{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3576", "width": "2279", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "V\\n,v-\\nM\\n^y^^\\no o\\n1", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "o\\n-*U.o\\n^oV", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY\\n(5o6\\nA Contribution to a Philosophy of Theisivi\\nBY\\nREV. JOHN T. DRISCOLL, S. T. L.\\nAuthor of Christian Philosophy A Treatise on the Human Soul\\nBENZIGER BROTHERS\\nPrinters to the Holy Apostolic See,\\nNEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO\\nI goo.\\nL", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "3^^/\\nOffice of t^Q t^ I\\nHeglst\u00c2\u00abr of Copyrights*\\nNihil obstat.\\nRev. F. X. McGOWAN, O. S. A.,\\nCensor Deputatus,\\n6002S\\nImprimatur\\nMICHAEL AUGUSTINE.\\nArchbishop of New York.\\nNew York, February loth, 1900.\\nCopyright, 1900,\\nBy John T. Driscoll.\\nSfcCJJ iD GOPY,\\nS\\no o", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "TO MY\\nfB^otbet\\nwho first spoke to me of God and urged me ever\\nto be faithful and true in His service\\nTHIS VOLUME\\nis\\nDEVOTEDLY INSCRIBED", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "PREFACE,\\nIn 1890 a translation of Father Hettinger s Apology by\\nFather Bowden of the Oratory appeared under the title of\\nNatural Religion. The great reputation of the writer drew\\nattention to the work. Many criticisms appeared and of espe-\\ncial interest was an article on Reason Alone A Reply\\nto Father Sebastian Bowden, in the Fortnightly Review, Nov.\\n1890, by W. H. Mallock. The importance of the problem was\\nbrought clearly to mind. Convinced that the existence of God\\nwas a certainty how present this truth to the mind of the\\npresent day? This volume is the fruit of the thought and study.\\nThe success attending the publication of the work on the\\nHuman Soul constrained the writer to adopt the comparative\\nmethod with this treatise also. The subject is heavy and\\nabstruse in parts. An effort has been made to render the\\nreading as easy as possible. Hence the illustrations, and\\nreferences to modern literature, and relegation of doubts and\\ncontroversies to the notes at the foot of the page.\\nThe line of thought worked out in this volume is a depart-\\nure from that followed in many treatises on the subject. The\\nwriter takes the idea of God as a fact of consciousness. The\\nquestion is not how the idea came to the individual mind.\\nBut are we justified in holding the idea, and what is its con-\\ntent? Hence an investigation into the grounds of the idea.\\nViewed in this aspect, it becomes a study in Psychology.\\nNow, as the idea of God is not an individual but a universal\\nfact, the course of investigation is of more than a personal\\nvalue. It is a study of the human mind.\\nSome particular questions, e. g.^ capability of the mind to\\nconceive the Infinite, the problem of Personality are not dis-\\n[v]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "VI PREFACE.\\ncussed at length. The latter notion has been examined in the\\nvolume on the Human Soul. The former pertains to a treatise\\non the Theory of Knowledge, whose proper place is in the\\nPhilosophy of Mind. This treatise is published in the hopes\\nthat it will bring light and comfort to those who believe, and\\nhelp dispel the clouds of error and misunderstanding under\\nwhich so many are struggling.\\nThe writer acknowledges the debt of gratitude to the kind\\nfriends who have in word and deed encouraged the progress\\nof the writing, and so carefully examined the proof-sheets of\\nthe work.\\nDec. 8th, 1899.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nCHAPTER I.\\nAgnosticism.\\nI. Modern Philosophy compared to: page.\\n(i) Greek Philosophy, V cent. B. C. 6\\n(2) Scholasticism of 13th cent. 6\\nII. Agnosticism:\\n(i) Origin:\\n(a) the term Mr. Huxley 7\\n(b) the doctrine: fundamentally the same as Greek Scepti-\\ncism, but circumstances are different 7\\n(2) Development:\\n(a) philosophical: Real Phenomenalism, e. g., Locke;\\nIdeal Phenomenalism, e. g., Kant; both combine in\\nHuxley, Spencer, etc S\\n(b) scientific: decline of Hegel; rise and spread of phys-\\nical science 12\\n(c) false representations of religious truth 15\\nIII. Doctrine:\\n(i) with Tyndall, Huxley: fragmentary 16\\n(2) with Spencer: systematic 17\\n(a) phenomenon and noumenon.\\n(b) Relativity of Knowledge, e.g., Hamilton, Mill, Grote,\\nSpencer.\\nIV. Criticism:\\n(i) true method 19\\n(2) True and false Agnosticism 21\\n(3) contradictions of Mr. Spencer 22\\n(4) Philosophy of Religion 23\\nV. Influence: in Science, Biblical Studies, Theology, Literature 23\\nCHAPTER II.\\nThe Fact.\\nBelief in God a psychological fact 26\\nI. U niversal in place, 27\\n[vii]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "Vlll CONTENTS.\\nPAGE.\\nII. Universal in time: primitive monotheism. 29\\n(i) in general 29\\n(2) speciatim:\\n(a) Indo-EuropSLns:\\n(i) Hindus 30\\n(2) Persians 33\\n(3) Greece and Rome 35\\n(4) conclusion 35\\n(b) Egyptians 36\\n(c) China 37\\n(dj Semites 38\\n(e) Savages:\\n(i) Individual testimony 39\\n(2) Traditions 41\\n(3) theory of evolution disproved 41\\n(3) Conclusion: primitive purity, degeneracy, primitive revela-\\ntion, monotheism 42\\nIII. Expression of the Fact:\\n(i) by moral and metaphysical relations 43\\n(2) by phenomena of the external world 44\\nCHAPTER III.\\nOrigin of the Belief.\\nI. Theory of Innate Ideas. 45\\n1. Defenders 46\\n2. Criticism:\\n(a) False Assumption 47\\n(b) False basis.\\n(c) Idea of God.\\nII. Theory of Evolution 49\\n1. Defenders: Spencer 50\\n2. Criticism 53\\n(a) Assumptions.\\n(b) False.\\n(c) Fallacious.\\nIII. Theory of Theosophy 55\\n1. Teaching.\\n2. Forms:\\n(a) Ontologism:\\n(i) De Bonald, Bonnetti 56", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. IX\\nIII. Theory of Theosophy Continued. page.\\n(2) Neo-Hegelians 57\\n(3) Criticism. 58\\n(b) Special faculty:\\n(i) Forms 58\\n(2) Muller 58\\n(3) Criticism 59\\n(c) Theory of feeling:\\n(i) Defenders 59\\n(2) Doctrine.\\n(3) Criticism.\\nIV. Theory of Christian Philosophy 60\\n1. Sources.\\n2. Teaching.\\nCHAPTER IV.\\nMental Life.\\nI. Grounds for idea of God in consciousness 63\\nII. Errors:\\n(i) The rzWz proof: Anselm, Scotus, DesCartes, Leibnitz... 64\\n(2) The Neo-Hegelian: Fichte, Hegel, The Neo-Hegelians 67\\nIII. Theory of Christian Philosophy 70\\n(i) Method a posteriori 71\\n(2) Argument.\\n(a) The universal idea viewed as to its content 72\\n(b) The judgment: first principles 75\\n(c) Reasoning: error, mathematics, reign of truth 76\\n(d) St. Augustine, Bossuet, Fenelon the facts of ignor-\\nance, of discovery 78\\nteaching 79\\nIV. Criticism of Prof. Royce: criticism 80\\nCHAPTER V.\\nMoral Life,\\nArgument is two-fold: law of conscience and aspirations of the\\nsoul 83\\nI. Argument from conscience 84\\n1\u00c2\u00b0. The Moral Order:\\n(i) right and wrong 84\\n(2) obligation, moral necessity and moral order 85\\n(3) sanction in the individual and in history 86", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "X CONTENTS.\\nI. Argument from conscience Continued. page.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Conscience. 87\\n(i) the voice of the moral law.\\n(2) its nature and office.\\n3\u00c2\u00b0. Argument 88\\n(i) how formulated.\\n(2) its conclusion: a just and good God.\\n4 Errors, Kant 89\\n(i) his notion of morality.\\n(2) Independent morality, e.g., Neo-Kantians, disciples\\nof culture, ethical societies, etc.\\n(3 criticism.\\nII. Argument from fundamental desires. 91\\ni^. aspiration for truth.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0 love of the good.\\n3\u00c2\u00b0. desire of life.\\n4\u00c2\u00b0. longing for happiness.\\n5\u00c2\u00b0. man s religious nature.\\nConclusion force of the argument 93\\nCHAPTER VI.\\nContingency.\\nI. Basis of the argument: the fact of change 96\\nII. The argument 97\\n(i) chemistry 97\\n(2) Physics:\\n(a) mechanical physics 99\\n(b) Thermo-Dynamics 100\\n(3) Astronomy 103\\n(4) Geology 105\\n(5) Biology 106\\n(6) Anthropology no\\n(7) Mathematics in\\nConclusion.\\nCHAPTER VII.\\nCausality.\\nI. The principle:\\n(i) cause 117\\n(2) efficient cause: its nature 118\\n(3) how expressed:\\n(a) every effect has a cause 119", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. XI\\nI. The principle Continued. page.\\n(b) the dependent demands the independent. 120\\n(c) a thing beginning to be demands a reason for the\\nbeginning 120\\n(4) how proved 121\\nII. Errors 121\\n(i) Hume:\\n(a) genesis of cause: its value 122\\n(b) criticism: experience value of Hume s position. 122\\n(2) Mill:\\n(a) nature of cause 125\\n(b) criticism 125\\nIII. Argument 126\\nCHAPTER VIII.\\nMotion.\\nI. The Principle 129\\n(i) motion: potential and kinetic energy 130\\n(2) definition of Aristotle 131\\nII. Errors: Hegel 131\\n(i) The TO fieri. 132\\n(2) criticism:\\n(a) false philosophically 132\\n(b) false scientifically 133\\n(c) falsity of Neo-Hegelianism 133\\nIII. The Argument 133\\nIV. The Argument from Local Motion 133\\n(i) nature of local motion 134\\n(2) nature of attraction:\\n(a) theory of Mechanists 135\\n(b) theory of Dynamists 137\\n(3) objections:\\n(a) eternal motion 138\\n(b) Kant s theory 139\\nV. Argument from Mutation 140\\n(i) question stated 140\\n(2) basis:\\n(a) everything in motion is moved by something else 140\\n(b) infinite series impossible 143\\n(3) reducible to local motion 144\\nVI. Conclusion 145", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "xii CONTENTS.\\nCHAPTER I\\nOrder. page.\\nHistory importance I47\\nI. Basis 148\\nfinal cause: question stated 149\\nn. The Fact 151\\n(i) efficient and final cause 151\\n(2) final cause necessary:\\n(a) Physiology 152\\n(b) Psychology 153\\n(c) Ethics 154\\nHI. The Principle 156\\n(i) nature 156\\n(2) Proof 157\\n(a) facts: hypothesis of chance.\\n(b) conscious experience.\\n(c) animal life.\\n(d) external nature: nature and art\\n(e) material universe.\\nIV. Theories 161\\ni Mechanical:\\n(a) doctrine 161\\n(b) criticism 162\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Evolution:\\n(a) forms: Monism, Agnosticism, Darwinism 165\\n(b) criticism 165\\n3\u00c2\u00b0. Pantheism: Schoppenhauer, Hartman 172\\nV. Theory of Christian Philosophy 174\\n1\u00c2\u00b0. Doctrine.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Proof:\\n(i) by exclusion.\\n(2) by reasoning from facts.\\n(3) method and conclusion.\\nCHAPTER X.\\nCreation.\\nI. Theory of Pantheism 179\\ni Theory of Emanation l8o\\n(i) doctrine.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. Xlll\\nI. Theory of Pantheism Continued. page.\\n(2) forms:\\n(a) India 181\\n(b) Gnostics 182\\n(c) Neo-Platonism 183\\n(d) Erigena 183\\n(e) Cousin 184\\n(3) criticism 185\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Theory of Manifestation 185\\n(i) doctrine.\\n(2) forms:\\n(a) India 186\\n(b) Stoic 187\\n(c) Spinoza 188\\n(3) Influence 189\\n3\u00c2\u00b0. Transcendental Theory. 190\\n(i) doctrine.\\n(2) forms:\\n(a) Vedanta 191\\n(b) German Transcendentalism 198\\nII. Dualistic Theory 200\\n(i) history and forms 200\\n(2) Ethical dualism 201\\nIII. Theory of Creation 202\\n(i) notion 202\\n(2) proof 204\\nCHAPTER XI.\\nUnity.\\nI. Unity 209\\nII. Simple Unity 211\\n(1) not collective unity 211\\n(2) not potential unity 213\\n(3) not abstract unity 217\\nIII. Theory of Christian Philosophy 223\\n(i) simple unity 223\\n(2) not a physical composite, e. g., body. 223\\n(3) not a metaphysical composite, e. g., soul 224\\n(4) not a logical composite 227\\n(5) God a pure act, a pure spirit 228\\nImmanence and Transcendence of God 229", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "XIV CONTENTS.\\nCHAPTER XII.\\nProvidence. page.\\nQuestion stated 231\\nI. Notion of Providence law, government, order, meaning of law, 233\\nII. The Material World 235\\nreign of law: Astronomy, Chemistry, Physics:\\nIII. Organic World 240\\nreign of law: Biology, Anatomy, Physiology.\\nIV. Difficulties:\\n(i) perturbations in stellar universe, e. g.. Astronomy, Mete-\\norology 246\\n(2) prodigality in organic kingdom 248\\n(3) useless organs 250\\nCHAPTER XIII.\\nPrayer.\\nThe question 253\\nI. The Fact 254\\nII. Theory of Modern Science 255\\n(i) prayer opposed to physical laws: its true value 256\\n(2) criticism 258\\nIII. Miracles 260\\n(i) nature 260\\n(2) Errors:\\n(a) Pantheists: Spinoza, Spencer, Hegel 265\\n(b) Physical Scientists 266\\n(c) facts denied, e. g., Tyndall, Huxley 268\\nIV. Special Providences 270\\n(i) nature 270\\n(2) how illustrated 271\\nV. Conclusion 273\\nCHAPTER XIV.\\nPessimism.\\nI. Buddhism.. 276\\n(i) origin 276\\n(2) doctrine:\\n(i) Buddhism of Gotama 278\\n(2) Four Noble Truths 279", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. XV\\nPAGE.\\nII. Schoppenhauer 283\\n(i) doctrine:\\n(a) sources, basis 283\\n(b) will the only reality 284\\n(c) value of life:\\n(a) a priori 285\\n(b) a posteriori 286\\n(2) criticism:\\n(a) theory of knowledge false 287\\n(b) principle is false 287\\nIII. Hartman 289\\n(i) doctrine:\\n(a) genesis, the unconscious, matter and mind 289\\n(b) Hedonism, value and goal of life, 290\\n(2) criticism 291\\nIV. Influence 292\\nV. Causes 294\\n(i) Philosophical.\\n(2) Ethical.\\n(3) Religious.\\nCHAPTER XV.\\nEvil.\\nI. The Problem 297\\n(i) nature of evil.\\n(2) nature and kinds of good.\\nII. In the Material World 300\\n(i) Principle of finality 300\\n(2) ends, tendencies, final cause 303\\n(3) mutual fitnesses, existence of goodness fundamental and\\nuniversal 305\\nIII. In Human Life 307\\n(i) Theory of Hedonism:\\n(a) exposition 308\\n(b) criticism 308\\n(2) Theory of Utilitariarism:\\n(a) exposition. 310\\n(b) Empirical, Intuitional and Evolutionary Ethics 311\\n(c) criticism 312\\n(3) Theory of Christian Philosophy 314\\n(a) in Animal Life: tendencies; pleasure and pain; animal\\nand human pain 314", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "xvi CONTENTS.\\nIII. In Human Life Continued. page.\\n(b) in Human Life:\\n(i) good, and moral order 316\\n(2) nature of evil 317\\n(3) physical pain and moral evil 319\\n(4) pain in Human Life 319\\nIV. Conclusion 320\\nCHAPTER XVI.\\nNatural and Supernatural.\\nThe Problem 322\\nI. Theory of Positivism 322\\n(a) teaching.\\n(b) supernatural.\\n(c) idea of humanity.\\n(d) criticism.\\nII. Theory of Pantheism 326\\n(a) teaching.\\n(b) defenders.\\nIII. Theory of Dr. Bushnell 329\\n(a) teaching.\\n(b) criticism.\\nIV. Theory of Christian Philosophy 332\\n(a) natural.\\n(b) supernatural.\\nConclusion.\\n335", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION.\\nI. God is the greatest word ia language, the most\\nprofound and far-reaching problem in philosophy.^\\nFound on the lips of every rational creature, it yet un-\\nfolds a depth of meaning which the greatest intelligence\\nhas never exhausted. It enters into the lowliest lives\\nto restrain, uplift and sanctify. In times of sore trial\\nthe thought of God is like a beacon in the gloom,\\nbreaking through the darkest cloud with a ray of hope,\\nand brings the message of light and peace, and hap-\\npiness beyond. Speak of God to the sorrow-laden and\\ndepressed; their burden becomes Hghter and their\\nheart more strong. The great astronomer, after untold\\nlabor spent in investigating the laws of the heavenly\\nbodies, lifts his soul in humble thanksgiving to God\\nfor the unutterable joys experienced in the contempla-\\ntion of His works. To bring a message about God to\\nour fellow-men is the highest duty and privilege. The\\nmessage is a glad tidings to the human soul which\\never yearns for more knowledge concerning its\\norigin and destiny. Thou hast made us for Thy-\\nself, O Lord, and our heart is restless till it rest in\\nThee.\\n2. A message, to be of value, must appeal to living\\nmen. Special questionings and difficulties are a part\\nof every individual mind. A wise physician examines\\nthe nature of the disease before prescribing a remedy.\\nLadd, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 400.\\nE. g. Kepler, cf. Order in the Physical World, tr. from the\\nFrench, by T. J. Slavin, p. 9.\\n^St. Aug. Confess. 1. i, c. i.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nHistory is a reflex of the individual. Its periods are\\ncharacterized by a predominance given to certain\\nproblems or to varied aspects of life. Hence special\\ndifficulties arise which mast be answered. The knowl-\\nedge of God s truth is ever increasing, an abundance\\nof material is at hand. The need is to gather this and\\ngive to it a shape and form best fitted to break the\\nadvance of error.\\n3. Our age is an age of scepticism. The storm of\\ndoubt, bitter and relentless, has swept over our lives.\\nBeliefs and truths, dear to the soul and sanctioned by\\ntime-honored tradition, have been ruthlessly assailed.\\nTimid minds have seen the dark hosts rapidly forming,\\nhave beheld positions believed impregnable success-\\nfully assailed and viewed in anticipation the ruin and\\ndesolation of what made life precious. The funda-\\nmental truths of religion are the object of attack. The\\nexistence of God, the nature of the soul, the fact of\\nrevelation are questioned. At such a time it is not\\nwise to fly to the refuge of faith. The most decisive\\nbattles of to-day are fought beyond the breastworks of\\nrevealed truth. The arms we use are those of reason,\\nthe missiles are the most certain facts of conscious-\\nness and of physical science. In employing these we\\nclaim the right to use any legitimate m.ethod. We\\ndeny the claim of adversaries to limit us to any one\\nmethod or any one class of facts, and then cry out\\nthat the reasoning is not conclusive. Methods vary,\\neven though legitimate. In time of war the wise leader\\ndisposes his array with a view to capture the position\\nof the enemy. In like manner we claim the right to\\nemploy the method best suited to the present exigen-\\ncies of the subject.\\nBalfour, Foundations of Belief, p. 2; Wordsworth, The One\\nReligion, p. 6.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION.\\n4. The considerations adduced are the heritage of\\nChristian Philosophy handed down by the pens of St.\\nAugustine and St. Thomas. The marvellous advance\\nin the sciences furnish mcreased data for argument\\nand illustration. The question is considered under all\\naspects. All sources of knowledge are investigated.\\nHistory, Language, Psychology, Ethics, the Physical\\nSciences, each comes with its special testimony. The\\naim is simply to collect the data and show their bear-\\ning on the Idea of God; to answer the question: What\\nis meant by God and has the idea of God an objective\\nvaUdity?\\n5. This is a problem of modern thought. Is the\\nmind constrained to admit that the Theistic interpre-\\ntation of the universe is the true one? All that is true\\nand noble in human life depends on the answer. The\\ntrend of philosophic speculation renders the discussion\\nimperative. The wide interest and large circulation\\nof treatises on the Idea of God is a sign of the times.\\nIn our own country the recent contributions of Prof.\\nRoyce and of Prof. Fiske hold the attention of readers.\\nIn chapter IV the views of the former are critically\\nexamined. Under a thoughtful and attractive style he\\nproposes an ethical and idealistic Pantheism. The\\nIdea of God by Prof. Fiske is a popular work, and\\nappeals strongly to the undisciplined mind. In the\\npresent treatise however the reader will clearly see:\\n(i) That his theory of the origin of the idea of God is\\nflatly contradicted by facts. (2) That his presentation\\nof the Christian idea of God as set forth by St.\\nAugustine is absolutely false.\u00c2\u00ae (3) That he con-\\nfounds the teaching of St. Athanasius and of Clement\\nof Alexandria with the doctrine of Spinosa, Lessing,\\nIdea of God, ch. III., pp. 154, 163; infra, ch. III., s. II.\\nIdea of God. ch. V., VI.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nand Schleiermacher/ (4) That far from present-\\ning a Theistic doctrine, his is rather a Cosmic\\nPantheism.*\\nIdea of God, pp. 94, 103, 109, 112.\\n8 Idea of God, ch. XIII., p. 166.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER I.\\nAGNOSTICISM.\\nI. History is the record of the human race. It\\nsets forth what man has achieved in the various spheres\\nof human activity. We there behold the many phases\\nof a nation s life from its early rise through all its\\nprogress in government, in science, in letters, in con-\\nquest on to its decline and fall. Thus nation comes\\nafter nation and government gives way to government.\\nThe map of the world is ever changing and each change\\nappeals to us with keen interest as involving the\\nhopes, resolves and fortunes of human beings like\\nourselves.\\n2. The mere narration of facts may please the Philosophy\\nyoung; it is not sufficient for the more mature mind.\\nHe seeks to get behind the facts, to grasp the causes,\\nto know why and how a people rose from amidst their\\nneighbors and exercised an influence upon con-\\ntemporaneous and subsequent periods. Thus we are\\nled to the most attractive study of the Philosophy of\\nHistory.\\n3. Our interest is now centered upon the history\\nof thought. The world has seen epochs characterized\\nby the activity and splendor of literary work. They\\nhave been called the intellectual ages of mankind. In\\nspite of many differences we may still detect some\\nstriking resemblances which form a basis for compari-\\nson and contrast. Thus the thoughtful student sees\\nreasons to compare the present period of philosophic\\nthought to the period of Greek Philosophy at the birth\\nof Socrates and to the Middle Ages at the time of St.\\nThomas Aquinas.\\n[5]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nAgnosticism.\\nPresent 4. In the fifth centurv, B. C, Athens was the center\\ntime can be j\\ncompared of intellectual life in Greece. There from all parts\\nto Greece\\nat the birth 2:athered teachers and those anxious still to learn. To\\nof Socrates.\\nthe Athenian success meant position in the state and\\nan influence in public affairs. For this the knowledge\\nof Rhetoric or of public debate was a necessity.\\nHence the multitude of individual teachers who claimed\\nto propose what all so eagerly sought. They became\\nknown as Sophists, e., wise men an appellation of\\nhonor at first, but with Socrates and Plato indicating\\nboastful, fallacious and venal men.\\nwork of 8 r. The Hfework of Socrates was to expose the pre-\\nSocrates. i\\ntensions of these men, to show the distinction between\\ntrue and false knowledge. This is done by a process\\nof intellectual analysis. At times he leaves the\\nadversary in doubt as in the Dialogues of Search; again\\nhe proposes positive and definite truths. In both the\\naim is apparent, viz., the necessity of forming clear\\nconceptions. The principal elements of Logic are\\nfound in the dialogues; afterwards they were thrown\\ninto scientific form by Aristotle. Thus was given a\\ndeathly blow to the universal scepticism of the time.\\n^o^ern g 6_ Modcm thought is running in a parallel course.\\ncism. The current tone is Agnostic, which is as Prof. Schur-\\nman says, the Apotheosis of Scepticism. The\\npassing generation has been deeply imbued with its\\nspirit. In Philosophy, Mr. Spencer is its acknowledged\\nleader; in Science, Mr. Huxley and Mr. Tyndall\\nchampion its teaching; in Literature, George Eliot,\\nCf. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools.\\nCf. Belief in God, by Pres. Schurman.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM.\\nMrs. Humphrey Ward are its open defenders. Not con-\\nfined within the walls of the university or lecture hall,\\nit has become a topic of conversation in the parlor, the\\ndining-room and on the railway carriage. The college-\\ngraduate and the daily laborer are heard to voice its\\nsentiments. The tendency is to question everything;\\nand philosophy, science, as well as common sense\\nassure us that the only state of mind on the important\\nproblems of life and of being is one of doubt.\\n11.\\nOrigin.\\n87. The term Agnosticism is of very recent origin of\\nthe term.\\norigin. Mr Huxley is very mgenuous m telling how\\nit was coined. When a young man, he became a mem-\\nber of the Metaphysical society of London, he found\\nhimself out of place in the company of men each of\\nwhom had a reputation as the parent of an I sm of some\\nkind. He felt constrained to be like his associates\\nand broached the doctrine of Agnosticism. In a\\nspirit of humility he openly confessed that he was an\\nAgnostic because he did not know nor could he ever\\nhope to know a solution for the fundamental truths of\\nreligion.\\n8 8. The doctrine, however, signified by the term the\\ndoctrine.\\nAgnosticism is not new.^ It is of the same nature as\\nthat proposed by the Sceptics in the time of Socrates.\\nNevertheless in its modern form it cannot claim to be\\n^Theological Essays, R. H. Hutton, p. 22; Is Life Worth\\nLiving, W. H. Mallock, ch. VIII; The Great Enigma, W. S.\\nLilly, ch. III., IV.\\nEssays on Some Controverted Questions, IX., Prof. Huxley;\\nhis article in XlXth Century, Feb., 1895, in criticism of Mr. Bal-\\nfour s Foundations of Belief.\\nThe Roots of Agnosticism, by James Seth in the New-\\nWorld, Sept., 1894.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\na direct offspring. It is a truth of history that like\\neffects may be traced to the working of independent\\ncauses. The cause at the base of the Greek Scepticism\\nas well as of modern Agnosticism is the failure on the\\npart of the human mind to acquire definite and true\\nknowledge of things. Thus we find Socrates ever\\noccupied in an analysis of the definition. The Dia-\\nlogues are discussions concerning the meaning of\\nwords. In our own day the fundamental problem of\\nPhilosophy is in like manner the theory of the notion.\\nThe circumstances, however, which brought the cause\\ninto play are not the same in both periods. We shall\\nbriefly indicate the sources and development of\\nmodern Agnosticism. They can be summed up under\\nthree heads: Philosophical, scientific and religious.\\nIts\\ncauses Phil- I Philosophical.\\nosophical.\\n9. (a) Locke is called the parent of English Psy-\\ntelSXng^^ chology. A disciple of Descartes, he yet shows inde-\\nAgnost?? pendence of mind in differing from his master, e. g.,\\nrejecting innate ideas, and in working out his own\\npeculiar theory of knowledge. He teaches that sensa-\\ntion and reflection are thie two sources of knowledge.\\nThe former embraces the knowledge of external\\nobjects. The latter is so much like this that it might\\nbe properly called the internal sense.\u00c2\u00ae\\n10. Thus is found an explanation for Locke s\\nempiricism. To him reflection is a more refined form\\nof sensation. The radical difference between sense\\nand thought is obliterated; the one runs into the other,\\nof which it is a more shadowy form. The higher\\npowers of mind are ignored. As a consequence we\\nonly know the qualities or sensitive appearances of\\nHuman Understanding, b. II., ch. i, sec. IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 9\\nthinefs: the real substance or essence is beyond reach/ Substance\\nunknown.\\nTherefore in the founder of English philosophy we find\\ntraces of the modern school of Agnosticism.\\nII. Starting from Locke s principle that the mind developed\\nknows external objects only through mental representa- and Hume?\\ntions,^ Berkeley quickly developed into Idealism.\\nIdeas, mental representations are the direct and\\nproper objects of cognition; the esse of things is their\\npei cipi.^ Hume combined the Agnosticism of Locke\\nand the Idealism of Berkeley and taught an open and\\nradical scepticism.^\\n12. The destructive character of Hume s writings\\naroused Kant. For upwards of twenty years he labored\\non his great work A Critic of Pure Reason. He was\\nconfident that he had given a death blow to scepticism\\nand placed human knowledge on a firm lasting basis.\\n8 13. (b) Kant tausfht that the mind independent of (b) Kant\\n,1- another\\nall experience, creates in itself certain pure forms of source of\\nknowledge. Into these forms and clothed by themcism.\\nare fitted the materials of knowledge, the phe-\\nnomena furnished by the senses. The forms of Intui-\\ntion are Space and Time; the forms of thought are\\nthe twelve Categories. The categories are purely\\nideal; they have no objective validity. Yet they are\\nthe direct object of the perceiving mind. For the\\nmind in the act of apprehending an object clothes the\\nobject with its own ideal vesture. The forms or\\nvesture constitute with Kant the phenomena. The\\nIndeed as to the real essence of substances we only sup-\\npose their being without precisely knowing what they are.\\nlb. B. III., ch. IV., sec. VI.\\nHb. B. IV., ch. I, sec. I.\\nBerkeley s Works V. i, sec. 3, The Theistic Argument, J.\\nDimon, p. 42.\\n^Treatise on Human Nature; The Theistic Argument, J.\\nDimon, DD., pp. 6, 7.\\nCritic of Pure Reason.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "lO\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nInfluence\\nof Locke\\nand Kant\\nupon\\nmodern\\nthought.\\nPhilosophy\\nof Associa-\\ntion is\\nAgnostic.\\nreal objects, as they are in their own concrete exist-\\nence independent of the mind, are never known.\\nWe know nothing but oar manner of perceiving\\nthem. The objects in their own objective nature\\nare called by Kant nou}ne7ia. Hence the famous dis-\\ntinction which obtains even to our day between the\\nphenome7ia and the noumena. The ideal appearances\\nmake up our knowledge; the real things are unknown\\nand unknowable. The speculative reason cannot\\nknow God; He becomes the postulate of practical\\nreason. Thus in attempting to refute Hume, Kant\\nbecomes the parent of modern Agnosticism.^*\\n14. The direct influence of the real phenomenalism\\nof Locke, and the ideal phenomenalism of Kant upon\\nthe formation of modern thought can be easily traced.\\nThe two currents worked their own way along until in\\nour own day the waters intermingle and their separate\\nidentity is merged into a wider and more powerful\\nstream.\\n15. Locke s theory of knowledge developed by\\nHume influenced Hartley, Priestley, Bentham and\\nJames Mill. Drawing the inspiration and teaching\\nfrom his father, J. S. Mill proposes it with a wealth of\\ndetail and analysis in his Logic, a work which exer-\\ncised a profound influence on the English mind of the\\npast generation. He thus became the logician, while\\nMr. Spencer is termed the metaphysician, and Mr.\\nBain the psychologist of the Association School.\\n16. Hence the only system of philosophy which\\ncan be considered as the product of the English mind\\nis the direct offspring of Locke and Hume. It teaches\\nwith them that we can only know the external appear-\\nRoyce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 321, 360.\\nCritic, Transc. ^sthet., p. 37.\\nA. K, Rogers, Modern Philosophy, p. 225.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 1 1\\nances of things, that what we term substance is only a\\nbundle of qualities united by the laws of association,\\nthat the real essence is unknown and unknowable.\\nThe bounds of human knowledge are confined within\\nthe domains of sense. The notions of cause, of sub-\\nstance, of essence are explained in a new meaning.\\nGod, soul, etc., may exist; the human mind is unable\\nto say so; therefore to us they are as good as not\\nexisting. But this is the distinctive character of\\nAgnosticism.\\n17. The influence of Kant comes through another Kant\\ncourse. During the eighteenth century the Scotch Hamilton a\\nsource of\\nschool of philosophy alone withstood the power of Agnosti-\\nEnglish scepticism and materialism. With Reid it\\nbecame a strong citadel of Theistic argument. Sir W.\\nHamilton, however, recognized the weakness in the\\nposition of his predecessor. At the time Kant was in\\nthe zenith of power and his teaching was considered\\nimpregnable. To him, therefore, Hamilton went for\\nthe material to supply what was lacking in Reid. His\\nwork was an attempt at a reconstruction. It was\\neagerly welcomed by Christian writers and for upwards\\nof fifty years was the recognized manual of Theistic\\nphilosophy outside of the Catholic church.\\n18. The real effect of Hamilton was contrary to^js^hemy\\nwhat he and his disciples expected. His theory of the edge.\\nnotion was riddled by J. S. Mill.^^ His philosophy of\\nthe conditioned is nothing more than an exposition in\\nEnglish form of the categories of Kant. The mind in\\nthe act of knowing fixes limits on the object known.\\nThus we can only know the limited, the finite.\\nEssays on Religion, J. S. Mill, p. 263.\\nExamination of Sir W. Hamilton.\\nTo define a thing is to give it limits. Knight, Aspects\\nof Theism, p. 157.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "12\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nMausel a\\ndisciple of\\nHamilton.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0 Scien-\\ntific.\\nposition\\nand influ-\\nence of\\nphysical\\nscience.\\nThe infinite is a mere negation, of the finite.\\nGod becomes not an object of knowledge but of faith.\\n19, Dean Mansel in his Bampton Lectures pub-\\nlicly and expressly attempted to harmonize this doc-\\ntrine with the tenets of Christian teaching. The result\\nwas disastrous. The fallacy of the reasoning, the\\nweakness of his position were too patent to be passed\\nby in silence. Christianity suffered by being allied to\\na false philosophy. And the effort to follow the lead\\nof Hamilton and Mansel has brought English non-\\nCatholic Apologetics to its present low position and\\nmade it so easy a mark for trenchant writers like Hux-\\nley and Spencer.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Scientific.\\n20. A second factor in the development of modern\\nAgnosticism is found in the rise and progress of phy-\\nsical science. Our century is truly an epoch of scien-\\ntific discovery. By observation and experimentation\\nevery department of nature has been compelled to dis-\\nclose its treasures and to reveal its laws. The old\\nclassic curriculum in the most conservative universities\\nhas been shattered and scientific departments formed\\nwith special academic degrees. The importance of a\\nscientific education is loudly proclaimed, the methods\\nof scientific mvestigation are praised to the exclusion\\nof any other.\\nLectures, V. 11, p. 374; Theological Essay, R. H. Hutton,\\npp. 6, 86.\\nThe Limits of Religious Thought.\\nThe Theistic Argument, by J. Dimon, p. 22. Thus Prof.\\nFraser holds that the alternative lies between either a scepti-\\ncal alienation from an uninterpretable universe or reconcili-\\nation vrith the universe in hopeful moral faith. Phil, of\\nTheism, 2d series, p. 3, This is the position of Kant. Cf. also\\nThe Christian Doctrine of God in Lux Mundi, p. 88; Royce,\\nThe Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. H., ch, IX.; Pres.\\nSchurman in the Philosophical Review, vol. IV., May, 1895.\\n2^ The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 201.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 1 3\\n21. The Physical sciences are of great value. No their value.\\none will deny that a larger knowledge of nature ennobles\\nman and contributes to the material comfort of life.\\nNevertheless the physical sciences investigate only one\\ndepartment of nature. Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics\\ncannot be classed as physical sciences.\\n22. The exclusive attention paid to physical science the source\\nis due to the rise of Positivism and the decline of power.\\nHegelianism. The metaphysics of Hegel, the culmin-\\nating point in the development of Kant, was considered Metaphy-\\nto be the last and final effort of the human mind in\\nsolving the mystery of the universe. Its merits were\\ninstantly recognized, but its critics were not silent.\\nThey succeeded in exposing the assumptions on which\\nit was based and the contradictions it involved. The\\nresult was a division of Hegel s disciples into three\\nwarring camps. The controversy was bitterly carried\\non by the small parties of followers. Many minds,\\nhowever, paused in dismay. To them metaphysics\\nwas a synonym for whatever is extravagant, unintelli-\\ngible and absurd.\\n23. At this crisis Comte broached the system off^^^J^\u00c2\u00b0,^\\nPositive philosophy. His aim was to constitute a ^^^^\u00c2\u00b0^\u00c2\u00b0p^5^-\\nhierarchy of the physical sciences and set forth sure\\nand true methods to be followed in the pursuit of\\nknowledge. His success was very great. The system\\nwas propagated in England, America, Germany, Italy^\\nas well as in France. He taught that observation and\\nexperimentation were the only channels of knowledge,\\nthat what was beyond the limits and scope of the\\nsenses did not exist, that the only knowledge deserving\\nthe name was physical knowledge. In England J. S.\\nHence Prof. Pfleiderer writes that we find ourselves in a\\nsort of interregnum in Philosophy. Phil, of Religion, vol. II.,\\np. 115.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "14 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nMill, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Harrison, George Eliot, and\\nMr. Lewes championed the new philosophy. In the\\nhands of Mr. Huxley, Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Youmans,\\nhowever, it appears under its true nature, a\\nscientific Agnosticism.\\nMr. Huxley 8 24. While Mr. Huxley acknowledges his indebted-\\nan apostle o\\nof scientmc ness to Hamilton and to Hume, and repudiates\\nAgnosti-\\ncism. Comte, his principles are nevertheless the principles of\\nPositivism. He tells us that Agnosticism is a method,\\nthe essence of which lies in the vigorous application\\nof a single principle, viz., in matters of knowledge\\nfollow reason as far as it will guide you and not pre-\\ntend that conclusions are certain which are not demon-\\nstrated or demonstrable. This principle, innocent\\nin itself, becomes vicious when interpreted after Mr.\\nHuxley s own mind. To him it means that any reality\\nbeyond phenomena and their laws is unknowable.\\nTyndall ^5 Tyndall attempts to explain life by\\nmechanical processes; he discerns in matter the\\npromise and potency of life; he affirms the phe-\\nnomenal nature of knowledge, and holds out the teach-\\ning of Democritus as the final word of modern science.\\nWith him the only means to arrive at truth are those\\nemployed by physical science, viz., exact observation\\nand experiment. He appeals to these as to a final\\ntribunal in his celebrated strictures on prayer and\\nspecial providences. Material agencies alone exist, and\\nwhat lies beyond is in the region of the unknowable.\\nEssay in XlXth Century, Feb. 1895, on Mr. Balfour s\\nFoundations of Belief.\\n2-* Life (if Hume, by T. Huxley.\\nThe Physical Basis of Life, p. 123; Scientific Aspects of\\nPositivism; Essays upon some Controverted Questions, Essay\\nIX.; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 8, 9, 10.\\n2 lb., Essay IX., Agnosticism.\\nBelfast Address in Fragments of Science.\\nModern Theorie^^ in Philosophy and Religion, by Prin. Tul-\\nloch, art. Scientific Materialism.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 1 5\\nNotwithstanding many contradictions and veiled\\nattempts to conceal the meaning of words and phrases\\nhe persists in advocating this doctrine. What is the\\nUnknowable with Mr. Spencer, becomes to him the\\nInscrutable.^^\\n\u00c2\u00a726. The same tone of thought was persistently in America.\\nadvocated in America by the writers of the Scientific\\nMonthly. With a show of knowledge put forth in an\\nattractive style they tried to convince readers that\\nreligious truth was beyond the sphere of exact thought,\\nthat science alone could verify its assertions; that\\nwhat was not within the limits of scientific methods\\ncould not be known. Thus science became the ally of\\nunbelief and no man of disciplined mind was presumed\\nto know anything whatsoever about the great truths\\npertaining to God or to the soul.^\u00c2\u00b0\\nRelmous. L^\\nlOUS.\\n8 27. A final element in forming the tone of modern\\nFalse pre-\\nscientific thought must be sought for in religion. False sentations\\nof religious\\npresentations of a truth are the most insidious errors truth a\\nsource of\\nand lead to the most disastrous consequences. Scepticism.\\n28. With the rise of Protestantism the great prob-\\nlems of discussion were the freedom of the will, the\\ndoctrine of grace, e., of divine supernatural help,\\nand of predestination. They assumed a most malig-\\nnant and repulsive form in the Creed of Calvinism.\\nThe history of religious thought shows how bitter was\\nthe strife. God was described as a being of infinite\\npower who created and destined men to eternal dar^-\\nnation without giving any means to enable them to\\nPop. Scien. Monthly, Dec. 1876.\\nAgainst this form of Phenomenalism Mr. Balfour directed\\nhis Essay, The Foundations of Belief, lb., p. 6. As a work of\\nphilosophical criticism the reasoning is very strong.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "l6 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nreach eternal blessedness. The human soul revolted\\nfrom a religion so terrible. Hence we can understand\\nthe indignant protest of J. S. Mill although we can\\nhardly reconcile it with his gospel of Utilitarianism,^\\nIn America Jonathan Edwards upheld the rigid Cal-\\nvinistic creed with voice and pen.^^ The result was a\\nreaction to an opposite extreme. While some religious\\nminds as, e. g., Emerson, Carlyle, etc., sought relief\\nin a vague Pantheism;^ others, e. g.^ Froude, Th.\\nParker, drifted away to Scepticism or a pure natural\\nreligion. In New England the effect is seen in the\\nUnitarian revival of some thirty years ago. The\\nmovement spent itself with the death of its leaders and\\nwas merged into the swelling tide of scientific Agnosti-\\ncism.^^\\nIII.\\nDoctrine.\\nMr. 8 29. Mr. Tyndall and Mr. Huxley left fragments of\\nspencer the 1 1 t\\nreal Phil- the Agnostic teacning scattered through various essays\\nosopher of t-,\\nAgnosti- and addresses, ror a systematic and minute expo-\\nsition we must go to Mr. Spencer. Ks the exponent\\nof the Synthetic Philosophy he is styled the Apostle of\\nModern Agnosticism. A brief examination of his\\nteaching is not therefore out of place.\\nJohn Fiske, Idea of God, pp. xxx., 41, 42.\\nExamination of Sir W. Hamilton, vol. i, p. 131.\\nJ. Edwards, by F. B. Sanborn, in Jour, of Specul. Philoso-\\nphy, Oct., 1883\\nRecollectionb and Impressions, O. B, Frothingham, ch.\\nXV., XVI.\\nThe Unitarians set forth a religion of ethics instead of a\\nGospel of faith; their word is practically not regeneration, but\\nself-culture; Christ is an interpreter of nature and only so a\\nredeemer the literature of the day religious only in\\nform; a substitute for Christianity; praises Christ as the great-\\nest of heroes; finds God in all; speaks of culture, refinement\\nand philanthropy; a captivating and plausible religion. Cf.\\nBushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 24, 28.\\n36 The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, ch. IV.\\ncism.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 1/\\n30. In the very begianing of his volume First ^js^^^^^\\nPrinciples, Mr. Spencer defines the limits of knowledge.\\nHe draws a distinction between phenomenon and\\nnoumenon. In this he is a disciple of Kant. The\\nformer, he tells us, the mind can grasp; the latter can\\nnever become the object of knowledge. This opens\\nthe way for a sharp distinction between science and on science\\nand relig-\\nreligion. Science investigates phenomena; its conciu- ion.\\nsions can therefore be known and verified. Religion\\nis concerned only with the noumenon; its teachings\\nbecome objects of faith, not of ascertained fact. We\\nmay believe that there is a soul or a God; we cannot\\nprove the assertions.\\n31. In the light of this distinction we can under- of^Knowi\\nstand what Mr. Spencer means by the phrase the\\nRelativity of Knowledge. The words are simple,\\nbut the meaning is very uncertain and vague. Found ^ith^^\u00e2\u0084\u00a2^^\\nin every treatise on Modern philosophy, they are rarely\\nemployed in the same sense. It is necessary, therefore,\\nto examine them carefully.\\n32. (a) By Relativity of Knowledge Mr. Hamilton g) Mn\\nmeans that we can never know reality except under\\nmodifications imposed by the perceiving mind, after\\nthe same manner that objects appear blue when viewed\\nthrough blue glasses. This is the teaching of Kant,\\nand leads to Idealism and Scepticism. We do know\\nexisting things. The knowledge is a postulate of\\nmodern science and is confirmed by sound reasoning.\\n2 The same disdnction is drawn by the Neo-Kantians.\\nErnest Laas attempts to bridge the chasm between science and\\nreligion by appealing to the esthetic sense. His teaching is\\ntermed an esthetic religious Neo-Kantianism. Cf. Pfieiderer,\\nPhil, of Relig., vol. II., p. 178.\\nLux Mundi, p. 49.\\n^^Metaphysics, I., p. 148.\\nThe Roots of Agnosticism, by James Seth, in the New\\nWorld, Sept., 1894.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "i8\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(b) Mr.\\nMill.\\n(c Mr.\\nGrote.\\n(d) Mr.\\nSpencer.\\n33- (t ^^r. Mill proposes another explanation.\\nHe holds that we know a thing only as distinguished\\nfrom something else. Thus our consciousness is of\\ndifference,\\nan object is known to be what it is by\\ncontrast with what it is not. Hence knowledge is\\nbased on the perception of relations.*^ Bat this is not\\ntrue. Our knowledge is primarily of things. As a\\nconsequence we can compare things. We never con-\\ntrasts objects not known. Some of our concepts,\\ne. g., short and tall, are essentially relative, but not\\nall are so.\\n34. (c) Mr. Grote s version brings us back to the\\ndays of the Greek Sophists. Things are as they\\nappear to be. As they appear to me so they are to\\nme; as they appear to you, so they are to you. Thus\\nwhat is true to one, may be falsehood to another.\\nTruth, therefore, varies with the individual.*^ The\\nerror lies in making the individual mind the measure\\nof things. Truth consists in the conformity of the\\nmind with objects. There are certain tests or criteria\\nlaid down in Logic which assure us when this con-\\nformity is had. We hold the truth if the evidence is in\\nthe mind s possession.*\\n35- i) By the phrase Relativity of Knowledge\\nMr. Spencer is more closely allied to Hamilton than\\nto the others. His teaching is the logical sequence of\\nthe distinction between phenomenon and noumenon.\\nThe phenomenon only is in relation to the mind know-\\ning; the noumenon is outside all relation to the\\nThe Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 40; Cosmic Philoso-\\nphy, J. Fiske, vol. I., p. 14; Significance of T. H. Green s teach^\\ning in Jour, of Spec. Phil., Oct,, 1883.\\nThe Great Enigma, W. S, Lilly, p. 222.\\n^2 Plato, Protagoras.\\nRoyce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 373.\\nMcCosh, Fundamental Truth.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. I9\\nknower. What is behind and beneath phenomena is\\nunknown/* We know the impressions produced on\\nus; we are compelled to think of these in relation to a\\npositive cause. This cause is termed the Absolute, his doctrine\\nof the\\nThe Absolute linked as it is with the concepts of Absolute.\\nexternal creation and of self-existence is inconceivable\\nas Mansel teaches.*^ Yet he tells us that this Unknow-\\nable, inasmuch as it is the highest abstract truth in\\nscience, philosophy and religion, presents the safest\\nground for a reconciliation between them.^\\n36. The Agnosticism of Mr. Spencer, therefore,\\ncomes in direct descent from Kant through Hamilton\\nand Mansel. Its initial point is the distinction between\\nthe phenomenon and the noumenon, and its funda-\\nmental principle is the Relativity of Knowledge, under-\\nstood in the sense that phenomena alone can be known.\\nIn explaining the origin of knowledge we discover\\ntraces of the phenomenal idealism which characterizes\\nthe English school of Association philosophy. It can\\nwith difficulty be distinguished from Positivism.\\nIV.\\nCriticism.\\n37 (i) J^st as the present epoch bears comparison d) Funda-\\nwith Greek thousfht at the time of Socrates by reason error is in\\nthe theory\\nof a prevailmg scepticism, so the corrective employed of the\\nconcept.\\nThe Thei=;dc Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 11, 13, 14, 37.\\nLewes, Problems of Life and Mind, ist series, p 397.\\nFirst Principles, pp 93, 96, 108; Principles of Psychology,\\nvol. I., p. 2og; XlXth Cent., Jan., 1884.\\n*Mb., ss. II, 13; XlXth Cent., Feb., 1889; Mansel, Limits of\\nReligious Thought, L. 11., III.\\n^\u00c2\u00b0Ib., ss. 8, 191; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 17;\\nProf. Knight wisely writes that Mr. Spencer s aim is to recon-\\ncile science and religion in the recognition of mystery.\\nAspects of Theism, p. 134.\\nChrisdan Philosophy The Soul, ch. IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "20 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nSO effectually in the one may be adopted with equal\\nsuccess in the other. The life-work of Socrates was\\nto place knowledge on a firm basis. The method he\\nused was one of cross-examination. In pursuance of\\nv/hat he felt to be a divine mission he questioned\\neveryone. Especially he sought the rhetoricians.\\nProfessing a desire to be instructed, he listened to the\\ndiscourse and proposed difficulties. Apparently on the\\ndefensive, he was ever the aggressor. In dialectic he\\nhad no superior. His penetration, humility and irony\\nleft him the victor. He occupied himself almost\\nexclusively in determining conceptions logically.\\nHis teaching v/as mainly moral, viz., inquiry into the\\nmeaning of virtue, courage, wisdom, etc. In this\\nmethod are found the elementary processes of true\\nLogic, e.g., analysis, division, definition, classification,\\netc. His work, however, was not complete. He\\npointed out the true method to be followed in dealing\\nwith the problem of doubt. It was reserved for the\\nmaster-mind of St. Thomas to solve the true nature of\\nthe notion, and to employ with precision the logical\\nprocesses of Aristotle in the problem of the universal\\nwhich deeply agitated the schools of the Middle Ages.\\nMethod of \u00c2\u00a738. To-dav the Same situation confronts US. Kant\\nSocrates\\nand teach- taught a thcory of the concept which leads to Agnosti-\\nThomasto cism. Hamilton vainly tried to reconcile Kant with\\nbe fol-\\nlowed, the traditional Scotch philosophy. J. S. Mill proposes\\nthe old doctrine of the Nominalists, viz., that ideas\\nare only nam_es. They overlook the distinction between\\nintellect and sense. Hence the current errors in phil-\\nosophy. The problem of the notion is the source of\\nall the confusion; its true solution the only real remedy.\\n1895\\nCf. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic schools.\\n5^ Agnosticism, Pres. Schurman, in Phil. Rev., vol. IV., May,", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 21\\nIn setting it forth we must adopt the method of\\nSocrates and the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas.\\nThis is done in a treatise on Philosophy of Mind.^\\n8 ^Q. C2) The position of the Agnostic in the Theistic (2) a true\\nL, r 1 rr., and a false\\ncontroversy contains a semblance of truth. Ihere isAgnosti-\\na true and a false Agnosticism, The distinction is\\nbased on the difference which should be made between\\nsimple and comprehensive knowledge. We may have\\na clear and distinct knowledge of a thing without being\\nable to grasp it in its entirety.* Thus our knowledge\\nis certain, but limited. Much more so it is true of\\nGod. We speak of God s infinite power, goodness\\nand truth. The words have a definite meaning, and\\nexpress definite concepts, but cannot tell the whole\\ntruth.\\n40. We thus express our knowledge of God a knovdedg-e\\nknowledge partial, it is true, but sufficient to dis- partial but\\ntinguish God from any other being. Our minds are\\ntoo limited in range and power to penetrate the inmost\\nrecesses of the divinity, to comprehend His judgments,\\nor to trace out His ways. Nevertheless we know that\\nGod is and in part we know what He is. The Holy\\nBible in many passages shows that the human mind\\ncan know God but not comprehend Him. The Fathers\\nof the church again and again insist upon the dis-\\ntinction.\\nThe Theistic Argument, J, Dimon, pp. 5, 37, 39, sq.\\nG. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, ist series, vol. L, p. 16.\\n5* Alind est enim videre, alind est totum videndo compre-\\nhendere, Aug., Epis. 147, n. 21.\\nA man may infer writes Prof. Dimon, that the author\\nof Hamlet was intelligent without professing to sound all the\\ndepths of Shakespere s mind. The Theistic Argument, p. 117.\\nDeus Ineffabilis est; facilius dicimus quid non sit quam\\nquid sit, Aug. Enar. in Ps. 85, n, 12.\\nA very good criticism of Kant s antinomies carried out on\\nthis line is found in Found, of Relig. Belief, by Prof. Wilson, p.\\n197.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "22\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY,\\nSpencer s\\nContradic-\\ntion.\\nAgnosti-\\ncism con-\\nfounds\\nthese\\n41. Mr. Spencer even is forced unconsciously to\\nmake a distinction. In the first part of First Princi-\\nples he tries to prove that God is unknowable. In\\nthe second part he admits His existence. Thus the\\nUnknowable can be known/\u00c2\u00ae And Mr. John Fiske,\\nin criticising Frederick Harrison, cites St. Athanasius\\nas teaching that God is revealed to mankind only\\nthrough incarnation in Christ a doctrine held to-day\\nby the Neo-Kantians with Ritschel, whereas the holy\\nDoctor in the same treatise expressly declares that\\nGod is known from the order and harmony of creation.\\nIn explaining the meaning of Unknowable the same\\nwriter forgets to make a distinction between simple\\nand comprehensive knowledge, and tells us that\\nwe know not the infinite but only its phenomenal\\nmanifestations an error due to the radical mis-\\ntake of confounding intellectual with sense-knowl-\\nedge.\\n42. Thus modern Agnosticism rests on a confusion\\nof concepts. It is clothed in a garb of false humility.\\nIt extols the greatness of the infinite or absolute and\\nbelittles the strength of the human intelligence. It\\nthus tends to separate the soul from God by an impas-\\nsible barrier.^* Of its nature it is destructive of religion\\nwhose office is the union of man and his maker. Hence\\nit comes that from one point of view Mr. Spencer is\\nconsidered by many thinkers to be a continuator of\\nthe Deism of the last century; whereas from another\\nhe is held to represent what is best in Spinoza s teach-\\n5\u00c2\u00bb Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., voL II., p. 157.\\nIdea of God, p. xxvii.\\nSt. Athanasius, C. Gentes.\\nlb., pp. xxviii, 36.\\nlb., p. xxviii.\\npp. T36, 140.\\nThe Great Enigma W. S. Lilly, p. 214, sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 2$\\ning, and thus to stand as the ablest defender of Cosmic\\nTheism or rather Cosmic Pantheism/^\\n\u00c2\u00a743- (3) Against Agnosticism we teach that there (3) There is\\nis a Philosophy as well as a History of Religion. It is of Religion,\\na science which deals with the fundamental questions\\nof the soul. It infers conclusions from physical, moral,\\nand intellectual data. From a study of the world and\\nof man it rises to the conception of an infinite mind\\nwhich has fashioned and guides all. The inference is\\nsound and certain. The course of reasoning by which\\nit was reached can be throv/n into a system and we\\nhave the science of Theodicy. The light which guides\\nus is the light of reason. Philosophy teaches the pos-\\nsibility, and History the fact of divine revelation. God\\nhas taught us more about Himself. The only-begotten\\nof the Father hath revealed the treasures of grace and\\nof oflorv hidden from the human mind. The revealed\\ntruths form the science of Theology. In the begin-\\nning of the Summa of Theology, St, Thomas discusses\\nthe problem whether Theology may be termed a\\nscience, and answers in the af6rmative. The reasons\\nhe adduces are vaUd to-day.\\nV.\\nInfluence.\\n44. The influence of Agnosticism upon the English influence of\\nand American mind during the past fifty years has been cifmTn\\nvery great. It has been hailed as a new Gospel.\\nConsisting, in its essence, of a few main principles, it\\nhas, like Positivism, generated a tone of thought and\\na certain manner of viewing things. Here is found the\\nFiske Cosmic Philosophy; Jacobi, Jewish Ideals, p. 58;\\nXlXth Cent., Oct., 1877; Fortnightly Rev., May, 1873; J. Fiske,\\nIdea of God, ch. VIII., XIII.\\nAn Agnostic s Apology, by Leslie Stephen.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "24 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nreal secret of its power. Every department of knowl-\\nedge has been infected by its virus. In Biology it has\\nbecome identified with the theory of Evolution; in\\nBiblical Studies with the so-called Higher Criticism;\\nin Theology with Ritschl and the Neo-Kantians.\\nWherever a destructive tendency appears, there is\\nfound a congenial atmosphere. The physcial sciences,\\nhowever, are its stronghold. Disclaiming any knowl-\\nedge whatsoever of metaphysical principles, it scatters\\nbroadcast false metaphysics. Its garb of false humility\\nserves to conceal its venom and to attract the unwary.\\nIts defenders are praised as men of honest and strong\\nminds. In public lecture halls its doctrines are pro-\\nclaimed by elegant and attractive speakers.\\nSerature. 45- Literature has been deeply imbued with its\\nspirit. Matthew Arnold, George Eliot, Mrs. Hum-\\nphrey Ward and Hall Caine propagate it in their\\nwritings; Swinburne, La Conte De Lisle, in their poetry.\\nTennyson tells us\\nI have but faith, I cannot see,\\nThere is more faith in honest doubt\\nBelieve me, than in half the creeds.\\nAnd proclaims the Gospel of modern thought in the\\ntouching and beautiful lines:\\nO yet we trust thai somehow good\\nWill be the final goal of ill.\\nThat nothing walks with aimless feet;\\nThat no one life shall be destro5^ed\\nOr cast as rubbish to the void\\nWhen God hath made the pile complete.\\nBehold, we know not anything;\\nI can but trust that good shall fall\\nAt last far off at last, to all,\\nAnd every Winter change to Spring.\\nGerhart, Institutes of the Christian Religion; Stuckenberg,\\nGerman Thought, p. 169.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "AGNOSTICISM. 2$\\nSo runs my dream: but what am I?\\nAn infant crying in the night:\\nAn infant crying for the light:\\nAnd with no language but a cry.\\nI falter where I firmly trod,\\nAnd falling with my weight of cares\\nUpon the great world s altar-stairs\\nThat slope through darkness up to God,\\nI stretch lame hands of faith and grope\\nAnd gather dust and chaff, and call\\nTo what I feel is Lord of all,\\nAnd faintly trust the larger hope.\\nO life as futile, then, as frail!\\nO for thy voice to soothe and bless!\\nWhat hope of answer or redress\\nBehind the veil, behind the veil.\\nIn Memorlani, LIV^-LVI.\\n46. Signs of a reaction are, however, now apparent. Reaction.