{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2843", "width": "1790", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "^0 a^", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u00a2A -r.\\nh\\nd-\\nX^^\\n-X^^\\ns\\\\\\n0 ^.---^O/ C\\nO..", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "BISMA\\nBISMARCK.\\nFROM A PAINTING BY F. VON LENBAOH.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0009.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0010.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "Iberoes of tbe IRattous\\nEDITED BY\\nEvelyn Hbbott, m.U.\\nFELLOW OF BALI.IOL COLLEGE, OXFORD\\nFACTA DUCIS VIVENT OPEROSAQUE\\nGLORIA RERUM. OVID, IN LIVIAM 2G5.\\nTHE HERO S DEEDS AND HARD-WON\\nPAME SHALL LIVE.\\nBISMARCK", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0011.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0012.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK\\nAND THE FOUNDATION OF THE\\nGERMAN EMPIRE\\nJAMES WYCLIFFE HEADLAM\\nG. P. PUTNAM S SONS\\nNEW YORK LONDON\\n27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREBT, STRAND\\nStl^E flnukcrbnclur ^kss\\n1899", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0013.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "TWO\\nCopies\\nRECEIVED\\n^^W I 3 1909\\n^\u00c2\u00abff^\u00c2\u00abter Of CopyH,.,,^\\nCopyright, i8gg\\nBY\\nG. P. PUTNAM S SONS\\nEntered at Stationers Hall, London\\nSECOND COPY,\\n1 fi U\\n5:fje TRnicftcibpcftcr ipiess, IHew Jt^orft", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0014.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "TO\\nMY WIFE", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0015.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0016.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "PREFACE.\\nTHE greater portion of the following pages were\\ncompleted before the death of Prince Bis-\\nmarck; I take this opportunity of apologising\\nto the publishers and the editor of the series, for the\\nunavoidable delay which has caused publication to\\nbe postponed for a year.\\nDuring this period, two works have appeared to\\nwhich some reference is necessary. The value of\\nBusch s Mejnozrs has been much exaggerated; ex-\\ncept for quite the last years of Bismarck s life they\\ncontain little new information which is of any im-\\nportance. Not only had a large portion of the book\\nalready been published in Busch s two earlier books,\\nbut many of the anecdotes and documents in those\\nparts which were new had also been published\\nelsewhere.\\nBismarck s own Memoirs have a very different\\nvalue: not so much because of the new facts which\\nthey record, but because of the light they throw on\\nBismarck s character and on the attitude he adopted\\ntowards men and political problems. With his\\nletters and speeches, they will always remain the\\nchief source for our knowledge of his inner life.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0017.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "vi Preface.\\nThe other authorities are so numerous that it is\\nimpossible here to enumerate even the more import-\\nant. I must, however, express the gratitude which\\nall students of Bismarck s career owe to Horst Kohl\\nin his Bismarck-Regesten he has collected and ar-\\nranged the material so as infinitely to lighten the\\nlabours of all others who work in the same field.\\nHis Bismarck-JalirbiicJi is equally indispensable;\\nwithout this it would be impossible for anyone\\nliving in England to use the innumerable letters,\\ndocuments, and anecdotes which each year appear\\nin German periodicals. Of collections of documents\\nand letters, the most important are those by Herr v.\\nPoschinger, especially the volumes containing the\\ndespatches written from Frankfort and those deal-\\ning with Bismarck s economic and financial policy,\\nA full collection of Bismarck s correspondence is\\nmuch wanted; there is now a good edition of the\\nprivate letters, edited by Kohl, but no satisfactory\\ncollection of the political letters.\\nFor diplomatic history between i860 and 1870, I\\nhave, of course, chiefly depended on Sybel but those\\nwho are acquainted with the recent course of criti-\\ncism in Germany will not be surprised if, while ac-\\ncepting his facts, I have sometimes ventured to differ\\nfrom his conclusions.\\nSeptember, 1899. J. W. H.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0018.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "^_\\nh w\\nM\\n-^^M-^\\nf^*if?\\nft\\nj i\u00c2\u00a3^\\nM\\nM.\\ns\\ni\\ni\\n^^P\\ne\\n1\\n^%fr\\nCONTENTS.\\nCHAPTER I.\\nBIRTH AND PARENTAGE I\\nCHAPTER II.\\nEARLY LIFE, 1821-1847 .14\\nCHAPTER III.\\nTHE REVOLUTION, 1847-1852 -34\\nCHAPTER IV.\\nTHE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1849-1852 7\u00c2\u00a9\\nCHAPTER V.\\nFRANKFORT, 1851-1857 86\\nCHAPTER VI.\\nST. PETERSBURG AND PARIS, 1858-1862 I27\\nCHAPTER VII.\\nTHE CONFLICT, 1862-1863 162\\nCHAPTER VIII.\\nX SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, 1863-1864 19-2", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0019.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "vili Contents.\\nCHAPTER IX.\\nPAGE\\nTHE TREATY OF GASTEIN, 1864-1865 226\\nCHAPTER X.\\n-V OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH AUSTRIA, 1865-1866 240\\nCHAPTER XL\\nV THE CONQUEST OF GERMANY, 1866 259\\nCHAPTER XII.\\n^THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH GERMAN CON-\\nFEDERATION, 1866-1867 291\\nCHAPTER XIII.\\nTHE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH FRANCE, 1867-\\n1870 315\\nCHAPTER XIV.\\nTHE WAR WITH FRANCE AND FOUNDATION OF\\nTHE EMPIRE, 1870-1871 346\\nCHAPTER XV.\\n^HE NEW EMPIRE, l87l\\\\,l878 377\\nCHAPTER XVI.\\nTHE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND ECO NOMIC _ R]EFORM,\\n1878-1887 405\\nCHAPTER XVII.\\nRETIREMENT AND DEATH, 1887-1898 440\\nINDEX 465", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0020.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "ILLUSTRATIONS.\\nBISMARCK Frontispiece\\n[From a painting by F. Von Lenbach.]\\nBismarck s coat of arms 2\\nschonhausen church interior\\nluise wilhelmine von bismarck lo\\nBismarck s Mother.\\nKARL WILHELM FERD. VON BISMARCK ,12\\nBismarck s Father.\\nBISMARCK IN 1834 18\\nSCHONHAUSEN CASTLE 26\\nBISMARCK IN 1848 (i^\\nPRINCESS BISMARCK 88\\nBISMARCK IN 1860 I30\\nGENERAL VON ROON I40\\nEMPEROR WILLIAM 1. 162\\nEMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH T94\\nBISMARCK .214\\n[From a painting by F. Von Lenbach.]\\nGENERAL VON MOLTKE 248\\n250\\nTHE CAPITULATION OF SEDAN\\n[From a painting by Anton Von Werner\\nBISMARCK AND HIS DOGS", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0021.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "X\\nIlhistrations,\\nNAPOLEON III. AND BISMARCK ON THE MORNING\\nAFTER THE BATTLE OF SEDAN\\n[From a painting by Wilhelm Camphausen.]\\nKING WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA PROCLAIMED EMPEROR\\nOF GERMANY, VERSAILLES, JANUARY l8, 1871.\\n[From a painting by Anton Von Werner.]\\nLOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS\\nOFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF BISMARCK IN BERLIN\\nTHE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878\\n[P rom a painting by Anton Von Werner.]\\nFRIEDRICHSRUHE\\n[From a photograph by Strumper Co., Ham-\\nburg.]\\nEMPEROR FREDERICK\\nSARCOPHAGUS OF EMPEROR WILLIAM I., CHARLOT-\\nTENBURG\\nSCHUECKENBERGE\\n[Where Bismarck s Mausoleum will be erected.]\\nMAP OF GERMANY SHOWING CHANGES MADE IN\\n1866\\n372\\n388\\n406\\n430\\n446\\n454\\n462\\n464", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0022.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0023.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0024.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK.\\nCHAPTER I.\\nBIRTH AND PARENTAGE.\\nOTTO EDUARD LEOPOLD von BIS-\\nMARCK was born at the manor-house of\\nSchoenhausen, in the Mark of Brandenburg,\\non April i, 1815. Just a month before, Napoleon\\nhad escaped from Elba and, as the child lay in his\\ncradle, the peasants of the village, who but half a\\nyear ago had returned from the great campaign in\\nFrance, were once more called to arms. A few\\nmonths passed by again the King of Prussia re-\\nturned at the head of his army in the village\\nchurches the medals won at Waterloo were hung up\\nby those of Grossbehren and Leipzig. One more\\nvictory had been added to the Prussian flags, and\\nthen a profound peace fell upon Europe; fifty years\\nwere to go by before a Prussian army again marched\\nout to meet a foreign foe.\\nThe name and family of Bismarck were among the\\noldest in the land. Many of the great Prussian states-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0025.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "2 Bismarck.\\nmen have come from other countries Stein was\\nfrom Nassau, and Hardenberg was a subject of the\\nElector of Hanover; even Bliicher and Schwerin\\nwere Mecklenburgers, and the Moltkes belong to\\nHolstein. The Bismarcks are pure Brandenburgers;\\nthey belong to the old Mark, the district ruled over\\nby the first Margraves who were sent by the Em-\\nperor to keep order on the northern frontier they\\nwere there two hundred years before the first Hohen-\\nzollern came to the north.\\nThe first of the name of whom we hear was Her-\\nbort von Bismarck, who, in 1270, was Master of the\\nGuild of the Clothiers in the city of Stendal. The\\ntown had been founded about one hundred years\\nbefore by Albert the Bear, and men had come in\\nfrom the country around to enjoy the privileges and\\nsecurity of city life. Doubtless Herbort or his father\\nhad come from Bismarck, a village about twenty\\nmiles to the west, which takes its name either from\\nthe little stream, the Biese, which runs near it, or from\\nthe bishop in whose domain it lay. He was prob-\\nably the first to bear the name, which would have no\\nmeaning so long as he remained in his native place,\\nfor the iwn was still a mark of origin and had not\\nyet become the sign of nobility. Other emigrants\\nfrom Bismarck seem also to have assumed it in the\\nneighbouring town of Prenzlau the name occurs, and\\nit is still found among the peasants of the Mark as\\nthe Wends were driven back and the German in-\\nvasion spread, more adventurous colonists migrated\\nbeyond the Oder and founded a new Bismarck in\\nPomerania.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0026.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK S COAT OF ARMS.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0027.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0028.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "Birth and Parentage.\\nOf the lineage of Herbert we know nothing his\\nancestors must have been among the colonists who\\nhad been planted by the Emperors on the northern\\nfrontier to occupy the land conquered from the\\nheathen. He seems himself to have been a man of\\nsubstance and position he already used the arms,\\nthe double trefoil, which are still borne by all the\\nbranches of his family. His descendants are often\\nmentioned in the records of the Guild his son or\\ngrandson, Rudolph or Rule, represented the town in\\na conflict with the neighbouring Dukes of Brunswick.\\nIt was his son Nicolas, or Claus as he is generally\\ncalled, who founded the fortunes of the family; he\\nattached himself closely to the cause of the Mar-\\ngrave, whom he supported in his troubles with the\\nDuke of Brunswick, and whose interests he repre-\\nsented in the Town Council. He was amply re-\\nwarded for his fidelity. After a quarrel between the\\ncity and the Prince Bismarck left his native home\\nand permanently entered the service of the Mar-\\ngrave. Though probably hitherto only a simple\\ncitizen, he was enfiefed with the castle of Burgstall,\\nan important post, for it was situated on the\\nborders of the Mark and the bishopric of Magde-\\nburg; he was thereby admitted into the privileged\\nclass of the ScJilosszesessenen, under the Margrave,\\nthe highest order in the feudal hierarchy. From\\nthat day the Bismarcks have held their own among\\nthe nobility of Brandenburg. Claus eventually be-\\ncame Hofmeister of Brandenburg, the chief officer\\nThere seems no authority for the statement that the Bismarcks\\nhad sprung from a noble Bohemian family.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0029.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "Bisma7^ck.\\nat the Court he had his quarrels with the Church,\\nor rather with the spiritual lords, the bishops of\\nHavelburg and Magdeburg, and was once excom-\\nmunicated, as his father had been before him, and as\\ntwo of his sons were after him.\\nClaus died about the year 1385. For two hundred\\nyears the Bismarcks continued to live at Burgstall,\\nto which they added many other estates. When\\nConrad of Hohenzollern was appointed Margrave and\\nElector, he found sturdy supporters in the lords of\\nBurgstall he and his successors often came there to\\nhunt the deer and wild boars, perhaps also the wolves\\nand bears, with which the forests around the castle\\nabounded for the Hohenzollerns were keen sports-\\nmen then as now, as their vassals found to their\\ncost. In 1555, Hans George, son of the reigning\\nElector, Albert Achilles, bought the neighbouring\\nestate of Letzlingen from the Alvenslebens there he\\nbuilt a house which is still the chief hunting-lodge of\\nthe Kings of Prussia. Soon he cast envious eyes on\\nthe great woods and preserves which belong to Burg-\\nstall, and intimated that he wished to possess them.\\nThe Bismarcks resisted long. First they were com-\\npelled to surrender their hunting rights; this was\\nnot sufficient; the appetite of the Prince grew; in\\nhis own words he wished to be rid of the Bismarcks\\nfrom the moor and the Tanger altogether. He of-\\nfered in exchange some of the monasteries which\\nhad lately been suppressed the Bismarcks (the fam-\\nily was represented by two pairs of brothers, who all\\nlived together in the great castle) long refused they\\nrepresented that their ancestors had been faithful", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0030.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "Birth and Parentage.\\nvassals they had served the Electors with blood and\\ntreasure they wished to remain in the pleasant\\nplace to which they had been assigned by God Al-\\nmighty. It was all of no use the Prince insisted,\\nand his wrath was dangerous. The Bismarcks gave\\nin they surrendered Burgstall and received in ex-\\nchange Schoenhausen and Crevisse, a confiscated nun-\\nnery, on condition that as long as the ejected nuns\\nlived the new lords should support them for which\\npurpose the Bismarcks had annually to supply a cer-\\ntain quantity of food and eighteen barrels of beer.\\nOf the four co-proprietors, all died without issue,\\nexcept Friedrich, called the Permutator, in v/hose\\nhands the whole of the family property was again\\ncollected he went to live at Schoenhausen, which\\nsince then has been the home of the family. No re-\\nmains of the old castle exist, but the church, built\\nin the thirteenth century, is one of the oldest and\\nmost beautiful in the land between the Havel and\\nthe Elbe. House and church stand side by side on\\na small rising overlooking the Elbe. Here they\\ntook up their abode the family to some extent had\\ncome down in the world. The change had been a dis-\\nadvantageous one they had lost in wealth and import-\\nance. For two hundred years they played no very\\nprominent part they married with the neighbouring\\ncountry gentry and fought in all the wars. Rudolph,\\nFriedrich s son, fought in France in behalf of the\\nHuguenots, and then under the Emperor against the\\nTurks. His grandson, August, enlisted under Bern-\\nhard of Saxe- Weimar; afterwards he fought in the\\nreligious wars in France and Germany, always on", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0031.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "6 Bismarck.\\nthe Protestant side lastly, he took service under\\nthe Elector of Brandenburg.\\nIt was in his lifetime that a great change began\\nto take place which was to alter the whole life\\nof his descendants. In 1640, Frederick William,\\nknown as the great Elector, succeeded his father.\\nHe it was who laid the foundations for that system\\nof government by which a small German principal-\\nity has grown to be the most powerful military\\nmonarchy in modern Europe. He held his own\\nagainst the Emperor he fought with the Poles and\\ncompelled their King to grant him East Prussia\\nhe drove the Swedes out of the land. More than\\nthis, he enforced order in his own dominions he\\nlaid the foundation for the prosperity of Berlin he\\norganised the administration and got together a\\nsmall but efficient military force. The growing\\npower of the Elector was gained to a great extent\\nat the expense of the nobles he took from them\\nmany of the privileges they had before enjoyed.\\nThe work he began was continued by his son, who\\ntook the title of King; and by his grandson, who\\ninvented the Prussian system of administration, and\\ncreated the army with which Frederick the Great\\nfought his battles.\\nThe result of the growth of the strong, organised\\nmonarchy was indeed completely to alter the posi-\\ntion of the nobles. The German barons in the south\\nhad succeeded in throwing off the control of their\\nterritorial lords they owned no authority but the\\nvague control of the distant Emperor, and ruled\\ntheir little estates with an almost royal independ-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0032.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0033.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0034.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "Birth and Parentage. 7\\nence; they had their own laws, their own coinage,\\ntheir own army. In the north, the nobles of Meck-\\nlenburg, Holstein, and Hanover formed a dominant\\nclass, and the whole government of the State was in\\ntheir hands but those barons whose homes fell\\nwithin the dominion of the Kings of Prussia found\\nthemselves face to face with a will and a power\\nstronger than their ov/n they lost in independence,\\nbut they gained far more than they lost. They were\\nthe basis on which the State was built up they no\\nlonger wasted their military prowess in purposeless\\nfeuds or in mercenary service in the Prussian army\\nand administration they found full scope for their\\nambition, and when the victories of Frederick the\\nGreat had raised Prussia to the rank of a European\\nPower, the nobles of Brandenburg were the most\\nloyal of his subjects. They formed an exclusive\\ncaste they seldom left their homes they were little\\nknown in the south of Germany or in foreign coun-\\ntries they seldom married outside their own ranks.\\nTheir chief amusement was the chase, and their\\nchief occupation was war. And no king has ever\\nhad under his orders so fine a race of soldiers they\\ncommanded the armies of Frederick and won his\\nbattles. Dearly did they pay for the greatness of\\nPrussia of one family alone, the Kleists, sixty-four\\nfell on the field of battle during the Seven Years\\nWar.\\nThey might well consider that the State which\\nthey had helped to make, and which they had saved\\nby their blood, belonged to them. But if they had\\nbecome Prussians, they did not cease to be Branden-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0035.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "8 Bismarck.\\nburgers their loyalty to their king never swerved,\\nfor they knew that he belonged to them as he did\\nto no other of his subjects. He might go to distant\\nKonigsberg to assume the crown, but his home was\\namongst them other provinces might be gained or\\nlost with the chances of war, but while a single\\nHohenzoUern lived he could not desert his subjects\\nof the Mark. They had the intense local patriotism\\nso characteristic of the German nation, which is the\\nsurest foundation for political greatness; but while\\nin other parts the Particularists, as the Germans\\ncalled them, aimed only at independence, the Bran-\\ndenburger who had become a Prussian desired\\ndomination.\\nAmong them the Bismarcks lived. The family\\nagain divided into two branches: one, which became\\nextinct about 1780, dwelling at Crevisse, gave several\\nhigh officials to the Prussian Civil Service the other\\nbranch, which continued at Schoenhausen, generally\\nchose a military career. August s son, who had the\\nsame name as his father, rebuilt the house, which\\nhad been entirely destroyed by the Swedes during\\nthe Thirty Years War; he held the position of\\nLandrath, that is, he was the head of the adminis-\\ntration of the district in which he lived. He married\\na Fraulein von Katte, of a well-known family whose\\nestates adjoined those of the Bismarcks. Frau von\\nBismarck was the aunt of the unfortunate young man\\nwho was put to death for helping Frederick the Great\\nin his attempt to escape. His tomb is still to be\\nseen at Wust, which lies across the river a few miles\\nfrom Schoenhausen and at the new house, which", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0036.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "Birth and Parentage.\\narose at Schoenhausen and still stands, the arms of the\\nKattes are joined to the Bismarck trefoil. The suc-\\ncessor to the estates, August Friedrich, was a thor-\\nough soldier he married a Fraulein von Diebwitz\\nand acquired fresh estates in Pomerania, where he\\ngenerally lived.\\nHe rose to the rank of colonel, and fell fighting\\nagainst the Austrians at Chotusitz in 1742. Ein\\nganzer Kerl (a fine fellow), said the King, as he\\nstood by the dying of^cer. His son, Carl Alexander,\\nsucceeded to Schoenhausen the next generation kept\\nup the military traditions of the family of four\\nbrothers, all but one became professional officers and\\nfought against France in the wars of liberation. One\\nfell at Mockern in 1813 another rose to the rank of\\nlieutenant-general; the third also fought in the war;\\nhis son, the later Count Bismarck-Bohlen, was\\nwounded at Grossbehren, and the father at once\\ncame to take his place during his convalescence, in\\norder that the Prussian army might not have fewer\\nBismarcks. When the young Otto was born two\\nyears later, he would often hear of the adventures\\nof his three uncles and his cousin in the great\\nwar. The latter, Bismarck-Bohlen, rose to very-\\nhigh honours and was to die when over eighty years\\nof age, after he had witnessed the next great war with\\nFrance. It is a curious instance of the divisions of\\nGermany in those days that there were Bismarcks\\nfighting on the French side throughout the war.\\nOne branch of the family had settled in South Ger-\\nmany the head of it, Friedrich Wilhelm, had taken\\nservice in the Wurtemburg army he had become a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0037.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "lo Bismarck.\\ncelebrated leader of cavalry and was passionately\\ndevoted to Napoleon. He served with distinction\\nin the Russian campaign and was eventually taken\\nprisoner by the Germans in the battle of Leipzig.\\nThe youngest of the four brothers, Karl Wilhelm\\nFriedrich v. Bismarck, had retired from the army at\\nan early age he was a quiet, kindly man of domestic\\ntastes on the division of the estates, Schoenhausen\\nfell to his lot, and he settled down there to a quiet\\ncountry life. He took a step which must have caused\\nm.uch discussion among all his friends and relations, for\\nhe chose as wife not one of his own rank, not a Kleist,\\nor a Katte, or a Bredow, or an Arnim, or an Alvens-\\nleben, or any other of the neighbouring nobility he\\nmarried a simple Fraulein Mencken. She was, how-\\never, of no undistinguished origin. Her father, the\\nson of a professor at the University of Leipzig, had\\nentered the Prussian Civil Service there he had risen\\nto the highest rank and had been Cabinet Secretary\\nto both Frederick William H. and Frederick HL He\\nwas a man of high character and of considerable\\nability as was not uncommon among the ofificials of\\nthose days, he was strongly affected by the liberal and\\neven revolutionary doctrines of France.\\nFraulein Mencken, who was married at the age of\\nsixteen, was a clever and ambitious woman. From\\nher her son inherited his intellect from his father he\\nderived what the Germans call Gemiith, geniality,\\nkindliness, humour. By his two parents he was thus\\nconnected with the double foundation on which\\nPrussia had been built: on his father s side he had\\nsprung from the fighting nobles on his mother s,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0038.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "LUISE WILHELMINE VON BISMARCK.\\nBISMARCK S MOTHER.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0039.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0040.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "Birth a7id Parentage. 1 1\\nfrom the scholars and officials. In later life we shall\\nfind that while his prejudices and affections are all en-\\nlisted on the side of the noble, the keen and critical\\nintellect he had inherited from his mother enabled\\nhim to overcome the prejudices of his order.\\nThe early life of the young pair was not altogether\\nfortunate. Several children died at a very early age\\nthe defeat of Prussia brought foreign occupation\\nSchoenhausen was seized by French troopers the\\nmarks of their swords are still to be seen in a beam\\nover one of the doors, and Rittmeister v. Bismarck\\nhad to take his wife away into the woods in order\\nto escape their violence.\\nOf all the children of the marriage only three\\nlived: Bernhard, who was born in i8iO, Otto, and\\none sister, Malvina, born in 1827.\\nOtto did not live at Schoenhausen long when he\\nwas only a year old, his father moved to Pomerania\\nand settled on the estates Kniephof and Kulz, which\\nhad come into the family on his grandfather s mar-\\nriage. Pomerania was at that time a favourite resid-\\nence among the Prussian nobility the country was\\nbetter wooded than the Mark, and game more plen-\\ntiful the rich meadows, the wide heaths and for-\\nests were more attractive than the heavy corn-lands\\nand the sandy wastes of the older province. Here, in\\nthe deep seclusion of country life, the boy passed\\nhis first years it was far removed from the bustle and\\nturmoil of civilisation. Naugard, the nearest town,\\nwas five miles distant communication was bad, for\\nit was not till after 1815 that the Prussian Govern-\\nment began to construct highroads. In this distant", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0041.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "1 2 Bismarck.\\nprovince, life went on as in the olden days, little\\naltered by the changes which had transformed the\\nState. The greater portion of the land belonged to\\nlarge proprietors the noble as in old days was still\\nall-powerful on his own estate; in his hands was the\\nadministration of the law, and it was at his manorial\\ncourt that men had to seek for justice, a court where\\njustice was dealt not in the name of the King but of\\nthe Lord of the Manor. He lived among his people\\nand generally he farmed his own lands. There was\\nlittle of the luxury of an English country-house or\\nthe refinement of the French noblesse he would be\\nup at daybreak to superintend the work in the\\nfields, his wife and daughters that of the household,\\ntalking to the peasants the pleasant Piatt Deutsch of\\nthe countryside. Then there would be long rides or\\ndrives to the neighbours houses shooting, for there\\nwas plenty of deer and hares and occasionally in\\nthe winter a visit to Berlin farther away, few of\\nthem went. Most of the country gentlemen had\\nbeen to Paris, but only as conquerors at the end of\\nthe great war.\\nThey were little disturbed by modern political\\ntheories, but were contented, as in old days, to be\\ngoverned by the King. It was a religious society\\namong the peasants and the nobles, if not among the\\nclergy, there still lingered something of the simple\\nbut profound faith of German Protestantism they\\nwere scarcely touched by the rationalism of the\\neighteenth or by the liberalism of the nineteenth\\ncentury there was little pomp and ceremony of\\nworship in the village church, but the natural periods", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0042.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "jl ,s;i t ,]A\\nKARL WILHELM FERD. VON BISMARCK.\\nBISMARCK S FATHER.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0043.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0044.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "Birth and Parentage. 1 3\\nof human life birth, marriage, death called for the\\nblessing of the Church, and once or twice a year\\ncame the solemn confession and the sacrament.\\nReligious belief and political faith were closely\\njoined, for the Church was but a department of the\\nState the King was chief bishop, as he was general\\nof the army, and the sanctity of the Church was\\ntransferred to the Crown to the nobles and peasants,\\ncriticism of, or opposition to, the King had in it\\nsomething of sacrilege the words by the Grace of\\nGod added to the royal title were more than an\\nempty phrase. Society was still organised on the\\nold patriarchal basis at the bottom was the peasant\\nabove him was gnddiger Herr above him, Unser\\nalter gnddigste Herr, the King, who lived in Berlin\\nand above him, the Herr Gott in Heaven.\\nTo the inhabitants of South Germany, and the\\nmen of the towns, these nobles of Further Pomerania,\\nthe Junker as they were called, with their feudal\\nlife, their medieval beliefs, their simple monarchism,\\nwere the incarnation of political folly to them lib-\\neralism seemed another form of atheism, but in this\\nsolitude and fresh air of the great plain was reared a\\nrace of men who would always be ready, as their\\nfathers had been, to draw their sword and go out to\\nconquer new provinces for their King to govern.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0045.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER II.\\nEARLY LIFE.\\n1821-1847.\\nOF the boy s early life we know little. His\\nmother was ambitious for her sons Otto\\nfrom his early years she designed for the\\nDiplomatic Service she seems to have been one of\\nthose women who was willing to sacrifice the present\\nhappiness of her children for their future advance-\\nment. When only six years old the boy was sent\\naway from home to a school in Berlin. He was nat\\nhappy there; he pined for the free life of the coun-\\ntry, the fields and woods and animals; when he saw\\na plough he would burst into tears, for it reminded\\nhim of his home. The discipline of the school was\\nhard, not with the healthy and natural hardships of\\nlife in the open air, but with an artificial Spartanism,\\nfor it was the time when the Germans, who had sud-\\ndenly awoke to feelings of patriotism and a love of\\nwar to which they had long been strangers, under\\nthe influence of a few writers, were throwing all their\\nenergies into the cultivation of physical endurance.\\nIt was probably at this time that there was laid\\n14", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0046.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "1821] Early Life. 1 5\\nthe foundation of that dislike for the city of Beriln\\nwhich Bismarck never quite overcame and from his\\nearliest years he was prejudiced against the exagger-\\nated and affected Teutonism which was the fashion\\nafter the great war. A few years later his parents\\ncame to live altogether in the town then the boy\\npassed on to the Gymnasium, boarding in the house\\nof one of the masters. The teaching in this school\\nwas supplemented by private tutors, and he learned\\nat this time the facility in the use of the English and\\nFrench languages which in after years was to be of\\ngreat service to him. The education at school was\\nof course chiefly in the classical languages he ac-\\nquired a sufficient mastery of Latin. There is no\\nevidence that in later life he continued the study of\\nclassical literature. In his seventeenth year he passed\\nthe Abiturienten examination, which admitted him\\nas a student to the university and entitled him to\\nthe privilege of serving in the army for one instead\\nof three years. His leaving certificate tells us that\\nhis conduct and demeanour towards his comrades\\nand teachers were admirable, his abilities consider-\\nable, and his diligence fair.\\nThe next year he passed in the ordinary course to\\nthe university, entering at Gottingen the choice\\nwas probably made because of the celebrity which\\nthat university had acquired in law and history. It\\nis said that he desired to enter at Heidelberg, but\\nhis mother refused her permission, because she\\nfeared that he would learn those habits of beer-\\ndrinking in which the students of that ancient seat\\nof learning have gained so great a proficiency it was.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0047.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "1 6 Bismarck. [1821-\\nhowever, an art which, as he found, was to be ac-\\nquired with equal ease at Gottingen. The young-\\nBismarck was at this time over six feet high, sHm and\\nwell built, of great physical strength and agility, a\\ngood fencer, a bold rider, an admirable swimmer and\\nrunner, a very agreeable companion frank, cheerful,\\nand open-hearted, without fear either of his comrades\\nor of his teachers. He devoted his time at Gottin-\\ngen less to learning than to social life in his second\\nterm he entered the Corps of the Hanoverians and\\nwas quickly noted for his power of drinking and\\nfighting he is reported to have fought twenty-six\\nduels and was only wounded once, and that wound\\nwas caused by the breaking of his opponent s foil.\\nHe was full of wild escapades, for which he was\\noften subjected to the ordinary punishments of the\\nuniversity.\\nTo many Germans, their years at the university\\nhave been the turning-point of their life but it was\\nnot so with Bismarck. To those who have been\\nbrought up in the narrow surroundings of civic life,\\nstudent days form the single breath of freedom\\nbetween the discipline of a school and the drudgery\\nof an of^ce. To a man who, like Bismarck, was ac-\\ncustomed to the truer freedom of the country, it\\nwas only a passing phase as we shall see, it was not\\neasy to tie him down to the drudgery of an office.\\nHe did not even form many friendships which he\\ncontinued in later years his associates in his corps\\nmust have been chiefly young Hanoverians few of\\nhis comrades in Prussia were to be found at Got-\\ntingen his knowledge of English enabled him to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0048.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "1847]\\nEarly Life. IJ\\nmake the acquaintance of the Americans and Eng-\\nhsh with whom Gottingen has always been a favour-\\nite university among his fellow-students almost the\\nonly one with whom in after life he continued the\\nintimacy of younger days was Motley. We hear\\nlittle of his work; none of the professors seem to\\nhave left any marked influence on his mind or char-\\nacter; indeed they had little opportunity for doing\\nso, for after the first term his attendance at lectures\\nalmost entirely ceased. Though never a student, he\\nmust have been at all times a considerable reader\\nhe had a retentive memory and quick understanding\\nhe read what interested him absorbed, understood,\\nand retained it. He left the university with his\\nmind disciplined indeed but not drilled he had a\\nconsiderable knowledge of languages, law, literature,\\nand history he had not subjected his mind to the\\ndominion of the dominant Hegelian philosophy, and\\nto this we must attribute that freshness and en-\\nergy which distinguishes him from so many of his\\nablest contemporaries his brain was strong, and it\\nworked as easily and as naturally as his body his\\nknowledge was more that of a man of the world than\\nof a student, but in later life he was always able to\\nunderstand the methods and to acquire the know-\\nledge of the subjects he required in his official ca-\\nreer. History was his favourite study he never\\nattempted, like some statesmen, to write; but if his\\nknowledge of history was not as profound as that of\\na professed historian, he was afterwards to shew as a\\nparliamentary debater that he had a truer perception\\nof the importance of events than many great scholars", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0049.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "1 8 Bismarck. [1821-\\nwho have devoted their lives to historical research,\\nand he was never at a loss for an illustration to ex-\\nplain and justify the policy he had assumed. For\\nnatural science he shewed little interest, and indeed\\nat that time it scarcely could be reckoned among the\\nordinary subjects of education philosophy he pur-\\nsued rather as a man than as a student, and we are\\nnot surprised to find that it was Spinoza rather than\\nKant or Fichte or Hegel to whom he devoted most\\nattention, for he cared more for principles of belief\\nand the conduct of life than the analysis of the\\nintellect.\\nHis university career does not seem to have left\\nany mark on his political principles during just those\\nyears, the agitation of which the universities had\\nlong been the scene had been forcibly repressed\\nit was the time of deep depression which followed\\nthe revolution of 1830, and the members of the\\naristocratic corps to which he belonged looked with\\nsomething approaching contempt on this Burschen-\\nschaft, as the union was called, which propagated\\namong the students the national enthusiasm.\\nAfter spending little more than a year at Got-\\ntingen, he left in September, 1833 in May of the fol-\\nlowing year he entered as a student at Berlin, where\\nhe completed his university course we have no\\nrecord as to the manner in which he spent the winter\\nand early spring, but we find that when he applied\\nto Gottingen for permission to enter at Berlin, it was\\naccorded on condition that he sat out a term of im-\\nprisonment which he still owed to the university\\nauthorities. During part of his time in Berlin he", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0050.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK IN 1834.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0051.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0052.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "1847] Early Life. 19\\nshared a room with Motley. In order to prepare for\\nthe final examination he engaged the services of a\\ncrammer, and with his assistance, in 1835, took the\\ndegree of Doctor of Law and at once passed on to\\nthe public service.\\nHe had, as we have seen, been destined for the\\nDiplomatic Service from early life; he was well con-\\nnected his cousin Count Bismarck-Bohlen stood in\\nhigh favour at Court. He was related to or ac-\\nquainted with all the families who held the chief\\nposts both in the military and civil service with his\\ngreat talents and social gifts he might therefore look\\nforward to a brilliant career. Any hopes, however,\\nthat his mother might have had were destined to be\\ndisappointed his early official life was varied but\\nshort. He began in the judicial department and was\\nappointed to the office of Auscultator at Berlin, for in\\nthe German system the judicature is one department\\nof the Civil Service. After a year he was at his own\\nrequest transferred to the administrative side and to\\nAix-la-Chapelle it is said that he had been extremely\\npained and shocked by the manner in which the offi-\\ncials transacted the duties of their office and espe-\\ncially by their management of the divorce matters\\nwhich came before the court. The choice of Aix-la-\\nChapelle was probably owing to the fact that the\\npresident of that province was Count Arnim of\\nBoytzenburg, the head of one of the most numerous\\nand distinguished families of the Mark, with so\\nmany members of which Bismarck was in later years\\nto be connected both for good and evil. Count\\nArnim was a man of considerable ability and moderate", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0053.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "20 Bismarck. [1821-\\nliberal opinions, who a few years later rose to be the\\nfirst Minister-President in Prussia. Under him Bis-\\nmarck was sure to receive every assistance. He had\\nto pass a fresh examination, which he did with great\\nsuccess. His certificate states that he shewed thor-\\noughly good school studies, and was well grounded\\nin law he had thought over what he had learnt and\\nalready had acquired independent opinions. He had\\nadmirable judgment, quickness in understanding, and\\na readiness in giving verbal answers to the questions\\nlaid before him we see all the qualities by which he\\nwas to be distinguished in after life. He entered on\\nhis duties at Aix-la-Chapelle at the beginning of\\nJune at his own request Count Arnim wrote to the\\nheads of the department that as young Bismarck\\nwas destined for a diplomatic career they were to\\nafford him every opportunity of becoming acquainted\\nwith all the different sides of the administrative work\\nand give him more work than they otherwise would\\nhave done he was to be constantly occupied. His\\ngood resolutions did not, however, continue long; he\\nfound himself in a fashionable watering-place, his\\nknowledge of languages enabled him to associate\\nwith the French and English visitors, he made ex-\\ncursions to Belgium and the Rhine, and hunting\\nexpeditions to the Ardennes, and gave up to society\\nthe time he ought to have spent in the ofifice. The\\nlife at Aix was not strict and perhaps his amuse-\\nments were not always edifying, but he acquired\\nthat complete ease in cosmopolitan society which he\\ncould not learn at Gottingen or Berlin, and his ex-\\nperiences during this year were not without use to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0054.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "18471 Early Life. 21\\nhim when he was afterwards placed in the somewhat\\nsimilar society of Frankfort. This period in his career\\ndid not last long in June, 1837, we find him applying\\nfor leave of absence on account of ill-health. He re-\\nceived leave for eight days, but he seems to have\\nexceeded this, for four months afterwards he writes\\nfrom Berne asking that his leave may be prolonged\\nhe had apparently gone ofT for a long tour in Switzer-\\nland and the Rhine. His request was refused he\\nreceived a severe reprimand, and Count Arnim ap-\\nproved his resolution to return to one of the older\\nPrussian provinces, where he might shew an activity\\nin the duties of his ofifice which he had in vain at-\\ntempted to attain in the social conditions of Aachen.\\nHe was transferred to Potsdam, but he remained\\nhere only a few weeks he had not as yet served in\\nthe army, and he now began the year as a private\\nsoldier which was required from him he entered\\nthe Jaeger or Rifles in the Garde Corps which was\\nstationed at Potsdam, but after a few weeks was\\ntransferred to the Jaeger at Stettin. The cause seems\\nto have been partly the ill-health of his mother; she\\nwas dying, and he wished to be near her in those\\ndays the journey from Berlin to Pomerania took\\nmore than a day besides this there were pecuniary\\nreasons. His father s administration of the family\\nestates had not been successful it is said that his\\nmother had constantly pressed her husband to intro-\\nduce innovations, but had not consistently carried\\nthem out this was a not unnatural characteristic in\\nthe clever and ambitious woman who wished to in-\\ntroduce into agricultural afTairs those habits which", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0055.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "22 Bismarck.\\n[1821-\\nshe had learnt from the bureaucrats in Berlin. How-\\never this may be, matters had now reached a crisis\\nit became necessary to sell the larger part of the\\nland attached to the house at Schoenhausen, and in\\nthe next year, after the death of Frau von Bis-\\nmarck, which took place on January i, 1839, i*^ ^^^s\\ndecided that Herr von Bismarck should in future\\nlive at Schoenhausen with his only daughter, now a\\ngirl of twelve years of age, while the two brothers\\nshould undertake the management of the Pomeranian\\nestates.\\nSo it came about that at the age of twenty-four\\nall prospect of an of^cial career had for the time\\nto be abandoned, and Otto settled down with his\\nbrother to the life of a country squire. It is curious\\nto notice that the greatest of his contemporaries,\\nCavour, went through a similar training. There\\nwas, however, a great difference between the two\\nmen Cavour was in this as in all else a pioneer;\\nwhen he retired to his estate he was opening out new\\nforms of activity and enterprise for his countrymen\\nBismarck after the few wild years away from home\\nwas to go back to the life which all his ancestors had\\nlived for five hundred years, to become steeped in the\\ntraditions of his country and his caste. Cavour al-\\nways points the way to what is new, Bismarck again\\nbrings into honour what men had hastily thought was\\nantiquated. He had to some extent prepared him-\\nself for the work by attending lectures at a newly\\nfounded agricultural college in the outskirts of Greifs-\\nwald. The management of the estate seems to have\\nbeen successful the two brothers started on their", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0056.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "1847] Early Life. 23\\nwork with no capital and no experience, but after\\nthree or four years by constant attention and hard\\nwork they had put the affairs in a satisfactory state.\\nIn 1841, a division was made Otto had wished this\\nto be done before, as he found that he spent a good\\ndeal more money than his brother and was gaining\\nan unfair advantage in the common household from\\nthis time he took over Kniephof, and there he lived for\\nthe next four years, while his brother took up his\\nabode four miles off at Kulz, where he lived till his\\ndeath in 1895. Otto had not indeed given up the\\nhabits he had learnt at Gottingen his wild freaks,\\nhis noisy entertainments, were the talk of the country-\\nside the beverage which he has made classical, a\\nmixture of beer and champagne, was the common\\ndrink, and he was known far and wide as the mad\\nBismarck. These acts. of wildness were, however, only\\na small part of his life he entered as a lieutenant of\\nLandwehr in the cavalry and thereby became ac-\\nquainted with another form of military service.\\nIt was while he was at the annual training that he\\nhad an opportunity of shewing his physical strength\\nand courage. A groom, who was watering horses in\\nthe river, was swept away by the current Bismarck,\\nwho was standing on a bridge watching them, at\\nonce leaped into the river, in full uniform as he was,\\nand with great danger to himself saved the drown-\\ning man. For this he received a medal for saving\\nlife. He astonished his friends by the amount and\\nvariety of his reading it was at this time that he\\nstudied Spinoza. It is said that he had among his\\nfriends the reputation of being a liberal it is prob-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0057.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "24 Bismai^ck.\\ntl82t-\\nable enough that he said and did many things which\\nthey did not understand and anything they did\\nnot understand would be attributed to Hberalism\\nby the country gentlemen of Pomerania partly no\\ndoubt it was due to the fact that in 1843 1^^ came\\nback from Paris wearing a beard. We can see, how-\\never, that he was restless and discontented he felt\\nin himself the possession of powers which were not\\nbeing used there was in his nature also a morbid\\nrestlessness, a dissatisfaction with himself which he\\ntried to still but only increased by his wild excesses.\\nAs his affairs became more settled he travelled one\\nyear he went to London, another to Paris of his\\nvisit to England we have an interesting account in a\\nletter to his father. He landed in Hul^ thence he\\nwent to Scarborough and York, where he was hos-\\npitably received by the officers of the Hussars al-\\nthough I did not know any of them, they asked me\\nto dinner and shewed me everything from York\\nhe went to Manchester, where he saw some of the\\nfactories.\\nGenerally speaking I cannot praise too highly the\\nextraordinary courtesy and kindness of English people,\\nwhich far surpass what I had expected even the poor\\npeople are pleasant, very unassuming, and easy to get on\\nwith when one talks to them. Those who come much\\ninto intercourse with strangers -cab-drivers, porters, etc.\\nIt is to this visit that a well-known anecdote refers having\\nlanded at Hull one Sunday morning, he was walking along the streets\\nwhistling, when a chance acquaintance of the voyage asked him to\\ndesist. Disgusted, he left the town. The story, as generally told,\\nsays that he went to Edinburgh we can have no doubt that Scar-\\nborough was meant,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0058.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "1847] Early Life. 25\\nnaturally have a tendency to extortion, but soon give in\\nwhen they see that one understands the language and\\ncustoms and is determined not to be put upon. Gener-\\nally I find the life much cheaper than I expected.\\nIn 1844, his sister, to whom he was passionately\\ndevoted, was married to an old friend, Oscar von\\nArnim. Never did an elder brother write to his\\nyoung sister more delightful letters than those which\\nshe received from him from them we get a pleasant\\npicture of his life at this time. Directly after the\\nwedding, when he was staying with his father at\\nSchoenhausen, he writes:\\nJust now I am living here with my father, reading,\\nsmoking, and walking I help him to eat lamperns and\\nsometimes play a comedy with him which it pleases him\\nto call fox-hunting. We start out in heavy rain, or per-\\nhaps with 10 degrees of frost, with Ihle, Ellin, and Karl\\nthen in perfect silence we surround a clump of firs with\\nthe most sportsmanlike precautions, carefully observing\\nthe wind, although we all, and probably father as well,\\nare absolutely convinced that there is not a living creat-\\nure in it except one or two old women gathering fire-\\nwood. Then Ihle, Karl, and the two dogs make their\\nway through the cover, emitting the most strange and\\nhorrible sounds, especially Ihle father stands there mo-\\ntionless and on the alert with his gun cocked, just as\\nthough he really expected to see something. Ihle comes\\nout just in front of him, shouting Hoo lala, hey heay,\\nhold him, hie, hie, in the strangest and most astonishing\\nmanner. Then father asks me if I have seen nothing,\\nand I with the most natural tone of astonishment that I\\ncan command, answer No, nothing at all Then after", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0059.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "26 Bismarck. [1821-\\nabusing the weather we start off to another wood, while\\nIhle with a confidence that he assumes in the most nat-\\nural manner praises its wealth in game, and there we\\nplay over the game again dal segno. So it goes on for\\nthree or four hours father s, Ihle s, and Fingal s passion\\ndoes not seem to cool for a moment. Besides that, we\\nlook at the orange house twice a day and the sheep once\\na day, observe the four thermometers in the room once\\nevery hour, set the weather-glass, and, since the weather\\n-has been fine, have set all the clocks by the sun and ad-\\njusted them so closely that the clock in the dining-room\\nis the only one which ever gives a sound after the others\\nhave struck. Charles V. was a stupid fellow. You will\\nunderstand that with so multifarious an occupation I\\nhave little time left to call on the clergymen as they\\nhave no vote for the election it was quite impossible.\\nThe Elbe is full of ice, the wind E. S. E., the latest\\nthermometer from Berlin shews 8 degrees, the barometer\\nis rising and at 8.28. I tell you this as an example how\\nin your letters you might write to father more the small\\nevents of your life they amuse him immensely tell him\\nwho has been to see you, whom you have been calling on,\\nwhat you had for dinner, how the horses are, how the\\nservants behave, if the doors creak and the windows are\\nfirm in short, facts and events. Besides this, he does not\\nlike to be called papa, he dislikes the expression. Avis au\\nlecteur.\\nOn another occasion he says\\nOnly with difficulty can I resist the temptation of filling\\na whole letter with agricultural lamentations over frosts,\\nsick cattle, bad rape, bad roads, dead lambs, hungry\\nsheep, want of straw, fodder, money, potatoes, and ma-\\nnure outside Johann is persistently whistling a wretched", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0060.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0061.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0062.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "1847] Early Life. 27\\nschottische out of tune, and I have not the cruelty to\\ninterrupt it, for he seeks to still by music his violent\\nlove-sickness.\\nThen we have long letters from Nordeney, where\\nhe delighted in the sea, but space will not allow us\\nto quote more. It is only in these letters, and in\\nthose which he wrote in later years to his wife, that\\nwe see the natural kindliness and simplicity of his\\ndisposition, his love of nature, and his great power\\nof description. There have been few better letter-\\nwriters in Germany or any other country.\\nHis ability and success as an agriculturist made\\na deep impression on his neighbours. As years went\\non he became much occupied in local business; he\\nwas appointed as the representative of his brother,\\nwho was Landrath for the district in 1845 he was\\nelected one of the members for the Provincial Diet\\nof Pomerania. He also had a seat in the Diet for the\\nSaxon province in which Schoenhausen was situated.\\nThese local Diets were the only form of representa-\\ntive government which existed in the rural districts\\nthey had little power, but their opinion was asked\\non new projects of law, and they were ofificially re-\\ngarded as an efficient substitute for a common Prus-\\nsian Parliament. Many of his friends, including his\\nbrother, urged him again to enter the public service,\\nfor which they considered he was especially adapted\\nhe might have had the post of Royal Commissioner\\nfor Improvements in East Prussia.\\nHe did make one attempt to resume his ofificial\\ncareer. At the beginning of 1844 he returned to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0063.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "V\\n28 Bismarck. [1821-\\nPotsdam and took up his duties as Referendar, but\\nnot for long; he seems to have quarrelled with his\\nsuperior. The story is that he called one day to ask\\nfor leave of absence his chief kept him waiting an\\nhour in the anteroom, and when he was admitted\\nasked him curtly, What do you want Bismarck\\nat once ansv/ered, I came to ask for leave of\\nabsence, but now I wish for permission to send in\\nmy resignation. He was clearly deficient in that\\nsubservience and ready obedience to authority which\\nwas the best passport to promotion in the Civil Serv-\\nice there was in his disposition already a certain\\ntruculence and impatience. From this time he nour-\\nished a bitter hatred of the Prussian bureaucracy.\\nThis did not, however, prevent him carrying out\\nhis public duties as a landed proprietor. In 1846\\nwe find him taking much interest in proposals for\\nimproving the management of the manorial courts;\\nhe wished to see them altered so as to give some-\\nthing of the advantages of the English system he\\nregrets the want of corporate spirit and public\\nfeeling in our corn-growing aristocracy it is\\nunfortunately difficult among most of the gentle-\\nmen to awake any other idea under the words patri-\\nmonial power but the calculation whether the fee\\nwill cover the expenses. We can easily understand\\nthat the man who wrote this would be called a lib-\\neral by many of his neighbours what he wanted,\\nhowever, was a reform which would give life, per-\\nmanency, and independence to an institution which\\nlike everything else was gradually falling before the\\ninroads of the dominant bureaucracy. The same", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0064.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "1847]\\nEarly Life. 29\\nyear he was appointed to the position of Inspector\\nof Dykes for Jerichow. The duties of this office\\nwere of considerable importance for Schoenhausen\\nand the neighbouring estate as he writes, it de-\\npends on the managers of this office whether from\\ntime to time we come under water or not. He\\noften refers to the great damages caused by the\\nfloods he had lost many of his fruit-trees, and\\nmany of the finest elms in the park had been de-\\nstroyed by the overflowing of the Elbe.\\nAs Bismarck grew in age and experience he asso-\\nciated more with the neighbouring families. Pome-\\nrania was at this time the centre of a curious religious\\nmovement the leader was Herr von Thadden, who\\nlived at Triglaff, not many miles from Kniephof.\\nHe was associated with Herr von Semft and three\\nbrothers of the family of Below. They were all pro-\\nfoundly dissatisfied with the rationalistic religion\\npreached by the clergy at that time, and aimed at\\ngreater inwardness and depth of religious feeling.\\nHerr von Thadden started religious exercises in his\\nown house, which were attended not only by the\\npeasants from the village but by many of the coun-\\ntry gentry they desired the strictest enforcement of\\nLutheran doctrine, and wished the State directly to\\nsupport the Church. This tendency of thought ac-\\nquired greater importance when, in 1840, Frederick\\nWilliam IV. succeeded to the throne he was also\\na man of deep religious feeling, and under his reign\\nthe extreme Lutheran party became influential at\\nCourt. Among the ablest of these were the three\\nbrothers von Gerlach, One of them, Otto, was a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0065.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "30 Bismarck. [1821-\\ntheologian another, Ludwig, was Over-President of\\nthe Saxon province, and with him Bismarck had\\nmuch official correspondence the third, Leopold,\\nwho had adopted a military career, was attached\\nto the person of the King and was in later years\\nto have more influence upon him than anyone ex-\\ncept perhaps Bunsen. The real intellectual leader\\nof the party was Stahl, a theologian.\\nFrom about the year 1844 Bismarck seems to have\\nbecome very intimate with this religious coterie;\\nhis friend Moritz v. Blankenburg had married\\nThadden s daughter and Bismarck was constantly a\\nvisitor at Triglaff. It was at Blankenburg s wed-\\nding that he first met Hans v. Kleist, who was in\\nlater years to be one of his most intimate friends.\\nHe was, we are told, the most delightful and cheer-\\nful of companions in his tact and refinement he\\nshewed an agreeable contrast to the ordinary man-\\nners of Pomerania. He often rode over to take\\npart in Shakespeare evenings, and amused them by\\naccounts of his visit to England.* He was present\\noccasionally at the religious meetings at Triglaff, and\\nthough he never quite adopted all the customs of\\nthe set the influence on him of these older men was\\nfor the next ten years to govern all his political ac-\\ntion. That he was not altogether at one with them\\nwe can understand, when we are told that at Herr\\nvon Thadden s house it would never have occurred\\nto anyone even to think of smoking. Bismarck\\nwas then, as in later life, a constant smoker.\\nLife of Herr v. Thadden- Triglaff, by Eleanor, Princess of Reuss.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0066.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "Y\\n1847] Early Life. 31\\nThe men who met in these family parties in dis-\\ntant Pomerania were in a few years to change the\\nwhole of European history. Here Bismarck for\\nthe first time saw Albrecht von Roon, a cousin of\\nthe Blankenburgs, then a rising young officer in the\\nartillery they often went out shooting together.\\nThe Belows, Blankenburgs, and Kleists were to be\\nthe founders and leaders of the Prussian Conserv-\\native party, which was Bismarck s only support in\\nhis great struggle with the Parliament and here,\\ntoo, came the men v/ho were afterwards to be editors\\nand writers of the Kreiiz Zeitwig.\\nThe religious convictions which Bismarck learnt\\nfrom them were to be lasting, and they profoundly\\ninfluenced his character. He had probably received\\nlittle religious training from his mother, who be-\\nlonged to the rationalistic school of thought. It was\\nby them that his monarchical feeling was strength-\\nened. It is not at first apparent what necessary\\nconnection there is between monarchical government\\nand Christian faith. For Bismarck they were ever\\ninseparably bound together nothing but religious\\nbelief would have reconciled him to a form of gov-\\nernment so repugnant to natural human reason.\\nIf I were not a Christian, I would be a Republi-\\ncan, he said many years later in Christianity he\\nfound the only support against revolution and social-\\nism. He was not the man to be beguiled by roman-\\ntic sentiment he was not a courtier to be blinded\\nby the pomp and ceremony of royalty he was too\\nstubborn and independent to acquiesce in the arbi-\\ntrary rule of a single man. He could only obey the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0067.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "32 Bismarck. [1821-\\nking if the king himself held his authority as the\\nrepresentative of a higher power. Bismarck was\\naccustomed to follow out his thought to its conclu-\\nsions. To whom did the king owe his power\\nThere was only one alternative to the people or to\\nGod. If to the people, then it was a mere question\\nof convenience whether the monarchy were contin-\\nued in form there was little to choose between a\\nconstitutional monarchy where the king was ap-\\npointed by the people and controlled by Parliament,\\nand an avowed republic. This was the principle\\nheld by nearly all his contemporaries. He deliber-\\nately rejected it. He did not hold that the voice of\\nthe people was the voice of God. This belief did\\nnot satisfy his moral sense it seemed in public life\\nto leave all to interest and ambition and nothing to\\nduty. It did not satisfy his critical intellect; the\\nword people was to him a vague idea. The serv-\\nice of the People or of the King by the Grace of\\nGod, this was the struggle which was soon to be\\nfought out.\\nBismarck s connection with his neighbours was\\ncemented by his marriage. At the beginning of\\n1847, he was engaged to a Fraulein von Puttkammer,\\nwhom he had first met at the Blankenburgs house\\nshe belonged to a quiet and religious family, and it is\\nsaid that her mother was at first filled with dismay\\nwhen she heard that Johanna proposed to marry the\\nmad Bismarck. He announced the engagement to\\nhis sister in a letter containing the two words, All\\nright, written in English. Before the wedding\\ncould take place, a new impulse in his life was to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0068.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "1847]\\nEarly Life.\\n33\\nbegin. As representative of the lower nobility he had\\nto attend the meeting of the Estates General which\\nhad been summoned in Berlin. From this time the\\nstory of his life is interwoven with the history of\\nhis country.\\nV", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0069.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III.\\nTHE REVOLUTION.\\n1847-1852.\\nBISMARCK was a subject of the King of Prus-\\nsia, but Prussia was after all only one part of\\na larger unit it was a part of Germany. At\\nthis time, however, Germany was little more than a\\ngeographical expression. The medieval emperors\\nhad never succeeded in establishing permanent\\nauthority over the whole nation what unity there\\nhad been was completely broken down at the Re-\\nformation, and at the Revolution the Empire itself,\\nthe symbol of a union which no longer existed, had\\nbeen swept away. At the restoration in 181 5 the\\nreorganisation of Germany was one of the chief\\ntasks before the Congress of Vienna. It was a task\\nin which the statesmen failed. All proposals to re-\\nstore the Empire were rejected, chiefly because\\nFrancis, who had taken the style of Emperor of\\nAustria, did not desire to resume his old title. Ger-\\nmany emerged from the Revolution divided into\\nthirty-nine different States Austria was one of the\\nlargest and most populous monarchies in Europe,\\nbut more than half the Austrian Empire consisted of\\n34", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0070.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "1847] The Revolution. 35\\nItalian, Slavonic, and Hungarian provinces. The\\nEmperor of Austria ruled over about 20,000,000\\nGermans. The next State in size and importance\\nwas Prussia. Then came four States, the Kingdoms\\nof Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and Wiirtemberg, vary-\\ning in size from five to two million inhabitants below\\nthem were some thirty principalities of which the\\nsmallest contained only a few thousand inhabitants.\\nBy the principles adopted in the negotiations which\\npreceded the Congress of Vienna, every one of these\\nStates was recognised as a complete independent\\nmonarchy, with its own laws and constitutions. The\\niirecognition of this independence made any common\\ngovernment impossible. Neither Austria nor Prus-\\nsia would submit to any external authority, or to\\none another the Kings of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg\\n^were equally jealous of their independence. All\\nthat could be done was to establish a permanent\\noffensive and defensive alliance between these States.\\nFor the management of common concerns, a Diet\\nwas appointed to meet at Frankfort the Diet, how-\\never, was only a union of diplomatists they had to\\nact in accordance with instructions from their govern-\\nments and they had no direct authority over the\\nGermans each German was officially regarded as a\\nsubject, as the case might be, of the King of Prussia,\\nthe Prince of Reuss, the Grand Duke of Weimar.\\nThere was no German army, no German law, no\\nGerman church. No development of common in-\\nstitutions was possible, for no change could be in-\\ntroduced without the universal consent of every\\nmember of the Confederation.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0071.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "36 Bismarck. [1847-\\nThis lamentable result of the Congress of Vienna\\ncaused much dissatisfaction among the thinking\\nclasses in Germany. A very strong national feeling\\nhad been aroused by the war against Napoleon.\\nThis found no satisfaction in the new political insti-\\ntutions. The discontent was increased when it was\\ndiscovered that the Diet, so useless for all else, was\\nactive only against liberty. Prince Metternich, a\\nvery able diplomatist, knew that the Liberal and\\nNational ideas, which were so generally held at that\\ntime, would be fatal to the existence of the Austrian\\nEmpire he therefore attempted to suppress them,\\nnot only in Austria, but also in Germany, as he did\\nin Italy. Unfortunately the King of Prussia, Fred-\\nerick William III., whose interests were really en-\\ntirely opposed to those of Austria, was persuaded by\\nMetternich to adopt a repressive policy. The two\\ngreat powers when combined could impose their will\\non Germany they forced through the Diet a series\\nof measures devoted to the restriction of the liberty\\nof the press, the control of the universities, and the\\nsuppression of democratic opinion.\\nThe result of this was great discontent in Germany,\\nwhich was especially directed against Prussia in\\n1830 the outbreak of revolution in Paris had been\\nfollowed by disturbances in many German States\\nAustria and Prussia, however, were still strong enough\\nto maintain the old system. The whole intellect of\\nthe country was diverted to a policy of opposition in\\nthe smaller States of the south, Parliamentary govern-\\nment had been introduced and the great aim of the\\nLiberals was to establish a Parliament in Prussia also.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0072.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 2 1\\nIn 1840 the old King died; the son, Frederick\\nWilliam IV., was a man of great learning, noble char-\\nacter, high aspirations he was, however, entirely\\nwithout sympathy or understanding for the modern\\ndesires of his countrymen he was a child of the\\nRomantic movement at the head of the youngest\\nof European monarchies, he felt himself more at\\nhome in the Middle Ages than in his own time.\\nThere could be no sympathy between him and the\\nmen who took their politics from Rousseau and Louis\\nBlanc, and their religion from Strauss. It had been\\nhoped that he would at once introduce into Prussia\\nrepresentative institutions. He long delayed, and\\nthe delay took away any graciousness from the act\\nwhen at last it was committed. By a royal decree\\npublished in 1822 it had been determined that no\\nnew loan could be made without the assent of an\\nassembly of elected representatives the introduc-\\ntion of railways made a loan necessary, and at the\\nbeginning of 1847 Frederick William summoned for\\nthe first time the States General.\\nThe King of Prussia had thereby stirred up a\\npower which he was unable to control he had hoped\\nthat he would be able to gather round him the repre-\\nsentatives of the nobles, the towns, and the peasants\\nthat this new assembly, collecting about him in re-\\nspectful homage, would add lustre to his throne that\\nthey would vote the money which was required and\\nthen separate. How much was he mistaken The\\nnation had watched for years Parliamentary govern-\\nment in England and France this was what they\\nwished to have, and now they were offered a mod-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0073.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "38 Bismarck. [1847-\\nern imitation of medieval estates. They felt them-\\nselves as grown men able and justified in governing\\ntheir own country the King treated them as child-\\nren. The opening ceremony completed the bad\\nimpression which the previous acts of the King had\\n/made. While the majority of the nation desired a\\nformal and written Constitution, the King in his\\nS opening speech with great emphasis declared that\\nhe would never allow a sheet of paper to come be-\\ntween him and God in heaven.\\nBismarck was not present at the opening cere-\\nmony it was, in fact, owing to an accident that he\\nwas able to take his seat at all he was there as\\nsubstitute for the member for the Ritterschaft of\\nJerichow, who had fallen ill. He entered on his Par-\\nliamentary duties as a young and almost unknown\\nman he did not belong to any party, but his politi-\\ncal principles were strongly influenced by the friends\\nhe had found in Pomerania. They were soon to be\\nhardened by conflict and confirmed by experience\\nduring the first debates he sat silent, but his indig-\\nnation rose as he listened to the speeches of the\\nLiberal majority. Nothing pleased them instead\\nof actively co-operating with the Government in the\\nconsideration of financial measures, they began to\\ndiscuss and criticise the proclamation by which they\\nhad been summoned. There was indeed ample\\nscope for criticism the Estates were so arranged\\nthat the representatives of the towns could always\\nbe outvoted by the landed proprietors they had\\nnot even the right of periodical meetings the King\\nwas not compelled to call them together again until", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0074.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 39\\nhe required more money. They not only petitioned\\nfor increased powers, they demanded them as a\\nright they maintained that an assembly summoned\\nin this form did not meet the intentions of previous\\nlaws when they were asked to allow a loan for a\\nrailway in East Prussia, they refused on the ground\\nthat they were not a properly qualified assembly.\\nThis was too much for Bismarck the action of\\nthe King might have been inconclusive much that\\nhe said was indiscreet but it remained true that he\\nhad taken the decisive step no one really doubted\\nthat Prussia would never again be without a Parlia-\\nment. It would be much wiser, as it would be more\\nchivalrous, to adopt a friendly tone and not to at-\\ntempt to force concessions from him. He was es-\\npecially indignant at the statement made that the\\nPrussian people had earned constitutional govern-\\nment by the part they took in the war of liberation\\nagainst this he protested\\nIn my opinion it is a bad service to the national\\nhonour to assume that the ill-treatment and degradation\\nthat the Prussians suffered from a foreign ruler were not\\nenough to make our blood boil, and to deaden all other\\nfeelings but that of hatred for the foreigners.\\nWhen told that he was not alive at the time, he\\nanswered\\nI cannot dispute that I was not living then, and I\\nhave been genuinely sorry that I was not born in time to\\ntake part in that movement a regret which is dimin-\\nished by what I have just heard. I had always believed\\nthat the slavery against which we fought lay abroad", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0075.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "40 Bismarck. [1847-\\nhave just learned that it lay at home, and I am not\\ngrateful for the explanation.\\nThe ablest of the Liberal leaders was George v.\\nVincke a member of an old Westphalian family,\\nthe son of a high official, he was a man of honesty\\nand independence, but both virtues were carried to\\nexcess a born leader of opposition, domineering,\\nquarrelsome, ill to please, his short, sturdy figure,\\nhis red face and red hair were rather those of a peas-\\nant than a nobleman, but his eloquence, his bitter\\ninvective, earned the respect and even fear of his op-\\nponents. Among these Bismarck was to be ranged\\nin these days began a rivalry which was not to cease\\ntill nearly twenty years later, when Vincke retired\\nfrom the field and Bismarck stood triumphant, the\\nrecognised ruler of the State. At this time it re-\\nquired courage in the younger man to cross swords\\nwith the experienced and powerful leader.\\nVincke was a strong Liberal, but in the English\\nrather than the Prussian sense; his constant theme\\nwas the rule of law; he had studied English history,\\nfor at that time all Liberals prepared themselves for\\ntheir part by reading Hallam or Guizot and Dahl-\\nmann he knevv^ all about Pym and Hampden, and\\nwished to imitate them. The English Parliament\\nhad won its power by means of a Petition of Right\\nand a Bill of Rights he wished they should do the\\nsame in Prussia it escaped him that the English\\ncould appeal to charters and ancient privileges, but\\nthat in Prussia the absolute power of the King was\\nthe undisputed basis on which the whole State had", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0076.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revohttio7i. 41\\nbeen built up, and that every law to which they\\nowed their liberty or their property derived its\\nvalidity from the simple proclamation of the King.\\nBismarck, if he had read less, understood better\\nthe characteristics of England, probably because he\\nknew better the conditions of his own country. He\\nrose to protest against these parallels with England\\nPrussia had its own problems which must be settled\\nin its own way.\\nParallels with foreign countries have always some-\\nthing disagreeable. At the Revolution, the\\nEnglish people were in a very different condition from\\nthat of Prussia to-day after a century of revolution and\\ncivil war, it was in a position to be able to give away a\\ncrown and add conditions which William of Orange ac-\\ncepted. On the other hand, we are in possession of a\\ncrown whose rights were actually unlimited, a crown held\\nby the grace not of the people but of God, and which\\nof its own free-will has given away to the people a por-\\ntion of its rights an example rare in history.\\nIt shows how strong upon him was the influence\\nof his friends in Pomerania that his longest and most\\nimportant speech was in defence of the Christian\\nmonarchy. The occasion was a proposal to increase\\nthe privileges of the Jews. He said\\nI am no enemy of the Jews if they become my ene-\\nmies I will forgive them. Under certain circumstances\\nI love them I am ready to grant them all rights but\\nthat of holding the magisterial office in a Christian State.\\nThis they now claim they demand to become Landrath,\\nGeneral, Ministerj yes even, under circumstances, Min-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0077.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "42 Bismarck. [1847-\\nister of Religion and Education. I allow that I am full of\\nprejudices, which, as I have said, I have sucked in with\\nmy mother s milk I cannot argue them away for if I\\nthink of a Jew face to face with me as a representative\\nof the King s sacred Majesty, and I have to obey him, I\\nmust confess that I should feel myself deeply broken\\nand depressed the sincere self-respect with which I now\\nattempt to fulfil my duties towards the State would leave\\nme. I share these feelings with the mass of the lower\\nstrata of the people, and I am not ashamed of their\\nsociety.\\nAnd then bespoke of the Christian State:\\nIt is as old as every European State it is the ground\\nin which they have taken root no State has a secure ex-\\nistence unless it has a religious foundation. For me, the\\nwords, by the Grace of God, which Christian rulers add\\nto their name, are no empty phrase I see in them a\\nconfession that the Princes desire to wield the sceptre\\nwhich God has given them according to the will of God\\non earth. As the will of God I can only recognise that\\nwhich has been revealed in the Christian Gospel I\\nbelieve that the realisation of Christian teaching is the\\nend of the State; I do not believe that we shall more\\nnearly approach this end by the help of the Jews.\\nIf we withdraw this foundation, we retain in a State\\nnothing but an accidental aggregate of rights, a kind of\\nbulwark against the war of all against all, which ancient\\nphilosophy has assumed. Therefore, gentlemen, do not\\nlet us spoil the people of their Christianity do not let\\nus take from them the belief that our legislation is drawn\\nfrom the well of Christianity, and that the State aims at\\nthe realisation of Christianity even if it does not attain\\nit? end.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0078.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 43\\nWe can well understand how delighted Herr von\\nThadden was with his pupil. With Bismarck I\\nnaturally will not attempt to measure myself, he\\nwrites in the last debates he has again said many\\nadmirable things and in another letter, I am\\nquite enthusiastic for Otto Bismarck. It was more\\nimportant that the King felt as if these words had\\nbeen spoken out of his own heart.\\nAmong his opponents, too, he had made his mark\\nthey were never tired of repeating well-worn jests\\nabout the medieval opinions which he had sucked\\nin with his mother s milk.\\nAt the close of the session, he returned to Pome-\\nrania with fresh laurels he was now looked upon as\\nthe rising hope of the stern and unbending Tories.\\nHis marriage took place in August, and the young\\nHans Kleist, a cousin of the bride, as he proposed\\nthe bridegroom s health, foretold that in their friend\\nhad arisen a new Otto of Saxony who would do for his\\ncountry all that his namesake had done eight hun-\\ndred years before. Careless words spoken half in jest,\\nwhich thirty years later Kleist, then Over-President\\nof the province, recalled when he proposed the\\nbridegroom s health at the marriage of Bismarck s\\neldest daughter. The forecast had been more than\\nfulfilled, but fulfilled at the cost of many an early\\nfriendship and all the glory of later years could\\nnever quite repay the happy confidence and inti-\\nmacy of those younger days.\\nFollowed by the good wishes of all their friends,\\nBismarck and his young wife started on their wed-\\nding tour, which took them through Austria to Italy.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0079.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "44 Bismarck. [1847-\\nAt Venice he came across the King of Prussia, who\\ntook the opportunity to have more than one conver-\\nsation with the man who had distinguished himself\\nin the States General. At the beginning of the\\nwinter they returned to Schoenhausen to settle\\ndown to a quiet country life. Fate was to will it\\notherwise. The storm which had long been gather-\\ning burst over Europe. Bismarck was carried away\\nby it from henceforth his life was entirely devoted\\nto public duties, and we can count by months the\\ntime he was able to spend with his wife at the old\\nfamily house more than forty years were to pass\\nbefore he was able again to enjoy the leisure of his\\nearly years.\\nThe revolution which at the end of February\\nbroke out in Paris quickly spread to Germany the\\nground was prepared and the news quickly came to\\nhim, first of disorder in South Germany, then of\\nthe fall of the Ministry in Dresden and Munich\\nafter a few days it was told that a revolution had\\ntaken place in Vienna itself. The rising in Austria\\nwas the signal for Berlin, and on the i8th of March\\nthe revolution broke out there also. The King had\\npromised to grant a Constitution a fierce fight had\\ntaken place in the streets of the city between the\\nsoldiers and the people the King had surrendered\\nto the mob, and had ordered the troops to withdraw\\nfrom the city. He was himself almost a prisoner in\\nhis castle protected only by a civilian National Guard.\\nHe was exposed to the insults of the crowd his\\nbrother had had to leave the city and the country. It\\nis impossible to describe the enthusiasm and wild", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0080.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "J852] The Revolution. 45\\ndelight with which the people of Germany heard of\\nthese events. Now the press was free, now they\\nalso were going to be free and great and strong. All\\nthe resistance of authority was overthrown nothing,\\nit seemed, stood between them and the attainment\\nof their ideal of a united and free Germany. They\\nhad achieved a revolution they had become a po-\\nlitical people they had shewn themselves the equals\\nof England and of France. They had liberty, and\\nthey would soon have a Constitution. Bismarck did\\nnot share this feeling he saw only that the monar-\\nchy which he respected, and the King whom, with\\nall his faults, he loved and honoured, were humiliated\\nand disgraced. This was worse than Jena. A de-\\nfeat on the field of battle can be avenged here the\\nenemies were his own countrymen it was Prussian\\nsubjects who had made the King the laughing-stock\\nof Europe. Only a few months ago he had pleaded\\nthat they should not lose that confidence between\\nKing and people which was the finest tradition of\\nthe Prussian State could this confidence ever be\\nrestored when the blood of so many soldiers and\\ncitizens had been shed He felt as though some-\\none had struck him in the face, for his country s dis-\\nhonour was to him as his own he became ill with\\ngall and anger. He had only two thoughts: first to\\nrestore to the King courage and confidence, and then\\nrevenge on the men who had done this thing. He\\nat least was not going to play with the revolution.\\nHe at once sat down and wrote to the King a letter\\nfull of ardent expressions of loyalty and affection,\\nthat he might know there still were men on whom", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0081.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "46 Bismarck. [1847-\\nhe could rely. It is said that for months after,\\nthrough all this terrible year, the King kept it open\\nby him on his writing-table. Then he hurried to\\nBerlin, if necessary to defend him with the sword.\\nThis was not necessary, but the situation was almost\\nworse than he feared the King was safe, but he was\\nsafe because he had surrendered to the revolution\\nhe had proclaimed the fatal words that Prussia was\\nto be dissolved in Germany.\\nAt Potsdam Bismarck found his old friends of the\\nGuard and the Court they were all in silent de-\\nspair. What could they do to save the monarchy\\nwhen the King himself had deserted their cause?\\nSome there were who even talked of seeking help\\nfrom the Czar of Russia, who had offered to come\\nto the help of the monarchy in Prussia and place\\nhimself at the head of the Prussian army, even if\\nnecessary against their own King. There was al-\\nready a Liberal Ministry under Count Arnim, Bis-\\nmarck s old chief at Aachen the Prussian troops\\nwere being sent to support the people of Schleswig-\\nHolstein in their rebellion against the Danes; the\\nMinisters favoured the aspirations of Poland for self-\\ngovernment in Prussia there was to be a Constitu-\\nent Assembly and a new Constitution drawn up by\\nit. Bismarck did what he could he went down to\\nSchoenhausen and began to collect signatures for an\\naddress of loyalty to the King; he wished to instil\\ninto him confidence by appealing to the loyalty of\\nthe country against the radicalism of the town.\\nThen he hurried back to Berlin for the meeting of\\nthe Estates General, which had been hastily sum-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0082.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "1952] The Revohttion. 47\\nmoned to prepare for the new elections. An address\\nwas proposed thanking the King for the concessions\\nhe had made Bismarck opposed it, but he stood\\nalmost alone.\\nI have not changed my opinion, he said, in the last\\nsix months the past is buried, and I regret more bit-\\nterly than any of you that no human power can re-\\nawaken it, now that the Crown itself has cast the earth\\non its coffin.\\nTwo men alone voted against the address Bis-\\nmarck and Herr von Thadden, It is easy to get\\nfame nowadays, said the latter; a little courage is\\nall one requires.\\nCourage it did require Berlin was terrorised the\\nnew National Guard was unable to maintain order;\\nmen scarcely dared to appear in the streets in the\\nordinary dress of a gentleman. The city was full of\\nPolish insurgents, many of whom had only just been\\nreleased from prison. When the National Assembly\\ncame together, it became the organ of the extreme\\nRepublican party; all the more moderate men and\\nmore distinguished had preferred to be elected for\\nthat general German Assembly which at the same\\ntime was sitting at Frankfort to create a new Consti-\\ntution for the whole Confederation. How quickly\\nhad the balance of parties altered Vincke, until a.\\nfew months ago the leader of the Liberals, found\\nhimself at Frankfort regarded as an extreme Con-\\nservative and Frankfort was moderate compared\\nto Berlin. At this time an ordinary English Radical\\nwould have been looked upon in Germany as almost", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0083.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "48 Bismarck. [1847-\\nreactionary. Bismarck did not seek election for\\neither of the Assemblies he felt that he could do\\nno good by taking part in the deliberations of a\\nParliament, the very meeting of which seemed to\\nhim an oiTence against the laws and welfare of the\\nState. He would indeed have had no logical posi-\\ntion both Parliaments were Constituent Assemblies\\nit was the duty of the one to build up a new Ger-\\nmany, of the other a new Prussia their avowed ob-\\nject was the regeneration of their country. Bismarck\\ndid not believe that Prussia wanted regenerating\\nhe held that the roots for the future greatness of the\\nState must be found in the past. What happened\\nto Germany he did not much care; all he saw was\\nthat every proposal for the regeneration of Germany\\nimplied either a dissolution of Prussia, or the subjec-\\ntion of the Prussian King to the orders of an alien\\nParliament.\\nDuring the summer he did what he could he\\ncontributed articles to the newspapers attacking the\\nPolish policy of the Government, and defending the\\nlandlords and country gentry against the attacks\\nmade on them. As the months went by, as the an-\\narchy in Berlin increased, and the violence of the\\nAssembly as well as the helplessness of the Govern-\\nment became more manifest, he and some of his\\nfriends determined to make their voices heard in a\\nmore organised way. It was at the house of his\\nfather-in-law at Rheinfeld that he, Hans Kleist, and\\nHerr von Below determined to call together a meet-\\ning of well-known men in Berlin, who should discuss\\nthe situation and be a moral counterpoise to the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0084.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 49\\nmeetings of the National Assembly for in that the\\nConservative party and even the Moderate Liberals\\nwere scarcely represented if they did speak they\\nwere threatened by the mob which encumbered the\\napproaches to the House. Of more permanent im-\\nportance was the foundation of a newspaper which\\nshould represent the principles of the Christian mon-\\narchy, and in July appeared the first number of the\\nNew Prussian Gazette, or, as it was to be more gen-\\nerally known, the Kreuz Zeitung, which was to give\\nits name to the party of which it was the organ.\\nBismarck was among the founders, among whom\\nwere also numbered Stahl, the Gerlachs, and others\\nof his older friends; he was a frequent contributor,\\nand when he was at Berlin was almost daily at the\\noflfice when he was in the country he contributed\\narticles on the rural afTairs with which he was more\\nspecially qualified to deal.\\nThese steps, of course, attracted the attention and\\nthe hostility of the dominant Liberal and Revolu-\\ntionary parties the Junker, as they were called,\\nwere accused of aiming at reaction and the restora-\\ntion of the absolute monarchy. As a matter of fact,\\nthis is what many of them desired; they were, how-\\never, only doing their duty as members of society;\\nit would have been mere cowardice and indolence\\nhad they remained inactive and seen all the institu-\\ntions they valued overthrown without attempting to\\ndefend them. It required considerable courage in\\nthe middle of so violent a crisis to come forward and\\nattempt to stop the revolution it was a good exam-\\nple that they began to do so by constitutional and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0085.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "50 Bismarck. [1847-\\nlegal means. They shewed that Prussia had an aris-\\ntocracy, and an aristocracy which was not frightened\\ndeserted by the King they acted alone in the hour\\nof greatest danger they founded a Conservative\\nparty, and matters had come to this position that\\nan organised Conservative party was the chief neces-\\nsity of the time.\\nAt first, however, their influence was small, for a\\nmonarchical party must depend for its success on\\nthe adhesion of the King, and the King had not yet\\nresolved to separate himself from his Liberal advisers,\\nBismarck was often at Court and seems to have had\\nmuch influence both to his other companions and\\nto the King himself he preached always courage and\\nresolution he spoke often to the King with great\\nopenness he was supported by Leopold von Gerlach,\\nwith whom at this time he contracted a close inti-\\nmacy. For long their advice was in vain, but in the\\nautumn events occurred which shewed that some\\ndecision must be taken the mob of Berlin stormed\\nthe Zcughaiis where the arms were kept the Con-\\nstitution of the Assembly was being drawn up so as\\nto leave the King scarcely any influence in the State\\na resolution was passed calling on the Ministers to\\nrequest all officers to leave the army who disliked\\nthe new order of things. The crisis was brought\\nabout by events in Vienna in October the Austrian\\narmy under Jellachich and Windischgratz stormed\\nthe city, proclaimed martial law, and forcibly over-\\nthrew the Revolutionary Government the King of\\nPrussia now summoned resolution to adopt a similar\\ncourse. It is said that Bismarck suggested to him", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0086.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revohition. 51\\nthe names of the Ministers to whom the task should\\nbe entrusted. The most important were Count\\nBrandenburg, an uncle of the King s, and Otto v.\\nManteufTel, a member of the Prussian aristocracy,\\nwho with Bismarck had distinguished himself in the\\nEstates General. He seems to have been constantly\\ngoing about among the more influential men, en-\\ncouraging them as he encouraged the King, and help-\\ning behind the scenes to prepare for the momentous\\nstep. Gerlach had suggested Bismarck s name as\\none of the Ministers, but the King rejected it, writ-\\ning on the side of the paper the characteristic words,\\nRed reactionary smells of blood will be useful\\nlater. Bismarck s language was of such a nature\\nas to alarm even many of those who associated with\\nhim. Count Beust, the Saxon Minister, was at this\\ntime in Berlin and met Bismarck for the first time\\nthey were discussing the conduct of the Austrian\\nGovernment in shooting Robert Blum, a leading\\ndemagogue who had been in Vienna during the\\nsiege. Beust condemned it as a political blunder.\\nNo, you are wrong, said Bismarck when I have\\nmy enemy in my power I must destroy him,\\nThe event fully justified Bismarck s forecast that\\nnothing was required but courage and resolution.\\nAfter Brandenburg had been appointed Minister, the\\nPrussian troops under Wrangel again entered Berlin,\\na state of siege was proclaimed, the Assembly was\\nordered to adjourn to Brandenburg they refused\\nand were at once ejected from their meeting-place,\\nand as a quorum was not found at Brandenburg,\\nwere dissolved. The Crown then of its own author-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0087.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "52 Bisniai -ck. [1847-\\nity published a new Constitution and summoned a\\nnew Assembly to discuss and ratify it. Based on\\nthe discipline of the army the King had regained\\nhis authority without the loss of a single life.\\nBismarck stood for election in this new Assembly,\\nfor he could accept the basis on which it had been\\nsummoned he took his seat for the district of the\\nWest Havel in which the old city of Brandenburg,\\nthe original capital of the Mark, was situated. He\\nhad come forward as an opponent of the Revolution.\\nEveryone, he said in his election address, must\\nsupport the Government in the course they have\\ntaken of combating the Revolution which threat-\\nens us all. No transaction with the Revolution,\\nwas the watchword proposed in the manifesto of\\nhis party. He appealed to the electors as one who\\nwould direct all his efforts to restore the old bond of\\nconfidence between Crown and people. He kept his\\npromise. In this Assembly the Extreme Left was\\nstill the predominant party in an address to the\\nCrown they asked that the state of siege at Berlin\\nshould be raised, and that an amnesty to those who\\nhad fought on the i8th of March should be pro-\\nclaimed. Bismarck did not yet think that the time\\nfor forgiveness had come the struggle was indeed\\nnot yet over. He opposed the first demand because,\\nas he said, there was more danger to liberty of de-\\nbate from the armed mob than there was from the\\nPrussian soldiers. In one of the most careful of his\\nspeeches he opposed the amnesty. Amnesty, he\\nsaid, was a right of the Crown, not of the Assem-\\nbly moreover the repeated amnesties were un-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0088.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 53\\ndermining in the people the feehng of law the\\nopinion was being spread about that the law of the\\nState rested on the barricades, that everyone who\\ndisliked a law or considered it unjust had the right\\nto consider it as non-existent. Who that has read\\nthe history of Europe during this year can doubt\\nthe justice of the remark? Then he continues:\\nMy third reason for voting against the amnesty is\\nhumanity. The strife of principles which during this\\nyear has shattered Europe to its foundations is one in\\nwhich no compromise is possible. They rest on opposite\\nbases. The one draws its law from what is called the\\nwill of the people, in truth, however, from the law of the\\nstrongest on the barricades. The other rests on author-\\nity created by God, an authority by the grace of God,\\nand seeks its development in organic connection with\\nthe existing and constitutional legal status the\\ndecision on these principles will come not by Parliament-\\nary debate, not by majorities of eleven votes sooner or\\nlater the God who directs the battle will cast his iron\\ndice.\\nThese words were greeted with applause, not only\\nby the men who sat on his side of the House, but by\\nthose opposite to him. The truth of them was to\\nbe shewn by the events which were taking place at\\nthat very time. They were spoken on the 22d of\\nMarch. The next day was fought the battle of No-\\nvara and it seemed that the last hopes of the Italian\\npatriots were shattered. Within a few months the\\nAustrian army subdued with terrible vengeance the\\nrising in Lombardy and Venetia Hungary was\\nprostrate before the troops whom the Czar sent to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0089.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "54 Bismarck. ti847-\\nhelp the young Austrian Emperor, and the last\\ndespairing outbreak of rebellion in Saxony and in\\nBaden was to be subdued by the Prussian arn:iy.\\nThe Revolution had failed and it had raised up, as\\nwill always happen, a military power, harder, crueller,\\nand more resolute than that it had overthrown.\\nThe control over Europe had passed out of the\\nhands of Metternich and Louis Philippe to fall into\\nthose of Nicholas, Schwarzenberg, and Napoleon III.\\nIn Prussia the King used his power with modera-\\ntion, the conflict of parties was continued within\\nlegal limits and under constitutional forms.\\nThe Parliament which still claimed that control\\nover the executive government which all Parlia-\\nments of the Revolution had exercised, was dis-\\nsolved. A new Assembly met in August the King\\nhad of his own authority altered the electoral law\\nand the new Parliament showed a considerable\\nmajority belonging to the more moderate Liberal\\nparty. Bismarck retained his old seat. He still\\nfound much to do his influence was increasing; he\\nopposed the doctrines of the more moderate Liberal-\\nism with the same energy with which he had attacked\\nthe extreme Revolution. The most important de-\\nbates were those concerning the Constitution he\\ntook part in them, especially opposing the claim of\\nthe Parliament to refuse taxes. He saw that if the\\nright was given to the Lower House of voting the\\ntaxes afresh every year they would be able to estab-\\nlish a complete control over the executive govern-\\nment; this he did not wish. He was willing that\\nthey should have the right of discussing and reject-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0090.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 55\\ning any new taxes and also, in agreement with the\\nCrown and the Upper House, of determining the\\nannual Budget. It was maintained by the Liberals\\nthat the right to reject supplies every year was an\\nessential part of a constitutional system they ap-\\npealed to the practice in England and to the\\nprinciples adopted in tHe French and Belgian Con-\\nstitutions. Their argument was that this practice\\nwhich had been introduced in other countries must\\nbe adopted also in Prussia. It was just one of those\\nargurnents which above all offended Bismarck s Prus-\\nsian patriotism. Why should Prussia imitate other\\ncountries? Why should it not have its own Consti-\\ntution in its own way Constitution, as he said, was\\nthe mot d ordre of the day, the word which men\\nused when they were in want of an argument. In\\nPrussia that only is constitutional which arises from\\nthe Prussian Constitution whatever be constitu-\\ntional in Belgium, or in France, in Anhalt Dessau,\\nor there where the morning red of Mecklenburg- free-\\ndom shines, here that alone is constitutional which\\nrests on the Prussian Constitution. If he defended\\nthe prerogative of the Crown he defended the Con-\\nstitution of his country. A constitution is the col-\\nlection of rules and laws by which the action of the\\nking is governed a state without a constitution is\\na mere Oriental despotism where each arbitrary\\nwhim of the king is transmuted into action this\\nwas not what Bismarck desired or defended there\\nwas no danger of this in Prussia. He did not even\\noppose changes in the law and practice of the Con-\\ngtitution what he did oppose was the particular", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0091.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "56 Bismarck. [1847-\\nchange which would transfer the sovereignty to an\\nelected House of Parliament. It has been main-\\ntained, he once said, that a constitutional king\\ncannot be a king by the Grace of God on the con-\\ntrary he is it above all others.