{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3655", "width": "2645", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "TWO COPIES HECSlVfiD,\\nLVtrtry of CongrM%\\nOffice of tb\u00c2\u00ab\\n7 1900\\nKeglttor of Copyright*\\n56783\\nCOPYRIGHT, I900, BY\\nCHARLES SCRIBNER S SONS\\n8EC0N0 COPY.\\nNortoooti 19rrs8\\nJ. S. Cushing Co. Berwick\\nNorwood Mas\u00c2\u00a7. USA.", "height": "3488", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "u\\n3To\\nFRIEDKICH PAULSEN\\nTHIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY DEDICATED\\nBY HIS FRIEND AND PUPIL", "height": "3504", "width": "2188", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3504", "width": "2432", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "TABLE OF CONTENTS\\nCHAPTER I\\nThe Nature and Methods of Ethics\\nPAGE\\n1. The Function of Science 1\\n2. The Subject-matter of the Sciences 3\\n3. The Science of Ethics 4\\n4. The Data of Ethics 7\\n5. The Subject-matter of Ethical Judgment 9\\n6. Definition of Ethics 11\\n7. The Interrelation of Sciences 12\\n8. Ethics and Psychology 13\\n9. Ethics and Politics 16\\n10. Ethics and Metaphysics 17\\n11. The Methods of Ethics 20\\n12. Theoretical Ethics and Practical Ethics 22\\n13. The Value of Ethics 23\\nCHAPTER II\\nTheories of Conscience\\n1. Introduction 26\\n2. The Mythical View 27\\n3. The Rationalistic Intuitionists 28\\n(1) The Schoolmen 29\\n(2) Cudworth 32\\n(3) Clarke 33\\n(4) Calderwood 34\\n4. The Emotional Intuitionists 36\\n(1) Shaftesbury 37\\n(2) Hutcheson 38\\n(3) Hume 39\\n(4) Rousseau, Kant, A. Smith, Herbart, Brentano 41\\nvii", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "Vlll\\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\\nPAGE\\nThe Perceptional Intuitionists 42\\n(1) Butler 42\\n(2) Martineau 43\\nThe Empiricists 47\\n(1) Hobbes 47\\n(2) Locke 48\\n(3) Helve tius 53\\n(4) Paley 54\\n(5) Bentham 55\\n(6) Hartley 56\\n(7) Bain 57\\nReconciliation of Intuitionism and Empiricism 59\\n(1) Kant 60\\n(2) Darwin 64\\n(3) Spencer 6Q\\n(4) Contemporaries 72\\nCHAPTER III\\n9.\\n10.\\n11.\\n12.\\nAnalysis and Explanation or Conscience\\nThe Psychological Pacts\\nAnalysis of Conscience\\nThe Feeling of Obligation\\nThe Peelings of Approval and Disapproval\\nConscience as Judgment\\nCriticism of Intuitionism\\nCriticism of Emotional Intuitionism\\nGenesis of Conscience\\nIn what Sense Conscience is Innate\\nThe Infallibility and Immediacy of Conscience\\nConscience and Inclination\\nThe Historical View and Morality\\n74\\n76\\n79\\n82\\n83\\n85\\n91\\n93\\n100\\n105\\n107\\n111\\nCHAPTER IV\\nThe Ultimate Ground or Moral Distinctions\\n1. Conscience as the Standard 116\\n2. The Theological View 117", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "TABLE OF CONTENTS IX\\nPAGE\\n3. The Popular View 118\\n4. The Teleological View .118\\n5. Arguments for Teleology 119\\n6. Teleological Schools 125\\n7. Summary 127\\nCHAPTER V\\nThe Teleological View\\n1. Conscience and Teleology 129\\n2. Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives 133\\n3. Actual Effects and Natural Effects .134\\n4. A Hypothetical Question answered 136\\n5. Morality and Prosperity 137\\n6. Imperfect Moral Codes 137\\n7. Moral Reform 139\\n8. The Ultimate Sanction of the Moral Law 140\\n9. Motives and Effects 141\\n10. The End justifies the Means 146\\n11. Teleology and Atheism 150\\n12. Teleology and Intuitionism 152\\nCHAPTER VI\\nTheories of the Highest Good Hedonism\\n1. The Standard of Morality and the Highest Good 155\\n2. The Greek Formulation of the Problem 156\\n3. The Cyrenaics 158\\n4. Epicurus 160\\n5. Democritus 162\\n6. Locke 163\\n7. Butler .164\\n8. Hutcheson 165\\n9. Hume 166\\n10. Paley 167\\n11. Bentham 168\\n12. John Stuart Mill 169\\n13. Sidgwick and Contemporaries 173\\n14. General Survey 176", "height": "3496", "width": "2268", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "TABLE OF CONTENTS\\nCHAPTER VII\\nTheories of the Highest Good: Energism\\npage\\n1. Socrates 180\\n2. Plato 181\\n3. The Cynics 183\\n4. Aristotle 184\\n5. The Stoics 186\\n6. The Neo-Platonists 188\\n7. Hoboes 190\\n8. Spinoza 190\\n9. Cumberland 193\\n10. Shaftesbury 194\\n11. Darwin 195\\n12. Stephen 197\\n13. Jhering 198\\n14. Wundt and Contemporaries 199\\n15. Kant 200\\n16. General Survey 203\\nCHAPTER VIII\\nCritique of Hedonism\\n1. The Conception of the Highest Good\\n2. Pleasure as the Highest Good\\n3. The Antecedents of Action\\n4. The Antecedents of Volition\\n5. Conclusions\\n6. The Hedonistic Psychology of Action\\n7. Present or Apprehended Pleasure-pain as\\n8. Present Pleasure-pain as the Motive\\n9. Pain as the Motive\\n10. Unconscious Pleasure-pain as the Motive\\n11. The Psychological Fallacies of Hedonism\\n12. The Pleasure of the Race as the Motive\\n13. Pleasure as the End realized by All Action\\n14. Pleasure-pain as a Means of Preservation\\n15. The Physiological Basis of Pleasure-pain\\n16. Metaphysical Hedonism\\n17. Pleasure as the Moral End\\nthe\\nMotive\\n205\\n207\\n209\\n215\\n217\\n217\\n218\\n228\\n232\\n234\\n236\\n239\\n239\\n242\\n246\\n247\\n249", "height": "3492", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "TABLE OF CONTENTS xi\\nCHAPTER IX\\nThe Highest Good\\nPAGE\\n1. The Question of Ends or Ideals 250\\n2. The Ideal of Humanity 253\\n3. Egoism and Altruism 258\\n4. The Effects of Action 258\\n5. The Motives of Action 261\\n6. Criticism of Egoism 263\\n7. Selfishness and Sympathy 267\\n8. Moral Motive and Moral Action 269\\n9. Biology and the Highest Good 276\\n10. Morality and the Highest Good 278\\n11. Conclusion 284\\nCHAPTER X\\nOptimism versus Pessimism\\n1. Optimism and Pessimism 286\\n2. Subjective Pessimism 287\\n3. Scientific Pessimism 289\\n4. Intellectual Pessimism 291\\n6. Emotional Pessimism 292\\n6. Volitional Pessimism 303\\nCHAPTER XI\\nCharacter and Freedom\\n1. Virtues and Vices 311\\n2. Character 313\\n3. The Freedom of the Will 316\\n4. Determinism 319\\n5. Theological Theories 323\\n6. Metaphysical Theories 324\\n7. Reconciliation of Freedom and Determinism 327\\n8. Criticism of Indeterminisrn 329\\n9. The Consciousness of Freedom 334\\n10. Responsibility 336\\n11. Determinism and Practice 337\\nIndex 341", "height": "3492", "width": "2160", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3492", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nCHAPTER I\\nTHE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 1\\n1. The Function of Science. The world presents\\nus with an endless array of phenomena. These\\nphenomena the human mind observes and endeavors\\nto understand. It notices that things and occur-\\nrences are, to a certain extent, uniform and constant,\\nthat nature is regular and orderly. The intellect of\\nman strives to detect similarities or uniformities in\\nthings and actions, and to arrange these in groups\\nor classes. It brings order into apparent confusion,\\n1 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 1-24 The History of\\nEthics, chap, i Stephen, The Science of Ethics, pp. 1-40 Schur-\\nman, The Ethical Import of Darwinism, pp. 1-37 Hoffding, Ethik,\\npp. 1-54 Mtmsterberg, Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit, pp. 1-10\\nWundt, Ethics, English translation, pp. 1-20 Paulsen, A System\\nof Ethics, edited and translated by Frank Thilly, pp. 1-29; Muir-\\nhead, Elements of Ethics, pp. 1-39 Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics,\\npp. 1-31, 324-328 Hyslop, The Elements of Ethics, pp. 1-17\\nJ. Seth, A Study of Ethical Principles, pp. 1-35 Marion, Lemons\\nde morale, chap, i Runze, Ethik, Vol. I, pp. 1-16 Dorner, Das\\nmenschliche Handeln, Introduction Sigwart, Logic, translated by\\nHelen Dendy, Vol. II, pp. 529 ff. The beginner will find the works\\nof Paulsen, Muirhead, Mackenzie, and Hyslop especially serviceable\\nin connection with this chapter.\\nB 1", "height": "3496", "width": "2196", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "2 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nit makes a cosmos out of the chaos, it analyzes and\\nclassifies.\\nBut it does not stop here. It would know why\\nthings are as they are, why they act as they act.\\nThe thinker is not content with knowing what is;\\nthe great question is, Why is it so, what is the rea-\\nson for its being as it is What is its relation to\\nother things and occurrences, what are the antece-\\ndents and concomitants upon which it is said to\\ndepend, and without which it cannot be what it is\\nWhat are its consequents or effects in short, what\\nplace does it occupy in the world of facts, how does it\\nfit into the system of things The tendency to find\\nout the why and wherefore of things is universal;\\nit manifests itself in the child who wonders what\\nmakes the wheels go round in his plaything, no\\nless than in the natural philosopher who longs\\nto know why the rain falls and the wind blows\\nand the grass grows. And there is something\\nof a Newton in the most superstitious savage.\\nScience begins with a question mark; it begins when\\nreasons .are sought after, and its perfection is meas-\\nured by the manner in which its problems are solved.\\nEvents which were once explained by supernatural\\ncauses are now referred to their natural antecedents\\nor concomitants, but the scientific instinct is essen-\\ntially the same as in those dark ages when our be-\\nnighted forefathers ascribed the thunder to the\\nthunder god, and regarded Apollo as the hurler of\\nthe shafts of disease and death. The scientist is", "height": "3500", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 3\\nborn when man begins to wonder at facts, and aims\\nto correlate them with other facts or insert them\\ninto a system, be it ever so crude. 1\\n2. The Subject-matter of the Sciences. Science,\\ntherefore, analyzes, classifies, and explains phenomena.\\nNow we may, for the sake of order and convenience,\\narrange these phenomena into different groups or\\nclasses, and form different sciences. Each particular\\nscience marks out for itself a particular subject-\\nmatter, and studies this. Thus physics investigates\\nthe general properties of matter, biology treats of\\nmatter in the living state, psychology examines\\nmental processes or states of consciousness. Each\\nof these sciences may in turn be subdivided until\\nwe have an endless number of special sciences, cor-\\nresponding to limited fields of investigation. In\\nevery case, however, the attempt is made not only\\n1 See Muirhead, The Elements of Ethics, 8; Hibben, Induc-\\ntive Logic, chap, i; Creigliton, Logic, 49, 59 ff., 78, 88; Sigwart,\\nLogic, Vol. II, pp. 417 ff. I quote from Creighton s Logic, p. 285\\nWe have said that Judgment constructs a system of knowledge.\\nThis implies, then, that it is not merely a process of adding one\\nfact to another, as we might add one stone to another to form a\\nheap. No Judgment combines the new facts with which it deals\\nwith what is already known, in such a way as to give to each its\\nown proper place. Different facts are not only brought together,\\nbut they are arranged, related, systematized. No fact is allowed\\nto stand by itself, but has to take its place as a member of a larger\\nsystem of facts, and receive its value from this connection. Of\\ncourse, a single judgment is not sufficient to bring a large number\\nof facts into relation in this way. But each judgment contributes\\nsomething to this end, and brings some new fact into relation to\\nwhat is already known.", "height": "3504", "width": "2168", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nto analyze and classify and describe, but also to\\nexplain, to account for a particular group of facts,\\nto tell why they are so and not otherwise, to ascer-\\ntain the conditions or circumstances which made\\nthem what they are, to relate them to other facts,\\nto insert them into a system, as was indicated above.\\n3. The Science of Ethics. Among the sciences\\nreferred to is one called ethics, which we are going\\nto study in this book. It will be our business,\\nfirst of all, to s|)ecify the facts or phenomena, the\\nsubject-matter, with which this branch of knowl-\\nedge concerns itself. And here, perhaps, the differ-\\nent names that have been used at various times to\\ndesignate our science may help us to understand\\nits boundaries. The ancient Greeks employed the\\nterms, ra tjOlkol (ta ethica), tjOl/ct} eTnarrjfxr) (ethice\\nepisteme), ethics, ethical science. 1 The word -qOiicos\\nis derived from the word 97^0? (ethos), character, dis-\\nposition, which is connected with e#o? (ethos*), custom\\nor habit. The Latin equivalent for the name ethics\\nis philosophia moralis, 2 from which comes the English\\n1 Though Aristotle (died 323 b.c.) was perhaps the first to em-\\nploy the term ethics in a strictly technical sense, the name was\\nused by Xenocrates (313 b.c), and perhaps also by the Cyrenaics.\\nSee Sextus Empiricus, Ad. Mathematicos, VII, 16. See also\\nRunze, Ethilc, p. 1 Wundt, Ethics, Fart I, chap. i.\\n2 See Wundt, Ethics, English translation, p. 26: The term\\nmoralis, which gave rise to the expression philosophia moralis,\\nwas a direct translation from Aristotle. Cicero remarks expressly,\\nin the passage where he introduces the word, that he has formed it\\non the analogy of the Greek ethicos (^^i/c6s), in order to enrich", "height": "3524", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 5\\nappellation, moral philosophy or moral science. 1 The\\nterm practical philosophy is also used as a synonym\\nof ethics, or as a more comprehensive generic term\\nincluding both ethics and politics 2 practical because\\nit investigates practice or conduct. 3\\nThe subject-matter of ethics is morality, the phe-\\nnomenon of right and wrong. It is a fact that men\\ncall certain characters and actions moral and im-\\nmoral, right and wrong, good and bad, that they\\napprove of them and disapprove of them, express\\nmoral judgments upon them, evaluate them. They\\nfeel morally bound to do certain tilings or to leave\\nthem undone, they recognize the authority of cer-\\ntain rules or laws, and acknowledge their binding\\n1 Compare the titles of the works of Paley, Stewart, Reid, Cal-\\nderwood, Porter, Bain, Bentham, Whewell, Price, Hume, and\\nothers.\\n2 Compare Lotze, Practische Philosophie Hodgson, Tlieory of\\nPractice.\\n3 The term ethics is the preferable one, as it is freest from\\nambiguity. The name moral philosophy, or moral science, was\\nformerly used in the sense of mental science to distinguish the\\nstudy of mental phenomena from that of physical phenomena, or\\nnatural philosophy. The term practical philosophy is also mislead-\\ning. The science which studies the principles of conduct or prac-\\ntice is just as theoretical as physics, physiology, or chemistry.\\nEthics is, like all sciences, both speculative and practical, both a\\nscience and an art. It is speculative, or theoretical, in so far as it\\nanalyzes, classifies, and explains its phenomena, or searches after\\ntheir principles or laws, practical in so far as it applies these princi-\\nples or laws, or puts them into practice. Physiology and chemistry\\nare theories, medicine is practice, or the application of the laws\\nor truths discovered by biology, chemistry, and physics. It is\\nconfusing to call ethics practical philosophy simply because it\\ndeals with practice. See 12 of this chapter.", "height": "3504", "width": "2184", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "6 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nforce. They say: This ought to be done, this ought\\nnot to be done thou shalt, and thou shalt not. In\\nshort, we seem to approach the world with a certain\\nmoral form or category, to impress it with a certain\\nmoral stamp we look at it through moral spectacles,\\nas it were.\\nNow this fact is as capable and as worthy of in-\\nvestigation as any other fact in the universe, and we\\nneed a science that will subject it to careful analysis.\\nThree problems here present themselves for our\\nconsideration. (1) What differentiates the subject-\\nmatter of ethics from that of other fields of knowl-\\nedge? What is there in an ethical phenomenon\\nthat allows us to refer it to a special class In what\\ndoes it differ from a fact of physics or aesthetics?\\n(2) How shall we explain the fact that men judge\\nethically, that they pronounce judgment as they do?\\nWhat do we mean when we say that an act is right\\nor wrong what is taking place in our consciousness\\nunder these circumstances Is there anything in\\nman that makes him judge as he judges, and what\\nis it? Why does man evaluate as he does? Is it\\nbecause certain moral truths are written on his heart,\\nbecause he possesses an innate faculty of knowledge,\\na conscience, a universal, original, immutable power\\nof the soul that enables him immediately to discrim-\\ninate the right from the wrong? Or do we grad-\\nually learn to make moral distinctions is the ability\\nto judge morally which we now possess an acquired\\none, a product of evolution, and as such capable", "height": "3516", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 7\\nof further development? (3) What is the nature\\nof acts which are designated as right and wrong\\nWhy are they right and wrong Is there anything\\nin them, any quality or attribute, that makes them\\nright and wrong, or that makes men call them so\\nIf so, what is it?\\nAll these are questions for the moralist to decide.\\nHe must calmly, carefully, and impartially investi-\\ngate the facts, and, if possible, explain them he\\nmust search after the principles or laws under-\\nlying them, if there be any he must unify them,\\nif that can be done. He must analyze and explain\\nboth character and conduct, the inside and outside of\\naction, the mental factor, conscience, or moral judg-\\nment, and the physical factor, the act which it\\njudges. He must tell us what they are, and why\\nthey are so he must account for them, show us\\ntheir raison d etre, indicate to us the place which\\nthey occupy in the system of things.\\n4. The Data of Ethics. We have stated in a\\ngeneral way what is the subject-matter with which\\nour science deals, and how it is to be treated. Let\\nus now attempt to show what differentiates ethical\\nfacts from other facts. Let us imagine that a\\nperson has killed a fellow-creature with malice\\naforethought. We call the deed murder, we pro-\\nnounce moral judgment upon it we say, It is wrong,\\nwicked, reprehensible. The same act, however, may\\nbe looked at from the physical or physiological point\\nof view. The energy stored up in the brain cells of", "height": "3504", "width": "2184", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "8 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthe murderer was liberated by certain currents com-\\ning from the periphery, and discharged into efferent\\nnerves connected with certain muscles, which pro-\\nduced the movement of the arm and hand holding the\\nweapon of destruction. And the blow on the victim s\\nskull so injured his brain and the vital functions de-\\npendent upon the nervous system as to cause death.\\nThe prosecuting attorney, ignoring the physiological\\nand even moral factors involved, may look at the act\\npurely from the legal standpoint. To kill a person\\nwith malice aforethought is a crime prohibited by law\\nand punishable by death. The psychologist may try\\nto explain the psychology of the entire affair. Certain\\nmotives were aroused in the mind of the murderer\\nby the behavior of his future victim. These motives\\nbecame more and more intense, and the inhibitions\\nweaker and weaker, until a resolution was finally\\nformed which led to the act.\\nWe see, one and the same circumstance may be\\nexamined from different points of view each indi-\\nvidual thinker may select particular elements in it\\nfor study, and ignore the others. The physicist\\nlooks at the rainbow and tries to understand its\\nphysical conditions. I may contemplate it and call\\nit beautiful, and then ask myself what makes it\\nbeautiful why is it that the contemplation of such\\na phenomenon arouses a peculiar aesthetic feeling in\\nme The science of aesthetics is appealed to for\\nan answer to this question. In ethics we do not\\ncare for the physical or physiological causes which", "height": "3524", "width": "2260", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 9\\nhave produced the acts, motives, and characters with\\nwhich we are concerned all these have interest for\\nus only because, and in so far as, we stamp them\\nwith a certain value, only because they bear a certain\\nrelation to the human soul, only because they pro-\\nvoke peculiar ethical feelings and judgments in us.\\nActs which are capable of exciting such judgments\\nfall within the province of the science of ethics.\\nThere could be no science of ethics if no one ever\\napproved and disapproved of things, if no one ever\\ncalled things right and wrong. If the contemplation\\nof certain acts. and motives did not arouse in us\\nethical feelings and judgments, there could be no\\nscience of ethics because there would be no facts\\nfor ethics to study. We might perhaps be perfect\\nphysicists, physiologists, astronomers, and even phi-\\nlosophers, but we should never pronounce moral\\njudgment upon an act. That we place a value upon\\nthings, that ive call them right or good, wrong or\\nbad, is the important fact in ethics, is ivhat makes\\na science of ethics possible. 1\\n5. The Subject-matter of Ethical Judgment. We\\nsaid before that moral judgment was pronounced upon\\nacts, but, we must add, not upon all acts. We do\\nnot feel like judging unless the act is the product\\nof some conscious being like ourself. We do not\\ncall an earthquake or a cyclone right or wrong as\\nMartineau says, we neither applaud the gold-mine\\n1 See Hoffding, Ethik, III, and his Ethische Principienlehre\\nMiinsterberg, Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit, pp. 10 ff\u00e2\u0080\u009e", "height": "3500", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "10 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nnor blame the destructive storm. 1 The child and\\nthe savage may applaud and condemn such occur-\\nrences and inanimate objects, but this is most likely\\nbecause they regard them as endowed with soul, or\\nbecause they have heard others do so. Generally\\nspeaking, we nowadays limit our judgments to the\\nactions of conscious human beings. We expect\\nthe act to have a mental or psychical background.\\nWhen the act is the expression of a conscious human\\nbeing, we feel like judging it morally. But when\\nwe are told that the agent did not control it, that it\\noccurred without his willing it, or that he was not\\ncapable of reasoning and feeling, and willing in a\\nhealthy manner at the time of its performance, then\\nwe withhold our judgment. We do not praise or\\nblame the movements made in an epileptic fit, or\\nhypnotic trance, or in sleep, or reflex actions over\\nwhich the person has no power. Nor do we con-\\ndemn or approve of the acts of a lunatic. But in\\ncase any of the acts under consideration are the\\nnecessary consequents of some previous conduct of\\nthe doer, which, we believe, he might have avoided,\\nwe pronounce judgment upon them, or at any rate\\nupon him. Wherever we are convinced that the acts\\nwere purely mechanical, that is, physically deter-\\nmined, and not accompanied by consciousness, we\\ndo not judge them morally. But whenever con-\\nsciousness is present in the performance of the act,\\nwe are tempted to judge.\\n1 Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, p. 20.", "height": "3520", "width": "2316", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 11\\nLet us therefore say that the subject-matter of\\nethical judgment is human conduct, that is, con-\\nsciously purposive action. 1 We must not forget,\\nhowever, that this was not always the case, and is\\nnot even now, perhaps, universally true. But it\\nmakes no difference to us here upon what the mind\\npronounces its judgments. The important thing for\\nethics is that such judgments are pronounced at all,\\nand it is the business of the science to examine every\\nfact or act which is judged ethically, or is capable\\nof being so judged.\\n6. Definition of Ethics. Ethics may now be\\nroughly defined as the science of right and wrong,\\nthe science of duty, the science of moral princi-\\nples, the science of moral judgment and conduct. It\\nanalyzes, classifies, describes, and explains moral phe-\\nnomena, on their subjective as well as on their objective\\nside. It tells us what these phenomena are, separates\\nthem into their constituent elements, and refers them\\nto their antecedents or conditions it discovers the\\nprinciples upon which they are based, the laws which\\ngovern them it explains their origin and traces their\\ndevelopment. In short, it reflects upon them, thinks\\nthem over, attempts to answer all possible questions\\nwhich may be asked with reference to them. It\\ndoes with its facts what every science does with its\\nsubject-matter it strives to know everything that\\n1 See Setli, A Study of Ethical Principles, chap, i Spencer,\\nData of Ethics, chap i Muirhead, A Manual of Ethics, pp. 15-17\\nMartineau, op. cit., Vol. II, chap. i.", "height": "3504", "width": "2196", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "12 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ncan be known about them, to correlate them, to\\nunify them, to insert them into a system.\\n7. The Interrelation of Sciences. When we say,\\nhowever, as we did before, that there are separate\\nsciences, we do not wish to be understood as mean-\\ning that these sciences are absolutely distinct from\\neach other, that their respective facts are to be\\nstudied apart from all other phenomena in the\\nworld. This is not the case. The world presents\\nitself to us as one, as a unity, a concrete whole.\\nThe mind splits it up into parts, but these parts are\\nby no means really separate, independent entities.\\nNo phenomenon can be thoroughly understood in iso-\\nlation, apart from all other phenomena. Strictly\\nspeaking, we cannot know one fact without know-\\ning them all. To know one thing thoroughly,\\nas Professor James says, would be to know the\\nwhole universe. Mediately or immediately, that\\none thing is related to everything else and to\\nknow all about it, all its relations need be known. 1\\nTennyson expresses the same idea poetically in the\\noft-quoted lines\\nLittle flower but if I could understand\\nWhat you are, root and all, and all in all,\\nI should know what God and man is.\\n1 See Leibniz, Monadology, 61: Everybody is affected by\\neverything that happens in the world, so that a man seeing every-\\nthing would know from each particular object everything that takes\\nplace everywhere, as well as what has taken place and will take\\nplace he perceives in the present that which is remote in time and\\nspace. 1 Cf. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, translated by\\nFrank Thilly, pp. 145 ff", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 13\\nAnd as the world is one, science is one. Sciences\\ndepend upon each other, are subservient to each\\nother. Thus the facts of psychology are in some\\nway related to the facts of physiology and physics\\nwe cannot study the phenomenon of sensation with-\\nout referring to the functions of the nervous sys-\\ntem and the properties of matter.\\n8. Ethics and Psychology. Inasmuch as the facts\\nof ethics are not isolated and independent, but are\\nconnected with the rest of the world, it is natural\\nthat the science of ethics should stand in some\\nrelation to the other sciences. If ethics is con-\\ncerned with human beings, it will necessarily have\\nsomething to do with the science of human nature.\\nIf ethics has to examine the conduct of man, and\\nif conduct is not merely physical movement, but the\\noutward expression, or sign, or aspect, of states of\\nconsciousness, and if the important thing in ethics\\nis the fact that human beings judge of things in\\na certain way, then, of course, ethics is bound to\\ndepend, in a large measure, upon psychology. Psy-\\nchology analyzes, classifies, and explains states of\\nconsciousness. Although all such states are of in-\\nterest to the moralist, some of them require especial\\nattention from him. The so-called ethical senti-\\nments, the feeling of obligation, etc., are mental\\nphenomena, and as such must be analyzed and ex-\\nplained by him and they cannot be treated apart\\nfrom the rest of consciousness. Thus, when the\\nethicist analyzes and describes the conscience, he", "height": "3500", "width": "2192", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "14 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nis doing the work of the psychologist. And when\\nhe studies the moral nature of the infant and the\\nprimitive man, as he sometimes does, with a view to\\ntracing the development of the conscience, he is\\nstill within the field of psychology. He may like-\\nwise consider animal states of consciousness, and\\nsearch for the beginnings of conscience there, as\\nDarwin did, in which case he is pursuing a psycho-\\nlogical investigation.\\nIndeed, we may say that in so far as ethics deals\\nwith moral states of consciousness, it is simply a spe-\\ncial branch of psychology. 1 But our science does not\\nonly look at the subjective side of conduct, it inves-\\ntigates the objective side also, and the relation which\\nthis bears to the subjective. What, it asks, is the\\nnature of the acts which are judged moral; do they\\npossess some mark or characteristic that makes them\\nmoral or leads men to call them so? Why do men\\njudge as they do what is the ground of moral dis-\\ntinctions Why is wrong wrong, and right right\\nExplain the virtues and duties, e.g., benevolence,\\ncharity, justice, veracity, etc., and their opposites.\\nIs there a standard or criterion or ideal by which\\nconduct is judged, and what is it Can we justify\\nthis standard or ideal, or is it something that cannot\\nor need not be justified Given a certain ideal or\\n1 See, for example, Ladd s treatment of the ethical sentiments in\\nhis Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, and Sully s account\\nof the ethical or moral sentiments in the second volume of his\\nHuman Mind, or, in fact, any modern work on psychology.", "height": "3496", "width": "2368", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 15\\nstandard, what conduct is moral, what immoral\\nDoes humanity remain true to the ideal What is\\nthe highest good for man, the end of life Can we\\nspecify it scientifically, or is it impossible to do so?\\nSuch are some of the questions which our science\\nasks and seeks to answer. Should it be said that\\nthese also are problems for psychology to solve, we\\nshould raise no serious objection. The important\\nthing is that the phenomena in question be examined\\nand explained whether by psychology or a special\\nscience does not matter. Ethical facts are, to a\\ngreat extent, mental processes, and as such objects\\nof psychological study. But the same may truth-\\nfully be said of the data of aesthetics. A science\\nmust thoroughly explain its facts, and, strictly\\nspeaking, psychology would have to explain ethical\\nand sesthetical facts. But sciences divide their\\nlabor, and it is in keeping with the practices of\\nmodern scientific research that psychology should\\nhand over to a special discipline the consideration of\\na particular set of its facts.\\nBesides, there are certain questions, as we have\\njust seen, which are not usually considered by the\\npsychologist. The psychologist studies states of con-\\nsciousness as such he regards his work as completed\\nwhen he has analyzed psychical phenomena and has\\nreferred them to their necessary psychical, or, if he\\nbe physiologically inclined, psychophysical antece-\\ndents. He does not, as a rule, inquire into the\\nprinciples underlying conduct; he does not concern", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "16 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nhimself with the question, What is the end of life,\\nor what is the standard or criterion by which acts\\nare measured But he could do so and still remain\\nwithin the confines of his proper field of study.\\nSuch an investigation would surely assist him in\\nbetter understanding the workings of the human\\nmind, just as a knowledge of physics and chemistry\\nwould enable the physiologist better to understand\\nthe subject-matter of his science. 1\\n9. Ethics and Politics. The relation which eth-\\nics bears to the science of politics largely depends\\nupon our conception of the nature and function of\\nthese two sciences. If we assume with Plato that\\nethics is the science of the highest good, and that\\nthe object of the State is to realize that end, then\\npolitics depends upon ethics, for we cannot tell what\\nthe State ought to do until we know what the high-\\nest good is. But if the State is the highest good,\\nthen conduct has value only in so far as it subserves\\nthe interests of the State, and ethics is simply a\\nbranch of, or another name for, politics, as Aristotle\\ndeclares.\\nBut let us say, ethics is the science of right and\\nwrong it discovers the principles of conduct, shows\\nthe ground of moral distinctions. Politics has to do\\n1 With the view advanced above Miinsterberg, Der Ursprung\\nder Sittlichkeit, and Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft,\\nagree. See also Sully, The Human Mind, Appendix L. Mackenzie,\\nA Manual of Ethics, especially Appendix B, opposes the concep-\\ntion.", "height": "3500", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 17\\nwith the nature, origin, and development of the\\nState it studies the different forms in which the\\nState appears and has appeared, and strives to define\\nthe functions which it performs. It deals, let us\\nsay, with the principles of organized society. Now\\nif ethics should discover that morality realizes a cer-\\ntain end or aim, and that the fact that it realizes\\nsuch an end explains its existence, and if politics\\nshould find that the State realizes the same end, then\\nthere would evidently be a close connection between\\nthe two. Should we be fortunate enough to dis-\\ncover a principle or standard of morals, we should\\nbe able to say, in a general way, how a man ought\\nto act in order to realize the ideal we should be\\nable to construct a moral code. And should we be\\nable to specify the end or ideal aimed at by the\\nState, we could compare the two ends or purposes.\\nShould they be the same, then politics might be\\ncalled a branch of ethics or vice versa. Ethics would\\nlay down the general rules of conduct it would tell\\nus how to act as individuals. Politics would tell\\nthe State how to act it would be a guide to the\\nconduct of man in organized society. 1\\n10. Ethics and Metaphysics. A science, as we\\nhave seen, analyzes, classifies, and explains a particu-\\nlar set of phenomena. Strictly speaking, no fact is\\nexplained until we know all about it, until we un-\\nderstand its relation to the entire universe. To\\n1 See Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk. I, chap, ii Mackenzie,\\n6 Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, pp. 34\\nc", "height": "3504", "width": "2160", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "18 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nknow one thing well means to know everything, as\\nwe have already pointed ont. 1 An ideal science\\nwonld therefore be able to account for every single\\nfact within its domain and coordinate it with the\\nrest of reality. As a matter of fact, however, this\\nideal is not realized. The different sciences do not\\neven aim at so high a goal. They do not go very far\\nin their search for the causes of things, nor do they\\nattempt to understand the world as a whole. When\\na science has referred an event to an antecedent,\\nand this perhaps to another antecedent or group of\\nantecedents, it is apt to regard its work as done.\\nThe physicist as such, for example, studies the prop-\\nerties of matter, the laws of motion. He does not\\nconcern himself with the question regarding the\\nultimate nature and origin of these data, nor does he\\nseek to correlate them with other forms of reality,\\nsay with the phenomena of mind. Nay, the tempta-\\ntion is strong to regard his facts as the ultimate and\\nmost important facts, and to subordinate all others\\nto them. The biologist studies the different forms\\nof living matter which occur upon our earth he\\ninvestigates the structure and function of organisms\\nand compares them with each other. It is true that\\nthe tendency toward unification is stronger in bi-\\nology than in many other sciences, and that attempts\\nhave been made to derive the more complex forms\\nof life from simple beginnings but in so far as this\\nis the case, biology more nearly realizes the ideal\\n1 See 7 of this chapter.", "height": "3504", "width": "2372", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 19\\nof science than the other sciences. Still, there are\\nfinal problems which the biologist as such does not\\nundertake to solve. The psychologist, again, ana-\\nlyzes and explains states of consciousness he splits\\nup the mind into its elements and refers them to\\ntheir physical and psychical antecedents. But the\\nquestions, What is the ultimate nature and origin\\nof consciousness or soul How is such a thing as mind\\npossible at all? Whence comes it and whither does it\\ngo? What is its relation to matter and motion are\\nleft unanswered. 1\\nEvery science, then, confines itself to a particular\\ngroup of phenomena and seeks to explain these in\\nterms of each other. 2 But certain ultimate ques-\\ntions suggest themselves, which, though hard to an-\\nswer, cannot be brushed aside. These questions are\\nhanded over to philosophy or metaphysics for settle-\\nment. Philosophy simply means, as James puts it,\\nan unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly\\nand consistently. To philosophize means to go to\\nthe very bottom of things, to think a problem out to\\nthe bitter end, to account for everything, to under-\\nstand everything. In strictness, every science\\nshould be philosophical, it should not stop until all\\nquestions have been answered. And as a matter of\\nfact, there are philosophical scientists in every\\n1 It cannot be denied, of course, that every science makes cer-\\ntain metaphysical assumptions, that it practically starts out with\\nthe metaphysics of common sense.\\n2 In so far as it does this, we might call it empirical, as distin-\\nguished from rational or metaphysical.", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "20 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nsphere of science, men who like Wilhelm von\\nHumboldt, Darwin, Huxley, and Helmholtz, cross\\nthe narrow confines of the particular fields in which\\nthey happen to be working, and look at the universe\\nas a whole.\\nNow the remarks which apply to the other sci-\\nences likewise apply to ethics. Ethics investigates\\na particular branch of facts and has to explain them.\\nAn ideal science of ethics will not stop until it\\nthoroughly understands the phenomena with which\\nit deals, and this, as we have seen, is not possible\\nwithout universal knowledge. To realize its ideal,\\nethics must become philosophical, must be philos-\\nophy. In this respect, however, we repeat, it in no\\nwise differs from the other sciences.\\nWe shall not, however, in this book, attempt to do\\nmore than the average science does with its subject-\\nmatter. We shall be satisfied if we succeed in find-\\ning the general principles underlying morality.\\nWe must leave it to the philosophers to solve the\\nultimate problems of ethics and to insert the facts of\\nmorality into the universal system of things. 1\\n11. The Methods of Ethics. Let us next con-\\nsider the methods of ethics. The method to be\\npursued by our science does not, generally speak-\\ning, differ from that followed by other sciences.\\nWe must examine moral phenomena with the same\\n1 For the relation of philosophy to the sciences, see Paulsen,\\nIntroduction to Philosophy, pp. 15 ff. Kiilpe, Introduction to\\nPhilosophy Munsterberg, Der Urspruny der iSittlichkeit, 1 ff.", "height": "3492", "width": "2376", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OE ETHICS 21\\ncare practised in other fields of research. We\\nmust observe and collect moral facts wherever we\\ncan. We must investigate the modes of conduct\\nof different races, nations, classes, individuals, and\\nperiods of time. We must watch the behavior of\\nthe civilized and uncivilized, adults and children,\\nmen and women we must go as far back to the\\nbeginnings of history as we can we must study\\nthe mythology, theology, philosophy, literature, and\\nart of the different peoples, in order to discover\\nwhat they considered right and wrong we must\\nlook at their language, the fossilized spiritual life\\nof mankind, at their systems of law, at their polit-\\nical, social, and economic conditions, which are to\\na large extent an embodiment of their morality.\\nWhat a wealth of moral facts we find in the works\\nof Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek tragedians, in\\nShakespeare, Byron, and Goethe What an insight\\nwe gain into the moral feelings of the Middle Ages\\nfrom the contemplation of their great works of art\\nand how much the social conditions of our own\\ntimes tell us of the moral ideals of the age\\nFacts, then, must be gathered in our science, both\\nexternal and internal facts. We must look out-\\nward and inward. But we must also study and\\nseek to interpret these facts we must reflect and\\nspeculate upon them. No science can live without\\nspeculation. You may gather facts by the thou-\\nsands and be no better off than before they are\\nmerely the raw material upon which you must work,", "height": "3504", "width": "2164", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "22 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nwhich you must form into a system. We must pass\\nfrom facts to principles. The mere observance of\\nfacts will lead to nothing. Only a highly synthetic,\\nonly an imaginative mind, one that can peer through\\nthe outward shell into the very heart of nature, is\\ncapable of advancing science.\\n12. Theoretical Ethics and Practical Ethics. We\\nmay distinguish between theoretical ethics and prac-\\ntical ethics. A science or theory, as has been said,\\nteaches us to know, and an art to do. 1 In studying\\na subject theoretically or scientifically in this sense,\\nwe seek to discover the principles or laws governing\\nour phenomena. Anatomy and physiology are the-\\nories in so far as they examine the general structure\\nand functions of organisms. After we have found\\nthe principles or laws, we apply them, we put them\\ninto practice, we lay down certain rules which must\\nbe obeyed in order that we may reach certain ends.\\nThe science or theory of physiology teaches us how\\nthe body functions, what causes it to function in\\nthis way, what are the conditions essential to its\\nfunctioning so. The art or practice of hygiene\\nframes rules based upon these principles, the observ-\\nance of which is essential to health. The science\\nof psychology tells us what are the conditions or\\ncauses of certain mental phenomena pedagogy\\napplies the truths discovered by the psychologist in\\npractice. Every art bases itself upon a theory and\\nthe more developed the art the more developed, as\\n1 See Sully, Teacher s Handbook of Psychology, chap. i.", "height": "3504", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 23\\na rule, the theory upon which it rests. And the\\nfinal end or purpose of every science or theory is to\\nbe of some practical use. 1\\nNow there is also a science or theory of ethics and\\nan art of ethics. The science discovers the princi-\\nples, the art applies them. The science teaches us\\nwhat is done, the art what ought to be done. Practi-\\ncal ethics is the application of theoretical ethics. 2\\n13. The Value of Ethics, In conclusion, let us\\nconsider the value of ethics for the student. Why\\nshould we study ethics? Well, why study any-\\nthing Morality is a fact, and as such deserves to\\nbe studied. Man is a reflective being, and, there-\\nfore, bound to take cognizance of everything in the\\nuniverse. His own conduct is surely important and\\ninteresting enough to merit the attention which is\\ngiven to the study of physical occurrences. Man\\n1 See Drobisch, Logik, p. 165.\\n2 For views similar to the above, see the references to Miinster-\\nberg, Simmel, Paulsen, and Stephen, mentioned at the beginning\\nof this chapter. See also Ziegler, Sittliches Sein unci sittliches\\nWerden. Many writers, following Wundt (Ethik, Part I, Intro-\\nduction), compare ethics to logic, and call it a normative science\\n(Normwissenschaft). According to them, logic gives us the laws of\\ncorrect thinking, the norms or rules which must be observed in order\\nto reach truth. It also measures our thinking by these rules or\\nnorms, and judges its value accordingly. Ethics tells us how\\nwe ought to act in order to act ethically, or morally it lays down\\nnorms, or rules of conduct, which the agent must obey in order to\\ninsure the morality of his conduct. See Hyslop, Muirhead, Mac-\\nkenzie. In this sense, however, it seems to me, every science\\nthat can be applied in practice is normative. Cf Spencer, Social\\nStatics, p. 458.", "height": "3504", "width": "2156", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "24 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nhas conquered the forces of nature because he has\\nthought about them, because he has subjected them\\nto critical analysis. It is to be supposed that the\\nexamination of moral forces will be equally fruitful.\\nThe discovery of an ethical criterion will surely\\nassist us in answering troublesome ethical questions.\\nWe do not always know what is right and what is\\nwrong we must reflect upon our conduct, we need\\na standard or ideal with which to measure it. There\\ncan be no great progress in morals without reflection.\\nMen are often ignorant of the right they have to\\nreason it out, they need a firm foundation on which\\nto base it. Or they often become sceptical with\\nregard to morals they observe a great divergence\\nin modes of conduct, and are apt to regard morality\\nas a collection of arbitrary rules having no real bind-\\ning force. A closer study of the moral world will\\neasily show the falseness of this view, and establish\\nethical truths upon a solid basis.\\nI do not, of course, wish to be understood as\\nclaiming that morality is impossible without reflec-\\ntion upon morality, or a science of ethics. This\\nwould be like saying that there can be no seeing\\nwithout a science of vision. Before there can be a\\nscience of optics men must possess the power of\\nsight before there can be a science of ethics men\\nmust act. But just as the science of optics greatly\\nassists us in our attempts to see things, so the\\nscience of ethics is an aid to action.\\nIt is held by some, however, that reflection upon", "height": "3500", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "THE NATURE AND METHODS OF ETHICS 25\\nmoral matters is apt to weaken a person s power of\\naction, and that a study of ethics is, therefore,\\ndangerous to morality. Even if this were so, it\\ncould not hinder men from theorizing on the prin-\\nciples of conduct. But the view is false. A careful\\nand thorough examination of the field of morals will,\\nit seems to me, inspire us with a greater respect for\\nmorality, and strengthen our impulses toward the\\ngood. Of course, hasty and superficial judgments\\nupon ethical facts are, like all half-truths, dangerous.\\nBut the best way to combat them is to prove their\\nfalseness the best cure for a half-truth is always a\\nwhole truth.", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER II\\nTHEORIES OF CONSCIENCE i\\n1. Introduction. We pronounce moral judgments\\nupon ourselves as well as upon others we distin-\\n1 For a history of ethical theories, see, besides the Histories of\\nPhilosophy Kostlin, Die Ethik des classischen Altertums Lut-\\nhardt, Die antike Ethik; Ziegler, Die Ethik der Griechen and\\nBomer Gass, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik Gass, D.ie Lehre\\nvom Gewissen; Ziegler, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik; Lut-\\nhardt, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik; Jodl, Geschichte der\\nEthik in der neueren Philosophic; Gizycki, Die Ethik David\\nHume s; Whewell, History of Moral Philosophy J. H. Fichte,\\nSystem der Ethik; Vorlander, Geschichte der philosophischen\\nMoral, Bechts- und Staatslehre Mackintosh, On the Progress\\nof Ethical Philosophy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth\\nCenturies; Stephen, English Thought of the Eighteenth Century\\nGuyau, La morale anglaise contemporaine Fouillee, Critique des\\nsystemes de morale contemporains Williams, A Beview of Evo-\\nlutional Ethics; Sidgwick, Outline of a History of Ethics; Janet,\\nHistoire de la philosophic morale et politique Paulsen, A System\\nof Ethics, pp. 33-215 Wundt, Ethics, Vol. II J. Seth, A Study\\nof Ethical Principles, pp. 77-249 Watson, Hedonistic Theories\\nfrom Aristippus to Spencer; Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, pp.\\n18-89; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory; Calderwood, Hand-\\nbook of Moral Philosophy, 10th edition, pp. 318 ff. Eucken,\\nDie Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker. For a history\\nof ethical conceptions, see also Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Grie-\\nchen; Lecky, History of European Morals, from Augustus to Char-\\nlemagne Friedlander, Die Sittengeschirhte Boms; Keim, Bom\\nund das Christentum. Sutherland s Origin and Growth of the\\nMoral Instinct contains much valuable material. Consult also the\\nbibliographies in my translation of Paulsen s Ethics. For bibliog-\\n26", "height": "3504", "width": "2420", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 27\\nguish between Tightness and wrongness in thoughts,\\nfeelings, volitions, acts, institutions, and so forth.\\nWe insist upon the performance of certain modes of\\nconduct and the avoidance of others we command\\ncategorically, Thou shalt, and thou shalt not. We\\nregard ourselves and our fellows as morally bound\\nor obliged to do certain things, and to refrain from\\nothers. The breach of rules which we feel ought\\nto be obeyed is condemned by us even when we\\nourselves are the offenders.\\nLet us embrace all these facts under a general\\nformula, and say that man pronounces moral judg-\\nments, or distinguishes between right and wrong;\\nman has a moral consciousness or a conscience. The\\nquestion naturally arises, How is this fact to be\\nexplained? We cannot solve this problem until\\nwe have carefully analyzed the phenomenon itself\\nwhich provoked it. Before attempting that, how-\\never, let us consider some answers which have already\\nbeen made to the question.\\n2. The Mythical View. The naive thinker tries\\nto account for things in a peculiar manner. He\\nregards natural phenomena as the expression of\\nhidden, mysterious forces. He collects a number\\nof similar occurrences and conceives them as the\\nraphyof the History of Philosophy, see my translation of Weber s\\nHistory of Philosophy, notes in 3. For special bibliographies\\nsee the notes on particular philosophers in Weber and Paulsen.\\nThe beginner will find the works of Paulsen, Seth, Wundt, Sidg-\\nwick, and Hyslop most helpful to him in his study of the history of\\nethics and ethical conceptions.", "height": "3496", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "28 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nmanifestation of some supernatural principle. Thus\\nrain and thunder are produced by rain and thunder\\ngods, disease by a god of disease. The same ten-\\ndency impels him to explain the fact of moral\\nconsciousness by referring it to supernatural powers.\\nHe notices a conflict in himself between two ten-\\ndencies, the one urging him in the direction of the\\ngood, the other in the direction of the evil. Behind\\neach he places an entity, a principle, of which the\\ndifferent occurrences are the expressions. Con-\\nscience, he says, is the voice of God in the human\\nsoul; it is God directly speaking to us; it is some-\\nthing distinct from the person, something from with-\\nout that tells him which way to go. Greek mythology\\npersonifies the pangs of conscience in the form of the\\nErinyes or Furies, who pursue the evil-doer as long\\nas he lives anc even Socrates speaks of the daemon\\nwithin him who warns him against certain lines of\\nconduct and urges him in the direction of the good. 1\\nAnd just as the naive consciousness places an entity\\nbehind the inner tendency toward the right, so it\\nmakes an entity of the inner tendency toward the\\nevil. The latter is called the principle of evil or\\nthe devil, who tempts man to do wrong.\\n3. The Rationalistic Intuitionists. The mytho-\\nlogical view, as we might call it, is superseded by\\nthe metaphysical view, which appears in many\\nforms, often in combination with the preceding.\\n1 See Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen Gass, Die Lehre vom Ge-\\nwissen. See also Bender, Mythologie und Jfetaphysik.", "height": "3500", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 29\\nLet us see how it answers our question. Why do\\nwe make moral distinctions? Because we have the\\npower of making such judgments. Man possesses\\na natural faculty, a peculiar moral endowment, a\\nconscience, which immediately enables him to dis-\\ntinguish between right and wrong. Its deliverances\\nare absolutely certain and necessary, as self-evident\\nas the truth that twice two is four, as immediate\\nand eternal as the axioms of geometry. You cannot\\nand need not prove that twice two is four, you can-\\nnot and need not prove that stealing is wrong. It\\nis as absurd to doubt the one fact as it is to doubt\\nthe other. And whence did man obtain this won-\\nderful power, you ask? Well, it is an inborn fac-\\nulty, which God has given us.\\n(1) Let us consider a few representatives of this\\nview, 1 and note how it is modified \u00e2\u0080\u00a2a the course of\\ntime. And, first, let us turn to the early Christian\\nthinkers. 2 u How, Chrysostom 3 asks the heathen, 4\\ndid your lawgivers happen to give so many laws on\\nmurder, marriage, wills, etc. The later ones have\\nperhaps been taught by their predecessors, but how\\ndid these learn of them How else than through con-\\nscience, the law which God originally implanted in hu-\\nman nature There is in our souls, says Pelagius, 5\\n1 In the following expositions I have tried, as far as possible, to\\nstate the different authors views in their own language.\\n2 See Gass, Die Lehre vom Gewissen.\\n3 Died 407. 4 Adv. pop. Antioch., Homil. 12.\\n6 A contemporary of St. Augustine.", "height": "3504", "width": "2176", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "30 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\na certain natural holiness, as it were, which pre-\\nsides over the citadel of the mind, a judgment of\\ngood and evil. 1 Augustine 2 declares that there\\nare in the natural faculty of judgment certain rules\\nand seeds of virtue, which are both true and incom-\\nmunicable.\\nBut, it might be asked, if there is such an absolute\\nfaculty, if the dictates of this conscience or the\\nmoral truths engraven on the mind are so certain\\nand universal, how comes it that so many mistakes\\nare made, and so many differences exist in action?\\nIn obeying the so-called inner voice the individual\\nmay still fall into error. To escape this troublesome\\nproblem the Schoolmen modified the view just set\\nforth in an ingenious way. I may pronounce judg-\\nment that a particular act is right or wrong. The\\nfaculty which enables me to do this is the conscience\\n(conscientia, awelh-qcn^ The judgment may be\\nfalse, for the particular act which it pronounces to\\nbe right or wrong may be the opposite. But I have\\nanother faculty, the faculty which tells me in general\\nthat all wrong must be avoided, that evil must not\\nbe done. This faculty, called the synteresis or syn-\\nderesis (avvhepecris}? cannot err, it is infallible, inex-\\ntinguishable. It is the spark of reason or truth\\nwhich burns even in the souls of the damned.\\nWhen we come to apply this truth to particular\\n1 Epist. ad Demetr., chap, iv, p. 25. 2 354-430.\\n3 The spelling and derivation of the word are in dispute. See\\nArchiv f. G. d. Ph., Vol. X, number 4.", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 31\\ncases and seek to discover what particular deeds\\nshould be avoided, we exercise the conscience and\\nmay err. To quote from Bonaventura 1 For God\\nhas endowed us with a twofold righteousness, one\\nfor judging correctly, and this is the righteousness\\nof conscience, and one for willing correctly, and that\\nis the righteousness of the synderesis, whose func-\\ntion it is to warn against (remurmurare) the evil\\nand to prompt to goodness. 2 Antoninus of Flor-\\nence 3 regards the synderesis as a natural habit\\nor endowment, a natural light, which tends to keep\\nman from doing wrong by warning him against\\nsin and inclining him to the good. 4 It is a simple\\nprinciple, dealing with general laws, sinless and in-\\nextinguishable, while the conscience is a faculty or\\nan activity which concerns itself with the particular\\nand is, therefore, subject to error and illusion.\\nThe human mind makes a certain syllogism, as it\\nwere, for which the synderesis furnishes the major\\npremise All evil is to be avoided. But a superior\\nreason assumes the minor premise of this syllogism,\\nsaying, Adultery is an evil because it is prohibited\\nby God, while an inferior reason says, Adultery is\\n1 1221-1274. Breviloqmum, Part II, chap. ii.\\n2 Duplicem enim indidit (Deus) rectitudinein ipsi naturse, vide-\\nlicet unam ad recte jndicandum, et hsec est rectitude* conscientiae\\naliam, ad recte volendum, et h?ec est rectitude- synderesis, cujus\\nest remurmurare contra malum et stimulare ad bonum.\\n3 1389-1459.\\n4 Synderesis est quidam connaturalis habitus sive connaturale\\nlumen, cujus actus vel officium est, hominem retrahere a malo\\nmurmurando contra peccatum et inclinare ad bonum.", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "32 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nan evil because it is unjust, or because it is dis-\\nhonest. But conscience draws the conclusion from\\nthe above premises Therefore adultery is to be\\navoided. 1\\n(2) We find similar views expressed by modern\\nthinkers. Ralph Cudworth 2 regards knowledge as\\nthe product of an independent activity of the soul,\\nor reason. The intellection consists in the appli-\\ncation of a given pattern thought, a ready-made\\ncategory, to the phenomena and objects presented\\nby experience. These categories or notions are\\na priori; they are the constant reflections of the\\nUniversal Reason, of God s mind. But they are\\nnot merely objects and products of the intellect,\\nthey form the nature or essence of things. All men\\nhave the same fundamental ideas. What is clearly\\nand distinctly perceived is true. Among the truths\\nwhich reason reveals to us are moral truths, which,\\nlike mathematical propositions, are absolute and\\neternal. But the soul is not a mere passive and\\nreceptive thing which has no innate active principles\\nof its own. Good and evil, intuitive intellectual\\n1 Fit in animo vel in mente hominis quasi quidam syllogismus,\\ncujus majorem prsernittit synderesis dicens, omne malum esse\\nvitandum. Minorem vero hujus syllogismi assumit ratio superior,\\ndicens adulterium esse malum, quia prohibitum est a Deo, ratio\\nvero inferior dicit, adulterium esse malum, quia vel est injustum\\nvel quia est inhonestum. Conscientia vero infert conclusionem\\ndicens et concludens ex supradictis, ergo adulterium est vitandum.\\n2 1617-1688. The title of Cudworth s book is characteristic\\nof his standpoint Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable\\nMorality. Selections in Selby-Bigge s British Moralists, Vol. II.", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 33\\ncategories, convey more than knowledge, and are\\nattended by an authority pleading with the will to\\nmove in a determinate direction. Moreover, the\\ntruths of mathematics and morals are as binding on\\nGod as they are on us he must think and act like\\nall rational beings. 1\\n(3) Samuel Clarke 2 teaches that there are eternal\\nand necessary differences and relations of things.\\nThe human differences are as obvious as the various\\nsizes of physical objects, the fitness of actions and\\ncharacters as obvious as the propositions of numbers\\nand geometrical figures. Hence the moral truths,\\nlike the mathematical truths, belong to the sphere\\nof eternal relations. The reason, divine and human,\\nperceives these eternal differences and relations as\\nthey are. And just as no one can refuse assent to\\na correct mathematical proof, no one who under-\\nstands the subject can refuse assent to moral propo-\\nsitions. So far as men are conscious of what is\\nright and wrong, so far they are under obligation\\nto act accordingly. 3 It is contrary to reason, con-\\ntrary to the eternal order of nature, to do wrong.\\nIndeed, it is as absurd as to try to make darkness\\nout of light, sweet out of bitter. To deny that I\\nshould do for another what he in the like case\\n1 For Cudworth, see especially Martineau, Types, Vol. II, Bk.\\nII; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik Sidgwick, History of Ethics.\\n2 1675-1729. Discourse concerning the Unalterable Obligations\\nof Natural Beligion. Selections from Clarke s ethical writings in\\nSelby-Bigge s British Moralists, Vol. II.\\n8 Op. cit., pp. 184 ff.\\np", "height": "3500", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "34 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nshould do for me, and to deny it, either in word or\\nin action, is as if a man should contend that,\\nthough two and three are equal to five, yet five\\nare not equal to two and three. God himself\\nnecessarily conforms his will to the laws of morals\\nhis activity must be in accord with eternal right. 1\\n(4) Henry Caldenvood 2 belongs to the same\\nschool. We have, he says, an intuitive knowledge of\\nthe right and wrong. This knowledge is immediate,\\nand its source is within the mind itself. By direct\\ninsight a law is visible to us which cannot be inferred,\\nbut which regulates all inferences in morals within\\nthe area to which the law applies. The recognition of\\na general truth or principle of conduct is perception\\nor intuition of the highest order. The power to\\nrecognize self-evident truth has been named Reason.\\nConscience, then, is that power by which moral law\\nis immediately recognized, it is reason discovering\\nuniversal truth having the authority of sovereign\\nmoral law, and affording the basis for personal obli-\\ngation. It is a cognitive or intellectual power, not\\na form of feeling, nor a combination of feelings\\nand it is vested with sovereign practical authority.\\nThis authority is found in the character of the truth\\nwhich conscience reveals, not in the nature of the\\nfaculty itself. This faculty is a power of sight,\\nmaking a perception of self-evident truth possible to\\n1 See references under Cudworth also Stephen, op. cit.,\\nVol. II.\\n2 1831-1897. Handbook of Moral Philosophy.", "height": "3488", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 35\\nman but it contributes nothing to the truth per-\\nceived. To this truth itself belongs inherent author-\\nity, by which is meant, absolute right to command,\\nnot force to constrain. 1\\nBut if conscience discovers moral law to us, how\\nis it that there exists such diversity of moral judg-\\nments among men Calderwood maintains that\\nthere is a very general agreement as to the forms\\nof rectitude, such as truthfulness, justice, benevo-\\nlence. No nation places these virtues in the list\\nof moral wrongs. But men \u00e2\u0080\u00a2differ as to the applica-\\ntion of these principles.\\nConscience cannot be educated. As well teach\\nthe eye to see, and the ear to hear, as to teach rea-\\nson to perceive self-evident truth. But. conscience\\ncan be trained, in the application of the law, which\\ncan be known only through personal experience.\\nThe foregoing thinkers practically agree in the\\nanswers which they give to our question, Why\\ndo men make moral judgments Men judge as they\\ndo because they have an innate knowledge of mo-\\nrality, a knowledge not derived from experience, but\\ninherent in the very nature of human reason. Rea-\\nson immediately reveals to us moral truths, certain\\nuniversal propositions which are as necessary and\\nabsolute as the truths of mathematics. Conscience\\nis an intuition of the reason (ratio). We may call\\n1 Handbook, Part I, chaps, iii and iv. To the same school belong\\nPrice, Reid, Stewart, Janet, Porter, and others.", "height": "3496", "width": "2244", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "36 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthe philosophers who adopt this view, rationalists or\\nintellectualists, rationalistic intuitionists.\\n4. The Emotional Intuitionists. There are other\\nphilosophers who agree with the above that con-\\nscience is innate, but do not conceive it as a faculty\\nof reason, as a faculty that pronounces universal\\nand necessary judgments, like, Stealing is wrong,\\nBenevolence is right. According to them we either\\nfeel or perceive that a particular act or motive is right\\nor wrong when it is presented to us. We contemplate\\nmotives and acts, and pronounce judgment upon them\\nwhen they are brought before consciousness, and we\\ndo this because we immediately and intuitively feel\\nor perceive them to be right or wrong, not because we\\nfirst compare them with an universal innate truth\\nor proposition, delivered by the reason. Let us\\nconsider the advocates of this view under two heads.\\nLet us call those who regard conscience as a form\\noi feeling, as an emotional faculty, emotional intuition-\\nists and those who base it upon perception, percep-\\ntional intuitionists. 1\\n1 Neither Shaftesbury nor Hutcheson draws a sharp distinction\\nbetween feeling and perception, both using the terms interchange-\\nably but they seem to me to incline toward the view that the\\nmoral sense is an emotional faculty. (See Martineau, Types, Vol. II,\\nBk. II, pp. 524 ff., where their meaning of the word sense is defined.)\\nHume is clearer in his statements on this point, and more out-\\nspoken in his opposition to the rationalists. Butler and Marti-\\nneau, on the other hand, regard conscience as a cognitive faculty,\\nbut not in the sense of the rationalists. With them it is a per-\\nception rather than a power of reason proclaiming general moral\\ntruths.", "height": "3492", "width": "2300", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 37\\n(1) According to Lord Shaftesbury, 1 man pos-\\nsesses self-affections which lead only to the good\\nof the private, natural, kind, or social affections,\\nwhich lead to the public good, and unnatural affec-\\ntions which lead neither to public nor private good.\\nVirtue consists in eliminating the latter, and estab-\\nlishing a proper harmony or balance between the\\nothers. But how can we tell whether these affec-\\ntions are properly balanced or not By means of\\nthe moral sense, the sense of right and wrong, a\\nnatural possession of all rational creatures, which\\nno speculative opinion is capable immediately and\\ndirectly to exclude or destroy. In a creature\\ncapable of forming general notions of things, he\\nsays, not only the outward beings which offer\\nthemselves to the sense are the objects of affection,\\nbut the very affections themselves and the affec-\\ntions of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their con-\\ntraries, being brought before the mind by reflection,\\nbecome objects, so that by means of this reflected\\nsense there arises another kind of affection toward\\nthose very affections themselves which have been\\nalready felt, and are now become the subject of a\\nnew liking or dislike. 2 No sooner are actions\\nviewed, no sooner the human affections and passions\\n1 1671-1713. Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, con-\\ntained in the second volume of the Characteristics. See especially\\nMartineau Stephen Jodl Gizycki, Die Philosophic Shaftesbury 1 s\\nFowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Selections in Selby-Bigge,\\nBritish Moralists, Vol. I. 2 Inquiry, Bk. I, Part II, Section III.", "height": "3500", "width": "2260", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "38 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ndiscerned (and they are most of them discerned as\\nsoon as felt), than straight an imvard eye distin-\\nguishes and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable,\\nthe admirable, the foul, the odious, or the despica-\\nble. How is it possible, then, not to own that as\\nthese distinctions have their foundation in nature, the\\ndiscernment itself is natural and from nature alone\\n(2) Francis Hutcheson 2 follows in the same path.\\nHe regards man as being moved by two kinds of\\naffections self-love and benevolence. In case a\\nconflict arises between these two motive principles,\\nan internal principle, intuitive and universal in man,\\nthe moral se?ise, appears and decides in favor of the\\nlatter. The moral sense has always approved of\\nevery kind affection, has pronounced morally\\ngood all actions which flow from benevolent affec-\\ntion, or intention of absolute good to others. What\\nis the nature of this faculty It does not, like the\\nconscience of the rationalists, evolve general propo-\\nsitions out of itself, but perceives virtue and vice as\\nthe eye perceives light and darkness. 3 It is a regu-\\nlating and controlling function, the faculty of per-\\n1 TJie Moralists, Part III, Section III. As Jodl says: The\\nmanner in which Shaftesbury speaks of this self-reflection upon which\\nthe moral judgment is said to depend, is somewhat indefinite and\\nvacillating. Still, he apparently means to point out that an emotional\\nelement enters into the process by which such judgments are formed.\\nWe may, therefore, call Shaftesbury an emotional intuitionist.\\n2 1694-1747. Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty\\nand Virtue, etc. Selections from Hutcheson s writings in Selby-\\nBigge, op. cit., Vol. I.\\n8 Inquiry, Section I, 8 System of Moral Philosophy, Bk I.", "height": "3492", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 39\\nceiving moral excellence. 1 Some actions have to\\nmen an immediate goodness by a superior sense,\\nwhich I call a moral one, we perceive pleasure in\\nthe contemplation of such actions in others, and are\\ndetermined to love the agent (and much more do we\\nperceive pleasure in being conscious of having done\\nsuch actions ourselves) without any view of further\\nnatural advantage from them. 2\\n(3) David Hume 3 agrees with Hutcheson. He\\ndiscusses the question whether tis by means of our\\nideas [reason] or impressions [feelings] we distin-\\nguish between vice and virtue, and pronounce an action\\nblamable or praiseworthy, 4 and finds that reason as\\nsuch is wholly inactive and can never be the source of\\nso active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals.\\nVice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason,\\nor the comparison of ideas. Our decisions concern-\\ning moral rectitude and depravity are perceptions.\\ntern, Bk. I.\\n2 Inquiry, Introduction. See especially Martineau, Types, Vol.\\nII, Bk. II.\\n3 1711-1776. Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, etc.\\nFor bibliography see Weber, History of Philosophy, 417, note.\\n4 Treatise on Morals, Bk. Ill, Part I, 1 Inquiry, Section I\\nThere has been a controversy started of late concerning the\\ngeneral foundation of morals whether they be derived from\\nreason or from sentiment whether we attain the knowledge of\\nthem by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate\\nfeeling and finer internal sense whether, like all sound judgment\\nof truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational,\\nintelligent being or whether, like the perception of beauty and\\ndeformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and\\nconstitution of the human species. Selections by Hyslop.", "height": "3504", "width": "2156", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "40 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nMorality is more properly felt, than judged of;\\nthough this feeling or sentiment is commonly so\\nsoft and gentle that we are apt to confound it with\\nan idea. 1 The final sentence, it is probable, which\\npronounces characters and actions amiable or odious,\\nblamable or praiseworthy that which stamps on\\nthem the mark of honor or infamy, approbation or\\ncensure that which renders morality an active\\nprinciple, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and\\nvice our misery it is probable, I say, that this final\\nsentence depends on some internal sense or feeling,\\nwhich nature has made universal in the whole\\nspecies. 2 And what is the nature of the feeling\\nby which we know good and evil? To have the\\n1 Treatise on Morals, Bk. Ill, Part I, 2.\\n2 Inquiry, Section I. See also Appendix I: Now, as virtue is\\nan end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or re-\\nward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys, it is\\nrequisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches\\nsome internal taste, or feeling, or whatever you choose to call it,\\nwhich distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the\\none and rejects the other. Thus the distinct boundaries and\\noffices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. The former\\nconveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood, the latter gives\\nthe sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one\\ndiscovers objects as they really stand in nature, without addition\\nor diminution, the other has a productive faculty, and, gilding or\\nstaining all natural objects with the colors borrowed from internal\\nsentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation. Reason, being\\ncool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the\\nimpulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the\\nmeans of attaining happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it\\ngives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or mis-\\nery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse\\nto desire and volition.", "height": "3492", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 41\\nsense of virtue is nothing but to feel a particular\\nkind of satisfaction, a peculiar kind of pleasure. 