\\nThe fact that so many men, eminent in the scientific\\nworld, are also devout Christians, has an influence\\nupon the minds of the younger generation. Time has\\npermitted a sober judgment to view with impartiality\\nthe works of the leading agnostics, to ask what they\\nhave really done and to separate the chaff from the\\nwheat. Agnosticism is viewed as the natural and\\nlogical result of a wrong theory of knowledge. Now,\\nas with Socrates and St. Thomas, the all-important\\nproblem is to form fixed and definite concepts. ^roXA m\\ndiscuss the problem here would be to extend the ^^y-\\npresent treatise beyond just limits. A full historical\\nand critical treatise pertains to Philosophy of Mind.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER II.\\nFACT.\\nI. Contact with other minds is invested with a\\npeculiar charm. The thoughts, the hopes, the fears\\nof those we meet in the varied relations of daily life,\\nare a subject of surpassing interest. The}? appeal to\\nus as sharers in a common humanity. Great is the\\ndelight felt in the study of physical nature and in the\\nknowledge of her secret treasures. Greater still is\\nthat derived from a study of man, whether in the\\ndevelopment of the individual, or in the course of his-\\ntory, or in the products of genius, e. g.^ Literature\\nand the Fine Arts.\\nGod^a^ 2. In the present essay we are concerned not with\\nTaTFac?^^ individual and isolated example. The bounds of\\nthe inquiry are much wider; they extend to and\\nembrace the whole human race. The purpose is to\\ndiscuss the validity of the belief in God. This is a\\nprimary conviction and possession of humanity. We\\ndeal, therefore, with a psychological fact. Its con-\\ncrete expression is found in the various forms of religi-\\nous worship which have held so prominent a place in\\nhuman history. The inquiry is not concerning the\\nproximate sources whence man derived the belief. In\\nthis authority and custom play an important part.^ We\\nare occupied with the ultimate grounds and justifica-\\ntion of the idea. Thus the discussion is more philo-\\nsophical and of more permanent value.\\nFoundations of Belief, by A. Balfour.\\nBovvne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 7; Mill, Essays on\\nReligion, p. 128.\\n[26]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "FACT. 27\\n3. The initial point of our inquiry is not an assump- ^^^J^^^^jJ\\ntion^^ We do not reason from an hypotliesis but from th^s fact has\\na fact. The fact is taken as it is presented in conscious basis,\\nexperience. The train of our reasoning will show at\\nevery step that this fact has a sound basis and can be\\nverified to a certainty. Thus it is not an ideal product\\nof subjective affections, e. g., of imagination, of hope,\\nor of fear; it has an objective content which is grounded\\nin the very nature of things.\\nI.\\nThe Fact is Universal. Fact is uni-\\nversal.\\n4. Now it is a fact that all men believe in God.\\nThis belief is the possession of civilized as well as of\\nsavage nations.^ No tribe has been found without a\\nreligion, and no religion without some conception of\\nGod.^ /The assertion that tribes exist who have no\\nnotion of a higher being has been refuted by facts/^\\nThe Benedictine monks of Australia say that the natives Australia.\\nbelieve in an Omnipotent Being, the creator of heaven\\nand earth, whom the}^ call Motogon/ /The Australian\\nwill say No, not seen him, e., Baiame, but I have\\nfelt him. Waitz tells us that the religious ideas of\\nthe African tribes are so high that if we do not like to^ Africa.\\ncall them monotheistic, we may say at least that they\\n^Supernatural Religion, vol. I., pp. 64-67.\\nThis method is pursued by Prof. Bowne in Philosophy of\\nTheism, p. 8. He, however, shows the influence of Kant in\\nresting belief in God not on demonstration but on the practical\\nreason, and in renouncing demonstration, p. 32.\\n^Cicero, de Leg. I., 8; Disp. Tusc, I.; Plutarch, adv. Col-\\notem, ch. 31; Tyler, Primitive Culture, vol. I., p. 425; vol. II.,\\np. 18; Spencer, First Principles, pp 4, 13.\\nReligion of Primitive Peoples, D. G. Brinton, p. 30.\\nOrigin and Growth of Religion, by M. Miiller, p. 78; Nat-\\nural Religion, p. 85\\nnh., p. 17.\\nJour. Anthrop. Instit. vol. II., p. 269.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "28 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nhave come very near the boundaries of true monothe-\\nism. However degraded these people may be,\\nwrites Mr. Livingstone, there is no need telling\\nthem of the existence of God or of a future life. These\\ntwo truths are universally admitted in Africa. If we\\nspeak to them of a dead man, they reply: He is\\ngone to God. This testimony is confirmed by\\nQua tref ages, Miiller, Wilkes, Wilson,^ Lang.\\nin America, g ^j Careful research into the customs and language\\nof the aborigines of America reveal the same truth.\\nTo the Indians God is the Great Spirit. With some\\nthe idea of God is very lofty. Again we find it exist-\\ning in cruder and lower expression. Darwin s descrip-\\ntion of the natives of Patagonia as very low is refuted\\nby Giacomio Bove,^\u00c2\u00b0 Nevertheless, however imperfect\\nand childish the expression may seem, it represents\\nthe highest and most perfect idea v/hich the mind for\\nthe time and circumstances can grasp. If we, with\\nthe great advantages of civilization, with the wealth of\\nknowledge in Religion, Philosophy, History and\\nScience handed down from the past and pouring in\\nWaitz, Anthrop., vol. II., p. 167; Miiller, Origin and\\nGrowth of Religion, p. 107.\\nMissionary Travels, p. 158.\\nThe Human Species, Hommes Fossiles et Hommes Sau-\\nvages; The Pigmies, ch. VII.\\n^3 L. c. Chips, vol. I., p. 45; Science of Religion, p. 39.\\nExploring Expedition.\\nNorth and South Guinea, p. 209.\\nThe Making of Religion.\\nEthnography and Philology of the Hidsata Indians. W\\nMathews.\\nPrescott, Conquest of Mexico; Schoolcraft, Oneota, p. 342.\\n^^Thus Payne, in his History of the New World, vol. I., p.\\n389, says that the lowest savages have no God. The difficulty\\nis found in his meaning of God. Cf. The Making of a\\nReligion, A. Lang.\\n20 Miiller, Natural Religion, p. 83.\\nMiiller, Science of Religion, p. 116; Pfleiderer, The Philos-\\nophy of Religion, vol. III., p. 15.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "FACT. 29\\nfrom all sides, still find a difficulty and a fruitful source\\nof error in the effort to express abstract and imma-\\nterial concepts by way of metaphor or analogy, why\\nshould we be supercritical in dealing with the savage\\nmind? We must for the moment forget our advantages,\\nput ourselves in sympathy with them and judge them\\non their own ground. Their environment is narrow,\\nthe data of their experience are limited. The diffi-\\nculty in expressing immaterial ideas is therefore much\\ngreater than ours.\\n6. Hence religion, in its most general sense, is a conclusion,\\nuniversal phenomenon of humanity. Patient research\\nday by day brings into stronger light the great truth\\nThat in all the ages\\nEvery human heart is human,\\nThat in even savage bosoms\\nThere are longings, yearnings, strivings\\nFor the good they comprehend not.\\nII.\\nPrimitive Monotheism. F/i i*ij^\\nMonothe-\\n7. Religion is a phenomenon universal not only in\\nplace but in time also. The records of all nations Belief in\\nfrom the very dawn of history show that the human ve\u00c2\u00b0rsai?n\\nrace has at all times sought for God,^* Abundant\\nproofs are furnished by the new department of science,\\nThe History of Religions, which has sprung up in our\\nown generation. It investigates the religious beliefs\\nof past nations as they are revealed in the written gP^^^y^^^\\nrecords, in the customs, laws and life, in the language, Religions.\\nand from these data presents some information of\\nTiele, Outlines, p. 6,\\nMiiller, chips, vol I., p, 30.\\nCicero, de Leg. i, 24; Aristotle, de Coelo, i, 3; Seneca, ep.\\n117. The fact is taken as a proof by Cicero de Nat. Deor. i,\\n17; Aristotle, Rhetor. 1, 13; St. Thomas, C. Gent. II., 34.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "30 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nby com-\\nwhat our remote ancestors have thought and felt con-\\ncerning their origin and destiny. In the discussion of\\nparative the primitive beliefs of mankind lanafuapre is by far the\\nPhilology. o J\\nmost important source. True index of thought and\\nfeeling it goes far beyond written records. The\\nmaterials so far collected are imperfect. Yet they all\\nconverge to the important truth that the farther back\\nwe go in the history of religious thought, the more\\ncertain it appears that the earliest belief of mankind\\nwas monotheistic.^\\nThemethod 8. In treating this subject we shall be candid and\\nfollowed.\\nloyal to truth. Nothing is gained by a travesty of\\nfacts. The only method to be followed is a deeper\\nand more exhaustive study of the very branch of\\nknowledge which at first sight is supposed to present\\nunsurmountable difficulties to the Christian believer.\\nIn thus proceeding the inference shall be safe and\\nsound.\\nIn India. 9. The sacred Books of the Hindus are made up\\nof various writings covering the space of a, thousand\\nyears. The most ancient is the collection called the\\nVedas. It embraces the Rig-Veda, the Sama-Veda,\\nthe Yagar-Veda, and the Atharva-Veda. Of these the\\nRig- Veda is the oldest and the most valuable for our\\npresent study. Its age has been variously estimated\\nfrom 1500 to 2000 B. C.^^ A careful examination of\\nthese records shows traces of a primitive monotheism.\\nApologie du Christ\u00e2\u0084\u00a2% Hettinger-Jannin, vol. I., ch. VIII.\\nWiseman Lectures on Science and Religion, Lect. III.;\\nTrue reverence is shown in treating every subject however\\nsacred, however dear to us, with perfect confidence; without\\nfear and without favor; with tenderness and love by all means,\\nbut, before all, with an unflinching and uncompromising loyalty\\nto truth. MuUer, Science of Religion, p. 6.\\nPhysical Religion, Miiller, pp. 58, 74,\\nHopkins, Religions of India, p. 5; Muir s Sanscrit Texts,\\nvol. I., p. 4; vol. IL, p. 206; vol. III., p. 116.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "FACT. 31\\nThus we read\\nIn the beginning there was neither aught nor naught.\\nThere was neither sky nor atmosphere above.\\nThere was neither death nor immortality.\\nThere was neither day nor night, neither light nor darkness.\\nOnly the Existing One breathed calmly self-contained.\\nGod is called Ekam Sat, i. e.^ the only existing being.\\nTrue it is that traces of a nature-religion can be found\\nin the Vedas.^ But to say that the Vedic gods are\\nnothing more than natural phenomena personified and\\nworshipped, or that nature-worship is the primitive\\ntype of Indian Religion is to betray the superficial\\nobserver. The moral and spiritual basis is older, and\\nmore in accord with the fundamental principles recog-\\nnized by the primitive x\\\\ryans.^^ That which is and\\nis one, says the Rig-Veda, the poets call in various\\nways. Or it puts the question He who established\\nthe six -worlds, is he that one which exists in the form\\nof the unborn Being?\\nS 10. That this one is not a barren unity of philo- notaphii-\\nJ r osopmcal\\nsophic speculation, such as is found later in the panthe- ^lity.\\nistic teaching of the Upanishads, is evident from\\nparallel passages.^-\\nHe who is our Father that begot us, he who is our creator,\\nHe who knows all places and all creatures,\\nHe who gav^e names to the gods, being one only.\\nTo him all other creatures go, to ask Him.\\nRig- Veda, x, mant, 129.\\nTiele, Elements of The Science of Religion, ist series;\\nOutlines of Primitive Belief, C. H. Keary, pref., p. xi.; History\\nof Religion, by A. Menzies, p. 324.\\nGod in Nature, by Baron Bunson; The Teaching of the\\nVedas, M. Phillips, p. 83.\\nlb., p. 35, 40, 45, 103, 104, no; Origins of Religions and\\nLanguage, F. C. Cook, pref., pp. 5, 6; d Harlez, Avesta and\\narticles in Jour. Asiatique.\\n33R.-Veda, I., 164, 46.\\nRig- Veda, I., 164, 6; x, 121, 8; Miiller, Physical Religion,\\np. 366.\\n2^ Rig- Veda, I., 164, 46; x, 82, 3.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "32 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThus Father Calmette does not hesitate to say that\\nthe true God is taught in the Vedas.^^ And scholars\\nof great name, e.g., Adoiphe Pictet, Miiller, Dr.\\nA. B, Smith,^^ Prof. Banergea, Card. Gibbons, F.\\nE. Ellmgwood, Prof. Wilson, M. Phillips, Muir,\\nJ. M. Mitchell/ do not hesitate to declare that the\\nloftier conceptions of the Vedic religion are unques-\\ntionably the earlier, and that they show clear traces of\\na primitive monotheism.\\nThe more 8 n. The farther back, therefore, we go in the his-\\nprimitive is 70\\nthe belief, torv of the Indian peoples, the purer becomes the form\\nthe purer\\nit is. of religious belief. Idolatry is shown to be a degenera-\\ntion.*^ In the Vedas different gods are worshipped.\\nSome writers maintain that this is due to a personifica-\\ntion of natural forces, that primitive man reads behind\\nthe powers of nature agencies separate and distinct\\nafter an analogy of his ov/n volitional power, that thus\\nthe conception of one God is only a later growth.*^\\nOthers, e. g.^ Miiller, hold that the different names in\\nthe Vedas express different deities. Reasoning on\\nthis basis, we can conclude with Tiele that the Jews at\\ndifferent times worshipped three different Gods, e. g.,\\nElohim, Jahweh, Adonai. Others that the different\\nMiiller, Physical Religion, p. 44.\\nLes Origines Indo-Europiennes.\\nHistory of Ancient Sanscrit Literature; Chips, vol. L, pp\\n23, 349; Science of Religion, pp. 37, 57, 86, 88, 99.\\nIntrod. to Christian Theology, p. 166.\\nAryan Witness,\\nOur Christian Heritage, ch. II.\\nOriental Religions and Christianity, ch. VII.\\nEssays, vol. II,, p. 51.\\nThe Teaching of the Vedas.\\nSanscrit Texts, vol. III., p. 245; vol. V., p. 412.\\nPresent Day Tracts, vol. VI, n. 33. The Hindu Religion.\\nOriental Religions and Christianity, by F. E. Ellingwood.\\nch, VII.; Origins of Religions and Language, F. C. Cook,\\np; lo-\\nDestiny of Man, J. Fiske, p. 78.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "FACT. 33\\nnames for God only represent different manifestations\\nor attributes of the one God.\\nS 12. A better explanation can be sousrlit in langfuasfe. explanation\\nof the de-\\nIt is a historical fact that the early form of religious gradation.\\nbelief was monotheistic. Now the names employed\\nby the mind to designate spiritual facts are all drawn\\nfrom conscious individual experience. In the begin-\\nning, man naturally expressed the power and attributes\\nof the infinite in different words drawn from nature\\nand from life. The tendency of language is to become\\ncrystallized. Words gradually lose their etymological\\nforce. The} stand out as distinct and independent\\nfacts in our mental life. What first was a sign, becomes\\nitself an object. Thus a language monotheistic in its\\nprimitive signification gradually becomes polytheistic\\nin fact.\\n13. The oldest and most trustworthy records of(b)irania.\\nthe Iranian worship are contained in the Gathas.^^The\\nThe sacred chants are attributed to Zoroaster. His\\nlife was an attempt to restore the primitive belief.\\nHence the doctrine of the Gathas is viewed as pure\\nIranian. Written in a different dialect from the rest\\nof the Avesta, they form the kernel about which the\\nsacred literature of the Persians clustered in an after-\\ngrowth.\\n14. Now the Gathas inculcate belief in AhuraAhura\\nMazda the self-existing, omniscient being. He is the\\nPhysical Religion, Miiller, p. 44; Oriental Religions and\\nChristianity, F. E. EUingwood, ch. VIT.\\nMiiller, Science of Language, vol. I.\\nScience of Religion, Miiller, p. 18.\\nOrigines du Zoroast by Jas. Darmesteter, in Annales du\\nMusee Gaimet, t. 24, p. 5; Origins of Religion and of Language,\\nF. C. Cook, p. 203.\\nEbrard, Apologetics, vol. IL, p. 217.\\nPresent day Tracts, vol. V, n. 25; The Zend-Avesta and The\\nReligions of the Parsees, J. M. Mitchell.\\nMuller translates Akura by living, Mazda by am who", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "34 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nall powerful Lord who made heaven and earth and all\\nthat is therein, and governs everything with wisdom..\\nThe sole really personal being is Mazda Ahura. The\\ntwo spirits in antagonism are below him.^\u00c2\u00ae Thus the\\nopposition of Ahriman is of a later date.^^ Originally\\nhe was a good spirit created by Ahura/ The Amesha-\\nSpeutas in the Gatha have the nature of abstract ideas\\nor qualities, attributes of Ahura. Afterwards\\nthey formed a kind of celestial council. The spiritual\\nunique nature of Ahura is attested beyond question.\\nHe is identified with Varuna, the god of light, of justice\\nand of the moral order, whose worship antedates Indra\\nand who is conceived as the most spiritual of the Vedic\\ngods.\\nconclusion. g i^. We can therefore with perfect safety accept\\nthe conclusions of d Harlez,\u00c2\u00ae* of Darmesteter/ of\\nTiele,\u00c2\u00ae^ that the primitive form of Iranian belief was\\nmonotheistic.\\nam. hence the self-existing living one; Hibbeit Lectures, p.\\nigi; so also Pfieiderer in Phil, of Religion, vol, IIL, p. 86,\\nChips, vol. L, p. 124. According to Mr. Cook, Asura or A Intra\\nmeans Lord, and is derived from aszt, i. e., life, and ultimately\\nfrom the verb as in zend, ah i. e., to be, and cites the St. Peters-\\nburg dictionary and Grassman. It thus has an affinity to the\\nHebrew verb to be, the root of Jahweh, Origins of Religion and\\nof Language, p. 51, note, p. 71; while Mazda is derived from\\nMaz i. e., great and da i. e.^ knowledge, ib., p. 141.\\nGathas, I., chant i.\\nTiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, ist series, p. 47.\\n58 Ib.\\n^3 Cook, 1. c. p. 141, Present Day Tracts, vol. V, n. 25, by J. M.\\nMitchell.\\n60 Pfieiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 84.\\nPresent Day Tracts ib., p. 16.\\n62 The God of Zoroaster, by L. H. Mills, in New World,\\nMarch, 1895.\\n63 Origins of Religions and Language, F. C. Cook, pp. 65, 141.\\n6* Avesta and articles in Jour. Asiatique.\\n6^ The Zend Avesta, in Annales du Musee Guimet, tom. 21;\\nOrigines da Zoroast.\u00e2\u0084\u00a2* ib. tom. 24; Contem. Review, Oct., 1879!\\n66 Elements of the Science of Religion, ist series.\\n6 Study of Five Zoroastrian Gathas, L. H. Mills, DD.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "FACT. 35\\n8 i6. The same truth comes out from a critical study (c) Greece\\nand Rome.\\nof the religions of Greece and Rome/^ When we\\nascend to the very dawn of Grecian history we are met\\nwith the fact that the idea of God, as the supreme\\nbeing, was firmly implanted in the minds of this branch\\nof the Aryan race.\u00c2\u00b0^ The worship of the powers of\\nnature came afterwards, and gave rise to the family\\nof gods which in Greece and in Rome surrounds the\\nperson of Zeus.\\n\u00c2\u00a717. A critical study of the Aryan religions con- Hence\\nI 1-1 ^1 Ml primitive\\nvmces the student that m them we nnd no illustration belief of the\\nT 1 1 Aryans was\\nof an evolution and progress from a low to a higher monotheis-\\nform/*^ Everywhere we find signs of degeneracy from\\nhigher and purer forms. The fact is forced upon the\\nmind that idolatry is explained by a tendency every-\\nwhere evident, to sink from a purer knowledge of God\\nto what is lower and corrupt.\\ni8. Under the strong light thrown by contemporary 1\u00c2\u00b0 Egypt\\nscholarship upon the ancient religions of Egypt and of\\nChina, the same truth is brought into clear view.\\nElHng worth, Oriental Religions and Christianity, ch. VII.;\\nMiiller, Science of Religion, p. 82.\\nMuller, Chips, vol. II., p. 146, who cites Welchers Mythol-\\nog:y-\\nPresent Day Tracts, vol. VI, n. 33; The Hindu Religion, J.\\nM. Mitchell; F. C. Cook, 1. c, p. 70.\\nAs Mr. Darmesteter so well writes The religion of the\\nIndo-European race, while still united, recognized a supreme\\nGod, an organizing God, almighty, omniscient, moral. The\\nconception was a heritage of the past. ContPm. Review, Oct.,\\n1879.\\n2 S. H. Kellogg, Genesis and Growth of Religion, p. 271;\\nMiiller, Chips, vol. I. pp. 37, 48. Is it not something worth\\nknowing that before the separation of the Aryan race, before the\\nexistence of Sanscrit, Greek or Latin, before the God of the\\nVedas had been worshipped, and before there was a sanctuary\\nof Zeus among the sacred oaks of Dodona one Supreme Deity\\nhad been found, had been named, had been invoked by the\\nancestors of our race. Science of Religion, Miiller, pp. 27,\\n82; also The Religion and Thought of the Aryans of Northern\\nEurope, R. Brown, F. S. A.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "36 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nPolytheism is shown to be an aftergrowth and\\ncorruption.\\n(a) Egypt. 19. In the most ancient monuments of Egypt the\\nsimplest and most precise conception of one God is\\nexpressed. He is one and alone; no others are with\\nHim. He is the only Being, living in truth, i. e.,\\nMaat, which signifies a straight and inflexible rule.\\nThou are one, we read, and millions of beings\\nproceed from thee. He has made everything and\\nhe alone has not been made. The hidden god from\\nwhom in the beginning all things came into existence\\nis represented as declaring\\nI am Turn, a being who is one alone\\nI am the great God, the self-existing.\\nexistin\\nspirit\\nunity\\nGod a self- God, therefore, is not only a unity, he is a self-existent\\nexisting\\nspiritual Unity. He is the spirit more spiritual than all spirits,\\nthe self-existent one, unbegotten, eternal. More\\nthan 5000 years ago in the valley of the Nile the hymn\\nof praise arose to the one God. He is termed nutar^\\ni. e.^ the iinperishable o?ie, according to Tiele, who cites\\nde Rouge, and Brugsch, or the strong one, according\\nto Renouf, who traces a striking resemblance of the\\nword to the Hebrew El ShaddaiJ^\\nReligions of Ancient Egypt, Le Page Renoaf, p. 262.\\nIn the Egyptian as in the Aryan and Semitic languages, the\\nnotion of stretching out is connected with the notions of straight,\\nright, righteous, trtie^ rule, row, order. Oar word rule, Latin\\nregula, comes from the Aryan Arg, which means to stretch out.\\nIn Gothic rak-j a, rach^ts, means right, straight. Hence the\\nEgyptian 77iaat signifies not only truth and justice but order and\\nlaw in the physical and in the m.oral world. Renouf, 1 c, p.\\n123.\\nM. de Rouge, in Annal de la Phil. Cret., t. XX., p. 327.\\nBook of the Dead, ch. 17.\\nTiele, Egyptian Religion, p. 218; Historj of Religion, A.\\nMenzies. p. 142.\\nTiele, 1. c, p. 225.\\nRenouf, Religions of Ancient Egypt, pp. 102, 254.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "FACT. 37\\n8 20. Monotheism, therefore, is a fact clearly hence mon-\\no otneistic.\\nexpressed in ancient Egyptian records. It is no less\\ntrue that the sublimer portions of the Egyptian religion\\nare not the comparatively late result of a process of\\npurification from earlier and grosser forms. That\\nthe worship of the Egyptians was polytheistic from the\\nbeginning was taught by Tiele in Outlines of History\\nof Religion, in a later work he expresses the contrary\\nopinion. The heritage of that ancient civilization is\\nthe belief in one supreme God, the creator and lawgiver\\nof men whom He has endowed with an immortal soul.\\nThese primitive truths now shine forth from the rank\\ngrowth of mythology and superstition in which they\\nhad been well-nigh buried.\\n21. In China the powers of nature, the spirits of\\nancestors are invoked and worshipped. But behind\\nall there is found the conviction in the existence of\\nsome higher power, who is the creator and preserver\\nof the world. This monotheistic belief is a tradition\\nhanded down from the earliest period of their history.\\nThe primitive Chinese worshipped Chang-Ti,\\nsupreme Lord. Together with him lower spirits were\\nassociated.^\u00c2\u00ae Chang-Ti was the supreme ruler, one,\\nTiele, 1. c, p. 222; Ebrard, Christian Apologetics, vol. III.,\\np. 267.\\nRenouf, 1. c, p. 95; Wordsworth, The One Religion, p. 32;\\nRawlinson, Religions of the Ancient World, p. 29.\\nP. 45.\\nCf. supra.\\nProf. Rawlinson History of Ancient Egypt, vol. I., p. 314;\\nRecords of the Past, vol. 11., p. 129; IV., p. 99; VI., p, 100.\\nDe Rouge, 1. c. Renouf, 1. c, p. 262; Ellingwood, Oriental\\nReligions and Christianity, ch. VII.; Wilkinson, Ancient Egyp-\\ntians, vol. IV., p. 178; Lenormant, Manual d Histoire Ancienne,\\nvol. I., p. 522.\\n8* Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 88.\\nEdkins, Religions in China, p. 95.\\n\u00c2\u00ae^D Harlez, in New World, Dec, 1893; F. M. James, in New\\nWorld, June, 1897.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "38 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ninvisible, spiritual, the only true God.^^ According to\\nMr. Legge, Ti was the one supreme object of homage\\nas far back as we can go.^ Tien, e.^ heaven, is a\\nnaturalistic and polytheistic word, used at first meta-\\nphorically, e. g.j may heaven grant, afterwards obs-\\ncured and corrupted the primitive faith. Hence Mr.\\nLegge, and Mgr. d Harlez. unhesitatingly declare that\\n5000 years ago the Chinese were monotheists.^^\\n3\u00c2\u00ab Semitic g 22. When we turn to the Semitic races we have in\\nthe Holy Bible a record of Jewish belief, which is\\nbeyond question. Their early government was\\na theocracy. They stand forth a clear example of a\\nnation monotheistic throughout the course of its\\nhistory. Renan attempts to explain this by a mono-\\ntheistic instinct in the Semitic race.^ The explana-\\ntion is rejected, but it is a striking testimony of a fact.\\nFallen into idolatry again and again, the Jews are\\nLa Relig. Chinoise, d Harlez.\\nLegge, Religion of China, p. 18.\\n^^Mijlier, Science of Religion, p. 86.\\n92 D Harlez, La Relig. Chinoise; New World, Dec, 1893; The\\nChinese, Dr. W. Martin, p. 163; Shoo-King, by Dr. Legge, ch. 27.\\n92 D Harlez in Dublin Review, vol. 43, p. 109.\\nThe Tao-Te-King, i. e.. The Book of Tao and of Virtue, is the\\nbasis of Taoism. Scholars do net agree in its interpretation.\\nAfter an exhaustive analysis Mr. d Harlez reaches the conclu-\\nsion: L orlgine de tous les etres et leur lois sont dans un\\netre premier, infini, eternal, spirituel, et personnel, infiniment\\nbon et perfait, que I esprit de I homme ne peut comprendre in\\nnommer. Cet etre infini a produit tous les etres particuliers en\\nles faisant sortir de sa substance. II les formes distincts de liu-\\nmeme, mais ii continue a les regir, a leur fournir tout ce que\\nest necessaire a leur existence. Les etres doivent s appuyer\\nsur lib, se servir de liu comme d un point d appui et d une\\nsource de dons necessaire a leur perfection morale. lis doivent\\nimitef ses vertus et retournir a liu a la fin de leur existence.\\nLe Tao-Te-King, par. M. d Harlez, Annales du Musee Guimet,\\nt, 20, p. 23.\\n9-* Pfleiderer speaks of a natural predisposition, Philos. of\\nReligion, vol. III., p. 117.\\n9* Mliller, Chips, vol. L, p. 340, who explains the fact by prim-\\nitive revelation, p. 348.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "FACT. 39\\nrecalled to the service of the one true God by a series\\nof punishments, inflicted by the voice of the Prophets.\\nRising up one after the other these great and holy\\nmen, filled with the divine spirit, strove in word and\\nin deed to uplift the people from the depths to which\\nthey had sunk. Thus the primitive belief remained\\nuntarnished and was preserved to the coming of Christ.\\nThe nations among whom the Jews lived were idola-\\ntrous. Scholars, however, assure us that this idolatry\\nwas a degeneracy, that traces of the primitive faith\\nshow a monotheistic conception.\\n23. Even among the lowest and most barbarous 4\u00c2\u00b0 with\\ntribes, traces of the same belief are found. The\\nnatives of Africa have sunk to the lowest grade of Africa,\\nhumanity. Covered over, as their belief is, with the\\ncrudest forms of superstition and fetichism, passing\\naway also before the advance of Christian civilization,\\nwe yet find reminiscences of a supreme God. In\\ntheir conceptions the ethical element predominates.^^\\nAs Dr. Robertson Smith truly observes, even in its\\nrudest forms Religion was a moral force. The\\nBushmen, Fuegians, Australians have moral and\\nomniscient gods, makers of things, fathers in\\nheaven, friends, guardians of morality, seeing what is\\n^\u00c2\u00aeRenan; Miiller; Ebrard; Ellingwood The Oriental\\nReligions and Christianity, p, 225; Montifiore in Hibbert Lec-\\ntures, 1892, writes: The worship of a chief divinity is\\nundoubtedly a characteristic feature of the Semitic religion,\\nyet adds analogy does not lead us to believe that if we were\\nto go farther and farther back into prehistoric times we should\\nfind a higher and purer religion, but rather one vaguer, meaner,\\nand more trivial. P. 25. The conception of primitive belief\\nwith Hume and Pfleiderer as an irrational and pathological\\nphenomenon (Phil, and Devel. of Religion, vol. I., pp. 13, 28),\\nis contradicted by historical facts.\\nMiiller, Science of Religion, p. 39.\\nLang, The Making of Religion, pp. 194, 280.\\nReligion of the Semites, p. 53.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "40 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nAustralia, good or bad in the hearts of men.^\u00c2\u00b0\u00c2\u00b0 The aborigines\\nof Australia are probably the lowest extant in the scale\\nof civilization. Yet their religious conceptions are so\\nlofty that we naturally seek an explanation in European\\ninfluence or in a higher civilization. An all-knowing\\nbeing observes and rewards the conduct of men; he is\\nnamed with reverence, if named at all; his abode is in\\nthe heavens; he is maker and Lord of all things; his\\nlessons soften the heart; he is called Fapang^ z.\\nFather, Mujigiin-uguar^ i. our Father. This\\nsupreme being is not the product of ancestor worship;\\nfor it is held v/here the latter is not found.\\nIn Guinea. g 24. In Guinea the natives worship The Ancient\\nOne, The Ancient 0?ze in the Sky land, Our Maker Our\\nFather, Our Great Father. Waitz teaches that if\\nthe African negroes are not called monotheists, they\\nare still on the borders of monotheism. The belief\\nin one supreme Being who made and upholds all things\\nis universal.\\nIn America. 25. In America the Pawnees worship Ti-ra-wa.\\ni. e., the Spirit Father, or A-ti-us ta-kaw-a, i. e., our\\nFather in all places. The Zunis speak of God as\\nAwonawilona, i. e., the all-Father. The Indians of\\nMissouri worship The Old Man I^nmortal, The Great\\nSpirit, The Great Mystery.^ The Tinne of British\\nAmerica have the word Nayeweri, i. e., he who creates\\ni\u00c2\u00b0o Lang, 1. c, p. 176.\\n^Mb., p. T91.\\n^\u00c2\u00b02Btough Smith, The Aborigines, I., 428; Taphin, The\\nNative Races of Australia.\\n^o^Lang, 1. c. ch. XIII., XIV.\\n^oMb., p. 222.\\n^o^b., p. 229.\\nWilson. North and South Guinea, p. 209.\\ni\u00c2\u00b0 Lang, 1. c, p. 255, 257.\\n^\u00c2\u00abMb., p. 271.\\nEthnography and Philology of the Hidsata Indians cit. by\\nMiiller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 17.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "FACT. 41\\nby thought. The Algonquin speaks of Kitche Maneto,\\nwho created the world, by an act of his will.\\nThe Aztecs of Mexico pray to Tota^ i. e.^ our Father;\\nthe tribes of North America to grandfather or\\ngreat grandfather.\\nS 26. If to this we add the tradition universal both universal\\n_ tradition\\namoner civilized and savage nations that formerly that form-\\n_ erly heaven\\nheaven was nearer to men than it is now, that the ^as nearer\\nearth.\\ncreator himself gave lessons of wisdom to human\\nbeings, but afterwards withdrew from them to heaven\\nwhere He now dwells, the reasoning will be made much\\nmore cogent. We find this tradition v/ith the ancient\\nHindus, with Greek and Romans, as also with\\nAfrican and Mexican tribes.\\n\u00c2\u00a727. The anthropological theory that God was^^5cf\u00c2\u00b0^\u00c2\u00b0-\\nevolved out of ghosts or ancestor-spirits can in no way J-efuted.*^\\nexplain the savage concepts of God. On the contrary,\\nthe facts show a corruption of a purer and older form.\\nThe fact is universal that mankind shows an inclination\\nto fall away from a primitive monotheism. This\\ntendency, so universal in history, can only be explained\\nby admitting that monotheism was the original belief\\nof mankind. Mr. Tylor himself admits that The\\ndegeneration theory, no doubt in some instances with\\nSchoolcraft, Oneota. p. 342.\\nRig- Veda, I., 179, 2; VII., 76,4; Muir s Sanscrit Texts,\\nvol. III., p. 245; The Teachingof the Vedas, M. Phillips, p. 175.\\n2 Miiller. Hibbert Lectures, 1878, p. 170.\\n3 Duke of Argyle, Conternp Review, June, 1881; Prescott s\\nMexico; Lang. The Making of Religion, passim.\\nAbbe de Broglie, Problemes et Conclusions de L Histoire\\ndes Religions, ch. II., III.\\n5 Ebrard, Christian Apologetics, vol. III., p. 317; The Mak-\\ning of Religion, A. Lang, p. 328, 334; Genesis and Growth of\\nReligion, S. H. Kellogg, p. 271; Origins of Religion and\\nLanguage, F. C. Cook, p. 70; Oriental Religions and Chris-\\ntianity, by F. Ellingwood, ch. VII.; Rawlinson, The Religions\\nof the Ancient World, p. 242.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "42 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfairness, may claim such beliefs as mutilated and per-\\nverted remains of higher religion.\\nconclusion. g 28. From this testimony we may with perfect safety\\nconsider the conclusions as well established (i) That\\nthe farther back we go in the history of any religion,\\nthe purer become the religious concepts, hence the\\nfact oi primitive purity for which we have the testimony\\nof Renouf, deRouge, MuUer, Rawlinson, Tiele. (2) That\\neverywhere evident traces are found of the corruption\\nof primitive belief, hence the fact of degeneracy for\\nwhich we appeal to the labors of Dr. Robertson Smith,\\nMiiller, Kellogg, Ebrard, Phillips, etc. (3) That all\\nnations point in tradition to the time when heaven was\\ncloser to earth, hence the traces oi primitive revelatio7t,\\nf. MuUer, Phillips. (4) That the ascertained results\\nof historic criticism show the earliest known belief of\\nthe Persians, the Hindus, the Egyptians, the Chinese,\\nto be a pure and spiritual mojiotheism^ for which fact we\\nhave the researches of d Harlez, Darmesteter, Tiele,\\nLegge, de Rouge, Renouf.\\nIII.\\nThe Expression of the Fact.\\nCompara- 8 20. The coursc of our investigation is not yet over.\\ntive Phil-\\noiogyre- The materials at hand enable us to advance a step\\nveals the 11,.,\\nthoughts of farther. A new science yet remains untouched which\\nprimitive _\\nman. opcus the way into a land flowing with milk and honey,\\nfilled with objects of delight and of food for the mind.\\nWithin our memory the Department of Linguistics was\\nplaced upon a scientific basis. It opens up a new\\nPrim. Culture, vol. II., p. 336; Pfleiderer, Phil, of Religion,\\nvol. III., p. 42.\\n1^ Reasoning from the data of language Miiller infers a primi-\\ntive Aryan, Semitic and Turanian religion. Science of Religion,\\npp. 82, 93.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "FACT. 43\\ncountry for exploration and conquest, where every\\nword is a sculptured monument revealing the highest\\nand deepest thoughts, feelings, aspirations of mankind.\\nBy the study of language we can enter into the thoughts\\nof past ages, and become cognizant of their inmost\\nconsciousness. Especially is this true with the problem\\nof God.^^\u00c2\u00ab\\n30. It has been shown that belief in God is a phe- (a) God ex-\\nnomenon universal both in place and in time. The mora? and\\nfact, however, does not satisfy us. We seek the S^ con-^^^\\ncauses of the fact. What were the sources whence\\nman derived the belief. The science of language gives\\nthe answer and bids us seek in the phenomena of the\\nmoral relations: Thus, e. g., Jahweh^ i. e., the one\\nwho is; Ahura, i. e., the living one; El^ the powerful\\nshown in Elohim, Ilah, Allah, Babylonia, bab, gate\\nand el; Elyon\\\\ Shaddai^ i, the Mighty; Bel^ i. e.^\\nLord; Molech, i. e.^ King; Adonai^ i. e., Lord; Wodin^\\ni. e.^ the all-Father. In the lower tribes cited above\\nwe have the Zulu, Unkululii^ i. e., Father, the\\nAustralian Fapang, i. e.^ Father. In Chinese Ti\\nmeans sovereign.^\\nS XI. Another source by which primitive man (b) by\\nwords\\nexpressed his concept of God is in the Physical world, drawn from\\nThus we have Dyaus Pitar of the Aryans, Tien of the nature.\\nChinese, Deva from the root Div, i. e., to shine. From\\nthe Sanscrit root we have the Greek Zeus^ the Latin\\nDeus,^ the Persian Daeva, the German This, Tiu, the\\nCeltic ia, the races of Central Asia Teo.^ The Vedic\\n^Miiller, Chips, vol. IV., p. 221,\\nPfleiderer, Philos. of Religion, vol. IIL, p. 42.\\nA. Lang, op. cit.\\nMiiller, Science of Religion, p. 75, sq. Thus Pfleiderer has\\nno grounds for asserdng that the names of gods of different\\nreligions all alike refer to natural phenomena. Philosophy of\\nReligion, vol. IIL, p. 13, 237.\\nEbrard, Apologetics, vol. II.. p. 145; The Idea of God and", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "44 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nAqui is formed from the root ag^ to move\\nquickly; and Varuna from var^ i. f., to cover, and\\nsignifies the wide-spreading sky. Num or Junta of\\nthe Samoyedes, Jumula of the Finlanders, is ixovixjum^\\ni. e.^ thunder, and la^ i. e.^ place, hence the place of\\nthunder, or the sky. The same word, modified by\\nphoenetic rules, is found among the Lapps, the Etho-\\nnians, the Syrjanes, the Tcherejuissians, the Voty-\\nakes. The Mongolian Te?ig-ri, i. e.^ Lord of the\\nsky, the Hunnish, ta7ig-li^ the modern Yakute word\\ntangara are the same as the Chinese Tien}\\n32. Thus for the first time the deepest germs of\\nthe consciousness of God among the different nations\\nof the world have been laid open. As yet the\\nmaterial is not complete. Nevertheless we are war-\\nranted to find, in our own being and in the world with-\\nout, the ground on which rests our concept of the\\nsupreme being.\\nthe Moral Sense, W. R. Baines; Miiller, Chips, vol. I; Science\\nof Religion, pp. 63 sq. Physical Religion, p. 136; Origins of\\nReligions and Language, F. C. Cook, p. 59, who cites Grimm,\\nHistory of the German Language, 2d ed., p. 282, and German\\nMythology, ch. IX.\\n^22 Miiller, Physical Religion, o. 122.\\nChips, vol. II, p. 65.\\n12^ Miiller, Science of Religion, p. 89.\\nMb., p. 92.\\nMiiller, Chips, vol. IV, p. 221.\\nIdea of God and the Moral Sense, by H. R. Baines.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III.\\nORIGIN OF THE BELIEF.\\nI. A distinction should be drawn between the ^^jgJJ^^^\\norigin of our belief in God s existence and the ^r^z^^^j- our^beiief\\nwhereby we strive to justify this belief. One logically\\nand naturally leads to the other; yet they are distinct,\\nand capable of separate treatment. They give rise to\\ndifferent trains of thought and are centers around\\nwhich cluster different groups of erroneous notions.\\nWe shall now set forth the various theories which\\nattempt to explain the origin of the idea of God.\\nTheory of Innate Ideas.\\n2. In the effort to combat a philosophy of sense, innate\\nand render the spiritual nature of man secure from all\\nattacks, some thinkers of great name have contended\\nthat our ideas do not all come through the channels of\\nthe senses, but some at least have their source in the\\nmind alone. These are the natural endowments of the\\nsoul. Hence God in creating man not only bestowed\\na mind with its activities, but also implanted in the\\nmmd one or more ideas already formed. They are\\ndue then not to the suggestion of sense, nor to the\\nactivity of mind, but whole and entire were our pos-\\nsession from the first dawn of consciousness. This is\\ncalled the theory of Innate Ideas.\\n3. This theory was proposed in different forms by proposed in\\nits defenders. From the dawn of philosophic specula- forms\\ntion even to our own day, men of great power and\\n[45]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "46 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nelevatioQ of mind have set it forth with skill and force/\\nPlato, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and Rosmini are its\\napologists. Kant taught that the subjective forms of\\nsensation and of intellect were innate. Rosmini holds\\nthat the idea of indeterminate being, of being in\\ngeneral, alone was innate. The former led the way to\\nscepticism and agnosticism; the latter inclines to Pan-\\ntheism. A criticism of their position will be presented\\nelsewhere.\\n(a) Plato. I 4, (a) Plato held that the souls of men were\\ncreated in the beginning, and for some fault com-\\nmitted were sentenced to be inclosed in the body as in\\na prison. The ideas, v/hich we have, do not come\\nfrom experience; they were implanted in the mind at\\nthe moment of its creation. The body acts upon the\\nsoul in a depressing manner, and causes these ideas to\\nbecome obscure and fade away. The objects v/e meet\\nin experience recalls the ideas once had and brings\\nthem fresh to mind. The mind learns nothing new\\nabout things; they are only the occasion whence it\\nrecalls long-forgotten knowledge. The theory of Plato\\nthus becomes a theory of reminiscence.\\na))Des g ^_ (b) The strange teaching propounded by Plato\\nwas not followed by his disciples, was bitterly attacked\\nby the Christian Fathers, and fell into oblivion. Des\\nCartes took it up, corrected it in parts, e. g., the pre-\\nexistence of souls, and proposed it in a new form.^\\nIdeas are of three kinds, he tells us. If, e. g., I\\nexamine my own consciousness I find some ideas are\\nadve7ititioiLs^ i. e., the ideas of external objects which I\\nexperience in the varied life of the day, which come\\nand go, and have no permanent influence upon my\\nmental life; others are i?inate, i. e., they do not come\\nF. Bowen, in Modern Philosophy, ch. II\\n^Medit. Ill Cousin s edition, vol. I, p. 268.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 47\\nthrough the senses, but whole and entire are the very\\nendowment of my rational nature, e. g,, transcendental\\nnotions, axioms and first principles speculative and\\nmoral, mathematical figures, and especially the idea of\\nGod; finally others are factitious^ i. e.^ they are the\\nproduct of discursive thought and are formed by the\\nmind reasoning from the data it possesses in the innate\\nand the adventitious.\\n6. (c) Leibnitz taught that the mind has confused (c) Leibnitz,\\nnotions of mundane objects. These he calls innate\\nideas. At the same time 2, power or inclination or dis-\\nposition is inherent in the mind by virtue of which these\\nconfused notions on the occasions of sensation are\\nelaborated and rendered more distinct. Thus sensa-\\ntion arouses the mind and makes it aware of the treas-\\nures stored within. Under the action of the mind the\\nnotions take form and shape, and become the primary\\ntruths and axioms of reasoning and of science.^\\n7. (i) The theory of Innate Ideas is of value on Cj-itjcism\\nthe suDposition that our ideas can be explained in theory rests\\non assump-\\nno Other way. This is the criterion of every hy-tion.\\npothesis. If, therefore, it can be shown that ideas\\ncan be readily explained without resorting to this\\nassumption, the theory is deprived of its founda-\\ntion. Now all our ideas can be explained by the\\nactivity of the mind and the data of sense. The ex-\\nplanation is much simpler and more in conformity\\nwith mental operations.\\n8 8. (2) It is false to maintain that we have ideas (:2) no ideas\\nJ _ antecedent\\nantecedent to sensation. Consciousness testifies that to sensa-\\ntion.\\nthe mind forms ideas from the contents of sensation.\\nThis is done by its power of abstraction. Hence the\\nidea of being, of unity, of moral duty, etc. The faculty\\nis innate because it is the mind itself in action. The\\n5 Nev/ Essays.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "48 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nideas, however, are not. The first principles are\\nintuitions, truths which the mind perceives to be\\nimmediately evident. They may be called spontaneous\\njudgments, the spontaneous assent of the mind\\nto the truth presented. Even these suppose data\\nwhich comes not from the inner constitution of the\\nthinking faculty, but point to some external source.\\nIdea of God 8 q_ The defenders of this theory held that at\\nnot mnate. c y _ J\\nleast the idea of God is innate. Their motive was\\ngood. In this way they strove to stem the tide of\\natheism and irreligion. Their zeal, however, was not\\naccording to knowledge. It is not at ail necessary to\\nhold that the idea of God is innate. The foundation\\nstone of our faith rests secure and impregnable. The\\nvast concourse of Christian apologists have never pro-\\nposed this hypothesis. On the contrary, they have\\ncombatted it strenuously. In fact if the idea of God\\nwere innate how can we explain the different modes\\nmen have adopted to express it The names of God\\nare by no means identical, they do not spring from the\\nsame root. Some, e. g., in the Indo-European family\\nof languages, have their source in the phenomena of\\nthe external world. If the idea were innate, it would\\nbe as definite and as exacting as a first principle. Now\\nwords give expression to our ideas. It would follow,\\ntherefore, that the word for God would be as exact and\\nas forceful as the idea. Experience shows that this is\\nnot so. The mind of man has expressed the idea of\\nGod in various ways.*\\nIt is derived lo. The phenomena of the external world, the\\nfrom CD-\\njective truths of the moral order, the voice of consciousness,\\nsources.\\nthe power and reign of truth have placed their stamp\\nEquidem unum esse Deum summum quis tarn demens\\nneget esse certissimum? Hujus nos virtutes per mun-\\ndanum opus diffusas, multis vocabulis, invocamus quoniam", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 49\\nUpon the expression of the idea. To say that external\\nobjects awaken or render clear the idea already\\nimbedded in the recesses of the mind is a pure assump-\\ntion and is in opposition to conscious experience. For\\nif the idea were implanted in any form, the act of\\nawakening or of rendering it clear would not change\\nits nature. It should appear the same.^\\nII.\\nTheory of Evolution.\\nII. The principal adherents of this school of^\u00c2\u00b0^^\\nthought are Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, Tyler, Reville. teachers.\\nThey concur in teaching that the idea of God is a mere\\nproduct of the imagination. Its universal and deep\\nhold upon the mind demanded an explanation. Vari-\\nous causes have been proposed. This difference is,\\nhowever, accidental. The source and process of\\nformation is the same. The primitive condition of\\nman is supposed to be that of the babarian and savage.\\nHis thoughts and feelings were just a shade higher\\nthan those of the brute. Brought in contact with the\\nraging elements and the mysteries of nature, his child-\\nlike mind was prone to think mighty and hidden per-\\nsons to be the cause. Hence the fields, the woods,\\nnomen ejus cuncd proprium videlicit ignoramus. Aug. Epis.\\n16; Aristotle, de Mundo, c. VII; Miiller, Science of Religion,\\np. 124.\\nLocke bitterly assailed the innate ideas of Descartes. His\\nposition is sound; but the reasons he alleges are without basis,\\nviz. (a) there are natives to whom the notion of God is strange,\\n(b) The greatest variety of opinion exists among the various\\nnations as to the nature of God.\\nPrimitive Culture, ch. II.\\nHistoire des religions des peuples non-civilizes, vol. II.\\nPfieiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 4, writes\\nhow could primitive man with his quite undeveloped mental\\npowers be able to grasp the difficult thought of one infinite God,\\nwho is pure spirit.\\nSir J. Lubbock, Origin of Civilizat., p. 119.\\n4", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "50 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nthe mountains and heavens were peopled with divini-\\nties. Fear and wonder made him in ignorance create\\ngods. Thus Lucretius wrote, and in our own day Mr.\\nTyndall proposes the same doctrine as the explanation\\nmost natural to ignorant minds to account for the phe-\\nnomena of nature. To Hobbes ignorance and fear\\nwere the causes; so also Hume in his Natural History\\nof Religion;^* J. S. Mill, however, rejects this\\nexplanation.^^ Mr. Flammarion, the illustrious savant,\\nsees the theologians driven from stronghold to strong-\\nhold before the irresistible march of scientific knowl-\\nedge.^^ To him ignorance and fear are the very reason\\nof their existence.\\n12. It is sufficient to indicate these views. To the\\nthoughtful student no refutation is needed. They are\\nas shallow as they are blatant. Popular with a certain\\nfew, their strength lies only in negation. They are\\nbased on wrong and degraded notions of human\\nnature, they are accepted only as a protest against an\\nexaggerated or a fancied form of religious teaching.\\nSpencer. g 13. A powerful writer and laborious student of our\\ntime has attempted to apply with a scientific parade of\\nlearning and of logic the theory of evolution to our\\nidea of God. The author of Synthetic Philosophy\\nf\u00c2\u00b0 Fiske, Idea of God, p. 65; to him Theism is a much later\\ndevelopment partly due to political circumstances. lb., p. 72.\\nDe Rer. Nat. V, 1161; Primus in or be deosfecit timer.\\nStatius, Theb. Ill, 661; Epicurus, cf. Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i, 20.\\nFragments of Science, Prayer.\\nCf. his Leviathan, Pfleiderer Philosophy of Religion, vol. I,\\np. 112.\\n^Sections 1-8.\\nUtility of Religion, p. 100.\\nCf. also J. Fiske, Idea of God, pp. 107, 108.\\nJ. Fiske, The Idea of God; J. Cotter Morison in the Service\\nof Man accepts the evolutionary theory of God and advocates\\nthe religion of humanity; Evolution of the Idea of God, by-\\nGrant Allen; Darwin in Descent of Man, vol. L pp. 63, 65; My\\nCreed, by M. Savage; d Aviella, Gifford Lectures, 1899;", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 5 1\\nhas been before the public too long and has obtained\\nthe reputation of too much learning, to be passed over\\nin silence. He is the foremost representative of a\\nschool which a few years ago exercised a wide and deep\\ninfluence on the English and American mind, but\\nwhich is now on the decline. In his Principles of\\nSociology, Mr. Spencer gives a long and elaborate\\ntreatise on the origin and growth of the idea of God.\\nAs the exponent of modern Positivism, his words\\ndeserve more than a passing notice.\\nS 14. Mr. Spencer bases his reasoning on the facts his\\no t- o argument.\\nof dream-life. Death takes away our dear and loved\\nones. The separation is not final. They come back basis.\\nto as in the shadowy dreamland. We see the well-\\nknown countenances, hold converse with them, and\\nlive in the trust that they are not far distant. Thus\\narose the belief in ghosts with a semi-substantial, e.,\\nPfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, pp. 3, 22, 32; Prof.\\nKnight, Aspects of Theism, p. 19; History of Religion, A Men-\\nzies, p. 28, sq.\\nIf it should be found, as I am persuaded is the fact, that\\nthe human mind begins with a vague naturalistic-humanistic\\nconception of the gods a conception whose elements are not\\nyet differentiated, much less opposed and that reflection after\\ndeveloping this latest contrast in the opposite directions of nat-\\nuralism and animism, rises ever}; where with the progress of\\ncivilization to a synthesis of both nature and man in one eternal\\nand infinite ground, the history of the development of the\\nreligious consciousness would be itself an argument in favor of\\nthat hypothesis. Belief in God, by J. G. Schurman, pp. 72,\\n78. An attempt, however, of a reconciliation with Hegel is evi-\\ndent e. The method is\u00c2\u00abbased on the fact that all exist-\\nences, all objects of thought or inquiry are in a state of\\nbecoming, p. 74; or when he speaks of man s consciousness\\nof God, p. 134. Again he writes God did not first exist and\\nthen as though in need of something else, create a world. It is\\nof the essence of spirit to manifest or reveal itself. And just\\nbecause God is a spirit, the world is his constant expression.\\nCreation is the external self-revelation of God. Pp. 139, 208,\\n217, 227.\\nPfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 13; Christian\\nPhilosophy, ch. IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "52 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nsemi-corporeal, form.^\u00c2\u00b0 This implied the conviction\\nthat in some way the dead were re-animated. The\\nafter-life, which thence grew upon the imagination, was\\nat first temporary. Under the influence of fancied\\nhopes and fears it became more and more enduring,\\nThis leads to the notion of another world, peopled\\nwith supernatural agents. The unscientific and\\nignorant mind looked upon these beings as real. Their\\npower was greater than any other being and they were\\nsupposed in some mysterious way to exercise an influ-\\nence over our health and good-fortune. Hence arose\\nthe conviction that they must be propitiated, a con-\\nviction which obtained a deep and permanent hold\\nupon the mind and resulted in a permanent worship.\\n15. According to Mr. Spencer, propitiation was\\nfirst offered to our near relatives. Hence the primitive\\nthe human religion was ancestor worship. Not those\\nman and who recently departed and were closely joined\\ndivine. by bonds of kinship became the objects of our prayers\\nand sacrifices; our forefathers who died long ago and\\nwho left behind a memory of power and position,\\nreceived likewise a share of our worship. By reason\\nPrin. of Sociology, vol. I, ch. XIII; The Supernatural, Its\\nOrigin, Nature and Evolution, by John G. King. 2 vol.; A Mod-\\nern Zoroastrian, by S. Lang, p. 149, 156; J. Fiske, Idea of God,\\npp. 69, 75, 106.\\n2^ lb., ch. XIV.\\nlb., ch. XV.\\n23 lb., ch. XVI.\\nChristian View of God and the World, Dr. Orr, p. 466.\\nP. 147. With Pfleiderer primitive religion was a worship of\\nhouse-gods. Phil, and Development of Religion, vol. i, p, 38.\\nBelief in God, he writes, was formed out of the prehistorical\\nbelief in spirits, which in turn points back to two sources;\\nancestral and nature spirits, p. 103. The former are found in\\ndream-life, the latter shown in the personification of nature, p.\\n104. He does not agree with Spencer in explaining nature\\ndeities by ancestral spirits, but admits two distinct sources, p.\\n106, sq.\\nP. 149.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 53\\nof the remoteness a distinction began to dawn upon the\\nmind between the huinan^ the semi-divine and the divined\\nRemoteness magnified their deeds and made them\\nappear more than mere mortals. Hence mankind grew\\nto look upon and act to them as gods. To Mr. Spencer\\nidolatry and fetich-worship are only aberrant forms of\\nancestor worship.^\u00c2\u00ae The animal worship, as practiced\\nby the Egyptians, he explains by pronouncing it a\\nspecial form of ghost-belief.^^ Thus Mr. Spencer\\nbelieves that he has solved in the most natural and\\nconvincing manner the origin of our idea of God.^\u00c2\u00b0\\ni6. (i) What strikes the reader in this explanation Criticism\\nis the extreme candor of the writer. He sees things sumptfon.\\nwhich no one else ever saw before, and tells them so\\nopenly that he seems to be convinced of their truth.\\nTo do so, however, he assumes from the very begin-\\nning all that he strives to prove; taking for granted\\nthat this process is the most natural one, he accumu-\\nlates facts and arranges them in a most plausible\\nmanner. Yet the process of reasoning is throughout\\nfilled with gratuitous assumptions, and untrustworthy\\nevidence.\\nS 17. (2) The theory of Evolution is not in accord- (2) Theory\\nof evolution\\nance with facts and scientific reasoning. Mr. Spencer as proposed\\nby him is\\nis its authoritative and most learned exponent. Day erroneous.\\nby day his standing and strength is weakening. The\\nP. 150.\\n98 lb., ch. XXI.\\n\u00c2\u00bb9Ib., ch. XXII.\\nThe Making of Religion, Andrew Lang, p. i.\\n2^ The theory that religion is the outgrowth of soulvvorship is\\nvery old. Enhemerus said the gods were deified men, e. g.,\\nZeus, King of Crete, cf. D. G, Brinton, Religion of Primitive\\nPeoples, p. 42. Resuscitated by the mythologists of the XVIIth\\nand XVIIIth centuries, it is brought before the minds of to-day\\nby the labors of Spencer and Lippert. Pfleiderer, The Philoso-\\nphy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 12.\\n2* The Making of Religion, by A. Lang, p. 46.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "54 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nelaborate system propounded by him after years of\\nlabor will not be lasting. Too many defects have\\nbeen pointed out, too many assumptions and weak\\narguments have been unmasked not to create in the\\nmind of the student a well-founded belief that the\\nreasoning is faulty throughout. Elsewhere radical\\ndefects have been indicated. Now such a theory can\\noffer poor support for an explanation of the idea of\\nGod. The more so that the explanation to be valid\\nsupposes the theory to be sound.\\ni8. (3) To study the existing beliefs of uncivilized\\nraces in the hope that thus is obtained the surest index\\nof their primitive condition is a false principle, utterly\\ndisregarded by contemporary historical science. Waitz\\nand Gerland have shown that the religion, language and\\npolitics of the savages in Africa and Australia bear\\nunmistakable traces of a higher and earlier stage.\\nHow explain the fact that in Polynesia the worship of\\nthe high gods has been expelled by that of ancestors?\\n(3) a petitio 8 ig. (4) Finallv our idea of ghosts does not create,\\nprincipii.\\nIt supposes a belief m a future life. Dreams are\\nabnormal states of the mind. To take such a founda-\\ntion for an elaborate theory concerning the origin of a\\nbelief which exercises a universal and deep influence\\non men, betrays poor logical acumen and shows the\\ninherent weakness of the argument. The conviction\\nof a future life is part and parcel of our waking\\nthoughts; it springs from the highest promptings of\\nour nature; it is imbedded deep in the soul. Yet Mr.\\nSpencer can tell us that the idea of ghost is the\\nprimitive type of the supernatural. On the contrary\\nthe dead seem to come back in dreams and hold con-\\n^^Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 15.\\n^S. H. Kellogg, Genesis and Growth of Religion, ch. HI.\\n35 Pfieiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 15.\\n3^ lb., p. 16; Lang, The Making of Religion, passim.