\\nThe references to foreign customs were indeed\\none of the most curious practices of the time the\\nmatter was once being discussed whether the Crown\\nhad the power to declare a state of siege without the\\nassent of the Chambers most speakers attempted to\\ninterpret the text of the Prussian Constitution by\\nprecedents derived from the practice in France and\\nEngland we find the Minister of Justice defending\\nhis action on the ground of an event in the French\\nRevolution, and Lothar Bucher, one of the ablest of\\nthe Opposition, complained that not enough attention\\nhad been paid to the procedure adopted in England\\nfor repealing the Habeas Corpus Act, entirely ignoring\\nthe fact that there was no Habeas Corpus Act in\\nPrussia. We can easily understand how repulsive\\nthis was to a man who, like Bismarck, wished no-\\nthing more than that his countrymen should copy,\\nnot the details of the English Constitution, but the\\nproud self-reliance which would regard as imperti-\\nnent an application of foreign notions.\\nThe chief cause for this peculiarity was the desire\\nof the Liberal party to attain that degree of inde-\\npendence and personal liberty which was enjoyed in\\nEngland or France the easiest way to do this\\nseemed to be to copy their institutions. There was,\\nhowever, another reason the study of Roman law\\nin Germany in which they had been educated had", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0092.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "1852} The Revohition. 57\\naccustomed them to look for absolute principles of\\njurisprudence which might be applied to the legisla-\\ntion of all countries when, therefore, they turned\\ntheir minds to questions of politics, they looked for\\nabsolute principles of constitutional government, on\\nwhich, as on a law of nature, their own institutions\\nmight be built up. To find these they analysed the\\nEnglish Constitution, for England was the classical\\nland of representative government they read its\\nrules as they would the institutions of a Roman\\nJurisconsult and used them to cast light on the dark\\nplaces of their own law. Bismarck did not share\\nthis type of thought his mind was rather of the\\nEnglish cast he believed the old Prussian Constitu-\\ntion was as much a natural growth as that of Eng-\\nland, and decided dark points by reference to older\\npractice as an Englishman would search for preced-\\nents in the history of his own country.\\nAt that time the absolute excellence of a demo-\\ncratic constitution was a dogma which few cared to\\ndispute it appeared to his hearers as a mere paradox\\nwhen Bismarck pointed out how little evidence there\\nwas that a great country could prosper under the\\ngovernment of a Parliament elected by an extended\\nfranchise. Strictly speaking, there was no evidence\\nfrom experience; France, as he said, was the parent\\nof all these theories, but the example of France was\\ncertainly not seductive. I see in the present cir-\\ncumstances of France nothing to encourage us to\\nput the Nessus robe of French political teaching\\nover our healthy body. (This was in September,\\n1849, when the struggle between the Prince Presi-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0093.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "58 Bismarck. [1847-\\ndent and the Assembly was already impending.)\\nThe Liberals appealed to Belgium it had, at least,\\nstood the storm of the last year, but so had Russia,\\nand, after all, the Belgian Constitution was only\\neighteen years old, an admirable age for ladies but\\nnot for constitutions. And then there was England.\\nEngland governs itself, although the Lower House\\nhas the right of refusing taxes. The references to Eng-\\nland are our misfortune give us all that is English\\nwhich we have not, give us English fear of God and\\nEnglish reverence before the law, the whole English\\nConstitution, but above all the complete independence of\\nEnglish landed property, English wealth and English\\ncommon-sense, especially an English Lower House, in\\nshort everything which we have not got, then I will say,\\nyou can govern us after the English fashion.\\nBut this was not all. How could they appeal to\\nEngland as a proof that a democratic Parliament\\nwas desirable? England had not grown great under\\na democratic but under an aristocratic constitution.\\nEnglish reform is younger than the Belgian Constitu-\\ntion we have still to wait and see whether this reformed\\nConstitution will maintain itself for centuries as did the\\nearlier rule of the English aristocracy.\\nThat, in Bismarck s opinion, it was not likely to do\\nso, we see a few years later; with most Continental\\ncritics of English institutions, he believed that the\\nReform Bill had destroyed the backbone of the\\nEnglish Constitution. In 1857 he wrote:\\nThey have lost the inherited wisdom since the Re-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0094.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 59\\nform Bill they maintain a coarse and violent selfishness\\nand the ignorance of Continental relations.\\nIt was not merely aristocratic prejudice; it was a\\nwise caution to bid his countrymen pause before\\nthey adopted from foreign theorists a form of gov-\\nernment so new and untried, and risked for the sake\\nof an experiment the whole future of Prussia.\\nIn later years Bismarck apologised for many of the\\nspeeches which he made at this period I was a\\nterrible Junker in those days, he said and biograph-\\ners generally speak of them as though they required\\njustification or apology. There seems no reason for\\nthis. It would have been impossible for him, had he\\nat that time been entrusted with the government of\\nthe State, entirely to put into practice what he had\\nsaid from his place in the Chamber. But he was\\nnot minister he was only a party leader his\\nspeeches were, as they were intended to be, party\\nspeeches they had something of the exaggeration\\nwhich conflict always produces. They were, more-\\nover, opposition speeches, for he was addressing not\\nso much the Government as the Chamber and the\\ncountry, and in them the party to which he belonged\\nwas a very small minority. But why was there not\\nto be a Conservative party in Prussia?\\nIt was necessary for the proper development of con-\\nstitutional life that the dominant Liberal doctrines\\nshould be opposed by this bold criticism. Bismarck\\nwas only doing what in England was done by the\\nyoung Disraeli, by Carlyle, and by Ruskin the\\nworld would not be saved by constitutional formulae.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0095.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "6o Bismarck.\\n[1847-\\nThere were some of his party whose aims went\\nindeed beyond what may be considered morally\\nlegitimate and politically practicable. The Gerlachs\\nand many of their friends, and the purely military\\nparty which was headed by Prince Charles Frederick,\\nthe King s youngest brother, desired to do away with\\nthe Constitution, to dismiss the Parliament, and to\\nrestore the absolute monarchy in a form which would\\nhave been more extreme than that which it had had\\nsince 1815. The King himself sympathised with\\ntheir wishes and he probably would have acted\\naccording to them were it not that he had sworn to\\nmaintain the Constitution. He was a religious man\\nand he respected his oath. There does not appear\\nany evidence that Bismarck wished for extreme action\\nof this kind. Even in his private correspondence,\\nat least in that part of it which has been published,\\none finds no desire to see Prussia entirely without a\\nParliament. It was a very different thing to wish as\\nhe did that the duties of the Parliament should be\\nstrictly limited and that they should not be allowed\\ncompletely to govern the State. We must always\\nremember how much he owed to representative\\nassemblies. Had the Estates General never been\\nsummoned, had the Revolution never taken place, he\\nwould probably have passed his life as a country gen-\\ntleman, often discontented with the Government of\\nthe country but entirely without influence. He owed\\nto Parliament his personal reputation, but he owed\\nto it something more than that. Up to 1847 ^^e\\nonly public career open to a Prussian subject was\\nthe Civil Service it was from them that not only the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0096.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "t852]\\nThe Revolution. 6i\\nsubordinate officials but the Ministers of the State\\nwere selected. Now we have seen that Bismarck\\nhad tried the Civil Service and deliberately retired\\nfrom it. The hatred of bureaucracy he never over-\\ncame, even when he was at the head of the Prussian\\nState. It arose partly from the natural opposition\\nbetween the nobleman and the clerk. Bismarck felt\\nin this like Stein, the greatest of his predecessors,\\nwho though he had taken service under the Prussian\\nCrown never overcame his hatred of the animal with\\na pen, as he called Prussian Civil Servants, and shed\\ntears of indignation when he was first offered a\\nsalary. Bismarck was never a great nobleman like\\nStein and he did not dislike receiving a salary but\\nhe felt that the Civil Servants were the enemies of\\nthe order to which he belonged. He speaks a few\\nyears later of the biting acid of Prussian legisla-\\ntion which in a single generation can reduce a\\nmediatised Prince to an ordinary voter. He is\\nnever tired of saying that it was the bureaucracy\\nwhich was the real introducer of the Revolution into\\nPrussia. In one of his speeches he defends himself\\nand his friends against the charge of being enemies\\nto freedom that they were not, he says\\nAbsolutism with us is closely connected with the\\nomnipotence of the Gehei}?irath and the conceited omni-\\nscience of the Professors who sit behind the green table,\\na product, and I venture to maintain a necessary product,\\nof the Prussian method of education. This product, the\\nbureaucracy, I have never loved.\\nWhen, as he often does, he maintains that the Prus-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0097.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "62 Bismarck.\\n[1847-\\nsian Parliament does not represent the people, he is\\nthinking of the predominance among them of\\nofificials, for we must always remember that many of\\nthe extreme Liberal party and some of their most\\nactive leaders were men who were actually at that\\ntime in the service of the Crown.\\nIt was the introduction of a Representative As-\\nsembly that for the first time in Prussian history\\nmade possible a Conservative opposition against\\nthe Liberalism of the Prussian Government. There\\nare two kinds of Liberalism. In one sense of\\nthe word it means freedom of debate, freedom of the\\npress, the power of the individual as against the\\nGovernment, independence of character, and personal\\nfreedom. Of Liberalism in this sense of the word\\nthere was indeed little in the Prussian Government.\\nBut Liberalism also meant the overthrow of the old\\nestablished institutions inherited from the Middle\\nAges, especially the destruction of all privileges held\\nby the nobility it meant on the Continent opposi-\\ntion to all form of dogmatic religious teaching; it\\nmeant the complete subjection of the Church to the\\nState it meant the abolition of all local distinctions\\nand the introduction of a uniform system of govern-\\nment chiefly imitated from French institutions. It\\nwas in this sense of the word that, with the exception\\nof the first few years of the reign of Frederick\\nWilliam IV., the Prussian Government had been\\nLiberal, and it was this Liberalism which Bismarck\\nand his friends hated almost as much as they did\\nthe Liberalism of the Revolution.\\nThe clearest instance of his attitude on such mat-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0098.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "18521 The Revohition. 63\\nters is to be found in his opposition to the Bill\\nintroduced for making civil marriage compulsory.\\nHe opposed it in a speech which was many years\\nlater to be quoted against him when he himself\\nintroduced a measure almost identical with that\\nwhich he now opposed. Civil marriage, he said, was\\na foreign institution, an imitation of French legisla-\\ntion it would simply serve to undermine the belief\\nin Christianity among the people, and he said,\\nI have seen many friends of the illumination during\\nthe last year or two come to recognise that a certain\\ndegree of positive Christianity is necessary for the\\ncommon man, if he is not to become dangerous to\\nhuman society. The desire for introducing this\\ncustom was merely an instance of the constant wish\\nto imitate what is foreign.\\nIt would be amusing, he said, if it were not just our\\nown country which was subjected to these experiments of\\nFrench charlatanism. In the course of the discussion it\\nhas often been said by gentlemen standing in this place\\nthat Europe holds us for a people of thinkers. Gentle-\\nmen, that was in old days. The popular representation\\nof the last two years has deprived us of this reputation.\\nThey have shown to a disappointed Europe only trans-\\nlators of French stucco but no original thinkers. It\\nmay be that when civil marriage also rejoices in its\\nmajority, the people will have their eyes opened to\\nthe swindle to which they have been sacrificed when\\none after another the old Christian fundamental rights\\nhave been taken from them the right to be governed by\\nChristian magistrates the right to know that they have\\nsecured to their children a Christian education in schools", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0099.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "64 Bismarck. [1847-\\nwhich Christian parents are compelled to maintain and\\nto use; the right of being married in the Christian fashion\\nwhich his faith requires from everyone, without being\\ndependent on constitutional ceremonies. If we go on in\\nthis way I hope still to see the day when the fool s ship\\nof the time will be wrecked on the rock of the Christian\\nChurch for the belief in the revealed Word of God\\nstill stands firmer among the people than the belief in\\nthe saving power of any article of the Constitution.\\nIn the same way he was able from his place in\\nParliament to criticise the proposals of the Govern-\\nment for freeing the peasants from those payments\\nin kind, and personal service which in some of the\\nprovinces still adhered to their property he attacked\\ntheir financial proposals; he exposed the injustice\\nof the land tax; he defended the manorial jurisdic-\\ntion of the country gentlemen. Especially he de-\\nfended the nobles of Prussia themselves, a class\\nagainst whom so many attacks had been made. He\\npointed out that by them and by their blood the\\nPrussian State had been built up the Prussian\\nnobles were, he maintained, not, as so often was said,\\nunpopular a third of the House belonged to them\\nthey were not necessarily opposed to freedom they\\nwere, at least, the truest defenders of the State,\\nLet people not confuse patriotism and Liberalism.\\nWho had done more for the true political inde-\\npendence of the State, that independence without\\nwhich all freedom was impossible, than the Prussian\\nnobles At the end of the Seven Years War boys\\nhad stood at the head of the army, the only surviv-\\nors of their families. The privileges of the nobles", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0100.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revolution. 65\\nhad been taken from them, but they had not be-\\nhaved like the democrats their loyalty to the State\\nhad never wavered they had not even formed a\\nFronde. He was not ashamed of the name of\\nJunker: We will bring the name to glory and\\nhonour, were almost the last words he spoke in\\nParliament.\\nBismarck soon became completely at home in the\\nHouse. Notwithstanding the strength of his opin-\\nions and the vigour with which he gave expression\\nto them, he was not unpopular, even among his op-\\nponents. He was always a gentleman and a man of\\nthe world he did not dislike mixing with men of all\\nclasses and all parties he had none of that stiffness\\nand hauteur which many of his friends had acquired\\nfrom their military pursuits. His relations with his\\nopponents are illustrated by an anecdote of which\\nthere are many versions. He found himself one day\\nwhile in the refreshment room standing side by side\\nwith d Ester, one of the most extreme of the Repub-\\nlican party. They fell into conversation, and d Es-\\nter suggested that they should make a compact and,\\nwhichever party succeeded in the struggle for power,\\nthey should each agree to spare the other. If the\\nRepublicans won, Bismarck should not be guillo-\\ntined if the monarchists, d Ester should not be hung.\\nNo, answered Bismarck, that is no use if you\\ncome into power, life would not be worth living.\\nThere must be hanging, but courtesy to the foot of\\nthe gallows.\\nIf he was in after years to become known as the\\ngreat adversary of Parliamentary government, this", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0101.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "66 Bisnia^^ck. [1847-\\ndid not arise from any incapacity to hold his own in\\nParhamentary debate. He did not indeed aim at\\noratory; then, as in later years, he always spoke\\nwith great contempt of men who depended for\\npower on their rhetorical ability. He was himself\\ndeficient in the physical gifts of a great speaker pow-\\nerful as was his frame, his voice was thin and weak.\\nHe had nothing of the actor in him he could not\\ncommand the deep voice, the solemn tones, the im-\\nposing gestures, the Olympian mien by which men\\nlike Waldeck and Radowitz and Gagern dominated\\nand controlled their audience. His own mind was\\nessentially critical he appealed more to the intellect\\nthan the emotions. His speeches were always con-\\ntroversial, but he was an admirable debater. It is\\ncurious to see how quickly he adopts the natural\\nParliamentary tone. His speeches are all subdued\\nin tone and conversational in manner. Many of\\nthem were very carefully prepared, for though he\\ndid not generally write them out, he said them over\\nand over again to himself or to Kleist, with whom he\\nlived in Berlin. They are entirely unlike any other\\nspeeches he has, in fact, in them, as in his letters,\\nadded a new chapter to the literature of his country,\\nhitherto so poor in prose.\\nThey shew a vivid imagination and an almost un-\\nequalled power of illustration. The thought is\\nalways concrete, and he is never satisfied with the\\nvague ideas and abstract conceptions which so easily\\nmoved his contemporaries. No speeches, either in\\nEnglish or in German, preserve so much of their\\nfreshness. He is almost the only Parliamentary", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0102.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK IN 1848.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0103.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0104.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "1852] The Revohition. 67\\norator whose speeches have become to some extent\\na popular book no other orator has enriched the\\nlanguage as he has done with new phrases and im-\\nages. The great characteristic of his speeches, as of\\nhis letters, is the complete absence of affectation and\\nthe very remarkable intellectual honesty. They are\\noften deficient in order and arrangement he did not\\nexcel in the logical exposition of a connected argu-\\nment, but he never was satisfied till he had presented\\nthe idea which influenced him in words so forcible\\nand original that it was impressed on the minds of\\nhis audience, and he was often able to find expres-\\nsions which will not be forgotten so long as the\\nGerman language is spoken.\\nWe can easily imagine that under other circum-\\nstances, or in another country, he would have risen\\nto power and held office as a Parliamentary Minister.\\nHe often appeals to the practice and traditions of\\nthe English Parliament, and there are few Conti-\\nnental statesmen Avho would have been so com-\\npletely at home in the English House of Commons;\\nhe belonged to the class of men from whom so many\\nof the great English statesmen had come and whom\\nhe himself describes\\nWhat with us is lacking is the whole class which in\\nEngland carries on poUtics, the class of gentlemen who\\nare well-to-do and therefore Conservative, who are inde-\\npendent of material interests and whose whole education\\nis directed towards making them English statesmen, and\\nthe object of whose life is to take part in the Common-\\nwealth of England.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0105.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "68 Bismarck. [1847-\\nThey were the class to whom he belonged, and he\\nwould gladly have taken part in a Parliamentary\\ngovernment of this kind.\\nThe weakness of his position arose from the fact\\nthat he was really acquainted with and represented\\nthe inhabitants of only one-half of the monarchy. So\\nlong as he is dealing with questions of landed-prop-\\nerty, or of the condition of the peasants, he has a\\nminute and thorough knowledge. He did not al-\\nways, however, avoid the danger of speaking as\\nthough Prussia consisted entirely of agriculturists.\\nThe great difificulty then as now of governing the\\nState, was that it consisted of two parts the older\\nprovinces, almost entirely agricultural, where the\\nland was held chiefly by the great nobles, and the\\nnew provinces, the Rhine and Westphalia, where\\nthere was a large and growing industrial population.\\nTo the inhabitants of these provinces Bismarck s\\nconstant appeal to the old Prussian traditions and\\nto the achievements of the Prussian nobility could\\nhave little meaning. What did the citizens of Co-\\nlogne and Aachen care about the Seven Years War?\\nIf their ancestors took part in the war, it would be\\nas enemies of the Kings of Prussia. When Bismarck\\nsaid that they were Prussians, and would remain\\nPrussian, he undoubtedly spoke the opinion of the\\nMark and of Pomerania. But the inhabitants of the\\nWestern Provinces still felt and thought rather as\\nGermans than as Prussians they had scarcely been\\nunited with the monarchy thirty years they were\\nnot disloyal, but they were quite prepared nay, they\\nwished to see Prussia dissolved in Germany. No", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0106.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "1852]\\nThe Revolution.\\n69\\none can govern Prussia unless he is able to reconcile\\nto his policy these two different classes in the State.\\nIt was this which the Prussian Conservatives, to\\nwhich Bismarck at that time belonged, have always\\nfailed to do. The Liberals whom he opposed failed\\nequally. In later years he was very nearly to suc-\\nceed in a task which might appear almost impos-\\nsible.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0107.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IV.\\nTHE GERMAN PROBLEM.\\n1849-1852.\\nBISMARCK, however, did not confine himself\\nto questions of constitutional reform and in-\\nternal government. He often spoke on the\\nforeign policy of the Government, and it is in these\\nspeeches that he shews most originality.\\nThe Revolution in Germany, as in Italy, had two\\nsides it was Liberal, but it was also National. The\\ni National element was the stronger and more deep-\\nLseated. The Germans felt deeply the humiliation\\nto which they were exposed owing to the fact that\\nthey did not enjoy the protection of a powerful\\nGovernment they wished to belong to a national\\nState, as Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Russians\\ndid. It was the general hope that the period of\\nrevolution might be used for establishing a gov-\\nernment to which the whole of Germany would\\npay obedience. This was the task of the Constitu-\\nent Assembly, which since the spring of 1848 had\\nwith the permission of the Governments been sit-\\nting at Frankfort. Would they be able to suc-\\n70", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0108.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "1849]\\nTJie German Problem. Ji\\nceed where the diplomatists of Vienna had failed\\nThey had at least good-will, but it was to be shewn\\nthat something more than honest endeavour was\\nnecessary. There were three great difificulties with\\nwhich they had to contend. The first was the Re-\\npublican party, the men who would accept no gov-\\nernment but a Republic, and who wished to found\\nthe new state by insurrection. They were a small\\nminority of the German people several attempts at\\ninsurrection organised by them were suppressed, and\\nthey were outvoted in the Assembly. The second\\ndifficulty was Austria. A considerable portion of\\nGermany was included in the Austrian Empire. If\\nthe whole of Germany were to be included in the\\nnew State which they hoped to found, then part of\\nthe Austrian Empire would have to be separated\\nfrom the rest, subjected to different laws and a\\ndifferent government nothing would remain but a\\npersonal union between the German and Slavonic\\nprovinces. The Government of Austria, after it had\\nrecovered its authority at the end of 1848, refused\\nto accept this position, and published a new Consti-\\ntution, binding all the provinces together in a closer\\nunion. The Assembly at Frankfort had no power\\nto coerce the Emperor of Austria they therefore\\nadopted the other solution, viz. that the rest of\\nGermany was to be reconstituted, and the Austrian\\nprovinces left out. The question, however, then\\narose Would Austria accept this- would she allow\\na new Germany to be created in which she had no\\npart? Surely not, if she was able to prevent it. The\\nthird difficultv was the relation between the indi-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0109.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "]2 Bismarck. [1849-\\nvidual States and the new central authority. It is\\nobvious that whatever powers were given to the new\\nGovernment would be taken away from the Princes\\nof the individual States, who hitherto had enjoyed\\ncomplete sovereignty. Those people who in Ger-\\nmany were much influenced by attachment to the\\nexisting governments, and who wished to maintain\\nthe full authority of the Princes and the local Parlia-\\nments, were called Particularists. During the ex-\\ncitement of the Revolution they had been almost\\nentirely silenced. With the restoration of order and\\nauthority they had regained their influence. It was\\nprobable that many of the States would refuse to\\naccept the new Constitution unless they were com-\\npelled to do so. Where was the power to do this\\nThere were many in the National Assembly who\\nwished to appeal to the power of the people, and by\\ninsurrection and barricades compel all the Princes to\\naccept the new Constitution. There was only one\\nother power in Germany which could do the work,\\nand that was the Prussian army. Would the King\\nof Prussia accept this task\\nThe German Constitution was completed in March,\\n1849. -^y exercise of much tact and great per-\\nsonal influence, Heinrich von Gagern, the President\\nof the Assembly and the leader of the Moderate\\nparty in it, had procured a majority in favour of an\\nhereditar}^ monarchy, and the King of Prussia was\\nelected to the post of first German Emperor. At the\\nbeginning of April there arrived in Berlin the deputa-\\ntion which was to offer to him the crown, and on his\\nanswer depended the future of Germany. Were he", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0110.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "1852] The Gei -man Problem. 73\\nto accept, he would then have undertaken to put him-\\nself at the head of the revolutionary movement it\\nwould be his duty to compel all the other States to\\naccept the new Constitution, and, if necessary, to\\ndefend it on the field of battle against Austria. Be-\\nsides this he would have to govern not only Prussia\\nbut Germany; to govern it under a Constitution which\\ngave almost all the power to a Parliament elected by\\nuniversal suffrage, and in which he had only a sus-\\npensive veto. Can we be surprised that he refused\\nthe offer He refused it on the ground that he could\\nnot accept universal suffrage, and also because the\\ntitle and power of German Emperor could not be\\nconferred on him by a popular assembly; he could\\nonly accept it from his equals, the German Princes.\\nThe decision of the King was discussed in the\\nPrussian Assembly, and an address moved declaring\\nthat the Frankfort Constitution was in legal existence,\\nand requesting the King to accept the offer. It was\\non this occasion that Bismarck for the first time came\\nforward as the leader of a small party on the Extreme\\nRight. He at once rose to move the previous ques-\\ntion. He denied to the Assembly even the right of\\ndiscussing this matter which belonged to the preroga-\\ntive of the King.\\nHe was still more strongly opposed to the accept-\\nance of the offered crown. He saw only that the\\nKing of Prussia would be subjected to a Parliament-\\nary Assembly, that his power of action would be\\nlimited. The motto of his speech was that Prussia\\nmust remain Prussia. The crown of Frankfort,\\nhe said, may be very bright, but the gold which gives", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0111.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "74 Bismarck.\\n11849\\ntruth to its brilliance has first to be won by melting\\ndown the Prussian crown. His speech caused great\\nindignation ten thousand copies of it were printed to\\nbe distributed among the electors so as to show them\\nthe real principles and objects of the reactionary\\nparty.\\nHis opposition to any identification of Prussia and\\nGermany was maintained when the Prussian Govern-\\nment itself took the initiative and proposed its own\\nsolution. During the summer of 1849, Prussian\\nprogramme was published. The Government invited\\nthe other States of Germany to enter into a fresh\\nunion the basis of the new Constitution was to be\\nthat of Frankfort, but altered so far as might be\\nfound necessary, and the union was to be a voluntary\\none. The King in order to carry out this policy ap-\\npointed as one of his Ministers Herr von Radowitz.\\nHe was a man of the highest character and extreme\\nability. An officer by profession, he was distin-\\nguished by the versatility of his interests and his\\ngreat learning. The King found in him a man who\\nshared his own enthusiasm for letters. He had been\\na member of the Parliament at Frankfort, and had\\ntaken a leading part am.ong the extreme Conserva-\\ntives a Roman Catholic, he had come forward in\\ndefence of religion and order against the Liberals\\nand Republicans a very eloquent speaker, by his\\nearnestness and eloquence he was able for a short\\ntime to give new life to the failing hopes of the\\nGerman patriots.\\nBismarck always looked on the new Minister with\\ngreat dislike. Radowitz, indeed, hated the Revolu-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0112.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "1852] The German Problem. 75\\ntion as much as he did he was a zealous and patri-\\notic Prussian but there was a fundamental difference\\nin the nature of the two men. Radowitz wished to\\nreform Germany by moral influence. Bismarck did\\nnot believe in the possibility of this. To this per-\\nhaps we must add some personal feeling. The Min-\\nistry had hitherto consisted almost entirely of men\\nwho were either personal friends of Bismarck, or\\nwhom he had recommended to the King. With\\nRadowitz there entered into it a man who was su-\\nperior to all of them in ability, and over whom\\nBismarck could not hope to have any influence.\\nBismarck s distrust, which amounted almost to\\nhatred, depended, however, on his feai that the new\\npolicy would bring about the ruin of Prussia. He\\ntook the extreme Particularist view he had no in-\\nterest in Germany outside Prussia Wiirtemberg\\nand Bavaria were to him foreign States, [in all\\nthese proposals for a new Constitution he saw only\\nthat Prussia would be required to sacrifice its com-\\nplete independence that the King of Prussia would\\nbecome executor for the decrees of a popular and\\nalien Parliament] They were asked to cease to be\\nPrussians in order that they might become Germans.\\nThis Bismarck refused to do. Prussians we are,\\nhe said, and Prussians we will remain. He had\\nno sympathy with this idea of a United Germany\\nwhich was so powerful at the time there was only\\none way in which he was willing that Germany\\nshould be united, and that was according to the ex-\\nample which Frederick the Great had set. The\\nideals of the German nation were represented by", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0113.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "76 Bismarck. [1849-\\nArndt s famous song, Was ist des Deutschen\\nVaterland The fatherland of the Germans was\\nnot Suabia or Prussia, not Austria or Bavaria, it was\\nthe whole of Germany wherever the German tongue\\nwas spoken. From this Bismarck deliberately dis-\\nsociated himself. I have never heard, he said, a\\nPrussian soldier singing, Was ist des Deutschen\\nVaterland The new flag of Germany was to be\\nthe German tricolour, black and white and gold.\\nThe Prussian soldiers, cried Bismarck, have no\\ntricoloured enthusiasm among them you will find, as\\nlittle as in the rest of the Prussian people, the desire for\\na national regeneration they are contented with the\\nname of Prussia, and proud of the name of Prussia.\\nThese troops follow the black and white flag, not the tri-\\ncolour under the black and white they die with joy for\\ntheir country. The tricolour they have learnt since the\\n18th of March to look on as the colours of their foes.\\nThese words aroused intense indignation. One of\\nthe speakers who followed referred to him as the\\nProdigal Son of the German Fatherland, who had\\ndeserted his father s house. Bismarck repudiated\\nthe epithet. I am not a prodigal son, he said\\nmy father s house is Prussia and I have never left\\nit. He could not more clearly repudiate the title\\nGerman. The others were moved by enthusiasm\\nfor an idea, he by loyalty to an existing State,\\nNothing was sound, he said, in Germany, except\\nthe old Prussian institutions.\\nWhat has preserved us is that which is specifically\\nPrussian. It was the remnant of the Stock- Preiissenthmn", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0114.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "1852] The German Problem. jj\\nwhich has survived the Revolution, the Prussian army,\\nthe Prussian treasure, the fruits of many years of intelli-\\ngent Prussian administration, and the living co-operation\\nbetween King and people. It was the attachment of the\\nPrussian people to their hereditary dynasty, the old\\nPrussian virtues of honour, loyalty, obedience, and the\\ncourage which, emanating from the officers who form its\\nbone and marrow, permeates the army down to the\\nyoungest recruit.\\nHe reminded the House how the Assembly at\\nFrankfort had only been saved from the insurgent\\nmob by a Prussian regiment, and now it was pro-\\nposed to weaken and destroy all these Prussian in-\\nstitutions in order to change them into a democratic\\nGermany. He was asked to assent to a Constitution\\nin which the Prussian Government would sink to the\\nlevel of a provincial council, under the guidance of\\nan Imperial Ministry which itself would be depend-\\nent on a Parliament in which the Prussian interests\\nwould be in a minority. The most important and\\nhonourable duties of the Prussian Parliament would\\nbe transferred to a general Parliament the King\\nwould lose his veto he would be compelled against\\nhis will to assent to laws he disliked even the Prus-\\nsian army would be no longer under his sole com-\\nmand. What recompense were they to gain for\\nthis?\\nThe pleasant consciousness of having followed an\\nunselfish and noble policy of having satisfied the re-\\nquirements of a national regeneration of having carried\\nout the historical task of Prussia, or some such vague\\nexpression.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0115.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "78 Bismarck. [1849-\\nWith this he contrasted what would have been a\\ntrue Prussian pohcy, a poHcy which Frederick the\\nGreat might have followed.\\nHe would have known that now as in the day of our\\nfathers the sound of the trumpets which summoned\\nthem to their sovereign s flag has not lost its power for\\nPrussian ears he would have had the choice either of\\njoining our old comrade Austria, and undertaking the\\nbrilliant part which the Emperor of Russia has played,\\nand destroying the cause of the Revolution, or by the\\nsame right by which he took Silesia, he might, after re-\\nfusing to accept the crown, have ordered the Germans\\nwhat constitution they should have, and thrown the\\nsword into the scale then Prussia would have been in\\nthe position to win for Germany its place in the Council\\nof Europe.\\nWe all wish the same. We all wish that the Prussian\\neagle should spread out his wings as guardian and ruler\\nfrom the Memel to the Donnersberg, but free will we\\nhave him, not bound by a new Regensburg Diet. Prus-\\nsians we are and Prussians will we remain I know that\\nin these words I speak the confession of the Prussian\\narmy and the majority of my fellow-countrymen, and I\\nhope to God that we will still long remain Prussian when\\nthis sheet of paper is forgotten like a withered autumn\\nleaf.\\nThe policy of Radowitz was doomed to failure,\\nnot so much because of any inherent weakness in it,\\nbut because Prussia was not strong enough to de-\\nfend herself against all the enemies she had called\\nup. The other Courts of Germany were lukewarm,\\nAustria was extremely hostile. The Kings of Han-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0116.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "1852] The German Problem. 79\\nover and Saxony retreated from the alliance on the\\nground that they would enter the union only if the\\nwhole of Germany joined Bavaria had refused to\\ndo so in fact the two other Kings had privately\\nused all their influence to prevent Bavaria from join-\\ning, in order that they might always have an excuse\\nfor seceding, Prussia was, therefore, left surrounded\\nby twenty-eight of the smaller States. A Parlia-\\nment from them was summoned to meet at Erfurt\\nin order to discuss the new Constitution. Bismarck\\nwas elected a member of it he went there avowedly\\nto protect the Prussian interests. He had de-\\nmanded from the Government that at least the\\nConstitution agreed on in Erfurt should again be\\nsubmitted to the Prussian Chamber he feared that\\nmany of the most important Prussian rights might\\nbe sacrificed. His request was refused, for it was\\nobvious that if, after the Parliament of Erfurt had\\ncome to some conclusion, the new Constitution was\\nto be referred back again to the twenty-eight Parlia-\\nments of the allied States, the new union would\\nnever come into effect at all. It is curious here to\\nfind Bismarck using the rights of the Prussian Par-\\nliament as a weapon to maintain the complete inde-\\npendence of Prussia. Sixteen years later, when he\\nwas doing the work in which Radowitz failed, one\\nof his chief difficulties arose from the conduct of\\nmen who came forward with just the same demand\\nwhich he now made, and he had to refuse their\\ndemands as Radowitz now refused his.\\nHe did not take much part in the debates at\\nErfurt as he was one of the youngest of the mem-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0117.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "8o Bismarck. [1849-\\nbers, he held the position of Secretary the President\\nof the Assembly was Simpson, a very distinguished\\npublic man, but a converted Jew. What would my\\nfather have said, observed Bismarck, if he had\\nlived to see me become clerk to a Jewish scholar?\\nOn one occasion he became involved in what might\\nhave been a very serious dispute, when he used his\\npower as Secretary to exclude from the reporters\\ngallery two journalists whose reports of the meeting\\nwere very partial and strongly opposed to Austria.\\nHis attitude towards the Assembly is shewn by the\\nwords\\nI know that what I have said to you will have no\\ninfluence on your votes, but I am equally convinced that\\nyour votes will be as completely without influence on\\nthe course of events.\\nThe whole union was, as a matter of fact, broken\\ndown by the opposition of Austria. Bismarck had,\\nin one of his first speeches, warned against a\\npolicy which would bring Prussia into the position\\nwhich Piedmont had held before the battle of\\nNovara, when they embarked on a war in which\\nvictory would have brought about the overthrow of\\nthe monarchy, and defeat a disgraceful peace. It\\nwas his way of saying that he hoped the King would\\nnot eventually draw the sword in order to defend\\nthe new Liberal Constitution against the opposition\\nof Austria. The day came when the King was\\nplaced in this position. Austria had summoned the\\nold Diet to meet at Frankfort Prussia denied that\\nthe Diet still legally existed the two policies were", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0118.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "1852] The German Problem. 8i\\nclearly opposed to one another: Austria desiring\\nthe restoration of the old Constitution, Prussia, at\\nthe head of Liberal Germany, summoning the States\\nround her in a new union. There were other dis-\\nputes about Schlesv/ig-Holstein and the affairs of\\nHesse, but this was the real point at issue. The\\nAustrians were armed, and were supported by the\\nCzar and many of the German States shots were\\nactually exchanged between the Prussian and Bava-\\nrian outposts in Hesse. The Austrian ambassador\\nhad orders to leave Berlin had he done so, war\\ncould not have been avoided. He disobeyed his\\norders, remained in Berlin, asked for an interview\\nwith the King, and used all his influence to persuade\\nhim to surrender. The Ministry was divided Rado-\\nwitz stood almost alone the other Ministers, Bis-\\nmarck s friends, had always distrusted his policy.\\nThey wished to renew the old alliance with Austria;\\nthe Minister of War said they could not risk the\\nstruggle it was rumoured that he had deliberately\\navoided making preparations in order to prevent the\\nKing putting himself at the head of the Liberal\\nparty. During the crisis, Bismarck was summoned\\nto the King at Letzlingen there can be no doubt\\nwhat his advice was; eventually the party of peace\\nprevailed, and Radowitz resigned. Bismarck on\\nhearing the news danced three times round the\\ntable with delight. Brandenburg died almost im-\\nmediately after ManteufTel became Minister-Presi-\\ndent he asked Schwarzenberg for an interview,\\ntravelled to Olmutz to meet him, and an agreement\\nwas come to by which practically Prussia surren-\\n6", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0119.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "82 Bismarck.\\n[1849-\\ndered every object of dispute between the two great\\nPowers.\\nThe convention of Olmutz was the most complete\\nhumihation to which any European State has ever\\nbeen subjected. Prussia had undertaken a policy,\\nand with the strong approval of the great majority\\nof the nation had consistently maintained it for over\\na year Austria had required that this policy should\\nbe surrendered the two States had armed the ulti-\\nmatum had been sent, everything was prepared for\\nwar, and then Prussia surrendered. The cause for\\nthis was a double one. It was partly that Prussia\\nwas really not strong enough to meet the coalition\\nof Austria and Russia, but it was also that the King\\nwas really of two minds; he was constitutionally un-\\nable to maintain against danger a consistent course\\nof policy.\\nBismarck was one of the few men who defended\\nthe action of the Ministry. In the ablest of all his\\nspeeches he took up the gauntlet, and exposed all\\nthe weakness and the dangers of Radowitz s policy.\\nThis was not a cause in which Prussia should risk\\nits existence. Why should they go to war in order to\\nsubject Prussia not to the Princes but to the Chambers\\nof the smaller States A war for the Union would,\\nhe said, remind him of the Englishman who had a\\nfight with the sentry in order that he might hang\\nhimself in the sentry-box, a right which he claimed\\nfor himself and every free Briton. It was the duty\\nof the councillors of the King to warn him from a\\npolicy which would bring the State to destruction.\\nStill I would not shrink from the war I would ad-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0120.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "1852] The German Problem. 83\\nvise it, were anyone able to prove to me the necessity for\\nit, or to point out a worthy end which could be attained\\nby it and in no other way. Why do great States wage war\\nnowadays? The only sound principle of action for a\\ngreat State is political egoism and not Romanticism, and\\nit is unworthy of a great State to fight for any matter\\nwhich does not concern its own interests. Shew us,\\ngentlemen, an object worthy of war and you have my\\nvote. It is easy for a statesman in his office or his\\nchamber to blow the trumpet with the breath of popu-\\nlarity and all the time to sit warming himself by his\\nfireside, while he leaves it to the rifleman, who lies\\nbleeding on the snow, whether his system attains victory\\nand glory. Nothing is easier but woe to the statesman\\nwho at such a time does not look about for a reason for\\nthe war which will be valid when the war is over. I am\\nconvinced you will see the questions which now occupy\\nus in a different light a year hence, when you look back\\nupon them through a long perspective of battle-fields and\\nconflagrations, misery and wretchedness. Will you then\\nhave the courage to go to the peasant by the ashes of\\nhis cottage, to the cripple, to the childless father, and\\nsay You have suffered much, but rejoice with us, the\\nUnion is saved. Rejoice with us, Hassenpflug is no\\nlonger Minister, Bayernhofer rules in Hesse.\\nEloquent words but what a strange comment on\\nthem his own acts were to afford. In 1850 Prussia\\nhad a clearer and juster cause of war than in 1866;\\nevery word of his speech might have been used with\\nequal effect sixteen years later; the Constitution of\\n1850 was little different from that which Bismarck\\nhimself was to give to Germany. The policy of\\nRadowitz was the only true policy for Prussia if", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0121.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "84 Bismarck. [1849-\\nhe failed, it was because Prussia s army was not\\nstrong enough war would have been followed by\\ndefeat and disaster. There was one man who saw\\nthe evils as they really were the Prince of Prussia\\ndetermined that if ever he became King the army\\nof Prussia should be again made strong and ef^cient.\\nIt was probably this speech which determined\\nBismarck s future career. He had defended the\\nagreement with Austria and identified himself with\\nthe policy of the Government what more natural\\nthan that they should use him to help to carry out\\nthe policy he had upheld. Prussia consented to\\nrecognise the restoration of the Diet it would be\\nnecessary, therefore, to send an envoy. Now that\\nshe had submitted to Austria the only wise policy\\nwas to cultivate her friendship. Who could do this\\nbetter than Bismarck? Who had more boldly sup-\\nported and praised the new rulers of Austria?\\nWhen the Gotha party, as they were called, had\\nwished to exclude Austria from Germany, he it was\\nwho said that Austria was no more a foreign State\\nthan Wiirtemberg or Bavaria. The appointment of\\nBismarck would be the best proof of the loyal inten-\\ntions of the Prussian Government.\\nA few years later he himself gave to Motley the\\nfollowing account of his appointment\\nIn the summer of 1851, Motley writes, he told me\\nthat the Minister, Manteuffel, asked him one day ab-\\nruptly, if he would accept the post of Ambassador at\\nFrankfort, to which (although the proposition was as un-\\nexpected a one to him as if I should hear by the next\\nmail that I had been chosen Governor of Massachusetts)", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0122.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "1852] The German Problem. 85\\nhe answered, after a moment s deliberation, yes, with-\\nout another word. The King, the same day, sent for\\nhim, and asked him if he would accept the place, to\\nwhich he made the same brief answer, Ja. His Majesty\\nexpressed a little surprise that he made no inquiries or\\nconditions, when Bismarck replied that anything which\\nthe King felt strong enough to propose to him, he felt\\nstrong enough to accept. I only write these details,\\nthat you may have an idea of the man. Strict integrity\\nand courage of character, a high sense of honour, a firm\\nreligious belief, united with remarkable talents, make up\\nnecessarily a combination which cannot be found any\\nday in any Court and I have no doubt that he is de-\\nstined to be Prime Minister, unless his obstinate truthful-\\nness, which is apt to be a stumbling-block for politicians,\\nstands in his way.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0123.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER V.\\nFRANKFORT.\\n1851-1857.\\nBISMARCK when he went to Frankfort was\\nthirty-six years of age he had had no experi-\\nence in diplomacy and had long been un-\\naccustomed to the routine of official life. He had\\ndistinguished himself by qualities which might seem\\nvery undiplomatic; as a Parliamentary debater he\\nhad been outspoken in a degree remarkable even\\nduring a revolution he had a habit of tearing away\\nthe veil from those facts which everyone knows and\\nwhich all wish to ignore a careless good-fellowship\\nwhich promised little of that reserve and discretion\\nso necessary in a confidential agent a personal and\\nwilful independence which might easily lead him\\ninto disagreement with the Ministers and the King.\\nHe had not even the advantage of learning his work\\nby apprenticeship under a more experienced official\\nduring the first two months at Frankfort he held the\\nposition of First Secretary, but his chief did not at-\\ntempt to introduce him to the more important nego-\\ntiations and when, at the end of July, he received his\\n86", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0124.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "1851] Frankfort. 87\\ndefinite appointment as envoy, he knew as little of\\nthe work as when he arrived at Frankfort.\\nHe had, however, occupied his time in becoming\\nacquainted with the social conditions. His first im-\\npressions were very unfavourable. Frankfort held\\na peculiar position. Though the centre of the Ger-\\nman political system it was less German than any\\nother town in the country. The society was very\\ncosmopolitan. There were the envoys of the German\\nStates and the foreign Powers, but the diplomatic\\ncircle was not graced by the dignity of a Court nor\\nby the neighbourhood of any great administrative\\nPower. Side by side with the diplomatists were the\\ncitizens of Frankfort but here again we find indeed\\na great money-market, the centre of the finance of\\nthe Continent, dissociated from any great productive\\nactivity. In the neighbourhood were the watering-\\nplaces and gambling-tables Homburg and Wies-\\nbaden, Soden and Baden-Baden, were within an easy\\nride or short railway journey, and Frankfort was\\nconstantly visited by all the idle Princes of Germany.\\nIt was a city in which intrigue took the place of\\nstatesmanship, and never has intrigue played so large\\na part in the history of Europe as during the years\\n1 850-1 870. Half the small States who were repre-\\nsented at Frankfort had ambitions beyond their\\npowers they liked to play their part in the politics\\nof Europe, Too weak to stand alone, they were also\\ntoo weak to be quite honest, and attempted to gain\\nby cunning a position which they could not main-\\ntain by other means. This was the city in which Bis-\\nmarck was to serve his diplomatic apprenticeship.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0125.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "88 Bismarck.\\n[1851-\\nTwo extracts from letters to his wife give the best\\npicture of his personal character at this time:\\nOn Saturday I drove with Rochow to Riidesheim\\nthere I took a boat and rowed out on the Rhine, and\\nbathed in the moonlight only nose and eyes above the\\nwater, and floated down to the Rat Tower at Bingen,\\nwhere the wicked Bishop met his end. It is something\\nstrangely dreamlike to lie in the water in the quiet,\\nwarm light, gently carried along by the stream to look\\nat the sky with the moon and stars above one, and, on\\neither side, to see the wooded mountain-tops and castle\\nparapets in the moonlight, and to hear nothing but the\\ngentle rippling of one s own motion. I should like a\\nswim like this every evening. Then I drank some very\\ngood wine, and sat long talking with Lynar on the bal-\\ncony, with the Rhine beneath us. My little Testament\\nand the starry heavens brought us on Christian topics,\\nand I long shook at the Rousseau-like virtue of his soul.\\nYesterday I was at Wiesbaden, and with a feeling of\\nmelancholy revisited the scenes of former folly. May it\\nplease God to fill with His clear and strong wine this\\nvessel in which the champagne of twenty-one years\\nfoamed so uselessly. I do not understand how\\na man who reflects on himself, and still knows, and will\\nknow, nothing of God, can endure his life for contempt\\nand weariness. I do not know how I endured this in\\nold days if, as then, I were to live without God, thee,\\nand the children, I do not know why I should not put\\nlife aside like a dirty shirt and yet most of my acquaint-\\nances live thus.\\nNow let us see what he thinks of his new duties:\\nOur intercourse here is at best nothing but a n^utual", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0126.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 89\\nsuspicion and espionage if only there was anything to\\nspy out and to hide It is pure trifles with which they\\nworry themselves, and I find these diplomatists with their\\nairs of confidence and their petty fussiness much more\\nabsurd than the member of the Second Chamber in his\\nconscious dignity. Unless some external events take\\nplace, and we clever men of the Diet can neither direct\\nnor foresee them, I know already what we shall bring\\nabout in one or two or three years, and will do it in\\ntwenty-four hours if the others will only be reasonable\\nand truthful for a single day. I am making tremendous\\nprogress in the art of saying nothing in many words I\\nwrite reports many pages long, which are smooth and\\nfinished like leading articles, and if Manteuffel after\\nreading them can say what they contain, he can do more\\nthan I. We all do as though we believed of each other\\nthat we are full of thoughts and plans, if only we would\\nexpress them, and all the time we none of us know a\\nhair s breadth more what will become of Germany.\\nOf the Austrian Envoy who was President of the\\nDiet he writes\\nThun in his outward appearance has something of a\\nhearty good fellow mixed with a touch of the Vienna\\nroue. Underneath this he hides, I will not say great\\npolitical power and intellectual gifts, but an uncommon\\ncleverness and cunning, which with great presence of\\nmind appears from underneath the mask of harmless\\ngood-humour as soon as politics are concerned. I con-\\nsider him as an opponent who is dangerous to anyone\\nwho honestly trusts him, instead of paying back in his\\nown coin.\\nHis judgment on his other colleagues is equally\\ndecisive of the Austrian diplomatists", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0127.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "90 Bismarck. [I85ir\\none must never expect that they will make what is\\nright the foundation of their policy for the simple reason\\nthat it is the right. Cautious dishonesty is the charac-\\nteristic of their association with us. They have nothing\\nwhich awakens confidence. They intrigue under the\\nmask of good-fellowship.\\nIt was impossible to look for open co-operation from\\nthem\\ntheir mouths are full of the necessity for common ac-\\ntion, but when it is a question of furthering our wishes,\\nthen ofificially it is, We will not oppose, and a secret\\npleasure in preparing obstacles.\\nIt was just the same with the envoys of the other\\ncountries: with few exceptions there is none for\\nwhom right has any value in itself.\\nThey are caricatures of diplomatists who put on their\\nofficial physiognomy if I ask them for a light, and select\\ngestures and words with a truly Regensburg caution, if\\nthey ask for the key of the water-closet. Writing to\\nGerlach he speaks of the lying, double-tongued policy\\nof the Austrians. Of all the lies and intrigues that go\\non up and down the Rhine an honest man from the old\\nMark has no conception. These South German child-\\nren of nature are very corrupt.\\nHis opinion of the diplomatists does not seem to\\nhave improved as he knew them better. Years later\\nhe wrote\\nThere are few diplomatists who in the long run do\\nnot prefer to capitulate with their conscience and their\\npatriotism, and to guard the interests of their country and\\ntheir sovereign with somewhat less decision, rather than,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0128.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 91\\nincessantly and with danger to their personal position,\\nto contend with the difificulties which are prepared for\\nthem by a powerful and unscrupulous enemy.\\nHe does not think much better of his own Prus-\\nsian colleagues he often complains of the want of\\nsupport which he received. With us the ofificial\\ndiplomacy, he writes, is capable of playing under\\nthe same roof with strangers against their own coun-\\ntrymen.\\nThese letters are chiefly interesting because of the\\nlight they throw on his own character at the begin-\\nning of his diplomatic career we must not take\\nthem all too seriously. He was too good a racon-\\nteur not to make a good story better, and too good\\na letter-writer not to add something to the effect of\\nhis descriptions besides, as he says elsewhere, he\\ndid not easily see the good side of people his eyes\\nwere sharper for their faults than their good quali-\\nties.* After the first few passages of arms he got on\\nwell enough with Thun when he was recalled two\\nyears later Bismarck spoke of him with much\\nwarmth. I like him personall}^ and should be\\nglad to have him for a neighbour at Schonhausen.\\nIt is however important to notice that the first\\nimpression made on him by diplomatic work was\\nthat of wanton and ineffective deceit. Those who\\naccuse him, as is so often done, of lowering the stand-\\nard of political morality which prevails in Europe,\\nThis trait is confirmed by Busch, wiio in his record of the conver-\\nsations of Bismarck observes that with one or two exceptions he\\nseldom had a good word to say for his colleagues.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0129.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "92 Bismarck. [1851-\\nknow little of politics as they were at the time when\\nSchwarzenberg was the leading statesman.\\nIt was his fate at once to be brought in close con--\\ntact with the most disagreeable side of political life.\\nIn all diplomatic work there must be a good deal of\\nespionage and underhand dealing. This was a part\\nof his duties which Bismarck had soon to learn. He\\nwas entrusted with the management of the Press.\\nThis consisted of two parts first of all, he had to\\nprocure the insertion of articles in influential papers\\nin a sense agreeable to the plans of the Prussian\\nGovernment secondly, when hostile articles ap-\\npeared, or inconvenient information was published,\\nhe had to trace the authors of it, find out by whom\\nthe obnoxious paper had been inspired, or who had\\nconveyed the secret information. This is a form of\\nactivity of which it is of course not possible to give\\nany full account it seems, however, clear that in\\na remarkably short time Bismarck shewed great apti-\\ntude for his new duties. His letters to Manteuffel\\nare full of curious information as to the intrigues of\\nthose who are hostile to Prussia. He soon learns to\\ndistrust the information supplied by the police all\\nthrough his life he had little respect for this depart-\\nment of the Prussian State. He soon had agents of\\nhis own. We find him gaining secret information as\\nto the plans of the Ultramontane party in Baden from\\na compositor at Freiburg who was in his pay. On\\nother occasions, when a Court official at Berlin had\\nconveyed to the newspapers private information, Bis-\\nmarck was soon able to trace him out. We get the\\nimpression, both from his letters and from what", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0130.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 93\\nother information we possess, that all the diplomat-\\nists of Germany were constantly occupied in calumni-\\nating one another through anonymous contributions\\nto a venal Press.\\nIt is characteristic of the customs of the time that\\nhe had to warn his wife that all her letters to him\\nwould be read in the post-ofifice before he received\\nthem. It was not only the Austrians who used\\nthese methods each of the Prussian Ministers would\\nhave his own organ which he would use for his own\\npurposes, and only too probably to attack his own col-\\nleagues. It was at this time that a curious fact came\\nto light with regard to Herr von Prokesch-Osten,\\nthe Austrian Ambassador at Berlin. He had been\\ntransferred from Berlin to Frankfort, and on leaving\\nhis house sold some of his furniture. In a chest of\\ndrawers was found a large bundle of papers consist-\\ning of newspaper articles in his handwriting, which\\nhad been communicated to different papers, attack-\\ning the Prussian Government, to which he at the\\ntime was accredited. Of Prokesch it is that Bis-\\nmarck once writes As to his statements I do not\\nknow how much you will find to be Prokesch, and\\nhow much to be true. On another occasion, before\\nmany witnesses, Bismarck had disputed some state-\\nment he made. If it is not true, cried Prokesch,\\nthen I should have lied in the name of the Royal\\nand Imperial Government. Certainly, answered\\nBismarck. There was a dead pause in the conversa-\\ntion. Prokesch afterwards of^cially admitted that\\nthe statement had been incorrect.\\nThis association with the Press formed in him a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0131.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "94 Bismarck. [1851-\\nhabit of mind which he never lost: the proper use\\nof newspapers seemed to him, as to most German\\nstatesmen, to be not the expression of pubHc opinion\\nbut the support of the Government if a paper is\\nopposed to the Government, the assumption seems\\nto be that it is bribed by some other State.\\nThe whole country would rejoice if some of the\\npapers which are supported by foreign sources were\\nsuppressed, with the express recognition of their unpa-\\ntriotic attitude. There may be opposition in the inter-\\nnal affairs, but a paper which in Prussia takes part\\nagainst the policy of the King on behalf of foreign\\ncountries, must be regarded as dishonoured and treated\\nas such.\\nPolitically his position was very difficult the\\nDiet had been restored by Austria against the will\\nof Prussia the very presence of a Prussian Envoy\\nin Frankfort was a sign of her humiliation. He had\\nindeed gone there full of friendly dispositions to-\\nwards Austria he was instructed to take up again the\\npolicy which had been pursued before 1848, when\\nall questions of importance had been discussed by\\nthe two great Powers before they were laid before\\nthe Diet. Bismarck, however, quickly found that\\nthis was no longer the intention of Austria the\\nAustria which he had so chivalrously defended at\\nBerlin did not exist he had expected to find a\\nwarm and faithful friend he found a cunning and\\narrogant enemy. Schwarzenberg had spared Prus-\\nsia but he intended to humble her; he wished to\\nuse the Diet as a means of permanently asserting", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0132.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 95\\nthe supremacy of Austria, and he would not be con-\\ntent until Prussia had been forced like Saxony or\\nBavaria to acquiesce in the position of a vassal\\nState. The task might not seem impossible, for\\nPrussia appeared to be on the downward path.\\nOf course the Diet of Frankfort was the place\\nwhere the plan had to be carried out it seemed an\\nadmirable opportunity that Prussia was represented\\nthere by a young and untried man. Count Thun\\nand his successors used every means to make it\\nappear as though Prussia was a State not of equal\\nrank with Austria. They carried the war into soci-\\nety and, as diplomatists always will, used the out-\\nward forms of social intercourse as a means for\\nobtaining political ends. On this field, Bismarck\\nwas quite capable of meeting them. He has told\\nmany stories of their conflicts.\\nAs President of the Diet, Thun claimed privileges\\nfor himself which others did not dare to dispute.\\nIn the sittings of the military commission when\\nRochow was Prussian envoy, Austria alone smoked.\\nRochow, who was a passionate smoker, would also have\\ngladly done so, but did not venture. When I came I\\ndid not see any reason against it and asked for a light\\nfrom the Presiding State this seemed to be noticed\\nwith astonishment and displeasure by him and the other\\ngentlemen it was obviously an event for them. This\\ntime only Austria and Prussia smoked. But the others\\nobviously held it so important that they sent home a\\nreport on it. Someone must have written about it to\\nBerlin, as a question from the late King arrived he\\ndid not smoke himself and probably did not find the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0133.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "96 Bismarck. [1851-\\naffair to his taste. It required much consideration at\\nthe smaller Courts, and for quite half a year only the\\ntwo great Powers smoked. Then Schrenk, the Bavarian\\nenvoy, began to maintain the dignity of his position by\\nsmoking. The Saxon Nostitz would doubtless have\\nliked to begin too, but I suppose he had not yet received\\npermission from his Minister. But when next time he\\nsaw that Bothmer, the Hanoverian, allowed himself a\\ncigar, he must have come to an understanding with his\\nneighbour (he was a good Austrian, and had sons in\\nthe Austrian army), for he brought out his pouch and lit\\nup. There remained only the Wiirtemberger and the\\nDarmstadter, and they did not smoke at all, but the\\nhonour and the importance of their States required it,\\nand so on the following day the Wiirtemberger really\\nbrought out his cigar. I can see him with it now, a long,\\nthin, yellow thing, the colour of rye-straw, and with\\nsulky determination, as a sacrifice for his Swabian\\nfatherland, he smoked at least half of it. Hesse-Darm-\\nstadt alone refrained.\\nOn another occasion Thun received Bismarck in\\nhis shirt sleeves: You are quite right, said Bis-\\nmarck, it is very hot, and took off his own coat.\\nIn the transaction of business he found the same\\nthing. The plan seemed to be deliberately to adopt\\na policy disadvantageous to Prussia, to procure the\\nvotes of a majority of the States, thereby to cause\\nPrussia to be outvoted, and to leave her in the di-\\nlemma of accepting a decision which was harmful to\\nherself or of openly breaking with the Federation.\\nOn every matter which came up the same scenes re-\\npeated themselves; now it was the disposal of the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0134.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 97\\nfleet, which had to a great extent been provided for\\nand maintained by Prussian money Austria de-\\nmanded that it should be regarded as the property\\nof the Confederation even though most of the States\\nhad never paid their contribution. Then it was the\\nquestion of the Customs Union a strong effort was\\nmade by the anti-Prussian party to overthrow the\\nunion which Prussia had estabHshed and thereby\\nruin the one great work which she had achieved.\\nAgainst these and similar attempts Bismarck had con-\\nstantly to be on the defensive. Another time it was\\nthe publication of the proceedings of the Diet which\\nthe Austrians tried to make a weapon against Prus-\\nsia. The. whole intercourse became nothing but a\\nseries of disputes, sometimes serious, sometimes\\ntrivial.\\nBismarck was soon able to hold his own poor\\nCount Thun, whose nerves were not strong, after a\\nserious discussion with him used to go to bed at iive\\no clock in the afternoon he complained that his\\nhealth would not allow him to hold his post if there\\nwere to be continuous quarrels. When his successor,\\nHerr v. Prokesch, left Frankfort for Constantinople,\\nhe said that it would be like an Eastern dream of\\nthe blessed to converse with the wise Ali instead of\\nBismarck.\\nAs soon as the first strangeness had passed off\\nBismarck became reconciled to his position. His\\nwife and children joined him, he made himself a com-\\nfortable home, and his house soon became one of the\\nmost popular in the town he and his wife were\\ngenial and hospitable and he used his position to ex-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0135.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "98 Bismarck. [1851-\\ntend his own influence and that of his country. His\\nold friend, Motley, visited him there in 1855 d\\nwrote to his wife:\\nFrankfort,\\nMonday, July 30, 1855.\\nThe Bismarcks are as kind as ever nothing\\ncan be more frank and cordial than her manners. I am\\nthere all day long. It is one of those houses where every-\\none does what he likes. The show apartments where\\nthey receive formal company are on the front of the\\nhouse. Their living rooms, however, are a salon and\\ndining-room at the back, opening upon the garden. Here\\nthere are young and old, grandparents and children and\\ndogs all at once, eating, drinking, smoking, piano-play-\\ning, and pistol-firing (in the garden), all going on at the\\nsame time. It is one of those establishments where every\\nearthly thing that can be eaten or drunk is offered you\\nporter, soda water, small beer, champagne, burgundy, or\\nclaret are about all the time, and everybody is smoking\\nthe best Havana cigars every minute.\\nHe had plenty of society, much of it congenial to\\nhim. He had given up playing since his marriage,\\nand was one of the few diplomatists who was not\\nfound at the Homburg gaming-tables, but he had a\\nsufficiency of sport and joined with the British envoy,\\nSir Alexander Malet, in taking some shooting. A\\ncouple of years later in contradicting one of the fre-\\nquent newspaper reports, that he aimed at supplant-\\ning the Minister, he says:\\nMy castle in the air is to spend three to five years\\nlonger at Frankfort, then perhaps the same time in", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0136.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 99\\nVienna or Paris, then ten years with glory as Minister,\\nthen die as a country gentleman.\\nA prospect which has been more nearly fulfilled than\\nsuch wishes generally are.\\nHe was for the first year still a member of the\\nSecond Chamber and occasionally appeared in it his\\ninterest in his diplomatic work had, however, begun\\nto overshadow his pleasure in Parliamentary debate.\\nI am thoroughly tired of my life here, he writes in\\nMay, 1853, to his wife from Berlin, and long for the day\\nof my departure. I find the intrigues of the House im-\\nmeasurably shallow and undignified if one always lives\\namong them, one deceives oneself and considers them\\nsomething wonderful. When I come here from Frank-\\nfort and see them as they really are, I feel like a sober\\nman who has fallen among drunkards. There is some-\\nthing very demoralising in the air of the Chambers it\\nmakes the best people vain without their knowing it.\\nSo quickly has he outgrown his feelings of a year\\nago then it was the intrigues of diplomatists that\\nhad seemed to him useless and demoralising. Now\\nit was Parliamentary debates in the opinion he\\nformed at this time he never wavered.\\nHis distaste for Parliamentary life was probably\\nincreased by an event which took place about this\\ntime. As so often before in the course of debate he\\nhad a sharp passage of words with Vincke the latter\\nreferred contemptuously to Bismarck s diplomatic\\nachievements. All I know of them is the famous\\nlighted cigar.\\nBismarck answered with some angry words and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0137.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "TOO Bismarck. [1851-\\nat the close of the sitting sent a challenge. Four\\ndays later a duel with pistols took place the only-\\none he ever fought. Neither was injured. It seems\\nthat Vincke, who had the first shot, seeing that Bis-\\nmarck (who had received the sacrament the night\\nbefore) was praying, missed on purpose Bismarck\\nthen shot into the air.\\nFor these reasons he did not stand for re-election\\nwhen the Chamber was dissolved in 1852, although\\nthe King was very much displeased with his deter-\\nmination. He was shortly afterwards appointed\\nmember of the newly constituted House of Lords,\\nbut though he occasionally voted, as in duty bound,\\nfor Government measures, he never spoke he was\\nnot to be heard again in the Parliament until he ap-\\npeared there as President of the Ministry. He was\\nglad to be freed from a tie which had interfered with\\nhis duties at Frankfort to these he devoted himself\\nwith an extraordinary energy all his old repugnance\\nto of^cial life had disappeared he did not confine\\nhimself to the mere routine of his duties, or to carry-\\ning out the instructions sent to him from Berlin.\\nHis power of work was marvellous: there passed\\nthrough his hands a constant series of most import-\\nant and complicated negotiations up to this time\\nhe had no experience or practice in sedentary literary\\nwork, now he seems to go out of the way to make\\nfresh labours for himself. He writes long and care-\\nful despatches to his Minister on matters of general\\npolicy some of them so carefully thought out and\\nso clearly expressed that they may still be looked\\non as models. He is entirely free from that circum-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0138.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. loi\\nlocution and involved style which makes so much\\ndiplomatic correspondence almost worthless. His\\narguments are always clear, complete, concise. He\\nused to work long into the night, and then, when\\nin the early morning the post to Berlin had gone, he\\nwould mount his horse and ride out into the country.\\nIt was in these years that he formed those habits\\nto which the breakdown of his health in later years\\nwas due but now his physical and intellectual vigour\\nseemed inexhaustible.\\nHe never feared to press his own views as to the\\npolicy which should be pursued. He also kept up\\na constant correspondence with Gerlach, and many\\nof these letters were laid before the King, so that\\neven when absent he continued as before to influence\\nboth the ofificial and unofficial advisers. He soon\\nbecame the chief adviser on German affairs and was\\noften summoned to Berlin that his advice might be\\ntaken within two years after his appointment he\\nwas sent on a special mission to Vienna to try and\\nbring about an agreement as to the rivalry concern-\\ning the Customs Union. He failed, but he had\\ngained a knowledge of persons and opinions at the\\nAustrian Court which was to be of much use to him.\\nDuring these years, indeed, he acquired a most\\nremarkable knowledge of Germany before, he had\\nlived entirely in Prussia, now he was at the centre of\\nthe German political system, continually engaged in\\nimportant negotiations with the other Courts after\\na few years there was not a man of importance in\\nGerman public life whose character and opinions he\\nhad not gauged.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0139.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "I02 Bismarck.\\n[1851-\\nFurther experience only confirmed in him the ob-\\nservations he had made at the beginning, that it was\\nimpossible to maintain a good understanding with\\nAustria. The tone of his letters soon changes from\\ndoubt and disappointment to settled and determined\\nhostility. In other matters also he found that the\\nworld was not the same place it had seemed to him\\nhe had been accustomed to regard the Revolution\\nas the chief danger to be met at Frankfort he was\\nin the home of it here for nearly a year the German\\nAssembly had held its meetings in the neighbour-\\ning States of Baden, Hesse, and in the Palatinate,\\nthe Republican element was strong he found them\\nas revolutionary as ever, but he soon learnt to despise\\nrather than fear them\\nThe population here would be a political volcano if\\nrevolutions were made with the mouth so long as it\\nrequires blood and strength they will obe)^ anyone who\\nhas courage to command and, if necessary, to draw the\\nsword they would be dangerous only under cowardly\\ngovernments.\\nI have never seen two men fighting in all the two years\\nI have been here. This cowardice does not prevent the\\npeople, who are completely devoid of all inner Christian-\\nity and all respect for authority, from sympathising with\\nthe Revolution.\\nHis observations on the character of the South\\nGermans only increased his admiration for the Prus-\\nsian people and his confidence in the Prussian State.\\nHe had not been at Frankfort a year before he\\nhad learnt to look on this hostility of Austria as\\nunsurmountable. As soon as he had convinced him-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0140.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "1857]\\nFrankfort. 103\\nself of this, he did not bewail and bemoan the de-\\nsertion of their ally he at once accustomed himself\\nto the new position and considered in what way the\\nGovernment ought to act. His argument was simple.\\nAustria is now our enemy we must be prepared to\\nmeet this enmity either by diplomacy or war we\\nare not strong enough to do so alone therefore we\\nmust have allies. There was no sure alliance to be\\nhad in Germany he despised the other German\\nStates. If there were to be a war he would rather\\nhave them against him than on his side. He must\\nfind help abroad Austria had overcome Prussia by\\nthe alliance with Russia. Surely the only thing to\\nbe done was to seek support where it could be got,\\neither with Russia or with France, if possible with\\nboth. In this he was only reverting to the old\\npolicy of Prussia the alliance with Austria had only\\nbegun in 18 13. From now until 1866 his whole\\npolicy was ceaselessly devoted to bringing about\\nsuch a disposition of the forces of Europe that\\nAustria might be left without allies and Prussia be\\nable to regain the upper hand in German affairs.\\nThe change was in his circumstances, not in his\\ncharacter; as before he was moved by a consuming\\npassion of patriotism something there was too of\\npersonal feeling, his own pride, his own ambitions\\nwere engaged, though this was as nothing compared\\nto love of his country and loyalty to the King. He\\nwas a soldier of the Prussian Crown at Berlin he\\nhad to defend it against internal enemies now the\\ndanger had shifted, the power of the Government\\nwas established, why waste time in fighting with", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0141.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "I04 Bismarck. [1851-\\nLiberalism? Other enemies were pressing on. When\\nJellachich and Windischgratz had stood victorious\\nby the blood-stained altar of St. Stephen s, the Aus-\\ntrian army had destroyed the common foe now it\\nwas the same Austrian army and Austrian statesmen\\nwho desired to put a limit to Prussian ambition.\\nBismarck threw himself into the conflict of diplomacy\\nwith the same courage and relentless persistence\\nthat he had shewn in Parliamentary debates. He\\nhad already begun to divine that the time might\\ncome when the Prussian Crown would find an ally in\\nItalian patriots and Hungarian rebels.\\nIt was the Eastern complications which first en-\\nabled him to shew his diplomatic abilities in the\\nlarger field of European politics. The plans for the\\ndismemberment of the Turkish Empire which were\\nentertained by the Czar were opposed by England,\\nFrance, and Austria; Prussia, though not immedi-\\nately concerned, also at first gave her assent to the\\nvarious notes and protests of the Powers so that\\nthe ambition of the Czar was confronted by the\\nunanimous voice of Europe.\\nBismarck from the beginning regarded the situa-\\ntion with apprehension he saw that Prussia was\\nbeing entangled in a struggle in which she had much\\nto lose and nothing to gain. If she continued to\\nsupport the Western Powers she would incur the\\nhatred of Russia then, perhaps, by a sudden change\\nof policy on the part of Napoleon, she would be left\\nhelpless and exposed to Russian vengeance. If war\\nwere to break out, and Prussia took part in the war,\\nthen the struggle between France and Russia would", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0142.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 105\\nbe fought out on German soil, and, whoever was\\nvictorious, Germany would be the loser. What in-\\nterests of theirs were at stake that they should incur\\nthis danger? why should Prussia sacrifice herself to\\npreserve English influence in the Mediterranean, or\\nthe interests of Austria on the Danube He wished\\nfor exactly the opposite policy the embarrassment\\nof Austria must be the opportunity of Prussia; now\\nwas the time to recover the lost position in Germany.\\nThe dangerous friendship of Austria and Russia was\\ndissolved if Prussia came to an understanding with\\nthe Czar, it was now Austria that would be isolated.\\nThe other German States would not desire to be\\ndragged into a war to support Austrian dominion in\\nthe East. Let Prussia be firm and they would turn\\nto her for support, and she would once more be able\\nto command a majority of the Diet.\\nFor these reasons he recommended his Govern-\\nment to preserve an armed neutrality, in union, if\\npossible, with the other German States. If they\\nwere to take sides, he preferred it should not be with\\nthe Western Powers, for, as he said,\\nWe must look abroad for allies, and among the\\nEuropean Powers Russia is to be had on the cheapest\\nterms it wishes only to grow in the East, the two others\\nat our expense.\\nIt shews the advance he had made in diplomacy\\nthat throughout his correspondence he never refers\\nto the actual cause of dispute others might dis-\\ncuss the condition of the Christians in Turkey or\\nthe Holy Places of Jerusalem he thinks only of the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0143.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "io6 Bisinarck.\\n[1851-\\nstrength and weakness of his own State. The open-\\ning of the Black Sea, the dismemberment of Turkey,\\nthe control of the Mediterranean, the fate of the\\nDanubian Principalities for all this he cared nothing,\\nfor in them Prussia had no interests they only ex-\\nisted for him so far as the new combinations among\\nthe Powers might for good or evil affect Prusfeia.\\nThe crisis came in 1854 a Russian army occupied\\nMoldavia and Wallachia England and France sent\\ntheir fleets to the Black Sea; they determined on\\nwar and they wished for the alliance of Austria.\\nAustria was inclined to join, for the presence of\\nRussian troops on the Danube was a menace to her\\nshe did not dare to move unless supported by Prussia\\nand Germany she appealed to the Confederacy and\\nurged that her demands might be supported by the\\narmies of her allies but the German States were lit-\\ntle inclined to send the levies of their men for the\\nEastern interests of the Emperor. If they were en-\\ncouraged by Prussia, they would refuse the result\\nin Germany, as in Europe, depended on the action\\nof Prussia, and the decision lay with the King.\\nWas Prussia to take part with Russia or the\\nWestern Powers? That was the question which for\\nmany months was debated at Berlin.\\nThe public opinion of the nation was strong for\\nthe Western Powers they feared the influence of\\nRussia on the internal affairs of Germany they had\\nnot forgotten or forgiven the part which the Czar\\nhad taken in 1849 choice seemed to lie between\\nRussia and England, between liberty and despotism,\\nbetween civilisation and barbarism. On this side", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0144.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 107\\nalso were those who wished to mahitain the alHance\\nwith Austria. Russia had few friends except at the\\nCourt and in the army, but the party of the Kreuz\\nZeitung, the Court Camarilla, the princes and nobles\\nwho commanded the Garde Corps, wished for nothing\\nbetter than a close alliance with the great Emperor\\nwho had saved Europe from the Revolution. Let\\nus draw our sword openly in defence of Russia, they\\nsaid, then we may bring Austria with us; the old\\nalliance of the three monarchies will be restored, and\\nthen will be the time for a new crusade against\\nFrance, the natural enemy of Germany, and the\\nupstart Emperor.\\nThe conflict of parties was keenest in the precincts\\nof the Court; society in Berlin was divided between\\nthe Russian and the English the Queen was hot for\\nRussia, but the English party rallied round the\\nPrince of Prussia and met in the salons of his wife.\\nBetween the two the King wavered he was, as al-\\nways, more influenced by feeling than by calculation,\\nbut his feelings were divided. How could he decide\\nbetween Austria and Russia, the two ancient allies\\nof his house? He loved and reverenced the Czar;\\nhe feared and distrusted Napoleon alliance with\\ninfidels against Christians was to him a horrible\\nthought, but he knew how violent were the actions\\nand lawless the desires of Nicholas. He could not\\nignore the opinions of Western Europe and he\\nwished to stand well with England. The men by\\nwhose advice he was guided stood on opposite sides\\nBunsen was for England, Gerlach for Russia the\\nMinistry also was divided. No efforts were spared", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0145.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "io8 Bismarck.\\n[1851-\\nto influence him the Czar and Napoleon each sent\\nspecial envoys to his Court the Queen of England\\nand her husband warned him not to forget his duty\\nto Europe and humanity if he would join the allies\\nthere would be no war. Still he wavered he\\ngoes to bed an Englishman and gets up a Russian,\\nsaid the Czar, who despised his brother-in-law as\\nmuch as he was honoured by him.\\nWhile the struggle was at its height, Bismarck was\\nsummoned to Berlin, that his opinion might also be\\nheard. At Berlin and at Letzlingen he had frequent\\ninterviews with the King. In later years he de-\\nscribed the situation he found there\\nIt was nothing strange, according to the custom of\\nthose days, that half a dozen ambassadors should be\\nliving in hotels intriguing against the policy of the\\nMinister.\\nHe found Berlin divided into two parties the one\\nlooked to the Czar as their patron and protector, the\\nother wished to win the approval of England he\\nmissed a reasonable conviction as to what was the\\ninterest of Prussia. His own advice was against\\nalliance with the Western Powers or Austria better\\njoin Russia than England better still, preserve neu-\\ntrality and hold the balance of Europe. He had the\\nreputation of being very Russian, but he protested\\nagainst the term. I am not Russian, he said,\\nbut Prussian. He spoke with great decision\\nagainst the personal adherents of the King, men\\nwho looked to the Czar rather than to their own\\nsovereign, and carried their subservience even to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0146.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "1857] Fra 71 kfort. 1 09\\ntreason. As in former days, courage he preached\\nand resolution. Some talked of the danger of isola-\\ntion With 400,000 men we cannot be isolated, he\\nsaid. The French envoy warned him that his policy\\nmight lead to another Jena Why not to Water-\\nloo he answered. Others talked of the danger of\\nan English blockade of their coasts he pointed out\\nthat this would injure England more than Prussia.\\nLet us be bold and depend on our own strength let\\nus frighten Austria by threatening an alliance with\\nRussia, frighten Russia by letting her think we may join\\nthe Western Powers if it were true that we could never\\nside with Russia, at least we must retain the possibility\\nof threatening to do so.\\nThe result was what we might expect from the\\ncharacter of the King unable to decide for either of\\nthe contending factors, he alternated between the\\ntwo, and gave his support now to one, now to\\nthe other. In March, when Bismarck was still in\\nBerlin, sudden disgrace fell upon the English party;\\nBunsen was recalled from London, Bonin, their chief\\nadvocate in the Ministry, was dismissed when the\\nPrince of Prussia, the chief patron of the Western\\nalliance, protested, he was included in the act of dis-\\nfavour, and had to leave Berlin, threatened with the\\nloss of his offices and even with arrest. All danger\\nof war with Russia seemed to have passed Bismarck\\nreturned content to Frankfort. Scarcely had he\\ngone when the old affection for Austria gained the\\nupper hand, and by a separate treaty Prussia bound\\nherself to support the Austrian demands, if necessary", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0147.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "no Bismarck. [I85i-\\nby arms. Bismarck heard nothing of the treaty till\\nit was completed the Ministers had purposely re.\\nfrained from asking his advice on a policy which\\nthey knew he would disapprove. He overcame his\\nfeelings of disgust so far as to send a cold letter of\\ncongratulation to Manteuffel to Gerlach he wrote:\\nHis Majesty should really see to it that his Ministers\\nshould drink more champagne none of the gentry\\nought to enter his Council without half a bottle under his\\nbelt. Our policy would soon get a respectable colour.\\nThe real weakness lay, as he well knew, in the\\ncharacter of the King. If here I say to one of my\\ncolleagues, We remain firm even if Austria drives\\nmatters to a breach, he laughs in my face and says,\\nAs long as the King lives it will not come to a war\\nbetween Austria and Prussia. And again, The\\nKing has as much leniency for the sins of Austria a^^\\nI hope to have from the Lord in Heaven.\\nIt was a severe strain on his loyalty, but he with-\\nstood it he has, I believe, never expressed his\\nopinion about the King; we can guess what it must\\nhave been. It was a melancholy picture a King\\nviolent and timid, obstinate and irresolute his will\\ndragged now this way, now that, by his favourites,\\nhis wife and his brother his own Ministers intrigu-\\ning against each other ambassadors recommending\\na policy instead of carrying out their instructions\\nand the Minister-President standing calmly by, as\\nbest he could, patching up the appearance of a\\nconsistent policy.\\nIt was probably the experience which he gained at", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0148.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 1 1 1\\nthis time which in later years, when he himself had\\nbecome Minister, made Bismarck so jealous of out-\\nside and irresponsible advisers he did not choose\\nto occupy the position of Manteuffel, he laid down\\nthe rule that none of his own subordinates should\\ncommunicate with the King except through himself;\\na Bismarck as Foreign Minister would not allow a\\nGerlach at Court, nor a Bismarck among his envoys.\\nHe had indeed been careful not to intrigue against\\nhis chief, but it was impossible to observe that com-\\nplete appearance of acquiescence which a strong and\\nefificient Minister must demand. Bismarck was often\\nasked his opinion by the King directly he was\\nobliged to say what he believed to be the truth, and\\nhe often disapproved of that which Manteuffel ad-\\nvised. In order to avoid the appearance of dis-\\nloyalty, he asked Gerlach that his letters should\\nshewn to Manteuffel not all of them could be\\nsnewn, still less would it be possible to repeat all he\\nsaid. If they were in conflict, his duty to the King\\nmust override his loyalty to the Minister, and the\\ntwo could not always be reconciled. To English-\\nmen indeed it appears most improper that the King\\nshould continually call for the advice of other poli-\\nticians without the intervention or the knowledge of\\nhis Ministers, but this is just one of those points on\\nwhich it is impossible to apply to Prussian practice\\nEnglish constitutional theory. In England it is a\\nmaxim of the Constitution that the sovereign should\\nnever consult anyone on political matters except the\\nresponsible Ministry this is possible only because\\nthe final decision rests with Parliament and the Cabi-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0149.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "112 Bismarck.\\n[1851-\\nnet and not with the sovereign. It was, however,\\nalways the contention of Bismarck that the effective\\ndecision in Prussia was with the King. This was\\nundoubtedly the true interpretation of the Prussian\\nConstitution but it followed from this that the\\nKing must have absolute freedom to ask the advice\\nof everyone whose opinions would be of help to him\\nhe must be able to command the envoys to foreign\\ncountries to communicate with him directly, and if\\noccasion required it, to consult with the political op-\\nponents of his own Ministers. To forbid this and\\nto require that all requests should come to him by\\nthe hands of the Ministers would be in truth to\\nsubstitute ministerial autocracy for monarchical\\ngovernment.\\nSomething of this kind did happen in later years\\nwhen the German Emperor had grown old, and when\\nBismarck, supported by his immense experience and\\nsuccess, guided the policy of the country alone, inde-\\npendent of Parliament, and scarcely allowing any in-\\ndependent adviser to approach the Emperor. This\\nwas exceptional; normally a Prussian Minister had\\nto meet his opponents and critics not so much in pub-\\nlic debate as in private discussion. Under a weak\\nsovereign the policy of the country must always\\nbe distracted by palace intrigue, just as in England\\nunder a weak Cabinet it will be distracted by party\\nfaction. The Ministers must always be prepared to\\nfind their best-laid schemes overthrown by the influ-\\nence exerted upon the royal mind by his private\\nfriends or even by his family. It may be said that\\ntenure of ofifice under these conditions would be im-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0150.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 113\\npossible to a man of spirit it was certainly very\\ndifficult; an able and determined Minister was as\\nmuch hampered by this private opposition as by\\nParliamentary discussion. It is often the fashion\\nto say that Parliamentary government is difficult to\\nreconcile with a strong foreign policy the experi-\\nences of Prussia from the year 1815 to 1863 seem\\nto shew that under monarchical government it is\\nequally difficult.\\nMeanwhile he had been maturing in his mind a\\nbolder plan Why should not Prussia gain the sup-\\nport she required by alliance with Napoleon\\nThe Germans had watched the rise of Napoleon\\nwith suspicion and alarm they had long been taught\\nthat France was their natural enemy. When Na-\\npoleon seized the power and assumed the name of\\nEmperor, the old distrust was revived his very\\nname recalled memories of hostility they feared he\\nwould pursue an ambitious and warlike policy that\\nhe would withdraw the agreements on which the\\npeace of Europe and the security of the weaker\\nStates depended, and that he would extend to the\\nRhine the borders of France. He was the first ruler\\nof France whose internal policy awoke no sympathy\\nin Germany his natural allies, the Liberals, he had\\nalienated by the overthrow of the Republic, and he\\ngained no credit for it in the eyes of the Conserva-\\ntives. The monarchical party in Prussia could only\\nhave admiration for the man who had imprisoned a\\nParliament and restored absolute government they\\ncould not repudiate an act which they would gladly\\nimitate, but they could not forgive him that he was", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0151.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "114 Bismarck. [1851-\\nan usurper. According to their creed the suppres-\\nsion of liberty was the privilege of the legitimate\\nKing.\\nIt was the last remnant of the doctrine of legiti-\\nmacy, the belief that it was the duty of the Euro-\\npean monarchs that no State should change its form\\nof government or the dynasty by which it was ruled\\nthe doctrine of the Holy Alliance that kings must\\nmake common cause against the Revolution. How\\nchanged were the times from the days when Metter-\\nnich had used this as a strong support for the as-\\ncendancy of the House of Austria! Austria herself\\nwas no longer sound; the old faith lingered only in\\nSt. Petersburg and Berlin but how weak and in-\\neffective it had become There was no talk now of\\ninterference, there would not be another campaign\\nof Waterloo or of Valmy there was only a prudish\\nreserve; they could not, they did not dare, refuse\\ndiplomatic dealings with the new Emperor, but they\\nwere determined there should be no cordiality the\\nvirgin purity of the Prussian Court should not be\\ndeflowered by intimacy with the man of sin.* If\\nthere could not be a fresh crusade against Buona-\\npartism, at least, there should be no alliance with it.\\nFrom the beginning Bismarck had little sympathy\\nwith this point of view he regarded the coup d etat\\nas necessary in a nation which had left the firm\\nground of legitimacy France could not be governed\\nexcept by an iron hand. As a Prussian, however, he\\ncould not be pleased, for he saw an enemy who had\\nI take the metaphor from Gerlach, but the English language\\ndoes not allow me to adopt the whole.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0152.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 115\\nbeen weak strengthened, but he did not believe in\\nNapoleon s warlike desires. In one way it was an ad-\\nvantage, the overthrow of the Republic had broken\\nthe bond which joined the German revolutionists to\\nFrance. He did not much mind what happened in\\nother countries so long as Prussia was safe.\\nThere is no ground for surprise that he soon began\\nto go farther he warned his friends not to irritate\\nthe Emperor; on the occasion of the Emperor s\\nmarriage the Kreiiz Zeitiuig published a violent art-\\nicle, speaking of it as an insult and threat to Prussia.\\nBismarck s feelings as a gentleman were offended by\\nthis useless scolding it seemed, moreover, danger-\\nous. If Prussia were to quarrel with France, they\\nwould be obliged to seek the support of the Eastern\\nPowers: if Russia and Austria should know this,\\nPrussia would be in their hands. The only effect\\nof this attitude would be to cut off the possibility of\\na useful move in the game of diplomacy:\\nThere is no good in giving our opposition to France\\nthe stamp of irrevocability it would be no doubt a\\ngreat misfortune if we were to unite ourselves with\\nFrance, but why proclaim this to all the world We\\nshould do wiser to act so that Austria and Russia would\\nhave to court our friendship against France than treat\\nus as an ally who is presented to them.\\nIt is a topic to which he often refers\\nWe cannot make an alliance with France without a\\ncertain degree of meanness, but very admirable people,\\neven German princes, in the Middle Ages have used a\\nsewer to make their escape, rather than be beaten or\\nthrottled.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0153.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "1 1 6 Bismarck.\\n[1851-\\nAn alliance with Napoleon was, however, accord-\\ning to the code of honour professed, if not followed,\\nin every German State, the sin for which there was\\nno forgiveness. It was but a generation ago that\\nhalf the German princes had hurried to the Court of\\nthe first Napoleon to receive at his hands the es-\\ntates of their neighbours and the liberties of their\\nsubjects. No one doubted that the new Napoleon\\nwould be willing to use similar means to ensure\\nthe power of France would he meet with willing\\nconfederates The Germans, at least, do not seem\\nto have trusted one another no prince dared show\\nordinary courtesy to the ruling family of France, no\\nstatesman could visit Paris but voices would be\\nheard crying that he had sold himself and his coun-\\ntry. An accusation of this kind was the stock-in-\\ntrade which the Nationalist press was always ready\\nto bring against every ruler who was obnoxious to\\nthem. It required moral courage, if it also shewed\\npolitical astuteness, when Bismarck proposed delib-\\nerately to encourage a suspicion from which most\\nmen were anxious that their country should be free.