1\\n(4) To the same school belong also J. J. Rousseau, 2\\nKant 3 (before the critical period), Adam Smith, 4\\nand J. F. Herbart. 5 F. Brentano has attempted to\\nstrengthen the theory in a peculiar manner. 6 There\\nare, he holds, certain self-evident judgments, which\\ncarry their self-evidence in them, which it would be\\nabsurd to deny, like, Things equal to the same thing\\nare equal to each other and certain instinctive or\\nblind judgments, which may or may not be true,\\nabout which there can be dispute. Similarly, there\\nare certain higher or self-evident feelings, feelings\\nwhich are valid for all human beings, feelings about\\nwhich there can be no dispute, and lower feel-\\nings, which lack this self-evident character, about\\nwhich there can be dispute. Thus we love knowl-\\nedge and truth, and dislike error and ignorance, and\\nthere can be no dispute about the value of this feel-\\ning. Should a different human species love error\\nand hate truth, we should regard its loving and\\nhating as fundamentally wrong. That a man should\\nlove knowledge and hate ignorance is self-evident\\nthat he should prefer champagne to Rhine-wine is\\n1 See Treatise, loc. cit.. Section II also Part III.\\n2 1712-1778.\\n3 See his TJeber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsdtze der nat iir-\\nlichen Theologie und Moral, 1764. Cf. Forster, Der Entwick-\\nlungsgang der Kantischen Ethik Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik.\\n4 1723-1790. A Theory of Moral Sentiments. 5 1776-1841.\\nG Born 1838. Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntniss, 1889.", "height": "3504", "width": "2244", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "42 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nnot self-evident. In other words, we have an innate\\nfeeling of preference for the good. 1\\n5. The Perceptional Intuitionists. In this class\\nbelong Bishop Butler, James Martineau, and W. E. H.\\nLecky. With them conscience is intuitive, but neither\\na feeling, as the foregoing thinkers declare, nor the\\nproduct of reason in the Cudworthian sense, but an\\ninner perception.\\n(1) According to Butler, 2 there is a superior\\nprinciple of reflection or conscience in every man,\\nwhich distinguishes between the internal principles\\nof his heart as well as his external actions which\\npasses judgment upon himself and them, and pro-\\nnounces determinately some actions to be in them-\\nselves evil, wrong, unjust which without being\\nconsulted, without being advised with, magisterially\\nexerts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer\\nof them accordingly. It is by this faculty, natural\\nto man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law\\nto himself, but this faculty, not to be considered\\nmerely as a principle in his heart, which is to have\\nsome influence as well as others, but considered as\\na faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all\\nothers, and which bears its own authority of being\\nso. You cannot form a notion of this faculty, con-\\n1 Hermann Scliwarz, Grundz uge der Ethik, is an emotional\\nintuitionist of the Hutcheson stamp. We feel intuitively the worth\\nof sympathy to be higher than that of selfishness.\\n2 1692-1752. Sermons upon Human Nature. See also Disserta-\\ntion upon Virtue. Works edited by Gladstone, 1897. Selections\\nin Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, Vol. I. See Collins, Butler.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OE CONSCIENCE 43\\nscience, without taking in judgment, direction,\\nsuperintenclency. This is a constituent part of the\\nidea, that is, of the faculty itself, and to preside\\nand govern, from the very economy and constitution\\nof man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it had\\nright, had it power as it had manifest authority, it\\nwould absolutely govern the world. What obli-\\ngations are we under to attend to and follow it\\nYour obligation to obey this law is its being the law\\nof your nature. That your conscience approves of\\nand attests to such a course of action is itself alone\\nan obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself\\nto show us the way we should walk in, but it like-\\nwise carries its own authority with it, that it is our\\nnatural guide, the guide assigned us by the author\\nof our nature, etc. 1 u The whole moral law is as\\nmuch matter of revealed command, as positive insti-\\ntutions are, for the Scripture enjoins every moral\\nvirtue. In this respect, then, they are both upon a\\nlevel. But the moral law is moreover written upon\\nour hearts, interwoven into our very nature. And\\nthis is a plain intimation of the author of it, which\\nis to be preferred when they interfere. 2\\n(2) Martineau s 3 modification of the intuitional\\ntheory is unique. On the simple testimony of our\\nperceptive faculty, he says, we believe in the per-\\nceived object and the perceiving self. This dual\\nconviction rests upon the axiom that we must ac-\\n1 Sermon iii. 2 Analogy of Beligion, Part II, chap. i.\\n3 1805-1900. Types of Ethical Theory.", "height": "3516", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "44 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ncept as veracious the immediate depositions of our\\nfaculties, and that the postulates, without which the\\nmind cannot exert its activity at all, possess the high-\\nest certainty. We ask no more than this on behalf\\nof our ethical psychology. Let perception be dicta-\\ntor among the objects of sense conscience, as to the\\nconditions of duty. 1\\nNow we have an irresistible tendency to approve\\nand disapprove, to pass judgments of right and\\nwrong. We judge persons, not things, and we\\njudge always the inner spring of action. 2 Hence,\\nwe judge first ourselves, then others. We could\\nnot judge other men s actions if what they sig-\\nnified were not already familiar to us by our own\\ninner experience. But we cannot judge an inner\\nspring of action if it is the only thing in conscious-\\nness. A plurality of inner principles is an indis-\\npensable condition of moral judgment. 3 There\\nmust be several impulses (incompatible impulses)\\npresent. Without them the moral consciousness\\nwould sleep. As soon as this condition is realized,\\nwe are sensible of a contrast between them other\\nthan of mere intensity or of qualitative variety\\nnot analogous to the difference between loud and\\nsoft, or between red and bitter, but requiring\\nquite a separate phraseology for its expression, such\\nas this that one is higher, worthier, than the other,\\nand in comparison with it has the clear right to us.\\n1 Types, Vol. II, Part II, Introduction.\\n2 /6., pp. 18 ff. 8 lb., p. 37.", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 45\\nThis apprehension is no mediate discovery of ours,\\nof which we can give an account, but is immediately\\ninherent in the very experience of the principles them-\\nselves a revelation inseparable from their appear-\\nance side by side. 1 It is unique and unanalyzable.\\nThe whole ground of ethical procedure con-\\nsists in this that we are sensible of a graduated\\nscale of excellence among our natural principles, quite\\ndistinct from the order of their intensity and irre-\\nspective of the range of their external effects. The\\nsensibility of the mind to the gradations of the scale\\nis conscience, the knowledge ivith oneself of the bet-\\nter and the worse. 2 It is the critical perception we\\nhave of the relative authority of our own several\\nprinciples of action. All moral discrimination has\\nits native seat in conscience we first feel differences\\nin our own springs of action, and then apply this\\nknowledge to the corresponding ones betrayed in\\nothers by their conduct.\\nBut how comes it that men are not unanimous\\nin their apparent moral judgments This is easy to\\nunderstand. The whole scale of inner principles is\\nopen only to the survey of the ripest mind, and to\\nbe perfect in its appreciation is to have exhausted\\nthe permutations of human exjDerience. To all\\nactual men, a part only is familiar, often a deplor-\\nably small part. Still, however limited the range of\\nour moral consciousness, it would lead us all to the\\n1 Types, Vol. II, Part II, p. 44.\\n2 lb., p. 53. See also p. 266, where Martineau gives a table of\\nthe springs of action in the ascending order of worth.", "height": "3504", "width": "2148", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "46 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nsame verdicts had we all the same segment of the\\nseries under cognizance. 1\\nConscience speaks with authority. This author-\\nity is a simple feeling, admitting of little analysis or\\nexplanation. 2 But it is not simply subjective, not\\nof my own making, not a mere self-assertion of my\\nown will. How can that be a mere self-assertion of\\nmy own will, to which my own will is the first to\\nbend in homage The authority which reveals itself\\nwithin us reports itself, not only as underived from\\nour will, but as independent of our idiosyncrasies\\naltogether. 3 If the sense of authority means any-\\nthing, it means the discernment of something higher\\nthan we, no mere part of ourself, but transcending\\nour personality. It is more than part and parcel of\\nmyself, it is the communion of God s life and guid-\\ning love entering and abiding with an apprehensive\\ncapacity in myself. 4 Here we encounter an objec-\\ntive authorit}^ without quitting our own centre of\\nconsciousness. A man is a law unto himself, not\\nby autonomy of the individual (as Green would\\nsay), but by self -communication of the infinite spirit\\nto the soul and the law itself, the idea of an abso-\\nlute should be, is authoritative with conscience,\\nbecause it is a deliverance of the eternal perfection\\nto a mind that has to grow, and is imposed, there-\\nfore, by the infinite upon the finite. 5\\ni Types, Vol. II, Part II, p. 61. 2 lb., p. 99.\\n3 76., p. 102. lb., p. 105.\\n5 For Lecky s view, see the first chapter of his History of Euro-\\npean Morals, especially pp. 55, G8 11, 75, 120, 121 note, 122 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 47\\nThe thinkers whom we have considered thus far\\nare all intuitionists, either rational, emotional, or\\nperceptional. According to them we have an innate\\nknowledge of moral distinctions. The truths are\\neither engraved on the mind, or revealed by a supe-\\nrior rational faculty or we feel or perceive immedi-\\nately upon the presentation in consciousness of a\\ncertain motive or act that it is right or wrong.\\nConscience is an ultimate, original factor, not further\\nto be explained, except perhaps by conceiving it as\\nimplanted in the soul of man by God.\\n6. The Empiricists. But there is another school\\nof moralists, which denies that the conscience is\\ninnate, and attempts to explain it as an acquisition, 1\\nas a product of experience. We have no special\\nmoral faculty which intuitively distinguishes between\\nright and wrong. Our knowledge of morality is,\\nlike all other knowledge, acquired by experience.\\nWe may call the advocates of this view empiricists\\n(from the Greek word e\\\\iireipla, empeiria, experience).\\n(1) Thus Thomas Hobbes 2 says: It is either\\nscience or opinion which we commonly mean by the\\nword conscience for men say that such a thing is true\\nin or upon their conscience; which they never do when\\n1 Some of the later mediaeval thinkers, like Duns Scotus and\\nOccam, reject the view that we have an innate knowledge of\\nmorality, and hold that we know right and wrong simply because\\nGod reveals it to us in the Scriptures. See Lecky, European\\nMorals, chap, i, p. 17.\\n2 1588-1079. Selections from Holmes s ethical writings by\\nSneath, and in Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, Vol. II.", "height": "3516", "width": "2164", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "48 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthey think it doubtful, and therefore they know, or\\nthink they know it to be true. But men, when they\\nsay things upon their conscience, are not therefore\\npresumed certainly to know the truth of what they\\nsay it remaineth then that that word is used by\\nthem that have an opinion, not only of the truth of\\na thing, but also of their knowledge of it; to which\\nthe truth of the proposition is consequent. Con-\\nscience I therefore define to be opinion of evidence. 1\\nAgain I conceive that when a man deliberates\\nwhether he shall do a thing or not do it, he does\\nnothing else but consider whether it be better for\\nhimself to do it or not to do it. 2 Moral philosophy\\nis nothing else but the science of what is good and\\nevil in the conversation and society of mankind.\\nGood and evil are names, that signify our appetites\\nand aversions, which in different tempers, customs,\\nand doctrines of men are different, and divers men\\ndiffer not only in their judgment on the senses of\\nwhat is pleasant and unpleasant but also of what\\nis conformable or disagreeable to reason in the\\nactions of common life. 3\\n(2) With all this John Locke 4 practically agrees.\\nHe, too, rejects the teaching that there are innate ideas\\nor truths, either speculative or practical. Na-\\nture has put into man a desire of happiness and an\\naversion to misery, and these are natural tendencies\\n1 Human Nature, chap, vi, 8. 2 On Liberty and Necessity.\\n3 Leviathan, chap. xv. See Lecky, European Morals, chap. i.\\nFor bibliography see Weber, History of Philosophy, p. 301 note.\\n1632-1704.", "height": "3504", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 49\\nor practical principles which influence all our actions. 1\\nThat which is apt to cause pleasure in us we call\\ngood, that which has an aptness to cause pain we\\ncall evil. 2 Now God has so arranged it that certain\\nmodes of conduct produce public happiness and\\npreserve society, and also benefit the agent himself.\\nMen discover these and accept them as rules of\\npractice. 3 To these rules are annexed certain re-\\nwards and punishments, either by God (rewards and\\npunishments of infinite weight and duration in an-\\nother life) or by men (legal punishments, popular\\napprobation or condemnation, loss of reputation),\\nwhich are goods and evils not the natural product\\nand consequence of the actions themselves. 4 Men\\nthen refer to these rules or laws, i.e., the law of\\nGod, the law of politic society, the law of fashion or\\nprivate censure, and compare their actions to them.\\nThey judge of the moral rectitude of their acts\\naccording as these agree or do not agree with the\\nrules. 5 Moral good and evil, then, is only the con-\\nformity or disagreement of our voluntary action to\\nsome law, whereby good and evil is drawn on us by\\nthe will and power of the lawmaker. 6 Hence con-\\nscience is nothing else but our opinion or judgment\\nof the moral rectitude or pravity of our actions. 7\\n1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, chap, iii, 3.\\nSee also the notes in Locke s Common-Place Book, published\\nby Lord King.\\n2 lb., Bk. II, chap, xx, 2 chap, xxi, 42 f.\\n8 lb., Bk. II, chap, iii, 6. lb., Bk. II, chap, xxviii, 6 ff.\\n6 lb., 13. 6 5. lb., Bk. I, chap, iii, 8.", "height": "3504", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "50 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nu Many men may come to assent to several moral\\nrules and be convinced of their obligation in the\\nsame way in which they come to the knowledge of\\nother things. Others may come to be of the same\\nmind from their education, company, and customs\\nof their country which persuasion, however got,\\nwill serve to set conscience on work. Thus we\\nmake moral judgments without having any rules\\n4 written on our hearts. Some men with the same\\nbent of conscience prosecute what others avoid. 1\\nWe may also reach a knowledge of morality by\\nreasoning from certain first principles, which, how-\\never, are also derived from experience. Knowledge\\nis the perception of the connection and agreement\\nor disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. 2\\nWhen we perceive this agreement or disagreement\\nof two ideas immediately, i.e., without the interven-\\ntion of any other, we have intuitive knowledge. 3 But\\nwhen we need other ideas with which to compare\\nour two ideas in order to discover their agreement\\nor disagreement, we have reasoning or demonstration,\\nand the knowledge thus acquired is called demon-\\nstrative.^ But in order that we may reach certainty,\\nthere must be, in every step reason makes in de-\\nmonstrative knowledge, an intuitive knowledge of\\nthe agreement or disagreement it seeks with the\\nnext intermediate idea; i.e., every step in reason-\\n1 Essay Concerning Htiman Understanding, Bk. I, chap, iii, 8.\\n2/5., Bk. IV, chap, i, 2 ff.\\n3 lb., chap, ii, 1. 4 lb., chap, ii, 2 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OE CONSCIENCE 51\\ning that produces knowledge must have intuitive\\ncertainty. 1\\nNow morality is capable of demonstration as well as\\nmathematics. For the precise real essence of the\\nthings for which moral words stand may be perfectly\\nknown, and so the congruity*and incongruity of the\\nthings themselves may be certainly discovered, in\\nwhich consists perfect knowledge. 2 All that is nec-\\nessary is that men search after moral truths in the\\nsame method and with the same indifferency as they\\ndo mathematical truths. 3 He that hath the idea\\nof an intelligent, but frail and weak, being, made by\\nand depending on another who is eternal, omnipotent,\\nperfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that\\nman is to honor, fear, and obey God, as that the sun\\nshines when he sees it. For if he hath but the ideas\\nof two such beings in his mind, and will turn his\\nthoughts that way, he will as certainly find that the\\ninferior, finite, and dependent is under an obliga-\\ntion to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is\\ncertain to find that three, four, and seven, are less\\nthan fifteen, if he will consider and compute those\\nnumbers nor can he be surer in a clear morning\\nthat the sun is risen, if he but open his eyes, and\\nturn them that way. But yet these truths, being\\never so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of\\n1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, chap, ii, 7.\\n2 lb., Bk. Ill, chap, xi, 16. Cf. also Bk. IV, chap, iii, 18, 20\\nchap, xii, 8.\\n3 lb., Bk. IV, chap, iii, \u00c2\u00a720.", "height": "3504", "width": "2156", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "52 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\neither, or all of them, who will never take the pains\\nto employ his faculties, as he should to inform him-\\nself about them. 1 The idea of a supreme Being,\\ninfinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose\\nworkmanship we are, and on whom we depend and\\nthe idea of ourselves, as understanding rational\\nbeings being such as are clear in us, would, I sup-\\npose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such\\nfoundations of our duty and rules of action as might\\nplace morality among the sciences capable of demon-\\nstration wherein I doubt not but from self-evident\\npropositions by necessary consequences, as incontes-\\ntable as those in mathematics, the measures of right\\nand wrong might be made out to any one that will\\napply himself with the same indifferency and atten-\\ntion to the one as he does to the other of these\\nsciences. The relation of other modes may certainly\\nbe perceived, as well as those of number and exten-\\nsion and I cannot see why they should not also\\nbe capable of demonstration if due methods were\\nthought on to examine or pursue their agreement\\nor disagreement. Where there is no property there\\nis no injustice, is a proposition as certain as any\\ndemonstration in Euclid for the idea of property\\nbeing the right to anything, and the idea to which\\nthe name injustice is given being the invasion or\\nviolation of that right, it is evident that these ideas\\nbeing thus established, and these names annexed\\n1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, chap, xiv,\\n\u00c2\u00a74.", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OE CONSCIENCE 53\\nto them, I can as certainly know this proposition\\nto be true as that a triangle has three angles\\nequal to two right ones. Again No government\\nallows absolute liberty the idea of government\\nbeing the establishment of certain rules or laws\\nivhich require conformity to them, and the idea of\\nabsolute liberty being for any one to do whatever\\nhe pleases, I am as capable of being certain of the\\ntruth of this proposition as of any in mathematics.\\n(3) The Frenchman, Helvetius, 2 does not materially\\ndiffer from Hobbes and Locke. The moral sense is\\nby no means innate 3 indeed, everything except self-\\nlove, that is, the aversion to pain and the desire for\\npleasure, is acquired. In all times and at all places,\\nin matters of morals as well as- in matters of mind,\\nit is personal interest which governs the judgment\\nof individuals and general or public interest, which\\ndetermines that of nations. Every man has re-\\ngard in his judgments, for nothing but his own inter-\\nest. 4 Consequently, the only way to make him\\nmoral is to make him see his own w r elfare in the public\\nwelfare, and this can be done by legislation only, i.e.,\\nby means of the proper rewards and punishments.\\nHence the science of morals is nothing but the\\nscience of legislation. 5\\n1 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, chap, iii,\\n\u00c2\u00a718.\\n2 1715-1771. DeV esprit; DeVhomme. Bibliography in Weber.\\n3 Be Vhomme, Section V, chaps, iii, iv Section II, chaps, vii, viii.\\n4 De V esprit, Discourse ii.\\n5 lb., II, 17. Similar to the views of Helvetius are those", "height": "3504", "width": "2156", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "54 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n(4) Even the author of the Evidences of Christian-\\nity, William Paley, 1 denies the existence of a moral\\nsense. 2 Upon the whole, he says, it seems to\\nme, either that there exist no such instincts as com-\\npose what is called the moral sense [here Paley\\nopposes Hume] or that they are not now to be dis-\\ntinguished from prejudices and habits on which\\naccount they cannot be depended upon in moral\\nreasoning, etc. 3 Virtue is the doing good to\\nmankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for\\nthe sake of everlasting happiness. 4 We can be\\nobliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to\\ngain or lose something by for nothing else can\\nbe a violent motive to us. As we should not be\\nobliged to obey the laws of the magistrate, unless\\nrewards and punishments, pleasure or pain, some-\\nhow or other, depended upon our obedience so\\nneither should we, without the same reason, be\\nobliged to do what is right, to practise virtue,\\nor to obey the commands of God. 5 The difference\\nbetween an act of prudence and an act of duty is\\nof Mandeville (1670-1733, author of TJie Fable of the Bees,\\nor Private Vices made Public Benefits), Lamettrie (1700-1751,\\nauthor of Lliomme machine, Discours sur le bonheur), and IIol-\\nbach (1723-1780, author of Systeme de la nature). All these\\nthinkers are materialists. See especially Lange, History of Mate-\\nrialism; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik Martineau, Types, Vol. II,\\npp. 312 ff. Lecky, Morals, chap. i.\\n1 1743-1803.\\n2 See his Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.\\n3 lb., Bk. I, chap. v. 4 lb., Bk. I, chap. vii.\\n6 lb., Bk. II, chap. ii.", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OE CONSCIENCE 55\\nthat, in the one case, we consider what we shall\\ngain or lose in the present world in the other case,\\nwe consider also what we shall gain or lose in the\\nworld to come. l\\n(5) Jeremy Bentham s 2 statements on this point\\nare not more radical. He says Nature has placed\\nmankind under the governance of two sovereign\\nmasters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to\\npoint out what we ought to do, as well as to deter-\\nmine what we shall do. 3 Conscience is a thing\\nof fictitious existence supposed to occupy a seat in\\nthe mind. 4 Conscience is the favorable or unfavor-\\nable opinion a man has of his own conduct, and has\\nvalue only in so far as it conforms to the principle\\nof utility. It is utterly useless to speak of duties,\\nhe declares the word itself has something disagree-\\nable and repulsive in it. While the moralist is\\nspeaking of duties, each man is thinking of his own\\ninterests. 5\\nAccording to the philosophers whom we have\\njust been considering, man is by birth a moral igno-\\nramus who desires his own happiness. He comes in\\ncontact with fellows similarly endowed, and in order\\nto live with them must obey certain rules. The\\n1 Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. II, chap. iii.\\n2 1748-1842. See especially Principles of Morals and Legisla-\\ntion.\\n3 Principles of Morals, etc., chap. i.\\n4 Deontology, Vol. I, p. 137.\\n5 For Bentham, see especially Lecky and Martineau, op. cit.", "height": "3504", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "56 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\npains and pleasures annexed to these laws point\\nout to him the course to pursue. Pleasure and\\npain are the great teachers of morality.\\n(6) But, it might be asked, how on this scheme\\ncan we explain the fact that men pronounce judg-\\nment upon acts without thinking about the pleas-\\nures and pains they produce How does it happen\\nthat men love virtue for virtue s sake\\nAn ingenious theory, the so-called theory of asso-\\nciation of ideas, is brought in to settle this difficulty. 1\\nDavid Hartley 2 attempts to show how the moral\\nsense is formed in a purely mechanical way. Man\\nis at first governed solely by his pleasures and pains.\\nHe soon learns to associate his pleasures with that\\nwhich pleases him, and then loves this for its own\\nsake. The infant connects the idea of its mother\\nwith the pleasure she procures it, and so comes to\\nlove her for her own sake. Money in itself pos-\\nsesses nothing that is admirable or pleasurable it\\nis a means of procuring objects of desire, and so\\nbecomes associated in our minds with the idea of\\npleasure. Hence the miser comes to love it for\\nits own sake, and is willing to forego the things\\nwhich the money procures rather than part with a\\nfraction of his gold. In the same way the moral\\nsentiments are formed. They procure for us many\\nadvantages which Ave love, and we gradually trans-\\n1 We find the beginnings of this theory in Hobbes, Locke,\\nHutcheson, Gay, and Tucker. See Leaky, Vol. I, pp. 22 ff.\\n2 1705-1757. Observations on Man.", "height": "3492", "width": "2328", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 57\\nfer our affections from these to the things which\\nprocure them, and love virtue for virtue s sake. 1\\n(7) The most careful and detailed explanation\\nof the moral faculty from this standpoint is given\\nby Alexander Bain. 2 According to him, conscience\\nis an imitation within ourselves of the government\\nwithout us. The first lesson that the child learns\\nas a moral agent is obedience. The child s suscepti-\\nbility to pleasure and pain is made use of to bring\\nabout this obedience, and a mental association is rap-\\nidly formed between disobedience and apprehended\\npain, more or less magnified by fear. Forbidden\\nactions arouse a certain dread the fear of encoun-\\ntering pain is conscience in its earliest germ. The\\nsentiment of love or respect toward persons in\\nauthority infuses a different species of dread, the\\ndread of giving pain to a beloved object. Later\\non, the child learns to appreciate the reasons or\\nmotives that led to the imposition of the rules of\\nconduct. When the young mind is able to take\\nnotice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions\\nimposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended\\nby them, a new motive is added, and the conscience\\nis then a triple compound, and begirds the action in\\n1 On Man, Vol. I, pp. 473-475 Vol. II, 338 f. See LecJcy, Vol. I,\\npp. 22 ff., 67 note Ribot, La psychologie anglaise contemporaine.\\nThis view is developed by Jaines Mill (Analysis of the Human\\nMind, Vol. II), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Utilitarianism,\\nespecially pp. 40-42, 44, 45, 46, 53 ff.\\n2 Born 1818. The Emotions and the Will Mental and Moral\\nScience.", "height": "3516", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "58 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nquestion with a threefold fear the last ingredient\\nbeing paramount in the maturity of the sympathies\\nand the reason. All that we understand by the\\nauthority of conscience, the senthnent of obligation,\\nthe feeling of right, the sting of remorse, can be\\nnothing else than so many modes of expressing the\\nacquired aversion and dread toward actions asso-\\nciated in the mind with the consequences now\\nstated.\\nBut there may not be present to a man s mind\\nany of these motives, namely, the fear of retribution,\\nor the respect to the authority commanding, affec-\\ntion or sympathy toward the persons or interests for\\nwhose sake the duty is imposed, his own advantage\\nindirectly concerned, his religious feeling, his indi-\\nvidual sentiments in accord with the spirit of the pre-\\ncept, or the infection of example. Just as in the\\nlove of money for its own sake, one may come to\\nform a habit of acting in a particular way, although\\nthe special impulses that were the original moving\\ncauses no longer recur to the mind. Here we have\\na case of the sense of duty in the abstract. This\\ndoes not prove, however, that there exists a primi-\\ntive sentiment of duty in the abstract, any more\\nthan the conduct of the miser proves that we are\\nborn with the love of gold in the abstract. It is the\\ntendency of association to erect new centres of force,\\ndetached from the particulars that originally gave\\nthem meaning which new creations will sometimes\\nassemble round themselves a more powerful body of", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 59\\nsentiment than conld.be inspired by any one of the\\nconstituent realities. 1\\nWe have examined the extreme rationalistic and\\nempiristic views of conscience. According to one\\nschool, conscience is a natural endowment of man\\nthe moral truths are inherent in his very nature\\nhis soul is a tablet with moral laws written upon it.\\nAccording to the other, conscience is not original,\\nbut acquired in the life of the individual. The\\nsoul is at birth an empty tablet, having no moral\\ntruths written upon it.\\n7. Reconciliation of Intuitionism and Empiri-\\ncism. Let us now consider some attempts that\\nhave been made to reconcile this opposition. Kant\\napproaches the problem from the rationalistic side,\\nSpencer from the empiristic. 2 Kant repudiates the\\nextreme rationalistic thesis that we have an innate\\nknowledge of particular moral truths, and regards\\nas the a priori element the category of obligation, a\\ngeneral moral form whose content is filled by experi-\\nence. 3 Spencer, on the other hand, concedes the\\n1 Emotions, 3d ed., chap, xv, 18 ff. The Will, chap, x, es-\\npecially 8 ft also chapter on Moral Faculty, in Mental and\\nMoral Science. For criticism of jBain, see Calderwood, Handbook,\\nPart. I, Div. II, chap. iii.\\n2 It is worthy of note that both of these philosophers were at\\none time believers in the moral-sense doctrine of Shaftesbury and\\nHutcheson. See p. 41, note 3, and Spencer s first edition of the\\nSocial Statics.\\n3 His theory reminds one of the mediaeval conception of the\\nsynderesis.", "height": "3504", "width": "2168", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "60 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\npresence of an a priori element, and denies that the\\nconscience is merely an acquisition of individual\\nexperience. Let us examine the views of these\\nthinkers a little more in detail.\\n(1) In his Kritik of Pure Reason Immanuel\\nKant 1 asks the question, How is knowledge pos-\\nsible, or how is it possible that man can make\\nsynthetic judgments a priori? Experience fur-\\nnishes us with only a limited number of cases it\\ncannot give us universality and necessity. Are\\nthese universal and necessary truths innate, as\\nold rationalism asserted Not exactly, Kant an-\\nswers. The mind is endowed with certain functions\\nor principles or forms or categories, which are not\\nderived from experience, but are prior to experience,\\nhence a priori or pure. Though we may not be\\nconscious of them, they act in every rational crea-\\nture? The senses furnish the mind with the raw\\nmaterials, while the sensibility and the understand-\\ning, the two powers of the mind, arrange them\\naccording to the forms of space, time, causality, etc.\\nThus, for example, I see all things in space because\\nmy mind functions according to the space form.\\nWhen I judge that heat expands bodies, I have\\nideas of heat, expansion, and bodies, elements ulti-\\nmately furnished by sensation, and the idea that the\\nheat is the cause of the expansion, the notion of\\n1 1729-1804. For Kant s ethics, see Cohen, Kant s Begrundung\\nder Ethik Schurman, Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolu-\\ntion; Porter, KanV s Ethics Paulsen, Kant; translation of Kant s\\nethical writings by Abbott, KanVs Theory of Ethics.", "height": "3500", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 61\\ncausality, which is not derived from sensation, but\\nwhich is a way my intellect has of looking at things.\\nThese forms or categories are, as it were, the colored\\nglasses through which the theoretical reason views\\nthe world. 1\\nHowever, we approach the world not merely from\\nthe theoretical standpoint, but from the practical or\\nmoral standpoint we say not only what is, but\\nwhat ought to be. The reason not only arranges\\nits phenomena in space, time, and according to the\\ncausal law, but also commands that they be arranged\\naccording to the moral law. Its commands are\\nunconditional, absolute, or categorical imperatives;\\nit speaks with authority Thou shalt, Thou shalt\\nnot. The theoretical use of reason is that by\\nwhich I know a priori (as necessary) that something\\nis, while the practical use of reason is that by which\\nI know a priori what ought to be. I assume that\\nthere really exist pure moral laws, which determine\\ncompletely a priori the conduct of every rational\\ncreature. I can with justice presuppose the prop-\\nosition because I can appeal not only to the proofs\\nof the most enlightened moralists, but also to the\\nmoral judgment of every human being. 2\\nNow the question is, How is all this possible\\nKnowledge is possible, as we have seen, because of\\n1 For Kant s theory of knowledge, see the histories of philos-\\nophy, e.g., Weber, where a bibliography is found.\\n2 Kritik of Pure Beason, Max Miiller s translation, pp. 510, 647.\\nSee also Abbott s translation of the ethical writings, pp. 28, 97 f.,\\n119, 136,", "height": "3504", "width": "2164", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "62 INTRODUCTION- TO ETHICS\\ncertain innate or a priori forms or conditions which\\nmake it necessary for the mind to function as it\\nfunctions. But how is morality possible Are the\\ndifferent imperatives or moral laws innate, as Cud-\\nworth and men of his ilk would assert No, says\\nKant, not exactly. But there is present in the\\npractical reason a formal principle or condition, a\\nform or category of obligation or oughtness, not\\nderived from experience, but prior to it, a priori, a\\nuniversally valid law, by virtue of which man is a\\nmoral being. 1 And, what does this categorical im-\\nperative enjoin we ask. Kant answers, Act so\\nthat the maxim of thy will can always at the same\\ntime hold good as a principle of universal legisla-\\ntion. 2 That is, do not perform acts of which thou\\ncanst not will that they become universal. The\\ndeceiver cannot will that lying should become a uni-\\nversal law, for with such a law there would be no\\npromises at all and his maxim would necessarily\\ndestroy itself. This law or maxim is valid for all\\nrational creatures generally, not only under certain\\ncontingent conditions, but with absolute necessity.\\nAlthough common men do not conceive it in such\\nan abstract and universal form, yet they always\\nreally have it before their eyes, and use it as the\\nstandard of their decision. 3\\n1 See Abbott, Kant s Theory of Ethics, p. 28.\\n2 75., pp. 17 ff., 38 ff.\\n3 76., pp. 20, 21, 93, 120 note, 192, 311, 321, 343. Man\\n(even the worst) does not in any maxim, as it were, rebelliously\\nabandon the moral law (and renounce obedience to it). On the", "height": "3500", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 63\\nThere is, then, a moral imperative inherent in the\\nvery nature of man, which categorically commands.\\nBut the question is, Whence does it come Is it\\nthe voice of a suprasensible being speaking in the\\nheart of man In a certain sense, yes. It is the\\nproduct of the free will, of the intelligible ego, of\\nthe thing-in-itself. 1 Freedom is the ratio essendi\\nof the moral law, that is, the free will imposes the\\nlaw upon itself and the moral law is the ratio\\ncognoscendi of freedom, that is, we must logically\\nconclude from the fact that there is a categorical\\nimperative in us, that there is a free will which im-\\nposes it. 2 The question, then, how a categorical\\nimperative is possible, can be answered to this ex-\\ntent, that we can assign the only hypothesis on which\\nit is possible, namely, the idea of freedom and we\\ncan also discern the necessity of this hypothesis, and\\nthis is sufficient for the practical exercise of reason,\\nthat is, for the conviction of the validity of this im-\\nperative, and hence of the moral law but how this\\nhypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned\\nby any human reason. 3\\ncontrary, this forces itself upon him irresistibly by virtue of his\\nmoral nature, and if no other spring opposed it, he would also\\nadopt it into his ultimate maxim as the adequate determining\\nprinciple of his elective will, that is, he would be morally\\ngood.\\n1 Abbott, Kant s Theory of Ethics, pp. 65 ff. Green It is the\\nvery essence of moral duty to be imposed by man upon himself.\\n2 I can because I must.\\n3 lb., p. 81. See also p. 84 It is, therefore, no fault in our\\ndeduction of the supreme principle of morality, but an objection", "height": "3504", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "64 INTRODUCTION- TO ETHICS\\n(2) Although Charles Darwin 1 did not work out a\\ncomplete system of ethics, it will be interesting to\\nexamine his view of conscience before taking up\\nSpencer s theory. Darwin bases our entire moral\\nnature upon the social impulse or sympathy. 2 He\\nregards it as highly probable that any animal what-\\never, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the\\nparental and filial affections being herein included,\\nwould inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience\\nas soon as its intellectual powers had become as well\\nor nearly as well developed as in man. Let us im-\\nagine that the animal has certain self-regarding\\ninstincts, e.g., the desire to satisfy hunger or any\\npassion such as vengeance, and social instincts, which\\nlead it to take pleasure in the society of its fellows\\nand to feel for them and to perform services for\\nthem. Such selfish instincts, though strong, are\\ntemporary, and can, for a time, be fully satisfied.\\nWith animals, however, which live permanently in\\na body, the social instincts are ever present and per-\\nsistent. Now suppose that an enduring and always\\nthat should be made to human reason in general that it cannot\\nenable us to conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional\\npractical law such as the categorical imperative must be. To the\\nKantian school belong, T. H. Green {Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883),\\nMuirhead {Elements of Ethics), J. S. Mackenzie {Manual of Eth-\\nics), J. Seth {A Study of Ethical Principles), and D Arcy {A Short\\nStudy of Ethics)\\n1 1808-1882. For exposition and criticism, see Schurman, Ethi-\\ncal Import of Darwinism Sully, Sensation and Intuition, pp. 17,\\n18; Martineau, Types; Williams, Evolutional Ethics; Guyau, La\\nmorale anglaise contemporaine.\\n2 See his Descent of Man, chap. iv.", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 65\\npresent social instinct has yielded to one of these\\nother instincts which was stronger at the time, but\\ndid not endure nor leave behind it a very vivid\\nimpression (like hunger). And suppose the animal\\nhas the power of memory. It will remember its past\\nactions and motives, and feel dissatisfaction or even\\nmisery because an enduring instinct was not satisfied. 1\\nOn the same principle we may explain why man\\nfeels that he ought to obey one instinctive desire\\nrather than another why he is bitterly regretful if\\nhe has yielded to a strong sense of self-preserva-\\ntion, and has not risked his life to save that of a\\nfellow-creature, or why he regrets having stolen food\\nfrom hunger. 2 Man reflects and so cannot help\\nremembering the past. He will be driven to make\\na comparison between the impression of past hunger,\\nvengeance satisfied, etc., and the ever present in-\\nstinct of sympathy, and his early knowledge of what\\nothers consider as blamable or praiseworthy. This\\nknowledge cannot be banished from his mind, and\\nfrom instinctive sympathy is esteemed of great mo-\\nment. He will feel as if he had been balked in\\nfollowing a present instinct or habit, and this with\\n1 The Descent of Man, pp. 98 ff. Darwin finds something\\nvery like a conscience in dogs. Thus, a struggle may often be\\nobserved in animals between different instincts, or between an\\ninstinct and some habitual disposition, as when a dog rushes after\\na hare, is rebuked, pauses, hesitates, pursues again, or returns\\nashamed to his master or as between the love of a female dog for\\nher young puppies and her master, for she may be seen to\\nslink away to them, as if half ashamed of not accompanying her\\nmaster. p. 107. 2 lb., p. 110.", "height": "3504", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "66 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nall animals causes dissatisfaction and even misery.\\nHe will then feel remorse, repentance, regret, or\\nshame. He will consequently resolve, more or less\\nfirmly, to act differently for the future and this\\nis conscience for conscience looks backwards, and\\nserves as a guide to the future. 1 Prompted by his\\nconscience man will become habituated to self-com-\\nmand, so that his desires and passions will yield\\ninstantly to his social instincts. It is possible that\\nthe habit of self-command may, like other habits, be\\ninherited. Thus at last man comes to feel, through\\nacquired and perhaps inherited habit, that it is best\\nfor him to obey his more persistent impulses. The\\nimperious word ought seems merely to imply the\\nconsciousness of the existence of a rule of conduct,\\nhowever it may have originated. 2\\n(3) According to Herbert Spencer 3 the essential\\ntrait in the moral consciousness is the control of\\nsome feeling or feelings by some other feeling or\\nfeelings. In the rudest groups of society, the lead-\\ning check to the immediate satisfaction of desires is\\nthe fear of the anger of fellow-savages. When\\nspecial strength, skill, or courage makes one of them\\na leader in battle, he inspires the most fear, and\\nthere comes to be a more decided check than before.\\n1 TJie Descent of Man, pp. 113 f.\\n2 See also the interesting passage on p. 124; which I have quoted\\nin chap, iii, 9, of this book. A. Sutherland has developed\\nDarwin s theory in his able work, TJie Origin and Growth of the\\nMoral Instinct, 2 vols., 1808.\\n3 Born 1820. Principles of Ethics.", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OE CONSCIENCE 67\\nAs chieftainship is established, aggression upon and\\ndisobedience to the leader are regarded as greater\\nevils still. That is, political control begins to differ-\\nentiate from the more indefinite control of mutual\\ndread. Meanwhile there has been developing the\\nghost-theory. The double of a deceased man is con-\\nceived as able to injure the survivors. Now there\\ngrows up another kind of check on immediate satis-\\nfaction of the desires a check constituted by ideas\\nof the evils which ghosts may inflict if offended\\nand when political headship gets settled, and the\\nghosts of dead chiefs are especially dreaded, there\\nbegins to take shape the form of restraint distin-\\nguished as religious. These three differentiated\\nforms of control, while enforcing kindred restraints\\nand incentives, also enforce one another. All of\\nthem involve the sacrifice of immediate special bene-\\nfits for the sake of more distant and general benefits.\\nBut joint aggressions upon men outside of the\\nsociety cannot prosper if there are many aggressions\\nwithin the society. Gradually, as the power of the\\nruler becomes greater, he forbids the aggressions\\nand inflicts punishments for disobedience. Pres-\\nently, political restraints of this class are enforced\\nby religious restraints. Dread of the ghost of the\\ndead chief tends to produce regard for the com-\\nmands he habitually gave, and they eventually\\nacquire sacredness. With further social evolution\\ncome further interdicts, until eventually there grows\\nup a body of civil laws, the breach of which is also", "height": "3500", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "68 INTRODUCTION- TO ETHICS\\ndisapproved by the society and looked upon as dis-\\npleasing to the gods.\\nThese three controls, political, religious, and\\nsocial, however, do not constitute the moral con-\\ntrol, but are only preparatory to it. The moral\\nrestraints refer not to the extrinsic effects of actions,\\nbut to their intrinsic effects, not to the incidental,\\ncollateral, non-necessary consequences of the acts,\\nbut to the consequences which the acts naturally\\nproduce. The truly moral deterrent from murder\\nis not constituted by a representation of hanging\\nas a consequence, or by a representation of the\\ntortures of hell as a consequence, or by a represen-\\ntation of the horror and hatred excited in fellow-\\nmen but by a representation of the necessary\\nnatural results the infliction of death-agony on\\nthe victim, the destruction of all his possibilities of\\nhappiness, the entailed sufferings to his belongings.\\nOnly after political, religious, and social restraints\\nhave produced a stable community, can there be suf-\\nficient experience of the pains, positive and negative,\\nsensational and emotional, which crimes of aggres-\\nsion cause, as to generate that moral aversion to\\nthem constituted by consciousness of their intrinsi-\\ncally evil results.\\nBut I do not always fear the social, political, and\\nreligious punishments when I contemplate a certain\\nact, nor do I think of the immediate consequences\\nwhich it has upon others. I simply feel that the\\nact ought not to be done, I feel its authoritative-", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 69\\nness and its obligation without considering any of\\nthese effects at all. Now the question arises, How\\ndoes there arise this feeling of moral obligation in\\ngeneral? It is an abstract sentiment generated in\\na manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas\\nare generated. Accumulated experiences have pro-\\nduced the consciousness that guidance by feelings\\nwhich refer to remote and general results is usually\\nmore conducive to welfare than guidance by feelings\\nto be immediately gratified. The idea of authori-\\ntativeness has come to be connected with feelings\\nhaving these traits. This idea of authoritativeness\\nis one element in the abstract consciousness of\\nduty. But there is another element the element\\nof coerciveness. The sense of coerciveness or com-\\npulsion which the consciousness of duty includes,\\nand which the word obligation indicates, has been\\ngenerated by fears of the political, social, and reli-\\ngious penalties. Now, this sense of coerciveness\\nbecomes directly connected with the above-men-\\ntioned moral feelings in this way. The political,\\nsocial, and religious motives are mainly formed of\\nrepresented future results (of penalties), and so is\\nthe moral restraining motive (of the intrinsic ef-\\nfects). Hence it happens that the representations,\\nhaving much in common, and often being aroused\\nat the same time, the fear joined with the three\\nsets becomes, by association, joined with the fourth.\\nThinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act\\nexcites a dread which continues present while the", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "70 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nintrinsic effects of the act are thought of and,\\nbeing thus linked with these intrinsic effects, causes\\na vague sense of moral compulsion. 1\\nHeredity plays an important part in the process.\\nThere have been, and still are, developing in the\\nrace certain fundamental moral intuitions. Though\\nthese moral intuitions are the result of accumulated\\nexperiences of utility, gradually organized and in-\\nherited, they have come to be quite independent of\\nconscious experience. The experiences of utility\\norganized and consolidated through all past gen-\\nerations of the human race have been producing\\ncorresponding nervous modifications, which, by con-\\ntinued transmission and accumulation, have become\\nin us certain faculties of moral intuition certain\\nemotions responding to right and wrong conduct,\\nwhich have no apparent basis in the individual\\nexperiences of utility. 2\\n1 Data of Ethics, 44 ff.\\n2 lb., 45. See Spencer s letter Mill, quoted in 45 of the\\nData of Ethics To make my position fully understood, it seems\\nneedful to add that, corresponding to the fundamental propositions\\nof a developed Moral Science, there have been, and still are, devel-\\noping in the race, certain fundamental moral intuitions and that,\\nthough these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated ex-\\nperiences of Utility, gradually organized and inherited, they have\\ncome to he quite independent of conscious experience. Just in the\\nsame way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any\\nliving individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated\\nexperiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him\\ntheir slowly developed nervous organizations just as I believe\\nthat this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and com-\\nplete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of", "height": "3516", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 71\\nHere, it seems to me, we get the compromise be-\\ntween extreme intuitionism and extreme empiri-\\ncism of which I spoke before. Spencer is perfectly\\nconscious of his relationship to the two schools. It\\nis possible, he says, 1 to agree with moralists of the\\nintuitive school respecting the existence of a moral\\nsense, while differing with them respecting its\\norigin. I have contended in the foregoing division\\nof this work, and elsewhere, that though there exist\\nfeelings of the kind alleged, they are not of super-\\nnatural origin, but of natural origin that, being\\ngenerated by the discipline of the social activities,\\ninternal and external, they are not alike in all men,\\nbut differ more or less everywhere in proportion as\\nthe social activities differ and that, in virtue of\\ntheir mode of genesis, they have a coordinate author-\\nity with the inductions of utility. But now,\\nwhile we are shown that the moral-sense doctrine\\nin its original form is not true, we are also shown\\nthat it adumbrates a truth, and a much higher truth.\\nthought, apparently quite independent of experience so do I\\nbelieve that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated\\nthrough all past generations of the human race, have been pro-\\nducing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued\\ntransmission and accumulation, have become in us certain facul-\\nties of moral intuition certain emotions responding to right and\\nwrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual\\nexperiences of utility. I also hold that, just as the space-intuition\\nresponds to the exact demonstrations of Geometry, and has its\\nrough conclusions interpreted and verified by them so will moral\\nintuitions respond to the demonstrations of Moral Science, and will\\nhave their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them.\\n1 The Inductions of Ethics, 117.", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "72 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nFor the facts cited, chapter after chapter, unite in\\nproving that the sentiments and ideas current in\\neach society become adjusted to the kinds of activity\\npredominating in it. A life of constant external\\nenmity generates a code in which aggression, con-\\nquest, revenge, are inculcated, while peaceful occu-\\npations are reprobated. Conversely, a life of settled\\ninternal amity generates a code inculcating the\\nvirtues conducing to harmonious cooperation\\njustice, honesty, veracity, regard for others claims.\\nAnd the implication is that if the life of internal\\namity continues unbroken from generation to gen-\\neration, there must result not only the appropriate\\ncode, but the appropriate emotional nature a moral\\nsense adapted to moral requirements. Men so con-\\nditioned will acquire, to the degree needful for com-\\nplete guidance, that innate conscience which the\\nintuitive moralists erroneously suppose to be pos-\\nsessed by mankind at large. There needs but a\\ncontinuance of absolute peace externally, and a\\nrigorous insistence of non-aggression internally to\\nensure the moulding of men into a form naturally\\ncharacterized by all the virtues. 1\\n(4) With this theory, as worked out by Spencer,\\nthe views of M. Guyau, 2 Leslie Stephen, 3 B. Car-\\n1 Inductions, 191.\\n2 Esquisse d une morale sa7is obligation ni sanction, 2d ed.,\\n1881 English translation, 1899 La morale anglaise contempo-\\nraine, 1885, Conclusion, pp. 423 ff.\\n3 The Science of Ethics, 1882: Conscience is the utterance of\\nthe public spirit of the race, ordering us to obey the primary con-", "height": "3504", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 73\\nneri, 1 H. Hoffding, 2 G. von Gizycki, 3 R. von Jhering, 4\\nW. Wundt, 6 F. Paulsen, 6 S. Alexander, 7 Hugo\\nMiinsterberg, 8 Paul Ree, 9 GeorgQ Simmel, 10 and\\nA. Sutherland 11 practically agree. 12\\nditions of its welfare, and it acts not the less forcibly though we\\nmay not understand the source of its authority or the end at which\\nit is aiming.\\n1 Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus, 1871.\\n2 Psychology, VI, C, 8; Ethik, 1888. Conscience, he holds, is\\nan instinct which has developed in the race. It commands categori-\\ncally, like all instincts.\\n3 Moralphilosophie, 1889.\\n4 Der Zwech im Becht, 1877, 3d ed., 1893.\\n5 Ethik, 1886, 2d ed., 1892, English translation, in 3 vols., by\\nTitchener, Washburn, and Gulliver.\\n6 System der Ethilc, 1889, 5th ed., 1899, edited and translated by\\nThilly, 1899. According to Paulsen, duty at first consists in acting\\nin accordance with custom. I perform certain customary acts be-\\ncause it is the will of my surroundings. The will of the people\\nspeaks to the individual in custom. In my feeling of duty, as it\\nnow exists, the will of my parents, teachers, ancestors, and race is\\nexpressed. The authority of the gods whom I worship is also mani-\\nfested in the feeling. At first man obeys the law because of external\\nauthority in time he comes to feel an inner obligation to the law,\\nhe acknowledges the right of others over him. See Bk. II, chap. v.\\n7 Moral Order and Progress, 1889.\\n8 Der TJrsprung der Sittlichkeit, 1889.\\n9 Die Entstehung des Gewissens, 1885.\\n10 Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, 2 vols., 1892, 1893. See\\nVol. I, chap. i.\\n11 The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, 2 vols., 1898.\\n12 For evolutional ethics, see Williams, A Beview of Evolutional\\nEthics.", "height": "3504", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III\\nANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF CONSCIENCE\\n1. Tlie Psychological Facts. Now that we have\\nexamined the historical attempts which have been\\nmade to account for the moral consciousness, let us\\ntry to come to some conclusion ourselves. We can-\\nnot, however, it seems to me, accomplish anything\\nwithout a thorough understanding of what the fact\\nwe are considering is. We must first analyze the\\npsychical processes concerned in this discussion, and\\nthen seek to interpret them. The false explanations\\nwhich have been advanced by so many of the writers\\nwhom we have passed in review, are, in my opinion,\\nlargely due to their neglect of psychology. To\\nassert that we must study our phenomena psycho-\\nlogically, means simply that we must know what\\nwe are talking about. If the science of ethics is\\n1 See, besides the works mentioned in the course of the last\\nchapter Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, Part VIII,\\nchaps, vii f. Wundt. Physiological Psychology, Vol. II, chap,\\nxviii, 3 Hoffding, Psychology, VI, C, 8 Baldwin, Feeling\\nand Will, pp. 205 ff. Sully, The Human 3Iind, Vol. II, pp.\\n155 ff.; Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 579 ff.\\nJodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, pp. 715 ff Sutherland, The Ori-\\ngin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, especially Vol. II, chaps, xv ff.\\nParts of this chapter appeared in the January number of the\\nPhilosophical Review, 1900.\\n74", "height": "3504", "width": "2396", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 75\\nto achieve any results, it must do what all other\\nsciences are doing it must analyze the facts which\\nit is desirous of explaining. Metaphysical specula-\\ntions on ethics will have to follow in the wake of\\npsychology. 1\\nAs was said before, we pronounce moral judgments\\nupon ourselves as well as upon others we approve\\nand disapprove of motives and acts, we call them\\nright and wrong. Certain modes of conduct, we say,\\nought to be performed, others ought to be avoided.\\nA bankrupt conveys a piece of property to a friend\\nin order to avoid the pa}mient of a just debt, with\\nthe understanding that it is to be returned to him\\nlater but when the time comes, the receiver of the\\nproperty fails to make restitution. I disapprove of\\nthe conduct of both parties I say that they did\\nwrong, that they ought not to have acted as they did.\\nJean Valjean, the released galley-slave in Hugo s Les\\nMiserables, finds a refuge in the home of the good\\ncurS after every one else had refused him shelter,\\nand repays his benefactor by robbing him. The\\npriest forgives him, and even tells a falsehood to\\nsave him from punishment. We say the convict\\ndid wrong, the priest did right. Jean Valjean, over-\\ncome by the sweet charity of the good old man,\\nleads a useful and honorable life from that time on.\\nBut one day he hears of the apprehension of a sup-\\nposed Jean Valjean. Now what shall he do One\\n1 See Simmel, Einleitung in die Morahvissenschaft, Vol. I,\\nPreface.", "height": "3504", "width": "2168", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "-76 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nvoice within him tells him to let things take their\\nnatural course, and not to forsake the position\\nachieved after so much suffering and transgression.\\nThe happiness of thousands depends upon his remain-\\ning where he is. But another voice, which we call\\nhis conscience, blames him for these thoughts, and\\nurges him authoritatively to do what is right and\\ngive himself up. After terrible inner struggles,\\nthe conscience finally triumphs, and Jean Valjean\\ngoes back to the galleys. The conflict is at an end,\\nthe moral craving is satisfied, and peace reigns in\\nhis heart. Had he allowed the supposed Jean Val-\\njean to be punished in his stead, he would have\\nsuffered remorse, stings or pangs of conscience, as\\nwe say. He would have looked back upon his con-\\nduct and still have recognized the authority of the\\nright over the wrong. We contemplate the mis-\\nfortune of the real Jean Valjean with the deepest\\npity, but with all our sorrowing we cannot wish that\\nhe had acted differently. Our moral approval rises\\nto moral enthusiasm, in which our respect and love\\nfor the moral law reach their height we bow down\\nhumbly before the rule of right as before a higher\\npower, and say, Thy will, not mine, be done.\\n2. Analysis of Conscience. We have here ex-\\namples of the phenomenon which we desire to inves-\\ntigate. The idea of a motive or an act arises in my\\nconsciousness. At once or after some reflection, pecu-\\nliar feelings and impulses group themselves around\\nthis idea feelings of approval which are pleasura-", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 77\\nble, or (as the case may be), feelings of disapproval,\\nwhich are painful feelings urging me toward the\\nperformance of the act, commanding me, forcing me,\\nas it were, to keep it before my mind and to recog-\\nnize its authority over me, crying out, yes, yes, you\\nmust or feelings deterring me from the act a\\nkind of shame takes possession of me, I feel ill at\\nease, in spite of the fact that the forbidden thing\\nmay have a certain charm about it. Or, I may have\\nthe ideas of several acts or springs of conduct before\\nme, one surrounded by feelings of approval and obli-\\ngation, the other by feelings of disapproval and de-\\nterrence, the one carrying with it a sense of authority\\nover the other. These ideas may rise and fall in\\nconsciousness, and with them their concomitant feel-\\nings. I may flit from one set to the other, until at\\nlast one may persist and lead to an act of volition,\\nand drive out the other. These inner processes\\nexpress themselves in judgments This act is right\\nor good This act is wrong or bad I ought to do\\nthis act I ought not to do that. In popular lan-\\nguage we say, My conscience approves of this, con-\\ndemns that, commands this, prohibits that; my\\nconscience warns me against or urges me toward\\na certain line of action; I must obey the voice of\\nmy conscience. In case the right act is willed\\nand done, or even willed without being done, I feel\\nsatisfied for having willed it, and perhaps a certain\\nsorrow for the vanquished possibility with which I\\nwas in love. Indeed, my moral satisfaction and", "height": "3516", "width": "2184", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "78 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nself -approval may become so strong as to fill me\\nwith Pharisaic vanity, and I may gloat over my\\nmoral triumph. If the wrong act wins the victory,\\nand the thought of the right one lingers on in con-\\nsciousness, I feel sad, troubled, ashamed, contempti-\\nble. I look upon the conquered past and read a\\nsilent sorrow in its face, which goes to my heart and\\ncauses my soul to resound with self-reproaches. 1 I\\nsit in judgment upon myself and pronounce myself\\nguilty. These painful feelings we call feelings of\\nremorse, repentance, pangs of conscience. They\\nmay become so intense as to throw the sufferer into\\nthe depths of despair, and make him willing and\\neven anxious to undergo the severest punishments.\\nWe see, then, that conscience functions both be-\\nfore and after the performance of the act. When\\nthe act perceived or thought of is not my own,\\nbut another s, or only an imagined one, the pro-\\ncess which takes place is much the same. The\\nfeelings and impulses of approval or disapproval,\\nalready mentioned, spring up in me even more read-\\nily than before I judge that the act is right or\\nwrong, and ought or ought not to be done.\\nCertain feelings and impulses, then, surround the\\nidea of a deed and lead us to make a judgment.\\nThe act arouses certain feelings and impulses in us,\\n1 See Euripides s Orestes, JEschylus s Agamemnon. See also\\nthe Gospel of St. Matthew: And Peter remembered the word of\\nJesus, which said unto him Before the cock crow, thou shalt\\ndeny me thrice. And he went out and wept bitterly.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 79\\nand we express this effect in a judgment of value.\\nWhen we characterize an act as right or wrong\\nin this way, we are really characterizing ourselves.\\nWe evaluate the act because it makes a certain\\nimpression upon us, just as we call an object beau-\\ntiful because it arouses certain feelings in us. If\\nthese feelings were absent, if acts did not, for some\\nreason or other, arouse in us feelings of approval,\\ndisapproval, and obligation, we should not judge\\nas we do, or make moral evaluations.\\nAll the processes which we have just mentioned\\nwe may gather together and embrace under one\\ngeneral term, conscience. We must emphasize the\\nfact that conscience is a mere general name used\\nto designate a series of complex phenomena, and not\\na separate special faculty. Hence to say, as com-\\nmon sense does, that we make moral judgments\\nbecause we have a faculty for making them, 1 does\\nnot help us. It is not an explanation of the fact\\nthat we remember, to refer to a faculty or power\\nof memory. To say that we remember because we\\nhave the power of memory, is like saying that we\\nremember because we remember. 2\\n3. The Feeling of Obligation. We find in con-\\nscience a complexus of psychical elements. Let us\\nconsider some of the more characteristic ones a\\n1 Cf. chap, ii, 3.\\n2 All these explanations remind us of Moliere s physician, who,\\nwhen asked why opium made one sleep, sagely replied Because\\nthere is in it a dormitive power.", "height": "3504", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "80 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nlittle more in detail. We have a mixture of feel-\\ning and impulse which we may call the feeling of\\nobligation, or oughtness. 1 This feeling, which Butler\\nemphasized so strongly, 2 is, however, not merely a\\nfeeling of impulsion toward a line of conduct,\\nnot the same as any other impulse, as Guyau\\nasserts. 3 To say that a pointer ought to point, is\\nnot, as Darwin seems to think, 4 the same as to say\\nthat a man ought to be honest. Nor, again, is this\\nfeeling of obligation identical with the feeling of\\nlogical necessity, as Clarke would appear to hold. 5\\nMoral obligation is a peculiar kind of obligation, a\\nunique mental process. We cannot describe it, we\\nmust experience it in order to understand it. In this\\nregard, however, it is like all other psychical states.\\nIt is as impossible to describe obligation to a being\\nthat does not feel it, as it is to talk to a blind man\\nof colors.\\nIt is this feeling of obligation which inspires men\\nwith awe, and makes them believe that conscience\\nis a voice from another world. Instead of explain-\\ning the phenomenon they personify it, looking upon\\nit as something outside of themselves, as a direct\\nmessenger from heaven. Even philosophers find it\\ndifficult to account for the authoritativeness of con-\\n1 The state of consciousness which we call the feeling of obliga-\\ntion contains an active or impulsive element.\\n2 See chap, ii, 5 (1).\\n8 Esquisse (Tune morale sans obligation ni sanction.\\n4 The Descent of Man, Part I, chap, iv, p. 116.\\ne See chap, ii, 3 (3).", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 81\\nscience without having recourse to the supernatural\\nor suprasensible. The faculty, says Martineau,\\nis the communion of God s life and guiding love\\nentering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity\\nin myself. We encounter an objective authority\\nwithout quitting our own centre of conscience. 1\\nThe authority which reveals itself within us,\\nreports itself not only as unclerived from our will,\\nbut as independent of our idiosyncrasies alto-\\ngether. 2 Kant likewise discovers in himself this\\nfeeling or impulse of obligation or authority accom-\\npanying certain ideas, and finds that it is expressed\\nin language by the imperative mood Thou shalt,\\nThou shalt not. He abstracts from the content of\\nthese promptings of conscience that which seems to\\nbe common to all of them, their authoritative char-\\nacter, the feeling of obligation, and makes an entity\\nof this abstraction. It is a form of the mind like\\nspace, time, and causality. But since this form or\\ncategory of obligation is concerned with action or\\npractice, Kant calls it a category of the practical\\nreason, or the will. 3\\n1 Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, chap, iv, p. 104.\\n2 lb., p. 102.\\n3 See Shninel, Einleitung in die 3forctlwissenschaft, Vol. I,\\nchap. i. Kant, of course, does not regard obligation as a feeling,\\nbut as a deliverance of the practical reason, or will, thereby evi-\\ndently emphasizing the impulsive nature of the feeling of obliga-\\ntion. He afterward tries to give this abstract form of oughtness a\\ncontent. He searches for a principle common to acts which are\\naccompanied in consciousness by obligation, and finds as the gen-\\nG", "height": "3500", "width": "2196", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "82 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nIn answer to Kant we may say that the feeling\\nor impulse of obligation is no more a category or\\nform of the mind than any other feeling. Nor is\\nit something outside of my empirical consciousness,\\nas I experience it. To say that a feeling of author-\\nity or obligation is present in consciousness, means\\nthat I feel bound or constrained or obliged to perform\\ncertain acts. Obligation is not a special category\\nor faculty or form of the reason it is a psychical\\nfact which is never found in consciousness apart\\nfrom other mental states. To say that this feeling\\nor impulse is an innate form, does not help us any\\nmore than to say that the feeling of hope is such a\\nform. Of course, hope and fear and love are all\\ninnate forms, if we mean by this that human\\nbeings experience them in connection with certain\\nconcrete ideas. What we wish to know is what\\nmodes of conduct are felt to be obligatory, and, if\\npossible, why they are felt to be so.\\n4. The Feelings of Approval and Disapproval.\\nSome thinkers emphasize this feeling of obligation,\\nand regard it as constituting the very essence of the\\nmoral consciousness, or conscience. But, as we no-\\nticed before, the idea of an act is, or at least may be,\\nsuffused with feelings of approbation and reproba-\\ntion. 1 The contemplation of a deed arouses feelings\\neral characteristic of all obligatory acts their fitness to become uni-\\nversal law. See chap, ii, 7, (1); also chap, vii, 15.\\n1 These feelings, too, like the feeling of obligation, contain\\nactive or impulsive elements, which express themselves iD bodily\\nmovements.", "height": "3492", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 88\\nof condemnation, contempt, disgust, abhorrence, in-\\ndignation, etc., or feelings of approval, admiration,\\nrespect, reverence, enthusiasm, etc. Some philoso-\\nphers have laid stress on such feelings, and have\\nidentified them with conscience. The moral-sense\\nphilosophers belong to this class, which is very apt\\nto overlook the authoritative element in morality.\\nJEsthetic feelings may also arise in connection with\\nthose we have mentioned. I may feel aesthetic\\npleasure in the contemplation of a deed. 2 This\\nfact has led some authors to identify the moral\\nsentiments with the aesthetic feelings, and to look\\nupon ethics as a branch of aesthetics. 3 We must in-\\nsist, however, that conscience is a complexus of psy-\\nchical states, and that the characteristic emotional\\nelements peculiar to it are the feelings of approval\\n(or disapproval) and the feeling of obligation or\\nauthority.\\n5. Conscience as Judgment. But conscience also\\njudges, and in so far is cognitive, or intellectual in\\ncharacter. Let us see how we come to make moral\\njudgments. The perception or thought of an act\\narouses feelings of obligation and feelings of ap-\\nproval. We express these feelings in language by\\nsaying, This act is right and ought to be done.\\nWe make a moral judgment. The judgment here\\nis based on feeling. When I declare an act to be\\nright or wrong, I am expressing my feelings with\\ni See chap, ii, 4. 2 See Sully, Human Mind, Vol. II, p. 167.\\n8 See Herbart and Volkmann.", "height": "3496", "width": "2228", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "84 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nreference to it. When I say an object is beautiful,\\nI am really saying that it arouses certain feelings\\n(here called aesthetic) in me. When I assert that\\nspitting is indecent, I am giving expression to the\\nfeelings of disgust aroused in me by a certain act.\\nIf the so-called moral act and beautiful object and\\nindecent behavior did not provoke in me these pecu-\\nliar emotional reactions, I should not judge them as\\nI do.\\nSome philosophers have emphasized the cognitive\\nelement in conscience, and have, therefore, called it\\nthe faculty of moral judgment. For them it is not\\nan emotional faculty, but a cognitive faculty, a fac-\\nulty that discovers truth. It is the special faculty\\nby which we discern moral truth. We may say,\\nhowever, first, that this is not its only function, that\\nwe must not overlook the characteristic emotional\\nand impulsive elements contained in conscience, and\\nsecondly, that there is no difference between the\\nfaculty which makes moral judgments (as such) and\\nthe faculty which makes other judgments. The\\ndifference lies in the subject-matter judged and the\\nmental background (feelings and impulses) which\\ngives rise to the judgment. Judgment is judgment,\\nwhether it be applied in morals, aesthetics, or eti-\\nquette. Judgment is a fundamental activity of\\nmind involving analysis and synthesis. When I\\nsay, This house is red, I am analyzing one of my\\npresentations, picking out of it a particular quality,\\nand predicating this of the original concrete whole", "height": "3492", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 85\\nwhich I have just broken up. When I say, This act\\nis wrong, I am really analyzing out of the act the\\nfeelings which it arouses in me, I am stating what\\nimpression it makes upon my consciousness.