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 55\\nverse with us, only because there is imbedded in our\\nsouls a conviction of an. after life. Ghosts are a par-\\nticular result, not the cause of the belief. They are\\nthe projection of the mind s hopes and fears, of its\\naffections and longings. These take shape in the\\nimagination and stand before us in the well-known\\nlineaments of our near and dear departed. Dreams\\nare accidental occurrences in our daily lives. Some\\npeople rarely, if ever, dream. The belief in God and\\nin a future life are universal and form part of our wak-\\ning conscious lives. So close to us and so imperative\\nare these beliefs that do what we may we cannot shake\\nthem off. To propose an accidental cause for a wide-\\nspread and permanent effect is a futile attempt, or it\\nsupposes a silent begging the question in the\\ncourse of the reasoning.\\nIII.\\nTheory of Theosophy.\\n20. The word Theosophy has a wide meaning. In Meaning of\\nits etymology it means those who are wise in the\\nthings of God. This wisdom is supposed in different\\npersons to be acquired in different ways. Thus the\\nword Theosophy has been applied to various physical\\nprocesses practiced in the far East; and the Gym-\\nnosophists and Yogis have been called Theosophists.\\nHere by Theosophy is understood a special knowledge\\nof God by virtue of a direct contemplation or insight\\ninto the divine essence.\\n\u00c2\u00a721. This theory appears in a special form with (i) the\\nthose who claim a direct insight into the divine essence. Pantheism.\\n2^ Miiller, Science of Religion, Lect. III.\\nThe Idea of God found in lowest known grades of savagery;\\nThe Making of Religion, by A. Lang, p. 175.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "56 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nIn the early ages of Christianity the Gnostics professed\\nto have this knowledge, whence their name. To the\\nNeo-Platonists the contemplation of the divine essence\\nwas the noblest exercise of man. This was accom-\\nplished by a divine illumination, an inner light, Pan-\\ntheists at all times have professed the same teaching.\\nThus Fichte writes Man reaches the knowledge of\\nGod in pure thought, which is the eye of the soul. By\\nthis he perceives God, for what is pure thought but\\nthe divine existence.\\n(2) Onto- 22. That man by the exercise ^f natural reason\\nalone has an intuition of the infinite, was broached by\\n(a) Catholic Catholic writers in France about fifty years ago. The\\nleaders were de Bonald, Bonnetti and Ventura. The\\naim was to stem the tide of a materialistic and atheistic\\nphilosophy. In this way the existence of God was not\\nonly placed beyond question, but was even rendered\\nincapable of proof, for we do not prove what we see.\\nThe movement spread and acquired adherents of great\\nname. At the same time it was subjected to most\\nrigorous criticism. Its philosophical basis was shown\\nto be most untrustvv orthy. In the Vatican Council\\nhuman reason was vindicated by the teaching that the\\nexistence of God can be demonstrated to a certainty.\\nTo-day Ontologism counts no defenders among Catholic\\nwriters. Looking back to the time of the conflict we\\ncan clearly see that the doctrine had its rise in a mis-\\ntaken zeal, which was not in accord w4th truth.\\n(b) modern S 23. Ontologism, no longer proposed as Catholic\\nnon-Catho- o 07 o r x\\nlie writers, teaching, is, nevertheless, most strenuously advocated\\nby many non-Catholic writers of the present day.\\nThus Dr. Harris writes: The belief in God is a\\n2^ Hoars with the Mystics, R. A. Vaughn.\\n^Hunt, Pantheism, p. 264.\\nDenziger. Euchiridion, p. 387.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 5/\\nrational intuition necessarily arising in its own self-evi-\\ndence in contemplating the process of thought in any\\nline of inquiry. Prof. Knight proposes an intu-\\nitional argument for the belief in God,* Dr. Luthardt\\nspeaks of an intuitional idea of God, MuUer holds\\nthat an intuition of God is a radical element of all\\nreligions; and adds to make clear his meaning We\\npity a man born blind, we cannot be angry with him.\\nProf. Fisher speaks of an intuition of the Infinite.\\nSo also Dr. Harris/ Prof. Wilson/^ Prof. Fraser, C.\\nM. Tyler, Princ. Caird, T. H. Green, Edward\\nCaird. On the other hand, we find Prof. Flint reject-\\ning the doctrine.\\n24. This recent form of Ontologism is due to the its source is\\ninfluence of Hegel. With the destructive criticism\\npassed by Mr. Mill on the pKilosophy of Sir Wm.\\nHamilton, English Theistic writers were left without\\na philosophical basis. The Association school could\\nnever be brought into harmony with Christian thought.\\nHence they turned to Hegel. Now the fundamental\\nprinciple of Hegel is the unity of the divine and the\\nhuman consciousness. This unity gave rise to the\\n^2 Self-Revelation of God, p. 154.\\n^2 Aspects of Theism, pp. 11, 131, 119, 120, 143; Lindsay in\\nRecent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion, p. 89.\\nFundamental Truths of Christianity, p. 57.\\n*5 Chips, vol. I, pp. X, 235.\\nlb., p. 53.\\nGrounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, p. 40.\\nPhilosophical Foundations of Theism.\\n^^Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 8.\\nPhilosophy of Theism, 2d series.\\nBases of Religious Relief, p. 120.\\nIntroduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 131, 249.\\nProlegom to Ethics, p. 72.\\nEvolution of Religion, vol. 1, p. 164.\\nTheism, p. 80, sq. Dr. McCosh must not be classed with\\nthese writers. He holds that there are certain intuitive prin-\\nciples which proceeding upon external facts lead to a conviction\\nof the existence of God. Method of Divine Government, p.\\n520.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "58\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nCriticism.\\n(3) Theory\\nof special\\nfaculty.\\nColeridg-e.\\nMiiller.\\nconcept of the divine intuition/^ Some writers, how-\\never, hesitate to use the word i}ituitio7i. To them God\\nis a necessary postulate of thought. In this form the\\ntheory will be examined elsev/here.\\n25. To hold that we have an intuition of the\\nInfinite is to advance a pure assumption. Conscious-\\nness gives no warrant for the assertion. In this ex-\\nplnation how can we admit that men deny or doubt\\nthe existence of God Agnosticism is another name\\nfor atheism and scepticism, and is the great philo-\\nsophical error of the present day. The theory falls in\\nface of facts.\\n26. A second form of Theosophy is found in the\\ndoctrine of those who hold that man has a special\\nfaculty by which he perceives God.^\u00c2\u00ae It is very much\\nakin to the Ontological phase. Thus we speak of the\\nintuition of Plotinus, the intellectuelle Auschauung of\\nSchelling, the intuitive reason of Coleridge. Through\\nSchelling and Coleridge it influenced the Transcend-\\nentalists of New England. Recently this theory has\\nbeen broached by a writer whose world-wide reputation\\ngives to his opinion a great weight. Mr. Miiller\\nteaches that besides sense and reason there is in man\\na third faculty by which he apprehends the infinite.\\nThis faculty is a power independent of sense and rea-\\nson, a power in a certain sense contradictory to sense\\nand reason, a very real power which alone cannot be\\n5^ With Baader the eye through which God sees me is the\\nsame as that in which I see God. Cf. Pfieiderer, Phil, of\\nReligion, vol. II, p. 32.\\nLindsay, Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of\\nReligion, p. 8q.\\nHunt, Pantheism, p. 181.\\nHours with the Mystics, R. O. Vaughn; Aids to Reflection,\\nColeridge, pp. 225, 249.\\nDimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 64.\\nScience of Religion, pp. 12, 14.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 59\\novercome by them. This faculty is at the root of all\\nreligions. Yet he denies that a mysterious element is\\nthus introduced into Psychology.\\n27. By this teaching Mr. Muller aimed at crushing criticism,\\nthe school which denies the possibility of conceiving\\nthe infinite. But this teaching is not at all necessary\\nto attain the desired result. His error is based on a\\nfalse theory of knowledge. He is a disciple of Kant.\\nNow Kant denied that the intellect could transcend\\nthe finite and reach the divine.^* To Mr. Muller it is\\nevident that sense cannot do so. Nevertheless, he was\\nconscious of such a conception, and to account for the\\nfact he postulated another faculty. A true exposition\\nof the power of mind, of the distinction between intel-\\nlect and sense, of the sphere and limits of both shows\\nthat the mind has a knowledge of the infinite without\\nthe need of resorting to a third and special faculty.\\n28. Finally Theosophy appears in the religious feel- ^f p^^?[^\\ning of Jacobi and Schleiermacher.^^ They maintained\\nthat the divine is immediately revealed through ^/V/^,\\nreligious feeling. The sense of absolute depend-\\nence is the religious feeling in its simplest form.* This\\nteaching is the legitimate consequence of Kant s theory\\nof knowledge, and of Spinoza s Pantheism.* If the\\nmind cannot reach objective truth, how shall we obtain\\nit? Kant held the existence of God was a postulate of\\n6 Hibbert Lectures, 1878, p. 26; The Philosophy of Right, D.\\nLioy, p. 135-\\n63 lb., Lect. I.\\n6* Muller, Science of Religion, p, 13.\\n6^ Thus the pious soul has an immediate knowledge of the\\nInfinite in the Finite. The infinite to him, however, was\\nimpersonal, hence Pantheistic. Cf. Hunt, Pantheism, p. 312,\\n6* Burt, History of Modern Philosophy, vol. II, p. 13; Lotze,\\nPhil, of Religion, pp. 1-8.\\nThe Religious Feeling, by Newman Smyth, p. 35; L. B.\\nHickok in Creator and Creature combines Kant and Jacobi.\\n68 Cf. Hunt, 1. c.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "6o\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nCriticism.\\nthe practical reason. Under the fire of criticism, what\\nbecomes of the practical reason? There is no warrant\\nfor the distinction between theoretical and practical.\\nTo stem a rising rationalism Jacobi appealed to feel-\\ning. God exists because he feels that it is so. To\\ngive objective validity to the feeUng, he made it the\\nchannel of divine revelation, or rather found in this\\nfeeling an intuition of a divine reality.^\\n29. The same criticism can be passed on all three\\nforms. They spring from a false theory of knowledge;\\nthey have no basis in consciousness; they are gratu-\\nitous assumptions to supply an imaginary need. The\\nfacts are answered with more ease and truth in the fol-\\nlowing theory.\\nIV.\\nThe Theory of Christian Philosophy.\\nThe\\nChristian\\nFathers.\\n30. The task of the early Apologists and Fathers\\nof the Church was to show forth the truth of the\\nChristian religion against the false philosophy and\\nreligions of the time. Their writings are the store-\\nhouse whence the schoolmen drew the materials for\\nthe magnificent structure of reasoned faith, the pride\\nand glory of the human intellect. Under the guidance\\nof divine faith they have sounded the depths of man s\\nnature and of his relation to God. To explain the\\norigin of the idea of God in the human mind is not an\\nisolated problem, occupying the attention of one only.\\nThe method of all the higher truths of religion is differ-\\nent, i. from the scientific method, being the method of faith,\\na verification by the heart and not by the notions of the head.\\nH. Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, p. 20. This ten-\\ndency predominant with Fred. Robertson, Theod. Parker.\\nThe problem of primitive revelation whether in its nature\\nor extent is not here discussed. That pertains to a treatise on\\nReligion. The argument is an induction from facts and the\\npurpose is to state the facts.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF. 6l\\nIt is a question which agitated the very greatest among\\nthem. Their teaching has been carefully collected,\\nand presents the following facts:\\n31. (i) The Fathers set forth a two-fold knowledge g^^J^Jf^^^\\nof God. The one is a vague and obscure knowledge\\nwhich is common to all men. The other is a more\\nelaborate and complete knowledge and comes from\\ninstruction and divine revelation.\\n\u00c2\u00a732. (2) The former knowledge is not learned by o^scureand\\nteaching; it arises spontaneously from our rational their\\nnature; the rational man has it by himself; it is a\\nnatural anticipation of the mind; what man obtains\\nfrom his own nature and without instruction; what\\nman learns from himself and not from another; the\\nknowledge which nature herself suggests.\\n33 (3) This is explained by saying that the human the expia-\\nsoul is made to the image and likeness of God; that\\nit is made to know God; that from the indeliberate\\nexercise of its own faculties by a kind of natural move-\\nment, it comes to the knowledge of God. Insita et\\ncum -natura conserta notitia. This knowledge is\\ntherefore vague and confused. Revelation and\\ninstruction purifies and makes it more scientific.\\n34. (4) This spontaneous knowledge of God is d is- the sources,\\ntinguished by two important characteristics: (a) It\\narises from rational nature by the use of faculties con-\\nnatural to all. Hence it is not an intuition, nor is it\\nthe result of a special faculty. On the contrary, it can\\nbe compared to a spontaneous inference, (b) It is\\nuniversal with human nature. The considerations,\\nwhence its source, are obvious and common to all who\\nPetavius, de Deo, 1. I; Franzelin de Deo, p. 94, sq.\\n2 Clemens Alex. Strom. V. p. 612; Gregorius Nazianz. or. 28,\\nal. 34, n. 5, 6; Aug. in Joan. tr. 106, n. 4; Chrysostomus, ad\\nPop. Antioch, h. 9, n. 2.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "62 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nhave the free use of reason. These obvious sources,\\nindicated again and again by them, are the world of\\nnature and of man.\\nThis teaching thus harmonizes with the results of\\ncomparative Philology. Historical science brings its\\ntestimony in favor of Christian Philosophy. In the\\nfollowing pages we shall investigate these two sources\\nand strive to find a detailed and philosophical justifica-\\ntion for our natural possession, the idea of God.^*\\nSt. Aug. Enar. in Ps. XLI, n. 7, 8. Praecipuum et prin-\\ncipale speculum ad videndum Deum est animus rationalis\\ninveniens seipsum. Si enim invisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta\\nsunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, ubi quaeso. quam in ejus imag-\\nine, cognitionis ejus vestigia expressius impressa inveniuntur\\nSt. Bernard, De Domo Inter., c. 12.\\nHartman therefore errs in holding that religion is not an\\noriginal and inseparable element, but was acquired by man on\\nhis way upwards. To him the motive element was egoistic\\nendaemonism, the creative factor was poetic fancy. History\\nof Religion, A Menzies, p. 43. These elements may enter as\\nfactors in the historic deterioration of religious belief, they are\\nnot primitive causes of the belief itself. Prof. Gruppe holds\\nthat religion is an acquired social habit. Miiller, Physical\\nReligion, p. 87.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IV.\\nMENTAL LIFE.\\nI. The consciousness of the human race bears\\ntestimony to the idea of God. It is the common prop-\\nerty of humanity. Shared alike by barbarian and civil-\\nized, by unlettered and learned, it finds varied\\nexpression in language and exerts a profound influence\\non thought and action. We shall not here discuss the\\nhistoric development of the idea or pass in critical\\nreview the various phases in which it has been realized.\\nThat pertains to the History of Religion. The aim of\\nthe present treatise is to investigate its philosophic\\nbasis, to seek the sources whence it has its origin, to\\nanalyze the grounds which gives to the idea an objec-\\ntive validity and prove that a being really exists whom\\nwe call God.\\n8 2. The testimony for the idea was sougfht and Conscious-\\no J nessfurmsh\\nfound in human consciousness.^ In like manner we l^\u00c2\u00b0\u00c2\u00a5?^s^9\\nthe idea of\\nshall seek in consciousness first of all for the grounds\\nwhich give to the idea an objective value. The method\\nto be pursued is psychological. The basis for the idea\\nmust be very near and close to us. Its universality\\nand deep influence on our lives can only thus be\\nexplained.^ In truth, as shall be shown, our whole\\nnature stretches up and cries aloud to God. Religion\\nand worship are only the various expressions for the\\nTertullian, De Testimonio Animae. Sero te amavi, pul-\\nchritude tarn antiqua tarn nova! Sero te amavi! Et ecce intus\\neras, et ego foras, et ibi te quarebam. Aug. Confess. 1. X, ch.\\n27; XII, 25; De Vera Relig., XXXIX, The Great Enigma, W.\\nS. Lilly, p. 266.\\nJanet, Traite Elementaire de Philosophie, p. 843\\n[63]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "64\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ncry, only means whereby the human soul tries to find\\nits Maker and show to Him the homage of adoration,\\nof love and of praise. Then we can turn to the world\\nwithout, which proclaims alike to the popular mind, to\\nthe scientist and to the philosopher, that it did not\\ncreate itself, that its existence and activity are due to\\na higher and greater being, whose everlasting divinity\\nand power is shown throughout.^\\nI.\\nFirst 3. In setting forth the sources whence arose the\\nsource to be\\ninvesti- idea of God, philosophers at all times have delighted\\ngated in\\nmental life, m making an appeal to our conscious mental life.\\nFrom Plato and St. Augustine down to contemporary\\nwriters this line of thought has been presented in vari-\\nous ways. The intellect itself, or the idea, or the\\nforce and reality of truth have suggested to the most\\nprofound and subtle minds the world has seen, reasons\\nfor the faith that is in them. Its fortunes have been\\nvaried and with a great many it has fallen into disre-\\npute. The fact, however, that so many acute and\\nbrilliant minds have been impressed with one or more\\nof its forms leads the thoughtful student to suspect\\nthat it is not altogether lacking in force, and gives the\\nhope that if presented in the proper manner, it may\\nhave a well-grounded basis, though not so readily\\ngrasped by the ordinary mind.\\nThe a\\npriori\\nargTiment.\\nII.\\nErrors.\\n4. (i) The fam.ous a priori argument for the exist-\\nence of God is based on the consideration of the idea.\\nFor upwards of one thousand years it has been eagerly\\n^St. Augustine, Enar. in Ps. 41, n. 8; 73, n. 25; 134, n. 10.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 65\\nand fiercely discussed in the schools and has been pro-\\nposed in slightly different ways in the hope that each\\nsucceeding presentation would stand firm against\\nfuture criticism. By Kant and recent writers it is\\ncalled the ontological argument.\\n8 7\u00e2\u0080\u009e (a) St, Anselm, the father of the school-men, (a) St.\\n1 Anselm.\\nwas the first to present this argument m scientific\\nform. He reasons thus: I have an idea of a being\\ninfinite in all perfections. The mind cannot conceive\\na being greater than this. Hence, he infers that such\\na being ought to exist. For if it did not exist, then it\\nwould not be the greatest being which the mind could\\nconceive. Therefore it has both an ideal and a real\\nexistence*\\n8. (b) Scotus, the doctor subtilis^ proposes the argu- (b) Scotus.\\nment in different words. The most perfect being, he\\nwrites, can exist; the possibility of the existence is\\nimplied in the idea. Therefore, he concludes, it must\\nexist. For if such a being did not really exist, it would\\nbe not possible to exist. For, in order to be possible\\nit must be real. Hence the notion of its possibility\\nimplies its reality.\\n\u00c2\u00a79. (c) Descartes recognized the fallacy in the(c)Des\\nwording of the argument and attempted to place it\\nupon a sound basis. He employs as a criterion the\\nprinciple that whatever we conceive clearly and dis-\\ntinctly must be true. When I examine the idea, which\\nI have, of the most perfect being, he reasons, I find\\nthat the note of existence is therein contained, just as\\nin the notion of a triangle the truth is contained that\\nProslogium, ch. 2, 3; St. Bona venture, Itinerarium; Shadd,\\nHistory of Doctrine, vol. I, p. 238; Flint, Theism, p. 279; Dr.\\nSterling says that the very thought of God is that which is,\\nand cannot be. Gifford Lectures, 1890, ist series, Lect. X;\\nThe Being of God, P. H. Steenstra, p. 80; Shedd Dog. TheoL,\\np. 222.\\n5", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "66 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nthe three angles are equal to two right angles, or in\\nthe idea of a circle that the points on a circumference\\nare equally distant from the center. Therefore, if not\\nmore evident, it is at least as certain that God, who is\\na being of such infinite perfection, exists, as any\\ndemonstration of Geometry could make/\\n(d)Leib- g lo. (d) The reasoning of Descartes did not seem\\nconclusive to Leibnitz/ He found in this presenta-\\ntion, as in the others, the same logical fallacy, viz.,\\nconcluding directly from the ideal to the real. He\\ntried, unsuccessfully, however, to avoid the rock;\\nnevertheless his reasoning is very captious. The divine\\nbeing is a being which is determined to existence by\\nits own essence, a being whose existence is\\nexplained not as the effect of another being, but as\\ndue to its own infinite essence. Now, he adds, such a\\nbeing, is evidently possible. Therefore it must really\\nexist. For if it did not really exist, it would not be\\npossible.^\\nCriticism. II. In form and process the argument follows that\\nof Scotus. Its weakness at first sight is more difficult\\nto detect than with the arguments of Anselm and Des-\\ncartes. Nevertheless the same criticism can be made\\nof all. In every form so far presented the argument\\nconcludes from, the ideal to the order of real existence.\\nThe ideal, as such, has only an ideal content. The\\nelement of reality must come from another source than\\nfrom the creative fancy of the mind. An inference\\nPrin. Phil., I, 14; Discours de la Methode, pt. IV. med. 3d.\\nNew Essays, B, IV, ch. 10.\\nIn order to prove that God exists it is sufficient to prove\\nthat He is possible. Now we have proved that God is possible.\\nTherefore He exists. The Monadology of Leibnitz, by R.\\nLatta, p. 274. What is possible and what a general principle\\ncompels us to say must be, that certainly is, Bradley, Appear-\\nance and Reality, pp. 149, 395; to him the absolute is shorn of\\npersonality and moral attributes, hence not God.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 67\\nfrom the pure ideal to the real exists. When, there-\\nfore, we reason that the element of existence must be\\ncontained in the idea of the most perfect being, we\\nconceive such a being is or is possible, the ready\\nanswer is: Granted if ideal existence is understood,\\nif, however, there is question of real objective existence,\\nthen we do not know; or granted, if it can be other-\\nwise shown, that such a being has real objective\\nexistence.^\\n12. (2) These forms of the ontological argument ^HJ^tie^^^\\nhave little influence on present philosophical thought, ^^y-\\nThey are of value only as historical vestiges of the\\nworking of the human mind in the effort to draw from\\ninner consciousness some assurance for the exist-\\nence of God. The effort is worthy of praise; it\\nhas undoubtedly a real basis; the criticism made is\\nthat the method is faulty or that the principle is\\nerroneous.\\n13= With the German disciples of Kant, the argu- teaching,\\nment assumes a new form.^ Presented in an attractive\\nstyle and with a certain pretense to deep reasoning, it\\nis fitted to appeal to the philosophical mind. Its influ-\\nence upon the present state of the Theistic argument\\nis very great. The right wing of Hegel s followers,\\ne.g.^ Goeschel, Gabler, Daub and Erdmann, as opposed\\nto the left, Strauss, and the extreme left, e. g.,\\nFeuerbach, have made this argument in a special man-\\nner their own possession.^ It appears in the writings\\nof Prof. Caird, Dr. Schurman, Dr. Sterrett, Prof.\\nPfieiderer, Prof. Green, and the followers of the Neo-\\nHegelian school.\\n^St. Thomas, 1. q. 2, i ad. 2.\\nKant himself rejects the argument, Critic, ch. 3, 4.\\nBelford Bax, Handbook to History of Modern Philosophy,\\nP- 390-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "68 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nFicMe^ 14. The adumbrations of the present form of the\\nso-called Ontological argument appear in Fichte. To\\nhim God and the world are two mutually involving\\nspheres of consciousness. They can be viewed as\\nthought-relations involving each other.* God as\\ncause is postulated to explain the effect in so far\\nas there is an effect to explain; and the effect is\\neffect of its cause only in so far as it displays its\\ncausalty.^^\\nmorescien- g i^. With Hegel, howcver, this reasoning assumes\\nHegel. a more consistent form.* He held that thought and\\nbeing were identical.*^ The world of thought, of\\nnature, and of man was an evolution of the idea. The\\nspirit exists by a necessity of thought. The concrete\\nexistence of the categories, nature and spirit, is\\ndeduced from their essence, which is thought. He\\nholds that we cannot by argument reason from the\\nsensible world to God. The argument to be employed\\nis only an expression of thought itself, for thought is\\nthe elevation of the spirit above the limits of the finite\\nto those of the invisible and infinite.*^ Therefore the\\nreal character of the proof is the assertion by the\\nspirit of the actuality of the infinite ideal. The assump-\\ntion on which it rests is that primal being is self-exist-\\nent. We can deny God only by denying self-existence;\\nFichte, by A. B. Thompson, p. 134.\\n^2 This argument is presented with some modifications by Prof.\\nBascom, Natural Theology, ch. Ill, 7. Cf. Foundations of\\nReligious Belief, by Prof. Wilson. With Cousin the finite\\nand infinite are logical correlatives. Elem. of Psych., p. 375.\\nSo also Prof. Schurman, in Philos. Review, vol. IV, May, 1895.\\n^3 lb., p. 142.\\n^4 Logic, Introd., 51.\\nPhil, and Devel. of Religion, by Prof. Pfleiderer, vol. I, p.\\n148; H. Haider, Some Aspects of Hegel s Philosophy, in Phil.\\nRev., vol. V, p. 263.\\nHegelianism and Personality by Prof. Seth, p. no.\\nHistoire de la Philosophic, par P. Janet et G. Seailles,\\np. 851.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 69\\nbut this is equivalent to the spirit denying itself a\\npatent contradiction.\\n8 16. This fundamental concept of Hesfel that the Hegel s\\nf o teaching\\nidea is the source and essence of all thing:s, which in presented\\nin various\\nthemselves are only the forms of its evolution, is pre- ways.\\nsented in various ways by his followers. Thus, (a)\\nsome tell us that the aim of the Ontological proof is to\\nidentify the idea of God with that of self-existence\\nwhich must be assumed. (b) Or that the belief in\\nGod is constitutive of intelligence itself.^ (c) Or with\\nProf. Caird that the belief in God is a psychological\\nnecessity, (d) Or, finally, with Prof. Pfleiderer, teach\\nthat while thinking and being are different, contrary to\\nHegel s dictum, yet they are constituted for each other\\nby the conformity of the laws on both sides and in this\\nagreement of the two sides the unity of the ordering\\nprinciple, e.^ of the effectuating thinking or the\\nomnipotent reason of God reveals itself.\\n17. The Ontological proof in the hands of its s\\nmost recent defenders is pure Pantheism. Thus the\\nunity of the divine and human consciousness is the\\nreason given why the mind is assured of the existence\\nBasal Concepts in Philosophy, by A. D. Ormond, p. 271.\\nGod is the absolute and transcendant ground of the world.\\nThe world is the product of an imminent spiritual potence which\\nhas as its immediate presupposition spiritual self-activity.\\nThis self-activity as the self-existent /rz z/j- of all being we have\\nfound to be God. His self-activity is a presupposition of im-\\nmanent potence. The immanent ground of the world-process\\nis a spiritual potence which leads it in its evolution through\\nstages of mechanism and life up to the soul of man in which\\nspirit becomes self-conscious. Thus man is a potence whose\\ninfinite and perfect actuality is God. Basal Concepts in Phi-\\nlosophy by A. D. Ormond, pp. 280-2S1.\\nThat God is the ultimate ground and source of all things\\nwhether they be living or in earth, thinking or unthinking,\\nseems to me not merely a conclusion reached by reflection and\\ninference, but an intuitive belief constitutive of intelligence\\nitself. J. G. Schurman. Agnosticism and Religion, p. 26.\\nPhilosophy and Development of Religion, vol. I, p. 148.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "70 ciirasTiAN philosophy.\\nof God. The objections to the pantheistic teaching\\nare also valid in the present case, God and the human\\nsoul are not identical. Memory and consciousness\\nmake us aware of our personal identity and assure us\\nthat we are individuals distinct both from God and\\ncreated things.\\nIII.\\nTheory of Christian Philosophy.\\nA true\\nargument\\ni8. Our inner life contains true sources for our\\nEmulated. of God. The human mind again and again, in\\nspite of failure, seeks there a justification of its belief.\\nAn instinctive conviction, as it were, tells that the\\nidea is more than a passing fiction. It has an abiding\\npresence, and a silent overshadowing power. A diffi-\\nculty is found in tracing it to the proper source. The\\nhope is nevertheless held that in some way its true\\nground can be discovered. Erroneous notions as to\\nour mental nature and activity, a false analysis of our\\nmental content may obscure the truth. It cannot\\nentirely rob us of the heritage which is a part of our\\nbeing and of our life.\\nThe intuition of an Absolute Reason is (i) ihe necessary\\npre-supposition of all other knowledge so that we cannot know\\nanything else to exist except hy assuming first of all that God\\nexists; (2) the necessary basis of all logical thought so that we\\ncannot put confidence in any of our reasoning processes except\\nby taking for granted that a thinking Deity has constructed our\\nminds with reference to the universe and to truth; (3) the\\nnecessary implication of our primitive belief in design so that\\nwe can assume all things to exist for a purpose only by making\\nthe prior assumption that a purposing God exists can regard\\nthe universe as a thought only by postulating the existence of\\nan Absolute Thinker. We cannot prove that God is, we can\\nshow that in order to the existence of any knowledge, thought,\\nreason in man, man must assume that God is. Dr. Strong in\\nSystematic Theology, pp. 33, 34. The writer tries to com-\\nbine Anselm, Descartes and Hegel. The argument labors with\\nthe defects of all.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 7I\\n19. We do not reason from the idea to the actual\\nexistence of the object therein represented. That lias\\nbeen shown to be a false process. We take the idea,\\ninvestigate it as it is given in consciousness, and seek\\na basis or foundation for its content. This Una of\\nreasoning is legitimate and opens up the wide range\\nand infinite possibility of our mental life. The idea is\\nreceived as a product or an effect. The activity of the\\nmind may explain its form. The content or compre-\\nhension of the idea, however, is not the result of the\\nmind s activity, but has an external or independent\\nbasis. The reasoning, therefore, is not a priori^ but\\nproceeds from the effect to the cause.\\n8 20. At the initial point of the investio^ation a vital Theories of\\nthe Uni-\\nproblem comes to view. The real value of the uni- versai idea,\\nversal idea has been discussed in the schools for\\ncenturies. The Nominalist holds that the idea is a\\nname only. This view exercises wide and deep influ-\\nence on modern thought. The Realist teaches that\\nthe ideas as such have an objective reality. This is\\nthe opinion of Plato and is now obsolete. Scholastic\\nphilosophy draws a distinction. It teaches that the\\nidea is formed by the mind and is therefore a mental\\nproduct; nevertheless, its content or comprehension is\\nbased in objective reality.\\n21. A criticism of these opinions shall not be pre- its present\\nsented here. The discussion would entail too much\\nspace and more properly pertains to Philosophy of\\nMind. The view of Scholastic philosophy is there\\nshown to be in accord with the known processes of\\nmental life and is implied in ordinary and scientific\\nlanguage. Its exposition naturally leads up to our\\nargument for the existence of God.\\nScientific Theism by F. Abbott.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "72 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(a) The 8 22. Consciousness reveals our inner life; it tells\\nidea. o\\nthe thoughts, desires, feeling which we experience\\nthrough the swiftly running moments of the day. By\\nits testimony we know that our ideas are singular, par-\\nticular or universal. Thus the idea of one person or\\nobject really existing, e. g., Peter, a stone, is called a\\nsingular idea; the idea of several objects, e. g., a group\\nof men, a few stones, is called a particular idea; the\\nidea of a whole class of persons or objects, e. g.^\\nScholastic humanity, stone, is called a universal idea. The uni-\\nteaching-.\\nversal idea is the idea so properly called. It is the\\ndirect and proper effect of the mind brought into con-\\ntact with external objects. The universal idea is\\ndefined as an idea which contains one quality or\\nattribute which is common to many individuals. Thus,\\ne. g., humanity is a universal idea inasmuch as it\\nexpresses the one quality, e. g., human nature, which\\nIs possessed by all mankind. So also whiteness is a\\nuniversal idea because its content is a quality which is\\nfound in many objects,\\nproved by 2T,. That such ideas exist in the mind is abund-\\n*^ss, antly proved by an examination of our mental life.\\nThey do not exist in a limited number. The mind is\\nbusy in their constant formation. It is not confined\\nwithin the bounds of things actually existing. Not all\\nthe objects exist to which the idea may extend, e. g.,\\nthe idea of humanity extends to all men: past, present\\nand future. Or again, the idea may express an essence\\nwhich as such does not actually exist, but which is con-\\nceived as possible. The mind, therefore, draws a clear\\ndistinction between existing and possible things,\\npossible g 24. Let us examine the possible essences. What\\nessences.\\nIS their nature? They are not absolutely nothing.\\nThey stand midway between a contradiction and an", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 73\\nactual fact. The mind can have no positive concep-\\ntion of a contradiction. It does not actually exist, nor\\ncan it ever exist. It has no reality of existence nor of\\nessence. It is an absolute nothing. An actual fact has\\na reality both of essence and of existence. Now a pos-\\nsible thing does not actually exist, but it can exist. It is\\nnot something absurd and contradictory. We cannot\\nsay that it has a reality of existence, because as yet it\\ndoes not actually exist; but we can say that it has a\\nreality of essence, inasmuch as the mind conceives it\\nas a thing which may exist in the concrete. The fact\\nthat a thing is possible does not depend on the mind.\\nThe distinction of the possible and the impossible\\nstands out clearly in our mental life. The mind can-\\nnot make or change the one or the other. A round\\nsquare, or, two plus two equals five, can never be\\nother than impossible. The intellect discovers the\\ntruth and in its presence stand in silent and helpless\\nacquiescence.^* Nor can we say that the possible or\\nthe impossible depends on existing things. If so, then\\nall possible things would exist; but this we know to be\\nfalse. Therefore a possible thing which is the object\\nof the mind is of its own intrinsic nature independent\\nboth of the mind and of existing things.\\n8 26. Some reason, however, must be given for its^^^?\\nJ possibility.\\npossibility. The human mind seeks to know why one\\nthing is possible and another is not. A closer analysis\\nof the nature of the possible alone can give a reason\\nwhich will be well-grounded and strong against adverse\\ncritcism.\\n\u00c2\u00a727. The elements v/hich go to make up the con-its inteiiigi-\\nr ble charac-\\nception of a possible thing are perceived to combine inter.\\n*Aug. de lib. Arbit. i, 2, ch. 12. To him truth is our highest\\ngood. Quid petis amplius quam ut beatus sis Et quid\\nbeatius eo qui fruitur inconcussa et incommutabli et excel-\\ne ntissima veritate. lb., ch. 13.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "74 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nharmonious accord. But there is more than a mere\\nmechanical combination. The elements are intelligible\\nnot only as units, but also as a combined whole. The\\nmind conceives them forming a harmonious unity.\\nThe character of intelligibility is stamped upon them.\\nThe mechanical combination takes place because the\\nmind conceives it as something intelligible. It has a\\npositive reality inasmuch as it is the direct object of\\nthought. What is impossible is unintelligible. If the\\nmind could conceive it, it would be possible,\\nits expiana- 8 28. The intelligibility of the idea is what must be\\ntion.\\nexplained. The mind does not make it so; it simply\\nfinds that such and such an object can be conceived.\\nThe intelligibility is not purely ideal. It is only the\\ncontent of the idea brought into the range of the mind s\\naction. Now the content of the universal idea has a\\nbasis in objective reality. In the case of actually\\nexisting things this cannot be doubted or gainsaid.\\nThe same is also true of possible essences. The simple\\nfact of existence makes no change or difference in\\ntheir relation to the mind. The actual and impossible\\nare equally intelligible. The content of the one, as of\\nthe other, is also based in an objective reality.\\nfound in 29. The Consideration of possible things, therefore,\\nobjective 1\\ntruth. leads the mind to the existence of objective truth.\\nIt conceives this truth as the basis of and the reason\\nwhy some things appear intelligible and others do not.\\nThis basis is real, just as the content of the idea is\\nreal. It is necessary because the mind is powerless to\\nchange its conceptions at will; it finds that the idea is\\nsuch and such and takes it as it is found. What it is\\nThe reasoning from possibility is to be viewed in connection\\nwith what follows. Thus in scope as in the manner of drawing\\nthe inference this argument must be distinguished from that of\\nKant. Cf. Janet, Traite Elementaire, p. 852.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 75\\nnow, it always was and always will be. The essence of\\na horse could never be other than it is; if so, the\\nhorse itself would be something else. Hence, we are\\nconstrained to admit an external, necessary basis to\\nexplain the content of a possible concept. We are led\\nto the objective reality of an external and necessary\\ntruth. This truth pervades the universe in some\\nwonderful manner. The mind is under its silent,\\npotent sway.\\n30. What is true of the idea can be affirmed in like (b) also\\n1 -1 TTT- 11-1 1 -i shown by\\nmanner of the judgment. With the latter the truth is an analysis\\nmuch more apparent and can be more readily grasped, judgment.\\nWe do not base our reasoning on the ordinary judg-\\nments employed in daily life. They depend upon a\\nvariety of circumstances and are conditioned by chang-\\ning things. Instead we take the first principles of\\nthought, e. g.j the principles of contradiction, of\\nexcluded middle, of identity. These principles are\\nsaid to be immediately evident. The connection\\nbetween subject and predicate is so intimate and\\nnecessary that the mind cannot help perceiving and\\naffirming it. They are called metaphysical principles;\\nwithout them discursive thought would be impossible;\\nthey impose upon the mind a law which it is powerless\\nto resist. It is natural to seek the true value of these\\nprinciples. Their control of the mind is supreme and\\ninexorable. Are they, then, merely subjective and\\nthe consequences of the mind s own nature?\\n8 31. First of all we observe that the name applied first\\n1 1 1 1 TVT principles\\nto them IS that of metaphvsical principles. Nowiniogicai\\n11 1 t r 1 1 onto-\\nMetaphysics or Ontology is the science of real being, logical\\nIts principles and fundamental notions are drawn from\\nthe consideration of the essence of things. They are,\\ntherefore, objectively real. Logic, on the contrary, is\\nthe science of mental operations and deals with ideal", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "76 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nbeing. Again, the first principles of Logic and the\\nfirst principles of Metaphysics are closely akin. They\\nare called by the same name, e. g., the principles of\\ncontradiction, of excluded middle, etc. They are only\\ndifferent expressions of great truths which pervade the\\nuniverse. The logical principle of contradiction,\\nthe mind cannot affirm or deny the same thing of\\nanother at the same time and under the same circum-\\nstances, has an objective validity when worded in\\nMetaphysics as the same thing cannot be and not be\\nat the same time. So also for the principles of\\nidentity and of excluded middle. The former expres-\\nsion is the logical, the latter is the ontoiogicai principle.\\n32. Hence, the first and fundamental principles of\\nthe mind are valid in the world of external reality, just\\nas the fundamental principles of the physical world\\npervade and dominate our mental life. The logical\\nprinciples do not depend upon existing things. They\\napply to the past and future, as to the present. If\\nthey were purely mental, their existence could be\\nexplained by the constitution of the mind. But they\\nare objectively real and point to a real and objective\\nbasis.\\n(c) reason- SS- Finally, the same line of thought is verified in\\nreasoning. The mental operation of reasoning consists\\nof the comparisons of ideas and of judgments with the\\nview to draw a conclusion. Ideas and judgments, there-\\nfore, form the material of our reasoning. Now if the\\nidea and the judgment are objectively real in the sense\\nexplained, and if they can only be explained by postu-\\nlating a basis which is objectively real, it follows that\\nthe process of reasoning is not the product of idle\\nfancy, but to be of value, it must be carried on in con-\\n^^The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, pp. 205, 228.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. *J7\\nformity to objective thing^s. The world of external o \u00c2\u00b0w^-\\nmust con-\\nreality then enters into the world of thougfht. The (oi to ob-\\njective\\nmind may turn or twist the mass to its own special truth,\\nends or purposes. Nevertheless, the content is objec-\\ntively real, the content comes from without, the pecu-\\nliar form and shape only can be ascribed to mental\\nactivity. An apt illustration is drawn from Mathe-\\nmatics.\\n34. Mathematics is distinguished from the other Mathe-\\nsciences because of its abstract character. It deals Astronomy,\\nwith abstract properties of numbers. It is distinc-\\ntively a work of the intelligence. I, e. g., could shut\\nm)^self in a room and for twenty years or more give\\nmyself up to the study of Geometry without once seek-\\ning verification for my conclusions in the world without.\\nThe result would be a complete science well-connected\\nand exact. It would not be the result of experience;\\nit is purely and solely a mental work. Yet scientists\\nassure us that the solar system is ruled by the truths\\nand principles which make up the science of Geometry\\nand to confirm the statement they point to the phys-\\nical and experimental science of Astronomy.\\n8 ^c;. How explain this marvellous accord? A world Hence the\\nreign of\\nof truth lies around. We see only in part and we truth,\\nknow only in part. The mind finds traces and indica-\\ntions of wonderful harmony between mental and phys-\\nical worlds; a harmony which can only be explained\\nby a basil unity. Not that one is the reflection of the\\nother, nor are they two aspects of the same thing.\\nSuch views contradict known truths and cannot be sus-\\ntained. But both suggest a unity which is above or\\nHoc ita esse debet, illud non ita; hoc ergo quaerens unde\\njudicarem, cum ita judicarem, inveneram incommutabilem et\\nveram veritatis aeternitatem, supra mentem meam commuta-\\nbilem. Aug. Conf., 1. VII, c. 17.\\n28 Chadbourne. Natural Theology, Lect. VIII, IX, X.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "78 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nbeneath, according as we view it, superior to or more\\nfundamental than either. This unity we cannot see\\nfor our eyes are holden, but we do see the traces of\\nits light in the world of sense and of thought, and from\\nthe participation, which we share in common with all\\nthinking beings and forming their constitution and\\nwritten law, we reason to its real existence. Else all\\nthinking things, all objects of our thought would be\\nshrouded in darkness and mystery and our minds\\nwould be put to inevitable confusion.\\nSt. Augus- g 36. This train of thought enables the reader to\\nreasoning, grasp the force of St. Augustine s famous argument\\ndrawn from the power and reign of truth. The mind\\ndoes not make, it finds the truth. In ordinary and\\nscientific language v/e speak of new discoveries made,\\nof the bounds of knowledge enlarged from day to day.\\nThe ingenuity of man may make instruments and\\nappliances to reach out or to apply the truth; but the\\ntruth itself is beyond his control. In its presence he\\nstands powerless. Its sv/ay is absolute and universal.\\nIt knows no limitation of time, of space, or of any\\ncreated intelligence. This absolute dominion of truth\\ncan only be explained in God. Its basis is not the\\nhuman mind, or existing things. Unchangeable and\\neternal it rises above the changing fortunes of con-\\ntingent things, and points to a mind unchangeable and\\neternal, whence its source and only sufficient expla-\\nnation.\\nS. Th. 1. q. 16, a. 5, ad. 2; 1, q, 12, a. 2; 1. q, 88, a. 3; 1. 2. q.\\nQ3, a. 2; 3. q. 5, a. 4. ad. 2; 1. q. 84 a. 5; C, Gent. 1. 3. e. 47;\\nCard. Zigliara, 1, 4, c. 12, 13.\\n30 De Lib. Arbit. 1. 2, ch. 8-12-14 where he also reasons that\\nthe highest truth is the greatest good; De Vera Relig., ch. 30,\\n31; Soliloq. 1. I, n. 3; Confess. XII, 25; Bossuet, Connaissance\\nde Dieu et soi meme, ch. IV-VII.\\nDr. William Ward, Philosophy of Theism, vol. I.\\n22 Fenelon, Demonstration de I existence de Dieu, p. i, ch.\\nIV. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 79\\n\u00c2\u00a737. The conclusion, therefore, is evident. ^^Jn i^sisof\\nanalysis of our mental life leads us to the existence of cental life\\nleads to\\nGod. The reasoning is from the effect. At first g^^jence of\\nsight, obscure and subtile, its power grows upon reflec-\\ntion. Our minds are subject to the laws and reign of\\ntruth. The truth is not purely subjective, not the\\nfanciful creation of the imagination. It has objective\\nelements and an objective basis. It is necessary and\\neternal, pervading alike the world of matter and of\\nmind. It constrains us to admit an external and neces-\\nsary mind. Therefore, God exists, the foundation and\\nsource of truth.\\nIV.\\nDr. Royce s Argument.\\n38. The course of reasoning set forth at first sight Prof-\\nbears a resemblance to that of Prof. Royce and found\\nin his works The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,\\nSpirit of Modern Philosophy, The Conception\\nof God. Upon closer examination a wide and funda-\\nmental difference is seen.\\n8 ^g. Prof. Royce admits his indebtedness to Kant, his\\nteaching.\\nSchelling and Hegel. He candidly ranks himself among\\nthe post-Kantian philosophers. Yet he is unlike them\\nall. With Kant he admits that theoretical reason can\\nnever give us external reality, that only a moral faith or\\ninsight can give certainty to what is beyond conscious-\\nness. Hence, the chapter on the Postulates. The ex-\\nternal world, the existence of God are postulate of\\n33 St. Aug. in Joan. tr. 23, n. 9, 10, 11.\\n^Cf. Hontheim, Theodicea, p. 128; Boedder, Theologia\\nNaturalis, p. 48; Balmes sees in the reasoning mind an argu-\\nment from intellectual order, Fundamental Philosophy, p. II,\\nB. IV. ch. 23. As such it bears contrast with the proofs from\\nthe moral and the physical order. The force of the argument,\\nhowever, rests in showing that truth is objective.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "80 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nmoral insight. Unlike Prof. Fraser he does not rest\\nhere.^* He attempts to justify the postulate and show\\nin what way the moral faith is rational. He does not\\nseek the reason for it in the faith or religious feeling\\nof Jacobi and Schleiermacher, nor in the asthetic sense\\nof the Neo-Kantians, nor in the religion of humanity.\\nHe turns abruptly and tries to justify his position from\\nintimate analysis of the theoretical reason. Hence,\\nhis candid and beautiful chapters on scepticism and\\npessimism. In developing the argument he appeals\\n(i) to the very act of thinking, e.^ thought itself;\\n(2) to the fact of error; (3) to the fact of ignorance.\\nThese are phases of the one and same argument and\\nshow a growing development in the writer.^\\nfacts true. 40. (i) The facts adduced by Prof. Royce can-\\nnot be questioned. They are a part of the con-\\nscious experience of every mind. Young and old,\\nuneducated and learned, are forced to admit that they\\nare in ignorance of many things, that day by day the\\nknowledge of truth is increased, that they have been\\nfrequently in error, and that the possibilities of error\\nare great. On these facts our argument was raised,\\nand we are happy to know that Prof. Royce has grasped\\ntheir significance and set them forth with a grace of\\nexpression and a wealth of detail.\\nfalse as S 41, (2\\\\ If, howcvcr, wc vicw thcse data, not abso-\\nProf. Royce, 7 t -r^ j\\nwords lutely, but m Prof. Royce s environment, we do not\\nsee what their real value in the present case can be.\\nHe sets forth with Kant s famous distinction, and\\ndevelops it and makes it his own. He is thus in an\\nPhil, of Theism, 2d series, p. 4.\\n2^ Spirit of Modern Philosophy, part II, ch. XL\\n2 Religious Aspect of Philosophy, ch. XL\\n3^ Conception of God, p. 15.\\n39 New World, June, 1898; A New Form of Theism, by J. E.\\nRussell.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "MENTAL LIFE. 8l\\nidealistic atmosphere. His Supreme Reality is An\\nultimate aspect of things. His initial point is abso-\\nlute scepticism. The very effort to rid himself of this\\nshows the fundamental principle to be false. Never-\\ntheless, he retains it in spite of the open contradiction\\nand makes no effort to question its truth.\\n\u00c2\u00a742. What is the test for subjective truth? Not test for\\nconformity with external reality. This he expressly\\nrejects. But conformity with a higher intelligence.\\nHence, he is a disciple of Berkeley. Here he falls into\\n2i petitio principii. He sets forth with the data of con-\\nsciousness to reason God s existence, as absolute\\nTruth. Yet he postulates the existence of the All-\\nKnower or All-Enfolder to justify the veracity of the\\ndata. This was the mistake of Descartes.\\n43. Again, his exposition of thought and of judg- thought\\nment is incorrect. The idea is the apprehension of anient.\\nreality, the judgment is a perception of the agreement\\nor disagreement of two ideas. Hence, an objective ele-\\nment is found in both. Yet Prof. Royce explains them\\nas wholly and entirely subjective. In setting forth the\\nnature of error, he confounds intention with attention^\\nand in passages almost following each other expresses\\nmost contradictory statements. If judgment and idea\\nnot only as acts, but viewed in their contents, are\\npurely subjective, we reach only a subjective inference.\\nThe All-Knower is a creation of the mind; it is not\\nobjectively real. To postulate it as a reality shows\\nthat the demonstration, as such, has failed absolutely\\nto give a reasoned truth. We admire much in Prof.\\nRoyce; his beautiful and thoughtful style, his candor\\nReligious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 222,\\nSpirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. XI; Religious Aspect of\\nPhilosophy, ch. VI, VII.\\nReligious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 342, 378.\\nReligious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 398, 399.\\n6", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "82 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nand truthful spirit, his penetrating criticisms of Scepti-\\ncism, of the Dieu-Proges, of the Relativity of Knowl-\\nedge. He has grasped the issue fairly; has seen many\\ntruths. His prepossessions and his assumptions taken\\nfrom others we object to. They are all centered in a\\nfalse epistemology. He has shown an honest develop-\\nment in philosophy, has rejected opinions once enter-\\ntained which gives the hope of further development\\nstill. There is a true Idealism, and Christian philoso-\\nphy gladly welcomes truth in any form.\\nPantheistic, g 44. Finally, this truth must not be identified with\\nGod. This is the Pantheism of Fichte. From the\\nintellectual, moral and physical order we reason to\\nGod s existence; but God is not the order itself.\\nWith as much truth I could, on seeing a beautiful\\nmansion, maintain that the symmetry and truth re-\\nvealed in the building is its maker. No, these point\\nto an Architect, just as the reign of truth points to a\\nMind.\\nSpirit of Modern Phil., ch. XI; Religious Aspect of Philoso-\\nphy, p. 194.\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^^Hunt, Pantheism, p. 264.\\nReligious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 195.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER V.\\nMORAL LIFE.\\nThe analysis of mental life does not exhaust the con- moral\\nTi/r nature.\\ntent of conscious experience. Man is not only an\\nintellectual, he is a moral being also. Endowed with\\na mind capable of acquiring a knowledge of himself\\nand of external things, he likewise possesses a heart\\nfilled Vv^ith longings for what is true, and beautiful and\\ngood. A consideration of mental data shows the exist-\\nence and power of a mind transcendent and immanent,\\nthe source and basis of objective truth. Our moral\\nnature in stronger and clearer voice calls us to look\\nbeyond ourselves to one who prescribes the funda-\\nmental laws and principles of human conduct, and\\nalone is able to satisfy the desires of the soul.\\n8 2, The moral argument embraces the lines of rea-t^^argu.\\n_ ment.\\nsoning based upon the existence and power of a moral\\nlaw over human life and upon the longings of the\\nhuman soul. It naturally separates into two parts.\\nThe former is better known as the argument from con-\\nscience; the latter as the argument from fundamental\\ndesires.\\n3. The argument from conscience has always been its force.\\na favorite with Theistic writers. Much simpler in form\\nthan that from ideas, it appeals to data more obvious.\\nIts force is apprehended not only by those whose minds\\nhave been disciplined to metaphysical reasoning. The\\nuneducated are conscious of the still small voice which\\nspeaks silently from the depths of the soul. Much,\\nhowever, depends upon the manner in which the argu-\\nment is proposed.\\n[83]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "84\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n1\u00c2\u00b0. The Moral Order.\\nright and\\nwrong.\\nman acts\\nfor a\\npurpose.\\nunity of\\nphysical\\nnature.\\n4. The distinction between right and wrong is a\\nprimary conviction of the human soul. Go where you\\nwill the wide world over, speak to persons in every\\nrank of society from the years of budding reasoning\\neven to decrepit old age, you will find that this truth is\\nan inalienable possession of mankind. An obligation\\npresses upon us to do what is right. We may do\\nwrong, but we are conscious of violating a law. The\\nobligation, therefore, is not of physical necessity. It\\ndoes not take away the exercise of free-will. The\\nnecessity is a moral one. It is that which has a basis\\nin the relation of means to an end. A rational creature\\nmust employ certain means to obtain a definite end.\\nTrue, he need not use these means; but the end can-\\nnot be secured without them.-\\n5. Now it is a fact of consciousness that, when we\\nact in the full possession of our faculties, we act for a\\npurpose or an end. The reason is found in our nature\\nas intelligent beings. Our waking lives are made up\\nof efforts to reach determined objects. Thus the mind\\nis led to grasp the notion of a moral order.\\n6. We look out into the world around us and see\\ncreatures differing in nature, but devoid of intelligence,\\nputting forth activities of various kinds. An order\\nand harmony prevails throughout. Every object pos-\\nsesses activities and exerts these not by virtue of free-\\ndetermination but through a physical necessity. It\\ncannot act otherwise than it does. Nevertheless, a\\nunity of action obtains and the world is viewed as a\\nDate of Modern Ethics, by Rev. J. Ming, S J,, p. 175.\\nMgr. d Hulst, Confer, de Notre Dame, 1892.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "MORAL LIFE. 85\\nsystem. The relation of means to ends is everywhere\\nvisible and furnishes the basis on which the argument\\nfrom design rests.\\n7. The same truth reigns in human life. With this o^ moral\\ndistinction, however, that lower creation by a physical\\nnecessity, in virtue of their nature, act in a determined\\nway for definite ends. Human action, on the contrary,\\nis free. The individual sees the end and bends the\\nenergies of mind and of body to its possession. A unity\\nand harmony should also prevail in our moral life.^\\nThis only is had by an ultimate unity of tendency.\\nThe conscious apprehension of this exercises a direct-\\ning and controlling influence over individual acts.\\nThus, human acts can be viewed as constituting\\na system. On this fact is based the science of\\nEthics.*\\n8 8. The reason for the unity and harmony which reason of\\nthis moral\\nshould reign m moral life is found not alone in unity,\\nthe subjective consciousness of the individual, but in\\nan objective moral order. All men seek happiness.\\nHappiness is the ultimate purpose of activity. Men\\nhave sought happiness in riches, in honor, or in\\nsensual pleasure. The result is bitter disappointment.\\nIn so acting men do not live up to the standard which\\nshould guide their lives. Here is seen the sphere and\\npower of the moral law. It is the guide and sanction\\nfor what conduces to our true last end. The sanction\\nis needed because of the free-will in the human\\nagent. By following its guidance we shall surely\\nobtain true happiness. The obligation to obey it is\\n2 Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 140, 141,\\nThe objection that the moral law is only the expression of\\nman s constitution is not of great weight, How in this hypoth-\\nesis can we explain its binding force in spite of free will and\\nthe fact of disobedience? Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. Ill,-\\np. 264.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "86 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ng^^ncdon in therefore based in the very nature of things.* Only\\nviduai. thus is Unity and harmony obtained in our moral life.\\nBy acting contrary to the moral law we bring unhap-\\npiness to ourselves and destroy the harmony which\\nshould otherwise exist. Order is preserved by obedi-\\nence to its dictates; if disorder is found it is due to\\nthe exercise of free-will.^\\nin history. 9. This truth is not limited to individual conscious-\\nness. The distinction between good and bad is found\\nin the laws, literature and religious beliefs of all peo-\\nples. If nations differ as to the morality of individual\\nacts, the difference is due to varying circumstances or\\nto an error of judgment. The great fundamental dis-\\ntinction is never obliterated.^\\n10. We cast a hasty glance over the history of the\\npast. The records of nations and of men rise before\\nus. The sanction of the moral order is not confined\\nto the individual. Not only does happiness follow the\\nperformance of a good act, and remorse attend an evil\\naction. Virtue and truth triumph sooner or later.\\nA man sacrifices honor, wealth, position, in obedience\\nto the moral law; his portion is contempt, calumny,\\nmay be death. The years roll on and time rights\\nLex aeterna moderatrix humanarum. St. Aug. De Lib.\\nArb., L I, c. 6.\\nMartineau, A Stud)^ of Religion, voL I, p. 21.\\nIn a suggestive chapter on Moral Insight Prof. Royce\\nreasons that ethical doubt leads to the apprehension of the abso-\\nlute and the universal will, (p. 172). It is true that doubt as to\\nwhat vve ought to do towards the attainment of universal har-\\nmony, (p. 141) may arouse in the mind the conviction of a\\nmoral order. Nevertheless it is not true to say that the stand-\\nard of action is the universal will which results from the\\neffort to become one with all the conflicting wulls, (pp. 172,\\n173). Such a standard is neither absolute nor universal; it is\\nmerely the subjective product of the mind, and as such ideal.\\nCL The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. i, ch. VI, VII.\\nS. Th. r, 2, q. 93, a. 4; q. 94, a. 5; Meyer, Inst. Jur. Nat.,\\np. 232; Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, p. 18.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "MORAL LIFE. 8/\\neverything. The true condition shines forth like the\\nsun. A moral action is justified by the progress of\\nevents, and men look back in praise to what so many\\nsaw only to condemn. The record of Christian virtue\\nis a striking illustration. Dragged before public tribu-\\nnals, tortured, robbed of wealth and position, the scorn\\nof men, the sport of wild beasts, the early martyrs\\nwent to an ignominious death. But might does not\\nconstitute right. The day surely comes when the\\nposition shall be reversed, when the last shall be first\\nand the first shall be last. Thus morality triumphs, as\\nhistory abundantly proves. Victory ultimately crowns\\nthe efforts of those who strive to obey\\nThe written and unchanging laws of heaven\\nThey are not of to-day or yesterday,\\nBut ever live and no one knows their birthtide.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Conscience.\\nII. The moral law so universal in time and place, conscience,\\nso exacting in its behests is made known through the\\nvoice of conscience. Conscience is thus the judgment\\nof the individual as to the morality of his own con-\\nduct; it is the application of the moral law to the\\nparticular events and circumstances of life.\\n12. This hidden monitor proclaims the ineradicable its office,\\ndistinction between good and evil. It awakens in the\\nsoul the consciousness of obligation and of duty. It\\nis the ultimate basis and guide of human action. Its\\nvoice is ever heard urging, restraining, praising or\\ncondemning. I carry with me in the lonely silence of\\nAntigone, 454-456.\\nCard. Newman, Grammar of Assent; Data of Modern Ethics,\\nJ. Ming, S. J. p. 186; Flint, Theism, p. 402; Cicero de Repub.,\\nI, II, ch. 22.\\nMiiller s definition of conscience is therefore partial and\\nerroneous. Natural Religion, p. 181.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "88 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nmy room a judge and witness of my most secret\\nthoughts. From its decisions there is no appeal. For\\nthey are the promulgations and applications of an\\neternal law which rules the course of history and of\\nman. The commands of duty, the consciousness of\\nobligation, the ought or ought not, are the\\ninseparable witnesses of every thought, word, or deed.^*\\n3\u00c2\u00b0. Argument.\\nfoSuiated ^3 argument from conscience can now be\\nformulated. It rests upon the moral order of the uni-\\nverse as an ultimate basis. Everywhere are found\\nindelible marks of a morally constituted world. What\\nis held so firmly in the consciousness of the individual,\\npervades the laws, customs, and religious beliefs of\\nmankind, and is verified by the course of history.\\nConscience, therefore, only promulgates a law eternal\\nand necessary. Now a moral law imposing upon a\\nfree agent the obligation of right and of duty, con-\\nstraining him to obedience even at the loss of wealth\\nand position, entailing self-sacrifice and sufi ering,\\ncontravening at times our individual hopes and desires,\\nfurnishing an unfailing source of strength in trial,\\nrewarding the good with peace and buoyancy of mind,\\npunishing the evildoer with the agony of remorse and\\nthe foretaste of utter failure, must have a moral source\\nand basis abDve and beyond the will of the individual.\\nConscience thus reveals a Lawgiver, who is the source\\nof the moral order, the supreme judge of human\\naction. The same Being who formed the human mind\\n12 Moral Philosophy, W. Hill, S. J., ch. VIII; Goethe, Tasso,\\nIII., 2; Tacitus, Annals, VI, 6; Cicero, de Leg., I, 14; Balfour,\\nFoundations of Belief, p. 79; The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly,\\nP- 305\\n1^ Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. II, p. 370; Dimon, The\\nTheistic Argument, Lect. VIIl.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "MORAL LIFE. 89\\nand is the basis of the truth which reigns supreme\\nthroughout the universe, giving the explanation of its\\nconstitution and harmony, also formed the moral order,\\nthe source and explanation of the harmony which\\nshould prevail in the world of man.\\n14. This argument has been a favorite with its history.\\nChristian writers. TertuUian appeals to it in his\\ndefense of Christianity.^ St. Augustine presents it in\\nmost beautiful passages of his confessions. Pascal,\\nFenelon, Bossuet, Butler, and Card. Newman word it\\nin language penetrating and sublime. It awakens in\\nthe mind the consciousness of dependence on one who\\nis far above and yet deep down in the recesses of the\\nsoul. It assures us that God is not only intelligent\\nand great, but also just and good. It has made heroes\\nthroughout the ages, and when enlightened by Chris-\\ntian faith is the unfailing source of Christian sanctity.\\n4\u00c2\u00b0. Errors.\\n15. To Kant the moral argument appealed with Kant,\\ngreat force. It presented a barrier against the\\ndestructive tendencies of his intellectual philosophy.\\nHe called the idea of duty and of moral obligation a\\npostulate of the practical reason. On this he raises\\nthe argument for the existence of God. The peculiar\\nposition occupied by Kant in the philosophic world\\ngave great weight to this line of reasoning. Theistic\\nwriters again and again have cited it with approval.\\nA brief examination of its worth will not, therefore,\\nbe out of place.\\n16. Kant taught that personality constituted man his notion\\nan absolutely independent being. Hence man has in\\n*De Anima, c. 7.\\nCritic of Judgment, 86; Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 175.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "90\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nits effects.\\nCriticism.\\na new\\nteaching.\\nnot justi-\\nfied.\\nhimself his own end. This independence is what gives\\nvalue to a morally good act. Then man acts as a\\nperson. A law imposed from without is not law, but\\npower. Autonomy is of the essence of morality. An\\nautonomous law alone can be moral. It is then actu-\\nated by a motive purely moral, for itself.\\n17. Hence the rise of independent morality.\\nFichte propagates the new doctrine. It is found in\\nGrotius, and in Rousseau. Through them it has\\ninfluenced modern thought. We find it openly taught\\nby the most recent German disciples of Kant, by the\\napostles of Culture under the leadership of Matthew\\nArnold and Emerson, by the Ethical societies in our\\nown country, and finds a congenial expression in the\\nReligion of Humanity.\\n18. The moral teaching of Kant is something new\\nin history. It differs both from Stoicism and from\\nChristianity. To him duty is not a manifestation of\\nnature, as with the Stoics, nor does it come from God\\nalone. It is an absolute, an independent law. We\\nobey it not through the hope of earthly happiness or\\nfuture reward.^\\n19. A morality which is not from divine origin,\\nnor can be considered as the expression of nature, can-\\nnot be justified. It is nothing more than an individual\\nor hereditary habit. It cannot be reconciled with the\\nexplicit testimony of consciousness, with the impera-\\ntive demands of duty, nor can it furnish the data for\\nany sound system or science of Ethics. According\\nT. Pesch, Kant et la Science Moderne, p. 170.\\nde Jure Belli, Proleg. n. 11.\\nSocial Contract.\\nPesch., 1. c, p. 1S9.\\n20 Cf. Hutton, Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters\\nof Faith, p. 271.\\nLa Morale de Kant, par A. Cresson, ch. IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "MORAL LIFE. 9I\\nto Kant morality rests on the individual judgment.\\nNow experience shows that judgments vary. In the\\nconflict who is right? The inevitable result is moral\\nscepticism and pessimism.\\nII.\\nFundamental Desires.\\n20. The force of this train of reasoning consists in uneof\\nshowing that our nature reaches out to and cries aloud\\nfor God. The cry comes from the depths of our being.\\nIt is not a passing phase of human emotion. It is per-\\nsistent and as universal as mankind. The longings of\\nour nature in various ways give expression to the cry\\nfor light and life. Only He who made the human soul\\ncan appease its cravings.\\nS 21. Ci) The mind is made to know truth. This is aspiration\\nr for truth.\\nIts object and m possession of truth it rests content.\\nNow the capacity of the mind for truth is infinite. It\\npenetrates the heavens above and the earth beneath.\\nIn restless activity it ever seeks new fields for investi-\\ngation. Created nature does not satisfy the desire of\\nknowledge. From the contemplation of the universe\\nthe mind rises to the Creator. With reverence and\\nwonder it strives to penetrate the Divine essence and\\ntell of the infinite perfections contained therein. True\\nto this rational tendency Plato placed the happiness of\\nthe philosopher in the contemplation of truth. And\\nChristian Theology teaches that man s ultimate end\\nand highest good is had in the vision of the God-head.\\nRoyce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. i, ch. V, VL\\n2 Prof. Porter, Science and Sentiment; Dr. Davidson, Burnett\\nLectures, 1892-93.\\n4 St. Aug. Confess. 1. VII, ch. 10; de Doctrina Christ, 1. i, ch,\\nS. 9.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "92 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nlove of the g 22. (2) The wili of man naturally seeks the good.\\nThe apprehension of good not attained is the source\\nand explanation of rational activity. Its possession\\nbrings rest and happiness. Now the capacity of the\\nwill for good is infinite. The passing objects of this\\nworld do not bring a lasting satiety. The heart is too\\ndeep and great to be appeased with anything less than\\nthe eternal and uncreated good. Hence the will in its\\nlongings passes beyond the present and seeks a future\\nexistence. The apprehension of a future life includes\\nthe possession of God, the highest good to the human\\nsouL^^\\ndesire of g 23. (3) The desire of life is fundamental. It\\nsprings from the depths of our being. Man longs to\\nlive. For life he willingly surrenders wealth and posi-\\ntion. The conviction that the visible world does not\\ninclude the sum-total of life is an inalienable possession\\nof the human race. Man bridges the dark chasm of\\ndeath and reaches out to a future existence v/ith its\\nuntold possibilities, its larger scope and fulness of life.\\nIn prayer v ^e cry aloud to the living God, in whose life\\nwe shall have life. The expression of this desire is a\\nfact of individual consciousness and finds abundant\\nillustration in the religious records of mankind. Belief\\nin immortalit}^ is inseparably connected with belief in\\nGod.\\nha ^\\\\nlss\u00c2\u00b0 24. (4) The desirc of happiness is a common prop-\\nerty of hum^anity. Everywhere man seeks to be happy.^\\nNow this desire cannot be satisfied perfectly by the\\ngoods of this world. Our happiness here is only\\nSt. Aug. Enar. in Ps. 26; de Civ. Dei, 1. II, ch. 10,\\nAtsi dixisset; omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non\\nvultis; dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret\\nvoluntate, quidquidenim quisquam latenter velit, ab hac volun-\\ntate quae omnibus hominibus satis nota sit non recederit,\\nAug. De Trin. 1. VIII, ch. 3.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "MORAL LIFE. 93\\ntransitory. The human soul seeks for something more\\nlasting than temporal pleasures, I do not deny that\\nmen are happy in this life. Pessimism is not a fact\\nor a true scheme of philosophy. Only this, that there\\nis a void in the human soul which earthly pleasures\\ncannot reach or satisfy. The avocations of a busy life\\nmay still the want for a time. But in the lonely\\nsilence of night, with the passing away of friends and\\nold companions, in the growing consciousness of life\\nfast ebbing, this desire becomes strong and unmistak-\\nable. We cannot quiet its voice. The pleasures of life\\nare weighed in the balance and found wanting. We\\nreach out in thought and desire beyond the limits of\\npresent existence. We seek a lasting happiness in the\\npresence and possession of a Being whose infinite per-\\nfections satisfy every craving of the soul, and in v/hose\\nfruition is found eternal blessedness.^\u00c2\u00ae\\n82 c;. (c) That man is a relierious beino: is a truth of man s\\n^-J^ religious\\nconsciousness and a fact of histor} Just as mankmd nature,\\nshows its social nature in the existence of communi-\\nties, in the laws and customs which govern the domestic\\nand civic relations, so in like manner history furnishes\\nproof of his religious nature. Everywhere are found\\ntemples, religious rites, and a priesthood of some kind.\\nIt seems as natural for men to express after this fashion\\ntheir belief in God, who is the Author and Father of\\ntheir being, as it is to gather into communities, to\\nexercise the various acts of a community life.\\n8 26. The argument from our desires has been strength of\\n_ _ the argu-\\nseverely criticised. That v/e desire an object, it is ^ent.\\nW. H. Mallock, Is Life Worth Living, p. 3.\\nCognoscere Deum in aliquo communi sub quadam con-\\nfusione est nobis naturaliter insertum in quantum Deus est\\nhominis habitudo. St. Thomas, i. q. 2, a. i.\\nJ. S, Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 139; Prof. Fraser, in Phil-\\nosophy of Theism, p. 201.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "94 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nsaid, is no valid proof that the object exists. The best\\nreply is to remove obscurity and exaggeration. We\\nappeal not to every desire, but only to those which are\\nfundamental, common to all men, and thus viewed as\\nthe voice of our human nature. Again, the argument\\nmust not be considered independent and alone. True,\\nit has not the force of other lines of reasoning. Never-\\ntheless, in connection with them it has force, subsidiary\\nmaybe, yet very great. It shows that man s nature in\\nits entirety looks up to God.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VI.\\nCONTINGENCY.\\nI. Man is the highest and noblest being in the\\nvisible universe. He stands at the head of the scale\\nof beings which vary in perfection down to the lowest\\nforms of organic life. His nature is not satisfied with\\nwhat is below; it craves something higher; in many-\\nways it reaches out and cries to God.\\nS 2. The data on which is based the proof of the So^^^^^s ^f\\nidea of God\\nexistence of God are not confined to our own nature, in the world\\nwithout.\\nThrough the senses the mind is brought in contact with\\nthe world about us. External things become the\\nobjects of thought. To the eager student the various\\naspects of nature appeal with an absorbing interest.\\nEach discovery, like a rift in the clouds, enlarges the\\nvision and enables the mind to catch a glimpse of that\\nmarvellous background of law and order which obtains\\nthroughout. Thus we have the various departments\\nof physical science which are only various aspects of\\nthe one great world around us. Each in its proper\\nsphere presents the relations of the phenomena and\\nthe laws which govern their movement. Nevertheless,\\nthey are not isolated; they bear relations one to\\nanother, and when viewed as a co-ordinated whole\\nthey give the best accredited and scientific knowledge\\nof the visible universe.^\\nDr. Stirling says the three proofs: Cosmological, Teleologi-\\ncal and Ontological constitute together but the three undula-\\ntions of a single wave, which wave is a natural rise and ascent\\nto God. Gilford Lectures of i8qo; Dimon, The Theistic Argu-\\nment, p. 77.\\n[95j", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "96 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThe fact of 2. As wc look out into the world the mind is\\nmovement.\\nimpressed with the great fact that all things change.^\\nSpring follows Winter, and Summer follows Spring in\\norderly succession. Night gives place to day, and day\\nto night in unvarying round. The seed is planted in\\nthe ground, rises in a stalk, flowers and produces seed\\nagain. We too change from youth to manhood, to\\nold age. The disposition to change is inherent in\\neverything, and the fact obtains with the necessity of\\na physical law.\\nIts aspects. 4. In this fact we can distinguish (a) the thing\\nwhich changes, (b) the change itself, (c) the cause of\\nthe change, (d) the marvellous order in the changes-\\nThe first is the basis on which rests the argument\\nfrom contingency; the second leads to the argument\\nfrom motion; the third gives the argument from\\ncausality; the last is the argument from order and\\ncontrivance.\\nI.\\nBasis.\\nargument 5. The argument of contingency arises from a con-\\ntingency, sideration of the beings which make up the world. By\\nobservation and experiment we investigate their nature\\nand constitution. The one dominant factor, which\\nprevails throughout, is dependence.^ No existing thing\\nis isolated; a constant action and interaction takes\\nplace. As a result particular beings undergo various\\nmodifications. These changes clearly show that the\\nAug. de Lib. Arblt., 1. 2, ch. 17.\\n3 Pfleiderer agrees with Kant and Hume and Strauss in main-\\ntaining that in proving the individuals contingent we cannot\\ninfer that the whole is so. Cf Phil, and Devel. of Religion, p.\\n148; The Philosophy of Religion, vol. Ill, p. 256. The argu-\\nment in its present form is valid for the whole as well as for the\\nparts. Ronayne, God Knowable and Known, p. 19.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. 9/\\nbeings themselves are dependent. As such they are not\\nsufficient for themselves but need support one from\\nanother. The character of dependence is, therefore,\\nmarked indelibly upon the visible universe. It is the\\nfinger of God. The knowledge of this fact constrains\\nthe mind to admit the existence of a being distinct from\\nthe world, yet over all, who alone can give a sufficient\\nreason for its dependence. We must, therefore, prove,\\nI, that the world is contingent 2, that this fact demands\\nan explanation in the necessary being, which is God.* J\\nII.\\nArgument.\\n6. To obtain a knowledge of the world we go to Knowledge\\nthe physical sciences. They set forth the properties, bie worw^^\\nrelations and laws of external nature. There are found tiiephysicS\\nfacts and principles which furnish the materials for our^\\nargument.\\n7. (i) Chemistry treats of the composition of(i)chem-\\nsubstances and the changes which they undergo. It^^\\ntells us that substances are made up of small particles\\nof matter called atoms. As to the quality or essence\\nof these atoms scientists at present are divided. The\\ngreat majority maintain that there are seventy-six ele-\\nments essentially different one from the other. Some\\ncontend that further analysis will disclose some com-\\nmon basis underlying these elements which accounts\\nfor the fact of their manifold, combinations.^\\nThe phenomena or changes in the universe have indeed\\neach of them a beginning and a cause, but their cause is always\\na prior change; nor do the analogies of experience give us any\\nreason to expect, from the mere occurrence of changes, that if\\nwe could trace back the series far enough we should arrive at a\\nPrimeval volition. Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 153. The\\nobjection is answered in the following pages.\\nCooke, New Chemistry, pp. 117, 118; Harper, S J., Meta-\\nphysics of the School, vol. I; The Unseen Universe, p. 160.\\n7", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "98\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nShows that\\nelements\\nare limited\\n(a) from\\ntheir num-\\nber.\\n(b) from\\ntheir de-\\ntermined\\nmode of\\nexistence.\\n(c) from\\ntheir defi-\\nnite com-\\nbination.\\n8. Now if the elements be different, e. g., seventy-\\nsix, the question naturally arises why are there so\\nmany and not more or less. Their existence is limited.\\nThe mind can easily conceive more or less existing.\\nThe fact that constant experimentation discloses an\\nelement hitherto unknown, or proves an element to be\\ncompound which before was considered simple, or\\nreduces so-called simple elements to a simpler one, is\\nproof for the contention. The elements themselves\\nare silent they contain no sufficient reason for their\\npresent existence; they are limited and dependent. If\\nthere be essentially only one element, two suppositions\\ncan be made. Either the atoms are limited in number\\nor they are infinite. In the former hypothesis they are\\nlimited and dependent. The latter hypothesis cannot\\nbe held, for it demands that an infinite number of\\natoms actually exist. But this is not only without\\nfoundation in fact, but is opposed to the principles of\\nsound reasoning, as will be shown further on.\\n9. Furthermore these atoms have a physical con-\\ncrete existence. They therefore exist in a determined\\nconcrete mode and shape. To affirm that a physical\\nreality has not special modes and form is equivalent to\\nassert that it does not exist. It cannot be maintained\\nthat a material atom has infinite modes of existence at\\none and the same instant of time. Some determined\\nmode and figure is of the essence of matter. True, a\\nmaterial atom may undergo successive changes and\\nassume various shapes as a result of the interaction of\\nother elements and in obedience to mechanical or\\nchemical laws. But these modifications are a striking\\nproof of its intrinsic dependence.\\n10. Finally, atoms combine in definite proportion\\nand their action follows on certain definite lines.\\nHence the laws of chemical equivalents and multiple", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. 99\\nproportions. The nature of the elements, therefore,\\nrequires that they combine in such and such a manner.\\nNow the determined mode of action reveals their limited\\nand determined nature. We therefore conclude that\\ntheir nature is dependent and limited; that they\\npresent no sufficient explanation for this limitation.\\nII. (2) Physics is that department of natural (2) Physics.\\nscience which treats of the general properties of bodies\\nand the causes that modify those properties. From it\\nare drawn strong and irrefutable proofs of our thesis.\\n812. (a) The great law of Physics is the law of inertia, (a) mechan-\\nical Physics\\nAccordmg to this law, matter is indifferent to rest or the law of\\n_. inertia.\\nmotion. If it be m a state of rest, it will remain so\\nunless an impulse to motion is imparted from an exter-\\nnal cause. If it be in a state of motion, it will con-\\ntinue to move until an external impediment causes the\\nmotion to retard or to cease.\\n13. Now in its physical existence matter must be\\neither in a state of rest or of motion. If the former,\\nit would exist in a solid or liquid or a gaseous state.\\nIf the latter, the motion would be of a certain velocity\\nand in a definite direction. Ordinary observation\\nshows that matter exists in all these conditions. In\\nthe hypothesis that matter is absolute and not depend-\\nent on any other being whatsoever, how can we account\\nfor its indifference to rest or motion? If it were abso-\\nlutely independent then rest or motion would be of its\\nessence. In the former case no motion would be\\npossible; in the latter there would be no rest. Ordi-\\nnary experience shows that these suppositions are con-\\ntrary to fact, and the law of inertia proves that they\\nare repugnant. Hence we have the remarkable, yet\\nHence in explaining the law of inertia writers distinguish\\nthe inertia of movement and the inertia of repose. Cf. Pere\\nVillard, Dieu Devant la Science et la Raison, ch. III.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "100 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfundamental, fact that matter must exist either in a\\nstate of rest or of motion; nevertheless, it is absolutely\\npowerless to determine itself to one state or the other.\\nThe determination exists as a physical fact, and the\\nlaw of inertia which reigns supreme proves to convic-\\ntion that the determination cannot come from matter\\nitself. The conclusion, therefore, is obvious that it\\ncomes from some external source. Hence the depend-\\nence of matter is an evident inference from the science\\nof Physics.\\n(b)Thermo- 8 14, (b) Thcrmo-Dynamics is the name given to\\nDynamics. ,^7^^ r,\\nthat oepartment of physical science which treats of the\\nmechanical action or relations of heat. Its origin is\\nvery recent, but so important have been the discoveries\\nin this field and so deep an insight has it presented to\\na fuller comprehension of the mysteries which envelop\\nthe interaction of nature s forces that it holds a pro-\\nminent place in the interest of scientific men. The\\nlabors of Helmholtz, of Tyndall, and of Thompson\\nhave been zealously taken up by the younger genera-\\ntion and the records of scientific meetings present the\\nmarvellous successes which have attended investiga-\\ntions in this special field.\\nshows a 18. The knowledge of a physical law is a solution\\nconver-\\ngence to many facts shrouded in obscurity. It opens a vista\\nof laws J f\\nworking to along which the mmd can travel. Not only present\\na definite 1 ^u\\nend. occurrences become simple and easy to explain. 1 he\\nfuture also is brought within the sphere of study and\\nwe are enabled to predict what will happen for the\\ncoming years. Oar inferences will become certainties\\nif the mind be enabled to detect a convergence of laws\\nworking steadily and irresistibly to a definite end.\\nThis is the nature of the present proof. The science\\nof Thermo-Dynamics sets forth laws or principles\\nwhich show to conviction that the time will come when", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. lOI\\nthe universe will have an end. If it had an end we can\\ninfer that it had a beginning. At any rate it is not\\neternal, but is limited and dependent.\\n8 i6. (i) A fundamental law of Physics is the con- d) law of\\nconserva-\\nservation of matter. Formerly it was thought possible tion of\\nthat matter could be destroyed. In proof of this,\\nappeal was made to ordinary facts which fell under the\\nobservation of the senses, e. g., combustion. It was\\nreserved to modern science to prove how false and\\nsuperficial was this belief. Lavoisier, the founder of\\nChemistry, proposed a series of experiments which\\nproved that matter is subject to constant change, but\\nis never destroyed. Thus by a balance it can be\\nshown that the weight of a piece of wood before com-\\nbustion is equivalent to the ashes, smoke and gases,\\ne. g., oxygen and carbonic acid, set free by the process.\\nOn this fact Chemistry as a science is based, and this\\nprinciple gives validity to the formulas which express\\nascertained and possible Chemical combinations.\\n17 (2) The discovery of this law led scientists to(2)iawof\\nsuspect that what was true of matter could be verified tkm of\\nof the forces which enter into play in the physical uni-\\nverse. Almost simultaneously Dr. Meyer in Germany\\n(1842), and Dr. Jules in England (1843), propounded\\nthe great law of the conservation of energy. By\\nrepeated and scientific experimentation, they showed\\nthat mechanical work could be converted into heat and\\nm ce versa. Hence the formula to express the\\nmechanical equivalent of heat (772 foot-pounds).\\nScientists began to experiment on the other forms of\\nenergy. Helmholtz, Thomson, and Rankin found that\\nthis principle was true of chemical affinity, light,\\ngravity and electricity. The unity of the physical\\nforces was proclaimed as a fact. The mind was\\nL Unite des forces physiques, par. P. Secchi, S. J.\\nconserva-\\ntion o:\\nforce.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "102 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nenabled to thoroughly understand the process of the\\nsteam-engine, and the way was opened to the intro-\\nduction of the various mechanical contrivances, e. g.,\\nelectro-motors, which hold so important a place in\\nmodern life.\\ntiSn ^oTphy- interaction of physical forces, there is\\nsicai force, no such thing as destruction. The loss or gain is only\\napparent. Constant transformations and conversions\\nhave place, nothing more. The law of the conserva-\\ntion of energy is considered an established fact.\\nUnremitting study and experimentation have resulted\\nin its repeated verification. Day by day the known\\nrange of its application is extending. Up to the present\\nnot one exception has been discovered.\\nthV^dTss^pa- 19- (3) Nevertheless, in the working of this law,\\nenergy. transformations which constantly take place, a\\nremarkable phenomenon has been noted. It has been\\ncalled by Thomson the law of the dissipation of energy.\\nBy this is meant that in the transformation of forces\\none form of energy gradually absorbs the others. Thus\\nmechanical work or electricity can be converted into\\nheat, yet experiment has shown that it is impossible\\nto convert the whole amount of heat into another form\\nof energy. A residuum always remains after conversion\\nwhich cannot be reached. There is no actual loss of\\nenergy; only a gradual increase in the amount of heat\\nand a corresponding decrease in the amount of the\\nenergies.\u00c2\u00ae\\ntendency of 20. Heucc a study of the laws of Physics clearly\\nforces to shows that natural forces have a tendency to be\\nheat.\\nreduced to heat. The inference is clear. If the\\namount of heat in the universe is gradually increasing\\nat the expense of other forms of energy, the time will\\ncome when all these energies will be no more and heat\\nFaye, L Origine du Monde, p. 310.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. IO3\\nalone exist. Now the natural tendency of heat is to\\na uniform temperature.\\n21. Thus the world is slowly and surely moving on The infer-\\nto the time when there shall be a perfect equilibrium,\\nwhen all motion shall cease, when life shall be impossi-\\nble, when one mean temperature shall pervade through-\\nout. There would be no day or night, no change of\\nseasons, no heat or cold; the grass would not grow, no\\ntrees or flowers would cheer the eye, no storm-cloud,\\nno light or shadow, no gentle breeze or chill blast, no\\nmoving thing around. Only a deep and dull silence\\nreigns; it is the death of the universe. No earthly\\nmortal shall live to see its solemn and awful end. That\\nthe end will come is as certain as the certainty of a\\nphysical law. It is true in the mind of a devout\\nbeliever there is a possibility that God may avert the\\ncalamity. Our argument is based only on the con-\\nsideration of the world, such as it is.^\\nS 22. (3) Astronomy is the science which treats of 3\u00c2\u00b0 Astro-\\nnomy.\\nthe heavenly bodies, their properties and the causes of\\ntheir various phenomena. From earliest times men\\nhave been led to study the phenomena of the heavens,\\nto trace out the course of the stars and to discover the\\nlaws which regulate their movements. A strange\\ncharm clings to the astrologers of old, and the rem-\\nnants of their theories which have survived the lapse\\nof time appeal to the mind like tales of imaginative\\nfiction. With the labors of Copernicus, Galileo, Tycho\\nBrahe, Kepler and Newton, astronomy was divested of\\nits atmosphere of the marvelous, was placed upon a\\nsolid basis and took the position and rank of a\\nscience.\\n^Conservation of Energy, by Balfour Stewart, p. 164, 188;\\nThe Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 131; The Unseen Uni-\\nverse, p. 126.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "I04\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nnebula-\\nTheory\\nits explana\\ntion.\\nformation g 23. At present Astronomy in its total extent does\\nworld, not claim our consideration. Attention is drawn to\\nthat portion of the science which treats of the forma-\\ntion of the stellar universe. In the preceding proof\\nthe laws of Physics clearly shov/ed that the universe\\nwould have an end. The laws of Astronomy, on the\\ncontrary, constrain the mind to admit that the world,\\nhad a beginning.\\n24. The science of Astronomy maintains that the\\nsolar system was gradually evolved from a primordial\\ngaseous mass called nebula. The theory which obtains\\nwith scientists of to-day is that proposed by Kant and\\nLa Place. It is the famous nebula theory and aims\\nat explaining the gradual formation of the stellar\\nuniverse.\\n25. Suppose a planetary nebula, like, e. g.^ the one\\nat present existing in the constellation of Andromeda,\\ndiffused in the space now occupied by our solar system.\\nThe power of attraction, with which it was endowed,\\ncaused the particles to gradually condense. In course\\nof time a body was formed at its center. This body\\nin some manner acquired a rotary motion. In the pro-\\ncess of rotation it gradually threw off one ring after\\nanother. These in turn condensed and assumed a\\nspherical shape. Hence the solar system in its present\\nstate.\\n26. This hypothesis is proposed in the name of\\nbe admitted science. It cannot be rejected, else the charge might\\nbe made that we are dogmatic and unscientific. In\\nadmitting it we show that we are in full accord with\\nthe principles and spirit of modern science. Astronomy\\nthus confesses that the universe had a beginning. In\\ndid not always exist as it does now. By successive\\nstages of development it reached its present condition.\\nThe whole process of development was directed and\\nan initial\\npoint must", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY, IO5\\nsustained by definite laws. Further on we shall see\\nthat law is the indication and expression of mind.\\nInsistence upon this train of thought would carry us\\nbeyond the sphere of our argument. What we contend\\nfor is that an initial point in the development must at\\nleast be admitted. It does not concern us at present the devei-\\nopment\\nwhether or not the nebulous mass exists from eternity, eternal or\\nnot.\\nElsewhere it is shown that this cannot be maintained.\\nIf we grant that the nebula is eternal, then it may have\\npossessed from eternity the forces of attraction and of\\nrepulsion. The acquisition of these forces at some\\nlater period necessarily points to an extrinsic cause.\\nNow let us admit that these forces are eternal, the\\nquestion naturally arises in the mind, why then did the\\ndevelopment begin so recently? Physical forces act in\\nan invariable manner. An invariable process from\\neternity would have exhausted the development in thccas^etife\\neternal past. Yet astronomers busy themselves in fs\u00c2\u00b0JtroSg!\\ncomputing the age of the earth and of the stellar\\nbodies in space. A suspension of action on the part\\nof the forces cannot be explained by the forces them-\\nselves. It must be due to an extrinsic cause. Here\\nagain we are brought to a standstill.\\n27. (4) Geology is the science which treats of (4) Geology\\nthe structure of the globe, the causes of its physical\\nfeatures and its history. As a science its origin\\ndates only from the past generation. In this short\\nperiod it has deciphered on the rocks the history of\\nthe earth s formation. It tells us that fire and water\\nwere the great agencies which had play in the consoli-\\ndation of the earth s crust from its primitive nebulous\\ncondition. The various stages in the process of\\nScience and Revelation, F. Peek.\\n1^ De Pressense, A Study of Origins, p. 146.\\n1 Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II, ch. I, II.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "I06 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ndm?wh\u00c2\u00b0en development are clearly marked, e.g.^ the present age,\\nno life ex- the Cenozoic, Mesozoic, Paleozoic and Azoic ages.\\nisted, e.\\nthe Azoic The characteristics of each asfe are clearly indicated\\nage.\\nand the various forms of life peculiar to each are noted.\\nOne fact, however, is clearly shown, viz., that there\\nwas a time when no life in any form whatsoever existed.\\nTherefore, Geology teaches that the period of life on\\nthis globe is limited, that life had a beginning, that\\nat a period in the remote past, which science has\\napproximately determined, no living being, not even a\\nblade of grass could be found upon the surface of the\\nglobe. Geology, therefore, forces the conclusion upon\\nus that terrestrial life is not eternal, that it is limited\\nand as a consequence dependent.\\n(5) Biology, g 28. (5) It is certain that terrestrial life had a\\nbeginning. Geology points out the strata of the\\nearth and shows that in the Azoic age no living thing\\nexisted. Paleontology traces back the scale of living\\nthings, and points to the earliest trace of life.^^ Now a\\nfundamental and well-established law of Biology is\\nteaches that\\nlife can only that life Can Only come from life. Therefore, living\\ncome from\\nlife. beings on earth are dependent and point to some\\nMr. Schurman passes over the argument, in the following\\nmanner: Natural history assures us there was a time when\\nthe earth held no living or thinking beings. But since they\\nhave actually appeared, it is certain there never was a time when\\nnature had not the capacity of producing them. And instead\\nof regarding nature before their emergence as a chaos, we are\\nbound to interpret it as a developing cosmos which contains in\\nitself the promise and potency of all terrestrial life and intelli-\\ngence. The reason is that atoms are merely the hypotheti-\\ncal elements of that material vesture in which spirit has\\neternally expressed itself. Spirit is the eternal realitj and\\nnature its eternal manifestations Nature is the exter-\\nnalisation of spirit and no more separable from it than the\\nspoken word from the thought it symbolizes. Cf. Belief in\\nGod, p. 156. It is to be wondered whether Hegel would recog-\\nnize himself in this hypothetical vesture.\\nTait, Recent Advances in Physical Science, Lect. VII; Prof.\\nYoung, The Sun, p. 1276.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. lO/\\nexternal cause as the sufficient reason for their exist-\\nence. For the past two hundred years the problem of\\nthe origin of life has been most eagerly studied. Two\\nmain solutions have been proposed.\\n8 2Q. (a) Materialists contend that the universe Theory of\\no y y Abio-\\nought to be explained by its own inherent forces alone, genesis.\\nHence they proclaim the theory of spontaneous genera-\\ntion, I. e., the spontaneous production of life as result-\\ning from the action of physical or chemical energies.\\nThis is the law of Abiogenesis.\\n30. (b) Others hold that in the animal or vegetable B?Jf\u00c2\u00b0JJeg4\\nkingdom life can only come from life. To explain the\\nbeginning of life they contend for the intervention of\\na force distinct from the material universe. This is\\nthe law of Biogenesis. The real question at issue is the\\nexistence of a living Creator. The former wish to\\nexplain the phenomena of the universe without having\\nrecourse to God. The latter find a necessity for action\\non the part of God, and the strongest proof that He\\nhas acted.\\n8 31. To the minds of the ancients there was nospontane-\\nous Genera-\\ndoubt that life was spontaneously generated. Aristotle tion.\\nbelieved that many living beings, e. g., insects, worms,\\netc., were generated by the forces of matter alone;\\nhence the formula: corruptio unius. geiieratio alterius.\\nIts history.\\nLucretius says that for this reason men speak of\\nMother Earth. Virgil describes the spontaneous gen-\\neration of bees,^^ Origen cites the production of worms\\nas a fact admitted without question, and St. Augustine indent.\\nholds this to be the only opinion of antiquity.^\u00c2\u00ae Dur-\\ning the Middle Ages the spontaneous generation of\\ncertain beings was held as a fact simply. Avicenna\\nDe Nat. Rerum, V. 793.\\ni\u00c2\u00abGeorg. IV.\\nContra Celsum, IV, 57.\\n^^DeCi^. Dei, XVI, 7.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "io8\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nmodern.\\nlabors of\\nRedi.\\nIn early-\\npart of\\npresent\\ncentury.\\nattributed this to the power of matter alone. St.\\nThomas, on the contrary, advanced the opinion that if\\nmatter produced living things it was in virtue of a\\nspecial power from God. This interpretation of\\nspontaneous generation by Christian Philosophers was\\nwidely different from Materialists.\\n32. In 1644 Van Helmont and Kircher gave receipts\\nfor the production of mice and of snakes. Towards\\nthe close of this century the first blow was aimed at\\nthe theory. Dr. Francisco Redi of Tuscany (1668)\\nshowed that worms in meat were the maggots of flies\\neggs. This was done by placing meat in jars so sealed\\nthat the flies could not touch it. The invention of the\\nmicroscope, however, in revealing a new world of living\\nbeings, brought the old doctrine into favor. Needham\\nand Buffon were the leaders in the revival. They\\nfound a strong adversary in Abbe Spallanzani (d. 1799),\\nwho tried to show, inconclusively, however, through\\nlack of means, that the latent life so generated was\\ndue to atmospheric germs. The problem was reopened\\nand earnestly debated up to the middle of the present\\ncentury.\\nThe discovery of oxygen and its presence as a\\nnecessary condition to existing life marked an epoch\\nin the controversy. In 1836 Schultz and Swann made\\nnotable experiments in sterilizing air which pointed to\\nthe impossibility of spontaneous generation. By caus-\\ning air to pass through hot glass tubes or sulphuric\\nacid they showed that the quantity of oxygen was pre-\\nserved while the organic matter was destroyed. The\\nexperiments were not conclusive because the nature\\nof what was destroyed could not be known. Twenty\\nyears later Mr. Ponchet declared that he saw infusoria\\nspontaneously generated in a sterilized liquid which\\nSt. Thorn. I, q. 71, a. i.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. IO9\\nhad been put in contact with the air despoiled of germs.\\nClaude Bernard, Quatrefages and Payen in vain pointed\\nout to him the causes of the mistake.\\n\u00c2\u00a734. In i860 the French Academy proposed the Pasteur,\\nproblem as a prize-subject with a view to have the\\nquestion thoroughly discussed. Mr. Pasteur now\\nbegan the experiments which have given him lasting\\nfame. He proved that our atmosphere is swarming\\nwith germs of life which are the real cause of putre-\\nfaction. He showed that pure air deprived of germs\\ndoes not produce putrefaction in a fermentible liquid,\\nbecause the germs are not always so abundant. Hence\\nthe phrase 07nne vnmfn e cellula was verified for the\\nworld of infinitely small beings as well as for those\\nvisible to the naked eye.\\n35. In 1872 Dr. Bastian claimed that he found the\\nphysico-chemical conditions apt to produce life with-\\nout germs. Pasteur in reply pointed out three causes\\nof error against which he had not guarded himself.^\\nAbout the sam.e time Fremy and Frecul held that a\\nliving being could not be born from brute matter, but\\nit could be produced by organized matter, e. g., the\\nferment of wine is caused by the cells of parenchyme\\nwhich make up the grape-juice. This is spontaneous\\ngeneration under another form. Pasteur made still\\nmore decisive experiments. He discovered that fer-\\nmentation v/as a function of life, that the phenomenon\\nis produced in fermentible liquids by atmospheric\\nyeast-germs, that grape-wine is unable to ferment of\\nitself, that the organic yeast which causes the fermenta-\\ntion comes from without the grain, that the air-germs\\nin summer are deposited on the grapes, and in autumn,\\nwhen the grapes are crushed, the germs mingle with\\nthe juice and cause fermentation.\\nPopular Science Monthly, Dec, i88i, p. 248.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "no\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nTyndall.\\nVirchow.\\n(6) Anthro-\\npology.\\n^6. In England Mr. Tyndall bestowed upon the\\nproblem most extended and minute study. He showed\\nwhy the brewer put yeast in barley-juice to make beer.\\nFor over a year he conducted most careful experiments\\nand conclusively proved that fermentation, or putre-\\nfaction, is the result of pre-existing germs. There\\nis in experimental science, he writes, no conclu-\\nsion more certain. In presence of such facts it will\\nbe absolutely monstrous to say that swarms of bacteria\\nhave been spontaneously generated.\\n37. Air. Virchow says There is not a single known\\npositive fact that spontaneous generation ever took\\nplace; those who hold the contrary are contradicted\\nby scientists, not by theologians/ The conclusion,\\ntherefore, is a fact which cannot be questioned; living\\nsubstances can only come from substances already\\npossessing life. Now Geology shows most conclu-\\nsively that terrestrial life had a beginning. The infer-\\nence is clear. The existence of living beings on earth\\ncan ultimately be explained only by recourse to a liv-\\ning cause outside and above the universe, who com-\\nmunicated to this earth the fact and potency of life.\\n38. Anthropology is the science which deals\\nwith the history and races of mankind. It differs\\nfrom Biology in this, that it considers man alone,\\nthe highest form of terrestrial life. It estimates\\napproximately the length of time man has inhabited\\nthe globe. At present we are not concerned with the\\nexactness of its statements. One truth is sufficient,\\nAdd. in Glasgow, 1876, in Fragments of Science; Huxley,\\nLay Sermons; Quatrefages, Darwin et ses Precurs. Franc, p.\\n174; Thein, Anthropology, ch. I; Schanz, A Christian Apology,\\nvol. I, ch. Vni; Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, p. 488.\\nGod Knowable and Known, M. Ronayne, S. J., p. 24.\\nTraces of this argument are found in Aug. Conf. 1. iii, ch.\\n6, n. 10; de Vera Relig., ch. XI; Soliloq. 1. i, n. 3; de Doct.\\nChrist, 1. I, ch. 7, 8; in Joan. tr. 19, n. 11.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. Ill\\nviz., there was a time when no human being existed on^eachesthat\\n_ human life\\nearth. A study of man s nature shows that in com- had a\\n_ beginning.\\nmon with the brute he is an animal. Yet over and\\nabove he possesses intelligence and free-will which\\nmark him off from all living beings and make him. lord\\nof creation. Now Psychology proves that sensation, ^hJ^g\u00c2\u00b0\\\\\u00c2\u00b0if/t\\nwhich is the characteristic of animal nature, cannot sense can-\\nnot be de-\\nspring from lower forms of life, e. g., life of a plant, ^^^^1^\u00c2\u00b0^\\nand that intelligence does not come from sensation, life,. nor\\ncan intellect\\nWherefore the sense and intellectual life on earth had be the de-\\nvelopment\\na beginning. But the reason for this cannot be sought of sense.\\nin any living earthly thing because all other forms of\\nlife belong to a lower scale. Hence they are due to an\\nexternal cause.\\n^g. Mathematics is the science which treats of(7)Mathe-\\nmatics.\\nquantity either discrete, e. g.^ numbers, or continuous,\\ne. g., magnitudes. Distinguished into several special\\ndepartments, it enunciates laws and principles which\\nhold sway throughout the material world. Primarily\\ndealing with quantity in the abstract, its data and in-\\nferences find logical and natural application in the\\nconcrete. Hence we have the distinction between\\npure and applied mathematics. Therefore the princi-\\nples of mathematics can be applied to the universe as\\na whole because of its quantity or magnitude, with the\\nsame reason that they are applied to Architecture,\\nAstronomy and Navigation.\\n\u00c2\u00a740. Now the science of Mathematics sets forth shows uni-\\n1 1 verse is not\\ncertam truths or prmciples which show conclusively infinite, but\\nthat the material universe is limited in time and in limited and\\nspace. Therefore it is not eternal or infinite, but\\ndependent and finite.\\n41. The question of the infinite in time and in\\nspace is not two-fold. It can be resolved into that of\\nThe suggestive article in cf. Revue des Questions Scientif.,\\n1878, vol. I, afterwards p.ublished in the volume Les Confins de\\nla Science, by Father Carborelle, S. J.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "112\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nProblem of\\ninfinite in\\nspace and in\\ntime re-\\nsolved into\\nthe infinite\\nin number.\\nIs infinite\\nnumber a\\ncontradic-\\ntion\\ninfinite number. The solution of this gives the\\nanswer to the difficulties involved in the former. For\\nthe concepts of space and of time, so frequently aris-\\ning in the mind, are in reality more difficult to analyze\\nthan that of number. The reasoning is not based on\\nthe abstruse problems of higher mathematics. We\\ntake the simple integral number found in the ordinary\\nschool Arithmetic. The problem to be discussed is\\nthat of the infinite number. It is a problem full of\\ndifficulties. For centuries it has engaged the thoughts\\nof philosophers. Can a consideration of the integral\\nnumbers used in Arithmetic bring us any nearer a solu-\\ntion and give a definite conception free from ambiguity\\nand error?\\n42. (a) Some maintain that in infinite number is\\na contradiction. But this assertion cannot be held.\\nTaken in its widest generality, as the phrase itself\\nwould justify, it appeals to us without any warrant\\nwhatsoever, and is known to be false. St. Augustine\\nsays that there is an infinity in number is a certainty\\nbeyond dispute. In setting forth proofs for the\\nexistence of God, St. Thomas omits the consideration\\nof the infinity of number, restricts himself to one aspect\\nmerely, and proposes an argument based on the truth\\nthat an infinity of efficient causes succeeding one\\nanother is false. Pascal candidly admits that there is\\nan infinity in number, but in the same breath adds that\\nhe knows not what it is. The ambiguity of the state-\\nment is clearly shown by Kant, who places it side by\\nside with its contradictory as among the antinomies of\\npure reason.\\nRabier, however, holds that the infinity of number I i poten-\\ntial, of soace is actual. Lecons de Philosophie, p. 465.\\n26DeCiv. Dei., 1. XII, ch. 18.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. II3\\n43. It is not absurd; else why is recourse had to ^^s\\nthe infinite number to explain many things which come\\nunder daily observation. Ask a boy with a hat full of\\nmarbles if more and more can be had and the answer\\nwill be there is an infinite number. To his mind there\\nis no limit to the number of possible marbles; other\\nboys have many more than he, and his store can be\\naugmented beyond all possible computation. We\\noften find ourselves reasoning after much the same\\nmanner, and the like answer so naturally arising pre-\\ncludes any further doubt or question. The same is\\ntrue of continuous quantity. A line, e. g., is made up\\nof geometrical points. If we ask how many points\\nmake up the line, the answer is an infinite number; but\\nthis limitation is due to the mind s action it is not in-\\nherent in the points themselves. So, too, when we try\\nto compute the number of integers in algebraic roots.\\n44. (b) Others try to clear up the obscurity by ^j^^ij.^^i^^\\nmaking a distinction between act and possibility, potency.\\nThus they contend that number can be infinite when\\nviewed as a potency or possibility, not when it is con-\\nsidered as actually existing. The phrase: an infinite\\nnumber actually existing involves a contradiction, is\\na time-honored dogma in philosophy and in theology.\\nThoughtful minds have presented it as an unanswer-\\nable argument to prove the existence of God, and as\\na stumbling-block in the path of Materialism. We do\\nnot deny that it contains truth. Only worded in such\\nfashion it is ambiguous and admits of further analysis.\\nTake for example the concepts of a line, of time, of\\nspace. The points in a line, the intervals in time, the\\ndistances in space actually exist. Yet it can be main-\\ntained that they are infinite, and it is impossible with\\nthe sole aid of this distinction to show that the con-\\ntention is false.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "114 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ndistinction 4^, (c) Another distinction, therefore, is necessary.\\ntermined. It has been shown that an infinite number is not a con-\\ntradiction or an absurdity. Nevertheless, so worded,\\nit is ambiguous. This can be cleared up by asserting\\nthat as such it is by its own nature undetermined.\\nHence we maintain that an infinite number is conceiv-\\nable, but it is essentially undetermined. The proof of\\nthis statement is very clear. Of two finite numbers, I\\ncan say that one is greater than the other. The just-\\nness of the estimate would be questioned by no one.\\nIf, however, I should say that of two infinite numbers\\none is greater than the other, my words become con-\\ntradictory and absurd.\\n46. Let us take, e. g., two infinite series, a, b, c,\\nand I, 2, 3. Now these series are equal. Yet I can\\nsuppose I to be lo or 20, or 100 times greater than a.\\nA comparison, therefore, of infinite series by reason of\\nquantity becomes impossible. The same holds good\\nof continuous quantity. Take, e. g., an isosceles\\ntriangle. Suppose a line EF be drawn parallel to the\\nbase, AB intersecting the sides x\\\\C and BC. Now it\\nis proved by a geometrical process that EF is shorter\\nthan AB. Admitting that the points of the line be\\ninfinite, we have one infinite greater than the other.\\nAt the same time by connecting the points in a special\\nmanner they could both be made equal. Finally let us\\ncompare an arithmetical with a geometrical progressive\\nseries, e. g., 1-2-3 and 2-4-6, etc. Now one series is\\ngreater than the other, yet both are infinite. Hence\\nit is evident that we cannot compare two infinite num-\\nbers by reason of quantity. This is due to their nature.\\nThey cannot receive a quantity which determines them\\nand makes them able to be grasped by the mind. They\\nconstantly elude all efforts to individualize or determine\\nthem. They are, therefore, essentially undetermined.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "CONTINGENCY. II5\\n8 47. The conclusion is clear. An infinite determined conclusion\\ninfinite\\nnumber is an impossibility. An infinite undetermined i^^\u00c2\u00b0iber.\\nnumber contains nothing absurd. Thus when it is\\nsaid there is an infinity in number the undetermined\\nnumber is understood. When, again, others say an\\ninfinite number is a contradiction they speak of the\\ndetermined number. Having found the proper dis-\\ntinction and presented a solution to the question of\\ninfinite number, we can now apply this principle to\\nthe infinite in time and in space.\\n\u00c2\u00a748. Now between two determined ^o lXiX.^ in space infinite in\\nthere cannot be an infinite interval. This is possible time,\\nonly when one of the extremes is undetermined. For,\\nif we grant that the interval were infinite, it could be\\nexpressed in numbers which would be at the same time\\ndetermined and infinite. This, as has been shown, is\\nimpossible. Mathematicians speak of lines meeting in\\ninfinity, e. g.^ two parallel lines, the asymptote meets\\nits curve in infinity. The language can be justified,\\nbut it should not be forgotten that the meaning is that\\nthe lines will never meet at all.\\ng 49. And hence (i) the material universe had a begin- Hence\\nning.^ A past event, e. g.^ a material phenomenon had^Jb?-\\nof any kind whatsoever, can have actually taken place\\nonly on the condition that it existed at a determined\\ninstant of time To maintain that it existed at an\\nundetermined epoch is to take away all its reality and\\nto render it an impossibility. But two determined\\ninstants in time cannot be separated by an infinite\\ninterval. The distance between them is finite. There-\\nfore the eternity of matter is an impossibility, and the\\nseries of phenomena which make up the material\\nuniverse must have had a beginning.^\u00c2\u00ae\\nThe Unseen Universe, p. VII, XV, XVIII.\\nWhat basis has Mr. Schurman for the opinion we do not\\nknovv that the world had a beginning in time and see no ei i-\\ndence to suppose it had. Cf. Belief in God, p. 149.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "ii6\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(2) universe\\nis limited in\\nspace.\\nobjection\\nfrom Geom-\\netry.\\nThis\\nreasoning\\ncan be ap-\\nplied to\\natoms.\\nI 50. (2) The material world is limited in space. Are\\nthe stars which fill the heavens infinite in number? The\\nanswer is very simple. Each star is determined by its\\nown existence. Thus the entire number is determined.