\\nHe had already plenty of enemies, and reports were\\nsoon heard that he was in favour of a French alli-\\nance they did not cease for ten years he often\\nprotests in his private letters against these unworthy\\naccusations; the protests seem rather absurd, for if\\nhe did not really wish for an alliance between Prus-\\nsia and France, he at least wished that people should\\ndread such an alliance. A man cannot frighten his\\nfriends by the fear he will rob them, and at the same\\ntime enjoy the reputation for strict probity.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0154.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 1 1 7\\nHe explains with absolute clearness the benefits\\nwhich will come from a French alliance\\nThe German States are attentive and attracted to us\\nin the same degree in which they believe we are be-\\nfriended by France. Confidence in us they will never\\nhave, every glance at the map prevents that and they\\nknow that their separate interests and the misuse of\\ntheir sovereignty always stand in the way of the whole\\ntendency of Prussian policy. They clearly recognise\\nthe danger which lies in this it is one against which\\nthe unselfishness of our Most Gracious Master alone\\ngives them a temporary security. The opinions of the\\nKing, which ought at least for a time to weaken their\\nmistrust, will gain his Majesty no thanks they will only\\nbe used and exploited. In the hour of necessity grati-\\ntude and confidence will not bring a single man into the\\nfield. Fear, if it is used with foresight and clearness,\\ncan place the whole Confederacy at our feet, and in\\norder to instil fear into them we must give clear signs\\nof our good relations with France.\\nHe objected to Prussia following what was called\\na German policy, for, as he said, by a national and\\npatriotic policy is meant that Prussia should do what\\nwas for the interest, not of herself, but of the smaller\\nStates.\\nIt was not till after the Crimean War that he was\\nable to press this policy. Napoleon had now won\\nhis position in Europe Gerlach had seen with pain\\nand disgust that the Queen of England had visited\\nhis Court. The Emperor himself desired a union\\nwith Prussia. In this, sympathy and interest com-\\nbined he had much affection for Germany his", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0155.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "ii8 Bismarck. [1851-\\nmind, as his education, was more German than\\nFrench he was a man of ideas he was the only\\nruler of France who has sincerely desired and de-\\nliberately furthered the interests of other countries\\nhe believed that the nation should be the basis of\\nthe State his revolutionary antecedents made him\\nnaturally opposed to the House of Austria; and he\\nwas ready to help Prussia in resuming her old am-\\nbitious policy.\\nThe affair of Neuchatel gave him an opportunity\\nof earning the personal gratitude of the King, and\\nhe did not neglect it, for he knew that in the\\nroyal prejudice was the strongest impediment to\\nan alliance. In 1857 Bismarck was sent to Paris\\nto discuss this and other matters. Two years be-\\nfore he had been presented to the Emperor, but it\\nhad been at the time when he was opposed to the\\nFrench policy. Now for the first time the two men\\nwho were for ten years to be the leaders, now\\nfriends, then rivals, in the realm of diplomacy, were\\nbrought into close connection. Bismarck was not\\nimpressed by the Emperor s ability. He wrote\\nPeople exaggerate his intellect, but underrate his\\nheart. Napoleon was very friendly his wish to help\\nthe King went farther than his duty to follow French\\npolicy. He said Why should we not be friends let\\nus forget the past if everyone were to attach himself to\\na policy of memories, two nations that have once been\\nat war must be at war to all eternity statesmen must\\noccupy themselves with the future.\\nThis was just Bismarck s opinion he wrote home\\nsuggesting that he might prepare the v/ay for a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0156.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "1857] F7^ankfort. 1 1 9\\nvisit of the Emperor to Prussia he would Hke to\\ncome and it would have a good effect. This was\\ngoing farther than the King, grateful though he\\nwas, would allow he told Gerlach not to answer\\nthis part of the letter at all while Bismarck was in\\nParis. Bismarck, however, continued in his official\\nreports and private letters to urge again and again\\nthe political advantages of an understanding with\\nFrance it is Austria that is the natural enemy, for\\nit is Austria whose interests are opposed to Prussia.\\nIf they repel the advance of Napoleon, they will\\noblige him to seek an alliance with Russia, and this\\nwas a danger which even in those days Bismarck\\nnever ceased to fear. Prince Napoleon, cousin of\\nthe Emperor, was at that time on a visit to Berlin\\non his way through Frankfort he had singled out\\nBismarck, and (no doubt under instructions) had\\nshown great friendliness to him the Kreiiz Zeitiuig\\nagain took the opportunity of insulting the ruler of\\nFrance Bismarck again remonstrated against the\\ndanger of provoking hostility by these acts of petty\\nrancour, disguised though they might be under the\\nname of principle. He did not succeed in persuad-\\ning the King or his confidant he was always met by\\nthe same answer: France is the natural enemy of\\nGermany Napoleon is the representative of the\\nRevolution there can be no union between the\\nKing of Prussia and the Revolution. How can a\\nman of your intelligence sacrifice your principles to\\na single individual? asks Gerlach, who aimed not\\nat shewing that an alliance with France would be\\nfoolish, but that it would be wrong.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0157.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "I20 Bismarck. [I85i~\\nFive years before, Bismarck would have spoken as\\nGerlach did but in these years he had seen and\\nlearnt much he had freed himself from the influ-\\nence of his early friends he had outgrown their\\ntheoretic formalism he had learned to look at the\\nworld with his own eyes, and to him, defending his\\ncountry against the intrigues of weaker and the\\npressure of more powerful States, the world was a\\ndifferent place from what it was to those who passed\\ntheir time in the shadow of the Court. He remem-\\nbered that it was not by strict obedience to general\\nprinciples that Prussia had grown great. Frederick\\nthe Second had not allowed himself to be stopped\\nby these narrow searchings of heart his successor\\nhad not scrupled to ally himself with revolutionary\\nFrance. This rigid insistence on a rule of right,\\nthis nice determining of questions of conscience,\\nseemed better suited to the confessor s chair than to\\nthe advisers of a great monarch. And the principle\\nto which he was asked to sacrifice the future of his\\ncountry, was it after all a true principle? Why\\nshould Prussia trouble herself about the internal\\nconstitution of other States, what did it concern her\\nwhether France was ruled by a Bourbon or an Or-\\nleans or a Bonaparte? How could Prussia con-\\ntinue the policy of the Holy Alliance when the close\\nunion of the three Eastern monarchies no longer\\nexisted If France were to attack Germany, Prussia\\ncould not expect the support of Russia, she could\\nnot even be sure of that of Austria. An under-\\nstanding with France was required, not by ambition,\\nbut by the simplest grounds of self-preservation.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0158.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 121\\nThese and other considerations he advanced in a\\nlong and elaborate memorandum addressed to Man-\\nteuffel, which was supplemented by letters to the\\nMinister and Gerlach. For closeness of reasoning,\\nfor clearness of expression, for the wealth of know-\\nledge and cogency of argument these are the most\\nremarkable of his political writings. In them he\\nsums up the results of his apprenticeship to political\\nlife, he lays down the principles on which the policy\\nof the State ought to be conducted, the principles\\non which in future years he was himself to act.\\nWhat, he asks, are the reasons against an alli-\\nance with France The chief ground is the belief\\nthat the Emperor is the chief representative of the\\nRevolution and identical with it, and that a com-\\npromise with the Revolution is as inadmissible in\\ninternal as in external policy. Both statements he\\ntriumphantly overthrows. Why should we look\\nat Napoleon as the representative of the Revolution\\nthere is scarcely a government in Europe which has\\nnot a revolutionary origin.\\nWhat is there now existing in the world of politics\\nwhich has a complete legal basis Spain, Portugal,\\nBrazil, all the American Republics, Belgium, Holland,\\nSwitzerland, Greece, Sweden, England, which State\\nwith full consciousness is based on the Revolution of\\n1688, are all unable to trace back their legal systems to\\na legitimate origin. Even as to the German princes we\\ncannot find any completely legitimate title for the\\nground which they have won partly from the Emperor\\nand the Empire, partly from their fellow-princes, partly\\nfrom the Estates.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0159.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "122 Bismarck. [1851-\\nHe goes farther: the Revolution is not peculiar\\nto France; it did not even originate there\\nIt is much older than the historical appearance of\\nNapoleon s family and far wider in its extent than\\nFrance. If we are to assign it an origin in this world,\\nwe must look for it, not in France, but in England, or go\\nback even earlier, even to Germany or Rome, according\\nas we regard the exaggerations of the Reformation or of\\nthe Roman Church as responsible.\\nBut if Napoleon is not the sole representative of\\nrevolutions, why make opposition to him a matter\\nof principle He shews no desire of propagandism.\\nTo threaten other States by means of the Revolution\\nhas been for years the trade of England, and this princi-\\nple of not associating with a revolutionary power is itself\\nquite modern it is not to be found in the last century.\\nCromwell was addressed as Brother by European potent-\\nates and they sought his friendship when it appeared\\nuseful. The most honourable Princes joined in alliance\\nwith the States-General before they were recognised by\\nSpain. Why should Prussia now alone, to its own in-\\njury, adopt this excessive caution\\nHe goes farther not only does he reject the\\nprinciple of legitimacy, he refuses to be bound by\\nany principles he did not free himself from one party\\nto bind himself to another; his profession was di-\\nplomacy and in diplomacy there was no place for\\nfeelings of affection and antipathy.\\nWhat is the proper use of principles in diplomacy\\nIt is to persuade others to adopt a policy which is\\nconvenient to oneself.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0160.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "1857] F7^ankfort. 123\\nMy attitude towards Foreign Governments springs\\nnot from any antipathy, but from the good or evil they\\nmay do to Prussia. A policy of sentiment is dangerous,\\nfor it is one-sided it is an exclusively Prussian pe-\\nculiarity. Every other Government makes its own\\ninterests the sole criterion of its actions, however much\\nit may drape them in phrases about justice and sympathy.\\nMy ideal for foreign policy is freedom from prejudice\\nthat our decisions should be independent of all impres-\\nsions of dislike or affection for Foreign States and their\\ngovernments.\\nThis was the canon by which he directed his own\\nactions, and he expected obedience to it from others.\\nSo far as foreigners go I have never in my life had\\nsympathy for anyone but England and its inhabitants,\\nand I am even now not free from it but they will not\\nlet us love them, and as soon as it was proved to me\\nthat it was in the interest of a sound and well-\\nmatured Prussian policy, I would let our troops fire on\\nFrench, English, Russian, or Austrian, with the same\\nsatisfaction.\\nI cannot justify sympathies and antipathies as regards\\nForeign Powers and persons before my feeling of duty\\nin the foreign service of my country, either in myself or\\nanother therein lies the embryo of disloyalty against\\nmy master or my country. In my opinion not even the\\nKing himself has the right to subordinate the interests of\\nhis country to his own feelings of love or hatred towards\\nstrangers he is, however, responsible towards God and\\nnot to me if he does so, and therefore on this point I am\\nsilent.\\nThis reference to the King is very characteristic.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0161.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "124 Bismarck. [1851-\\nHolding, as he did, so high an ideal of public duty\\nhimself, he naturally regarded with great dislike the\\ninfluence which, too often, family ties and domestic\\naffection exercised over the mind of the sovereign.\\nThe German Princes had so long pursued a purely\\ndomestic policy that they forgot to distinguish be-\\ntween the interests of their families and their land.\\nThey were, moreover, naturally much influenced in\\ntheir public decisions, not only by their personal\\nsympathies, but also by the sympathies and opinions\\nof their nearest relations. To a man like Bismarck,\\nwho regarded duty to the State as above everything,\\nnothing could be more disagreeable than to see the\\nplans of professional statesmen criticised by irrespon-\\nsible people and perhaps overthrown through some\\nwoman s whim. He was a confirmed monarchist but\\nhe was no courtier. In his letters at this period he\\nsometimes refers to the strong influence which the\\nPrincess of Prussia exercised over her husband, who\\nwas heir to the throne. He regarded with appre-\\nhension the possible effects which the proposed\\nmarriage of the Prince of Prussia s son to the\\nPrincess Royal of England might have on Prussian\\npolicy. He feared it would introduced English in-\\nfluence and Anglomania without their gaining any\\nsimilar influence in England. If our future Queen\\nremains in any degree English, I see our Court sur-\\nrounded by English influence. He was not in-\\nfluenced in this by any hostility to England almost\\nat the same time he had written that England was the\\nonly foreign country for which he had any sympathy.\\nHe was only (as so often) contending for that inde-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0162.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "1857] Frankfort. 125\\npendence and self-reliance which he so admired in\\nthe English. For two hundred years English tradi-\\ntions had absolutely forbidden the sovereign to allow\\nhis personal and family sympathies to interfere with\\nthe interests of the country. If the House of Hohen-\\nzollern were to aspire to the position of a national\\nmonarch it must act in the same way. At this very\\ntime the Emperor Napoleon was discussing the\\nPrussian marriage with Lord Clarendon. It will\\nmuch influence the policy of the Queen in favour of\\nPrussia, he said. No, your Majesty, answered\\nthe English Ambassador. The private feelings of\\nthe Queen can never have any influence on that which\\nshe believes to be for the honour and welfare of Eng-\\nland. This was the feeling by which Bismarck was\\ninfluenced he was trying to educate his King, and\\nthis was the task to which for many years he was\\ndevoted. What he thought of the duties of princes\\nwe see from an expression he uses in a letter to\\nManteuffel Only Christianity can make princes\\nwhat they ought to be, and free them from that\\nconception of life which causes many of them to\\nseek in the position given them by God nothing but\\nthe means to a life of pleasure and irresponsibility.\\nAll his attempts to win over the King and Gerlach\\nto his point of view failed the only result was that\\nhis old friends began to look on him askance his\\nnew opinions were regarded with suspicion. He was\\nno longer sure of his position in Court his outspok-\\nenness had caused offence after reading his last\\nletter, Gerlach answered Your explanation only\\nshews me that we are now far asunder the corre-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0163.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "126 Bismarck. [1857\\nspondence, which had continued for almost seven\\nyears, stopped. Bismarck felt that he was growing\\nlonely he had to accustom himself to the thought\\nthat the men who had formerly been both politically\\nand personally his close friends, and who had once\\nwelcomed him whenever he returned to Berlin, now\\ndesired to see him kept at a distance. In one of\\nhis last letters to Gerlach, he writes I used to be\\na favourite now all that is changed. His Majesty\\nhas less often the wish to see me the ladies of the\\nCourt have a cooler smile than formerly the gentle-\\nmen press my hand less warmly. The high opinion\\nof my usefulness is sunk, only the Minister [Man-\\nteuffel] is warmer and more friendly. Something\\nof this was perhaps exaggerated, but there was no\\ndoubt that a breach had begun which was to widen\\nand widen: Bismarck was no longer a member of\\nthe party of the Krcuz Zeitung. It was fortunate\\nthat a change was imminent in the direction of the\\nPrussian Government the old figures who had\\nplayed their part were to pass away and a new era\\nwas to begin.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0164.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VI.\\nST. PETERSBURG AND PARIS.\\n1858-1862.\\nIN the autumn of 1857 the health of the King of\\nPrussia broke down he was unable to conduct\\nthe affairs of State and in the month of Septem-\\nber was obliged to appoint his brother as his repre-\\nsentative to carry on the Government. There was\\nfrom the first no hope for his recovery the com-\\nmission was three times renewed and, after a long\\ndelay, in October of the following year, the King\\nsigned a decree appointing his brother Regent. At\\none time, in the spring of 1858, the Prince had, it is\\nsaid, thought of calling on Bismarck to form a Min-\\nistry. This, however, was not done. It was, how-\\never, one of the first actions of the Prince Regent\\nto request Manteuffel s resignation he formed a\\nMinistry of moderate Liberals, choosing as President\\nthe Prince of HohenzoUern, head of the Catholic\\nbranch of his own family.\\nThe neiv era, as it was called, was welcomed with\\ndelight by all parties except the most extreme Con-\\nservatives. No Ministry had been so unpopular as\\n127", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0165.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "128 Bismarck.\\n[1858-\\nthat of Manteuffel. At the elections which took\\nplace immediately, the Government secured a large\\nmajority. The Prince and his Ministers were able\\nto begin their work with the full support of Parlia-\\nment and country.\\nBismarck did not altogether regret the change\\nhis differences with the dominant faction at Court\\nhad extended to the management of home as well\\nas of foreign affairs for the last two years he had\\nbeen falling out of favour. He desired, moreover,\\nto see fresh blood in the Chamber.\\nThe disease to which our Parliamentary life has suc-\\ncumbed, is, besides the incapacity of the individual, the\\nservility of the Lower House. The majority has no in-\\ndependent convictions, it is the tool of ministerial om-\\nnipotence. If our Chambers do not succeed in binding\\nthe public interest to themselves and drawing the atten-\\ntion of the country, they will sooner or later go to their\\ngrave without sympathy.\\nCurious it is to see how his opinion as to the duties\\nand relations of the House towards the Govern-\\nment were to alter when he himself became Minis-\\nter. He regarded it as an advantage that the\\nMinistry would have the power which comes from\\npopularity his only fear was that they might draw\\nthe Regent too much to the left but he hoped that\\nin German and foreign affairs they would act with\\nmore decision, that the Prince would be free from\\nthe scruples which had so much influenced his\\nbrother, and that he would not fear to rely on the\\nmilitary strength of Prussia.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0166.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 129\\nOne of their first acts was to recall Bismarck from\\nFrankfort the change was inevitable, and he had\\nforeseen it. The new Government naturally wished\\nto be able to start clear in their relations to Austria\\nthe Prince Regent did not wish to commit himself\\nfrom the beginning to a policy of hostility. It was,\\nhowever, impossible for a cordial co-operation be-\\ntween the two States to be established in German\\naffairs so long as Bismarck remained at Frankfort\\nthe opinions which he had formed during the last\\neight years were too well known. It was, moreover,\\nevident that a crisis in the relations with Austria was\\napproaching war between France and Austria\\nwas imminent a new factor and a new man had\\nappeared in Europe, Piedmont and Cavour.\\nIn August, 1858, Cavour had had a secret and\\ndecisive interview with Napoleon at Plombieres\\nthe two statesmen had come to an agreement by\\nwhich France engaged to help the Piedmontese to\\nexpel the Austrians from Italy. Bismarck would\\nhave desired to seize this opportunity, and use the\\nembarrassment of Austria as the occasion for taking\\na stronger position in Germany if it were necessary\\nhe was prepared to go as far as an alliance with\\nFrance. He was influenced not so much by sympa-\\nthy with Piedmont, for, as we have seen, he held\\nthat those who were responsible for foreign policy\\nshould never give way to sympathy, but by the\\nsimple calculation that Austria was the common\\nenemy of Prussia and Piedmont, and where there\\nwere common interests an alliance might be formed.\\nThe Government were, however, not prepared to\\n9", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0167.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "130 Bismarck. ti858-\\nadopt this policy. It might have been supposed\\nthat a Liberal Ministry would have shewn more\\nsympathy with the Italian aspirations than the Con-\\nservatives whom they had succeeded. This was not\\nthe case, as Cavour himself soon found out.\\nAfter his visit to Plombieres, Cavour had hurried\\nacross the frontier and spent two days at Baden-\\nBaden, where he met the Prince of Prussia, Man-\\nteuffel, who was still Minister, and other German\\nstatesmen. Bismarck had been at Baden-Baden in\\nthe previous week and returned a few days later\\nhe happened, however, on the two days when Cavour\\nwas there, to be occupied with his duties at Frank-\\nfort the two great statesmen therefore never met.\\nCavour after his visit wrote to La Marmora saying\\nthat he had been extremely pleased with the sympa-\\nthy which had been displayed to him, both by the\\nPrince and the other Prussians. So far as he could\\nforesee, the attitude of Prussia would not be hostile\\nto Italian aspirations. In December, however, after\\nthe change of Ministry, he writes to the Italian\\nEnvoy at Frankfort that the language of Schleinitz,\\nthe new Foreign Minister, is less favourable than\\nthat of his predecessor. The Cabinet do not feel\\nthe same antipathy to Austria as that of Manteuf-\\nfel did German ideas have brought about a rap-\\nprochement.\\nI do not trust their apparently Liberal tendencies. It\\nis possible that your colleague, Herr von Bismarck, will\\nsupport us more closely, but I fear that even if he is\\nkept at Frankfort he will not exercise so much influence\\nas under the former Ministry.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0168.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK IN 1860.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0169.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0170.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 131\\nCavour s insight did not deceive him. The ItaHan\\nquestion had for the moment re-awakened the old\\nsympathy for Austria Austria, it seemed, was now\\nthe champion of German nationahty against the\\nunscrupulous aggression of France. There were few\\nmen who, like Bismarck, were willing to disregard\\nthis national feeling and support the Italians. To\\nhave deliberately joined Napoleon in what after all\\nwas an unprovoked attack on a friendly prince of\\nthe same nation, was an act which could have been\\nundertaken only by a man of the calibre of Freder-\\nick the Great. After all, Austria was German the\\nAustrian provinces in Italy had been assigned to\\nthe Emperor by the same authority as the Polish\\nprovinces to Prussia. We can imagine how great\\nwould have been the outcry had Austria joined with\\nthe French to set up a united Poland, taking Posen\\nand West Prussia for the purpose and yet this\\nact would have been just of the same kind as that\\nwhich would have been committed had Prussia at\\nthis time joined or even lent diplomatic support to\\nthe French-Italian alliance. It is very improbable\\nthat even if Bismarck had been Minister at this\\nperiod he would have been able to carry out this\\npolicy.\\nThe Prussian Government acted on the whole cor-\\nrectly. As the war became more imminent the\\nPrince Regent prepared the Prussian army and event-\\nually the whole was placed on a war footing. He\\noffered to the Emperor of Austria his armed neutral-\\nity and a guarantee of the Austrian possessions in\\nItaly, In return he required that he himself should", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0171.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "132 Bismarck. [1858-\\nhave the command of all the forces of the German\\nDiet. Had Austria accepted these terms, either the\\nwar would have been stopped or the whole force of\\nGermany under the King of Prussia would have at-\\ntacked France on the Rhine. The Emperor how-\\never refused to accept them he required a guarantee\\nnot only of his possessions in Italy but also of his\\ntreaties with the other Italian princes. Moreover,\\nhe would accept the assistance of Prussia only on\\ncondition that the Prussian army was placed under\\nthe orders of the general appointed by the Diet. It\\nwas absurd to suppose that any Prussian statesman\\nwould allow this. The action of Austria shewed in\\nfact a distrust and hatred of Prussia which more than\\njustified all that Bismarck had written during his\\ntenure of office at Frankfort. In the end, rather than\\naccept Prussian assistance on the terms on which it\\nwas offered, the Emperor of Austria made peace with\\nFrance he preferred to surrender Lombardy rather\\nthan save it by Prussian help. Thank God, said\\nCavour, Austria by her arrogance has succeeded in\\nuniting all the world against her.\\nThe spring of the year was spent by Bismarck at\\nSt. Petersburg. He had been appointed Prussian\\nMinister to that capital put out in the cold, as he\\nexpressed it. From the point of dignity and posi-\\ntion it was an advance, but at St. Petersburg he was\\naway from the centre of political affairs. Russia had\\nnot yet recovered from the effects of the Crimean\\nWar the Czar was chiefly occupied with internal\\nreforms and the emanicipation of the serfs. The\\nEastern Question was dormant, and Russia did not", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0172.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 133\\naim at keeping a leading part in the settlement of\\nItalian affairs. Bismarck s immediate duties were\\nnot therefore important and he no longer had the\\nopportunity of giving his advice to the Government\\nupon the general practice. It is improbable that\\nHerr von Schleinitz would have welcomed advice.\\nHe was one of the weakest of the Ministry an ami-\\nable man of no very marked ability, who owed his\\nposition to the personal friendship of the Prince Re-\\ngent and his wife. The position which Bismarck had\\noccupied during the last few years could not but be\\nembarrassing to any Minister this man still young,\\nso full of self-confidence, so unremitting in his labours,\\nv/ho, while other diplomatists thought only of getting\\nthrough their routine work, spent the long hours of\\nthe night in writing despatches, discussing the whole\\nforeign policy of the country, might well cause appre-\\nhension even to the strongest Minister.\\nFrom the time of Bismarck s departure from Frank-\\nfort our knowledge of his ofificial despatches ceases\\nwe lose the invaluable assistance of his letters to\\nManteuffel and Gerlach. For some time he stood so\\nmuch alone that there was no one to whom he could\\nwrite unreservedly on political matters.\\nHe watched with great anxiety the progress of\\naffairs with regard to Italy. At the beginning of\\nMay he wrote a long letter to Schleinitz, as he had\\ndone to Manteuffel, urging him to bold action he\\nrecounted his experiences at the Diet, he reiterated\\nhis conviction that no good would come to Prussia\\nfrom the federal tie\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the sooner it was broken the\\nbetter; nothing was so much to be desired as that", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0173.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "134 Bismarck. [1858-\\nthe Diet should overstep its powers, and pass some\\nresolution which Prussia could not accept, so that\\nPrussia could take up the glove and force a breach.\\nThe opportunity was favourable for a revision of the\\nConstitution. I see, he wrote in our Federal\\nconnection only a weakness of Prussia which sooner\\nor later must be cured, ferro et igni Probably\\nSchleinitz s answer was not of such a kind as to\\ntempt him to write again. In his private letters he\\nharps on the same string he spent June in a visit to\\nMoscow but he hurried back at the end of the\\nmonth to St. Petersburg to receive news of the war.\\nBefore news had come of the peace of Villafranca he\\nwas constantly in dread that Prussia would go to\\nwar on behalf of Austria\\nWe have prepared too soon and too thoroughly, the\\nthe weight of the burden we have taken on ourselves is\\ndrawing us down the incline. We shall not be even an\\nAustrian reserve we shall simply sacrifice ourselves for\\nAustria and take away the war from her.\\nHow disturbed he was, we can see by the tone of\\nreligious resignation which he assumes no doubt\\na sign that he fears his advice has not yet been acted\\nupon.\\nAs God will. Everything here is only a question of\\ntime peoples and men, wisdom and folly, war and peace,\\nthey come and go like rain and water, and the sea alone\\nremains. There is nothing on earth but hypocrisy and\\ndeceit.\\nThe language of this and other letters was partly", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0174.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersbitrg a7td Paris. 135\\ndue to the state of his health the continual anxiety\\nand work of his life at Frankfort, joined to irregular\\nhours and careless habits, had told upon his consti-\\ntution. He fell seriously ill in St. Petersburg with a\\ngastric and rheumatic affection an injury to the leg\\nreceived while shooting in Sweden, became painful\\nthe treatment adopted by the doctor, bleeding and\\niodine, seems to have made him worse. At the be-\\nginning of July, i860, he returned on leave to Berlin\\nthere he was laid up for ten days his wife was sum-\\nmoned and under her care he began to improve.\\nAugust he spent at Wiesbaden and Nauheim, taking\\nthe waters, the greater part of the autumn in Berlin\\nin October he had to go Warsaw officially to receive\\nand accompany the Czar, who came to Breslau for\\nan interview with the Prince Regent. From Bres-\\nlau he hurried back to Berlin, from Berlin down to\\nPomerania, where his wife was staying with her\\nfather then the same week back to Berlin, and\\nstarted for St. Petersburg. The result of these long\\njourneys when his health was not completely re-\\nestablished was very serious. He was to spend a\\nnight on the journey to St. Petersburg with his old\\nfriend, Herr von Below, at Hohendorf, in East Prus-\\nsia he had scarcely reached the house when he fell\\ndangerously ill of inflammation of the lungs and rheu-\\nmatic fever. He remained here all the winter, and\\nit was not until the beginning of March, i860, that\\nhe was well enough to return to Berlin. Leopold von\\nGerlach, who met him shortly afterwards, speaks of\\nhim as still looking wretchedly ill. This prolonged\\nillness forms an epoch in his life. He never regoy-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0175.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "136 Bismarck. [1858-\\nered the freshness and strength of his youth. It left\\na nervous irritation and restlessness which often\\ngreatly interfered with his political Avork and made\\nthe immense labour which came upon him doubly\\ndistasteful. He loses the good humour which had\\nbeen characteristic of him in early life he became\\nirritable and more exacting. He spent the next three\\nmonths in Berlin attending the meetings of the Her-\\nrenhaus, and giving a silent vote in favour of the Gov-\\nernment measures he considered it was his duty as\\na servant of the State to support the Government,\\nthough he did not agree with the Liberal policy\\nwhich in internal affairs they adopted. At this time\\nhe stood almost completely alone. His opinions on\\nthe Italian question had brought about a complete\\nbreach with his old friends. Since the conclusion\\nof the war, public opinion in Germany, as in England,\\nhad veered round. The success of Cavour had\\nraised a desire to imitate him a strong impulse had\\nbeen given to the national feeling, and a society, the\\nNational Verein, had been founded to further the\\ncause of United Germany under Prussian leadership.\\nThe question of the recognition of the new King-\\ndom of Italy was becoming prominent all the Lib-\\neral party laid much stress on this. The Prince\\nRegent, however, was averse to an act by which\\nhe might seem to express his approval of the forcible\\nexpulsion of princes from their thrones. As the\\nnational and liberal feeling in the country grew, his\\nmonarchical principles seemed to be strengthened.\\nThe opinions which Bismarck was known to hold on\\nthe French alliance had got into the papers and were", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0176.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Peter shirg and Paris. 137\\nmuch exaggerated he had plenty of enemies to\\ntake care that it should be said that he wished Prus-\\nsia to join with France to do as Piedmont had\\ndone, and by the cession of the left bank of the\\nRhine to France to receive the assistance of Na-\\npoleon in annexing the smaller states. In his let-\\nters of this period Bismarck constantly protests\\nagainst the truth of these accusations. If I am\\nto go to the devil, he writes, it will at least not be\\na French one. Do not take me for a Bonapartist,\\nonly for a very ambitious Prussian. It is at this\\ntime that his last letter to Gerlach was written.\\nThey had met at the end of April, and Gerlach\\nwrote to protest against the opinion to which Bis-\\nmarck had given expression\\nAfter the conversation which I have had with you I\\nwas particularly distressed that, by your bitterness against\\nAustria, you had allowed yourself to be diverted from\\nthe simple attitude towards law and the Revolution.\\nFor you an alliance with France and Piedmont is a pos-\\nsibility, a thought which is far from me and, dear Bis-\\nmarck, ought to be far from you. For me Louis Napoleon\\nis even more than his uncle the incarnation of the Revo-\\nlution, and Cavour is a Rheinbund Minister like Montgel-\\nlas. You cannot and ought not to deny the principles\\nof the Holy Alliance they are no other than that au-\\nthority comes from God, and that the Princes must\\ngovern as servants appointed by God.\\nBismarck answers the letter the next day\\nI am a child of other times than you. No one loses\\nthe mark impressed on him in the period of his youth,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0177.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "138 Bismarck.\\n[1858-\\nIn you the victorious hatred of Bonaparte is indelible\\nyou call him the incarnation of the Revolution and if you\\nknew of any worse name you would bestow it upon him.\\nI have lived in the country from my twenty-third to my\\nthirty-second year and will never be rid of the longing\\nto be back again I am in politics with only half my\\nheart what dislike I have of France is based rather on\\nthe Orleans than the Bonapartist regime. It is opposed\\nto bureaucratic corruption under the mask of constitu-\\ntional government. I should be glad to fight against\\nBonaparte till the dogs lick up the blood but with no\\nmore malice than against Croats, Bohemians, and Bam-\\nberger fellow-countrymen.\\nThe two friends were never to meet again. The\\nold King of Prussia died at the beginning of the next\\nyear, and Gerlach, who had served him so faithfully,\\nthough perhaps not always wisely, survived his mas-\\nter scarcely a week.\\nIn the summer of i860 Bismarck returned to his\\nduties in Russia; and this time, with the exception\\nof a fortnight in October, he spent a whole year in\\nSt. Petersburg. He had still not recovered from the\\neffects of his illness and could not, therefore, go out\\nmuch in society, but he was much liked at Court and\\nsucceeded in winning the confidence both of the\\nEmperor and his family. His wife and children were\\nnow with him, and after the uncertainty of his last\\ntwo years he settled down with pleasure to a quieter\\nmode of life. He enjoyed the sport which he had in\\nthe Russian forests; he studied Russian and made\\nhimself completely at home. Political work he had\\nlittle to do, except what arose from the charge of", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0178.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Peter sbtL7 g and Paris. 139\\nsome 200,000 vagabond Prussians who lived in\\nRussia. Of home affairs he had h ttle knowledge\\nI am quite separated from home politics, as be-\\nsides the newspapers I receive scarcely anything but\\nofficial news which does not expose the foundation of\\naffairs.\\nFor the time the reports of his entering the Min-\\nistry had ceased he professed to be, and perhaps was,\\nquite satisfied.\\nI am quite contented with my existence here I ask\\nfor no change in my position until it be God s will I settle\\ndown quietly at Schonhausen or Reinfeld and can leis-\\nurely set about having my coffin made.\\nIn October he had to attend the Czar on a journey\\nto Warsaw where he had an interview with the Prince\\nRegent. The Prince was accompanied by his Min-\\nister-President, the Prince of Hohenzollern, who took\\nthe opportunity of having long conversations with\\nthe Ambassador to St. Petersburg. It is said that as\\na result of this the Minister, who wished to be re-\\nlieved from a post which was daily becoming more\\nburdensome, advised the Prince Regent to appoint\\nBisuiarck Minister-President. The advice, however,\\nwas not taken.\\nMeanwhile events were taking place in Prussia\\nwhich were to bring about important constitutional\\nchanges. The success of the Ministry of the 7iezv\\nera had not answered the expectations of the coun-\\ntry. Their foreign policy had been correct, but they\\nhad shewn no more spirit than their predecessors,\\nand the country was in that excited state in which", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0179.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "140 Bismarck. [1858-\\npeople wanted to see some brilliant and exciting\\nstroke of policy, though they were not at all clear\\nwhat it was they desired. Then a rift had begun to\\ngrow between the Regent and his Ministers. The\\nLiberalism of the Prince had never been very deep\\nit owed its origin in fact chiefly to his opposition to\\nthe reactionary government of his brother. As an\\nhonest man he intended to govern strictly in accord-\\nance with the Constitution. He had, however, from\\nthe beginning no intention of allowing the Chambers\\nto encroach upon the prerogatives of the Crown.\\nThe Ministers on the other hand regarded themselves\\nto some extent as a Parliamentary Ministry they\\nhad a majority in the House and they were inclined\\nto defer to it. The latent causes of difference were\\nbrought into activity by the question of army\\nreform.\\nThe Prince Regent was chiefly and primarily a\\nsoldier. As a second son it had been doubtful\\nwhether he would ever succeed to the throne. He\\nhad an intimate acquaintance with the whole condi-\\ntion of the army, and he had long known that in\\nmany points reform was necessary. His first action\\non succeeding his brother was to appoint a Commis-\\nsion of the War Office to prepare a scheme of re-\\norganisation. A memorandum had been drawn up\\nfor him by Albert von Roon, and with some altera-\\ntions it was accepted by the Commission. The\\nMinister of War, Bonin (the same who had been\\ndismissed in 1854 at the crisis of the Eastern compli-\\ncations), seems to have been indifferent in the mat-\\nter; he did not feel in himself the energy for carrying", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0180.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "GENERAL VON ROON.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0181.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "w", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0182.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 141\\nthrough an important reform which he had not him-\\nself originated, and of which perhaps he did not\\naltogether approve. The Prince Regent had set\\nhis mind upon the matter the experience gained\\nduring the mobilisation of 1859 shewn how seri-\\nous the defects were the army was still on a war\\nfooting and it was a good opportunity for at once\\ncarrying through the proposed changes. Bonin\\ntherefore resigned his oflfice and Roon, in December,\\n1859, w^s appointed in his place.\\nThis appointment was to have far-reaching results\\nit at once destroyed all harmony in the Ministry\\nitself. Tfie rest of the Ministers were Liberals.\\nRoon was a strong Conservative. He was appointed\\nprofessedly merely as a departmental Minister, but\\nhe soon won more confidence with the Regent than\\nall the others. He was a man of great energy of\\ncharacter and decision in action. The best type of\\nPrussian ofificer, to considerable learning he joined\\na high sense of duty founded on deep-rooted and\\nsimple religious faith. The President of the Ministry\\nhad practically retired from political life and the Gov-\\nernment had no longer a leader. Roon s introduction\\nwas in fact the beginning of all the momentous\\nevents which were to follow. But for him there\\nwould have been no conflict in the Parliament and\\nBismarck would never have become Minister.\\nAt the beginning of i860 the project of law em-\\nbodying the proposals for army reform was laid be-\\nfore the Lower House. It was ordered by them in\\naccordance with the practice to be referred to a\\nsmall Committee.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0183.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "142 Bismarck. [1858-\\nThe proposals consisted of (a) an increase in the\\nnumber of recruits to be raised each year, (b) a\\nlengthening of the term of service with the colours,\\n(c) an alteration in the relations of the Landwehr to\\nthe rest of the army.\\nThe Committee appointed to consider these re-\\nforms accepted the first, but rejected the second and\\nthird. They asserted that the three years service\\nwith the colours was not necessary, and they strongly\\ndisliked any proposal for interfering with the Land-\\nwehr. The report of the Committee was accepted\\nby the House. It was in vain that the more far-\\nseeing members of the Liberal party tried to persuade\\ntheir leaders to support the Government it was in\\nvain that the Ministers pointed out that the Liberal\\nmajority had been elected as a Government majority,\\nand it was their duty to support Ministers taken from\\ntheir own party. The law had to be withdrawn and\\nthe Government, instead, asked for a vote of nine\\nmillion thalers, provisionally, for that year only, as a\\nmeans of maintaining the army in the state to which\\nit had been raised. In asking for this vote it was\\nexpressly stated that the principles of the organisa-\\ntion should be in no wise prejudiced.\\nThe question whether in future a two or three years\\nservice shall be required whether the period with the\\nReserve shall be extended in what position the Land-\\nwehr shall be placed all this is not touched by the\\npresent proposal.\\nOn this condition the House voted the money re-\\nquired, but for one year only. The Government,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0184.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 143\\nhowever, did not keep this pledge the Minister of\\nWar simply continued to carry out the reorganisa-\\ntion in accordance with the plan which had been\\nrejected new regiments were formed, and by the\\nend of the year the whole army had been reor-\\no-anised. This action was one for which the Prince\\nand Roon were personally responsible it was done\\nwhile the other Ministers were away from Berlin,\\nand without their knowledge.\\nWhen the House met at the beginning of the next\\nyear they felt that they had been deceived they\\nwere still more indignant when Roon informed them\\nthat he had discovered that the whole of the re-\\norganisation could be legally carried through in\\nvirtue of the prerogative of the Crown, and that a\\nfresh law was not required that therefore the con-\\nsideration of the changes was not before the House,\\nand that all they would have to do would be to vote\\nthe money to pay for them. Of course the House\\nrefused to vote the money; after long debates the\\nfinal settlement of the question was postponed for\\nanother year; the House, though this time by a\\nmajority of only eleven votes, granting with a few\\nmodifications the required money, but again for one\\nyear only.\\nAll this time Bismarck was living quietly at St.\\nPetersburg; he had no influence on affairs, for the mili-\\ntary law had nothing to do with him, and the Regent\\ndid not consult him on foreign policy. No one, how-\\never, profited by Roon s appointment so much as he\\nhe had once more a friend and supporter at Court,\\nwho replaced the loss of Gerlach. Roon and he had", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0185.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "144 Bis ma rck. t1 858-\\nknown one another in the old Pomeranian days.\\nThere was a Hnk in Moritz Blankenburg, who was a\\nDutz friend of Bismarck s and Roon s cousin.\\nWe can understand how untenable Roon s position\\nwas when we find the Minister of War choosing as\\nhis political confidants two of the leaders of the party\\nopposed to the Ministry to which he belonged.\\nEver since Roon had entered the Government\\nthere had been indeed a perpetual crisis.\\nThe Liberal Ministers were lukewarm in their\\nsupport of the military bill they only consented to\\nadopt it on condition that the King would give his\\nassent to those measures which they proposed to\\nintroduce, in order to maintain their positions as\\nleaders of the party they proposed to bring in bills\\nfor the reform of the House of Lords, for the re-\\nsponsibility of Ministers, for local government.\\nThese were opposed to the personal opinions of the\\nKing; he was supported in his opposition by Roon\\nand refused his assent, but he neither dismissed the\\nMinisters nor did they resign. So long as they\\nwere willing to hold office on the terms he required,\\nthere was indeed no reason why he should dismiss\\nthem to do so would be to give up the last hope of\\ngetting the military Bill passed. All through i86i\\nthe same uncertainty continued Roon indeed again\\nand again wrote to his master, pointing out the\\nnecessity for getting rid of his colleagues he wished\\nfor a Conservative Ministry with Bismarck as Presi-\\ndent. Here, he thought, was the only man who had\\nthe courage to carry through the army reform.\\nOthers thought as he did. Who so fitted to come", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0186.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 145\\nto the help of the Crown as this man who, ten years\\nbefore, had shewn such ability in Parliamentary de-\\nbate? And whenever the crisis became more acute,\\nall the Quidnuncs of Berlin shook their heads and\\nsaid, Now we shall have a Bismarck Ministry,\\nand that will be a coup d e tat and the overthrow of\\nthe Constitution.\\nBismarck meanwhile was living quietly at St. Peters-\\nburg, awaiting events. At last the summons came;\\non June 28, 1861, Roon telegraphed to him that the\\npear was ripe he must come at once there was\\ndanger in delay. His telegram was followed by a\\nletter, in which he more fully explained the situa-\\ntion. The immediate cause of the crisis was that\\nthe King desired to celebrate his accession, as his\\nbrother had done, by receiving the solemn homage of\\nall his people the Ministry refused their assent\\nto an act which would appear to the country as\\nfeudal and reactionary. A solemn pledge of\\nobedience to the King was the last thing the Liber-\\nals wanted to give, just for the same reasons that\\nthe King made a point of receiving it his feelings\\nwere deeply engaged, and Roon doubtless hoped\\nthat his colleagues would at last be compelled to\\nresign he wished, therefore, to have Bismarck on\\nthe spot.\\nBismarck could not leave St, Petersburg for some\\ndays he, however, answered by a telegram and a\\nlong letter; he begins in a manner characteristic of\\nall his letters at this period\\nYour letter disturbed me in my comfortable medita-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0187.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "146 Bismarck. [1858-\\ntions on the quiet time which I was going to enjoy at\\nReinfeld. Your cry to horse came with a shrill dis-\\ncord. I have grown ill in mind, tired out, and spiritless\\nsince I lost the foundation of my health.\\nAnd at the end\\nMoving, quarrelling, annoyance, the whole slavery\\nday and night form a perspective, which already makes\\nme homesick for Reinfeld or St. Petersburg. I cannot\\nenter the swindle in better company than yours but\\nboth of us were happier on the Sadower Heath behind\\nthe partridges.\\nSo he wrote late at night, but the next morning in\\na postscript he added If the King will to some ex-\\ntent meet my views, then I will set to the work with\\npleasure. In the letter he discusses at length the\\nprogramme; he does not attach much importance\\nto the homage it would be much better to come to\\nterms on the military question, break with the\\nChamber, and dissolve. The real difficulty he sees,\\nhowever, is foreign policy only by a change in the\\nmanagement of foreign affairs can the Crown be\\nrelieved from a pressure to vfhich it must ultimately\\ngive way he would not himself be inclined to\\naccept the Ministry of the Interior, because no good\\ncould be done unless the foreign policy was changed,\\nand that the King himself would probably not wish\\nThe chief fault of our policy is that we have been\\nLiberal at home and Conservative abroad we hold the\\nrights of our own King too cheap, and those of foreign\\nprinces too high a natural consequence of the differ-\\nence between the constitutional tendency of the Minis-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0188.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "18621 St. Petersburg and Paris. 147\\nters and the legitimist direction which the will of his\\nMajest}^ gives to our foreign policy. Of the princely\\nhouses from Naples to Hanover none will be grateful\\nfor our love, and we practise towards them a truly evan-\\ngelical love of our enemies at the cost of the safety of\\nour own throne. I am true to the sole of my foot to my\\nown princes, but towards all others I do not feel in a\\nsingle drop of blood the slightest obligation to raise up\\na little finger to help them. In this attitude I fear that\\n1 am so far removed from our Most Gracious Master,\\nthat he will scarcely find me fitted to be a Councillor of\\nhis Crown. For this reason he will anyhow prefer to\\nuse me at the Home-Office. In my opinion, however,\\nthat makes no difference, for I promise myself no useful\\nresults from the whole Government unless our attitude\\nabroad is more vigorous and less dependent on dynastic\\nsympathies.\\nBismarck arrived in Berlin on July 9th. When\\nhe got there the crisis was over Berlin was nearly\\nempty Roon was away in Pomerania, the King in\\nBaden-Baden a compromise had been arranged\\nthere was not to be an act of homage but a corona-\\ntion. There was, therefore, no more talk of his en-\\ntering the Ministry Schleinitz, however, told him\\nthat he was to be transferred from Russia, but did\\nnot say what post he was to have. The next day, in\\nobedience to a command, he hurried off to Baden-\\nBaden the King wished to have his advice on many\\nmatters of policy, and instructed him to draw up a\\nmemorandum on the German question. He used\\nthe opportunity of trying to influence the King to\\nadopt a bolder policy. At the same time he at-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0189.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "148 Bismarck. [1858-\\ntempted to win over the leaders of the Conservative\\nparty. A general election was about to take place\\nthe manifesto of the Conservative party was so\\nworded that we can hardly believe it was not an ex-\\npress and intentional repudiation of the language\\nwhich Bismarck was in the habit of using they\\ndesired\\nthe unity of our German fatherland, though not like\\nthe Kingdom of Italy through blood and fire \\\\^Blut\\nund Brand J almost the words which Bismarck had used\\nto describe the policy which must be followed], but in\\nthe unity of its princes and peoples holding firm to\\nauthority and law.\\nBismarck, on hearing this, sent to his old friend\\nHerr von Below, one of the leaders of the party, a\\nmemorandum on German affairs, and accompanied\\nit by a letter. He repeated his old point that Prus-\\nsia was sacrificing the authority of the Crown at\\nhome to support that of other princes in whose safety\\nshe had not the slightest interest. The solidarity of\\nConservative interests was a dangerous fiction, un-\\nless it was carried out with the fullest reciprocity\\ncarried out by Prussia alone it was Quixotry it pre-\\nvented King and Government from executing their\\ntrue task, the protection of Prussia from all injustice,\\nwhether it came from home or abroad this was the\\ntask given to the King by God.\\nWe make the unhistorical, the jealous, and lawless\\nmania for sovereignty of the German Princes the bosom\\nchild of the Conservative party in Prussia, we are en-\\nthusiastic for the petty sovereignties which were created", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0190.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 149\\nby Napoleon and protected by Metternich, and are blind\\nto the dangers which threaten Prussia and the independ-\\nence of Germany.\\nHe wishes for a clear statement of their policy a\\nstricter concentration of the German military forces,\\nreform of the Customs Unions, and a number of\\ncommon institutions to protect material interests\\nagainst the disadvantages which arise from the un-\\nnatural configuration of the different states.\\nBesides all this I do not see why we should shrink\\nback so bashfully from the idea of a representation of\\nthe people. We cannot fight as revolutionary an institu-\\ntion which we Conservatives cannot do without even in\\nPrussia, and is recognised as legitimate in every German\\nState.\\nThis letter is interesting as shewing how nearly his\\nwishes on German affairs coincided with those of the\\nLiberal party and of the National Verein he was\\nasking the Conservatives to adopt the chief points in\\ntheir opponents programme. Of course they would\\nnot do so, and the King himself was more likely to\\nbe alarmed than attracted by the bold and adven-\\nturous policy that was recommended to him. Bis-\\nKohl prints a memorandum of this year (1861) which probably is\\nthat sent to Herr von Below in it the ideas of the letter are devel-\\noped at greater length and the language is more cautious Bismarck\\nrecommends in it a representation of the people at the Diet, but\\npoints out that under present circumstances the consent of the Diet\\ncould not be attained the plan to which he seems to incline is that\\nof a separate union between some of the States exactly the plan\\nwhich Radowitz had followed and Bismarck had ten years before\\nso bitterly opposed.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0191.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "1 50 Bismarck. tl858-\\nmarck s anticipation was justified the King was not\\nprepared to appoint him Foreign Minister. Herr von\\nSchleinitz indeed resigned, but his place was taken\\nby Bernstorff, Minister at London he had so Httle\\nconfidence in the success of his ofifice that he did not\\neven give up his old post, and occupied the two\\npositions, one of which Bismarck much desired to\\nhave.\\nAfter attending the coronation at Konigsberg,\\nBismarck, therefore, returned to his old post at St.\\nPetersburg; his future was still quite uncertain; he\\nwas troubled by his own health and that of his child-\\nren for the first time he begins to complain of the\\ncold.\\nSince my illness I am so exhausted that I have lost\\nall my energy for excitement. Three years ago I would\\nhave made a serviceable Minister when I think of such\\na thing now I feel like a broken-down acrobat. I would\\ngladly go to London, Paris, or remain here, as it pleases\\nGod and his Majesty. I shudder at the prospect of the\\nMinistry as at a cold bath.\\nIn March he is still in ignorance; his household is\\nin a bad state.\\nJohanna has a cough, which quite exhausts her Bill\\nis in bed with fever, the doctor does not yet know what\\nis the matter with him the governess has no hope of\\never seeing Germany again.\\nHe does not feel up to taking the Ministry; even\\nParis would be too noisy for him.\\nLondon is quieter but for the climate and the child-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0192.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "1862] St Peter sbui^g and Paris. 1 5 1\\nren s health, I would prefer to stay here. Berne is an\\nold idea of mine dull places with pretty neighbourhoods\\nsuit old people only there is no sport there, as I do not\\nlike climbing after chamois.\\nThe decision depended on the events at home the\\nposition of the Government was becoming untenable.\\nThe elections had been most unfavourable the Radi-\\ncals had ceased to efface themselves, the old leaders\\nof 1848 had appeared again they had formed a new\\nparty of Progressives, and had won over a hun-\\ndred seats at the expense of the Conservatives and\\nthe moderate Liberals they were pledged not to\\ncarry out the military reforms and to insist on the\\ntwo years service. They intended to make the dif-\\nference of opinion on this point the occasion of a\\ndecisive struggle to secure and extend the control of\\nthe House over the administration, and for this pur-\\npose to bring into prominence constitutional ques-\\ntions which both Crown and Parliament had hitherto\\navoided. From the day the session opened it was\\nclear that there M^as now no chance of the money\\nbeing voted for the army. Before the decisive de-\\nbate came on, the majority had taken the offensive\\nand passed what was a direct vote of want of confid-\\nence in the Ministry. On this the Ministry handed\\nin their resignations to the King their place was\\ntaken by members of the Conservative party and\\nParliament again dissolved after sitting only six\\nweeks. It was the end of the 7iezv era.\\nIt was doubtful whether the new Ministers would\\nhave the skill and resolution to meet the crisis they\\nstill were without a leader; Prince von Hohenlohe,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0193.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "152 Bisma7 -ck.\\n[1858-\\na member of the Protestant branch of the family to\\nwhich the present Chancellor of the Empire belongs,\\nwas appointed provisional President. The opinions\\nof the country was clear enough the elections re-\\nsulted in the complete defeat not only of the Con-\\nservatives but of the moderate Liberals not a single\\none of the Ministers was returned. There was, there-\\nfore, no doubt that the King would either have to\\ngive in on the question of the army or to govern\\nagainst the will of the majority of the Chamber.\\nThe struggle was no longer confined to the question\\nof the army it was a formal conflict for power be-\\ntween the House and the Crown. The attempt to\\nintroduce a Parliamentary government which had\\nbeen thwarted ten years before was now revived.\\nWho could say what the end would be All pre-\\ncedent seemed to shew that in a struggle between\\nCrown and Parliament sooner or later the King must\\nbe beaten, unless, indeed, he was prepared to adopt\\nthe means which Napoleon used. The King would\\nnot give in he believed that the army reform was\\nnecessary to the safety of his country on the other\\nhand, he was a man of too loyal a character to have\\nrecourse to violence and a breach of the Constitu-\\ntion. If, however, the Constitution proved to be of\\nsuch a kind that it made it impossible for him to\\ngovern the country, he was prepared to retire from\\nhis post the position would indeed be untenable if\\non his shoulders lay the responsibility of guiding the\\npolicy and defending the interests of Prussia, and at\\nthe same time the country refused to grant him the\\nmeans of doing so,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0194.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 153\\nThe elections had taken place on May 6th four\\ndays later Bismarck arrived in Berlin he had at\\nlast received his recall. As soon as he was seen\\nin Berlin his appointment as Minister-President was\\nexpected all those who wished to maintain the au-\\nthority of the Crown, looked on him as the only man\\nwho could face the danger. Roon was active, as\\nusual, on his side and was now supported by some\\nof his colleagues, but Schleinitz, who had the sup-\\nport of the Queen, wished to be President himself\\nthere were long meetings of the Council and audi-\\nences of the King but the old influences were still\\nat work Bismarck did not wish to enter the Ministry\\nexcept as Foreign Minister, and the King still feared\\nand distrusted him. An incident which occurred\\nduring these critical days will explain to some extent\\nthe apprehensions which Bismarck so easily awoke.\\nThe chronic difficulties with the Elector of Hesse\\nhad culminated in an act of great discourtesy the\\nKing of Prussia had sent an autograph letter to the\\nElector by General Willisen the Elector on receiv-\\ning it threw it unopened on the table as the letter\\ncontained the final demands of Prussia, the only\\nanswer was to put some of the neighbouring regi-\\nments on a war footing. Bernstorff took the oppor-\\ntunity of Bismarck s presence in Berlin to ask his\\nadvice the answer was The circumstance that\\nthe Elector has thrown a royal letter on the table is\\nnot a clever casus belli if you want war, make me\\nyour Under Secretary I will engage to provide you\\na German civil war of the best quality in a few\\nweeks, The King might naturally fear that if he", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0195.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "154 Bismarck. [1858-\\nappointed Bismarck, not Under Secretary, but Min-\\nister, he would in a few weeks, whether he hked it or\\nnot, find himself involved in a German civil war of\\nthe best quality. He wanted a man who would de-\\nfend the Government before the Chambers with\\ncourage and ability; Bismarck, who had gained his\\nreputation as a debater, was the only man for the\\npost. He could have had the post of Minister of\\nthe Interior; he was offered that of Minister-Presi-\\ndent without a Portfolio but if he did not actually\\nrefuse, he strongly disapproved of the plan he\\nwould not be able to get on with Bernstorff, and\\nSchleinitz would probably interfere. I have no\\nconfidence in Bernstorff s eye for political matters\\nhe probably has none in mine. Bernstorff was too\\nstiff, his collars were too high. During these\\nlong discussions he wrote to his wife\\nOur future is obscure as in Petersburg. Berlin is\\nnow to the front 1 do nothing one way or another as\\nsoon as I have my credentials for Paris in my pocket I\\nwill dance and sing. At present there is no talk of\\nLondon, but all may change again. I scarcely get free\\nof the discussions all day long I do not find the Minis-\\nters more united than their predecessors were.\\nDisgusted with the long waiting and uncertainty\\nhe pressed for a decision after a fortnight s delay he\\nwas appointed Minister at Paris, but this was in\\nreality only a fresh postponement nothing had\\nreally been decided the King expressly told him\\nnot to establish himself there, To his wife he wrote\\nfrom Berlin;", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0196.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 155\\nI am very much pleased, but the shadow remains in\\nthe background. I was already as good as caught for\\nthe Ministry. Perhaps when I am out of their sight\\nthey will discover another Minister-President. I expect\\nto start for Paris to-morrow whether for long, God\\nknows perhaps only for a few months or even weeks.\\nThey are all conspired together that I should stay here.\\nI have had to be very firm to get away from this hotel\\nlife even for a time.\\nHe did not really expect to be away more than\\nten days or a fortnight. At a farewell audience just\\nbefore he started, the King seems to have led him\\nto expect that he would in a very few days be ap-\\npointed as he wished, Foreign Minister.\\nHe arrived in Paris on the 30th, to take up his\\nquarters in the empty Embassy. He did not wait\\neven to see his wife before starting and he wrote to\\nher that she was not to take any steps towards\\njoining him.\\nIt is not decided that I am to stay here I am in the\\nmiddle of Paris lonelier than you are in Reinfeld and sit\\nhere like a rat in a deserted house. How long it will\\nlast God knows. Probably in eight or ten days I shall\\nreceive a telegraphic summons to Berlin and then game\\nand dance is over. If my enemies knew what a benefit\\nthey would confer on me by their victory and how sin-\\ncerely I wish it for them, Schleinitz out of pure malice\\nwould probably do his best to bring me to Berlin.\\nDay after day, however, went by and the summons\\ndid not come on the contrary Bernstorff wrote as\\nthough he were proposing to stay on he did not", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0197.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "156 Bismarck. [1858-\\nhowever, suggest giving up his post in London.\\nRoon wrote that he had raised the question in con-\\nversation with the King that he had found the old\\nleaning towards Bismarck, and the old irresolution.\\nThe Chamber had met, but the first few weeks of\\nthe session passed off with unexpected quiet and it\\nwas not till the autumn that the question of the Bud-\\nget would come up. Bismarck wrote to Bernstorff\\nto try and find out what was to happen to him, but\\nthe King, before whom the letter was laid, was quite\\nunable to come to any decision.\\nBismarck therefore determined to use his enforced\\nleisure in order to go across to London for a few\\ndays. He had only visited England once as a young\\nman, and, expecting as he did soon to be responsible\\nfor the conduct of foreign affairs, it was desirable\\nthat he should make the personal acquaintance of\\nthe leading English statesmen. Undoubtedly, one\\nof the reasons why he had been sent to Paris was\\nthat he might renew his acquaintance with the Em-\\nperor. There was also a second International Exhi-\\nbition and everyone was going to London. We\\nhave, unfortunately, no letters written from Eng-\\nland after his return he writes to Roon\\nI have just come back from London people there\\nare much better informed about China and Turkey than\\nabout Prussia. Loftus must write more nonsense to his\\nMinisters than I thought.\\nThe only event of which we have any information\\nwas his meeting with Mr. Disraeli, who at that time\\nwas leader of the Opposition in the House of Com-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0198.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 157\\nmons it took place at a dinner given by the Russian\\nAmbassador to the Grand Duchess of Saxe-Weimar.\\nAmong the guests was Count Vitzthum, Saxon\\nEnvoy he saw Bismarck and Disraeli engaged in\\na long conversation after dinner afterwards the\\nEnghsh statesman told him the substance of it.\\nBismarck had spoken as follows\\nI shall soon be compelled to undertake the leader-\\nship of the Prussian Government. My first care will be,\\nwith or without the help of Parliament, to reorganise the\\narmy. The King has rightly set himself this task he\\ncannot however carry it through with his present coun-\\ncillors. When the army has been brought to such a state\\nas to command respect, then I will take the first oppor-\\ntunity to declare war with Austria, burst asunder the\\nGerman Confederation, bring the middle and smaller\\nStates into subjection, and give Germany a national\\nunion under the leadership of Prussia. I have come\\nhere to tell this to the Queen s Ministers.\\nDisraeli added to Vitzthum, who, of course, as\\nSaxon Envoy was much interested Take care of\\nthat man he means what he says. It does not ap-\\npear that Bismarck had an opportunity of explaining\\nhis project either to Lord Palmerston or to Lord\\nRussell.\\nAll through July he remained in Paris, to wliich\\nhe was called back in order to receive some des-\\npatches which after all never arrived the same un-\\ncertainty continued there was no work to be done\\nthere, Emperor and Ministers were going away he\\nwas still all alone in the Embassy without servants,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0199.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "158 Bismarck. [less-\\nor furniture. As he wrote to his wife, he did not\\nknow what to have for dinner or what to eat it on.\\nHe therefore appHed for leave he was himself of\\nopinion that as the King would not immediately\\ngive him the Foreign Office it was not yet time for\\nhim to enter the Ministry. Writing to Roon he\\nadvised that the Government should prolong the\\nconflict, draw the Chamber into disputes on small\\nmatters which would weary the country then when\\nthey were getting worn out and hoped that the\\nGovernment would meet them half-way so as to end\\nthe conflict, then would be the time to summon him,\\nas a sign that we are far from giving up the battle.\\nThe appearance of a new battalion in the Ministerial\\narray would then perhaps make an impression that\\nwould be wanting now, especially if beforehand a com-\\nmotion was created by expressions about a coup d etat\\nand a new Constitution then my own reputation for\\ncareless violence would help me and people would think,\\nnow it is coming Then, all the half-hearted would be\\ninclined to negotiation. I am astonished at the political\\nincapacity of our Chambers and yet we are an educated\\ncountry. Undoubtedly too much so others are not\\ncleverer but they have not the childish self-confidence\\nwith which our political leaders publish their incapacity\\nin its complete nakedness as a model and pattern.\\nHow have we Germans got the reputation of retiring\\nmodesty There is not a single one of us who does not\\nthink that he understands everything, from strategy to\\npicking the fleas off a dog, better than professionals who\\nhave devoted their lives to it.\\nIt was only with difficulty he could even get leave", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0200.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "1862] St. Petersburg and Paris. 159\\nof absence, for the King was as irresolute as ever\\nas to the cause of the difficulty we get some hint in\\nRoon s letters. There was a party which was push-\\ning Schleinitz, the only member of the Liberal\\nMinistry who remained in office he had very influ-\\nential support.\\nHer Majesty the Queen returns to Babelsburg on\\nSunday she is much agitated, there will be scenes\\nthe temperature towards the Ministry will fall to zero\\nor below.\\nHe eventually got away at the end of July with\\nsix weeks leave of absence he travelled down to\\nBordeaux and Bayonne and across the Pyrenees to\\nSan Sebastian he was away from all news of the\\nworld for weeks he scarcely saw even a German\\npaper.\\nOn the r4th of September he was at Toulouse\\nthe sea-bathing, the mountain air, the freedom from\\nwork and anxiety, and the warmth had completely\\nrestored his health for the first time since he went\\nto St. Petersburg he had recovered his old spirit, his\\ndecision, and directness of action. He wrote that\\nhe must have some definite decision otherwise he\\nwould send in his resignation. My furniture is at\\nSt. Petersburg and will be frozen up, my carriages\\nare at Stettin, my horses at Berlin, my family in\\nPomerania, and I on the highroad. He was pre-\\npared to be his Majesty s Envoy at Paris but he\\nwas also ready at once to enter the Ministry. Only\\nget me certainty, one way or another, he writes to\\nRoon, and I will paint angels wings on your", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0201.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "1 60 Bismarck.\\n[1858-\\nphotograph. Two days later, just as a year before,\\nhe received a telegram from Roon telling him to\\ncome at once. On the 17th he was in Paris and on\\nthe morning of the 20th he arrived in Berlin.\\nThe long-delayed crisis had at last come the de-\\nbates on the Budget and the vote for. the army\\nreform began on September iith; it was continued\\nfor five days, and at the end the House, by a\\nmajority of 273 to 62, refused the money required\\nfor the increased establishment. The result of this\\nvote would be that if the wishes of the House were\\ncarried out, the whole of the expenditure which had\\nalready been made for eight months of the current\\nyear was illegal moreover, the regiments which had\\nalready existed for two years must be disbanded.\\nIt was a vote which could not possibly be carried\\ninto effect, as the money had already been spent.\\nAt a meeting of the Ministry which was held the\\nnext morning, the majority, including this time even\\nRoon, seemed to have been inclined to attempt a\\ncompromise. The King alone remained firm. When\\nhe had heard the opinion of all the Ministers, he rose\\nand said that in that case it would be impossible for\\nhim to carry on the Government any longer it would\\nonly remain for him to summon the Crown Prince.\\nAs he said this he put his hand on the bell to call\\na messenger. The Ministers all sprang from their\\nchairs and assured him that he might depend upon\\nthem, and they would support him to the end.\\nSuch were the circumstances in which Roon sum-\\nmoned Bismarck. None the less the influence of\\nthe Queen and the Crown Prince were so strong", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0202.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "1862]\\nS^. Pete^ sbui^o- and Paris.\\ni6i\\nthat the King still doubted whether he ought to\\ncontinue the struggle on one thing he was deter-\\nmined, that if he had to give way he would abdicate.\\nTwo days later he again asked Roon his advice.\\nAppoint Bismarck Minister-President, was the\\nanswer. But he is not here, he will not accept,\\nobjected the King, referring doubtless to the dif^-\\nculties which Bismarck had raised formerly. He\\nis in Berlin at this moment, said Roon. The King\\nordered him to come to Potsdam. When Bismarck\\narrived there he found the King sitting at his table,\\nand in front of him the act of abdication, already\\nsigned. The King asked him whether he was will-\\ning to undertake the Government, even against the\\nmajority of the Parliament and without a Budget.\\nBismarck said he would do so. It was one last\\nchance, and the King tore up the act of abdication.\\nTwo days later Bismarck was appointed provisional\\nMinister-President, and, at the beginning of October,\\nreceived his definite appointment as President and\\nForeign Minister.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0203.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VII.\\nTHE CONFLICT.\\n1 862-1 863.\\nTHE circumstances under which Bisnriarck ac-\\ncepted office were such as to try the nerves\\nof the strongest man. The King had not\\nappealed to him so long as there was anyone else\\nwho would carry on the Government he was the\\nlast resource, and had taken up a burden from which\\nall others shrunk. He had pledged himself to sup-\\nport the King in a conflict against the whole nation\\nwith the exception of the Upper House he had no\\nfriends or supporters. The opinion in Europe was\\nas decisively against him as that in Prussia he was\\nscarcely looked on as a serious politician every-\\none believed that in a few weeks he would have to\\nretire, and the King to give up the useless conflict\\non which he was staking his throne. Bismarck was\\nunder no illusion as to his position he had been\\nsummoned by the King, he depended for his office\\nentirely on the King, but would the King have the\\nstrength of will and courage to resist Only a few\\ndays after his appointment, the King had gone to\\n162", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0204.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "1862] The Co7ifiict. 163\\nBaden-Baden for a week, where he met the Queen.\\nWhen he came back, he was completely disheart-\\nened. Bismarck, who had travelled part of the way\\nto meet him, got into the train at a small roadside\\nstation. He found that the King, who was sitting\\nalone in an ordinary first-class carriage, was prepared\\nto surrender. What will come of it? he said.\\nAlready I see the place before my castle on which\\nyour head will fall, and then mine will fall too.\\nWell, as far as I am concerned, answered Bis-\\nmarck, I cannot think of a finer death than one on\\nthe field of battle or the scaffold. I would fall like\\nLord Strafford and your Majesty, not as Louis\\nXVL, but as Charles L That is a quite respectable\\nhistorical figure.\\nFor the moment the centre of interest lay in the\\nHouse. The new Minister began by what he in-\\ntended as an attempt at reconciliation he announced\\nthat the Budget for 1863 would be withdrawn; the\\nobject of this was to limit as much as possible the\\nimmediate scope of difference a fresh Budget for\\nthe next year would be laid before them as soon as\\npossible. There would remain only the settlement\\nof the Budget for the current year. This announce-\\nment was badly received the House was distrustful,\\nand they interpreted it as an attempt to return to the\\nold practice of deferring consideration of the Budget\\nuntil the beginning of the year to which it applied.\\nThe first discussion in which Bismarck took part was\\nnot in the House itself, but in the Budget Commit-\\ntee. The Committee proposed a resolution requiring\\nthe Government at once to lay before the House the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0205.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "1 64 Bismarck.\\n[1862-\\nBudget for 1863, and declaring that it was uncon-\\nstitutional to spend any money which had been\\nexpressly and definitely refused by the House of\\nRepresentatives, On this there took place a long\\ndiscussion, in which Bismarck spoke repeatedly for\\nthe discussions in Committee, which consisted only\\nof about thirty members, were conversational in their\\nnature. There was no verbatim report, but the room\\nwas crowded with members who had come to hear\\nthe new Minister. They were not disappointed.\\nHe spoke with a wit, incisiveness, and versatility to\\nwhich, as one observer remarked, they were not ac-\\ncustomed from Prussian Ministers. He warned them\\nnot to exaggerate their powers. The Prussian Con-\\nstitution did not give the House of Representatives\\nthe sole power of settling the Budget it must be\\nsettled by arrangement with the other House and\\nthe Crown. There was a difference of opinion in\\nthe interpretation of the Constitution all constitu-\\ntional government required compromise a consti-\\ntution was not something dead, it must be enlivened\\nit was interpreted by custom and practice it would\\nbe wiser not to hasten this practice too quickly; then\\nthe question of law might easily become one of\\npower. It was not the fault of the Government that\\nthey had got into this position people took the\\nsituation too tragically, especially in the press they\\nspoke as though the end of all things was come\\nbut, he added, a constitutional struggle is not a\\ndisgrace, it is rather an honour; after ail we are all\\nchildren of the same country. A true note, but\\none which he was not always able to maintain in the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0206.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "1863] The Conflict. 165\\nstruggle of the coming years. Then he expounded\\nthe view of the German character which we have\\nlearnt from his letters it was customary to speak of\\nthe sobriety of the Prussian people yes, but the\\ngreat independence of the individual made it difificult\\nin Prussia to govern with the Constitution in France\\nit was different; there this individual independence\\nAvas wanting; we are perhaps too educated to en-\\ndure a constitution we are too critical the capacity\\nfor judging measures of the Government and acts of\\nthe Representatives was too universal there were\\nin the country too many Catilinarian existences,\\nwhich had an interest in revolutions. He reminded\\nthem that Germany did not care for the Liberalism\\nof Prussia, but for its power; Bavaria, Wiirtemberg,\\nBaden, might indulge in Liberalism Prussia must\\nconcentrate its power and hold itself ready for the\\nfavourable moment which had already been passed\\nover more than once Prussia s boundaries, as fixed\\nby the Congress of Vienna, were not favourable to a\\nsound political life not by speeches and majority-\\nvotes are the great questions of the time decided\\nthat was the great blunder of 1848 and 1849- but\\nby blood and iron. He appealed for confidence:\\nDo not force a quarrel we are honest people and\\nyou can trust us.\\nThe effect of these speeches was very unfavour-\\nable the very quickness of thought and originality\\nof expression produced a bad impression; even the\\nfree indulgence in long foreign words offended\\npatriotic journalists. They seemed to his audience\\nreckless what was this reference to the Treaties of", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0207.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "1 66 Bismarck.\\n[1862-\\nVlenna but an imitation of Napoleonic statesman-\\nship They had the consciousness that they were\\nmaking history, that they were involved in a great\\nand tragic conflict, and they expected the Minister\\nto play his part seriously and solemnly; instead of\\nthat they had listened to a series of epigrams with\\nno apparent logical connection. We know how\\ndangerous it is, even in England, for a responsible\\nstatesman to allow himself to be epigrammatic in\\ndealing with serious affairs. Much more was it\\nin Germany, where the Ministers were nearly always\\nofficials by training. Bismarck had the dangerous\\ngift of framing pregnant and pithy sentences which\\nwould give a ready handle to his opponents:\\nMacht geJit vor Recht he had not said these words,\\nbut he had said something very much like them, and\\nthey undoubtedly represented what seemed to his\\naudience the pith of his speeches. And then these\\nwords, blood and ir 071. He has told us in later years\\nwhat he really meant\\nPut the strongest possible military power, in other\\nwords, as much blood and iron as you can, into the hands\\nof the King of Prussia, then he will be able to carry out\\nthe policy you wish it cannot be done with speeches\\nand celebrations and songs, it can only be done by\\nblood and iron.\\nWhat everyone thought he meant was that blood\\nmust be shed and iron used and perhaps they were\\nnot so far wrong.\\n\u00e2\u0099\u00a6Speech of January 28, \\\\i", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0208.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "1863] The Conflict. 167\\nThe attempt at conciliation failed the report of\\nthe Committee was adopted, and an amendment pro-\\nposed by Vincke, which Bismarck was prepared to\\naccept, was rejected. Bismarck warned the House\\nnot to push the conflict too far the time would come\\nwhen the prospect of a peaceful solution would have\\ndisappeared then the Government too would be\\nprepared to oppose theory to theory and interpreta-\\ntion to interpretation.\\nHe showed to the President of the House a twig\\nof olive. I gathered this in Avignon to bring it to\\nthe House it does not seem to be time yet.\\nThe Budget was sent up to the House of Lords in\\nthe amended form in which the House of Representa-\\ntives had passed it the Lords unanimously threw it\\nout, as they were legally justified in doing not con-\\ntent with that, they altered it to the original form in\\nwhich it had been proposed by the Government and\\nsent it down again to the Lower House. This was\\nclearly illegal. Their action, however, was most use-\\nful to the Government. A conflict had now arisen\\nbetween the two Houses, and technically the\\nresponsibility for the failure to bring the conciliation\\nabout was taken away from the Government they\\ncould entrench themselves behind the impregnable\\nposition that the law required the Budget to be\\npassed by both Houses; until this was done they\\ncould do nothing. The Houses would not agree the\\nGovernment was helpless. The House of Repre-\\nsentatives at once passed a motion declaring the\\nvote of the Upper House for altering the Budget\\nnull and void, as indeed it was; in the middle of the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0209.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "1 68 Bisfnarck.\\n[1862-\\ndiscussion a message was brought down by the Presi-\\ndent announcing that the House was to be prorogued\\nthat afternoon they had just time to pass the resolu-\\ntion and to send it in a cab which was waiting at the\\ndoor to the Upper House, where it was read out\\namidst the boisterous laughter of the Peers; then\\nboth Chambers were summoned to the Palace, and\\nthe session closed. The first round in the conflict\\nwas over.\\nThe recess was short the next session was by\\nthe Constitution obliged to begin not later than Janu-\\nary 15th; there were many who expected that the\\nConstitution would be ignored and the Parliament\\nnot summoned. This was not Bismarck s plan he\\nfulfilled all the technical requirements in the strictest\\nway he carefully abstained from any action which\\nhe could not justify by an appeal to the letter of the\\nConstitution the government of the country was\\ncarried on with vigour and success he allowed no\\nloophole by which his opponents might injure his\\ninfluence with the King. It is true that they were\\nspending money which had not been voted, but then,\\nas he explained, that was not his fault the pro-\\nvisions of the law were quite clear.\\nIt was the duty of the Government to submit the\\nBudget to the Lower House, who could amend it\\nit had then to be passed in the form of a law, and\\nfor this the assent of both Houses of Parliament and\\nof the Crown was required. The Upper House had\\nnot the right of proposing amendments, but they\\nhad the right of rejecting them. In this case they\\nhad made use of their right no law had been passed", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0210.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "1863] The Conflict. 169\\nthe two Houses had not agreed. What was to hap-\\npen? The Constitution gave no help; there was a\\ngap in it. The Government therefore had to act as\\nbest they could. They could not be expected to\\nclose the Government offices, cease to pay the\\ntroops, and let the government of the country come\\nto an end they must go on as best they could, tak-\\ning all the responsibility until they could come to\\nsome agreement.\\nAs soon as the House met it began to vote an\\naddress to the King. They adopted the obvious fic-\\ntion, which, in fact, they could not well avoid, that\\nhe was being misled by his Ministers, and the atti-\\ntude of the country misrepresented to him even\\nhad they known as well as we do that the Ministers\\nwere only carrying out the orders of the King, they\\ncould not well have said so. Bismarck, however, did\\nnot attempt to conceal the truth the address, he\\nsaid, touched the King the acts complained of were\\ndone in the name of the King they were setting\\nthemselves against him. The contest was, who was\\nto rule in Prussia, the House of Hohenzollern or the\\nHouse of Parliament. He was at once accused of\\ndisloyalty he was, they said, protecting himself be-\\nhind the person of the sovereign, but, of course, it\\nwas impossible for him not to do so. The whole\\njustification for his action was that he was carrying\\nout the King s orders. What was at the root of the\\nconflict but the question, whether in the last resort\\nthe will of the King or the majority of the House\\nshould prevail? To have adopted the English prac-\\ntice, to have refrained from mentioning the King s", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0211.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "1 70 Bismarck. [1862-\\nname, would have been to adopt the very theory of\\nthe Constitution for which the House was contend-\\ning, the English theory that the sovereign has\\nneither the right of deciding nor responsibility; it\\nwould have been to undermine the monarchical side\\nof the Constitution which Bismarck was expressly\\ndefending. The King himself never attempted to\\navoid the responsibility in a public speech he had\\nalready said that the army organisation was his own\\nwork: It is my own and I am proud of it I will\\nhold firmly to it and carry it through with all my\\nenergy. In his answer to the address from tlie\\nHouse, both on this and on later occasions, he ex-\\npressly withdrew the assumption that he was not\\nwell informed or that he did not approve of his\\nMinisters action.\\nThe address was carried by a majority of 255 to\\n68 the King refused to receive it in person. The\\nHouse then proceeded to throw out a Bill for mili-\\ntary reorganisation which was laid before them\\nthey adopted a resolution that they reserved for\\nlater discussion the question, for what part of the\\nmoney illegally spent in 1862 they would hold the\\nMinistry personally responsible. They then pro-\\nceeded to the Budget of 1863, and again rejected\\nthe army estimates they refused the money asked\\nfor raising the salaries of the ambassadors (Bis-\\nmarck himself, while at St. Petersburg, had suffered\\nmuch owing to the insufificiency of his salary, and he\\nwished to spare his successors a similar inconven-\\nience) and they brought in Bills for the responsibil-\\nity of Ministers, The public attention, however,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0212.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "1863] The Confiid. 171\\nwas soon directed from these internal matters to\\neven more serious questions of foreign policy.\\nAt the beginning of February the Poles had once\\nmore risen in revolt against the Russian Govern-\\nment. Much sympathy was felt for them in West-\\nern Europe. England, France, and Austria joined\\nin representations and remonstrances to the Czar\\nthey expected that Prussia would join them.\\nNothing could have been more inconvenient to\\nBismarck he was at the time fully occupied in ne-\\ngotiations about German affairs, and he was proba-\\nbly anxious to bring to a speedy issue the questions\\nbetween Prussia and Austria it was therefore most\\nimportant to him to be on good terms with France\\nand England, for he would not challenge Austria\\nunless he was sure that Austria would have no allies\\nnow he must quarrel with either Russia or with\\nFrance. An insurrection in Poland was, however, a\\ndanger to which everything else must be postponed;\\non this his opinion never varied, here there could be\\nno compromise. He was perfectly open The Pol-\\nish question is to us a question of life and death,\\nhe said to Sir Andrew Buchanan. There were two\\nparties among the Poles the one, the extreme\\nRepublican, wished for the institution of an inde-\\npendent republic the other would be content with\\nself-government and national institutions under the\\nRussian Crown they were supported by a considera-\\nble party in Russia itself. Either party if successful\\nwould not be content with Russian Poland they\\nwould demand Posen, they would never rest until\\nthey had gained again the coast of the Baltic and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0213.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "172 Bisniai^ck. [1862-\\ndeprived Prussia of her eastern provinces. The dan-\\nger to Prussia would be greatest, as Bismarck well\\nknew, if the Poles became reconciled to the Rus-\\nsians an independent republic on their eastern\\nfrontier would have been dangerous, but Polish\\naspirations supported by the Panslavonic party and\\nthe Russian army would have been fatal. Russia\\nand Poland might be reconciled, Prussia and Poland\\nnever can be. Prussia therefore was obliged to\\nseparate itself from the other Powers instead of\\nsending remonstrances to the Czar, the King wrote\\nan autograph letter proposing that the two Govern-\\nments should take common steps to meet the com-\\nmon danger General von Alvensleben, who took\\nthe letter, at once concluded a convention in which\\nit was agreed that Prussian and Russian troops\\nshould be allowed to cross the frontier in pursuit of\\nthe insurgents at the same time two of the Prus-\\nsian army corps were mobilised and drawn up along\\nthe Polish frontier.\\nThe convention soon became known and it is easy\\nto imagine the indignation with which the Prussian\\npeople and the House of Representatives heard of\\nwhat their Government had done. The feeling was\\nakin to that which would have prevailed in America\\nhad the President offered his help to the Spanish\\nGovernment to suppress the insurrection in Cuba.\\nThe answers to questions were unsatisfactory, and\\non February 26th Heinrich von Sybel rose to move\\nthat the interests of Prussia required absolute neu-\\ntrality. It was indeed evident that Bismarck s ac-\\ntion had completely isolated Prussia except the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0214.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "1863] The Conflict. 1 73\\nCzar, she had now not a single friend in Europe and\\nscarcely a friend in Germany, Bismarck began his\\nanswer by the taunt that the tendency to enthusi-\\nasm for foreign nationalities, even when their ob-\\njects could only be realised at the cost of one s own\\ncountry, was a political disease unfortunately limited\\nto Germany. It was, however, an unjust taunt, for\\nno one had done more than Sybel himself in his his-\\ntorical work to point out the necessity, though he\\nrecognised the injustice, of the part Prussia had\\ntaken in the partition of Poland nobody had\\npainted so convincingly as he had, the political and\\nsocial demoralisation of Poland. Bismarck then\\ndwelt on the want of patriotism in the House, which\\nin the middle of complicated negotiations did not\\nscruple to embarrass their own Government. No\\nEnglish House of Commons, he said, would have\\nacted as they did, a statement to which we cannot\\nassent an English Opposition would have acted ex-\\nactly as the majority of the Prussian Parliament did.\\nWhen a Minister is in agreement with the House on\\nthe general principles of policy, then indeed there\\nrests on them the obligation not to embarrass the\\nGovernment by constant interpolation with regard\\nto each diplomatic step self-restraint must be exer-\\ncised, confidence shewn. This was not the case here\\nthe House had every reason to believe that the ob-\\njects of Bismarck were completely opposed to what\\nthey wished they could not be expected to repose\\nconfidence in him. They used this, as every other\\nopportunity, to attempt to get rid of him.\\nThe question of Poland is one on which Bismarck", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0215.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "1 74 Bismarck. [1862-\\nnever altered his attitude. His first public expression\\nof opinion on foreign affairs was an attack on the\\nPolish policy of the Prussian Government in 1848.\\nNo one then, he wrote, could doubt that an independ-\\nent Poland would be the irreconcilable enemy of Prussia\\nand would remain so till they had conquered the mouth\\nof the Vistula and every Polish-speaking village in West\\nand East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia.\\nForty years later one of the last of his great speeches\\nin the Reichstag was devoted to attacking the Polish\\nsympathies of the Catholic party in Prussia. He\\nwas never tired of laughing at the characteristic\\nGerman romanticism which was so enthusiastic for\\nthe welfare of other nations. He recalled the memo-\\nries of his boyhood when, after the rebellion of 1831,\\nPolish refugees were received in every German town\\nwith honours and enthusiasm greater than those paid\\nto the men who had fought for Germany, when\\nGerman children would sing Polish national airs as\\nthough they were their own.\\nNothing shews the change which he has been able\\nto bring about in German thought better than the\\nattitude of the nation towards Poland. In the old\\ndays the Germans recollected only that the partition\\nof Poland had been a great crime it was their hope\\nand determination that they might be able to make\\namends for it. In those days the Poles were to be\\nfound in every country in Europe, foremost in fight-\\ning on the barricades they helped the Germans to\\nfight for their liberty, and the Germans were to help\\nthem to recover independence. In 1848, Mieroslawski", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0216.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "1863]\\nThe Conflict. 175\\nhad been carried like a triumphant hero through the\\nstreets of Berlin the Baden rebels put themselves\\nunder the leadership of a Pole, and it was a Pole\\nwho commanded the Viennese in their resistance to\\nthe Austrian army a Pole led the Italians to dis-\\naster on the field of Novara. At a time when poets\\nstill were political leaders, and the memory and in-\\nfluence of Byron had not been effaced, there was\\nscarcely a German poet, Platen, Uhland, Heine, who\\nhad not stirred up the enthusiasm for Poland. It\\nwas against this attitude of mind that Bismarck had\\nto struggle and he has done so successfully. He has\\ntaught that it is the duty of Germany to use all the\\npower of the State for crushing and destroying the\\nPolish language and nationality the Poles in Prussia\\nare to become Prussian, as those in Russia have to\\nbecome Russian. A hundred years ago the Polish\\nState was destroyed now the language and the\\nnation must cease to exist.\\nIt is a natural result of the predominance of\\nPrussia in Germany. The enthusiasm for Poland\\nwas not unnatural when the centre of gravity of\\nGermany was still far towards the West. Germany\\ncould be great, prosperous, and happy, even if a re-\\nvived Poland spread to the shores of the Baltic, but\\nPrussia would then cease to exist and Bismarck has\\ntaught the Germans to feel as Prussians.\\nThe danger during these weeks was real Napo-\\nleon proposed that Austria, England, and France\\nshould present identical notes to Prussia remonstrat-\\ning with and threatening her. Lord Russell refused\\nit was, as Bismarck said in later years, only the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0217.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "1 76 Bismarck. [1862-\\nfriendly disposition of Lord Russell to Germany\\nwhich saved Prussia from this danger. Bismarck s\\nown position was very insecure but he withstood\\nthis attack as he did all others, though few knew at\\nwhat expense to his nerves and health he used to\\nattribute the frequent illnesses of his later years to\\nthe constant anxiety of these months he had a\\nvery nervous temperament, self-control was difificult\\nto him, and we must remember that all the time\\nwhen he was defending the King s Government\\nagainst this public criticism he had to maintain him-\\nself against those who at Court were attempting to\\nundermine his influence with the King.\\nHe had, however, secured the firm friendship\\nof Russia. When he was in St. Petersburg he had\\ngained the regard of the Czar now to this personal\\nfeeling was added a great debt of gratitude. What\\na contrast between the action of Austria and Prus-\\nsia The late Czar had saved Austria from dissolu-\\ntion, and what had been the reward Opposition in\\nthe East, and now Austria in the Polish affair was\\nagain supporting the Western Powers. On the other\\nhand Prussia, and Prussia alone, it was which had\\nsaved Russia from the active intervention of France\\nand England. Napoleon had proposed that a land-\\ning should he made in Lithuania in order to effect\\na junction with the Poles; Bismarck had immedi-\\nately declared that if this were done he should re-\\ngard it as a declaration of war against Prussia. So\\ndeep was the indignation of Alexander that he wrote\\nhimself to the King of Prussia, proposing an alliance\\nand a joint attack on France and Austria. It must", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0218.