\\n6. Criticism of Intuitionism. Some moralists have\\nrecognized the fact that conscience functions as a\\njudging power, and, therefore, speak of it in the\\nmanner of Calderwood, who says Conscience is\\nthat power of mind by which moral law is discov-\\nered to each individual for the guidance of his\\nconduct. It is the reason, as that discovers to us\\nabsolute moral truth. 1 Cudworth and Clarke\\nlooked upon such judgments as, Stealing is wrong,\\nMurder is wrong, etc., as self-evident and neces-\\nsary, and consequently proclaimed them as eternal\\ntruths, truths of the kind discovered in mathemat-\\nics. Such propositions, they declared, are recognized\\nimmediately and intuitively it is neither necessary\\nnor possible to prove them. They are inherent in\\nthe mind, original possessions of reason, a priori,\\ninnate. Other writers believe that we immediately\\nperceive the rightness and wrongness of acts, that\\nas soon as an act is presented to consciousness, we\\nperceive its moral worth. To this school belong\\nMartineau and Lecky. The rationalistic intuition-\\nists, therefore, hold either that certain moral propo-\\nsitions are engraven on the mind, or that we have a\\nrational faculty which is bound by its very nature to\\n1 Handbook of Moral Philosophy, Part I, chap, iv, p. 77, 12th\\nedition.", "height": "3504", "width": "2188", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "86 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nformulate them, while the perceptional intuitionists\\nmaintain that we have no such universal proposi-\\ntions stamped upon the mind or turned out by\\nreason, but that we perceive the rightness and\\nwrongness of acts and motives immediately upon\\ntheir presentation to consciousness.\\nIn answer to these schools we may say, among\\nother things (1) Although there is present in the\\nmoral consciousness an intellectual or cognitive ele-\\nment (call it perception or reason or what you will),\\nthis is not all there is in it. We must not ignore\\nthe important emotional and impulsive constituents\\nmentioned before.\\n(2) We have no such innate knowledge or per-\\nception of moral distinctions as is claimed by ex-\\ntreme intuitionists. If we did, then all men would\\nhave to agree in their judgments, which is not the\\ncase. It will not do to say that the moral law has\\nbeen obscured and eliminated in savage tribes. 1\\nWe cannot corrupt or eliminate the perception of\\nspace and time in whole groups of men how then\\nshould it be possible to wipe out the a priori moral\\nforms Kant seems to think that men who are\\napparently without conscience are not actually with-\\nout it, but merely disregard its dictates. 2 This is\\nundoubtedly true of some men but we surely can-\\nnot claim that whole ages and peoples have known\\n1 See Leibniz, New Essays, Bk. I, chap, ii, 12.\\n2 See Abbott s translation, pp. 192, 311, 321, 343 also Religion\\ninnerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, pp. 235, 285.", "height": "3500", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 87\\nthe laws of morality as we know them now, and\\nhave deliberately refused to obey them. But, it\\nmay be said, though men may differ as to details,\\nthey surely accept certain fundamental moral prin-\\nciples as self-evident and obligatory. Thus cruelty\\nis universally condemned and benevolence approved.\\nIt is a psychological fact, says Lecky, 1 that we\\nare intuitively conscious that our benevolent affec-\\ntions are superior to our malevolent ones. 2 An-\\nthropologists and historians, however, have adduced\\nmany facts which seem to contradict these state-\\nments, or, at least, to render them doubtful. 3 Con-\\nscience, says Burton, does not exist in Eastern\\nAfrica, and repentance expresses regret for missed\\nopportunities of mortal crime. Robbery constitutes\\nan honorable man murder the more atrocious\\nthe midnight crime the better makes the hero. 4\\nThe Arabian robber, says Burckhardt, regards\\nhis occupation as an honorable one, and the term\\nharamy (robber) is one of the most nattering titles\\nwhich one can give a young hero. 5 Mr. Galbraith,\\nan Indian agent, describes the Sioux as bigoted,\\nbarbarous, and exceedingly superstitious. They\\n1 History of European Morals, Vol. I, pp. 99 f.\\n2 P. Ree gives a long list of writers who agree with this idea in\\nhis Entstehung des Gewissens, pp. 9, 10, 25-27.\\n3 A good resume 1 of such facts is given by Williams, A Beview\\nof Evolutional Ethics, pp. 466 ff. Ree, pp. 13 ff. Spencer, In-\\nductions, pp. 325 ff. See also in this connection Locke s Essay,\\nBk. I, chap. ii.\\n4 First Fo otsteps in Eastern Africa, p. 176.\\n6 Wahali, p. 121.", "height": "3504", "width": "2196", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "88 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nregard most of the vices as virtues. Theft, arson,\\nrape, and murder are among them regarded as the\\nmeans of distinction and the young Indian from\\nchildhood is taught to regard killing as the highest\\nof virtues. 1 In Tahiti, the missionaries consid-\\nered that no less than two-thirds of the children\\nwere murdered b}^ their parents. 2 Indeed, I do\\nnot remember a single instance in which a savage is\\nrecorded as having shown any symptoms of remorse\\nand almost the only case I can recall to mind, in\\nwhich a man belonging to one of the lower races has\\naccounted for an act by saying explicitly that it was\\nright, was when Mr. Hunt asked a young Fijian\\nwhy he had killed his mother. 3 Darwin does not\\nbelieve that the primitive conscience would reproach\\na man for injuring his enemy. Rather it would\\nreproach him, if he had not revenged himself. To\\ndo good in return for evil, to love your enemy, is a\\nheight of morality to which it may be doubted\\nwhether the social instincts would, by themselves,\\nhave ever led us. It is necessary that these in-\\nstincts, together with sympathy, should have been\\nhighly cult i vat ed and extended by the aid of reason,\\ninstruction, and the love or fear of God, before any\\nsuch golden rule would be thought of and obeyed. 4\\n(3) We cannot, therefore, prove the innateness of\\nconscience by referring to principles that are uni-\\n1 Lubbock, Origin of Civilization, pp. 397, 398.\\n2 lb. 3 lb., p. 405.\\nThe Descent of Man, p. 113 note.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 89\\nversally recognized as right. Some moralists grant\\nthe truth of this statement, but still maintain that\\nconscience is innate. It is true, they declare, that\\nthe moral judgments of mankind diverge, that one\\nage or tribe may approve of what another condemns.\\nBut all times and peoples agree that some form of\\nconduct is better, higher, nobler than another, that\\nright is better than wrong, that we bow down be-\\nfore authority. This is practically the theory\\nadvocated by the Schoolmen, 1 who held that we have\\nan innate faculty, the synderesis, which tells us that\\nthe right ought to be done and the wrong avoided.\\nThere is, however, no such faculty as the one\\nspoken of here. The proposition, The right ought\\nto be done and the wrong avoided, is, like all general\\nstatements of the kind, the result of abstraction.\\nWe find by experience that many particular acts are\\naccompanied in consciousness by feelings of obliga-\\ntion and approval, and that others are associated\\nwith feelings of disapproval and deterrence. We\\nbring these acts under general heads, and call the\\nformer right, the latter wrong. To say that right\\nacts ought to be performed and wrong ones avoided,\\nsimply means that certain forms of conduct arouse\\nfeelings of obligation and approval, and others the\\nreverse. The proposition, therefore, that we ought\\nto do the right and refrain from the wrong, is a\\ngeneral expression of the fact that we feel obliged\\nto perform certain actions and to refrain from\\ni See chap, ii, \u00c2\u00a73 (1).", "height": "3504", "width": "2196", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "90 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nothers it is a universal proposition, an inference\\ndrawn from the facts of experience, not an a priori\\njudgment of the reason.\\n(4) Even if it were true that certain moral judg-\\nments were universally accepted, this would not\\nnecessarily prove them to be innate. They might\\nbe the products of universally prevalent conditions.\\n(5) Nor can we prove the innateness of conscience\\nfrom the self-evidence and necessity of some of\\nits deliverances. It is true that such propositions\\nas Stealing is wrong, Murder is wrong, Honesty\\nis right, etc., seem necessary and self-evident to us\\nchildren of the nineteenth century. But they may\\nbe satisfactorily explained without our having re-\\ncourse to the doctrine of nativism, which is, after all,\\nmerely a confession of ignorance. As we saw before,\\nthe ideas of certain acts, say of murder and self-sac-\\nrifice, are accompanied in consciousness by pecul-\\niar feelings called moral feelings, feelings which are\\nlacking when we think of other acts or things. I\\nhave no such sentiments when I perceive or think of\\na tree or a mountain. Whenever these feelings sur-\\nround an idea, we call that for which it stands right\\nor wrong. To say that stealing, or any particular\\ndeed, is wrong, means that the idea of that act is asso-\\nciated in my mind with feelings of disapproval, etc.\\nHence the judgment, Stealing is wrong, is equiva-\\nlent to the proposition that an act which is con-\\ndemned and prohibited is condemned and prohibited.\\nThe words, stealing, adultery, robbery, murder, etc..", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 91\\ncontain everything that is expressed in the predi-\\ncate, wrong or bad; they express not only ideas of\\nacts, but our attitude toward these acts. The judg-\\nment in question is what Kant would call an analyt-\\nical judgment, i.e., one in which the predicate is but\\na repetition of the subject. Such judgments are\\nalways necessary and self-evident the predicate is\\nidentical with, or only another way of writing, the\\nsubject. And when I perceive an act to be right or\\nwrong, it is because that act arouses feelings in me\\nin consequence of which I approve or disapprove of\\nit. 1\\n7. Criticism of Emotional Intuitionism. If all this\\nis so, the question concerning the innateness of con-\\nscience or moral judgment must be formulated in a\\nslightly different manner. Are the moral feelings,\\nwe now ask, which accompany certain ideas, the\\noriginal associates of those ideas? That is, do the\\ndeeds which we noiv designate as right and wrong\\nalways arouse, and have the}^ always aroused, in\\nthe consciousness, the feelings mentioned before?\\nWe can hardly assert it. One age, or race, or\\nnation, or class, or sect, or even individual, may\\nregard an act as right which another views with\\nindifference or abhorrence. We cannot read without\\na thrill of pain and horror the accounts of gladia-\\ntorial contests which the purest Roman virgin wit-\\nnessed without the slightest moral compunction.\\n1 See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap v, 4 Ree, Die Entstehung\\ndes Gewissens.", "height": "3504", "width": "2180", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "92 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nThe orthodox Jew is conscience-stricken for hav-\\ning lighted a fire in his house on the Sabbath, the\\nHindoo for having occasioned the death of a cow,\\nthe Turkish woman for exposing her face. The\\nancient Icelander regarded revenge not merely as\\nsweet, but as praiseworthy and honorable, and it\\nmost likely had never entered the mind of the Celtic\\nchief that robbery merely as robbery was a wicked\\nand disgraceful act. 1\\nIf these feelings of obligation, etc., were the original\\nand inseparable associates of certain modes of con-\\nduct, we should expect every age and race to pro-\\nnounce the same judgments. It would not be possible\\neither to add these feelings to certain ideas or to sub-\\ntract them from them. We should not be able to\\neducate them away, so to speak. The truth is, our\\nparents and teachers not only arouse ideas in our\\nminds, but also surround these ideas with a moral\\nfringe. The words of the language which they teach\\nus to understand and to speak, express not only\\nthoughts, but values. The terms, murder, robbery,\\ntheft, benevolence, veracity, sacrifice, stand not merely\\nfor acts and modes of conduct and dispositions of the\\nwill, but for our feelings and impulses in reference\\nto them. The past transmits to the present its ideas\\nwith the moral halos encircling them. The present\\nfrequently changes its values, and so it happens that\\nacts which were once associated in consciousness\\nwith the moral sentiments lose the fringe which once\\n1 Macaulay. Quoted by Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 280.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 93\\nsurrounded them, or arouse new associations. The\\nsinner of yesterday becomes the saint of to-morrow.\\n8. Genesis of Conscience. Let us now see how\\nthe process of moralization goes on. The connec-\\ntion between the moral feelings and the ideas of\\ncertain acts is largely brought about by education.\\nChildren are made to observe that certain acts do\\nnot meet with the approval of their surroundings.\\nFrowns, austere looks, shakes of the head, stern\\nwords, and other signs of displeasure precede and\\nfollow certain modes of conduct. The child impul-\\nsively imitates these outward manifestations of dis-\\napproval at an early age, and so begins to feel a\\ncertain kind of uneasiness in connection with certain\\nacts himself. He also feels pain and anger when\\ncertain acts are directed against himself, and instinc-\\ntively resents them, or frowns them down. Words\\nspoken to him in an authoritative manner by a\\nparent or any other superior arouse in his conscious-\\nness feelings of coercion and restraint he feels\\ninstinctively that he must do a certain act or leave\\nit undone. 1\\n1 See Sully, The Human Mind, Vol. II, pp. 164 f. The force\\nof a command on a child cannot be wholly attributed to experience\\nand prevision of consequences. It shows itself too early, and is\\nout of proportion to the range and intensity of the experiences\\nof punishment. Here then we have, as it seems, to do with a\\nresidual phenomenon, which we must regard as instinctive. This\\ninstinctive deference to an uttered command is in part referrible to\\nthe superior power of external stimuli, or sense-presentations gen-\\nerally in our mental life. A command given with emphasis (spe-\\ncial loudness and distinctness of tone, accompanied by intent", "height": "3504", "width": "2204", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "94 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nThe performance of acts which are frowned down\\nand prohibited by direct command is frequently\\nfollowed by consequences of a disagreeable kind,\\nnatural as well as artificial, and the vague remem-\\nbrance of these arouses fear and aversion. The\\nchild also often hears that there are other, mysteri-\\nous beings who will punish him for disobedience,\\nand the fear produced by the prospect is all the\\nmore intense because of the uncertainty and mystery\\nof the imagined evil. 1 In the course of time he is\\ntold that there is a God, and that this God dis-\\napproves of and punishes offences. And then the\\ninstinctive craving for recognition, the desire to be\\nwell thought of, which may become more and more\\nintensified, assists in turning the individual from\\ncertain kinds of behavior, and attracts him to others.\\nlook) is the most powerful way of initiating or bringing on the\\ncorresponding movement (or inhibition of movement). In this\\nrespect it stands on a level with the actual presentation of an\\naction by another, which, as we shall see, has a powerful tendency\\nto call forth an imitative response. This force of external verbal\\nsuggestion, the effect of which we have already seen in the domain\\nof normal belief, is illustrated further in the phenomena of hyp-\\nnotic suggestion, which Guyau has recently brought into an in-\\nstructive analogy with the moral influence of education. (Guyau\\nconsiders that suggestion sets up in the hypnotized subject a sense\\nof must, or of obligation closely analogous to a moral feeling.\\nSee his volume, Education and Heredity, English translation,\\nchap, i.) The natural impulse to comply with commands is, how-\\never, more than this, and involves a rudiment of regard of what\\nothers think and say of us as intrinsically valuable, that is to\\nsay, what we have dealt with under the head, love of approbation.\\n1 The small boy s vague conception of the goblins makes the\\nthreat that the goblins will get him all the more alarming.", "height": "3500", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 95\\nAfterward, when sympathy develops, love begins to\\nplay an important part as a motive to action. The\\nchild s affection for persons around him and the\\nGod above him makes him anxious to avoid causing\\ndispleasure. He suffers with others, the thought of\\nhurting them hurts him, and deters him from certain\\nacts. With the growth of intelligence the agent\\nlearns to understand the rationale of certain prohi-\\nbitions, and is deterred from breaking the law. The\\ntraining begun in the family is continued by the\\nschool and the world at large. On every hand he\\nmeets with signs of disapproval and pain, and hears\\nthe command, Thou shalt not. In this way he learns\\nto fear and acknowledge the law.\\nThe feelings aroused by the disapproval and\\nauthoritative tones of others, the feeling of pain,\\nthe fear of punishment, human and divine, the\\nfear of losing the good opinion of others, the fear\\nof causing injury, directly or indirectly, to himself\\nand the beings he loves, form the beginning, in\\nthe child s consciousness, of that peculiar complexus\\nof sentiments which we call moral. In all these\\nfeelings there is an element of opposition to the acts\\nwith which they are associated, a kind of aversion,\\na feeling of negation and deterrence, of must not or\\nshall not, a feeling which is strongly intensified by\\nthe combination of the factors we have mentioned.\\nIn the course of time many of these factors drop out\\nof consciousness, and the feeling of opposition and\\ndeterrence comes to be directly associated with the", "height": "3504", "width": "2212", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "96 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nideas of acts. The agent feels a check in the pres-\\nence of certain acts without picturing to himself the\\ncauses which originally produced that feeling. He\\nfeels a restraint or compulsion which seems to be\\nwithin him, and yet to come from without its mys-\\nteriousness fills him with awe. When this senti-\\nment surrounds the idea of a deed, he cannot help\\nrecognizing its binding force over him. All the\\nother elements seem to fade out of consciousness,\\nleaving behind a kind of abstract obligation and\\ndisapproval, a feeling of antagonism to the thing\\nwith whose idea it is connected.\\nA similar process takes place with acts that meet\\nwith approval, and we need not follow it out here.\\nThese feelings of approval may be intensified into\\nfeelings of respect, admiration, love, and, where the\\nelement of mystery enters in, reverence. We ad-\\nmire and love good deeds with the same fervor with\\nwhich we love and admire persons we reverence\\nthem as we reverence the gods. We feel constrained\\nor obliged to perform acts to which our conscious-\\nness gives a moral value, we recognize their binding\\nforce.\\nIn other words, the feelings of resentment, fear,\\netc., which we find connecting themselves with the\\nideas of certain acts in the consciousness of the child,\\ngradually develop into the feelings of moral disap-\\nproval, deterrence, and their opposites, which we\\ndiscover in the adult. It must not be imagined,\\nhowever, that these feelings are developed in the", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 97\\nsame degree in all persons. In some the ideas of\\ncertain acts merely arouse feelings of fear. Many\\npersons, I am convinced, feel that they must not do\\ncertain things on account of the fear of discovery\\nand the consequent punishments. 1 Others are afraid\\nof the wrath of God or other supernatural powers,\\nhere and hereafter. Still others are afraid with-\\nout knowing exactly what they are afraid of the\\nthought of certain modes of conduct immediately\\ncalls up a vague fear, of what they know not. 2 On\\nthe other hand, there are persons who respect and\\nreverence the law, who love duty for duty s sake.\\nThey feel themselves bound to obey the law, without\\nfeeling bound to any person or institution they\\nfeel a blind pressure toward the right, without being\\nurged by fear to do it. Such characters are not, in\\nmy opinion, as common as is often believed. They\\nare the rigorous moralists, the moral enthusiasts.\\nThey feel as Kant felt when he said Two things\\nfill the mind with new and increasing admiration\\nand awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect\\non them the starry heavens above and the moral law\\nwithin; 3 and when he wrote his celebrated apos-\\n1 And the Lord God called unto Adam, and said unto him,\\nWhere art thou And he said, I heard thy voice in the garden,\\nand I was afraid, because I was naked and I hid myself.\\n2 Schopenhauer finds in conscience the following ingredients\\nfear of man, -i superstition, prejudice, vanity, custom.\\n3 Kritik of Practical Beason, Part II, Abbott s translation,\\np. 260. Lord Houghton translates these lines as follows\\nTwo things I contemplate with ceaseless awe\\nThe stars of heaven and man s sense of Law.\\nn", "height": "3504", "width": "2204", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "98 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ntrophe to Duty Duty Thou sublime and mighty\\nname that dost embrace nothing charming or insin-\\nuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not\\nto move the will by aught that would arouse natural\\naversion or terror, but merely boldest forth a law\\nwhich of itself finds entrance into the mind, and\\nyet gains reluctant reverence (though not always\\nobedience), a law before which all inclinations are\\ndumb, even though they secretly counterwork\\nwhat origin is worthy of thee, and where is to be\\nfound the root of thy noble descent? 1 They feel\\nas Wordsworth felt when he composed his Ode to\\nDuty\\nStern daughter of the voice of God\\nO Duty if that name thou love\\nWho art a light to guide, a rod\\nTo check the erring, and reprove\\nThou, who art victory and law\\nWhen empty terrors overawe\\nFrom vain temptation dost set free\\nAnd calm st the weary strife of frail humanity.\\nWe have seen how the moral sentiments, the feel-\\nings of approval and disapproval, and the ought-feel-\\ning, come to be connected with certain forms of con-\\nduct in the mind of the individual. 2 We may assume\\n1 Kritik of Practical Reason, Part I, chap, in, Abbott s trans-\\nlation, p. 180.\\n2 I quote from Ladd s Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory,\\np. 582 The parent, or the nurse, or the teacher, deliberately and\\nhabitually connects with certain doings the arousement of the\\nought-feeling and the feeling of approbation with certain other\\nforms of conduct, in the same way, are connected the opposite\\nforms of these ethical sentiments. With all persons, including", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 99\\nthat they originated somewhat similarly in the race.\\nThe primitive man, let us say, instinctively resented\\nattacks upon himself, and those near to him, and feared\\nthe painful consequences which injury done to others\\nwas bound to bring upon him and those for whom he\\ncared. In the course of time, with the development\\nof society, the fear of personal revenge gave way to\\nthe fear of the ruler and the State, the fear of the\\nwrath of invisible powers, the fear of losing social\\nrecognition, the fear of causing ideal pain to others.\\nThen, perhaps, the feeling of sympathy, which at\\nfirst included only a few in its scope, was extended,\\ntaking in larger numbers, and became a motive.\\nFinally, feelings of respect and reverence for the\\nlaw as law, the feeling of obligation, arose as in the\\ncase of the individual. If it is true that the develop-\\nment of the individual, or ontogenesis, is a repetition\\nthose not thus well bred, the social and even the physical environ-\\nment tends to establish a similar connection. But this connection\\nimplies, in its very possibility, the beginning of a so-called moral\\nnature for the child. All its pleasure-pains may thus come to\\nhave for it a quasi-moral import. On the basis of this experience\\nwith its own states of affective consciousness, considered as con-\\nnected with deeds of its own will and voluntary courses of conduct,\\nthe intellect of the child generalizes. Here, however, the greater\\npart of the conclusions such as this is right and that is wrong\\nare accepted as already formed from those older than itself. The\\nfreeing of the idea of the right from its concrete and sensuous\\nclothing, as it were, results in a formation of a more and more\\nabstract system of moral principles. Such are statements like the\\nfollowing Truth-telling is right, and lying is wrong honesty is\\nright, and stealing is wrong kindness is right, and cruelty is\\nwrong, etc.\\nL. #f C.", "height": "3504", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "100 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nof the development of the race, ox phylogenesis, then\\nwe must imagine that this feeling of obligation is\\na late arrival in the race-consciousness, and not an\\noriginal possession in the sense that it existed in the\\nprimitive soul.\\n9. In what Sense Conscience is Innate. The in-\\ndividual, then, does not know or feel at birth what\\nis right and what is wrong nor is the feeling of\\nobligation immediately aroused in him. He pos-\\nsesses, however, many instincts out of which the\\nmoral sentiments may be said to evolve. Among\\nthese instincts, which must be regarded as innate,\\nmay be mentioned: the feeling of resentment, the\\nfear of others resentment, the regard for others\\nopinions, the impulse of imitation, the sympathetic\\nregard for others welfare, the tendency to submit\\nto superior powers, or to obey commands. These\\ninstinctive factors of consciousness form the basis\\nof the higher moral feelings out of them the latter\\nwill grow under the proper conditions. If the fact\\nthat the higher moral feelings are bound to be de-\\nveloped in consciousness under suitable conditions\\nmeans that they are innate, then we must subscribe\\nto the doctrines of intuitionism. In this sense, how-\\never, all our feelings, hope, fear, anger, etc., in-\\ndeed, everything in consciousness, our capacity for\\nlanguage, our capacity for hearing and seeing, are\\noriginal or innate. But this does not yet prove that\\nthe moral sentiments are originally connected with\\nthe ideas of certain forms of conduct. All that we", "height": "3504", "width": "2388", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 101\\ncan assert so far is that such feelings may be aroused\\nin consciousness, and may be attached to the ideas\\nof certain acts.\\nMoreover, if the evolutionistic theory is correct in\\nits doctrine of inheritance, we may suppose that the\\ncapacity for feeling approval and obligation is trans-\\nmitted by its possessors to succeeding generations.\\nSome men seem to be more timid, or cowardly, or\\ncruel, or sympathetic by nature than others, which\\nmeans that these impulses are more readily produced\\nin them than in others. To say, then, that a man has\\ninherited a great respect or reverence for the law,\\nwould signify that, if he were properly trained, he\\nwould develop these feelings. In this sense we may\\nspeak of conscience as an instinct, as some writers do.\\nAnd, furthermore, if it is possible for us to inherit\\na tendency to feel and to think and to act in a cer-\\ntain way, why should it not be possible for us to feel\\nobligation and approval in connection with certain\\nideas? We inherit not only fear in the abstract, or\\nthe capacity for fear, but the fear of particular\\nthings, say of dark places, vermin, etc. 1 If certain\\nfixed neural relations are formed between the brain\\nprocesses which stand for particular percepts, and\\nthose which stand for particular feelings (of fear,\\netc.), and are transmitted from generation to gen-\\n1 See James, Psychology, chapter on Instinct Sully, The\\nHuman Mind, Vol. II, p. 71 Ziehen, Introduction to Physi-\\nological Psychology, pp. 244 ff. Schneider, Der menschliche Wille,\\np. 224.", "height": "3504", "width": "2204", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "102 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\neration, there is no great reason why such connec-\\ntions should not be formed between the paths which\\nrepresent certain acts, like murder, for example, and\\nthose which are the physiological counterparts of\\nthe ought-feelings, whatever they may be, and be\\nhanded down to offspring. This would not mean\\nthat the child is born with these two psychical\\nstates together, but it would mean that, under the\\nproper conditions and at the proper time, the con-\\nnection would be formed more easily than if it had\\nnot already existed in a long line of ancestors. 1\\n1 See Darwin, Descent of Man, pp. 123 f. After quoting that\\npart of Spencer s letter to Mill in which Spencer expresses his be-\\nlief in the transmission of moral intuitions, Darwin says There\\nis not the least inherent improbability, as it seems to me, in vir-\\ntuous tendencies being more or less strongly inherited for, not\\nto mention the various dispositions and habits transmitted by\\nmany of our domestic animals to their offspring, I have he.ard of\\nauthentic cases in which a desire to steal and a tendency to lie\\nappeared to run in families of the upper ranks and as stealing is a\\nrare crime in the wealthy classes, we can hardly account by acci-\\ndental coincidence for the tendency occurring in two or three\\nmembers of the same family. If bad tendencies are transmitted,\\nit is probable that good ones are likewise transmitted. That the\\nstate of the body, by affecting the brain, has great influence on the\\nmoral tendencies is known to most of those who have suffered\\nfrom chronic derangements of the digestion or liver. The same\\nfact is likewise shown by the perversion or destruction of the\\nmoral sense being often one of the earliest symptoms of mental\\nderangement (Maudsley, Body and Blind, 1870, p. 60), and\\ninsanity is notoriously often inherited. Except through the prin-\\nciple of the transmission of moral tendencies, we cannot under-\\nstand the differences believed to exist in this respect between\\nthe various races of mankind. Even the partial transmission of\\nvirtuous tendencies would bo an immense assistance to the primary\\nimpulse derived directly and indirectly from the social instincts.", "height": "3504", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 103\\nNor would this mean that the connection has\\nexisted forever and will continue to exist forever,\\nthat it is inseparable and eternal, or that the same\\ncombinations exist in all human beings.\\nWhether such tendencies to feel bound in the pres-\\nence of certain acts are really inherited, we cannot\\ntell positively, but there is nothing improbable in\\nthe thought. The fact that time and training are\\nrequired to bring out the moral feelings would be\\nno argument against the belief. There are many\\ninstincts in man which do not ripen at once and\\nwithout the proper excitants, and yet we do not\\ndeny to them their instinctive and innate character.\\nLet us sum up The moral feelings, as we find\\nthem now, are comparatively late arrivals in the his-\\ntory of the individual and the race. They are not\\nthe original and inseparable companions of any par-\\nticular acts, but may become attached to all forms\\nof conduct under suitable conditions. There is\\nnothing impossible in the notion that the tendency\\nto feel them in connection with certain acts may\\nAdmitting for a moment that virtuous tendencies are inherited,\\nit appears probable, at least in such cases as chastity, temperance,\\nhumanity to animals, etc., that they become first impressed on the\\nmental organization through habit, instruction, and example, con-\\ntinued during several generations in the same family, and in a\\nquite subordinate degree, or not at all, by the individuals possess-\\ning such virtues having succeeded best in the struggle for life.\\nSee also Darwin and Spencer in the passages quoted in chap, ii,\\n7 (2) and (3) Carneri, Grundzuge der Ethik, pp. 348 f. Ent-\\nwickelung und Daricinismiis, p. 212 Williams, Ethics, pp. 402 ff.,\\n435 ff., 449 ff. Sutherland, Moral Instinct, Vol. II, pp. 60 ff.", "height": "3496", "width": "2204", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "104 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nbecome fixed and habitual, and be transmitted to\\noffspring.\\nBut, the question may be asked, how did the first\\nman who ever felt obligation, etc., come to feel that\\nway What is the first origin of the feeling\\nEven if we should maintain that it is a form of vague\\nfear, we should still have to inquire, Whence did it\\nspring It is as hard to solve this problem as it is\\nto solve the problem of first beginnings in general.\\nHow did any feeling, or in fact anything, originally\\narise We do not know. We do not know how\\nconsciousness arose, or, indeed, how it arises every\\nday in new human beings, or how one thought\\nsprings from the other. We think and feel and\\nwill, and think and feel and will about our own\\nthinking, feeling, and willing but how all that is\\npossible we are utterly at a loss to understand. I\\ncan explain to you the antecedent and concomitant\\nprocesses, both physical and mental, which go with\\ncertain ideas and feelings and volitions, but if you\\nask me how such a state as a conscious process is\\npossible at all, I must remain silent. I know that\\nconsciousness is what it is in the last analysis, and\\nhow it came to be, I cannot tell. We have reached\\nthe confines of our science at this point. Here the\\nmoralist must take leave of you, and hand you over to\\nthe tender mercies of the theologian or metaphy-\\nsician. Did God create the feeling of obligation\\nWell, if He created you, He created all of you, and\\nthere is no need of singling out one particular feel-", "height": "3488", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 105\\ning. Is the feeling of obligation the self-imposed\\nlaw of your own personality Yes, in the sense\\nthat you are your feeling of obligation, that the\\nfeeling is not outside of you, something standing\\nover and against you, but in you and of you.\\n10. The Infallibility and Immediacy of Conscience.\\nAfter the foregoing, it will not be difficult to dis-\\ncover our attitude toward several questions which\\nare frequently asked with respect to the conscience.\\nIs conscience infallible Kant calls an erring con-\\nscience a chimera. 1 Before we can answer this\\nquestion we must understand its meaning. If all\\nsuch acts are right as are preceded by the feeling of\\nobligation, i.e., if the criterion of their goodness is\\nthe fact that they are dictated by conscience, then,\\nof course, whatever conscience tells me is right, is\\nright, and to say that conscience errs, is to contra-\\ndict oneself. An erring conscience is, indeed,\\na chimera, if conscience is the sole criterion of\\nthe rightness and wrongness of acts.\\nBut we notice that the popular consciousness\\noften condemns acts which have the approval of an\\nindividual conscience, and that history frequently\\nreverses its judgments. It would appear from this\\nthat a mistake has been made somewhere, and that\\nthere is perhaps a principle by which we judge even\\nthe dictates of an individual conscience. If it is\\ntrue, as some hold, that the goodness of acts ulti-\\nmately depends upon the effects which they tend to\\n1 Abbott s translation, p. 311.", "height": "3504", "width": "2204", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "106 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nproduce, and if it is true that the feeling of obliga-\\ntion may be connected with the ideas of acts which\\ndo not produce such effects, then an erring con-\\nscience is not a chimera. Ignorance, inexperience,\\nand superstition may cause acts to be clothed with\\nthe authority of the law which succeeding genera-\\ntions may stamp with their disapproval. Then\\nagain, conditions may change and make new evalua-\\ntions necessary. The conscience of the race repre-\\nsents the experience of the race, and grows as the\\nlatter grows. Bat the race conscience develops\\nslowly, and may be outstripped by the individual\\nconscience. An individual conscience may be in\\nadvance of its age it may feel bound to forms of\\nconduct which the future will adopt. Every great\\nmoral reformer who has been persecuted for con-\\nscience sake was in advance of his times. 1\\nCan conscience be educated? If our standpoint\\nis correct, it can. Indeed, a man s conscience is\\nlargely the product of education, as we noticed be-\\nfore. Our teachers, past and present, surround the\\nideas of certain acts with moral feelings, and so\\neducate us into morality. Even if we regard con-\\nscience as a form of obligation without regard to\\ncontent, we must hold that its existence depends on\\ntraining. The feeling of obligation will not appear\\nunless consciousness as a whole is developed.\\nDoes conscience immediately tell us what is right\\nand wrong Not in every instance. A member of\\n1 See Paulsen, Ethics, pp. 357 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2400", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 107\\nour civilization cannot help disapproving of certain\\nacts immediately, the wrongfulness of which has\\nbeen impressed upon him from childhood. But\\nthere are many courses of conduct which baffle many\\nconsciences. We are sometimes in doubt as to what\\nwould really be the dutiful course to pursue, until\\nwe can bring the case under a general formula.\\nThe success with which a person judges the moral\\nworth of an act will often depend upon his ability to\\nrefer it to a class concerning which there is no\\ndoubt.\\n11. Conscience and Inclination. Another point\\ndeserves to be considered. Kant teaches that such\\nacts are moral as are done from a sense of duty, from\\na respect for the moral law. Acts which are done\\nfrom inclination have no moral worth. If you do\\ngood from a love of it, there is no merit in your act.\\nIf you delight in being kind to others, and help\\nthem because you love them, you are not moral. If,\\nhowever, you have no such inclination, or if you\\nhave an antipathy against doing it, and still aid\\nothers from a sense of duty, then you are moral. 1\\nOf course, in a matter of this kind everything\\ndepends upon one s standpoint. If the criterion of\\nmorality is the sense of duty, or obligation, then, to\\nbe sure, no act can be moral that is not prompted by\\nreverence for the law. But it is begging the entire\\nquestion to insist upon this thesis. Do we really\\ncall only such acts moral as are held by Kant to be\\n1 See Kant s MetaphysiTc der Sitten.", "height": "3504", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "108 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nmoral If we do, we must regard as moral the\\nmurderer who acts from a sense of duty. No, Kant\\nwould object, you cannot call the murderer moral,\\nnor can he call himself moral, because he cannot\\nwill that his conduct become universal law. Well,\\nwe ask, why not Why cannot he will that the\\nkilling of tyrants become universal, so long as it is\\nprompted by a sense of duty Besides, Kant here\\nintroduces a new principle or criterion the fitness\\nof the act to become a universal maxim. First he\\nsays that an act is moral when it is prompted by the\\nsense of duty, then he tells me to act only on that\\nmaxim whereby thou canst at the same time will\\nthat it should become a universal law. If he ad-\\nheres to the first proposition, the murderer is moral\\nif to the second, then the sense of duty is not the\\ncriterion if to both, we have either a contradiction\\nor two criteria which must be harmonized in some\\nway. 1\\nThe main thing, it seems to me, is that a man do\\nthe right. Now, if he does it from inclination,\\nbecause he loves to do it, why should he not be\\nadjudged moral Spencer believes that the time\\nwill come when the sense of duty or moral obliga-\\ntion will pass away. The observation is not infre-\\nquent, he says, that persistence in performing a\\n1 For criticism of the Kantian view, see Paulsen, Ethics, pp.\\n350 ft*.; Janet, Theory of Morals, Bk. Ill, chap, v Mackenzie,\\nManual of Ethics, chap, iv Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, 56\\nBradley, Ethical Studies, IV.", "height": "3504", "width": "2380", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 109\\nduty ends in making it a pleasure and this amounts\\nto the admission that, while at first the motive con-\\ntains an element of coercion, at last this element of\\ncoercion dies out, and the act is performed without\\nany consciousness of being obliged to perform it. 1\\nIt is evident, then, that that element in the moral\\nconsciousness which is expressed by the word obliga-\\ntion will disappear. However this may be, I see\\nno reason why a man should be called non-moral\\nbecause he loves to do the right.\\nOf course, the feeling of obligation, the feeling\\nthat an act ought to be performed, will be a great\\nincentive to the doing of it, and possibly owes its ex-\\nistence to this fact. A man in whom this sentiment\\nis very strong will do the right in the face of the\\nstrongest temptations, provided, of course, the feeling\\nis connected with right actions. It is an excellent\\nreenforcer of morality it pushes itself in between\\nthe desire to violate the law and the desire to obey 1/\\nit, and helps the latter to gain the victory. Human-\\nity instinctively recognizes this truth. In times of\\nmoral degeneracy, reformers point out the danger\\nof listening to the seductive voice of inclination,\\nand appeal to the sense of duty. It is also to be\\nobserved that we love conflict, and admire the man\\nwho struggles. There is nothing dramatic in an\\n1 Data of Ethics, p. 128. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, chap, x\\nFor it may be added that a person is not good if he does not take\\ndelight in noble actions, as nobody would call a person just if he\\ndid not take delight in just actions, etc.", "height": "3504", "width": "2196", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "110 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\neven, quiet life that is free from storms of passion\\nand temptation. But the sense of duty does not\\nplay the role in life which moralists of Kant s\\npietistic training assign to it. Life is not a con-\\ntinuous conflict between our inclinations, desires,\\nor impulses, and the sense of duty. If it were, it\\nwould soon consume itself. Men do not do every-\\nthing from a sense of duty, or because they feel that\\nthey must. Men are trained to righteousness, and\\nthen act from force of habit. Where the training\\nis complete, character is formed, and acts follow\\nfrom character. The conflicts which Kant regards\\nas forming the very essence of character are rare\\nin a healthy moral life. A good man does not have\\nto call out the inner police force every time he acts.\\nAn appeal to authority is not always necessary in\\nhis case. The thou shaft is superseded by the\\nI will, and the rule of law gives way to the\\nrule of love. 1\\nMany men form ideals of conduct, that is, reach\\ncertain general principles, which aim to give their\\nlife a unity. The ideal is like the flag that leads\\nthe hosts to battle. It may be followed for many\\nreasons, from love, or from a sense of obligation, or\\n1 See Spencer, Inductions, p. 338 Miinsterberg, Ursprung\\nder SiUlichkeit, last chapter; Wundt, Ethik, Part III, chap, iii:\\nWhereas a moral law which demands that the good be done\\nwithout inclination, i.e., without motives, asks more than can be\\naccomplished, it is, on the contrary, the genuine mark of the\\nmature character to perform the moral act, without deliberation,\\nfrom pure inclination.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 111\\nfrom force of habit. I compare my acts with this\\nideal and may feel obliged to perform those agreeing\\nwith it, or I may do them from love. Often a line\\nof reasoning is required to discover the acts which\\nare necessary to the realization of my ideal.\\n12. The Historical Vieiv and Morality. In conclu-\\nsion, I should like to consider an objection which is\\nfrequently urged against the historical view of con-\\nscience by those who regard the moral faculty as of\\nsupernatural origin. They hold that to deny the\\nsupernatural character of conscience is to rob it of its\\nsacredness and authority. When we know that and\\nhow a thing has originated, we are apt to lose respect\\nfor it. The knowledge that conscience is not a\\ndescendant of the gods, but an earth-born child, a\\nplebeian, so to speak, deprives it of the respect neces-\\nsary to make it effective, and renders it less awehil\\nthan before. Hence, these persons hold, the historical\\nview of conscience is dangerous to morality. 1\\nWe reply (1) Even if all this were so, it would\\nnot affect the truth of the teaching. Truth is one\\nthing, expediency another.\\n(2) But why should the belief that conscience\\nis a child of nature and not the direct voice of God\\nmake us lose respect for morality If I believe in\\nGod and believe that He is a good God, I shall surely\\n1 Even Guyau, an evolutionist, is of the same opinion: The\\nscientific spirit, he says, is the enemy of all instinct it tends to\\ndestroy the sense of obligation on which instinct is based. Every\\ninstinct disappears upon consciousness.", "height": "3504", "width": "2328", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "112 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nbelieve that He is in favor of the law, that it is His\\nwill that I obey the law. And what is to hinder me\\nfrom believing that His voice speaks in the experi-\\nence of the race, that the voice of the people is the\\nvoice of God in moral matters, that mankind ulti-\\nmately hit upon the right and transmit their knowl-\\nedge from generation to generation? When the\\ntheory of evolution first appeared, it was attacked\\nas dangerous to morality and religion, on the ground\\nthat if man grew out of simple beginnings and was\\nnot directly created by God, then there would be no\\nneed of a God. We are coming to understand,\\nhowever, that even if the evolutionistic hypothesis\\nshould be true, God could still reign. Why could\\nnot God, instead of having made man out of clay\\nand having breathed the breath of life into his\\nnostrils, have created simple elements from which\\na being like man eventually had to evolve? The\\nlatter belief is surely as reasonable as the former.\\nAnd so, too, why can we not believe, if we wish,\\nthat God made a universe which was bound to pro-\\nduce a human consciousness and a human con-\\nscience Why should not God let soul-life grow\\nas He lets plant-life grow, and why should we not\\nadmire a conscience that has been produced natu-\\nrally as much as we admire other products of\\nnature\\n(3) Even if an insight into the origin of the\\nought-feeling could lead to the elimination of the\\nfeeling, would that mean the overthrow of morality", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 113\\nI do not believe it. If the habitual performance of\\ngood deeds ends in their being done joyfully, why\\nshould not a person learn to do the right because\\nhe loves to do it? And if he can do it from love,\\nwhy should the loss of the sense of duty mean the\\ndefeat of all righteousness? Moreover, the man\\nwho is intelligent enough to understand the argu-\\nments which make for the historical view, will, at\\nthe same time, be intelligent enough to see that\\nmorality serves a purpose in the world, that the\\nrules of conduct are not mere arbitrary commands,\\nbut that they represent the necessary means of\\nhuman existence. And if he believes that, why\\nshould he despise morality Nay, would he not\\nbe more inclined to uphold the right than before?\\nI believe that the race could not exist without\\nmorality, I believe that I could not live and grow\\nin an environment in which the laws of morality\\nare constantly broken, I believe that the universe\\nis so arranged that immorality cannot thrive in it in\\nthe long run, then why should I become immoral\\nsimply because I have discovered that the voice\\nwithin me which urges me in the direction of the\\nright was not made in a day and that it will tell me\\nbetter things as the world rolls on? 1\\n1 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics The Utilitarian must repudiate\\naltogether that temper of rebellion against the established morality,\\nas something purely external and conventional, into which the re-\\nflective mind is always apt to fall when it is first convinced that its\\nrules are not intrinsically reasonable. He must, of course, also repu-\\ndiate as superstitious that awe of it as an absolute or Divine code\\ni", "height": "3504", "width": "2316", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "114 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n(4) There are no a priori reasons why a person\\nwho understands the genesis of his moral nature\\nshould lose it. Nor do the facts, which after all\\nfurnish the most important testimony, prove that\\nsuch is the case. I do not believe that the advo-\\ncates of the historical theory, men like the Mills,\\nDarwin, Spencer, Wundt, Hoffding, and Paulsen,\\nare less moral than Kant and Martineau. An in-\\nsight into its genesis no more destroys conscience\\nthan an understanding of the psychology of courage\\nmakes a man cowardly, or a knowledge of the con-\\nditions of sight and hearing makes a man blind and\\ndeaf. It is not an easy thing to break down the\\ntraining of a lifetime. 1 It would require system-\\natic efforts to loosen the association between the\\nwhich intuitional moralists inculcate. (At the same time this\\nsentiment, which Kant, among others, has expressed with peculiar\\nforce, is in no way incompatible with Utilitarianism only it must\\nnot attach itself to any subordinate rules of conduct.) Still, he\\nwill naturally contemplate it with reverence and wonder, as a\\nmarvellous product of nature, the result of long centuries of\\ngrowth, showing in many parts the same fine adaptation of means\\nto complex exigencies as the most elaborate structures of physical\\norganisms exhibit he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a\\nmechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispo-\\nsitions, by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum\\nof human happiness is continually being produced, a mechanism\\nwhich no politicians or philosophers could create, yet without\\nwhich the harder and coarser machinery of Positive Law could not\\nbe permanently maintained, and the life of man would become\\nas Hobbes forcibly expresses it solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,\\nand short.\\n1 See TurgSnev s novels, Xciv Fathers and Sons; and Dos-\\ntoie .ski s Crime and Punishment.", "height": "3504", "width": "2408", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE 115\\nideas of certain modes of conduct and the moral\\nsentiments. Why should the philosopher who un-\\nderstands the utility of these feelings attempt to\\neradicate them? Nay, will he not rather seek to\\ndevelop and to strengthen them, to attach them\\nto forms of conduct which his growing intelligence\\nfinds to be the best?\\nOur philosophical and theological beliefs have, as\\nPaulsen points out, much less influence on our\\nactions than is commonly supposed. Many men\\nwho honestly believe in conscience as the voice of\\nGod, and who believe that there is a future life in\\nwhich the just will be rewarded and the unjust pun-\\nished, act as though they had neither conscience\\nnor fear of hell. Conduct depends upon character,\\ncharacter depends upon impulses, feelings, and ideas\\ntogether, not on ideas alone. Train a child properly,\\nwork moral habits into his very nature, arouse in\\nhim a fellow-feeling for all mankind, and you may\\nturn him loose upon the world without fear. If,\\nhowever, you tell him that he must obey the moral\\nlaw simply because it is God s will, and for no other\\nreason, then, if he ever loses his faith in God, his\\nmorality will be without support, and he will dis-\\nregard the law simply to prove his freedom and\\nenlightenment.", "height": "3496", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IV\\nTHE ULTIMATE GROUND OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS 1\\n1. Conscience as the Standard. Our first ques-\\ntion was, Why do men judge or evaluate as they\\ndo in morals? Why do they call acts right and\\nwrong We answered this question psychologi-\\ncally, that is, we pointed out the psychical states\\nupon which moral judgment depends. We found\\nthat certain feelings cluster around certain ideas of\\nacts, and that it is in virtue of these feelings that\\nwe pronounce moral judgments. We embraced all\\nthese mental conditions of moral judgment under\\nthe term conscience, and declared that men judge as\\nthey do because they have a conscience. We also\\nexamined the views of the different schools with\\nregard to the innateness of conscience, and came to\\nthe conclusion that conscience is neither original\\nin the human soul in the sense in which the intu-\\nitionists take it, nor the product of individual expe-\\nrience, as their opponents hold, but that there is an\\nelement of truth in both schools. We agreed with\\nthe former in saying that conscience is an intuition,\\nwith the latter, that it has an origin and development.\\nBut we are not yet satisfied with the results which\\nwe have reached. Men judge as they do because\\n1 See references under chap. v.\\n116", "height": "3504", "width": "2420", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "THE CRITERION OF MORALITY 117\\nthey have a conscience. They call an act right or\\nwrong because conscience tells them so. But, we\\nask, why does conscience tell them so? Why do\\nthe feelings of approval (and disapproval) and the\\nought-feeling surround the ideas of certain acts?\\nBecause our parents and teachers, present and past,\\nhave made the connection for us? But who made\\nthe connection for them? What is the principle\\nwhich originally governed the process? What is\\nthe ultimate reason or ground why certain acts are\\njudged as they are judged? In other words, what\\nis the ultimate ground of moral distinctions, why is\\nright right, and wrong wrong? What in the last\\nanalysis makes it right or wrong Why is it right\\nto tell the truth, and wrong to lie and steal\\n2. The Theological View. Simply because God\\nhas willed it, answers one school, which was founded\\nby the mediaeval schoolmen, Duns Scotus and Will-\\niam Occam. God has made the connection spoken\\nof before. Stealing and lying are wrong because\\nGod has arbitrarily decreed them to be so. Had\\nHe, as He might and could have done, declared them\\nto be right, then stealing and lying would be right.\\nGod does not require actions because they are\\ngood, says the old schoolman Gerson, but they\\nare good because He requires them just as others\\nare evil because He forbids them. 1 We might, if we\\nchose, call this the theological school.\\n1 See Janet, Theory of Morals, translated by M. Chapman,\\np. 167 Lecky, History of European Morals, pp. 17 ff. According", "height": "3504", "width": "2308", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "118 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n3. The Popular View. No, says another class of\\nthinkers, an act is right or wrong intrinsically. It\\nis absurd to ask why lying and stealing are wrong.\\nMoral truths are as self-evident as the axioms of\\ngeometry. We might as well ask why twice two\\nare four as ask why stealing is wrong. The ethical\\nrules are absolutely true, they are necessary truths\\nwe cannot possibly withhold our assent from them,\\nand yet we cannot prove them. And as God is\\nbound by the truths of mathematics and cannot\\nmake twice two anything but four, so He is bound\\nby the moral law and cannot make stealing right. 1\\nAn act is right or wrong because conscience tells\\nme so, and conscience tells me so because it is so.\\nBehind the dicta of conscience we cannot go. 2 Let\\nus call this school the popular or common-sense school.\\n4. The Teleological Vieiv. But the scientific in-\\nstinct is too strong in man to be silenced by such\\ndogmatic assertions as the foregoing. The philo-\\nsophical thinker demands reasons, and is not to be\\nput off with words. He is apt to begin at the very\\npoint where the popular mind abandons the search\\nas useless or impossible. We desire to know why\\nan act is right, what makes it right, and receive the\\ndogmatic reply that it is right in itself, that it is\\nabsolutely right, that there is no reason for its being\\nto Descartes, the will of God makes all moral distinctions He could\\nmake good bad. See his Meditations, Answer to the Sixth\\nObjection.\\n1 See Thomas Aquinas and his school.\\n2 See the rational intuitionists discussed in chap ii, 3.", "height": "3500", "width": "2388", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "THE CRITERION OF MORALITY 119\\nright beyond the fact that conscience dictates it, or\\nthat it is right because God wills it car tel est\\nson bon plaisir Now we are willing to admit that\\nconscience dictates it, and that what conscience dic-\\ntates is for the time being right. And we are also\\nwilling to admit that it is the will of God. But we\\nwould know why conscience speaks as it does, what\\nhas guided it in its deliverances, what is the prin-\\nciple or criterion or standard underlying its judg-\\nments. There must be some ultimate ground for\\nthe distinctions which it makes. And if God made\\nright right and wrong wrong, we would know why\\nHe did it, why He made stealing wrong, what reason\\nHe had for doing it, what purpose He had in view\\nwhen He willed it. Wherever we find an instinct\\nwe investigate and seek to explain it, to discover its\\nraison d etre if it has any. I ask, Why do we eat\\nand drink and sleep and you tell me with a con-\\ntemptuous smile, Because we are hungry and thirsty\\nand tired, which, though perfectly true, does not\\nanswer my question at all. I desire to know the\\nraison d etre of eating and drinking and sleeping,\\nthe purposes aimed at and realized by these func-\\ntions, the principles on which they rest.\\n5. Arguments for Teleology. Let us see whether\\nwe cannot find a reason for our question, What is\\nthe ultimate ground of moral distinctions? Why\\nis it right to tell the truth, and wrong to lie and\\nsteal? The following reflections may suggest the\\nanswer", "height": "3492", "width": "2328", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "120 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n(1) Every willed action has some end in view.\\nWe desire to realize a purpose. Indeed, all action\\ntends to realize an end or purpose, even instinctive\\nand automatic action. It lies in the very nature of\\nthings that acts and motives should produce results.\\nNow if human conduct is willed by man, and if the\\nwill always aims at results, it is to be supposed that\\nmoral conduct aims at results, that it realizes ends\\nor purposes which are desired by man. And we\\nshould not go far amiss in saying that these results\\nor effects are the raison d etre, the reason for exist-\\nence, of moral conduct.\\n(2) When we reflect upon the modes of conduct\\nwhich our age calls right and wrong, we find that\\nthose which are called right or good uniformly pro-\\nduce effects different from those which are called\\nwrong or bad, and that the effects of the former\\nare preferred, desired, and approved, while the\\neffects of the latter are disliked and disapproved.\\nFalsehood, calumny, theft, treachery, murder, etc.,\\nproduce results which we call pernicious and evil\\ntruthfulness, honesty, loyalty, benevolence, justice,\\nproduce consequences of a beneficial nature. The\\nuniverse is so arranged that certain acts are bound\\nto have certain effects, and human nature is so con-\\nstituted that some effects are desired and others\\nhated. The act of murder carries countless evils\\nin its train the destruction of the victim and his\\nlife s hopes, feelings of grief and desires for revenge\\nin the hearts of the related survivors, general sorrow", "height": "3500", "width": "2396", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "THE CRITERION OF MORALITY 121\\nand a feeling of insecurity in the entire community.\\nThe family of the murdered man may also suffer ma-\\nterial loss by the removal of their supporter, while\\nother circles are indirectly affected by their misfor-\\ntune. The murderer himself cannot live the life\\nof peace and security which he enjoyed before the\\ncrime. He has drawn upon himself the wrath of\\nhis fellows, not to speak of the legal punishment\\nwhich may stare him in the face. The mark of\\nCain is upon him, the blood of his victim cries for\\nrevenge, men fear him and hate him, and he fears\\nand hates them in return. Such and many kindred\\neffects are bound to follow the commission of crime\\neven in the most primitive state of society. And\\nit would be impossible for men to live together in\\na community in which acts having such effects were\\nhabitually practised. A society cannot thrive whose\\nmembers lie and steal and commit murder and other-\\nwise disregard each other, in which the wicked are\\nnot punished and wrongs redressed, in which even\\nthieves and rascals fall out. Now would it not be\\nsafe to assume that these effects, both internal and\\nexternal, are the significant thing in morals\\n(3) We also notice that whenever our conscience\\nleaves us in the lurch, and fails to indicate the proper\\ncourse to pursue, we frequently attempt to reason\\nabout our conduct. What, we ask ourselves, would\\nbe the effect of such and such an act upon ourselves\\nand others and society at large I may fully approve\\nof a line of action which I have been pursuing and", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "122 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nwhich everybody else commends, until some day\\nit dawns upon me that my behavior is bound to\\nharm myself and others, in which case I alter my\\njudgment. And in urging others to be moral we\\nfrequently point out to them the effects which\\naccompany both right- and wrong-doing. We seem\\nto be anxious to justify the law by its effects.\\nSaint Paul says If thy brother be grieved with\\nthy meat, now walkest thou not charitably. Destroy\\nnot him with thy meat, for whom Christ died.\\nIt is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine,\\nnor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is\\noffended or is made weak. x That is, do not do cer-\\ntain things because of the effect of your example.\\nWe also often try to influence children, who do not\\nalways see into the so-called self-evidence of the\\nmoral law, by showing them the effects of right\\nand wrong. Moreover, we are sometimes advised\\nto do right on the ground that God wills our good,\\nand that this is realized by the moral law.\\n(4) When we study the morality of different\\nraces and ages, we observe that certain modes of\\nconduct are insisted on which are especially adapted\\nto the conditions, both inner and outer, of the times.\\nWhere men dwell together in families or clans, and\\ncare only for those related to them, the chief con-\\ncern seems to be to ward off the attacks of other\\nfamilies and tribes. In such a state blood-revenge\\nis a sacred duty, and disloyalty to the clan a heinous\\n1 Bomans, xiv, 14-23.", "height": "3504", "width": "2420", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "THE CRITERION OF MORALITY 123\\ncrime. In societies of a larger growth surrounded\\nby warlike neighbors, obedience to authority and\\nmartial courage are the highest virtues. Such acts\\nare commanded and judged as moral which enable\\nthe community to live and to maintain and increase\\nits possessions. Whatever hinders it from realizing\\nthis purpose is condemned. Child murder is often\\nlooked upon as legitimate where additions to the\\nmembership of the tribe are regarded as dangerous\\nto its welfare. Aged adults are killed without com-\\npunction when their presence becomes a burden.\\nSickly infants and some of the female offspring are\\nput to death or exposed lest the} r hamper the tribe\\nin the struggle for life. For the ancient Greek as\\nwell as the ancient Hebrew, the strength of the\\nState was the all-important thing. The moral code\\nof such peoples embraces forms of conduct which we\\nshudder at, but which will be found, upon investi-\\ngation of all the conditions, to have had their rea-\\nson for existence. Men like Socrates, Plato, and\\nAristotle, whom we may surely regard as high\\ntypes of Grecian morality, regarded as right and\\nproper customs which we condemn, but which\\nseemed to them essential to the existence of the\\nState. 1 Plato speaks of the exposure of children\\nwith as little concern as we should feel at the kill-\\n1 See Plato s Bepublic; Aristotle s Politics; Mahaffy, Social\\nLife in Greece; Spencer, Inductions of Ethics Ree, Entstehung\\ndes Gewissens Williams, A Beview of Evolutional Ethics Suth-\\nerland, The Origin and Groivth of the Moral Instinct.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "124 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ning of a dog. Aristotle justifies slavery on the\\nground of its necessity, and jestingly declares that\\nslavery will be abolished as soon as the shuttle-\\ncocks in the looms begin to move themselves.\\n(5) When we investigate the subject-matter of\\nthe moral law, we notice certain discrepancies\\nwhich cannot be explained except on the theory\\nthat the effect of the act is the important thing.\\nThe law says, Thou shalt not kill either thyself or\\nother human beings. It is wrong to take human\\nlife. And yet according to the popular conscience\\nthe State has the right to execute criminals, and an\\nindividual may kill a fellow in self-defence. Nor is\\nkilling in war regarded as reprehensible. It is right\\nfor a nation to defend itself when attacked, or to\\nattack another nation that is meditating its destruc-\\ntion. Suicide is generally condemned as wrong, and\\nyet we do not blame Arnold von Winkelried, who\\ngathered to his breast the spear-points of the enemy\\nin order to open a path for his followers.\\nThe law says, Thou shalt not lie. But we do not\\nfind fault with the physician for deceiving his\\npatients for their own good, nor with the general\\nfor deluding the enemy, nor with the officer of the\\nlaw for not always telling the truth to the murderer\\nwhom he wishes to entrap.\\nIn all these cases modes of conduct are prohibited\\nwhich have certain harmful effects. They all repre-\\nsent forms of action which endanger life. And yet\\nthese same modes of conduct are allowed in certain", "height": "3504", "width": "2400", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "THE CRITERION OE MORALITY 125\\ninstances apparently because the usual results\\nattendant upon them do not appear, or because an\\ninsistence upon their performance would have still\\nmore serious consequences than the abrogation of\\nthe law.\\nFrom the above, it seems to me, we may safely\\ninfer that the ultimate ground of moral distinctions\\nlies in the effects which acts tend to produce. Such\\nacts as actually tend or are believed to produce con-\\nsequences desired by mankind come to be regarded\\nas good or right, and are enjoined as duties, while\\ntheir opposites are condemned and prohibited. The\\neffect or end or purpose which an act tends to real-\\nize must, in the last analysis, be what gives to it its\\nmoral worth. It must be this end or purpose which,\\nin some way or another, has prompted man to eval-\\nuate as he does. This it must be which constitutes\\nthe ground or principle or standard or criterion of\\nmoral codes. In other words, morality is a means to\\nan end its utility or purposiveness is its standard.\\n6. Teleological Schools. Let us call this view,\\nwhich regards the utility or purposiveness or tele-\\nology (from the Greek word, reXo?, telos, end, pur-\\npose) of morality as its ground, the teleological\\nview. 1 According to it such acts are good or right\\n1 The Latin word for useful is utilis. We might therefore call\\nthe school which regards the utility of conduct as the criterion of\\nits moral worth, the utilitarian school. But, as we shall see later\\non, this term has been appropriated by a particular branch or\\nphase of the school. To avoid confusion, therefore, we shall follow\\nthe usage introduced by Paulsen, and employ the term teleological.", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "126 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nas tend to produce certain results or effects, or to\\nrealize a certain end. Here the question naturally\\narises, What is the end or purpose which morality\\nrealizes or seeks to realize Different answers have\\nbeen given\\n(1) Morality conduces to pleasure or happiness\\nit is the pleasure-giving quality of an act that makes\\nit good. The Greek word for pleasure is rjSovr)\\n(hedone). Hence we may call this view the pleas-\\nure-theory, or hedonism. 1 It declares that acts are\\ngood or bad according as they tend to produce\\npleasure or pain.\\nBut, we ask, Pleasure for whom? My pleasure\\nor your pleasure (a) Mine, say some. Acts are\\ngood or bad because they tend to make me happy or\\nunhappy. This is egoistic (from Greek \u00e2\u0082\u00ac70), Latin\\nego Y), or individualistic hedonism.\\n(5) No, say others, acts are good or bad according\\nas they tend to give pleasure or pain to others. This\\nis heteristic (erepos, heteros, other) or altruistic (Latin\\nalter, other), or universalistic hedonism. 2\\n(2) According to other teleologists, the principle\\n1 The Greek word for happiness is evbaifxovla (eudcemonia).\\nHence the theory is often called eudcemonism.\\n2 Called by John Stuart Mill utilitarianism. Mill s utilitarian-\\nism is universalistic hedonism. He applies the general, or generic,\\nterm to a particular species, and identifies utilitarianism with a\\nparticular phase of it. It is for this reason, as we stated before,\\nthat we prefer to use the term teleology. The term utilitarianism,\\nowing to Mill s use of it, means, in most persons minds, univer-\\nsalistic hedonism, which, of course, is not the only possible teleo-\\nlogical school.", "height": "3504", "width": "2380", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "THE CRITERION OF MORALITY 127\\nof morality is not pleasure or happiness, but the\\npreservation of life, virtuous activity, welfare,\\ndevelopment, progress, perfection, realization. We\\nmight call the adherents of this school anti-hedonists,\\nor according to their more positive tenets, vitalists\\n(vita, life), perfectionists, realizationists, or ener gists. 1\\nThe energists or perfectionists hold that acts are\\ngood which tend to preserve and develop human life.\\nWe may have here, as above (a) egoistic or indi-\\nvidualistic energism and (7 altruistic or univer-\\nsalistic energism. According to the former, the end\\nof morality is the preservation and development of\\nindividual life according to the latter, of the life\\nof the species.\\n7. Summary. The following table attempts to\\nsummarize the views mentioned in this chapter 2\\n1 A term employed by Paulsen, derived from the Greek ivtpyeca\\n(energeia), energy, work, action. The advocates of this view are\\nalso called eudtemonists by some. The word eudoemonia means\\nhappiness, but for Aristotle and others happiness is identical with\\nvirtuous activity. The different senses in which this word eudce-\\nmonia is used by different writers often causes confusion.\\n2 These views are by no means, as is usually supposed, neces-\\nsarily antagonistic to each other. The statements, An act is\\nright or wrong because conscience tells me so, and An act is\\nright or wrong because of the effects it tends to produce, do not\\nnecessarily exclude each other. They can both be true. Similarly,\\nthe statements, An act is right or wrong because God wills it to\\nbe so, and An act is right or wrong because conscience tells me\\nso, and An act is right or wrong because its effects make it so,\\ncan be easily harmonized. See chap, v, 1, 11, 12.", "height": "3500", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "128\\nINTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nWhat makes an Act Right\\n1\\nor Wrong\\n1 1\\nThe Theological The Common-sense The Teh ological\\nSchool School School\\nThe will of God Conscience The effect of the act\\n1 1\\n1\\nThe will of God, and the\\ninherent goodness or\\n1 1\\nWhat is the effect?\\n1\\nbadness of the act\\n1\\nPleasure\\n(Hedonism)\\nPerfection\\n(Energism)\\n1\\n1 1\\nWhose pleasure\\n1\\nWhose perfection\\nOf self Of others\\n(Egoistic (Altruistic\\nhedonism) hedonism)\\n1 1\\nOf self Of others\\n(Egoistic (Altruistic\\nenergism) energism)\\n1 1\\n1\\nOf self and others\\nOf self and others\\n1\\nTheologico-Teleological School An act is good or bad because\\nGod wills it, and God wills it because of its effects.", "height": "3504", "width": "2380", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER V\\nTHE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 1\\nBefore attempting to discuss the problems sug-\\ngested in the last chapter, let us examine a little\\nmore carefully our fundamental thesis that the\\nmoral worth of acts ultimately depends upon the\\neffects which they naturally tend to produce, and\\nconsider some objections which may be urged\\nagainst it.