\\nAs such it cannot be infinite. Again, if the material\\nworld had an infinite extent, real phenomena v/ould\\nexist, separated one from another by infinite distances.\\nBut this, it has been shown, cannot be maintained.\\nTherefore the universe is limited in all directions.\\n51. It may be said that this reasoning does not\\nhold good of abstract geometrical figures. The reason\\nis that by their abstract nature, they contain unde-\\ntermined parts. The mind determines each part in\\nthe very act of conceiving it. Nevertheless a concep-\\ntion of the whole is possible without a determination\\nof all the parts. A material phenomenon, on the con-\\ntrary, is of necessity determined by its own existence.\\nThe place it occupies in space is necessarily determined.\\n52. The same line of reasoning can be applied in\\nall its cogency to the atoms which are supposed to\\nmake up the universe. They exist in the concrete;\\nas such they are determined. Therefore they cannot\\nbe infinite. In face of this what should we say of John\\nStuart Mill s assertion that the world does not by\\nits mere existence bear witness to God?\\n^^3 Essays on Religion, p. 153; Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig, vol.\\nIll, p. 257; St. Thomas, C. Gent., 1. I, ch. 13; II, 15; Sum, TheoL,\\nI. q. 44. a I, 2; 1. q. 45, a. 12. Ex operibus corporis agnosco\\nvi ventem ex operibus creaturae non potes agnoscere Creatorem\\nAug. Enar., in Ps. 73, n. 25. Interrogavi terram, et dixit, non\\nsum (Deus); et quaecumque in eadem sunt, idem confessa sunt.\\nInterrogavi mare et abysses, et reptilia animarum vivarum, et\\nresponderunt; non sumus Deus tuus; quaere super nos. In-\\nterrogavi auras flabiles et inquit universus aer cum incolis suis;\\nFallitur Anaximenes; non sum Deus. Interrogavi coelum,\\nsolem, lunam, Stellas; neque nos sumus Deus, quem quaeris,\\ninquiunt. Et dixi omnibus his quae circumstant fores carnis\\nmeae; Dixistis mihi de Deo meo quod vos non estis, dicite\\nmihi de illo aliquid. Et exclamaverunt voce magna; ipse fecit\\nnos, St. Aug. Confess. X. 6.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VII.\\nCAUSALITY.\\nI. Causality is a primary conviction of the human\\nmind. It is at the basis of our mental life.^ Uni-\\nversal in application with people of every age, race or\\ncondition, it enters into every subject of thought,\\nevery topic of conversation, whether by the laborer in\\nthe humble service of daily toil, or by the thoughtful\\nstudent in the effort to solve the problems of life and\\nof being. To the untutored mind of the child and of\\nthe savage its working in the physical world presents\\ncountless sources of wonder. The world is pictured\\nas filled with mysterious beings. The mind is naturally\\nprone to personify the objects acting around us. The\\nerror is laid bare by experimental investigation and\\nreflection which enables the mind to trace the physical\\nlaws and to grasp the real nature of the proximate\\ncauses. The objective truth of causality rer/iains\\nintact; its apprehension only becomes more intelligent.\\nFrom a spontaneous judgment it has assumed the form\\nand force of a philosophical certainty.\\nI.\\nThe Principle.\\n\u00c2\u00a72. The principle of causality enters into every a special\\n^argument for the existence of God.^ Around and\\nthrough it are woven the facts of ordinary and scientific\\ninvestigation. Hence comes the consistency and\\nInest homini natiiraie desiderium cognoscendi causam\\ncum inluetuV efiectum. St. Thomas, i. q. 12, a. I.\\nFarges, L idee de Dieu, p. 59.\\n[117]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "Il8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ncogency of the reasoning. In a certain sense, there-\\nfore, the other arguments proposed can be called argu-\\nments from causality. Nevertheless a special train of\\nthought can be formulated from the consideration of\\ncausality in existing things. It takes the name and\\nrank of a distinct proof.\\n(i)distinc- 8 7., (i) Aristotlc in his Metaphysics distinguishes\\ntionof C o V t J b\\ncauses. four kinds of causes; material, formal, final and\\nefficient. Thus, e. g.^ a sculptor forms a statue of\\nWashington out of a piece of marble. The stone out\\nof which the statue is made is called the 7naterial\\ncause; the form or figure which makes the marble\\nappear in the likeness of our country s hero, is\\ncalled the /^r;;z^/ cause; the motive of the worker or\\nthe purpose of the work, e.g.^ money, reputation, the\\nornamentation of a public building, is considered as\\nthe final cause; finally the agent who by the exercise\\nof his own energy slowly and with labor fashions the\\nwork is the efficient cause. This division obtains in\\nScholastic Philosophy and has been most fiercely and\\npersistently attacked by modern writers. The present\\nargument is based on efficient causes; in the following\\nchapter the problem of the final cause will be discussed.\\n(b) arp- 8 4_ C2) The efficient cause can be either moral, e. g.,\\nment based a\\non efficient when the actioQ is due to a command, entreaty, etc.,\\ncause. J 5\\no^c physical, e. g., the agencies of the m.aterial universe\\nexercise a real activity to produce a certain result, thus\\nheat expands, cold contracts, fire burns, etc. The\\n^Modern German Ethnographers, e. g., Peschel, Ratzei,\\nSchurtz, have traced the orig-in of religion to one characte -istic\\nof the human intellect, the notion of causality. Cf. Religion of\\nPrimitive Peoples, D. G. Brinton, p. 44. Pres. Schurman dis-\\nmissed the argument with the words The question, Is there a\\nfirst cause? is obsolete for a generation that finds God in the\\nworld and not outside and apart from it. Belief in God, p. 14.\\nThe writer evidently does not understand the subject treated.\\nProf. Knight thinks the argument illusory. Aspects of Theism,\\nch. IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "CAUSALITY. 119\\ndistinction should be borne in mind, for it enables the\\nreader to guard against confusion, indicates the true\\nmethod to be pursued in proving the principle of caus-\\nality, and reveals the wide extent and true value of the\\nprinciple itself.\\n5. (3) The argument is based on facts of experi-(3)and on\\nence Ordiaary experience is reinforced by a wealth expedence.\\nof data from the physical sciences. We are conscious\\nof a real causality influencing every act throughout our\\ndaily life. The agencies in nature act upon us. In\\nlike manner throughout the visible universe, object\\nacts upon and modifies object. The various sciences\\nset forth the nature of process. The argument, there-\\nfore, takes the form of an induction vigorously con-\\ncluding from scientific data.\\n8 6. (4) The principle of causality can be termed a nature of\\nspontaneous judgment.* It is the natural possession cipie.\\nand property of the human mind. Nevertheless it is\\nnot so easy to formulate it in words. At the present\\ntime scholars are not content in amassing stores of\\nfacts and in tracing them to proper causes. The very\\nfoundations of knowledge have been questioned. The\\nfirst principles of thought, the manner and mode of\\nthinking have been discussed most eagerly. The ulti-\\nmate result is that we have a better knowledge of the\\nlimits and needs of the mind, a clearer grasp of the\\nprinciples themselves and a more luminous insight into\\ncurrent difficulties.\\n87. (a) The principle of causa.lity is by some its various\\nexpressions.\\nexpressed as every effect has a cause. So taken the\\nprinciple is immediately evident; its truth is forced (a) every\\nupon the mind without the slightest hesitation or cause,\\nreflection. But it possesses no value when applied to\\nobjective facts in a proof for the existence of God.\\nFr. Harper, S. J., Metaphysics of the School, vol. ITI.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "ning.\\n120 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThe defect is that it is tautological. The whole\\nstrength of the argument lies in showing to conviction\\nthat the world is an effect. To employ the principle\\nin this form would be to make a gratuitous assumption\\nin the most vital part of our reasoning and to render\\nthe attempt itself invalid and abortive.\\n(b) the de- 8 8. (b) Or we may say that what dependently exists\\npendent de- j\\nmandsthe can Only 06 exptaimd by postulating an independent and\\nent being, uecessary cause. In this sense the principle is employed\\nin the argument from contingency. So expressed, the\\nprinciple requires some reflection before its strength\\nis apparent. We cannot say, therefore, that it is\\nimmediately evident to the mind.\\n(c) what be- 9. (c) Finally, it maybe stated in a slightly differ-\\nmusthave ent form, viz., that which begins to exist demands a\\na cause for nm 1 i 1\\nthe begin- cause for the beginning Thus a bemg which now^\\nexists, but did not at some time exist, owes it existence\\nto the activity of some other being which is termed its\\ncause. In this form the principle is employed in the\\nargument from causality. So expressed, it is not\\nimmediately evident.^ As in the former case reflection\\nis necessary to grasp its force.\\nMr. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 150, says: The principle\\nof causality is whatever has begun to be, whether a thing or an\\nevent, must have a cause or antecedent to account for it. So\\nalso Janet, Final Causes, p. 17. The Theistic Argument, J.\\nDimon, p. 82; J. S, Mill also interprets the principle of causality\\nin this sense, yet contends that it is valid only for the change-\\nable element in nature, whereas the permanent element, i.\\nthe specific elementary substances, do not come under its sway.\\nCf. Essays on Religion, p. 142. And in his Logic, vol. I, p. 422,\\nsays that ultimate or efficient causes are radically inaccessible\\nto the human faculties. This is explained by the Doctrine\\nof Phenomenal Idealism which springs from his peculiar\\ntheory of knowledge. Cf. the Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly,\\np. 223.\\nDr. Fisher, in Manual of Natural Theology, holds it a\\nself-evident truth, p. 10; Dr. Bowne, in Philosophy of\\nTheism, p. 70, writes we know directly nothing of causes.\\nBoth err in extremes.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "CAUSALITY. 121\\nlo. The same line of thought applies to both. of^^a^St\\nmake use of the principle of sufficient reason. This verified.\\ncannot be doubted or denied; to do so is to suppose a\\nsufficient reason for acting. Thus, whenever we act\\nintelligently, a sufficient reason is present. If, there-\\nfore, the world began to exist, it must have a sufficient\\nreason for beginning to be. This can be found (i)\\neither in nothing; but this is absurd, for nothing can\\nproduce nothing; (2) or in the possibility of the world\\nbeginning to be; but this cannot be maintained,\\nelse all possible things would exist. Mere objective\\npossibility can never be the cause why a being in such\\na state began to exist in concrete reality; (3) or in the\\nworld beginning to be; but this must be rejected,\\nbecause a thing cannot act before it exists, and the\\nquestion is to account for the initial point of its exist-\\nence; (4) or in some other being which by its activity\\ncaused, e. g.^ the world, to assume its present exist-\\nence. Now this is what is understood by the efficient\\ncause. The principle of causality, therefore, is\\nexpressed clearly and without ambiguity; its validity\\nis shown to be strong and indisputable. We shall now\\nconsider the principal modern errors which try to\\ndestroy its real force, and take away a fundamental\\nprop to our faith.\\nII.\\nErrors.\\nII. The principle of causality has been fiercely\\nattacked by two writers who at different times exer-\\ncised a strong influence in moulding the English\\nphilosophic mind.^\\nKant held that the principle of causality is valid only within\\nthe world of our experience. Cf. Pfleiderer, Hist, of Phil., vol.\\nIll, p. 258; Lewes, Phil, of Aristotle, 62, shows that it is abso-\\nlute.\\nTheir teaching is at the root of the so-called system of", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "122\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nhis notion\\nof cause.\\nHume. i\\\\ Hume is the founder of the Associationist\\nschool of philosophy. For upwards of one hundred\\nyears his writings have deeply moved English thought.\\nThe leading English writers of to-day are his apologists\\nor disciples.^ To the foreigner it is the only school of\\nphilosophy that has a claim to be considered indige-\\nnous to English soil.\\n12. Hume maintains that all our ideas come from\\nexperience. Granted that the mind has the idea of\\ncause; this idea could have its source in experience\\nalone. But, he continues, when we analyze our experi-\\nence, the mind can find no sound basis to justify\\nthe formation of the concept. Experience shows that\\nevents succeed one another, not that one has produced\\nthe other; hence we have succession only, not causa-\\ntion. The mind does not know in what consists the\\nconnection or bond of what is understood by causation.\\nTherefore, he concludes that causation is nothing more\\nthan succession; that causation in the sense of effi-\\nciency has no foundation in experience, but is simply\\na mental fancy or exaggeration and should accordingly\\nbe rejected by the thoughtful student.\\ncriticism. 13. (a) The reasoning of Hume starts from a pat-\\nent fallacy^ The solution is had in the explanation of\\nambtguous experience. Experience can be considered as a prac-\\ntheword tical acquaintance with anything by personal observa-\\nexperience. TMi^ comcs clthcr through the\\nInductive Logic, Hence we find writers confessing that we\\ncannot bv induction rise above phenomena. Cf. Knight,\\nAspects of Theism, p. 144. The true answer is to show that\\nthe method of induction in this question is partial and false,\\nthat its basis is erroneous.\\nThe Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, pp. 10, 12.\\n^OMill, Logic, b. Ill, ch. 5.\\nNatural expectation caused by repetition is the sole basis of\\nthe idea of causation. Modern Philosophy by A. K. Rogers,\\np. 112.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "CAUSALITY. 123\\nexternal senses which give a knowledge of the out-\\nside world, or through the internal faculties which\\nreveal the feelings of the body, the thoughts of\\nthe mind, the movements and emotions of the will.\\nExperience, therefore, is two-fold; external and\\ninternal. Of the two, internal ranks much higher.\\nWe may be deceived by the senses, by consciousness\\nnever.\\n14. (b) Hume errs in holding that the idea of ^o^j^|^|ro^\\ncausality primarily comes from external experience, 3\u00e2\u0084\u00a2^^^^\\nand that we should first of all seek in external experi-\\nence for its basis and justification. On the contrary,\\nthe idea of cause comes primarily from internal\\nexperience.\\n(i) Consciousness testifies that we are the causaP^s*^^ y\\nV of con-\\nagents of our own thoughts and desires. There is a^^jojj^^^ss\\nreal causal connection between the mind and its casuaiity of\\nwill.\\nthoughts, between the will and its volitions or resolves.\\nThis bond or connection is a fundamental fact of inner\\nexperience. There is nothing closer to us than our\\nthoughts and our feelings; they constitute our very\\nlife. Here only is found the true source and origin of\\nthe notion of causality.\\n15. (2) Consciousness also testifies that the mem-thepower\\n1 rill 1 1 1 1 1 1 of Wi^l O^\\nbers of the body are under the control of the will, the bodily\\nThus, e. g.^ after careful thought I determine to write;\\nthe will directs the movement of the hand and my\\nthoughts appear on the written page. In like manner\\nI move my feet to walk, turn the head in ansv^er to a\\nquestion, move the lips to speak. Often, it is true, my\\nacts are indeliberate; but they ever answer an internal\\nimpulse which is found at its highest and best in the\\ndeliberate act of the rational will. This control and\\nimpulse is the connection or bond which is of the\\nessence of causality.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "124 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nscfousness ^3) ^S^ ^^j ^i*^ Certain that other bodies act\\n^l^f j^^^ upon us. Thus, e. g., a person strikes me a severe\\nupon us. blow with the hand; there is more than mere succes-\\nsion in the act; there is a real communication of energy\\nto produce an effect, viz., discoloration of face or a\\nsudden fall. So, too, the energies of nature influence\\nus. We are a prey to cold and heat; the sun, rain,\\netc., act upon us in many ways.^^\\nencifo^the ^7- (4) Finally, we infer that external objects act\\n^u^!^*^ one upon another. This is an inference from analogy,\\nhaving its basis in the most certain testimony of con-\\nsciousness. It is supposed in the ordinary daily\\nconfirmed actious it is confirmed by scientific investigation; it is\\nillustrated in every department of mechanical work,\\ne.g., Chemistry, Astronomy.\\n(c) the no- 8 1 8. (c) External observation alone might p:i7e a\\ntion of fc *3\\ncause which Y a CTue notiou of cause and effect. But this would lack\\ncomes from\\nexternal Ob- the vigor and conviction which the concept possesses.\\nservation\\nalone much Hen cc it would approximate to Hume s notion of suc-\\ndifferent\\nfrom the ccssion. Consciousness tells us otherwise, and here\\nprinciple.\\nIS found the true origm of the idea. A cause is noth-\\ning more than a substance exercising active power.\\nHence the concept of cause springs from and is based\\nin that of substance. Thus every cause is a substance,\\nor every substance has the potency to become a cause.\\nHume s error arises from his failure to obtain a true\\nconcept of substance. To him the mind, e. g., was a\\nbundle of qualities. Of itself, therefore, it is nothing.\\nHov/ then could it exercise power and become a\\ncause? Internal experience is nothing more than a\\npassing series of thoughts and feelings. Hence to\\nhim succession was the only bond. Causality naturally\\nwas view^ed as nothing more. Real efficiency gave\\nRicaby, General Metaphysics, ch. Causation.\\nFarges, L idee de Dieu, p. 29.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "CAUSALITY. 125\\nplace to association, and instead of a causal connection\\nbetween the mind and its thought, we have the suc-\\ncession of idea to idea, the association of feeling to\\nfeeling in a shadowy uncertain round.\\n19. (2) Mr. Mill confounds the principle of cans- To Mm\\n1 1 1 causality is\\nalit}^ With the law of the uniformity 01 nature. uniformity\\nThus he speaks of universal causation, a uni-\\nformity in the succession of events. This arises from\\nthe physical truth that the amount of energy in the\\nuniverse, both actual and potential, is ever a constant\\nquantity and that it acts in definite ways, according to\\nfixed laws. Hence, the principle of causation, he\\nmaintains, can be formulated as a scientific truth.\\n20. (a) The principle of causality is distinct from (a) One\\nthe law of the uniformity of nature; it is of an alto- not the\\nother: caus-\\ngether amerent order. The former is a primary con-aiitya\\npriori.\\nviction which has its source in our inner consciousness.\\nIt is an obvious truth forced upon the mind and\\nholds imperious sway over the thoughts of children\\nand savages as well as of the aged and wise. This\\nfundamental and necessary character of the causal\\njudgment can only be explained by holding it to spring\\nfrom the depths of our rational nature.\\n8 21. (b) On the other hand, the law of the uni-(t )prin-\\nciple of uni-\\nform! tv in nature comes from experience. It is an formity not\\n2,. prion.\\ninduction based upon a long and careful observation\\nof facts. It is not a self-evident truth; it does not\\nrank as a universal and necessary principle. Mr. Mill\\nhas shown that the conviction or belief in a fixed and\\nw^U-ordered system in spite of constant interferences\\nand apparent disorders is forced upon the mind after\\nlong and patient research in the field of nature.\\nSystem of Logic, B. Ill, ch. XXI; Martineau, A Study of\\nReligion, vol. I, p. 150,\\n5 Logic, B. IV, ch. 21.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "126 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(c)\u00e2\u0080\u009e\u00c2\u00a5 22. (c) Mr. Mill was led into this error by too\\nMill s error o j\\ndue to careful adherence to the teaching of Hume. Both\\nHume.\\nStarted from the same point, viz., that experience is\\nthe source which can give the true notion of cause.\\nBoth passed over, as of no worth, the patent and\\nfundamental testimony of consciousness. Seeking in\\nexternal experience alone for a solution they separated\\nand proposed different but not necessarily contradictory\\ndoctrines. Hume saw series of phenomena succeeding\\none another; to him, therefore, causality meant suc-\\ncession. Mr. Mill was impressed with the marvelous\\norder and uniformity which prevailed in the physical\\nworld. Rising above particular facts, he grasped the\\ngreat law of uniformity of nature, and proclaimed this\\nto be the principle of causality. But he took the effect\\nfor the cause, the result for the principle. Uniformity\\nsupposes constant succession of fact upon fact. This\\nconstant succession, however, is due to the causal\\nactivity of the one upon the other. Physical causality\\nis grasped as an analogy from evident facts of con-\\nsciousness and is corroborated and supposed by physi-\\ncal science.\\nni.\\nArgument.\\nbafedTif^ 23- The fact of objective causality, therefore, is\\ncausality, established beyond question. On this the argument\\nis based. We shall now set it forth as briefly and as\\nconclusively as possible. From the truth that objects\\nin nature exert an influence to produce certain effect s,\\nand these in turn produce other effects, we have what\\ncan be termed successive series of causes and effects.\\nEach unit of the series is an effect inasmuch as it was\\nMcCosh, Fandamental Truth; Harper, S. J., Metaphysics\\nof the Schools, vol. III.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "CAUSALITY. 127\\nproduced by the anterior unit; it is a cause inasmuch\\nas it produced the following one. Efficient causality,\\ntherefore, is a link which binds them all together.\\n8 24. That such series exist is evident to ordinary successive\\nrr^, series of\\nobservation. The various sciences, each in its own causes and\\n1 ^1 effects.\\ndepartment, proposes them. Physics and Chemistry\\nset forth chemical combinations and mechanical activi-\\nties. Biology deals with birth, death, the various\\nmodes by which life is communicated. Thus many\\nseries as a fact exist. For the argument, one such\\nseries is sufficient.\\n2K. Now this series is either finite or infinite. If seriesfinite\\nor infinite.\\nit be finite, then it has a first member. The existence\\nand activity of the first member can only be explained\\nby postulating a cause outside the series. Else it\\nwould come from nothing or produce itself, which is\\ncontradictory. This outside cause must be uncaused;\\nelse we should go on to infinity.\\nIf the series be infinite, the solution is convincinsf. in either\\ncase the\\nAccording to the hypothesis, based on facts, each conclusion\\nmember was produced. But if each member be caused, ing.\\nthe whole series was caused likewise. The prolonga-\\ntion of a series of caused units to infinity by no means\\nA view opposed to this and very prevalent to-day as an\\neffect of Hegel on modern Theistic discussion is expressed by\\nMr. Schurman, Belief in God, pp. 157, 161, 172. The truth of\\nthe argument from causality lies not in an extra-mundane\\nCause or Maker of a created world, but in an intra-mundane\\ncause or ground of an uncreated world. This is pure Panthe-\\nism, Cf. Bowne, Intr. to Phil, of Theism.\\nJ. S. Mill writes that The First Cause Argument is of no\\nvalue because no cause is needed for that which had no begin-\\nning; and both matter and force have had so far as our experi-\\nence can teach us, no beginning which cannot be said of\\nmind. Essays on Religion p. 53, 143; Exam, of Sir W.\\nHamilton, vol. H, p. 37. In answer we refer to the argu-\\nment from contingency.\\nThis solution is proposed by Hamilton, Mill and Bascom,\\nProf. Wilson, Found, of Relig. Belief, p. 93.\\nIS convinc-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "sion\\n128 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nchanges the nature of the series itself.^ Hence a\\ncause for the infinite series is imperative. Otherwise\\nthere would be an effect without a cause, a state-\\nment contrary to the principle of causality.\\n26. Again, suppose the series be infinite. In con-\\nsequence a present effect would have an infinite number\\nof intermediary causes. If this supposition be true,\\nthen no activity could be had, because an intermediary\\ncause is also an effect and is only a cause by reason of\\nthe activity communicated by its immediate ante-\\ncedent. Hence we should have, according to our\\nreason, no ultimate effect, a conclusion contradictory\\nto the hypothesis. But this is to be rejected as absurd.\\nTheconciu- g 27. The conclusion is rigorous and certain. By\\nthe principle of causality the mind is forced to admit\\na first cause to explain the successive series of causes\\nand effects in the world about us. This cause must\\nbe a cause in the sense that it is not an effect of a\\npreceding cause. Therefore it is an uncaused cause,\\n^.God.\\n2 It is not therefore A doubtful piece of Logic to argue from\\nthe absolute necessity of a cause in every case to the existence\\nof aa absolute beginning which does not need a cause. Mod-\\nern Philosophy, A. K. Rogers, p. 54. The real alternative,\\nwrites Mr. Dimon, does not lie betv/een an infinite series and\\na first cause, but between accepting a first cause, or rejecting\\nthe idea of cause altogether. The Theistic Argument, p. 85.\\nAn infinite succession of causes rests, by the very hypothesis,\\nupon no cause. lb., p. 85.\\nCard. Newman, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, pp.\\n197, 198; Clark, Existence of God, p. i, ch. 4, 3.\\nHence it is obvious that however remote that point to\\nwhich we trace in thought the history of our universe, we are\\nstill confronted with the impossibility of accounting by physical\\ncausation for its commencement; in moral causality we do not\\nexclude the subsequent perpetual agency of Creative Will,\\nbecause in scientific reasoning we speak of it in the language\\nof physical force. Cf. W. Carpenter, M, D,, Nature and Man,\\np. 396; Prof. Wilson, Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 92.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VIII.\\nMOTION.\\nI. The considerations drawn from the nature of\\nthe beings which make up this universe, lead the\\nmind to the conclusion that a being exists independent\\nand self-sufficient on whom all things depend. This\\nis what is meant by a necessary being, e.^ God.\\n2. In the present chapter we do not dwell upon Fact of\\nthe nature of the beings around us. We take the great\\nand universal fact of movement. All things are in\\nconstant change. Astronomy sets forth the revolu-\\ntions and various motions of stellar bodies. Geology\\nexplains the development of the earth. Biology is\\nbusied with the phenomena of growth. Physics and\\nChemistry reveal the molecular movements, caloric\\nvibrations and the multiform combinations of inorganic\\nelments.^\\nOn this fundamental fact of movement and change\\nrests the argument which constrains the thoughtful\\nreader to admit the existence of God.\\nI.\\nThe Principle.\\n8 3. Motion is a universal and fundamental phe- The nature\\nrr. of the fact,\\nl^nomenon. To take this as a basis of an argument is not the fact\\nan appeal to an obvious as well as to a metaphysical tioned.\\ntruth. There is no question about the fact of move-\\nThe Abbe Dubois attempts to show that all the aiguments\\nfor the existence of God can be reduced to that of motion, that\\nthe one only proof is motion inasmuch as all the others are\\nonly phases of it. Cf. Science Catholique, X*annee, N 6.\\nJanet, Materialism of the Present Day, ch. IV.\\n3 Aristotle, Physics, B. I, IV, VI.\\n9 [129]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "I30 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nmerit, but there is most serious discussion about the\\nnature of the fact. On this point Aristotle took issue\\nwith the leading schools of Greek thought. We do not\\ngo back to ancient history. The problem is at the\\nbasis of modern philosophy. The Hegelian system is\\nthe highest effort of modern metaph5^sic. It has influ-\\nenced theistic and atheistic thought. In a treatise on\\nthe existence and attributes of God we are constantly\\nbrought in contact with its teaching. At present not\\none or the other aspect of the system is presented for\\nconsideration. The very concept which lies at the\\nbasis and gives form and substance to the whole struc-\\nture, comes up for criticism,\\ndefinition of 8 4. In its most i^feneral si2:nification motion can be\\nmovement.\\ndefined as a change. Thus objects which change are\\nsaid to be in motion. The change affects quality or\\nquantity, or position in place. Ordinary observation\\nof the external world reveals the manifold changes\\nwhich make up the content of sense experience. At\\nthe same time it is an obvious truth that motion is not\\ncontinuous and incessant, that all things do not\\nalways move. There is constant motion going on in\\nthe world in the sense that some objects are in motion,\\nimplies the Else wc would have perfect rest and quiet. The\\nrest\u00c2\u00b0rnd^of i^otions of rcst and of movement have each a basis in\\nmotion. experience. Every object is not ever at rest; nor is\\nevery object ever in motion. Hence we distinguish\\ntwo states; repose and movement. This distinction,\\nso true to ordinary observation, is verified in scientific\\nand philosophic discussion.\\nill physk;s 5 scicnce of Physics treats of the properties\\nof material bodies. It tells us that inertia and force\\nare of the essence of physical things. By reason of\\ninertia a body is indifferent to motion or to repose.\\nIf in motion it continues to move, if at rest it so", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 131\\nremains. Thus this law supposes that a body can be\\nin one or the other state. Again, Physics speaks of\\nenergy. It distinguishes two kinds: kinetic and\\npotential energy. The former is called vis viva and is\\nnothing more than active force. Its power is expressed\\nin the mathematical formula Potential energy\\nis so termed because it does not exert its power in\\naction, but can do so when the opportunity is presented.\\nThus, e,g.^ a stone suspended in the air exerts no action,\\nbut possesses the potency to fall as soon as the impedi-\\nment is removed. Potential energy is, therefore, the\\nproperty of an object which is in a state of rest,\\nS 6. The same distinction obtains in Metaphysics, i Meta-\\nphysics.\\nThere we discuss the properties of being. Potency\\nand act are viewed in their real nature. We learn that\\npotency is transformed into act by virtue of an\\nextrinsic mover. The mover causes a body in a state\\nof rest to exert its activity and to be in motion. The\\npotential energy under the impulse becomes kinetic.\\nThis passage from a state of rest to a state of activity\\nis the basis for the Scholastic definition of motion.\\nAristotle words it as the act of a being in potenc}?-\\ninasmuch as it is in potency, and St. Thomas\\nexplains the definition as above. Thus the funda-\\nmental concept of Scholastic Philosophy is found to\\nrest upon ordinary and scientific observation.\\nII.\\nErrors.\\n7. In ancient times Parmenides, and in our own\\nday Herbart, denied the fact of motion. The answer\\nso effectually given to the former is also valid for the\\nAristotle, Phys., 1. Ill, ch. i.\\nC. Gent., II, 20: III, 82; S. Th. 1. q. 45, a. 5; 1. q. 90, a, 2;\\nFere Villard, Dieu Devant la Science et la Raison, p. 100.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "132 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nHeraciitus. latter, solvitur ambulaiido. The error of Heracli-\\ntus, however, is much more germane to our thesis.\\nHe maintained that objects were in a perpetual motion\\nand that repose did not exist. This opinion has been\\nbroached by no less a person than Hegel. Heraciitus\\nwas content in teaching the motion of material things.\\nHis doctrine is, therefore, purely materialistic. Hegel,\\non the contrary, took the statement of Heraciitus,\\ntaught that all things were in a state of becoming, from\\nthis formed an abstract conception which he called\\nTO fieri, and made it the central concept of an Ideal-\\nistic system. Nevertheless, the main error is found\\nin both.\\nHegel. g 8. With Hegel the ro fieri \\\\s the medium between\\nexisting being and absolute nothing. All existing\\nthings are its manifestations. The evolution is seen\\n(a) in abstract and metaphysical notions, hence the\\ndepartment of Logic (b) in real existences and material\\nphenomena, hence nature; (c) finally, the idea rises to\\nconsciousness and manifests itself in the phenomena\\nof human thought.^ Hence no rest or repose; only a\\nconstant movement and evolution.\\nCriticism. 9. (i) The crror of Hegel finds its source with\\nLeibnitz. He taught that potency was a third some-\\ntophHoso-^ thing between act and pure passivity, hence a sort of\\nfcTence^ interm.ediate entity. Hegel formed an abstraction\\nfrom this which he termed the to fieri. Again it is false\\nto say that all beings are at all times in act. This\\nmeans the negation of a state of repose. Now physical\\nscience and sound metaphysics teach the contrary.\\n(2) its S 10. (2) The result of this doctrine is the contra-\\nresults.\\ndiction between science and metaphysics. Hence the\\nFarges, L id6e de Dieu. p. 413.\\nHegel s Philosophy of Mind, by W. Wallace; Hegel s\\nLogic, by W. T. Harris.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 133\\ndisrepute into which the latter branch of knowledge\\nhas in these times fallen. Science found that it could\\nnot harmonize with philosophy. Hence it rejected\\nphilosophy altogether and justly declared that a pos-\\nteriori conclusions should be preferred to a priori\\ntheories. With philosophy religion goes hand in hand.\\nHence the bitter antagonism which arose between\\nscience and religion. A false system of philosophy is\\nthe source of all the confusion and strife. Metaphysics\\nis built upon Physics, The notions and principles dis-\\ncussed in the former find logical application and verifi-\\ncation in the latter.\\nII. (3) It is false to suppose that an improvement (3) cannot\\non the Hegelian philosophy can be made. The Neo-\\nHegelian system is only transitory. A change or\\nmodification of detail is no remedy to a system radically\\nwrong. The fundamental concept of Hegel s philoso-\\nphy is a scientific and a metaphysical error. The only\\nresource is a radical change and the adoption of a\\nsystem more in accordance with sound reasoning.\\nIII.\\nThe Argument.\\n8 12. Movement is a fact of daily experience.\u00c2\u00ae It is^^ii^^sof\\no movement.\\nconfirmed by exact and profound scientific experi-\\nmentation. Nevertheless there are various kinds of\\nmovements. These must be distinguished one from\\nthe other, not only for the sake of clearness, but\\nespecially because they give rise to separate lines of\\nreasoning. Thus there is r 2/ movement, e.^ move- local,\\nment from place to place, e. g.^ I walk across the room,\\na train of cars moves from Albany to New York, the\\nearth moves from place to place in its path around the\\nSt. Thomas, 1. q. 2, a. 3.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "134 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n?ive Again, an object may change in quantity, i. e.,\\nmay become greater or smaller in size, e. g., the phe-\\nnomena of growth in living things of increase and\\ndecrease in inanimate objects through the forces of\\nattraction or of friction. Hence we have quantitative\\nchange or quantitative movement. Finally, an object\\nmay change in quality, e., remaining unchanged in\\nsize or weight, it may acquire or lose other attributes,\\ne. g., the change from heat to cold, from bitter to\\nsweet, from white to black, from a pleasant to a nause-\\nquaiitative ous odor, etc. This is called a qualitative change.\\nmotion.\\nLocal motion is movement in the strict sense of the\\nword. Quantitative and qualitative motion, however,\\nare more properly designated by the common term,\\nmutation. Thus we have two lines of reasoning leading\\nthe mind to admit the existence of God. The former\\nis based on local motion and is confined to the field of\\nphysical science. The latter rests upon the notion of\\nmutation and is more metaphysical.\\nIV.\\nLocal Motion.\\nhistory. 13. The argument drawn from local motion was\\nfirst proposed by Aristotle. St. Thomas develops it\\nin the sense and scope of his master.^ Suarez, how-\\never, rejects the proof as limited in range and lacking in\\nstrength. Cardinal Satolli, Fr. Pesch, Abb6 Farges\\nhave resuscitated the argument from its long oblivion,\\nCont. Gent, i, 13.\\nSuarez reasons from a peculiar kind of local motion and\\nbetrays the undeveloped condition of Physics at the time. He\\nconcludes: Igitur ex solo motu coeli nulla est sufficiens via ad\\nhujusmodi demonstrationem conficiendam. Disput. Meta-\\nphys., Disp. XXX, sect. i.\\nSatolli, Praelectiones, Quaes. II, art. Ill, Pesch. Instit.\\nPhil. Naturalis, L. II, Disp. 3; Farges L idee de Dieu, p. 61.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 135\\nwoven it through the facts and laws recently revealed\\nby the marvelous progress in the physical sciences,\\nand thrown it into a new and conclusive form.\\n14. Physical science explains the phenomena J^VneYb\\nmotion by attraction. This is defined as the invisible attraction.\\npower in nature which tends to draw bodies together.\\nThe law which rules the mutual action and reaction\\nwas formulated by Newton. A body attracts another\\nbody in the direct ratio of the squares of the masses\\nand the inverse square of the distances, e. g., a \u00e2\u0080\u0094~^i.\\nThis law holds universal sway throughout the material\\nuniverse. Thus Astronomy tells how the stellar bodies\\nmove through space along their accustomed path in\\nobedience to this law. Physics and Chemistry re-\\nveal its working in the molecules of a body, and\\nenunciate the laws of chemical affinity.\\n8 iii. The existence and universal sway of attraction nature of\\nr 1- 1/- r, attraction.\\nIS, therefore, an undisputed fact of modern science.\\nNevertheless scientists are not in accord as to the\\nnature of the law. Two opposing schools exist and\\nstrong reasons are advanced by earnest and energetic\\nadherents.\\n16. Some scientists maintain that matter is purely Mechanical\\npassive, that of itself it possesses no force, that the^^^\\naction comes from another source. This is the theory\\nof Descartes and its defenders are called Mechanists.\\nIn support of their position they appeal to the laws\\nand principles of Physics.\\n17. (a) The nature of matter is revealed by the (a) appeals\\nstudy of its laws. A primary and fundamental law is inenll.^^\\nthe law of inertia. By this is understood the fact that\\nmatter of itself is indifferent to rest or to motion. If\\nit be in a state of rest, it will remain so unless an\\n2 Farges, L idee de Dieu, p. 65.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "136 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nexternal impulse be imparted to set it in motion. If\\nit be in a state of movement, it will continue in motion\\nunless an external force impedes its action and brings\\nit to a state of rest.^^ This principle holds universal\\nsway throughout the material universe. The countless\\nplanets, in their swift course through the depths of\\nspace, move in mute obedience to its power. In\\nunmolested round they hold their appointed path,\\nbecause no other body is near enough to cause a\\ndeflection. If, however, their course is retarded or\\nperturbations are discovered, this law bids us seek the\\ncause in the presence of a heavenly body hitherto\\nunknown. Thus the Mathematician in his study with\\nthe known perturbations of Uranus as data, could\\ndirect the telescope of the astronomer to a definite\\npoint beyond the known limits of the solar system\\nwhere the planet Neptune moved.\\n18. The law of inertia is not only true of large\\nmaterial masses; it is also verified of the smallest\\nparticles of matter. On this principle rests the science\\nof Mechanics, and it renders possible the multiform\\nchemical combinations,\\n(b) to law of S 10. (b) A fundamental law of nature which also\\nconserva- tj\\ntionof holds sway throughout the material universe is the law\\nenergy.\\nof the conservation of energy. That material forces\\nenter into play in the world around us is a fact of\\nordinary and of scientific experience. These forces\\nare not always in action. Hence in Physics we have\\nthe distinction between latent and active energy. To\\npotential the former the name, potential energy, has been given,\\nenergy iuasmuch as it is not yet active, but is in potence to\\nbecome active, e. g energy of position; thus a ball\\nsuspended in air has the latent energy to fall if the\\nhand holding it is removed. To the latter the term vis\\n*3 Aristotle, by G. H. Lewes, ch. IV, 62, 63.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 137\\nviva, i. e., living force, has been applied, inasmuch as\\nit is exerting itself in action.\\n20. Potential energy is constantly undergoing their trans-\\ntransformation into actual energy. Actual energy is\\nlikewise converted from one of its various forms into\\nanother, e. g., heat into mechanical work or into\\npotential energy. The law of the conservation of\\nenergy asserts that in this perpetual transformation no\\nenergy is ever lost and that the sum of actual and of\\npotential energy is a constant quantity, e. g., P A C.\\nThese energies may vary; at one time actual ma)^ be\\ngreater or less than at another; yet a corresponding\\nvariation takes place in potential energy; thus the sum\\nis always the same, e. g. (A I) (P I) C; or (A\u00e2\u0080\u0094 I)\\n(P I)=C. This scientific truth leads the mind to\\nadmit a vast store of energy in nature, distinct from\\nmatter as such, in constant transformation from one\\nform to another, whereas matter itself passively\\nreceives and transmits the movements. A contrast of\\nthis law with the law of the conservation of matter\\nbrings out more clearly the ground on which the\\nhypothesis rests.\\n\u00c2\u00a721. The other theory contends that attraction is Theory of\\nan active force inherent in matter. It owes its origin\\nto Leibnitz and its defenders are called Dynamists.\\nThey maintain that matter is not purely passive. Ordi-\\nnary observation, they tell us, and scientific experi-\\nmentation reveal in matter an active element, which is an active\\nthe basis and the explanation of the phenomena of matter.\\nuniversal attraction. The law of inertia is true of\\nmatter in the sense that matter cannot move itself\\nspontaneously. Hence a clear line of demarkation\\nexists between the inertia or material sphere and\\nbodies endowed with life. Yet matter possesses in\\nitself the power to act upon matter a power, how-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "138 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\never, limited or conditioned upon the quantity of the\\nmaterial bodies and the distances intervening. Thus\\nthe law of universal attraction can be expressed in a\\nSnf?om^ mathematical formula A p. The conclusion is\\ntheories, therefore drav/n of a universe in which exist action and\\ninteraction without the necessity of admitting a prim-\\nordial mover or initial cause of movement,\\nelusion ?s 2-- Take either hypothesis; the reasoning is strong\\nfalse. and conclusive. According to the first theory motion\\nis not inherent in matter, but springs from another\\nsource. Now all particles of matter are of the same\\nnature. Therefore, if motion were not in some way\\ncommunicated to the material elements, all movement\\nwould be impossible. The very fact of motion sup-\\nposes a mobile and a mover. This inference leads\\nthe mind conclusively to admit the existence of a prime\\nmover, the source and explanation of all movement,\\ne.^ God.\\narg-ument R 23. But, wc are told, motion is eternal, Aristotle\\ngood, It we 0^1\\ngrant that so taught,^ and St. Thomas does not deny the\\nmotion is\\neternal. absolutc possibility. Let US grant the contention.\\nThe force of the reasoning is not at all weakened. The\\neternity of motion does not change its nature. That\\nmatter is indifferent to rest or motion is a physical law.\\nAs it is now, so it was in the eternal past. Kxv external\\ncause of motion has been shown to be necessary. On\\nthe supposition that matter be eternal, we should be\\nforced to admit an eternal cause.\\nlaw of \u00c2\u00a724. Again, the law of inertia shows that the motions\\ninertia\\npoints to a which fall Under our observation had a beginning.\\nThus we have a series of motions communicated. If\\nwe admit the series to be infinite, we should have an\\ninfinite series of movements, each one of which had a\\nAristotle, Metaph. IV, 6.\\n15 Phys. LVni, ch. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 139\\nbegianing, and at the same time hold that the series\\nhad no beginning. But this is an open absurdity.\\n8 2^. In the second hypothesis matter is considered inference\\nfrom theory\\nas possessing an inherent active force. The inference of Oyna-\\nmists con-\\nfrom this principle is no less conclusive. This inherent elusive also.\\npower of matter passes from potency to act, as observa-\\ntion shows. Therefore, it is not always in action. We\\nsee about us bodies at rest, passing from rest to motion,\\nor returning again to a state of quiet. Hence we have\\nmotions constantly beginning. Therefore, we are\\nforced to admit a prime beginning and a prime cause\\nof the movement.\\n26. Kant maintains that the conclusion is not war- objectionof\\nranted by the premises. He holds that universal\\nattraction of itself is sufficient to account for motion.\\nThis opinion is out of date and to-day is rejected by\\nscientists of great name. It is the weak point in criticism.\\nKant s nebular hypothesis. Universal attraction is a\\nlaw depending upon the quantity of matter and the\\nintervals separating the material bodies. Thus it only\\nbecomes possible on the convergence of these con-\\nditions. It is difficult to explain its beginning.\\nQuantity or space are only conditions. The mutual\\ninfluence is a fact. It will not explain itself. Another\\nsource is necessary. Faye has shown this conclusively.\\nThe atoms in the primal nebula were equally distributed\\nor not. If the former supposition be true, then the\\natoms would be homogeneous; unequal or different\\nforces would be impossible; and a perfect state of\\nequilibrium would exist. This is contrary to fact. If,\\nhowever, the atoms be unequally distributed, we are\\nface to face with a gratuitous supposition. It can for\\nthis reason be rejected; or if granted we are warranted\\nin seeking a cause for this inequality.\\nFaye, L Origine du Monde, p. 120, sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "I40\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfi^^^^ S 2 7. The conclusion is therefore forced upon the\\nconclusion.\\ncandid mind. The universe is powerless to explain\\nitself. A consideration of the phenomena of movement\\nviewed in the light of physical science alone has shown\\nthis to a certainty.\\nV.\\nMutation.\\nmutation. g 28. Another line of thought, equally cogent, but\\nmox^e far-reaching in application, can be formulated\\nfrom the consideration of movement in the sense of\\nmutation. It is not confined to the changes in place\\nwhich physical bodies undergo, but embraces any\\nchange whatsoever which takes place in nature.^ It\\npasses beyond the limits of the external world, enters\\ninto our inner life, and takes as data, the secret\\nthoughts and desires and emotions of the soul. The\\nstrength of the argument rests upon two fundamental\\nprinciples,\\n(i)every g 29. (i) The first principle is that every being\\nmotion was v/hich is in a state of motion is so because it has been\\nput m\\nmotion by put in motiou by the action of some other being,\\nthe activity-\\nof another This IS provcd truc of material bodies by the law of\\ninertia. Matter of itself is indifferent to rest or to\\nmotion. Now it is a fact that all material things are\\nnot in movement. Else motion would be of the\\nessence of matter and no rest would be possible.\\nOrdinary and scientific experience shows this to be\\nfalse. The indifference on the part of matter, there-\\nfore, can only be explained by affirming that m.aterial\\nbodies existing in a state of movement owe the motion\\nto the operation of a force external to themselves.\\na being in S ^o. Ao^ain, a beinsf is in motion in order to obtain\\nmotion is f\\nimperfect, some perfection it does not at present possess. For\\nf Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. II, ch. 4; VIII, ch. 6.\\nC. Gentes, 1. i, ch. 13.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 141\\nwe must bear in mind that motion here is taken in the\\nsense of action or operation. If it already possessed the\\nperfection, it would not move to obtain it. Hence\\nthe acquisition of the perfection is the explanation of\\nthe movement. To say, therefore, that a being moves\\nitself, is to assert that at the same time it has or has\\nnot the perfection. It has not, inasmuch as it moves\\nto acquire the quality; it already possesses the per-\\nfection, inasmuch as it contains in itself the sufficient\\ncause of the movement. But this must be rejected\\nas absurd.\\nS ^i. Another reason is proposed bv St. Thomas ini ^^uctive\\nr r argument\\nthe form of an argument from induction. The Angelic of St.\\n*f Thomas.\\nDoctor draws a distinction between violent and natural\\nmovement. It is manifest that an object is violently\\nset in motion by the sudden and overpowering influ-\\nence of an external agent. As to natural movement we\\ncan distinguish between motions in the physical sphere for physical\\nand motions of living beings. The law of inertia\\nproves to conviction that no material body is capable of\\ngiving movement to itself. Its indifference to rest or\\nto motion absolutely precludes any such possibility/^\\n\u00c2\u00a732. The organic world is composed of living, of for organic\\nsentient and of intelligent beings; it embraces plants,\\nanimals, man. Growth is movement of a certain kind.\\nBut growth is not an absolute, it is a relative and\\ndependent phenomenon. The plants, e. g., need earth,\\nmoisture, temperature, rays of the sun for their develop-\\nment. If these be removed, life would be impossible,\\nEcce sunt coeli et terra; clamant quod facta sint; mutan-\\ntur enim atque variantur. Quidquid autem factum non est, et\\nlamen est, non est in eo quidquam quod ante non erat, quod est\\nmutari atque variari. Clamant etiam quod seipsa non fecerint.\\nIdeo sumus quia facti sumus; non ergo eramus antequam\\nessemus; ut fieri possimus a nobis, Et vox dicentium est ipsa\\nevidentia. St. Aug. Confess., 1. XI, ch. 4: de Civ. Dei, 1. II,\\nch. 4.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "142 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nthe plant would wilt and die, and death would be the\\ncessation of all vital action. Furthermore, a funda-\\nmental law of Biology is that life can only come from\\nantecedent existing life. Hence living motion is not\\nspontaneous; it is derivative, and the fact that a living\\nthing exists is proof that its vital motion was imparted\\nby another being possessing life.\\nfor animal g 33. The phenomena of sentient and of intellectual\\nlife are set forth in the science of Psychology. There\\nthe motions of the soul in all their extent are discussed.\\nOur actions are always influenced by some motive.\\nExternal objects come in contact with the senses and\\nat times so strong is the power exerted that our action\\nis precipitate and indeliberate.\\nfor man. 34. Again, wc act judiciously and after mature\\nreflection; the motive power resides in the will. But\\nthe will never acts independently of the intellect. The\\nmind seeks motives and presents them to the will.\\nInfluenced by them we exert action. Now our act is\\ncool and dispassionate. We speak or write or move\\nabout with hardly the show of color in the cheek or an\\nuntoward glance of the eye. Again, the motives pre-\\nsented by the mind may so possess our wills that our\\nsouls are moved to the very depths, our whole being\\nis charged with emotions of divers kinds, e. g., anger,\\ndesire, pain, etc. the perspiration gathers on the\\nbrow, the cheek burns or is ashy pale, the muscles of\\nthe face contract in pain or expand in joy, the eye\\nreveals the passion burning within and we give vent to\\nour feelings in a strong and resolute manner. Even\\nhere w^e find the influence brought to bear which is the\\nimpelling cause of action.\\nconclusion 35. Thus 3. Complete induction verifies our princi-\\nthat motion _,, 1 j\\nis due to an pie. 1 he motion or action of a bemg is due to aa\\nexternal\\n20 St. Aug. De Quant. An., XXXIV; Enar. in Ps. XLI, n. 7, 8.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 143\\nexternal source or cause. No one being is sufficient\\nof itself. Everywhere within us and without we find\\nobjects influencing other objects in various ways\\nwith the result that the things influenced are set in\\nmotion.\\nS 36. (2) The second principle is that an infinite (2) infinite\\nseries of\\nseries of movements and of moving things is impossi- moving\\ntliin ^s is\\nble. This when added to the former gives to the impossible,\\nargument a conclusiveness which cannot be shaken.\\nIts truth is apparent w^hen viewed in the light of the\\nfirst principle. In a certain sense it can be considered\\nas a corollary. That an object in motion owes the\\nmovement to an impulse imparted by another being has\\nbeen clearly shown. It is universal and valid as a\\nphysical law. By reasoning from this as data the\\nmind can rise to the higher plane of metaphysics,\\nextend its vision backwards beyond an experimental\\nresearch and enunciate a truth far more reaching in\\napplication.\\n37. If a body is set in motion by another, it proQ^.ofthis\\ndepends upon the other for the movement. Thus,\\ne. g., A is moved by B; therefore A is dependent upon\\nB, and in B alone is to be found the cause of move-\\nment in A. In like manner it is evident that B is set\\nin motion by C, and so on until we come to a first\\nmover or to infinity. If the first mover be moved by^oi motions\\nma direct\\nanother, then omnia muta^itur ab alio; but this is^i\\na contradiction. If we admit a series of objects\\nimparting movement one to another and stretching\\nback to infinity, then we are forced to deny the princi-\\nple of causality or admit that no movement is possible,\\nas has been shown.\\n8 ^8. But it may be said, why suppose movement for circular\\nmotions.\\nin a straight line; could not circular motion evade", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "144 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nthe dilemma? Let us grant that the motion is in a\\n-D circle, the molecules of the\\ncircumference acting on one\\nanother and form-ing a per-\\nfect round. Then A will act\\non B, and B on C, and C\\non D. The activity of B is\\ndue to the impulse of A,\\nthat of C to B, that of D to\\nC, that of A to D. Now,\\nthen, A is moved by D and\\nand in turn moves B. Two alternatives can only be\\nadm.itted. Either the movement had a beginning or it\\nhad not. If the former, then our argument is granted\\nand we have a prime-mover. If the movement had\\nnot a beginning, then we are constrained to admit that\\nA at one and the same instant of time is in a state of\\nmotion and in a state of repose. It is in motion\\nbecause it moves B. It is not in a state of motion\\nbecause it is moved by D. The principle that move-\\nment of a being is due to an impulse from an external\\nobject applies to the case with all its rigor. We are,\\ntherefore, face to face with a manifest contradiction.\\nThe conclusion, therefore, is forced upon us that a first\\nmover exists.\\nargument R cjq. This argument can be thrown into a simpler\\nin another 8 oy f\\nform. form. Three species of movement have been dis-\\ntinguished. The general argument rests upon the\\nconcepts of local motion and of mutation. But move-\\nment in the strict sense of the word is local motion.\\nThis is fundamental. Scientific experimentation has\\nshown that all other forms of movement can be\\nViderunt (Platonici) quidquid mutabile non esse summum\\nDeum; et ideo omnem animam mutabilesque omnes spiritus\\ntranscenderunt, quaerentes summum Deum. Aug. de Civ.\\nDei, 1. VIII, ch. 6.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "MOTION. 145\\nreduced to it. In the action of one molecule upon\\nanother, we find that one draws nearer and nearer to\\nthe other until they meet. The molecular vibrations ^11 \u00e2\u0084\u00a2ove-\\nment can\\nof a body are only possible, therefore, by local be reduced\\nmotion. It is at the basis of all sensible phenomena, motion.\\nBy it movements of quantity and of quality are\\nexplained.\\n40. If, then, all movement or mutation can be but local\\n1 r -rii ^notion\\nreduced to local motion, and 11 an analysis of local points to a\\n1 r 1 Being: dis-\\nmotion points to a Being distinct from the universe as tinct^from\\nthe cause of all movement, it follows that the proof\\ndrawn from local motion can and should be applied to\\nmutation. The conclusion, therefore, is manifest,\\neven though somewhat indirect.\\nVI.\\nConclusion.\\n\u00c2\u00a741. In drawing a conclusion from this argument, Piato and\\nPlato asserts that the first-mover moves himself, not contra-\\nAristotle, on the contrary, infers, a mover who is other.\\nimmovable.^ At first sight a patent contradiction is\\nevident. Not so, however, when the words and the\\nlines of reasoning are closely examined. By saying\\nthat the first-mover moves himself, Plato wishes to\\nguard against the inference that it is inert and passive.\\nIn like manner Aristotle aims at showing that the first-\\nmover does not move in the sense that it changes.\\n42. The first-mover is immovable in the sense that\\nit is not subject to mutable movement, he does\\n22 c. Gent. II, 20; III, 82; S. Th., 1. q. 45, a. 5.\\nFarges, de I acte et de la puissance, ch. IV; The laws of\\nphysics and chemistry, of gravity, electricity and affinities are\\nall, or appear to be, reducible to the laws of motion. Janet,\\nFinal Causes, p. 187.\\n24 Kivovv (XKivTiTov, Physics, B. VII, VIII; Metaphys., B. XII,\\nch, 6, 7.\\n10", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "146 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nnot move himself in such a manner that he changes.\\nThus St. Thomas reconciles the teaching of both.\\nThere is no contradiction. Different aspects of the\\none great truth are brought out prominently with a\\nview to offset special errors.