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "1863] The Conflict. 177\\nhave been a great temptation to Bismarck, but he\\nnow shewed the prudence which was his great char-\\nacteristic as a diplomatist he feared that in a war of\\nthis kind the brunt would fall upon Prussia, and that\\nwhen peace was made the control of negotiations\\nwould be with the Czar. He wished for war with\\nAustria, but he was determined that when war came\\nhe should have the arrangement of the terms of\\npeace. On his advice the King refused the offer.\\nThe bitterness of the feeling created by these de-\\nbates on Poland threatened to make it impossible\\nfor Ministers any longer to attend in the House\\nBismarck did his part in increasing it.\\nYou ask me, he said, why, if we disagree with you,\\nwe do not dissolve it is that we wish the country to\\nhave an opportunity of becoming thoroughly acquainted\\nwith you.\\nHe was tired and angry when during one of these\\nsittings he writes to Motley\\nI am obliged to listen to particularly tasteless speeches\\nout of the mouths of uncommonly childish and excited\\npoliticians, and I have therefore a moment of unwilling\\nleisure which I cannot use better than in giving you. news\\nof my welfare. I never thought that in my riper years I\\nshould be obliged to carry on such an unworthy trade as\\nthat of a Parliamentary Minister. As envoy, although\\nan official, I still had the feeling of being a gentleman\\nas [Parliamentary] Minister one is a helot. I have come\\ndown in the world, and hardly know how.\\nApril 1 8th. I wrote as far as this yesterday, then\\nthe sitting came to an end five hours Chamber until\\nthree o clock one hour s report to his Majesty three", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0219.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "1 78 Bismarck. [1865-\\nhours at an incredibly dull dinner, old important Whigs\\nthen two hours work finally, a supper with a colleague,\\nwho would have been hurt if I had slighted his fish.\\nThis morning, I had hardly breakfasted, before Karolyi\\nwas sitting opposite to me he was followed without in-\\nterruption by Denmark, England, Portugal, Russia,\\nFrance, whose Ambassador I was obliged to remind at\\none o clock that it was time for me to go to the House\\nof phrases. I am sitting again in the latter hear people\\ntalk nonsense, and end my letter. All these people have\\nagreed to approve our treaties with Belgium, in spite of\\nwhich twenty speakers scold each other with the greatest\\nvehemence, as if each wished to make an end of the\\nother they are not agreed about the motives which\\nmake them unanimous, hence, alas a regular German\\nsquabble about the Emperor s beard querelle d Alle-\\nma7id. You Anglo-Saxon Yankees have something of\\nthe same kind also. Your battles are bloody\\nours wordy these chatterers really cannot govern Prus-\\nsia. I must bring some opposition to bear against them\\nthey have too little wit and too much self-complacency\\nstupid and audacious. Stupid, in all its meanings, is not\\nthe right word considered individually, these people\\nare sometimes very clever, generally educated the regu-\\nlation German university culture but of politics, be-\\nyond the interests of their own church tower, they know\\nas little as we knew as students, and even less as far as\\nexternal politics go, they are also, taken separately, like\\nchildren. In all other questions they become childish\\nas soon as they stand together in corpore. In the mass\\nstupid, individually intelligent.\\nRecalling these days, Bismarck .said in later years:\\nI shall never forget how I had every morning to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0220.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "1863]\\nThe Conflict. 179\\nreceive the visit of Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English\\nAmbassador, and Talleyrand, the representative of\\nFrance, who made hell hot for me over the inexcusable\\nleanings of Prussian policy towards Russia, and held\\nthreatening language towards us, and then at midday I\\nhad the pleasure of hearing in the Prussian Parliament\\npretty much the same arguments and attacks which in\\nthe morning the foreign Ambassadors had made against\\nme.\\nOf course the language used in the House weak-\\nened his influence abroad, and the foreign Govern-\\nments shewed more insistence when they found out\\nthat the Prussian Parliament supported their de-\\nmands. It was noticed with satisfaction in the\\nEnglish Parliament that the nation had dissociated\\nitself from the mean and disgraceful policy of the\\nGovernment.\\nAt last personal friction reached such a point that\\nthe session had to be closed. In order to under-\\nstand the cause of this we must remember that in\\nPrussia the Ministers are not necessarily members of\\neither House they enjoy, however, by the Consti-\\ntution, the right of attending the debates and may\\nat any time demand to be heard they do not sit in\\nthe House among the other members, but on a\\nraised bench to the right of the President, facing the\\nmembers. They have not, therefore, any feeling of\\nesprit de corps as members of the assembly Bis-\\nmarck and his colleagues when they addressed the\\nHouse spoke not as members, not as the representa-\\ntives of even a small minority, but as strangers, as\\nthe representatives of a rival and hostile authority", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0221.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "1 80 Bismarck.\\n[1862-\\nit is this which alone explains the almost unanimous\\nopposition to him he was the opponent not of one\\nparty in the House but of the Parliament itself and\\nof every other Parliament. In the course of a debate\\nhe came into conflict with the Chair the President\\npointed out that some of his remarks had nothing\\nto do with the subject Bismarck at once protested\\nI cannot allow the President the right to a discip-\\nlinary interruption in my speech. I have not the\\nhonour of being a member of this assembly I have\\nnot helped to vote your standing orders; I have not\\njoined in electing the President I am not subject\\nto the disciplinary power of the Chamber. The\\nauthority of the President ends at this barrier. I\\nhave one superior only, his Majesty the King.\\nThis led to a sharp passage with the President, who\\nmaintained that his power extended as far as the\\nfour walls he could not indeed withdraw the right\\nof speech from a Minister, but could interrupt him.\\nBismarck at once repeated word for word the ob-\\nnoxious passage of his speech. The President\\nthreatened, if he did so again, to close the sitting;\\nBismarck practically gave way I cannot, he said,\\nprevent the President adjourning the House what\\nI have said twice I need not repeat a third time\\nand the debate continued without further interrup-\\ntion. A few weeks later a similar scene occurred,\\nbut this time it was not Bismarck but Roon, and\\nRoon had not the same quick feeling for Parlia-\\nmentary form Bismarck had defied the President\\nup to the extreme point where his legal powers\\nwent, Roon passed beyond them. The President", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0222.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "1863] The Confiict. i8i\\nwished to interrupt the Minister; Roon refused to\\nstop speaking the President rang his belL When\\nI interrupt the Minister, he said, he must be\\nsilent. For that purpose I use my bell, and, if the\\nMinister does not obey, I must have my hat brought\\nme. When the Chairman put on his hat the House\\nwould be adjourned. Roon answered, I do not\\nmind if the President has his hat brought accord-\\ning to the Constitution I can speak if I wish, and no\\none has the right to interrupt me. After a few\\nmore angry words on either side, as Roon continued\\nto dispute the right of the President, the latter rose\\nfrom his seat and asked for his hat, which he placed\\non his head. All the members rose and the House\\nwas adjourned. Unfortunately the hat handed to\\nhim was not his own it was much too large and\\ncompletely covered his head and face, so that the\\nstrain of the situation was relieved by loud laughter.\\nAfter this the Ministers refused to attend the House\\nunless they received an assurance that the President\\nno longer claimed disciplinary authority over them\\na series of memoranda were exchanged between the\\nHouse and the Ministry the actual point in dispute\\nwas really a very small one it is not even clear that\\nthere was any difference of opinion everyone ac-\\nknowledged that the Ministers might make as many\\nspeeches as they liked, and that the Chairman could\\nnot require them to stop speaking. The only\\nquestion was whether he might interrupt them in\\norder to make any remarks himself; but neither\\nside was prepared to come to an understanding.\\nThe King, to whom the House appealed, supported", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0223.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "182 Bismarck.\\n[1862-\\nthe Ministry, and a few days later the House was\\nprorogued. The second session was over.\\nThree days later, by Royal proclamation, a series\\nof ordinances was published creating very stringent\\nregulations for the control of the Press they gave\\nthe police the right of forbidding a newspaper to\\nappear for no other reason except disapproval of its\\ngeneral tendency. It was a power more extreme\\nthan in the worst days of the Carlsbad decrees had\\never been claimed by any German Government.\\nThe ordinances were based on a clause in the Con-\\nstitution which gave the Government at times of\\ncrisis, if Parliament were not sitting, the power of\\nmaking special regulations for the government of the\\nPress. The reference to the Constitution seemed\\nalmost an insult the kind of crisis which was meant\\nwas obviously a period of civil war or invasion it\\nseemed as though the Government had taken the\\nfirst pretext for proroguing Parliament to be able to\\navail themselves of this clause. The ordinances\\nreminded men of those of Charles X. surely, they\\nsaid, this was the beginning of a reign of violence.\\nThe struggle was now no longer confined to Par-\\nliament. Parliament indeed was clearly impotent\\nall that could be done by speeches and votes and\\naddresses had been done and had failed the King\\nstill supported the Ministry. It was now the time\\nfor the people at large the natural leaders were the\\ncorporations of the large towns the Liberal policy\\nof the Prussian Government had given them con-\\nsiderable independence they were elected by the\\npeople, and in nearly every town there was a large", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0224.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "1863] The Conflict. 183\\nmajority opposed to the Government. Headed by\\nthe capital, they began a series of addresses to the\\nKing pubhc meetings were organised at Cologne\\na great festival was arranged to welcome Sybel and\\nthe other representatives from the Rhine. It was\\nmore serious that in so monarchical a country the\\ndiscontent with the personal action of the King found\\npublic expression. The Crown Prince was at this time\\non a tour of military inspection in East Prussia town\\nafter town refused the ordinary loyal addresses they\\nwould not welcome him or take part in the usual\\nceremonies; the ordinary loyal addresses to the\\nKing and other members of the Royal Family were\\nrefused. It was no longer a conflict between the\\nMinistry and the Parliament, but between the King\\nand the country.\\nSuddenly the country learned that the Crown\\nPrince himself, the Heir Apparent to the throne, was\\non their side. He had always disliked Bismarck; he\\nwas offended by the brusqueness of his manner. He\\ndisliked the genial and careless bonhonimie with\\nwhich Bismarck, who hated affectation, discussed\\nthe most serious subjects; he had opposed his ap-\\npointment, and he now held a position towards his\\nfather s Government similar to that which ten years\\nbefore his father had held towards his own brother.\\nHe was much influenced by his English relations,\\nand the opinion of the English Court was strongly\\nunfavourable to Bismarck. Hitherto the Crown\\nPrince had refrained from any public active oppo-\\nsition he had, however, not been asked his opinion\\nconcerning the Press ordinances, nor had he even", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0225.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "184 Bismarck. [I862-\\nreceived an invitation to the council at which they\\nwere passed. Bitterly offended at this slight upon\\nhimself, seriously alarmed lest the action of the\\nGovernment might even endanger the dynasty, on\\nhis entry into Danzig he took occasion to dissociate\\nhimself from the action of the Government. He had\\nnot, he said, been asked; he had known nothing\\nabout it he was not responsible. The words were\\nfew and they were moderate, but they served to\\nshew the whole of Germany what hitherto only those\\nabout the Court had known, that the Crown Prince\\nwas to be counted among the opponents of the\\nGovernment.\\nAn incident followed a few days later which could\\nonly serve to increase the breach. After his speech\\nat Danzig, the Crown Prince had offered to surren-\\nder all his official positions the King had not re-\\nquired this of him, but had strictly ordered him\\nnot again to come into opposition to his Govern-\\nment. The Crown Prince had promised obedience,\\nbut continued his private protests against these\\nrude and insolent Ministers. The letters on both\\nsides had been affectionate and dignified. A few\\ndays later, however, the Berlin correspondent of\\nthe Times was enabled to publish the contents of\\nthem. It is not known who was to blame for this\\nvery serious breach of confidence; but the publica-\\ntion must have been brought about by someone very\\nclosely connected with the Crown Prince suspicion\\nwas naturally directed towards the Court of Coburg.\\nIt was not the last time that the confidence of the\\nCrown Prince was to be abused in a similar manner,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0226.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "1863] The Confiict. 185\\nThe event naturally much increased Bismarck s dis-\\nlike to the entourage of the Prince. There was in-\\ndeed a considerable number of men, half men of\\nletters, half politicians, who were glad to play a part\\nby attaching themselves to a Liberal Prince they\\ndid not scruple to call in the help of the Press of the\\nforeign countries, especially of England, and use its\\ninfluence for the decision of Prussian affairs. Unfor-\\ntunately their connections were largely with Eng-\\nland they had a great admiration for English\\nliberty, and they were often known as the English\\nparty. This want of discretion, which afterwards\\ncaused a strong prejudice against them in Germany,\\nwas used to create a prejudice also against England.\\nPeople in Germany confused with the English na-\\ntion, which was supremely indifferent to Continental\\naffairs, the opinions of a few writers who were nearly\\nalways German. For many years after this, the rela-\\ntions between Bismarck and the Crown Prince were\\nvery distant, and the breach was to be increased by the\\nvery decided line which the Crown Prince afterwards\\ntook with regard to the Schleswig-Holstein affair.\\nThe event shewed that Bismarck knew well the\\ncountry with which he was dealing the Press ordi-\\nnances were not actually illegal, they were strictly\\nenforced many papers were warned, others were\\nsuppressed the majority at once changed their tone\\nand moderated their expression of hostility to the\\nGovernment. In England, under similar circum-\\nstances, a host of scurrilous pamphlets have always\\nappeared the Prussian police were too prompt for\\nthis to be possible. The King refused to receive the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0227.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "1 86 Bismarck.\\n[1862-\\naddresses an order from the Home Office forbade\\ntown councils to discuss political matters a Burger-\\nmeister who disregarded the order was suspended\\nfrom his office public meetings were suppressed.\\nThese measures were successful the discontent re-\\nmained and increased, but there was no disorder and\\nthere were no riots. Great courage was required to\\ndefy public opinion, but with courage it could be\\ndefied with as much impunity as that of the Parlia-\\nment. Englishmen at the time asked why the peo-\\nple did not refuse to pay the taxes the answer is\\neasy there would have been no legal justification\\nfor this, for though, until the estimates had been\\npassed, the Ministers were not legally enabled to\\nspend a farthing of public money, the taxes could\\nstill be levied they were not voted annually once\\nimposed, they continued until a law was passed\\nwithdrawing them. The situation, in fact, was this,\\nthat the Ministry were obliged to collect the money\\nthough they were not authorised in spending it. To\\nthis we must add that the country was very prosper-\\nous the revenue was constantly increasing there\\nwas no distress. The socialist agitation which was\\njust beginning was directed not against the Govern-\\nment but against society Lassalle found more sym.-\\npathy in Bismarck than he did with the Liberal\\nleaders. He publicly exhorted his followers to sup-\\nport the Monarchy against these miserable Bour-\\ngeois, as he called the Liberals. Except on the one\\nground of the constitutional conflict, the country\\nwas well governed there was no other interference\\nwith liberty of thought or action,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0228.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "1863] The Conflict. 187\\nMoreover, there was a general feeling that things\\ncould not last long the Liberals believed that the\\nfuture was with them time itself would bring re-\\nvenge. At the worst they would wait till the death\\nof the King he was already nearly seventy years of\\nage the political difficulties had much injured his\\nhealth. When he was gone, then with the Crown\\nPrince the constitutional cause would triumph.\\nHow different was the future to be! Year after\\nyear the conflict continued. Each year the House \\\\J\\nwas summoned and the Budget laid before it each\\nyear the House rejected the Budget they threw\\nout Government measures, they refused the loans,\\nand they addressed the King to dismiss his Ministers.\\nThe sessions, however, were very short; that of 1864\\nlasted only a few weeks.\\nEach year Bismarck s open contempt for -the Par-\\nliament and their unqualified hatred of him increased. J/\\nThe people still continued to support their represent-\\natives. The cities still continued to withhold their\\nloyal addresses to the King. With each year, how-\\never, the Government gained confidence. It was\\neasy to see that the final result would depend on\\nthe success of the Government in external affairs.\\nTo these we must now turn,\\nEnglish opinion at that time was unanimously\\nopposed to the King; it is difficult even now to\\njudge the issue. It was natural for Englishmen to\\nsympathise with those who wished to imitate them.\\nTheir pride was pleased when they found the ablest\\nParliamentary leaders, the most learned historians\\nand keenest jurists desirous to assimilate the institu-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0229.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "1 88 Bis77ta7 -ck. [1862^\\ntions of Prussia to those which existed in England. It\\nis just this which ought to make us pause. What do\\nwe think of pohticians who try to introduce among\\nus the institutions and the faults of foreign countries\\nWhy will not the King of Prussia be content\\nwith the position which the Queen of England holds,\\nor the King of the Belgians, then all his unpopular-\\nity would be gone was a question asked at the time\\nby an English writer. We may ask, on the other\\nhand, why should the King of Prussia sacrifice his\\npower and prerogative The question is really as\\nabsurd as it would be to ask, why is not an English\\nParliament content with the power enjoyed by the\\nPrussian Parliament? It was a commonplace of the\\ntime, that the continued conflict shewed a want of\\nstatesmanship so it did, if it is statesmanship always\\nto court popularity and always to surrender one s\\ncause when one believes it to be right, even at the\\nrisk of ruining one s country. It must be remem-\\nbered that through all these years the existence of\\nPrussia was at stake. If the Prussian Government\\ninsisted on the necessity for a large and efficient\\narmy, they were accused of reckless militarism.\\nPeople forgot that the Prussian Monarchy could no\\nmore maintain itself without a large army than the\\nBritish Empire could without a large navy. In all\\nthe secret diplomatic negotiations of the time, the\\ndismemberment of Prussia was a policy to be con-\\nsidered. France wished to acquire part of the left\\nbank of the Rhine, Austria had never quite given .up\\nhope of regaining part of Silesia; it was not fifty\\nyears since Prussia had acquired half the kingdom", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0230.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "1863J The Conflict. 189\\nof Saxony might not a hostile coaHtion restore this\\nterritory And then the philanthropy of England\\nand the intrigues of France were still considering\\nthe possibility of a revived Poland, but in Poland\\nwould have to be included part of the territory\\nwhich Prussia had acquired.\\nIt is often said that from this conflict must be\\ndated the great growth of militarism in Europe it\\nis to the victory of the King and Bismarck that we\\nare to attribute the wars which followed and the\\nimmense armaments which since then have been\\nbuilt up in Europe. To a certain extent, of course,\\nthis is true, though it is not clear that the presence\\nof these immense armies is an unmixed evil. It\\nis, however, only half the truth the Prussian Gov-\\nernment was not solely responsible. It was not\\nthey who began arming, it was not they who first\\nbroke the peace which had been maintained in\\nEurope since 18 15. Their fault seems to have been,\\nnot that they armed first, but that when they put\\ntheir hand to the work, they did it better than other\\nnations. If they are exposed to any criticism in the\\nmatter, it must rather be this, that the Government\\nof the late King had unduly neglected the army\\nthey began to prepare not too soon but almost too\\nlate. It was in Austria in 1848 that the new mili-\\ntary dominion began Austria was supported by\\nRussia and imitated by France Prussia, surrounded\\nby these empires, each at least double herself in\\npopulation, was compelled to arm in self-defence.\\nBy not doing so sooner she had incurred the dis-\\ngrace of Olmiitz her whole policy had been weak", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0231.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "190 Bismarck. [1862-\\nand vacillating, because the Government was fright-\\nened at stirring up a conflict in which they would\\nalmost certainly be defeated. 4,\\nThere is one other matter with regard to the con-\\nflict so far as regards Bismarck personally. We\\nmust always remember that he was not responsible\\nfor it. It had originated at a time when he was\\nWabsent from Germany, and had very little influence\\non the conduct of affairs. Had he been Minister\\ntwo years before, there probably would have been\\nno conflict at all. The responsibility for it lies\\npartly with the leaders of the Liberal party, whc, as\\nwe know from memoirs that have since been pub-\\nlished, were acting against their own convictions, in\\nopposing the military demands of the Government,\\nfor they feared that otherwise the party would not\\nfollow them. Much of the responsibility also rests\\nAvith the Ministry of the neiv era; they had mis-\\nmanaged affairs the mismanagement arose from\\nthe want of union among them, for the Liberal\\nmajority were in many matters opposed to the King\\nand the throne. It was this want of cordial co-\\noperation in the Ministry which led to the great\\nblunder by which the Minister of War acted in a\\nway which seemed to be, and in fact was, a breach\\nof an engagement made by the Minister of Finance.\\nHad Bismarck been in authority at the time, we\\ncan hardly doubt that he would have found some\\nway of effecting a compromise between the Govern-\\nment and the leaders of the Moderate Liberal party.\\nAt least no blame attached to him for what had\\nhappened. Still less can we afford him anything", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0232.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "1863]\\nThe Conflict.\\n191\\nbut the highest commendation, that, when the King\\nhad got into an absolutely untenable position, he\\ncame forward, and at the risk of his reputation, his\\nfuture, perhaps his life, stood by his side.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0233.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VIII.\\nSCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.\\n1 863-1 864.\\nWE have seen that the result of the conflict\\nwould eventually depend upon the man-\\nagement of foreign affairs. Bismarck be-\\nfore his appointment had always said that the\\nGovernment could only gain freedom at home by a\\nmore vigorous policy abroad. He was now in a\\nposition to follow the policy he desired. The conflict\\nmade him indispensable to the King if he retired,\\nthe King would have to surrender to the House.\\nThis was always present to his mind and enabled\\nhim to keep his influence against all his enemies, who\\nthroughout the spring had used every effort to un-\\ndermine his authority with the King.\\nThere were many who thought that he deliberately\\nmaintained the friction in order to make himself\\nindispensable, and in truth his relations to the Par-\\nliament had this advantage, that there was no use in\\nattempting to take into consideration their wishes.\\nHad he been supported by a friendly House he would\\n192", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0234.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "1863] Schlesivig-Holstein. 193\\nhave had to justify his policy, perhaps to modify it\\nas it was, since they were sure to refuse supplies\\nwhatever he did, one or two more votes of censure\\nwere a matter of indifference to him, and he went on\\nhis own way directing the diplomacy of the country\\nwith as sure and firm a hand as though no Parliament\\nexisted.\\nIn the autumn he had the first opportunity for\\nshewing how great his influence already was. Dur-\\ning the summer holidays, he was in almost constant\\nattendance on the King, who as usual had gone to\\nGastein for a cure. Perhaps he did not venture to\\nleave the King, but he often complained of the new\\nconditions in which his life was passed he wished\\nto be back with his wife and children in Pomerania.\\nHe writes to his wife from Baden I wish that some\\nintrigue would necessitate another Ministry, so that\\nI might honourably turn my back on this basin of\\nink and live quietly in the country. The restlessness\\nof this life is unbearable for ten weeks I have been\\ndoing clerk s work at an inn it is no life for an hon-\\nest country gentleman.\\nAt the end of July, a proposal came from the Em-\\nperor of Austria which, but for Bismarck s firmness,\\nmight have had very far-reaching results. The Em-\\nperor had visited the King and discussed with him\\nproposals for the reform of the Confederation. He\\nexplained an Austrian plan for the reform which was\\nso much needed, and asked the King if he would\\njoin in an assembly of all the German Princes to\\ndiscuss the plan. The King for many reasons re-\\nfused nevertheless two days afterwards formal invit-\\n13", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0235.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "194 Bismarck. [1863-\\nations were sent out to all the Princes and to the\\nBurgomasters of the free cities, inviting them to a\\nCongress which was to meet at Frankfort. All the\\nother Princes accepted, and the Congress met on the\\n15th of August. The Emperor presided in person,\\nand he hoped to be able to persuade them to adopt\\nhis proposals, which would be very favourable for\\nAustria. It was, however, apparent that without the\\npresence of the King of Prussia the Congress would\\ncome to no result it was therefore determined to\\nsend a special deputation to invite him to recon-\\nsider his refusal. The King had the day before\\nmoved from Karlsbad to Baden and was therefore in\\nthe immediate neighbourhood of Frankfort. It was\\nvery difficult for him not to accept this special invi-\\ntation. How can I refuse, he said, when thirty\\nPrinces invite me and they send the message by a\\nKing!\\nPersonally he wished to go, though he agreed with\\nBismarck that it would be wiser to stay away all\\nhis relations pressed him to go. It would have\\nbeen pleasant for once to meet in friendly conclave\\nall his fellow Princes. Bismarck, however, was de-\\ntermined that it should not be. He also had gone\\nto Baden-Baden the King consulted him before\\nsending the answer. After a long and exhausting\\nstruggle, Bismarck gained his point and a refusal\\nwas sent. He had threatened to resign if his advice\\nwere not taken. As soon as the letter was sealed\\nand despatched, Bismarck turned to a tray with\\nglasses which stood on the table and smashed them\\nin pieces. Are you ill asked a friend who was", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0236.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0237.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0238.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstem. 195\\nin the room. No, was the answer I was, but I\\nam better now. I felt I must break something.\\nSo much were his nerves affected by the struggle.\\nThe Congress went on without the representative\\nof Prussia. The Kings and Princes discussed the\\nproposals in secret session. They enjoyed this un-\\naccustomed freedom for the first time they had\\nbeen able to discuss the affairs of their own country\\nwithout the intervention of their Ministers. The\\nMinisters had, of course, come to Frankfort, but\\nthey found themselves excluded from all participa-\\ntion in affairs. With what admiration and jealousy\\nmust they have looked on Bismarck, but there was\\nnone of them who had done for his Prince what Bis-\\nmarck had for the King of Prussia.\\nPerhaps it was his intention at once to press for-\\nward the struggle with Austria for supremacy in\\nGermany. If so, he was to be disappointed. A new\\ndifficulty was now appearing in the diplomatic\\nworld: the Schleswig-Holstein question, which had\\nbeen so long slumbering, broke out into open fire,\\nand nearly three years were to pass before Bismarck\\nwas able to resume the policy on which he had\\ndetermined. Men often speak as though he were\\nresponsible for the outbreak of this difficulty and\\nthe war which followed that was far from being\\nthe case it interrupted his plans as much as did the\\nPolish question. We shall have to see with what\\ningenuity he gained for his country an advantage\\nfrom what appeared at first to be a most incon-\\nvenient situation.\\n\\\\Ve must shortly explain the origin of this ques-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0239.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "196 Bismarck. [1863-\\ntion, the most complicated that has ever occupied\\nEuropean diplomacy.\\nThe Duchy of Holstein had been part of the Ger-\\nman Empire for many hundreds of years the Duke\\nof Holstein had also been King of Denmark the\\nconnection at first had been a purely personal union\\nit was, however, complicated by the existence of the\\nDuchy of Schleswig. Schleswig was outside the\\nConfederation, as it had been outside the German\\nEmpire, and had in old days been a fief of the King-\\ndom of Denmark. The nobles of Holstein had,\\nhowever, gradually succeeded in extending German\\ninfluence and the German language into Schleswig,\\nso that this Duchy had become more than half\\nGerman. Schleswig and Holstein were also joined\\ntogether by very old customs, which were, it is said,\\nfounded on charters given by the Kings of Den-\\nmark it was claimed that the two Duchies were\\nalways to be ruled by the same man, and also that\\nthey were to be kept quite distinct from the King-\\ndom of Denmark. These charters are not undis-\\nputed, but in this case, as so often happens in\\npolitics, the popular belief in the existence of a right\\nwas to be more important than the legal question\\nwhether the right really existed.\\nThe trouble began about 1 830. There was a\\ndouble question, the question of constitution and\\nthe question of inheritance. The Danes, desirous\\nto consolidate the Monarchy, had neglected the\\nrights of the old local Estates in the Duchies this\\nled to an agitation and a conflict. It was a struggle\\nfor the maintenance of local privileges against the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0240.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. i(^y\\nMonarchy in Copenhagen. Moreover, a vigorous\\ndemocratic party had arisen in Denmark their ob-\\nject was to incorporate the whole of Schleswig in\\nthe Danish Monarchy they did not care what hap-\\npened to Holstein. This party were called the\\nEider Danes, for they wished Denmark to be ex-\\ntended to the Eider. Against this proposed separa-\\ntion of the two Duchies violent protests were raised,\\nand in 1848 a rebellion broke out. This was the re-\\nbellion which had been supported in that year by\\nPrussia, and it had the universal sympathy of every-\\none in Germany, Princes and people alike.\\nThe question of constitution was complicated by\\none of succession. The male line of the Royal House\\nwhich ruled in Denmark was dying out according\\nto a law introduced in 1660, descendants of the fe-\\nmale branch might succeed in the Kingdom. This\\nlaw had proba.bly never been legally enacted for the\\nDuchies in Schleswig and Holstein the old Salic\\nlaw prevailed. In the ordinary course of things, on\\nthe~death of Frederick VH., who had succeeded in\\n1847, the long connection between Holstein and\\nDenmark would cease. Would, however, Schleswig\\ngo with Holstein or with Denmark Every Schles-\\nwig-Holsteiner and every German declared that the\\ntwo Duchies must remain for ever unvertheilt\\nthe majority of the Danes determined, whatever the\\nlaw might be, that they would keep Schleswig, which\\nhad once been Danish. The King took a different\\nline he wished to maintain all the possessions in his\\nHouse, and that the same man should succeed both\\nin the Kingdom and the Duchies. There was no", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0241.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "198 Bzsma7 -ck. [1863-\\nauthority qualified to decide the legal question and\\ntherefore the question of right was sure to become\\none of power. At first, strange as it may seem, the\\npower was on the side of the Danes. Germany was\\nweak and disunited, the Prussian troops who had\\nbeen sent to help the rebellion were withdrawn, and\\nthe surrender of Olmiitz was fatal to the inhabitants\\nof the Duchies. The whole question was brought\\nbefore a European Congress which met at London.\\nThe integrity of the Danish Monarchy was declared\\nto be a European interest and the Congress of the\\nPowers presumed to determine who should succeed\\nto the ducal and royal power. They chose Christian\\nof Glucksburg, and all the Powers pledged them-\\nselves to recognise him as ruler over all the domin-\\nions of the King of Denmark.\\nPrussia and Austria were among the Powers who\\nsigned the Treaty of London, but the Diet of Frank-\\nfort was not bound by it. At the same time, Den-\\nmark had entered into certain engagements pledging\\nitself to preserve the separation between Schleswig-\\nHolstein and Denmark, and also not to oppress the\\nGerman people in Schleswig. The Danes did not\\nkeep their engagement despising the Germans,\\nthey renewed the old policy, attempted to drive\\nback the German language, and introduced new laws\\nwhich were inconsistent with the local privileges of\\nHolstein and Schleswig. The Holstein Estates ap-\\npealed for protection to the Diet. The Germans\\nprotested, but the Danes were obstinate. As years\\nwent on, the excitement of the Germans grew they\\nbelieved, and justly believed, that it was a matter of", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0242.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 199\\nhonour to defend the rights of the Duchies. Schles-\\nwig-Holstein was the symbol of German weakness\\nand disgrace, and in defence of them the national\\nenthusiasm was again roused.\\nWith this popular enthusiasm Bismarck had no\\nsympathy and he had no interest for the cause of\\nSchleswig-Holstein. He had originally considered \\\\y/\\nthe inhabitants merely as rebels against their lawful\\nsovereign. He had learnt at Frankfort sufficient to\\nmake this indifferent to him, but he still regarded\\nthem as foreigners and looked on their claims merely\\nfrom the point of view of Prussian interests. Both\\nhis sympathy and his reason led him in fact rather\\nto take the Danish side. The maintenance of\\nDenmark is in our interest, he wrote in 1857, t ut\\nDenmark could only continue to exist if it were\\nruled, more or less arbitrarily, with provincial Estates\\nas it has been for the last hundred years and in\\nanother letter We have no reason to desire that the\\nHolsteiners should live very happily under their\\nDuke, for if they do they will no longer be interested\\nin Prussia, and under certain circumstances their\\ninterest may be very useful to us. It is important\\nthat, however just their cause may be, Prussia should\\nact with great prudence. He recognised that if\\nthe complaints of the Duchies led again to a war\\nbetween Germany and Denmark all the loss would\\nfall on Prussia the coast of Prussia was exposed to\\nthe attacks of the Danish fleet. If the war was suc-\\ncessful, the result would be to strengthen the Diet\\nand the Federal Constitution and, as we know, that\\nwas the last thing which Bismarck desired if it", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0243.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "200 Bismarck.\\n[1863-\\nfailed, the disgrace and the blame would fall upon\\nPrussia.\\nThe only thing which would have induced him\\nwarmly to take up the cause was the prospect of\\nwinning the Duchies for Prussia, but of that there\\nseemed little hope.\\nSo long, therefore, as he remained at Frankfort, he\\nhad endeavoured to keep the peace, and he continued\\nthis policy after he became Minister. The greater\\nnumber of the German States wished to carry out\\na Federal execution in Holstein he tried to\\navert this and warmly gave his support to Lord\\nRussell in his attempt to settle the question by Eng-\\nlish mediation. His efforts, however, were unavail-\\ning, for the Danish Government, presuming on the\\nweakness of Germany, continued their provocative\\naction. On March 30, 1863, a new Constitution was\\nproclaimed, completely severing Holstein from the\\nrest of the Monarchy. The Holstein Estates had\\nnot been consulted and appealed to the Diet for\\nprotection the law of the Federation enabled the\\nDiet in a case like this to occupy the territory of the\\noffending sovereign in order to compel him to rule\\naccording to the Constitution. The national German\\nparty wished to go farther, to confuse the questions\\nof Schleswig and of Holstein, and so bring about a\\nwar with Denmark. Bismarck wrote to the Duke of\\nOldenburg to explain his objections to this it would\\nmake the worst impression in England and he in-\\nsisted that they should attempt nothing more than\\nFederal execution in Holstein. As Holstein belonged\\nto the Federation, this would be a purely German", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0244.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 201\\naffair and no ground would be given for interfering\\nto England or France. In consequence, the simple\\nexecution in Holstein was voted. Even now, how-\\never, Bismarck did not give up hopes of keeping\\npeace. He brought pressure to bear on the Danes\\nand was supported by England. If only they would\\nwithdraw the proclamation of March 30th, and ac-\\ncept English mediation for Schleswig, he promised\\nthem that he would use all his influence to prevent\\nthe execution and would probably be successful.\\nHis moderation, which received the warm approval\\nof Lord Russell, of course only added to his unpop-\\nularity in Germany. The Danish Government, how-\\never, refused to accept Bismarck s proposal they\\nbrought in still another Constitution by which the\\ncomplete incorporation of Schleswig with the Mon-\\narchy was decreed. This was an overt breach of their\\ntreaty engagements and a declaration of war with Ger-\\nmany. At the beginning of November, it was carried\\nthrough the Rigsrad by the required majority of two-\\nthirds, and was sent up to the King to receive his sig-\\nnature. Before he had time to sign it the King died.\\nIt was expected that the death of the King would\\nmake little difference in the situation, for it had been\\nagreed that Christian of Glucksburg should succeed to\\nall the provinces of the Monarchy. The first act he\\nhad to perform was the signature of the new Consti-\\ntution it is said that he hesitated, but was told by\\nthe Ministers that if he refused they would answer\\nneither for his crown nor his head. On November\\n23d he signed.\\nBefore this had happened the situation had re-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0245.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "202 Bismarck.\\n[1863-\\nceived an unexpected change. A new claimant ap-\\npeared to dispute his title to the Duchies. The\\nday after the death of the King, Frederick, eldest\\nson of the Duke of Augustenburg, published a pro-\\nclamation announcing his succession to the Duchy\\nunder the title of Frederick VIII. No one seems to\\nhave foreseen this step it was supposed that after\\nthe agreement of 1853 the question of succession\\nhad been finally settled. The whole of the German\\nnation, however, received with enthusiasm the news\\nthat it was again to be raised.\\nThey believed that the Prince was the lawful heir\\nthey saw in his claim the possibility of permanently\\nseparating the Duchies from Denmark. Nothing\\nseemed to stand between this and accomplishment\\nexcept the Treaty of London. Surely the rights of\\nthe Duchies, and the claim of Augustenburg, sup-\\nported by united Germany, would be strong enough\\nto bear down this treaty which was so unjust.\\nThe question will be asked, was the claim of\\nAugustenburg valid? No positive answer can be\\ngiven, for it has never been tried by a competent\\ncourt of law. It may, however, I think, be said that\\nalthough there were objections, which might invali-\\ndate his right to at least a part of the Duchies, it is\\nalmost certain that a quite impartial tribunal would\\nhave decided that he had at least a better claim than\\nany of his rivals. This at least would have been\\ntrue fifteen years before. When, however, the Treaty\\nof London was arranged it was necessary to procure\\nthe renunciation of all the different claimants. That\\nof the Emperor of Russia, the Duke of Oldenburg,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0246.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 203\\nand others was obtained without much difificulty\\nthe Duke of Augustenburg long refused. In order\\nto compel him to renounce, the Danish Government\\nrefused to restore to him his private property, which\\nhad been confiscated owing to the part he had taken\\nin the late rebellion. He had been enormously\\nwealthy, but was now living in exile and deprived of\\nhis revenues. By this means they had at last in-\\nduced him to sign a document, in which he pro-\\nmised, for himself and his successors, not to make\\nany attempt to enforce his claims to the succession.\\nThe document was curiously worded there was no\\nactual renunciation, only a promise to abstain from\\naction. In return for this a sum of money, not\\nequal, however, to that which he had lost, was handed\\nover to him. Now it was Bismarck who, while en-\\nvoy at Frankfort, had carried on the negotiations\\nhe had taken much trouble about the matter, and\\nearned the warm gratitude both of the King of\\nDenmark and of the Duke. There is, I think, no\\ndoubt that he beheved that the agreement was a\\nbona fide one and would be maintained. Since then\\nthe Duke had renounced all his claims in favour of\\nhis eldest son Prince Frederick had not signed the\\ncontract and maintained that he was not bound by\\nit. Of course Bismarck could not admit this, and\\nhis whole attitude towards the Prince must from the\\nbeginning be hostile.\\nIt is only fair to point out that there was no rea-\\nson whatever why the Augustenburgs should do\\nanything more than that to which they were bound\\nby the strict letter of the agreement they had no", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0247.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "204 Bismarck. [1863-\\nties of gratitude towards Denmark they had not, as\\nis often said, sold their rights, for they had received\\nonly a portion of their own possessions. However\\nthis may be, his claim was supported, not only\\nby the people and Parliaments, but by leaders of\\nthe German Governments, headed by the King of\\nBavaria.\\nBismarck was now asked to denounce the Treaty\\nof London to which Prussia had given her assent\\nto support the claims of Augustenburg to carry\\nout the policy of the Diet, and if necessary to allow\\nthe Prussian army to be used in fighting for Prince\\nFrederick against the King of Denmark. This he\\nhad not the slightest intention of doing. He had\\nto consider first of all that Prussia was bound by\\ntreaties. As he said We may regret that we\\nsigned, but the signature took place. Honour as\\nwell as wisdom allows us to leave no doubt as to our\\nloyalty to our engagements. He had moreover to\\nconsider that if he acted as the Germans wished he\\nwould find himself opposed, not only by Denmark,\\nbut also by Russia and England, and in military op-\\nerations on the narrow peninsula the power of the\\nEnglish fleet would easily outbalance the superiority\\nof the Prussian army. Moreover, and this was the\\npoint which affected him most, what good would\\ncome to Prussia even if she were successful in this\\nwar I cannot regard it as a Prussian interest to\\nwage war in order in the most favourable result to\\nestablish a new Grand Duke in Schleswig-Holstein,\\nwho out of fear of Prussian aggression would vote\\nagainst us at the Diet.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0248.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 205\\nHis policy, therefore, was clearly marked out for\\nhim: he must refuse to recognise the claims of Au-\\ngustenburg he must refuse to break the Treaty of\\nLondon. This, however, would not prevent him\\nfrom bringing pressure to bear on the new King of\\nDenmark, as he had done on his predecessor, to in-\\nduce him to abide by his treaty engagements, and,\\nif he did not do so, from declaring war against him.\\nThere was even at this time in his mind another\\nthought. He had the hope that in some way or\\nother he might be able to gain a direct increase of\\nterritory for Prussia. If they recognised the Au-\\ngustenburg claims this would be always impossible,\\nfor then either the Duchies would remain under the\\nKing of Denmark or, if the Danes were defeated,\\nthey would have to be given to the Prince.\\nIn this policy he was supported by Austria. The\\nAustrian Government was also bound by the Treaty\\nof London they were much annoyed at the violent\\nand almost revolutionary agitation which had broken\\nout in Germany it was with much relief that they\\nlearned that Prussia, instead of heading the move-\\nment as in 1849, w^s ready to oppose it. The two\\ngreat Powers so lately in opposition now acted in\\nclose union.\\nIssue was joined at the Diet between the two part-\\nies. The Prince brought his claim before it, and\\nthose who supported him proposed that, as the suc-\\ncession to the Duchies was in dispute, they should\\nbe occupied by a Federal army until the true ruler\\nhad been determined. Against this Austria and\\nPrussia proposed that the Federal execution in Hoi-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0249.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "2o6 Bismarck. [1863-\\nstein, which had before been resolved on, should be\\nat once carried out. If the execution were voted it\\nwould be an indirect recognition of Christian as ruler,\\nfor it would be carried out as against his Govern-\\nment on this point, execution or occupation, the\\nvotes were taken.\\nBismarck was, however, greatly embarrassed by\\nthe strong influence which the Prince of Augusten-\\nburg had in the Prussian Royal Family he was an\\nintimate friend of the Crown Princess, and the Crown\\nPrincess and the King himself regarded his claims\\nwith favour. Directly after his proclamation the\\npretender came to Berlin he had a very friendly\\nreception from the King, who expressed his deep\\nregret that he was tied by the London Convention,\\nbut clearly shewed that he hoped this difficulty\\nmight be overcome. Bismarck took another line\\nhe said that he was trying to induce the new King\\nnot to sign the Constitution the Prince, to Bis-\\nmarck s obvious annoyance, explained that that\\nwould be no use he should maintain his claims just\\nthe same.\\nThe King disliked the Treaty of London as much\\nas everyone else did he had to agree to Bismarck s\\narguments that it would not be safe to denounce it,\\nbut he would have been quite willing, supposing\\nPrussia was outvoted in the Diet, to accept the vote\\nand obey the decision of the majority he even\\nhoped that this would be the result. Bismarck would\\nhave regarded an adverse vote as a sufficient reason\\nfor retiring from the Federation altogether. Were\\nPrussia outvoted, it would be forced into a Euro-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0250.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 207\\npean war, which he wished to avoid, and made to\\nfight as a single member of the German Confedera-\\ntion. Rather than do this he would prefer to fight\\non the other side Denmark is a better ally than\\nthe German States, he said. The two parties were\\ncontending as keenly at the Prussian Court as at\\nFrankfort Vincke wrote a long and pressing letter\\nto the King Schleinitz appeared again, supported as\\nof old by the Queen the Crown Prince was still in\\nEngland, but he and his wife were enthusiastic on the\\nPrince s side.\\nHow much Bismarck was hampered by adverse\\ninfluences at Court we see from a letter to Roon\\nI am far removed from any hasty or selfish resolu-\\ntion, but I have a feeling that tlie cause of the King\\nagainst the Revolution is lost his heart is in the other\\ncamp and he has more confidence in his opponents than\\nhis friends. For us it will be indifferent, one year or\\nthirty years hence, but not for our children. The King\\nhas ordered me to come to him before the sitting to dis-\\ncuss what is to be said I shall not say much, partly\\nbecause I have not closed my eyes all night and am\\nwretched, and then I really do not know what to say.\\nThey will certainly reject the loan, and his Majesty at\\nthe risk of breaking with Europe and experiencing a\\nsecond Olmiitz will at last join the Democracy, and work\\nwith it in order to set up Augustenburg and found a new\\nState. What is the good of making speeches and scold-\\ning? Without some miracle of God the game is lost.\\nNow and with posterity the blame will be laid upon\\nus. As God will. He will know how long Prussia has\\nto exist. But God knows I shall be sorry when it\\nceases.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0251.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "2o8 Bis77iarck. [1863-\\nThe only ally that Bismarck had was Austria.\\nTheir combined influence was sufficiently strong by\\na majority of one to carry through the Diet execu-\\ntion instead of occupation though there was ap-\\npended to the motion a rider that the question of\\nsuccession was not thereby prejudiced.\\nThe execution took place. During the month of\\nDecember the Hanoverians and Saxons occupied\\nHolstein the Danes did not resist but retreated\\nacross the Eider. At the end of the year the occu-\\npation was complete. In the rear of the German\\ntroops had come also the Prince of Augustenburg,\\nwho had settled himself in the land of which he\\nclaimed to be ruler.\\nWhat was now to be done The Augustenburg\\nparty wished at once to press forward with the\\nquestion of the succession let the Diet decide this\\nimmediately then hand over Holstein to the new\\nDuke and immediately seize Schleswig also and vin-\\ndicate it from Christian, the alien usurper. Bismarck\\nwould not hear of this he still maintained his policy\\nthat Prussia should not denounce the London Con-\\nvention, should recognise the sovereignty of Christ-\\nian, and should demand from him as lawful ruler\\nof all the Danish possessions the repeal of the obnox-\\nious November Constitution. In this he was still\\nsupported by Austria if the Danes did not acquiesce\\nin these very moderate demands, the Germans should\\nenter Schleswig and seize it as a security. Then he\\nwould be able when he wished to free himself from\\nthe Treaty of London, for war dissolves all treaties.\\nThe advantage of this plan was that it entirely de-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0252.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 209\\nprived England of any grounds for interference\\nPrussia alone was now defending the London Con-\\nvention Prussia was preventing the Diet from a\\nbreach of treaty the claim of Denmark was one in\\nregard to which the Danes were absolutely wrong.\\nBismarck had therefore on his side Austria, Russia,\\nprobably France, and averted the hostility of Eng-\\nland. Against him was German public opinion, the\\nGerman Diet, and the Prussian Parliament every-\\none, that is, whom he neither feared nor regarded.\\nSo long as the King was firm he could look with\\nconfidence to the future, even though he did not\\nknow what it would bring forth.\\nWith the Parliament indeed nothing was to be\\ndone they, of course, strongly supported Augusten-\\nburg. They refused to look at the question from a\\nPrussian point of view. On your side, Bismarck\\nsaid, no one dares honestly to say that he acts for\\nthe interests of Prussia and as a Prussian. They\\nfeared that he proposed to hand back the Duchies to\\nDenmark; they refused to consider him seriously as\\nForeign Minister they spoke of him as a rash ama-\\nteur. It was to attack him on his most sensitive\\npoint. Here, at least, he felt on completely secure\\nground diplomacy was his profession what did the\\nprofessors and talkers in the Chamber know of it\\nThey were trying to control the policy of the State,\\nbut, he said, in these days an Assembly of 350\\nmembers cannot in the last instance direct the policy\\nof a great Power. The Government asked for a\\nloan for military operations; he appealed to their\\npatriotism, but it was in vain the House voted an", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0253.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "2IO Bismarck.\\n[1863-\\naddress to the King, remonstrating against the con-\\nduct of foreign affairs, and threw out the loan by a\\nmajority of 275 to 51. If you do not vote the\\nmoney, we shall take it where we can get it, Bis-\\nmarck had warned them. The House was immedi-\\nately prorogued after a session of only two months,\\nnot to meet again till January, 1865.\\nThis policy of Bismarck was proposed by Austria\\nand Prussia at the Diet the other States refused to\\nadopt it, as they wished to raise the question of\\nsuccession on a division Prussia was outvoted. The\\ntwo great Powers therefore entered into a separate\\nagreement in which, while still recognising the in-\\ntegrity of the Danish Monarchy, they undertook to\\nforce the King to withdraw the obnoxious Constitu-\\ntion, and, if he did not consent to do so, they agreed\\nto occupy Schleswig.\\nThe Prussian House, in its address to the King,\\nhad declared that the only result of this policy would\\nbe to give back the Duchies to Denmark. Was there\\nno fear of this What would have happened had\\nDenmark after all given in, as England strongly\\npressed her to do? Had she withdrawn the obnox-\\nious Constitution, and granted all that Bismarck\\nasked, why then Prussia and Austria would have\\nbeen bound to support the integrity of Denmark,\\nand, if necessary, by force of arms to eject the Fed-\\neral troops from Holstein. Bismarck had consid-\\nered this contingency, and guarded himself against\\nit. Many years later Beust put the question to him.\\nOh, I was all right, he answered I had assured\\nmyself that the Danes would not give in. I had", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0254.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 2 1 1\\nled them to think that England would support them,\\nthough I knew this was not the case. He had,\\nhowever, even a surer guarantee than this; the ulti-\\nmatum presented to Denmark was couched in such\\na form that even if he would the King could not\\ncomply with it. The requirement was that the Con-\\nstitution should be revoked before the 1st of Janu-\\nary, By the Constitution the King could not do\\nthis of his own prerogative he must have the assent\\nof the Rigsrad. This assent could not be obtained\\nfor the following reasons the Rigsrad of the old\\nConstitution had been dissolved and had no longer\\na legal existence a new assembly could not be\\nsummoned before the 1st of January there was\\nnot time. If an assembly were summoned after that\\ndate, it must be of course summoned according to\\nthe new Constitution. To do this, however, would\\nbe to bring the obnoxious Constitution actually into\\nforce, and would mean, so to speak, a declaration of\\nwar against Prussia. If the King wished to give in\\nhe must have time he must be allowed to summon\\nthe new assembly, lay before it the German de-\\nmands, and require it to declare its own revocation.\\nThe English Government, still anxious to keep the\\npeace, represented to Bismarck the dilemma in which\\nhe had placed the Danes. Lord Wodehouse, who\\nwas in Berlin in December, requested that at least\\nmore time should be allowed. Bismarck refused to\\nlisten to the request.\\nThese constitutional questions, he said, had no-\\nthing to do with him the Danes had put off the Germans\\nfor years they could not wait any longer. The King", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0255.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "212 Bismarck.\\n[1863-\\ncould always make a coup d etat he would have to do so\\nsooner or later. Germany and Denmark could never be\\nat peace so long as the Democratic party had the au-\\nthority.\\nDenmark did not give way; the help from Eng-\\nland, on which they had reckoned, was not forth-\\ncoming the fatal day passed the Austrians and\\nPrussians entered Holstein, marched across that\\nDuchy, and in the early part of February began the\\ninvasion of Schleswig. The relations of the Allied\\ntroops to the Federal army of occupation were very\\nremarkable. Both were opposed to the Danes, but\\nthey were equally opposed to one another had\\nthey dared to do so, the Saxons would have op-\\nposed the Prussian advance. As it was they sul-\\nlenly watched the Prussian and Austrian columns\\nmarching north to the invasion of Denmark.\\nIt was the first time that the remodelled Prussian\\narmy had been tested on the field of battle Bis-\\nmarck had brought it about that they were fighting\\nfor the cause of Germany and in alliance with\\nAustria. As soon as war began, his own position\\nimproved. The King and the army were, of course,\\nall the more confident in a Minister who had given\\nthem so good a cause of war and allowed them to\\ntake the field side by side with their old ally. Their\\nsuperiority in number and discipline ensured success\\nin the military operations the Danes evacuated\\ntheir first position at the Dannewirk the German\\ntroops occupied the whole of Schleswig, then after\\nsome further delay advanced into Jutland, and\\nfinally began the siege of the strong fortification of", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0256.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 213\\nthe Diippel. The taking of this was a difficult piece\\nof work, which, after some delay, was successfully\\ncarried out at the beginning of April.\\nMeanwhile the diplomatic difficulties had con-\\ntinued. There had now come from England the\\nproposal of a Conference. This Bismarck, always\\nwishing to preserve the appearance of moderation,\\naccepted. Before doing so, he knew that he had\\ngained a very important ally. Napoleon was dis-\\npleased with the English Government he it was\\nwho suggested to Bismarck that the best solution\\nof the difficulty would be the annexation of the\\nDuchies to Prussia. It was just what Bismarck him-\\nself desired. Would he be able to bring it about?\\nThis was what was in his mind when he had to\\nconsider the attitude he should adopt at the\\nConference.\\nHe could not, of course, propose it openly; he\\nmight be able to arrange affairs so that in the uni-\\nversal confusion this solution should be welcomed.\\nHe first of all began to change his attitude towards\\nthe German agitation for Augustenburg hitherto\\nhe had opposed and discouraged it now he let it\\nhave free course. He wrote\\nThe present situation is such that it seems to me\\ndesirable to let loose the whole pack against the Danes\\nat the Congress the joint noise will work in the direc-\\ntion of making the subjugation of the Duchies to Den-\\nmark appear impossible to foreigners they will have to\\nconsider programmes which the Prussian Government\\ncannot lay before them.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0257.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "214 Bismarck. [1863-\\nWhat this means is that England and Russia were\\nto be convinced that Denmark could not regain the\\nDuchies then they would have to consider who\\nshould have them. Bismarck believed that Austria\\nwas irrevocably opposed to Augustenburg. She\\nwould rather see the Duchies in our hands than in\\nthose of the Prince, he wrote. Austria and Russia\\nwould, therefore, oppose this solution if both Den-\\nmark and Augustenburg were impossible, then would\\nbe the time for France to ask why should they not\\nbe given to Prussia, and to join this proposal with\\nanother one for the division of the Duchies accord-\\ning to nationality.\\nNapoleon, in accordance with his principles, wished\\nentirely to disregard the question of law he was\\nequally indifferent to the Treaty of London, the\\nhereditary rights of Augustenburg, or the chartered\\nprivileges of the Duchies. He wished to consult\\nthe inhabitants and allow each village to vote\\nwhether it wished to be German or Danish thus,\\ndistricts in the north where Danish was spoken\\nwould then be incorporated in Denmark the whole\\nof Holstein and the south of Schleswig would be per-\\nmanently united to Germany, and by preference to\\nPrussia. These revolutionary principles of Napo-\\nleon were in the eyes of the Austrian statesmen\\ncriminal, for if applied consistently not only would\\nAustria be deprived of Venetia, but the whole Em-\\npire would be dissolved. It required all Bismarck s\\ningenuity to maintain the alliance with Austria,\\nwhich was still necessary to him, and at the same\\ntime to keep Napoleon s friendship by giving his", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0258.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK.\\nFROM A PAINTING BY F. VON LENBACH.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0259.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0260.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 215\\nassent to doctrines that would be so convenient to\\nPrussia.\\nIn considering Bismarck s diplomatic work we\\nmust not suppose that he ever deceived himself into\\nthinking that he would be able clearly to foresee all\\nthat would happen he knew too well the uncertain\\nnature of the pieces with which he had to deal: no\\none could quite foretell, for instance, the result of the\\nstruggle which was going on in the English Ministry\\nor the votes of the House of Commons equally\\nimpossible was it to build on the assurances of\\nNapoleon.\\nThe longer I work at politics, he said, the smaller\\nis my belief in human calculation. I look at the affair\\naccording to my human understanding, but gratitude for\\nGod s assistance so far, raises in me the confidence that\\nthe Lord is able to turn our errors to our own good that\\nI experience daily to my wholesome humiliation.\\nThis time he had been mistaken in his forecast.\\nIn a despatch of May 23d to Austria he suggested\\ntwo solutions, ^the Augustenburg succession, and\\nannexation by Prussia he inclined towards the for-\\nmer, though, as he said, if the Prince was to be\\nrecognised,\\nit would be imperatively necessary to obtain guarantees\\nfor a Conservative administration, and some security that\\nthe Duchies should not become the home of democratic\\nagitations.\\nAs he said elsewhere, Kiel must not become a sec-\\nond Goth^. He no doubt anticipated that Austria", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0261.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "2 1 6 Bismarck.\\n[1863-\\nwould refuse this first alternative then the annex-\\nation by Prussia would naturally arise for discussion.\\nHad Austria been consistent, all would have been well,\\nbut a change had taken place there the Government\\nwas not disinclined to win the popularity that would\\naccrue to them if they took up the Augustenburg\\ncause after all, Austria would be rather strengthened\\nthan weakened by the establishment of a new Fed-\\neral State, which, as all the other smaller Princes,\\nwould probably be inclined to take the Austrian side.\\nIn answer, therefore, to this despatch the Austrians,\\nthrowing aside all attempt at consistency, proposed\\nvigorously to press the Augustenburg claim. It is\\njust what we were going to suggest ourselves, they\\nsaid. Bismarck therefore was compelled now, as best\\nhe could, to get out of the difficulty, and, as Austria\\nhad not rejected it, he begins to withdraw the pro-\\nposal he had himself made. To Bernstorff, his envoy\\nat the Congress, he writes\\nAustria is endeavouring to establish irrevocably the\\ncandidacy of Augustenburg in order by this means to\\nrender it difficult for Prussia to impose special conditions.\\nWe cannot consent to this. The dynastic questions must\\nbe discussed with special consideration for Prussian in-\\nterests, and, consequently, other possibilities cannot be\\nruled out, until we have negotiated with Augustenburg\\nand ascertained in what relation to Prussia he intends to\\nplace himself and his country. If the person of August-\\nenburg meets with more opposition in the Conference\\nthan the project of a division, then let the former drop.\\nThe proposal, however, had to be made for once,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0262.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 217\\nall the German Powers appeared in agreement when\\nthey demanded from the neutrals the recognition of\\nAugustenburg but Bismarck proposed it in such\\nwords as to avoid pledging himself to the legality.\\nOf course the proposal was rejected by the Danes\\nand Russians and it was allowed to fall to the ground.\\nFor Bismarck the interest is for the moment diverted\\nfrom London to Berlin.\\nThe time had come when Bismarck should defin-\\nitely decide on the attitude he was to adopt toward\\nAugustenburg. Hitherto he had avoided committing\\nhimself irrevocably it was still open to him either to\\nadopt him as the Prussian candidate on such condi-\\ntions as might seem desirable, or to refuse to have any\\ndealings with him. He had, in fact, kept both plans\\nopen, for it was characteristic of his diplomatic work\\nthat he would generally keep in his mind, and, to\\nsome extent, carry out in action, several different\\nplans at the same time. If one failed him he could\\ntake up another. In this case he intended, if possi-\\nble, to get the Duchies for Prussia it was always to\\nbe foreseen that the difficulties might be insurmount-\\nable; he had therefore to consider the next best\\nalternative. This would be the creation of a new\\nState, but one which was bound to Prussia by a spe-\\ncial and separate treaty. There were many demands,\\nsome of them legitimate, which Prussia was prepared\\nto make. Bismarck attributed great importance to\\nthe acquisition of Kiel, because he wanted to found\\na Prussian navy. Then he was very anxious to\\nhave a canal made across Holstein so that Prussian\\nvessels could reach the North Sea without passing", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0263.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "2i8 Bismarck. [1863-\\nthe Sound and of course he had to consider the\\nmilitary protection on the north. It would there-\\nfore be a condition that, whoever was made Duke,\\ncertain military and other privileges should be\\ngranted to Prussia. On this, all through the sum-\\nmer, negotiations were carried on unofficially be-\\ntween the Prince of Augustenburg and the Prussian\\nauthorities. We cannot here discuss them in detail,\\nbut the Prince seems to have been quite willing to\\nacquiesce in these naval and military requirements.\\nHe made several suggestions and objections in de-\\ntail, and he also pointed out that constitutionally he\\ncould not enter into a valid treaty until after he had\\nbeen made Duke and received the assent of the\\nEstates. I think, however, that no one can doubt\\nthat he was quite loyal to Prussia and really wished\\nto bring the matter to a satisfactory issue. As might\\nbe expected, he was very cautious in his negotia-\\ntions with Bismarck, but his letters to the King are\\nmore open. Had Bismarck wished he could at any\\ntime have come to an agreement with the Prince,\\nbut he never gave the opportunity for a serious and\\ncareful discussion on the detailed wording of the con-\\nditions. He did not wish to be bound by them, but\\nhe kept the negotiations open in case events occurred\\nwhich might compel him to accept this solution.\\nIn his treatment of the question he was, to some\\nextent, influenced by the personal dislike he always\\nfelt for the Prince.\\nWhat was the cause of this enmity There was\\nnothing in the Prince s character to justify it he was\\na modestj honourable, and educa,ted man though", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0264.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 219\\ndeficient in practical ability, he had at a very critical\\ntime announced his claims to a decision and main-\\ntained them with resolution. Bismarck, who in pri-\\nvate life was always able to do justice to his enemies,\\nrecognised this: I should have acted in just the\\nsame way myself had I been in your place, he said.\\nHe always himself said that his distrust of the\\nPrince was caused by his dislike of the men whom\\nthe latter relied upon for advice. He was too closely\\nconnected with the Progressive party. He had\\nsurrounded himself with a kind of ministry, consist-\\ning chiefly of men who, though by birth inhabitants\\nof the Duchies, had for some years been living at\\nGotha under the protection of the Duke of Coburg.\\nThey were strong Liberals and belonged to that\\nparty in Germany of which the Court of Coburg was\\nthe centre, who maintained a close connection with\\nthe Crown Prince, and who undoubtedly were look-\\ning forward to the time when the Crown Prince\\nwould become King of Prussia, Bismarck would be\\ndismissed, and their party would come into offlce.\\nThis is probably quite sufficient reason to explain\\nBismarck s personal dislike of Augustenburg, though\\nit is probable that he laid more stress on this aspect\\nof the matter than he otherwise would have done,\\nfor he hoped thereby to prejudice the King against\\nthe Prince as long as the King recognised Augusten-\\nburg s claims, his own hands would be tied in the\\nattempt to win the Duchies for Prussia.\\nHe had, as we have seen, had a short interview\\nwith the Prince at the end of the previous year\\nnow a new meeting was arranged, avowedly to dis-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0265.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "2 20 Bismarck.\\n[1863-\\ncuss the conditions which Prussia would require if\\nshe supported the Prince. The Crown Prince, who\\nwas very anxious to help his friend, persuaded him\\nto go to Berlin and if possible come to some clear\\nunderstanding with the King and Bismarck. Au-\\ngustenburg was reluctant to take this step. Loyal\\nas he was to Prussia he much distrusted Bismarck.\\nHe feared that if he unreservedly placed his cause in\\nPrussia s hands, Bismarck would in some way betray\\nhim. The position he took up was perfectly con-\\nsistent. He was, by hereditary right, reigning Duke\\nhe only wished to be left alone with the Duchies\\nhe knew that if he was, they would at once recognise\\nhim and he would enter into government. In order\\nto win his dominions, he had required the help of\\nGermany it was comparatively indifferent to him\\nwhether the help came from Prussia, Austria, or the\\nFederation. But he quite understood that Prussia\\nmust have some recompense for the help it had given.\\nWhat he had to fear was that, if he entered into any\\nseparate and secret engagements with Prussia, he\\nwould thereby lose the support he enjoyed in the\\nrest of Germany, and that then Bismarck would find\\nsome excuse not to carry out his promises, so that\\nat the end he would be left entirely without support.\\nWe know that his suspicions were unfounded, for\\nBismarck was not the man in this way to desert any-\\none who had entered into an agreement with him,\\nbut Augustenburg could not know this and had\\nevery reason for distrusting Bismarck, who was his\\navowed enemy.\\nOn the 30th of May, the Prince, with many mis-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0266.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "1864]\\nSchlesww-Holstein. 2 2 1\\ngivings, came to Berlin. The evening of the next\\nday he had a long interview with Bismarck it began\\nabout nine o clock and lasted till after midnight.\\nThere is no doubt that this interview was decisive\\nagainst his chances. From that time Bismarck was\\ndetermined that under no circumstances should he\\nsucceed, and we shall see that when Bismarck wished\\nfor anything he usually attained it. We would gladly,\\ntherefore, know exactly what happened both Bis-\\nmarck and the Prince have given accounts of what\\ntook place, but unfortunately they differ on very\\nimportant points, and no one else was present at the\\ninterview. It is clear that the Prince throughout, for\\nthe reasons we have named, observed great reserve.\\nIt would undoubtedly have been wiser of him openly\\nto place himself entirely in Bismarck s hands, to\\nthrow himself on the generosity of Prussia, and to\\nagree to the terms which Bismarck offered. Why\\nhe did not do this we have explained. The con-\\nversation chiefly turned on the Prussian demands\\nfor the harbour of Kiel and certain other concessions\\nthe Prince expressed himself quite willing to grant\\nmost of what was required, but he could not enter\\ninto any formal treaty without the consent of the Es-\\ntates of the Duchies. When he left the room he\\nseems to have been fairly satisfied with what had\\nbeen said. If so he deceived himself grievously.\\nScarcely had he gone (it was already midnight) when\\nBismarck sent off despatches to St. Petersburg, Paris,\\nand London, explaining that he was not inclined to\\nsupport Augustenburg any longer, and instructing\\nthe Ambassadors to act accordingly.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0267.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "222 Bismarck. [1863-\\nNot content with this he at once brought forward\\nan alternative candidate. Among the many claim-\\nants to the Duchies had been the Duke of Olden-\\nburg and the Czar, who both belonged to the same\\nbranch of the family. The Czar had, at the end of\\nMay, transferred his claims to the Duke, and Bis-\\nmarck now wrote to St. Petersburg that he would\\nalso be prepared to support him. We must not sup-\\npose that in doing this he had the slightest intention\\nof allowing the Duke to be successful. He gained,\\nhowever, a double advantage. First of all he pleased\\nthe Czar and prevented any dif^culties from Russia;\\nsecondly, the very fact of a rival candidate coming\\nforward would indefinitely postpone any settlement.\\nSo long as Augustenburg was the only German candi-\\ndate there was always the danger, as at the Congress\\nof London, that he might suddenly be installed and\\nBismarck be unable to prevent it. If, however, the\\nDuke of Oldenburg came forward, Bismarck would\\nat once take up the position that, as there were\\nrival claimants, a proper legal verdict must be ob-\\ntained and that Prussia could not act so unjustly\\nas to prejudice the decision by extending her sup-\\nport to either. It was not necessary for anyone to\\nknow that he himself had induced the Duke of\\nOldenburg to revive his claim.\\nAt the same time he took other steps to frustrate\\nAugustenburg s hopes he caused the statement to\\nbe published in the Prussian papers that during the\\nconversation of May 31st the Prince had said that\\nhe had never asked the Prussians for help, and that\\nhe could have got on very well without them. It", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0268.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 223\\nwas just the sort of thing which would strongly\\nprejudice the King against him, and Bismarck was\\nvery anxious to destroy the influence which the\\nPrince still had with the King and with many other\\nPrussians. At that time, and always later, the Prince\\ndenied that he had said anything of the kind. Even\\nif, in the course of a long conversation, he had said\\nanything which might have been interpreted to\\nmean this, it was a great breach of confidence to\\npublish these words from a private discussion taken\\nout of their context. The Prussian Press received\\nthe word, and for years to come did not cease to\\npour out its venom against the Prince. This action\\nof Bismarck s seemed quite to justify the apprehen-\\nsion with which the Prince had gone to Berlin.\\nIt is not necessary to look for any far-fetched ex-\\nplanation of Bismarck s action the simplest is the\\nmost probable. He had not arranged the interview\\nwith any intention of entrapping Augustenburg he\\nhad really been doubtful whether, after all, it might\\nnot be wiser to accept the Prince and make a separ-\\nate treaty with him. All depended on his personal\\ncharacter and the attitude he adopted towards Prus-\\nsia. Bismarck, who had great confidence in his own\\njudgment of mankind, regarded a personal interview\\nas the best means of coming to a conclusion the\\nresult of it was that he felt it impossible to rely on\\nthe Prince, who, instead of being open, positive, and\\nready to do business, was reserved, hesitating, dis-\\ntrustful, and critical. Bismarck had given him his\\nchance he had failed to seize it. Instead of being a\\ngrateful client he was a mere obstacle in the road of", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0269.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "2 24 Bismarck. [1863-\\nPrussian greatness, and had to be swept away.\\nAgainst him all the resources of diplomacy were\\nnow directed. His influence must be destroyed, but\\nnot by force, for his strength came from his very\\nweakness the task was to undermine the regard\\nwhich the German people had for him and their en-\\nthusiasm for his cause work to be properly assigned\\nto the Prussian Press.\\nThe Conference in London separated at the end\\nof June without coming to any conclusion it had,\\nhowever, enabled Bismarck formally to dissociate\\nhimself from the former Treaty of London, and\\nhenceforward he had a free hand in his dealings\\nwith Denmark.\\nAnother brilliant feat of arms, the transference of\\nthe Prussian troops across the sea to the island of\\nAlsen, completed the war. Denmark had to capit-\\nulate, and the terms of peace, which were ultimately\\ndecided at Vienna, were that Schleswig, Holstein,\\nand also Lauenburg should be given up. Christian\\ntransferred to the Emperor of Austria and the King\\nof Prussia all the rights which he possessed. As to\\nLauenburg the matter was simple the authority of\\nthe King of Denmark over this Duchy was undis-\\nputed as to Schleswig-Holstein all the old ques-\\ntions still continued the King had transferred his\\nrights, but what were his rights He could only\\ngrant that which belonged to him if the Prince of\\nAugustenburg was Duke, then the King of Den-\\nmark could not confer another man s throne. There\\nwas, however, this difference hitherto the question\\nhad been a European one, but since the London", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0270.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "1864]\\nSchleswig-Holstein.\\n225\\nCongress no other State had any claim to interfere.\\nThe disputed succession of the Duchies must be set-\\ntled between Austria and Prussia. It was a special\\nclause in the terms of peace that it should be decided\\nby agreement between them and not referred to the\\nDiet.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0271.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IX.\\nTHE TREATY OF GASTEIN.\\n1 864- 1 865.\\nBISMARCK always looked back with peculiar\\npleasure on the negotiations which were con-\\ncluded by the Peace of Vienna. His conduct\\nof the affair had in fact been masterly he had suc-\\nceeded in permanently severing the Duchies from\\nDenmark he had done this without allowing foreign\\nnations the opportunity for interfering he had main-\\ntained a close alliance with Austria he had pleased\\nand flattered the Emperors of Russia and France.\\nWhat perhaps gave him most satisfaction was that,\\nthough the result had been what the whole of the\\nGerman nation desired, he had brought it about\\nby means which were universally condemned, and\\nthe rescue of the Duchies had been a severe defeat\\nto the Democratic and National party.\\nWith the Peace a new stage begins the Duchies\\nhad been transferred to the Allied Powers how\\nwere they now to be disposed of? We have seen\\nthat Bismarck desired to acquire them for Prussia\\nif it were absolutely necessary, he would accept an\\n226", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0272.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "1864] The Treaty of Gastein. 227\\narrangement which would leave them to be ruled by\\nanother Prince, provided very extensive rights were\\ngiven to Prussia. He would acquiesce in this arrange-\\nment if annexation would involve a war with one of\\nthe European Powers. If, however, a Duke of Schles-\\nwig-Holstein was to be created he was determined\\nthat it should not be the Prince of Augustenburg,\\nwhom he distrusted and disliked. The real object\\nof his diplomacy must be to get the Duchies offered\\nto Prussia it was, however, very improbable, as the\\nCzar once said to him, that this would happen.\\nHe wished for annexation, but he wished to have\\nit peacefully he had not forgotten his own resolu-\\ntion to have a war with Austria, but he did not wish\\nto make the Duchies the occasion of a war. Austria,\\nhowever, refused to assent to annexation unless the\\nKing of Prussia would give her a corresponding in-\\ncrease of territory this the King positively refused.\\nIt was an unchangeable principle with him that he\\nwould not surrender a single village from the Prus-\\nsian Monarchy his pride revolted from the idea of\\nbartering old provinces for new. If Austria would\\nnot offer the Duchies to Prussia, neither would the\\nDiet the majority remained loyal to Augustenburg.\\nThe people of the Duchies were equally determined\\nin their opposition to the scheme attempts were\\nmade by Bismarck s friends and agents to get up a\\npetition to incorporate them with Prussia, but they\\nalways failed. Even the Prussian people were not\\nreally very anxious for this acquisition, and it required\\ntwo years of constant writing in the inspired Press to\\nbring them into such a state of mind that they would", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0273.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "2 28 Bisma7^ck. [1864-\\nbelieve that it was, I will not say the most honour-\\nable, but the most desirable solution. The King him-\\nself hesitated. It was true that ever since the taking\\nof the Diippel the lust of conquest had been aroused\\nin his mind he had visited the place where so many\\nPrussian soldiers had laid down their lives and it was\\na natural feeling if he wished that the country they\\nhad conquered should belong to their own State. On\\nthe other hand, he still felt that the rights of August-\\nenburg could not be neglected.; when he discussed\\nthe matter with the Emperor of Austria and the sub-\\nject of annexation was raised, he remained silent and\\nwas ill at ease.\\nIf Bismarck was to get his way, he must first of all\\nconvince the King this done, an opportunity might\\nbe found. There was one man who was prepared to\\noffer him the Duchies, and that man was Napoleon. It\\nis instructive to notice that as soon as the negotiations\\nat Vienna had been concluded, Bismarck went to\\nspend a few weeks at his old holiday resort of Biarritz.\\nHe took the opportunity of having some conversation\\nwith both the Emperor and his Ministers.\\nHe required rest and change after the prolonged\\nanxieties of the two years at no place did he find it\\nso well as in the south of France\\nIt seems like a dream to be here again, he writes to\\nhis wife. I am already quite well, and would be quite\\ncheerful if I only knew that all was well with you.\\nThe life I lead at Berlin is a kind of penal servitude,\\nwhen I think of my independent life abroad. Sea-\\nbathing, expeditions across the frontier, and sport\\npassed three weeks. I have not for a long time found", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0274.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "1865] The Treaty of Gastezn. 229\\nmyself in such comfortable conditions, and yet the evil\\nhabit of work has rooted itself so deeply in my nature,\\nthat I feel some disquiet of conscience at my laziness. I\\nalmost long for the Wilhelmstrasse, at least if my dear\\nones were there.\\nOn the 25th he left dear Biarritz for Paris,\\nwhere he found plenty of politics awaiting him\\nhere he had another of those interviews with Napo-\\nleon and his Ministers on which so much depended,\\nand then he went back to his labours at Berlin.\\nAt that time he was not prepared to break with\\nAustria, and he still hoped that some peaceful means\\nof acquisition might be found, as he wrote some\\nmonths later to Goltz, We have not got all the\\ngood we can from the Austrian alliance. Prussia\\nhad the distinct advantage that she was more truly\\nin possession of the Duchies than Austria. This\\npossession would more and more guarantee its own\\ncontinuance it was improbable that any Power\\nwould undertake an offensive war to expel her. On\\nthe whole, therefore, Bismarck seems to have wished\\nfor the present to leave things as they were; gradu-\\nally to increase the hold of Prussia on the Duchies,\\nand wait until they fell of themselves into his hands.\\nIn pursuit of this policy it was necessary, however,\\nto expel all other claimants, and this could not be\\ndone without the consent of Austria this produced\\na cause of friction between the two great Powers\\nwhich made it impossible to maintain the co-do-\\nminium.\\nThere were in Holstein the Confederate troops\\nwho had gone there a year ago and had never been", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0275.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "230 Bismarck. [1864-\\nwithdrawn Augustenburg was still living at Kiel\\nwith his phantom Court and then there were the\\nAustrian soldiers, Prussia s own allies. One after\\nanother they had to be removed. Bismarck dealt\\nfirst with the Confederate troops.\\nHe had, as indeed he always was careful to have,\\nthe strict letter of the law on his side he pointed\\nout that as the execution had been directed against\\nthe government of Christian, and Christian had\\nceased to have any authority, the execution itself\\nmust ipso facto cease he therefore wrote asking\\nAustria to join in a demand to Saxony and Han-\\nover he was prepared, if the States refused, to ex-\\npel their troops by force. Hanover for the King\\nstrongly disliked Augustenburg at once acquiesced\\nSaxony refused. Bismarck began to make military\\npreparations the Saxons began to arm the Crown\\ntreasures were taken from Dresden to Konigstein.\\nWould Austria support Saxony or Prussia For\\nsome days the question was in debate at last Aus-\\ntria determined to support a motion at the Diet de-\\nclaring the execution ended. It was carried by\\neight votes to seven, and the Saxons had to obey.\\nThe troops on their return home refused to march\\nacross Prussian territory; and from this time Beust\\nand the King of Saxony must be reckoned among\\nthe determined and irreconcilable enemies of Bis-\\nmarck.\\nThe first of the rivals was removed there re-\\nmained Austria and the Prince.\\nJust at this time a change of Ministry had taken\\nplace in Austria Rechberg, who had kept up the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0276.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "1865] The Treaty of Gastein. 231\\nalliance, was removed, and the anti-Prussian party\\ncame to the front. It was, therefore, no longer so\\neasy to deal with the Prince, for he had a new and\\nvigorous ally in Austria. Mensdorf, the new Min-\\nister, proposed in a series of lengthy despatches his\\nsolution of the question it was that the rights of\\nthe two Powers should be transferred to Augusten-\\nburg, and that Schleswig-Holstein should be estab-\\nlished as an independent Confederate State. The\\nAustrian position was from this time clearly defined,\\nand it was in favour of that policy to which Bis-\\nmarck would never consent. It remained for him to\\npropose an alternative. Prussia, he said, could only\\nallow the new State to be created on condition that\\nlarge rights were given to Prussia what these were\\nwould require consideration he must consult the\\ndifferent departments. This took time, and every\\nmonth s delay was so much gain for Prussia it was\\nnot till February, 1865, that Bismarck was able to\\npresent his demands, which were, that Kiel should\\nbe a Prussian port, Rendsburg a Prussian fortress\\nthat the canal was to be made by Prussia and be-\\nlong to Prussia, the management of the post and\\ntelegraph service to be Prussian and also the rail-\\nways the army was to be not only organised on the\\nPrussian system but actually incorporated with the\\nPrussian army, so that the soldiers would take\\nthe oath of allegiance not to their own Duke but to\\nthe King of Prussia. The Duchies were to join the\\nPrussian Customs Union and assimilate their sys-\\ntem of finance with that of Prussia. The proposals\\nwere so drawn up that it would be impossible for", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0277.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "232 Bzs7narck. [1864-\\nAustria to support, or for the Prince of Augusten-\\nburg to accept them. They were, in fact, as Bis-\\nmarck himself told the Crown Prince, not meant to\\nbe accepted. I would rather dig potatoes than be\\na reigning Prince under such conditions, said one\\nof the Austrian Ministers. When they were offi-\\ncially presented, Karolyi was instructed to meet them\\nwith an unhesitating negative, and all discussion on\\nthem ceased.\\nPrussia and Austria had both proposed their solu-\\ntion each State even refused to consider the sug-\\ngestion made by the other. Meanwhile, since the\\ndeparture of the Confederate troops the administra-\\ntion of the Duchies was in their hands each Power\\nattempted so to manage affairs as to prepare the\\nway for the final settlement it desired, Prussia for\\nannexation, Austria for Augustenburg. Prince Fred-\\nerick was still living at Kiel. His position was very\\nanomalous he assumed the style and title of a reign-\\ning Prince, he was attended by something like a\\nCourt and by Ministers throughout Holstein, almost\\nwithout exception, and to a great extent also in\\nSchleswig, he was looked upon and treated by the\\npopulation as their lawful sovereign his birthday\\nwas celebrated as a public holiday he was often\\nprayed for in church. All this the Austrians re-\\ngarded with equanimity and indirectly supported\\nBismarck wished to expel him from the country, but\\ncould not do so without the consent of Austria. At\\nthe end of March the matter again came up in the\\nDiet Bavaria and Saxony brought in a motion that\\nthey expected that Austria and Prussia would trans-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0278.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "1865] The Treaty of Gastein. 233\\nfer the administration to Frederick. The Prussian\\nEnvoy rose and explained that they might expect\\nit, but that Prussia would not fulfil their expecta-\\ntions he moved that the claims of all candidates\\nshould be considered by the Diet, not only those of\\nAugustenburg and of the Duke of Oldenburg, but\\nalso of Brandenburg.\\nThe claims of Brandenburg were a new weapon of\\nwhich Bismarck was glad to avail himself. No one\\nsupposed that they had really any foundation they\\nwere not seriously put forward but if the motion\\nwas carried, the Diet would be involved in the solu-\\ntion of a very complicated and necessarily very\\nlengthy legal discussion. What the result was\\nwould be known from the beginning, but the Diet\\nand its committees always worked slowly, and Bis-\\nmarck could with much force maintain that, until\\nthey had come to a decision, there was no reason for\\nhanding over the administration to Augustenburg;\\nit was at least decent not to do this till the claims\\nof the rivals had been duly weighed. In the months\\nthat must elapse many things might happen. In the\\nmeantime the Diet would be helpless. When it had\\ncome to a decision he would then be able to point\\nout, as he had already done, that they had no legal\\npower for determining who was the ruler of any\\nState, and that their decision therefore was quite\\nvalueless, and everything would have been again ex-\\nactly as it was before. Austria supported the mo-\\ntion of Saxony, which was carried by nine votes to six.\\nPrussia answered by sending her fleet from Danzig to\\nKiel, and occupying the harbour; the Government", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0279.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "234 Bismarck. [1864\\nasked for a vote for the erection of fortifications and\\ndocks and for the building of a fleet the Cham-\\nber refused the money, but Roon declared publicly\\nin the House that Prussia would retain Kiel, they\\nhad gone there and did not intend to leave. The\\noccupation of Kiel was an open defiance to Austria;\\nthat it was intended to be so is shewn by the fact\\nthat a few days later Bismarck wrote to Usedom,\\nthe Prussian Minister at Florence, instructing him to\\nsound the Italian Government as to whether they\\nwould be willing to join Prussia in war against Aus-\\ntria. At the same time he wrote to Goltz to find out\\nin Paris whether there was any alliance between\\nAustria and France. It would be some time before\\nforeign relations could be sufficiently cleared up for\\nhim to determine whether or not war would be safe.\\nHe occupied the intervening period by continuing\\nthe negotiations as to the principles on which the\\njoint administration should be conducted. He came\\nforward with a new proposal and one which was ex-\\ntremely surprising, that the Estates of the Duchies\\nshould be summoned, and negotiations entered into\\nwith them. It is one of the most obscure of all his\\nactions he did it contrary to the advice of those on\\nthe spot. Everyone warned him that if the Estates\\nwere summoned their first action would be to pro-\\nclaim Augustenburg as Duke. Some suppose that\\nthe King insisted on his taking this step that is,\\nhowever, very improbable others that he proposed\\nit in order that it might be rejected by Austria, so\\nthat Austria might lose the great influence which\\nby her support of Augustenburg she was gaining in", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0280.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "1865] The Treaty of Gastein. 235\\nGermany. Austria, however, accepted the proposal,\\nand then negotiations began as to the form in which\\nthe Estates should be called together; what should\\nbe the relations to them of the two Powers? This\\ngave rise to a minute controversy, which could not be\\nsettled, and no doubt Bismarck did not wish that it\\nshould be settled. One of his conditions, however,\\nwas that, before the Estates were summoned, August-\\nenburg should be compelled to leave Holstein. Of\\ncourse the Prince refused, for he well knew that, if\\nhe once went away, he would never be allowed to\\nreturn. The Duke of Oldenburg, who was always\\nready to come forward when Bismarck wished it,\\nhimself demanded the expulsion of the Prince. The\\nKing of Prussia wrote a severe letter to Augusten-\\nburg, intimating his displeasure at his conduct and\\nwarning him to leave the country. The Prince an-\\nswered, as he always did to the King, expressing his\\ngratitude and his constant loyalty to Prussia, but re-\\nfused, and his refusal was published in the papers.\\nIt was still impossible to remove him except by force,\\nbut before he ventured on that Bismarck had to make\\nsecure the position of Prussia.\\nAt the beginning of July events began to move\\ntowards a crisis. Bismarck had appointed a com-\\nmission of Prussian lawyers to report on the legal\\nclaim of the different candidates for the Ducal\\nthrone; their report was now published. They\\ncame to the conclusion, as we might anticipate that\\nthey would, that Augustenburg had absolutely no\\nclaim, and that legally the full authority was pos-\\nsessed by the two Powers who had the de facto", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0281.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "236 Bismarck. [1864-\\ngovernment. Their opinion did not carry much\\nweight even in Prussia itself, but they seem to\\nhave succeeded in convincing the King. Hitherto\\nhe had always been haunted by the fear lest, in dis-\\npossessing Augustenburg, he would be keeping a\\nGerman Prince from the throne which was his right,\\nand that to him was a very serious consideration.\\nNow his conscience was set at rest. From this time\\nthe last support which Augustenburg had in Prussia\\nwas taken from him, for the Crown Prince, who\\nalways remained faithful to him, was almost without\\ninfluence. Bismarck was henceforward able to move\\nmore rapidly. On the 5th of July the Prince s\\nbirthday was celebrated throughout the Duchy with\\ngreat enthusiasm this gave bitter offence to the\\nKing; shortly afterwards Bismarck left Berlin and\\njoined the King, who was taking his annual cure at\\nCarlsbad, and for July 28th a Council of State was\\nsummoned to meet at Regensburg. Probably this\\nis the only instance of a King coming to so im-\\nportant a decision outside his own territories. The\\nCouncil was attended not only by the Ministers, but\\nalso by some of the generals and by Goltz, who was\\nsummoned from Paris for the purpose. It was de-\\ntermined to send an ultimatum to Austria; the chief\\ndemand was that Austria should withdraw all sup-\\nport from Augustenburg, and agree immediately to\\neject him from the Duchies. If Austria refused to\\nagree, Prussia would do so herself; he was to be\\nseized, put on board a ship, and carried off to East\\nPrussia. To shew that they were in earnest, a begin-\\nning was made by seizing in Holstein Prussian sub-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0282.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "1865]\\nThe Treaty of Gastein. 237\\njects who had written in the newspapers in a sense\\nopposed to the wishes of the Prussian Government,\\nand carrying them off to be tried at BerHn. In order\\nto be prepared for all possibilities, an ofificial request\\nwas sent to Italy to ask for her assistance in case of\\nan outbreak of war. After these decisions were ar-\\nrived at, the King continued his journey to Gastein\\nto complete his cure there, on Austrian territory in\\ncompany with Bismarck, he awaited the answer.\\nIn Austria opinions were divided the feeling of\\nannoyance with Prussia had been steadily growing\\nduring the last year. The military party was gaining\\nground many would have been only too glad to\\ntake up the challenge. It would indeed have been\\ntheir wisest plan to do so openly to support the\\nclaim of Augustenburg, to demand that the Estates\\nof Holstein should be at once summoned, and if\\nBismarck carried out his threats, to put herself at the\\nhead of Germany and in the name of the outraged\\nright of a German Prince and a German State to\\ntake up the Prussian challenge.\\nThere were, however, serious reasons against this.