\\n1. Conscience and Teleology. When we say that\\nthe end which morality subserves is its ground or\\nreason for being, we do not mean to imply that the\\nagent always has the end or purpose clearly in\\n1 Advocates of the Teleological View Aristotle, Nicomachean\\nEthics Butler, Sermons upon Human Nature Hutcheson, Inquiry\\ninto the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue and Beauty Hume, Inquiry\\nconcerning the Principles of Morals Paley, 3Ioral Philosophy\\nMill, Utilitarianism, chap, ii Spencer, Data of Ethics, chaps, i-\\nifi Stephen, Science of Ethics, chaps, iv-v Hoffding, Ethik, chap,\\nvii; Jhering, Der Zweck im Becht, Vol. II, pp. 95 ff. Wundt,\\nEthics, Part III, chaps, ii-iv; Paulsen, Ethics, pp. 222 ff.; Suther-\\nland, The Moral Instinct, especially Vol. II, pp. 32 ff. and all the\\nthinkers mentioned in next two chapters. Opponents of the Tele-\\nological View Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Abbott s translation,\\npp. 9 ff. Lecky, History of European Morals, chap, i Bradley,\\nEthical Studies; Martineau, Types, Vol. II; Spencer, Social Stat-\\nics, first edition.\\nk 129", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "130 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nview. 1 We have already pointed out in our chapter\\non conscience that he pronounces judgment upon\\nan act immediately or instinctively, so to speak, that\\nhe calls the act right or wrong because his con-\\nscience tells him so. He may not be conscious of\\nthe utility of the act which he approves or feels him-\\nself obliged to perform. Our theory does not at all\\nassert that he performs acts because of their effects.\\nMoral acts are not necessarily prompted by the con-\\nscious desire on part of the doer to produce certain\\nconsequences. We eat without being conscious of\\nthe utility of eating and without intending to pre-\\nserve our bodies, but because we feel hungry. Still,\\nwe may say, and have the right to say, that the tak-\\ning of nourishment produces beneficial results, and\\nthat these constitute the reason or ground for our\\ntaking food. 2 There is no contradiction whatever\\nbetween the statement that we call stealing wrong\\nbecause we feel it to be wrong, or because conscience\\ntells us so, and the statement that stealing is wrong\\nbecause of its effects. In the former case we give\\nthe psychological reason or ground for the wrongness\\n1 See Stephen, The Science of Ethics, chap, iv, ii, The MoAl\\nLaw. 1 See also supra, p. 72, note 3.\\n2 See Williams, A Review of Evolutional Ethics, pp. 326 ff.\\nSee Butler, Human Nature: It may be added that as persons\\nwithout any conviction from reason of the desirableness of life,\\nwould yet, of course, preserve it merely from the appetite of\\nhunger; so, by acting merely from regard (suppose) to reputation,\\nwithout any consideration of the good of others, men often con-\\ntribute to public good.", "height": "3500", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 131\\nof the act in the latter we point out the real\\nreason.\\nIt is just as easy and just as hard, in the last analy-\\nsis, to explain why we should perform certain acts\\nwithout being conscious of their utility, why we\\nshould feel obliged to pursue certain modes of con-\\nduct, the purpose of which turns out to be useful,\\nwithout being conscious of their purposiveness, as it is\\nto tell why animals should feel impelled to do the very\\nthings which they ought to do in order to preserve\\nlife, without knowing anything of the end or pur-\\npose realized by their impulses. The attempts which\\nhave been made to account for this apparently pre-\\nestablished harmony in the latter case greatly resem-\\nble those employed to explain the former. According\\nto some, God has implanted certain ideas and feelings\\nin the soul of the bird for the purpose of enabling\\nit to do what it does. It knows what is good for it,\\nbecause God has given it a faculty of knowing it.\\nOthers simply declare that instincts are innate ca-\\npacities for acting in a certain useful way. Still\\nothers try to explain them as the results of a long\\nline of development, as products of evolution but\\nin every case the utility of the instinct is confessed\\nto be the ground of the animal s possessing it.\\nThe fact that conscience prescribes acts which are\\nuseful, without knowing of their usefulness, is ac-\\ncounted for in the same ways, as we have already\\nseen. 1 According to some, God has given us a\\n1 See chap. ii.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "i32 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nfaculty by means of which we immediately discover\\nuseful acts. 1 We, however, prefer to say, as we said\\nbefore, that conscience is a development, and grows\\nwith its environment. The race learns by experience\\nthat certain acts make happy and peaceful living to-\\ngether impossible, while others tend to create relations\\nof harmony and good will, and gradually evolves a\\ncode of morals which, in a measure at least, tends to\\npreservation or happiness, or whatever the end may\\nbe. These modes of conduct, which must be strictly\\nenforced, become habitual or customary, and are sur-\\nrounded with the feelings all the way from fear\\nof retaliation to pure obligation which we noticed\\nbefore. 2 By the side of these feelings, which are\\nmore or less intense and easily hold the attention,\\nthe real purpose of the rules is lost sight of. Of\\ncourse, it is not to be supposed that primitive soci-\\neties carefully reasoned out the possible effects of\\ncertain conduct and then adopted a particular end\\nor purpose by an act of parliament. But we may\\nimagine, I believe, that the primitive man had sense\\nenough to find out when he was hurt, and when he\\nhurt some one else, and that in order to live at all\\nevery one had to have some regard for every one\\nelse. Humanity did not solve the problem of adapt-\\n1 Thus, Hutcbeson says Certain feelings and acts are intui-\\ntively recognized as good we have a natural sense of immediate\\nexcellence, and this is a supernaturally derived guide. All these\\nfeelings and acts agree in one general character, of tending to\\nhappiness. See also Paley, Moral Philosophy.\\n2 See chap. iii.", "height": "3496", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 133\\ning itself to its surroundings in a day indeed, it is\\nfar from having mastered the subject even in the\\nenlightened present.\\nThe objection, then, that individuals are not always\\nconscious of the ultimate ground of moral distinc-\\ntions 1 does not affect our theory at all. We can\\nwithout difficulty explain both the immediacy with\\nwhich moral judgments are uttered, and the igno-\\nrance of the agent with reference to the end or pur-\\npose upon which the law is based.\\n2. Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives.\\nClosely connected with this objection is the one\\nthat the teleological theory cannot explain the abso-\\nluteness of the moral law. The law, it is asserted,\\ncommands categorically or unconditionally, Thou\\nshalt, Thou shalt not and is apparently utterly\\nregardless of ends or effects or experience. We\\nanswer, in the first place, that the so-called categori-\\ncal imperative is the expression in language of the\\nfeeling of obligation within us, which speaks per-\\nemptorily, and that when we have explained this\\nfeeling we have explained the categorical impera-\\ntive. Secondly, the teleological view will have to\\nregard this imperative in the same light in which it\\nviews all imperatives or rules or commands or pre-\\nscriptions. The claim of the teleological school is\\nthat acts are good or bad, right or wrong, according\\nto the effects which they tend to produce. 2 Stealing,\\n1 See first edition of Spencer s Social Statics.\\n2 See, for example, Mill s Utilitarianism, p. 9.", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "134 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nlying, murder, cruelty, are wrong because they pro-\\nduce effects quite different from honesty, kindness,\\nbenevolence, etc. Moral rules, like all other rules,\\nhave a purpose in view they command a certain\\nact in order that an end may be reached. When\\nthe physician prescribes for you he lays down certain\\nrules, the purpose or object of which is the restora-\\ntion of your health. These prescriptions may be\\nreduced to the hypothetical form, as follows If\\nyou would get well, do thus or so. Though the\\nphysician s imperatives are peremptory or uncondi-\\ntional or categorical (as Kant would say) in form,\\nthough he may give no reason for them, they are\\nvirtually hypothetical in meaning. The same may\\nbe said of the moral imperatives. They are cate-\\ngorical in form Thou shalt not steal and hypo-\\nthetical in meaning If thou dost not desire certain\\nconsequences. The command, Do not steal, is not\\ngroundless or absolute or unconditional, as its form\\nwould indicate its reason or ground, though not\\nexplicitly stated, is implied because stealing tends\\nto bring about certain effects.\\n3. Actual Effects and Natural Effects. Again,\\nthe objector declares, the moral worth of an act is\\nnot dependent upon its effects nay, it is either good\\nor bad utterly regardless of its results. 1 Even\\nthough, owing to peculiar circumstances, the assassi-\\nnation of a tyrant may, all things considered, pro-\\nduce good effects, and the performance of a kind\\n1 See Kant and Martineau, chap. ii.", "height": "3504", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 135\\ndeed do the opposite, still murder is wrong and\\nbenevolence right. 1\\nVery true, we should say. We do not maintain that\\nan act is right or wrong because of the effects which\\nit actually produces in a particular case, but because\\nof the effects which it naturally tends to produce.\\nArsenic is a fatal poison because it naturally tends\\nto cause death. Sometimes the usual effect fails to\\nappear, but we say that this is exceptional, and still\\nregard arsenic as a fatal poison. Falsehood, cal-\\numny, theft, treachery, and murder naturally tend\\nto produce evil effects, and are therefore wrong. It\\nlies in the very nature of these modes of conduct to\\ndo harm. The universe is so arranged that certain\\nacts are bound to have certain effects, and human\\nnature is so constituted that some effects are desired,\\nothers despised. Now whether we assume that God\\ndirectly gave to man certain laws, the observance of\\nwhich enables him to reach ends desired by him, or\\nwhether we assume that man discovered them himself,\\nthe fact remains, that morality realizes a purpose, and\\nthat this purpose is the ground for its existence.\\n1 Cardinal Newman says: The Church holds that it were\\nbetter for sun and moon to drop from the heavens, for the earth to\\nfail, and for all the many millions who are upon it to die of starva-\\ntion in extremest agony, so far as temporal affliction goes, than\\nthat one soul, I will not say should be lost, but should commit one\\nsingle venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, though it harmed\\nno one, or steal one poor farthing without excuse. Anglican\\nDifficulties, p. 190. Compare with this Fichte s statement, I\\nwould not break my word even to save humanity.", "height": "3504", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "136 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nBesides, it would be very difficult to prove that\\nthe slaying of the tyrant had no evil effects, and the\\nbenevolent deeds no good ones. Human nature is\\nso constituted that the commission of a crime like\\nmurder cannot fail to do harm. The experience of\\nmankind shows that the results of such a deed are\\nbaneful, and you can hardly prove that they will\\nbe absent in a particular case. Who can say that\\nthe murder of Julius Csesar, or of Alexander II of\\nRussia, or even of Caligula, was a blessing Who\\nwould be willing to live in a society in which even\\nthe killing of tyrannical governors became the rule\\n4. A Hypothetical Question Answered. But, the\\ncommon-sense moralist insists, even though murder\\nand theft naturally tended to produce effects oppo-\\nsite to those which they now produce, they would\\nstill be wrong. The teleologist would answer I\\ncannot imagine such a state of affairs in a world con-\\nstituted like ours. As things go here, these forms of\\nconduct cannot help producing effects which human-\\nity condemns. Still, for the sake of argument, I\\nwill suppose your case. And let me first ask you a\\nquestion. Would charity and honesty and loyalty\\nand truthfulness still be virtues if they led to the\\noverthrow of the world, if they caused sorrow and\\nsuffering, if they destroyed the life and progress and\\nhappiness of mankind It does not seem plausible,\\ndoes it If murder and theft and falsehood really\\ntended to produce opposite effects, mankind would\\nnot have condemned them. If murder were life-", "height": "3504", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "THE TELE0L0G1CAL VIEW 137\\ngiving instead of death-dealing, it would no longer\\nbe murder, that is all. Moreover, were mankind so\\nconstituted as to prefer death to life, it would not\\ninsist upon acts which make life and happiness\\npossible.\\n5. Morality and Prosperity. Yet if your view\\nis correct, our opponents assert, then the most moral\\nman and the most moral nation should live and\\nthrive. But is this always the case Nay, is not\\nthe reverse true We can answer, that, generally\\nspeaking, obedience to the laws of morality insures\\nlife and happiness, and that the wages of sin is\\ndeath. But, just as a man who observes the rules\\nof hygiene may become sick and die, so a moral indi-\\nvidual and a moral nation may perish. Eating tends\\nto preserve life, but yet eating men die. An earth-\\nquake may swallow the most moral community in\\nexistence, and still its morality was the condition\\nof its peaceful and happy life.\\n6. Imperfect Moral Codes. If utility is the\\ncriterion of morality, why do we find so many harm-\\nful and indifferent acts enjoined in the moral codes\\nof peoples Why do men adhere with such tenacity\\nto customs which, so far as we can see, have no\\nraison d etre\\nWe answer (a) Certain acts were believed to\\nhave good effects, and so came to be invested with\\nthe authority of the law others were believed to\\nhave bad effects, and were prohibited. As we said\\n1 Gallwitz, Problem der Ethik in der Gegenwart.", "height": "3504", "width": "2204", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "138 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nbefore, ignorance and superstition play an important\\npart in the making of moral codes. If human\\nbeings were all- wise and unprejudiced, the code\\nmight perhaps be perfect but as men are fallible,\\nthey cannot solve the problems of morality with\\nabsolute perfection. The belief in invisible powers\\nled to many superstitious practices which we should\\ncall immoral, but which were imagined to be pro-\\nductive of good to the race. Many tribes offered\\nhuman sacrifices to their gods, who reflected the\\nmoral nature of their chiefs, in order to satisfy the\\nhunger of the deities, to appease their wrath, or to\\ngain their good will. 1 After such practices have\\nonce become customary, they are clothed with the\\nauthority of conscience, and felt to be right. The\\nHindoo mother who throws her children into\\nthe river or is buried alive in the grave of her hus-\\nband obeys the law of her tribe, and believes that\\nsomehow some good is going to come of it.\\n(5) Where we have a low grade of intelligence\\nin nations, we are apt to have what we of the pres-\\nent would call a low grade of morality. And\\nsimilarly, where we have the feeling of sympathy\\nundeveloped, we find modes of conduct which are\\nabhorrent to a person of wider and deeper sympa-\\nthies. Certain cruel practices are due to this fact.\\nWhen the race grows more intelligent and its sym-\\n1 See Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 266 Spencer,\\nInductions of Ethics Williams, Evolutional Ethics; E,e e, Entsteh-\\nung des Gewissens.", "height": "3516", "width": "2420", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 139\\npathy widens, old forms of conduct are repudiated\\nand new ones adopted.\\nConditions, inner and outer, change and make\\nacts harmful or harmless, which were once not so.\\nThe race, however, is conservative, and clings to the\\nold forms from force of habit and because the moral\\nsentiments which cluster around them cannot be\\neradicated all at once. Just as there are laws on\\nour statute books which once served a useful pur-\\npose, but are now ineffective and even harmful, so\\nthere are laws inscribed on the hearts of men which\\nhave lost their reason for existence. The orthodox\\nJew is taught to feel a certain moral reverence for\\ncustoms which were rational for the time and place\\nwhere they originated, but whose usefulness is gone.\\n7. Moral Reform. But perhaps the end realized\\nby the several moral codes of peoples is not a truly\\nmoral one, you say perhaps their morality is not the\\ntrue morality. Very true, we answer, but it is not\\nour purpose to give to the world a brand new moral\\ncode, but to interpret the codes already existing.\\nIt is the business of a scientific ethics to study the\\nmorality that is, to investigate the rules of conduct\\nwhich men feel as moral, and discover the principle\\nwhich gave rise to them. If we find that there is\\nsuch a principle and that men tacitly assent to it,\\nwe shall understand the genesis of morals. We shall\\nbe able to see where men have bungled in their blind\\nattempts to apply the principle, and we shall be able\\nto distinguish more intelligently between the right", "height": "3500", "width": "2244", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "140 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nand the wrong. After we have found the ideal which\\nis vaguely guiding the destinies of mankind, we of\\nthe present time can ask ourselves whether we are\\nreally realizing it in our conduct. We cannot, how-\\never, lay down the law to the world, nor can we\\nevaluate the existing codes of morality, without hav-\\ning a principle or criterion by which to test it. If\\nwe make conscience the criterion, that is, our own\\nindividual conscience, we are bound to speak dog-\\nmatically, and must concede the same right to other\\nconsciences. We can never obtain the consensus\\nhominum for our rules unless we can justify them\\nby means of a principle which everybody tacitly\\naccepts.\\n8. The Ultimate Sanction of the Moral Law. But,\\nwe are asked by another objector, what validity has\\nthis principle of yours? You say that an act is\\ngood or bad because it produces effects desired or\\nnot desired by men. Why do men desire these\\neffects Why do they prefer certain effects to\\nothers? And why do they feel bound to bring\\nabout certain ones and to refrain from causing\\nothers You say that morality is a means to an\\nend, that the moral laws are grounded on their\\nutility. Suppose we grant it, suppose we justify\\nthe particular rules by the fact that they serve a\\npurpose. But how are we to justify this end or\\npurpose itself?\\nWe cannot answer. We regard certain acts as\\ngood or bad because they tend to produce certain", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 141\\neffects or to realize a certain end or ideal. These\\neffects, this end, this ideal, are desired by men abso-\\nlutely. We can give no reason for the fact that\\nman prefers life to death or happiness to unhap-\\npiness. We can understand why having certain\\nimpulses he should come to develop modes of conduct\\nwhich tend to realize them. But why he should\\ndesire what he desires is a mystery which we can-\\nnot solve. Here we have reached the bed-rock of\\nour science, here we have a true categorical impera-\\ntive which commands absolutely and unconditionally. 1\\n9. Motives and Effects. The point is also raised\\nthat we call a man good in spite of the evil effects\\nwhich his acts naturally tend to produce, when\\nhis motives are good. If the effects constituted\\nthe measure of worth, it is held, then the agent\\nwould be called bad regardless of his motives.\\n1 Hume, Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix\\nI, v It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions\\ncan never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recom-\\nmend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of man-\\nkind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties. Ask a\\nman why he uses exercise he will answer, because he desires to\\nkeep his health if you then inquire why he desires health, he will\\nreadily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your in-\\nquiries farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impos-\\nsible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never\\nreferred to any other object. Something must be desirable on its\\nown account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement\\nwith human sentiment and affection. See Paulsen, Ethics, espe-\\ncially p. 219 Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap, iii, 9 Sigwart,\\nVorfragen der Ethilc, pp. 11 f. Logic, II, pp. 529 ff. See also\\n9 (c), 12, and beginning of chap. vi.", "height": "3504", "width": "2248", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "142 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nWe judge alwa} T s the inner spring of action, as\\ndistinguished from its outward operation, says\\nMartineau or, as Bradley puts it, 1 Acts in so far\\nas they spring from the good will are good. And\\nKant holds, Nothing can possibly be conceived\\nin the world, or even out of it, which can be called\\ngood without qualification, except a Good Will.\\nM A good will is good not because of what it per-\\nforms or effects, not by its aptness for the attain-\\nment of a proposed end, but simply by virtue of the\\nvolition that is, it is good in itself. 2\\nLet us analyze this view.\\n(a) An act is good because it is prompted by a\\ngood will. But, we ask, what is a good will Is\\nthere any such thing as an absolute good will If\\nnot, what is the criterion of its goodness A good\\nwill is a will that is good for something, a will that\\ntends to realize a certain end or purpose, is it not\\nTo say that a good will is a will that wills the good,\\nis to argue in a circle. What is the good, what is\\nthe criterion of goodness It seems that we need\\na standard for judging springs of action as much\\nas we need one for judging acts.\\n(6) No, ou say, a good will is one which acts\\nfrom a sense of duty or respect for the law, regard-\\nless of effects, 3 and we call him good whose will is\\ngood in this sense. But, we ask, do we really call\\na man good whose sense of duty prompts him to\\n1 Ethical Studies. 2 Abbott s translation, p. 9.\\n8 Kant.", "height": "3504", "width": "2396", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 143\\ncommit crime? Almost every fanatic who has assas-\\nsinated the ruler of a nation, from Harmodios and\\nAristogeiton down to the miserable wretch who\\ntook the life of the defenceless Queen Elizabeth of\\nAustria, did so from a sense of duty. We cannot\\ncall the deeds of these pretended patriots good,\\neven though we may believe that their motives\\nwere good, good in the sense that they intended\\nto benefit mankind. The fact is, we judge not only\\nthe disposition or motive, but both motive and act,\\nthe person and the thing, the subject and the object.\\nWhen a man s motives are good or pure, we call him\\nsubjectively or formally moral when his act is good,\\nobjectively or materially moral. 1 To quote Paulsen s\\nexample, Saint Crispin stole leather from the rich\\nto make shoes for the poor. His desire was to\\nalleviate suffering, his motives were in a certain\\nsense good. But can we approve of his conduct,\\nor of the conduct of the political assassins who\\nbelieve that the devil should be fought with his\\nown devilish weapons? Is it right to steal from\\nthe rich to benefit the poor is it right to commit\\nmurder even without malice aforethought Why\\nnot? Because theft and murder tend to produce\\neffects subversive of life, because it lies in the very\\n1 An act is materially good when, in fact, it tends to the\\ninterest of the system, so far as we can judge of its tendency,\\nor to the good of some part consistent with the system, what-\\never were the affections of the agent. An action is formally\\ngood when it flowed from good affection in a just proportion.\\nHutcheson. See also Wundt, Paulsen, Jhering, and others.", "height": "3504", "width": "2248", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "144 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nnature of these acts to breed ruin and destruction.\\nA man, then, may be subjectively moral and objec-\\ntively immoral, and vice versa. But can we call\\nhim truly good or moral when there is a conflict\\nbetween his motives and his deeds Should we\\nhold him up to the world as a model, should we\\nadmire him as much as one whose motives lead\\nhim to the performance of commendable deeds\\nNay, should we not rather seek excuses for him\\nThink of the thousand unfortunates whom the\\nreligious fervor of our Catholic forefathers slew\\nfor the greater glory of God We turn over the\\npages of the history of the Inquisition and shudder\\nto think that the sense of duty should have allied\\nitself with such cruelty, such heartlessness, such\\ninhumanity.\\nLet us say, then, that the goodness of an act\\ndepends upon the effects which it naturally tends\\nto produce, and the goodness of a motive depends\\nupon its tendency to express itself outwardly in\\ngood acts. The truly good man not only desires\\nto do right, but does it. The reason why we lay\\nso much stress on right feeling, on the inwardliness\\nof morality, so to speak, is that it is apt to lead\\nto right action. The heart is the citadel of moral-\\nity, and the pure in heart are apt to be pure in deed.\\nThou blind Pharisee, cleanse first the inside of the\\ncup and of the platter, that the outside thereof may\\nbecome clean also. As Leslie Stephen says The\\nmoral law has to be expressed in the form, 4 Be this,", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 145\\nnot in the form 4 Do this Regulate a man s feel-\\nings or his actions, and you necessarily affect his\\nactions or his feelings. Induce a man not to hate\\nhis brother, and he will be slow to kill him and if\\nyou persuade him not to kill, you necessarily limit to\\nsome degree the force of his hatred. As it is easier\\nfor the primitive mind to accept the objective than\\nthe subjective definition of conduct, the primitive\\nrule takes the corresponding form, and only pre-\\nscribes qualities of character indirectly by prescrib-\\ning methods of conduct. 1\\n(6) In a certain sense, however, we must confess,\\nit is the human will which makes the act good. An\\nact is good because of the end or purpose it realizes.\\nThis end or purpose is one desired or willed by\\nman, and this ideal, this categorical imperative, as\\nwe called it before, is good in itself, absolutely good,\\nthat is, good in the sense that no reason can be given\\nfor its goodness. Hence we are brought back to an\\nultimate principle of human nature. The goodness\\nof a particular act depends upon the effect which it\\ntends to produce and the goodness of a particular\\nmotive depends upon the effect which it tends to\\nproduce in action, but the effect itself is good\\nbecause man wills it. Interpreted in this sense, the\\nKantian view cannot be escaped in this sense noth-\\ning in this world is good except a good will, and a\\ngood will is good simply b}^ virtue of its volition.\\n1 Science of Ethics, chap, iv, iv. See also Wundt, Ethics, Vol. I,\\nchap, i, 2 6, pp. 37 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2248", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "146 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n10. The End justifies the Means. The following\\nargument is also urged as a fatal objection to our\\ntheory a According to the teleological view, it is\\nmaintained, morality is a means to an end. Hence, if\\nthe end is good, the means of realizing that end must\\nnecessarily be good, which is equivalent to saying\\nthat the end justifies the means. And if the end jus-\\ntifies the means, then it is right to commit crime in\\norder to realize a good end. The practical applica-\\ntion of this teaching is bound to lead to immorality,\\nwhich in itself stamps it as false and dangerous.\\nThese statements are full of misconceptions. The\\ntheory does not assert that any end which any per-\\nson may happen to regard as good justifies any\\nmeans which in that person s opinion will realize the\\nend. It maintains that morality conduces to an end,\\nthat this end is the highest end, that this end, as the\\nhighest end, is tacitly desired and approved by all\\nmankind. The correct application of such a prin-\\nciple cannot fail to meet the approval of the most\\nmoral man in existence. Let us go into details.\\nz) This theory does not hold that when once a\\nman has adopted a certain end as good he is justified\\nin doing whatever conduces to it. Nay, we have\\nexpressly repudiated this view in our criticism of\\nthe springs-of-action theory. 2 Our theory does\\nnot concern itself with the temporary and particular\\n1 See Paulsen, System of Ethics, in which it is treated in full,\\nand to which I am largely indebted for the following paragraph.\\n2 See chap, v, 9.", "height": "3504", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 147\\ndesires of individuals, which may conflict with the\\nultimate purpose of morality. I have the right to\\nacquire property, but I have not the right to murder\\nand steal in order to gain my point. The amassing\\nof wealth is not the highest end, the chief good\\nindeed, it is not an end in itself at all, but a means\\nto a higher end. You may happen to believe that\\nthe advancement of a particular religious sect is the\\nhighest end, that God desires your faction to be tri-\\numphant. You may consequently regard it as right\\nto use whatever means may benefit your sect. But\\nyou should remember, first, that your believing this\\ndoes not make it so and, secondly, that evil deeds\\nwill not in the long run benefit any cause. Teleo-\\nlogical ethics does not say that ends justify means,\\nbut it can safely assert that the highest end, what-\\never that may be, justifies the means.\\n(7 Does that mean that if the highest end can\\nbe realized by murder, theft, and falsehood, then\\nthese modes of conduct are moral We must\\nanswer, as before, that murder, theft, and falsehood\\ntend to breed destruction, that it lies in their very\\nnature to do so, as the experience of countless ages\\namply proves. Temporary advantages may, per-\\nhaps, be gained in exceptional cases by the perform-\\nance of such deeds, but lasting good cannot follow\\nwrong. Honesty is the best policy, and the devil\\nthe father of lies. The highest end cannot be\\nattained by such means; nay, no cause can thrive\\non wrong.", "height": "3504", "width": "2308", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "148 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nBut, you say, suppose a form of conduct which,\\nas a rule, tends to produce pernicious effects, and\\nis condemned, should, owing to changed conditions\\nor special circumstances, result in good, what then?\\nWell, we reply, if it is absolutely certain that such\\nconduct tends to realize the end of morality, human-\\nity will approve of it. It is wrong to take human\\nlife or to rob a man of his liberty, and yet the State\\ninflicts the death penalty on criminals, orders its\\nsoldiers to shoot down public foes by the hundreds,\\nconfines lawbreakers in prisons, and breaks up hun-\\ndreds and thousands of homes. It is right to tell\\nthe truth, and yet the general deceives the enemy\\nand even his own army and the physician deceives\\nhis patients in case he deems it necessary. 1 Is hu-\\nmanity benefited by these acts, would life and growth\\nbe impossible without them, are there no evil conse-\\nquences attaching to them? We evidently believe\\nthat capital punishment tends to preserve society\\notherwise we should not permit it. Should the race\\never lose faith in the efficacy of this awful process,\\nso shocking to all sympathetic natures, it would not\\nonly abolish it, but forever regret the fate of those\\nwho have died on the bloody scaffold.\\n(e) Another thing. The theory does not say that\\nthe end justifies the means which you or I may be-\\nlieve or think will make for the end. There is a\\ngreat difference between saying that the end justi-\\n1 See Xenophon s Memorabilia, Bk. IV, Socrates s Definition\\nof Justice.", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 149\\nfies the means, and, the end justifies the means which\\nyou or I believe to be the means. In order to be\\nstrictly moral, an act must actually realize the high-\\nest end. Your believing or feeling certain that it\\ndoes, does not make it so.\\n(d) It seems, then, you say, that both the race\\nand the individual may be mistaken, that they may\\napprove of laws which do not really promote the\\nwelfare of humanity, or whatever the end may be.\\nExactly, we answer, such is the case. To err is\\nhuman, in morals as everywhere else. Many forms\\nof conduct have in the course of history been felt\\nas right, which subsequent generations acknowledged\\nto be wrong. And men have died at the stake and\\non the cross for offering the world a moral code for\\nwhich future ages blessed their names. The sinner\\nof to-day often becomes the saint of to-morrow.\\n(e) And now let us ask some questions ourselves.\\nThe opponents of teleology usually regard conscience\\nas the final arbiter of conduct. A man is asked\\nto act according to the dictates of his conscience.\\nNow suppose it tells him to steal and kill and lie\\nin order to accomplish what he believes to be right.\\nThen are not falsehood and murder and stealing right\\nAnd then, does not the good end justify the means?\\nIf you say that his conscience may be mistaken, and\\nthat he should therefore not obey his conscience, you\\nhave given up your position. Besides, how shall\\nhe correct his conscience By reflecting Reflect-\\ning upon what? Evidently upon some principle or", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "150 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ncriterion which is to serve as a guide even to his\\nso-called infallible conscience. 1\\n11. Teleology and Atheism. The objection is also\\nfrequently raised that teleology is a godless doc-\\ntrine. This is the usual stand taken by persons who\\ncan oppose no tenable arguments against a view,\\nand yet desire in some way to confound it. By\\ndesignating it as atheistic they hope to cast discredit\\nupon it and its supporters, and to frighten others\\nfrom subscribing to it. The theory, however, is\\nno more godless than any other theory. There is\\nnothing absurd in the thought that God established\\nmorality because of the effects which it tends to\\nrealize. It is not absurd to believe that He had a\\npurpose in view in establishing it, and that this pur-\\npose is the reason for its existence. No one, it seems\\nto me, can accuse men like Thomas Aquinas, Will-\\niam Paley, 2 and Bishop Butler of godlessness; and\\nyet they found it possible to believe in teleology.\\nLet me quote from Butler s Sermons upon Human\\nNature It may be added that as persons without\\nany conviction from reason of the desirableness of\\nlife would yet, of course, preserve it merely from\\nthe appetite of hunger, so, by acting merely from\\nregard (suppose) to reputation, without any con-\\nsideration of the good of others, men often contrib-\\nute to public good. In both these instances they\\nare plainly instruments in the hands of another, in\\n1 See Kant, Abbott s translation, p. 311.\\n2 See chap, vi, 10.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW 151\\nthe hands of Providence, to carry on ends the\\npreservation of the individual and good of society\\nwhich they themselves have not in their view or\\nintention. 1\\n12. Teleology and Intuitionism. In conclusion, I\\nshould like to emphasize the fact that there is no\\nnecessary contradiction between the theory we have\\nadvanced in the foregoing pages, and intuitionism. 2\\n1 See Mill s Utilitarianism, chap, ii, pp. 31 f. We not uncom-\\nmonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless\\ndoctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so\\nmere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon\\nwhat idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If\\nit be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness\\nof His creatures, and that this was His purpose in their creation,\\nutility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly\\nreligious than any other. If it be meant that utilitarianism does\\nnot recognize the revealed will of God as the supreme law of\\nmorals, I answer that an utilitarian who believes in the perfect\\ngoodness and wisdom of God necessarily believes that whatever\\nGod has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals must fulfil\\nthe requirements of utility in a supreme degree. But others\\nbesides utilitarians have been of opinion that the Christian revela-\\ntion was intended, and is fitted, to inform the hearts and minds of\\nmankind with a spirit which should enable them to find for them-\\nselves what is right, and incline them to do it when found, rather\\nthan to tell them, except in a very general way, what it is\\nand that we need a doctrine of ethics, carefully followed out, to\\ninterpret to us the will of God. Whether this opinion is correct or\\nnot, it is superfluous here to discuss, since whatever aid religion,\\neither natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as\\nopen to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as\\nthe testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given\\ncourse of action, by as good right as others can use it for the indi-\\ncation of a transcendental law, having no connection with useful-\\nness or with happiness.\\n2 See chap, iv, 7, note.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "152 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nAccording to the teleological view, the ultimate\\nground of moral distinctions is to be sought in the\\neffects which acts naturally tend to produce. That\\nis, morality realizes a purpose, is a means to an end,\\nand owes its existence to its utility. Intuitionism\\nmaintains that morality is intuitive, that the moral\\nlaw is engraven on the heart of man, that it is not\\nimposed upon him from without, but springs from\\nhis innermost essence.\\nNow these two views are by no means antithetical,\\nas is so often declared, but may be easily harmonized.\\nIn the first place, the end realized by morality is one\\nabsolutely desired by human beings. An act is right\\nbecause it produces a certain effect upon human na-\\nture, because, in the last analysis, humanity approves\\nof that effect. 1 We cannot ultimately justify it\\nexcept on the ground of its effect upon man. It is\\ngood because man acknowledges it as a good, be-\\ncause he is by nature so constituted as to be com-\\npelled to acknowledge it as a good. In a certain\\nsense, Kant is right in saying that nothing in this\\nworld is good except a good will, and that a good\\nwill is good simply by virtue of its volition. The\\nhighest good, or the end realized by the moral law, is\\nan absolute good, a good unconditionally desired by\\nthe human will, one for which no other ground can\\nbe found, one whose goodness inheres in itself. A\\nparticular act is good because of the end which it\\ntends to realize, but the end is good in itself, good\\ni See chap, v, 8, 9 (c).", "height": "3516", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW\\n153\\necause man wills it. In this sense, there is a cate-\\ngorical imperative in the heart of man, an imperative\\nthat is.no longer hypothetical, but unconditional. 1\\nIn this sense, too, morality is imposed upon man by\\nhimself: it is the expression of his own innermost\\nessence.\\nIn the second place, we may say, as we have already\\nsaid, that an act is good or bad because conscience\\ndeclares it to be so. 2 The agent evaluates as he\\ndoes because the contemplation of the act produces\\na certain effect upon his consciousness, because it\\narouses certain emotions in him, because conscience\\npronounces judgment upon it. This statement by\\nno means contradicts the statement that the effect\\nof the act is the final criterion of its moral worth.\\nThe intuitionist must grant that the acts approved\\nby conscience produce good effects or realize the high-\\nest good for man, and that its function is to help\\nman to attain his goal. The theological intuitionist\\nmust admit that conscience approves of forms of\\nconduct enjoined by God on account of their con-\\nsequences, that conscience is the representative of\\nGod in the human heart, placed there in order to\\nserve the purpose of the Creator with reference to\\nman. In every instance, conscience is supposed\\nto serve a purpose, to accomplish something for man,\\nto produce effects; otherwise, why should it exist?\\nThere is really no controversy between the intuition-\\n1 See chap, v, 2 also chap, ii, 7 (1).\\n2 Chap, v, 1.", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "154 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nist and the teleologist on this point. Both may-\\nagree that conscience is a means to an end, and that\\nthis end, in some way, accounts for its existence.\\nThe question concerning the origin of conscience\\nwill not necessarily affect this view. The teleol-\\nogist may believe that conscience is innate, or that\\nit is the product of experience, or that it contains\\nboth a priori and a posteriori elements, without con-\\ntradicting his general theory, that morality serves a\\npurpose in the world, and that this purpose is its\\nfinal ground.", "height": "3504", "width": "2416", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VI\\nTHEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD: HEDONISM i\\n1. The Standard of Morality and the Highest\\nG-ood. The conclusion reached in the last chapter\\nwas that the effects of acts constitute the ultimate\\nground of moral distinctions. Acts are, in the last\\nanalysis, right or wrong, good or bad, because of the\\nend or purpose which they tend to realize. We\\nhave attempted to show what this means and what\\nit does not mean. The question now confronts us,\\nWhat is this end or purpose at which human conduct\\naims Mankind enjoins certain modes of conduct in\\nits moral codes, and insists upon their performance.\\nThe end realized by these must, therefore, represent\\nwhat the race ultimately desires and approves it\\nmust in a measure represent the ideal of the race, or\\na good. The race desires and approves of the forms\\nof conduct embraced in the moral code, for the sake\\nof the end realized by that code, and desires and\\napproves of the end for its own sake. The end\\nmust be something which it desires absolutely, other-\\nwise it would be no end, but a means. Our original\\nquestion, What is the ground of moral distinctions,\\nmay therefore be reduced to this What is the\\n1 See references under chap. ii.\\n155", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "156 INTRODUCTION- TO ETHICS\\nhighest end, or the highest good, the summum bonum?\\nWhat is it that mankind strives for, what does it\\nprize above all else, what is its ideal\\n2. The Greek Formulation of the Problem. This\\nis the form in which the ancient Greeks put the\\nproblem. They do not analyze moral facts as we do,\\nin order to discover the principles underlying them,\\nbut simply inquire into the nature of the highest\\ngood. Every art and every scientific inquiry,\\nsays Aristotle, at the beginning of his Nieomachean\\nEthics, and similarly every action and purpose,\\nmay be said to aim at some good. Hence the good\\nhas been defined as that at which things aim. But\\nit is clear that there is a difference in the ends for\\nthe ends are sometimes activities, and sometimes\\nresults beyond the mere activities. Also, where\\nthere are certain ends beyond the actions, the results\\nare naturally superior to the activities. As there\\nare certain arts and sciences, it follows that the\\nends are also various. Thus health is the end of\\nmedicine, a vessel of ship-building, and wealth of\\ndomestic economy. 1\\nWhat, then, is the good in each of these instances\\nIt is presumably that for the sake of which all else is\\ndone. This in medicine is health in strategy, vic-\\ntory in domestic architecture, a house and so on.\\nBut in every action and purpose it is the end, as it is\\nfor the sake of the end that people all do everything\\nelse. If, then, there is a certain end of all action,\\n1 Bk. I, chap. i.", "height": "3504", "width": "2408", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 157\\nit will be this which is the practicable good, and if\\nthere are several such ends it will be these.\\nAs it appears that there are more ends than one, and\\nsome of these, e.g., wealth, flutes, and instruments\\ngenerally, we desire as means to something else, it is\\nevident that they are not all final ends. But the\\nhighest good is clearly something final. Hence, if\\nthere is only one final end, this will be the object of\\nwhich we are in search, and if there are more than\\none, it Avill be the most final of them. We speak of\\nthat which is sought after for its own sake as more\\nfinal than that which is sought after as a means to\\nsomething else we speak of that which is never\\ndesired as a means to something else as more final\\nthan the things which are desired both in themselves\\nand as a means to something else; and we speak of a\\nthing as absolutely final, if it is always desired in\\nitself and never as a means to something else. 1\\nLet us see how this question of the highest good\\nwas answered in the past.\\nThe question usually receives one of two answers:\\n(1) According to one school, pleasure is the highest\\n1 Bk. I, chap, v, Welldon s translation. Compare with this\\nMill, Utilitarianism, chap, i: Questions of ultimate ends are not\\namenable to direct proof. Whatever can he proved to be good\\nmust be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to\\nbe good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good\\nby its conducing to health but how is it possible to prove that\\nhealth is good The art of music is good for the reason, among\\nothers, that it produces pleasure but what proof is it possible to\\ngive that pleasure is good See also Hume, Principles of Morals,\\nAppendix I, v., quoted in note on p. 141.", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "158 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ngood, end, or purpose (2) according to another, it\\nis action, or preservation, or perfection, or reason.\\nWe shall discuss the different theories in what fol-\\nlows, under the heads of hedonism and energism. 1\\n3. The Cyrenaics. Aristippus of Cyrene, who\\nlived in the third century before Christ and founded\\nthe Cyrenaic school, 2 regards pleasure Qqhovr)*) as the\\nultimate aim of life, for all normal beings desire it.\\nWe are from childhood attracted to it without any\\ndeliberate choice of our own and when we have\\nobtained it, we do not seek anything further, and\\nthere is nothing which we avoid so much as its oppo-\\nsite, which is pain. 3 By pleasure he means the\\npositive enjoyment of the moment (rjhovrj ev klv^(T\u00e2\u0082\u00acl),\\nnot merely repose of spirit, a sort of undisturbed-\\nness, or permanent state of happiness. The chief\\ngood is a particular pleasure. Only the present is\\nours, the past is gone, the future uncertain. Therefore,\\nCarpe diem, Gather the rosebuds while ye may,\\nEat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow you die.\\nBut shall the pleasure be bodily or mental?\\nWell, bodily pleasures are superior to mental ones,\\n1 See chap, iv, 6.\\n2 See Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent\\nPhilosophers, Bk. II Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. Bk. VII, 191-\\n192 Bitter and Preller, Historic/, Philosophies Grcecce, pp. 207 ff.\\nMullach, Fragments, Vol. II, 397 ff. the histories of ethics, etc., men-\\ntioned under chap, ii, especially Paulsen, Seth, Sidgwick, Hyslop,\\nLecky, chap i. For fuller bibliographies on the thinkers mentioned\\nin this chapter, see the histories of philosophy, especially English\\ntranslation of Weber s History of Philosophy.\\n8 Diogenes Laertius, translated in Bonn s Library, p. 89.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 159\\nand bodily sufferings worse than mental. Still,\\nevery pleasant feeling (J]hvirdQeia)^ whether it be\\nphysical or spiritual, is pleasure. Every pleasure\\nas such is a good. But some pleasures are bought\\nwith great pain and are to be avoided. A man\\nshould exercise his judgment, be prudent in the\\nchoice of his pleasures. The best thing, says\\nAristippus, is to possess pleasures without being\\ntheir slave, not to be devoid of pleasures.\\nTheodoras, a member of the same school, declares\\nthat, since you cannot always enjoy, you should try\\nto reach a happy frame of mind (%apa). Prudence\\nwill enable a man to obtain the pleasant and avoid\\nthe unpleasant. Pleasure, then, is the end pru-\\ndence or insight or reflection \u00c2\u00a3/ooV?7 u?), the means\\nof getting the most pleasure out of life.\\nHegesias, called ireicjiQavaTos (persuader to die),\\nthe pessimist, admits that we all desire happiness,\\nbut holds that complete happiness cannot exist.\\nHence the chief good is to be free from all trouble\\nand pain, and this end is best attained by those who\\nlook upon the efficient causes of pleasure as indiffer-\\nent. Indeed, death is preferable to life, for death\\ntakes us out of the reach of pain. 1 Anniceris, too,\\nconsiders pleasure as the chief good, and the depri-\\nvation of it as an evil. Still, a man has natural\\nfeelings of benevolence, and ought therefore to sub-\\nmit voluntarily to this deprivation out of regard for\\nhis friends and his country.\\n1 See Cicero, Tusc. 34.", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "160 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n4. Epicurus. According to Epicurus, 1 a later\\nadvocate of hedonism, pleasure is the highest good,\\npain the greatest evil, 2 not, however, the positive or\\nactive pleasure of the Cyrenaics, pleasure in motion\\n(jjhovr) kivh]tik7])^ but quiet pleasure (rfiovr) Karaarrj-\\nHaTLicr/), repose of spirit (arapa^ia), freedom from\\npain (airovlci). The latter pleasures, which Epicu-\\nrus calls pleasures of the soul, are greater than the\\nformer, those of the body just as the pains of\\nthe soul are worse than those of the body. For the\\nflesh is only sensible to present joy and affliction,\\nbut the soul feels the past, the present, and the\\nfuture. Physical pleasure does not last as such\\nonly the recollection of it endures. Hence, mental\\npleasure, i.e., the remembrance of bodily pleasure,\\nwhich is free from the pains accompanying physical\\nenjoyment, is higher than physical pleasure.\\nNow how shall we reach the chief good Although\\nno pleasure is intrinsically bad, we do not choose\\nevery pleasure, for many pleasures are followed by\\ngreater pains, and many pains are followed by\\ngreater pleasures. We must exercise our judgment,\\nwe must have prudence or insight (jfypovqa-is to\\n1 340-270 b.c. Diogenes Laertius, X; Cicero, De finibus, I;\\nLucretius, De rerum natura Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math., XI;\\nRitter and Preller, pp. 373 ff. See my translation of Weber, His-\\ntory of Philosophy, p. 134, note 1.\\n2 They say that there are two passions, pleasure and pain,\\nwhich affect everything alive, and that the one is natural, and\\nthe other foreign to our nature with reference to which all objects\\nof choice and avoidance are judged of. Diogenes Laertius, Eng-\\nlish translation, p. 436 see also p. 470.", "height": "3504", "width": "2408", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 161\\nguide us in our choice of pleasures and in our avoid-\\nance of pains. When therefore we say that pleas-\\nure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the\\npleasures of the debauched man, or those who lie\\nin sensual enjoyment, as some think who are igno-\\nrant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else\\ninterpret them perversely but we mean the freedom\\nof the body from pain, and of the soul from confu-\\nsion. For it is not continued drinkings and revels,\\nor the enjoyment of female society, or feasts of fish\\nand other such things as a costly table supplies,\\nthat make life pleasant, but sober contemplation,\\nwhich examines the reasons for all choice and avoid-\\nance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions\\nfrom which the greater part of the confusion arises\\nwhich troubles the soul. The wise man, the man\\nof insight, understands the causes of things, and\\nwill, therefore, be free from prejudice, superstition,\\nfear of death, all of which render one unhappy and\\nhinder the attainment of peace of mind.\\nIn order to be happy, then, you must be prudent,\\nhonest, and just. It is not possible to live pleas-\\nantly unless one also lives prudently, and honorably,\\nand justly and one cannot live prudently, and hon-\\nestly, and justly, without living pleasantly for the\\nvirtues are connate with living agreeably, and living\\nagreeably is inseparable from the virtues. 1\\nWe see how this school develops from a crass\\nhedonism to a somewhat more refined form of it.\\n1 D. L., pp. 471 f.", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "162 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nAt first it makes active pleasure, pleasure of a posi-\\ntive sort, the goal, then gradually diminishes its\\nintensity until it becomes painlessness, repose of\\nspirit, peace of mind, in Hegesias and Epicurus.\\nAgain, at first it is the pleasure of the moment\\nwhich is sought after, then the pleasure of a life-\\ntime is conceived as the highest good. Forethought,\\nor prudence, is also insisted on in the course of time\\nas a necessary means of realizing the goal.\\n5. Democritus. All these ideas, however, had been\\nadvanced by Democritus, 1 of Abdera, the materialistic\\nphilosopher, long before the appearance of the Cyre-\\nnaics. Though this thinker is the first consistent\\nhedonist among the ancients, and the intellectual\\nfather of Epicurus, I have placed him at the end of\\nthe exposition of ancient hedonism, because his\\nteachings seem to me to be more matured than\\nthose of his followers.\\nAccording to Democritus, the end of life is pleas-\\nure or happiness (eveo-rco, evdv/ita, aOav/jbaata, a0a/JL-\\nftia, aTapa^La, apfjbovta, ^v/jL/jLerpia, evhai[JLOvia), by\\nwhich he means an inner state of satisfaction, an\\ninner harmony, fearlessness. 2 This feeling does not\\ndepend upon external goods, on health or sensuous\\npleasures. 3 In order to attain it man must use his\\nreason. He must be moderate in his desires, because\\nthe less he desires, the less apt he is to be disap-\\n1 Bibliography in Weber, p. 55, note 3. See especially Miinz,\\nVorsokratische Ethik.\\n2 Fragments, 1, 2, 5, 7. 3 lb., 15, 16.", "height": "3504", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 163\\npointed. He must also distinguish carefully between\\nthe different kinds of enjoyment, and select such as\\npreserve and promote health. He must be temper-\\nate, for excess defeats itself. Again, sensuous pleas-\\nures are of short duration and require repetition,\\nwhich disturbs one s peace of mind. 1 We should\\nseek to obtain the pleasures produced by reflection\\nand the contemplation of beautiful acts. Indeed,\\nthe best way to reach the goal is to exercise the\\nmental powers.\\nAll other virtues are valuable in so far as they\\nrealize the highest good, pleasure. Justice and\\nbenevolence are chief means of doing this. Envy,\\njealousy, and enmity create discord, which injures\\neverybody. We should be virtuous, for only through\\nvirtue can we reach happiness. 2 But we should not\\nonly do the right from fear of punishment, since\\nenforced virtue is likely to become secret vice. It\\nis not enough to refrain from doing evil; we should\\nnot even desire to do it. Only by doing the right\\nfrom conviction and because you desire it, can you\\nsubserve the ends of virtue and be happy. 3 Happi-\\nness, then, is the end virtue the means of reaching it.\\n6. Locke. Let us now look at a few pronounced\\nmodern representatives of this school. We have\\nalready seen 4 that, according to John Locke, every\\ni Fragments, 47, 50. 2 76., 45, 20, 21, 26, 36.\\n3 117 fMT] Sid (p6(3op, d\\\\Xa 8ia rbv btov xP v o,TT^x T ai\\na/xapTTi/x Tiov.\\nChap, ii, 6 (2).", "height": "3484", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "164 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\none constantly pursues happiness, and desires what\\nmakes any part of it. 1 Virtue, he says, as in\\nits obligation it is the will of God, discovered by\\nnatural reason, and thus has the force of law, so in\\nthe matter of it, it is nothing else but doing of good,\\neither to oneself or others; and the contrary hereunto,\\nvice, is nothing else but doing of harm. 2 Thus, I\\nthink It is man s proper business to seek happi-\\nness and avoid misery. Happiness consists in what\\ndelights and contents the mind misery in what dis-\\nturbs, discomposes, or torments it. I will therefore\\nmake it my business to seek satisfaction and delight,\\nand avoid uneasiness and disquiet to have as much\\nof the one, and as little of the other, as may be. But\\nhere I must have a care I mistake not, for if I prefer\\na short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross\\nmy own happiness. The most lasting pleasures in\\nlife consist in (1) health, (2) reputation, (3) knowl-\\nedge, (4) doing good, (5) the expectation of eternal\\nand incomprehensible happiness in another world. 3\\n7. Butler. Bishop Butler, too, has hedonistic ten-\\ndencies, as may be seen from certain significant pas-\\nsages in his sermons. Conscience and self-love,\\n1 Essay, Bk. II, chap, xx, 1 ff.; chap, xxi, 42 ff.; Bk. I,\\nchap, iii, 3 Bk. II, chap, xxviii, 5 ff.\\n2 See passage in Locke s Common-Place Book, first published\\nby Lord King, The Life of John Locke, pp. 292-293.\\n8 Lord King, p. 304 Fox Bourne s Life of Locke, Vol. I, pp.\\n163-165. With this view, Leibniz (1646-1716) practically agrees.\\nSee his New Essays, translated by Langley, Bk. I, chap, ii, 1,\\n3 Bk. II, chap, xx, 2 chap, xxi, 42 also some notes published\\nin Erdmann s edition of his works (Duncan s translation, p. 130).", "height": "3504", "width": "2388", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 165\\nhe says, if we understand our true happiness, always\\nlead us the same way. Duty and interest are per-\\nfectly coincident for the most part in this world,\\nbut entirely and in every instance if we take in the\\nfuture and in the whole this being implied in the\\nnotion of a good and perfect administration of\\nthings. 1 It may be allowed without any preju-\\ndice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our\\nideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas\\nthe nearest and most important to us. Let it\\nbe allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does\\nindeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what\\nis right and good, as such, yet, that when Ave sit\\ndown in a cool hour, we can neither justify to our-\\nselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced\\nthat it will be for our happiness, or at least not con-\\ntrary to it. 2\\n8. Hutcheson. Francis Hutcheson calls an action\\nmaterially good when in fact it tends to the interest\\nof the system, so far as we can judge of its tendency,\\nor to the good of some part consistent with that\\nof the system, whatever were the affections of the\\nagent. An action is formally good when it flowed\\nfrom good affection in a just proportion. But\\nwhat is the good That action is best which pro-\\ncures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers,\\nand worst which in like manner occasions misery. 3\\n1 Sermon iii, end. 2 Sermon xi.\\n3 See Martineau, Types, Vol. II, pp. 514 ff.; Albee, Shaftes-\\nbury and Hutcheson, Phil. Beview, Vol. V, number 1.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "166 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n9. Hume. We have already examined David\\nHume s doctrine of the moral sense. We feel or per-\\nceive the rightness or wrongness of an act, 1 we feel a\\npeculiar kind of pleasure or pain in the contemplation\\nof characters and actions, in consequence of which we\\ncall them right or wrong. Now the question behind\\nthis is, Why does any action or sentiment, upon\\nthe general view or survey, give this satisfaction or\\nuneasiness 2 In other words, what is the ultimate\\nground of moral distinctions Qualities, Hume\\nanswers, acquire our approbation because of their\\ntendency to the good of mankind. 3 We find that\\nmost of those qualities which we naturally approve\\nof, have actually that tendency, and render a man a\\nproper member of society while the qualities which\\nwe naturally disapprove of, have a contrary tendency\\nand render any intercourse with the person danger-\\nous or disagreeable. Moral distinctions arise, in a\\ngreat measure, from the tendency of the qualities\\nand characters to the interests of society, and it is\\nour concern for that interest which makes us ap-\\nprove or disapprove of them. Now we have no such\\nextensive concern for society but from sympathy\\nand consequently it is that principle which takes\\nus so far out of ourselves as to give us the same\\npleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others,\\nas if they had a tendency to our own advantage or\\n1 Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. Ill, Section II.\\n2 lb., Bk. Ill, Section III, end.\\nlb., Bk. Ill, Part III, Section I; Hyslop s Selections, p. 226.", "height": "3516", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 167\\nloss. 1 We have a feeling for the happiness of man-\\nkind, and a resentment of their misery, 2 and every-\\nthing which contributes to the happiness of society\\nrecommends itself directly to our approbation and\\ngood will. 3\\n10. Paley. According to William Paley, actions\\nare to be estimated according to their tendency.\\nWhatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of\\nany moral rule which constitutes the obligation of it. 4\\nVirtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience\\nto the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting\\nhappiness. 5 God wills and wishes the happiness of\\nHis creatures. The method of coming at the will of\\nGod concerning any action, by the light of nature,\\nis to inquire into the tendency of that action to pro-\\nmote or diminish the general happiness. 6 Happiness\\ndoes not consist in the pleasures of sense, for these\\npleasures continue but a little while at a time, lose\\ntheir relish by repetition, and are really never en-\\njoyed because we are always eager for higher and\\nmore intense delights. Nor does happiness con-\\n1 See Hyslop, p. 227 also Treatise, Conclusion, Section VI\\nalso Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, especially Sec-\\ntion V.\\n2 Inquiry, Appendix I.\\n3 16., Part II, Section V. See also Appendix I, v, and Treatise\\non Human Nature, Bk. II, Part III, Section I: The chief spring\\nor actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain and\\nwhen these sensations are removed, both from our thought and\\nfeeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable, of passion or action,\\nof desire or volition.\\n4 Moral Philosophy, p. 38. 6 lb., p. 26. 6 lb., pp. 36 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "168 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nsist in an exemption from pain, care, business, sus-\\npense, etc., nor in greatness or rank. It consists\\nin the exercise of social affections, exercise of our\\nfaculties, either of body or mind, in the pursuit of\\nsome engaging end, in the prudent constitution of\\nthe habits, in health. Pleasures differ in nothing\\nbut continuance and intensity. 1\\n11. Bentham. Jeremy Bentham also makes pleas-\\nure the end of action. Pleasure is in itself a\\ngood, nay the only good pain is in itself an evil,\\nthe only evil. 2 Everything else is good only in\\nso far as it conduces to pleasure. All actions are\\ndetermined by pleasures and pains, and are to\\nbe judged by the same standard. The con-\\nstantly proper end of action on the part of\\nevery individual at the moment of action is his\\nreal greatest happiness from that moment to the\\nend of his life. What kind of pleasure shall we\\nchoose? Choose those pleasures which last the\\nlongest and are the most intense, regardless of\\ntheir quality. The quantity of pleasure being\\nequal, push-pin is as good as poetry. In esti-\\nmating the value of a pleasure or a pain, we\\nmust also consider, besides the intensity and dura-\\ntion, its certainty or uncertainty, its propinquity or\\nremoteness, its fecundity or the chance it has of\\nbeing followed by sensations of the same kind\\n1 Moral Philosophy, pp. 19 ff.\\n2 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap, x* Bowring s edi-\\ntion, p. 102; Springs of Action, ii, 4; Deontology, Vol. I, p. 126.", "height": "3516", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 169\\nor purity or the chance it has of not being\\nfollowed by sensations of the opposite kind\\nand likewise its extent, that is, the number of\\npersons to whom it extends or who are affected\\nby it.*\\nMy own happiness depends upon the happiness\\nof the greatest number, i.e., the conduct most con-\\nducive to general happiness always coincides with\\nthat which conduces to the happiness of the agent. 2\\nHence it is to the interest of the individual to strive\\nafter the general happiness, and it is the business of\\nethics to point this out to him. To prove that the\\nimmoral action is a miscalculation of self-interest, to\\nshow how erroneous an estimate the vicious man\\nmakes of pains and pleasures, is the purpose of the\\nintelligent moralist. 3\\n12. J. S. Mill John Stuart Mill 4 accepts the\\nteaching of Bentham in a somewhat modified form.\\nActions are right in proportion as they tend to pro-\\n1 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap, iv, pp. 29 ff.\\nBentham expresses his scheme in the following lines. I presume\\nhe supposed that at some future time the school children would be\\ncompelled to learn them off by heart\\nIntense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure\\nSuch marks in pleasures and m. pains endure.\\nSuch pleasures seek, if private be thy end\\nIf it be public, wide let them extend.\\nSuch pains avoid, whichever be thy view\\nIf pains must come, let them extend to few.\\n2 lb., chap, xvii, p. 313. 3 Deontology.\\n4 1806-1873. Utilitarianism, 1861. See also Analysis of the\\nPhenomena of the Human Mind, by James Mill.", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "170 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nmote happiness wrong, as they tend to produce the\\nreverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleas-\\nure and the absence of pain by unhappiness, pain and\\nthe privation of pleasure. 1 Some kinds of pleasure,\\nhowever, are more desirable and more valuable than\\nothers. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which\\nall or almost all who have experience of both give a\\ndecided preference, irrespective of any moral obliga-\\ntion to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.\\nNow it is an unquestioned fact that those who are\\nacquainted with all pleasures prefer those following\\nthe employment of the higher faculties. No intelli-\\ngent human being would consent to be a fool, no\\ninstructed person would be an ignoramus, no person\\nof feeling and conscience would be selfish and base,\\neven though they should be persuaded that the fool,\\nthe dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his\\nlot than they with theirs. It is better to be a\\nhuman being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied better\\nto be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.\\nAnd if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion,\\nit is because they only know their own side of the\\nquestion. The other party to the comparison knows\\nboth sides. 2\\nHowever, the standard is not the agent s own\\ngreatest happiness, but the greatest amount of hap-\\npiness altogether. 3 As between his own happiness\\nand that of others, utilitarianism requires him (the\\nagent) to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested\\n1 Utilitarianism, chap, ii, pp.9, 10. 2 lb., p. 14. 3 lb., p. 16.", "height": "3504", "width": "2420", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 171\\nand benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of\\nJesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the\\nethics of utility. To do as one would be done by,\\nand to love one s neighbor as oneself, constitute the\\nideal perfection of utilitarian morality. 1 It is\\nnoble to be capable of resigning entirely one s own\\nportion of happiness, or chances of it but, after all,\\nthis self-sacrifice must be for some end it is not\\nits own end. A sacrifice which does not increase,\\nor tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, is\\nwasted. 2\\nBut why should I desire the greatest happiness\\naltogether instead of my own greatest happiness, as\\nthe standard Mill is somewhat vague and indefi-\\nnite on this point. Each person desires his own\\nhappiness. Each person s happiness is a good to\\nthat person and the general happiness, therefore, a\\ngood to the aggregate of all persons. 3 The reason-\\ning here seems to be this: Eveiwbody desires his own\\nhappiness. The happiness of everybody (every par-\\nticular individual) is a good to everybody (to that\\nparticular individual). Hence the happiness of\\neverybody (that is, of all, of the whole) is a good to\\neverybody (that is, to every particular individual). 4\\nA more satisfactory answer is given to the question\\nin another place. I have a feeling for the happiness\\nof mankind, a regard for the pains and pleasures of\\n1 Utilitarianism, chap, ii, p. 24. 2 75., pp. 23 ff. 8 lb., p. 53.\\nMVe have here a beautiful example of the logical fallacy of\\ncomposition.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "172 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nothers. This firm foundation is that of the social\\nfeelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with\\nour fellow-creatures, which is already a powerful\\nprinciple in human nature, and happily one of those\\nwhich tend to become stronger, even without express\\ninculcation, from the influences of advancing civili-\\nzation. 1 That is, I desire the happiness of others,\\nbecause I have social feelings, or sympathy.\\nBoth Mill and Bentham, therefore, agree that the\\ngreatest good of the greatest number is the goal of\\naction and the standard of morality. But according\\nto Bentham, self-interest is the motive, while accord-\\ning to Mill, sympathy or social feeling is the main-\\nspring of morality.\\nThere is, however, as we have seen, another point\\nof difference between Bentham and Mill. The\\nformer regards those pleasures as the best which last\\nthe longest and are the most intense, making no\\nqualitative distinction between them. The quan-\\ntity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as\\npoetry. Mill, on the other hand, distinguishes be-\\ntween the quality of pleasures; some are more desir-\\nable and more valuable than others, and the highest\\npleasures are to be preferred. According to the\\nGreatest Happiness Principle, he declares, the\\nultimate end with reference to and for the sake of\\nwinch all other things are desirable (whether we are\\nconsidering our own good or that of other people)\\nis an existence exempt as far as possible from pain,\\n1 Utilitarianism, chap, ii, p. 46.", "height": "3520", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 173\\nand as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point\\nof quantity and quality the test of quality, and the\\nrule for measuring it against quantity, being the\\npreference felt by those who, in their opportunities\\nof experience, to which must be added their habits of\\nself-consciousness and self-observation, are best fur-\\nnished with the means of comparison. This, being,\\naccording to the utilitarian opinion, the end of\\nhuman action, is necessarily also the standard of\\nmorality; which may accordingly be defined, the\\nrules and precepts for human conduct, by the observ-\\nance of which an existence such as has been described\\nmight be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to\\nall mankind; and not to them only, but so far as the\\nnature of things admits, to the whole of sentient\\ncreation. 1\\n13. Sidgivick and Contemporaries. We reach\\nanother phase of the theory in Henry Sidgwick. 2\\nAccording to him, the greatest happiness is the\\nultimate good. 3 By this is meant the greatest pos-\\nsible surplus of pleasure over pain, the pain being\\nconceived as balanced against an equal amount of\\npleasure, so that the two contrasted amounts anni-\\nhilate each other for purposes of ethical calculation. 4\\nThere are certain practical principles the truth\\nof which, when they are explicitly stated, is mani-\\nfest. 5 One of these is the principle of rational self-\\n1 Utilitarianism, chap, ii, p. 17.\\n2 Born 1838. The Methods of Ethics, 1874.\\n8 Methods, pp. 391 ff., 409 ff. lb., p. 411. lb., p. 379.", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "174 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nlove or prudence, according to which one ought to\\naim at one s own happiness or pleasure, as a whole\\nthat is, reason dictates an impartial concern for\\nall parts of our conscious life, an equal regard\\nfor the rights of all moments, the future as well\\nas the present, the remote as well as the near. The\\npresent pleasure is to be foregone with the view of\\nobtaining greater pleasure or happiness hereafter.\\nHereafter is to be regarded neither less nor more\\nthan Now.