\\n25 C. Gent., 1. I, ch. XIII; St. Aug. de Gen. ad Lit. 1. VIII\u00c2\u00bb\\nch. 20-26.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "CHAPER IX.\\nORDER.\\nI. The oldest and most popular argument for the History,\\nexistence of God is drawn from the order and harmony\\nof the universe. In the remnants of ancient literature\\nwhich exhibit the mind seeking a solution for the\\nmysteries of life this argument appears in simple and\\ncrude form. Language, true index of thought and of\\nfeeling, goes far beyond the known records of time and\\npresents m its vocabulary words which bear the indeli-\\nble marks of order and design.* Thus to the Greeks\\nthe world was a Koo-jxos, to the Latins a mundus^ to our\\nforefathers a universe^ i. e.^ one united and harmonious\\nwhole. The Christian Fathers and Apologists most\\nfrequently insist upon this consideration.^ They cite\\nthe sublime song of the Hebrew Psalmist, The\\nheavens show forth the glory of God and the firma-\\nment declares the works of His hands. They call\\nthe mind of the lowest and humblest to the marvelous\\nharmony of the heavenly bodies in their course, to the\\nregular succession of the seasons. They find con-\\nsiderations which constrain the ignorant and the\\nThe idea of order is expressed in the Vedic word Rita, which\\nmeans physical or moral order and law (Rig.-Veda, III, 40, 4);\\nin Zend Ratu, which means order and orderer (Darmesteter;\\nOrmazd and Ahriman, p. 12); in Latin, Rattis, e. g., motus\\nstellarum rati et constantes. Cicero, Dis. Tusc. V, 24, 6g, de\\nNat. Deor, II, 20, 51. Cf. Miiller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 239,\\nFor the meaning of the Egyptian word Maat, cf. supra, ch. II,\\np. 10.\\n^Cicero, de Nat. Deor., 1. II, c. 34.\\nSt. Aug. De Ordine; Serm. 141, al. 55, ch. i, 2; Athanasius,\\nC. Gentes; Bossuet, Conn, de Dieu et soi-meme, ch. IV; Clem-\\nens Romanus, ep. ad Corinth.\\n4Ps. 18.\\n[147]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "148 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nlearned to admit an intelligence and providence all\\npowerful and beneficent, which shapes the course of\\nall things and appointeth to each its place and time.\\nIts force S In our own time this argument has been most\\nto-day. c n r i i\\nbitterly assailed. The rise and influence of the phys-\\nical sciences, especially of Biology and of Physiology\\nhave, for a time seemed to deprive it of force and\\nrender it worthless. The very basis on which it rests\\nhas been turned so that a series of inferences were\\ndrawn to prove the opposite. Its value, therefore, is\\nsaid to be purely historic, representing only a puerile\\nand unscientific state of the human mind.\\n3. The attempt; however, has utterly failed. The\\nlesson taught is that true philosophy has naught to\\nfear from science. For a time, it is true, superficial\\nstudy and hasty generalization may seem to shatter\\nthe foundation of our highest and noblest beliefs.\\nProfound thought and critical analysis win at last, and\\nthe victory is more lasting and brilliant because of the\\ndoubt and suspense and bitter conflict which preceded.\\nI.\\nThe Basis.\\nBasis is the a The basis of the argument is the existence and\\nvalidity of final causes. Do they really exist and what\\n5 Nam sicut humana consuetudo verbi?, ita divina potentia\\netiam factis loquitur. Aug. ep. 102, n. 33. ex operibus\\nartificem cognosces. Serm. 241, n. i; serm. 197, n. i. Sun\\nand moon move in regular succession that we may have faith,\\nO India. Rig-Veda, I, 102, 2, MuUer, op. cit., p. 301- The\\nassertion of Mr. Fiske that all attempts to study God as\\nrevealed in the workings of the visible universe, and to charac-\\nterize the divine activity in terms derived from such study, have\\nmet with discourageme nt, if not with obloquy can come from\\nonly one who v/rites in utter disregard of the history of the\\npast. Cf. Fiske, Idea of God, p. 41, infra, 4.\\n^Farges, L idee de Dieu, p. 126; Fiske, Idea of God, pp. 126,\\n128; Cosmic Philosophy, vol. II, p. 381, sq.\\nFaye, L Origine du Monde, p. 2.\\nFinal cause.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 149\\ndo they prove? Bacon,\u00c2\u00ae Spinosa/ the modern its history.\\nmechanical and evolution schools contend that the\\nfinal cause is a pure fiction of the mind. On the other\\nhand, Aristotle and the Christian Philosophers have\\nset forth the truth in clear and convincing language.\\nIn our day the Bridgewater Treatises/^ the writings of\\nDugald Stewart, of Faley, of the Duke of Argyll, of\\nProf. Flint, and of Paul Janet have been to thousands\\nan armory for the refutation of error and the defense\\nof faith. It must not, however, be taken for granted\\nthat these various treatises are of the same intrinsic\\nvalue. Bitter discussion has served to bring out into\\nclear light the real problem and the difficulties which\\nenvelop it.^^ Final cause is defined as that on account definition of\\nFinal cause.\\nof which one acts, or the end for which one acts. Hence\\n8 De Dignit. et Augm, Scien. 1. 3; New Organ, b. II, appor. 2.\\n^Ethics, part i, prop. 56, Appendix; Eraser, Theism, p. 80.\\n^^Arist. Phys., 1. 2, c. 8; Metaphys., 1. i, c. 4; Socrates, cf.\\nXenophon, Mem. i, 4, 2; Plato, Apology, Phaed., Laws, b. 12;\\nSeneca, de Providentia; Clement of Alex. Strom., 5; Athanasius,\\nC. Gent., n. 35; Gregory Nazian, Orat. II; Aug. de Ordine,\\n1. I, ch. 2; Chrysostom, de Providentia; Aug. de Vera Relig.,\\nch. 29; serm. 141, n. 2.\\nThe Hand, by Dr. Charles Bell; The Adaptation of External\\nNature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man, by\\nDr. Chalmers; The Adaptation of External Nature to the\\nPhysical Constitution of Man, by John Kidd; Astronomy,\\nGeology, Physics, treated in reference to Natural Theology, by\\nW. Whewell; Animal and Vegetable Physiology considered in\\nreference to Natural Theology, by P. M. Roget; Geology and\\nMineralogy, by W. Buckland; Power, Wisdom and Goodness\\nof God as Manifested in the Creation of Animals, by W. Kirby;\\nChemistry and Function of Digestion, by C. Babbage; Foot-\\nprints of the Creator, by Hugh Miller; Theologie de la Nature,\\npar H. Durkheim; Butler s Analogy; Typical Forms, by Mc-\\nCosh; Faith in God and Modern Atheism, by J. Buchanan;\\nTheism and Witness of Reason and Nature to the Creator, by\\nPrin. Tulloch.\\n^-J. S. Mill considers the argument from design to be the\\nprincipal and strongest but inconclusive. Cf. Essays on\\nReligion, p. 139, 155, 167. This argument is the mainstay of\\nEnglish Apologetical writers. Thus Prof. Fraser says the\\ncardinal fact is that the universe is interpretable and not chaotic,\\nnot when or whether it began to be. Phil, of Theism, p. 242;", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "150 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nthe teriQ. finals which comes from the Latin ^\u00c2\u00ab/i-, e.^\\nan end. The discussion, therefore, is narrowed down\\nto the simple fact, are there ends in nature? Do\\nnatural agents exert activities mechanically or do they\\nact with a certain character or predetermination in\\norder to obtain definite ends by employing most\\nfitting means? In the argument from causality the\\nprinciple was laid down as a necessary law of the mind\\nthat a phenomenon, which began to be, demands a\\ncause to explain its beginning.\\ncoincidence 8 5. At present wc are not concerned with a single\\nof phenom-\\nenaafact phenomenon, but with a group or phenomena; we do\\nexplained, not scck to explain how a phenomenon began to exist,\\nbut we are in search of a cause to explain the marvel-\\nous agreement and coincidence of the phenomena.\\nThis very agreement or coincidence is a phenomenon\\nwhich must be accounted for.^^ Scientific men adm.it\\nthe fact and, taking it as a principle, push on in their\\ninvestigations to most profitable results. In all depart-\\nments of physical science, especially in Astronomy,\\ne. g., law of gravitation, in Physics, e. g., the law of\\ninertia, in Chemistry, e. g., chem.ical combinations, it\\nha\u00c2\u00a7 been the source of far-reaching discoveries and the\\nbasis of fruitful hypothesis. The method, therefore,\\nis only an application of the principle of sufficient rea-\\nson to the groups of orderly arrayed phenomeaa in the\\nworld about us.\\nKnight, Aspects of Theism, p. 59; in Germany, Drobisch and\\nFliigel maintain the same position; Pfleiderer, Phil, of Religion,\\nvol. II, p. 221.\\nOrdo est recta rado rerum ad finem. St. Thomas, i. q.\\n22, a. i; omne agens agit propter finem. St. Thomas, C.\\nGentes, II, c. 42; 1, III, ch. 2.\\nJanet, p. 23.\\nAdjustment not our inference from facts but a part of\\nthe facts themselves. Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 82, 84,\\nnote B.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 151\\nII.\\nThe Fact.\\n6. The thoughtful student, brought face to face distinction\\nwith the various aspects of physical nature, is forced phenomena.\\nto admit a distinction between phenomena. Some\\nphenomena are sufficiently explained by detecting the\\nrelation to their efficient cause. They are results or\\neffects; nothing more. The mind is then satisfied\\nand is not constrained to go farther. They appear to\\nhave no aim or end. Thus, e. g., the peaks of a\\nmountain range, so varied in height and form, are\\nsimply results of nature s forces in the remote past;\\nthe masses of lava thrown up by a volcano, the frag-\\nments of rock resulting from an explosion are explained\\nby pointing to the cause whence they happened. The so^e ex-\\nmind is not forced to seek the w/iy and the wherefores f^^^nt^^\\nit rests content in knowing the agency which produced\\nthem and the manner of their occurrence, the\\nefficient cause. We do not deny that they have ends\\nox purposes; we only state an obvious fact, viz., that\\nthe mind is in no wise constrained to look for the\\naim or ends}^\\n87. Other phenomena, however, have a different others only\\nexplained\\ncharacter stamped upon them. They bear relations by final\\ncause.\\nnot to the past only; they look forward to ^^i^ future.\\nThe mind is not satisfied in discovering the efficient\\ncause; it seeks to know more. It finds a relation exist-\\ning between the grouping of activities and their effects\\nwhich imperiously demands an explanation. The\\neffects appear in the light of causes inasmuch as they\\nseem to influence the apt arrangement and harmonious\\nworking of the activities. Hence the mind grasps the\\nJanet, Final Causes, p. 7, sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "152 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(a) Psychol- peculiar relation of means to the end. For illustra-\\nogy,\\ntions we go to the physical sciences.\\n8. (a) Physiology is the science of the human or-\\nganism. Its closeness to our lives makes it a study of\\nsurpassing interest. Take up any text-book the facts\\nrecorded give remarkable verification to our line of\\nthought. Every organ of the body is specially adapted\\nto definite functions. Everywhere we find a coinci-\\ndence of innumerable precautions and conditions with\\norgans. a view to a determined result. The senses are each\\na marvelous piece of mechanism. The eye, the ear,\\nthe nose, the mouth, the skin, are formed for special\\noffices. The processes of respiration, of deglutition,\\nof digestion, are a constant source of wonder.\\nJ^steS!^^^ 9- Not only are the single organs illustrations of\\npurpose. The harmony and co-ordination of the\\nhuman system is more wonderful still. Here wc find\\na subordination, not of single activities, but of groups\\nof activities, and tending to the growth and preserva-\\ntion of the system. Hence Cuvier s celebrated law\\nof correlation of organs: Every organized being\\nforms a v/hole a peculiar system of its own, the parts\\nof which mutually correspond and concur in produc-\\ning the same definite action by a reciprocal reaction.\\nThus from one bone he could construct an entire\\norganism. For this reason Claude Bernard identifies\\nthe governing idea which rules the development of the\\norganism with the Final Cause of x\\\\ristotle.\\ndonoftex ^^y so Step farther in our investigation\\nThe most remarkable of all the facts of co-ordination\\nDe Pressens6, Study of Origins, B. II, ch. i.\\nHelmholtz, Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, p. 228;\\nMartineau, A Study of Religions, vol. I, p. 338.\\n19 Duke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 174.\\n20 Ma^fineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 282, 283.\\n1 De Pressense, A Study of Origins, p. 150.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 153\\nis the existence of the sexes. Here is found the\\nadaptation of organ to organ. One is not the effect of\\nthe other; they are distinct and independent; yet can\\nonly be explained the one by the other. Now this is\\nwhat is understood by finality.^^\\nII, A thoughtful consideration of these facts forces\\nupon the mind the conviction that the relation between\\nthe structure of these organs and the work they per-\\nform could not be in virtue of a physical law merely;\\nbut there is a relation of means to an end, a marvelous\\nadaptation of complex and different elements coales-\\ncing into a unity of action to obtain a desired result.\\n12. (b) Psychology furnishes another class of facts, Psychoi-\\nno less strange and convincing. Reference is made to\\nthe phenomena of instinct. We deal only with the\\nfacts. We find in animals innate capacities or tenden-\\ncies to perform definite actions which tend to the pre-\\nservation of the individual and of the species. This phenomena\\n1 1 of instinct.\\ntendency is prior to all experience or imitation, e. g.^\\nthe duck, the bee, etc. These tendencies have been\\nclassified as (a) instincts which tend to the preservation\\nof the individual; (b) instincts which tend to the pre-\\nservation of the species.^\\n8 13. In instinct, therefore, we detect a striking in instinct\\nr T i r 1 adapta-\\nanalogy to function. Just as the organs are conformed tion of\\nto exercise special functions, so in animals we find\\nJanet, Final Causes, p. 51, sq. Order in the Physical World,\\ntr. from the French, by T. J. Slevin, John Hodges, London, a\\nvaluable and exhaustive work.\\nJ. S. Mill tries to weaken the force of the argument.\\nCreative forethought, he writes, is not the only link\\nbetween the mechanism of the eye and the fact of sight;\\nanother is the survival of the fittest. Essays on Religion, p.\\n172. Yet he adds, The adaptations of nature afford a large\\nbalance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence. It\\nis equally certain that this is no more than a probability; and\\nthat the various other arguments add nothing to ils force. P.\\n174.\\n24 Chadbourne, Natural Theology, Lect. Ill, IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "154 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ninnate tendencies to perform special acts. Tiie func-\\ntion alone can explain the structure of the organ;\\ninstinct preserves the life of the animal. In both\\ncases there is a wonderful adaptation; in the former an\\nadaptation of structure^ in the latter an adaptation of\\naction. The striking agreement and coincidence are\\nphenomena that cannot be explained by seeking the\\nefficient cause alone; the relation to the effects must\\nbe explained also. Now to admit that the effects\\nin some way conditioned the combinations of the\\nvarious elements, whether of tissue or of action,\\nis to confess that there is an end or aim in the acts\\nthemselves,\\n(c) Ethics. 14. (c) Ethics is the science which deals with the\\nprinciples and rules of human action. Its basis rests\\nhuman upon Psychology and its principle source is conscious-\\nahva?s^^ ness. It is a principle of Ethics that man acts for\\nan end. an end or purpose when he employs reason. Dis-\\ntinction is drav/n between the acts of man and human\\nacts. The former do not suppose voluntar}^ reflection,\\ne, g., acts in sleep or in delirium, the Tatter always\\nsuppose reason and consent. Now consciousness\\naffirms that w^hen we act v/e not only exert an active\\nforce, but we so exert it that our thoughts, desires,\\nand movements all converge to a definite object. We\\nstrive to obtain this object and we so conform our acts\\nas to secure it. This idea dominates the entire series\\nof thoughts and motions. It induces us to seek some\\nspecial means, to neglect or throw aside others.\\nHence, to act for a purpose is the distinctive character\\nof voluntary activity. What is true of our own con-\\nscious experience we are constrained to admit is true\\nof other men also.\\nIn mental life causality and finality go together. Cf. Paul-\\nsen, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 220.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 155\\n8 It:. By the same analogy that forces us to believe finality in\\no J J oj other men.\\nthat Other men have reason and free-will, the mental\\nendowment which we possess, we are forced to admit\\nthat they act after the same manner as ourselves.\\nHence we strive to detect in their actions some special\\npurpose; we are constantly attributing motives to\\nthem. We are convinced that they act for a motive,\\nand while we may fail to detect or err in attributing\\nfalse motives, the general fact remains true that their\\nacts are regulated by some dominating idea which\\nurges them on and gives a special character and con-\\nformation to their actions.\\n16. Thus Ethics not only reveals the agreement\\nand coincidence of phenomena, e., of human actions;\\nit also gives the explanation. It tells that the coinci-\\ndence is explained not by efficient cause, but by the\\nresult^ that the residt preconceived determines the har-\\nmony of the series. Hence it gives a clear and decisive\\nillustration of a t^;^^/ cause an illustration which is\\nfounded in our own experience.\\nThe man of science, in his scientific labors, walks by faith,\\nby the faith that the universe is constructed on rational prin-\\nciples, on principles the rationality of which the human, or at\\nany rate the scientific, mind can comprehend. His faith is that\\nthe external facts of consciousness do form one consistent, har-\\nmonious whole, regulated by the laws of nature, and that we\\ncan more or less comprehend the system which the physical\\nuniverse forms. The moral philosopher holds the same faith\\nwith regard to the facts of morality, that they too are consistent\\nwith one another and are all consistent with reason and with\\nthe moral aspirations of man rightly construed. Introduction\\nto History of Religion, by F. B. Jevons, p. 407. It is well to\\nnote that in this passage the word faith is employed in\\ndifferent senses. John Fiske writes in a similar strain, Idea\\nof God, p. 138; so also Prof. Royce, in the Religious Aspect of\\nPhilosophy, p. 330.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "156\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThe\\nprinciple.\\nIII.\\nThe Principle.\\n17. The principle of finality can now be drawn\\nfrom the facts enumerated. When we find manifold\\nactivities of different kinds combining to produce a\\nfuture effect, so that the effect results not from any-\\none in particular, but from the mutual and harmonious\\nactivity of ail working as a unit, the mind is con-\\nstrained to admit that this coincidence of action can\\nonly be explained by admitting that the effect in some\\nmanner influenced the arrangement of the activities.\\nThe necessity and existence of this very influence\\ntransforms the effect into a cause. The principle of\\nfinality is not a priori and universal. In this it differs\\nfrom the prmciple of efficient causality. True, every\\nbeing has an effect by virtue of the fact that it is a sub-\\nstance exercising power. That every being has an aim\\nor purpose^ however, is by no means necessary and self-\\nevident.^^ Later on in the discussion, when the\\nprinciple, well-established, is applied to the interpreta-\\ntion of the universe, the mind may be led in a wider\\nhope to grant purposes in creation as yet unknown to\\nexperience; but at present it would be poor logic\\nto pass beyond well-authenticated facts. Again, the\\nprinciple of finality is not universal. Some phenomena,\\non the contrary, cannot be explained without refer-\\n2 By Teleology is understood the theory which explains the\\nprior acts of a series as determined by the preconception of a\\nposterior. Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. i, p. XIV.\\nThe Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 106.\\n^It is not at all necessary to suppose with Hegel and Pres.\\nSchurman, Belief in God, p. 180, that the cork-tree exists for\\nthe sake of the corks which are cut from its bark to serve as\\nstoppers for wine bottles. The statement is shallow and flip-\\npant. Cf. also Prof. Royce, in The Religious Aspects of Philos-\\nophy, p. 282.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 157\\nence to the end. The principle, therefore, is limited\\nto phenomena of a special kind.\\n818. The distinctive character of the latter class of why we\\ndemand\\nphenomena is the fact that they are not explained to finality.\\nsatisfaction by pointing out the efficient causes. There\\nis a gap between the cause and the effect. The mind\\nis forced by the principle of sufficient reason to explain\\nthe deficiency. This is done by applying the second\\nmethod of induction, the method of differences,\\nto the problem. The element over and above the\\nactivity of the efficient cause is found to be the con-\\nditioning and determinating influence of the effect upon\\nthe group of activities. The effect becomes a cause\\nby virtue of its causal influence. Thus only can the\\nmind explain the evident adaptation of activities to\\nthe future.\\n19. It may be objected that chance can explain the Hypothesis\\ncoincidence of phenomena. This objection is not new;\\nit is as old as philosophic speculation.^^ That it\\nshould be advanced to-day seems strange in view of\\nthe fact that it has been refuted so often and so\\nthoroughly. Chance is a word which cloaks our igno-\\nrance. It has no objective value. It is not a cause.\\nIt is a name given to a group of phenomena, independ-\\nent of one another and without any known connection.\\nThe known relation between the phenomena is purely\\nexternal. Now that such a grouping may occur, can-\\nnot be denied. The admission does not touch our\\ntrend of reasoning. Our basis is the constaiit repetition\\nof this group with the same result. A single combina-\\nBowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 86, writes we can under-\\nstand the q^rouping of efficient causes only by reference to final\\ncauses, and the final cause is realized only through the efficient\\ncause.\\n3* Lucretius, de Nat. Rer., 1. V, 420; criticised by Cicero, de\\nNat. Deor. II; Plato, de Leg. XII; Apology.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "158 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ntion might be due to chance. The frequent combina-\\ntion of the same elements, and their manifold content\\nis a phenomenon which demands a cause. Common\\nsense assures us of this, and science employs this\\nreasoning with profit. It is an application of the\\nprinciple of induction which lies at the foundation of\\nscientific progress.\\nfinan^\u00c2\u00b0^ 20. The process to be pursued in explaining the\\nfound in principle of finality is similar to that employed in a\\nconscious r L j r j\\nexperience, preceding chapter when the validity of the principle\\nof causality was defended against the attack of Hume.\\nOur reasoning does not begin with and is not founded\\non external experience. Its source is within ourselves.\\nWe start from experience, but from our own conscious\\nexperience. Consciousness testifies that when we act\\nin the full possession of our faculties, we act for an\\naim or purpose. Let us look within ourselves at any\\nmoment of the day. A thousand thoughts and wishes\\nprove the truth of the statement. Or let us examine\\nour actions; they are prompted by a motive or aim.\\nI sit at the desk to prove to you, kind reader, that the\\nexistence of God is forced upon the mind by every\\ndepartment of human science; or I take a walk for\\nexercise or to visit the sick; or I go about the avoca-\\ntions of the day with the aim of supporting my family,\\nof acquiring fame, or of doing my duty. In each and\\nevery instance the clear type of final cause is found.\\nIt is the distinctive mark of my conscious action. The\\nwhy and the wherefore are elements of my conscious-\\ndaily life. When I turn to examine the acts of my\\nfellows, I detect finality there also. As I am convinced\\nthat they have intelligence and free-will, so I am posi-\\ntive that the principle of finality permeates their lives.\\nIt is a reasoning from analogy, but an analogy which\\nis equivalent to the strictest demonstration. In all", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 159\\nthe works of human industry we read the character of\\nfinality. Men mould and fashion the materials of\\nnature with a view to obtain definite results, e. g.,\\nhouse, ship, works of mechanics and of art. The sight\\nof strange buildings causes us to ask for what purpose\\nthey were made. Thus in works which come from the\\nhands of men we read ends and means.\\nS 21. The same reasoning: can be extended to ani- f^m\\nanimal life.\\nmals. Animals act from instinct. From the first\\ninstant of existence they perform without reflection\\nand without anterior experience acts which conduce to\\nthe preservation of themselves and of the species. In\\nthis, instinctive action differs from human action.\\nNevertheless, we find in both the like combination of\\ncomplicated actions in order to obtain a definite result.\\nIn animals, therfore, we see traces of unconscious\\nfinality; nevertheless it is finality.\\n22. If we extend the line of reasoning to external in external\\nnature, it is because our basis is strong and impregnable.\\nWe have seen that works of art exhibit the character\\nof finality. Now there are differences between works\\nof nature and of art; nevertheless they have some com-\\nmon characteristics: (a) The relation of parts to the analog of\\nwhole; (b) the relation of the whole to the objects on ^amreand\\nwhich it acts.^^ The part has value and can be^^^\\nexplained by showing the relation it bears to the whole.\\n2^ Ilia ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent in finem,\\nquia habent dominium actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est\\nfacultas voluntatis et rationis; ilia vero quae ratione carent\\ntendunt in finem propter naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio\\nmota, non a seipsa Ideo proprium est naturae\\nrationalis ut tendat in finem, quasi se agens vel ducens in\\nfinem. St. Thomas, i, 2, q. i, a. 2.\\n22 Janet, Final Causes, pp. 12, 108. Prof Schurman says that\\nDr. Flint virtually abandons the argument from design in miss-\\ning the analogy between works of nature and products of art;\\nin the former he recognizes adaptation, not purpose, and there-\\nfore argues from order not from purpose. Belief in God,\\np. 185.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "universe.\\nl6o CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThe whole can only be understood when viewed in rela-\\ntion to what it does. Hence Kant admits the identity\\nof nature and of art. But this is what is understood\\nby finality.^* This is evident in all living beings. The\\nunity of parts into a harmonious whole requires a\\ncause which proclaims the principle of finality.\\nin material 23. The reasoning can now be extended to the\\nmaterial universe. Wherever we observe various\\nactivities combining in harmonious unity to produce\\nan effect, we are justified in recognizing the effect as a\\nfinal cause. Science is not adverse to this contention.\\nIt deals mainly with efficient causes. Far from declar-\\ning against final causes it often assum.es their truth as\\na working hypothesis.^\u00c2\u00ae The efficient and the final\\ncause are not contradictory. It must always be\\nremembered, writes the Duke of Argyll, that the\\ntwo ideas that of physical cause and that of mental\\npurpose are not antagonistic; only the one is larger\\nand more comprehensive than the other. The\\nseries of efficient and of final causes are identical.\\nThe latter is simply the reversal of the former. In the\\nformer series we reason from cause to effect; in the\\nlatter from effect to cause. Mr. Lewes admJts the force\\nof this reasoning. Science, he v/rites, finds it\\nindispensable to co-ordinate all the facts in a general\\nIn nature there is the most elaborate machinery to accom-\\nplish purpose through the instrumentality of means. It seems\\nas if all that is done in nature, as well as all that is done in art,\\nwere done dy knowing how to do it. Duke of Argyll, Reign of\\nLaw, p. 127.\\n3= Duke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 172.\\nMcCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 158.\\nNecessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur\\nad unum est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem. St.\\nThomas, i. q. 103, a. i; Janet, Final Causes, B. I, ch. IV, VI.\\nBowne, Phil, of Theism, p. 85, The postulate of physical\\nscience is that the world is Kosmos. The Great Enigma, W.\\nS. Lilly, p. 153.\\nReign of Law, p. 32; Dr. Bruce in Gifford Lectures, i8g8.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "ORDER. l6l\\nconcept, such as a plan. And Mr. John Fiske holds\\nas an evident truth that the whole scheme of the\\norder of nature is Teleological, and each single act in\\nit has a teleological meaning. In the explanation,\\nhowever, Mr. Fiske approximates to the unconscious\\nteleology of Hartmann. In face of this Mr. Rogers\\ncalmly tells us that teleology appears only where\\nmechanism breaks down; the reason is that there are\\ncertain facts which can be explained by mechanism\\nand natural law. Hence the string of events is quite\\nexplainable on natural grounds until we reach the end\\nand then a wholly new power is appealed to which\\ncannot be stated in scientific terms. And further-\\nmore it is a fact of history that the principle of\\nteleology has tended more and more to be displaced by\\nthe principle of mechanism.\\nIV.\\nTheories.\\n24. Having set forth the basis on which the argu-\\nment for theism rests, we can now examine the different\\ntheories proposed to account for the facts. It must\\nbe borne in mind, however, that they rigorously\\nexclude the idea of God, and are therefore properly\\ntermed anti-theistic.\\n1\u00c2\u00b0. Mechanical Theory.\\n8 25. This theory professes to explain the facts of its\\n11-1 1 ii T teaching-.\\norder m the universe by physical causes alone. It\\nfinds a basis in the physical sciences. There, we are\\n40 Hist, of Phil. Prologue, p. XXXVL\\n41 Idea of God, p. 161.\\n42 Cf. His Modern Philosophy, p. 56.\\n^Hb., p. 57.\\n44 Descartes taught that we should not examine the ends\\nwhich God has proposed to Himself in creating the world and\\nII", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "i62 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ntold, facts are presented as they actually occur.. Effi-\\ncient causes only are the objects of scientific investiga-\\ntion. The notion of finality is by no means necessary;\\nthe mind can do without it. Science receives no\\ndetriment thereby. The nebula hypothesis, e. g.^ is a\\nsimple explanation of the solar system. So, too.\\nChemistry exhibits the phenomena of crystallization.\\nA marvelous order is had, but no vestige of final cause.\\nEverything is explained by the mechanical working of\\nthe physical cause.*\u00c2\u00ae They contend that nothing pre-\\nvents us extending this view to living beings. Did\\nnot Des Cartes hold that animals were automata? As\\nfor organ and function, there is no adaptation;\\nthe function is only the natural result of the organ\\nin act.*^\\nCriticism. 26. (i) The defenders of this theory must admit\\nthat the forces of nature are alike.*\u00c2\u00ae This we know\\nbasis. to be false. An impassable gulf separates viaterial\\nfrom vital^ and vital from mental forces. What might\\nbe true of material energies cannot be applied to\\nmental activities in face of the fact that the final\\ncause is given as a certain fact of conscious experience.\\nIt is just as absurd and illogical to affirm that there is\\nno place for a God in nature directing and controlling\\nshould reject entirely from our philosophy the search for final\\ncauses; for we ought not to be so presumptuous as to believe\\nthat God has chosen to take us into His counsel. Cf. Types of\\nEthical Theory, James Martineau, B. I, c, 2, 8; K study\\nof Religion, vol. i, p. 256; Descartes, Med., 4.\\nBowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 87.\\nE. Haeckel, Our Monism, in Monist, July, 1892,\\nHerbart; Lucretius, de Nat. Deorum, 1. 4, V. 822; Aristotle,\\nMetaph., 1. i, ch. 4, 6. The Neo-Kantians, with Fries and Her-\\nbart, exclude finality and explain nature and man by mechan-\\nism, although the explanation is contradictory to their religious-\\naesthetic view. Cf. Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. II, p. 171,\\n218.\\nSpencer, First Principles, Principles of Psychology.\\nW. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 129.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 163\\nits forces by His will, as it would be to assert that there\\nis no place in man s body for his conscious mind,^\u00c2\u00b0\\n8 27. (2) In this theory how can we explain man (2) it does\\nnot explain\\nIs man the simple result of physical causes? Why man.\\nmust we admit finality as the distinctive mark of his\\nconscious experience? Man foresees, calculates, seeks\\nmeans for ends. Are these acts the pure result of physical\\ncauses? Is a being, which can shape ends for himself,\\nthe result of a nature without ends? This is absurd.\\n28. (3) The theory is partial and limited. It starts (3) partial\\nfrom physical sciences. Its limit cannot extend to\\nliving beings, e. g.^ plants and animals, much less man.\\nPure mechanism cannot explain the phenomena of\\nlife. A directive idea is present in the youth of the\\nplant which accounts for the combination of acts tend-\\ning to its own preservation and the multiphcation of its\\nkind. Teleology has taken possession of the language\\nof Botany and of Biology. Thus Mr. Huxley speaks\\nof apparatus^ plan^ fabrics^ in order to for the purpose of\\nlay the foundation of foreshadows Mr. Spencer uses\\nthe words fitness^ manifest relatio?is to future external\\nevents^ adaptation^ processes^ correspondence^ anticipates^\\nadjustment^ in order that, Psychology recognizes special\\nfunctions as the ends of special organs, regards teeth as\\nhaving the office of mastication. A mechanical theory,\\nW. Carpenter, M. D., Nature and Man, p. 364.\\nProf. Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 11.\\nSchelling, Hegel, Hartman, Teichmuller, Zeller reject the\\npure mechanical explanation. Pfieiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol.\\nIll, p. 261.\\n^2 Chadbourne, Natural Theology, Lect. V, VII.\\nElements of Comparative Anatomy.\\n5^ Prin. of Biology; Argyll, Phil, of Belief, pp. 65, 136; Dar-\\nwin, on Fertilization of Orchards; Mr. Wallace, in Quar. Jour,\\nof Science, Oct., 1867; Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I,\\npp. 259, 261; Prof. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, ch. VII; Dr.\\nPaulsen, however, assures us that the prevailing view is that\\nthere is no finality in physical nature. Cf. Introduction to\\nPhilosophy, p. 222.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "164 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ntherefore, is artificial and is adverse to sound rea-\\nsoning.^^\\n(4) Science 29. (4) Finally it rests upon a false assumption,\\ndiscard e. that science discards final causes. This is\\nfinal causes.\\nerroneous. Science investigates efficient causes, but\\nbetween the efficient and the final cause there is no\\nantagonism. The one does not exclude the other.\\nThe perception of the final cause often leads to the\\ndiscovery of the efficient, e. g., the conformation of the\\nvalves in the veins led Harvey to discover the circula-\\ntion of the blood. The fact, e. g., that man always\\nacts for a purpose does not render useless or interfere\\nwith his efficient causality. Efficient causes are agents\\nor means to obtain the desired purpose,.^^ What is\\ncontrivance, writes the Duke of Argyll, but that\\nkind of arrangement by which the unchangeable\\ndemands of law are met and satisfied.\\nIf you place me face to face, not v/ith an infinite living\\nspirit, but only with what is called the great necessity, what\\nenthusiasm do you expect the vision to excite? Can there be a\\nmore paralyzing spectacle? and shall I fling myself with pas-\\nsionate devotion into the arms of that ghastly physical giant?\\nIt is impossible: homage to an automaton-universe is no bet-\\nter than mummy-worship Vi^ould be to one who has known what\\nit is to love and trust, to embrace the living friend. In short,\\na human soul so placed \\\\vould itself be higher than aught it\\nknows v/ithin the immensity, and could worship nothing there\\nwithout idolatry. Martineau, A Study of Religion, V. i, p. 12.\\nDr. Gildea, Is there evidence of design in nature, in Pro-\\nceedings of Aristotelian Soc, i88g-go, p. 49.\\nMartineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 256.\\nLotze, Microcosmus, B. IV, ch. i, No. 2.\\nReign of Law, pp. 90, 127, A false definition explains a\\nstrange and undefinable position. If we confound teleology\\nwith miracle, we can understand that in so far as teleology\\nmeans a breaking into what would otherwise have been the\\nnatural order of events by a separate and transcendent power,\\nwhose workings cannot be reduced to strictly scientific formulse,\\nit has the whole weight of scientific achievement against it.\\nCf. A. K. Rogers Modern Philosophy, p. 58. But this is\\nconfusing and fallacious reasoning. No wonder he continues\\nwe must either drop the notion of end altogether, or else we\\nmust adopt some new conception of what end or design means", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 165\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Theory of Evolution.\\n\u00c2\u00a730, Evolution is a term possessing a singular forms of\\nattraction. A wide generalization, it elevates the mind\\nand broadens its view. Eagerly welcomed by men of\\nscience as a universal solvent of all riddles in life and\\nbeing, the hope was entertained that science and phil-\\nosophy would be revolutionized and nature would be\\nviewed in a new and truer light. It is not the purpose\\nto criticise the theory in its entirety; that pertains\\nto another department of Apologetics. We shall\\ndiscuss the principal presentations by its leading\\ndefenders.\\n31. (a) Atheistic evolution appears under the form (a) Monism.\\nof Monism. This theory supposes the universal evolu-\\ntion of all forms of life; its fundamental principle is\\nthe unity of force. Its teaching is as old as Empedo-\\ncles, Lucretius and Epicurus; but in the hands of its\\nmodern exponent, Mr. Haeckel, it has acquired a\\ncertain novelty and popularity. From the motion of\\nheavenly bodies, he writes, and the fall of a stone,\\neven to the growth of plants and to conscience in man,\\nall are reducible to the mechanism of atoms, Mr.\\nHaeckel s position is set forth in two works, The\\nHistory of Creation, and The Descent of Man.\\n32, By reducing all things to the mechanical criticism.\\naction of atoms, Mr. Haeckel has once and for all\\ndone away with final causes. But this principle\\nis a gratuitous assumption. So, too, the process of\\nreasoning, in which he sets forth his theory at length,\\nis made up of assumptions and false analogies. There\\nis no need at present to enter into a detailed examina-\\nand how it works. (lb.) Further on we read the following:\\nMechanism explains the way in which, not the reason for\\nwhich, a thing is done, and he sees no inherent contradiction\\nbetween mechanism and teleology, p. 306.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "l66 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ntion of the system. We need only state that in essence\\nit is identical with the Mechanical theory. The same\\ndeficiencies are found in both, and the same criticism\\nis true of the one as of the other.\\n(b)Agnosti- SS- (t Atheistic evolution appears under the form\\nof Agnosticism. It is a recent and powerful phase of\\nhuman thought. Its fundamental principle, according\\nto Huxley, who coined the word,\u00c2\u00ae^ i positively to follow\\nthe intellect as far as it will take you, and negatively^ not\\npretend conclusions to be certain which are not demon-\\nits principle, strated or demonstrable. Yet there is a reservation\\nimplied, viz., nothing is to be admitted on any other\\nevidence than of the senses. In this philosophy the\\nfinal cause has no place, for the order and finality or\\nthe phenomena do not appeal to the senses and are\\ngrasped by the intellect alone,\\ns^ n r 34 Herbert Spencer is the greatest living exponent\\nteaching, of Aguosticism. He has done more than any other to\\nform a consistent philosophy of evolution on a scientific\\nbasis. He holds that there is one unknowable reality\\nwhich manifests itself alike in the material and living\\nworld. He commonly speaks of this reality as force,\\nand at times seems to identify it with force. To him\\nmatter is identical with force, and the evolution of all\\nexisting things is to be explained by the law of trans-\\nformed motion. The process is a mechanical problem.\\nA first principle is the persistence of force. This\\nprinciple in its working follows certain laws: (i) Motion\\nfollows the lines of least resistance, (2) The homo-\\ngeneous becomes the heterogeneous. He assumes\\nhomogeneous matter endowed with forces. This, by\\nreason of its instability, passes into the heterogeneous\\nunder the action of the force. (3) The passage is\\n\u00c2\u00abi XlXth Cent., Feb., 1889.\\nFirst Prin., p. 73.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 167\\nhelped by the law of segregation, which by separation\\nor selection enables us to pass from the indefinite to\\nthe definite. In other words, it is the law of natural\\nselection. Hence arise differences in types and species.\\n(4) Finally, the law of adaptation, by which the being\\nadapts itself to the environments and renders per-\\nmanent the structural differentiation.^\\n35. (i) The purpose of Mr. Spencer is to explain criticism,\\nthe universe by mechanical principles. His system,\\ntherefore, is the mechanical hypothesis in another mechanical\\nthcorv\\nform. To him the lowest forms of life are essentially again,\\nthe continuation of non-vital processes; while thought\\nand consciousness are merely transformations of\\nmotion. Now this process of reasoning starts with\\nand is bolstered up by pure assumptions.\\n\u00c2\u00a736. (2) He is forced to recognize design in the (2) he\\nfiA mi 1 r 1 1 recognises\\nuniverse.* 1 he laws of segregation and of adaptation design in\\nare worded in the language of teleology. The very\\nprocess itself by which the homogeneous passes into\\nthe heterogeneous cannot be fully explained unless we\\nadmit the final cause as guiding the complicated com-\\nbination of varied elements to the gradual formation\\nof the specific type. That structure is subservient to\\nfunction, and that structural growth is prior in time to\\nthe actual or possible discharge of function are domi-\\nnant facts in the whole organic world.\\n^37- (i) Finally, Mr. Spencer s theory is the (3) a theory\\no vyy jy r j of chance,\\nhypothesis of chance dressed in scientific terminology.\\nChance might explain one combination. But here we\\ndeal with frequent and repeated combinations of most\\ncomplex elements with the constant recurrence of the\\nsame result.\\n*3 De Pressense, A Study of Origins, ch. I.\\nPrinciples of Biology; Dake of Argyll, Phil, of Belief.\\n^5 Duke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief: Schurman, Belief in\\nGod, p. 174.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "i68\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(c) Darwin-\\nism.\\nDarwin s\\nwritings.\\nhis\\nteaching.\\n38. (c) Finally, atheistic evolution appears under\\nthe form of Darwinism. This theory takes its name\\nfrom Charles Darwin, who, in 1856, published his studies\\non the origin of species. The work aroused profound\\nand wide-spread discussion. A laborious life was\\ndevoted to investigations in this line. His most\\nimportant writings are the Origin of Species, Varia-\\ntions of Animals and Plants, and the Descent of Man.\\nIn his younger days Darwin was a devout believer; but\\nas he advanced in years and in the prosecution of these\\nstudies, his religious convictions became unsettled.\\nIn a letter written in 1879 he says: I think that in\\ngeneral the most exact description of my state of mind\\nis that of Agnosticism. In his Origin of Species he\\nconcludes with these words: There is grandeur in\\nthis view of life, with its several powers, having been\\nsignally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or\\ninto one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling\\non according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so\\nsimple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and\\nmost wonderful have been and are being involved.\\nIn a later volume, The Descent of Man, he with-\\ndrew the concession as to the necessity of the creation\\nof primitive types. His disciples extended the theory\\nto the origin of life, of man and of the universe.\\ng 39. In the point of departure the theory of Dar-\\nwinism differs from that of Spencer. Spencer starts\\nfrom the physical science and attempts to explain the\\nprocess by the law of mechanics. Darwin takes living\\nbeings and tries, by a large and minute observation of\\nfacts, to establish a Biology of evolution. Darwin\\ndiffers from other naturalists, e. g., Cope and Mivart,\\nby explaining the acquisition of superior qualities, not\\nthrough the development of active powers inherent in\\nLife and Letters.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 169\\nthe individual and brought into exercise at favorable\\nopportunities, but through the many exterior circum-\\nstances and causes which slowly and gradually impart\\nto the individual the qualities it had not before. Thus\\nDarwin required one thousand generations for the\\ntransformation of species; and this result is obtained\\nby the exterior influences of fortuitous causes.\\n8 40. The basis of Darwinism is the general fact that its main\\nlines.\\nlife is a struggle for existence. The result of the struggle\\nis the survival of the fittest by a process of natural selec-\\ntion or elimination. It is a fact that living things vary,\\ne. g.y the distinction of individual, of family, of type.\\nHence he infers the law of variability of organic forms.\\nThe variation may come from the repetition of the\\nsame acts or from disuse of the faculties which results\\nin atrophy; and he enunciates the law of use and non-\\nuse. An illustration is drawn from the law of phonetic\\ndecay in language. Or variations can be explained by\\nthe action of the environment upon the organism,\\ncreating new needs and causing the organism to\\nrespond to the needs so that life may be preserved.\\nHence the law of adaptation. The variations once\\nacquired are transmitted from generation to generation\\nby the law of heredity, and the transmitted traits abide\\nin virtue of the law oi permanent eharacterization. After-\\nwards, in the work The Descent of Man, Darwin\\nadded the law of sexual selection, which is only a pecu-\\nliar form of natural selection. The struggle is not\\nonly for life and nourishment, but also for sexual\\nfitness.\\ng 41. It is not the purpose to criticise Mr. Darwin s criticism.\\ntheory as a whole\u00e2\u0080\u009e Its defects have been recognized\\nby his own disciples, e. g., Wallace and Romanes, who\\nhave attempted to supply what was wanting by advanc-\\nOrigin of Species.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "170 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ning theories of their own. Its relation to the argument\\nfrom design shall only be considered/^\\nW^^ests on g 42. (i) Mr. Darwin reasons by analogy from arti-\\nanaiogy. ficial natural selection. But this analogy is a false one.\\nIn artificial selection there is a reflection, calculation,\\nchoice, purpose in the agent. In natural selection\\nintelligence and design are rigidly excluded. The\\nreasoning from a work of intelligent industry to the\\neffect of fortuitous circumstances and blind chance is\\nfaulty throughout.\\n(2) supposes S 43. (2) Natural selection can only count as a factor\\nchoice m u -t^ v y j\\nthe agent, in Mr. Darwin s theory if we grant to living beings the\\nfinality. powcr of choice. Mr. Darwin s own language indi-\\ncates or supposes this. If this be so, what stronger\\nargument for final causes can be had? Finality, then,\\nwould be inherent in and universal throughout nature.\\nIn fact, the working of his laws indicate design, e. g,,\\nlav/ of use and non-use of adaptatio7i, of heredity.\\nIf we admit natural forces struggling onward to reach\\ntheir highest and noblest expression in man, we can\\nunderstand why Darwin broached a theory so sublime in\\nconception. But let us exclude every vestige of finality\\nand the theory becomes a play upon words,\\nof chance^^ 44. (3) In reality Darwinism is based on the h5 poth-\\nesis of chance. Hence he appeals to long periods\\nof time, to external circumstances, to fortuitous events.\\nQuatrefages, The Human Species; Darwin et ses precur.\\nFrancaises.\\nMartineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, pp. 288. 289; Duke\\nof Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 17.\\n^Organs develop for, not by, use. Duke of Argyll, Phil, of\\nBelief, p. 17. Mr. John Fiske tacitly concedes this point when\\nhe says that the action of natural selection upon man is coming\\nto an end, and man s future development will be accom-\\nplished through the direct adaptation of his wonderfully plastic\\nintelligence to the circumstances in which it is placed. Idea\\nof God, p. 163.\\nMartineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 262; Wm. Gra-\\nham, Creed of Science, pp. 25-35-47.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 171\\nChance, therefore, is the dominating idea in the pro-\\ncess. The various laws he mentions are only special\\nnames for the great power of chance. This is absurd.\\nCommon sense will tell us that the marvelous develop-\\nments and the convergence of so many and varied ele-\\nments are not merely fortuitous. This harmonious\\nagreement and continuity of growth requires a cause\\nover and above the mere chance assemblage of ele-\\nments. In nature all things are done by the use of\\nappropriate means and the subordination of material\\nstructures to future work and function. The conclu-\\nsion, therefore, is evident. The theories of Evolu-\\ntion cannot answer the problem. They are deficient,\\nor if they give a satisfactory answer, it is only\\nby begging the question, In the light of the\\nforegoing exposition we are enabled to rightly\\nestimate the value of Mr. Sully s words: The\\nsignificance which evolution gives to the relation\\nbetween organ and function, e. g.^ the eye and vision,\\nrenders less necessary, for purposes of immediate\\nexplanation, the hypothesis of a divine prearrangement\\nand preadaptation. Consequently, in these last times\\nthe teleological view of nature upheld by Christianity\\nhas had either to take the shape of a faith which seeks\\nto disregard fact and reason, or to fall back on the\\nmore philosophical bnt scarcely optimistic hypothesis\\nthat the divine purpose is some unknown quantity, or\\nat least comprehends interests of which human life\\nforms but a very small fraction, and is carried out by\\nmeans of unswerving purposes of natural law.\\nDuke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 11; Huxley,\\nComp. Anat., pp. lo-ii.\\nPessimism, p. 67. A conclusion altogether different has\\nbeen reached by Mr. E. G\u00e2\u0080\u009e Robinson, in Principles and Practice\\nof Morality. The evidences of a pre-existent and predisposing\\npurpose in nature are too numerous and too distinct to be over-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "1/2\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nGerman\\nPantheism.\\nSchoppen-\\nhauer.\\nhis\\ndoctrine.\\nHartman.\\n3 Theory of Pantheism,\\n45. By Pantheism is here understood not the doc-\\ntrine of Pantheism as a whole, but only special phases\\nwhich have appeared in recent years and have a direct\\nbearing upon the argument from design. Allusion is\\nmade to the systems of Schoppenhauer and Hartman.\\nThe common character of their teaching, distinguishing\\nthem from the other theories discussed, is that both\\nadmit tendencies and finalities in the universe. The\\nwork of Hartman, The Philosophy of the Uncon-\\nscious, is a storehouse for those who seek proofs and\\nillustrations of purpose and design in nature.\\n46. Schoppenhauer contends that an infinite finality\\nexists in nature, but is not due to intelligence. He\\ndenies the right to reason from our own acts to the\\noperations of external nature. Nature, he says, is\\nprior to the mind, and natural action is absolutely dis-\\ntinct from ours. To us nature seems to act for a pur-\\npose; in reality this action is without reflection and\\nwithout conception of end, for in nature there is no in-\\ntelligence only a will blindly exerting its own activity.\\n47. He bases this theory on the phenomena of\\ninstinct. Here, he says, we find beings who work for\\nan end with the greatest surety, yet are absolutely\\nunconscious of any purpose in the action. Animals,\\ne. g., insects, will the end without knowing it, nor have\\nthey the choice of means in general; so also nature\\nacts when we say it acts according to final cause.\\n48. Hartman differs from Schoppenhauer in declar-\\ning that not will alone, but intelligence knows every-\\nthing, with the single exception of itself; thus it\\nknows, but it does not know that it knows. Hence we\\nlooked. With the progress of natural science these evidences\\nare becoming every day increasingly clear.\\nDie Welte als Wille, t. 2, ch. XXVI.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 173\\nhave the title of his system: The Philosophy of thesis\\ndoctrine.\\nUnconscious. Hartman bases his theory likewise of\\nPsychology. Unconscious processes, he says, lies at\\nthe basis of our conscious activity. Genius and instinct\\nare illustrations of his contention. In all are found tend-\\nencies to definite ends. There are revelations of intelli-\\ngence, but of unconscious intelligence. Thus we reason\\nto a first cause which is absolute and unconscious.\\n\u00c2\u00a749. (i) We deny the right to make instinct the criticism,\\nbasis of the theory. Man is nobler than the brute,\\nand human action is more elevated than instinct. For true basis.\\nwhat reason, therefore, should brute action be taken\\nas a type of universal activity? The mechanist who\\nreasons upwards from physical forces, the teleologist\\nwho reasons downwards from conscious action, are\\nmuch more consistent than the half-way theory of\\nunconscious reason.\\n8 Ko. (2) What is instinct? It is a phenomenon (2) instinct\\nnot a clear\\nmost obscure and difficult to understand. Mechanical expiana-\\ntion.\\nactivity or intelligence are much simpler than instinct.\\nNevertheless we are asked to take it as their explana-\\ntion. Instinct is unable to explain physical activity.\\nThe impassable gulf between Biology and Physics can-\\nnot be thus bridged. Again, instinct cannot explain\\nintelligence. Psychology proves that reason is an act\\nof a kind specifically different.\\n51. (3) To admit an unconscious tendency to (3) chance\\ncertain ends is a reversal to the hypothesis of chance phism.\\nor of zoomorphism. But chance cannot explain the\\norder and harmony in the tendency, as has been dis-\\ntinctively shown. The latter theory is in contradiction\\nto facts and must, therefore, be rejected. One\\nexplanation now remains. It is the theory of Chris-\\ntian Philosophy. We shall now attempt to give a brief\\nsummary of its teaching.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "174\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nV.\\nTheory of Christian Philosophy.\\nIts\\nteaching.\\n(i) arg-u-\\nment of\\nexclusion.\\n(2) possible\\nexplana-\\ntions.\\n(a) mechan-\\nics not an\\nexplana-\\ntion.\\n(b) nor is\\ninstinct.\\n52. In the first section of the chapter the fact and\\nprinciple of finality were set forth. The attempt was\\nthen made to criticise the various interpretations\\nwhich modern writers have advanced. A critical analy-\\nsis laid bare their defects and sophistries. The way\\nis now clear for an answer which is in accord with our\\nown experience and scientific investigation.\\n53. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that mind\\nand mind alone is the cause of the marvelous order in\\nthe universe. Therefore, mind alone can explain the\\nfacts and the principles of finality.\\n\u00c2\u00a754. (i) The first argument is one of exclusion. All\\ntheories advanced to explain finality have been shown\\nto be defective and faulty. Mind alone is the only\\nother theory that in fact has possession. The force\\nof this reasoning is purely negative.\\n55. (2) If we exclude chance, as the trend of the\\nchapter constrains us to do, the explanation of finality\\ncan be reduced to these sources: (a) Mechanical\\naction; (b) instinct; (c) mind. Now the theory of\\nmechanics cannot explain intelligence; therefore it is\\nlimited and exclusive. Likewise the theory of the\\nUnconscious fails to interpret the facts of conscious\\ndaily life; therefore it likewise is limited in range and\\nexclusive.\\nIn the Dialogues on Natural Religion, Hume criticises the\\ndesign argument. He denies a valid induction from art to\\nnature, holds that chance may explain design inasmuch as the\\ndesign is not at all perfect; that at the most the cause of the\\nworld-order has a remote similarity with human intelligence is\\nonly probable, too indefinite to be a principle of practical religion.\\nEven if we admit the existence of God, the world is still incon-\\nceivable, and one hypothesis is as good as the other.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 175\\n\u00c2\u00a756. To extend these hypotheses and make their Their^\\napplication universal is to commit a logical fallacy, hearing.\\nNot so, however, the theory of mind. It harmonizes\\nwith physical and biological science. The final cause\\ndoes not render null and void the physical efficiency of\\nmaterial forces. With his, the modern man of\\nscience, belief in Mathematical Physics and familiarity\\nwith their logical structure, he must know that the\\ncosmos, whatever else it may be, is mechanical; and\\nthat to read back any one of its systems into its ele-\\nmentary dynamical equivalents, and from these to\\nreturn forward and predict its still future phases, is\\none of the most admirable exercises of Reason.