\\nThe Emperor was very reluctant to go to war, and,\\nas so often, the personal feelings of the rulers had\\nmuch to do with the policy of the Government.\\nThen the internal condition of Austria both politically\\nand financially was very unsatisfactory it would\\nhave been necessary to raise a loan and this could not\\nbe easily done. There was also the constant danger\\nfrom Italy, for Austria knew that, even if there were\\nno alliance, as soon as she was attacked on one side\\nby Prussia, the Italians on the other side would in-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0283.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "238 Bismarck. [1864-\\nvade Venetia. Count Metternich was instructed to\\nask Napoleon, but received as an answer that they\\ncould not hope for a French alliance the Austrians\\nfeared that he might already be engaged on the side\\nof Prussia. For all these reasons it was determined\\nto attempt to bring about a compromise. A change\\nof Ministry took place, and Count Blome, one of the\\nnew Ministers, was sent to Gastein. He found both\\nthe King and Bismarck not disinclined to some com-\\npromise. The reports both from Florence and Paris\\ndid not seem to Bismarck to be entirely satisfactory\\nhe did not find such readiness as he had hoped for;\\nhe feared that some secret understanding might be\\narrived at between Austria and Napoleon and then,\\nas we have seen, he was really anxious to avoid war\\nfor the sake of the Duchies he had not given up his\\nintention of war with Austria some day, but it would\\nbe impossible to find a less agreeable excuse for it.\\nHalbuber and Augustenburg are acting so that we\\nshall soon have to apply force this will cause bad blood\\nin Vienna it is not what I wish, but Austria gives us no\\nchoice,\\nhe had written a few days before. After a few days\\nof indecision a compromise therefore was agreed\\nupon. The joint administration of the Duchies was\\nto be given up Austria was to administer Holstein,\\nPrussia, Schleswig they both undertook not to bring\\nthe question before the Diet the Duchy of Lauen-\\nburg was to be handed over absolutely to the King\\nof Prussia, the Emperor of Austria receiving two\\nmillion thalers for his share.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0284.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "1865]\\nThe Treaty of Gastein.\\n239\\nLauenburg was the first new possession which Bis-\\nmarck was able to offer to the King; the grateful\\nmonarch conferred on him the title of Count, and in\\nlater years presented to him large estates out of the\\nvery valuable royal domains. It was from Lauen-\\nburg that in later years the young German Emperor\\ntook the title which he wished to confer on the retir-\\ning Chancellor.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0285.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER X.\\nOUTBREAK OF WAR WITH AUSTRIA.\\n1 865- 1 866.\\nTHE arrangement made at Gastein could not be\\npermanent it was only a temporary expedi-\\nent to put off the conflict which henceforward\\nwas inevitable inevitable, that is, if the Emperor of\\nAustria still refused to sell Holstein to Prussia. It\\nwas, however, so far as it went, a great gain to Prus-\\nsia, because it deprived Austria of the esteem of the\\nother German States. Her strength had hitherto\\nlain in her strict adhesion to popular feeling and to\\nwhat the majority of the Germans, Princes and\\npeople alike, believed was justice; by coming to a\\nseparate agreement with Prussia, she had shaken\\ntheir confidence. Bavaria especially was much an-\\nnoyed by this change of front, and it seemed prob-\\nable that the most important of the southern States\\nwould soon be ranged on the side of Prussia. This\\nwas a consummation which Bismarck ardently de-\\nsired, and to which he addressed himself with much\\nenergy.\\nThe attitude of France was more important than\\nthat of the German States, and in the autumn Bis-\\n240", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0286.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "1865] Outbj^eak of War ivith Austria. 241\\nmarck made a fresh visit to that country. Just as\\nhe had done the year before, he went to take the\\nsea-baths at Biarritz. This step was the more re-\\nmarkable because Napoleon had received the news\\nof the Treaty of Gastein with marked displeasure,\\nand had given public expression to his opinions.\\nBismarck saw Drouyn de Lhuys at Paris and then\\nwent on to Biarritz where the Emperor was for\\nten days he lived there in constant association with\\nthe Imperial family. The personal impression which\\nhe made was very favourable A really great man,\\nwrote Merimee, free from feeling and full of esprit^\\nHe saw Napoleon again on his return through Paris\\nthe two succeeded in coming to an understanding.\\nNapoleon assured him that he might depend on\\nthe absolute neutrality of France, in case of a war\\nbetween Prussia and Austria it was agreed also\\nthat the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia would\\nnot be an increase of territory which would cause\\nany uneasiness at Paris Napoleon would view it\\nwith favour. Bismarck went farther than this he\\nopened the subject of a complete reform of the\\nGerman Constitution on the lines that Prussia was\\nto have a free hand in the north of Germany he\\npointed out\\nthat the acquisition of the Duchies would only be an\\nearnest for the fulfilment of the pledge which history\\nhad laid upon the State of Prussia for the future pro-\\nsecution of it we need the most friendly relations with\\nFrance. It seems to me in the interest of France to\\nencourage Prussia in the ambitious fulfilment of her\\nnational duty.\\n16", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0287.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "242 Bismarck. [1865\\nThe Emperor acquiesced as we know, the division\\nof Europe into large national States was what he\\nmeant by Napoleonic ideas he was willing enough\\nto help in Germany a change such as that he had\\nbrought about in Italy. It was agreed that events\\nshould be allowed to develop themselves when the\\ntime came it would be easy enough to come to some\\ndefinite agreement.\\nThis however was not all it was not to be expected\\nthat Napoleon should render Prussia so valuable a\\nservice without receiving something in exchange;\\nwe know Bismarck s opinion of a statesman who,\\nout of sympathy for another country, would sacri-\\nfice the interests of his own. The creation of a\\nstrong consolidated State in the north of Germany\\ncould not be in the interests of France the power\\nof France had always been founded on the weakness\\nof Germany. Even if Napoleon himself, with his\\ngenerous and cosmopolitan sympathies, was willing\\nto make the sacrifice, France was not Napoleon\\nknew, and Bismarck knew, that Napoleon could not\\ndisregard the feeling of the country his power was\\nbased on universal suffrage and the popularity of\\nhis name he could not, as a King of Prussia could,\\nbrave the displeasure of the people. France must\\nthen have some compensation. What was it to be?\\nWhat were to be the terms of the more intimate and\\nspecial understanding? We do not know exactly\\nwhat was said we do know that Bismarck led both\\nthe Emperor and his Ministers to believe that Prus-\\nsia would support them in an extension of the\\nfrontier. He clearly stated that the King would", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0288.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "1866] Outbreak of War with Atistria. 243\\nnot be willing to surrender a single Prussian village\\nhe probably said that they would not acquiesce in\\nthe restoration to France of any German territory.\\nFrance therefore must seek her reward in a French-\\nspeaking people. It was perhaps an exaggeration if\\nDrouyn de Lhuys said he offered us all kinds of\\nthings which did not belong to him, but Napoleon\\nalso in later years repeated that Bismarck had\\npromised him all kinds of recompenses. No written\\nagreement was made that was reserved for later\\nnegotiations, but there was a verbal understanding,\\nwhich both parties felt was binding. This was the\\npendant to the interview of Plombieres. But Bis-\\nmarck had improved on Cavour s example he did\\nnot want so much, he asked only for neutrality the\\nKing of Prussia would not be called upon, like Victor\\nEmmanuel, to surrender the old possessions of his\\nHouse.\\nBismarck returned to Berlin with his health invig-\\norated by the Atlantic winds and his spirits raised\\nby success. The first step now was to secure the\\nhelp of Italy he had seen Nigra, the Italian Minis-\\nter, at Paris, and told him that war was inevitable\\nhe hoped he could reckon on Italian alliance, but\\nthere was still, however, much ground for anxiety\\nthat Austria might succeed in arranging affairs with\\nItaly.\\nThe relations of the four Powers at this time were\\nvery remarkable. All turned on Venetia. The new\\nKingdom of Italy would not rest until it had secured\\nthis province. Napoleon also was bound by honour\\nto complete his promise and free Italy to the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0289.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "244 Bismarck. [1865-\\nAdriatic neither his throne nor that of his son\\nwould be secure if he failed to do so. A war be-\\ntween Austria and Prussia would obviously afford\\nthe best opportunity, and his whole efforts were\\ntherefore directed to preventing a reconciliation be-\\ntween the two German Powers. His great fear was\\nthat Austria should come to terms with Prussia, and\\nsurrender the Duchies on condition that Prussia\\nshould guarantee her Italian possessions. When\\nBismarck visited Napoleon at Biarritz, the first ques-\\ntion of the Emperor was, Have you guaranteed\\nVenetia to Austria It was the fear of this which\\ncaused his anger at the Treaty of Gastein. On the\\nother hand, Bismarck had his reasons for anxiety.\\nIt was always possible that Austria, instead of com-\\ning to terms with Prussia, might choose the other\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0side she might surrender Venetia in order to obtain\\nFrench and Italian support in a German war. The\\nsituation indeed was this: Austria was liable at any\\nmoment to be attacked by both Italy and Prussia;\\nit would probably be beyond her strength to resist\\nboth assailants at the same time. A wise statesman\\nwould probably have made terms with one or the\\nother. He would have either surrendered Venetia,\\nwhich was really a source of weakness, to Italy,\\nor agreed with Prussia over the Duchies and the\\nGerman problem, thereby gaining Prussian support\\nagainst Italy. The honourable pride of Mensdorf\\nand the military party in Austria refused to surren-\\nder anything till it was too late.\\nNone the less, the constant fear lest Austria\\nshould make terms with one of her enemies for a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0290.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "1866] Outbreak of War with Austria. 245\\nlong time prevented an alliance between Prussia and\\nItaly. The Italians did not trust Bismarck they\\nfeared that if they made a treaty with him, he would\\nallow them to get entangled in war, and then, as at\\nGastein, make up his quarrel with Austria. Bis-\\nmarck did not trust the Italians he feared that they\\nand Napoleon would even at the last moment take\\nVenetia as a present, and, as very nearly happened,\\noffer Austria one of the Prussian provinces instead.\\nIt was impossible to have any reliance on Napoleon s\\npromises, for he was constantl)^ being pulled two\\nways his own policy and sympathies would lead\\nhim to an alliance with Prussia the clerical party,\\nwhich was yearly growing stronger and had the sup-\\nport of the Empress, wished him to side with the\\nCatholic power. In consequence, even after his\\nreturn from France, Bismarck could not pass a day\\nwith full security that he might not find himself\\nopposed by a coalition of Austria, France, and Italy\\nthe Austrians felt that they were to be made the\\nvictims of a similar coalition between Prussia, France,\\nand Italy France always feared a national union\\nbetween the two great German Powers.\\nBismarck began by completing and bringing to a\\nconclusion the arrangements for a commercial treaty\\nwith Italy at the beginning of January the King of\\nPrussia sent Victor Emmanuel the order of the Black\\nEagle Bismarck also used his influence to induce\\nBavaria to join in the commercial treaty and to recog-\\nnise the Kingdom of Italy. Then on January 13th\\nhe wrote to Usedom that the eventual decision in\\nGermany would be influenced by the action of Italy", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0291.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "246 Bismarck. [1865-\\nif they could not depend on the support of Italy,\\nhe hinted that peace would be maintained in this\\nway he hoped to force the Italians to join him.\\nAffairs in the Duchies gave Bismarck the op-\\nportunity for adopting with good grounds a hostile\\nattitude towards Austria Gablenz, the new Governor\\nof Holstein, continued to favour the Augustenburg\\nagitation. Many had expected that Austria would\\ngovern Holstein as a part of the Empire instead of\\ndoing so, with marked design the country was adminis-\\ntered as though it were held in trust for the Prince\\nno taxes were levied, full freedom was allowed to the\\nPress, and while the Prussians daily became more ij.n-\\npopular in Schleswig the Austrians by their leniency\\nwon the affection of Holstein. At the end of\\nJanuary, they even allowed a mass meeting, which\\nwas attended by over 4000 men, to be held at Altona.\\nThis made a very unfavourable impression on the\\nKing, and any action of Austria that offended the\\nKing was most useful to Bismarck. Bismarck is\\nusing all his activity to inspire the King with his own\\nviews and feelings, wrote Benedetti, the French\\nAmbassador, at this time. At the end of January he\\nfelt sufficiently secure to protest seriously against the\\nAustrian action in Holstein. Why, he asked,\\nhad they left the alliance against our common\\nenemy, the Revolution Austria, in return, refused\\nperemptorily to allow Bismarck any voice in the\\nadministration of Holstein. Bismarck, when the\\ndespatch was read to him, answered curtly that he\\nmust consider that henceforth the relations of the two\\nPowers had lost their intimate character we are as", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0292.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "1866] Outbreak of War with Austria. 247\\nwe were before the Danish war, neither worse nor\\nbetter. He sent no answer to the Austrian despatch\\nand ceased to discuss with them the affairs of the\\nDuchies.\\nThis was a fair warning to Austria and it was\\nunderstood they took it as an intimation that\\nhostihties were intended, and from this day began\\nquietly to make their preparations. As soon as they\\ndid this, they were given into Bismarck s hands\\nthe Prussians, owing to the admirable organisation\\nof the army, could prepare for war in a fortnight or\\nthree weeks time less than the Austrians would re-\\nquire Austria to be secure must therefore begin to\\narm first as soon as she did so the Prussian Govern-\\nment would be able, with full protestation of inno-\\ncence, to point to the fact that they had not moved\\na man, and then to begin their own mobilisation, not\\napparently for offence but, as it were, to protect\\nthemselves from an unprovoked attack. In a minute\\nof February 22d Moltke writes that it would be\\nbetter for political reasons not to mobilise yet\\nthen they would appear to put Austria in the wrong\\nAustria had now 100,000 men in Bohemia and it\\nwould be impossible to undertake any ofTensive\\nmovement against Prussia with less than 150,000 or\\n200,000 to collect these at least six weeks would\\nbe required, and the preparations could not be con-\\ncealed. Six days later a great council was held in\\nBerlin. A war with Austria must come sooner or\\nlater it is wiser to undertake it now, under these\\nmost favourable circumstances, than to leave it to\\nAustria to choose the most auspicious moment for", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0293.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "248 Bismarck. [1865-\\nherself, said Bismarck, The rupture, he explained,\\nhad already really been effected that had been\\ncompleted at his last interview with Karolyi. Bis-\\nmarck was supported by most of the Ministers the\\nKing said that the Duchies were worth a war, but\\nhe still hoped that peace would be kept. The arrange-\\nment of the foreign alliances was now pushed on. The\\nKing wrote an autograph letter to Napoleon saying\\nthat the time for the special understanding had\\ncome; Goltz discussed with him at length the terms\\nof French compensation. Napoleon did not ask for\\nany definite promise, but suggested the annexation\\nof some German territory to France it was explained\\nto him that Prussia would not surrender any German\\nterritory, but that, if France took part of Belgium,\\nthe Prussian frontier must be extended to the Maas,\\nthat is, must include the north-east of Belgium.\\nAgain no definite agreement was made, but Na-\\npoleon s favouring neutrality seemed secure. There\\nwas more difficulty with Italy, for here an active\\nalliance was required, and the Italians still feared\\nthey would be tricked. It was decided to send\\nMoltke to Florence to arrange affairs there this,\\nhowever, was unnecessary, for Victor Emmanuel sent\\none of his generals, Govone, nominally to gain some\\ninformation about the new military inventions for\\nthe next three weeks, Govone and Barrel, the Italian\\nMinister, were engaged in constant discussions as to\\nthe terms of the treaty. Of course the Austrians\\nwere not entirely ignorant of what was going on.\\nThe negotiations with Italy roused among them in-\\ntense bitterness without actually mobilising they", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0294.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "GENERAL VON MOLTKE.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0295.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0296.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "1866] Outbj^eak of War with Attstria. 249\\nslowly and cautiously made all preliminary arrange-\\nments a despatch was sent to Berlin accusing the\\nPrussians of the intention of breaking the Treaty of\\nGastein, and another despatch to the German Courts\\nasking for their assistance. Karolyi waited on Bis-\\nmarck, assured him that their military preparations\\nwere purely defensive, and asked point-blank whether\\nPrussia proposed to violate the treaty. The answer,\\nof course, was a simple No, but according to the\\ngossip of Berlin, Bismarck added, You do not\\nthink I should tell you if I did intend to do so.\\nOn March 24th a despatch was sent to the envoys at\\nall the German Courts drawing their attention to\\nthe Austrian preparations, for which it was said there\\nwas no cause in view of this obvious aggression\\nPrussia must begin to arm. That this was a mere\\npretext is shewn by a confidential note of Moltke of\\nthis same date in it he states that all the Austrian\\npreparations up to this time were purely defensive\\nthere was as yet no sign of an attempt to take the\\noffensive. Two days later, a meeting of the Prussian\\nCouncil was held and the orders for a partial mobil-\\nisation of the army were given, though some time\\nelapsed before they were actually carried out.\\nUnder the constant excitement of these weeks\\nBismarck s health again began to break down ex-\\ncept himself, there was in fact scarcely a single\\nman who desired the war the King still seized\\nevery opportunity of preserving the peace Eng-\\nland, as so often, was beginning to make proposals\\nfor mediation all the Prussian diplomatists, he com-\\nplained, were working against his warlike projects,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0297.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "250 Bismarck. [1865-\\nHe made it clear to the Italians that the result would\\ndepend on them if they would not sign a treaty\\nthere would be no war. The great difficulty in ar-\\nranging the terms of the treaty was to determine\\nwho should begin. The old suspicion was still there\\neach side expected that if they began they would be\\ndeserted by their ally. The suspicion was unjust,\\nfor on both sides there were honourable men. The\\ntreaty was eventually signed on April 9th it was to\\nthe effect that if Prussia went to war with Austria\\nwithin the next three months, Italy would also at\\nonce declare war neither country was to make a\\nseparate peace Prussia would continue the war till\\nVenetia was surrendered. On the very day that this\\ntreaty was signed, Bismarck, in answer to an Austrian\\ndespatch, wrote insisting that he had no intention of\\nentering on an offensive war against Austria. In\\nprivate conversation he was more open to Bene-\\ndetti he said I have at last succeeded in deter-\\nmining a King of Prussia to break the intimate\\nrelations of his House with that of Austria, to con-\\nclude a treaty of alliance with Italy, to accept ar-\\nrangements with Imperial France I am proud of\\nthe result.\\nSuddenly a fresh impediment appeared the Aus-\\ntrians, on April i8th, wrote proposing a disarming\\non both sides the Prussian answer was delayed for\\nmany days it was said in Berlin that there was\\na difference of opinion between Bismarck and the\\nKing Bismarck complained to Benedetti that he\\nwas wavering when at last the answer was sent it\\nwas to accept the principle, but Bismarck boasted", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0298.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0299.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0300.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "1866] OtUbi^eak of War with Austria. 251\\nthat he had accepted it under such conditions that it\\ncould hardly be carried out. The reluctance of the\\nKing to go to war caused him much difficulty all\\nhis influence was required it is curious to read the\\nfollowing words which he wrote at this time\\nIt is opposed to my feelings, I may say to my faith, to\\nattempt to use influence or pressure on your paternal\\nfeelings with regard to the decision on peace or war\\nthis is a sphere in which, trusting to God alone, I leave\\nit to your Majesty s heart to steer for the good of the\\nFatherland my part is prayer, rather than counsel\\nand then he again lays before the King the insuper-\\nable arguments in favour of war.\\nLet us not suppose that this letter was but a cun-\\nning device to win the consent of the King. In\\nthese words more than in anything else we see his\\ndeepest feelings and his truest character, Bismarck\\nwas no Napoleon he had determined that war was\\nnecessary, but he did not go to the terrible arbitra-\\nment with a light heart. He was not a man who\\nfrom personal ambition would order thousands of\\nmen to go to their death or bring his country to\\nruin. It was his strength that he never forgot that\\nhe was working, not for himself, but for others. Be-\\nhind the far-sighted plotter and the keen intriguer\\nthere always remained the primitive honesty of his\\nyounger years. He may at times have complained of\\nthe difficulties which arose from the reluctance of the\\nKing to follow his advice, but he himself felt that\\nit was a source of strength to him that he had to ex-\\nplain, justify, and recommend his policy to the King.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0301.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "252 Bismarck.\\n[1865-\\nAll anxiety was, however, removed by news which\\ncame the next day. A report was spread through-\\nout the papers that Italy had begun to mobihse, and\\nthat a band of Garibaldians had crossed the frontier.\\nThe report seems to have been untrue. How it\\noriginated we know not when Roon heard of it he\\nexclaimed, Now the Italians are arming, the Aus-\\ntrians cannot disarm. He was right. The Austrian\\nGovernment sent a message to Berlin that they\\nwould withdraw part of their northern army from\\nBohemia, but must at once put the whole of their\\nsouthern army on a war footing. Prussia refused to\\naccept this plea, and the order for the mobilisation\\nof the Prussian army went out.\\nAs soon as Austria had begun to mobilise, war was\\ninevitable the state of the finances of the Empire\\nwould not permit them to maintain their army on a\\nwar footing for any time. None the less, another\\nsix weeks were to elapse before hostilities began.\\nWe have seen how throughout these complications\\nBismarck had desired, if he fought Austria, to fight,\\nnot for the sake of the Duchies, but for a reform of\\nthe German Confederation.\\nIn March he had said to the Italians that the Hol-\\nstein question was not enough to warrant a declara-\\ntion of war. Prussia intended to bring forward the\\nreform of the Confederation. This would take sev-\\neral months. He hoped that among other advan-\\ntages, he would have at least Bavaria on his side\\nfor the kind of proposal he had in his mind, though\\nat this time he seems to have had no clear plan, was\\nsome arrangement by which the whole of the north", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0302.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "18661 Outbreak of War with Austria. 253\\nof Germany should be closely united to Prussia, and\\nthe southern States formed in a separate union with\\nBavaria at the head. He had always pointed out,\\neven when he was at Frankfort, that Bavaria was a\\nnatural ally of Prussia. In a great war the consider-\\nable army of Bavaria would not be unimportant.\\nAt the beginning of April Bismarck instructed^\\nSavigny, his envoy at the Diet, to propose the con-\\nsideration of a reform in the Constitution. The pro-\\nposal he made was quite unexpected. No details\\nwere mentioned as to changes in the relations of the\\nPrinces, but a Parliament elected by universal suf-\\nfrage and direct elections was to be chosen, to help\\nin the management of common German affairs. It\\nis impossible to exaggerate the bewilderment and\\nastonishment with which this proposal was greeted.\\nHere was the man who had risen into power as the\\nchampion of monarchical government, as the enemy\\nof Parliaments and Democracy, voluntarily taking up\\nthe extreme demand of the German Radicals. It\\nmust be remembered that universal suffrage was at\\nthis time regarded not as a mere scheme of voting,\\nit was a principle it was the cardinal principle of\\nthe Revolution it meant the sovereignty of the\\npeople. It was the basis of the French Republic of\\n1848, it had been incorporated in the German Con-\\nstitution of 1849, and this was one of the reasons\\nwhy the King of Prussia had refused then to accept\\nthat Constitution. The proposal was universally\\ncondemned. Bismarck had perhaps hoped to win\\nthe Liberals if so, he was disappointed their con-\\nfidence could not be gained by this sudden and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0303.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "254 Bismarck. [1865-\\namazing change they distrusted him all the more\\na Government that, despising the laws of its own\\ncountry, comes forward with plans for Confederate\\nreform, cannot have the confidence of the German\\npeople, was the verdict of the National party. The\\nModerate Liberals, men like Sybel, had always been\\nopposed to universal suffrage even the English\\nstatesmen were alarmed it was two years before\\nDisraeli made his leap in the dark, and here was the\\nPrussian statesman making a far bolder leap in a\\ncountry not yet accustomed to the natural working\\nof representative institutions. He did not gain the\\nadhesion of the Liberals, and he lost the confidence\\nof his old friends. Napoleon alone expressed his\\npleasure that the institutions of the two countries\\nshould become so like one another.\\nThere was, indeed, ample reason for distrust uni-\\nversal suffrage meant not only Democracy, it was\\nthe foundation on which Napoleon had built his\\nEmpire he had shewn that the voice of the people\\nmight become the instrument of despotism. All the\\nold suspicions were aroused people began to see\\nfresh meaning in these constant visits to France\\nNapoleon had found an apt pupil not only in foreign\\nbut in internal matters. It could mean nothing\\nmore than the institution of a democratic monarchy\\nthis was Bonapartism it seemed to be the achieve-\\nment of that change which, years ago, Gerlach had\\nforeboded. No wonder the King of Hanover began\\nto feel his crown less steady on his head.\\nWhat was the truth in the matter? What were\\nthe motives which influenced Bismarck? The ex-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0304.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "1866] Outbreak of War with Austria. 255\\nplanation he gave was probably the true one by\\nuniversal suffrage he hoped to attain a Conservative\\nand nnonarchical assembly he appealed from the\\neducated and Liberal -middle classes to the peasants\\nand artisans. We remember how often he had told\\nthe Prussian House of Commons that they were not\\nthe true representatives of the people.\\nDirect election and universal suffrage I consider to be\\ngreater guarantees of Conservative action than any arti-\\nficial electoral law the artificial systeni of indirect elec-\\ntion and elections by classes is a much more dangerous\\none in a country of monarchical traditions and loyal\\npatriotism. Universal suffrage, doing away as it does\\nwith the influence of the Liberal bourgeoisie, leads to\\nmonarchical elections.\\nThere was in his mind a vague ideal, the ideal of a\\nking, the father of his country, supported by the\\nmasses of the people. He had a genuine inter-\\nest in the welfare of the poorest he thought he\\nwould find in them more gratitude and confidence\\nthan in the middle classes. We know that he was\\nwrong universal suffrage in Germany was to make\\npossible the Social Democrats and Ultramontanes\\nit was to give the Parliamentary power into the\\nhands of an opponent far more dangerous than the\\nLiberals of the Prussian Assembly. Probably no\\none had more responsibility for this measure than\\nthe brilliant founder of the Socialist party. Bis-\\nmarck had watched with interest the career of Las-\\nsalle he had seen with admiration his power of\\norganisation he felt that here was a man who in", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0305.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "256 Bismarck. [1865-\\ninternal affairs and in the management of the people\\nhad something of the skill and courage which he\\nhimself had in foreign affairs. He was a great dema-\\ngogue, and Bismarck had already learnt that a man\\nwho aimed at being not only a diplomatist, but a\\nstatesman and a ruler, must have something of the\\ndemagogic art. From Lassalle he could learn much.\\nWe have letters written two years before this in\\nwhich Lassalle, obviously referring to some previous\\nconversation, says Above all, I accuse myself of\\nhaving forgotten yesterday to impress upon you that\\nthe right of being elected must be given to all Ger-\\nmans. This is an immense means of power; the\\nmoral conquest of Germany. Obviously there had\\nbeen a long discussion, in which Lassalle had per-\\nsuaded the Minister to adopt universal suffrage.\\nThe letters continue with reference to the machinery\\nof the elections, and means of preventing abstention\\nfrom the poll, for which Lassalle professes to have\\nfound a magic charm.\\nOne other remark we must make this measure,\\nas later events were to prove, was in some ways\\ncharacteristic of all Bismarck s internal policy. Roon\\nonce complained of his strokes of genius, his unfore-\\nseen decisions. In foreign policy, bold and decisive\\nas he could be, he was also cautious and prudent\\nto this he owes his success he could strike when\\nthe time came, but he never did so unless he had\\ntested the situation in every way he never be-\\ngan a war unless he was sure to win, and he left\\nnothing to chance or good fortune. In internal\\naffairs he was less prudent he did not know his", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0306.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "1866] Outbreak of War zvith Austria. 257\\nground so well, and he exaggerated his own influ-\\nence. Moreover, in giving up the simpler Conserva-\\ntive policy of his younger years, he became an\\nopportunist he would introduce important measures\\nin order to secure the support of a party, even\\nthough he might thereby be sacrificing the interests\\nof his country to a temporary emergency. He really\\napplied to home affairs the habits he had learned in\\ndiplomacy there every alliance is temporary when\\nthe occasion of it has passed by, it ceases, and leaves\\nno permanent effect. He tried to govern Germany\\nby a series of political alliances but the alliance of\\nthe Government with a party can never be barren\\nthe laws to which it gives birth remain. Bismarck\\nsometimes thought more of the advantage of the\\nalliance than of the permanent effect of the laws.\\nEven after this there was still delay there were\\nthe usual abortive attempts at a congress, which, as in\\n1859, broke down through the refusal of Austria to\\ngive way. There were dark intrigues of Napoleon,\\nwho even at the last moment attempted to divert the\\nItalians from their Prussian alliance. In Germany\\nthere was extreme indignation against the man who\\nwas forcing his country into a fratricidal war. Bis-\\nmarck had often received threatening letters now\\nan attempt was made on his life; as he was walking\\nalong Unter den Linden a young man approached\\nand fired several shots at him. He was seized by\\nBismarck, and that night put an end to his own life\\nin prison. He was a South German who wished to\\nsave his country from the horrors of civil war.\\nMoltke, now that all was prepared, was anxious to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0307.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "258 Bismarck. [1866\\nbegin. Bismarck still hesitated he was so cautious\\nthat he would not take the first step. At last the\\nfinal provocation came, as he hoped it would, from\\nAustria. He knew that if he waited long enough\\nthey would take the initiative. They proposed to\\nsummon the Estates of Holstein, and at the same\\ntime brought the question of the Duchies before the\\nDiet. Bismarck declared that this was a breach of\\nthe Treaty of Gastein, and that that agreement was\\ntherefore void Prussian troops were ordered to\\nenter Holstein. Austria appealed for protection to\\nthe Diet, and moved that the Federal forces should\\nbe mobilised. The motion was carried by nine votes\\nto seven. The Prussian Envoy then rose and de-\\nclared that this was a breach of the Federal law\\nPrussia withdrew from the Federation and declared\\nwar on all those States which had supported Austria.\\nHanover and Hesse had to the end attempted to\\nmaintain neutrality, but this Bismarck would not\\nallow they Were given the alternative of alliance\\nwith Prussia or disarmament. The result was that,\\nwhen war began, the whole of Germany, except the\\nsmall northern States, was opposed to Prussia. I\\nhave no ally but the Duke of Mecklenburg and\\nMazzini, said the King.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0308.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XI.\\nTHE CONQUEST OF GERMANY.\\n1866.\\nBISMARCK had no part in the management of\\nthe army. This the King always kept in his\\nown hands. He was himself Commander-in-\\nChief, and on all military questions he took the ad-\\nvice of his Minister of War and the chief of the staff.\\nWhen his power and influence in the State were\\ngreatest, Bismarck s authority always ceased as soon\\nas technical and military matters arose for consider-\\nation. He often chafed at this limitation and even\\nin a campaign was eager to offer his advice there\\nwas soldier s blood in his veins, and he would have\\nliked himself to bear arms in the war. At least he\\nwas able to be present on the field of battle with the\\nKing and witness part of the campaign.\\nWith the King he left Berlin on June 30th to join\\nthe army in Bohemia. Already the news had come\\nof the capitulation of the Hanoverians the whole of\\nNorth-West Germany had been conquered in a week\\nand the Prussian flank was secure. The effect of\\nthese victories was soon seen his unpopularity was\\n259", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0309.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "26o Bismarck.\\n[1866\\nwiped out in blood. Night by night as the bulletins\\narrived, crowds collected to cheer and applaud the\\nMinister.\\nThe King and his suite reached the army on July\\n1st they were just in time to be present at the\\ndecisive battle. At midnight on July 2d it was\\nknown that the Austrians were preparing to give\\nbattle near Koniggratz with the Elbe in their rear.\\nEarly the next morning the King with Bismarck,\\nRoon, and Moltke rode out and took up their posi-\\ntions on the hill of Dub, whence they could view\\nwhat was to be the decisive battle in the history of\\nGermany. Here, after the lapse of more than a\\nhundred years, they were completing the work which\\nFrederick the Great had begun. The battle was\\nlong and doubtful. The army of Prince Frederick\\nCharles attacked the Austrian division under the\\neyes of the King, but could make no advance against\\ntheir powerful artillery. They had to wait till the\\nCrown Prince, who was many miles away, could come\\nup and attack the right flank of the Austrians.\\nHour after hour went by and the Crown Prince did\\nnot come if he delayed longer the attack would\\nfail and the Prussians be defeated. We can easily\\nimagine what must have been Bismarck s thoughts\\nduring this crisis. On the result depended his posi-\\ntion, his reputation, perhaps his life into those few\\nhours was concentrated the struggle to which he\\nhad devoted so much of his lifetime, and yet he was\\nquite helpless. Success or failure did not depend on\\nhim. It is the crudest trial to the statesman that\\nhe must see his best plans undone by the mistakes", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0310.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 261\\nof the generals. Bismarck often looked with anxiety\\nat Moltke s face to see whether he could read in it\\nthe result of the battle. The King, too, was getting\\nnervous. Bismarck at last could stand it no longer\\nhe rode up to Moltke, took out a cigar case, and\\noffered it to the General Moltke looked at the\\ncigars carefully and took the best then I knew we\\nwere all right, said Bismarck in telling this story.\\nIt was after two when at last the cannon of the\\nCrown Prince s army came into action, and the\\nAustrian army, attacked on two sides, was\\noverthrown.\\nThis time the brave grenadiers have saved us,\\nsaid Roon. It was true but for the army which he\\nand the King had made, all the genius of Moltke\\nand Bismarck would have been unavailing.\\nOur men deserve to be kissed, wrote Bismarck to\\nhis wife. Every man is brave to the death, quiet,\\nobedient with empty stomachs, wet clothes, little sleep,\\nthe soles of their boots falling off, they are friendly to-\\nwards everyone there is no plundering and burning\\nthey pay what they are able, though they have mouldy\\nbread to eat. There must exist a depth of piety in our\\ncommon soldier or all this could not be.\\nBismarck might well be proud of this practical\\nillustration which was given of that which he so often\\nin older days maintained. This was a true comment\\non the pictures of the loyalty of the Prussian people\\nand the simple faith of the German peasants, which\\nfrom his place in Parliament he had opposed to the\\nnew sceptical teaching of the Liberals. As soon as\\nhe was able he went about among the wounded as", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0311.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "262 Bismarck.\\n[1866\\nhe once said, the King of Prussia was accustomed to\\nlook into the eyes of wounded men on the field of\\nbattle and therefore would never venture on an un-\\njust or unnecessary war, and in this Bismarck felt as\\nthe King. He writes home for cigars for distribut-\\ning among the wounded. Personally he endured\\nsomething of the hardships of campaigning, for in\\nthe miserable Bohemian villages there was little food\\nand shelter to be had. He composed himself to\\nsleep, as best he could, on a dung-heap by the\\nroadside, until he was roused by the Prince of\\nMecklenburg, who had found more acceptable\\nquarters.\\nIt was not for long that this life, which was to him\\nalmost a welcome reminiscence of his sporting days,\\ncould continue. Diplomatic cares soon fell upon\\nhim.\\nNot two days had passed since the great battle,\\nwhen a telegram from Napoleon was placed in the\\nKing s hands informing him that Austria had re-\\nquested France s mediation, that Venetia had been\\nsurrendered to France, and inviting the King to\\nconclude an armistice. Immediately afterwards came\\nthe news that the surrender of Venetia to France\\nhad been published in the Moniteiir.\\nIf this meant anything, it meant that Napoleon\\nintended to stop the further progress of the Prussian\\narmy, to rescue Austria, and to dictate the terms of\\npeace it could not be doubted that he would be\\nprepared to support his mediation by arms, and in a\\nfew days they might expect to hear that the French\\ncorps were being stationed on the frontier.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0312.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conq2iest of Germany. 263\\nWhat was to be done? Bismarck neither doubted\\nnor hesitated it was impossible to refuse French\\nmediation. West Germany was almost undefended,\\nthe whole of the southern States were still uncon-\\nquered however imperfect the French military\\npreparations might be, it was impossible to run such\\na risk. At his advice the King at once sent a\\ncourteous answer accepting the French proposal.\\nHe was more disposed to this because in doing so he\\nreally bound himself to nothing. He accepted the\\nprinciple of French mediation but he was still free\\nto discuss and refuse the special terms which might\\nbe offered. He said that he was willing to accept an\\narmistice, but it was only on condition that the pre-\\nliminaries of peace were settled before hostilities,\\nceased, and to them the King could not agree except\\nafter consultation with the King of Italy. It was a\\nfriendly answer, which cost nothing, and meanwhile\\nthe army continued to advance. An Austrian re-\\nquest for an armistice was refused Vienna was now\\nthe goal Napoleon, if he wished to stop them, must\\ntake the next move, must explain the terms of peace\\nhe wished to secure, and shew by what measures he\\nwas prepared to enforce them.\\nBy his prompt action, Bismarck, who knew Napo-\\nleon well, hoped to escape the threatened danger.\\nWe shall see with what address he used the situation,\\nso that the vacillation of France became to him more\\nuseful than even her faithful friendship would have\\nbeen, for now he felt himself free from all ties of\\ngratitude. Whatever services France might do to\\nPrussia she could henceforth look to hini for no vol-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0313.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "264 Bismarck. [I866\\nuntary recompense. Napoleon had deceived him\\nhe would henceforward have no scruples in deceiving\\nNapoleon. He had entered on the war relying on\\nthe friendship and neutrality of France; at the first\\ncrisis this had failed him he never forgot and he\\nnever forgave years later, when the news of Napo-\\nleon s death was brought to him, this was the first\\nincident in their long connection which came into his\\nmind.\\nIntercourse with Paris was slow and uncertain the\\ntelegraph wires were often cut by the Bohemian\\npeasants some time must elapse before an answer\\ncame. In the meanwhile, as the army steadily ad-\\nvanced towards the Austrian capital, Bismarck had\\nto consider the terms of peace he would be willing to\\naccept. He had to think not only of what he would\\nwish, but of what it was possible to acquire. He\\nwrote to his wife at this time\\nWe are getting on well. If we are not extreme in\\nour claims and do not imagine that we have conquered\\nthe world, we shall obtain a peace that is worth having.\\nBut we are as easily intoxicated as we are discouraged,\\nand I have the thankless task of pouring water into the\\nfoaming wine and of pointing out that we are not alone\\nin Europe, but have three neighbours.\\nOf the three neighbours there was little to fear\\nfrom England. With the death of Lord Palmerston,\\nEnglish policy had entered on a new phase; the tra-\\nditions of Pitt and Canning were forgotten England\\nno longer aimed at being the arbitress of Europe;\\nthe leaders of both parties agreed that unless her", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0314.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "1866] The Co7iquest of Germany. 265\\nown interests were immediately affected, England\\nwould not interfere in Continental matters. The\\ninternal organisation of Germany did not appear to\\nconcern her; she was the first to recognise the new\\nprinciple that the relations of the German States to\\none another were to be settled by the Germans\\nthemselves, and to extend to Germany that doctrine\\nof non-intervention which she had applied to Spain\\nand Itsely.\\nNeither France nor Russia would be so accommo-\\ndating France, we have already seen, had begun to\\ninterfere, Russia would probably do so if they\\ncame to some agreement they would demand a con-\\ngress and, as a matter of fact, a few days later the\\nCzar proposed a congress, both in Paris and in Lon-\\ndon. Of all issues this was the one which Bismarck\\ndreaded most. A war with France he would have\\ndisliked, but at the worst he was not afraid of it.\\nBut he did not wish that the terms of peace he pro-\\nposed to dictate should be subjected to the criticism\\nand revision of the European Powers, nor to un-\\ndergo the fate which fell on Russia twelve years\\nlater. Had the congress, however, been supported\\nby Russia and France he must have accepted it.\\nIt is for this reason that he was so ready to meet\\nthe wishes of France, for if Napoleon once entered\\ninto separate and private negotiations, then what-\\never the result of them might be, he could not join\\nwith the other Powers in common action.\\nWith regard to the terms of peace, it was obvious\\nthat Schleswig-Holstein would now be Prussian; it\\ncould scarcely be doubted that there must be a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0315.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "266 Bismarck. [I866\\nreform in the Confederation, which would be re-\\norganised under the hegemony of Prussia, and that\\nAustria would be excluded from ail participation in\\nGerman affairs. It might, in fact, be anticipated\\nthat the very great successes of Prussia would en-\\nable her to carry out the programme of 1849,\\nto unite the whole of Germany in a close union.\\nThis, however, was not what Bismarck intended\\nfor him the unity of Germany was a matter of\\nsecondary importance; what he desired was com-\\nplete control over the north. In this he was going\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0back to the sound and true principles of Prussian\\npolicy he, as nearly all other Prussian statesmen,\\nlooked on the line of the Main as a real division.\\nHe, therefore, on the 9th of July, wrote to Goltz,\\nexplaining the ideas he had of the terms on which\\npeace might be concluded.\\nThe essential thing, he said, was that they\\nshould get control over North Germany in some\\nform or other.\\nI use the term North German Confederation without\\nany hesitation, because I consider that if the necessary\\nconsolidation of the Federation is to be made certain it\\nwill be at present impossible to include South Germany\\nin it. The present moment is very favourable for giving\\nour new creation just that delimitation which will secure\\nit a firm union.\\nThe question remained, what form the Union should\\ntake. On this he writes Your Excellency must\\nhave the same impression as myself, that public\\nopinion in- our country demands the incorporation", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0316.jp2"}, "315": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 267\\nof Hanover, Saxony, and Schleswig. He adds that\\nthis would undoubtedly be the best solution of the\\nmatter for all concerned, if it could be effected with-\\nout the cession of other Prussian territory, but he\\ndid not himself consider the difference between a\\nsatisfactory system of reform and the acquisition of\\nthese territories sufficient to justify him in risking\\nthe fate of the whole monarchy. It was the same\\nalternative which had presented itself to him about\\nSchleswig-Holstein now, as then, annexation was\\nwhat he aimed at, and he was not the man easily to\\nreconcile himself to a less favourable solution. At\\nthe same time that he wrote this letter he sent\\norders that Falkenstein should quickly occupy all\\nthe territory north of the Main.\\nIt is important to notice the date at which this\\nletter was sent. It shews us that these proposals\\nwere Bismarck s own. Attempts have often been\\nmade since to suggest that the policy of annexation\\nwas not his, but was forced on him by the King, or\\nby the military powers, or by the nation. This was\\nnot the case. He appeals indeed to public opinion,\\nbut public opinion, had it been asked, would really\\nhave demanded, not the dethronement of the Kings\\nof Hanover and Saxony, but the unity of all Ger-\\nmany and we know that Bismarck would never\\npursue what he thought a dangerous policy sim-\\nply because public opinion demanded it. It has also\\nbeen said that the dethronement of the King of Han-\\nover was the natural result of the obstinacy of him-\\nself and his advisers, and his folly in going to Vienna\\nto appeal there to the help of the Austrian Emperor.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0317.jp2"}, "316": {"fulltext": "268 Bismarck. [1866\\nThis also is not true. We find that Bismarck has\\ndetermined on this policy some days before the King\\nhad left Thuringia. This, like all he did, was the\\ndeliberate result of the consideration What would\\ntend most to the growth of Prussian power? He\\nhad to consider three alternatives that these States\\nshould be compelled to come into a union with Prus-\\nsia on the terms that the Princes should hand over\\nthe command of their forces to the Prussian King,\\nbut he knew that the King of Hanover would never\\nconsent to this, and probably the King of Saxbny\\nwould also refuse he might also require the reigning\\nKings to abdicate in place of their sons or he might\\nleave them with considerable freedom, but cripple\\ntheir power by taking away part of their territory.\\nThese solutions seemed to him undesirable because\\nthey would leave dynasties, who would naturally be\\nhostile, jealous, and suspicious, with the control of\\nlarge powers of government. Surely it would be\\nbetter, safer, and wiser to sweep them away alto-\\ngether. It may be objected that there was no ground\\nin justice for so doing. This is true, and Bismarck\\nhas never pretended that there was. He has left it\\nto the writers of the Prussian Press to justify an\\naction which was based purely on policy, by the pre-\\ntence that it was the due recompense of the crimes\\nof the rival dynasties.\\nSybel says that Bismarck determined on these\\nterms because they were those which would be most\\nacceptable to France; that he would have preferred\\nat once to secure the unity of the whole of Germany,\\nbut that from his knowledge of French thought and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0318.jp2"}, "317": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Geinnany. 269\\nFrench character he foresaw that this would be pos-\\nsible only after another war, and he did not wish to\\nrisk the whole. So far as our information goes, it is\\nagainst this hypothesis it is rather true to say that\\nhe used the danger of French interference as a means\\nof persuading the King to adopt a policy which was\\nnaturally repugnant to him. It is true that these\\nterms would be agreeable to Napoleon. It would\\nappear in France and in Europe as if it was French\\npower which had persuaded Prussia to stop at the\\nMain and to spare Austria Bismarck did not mind\\nthat, because what was pleasant to France was con-\\nvenient to him. He knew also that the proposal to\\nannex the conquered territories would be very agree-\\nable to Napoleon the dethronement of old-estab-\\nlished dynasties might be regarded as a delicate\\ncompliment to the principles he had always main-\\ntained and to the traditional policy of his house. If,\\nhowever, we wish to find Bismarck s own motives, we\\nmust remember that before the war broke out he had\\nin his mind some such division of Germany he\\nknew that it would be impossible at once to unite\\nthe whole in a firm union. If Bavaria were to be in-\\ncluded in the new Confederation they would lose in\\nharmony what they gained in extent. As he said\\nin his drastic way\\nWe cannot use these Ultramontanes, and we must\\nnot swallow more than we can digest. We will not fall\\ninto the blunder of Piedmont, which has been more weak-\\nened than strengthened by the annexation of Naples.\\nOf course he could not express this openly, and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0319.jp2"}, "318": {"fulltext": "270 Bismarck. [1866\\neven now German writers obscure the thought, for in\\nGermany, as in Italy, the desire for unity was so\\npowerful that it was difficult to pardon any statesman\\nwho did not take the most immediate path to this\\nresult. It was fortunate for Germany that Bismarck\\nwas strong enough not to do so, for the Confedera-\\ntion of the north could be founded and confirmed\\nbefore the Catholic and hostile south was included.\\nThe prize was in his hands he deliberately refused to\\npick it up.\\nSupposing, however, that, after all, France would\\nnot accept the terms he suggested during the anx-\\nious days which passed, this contingency was often\\nbefore him. It was not till the 14th that Goltz\\nwas able to send him any decisive information, for\\nthe very good reason that Napoleon had not until\\nthen made up his own mind. Bismarck s anxiety\\nwas increased by the arrival of Benedetti. He had\\nreceived instructions to follow the King, and, after\\nundergoing the discomfort of a hasty journey in the\\nrear of the Prussian army, reached headquarters on\\nthe loth at Zwittau. He was taken straight to Bis-\\nmarck s room although it was far on into the night.\\nHe found him sitting in a deserted house, writing,\\nwith a large revolver by his side for as Roon com-\\nplains, even during the campaign Bismarck would not\\ngive up his old custom of working all night and sleep-\\ning till midday or later. Bismarck received the French\\nAmbassador with his wonted cordiality and the con-\\nversation was prolonged till three or four o clock in\\nthe morning, and continued on the following days.\\nBismarck hoped that he had com.e with full powers", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0320.jp2"}, "319": {"fulltext": "18661 The Conquest of Germany. 271\\nto treat, or at least with full information on the in-\\ntentions of his Government that was not the case\\nhe had no instructions except to use his influence to\\npersuade Prussia to moderation Napoleon was far\\ntoo much divided in his own mind to be able to tell\\nhim anything further. Bismarck with his usual frank-\\nness explained what he wished, laying much stress on\\nthe annexations in North Germany Benedetti, so\\nlittle did he follow Napoleon s thought, protested\\nwarmly against this. We are not, he said, in the\\ntimes of Frederick the Great. Bismarck then tried\\nto probe him on other matters as before, he assumed\\nthat Napoleon s support and good-will were not to\\nbe had for nothing. He took it as a matter of course\\nthat if France was friendly to Prussia, she would re-\\nquire some recompense. He had already instructed\\nGoltz to enquire what non-German compensation\\nwould be asked he was much disturbed when Ben-\\nedetti met his overtures with silence he feared that\\nNapoleon had some other plan. Benedetti in his\\nreport writes\\nWithout any encouragement on my part, he attempted\\nto prove to me that the defeat of Austria permitted\\nFrance and Prussia to modify their territorial limits and\\nto solve the greater part of the difficulties which con-\\ntinued to menace the peace of Europe. I reminded him\\nthat there were treaties and that the war which he desired\\nto prevent would be the first result of a policy of this kind.\\nM. de Bismarck answered that I misunderstood him, that\\nFrance and Prussia united and resolved to rectify their\\nrespective countries, binding themselves by solemn en-\\ngagements henceforth to regulate together these ques-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0321.jp2"}, "320": {"fulltext": "272 Bzsmai^ck. [I866\\ntions, need not fear any armed resistance either from\\nEngland or from Russia.\\nWhat was Bismarck s motive in making these sug-\\ngestions and enquiries? German writers generally\\ntake the view that he was not serious in his proposal,\\nthat he was deliberately playing with Napoleon,\\nthat he wished to secure from him some compro-\\nmising document which he might then be able, as,\\nin fact, was to happen, to use against him. They\\nseem to find some pleasure in admiring him in the\\npart of Agent provocateur. Perhaps we may inter-\\npret his thought rather differently. We have often\\nseen that it was not his practice to lay down a clear\\nand definite course of action, but he met each crisis\\n/as it occurred. The immediate necessity was to\\ny secure the friendship of France believing, as he did,\\nthat in politics no one acted simply on principle or\\nout of friendship, he assumed that Napoleon, who\\nhad control of the situation, would not give his sup-\\nport unless he had the promise of some important\\nrecompense. The natural thing for him, as he\\nalways preferred plain dealing, was to ask straight\\nout what the Emperor wanted. When the answer\\ncame, then fresh questions would arise if it was of\\nsuch a kind that Bismarck would be able to accept\\nit, a formal treaty between the two States might be\\nmade if it was more than Bismarck was willing to\\ngrant, then there would be an opportunity for pro-\\nlonging negotiations with France, and haggling over\\nsmaller points, and he would be able to come to\\nsome agreement with Austria quickly. If he could\\nnot come to any agreement with France, and war", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0322.jp2"}, "321": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 273\\nwere to break out, he would always have this advan-\\ntage, that he would be able to make it appear that\\nthe cause of war arose not in the want of moderation\\nof Prussia, but in the illegitimate claims of France.\\nFinally he had this to consider, that so long as\\nFrance was discussing terms with him, there was no\\ndanger of their accepting the Russian proposal for\\na congress. Probably the one contingency which\\ndid not occur to him was that which, in fact, was\\nnearest to the truth, namely, that Napoleon did not\\ncare much for any recompense, and that he had not\\nseriously considered what he ought to demand.\\nHe was, however, prepared for the case that\\nFrance should not be accommodating. He deter-\\nmined to enter on separate negotiations with Austria.\\nAs he could not do this directly, he let it be known\\nat Vienna by way of St. Petersburg that he was\\nwilling to negotiate terms of peace. At Brunn,\\nwhere he was living, he opened up a new channel of\\nintercourse. An Austrian nobleman, who was well\\ndisposed towards Prussia, undertook an unofficial\\nmission, and announced to the Emperor the terms\\non which Prussia would make peace. They were\\nextraordinarily lenient, namely, that, with the excep-\\ntion of Venetia, the territory of Austria should\\nremain intact, that no war indemnity should be\\nexpected, that the Main should form the boundary\\nof Prussian ambition, that South Germany should\\nbe left free, and might enter into close connection\\nwith Austria if it chose the only condition was that\\nno intervention or mediation of France should be\\nallowed. If the negotiations with France were suc-\\n18", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0323.jp2"}, "322": {"fulltext": "2 74 Bismarck. tl866\\ncessful, then the French and Prussian armies united\\nwould bid defiance to the world. If those with\\nFrance failed, then he hoped to bring about an\\nunderstanding with Austria the two great Powers\\nwould divide Germany between them, but present\\na united front to all outsiders. If both negotiations\\nbroke down, he would be reduced to a third and more\\nterrible alternative against a union of France and of\\nAustria he would put himself at the head of the\\nGerman national movement he would adopt the\\nprogramme of 1849 would appeal to the Revolu-\\ntion he would stir up rebellion in Hungary; he\\nwould encourage the Italians to deliver a thrust into\\nthe very heart of the Austrian Monarchy and,\\nwhile Austria was destroyed by internal dissensions,\\nhe would meet the French invasion at the head of\\na united army of the other German States.\\nAfter all, however, Napoleon withdrew his oppo-\\nsition. It was represented to him that he had not\\nthe military force to carry out his new programme\\nItaly refused to desert Prussia or even to receive\\nVenetia from the hands of France Prince Napoleon\\nwarned his cousin against undoing the work of his\\nlifetime. The Emperor himself, broken in health\\nand racked by pain, confessed that his action of July\\n5th had been a mistake he apologised to Goltz\\nfor his proclamation he asked only that Prussia\\nshould be moderate in her demands the one thing\\nwas that the unity of Germany should be avoided, if\\nonly in appearance. This, we have seen, was Bis-\\nmarck s own view. Napoleon accepted the terms\\nwhich Goltz proposed, but asked only that the King-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0324.jp2"}, "323": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 2 75\\ndom of Saxony should be spared if this was done,\\nhe would not only adopt, he would recommend\\nthem. An agreement was quickly come to. Bene-\\ndetti went on to Vienna he and Gramont had little\\ndif^culty in persuading the Emperor to agree to\\nterms of peace by which the whole loss of the war\\nwould fall not upon him, not even upon his only\\nactive and faithful ally, the King of Saxony, but on\\nthose other States who had refused to join them-\\nselves to either party. What a triumph was it of\\nBismarck s skill that the addition of 4,000,000 sub-\\njects to the Prussian Crown and complete dominion\\nover Northern Germany should appear, not as the\\ndemand which, as a ruthless conqueror, he enforced\\non his helpless enemies, but as the solution of all\\ndifificulties which was recommended to him in reward\\nfor his moderation by the ruler of France\\nOn the 23d of July an armistice was agreed on,\\nand a conference was held at Nikolsburg to arrange\\nthe preliminaries of peace. There was no delay. In\\nolden days Bismarck had shewn how he was able to\\nprolong negotiations year after year when it was\\nconvenient to him that they should come to no con-\\nclusion now he hurried through in three days the\\ndiscussion by which the whole future of Germany\\nand Europe were to be determined. When all were\\nagreed on the main points, difificulties on details\\nwere easily overcome. It remained only to procure\\nthe assent of the King. Here again, as so often be-\\nfore, Bismarck met with most serious resistance.\\nHe drew up a careful memorandum which he pre-\\nsented to the monarch, pressing on him in the very", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0325.jp2"}, "324": {"fulltext": "276 Bismarck. [1866\\nstrongest terms the acceptance of these conditions.\\nUp to the last moment, however, there seems to\\nhave been a great rekictance Sybel represents the\\ndifficulties as rising from the immoderate demands\\nof the military party at Court they were not pre-\\npared, after so great a victory, to leave Austria with\\nundiminished territory they wished at least to\\nhave part of Austrian Silesia. This account seems\\nmisleading. It was not that the King wanted more\\nthan Bismarck had desired he wanted his acquisi-\\ntion of territory to come in a different way. He\\nwas not reconciled to the dethronement of the King\\nof Hanover he wished to take part of Hanover,\\npart of Saxony, part of Bavaria, and something from\\nDarmstadt to his simple and honest mind it seemed\\nunjust that those who had been his bitterest enemies\\nshould be treated with the greatest consideration.\\nIt was the old difficulty which Bismarck had met\\nwith in dealing with Schleswig-Holstein the King\\nhad much regard for the rights of other Princes.\\nThis time, however, Bismarck, we are surprised to\\nlearn, had the influential support of the Crown\\nPrince the scruples which he had felt as regards\\nSchleswig-Holstein did not apply to Hanover. He\\nwas sent in to his father the interview lasted two\\nhours what passed we do not know he came out\\nexhausted and wearied with the long struggle, but\\nthe King had given in, and the policy of Bismarck\\ntriumphed. The preliminaries of Nikolsburg were\\nsigned, and two days afterwards were ratified, for\\nBismarck pressed on the arrangements with feverish\\nimpetuosity.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0326.jp2"}, "325": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Gei^many. 277\\nHe had good reason to do so he had just received\\nintelligence that the Emperor of Russia was making\\nan official demand for a congress and fresh news had\\ncome from France. On the 25th Benedetti had\\nagain come to him and had sounded him with regard\\nto the recompense which France might receive. On\\nthe 26th, just as Bismarck was going to the final sit-\\nting of the Conference, the French Ambassador again\\ncalled on him, this time to lay before him a despatch\\nin which Drouyn de Lhuys stated that he had not\\nwished to impede the negotiations with Austria, but\\nwould now observe that the French sanction to\\nthe Prussian annexations presupposed a fair indem-\\nnification to France, and that the Emperor would\\nconfer with Prussia concerning this as soon as his\\nrole of mediator was at an end. What madness this\\nwas As soon as the role of mediator was at an\\nend, as soon as peace was arranged with Austria, the\\none means which France had for compelling the ac-\\nquiescence of Prussia was lost.\\nWhat had happened was this Napoleon had, in\\nconversation with Goltz, refused to consider the ques-\\ntion of compensation it was not worth while, he said\\nthe gain of a few square miles of territory would not\\nbe of any use. He therefore, when he still might\\nhave procured them, made no conditions. Drouyn\\nde Lhuys, however, who had disapproved of the\\nwhole of the Emperor s policy, still remained in\\noffice he still wished, as he well might wish, to\\nstrengthen France in view of the great increase of\\nPrussian power. He, therefore, on the 21st again\\napproached Napoleon and laid before him a des-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0327.jp2"}, "326": {"fulltext": "278 Bismarck. [1866\\npatch in which he brought up the question of com-\\npensation. He was encouraged to this course by the\\nreports which Benedetti had sent of his conversa-\\ntions with Bismarck it was clear that Bismarck ex-\\npected some demand he had almost asked that it\\nshould be made. We wish to avoid any injury to\\nthe balance of power, Goltz had said we will\\neither moderate our demands or discuss those of\\nFrance. It appeared absurd not to accept this\\noffer. Napoleon was still reluctant to do so, but he\\nwas in a paroxysm of pain. Leave me in peace,\\nwas his only answer to his Minister s request, and\\nthe Minister took it as an assent.\\nBismarck, when Benedetti informed him of the de-\\nmand that was to be made, at once answered that he\\nwas quite ready to consider the proposal. Bene-\\ndetti then suggested that it would probably concern\\ncertain strips of territory on the left bank of the\\nRhine on this, Bismarck stopped him Do not\\nmake any official announcements of that kind to me\\nto-day. He went away, the Conference was con-\\ncluded, the preliminaries were signed and ratified.\\nFrance had been too late, and when the demand\\nwas renewed Bismarck was able to adopt a very\\ndifferent tone.\\nLet us complete the history of these celebrated\\nnegotiations.\\nThe discussion which had been broken off so\\nsuddenly at Nikolsburg was continued at Berlin\\nduring the interval the matter had been further dis-\\ncussed in Paris, and it had been determined firmly\\nto demand compensation. Benedetti had warned", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0328.jp2"}, "327": {"fulltext": "18661 The Conquest of Germany. 279\\nthe Government that Bismarck would not surrender\\nany German territory it was no good even asking\\nfor this, unless the demand was supported by urgent\\nand threatening language. The result of the con-\\nsiderations was that he was instructed categorically\\nto require the surrender to France of the Palatinate\\nand Mayence. Benedetti undertook the task with\\nsome reluctance in order to avoid being present at\\nthe explosion of anger which he might expect, he\\naddressed the demand to Bismarck on August 5th,\\nby letter. Two days he waited for an answer, but\\nreceived none on the evening of the 7th, he himself\\ncalled on the Count, and a long discussion took place.\\nBismarck adopted a tone of indignation The whole\\naffair makes us doubt Napoleon and threatens to\\ndestroy our confidence. The pith of it was con-\\ntained in the last words Do you ask this from us\\nunder threat of war? said Bismarck. Yes, said\\nBenedetti. Then it will be war. Benedetti asked\\nto have an interview with the King it was granted,\\nand he received the same answer. This was the re-\\nsult he had anticipated, and the next evening he\\nreturned to Paris to consider with the Government\\nwhat was to be done. Bismarck meanwhile had\\ntaken care that some information as to these secret\\nnegotiations should become known with character-\\nistic cleverness he caused it to be published in a\\nFrench paper, Le Silrle, that France had asked for\\nthe Rhine country and been refused. Of course,\\nthe German Press took up the matter with patriotic\\nfervour they supported the King and Minister.\\nNapoleon found himself confronted by the danger", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0329.jp2"}, "328": {"fulltext": "28o Bismarck.\\n[1866\\nof a union of all Germany in opposition to French\\nusurpation, and his own diplomatic defeat had be-\\ncome known in a most inconvenient form he at\\nonce travelled to Paris, consulted Benedetti, re-\\nturned to his former policy, and asked that the de-\\nmand of August 5th might be forgotten it was\\nwithdrawn, and things were to be as if it had never\\nbeen made.\\nWere they, however, still to give up all hope of\\nsome increase of French territory The demand\\nfor German soil had been refused it was not at all\\nclear that Bismarck would not support the acquisi-\\ntion of at least part of Belgium. In conversation\\nwith Benedetti, on August 7th, he had said Per-\\nhaps we will find other means of satisfying you.\\nGoltz was still very sympathetic he regarded the\\nFrench desire as quite legitimate in principle. It\\nwas determined, therefore, now to act on these\\nhints and suggestions which had been repeated so\\noften during the last twelve months; Benedetti was\\ninstructed to return with a draft treaty the French\\ndemands were put in three forms first of all he was\\nto ask for the Saar Valley, Landau, Luxemburg,\\nand Belgium if this was too much, he was to be con-\\ntent with Belgium and Luxemburg, and if it seemed\\ndesirable he should offer that Antwerp be made a\\nfree city by this perhaps the extreme hostility of\\nEngland would be averted. With this demand, on\\nAugust 20th, he again appeared before Bismarck.\\nOf course, the Minister, as soon as Saarbriick and\\nLandau were mentioned, drew himself up to his full\\nheight, adopted an angry air, and reminded Bene-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0330.jp2"}, "329": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 281\\ndetti of his repeated declaration that they were not\\ngoing to give up a single German village. Benedetti,\\ntherefore, in accordance with his instructions, with-\\ndrew this clause. The rest of the treaty he and\\nBismarck discussed together carefully they took it\\nline by line and clause by clause, Bismarck dealing\\nwith the matter in a serious and practical manner.\\nAfter this had been finished a revised draft was\\nwritten out by Benedetti, Bismarck dictating to him\\nthe alterations which had been made. This revised\\ndraft consisted of five articles: (i) The Emperor\\nrecognised the recent acquisitions of Prussia (2) the\\nKing of Prussia should bind himself to assist France\\nin acquiring Luxemburg from the King of Holland\\nby purchase or exchange (3) the Emperor bound\\nhimself not to oppose a union of the North German\\nFederation with the South German States and the\\nestablishment of a common Parliament (4) if the\\nEmperor at any time wished to acquire Belgium,\\nthe King of Prussia was to support him and give\\nhim military assistance against the interference of\\nany other Power (5) a general treaty of alliance.\\nIt will be seen that this treaty consists of two\\nparts. The first refers to what has already taken\\nplace, the Emperor of the French in return for past\\nassistance is to have Luxemburg this part would\\nnaturally come into operation immediately. The\\nnext two clauses referred to the future the union of\\nall Germany would in the natural course of events\\nnot be long delayed this would seriously alter the\\nbalance of power and weaken France. Napoleon\\nwould naturally in the future use all his efforts to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0331.jp2"}, "330": {"fulltext": "282 Bismarck.\\n[1866\\nprevent it, as he had done during this year, and by\\nan alliance with Austria he would probably be able\\nto do so. He would, however, withdraw his opposi-\\ntion if he was allowed to gain a similar increase of\\nterritory for France. After all, the acquisition of at\\nleast part of Belgium by France might be justified by\\nthe same arguments by which the dethronement of\\nthe King of Hanover was defended. Many of the\\nBelgians were French there was no natural division\\nbetween Belgium and France probably the people\\nwould offer no opposition.\\nBismarck had to remember that he could not com-\\nplete the union of Germany without considering\\nNapoleon there Avere only two ways of doing the\\nwork, (i) by war with France, (2) by an alliance.\\nNeed we be surprised that he at least considered\\nwhether the latter would not be the safer, the\\ncheaper, and the more humane Was it not bet-\\nter to complete the work by the sacrifice of Belgian\\nindependence rather than by the loss of 300,000\\nlives?\\nBenedetti sent the revised draft to Paris it was\\nsubmitted to the Emperor, accepted in principle, and\\nreturned with some small alterations and sugges-\\ntions. Benedetti sent in the revision to Bismarck\\nand said he would be ready at any time to meet the\\nMinister and finish the negotiations. He himself left\\nBerlin for Carlsbad and there awaited the summons.\\nIt never came. Week after week went by, Bismarck\\nretired to his Pomeranian estate he did not return\\nto Berlin till December and he never renewed the\\nnegotiations, The revised draft in Benedetti s hand-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0332.jp2"}, "331": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 283\\nwriting was in his hands four years later, when war\\nhad been declared against France, he published it in\\norder to destroy whatever sympathy for Napoleon\\nthere might be in England.\\nBismarck did not continue the negotiations, for\\nhe had found a better way. Till August 23d his\\nrelations to Austria were still doubtful he always\\nhad to fear that there was some secret understand-\\ning between France and Austria, that a coalition of\\nthe two States had been completed, and that Prussia\\nmight suddenly find herself attacked on both sides.\\nHe had, therefore, not wished to offend France.\\nMoreover his relations to Russia were not quite sat-\\nisfactory. The Czar took a very serious view of the\\nannexations in North Germany I do not like it,\\nhe said I do not like this dethronement of dy-\\nnasties. It was necessary to send General Man-\\nteuffel on a special mission to St. Petersburg the\\nCzar did not alter his opinion, but Bismarck found it\\npossible at least to quiet him. We do not know all\\nthat passed, but he seems to have used a threat and\\na promise. If the Czar attempted to interfere in\\nGermany, Bismarck hinted, as he had already done,\\nthat he might have to put himself at the head of the\\nRevolution, and proclaim the Constitution of 1849;\\nthen what would happen to the monarchical princi-\\nples? He even suggested that a Revolution which\\nbegan in Germany might spread to Poland. The Czar\\nexplained that he was discontented with many\\nclauses in the Treaty of Paris. There was an under-\\nstanding, if there was no formal compact, that Prussia\\nwould lend her support, when the time came for the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0333.jp2"}, "332": {"fulltext": "284 Bismarck. [I866\\nCzar to declare that he was no longer willing to ob-\\nserve this treaty.\\nBy the end of August Bismarck had therefore re-\\nmoved the chief dangers which threatened him.\\nRussia was quieted, France was expectant, Austria\\nwas pacified. He had, however, done more than this\\nhe had already laid the foundation for the union of\\nthe whole of Germany which Napoleon thought he\\nhad prevented.\\nThe four southern States had joined in the war\\nagainst Prussia. In a brilliant and interesting cam-\\npaign a small Prussian army had defeated the Fed-\\neral forces and occupied the whole of South Germany.\\nThe conquest of Germany by Prussia was complete.\\nThese States had applied at Nikolsburg to be al-\\nlowed to join in the negotiations. The request was\\nrefused, and Bismarck at this time treated them\\nwith a deliberate and obtrusive brutality. Baron\\nvon der Pfortden, the Bavarian Minister, had himself\\ntravelled to Nikolsburg to ask for peace. He was\\ngreeted by Bismarck with the words What are\\nyou doing here? You have no safe-conduct. I\\nshould be justified in treating you as a prisoner of\\nwar. He had to return without achieving anything.\\nFrankfort had been occupied by the Prussian army\\nthe citizens were required to pay a war indemnity\\nof a million pounds Manteuffel, who was in com-\\nmand, threatened to plunder the town, and the full\\nforce of Prussian displeasure was felt by the city\\nwhere Bismarck had passed so many years. It was\\narranged with Austria and France that the southern\\nStates should participate in the suspension of hos-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0334.jp2"}, "333": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conqttest of Germmty. 285\\ntilities that they should preserve their independence\\nand should be allowed to enter into any kind of\\nFederal alliance with one another. The result of\\nthis would have been that South Germany would be\\na weak, disunited confederation, which would be\\nunder the control partly of France and partly of\\nAustria. This would have meant the perpetuation\\nin its worst form of French influence over South\\nGermany. When this clause was agreed on, the\\nterms of peace between these States and Prussia had\\nnot yet been arranged. The King of Prussia wished\\nthat they should surrender to him some parts of\\ntheir territory. Bismarck, however, opposed this.\\nHe was guided by the same principles which had\\ninfluenced him all along. Some States should be\\nentirely absorbed in Prussia, the others treated so\\nleniently that the events of this year should leave no\\nfeeling of hostility. If Bavaria had to surrender\\nBayreuth and Anspach, he knew that the Bavarians\\nwould naturally take part in the first coalition against\\nPrussia. With much trouble he persuaded the King\\nto adopt this point of view. The wisdom of it was\\nsoon shewn. At the beginning of August he still\\nmaintained a very imperious attitude, and talked\\nto the Bavarians of large annexations. Pfortden in\\ndespair had cried, Do not drive us too far we\\nshall have to go for help to France. Then was Bis-\\nmarck s turn. He told the Bavarian Minister of\\nNapoleon s suggestion, shewed him that it was Prus-\\nsia alone who had prevented Napoleon from annex-\\ning a large part of Bavaria, and then appealed to him\\nthrough his German patriotism Would not Bavaria", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0335.jp2"}, "334": {"fulltext": "286 Bismarck.\\n[1866\\njoin Prussia in an alliance Pfortden was much\\nmoved, the Count and the Baron embraced one an-\\nother, and by the end of August Bismarck had ar-\\nranged with all the four southern States a secret\\noffensive and defensive alliance. By this they bound\\nthemselves to support Prussia if she was attacked.\\nPrussia guaranteed to them their territory in case of\\nwar they would put their army under the command\\nof the King of Prussia. He was now sure, therefore,\\nof an alliance of all Germany against France. He\\nno longer required French assistance. The unity of\\nGermany, when it was made, would be achieved by\\nthe unaided forces of the united German States.\\nThe draft treaty with Napoleon might now be put\\naside.\\nThese negotiations mark indeed a most important\\nchange in Bismarck s own attitude. Hitherto he had\\nthought and acted as a Prussian he had deliber-\\nately refused on all occasions to support or adopt the\\nGerman programme. He had done this because he\\ndid not wish Germany to be made strong until the\\nascendancy of Prussia was secured. The battle of\\nKoniggratz had done that North Germany was\\nnow Prussian the time had come when he could be-\\ngin to think and act as a German, for the power of\\nPrussia was founded on a rock of bronze.\\nThis change was not the only one which dates\\nfrom the great victory. The constitutional conflict\\nhad still to be settled. The Parliament had been\\ndissolved just before the war the new elections had\\ntaken place on the 3d of July, after the news of the\\nfirst victory was known. The result was shewn in a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0336.jp2"}, "335": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 287\\ngreat gain of seats to the Government and to the\\nModerate Liberal party. The great question, how-\\never, was, How would Bismarck use his victory over y\\nthe House? for a victory it was. It was the cannon\\nof Koniggratz which decided the Parliamentary con-\\nflict. The House had refused the money to re-\\norganise the army, and it was this reorganised army\\nwhich had achieved so unexampled a triumph.\\nWould the Government now press their victory and\\nuse the enthusiasm of the moment permanently to\\ncripple the Constitution This is what the Con-\\nservative party, what Roon and the army wished to\\ndo. It was not Bismarck s intention. He required\\nthe support of the patriotic Liberals for the work he\\nhad to do he proposed, therefore, that the Govern-\\nment should come before the House and ask for an\\nindemnity. They did not confess that they had\\nacted wrongly, they did not express regret, but they\\nrecognised that in spending the money without a\\nvote of the House there had been an offence against\\nthe Constitution this could now only be made good\\nif a Bill was brought in approving of what had hap-\\npened. He carried his opinion, not without diffi-\\nculty the Bill of indemnity was introduced and\\npassed. He immediately had his reward. The\\nLiberal party, which had hitherto opposed him,\\nbroke into two portions. The extreme Radicals and\\nProgressives still continued their opposition the\\nmajority of the party formed themselves into a new\\norganisation, to which they gave the name of Na-\\ntional Liberals. They pledged themselves to sup-\\nport the National and German policy of the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0337.jp2"}, "336": {"fulltext": "288 Bismarck. [I866\\nGovernment, while they undertook, so far as they\\nwere able, to maintain and strengthen the constitu-\\ntional rights, of Parliament. By this Bismarck had\\na Parliamentary majority, and he more and more\\ndepended upon them rather than his old friends, the\\nConservatives. He required their support because\\nhenceforward he would have to deal not with one\\nParliament, but two. The North German Confed-\\neration was to have its Parliament elected by uni-\\nversal suffrage. Bismarck foresaw that the principles\\nhe had upheld in the past could not be applied in\\nthe same form to the whole of the Confederation.\\nThe Prussian Conservative party was purely Prus-\\nsian, it was Particularist had he continued to depend\\nupon it, then all the members sent to the new\\nReichstag, not only from Saxony, but also from the\\nannexed States, would have been thrown into oppo-\\nsition the Liberal party had always been not Prus-\\nsian but German now that he had to govern so\\nlarge a portion of Germany, that which had in the\\npast been the great cause of difference would be the\\nstrongest bond of union. The National Liberal\\nparty was alone able to join him in the work of cre-\\nating enthusiasm for the new institutions and new\\nloyalty. How often had he in the old days com-\\nplained of the Liberals that they thought not as\\nPrussians, that they were ashamed of Prussia, that\\nthey were not really loyal to Prussia. Now he knew\\nthat just for this reason they would be most loyal to\\nthe North German Confederation.\\nBismarck s moderation in the hour of victory\\nmust not obscure the importance of his triumph.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0338.jp2"}, "337": {"fulltext": "BISMARCK AND HIS DOGS.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0339.jp2"}, "338": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0340.jp2"}, "339": {"fulltext": "1866] The Conquest of Germany. 289\\nThe question had been tried which should rule\\nthe Crown or the Parliament the Crown had won\\nnot only a physical but a moral victory. Bismarck\\nhad maintained that the House of Representatives\\ncould not govern Prussia the foreign affairs of the\\nState, he had always said, must be carried on by a\\nMinister who was responsible, not to the House, but\\nto the King. No one could doubt that had the\\nHouse been able to control him he would not have\\nwon these great successes. From that time the con-\\nfidence of the German people in Parliamentary gov-\\nernment was broken. Moreover, it was the first\\ntime in the history of Europe in which one of these\\nstruggles had conclusively ended in the defeat of\\nParliament. The result of it was to be shewn in the\\nhistory of every country in Europe during the next\\nthirty years. It is the most serious bloAv which the\\nprinciple of representative government has yet re-\\nceived.\\nBy the end of August most of the labour was\\ncompleted there remained only the arrangement of\\npeace with Saxony this he left to his subordinates\\nand retired to Pomerania for the long period of rest\\nwhich he so much required.\\nDuring his absence a motion was brought before\\nParliament for conferring a donation on the victorious\\ngenerals. At the instance of one of his most con-\\nsistent opponents Bismarck s name was included in\\nthe list on account of his great services to his coun-\\ntry a protest was raised by Virchow on the ground\\nthat no Minister while in ofifice should receive a pres-\\nent, and that of all men Bismarck least deserved one,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0341.jp2"}, "340": {"fulltext": "290\\nBismarck.\\n[1866\\nbut scarcely fifty members could be found to oppose\\nthe vote. The donation of 40,000 thalers he used\\nin purchasing the estate of Varzin, in Pomerania,\\nwhich was to be his home for the next twenty\\nyears.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0342.jp2"}, "341": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XII.\\nTHE FORMATION OF THE NORTH GERMAN\\nCONFEDERATION.\\n1 866-1 867.\\nWE have hitherto seen Bismarck in the charac-\\nter of party leader, Parliamentary debater,\\na keen and accomplished diplomatist now\\nhe comes before us in a new role, that of creative\\nstatesman he adopts it with the same ease and\\ncomplete mastery with which he had borne himself\\nin the earlier stages of his career. The Constitution\\nof the North German Confederation was his work,\\nand it shews the same intellectual resource, the ori-\\nginality, and practical sense which mark all he did.\\nBy a treaty of August 18, 1866, all the North\\nGerman States which had survived entered into a\\ntreaty with one another and with Prussia; they mu-\\ntually guaranteed each other s possessions, engaged\\nto place their forces under the command of the\\nKing of Prussia, and promised to enter into a new\\nfederation for this purpose they were to send\\nenvoys to Berlin who should agree on a Constitu-\\ntion, and they were to allow elections to take place\\n291", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0343.jp2"}, "342": {"fulltext": "2g2 Bismarck. [1866-\\nby universal suffrage for a North German Parliament\\nbefore which was to be laid the draft Constitution\\nagreed upon by the envoys of the States. These\\ntreaties did not actually create the new federation\\nthey only bound the separate States to enter into\\nnegotiations, and, as they expired on August 30, 1867,\\nit was necessary that the new Constitution should be\\ncompleted and ratified by that date. The time was\\nshort, for in it had to be compressed both the nego-\\ntiations between the States and the debates in the\\nassembly but all past experience had shewn that\\nthe shorter the time allowed for making a Constitu-\\ntion the more probable was it that the work would\\nbe completed. Bismarck did not intend to allow the\\nprecious months, when enthusiasm was still high and\\nnew party factions had not seized hold of men s\\nminds, to be lost.\\nHe had spent the autumn in Pomerania and did\\nnot return to Berlin till the 21st of December; not\\na week remained before the representatives of the\\nNorth German States would assemble in the capital\\nof Prussia. To the astonishment and almost dis-\\nmay of his friends, he had taken no steps for prepar-\\ning a draft. As soon as he arrived two drafts were\\nlaid before him he put them aside and the next\\nday dictated the outlines of the new Constitution.\\nThis document has not been published, but it was\\nthe basis of the discussion with the envoys Bis-\\nmarck allowed no prolonged debates they were\\nkept for some weeks in Berlin, but only three formal\\nmeetings took place. They made suggestions and\\ncriticisms, some of which were accepted, but they", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0344.jp2"}, "343": {"fulltext": "1867] The North Germa^t Confederation, ic^\\nwere of course obliged to assent to everything on\\nwhich Bismarck insisted. The scheme as finally\\nagreed upon by the conference was then laid before\\nthe assembly which met in Berlin on February 24th.\\nA full analysis of this Constitution, for which we\\nhave no space here, would be very instructive it\\nmust not be compared with those elaborate constitu-\\ntions drawn up by political theorists of which so\\nmany have been introduced during this century.\\nBismarck s work was like that of Augustus he found\\nmost of the institutions of government to his hand,\\nbut they were badly co-ordinated what he had to\\ndo was to bring them into better relations with each\\nother, and to add to them where necessary. Many\\nmen would have swept away everything which ex-\\nisted, made a clear field, and begun to build up a new\\nState from the foundations. Bismarck was much too\\nwise to attempt this, for he knew that the foundations\\nof political life cannot be securely laid by one man\\nor in one generation. He built on the foundations\\nwhich others had laid, and for this reason it is prob-\\nable that his work will be as permanent as that of\\nthe founder of the Roman Empire.\\nWe find in the new State old and new mixed to-\\ngether in an inseparable union, and we find a com-\\nplete indifference to theory or symmetry each point\\nis decided purely by reference to the political situation\\nat the moment. Take, for instance, the question of\\ndiplomatic representation Bismarck wished to give\\nthe real power to the King of Prussia, but at the\\nsame time to preserve the external dignity and re-\\nspect due to the Allied Princes. He arranged that", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0345.jp2"}, "344": {"fulltext": "/294 Bismarck. [1866-\\nthe King of Prussia as President of the Confedera-\\ntion appointed envoys and ambassadors to foreign\\nStates from this time there ceased to be a Prussian\\ndiplomatic service, and, in this matter, Prussia is en-\\ntirely absorbed in Germany. It would have been\\nonly natural that the smaller Allied States should\\nalso surrender their right to enter into direct diplo-\\nmatic relations with foreign Powers. This Bismarck\\ndid not require. Saxony, for instance, continued to\\nhave its own envoys England and France, as in the\\nold days, kept a Minister in Dresden. Bismarck was\\nmuch criticised for this, but he knew that nothing\\nwould so much reconcile the King of Saxony to his\\nnew position, and it was indeed no small thing that\\nthe Princes thus preserved in a formal way a right_\\nwhich shewed to all the world that they were not\\nsubjects but sovereign allies. When it was repre-\\nsented to Bismarck that this right might be the\\nsource of intrigues with foreign States, he answered\\ncharacteristically that if Saxony wished to intrigue-\\nnothing could prevent her doing so it was not\\nnecessary to have a formal embassy for this purpose.\\nHis confidence was absolutely justified. A few\\nmonths later Napoleon sent to the King of Saxony a\\nspecial invitation to a European congress the King\\nat once sent on the invitation to Berlin and let it be\\nknown that he did not wish to be represented apart\\nfrom the North German Confederation. The same\\nleniency was shewn in 1870. Nothing is a better\\nproof of Bismarck s immense superiority both in\\npractical wisdom and in judgment of character. The\\nLiberal Press in Germany had never ceased to revile", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0346.jp2"}, "345": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederation. 295\\nthe German dynasties Bismarck knew that their\\napparent disloyalty to Germany arose not from their\\nwishes but was a necessary result of the faults of the\\nold Constitution. He made their interests coincide\\nwith the interests of Germany, and from this time\\nthey have been the most loyal supporters, first of the\\nConfederation, and afterwards of the Empire. This\\nhe was himself the first to acknowledge both before\\nand after the foundation of the Empire he has on\\nmany occasions expressed his sense of the great\\nservices rendered to Germany by the dynasties.\\nThey, he said once, were the true guardians of\\nGerman unity, not the Reichstag and its parties.\\nThe most important provisions of the Constitution\\nwere those by which the military supremacy of\\nPrussia was secured in this chapter every detail is\\narranged and provided for; the armies of all the\\nvarious States were henceforth to form one army,\\nunder the command of the King of Prussia, with\\ncommon organisation and similar uniform in every\\nState in every State the Prussian military system\\nwas to be introduced, and all the details of Prussian\\nmilitary law.\\nNow let us compare with this the navy the army\\nrepresented the old Germany, the navy the new\\nthe army was arranged and organised as Prussian,\\nSaxon, Mecklenburg the navy, on the other hand,\\nwas German and organised by the new Federal\\nofificials. There was a Federal Minister of Marine,\\nbut no Federal Minister of War the army con-\\ntinued the living sign of Prussian supremacy among\\na group of sovereign States, the navy was the first", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0347.jp2"}, "346": {"fulltext": "296 Bismarck. tl866-\\nfruit of the united German institutions which were\\nto be built up by the united efforts of the whole\\npeople\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a curious resemblance to the manner in\\nwhich Augustus also added an Imperial navy to the\\nolder Republican army.\\nThe very form in which the Constitution was pre-\\nsented is characteristic in the Parliamentary debates\\nmen complained that there was no preamble, no\\nintroduction, no explanation. Bismarck answered\\nthat this was omitted for two reasons first, there\\nhad not been time to draw it up, and secondly, it\\nwould be far more difficult to agree on the principles\\nwhich the Constitution was to represent than on the\\ndetails themselves. There is no attempt at laying\\ndown general principles, no definitions, and no\\nenumeration of fundamental rights all these rocks,\\non which so often in Germany, as in France, precious\\nmonths had been wasted, were entirely omitted.\\nAnd now let us turn to that which after the\\norganisation of the army was of most importance,\\nthe arrangement of the administration and legisla-\\ntion. Here it is that we see the greatest originality.\\nGerman writers have often explained that it is im-\\npossible to classify the new State in any known\\ncategory, and in following their attempts to find the\\ntechnical definition for the authority on which it\\nrests, one is led almost to doubt whether it really\\nexists at all.\\nThere are two agents of government, the Federal\\nCouncil, or Biindesrath, and the Parliament, or Reich-\\nstag. Here again we see the blending of the old\\nand new, for while the Parliament was now created", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0348.jp2"}, "347": {"fulltext": "1867]\\nThe North German Confederation. 297\\nfor the first time, the Council was really nothing but\\nthe old Federal Diet. Even the old system of voting\\nwas retained not that this was better than any other\\nsystem, but, as Bismarck explained, it was easier to\\npreserve the old than to agree on a new. Any sys-\\ntem must have been purely arbitrary, for had each\\nState received a number of votes proportionate to its\\npopulation even the appearance of a federation\\nwould have been lost, and Bismarck was very\\nanxious not to establish an absolute unity under\\nPrussia.\\nIt will be asked, Why was Bismarck now so careful\\nin his treatment of the smaller States The answer\\nwill be found in words which he had written many\\nyears ago\\nI do not wish to see Germany substituted for Prussia\\non our banner until we have brought about a closer and\\nmore practical union with our fellow-countrymen.\\nNow the time had come, and now he was to be the\\nfirst and most patriotic of Germans as in old days he\\nhad been the strictest of Prussians. Do not let us\\nin welcoming the change condemn his earlier policy.\\nIt was only his loyalty to Prussia which had made\\nGermany possible for it is indeed true that he could\\nnever have ruled Germany had he not first conquered\\nit. The real and indisputable supremacy of Prussia\\nwas still preserved and Prussia was now so strong\\nthat she could afford to be generous. It was wise\\nto be generous, for the work was only half com-\\npleted the southern States were still outside the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0349.jp2"}, "348": {"fulltext": "298 Bismarck. [1866-\\nunion he wished to bring them into the fold, but\\nto do so not by force of arms but of their own free\\nwill and they certainly would be more easily at-\\ntracted if they saw that the North German States\\nwere treated with good faith and kindness.\\nSide by side with the Council we have the Reichs-\\ntag this was, in accordance with the proposal made\\nin the spring of 1866, to be elected by universal\\nsuffrage. And now we see that this proposal, which\\na few months ago had appeared merely as a despair-\\ning bid for popularity by a statesman who had\\nsacrificed every other m.eans of securing his policy,\\nhad become a device convincing in its simplicity\\nat once all possibility of discussion or opposition was\\nprevented not indeed that there were not many\\nwarning voices raised, but as Bismarck, in defend-\\ning this measure, asked, what was the alterna-\\ntive? Any other system would have been purely\\narbitrary, and any arbitrary system would at once\\nhave opened the gate to a prolonged discussion\\nand political struggle on questions of the franchise.\\nIn a modern European State, when all men can read\\nand write, and all men must serve in the army, there\\nis no means of limiting the franchise in a way which\\nwill command universal consent. In Germany there\\nwas not any old historical practice to which men\\ncould appeal or which could naturally be applied to\\nthe new Parliament universal suffrage at least gave\\nsomething clear, comprehensible, final. Men more\\neasily believed in the permanence of the new State\\nwhen every German received for the first time the\\nfull privilege of citizenship. We must notice, hoW", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0350.jp2"}, "349": {"fulltext": "1867] The North Germaji Confederation. 