\\nAnother such principle, the principle of the duty\\nof benevolence, teaches that the good of any one in-\\ndividual is of no more importance, from the point\\nof view of the universe, than the good of any other.\\nOne is morally bound to regard the good of any\\nother individual as much as one s own, except in\\nso far as we judge it to be less, when imjDartially\\nviewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable. As\\na rational being I am bound to aim at good gen-\\nerally, not merely at a particular part of it. When\\nthe egoist puts forward, implicitly or explicitly, the\\nproposition that his happiness or pleasure is good, not\\nonly for him, but from the point of the universe\\nas, e.g., by saying that nature designed him to seek\\nhis own happiness, it then becomes relevant to\\npoint out to him that his happiness cannot be a more\\nimportant part of good taken universally, than the\\nequal happiness of any other person. And thus, start-\\ning with his own principle, he may be brought to\\naccept universal happiness or pleasure as that which is", "height": "3516", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 175\\nabsolutely without qualification good or desirable as\\nan end, therefore, to which the action of a reasonable\\nagent as such ought to be directed. 1\\nAnother principle is the principle of justice what-\\never action any one of us judges to be right for him-\\nself he implicitly judges to be right for all similar\\npersons in similar circumstances. It cannot be right\\nfor A to treat B in a manner in which it would be\\nwrong for B to treat A merely on the ground that\\nthey are two different individuals, and without there\\nbeing any difference between the natures or circum-\\nstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable\\nground for difference of treatment. 2\\nOther contemporary exponents of the hedonis-\\ntic school are Alexander Bain, 3 Alfred Barratt, 4\\nShadworth Hodgson, 5 Herbert Spencer, 6 Georg von\\nGizycki, 7 and Thomas Fowler. 8\\n1 3Iethods, p. 418. 2 p. 380.\\n3 The Senses and the Intellect, 1856 The Emotions and the\\nWill, 1859 Mental and Moral Science, 1868. See chap, ii, 6 (7).\\n4 Physical Ethics, 1869. 5 Theory of Practice, 2 vols., 1870.\\n6 Principles of Ethics Part I, The Data of Ethics, 1879;\\nPart II, The Inductions of Ethics, 1892 Part III, The Ethics\\nof Individual Life, 1892 Part IV, Justice, 1891. There is no\\nescape, says Spencer, from the admission that in calling good\\nthe conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which\\nhinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing,\\nand not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good\\nor bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.\\nData of Ethics, chap, iii, p. 28.\\n7 Grundzuge der Moral, 1883, translated by Stanton Coit Mor-\\nalphilo sophie, 1889.\\n8 Progressive Morality, 1884 Eowler and Wilson, Principles of\\nMorality, 1886-1887.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "176 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n14. General Survey. In conclusion let us briefly\\nsurvey the history of the theories of hedonism, and\\nnote their development. In Greek hedonism the ten-\\ndency was at first to regard bodily pleasure and the\\npleasure of the moment as the highest good and\\nmotive of action (Aristippus). A closer study of\\nthe problem led to the gradual modification of this\\nconception. Instead of the pleasure of the moment,\\nthe pleasure of a lifetime instead of violent pleas-\\nure, repose of spirit, a happy frame of mind, came\\nto be regarded as the ideal of conduct (Theodorus,\\nDemocritus, Epicurus). The element of prudence\\nor reason was also more strongly emphasized in\\nthe course of time. It was pointed out that hap-\\npiness could not be secured without prudence or\\nforethought that the desire for pleasure had to\\nbe governed by reason (Democritus, Epicurus).\\nThen it was shown that mental pleasures were\\npreferable to bodily pleasures, that the ideal could\\nnot be realized through sensuous enjoyment, but\\nonly by the exercise of the higher intellectual\\nfaculties (Democritus, Epicurus). The commonly\\naccepted virtues were also included among the\\nmeans of happiness, and a moral life insisted on as\\nnecessary to the realization of the highest good.\\nIndeed, the controversy between hedonism and the\\nopposing school finally reduced itself to a dispute\\nconcerning the fundamental principle underlying\\nmorality both schools practically recommended\\nthe same manner of life, one because it led to", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 177\\nhappiness, the other because it tended toward per-\\nfection. 1\\nModern hedonists make the standpoint ultimately\\nreached by the Greeks their starting-point. None\\nof them asserts that pleasure is the highest good,\\nwithout modifying the statement somewhat. The\\nelement of prudence or reason is emphasized by\\nall. Even Bentham, who is the most radical rep-\\nresentative of the modern school, makes the pleas-\\nure of a lifetime the end, and insists that we cannot\\nreach this goal without exercising prudence. They\\nwould all agree, also, that the goal cannot be\\nreached by the pursuit of sensuous pleasure, and\\nthat the exercise of the mental faculties procures\\nthe greatest happiness.\\nAn important advance, however, is made by the\\nmodern advocates of the theory. Locke, Paley, and\\nBentham still incline toward egoistic hedonism, which\\nwas so prominent in the Greek systems the highest\\ngood is the happiness of the individual, though this\\ncannot be realized except through the happiness of\\nthe race. Hutcheson, Hume, J. S. Mill, and Sidg-\\nwick, on the other hand, recognize the sympathetic\\nimpulse in man as a natural endowment the highest\\ngood is the happiness of the race. But this is a\\ndifference of principle only, which does not affect\\nthe practice of human beings both systems empha-\\n1 In Anniceris we even get a slight tendency to altruism he\\nadvises us to forego our pleasure and submit to pain for the sake\\nof friends and country.", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "178 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nsize the necessity of doing good to our fellows, the\\none because our individual happiness depends upon\\nour regard for our neighbor, the other because man\\nis by nature disposed to care for the good of his\\nfellow-men.\\nAnother important change is made in modern\\nhedonism by J. S. Mill. According to him pleasure\\nis the highest good and the standard of morality.\\nBut the experience of the race teaches that some\\npleasures, as, for example, the pleasures accompany-\\ning the exercise of our higher mental faculties, are\\npreferred to others. The race prefers them, how-\\never, not because they are the most intense, but\\nbecause they differ in hind or quality from those\\naccompanying the lower functions. Men evidently\\nprefer these pleasures because they cannot help\\nthemselves, they must prefer them, they prefer them\\nabsolutely it is their nature to prefer them. The\\nstandard, therefore, is not pleasure as such, but a\\ncertain quality of pleasure, and man prefers this\\nquality absolutely 1 Not pleasure as such, but the\\nhigher pleasures, move us to action. Or, rather,\\nsince it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than\\na fool satisfied, the highest good is really not pleas-\\nure so much as the exercise of the higher mental\\nfunctions. In this form there is no radical differ-\\nence between hedonism and energism. 2\\n1 This view reminds one of Martineau s theory of conscience.\\nSee chap, ii, 5, p. 45.\\n2 See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap, ii, end of 6.", "height": "3516", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 179\\nNot only do we get in Mill an approximation to\\nenergism, but an approximation to intuitionism.\\nAccording to him both the egoistic and altruistic or\\nsympathetic impulses are innate or original posses-\\nsions of the human soul. Besides, in so far as we\\nmake a qualitative distinction between different\\npleasures, absolutely preferring some to others, we\\nmay be said to possess an innate knowledge of the\\nbetter and the worse, or an innate conscience. In\\nSidgwick this intuitional phase is more pronounced.\\nMan is endowed with innate principles the prin-\\nciple of self-love, the principle of benevolence, and\\nthe principle of justice.", "height": "3476", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VII\\nTHEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD ENERGISM i\\n1. Socrates. Let us now turn our attention to a\\nschool of thinkers who deny that pleasure or happi-\\nness is the end of life and the standard of morality,\\nand set up what they at least believe to be a differ-\\nent goal.\\nSocrates 2 opposed the hedonistic teachings of the\\nSophists, and declared virtue to be the highest good.\\nBut what is virtue Virtue is knowledge. 3 We\\ncannot be proficient in any line without knowledge\\nof the subject. A man cannot be a successful general\\nwithout a knowledge of military affairs, nor a states-\\nman unless he has an insight into the nature and\\npurpose of the State.\\nBut what is knowledge To know means to have\\ncorrect concepts of things, to know their purposes,\\naims, or ends, to know what they are good for.\\n1 See references under chap. ii.\\n2 469-399 b.c. See Xenophon s Memorabilia, translated in\\nBonn s Library Plato s Protagoras, Apology, Crito, Symposium,\\netc., in Jowett s translation; Aristotle s Metaphysics, Bk. I, 6.\\nBibliography in Weber.\\n8 Xenophon, Memorabilia, Bk. IV, chap, vi, 11 Bk. I, chap, i,\\n10 Bk. II, chap, ix, 5.\\n180", "height": "3504", "width": "2368", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 181\\nEverything has its purpose, is good for something,\\nespecially for man. 1 If that is so, the man who\\nknows what things are good for him, will do these\\nthings, and he alone will be able to realize his de-\\nsires, his welfare and happiness. Hence knowledge\\nor wisdom (a-oc/ua), without which a man cannot\\nattain to happiness (ev tftv, fjSeays \u00c2\u00a3V)^), is the highest\\ngood (fjLeyio-rov a^aQov). That is to say, virtue is\\nthe knowledge of good and evil, and the consequent\\ndoing of good, and the avoidance of evil. Hence\\nno man is voluntarily bad nor involuntarily good.\\nVice is due to ignorance.\\nNow what is good for man What is useful to\\nhim The lawful (vofiifiov), says Socrates. Man\\nmust obey the laws of the State as well as the un-\\nwritten laws of the gods, i.e., the universal laws of\\nmorality. To be good or moral is to be in harmony\\nwith the laws of one s country and human nature.\\nVirtue conduces to happiness. But should a con-\\nflict arise between virtue and happiness, virtue must\\nnever be sacrificed to happiness. 2\\n2. Plato. Plato, 3 the pupil and follower of Soc-\\nrates, teaches that not pleasure, but insight, knowl-\\nedge, the contemplation of beautiful ideas, a life of\\nreason, are the highest good. 4 We should seek to\\n1 Memorabilia, Bk. I, chap, iv, 7-17 Bk. IV, chap, iii, 3 ff.\\n2 Bk. II, chap, vii, 10 Bk. IV, chap, iv, 4 j Plato s Apology,\\n29, 30.\\n3 427-347 b.c. See the Dialogues of Plato, especially Thecetetus,\\nPhcedo, PJiilebus, Gorgias, Republic, translated by Jowett.\\n4 Gorgias, 474 c ff. Philebus, 11 b, 14 6, 19 d.", "height": "3492", "width": "2328", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "182 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nfree ourselves from the body and the senses, for the\\nbody is a fetter, the prison-house of the soul, an evil.\\nWherefore we ought to fly away from earth to\\nheaven as quickly as we can, and to fly away is to\\nbecome like God. 1 Philosophy means the separa-\\ntion and release of the soul from the body, 2 the\\nlosing of oneself in the contemplation of ideas, which\\nare the true essences of things, the return of the soul\\nto its former heavenly home.\\nBeside this ascetic ideal of life, Plato also presents\\na somewhat modified ethical scheme, adapted to\\nthe conditions of the world in which we live. 3 The\\nsense-world being a reflection of the ideal world, the\\ncontemplation of it will give us a glimpse into the\\ntruth and beauty of the other. Now in such a world\\nwhat is the highest good? The highest good must\\nbe something perfect, 4 something that does not need\\nanything outside of itself, something desirable in\\nitself, something the possession of which makes\\nother things unnecessary. Now neither pleasure nor\\nwisdom as such is a good. A life of pleasure devoid\\nof intelligence and wisdom no one would call desir-\\nable. Nor would any one choose a life of reason\\nthat is free from pleasure and pain. The end is a\\nfjLLKTos \u00c2\u00a3to?, a mixed life of wisdom and pleasure. In\\nsuch a life pleasure is not the highest factor, but the\\nlowest. The pleasure must be controlled by wisdom.\\n1 Thecetetus, 176 a. 2 Phcedo, 64-67, 69, 79-84, 114.\\n3 See Schwegler, Historij of Greek Philosophy, pp. 228, 232.\\n*Tt\\\\eor; Philebus, 20 ff.", "height": "3492", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 183\\nWisdom produces order, harmony, symmetry, law.\\nIf pleasure were the highest, then the most intense,\\nunbridled pleasure would be the best, which is not\\nthe case. The best life is one in which the lower\\nsoul-forces, the impulses and the animal desires, are\\nsubordinated to reason, one in which reason com-\\nmands and the other elements obey.\\n3. The Cynics. After the death of Socrates,\\nAntisthenes, 1 one of his most devoted followers,\\nfounded the Cynic School, named after the gymna-\\nsium of Kynosarges, where he delivered his lectures.\\nThe Cynics opposed the hedonism of the Cyrenaics, 2\\nand exaggerated certain phases of the Socratic doc-\\ntrine. Pleasure, says Antisthenes, is not the high-\\nest good indeed, it is no good at all, but an evil. 3\\nThen what is the good? The very opposite of pleas-\\nure, 7toVo?, privation, exertion, work, struggle with\\npassion, is good. We should make ourselves inde-\\npendent of the things of the world (^ey/cpdreta).\\nThe man who sets his heart on pleasure, wealth,\\nhonor, or fame, is doomed to disappointment. Let\\nhim renounce the uncertain, treacherous gifts of for-\\ntune, let him be indifferent to pleasure and pain\\nalike let him learn to want, and misfortune cannot\\nconquer him. Sweet are the pleasures that follow\\nlabor. Cease desiring, and you will be rich even in\\n1 Diogenes Laertius, Bk. VI Mullach s Fragments, vol. II,\\n261 ff. Ritter and Preller s Fragments, pp. 216 ft\\n2 See chap, vi, 3.\\n3 I would rather go mad than feel pleasure, as he once said:\\nIxavLrjv fx.a\\\\\\\\ov i) yjadd-qv. Diogenes Laertius, Bk. VI.", "height": "3488", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "184 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\na beggar s garb. To desire nothing is the greatest\\nwealth. Virtue is the highest and only good. It\\nis not, however, necessary to be very learned to be\\nvirtuous. Virtue consists in action and conduces to\\nhappiness. 1\\n4. Aristotle. According to Aristotle, 2 all human\\nactivity has some end in view. This end in turn\\nmay be the means to another higher end, but there\\nmust be some ultimate or highest end or good,\\nwhich is desired for its own sake and not as a means\\nto something else. Now what is this highest good\\nFor some it consists in wealth, for others in pleasure,\\nfor still others in honor, wisdom, or virtue. But\\nwealth is a means to an end, not an end in itself.\\nPleasure, too, is a good, but not the good. The\\ntruth is we strive after honor, pleasure, virtue, wis-\\ndom, for the sake of something else, which is sought\\nafter for its own sake. That end is eudsemonia\\n(evhainovia), or happiness. In what does happiness\\nconsist The welfare of every being consists in the\\nrealization of its specific nature. The end or hap-\\npiness of man will therefore consist in the realiza-\\ntion of that which makes man a man, that is, in the\\nexercise of rational activity. The highest good of\\nhuman existence is the exercise of reason.\\nVirtue, then, means the proper functioning of the\\n1 Diogenes of Sinope, the pupil of Antisthenes, whom Plato\\ncalled a Socrates gone mad, is an extreme representative of\\ncynicism. A man must not only learn to do without pleasure,\\nhe says, he must learn to do with pain.\\n2 385-323 b.c. Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Welldon.", "height": "3504", "width": "2396", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 185\\nsoul. Now the soul is partly reflective or thinking\\nor knowing, partly volitional or practical. Hence,\\nthere are dianoetical virtues (such as wisdom, pru-\\ndence, insight) and ethical or practical virtues (such\\nas liberality, self-control, courage, pride, magnanim-\\nity, etc.). Ethical virtue consists in the subordi-\\nnation of the lower soul-forces or impulses to correct\\nreason. The impulses must be governed or con-\\ntrolled by reason or insight. Virtue is acquired,\\nbut based on preexisting dispositions of the soul.\\nVirtue is the rationalization of impulses. But the\\nquestion arises, When is an impulse rationalized?\\nWhen it keeps the mean between two extremes,\\nanswers Aristotle. Virtue is a disposition involv-\\ning deliberate purpose, or choice, consisting in a\\nmean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being\\ndetermined by reason, or as a prudent man would\\ndetermine it. 1\\nVirtuous activity, then, in a complete or full life\\nis the highest good. 2 Pleasure is the necessary and\\nimmediate consequence of such activity, but it is not\\nthe end. We should choose virtuous activity even\\nthough it were not accompanied by pleasure. The\\npleasure depends upon the virtuous activity, and\\nonly such pleasure as follows virtuous activity is\\ngood or moral. 3 Certain external goods, however,\\n1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, chap, vi, Welldon s translation,\\np. 50.\\n2 For one swallow does not make spring, Aristotle adds.\\n3 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, chap. ix.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "186 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nare indispensable to eudeemonia, namely health, free-\\ndom, honor certain capacities and talents wealth,\\netc. Neither a slave nor a child can be happy.\\n5. The Stoics. The Stoic school, founded by\\nZeno of Citium in the aroa ttolklXt], shortly after\\n310 B.C., is the successor of the Cynics. 1 The Stoics\\ntaught that the chief good is to live according to\\nnature. For man this means to live according to\\nhis nature, i.e. n according to reason, that universal\\nright reason which pervades everything. 2 We live\\naccording to nature or reason, when we live accord-\\ning to virtue.\\nNow what does virtuous action demand It de-\\nmands that man conquer his passions, for passions\\nare the irrational element in us. There are four\\nfundamental passions (irdOrf) pain, fear, desire,\\npleasure (Xvttj], cj 6/3o iiriQv^Ca^ rjhovrj~). These\\npassions arise as follows We have impulses which\\nare in themselves good, like the impulse of self-pres-\\nervation. These impulses may become too violent\\nand give rise to a false judgment on our part. Such\\na false judgment is a passion. Thus a false judg-\\nment of present and future goods arouses pleasure\\nand desire of present and future ills, pain and fear.\\nAll these passions and their different species we\\nmust combat, for they are irrational they are dis-\\n1 See Diogenes Laertius, Bk. VII Stobseus, Eclogues, Bk. II\\nCicero, Be finibus the works of Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius;\\nRitter and Preller, pp. 392 ff.\\n2 Diogenes Laertius, p. 291.", "height": "3504", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 187\\neases of the soul. It is not enough to be moderate\\napathy is the only proper state with reference to\\nthem. The wise man is without passion, apathetic\\nhe is not affected by fear, desire, pain, or pleasure.\\nVirtue, therefore, is identical with apathy. The\\npassionless sage is the Stoic ideal.\\nVirtue is the highest and only good, vice the only\\nevil everything else is indifferent death, sickness,\\npoverty, etc., are not evils life, health, honor,\\npossessions, are not goods. Even the pleasure\\nproduced by virtue Qxapa) is not an end, but merely\\nthe natural consequence of virtuous action. 1 The\\nwise man is the virtuous man, because he knows\\nwhat to do and what to avoid.\\nThe Stoic ethics exercised a great influence upon\\nRoman thought and action. As the most illustrious\\nrepresentatives of the school in later times we may\\nmention Cicero, 2 Lucius Annseus Seneca, 3 Epicte-\\ntus, 4 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the Emperor. 5\\n6. The Neo-Platonists. According to the later\\nPlatonists or Neo-Platonists, the universe is an\\n1 Strict adherents of the school do not even admit that pleasure\\nis a consequence.\\n2 t 43 b.c. De finibus bonorum et malorum. English trans-\\nlation in Bonn s Library.\\n3 t 65 a.d. Letters to Lucilius. English translation of Seneca\\nin Bonn s Library.\\n4 Born about 60 a.d. His teachings were preserved by Flavius\\nArrianus in the JEncheiridion, or Manual. English translation by\\nLong.\\n5 Died 180 a.d. twv els eavrbv /3t/3\\\\i a. English translation by\\nLong.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "188 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nemanation from God, the absolute spirit, who trans-\\ncends everything that can be conceived or said.\\nAll the way from intelligence to formless matter the\\nemanations become more and more imperfect. Mat-\\nter is the very lowest in the stage of being, devoid\\nof form, the principle of all imperfection and evil in\\nthe world. Yet matter is necessary. Just as light\\nmust in the end become darkness at the farthest dis-\\ntance from its origin, so spirit must become matter.\\nBut everything that has come from God strives to\\nreturn to Him again.\\nMan is the mirror of the universe, the microcosm,\\nmind and matter, good and bad. The highest good\\nis the pure intellectual existence of the soul, in\\nwhich the soul has no community with the body, and\\nis wholly turned toward reason, and restored to the\\nlikeness of God. 1 The highest aim of man is to\\nbecome one with God and the supra-sensuous world,\\nto lose himself in the absolute. To quote from\\nWeber s History of Philosophy 2 The artist seeks\\nfor the idea in its sensible manifestations the\\nlover seeks for it in the human soul; the philoso-\\npher, finally, seeks for it in the sphere in which it\\ndwells without alloy, in the intelligible world and\\nin God. The man who has tasted the delights of\\nmeditation and contemplation foregoes both art and\\nlove. The traveller who has beheld and admired a\\n1 Plotinus, the chief representative of the school, seemed to he\\nashamed of having a body.\\n2 English translation, pp. 178-179.", "height": "3516", "width": "2396", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 189\\nroyal palace forgets the beauty of the apartments\\nwhen he perceives the sovereign. For the philoso-\\npher, beauty in art, nay, living beauty itself, is but a\\npale reflection of absolute beauty. He despises the\\nbody and its pleasures in order to concentrate all his\\nthoughts upon the only thing that endures forever.\\nThe joys of the philosopher are unspeakable. These\\njoys make him forget, not only the earth, but his\\nown individuality; he is lost in the pure intuition of\\nthe absolute. His rapture is a union (eWo-i?) of the\\nhuman soul with the divine intellect, an ecstasy, a\\nflight of the soul to its heavenly home. As long as\\nhe lives in the body, the philosopher enjoys this\\nvision of God only for certain short moments,\\nPlotinus had four such transports, but what is the\\nexception in this life will be the rule and the normal\\nstate of the soul in the life to come. Death, it is\\ntrue, is not a direct passage to a state of perfection.\\nThe soul which is purified in philosophy here below\\ncontinues to be purified beyond the grave until it is\\ndivested of individuality itself, the last vestige of its\\nearthly bondage. In short, the highest happiness\\nconsists in being united with the supra-sensible.\\nWe must, therefore, withdraw ourselves from the\\nworld of sense, free ourselves from the body, become\\nascetics.\\nWe have in this philosophy an exaggerated edition\\nof Platonism. If the highest good is mind or intel-\\nlectuality or the supra-sensuous, then the sooner we\\nget away from the body the better. If the body is", "height": "3504", "width": "2308", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "190 INTRODUCTION- TO ETHICS\\nthe prison, the fetter, the chain, the pollution of the\\nsoul, the sooner we free ourselves from it the better. 1\\n7. Hobbes. Let us now turn to modern times.\\nAccording to Thomas Hobbes, 2 every living being\\nstrives to preserve itself. It seeks everything that\\nfurthers this end, avoids everything that defeats it.\\nBut the end is not always realized. The individual\\ndoes not realize the end because other individuals\\nhaving the same purpose in view come in conflict\\nwith him. The impulse of self-preservation thus\\nproduces a war of all against all, bellum omnium con-\\ntra omnes, and so really defeats itself. Prudence\\ntherefore demands the formation of the State, in\\nwhich the individual subordinates his own will to\\nthe general will, thus making life possible. In the\\nState peace and security, the conditions of self-pres-\\nervation, are realized. The highest end is therefore\\nself-preservation, or life, of which the State is the\\nmeans. 3\\n8. Spinoza. From this view the ethical system\\nof Spinoza 4 does not much differ. He too holds\\n1 With these ascetic tendencies in Plato and his successors,\\nprimitive Christianity had much in common. Christianity was for\\na long time an ascetic religion. It preached the crucifixion of the\\nflesh. This world was regarded as a vale of tears, as a grave, and\\nheaven as the soul s true home. For the Christian conception of\\nlife, see the excellent chap, ii, Bk. I, in Paulsen s Ethics.\\n2 See chap, ii, 6 (1).\\n8 See Leviathan, especially chaps, vi, xiii, xiv.\\n4 1032-1677. Ethics, translated by White also in Bonn s\\nLibrary. Selections from Ethics, translated by Fullerton. For\\nbibliography, see Weber s History of Philosophy. See also Fuller-\\nton, On Spinozistic Immortality.", "height": "3504", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 191\\nthat every being strives to preserve its own exist-\\nence or essence. 1 As reason makes no demands\\ncontrary to nature, it demands that every man\\nshould love himself, should seek that which is useful\\nto him I mean, that which is really useful to him,\\nshould desire everything which really brings man to\\ngreater perfection, and should, each for himself,\\nendeavor as far as he can to preserve his own being.\\nThis is as necessarily true as that a whole is greater\\nthan a part. Again, as virtue is nothing else but\\naction in accordance with the laws of one s own\\nnature, 2 and as no one endeavors to preserve his\\nown being, except in accordance with the laws of his\\nown nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of\\nvirtue is the endeavor to preserve one s own being,\\nand that happiness consists in man s power of pre-\\nserving his own being secondly, that virtue is to be\\ndesired for its own sake, and that there is nothing\\nmore excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of\\nwhich we should desire it thirdly and lastly, that\\nsuicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by exter-\\nnal causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it\\nfollows that we can never arrive at doing without all\\nexternal things for the preservation of our being or\\n1 Ethics, Part III, prop. vi.\\n2 lb., Part IV, prop, xx The more every man endeavors, and\\nis able to seek what is useful to him in other words, to pre-\\nserve his own being the more is he endowed with virtue on the\\ncontrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to\\nhim, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.\\nSee also Part IV, prop. xxiv.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "192 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nliving, so as to have no relations with things which\\nare outside of ourselves. Again, if we consider our\\nmind, we see that our intellect would be more imper-\\nfect, if mind were alone, and could understand noth-\\ning besides itself. There are, then, many things\\noutside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are,\\ntherefore, to be desired. Of such none can be dis-\\ncerned more excellent than those which are in entire\\nagreement with our nature. For if, for example, two\\nindividuals of entirely the same nature are united,\\nthey form a combination twice as powerful as either\\nof them singly. Therefore, to man there is nothing\\nmore useful than man nothing, I repeat, more ex-\\ncellent for preserving their being can be wished for\\nby men, than that all should so in all points agree,\\nthat the minds and bodies of all should form, as it\\nwere, one single mind and one single body, and that\\nall should, with one consent, as far as they are able,\\nendeavor to preserve their being, and all with one\\nconsent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men\\nwho are governed by reason that is, who seek what\\nis useful to them in accordance with reason desire\\nfor themselves nothing which they do not also desire\\nfor the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just,\\nfaithful, and honorable in their conduct. x Now, in\\nlife it is before all things useful to perfect the under-\\nstanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone\\nman s highest happiness or blessedness consists, in-\\ndeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment\\n1 Ethics, Part IV, prop, xviii note.", "height": "3520", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 193\\nof the spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowl-\\nedge of God now, to perfect the understanding is\\nnothing else but to understand God, God s attributes,\\nand the actions which follow from the necessity of\\nHis nature. 1 The mind s highest good is the knowl-\\nedge of God, and the mind s highest virtue is to\\nknow God. 2\\n9. Cumberland. Both Richard Cumberland and\\nLord Shaftesbury also place the highest good in wel-\\nfare, not in the welfare of the individual, however,\\nbut in the common good, by which they mean not\\npleasure, but perfection. 3 Cumberland says The\\nendeavor, to the utmost of our power, of promoting\\nthe common good of the whole system of rational\\nagents, conduces, as far as in us lies, to the good of\\nevery part, in which our own happiness, as that of a\\npart, is contained. But contrary action produces\\ncontrary effects, and consequently our own misery,\\nas well as that of others. 4 The greatest possible\\nbenevolence of every rational agent toward all the\\nrest constitutes the happiest state of each and all, so\\nfar as depends on their own power, and is necessa-\\nrily required for their happiness accordingly com-\\n1 Ethics, Part IV, Appendix iv.\\n2 lb., Part IV, prop, xxviii. Translations taken from Bonn s\\nLibrary Edition.\\n3 Richard Cumberland, 1632-1719, Be legibus naturce, 1672\\ntranslated into English by Jean Maxwell, 1727. See E. Albee,\\nThe Ethical System of Richard Cumberland, Philosophical lie-\\nview, 1895. For Shaftesbury, see chap, ii, 4 (1).\\n4 See Albee, The Ethical System of Richard Cumberland.", "height": "3504", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "194 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nmon good will be the supreme law. Again, The\\nhappiness of each individual is derived from the\\nbest state of the whole system, as the nourishment\\nof each member of an animal depends upon the\\nnourishment of the whole mass of blood diffused\\nthrough the whole. The common good being the\\nend, such actions as take the shortest way to this\\neffect are naturally called right, because of\\ntheir natural resemblance to a right line, which is\\nthe shortest that can be drawn between any two\\ngiven points, but the rule itself is called\\nright, as pointing out the shortest way to the\\nend.\\n10. Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury l finds in man two\\nkinds of impulses: selfish or private affections,\\nand natural, kind, or social affections. The self-\\nish affections are directed toward the individual\\nwelfare or preservation, private good the social\\naffections, toward common welfare, the preservation\\nof the system of which the individual forms a part,\\npublic good. Just as the health or perfection of\\na bodily organism consists in the harmonious coope-\\nration of all its organs, so the health or perfection of\\nthe soul consists in the harmonious cooperation of\\nthe selfish and social affections. An individual is\\ngood or virtuous when all his inclinations and affec-\\ntions conduce to the welfare of his species or the\\nsystem of which he is a part. Virtue is the proper\\nbalance or harmony between the two impulses.\\n1 See chap, ii, 4 (1).", "height": "3516", "width": "2372", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 195\\nBut how can we tell whether our impulses are\\nproperly balanced? By means of the moral sense,\\nas we have already seen, 1 the sense of right and\\nwrong, the rational affections. The moral sense is\\noriginal or innate, like the other affections. Just\\nas the contemplation of works of art arouses feelings\\nof disinterested approbation and disapprobation, so\\nthe contemplation of human acts and impulses,\\nwhether of others or ourselves, arouses feelings of\\napproval and disapproval.\\nSince man is originally a social being, he derives\\nhis greatest happiness from that which makes for\\nthe existence of society and the common weal. The\\nnecessary concomitant of virtue is happiness, just\\nas pleasure accompanies the right state of the\\norganism.\\n11. Darwin. 2 The modern evolutionists agree\\nwith this conception. I quote a passage from Dar-\\nwin s Descent of Man In the case of the lower ani-\\nmals it seems much more appropriate to speak of\\ntheir social instincts as having been developed for\\nthe general good rather than for the general happi-\\nness of the species. The term general good may be\\ndefined as the rearing of the greatest number of indi-\\nviduals in full vigor and health, with all their facul-\\nties perfect, under the conditions to which they are\\nsubjected. As the social instincts both of man and\\nthe lower animals have no doubt been developed\\nby nearly the same steps, it would be found advis-\\ni Chap, ii, 4 (1). 2 See chap, ii, 7 (2).", "height": "3504", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "196 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nable, if found practicable, to use the same definition\\nin both cases, and to take as the standard of moral-\\nity the general good or welfare of the community\\nrather than the general happiness. When a\\nman risks his life to save that of a fellow-creature, it\\nseems also more correct to say that he acts for the\\ngeneral good, rather than for the general happiness\\nof mankind. No doubt the welfare and the happi-\\nness of the individual usually coincide and a con-\\ntented, happy tribe will flourish better than one\\nthat is discontented and unhappy. We have seen\\nthat even at an early period in the history of man,\\nthe expressed wishes of the community will have\\nnaturally influenced, to a large extent, the conduct\\nof each member and as all wish for happiness, the\\ngreatest happiness principle will have become a\\nmost important secondary guide and object the\\nsocial instinct, however, together with sympathy\\n(which leads to our regarding the approbation and\\ndisapprobation of others), having served as the\\nprimary impulse and guide. Thus the reproach is\\nremoved of laying the foundation of the noblest part\\nof our nature in the base principle of selfishness\\nunless, indeed, the satisfaction which every animal\\nfeels, when it follows its proper instincts, and the dis-\\nsatisfaction felt when prevented, be called selfish. 1\\n12. Stephen. Leslie Stephen 2 defines the moral\\nlaw as a statement of the conditions or of a part of\\n1 Descent of Man, chap, iv, Part I, Concluding Remarks.\\n2 The Science of Ethics, 1882.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 197\\nhe conditions essential to the vitality of the social\\ntissue. 1 Our moral judgments must condemn\\ninstincts and modes of conduct which are pernicious\\nto the social vitality, and must approve the opposite\\nbut it does not necessarily follow that it must dis-\\napprove or approve them because they are per-\\nceived to be pernicious or beneficial. 2 It is essential\\nto social vitality that actions result from inner feel-\\nings. Hence the moral law has to be expressed in\\nthe form, Be this, not in the form Do this.\\nThe utilitarian theory, which makes happiness the\\ncriterion of morality, coincides approximately with\\nthe evolutionistic theory, which makes health of the\\nsociety the criterion for health and happiness\\napproximately coincide. We may infer that the\\ntypical or ideal character, at any given stage of\\ndevelopment, the organization, which, as we say,\\nrepresents the true line of advance, corresponds to a\\nmaximum of vitality. 3 It seems, again, this typical\\nform, as the healthiest, must represent not only the\\nstrongest type, that is, the type most capable of\\nresisting unfavorable influences, but also the hap-\\npiest type for every deviation from it affords a\\nstrong presumption, not merely of liability to the\\ndestructive processes which are distinctly morbid,\\nbut also to a diminished efficiency under normal\\nconditions. 4\\n1 The Science of Ethics, 1882, chap, iv, ii, p. 148.\\n2 lb. 3 lb., p. 406.\\n4 lb., p. 407. See chap, ix, pp. 359 ff.; also chap, x, pp. 404 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "198 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n13. Jhering. Rudolph von Jhering 1 advances a\\nsimilar view. All moral laws and customs have as\\ntheir end the weal and prosperity of society. All\\nmoral norms are social imperatives. All these social\\nimperatives owe their existence to social ends. The\\nends of society depend upon its conditions. 2 The\\npurpose of morality is the establishment and prosper-\\nity of society. 3 Now, just as a house is not a mere\\nmass of stones, society is not a mere aggregate of\\nindividuals, but a whole made up of individual mem-\\nbers, and formed into a unity by a community of\\nends. The part must adapt itself to the whole if\\nthe whole is to stand. Hence the postulate of a\\nsocial norm which prescribes to the individual such\\nconduct as is necessary to the social order in so far\\nas his own inclinations do not serve society, and the\\nnecessity of securing compliance with the norm by\\nmeans of compulsion. But mere mechanical or\\nlegal compulsion is not enough. We have also psy-\\nchological compulsion. The advantage of psycho-\\nlogical compulsion lies in the fact that it stops\\nbefore no relation in life it presses in everywhere\\nlike the atmosphere, into the interior of the home as\\nwell as to the steps of the throne in places where\\nmechanical compulsion can have no effect.\\nWe may say that whatever human conduct is\\nnecessary to the existence of society is a constituent\\nof the moral order and falls within the realm of\\n1 Der Zioeck im Becht, 2 vols, 1874.\\n2 Ib. y Vol. II, pp. 95 ff. 8 lb., Vol. II, pp. 134 ff.", "height": "3516", "width": "2420", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 199\\nmoral law. As now the individual is necessary to\\nsociety, whatever is required that he may live, even\\neating and drinking, comes under the view of morals.\\nEven acts which spring from egoistic motives are\\nobjectively moral when they further the ends of\\nsociety. Even our pleasures, recreations, and enjoy-\\nments have high objective moral significance, for\\nthey are the indispensable sources of our strength,\\nand this benefits not merely us, but society.\\nOne thought runs through all creation self-\\npreservation. Man raises himself up to the moral\\nplane when he gains the insight that his individual\\nself-preservation is conditioned by his social self-\\npreservation. The means which nature employs in\\norder to realize the law of self-preservation is pleas-\\nure. The necessary condition of pleasure is well-\\nbeing. Well-being is possession of full powers.\\nThe striving after well-being is called eudsemonism.\\nSocial eudaemonism is the principle of morals.\\nWherein the weal and happiness of society consists,\\nthe history of mankind alone can evolve. Eudse-\\nmonism and utilitarianism are the same thing, from\\ndifferent points of view, the former from that of end,\\nthe latter from that of means. 1\\n14. Wundt and Contemporaries. Wundt 2 reaches\\na similar result. He holds that the proper way to\\ninvestigate the moral end is to begin with the em-\\npirical moral judgments. Find the moral end in\\n1 Der Zweck im Becht, Vol. II, chap, ix, pp. 204 ff.\\n2 Ethics, translated in 3 vols.", "height": "3516", "width": "2300", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "200 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nparticular cases, and by means of them proceed to\\nthe general ethical principle. Such an investigation\\nwill show that the individual, be it oneself or\\nanother, cannot be the ultimate end of morality.\\nHappiness may be an important motive to the will\\nand even an indispensable means for realizing the\\nmoral ends, but it cannot be regarded as the moral\\nend itself. The universal spiritual productions of\\nhumanity, such as the State, art, science, and univer-\\nsal culture, are the objects of morality attainable by\\nus. But since the very essence of morality is a\\nceaseless striving, the moral steps attained must not\\nbe regarded as a lasting end. The ultimate end of\\nmoral striving becomes an ideal never to be attained\\nin reality. Thus the ethical ideal is the ultimate\\nend the progressive moral perfection of humanity\\nthe immediate end, of human morality. 1\\nTo the same school belong H. Hoffding, 2 F.\\nPaulsen, 3 Th. Ziegler, 4 A. Dorner, 5 J. Seth, 6 and\\nothers.\\n15. Kant. Even Kant, 7 who regards himself as\\nan opponent of all teleology, may, in my opinion, be\\nclassed among the energists. According to him, the\\nhighest good is not pleasure, neither my own nor\\nthat of mankind, but virtue, duty for duty s sake.\\n1 Ethics, Part III.\\n2 Ethik, 1887 Ethische Principienlehre, 1897.\\n8 Systeyn of Ethics, edited and translated by Frank Thilly.\\n4 Sittliches Sein und sitthches Werden.\\n5 Das menschliche Handeln.\\n6 A Study of Ethical Principles. 7 See chap, ii, 7 (1).", "height": "3504", "width": "2420", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 201\\nThe highest good in the world is a good will, and a\\ngood will is good not because of what it performs,\\nbut good in itself. That is, it acts from respect of\\nthe law, from a pure sense of duty. 1 Now rational\\ncreatures alone have the faculty of acting according\\nto the conception of laws, i.e., according to principles,\\ni.e., have a will. 2 The conception of an objective\\nprinciple, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is\\ncalled a command (of reason), and the formula of\\nthe command is called an imperative. 3 There is\\nan imperative which commands a certain conduct\\nimmediately. It concerns not the matter of the\\naction, or its intended result, but its form and the\\nprinciple of which it is itself the result. 4 This is\\nthe categorical imperative. In order that this\\nshould be valid, it must be a necessary truth. This\\nlaw follows necessarily from the very nature of the\\nrational will. 5 If there is anything of absolute\\nworth, an end in itself, the reason must command it. 6\\nNow rational nature exists as an end in itself.\\nEvery man necessarily conceives his own existence\\nas an end in itself, and must therefore regard every\\nother rational creature s existence in the same way.\\nHence the will must give itself this law, So act as\\nto treat humanity, whether in thine own person or\\nin that of any other, in every case as an end withal,\\nnever as a means only. This principle is essentially\\nidentical with this other Act upon a maxim which,\\n1 Abbott s translation, pp. 12, 16, 55, 164 ff., 180, 241.\\n2 p. 29. 3 p. 30. p. 33. 5 p. 44. 6 pp. 46 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2308", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "202 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nat the same time, involves its own universal validity\\nfor every rational being. 1 For if I am only to act\\nso that my acts can become universal, I cannot will\\nto use any other rational creature as a means with-\\nout willing that he use me as a means. The rational\\nwill therefore imposes universal laws, laws that hold\\nfor all, laws acceptable to all, which makes possible\\na kingdom of ends. 2 Every rational being must so\\nact as if he were by his maxims in every case a\\nlegislating member in the universal kingdom of\\nends. 3\\nTranslated into popular language, this ethical phi-\\nlosophy of Kant s seems to me to agree with the\\nsystems which we have just been considering. Con-\\nscience categorically commands certain forms of\\nconduct, regardless of their effects. When we\\nexamine the forms of conduct enjoined by con-\\nscience, we find that a common principle is applicable\\nto all they are all fit for something, they all con-\\nduce to an end or highest good, something of ab-\\nsolute worth, something absolutely desired by human\\nnature, or as Kant states it, something that reason\\nor the categorical imperative commands. Now what\\nis this end? It seems to be the good of society.\\nu So act that thou canst will the maxim of thy\\naction to become universal law. That is, do not\\nlie and steal, for thou canst not will that lying and\\nstealing become universal. Why not? For with\\nsuch a law there would be no promises at all, since\\n1 Abbott s translation, p. 56. 2 p. 52. 8 p. 57.", "height": "3516", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "THEORIES OF THE HIGHEST GOOD 203\\nit would be in vain to allege my intention in regard\\nto my future actions to those who would not believe\\nthis allegation, or if they over-hastily did so would\\npay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as\\nsoon as it should be made a universal law, would\\nnecessarily destroy itself. The implication here\\nseems to be that society would go to pieces if the\\nprinciples underlying certain acts should become\\nuniversal.\\nKant also declares that every man necessarily\\nconceives his own existence as an end in itself.\\nThis means that every man has egoistic impulses.\\nAnd because he is egoistic he must have a due re-\\ngard for others, he must treat them with respect,\\nfor otherwise he cannot expect them to treat him\\nwith respect. This is what he means when he says,\\nSo act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own\\nperson or in that of any other, in every case as an\\nend withal, never as a means only. This is a philo-\\nsophical statement of the command, Do unto others\\nas you would have them do unto you. The king-\\ndom of ends would be impossible unless every man\\ncared for his own welfare and that of his fellows\\ntherefore such principles of morality are implanted\\nin his heart as to make a kingdom of ends possible. 1\\n16. G-eneral Survey. In conclusion, let us note\\nthe progress which has been made in the history of\\nthe theory discussed in this chapter. The Greek\\n1 Compare with this Sidgwick s system, as given in chap, vi,\\n\u00c2\u00a713.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "204 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nenergists regarded as the highest good, the exer-\\ncise of reason, or the development of knowledge,\\nand tended to ignore the emotional and impulsive\\nfactors of the soul-life. Modern energists gener-\\nally take a broader view of the highest good,\\ndefining it not merely as the exercise of the in-\\ntellectual functions, but as the preservation and\\ndevelopment of life as a whole. Happiness as a\\nphase of soul-life receives its appropriate place as\\na part of the end or highest good, and the the-\\nory of energism more closely approximates hedo-\\nnism. Pleasure is a means to the end of perfection,\\nan accompaniment of virtuous action, a sign that\\nthe goal is being realized. The altruistic element\\nis also gradually introduced into the modern con-\\nception of energism. The preservation and de-\\nvelopment of the race is looked upon as the ideal of\\nlife and the standard of morality. Man is no longer\\nconceived as striving merely for his own individual\\nperfection and happiness, but for the good of the\\nwhole. Sympathy takes its place by the side of\\nself-love as a natural endowment of the soul. 1 In\\nthe evolutionistic school we also get a closer approxi-\\nmation to intuitionism. Man strives after the preser-\\nvation and perfection of himself and his fellows and\\nconscience is largely an inherited instrument in the\\nservice of this ideal or goal. It demands what is good\\nfor man as a member of society it is the expression\\nof the general will in the individual heart.\\n1 Compare chap, vi, 14.", "height": "3520", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VIII\\nCRITIQUE OF HEDONISM*\\n1. The Conception of the Highest Good. Our his-\\ntorical review has shown us that there are different\\nanswers to the question, What is the end of life and\\nthe standard of morality One school holds that\\npleasure all the way from sensuous pleasure to\\nintellectual pleasure, and all the way from the\\npleasure of the individual to the pleasure or hap-\\npiness of humanity is the highest good. An-\\nother combats this notion, and sets up as the\\nend, not pleasure, but virtue, knowledge, perfec-\\ntion, self-preservation, or the preservation of society.\\nWe pointed out the fact that the Greeks concerned\\nthemselves with the question of the highest good,\\nwhile the modern thinkers formulate the problem\\nin a somewhat different manner, asking, What is\\nthe ground of moral distinctions; what makes an\\n1 For criticism of hedonism, see Plato, Philebus and Republic,\\nBk. IX; Aristotle, Ethics; Kant, Abbott s translation; Darwin,\\nDescent of Man, chap, iv Lecky, European Morals, chap, i\\nSidgwick, Methods, Bk. I, chap, iv Bradley, Ethical Studies, III,\\nVII Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Bk. II, chap, ii Bk. Ill,\\nchaps, i, iv Bk. IV, chaps, iii, iv Martineau, Types, Vol. II\\nMurray, Handbook of Ethics, Bk. II, Part. I, chap, i Simmel,\\nEinleitung, Vol. I, chap, iv Hyslop, Elements, pp. 349-385\\nPaulsen, Ethics, pp. 250 ff.\\n205", "height": "3500", "width": "2336", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "206 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nact right or wrong what is the criterion, or stand-\\nard, or ideal of conduct, called moral\\nLet us now examine the answers which have been\\ngiven to the question as the ancient Greeks asked it,\\nand try to reach some conclusion with respect to it.\\nAnd first, let us inquire, What do we mean by the\\nsummum bonum or the highest good\\nWe may mean by the summum bonum (1) some-\\nthing which humanity prizes as the most valuable\\nthing in the world, something of absolute worth,\\nfor the sake of which everything else that is desired\\nis desired. We may say: (a) that humanity con-\\nsciously mid deliberately sets up this good as its goal\\nor ideal; or that men are urged to action by\\nthis good, that this good is the motive of all action\\nwithout being clearly and distinctly conceived as\\nan ideal.\\nOr we may mean, not that men consciously or\\nunconsciously strive after a certain end, but (2) that\\na certain end or result is realized in human conduct.\\nThis end or result may be desired by some intelli-\\ngence outside of man, or it may be a purely mechani-\\ncal consequence of the laws of nature. Thus we may\\nfind that a certain organ in the body realizes a certain\\nend, that it serves a certain purpose, without desiring\\nthat purpose, or, in fact, knowing anything about it.\\nWe may attempt to explain this by saying that the\\npurpose was desired by an intelligence outside or\\ninside of the organ, which would lead us into\\nmetaphysics, or, that it was simply the effect of\\ncertain natural conditions.", "height": "3516", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 207\\nOr the proposition may mean, not that a certain\\nend or ideal is desired by humanity, nor that it is\\nrealized by humanity, but (3) that humanity ought\\nto desire it.\\nLet us turn to the hedonistic theory and examine\\nit in the light of the preceding reflections.\\n2. Pleasure as the Highest Grood. According to\\nthe hedonistic theory, pleasure is the highest good or\\nend. Let us take this to mean that all human beings\\nstrive after pleasure. By pleasure we may mean posi-\\ntive or active pleasure, or freedom from pain, repose\\nof spirit, peace of mind sensuous pleasure, or intel-\\nlectual pleasure the pleasure of self, or the pleasure\\nof others; momentary pleasure, or the pleasure of\\na lifetime. Now if the theory maintains that all\\nmen strive after pleasures of sense, that these are\\nthe highest good, it cannot be upheld. Men do not\\ndesire sensuous pleasures in preference to all others.\\nWe may say that they desire both kinds of pleasure,\\nand that if any are preferred, it is the so-called higher\\npleasures rather than the others. With the progress\\nof civilization, the race comes to care more for intel-\\nlectual and moral pleasures than for the so-called\\nbodily enjoyments. This truth has been recognized\\nby such hedonists as Democritus, Epicurus, Mill,\\nSidgwick, and others. Again, if the theory means\\nby pleasure the pleasure of the moment, it can be\\neasily refuted. Indeed, perhaps no hedonist, not\\neven Aristippus, ever recommended that we sacrifice\\nthe future to the present. It does not require much", "height": "3516", "width": "2296", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "208 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nexperience to discover that certain pleasures are fol-\\nlowed by pain, and that a whole life may be wrecked\\nby the pleasure of a moment. u Der Wahn ist kurz,\\ndie Reu ist lang. Rational creatures are able to\\njudge of the future by the past, and will, therefore,\\nbe willing to forego a present pleasure and even to\\naccept a present pain for the sake of a more enduring\\nfuture pleasure.\\n(1) Let us interpret the theory to mean that men\\nuniversally strive after pleasure, using the term\\npleasure in the widest and most favorable sense.\\nNow, if we are to understand by this that every\\nhuman being consciously sets up as the ideal of his\\nconduct, pleasure or happiness, or freedom from pain,\\nand systematically compares all his acts with this\\nstandard, selecting such as tend to produce pleasure\\nand rejecting the opposites, the theory cannot stand.\\nIt cannot be proved that all men have clear ideals of\\nlife, and that they govern their lives in consistent\\nharmony with them. Much less can it be proved\\nthat this ideal is pleasure. We cannot imagine the\\naverage man as saying to himself, Does this act\\nagree with my ideal of life will this mode of con-\\nduct be in harmony with my ideal of pleasure\\n(2) But perhaps his acts are determined by pleas-\\nure after all, though he may not know it until he\\nbegins to reflect upon his states of consciousness.\\nThat is to say, the hedonistic theory may teach,\\nAll human acts are prompted by pleasure the desire\\nto get pleasure and to avoid pain is the principle", "height": "3516", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 209\\ngoverning all conduct; pleasure is the only motive\\nof action. Stated in this form the problem is a\\npsychological problem, and must be solved by the\\nscience of psychology. We shall therefore have to\\ninvestigate the psychology of action before we can\\ngive a satisfactory answer to the question under\\ndiscussion.\\n3. The Antecedents of Action. The first ques-\\ntion which we shall ask ourselves here is this, What\\nare the psychical antecedents of action, z.e., the states\\nof consciousness leading to an act or movement?\\nWhat takes place in consciousness before a man\\nacts or moves, in consequence of which he is said\\nto act? 1\\n(1) Sometimes movements occur without being\\npreceded by any conscious states. The movements\\ngoverning circulation and metabolism are largely\\nreflex or mechanical; they are not under the con-\\ntrol of consciousness, and not even accompanied by\\nconsciousness. Other reflex movements, like the\\ncontraction of the pupil regulating the amount of\\nlight received by the retina, likewise belong to this\\ncategory. 2\\n(2) In other cases reflex movements are followed\\nor accompanied by conscious states. A strong\\natmospheric concussion may cause a violent shock\\nin my entire nervous system, producing widespread\\nmovements, and arising in consciousness as a loud\\n1 See the standard works on psychology.\\n2 See Jodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologies p. 416.", "height": "3488", "width": "2288", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "210 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nsound. Here it is not the sensation of sound that\\nproduces the movements nay, what produces the\\nformer at the same time produces the latter.\\n(3) Sometimes movements follow conscious states\\nimmediately. Certain psychical states are accom-\\npanied or followed by movements in the body over\\nwhich we have no control, and movements of the body,\\nwhich we may learn to control. Let us look at some\\nof these.\\n(a) The perception or thought of certain things\\nmay be accompanied or followed by intra-organic\\nchanges of all kinds (in the vasomotor, circula-\\ntory, respiratory systems, in the digestive appara-\\ntus, etc.), as well as by more pronounced physical\\nreactions, such as laughing, weeping, screaming,\\netc., movements of attack and defence, gestures,\\nexclamations, facial movements, etc. Sometimes,\\nespecially in children, the mere sight of a move-\\nment leads to imitative movements. In all these\\ncases a fixed path seems to have been formed be-\\ntween certain brain parts and certain muscles,\\nwhich are transmitted from generation to genera-\\ntion. We might call such movements instinctive.\\n(b~) Often the mere perception or thought of a\\nmovement or object is followed by a movement\\nwhich has been learned, without the intervention\\nof any other psychical element. A person may,\\nupon seeing a piano, begin to play in an almost\\nmechanical way, or grasp at an object before him\\nwithout really intending to do so. Or his thought", "height": "3488", "width": "2344", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 211\\nmaybe followed by incipient movements of the vocal\\norgans, without his having the slightest knowledge\\nof what is taking place. 1 A strong association seems\\nto have been formed, by practice, between certain\\nideas and certain movements, so that when the\\nformer arise in consciousness, the latter immediately\\nfollow. Whenever a movement follows immediately\\nupon an idea, the action is called ideo-motor. 2\\nAgain, we may have the idea of a move-\\nment plus a feeling of pressure toward it. Here\\nthe whole soul seems to thrust itself in the direc-\\ntion of a certain movement. This process is\\nattended with pleasurable feelings, which easily\\nchange into pain, when the pressure becomes too\\ngreat, or when the impulse to perform the move-\\nment is balked. The physiological condition of\\nthe pressure feeling is most likely the energy\\nstored up in the brain cells (which produces the\\nmovement) together with the excitations caused\\nin the brain by muscular movements accompanying\\nattention. The sight of a person who has insulted\\nme may arouse in me a strong desire to strike him.\\nI feel that I have to hold myself back, as it were,\\n1 Steinthal calls attention to the contagious effect of the move-\\nments of the Flagellants, Tarantella dancers, etc., in this connec-\\ntion. Motions become contagious. When thousands cry vive\\nV Empereur, the Republican and Bourbon cannot resist. We can\\nrecall no movements without repeating the respective innervations.\\nThis explains actions performed by men who fear them, hurling\\noneself from a tower, etc. Steinthal s JEthik, pp. 330 ff.\\n2 See Carpenter, Mental Physiology, and others.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "212 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nand the more I restrain myself the more I feel\\nimpelled to strike the blow. Here almost any move-\\nment will afford relief. We might call these acts\\nimpulsive acts.\\n(c?) At other times a feeling of pleasure or a feel-\\ning of pain, or an anticipation of pleasure or pain,\\nseems to push itself in between the idea and the act.\\nThis means simply that the idea is suffused with\\npleasure or pain, and that no movement will take\\nplace until these feelings are present. I make a\\nmovement it gives me pleasure and I continue it,\\nor it produces pain, and I stop it or make another.\\nOr I think of a movement to be made, expect it to\\nbe pleasurable, and therefore make it.\\n(e) Most frequently many of these states together,\\ni.e., ideas, feelings of pressure, feelings of pleasure,\\nfeelings of aversion, feelings of pain, precede the\\ndischarge of a movement.\\n(4) In all cases mentioned above, the act takes\\nplace without the intervention of a so-called decision\\nof the will. Let us now examine states in which\\nthis element enters.\\nThe question here is, What are the elements in-\\nvolved in willing as such, and what are the antece-\\ndents leading to an act of will, i.e., what makes men\\nwill what they will What takes place in conscious-\\nness when I will something, and what has taken\\nplace there before I willed it\\nLet us take a typical case of willing, one which\\neverybody would accept as such. I am considering", "height": "3496", "width": "2344", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 213\\na certain end or result, be it a specific act, or a whole\\nscries of acts, or a train of thought. J have in con-\\nsciousness the idea of an cud or purpose or projeel or\\nsomething that has not yet been done, but ma\\\\ In-\\ndone. The end may be a vague one; I may have\\nnothing but a hazy outline of the result to be\\nachieved, or it maybe clearly defined: I may have\\nworked it out carefully, even to the details. J may\\nbe said to will this end or result when I assume a\\ncertain attitude toward it, when I decide that it shall\\nbe done, when I utter t\\\\m fiat or decide that it shall\\nnot be done, or utter the veto. In the one case I say\\nyes, in the other no. A peculiar state of conscious-\\nness surrounds the idea of the result, a state of con-\\nsciousness to which I give expression in language\\nby saying, I will; my mind is made up. We call\\nthis state of consciousness or process in which the\\nego decides for or against the realization of an idea.\\nan act of will. 1 Ziehen calls this state which\\naccompanies the idea of an act in willing, a positive\\nemotional tone. 2 Perhaps we had better speak of\\nit, however, as decision, as an attitude of the ego\\ntoward its project. 3 Hoffding defines it as follows:\\nVolition proper is characterized psychologically by\\n1 By will I do not mean a substantial entity, a metaphysical\\nessence or force that produces the act (Schopenhauer), but simply\\nthe process itself which introspection reveals to us.\\n2 See Introduction to Physiological Psychology, chap, xiv, pp.\\n265 ff.\\n3 James speaks of it as the voluntary fiat, the volitional man-\\ndate, the mental consent.", "height": "3492", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "214 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthe ideas of the end of the action and the means to\\nits realization, and by a vivid feeling of the worth of\\nthat end. 1\\nThe drama of willing is closed when this peculiar\\nprocess enters. It makes no difference whether the\\nthing willed is ever realized or not. I may will to\\npursue a certain line of conduct, and afterwards\\nchange my mind about it. I may will to perform an\\nact and never have an opportunity of doing it, or I\\nmay will it and find that I have not the power to\\ncarry it out. I have willed it when I have decided\\nthat I am going to do it, when it has received my\\nsanction. If the act willed is a possible one, it will\\nfollow the act of will, the decision, as soon as the ideas\\nof the movements to be made (the kinsesthetic\\nideas, as they are called by the psychologists) or the\\nideas initiating these movements (the remote ideas,\\nas James calls them) arise in consciousness. We are\\nutterly in the dark as to how the process takes place\\nwe simply know, for example, that when we will to\\nmove the arm, it moves, and when we will to move\\nthe ear, it does not move. 2 The essential element in\\nan act of will is this fiat or veto, this volitional man-\\n1 Psychology, pp. 308-356. See Steinthal s Ethik Will is the\\nconscious idea whose realization is approved of because its result,\\nthe caused alteration in the external world, is also presented and\\ndesired.\\n2 All that we can do is to show how such kinsesthetic ideas are\\nproduced, and that when they are present in consciousness they\\nmay be accompanied by movements. See the psychologies of\\nLotze, Bain, Preyer, Baumann, James, which show how we learn\\nto make movements.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM\\n215\\ndate, the decision or cutting short of the process of\\ndeliberation, this determination, selective volition,\\nor choice. 1 Unless this element is present, we cannot\\nbe said to will in the common sense of that term.\\nMovements may be made, however, without the\\npresence of this factor. Not all the acts performed\\nby us are willed in the sense in which we have just\\nspoken of willing not every conscious act, in other\\nwords, is a willed act. Instincts, impulses, desires,\\nideo-motor action, etc., are not acts of the will\\nthey are not necessarily willed, though, of course,\\nthey may be. In order to be willed in the real sense\\nof the term, they need the consent or assent we have\\nspoken of. We frequently perform acts impulsively\\nand excuse ourselves by saying that we did not intend\\nthem, that we could not help ourselves. 2\\n4. The Antecedents of Volition. We have found\\nthus far that men are prompted to action by their\\n1 See Ladd s Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp.\\n613 ff.\\n2 It has become customary in modern psychology to extend the\\nterm will so as to make it synonymous with psychic energy. It is\\nheld that attention is involved in every state of consciousness, that\\nno state can come to consciousness or be kept in consciousness\\nwithout an act of attention. Just as a certain amount of physical\\nenergy must be present in the brain before an excitation can be\\nproduced there, so a certain amount of psychical energy must\\nbe present in consciousness before a state of consciousness can\\narise. This energy, or force, is called by Schopenhauer will, by\\nWundt and his followers will, attention, apperception, or conation.\\nAccording to this view, every mental act is an act of will, and\\nevery physical movement that is preceded by consciousness is the\\nsame. We have preferred to use the term will in a narrower sense.", "height": "3504", "width": "2300", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "216 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nideas, feelings, instincts, impulses, will, and combina-\\ntions of these factors. We cannot say that feelings\\nof pleasure are the only motives to action. But\\nperhaps feelings of pleasure are the only motives\\nto willed action, in the sense in which we have been\\nusing this term. Let us therefore investigate the\\nantecedents of willing or volition a little more\\nclosely.\\nLet us ask, What causes me to decide for or\\nagainst a project or end, or, rather, what happens in\\nmy consciousness prior to the decision or fiat\\nSometimes the bare idea of an end is sufficient to\\ncall forth the decision of the will. When the clock\\nstrikes eight I think of meeting my class, and with-\\nout a moment s hesitation I utter the mental yes.\\nSometimes the decision is prompted by an instinct,\\nan impulse, a wish, or a desire, by a feeling of pleas-\\nure or pain, or by the expectation of a pleasure or\\npain. I may will a course of conduct because I\\nlove or desire it, or because it promises me pleasure\\nor freedom from pain, or because all these ele-\\nments unite to gain my consent. Sometimes I feel\\nimpelled to act in a certain way which promises me\\npleasure, but feel a moral obligation to say no. It\\nmay require a severe effort on my part to say no, to\\ndecide against an act which is so charming I seem-\\ningly have to force myself to consent to a course,\\nwhich I finally do with a heavy heart. 1 Sometimes\\n1 This feeling of effort is frequently spoken of as the will, or\\nsoul, in action here we are supposed to feel the soul working,", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 217\\nte consent is not obtained until a great many rea-\\nsons for and against a line of conduct have been con-\\nsidered, and until the agent understands the relation\\nof the act to his desires or impulses or hopes or\\nmoral aims. 1 I may say yes to a line of conduct\\nwhen I discover by reasoning or otherwise that it\\nagrees with an ideal of mine, an ideal which I have\\nalready chosen by an act of will.\\n5. Conclusions. Our main conclusions here are\\n(1) Not all human conscious action is willed\\naction.\\n(2) Man is prompted to action by his instincts,\\nimpulses, desires, feelings, thoughts, perceptions,\\nand volitions, i.e., consciousness in every shape\\nand form tends to be followed by action.\\n(3) Man is determined to will by his instincts,\\nimpulses, desires, feelings, thoughts, perceptions,\\ni.e., any state of consciousness may cause the ego to\\nrender a decision and hence,\\n(4) It cannot be true that pleasure alone deter-\\nmines action or volition.\\n6. The Hedonistic Psychology of Action. Let us\\nnow look at the hedonistic psychology itself, and\\nthe dull, dead heave of the will (see James, Psychology,\\nchapter on The Will But this feeling, whatever it may be, is not\\nthe fiat, or veto, itself, though it may be necessary to bring about\\nthe fiat, or veto. The view which identifies will with mental\\nactivity, and regards all psychic energy as will, will look upon\\nthe effort-feeling as a most typical case of willing, or soul-action.\\n1 See James, Psychology, chapter on The Will, the reasonable\\ntype of willing.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "218 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nsubject it to criticism. It asserts that all men are\\nprompted to action either by pleasure or pain. This\\nmay mean that all action, both voluntary and non-\\nvoluntary (in our sense), is caused by pleasure and\\npain or, that only willed action is determined in\\nthat way, i.e., that pleasure and pain are the sole\\nmotives of willing.\\nIn either case the sole motive may be\\n(1) Some variety of pleasure or pain, present or\\napprehended that is, pleasure or pain, or the idea\\nof pleasure or pain\\n(2) Always a feeling of present pleasure or pain;\\n(3) A feeling of pain alone or,\\n(4) Unconscious pleasure or pain, or an uncon-\\nscious idea of pleasure or pain.\\n7. Present or Apprehended Pleasure-Pain as the\\nMotive. Interpreting the theory in the first sense,\\nit means that actions are performed or not performed\\nbecause they give us or promise us pleasure or pain.\\nTo quote Bain, 1 a typical hedonistic psychologist\\nA few repetitions of the fortuitous concurrence of\\npleasure and a certain movement will lead to the\\nforging of an acquired connection under the Law of\\nRetentiveness and Contiguity, so that, at an after\\ntime, the pleasure or its idea shall evoke the proper\\nmovement. 2 The remembrance, notion, or antici-\\npation of a feeling can operate in essentially the\\nsame way as the real presence. Without\\nsome antecedent of pleasurable or painful feeling,\\n1 Emotions and Will, 3d edition, pp. 303-504. 2 lb., chap, i, 8.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 219\\nactual or ideal, primary or derivative, the will\\ncannot be stimulated. There is at bottom of\\nevery genuine voluntary impulse some one variety\\nof the many forms wherein pain or pleasure takes\\npossession of the conscious mind. 1 Every object\\nthat pleases, engages, charms, or fascinates the mind,\\nwhether present, prospective or imagined, whether\\nprimitive or generated by association, is a power\\nto urge us to act, an end of pursuit everything that\\ngives pain, suffering, or by whatever name we choose\\nto designate the bad side of our experience, is a\\nmotive agent in like manner. 2 The same remarks\\nare made to apply to higher acts of willing, accord-\\ning to the same authority. In this whole subject\\nof deliberation, therefore, there is no exception fur-\\nnished against the general theory of the will, or the\\ndoctrine, maintained in the previous pages, that, in\\nvolition, the executive is uniformly put in motion by\\nsome variety of pleasure or pain, present or appre-\\nhended, cool or excited. 3 It is not necessary,\\nhowever, it is not a condition of our enjoyment, that\\nwe should be every moment occupied with the\\nthought of the subjective pleasure or pain connected\\nwith our pursuits we are set in motion by these,\\nand then we let them drop out of view for a time. 4\\n1 Emotions and Will, chap, iii, \u00c2\u00a78, pp. 354 ff. 2 lb., p. 357.\\n3 lb. chap, vii, p. 416. See also pp. 420 ff. A voluntary act (as\\nwell as some acts not voluntary) is accompanied with conscious-\\nness, or feeling of which there may be several sorts. The original\\nmotive is some pleasure or pain, experienced or conceived.\\n4 lb., p. 347. See also Jodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, pp. 425*,\\n719 ff., 726.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "220 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nThat is, men think and act in order to procure\\npleasure and to avoid pain. Thus, for example, I am\\nstudying philosophy because of the pleasure I am\\nderiving from it now, or because I expect pleasure\\nhereafter. And I assist my fellow-men in their\\nstruggle for existence for the sake of the happiness\\nmy conduct procures for me. Pleasure, or the idea\\nof it, in every case stimulates me to act as I do.