\\nThus, there is order, adjustment and harmony in\\nthe mechanism. In like manner the final cause (c) only\\nis the best explanation for instinctive acts. As complete\\nfor mind, we have a direct example of the final f^^^^^^^\\ncause in our conscious experience. The hypo-\\nthesis of intelligence as the sufficient explanation of\\nfinality has a strong antecedent probability in its\\nfavor.\\n57- (3) Finally, in setting forth the facts and the (3) method\\nprinciple of finality we reasoned from our conscious soun^cfaS\\nexperience to the facts of external nature. The pro-\\ncess was shown to be sound and convincing. The\\nanalogy is so strong as to equal the most rigid demon-\\nstration. By the same right we are justified in seeking\\nthe interpretation of finality by a like process. Now\\nconsciousness gives the clear and decisive answer. It\\ntells that finality can only be explained by intelligent\\naction. Therefore the fact of finality so varied and\\nmanifold in nature from the activities of the atom to\\nthe complicated structure of man postulates the exist-\\nMarlineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 326.\\nstrong", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "176\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY\\nThe mind\\nis God.\\nistic and\\n(2) Ethical\\nPantlieism.\\nence of a mind that shapes all things in number and\\nmeasure to the proper end.\\n58. This mind is identical with God. To the\\nChristian Philosopher, God is the creator and governor\\nof all things. The argument from final causes proves\\nthis conclusively. Some writers recognize the exist-\\nence of all pervading order, yet appear to deify this\\nand make it God. To them God is merely a synonym\\n(i) material- of nature, and the laws of nature are the laws of\\nGod. This language from the pen of one v/ho lays\\nclaim to scientific habits of thought, is certainly errone-\\nous.^\u00c2\u00ae Others, with Fichte, object to a God different\\nfrom the moral ^orld-order and declare it necessary\\nto go no further than that order itself. This teaching\\nhas given rise to the JDieic-Fr ogres of Taine, Vacherot,\\nRenan; to the stream of tendency that makes for\\nrighteousness of Mr. Arnold.\u00c2\u00ae^ Finally, others with\\nKant held that the teleological argument concludes to\\nan Architect, not a Creator\\n59. The works of art differ from the works of\\nnature in this, that the former point to an external,\\nthe latter to an internal principle. Hence order is\\nJ. S. Mill holds that The First Cause can be no other than\\nForce: Force is prior to volition, hence volition is not a first\\ncause, for Force is eternal and uncreated Nor is\\nvolition coeternal with force, for it has no exclusive privilege of\\norigination. Cf. Essays on Religion, pp. 145, 148. His argu-\\nment rests upon pure assumption. J. Dimon, The Theistic Ar-\\ngument, p. 99; W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 231.\\nNatural Religion, ch. 2, 3; Martineau, A Study of Religion,\\nvol. I, p. 5.\\nPfleiderer, Philos. of Relig., vol. Ill, p. 269.\\nFarges, L Idee de Dieu, p 419.\\nGod and the Bible. A good criticism of this phase of mod-\\nern thought is given by Prof. Royce, The Religious Aspect of\\nPhilosophy, B. II, ch. i, II, III.\\n8 Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 306, where this\\ninterpretation is defended; Prof. E. Caird, Philosophy of Kant,\\np. 635; Pfleiderer, Phil, and Devel. of Religion, vol, I, p. 153.\\nDrobish holds the same view. Pfleiderer, Philosophy of\\nReligion, vol. II., p. 219, vol. Ill, p. 259.\\n(3) Kant s\\nobjection.\\norder is\\nintrinsic.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "ORDER. 177\\nintrinsic to natural beings. Kant draws the distinction\\nbetween internal and external finality.\u00c2\u00ae^ The former\\nis a need in the being, the latter the means nature\\ntakes to supply the need, e. g., the hunger of a cow\\nand the grass of the field. Therefore the tendency\\nto order is intrinsic in the natural elements; it is not\\na geometrical arrangement; it is something essential,\\ng., take away chemical affinity and the element is\\ndestroyed. Plant the shipbuilders skill within the\\ntimber itself, writes Aristotle, and you have the\\nmode in which nature produces. Thus, the mind\\nthat imposed upon natural things an intrinsic tendency\\nto order, must have made the essence of things as they\\nare; in other words, must have created them.\\n60. Our course of reasoning has reached the\\ndesired end. The wonderful harmony of creation, the\\nmarvelous unity of action among elements so different\\nin kind, the combination of diverse tendencies to a\\ncommon result, all show with unmistakable emphasis\\nthat a divine mind guides the universe and gave to\\nall its elements their course and being. End is Q^j^^j^jg-^j^\\nnot an infringement on God s perfection,\u00c2\u00ae^ nor is\\npurpose an evidence of limitation of power. To\\nact for an end is a sign of intelligence. Purpose is\\nintrinsic to nature. The tendency to an end is natural\\nto every agent. Only thus can the world-order be\\nexplained.\u00c2\u00ae^ The conclusion, therefore, is imperative.\\n^2 Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 13.\\ns^Chadbourne, Natural Theology, Lect. II, III, V.\\n\u00c2\u00ab5 Pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. Ill, p. 261.\\nssphys., B. 2, c. 8.\\nSpinoza, Eth. i, App,\\nFiske, Idea of God, p. 126; Mill, Triree Essays on Religion,\\np. 176; Tyndall, Fragments, pp. 527, 353. Contrivance is not\\na sign of limited intellect, but is only the rational connection of\\nmany factors with reference to an ideal end. Bowne, Philos-\\nophy of Theism, p. 137.\\nMartineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 324.\\n12", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "1/8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nWe are led by another way to God, and we are con-\\nstrained to accept the Theistic hypothesis, not as the\\nbest, but as the only interpretation of facts.^\\n6i. We shall not discuss at length the criticism of\\nKant and of Mill that the argument from design is\\ngood, but does not prove the existence of God in the\\nChristian sense of the word, e.^ God as supreme.\\nThe objection has been answered in showing that the\\nsame mind which is the Designer is also the Creator.\\nNow creation is an act of infinite power. Therefore\\nthe argument gives the highest and true conception\\nof God.\\n62. Lotze hesitates at accepting the full force of\\nthe teleological argument. He admits that it does not\\nexclude the activity of physical causes. Yet he sees\\na difficulty in granting that the Supreme Will or Mind\\nin nature should act through means. To him this is an\\nimperfection.^^ That there is imperfection we readily\\nconcede; but the imperfection does not come from the\\npart of God; it arises from the imperfections and lim-\\nitations of things. The Duke of Argyll considers this\\nobjection to spring from 2;/r/(?/ conceptions. Our\\nnotions, he writes, must be ruled or disciplined by\\nobservation of that which is, not founded on a priori\\nconceptions of what ought to be. And again, The\\nnecessity of contrivance for the accomplishment of\\npurpose arises out of the immutability of natural\\nforces. They must be conformed to and obeyed.\\nThe aim of Prof. Bowne is to prove that the world is a\\nunit and can be explained only by a unitary being, hence he\\npostulates a world-cause in place of a world-substance/ Phil-\\nosophy of Theism, pp. 146-59.\\nSuarez, Disput, Metaphys, Disp. xx, s. 2.\\nMicrocosmus, B. IV, ch. i, No. 2.\\n^^Ib.,No. 5; so also Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 178.\\nReign of Law, ch. III., p. 127.\\ns^b., p. 126.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER X.\\nCREATION.\\nI. The human mind instinctively seeks to know\\nthe causes of things. Illustrations of this are found in\\nchildhood, as well as m mature years, in the ordinary\\navocations of daily life, as well as in the silent and\\nserious meditations of the student. The line of\\nthought pursued in this essay has repealed the true\\nnature of the material universe. It is conditioned on\\nevery side and dependent. As such it had a beginning;\\nin other words, it was produced. We shall now\\nexamine the various theories proposed by thoughtful\\nminds at different times to account for its origin.\\nI.\\nTheory of Pantheism.\\n2. Pantheism is an error which dates back to the History,\\nvery dawn of philosophic speculation. In the remnants\\nand records of human thought, preserved through the\\nravages of time and the changing fortunes of the human\\nrace, this theory appears in all its phases. The\\nPantheism of the Hindus is set forth in the Upanishads\\nand exerted a deep and lasting influence on subsequent\\nIndian thought. The Eleatic school in Greece, e. g.,\\nXenophanes, Parmenides, the most powerful philosoph-\\nical school in Rome, e. g., the Stoics, perpetuated the\\nteaching for centuries. We find it proposed in the\\ncrude and bold teachings of Scotus Erigena, in the sub-\\ntility of Avincennes, in the mystic dreamings of Master\\nEckart, in the ever-changing and strangely contra-\\ndictory S) stems of the German disciples of Kant. In\\n[179]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "l8o CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nour own time it is worded in all the charms of prose\\nand poetic diction, with a certain elevation of tone and\\na dreamy aspiration after the ideal of all that is,\\nand a vague fellowship with nature and with man, that\\nappeals to the cultured and meditative mind and seems\\nto contain the promise of what the human soul has\\never longed for: Light, strength, and rest. But the\\npromise is belied, the appearance is deceiving; an\\nalluring but dry and empty husk is offered, or a shadow\\nwhich takes form and substance only in the darkening\\nmist, but recedes further and further from the eager\\nseeker and vanishes into thin air before the growing light,\\nitsfunda- The fundamental and characteristic doctrine of\\nmental J _\\ndoctrine. Pantheism consists in identifying God with all that\\nexists. Thus, everything is God and God is every-\\nthing, or rather God is the only real substance. In\\nsetting forth this principle, its defenders separate into\\ndifferent schools. Historically and philosophically\\nviewed, Pantheism assumes different phases. Created\\nthings are considered as emanations from, or mani-\\nfestations of, the one divine substance; or God, the\\nuniversal, indeterminate Being, by a process of self\\ndetermination constitutes the universe of beings dis-\\ntinct from one another.^\\n1\u00c2\u00b0. Theory of E7na7iation.\\nTheory of g a That existing: things are to be explained by an\\nEmanation. o\\nemanation out of the original one divme substance is\\nmythoiogi- a doctrine found in all ancient mythologists. The\\nancient Vedic bards or risJiis relate in childish and\\nfantastic imagery how the different classes of beings\\nsprang from the different members of Brahma.^ The\\nE. g., Shelley, Emerson, Thoeodore Parker.\\n2 Concilium Vaticanum Sess. Ill, can. 4; of. Denzigers,\\nEnchiridion, p. 392.\\n^Muir s Sanscrit Texts, vol. i, ch. i.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "CREATION. l8]\\nGreek, Norse, and Aztec mythologists only differ in\\nthe local coloring of racial characteristics and sur-\\nroundings which give life and force to the legend. As\\nsuch, this belongs not to philosophy but to the history\\nof religion. There it is shown that such accounts are\\nonly degenerate forms of the doctrine of creation,\\ntraces of which are everywhere found in the records of\\nthe early religious life of our race.\\n8=;. The earliest forms of philosophical Pantheism Phiiosophi-\\ncal emana-\\nare to be found in India. The primitive Vedic, with its tion.\\ntraces of monotheism and pure religious conceptions,\\ngave way to the later Vedic and Brahmanic ages with\\ntheir plurality of gods, caste distinctions and corrupt\\nnotions of religious belief and practice. The inevi-\\ntable reaction set in. Gross superstition is revolting\\nto our higher nature and man turns from it in disgust.\\n6. The unity of nature and the reign of law so evi- Upani-\\ndent and so marvelous, impress the thoughtful mind in\\nevery age with a conviction of an underlying unity and\\nmakes Polytheism with its hierarchy of Gods and\\nGoddesses to appear as childish fancies without a\\nstrong foundation or real meaning. Unfortunately\\nthe reaction turned to a philosophical Monism, not\\nto a religious Monotheism. The evidence of this is\\nfound in the Upanishads, a collection of writings which\\ndate from the later part of the Brahmanic period. In\\nthem the Brahma of Indian Polytheism is deprived of\\nhis ethical character and becomes the neuter Brahman,\\nthe first principle or the primordial and sole real\\nexisting being.\\n7. To explain the existence of the universe the Two\\nschools of\\nHindoo sages divide into two arreat schools. The one Indian\\nthought.\\nIS realistic and considers the world about us to be an\\nemanation from the one infinite substance. The other\\nis idealistic and views the world as an illusion or", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "1 82 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nmirage, the only existing thing being the all-pervading\\nsoul or self.\\n(a)Materi- 8 8. (a) The whole universe is Brahman, e..\\nalistic. o\\nabsolute being. In the begmnmg was that only\\nwhich is. It was one only without a second.^\\nOthers say that in the beginning there was that which\\nwas not, that it was alone and without a second;\\nand from that v/hich is not, that which -is, was\\nborn. But this is not true. Only that which is was\\nin the beginning. It thought, may I be many, may I\\ngrow forth. It sent forth fire. In like manner fire\\nsent forth water and water earth. That Being thought,\\nlet me enter into those three beings with this living\\nself, and let me reveal names and forms, of\\nparticular existences. The Self, therefore, entered\\ninto these three elements: earth, water and fire. In\\nso doing, existing things took their variety and shape\\nand being. The subtlest portion of earth (food)\\nbecame mind, the subtlest portion of water became\\nbreath, breath passed into heat (fire), heat into highest\\nBeings. Now that which is that subtle essence (the\\nroot of all) in it all that exists has its being. It is the\\nTrue.\\n(b)Gnos- 9. (b) In the early ages of Christianity this form\\nof Pantheism had wide sway. The Gnostic heretics\\n^Chandog. Upan. VI, 2 sq.\\nBrih. Upan. I, 4, 11; I, 5, 7.\\n^Tait. Up. 2, 6.\\nGiva atma, i. e., the living self is not the Highest self, but\\nthe shadow of the highest self.\\nThat which is i. Sat; sat-ya, i. e., to be endowed with\\nbeing True. In this passage (Chang. Up. VI, 2 sq.) not being\\nis derived from being. The contrary is stated (Chang. Ill, 19,\\ni) In the Taith, Upan. 11, 7. In the beginning this was not\\nexistent i. e., not yet defined by form or name. From it was\\nborn what exists. In the Brih. Up. V, 5, I, In the beginning\\nwas water. Water produced the true and the true is Brahman.\\nIn the Mundaka Upan., 6. g, Brahma is compared to a spider\\nwhich sends out a web of being.\\ntics,", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 183\\nand the powerful school of Neo-Platonism made the\\ndoctrine of emanation a cardinal and fundamental\\npoint. Among the Gnostics some taught two supreme\\nprinciples, the one good and the other bad, influenced\\nevidently by contemporaneous Persian cosmogony.\\nOthers, however, Valentinus held that one supreme\\nprinciple exists, which was called silence^ the depth.\\nFrom this principle other beings or Acones came forth\\nin a series of emanations, which are considered to be\\nthe proximate principles of the universe with its vari-\\nous forms of existence\\n10. (c) The Neo-Platonic school was an effort to (c) Neo-\\nresuscitate the philosophy of Plato, correcting it in\\ncertain parts so as to make it more systematic and con-\\nformable to the supposed exigencies of the times. Its\\nfounder is Ammonious Saccas, its leading teacher is\\nPlotinus, its doctrine is pure Pantheism. One principle\\nexists, from which all things proceed. This principle is\\nunformed; it therefore cannot be comprehended under\\nany known category of existing being, nor can it be\\nthe object of thought so that we could contemplate its\\nattributes or conceive it as such or such. Beyond the\\nreach of any created intelligence it exists alone, vast,\\nimpenetrable. From this unity proceeds intelligence^\\ni. e. (vovs), and the soul of the worlds i. e.^ \\\\j/vxt) tov iravTos.\\nThese three principles, according to Plotinus, con-\\nstitute a divinity. The universal soul by contemplating\\nitself produces all created things, just as it is one and\\nthe same with the first principles. Thus Plotinus\\nendeavored to combine the conception of God with the\\nvovs of Anaxagoras and the X070S of Plato, St. John,\\nand of Philo.\\nII. (d) In John Scotus Erigena is found a bold( i)Erigena.\\nand profound exponent of pantheistic emanation.\\nComing forth from the learned and peaceful seclusion", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "iS4\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nof the Irish Universities, a master of dialectic, with a\\nprofound knowledge of Greek philosophy and the rare\\naccomplishment of acquaintance with the Greek\\nlanguage, he is placed by Charles the Bald over the\\nUniversity of Paris. His name held a prominent place\\nin the history of the intellectua,! conflicts which dis-\\nturbed the times, and the influence of his personality\\nand great learning was felt long after his death, for we\\nread that the Albigenses of the XIII century claimed\\nperfect accord with his teaching,\\nkis writings 8 i2. His principle work, in which the traces of\\nand\\nteaching. Pantheism are found, is entitled On the Division of\\nNature. By nature he understands not only all-being\\nbut also all non-being; the distinction of God and the\\nworld is only apparent; in reality they are one. Exist-\\ning things emanate from God, and thus only are said\\nto be real. By virtue of this emanation God and\\ncreated things are one. The emanation takes place\\nthrough the medium of the Word in whom all God s\\nthoughts and attributes have an objective existence.\\nThe efflux goes on from all eternity; thus the phe-\\nnomenal universe, as we behold it, is co-eternal\\nwith the ideal universe, e.^ as it exists in the Word,\\nand the essence of God is the one substance of all\\nthings. In this sense Erigena holds that the universe\\nis an extension and a manifestation of God s being.\\n(e)Cousin. 13. (e) Victor Cousin, the founder of the Eclectic\\nschool in France, is not altogether free from the charge\\nof Pantheism. Although he expressly condemns such\\nteaching, and has found able apologists who endeavor\\nto explain his writings in the orthodox sense, neverthe-\\nless his words, taken in their evident meaning, show\\nthat such was his real mind. To him substance, as\\nsuch, is absolutely necessary; therefore there can be\\nbut one substance and that is God. God is the one", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 185\\nuniversal sole being. The universal being embraces\\nboth the ego and the non-ego^ is one in its own sub-\\nstance, but appears manifold in the phenomena. He\\ncontends that creation is not the production of things\\nfrom nothing, for such a conception is absurd, but the\\nnecessary production of things by God out of His own\\ndivine substance. The history of the human race is\\nthe evolution of God in humanity. This is the doc-\\ntrine of emanation pure and simple.^\\n14. A word in criticism of the theory will not be criticism,\\nout of place. This form of Pantheism recognizes\\nthe two concepts of God and of the universe with\\ntheir corresponding external realities. It admits\\nthat the world must have its origin and explanation\\nin God, who is the absolute and primal source of\\nreality. The fundamental error consists in the wrong\\nview taken of how the world originated, in the failure\\nto grasp the true notion of creation. This is the root\\nand source of all the inconsistencies and contradictions\\nwhich follow the theory, and render its acceptance\\nimpossible. It therefore exercises very little influence\\nupon the trend of contemporary thought.\\nII.\\nTheory of Manifestation.\\ntraces.\\n15. That God should manifest Himself in divers Early\\nforms and ways is a belief which has left traces in the\\nearly history of all known races. Thus the avartars or\\nincarnations of Hinduism rest upon this belief, and the\\nPolytheism of the Egyptians to some writers finds in\\nthis a natural basis. The true explanation is found in\\nChristian Theology, which represents the world as the\\nwork of God and the highest manifestation of His per-\\n\u00c2\u00aeDr. Matheson, in Can the Old Faith live with the New.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "1 86 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfections in the natural order, and by its side sets forth\\nthe theophanies of the Old Dispensation leading up to\\nand finding their perfection in the Incarnation of the\\nEternal Son, the highest manifestation of God in the\\nsupernatural order.\\nPantheistic g j5^ Pantheism, however, is a corruption of this\\ntion. truth. Christian Philosophy teaches that God is\\ndistinct from the world; Pantheism identifies both.\\nThe former contends that created things have a true\\nsubstantial subsistence; the latter views existing things\\nas modes or accidental modifications of the one eternal\\nabsolute substance.\\n(a)in India, g jy^ (a) The earliest traces of the Manifestation\\nTheory, or of Immanent Pantheism, as it is sometimes\\ncalled, are found in India. Brahman is the abstract\\ntotality of all things. It is analogous to the word\\nexistence in Western Philosophy. At times the uni-\\nverse was considered as an emanation from Brahman.\\nAgain, it was viewed as the modification of Brahman.\\nFor just as existence has modes, e. g.^ quality, time,\\nplace, etc., so the supreme principle, the only real sub-\\nstance, manifested itself in various modes, created\\nthings. By means of thoughts, seeing, touching,\\nand passions the incarnate self assumes successively in\\nvarious places various forms. That incarnate self,\\naccording to its own qualities, assumes many shapes,\\ncoarse or subtle, and having caused his union with\\nthem he is seen as another and another through the\\nqualities of his body. No beginning and no end, having\\nmany forms alone enveloping everything.\\nBrlhma\u00c2\u00b0n being, therefore, is Brahman, the\\nSelf. The Self is all, is absolute. He became like\\nunto every form, and this is meant to reveal the (true)\\nform of him (Atman). This is the Brahman without\\nSvetasvata Up, V, 11-13, Miiller s trans.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 187\\ncause and without effect, without anything inside or\\noutside, this self is Brahman, omnipresent, omniscient.\\nThis is the teaching, e.^ of the Upanishads.\\nCreated things are viewed as the body of the self.^^\\nThey are involucra, webs of finer or of coarser tissue\\nwoven over the one and only self.^^\\n19. What is true of the visible world is true also of the gods a\\n1 r^, i T-i 1 manifesta-\\nthe Gods. 1 hey are a part of the universe. bactitionof\\nGod is but a manifestation of Brahman, for he is all\\nGods. Again, Vayu, Avidya, Time, Breath, Food,\\nBrahma, Rudra, Vishnu are but the chief manifesta-\\ntions of the highest immortal, the incorporeal Brah-\\nman.^ This all-permeating self is manifested in the\\nGods, in the natural bodies and forces, in the hearts\\nof all living things.\\n8 20. It is true that in passages of the Upanishads nature of\\n11- 1 1 1 the world.\\nthe world is considered as phenomenal, not real.\\nExamples of the mirage, of the reflection cast by\\nflowers on glass, are given to show its illusory nature.\\nNevertheless it seems to have a reality or has a reality\\nto the uninstructed.^\\n821. (b) The Stoic philosophy was not merely a(b) in stoic\\nrL .11 1 X 1 J Philosophy.\\nsystem of Jb^taics; it has also its metaphysics. It laid\\ndown rules of conduct, but also grappled with the\\nproblems of the world s origin and nature. This aspect\\nof its teaching at present appeals to our consideration.\\nBrih. Up. II, 5, 19,\\n12 Brih. Up. Ill, 7; Chand. Up. IV, 5; IV, 15, i; VIII, 7, 4.\\nKatha Up. 11, 5, 12.\\nI ^Brih. Upan. I, 4, 6.\\n15 Tail. Brah. Up. IV.\\n1\u00c2\u00ae Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 132-137.\\nIn the Vedanta Philosophy Lect. I, Miiller considers the\\nVedanta to be the orthodox philosophy of the Upanishads. Prof.\\nGough tries in his Philosophy of the Upanishads to prove that\\nthis system is found exclusively in the Upanishads. Prof. Hop-\\nkins dissents from this view and holds that it can only be main-\\ntained by ignoring strong and plain passages which teach\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0otherwise. E. W. Hopkins, Religions of India, p, 228, note.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "l88 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nits\\nteaching.\\nThe Stoics taught that the world v/as produced and\\ntherefore was not eternal. To them God was Anima\\nmundi, i. e., the soul of the w^orld.^ Holding that all\\nideas came through the senses, they maintained that\\nwe could have no concept of spiritual beings, God,\\ntherefore, was the subtlest form of matter, an activity\\nafter the analogy of ether or physical force. God was\\nthe active principle, energizing all things, forming and\\nproducing all things, yet of one and the same essence\\nwith all. Quid aliud est natura quam Deus exclaims\\nSeneca. Such was the conception of Zeno and his\\nGreek disciples. Such was the teaching of the school\\nwhich most profoundly influenced Roman thought and\\nlife. Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius learned\\nand transmitted this doctrine in language that for\\nelevation and elegance is unsurpassed. The chief\\ncharm, it is true, is found in its ethical character.\\nThus their writings became the daily companions of\\nthe great Christian Doctors. In its metaphysics, how-\\never, it should be classed with realistic Pantheism or\\nrather pure Naturalism.\\nin Spinoza. g 22. Spinoza is the classic and ablest expounder of\\nImmanent Pantheism.^ Born a Jew and skilled in\\nJewish thought and traditions he broke away from the\\nearly faith to devote himself to the study of Philoso-\\nphy. The teaching of Descartes was then in the zenith\\nof power and Spinoza was brought under its influence.\\nTaking the definition of substance proposed by Des\\nCartes, as that whose concept needs not the concept of\\n8 St. Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. IV, ch. 31.\\n19 De Benefic. IV, 7.\\nThe Stoic doctrine of God was in its essence a somewhat\\nrude Pantheism, v;hich went further than the Socratic idealism\\nto the pre-Socratic Naturalism. Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of\\nReligion, vol. Ill, p. 244.\\n21 J. Martineau, A Study of Spinoza; Pfleiderer, The Phil-\\nosophy of Religion, vol. I, i.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 189\\nanother being for its formation, he inferred that one hisgachm|\\nsubstance alone existed, viz., God. Created things, created\\ntherefore, are not substances, but only modes of the\\none infinite and necessary substance. The infinite sub-\\nstance has many attributes, but two only are clearly\\nperceived by the human mind, viz., infinite thought\\nand infinite extension. External nature is only the\\nimage and manifestation of infinite thought. The\\nthought is natura jiatiirans^ i. e., nature producing,\\nthe extended world is natura naturata, i, nature pro-\\nduced. To Spinoza the soul is a mode of the divine\\nactivity, the body is a mode which expresses after a\\ncertain determinate fashion the essence of God con-\\nsidered as something extended. They have, therefore,\\nan identity in God, inasmuch as thought and extension\\nare his attributes.\\n\u00c2\u00a723. Created things, being modes of God, neces- a fatalism,\\nsarily exist. Hence the notion of necessity which\\ninfluences his system throughout, rendering it a modern\\nfatalism. Accordingly, he is led to deny free-will, or\\nrather to teach a free necessity, to hold predestina-\\ntion or fate in all its rigidity, to do away with final\\ncauses.\\n24. The influence of Spinoza on contemporary s\\nEnglish thought has been very great. His Pantheism\\nseems to correspond in general trend and in many\\ndetails to the mechanical conception of the universe\\nwhich has so many attractions to modern scientific\\nminds. His conception of God with the two attributes\\nof thought and of extension reappears in English\\nPsychology, where mind and matter are held to be the\\ndouble-faces, two sides or aspects of some\\nfundamental reality, and in Apologetics as a Cosmic\\nTheism, proclaimed by many to be the religion of the", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "IQO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfuture. The English agnostic school teaches that\\nGod is unknowable and as such does not come \\\\^ithin\\nthe scope of human thought and action; nevertheless,\\nin all other points it is fashioned on the mould of\\nSpinoza. Hence comes the charge so strange at\\nfirst sight that Mr. Spencer is a Pantheist. In\\nthe criticism of his system we meet with the same diffi-\\nculties that we find in Spinoza, the nature of mind\\nand of matter, the character of their interaction and the\\ndoctrine of determinism. Both Spinoza and Spencer\\nteach a pure Naturalism, with this difference only that\\nthe God of the former becomes to the latter the\\nUnknown and Unknowable behind the phenomxcna.^^\\nIII.\\nTranscendental Theory.\\nIdealistic 2K. The two theories set forth are phases of\\nPantheism. o r-\\nRealistic or Naturalistic Pantheism. Another, more\\nsubtle, which has exerted a deep and widespread\\ninfluence on modern theistic and atheistic thought, is\\nIdeal, or, as it is more correctly termed. Transcen-\\ndental Pantheism.\\n^2 Fiske, Cosmic Philosophy; Jacobi, Jewish Ideals, p. 58;\\nFortnightly, May, 1873; XIX Cent., Oct., 1S77.\\n2^ To Spencer the forces of nature are interchangeable mani-\\nfestations of a universal energy which pervades space in every\\npart and exerts its influence upon the innumerable bodies that\\ncompose the universe. Each specific force is but a transforma-\\ntion of some other or a modification of that which is the\\ncommon-ground of them all. All are but phases of the one\\ngreat and persistent energy which, as Mr. Spencer declares, is\\nthe infinite force. His philosophy is thus the scheme of\\nthought which identifies the forces of the w^orld with the activi-\\nties of the First Cause. The inevitable consequences are that\\ntheie is one great and universal force, of which these forces\\nare manifestations and forms, and that universal force is none\\nother than the creative power which has formed the earth and\\nstretched out the heavens the ever present, the unchangeable,\\nthe unbeginning, the unending one. Cf. Recent Physical\\nTheories in their Bearing on the Theistic Argument, by Prof.\\nB. N. Martin, in Christian Philosophical Quarterly, vol. I, n. xix.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 191\\n(a) The Vedanta.\\n8 26. The earliest traces of this form of Pantheism (a) The\\nVedanta.\\nmust likewise be sought for in the far East. The\\nUpanishads do not contain a complete and systematic\\ndoctrine. They are rather a collection of medita-\\ntions or conferences between the sages of the forest\\nand their disciples, and thrown into the form of a\\ndialogue.^\\n27. To the Vedantist Brahman was the eternal its\\nreality. The universe as we see it by bodily senses is\\nphenomenal. This is due to Avidya^ i. e., Nescience.\\nThe aim of the Vedanta philosophy was to dispel this\\nand teach the Vidya^ i. e.^ true knowledge or Brahfna-\\nVidya^ i. e.^ knowledge of the self. Thus the eyes of d) The self,\\nthe seer became opened and he discovered the real\\nbehind the unreal. The individual self is phenomenal\\nalso; in its ultimate reality it is one with the Highest\\nSelf. The Upadhis, e.^ the body and its organs,\\ncondition the Higher Self and make it appear as the\\nembodied self. The Upadhis are due to Avidya. We\\ncannot rid ourselves of these conditions, but we can\\ngrasp their true nature, soar above them, and recognize\\nour substantial unity with Brahman, the Higher\\nSelf.\\n28. The knowledge of the Self as the only reality (2) Knowi-\\nis the one thing necessary. This releases man from seiFa?one\\nthe miseries of life, and the fear of successive transmi- y-\\ngrations to a higher or lower sphere of existence after\\ndeath.\\nMax Miiller, The Vedanta Philosophy, p. 22.\\nssMiiller, The Vedanta Phil., Lee. 2; Chandg. Up. Ill; In\\nthe Taith Up. I, 9, good words, i. e., sacrifices and austerity are\\nessential conditions of this knowledge.\\nFor the act of transmigration cf. Brih. Up. Ill, 9. 28; VI,\\n2, 16; Chang. Up, V, 10, 7; The Laws of Manu; the embodi-\\nments are described with minute and fanciful detail in the\\nManavadharmasastra, XII, 54. sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "192\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThe more intense the abstraction becomes, the more\\nThis ob-\\ntained by\\nabstraction, the scnses are crashed and the mind tranquil and\\nsubdued, penetrates into the depths of his\\nidentity of\\nindivid-\\nual and\\nhigher self.\\ncannot be\\nconceived\\nexpressed.\\nbeing.\\nThe seeming duality of subject and of object disappears\\nbefore the gaze of the Indian sage and he is conscious\\nof one being only. This being is the great omni-\\npresent Self within him apprehended by a perfect\\nabstraction.\\nThis is the only one thing that perishes not in all\\nthings that perish, the one thing that gives light in all\\nthings that have no light. Beyond this he cannot\\ngo. In illustration he points to dreamless sleep. To\\nthe sleeper the external world has no existence.\\nThe inequalities and miseries of life have passed. The\\nduality of subject and object have melted away. His\\nown self has been merged into the true impersonal\\nself, the self hidden in all things. For when\\nthere is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other,\\none salutes the other, one perceives the other, one\\nknows the other; but when the self only is all this,\\nhow should he see another? How should he know\\nhimself the Knower?\\n29. This principle has no visible form, says the\\nKatha Upanishad. It is above and beyond the appre-\\nhension of the mind. Therefore, it can only be\\ndescribed by No. It cannot be positively conceived\\nor enunciated. Thou canst not think the thinker of the\\nthought, thou canst not know the knower of all knowl-\\nedge. This is thy self that is in all things that are.\\nKatha Up. I, 2,25.\\n28 Katha Up. II, 4, 4.\\n29 lb.\\n20 Chang. Up. VI, 8. i; VIII, 11, I.\\n2^ Katha Up. I, 3, 12.\\n32 Br. Up. Ill, II, 13.\\n33Brih. Up. II, 3, 6; IV, 2, 4; IV, 9, 26.\\n34Brih. Up. Ill, 4, 2; Mund. Up. Ill, i, 8.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 193\\nThe mind is necessitated to think of it. It is\\nthought by him that thinks it not; he that thinks,\\nknows it not; it is unknown to them that know it,\\nknown to them that know it not. Nevertheless,\\nit cannot be formed by the mind: that which is not\\nuttered by the voice and that by which the voice is\\nuttered. That which is not thought by the thought,\\nthat by which the thought is thought. Know thou\\nthat only is the Self. Sat or Brahman is to be con-\\nceived as out of space or time, as free from all quali-\\nties.^^ It is other than the known, and above the\\nunknown. It alone abides one in its essence\\nunchanging among changing things.\\n8 ^o. This supreme principle, Sat, that which is, Brahman\\n1117 7 7 anuncon-\\nis at the root of everything and permeates all things, scious\\nIt also sees and knows becau3e it is vision and knowl-\\nedge itself. It is not a deity in the ordinary sense of\\nthe word. It is but the expression of the highest\\nabstraction of the human mind, The Brahman is, in\\nour use of the word, unconscious. Consciousness is\\nhad where subject and object are apprehended as such.\\nIt IS only by the extinction of consciousness that the\\nsoul returns into the unity of the self. Brahman is\\ncalled light or intelligence, but not in our use of the\\nterm. He is abstract knowledge, and knowledge with-\\nout an object known. All that moves and breathes\\nand stirs is centered in the Self.** This Self is self-\\nluminous, dwelling in the heart of every living thing.\\nIts light diffuses itself over the modifications of the\\n36KenaUp. II, 3.\\n3\u00c2\u00ab Kena Up. I, 5, 9.\\n3^ Svetas. Up. VI, 6.\\n38 Kena Up. I, 4.\\n39 Katha Up. I, 2, 22.\\n^oChand. Up. VI, 8, 6.\\n*iMund. Up. II, 2.\\n^2 Katha Up. I, 2, 20.\\n13", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "194\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nlike our\\nword ex-\\nTrue\\nnature of\\nthe soul.\\nThe phe-\\nnomenal\\nand the\\nreal.\\nThe Self\\nand its\\nmirrored\\ncounter-\\nfeits.\\nmind and makes thoughts possible. Without this\\nlight, darkness and nothingness would envelop all\\nthings. Brahman is the abstract totality of all things,\\nsomething like our conception of existence. To the\\nVedantist the concrete forms or modifications of exist-\\ning things were appearances. The only reality, the\\nexternal essence is Sat, or Brahman, or the Self.\\n31. The true nature of the soui is the one Self.\\nIndividuality is fictitious. An illusion hides from the\\nindividual his true nature. Under the illusion it views\\nitself as one with the body. In this condition he is\\nsubject to the rounds of births.** In the knowledge\\nthat he is no longer a person or self, distinct from the\\ncharacterless plenitude of being, he sees the truth.\\n32. The individual and his environment are real\\nfor the many; they are false for the few. They exist\\nin so far as they can account for all that seems to go on\\nin daily life. By intuition their existence is seen to\\nfade away and disappear into the higher and real exist-\\nence of the only Self. What is real and true in the\\nindividual is the Self within invisible. What we see in\\nthe individual is not real, but only involucra or seem-\\nings woven like warp and woof over the self.\\n33. The individual soul is not another and inde-\\npendent entity. The sun mirrored upon one pool may\\ntremble with the rippling of the surface, and the sun\\nreflected upon another may be motionless. In like\\nmanner the real Self is reflected upon its counterfeits,\\nthe bodies of sentient creatures, and thus fictitiously\\n4s Katha Up. II, 5, 15; Mund. Up. II, 2, 10.\\nKatha Up. II, 4, 10.\\n45Chand. Up. VII.\\n46Brih. Up. Ill, 6, 8; Kalha Up. I, 3, 10; 11, 6, 7; Chand.\\nUp. Ill, 14, 2. Sankara says the individual soul is only a\\nsemblance of the one and only self, as the sun imaged upon a\\nwatery surface is only a semblance of the one and only sun in\\nthe heavens.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 195\\nshares their growth, diminution and other sensible\\nmodes of life. Apart from its various counterfeits,\\nthe Self is changeless and unvaried/ The individual,\\ntherefore, is only an illusion. Maya overspreads the\\nself. Thus causes a fictitious limitation. The expla-\\nnation or reason for the individual is avidya, e..\\nnature of\\nnescience. The individual is such because it does not individu-\\nality.\\nknow that it is not such.\\n34. But Maya is more than the individual illusion. Maya is the\\nThrough an abstraction or aggregation, Maya came principle,\\nto be viewed as the world illusion. Maya is sometimes\\nfictitious; it is neither entity nor nonentity. From\\nthe union, before all time, of Brahman, the ultimate\\nprinciple of reality, the one and only being, with Maya,\\nthe illusion, the unreal principle, have proceeded all\\nthings. Things seem to be manifold, but this, too, is\\nan illusion. Before the subtle and penetrating gaze\\nof the sage the veils fade away and disappear, or are\\nmerged into the totality of Self.^\\n8 x^. Brahman is untouched by the world-fiction. Brahman\\nand Maya.\\nIn illustration they point to the sun which is unsullied\\nthough its rays fall on impure earth, or moving waters.\\nMaya, the world-fiction, overspreads Brahman, as the\\nmirage fictitiously overspreads the desert sands. This\\ndisappears and the great unborn consciousless Self\\nalone remains. Brahman alone, the inward light\\nis real; it alone abides; it alone is worthy of our\\nmeditations and affections. It is omnipresent like\\nGough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, p, 49.\\nThis is the theory of illusion, the solution of Sankara,\\nRamanuga holds the theory of evolution. Max Miillcr, The-\\nosophy, p. 108.\\n^^Katha Up. II, 5, 12.\\n60 Br. Up. IV. 4, 23.\\nKatha Up, II, 5, H: Chand. Up. VI.\\n59 Br. Up. IV, 4, 23.\\n\u00c2\u00ab3 Chand. Up. 11,4, 5-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "196\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThe wise\\nman.\\nthe ether. This universal spirit is one s own\\nspirit,\\nTrue wis- R ^6. The knowledge and vision of the Self, the\\ndom and\\nhappiness, pure light of lights withm the heart, by spiritual\\nabstraction, purifies the wise man from the world illu-\\nsion, and makes him intelligent, e., self-luminous,\\nfrees him from the miseries of transmigration, and\\nis the only salvation and bliss. Many means,\\ne. g,, renunciation, meditation, bodily postures are\\nenjoined.\\n37. The sage of the Upanishads sits rigid, insensi-\\nble to things around, his thoughts and feelings stifled,\\nhis mind fixed upon a single point, the light within,\\nAs the meditation becomes more intense, his body and\\nits environment, the vestures of the vital airs, of the\\ninward sense, of the mind in turn fade away. The\\nmental vesture merges into the vesture of characterless\\nbliss, a bliss a hundred times more than the highest\\nhuman joys. Then sorrow is no more, nor fear,\\nnor pain. He is not troubled at the commission of\\nevil deeds nor the omission of good works.\u00c2\u00ae He is in\\nthe body, but untouched by actions, whether good or\\nbad. Individuals suffer because one causes belief to\\nanother. But in the universal soul, where all indi-\\nviduals are one, their sufferings are neutralized.\\nWith the disappearance of the body he is liberated\\nfrom the illusions of life in various embodiments. He\\n54Chand. Up. Ill, 12, 7; HI, 18, i; IV, 10, 5; Tait. Up. i;\\nMund. Up. r.\\nChand. Up. Ill, 13, 8; 14, 2.\\n56 Mund. Up. II, 2.\\ns^Katha Up. I, 4, 12; II, 6, 17.\\n58Svetsasv. Up.; Tait Up. VI, 18; VI, 24; Mund. Up. Ill, i;\\nII, 2, 4; Miiller, S. B. E., vol. i, p. XXIII; Katha Up. 1,2,\\n11; Tait. Up. I, 8; Br. Up. IV, 4, 7-\\n5\u00c2\u00bbBr. Up. IV, 3, 33.\\n\u00c2\u00abOTait. Up. II, 9; Br. Up. IV, 3; Tait. Up. VI, 18.\\nBr. Up. I, 5, 20.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 197\\nhas returned into the Self as water into water, light\\ninto light, as rivers into the sea/^ There is no longer\\nany consciousness. As the bees make honey by col-\\nlecting the juices of distant trees and reduce the juice\\ninto one form, and as these juices have no discrimina-\\ntion so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree\\nor that, in the same manner all these creatures, when\\nthey have become merged into the True, know not\\nthat they are merged into the True. And again,\\nAs those rivers when they are in the sea do not know\\nI am this or that river. In the same manner all\\ncreatures, when they have come back from the Time,\\nknow not that they have come back from the Time.\\nThe thief, the outcast, the monk are all merged into\\nthe characterless Brahman. The father is no longer\\nfather, the mother no longer mother, the gods no\\nlonger gods.^^ In its true nature the soul is imper-\\nsonal. It has lost or rather regained its identity. It\\ndid not know that it was the true Self because it had\\nidentified itself with fictitious vestures and embodi-\\nments. It regains itself, it recovers its true nature by\\nseeing and knowing itself as it is free from the\\npleasures and pains of the world-illusion.\\n38. The intuition of the unity of souls in the Self\\nfulfils all desires. He is motionless like pure water\\npoured out upon a level surface. Such a one passes\\ninto the self never to return, and to use a phrase oft\\nrepeated in the Upanishads, is lost like a lump of salt\\nin salt water. His mind reflects the pure light of\\nundifferenced being; his personality becomes one with\\nMund. Up. Ill, 2, 8.\\n\u00c2\u00ab3Chand. Up. 9, i.\\n64 lb., VI, 10, I.\\n\u00c2\u00ab5 Brih. Up. IV, 3, 22.\\n\u00c2\u00ab\u00c2\u00abIb.\\nBr. Up. IV, 3, 23.\\nBr. Up. II, 4, 12.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "198 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nthe Self. No hope of recompense spurs him on. The\\nparadise of Brahma and the gods is but transitory and\\nempt3\\\\ As the clouds slowly break away and disperse,\\nletting the sun shine forth in pure radiance; so the\\nfictions of the world-seeming pass away and the self\\nalone abides. It is this undying Self that is out-\\nspread before, Self behind, Self to the right. Self to\\nthe left, above, below; Brahman alone is all this.\\nAll works are exhausted; metempsychosis with all its\\nmiseries has passed; all doubts disappear; all affec-\\ntions are crushed; the sage wakes out of this dream-\\nworld into real being, the soul enters into the All of\\nthings.\\n(b) Ger?7ian Transce7identalis7?i.\\nTraScend ^9 ccntury Emmanuel Kant, a pro-\\nentaUsm. fessor in Konigsberg, dissatisfied with the condition of\\ncurrent philosophical teaching, felt that a remedy\\nshould be provided. For years in studious retirement\\nhe turned the problem over and over in his mind and\\nThe Critic finally published the Critic of Pure Reason. This\\nof Kant.\\nwork exerted a profound and lasting impression on\\nsubsequent philosophic and religious thought. In it\\nare found the sources of two great tendencies of\\nmodern thought: Transcendental Pantheism, and\\nModern Scepticism, whose highest and legitimate form\\nis reached in Agnosticism,\\n^is 3 40. Kant attemoted to effect a revolution in Philoso-\\nteacnmg. s\\nphy, analogous to that worked by Copernicus in\\nAstronomy. The radical error in preceding systems\\nwas to him the fact that they rested upon a wrong\\nbasis. Instead of teaching that thought should be\\nconformed to external things, Kant boldly maintained\\n\u00c2\u00ab9Mund. Up. II, 1. II.\\n^Critic of Pure Reason, pref. to 2d ed.; IMiiller s Trans., p.\\n693.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 199\\nthe contrary. He thus reversed the whole fabric of\\nPhilosophy. To him the mind was the real center,\\nand the subjective alone was true. External things as\\nthey really exist can never be known. The mind per-\\nceives objects only as they are covered over by subjec-\\ntive conditions or forms of thought. These forms,\\nideal phenomena^ thus become the objects known.\\nHence the ideal only is apprehended, the real,\\nnoumena, forever escape our grasp.\\n41. This fundamental principle was seized bypichte.\\nPichte and developed with all the ardor of an enthusi-\\nastic disciple. The subject, the /or 7ne, to him\\nwas the fundamental and only reality. The outer\\nworld was the mirror of the The existence of the\\n7 is a most certain fact of consciousness; its essence\\nis unknown and does not concern us. We know it only\\nas an activity, forming internal images and representa-\\ntions. The /is thus conceived as possessing a creative\\npower, and by the exercise of this power becomes con-\\nscious of itself. The is the subject; the object or\\nimage is the non-I. The image is the self-determination\\nof the and is viewed as its conscious modification. In\\nthis consciousness the /and the non-I 2ive again united.\\n42. The phenomena of the external world are only The infinite\\nthe representations of the/. These result from thelSite.\\nactivity of the and are its limitations. Freed from\\nthese, the becomes the infinite. The original and\\nfundamental consciousness is that of the infinite This\\n/is not conceivable by the mind, is not conscious,\\nnor a person, nor a substance, nor a spirit, nor a\\nreality. To attribute such qualities to God is to limit\\nHim and place Him in the category of the finite. God\\nis a pure activity; pure thought is the divine existence;\\nhuman existence is absolutely one with the divine.\\nFicbte, by Robert Adamson, ch. VI, VII.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "200\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nIdea of\\ncreation.\\nSchelling.\\nSchoppen-\\nhauer.\\nHartman.\\nhistory.\\n43. Thus to Fichte the pure and transcendental\\nis the only reality; this possesses infinite activity; it\\nis thus determined to know the and the non-Ij to\\nknow them is to create; before I had the consciousness\\nof myself, writes Fichte, I did not exist.\\n\u00c2\u00a744. With Fichte the /was the only reality; the\\nnon-I was its production. To Schelling they both were\\nreal, because they were one and the same. His funda-\\nmental principle was the identity of the /and the non-I^\\nof the mind thinking and the thing thought.\\n45. Schoppenhaur replaces the idea of Hegel by the\\nconcept of will. To him the will is the only reality;\\neverything else in the world are effects, evolutions or\\nphenomena of Will. The Will manifests itself in\\ndifferent ways; in nature as a physical force, in man\\nas consciousness; therefore, only as manifested in man\\ndoes it possess personality, and with the death of\\nman loses personality. Of a personal God distinct\\nfrom the world, the mind can know absolutely nothing.\\n46. Hartman felt that the will alone was insuffi-\\ncient; to it must be added the idea. But the will and\\nthe idea are to be explained; they cannot exist abso-\\nlutely; they point to a further concept, which is funda-\\nmental and primal. This principle is the Uncojiscious,\\nIt is at the same time one and everything. Through\\nthe idea and the will it evolves and becomes every-\\nthing. Existing things are only the appearances of the\\nUnconscious\\nII.\\nDuALiSTic Theory.\\n47. The theory of Pantheism resolves all things\\ninto one absolute principle. Other philosophers, how-\\never, explain the origin of the universe by postulating\\ntw^o principles equally eternal and supreme. This", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 201\\ntheory has attracted men of great gifts but has not\\nexerted the influence of the Pantheistic system. It is\\nfound in the highest stage of Greek philosophy. It\\nhas been ascribed to Plato. Others hold that Aris-\\ntotle taught the coexistence of two eternal principles.\\nIt is certain that he maintained the eternity of matter.\\nSt. Thomas was influenced by the opinion of Aristotle\\nto contend that creation from eternity was possible.\\nThus he attempted to reconcile the philosophers with\\nthe revealed truth of Catholic faith.\\n\u00c2\u00a748. The Stoics are said to hold the existence of stoics.\\ntwo principles; the one was matter, the other was the\\nworld-soul. It is easy to conceive that some of them\\nshould so believe after the analogy of man composed\\nof body and soul. Tertullian is the authority for this.\\n8 49. The problem of good and evil has engaged the Ethical\\nr 1 t r i -TT 1 dualism.\\nattention of thoughtful men in all ages. Various solu-\\ntions have been proposed. The solution that has\\ninterest at present is that drawn from the later Persian\\ncosmogony and taught as a cardinal doctrine by the\\nManichean heretics. To explain the simultaneous (a) Mani-\\nexistence of good and evil they postulated two eternal\\nprinciples; the one, the cause of all the good, the\\nother, the cause of all the evil that exists. These two\\nprinciples are mutually opposed. The preponderance\\nof good or evil is explained by temporary advantage\\ngained by the one over the other. This teaching pro-\\nfoundly influenced early Christianity. St. Augustine (b)St.\\nfell under its sway for some years. We find it com-^\\ning out afresh in the doctrines of the Albigensians of (^w g.\\nthe XII century. In our day it has been advanced by^^^-\\nJohn Stuart Mill.\\nTimaeus.\\nContr. Hermog., c. 1. VIII.\\nConfessions.\\nEss. on Rel. on Nature, p. 41.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "202 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nIII.\\nTheory of Creation.\\nemS^of the 5\u00c2\u00b0 universe is dependent has been proved\\nuniverse, ^o a Certainty. Mathematics shows that it limited in\\ntime and in space. Physics points out that it had a\\nbeginning and that it will have an end. We can indicate\\nthe approximate period when vegetable, animal and\\nhuman life first appeared. That life can come only\\nfrom pre-existing life is an established truth of Biology.\\nHence the source of terrestrial life must be outside and\\nbeyond the universe. The laws of motion, the proper-\\nties of matter prove that the inorganic world in its\\nintimate nature depends on some higher and external\\npower. Thus we have been led to the conception of\\nGod, His principal attributes have been indicated as\\nfar as human reason from the contemplation of mun-\\ndane existences can conceive them. We know that God\\nis a spirit; that He is living and intelligent. The\\nThe nature Problem that now confronts us is how to account for\\npendence beginning of the universe, or what is the nature of\\nits dependence.\\nCreation. \u00c2\u00a751- Three thcorics are proposed (a) Pantheism in\\nits various phases; (b) Philosophic Dualism; (c) Crea-\\ntion. The first two have been analyzed critically and\\nentproba- found Untenable. This leaves an antecedent proba-\\nbility in favor of the third hypothesis, viz., Creation.\\nnotion of 5 2. The classic definition of Creation is: Productio\\nrei ex nihilo sui et subjecti^ i. e., the production of a thing\\nfrom nothing in the sense that before its production\\nneither the thing itself existed, nor did any subject-\\nmatter exist from which the thing could be fashioned.\\nAn illustration may be drawn from ordinary work.\\nThus a carpenter may carve a piece of furniture from\\na block of wood, or a sculptor may chisel a statue from", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 203\\na rough piece of marble. Neither the one nor the\\nother existed as such before the workman fashioned\\nthem; hence he is said to have produced them ex ?iihilo\\nsid. But the material existed; this the workman did\\nnot make; he simply took it and made it assume such\\nand such a shape; hence he did not produce the statue\\nex nihilo subjecti. Thus the ordinary workman is not a\\ncreator but only an artificer. In extraordinary works\\nof genius as, e. g.^ a wonderful poem, or a great paint-\\ning, the writer or artist is called the creator and his\\nwork dignified by the title of creation, because the\\nextraordinary brilliancy of the work, the extreme rarity\\nand difficulty of production, the slender means at his\\ndisposal arouse in the mind the thought that from\\nalmost nothing at his disposal this man has produced\\nsomething which for ages will challenge the admiration\\nof man. The apparent absence of any material or sub-\\nject-matter out of which the works of genius can be\\nformed makes them approximate to the true notion\\nof creation and obtains for them the title.\\n8 q^. For this reason creation is said to be the pro- meaning of\\nthe phrase\\nduction of a thing out of nothing. The phrase has given produced\\nrise to much misconception, false imputation and con- nothing.\\nfusion. When we say out of nothing, we do not imply\\nthat nothing was the material or subject-matter after nothing not\\nthe analogy of the sculptor. Christian Philosophy has cause,\\nclearly and repeatedly explained the words. They do\\nnot imply any notion of material causality whatsoever;\\nthey refer only to the order of time or of succession.\\nThus, e. g., in explaining creation out of nothing we\\nsimply mean that before creation there was nothing;\\nthat by creation things began to exist; that there is no\\nquestion of a causal connection between nothing and\\nexistence, only a mere succession. The famous\\nSt. Thomas, Contra Gent. L. II, ch. 16.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "204 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfrom noth- dictum handed down by antiquity and employed to-da5%\\ning notning t. i j\\ncomes. that from nothing fwthing co??ies, is thus shorn of mean-\\ning and strength. The phrase is based upon ambiguity\\nand misconception. It only has a meaning when we\\nadmit a causal connection between the two terms.\\nThis Christian Philosophy has ever emphatically\\ndenied and it should be heard in its own behalf/\\ndependence 8 A.. The dependent nature of the universe has been\\nexplained.\\nproved beyond question. The arguments set forth\\nshow that the world, considered as a whole or in its\\nseveral parts, e., the particular beings, alike are\\ndependent. Now what is dependent had a beginning,\\nor in other words, has been produced. It could not\\nbe produced by an emanation from the divine sub-\\nstance, nor is it a manifestation or evolution of a real\\nor ideal divine being. These are the various phrases\\nof Pantheism.\\n(a) not by 55. (a) It is absurd to suppose that the different\\nbeings are the emanations of God. God then would be\\ndivided; His substance would have parts, and every\\nthing that is would be a portion of the divinity. Con-\\nsciousness presents an inseparable barrier to this\\ntheory. It tells me that I am a person distinct from\\nrefuted by God and from every other being. Again, this theory\\nand^EtmS saps the foundation of Ethics, If everything were a\\npart of God, it would have the nature of God and its\\nactivities vv^ould be divine. How, then, could we make\\na distinction between good and bad? That there\\nSt. Augustine, Op. Imp. contra Julian, V, 31; Si. Thomas,\\n1. q. 45, a. T, ad. 3. As Lucretius expresses it\\nPriacipium hinc cujus nobis exordia sumet:\\nNuUam rem nihilogigni divinitus unquam.\\nDe Nat. 1, V. 148.\\nAccording to J. G. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 140, Mar-\\ntineau makes creation an external process like a self-scissure of\\nthe Deity in whom in some way the world was always con-\\ntained; Dr. Upton teaches a theory of pantheistic mani-\\nfestation and scission in Hibbert Lectures, 1893.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 205\\nIS such a distinction is a fundamental and evident\\ntruth.\\n8 k6. (2) The Pantheism of manifestation, whether (t not by\\no s} 7 7 manifesta-\\nit be viewed as real or as ideal, is no less untenable, tion\\ntheory.\\nConsciousness bears witness to my own substantial\\nreality; it teiis me that /am not a mere mode or\\nmanifestation of something else. The substantial\\nreality of the is a firm conviction of ordinary daily\\nlife and an evident and fundamental truth of Psy- refuted by\\nPsychol-\\nchology. No fallacious reasoning can obliterate this, ogy.