299\\never, that Bismarck had always intended that voting\\nshould be open the Parliament in revising the Con-\\nstitution introduced the ballot. He gave his consent\\nwith much reluctance voting seemed to him to be\\na public duty, and to perform it in secret was to un-\\ndermine the roots of political life. He was a man\\nwho was constitutionally unable to understand fear.\\nWe have then the Council and the Parliament, and\\nwe must now enquire as to their duties. In nearly\\nevery modern State the popular representative as-\\nsembly holds the real power before it, everything\\nelse is humbled the chief occupation of lawgivers\\nis to find some ingenious device by which it may at\\nleast be controlled and moderated in the exercise of\\nits power. It was not likely that Bismarck would\\nallow Germany to be governed by a democratic as-//\\nsem.bly he was not satisfied with creating an arti-\\nficial Upper House which might, perhaps, be able\\nfor one year or two to check the extravagances of\\na popular House, or with allowing to the King a veto\\nwhich could only be exercised with fear and tremb-\\nling. Generally the Lower House is the predomi-\\nnant partner it governs the Upper House can only\\namend, criticise, moderate. Bismarck completely\\nreversed the situation the true government, the\\nfull authority in the State was given to the Council\\nthe Parliament had to content itself with a limited\\nopportunity for criticism, with the power to amend\\nor veto Bills, and to refuse its assent to new taxes.\\nIn England the government rests in the House of\\nCommons in Germany it is in the Federal Council,\\nand for the same reason, that the Council has both", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0351.jp2"}, "350": {"fulltext": "300 Bismarck. [1866-\\nexecutive and legislative power. Constitutions have\\ngenerally been made by men whose chief object was\\nto weaken the power of the Government, who be-\\nlieved that those rulers do least harm who have least\\npower, with whom suspicion is the first of political\\nvirtues, and who would condemn to permanent\\ninefficiency the institutions they have invented. It\\nwas not likely Bismarck would do this. The ordi-\\nnary device is to separate the legislative and execu-\\ntive power; to set up two rival and equal authorities\\nwhich may check and neutralise each other. Bis-\\nmarck, deserting all the principles of the books,\\nunited all the powers of government in the Council.\\nThe whole administration was subjected to it all\\nlaws were introduced in it. The debates were secret\\nit was an assembly of the ablest statesmen in Ger-\\nmany the decisions at which it arrived were laid in\\ntheir complete form before the Reichstag. It was a\\nsubstitute for a Second Chamber, but it was also a\\nCouncil of State; it united the duties of the Privy\\nCouncil and the House of Lords it reminds us in\\nits composition of the American Senate, but it would\\nbe a Senate in which the President of the Republic\\npresided.\\nBismarck never ceased to maintain the importance\\nof the Federal Council he always looked on it as\\nthe key to the whole new Constitution. Shortly\\nafter the war with France, when the Liberals made\\nan attempt to overthrow its authority, he warned\\nthem not to do so.\\nI believe, he said, that the Federal Council has a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0352.jp2"}, "351": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederation. 301\\ngreat future. Great as Prussia is, we have been able to\\nlearn much from the small, even from the smallest\\nmember of it they on their side have learnt much\\nfrom us. From my own experience I can say that I\\nhave made considerable advance in my political educa-\\ntion by taking part in the sittings of the Council and by\\nthe life which comes from the friction of five and twenty\\nGerman centres with one another. I beg you do not\\ninterfere with the Council. I consider it a kind of\\nPalladium for our future, a great guarantee for the\\nfuture of Germany in its present form.\\nNow, from the peculiar character of the Council\\narose a very noticeable omission; just as there u^as\\nno Upper House (though the Prussian Conservatives\\nstrongly desired to see one), so, also, there was no\\nFederal Ministry. In every modern State there is a\\nCouncil formed of the heads of different administra-\\ntive departments this was so universal that it was\\nsupposed to be essential to a constitution. In the\\nGerman Empire we search for it in vain there is\\nonly one responsible Minister, and he is the Chan-\\ncellor, the representative of Prussia and Chairman of\\nthe Council. The Liberals could not reconcile them-\\nselves to this strange device they passed it with\\nreluctance in the stress of the moment, but they\\nhave never ceased to protest against it. Again and\\nagain, both in public and in private, we hear the\\nsame demand till we have a responsible Ministry\\nthe Constitution will never work. Two years later\\na motion was introduced and passed through the\\nReichstag demanding the formation of a Federal\\nMinistry Bismarck opposed the motion and refused\\nto carry it out.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0353.jp2"}, "352": {"fulltext": "302 Bismarck. [1866-\\nHe had several reasons for omitting what was\\napparently almost a necessary institution. The first\\nwas respect for the rights of the Federal States. If\\na Ministry, responsible to Parliament, had existed,\\nthe executive power would have been taken away\\nfrom the Bundesrath, and the Princes of the smaller\\nStates would really have been subjected to the new\\norgan the Ministers must have been appointed by\\nthe President they would have looked to him and\\nto the Reichstag for support, and would soon have\\nbegun to carry out their policy, not by agreement\\nwith the Governments arrived at by technical discus-\\nsions across the table of the Council-room, but by\\norders and decrees based on the will of the Parlia-\\nment. This would inevitably have aroused just what\\nBismarck wished to avoid. It would have produced\\na struggle between the central and local authorities\\nit would again have thrown the smaller Governments\\ninto opposition to national unity; it would have\\nfrightened the southern States.\\nHis other reasons for opposing the introduction\\nof a Ministry were that he did not wish to give more\\npower to the Parliament, and above all he disliked\\nthe system of collegiate responsibility.\\nYou wish, he said, to make the Government re-\\nsponsible, and do it by introducing a board. I say the\\nresponsibility will disappear as soon as you do so re-\\nsponsibility is only there when there is a single man who\\ncan be brought to task for any mistakes. I con-\\nsider that in and for itself a Constitution which intro-\\nduces joint ministerial responsibility is a political\\nblunder from which every State ought to free itself as", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0354.jp2"}, "353": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederatio7t. 303\\nsoon as it can. Anyone who has ever been a Minister\\nand at the head of a Ministry, and has been obliged to\\ntake resolutions upon his own responsibility, ceases at\\nlast to fear this responsibility, but he does shrink from\\nthe necessity of convincing seven people that that which\\nhe wishes is really right. That is a very different work\\nfrom governing a State.\\nThese reasons are very characteristic of him the\\nfeeling became more confirmed as he grew older.\\nIn 1875 he says\\nUnder no circumstances could I any longer submit\\nto the thankless role of Minister-President of Prussia in\\na Ministry with joint responsibility, if I were not accus-\\ntomed, from my old affection, to submit to the wishes of\\nmy King and Master. So thankless, so powerless, and so\\nlittle responsible is that position one can only be re-\\nsponsible for that which one does of one s own will a\\nboard is responsible for nothing.\\nHe alvi^ays said himself that he would be satisfied\\nwith the position of an English Prime Minister. He\\nwas thinking, of course, of the constitutional right\\nwhich the Prime Minister has, to appoint and dis-\\nmiss his colleagues, which if he has strength of\\ncharacter will, of course, give him the real control\\nof affairs, and also of the right which he enjoys of\\nbeing the sole means by which the views of the\\nMinisters are represented to the sovereign. In\\nPrussia the Minister-President had not acquired by\\nhabit these privileges, and the power of the different\\nMinisters was much more equal. In the new Fed-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0355.jp2"}, "354": {"fulltext": "304 Bismarck. [1866-\\neration he intended to have a single will directing\\nthe whole machine.\\nThe matter is of some interest because of the\\nlight it throws on one side of his character. He\\nwas not a man with whom others found it easy to\\nwork; he did not easily brook opposition, and he\\ndisliked having to explain and justify his policy to\\nanyone besides the King. He was not able to keep\\na single one of his colleagues throughout his official\\ncareer. Even Roon found it often difificult to con-\\ntinue working with him he complained of the Her-\\nmit of Varzin, who wishes to do everything himself,\\nand nevertheless issues the strictest prohibition that\\nhe is never to be disturbed. What suited him best\\nwas the position of almost absolute ruler, and he\\nlooked on his colleagues rather as subordinates than\\nas equals.\\nBut, it will be objected, if there was to be a single\\nwill governing the whole, the government could not\\nbe left to the Council a board comprising the\\nrepresentatives of twenty States could not really ad-\\nminister, and in truth the Council was but the veil\\nbehind it is the all-pervading power of the King of\\nPrussia and his Minister. The ruler of Germany\\nwas the Chancellor of the Federation it was he\\nalone that united and inspired the whole. Let us\\nenumerate his duties. He was sole Minister to the\\nPresident of the Confederation (after 1870 to the Em-\\nperor). The President (who was King of Prussia)\\ncould declare peace and war, sign treaties, and ap-\\npointed all ofificials, but all his acts required the\\nsignature of the Chancellor, who was thereby For-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0356.jp2"}, "355": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederation. 305\\neign Minister of the Confederation and had the\\nwhole of the patronage. More than this, he was at\\nthe head of the whole internal administration from\\ntime to time different departments of State were\\ncreated, marine, post-office, finance, but the men\\nwho stood at the head of each department were not\\nco-ordinate with the Chancellor they were not his\\ncolleagues, but were subordinates to whom he dele-\\ngated the work. They were not immediately re-\\nsponsible to the Emperor, Council, or Reichstag,\\nbut to him he, whenever he wished, could under-\\ntake the immediate control of each department, he\\ncould defend its actions, and was technically re-\\nsponsible to the Council for any failure. Of course,\\nas a matter of fact, the different departments gen-\\nerally were left to work alone, but if at any time it\\nseemed desirable, the Chancellor could always inter-\\nfere and issue orders which must be obeyed if the\\nhead of the department did not agree, then he had\\nnothing to do but resign, and the Chancellor would\\nappoint his successor.\\nThe Chancellor was, then, the working head of the\\nGovernment but it will be said that his power would\\nbe so limited by the interference of the Emperor,\\nthe Council, the Parliament, that he would have no\\nfreedom. The contrary is the truth. There were\\nfive different sources of authority with which he had\\nto deal the President of the Federation (the Em-\\nperor), who was King of Prussia, the Council, the\\nPrussian Parliament, the German Parliament, and\\nthe Prussian Ministry. Now in the Council he pre-\\nsided, and also represented the will of Prussia, which", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0357.jp2"}, "356": {"fulltext": "3o6 Bisinarck. [1866-\\nwas almost irresistible, for if the Constitution was to\\nwork well there must be harmony of intention be-\\ntween Prussia and the Federal Government here\\ntherefore he could generally carry out his policy\\nbut in the Prussian Ministry he spoke as sole Minis-\\nter of the Federation and the im-mense authority he\\nthus enjoyed raised him at once to a position of\\nsuperiority to all his colleagues. More than this, he\\nwas now free from the danger of Parliamentary con-\\ntrol it was easier to deal with one Parliament than\\ntwo they had no locus standi for constitutional op-\\nposition to his policy. The double position he held\\nenabled him to elude all control. Policy was decided\\nin the Council when he voted there he acted as\\nrepresentative of the King of Prussia and was bound\\nby the instructions he received from the Prussian\\nMinister of Foreign Affairs the Reichstag had\\nnothing to do with Prussian policy and had no right\\nto criticise the action of the Prussian Minister. It\\ndid not matter that Bismarck himself was not only\\nChancellor of the Diet, but also Minister-President\\nof Prussia and Foreign Minister, and was really act-\\ning in accordance with the instructions he had given\\nto himself the principle remained, each envoy to\\nthe Diet was responsible, not to the Reichstag, but to\\nthe Government he represented. When, however, he\\nThe complication of oiBces became most remarkable when Bis-\\nmarck in later years undertook the immediate direction of trade. He\\nbecame Minister of Finance for Prussia; and we have a long corre-\\nspondence which he carries on with himself in his various capacities\\nof Prussian Minister, Prussian representative in the Council, and\\nChancellor of the Empire.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0358.jp2"}, "357": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederation. 307\\nappeared in the Reichstag to explain and defend the\\npohcy adopted by the Council, then he stood before\\nthem as representative not necessarily of his own\\npolicy, but of that which had been decided on by a\\nboard in which he had possibly been outvoted. The\\nReichstag could reject the proposal if it were a law\\nor a tax they could criticise and debate, but there\\nwas no ground on which they could constitutionally\\ndemand the dismissal of the Minister.\\nOf course Bismarck did not attempt to evade the\\nfull moral responsibility for the policy which he ad-\\nvocated, but he knew that so long as he had the con-\\nfidence of the King of Prussia and the majority of\\nthe Allied States, all the power of Parliament could\\nnot injure him.\\nWhat probably not even he foresaw was that the\\nnew Constitution so greatly added to the power of\\nthe Minister that even the authority of the King be-\\ngan to pale before it. As before, there was only one\\ndepartment of State where his authority ceased,\\nthe army.\\nIt will be easily understood that this Constitution,\\nwhen it was laid before the assembly, was not ac-\\ncepted without much discussion and many objections.\\nThere were some the representatives of conquered\\ndistricts, Poles, Hanoverians, and the deputies from\\nSchleswig-Holstein who wished to overthrow the\\nnew Federation which was built up on the destruc-\\ntion of the States to which they had belonged.\\nTheirs was an enmity which was open, honourable,\\nand easy to meet. More insidious and dangerous\\nwas the criticism of those men who, while they pro-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0359.jp2"}, "358": {"fulltext": "3o8 Bis7narck. [1866-\\nfessed to desire the ends which Bismarck had attained,\\nrefused to approve of the Constitution because they\\nwould have to renounce some of the principles of the\\nparties to which they belonged.\\nThere were some to whom it seemed that he gave\\ntoo much freedom to the individual States they\\nwished for a more complete unity, but now Bismarck,\\nfor the first time, was strong enough to shew the\\nessential moderation of his character he knew what\\nthe Liberals were ready to forget, that moderation,\\nwhile foolish in the moment of conflict, is the proper\\nadornment of the conqueror. When they asked him\\nto take away many of the privileges reserved to the\\nsmaller States, he reminded them that, though\\nMecklenburg and the Saxon duchies were helpless\\nbefore the increased power of the Prussian Crown,\\nthey were protected by Prussian promises, and that\\na King of Prussia, though he might strike down his\\nenemies, must always fulfil in spirit and in letter his\\nobligations to his friends. The basis of the new alli-\\nance must be the mutual confidence of the allies he\\nhad taught them to fear Prussia, now they must learn\\nto trust her.\\nThe Prussian Conservatives feared that the power\\nof the Prussian King and the independence of the\\nPrussian State would be affected but Bismarck s in-\\nfluence with them was sufficient to prevent any open\\nopposition. More dangerous were the Progressives,\\nwho apprehended that the new Constitution would\\nlimit the influence of the Prussian Parliament. On\\nmany points they refused to accept the proposals of\\nthe Government they feared for liberty. For them", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0360.jp2"}, "359": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederation. 309\\nBismarck had no sympathy and no words but con-\\ntempt, and he put curtly before them the ques-\\ntion, did they wish to sacrifice all he had attained\\nto their principles of Parliamentary government\\nThey demanded, for instance, that, as the Constitu-\\ntion of Prussia could not be altered without the con-\\nsent of the Prussian Parliament, the new Federal\\nConstitution must be laid before the Prussian Parlia-\\nment for discussion and ratification. It is curious to\\nnotice that this is exactly the same claim which Bis-\\nmarck in 1852 had supported as against Radowitz\\nhe had, however, learned much since then he\\npointed out that the same claim which was made by\\nthe Prussian Parliament might be made by the Par-\\nliament of each of the twenty-two States. It was\\nnow his duty to defend the unification of Germany\\nagainst this new Partiailarism in old days Particu-\\nlarism found its support in the dynasties, now it is,\\nhe said, in the Parliaments.\\nDo you really believe, he said, that the great\\nmovement which last year led the peoples to battle from\\nthe Belt to the Sicilian Sea, from the Rhine to the\\nPruth and the Dniester, in the throw of the iron dice\\nwhen we played for the crowns of kings and emperors,\\nthat the millions of German warriors who fought against\\none another and bled on the battle-fields from the Rhine\\nto the Carpathians, that the thousands and ten thousands\\nwho were left dead on the battle-field and struck down\\nby pestilence, who by their death have sealed the national\\ndecision, that all this can be pigeon-holed by a reso-\\nlution of Parliament Gentlemen, in this case you\\nreally do not stand on the height of the situation.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0361.jp2"}, "360": {"fulltext": "3IO Bis7narck. [1866-\\nI should like to see the gentlemen who consider this\\npossibility answer an invalid from Koniggratz when he\\nasks for the result of this mighty effort. You would say\\nto him Yes, indeed, for the German unity nothing is\\nachieved, the occasion for that will probably come, that\\nwe can have easily, we can come to an understanding\\nany day, but we have saved the Budget-right of the\\nChamber of Deputies, we have saved the right of the Prus-\\nsian Parliament every year to put the existence of the\\nPrussian army in question, and therewith the\\ninvalid must console himself for the loss of his limbs and\\nthe widow as she buries her husband.\\nIt is interesting to compare this speech with the\\nsimilar speech he made after Olmiitz how great is the\\nsimilarity in thought and expression, how changed\\nis the position of the speaker He had no sympathy\\nwith these doubts and hesitations why so much dis-\\ntrust of one another? His Constitution might not\\nbe the best, it might not be perfect, but at least let\\nit be completed. Gentlemen, he said, let us\\nwork quickly, let us put Germany in the saddle it\\nwill soon learn to ride. He was annoyed and irri-\\ntated by the opposition he met.\\nIf one has struggled hard for five years to achieve that\\nwhich now lies before us, if one has spent one s time, the\\nbest years of one s life, and sacrificed one s health for it,\\nif one remembers the trouble it has cost to decide quite\\na small paragraph, even a question of punctuation, with\\ntwo and twenty Governments, if at last we have agreed\\non that as it here lies before us, then gentlemen who\\nhave experienced little of all these struggles, and know\\nnothing of the official proceedings which have gone be-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0362.jp2"}, "361": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederation. 311\\nfore, come forward in a manner which I can only com-\\npare to that of a man who throws a stone at m};- window\\nwithout knowing where I stand. He knows not where\\nhe hits me, he knows not what business he impedes.\\nHe compared himself v/ith Hotspur when after the\\nbattle he met the courtier who came to demand his\\nprisoners, and when wounded and tired from the\\nfight had to hear a long lecture over instruments of\\nslaughter and internal wounds.\\nThe debates were continued for two months with\\nmuch spirit and ability; again and again a majority\\nof the Parliament voted amendments against which\\nBismarck had spoken. When they had completed\\nthe revision of the Constitution, these had again to\\nbe referred to the separate Governments. Forty\\nwere adopted on two only Bismarck informed the\\nParliament that their proposals could not be accepted.\\nOne of these was the arrangements for the army\\nBudget so soon did a fresh conflict on this matter\\nthreaten. A compromise was agreed upon in con-\\nsideration of the immediate danger (it was just the\\ntime when a war with France regarding Luxemburg\\nappeared imminent), the House voted the money re-\\nquired for the army for the next four years in 1 87 1\\na new arrangement would have to be made, but for\\nthis time the Government was able to maintain\\nthe army at the strength which they wished for. The\\nother matter was of less immediate importance the\\nmajority of the House had voted that members of\\nthe Parliament should receive payment for their serv-\\nices, Bismarck had spoken strongly against this", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0363.jp2"}, "362": {"fulltext": "312 Bismarck. [1866-\\nnow he made it a question of confidence, and warned\\nthem that the Governments would not accept it. The\\nHouse had no alternative except to withdraw their\\nvote.\\nThe Constitution as finally agreed on exists to this\\nday as that of the German Empire. Notwithstand-\\ning the evil forebodings made at the time, it has\\nworked well for over thirty years.\\nFrom the moment that the new State had been\\ncreated and the new Constitution adopted, a great\\nchange took place in Bismarck s public position. He\\nwas no longer merely the first and ablest servant of\\nthe Prussian King; he was no longer one in the dis-\\ntinguished series of Prussian Ministers. His position\\nwas let us recognise it clearly greater than that\\nof the King and Emperor, for he was truly the\\nFather of the State it was his will which had cre-\\nated and his brain which had devised it he watched\\nover it with the affection of a father for his son none\\nquite understood it but himself he alone could au-\\nthoritatively expound the laws of the Constitution.\\nA criticism of it was an attack upon himself opposi-\\ntion to him was scarcely to be distinguished from\\ntreason to the State. Is it not inevitable that as\\nyears went on we should find an increasing intoler-\\nance of all rivals, who wished to alter what he had\\nmade, or to take his place as captain of his ship, and\\nat the same time a most careful and strict regard for\\nthe loyal fulfilment of the law and spirit of the Con-\\nstitution? From this time all other interests are laid\\naside, his whole life is absorbed in the prosperity of\\nGermany.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0364.jp2"}, "363": {"fulltext": "1867] The North German Confederation. 313\\nOf course Germany did not at once settle down\\nto political rest there were many difficulties to be\\novercome on which we cannot enter here. The most\\nserious arose from the regulation of the affairs in the\\nconquered provinces, and especially in the Kingdom\\nof Hanover. The annexation to Prussia was very un-\\npopular among all classes except the tradesmen and\\nmiddle classes of the towns. The Hanoverian depu-\\nties to both the Prussian Parliament and the Parlia-\\nment of the North German Confederation on principle\\nopposed all measures of the Government. The\\nKing himself, though in exile, kept up a close con-\\nnection with his former subjects. There were long\\nnegotiations regarding his private property. At last\\nit was agreed that this should be paid over to him.\\nThe King, however, used the money for organising\\na Legion to be used when the time came against\\nPrussia it was therefore necessary to cease paying\\nhim funds which could be used for this purpose.\\nThis is the origin of the notorious Welfenfond. The\\nmoney was to be appropriated for secret service\\nand especially for purposes of the Press. The party\\nof the Guelphs, of course, maintained a bitter feud\\nagainst the Government in their papers. Bismarck,\\nwho had had ample experience of this kind of war-\\nfare, met them on their own ground.\\nHe defended this proposal by drawing attention\\nto one of the weaknesses of Germany. What other\\ncountry, he asked, was there where a defeated party\\nwould look forward to the help of foreign armies?\\nThere are unfortunately, he said, many Corio-\\nlani in Germany, only the Volsgi ?ire wanting if", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0365.jp2"}, "364": {"fulltext": "314 Bismarck. [1867\\nthey found their Volsci they would soon be un-\\nmasked. Everyone knew that the Volsci from over\\nthe Rhine would not be slow to come when the\\noccasion offered.\\nIt was, he said, a melancholy result of the cen-\\nturies of disunion. There were traitors in the country\\nthey did not hide themselves they carried their heads\\nerect they found public defenders even in the walls of\\nParliament. Then he continued Everywhere where\\ncorruption is found there a form of life begins which no\\none can touch with clean kid gloves. In view of these\\nfacts you speak to me of espionage. In my nature I am\\nnot born to be a spy, but I believe we deserve your\\nthanks if we condescend to follow malignant reptiles\\ninto their cave to observe their actions.\\nThis is the origin of the expression the reptile\\nPress, for the name was given by the people not to\\nthose against whom the efforts of the Government\\nwere directed, but to the paid organs to which, if\\nreport is true, so large a portion of the Guelph fund\\nwas given.\\nBut we must pass on to the events by which the\\nwork of 1866 was to be completed.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0366.jp2"}, "365": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIII.\\nTHE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH FRANCE.\\n1 867- 1 870.\\nEVER since the conclusion of peace, the danger\\nof a conflict between France and Germany\\nhad been apparent. It was not only the grow-\\ning discontent and suspicion of the French nation and\\nthe French army, who truly felt that the suprem-\\nacy of France had been shaken by the growth of\\nthis new power it was not only that the deep-rooted\\nhatred of France which prevailed in Germany had\\nbeen stirred by Napoleon s action, and that the Ger-\\nmans had received confidence from the consciousness\\nof their own strength. Had there been nothing more\\nthan this, year after year might have gone by and, as\\nhas happened since and had happened before, a war\\nalways anticipated might have been always deferred.\\nWe may be sure that Bismarck would not have gone\\nto war unless he believed it to be necessary and de-\\nsirable, and he would not have thought this unless\\nthere was something to be gained. He has often\\nshewn, before and since, that he was quite as well\\nable to use his powers in the maintenance of peace\\n315", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0367.jp2"}, "366": {"fulltext": "J\\n1 6 Bismarck. [1867-\\nas in creating causes for war. There was, however,\\none reason which made war ahuost inevitable. The\\nunity of Germany was only half completed the\\nSouthern States still existed in a curious state of\\nV semi-isolation. This could not long continue; their\\nposition must be regulated. War arises from that\\nstate of uncertainty which is always present when a\\npolitical community has not found a stable and per-\\nmanent constitution. In Germany men were look-\\ning forward to the time when the southern States\\nshould join the north. The work was progressing;\\nthe treaties of offensive and defensive alliance had\\nbeen followed by the creation of a new Customs\\nUnion, and it was a further step when at Bismarck s\\nproposal a Parliament consisting of members elected\\nthroughout the whole of Germany was summoned at\\nBerlin for the management of matters connected with\\nthe tariff. Further than this, however, he was not\\nable to go the new Constitution was working well\\nthey could risk welcoming the States of the south\\ninto it but this could not be done without a war\\nwith France. Bismarck had rejected the French\\nproposal for an alliance. He knew, and everyone else\\nknew, that France would oppose by the sword any\\nattempt to complete the unity of Germany and,\\nAvhich was more serious, unless great caution was\\nused, that she would be supported by Austria and\\nperhaps by the anti-Prussian party in Bavaria. There\\nwere some who wished to press it forward at once.\\nBismarck was very strongly pressed by the National\\nLiberals to hasten the union with the south at the\\nbeginning of 1870 the Grand Duke of Baden, him-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0368.jp2"}, "367": {"fulltext": "1870] OzLtbreak of War with France. 317\\nself a son-in-law of the King of Prussia and always\\nthe chief supporter of Prussian influence in the south,\\nformally applied to be admitted into the Federation.\\nThe request had to be refused, but Bismarck had\\nsome dif^culty in defending his position against his\\nenthusiastic friends. He had to warn them not to\\nhurry they must not press the development too\\nquickly. If they did so, they would stir the resent-\\nment of the anti-Prussian party they would play\\ninto the hands of Napoleon and Austria. But if\\nthere was danger in haste, there was equal danger in\\ndelay the prestige of Prussia would suffer.\\nIt is clear that there was one way in which the\\nunion might be brought about almost without re-\\nsistance, and that was, if France were to make an\\nunprovoked attack upon Germany, an attack so com-\\npletely without reason and excuse that the strong\\nnational passion it provoked might in the enthusiasm\\nof war sweep away all minor differences and party\\nfeelings.\\nThere was another element which we must not\\nomit. These years witnessed the growth in deter-\\nmination and in power of the Ultramontane party.\\nWe can find their influence in every country in\\nEurope their chief aim was the preservation of the\\ntemporal power of the Pope and the destruction of\\nthe newly created Kingdom of Italy. They were also\\nopposed to the unity of Germany under Prussia.\\nThey were very active and powerful in South Ger-\\nmany, and at the elections in 1869 had gained a\\nmajority. Their real object must be to win over\\nthe Emperor of the French to a complete agreement", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0369.jp2"}, "368": {"fulltext": "3i8 Bismarck. [1867-\\nwith themselves, to persuade him to forsake his\\nearlier policy and to destroy what he had done so\\nmuch to create. They had a strong support in the\\nperson of the Empress, and they joined with the\\ninjured vanity of the French to press the Emperor\\ntowards war.\\nIn 1867, war had almost broken out on the ques-\\ntion of Luxemburg. Napoleon had attempted to get\\nat least this small extension of territory relying on\\nthe support of Prussia he entered into negotiations\\nwith the King of Holland the King agreed to sur-\\nrender the Grand Duchy to France, making, however,\\na condition that Napoleon should secure the assent\\nof Prussia to this arrangement. At the very last mo-\\nment, when the treaty was almost signed, Bismarck\\nmade it clear that the national feeling in Germany\\nwas so strong that if the transaction took place he\\nwould have to declare war against France. At the\\nsame time, he published the secret treaties with the\\nsouthern States. These events destroyed the last\\nhope of maintaining the old friendly relations with\\nNapoleon I have been duped, said the Emperor,\\nwho at once began reorganising and rearming his\\nforces. For some weeks there was great danger of\\nwar concerning the right of garrisoning Luxemburg\\nthis had hitherto belonged to Prussia, but of course\\nwith the dissolution of the German Confederation\\nthe right had lapsed. The German nation, which was\\nmuch excited and thought little of the precise terms\\nof treaties, wished to defend the right Bismarck\\nknew that in this matter the Prussian claim could\\nnot be supported moreover, even if he had wished", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0370.jp2"}, "369": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbi^eak of War with France. 319\\nto go to Avar with France he was not ready for some\\ntime must elapse before the army of the North Ger-\\nman Confederation could be reorganised on the\\nPrussian model. He therefore preserved the peace\\nand the matter was settled by a European Congress.\\nIn the summer of 1867, he visited Paris with the\\nKing externally the good relations between the two\\nStates were restored, but it was in reality only an\\narmed peace.\\nIt is difficult to decipher Napoleon s wishes he\\nseems to have believed that war was inevitable\\nthere is no proof that he desired it. He made\\npreparations the army was reorganised, the num-\\nbers increased, and a new weapon introduced. At\\nthe same time he looked about for allies. Negotia-\\ntions were carried on with Austria in 1868 a meet-\\ning was ari anged between the two Emperors Beust,\\nwho was now Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, was\\nanxious to make an attempt to overthrow the power\\nof Prussia in Germany. In 1 870, negotiations were\\nentered into for a military alliance a special envoy,\\nGeneral Lebrun, was sent to Vienna to discuss the\\nmilitary arrangements in case of war. No treaty\\nwas signed, but it was an almost understood thing\\nthat sooner or later an alliance between the two Em-\\nperors should be formed against Prussia.\\nIt will be seen then that at the beginning of 1 870\\neverything was tending towards war, and that under\\ncertain circumstances war was desirable, both for\\nFrance and for Germany much seemed to depend\\non the occasion of the outbreak. If Prussia took\\nthe offensive, if she attempted by force to win the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0371.jp2"}, "370": {"fulltext": "320 Bismarck. [1867-\\nsouthern States, she would be faced by a coalition of\\nFrance and Austria, supported only too probably\\nby Bavaria, and this was a coalition which would\\nfind much sympathy among the discontented in\\nNorth Germany. On the other hand, it was for the\\nadvantage of Prussia not to delay the conflict the\\nKing was growing old Bismarck could never be sure\\nhow long he would remain in office moreover, the\\nwhole forces of North Germany had now been com-\\npletely reorganised and were ready for war, but with\\nthe year 1871 it was to be foreseen that a fresh at-\\ntempt would be made to reduce their numbers it\\nwas desirable to avoid a fresh conflict on the military\\nbudget everything shews that 1870 was the year in\\nwhich it would be most convenient for Prussia to\\nfight.\\nPrussia, at this time, had no active allies on whom\\nshe could depend Bismarck indeed had secured the\\nneutrality of Russia, but he did not know that the\\nCzar would come actively to his help we may feel\\nsure that he would prefer not to have to call upon\\nRussia for assistance, for, as we have seen in older\\ndays, a war between France and Russia, in which\\nGermany joined, would be very harmful to Germany.\\nIt was in these circumstances that an opportunity\\nshewed itself of gaining another ally who would be\\nmore subservient than Russia. One of the many\\nrevolutions which had harassed Spain during this\\ncentury had broken out. Queen Isabella had lost\\nthe throne, and General Prim found himself obliged\\nto look about for a new sovereign. He applied in\\nvain to all the Catholic Courts nobody was anxious", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0372.jp2"}, "371": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with France. 321\\nto accept an honour coupled with such danger as\\nruHng over the Spanish people. Among others he\\napplied to Leopold, hereditary Prince of Hohen-\\nzoUern, eldest son of that Prince of Hohenzollern\\nwho a few years before had been President of the\\nPrussian Ministry. The choice seemed a good one\\nthe Prince was an amiable, courageous man he was\\na Catholic he was, moreover, connected with the\\nNapoleonic family. His brother had, three years\\nbefore, been appointed King of Roumania with\\nNapoleon s good-will.\\nThe proposal was probably made in all good faith\\nunder ordinary circumstances, the Prince, had he\\nbeen willing to accept, would have been a very proper\\ncandidate. It was, however, known from the first\\nthat Napoleon would not give his consent, and, ac-\\ncording to the comity of Europe, he had a right to\\nbe consulted. Nor can we say that Napoleon was\\nnot justified in opposing the appointment. It has\\nindeed been said that the Prince was not a member\\nof the Prussian Royal House and that his connection\\nwith Napoleon was really closer than that with the\\nKing of Prussia. This is true, but to lay stress on it\\nis to ignore the very remarkable voluntary connec-\\ntion which united the two branches of the House of\\nHohenzollern. The Prince s father had done what\\nno sovereign prince in Germany has ever done before\\nor since out of loyalty to Prussia he had surren-\\ndered his position as sovereign ruler and presented\\nhis dominions to the King of Prussia he had on\\nthis occasion been adopted into the Royal Family\\nhe had formally recognised the King as Head of", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0373.jp2"}, "372": {"fulltext": "32 2 Bismarck. [1867-\\nthe House, and subjected himself to his authority.\\nMore than this, he had even condescended to accept\\nthe position of Prussian Minister. Was not Napoleon\\njustified if he feared that the son of a man who had\\nshewn so great an affection to Prussia would not be\\nan agreeable neighbour on the throne of Spain?\\nIt was in the early spring of 1869 that the first\\nproposals were made to the Prince our information\\nas to this is very defective, but it seems that they\\nwere at once rejected. Benedetti s suspicions were,\\nhowever, aroused. He heard that a Spanish diplo-\\nmatist, who had formerly been Ambassador at Berlin,\\nhad again visited the city and had had two interviews\\nwith Bismarck. He feared that perhaps he had\\nsome mission with regard to the Hohenzollern candi-\\ndature, and, in accordance with instructions from his\\nGovernment, enquired first of Thiele and, after a visit\\nto Paris, saw Bismarck himself. The Count was\\nquite ready to discuss the matter with great frank-\\nness he explained all the reasons why, if the throne\\nwere offered to the Prince, the King would doubtless\\nadvise him not to accept it. Benedetti was still sus-\\npicious, but for the time the matter dropped. From\\nwhat happened later, though we have no proof, we\\nmust, I think, share his suspicion that Bismarck was\\nalready considering the proposal and was prepared\\nto lend it his support.\\nIn September of the same year, the affair began\\nto advance. Prim sent Salazar, a Spanish gentleman,\\nto Germany with a semi-ofificial commission to invite\\nthe Prince to become a candidate, and gave him a\\nletter to a German acquaintance who would procure", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0374.jp2"}, "373": {"fulltext": "1870] Otitbi^eak of War with France. 323\\nhim an introduction to the Prince. This German\\nacquaintance was no other than Herr von Werther,\\nPrussian Ambassador at Vienna. If we remember\\nthe very strict discipline which Bismarck maintained\\nin the Diplomatic Service we must feel convinced\\nthat Werther was acting according to instructions.\\nHe brought the envoy to the Prince of Hohenzol-\\nlern the very greatest caution was taken to pre-\\nserve secrecy the Spaniard did not go directly to\\nthe castle of Weinburg, but left the train at another\\nstation, waited in the town till it was dark, and only\\napproached the castle when hidden from observa-\\ntion by night and a thick mist. He first of all asked\\nPrince Charles himself to accept the throne, and\\nwhen he refused, offered it to Prince Leopold, who\\nalso, though he did not refuse point-blank, left no\\ndoubt that he was disinclined to the proposal he\\ncould only accept, he said, if the Spanish Govern-\\nment procured the assent of the Emperor Napoleon\\nand the King of Prussia. Notwithstanding the re-\\nluctance of the family to take the proffered dignity,\\nHerr von Werther (and we must look on him as\\nBismarck s agent a fortnight later travelled from\\nMunich in order to press on the Prince of Roumania\\nthat he should use his influence not to allow the\\nHouse of Hohenzollern to refuse the throne. For\\nthe time, however, the subject seems to have dropped.\\nA few months later, for the third time, the offer was\\nrepeated, and now Bismarck uses the whole of his\\ninfluence in its favour. At the end of February,\\nSalazar came on an of^cial mission to Berlin he\\nSybel states that this was not the case.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0375.jp2"}, "374": {"fulltext": "324 Bismarck. [1867-\\nhad three letters, one to the King, one to Bismarck,\\none to the Prince. The King refused to receive\\nhim Prince Leopold did not waver in his refusal\\nand was supported by his father their attitude was\\nthat they should not consider the matter seriously\\nunless higher reasons of State required it. With\\nPrince Bismarck, however, the envoy was more suc-\\ncessful he had several interviews with the Minister,\\nand then left the city in order that suspicions might\\nnot be aroused or the attention of the French Gov-\\nernment directed to the negotiations. Bismarck\\npleaded with great warmth for the acceptance of the\\noffer; in a memoir to the King, he dwelt on the great\\nimportance which the summons of a Hohenzollern\\nprince to the Spanish throne would have for Ger-\\nmany it would be politically invaluable to have a\\nfriendly land in the rear of France it would be of\\nthe greatest economic advantage for Germany and\\nSpain if this thoroughly monarchical country de-\\nveloped its resources under a king of German\\ndescent. In consequence of this, a conference was\\nheld at Berlin, at which there were present, besides\\nthe King, the Crown Prince, Prince Carl Anton, and\\nPrince Leopold, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Schlei-\\nnitz, Thiele, and Delbriick. By summoning the\\nadvice of these men, the matter was taken out of\\nthe range of a private and family matter it is true\\nthat it was not ofificially brought before the Prussian\\nMinistry, but those consulted were the men by whom\\nthe policy of the State was directed. The unani-\\nmous decision of the councillors was for acceptance\\non the ground that it was the fulfilment of a patri-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0376.jp2"}, "375": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with France. 325\\notic duty to Prussia. The Crown Prince saw great\\ndifficulties in the way, and warned his cousin, if he\\naccepted, not to rely on Prussian help in the future,\\neven if, for the attainment of a definite end, the\\nPrussian Government furthered the project for the\\nmoment. The King did not agree with his Minis-\\nters he had many serious objections, and refused to\\ngive any definite order to the Prince that he should\\naccept the offer; he left the final decision to him.\\nHe eventually refused.\\nBismarck, however, was not to be beaten he in-\\nsisted that the Hohenzollerns should not let the mat-\\nter drop and, as he could not persuade the King to\\nuse his authority, acted directly upon the family with\\nsuch success that Prince Carl Anton telegraphed to\\nhis third son, Frederick, to ask if he would not ac-\\ncept instead of his brother. Bismarck had now de-\\nclared that the acceptance by one of the Princes was\\na political necessity this he said repeatedly and\\nwith the greatest emphasis. At the same time, he\\ndespatched a Prussian officer of the general staff and\\nhis private secretary, Lothar Bucher, to Spain in or-\\nder that they might study the situation. It was\\nimportant that as far as possible the official repre-\\nsentative of Prussia should have no share in the\\narrangement of this matter.\\nPrince Frederick came to Berlin, but, like his\\nbrother, he refused, unless the King gave a command.\\nAt the end of April, the negotiations seemed again\\nto have broken down. Bismarck, who was in ill\\nhealth, left Berlin for Varzin, where he remained for\\nsix weeks.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0377.jp2"}, "376": {"fulltext": "326 Bismarck. [1867-\\nWe are, however, not surprised, since we know that\\nBismarck s interest was so strongly engaged, that he\\nwas able after all to carry the matter through. He\\nseems to have persuaded Prince Carl Anton he then\\nwrote to Prim telling him not to despair; the can-\\ndidature was an excellent thing which was not to be\\nlost sight of he must, however, negotiate not with\\nthe Prussian Government, but with the Prince him-\\nself. When he wrote this he knew that he had at\\nlast succeeded in breaking down the reluctance of\\nthe Prince, and that the King, though he still was\\nunwilling to undertake any responsibility, would not\\nrefuse his consent if the Prince voluntarily accepted.\\nPrince Leopold was influenced not only by his inter-\\nest in the Spanish race, but also by a letter from Bis-\\nmarck, in which he said that he ought to put aside all\\nscruples and accept in the interests of Prussia. The\\nenvoys had also returned from Spain and brought\\nback a favourable report they received an extra-\\nordinarily hearty welcome we may perhaps suspect\\nwith the King that they had allowed their report to\\nreceive too rosy a colour no doubt, however, they\\nwere acting in accordance with what they knew were\\nthe wishes of the man who had sent them out. In\\nthe beginning of June the decision was made Prince\\nLeopold wrote to the King that he accepted the\\ncrown which had been ofTered to him, since he thereby\\nhoped to do a great service to his Fatherland. King\\nWilliam immediately answered that he approved of\\nthe decision.\\nBismarck then at last was successful. A few days\\nlater Don Salazar again travelled to Germany this", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0378.jp2"}, "377": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with France. 327\\ntime he brought a formal offer, which was formally-\\naccepted. The Cortes were then in session it was\\narranged that they should remain at Madrid till his\\nreturn the election would then be at once completed,\\nfor a majority was assured. The secrecy had been\\nstrictly maintained there were rumours indeed, but\\nno one knew of all the secret interviews men might\\nsuspect, but they could not prove that it was an in-\\ntrigue of Bismarck. If the election had once been\\nmade the solemn act of the whole nation, Napoleon\\nwould have been confronted with a fait accompli.\\nTo have objected would have been most injurious;\\nhe would have had to do, not with Prussia, which ap-\\nparently was not concerned, but with the Spanish\\nnation. The feeling of France would not allow him\\nto acquiesce in the election, but it would have deeply\\noffended the dignity and pride of Spain had he\\nclaimed that the King who had been formally ac-\\ncepted should, at his demand, be rejected. He could\\nscarcely have done so without bringing about a war;\\na war with Spain would have crippled French re-\\nsources and diverted their attention from Prussia\\neven if a war did not ensue, permanent ill feeling\\nwould be created. It is not difificult to understand\\nthe motives by which Bismarck had been influenced.\\nAt the last moment the plan failed. A cipher\\ntelegram from Berlin was misinterpreted in Madrid\\nand in consequence the Cortes, instead of remaining\\nin session, were prorogued till the autumn. All had\\ndepended on the election being carried out before\\nthe secret was disclosed a delay of some weeks\\nmust take place, and some indiscreet words of Salazar", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0379.jp2"}, "378": {"fulltext": "328 Bismarck. [1867-\\ndisclosed the truth. General Prim had no course\\nleft him but to send to the French Ambassador, to\\ngive him official information as to what had been\\ndone and try to calm his uneasiness.\\nWhat were Bismarck s motives in this affair It\\nis improbable that he intended to use it as a means\\nof bringing about a war with France. He could not\\npossibly have foreseen the very remarkable series of\\nevents which were to follow, and but for them a war\\narising out of this would have been very unwise, for\\nGerman public opinion and the sympathy of all the\\nneutral Powers would have been opposed to Prussia,\\nhad it appeared that the Government was disturbing\\nthe peace of Europe simply in order to put a Prus-\\nsian prince on the throne of Spain contrary to the\\nwishes of France. He could not ignore German\\npublic opinion now as he had done in old days he\\ndid not want to conquer South Germany, he wished\\nto attract it. It seems much more probable that he\\nhad no very clear conception of the results which\\nwould follow he did not wish to lose what might\\nbe the means of gaining an ally to Germany and\\nweakening France. It would be quite invaluable if,\\nsupposing there were to be war (arising from this or\\nother causes), Spain could be persuaded to join in\\nthe attack on France and act the part which Italy\\nhad played in 1866. What he probably hoped for\\nmore than anything else was that France would de-\\nclare war against Spain then Napoleon would waste\\nhis strength in a new Mexico he would no longer\\nbe a danger to Germany, and whether Germany\\njoined in the war or not, she would gain a free hand", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0380.jp2"}, "379": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with France. 329\\nby the preoccupation of France. If none of these\\nevents happened, it would be an advantage that\\nsome commercial gain might be secured for Ger-\\nmany.\\nOn the whole, the affair is not one which shews his\\nstrongest points as a diplomatist it was too subtle\\nand too hazardous.\\nThe news aroused the sleeping jealousy of Prussia\\namong the French people the suspicion and irrita-\\ntion of the Government was extreme, and this feel-\\ning was not ill-founded. They assumed that the\\nwhole matter was an intrigue of Bismarck s, though,\\nowing to the caution with which the negotiations\\nhad been conducted, they had no proofs. They\\nmight argue that a Prussian prince could not accept\\nsuch an offer without the permission of his sovereign,\\nand they had a great cause of complaint that this\\npermission had been given without any communica-\\ntion with Napoleon, whom the matter so nearly con-\\ncerned. The arrangement itself was not alone the\\ncause of alarm. The secrecy with which it had\\nbeen surrounded was interpreted as a sign of ma-\\nlevolence.\\nOf course they must interfere to prevent the elec-\\ntion being completed. Where, however, were they\\nto address themselves With a just instinct they\\ndirected their remonstrance, not to Madrid, but to\\nBerlin; they would thereby appear not to be inter-\\nfering with the independence of the Spaniards, but\\nto be acting in self-defence against the insidious\\nadvance of German power.\\nThey could not, however, approach Bismarck he", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0381.jp2"}, "380": {"fulltext": "2,3*^ Bismarck. [1867-\\nhad retired to Varzin, to recruit his health the\\nother Ministers also were absent the King was at\\nEms. It was convenient that at this sudden crisis\\nthey should be away, for it was imperative that the\\nPrussian Government should deny all complicity.\\nBismarck must not let it appear that he had any\\ninterest in, or knowledge of, the matter he therefore\\nremained in the seclusion of Pomerania.\\nBenedetti also was absent in the Black Forest. On\\nthe 4th of July, therefore, the French Charge d Af-\\nfaires, M. de Sourds, called at the Foreign Office and\\nsaw Herr von Thiele. Visibly embarrassed, he\\nwrites, he told me that the Prussian Government\\nwas absolutely ignorant of the matter and that it\\ndid not exist for them. This was the only answer\\nto be got; in a despatch sent on the nth to the\\nPrussian agents in Germany, Bismarck repeated the\\nassertion. The matter has nothing to do with Prus-\\nsia. The Prussian Government has always considered\\nand treated this affair as one in which Spain and the\\nselected candidate are alone concerned. This was\\nliterally true, for it had never been brought before\\nthe Prussian Ministry, and no doubt the records of\\nthe office would contain no allusion to it the\\nmajority of the Ministers were absolutely ignorant\\nof it.\\nOf course M. de Sourds did not believe Herr von\\nThiele s statement, and his Government was not satis-\\nfied with the explanation the excitement in Paris\\nwas increasing; it was fomented by the agents of the\\nMinistry, and in answer to an interpolation in the\\nChamber, the Due de Grammont on the 6th de-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0382.jp2"}, "381": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War- with France. 331\\nclared that the election of the Prince was inadmissi-\\nble he trusted to the wisdom of the Prussian and the\\nfriendship of the Spanish people not to proceed in\\nit, but if his hope were frustrated they would know\\nhow to do their duty. They were not obliged to\\nendure that a foreign Power by setting one of its\\nPrinces on the throne of Charles V. should destroy\\nthe balance of power and endanger the interests and\\nhonour of France. He hoped this would not happen\\nthey relied on the wisdom of the German and the\\nfriendship of the Spanish people to avoid it but if\\nit were necessary, then, strong in the support of the\\nnation and the Chamber, they knew how to fulfil their\\nduty without hesitation or weakness.\\nThe French Ministry hereby publicly declared that\\nthey held the Prussian Government responsible for\\nthe election, and they persisted in demanding the\\nwithdrawal, not from Spain, but from Prussia Prim\\nhad suggested that as the Foreign Office refused to\\ndiscuss the matter, Grammont should approach the\\nKing personally. Benedetti received instructions to\\ngo to the King at Ems and request him to order or\\nadvise the Prince to withdraw. At first Grammont\\nwished him also to see the Prince himself on se-\\ncond thoughts he forbade this, for, as he said, it was\\nof the first importance that the messages should be\\nconveyed by the King he was determined to use\\nthe opportunity for the humiliation of Germany.\\nIf it was the desire of the French in this way to\\nestablish the complicity of Prussia, it was impera-\\ntive that the Prussian Government should not allow\\nthem to do so. They were indeed in a disagreeable", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0383.jp2"}, "382": {"fulltext": "T);^2 Bismarck. [1867-\\nsituation they could not take up the French chal-\\nlenge and allow war to break out not only would\\nthe feeling of the neutral Powers, of England and of\\nRussia, be against them, but that of Germany itself\\nwould be divided. With what force would the anti-\\nPrussian party in Bavaria and Wiirtemberg be able\\nto oppose a war undertaken apparently for the dynas-\\ntic interests of the Hohenzollern If, however, the\\nPrince now withdrew, the French would be able to\\nproclaim that he had done so in consequence of the\\nopen threats of France supposing they were able to\\nconnect the King in any way with him, then they\\nmight assert that they had checked the ambition of\\nPrussia Prussian prestige would be seriously injured\\nat home, and distrust of Prussian good faith would\\nbe aroused abroad.\\nThe King therefore had a difficult task when\\nBenedetti asked for an interview. He had been\\nbrought into this situation against his own will, and\\nhis former scruples seemed fully justified. He com-\\nplained of the violence of the French Press and the\\nMinistry he repeated the assertion that the Prus-\\nsian Government had been unconnected with the\\nnegotiations and had been ignorant of them he had\\navoided associating himself with them, and had only\\ngiven an opinion when Prince Leopold, having de-\\ncided to accept, asked his consent. He had then\\nacted, not in his sovereign capacity as King of Prus-\\nsia, but as head of the family. He had neither col-\\nlected nor summoned his council of Ministers, though\\nhe had informed Count Bismarck privately. He\\nrefused to use his authority to order the Prince to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0384.jp2"}, "383": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with France. 333\\nwithdraw, and said that he would leave him full\\nfreedom as he had done before.\\nThese statements were of course verbally true\\nprobably the King did not know to what extent\\nBismarck was responsible for the acceptance by\\nthe Prince. They did not make the confidence of\\nthe French any greater it was now apparent that the\\nKing had been asked, and had given his consent\\nwithout considering the effect on France they could\\nnot acquiesce in this distinction between his acts as\\nsovereign and his acts as head of the family, for, as\\nBenedetti pointed out, he was only head of the family\\nbecause he was sovereign.\\nAll this time Bismarck was still at Varzin while\\nParis was full of excitement, while there were hour-\\nly conferences of the Ministers and the city was\\nalready talking of war, the Prussian Ministers osten-\\ntatiously continued to enjoy their holidays. There\\nwas no danger in doing so the army was so well\\nprepared that they could afford quietly to await what\\nthe French would do. What Bismarck s plans and\\nhopes were we do not know; during these days he\\npreserved silence the violence of the French gave\\nhim a further reason for refusing to enter into any\\ndiscussion. When, however, he heard of Benedetti s\\nvisit to Ems he became uneasy he feared that the\\nKing would compromise himself; he feared that the\\nFrench would succeed in their endeavour to inflict\\na diplomatic defeat on Prussia. He proposed to go\\nto Ems to support the King, and on the 12th left\\nVarzin that night he arrived in Berlin. There\\nhe received the news that the Prince of Hohen-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0385.jp2"}, "384": {"fulltext": "334 Bismarck. [1867-\\nzollern, on behalf of his son, had announced his\\nwithdrawal.\\nThe retirement was probably the spontaneous act\\nof the Prince and his father the decisive influence\\nwas the fear lest the enmity of Napoleon might\\nendanger the position of the Prince of Roumania.\\nEveryone was delighted the cloud of war was dis-\\npelled two men only were dissatisfied Bismarck\\nand Grammont. It was the severest check which Bis-\\nmarck s policy had yet received he had persuaded\\nthe Prince to accept against his will he had per-\\nsuaded the King reluctantly to keep the negotia-\\ntions secret from Napoleon however others might\\ndisguise the truth, he knew that they had had to\\nretreat from an untenable position, and retreat before\\nthe noisy insults of the French Press and the open\\nmenace of the French Government his anger was\\nincreased by the fact that neither the King nor the\\nPrince had in this crisis acted as he would have\\nwished.\\nWe have no authoritative statement as to the\\ncourse he himself would have pursued he had, ac-\\ncording to his own statement, advised the King not\\nto receive the French Ambassador probably he\\nwished that the Prince should declare that as the\\nSpaniards had offered him the crown and he had\\naccepted it, he could not now withdraw unless he\\nwere asked to do so by Spain the attempt of Gram-\\nmont to fasten a quarrel on Prussia would have been\\ndeprived of any responsible pretext he would have\\nbeen compelled to bring pressure to bear on the Span-\\niards, with all the dangers that that course would", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0386.jp2"}, "385": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbj^eak of War with Finance. 335\\ninvolve. We may suspect that he had advised this\\ncourse and that his advice had been rejected. How-\\never this may be, Bismarck felt the reverse so keenly\\nthat it seemed to him impossible he could any longer\\nremain Minister, unless he could obtain redress for\\nthe insults and menaces of France. What prospect\\nwas there now of this It was no use now going on\\nto Ems; he proposed to return next day to Varzin,\\nand he expected that when he did so he would be\\nonce more a private man.\\nHe was to be saved by the folly of the French.\\nGrammont, vain, careless, and inaccurate, carried\\naway by his hatred of Prussia, hot-headed and blus-\\ntering, did not even see how great an advantage he\\nhad gained. When Guizot, now a very old man, living\\nin retirement, heard that the Prince had withdrawn,\\nhe exclaimed What good fortune these people\\nhave! This is the finest diplomatic victory which\\nhas been won in my lifetime. This is indeed the\\ntruth how easy it would have been to declare that\\nFrance had spoken and her wishes had been fulfilled\\nthe Government need have said no more, but every\\nFrenchman would have always told the story how\\nBismarck had tried to put a Hohenzollern on the\\nthrone of Spain, had been foiled by the word of the\\nEmperor, and had been driven from office. Gram-\\nmont prepared to complete the humiliation of Prussia,\\nand in doing so he lost all and more than all he had\\nwon.\\nHe had at first declared that the withdrawal of\\nthe Prince was worthless when it was officially com-\\nmunicated to him by Prussia now he extended his", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0387.jp2"}, "386": {"fulltext": "^T,6 Bismarck. [i867~\\ndemands. He suggested to the Prussian Ambassador\\nat Paris that the King should write to the Emperor\\na letter, in which he should express his regret for\\nwhat had happened and his assurance that he\\nhad had no intention of injuring France. To Ben-\\nedetti he telegraphed imperative orders that he was\\nto request from the King a guarantee for the future,\\nand a promise that he would never again allow the\\nPrince to return to the candidature. It was to give\\nhimself over to an implacable foe. As soon as Bis-\\nmarck heard from Werther of the first suggestion, he\\ntelegraphed to him a stern reprimand for having\\nlistened to demands so prejudicial to the honour of\\nhis master, and ordered him, under the pretext of ill\\nhealth, to depart from Paris and leave a post for\\nwhich he had shewn himself so ill-suited.\\nThat same morning he saw Lord Augustus Loftus,\\nand he explained that the incident was not yet\\nclosed Germany, he said, did not wish for war, but\\nthey did not fear it. They were not called on to\\nendure humiliations from France after what had\\nhappened they must have some security for the\\nfuture the Due de Grammont must recall or ex-\\nplain the language he had used France had begun\\nto prepare for war and that would not be allowed.\\nIt is clear, writes the English Ambassador, that\\nCount Bismarck and the Prussian Ministry regret the\\nattitude which the King has shewn to Count Benedetti,\\nand feel, in regard to public opinion, the necessity of\\nguarding the honour of the nation.\\nTo the Crown Prince, who had come to Berlin,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0388.jp2"}, "387": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with France. 2iZl\\nBismarck was more open he declared that war was\\nnecessary.\\nThis very day there were taking place at Ems\\nevents which were to give him the opportunity for\\nwhich he longed. On Benedetti had fallen the task\\nof presenting the new demands to the King it was\\none of the most ungrateful of the many unpleasant\\nduties which had been entrusted to him during the\\nlast few years. In the early morning, he went out in\\nthe hope that he might see someone of the Court\\nhe met the King, himself who was taking the waters.\\nThe King at once beckoned to him, entered into\\nconversation, and shewed him a copy of the Cologne\\nGazette containing the statement of the Prince s\\nwithdrawal. Benedetti then, as in duty bound,\\nasked permission to inform his Government that the\\nKing would undertake that the candidature should\\nnot be resumed at any time. The King, of course,\\nrefused, and, when Benedetti pressed the request,\\nrepeated the refusal with some emphasis, and then,\\nbeckoning to his adjutant, who had withdrawn a few\\npaces, broke off the conversation. When a few\\nhours later the King received a letter from the\\nPrince of Hohenzollern confirming the public state-\\nment, he sent a message to Benedetti by his aide-de-\\ncamp. Count Radziwill, and added to it that there\\nwould now be nothing further to say, as the incident\\nwas closed. Benedetti twice asked for another in-\\nterview, but it was refused.\\nHe had done his duty, he had made his request,\\nas he expected, in vain, but between him and the\\nKing there had been no departure by word or gest-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0389.jp2"}, "388": {"fulltext": "338 Bismarck. [i867-\\nure from the ordinary courtesy which we should ex-\\npect from these two accomplished gentlemen. All\\nthe proceedings indeed had been unusual, for it was\\nnot the habit of the King, as it was of Napoleon, to\\nreceive foreign envoys except on the advice of his\\nMinisters, and the last conversation had taken place\\non the public promenade of the fashionable water-\\ning-place but the exception had been explained\\nand justified by the theory that the King s interest in\\nthe affair was domestic and not political. Both were\\nanxious to avoid war, and the King to the last\\ntreated Benedetti with marked graciousness he had\\nwhile at Ems invited him to the royal table, and\\neven now, the next morning before leaving Ems,\\ngranted him an audience at the station to take leave.\\nNevertheless, he had been seriously annoyed by this\\nfresh demand he was pained and surprised by the\\ncontinuance of the French menaces he could not\\nbut fear that there was a deliberate intention to force\\na quarrel on him. He determined, therefore, to re-\\nturn to Berlin, and ordered Abeken, Secretary to\\nthe Foreign Office, who was with him, to telegraph\\nto Bismarck an account of what had taken place, with\\na suggestion that the facts should be published.\\nIt happened that Bismarck, when the telegram\\narrived, was dining with Roon and Moltke, who had\\nboth been summoned to Berlin. The three men\\nwere gloomy and depressed they felt that their\\ncountry had been humiliated, and they saw no pros-\\npect of revenge. This feeling was increased when\\nBismarck read aloud the telegram to his two col-\\nleagues. These repeated and impatient demands,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0390.jp2"}, "389": {"fulltext": "1870] Oiitbreak of War with France. 339\\nthis intrusion on the King s privacy, this ungenerous\\nplaying with his kindly and pacific disposition, stirred\\ntheir deepest indignation to them it seemed that\\nBenedetti had been treated with a consideration he\\ndid not deserve the man who came with these pro-\\nposals should have been repulsed with more marked\\nindignation. But in the suggestion that the facts\\nshould be published, Bismarck saw the opportunity\\nhe had wished. He went into the next room and\\ndrafted a statement he kept to the very words of\\nthe original telegram, but he left out much, and ar-\\nranged it so that it should convey to the reader the\\nimpression, not of what had really occurred, but of\\nwhat he would have wished should happen. With\\nthis he returned, and as he read it to them, Roon\\nand Moltke brightened here at last was an answer\\nto the French insults before, it sounded like a\\nChamade (a retreat), now it is a Fanfare,\\nsaid Moltke. That is better, said Roon. Bis-\\nmarck asked a few questions about the army. Roon\\nassured him that all was prepared Moltke, that,\\nthough no one could ever foretell with certainty the\\nresult of a great war, he looked to it with confidence\\nthey all knew that with the publication of this state-\\nment the last prospect of peace would be gone. It\\nwas published late that night in a special edition of\\nthe North German Gazette, and at the same time a\\ncopy was sent from the Foreign Office to all German\\nembassies and legations.\\nIt is not altogether correct to call this (as has often\\nbeen done) a falsification of the telegram. Under\\nno circumstances could Bismarck have published in", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0391.jp2"}, "390": {"fulltext": "340 Bismarck. [1867-\\nits original form the confidential nnessage to him from\\nhis sovereign all he had to do was to communi-\\ncate to the newspapers the facts of which he had\\nbeen informed, or so much of the facts as it seemed\\nto him desirable that the public should know. He,\\nof course, made the selection in such a form as to\\nproduce upon public opinion the particular effect\\nwhich for the purposes of his policy he wished.\\nWhat to some extent justifies the charge is that the\\naltered version was published under the heading,\\nEms. The official statement was supplemented\\nby another notice in the NortJi German Gazette, which\\nwas printed in large type, and stated that Benedetti\\nhad so far forgotten all diplomatic etiquette that he\\nhad allowed himself to disturb the King in his holi-\\ndays, to intercept him on the promenade, and to at-\\ntempt to force demands upon him. This was untrue,\\nbut on this point the telegram to Bismarck had been\\nitself incorrect. Besides this, Bismarck doubtless saw\\nto it that the right instructions should be given to\\nthe writers for the Press.\\nBut, indeed, this was hardly necessary the state-\\nment itself was a call to arms. During all these days\\nthe German people had been left almost Avithout in-\\nstruction or guidance from the Government they\\nhad heard with astonishment the sudden outbreak\\nof Gallic wrath they were told, and were inclined to\\nbelieve it, that the Prussian Government was inno-\\ncent of the hostile designs attributed to it and the\\ncalm of the Government had communicated itself to\\nthem. They remained quiet, but they were still un-\\neasy, they knew not what to think now all doubt", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0392.jp2"}, "391": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with France. 341\\nwas removed. It was then true that with unexam-\\npled eagerness the French had fastened an alien\\nquarrel upon them, had without excuse or justifica-\\ntion advanced from insult to insult and menace to\\nmenace and now, to crown their unparalleled acts,\\nthey had sent this foreigner to intrude on the reserve\\nof the aged King, and to insult him publicly in his\\nown country. Then false reports came from Ems\\nit was said that the King had publicly turned his\\nback on Benedetti on the promenade, that the Am-\\nbassador had followed the King to his house, and\\nhad at last been shewn the door, but that even\\nthen he had not scrupled again to intrude on the\\nKing at the railway station.* From one end of Ger-\\nmany to another a storm of indignation arose they\\nhad had enough of this French annoyance if the\\nFrench wished for war then war should they have\\nnow there could no longer be talk of Prussian ambi-\\ntion all differences of North and South were swept\\naway wherever the German tongue was spoken men\\nfelt that they had been insulted in the person of the\\nKing, that it was theirs to protect his honour, and\\nfrom that day he reigned in their hearts as uncrowned\\nEmperor.\\nThe telegram was as successful in France as in\\nGermany. There the question of peace and war\\nwas still in debate there was a majority for peace,\\nand indeed there was no longer an excuse for war\\nwhich would satisfy even a Frenchman. Then there\\nSome of the more exaggerated statements were contradicted at\\nthe time, apparently by Prince Radziwill, but in the excitement of\\nthe moment no one paid attention to this.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0393.jp2"}, "392": {"fulltext": "342 Bismarck. [1867-\\ncame in quick succession the recall and disavowment\\nof the Prussian Ambassador, news of the serious\\nlanguage Bismarck had used to Lord A. Loftus, and\\nthen despatches from other Courts that an official\\nmessage had been sent from Berlin carrying the\\nrecord of an insult offered to the King by the French\\nAmbassador add to this the changed tone of the\\nGerman Press, the enthusiasm with which the French\\nchallenge had been taken up they could have no\\ndoubt that they had gone too far they would now be\\nnot the accuser but the accused had they wished,\\nthey did not dare retreat with the fear of the Paris\\nmob before them, and so they decided on war, and\\non the 15th the official statement was made and\\napproved in the Chamber.\\nIt was on this same day that the King travelled\\nfrom Ems to Berlin. When he left Ems he still\\nrefused to believe in the serious danger of war, but\\nas he travelled north and saw the excited crowd\\nthat thronged to meet him at every station his own\\nbelief was almost overthrown. To his surprise, when\\nhe reached Brandenburg he found Bismarck and the\\nCrown Prince awaiting him the news that they had\\ncome to meet the King was itself looked on almost\\nas a declaration of war all through the return\\njourney Bismarck unsuccessfully tried to persuade\\nhis master to give the order for mobilisation. When\\nthey reached Berlin they found the station again\\nsurrounded by a tumultuous throng; through it\\npressed one of the secretaries of the Foreign Office\\nhe brought the news that the order for mobilisation\\nhad been given in France. Then, at last, the reluc-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0394.jp2"}, "393": {"fulltext": "1870]\\nOutbreak of War with France. 343\\ntance of the King was broken down he gave the\\norder, and at once the Crown Prince, who was stand-\\ning near, proclaimed the news to all within earshot.\\nThe North German Parliament was summoned, and\\nfive days later Bismarck was able to announce to\\nthem that he had received the Declaration of War\\nfrom France, adding as he did so that this was the\\nfirst ofScial communication which throughout the\\nwhole affair he had received from the French Govern-\\nment, a circumstance for which there was no prece-\\ndent in history.\\nWhat a contrast is there between the two countries\\nOn the one hand, a King and a Minister who by seven\\nyears of loyal co-operation have learnt to trust and\\ndepend upon one another, who together have faced\\ndanger, who have not shrunk from extreme un-\\npopularity, and who, just for this reason, can now\\ndepend on the absolute loyalty of the people. On\\nthe other side, the Emperor broken in health, his\\nwill shattered by prolonged pain and sickness,\\ntrying by the introduction of liberal institutions to\\nfree himself from the burden of government and\\nweight of responsibility which he had voluntarily\\ntaken upon his shoulders. At Berlin, Bismarck s\\nseverity and love of power had brought it about that\\nthe divergent policy and uncertainty of early years\\nhad ceased there was one mind and one will direct-\\ning this State the unauthorised interference and\\namateur criticism of courtiers were no longer per-\\nmitted. In France, all the evils from which Prussia\\nhad been freed by Bismarck were increasing here\\nthere was no single will the Ministry were divided.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0395.jp2"}, "394": {"fulltext": "344 Bismarck. [1867-\\nthere was no authority over them no one could\\nforesee by whom the decision of the Emperor would\\nbe determined the deliberate results of long and\\npainful negotiations might be overthrown in ten\\nminutes by the interference of the Empress or the\\nadvice of Prince Napoleon. The Emperor would\\npursue half a dozen inconsistent policies in as many\\nhours. And then, below all, there was this fatal\\nfact, that Napoleon could not venture to be un-\\npopular. He knew the folly of the course into which\\nhe was being driven, but he did not dare to face the\\nmob of Paris, or to defy the Chamber of Deputies.\\nHe owed his throne to universal suffrage, and he\\nknew that the people who had set him up could\\nquickly overthrow him. No man can ever govern\\nwho fears unpopularity. Bismarck did not, Napoleon\\ndid.\\nBefore the campaign began, two events took place\\nwhich we must record. The first was the publica-\\ntion in the Times of the text of the treaty with\\nFrance regarding Belgium. We need not add any-\\nthing further to what we have said regarding it\\npublished at this moment it had a great effect on\\nEnglish public opinion. The other arose out of\\nthe opposition which the exiled King of Hanover\\nhad continued to maintain. He had used the very\\nlarge sums of money which he possessed to keep\\ntogether a Hanoverian Legion, recruited from former\\noflficers and soldiers of the Hanoverian army. He\\nhad hoped that war would break out before this\\nand would be accompanied ,by a rising in Hanover.\\nHis means had now come to an end, and the un-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0396.jp2"}, "395": {"fulltext": "1870] Outbreak of War with Fra^tce. 345\\nfortunate men were living in Paris almost without\\nsupport. They were now exposed to a terrible\\nalternative. They could not return to Germany\\nthey did not wish to take part in a war on the\\nFrench side. Their only hope was emigration to\\nAmerica. Bismarck heard of their position he\\noffered to pardon them all and to pay to them from\\nthe Prussian funds the full pension which they would\\nhave received had they continued to serve in the\\nHanoverian army. It was a timely act of generosity,\\nand it had the effect that the last element of hostil-\\nity in Germany was stilled and the whole nation\\ncould unite as one man in this foreign war.\\nNote. In this chapter, besides the ordinary authorities, I have\\ndepended largely on the memoirs of the King of Roumania. Bis-\\nmarck, in his own memoirs, states that the writer was not accurately\\ninformed but even if there are some errors in detail, the remarkable\\nstatements contained in this work must command belief until they\\nare fully contradicted and disproved. There has, I believe, been no\\nattempt to do this.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0397.jp2"}, "396": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIV.\\nTHE WAR WITH FRANCE AND FOUNDATION OF THE\\nEMPIRE.\\n1870- 1 87 1.\\nON July 31, 1870, Bismarck left Berlin with\\nthe King for the seat of war, for, as in 1866,\\nhe was to accompany the army in the field.\\nFor the next few months indeed Germany was to\\nbe governed from the soil of France, and it was\\nnecessary for the Minister to be constantly with the\\nKing. Bismarck never forgot that he was a soldier\\nhe was more proud of his general s uniform than of\\nhis civil rank, and, though not a combatant, it was\\nhis pride and pleasure that he should share something\\nof the hardships and dangers of war. He was as a\\nmatter of fact never so well as during the campaign\\nthe early hours, the moderate and at times meagre\\nfood, the long hours in the saddle and the open air,\\nrestored the nerves and health which had been\\ninjured by the annoyances of ofifice, late hours, and\\nprolonged sedentary work. He was accompanied\\nby part of the staff of the Foreign Office, and many\\nof the distinguished strangers who followed the\\n346", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0398.jp2"}, "397": {"fulltext": "1870]\\nWar zvith Finance. 347\\narmy were often guests at his table he especially\\nshewed his old friendliness for Americans General\\nSheridan and many others of his countrymen found\\na hearty welcome from the Chancellor.\\nIt was not till the 17th of August that the head-\\nquarters came up with the fighting front of the\\narmy but the next day, during the decisive battle\\nof Gravelotte, Bismarck watched the combat by the\\nside of the King, and, as at Koniggratz, they more\\nthan once came under fire. At one period, Bis-\\nmarck was in considerable danger of being taken\\nprisoner. His two sons were serving in the army;\\nthey were dragoons in the Cuirassiers of the Guards,\\nserving in the ranks in the same regiment whose\\nuniform their father was entitled to wear. They\\nboth took part in the terrible cavalry charge at\\nMars-la-Tour, in which their regiment suffered so\\nseverely the eldest, Count Herbert, was wounded\\nand had to be invalided home. Bismarck could\\njustly boast that there was no nepotism in the Prus-\\nsian Government when his two sons were serving as\\nprivates. It was not till the war had gone on some\\nweeks and they had taken part in many engage-\\nments, that they received their commissions. This\\nwould have happened in no other country or army.\\nThis was the true equality, so different from the\\nexaggerated democracy of France, an equality not\\nof privilege but of obligation every Pomeranian\\npeasant who sent his son to fight and die in France\\nknew that the sons of the most powerful man in the\\ncountry and in Europe were fighting with them not\\nas officers but as comrades. Bismarck was more", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0399.jp2"}, "398": {"fulltext": "34^ Bismarck. [1870-\\nfortunate than his friends in that neither of his sons\\nnor any of his near relatives lost his life Roon s\\nsecond son fell at Sedan, and the bloody days of\\nMars-la-Tour and Gravelotte placed in mourning\\nnearly every noble family in Prussia.\\nFrom Gravelotte to Sedan he accompanied the\\narmy, and he was by the King s side on that fatal\\nday when the white flag was hoisted on the citadel\\nof Sedan, and the French general came out of the\\ntown with the message that Napoleon, having in\\nvain sought death at the head of his troops, placed\\nhis sword in the hands of the King of Prussia.\\nThe surrender of Sedan was a military event, and\\nthe conditions had to be arranged between Moltke\\nand Wimpffen, who had succeeded MacMahon in\\ncommand, but Bismarck was present at the confer-\\nence, which was held in his quarters, in case political\\nquestions arose. As they rode down together to\\nDoncheroy he and Moltke had agreed that no terms\\ncould be offered except the unconditional surrender\\nof the whole army, the officers alone being allowed\\nto retain their swords. Against thes6 conditions\\nWimpffen and his companions struggled long, but in\\nvain. Moltke coldly assured them that they could\\nnot escape, and that it would be madness to begin\\nthe fight again they were surrounded if the sur-\\nrender were not complete by four o clock the next\\nmorning the bombardment of the town would begin.\\nWimpffen suggested that it would be more politic of\\nthe Germans to show generosity they would thereby\\nearn the gratitude of France, and this might be\\nmade the beginning of a lasting peace,; otherwise", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0400.jp2"}, "399": {"fulltext": "1871] War with France. 349\\nwhat had they to look forward to but a long series\\nof wars Now was the time for Bismarck to inter-\\nfere it was impossible, he declared, to reckon on the\\ngratitude of nations at times men might indeed\\nbuild with confidence on that of a sovereign and his\\nfamily but I repeat, nothing can be expected from\\nthe gratitude of a nation. Above all was this true\\nof France. The Governments there have so little\\npower, the changes are so quick and so unforeseen,\\nthat there is nothing on which one can rely. Be-\\nsides, it would be absurd to imagine that France\\nwould ever forgive us our successes. You are an\\nirritable and jealous people, envious and jealous to\\nthe last degree. You have not forgiven us Sadowa,\\nand would you forgive us Sedan? Never.\\nThey could not therefore modify the terms in or-\\nder to win the gratitude and friendship of France\\nthey might have done so had there been prospects\\nof immediate peace. One of the officers, General\\nCastelnau, announced that he had a special message\\nfrom Napoleon, who had sent his sword to the King\\nand surrendered in the hope that the King would\\nappreciate the sacrifice and grant a more honourable\\ncapitulation. Whose sword is it that the Emperor\\nNapoleon has surrendered asked Bismarck is it\\nthe sword of France or his own? If it is the sword\\nof France the conditions can be greatly softened\\nyour message would have an extraordinary import-\\nance. He thought and he hoped that the Em-\\nperor wished to sue for peace, but it was not so.\\nIt is only the sword of the Emperor, answered\\nthe General. All then remains as it was, said", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0401.jp2"}, "400": {"fulltext": "350 Bismarck. [1870-\\nMoltke; he insisted on his demands; Wimpffen asked\\nat least that time might be allowed him to return to\\nSedan and consult his colleagues. He had only\\ncome from Algeria two days before he could not\\nbegin his command by signing so terrible a surrender.\\nEven this Moltke refused. Then Wimpffen declared\\nthe conference ended rather than this they would\\ncontinue the battle he asked that his horses might\\nbe brought. A terrible silence fell on the room\\nMoltke, with Bismarck by his side, stood cold and im-\\npenetrable, facing the three French officers their\\nfaces were lighted by two candles on the table be-\\nhind stood the stalwart forms of the German ofificers\\nof the staff, and from the walls of the room looked\\ndown the picture of Napoleon I. Then again Bis-\\nmarck interfered he begged Wimpffen not in a mo-\\nment of pique to take a step which must have such\\nhorrible consequences he whispered a few words to\\nMoltke, and procured from him a concession hos-\\ntilities should not be renewed till nine o clock the\\nnext morning. Wimpffen might return to Sedan\\nand report to the Emperor and his colleagues.\\nIt was past midnight when the conference broke\\nup before daybreak Bismarck was aroused by a\\nmessenger who announced that the Emperor had\\nleft Sedan and wished to see him. He hastily sprang\\nup, and as he was, unwashed, without breakfast,\\nin his undress uniform, his old cap, and his high\\nboots, shewing all the marks of his long day in the\\nsaddle, he mounted his horse and rode down to the\\nspot near the highroad where the Emperor in his\\ncarriage, accompanied by three officers and attended", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0402.jp2"}, "401": {"fulltext": "1871] War with France. 351\\nby three more on horseback, awaited him. Bismarck\\nrode quickly up to him, dismounted, and as he ap-\\nproached saluted and removed his cap, though this\\nwas contrary to etiquette, but it was not a time when\\nhe wished even to appear to be wanting in courtesy.\\nNapoleon had come to plead for the army he wished\\nto see the King, for he hoped that in a personal in-\\nterview he might extract from him more favourable\\nterms. Bismarck was determined just for this reason\\nthat the sovereigns should not meet until the capitu-\\nlation was signed he answered, therefore, that it\\nwas impossible, as the King was ten miles away. He\\nthen accompanied the Emperor to a neighbouring\\ncottage; there in a small room, ten feet square, con-\\ntaining a wooden table and two rush chairs, they sat\\nfor some time talking afterwards they came down\\nand sat smoking in front of the cottage.\\nA wonderful contrast to our last meeting in the\\nTuileries, wrote Bismarck to his wife. Our conversa-\\ntion was difificult, if I was to avoid matters which would\\nbe painful to the man who had been struck down by the\\nmighty hand of God. He first lamented this unhappy\\nwar, which he said he had not desired he had been\\nforced into it by the pressure of public opinion. I\\nanswered that with us also no one, least of all the King,\\nhad wished for the war. We had looked on the Spanish\\naffair as Spanish and not as German.\\nThe Emperor asked for more favourable terms of\\nsurrender, but Bismarck refused to discuss this with\\nhim it was a military question which must be settled\\nbetween Moltke and Wimpffen. On the other hand,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0403.jp2"}, "402": {"fulltext": "352 Bismarck. ti870-\\nwhen Bismarck enquired if he were inclined for ne-\\ngotiations for peace, Napoleon answered that he\\ncould not discuss this he was a prisoner of war and\\ncould not treat he referred Bismarck to the Govern-\\nment in Paris.\\nThis meeting had therefore no effect on the situa-\\ntion. Bismarck suggested that the Emperor should\\ngo to the neighbouring Chateau of Belle Vue, which\\nwas not occupied by wounded there he would be\\nable to rest. Thither Bismarck, now in full uniform\\n(for he had hurried back to his own quarters), accom-\\npanied him, and in the same house the negotiations\\nof the previous evening were continued Bismarck\\ndid not wish to be present at them, for, as he said,\\nthe military men could be harsher and so gave\\norders that after a few minutes he should be sum-\\nmoned out of the room by a message that the King\\nwished to see him. After the capitulation was signed,\\nhe rode up with Moltke to present it to the King,\\nwho received it on the heights whence he had watched\\nthe battle, surrounded by the headquarters staff and\\nall the princes who were making the campaign. Then,\\nfollowed by a brilliant cavalcade, he rode down to\\nvisit the captive sovereign.\\nBismarck would at this time willingly have made\\npeace, but there was no opportunity of opening\\nnecfotiations and it is doubtful whether even his\\ninfluence would have been able successfully to com-\\nbat the desire of the army to march on Paris. On\\nSeptember 4th, the march, which had been inter-\\nrupted ten days before, was begun. Immediately\\nafterwards news came which stopped all hopes of a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0404.jp2"}, "403": {"fulltext": "i: J", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0405.jp2"}, "404": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0406.jp2"}, "405": {"fulltext": "1871]\\nWar with France. 353\\nspeedy peace. How soon was his warning as to the\\ninstability of French Governments to be fulfilled\\nA revolution had broken out in Paris, the dethrone-\\nment of the Emperor had been proclaimed, and a\\nProvisional Government instituted. They at once\\ndeclared that they were a government of national\\ndefence, they would not rest till the invaders were\\ndriven from the land, they appealed to the memo-\\nries of 1792. They were indeed ready to make\\npeace, for the war, they said, had been undertaken\\nnot against France but against the Emperor the\\nEmperor had fallen, a free France had arisen they\\nwould make peace, but they would not yield an inch\\nof their country or a stone of their fortresses. With\\ngreat energy they prepared the defence of Paris and\\nthe organisation of new armies M. Thiers was in-\\nstructed to visit the neutral Courts and to beg for\\nthe support of Europe.\\nUnder these circumstances it was Bismarck s duty\\nto explain the German view he did so in two circu-\\nlar notes of September i 3th and September i6th. He\\nbegan by expounding those principles he had already\\nexpressed to Wimpffen, principles which had already\\nbeen communicated by his secretaries to the Ger-\\nman Press and been repeated in almost every paper\\nof the country. The war had not been caused by\\nthe Emperor it was the nation which was responsi-\\nble for it. It had arisen from the intolerance of the\\nFrench character, which looked on the prosperity of\\nother nations as an insult to themselves. They\\nmust expect the same feeling to continue\\nWe cannot seek guarantees for the future in French\\n23", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0407.jp2"}, "406": {"fulltext": "354 Bis7narck. [1870-\\nfeeling. We must not deceive ourselves we must soon\\nexpect a new attack we cannot look forward to a\\nlasting peace, and this is quite independent of the con-\\nditions we might impose on France. It is their defeat\\nwhich the French nation will never forgive. If now we\\nwere to withdraw from France without any accession of\\nterritory, without any contribution, without any advan-\\ntage but the glory of our arms, there would remain in\\nthe French nation the same hatred, the same spirit of\\nrevenge, for the injury done to their vanity and to their\\nlove of power.\\nAgainst this they must demand security the de-\\nmand was addressed not to any single Government\\nbut to the nation as a whole South Germany must\\nbe protected from the danger of French attack\\nthey would never be safe so long as Strasburg and\\nMetz were in French hands Strasburg was the gate\\nof Germany restored to Germany, these cities\\nwould regain their defensive character. Twenty\\ntimes had France made war on Germany, but from\\nGermany no danger of disturbance to the peace of\\nEurope was to be feared.\\nFor the first time he hereby officially stated that\\nGermany would not make peace without some ac-\\ncession of territory that this would be the case,\\neveryone had known since the beginning of the war.\\nAt a council of war directly after Gravelotte it was\\ndetermined to require Alsace after Sedan the terms\\nnaturally rose. The demand for at least some terri-\\ntory was indeed inevitable. The suggestion that\\nfrom confidence in the peaceful and friendly charac-\\nter of the French nation they should renounce all", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0408.jp2"}, "407": {"fulltext": "1871] War zvith Frmice. 355\\nthe advantages gained by their unparalleled victor-\\nies scarcely deserved serious consideration. Had\\nthe French been successful they would have taken\\nall the left bank of the Rhine this was actually\\nspecified in the draft treaty which General Le Brun\\nhad presented to the Emperor of Austria. What\\nclaim had France to be treated with a leniency which\\nshe has never shewn to any conquered enemy\\nBismarck had to meet the assumption that France\\nwas a privileged and special land that she had free-\\ndom to conquer, pillage, and divide the land of her\\nneighbours, but that every proposal to win back from\\nher what she had taken from others was a crime\\nagainst humanity.\\nSo long as the Provisional Government adopted\\nthe attitude that they would not even consider peace\\non the basis of some surrender of territory, there was\\nno prospect of any useful negotiations. The armies\\nmust advance, and beneath the walls of Paris the\\nstruggle be fought out to its bitter end. Bismarck\\nmeanwhile treated the Government with great re-\\nserve. They had no legal status as he often pointed\\nout, the Emperor was still the only legal authority in\\nFrance, and he would be quite prepared to enter into\\nnegotiations with him. When by the medium of the\\nEnglish Ambassador they asked to be allowed to open\\nnegotiations for an armistice and discuss the terms\\nof peace, he answered by the question. What guaran-\\ntee was there that France or the armies in Metz and\\nStrasburg would recognise the arrangements made\\nby the present Government in Paris, or any that\\nmight succeed it It was a quite fair question for as", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0409.jp2"}, "408": {"fulltext": "356 Bismarck. Li 870-\\nevents were to shew, the commander of the army\\nin Metz refused to recognise them, and wished to\\nrestore the Emperor to the throne and the Govern-\\nment themselves had declared that they would at\\nonce be driven from power if they withdrew from their\\ndetermination not to accept the principle of a ces-\\nsion of territory. They would be driven from power\\nby the same authority to which they owed their ex-\\nistence, the mob of Paris it was the mob of Paris\\nwhich, from the beginning, was really responsible\\nfor the war. What use was there in a negotiation\\nin which the two parties had no common ground\\nNone the less Bismarck consented to receive M.\\nJules Favre, who held the portfolio of Foreign Af-\\nfairs, and who at the advice of Lord Lyons came\\nout from Paris, even at the risk of a rebuff, to see if\\nby a personal interview he might not be able to influ-\\nence the German Chancellor. It is well at least to\\nsee what sort of man he is, was the explanation\\nwhich Bismarck gave but as the interview was not\\nstrictly official he did not, by granting it, bind him-\\nself to recognise Favre s authority.\\nJules Favre met Bismarck on September i8th.\\nThey had a long conversation that evening, and it\\nwas continued the next day at Ferrieres, Baron\\nRothschild s house, in which the King was at that\\ntime quartered. The French envoy did not make\\na favourable impression a lawyer by profession, he\\nhad no experience in diplomatic negotiations vain,\\nverbose, rhetorical, and sentimental, his own report\\nof the interview which he presented to his colleagues\\nin Paris is sufficient evidence of his incapacity, for the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0410.jp2"}, "409": {"fulltext": "1871] War with France. 357\\ntask he had taken upon himself. He spoke to me\\nas if I were a public meeting, said Bismarck after-\\nwards, using an expression which in his mouth was\\npeculiarly contemptuous, for he had a platonic dis-\\nlike of long speeches. But let us hear Favre him-\\nself\\nAlthough fifty-eight years of, age Count Bismarck\\nappeared to be in full vigour. His tall figure, his power-\\nful head, his strongly marked features gave him an as-\\npect both imposing and severe, tempered, however, by a\\nnatural simplicity amounting to good-nature. His man-\\nners were courteous and grave, and quite free from\\nstiffness or affectation. As soon as the conversation com-\\nmenced he displayed a communicativeness and good-\\nwill which he preserved while it lasted. He certainly\\nregarded me as a negotiator unworthy of him and he\\nhad the politeness not to let this be seen, and appeared\\ninterested by my sincerity. I was struck with the clear-\\nness of his ideas, his vigorous good sense, and his origin-\\nality of mind. His freedom from all pretensions was no\\nless remarkable.\\nIt is interesting to compare with this the account\\ngiven by another Frenchman of one of the later\\ninterviews between the two men\\nThe negotiations began seriously and quietly. The\\nChancellor said simply and seriously what he wanted\\nwith astonishing frankness and admirable logic. He\\nwent straight to the mark and at every turn he discon-\\ncerted Jules Favre, who was accustomed to legal quibbles\\nand diplomatic jobbery, and did not in the least under-\\n*Comte Herisson d Herisson, yournal d u7i officier d orjonnance.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0411.jp2"}, "410": {"fulltext": "358 Bismarck. [1870-\\nstand the perfect loyalty of his opponent or his superb\\nfashion of treating questions, so different from the\\nordinary method. The Chancellor expressed himself in\\nFrench with a fidelity I have never met with except\\namong the Russians. He made use of expressions at\\nonce elegant and vigorous, finding the proper word to\\ndescribe an idea or define a situation without effort or\\nhesitation.\\nI was at the outset struck by the contrast between\\nthe two negotiators. Count Bismarck wore the uniform\\nof the White Cuirassiers, white tunic, white cap, and\\nyellow band. He looked like a giant. In his tight\\nuniform, with his broad chest and square shoulders and\\nbursting with health and strength, he overwhelmed the\\nstooping, thin, tall, miserable-looking lawyer with his\\nfrock coat, wrinkled all over, and his white hair falling\\nover his collar. A look, alas, at the pair was sufficient to\\ndistinguish between the conqueror and the conquered,\\nthe strong and the weak.\\nThis, however, was four months later, when Jules\\nFavre was doubtless much broken by the anxieties\\nof his position, and perhaps also by the want of\\nsufficient food, and Comte d H^risson is not an\\nimpartial witness, for, though a patriotic Frenchman,\\nhe was an enemy of the Minister.\\nBismarck in granting the interview had said that\\nhe would not discuss an armistice, but only terms of\\npeace. For the reasons we have explained, Favre\\nrefused to listen even to the proposition of the only\\nterms which Bismarck was empowered to bring for-\\nward. The Chancellor explained those ideas with\\nwhich we are already acquainted Strasburg, he", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0412.jp2"}, "411": {"fulltext": "1871] War with France. 359\\nsaid, is the key of our house and we must have it.