\\n(1) The psychology of action does not seem to me\\nto bear out this view. Pleasure, or the idea of pleas-\\nure, is, of course, an antecedent to volition and\\naction, but it is not the only one by any means. I\\ndo not necessarily eat for the pleasure it gives me,\\nnor do I get angry for the enjoyment of the thing.\\nI do not necessarily obey the moral law because I\\nget, or expect to get, pleasure, or desire to avoid\\npain. As was noticed before, psychology presents\\nus with countless instances in which acts follow im-\\nmediately upon the appearance in consciousness of\\ncertain ideas. As Professor James says So wide-\\nspread and searching is this influence of pleasures\\nand pains upon our movements that a premature\\nphilosophy has decided that these are our only spurs\\nto action, and that wherever they seem to be absent,\\nit is only because they are so far on among the\\n4 remoter images that prompt the action that they\\nare overlooked. This is a great mistake, however.\\nImportant as is the influence of pleasures and pains\\nupon our movements, they are far from being our\\nonly stimuli. With the manifestations of instinct", "height": "3500", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 221\\nand emotional expression, for example, they have\\nabsolutely nothing to do. Who smiles for the\\npleasure of the smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of\\nthe frown? Who blushes to escape the discomfort\\nof not blushing? Or who in anger, grief, or fear is\\nactuated to the movements which he makes by the\\npleasures which they yield? In all these cases the\\nmovements are discharged fatally by the vis a tergo\\nwhich the stimulus exerts upon a nervous system\\nframed to respond in just that way. The objects of\\nour rage, love, or terror, the occasions of our tears\\nand smiles, whether they be present to our senses, or\\nwhether they be merely represented in idea, have\\nthis peculiar sort of impulsive power. The impulsive\\nquality of mental states is an attribute behind which\\nwe cannot go. Some states of mind have more of it\\nthan others, some have it in this direction, and some\\nin that. Feelings of pleasure and pain have it, and\\nperceptions and imaginations of fact have it, but\\nneither have it exclusively or peculiarly. It is of\\nthe essence of all consciousness (or of the neural pro-\\ncess which underlies it) to instigate movement of\\nsome sort. That with one creature and object it\\nshould be of one sort, with others of another sort, is\\na problem for evolutionary history to explain. How-\\never the actual impulsions may have arisen, they\\nmust now be described as they exist and those per-\\nsons obey a curiously narrow teleological superstition\\nwho think themselves bound to interpret them in\\nevery instance as effects of the secret solicitancy of", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "222 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\npleasure, and repugnancy of pain. If the thought of\\npleasure can impel to action, surely other thoughts\\nmay. Experience only can decide which thoughts\\ndo. 1 Or in the words of Darwin, who, though not a\\nprofessed psychologist, has observed more carefully\\nthan many of them All the authors whose works\\nI have consulted, with a few exceptions, write as if\\nthere must be a distinct motive for every action, and\\nthat this must be associated with some pleasure or\\ndispleasure. But man seems often to act impul-\\nsively, that is, from instinct or long habit, without\\nany consciousness of pleasure, in the same manner\\nas does probably a bee or ant, when it blindly fol-\\nlows its instincts. Under circumstances of extreme\\nperil, as during a fire, when a man endeavors to save\\na fellow-creature without a moment s hesitation, he\\ncan hardly feel pleasure and still less has he time\\nto reflect on the dissatisfaction which he might sub-\\nsequently experience if he did not make the attempt.\\nShould he afterward reflect upon his own conduct,\\nhe would feel that there lies within him an impul-\\nsive power widely different from a search after\\npleasure or happiness and this seems to be the\\ndeeply planted social instinct. 2\\n1 Psychology, chapter on The Will, Vol. IT, pp. 549 ff. Com-\\npare with this Guyau, La morale contemporaine, p. 425 We\\nthink, we feel, and the act follows. There is no need, therefore, of\\ninvoking the aid of an exterior pleasure, no need of a middle term\\nor bridge to pass from one to the other of these two things\\nthought action.\\n2 The Descent of Man, p. 120. See also Sidgwick, Methods of", "height": "3504", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 223\\nThe urgency with which an idea can compel the\\nattention and dominate consciousness is what gives it\\nits motor force. Let it once so dominate, says\\nProfessor James, let no other ideas succeed in dis-\\nplacing it, and whatever motor effects belong to it\\nby nature will inevitably occur its impulsion, in\\nshort, being given to boot, and will manifest itself as\\na matter of course. This is what we have seen in\\ninstinct, in emotion, in common ideo-motor action,\\nin hypnotic suggestion, in morbid impulsion, and in\\nvoluntas invito,, the impelling idea is simply the\\none which possesses the attention. It is the same\\nwhere pleasure and pain are the motor spurs they\\ndrive other thoughts from consciousness at the same\\ntime that they instigate their own characteristic\\n4 volitional effects. In short, one does not see any\\ncase in which the steadfast occupancy of conscious-\\nness does not appear to be the prime condition of\\nimpulsive power. It is still more obviously the\\nprime condition of inhibitive power. What checks\\nEthics, Pleasure and Desire, pp. 52 f. Thus a man of weak\\nself-control, after fasting too long, may easily indulge his appetite\\nfor food to an extent which he knows to be unwholesome and\\nthat not because the pleasure of eating appears to him, even in\\nthe moment of indulgence, at all worthy of consideration in com-\\nparison with the injury to his health, but merely because he feels\\nan impulse to eat food, too powerful to be resisted. Thus, again,\\nmen have sacrificed all the enjoyments of life, and even life itself,\\nto obtain posthumous fame not from any illusory belief that they\\nwould be somehow capable of deriving pleasure from it, but from\\na direct desire of the future admiration of others, and a preference\\nof it to their own pleasure. Hume, Inquiry concerning the Prin-\\nciples of Morals, Appendix I.", "height": "3500", "width": "2296", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "224 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nour impulses is the mere thinking of reason to the\\ncontrary it is their bare presence to the mind\\nwhich gives the veto, and makes acts, otherwise\\nseductive, impossible to perform. If we could only\\nforget our scruples, what exultant energy we should\\nfor a while display.\\n(2) Another point. If pleasure or pain, or the\\nexpectation of pleasure or pain, is what prompts all\\naction, how shall we explain the first performance of\\nso-called instinctive acts? Men as well as animals\\nperform many acts instinctively, without knowing\\nbeforehand whether the results will be pleasurable\\nor painful. The newly hatched chick sees the grain\\nof corn, and straightway makes the movements nec-\\nessary to pick it up, without any thought of pleas-\\nure. Similarly the sight of the infant arouses the\\nlove of the young mother, and impels her to care\\nfor it. And the lover of truth feels a craving to\\nunravel the mysteries of the universe, regardless of\\nwhether his longings will bring him pleasure or pain.\\nIn cases like these there is present in consciousness\\na more or less distinct idea and a tendency toward\\nit, a feeling of pressure or impulsion toward it.\\nThe explosion of the impulse will be followed by\\npleasure, though the agent may know nothing of\\nthis result until it has happened. The impulse or\\ndesire for the act here exists prior to the act itself\\nand the pleasure accompanying or following it.\\nIf the hedonistic theory is correct, then all these\\nacts must be prompted by pleasure or the expecta-", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 225\\ntion of pleasure, or by pain or the fear of pain. It\\nwill not do to say that such acts are at first purel} r\\nreflex, in the sense that they follow mechanically as\\nthe consequence of the stimulation of some nerve\\ncentre from within or without, and that the pleas-\\nure experienced after the first mechanical movement\\nbecomes the future motor cue. For if they have\\noccurred originally without the intervention of a\\npleasurable motive, why should the pleasure be such\\nan indispensable condition thereafter? Nor will it\\ndo to say that pleasure, though not now the motive,\\nwas the original motive, and that such acts are in-\\nheritances of the past. Such an explanation is a\\nmere begging of the question it pushes the problem\\nfarther back into the field of the unknown, and then\\nassumes the very tiling to be proved. Besides, if\\nacts can be performed at the present time without\\nbeing prompted by pleasure, why could they not\\nhave been performed in a similar way before?\\n(3) Again, if pleasure, or the idea of pleasure, is\\nthe sole motive to action, how shall we explain the\\nfact that some pleasures are preferred to others?\\nWhy do many men prefer the pleasures of the intel-\\nlect to the pleasures of sense? Shall we say with\\nBentham that the so-called higher pleasures are\\nmore intense than the others? But many psycholo-\\ngists hold that the reverse is true. 1 And if the\\nintensity of the pleasure is not what gives it its\\nmotive force, what is it? The peculiar quality of\\n1 See Ladd, Psychology, p. 195.\\nQ", "height": "3500", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "226 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthe pleasure? (Mill.) In that case the theory aban-\\ndons its original position that pleasure is the sole\\nmotive to action, and substitutes for it the view\\nthat a certain kind of pleasure causes us to act, a\\nfact which must be explained.\\nMoreover, how did the race emerge from savagery,\\nhow did it come to prefer ideal pleasures? Who\\ntold our ancestors of the pleasures resulting from\\nthe pursuit of higher aims before they had tasted\\nthem? Were they not bound to think first, before\\nthey discovered that thinking was pleasurable\\n(4) It seems that there can be conscious action\\nwhich is not prompted by pleasure or the anticipa-\\ntion of it. Men think and plan and act, they strug-\\ngle for fame and recognition in this world and in the\\nnext, they sacrifice themselves for ideals, much in\\nthe same manner in which children play and birds\\nsing because it is their nature to do what they do,\\nbecause they desire or will to do it, not because it\\ngives them pleasure. Giordano Bruno did not die\\nnt the stake for the pleasure of the thing, nor did\\nSocrates drink the poisoned hemlock for the sake of\\nhappiness beyond the grave. Aristotle and Coper-\\nnicus, Newton and Darwin, did not give up their\\nlives to the study of nature in order to realize\\npleasure and avoid pain. They did what they did\\nbecause they could not help themselves. It is a\\ncalumny to say, so Carlyle declares, that men are\\nroused to heroic actions by ease, hope of pleasure,\\nrecompense sugar-plums of any kind in this world", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 227\\nor the next. In the meanest mortal there lies some-\\nthing nobler. The poor swearing soldier hired to\\nbe shot has his honor of a soldier, different from\\ndrill, regulations, and the shilling a day. It is not\\nto taste sweet things, but to do noble and true\\nthings, and vindicate himself under God s heaven\\nas a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam\\ndimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, the\\ndullest day-drudge kindles into a hero. They wrong\\nman greatly who say he is to be seduced by ease.\\nDifficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death, are the\\nallurements that act on the heart of man. Kindle\\nthe inner genial life of him, you have a flame that\\nburns up all lower considerations. 1\\n(5) It is true that the realization of our desires\\nand purposes is accompanied or followed by a tem-\\nporary feeling of relief or satisfaction or pleasure.\\nBut this does not prove that the feeling, or the\\nexpectation of it, w r as the cause of the result. If I\\nshould make up my mind to jump out of the win-\\ndow, I should not be satisfied until I had accom-\\nplished the task. The realization of my desire\\nwould bring me relief, but the latter would not\\nnecessarily be the cause of the act. The tension\\nin my brain or the energy in the cells would be\\ndischarged into my muscles, and a feeling of pleas-\\nure would ensue. But I could not say that it was\\nthe expectation of this result that made me jump.\\n1 Hero-Worship, p. 237 (ed. 1858). Quoted by Lecky, European\\nMorals, Vol. I, p. 57.", "height": "3492", "width": "2284", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "228 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nMy pleasures depend upon my impulses and desires,\\nmy desires do not depend upon my pleasures. To\\nassume that pleasure is the cause of an act because\\nit follows the act, is a fallacy of the post hoc ergo\\npropter hoc kind. As Hoffding says Because\\nthe end or the object of the impulse is something\\nthat excites, or seems to excite, pleasure, it need\\nnot necessarily be the feeling of pleasure itself.\\nThe impulse is essentially determined by an idea,\\nis a striving after the content of this idea. In\\nhunger, e.g., the impulse has reference to the food,\\nnot to the feeling of pleasure in its consumption. 1\\nThe sympathetic impulses, e.g., the impulse to miti-\\ngate the sorrows or to promote the welfare of others,\\nare guided by the idea of the improved condition\\nof others, depicted more or less in the imagination,\\nas also by that of the pleasure they feel in their\\nimproved condition, but it is not in the least\\nnecessary for the idea of the pleasure afforded to\\nus by the sight of their improved condition to make\\nitself felt. 2\\n8. Present Pleasure Pain as the Motive.\\nSometimes the theory is interpreted in the second\\nsense referred to above. 3 That is, all action\\nis prompted by pleasure or pain, not by the idea\\nor expectation of it. It is only because the idea of\\n1 Psychology, English translation, p. 323. See Bain s answer to\\nthis argument, Emotions and the Will, The Will, chap, viii,\\n\u00c2\u00a77.\\n2 See also Steinthal, Ethik, Part III, pp. 312-382 II, pp. 227, 348.\\n8 \u00c2\u00a76.", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 229\\na pleasure is accompanied by pleasure, and an idea\\nof pain, by pain, that it has motive force. In the\\nwords of Jodl Only the newly arising feeling,\\ncaused by memory -images (presentation-feeling),\\nnot the idea of the feeling, that is, the memory of\\na feeling, or the conception of a feeling, influences\\nthe will. 1\\nIn answer to this view we may say (1) Strictly\\nspeaking, we never have a state of consciousness\\nwhich is purely a feeling. The feeling may be the\\npredominant element, but it is not the only one in\\nthe process. In addition to feeling we have, accord-\\ning to modern psychology, 2 intellection and cona-\\ntion, or, to use more popular terms, thinking and\\nwilling. Consequently, why should we pick out\\none of the factors which go to make up a unified,\\nconscious state, and regard it as the all-important\\nmotive to action? And, then, why pick out this\\nparticular one? The hedonistic psychologist makes\\nthe scheme of action and willing far too simple. He\\nimagines that first we have an idea of some object\\nor act, that this idea somehow or other arouses a\\nfeeling of pleasure or pain, in consequence of which\\na movement is made or inhibited. This explanation\\nis as unsatisfactory as it is simple.\\n(2) Moreover, ignoring this objection, to say that\\n1 Lehrbuch der Psychologie, p. 726.\\n2 See Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, chap, iv\\nHoffding, Psychology, chap, iii Sully, The Human Mind, Vol. I,\\nchap, iv Jodl, Psychologic, chap, iii, 2 Williams, A Review of\\nEvolutional Ethics, pp. 360 ff.", "height": "3496", "width": "2284", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "230 INTRODUCTION- TO ETHICS\\npleasure is the only motive to action, assumes (a)\\nthat feelings alone can instigate action (6) that\\nonly pleasurable and painful feelings can and (c)\\nthat all feelings must be either pleasurable or pain-\\nful. Each one of these statements is open to serious\\nobjection.\\nWe have already shown in what precedes that\\nfeelings are not the sole motives to action or willing.\\nAnd unless pleasure-pains are the only feelings in\\nconsciousness, we can show that other feelings have\\nas much right to be regarded as motive forces as\\nthese. We have feelings of obligation, approval\\nand disapproval, feelings of hope and fear, love and\\nhate, anger, envy, trust, etc., all of which can influ-\\nence action. Are these feelings merely pleasurable\\nor painful tones of different ideas? 1 There is pain\\nin disapproval, fear, hate, anger, and envy, no doubt,\\nand pleasure in approval, hope, love, and trust. But\\nis that all there is in these feelings Does not each\\nfeeling possess its peculiar color-tone, so to speak?\\nIs not the feeling of fear more than the idea of a\\nfuture object plus a feeling of pain, and the feeling\\nof anger more than the idea of something that\\nopposes me, plus pain?\\nBut, the opponent urges, would you perform cer-\\ntain acts if they procured you no pleasure Yes,\\nI answer, I should and I do. I perform many acts\\n1 Spinoza, Hoffding, Kiilpe, Jodl, Bain, would answer this\\nquestion in the affirmative. In opposition see especially Wundt\\nand Ladd.", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 231\\nwhich not only yield me no pleasure, but even give\\nme pain. I catch a student cheating it gives me no\\npleasure. I report him to the authorities it gives\\nme no pleasure. I testify against him it gives me\\nno pleasure. I see him disgraced it gives me no\\npleasure. So, too, I submit to the pain of a surgical\\noperation. Ah, yes, the hedonist replies, you derive\\npleasure from the thought of having done your duty,\\nor from the hope of being restored to health. That\\nmay be but I also get pain. Very true, but the\\npleasure exceeds the pain, comes the answer. I\\ndon t know it is not an easy thing to compute\\npleasures and pains, and it is much harder to com-\\npare them with each other, and to say that the\\namount of pleasure which I derive from one act is\\ngreater than the amount of pain yielded hj another.\\nBesides, even though the pleasure did exceed the\\npain, that would not prove that the feeling of pleas-\\nure was the motive. As we have said before, the\\nfact that pleasure follows does not prove that it pre-\\ncedes. But, it is said, the hope of it preexists.\\nWell, we have already found that the idea of pleas-\\nure is not the sole motive.\\nAnother argument in favor of this aspect of\\nthe theory appears in this form: Pleasure must be\\nthe motive, because if an act gave me pain I should\\nnot perform it. Our answer is (1) I do perform\\nmany acts which give me pain. Yes, but you do\\nthem for the sake of some future pleasure, I am told.\\nThat is begging the question that is the very point", "height": "3504", "width": "2284", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "232 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nwhich has to be proved, and has not been proved.\\n(2) Even if it were true that I should not perform\\nan act that gave me pain, this would not of itself\\nprove that the pleasure is the thing I am after. It\\nwould be like asserting that I go to the theatre in\\norder to get warm, because I would not go if the\\nhouse were cold. 1 We cannot think without the\\npresence of arterial blood in the brain, but that will\\nnot allow us to conclude that arterial blood is the\\ncause of thought, as Empedocles did. I cannot live\\nwithout eating, but does that make eating the motive\\nof my living I will not eat of a certain dish unless\\nit is seasoned properly, but is the seasoning the thing\\nI am after Do I eat my food for the pepper and\\nsalt it contains\\n9. Pain as the Motive. According to another\\nphase of hedonism, neither pleasure nor the idea of\\npleasure, but a feeling of pain or discomfort, impels\\nus to action. 2 We have certain needs or cravings,\\nsays Schopenhauer, and we feel pain unless they are\\nsatisfied. The will strives to free itself from pain,\\nand therefore acts. 3\\nNow, it is doubtless true that feelings of pain and\\ndiscomfort often prevail in consciousness, and may\\nbe regarded as giving rise to action. My aching\\ntooth may impel me to seek relief at the dentist s.\\n1 See Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft,Yo\\\\. I, p. 316.\\n2 See Rolph, Biologische Probleme Sergi, Physiological Psy-\\nchology Schopenhauer and others.\\n3 See chap. x.", "height": "3524", "width": "2376", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 233\\nOr I may be bored to death in a certain town, and\\nseek for a change of scene in consequence. But can\\nwe say that the feeling of pain is the sole motive to\\naction Do you eat and drink and plan and study\\nand love and hate, simply in order to rid yourself of\\npain I do not think so. Pain is a motive among\\nothers and a very effective motive at times but\\nit is not the only one. We have impulses and de-\\nsires, and when they are not satisfied they may grow\\nmore intense and be felt as pain or discomfort. But\\nthey may be realized before this feeling arises. This\\nfeeling of discomfort is in many cases nothing but\\nthe intensification of the impulse itself, the exalta-\\ntion of the tendency or urgency from within out-\\nward. 1 Perhaps it stands for the increased tension\\nof the motor cells the energy increases until it\\nreaches the explosion point 2 perhaps it represents\\nthe muscular, tendinous, and articular excitations\\ncaused in different parts of the body by the over-\\nflow from the brain 3 perhaps it is due to both. 4 At\\nany rate, to say that this feeling is the cause of\\nthe explosion or the movement, is like saying that\\nthe intensification of the impulse is the cause of the\\nimpulse, or that I desire an act because I desire it\\nstrongly.\\nWe must therefore say to the advocates of this\\nview (1) If you claim that every act has for its\\n1 Kiilpe, Psychology, English translation, p. 266.\\n2 Bain, Wundt, Preyer. 3 James and Munsterberg.\\nLadd, Psychology, pp. 221 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2268", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "234 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nmotive a feeling of pain, as in the examples first\\nmentioned, you are in error not all acts are thus\\nproduced. (2) If by the feeling of pain you mean\\nthe feeling of uneasiness which accompanies an\\nimpulse, you are wrong again, for (a) this feeling is\\nnot an essential antecedent to every act, and (5) it\\ncannot be said to precede the impulse and set it in\\nmotion, it is the impulse itself intensified. 1\\n10. Unconscious Pleasure-Pain as the Motive.\\nPsychology makes against the view that pleasure\\nand pain, in any of the forms discussed above,\\nare the sole motives to action. We are deter-\\nmined in our conduct not merely by pleasure and\\npain, or the hope or fear of pleasure and pain.\\nConvinced of this fact, and yet unwilling to abandon\\nhis general proposition, the hedonist might say:\\nTrue, the will is roused to action not merely by con-\\nscious pleasure or pain, or by a conscious idea of\\npleasure and pain, but by unconscious pleasure and\\npain, or by an unconscious presentation of pleasure\\nand pain. That is to say, I am guided in many of\\nmy doings by unconscious pleasure and pain. My\\nwill is directed toward pleasure without knowing it.\\nI strive after wealth, honor, fame, for the sake of\\nthe pleasure they will bring, without, however,\\nalways being \u00c2\u00abaware of it. Wealth, honor, and\\nfame, like the food which we eat, are sought after\\nfor the pleasure which they procure, though we may\\nnot be conscious of the fact.\\n1 Klilpe, Psychology, p. 267.", "height": "3504", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 235\\nThis, it seems to me, is rather a weak basis upon\\nwhich to rest a theory. What happens in the realm\\nof the unconscious I have no means of telling\\nindeed, I do not even know whether there is such a\\nthing as an unconscious soul-life. When the hedo-\\nnist has recourse to the unconscious he has recourse\\nto the metaphysical he shifts the problem from psy-\\nchology to philosophy. As Sidgwick says The\\nproposition would be difficult to disprove.\\nWhen once Ave go beyond the testimony of conscious-\\nness, there seems to be no clear method of deter-\\nmining which among the consequences of any action\\nis the end at which it is aimed. For the same\\nreason, however, the proposition is at any rate\\nequally difficult to prove. x\\nBut suppose we permit the concept of the uncon-\\nscious to enter into our discussion. The hedonist\\nclaims that man blindly strives after pleasure, that\\nhe is unconsciously determined by pleasure or pain,\\nor the idea of pleasure and pain. This assumption\\nmust be proved in some way. How can the hedo-\\nnist prove it How can he show us what takes place\\nbehind the curtain of the unconscious By refer-\\nring to the effects or results of the blind striving\\nThat is, shall Ave say, Pleasure is the invariable\\neffect of unconscious striving, hence pleasure is the\\nunconscious motive But even if the premise were\\ntrue, would that make the conclusion true Besides,\\nis the premise true Can Ave prove that pleasure\\n1 Methods of Ethics, p. 53.", "height": "3504", "width": "2260", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "236 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nis the invariable effect or consequence of all blind\\nstriving\\nI believe not. In the first place many results\\nfollow our impulses movements, sensations, feelings\\nof pleasure and pain, feelings of satisfaction due to\\nthe realization of the impulse, ideas, other impulses,\\netc. The realization of every impulse is accom-\\npanied and followed by elements of thinking, feeling,\\nand willing. Now why should I pick out one of\\nthese and say that it is the unconscious choice of the\\nmind Besides, waiving this point, does the pleas-\\nure always come Say that I am striving after\\nwealth. My ostensible aim is the money but,\\nsays hedonism, the real aim is pleasure. Pleasure,\\nwhich is the secret power behind the throne, invari-\\nably follows the realization of desire. Is this true\\nI work and struggle and accumulate money, but\\nam I ever satisfied?\\nHedonism in this form consists of nothing but a\\nlot of unproved suppositions\\n(1) That there are unconscious states of mind\\n(2) That there can be unconscious pleasures and\\npains, or unconscious ideas of pleasure-pains\\n(3) That pleasure-pains are the only unconscious\\nmotives that can lead to action\\n(4) That pleasure and pain are the universal\\naccompaniments of action.\\n11. The Psychological Fallacies of Hedonism.\\nI believe that we may now say without fear of\\ncontradiction that psychology makes against the", "height": "3516", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 237\\nview that pleasure is the sole motive to action. We\\nare not prompted to action solely by feelings of\\npleasure and pain, or ideas of pleasure and pain. It\\nis a psychological fallacy to claim that we are.\\nGenerally speaking, this fallacy is based upon the\\nfollowing misconceptions\\n(1) Hedonistic psychologists hold that all feelings\\nmust be either pleasurable or painful, and that\\npleasure-pain constitutes the only class of feeling.\\nThis hypothesis, however, has not been proved to\\nthe satisfaction of a large number of psycholo-\\ngists.\\n(2) Hedonistic psychologists confuse impulses and\\ndesires with pleasurable and painful feelings. There\\nis frequently present in consciousness, as we have\\npointed out, a more or less distinct idea of move-\\nment, together with a tendency toward it, a feeling\\nof impulsion toward it, a pressure from within,\\noutward. This impulsion is felt as pleasurable\\nuntil it reaches a certain point, when it may become\\npainful. According as we unduly emphasize either\\nthe pleasurable or painful aspects of such states of\\nconsciousness as these, we shall assert either that\\npleasure or that pain is the invariable antecedent of\\naction. But we must guard against wholly identify-\\ning the feeling of impulsion with pleasure or pain\\nthe impulse contains more than these elements, as we\\nhave pointed out above. Whether the physiological\\ncause of the feeling-impulse is a nervous current\\nrunning from the brain, or whether it is the excita-", "height": "3500", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "238 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ntion produced in the brain by the resulting move-\\nments in the muscles, joints, and skin, or whether\\nit is both, does not concern us here. One thing\\nseems certain the impulse on its mental side is\\nmore than pleasure and pain.\\n(3) Hedonistic psychologists also identify the\\naffirmation or fiat of the will with pleasure, and the\\nnegation or veto with pain. They find that when\\nthe mind decides a case, there is a tone of feeling\\npresent, which, since pleasure-pains are the only\\nfeelings possible, must be a form of pleasure or pain.\\nBut though pleasures and pains are frequently fused\\nwith the state of consciousness which characterizes\\nan act of will (in our sense), they are not the only\\nelements contained in it, nor are they the all-impor-\\ntant ones.\\n(4) Hedonistic psychologists also notice that the\\ncognitive elements preceding an act are always\\nchanging, while the feeling-element remains the\\nsame. Hence they come to regard the feelings as\\nthe invariable antecedents of acts, and set them up\\nas the motives of action. They make two mistakes\\nhere They regard all feelings as tones or shades\\nof pleasure-pain and they conclude that because a\\ncertain aspect of consciousness precedes action, it\\nmust be the motive or cause of action.\\n(5) Hedonistic psychologists also believe that all\\nacts are accompanied or followed by pleasure-pains,\\nand therefore conclude that these must be the motives.\\nBut, as we have shown, it does not necessarily follow", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 239\\nthat because pleasure-pains are the effects or results\\nof acts they are therefore also the causes.\\n12. Tlie Pleasure of the Race as the Motive.\\nBut perhaps our opponents will say, We do not\\nmean that the pleasure of self is the end or motive,\\nbut the pleasure of the race, the greatest happiness\\nof the greatest number. 1\\nWe may urge the same objections against this\\nview as against the other. It cannot be proved that\\nall human beings strive after the pleasure of the race,\\nthat the idea of racial pleasure is the motive of\\nhuman action. And to say that they unconsciously\\nstrive after the happiness of the race is as objec-\\ntionable, in a certain sense, as to say that they\\nunconsciously strive after their own pleasure.\\n13. Pleasure as the End realized by All Action.\\nOur conclusion, then, is this If by the assertion,\\nPleasure, or happiness, is the end of life or the\\nhighest good, we mean that feelings of pleasure-pain,\\nin some form or other, are the motives of human\\naction, the theory cannot stand. Let us now inter-\\npret hedonism in a different sense. 2 Let us take it\\nto mean that pleasure is the end or purpose of all\\naction in the sense that all living beings realize\\npleasure, and that the realization of pleasure is the\\nobject of their existence.\\nBut the first question which forces itself upon us\\nhere is this, Is pleasure really the result of all\\naction It will have to be proved not only that\\n1 Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 22-23. 2 See chap, viii, 1 (2).", "height": "3500", "width": "2260", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "240 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\npleasure is a result of action, but the result, i.e.,\\nthat all animals get more pleasure out of life than\\npain. We have already seen that Aristotle regards\\npleasure as the consequence or concomitant of nor-\\nmal or natural activity, while pain is linked with\\nabnormal or injurious action. Spencer declares that\\npains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the\\norganism, while pleasures are the correlatives of\\nacts conducive to its welfare. By conducive and\\ninjurious he means tending to continuance or\\nincrease of life, and the reverse. 1 Bain teaches\\nthat states of pleasure are connected with an\\nincrease, and states of pain with an abatement, of\\nsome or all, of the vital functions. 2 Although there\\nare differences in expression, all these statements\\nevidently mean the same, namely, that pleasure is\\nsignificant of activities which are beneficial, and\\npain is significant of what is harmful, either to the\\ntotal organism of the individual or of the species, or\\nto the particular organ primarily involved. 3\\nAlthough this theory is not free from objections, 4\\nlet us accept it for the sake of argument. Let us\\nassume that pleasure accompanies beneficial activity,\\nand that pain is the concomitant of all action that is\\nharmful and dangerous. Functions, then, which are\\n1 Psychology, 124 Data of Ethics, 33.\\n2 The Senses and the Intellect, 4th edition, chap, iv, 18, p. 303.\\n3 Ladd, Psychology, p. 191. See also Sidgwick, Methods of\\nEthics, pp. 177 ff. Kiilpe, Psychology, English translation, pp. 267\\nff.; Marshall, Pleasure, Pain, and ^Esthetics, especially pp. 169 ff.\\n4 See Ladd, Kiilpe, Sidgwick, Marshall.", "height": "3520", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 241\\nuseful are followed by pleasure, while those which\\nare injurious have pain as their consequence. But\\nwould this prove that pleasure is the end of all\\nanimal existence, either in the sense in which we\\nspeak of vision being the end or purpose of the eye,\\nor in the sense that God or some intelligent principle\\nin nature has set up as the goal the pleasure of living\\nbeings\\nWhen we speak of ends we may merely mean that\\na certain result is obtained, that life, for example, is\\ntending in a certain direction. Thus, we say that\\nan organ realizes a purpose. The eye is a purposive\\nor teleological mechanism it has a function to\\nperform which is useful to the animal, it serves a\\npurpose, realizes an end.\\nNow, is pleasure the end of life in this sense\\nPleasure or happiness is a result of human existence,\\none of the results, a result among others. But how\\ncan we say that it is the highest end, that all other\\nfactors and functions are means to this We can\\nsay that perception, imagination, reasoning, willing,\\netc., are means to pleasure, but can we not say with\\nequal right that pleasure is a means to these How\\ncan we prove that pleasure is the final goal of life\\nWhy pick out one element of psychic life and say\\nthat the realization of this element is the goal toward\\nwhich everything is making, the end-all and be-all\\nof animal existence Would it not be like claiming\\nthat seeing is the highest goal because normal beings\\npossess an organ of sight Would it not be more", "height": "3504", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "242 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nreasonable to say that the different organs of the\\nbody are means to a higher end the life of the\\nentire body, of which the organs are parts and that\\ntherefore every organ is a means to bodily life, and\\nin so far as life consists of its organs, a partial end-\\nin-itself And would it not also be more reasonable\\nto say that the realization of all mental states is the\\nend, rather than that one element, which never\\nexists alone in consciousness, is the end It would\\nbe absurd to say that the whole body and its organs,\\nthe whole mind and all its functions, are the subor-\\ndinate means to pleasure. It would be like saying\\nthat all the organs of the body are merely means\\nof seeing, that vision is the end of life. Would it\\nnot be more plausible to reverse the statement and\\nsay, Vision is a means of life, and pleasure and pain\\nare both means of preservation\\n14. Pleasure-Pain as a Means of Preservation.\\nWe can say that pain serves as a warning,\\npleasure as a bait. When the animal feels pain it\\nmakes movements of defence or flight. Pleasure and\\npain may be conceived as primitive forms of the\\nknowledge of good and evil, as Paulsen expresses it.\\nWhen the dangerous object is near at hand, the\\ndanger to life is greatest, and pain, therefore, most\\neasily aroused. We find greater sensibility to pain\\nin direct touch than in indirect touching like seeing\\nand hearing. 2\\n1 See Nichols, article on Pleasure and Pain, Philosophical\\nReview, Vol. I, pp. 414 ff.", "height": "3524", "width": "2360", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 243\\nIt seems, also, that as we pass from lower to higher\\nforms of organic life (from lower animals to man,\\nand from the lower organs to the higher), pleasure\\nand pain gradually fall into the background. In the\\nlowest forms the animal must come into direct con-\\ntact with objects before it can feel and know how to\\nact with regard to them. Tactual sensations plus\\nfeelings of pleasure and pain would assist the animal\\nin preserving itself. In the course of time, however,\\norgans are developed which enable the animal to be-\\ncome aware of helpful and dangerous things without\\ncoming into such close contact with them. By\\nmeans of the organs of taste, smell, hearing, and\\nsight, the animal practically touches objects at a\\ngreater and greater distance, and the farther away\\nthe object of sense is, the less pain and pleasure does\\nit arouse.\\nI see no better way of interpreting such facts as\\nthese than by conceiving the feelings of pleasure and\\npain as means to an end preservation.\\nWe may reach a similar result by considering the\\nfunction which memory performs. Even though it\\nwere true that every sensation had to be felt origi-\\nnally as pleasurable or painful in order to inform the\\nanimal of the nature of the object before it, and to\\nrelease the appropriate movement with reference to\\nit, we can understand how an animal possessing the\\npower to retain its experiences could learn to act\\nwithout being prompted by feelings of pleasure and\\npain. The touch or sight of the object might call", "height": "3500", "width": "2292", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "244 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nup the thought of the pleasure or pain experienced\\nbefore, and the animal might act appropriately with-\\nout feeling peripherally excited pleasure or pain.\\nThe animal could tell what was good or bad for it\\nwithout directly experiencing pleasure or pain at all,\\nbecause each sensation would be associated with\\nideas or copies of past sensations, and it could pre-\\nserve itself because these ideas would call up certain\\nmovements which had been made before. Indeed,\\nthe sensation itself might come to be associated with\\nthe appropriate movements, without the interven-\\ntion of any additional element. The sight of the\\nhawk may be associated in the consciousness of\\nthe hen with certain tendencies to action, and here the\\nassociation may have been formed during the history\\nof the species it may be the result of race experi-\\nence. The sight of a cliff over which the mule has\\nonce fallen may become associated in the mind of\\nthe animal with the thought of its past experience,\\nand cause it to hesitate. Here the association is the\\nresult of individual experience. In both cases, how-\\never, a feeling of aversion is perhaps felt in the pres-\\nence of the dangerous object, and this may be followed\\nby a movement or the inhibition of a movement.\\nNow in the case of man abstract reasoning is added\\nto the other processes. We pick out certain char-\\nacteristics from the concrete object which we are\\nconsidering, and connect them with certain general\\nconsequences. 1 We reason from the fact that a man\\n1 See James, Psychology Reasoning, Vol. II, chap. xxii.", "height": "3504", "width": "2388", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 245\\nhas certain symptoms that he has a certain disease,\\nand prescribe a particular mode of treatment. The\\ngeneral discovers a weakness in the enemy s line of\\nbattle, and makes the movements which will lead to\\nthe desired overthrow of the opposing force.\\nIt seems, then, that in the lowest stages of life the\\nfeelings of pleasure and pain serve as signs that the\\nact is preservative. Afterward this element falls\\ninto the background, and other signs are employed.\\nPercepts and ideas are associated either with the idea\\nof pleasure or pain, which, in turn, is associated with\\nthe idea of some appropriate movement; or the per-\\ncept or idea is associated directly with the act, as is\\nthe case with instincts, habitual acts, ideo-motor\\naction, etc.\\nHence we may say again what we found to be\\ntrue before Feelings of pleasure and pain often\\nserve as signs of what furthers and hinders life;\\nsometimes the ideas of such feelings, that is, the\\nexpectation of pleasure and pain, sometimes other\\nideas, indicate it. Hence it is fair to say that\\npleasures and pains are means of guiding the\\nwill they assist the will in preserving and pro-\\nmoting individual and generic life. Whenever\\nthese results can be attained without the help of\\npleasure and pain, other means are employed.\\nPleasure is not the end aimed at by the will, but\\na means. It is far more reasonable to say that the\\nwill blindly strives for the preservation and the\\ndevelopment of life, and that pleasure and pain", "height": "3488", "width": "2276", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "246 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nare among its guides, than to say that pleasure is\\nthe end and life the means. The part is a means\\nto the whole of which it is the part the whole is\\nnot a means to an individual part.\\n15. The Physiological Basis of Pleasure-Pain.\\nNow let us look at the matter physiologically.\\nLet us consider what are the physiological condi-\\ntions of pleasure and pain. When I exercise an\\norgan moderately, a pleasant feeling arises when I\\noverexercise it, an unpleasant feeling is the result.\\nA too intense light causes pain a very loud sound\\ndoes the same. It is often said that a very weak\\nsensation is accompanied by an unpleasant feeling.\\nThis is true, however, only when we attempt to pay\\nattention to it, in which case the pain is due to the\\neffort we make. We may suppose that when an\\norgan is exercised or stimulated, the cortical centre\\nto which or from which the current runs has its\\nnervous substance, its cells, destroyed. The energy\\nin the cells is used up. But the energy is restored\\nas quickly as possible by the blood, which carries\\nnourishment. If the expended central energy is\\nrestored quickly enough to make up for the waste,\\na pleasant feeling arises. But when the cellular\\nsubstance is not restored rapidly enough, we get\\nunpleasant feelings. When the nervous system\\nis acted upon, blood is carried to the parts in action\\nin order to restore the expended force. The arte-\\nries are dilated. This explains the changes in pulse,\\nrespiration, etc., which accompany or follow pleas-", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 247\\nurable feelings. When, however, too severe a drain\\nis made upon the parts in action, the blood does not\\ncarry enough nourishment, and the lost energy is\\nnot restored. Pain ensues. The breaking down\\nof the cells reacts upon the movement of the arte-\\nries the greater the demand made upon them, the\\nless they can do they become constricted. Hence,\\nintense bodily pain may produce a swoon, and the\\ntortures of the rack have sometimes put the victim\\nto sleep. 1\\nNow to say that pleasure is the end, would mean,\\nwhen translated into physiological language, that\\nthe entire body, with all its complicated organs, was\\nnothing but a means for keeping the nervous energy\\nin such a state that destruction should not exceed\\nconstruction. 2 This is manifestly absurd. The\\nsanest view to take is that the physiological con-\\ndition corresponding to pleasure is a sign of the\\nproper functioning of the system, that the health\\nand integrity of the entire system is the end which\\nis realized by the proper functioning of the nervous\\nand every other system.\\n16. Metaphysical Hedonism. Much harder would\\nit be to prove that pleasure is the highest end\\n1 Ktilpe, Psychology i p. 273. See Sutherland, The Origin and\\nGrowth of the Moral Instinct, Vol. II, chap. xxii.\\n2 Or, if we assume the existence of special pain and pleasure\\nnerves, the hedonistic physiology would mean that all the other\\nnerves and all the other parts of the body were means to the exci-\\ntation of the pleasure nerves, and that the excitation of these nerves\\nwas the end and aim of life.", "height": "3500", "width": "2268", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "248 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\naimed at by nature or by God. We should have\\nthe same problem as before, complicated with all\\nthe difficulties belonging to the teleological argu-\\nment in metaphysics. 1 We should have to prove\\n(1) that an end is really realized (2) that pleas-\\nure is that end, which we have not been able to do\\nso far (3) that it is the end desired by God or\\nby some intelligent principle in nature and (4)\\nthat everything else is an appropriate means of\\nrealizing it. It would have to be shown that God\\nmade the world and everything in it in order to\\nprocure pleasure or happiness for his creatures.\\nCan that be done Countless numbers of living\\nbeings perish in the struggle for existence. Many\\nare called but few are chosen. Only those survive\\nwho can meet the requirements of their surround-\\nings, whose natures are adapted to the conditions\\nof the world.\\nTo assume that the end aimed at by God is pleas-\\nure, is to assume that everything in this world, the\\ncomplicated bodies of the animals and everything\\nin existence, was made in order that living beings\\nmight get pleasure. One feels like asking in this\\nconnection, why so much effort was wasted to pro-\\nduce this result tant de bruit pour une omelette\\nwhen it might have been attained with less trouble.\\nPerhaps the jellyfish has less to grumble at than\\nman.\\n1 For an excellent critique of teleology, see Paulsen s Introduc-\\ntion to Philosophy, English translation, pp. 158 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2400", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM 249\\n17. Pleasure as the Moral End. But, it might\\nbe said, although pleasure or happiness is not the\\nend at which men aim, consciously or unconsciously,\\nthey ought to aim at it. Why, however, ought they\\nto aim at it? we ask. To say that one ought to do a\\nthing can mean (1) that, if one desires to realize\\na certain end, one ought to use certain means or (2)\\nthat one is absolutely bound to do a certain tiling.\\nNow if we say that man ought to make pleasure\\nthe goal, taking the ought relatively as in the first\\ncase, then we are practically making pleasure a\\nmeans to some other end. If the ought is taken in\\nthe second sense, and we say that man is bound\\nunconditionally to seek his happiness, that he is\\nobliged to seek it, morally obliged, perhaps, we\\nare simply making a dogmatic assertion which can-\\nnot be proved, and which will not be accepted by\\nevery one without qualification. It cannot be proved\\nthat one ought to strive after some highest good\\nthis is a matter of feeling. Now, do all human\\nbeings feel that they ought to seek pleasure regardless\\nof everything else, and do they feel that they ought\\nto seek everything else for the sake of pleasure", "height": "3504", "width": "2260", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IX\\nTHE HIGHEST GOOD*\\n1. The Question of Ends or Ideals. Our exami-\\nnation has shown us that pleasure cannot be regarded\\nas the end of action, in whatever sense we take the\\nword end. Then what is the end If we mean by\\nthe question, What is the motive to action we can-\\nnot answer in a single word. All ideas are more\\nor less impulsive, indeed every conscious state tends\\nto translate itself into movement consciousness is\\nmotor. If we mean by the question, What is the\\nfinal goal at which human beings are consciously\\nand deliberately aiming? then our answer must\\nbe, Human beings have not a definite end in view\\ntoward which they are consciously and methodically\\nmoving. We do not plan our lives so carefully, we\\ndo not first set up an ideal and then try to realize it.\\nIndividuals and nations may be said to have certain\\nideals, but not in the sense that they are clearly con-\\nscious of them.\\n1 See the authors mentioned in chap, vii, especially Stephen,\\nScience of Ethics, chaps, iv, ix, x Jhering, ZwecJc im Becht, Vol.\\nII, 95 ff.; Wundt, Ethics, pp. 493 ft; Hoffding, Ethik, VI; Paulsen,\\nEthics, Introduction, also pp. 275 ff.; also Ziegler, Sittliches Sein\\nund sittliches Werden Williams, Evolutional Ethics, Part II,\\nchaps, vii, viii, ix. See also my article, The Moral Law, in\\nthe International Journal of Ethics, January, 1900.\\n250", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0260.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 251\\nWe can say, however, that every animal desires to\\nlive in its own peculiar way. The lion desires to\\nlive the life of a lion, man the life of a man. The\\nbrute is, of course, not conscious of the ultimate con-\\nsequences of its strivings. It desires food and cares\\nfor its young not because it has before its conscious-\\nness the idea of individual and race preservation.\\nIt is not necessary that it should know all these\\nthings the important thing is that it should do\\nthem.\\nWhen we examine the acts desired by animals, we\\nfind that the}* are purposive, that they realize a pur-\\npose. The lion roams over the desert seeking for\\nprey, and when he finds it he acts in a manner appro-\\npriate to his purpose. The lioness cares for her\\nyoung much like a human mother. We may say\\nthat the actions of these animals tend toward their\\nself-preservation as well as toward the preservation\\nof the species. And we may, therefore, say in a cer-\\ntain sense that these animals desire their own and\\ntheir species good, not, however, that they have in\\nconsciousness an ideal toward which they are work-\\ning, and for the realization of which they are using\\neverything else as a means. Their desires are\\ndirected toward concrete acts, which we may embrace\\nunder different classes, not toward abstract ideals.\\nNow, human beings, like other animals, have their\\nminds fixed upon specific acts without being neces-\\nsarily conscious of the ultimate consequences of these\\nacts. They desire these acts, not for the sake of any", "height": "3504", "width": "2292", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0261.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "252 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nultimate good, but for the sake of the acts them-\\nselves and their immediate consequences. I may\\nbenefit others because I love to do so, without being\\naware that I am thereby bettering humanity, and\\nwithout consciously striving after that end. I may\\nstudy from a love of study, because I have certain\\nintellectual impulses, without being conscious that\\nthe realization of my desires will assist in civilizing\\nthe world, and without intending to work for prog-\\nress. Or I may be thoroughly conscious of what I\\nam doing and for what I am doing it, I may be gov-\\nerned in all my conduct by a clearly conceived ideal.\\nNow, different persons may have different ideals\\n(meaning by ideals the direction which their im-\\npulses are taking, whether they are conscious of it or\\nnot). And the same individual may have different\\nideals at different times, nay, even, different ideals\\nat the same time. One ideal may give way to an-\\nother, which in turn may be relieved by a third.\\nMoreover, ideals are more clearly presented in some\\nconsciousnesses than in others, and govern the lives\\nof some individuals more characteristically than\\nthose of others.\\nCollective bodies like individuals move in certain\\ndirections in obedience to their characteristic desires,\\nand have their ideals. Different nations have dif-\\nferent ideals, and the same nation may have different\\nideals at different times. A nation s ideal manifests\\nitself in all its products in its religion, philosophy,\\npoetry, art, literature, science, politics, moralitj^, etc.", "height": "3504", "width": "2396", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0262.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 253\\nThe ideals of the Jews, Athenians, and Spartans\\nwere not the same. The ideal of the earlier Romans\\ndiffered largely from that of the Empire, and the\\nideal of the modern times does not agree with the\\nideal of the Middle Ages.\\n2. The Ideal of Humanity. All these facts show\\nus how hard it must be to answer the question,\\nWhat is the highest good or ideal which humanity is\\nstriving to reach? in anything but a very general\\nway. We can say that human beings desire to live\\nhuman lives, which is a general statement of the\\nfact that they have specific impulses, desires, or\\ntendencies. The} r not only desire to live, but to live\\nin specific ways. They love to exercise their powers\\nand to develop their capacities. In the words of\\nPaulsen The goal at which the will of every liv-\\ning creature aims, is the normal exercise of the vital\\nfunctions which constitute its nature. Every animal\\ndesires to live the life for which it is predisposed.\\nIts natural disposition manifests itself in impulses,\\nand determines its activity. The formula may also\\nbe applied to man. He desires to live a human life\\nand all that is implied in it that is, a mental, his-\\ntorical life, in which there is room for the exercise of\\nall human mental powers and virtues. He desires\\nto play and to learn, to work and to acquire, to\\npossess and to enjoy, to form and to create he de-\\nsires to love and to admire, to obey and to rule, to\\nfight and to win, to make poetry and to dream, to\\nthink and to investigate. And he desires to do all", "height": "3504", "width": "2276", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0263.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "254 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthese things in their natural order of development,\\nas life provides them. He desires to experience the\\nrelations of the child to its parents, of the pupil to\\nhis teacher, of the apprentice to the master and his\\nwill, for the time being, finds the greatest satisfac-\\ntion in such a life. He desires to live as a brother\\namong brothers, as a friend among friends, as a\\ncompanion among companions, as a citizen among\\ncitizens, and also to prove himself an enemy against\\nenemies. Finally, he desires to experience what the\\nlover, husband, and father experience he desires to\\nrear and educate children who shall preserve and\\ntransmit the contents of his own life. And after he\\nhas lived such a life and has acquitted himself like\\nan honest man, he has realized his desires his life is\\ncomplete contentedly he awaits the end, and his\\nlast wish is to be gathered peacefully to his fathers. 1\\nThat is, to speak in general terms, man has certain\\nimpulses and longings, which he seeks to live out.\\nAs Professor James puts it, he has a material me, a\\nsocial me, and a spiritual me, and the corresponding\\nfeelings and impulses. He desires to preserve and\\ndevelop his body, to clothe it, to adorn it, to house\\nit, to acquire and enjoy property, friends, and other\\npossessions, to get social recognition, to be loved and\\nadmired, to promote his spiritual interests, and to\\nassist his fellows in realizing similar desires.\\nWe may generalize and say Man desires his pres-\\nervation and development, physical and mental. He\\n1 Ethics, Bk. II, chap, ii, 5.", "height": "3504", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0264.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 255\\ndesires to know, to feel, to will, and to act. Some\\nphilosophers have regarded intellect (reason) as the\\ngoal, others have emphasized the feelings (pleasure),\\nand still others have designated action, as the end. 1\\nSome have advised us to eradicate all material striv-\\nings, and to care only for the health of the soul, by\\nwhich they meant either our moral or religious nature,\\nor both. Mediaeval ascetics regarded the body and\\nall impulses except the desire to be united with God,\\nas obstacles in the path of man. Natural impulses\\nwere regarded as the work of the devil, and there-\\nfore as things that ought to be suppressed. We\\nmust, however, beware of one-sidedness here, and\\nnot emphasize one element at the expense of another.\\nWe may say that human life and the development\\nof human life is the end. But by life we do not\\nmean mere eating and drinking, i.e., the preservation\\nof the body, or the exercise of any other single phase\\nof life, such as thinking, feeling, or willing, but\\nthe unfolding of all human capacities in conformity\\nwith the demands of the natural and human environ-\\nment. The end is the development of body and mind\\nin harmony with each other, the unfolding of all\\npowers and capacities of the soul, cognitive, emo-\\ntional, and volitional, in adaptation to both physical\\nand psychical surroundings. A person is realizing\\n1 Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, chap, iii (Welldon s translation):\\nThus ordinary or vulgar people conceive it (the good) to be\\npleasure, and accordingly approve a life of enjoyment. For\\nthere are practically three prominent lives, the sensual, the politi-\\ncal, and, thirdly, the speculative.", "height": "3504", "width": "2252", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0265.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "256 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthe highest good when his inner life is well ordered\\nor rationalized when the so-called lower forces are\\nsubordinated to the higher spiritual powers when\\nhe is what the Greeks called aaxfrpov (s5phron), or\\nhealthy-minded; when his body is the servant and\\nsymbol of the soul, and like a good servant does\\nmuch and demands little; when there is a proper\\nbalance between his egoistic and altruistic impulses\\nand acts, in short, when he is a virtuous man. 1\\nWhen we declare that the end of human striving\\nis the unfolding of human life, we merely indicate\\nthe end in vague and general outlines. We cannot\\ngive a detailed and definite account of what we mean\\nby human life we must allow humanity to fill in\\nthe content itself. We can tell what life is only by\\nliving it. As life is movement, action, the unfolding\\nof capacities, our goal cannot be a fixed or stable\\none we cannot imagine that we shall ever reach a\\n1 The following quotation, from Huxley s Science and Educa-\\ntion, will show us what that writer regards as the highest good\\nThat man, I think, has a liberal education who has been so\\ntrained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will, and\\ndoes with ease and pleasure all the work that, as a mechanism, it\\nis capable of whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with all\\nits parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order ready,\\nlike a steam engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin\\nthe gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind whose\\nmind is stored with the great and fundamental truths of Nature\\nand of the laws of her operations one who, no stunted ascetic, is\\nfull of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel\\nby a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience who has\\nlearned to love all beauty, whether of Nature or of art, to hate all\\nvileness, and to respect others as himself. p. 86.", "height": "3504", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0266.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 257\\npoint of rest, a stopping-place. The goal is a mov-\\nable goal in fact, there is no goal in the sense of a\\ndestination to be reached. History and anthropology\\nshow us how humanity has moved from ideal to ideal,\\nhow there has been a gradual unfolding and differen-\\ntiation of faculties, how society has advanced from the\\nsimple to the complex. We may say that humanity\\nhas taken each step consciously, without, however,\\nbeing aware of what the next step would be. Our\\nthoughts are fixed upon the present and immediate\\nmainly, and now and then we get a faint glimpse of\\nthe future and remote. We do the work that lies\\nnearest to us, and pass on to the next problem, with-\\nout knowing what the solution will be and to what\\nnew problems it will give rise. So the human race\\nperforms its tasks, and takes up new ones when these\\nare accomplished. We cannot tell what the next\\nproblem will be, although, of course, our knowledge\\nof the past will, in a certain measure, enable us to\\nindicate the direction in which the times are moving.\\nAs Jhering aptly says Wherein the weal and\\nhappiness of society consist is a question that cannot\\nbe answered by theory. The history of mankind\\nanswers it as she unrolls leaf by leaf of her book.\\nEvery end attained contains within itself a new one.\\nThe first goal must be reached before the next one\\ncan be sighted. Of the perfect form of the well-\\nbeing of mankind we have no idea at all. 1\\n1 Der Zwech im Becht, Vol. II, p. 205. See also Hoffding,\\nEthik, pp. 103 ff.: Every achievement of an end is but the begin-", "height": "3496", "width": "2260", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0267.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "258 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n3. Egoism and Altruism. 1 The end or purpose,\\nthen, of all human striving, the summum bonum, is\\nthe preservation and perfection of human life. But\\nthe question at once arises, Whose preservation and\\nperfection are we aiming at, our own or that of\\nothers Here again, as we saw before, 2 two answers\\nare usually given. I may regard as the ideal my\\nown good or the good of the race. In the one case\\nwe have egoism, in the other, altruism. Now which\\nof these views is correct\\nLet us formulate the problem of egoism and altru-\\nism in this way. Let us ask: (a) What is the end\\nrealized by human action? and (7 What is the\\nmotive in the mind of the agent\\n4. TJie Effects of Action. Generally speaking, the\\nacts performed by mankind have the tendency to\\npromote individual and social welfare. Whatever\\nmay be his motive, it may be said that every individ-\\nual performs acts which influence, not only himself,\\nbut others. The relations between man and man are\\nning of a new end. Welfare is therefore not a passive condition,\\nbut activity, work, development. See also Wunclt, Ethics, and\\nPaulsen, Ethics, Introduction, and Bk. II, chap, ii, 7 ff.\\n1 For views similar to those expressed in the following sections,\\nsee the ethical works of Bacon, Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hutche-\\nson, Butler, Hume, A. Smith, J. S. Mill, Bain, Darwin, Sidgwick\\nSpencer, Data of Ethics, chaps, xi-xiv Stephen, Science of Ethics,\\nchap, vi Hbffding, Ethik, VIII Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap, vi\\nSimmel, Einleituiuj, Vol. I, chap, ii Williams, Evol. Ethics, Part\\nII, chaps, v, vi Harris, Moral Evolution Drummond, Ascent of\\nMan; Sutherland, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.\\n2 See chap, iv, 6.", "height": "3500", "width": "2428", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0268.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 259\\nso close in a civilized community that every member s\\nbehavior is bound to produce effects upon the envi-\\nronment as well as upon the agent himself. The\\nman who cares for his body, be his motive what it\\nmay, is benefiting others almost as much as himself\\nwhile he who has a proper regard for the health of\\nhis fellows cannot fail to be benefited in his own per-\\nson by his action. What benefits my family has a\\ntendency to benefit me, and what benefits me has a\\ntendency to benefit my family. Similarly, what\\nbenefits the society in which I live tends to benefit\\nme, and what benefits me tends to benefit the society\\nof which I am a member. 1 The purely egoistic\\ncharacter of so-called personal virtues, for the asser-\\ntion of which so much has been written, is a myth.\\nNo man can make a sot of himself, or indeed injure\\nhimself in any way, without reducing his power to\\nbenefit society, and harming those nearest to him. 2\\nSimilarly, we are accustomed to regard honesty in\\neconomic life as a duty to others, but it is no less a\\nduty of the individual to himself. Many proverbs\\nexpress the experience of the race on this point\\nHonesty is the best policy Ill-gotten goods seldom\\nprosper The biter is sometimes bit 111 got, ill\\nspent. 3 The organ which performs its own func-\\n1 See Spencer, Data of Ethics, chaps, xi ff. Paulsen, Ethics,\\nBk. II, chap. vi.\\n2 Williams, A Beview of Evolutional Ethics, Part II, chaps, v\\nand vi.\\n8 Paulsen, Ethics, p. 385. See Bishop Butler, Human Nature and\\nother Sermons, Sermon i end of Sermon iii beginning of Sermon v.", "height": "3500", "width": "2252", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0269.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "260 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ntions properly promotes the health of the entire\\norganism, and the health of the whole organism is\\nadvantageous to each particular organ. The indi-\\nvidual is not an isolated atom, but a part of a whole,\\ninfluencing the whole and influenced by it. 1\\nWe cannot, therefore, draw a sharp distinction be-\\ntween egoistic and altruistic acts according to their\\neffects an act affects not only the agent or another,\\nbut both. There is no act, as Paulsen says, 2 that\\ndoes not influence the life of the individual as well\\nas that of the surroundings, and hence cannot and\\nmust r iiot be viewed and judged from the standpoint\\nof Both individual and general welfare. The tra-\\nditional classification, which distinguishes between\\nduties toward self and duties toward others, can-\\nnot be recognized as a legitimate division. There is\\nno duty toward individual life that cannot be con-\\nstrued as a duty toward others, and no duty toward\\nothers that cannot be proved to be a duty toward\\nself. In its effects the act is both egoistic and altru-\\nistic. We may regard such acts as tend to promote\\nboth individual and social welfare as the products of\\nevolution. Persons performing acts benefiting them-\\nselves, but interfering with the welfare of the group\\nin which they lived, as well as persons performing\\nacts benefiting the group, but injuring themselves,\\nperished in the struggle for existence. Such persons,\\n1 See the systems of Cumberland and Shaftesbury, chap, vii,\\n9, 10.\\n2 Ethics, p. 383.", "height": "3504", "width": "2380", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0270.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 261\\nhowever, as learned to perform acts benefiting both\\nthemselves and the community, survived, and trans-\\nmitted their modes of behavior to their offspring,\\neither by heredity or education, or both.\\n5. The Motives of Action. Some thinkers divide\\nacts into egoistic and altruistic according to the motives\\nof the agent who performs them. Egoistic acts are\\nsuch as are prompted solely by regard for self altru-\\nistic acts are such as are prompted solely by regard\\nfor others. And it is asserted by some that there are\\nno real altruistic acts in this sense that all acts are\\negoistic or instigated by a selfish motive.\\nThus Hobbes holds that every individual strives\\nto preserve himself, that whatever furthers his own\\nwell-being is desired by him, that he cares for others\\nonly in so far as they are means to his own welfare.\\nBut since every other individual has the same object\\nin view, and since this object cannot be realized\\nunless each individual makes certain concessions to\\nhis fellows, men also act for the good of others. 1\\nAccording to Mandeville, 2 all actions including\\nthe so-called virtues spring from vanity and egoism.\\nShaftesbury is wrong in assuming the existence of\\nunselfish affections or impulses. Man is by nature\\nself-seeking, fear makes him social. Actions which\\napparently imply the sacrifice of selfish inclinations\\n1 Chap, vii, 7. This view was opposed by Cumberland. See\\nchap, vii, 9.\\n2 Fable of the Bees; or Private Vices Public Benefits, 1714\\nwritten in opposition to Shaftesbury s system.", "height": "3504", "width": "2260", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0271.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "262 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nfor the good of society are really done out of pride\\nand self-love. And this is as it should be. Greed,\\nextravagance, envy, ambition, and rivalry are the\\nroots of the acquisitive impulse, and contribute more\\nto the public good than benevolence and the con-\\ntrol of desire. 1 Hence the welfare of society really\\ndepends upon the vice (egoistic impulses) of its mem-\\nbers. A similar view had already been expressed\\nby La Rochefoucauld, 2 who regards amour-propre, or\\nself-love, as the only motive to human action, and\\nLa Bruyere. 3 Lamettrie, 4 the materialist, is also an\\negoist in ethics, as are also Helvetius, 6 Frederick\\nthe Great, Voltaire, D Alembert, and Holbach, the\\nauthor of the Systeme de la nature 6\\nHelvetius holds that there is but one really origi-\\nnal and innate impulse in man amour-propre, self-\\nlove. Self-love is the source of all our desires and\\nemotions; all other dispositions are acquired. Moral-\\nity is made possible by educating men to see their\\nown interest in the general interest. The expecta-\\ntion of reward is the only motive to morality if it\\nwere not to our interest to love virtue, there would\\nbe no virtue. 7\\n1 Quoted from Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy,\\ntranslated by Armstrong, pp. 202, 203.\\n2 In his Reflexions, on sentences et maximes morales, 1665.\\n8 In his Les characteres et les mceurs de ce siecle, 1687.\\n4 1709-1751. 6 See chap, ii, 6 (3). 6 1776.\\n7 See also Paley and Bentham, whose systems are given in chap,\\nvi. Hartley and his school regard the egoistic impulses as pri-\\nmary, and sympathy as secondary or derivative. With this view,\\nThe following claim", "height": "3504", "width": "2396", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0272.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 263\\n6. Criticism of Egoism. This theory seems to me\\nto be false. It is not true that the sole motive of\\nhuman action is the preservation and advancement\\nof self. To say that an act was prompted by a\\nselfish motive may mean one of two things. It may\\nmean either (a) that the agent had his own welfare\\nclearly in view in performing the act, that is, that\\nhe knew that it was going to benefit him and de-\\nsired it for that reason or it may mean (6) that\\nhe desired certain acts which happened to be advan-\\ntageous to him, without, however, knowing that they\\nwere so.\\n(1) If we interpret egoism in the first sense,\\nthen, it seems to me, many acts which are called\\negoistic are really neither egoistic nor altruistic;\\nthat is, the doer of them is not conscious of the\\npurpose they realize. The mere fact that an animal\\ndesires an act which turns out to be self-preservative\\nwill not allow us to infer that there was a selfish\\nmotive behind it. When the cat runs after the\\nmouse, she cannot really be said to care for herself,\\nbut for the mouse. She desires the mouse for its\\nown sake, and has no idea of benefiting herself.\\nOur interest in things says Professor James, means\\nthe attention and emotion which the thought of them\\nwill excite, and the actions which their presence will\\nthat both egoism and sympathy are original Bacon, Cumberland,\\nShaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, A. Smith, J. S. Mill, Bain,\\nDarwin, Sidgwick, Spencer, Stephen. Paulsen, and Hoffding; and\\nin fact, almost all the modern psychologists.", "height": "3500", "width": "2316", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0273.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "264 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nevoke. Thus every species is particularly interested\\nin its own prey or food, its own enemies, its own\\nsexual mates, and its own young. These things\\nfascinate by their intrinsic power to do so they are\\ncared for for their own sakes. What my comrades\\ncall my bodily selfishness or self-love, is nothing but\\nthe sum of all the outer acts which this interest in\\nmy body spontaneously draws from me. My self-\\nishness is here but a descriptive name for grouping\\ntogether the outward symptoms which I show.\\nWhen I am led by self-love to keep my seat whilst\\nladies stand, or to grab something first and cut out\\nmy neighbor, what I really love is the comfortable\\nseat, is the thing itself which I grab. I love them\\nprimarily, as the mother loves her babe, or a gen-\\nerous man an heroic deed. Wherever, as here,\\nself-seeking is the outcome of simple instinctive\\npropensity, it is but a name for certain reflex acts.