\\nFavre protested that he could not discuss conditions\\nwhich were so dishonourable to France. On this\\nexpression we need only quote Bismarck s comment\\nI did not succeed in convincing him that conditions,\\nthe fulfilment of which France had required from Italy,\\nand demanded from Germany without having been at\\nwar, conditions which France would undoubtedly have\\nimposed upon us had we been defeated and which had\\nbeen the result of nearly every war, even in the latest\\ntime, could not have anything dishonourable in them-\\nselves for a country which had been defeated after a\\nbrave resistance, and that the honour of France was not\\nof a different kind to that of other countries.\\nIt was impossible to refuse to discuss terms of an\\narmistice as in 1 866 the military authorities objected\\nto any kind of armistice because from a military point\\nof view any cessation of hostilities must be an advan-\\ntage to France it would enable them to continue\\ntheir preparations and get together new armies,\\nwhile Germany would have the enormous expense\\nof maintaining 500,000 men in a foreign country.\\nBismarck himself from a political point of view also\\nknew the advantage of bringing the war to a rapid\\nclose, while the moral effect of the great victories\\nhad not been dissipated. However, France had no\\nGovernment a legal Government could not be\\ncreated without elections, and Favre refused to con-\\nsider holding elections during the progress of hos-\\ntilities. After a long discussion Bismarck, other\\nsuggestions being rejected, offered an armistice on", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0413.jp2"}, "412": {"fulltext": "360 Bismarck. [1870-\\ncondition that the war should continue round Metz\\nand Paris, but that Toul and Strasburg should be\\nsurrendered and the garrison of Strasburg made\\nprisoners of war. The towns would anyhow fall\\ninto our hands, he said it is only a question of\\nengineering. At these words, says Favre, I\\nsprang into the air from pain and cried out, You\\nforget that you speak to a Frenchman. To sacrifice\\nan heroic garrison which is the object of our admira-\\ntion and that of the world would be a cowardice. I\\ndo not promise even to say that you have offered\\nsuch a condition. Bismarck said that he had no\\nwish to offend him if the King allowed it the\\narticle might be modified he left the room, and\\nafter a quarter of an hour returned, saying that the\\nKing would accept no alteration on this point. My\\npowers were exhausted, writes Favre I feared\\nfor a moment that I should fall down I turned\\naway to overcome the tears which choked me, and,\\nwhile I excused myself for this involuntary weakness,\\nI took leave with a few simple words. He asked\\nBismarck not to betray his weakness. The Count,\\nwho seems really to have been touched by the display\\nof emotion, attempted in some sort of way to console\\nhim, but a few days later his sympathy was changed\\ninto amusement when he found that the tears which\\nhe had been asked to pass over in silence were\\nparaded before the people of Paris to prove the\\npatriotism of the man, He may have meant it,\\nsaid Bismarck, but people ought not to bring\\nsentiment into politics.\\nThe terras which Bismarck had offered were gs a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0414.jp2"}, "413": {"fulltext": "1871]\\nWar with France. 361\\nmatter of fact not at at all harsh a week later the\\ngarrison of Strasburg had become prisoners of war\\nhad the French accepted the armistice and begun\\nnegotiations for peace they would probably, though\\nthey could not have saved Strasburg and Alsace,\\nhave received far better terms than those to which\\nthey had to assent four months later.\\nBismarck in refusing to recognise the Provisional\\nGovernment always reminded them that the Em-\\nperor was still the only legitimate Government in\\nFrance. He professed that he was willing to ne-\\ngotiate with the Emperor, and often talked of releas-\\ning him from his confinement in Germany, coming to\\nterms with Bazaine, and allowing the Emperor at\\nthe head of the army at Metz to regain his authority\\nin France. We do not quite know to what extent\\nhe was serious in using this language, for he often\\nthreatened more than he intended to perform. It is\\nat least possible that he only used it as a means for\\ncompelling the Provisional Government quickly to\\ncome to terms and thereby to bring the war to an\\nend. It is, however, certain that negotiations went\\non between him and the Empress and also with\\nBazaine. They came to nothing because the Em-\\npress absolutely refused to negotiate if she was to\\nbe required to surrender any French territory. In\\nthis she adopted the language of the Provisional\\nGovernment in Paris, and was supported by the\\nEmperor.\\nThe negotiations with the Provisional Govern-\\nment were more than once renewed soon after\\nthe investiture of Paris had begun, General Burnside", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0415.jp2"}, "414": {"fulltext": "362 Bismarck.\\n[1870-\\nand another American passed as unofficial mes-\\nsengers between the French and German Govern-\\nments, and at the beginning of November, Thiers\\ncame as the official agent of the Government in\\nTours these attempts were, however, always without\\nresult the French would not accept an armistice on\\nthe only conditions which Bismarck was authorised by\\nthe King and the military authorities to offer. Dur-\\ning the rest of the year there was little direct com-\\nmunication with the French authorities. Bismarck,\\nhowever, was not idle. In his quarters at Versailles\\nhe had with him many of the Foreign Office staff\\nhe had not only to conduct important diplomatic\\nnegotiations, but also to maintain control over the\\nnation, to keep in touch with the Press, to communi-\\ncate to the newspapers both events and comments\\non them. At this crisis he could not leave public\\nopinion without proper direction he had to com-\\nbat the misstatements of the French, who had so\\nlong had the ear of Europe, and were still carrying\\ntheir grievances to the Courts of the neutral Powers,\\nand found often eager advocates in the Press of the\\nneutral countries. He had to check the proposal of\\nthe neutral Powers to interfere between the two\\ncombatants, to inform the German public of the\\ndemands that were to be made on France and the\\nproposals for the unity of the country, and to justify\\nthe policy of the Government all this was done not\\nonly by official notes, but by articles written at his\\ndictation or under his instruction, and by information\\nor suggestions conveyed by his secretaries to his\\nnewspapers, Jn old days the Prqssian Goy^rnnaent", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0416.jp2"}, "415": {"fulltext": "1871] War with Finance. 363\\nhad been inarticulate, it had never been able to de-\\nfend itself against the attacks of foreign critics it\\nhad suffered much by misrepresentation it had lost\\npopularity at home and prestige abroad. In the\\nformer struggles with France the voice of Germany\\nhad scarcely been heard Europe, which was accus-\\ntomed to listen to every whisper from Paris, ignored\\nthe feelings and the just grievances of Germany.\\nBismarck changed all this now he saw to it that\\nthe policy of the Government should be explained\\nand defended in Germany itself for though he de-\\nspised public opinion when it claimed to be the\\ncanon by which the Government should be directed,\\nhe never neglected this, as he never neglected any\\nmeans by which the Government might be strength-\\nened. Speaking now from Versailles, he could be\\nconfident that Europe would listen to what Ger-\\nmany said, and it was no small benefit to his nation\\nthat it had as its spokesman a man whose character\\nand abilities ensured that no word that he uttered\\nwould be neglected.\\nThe neutral Powers really gave him little concern.\\nThere was no intention of supporting France either\\nin England, Russia, or Austria. He shewed great\\nactivity, however, in defending the Germans from\\nthe charges so freely made against them by the\\nFrench Press, of conducting the war in a cruel man-\\nner; charges which were untrue, for, according to\\nthe unanimous testimony of foreign observers who\\naccompanied the army, the moderation of the Ger-\\nman soldiers was as remarkable as their successes.\\nBismarck was not content with rebutting unjust ac-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0417.jp2"}, "416": {"fulltext": "364 Bismarck. [1870~\\ncusations, he carried on the war into the enemy s\\ncamp. He was especially indignant at the misuse\\nmade by the French of irregular troops he often\\nmaintained that the German soldiers ought never to\\nimprison the franc-tireurs, but shoot them at once.\\nHe feared that if civilians were encouraged to take\\npart in the war it would necessarily assume a very\\ncruel character. At Meaux he came upon a number\\nof franc-tireurs who had been taken prisoners.\\nYou are assassins, gentlemen, he said to them\\nyou will all be hung. And, indeed, these men\\nwho fired secretly on the German troops from be-\\nhind hedges and in forests, and had no kind of uni-\\nform, could not claim to be treated as prisoners of\\nwar. When the bombardment of Paris began he\\ntook great pains to defend a measure which was\\nmuch attacked in other countries he had used all\\nhis influence that the bombardment should not be\\ndelayed, and often spoke with great annoyance of\\nthe reluctance of the military authorities to begin.\\nHe wished every measure to be taken which would\\nbring the war to an end as soon as possible. The\\nlong delay before Paris seems to have affected his\\nnerves and spirits there were many anxious hours,\\nand it was always difficult for him to wait patiently\\nthe result of what others were doing. The military\\nauthorities were, as always, very jealous of all at-\\ntempts by him to interfere in their department, and\\nhe was not always satisfied with their decisions.\\nLike all the Germans he was surprised and angry at\\nthe unexpected resistance of Paris, and the success\\nof Gambetta s appeal to the nation. He was espe-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0418.jp2"}, "417": {"fulltext": "1871]\\nWar zvith France. 365\\ndaily indignant at the help which Garibaldi gave\\nThis, he said, is the gratitude of the Italians\\nhe declared that he would have the General taken\\nprisoner and paraded through the streets of Berlin.\\nDuring the long weeks at Versailles, Bismarck was\\nmuch occupied with German affairs. The victory of\\nSedan was the foundation of German unity Bis-\\nmarck s moderation and reserve now earned its re-\\nward he had always refused to press the southern\\nStates into the Federation; now the offer to join\\ncame from them. Baden asked, as she had already\\ndone at the beginning of the year, to be received\\ninto the Union the settlement with Wiirtemberg,\\nand above all with Bavaria, was less simple. At the\\nrequest of the Bavarian Government Delbriick was\\nsent to Munich for an interchange of opinion, and\\nthe negotiations which were begun there were after-\\nwards continued at Versailles and Berlin. There\\nwere many difficulties to be overcome the Bava-\\nrians were very jealous of their independence and\\nwere not prepared to put themselves into the posi-\\ntion which, for instance, Saxony occupied. But the\\ndifficulties on the Prussian side were equally great\\nthe Liberal party wished that the Constitution\\nshould be revised and those points in it which they\\nhad always disliked altered they would have made\\nthe government of the Federal authorities more\\ndirect, have created a Federal Ministry and a Federal\\nUpper House, and so really changed the Federation\\ninto a simple State, thereby taking away all the in-\\ndependence of the dynasties. It was quite certain\\nthat Bavaria would not accept this, and there was", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0419.jp2"}, "418": {"fulltext": "366 Bismarck. [1870-\\nsome considerable danger that their exaggerated\\ndemands might lead to a reaction in South Germany.\\nProbably under any circumstances the unification of\\nGermany would have been completed, but it required\\nall Bismarck s tact to prevent the outbreak of a regu-\\nlar party struggle. The most extreme line was\\ntaken by the Crown Prince of Prussia he desired\\nthe immediate creation of an emperor who should\\nhave sovereign authority over the whole of Ger-\\nmany, and he even went so far as to suggest that, if\\nthe Bavarians would not accept this voluntarily,\\nthey might be compelled to do so. He had re-\\npeated conversations with Bismarck on this, and on\\none occasion at least it ended in an angry scene. The\\nCrown Prince wished to threaten the South Ger-\\nmans. There is no danger, he said let us take a\\nfirm and commanding attitude. You will see I was\\nright in maintaining that you are not nearly suffi-\\nciently conscious of your own power. It is almost\\nincredible that he should have used such language,\\nbut the evidence is conclusive he was at this time\\ncommanding the Bavarian troops against the French\\nBavaria had with great loyalty supported Prussia\\nthrough the war and performed very valuable serv-\\nices, and now he proposed to reward their friendship\\nby compelling them to accept terms by which the\\nindependence of the King and the very existence of\\nthe State would be endangered. The last request\\nwhich the King of Bavaria had sent to the Crown\\nPrince as he left Munich to take command of the\\nBavarian armj^ was that nothing might be done to\\ninterfere with Bavarian independence. Of course", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0420.jp2"}, "419": {"fulltext": "1871] War with France. 367\\nBismarck refused to listen to these suggestions had\\nhe done so, the probable result would have been that\\nthe Bavarian army would have been withdrawn from\\nFrance and then all the result of the victories would\\nhave been lost.\\nWhat Bismarck did was in accordance with his\\nusual practice to make no greater alteration in exist-\\ning institutions than was absolutely necessary he\\ndid not therefore undertake any reform of the Fed-\\neral Constitution, but simply proposed treaties by\\nwhich the southern States, each separately, entered\\ninto the existing alliance. Certain special conditions\\nwere allowed the King of Bavaria was to maintain\\nthe command over his troops in time of peace a\\nvoice was given to Bavaria in the management of\\nforeign affairs she retained her own post and tele-\\ngraph, and there were certain special privileges with\\nregard to finance to meet the system of taxation on\\nbeer; and then the Prussian military code was not\\nto apply to Bavaria, and Bavaria was to retain her\\nown special laws with regard to marriage and citi-\\nzenship. These concessions were undoubtedly very\\nconsiderable, but Bismarck granted them, for, as he\\nsaid to the Bavarian envoys, we do not want a dis-\\ncontented Bavaria we want one which will join us\\nfreely. The Liberal Publicists in Germany with\\ncharacteristic intolerance complained that when they\\nhad hoped to see the Constitution made simpler and\\nthe central government stronger it had really be-\\ncome more federal they did not see that this feder-\\nalism was merely the expression of existing facts\\nwhich could not be ignored. They prophesied all", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0421.jp2"}, "420": {"fulltext": "368 Bismarck. [1870-\\nkinds of difficulties which have not been fulfilled,\\nfor they forgot that harmonious working, in an\\nalliance voluntarily made, would be a firmer bond\\nof union than the most stringent articles of treaties\\nwhich were looked on as an unjust burden. Bis-\\nmarck s own words, spoken the evening after the\\nagreements were signed, give the true account of the\\nmatter\\nThe newspapers will not be satisfied, the historian\\nmay very likely condemn our Conventions he may say,\\nThe stupid fellow might easily have asked for more, he\\nwould have got it, they would have had to give it him\\nhis might was his right. I was more anxious that these\\npeople should go away heartily satisfied. What is the\\nuse of treaties which men are forced to sign I know\\nthat they went away satisfied. I do not wish to press\\nthem or to take full advantage of the situation. The\\nConvention has its defects, but it is all the stronger on\\naccount of them.\\nHe could afford now to be generous because in\\n1866 he had been so stern he had refused to take\\nin Bavaria when it would have weakened the associ-\\nation of the North now that the nucleus had been\\nformed he could allow the Catholic South greater\\nfreedom. He was right the concessions granted to\\nBavaria have not been in any way a danger to the\\nEmpire.\\nAs soon as he had signed the Convention he\\nlooked into the room where his secretaries were,\\nand said The work is done the unity of Germany\\nis completed and with it Kaiser and Reich. Up to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0422.jp2"}, "421": {"fulltext": "1871]\\nWar with France. 369\\nthis time he had taken no open steps towards the\\nproclamation of the Empire; but it was unanimously-\\ndemanded by almost the whole nation and especially\\nby the South Germans. But here he kept himself\\nin the background he refused to make it appear as\\nthough he were to make the Emperor or found the\\nEmpire. He allowed the natural wish of the people\\nto work itself out spontaneously. There was indeed\\nsome reluctance to assume the title at the Prussian\\nCourt the King himself was not anxious for a new\\ndignity which would obscure that title which he and\\nhis ancestors had made so honourable. This feeling\\nwas shared by many of the nobility and the officers\\nwe find it strongest in Roon, who in this represents\\nthe genuine feeling of the older Prussian nobility.\\nThey disliked a change which must mean that the\\nPrussia to which they were so devotedly attached\\nwas to become merged in a greater Germany. There\\nwas also some apprehension that with the new title\\nthe old traditions of the Prussian Court, traditions\\nof economy, almost of parsimony, might be forgot-\\nten, and that a new career might begin in which they\\nwould attempt to imitate the extravagance and\\npomp of less prudent sovereigns. With this per-\\nhaps Bismarck himself had some sympathy.\\nThe King would, of course, only assume the new\\ntitle if it was offered to him by his fellow-princes\\nthere was some danger lest the Reichstag, which\\nhad been summoned to ratify the treaties, might\\nask him to assume it before the princes did had\\nthey done so, he would probably have refused. The\\nCrown Prince, who was very eager for the new\\n24", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0423.jp2"}, "422": {"fulltext": "370 Bismarck. [I87b-\\ntitle, and the Grand Duke of Baden used all their\\ninfluence with their fellow-princes. The initiative\\nmust come from the King of Bavaria he was in\\ndifficulty as to the form in which the offer should be\\nmade. Bismarck, who throughout the whole nego-\\ntiations worked behind the scenes, smoothing away\\ndifificulties, thereupon drafted a letter which he sent\\nby special messenger to the King of Bavaria. The\\nKing at once adopted it, copied it out and signed it,\\nand at the same time wrote another letter to the\\nother princes, asking them to join in the request\\nwhich he had made to the King of Prussia, to assume\\nthe title of Emperor which had been in abeyance\\nfor over sixty years. So it came about that the\\nletter by which the offer to the King was made\\nhad really emanated from his own Chancellor. It\\nshews to what good purpose Bismarck used the con-\\nfidence which, by his conduct in the previous nego-\\ntiations, the King of Bavaria had been led to place\\nin him.\\nOn the 1 8th of January, 1871, in the Palace of Ver-\\nsailles, the King publicly assumed the new title a\\nfew days later Bismarck was raised to the rank of\\nPrince.\\nA few days later Paris fell the prolonged siege\\nwas over and the power of resistance exhausted\\nthen again, as three months before, Favre asked for\\nan audience, this time to negotiate the capitulation\\nof the city we need not here dwell on the terms of\\nthe capitulation we need only quote what Favre\\nhimself says of Bismarck s attitude\\nI should be unfaithful to truth if I did not recognise", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0424.jp2"}, "423": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0425.jp2"}, "424": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0426.jp2"}, "425": {"fulltext": "1871] Wai with France. 371\\nthat in these mournful discussions I always found the\\nChancellor eager to soften in form the cruelty of his\\nrequirements. He applied himself as much as was\\npossible to temper the military harshness of the general\\nstaff, and on many points he consented to make himself\\nthe advocate of our demands.\\nA few weeks were allowed for elections to be\\nheld and an assembly to meet at Bordeaux, and\\nthen once more M. Thiers appeared, to negotiate\\nthe terms of peace. He knew that the demands\\nwould be very heavy he anticipated that they would\\nbe asked to surrender Alsace, including Belfort, and\\nof Lorraine at least the department of the Moselle,\\nwith Metz he expected a large war indemnity five\\nthousand million francs. The terms Bismarck had\\nto offer were almost identical with these, except\\nthat the idemnity was placed at six thousand mil-\\nlion francs. The part Thiers had to play was a very\\ndifficult one he knew that if Germany insisted on\\nher full demands he must accept he was too ex-\\nperienced a politician to be misled by any of the\\nillusions under which Favre had laboured. He, as\\nall other Frenchmen, had during the last three\\nmonths learned a bitter lesson. Had we made\\npeace, he said, before the fall of Metz, we might\\nat least have saved Lorraine. He hoped against\\nhope that he might still be able to do so. With\\nall the resources of his intellect and his eloquence\\nhe tried to break down the opposition of the Count.\\nWhen Metz was refused to him then he pleaded for\\nBelfort. Let us hear what Favre, who was present\\nat the decisive interview, tells us we may use his", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0427.jp2"}, "426": {"fulltext": "372 Bismarck. [1870-\\nauthority with more confidence that he was a silent\\nand passive auditor.\\nOne must have been present at this pathetic scene to\\nhave an idea of the superhuman resources which the\\niUustrious statesman displayed. I still see him, pale,\\nagitated, now sitting, now springing to his feet I hear\\nhis voice broken by grief, his words cut short, his tones\\nin turn suppliant and proud I know nothing grander\\nthan the sublime passion of this noble heart bursting\\nout in petitions, menaces, prayers, now caressing, now\\nterrible, growing by degrees more angry in face of this\\ncruel refusal, ready for the last extremities, impervious\\nto the counsels of reason, so violent and sacred were\\nthe sentiments by which he was governed.\\nBismarck remained obdurate he would surrender\\nneither Metz nor Belfort. Then Thiers cried out\\nWell, let it be as you will these negotiations are a\\npretence. We appear to deliberate, we have only to pass\\nunder your yoke. We ask for a city absolutely French,\\nyou refuse it to us it is to avow that you have resolved\\nto wage against us a war of extremity. Do it Ravish\\nour provinces, burn our houses, cut the throats of their\\nunoffending inhabitants, in a word, complete your work.\\nWe will fight to the last breath we shall succumb at\\nlast, but we will not be dishonoured.\\nIt was a burst of passion, all the more admirable\\nthat Thiers knew his threats were vain but it was\\nnot ineffective. Bismarck was troubled he said he\\nunderstood what they suffered he would be glad\\nto make a concession, but, he added, I can promise\\nnothing; the King has commanded me to maintain", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0428.jp2"}, "427": {"fulltext": "LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0429.jp2"}, "428": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0430.jp2"}, "429": {"fulltext": "1871] War with France. 373\\nthe conditions, he alone has the right to modify them\\nI will take his orders I must consult with Mons. de\\nMoltke, He left the room it was nearly an hour\\nbefore he could find Moltke then he returned to\\ngive the answer to the Frenchmen. You had re-\\nfused that we should enter Paris if you will agree\\nthat the German troops occupy Paris, then Belfort\\nshall be restored to you. There could be no doubt\\nas to the answer, and some hours later the assent of\\nthe King was given to this alteration in the condi-\\ntions. Before this the indemnity had been reduced to\\nfive thousand million francs below that all the efforts\\nof the French were not able to bring it. There were\\nmany other exciting scenes during the progress of\\nthe negotiations on one occasion Thiers threatened\\nBismarck with interposition of the neutral Powers\\nIf you speak to me of Europe, I will speak of the\\nEmperor, was Bismarck s answer. He threatened\\nto open negotiations with him and to send him back\\nto France at the head of Bazaine s army. On another\\noccasion it was during the discussion of finance\\nanother scene took place which Favre describes\\nAs the discussion continued, he grew animated, he\\ninterrupted Thiers at every word, accused him of wish-\\ning to spoil everything he said that he was ill, at the\\nend of his powers, he was incapable of going further, in\\na work that we were pleased to make of no use. Then,\\nallowing his feelings to break out, walking up and down\\nthe little room in which we were deliberating with great\\nstrides, he cried, It is very kind of me to take the trouble\\nto which you condemn me our conditions are ultima-\\ntums you must accept or reject them. I will not take", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0431.jp2"}, "430": {"fulltext": "374 Bismarck. [1870-\\npart in it any longer bring an interpreter to-morrow,\\nhenceforward I will not speak French any longer.\\nAnd he began forthwith to talk German at a great\\nrate, a language which of course neither of the\\nFrenchmen understood.\\nIt is interesting to compare with this Bismarck s\\nown account of the same scene\\nWhen I addressed a definite demand to Thiers, al-\\nthough he generally could command himself, he sprang\\nup and cried, Mais c est un indignite. I took no notice\\nbut began to talk German. For a time he listened, but\\nobviously did not know what to think of it. Then in a\\nplaintive voice he said, But, Count, you know that I do\\nnot understand German. I answered him now in French.\\nWhen just now you spoke of indignite, I found that\\nI did not understand French enough and preferred to\\nspeak German, where I know what I say and hear. He\\nunderstood what I meant and at once agreed to that\\nwhich he had just refused as an indignite.\\nBismarck s part in these negotiations was not alto-\\ngether an easy one, for it is probable that, in part at\\nleast, he secretly sympathised with the arguments\\nand protests of the French. He was far too loyal to\\nhis master and his country not to defend and adopt\\nthe policy which had been accepted but there is\\nmuch reason to believe that, had he been completely\\nmaster, Germany would not have insisted on having\\nMetz, but would have made the demand only to\\nwithdraw it. The arguments for the annexation of\\nAlsace were indeed unanswerable, and again and\\nagain Bismarck had pointed out that Germany could\\nnever be safe so long as France held Strasburg, and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0432.jp2"}, "431": {"fulltext": "1871]\\nWar with France. 375\\na French army supported on the strong basis of the\\nVosges could use Strasburg as a gate whence to sally\\nforth into Germany. No one indeed who has ever\\nstood on the slopes of the Black Forest and looked\\nacross the magnificent valley, sheltered by the hills\\non either side, through which the Rhine flows, can\\ndoubt that this is all one country, and that the front-\\nier must be sought, not in the river, which is not a\\nseparation, but the chief means of communication,\\nbut on the top of the hills on the further side.\\nEvery argument, however, which is used to support\\nGerman claims to Strasburg may be used with equal\\nforce to support French claims to Metz. If Stras-\\nburg in French hands is the gate of Germany, Metz\\nin German hands is, and always will remain, a mili-\\ntary post on the soil of France. No one who reads\\nBismarck s arguments on this point can fail to notice\\nhow they are all nearly conclusive as to Strasburg,\\nbut that he scarcely takes the trouble to make it\\neven appear as though they applied to Metz. Even\\nin the speech before the Reichstag in which he ex-\\nplains and justifies the terms of peace, he speaks\\nagain and again of Strasburg but hardly a word of\\nMetz. He told how fourteen years before, the old\\nKing of Wiirtemberg had said to him, at the time of\\nthe Crimean troubles, that Prussia might count on\\nhis voice in the Diet as against the Western Powers,\\nbut only till war broke out.\\nThen the matter takes another form. I am determined\\nas well as any other to maintain the engagements I have\\nentered into. But do not judge me unjustly give us\\nStrasburg and we shall be ready for all eventualities, but", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0433.jp2"}, "432": {"fulltext": "2,^^ Bismarck. [1871-\\nso long as Strasburg is a sally-port for a Power which is\\nalways armed, I must fear that my country will be over-\\nrun by foreign troops before my confederates can come\\nto my help.\\nThe King was right Germany would never be se-\\ncure so long as Strasburg was French but can\\nFrance ever be secure so long as Metz is German\\nThe demand for Metz was based purely on mili-\\ntary considerations it was supported on the theory,\\nwhich we have already learnt, that Germany could\\nnever take the offensive in a war with France, and\\nthat the possession of Metz would make it impossi-\\nble, as indeed is the case, for France to attack Ger-\\nmany. It was not, however, Bismarck s practice to\\nsubordinate political considerations to military. It\\nmay be said that France would never acquiesce in\\nthe loss of either province, but while we can imagine\\na generation of Frenchmen arising who would learn\\nto recognise the watershed of the Vosges as a perma-\\nnent boundary between the two nations, it is difificult\\nto believe that the time will ever come when a single\\nFrenchman will regard with contentment the pre-\\nsence of the Germans on the Upper Moselle.\\nEven after the preliminaries of peace were settled\\nfresh difficulties arose; the outbreak of the Com-\\nmune in Paris made it impossible for the French to\\nfulfil all the arrangements Bismarck, who did not\\ntrust the French, treated them with much severity,\\nand more than once he threatened again to begin\\nhostilities. At last Favre asked for a fresh interview\\nthe two statesmen met at Frankfort, and then the\\nfin^l treaty of peage was signed,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0434.jp2"}, "433": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XV.\\nTHE NEW EMPIRE.\\n1871-1878.\\nWITH the peace of Frankfort, Bismarck s work\\nwas completed. Not nine years had passed\\nsince he had become Minister in that\\nshort time he completed the work which so many\\nstatesmen before him had in vain attempted. Nine\\nyears ago he had found the King ready to retire\\nfrom the throne; now he had made him the most\\npowerful ruler in Europe. Prussia, which then had\\nbeen divided in itself and without influence in the\\ncouncils of Europe, was the undisputed leader in a\\nUnited Germany.\\nFate, which always was so kind to Bismarck, was\\nnot to snatch him away, as it did Cavour, in the\\nhour of his triumph; twenty years longer he was to\\npreside over the State which he had created and to\\nguide the course of the ship which he had built. A\\nweaker or more timid man would quickly have re-\\ntired from public life he would have considered that\\nnothing that he could do could add to his fame, and\\nth^t he w^s always risking the loss of soine of the\\n377", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0435.jp2"}, "434": {"fulltext": "^yS Bismai -ck. [1871-\\nreputation he had attained. Bismarck was not in-\\nfluenced by such motives. The exercise of power had\\nbecome to him a pleasure he was prepared if his\\nKing required it to continue in ofifice to the end of\\nhis days, and he never feared to hazard fame and\\npopularity if he could thereby add to the prosperity\\nof the State.\\nThese latter years of Bismarck s life we cannot\\nnarrate in detail space alone would forbid it. It\\nwould be to write the history of the German Em-\\npire, and though events are not so dramatic they\\nare no less numerous than in the earlier period.\\nMoreover, we have not the material for a complete\\nbiographical narrative there is indeed a great abund-\\nance of public records but as to the secret reasons\\nof State by which in the last resource the policy of\\nthe Government was determined, we have little\\nknowledge. From time to time indeed some illicit\\ndisclosure, the publication of some confidential docu-\\nment, throws an unexpected light on a situation\\nwhich is obscure but these disclosures, so hazardous\\nto the good repute of the men who are responsible\\nand the country in which they are possible, must be\\ntreated with great reserve. Prompted by motives\\nof private revenge or public ambition, they disclose\\nonly half the truth, and a portion of the truth is\\noften more misleading than complete ignorance.\\nIn foreign policy he was henceforward sole, undis-\\nputed master in Parliament and in the Press scarcely\\na voice was raised to challenge his pre-eminence he\\nenjoyed the complete confidence of the allied sov-\\nereigns and the enthusiastic affection of the nation;*", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0436.jp2"}, "435": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 379\\neven those parties which often opposed and criticised\\nhis internal poHcy supported him always on foreign\\naffairs. Those only opposed him who were hostile\\nto the Empire itself, those whose ideals or interests\\nwere injured by this great military monarchy Poles\\nand Ultramontanes, Guelphs and Socialists in op-\\nposing Bismarck they seemed to be traitors to their\\ncountry, and he and his supporters were not slow to\\ndivide the nation into the loyal and the Reichs-\\nfeindlich.\\nHe deserved the confidence which was placed in\\nhim. He succeeded in preserving to the newly\\nfounded Empire all the prestige it had gained he\\nwas enabled to soothe the jealousy of the neutral\\nPowers. He did so by his policy of peace. Now\\nhe pursued peace with the same decision with which\\nbut two years before he had brought about a war.\\nHe was guided by the same motive as war had then\\nbeen for the benefit of Germany, so now was peace.\\nHe had never loved war for the sake of war he was\\ntoo good a diplomatist for this war is the negation\\nof diplomacy, and the statesman who has recourse to\\nit must for the time give over the control to other\\nhands. It is always a clumsy method. The love of\\nwar for the sake of war will be found more commonly\\namong autocratic sovereigns who are their own gen-\\nerals than among skilled and practised ministers, and\\ngenerally war is the last resource by which a weak\\ndiplomatist attempts to conceal his blunders and to\\nregain what he has lost.\\nThere had been much anxiety in Europe how the\\nnew Empire would deport itself would it use this", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0437.jp2"}, "436": {"fulltext": "o\\n80 Bismarck. [1871-\\npower which had been so irresistible for fresh con-\\nflicts? The excuse might easily have been found\\nBismarck might have put on his banner, The Union\\nof All Germans in One State he might have re-\\ncalled and reawakened the enthusiasm of fifty years\\nago he might have reminded the people that there\\nwere still in Holland and in Switzerland, in Austria\\nand in Russia, Germans who were separated from\\ntheir country, and languishing under a foreign rule.\\nHad he been an idealist he would have done so, and\\nraised in Germany a cry like that of the Italian\\nIrredentists. Or he might have claimed for his\\ncountry its natural boundaries after freeing the\\nupper waters of the Rhine from foreign dominion he\\nmight have claimed that the great river should flow\\nto the sea, German. This is what Frenchmen had\\ndone under similar circumstances, but he was not the\\nman to repeat the crimes and blunders of Louis and\\nNapoleon.\\nHe knew that Germany desired peace a new gen-\\neration must grow up in the new order of things\\nthe old wounds must be healed by time, the old\\ndivisions forgotten long years of common work\\nmust cement the alliances that he had made, till the\\njealousy of the defeated was appeased and the new\\nEmpire had become as firm and indissoluble as any\\nother State in Europe.\\nThe chief danger came from France in that un-\\nhappy country the cry for revenge seemed the only\\nlink with the pride which had been so rudely over-\\nthrown. The defeat and the disgrace could not be\\nforgotten the recovery of the lost provinces was", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0438.jp2"}, "437": {"fulltext": "18781 The New Empire. 381\\nthe desire of the nation, and the programme of every\\nparty- As we have seen, the German statesmen had\\nforeseen the danger and deHberately defied it. They\\ncared not for the hostility of France, now that they\\nneed not fear her power. Oderint duin metuant.\\nAgainst French demands for restitution they pre-\\nsented a firm and unchangeable negative it was\\nkinder so and juster, to allow no opening for hope,\\nno loophole for negotiation, no intervention by other\\nPowers. Alsace-Lorraine were German by the right\\nof the hundred thousand German soldiers who had\\nperished to conquer them. Any appearance of\\nweakness would have led to hopes which could never\\nbe realised, discussions which could have had no\\nresult. The answer to all suggestions was to be\\nfound in the strength of Germany the only diplom-\\nacy was to make the army so strong that no French\\nstatesman, not even the mob of Paris, could dream\\nof undertaking single-handed a war of revenge.\\nThis was not enough it was necessary besides to\\nisolate France. There were many men in Europe\\nwho would have wished to bring about a new coali-\\ntion of the armies by whose defeat Germany had\\nbeen built up France and Austria, Denmark and\\nthe Poles then it was always to be expected that\\nRussia, who had done so much for Germany in the\\npast, would cease to regard with complacency the\\nsuccess of her protege after all, the influence of\\nthe Czar in Europe had depended upon the divisions\\nof Germany as much as had that of France. How\\nsoon would the Russian nation wake up, as the French\\nhad done, to the fact that the sympathies of their", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0439.jp2"}, "438": {"fulltext": "382 Bismarck. [1871-\\nEmperor had created a great barrier to Russian\\nambition and Russian diplomacy It was especially\\nthe Clerical party who wished to bring about some\\ncoalition for them the chief object was the over-\\nthrow of Italy, and the world still seemed to centre\\nin Rome they could not gain the assistance of Ger-\\nmany in this work, and they therefore looked on\\nthe great Protestant Empire as an enemy. They\\nwould have liked by monarchical reaction to gain\\ncontrol of France by the success of the Carlist\\nmovement to obtain that of Spain, and then, assisted\\nby Austria, to overthrow the new order in Europe.\\nAgainst this Bismarck s chief energies were directed\\nwe shall see how he fought the Ultramontanes at\\nhome. With regard to France, he was inclined to\\nsupport the Republic, and refused all attempts which\\nwere made by some German statesmen, and especially\\nby Count Arnim, the Ambassador at Paris, to win\\nGerman sympathy and support to the monarchical\\nparty. In Spain his support and sympathy were given\\nto the Government, which with difificulty maintained\\nitself against the Carlists a visit of Victor Emmanuel\\nto Berlin confirmed the friendship with Italy, over\\nwhich the action of Garibaldi in 1870 had thrown a\\ncloud. The greatest triumph of Bismarck s policy\\nwas, however, the reconciliation with Austria. One\\nof the most intimate of his councillors, when asked\\nwhich of Bismarck s actions he admired most, speci-\\nfied this. It was peculiarly his own he had long\\nworked for it even while the war of 1866 was still\\nbeing waged, he had foreseen that a day would come\\nwhen Germany and Austria, now that they were", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0440.jp2"}, "439": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Enipii^e. 383\\nseparated, might become, as they never had been\\nwhen joined by an unnatural union, honest aUies.\\nIt was probably to a great extent brought about by\\nthe strong regard and confidence which the Austrian\\nEmperor reposed in the German Chancellor, The\\nbeginnings of an approximation were laid by the dis-\\nmissal of Beust, who himself now was to become a\\npersonal friend of the statesman against whom he\\nhad for so long and with such ingenuity waged an\\nunequal conflict. The union was sealed when, in\\nDecember, 1872, the Czar of Russia and Francis\\nJoseph came to Berlin as guests of the Emperor.\\nThere was no signed contract, no written alliance,\\nbut the old union of the Eastern monarchies under\\nwhich a generation before Europe had groaned, was\\nnow restored, and on the Continent there was no\\nplace to which France could look for help or\\nsympathy.\\nThe years that followed were those in which\\nforeign affairs gave Bismarck least anxiety or occu-\\npation. He even began to complain that he was dull\\nafter all these years of conflict and intrigue he found\\nthe security which he now enjoyed uninteresting.\\nNow and again the shadow of war passed over\\nEurope, but it was soon dispelled. The most serious\\nwas in 1875.\\nIt appears that the French reforms of the army\\nand some movements of French troops had caused\\nalarm at Berlin I say alarm, though it is difificult to\\nbelieve that any serious concern could have been\\nfelt. There was, however, a party who believed that\\nwar must come sooner or later, and it was better,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0441.jp2"}, "440": {"fulltext": "384 Bismarck. [1871-\\nthey said, not to wait till France was again powerful\\nand had won allies surely the wisest thing was while\\nshe was still weak and friendless to take some excuse\\n(and how easy would it be to find the excuse!), fall\\nupon her, and crush her^ crush and destroy, so that\\nshe could never again raise her head treat her as\\nshe had in old days treated Germany. How far this\\nplan was deliberately adopted we do not know, but\\nin the spring of this year, the signs became so alarm-\\ning that both the Russian and the English Govern-\\nments were seriously disturbed, and interfered. So\\nsober a statesman as Lord Derby believed that the\\ndanger was real. The Czar, who visited Berlin at\\nthe beginning of April, dealt with the matter per-\\nsonally the Queen of England wrote a letter to\\nthe German Emperor, in which she said that the in-\\nformation she had could leave no doubt that an ag-\\ngressive war on France was meditated, and used her\\npersonal influence with the sovereign to prevent it.\\nThe Emperor himself had not sympathised with the\\nidea of war, and it is said did not even know of the\\napproaching danger. It did not require the inter-\\nvention of other sovereigns to induce him to refuse\\nhis assent to a wanton war, but this advice from\\nforeign Powers of course caused great indignation\\nin Bismarck it was just the kind of thing which\\nalways angered him beyond everything. He main-\\ntained that he had had no warlike intentions, that\\nthe reports were untrue. The whole story had its\\norigin, he said, in the intrigues of the Ultramontanes\\nand the vanity of Gortschakoff the object was to\\nmake it appear that France owed her security and", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0442.jp2"}, "441": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 385\\npreservation to the friendly interference of Russia,\\nand thereby prepare the way for an alliance between\\nthe two Powers. It is almost impossible to believe\\nthat Bismarck had seriously intended to bring about\\na war he must have known that the other Powers\\nof Europe would not allow a second and unprovoked\\nattack on France he would not be likely to risk all\\nhe had achieved and bring about a European coali-\\ntion against him. On the other hand his explana-\\ntion is probably not the whole truth even German\\nwriters confess that the plan of attacking France\\nwas meditated, and it was a plan of a nature to re-\\ncommend itself to the military party in Prussia.\\nYet this may have been the beginning of a diverg-\\nence with Russia. The union had depended more\\non the personal feelings of the Czar than on the\\nwishes of the people or their real interests. The ris-\\ning Pan-Slavonic party was anti-German their leader\\nwas General Ignatieff, but Gortschakoff, partly per-\\nhaps from personal hostility to Bismarck, partly from\\na just consideration of Russian interests, sympa-\\nthised with their anti-Teutonic policy. The outbreak\\nof disturbances in the East roused that national feel-\\ning which had slept for twenty years in truth the\\nstrong patriotism of modern Germany naturally cre-\\nated a similar feeling in the neighbouring countries;\\njust as the Germans were proud to free themselves\\nfrom the dominant culture of France, so the Rus-\\nsians began to look with jealousy on the Teutonic\\ninfluence which since the days of Peter the Great\\nhad been so powerful among them.\\nIn internal matters the situation was very differ-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0443.jp2"}, "442": {"fulltext": "386 Bismarck. [1871-\\nent here Bismarck could not rule in the same undis-\\nputed manner he had rivals, critics, and colleagues.\\nThe power of the Prussian Parliament and the\\nReichstag was indeed limited, but without their\\nassent no new law could be passed each year their\\nassent must be obtained to the Budget. Though\\nthey had waived all claim to control the foreign\\npolicy, the parties still criticised and often rejected\\nthe laws proposed by the Government. Then in\\nPrussian affairs he could not act without the good-\\nwill of his colleagues in finance, in legal reform,\\nthe management of Church and schools, the initia-\\ntive belonged to the Ministers responsible for each\\ndepartment. Some of the difficulties of govern-\\nment would have been met had Bismarck identified\\nhimself with a single party, formed a party Ministry\\nand carried out their programme. This he always\\nrefused to do he did not wish in his old age to be-\\ncome a Parliamentary Minister, for had he depended\\nfor his support on a party, then if he lost their con-\\nfidence, or they lost the confidence of the country,\\nhe would have had to retire from office. The whole\\nwork of his earlier years would have been undone.\\nWhat he wished to secure was a Government party,\\na Bismarck party sans phrase, who would always\\nsupport all his measures in internal as well as exter-\\nnal policy. In this, however, he did not succeed. He\\nwas therefore reduced to another course in order\\nto get the measures of the Government passed,\\nhe executed a series of alliances, now with one,\\nnow with another party. In these, however, he\\nhad to give as well as to receive, and it is curious", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0444.jp2"}, "443": {"fulltext": "1878]\\nThe New Empii e. 387\\nto see how easily his pride was offended and his\\nanger roused by any attempt of the party with which\\nat the time he was alHed to control and influence his\\npolicy. No one of the alliances lasted long, and he\\nseems to have taken peculiar pleasure in breaking\\naway from each of them in turn when the time\\ncame.\\nThe alliance with the Conservatives which he had\\ninherited from the older days had begun to break\\ndirectly after 1866. Many of them had been disap-\\npointed by his policy in that year. The grant of\\nuniversal suffrage had alarmed them they had\\nwished that he would use his power to check and\\npunish the Parliament for its opposition instead of\\nthat he asked for an indemnity. They felt that\\nthey had borne with him the struggle for the in-\\ntegrity of the Prussian Monarchy no sooner was\\nthe victory won than he held out his hand to the\\nLiberals and it was to them that the prize went.\\nThey were hurt and disappointed, and this personal\\nfeeling was increased by Bismarck s want of consid-\\neration, his brusqueness of manner, his refusal to\\nconsider complaints and remonstrances. Even the\\nsuccess of 1870 had not altogether reconciled them\\nthese Prussian nobles, the men to whom in earlier\\ndays he himself had belonged, saw with regret the\\nname of King of Prussia hidden behind the newer\\nglory of the German Emperor it is curious to read\\nhow even Roon speaks with something of contempt\\nand disgust of this new title: I hope, he writes,\\nBismarck will be in a better temper now that the\\nKaiser egg has been safely hatched. It was, how-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0445.jp2"}, "444": {"fulltext": "388 Bismarck. [1871-\\never, the struggle with the CathoHc Church which\\nachieved the separation the complete subjection of\\nthe Church to the State, the new laws for school in-\\nspection, the introduction of compulsory civil mar-\\nriage, were all opposed to the strongest and the\\nhealthiest feelings of the Prussian Conservatives.\\nThese did not seem to be matters in which the safety\\nof the Empire was concerned; Bismarck had simply\\ngone over to, and adopted the programme of, the\\nLiberals he was supporting that all-pervading power\\nof the Prussian bureaucracy which he, in his earlier\\ndays, had so bitterly attacked. Then came a pro-\\nposal for change in the local government which\\nwould diminish the influence of the landed proprie-\\ntors. The Conservatives refused to support these\\nmeasures the Conservative majority in the House\\nof Lords threw them out. Bismarck s own brother,\\nall his old friends and comrades, were now ranged\\nagainst him. He accepted opposition from them as\\nlittle as from anyone else the consent of the King\\nwas obtained to the creation of new peers, and by\\nthis means the obnoxious measures were forced\\nthrough the unwilling House. Bismarck by his\\nspeeches intensified the bitterness he came down\\nhimself to make an attack on the Conservatives.\\nThe Government is disappointed, he said; we\\nhad looked for confidence from the Conservative\\nparty confidence is a delicate plant if it is once\\ndestroyed it does not grow again. We shall have to\\nlook elsewhere for support.\\nA crisis in his relations to the party came at the\\nend of 1872 up to this time Roon had still remained", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0446.jp2"}, "445": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0447.jp2"}, "446": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0448.jp2"}, "447": {"fulltext": "1878]\\nThe New Empire. 389\\nin the Government now, in consequence of the\\nmanner in which the creation of peers had been de-\\ncided upon, he requested permission to resign. The\\nKing, who could not bear to part with him, and who\\nreally in many matters of internal policy had more\\nsympathy with him than with Bismarck, refused to\\naccept the resignation. The crisis which arose had\\nan unexpected ending: Bismarck himself resigned\\nthe office of Minister-President of Prussia, which\\nwas transferred to Roon, keeping only that of For-\\neign Minister and Chancellor of the Empire.\\nA letter to Roon shews the deep depression under\\nwhich he laboured at this time, chiefly the result of\\nill-health. It was, he said, an unheard-of anom-\\naly that the Foreign Minister of a great Empire\\nshould be responsible also for internal afTairs. And\\nyet he himself had arranged that it should be so.\\nThe desertion of the Conservative party had, he\\nsaid, deprived him of his footing; he was dispirited\\nby the loss of his old friends and the illness of his\\nwife he spoke of his advancing years and his con-\\nviction that he had not much longer to live the\\nKing scarcely knows how he is riding a good horse\\nto death. He would continue to do what he could\\nin foreign affairs, but he would no longer be responsi-\\nble for colleagues over whom he had no influence\\nexcept by requests, and for the wishes of the Em-\\nperor which he did not share. The arrangement\\nlasted for a year, and then Roon had again to re-\\nquest, and this time received, permission to retire\\ninto private life his health would no longer allow\\nhim to endure the constant anxiety of office. His", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0449.jp2"}, "448": {"fulltext": "390 Bismarck. [1871-\\nretirement occasioned genuine grief to the King\\nand of all the severances which he had to undergo,\\nthis was probably that which affected Bismarck most.\\nFor none of his colleagues could he ever have the\\nsame afTection he had had for Roon he it was who\\nhad brought him into the Ministry, and had gone\\nthrough with him all the days of storm and trouble.\\nIt will be lonely for me, he writes, in my work;\\never more so, the old friends become enemies and\\none makes no new ones. As God will. In 1873\\nhe again assumed the Presidency. The resignation\\nof Roon was followed by a complete breach with\\nthe party of the Kreuz Zeitiing the more moderate\\nof the Conservatives split off from it and continued to\\nsupport the Government the remainder entered on\\na campaign of factious opposition.\\nThe quarrel was inevitable, for quite apart from\\nthe question of religion it would indeed have been\\nimpossible to govern Germany according to their\\nprinciples. We may, however, regret that the quar-\\nrel was not conducted with more amenity. These\\nPrussian nobles were of the same race as Bismarck\\nhimself they resembled him in character if not in\\nability they believed that they had been betrayed,\\nand they did not easily forgive. They were not\\nscrupulous in the weapons they adopted the Press\\nwas used for anonymous attacks on his person and\\nhis character; they accused him of using his public\\nposition for making money by speculation, and of\\nsacrificing to that the alliance with Russia. More\\nthan once he had recourse to the law of libel to\\ndefend himself against these unworthy insults,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0450.jp2"}, "449": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 391\\nWhen he publicly in the Reichstag protested\\nagainst the language of the Kreiiz Zeitimg, the dis-\\nhonourable attacks and the scandalous lies it spread\\nabroad, a large number of the leading men among\\nthe Prussian nobility signed a declaration formally\\ndefending the management of the paper, as true ad-\\nherents of the monarchical and Conservative banner.\\nThese Declaranten, as they were called, were hence-\\nforward enemies whom he could never forgive. At\\nthe bottom of the list we read, not without emotion,\\nthe words, Signed with deep regret, A. von Thad-\\nden so far apart were now the two knight-errants\\nof the Christian Monarchy. It was in reality the\\nend of the old Conservative party it had done its\\nwork Bismarck was now thrown on the support of\\nthe National Liberals.\\nSince 1866 they had grown in numbers and in\\nweight. They represented at this time the general\\nsense of the German people it was with their help\\nthat during the years down to 1878 the new institu-\\ntions for the Empire were built up. In the elections\\nof 1871 they numbered 120; in 1874 their numbers\\nrose to 152 they had not an absolute majority, but\\nin all questions regarding the defence of the Empire,\\nforeign policy, and the army they were supported\\nby the moderate Conservatives in the conflict with\\nthe Catholics and internal matters they could gen-\\nerally depend on the support of the Progressives; so\\nthat as long as they maintained their authority they\\ngave the Government the required majority in both\\nthe Prussian and the German Parliament. There\\nwere differences in the party which afterwards were", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0451.jp2"}, "450": {"fulltext": "392 Bismarck. [1871-\\nto lead to a secession, but during this time, which\\nthey looked upon as the golden era of the Empire,\\nthey succeeded in maintaining their unity. They\\nnumbered many of the ablest leaders, the lawyers\\nand men of learning who had opposed Bismarck at\\nthe time of the conflict. Their leader was Bennig-\\nsen himself a Hanoverian, he had brought no feel-\\nings of hostility from the older days of conflict.\\nModerate, tactful, restrained, patriotic, he was the\\nonly man who, when difficulties arose, was always\\nable to approach the Chancellor, sure of finding some\\ntenable compromise. Different was it with Lasker,\\nthe ablest of Parliamentary orators, whose subordin-\\nation to the decisions of the party was often doubt-\\nful, and whose criticism, friendly as it often was,\\nalways aroused Bismarck s anger.\\nAs a matter of fact the alliance was, however, never\\ncomplete it was always felt that at any moment\\nsome question might arise on which it would be\\nwrecked. This was shewn by Bismarck s language\\nas early as 1871 in a debate on the army he ex-\\nplained that what he demanded was full support\\nmembers, he said, were expressly elected to support\\nhim they had no right to make conditions or with-\\ndraw their support if they did so he would resign.\\nThe party, which was very loyal to him, constantly\\ngave up its own views when he made it a, question\\nof confidence, but the strain was there and was al-\\nways felt. The great question now as before was\\nthat of the organisation of the army. It will be\\nremembered that, under the North German Confed-\\neration, a provisional arrangement was made by", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0452.jp2"}, "451": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 393\\nwhich the numbers of the army in peace were to be\\nfixed at one per cent, of the population. This\\nterminated at the end of 1871 the Government,\\nhowever, did not then consider it safe to alter the\\narrangement, and with some misgiving the Reichstag\\naccepted the proposal that this system should be\\napplied to the whole Empire for three years. If,\\nhowever, the numbers of the army were absolutely\\nfixed in this way, the Reichstag would cease to have\\nany control over the expenses all other important\\ntaxes and expenses came before the individual\\nStates. In 1874, the Government had to make their\\nproposal for the future. This was that the system\\nwhich had hitherto been provisionally accepted\\nshould become permanent, and that the army should\\nhenceforward in time of peace always consist of the\\nsame number of men. To agree to this would be\\npermanently to give up all possibility of exercising\\nany control over the finance. It was impossible for\\nthe National Liberal party to accept the proposal\\nwithout giving up at the same time all hope of con-\\nstitutional development Bismarck was ill and could\\ntake no part in defending the law; they voted\\nagainst it, it was thrown out, and it seemed as\\nthough a new conflict was going to arise.\\nWhen the Reichstag adjourned in April for the\\nEaster holidays the agitation spread over the coun-\\ntry, but the country was determined not again to\\nhave a conflict on the Budget. There was a regu-\\nlar fanaticism for unconditional acceptance of the\\nlaw; those even on the Left refused to hear anything\\nof constitutional considerations, writes one member", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0453.jp2"}, "452": {"fulltext": "394 Bismarck. [1871-\\nof the National Liberty party after meeting his con-\\nstituents. If the Reichstag persisted in their refusal\\nand a dissolution took place, there was no doubt that\\nthere would be a great majority for the Government.\\nIt was the first time since 1870 that the question of\\nconstitutional privileges was raised, and now it was\\nfound, as ever afterwards was the case, that, for the\\nGerman people, whatever might be the opinion of\\ntheir elected representatives, the name of Bismarck\\nalone outweighed all else. Bennigsen arranged a com-\\npromise and the required number of men was agreed\\nto, not indeed permanently, but for seven years.\\nFor four years more the alliance was continued.\\nAt this time all other questions were thrown into\\nthe shade by the great conflict with the Roman\\nCatholic Church on which the Government had em-\\nbarked. Looking back now, it is still difificult to\\njudge or even to understand the causes which\\nbrought it about. Both sides claim that they were\\nacting in self-defence. Bismarck has often explained\\nhis motives, but we cannot be sure that those he\\nputs forward were the only considerations by which\\nhe was moved. He, however, insisted that the strug-\\ngle was not religious but political he was not moved\\nby Protestant animosity to the Catholic Church, but\\nby his alarm lest in the organisation of the Roman\\nhierarchy a power might arise within the Empire\\nwhich would be hostile to the State. But even if the\\nChancellor himself was at first free from Protestant\\nhatred to Catholicism,^and this is not quite clear,\\nhe was forced into alliance with a large party who\\nappealed at once to the memories of the Reforma-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0454.jp2"}, "453": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 395\\ntion, who stirred up all that latent hatred of Rome\\nwhich is as strong a force in North Germany as in\\nEngland and with others who saw in this an op-\\nportunity for more completely subduing all, Pro-\\ntestant and Catholic alike, to the triumphant power\\nof the State, and making one more step towards the\\ndissociation of the State from any religious body.\\nThe immediate cause of the struggle was the pro-\\nclamation of the infallibility of the Pope. It might\\nbe thought that this change or development in\\nthe Constitution of the Roman Church was one\\nwhich concerned chiefly Roman Catholics. This is\\nthe view which Bismarck seems to have taken\\nduring the meetings of the Vatican Council. The\\nopposition to the decrees was strongest among the\\nGerman Bishops, and Prince Hohenlohe, the Prime\\nMinister of Bavaria, supported by his brother the\\nCardinal, was anxious to persuade the Governments\\nof Europe to interfere, and, as they could have done,\\nto prevent the Council from coming to any conclu-\\nsion. Bismarck refused on behalf of the Prussian\\nGovernment to take any steps in this direction.\\nThe conclusion of the Council and the proclamation\\nof the decrees took place just at the time of the out-\\nbreak of war with France. For some months Bis-\\nmarck, occupied as he was with other matters, was\\nunable to consider the changes which might be\\ncaused it was moreover very important for him\\nduring the negotiations with Bavaria, which lasted\\nall through the autumn, not to do anything which\\nwould arouse the fears of the Ultramontanes or in-\\ntensify their reluctance to enter the Empire,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0455.jp2"}, "454": {"fulltext": "396 Bismarck.\\n[1871-\\nIn the winter of 1870 the first sign of the dangers\\nahead was to be seen. They arose from the occu-\\npation of Rome by the Italians. The inevitable\\nresult of this was that the Roman Catholics of all\\ncountries in Europe were at once given a common\\ncause of political endeavour; they were bound each\\nof them in his own State to use his full influence to\\nprocure interference either by diplomacy or by arms,\\nand to work for the rescue of the prisoner of the\\nVatican. The German Catholics felt this as strongly\\nas their co-religionists, and, while he was still at\\nVersailles, a cardinal and bishop of the Church\\naddressed a memorial to the King of Prussia on this\\nmatter. This attempt to influence the foreign policy\\nof the new Empire, and to use it for a purpose alien\\nto the direct interest of Germany, was very repug-\\nnant to Bismarck and was quite sufificient to arouse\\nfeelings of hostility towards the Roman Catholics.\\nThese were increased when he heard that the Roman\\nCatholic leaders were combining to form a new\\npolitical party in the elections for the first Reich-\\nstag this movement was very successful and fifty\\nmembers were returned whose sole bond of union\\nwas religion. This he looked upon as a mobilisa-\\ntion of the Church against the State the formation\\nof a political party founded simply on unity of con-\\nfession was, he said, an unheard-of innovation in\\npolitical life. His distrust increased when he found\\nthat their leader was Windthorst, a former Minister\\nof the King of Hanover, and, as a patriotic Hanover-\\nian, one of the chief opponents of a powerful and\\ncentralised Government. The influence the Church", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0456.jp2"}, "455": {"fulltext": "16781 The New Empire. 397\\nhad in the PoHsh provinces was a further cause of\\nhostihty, and seemed to justify him in condemning\\nthem as anti-German. During the first session the\\nnew party prominently appeared on two occasions.\\nIn the debate on the address to the Crown they\\nasked for the interference of Germany on behalf of\\nthe Pope in this they stood alone and on a division\\nfound no supporters. Then they demanded that in\\nthe Constitution of the Empire certain clauses from\\nthe Prussian Constitution should be introduced\\nwhich would ensure freedom to all religious de-\\nnominations. Here they gained considerable sup-\\nport from some other parties.\\nAn impartial observer will find it difficult to justify\\nfrom these acts the charge of disloyalty to the Em-\\npire, but a storm of indignation arose in the Press,\\nespecially in the organs of the National Liberal party,\\nand it was supported by those of the Government.\\nThe desire for conflict was awakened meetings\\nwere held in the autumn of 1871 to defend the Pro-\\ntestant faith, which hardly seemed to have been at-\\ntacked, and a clearer cause for dispute soon occurred.\\nIt was required by the authorities of the Church that\\nall bishops and priests should declare their assent to\\nthe new Vatican decrees; the majority did so, but a\\ncertain number refused they were of course excom-\\nmunicated a secession from the Roman Catholic\\nChurch took place, and a new communion formed\\nto which the name of Old Catholics was given. The\\nbishops required that all the priests and religious\\nteachers at the universities and schools who had re-\\nfused to obey the orders of the Pope should be dis-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0457.jp2"}, "456": {"fulltext": "398 Bismarck. [1871-\\nmissed from their office the Prussian Government\\nrefused their assent. The legal question involved\\nwas a difficult one. The Government held that as\\nthe Roman Catholic Church had changed its teach-\\nings, those who maintained the old doctrine must be\\nsupported in the offices conferred on them. The\\nChurch authorities denied there had been any es-\\nsential change. On the whole we may say that they\\nwere right a priest of the Catholic Church held his\\nposition not only in virtue of his assent to the actual\\ndoctrines taught, but was also bound by his vow of\\nobedience to accept any fresh teaching which, in ac-\\ncordance with the Constitution of the Church and by\\nthe recognised organ of Government, should in the\\nfuture also be declared to be of faith. The duty of\\nevery man to obey the laws applies not only to the\\nlaws existing at any moment, but to any future laws\\nwhich may be passed by the proper agent of legisla-\\ntion. Even though the doctrine of infallibility were\\na new doctrine, which is very doubtful, it had been\\npassed at a Council; and the proceedings of the\\nCouncil, even if, in some details, they were irregular,\\nwere not more so than those of any other Council in\\nthe past.\\nThe action of the Government in supporting the\\nOld Catholics may, however, be attributed to another\\nmotive. The Catholics maintained that Bismarck\\ndesired to take this opportunity of creating a national\\nGerman Church, and reunite Protestants and Catho-\\nlics. To have done so, had it been possible, would\\nhave been indeed to confer on the country the great-\\nest of all blessings. We cannot doubt that the thought", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0458.jp2"}, "457": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 399\\nhad often come into Bismarck s mind it would be\\nthe proper and fitting conclusion to the work of creat-\\ning a nation. It was, however, impossible under no\\ncircumstances could it have been done by a Protest-\\nant statesman the impulse must have come from\\nBavaria, and the opposition of the Bavarian bishops\\nto the Vatican decrees had been easily overcome.\\nTwice an opportunity had presented itself of making\\na national German Church: once at the Reforma-\\ntion, once after the Revolution. On both occasions\\nit was lost and it will never recur.\\nThe result, however, was that a bitter feeling of\\nopposition was created between Church and State.\\nThe secessionist priests were maintained in their\\npositions by the Government, they were excommuni-\\ncated by the bishops students were forbidden to\\nattend their lectures and the people to worship in\\nthe churches where they ministered. It spread even\\nto the army, when the Minister of War required the\\narmy chaplain at Cologne to celebrate Mass in a\\nchurch which was used also by the Old Catholics.\\nHe was forbidden to do so by his bishop, and the\\nbishop was in consequence deprived of his salary\\nand threatened with arrest.\\nThe conflict having once begun soon spread a\\nnew Minister of Culture was appointed in the\\nReichstag a law was proposed expelling the Jesuits\\nfrom Germany and a number of important laws, the\\nso-called May laws, were introduced into the Prussian\\nParliament, giving to the State great powers with re-\\ngard to the education and appointment of priests;\\nit was, for instance, ordered that no one should be", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0459.jp2"}, "458": {"fulltext": "400 Bismarck. [1871-\\nappointed to a cure of souls who was not a German,\\nand had not been brought up and educated in the\\nState schools and universities of Prussia. Then\\nother laws were introduced, to which we have already\\nreferred, making civil marriage compulsory, so as to\\ncripple the very strong power which the Roman\\nCatholic priests could exercise, not only by refusing\\ntheir consent to mixed marriages, but also by refus-\\ning to marry Old Catholics a law was introduced\\ntaking the inspection of elementary schools out of\\nthe hands of the clergy, and finally a change was\\nmade in those articles of the Prussian Constitution\\nwhich ensured to each denomination the manage-\\nment of its own affairs. Bismarck was probably not\\nresponsible for the drafting of all these laws he\\nonly occasionally took part in the discussion and\\nwas often away from Berlin.\\nThe contrast between these proposals and the\\nprinciples he had maintained in his earlier years was\\nvery marked his old friend Kleist recalled the elo-\\nquent speech which in former years he had made\\nagainst civil marriage. Bismarck did not attempt\\nto defend himself against the charge of inconsistency\\nhe did not even avow that he had changed his per-\\nsonal opinions he had, however, he said, learnt to\\nsubmit his personal convictions to the requirements\\nof the State he had only done so unwillingly and\\nby a great struggle. This was to be the end of the\\ndoctrine of the Christian State. With Gneist, Lasker,\\nVirchow, he was subduing the Church to this new\\nidol of the State he was doing that against which in\\nthe old days he had struggled with the greatest", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0460.jp2"}, "459": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 401\\nresolution and spoken with the greatest eloquence.\\nNot many years were to go by before he began to\\nrepent of what he had done, for, as he saw the\\nnew danger from Social Democracy, he like many\\nother Germans believed that the true means of de-\\nfeating it was to be found in increased intensity of\\nreligious conviction. It was, however, then too late.\\nHe, however, especially in the Prussian Upper\\nHouse, threw all the weight of his authority into the\\nconflict. It was, he said, not a religious conflict but\\na political one they were not actuated by hatred\\nof Catholicism, but they were protecting the rights\\nof the State.\\nThe question at issue, he said, is not a struggle\\nof an Evangelical dynasty against the Catholic Church\\nit is the old struggle a struggle for power as old as\\nthe human race between king and priest a\\nstruggle which is much older than the appearance of our\\nRedeemer in this world. a struggle which has filled\\nGerman history of the Middle Ages till the destruction of\\nth*e German Empire, and which found its conclusion when\\nthe last representative of the glorious Swabian dynasty\\ndied on the scaffold, under the axe of a French con-\\nqueror who stood in alliance with the Pope.* We are\\nnot far from an analogous solution of the situation,\\nalways translated into the customs of our time.\\nHe assured the House that now, as always, he would\\ndefend the Empire against internal and external\\nenemies. Rest assured we will not go to Canossa,\\nhe said.\\nThe Ghibellines were expelled from Italy in 1267, when Con-\\nradin of Hohenstaufen was beheaded by Charles of Anjou.\\n26", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0461.jp2"}, "460": {"fulltext": "402 Bismai^ck. [1871-\\nIn undertaking this struggle with the Church he\\nhad two enemies to contend with the Pope and\\nthe governnaent of the Church on the one side, on\\nthe other the Cathohc population of Germany. He\\ntried to come to some agreement with the Pope and\\nto separate the two it seemed in fact as if the real\\nenemy to be contended against was not the foreign\\npriesthood, but the Catholic Democracy in Germany.\\nAll Bismarck s efforts to separate the two and to\\nprocure the assistance of the Pope against the party\\nof the Centre were to be unavailing; for some years\\nall official communication between the German Gov-\\nernment and the Papal See was broken off. It was\\nnot till the death of Pius IX. and the accession\\nof a more liberal-minded Pope that communica-\\ntion was restored then we are surprised to find\\nBismarck appealing to the Pope to use his influence\\non the Centre in order to persuade them to vote for\\na proposed increase in the German army. This is\\na curious comment on the boast, We will not go\\nto Canossa.\\nThe truth is that in undertaking the conflict and\\nassociating himself with the anti-Clerical party Bis-\\nmarck had stirred up an enemy whom he was not\\nable to overcome. He soon found that the priests\\nand the Catholics were men of a different calibre to\\nthe Liberals. They dared to do what none of the\\nProgressives had ventured on they disobeyed the\\nlaw. With them it was not likely that the conflict\\nwould be confined to Parliamentary debates. The\\nGovernment attempted to meet this resistance, but\\nin vain. The priests were deprived of their cures.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0462.jp2"}, "461": {"fulltext": "1878] The New Empire. 403\\nbishops were thrown into prison, nearly half the\\nCatholic parishes in Prussia were deprived of their\\nspiritual shepherds, the churches were closed, there\\nwas no one to celebrate baptisms or weddings.\\nAgainst this resistance what could the Government\\ndo? The people supported the leaders of the party,\\nand a united body of one hundred members under\\nWindhorst, ablest of Parliamentary leaders, was com-\\nmitted to absolute opposition to every Government\\nmeasure so long as the conflict continued. Cgm we\\nbe surprised that as the years went on Bismarck\\nlooked with some concern on the result of the\\nstruggle he had brought about\\nHe attempted to conceal the failure Th^^sult\\nwill be, he said, that we shall have two gr^t par-\\nties one which supports and maintains the State,\\nand another which attacks it. The former will\\nbe the great majority and it will be formed in\\nthe school of conflict. These words are the strong-\\nest condemnation of his policy. It could not be\\nwise for any statesman to arrange that party conflict\\nshould take the form of loyalty and disloyalty to\\nthe Empire.\\nThere can be little doubt that his sense of failure\\nhelped to bring about a feeling of enmity towards\\nthe National Liberals. Suddenly in the spring of\\n1877 he sent in his resignation. There were, how-\\never, other reasons for doing this. He had become\\naware that the financial policy of the Empire had\\nnot been successful on every side it seemed that\\nnew blood and new methods were required. In\\nfinancial matters he had little experience or author-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0463.jp2"}, "462": {"fulltext": "404 Bismarck. [i878\\nity he had to depend on his colleagues and he\\ncomplained of their unfruitfulness. Influenced per-\\nhaps by his perception of this, under the pretext a\\ngenuine pretext- of ill-health, he asked the Em-\\nperor to relieve him of his offices. The Emperor\\nrefused. Never, he wrote on the side of the min-\\nute. Instead he granted to Bismarck unlimited\\nleave of absence. In the month of April the Chan-\\ncellor retired to Varzin for ten months he was\\nabsent from Berlin, and when he returned, recruited\\nin health, in February, 1878, it was soon apparent\\nthat a new period in his career and in the history of\\nthe Empire was to begin.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0464.jp2"}, "463": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XVI.\\nTHE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND ECONOMIC REFORM.\\n1878-1887.\\nTHE year 1878 forms a turning-point both in\\ninternal and in external politics. Up to this\\nyear Prussia has been aUied with the two\\nEastern monarchies the Empire has been governed\\nby the help of the National Liberal party the chief\\nenemy has been the Clericals. The traditions of the\\ntime before the war are still maintained. After this\\nyear the understanding with Russia breaks down\\ninstead of it the peace of Europe is preserved by the\\nTriple Alliance with Austria and Italy. In internal\\naffairs the change is even more marked the rising\\npower of the Socialists is the enemy to be fought\\nagainst for this conflict, peace has to be made with\\nthe Catholics the May laws are modified or repealed.\\nThe alliance with Liberalism breaks down, and the\\nefforts of the Government are devoted to a far-\\nreaching scheme of financial reform and social legis-\\nlation.\\nWhen, in April, 1877, the Emperor refused to ac-\\ncept Bismarck s resignation, the whole country\\n405", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0465.jp2"}, "464": {"fulltext": "4o6 Bismarck. [1878-\\napplauded the decision. In the Reichstag a great\\ndemonstration was made of confidence in the Chan-\\ncellor. Everyone felt that he could not b*e spared\\nat a time when the complications in the East were\\nbringing new dangers upon Europe, and in the se-\\nclusion of Varzin he did not cease during the next\\nmonths to direct the foreign policy of the Empire.\\nHe was able with the other Governments of Europe\\nto prevent the spread of hostilities from Turkey to\\nthe rest of Europe, and when the next year the Eng-\\nlish Government refused its assent to the provisional\\npeace of San Stefano, it was the unanimous desire\\nof all the other States that the settlement of Turkey\\nshould be submitted to a Congress at Berlin over\\nwhich he should preside. It was the culmination of\\nhis public career it was the recognition by Europe\\nin the most impressive way of his primacy among\\nliving statesmen. In his management of the Con-\\ngress he answered to the expectations formed of\\nhim. We do not wish to go, he had said, the\\nway of Napoleon we do not desire to be the arbitra-\\ntors or schoolmasters of Europe. We do not wish to\\nforce our policy on other States by appealing to the\\nstrength of our army. I look on our task as a more\\nuseful though a humbler one it is enough if we can\\n-be an honest broker. He succeeded in the task he\\nhad set before himself, and in reconciling the appar-\\nently incompatible desires of England and Russia.\\nAgain and again when the Congress seemed about\\nto break up without result he made himself the\\nspokesman of Russian wishes, and conveyed them\\nto Lord Beaconsfield, the English plenipotentiary.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0466.jp2"}, "465": {"fulltext": "H E", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0467.jp2"}, "466": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0468.jp2"}, "467": {"fulltext": "1887] The Ti iple Alliance. 407\\nNone the less the friendship of Russia, which had\\nbefore wavered, now broke down. A bitter attack\\non Germany and Bismarck was begun in the Russian\\nPress the new German fiscal policy led to misun-\\nderstandings the Czar in private letters to the Em-\\nperor demanded in the negotiations that were still\\ngoing on the absolute and unconditional support of\\nGermany to all Russian demands as the condition of\\nRussian friendship. In the autumn of the next\\nyear matters came near to war it was in these cir-\\ncumstances that Bismarck brought about that alli-\\nance which ever since then has governed European\\npolitics. He hastily arranged a meeting with Count\\nAndrassy, the Austrian Minister, and in a few days\\nthe two statesmen agreed on a defensive alliance be-\\ntween the two Empires. Many years later, in 1886,\\nthe instrument of alliance was published. It was\\nagreed that if either of the German States was at-\\ntacked by Russia the other would join to defend it\\nif either was attacked by France the other would\\nobserve neutrality but if the French were supported\\nby Russia then the first clause would come into\\nforce. The Emperor of Austria willingly gave his\\nassent it was only after a prolonged struggle that\\nBismarck was able to gain the assent of his own\\nsovereign. This alliance, which in the next year\\nwas joined by Italy, again gave Germany the ruling\\nposition in Europe.\\nDuring this crisis in foreign affairs Bismarck was\\noccupied by another, which threatened to be equally\\nserious, in home politics. In the spring of 1878 an\\nattempt was made on the life of the Emperor; a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0469.jp2"}, "468": {"fulltext": "4o8 Bismarck. [1878-\\nyoung man, named Hobel, a shoemaker s apprentice,\\nshot at him in the streets of BerHn, fortunately with-\\nout result. The attempt naturally created intense\\nindignation throughout the country. This was in-\\ncreased when it became known that he had been to\\nsome extent connected with the Socialist party, and\\nit seemed as though the motives of the crime were\\nsupplied by the violent speeches made at Socialist\\ngatherings. Bismarck had long regarded the growth\\nof Socialism with concern. He determined to use\\nthis opportunity to crush it. He at once brought\\ninto the Bundesrath a very severe law, forbidding\\nall Socialist agitation and propaganda. He suc-\\nceeded in passing it through the Council, but it\\nwas thrown out in the Reichstag by a very large\\nmajority. No one voted for it except the Conserva-\\ntives. The law indeed was so drawn up that one\\ndoes not see how anyone could have voted for it\\nthe first clause began, Printed writings and unions\\nwhich follow the aims of Social Democracy may be\\nforbidden by the Federal Council, but, as was pointed\\nout, among the aims of Social Democracy were many\\nwhich were good in themselves, and many others\\nwhich, though they might be considered harmful by\\nother parties, were at least legitimate. Directly after-\\nwards the Reichstag was prorogued. Ten days\\nlater, another attempt was made on the Emperor s\\nlife this time a man of the name of Nobeling (an\\neducated man who had studied at the University)\\nshot at him while driving in the Unter den Linden,\\nand wounded him severely in the head and arms\\nwith large shot. The Emperor was driven home to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0470.jp2"}, "469": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 409\\nhis palace almost unconscious, and for some time bis\\nlife was in danger. This second attempt in so short\\na time on the life of a man almost eighty years of\\nage, so universally loved and respected, who had\\nconferred such benefits on his country, naturally\\naroused a storm of indignation. When Bismarck\\nreceived the news his first words were, Now the\\nReichstag must be dissolved. This was done the\\ngeneral elections took place while the excitement\\nwas still hot, and of course resulted in a great loss to\\nthose parties especially the National Liberals who\\nhad voted against the Socialist law the Centre alone\\nretained its numbers. Before this new Parliament a\\nfresh law was laid, drafted with much more skill. It\\nabsolutely forbade all speeches or writing in favour\\nof plans for overthrowing the order of society, or di-\\nrected against marriage and property. It enabled\\nthe Government to proclaim in all large towns a state\\nof siege, and to expel from them by the mere decree\\nof the police anyone suspected of Socialist agitation.\\nThe law, which was easily carried, was enforced with\\ngreat severity a state of siege was proclaimed in\\nBerlin and many other places. Socialist papers, and\\neven books, for instance the writings of Lassalle,\\nwere forbidden they might not even be read in\\npublic libraries and for the next twelve years the\\nSocialist party had to carry on their propaganda by\\nsecret means.\\nThis Socialist law is very disappointing; we find\\nthe Government again having recourse to the same\\nmeans for checking and guiding opinion which Met-\\nternich had used fifty years before. Not indeed", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0471.jp2"}, "470": {"fulltext": "4IO Bis7narck. [1878-\\nthat the Socialists themselves had any ground for\\ncomplaint their avowed end was the overthrow of\\ngovernment and society they professed to be at\\nwar with all established institutions if they con-\\nfined their efforts to legal measures and did not use\\nviolence, it was only because the time had not yet\\ncome. The men who avowed admiration for the\\nParis Commune, who were openly preparing for a\\nrevolution more complete than any which Europe\\nhad hitherto seen, could not complain if the Govern-\\nment, while there was yet time, used every means\\nfor crushing them. The mistake was in supposing\\nthat this measure would be successful. Bismarck\\nwould, indeed, had he been able, have made it far\\nmore severe his own idea was that anyone who had\\nbeen legally convicted of holding Socialist opinions\\nshould be deprived of the franchise and excluded\\nfrom the Parliament. What a misunderstanding\\ndoes this shew of the whole object and nature of\\nrepresentative institutions It had been decided\\nthat in Germany Parliament was not to govern\\nwhat then was its function except to display the\\nopinions of the people? If, as was the case, so\\nlarge a proportion of the German nation belonged\\nto a party of discontent, then it was above all desir-\\nable that their wishes and desires should have open\\nexpression, and be discussed where they could be\\noverthrown. The Government had enormous means\\nof influencing opinion. In the old days the men of\\nletters had been on principle in opposition now Ger-\\nmany was flooded by papers, books, and pamphlets^\\nall devoted to the most extravagant praise of the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0472.jp2"}, "471": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Refor^n. 411\\nnew institutions. The excuse which was made for\\nthese laws was not a sufficient one. It is seldom\\nnecessary to meet political assassination by repress-\\nive measures, for they must always create a danger\\nwhich they intend to avert. There was not the\\nslightest ground for supposing that either Hobel or\\nNobeling had any confederates there was no plot\\nit was but the wild and wicked action of an individ-\\nual. It was as absurd to put a large party under\\npolice control for this reason as it was to punish\\nLiberals for the action of Sand. And it was ineffect-\\nive, as the events of the next years shewed for the\\nSocialist law did not spare Germany from the infec-\\ntion of outrage which in these years overran Europe.\\nThe Socialist laws were soon followed by other pro-\\nposals of a more useful kind, and now we come to\\none of the most remarkable episodes in Bismarck s\\ncareer. He was over sixty years of age; his health\\nwas uncertain he had long complained of the ex-\\ntreme toil and the constant annoyance which his\\npublic duties brought upon him. It might appear\\nthat he had finished his work, and, if he could not\\nretire altogether, would give over the management of\\nall internal affairs to others. That he would now\\ntake upon himself a whole new department of public\\nduties, that he would after his prolonged absence\\nappear again as leader and innovator in Parliament-\\nary strife this no one anticipated.\\nUp to the year 1876 he had taken little active part\\nin finance his energies had been entirely absorbed\\nby foreign affairs and he had been content to adopt\\nand support the measures recommended by his tech-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0473.jp2"}, "472": {"fulltext": "412 Bismarck. [i878-\\nnical advisers. When he had interfered at all it had\\nonly been on those occasions when, as with regard to\\ncommercial treaties, the policy of his colleagues had\\nimpeded his own political objects. In 1864 he had\\nbeen much annoyed because difference on commer-\\ncial matters had interfered with the good understand-\\ning with Austria, which at that time he was trying to\\nmaintain. Since the foundation of the Empire al-\\nmost the complete control over the commercial pol-\\nicy of the Empire had been entrusted to Delbriick,\\nwho held the very important post of President of\\nthe Imperial Chancery, and was treated by Bismarck\\nwith a deference and consideration which no other\\nof his fellow-workers received, except Moltke and\\nRoon. Delbriick was a confirmed Free-Trader, and\\nthe result was that, partly by commercial treaties, and\\npartly by the abolition of customs dues, the tariff\\nhad been reduced and simplified. The years follow-\\ning the war had, however, not been altogether pros-\\nperous; a great outbreak of speculation was followed\\nin 1873 by a serious commercial crisis. And since\\nthat year there had been a permanent decrease in\\nthe Imperial receipts. This was, for political reasons,\\na serious inconvenience. By the arrangement made\\nin 1866 the proceeds of the customs and of the indi-\\nrect taxation (with some exceptions) were paid into\\nthe Exchequer of the Federation, and afterwards of\\nthe Empire. If the receipts from these sources were\\nnot sufficient to meet the Imperial requirements, the\\ndeficit had to be made up by contributions paid (in\\nproportion to their population) by the separate\\nStates. During later years these contributions had", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0474.jp2"}, "473": {"fulltext": "1887]\\nEconomic Reform. 413\\nannually increased, and it is needless to point out\\nthat this was sufficient to make the relations of the\\nState Governments to the central authorities disa-\\ngreeable, and to cause some discontent with the new\\nConstitution. This meant also an increase of the\\namount which had to be raised by direct taxation.\\nNow Bismarck had always much disliked direct\\ntaxes he had again and again pointed out that they\\nwere paid with great reluctance, and often fell with\\npeculiar hardship on that very large class which\\ncould only just, by constant and assiduous labour,\\nmake an income sufficient for their needs. Worst\\nof all was it when they were unable to pay even the\\nfew shillings required they then had to undergo\\nthe hardship and disgrace of distraint, and see their\\nfurniture seized and sold by the tax-collectors. He\\nhad therefore always wished that the income derived\\nfrom customs and indirect taxation should be in-\\ncreased so as by degrees to do away with the neces-\\nsity for direct taxation, and if this could be done,\\nthen, instead of the States paying an annual con-\\ntribution to the Empire, they would receive from the\\ncentral Government pecuniary assistance.\\nThe dislike of direct taxation is an essential part\\nof Bismarck s reform he especially disapproved of\\nthe Prussian system, the barbarous system, as he\\ncalled it, according to which every man had to pay a\\nsmall portion, it might be even a few groschen, in\\ndirect taxes.\\nI ascribe, he said, the large part of our emigra-\\ntion to the fact that the emigrant wishes to escape the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0475.jp2"}, "474": {"fulltext": "414 Bismarck. [1878-\\ndirect pressure of the taxes and execution, and to go to\\na land where the klassensteuer does not exist, and where\\nhe will also have the pleasure of knowing that the pro-\\nduce of his labours will be protected against foreign\\ninterference.\\nHis opinion cannot be called exaggerated if it is\\ntrue that, as he stated, there were every year over a\\nmillion executions involving the seizure and sale of\\nhousehold goods on account of arrears of taxation.\\nIt was not only the State taxes to which he objected\\nthe local rates for municipal expenses, and especially\\nfor education, fell very heavily on the inhabitants of\\nlarge cities such as Berlin. He intended to devote\\npart of the money which was raised by indirect\\ntaxation to relieving the rates.\\nHis first proposals for raising the money were of a\\nvery sweeping nature. He wished to introduce a\\nState monopoly for the sale of tobacco, brandy, and\\nbeer. He entered into calculations by which he\\nproved that were his policy adopted all direct taxa-\\ntion might be repealed, and he would have a large\\nsurplus for an object which he had very much at\\nheart the provision of old-age pensions. It was a\\nmethod of legislation copied from that which pre-\\nvails in France and Italy. He pointed out with\\nperfect justice that the revenue raised in Germany\\nfrom the consumption of tobacco was much smaller\\nthan it ought to be. The total sum gained by the\\nState was not a tenth of that which was produced\\nin England by the taxing of tobacco, but no one\\ncould maintain that smoking was more common in", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0476.jp2"}, "475": {"fulltext": "1887]\\nEconomic Reform. 415\\nEngland than in Germany. In fact tobacco was less\\nheavily taxed in Germany than in any other country\\nin Europe.\\nIn introducing a monopoly Bismarck intended and\\nhoped iiot only to relieve the pressure of direct\\ntaxation, though this would have been a change suf-\\nficient in its magnitude and importance for most\\nmen, but proposed to use the very large sum which\\nthe Government would have at its disposal for the\\ndirect relief of the working classes. The Socialist\\nlaw was not to go alone he intended absolutely to\\nstamp out this obnoxious agitation, but it was not\\nfrom any indifference as to the condition of the\\nworking classes. From his earliest days he had\\nbeen opposed to the Liberal doctrine of laissez-faire\\nit will be remembered how much he had disliked the\\nbourgeois domination of the July Monarchy as a\\nyoung man he had tried to prevent the abolition of\\nguilds. He considered that much of the distress\\nand discontent arose from the unrestricted influence\\nof capital. He was only acting in accordance with\\nthe oldest and best traditions of the Prussian Mon-\\narchy when he called in the power of the State to\\nprotect the poor. His plan was a very bold one; he\\nwished to institute a fund from which there should\\nbe paid to every working man who was incapacitated\\nby sickness, accident, or old age, a pension from the\\nState. In his original plan he intended the work-\\ning men should not be required to make any contri-\\nbution themselves towards this fund. It was not to\\nbe made to appear to them as a new burden imposed\\non them by the State. The tobacco monopoly, he", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0477.jp2"}, "476": {"fulltext": "41 6 Bismarck. [1878-\\nsaid, he looked on as the patrimony of the disin-\\nherited.\\nHe did not fear the charge of SociaHsm which\\nmight be brought against him he defended himself\\nby the provisions of the Prussian law. The Code of\\nFrederick the Great contained the words\\nIt is the duty of the State to provide for the sustenance\\nand support of those of its citizens who cannot procure\\nsustenance themselves and again, work\u00e2\u0080\u009eadapted to\\ntheir strength, and capacity shall be supplied to those\\nwho lack means and opportunity of earmng^^ivelihood\\nfor themselves and those dependent on them.\\nIn the most public way the new policy was intro-\\nduced by an Imperial message, on November 17,\\n1881, in which the Emperor expressed his conviction\\nthat the social difificulties could not be healed simply\\nby the repression of the exaggerations of Social De-\\nmocracy, but at the same time the welfare of the\\nworkmen must be advanced. This new policy had\\nthe warm approval of both the Emperor and the\\nCrown Prince no one greeted more heartily the\\nchange than Windthorst.\\nAllow me, he once said to Bismarck, to speak\\nopenly you have done me much evil in my life, but, as\\na German patriot, I must confess to you my gratitude\\nthat after all his political deeds you have persuaded our\\nImperial Master to turn to this path of Social Reform.\\nThere were, he said, dif^culties to be met he ap-\\nproved of the end, but not of all the details,\\nand, he continued, something of the difficulty, if I", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0478.jp2"}, "477": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 417\\nmay say so, you cause yourself. You are often too stormy\\nfor us you are always coming with something new and\\nwe cannot always follow you in it, but you must not\\ntake that amiss. We are both old men and the Emperor\\nis much older than we are, but we should like ourselves\\nin our lifetime to see some of these reforms established.\\nThat I wish for all of us and for our German country,\\nand we will do our best to help in it.\\nOpinions may differ as to the wisdom of Bis-\\nmarck s social and financial policy nobody can\\ndeny their admiration for the energy and patriotism\\nwhich he displayed. It was no small thing for him,\\nat his age, to come out of his comparative retirement\\nto bring forward proposals which would be sure to\\nexcite the bitterest opposition of the men with whom\\nhe had been working, to embark again on a Parlia-\\nmentary conflict as keen as any of those which had\\nso taxed his energies in his younger years. Not con-\\ntent with inaugurating and suggesting these plans, he\\nhimself undertook the immediate execution of them.\\nIn addition to his other offices, in 1880 he under-\\ntook that of Minister of Trade in Prussia, for he found\\nno one whom he could entirely trust to carry out his\\nproposals. During the next years he again took a\\nprominent part in the Parliamentary debates day\\nafter day he attended to answer objections and to\\ndefend his measures in some of his ablest and longest\\nspeeches. By his proposals for a duty on corn he\\nregained the support of most of the Conservatives,\\nbut in the Reichstag which was elected in 1884 he\\nfound himself opposed by a majority consisting of\\nthe Centre, Socialists, and Progressives. Many of the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0479.jp2"}, "478": {"fulltext": "41 8 Bismarck. [1878-\\nlaws were rejected or amended, and it was not until\\n1890 that, in a modified form, the whole of the social\\nlegislation had been carried through.\\nFor the monopoly he gained no support scarcely\\na voice was raised in its favour, nor can we be\\nsurprised at this. It was a proposal very characteristic\\nof his internal policy he had a definite aim in view\\nand at once took the shortest, boldest, and most\\ndirect road towards it, putting aside the thought of\\nall further consequences. In this others could not\\nfollow him quite apart from the difficulties of\\norganisation and the unknown effect of the law on all\\nthose who gained their livelihood by the growth,\\npreparation, and sale of tobacco, there was a deep feel-\\ning that it was not safe to entrust the Government with\\nso enormous a power. Men did not wish to see so\\nmany thousands enrolled in the army of of^cials,\\nalready too great they did not desire a new check\\non the freedom of life and occupation, nor that the\\nGovernment should have the uncontrolled use of so\\ngreat a sum of money. And then the use he proposed\\nto make of the proceeds if the calculations were\\ncorrect, if the results were what he foretold, if from\\nthis monopoly they would be able to pay not only\\nthe chief expenses of the Government but also\\nassign an old-age pension to every German workman\\nwho reached the age of seventy\u00e2\u0080\u0094 what would this be\\nexcept to make the great majority of the nation\\nprospective pensioners of the State? With compul-\\nsory attendance at the State schools with the State\\nuniversities as the only entrance to public life and\\nprofessions when everyone for three years had to", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0480.jp2"}, "479": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 419\\nserve in the army when so large a proportion of the\\npopulation earned their livelihood in the railways,\\nthe post-office, the customs, the administration\\nthe State had already a power and influence which\\nmany besides the Liberals regarded with alarm.\\nWhat would it be when every working man looked\\nforward to receiving, after his working days were\\nover, a free gift from the Government Could not\\nthis power be used for political measures also could\\nnot it become a means for checking the freedom of\\nopinions and even for interfering in the liberty of\\nvoting?\\nHe had to raise the money he wanted in another\\nway, and, in 1879, he began the great financial\\nchange that he had been meditating for three years;\\nhe threw all his vigour into overthrowing Free Trade\\nand introducing a general system of Protection.\\nIn this he was only doing what a large number of\\nhis countrymen desired. The results of Free Trade\\nhad not been satisfactory. In 1876 there was a\\ngreat crisis in the iron trade owing to overpro-\\nduction there was a great fall of prices in England,\\nand Germany was being flooded with English goods\\nsold below cost price. Many factories had to be\\nclosed, owners were ruined, and men thrown out of\\nwork; it happened that, by a law passed in 1873, the\\nlast duty on imported iron would cease on the 31st\\nof December, 1876. Many of the manufacturers\\nand a large party in the Reichstag petitioned that\\nthe action of the law might at any rate be sus-\\npended. Free-Traders, however, still had a majority,\\nfor the greater portion of the National Liberals be-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0481.jp2"}, "480": {"fulltext": "420 Bismarck. [1878--\\nlonged to that school, and the law was carried out.\\nIt was, however, apparent that not only the iron\\nbut other industries were threatened. The building\\nof railways in Russia would bring about an increased\\nimportation of Russian corn and threatened the pros-\\nperity, not only of the large proprietors, but also of\\nthe peasants. It had always been the wise policy of\\nthe Prussian Government to maintain and protect\\nby legislation the peasants, who were considered the\\nmost important class in the State. Then the trade\\nin Swedish wood threatened to interfere with the\\nprofits from the German forests, an industry so use-\\nful to the health of the country and the prosperity\\nof the Government. But if Free Trade would in-\\njure the market for the natural products of the soil,\\nit did not bring any compensating advantages by\\nhelping industry. Germany was flooded with Eng-,\\nlish manufactures, so that even the home market\\nwas endangered, and every year it became more ap-\\nparent that foreign markets were being closed. The\\nsanguine expectations of the Free-Traders had not\\nbeen realised America, France, Russia, had high\\ntariffs; German manufactured goods were excluded\\nfrom these countries. What could they look for-\\nward to in the future but a ruined peasantry and the\\ncrippling of the iron and weaving industries? I\\nhad the impression, said Bismarck, that under\\nFree Trade we were gradually bleeding to death.\\nHe was probably much influenced in his new\\npolicy by Lothar Bucher, one of his private secre-\\ntaries, who was constantly with him at Varzin.\\nBucher, who had been an extreme Radical, had, in", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0482.jp2"}, "481": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 421\\n1849, been compelled to fly from the country and\\nhad lived many years in England. In 1865 he had\\nentered Bismarck s service. He had acquired a pecul-\\niar enmity to the Cobden Club, and looked on that\\ninstitution as the subtle instrument of a deep-laid\\nplot to persuade other nations to adopt a policy\\nwhich was entirely for the benefit of England. He\\ndrew attention to Cobden s words All we desire is\\nthe prosperity and greatness of England. We may\\nin fact look on the Cobden Club and the principles\\nit advocated from two points of view. Either they\\nare, as Bucher maintained, simply English and their\\nonly result will be the prosperity of England, or\\nthey are merely one expression of a general form of\\nthought which we know as Liberalism it was an\\nattempt to create cosmopolitan institutions and to\\ninduce German politicians to take their economic\\ndoctrines from England, just as a few years before\\nthey had taken their political theories. In either\\ncase these doctrines would be very distasteful to\\nBismarck, who disliked internationalism in finance\\nas much as he did in constitutional law or Socialist\\npropaganda.\\nBismarck in adopting Protection was influenced,\\nnot by economic theory, but by the observation of\\nfacts. All nations, he said, which have Protective\\nduties enjoy a certain prosperity; what great ad-\\nvantages has America reached since it threatened\\nto reduce duties twice, five times, ten times as high\\nas ours England alone clung to Free Trade, and\\nwhy? Because she had grown so strong under the\\nold system of Protection that she could now as a", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0483.jp2"}, "482": {"fulltext": "42 2 Bismarck. li878-\\nHercules step down into the arena and challenge\\neveryone to come into the lists. In the arena of\\ncommerce England was the strongest. This was\\nwhy she advocated Free Trade, for Free Trade was\\nreally the right of the most powerful. English\\ninterests were furthered under the veil of the magic\\nword Freedom, and by it German enthusiasts for\\nliberty were enticed to bring about the ruin and\\nexploitation of their own country.\\nIf we look at the matter purely from the economic\\npoint of view, it is indeed difificult to see what\\nbenefits Germany would gain from a policy of Free\\nTrade. It was a poor country if it was to maintain\\nitself in the modern rivalry of nations, it must\\nbecome rich. It could only become rich through\\nmanufactures, and manufactures had no opportunity\\nof growing unless they had some moderate protec-\\ntion from foreign competition.\\nThe effect of Bismarck s attention to finance was\\nnot limited to these great reforms he directed the\\nwhole power of the Government to the support of\\nall forms of commercial enterprise and to the removal\\nof all hindrances to the prosperity of the nation.\\nTo this task he devoted himself with the same\\ncourage and determination which he had formerly\\nshewn in his diplomatic work.\\nOne essential element in the commercial reform\\nwas the improvement of the railways. Bismarck s\\nattention had long been directed to the inconven-\\niences which arose from the number of private\\ncompanies, whose duty it was to regard the dividends\\nof the shareholders rather than the interests of the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0484.jp2"}, "483": {"fulltext": "r887] Economic Reform. 423\\npublic. The existence of a monopoly of this kind\\nin private hands seemed to him indefensible. His\\nattention was especially directed to the injury done\\nto trade by the differential rate imposed on goods\\ntraffic on many lines it was the custom to charge\\nlower rates on imported than on exported goods,\\nand this naturally had a very bad effect on German\\nmanufactures. He would have liked to remedy all\\nthese deficiencies by making all railways the prop-\\nerty of the Empire (we see again his masterful mind,\\nwhich dislikes all compromise) in this, however, he\\nwas prevented by the opposition of the other States,\\nwho would not surrender the control of their own\\nlines. In Prussia he was able to carry out this policy\\nof purchase of all private lines by the State by the\\ntime he laid down the Ministry of Commerce hardly\\nany private companies remained. The acquisition\\nof all the lines enabled the Government greatly to\\nimprove the communication, to lower fares, and to\\nintroduce through communications all this of course\\ngreatly added to the commercial enterprise and there-\\nfore the wealth of the country.\\nHe was now also able to give his encouragement\\nand support to those Germans who for many years\\nin countries beyond the sea had been attempting to\\nlay the foundations for German commerce and even\\nto acquire German colonies. Bismarck s attitude in\\nthis matter deserves careful attention. As early as\\n1874 he had been approached by German travellers\\nto ask for the support of the Government in a plan\\nfor acquiring German colonies in South Africa.\\nThey pointed out that here was a country fitted by", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0485.jp2"}, "484": {"fulltext": "424 Bismarck. [1878-\\nits climate for European occupation the present\\ninhabitants of a large portion of it, the Boers, were\\nanxious to establish their independence of England\\nand would welcome German support. It was only-\\nnecessary to acquire a port, either at Santa Lucia or\\nat Delagoa Bay, to receive a small subsidy from the\\nGovernment, and then private enterprise would\\ndivert the stream of German emigration from North\\nAmerica to South Africa. Bismarck, though he\\ngave a courteous hearing to this proposal, could not\\npromise them assistance, for, as he said, the political\\nsituation was not favourable. He must foresee that\\nan attempt to carry out this or similar plans would\\ninevitably bring about very serious difificulties with\\nEngland, and he had always been accustomed to\\nattach much importance to his good understanding\\nwith the English Government. During the following\\nyears, however, the situation was much altered.\\nFirst of all, great enterprise had been shewn by the\\nGerman merchants and adventurers in different\\nparts of the world, especially in Africa and in the\\nPacific. They, in those difficulties which will always\\noccur when white traders settle in half-civilised lands,\\napplied for support to the German Government.\\nBismarck, as he himself said, did not dare to refuse\\nthem this support.\\nI approached the matter with some reluctance I\\nasked myself, how could I justify it, if I said to these\\nenterprising men, over whose courage, enthusiasm, and\\nvigour I have been heartily pleased That is all very\\nwell, but the German Empire is not strong enough, it\\nwould attract the iU-will of other States, I had not the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0486.jp2"}, "485": {"fulltext": "1887] Econoniic Reform. 425\\ncourage as Chancellor to declare to them this bankruptcy\\nof the German nation for transmarine enterprises.\\nIt must, however, happen that wherever these\\nGerman settlers went, they would be in the neigh-\\nbourhood of some English colony, and however\\nfriendly were the relations of the Governments of\\nthe two Powers, disputes must occur in the out-\\nlying parts of the earth. In the first years of the\\nEmpire Bismarck had hoped that German traders\\nwould find sufficient protection from the English\\nauthorities, and anticipated their taking advantage of\\nthe full freedom of trade allowed in the British\\ncolonies they would get all the advantages which\\nwould arise from establishing their own colonies,\\nwhile the Government would be spared any addi-\\ntional responsibility. He professed, however, to\\nhave learnt by experience from the difficulties which\\ncame after the annexation of the Fiji Islands by\\nGreat Britain that this hope would not be fulfilled\\nhe acknowledged the great friendliness of the For-\\neign Office, but complained that the Colonial Office\\nregarded exclusively British interests. As a com-\\nplaint coming from his mouth this arouses some\\namusement the Colonial Office expressed itself\\nsatisfied to have received from so high an authority\\na testimonial to its efficiency which it had rarely\\ngained from Englishmen.\\nThe real change in the policy of the Empire must,\\nhowever, be attributed not to any imaginary short-\\ncomings of the English authorities; it was an inevit-\\nable result of the abandonment of the policy of Free", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0487.jp2"}, "486": {"fulltext": "426 Bismarck. [1878-\\nTrade, and of the active support which the Govern-\\nment was now giving to all forms of commercial en-\\nterprise. It was shewn, first of all, in the grant of\\nsubsidies to mail steamers, which enabled German\\ntrade and German travellers henceforward to be car-\\nried by German ships before they had depended\\nentirely on English and French lines. It was not\\ntill 1884 that the Government saw its way to under-\\ntake protection of German colonists. They were en-\\nabled to do so by the great change which had taken\\nplace in the political situation. Up to this time\\nGermany was powerless to help or to injure Eng-\\nland, but, on the other hand, required English sup-\\nport. All this was changed by the occupation of\\nEgypt. Here England required a support on the\\nContinent against the indignation of France and the\\njealousy of Russia. This could only be found in\\nGermany, and therefore a close approximation be-\\ntween the two countries was natural. Bismarck let\\nit be known that England would find no support,\\nbut rather opposition, if she, on her side, attempted,\\nas she so easily could have done, to impede German\\ncolonial enterprise.\\nIn his colonial policy Bismarck refused to take\\nthe initiative he refused, also, to undertake the\\ndirect responsibility for the government of their\\nnew possessions. He imitated the older English\\nplan, and left the government in the hands of pri-\\nvate companies, who received a charter of incorpora-\\ntion he avowedly was imitating the East India\\nCompany and the Hudson s Bay Company. The\\nresponsibilities of the German Government were lim-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0488.jp2"}, "487": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 427\\nited to a protection of the companies against the\\nattack or interference by any other Power, and a\\ngeneral control over their actions. In this way it\\nwas possible to avoid calling on the Reichstag for\\nany large sum, or undertaking the responsibility of\\nan extensive colonial establishment, for which at\\nthe time they had neither men nor experience.\\nAnother reason against the direct annexation of\\nforeign countries lay in the Constitution of the Em-\\npire it would have been easier to annex fresh land\\nto Prussia this could have been done by the au-\\nthority of the King; there was, however, no provi-\\nsion by which the Bundesrath could undertake this\\nresponsibility, and it probably could not be done\\neven with the assent of the Reichstag unless some\\nchange were made in the Constitution. It was, how-\\never, essential that the new acquisitions should be\\nGerman and not Prussian.\\nAll these changes were not introduced without\\nmuch opposition the Progressives especially distin-\\nguished themselves by their prolonged refusal to\\nassent even to the subsidies for German lines of\\nsteamers. In the Parliament of 1884 they were en-\\nabled often to throw out the Government proposals.\\nIt was at this time that the conflict between Bismarck\\nand Richter reached its height. He complained,\\nand justly complained, that the policy of the Pro-\\ngressives was then, as always, negative. It is indeed\\nstrange to notice how we find reproduced in Ger-\\nmany that same feeling which a few years before had\\nin England nearly led to the loss of the colonies and\\nthe destruction of the Empire,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0489.jp2"}, "488": {"fulltext": "428 Bismarck. [1878-\\nIt is too soon even now to consider fully the re-\\nsult of this new policy the introduction of Protec-\\ntion has indeed, if we are to judge by appearances,\\nbrought about a great increase in the prosperity of\\nthe country whether the scheme for old-age pensions\\nwill appease the discontent of the working man\\nseems very doubtful. One thing, however, we must\\nnotice: the influence of the new policy is far greater\\nthan the immediate results of the actual laws passed.\\nIt has taught the Germans to look to the Govern-\\nment not only as a means of protecting them against\\nthe attacks of other States, but to see in it a thought-\\nful, and I think we may say kindly, guardian of\\ntheir interests. They know that every attempt of\\neach individual to gain wealth or power for his coun-\\ntry will be supported and protected by the Govern-\\nment they know that there is constant watchfulness\\nas to the dangers to life and health which arise from\\nthe conditions of modern civilisation. In these laws,\\nin fact, Bismarck, who deeply offended and irre-\\ntrievably alienated the survivors of his own genera-\\ntion, won over and secured for himself and also for\\nthe Government the complete loyalty of the rising\\ngeneration. It might be supposed that this power-\\nful action on the part of the State would interfere\\nwith private enterprise the result shews that this is\\nnot the case. A watchful and provident Government\\nreally acts as an incentive to each individual. Let\\nus also recognise that Bismarck was acting exactly\\nas in the old days every English Government acted,\\nwhen the foreign policy was dictated by the interests\\nof British trade and the home policy aimed at pre-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0490.jp2"}, "489": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 429\\nserving, protecting, and assisting the different classes\\nin the community.\\nBismarck has often been called a reactionary, and\\nyet we find that by the social legislation he was the first\\nstatesman deliberately to apply himself to the prob-\\nlem which had been created by the alteration in\\nthe structure of society. Even if the solutions which\\nhe proposed do not prove in every case to have been\\nthe best, he undoubtedly foresaw what would be the\\nchief occupation for the statesmen of the future. In\\nthese reforms he had, however, little help from the\\nReichstag the Liberals were bitterly opposed, the\\nSocialists sceptical and suspicious, the Catholics cool\\nand unstable allies during these years the chronic\\nquarrel between himself and Parliament broke out\\nwith renewed vigour. How bitterly did he deplore\\nparty spirit, the bane of German life, which seemed\\neach year to gain ground\\nIt has, he said, transferred itself to our modern\\npublic life and the Parliaments the Governments, in-\\ndeed, stand together, but in the German Reichstag I do\\nnot find that guardian of liberty for which I had hoped.\\nParty spirit has overrun us. This it is which I accuse\\nbefore God and history, if the great work of our people\\nachieved between 1866 and 1870 fall into decay, and in\\nthis House we destroy by the pen what has been created\\nby the sword.\\nIn future years it will perhaps be regarded as one\\nof his chief claims that he refused to become a party\\nleader. He saved Germany from a serious danger\\nto which almost every other country in Europe which", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0491.jp2"}, "490": {"fulltext": "430 Bismarck. [1878-\\nhas attempted to adopt English institutions has\\nfallen a victim the sacrifice of national welfare to\\nthe integrity and power of a Parliamentary fraction.\\nHis desire was a strong and determined Government,\\nzealously working for the benefit of all classes, quick\\nto see and foresee present and future evil he re-\\ngarded not the personal wishes of individuals, but\\nlooked only in each matter he undertook to its effect\\non the nation as a whole. I will accept help, he\\nsaid, wherever I may get it. I care not to what\\nparty any man belongs. I have no intention of fol-\\nlowing a party policy I used to do so when I was a\\nyoung and angry member of a party, but it is impos-\\nsible for a Prussian or German Minister. Though\\nthe Constitution had been granted, he did not wish\\nto surrender the oldest and best traditions of the\\nPrussian Monarchy and even if the power of the\\nKing and Emperor was limited and checked by two\\nParliaments it was still his duty, standing above all\\nparties, to watch over the country as a hundred\\nyears before his ancestors had done.\\nHis power, however, was checked by the Parlia-\\nments. Bismarck often sighed for a free hand he\\nlonged to be able to carry out his reforms complete\\nand rounded as they lay clear before him in his own\\nbrain how often did he groan under all the delay,\\nthe compromise, the surrender, which was imposed\\nupon him when, conscious as he was that he was\\nonly striving for the welfare of his country, he had\\nto win over not only the King, not only his colleagues\\nin the Prussian Ministry, his subordinates, who had\\nmuch power to check and impede his actions, but.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0492.jp2"}, "491": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0493.jp2"}, "492": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0494.jp2"}, "493": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 43 1\\nabove all, the Parliaments. It was inevitable that\\nhis relation to them should often be one of conflict\\nit was their duty to submit to a searching criticism\\nthe proposals of the Government and to amend or\\nreject them, and let us confess that it was better\\nthey were there. The modifications they introduced\\nin the bills he proposed were often improvements;\\nthose they rejected were not always wise. The\\ndrafting of Government bills was often badly done\\nthe first proposals for the Socialistic law, the original\\ndrafts of many of his economic reforms, were all the\\nbetter when they had been once rejected and were\\nagain brought forward in a modified form. More\\nthan this, we must confess that Bismarck did not\\npossess that temperament which would make it wise\\nto entrust him with absolute dictatorial power in in-\\nternal matters. He attempted to apply to legislation\\nhabits he had learnt in diplomacy. And it is curious\\nto notice Bismarck s extrem,e caution in diplomacy,\\nwhere he was a recognised master, and his rashness in\\nlegislation, where the ground was often new to him.\\nIn foreign affairs a false move may easily be with-\\ndrawn, a change of alliance quickly made; it often\\nhappens that speed is more important than wisdom.\\nIn internal affairs it is different there, delay is in\\nitself of value; moreover, false legislation cannot be\\nimposed with impunity, laws cannot be imposed and\\nrepealed.\\nBismarck often complained of the conduct of\\nthe Reichstag. There were in it two parties, the\\nSocialists and the Centre, closely organised, admira-\\nbly disciplined, obedient to leaders who were in op-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0495.jp2"}, "494": {"fulltext": "432 Bismarck. [1878-\\nposition by principle they looked on the Parlia-\\nmentary campaign as a struggle for power, and they\\nmaintained the struggle with a persistency and suc-\\ncess which had not been surpassed by any Par-\\nliamentary Opposition in any other country. Apart\\nfrom them the attitude of all the parties was nor-\\nmally that of moderate criticism directed to the\\nmatter of the Government proposals. There were,\\nof course, often angry scenes Bismarck himself did\\nnot spare his enemies, but we find no events which\\nshew violence beyond what is, if not legitimate, at\\nleast inevitable in all Parliamentary assemblies. The\\nmain objects of the Government were always at-\\ntained the military Budgets were always passed,\\nthough once not until after a dissolution. In the\\ncontest with the Clerical party and the Socialists the\\nGovernment had the full support of a large majority.\\nEven in the hostile Reichstag of 1884, in which the\\nSocialists, Clericals, and Progressives together com-\\nmanded a majority, a series of important laws were\\npassed. Once, indeed, the majority in opposition to\\nthe Government went beyond the limits of reason and\\nhonour when they refused a vote of X)0 for an\\nadditional director in the Foreign Office. It was\\nthe expression of a jealousy which had no justifica-\\ntion in facts at the time the German-Foreign Office\\nwas the best managed department in Europe the\\nlabour imposed on the secretaries was excessive, and\\nthe nation could not help contrasting this vote with\\nthe fact that shortly before a large number of the\\nmembers had voted that payments should be made\\nto themselves. The nation could not help asking", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0496.jp2"}, "495": {"fulltext": "1887] Econo7nic Reform. 433\\nwhether it would not gain more benefit from another\\n;i{J iOOO a year expended on the Foreign Office than\\nfrom ^50,000 a year for payment of members. Even\\nthis unfortunate action was remedied a few months\\nlater, when the vote was passed in the same Parlia-\\nment by a majority of twenty.\\nNotwithstanding all their internal differences and\\nthe extreme party spirit which often prevailed, the\\nReichstag always shewed determination in defend-\\ning its own privileges. More than once Bismarck\\nattacked them in the most tender points. At one\\ntime it was on the privileges of members and their\\nfreedom from arrest both during the struggle with\\nthe Clericals and with the Socialists the claim was\\nmade to arrest members during the session for polit-\\nical utterances. When Berlin was subject to a state\\nof siege, the President of the Police claimed the\\nright of expelling from the capital obnoxious Social-\\nist members. On these occasions the Government\\nfound itself confronted by the unanimous opposition\\nof the whole House. In 1884, Bismarck proposed\\nthat the meetings of the Reichstag should be bien-\\nnial and the Budget voted for two years the pro-\\nposal was supported on the reasonable grounds that\\nthereby inconvenience and press of work would be\\naverted, which arose from the meeting of the Prus-\\nsian and German Parliaments every winter. Few\\nvotes, however, could be obtained for a suggestion\\nwhich seemed to cut away the most important privi-\\nleges of Parliament.\\nAnother of the great causes of friction between\\nBismarck and the Parliament arose from the question\\n28", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0497.jp2"}, "496": {"fulltext": "434 Bisinarck. [i878-\\nas to freedom of debate. Both before 1866, and\\nsince that year, he made several attempts to intro-\\nduce laws that members should be to some extent\\nheld responsible, and under certain circumstances be\\nbrought before a court of law, in consequence of what\\nthey had said from their places in Parliament. This\\nwas represented as an interference with freedom of\\nspeech, and was bitterly resented. Bismarck, how-\\never, always professed, and I think truly, that he did\\nnot wish to control the members in their opposition\\nto the Government, but to place some check on their\\npersonal attacks on individuals. A letter to one of\\nhis colleagues, written in 1883, is interesting:\\nI have, he says, long learned the difficulties which\\neducated people, who have been well brought up, have to\\novercome in order to meet the coarseness of our Parlia-\\nmentary ^/(?/)/,?^/^/^r [pugilists] with the necessary amount\\nof indifference, and to refuse them in one s own con-\\nsciousness the undeserved honour of moral equality.\\nThe repeated and bitter struggles in which you have\\nhad to fight alone will have strengthened you in your\\nfeeling of contempt for opponents who are neither\\nhonourable enough nor deserve sufficient respect to be\\nable to injure you.\\nThere was indeed a serious evil arising from the\\nwant of the feeling of responsibility in a Parliament-\\nary assembly which had no great and honourable\\ntraditions. He attempted to meet it by strengthen-\\ning the authority of the House over its own mem-\\nbers the Chairman did not possess any power of\\npunishing breaches of decorum. Bismarck often", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0498.jp2"}, "497": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 435\\ncontrasted this with the very great powers over their\\nown members possessed by the British Houses of\\nParliament. He drew attention to the procedure by\\nwhich, for instance, Mr. Plimsoll could be compelled\\nto apologise for hasty words spoken in a moment of\\npassion. It is strange that neither the Prussian nor\\nthe German Parliament consented to adopt rules\\nwhich are really the necessary complement for the\\nprivileges of Parliament.\\nThe Germans Avere much disappointed by the con-\\nstant quarrels and disputes which were so frequent\\nin public life they had hoped that with the unity of\\ntheir country a new period would begin; they found\\nthat, as before, the management of public affairs was\\ndisfigured by constant personal enmities and the\\nstruggle of parties. We must not, however, look on\\nthis as a bad sign it is rather more profitable to ob-\\nserve that the new institutions were not affected or\\nweakened by this friction. It was a good sign for\\nthe future that the new State held together as firmly\\nas any old-established monarchy, and that the most\\nimportant questions of policy could be discussed and\\ndecided without even raising any point which might\\nbe a danger to the permanence of the Empire.\\nBismarck himself did much to put his relations\\nwith the Parliament on a new and better footing.\\nActing according to his general principle, he felt that\\nthe first thing to be done was to induce mutual con-\\nfidence by unrestrained personal intercourse. The\\nfact that he himself was not a member of the Parlia-\\nment deprived him of those opportunities which an\\nEnglish Minister enjoys. He therefore instituted,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0499.jp2"}, "498": {"fulltext": "43^ Bismarck. [1878-\\nin 1868, a Parliamentary reception. During the ses-\\nsion, generally one day each week, his house was\\nopened to all members of the House. The invita-\\ntions were largely accepted, especially by the mem-\\nbers of the National Liberal and Conservative parties.\\nThose who were opponents on principle, the Cen-\\ntre, the Progressives, and the Socialists, generally\\nstayed away. These receptions became the most\\nmarked feature in the political life of the capital,\\nand they enabled many members to come under the\\npersonal charm of the Chancellor. What an event\\nwas it in the life of the young and unknown Deputy\\nfrom some obscure provincial town, when he found\\nhimself sitting, perhaps, at the same table as the\\nChancellor, drinking the beer which Bismarck had\\nbrought into honour at Berlin, and for which his\\nhouse was celebrated, and listening while, with com-\\nplete freedom from all arrogance or pomposity, his\\nhost talked as only he could\\nThe weakest side of his administration lay in the\\nreadiness with which he had recourse to the criminal\\nlaw to defend himself against political adversaries.\\nHe was, indeed, constantly subjected to attacks in\\nthe Press, which were often unjust and sometimes\\nunmeasured, but no man who takes part in public\\nlife is exempt from calumny. He was himself never\\nslow to attack his opponents, both personally in\\nthe Parliament, and still more by the hired writers\\nof the Press. None the less, to defend himself from\\nattacks, he too often brought his opponents into the\\npolice court, and Bismarckbelcidigiing became a com-\\nmon offence. Even the editor of Kladderadatsch was", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0500.jp2"}, "499": {"fulltext": "1887] Economic Reform. 437\\nonce imprisoned. He must be held personally re-\\nsponsible, for no action could be instituted without\\nhis own signature to the charge. We see the same\\nwant of generosity in the use which he made of at-\\ntempts, or reputed attempts, at assassination. In\\n1875, while he was at Kissingen, a young man shot\\nat him he stated that he had been led to do so ow-\\ning to the attacks made on the Chancellor by the\\nCatholic party. No attempt, however, was made to\\nprove that he had any accomplices it was not even\\nsuggested that he ivas carrying out the wishes of the\\nparty. It was one of those cases which will always\\noccur in political struggles, when a young and inex-\\nperienced man will be excited by political speeches\\nto actions which no one would foresee, and which\\nwould not be the natural result of the words to\\nwhich he had listened. Nevertheless, Bismarck was\\nnot ashamed publicly in the Reichstag to taunt his\\nopponents with the action, and to declare that\\nwhether they would or not their party was Kuhl-\\nmann s party he clings to your coat-tails, he\\nsaid. A similar event had happened a few years\\nbefore, when a young man had been arrested on the\\ncharge that he intended to assassinate the Chancellor.\\nNo evidence in support of the charge was forthcom-\\ning, but the excuse was taken by the police for\\nsearching the house of one of the Catholic leaders\\nwith whom the accused had lived. No incriminating\\ndocuments of any kind were found, but among the\\nprivate papers was the correspondence between the\\nleaders in the party of the Centre dealing with ques-\\ntions of party organisation and political tactics.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0501.jp2"}, "500": {"fulltext": "438 Bismarck. [1878-\\nThe Government used these private papers for po-\\nlitical purposes, and published one of them. The\\nconstant use of the police in political warfare be-\\nlonged, of course, to the system he had inherited,\\nbut none the less it was to have been hoped that he\\nwould have been strong enough to put it aside.\\nThe Government was now firmly established it\\ncould afford to be generous. Had he definitely cut\\nhimself off from these bad traditions he would have\\nconferred on his country a blessing scarcely less than\\nall the others.\\nThe opposition of the parties in the Reichstag to\\nhis policy and person did not represent the feelings\\nof the country. As the years passed by and the\\nnew generation grew up, the admiration for his past\\nachievements and for his character only increased.\\nHis seventieth birthday, which he celebrated in 1885,\\nwas made the occasion for a great demonstration of\\nregard, in which the whole nation joined. A na-\\ntional subscription was opened and a present of two\\nmillion marks was made to him. More than half of\\nthis was devoted to repurchasing that part of the es-\\ntate at Schoenhausen which had been sold when he\\nwas a young man. The rest he devoted to forming\\nan institution for the help of teachers in higher\\nschools. A few years before, the Emperor had pre-\\nsented to him the Sachsen Wald, a large portion of\\nthe royal domains in the Duchy of Lauenburg. He\\nnow purchased the neighbouring estate of Fried-\\nrichsruh, so that he had a third country residence to\\nwhich he could retire. It had a double advantage:\\nits proximity to the great forest in which he loved", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0502.jp2"}, "501": {"fulltext": "1887]\\nEconomic Reform.\\n439\\nto wander, and also to a railway, making it little\\nmore than an hour distant from Berlin. He was\\nable, therefore, at Friedrichsruh, to continue his\\nmanagement of affairs more easily than he could at\\nVarzin.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0503.jp2"}, "502": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XVII.\\nRETIREMENT AND DEATH.\\n1 887- 1 898.\\nWELL was it for Germany that Bismarck had\\nnot allowed her to fall into the weak and\\nvacillating hands of a Parliamentary government.\\nPeace has its dangers as well as war, and the rivalry\\nof nations lays upon them a burden beneath which\\nall but the strongest must succumb. The future\\nwas dark threatening clouds were gathering in the\\nEast and West the hostility of Russia increased,\\nand in France the Republic was wavering a mili-\\ntary adventurer had appeared, who threatened to\\nuse the desire for revenge as a means for his per-\\nsonal advancement. Germany could no longer dis-\\nregard French threats year by year the French\\narmy had been increased, and in 1886 General Bou-\\nlanger introduced a new law by which in time of\\npeace over 500,000 men would be under arms. Rus-\\nsia had nearly 550,000 soldiers on her peace estab-\\nlishment, and, against this, Germany only 430,000.\\nThey were no longer safe; the duty of the Govern-\\nment was clear; in December, 1886, they brought\\n440", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0504.jp2"}, "503": {"fulltext": "1887] Retirement and Death. 441\\nforward a law to raise the army to 470,000 men and\\nkeep it at that figure for seven years. We have\\nno desire for war, said Bismarck, in defending the\\nproposal we belong (to use an expression of Prince\\nMetternich s) to the States whose appetite is satis-\\nfied under no circumstances shall we attack France\\nthe stronger we are, the more improbable is war but\\nif France has any reason to believe that she is more\\npowerful than we, then war is certain. It was, he\\nsaid, no good for the House to assure the Govern-\\nment of their patriotism and their readiness for sac-\\nrifice when the hour of danger arrived they must\\nbe prepared beforehand. Words are not soldiers\\nand speeches not battalions.\\nThe House (there was a majority of Catholics,\\nSocialists, and Progressives) threw out the bill, the\\nGovernment dissolved, and the country showed\\nits confidence in Bismarck and Moltke Conserva-\\ntives and National Liberals made a coalition, the\\nPope himself ordered the Catholics not to oppose\\nthe Government (his support had been purchased by\\nthe partial repeal of a law expelling religious orders\\nfrom Prussia), and the Emperor could celebrate his\\nninetieth birthday, which fell in March, 1887, hope-\\nful that the beneficent work of peaceful reform\\nwould continue. And yet never was Bismarck s\\nresource so needed as during the last year in which\\nhe was to serve his old master.\\nFirst, a French spy was arrested on German\\nsoil the French demanded his release, maintain-\\ning that German ofificers had violated the frontier.\\nUnless one side gave way, war was inevitable", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0505.jp2"}, "504": {"fulltext": "442 Bismarck. [1887-\\nthe French Government, insecure as it was, could\\nnot venture to do so Bismarck was strong enough\\nto be lenient the spy was released and peace\\nwas preserved. Then, on the other side, the pas-\\nsionate enmity of Russia burst out in language of\\nunaccustomed violence the national Press de-\\nmanded the dismissal of Bismarck or war the Czar\\npassed through Germany on his way to Copenhagen,\\nbut ostentatiously avoided meeting the Emperor\\nthe slight was so open that the worst predictions\\nwere justified. In November, on his return, he\\nspent a few hours in Berlin. Bismarck asked for an\\naudience, and then he found that despatches had\\nbeen laid before the Czar which seemed to shew that\\nhe, while avowedly supporting Russia in Bulgarian\\naffairs, had really been undermining her influence.\\nThe despatches were forged we do not yet know\\nwho it was that hoped to profit by stirring up a war\\nbetween the two great nations. We can well be-\\nlieve that Bismarck, in the excitement of the\\nmoment, spoke with an openness to which the Czar\\nwas not accustomed he succeeded, however, in\\nbringing about a tolerable understanding. The\\nCzar assured him that he had no intention of going\\nto war, he only desired peace Bismarck did all that\\nhuman ingenuity could to preserve it. By the Triple\\nAlliance he had secured Germany against the attack\\nof Russia. He now entered into a fresh and secret\\nagreement with Russia by which Germany agreed\\nto protect her against an attack from Austria he\\nthereby hoped to be able to prevent the Czar from\\nlooking to France for support against the Triple", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0506.jp2"}, "505": {"fulltext": "18981 Retirement and Death. 443\\nAlliance. It was a policy of singular daring to enter\\ninto a defensive alliance with Russia against Austria,\\nat the same time that he had another defensive alli-\\nance with Austria against Russia.* To shew that he\\nhad no intention of deserting his older ally, he\\ncaused the text of the treaty with Austria to be\\npublished. This need no longer be interpreted as a\\nthreat to Russia. Then, that Germany, if all else\\nfailed, might be able to stand on her own resources,\\nanother increase of the army was asked for. By the\\nreorganisation of the reserve, 500,000 men could be\\nadded to the army in time of war. This proposal\\nwas brought before the Reichstag, together with one\\nfor a loan of twenty-eight million marks to purchase\\nthe munitions of war which would be required, and\\nin defence of this, Bismarck made the last of his\\ngreat speeches.\\nIt was not necessary to plead for the bill. He\\nwas confident of the patriotism of the House his\\nduty v/as to curb the nervous anxiety which recent\\nevents had produced. These proposals were not\\nfor war, but for peace; but they must indeed be\\nprepared for war, for that was a danger that was\\nnever absent, and by a review of the last forty years\\nhe shewed that scarcely a single year had gone by\\nin which there had not been the probability of a\\ngreat European conflict, a war of coalitions in which\\nall the great States of Europe would be ranged on\\nOur knowledge of this treaty is still very incomplete even the\\ndate is not certain, but it seems most probable that it was executed\\nat this time. Neither Bismarck s own memoirs nor Busch s book\\nthrow any light upon it.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0507.jp2"}, "506": {"fulltext": "444 Bismarck.\\n[1887-\\none side or the other. This danger was still pre-\\nsent, it would never cease; Germany, now, as before,\\nmust always be prepared for the strength of Ger-\\nmany was the security of Europe.\\nWe must make greater exertions than other Powers\\non account of our geographical position. We lie in the\\nmiddle of Europe we can be attacked on all sides.\\nGod has put us in a situation in which our neighbours\\nwill not allow us to fall into indolence or apathy. The\\npike in the European fish-pond prevent us from becom-\\ning carp,\\nIt was not their fault if the old alliance with\\nRussia had broken down the alliance with Austria\\nstill continued. But, above all, Germany must de-\\npend on her army, and then they could look boldly\\ninto the future. It will calm our citizens if they\\nthink that if we are attacked on two sides we can\\nput a million good soldiers on the frontier, and in a\\nfew weeks support them by another million. But\\nlet them not think that this terrible engine of war\\nwas a danger to the peace of Europe. In words\\nwhich represent a profound truth he said It is\\njust the strength at which we aim that makes us\\npeaceful. That sounds paradoxical, but it is so.\\nWith the powerful engine into which we are forming\\nthe German army one undertakes no ofTensive\\nwar. In truth, when the army was the nation,\\nwhat statesman was there who would venture on\\nwar unless he were attacked If I were to say to\\nyou, We are threatened by France and Russia it\\nis better for us to fight at once an offensive war", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0508.jp2"}, "507": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 445\\nis more advantageous for us, and ask for a credit\\nof a hundred millions, I do not know whether you\\nwould grant it, I hope not. And he concluded\\nIt is not fear which makes us lovers of peace,\\nbut the consciousness of our own strength. We can\\nbe won by love and good-will, but by them alone\\nwe Germans fear God and nothing etse in the world,\\nand it is the fear of God which makes us seek peace\\na7id ensne it.\\nThese are words which will not be forgotten so\\nlong as the German tongue is spoken. Well will it\\nbe if they are remembered in their entirety. They\\nwere the last message of the older generation to the\\nnew Germany which had arisen since the war for\\nalready the shadow of death lay over the city; in\\nthe far South the Crown Prince was sinking to his\\ngrave, and but a few weeks were to pass before Bis-\\nmarck stood at the bedside of the dying Emperor.\\nHe died on March 9, 1888, a few days before his\\nninety-first birthday, and with him passed the sup-\\nport on which Bismarck s power rested.\\nHe was not a great man, but he was an honour-\\nable, loyal, and courteous gentleman; he had not\\nalways understood the course of Bismarck s policy\\nor approved the views which his Minister adopted.\\nThe restraint he had imposed had often been incon-\\nvenient, and Bismarck had found much difficulty\\nin overcoming the prejudices of his master; but\\nit had none the less been a gain for Bismarck that\\nhe was compelled to explain and justify his action\\nto a man whom he never ceased to love and respect.\\nHow beneficial had been the controlling influence", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0509.jp2"}, "508": {"fulltext": "446 Bismarck. [1887-\\nof his presence the world was to learn by the events\\nwhich followed his death.\\nThat had happened to which for five and twenty\\nyears all Bismarck s enemies had looked forward.\\nThe foundation on which his power rested was taken\\naway men at once began to speculate on his fall.\\nThe noble presence of the Crown Prince, his cheer-\\nful and kindly manners, his known attachment to\\nliberal ideas, his strong national feeling, the success\\nwith which he had borne himself on the uncongenial\\nfield of battle, all had made him the hope of the\\ngeneration to which he belonged. Who was so well\\nsuited to solve the difficulties of internal policy with\\nwhich Bismarck had struggled so long? Hopes\\nnever to be fulfilled Absent from his father s death-\\nbed, he returned to Berlin a crippled and dying man,\\nand when a few weeks later his body was lowered into\\nthe grave, there were buried with him the hopes and\\naspirations of a whole generation.\\nHis early death was indeed a great misfortune for\\nhis country. Not that he would have fulfilled all\\nthe hopes of the party that would have made him\\ntheir leader. It is never wise to depend on the\\nliberalism of a Crown Prince. When young and\\ninexperienced he had been in opposition to his\\nfather s government but his father before him had,\\nwhile heir to the throne, also held a similar position to\\nhis own brother. As Crown Prince, he had desired and\\nhad won popularity he had been even too sensitive\\nto public opinion. His, however, was a character\\nthat required only responsibility to strengthen it\\nwith the burden of sovereignty he would, we may", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0510.jp2"}, "509": {"fulltext": "EMPEROR FREDERICK.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0511.jp2"}, "510": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0512.jp2"}, "511": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 447\\nsuppose, have shewn a fixity of purpose which many\\nof his admirers would hardly have expected of him,\\nnor would he have been deficient in those qualities of\\na ruler which are the traditions of his family. He\\nwas not a man to surrender any of the prerogatives\\nor authority of the Crown. He had a stronger will\\nthan his father, and he would have made his will\\nfelt. His old enmity to Bismarck had almost\\nceased. It is not probable that with the new Em-\\nperor the Chancellor would long have held his posi-\\ntion, but he would have been able to transfer the\\nCrown to a man who had learnt wisdom by pro-\\nlonged disappointment. How he would have gov-\\nerned is shewn by the only act of authority which\\nhe had time to carry out. He would have done\\nwhat was more important than giving a little more\\npower to the Parliament he would at once have\\nstopped that old and bad system by which the\\nPrussian Government has always attempted to\\nschoolmaster the people. During his short reign\\nhe dismissed Herr von Puttkammer, the Minister of\\nthe Interior, a relative of Bismarck s wife, for interfer-\\ning with the freedom of election we may be sure that\\nhe would have allowed full freedom of speech and\\nthat he would not have consented to govern by aid\\nof the police. Under him there would not have been\\nconstant trials for Majestdtsbeleidigitng or Bismarck-\\nbeleidigung. This he could have done without weak-\\nening the power of the Crown or the authority of\\nthe Government those who know Germany will\\nbelieve that it was the one reform which was still\\nrequired.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0513.jp2"}, "512": {"fulltext": "44^ Bismarck. [1887-\\nThe illness of the Emperor made it desirable to\\navoid points of conflict both he and Bismarck\\nknew that it was impossible, during the few weeks\\nthat his life would be spared, to execute so important\\na change as the resignation of the Chancellor would\\nhave been. On many points there was a difference\\nof opinion, but Bismarck did not unduly express his\\nview, nor did he threaten to resign if his advice were\\nnot adopted. When, for instance, the Emperor\\nhesitated to give his assent to a law prolonging the\\nperiod of Parliament, Bismarck did not attempt to\\ncontrol his decision. When Herr Puttkammer was\\ndismissed, Bismarck did not remonstrate against\\nan act which was almost of the nature of a personal\\nreprimand to himself. It was, however, different\\nwhen the foreign policy of the Empire was affected,\\nfor here Bismarck, as before, considered himself the\\ntrustee and guarantor for the security of Germany.\\nAn old project was now revived for bringing about a\\nmarriage between the Princess Victoria of Prussia\\nand Prince Alexander of Battenberg. This had been\\nsuggested some years before, while the Prince was\\nstill ruler of Bulgaria at Bismarck s advice, the Em-\\nperor William had refused his consent to the mar-\\nriage, partly for the reason that according to the\\nfamily law of the Hohenzollerns a marriage with the\\nBattenberger family would be a mesalliance. He was,\\nhowever, even more strongly influenced by the effect\\nthis would have on the political situation of Europe.\\nThe foundation of Bismarck s policy was the main-\\ntenance of friendship with Russia this old-estab-\\nlished alliance depended, however, on the personal", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0514.jp2"}, "513": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 449\\ngood-will of the Czar, and not on the wishes of the\\nRussian nation or any identity of interests between\\nthe two Empires. A marriage between a Prussian\\nprincess and a man who was so bitterly hated by the\\nCzar as was Prince Alexander must have seriously in-\\njured the friendly relations which had existed between\\nthe two families since the year 1814. Bismarck\\nbelieved that the happiness of the Princess must be\\nsacrificed to the interests of Germany, and the Em-\\nperor William, who, when a young man, had for\\nsimilar reasons been required by his father to re-\\nnounce the hand of the lady to whom he had been\\ndevotedly attached, agreed with him. Now, after\\nthe Emperor s death the project was revived the\\nEmperor Frederick wavered between his feelings as\\na father and his duty as a king. Bismarck suspected\\nthat the strong interest which the Empress displayed\\nin the project was due, not only to maternal affec-\\ntion, but also to the desire, which in her would be\\nnatural enough, to bring over the German Empire to\\nthe side of England in the Eastern Question, so that\\nEngland might have a stronger support in her peren-\\nnial conflict with Russia. The matter, therefore,\\nappeared to him as a conflict between the true inter-\\nests of Germany and those old Court influences which\\nhe so often had had to oppose, by which the family\\nrelationships of the reigning sovereign were made to\\ndivert his attention from the single interests of his\\nown country. He made it a question of confidence\\nhe threatened to resign, as he so often did under\\nsimilar circumstances he let it be known through\\nthe Press what was the cause, and, in his opinion, the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0515.jp2"}, "514": {"fulltext": "450 Bismarck. [1887-\\ntrue interpretation, of the conflict which influenced\\nthe Court. In order to support his view, he called\\nin the help of the Grand Duke of Baden, who, as the\\nEmperor s brother-in-law, and one of the most ex-\\nperienced of the reigning Princes, was the proper\\nperson to interfere in a matter which concerned both\\nthe private and the public life of the sovereign. The\\nstruggle, which threatened to become serious, was,\\nhowever, allayed by the visit of the Queen of Eng-\\nland to Germany. She, acting in German affairs with\\nthat strict regard to constitutional principle and\\nthat dislike of Court intrigue that she had always\\nobserved in dealings with her own Ministers, gave\\nher support to Bismarck. The marriage did not\\ntake place.\\nFrederick s reign lasted but ninety days, and his\\nson ruled in his place. The new Emperor belonged\\nto the generation which had grown up since the\\nwar; he could not remember the old days of con-\\nflict like all of his generation, from his earliest\\nyears he had been accustomed to look on Bismarck\\nwith gratitude and admiration. In him, warm per-\\nsonal friendship was added to the general feeling of\\npublic regard he had himself learnt from Bismarck s\\nown lips the principles of policy and the lessons of\\nhistory. It might well seem that he would continue\\nto lean for support on the old statesman. So he\\nhimself believed, but careful observers who saw his\\npower of will and his restless activity foretold that\\nhe would not allow to Bismarck that complete free-\\ndom of action and almost absolute power which he\\nhad obtained during the later years of the old", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0516.jp2"}, "515": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 45 1\\nEmperor. They foretold also that Bismarck would\\nnot be content with a position of less power, and\\nthere were many ready to watch for and foment the\\ndifferences which must arise.\\nIn the first months of the new reign, some of\\nBismarck s old enemies attempted to undermine his\\ninfluence by spreading reports of his differences with\\nthe Emperor Frederick, and Professor Geffken even\\nwent so far as to publish from the manuscript some of\\nthe most confidential portions of the Emperor s diary\\nin order to shew that but for him Bismarck would\\nnot have created the new Empire. The attempt\\nfailed, for, rightly read, the passages which were to\\ninjure Bismarck s reputation only served to shew\\nhow much greater than men thought had been the\\ndifificulties with which he had had to contend and\\nthe wisdom with which he had dealt with them.\\nFrom the very beginning there were differences of\\nopinion the old and the new did not think or feel\\nalike. Bismarck looked with disapproval on the con-\\nstant journeys of the Emperor he feared that he was\\ncompromising his dignity. Moltke and others of\\nthe older generation retired from the posts they\\nfilled Bismarck, with growing misgivings, stayed\\non. His promises to his old master, his love of\\npower, his distrust of the capacity of others, all made\\nit hard for him to withdraw when he still might\\nhave done so with dignity. We cannot doubt that\\nhis presence was irksome to his master his influence\\nand authority were too great before them, even the\\nmajesty of the Throne was dimmed; the Minister\\nwas a crreater man than the Sovereig-n.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0517.jp2"}, "516": {"fulltext": "452 Bismarck. [1887-\\nIf we are to understand what happened we must\\nremember how exceptional was the position which\\nBismarck now occupied. He had repeatedly defied\\nthe power of Parliament and shewn that he was\\nsuperior to the Reichstag there were none among\\nhis colleagues who could approach him in age or\\nexperience the Prussian Ministers were as much\\nhis nominees as were the officials of the Empire. He\\nhimself was Chancellor, Minister-President, Foreign\\nMinister, and Minister of Trade; his son was at the\\nhead of the Foreign Office and was used for the\\nmore important diplomatic missions his cousin was\\nMinister, of the Interior in the management of the\\nmost critical affairs, he depended upon the assistance\\nof his own family and secretaries. He had twice\\nbeen able against the will of his colleagues to reverse\\nthe whole policy of the State. The Government was\\nin his hands and men had learnt to look to him\\nrather than to the Emperor. Was it to be expected\\nthat a young man, ambitious, full of spirit and self-\\nconfidence, who had learnt from Bismarck himself a\\nhigh regard for his monarchical duties, would acqui-\\nesce in this system Nay, more was it right that\\nhe should\\nIt was a fitting conclusion to his career that the\\nman who had restored the monarchical character of\\nthe Prussian State should himself shew that before\\nthe will of the King he, as every other subject, must\\nbow.\\nBismarck had spent the winter of 1889 at Fried-\\nrichsruh. When he returned to Berlin at the end\\nof January, he found that his influence and authority", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0518.jp2"}, "517": {"fulltext": "1898]\\nRetirement and Death. 453\\nhad been undermined not only was the Emperor\\ninfluenced by other advisers, but even the Ministry\\nshewed an independence to which he was not accus-\\ntomed. The chief causes of difference arose re-\\ngarding the prolongation of the law against the\\nSocialists. This expired in 1890, and it was proposed\\nto bring in a bill making it permanent. Bismarck\\nwished even more than this to intensify the strin-\\ngency of its provisions. Apparently the Emperor\\ndid not believe that this was necessary. He hoped\\nthat it would be possible to remove the disaffection\\nof the working men by remedial measures, and, in\\norder to discuss these, he summoned a European\\nCongress which would meet in Berlin.\\nHere, then, there was a fundamental difference of\\nopinion between the King of Prussia and his Minister\\nthe result was that Bismarck did not consider himself\\nable to defend the Socialist law before the Reich-\\nstag, for he could not any longer give full expression\\nto his own views the Parliament was left without\\ndirection from the Government, and eventually a\\ncoalition between the extreme Conservatives, the\\nRadicals, and the Socialists rejected the bill alto-\\ngether, A bitterly contested general election fol-\\nlowed in which the name and the new policy of the\\nEmperor were freely used, and it resulted in a ma-\\njority opposed to the parties who were accustomed\\nto support Bismarck. These events made it obvious\\nthat on matters of internal policy a permanent\\nagreement between the Emperor and the Chan-\\ncellor was impossible. It seems that Bismarck\\ntherefore offered to resign his post as Minister,", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0519.jp2"}, "518": {"fulltext": "454 Bismarck. [i887-\\nPresident, maintaining only the general control of\\nforeign affairs. But this proposition did not meet\\nwith the approval of the Emperor. There were,\\nhowever, other grounds of difference connected even\\nwith foreign affairs the Emperor was drawing\\ncloser to England and thereby separating from\\nRussia.\\nBy the middle of March, matters had come to a\\ncrisis. The actual cause for the final difference was\\nan important matter of constitutional principle. Bis-\\nmarck found that the Emperor had on several occa-\\nsions discussed questions of administration with some\\nof his colleagues without informing him moreover,\\nimportant projects of law had been devised without\\nhis knowledge. He therefore drew the attention of\\nthe Emperor to the principle of the German and\\nPrussian Constitutions. By the German Constitution,\\nas we have seen, the Chancellor was responsible for\\nall acts of the Ministers and Secretaries of State, who\\nheld ofifice as his deputies and subordinates. He\\ntherefore claimed that he could require to be con-\\nsulted on every matter of any importance which con-\\ncerned any of these departments. The same right\\nas regards Prussian affairs had been explicitly secured\\nto the Minister-President by a Cabinet order of 1852,\\nwhich was passed in order to give to the President that\\ncomplete control which was necessary if he was to\\nbe responsible for the whole policy of the Govern-\\nment. The Emperor answered by a command that\\nhe should draw up anew order reversing this decree.\\nThis Bismarck refused to do the Emperor repeated\\nhis instructions, It was a fundamental point on", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0520.jp2"}, "519": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0521.jp2"}, "520": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0522.jp2"}, "521": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 455\\nwhich no compromise was possible; the Emperor\\nproposed to take away from the Chancellor that\\nsupreme position he had so long enjoyed to recall\\ninto his own hands that immediate control over all\\ndepartments which in old days the Kings of Prussia\\nhad exercised and, as Bismarck said, to be his own\\nPrime Minister. In this degradation of his position\\nBismarck would not acquiesce he had no alternative\\nbut to resign.\\nThe final separation between these two men, each\\nso self-willed and confident in his own strength, was\\nnot to be completed by ceremonious discussions on\\nconstitutional forms. It was during an audience at\\nthe castle, that the Emperor had explained his views,\\nBismarck his objections the Emperor insisted that\\nhis will must be carried out, if not by Bismarck, then\\nby another. Then I am to understand, your\\nMajesty, said Bismarck, speaking in English that\\nI am in your way? Yes, was the answer. This\\nwas enough he took his leave and returned home\\nto draw up the formal document in which he ten-\\ndered his resignation. This, which was to be the\\nconclusion of his public life, had to be composed\\nwith care; he did not intend to be hurried; but the\\nEmperor was impatient, and his impatience was in-\\ncreased when he was informed that Windthorst, the\\nleader of the Centre, had called on Bismarck at his re-\\nsidence. He feared lest there was some intrigue, and\\nthat Bismarck proposed to secure his position by an\\nalliance with the Parliamentary opposition. He sent\\nan urgent verbal message requiring the resignation\\nimmediately, a command with which Bismarck was", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0523.jp2"}, "522": {"fulltext": "456 Bismarck. [1887-\\nnot likely to comply. Early next morning, the Em-\\nperor drove round himself to his house, and Bismarck\\nwas summoned from his bed to meet the angry\\nsovereign. The Emperor asked what had taken\\nplace at the interview with Windthorst, and stated\\nthat Ministers were not to enter on political discus-\\nsions with Parliamentary leaders without his per-\\nmission. Bismarck denied that there had been any\\npolitical discussion, and answered that he could not\\nallow any supervision over the guests he chose to\\nreceive in his private house.\\nNot if I order it as your sovereign asked the\\nEmperor.\\nNo. The commands of my King cease in my\\nwife s drawing-room, answered Bismarck. The Em-\\nperor had forgotten that Bismarck was a gentleman\\nbefore he was a Minister, and that a Prussian noble-\\nman could not be treated like a Russian boyar.^\\nNo reconciliation or accommodation was now pos-\\nsible. The Emperor did all he could to make it ap-\\npear that the resignation was voluntary and friendly.\\nHe conferred on the retiring Chancellor the highest\\nhonours he raised him to the rank of Field Marshal\\nand created him Duke of Lauenburg, and publicly\\nstated his intention of presenting him with a copy\\nof his own portrait. As a soldier, Bismarck obedi-\\nently accepted the military honour the new title he\\nrequested to be allowed not to use he had never\\nbeen asked whether he desired it.\\nIt must be remembered that our knowledge of these events is\\nimperfect and probably inaccurate it is at least one-sided. It\\ncomes entirely from the published statements of those who gained\\ntheir information directly or indirectly from Bismarck.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0524.jp2"}, "523": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 45 7\\nNo outward honours could recompense him for\\nthe affront he had received. What profited it him\\nthat the Princes and people of Germany joined in\\nunanimous expression of affection and esteem, that\\nhe could scarcely set foot outside his house for the\\nenthusiastic crowd who cheered and followed him\\nthrough the streets of Berlin For twenty-four\\nyears he had been Prussian Minister and now he was\\ntold he was in the way. His successor was already\\nin office he was himself driven in haste from the\\nhouse which so long had been his home. A final\\nvisit to the Princes of the Royal House, a last audi-\\nence with the Emperor, a hasty leave-taking from his\\nfriends and colleagues, and then the last farewell,\\nwhen in the early morning he drove to Charlotten-\\nburg and alone went down into the mausoleum\\nwhere his old master slept, to lay a rose upon his\\ntomb.\\nThe rest he had so often longed for had come, but\\nit was too late. Forty years he had passed in public\\nlife and he could not now take up again the interests\\nand occupations of his youth. Agriculture had no\\nmore charms for him he was too infirm for sport he\\ncould not, like his father, pass his old age in the busy\\nindolence of a country gentleman s life, nor could he,\\nas some statesmen have done, soothe his declining\\nyears by harmless and amiable literary dilettanteism.\\nHis religion was not of that complexion that he could\\nfind in contemplation, and in preparation for another\\nlife, consolation for the trials of this one. At seventy-\\nfive years of age, his intellect was as vigorous and his\\nenergy as unexhausted as they had been twenty years", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0525.jp2"}, "524": {"fulltext": "458 Bismarck. [1887-\\nbefore his health was improved, for he had found\\nin Dr. Schweninger a physician who was not only\\nable to treat his complaints, but could also compel\\nhis patient to obey his orders. He still felt within\\nhimself full power to continue his public work, and\\nnow he was relegated to impotence and obscurity.\\nWhether in Varzin or Friedrichsruh, his eyes were\\nalways fixed on Berlin. He saw the State which he\\nhad made, and which he loved as a father, subjected to\\nthe experiment of young and inexperienced control.\\nHe saw overthrown that carefully planned system by\\nwhich the peace of Europe was made to depend upon\\nthe prosperity of Germany. Changes were made in\\nthe working of that Constitution which it seemed\\npresumption for anyone but him to touch. His\\npolicy was deserted, his old enemies were taken into\\nfavour. Can we wonder that he could not restrain\\nhis impatience He felt like a man who sees his heir\\nruling in his own house during his lifetime, cutting\\ndown his woods and dismissing his old servants, or\\nas if he saw a careless and clumsy rider mounted on\\nhis favourite horse.\\nFrom all parts of Germany deputations from\\ntowns and newspaper writers came to visit him. He\\nreceived them with his customary courtesy, and\\nspoke with his usual frankness. He did not dis-\\nguise his chagrin he had, he said, not been treated\\nwith the consideration which he deserved. He\\nhad never been accustomed to hide his feelings or\\nto disguise his opinions. Nothing that his succes-\\nsors did seemed to him good. They made a treaty\\nwith England for the arrangement of conflicting", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0526.jp2"}, "525": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 459\\nquestions in Africa men looked to Bismarck to\\nhear what he would say before they formed their\\nopinion I would never have signed the treaty,\\nhe declared. He quickly drifted into formal op-\\nposition to the Government he even made arrange-\\nments with one of the Hamburg papers that it\\nshould represent his opinions. He seemed to have\\nforgotten his own principle that, in foreign affairs\\nat least, an opposition to the policy of the Govern-\\nment should not be permitted. He claimed a privi-\\nlege which as Minister he would never have allowed\\nto another. He defied the Government. They\\nshall not silence me, he said. It seemed as\\nthough he was determined to undo the work of his\\nlife. Under the pretext that he was attacking the\\npolicy of the Ministers, he was undermining the\\nloyalty of the people, for few could doubt that it\\nwas the Emperor at whom the criticisms were aimed.\\nIn his isolation and retirement, the old uncompro-\\nmising spirit of his ancestors once more awoke in\\nhim. He had been loyal^ to the Crown -who more\\nso? but his loyalty had limits. His long service had\\nbeen one of personal and voluntary affection he\\nwas not a valet, that his service could be handed\\non from generation to generation among the assets\\nof the Crown. After all, he would ask, who are\\nthese Hohenzollerns My family is as good as theirs.\\nWe have been here longer than they have. Like\\nhis ancestors who stood out against the rule of the\\nGreat Elector, he was putting personal feeling above\\npublic duty. Even if the action of the new Govern-\\nment was not always wise, he himself had made", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0527.jp2"}, "526": {"fulltext": "460 Bismarck. [1887-\\nGermany strong enough to support for a few years\\na weak Ministry.\\nMore than this, he was attempting to destroy the\\nconfidence of the people in the moral justice and ne-\\ncessity of the measures by which he had founded the\\nEmpire. They had always been taught that in 1870\\ntheir country had been the object of a treacherous\\nand unprovoked attack. Bismarck, who was always\\nliving over again the great scenes in which he had\\nbeen the leading actor, boasted that but for him\\nthere would never have been a war with France.\\nHe referred to the alteration in the Ems telegram,\\nwhich we have already narrated, and the Government\\nwas forced to publish the original documents. The\\nconclusions drawn from these disclosures and others\\nwhich followed were exaggerated, but the naive and\\nsimple belief of the people was irretrievably de-\\nstroyed. Where they had been taught to see the\\nwill of God, they found only the machinations of the\\nMinister. In a country where patriotism had already\\ntaken the place of religion, the last illusion had been\\ndispelled almost the last barrier was broken down\\nwhich stood between the nation and moral scepticism.\\nBismarck s criticism was very embarrassing to the\\nGovernment by injuring the reputation of the Min-\\nistry he impaired the influence of the nation. It was\\ndif^cult to keep silence and ignore the attack, but\\nthe attempts at defence were awkward and unwise.\\nGeneral Caprivi attempted to defend the treaty with\\nEngland by reading out confidential minutes, ad-\\ndressed by Bismarck to the Secretary of the Minister\\nfor Foreign Affairs, in which he had written that the", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0528.jp2"}, "527": {"fulltext": "1898] Retirement and Death. 461\\nfriendship of England and the support of Lord\\nSahsbury were more important than Zanzibar or the\\nwhole of Africa, He addressed a circular despatch\\nto Prussian envoys to inform them that the utter-\\nances of Prince Bismarck were without any actual\\nimportance, as he was now only a private man. This\\nonly made matters worse for the substance of the\\ndespatch quickly became known (another instance of\\nthe lax control over important State documents\\nwhich we so often notice in dealing with German\\naffairs), and only increased the bitterness of Bis-\\nmarck, which was shared by his friends and sup-\\nporters.\\nFor more than two years the miserable quarrel\\ncontinued Bismarck was now the public and avowed\\nenemy of the Court and the Ministry. Moltke died,\\nand he alone of the great men of the country was\\nabsent from the funeral ceremony, but in his very\\nabsence he overshadowed all who were there. His\\npublic popularity only increased. In 1892, he travelled\\nacross Germany to visit Vienna for his son s wed-\\nding. His journey was a triumphal progress, and the\\nwelcome was warmest in the States of the South, in\\nSaxony and Bavaria. The German Government,\\nhowever, found it necessary to instruct their ambas-\\nsador not to be present at the wedding and to take\\nno notice of the Prince he was not even granted an\\naudience by the Austrian Emperor. It was held\\nnecessary also to publish the circular to which I\\nhave already referred, and thereby officially to recog-\\nnise the enmity.\\nThe scandal of the quarrel became a grave injury", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0529.jp2"}, "528": {"fulltext": "462 Bismarck. [1887-\\nto the Government of the country. A serious\\nillness of Bismarck caused apprehension that he\\nmight die while still unreconciled. The Emperor\\ntook the opportunity, and by a kindly message\\nopened the way to an apparent reconciliation. Then\\na change of Ministry took place General Caprivi\\nwas m.ade the scapegoat for the failures of the new\\nadministration, and retired into private life, too loyal\\neven to attempt to justify or defend the acts for\\nwhich he had been made responsible. The new\\nChancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, was a friend and\\nformer colleague of Bismarck, and had in old days\\nbeen leader of the National party in Bavaria. When\\nBismarck s eightieth birthday was celebrated, the\\nEmperor was present, and once more Bismarck went\\nto Berlin to visit his sovereign. We may be allowed\\nto believe that the reconciliation was not deep. We\\nknow that he did not cease to contrast the new marks\\nof Royal favour with the kindly courtesy of his old\\nmaster, who had known so well how to allow the\\nKing to be forgotten in the friend.\\nAs the years went on, he became ever more lonely.\\nHis wife was dead, and his brother. Solitude, the\\ncurse of greatness, had fallen on him. He had no\\nfriends, for we cannot call by that name the men, so\\ninferior to himself, by whom he was surrounded\\nmen who did not scruple to betray his confidence\\nand make a market of his infirmities. With dififi-\\nculty could he bring himself even to systematic\\nwork on the memoirs he proposed to leave. Old\\nage set its mark on him his beard had become\\nwhite he could no longer, as in former days, ride", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0530.jp2"}, "529": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0531.jp2"}, "530": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0532.jp2"}, "531": {"fulltext": "1898]\\nRetii^ement and Death.\\n46.\\nand walk through the woods near his house. His\\ninterest in pubHc affairs never flagged, and especially\\nhe watched with unceasing vigilance every move in\\nthe diplomatic world his mind and spirit were still\\nunbroken when a sudden return of his old malady\\novertook him, and on the last day of July, 1898, he\\ndied at Friedrichsruh.\\nHe lies buried, not among his ancestors and kins-\\nfolk near the old house at Schoenhausen, nor in the\\nImperial city where his work had been done but in\\na solitary tomb at Friedrichsruh to which, with\\nscanty state and hasty ceremony, his body had been\\nborne.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0533.jp2"}, "532": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0534.jp2"}, "533": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0535.jp2"}, "534": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0536.jp2"}, "535": {"fulltext": "MAP OF GERMANY SHOWING CHANGES MADE IN 1866.", "height": "2232", "width": "2911", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0537.jp2"}, "536": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0538.jp2"}, "537": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\nAlexander, Prince, of Batten-\\nberg, 448-450\\nArmy, 295\\nArniin, Count, 19-21, 46\\nArnim, Oscar von, marries Mal-\\nvina von Bismarck, 25\\nAugustenburg, Frederick, Prince\\nof, 202-209, 213-224, 227,\\n228, 230-237, 246\\nB\\nBazaine, Marshal, 361, 373\\nBenedetti, Count Vincent, 270-\\n272, 275, 277-282, 322, 330-\\n333, 336-338, 340-342\\nBennigsen, 392, 394\\nBerlin, its condition after the\\nRevolution, 47, 50, 51\\nBismarck, the family of, its\\norigin and history, 1-12\\nBismarck, August von, 5\\nBismarck, August von, the\\nLandrath, 8\\nBismarck, August Friedrich\\nvon, 9\\nBismarck, Bernhard von, 11, 22,\\n23\\nBismarck, Carl Alexander von, 9\\nBismarck, Friedrich von, the\\nPermutator, 5\\nBismarck, Friedrich Wilhelm\\nvon, 9\\nBismarck, Herbert von, 347\\nBismarck, Herbort von, 2\\nBismarck, Karl Wilhelm Frie-\\ndrich von, 10 his marriage,\\n10 moves to Pomerania, 11,\\n21 to Schoenhausen, 22, 25,\\n26\\nBismarck, Malvina von, ir, 22\\nmarries Oscar von Arnim, 25\\nBismarck, Nicolas (or Claus)\\nvon, 3\\nBismarck, Otto Eduard Leopold\\nvon, his birth, i ancestry, i-\\n12 destined for Diplomatic\\nService, 14 at school in Ber-\\nlin, 14, 15; enters at Gottingen,\\n15 his personal appearance\\nandcharacter, 16 enters Corps\\nof Hanoverians, 16 his uni-\\nversity career, 16-18 leaves\\nGottingen, 18 enters at Ber-\\nlin, 18 takes degree of Doctor\\nof Law, 19 early official life,\\n19 appointed Auscultator at\\nBerlin, 19 transferred to ad-\\nministrative side and to Aix-\\nla-Chapelle, 19 his life at\\nAix, 20 transferred to Pots-\\ndam, 21 begins army service\\nin Jaeger at Potsdam, 21\\ntransferred to Jaeger at Stet-\\ntin, 21 settles in Pomerania,\\n22 his attendance at lectures\\nin agricultural college near\\nGreifswald, 22 his successful\\n465", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0539.jp2"}, "538": {"fulltext": "466\\nIndex.\\nBismarck Con tin ued\\nmanagement of the Pomer-\\nanian estates, 22, 23 takes\\nKniephof on division of estates,\\n23 his wildness, 23 enters\\nas lieutenant of Landwehr in\\ncavalry, 23 saves groom from\\ndrowning, 23 his restlessness\\nand discontent, 24 travels, to\\nParis, London, Hull, Scarbor-\\noitgh, York, Manchester, 24;\\nhis letters from Schoenhausen,\\n25-27 member of Diets of\\nPomerania and of province\\ncontaining Schoenhausen, 27\\nReferendar at Potsdam, re-\\nsigns, 28 his hatred of\\nPrussian bureaucracy, 28, 61\\nhis interest in his duties as\\nlanded proprietor, 28 In-\\nspector of Dykes for Jerichovv,\\n29 his intimacy with the re-\\nligious coterie at Triglaff, 29,\\n30 his religious convictions\\nand their effect oil his mo-\\nnarchical feeling, 31, 32 his\\nengagement, 32 summoned to\\nattend meeting of Estates Gen-\\neral in Berlin, 33 enters on\\nhis Parliamentary duties, 38\\nopposes action of Liberals,\\n38-40 his remarks on Prussia\\nand England, 4.1 on the Jews\\nand the Christian State, 41,\\n42 returns to Pomerania, 43\\nhis marriage, 43 his wedding\\njourney, meets the King of\\nPrussia, returns to Schoen-\\nhausen, 43, 44 his sentiments\\non the Revolution, writes to\\nthe King, hurries to Berlin,\\n45, 46 collects signatures for\\naddress of loyalty, 46 atmeet-\\ning of Estates General, 46,\\n47 writes articles, takes part\\nin calling meeting, and in\\nfounding the Kreiiz Zntuna;,\\n48, 49; his counsels and aid.\\nto the King, 50, 51 takes\\nseat in new Assembly, 52\\nopposes amnesty, 51, 52 in\\nnew Parliament, opposes Par-\\nliamentary control of taxes,\\n54, 55 opposes reference to\\nforeign customs, 55-59 be-\\nlieves in Parliament for\\nPrussia, 60-62 his hatred of\\nLiberalism, 60 on civil mar-\\nriage and Christianity, 63, 64\\non the Prussian nobility, 64\\nhis geniality, 65 his Parlia-\\nmentary speeches, 66, 67 his\\npartial knowledge of the peo-\\nple, 68 sustains the King s\\nrefusal of the German crown,\\n73, 74 advocates independ-\\nence of Prussia, 74-78 in\\nParliament of Erfurt, 79, 80\\nadvises peace with Austria, Si\\ndefends the Ministry, 82-84 I\\nAmbassador at Frankfort, 84,\\n85 his characteristics, 86; at\\nFrankfort, 86 letters to his\\nwife, 88-91 his opinions of\\nthe diplomatists, 89-91;\\nentrusted with management\\nof the Press, 92 his idea\\nof newspapers, 94 smoking in\\nthe military commission, 95,\\n96 his defence of Prussian in-\\nterests, 96, 97 home and social\\nlife in Frankfort, g8 his dis-\\ntaste for Parliamentary life,\\n99 duel with Vincke, 99, 100\\nmember of House of Lords,\\n100 his power of work, his\\ndespatches, 100, loi on\\\\\\nspecial mission to Vienna, loi;\\nhis policy of seeking allies for\\nPrussia against Austria, 102,\\n103 his policy as to Russia\\nand the Western Powers, 104-\\niio his policy toward France,\\n113-120; sent to Paris, meets\\nNapoleon, 118; his ideal of\\nforeign policy, 121-125 loss\\nof popularity at Court, 125,\\n126 his attitude toward the\\nnew Ministry, 128 recalled\\nfrom Frankfort, 129 ap-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0540.jp2"}, "539": {"fulltext": "Indi\\nex.\\n467\\nBismarck Contin tied\\npointed Minister to St. Peters-\\nburg, 132 his advice as to\\nAustria, 133, 134 his jour-\\nneys, his prolonged illness, and\\nits effect, 135 supports the\\nGovernment, 136 his senti-\\nments as to France, 137, 138\\nreturns to Russia, 138 inter-\\nview with Prince Regent, 139;\\nhis friendship with Roon, 143\\nsent for by Roon, his reply,\\n145-147 arrives in Berlin, in-\\nterview with the King, 147\\nhis memorandum and letter\\non German affairs, 148, 149\\nreturns to St. Petersburg, 150;\\ngoes to Berlin, 153; offered\\npost of Minister- President,\\nappointed Minister to Paris,\\n154 in Paris, 155 visits Lon-\\ndon, meets Disraeli, 156, 157\\nhis advice to Roon, 158 leave\\nof absence, 159 summoned to\\nBerlin, 160 appointed Min-\\nister-President, 161 conversa-\\ntion with the King, 163 his\\nHouse speeches oii the Budget,\\ntheir effect, 163-167 on the\\nHouse address to the King.\\n169 his course on the Polish\\nquestion, 171-177 difficulties\\nof his position, 177-179 con-\\nffict with Chairman of House,\\n180 disliked by the Crown\\nPrince, 184, 185 not respons-\\nible for conflict, rgo his\\nforeign policy, 192 with the\\nKing at Gastein, 193 dis-\\nsuades the King from attending\\nCongress at Frankfort, 193\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\n195 his course as to Schleswig-\\nHolstein, 195, 199-201, 203,\\n206-224, 226-238 his satis-\\nfaction with Peace of Vienna,\\n226 concludes treaty of Gas-\\ntein, 238 created Count, 2^,9\\nvisits France, 241 interview\\nwith Napoleon, 241-243 re-\\nturns to Berlin, 243 concludes\\ncommercial treaty with Italy,\\n245 adopts hostile attitude\\ntoward Austria, 246 prepares\\nfor war, 247, 248 fails in\\nhealth, 249 concludes treaty\\nwith Italy, 250 influences the\\nKing toward war, 251 desires\\nwar in order to reform German\\nConfederation, 252-256 at-\\ntempt on his life, 257 takes\\nno part in management of\\narmy, 259 leaves Berlin to\\njoin army, 259 at battle of\\nKoniggratz, 260, 261 his life\\nduring the campaign, 261, 262;\\nadvises acceptance of French\\noffer of mediation, 262, 263;\\nconsiders terms of peace, 264\\ndesires control of North Ger-\\nmany, 266 his policy and mo-\\ntives, 267-273 his interview\\nwith Benedetti, 270-272 his\\nterms of peace, 273-275 his\\nmanagement of peace pre-\\nliminaries, his persuasion of\\nthe King, 275, 276 his treat-\\nment of demands of France,\\nhis interviews with Benedetti,\\n277-286 his course toward\\nRussia, 283, 284 has laid\\nfoundation for German union,\\n284-286 begins to think and\\nact as a German, 286 secures\\nParliamentary majority, 287\\nhis moderation, 2S8 voted\\ndonation of money, 289, 290\\nhis role of creative statesman,\\n291 dictates outlines of new\\nFederal Constitution, 292 iiis\\nplan of Constitution, 293-307\\nsupports Constitution before\\nAssembly, 308-212; defends\\nwitholding of money from\\nKing of Hanover, 313, 314\\nsummons Parliament to con-\\nsider tariff, 316 refuses to\\nadmit (jrand Duke of Baden\\ninto Federation, 317 refuses\\nto support Napoleon s acquire-\\nment of Luxemburg, 318 pre-", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0541.jp2"}, "540": {"fulltext": "468\\nIndex.\\nBismarck Continued\\nserves the peace, visits Paris,\\n319; interview with Benedetti\\nas to the Spanish Succession,\\n322 his efforts to secure ac-\\nceptance of Spanisla throne by\\nPrince Leopold of Hohen-\\nzolhen, 322-327 his motives,\\n328, 329; retires to Varzin,\\n330 goes to Berlin, 333 his\\npolicy, 334 orders Werther\\nfrom Paris, sees Lord Loftus,\\n336 receives telegram from\\nthe King announcing the Bene-\\ndetti incident, 338 prepares\\nstatement and causes its pub-\\nlication, 339 his purpose, 340\\nmeets the King at Branden-\\nburg, 342; announces to Parlia-\\nment France s declaration of\\nwar, 343 pardons the Hano-\\nverian Legion, 345 leaves for\\nseat of war, 346 his health\\nduring the campaign, 346 at\\nGravelotte, 347 at Sedan,\\n348 refuses to modify terms\\nof surrender, 349 defers re-\\nnewal of hostilities, 350 meets\\nNapoleon, their interview,\\n351 accompanies Napoleon\\nto Belle Vue, 352 willing to\\nmake peace, 352 his circular\\nnotes explaining the Cierman\\nview, 353, 354 demands terri-\\ntory, 354; his attitude toward\\nthe Provisional Government,\\n355 his interviews with Jules\\nFavre, 356-360 his person-\\nality, 357, 358 his offer of\\nterms, 358-361 at Versailles,\\n362 upholds Germany through\\nthe Press, 362, 363 indignant\\nat France s use of irregular\\ntroops, 364 affected by delay\\nbefore Paris, 364 his tact in\\nGerman unification, 366 his\\ninterview with the Crown\\nPrince, 366 proposes treaties\\nwith southern German States,\\n367 his agreement with Ba-\\nvaria, 367, 368 drafts letter\\nby which King of Bavaria re-\\nquests King of Prussia to as-\\nsume title of Emperor, 370\\nraised to rank of Prince, 370\\ninterview with Favre on capit-\\nulation of Paris, 370, 371 in-\\nterviev/ with Thiers, 371-374\\nhis part in the negotiations,\\n374 his views as to Strasburg\\nand Metz, 374-376; at signa-\\nture of Peace of Frankfort,\\n376 continues in power, 377\\nsole master in foreign policy,\\n375 his success in peace, 379\\nrefuses support to French mo-\\nnarchical party, 382 brings\\nabout reconciliation with\\nAustria, 382, 3S3 indignant\\nat report of warlike intentions\\ntoward France, 384 his posi-\\ntion as to internal matters,\\n385, 386 his party alliances,\\n386-388 resigns as Minister-\\nPresident, 389 his depression,\\n389 his affection for Roon,\\n390 resumes the Presidency,\\n390 opposition to him, 390,\\n391 his dependence on the\\nNational Liberals, 391-394\\nsupported on army organisa-\\ntion, 393, 394 his part in con-\\nflict with Roman Catholic\\nChurch, 394-403 his resigna-\\ntion refused by the Emperor,\\ngranted leave of absence, re-\\ntires to Varzin, 404 presides\\nover Congress of Berlin, 406\\neffects Triple Alliance, 407 his\\nefiforts against Socialism, 407-\\n411 his scheme of economic\\nreform, 411-429 his dislike of\\ndirect taxation, 413, 414 his\\nproposals for State monopolies,\\n414-419 introduces system of\\nProtection, 419-423 his co-\\nlonial policy, 423-427 effects\\nof his measures, 428 re-\\nfuses to become a party\\nleader, 429 his power", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0542.jp2"}, "541": {"fulltext": "Index.\\n469\\nBismarck Continued\\nchecked by Parliament, 430\\ncomplains of conduct of Reich-\\nstag, 431 friction with Parlia-\\nment as to freedom of debate,\\n434 his Parliamentary re-\\nceptions, 435, 436 his re-\\ncourse to criminal law against\\nhis adversaries, 436 his lack\\nof generosity in political strug-\\ngles, 437 celebration of his\\nseventieth, birthday, 438 pre-\\nsented with two million marks,\\npurchases Friedrichsruh, 438\\ndefends bill for army increase,\\n441 his release of French spy,\\n441, 442 his interview with\\nthe Czar, 442 enters into\\nsecret agreement with Russia,\\n442, 443 proposes army in-\\ncrease, 443 his speech, 443-\\n445 foundation of his power\\nremoved by death of Emperor\\nWilliam, 445, 446; his pro-\\nspects with Emperor Freder-\\nick, 447 opposes marriage of\\nPrincess Victoria of Prussia\\nto Prince Alexander of Batten-\\nberg, 448-450 his differences\\nwith Emperor William II.,\\n450, 451 his power, 452\\nfinds his influence and author-\\nity undermined, 452, 453\\nchief causes of his differences\\nwith the Emperor, 453, 454;\\nrefuses to acquiesce in degrad-\\nation of his position, 455 his\\nfirst separation from the Em-\\nperor, 455 declines to justify\\ninterview with Windhorst,\\n456 resigns, created Field\\nMarshal and Duke of Lauen-\\nburg, 456 his leave-takings,\\n457 his restlessness in leisure,\\nhis energy, 457, 458 receives\\ndeputations, 45S opposes and\\ndefies the Government, 459\\nhis disclosures, 460 the\\navowed enemy of Court and\\nMinistry, 461 absents himself\\nfrom Moltke s funeral, 461; his\\ntriumphal journey to Vienna,\\n461 his reconciliations with\\nthe Emperor, 462 celebration\\nof his eighty-fifth birthday,\\n462; his loneliness and infirmi-\\nties, 462 his interest in pub-\\nlic affairs, his unbroken mind\\nand spirit, 463 his death, his\\nburial at Friedrichsruh, 463\\nBismarck, Rudolph von, 5\\nBismarck-Bohlen, g, 19\\nBlankenburg, Moritzvon, 30,144\\nBonin. 109, 140, 141\\nBoulanger, General, 440\\nBrandenburg, Count, 51, 81\\nBrandenburg, the nobility of, 6-8\\nBucher, Lothar, 56, 325, 420, 421\\nBundesrath, 296\\nBurnside, General, 361\\nC\\nCaprivi, General, 460, 462\\nCastelnau, General, 349\\nCavour, 22, 129-132\\nCharles Frederick, Prince, 60\\nCrevisse, 5, 8\\nD\\nDelbriick, 365, 412\\nDiebwitz, Fraulein von, 9\\nDisraeli, 156, 157\\nE\\nErfurt, Parliament of, 79, 80\\nF\\nFavre, Jules, 356-360, 370, 373,\\n376\\nFrankfort, 87\\nFrankfort, Peace of, 376, 377\\nFrederick, Crown Prince, after-\\nward Frederick III., 183, 1S4,\\n207, 219, 220, 236, 260, 276,\\n324, 325, 336, 342, 343, 366,\\n369, 416, 445-450", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0543.jp2"}, "542": {"fulltext": "470\\nIndex.\\nFrederick William, Elector of\\nBrandenburg, 6\\nFrederick William III., 36, 37\\nFrederick William IV., 29, 30,\\n37, 38. 44, 50-52, 54, 60, 72,\\n73, 107-110, 127, 138\\nFriedrichsruh, 438, 439, 463\\nGagern, Heinrich von, 72\\nGambetta, 364\\nGaribaldi, 365\\nGastein, Treaty of, 238, 240\\nGerlach, Leopold von, 30, 49, 50\\nGortschakoff, 384, 385\\nGrammont, Due de, 275, 330,\\n331, 335\\nGravelotte, battle of, 347\\nGreifswald, 22\\nGuizot, 335\\nH\\nHerisson, Comte, 357, 358\\nHobel, 408, 411\\nHohenzollern, Leopold, Prince\\nof, 321-326, 331-337\\nIlolstein, 195-238, 240, 246, 258,\\n265\\nK\\nKatte, Fraulein von, 8\\nKleist, Hans von, 30, 43, 48, 400\\nKoniggrjitz, battle of, 260, 261\\nKretiz Zeiiujig, 49, 107, 115,\\n119, 126, 390, 391\\nLasker, 392\\nLauenburg, 238, 239\\nLhu3 s, Drouyn de, 277, 278\\nLoftus, Lord Augustus, 336, 342\\nM\\nMacMahon, 348\\nManteuffel, Otto von, 51\\nMars-la-Tour, 347, 348\\nMencken, Fraulein, afterward\\nwife of Karl von Bismarck,\\n10, 14, 21, 22\\nMetternich, Prince, 36\\nMetz, 354 360, 374-476\\nMoltke, Helmuth Karl Bernard\\nvon, 247-249, 257, 259-261,\\n338, 339, 348-352, 373, 441,\\n451, 461\\nMotley, John Lothop, 17, 19, 98,\\n177\\nN\\nNapoleon III., 113-119, 125,\\n129, 137, 138, 175, 176, 213,\\n214, 228, 238, 241-245, 248,\\n254, 257, ,262-264, 270-274,\\n277-286, 294, 315, 318, 319,\\n343, 344, 348-353, 361\\nNavy, 295\\nA^ew Prussian Gazette, 49\\nNobeling, 408, 411\\nO\\nOldenburg, Duke of, 200, 222\\nOlmutz, Convention of, 81, 82\\nPfortden, Baron von der, 284-\\n286\\nPoland, I 71-17 7\\nPomerania, 11-13, 21-24, 29\\nPress, the, 182, 183, 185\\nPrim, General, 320, 322, 326,\\n331\\nProkesch-Osten, Herr von, 93,\\n97\\nPuttkammer, Fraulein von, after-\\nward wife of Otto von Bis-\\nmarck, 32 Herr v., 447\\nR\\nRadowitz, Herr von, 74, 75, 81\\nReichstag, 296, 298\\nRichter, 427", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0544.jp2"}, "543": {"fulltext": "Index.\\n471\\nRoon, Albrecht Theodor Emil\\nvon, 31, 140, 141, 143-145,\\n156, 158-161, 180, 181, 234,\\n252, 256, 260, 261, 287, 304,\\n324, 338, 339, 369, 387-390\\nSchleinitz, Herr von, 133, 207\\nSchleswig, 195-238, 246, 265\\nSchoenhausen, i, 5, 8-11, 22, 25-\\n27, 29, 44, 46, 438, 463\\nSchweninger, Doctor, 458\\nSedan, 348-352\\nSheridan, General, 347\\nSourds M. de, 330\\nStahl 30, 49\\nSlrasburg, 360, 361, 374-37^\\nSybel, Heinrich von, 172, 323\\nThadden, Herr von, 29, 43, 47,\\n391\\nThiele, Herr von, 330\\nThiers, M., 353, 362, 371\\nThun, 89, 91, 95-97\\nToul, 360\\nTrigkff, 29, 30\\nTriple Alliance, 405, 407, 442,\\n443\\nV\\nVersailles, 362, 365\\nVictor Emmanuel, 245, 248, 382\\nVictoria, Princess, of Prussia,\\n124, 206, 448-450\\nVienna, Congress of, 34-36\\nVienna, Peace of, 224-226\\nVincke, George von, 40, 47, 207\\nW\\nWelfenfond, 313\\nWerther, Herr von, 323, 336\\nWilliam, Prince Regent, after-\\nv/ard William I., 127, 131, 139\\n-141, 145, 152-156, 160-163,\\n169, 170, 177, 181, 184, 187-\\n189, 192-194, 206, 207, 227,\\n228, 234-239, 246, 248-251,\\n258-263, 275, 276, 279, 324-\\n326 331-334, 336-343. 346-\\n349, 352, 369, 370, 384, 388-\\n3QO, 404, 407-409, 416, 441,\\n445, 446, 449\\nWilliam II., 450-462\\nWimpffen, 348, 350, 351, 353\\nWindthorst, 396, 416, 455, 456", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0545.jp2"}, "544": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0546.jp2"}, "545": {"fulltext": "Heroes of the Nations.\\nEDITED BY\\nEVELYN ABBOTT, M.A.,\\nFellow of Balliol College, Oxford.\\nA Series of biographical studies of the Hves and work\\nof a number of representative historical characters about\\nwhom have gathered the great traditions of the Nations\\nto which they belonged, and who have been accepted, in\\nmany instances, as types of the several National ideals-\\nWith the life of each typical character will be presented\\na picture of the National conditions surrounding hin\\nduring his career.\\nThe narratives are the work of writers who are recog-\\nnized authorities on their several subjects, and, while\\nthoroughly trustworthy as history, will present picturesque\\nand dramatic stories of the Men and of the events con-\\nnected with them.\\nTo the Life of each Hero will be given one duo-\\ndecimo volume, handsomely printed in large type, pro-\\nvided with maps and adequately illustrated according to\\nthe special requirements of the several subjects. The\\nvolumes will be sold separately as follows\\nLarge 12\u00c2\u00b0, cloth extra $i 50\\nHalf morocco, uncut edges, gilt top I 75", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0547.jp2"}, "546": {"fulltext": "HEROES OF THE NATIONS.\\nNelson, and the Naval Supremacy of England. By W. Clark Russell, author of\\nTheWrec of the Grosvenor, etc.\\nGustavus Adolphus, and the Struggle of Protestantism for Existence. By C. R.\\nL. Fletcher, M.A., late Fellow of All Souls College.\\nPericles, and the Golden Age of Athens. By Evelyn Abbott, M. A,\\nTheodoric the Goth, the Barbarian Champion of Civilisation. By Thomas\\nHoDGKiN, author of Italy and Her Invaders, etc.\\nSir Philip Sidney, and the Chivalry of England. By H. R. Fox-Bourne, author of\\nThe Life of John Locke, etc.\\nJulius Caesar, and the Organisation of the Roman Empire. By W, Ward\\nFowler, M.A., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.\\nJohn Wyclif, Last of the Schoolmen, and First of the English Reformers. By\\nLewis Sergeant, author of New Greece, etc.\\nNapoleon, Warrior and Ruler, and the Military Supremacy of Revolutionary\\nFrance. By W. O Connor Morris.\\nHenry of Navarre, and the Huguenots of France. By P. F. Willert, M.A., Fel-\\nlow of Exeter College, Oxford.\\nCicero, and the Fall of the Roman Republic. By J. L. Strachan-Davidson, M.A.,\\nFellow of Balliol College, Oxford.\\nAbraham Lincoln, and the Downfall of American Slavery. By Noah Brooks.\\nPrince Henry (of Portugal) the Navigator, and the Age of Discovery. By C. R.\\nBeazley, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford.\\nJulian the Philosopher, and the Last Struggle of Paganism against Christianity.\\nBy Alice Gardner.\\nLouis XIV., and the Zenith of the French Monarchy. By Arthur Hassall,\\nM.A., Senior Student of Christ Church College, Oxford.\\nCharles XII., and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire, 1682-1719. By R. Nisbet\\nBain.\\nLorenzo de Medici, and Florence in the 15th Century. By Edward Armstrong,\\nM.A., Fellow of Queen s College, Oxford.\\nJeanne d Arc. Her Life and Death. By Mrs. Oliphant.\\nChristopher Columbus. His Life and Voyages. By Washington Irving.\\nRobert the Bruce, and the Struggle for Scottish Independence. By Sir Herbert\\nMaxwell, M.P.\\nHannibal, Soldier, Statesman, Patriot and the Crisis of the Struggle between\\nCarthage and Rome. By W. O Connor Morris, Sometime Scholar of Oriel\\nCollege, Oxford.\\nUlysses S. Grant, and the Period of National Preservation and Reconstruction,\\n1822-1885. By Lieut. -Col. William Conant Church.\\nRobert E. Lee, and the Southern Confederacy, 1807-1870. By Prof. Henry\\nAlexander White, of the Washington and Lee University.\\nThe Cid Campeador, and the Waning of the Crescent in the West. By K.\\nButler Clarke, Fellow of St. Jol n s College, Oxford.\\nSaladin, and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. By Stanley Lane-Poole,\\nauthor of The Moors in Spain, etc.\\nBismarck, and the New German Empire. How it Arose and What it Displaced.\\nBy W. J. Headlam, M.A., Fellow of King s College.\\nCharlemagne (Charles the Greatj. The Hero of Two Nations. By H. W. Car-\\nless Davis, M.A., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, Sometime Scholar of Balliol.\\nAlexander the Great, and the Extension of Greek Rule and Greek Ideas, 356-323\\nB.C. By Benj.amin I. Wheeler, Prcsijent of the University of C.iifo-r.i 1.\\nDaniel O Connell, and the Revival of National Life in Ireland. By Robert Dun-\\nlop, M.A.\\nFor further information and sitles, see descriptive circular.\\nG. P. PUTNAM S SONS, New York and London.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0548.jp2"}, "547": {"fulltext": "Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM S SONS take pleasure in\\nannouncing that they have in course of publication, in\\nco-operation with Mr. T. Fisher Unwin, of London, a\\nseries of historical studies, intended to present in a graphic\\nmanner the stories of the different nations that have\\nattained prominence in history.\\nIn the story form the current of each national life is\\ndistinctly indicated, and its picturesque and noteworthy\\nperiods and episodes are presented for the reader in their\\nphilosophical relation to each other as well as to universal\\nhistory.\\nIt is the plan of the writers of the different volumes to\\nenter into the real life of the peoples, and to bring them\\nbefore the reader as they actually lived, labored, and\\nstruggled as they studied and wrote, and as they amused\\nthemselves. In carrying out this plan, the myths, with\\nwhich the history of all lands begins, will not be over-\\nlooked, though these will be carefully distinguished from\\nthe actual history, so far as the labors of the accepted\\nhistorical authorities have resulted in definite conclusions.\\nThe subjects of the different volumes have been planned\\nto cover connecting and, as far as possible, consecutive\\nepochs or periods, so that the set v/hen completed will\\npresent in a comprehensive narrative the chief events in\\nthe great Story OF THE NATIONS but it is, of course,\\nnot always practicable to issue the several volumes in\\ntheir chronological order.", "height": "2783", "width": "1737", "jp2-path": "bismarckfoundati00head_0549.jp2"}, "548": {"fulltext": "THE STORY OF THE NATIONS.\\nThe Stories are printed in good readable type, and in\\nhandsome i2mo form. They are adequately illustrated and\\nfurnished with maps and indexes. Price per vol., cloth, $1.50\\nhalf morocco, gilt top, $1.75.\\nThe following are now ready\\nGREECE. Prof. Jas. A. Harrison.\\nROME. Arthur Gilman.\\nTHE JEWS. Prof. James K. Hosmer.\\nCHALDEA. Z.A.Ragozin.\\nGERMANY. S. Baring-Gould.\\nNORWAY. Hjalmar H. Boyesen.\\nSPAIN. Rev. E. E. and Susan Hale.\\nHUNGARY. Prof. A. Vambery.\\nCARTHAGE. Prof. Alfred J. Church.\\nTHE SARACENS. Arthur Gilman.\\nTHE MOORS IN SPAIN. Stanley\\nLane-Poole.\\nTHE NORMANS. Sarah Ornejewett.\\nPERSIA. S. G, W. Benjamin.\\nANCIENT EGYPT. Prof. Geo. Raw-\\nlinson.\\nALEXANDER S EMPIRE. Prof. J.\\nP. MahafFy.\\nASSYRIA. Z. A. Ragozin.\\nTHE GOTHS. Henry Bradley.\\nIRELAND. Hon. Emily Lawless.\\nTURKEY. Stanley Lane-Poole.\\nMEDIA, BABYLON, AND PERSIA.\\nZ. A. Ragozin.\\nMEDIEVAL FRANCE. Prof. Gus-\\ntave Masson.\\nHOLLAND. Prof. J. Thorold Rogers.\\nMEXICO. Susan Hale.\\nPHOENICIA. Geo. Rawlinson.\\nTHE HANSATOW^NS. Helen Zim-\\nmern.\\nEARLY BRITAIN. Prof. Alfred J.\\nChurch.\\nTHE BARBARY CORSAIRS. Stan-\\nley Lane-Pool.\\nRUSSIA. W. R. Morfill.\\nTHE JEWS UNDERROME. W^. D.\\nMorrison.\\nSCOTLAND. John Mackintosh.\\nSV/ITZERLAND. R, Stead and Mrs.\\nA. Hug.\\nPORTUGAL. H. Morse-Stephens.\\nTHE BYZANTINE EMPIRE. C. W^.\\nC. Oman.\\nSICILY. E. A. Freeman.\\nTHE TUSCAN REPUBLICS- Bella\\nDuffy.\\nPOLAND. W.R. Morfill.\\nPARTHIA. Geo. Rawlinsoa\\nJAPAN. David Murray.\\nTHE CHRISTIAN RECOVERY OF\\nSPAIN. H. E. Watts.\\nAUSTRALASIA. Greville Tregar-\\nthen.\\nSOUTHERN AFRICA. Geo. M.\\nTheal.\\nVENICE. AletheaWiel.\\nTHE CRUSADES. T. S. Archer and\\nC. L. Kingsford.\\nVEDIC INDIA. Z. A. Ragozin.\\nBOHEMIA. C. E. Maurice.\\nCANADA. J. G. Bourinot.\\nTHE BALKAN STATES. W^illiam\\nMiller.\\nBRITISH RULE IN INDIA. R. W^.\\nFrazer.\\nMODERN FRANCE. Andre Le Bon.\\nTHE BUILDINGOFTHE BRITISH\\nEMPIRE. Alfred T. Story. Two\\nvols.\\nTHE FRANKS. Lewis Sergeant.\\nTHE WEST INDIES. Amos K.\\nFiske.\\nTHE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND IN\\nTHE 19TH CENTURY. Justin\\nMcCarthy, M. P. Two vols.\\nAUSTRIA, THE HOME OF THE\\nHAPSBURG DYNASTY, FROM\\n1282 TO THE PRESENT DAY.\\nSidney Whitman.\\nCHINA. Robt. K. Douglass.\\nMODERN SPAIN. Major Martin A.\\nS. Hume.\\nOther volumes in preparation are\\nTHE UNITED STATES, 1775-1897.\\nA. C. McLaughlin, Professor o\\nAmerican History, University of\\nMichigan. In two vols.\\nBUDDHIST INDIA. Prof. T. W.\\nRhys-Davids.\\nMOHAMMEDAN INDIA. Stanley\\nLane-Poole.\\nTHE THIRTEEN COLONIES.\\nHelen A. Smith.\\nWALES AND CORNWALL, Owsn\\nM. 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