\\nSomething rivets my attention fatally, and fatally\\nprovokes the selfish response. Could an automa-\\nton be so skilfully constructed as to ape these acts,\\nit would be called selfish as properly as I. It is true\\nthat I am no automaton, but a thinker. But my\\nthoughts, like my acts, are here concerned only with\\nthe outward things. They need neither know nor\\ncare for any pure principle within. In fact, the\\nmore utterly c selfish I am in this primitive way,\\nthe more blindly absorbed my thought will be in the\\nobjects and impulses of my lusts, and the more de-\\nvoid of any inward-looking glance. A baby, whose", "height": "3504", "width": "2404", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0274.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 265\\nconsciousness of the pure Ego, of himself as a\\nthinker, is not usually supposed developed, is, in\\nthis way, as some German has said, der vollendetste\\nEgoist. 1\\n(2) If, however, we interpret egoism in the sec-\\nond sense, and say. that such acts are selfish which\\nhappen to be advantageous to the agent (even with-\\nout his knowing it), then, again, it is not true that\\nall acts are egoistic. For many acts are performed\\nand desired by animals as well as men, which are\\nbeneficial not only to the individual who performs\\nthem, but also to the species to which he belongs,\\nas we have already seen. That is to say, human\\nbeings do not perform and desire only acts which\\nare conducive to their own welfare.\\n(3) It is not true that we care for ourselves alone.\\nWe care for ourselves and we care for others. 2 The\\n1 James, Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 320 f. See also Hume, Inquiry\\nconcerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix II, end: In the\\nsame manner, there are mental passions, by which we are impelled\\nimmediately to seek particular objects, such as fame, or power, or\\nvengeance, without any regard to interest and when these objects\\nare attained, a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of\\nour indulged affections. Nature must, by the internal frame and\\nconstitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame ere\\nwe can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or pursue it from\\nmotives of self-love, and a desire of happiness. In all these cases,\\nthere is a passion which points immediately to the object, and con-\\nstitutes it our good or happiness as there are other secondary\\npassions which afterward arise, and pursue it as a part of our\\nhappiness, when once it is constituted such by our original affec-\\ntions. Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love,\\nthat propensity could scarcely ever exert itself, etc.\\n2 Ladd, Psychology, p. 586: In concrete fact, men think and", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0275.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "266 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nassertion that we care for ourselves alone falls as\\nshort of the truth as the assertion that we care for\\nothers alone. As a matter of fact, every human being\\nis both egoistic or selfish, and altruistic or unselfish.\\nParents who love their children and are willing to\\nsacrifice certain comforts in life in order that their\\nchildren may prosper, are altruistic the soldier\\nwho takes up arms in defence of his country, from\\nlove of his country, has some unselfish motives. In-\\ndeed, just as the effects of acts tend to both personal\\nand general good, so the motives may be both ego-\\nistic and altruistic. It is a mistake to suppose that\\nevery act has but one motive. 1 Many motives com-\\nbine to influence the will to action. Every man\\ndesires to live, it is true, but he also desires to\\nkeep his family alive, to be a useful member of the\\ncommunity, to help others. He does not live for\\nhimself alone. There is, says Hume, 2 some\\nbenevolence, however small, infused into our bosom\\nsome spark of friendship for human kind some par-\\nticle of the dove kneaded into our frame along with\\nthe elements of the wolf and serpent. Let these\\ngenerous sentiments be supposed ever so weak let\\nthem be insufficient to move even a hand or finger\\nof our body they must still direct the determina-\\ntions of our mind, and, where everything else is\\nfeel far less with direct reference to self than is ordinarily sup-\\nposed.\\n1 See Darwin, quoted in chap, viii, 7 (1).\\n2 Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Section IV.", "height": "3500", "width": "2408", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0276.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 267\\nequal, produce a cool preference of what is useful\\nand serviceable to mankind to what is pernicious\\nand dangerous. 1\\nThe mission of the individual seems to be to live\\nand let live. His impulses are turned in the direc-\\ntion of self-preservation and the preservation of his\\nspecies. This means that he desires acts which tend to\\npreserve himself and others. He need not know that\\nthey have these results but he may become aware\\nof the utility of such acts, and then perform them\\nconsciously, in order to realize the end reached by\\nthem. Nature often works in the dark, as it were\\nthe object may be realized without the individual s\\nknowing what it is, or consciously aiming at it.\\n7. Selfishness and Sympathy. But, it may be\\nasked, is not the conscious desire to benefit oneself\\nstronger as a motive than that to advance others\\nWe must confess that, generally speaking, it is.\\nThe individual desires to live, first of all then he\\ndesires the life of others. This is as it should be.\\nEach individual must perforin acts which make for\\n1 See also Section V, Part II, note It is needless to push our\\nresearches so far as to ask why we have humanity, or a fellow-\\nfeeling with others. It is sufficient that this is experienced to be a\\nprinciple of human nature. We must stop somewhere in our exam-\\nination of causes and there are, in every science, some general\\nprinciples, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle\\nmore general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness\\nand misery of others. 1 See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap, vi;\\nWilliams, Evolutional Ethics, pp. 383 ff. Darwin, Descent of\\nMan, chap, iv Simmel, Einleitung in die, Moralwissenschaft, Vol.\\nI, chap, ii; Lipps, Eihische Grundfragen, Lecture I.", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0277.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nself-preservation, and it is to be supposed that the\\nwork can be best performed by the person directly\\ninterested. But, as was noticed before, the acts\\ntending to realize his purpose do not necessarily run\\ncounter to the acts of others. He may advance\\nhimself without interfering with others indeed,\\nby looking out for himself and his interests, he in\\na large measure advances the interests of the whole\\nof which he forms a part, and at the same time\\nputs himself in the position to benefit others more\\ndirectly. Still, there is a point beyond which indi-\\nvidual aspirations cannot well go without causing\\ninjury to others. A person s conscious desire to\\nadvance himself may become so strong, or external\\nconditions may become such, as to tempt him to seek\\nhis own welfare at the expense of that of his sur-\\nroundings. 1 In order to hinder this result and to\\nkeep each individual on his own ground, moral codes\\nhave been developed, and these in turn have led to\\nthe development of moral feelings. In other words,\\nmorality is the outgrowth of the conflict between\\nindividual interests. When one individual injures\\nanother in the struggle for existence, he arouses the\\nresentment of the latter, as well as the sympathetic\\nresentment of all disinterested spectators. The com-\\nbined feelings and impulses aroused by the aggres-\\n1 It is also possible that a person s sympathy may lead him to\\nperform acts which are dangerous to the community, and that his\\nselfishness may injure him. Wherever his acts tend to harm the\\ncommunity, they are disapproved.", "height": "3500", "width": "2480", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0278.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 269\\nsor s selfishness give birth to injunctions Thou\\nshalt, and Thou shalt not. In the course of time,\\nas has been already explained, the moral sentiments\\nare developed, and come to the rescue of the sympa-\\nthetic feelings when these are in danger of being\\noverwhelmed by selfishness. If it were not for the\\nfact that human beings come in conflict with each\\nother in their desire to live, there would be no need\\nof the moral law. Moral laws aim to hinder con-\\nduct which makes impossible social life, or rather\\nsuch conduct as a group of men have found by\\nexperience, or believe, to be antagonistic to their\\npurposes. 1\\n8. Moral Motive and Moral Action. Men, then,\\nare neither purely egoistic nor purely altruistic,\\nwhether we judge their conduct from the standpoint\\nof the motive or from the standpoint of the effect.\\nWe may now ask (a) How ought they to feel in\\norder to be called moral? and (6) How ought they\\nto act in order to be called moral\\n(1) Schopenhauer declares that no act has moral\\nworth unless it is the result of pure altruistic feeling,\\nunless it is actuated by the weal or woe of another.\\nIf the motive which impels me to action is my own\\nwelfare, my act has no moral worth at all. Fichte\\ngoes so far as to say There is but one virtue, and\\nthat is to forget oneself as a person but one vice, to\\nthink of oneself. Whoever in the slightest degree\\n1 See article on the Moral Law, in the International Journal\\nof Ethics, January, 1900.", "height": "3504", "width": "2276", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0279.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "270 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nthinks of his own personality, and desires a life and\\nexistence and any self -enjoyment whatsoever, except\\nfor the species, is fundamentally and radically, a\\npetty, low, wicked, and wretched fellow. 1\\nThis is a one-sided view, in my opinion. The\\nquestion at issue here is not, What must be a man s\\nmotive in order that you or I may regard him as\\nmoral? but, What must be his motive in order that\\nhe be regarded moral in the judgment of the race\\nNow, are only such acts approved of by mankind as\\nare prompted by a purely altruistic motive\\nWe can hardly claim it. In the first place, as has\\nalready been pointed out, we judge of acts subjec-\\ntively and objectively. 2 We often regard an act as\\nobjectively moral regardless of the motives prompt-\\ning it. Besides, as has also been said, our motives\\nare always complex they are never absolutely ego-\\nistic or absolutely altruistic, but mixed. We do not\\nnecessarily call a man immoral because he cares for\\nhis own welfare, as Fichte holds that we ought to do\\nnor do we call an act that is prompted by a mixture\\nof self- regarding and other -regarding feelings non-\\nmoral. We commend a person who is industrious\\nand useful because he desires to support himself and\\nfamily. It is not necessary that a man do what he\\ndoes from a purely altruistic motive and no other.\\nHe may act from a sense of duty, as we have shown\\nin our chapter on Conscience, and as Kant declares\\n1 Characteristics of the Present Age, 70.\\n2 See chap, v, 9 (6).", "height": "3504", "width": "2428", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0280.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 271\\nhe must act in order that his act may have moral\\nworth at all.\\nStill, it must be confessed that, if his motive were\\nabsolutely egoistic, that is, if he did what he did\\nmerely in order to benefit himself, regardless of the\\nweal and woe of others, if he had no spark of sympa-\\nthy in him, we should not regard him as a moral\\nman. Indeed, we should regard him as an abnor-\\nmal human being, as a perverse character. The\\nreason for this is perhaps to be sought in the fact\\nthat an extreme egoist would be apt to endanger\\nsocial life. A man who thinks of himself all the\\ntime and of himself only, will, unless he be exceed-\\ningly shrewd, injure others. The feelings of sym-\\npathy and brotherly love, and the feelings of moral\\napproval, disapproval, and obligation, will, on the\\nother hand, tend to give his conduct a more altruistic\\ndirection and thereby promote social welfare. The\\nends of morality can, therefore, be best subserved by\\nhuman beings who have sympathetic feelings and\\nimpulses in addition to their self -regarding feelings\\nand impulses. This is the reason why the sympa-\\nthetic motive is valued, and why acts springing from\\npure egoism are often regarded as not falling within\\nthe scope of morals. But it must not be forgotten\\n(a) that egoism is not condemned morally as long as\\nit does not conflict with altruism (5) that when it\\ncooperates with altruism to produce good results,\\nit receives moral approval (c) that when its absence\\ncauses harm, the lack of it is condemned. The", "height": "3476", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0281.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "272 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nsuicide who cares nothing for his own life receives\\nthe moral disapproval of mankind.\\n(2) It is held by some that the good of humanity\\nis best achieved by the unimpeded play of egoism. 1\\nMan should satisfy his desire for power he ought\\nto live for himself and not for others, and not allow\\nhimself to be moved by compassion or pity, which is\\nthe virtue of weaklings. Everything is right that\\nincreases man s consciousness of power, his desire\\nfor power, and his power. Let the weaklings and\\nunhealthy perish, and help them to perish. The\\nstrongest ought to rule, the weak obey. The anar-\\nchist and the Christian, says Nietzsche, are made of\\nthe same stuff they are both rooted in sympathy,\\nand seek to hamper the progress of the individual.\\nA similar view is frequently advanced by evolu-\\ntionists. Life is governed by the struggle for exist-\\nence, and those most fitted for the fray are selected\\n(survival of the fittest). Only when this principle\\nis allowed to act without hindrance can the best\\nresults be obtained. Altruism is a means of injuring\\nthe race, not a means of preservation, for it makes\\npossible the survival of the weak, of all individuals\\nnot adapted to their environment. Our sympathy\\nimpels us to care for and to preserve the weak, the\\nsick, the crippled, and the insane, elements in our\\npopulation which the free play of egoism would\\neliminate, and ought to be allowed to eliminate, for\\nthe perfection of the race.\\n1 See, for example, Stiraer, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum,\\nand Nietzsche s writings.", "height": "3504", "width": "2476", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0282.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 273\\nWe answer The hnrnan race would not have\\nreached its present state of development without\\nthe aid of sympathy and cooperation. It is the\\nsocial instinct in animals which enables them to act\\ntogether, and it is this tendency to cooperate which\\ngives them advantages over other species. In union\\nthere is strength. A group of men can accomplish\\nmore than each individual singly. If there were no\\naltruism in the race, what would become of offspring?\\nWould social life be possible if men did not desire\\nto live with their fellows, and is not this desire to\\nassociate with kind altruism?\\nSympathy and cooperation are useful to the race.\\nIf they were not, or if they were harmful, they\\nwould be eliminated. The sympathetic impulses,\\nhowever, do not seem to be growing weaker, but\\nstronger. Of course, extreme sympathy is danger-\\nous, as dangerous as extreme egoism. Neither our\\negoistic nor our sympathetic impulses are good or\\nbad as such they are made so by the controlling\\ninfluence of reason. Irrational sympathy is bad,\\nand harmful to the race, and ought to be eliminated.\\nAnd the same remarks apply to irrational egoism.\\nSocial harmony can never be reached by the stub-\\nborn continuance of each in his line of inharmonious\\nconduct, but can only be attained by such gradual\\nmoulding of habit and desire, that by natural organi-\\nzation individuals will come to be in harmony with\\neach other. It is the history of social evolution that\\nthe individual, though always determining what are\\nT", "height": "3476", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0283.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "274 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nhis own needs, as it is obvious that he can best do,\\nis increasingly aided in satisfying them by coopera-\\ntion, while he also gives increasing aid in return.\\nAgainst the list of the advantages of egoism enu-\\nmerated by Spencer and others, I would muster the\\nadvantages of altruism, for by cooperation alone can\\nthe individual attain the pleasures which now so\\noften lie beyond his reach by it alone can society\\nattain a higher plane and the pleasures of altruism\\nare the highest and most unfailing. The selfish man\\nwill suffer disappointment and loss as well as the\\nbenevolent man, and he will lack the refuge of sym-\\npathy, and of the power to find happiness in the\\nhappiness of others. What man who has felt the\\njoys of sympathy would exchange even the hard-\\nships it brings for the brutal liberty and unmoved\\nselfishness of the savage what man who has known\\nthe joys of the higher, the more unselfish, love, would\\nexchange them for the ungoverned and quickly\\npalling pleasures of the profligate Those joys first\\nlend life worth and meaning through association\\nand altruism, cooperation in action and feeling, man\\nfirst becomes a power in the world. Yet the man\\nwho is capable of the higher sympathy is incapable\\nof a selfish calculation of its personal advantages to\\nhim. 1\\n(3) And now let us look at the acts regardless of\\nthe motives which have prompted them. Do we\\n1 Williams, A Bpvicw of Evolutional Ethics, chap, viii, p. 513.\\nSee also Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap, vi, 5.", "height": "3488", "width": "2484", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0284.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 275\\ndemand that personal interests be invariably sacri-\\nficed to the interests of others And must we make\\nthis sacrifice in every case in order to subserve the\\nends of morality I do not believe it. We do not\\nexpect a person to sacrifice his important interests\\nto the unimportant interests of another. It is right\\nand proper that a person should sacrifice himself for\\nthe real interests of his family but it is not neces-\\nsary that he should sacrifice himself in order that\\nhis wife and children might enjoy things which\\nwere never intended for them. It is right and proper\\nfor me to offer up my life in the defence of my\\ncountry but it cannot be required that I sacrifice\\nmyself in order to save a lady s pug dog from being\\nrun over by a carriage. It is right that I should\\ndeny myself many pleasures and comforts for the\\nsake of helping others but it is not right that I\\nshould ruin my health and impede my own intellec-\\ntual development in order to keep a drunken loafer\\nout of the poorhouse.\\nIn order that the ends of morality may be realized,\\nmen must be altruistic, of course. They must work\\nfor others, and they must be able to make sacrifices\\nfor others. But they cannot work for others without\\nfirst working for themselves. They cannot care for\\nthemselves in the proper way if they allow their care\\nfor others to go too far. We may say, I believe,\\nthat each man ought to care for his own good,\\nfor the good of his family, for his neighbors, his\\ntown, his county, his state, his nation, and humanity", "height": "3488", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0285.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "276 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nat large. He should work from the centre to the\\nperiphery, that is, protect and advance his own inter-\\nests and those of his family, and then those of far-\\nther circles. Charity begins at home. 1 It is wisely\\nordained by nature, sa}^s Hume, that private con-\\nnections should commonly prevail over universal\\nviews and considerations otherwise our affections\\nand actions would be dissipated and lost for want of\\na proper limited object. Thus a small benefit done\\nto ourselves or our near friends, excites more lively\\nsentiments of love and approbation, than a great\\nbenefit done to a distant commonwealth. 2\\n9. Biology and the Highest Good. Biology, too,\\nwill give us some hints concerning the direction of\\nlife or the ideal toward which we are making. On\\nthe lowest stages of animal existence life consists\\nwholly in the acquisition of food and in attempts to\\nward off unfavorable external influences. If there\\nare any psychical processes at all, they are exceed-\\ningly simple. Gradually, hoAvever, sexual and social\\nimpulses arise, the intelligence develops, and we have\\nthe beginnings of social and intellectual life which\\nreach their highest stage in man. As conscious life\\ndevelops the so-called lower faculties are subordi-\\nnated to the higher ones, the sensuous feelings and\\nimpulses are placed under the control of the reason,\\nand are regarded as inferior to the others the ego-\\nistic feelings and impulses yield, in a large measure,\\n1 See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap, vi, pp. 391 ff.\\n2 Principles of Morals, Section V, Part II.", "height": "3500", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0286.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 277\\nto sympathetic feelings and impulses, and the indi-\\nvidual is subordinated to society. The spiritual\\nforces are unfolded, the spiritual me takes prece-\\ndence in the hierarchy of the mes of the material\\nme. The so-called lower functions are not, of course,\\nneglected they are exercised, on the one hand, for\\ntheir own sake, as partial ends in themselves, but\\nthey are especially conceived as means to higher\\nends the unfolding of the spiritual powers. Simi-\\nlarly, the individual comes to be regarded, on the\\none hand, as a whole, as an end in himself, and, on\\nthe other, as a part of a wider whole, as a part of\\nhumanity. We may liken this relation to the rela-\\ntion which the different members of an organism\\nbear to the entire organism. The heart, the brain,\\nthe hands, the eyes, the muscles, the bones, etc., are\\nall means to an end, the preservation of the body.\\nB at they are at the same time parts of the body\\nthey are the body, and hence means of preserving\\nthemselves. 1 The welfare of the body depends upon\\nthe welfare of its organs, and the welfare of the\\norgans depends upon the welfare of the whole. In\\na perfect organism the parts work harmoniously to\\na common end. The parts are means to an end\\n(seeing is a means to an end), and yet ends in them-\\nselves (seeing is valuable in itself). So the indi-\\nvidual is both a means to an end and an end in\\nhimself.\\nWe may safely assert, I believe, that history is\\n1 See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap, ii, 7.", "height": "3488", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0287.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "278 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ntending toward the further development of spiritual\\nlife and toward a fuller realization of the individual\\nin society. We may say that humanity will continue\\nto advance in intelligence and morality, that man-\\nkind will gain a deeper insight into the workings of\\npsychical and physical nature, and a larger control\\nover reality, and that there will be less friction\\nbetween the different members of society and the\\ndifferent societies themselves. 1\\n10. Morality and the Highest G-ood. We have\\nfound thus far, I believe, that the preservation and\\npromotion of individual and social life is the highest\\ngood, or the end aimed at by humanity, in the sense\\nexplained before. That is, the individual human\\nbeing strives to preserve and advance himself as\\nwell as those persons with whom he sympathizes.\\nAt first the sympathetic impulse is both weak and\\nnarrow in its scope, being limited to the members\\nof a small group. In the course of time, however,\\nthe consciousness of kind develops more and more,\\nthe feeling of sympathy increases in intensity, and\\nextends to wider and wider circles. A glance at the\\ngrowth of religions, which always embody the con-\\nceptions and ideals of men, exemplifies this gradual\\nextension of other-regarding or sympathetic feelings.\\nThere is an advance from the narrow family religion\\nthrough the universal type to the universal religion\\nof Christianity. 2 The history of Greece and Rome\\n1 See Sutherland, Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.\\n2 See Sir Henry Maine, Early Law and Custom, p. 57.", "height": "3500", "width": "2476", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0288.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 279\\nalso shows a gradual progress of sympathy. 1 Of\\nRome Lecky says The moral expression of the\\nfirst period is obviously to be found in the narrower\\nmilitary and patriotic virtues that of the second\\nperiod in enlarged philanthropy and sympathy. 2\\nOur sympathies are widening and deepening in mod-\\nern times, as witness universal peace congresses, de-\\nmands for international arbitration, protests against\\nthe barbarities practised in many of the less civilized\\ncountries, the progress of socialism, the building of\\nhospitals and other charitable institutions, the estab-\\nlishment of societies for the prevention of cruelty to\\nanimals. We care not only for ourselves as indi-\\nviduals and as a nation, but for humanity in general.\\nBut the time has not yet come when there will\\nbe no more conflicts between self -regarding impulses\\nand acts, and other-regarding impulses and acts.\\nThe selfishness of the individual is apt to overwhelm\\nhis sympathy in many instances, and to lead him to\\nencroach upon the domain of others. He is, how-\\never, kept in check by the self-assertion of those\\nupon whose claims he trespasses, as well as by the\\nsympathetic opposition of his fellows. Rules gradu-\\nally come into existence forbidding certain modes of\\nconduct and enjoining others. Certain acts arouse\\nin consciousness the moral sentiments referred to\\nbefore, and we have moral codes. Morality is there-\\nfore developed as a necessary means of realizing the\\n1 Lecky, History of European Morals, Vol. I, pp. 228 1\\n2 /6., Vol. I, p. 239.", "height": "3496", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0289.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "J\\n280 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nhighest good, or the unconditional desires of the\\nhuman race. If the highest good could be realized\\nwithout a moral code, as we intimated before, there\\nwould be no moral laws, or any other laws, for that\\nmatter. Laws are made to hinder certain things\\nand to enforce others, and arise only after the par-\\nticular actions have taken place. In a certain sense,\\ntherefore, the lawbreakers are the lawmakers.\\nOne thing I should like to emphasize here, and\\nthat is that- morality is a means to an end %hat,\\ngenerally speaking, the moral code embraces only\\nsuch rules as make it possible for human beings to\\nrealize the end or purpose or highest good. Moral-\\nity aims to remove all the obstacles in the way of the\\nend. It is not the embodiment of all the aims and\\nstrivings of the race. It is not so comprehensive as\\nto guide the individual in all his attempts to realize\\nthe highest good. In other words, not all modes of\\nconduct are felt as obligatory which satisfy the\\ndesires of the race. Only such acts will gather\\naround them the moral sentiments as are commanded\\nby the race, and only such will be commanded, in the\\nmain, as are absolutely necessary, or are believed to\\nbe necessary, to the life of society.\\nThe moral code, then, does not embrace the whole\\nof conduct. Life and its ideals are broader than\\nmorality. The aims and ideals of humanity are\\nnot exhausted by the aims of morality. Without\\nmorality humanity cannot reach its goal morality\\nis the conditio sine qua non, but the fulfilment of the", "height": "3504", "width": "2484", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0290.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 281\\nlaw alone will not realize the aspirations of man-\\nkind. 1 To illustrate The laws of hygiene must\\nbe observed in order that I may reach my goal the\\nlaws of hygiene are means to a higher end obedi-\\nence to them is an essential condition of the realiza-\\ntion of my hopes and aspirations. But it does not\\nfollow from this that if I obey them my aims will\\nbe realized. My aims are broader than the aims of\\nhygiene. So my aims as a human being are broader\\nthan my aims as a moral being; they include the\\nlaws of morality, but are not exhausted by them.\\nAnother point needs emphasis. The purpose of\\nthe moral law, we may say, is to make possible indi-\\nvidual and social life. Moral acts tend to promote\\nindividual and social welfare. Morality draws the\\ncircle, as it were, within which human beings may\\nsafely pursue their ends without doing injury to\\neach other. Stealing, lying, and murder tend to\\ninjure both the agent and his environment; there-\\nfore the command, Do not steal, lie, or murder.\\nHonesty, truthfulness, and self-control tend to pro-\\nmote the welfare of the man who possesses these\\nvirtues as well as of his surroundings therefore,\\nbe truthful, honest, and moderate.\\nIf the view advanced in the foregoing is correct,\\nwe can draw certain conclusions. If morality is in\\nthe service of the ideal or highest good, then it must,\\nin a measure, be dependent on this ideal. Changes\\nin the ideals of the race will lead to changes in the\\n1 See Mtinsterberg, Ur sprung der Sittlichkeit, IV, pp. 98 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0291.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "282 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nmoral code. Now we have already noticed that\\nideals change and grow. One age and people is\\nmore combative or more peace-loving, or more self-\\nish or more sympathetic than another, and will\\ntherefore emphasize the virtue of courage or submis-\\nsion or self-assertion or benevolence. Where the\\nideal is an ascetic one, the moral law will prohibit\\nforms of conduct which are not only regarded as\\ntotally indifferent, but even essential in societies\\naiming, say, at physical advancement. The care\\nwhich the ancient Greek bestowed upon his body\\nseemed not only foolish, but sinful, to the mediaeval\\nsaint. Where the ideal is a political one, it is re-\\ngarded as the duty of the citizen to take part in\\npolitics. When the sphere of persons sympathized\\nwith is a narrow one, as is frequently the case at the\\nbeginnings of historical life, the moral code embraces\\nonly the members of the same tribe or nation. The\\nGreeks regarded all foreigners as barbarians and\\nenemies, and the Jews always looked upon them-\\nselves as the chosen people of God. 1\\nNow it frequently happens that the moral code of\\na people does not keep step with its ideals indeed,\\nit may even be an impediment to the realization of\\nthe highest good. In such cases a conflict is apt to\\nensue between the old and the new. The conserva-\\n1 Foreigner and enemy originally meant the same thing think\\nof the words %evos and hostis. See R\u00c2\u00a3e, Entstehung des Geirissens,\\np. 1 )0; Hearn, Aryan Household, p. 19; M Lennan, Primitive\\nMarriage, p. 107 and others quoted by R\u00c2\u00a3e.", "height": "3504", "width": "2492", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0292.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 283\\ntive element will cling to the old rules, while the\\nyounger generation will turn its face to the future.\\nWhen Jesus Christ preached the doctrine of univer-\\nsal brotherly love, and changed the old narrow\\nHebrew conception of God and His relation to man,\\nhe made a change in morality absolutely necessary.\\nEven where ideals remain practically stable, con-\\nditions may change to such an extent as to make old\\nforms of conduct useless and even harmful, and new\\nones necessary. But human beings are creatures of\\nhabit, and look with suspicion on the new. Conse-\\nquently, certain modes of conduct are often con-\\ntinued and enjoined as right long after they have\\nlost their raison d etre. 1\\nBut there are many modes of conduct which re-\\nmain moral in spite of all changes in ideals, and they\\nare those without the observance of which no earthly\\nideal can ever be realized. No community can exist\\nand pursue ideals, in which falsehood, murder, and\\ntreachery thrive. Even a band of thieves must obey\\nsome of the laws of morality in order to be able to\\nlive together at all. Only in case the ideal were\\ndeath and ruin instead of life and happiness, would\\nthe commonly accepted rules of morality have to\\ngive way to others. A community seeking death\\ninstead of life, ought not to foster the virtues of\\ntruth, honor, loyalty, honesty, justice, and chastity,\\nfor these are the very life of life. The wages of\\nsin is death.\\n1 See Paulsen s Ethics, Introduction.", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0293.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "284 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n11. Conclusion. Our conclusion is this The\\nsummum bonum or highest good is that which\\nhuman beings universally strive after for its own\\nsake, which for them has absolute worth. It differs\\nfor different nations and times, depending upon\\ndifferent inner and outer conditions. Hence it is\\nnot possible to give a detailed picture of the highest\\ngood. All that we can do is to observe the similar-\\nities existing between the different ideals of human-\\nity, and to embrace these under a general formula or\\nprinciple. This formula or principle is, of course,\\nbound to be vague and indefinite, a mere outline of\\nthe general direction of human strivings. We\\ndefined it as the preservation and unfolding of indi-\\nvidual and social, physical and spiritual life, in adap-\\ntation to the surroundings. Whatever rules are\\ndeveloped by mankind for the realization of the\\nhighest good, and produce the moral sentiments re-\\nferred to before, are called moral rules. The object\\nof these rules is to make the realization of the ideal\\npossible. Morality is a means to an end, just as\\nlaw is a means to an end. But in the case of moral-\\nity the rules must, generally speaking, arouse certain\\nsentiments, such as obligation, approval, disapproval,\\netc. Hence moral facts are characterized by the\\neffects which acts and motives have upon the con-\\nsciousness of the individuals as well as upon their\\ngeneral welfare.\\nThe knowledge we have gained thus far will\\nenable us to examine the different moral codes, and", "height": "3504", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0294.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "THE HIGHEST GOOD 285\\nto criticize them. We can now judge of a people s\\nconduct in a more rational way we can tell whether\\nthe race is realizing its purpose, the highest good.\\nWe can also tell what modes of conduct are neces-\\nsary to the realization of the ideal, and say that they\\nought to be pursued. This part of our problem\\nwould belong to practical ethics.", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0295.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER X\\nOPTIMISM VEBSUS PESSIMISM i\\n1. Optimism and Pessimism. We said that the\\nend or aim of human life, i.e., the highest good, was\\nthe exercise of human functions. This means, of\\ncourse, that human beings set a value upon things,\\nthat they regard certain ends as having absolute\\nworth for them. They value their lives and those\\nof others they prize development and progress for\\nits own sake. In other words, they regard life\\nas worth living, as good, as the best thing for them\\n(optimum). We may call this view optimism.\\nThis conception is opposed by a set of thinkers\\nwho declare that life is not worth living, that it is\\nnot a good, but an evil, not the best thing, but the\\nworst thing (pessimum). We may call this theory\\n1 Diihring, Der Werth des Lebens Hartmann, Zur Geschichte\\nund Begrundung des Pessimismus Sully, Pessimism, A History\\nand Criticism; Sommer, Der Pessimismus und die Sittenlehre;\\nPliimacher, Der Pessimismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart\\nPaulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chaps, iii, iv, vii Wallace, Pessimism,\\nEncyclopedia Britannica Lubbock, The Pleasures of Life. See\\nthe bibliography in Sully s Pessimism, pp. xvii, xix. For much\\nthat is contained in the following chapter I am indebted to Paul-\\nsen s admirable chapters on Pessimism, The Evil, the Bad and\\nTheodicy, and Virtue and Happiness.\\n286", "height": "3504", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0296.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 287\\nLet us examine this view somewhat more in detail.\\nThere are two ways of treating the subject. I may\\nsay that my life is not worth living, that 7 do not rare\\nfor it, that to me it seems an evil rather than a good.\\nHere I offer no proofs for my statements, but sim-\\nply express my personal feelings toward life, my\\nindividual attitude toward it. This is subjective or\\nunscientific pessimism. Or I may attempt to prove\\nscientifically that life in general is not worth living,\\nthat it is unreasonable or illogical for any one to\\ncare for it. This is objective or scientific or philo-\\nsophical pessimism. We shall have occasion to\\nrefer to both forms in the course of the following\\ndiscussion.\\n2. Subjective Pessimism. Lord Bacon gives us a\\ncharacteristic estimate of the value of life in these\\npessimistic lines\\nThe world s a bubble, and the life of man\\nLess than a span\\nIn his conception wretched, from the womb\\nSo to the tomb\\nCurst from his cradle, and brought up to years\\nWith cares and fears.\\nWho then to frail mortality shall trust,\\nBut limns on water, or but writes in dust.\\nShakespeare s Hamlet expresses himself in a simi-\\nlar strain\\nHow weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable\\nSeem to me the uses of this world\\nFie on t, oh, fie Tis an unweeded garden\\nThat grows to seed things rank and gross in nature\\nPossess it merely.", "height": "3492", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0297.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "288 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nAnd Keats in his Ode to the Nightingale draws an\\nequally mournful picture of the world in which his\\nunhappy lot has been cast\\nFade far away, dissolve, and quite forget\\nWhat thou among the leaves hast never known,\\nThe weariness, the fever, and the fret\\nHere, where men sit and hear each other groan\\nWhere palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs,\\nWhere youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies;\\nWhere but to think is to be full of sorrow\\nAnd leaden-eyed despairs\\nWhere beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes,\\nOr new love pine at them beyond to-morrow.\\nThese pessimistic utterances, however, prove noth-\\ning but the temporary mood of the poet who gives\\nvent to them. They are common to every age and\\nevery clime, and are symptoms of the weariness and\\ndisappointment that lay hold upon the race in its\\nstruggle toward perfection. There is scarcely a\\nperson living who does not sometimes succumb to\\nthe black demon of melancholy, who does not at\\ntimes long to lie down like a tired child and weep\\naway this life of care. And we may say that he is\\nnone the worse for it. Pessimistic broodings are\\nlike the storm-clouds that gather on the horizon,\\nand in a healthy life pass away as quickly as they\\ncame, leaving the mental atmosphere calm and pure.\\nIt is only when such moods become chronic and per-\\nmanent that they prove dangerous to both the indi-\\nvidual and the race, for unless we regard life as worth\\nliving we shall not live it as it ought to be lived.", "height": "3496", "width": "2520", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0298.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 289\\nThere are persons, however, with whom pessimism\\nis not merely a passing feeling, but a philosophic\\ncreed. A man may, like Hamlet or Faust, look upon\\nlife as burdensome to him, and express himself to\\nthat effect. When Hamlet says that the world seems\\nweary, stale, flat, and unprofitable to him, we cannot\\nrefute him, because he is simply telling how the\\nworld affects him, what feelings it arouses in him.\\nHis feelings are facts, and as such incontrovertible.\\nWhen you tell me that you do not value life, that\\nyou prefer death to life, and wish you had never\\nbeen born, I cannot refute you any more than you can\\nrefute me when I say that I love life and am glad I\\nam here. We are both simply giving expression to\\nour feelings, and no one knows better how we feel\\nthan we ourselves. De gustibus non disputandum.\\n3. Scientific Pessimism. But when you dogmati-\\ncally declare that life is not worth living, that there\\nis nothing in it for anybody, that it has absolutely\\nno value, that instead of being a blessing it is a\\ncurse, you are making general assertions which call\\nfor proof. You are advancing a theory of life which\\nshall be valid for all, and theories can be proved and\\nrefuted. You will have to show why life is not\\nworth living you will have to give reasons for your\\nview, and reasons we can examine and criticise.\\nNow, it can be shown, I believe, that pessimism as\\na philosophic creed is untenable, and that the opti-\\nmistic conception of life is far more rational. 1\\n1 Philosophical pessimists Schopenhauer, World as Will and", "height": "3496", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0299.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "290 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nLet us see. The pessimist may argue that life\\nis not worth living because it does not realize the\\nend or goal desired by man. Life is worthless be-\\ncause it fails to yield what human beings most prize,\\nbecause it fails to realize the summum bonum or the\\nhighest good. Hence, to desire life is to desire some-\\nthing you really do not want, an exceedingly\\nsenseless procedure.\\nBut what is the highest good it may be asked; what\\nis the goal at which we are all aiming There are as\\nmany different forms of pessimism as there are answers\\nto this question. Let us consider some of them.\\n(a) The highest good is knowledge, one pessimist\\nmay argue life does not realize it for us, we do not\\nand cannot know anything hence, life is not worth\\nliving. Let us call this intellectual pessimism. It\\nis preached by such characters as Faust:\\nI ve studied now Philosophy,\\nAnd Jurisprudence, Medicine,\\nAnd even, alas, Theology,\\nFrom end to end, with labor keen\\nAnd here, poor fool, with all my lore\\nI stand no wiser than before. x\\nThe highest good is pleasure or happiness,\\nsays another pessimist. Now life does not realize\\nIdea, English translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, Bk. IV\\nVol. II, Appendix to Bk. IV Pai-erga, chaps, xi, xii, xiv Balm-\\nsen, Zur Philosophie der Geschichte Mainlander, Die Philosophic\\nder Erlosung Hartmann, Die Philosophie des Unbewussten,\\ntranslated by Coupland. Consult Sully s bibliography referred to\\nbefore, and read his preface to the second edition.\\n1 Bayard Taylor s translation of Goethe s Faust.", "height": "3488", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0300.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 291\\nthis end indeed, it yields more pain than pleasure\\nhence, life is a failure. We find traces of this view,\\nwhich we might call emotional pessimism, in the Old\\nTestament, as, indeed, we are bound to find them in\\nevery book that holds the. mirror up to the soul of\\nman. For what hath man of all his labor, and of\\nall the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath labored\\nunder the sun. For all his days are sorrows, and his\\ntravail grief yea, his heart taketh not rest in the\\nnight. The days of our age are threescore years\\nand ten, and though men be so strong that they come\\nto fourscore years yet is their strength then but\\nlabor and sorrow; so soon passeth it away, and we\\nare gone.\\n(c) No, says still another, the highest good is vir-\\ntue; life does not realize virtue, men are wicked, the\\nworld is thoroughly bad hence, life in a world like\\nthis is not worth living. The race is not to the\\nswift nor the battle to the strong neither yet bread\\nto the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding,\\nnor yet favor to men of skill. This way of looking\\nat the world let us characterize as volitional pessimism.\\n4. Intellectual Pessimism. All these syllogisms\\ncontain unproved premises. Take the first. Knowl-\\nedge is the highest good, knowledge is impossible,\\nwe do not know anything and we cannot know\\nanything. In the first place, knowledge is not the\\nhighest good, but a part of the good, a means to an\\nend. As we said before, the goal for which we are\\nstriving is a mixed life of knowledge, feeling, and", "height": "3492", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0301.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "292 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nwilling. The perfect or well-rounded man is not\\none in whom the intellectual faculties are developed\\nat the expense of the emotional and volitional\\nelements, but one who knows, feels, and wills in a\\nnormal manner. Besides, it cannot be said that we\\nknow nothing and can know nothing, nor can it be\\nsaid that we are growing more ignorant in the course\\nof history. We may not be able to discover the\\nultimate essences of things, or to solve all the riddles\\nof existence, but our knowledge is sufficient to guide\\nus in the practical affairs of life. We are gaining a\\ndeeper insight into the workings of nature, and our\\npower over the world is increasing in consequence.\\nThe wonderful progress that has been made in mod-\\nern technics is undoubtedly due to our improved\\nknowledge of the laws of the physical universe,\\nand it is safe to predict that we shall make even\\ngreater advances along these lines in the future.\\nBut we have learned from experience in all depart-\\nments of life, and are doing our work much better\\nthan it has been done in the past, and succeeding\\ngenerations will most likely improve upon our\\nmethods.\\n5. Emotional Pessimism. This form of pessimism\\nis also open to criticism. Let us see. Pleasure or\\nhappiness is the highest good. Life does not procure\\nit for us hence life is not good. But pleasure is\\nnot the end of life, as we have already pointed out\\npleasure or happiness is a means to a higher end and\\na part of that end. However, let us waive this point,", "height": "3496", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0302.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 293\\nand examine the other statement, the one that life\\nyields more pain than pleasure. There are two pos-\\nsible ways of arguing for the truth of this assertion.\\nWe must either show, by reference to experience,\\nthat the world is a vale of tears, which would give\\nus an inductive proof or we must prove on a priori\\ngrounds that life cannot possibly be happy, that\\nhuman nature and the very universe itself are so con-\\nstituted as to preclude the possibility of such a thing.\\n(1) Now, I ask, can either proof be furnished?\\nPessimists are fond of telling us that life yields a\\nsurplus of pain, that the balance is on the pain side\\nof the ledger. But it is impossible to make the\\nnecessary calculations in this field. Take your own\\nindividual existence. Can you say that a particular\\npain is more painful than a particular pleasure is\\npleasurable Then can you add up the different\\npleasures and pains which you have experienced\\nduring a single day or hour of your life, and com-\\npare the results And can you, in like manner,\\ncompute the pleasures and pains of your entire life,\\nand say that your pains exceed your pleasures\\nAnd if you cannot give a safe estimate of the pleas-\\nures and pains of your own life, with which you are\\nreasonably familiar, how can you make the calcula-\\ntions for others, and for the entire race, and say that\\nthey suffer more than they enjoy How can you\\nsay that the amount of pleasure realized by one indi-\\nvidual is counterbalanced or exceeded by the pain\\nsuffered by another", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0303.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "294 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\n(2) The great German pessimist, Schopenhauer,\\nattempts to prove deductively, from the nature of\\nman s will, that life yields more pains than pleas-\\nures. Life consists of blind cravings which are pain-\\nful so long as they are not satisfied. When I desire a\\nthing and do not get it, I am miserable when I get\\nit I am satisfied for a moment, and then desire some-\\nthing else, and am miserable again. I am never\\npermanently satisfied I am constantly yearning for\\nsomething I do not possess there is a worm in\\nevery flower. Every human life oscillates between\\ndesire and fulfilment. Wishes are by their very\\nnature painful their realization soon sates us the\\ngoal was but an illusion possession takes away the\\ndesire, but the wish reappears under a new form\\nif not, emptiness, hollowness, ennui, Langeweile,\\nresults, which is as much of a torture as want. x I\\ngo on hoping for better things day in, day out, but\\nthey never come. One illusion merely gives way\\nto another. I keep on longing and longing until\\nthe angel of death takes pity on me and folds me\\nunder his wing. Each particular day brings me\\nnearer to the grave, the awful end of it all. Touch-\\nstone is right when he soliloquizes\\nIt is ten o clock.\\nThus may we see, quoth he, how the world wags\\nTis but an hour ago since it was nine;\\nAnd after an hour more twill be eleven\\n1 Schopenhauer s Works, Frauenstadt s edition, The World as\\nWill and Idea, Vol. I, p. 370.", "height": "3500", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0304.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 295\\nAnd so from hour to hour we ripe and ripe;\\nAnd then from hour to hour we rot and rot\\nAnd thereby hangs a tale\\nWe are like shipwrecked mariners who struggle\\nand struggle to save their wearied bodies from the\\nterrible waves, only to be engulfed in them at last. 1\\nThe life of most men, says Schopenhauer, is but\\na continuous struggle for existence, a struggle\\nwhich they are bound to lose at last. 2 Every\\nbreath we draw is a protest against the Death which\\nis constantly threatening us, and against which we\\nare fighting every second. But Death must conquer\\nafter all, for we are his by birth, and he simply plays\\nwith his prey a little while before devouring it. We,\\nhowever, take great pains to prolong our lives as far\\nas we can, just as we blow soap-bubbles as long and\\nas large as possible, though we know with absolute\\ncertainty that they must break at last. 3 In an\\nold poem by William Drummond a similar thought\\nis expressed\\nThis life which seems so fair,\\nIs like a bubble blown up in the air\\nBy sporting children s breath,\\nWho chase it everywhere\\nAnd strive who can most motion it bequeath.\\nAnd though it sometimes seem of its own might\\nLike to an eye of gold to be fixed there,\\nAnd firm to hover in that empty height,\\nThat only is because it is so light.\\n1 The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I, p. 369.\\n2 /6., p. 368. -lb., p. 367.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0305.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "296 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nBut in that pomp it doth not long appear\\nFor when tis most admired, in a thought,\\nBecause it erst was nought, it turns to nought.\\nAnother proof of the futility of life is this Hap-\\npiness is a purely negative quantity. It can never\\nbe realized except by the satisfaction of a desire.\\nWith the satisfaction of the desire, however, the\\ndesire itself, and with it the pleasure, ceases. Hence\\nthe satisfaction of desire or happiness can mean\\nnothing but liberation from pain or want. 1 To\\nquote Schopenhauer again We feel pain, but\\nnot painlessness we feel care, but not freedom from\\ncare fear, but not security. We feel the wish as\\nwe feel hunger and thirst but as soon as it is ful-\\nfilled, it is much the same as with the agreeable\\nmorsel, which, the very moment it is swallowed,\\nceases to exist for our sensibility. We miss pain-\\nfully our pleasures and joys as soon as they fail us\\nbut pains are not immediately missed even when\\nthey leave us, after tarrying long with us, but at\\nmost we remember them voluntarily by means of\\nreflection. For only pain and want can be felt\\npositively, and so announce themselves as something\\nreally present happiness, on the contrary, is simply\\nnegative. Accordingly, we do not appreciate the\\nthree greatest goods of life, health, youth, and free-\\ndom, as long as we possess them, but only after we\\nhave lost them for these also are negations. That\\ncertain days of our life were happy ones, we recog-\\n1 The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I, p. 376.", "height": "3504", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0306.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 297\\nnize first of all, after they have made room for unhappy\\nones. 1 Voltaire expresses the same thought Hap-\\npiness is but a dream, while sorrow is a reality. I\\nhave been experiencing this truth for fourscore\\nyears. There is nothing left for me but to resign\\nmyself to Fate, and to acknowledge that the flies\\nare born to be eaten up by the spiders, and men to\\nbe consumed by sorrows. 2\\nNow I ask you, Is not all this gross exaggeration?\\nIs not the picture which the pessimist draws a cari-\\ncature rather than a faithful representation of life?\\nIs not Schopenhauer s description of the human will\\nthat of a spoilt child rather than that of a healthy\\nman? Of course, life is not free from disappoint-\\nment. True, we desire and keep on desiring, we\\nhope and hope, often even against hope, and our\\nhopes extend beyond the grave. But it is not so\\npainful a thing to have desires and hopes, nay,\\nwhat would a life be worth without desires and\\nhopes and strivings and expectations? And what\\nwould it be without struggle and an occasional\\ndisappointment\\nLife is movement, action, development hence there\\ncan be no fixed or stable goal, a cessation of desire\\nand striving. We cannot imagine that we shall ever\\nreach a point of rest, a stopping-place, and that we\\ncould ever be happy in the passive enjoyment of such\\na state of absolute rest. If life were differently con-\\n1 This translation is taken from Sully s Pessimism.\\n2 See Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II, pp. 659 f.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0307.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "298 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nstituted, it would be death and not life. Niir der\\nverdient die Freiheit und das Leben, der tciglicli sie\\nerobern muss.\\nThe main trouble with the pessimist is that he\\nregards a permanent, stable state of happiness as the\\nhighest good, and that he judges life in the light of\\na means of achieving this good. Life, however, is\\nnot a means to an end, but an end in itself, some-\\nthing desired and prized for its own sake. It is not\\nlike a railroad journey, a means of reaching a certain\\ngiven destination, but rather like a ramble through\\na beautiful forest, something that is enjoyed for its\\nown sake. We enjoy the muscular activity, the\\nshady paths, the rippling brooks, the song of the\\nbirds, the chirp of the insects, the beauty and fra-\\ngrance of the flowers, the warm sunshine and the\\ncooling shade, the blue sky overhead and the mossy\\nbanks underfoot. There may be hills to climb, and\\nthe exercise may be hard and fatiguing we may\\npass through brier and thorn, and tear the flesh;\\nour lips may be parched with thirst, and we may feel\\nthe pangs of hunger. And we may suffer many\\nlittle disappointments on the way, and become the\\nvictims of illusion, but the walk, taken as a whole,\\ncannot be called a disappointment and illusion. So\\nit is with life. Life has its lights and shadows, its\\njoys and its sorrows, its victories and defeats.\\nBe still, sad heart and cease repining\\nBehind the clouds is the sun still shining;\\nThy fate is the common fate of all,", "height": "3504", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0308.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 299\\nInto each life some rain must fall,\\nSome days must be dark and dreary.\\nSunshine and rain are both essential to growth.\\nPain is a chastener, and often more valuable as\\na developer of character than pleasure. Auch der\\nSchmerz ist Crottes Bote. No strong character can be\\nformed except in the school of sorrow and defeat.\\nNot until you have received some sharp blows from\\nthe world, not until the iron has entered into your\\nsoul, will you become an able warrior in the ranks of\\nlife. Sweet are the uses of adversity.\\nAnd as for the negativity of happiness, the doc-\\ntrine is psychologically false. Pleasure is just as\\nreal and just as positive as pain, indeed, even the\\nabsence of pain is felt as positively pleasurable.\\n(3) The pessimist also attempts to prove geneti-\\ncally that the pains exceed the pleasures of life\\nby referring to the nature and development\\nof knowledge. 1 He believes with the preacher\\nthat in much wisdom is much grief and he that\\nincreaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. The more\\nwe know the unhappier we become. Civilization\\nmeans a multiplication of needs or desires, new needs\\nmean new pains and new disappointments. More-\\nover, the intelligent being looks before and after,\\nand pines for what is not. The brute lives in. the\\npresent alone, regardless of the past and future, suf-\\nfering neither remorse nor fear of death. Its igno-\\nrance is its bliss. Man, on the other hand, reviews the\\n1 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I, 365 f.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0309.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "300 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\npast, and suffers over again the pains that once tor-\\ntured him he looks into the future, and foresees the\\nevils awaiting him there. The fear of the coming\\npain is often more painful than the actual pain itself,\\nand the horror of death is the worst pain of all.\\nAgain, man has an ideal self besides a physical self,\\na social me, as Professor William James calls it, his\\nhonor or reputation, the picture of himself in the\\nhearts of others. The more complex society becomes,\\nthe greater our dependence upon our fellows and\\nthe greater the possibility of injuring the ideal self.\\nThink of the pains of unsatisfied ambition, injured\\npride, unrequited love, etc., as compared with bodily\\nhurts. And finally, as intelligence increases, our\\nsympathies enlarge, and then we suffer not only our\\nown sorrows, but those of others. We die a thou-\\nsand deaths. 1\\nThere is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in\\nthese reflections, but they are, like the entire pessi-\\nmistic philosophy, one-sided. It is true that as life\\nunfolds, the possibilities for suffering pain increase.\\nThe surface of sensitivity to pain becomes larger, as\\nit were. But look at the other side of the picture.\\nThe pleasures also grow in extent and intent. Civil-\\nization creates new needs, very true but it also\\ncreates new means of satisfying them. New needs\\nmean new activities, new activities mean new\\npleasures. It is likewise true that we anticipate\\nfuture sorrows, but do we not also look forward to\\n1 See, especially, Parerga, chap, xii, 154 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2540", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0310.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 301\\nfuture pleasures, and do we not enjoy them in\\nadvance Is not the feeling of hope a joyful feel-\\ning is it not a blessing instead of a curse? Human\\nbeings also fear the future, but can we say that they\\nhope less than they fear? Is it not the tendency\\nof men to paint the future in rosy colors, and always\\nto be expecting better things It seems so to me.\\nHope springs eternal in the human breast.\\nAm Grabe noch pjianzt er die Hoffnung auf.\\nAnd when it comes to looking backward, do we not\\nforget the troubles we have passed through and\\nlinger upon the happy hours we have spent Our\\ngriefs lose their sting in retrospect time heals all\\nwounds. We come to view our sorrows and dis-\\nappointments as blessings in disguise, as stepping-\\nstones to higher things. The same remarks apply\\nto our ideal selves. We gVicvc when we are for-\\ngotten or not thought well of, when we are despised\\nand hated but we likewise rejoice when we are\\nloved and admired and applauded. And though\\nwe suffer the sorrows of others, we also enjoy their\\npleasures. Besides, it is sweet to be sympathized\\nwith by others nothing affords us greater consola-\\ntion in our grief than to gaze into the tearful eyes\\nof friendship and nothing fills our hearts with\\ndeeper joy than to share our good fortune with those\\nwe love.\\nThe long and short of it is that, if the growth\\nof intelligence does increase our sorrows, it also", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0311.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "302 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nincreases our joys. In what proportion? The\\noptimist claims that there is a balance in favor of\\npleasure or happiness, while the pessimist declares\\nthat the pain exceeds the pleasure. We cannot\\nprove either side statistically, but I believe with\\nhealthy common sense that optimism is in the right.\\nIf the biological view is true, which holds that pleas-\\nurable feelings go with beneficial activity, and pain-\\nful feelings with harmful action, we may claim that\\na healthy life, one adapted to its surroundings,\\nyields more pleasure than pain, and that inasmuch\\nas the normal healthy beings outnumber the abnor-\\nmal ones, there is more happiness than sorrow in\\nthe world. We may also point out the fact that\\nif pleasure is linked with beneficial activity, and\\npain with harmful action, then the animals feeling\\npleasure will be preserved, while the others will\\nperish. The fact that a man is alive at all would,\\nin a measure, indicate that he was happy, for if he\\ndid not get more pleasure out of life than pain, the\\nchances are that he would be eliminated. The world\\nbelongs to those who can adapt themselves to it\u00c2\u00aband\\nesjoy~4t.\\nAnd even if it could be shown that pain is in\\nexcess of pleasure, this would not justify absolute\\npessimism. Perhaps this world is a vale of tears\\nbut is it necessarily so? Perhaps it is full of sorrow\\nand disappointment but may that not be due to\\nconditions which may be changed? If the pessimist\\nwould only spend the time and energy which he", "height": "3504", "width": "2532", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0312.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 303\\nwastes in complaining and weeping, in ameliorating\\nthe conditions of the unfortunate, he would most\\nlikely soon be converted into an optimist.\\n6. Volitional Pessimism. Let us now turn to\\nthat form of pessimism which regards the whole\\nworld as morally bad, and therefore longs to be\\ndelivered from it. Men are knaves, or fools, or\\nboth. The end and aim of the average man s exist-\\nence is to keep himself alive, and he will do any-\\nthing to realize this purpose. He is a cruel, unjust,\\nand cowardly egoist, whom vanity makes sociable,\\nfear honest. And the only way to succeed in this\\nworld is to be tricky and dishonest like the rest.\\nShakespeare gives poetical expression to this moral-\\nistic pessimism, as Paulsen calls it, in one of his best\\nsonnets\\nTired with all these, for restful death I cry\\nAs, to behold desert a beggar born,\\nAnd needy nothing trimrn d in jollity,\\nAnd purest faith unhappily forsworn,\\nAnd gilded honor shamefully misplaced,\\nAnd maiden virtue rudely strumpeted,\\nAnd right perfection wrongfully disgraced,\\nAnd strength by limping sway disabled,\\nAnd art made tongue-tied by authority,\\nAnd folly, doctor-like, controlling skill,\\nAnd simple truth miscalled simplicity,\\nAnd captive Good attending Captain 111.\\nAnd the broken-hearted King Lear thus moralizes\\nupon the injustice of the world\\nThrough tattered clothes small vices do appear,\\nRobes and furred gowns hide all. Plate sin with gold,", "height": "3496", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0313.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "304 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nAnd the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks;\\nArm it in rags, the pigmy s sword doth pierce it.\\nThe good are not appreciated, indeed, they are\\npersecuted by the malicious, envious common herd,\\nwho hate virtue because it makes their insignificance\\nand meanness all the more contemptible.\\nNow is the world really as black as all that?\\nThere is undoubtedly much truth in what the\\naccusers of mankind say but is humanity so abso-\\nlutely rotten as they rhetorically declaim? How\\ncan it be proved? Either inductively, that is, by\\nappealing to the facts or deductively, by showing\\nthat man is bound to be bad by the very nature of\\nthings.\\n(1) Are there more bad men in the world than\\ngood ones Before we can undertake to answer this\\nquestion, we must have some criterion by which to\\nmeasure the moral value of men and times. How\\nmust they act in order to be called good? What\\nstandard shall we apply to them. Much depends\\nupon the answer given to this question. If you\\nregard as the standard of morality perfect knowl-\\nedge, or perfect holiness, or perfect anything, the\\nverdict must turn out against the human race. If\\nyou demand an absolute suppression of egoistic feel-\\nings, the verdict will be unfavorable. If you\\ndemand that man absolutely negate his will, that he\\nseek only the pleasures arising from artistic or reli-\\ngious or scientific contemplation, or that he think of\\nnothing but heaven all the time, that he live in rags", "height": "3504", "width": "2492", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0314.jp2"}, "315": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 305\\nin order that others may be clad in purple, then, of\\ncourse, this world will seem mean and wretched\\nto you. But if you measure humanity by a more\\nhuman standard, by an ideal to which the race can\\naspire, the case is not so hopeless. Let us call such\\nacts good as tend to make for physical and spiritual,\\nindividual and social, upliftment let us call those\\nmen good who aim to realize this ideal, who care for\\nthemselves and others, who are struggling for their\\nown and others advancement. Now if this be our\\nmeasuring-rod, is humankind so dreadfully wicked?\\nAre men as grossly egoistic as the pessimist would\\nhave us believe Are they as cruel, vindictive, dis-\\nhonest, unjust, treacherous, false, envious, malicious,\\nas their accuser paints them\\nWell, here again, we must say we have not counted\\nthe good and the bad we have no statistics on the\\npoint. It is true, there are evil-minded and evil-\\ndoing persons in the world, and we cannot shut our\\neyes to the fact that we are far from being perfect.\\nThere are many wrongs to which we may point. It\\nis true, there is much corruption in politics. The\\npeople are often led around by the noses by adroit\\nrascals who are seeking their own personal gain at\\nthe expense of the community and in the name of\\npatriotism, that much-abused word. Parties are too\\nfrequently willing to damage the country which they\\nare pretending to serve, merely for the sake of injur-\\ning the opposing party, which is supposed to bear\\nthe entire responsibility. The influential boss can", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0315.jp2"}, "316": {"fulltext": "306 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\noften control legislation, as can the millionaire and\\nthe rich corporation. Plate sin with gold, and the\\nstrong lance of justice hurtless breaks. And good\\nmen meet with defeat in the struggle for existence, or,\\nat any rate, are regarded by the world as failures, as\\nunpractical dreamers, whom nobody minds, while\\nincense is burned at the altars of unscrupulous vil-\\nlains, charlatans, and fools whose purses are as fat\\nas their hearts are empty.\\nBut is that the whole story Are there not many\\ngood men in the world Are there not many who\\nare fighting on the side of truth and justice, many\\nwho are willing to sacrifice themselves for their fel-\\nlows Is it really true that dishonesty and trickery\\nare the conditions of success, that a man cannot\\nthrive unless he be a knave It seems, the very fact\\nthat we pay so much attention to the successful ras-\\ncals shows that we are surprised at their success, that\\nit is unusual for thieves and liars to win the battle\\nof life. If it were the rule the world over for false-\\nhood and sham to lead to health and wealth, should\\nwe be so shocked and chagrined thereby? The\\nmoral heroes and the moral villains stand out in\\nbold relief as the observed of all observers, while the\\ngreat mass of men who are neither angels nor devils\\npass by unnoticed.\\n(2) Nor can we prove that the world and its inhab-\\nitants must of necessity be bad. Is man an original\\nsinner Is sin hereditary with him, as Saint Augus-\\ntine and Schopenhauer and many others would hold?", "height": "3504", "width": "2532", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0316.jp2"}, "317": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 307\\nAccording to Schopenhauer man is a crass egoist by\\nnature, and egoism is bad, hence no good can come\\nout of him. But man is not a crass egoist. Scho-\\npenhauer himself believes that we can free ourselves\\nfrom our wicked wills, that we can negate the will,\\nsuppress our egoistic strivings, and lose ourselves in\\nthe contemplation of the objects of art, science, and\\nreligion hence we cannot be so bad after all. And\\nihose who believe in the total depravity of man are\\nlikewise optimistic enough to believe that there is\\nsome way out of the difficulty, either through Christ\\nor the groundless grace of God, so unwilling are\\nthey to concede the necessary loss of a single human\\nsoul.\\nIt is much easier to show on a priori grounds that\\nman is not radically bad than the opposite. Man is\\nboth egoistic and altruistic he acts for his own\\ngood and that of others. Humanity could not exist\\nand realize the ideals which have been realized if\\nmen were absolutely bad. The fact of their living\\ntogether at all proves that obedience to the laws of\\nmorality is the rule and not the exception. If men\\nwere as immoral as the pessimist paints them, society\\nwould go to pieces. The fact that it takes unusually\\nadroit men to succeed in spite of their dishonesty\\nshows how hard it is to break the moral law and\\nthrive. The wages of sin is death. This is as\\nprofound a truth as was ever uttered.\\nBut even if it were true, even if the world were a\\nhotbed of corruption, why should we despair Why", "height": "3492", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0317.jp2"}, "318": {"fulltext": "308 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nshould we not make ourselves and the world better\\nLet us strive to improve it, and not sit idly by, weep-\\ning and moaning over its wickedness. Let us strike\\nat wrong wherever it shows its head, let us enroll\\nourselves in the ranks of virtue and fight the great\\nbattle of the right against the wrong. The best way\\nto grow strong in righteousness is to combat evil.\\nAnd we can make no better beginning than by first\\nimproving ourselves. Thou hypocrite, cast out first\\nthe beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou\\nsee clearly to pull out the mote that is in thy brother s\\neye.\\n(3) The attempt is also made to prove pessimism\\ngenetically by comparing the present with the past.\\nJust as sorrow is increasing, vice is increasing men\\nare growing worse and worse the times are out of\\njoint. The world is degenerating. There was a\\ntime, says Rousseau, when things were better. In\\nhis primitive days, man lived peacefully, virtuously,\\nand happily, but with the progress of civilization\\nand culture all this has been changed. We are\\ngrowing away from the sweet simplicity of the past,\\nand our demands on life and the values we put upon\\nthings are changing. Social inequalities are multi-\\nplying, carrying in their train all the vices of an\\nartificial mode of existence. We esteem knowledge,\\nnot for itself, but simply as we value diamonds and\\nprecious jewels, because it gives to its possessors\\nsomething not enjoyed by others. Wealth and cul-\\nture are the badges of classes, and valued merely as", "height": "3504", "width": "2532", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0318.jp2"}, "319": {"fulltext": "OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM 309\\nsuch. The rich and cultured are becoming more\\nlordly, haughty, supercilious, and unsympathetic,\\nwhile the poor and ignorant are made more servile,\\ncowardly, deceitful, and base by the artificial condi-\\ntions of the times.\\nIt is, however, not true that the world is getting\\nworse, that the original state was a blissful moral\\nstate. This conception of a better past is common\\nto many religions and peoples. The Greeks believed\\nin a golden age, the Jews in Paradise. It is charac-\\nteristic of old age to live in and glorify the past,\\nlargely perhaps because it is past. The evils of the\\npresent are distinctly before us the evils of the past\\nwe are apt to forget, and to think only of its bright\\nsides. Besides, old age has formed its habits, the\\nhabits of the past, and we all know how hard it is to\\naccept new ways of thinking, feeling, and willing;\\nYou can t teach an old dog new tricks, as the saying\\nis. The old man often feels out of place in the world\\nwith its new habits, and so comes to regard everything\\nin it as wrong. He makes the same objections to\\nthe present which his parents made to his past,\\nwhich was their present.\\nBut is the present really worse than the past?\\nHere again everything depends upon our conception\\nof the better and the worse. If you do not believe\\nin the progress of political and religious freedom, you\\nwill condemn the present. If you hate the rabble\\nso called, and find that the plain man of the people\\nis playing a greater role in the world than you are", "height": "3496", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0319.jp2"}, "320": {"fulltext": "310 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nwilling he should play, you will find fault with the\\ntimes. If you regard civilization with its culture\\nand luxury as an absolute evil, you will hate the\\npresent. If you believe that men ought to live the\\nlives of mediaeval ascetics, that they should despise\\nliterature, science, and art, then you cannot contem-\\nplate our age with pleasure.\\nBut if you believe with me that the ideal of man-\\nkind is to develop the physical and spiritual powers\\nof the race in harmony with each other and in adap-\\ntation to the surroundings, to make men more rational\\nand sympathetic, to give them control over them-\\nselves and nature, to bring the blessings of civilization\\nwithin the reach of the humblest and most neglected,\\nthen you will have to admit that our times are better\\nthan the past. If civilization is better than sav-\\nagery, then the present is better than the past. If a\\nwider and deeper sympathy with living beings, jus-\\ntice, and truth, are better than hatred, cruelty, preju-\\ndice, and injustice, then civilization is better than\\nsavagery. The good old times solved their problems\\nin their way; let us solve ours in our way. Let us\\nbe thankful that the past is gone, and look with hope\\nto a brighter and better future. 1\\n1 See the excellent chapter on The Moral Progress of the\\nRace, in Williams, Beview of Evolutional Ethics, pp. 466 ff.", "height": "3496", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0320.jp2"}, "321": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XI\\nCHARACTER AND FREEDOM i\\n1. Virtues and Vices. We have found that such\\nacts are right as tend to promote welfare, and that\\nsuch are wrong as tend to do the reverse. We have\\nalso found that acts are the outward expressions of\\ninner psychical states, that they are prompted by\\nsomething on the inner side. Among these inner\\nstates we mentioned the so-called egoistic and altru-\\nistic impulses and feelings, and the so-called moral\\nsentiments. Morality, therefore, or moral conduct,\\nsprings from the human heart it represents the\\nwill of humanity. Moral conduct, like all conduct,\\nis the outward expression of the human will. Men\\nact morally or for the welfare of themselves and\\nothers because they desire or will that welfare.\\n1 Green, Prolegomena, Bk. I, chap, iii, Bk. II, chap, i Stephen,\\nThe Science of Ethics, pp. 264-294 Miinsterberg, Die Willens-\\nhandlnng; Fouillee, La liberie et determinisme Sigwart, Der\\nBegriff des Wollens und sein Verhdltniss zum Begriff der Cau-\\nsalitat; Wundt, Ethics, Part III, chap, i, 1, 2. 3 Paulsen, Ethics,\\nBk. H, chap, ix Thilly, The Freedom of the Will, Philosophical\\nReview, Vol. Ill, pp. 385-411; Hyslop, Elements, chaps, iv, v;\\nMackenzie, Manual, chap, viii Seth, Ethical Principles, Part III,\\nchap. i. For history of the freewill question, see Penzig, Arthur\\nSchopenhauer und die menschliche Willensfreiheit A. Alexander,\\nTheories of the Will.\\n311", "height": "3480", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0321.jp2"}, "322": {"fulltext": "312 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nHumanity as a whole desires its own preservation\\nand advancement, and therefore performs acts which\\ntend to realize the desired end.\\nWe call such acts as tend to promote welfare vir-\\ntuous, their opposites vicious. We call the will that\\ntends to express itself in virtuous acts a good or virtu-\\nous will, its opposite vicious. Acts which ought to\\nbe done we call duties, persons who do them dutiful.\\nMorality is based upon impulses. Because men\\ndesire the preservation of themselves and others\\nthey are moral. But and this is an important\\npoint an impulse as such is not necessarily a vir-\\ntue, though it may be fashioned into one. The im-\\npulse to preserve your life is not necessarily a virtue.\\nYour desire to preserve yourself may be so irra-\\ntional as to destroy you. Your desire for food may\\nbe so strong as to cause your ruin. Nor is the sym-\\npathetic impulse necessarily a virtue. Your sympa-\\nthy for a person may be so irrational as to injure\\nboth you and the person for whom you feel it.\\nVirtues are rational impulses, i.e., impulses or\\nvolitions fashioned in such a manner as to realize\\nmoral ends. They are impulses guided by reason,\\ncontrolled by ideas. Impulses are formed or fash-\\nioned or educated by experience with natural and\\nsocial surroundings. Exaggerated impulses are cor-\\nrected and weak ones strengthened. Impulses may\\nalso be reenforced or defeated by the aid of the moral\\nsentiments or the conscience. An extreme egoistic\\nimpulse may be held in check by the feeling of obli-", "height": "3500", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0322.jp2"}, "323": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 313\\ngation and a weak altruistic impulse intensified in\\nthe same way. A person who is exceedingly selfish\\nmay be kept within proper bounds by his conscience,\\nby the feeling that he ought not to indulge his\\ndesire to advance himself at the expense of others\\nwhile an individual lacking altruism may be urged\\nby his conscience to care for others. Or the feeling\\nof obligation may influence a man who cares little\\nfor self -advancement to preserve and develop his\\nlife, and cause one who is too altruistically inclined\\nto modify his altruism. 1\\n2. Character. Impulses are fashioned into fixed\\nhabits of action, which cannot easily be changed, and\\na character is formed. A character, as J. S. Mill\\nsays, is a completely fashioned will, and by will\\nhere is meant an aggregate of tendencies to act in\\na firm and prompt and definite way upon the princi-\\npal emergencies of life. 2 We may, therefore, say\\nthat a character is the combined product of one s\\nnatural tendencies or impulses, and the environment\\nacting upon them. In other words, a man s char-\\nacter depends upon his will or nature or disposition,\\nand the influences exerted upon it by the outside\\nworld of living and lifeless things. This implies\\n(1) that the individual starts out with a certain\\nstock in trade, certain impulses or tendencies, or, to\\nstate it physiologically, a peculiarly constituted brain\\nand nervous system (2) that these tendencies or\\n1 See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. Ill, chap. i.\\n2 See James, Psychology, Vol. I, chap. iv.", "height": "3504", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0323.jp2"}, "324": {"fulltext": "314 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nimpulses, this brain and nervous system, may be\\ninfluenced and modified, hence that a person may\\nbe educated into morality (3) that what a man\\nwill be, must depend, to some extent, upon what he\\nis, that is, upon his native disposition.\\nA man may have been endowed by nature with\\nbountiful intellectual and physical gifts, but the\\nabsence of favorable conditions or the presence of\\nunfavorable ones may hinder these capacities from\\nbeing realized. A person who might have become\\nan athlete, had he been born in a certain climate\\nand had he received the proper training, may turn\\nout to be physically deficient. So, too, a man who\\nmight have become a great artist may find his\\nnatural powers weakening from lack of exercise.\\nIn order, then, to form a moral character, we need\\na natural capacity for goodness, so to speak, and\\nfavorable life conditions. We have just seen that\\nthe absence of the latter is bound to show its effects.\\nBut the former also, the native endowment, is\\nneeded. A man with a dwarfed brain can never\\nbecome an intellectual prodigy. But there are many\\ngradations from a diseased brain and organism to a\\nperfectly healthy and well-developed system, and\\nconsequently many gradations in physical excellence.\\nSome persons seem to be utterly devoid of moral\\nimpulses, and consequently bound to turn out bad.\\nSome criminals are criminals by nature. They are\\nwhat has been called by alienists morally insane.\\nSuch individuals are usually without the impulses", "height": "3504", "width": "2552", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0324.jp2"}, "325": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 315\\nupon which morality is based. Modern reforma-\\ntories have testified to the possibility of the redemp-\\ntion of a large number of criminals from their evil\\nlife, but they have shown, nevertheless, that there is\\na lust of cupidity, a love of meanness, and an animal-\\nity from which rescue is almost if not quite impossi-\\nble. The reaction of men whose past opportunities\\nhave been about equal, upon effort for their reform,\\nexhibits also very different degrees of readiness.\\nThe testimony of reformatories for the young is\\nespecially of worth on this point and I once heard\\nMrs. Mary Livermore describe the faces of many of\\nthe children to be found in a certain institution of\\nthis sort as bearing fearful witness to the fact that\\nthey had been mortgaged to the devil before they\\nwere born. I remember a number of cases cited by\\nthe matron of a certain orphan asylum, showing that\\nchildren taken from their home at too early an age\\nto have learned the sins of their parents by imitation\\nmay yet repeat those sins. Out of three children of\\nthe same parents, the one of whom was a drunkard\\nand prostitute, the other a thief, one developed, at a\\nvery early age, a tendency to dishonesty, another an\\nextreme morbid eroticism, and the third child ap-\\npeared to have escaped the evil inheritance but he\\nwas still very young when I last heard of him. 1\\nWhoever is destitute of moral feeling is, to that\\nextent, a defective being he marks the beginning\\nof race-degeneracy and if propitious influence do\\n1 Williams, Evolutional Ethics, Part II, pp. 405 f.", "height": "3496", "width": "2364", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0325.jp2"}, "326": {"fulltext": "316 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nnot chance to check or to neutralize the morbid\\ntendency, his children will exhibit a further degree\\nof degeneracy, and be actual morbid varieties.\\nWhether the particular outcome of the morbid strain\\nshall be vice, or madness, or crime, will depend much\\non the circumstances of life. When we make a\\nscientific study of the fundamental meaning of those\\ndeviations from the sound type which issue in insan-\\nity and crime, by searching inquiry into the laws of\\ntheir genesis, it appears that these forms of human\\ndegeneracy do not lie so far asunder as they are com-\\nmonly supposed to do. Moreover, theory is here\\nconfirmed by observation for it has been pointed\\nout by those who have made criminals their study\\nthat they oftentimes spring from families in which\\ninsanity, epilepsy, or some allied neurosis exists, that\\nmany of them are weak-minded, epileptic, or actu-\\nally insane, and that they are apt to die from dis-\\neases of the nervous system and from tubercular\\ndiseases. 1\\n3. The Freedom of the Will. The preceding\\nstatements naturally suggest the problem of the free-\\ndom of the will, which we shall now consider. Is\\nthe will free or is it determined? Before we can\\nanswer this question we must understand the terms\\ninvolved in our discussion.\\n1 Maudsley, Pathology of Mind, pp. 102 ff., quoted by Williams,\\nloc. cit. See also Lonibroso, IJhomme criminel; Krafft-Ebing,\\nPsychiatrie, Vol. II, p. 65 Striimpell, Pedagogische Pathologie\\nWilliams, Evolutional Ethics, pp. 402 ff.; Paulsen, Ethics, pp. 373\\nff., 475 ft", "height": "3504", "width": "2540", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0326.jp2"}, "327": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 317\\nLet us see. By the will we may mean the atti-\\ntude of the ego toward its ideas, i.e., the element of\\ndecision, the fiat or veto, will in the narrow sense of\\nthe term. 1 Or by will we may mean the so-called\\nimpulsiveness of consciousness, that is, the tendency\\nof consciousness to act, the so-called self-determina-\\ntion of the soul. 2 Thus in attention there is psychic\\nenergy. Whether I pay attention to a loud noise or\\nforce my attention upon my lesson, I am always put-\\nting forth mental energy, I am willing in the broader\\nsense of the term. This psychic energy or conation\\nis present in all states of consciousness every state\\nof consciousness is impulsive or energetic.\\nBy freedom we may mean unhindered by an exter-\\nnal force. A nation or individual is free when not\\nhindered by an outer force I am free when I can\\ndo what I please, that is, when my acts are the\\nexpression of my consciousness, the outflow of my\\nown will, not the expression of some consciousness\\noutside of mine. This is what the average man\\nmeans by freedom when he applies the term to\\nhuman beings. Man is free to do what he pleases,\\nmeans that he is not hindered in his willing. In\\nthis sense there can be no doubt of the possibility of\\nman s freedom. I am free to get up or sit down,\\nfree to teach or not to teach, as I please. If I will\\nto get up, I can get up if I will to sit down I am\\nfree to do that.\\n1 See chap. viii, 3 (4)\\n2 See chap, viii, 3 (4), p. 215, note 2.", "height": "3504", "width": "2380", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0327.jp2"}, "328": {"fulltext": "318 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nBut by freedom I may mean something else. I\\nmay mean by free something uncaused, undeter-\\nmined, having no necessary antecedents, self-caused,\\ncausa sui, an uncaused cause. God, we say, is un-\\ncaused, not caused by something outside of Himself,\\ncausa sui.\\nIf we apply this last conception to the will in\\nthe narrow sense of the term, free will means:\\nThe will is uncaused, undetermined by antecedents.\\nI will that A be done instead of B, I give my con-\\nsent, or assent, to A without being determined\\nthereto by anything outside of me or inside of me.\\nI, as will, decide for or against an act absolutely,\\nwithout being influenced to do so. Not only, then,\\ncan I do as I please, but I can please as I please.\\nIf we employ the term will in the broader sense,\\nand accept the second interpretation of freedom,\\nfree will means The energy of the soul, the\\nactivity or impulsiveness of consciousness, is an\\nuncaused or indeterminate factor, dependent upon\\nnothing. We can put forth any amount of effort\\nof attention or psychic force at any time. The\\namount of effort put forth depends upon no antece-\\ndents whatever it is not determined by anything\\nit is free or indeterminate. 1\\nIn short, the libertarian view holds that the will,\\nin whatever sense we take it, is not subject to the\\n1 See James, Psychology, Vol. II, chap, xxvi also The Di-\\nlemma of Determinism, 1 in The Will to Believe Ladd, Psychology,\\nDescriptive and Explanatory, chap. xxvi.", "height": "3504", "width": "2544", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0328.jp2"}, "329": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 319\\nlaw of causality it is a cause without being an\\neffect. Freedom here means, as Kant and Scho-\\npenhauer put it, the faculty of beginning a causal\\nseries. A man is free when he has the power to\\nbegin a causal series without being in any Way\\ndetermined thereto. Psychical activity is free when\\nit acts without cause, when it depends upon no ante-\\ncedent event. I will to perform a certain act; noth-\\ning has determined me to will as I did under the\\nsame conditions I could have willed otherwise.\\nHowever this view may be modified, freedom essen-\\ntially means a causeless will.\\nThe deterministic view opposes this conception,\\nand holds that there is no such thing as an uncaused\\nprocess, either in the ph} T sical or psychical sphere\\nthat every phenomenon or occurrence, be it a move-\\nment or a thought, a feeling or an act of will, is\\ncaused, not an independent factor, but dependent\\nupon something else.\\n4. Determinism. Which of these two views is\\ncorrect? Is the will caused or uncaused? Let us\\nsee. By a cause we mean the antecedent or con-\\ncomitant, or the group of antecedents and concomi-\\ntants, without which the phenomenon cannot appear.\\nThe scientist explains things by revealing their\\ninvariable antecedents or causes, by showing that\\nthings act uniformly under the same conditions.\\nIt is a postulate of science that all phenomena in\\nthe universe are subject to law in the sense that\\nthey are caused, that there is a reason for their", "height": "3496", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0329.jp2"}, "330": {"fulltext": "320 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nbeing and acting so and not otherwise. Now can\\nwe apply the same formula to human willing, or, let\\nus say, making the statement as broad as possible,\\nto the human mind as a whole? Has the human\\nmind any such antecedents or concomitants, or is it\\nindependent of them? Is there any reason why the\\nmind should think, feel, and will as it does Is it\\ndependent upon anything for thinking, feeling, and\\nwilling in this way\\nScience will naturally answer the question in\\nthe affirmative. Its ideal is to explain the world,\\nand explanation is impossible unless things happen\\naccording to law, unless there is uniformity in\\naction. Even where we are unable to find the\\ninvariable antecedents or causes, we imagine them\\nto be present, though we may regard their discovery\\nas practically impossible.\\nNow the scientific investigation of mind seems\\nto show uniformity of action. Under the same\\ncircumstances the same states occur; the same an-\\ntecedents seem to be followed by the same conse-\\nquents. In the first place, we may say that in order\\nto have human consciousness we must be born with\\nhuman minds, with human capacities for sensation,\\nideation, feeling, and willing. Plrysiologically speak-\\ning, we must have a human brain, human sense-\\norgans, a human body. In a certain sense, all\\nhuman beings are alike dependent upon the nature\\nof the consciousness which they inherit from the\\nrace. What a being is going to think, feel, and", "height": "3504", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0330.jp2"}, "331": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 321\\nwill in this world depends, to some extent, upon\\nthe mental and physical stock in trade with which\\nhe begins life.\\nNot only, however, does man inherit the general\\ncharacteristics of the race he also inherits specific\\nqualities from his ancestors. Just as a man may\\ninherit a weak or a vigorous brain and more or less\\nperfect sense-organs, so he may receive from his\\nnation or his ancestors a capacity for thinking, feel-\\ning, and willing in a particular way. In short, if we\\nembrace all mental tendencies or capacities or func-\\ntions under one term, character, we may say that every\\nindividual has a character of his own, and that this\\ncharacter is dependent upon the entire past. As\\nTyndall says It is generally admitted that the\\nman of to-day is the child and product of incalcu-\\nlable antecedent times. His physical and intellectual\\ntextures have been woven for him during his passage\\nthrough phases of history and forms of existence\\nwhich lead the mind back to an abysmal past. 1\\nWe may say that the way in which the world\\naffects an individual must depend largely upon his\\ncharacter. Physiologically stated, the impression\\nmade by an external stimulus upon a human brain\\nwill depend largely upon the nature of the entire\\norganism affected, which does not merely receive\\nexcitations, but transforms them according to its\\nnature. This character, this brain, is the heir of\\nall the ages, an epitome of the past. It is what it\\n1 Science and Man, Fortnightly Review, 1877, p. 594.\\nT", "height": "3504", "width": "2368", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0331.jp2"}, "332": {"fulltext": "322 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nis because many other things have been what they\\nwere. In this sense we may say that it is deter-\\nmined. I have a human body and not an animal s,\\nbecause I am the child of human parents I have a\\nparticular human body because I am the child of a\\nparticular race, of a particular nation, a particular\\nfamily. Similarly I may say that I have a human\\nmind, a human will, a particular human mind and a\\nparticular will, because I am the child of a particular\\nrace, nation, age, and family.\\nThe mind, then, is, in a certain sense, determined\\nby the past. But it is likewise determined by the\\npresent. Just as a seed needs certain favorable\\nconditions in order to grow and thrive, a character\\nneeds an environment suitable to its development. To\\nexpress it physiologically, a brain needs stimuli in\\norder that it may act out its nature. It will develop\\nfrom immaturity to maturity only under the proper\\nconditions. Just as a man must exercise his muscles\\nproperly in order to develop them, he must exercise\\nhis mental powers in order to develop them.\\nAs was said before, we must give due weight to\\nboth the inside and the outside, the character and its\\nphysical and social environment. The brain requires\\nstimulation in order to act at all it will not develop\\nwithout being incited to action from without. But\\nit is not merely a puppet in the hands of the ex-\\nternal world it does not merely receive, but gives\\nit strikes back. That is, it reacts upon stimuli\\naccording to its oivn nature. Similarly, the mind is", "height": "3504", "width": "2540", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0332.jp2"}, "333": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 323\\nnot merely a passive thing, but an active thing\\ncharacter is not merely a creature, but a creator.\\nThe manner in which a person will think, feel, and\\nact will depend not merely upon the outward cir-\\ncumstances, but upon the inner. Stating the matter\\npsychologically and applying it to the subject of the\\nwill, we may say Whether an idea or feeling is to\\nhave motive power or not, depends altogether upon\\nthe character of the individual, which has been\\nformed by a multitude of influences and conditions.\\nScientific psychology, then, is deterministic in the\\nsense of claiming that states of consciousness, like\\nother facts in the universe, have their invariable\\nantecedents, concomitants, and consequents. Men-\\ntal phenomena are inserted into the general system\\nof things like all other phenomena. They are not\\nisolated and independent processes without connec-\\ntion with the rest of the world, but parts of an\\ninterrelated whole.\\n5. Theological Theories. Now that we have con-\\nsidered the psychological answer to the question of\\nfree will and determinism, let us briefly examine the\\nattitude of theology and metaphysics toward the\\nproblem. Theology is either deterministic or liber-\\ntarian, according to the conceptions from which it\\nstarts out. The great thesis of Christian theology\\nhas always been that Christ came to save man from\\nsin. Now, reasoned Augustine, if Christ came to\\nsave man from sin, then evidently man was not able\\nto save himself, he was unable not to sin; he was", "height": "3404", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0333.jp2"}, "334": {"fulltext": "324 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ndetermined to sin, and hence not free. 1 This is the\\ndoctrine of original sin. Other theologians make the\\nsame thesis their starting-point, and reach a different\\nconclusion. If Christ saved man from sin, then\\nevidently man was a sinner. But man cannot be a\\nsinner unless he has the power of freedom to sin or\\nnot to sin, for sin implies freedom. Hence, if sin is\\nto mean anything, man must be free. 2\\nOr, the theologian may make the conception of\\nGod his starting-point, and reach either freedom or\\ndeterminism. God is all-powerful, say some, and\\nman wholly dependent upon Him. If man were free,\\nthen God could not determine him one way or the\\nother, man would represent an independent entity in\\nGod s universe which would rob God of some of\\nHis power. No, say others, God is all-good, hence\\nHe cannot have determined man to sin. If man were\\ndetermined by God to sin, then God would not be an\\nall-good God He would be responsible for the evil\\nin the world. But as He is not responsible for the\\nevil, this must be the result of man s choice. Hence,\\nman is not determined, but free.\\n6. Metaphysical Theories. Metaphysics, too, may\\nbe either deterministic or indeterministic. Material-\\nism assumes that matter is the essence or principle\\nof reality, that everything in the world is matter in\\nmotion, and that nothing can happen without cause.\\nIf these premises are true, then of course mind is\\n1 See also Luther and Calvin.\\n2 See Pelagius and the Jesuits.", "height": "3504", "width": "2556", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0334.jp2"}, "335": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 325\\nthe effect of motion, or only a different form of\\nmotion, and is governed or determined by the laws\\nof matter.\\nAccording to spiritualism or idealism, mind is the\\nprinciple of reality, and everything is a manifestation\\nof mind. According to monistic spiritualism, there is\\none fundamental mind or intelligence in the universe,\\nof which all individual intelligences or minds are\\nthe manifestation. Kant calls this principle the\\nintelligible or noumenal world, the thing-in-itself or\\nfreedom Fichte calls it the practical ego Hegel\\ncalls it the universal reason Schopenhauer calls it\\nthe will. The principle itself is regarded as free,\\nuncaused, self-caused, or self-originative. But if\\nman s mind is a manifestation of this principle, then\\nman s mind depends upon it, cannot be without it,\\nmust act in accordance with its nature, is determined\\nby it. Kant and Schopenhauer both hold that man s\\nempirical character, that is, his phenomenal character,\\nhis character as we know it, is determined by the\\nintelligible character, the noumenal character, the\\nprinciple of which it is the manifestation. 1\\nAccording to pluralistic or individualistic spirit-\\nualism, there are many minds or principles. Duns\\nScotus, the schoolman, regards every human being\\nas an individualistic principle, absolutely free to\\nchoose and to act, not bound to choose or act in any\\nparticular way. If this standpoint is strictly adhered\\nto, and it is the only possible standpoint for those\\n1 See also Green, op. cit.", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0335.jp2"}, "336": {"fulltext": "326 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nwho accept the freedom of indifference, then each\\nindividual is practically a creator. Leibniz, too, is a\\npluralist, but his pluralism differs somewhat from\\nthe pluralism .of Duns Scotus. The world consists\\nof monads or metaphysical points, or spiritual sub-\\nstances, each one of which is free in the sense of not\\nbeing determined from without, that is, by any power\\noutside of itself. Each spirit is, as Leibniz puts it,\\na little divinity in its own department. But\\nsince whatever happens in the monad happens in\\naccordance with its own nature, the monad is really\\ndetermined by its own nature. I must think, feel,\\nand act as I do because it is my nature or character\\nso to think, feel, and act.\\nIf we reject both spiritualism and materialism, and\\nregard mental and physical processes as two sides of\\nan underlying principle which is neither mind nor\\nmatter, but the cause of both, then both mind and\\nmatter are determined by this principle, and are not\\nfree. The principle itself, however, may be free or\\nuncaused or self-originating.\\nAccording to dualism we have two principles,\\nmind and matter, each one differing in essence from\\nthe other. Each person is a corporeal and spiritual\\nsubstance. Dualism may be either deterministic or\\nindeterministic, according as it is claimed that the\\nmental realm is governed by law or not. Some\\nthinkers have reasoned that, since mind and matter\\ngo together or run parallel with each other, and since\\nmatter is governed by law, mind must be governed", "height": "3504", "width": "2556", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0336.jp2"}, "337": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 327\\nby law. Others have denied this assumption and\\nhave insisted that mind at least, or the human will,\\nis free and uncaused. 1\\n7. Reconciliation of Freedom and Determinism.\\nNow what shall be our conclusion on this point In\\na certain sense we may accept a kind of freedom.\\nAll systems assume that the principle of being,\\nwhether it be matter or mind, or both, or neither,\\nhas neither beginning nor end, has nothing outside of\\nitself upon which it depends, and that it is therefore\\nuncaused or unexplainable. We must also .maintain\\nthat the principle is determined in the sense that it\\nshows uniformity of action, or is governed by law.\\nThis does not mean, however, that it is forced or\\ncompelled or coerced or pushed into action, but that\\nit acts with regularity and uniformity. 2 Even the\\natom of materialism is free in the sense of not being\\ncoerced by anything outside of itself it is deter-\\nmined in that it does not act capriciously and con-\\ntrary to law, but uniformly and lawfully. And the\\nhuman mind or will may be said to possess similar\\ncharacteristics. The will is determined in the sense\\nthat it has uniform antecedents, that it does not act\\ncapriciously and without reason, but according to\\nlaw. The will is free in the sense that it is not\\ncoerced by anything outside of itself. If the nature\\nof causality, as Paulsen aptly says, consisted of\\n1 For example, Descartes.\\n2 See Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, English translation,\\npp. 318 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0337.jp2"}, "338": {"fulltext": "328 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nan external necessity which excludes inner necessity,\\nthey would be right who rebel against its application\\nto the mental sphere. Only in that case they ought\\nto go a step farther and maintain that the causal law\\nis invalid not only for the will, but for the entire\\nsoul-life. But if we define the notion of causality\\ncorrectly, if we mean by it what Hume and Leibniz\\nmeant by it, that is, the regular harmony between\\nthe changes of many elements, then it is plain that it\\nprevails in the mental world no less than in nature.\\nIt may be more difficult to detect uniformity in the\\nformer case or to reduce it to elementary laws than\\nin the latter. Still it is evident that such uniformity\\nexists. Isolated or lawless elements exist in neither\\nsphere each element is definitely related to antece-\\ndent, simultaneous, and succeeding elements. We\\ncan hardly reduce these relations to mathematical\\nformulae anywhere but their existence is perfectly\\nplain everywhere. Everybody tacitly assumes that\\nunder wholly identical inner and outer circumstances\\nthe same will invariably ensue the same idea, the\\nsame emotion, and the same volition will follow\\nthe same stimulus. Freedom by no means conflicts\\nwith causality properly understood freedom is not\\nexemption from law. Surely ethics has no interest\\nin a freedom of inner life that is equivalent to law-\\nlessness and incoherency. On the contrary, the occur-\\nrence of absolutely disconnected elements, isolated\\nvolitions standing in no causal connection with the\\npast and future, would mean derangement of the", "height": "3504", "width": "2540", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0338.jp2"}, "339": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 320\\nwill, nay, the complete destruction of psychical exist-\\nence. If there were no determination whatever of\\nthe consequent by the antecedent, then, of course,\\nthere could be no such thing as exercise and experi-\\nence, there could be no efficacy in principles and\\nresolutions, in education and public institutions. 1\\n80 Criticism of Indeterminism. But we cannot\\nmaintain that the will is free in the Scotian sense. 2\\n(1) Wherever in the world we have a phenom-\\nenon we seek for its cause in some antecedent phe-\\nnomenon or sum of phenomena. If we acknowledge\\nthe application of the causal law to the events of\\nphysical nature, and deny its validity in the men-\\ntal sphere, we present an exception to the uniformity\\nof nature And as Bain says: Where there is no\\nuniformity, there is clearly no rational guidance, no\\nprudential foresight. Every act, be it ever so\\ninsignificant, has its antecedent cause. I can sit\\ndown or get up as I please, but whether I please or\\nnot depends upon conditions which may be apparent\\nor concealed. James holds in his article on The\\nDilemma of Determinism s that the world would be\\nno less rational if actions like the bending into one\\nstreet rather than into another were left to absolute\\nvolition. However, such a slight deviation from\\nthe law would be, as far as the principle is con-\\n1 Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 221. See also his\\nEthics, p. 460 note.\\n2 See 6. Parts of what follows are taken from my article in\\nthe Philosophical Review, referred to on page 311 note.\\n3 The Will to Believe.", "height": "3500", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0339.jp2"}, "340": {"fulltext": "330 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ncerned, as great a miracle as though the planet Ju-\\npiter should sway from its path. It would make the\\nentire universe irrational. In the words of Riehl\\nHowever infinitely small the difference between\\nsuch a world and the real one might appear to the\\nfancy, for the understanding an infinitely small\\ndeviation from the law of determination of occur-\\nrences, from the general law of causality, would still\\nremain an infinitely great miracle. There would\\narise out of the ability to perform apparently insig-\\nnificant acts with absolute freedom, the ability to\\npervert the entire order of nature in continually\\nincreasing extents. The consequences of a single\\nelement of irrationality, an exception to the law of\\ncausation, could not but make the whole of nature\\nirrational, just as a very little amount of ferment is\\nable to produce fermentation in an entire organic\\nmass. Nature could not exist alongside of an unde-\\ntermined power of freedom. 1\\n(2) In order to escape these difficulties many\\ndevices are resorted to. We must think in terms of\\ncausality true. But, nevertheless, the will is free.\\nIn order to make these two contradictions agree,\\ncausality is simply interpreted to mean freedom or\\nnon-causality. In other words, a special theory of\\ncausality is often manufactured to meet the require-\\nments of the libertarian doctrine. Dr. Ward 2 is\\nguilty of such a fabricated scheme of harmonizing\\ni Riehl, Kriticismus, Vol. IE, Part II, p. 243.\\n2 Dublin Review, July, 1874.", "height": "3504", "width": "2572", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0340.jp2"}, "341": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 331\\nopposites. He will not grant that free and un-\\ncaused are synonyms. There are two kinds of cau-\\nsation in the one case it means a law of uniform\\nphenomenal sequence. By this kind of causation\\nthe physical world is ruled, the important exception\\nbeing miracles. But there is also such a thing as\\noriginative causation. An intelligent substance, for\\nexample, acts as an originative cause. Such a sub-\\nstance is the human soul. Dr. Ward bases his in-\\nterpretation of the causal law on the hypothesis of\\nfreedom, which is the very thing to be proved. You\\nsay, he exclaims, there is no such a thing as an origi-\\nnative cause Look at the human will. You have\\nanti-impulsive will-acts due to the soul s power of\\nabsolute choice. You say, he continues, that free\\nwill violates the causal principle Not at all, for\\nwhat does causation signify but originative cause\\nIt is evident we have here an excellent example\\nof the circulus vitiosus.\\nMartineau J may be accused of the same vicious\\nreasoning. The will, he says, is a cause, i.e., it is\\nsomething which terminates the balance of possibili-\\nties in favor of this phenomenon rather than that.\\nThis notion he applies to the universe, then back\\nagain to the will. He wants to show that the idea\\nof causality applied does not make for determinism,\\nbut for freedom he begins by assuming that cau-\\nsality equals freedom. His false reasoning is very\\napparent. Determinists say, according to him,\\n1 Study of Beligion, Vol. II, Bk. Ill, pp. 196-324.", "height": "3504", "width": "2356", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0341.jp2"}, "342": {"fulltext": "332 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nevery action must have a cause, the will must be\\ncontrolled by motives, for nothing can be without a\\ncause. The will cannot be free because of this\\ncausal principle. Yes, answers Martineau, if cau-\\nsality means that different effects must have differ-\\nent causes, then the will is not free. But it is\\nnot true that different effects must have different\\ncauses. The will is not determined, because differ-\\nent effects need not have different causes. They\\nneed not have different causes, because in the will\\nwe have an example of a cause which has the\\npower to determine an alternative, i.e., a free cause.\\nThis amounts to saying, The will is free because it is\\nfree.\\n(3) We observe, then, that a free will in this\\nsense is wholly inconceivable it violates the law\\nof causality. The psychological investigation has\\nalready shown that it contradicts the facts. We\\nmust now also insist that, if the will is free, it is\\nutterly useless to attempt to determine it. And yet\\neverybody acts on the conviction that this may be\\ndone. If nothing can determine it, what is the use\\nof education, of laws, of arguments, of entreaties, of\\nmoral suasion, of punishment, and all those means\\nemployed to determine conduct How can an\\nutterly groundless willing be in any way held re-\\nsponsible The voluntary activity has been initi-\\nated without being caused. Hence nothing can be\\ndone to affect it. Like a deus ex machina, the free\\nwill enters upon the scene of action, and in the same", "height": "3504", "width": "2548", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0342.jp2"}, "343": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 833\\nmysterious manner disappears. How can it be ap-\\nproached, this guilty party Why offer it motives\\nif these have no influence Besides, if the will does\\nnot come under the causal law, why speak of its de-\\nvelopment during the various periods of race and\\nindividual life If it cannot be determined, how\\nexplain the influences of disease and stimulants on\\nit Why should it ever degenerate What be-\\ncomes of it in sleep Where is it in the hypnotized\\nstate\\nWhat would morality be to a person absolutely\\nfree Indeterminism, says Riehl, would sub-\\nject our moral life to contingency. The free will\\ncannot be impelled by reason to act it can in no\\nway be determined to adopt the more reasonable\\ncourse, but acts groundlessly. Nor can conscience\\nbe of avail, nor remorse, nor any other ethical feel-\\ning. A person* acting without cause would be\\nutterly unreliable in fact, the ideal free man s\\nactions would resemble those of the lunatic. To\\ndesire such freedom would, indeed, as Leibniz\\nexclaims, be to desire to be a fool. Or, in Schel-\\nling s words To be able to decide for A and non-\\nA without any motives whatsoever, would, in truth,\\nsimply be a prerogative to act in an altogether irra-\\ntional manner.\\nI also fail to see in what respect the cause of liber-\\ntarianism is helped by granting that the will cannot\\nact without motives, but that it is, in some cases,\\nable to choose one motive to the exclusion of the", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0343.jp2"}, "344": {"fulltext": "334 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nother, and that, too, without cause. The same fal-\\nlacy obtains in the reasoning, whether you extend or\\nlimit this faculty of the will to begin a new causal\\nseries. When Martineau asserts the will to be a\\ncause which terminates the balance of possibilities\\nin favor of this phenomenon rather than that, he\\nmaintains absolute freedom of volition, and lays him-\\nself open to all the objections urged above.\\n9. The Consciousness of Freedom, There are, it\\nis said, certain facts which make for free will. I\\nhold, therefore, says Sidgwick, that against the\\nformidable array of cumulative evidence offered for\\nDeterminism, there is but one argument of real\\nforce the immediate affirmation of consciousness in\\nthe moment of deliberate action. 1\\n(1) Now, if it were really true that we have a\\nconsciousness of being free in the sense in which this\\nterm has been used, this feeling would have as little\\nweight as a scientific proof as the feeling that the\\nsun moves around the earth has for astronomy.\\nWhere a man accepts this immediate intuition of\\nthe soul s freedom as a proof of its actuality, he is\\nsimply asserting that his soul is free because he feels\\nit to be free. 2\\n(2) And even granting that such a feeling can\\nprove anything, must we not show that it exists,\\nand (b) what it tells us Libertarians claim that\\nmen are conscious of being free, and see herein a\\nproof of their thesis. But the all-important ques-\\n1 Methods of Ethics, p. 67. 2 Dr. Ward.", "height": "3500", "width": "2608", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0344.jp2"}, "345": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 335\\ntion is, whether men really say and believe them-\\nselves to be free in the sense in which these philoso-\\nphers claim that they are free. The libertarian is\\napt to throw into this consciousness of freedom his\\nentire doctrine, thereby garbling the facts to suit his\\ntheory.\\nIt is necessary, therefore, to analyze this conscious-\\nness of freedom. Before the volition takes place\\nthere may be present in consciousness a feeling that\\nI can do either this or that. In the moment of will-\\ning no such feeling exists, while after the act has\\nbeen willed and executed I say to myself, I might\\nhave done otherwise. Now all the possibilities of\\naction occur to me, my mind is in a different state,\\ncertain ideas and feelings that formerly exerted an\\nirresistible influence are no longer present, or only\\ndimly remembered. All the conditions being\\nchanged, I feel as though I could have acted differ-\\nently. And so I could have done, if only I had\\nwilled differently, and so I could have willed differ-\\nently, if only the conditions of willing had been\\ndifferent. I can do what I will to do I am free to\\nget up or sit down, free to go home or stay here, to\\ngive up all my prospects in life, if only I loill to do\\nso. Never does my consciousness tell me that a voli-\\ntion is uncaused, that there was no reason for my\\nwilling as I did will, that the will is the absolute\\nbeginning of an occurrence, that at any moment any\\nvolition may arise regardless of all antecedent pro-\\ncesses. Least of all does it tell me that I am the", "height": "3504", "width": "2316", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0345.jp2"}, "346": {"fulltext": "336 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\nmanifestation of an intelligible self which I feel to\\nbe free.\\nAgainst those who so strongly emphasize the\\nsense of freedom, we may urge the deterministic\\nstandpoint generally accepted in all the affairs of\\nlife. We regard the actions of men as necessary\\nfunctions of their character. In all historical sci-\\nences, we invariably seek for the causes of events\\nwe analyze the characters of the actors, and show\\nthe influences of their times and surroundings. Our\\nentire social life is based on the conviction that\\nunder certain conditions men will act in a certain\\nway. That this is so, let the methods of educa-\\ntion and government attest.\\n10. Responsibility. The feeling of responsibility\\nis also urged against determinism, and accepted as a\\nproof of liberty. This, however, proves nothing but\\nthat acts and motives depend upon character or flow\\nfrom the will of the agent. The person regards\\nevery voluntary action of his as the expression of his\\npersonality, which, in truth, it is. The act is his,\\nwilled by him and acknowledged by him, the prod-\\nuct of his own character. He does not regard his\\ncharacter as something outside of himself, as some-\\nthing forcing him in a certain direction, pushing\\nhim now hither, noAV thither, but identifies himself\\nwith it. In fact, he is his character, and therefore\\nholds himself responsible for his acts and motives.\\nAnd because he feels himself as an agent, the acts as\\nhis acts, he sees no reason why this self from which", "height": "3504", "width": "2572", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0346.jp2"}, "347": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 337\\nthe acts emanated should not be held responsible.\\nWho else should be held responsible but the willing\\npersonality\\nBut if character is the necessary product of con-\\nditions, why hold any one responsible, even though\\nhe feel himself responsible If man s acts are the\\neffect of causes, why punish him for what he cannot\\nhelp Because punishment is a powerful determin-\\ning cause. Why should I be held responsible for\\nmy deeds? The reply is, in Tyndall s words, the\\nright of society to protect itself against aggres-\\nsive injurious forces, whether they be bound or\\nfree, forces of nature or forces of man. 1 Punish-\\nment can have a meaning only in a deterministic\\nscheme of things. We can by education make a\\nmoral being out of man, that is, influence his char-\\nacter, determine him to act for the social good. As\\nRiehl expresses it epigrammatically Man is not\\nheld responsible because he is by birth a moral\\nbeing he becomes a moral being because he is held\\nresponsible.\\n11. Determinism and Practice. There are many\\nmen who, while acknowledging the arguments of\\nthe deterministic theory to be unanswerable, yet\\nreject it on practical grounds. They claim that life\\nwould be impossible on such an hypothesis.\\nThe deterministic theory is not, however, a dis-\\ncouraging and paralyzing doctrine. On the con-\\ntrary, the knowledge that we are determined must\\n1 Fortnightly Bevieio, 1877, Science and Man, p. 612.", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0347.jp2"}, "348": {"fulltext": "338 INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS\\ndetermine us to avoid certain conditions, and seek\\nothers more favorable. Determinism does not de-\\nstroy the energy of action. Fatalistic nations like\\nthe Mohammedans were far more energetic than\\nChristian ascetics, who believed in the will s abso-\\nlute freedom. Determinism is the strongest motive\\nto action. If I am exceedingly desirous of fame,\\nhow can the knowledge that this desire depends\\nupon conditions affect me Why should it make\\nme less ambitious If I have been morally educa-\\nted, I shall continue to strive after certain things in\\nspite of my belief in determinism. I shall go right\\non deliberating and choosing as heretofore, and\\nmake an effort to live an honorable, useful life.\\nNow when it is said by a fatalist, Butler writes,\\nthat the whole constitution of nature, and the\\nactions of men, that every thing and every mode\\nand every circumstance of every thing, is necessary,\\nand could not possibly have been otherwise, it is to\\nbe observed, that this necessity does not exclude\\ndeliberation, choice, preference, and acting from cer-\\ntain principles and to certain ends because all this\\nis a matter of undoubted experience, acknowledged\\nby all, and what every man may, every moment, be\\nconscious of. 1 The author of nature then being\\ncertainly of some character or other, notwithstanding\\nnecessity, it is evident this necessity is as reconcil-\\nable with the particular character of benevolence,\\nveracity, and justice, in him, which attributes are\\n1 Analogy of Religion, chap, vi, p. 153.", "height": "3504", "width": "2564", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0348.jp2"}, "349": {"fulltext": "CHARACTER AND FREEDOM 339\\nthe foundation of religion, as with any other charac-\\nter since we find their necessity no more hinders\\nmen from being benevolent than cruel true than\\nfaithless just than unjust, or, if the fatalist pleases,\\nwhat we call unjust. 1\\n1 Analogy of Religion, chap, vi, p. 159.", "height": "3504", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0349.jp2"}, "350": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3500", "width": "2520", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0350.jp2"}, "351": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\nn. STANDS FOR NOTE\\nAbsolute moralitj 118, 145.\\nAction, antecedents of, 209 ff.\\nAlexander, S., 73.\\nAlt ruism, 126 f. egoism and, 258 ff.\\nAltruists, 258 n. 1.\\nAnniceris, 159, 177 n.l.\\nAntisthenes, on highest good, 183 f.\\nAntoninus of Florence, on con-\\nscience, 31.\\nApproval, feelings of, 82 f.\\nAristippus, 153 1 170.\\nAristotle, 109 n. 1, 123, 127 n. 1, 255\\nn. 1 his definition of an end, 150\\nf on highest good, 184 ff. on\\npleasure-pain as the consequence\\nof action, 240.\\nAssociatiouists, theory of con-\\nscience, 55 f\\nAtheism and teleological theory,\\n150 f.\\nAugustine, 30, 306.\\nB.\\nBacon, 262 n. 7, 287.\\nBahnsen, 289 n. 1.\\nBain, 175, 214 n.% 230 n. 1, 233 n.\\n2, 262 n. 7, 329 on conscience, 57\\nff. on motive to action, 218 ff.\\non pleasure-pain as consequence\\nof action, 240.\\nBalance of pleasures, 293.\\nBarratt, 175.\\nBaumanu, 214 n. 2.\\nBentham, 177, 262 n. 7; on con-\\nscience, 55 on highest good, 168\\nf. and Mill, 172 f.\\nBiology and highest good, 276 ff.\\nBonaventura, on conscience, 31.\\nBradley, 142.\\nBrentano, on conscience, 41 f.\\nBuivkhar.lt, 87.\\nBurton, 87.\\nButler, 36 n. 1, 80, 130 n. 2, 150, 262\\nn. 7 on conscience, 42 f on de-\\nterminism, 338 f. on highest\\ngood, 164 f.\\nC\\nCalderwood, 85 on conscience, 34 f.\\nCalvin, 324 n.l.\\nCarlyle, on motives to aetion, 226 f\\nCarneri, 73.\\nCategorical imperative, 61 ff., 133\\nff.\\nCausality, 327 ff. and will, 319 ff\\nCharacter, 311 ff.\\nChristian conception, 190 n. 1.\\nChrysostom, 29.\\nCicero, 187.\\nCivilization and pessimism, 299 ff.\\nClarke, S., 80, 85 on conscience, 33.\\nConscience, analysis and explana-\\ntion of, 74 ff differences in, 87 f.,\\n96 ff empirical view of, 47 ff\\nevolutional view of, and morality,\\n111 ff genesis of, 93 ff and\\nheredity, 70 ff. and inclination,\\n167 ff. immediacy and infalli-\\nbility of, 105 ff. innatenessof, 100\\nff intuitional view of, 28 ff\\ncriticism of intuitional view of,\\n85 ff. as judgment, 83 ff. met-\\naphysical view of, 28 ff. myth-\\nical view, 27 f. as standard of\\nmorals, 116 ff and teleological\\n341", "height": "3504", "width": "2328", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0351.jp2"}, "352": {"fulltext": "342\\nINDEX\\nor utilitarian theory, 129 ff.\\ntheories of, 26 ff\\nConsciousness of freedom, 331 ff.\\nCooperation, 272 ff\\nCriminals, 314 ff.\\nCriterion of morality and highest\\ngood, 155 ff.\\nCudworth, 85 on conscience, 32 f\\nCumberland, 261 n. 1, 262 n. 7 on\\nhighest good, 193 f\\nCynics, on highest good, 183 f.\\nCyrenaics, on highest good, 158 ff\\nD.\\nD Alembert, 262.\\nD Arcy, 63 n. 3.\\nDarwin, 80, 88, 262 n. 7 on con-\\nscience, 64 ff. on inherited con-\\nscience, 102 n. 1 on highest good,\\n195 f on motives of action, 222.\\nDecision of will, 212 ff.\\nDemocritus, 176, 270; on highest\\ngood, 162 f.\\nDepravity, 306 f\\nDescartes, 117 n. 1, 327 n. 1.\\nDeterminism, 319 ff and prac-\\ntice, 337 ff.\\nDiogenes of Sinope, 184 n. 1.\\nDisapproval, feelings of, 82 f\\nDorner, A., 200.\\nDrummond, W., 295.\\nDualism and free will, 326 f.\\nDuns Scotus, 117 on conscience,\\n47 n. 1 on free will, 325 f.\\nDuty and inclination, 107 ff.\\nE.\\nEffects of action, 118 ff., 134 ff.,\\n258 ff. motives and, 141 ff.\\nEffort, feeling of, 216 f.\\nEgoism, 126 f. altruism and, 258\\nff. criticism of, 263 ff as moral\\nmotive, 272 ff.\\nEmotional intuitionists, 36 ff\\ncriticism of, 91 ff\\nEmpirical theory of conscience, 47\\nff. and intuitionism reconciled,\\n59 ff\\nEnd justifies the means, 146 ff.\\nEnds or ideals, 250 ff.\\nEnergism, 127, 180 ff historical\\nsummary, 203 f\\nEnvironment and heredity, 313 ff.\\nEpictetus, 187.\\nEpicurus, on highest good, 160 ff.,\\n176, 207.\\nEthical judgment, subject-matter\\nof, 9 ff.\\nEthics, definition of, 4 ff differ-\\nentia of, 7 ff and metaphysics,\\n17 ff methods of, 20 ff as a\\nnormative science, 23 n. 3; and\\npolitics, 16 f and psychology,\\n13 ff. theoretical and practical,\\n22 f value of, 23 ff.\\nEudfemonism, 126 n. 1, 127 n. 1, 180\\nff., 184 ff.\\nEvaluation, 5.\\nExplanation, 2 f\\nFaust, 289.\\nFiat, 212 ff\\nFiohte, on free will, 325 on moral\\nmotive, 269 f\\nFowler, 175.\\nFreedom, of will, 316 ff. conscio\\nness of, 334 ff. criticism of, 329\\nff. and determinism reconciled,\\n327 ff of indiffereuce, 325 f\\n329 ff and metaphysics, 324 ff\\nand science, 320; and theology,\\n323 f.\\nG.\\nGenesis of conscience, 93 ff\\nGerson, 117.\\nGizycki, G. von, 73, 175.\\nGolden age, 308 ff.\\nGood, see Highest Good.\\nGood will, 142 ff.\\nGreen, 63 n. 1, n. 3, 325 n. 1.\\nGuyau, 72, 80, 93 n. 1, 111 n. 1; on\\npleasure-theory, 222 n. 1.\\nH.\\nHamlet, 287, 289.\\nHappiness and virtue, 303 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0352.jp2"}, "353": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n343\\nHartley, on conscience, 56 f on\\nsympathy, 202 n. 7.\\nHartmann, 289 n. 1.\\nHedonism, 126, 155 ff. critique of,\\n205ff.; metaphysical, 247 f.; psy-\\nchological fallacies of, 236 ff.;\\nsummary oi history of, 176 ff.\\nHedonistic psychology, 217 ff.\\nHegel, 325.\\nHegesias, 159.\\nHelved us, 262; on conscience, 53.\\nHerhart, 41, 83 n.3.\\nHeredity, conscience and, 70 ff.,\\n101 ff. environment and, 313 ff.\\nHighest good, 205 ff., 250 ff. biol-\\nogy and, 276 ff and criterion\\nof morality, 155 ff. and moral-\\nity, 278 ff theories of, 155 ff.\\nHobbes, on conscience, 47 f. on\\negoism, 261 on highest good, 190.\\nHoffding, 73, 200, 230 n. 1, 257 n. 1,\\n262 n. 7 on motives, 228 on will,\\n213.\\nHolbach, 53 n. 5, 262.\\nHumanity, ideal of, 253 ff\\nHume, 36 n. 1, 141 n. 1, 177,262 n. 7,\\n276 on conscience, 39 ff on ego-\\nism, 265 n. 1, 266, 267 n. 1; on\\nhighest good, 166 f.\\nHutcheson, 132 n. 1, 143 n. 1, 177,\\n262 n. 7 on conscience, 36 n. 1,\\n38 f on highest good, 165 f\\nHuxley, 256 n. 1.\\nHypothetical imperatives, 133 ff.\\nI.\\nIdeal of humanity, 253 ff\\nIdeals, 250 ff.\\nIdeo-motor action, 211.\\nImmediacy of conscience, 105 ff.\\nImpulses, 227 f., 233 f. physiology\\nof, 233 f and pleasure-pain,\\n237 f and virtues, 312 f\\nImpulsive acts, 211 f.\\nInclination and duty, 107 ff.\\nIndeterminism, criticism of, 329 ff\\nInfallibility of conscience, 105 ff.\\nInnate elements in conscience,\\n100 ff.\\nInstincts, 210, 224 f. explanations\\n\u00c2\u00bbf, 131.\\nIntellectual pleasures, 225 f.\\nIntuitionism, 28 i W: criticism of,\\n85 ff. emotional, 36 ff and\\nempiricism reconciled, 69 ff.; per-\\nceptional, 42 ff., 85 ff. rational-\\nistic, 28 ff. and teleological\\ntheory, 152 ff.\\nJ.\\nJames, 12, 19, 214, 233 n. 3, 254, 300,\\n329; on egoism, 263 ff. on mo-\\ntives to action, 220 ff on voli-\\ntion, 213 n. 1.\\nJanet, 35 n. 1.\\nJesuits, 324 n. 2.\\nJhering, 73, 257, 262 n. 7 on high-\\nest good, 198 f.\\nJodl, 230 n. 1; on motives of ac-\\ntion, 229.\\nJudgment in conscience, 83 ff\\nK.\\nKant, 41, 81, 86, 97, 134, 142, 145;\\non conscience, 60 ff on free\\nwill, 319, 325 on highest good,\\n200 ff on inclination and duty,\\n107 ff on infallible conscience,\\n105 ff.\\nKeats, 288.\\nKiilpe, 230 n. 1. 247.\\nL.\\nLa Bruyere, 262.\\nLadd, 98 n. 2, 230 n. 1, 233 n. 4, 240\\nn. 3 on conscience, 98 n. 2 on\\negoism, 265 n. 2.\\nLamettrie, 53 n. 5, 262.\\nLa Rochefoucauld, 262.\\nLear, 303.\\nLecky, 85, 87, 279.\\nLeibniz, 12 n. 1, 86 n. 1, 164 n. 3;\\non free will, 326, 333.\\nLivermore, 315.\\nLocke, 177 on conscience, 48 ff\\non highest good, 163 f\\nLotze, 214 n. 2.\\nLuther, 324 n. 1.", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0353.jp2"}, "354": {"fulltext": "344\\nINDEX\\nM.\\nMacaulay, 92.\\nMackenzie, 63 n. 3.\\nMaine, 27S n.2.\\nMainlander, 289 n. 1.\\nMandeville, 53 n. 5; on egoism,\\n201 f.\\nMarcus Aurelius, 187.\\nMarshall, 240 n.3.\\nMartineau, 9, 36 n.l, 81, 85, 142,\\n178 n. 1 on conscience, 43 ff on\\nfree will, 331 f.\\nMaterialism, 324 ff.\\nMemory, 243 f\\nMetaphysics, ethics and, 17 ff and\\nfree will, 324 ff.\\nMill, James, 57 n. 1, 169 n. 4.\\nMill, J. S., 57 n. 1, 126 n. 1, 151 ft.\\n1, 157 ft. 1, 177 ff., 207, 226, 262 n.\\n7, 313; Bentham and, 172 f. on\\nhighest good, 169 ff.\\nMoral action, 209 ff. moral codes,\\n137 ff.; moral evaluation, 5;\\nmoral insanity, 3, 4 ff moral\\nmotives, 269 ff moral philoso-\\nphy, 5.\\nMoralistic pessimism, 303 ff.\\nMorality, criterion of, 116 ff. cri-\\nterion of, and highest good, 155\\nff and ethics, 23 ff and highest\\ngood, 278 ff. and prosperity, 137\\nff theological view of, 117 f\\nMotives, 206 of action, 209 ff., 261\\nff and effects, 141 ff egoistic\\nand altruistic, 253 ff moral,\\n269 ff.\\nMuirhead, 63 n. 3.\\nMiinsterberg, 73, 233 ft. 3.\\nN.\\nNeo-Platonists, on highest good,\\n188 ff.\\nNewman, Cardinal, 135 n. 1.\\nNichols, 242 n. 1.\\nNietzsche, 272.\\nO.\\nObligation, 79 ff.\\nOntogenesis, 99.\\nOptimism, 286 ff.\\nOriginal sin, 306 f\\nP.\\nPain, as a motive, 232 ff as a\\nnegative quantity, 296 ff. as a\\nwarning, 242 ff.\\nPaley, 150, 177, 262 n. 7; on con-\\nscience, 54 f on highest good,\\n167 f.\\nPaul, St., 122.\\nPaulsen, 73, 115, 125 n. 1, 127 n. 1,\\n143, 200, 242, 253 f., 259 ft. 3, 260,\\n262 n. 7, 303, 327 f.\\nPelagius, 29, 324 n. 2.\\nPerceptional intuitionists, 42 ff.\\nPerfection-theory. 180 ff.\\nPessimism, 286 ff and civili-\\nzation, 299 ff. emotional, 293 ff.\\nintellectual, 291 f different\\nkinds of, 290 ff scientific, 289\\nff subjective, 287 ff volitional,\\n303 ff.\\nPhylogenesis, 100.\\nPlato, 123; on highest good, 181 ff.\\nPleasure, as a bait, 242 ff as end\\nof all existence, 239 ff as high-\\nest good, 207 ff as the moral\\nend, 249; as motive, 218 ff of\\nrace, as motive, 239.\\nPleasure-pains, as consequence of\\naction, 239 ff as the only feel-\\nings, 230, 237; and impulses,\\n237 f as motives, 212, 228 ff\\nphysiology of, 246 f and preser-\\nvation, 242 ff.\\nPleasure-theory, 155 ff.\\nPlotinus, 188 n. 1.\\nPolitics, ethics and, 16 f.\\nPorter, 35 n. 1.\\nPractical ethics, 285 and theoreti-\\ncal ethics, 22 f\\nPractical philosophy, 5.\\nPractice, theory and, 5 ft. 3, 22 f\\nPrayer, 214 n. 2, 233 n. 2.\\nPreservation, pleasure-pain and,\\n242 ff.\\nPrice, 35 ft. 1.\\nPsychology, ethics and, 13 ff.", "height": "3504", "width": "2580", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0354.jp2"}, "355": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n345\\nRational intuitionists, 28 ff.\\nRealization-theory, 180 ff.\\nReasoning, 244 f\\nRe e, 73.\\nReflex acts, 209.\\nReid, 35 \u00c2\u00bb.l.\\nResponsibility, 336 f.\\nRichl, on free will, 330, 333; on re-\\nsponsibility, 337.\\nRolph, 232 n.2.\\nRousseau, 41, 308 ff.\\nS.\\nSanction of morality, 129 ff., 146.\\nSchelling, on free will, 333.\\nSchoolmen, on conscience, 30 ff.\\nSchopenhauer, 97 n. 2, 213 n. 1, 232\\nn. 2, 289 n. 1, 307, 325 on free\\nwill, 319 on moral motive, 2( 9 f\\non pessimism, 294 ff on will, 215\\nn.2.\\nSchwarz, H.,42n. 1.\\nScience, and free will, 320; func-\\ntion of, 1 ff interrelation of,\\n12 ff. subject-matter of, 3 f\\nSelf-evidence, of conscience, 90 f\\nof moral rules, 118.\\nSelfishness and sympathy, 267 ff\\nSeneca, 187.\\nSensation, and pleasure-pain, 243.\\nSergi, 232 n. 2.\\nSetii, J.,63?i. 3, 200.\\nShaftesbury, 261, 262 n. 7 on con-\\nscience, 36 n. 1, 37 f on highest\\ngood, 194 f.\\nShakespeare, 287, 303.\\nSidgwick, H., 113 n. 1, 177, 179,\\n203 n. 1, 207, 240 n. 3, 262 n. 7;\\non consciousness of freedom, 334\\non highest good, 173 ff. on mo-\\ntive of action, 222 n.2; on un-\\nconscious pleasure-pain, 235.\\nSimmel, 73.\\nSmith, A., 41, 262 n. 7.\\nSocrates, 27, 123; on highest good,\\n180 f.\\nSophists, 180.\\nSpencer, 259 n. 1, 262 n. 7 on con-\\nscience, 66 ff on highest good,\\n175; on obligation, 108 f. on\\npleasure-pain as consequence of\\naction, 240.\\nSpinoza, 230 n. 1 on highest good,\\n190 ff.\\nSpiritualism and free will, 325 f\\nSteinthal, on will, 214 a. 1.\\nStephen, 72, 144 f., 262 n. 7 on\\nhighest good, 197 f.\\nStewart, 35 n. 1.\\nStoics, on highest good, 186 f\\nSubjective and objective morality,\\n142 ff.\\nSully, 93 n. 1.\\nSummum bonum, see Highest\\nGood.\\nSutherland, 66 n. 2, 73.\\nSympathy, 278 ff growth of,\\n278 ff as a moral motive,\\n269 ff selfishness and, 267 ff\\nSynderesis, 30 ff., 89.\\nSyneidesis, 30.\\nT.\\nTeleological schools, 124 ff\\nTeleological theory, 118 ff., 129 ff.\\nand atheism, 150 f and con-\\nscience, 129 ff and intuitionism,\\n152 ff.\\nTennyson, 112.\\nTheodorus, 159, 176.\\nTheology, and theories of will,\\n323 f\\nTheoretical and practical ethics,\\n22 f\\nTheory and practice, 5 n. 3.\\nThomas Aquinas, 118 n. 1, 150.\\nTyndall, on free will, 321; on re-\\nsponsibility, 337.\\nU.\\nUnconscious pleasure-pain as mo-\\ntive, 234 ff\\nUtilitarianism, 118 ff., 126 n. 2,\\n129 ff.\\nV.\\nVices, 311 ff.\\nI Virtue and happiness, 303 ff", "height": "3504", "width": "2340", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0355.jp2"}, "356": {"fulltext": "346\\nINDEX\\nVirtues, and impulses, 312 f and\\nvices, 311 ff.\\nVolition, 212 ff antecedents of,\\n215 ff and pleasure-pain, 238.\\nVolkmann, 83 n.2.\\nVoltaire, 262; on pessimism, 297.\\nW.\\nWard, on free will, 330 f.\\nWill, 212 ff freedom of, 316 ff\\nWilliam Occam, 117 on conscience,\\n47 n. 1.\\nWilliams, 259 n. 2, 274 n. 1,\\n315.\\nWordsworth, 98.\\nWundt, 23 n. 2, 73, 110 n. 1, 230 n. 1,\\n233 n. 2 on highest good, 199 f\\non will, 215 n. 2.\\nZ.\\nZeno, the Stoic, 186.\\nZiegler, Th., 200.\\nZiehen, on will, 213.", "height": "3492", "width": "2572", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0356.jp2"}, "357": {"fulltext": "BOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY\\nTHE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. An Introduction\\nto the Study of Philosophy. By John Grier Hibben,\\nProfessor of Logic in Princeton University. i2mo, 203\\npages. $1.00.\\nThe author presents a concise and luminous statement of the\\nvarious points at issue between the several schools of philosophy and\\nforms a general introduction for beginners in the study. It is designed\\nboth for the work of reference and text-book.\\nCONTENTS. 1. A Plea for Philosophy. 2. The Problems of Philosophy.\\n3. The Problem of Being. 4. The World Problem. 5. The Problem of Mind.\\n6. The Problem of Knowledge. 7. The Problem of Reason. 8. The Problem\\nof Conscience. 9. The Problem of Political Obligation. 10. The Problem of\\nthe Sense of Beauty. Index.\\nPresident J. M. Taylor, Vassar College.\\nThe books seem to me to emphasize what most teachers come to feel, I think,\\nthat the teaching of the mere science of Psychology to beginners is depriving\\nthem of an interest in the subject, which the opening of their eyes to the philo-\\nsophical problem involved would be sure to give them. It seems to me to cover\\nwell the ground it professes to, and I should say that it would be of use further\\nto older readers in the way of review and of fresh suggestion, and that it would\\nprove a good introduction to the study of philosophy to general readers who are\\nof a philosophical turn of mind but unacquainted with the general subject.\\nProfessor J. E. Creighton, Cornell University.\\nIt will not repel the busy reader by its length, as so many introductions are apt\\nto do, and, moreover, it carries one on by its charming style and interesting\\nmanner of exposition.\\nPsychological Review.\\nThe task, whether grateful or ungrateful, has been done in a very clear and\\nconcise manner. In mapping out the lines of thought to the student the book\\nwill be found to have performed an excellent service.\\nThe Philosophical Review.\\nProfessor Hibben has succeeded in writing an introduction to philosophy which\\nis better adapted to the needs of the beginner than any similar work now in the\\nfield. Moreover, his book has all the attraction which an excellent literary\\nstyle can lend, and for this reason, among others, it ought to appeal not merely\\nto the professional students of philosophy, but also to a wider circle of readers.\\nA SYSTEM OF ETHICS. By Friedrich Paulsen.\\nTranslated and edited by Frank Thilly, Professor of\\nPhilosophy in the University of Missouri. Crown 8vo,\\n720 pages. $3.00 net.\\nThe value of Professor Paulsen s Ethics was at once recognized\\nupon its first appearance in German, and the desirability of an", "height": "3504", "width": "2280", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0357.jp2"}, "358": {"fulltext": "BOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY\\nEnglish translation has been so often and so urgently suggested\\nthat the publishers have arranged to undertake it. One of the\\nserious objections that sometimes arise in such cases is the exten-\\nsiveness of such a work, and for that reason its lack of adaptation\\nas a text-book. In the present case, however, the translator has\\nevinced the sairfe skill as shown in his other efforts, and has not\\nonly rendered an accurate translation, but has condensed the text\\nand edited it with the advice and approval of the author, so that\\nit now stands in every way suited to use in college classes.\\nThe first book surveys moral philosophies from Greek times to\\nthe present. The second reviews the fundamental questions of ethics,\\nanswering them in each case with soundness of judgment and\\ncommon sense. The third defines virtues and duties. Modern\\npessimism, hedonism, and Nietzcheanism, suicide, temperance, and\\nthe lie of necessity are among the subjects discussed.\\nProfessor George M. Duncan, Yale University.\\nI have recommended Professor Paulsen s Ethics to my colleague for use at\\nYale as the required text-book.\\nProfessor R. M. Wenley, University of Michigan.\\nI propose to use it in my Ethics class next session.\\nProfessor J. E. Creighton, Editor of The Philosophical Review.\\nPaulsen is by far the most gifted German who writes on philosophical subjects\\nat the present day, and his Ethics has not a dull page in it, and should attract\\nthe attention both of students and general readers. Professor Thilly s translation\\nseems to preserve the spirit of the original to a remarkable degree.\\nDr. E. Ritchie, Wellesley College.\\nI regard the work as one of the very best text-books on Ethics for the use of col-\\nlege students, and I am very glad that it is now accessible in our own language.\\nHISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. By Dr. W.\\nWindelband, Professor of Philosophy in the University\\nof Strassbourg. Authorized translation from the second\\nGerman edition, by Herbert Ernest Cushman, Ph.D.,\\ninstructor of Philosophy in Tufts College. 8vo. $2.56\\nnet.\\nCONTENTS\\nTranslator s Preface, Author s Preface, Introduction, Greek Philosophy.\\n1. The Milesian Nature Philosophy. 2. The Metaphysical Conflict, Heracleitus,\\nand the Eleatics. 3. Efforts toward Reconciliation. 4. The Greek Enlighten-\\nment, The Sophists, and Socrates. 5. Materialism and Idealism, Democritus\\nand Plato. 6 Aristotle.\\nHellenic-Roman Philosophy.\\n1. The Controversies of the Schools. 2. Skepticism and Cyncrecism.\\n3. Patristics. 4. Neo-Platonism.", "height": "3504", "width": "2596", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0358.jp2"}, "359": {"fulltext": "BOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY\\nBibliography and Index.\\nProf. George H. Palmer, Harvard University.\\nI have recommended it to my classes, and have ordered copies for the libraries\\nof Harvard and Radcliffe colleges. There is no other history of ancient philoso-\\nphy at once so brief, so full, so scholarly, and so interesting. A remarkable\\nbook, of importance alike to the beginner and the advanced student, and Dr.\\nCushman has put it into befitting English dress, flowing, graceful, and dignified.\\nIt is a real addition to our philosophical apparatus.\\nThe Mail and Express, New York.\\nDr. Windelband has seen the mistake of separating the history of thought\\nfrom the history of affairs, as is generally done. On the contrary, he leads his\\nreader to the former through the study of the latter. In this case, the affairs of\\nthe Greek nation.\\nThree Important Books\\nby Professor GEORGE TRUMBELL LADD\\nof Yale University\\nPHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE. 8vo, 614 pages. $4.00.\\nThis is the first adequate discussion of the subject by any Ameri-\\ncan author, and naturally will attract special attention aside from the\\nfact that it is the work of Dr. Ladd, whose name is so familiar to the\\nstudents of philosophy, both in this country and abroad. The book\\nappeals to the general reader by reason of the relation which this sub-\\nject bears to questions now so prominently before the philosophical\\nand religious world, as well as through the broad sympathy of the\\nauthor, with different phases of thought. It will also find a place wait-\\ning for it as a text-book for advanced and post-graduate students in the\\nstudy of logic and the laws of thought. Ministers, too, will get from\\nit much material for which they will find a constant use.\\nThe Philosophical Review.\\nIt would ill become one to take leave of a work which must lay many under\\nobligation without noting its broad basis in a knowledge carefully garnered from\\nmany sources during long years, its candor, its striking variety of content, and\\nits suggestiveness.\\nPHILOSOPHY OF MIND. 8vo, 412 pages. $3.00.\\nThis is a speculative treatment of certain problems suggested, but\\nnot discussed, in the study of psychology, and therefore appropriately\\nfollows the author s earlier works on that subject. The subjects treated\\nare Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, The Concept of Mind,\\nThe Reality of Mind, The Consciousness of Identity and the so-called", "height": "3504", "width": "2348", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0359.jp2"}, "360": {"fulltext": "BOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY\\nDouble Consciousness, The Unity of Mind, Mind and Body, Mate-\\nrialism and Spiritualism, Monism and Dualism, Origin and Permanence\\nof Mind, Place of Man s Mind in Nature.\\nJohn E. Russell, Williams College.\\nIt is one of the most important works in the field of philosophy published in\\nrecent years. The subject itself, and the acknowledged position and influence\\nof the author, should strongly recommend this volume to all students and to all\\nreaders in philosophy.\\nTHE THEORY OF REALITY. 8vo, 551 pages. $4.00.\\nCONTENTS. 1. On Metaphysics; Nature; Its Methods; and the Propriety\\nof It. 2. Phenomenon and Actuality. 3. Analysis of the Conception of Reality.\\n4. Reality as an Actual Harmony of the Categories. 5. Particular Beings and\\nTheir Qualities. 6. Change and Becoming. 7. Relation. 8. Time. 9. Space\\nand Motion. 10. Force and Causation, n. Measure and Quantity. 12. Num-\\nber and Unity. 13. Forms and Laws. 14. Teleology. 15. Spheres of Reality.\\n16. Matter. 17. Nature and Spirit. 18. The Actuality of the Ideal. 19. The\\nWorld and the Absolute. 20. Summary and Conclusion. Index.\\nHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By Alfred Weber, Profes-\\nsor in the University of Strasburg. Translated by\\nFrank Thilly, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in the\\nUniversity of Missouri, from the Fifth French Edition,\\nrevised and enlarged. With bibliography. 8vo, 620\\npages. $2.50 net.\\nThe leading authorities are unanimous in declaring thjs to be the\\nmost satisfactory text-book for college classes thus far published, and\\nmention among its many marks of excellence The clearness and pre-\\ncision of its style, the condensed and simple character of exposition,\\nthe completeness with which it covers the whole field of philosophy,\\nthe absence of undefined technical terms, the impartiality of treatment,\\nand the soundness of criticism concerning doubtful or disputed points.\\nWilliam James.\\nFrom its size, its clearness, its proportion, it is adapted better for an ordinary\\ncollege text-book than any extant general History of Philosophy.\\nCHARLES SCRIBNER S SONS, Publishers\\nNEW YORK", "height": "3571", "width": "2295", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0360.jp2"}, "361": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3504", "width": "2204", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0361.jp2"}, "362": {"fulltext": "i ~y\\nV\\nH Xl\\nV\\n-^y\\ntf\\nV^\\nV\u00c2\u00b0\\nDeacidified using the Bookkeeper process.\\nNeutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide\\nTreatment Date: Dec. 2004\\nPreservationTechnologies\\nA WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION\\n1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive\\nCranberry Township, PA 16066\\n(724)779-2111", "height": "3590", "width": "2291", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0362.jp2"}, "363": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3504", "width": "2156", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0363.jp2"}, "364": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n013 544 494 7", "height": "3645", "width": "2459", "jp2-path": "introductiontoet00thi_0364.jp2"}}