\\nand the system of Philosophy which neglects the dis-\\ntinction is faulty in its very basis and will surely fail to\\ngive the answer to the deepest questions of being and\\nof life which the mind in every age imperatively\\ndemands.\\n57- (3) It is opposed to and contradicted by the bjr Physical\\nphysical sciences. Everywhere in the broad field of\\nscience the substantial reality of mundane beings is\\ntaken for granted; their properties are set forth, their\\nlaws are formulated. Not only are these beings con-\\nceived and dealt with as substantial realities, but they are\\nrecognized as substances differing one from another in\\ntheir substantial nature. Reasoning from this evident\\ntruth, we speak of the classifications and hierarchy of\\nreal beings. Hence also the basis for the real distinc-\\ntion and difference of the various sciences. Through-\\nout there is question of substantial realities, not of\\nappearances; of beings differing one from another in\\nnature. In the supposition of one substance only, or\\nof the essential identity of all things, such a process\\nwould be absurd and open to manifest contradictions.\\n58. (4) Again, this form of Pantheism supposes by prin-\\nthat the perfect and determined have followed and reason,\\nproceeded from the imperfect and the undetermined.\\nChristian Philosophy, The Soul. ch. I, VI.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "206 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nHence the imperfect is prior to the perfect; the former\\nproduces the latter. But this is contradicted by the\\nprinciple of causality. It is an evident and funda-\\nmental truth that the effect cannot be more perfect\\nthan the cause. In some manner the perfection of\\nbeing which we discover in the effect must be precon-\\ntained in the cause. Hence Pantheism is opposed to\\nthe first principle of sound reasoning. It is also con-\\ntradicted by the principle of contradiction. If God\\nand the world were one and the same being, then this\\nbeing would at the one and same time be infinite and\\nfinite, eternal and temporary, necessary and depend-\\nent, immutable and subject to constant change, imper-\\nfect and ever becoming perfect. Such a position is\\nabsurd. Hence we are constrained to reject it\\naltogether.\\n(2) not by R erg. (b) Another solution is sought in the pre-exist-\\nDualistic Jy _ b\\nTheory. ence or the eternity of matter. According to this view\\nGod fashioned the world from pre-existing matter.\\nHe thus becomes the designer or Artificer, not the\\nCreator. This theory cannot stand criticism and for\\ntwo main reasons\\nrefuted by (i) It is contradictory to the known nature of matter\\no^ mat en and therefore utterly lacks foundation in fact. The\\nproperties of matter show that it cannot be eternal.\\nScience proves that the world had a beginning as it\\nwill surely have an end. Even if we grant that matter\\nis eternal, the hypothesis will not be one whit\\nstrengthened. Matter as such is dependent. The\\nprolongation of its existence to an eternity will never\\nchange its nature. External matter can never be other\\nthan dependent. To maintain that God fashioned the\\nworld from pre-existing or eternal matter is a mani-\\nfest contradiction. In the hypothesis it is conceived\\nto be independent; but in its nature it is evidently", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "CREATION. 207\\ndependent. Therefore, the hypothesis is contrary to\\na known truth and must accordingly be rejected.\\n60. (2) The world cannot be the cause of itself. (3) The\\n_ 1-1 1 1 world can-\\nIt is a philosophical axiom that a being cannot act not be the\\n-ri 1 1 cause of\\nbefore it exists. It does not exist m hypothesis; it itself.\\ndoes exist on the supposition that it exerts activity.\\nThus it would have existed and not have existed at the\\nsame time, which is a patent contradiction.\\n61. (c) The final theory proposed is that of Cre- (4) Theory\\nation. This is the theory of Christian Philosophy. It\\nalone is free from contradiction and appeals to sound\\nreasoning.^\\n8 62. (i) The rejection of all other hypothesis is a(a)negative\\no y J J i- argument.\\nnegative argument for creation. It alone now pos-\\nsesses the field, and taking the fact that it has been\\ntaught consistently and constantly for two thousand\\nyears by the most powerful and soundly reasoned\\nschool of philosophy that has ever appealed to or influ-\\nenced the minds of thinking men, the negative proof\\nhas a weight and force which cannot be lightly treated.\\n62,. (2) Furthermore, no contradiction can be (b) it is not\\npointed out in this theory. It is a fact that the uni- dktor^y\\nverse is dependent and limited; it is a fact that it did\\nnot always exist; it is a fact that this theory alone\\ndoes full and impartial justice to the nature of the\\nworld and the conception of God. We may not com-\\nprehend the manner^ but we can reason to the fact. It\\nis true that the act of creation implies infinite power;\\nbut the conception of God as supreme and infinite is\\ndeep-seated in the mind; it is what makes God what\\nHe is.\\n64. (3) If it be objected that a difiiculty is found (c) creation\\nin understanding how a spirit can bring into existence Svabie?\\nThe sublime passages in Confessions of St. Augustine, b.\\n10, ch. 6; b. II. ch. 4.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "208 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nconfusion substancc distinct from itself, we answer that the\\nof intellect\\nand sense, difficulty ariscs f roHi the confusion of intelligence and\\nimagination. It is hard to imagine such a process.\\nYet it is not so hard to conceive. The foregoing dis-\\ncussion is a preparation of the mind to receive and\\nadmit creation as the only possible explanation.\\nFurthermore, by way of partial illustration we may\\nillustration appeal to the works of the human intellect. The mind\\nlife. not only builds houses, and fashions mechanical imple-\\nments from materials already existing. It possesses\\nwhat is called a creative power. Literature -and the\\nfine arts are its product. The more closely the human\\nmind approximates to the concept of divine creation,\\nthe higher it is conceived to be in the scale of intelli-\\ngence and the greater are its works. It clothes its\\nconcepts in the written and spoken word. How differ-\\nent the sight and sound from the thing signified!\\nA. K. Rogers, Modern Philosophy, p. 51.\\nJ. G. Schurman, Belief in God, p. 148, writes that creation is\\nabsolutely inconceivable; so also Wm. Graham in Creed of\\nSciences, p. 4.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XL\\nUNITY.\\nI. The line of thought developed in the preceding\\nchapters brings home to the mind of the thoughtful\\nreader the conviction that the visible universe does\\nnot exhaust all reality, that behind and beyond what\\nappears to sense or appeals to thought, there is another\\nbeing on whom the present world rests and in whom\\nalone it finds a rational and complete explanation.\\n2. Call it what you may, dignify it by the most the fact,\\nsublime conceptions of the human soul, represent it as\\nthe World Ground, pause before as the great\\nUnknown, its existence cannot be ignored or\\ndenied. The labored efforts of Philosophical reason-\\ning afford dim glimpses of a far-away truth; their tone\\nis wavering and uncertain; they have no power over\\nthe mind; they seem like half-concessions or studied\\napologies. The term God is artfully avoided or\\ncovered over with learned verbiage. Consecrated by\\nlong use, bound with the dearest recollections of life,\\nthe memories of childhood, appealing to our entire\\nbeing with its varied questionings, needs and aspira-\\ntions, no other word in our language brings the truth\\nnearer or expresses it with more simple force or reveals\\nits living reality and influence upon our daily lives.\\n3. The task is by no means complete with the bare the\\nproof that an extramundane being exists. A further\\npurpose remains. It is necessary to show, as far as\\nhuman reason can, that this being corresponds to the\\nBowne, Phil, of Theism,\\nSpencer, First Principles.\\n14 [209]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "2IO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nChristian notion of God. This is an investigation inta\\nthe nature of the divine attributes. The first and\\nfundamental problem is the Unity of God.\\nI.\\nUnity.\\n^tyof g 4, That God is one is a certainty, though not a\\ntruth evident at first sight. The contrary has been\\nheld and taught at different times even by entire\\nraces. Historically viewed, this teaching is justly esti-\\nmated as a corruption and an error. The primitive\\nbelief of the human mind was that God is one.\\nResearch into the earliest languages reveals the forms\\nand convictions which possessed the minds of our\\nremote ancestors. Everywhere are found traces of a\\nclear and defmite monotheism. The records of the\\npast, whether preserved in sacred books or engraved\\non monuments, confirm this conclusion. The History\\nof Religions day by day presents arguments in support\\nof this position. Idolatry and Polytheism were not\\nthe primitive forms of human worship. They have\\nbeen given a proper place in the development of\\nreligious thought and are now viewed as degradations\\nor corruptions of a purer belief.\\nviewed 5. Thus the farther back we go in the life of a\\nhistorically. \u00e2\u0080\u00a2\u00e2\u0080\u00a2,11\\nnation, the purer and more spiritual are the conceptions\\nof the Supreme Being. Human reason confirms the\\nvoice of history. Among the most civilized races of\\nantiquity we find a protest against Polytheism in the\\nform of a philosophic reaction. Hence the rise and\\nspread of philosophical systems with the Hindus, the\\nGreeks, and the Romans. Differing one from anothef\\n2 Inferred from the order and harmony of the universej\\nAthanasius, C. Gentes; St. Thomas, C. Gentes, 1. I, ch. 14.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "philosophi\\nUNITY. 211\\nin the conception of the universe and of its formation,\\nthey nevertheless owe their origin and existence to the\\nconviction of a unity at the base of all things. The\\nmarvelous order and harmony of the world, the reign\\nof law which obtains throughout, the manifest signs of\\na universal system, made up, it is true, of many parts,\\nyet welded into a compact whole, the scale of beings caiTy\\nfrom the pure material existences up to the highest\\nforms of organic life, their varied and intricate rela-\\ntions and experiences reveal a unity of action which\\ncannot fail to impress the thoughtful mind. The\\nargument from Order not only proves the existence of\\na divine Architect and Creator; it proves also to con-\\nviction that the cause of all is one. No simpler or\\nstronger expression of this truth can be found than in\\nthe word universe, consecrated by long usage of\\nEnglish-speaking peoples. The world in all its entirety\\nis designated by the term universe, e.^ one uni-\\nversal system made up of many parts.\\nII.\\nSimple Unity.\\n6. It is not sufficient to say that God is a unity, ui^ty^\\nWe could not draw any definite conclusion therefrom,\\nnor could we from the phrase, as it stands, form a real\\nand definite conception. There are various kinds of\\nunity. To be exact we must distinguish. For under\\nan apparently clear term the strangest aberrations of\\nthe human mind have been covertly proposed.\\n1\u00c2\u00b0, Collective Unity.\\n7. y4 collective unity is an aggregate of elements or collective\\nof individuals distinct and separable, but formed into\\na whole by some common bond. This bond may be", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "212 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nphysical, i. e., links form one chain, or moral, i. e., law\\nunites persons to form a community or government, or\\nintellectual, e. g., as in the words or sentences of an\\nessay or an argument/\\nthis the g 8. That God is a collective unity is the teaching: of\\ndoctrine of y o\\nPantheism. Pantheism. Mention is here made of the Pantheism\\nof Emanation and of Manifestation. Further on,\\nGerman Pantheism, in which the notion of Evolution\\npredominates, will be subjected to criticism. Accord-\\ning to these forms of Pantheism the visible universe is\\nan emanation from or a manifestation of the one divine\\nsubstance. Thus existing things are a part of God;\\nthey partake of the divine nature and, in the highest\\nsense of the word, are divine. God is therefore the\\nsum of everything; there is nothing distinct from him;\\nHe is all that is.^\\ncriticism. g c). Pantheism is compelled to teach the unity\\nof God; but the unity is only a shadow of the real-\\nity. Under the strong light of logical analysis it\\ndisappears and there is presented to our gaze only a\\nstrange assemblage of objects differing one from\\nanother in nature.\u00c2\u00ae Even then there is a unity appar-\\nent, but the unity is that of order and of system, not\\nChristian Philosophy The Soul, p. 71.\\nThe universe is one in this sense that its differences exist\\nharmoniously within one whole, beyond which there is nothing.\\nHence the Absolute is, so far, an individual and a system.\\nBradley, Appearance and Reality, p, 144= All differences come\\ntogether in the Absolute The Absolute is the richer for\\nevery discord and for all diversity which it embraces; and it is\\nour ignorance only in which consists the poverty of our object.\\nP. 204. This teaching is pure Idealism, after the Neo-Kantian\\ntype, for we read The Absolute is one system and its contents\\nare nothing but sentient experience. P. 146.\\n\u00c2\u00aeThus the Neo-Kantians with Ritschel teach that God is\\nthe unity into which we combine the affections of our religious\\nsensitivity and to which we refer them as its qualities. Cf.\\nL. Stahlin, in Kant, Lotze and Ritschel, p. 200. In this we see\\nKant s apperception, and Jacobi s Sentimentalism combining\\ninto a form of Pantheism.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 213\\nof nature and intimate constitution. Scholastic Phil-\\nosophy having a basis on sound reasoning proclaims\\nthe former and from it infers the unity of the con-\\ntrolling power which guides and sustains all things.\\nPantheism proclaims the latter in opposition to the\\ntestimony of consciousness which tells me that I am\\ndistinct from my fellows and from the world around,\\nand gives no intimation whatsoever that my nature is\\na part of God. It is in contradiction to the funda-\\nmental principles of right and wrong, to the common\\nsense of man, and without the slightest vestige of\\nscientific proof.\\nIV.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Potential Unity.\\n8 10. The term Potential is not used in its Scholastic potential\\nunity.\\nmeaning. St. Thomas speaks of a potential whole,\\nas a unity which by virtue of its nature is capable of\\nexerting its activity in various ways. These various\\nmodes or channel of activity are called potencies, a\\nword identical in meaning with our English term\\nfaculty. Thus, the soul, in its nature a simple unity,\\nexerts its activity in various ways, which are called\\npotencies or faculties.\u00c2\u00ae\\nII. Here by potential unity is designated a thing its meaning,\\nwhich, not yet one in its complete essence, is yet in\\npotency to become one. The unity, therefore, is the\\nresult of development; it is a something which has\\ngrown up; actually it is nothing, potentially it is\\nsomething.^\\n12. That God is a potential unity is the doctrine its teachers,\\nadvanced in common by the Pantheistic disciples of\\nChristian Philosophy The Soul, p. 166.\\n^Christian Philosophy The Soul, ch. iii.\\nWallace s Hegel, Prolegomena, ch. VII.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "214 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nKant. They may differ one from another in the start-\\ning point or in the form in which the system is pro-\\nposed, nevertheless the characteristic notion is that of\\npotentiality or evolution.\\nFichte. g i2_ Thus to Fichte, individual consciousness is the\\nprimary fact and the true basis of philosophy. The\\nConsciousness of the absolute Ego alone orginally\\nexists. But this Consciousness receives its first form\\nin the existence of the individual Ego. We know not\\nthe nature of that which thinks; we only know it as an\\nactivity, e.^ as forming and representing images.\\nThus by acting the Ego creates itself; it becomes\\nactually what it was potentially. The internal image\\nis known as something different from the Ego.\\nThus arises self-consciousness and the distinction\\nbetween the Ego and the non-Ego. This duality is not\\nreal or permanent. In the very act of forming an\\nimage, the Ego is conscious that the image is only a\\nmodification of itself. In this consciousness the Ego\\nand the non-Ego become a unity. The varied phe-\\nnomena of the world, therefore, are only the repre-\\nsentation of the individual Ego, and this in turn is lost\\nin the inner consciousness or Ego. God, therefore,\\nis a pure activity, just as the individual Ego is not a\\nbeing but a pure activity. Pure thought is God, and\\nin pure thought man perceives God.\\nScheiiing. 14. With Fichte the Ego alone was real; the non-\\nEgo was its image or representation. Scheiiing, on\\nthe contrary, held both to be real, but their reality\\nconsists in their identity. We cannot think without\\nthinking of something. Thus the subject thinking and\\nthe object thought have a fundamental unity. This is\\ncalled the Absolute Ego and is conceived as a mind\\nwhich has in itself the potency to become everything,\\nand by its own evolution evolves the potential into the", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 215\\nactual, first in the world of matter and of animal life,\\nfinally in the world of man. God thus becomes the\\nliving unity of all forces.\\n\u00c2\u00a715. To Hegel thought was existence; what is Hegel,\\nrational is real, and the absolute thought or idea is the\\nhighest reality. God, therefore, is the absolute mind.\\nThe mind conceives the Absolute as being. This con-\\ncept of being is primitive, necessary and indeterminate.\\nHe calls it a pure being. As such it is distinguished\\nfrom nothing. The bond of their union is a becoming,\\ne. TO fieri.\\n16. The idea, to fieri, by a constant process\\nevolves itself into all that is. The evolution is seen\\n(i) in Logic which explains the genesis and nature of\\nthe idea; (2) in the philosophy of nature, which is the\\nidea of its otherness. The evolution is marked by\\nthree stages, viz., the mechanical, the physical, and\\nthe organic; (3) in the philosophy of spirit, which\\nshows how the idea returns from nature. The terminus\\nof evolution is reached in self-consciousness.^ The\\nidea with Hegel is God, but God viewed as abstract\\nand universal. As such He is a pure potency, con-\\ntaining in Himself the power to become all things.\\nWhat we grasp is the becoming, the to fieri, a divine\\nprocess, God realizing Himself in the world of nature\\nand of man.\\n17. The potential differs but little from the criticism,\\ncollective unity. It is a peculiar aspect only of n^t differ-\\nthe latter. The same criticism applies to both. ThecSnicSve\\nunity.\\n]0 The strength and merit of the Hegelian philosophj^ lay in\\nthis that it applied the Idealism of the Kantian subjective\\nphilosophy to the historical life of humanity and has understood\\nthat life in the light of a development of the spirit in conformity\\nwith law. Pfleiderer, Philosophy and Development of\\nReligion, vol. i, p. 23.\\nBelford Bax, Handbook of History of Mod. Philosophy\\np. 406.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "2l6\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\npurely\\nideal.\\nself con-\\ntradictory.\\ncharacteristic of the latter form of Pantheism is the\\nelement of a perpetual evolution process. To Schel-\\nling God only becomes personal in self-consciousness.\\nWith Hegel the highest manifestation or evolution of\\nthe idea, God is found in self-conscious mind.\\nNow the conception of a potential God evolving and\\nrealizing Himself in nature and in man is a travesty of\\nthe truth. It is a pure ideal conception, based upon\\nunsound metaphysical principles, and v/ithout the\\nslightest verification. It represents a conception of\\nGod at first indeterminate, imperfect, vague, and\\nindefinite, who by a perpetual process of evolution\\nbecomes definite, more perfect and more determined.\\ni8. The thoughtful reader sees v/hat a strange con-\\ntradiction is here presented, of an abstract entity,\\ndetermining itself,^^ and becoming more perfect by\\nvirtue of its very limitation, and realizes how inevitably\\nsuch a teaching has failed to hold the assent of the\\nearnest thinkers in our days. Hence the attempt to\\nmodify these doctrines, to preach a Neo-Hegelianism\\nor to pass by Hegel and start once more from Kant.^^\\n^2 The Absolute is the result together with its becoming.\\nThis process of evolution is crowned and consummated in\\nspirit, is itself the ultimately real. Cf. A. Seth, Hegelianism\\nand Personality, p. 8i, With Mr. Rogers in Modern Philo-\\nsophy, p. 222, A unity which, as intelligent and active purpose,\\ntakes up the complexity of means which are needed for its\\naccomplishment as an essential part of itself. And Mr. Schur-\\nman writes In the case of the Ego we have not merely a\\nmode of the divine activity; we have as it were a part of the\\ndivine essence. Belief in God, pp. 227, 228,\\n^2 To Mr. Bradley everything is the absolute, the ideal system\\nof metaphysics is to show how the world physical and spiritual\\nrealizes by various stages and degrees the one absolute prin-\\nciple. P. 359; cf. also Dr. S. Harris, Phil. Basis of Theism,\\np. 410.\\n^4 Pfleiderer, Phil, of Religion, vol. II, p. 79.\\nRecent writers recognize this error in Hegel and try to\\nexplain it away by contending that he is concrete not abstract.\\nCf, A. R. Rogers, Modern Philosophy, ch. on Hegel. That\\nnature should be comprehended as the living tissue which a", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 217\\nNeither one nor the other can furnish what the mind\\ncraves. It is in vain that we try to pull and twist their\\nteaching. The fundamental principles of both are\\nerroneous. The sad consequences they lead to are only\\nlegitimate products. Both are in contradiction to\\ntrue science and sound philosophy. Their only real\\nvalue is now historical. Looking back we view them\\nas abnormal phases in the history of the human mind,\\nand wonder how we could be so deeply influenced by\\nthem. Constant and earnest thought has shown how\\nstrange these assumptions, how patent their contra-\\ndictions, how distant and speculative they are, how\\nhard to realize their teaching, and what little real\\ninfluence they had upon our lives.\\n3\u00c2\u00b0. Abst7 act Unity.\\n19. By abstract unity is understood a unity which Abstract\\nis the creation of the mind and has existence only in\\nthe mind. God thus becomes an ideal, and religion\\nconsists in the worship of the ideal, in our con-\\nscious recognition of and aspiration to it with its\\ncorresponding influence to uplift and purify the intel-\\nlectual and moral life. Not, however, in the sense that\\nGod or Christ is proposed as an ideal by Christian\\nPhilosophy. Jesus has a real and objective existence,\\nand owing to the divine perfection of His nature\\nHe is, in the highest meaning of the term, a model An ideal,\\naccording to which we should fashion and mould our\\nlives. The ideal God of modern philosophy is far\\ndivine spirit is ever weaving is not a doctrine dangerous or\\neven antipathetic to natural theology. Schurman, Belief in\\nGod. p. 174.\\nThus Feuerbach inverted Hegel s position and taught that\\nthe human spirit was God. He is nothing more than the\\nOptative of the human heart converted into the certain and\\nblessed Indicative. Pfieiderer, Phil, of Religion, vol. II, p. iig.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "2l8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ndiSerent. It is a simple conception representing the\\nhighest aspiration of our social, or intellectual, or\\nethical life, vague and shadowy in its nature, having\\nno reality, and conveying no meaning any other than\\nthe projection of the mind upon itself. This idea\\nappears in various forms; and its wide prevalence\\nto-day calls for a distinct and separate discussion.\\nshown in 8 20. The aim of Positivism was the reform of\\n(a) Positiv-\\nTh Rr society. It is therefore primarily a Sociology. Its\\nion of peculiar metaphysical and religious aspects can thus\\nHumanity. o r-\\nbe expla!ned. All departments of learnmg lead up to\\nSociology; it is the culmination and perfection of the\\nsciences. To propose a new science of Sociology\\none free from the imperfections and errors hitherto\\ntaught and followed, Comte felt that the fundamental\\nprinciples which obtained in the hierarchy cf science\\nshould be modified or changed. Hence his Metaphy-\\nsics, which alone was adopted by some disciples, e. g.,\\nLittre, and the English writers, e. g., John Stuart\\nMill, Frederick Harrison, George Eliot. To us, at\\nfirst sight, this seems to be Positivism in its purity.\\nA critical examination, however, reveals that the meta-\\nModern Guides of English Thought in Matter of Faith, ch.\\nV, George Eliot, R. H. Hutton, p. 275. You do not so\\nmuch as touch the threshold of religion, so long as j^ou are\\ndetained by the phantoms of your thought; the very gate of\\nentrance to it, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that\\nyour gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush\\nof a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and per-\\nsuasion of the soul of souls; short of this there is 720 object given\\nyou, and you have not even reached the specified point of\\nadmiration. Within the limits of pure sincerity, no one can ever\\nworship either a nature beneath him or an idea within him;\\nhowever big may be the one, though it comprise all forces and\\nall stars, if that be all, it will be venerable to no spirit that can\\ncomprehend it; and however fine may be the other, if it be but\\na dreamer s image, a phenomenon of perishable consciousness,\\nit can never be more than the personality that has it, so as to\\nmake him suppliant. J. Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol.\\nI, p. 13.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 219\\nphysics of Comte contain nothing new, that they can\\nbe considered as the legitimate consequences of Hume s\\nteaching, and that accordingly many English writers\\nhave proposed the same, and distinctly disclaim any\\ndependence upon or indebtedness to Comte.\\n\u00c2\u00a72 1. Comte s theology was the offspring of hisCompte s\\n^_ teaching.\\nSociology. Humanity to him was the dominating idea.\\nTo uplift and perfect the human race was his sole aim.\\nIn his metaphysics he considers that alone to be\\npositive which is within the domain of the senses.\\nWhat is above or beyond the reach of sense does not\\nexist. Hence there is no God, no angel, no soul. The\\nreligious instincts of our nature are a fact, v/hich\\nobtrudes upon every conscious mind and cannot be\\nignored in any system of Philosophy. The human soul\\nwill worship God, even to the extent as to create Gods\\nfor its worship. Comte felt that the need had to be\\nsupplied. Having shut off every avenue by which the\\nmind might rise to the true concept of God, of neces-\\nsity he invented a false one. If nothing exists but\\nwhat sense shows, we must fashion God from the testi-\\nmony of sense. As a natural and logical consequence\\nof his system, he made man the highest object of\\nworship. Not the individual, for our feelings would\\nrevolt, but humanity as a whole in its highest develop-\\nment. The final end of his Sociology and Philosophy\\nthus becomes the highest object of faith and worship.\\nThe abstract idea of humanity becomes God. This\\nidea is made the center of an elaborate ritual, borrowed\\nentire from the liturgy of the Catholic Church. He\\nmarked out a festal year, he prescribed an elaborate\\nceremonial. By unmeaning shadows he attempted to\\ngive reality and life to what was destitute of either.\\n^s Christian Philosopliy The Soul, ch. IV.\\nTaine, Vacherot, Renan teach that God is only a human", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "220\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(b)in\\nEthical\\nCulture\\nReligion.\\nIts\\nteaching.\\n22. Another form of abstract Unity in Theism is\\nthat set forth by the advocates of Ethical Culture.\\nThe source of this theory may be traced to Kant. The\\nprinciple of his Critical Philosophy is thai the human\\nmind can never know things as they really are and can\\nthus never attain objective truth. The practical rea-\\nson, however, supplies the deficiency. It gives the\\nbasis for a philosophical system. Hence the important\\nplace given to his peculiar theory of Ethics. Fichte\\ndevelops the idealism of Kant s theoretical philosophy\\nand joins to it the ethics of the practical. Hence\\nthe ethical idealism which runs through his writings\\nan idealism which has influenced Goethe, Matthew\\nArnold, Carlyle, Emerson, John Stuart Mill, the\\nNeo-Kantian School with Fries and A. Lange, and\\nmodern writers on Ethical culture.\\n23. Ethics is the conception of what ought to be.\\nIt holds up the picture of our ideal selves. Ethical\\nreligion turns the thoughts of men to the ideal ends of\\nhuman life. It is practical because ideal. Man\\nmust act up to the ideal. The noble side of God is\\nthe ideal conception of the perfect. The personal\\nGod taught in Theology is an illusion. All that men\\nhave gathered into the form of God is but the image\\nof our possible selves. When we say that Christian\\nlove and justice are actually ruling in the world, we\\ngive expression to a myth. Our ideals do not reveal\\nideal which the world gradually realizes by an indefinite pro-\\ngress, hence the term Dieu-Progres. Farges, L Iclee de Dieu,\\np. 419; cf. Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 246.\\nT. Pesch, Kant et la Science Moderne, p. 196.\\nSovereignty of Ethics, Divinity School Address, Character.\\n2 Utility of Religion, pp. 101-117.\\n23pfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. II, p. 173.\\n*4W. M. Salter, Ethical Religion, p. 8.\\n2Mb., p. 9.\\n26 P. II.\\nP. 12.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 221\\nanything outside ourselves, but only indicate what we\\nourselves should be. The good and right are simply\\nwhat should be. Of themselves they are nothing.\\nTheir only meaning or reality is as ideals of action,^\u00c2\u00ae\\nMorality is reason uttering itself; an ideal fordoing.^\\nIt is the highest thought in man and it is there to\\nrule. God is often a name for that supreme sanctity\\nwhich is in every man s breast; the word itself is\\nambiguous; the ethical obligation is in the reason and\\nnature of things. Hence morality is in its essence\\nideal. All separate moral rules may be resolved into\\nthe supreme one, to seek the general welfare, the\\nuniversal good,^\\n24. A new religion therefore rises, whose basis is\\ntrust in man. And the religious man of the future\\nwill give himself to dreams of the perfect without ques-\\ntioning or concern. An ideal aim stands out before\\nevery one.^^ It is not to please some supernatural\\nbeing in the skies, it is not to follow some far-away\\nhistorical figure in the past. It is closer to us than\\nthis; it is in our own heart; it is given to us in our\\nvery nature as moral beings. At the same time we\\nare told that morality is the assertion of ourselves;\\nhence we are independent of any law and the doctrine\\nof supreme individualism holds sway.^^\\n25. This moral impulse forms the substance of our\\nnature. To Fichte religion is the element of duty con-\\n28 p. 13.\\n59 P. 63.\\n30 p. 65.\\n31 P. 69.\\n32 W. L. Sheldon, An Ethical Movement.\\n33 P. 28.\\nlb., p. 39.\\n35 P. 41.\\n3s Felix Adler, Creed and Deed.\\n3 P. 57-\\n38 P. 43; T. Pesch, Kant et la Science moderne, p. 170.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "222\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nCriticism.\\n(i) result of\\nKant.\\n(2) Senti-\\nmental\\nIdealism.\\n(3) inde-\\npendent\\nmorality.\\n(4) not\\nsatisfying\\nor perman-\\nent.\\nceived after this manner. God is nothing more than\\nthe power that works in all toward the accomplishment\\nof the highest demand of duty.^^ He is, as Mr. Arnold\\nputs it, the power that makes for righteousness.\\n26. (i) This teaching, advocated so boldly in\\nchoice and elegant diction by modern disciples of\\nculture and ethical Associations, shows to conviction\\nthat Kantian philosophy as a system of truth is a\\nfailure. Its consequences are illusions and nihilism.\\nIn place of God we have a refined form of Senti-\\nmental idealism. It is the logical sequence of Kant s\\ntwo great works. In the Critic of Pure Reason\\nhe teaches that the mind is unable to seize objective\\ntruth, hence idealism. In the Critic of Practical Rea-\\nson he holds that morality is autonomous, that man is\\na law and end to himself.\\n27. Hence the modern doctrine of an independent\\nmorality which forms the fundamental teaching of\\nthe Neo-Kantian School, e. g., Ritschl, Lange, etc.\\nMorality degenerates into an ideal creation which takes\\nform and tone from the peculiar temperament or bent\\nof mind. Thus we have the aesthetic ideal of the Neo-\\nKantians, or the practical ideal which verges so closely\\nto Positivism and its religion of humanity.\\n28. Human nature will reassert itself. As the\\npoet so well says\\nTruth crushed to earth will rise again\\nThe eternal years of God are hers.\\nThe human mind can rise to the proof of God s exist-\\nence; the human heart craves for the great and living\\nGod. A true theory of knowledge is our only guide.\\n39 C. C. Everett, Fichte, p. 257.\\nLiterature and Dogma.\\nL. Stahnlin, in Kant, Lotze, and Ritsch, p.\\nA. Cresson, La Morale de Kant, ch. IV.\\n69.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 223\\nThe problem of to-day, both in Philosophy and in\\nApologetics, is the nature of the human mind. In this\\nvital question modern philosophy from the time of\\nKant has been drifting helplessly. What wonder is it to\\nfind men teaching the most patent travesties of truth\\nwhen they perceive objects as through glasses colored\\nby prejudice and false theories!\\nIII.\\nTheory of Christian Philosophy.\\n29. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that God\\n5s a most simple unity. To understand the meaning\\nof this phrase, we must have a clear notion of the\\nterm, simple.\\n(i) The word si7nple is used in contradiction to the meaning of\\nword composite. What is simple is not composite;\\nwhat is composite is not simple. The terms are\\nantithetical. The analysis of the one throws light\\nupon the meaning of the other.\\n30. We can distinguish three kinds of composition;\\nor rather a composite thing can be so in three different\\nways. Thus we speak of physical., of metaphysical and\\nof logical composition.\\n(a) A physical composite is a being made up of (a) not a\\nphysical parts really distinct or distinguishable. It compound.\\nis applied to and embraces material objects. Matter is\\ncomposite in whatever way we may view it. Hence\\narises the notion of quantity. If the parts are really\\ndistinct, we have discreet quantity, which becomes the\\nsubject-matter of Arithmetical science. If the parts\\nare continuous we have continuous quantity, the prop-\\nerties of which are explained in Geometry. Moreover\\nphysical forces which are inseparable from matter are\\nT. Pesch, Le Kantianisme et ses erreurs.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "224 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nalso quantitative. They can be weighed, measured,\\ncalculated, as we learn from the science of Physics.\\nIn analysis and experimentation they are considered as\\nquantities. They may therefore be justly termed\\nphysical composites\\nGod not 31. Now the nature of God is not such. The train\\nof reasoning, which proves that matter and physical\\nforces are dependent and limited, shows conclusively\\nthat neither matter nor physical forces could ade-\\nquately explain this universe. Matter is matter\\nwherever it is found. Its nature remains unchanged,\\ndespite the varying circumstances of place or position;\\nit is utterly unable to account for its own existence,\\nmuch less explain the existence of anything else.\\nGod, therefore, cannot be a composite unity. This\\nteaching is Pantheism and differs only in word from\\nopen Atheism.\\n32. But have we in experience any being or class\\nof beings which are not material? The answer comes\\nwithout hesitation. Introspection reveals the exist-\\nence and the nature of the soul. We know it to be a\\nspiritual substance; in its own essence immaterial, it\\nis able to subsist independently of matter. Physical\\ncomposition is utterly foreign to its nature. It is\\ntherefore called a simple immaterial unity. In its\\nnature far above material existences, it approximates\\nmore closely to the true concept of God. Neverthe-\\nless it falls far short of what the human mind holds God\\nto be; and this for two main reasons.\\n(b)nota 33. (b) The soul is a metaphysical composite. It\\nSfcom-^^ is simple in essence, inasmuch as it is not made\\nup by the coalition of parts really distinct; never-\\ntheless the imperfection of its nature and of its\\nactivity is a reason why it is regarded in the light of\\na composite.\\nposite.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 225\\n34. In a metaphysical composite the parts are not\\nseparate entities which coalesce into a unity. The\\nobject is viewed in its own essence. This essence is\\nconsidered distinct from its existence and its acts.\\nEssence is a concept which is different from existence.\\nEssence is what makes a thing such and not otherwise.\\nExistence is what constitutes a thing in the objective\\norder of reality and distinguishes it from what is only\\npossible. Thus the essence of man is rational animality;\\nhis existence is the concrete fact that he is an objec-\\ntive reality. The concepts are different because they its\\ndesignate different things. The distinction is clearly\\nbrought out in possible things. Thus objects which\\nare possible are those which can exist but do not yet\\nactually exist. Inasmuch as they can exist they have\\nan essence. In metaphysics we treat of their essences\\nand question the nature and extent of their reality.\\nIn so far, however, as they do not yet exist, they have\\nno existence. The are in the pure state of possibility.\\nThey began to exist and we conceive it due to the fact\\nthat existence has been added to essence. Hence\\narises the composition of essence and existence.\\n35. This composition is found in every dependent where\\nbeing. Its very dependence shows that at a definite\\ntime it began to exist,, that before existing it was in a\\nstate of possibility, and was simply an essence. That\\nthe visible universe is dependent has been proved to a\\ncertainty. There was a time accordingly when it did\\nnot exist. As such it was only possible it had essence,\\nbut not existence. Hence a composition of essence\\nand of existence it true of every being in the universe.\\nThis is due to its dependent nature. Wherever we find\\ndependence or an initial beginning, there we can dis-\\ntinguish between a state of possibility and the state of\\nactual existence. This is true of the human soul.\\n15", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "226 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nThere was a time when we did not exist; our nature is\\ntherefore dependent; we were possible before we\\nbegan to be.\\n36. What is true of essence and of existence can\\nalso be verified of a continued state of existence. Every\\nliving being grows. Growth is a law of life. But\\ngrowth means acquisition. In the progress of growth\\na being constantly puts forth activities and acquires\\ndevelopment in a manner proportionate to its nature.\\nWe speak here only of intelligent beings. Thus the\\nmind of the child grows or develops by the acquisition\\n,oi knowledge, by the exercise of thought. The child,\\ne. g.y has the capacity to think, to acquire knowledge,\\nto become a learned man. This is accomplished by\\nlaborious study. Thus we can distinguish between the\\nmind destitute of knowledge and the thought or learn-\\ning which it obtains. The one added to the other\\nmakes him learned. Hence we have a composition.\\nThe learning is viewed as something perfecting the\\nmind. If the mind knew everything from the begin-\\nning, it could acquire nothing new. Its thought could\\nnot then be viewed as perfecting its nature and there\\nwould be no composition,\\nits source 37. Hencc the composition arises from its imper-\\nfection. Now metaphysical composition cannot be\\nfound in God. He is the first cause, the prime mover,\\nthe orderer of all things. In nature He is not dependent.\\nHe therefore never began to be but always was. Thus\\nthere never was a time when He was merely possible.\\nIn Him there is no composition of essence or existence.\\nThe same is true of His acts. If we conceive that the\\nacts of God perfect His nature, He becomes imperfect,\\nlimited, dependent. This is contradictory to the\\nnotion formed from the conviction that He is inde-\\npendent in His own existence, yet sustains all things", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 227\\nand from a consideration of the infinite perfection\\nwhich is necessary for the creative act.\\n38. (c) Finally there is what is called Logical com- (c) not a\\nposition. In Logic we distinguish between the genus composite,\\nand the specific difference. Individuals are classed\\ninto groups. There is a common element in all which\\nis the basis of the classification. This element is\\ncalled the genus. Thus, e. g., animal is the generic\\nelement of man and brute. Nevertheless there is\\nanother element which gives rise to a distinction in the\\ngeneric group. This element is called the specific\\ndifference and is the reason why we separate a genus\\ninto many species. Thus, e. g.^ rationality is the\\nspecific element in man. It marks him out from the\\nother species of the genus, animal.\\n39. The union of the genus and the specific differ- its\\nence constitutes a logical species. Thus, e.g., man\\ncan be viewed as a logical composite made up of genus\\nand specific difference. This composition obtains in\\nLogic. It forms the basis of Logical classification.\\nIn every individual a generic and a specific element are\\nfound. By reason of this they are placed in definite\\ncategories.\\n40. Now God is not in any category. He is above\\nall categories. He differs in nature from created\\nthings. When objects are placed in the same category,\\nit is by reason of a common element. This element\\nis the same in all; each individual agrees with the\\nothers in this common characteristic. But God is not\\nof the same nature as creatures. He is uncreated,\\nthey are created; He is independent, they are depend-\\nent; He is infinite, they are finite and of limited per-\\nfection. Hence we cannot consider God as a genus,\\nof which created things are species. God exists, as\\nalso creatures. But God s existence differs in nature", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "228 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfrom existence in creatures. Hence existence in one\\nhas not the same meaning as existence in the other.\\nThe term existence is applied to both not univocally^\\ni. e.^ in the same meaning, but analogically^ z. e., after\\na certain manner or likeness. The concept of God,\\ntherefore, affords no reason for distinguishing genus\\nand species. There is no basis for a logical com-\\nposition.\\nGod a 8 41. ^Ve are thus led to understand how it is that\\npure act.\\nScholastic Philosophy speaks of God diS pure ad.^^ In\\nGod there is no possibility. No potency to be or to\\nbecome is found. Potency or acquisition is a sign of\\nimperfection. It is a mark of limitation and depend-\\nence. It is found in created and dependent beings,\\nnot in God. Therefore God is conceived as a 7nost\\npure act.^\\nGod not 42. The soul, in its highest activity is independent\\nof the bcdily organs. It can subsist after dissolution\\nof the body. Its nature is inorganic and spiritual.\\nNevertheless it was created to animate a bodily frame;\\nthis inciiaation is a part of its nature and is retained\\nafter separation from the body. The dependence\\nupon the body is only extrinsic; yet it is natural.\\nBecause of its spiritual and inorganic nature, the soul\\nis termed a spirit; by reason of the dependence upon\\nthe body, it is termed a soul. Through the bodily\\nsenses it obtains the materials of thought. In\\nco-operation with the body it exercises the acts of\\nsensation and of movement. Without this inclination\\nto be united to a corporeal organism, the soul would\\nAristotle, Metaphys. XI, ch. 6.\\nTu facis nos Domine cui esse et vivere non aliud atque\\naliud est; quia summum esse, atque summum vivere idipsum\\nes Summus enim es et non mutaris. Aug. Confess., 1. i,\\nch. 6.\\nChristian Philosophy The Soul, ch. V-VL\\na soul.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "UNITY. 229\\nhave a pure spiritual existence. By reason of the^^t^p^^ e\\ntendency, its existence is to a certain extent organic.\\nHence we speak of the soul as a spirit^ but not 2i pure\\nspirit. Thus the soul is dependent in its nature and is\\nnot entirely self-sufficient Its natural and perfect state\\nis union with body.\\n43. Not so with God. Christian Philosophy has\\never taught that God is a pure spirit. For this reason\\nin the early centuries of our era the Fathers of the\\nChurch took issue with the Stoics. They maintained\\nin strong and eloquent argument that God could not\\nbe the soul of the worlds as Stoicism taught. The notion\\nof dependence in any shape whatever is foreign to\\ntheir belief in the divine nature. To them God was\\nthe first cause, leaning on nothing else, self-sufficient\\nand of infinite perfection. This teaching they embraced\\nand expressed under the t^vm. pure spirit. To no other\\nbeing was this term applied. As far as imperfect\\nhuman speech could go, this term alone expressed\\nsimply and clearly the characteristic of the divine\\nessence.\\n\u00c2\u00a744. The mind is now prepared to grasp the true God trans-\\nrelation of the Creator to the universe. This problem ^nd\\nImmanent,\\nhas occupied the attention of philosophers at all times,\\npresents various aspects and gives rise to various\\ninterpretations. Thus some lay exclusive stress on the\\ntranscendence of God over creatures, and we have the\\nschool of Deists. Others appeal to the immanence of\\nGod in creation, and thus formulate the doctrine of\\nPantheism. The truth lies in recognizing the funda-\\nmental doctrine of both. God is both transcendent\\nand immanent. He is transcendent by virtue of His\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0*Tenelon, Demonstration de I existence de Dieu, p. II, ch.\\nV; Franzelin, De Deo Uno., III, ch. III.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "230 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nnature; He is immanent by His presence and activity/^\\nIn illustration we go to the living organism. The soul\\nis present everywhere in the living body, but is of far\\nhigher nature than the material elements. So but in\\nan infinitely higher manner God is transcendent to but\\nimmanent in the world He hath made.\\nQuod ubique sis, quem nullus circumscribit locus, et solus\\nes praesens eliam iis qui large fiunt a te. Aug. Conf., V. 2;\\nep. 137, n. 4.\\nDeus est ubique per essentiam, praesendam, potendam.\\nCard. Satolli, de Deo, q. 8, a. 3. St. August, ep. 118, n. 23;\\n137, n. 4; ep. 187, De Presentia Dei. The contention of\\nMr. Fiske that two separate schools existed in the early church:\\none with the Greek Fathers recognizing the immanence of God,\\nthe other with the Latins insisting on His transcendence is with-\\nout foundation, Cf. Fiske, Idea of God, ch. V, VI.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XII.\\nPROVIDENCE.\\nI. Our line of thought has led to the conviction Summary\\nthat behind the visible universe there exists a Supreme prece^ding.\\nPrinciple which is the source and explanation of all\\nexisting things. The world within our conscious\\nbreasts and the wide world without, alike unite in\\npostulating God. Physical science needs God to\\nexplain nature; mental and moral science needs God\\nto explain man.^\\n2. The problem is about a truth, not concerning a christian\\nmere hypothesis.^ The task, however, is not yet com-God,\u00c2\u00b0\\nplete. The true conception of God implies more. To\\nthe soul of man in all ages God is not a mere philo-\\nsophical entity, colorless and independent of any\\nrelation whatsoever to the universe. The proofs pre-\\nsented for God s existence contain much more.\\nThey show not only that God exists but that He\\nis in constant touch with the world. Hence the\\nfurther notion of Providence to complete the concept\\nof God.^\\n8 3. By providence of God is understood God s gov- Providence\\nof God.\\n\u00e2\u0082\u00acrnment of the world. Universal and coexistent with\\nthe limits of creation, God s government holds sway\\nover the most insignificant creatures and the most\\nFarges, L idee de Dieu, p. 20.\\nProf. Bovvne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 8.\\n2 Dr. Bruce assumes the providential order of the world as a\\nhypothesis and then shows that it is justified by facts. Cf.\\nGifford Lectures, 1897. This method is unnecessary and betrays\\nconfusion or weakness of argument.\\nProf. Wilson, Foundations of Religious Belief, p. 339; Aug.\\nie Ordine, 1. I, ch. I.\\n[231J", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "232 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nminute particles of matter/ Possessing its sole source\\nin the uncreated wisdom of the God-head, it neverthe-\\nless presents various and different aspects when viewed\\nits phases, in application to existing things. To place the truth\\nin strong and clear outline, to avoid confusion and\\nerror in this most difficult question, it is necessary to\\ndraw distinctions and to treat the several parts of the\\ndistinctions in detail. Not that God Himself is varied\\nor made up of parts or is changeable; His truth is one\\nand His divine providence is a unity. But just as a\\nsingle ray of light thrown upon a prism takes divers\\nforms and colors, so, but in an infinitely higher man-\\nner, God s government seems diverse because of the\\ndiversity in the creatures which are under its sway.\\nThus we have the different departments of the Physical\\nSciences, of Biology, of Physiology, of Psychology, of\\nNatural and Christian Ethics.\\nmethod. 4. The distinction to be made in treating God s\\nProvidence falls in the same line as that made in set-\\nting forth the arguments to prove God s existence.\\nThese arguments were divided into two great classes:\\nthose drawn from a consideration of man s nature and\\nthose based upon the study of the external world.\\nAfter the sam^e method we shall discuss God s Provi-\\ndence as exemplified in the external world and in the\\nlife of man. In the present chapter the former ques-\\ntion shall occupy our thoughts. In the following, the\\nProvidence of God over the being and life of man shall\\nbe examined carefully and in detail.\u00c2\u00ae\\nJanet sees a rational order in the system of laws which per-\\nvade the universe, 2. providential order in the system of means\\nand ends. Traite Elementaire de Philosophie, p. 845. Creare\\nnamque dicitur condere et ordinare. Aug. de Mor. Manich.,\\nch. 7.\\nNotion of Providence not to be confounded with the marvel-\\nous. Fraser, Theism, p. 66.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 233\\nI.\\nNotion of Providence.\\n8 K. The idea of government is intimately connected govem-\\n^,r^, ri nient and\\nWith the idea of law. The one is a correlative of the law.\\nother. The relation is not so much of logical neces-\\nsity. Its basis is in the concrete facts of the external\\nworld. It is forced upon the mind by external observa-\\ntion and confirmed by profound study. The intimate\\nconnection between government and law is not limited\\nto special spheres of activity or unfolded by special\\ndepartments of human knowledge. It is coextensive\\nwith existing things and developed by every branch of\\nhuman science. Thus from the prevalence of law we\\ncan reason to the existence of government; from the\\nnature and stability of law we can infer the nature and\\nstrength of the governing power.\\n8 6. The word law is employed in various meaning\\n.of law.\\nmeanings. These meanings are not absolutely dif-\\nferent; they represent aspects of the same thing, or\\nrather they indicate the different phases in which law\\nis realized. Nevertheless the word, as it stands, is\\nambiguous and requires definition.\\n7. (a) The word law is applied to designate an (a) order\\nobserved order of things. In this sense the word isofthmgs.^^\\ntaken for the effect. The orderly sequence of phe-\\nnomena which go to form a system impresses the mind\\nwith the notion of law and the word is employed to\\nsignify the system itself. Thus we speak of the reign\\nof law and order. The cause of the observed order\\nmay be unknown. The mind simply grasps and states\\nthe effect. This is naturally more obvious. To the\\nordinary observer the constant and uniform sequence\\nof phenomena is what is meant by the laws of nature.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "(b) proxi-\\nmate cause\\nof the\\norder, i. e.,\\n234 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nEven in the sphere of physical science the term law is\\napplied to special groupings of facts. The famous\\nthree laws of Kepler, which opened up a new vista in\\nAstronomy and made Newton s labors of so much\\nvalue, ha-^e no other meaning. They express a scien-\\ntific truth beyond which scientists for 5^ears could not\\nprogress, but the truth was simply a newly observed\\nseries of facts. In this sense laws form the beginning\\nof every inductive science. Only after patient and\\nexperimental investigation upon an observed order of\\nphenomena is the real scientific bond and its nature\\nunfolded. Hence the second meaning of the word\\nlaw.\\n8. (b) The term law is also employed to desig-\\nnate the force or cause of the orderly sequence. An\\nforce. order of phenomena which is constant and uniform is\\nitself a fact which demands an explanation. Such an\\ninference is merely a special application of the general\\nprinciple of causality. The mind instinctively rises to\\nthe conception of some force behind the facts and\\nexerting its activity through them so that they combine\\ninto a uniform arrangement. The force in an opera-\\ntion is conceived to be the cause of the orderly\\nsequence. The order is the effect. To obtain a\\nknowledge of the forces which work in and through\\nphenomena is the aim of physical science. Their dis-\\ncovery is a sign of progress and a mark of perfection.\\nYears of patient and unremitting labor are considered\\nwell-spent if the facts at length are made to tell the\\nsecret of the marvelous adjustment. We can then\\nspeak of nature s laws in a higher and truer sense.\\nMany things heretofore shrouded in mystery are cleared\\nup and their manifold relations can be expressed with\\nthe precision of a mathematical formula. One such\\nWhevvell, the Inductive Sciences.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 235\\ndiscovery often revolutionizes a science and brings to\\nthe name of the scientist a halo of undying fame. The\\ndiscovery of the law of gravitation by Newton marks\\nan epoch in history. Linguistics, Sociology, Philoso-\\nphy of History, every branch of natural science deals\\nwith laws in this special meaning of the word.^\\n8 o. (c) Finally, law can be viewed in the law-giver, (c) ordi-\\nIt there appears as an act of the reason oraina/io r^tionis.\\nra/wm s. The mind perceives the utility or neces-\\nsity of a certain line of action, reflects upon the means\\nmost fitted to accomplish the purpose and then pre-\\nscribes the rule with the binding power of the will. In\\nits highest analysis, therefore, law is a rule having its\\nsource in the mind and will of a superior. Laws are\\ndistinguished according to the nature of the beings\\naffected or the means employed, as, e. g.y positive law\\nand natural law. The former is a direct and explicit\\nenactment; the latter is an inclination implanted in\\nthe nature of things by which they act in such or such\\na manner. Again, laws are called divine or human, if\\nthey have source in a divine or human power.\\nII.\\nThe Material World.\\n10. The relation between the notion of Providence, Provi-\\n_ _i, dence, Gov-\\nGovernment and Law is very mtimate. 1 he one can emment\\nbe inferred from the other. Government is possible\\nonly through law; law implies a guiding and restrain-\\ning power. The inference is not drawn from a priori\\nprinciples, nor is it based on the metaphysical essence\\nof things. It is a truth of experience and is based on\\na wide induction from facts. The relation is therefore\\n8 Prof. Wilson, Foundadons of ReUgious Belief, p. 339.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 90, a. 4.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ngovern-\\nment.\\nRei^n of\\nlaw is\\nshown by\\nphysical\\nsciences.\\na necessary one. At present the nature of that rela-\\ntion is of little moment. The reader is now prepared\\nto follow the line of thought and to grasp its bearing\\non the problem.\\nII. The existence of a mind behind phenomena\\nhas been proved. The characters of intelligence are\\nindelibly stamped upon the universe. The reign of\\nlaw which obtains throughout from the smallest atom\\nup to the highest forms of organized existence, so\\nmarvelous in precision and endless contrivance, raises\\nthe thoughts from the visible to the invisible, from the\\nfinite objects of sense to the conviction of an infinite\\nmind that gives to each its appointed sphere and\\nmeasure of action.^\\n\u00c2\u00a712. But intelligence is not the only inference. The\\nprevalence of law leads to another conviction. It\\nreveals the method and mode of divine government.\\nThe reign of law in the physical world is a uniform and\\npatent fact. The constant and regular sequence of\\nphenomena is a necessary condition for science.\\nWithout it science would be impossible. How, for\\nexample, could I explain a state of things which was\\nnever the same, but constantly changing, and so that\\nno order or sequence could be detected in the change?\\nI should give up in despair and say that everything\\nwas in confusion and that I could not understand.\\nNov/ science does not answer after this fashion. Every\\naspect and department of the material world is brought\\nunder careful observation. Everywhere order and law\\n^0 Aug. de Gen. ad Lit., 1. IV, ch. 32; Serm. 141, 241; Franze-\\nlin, de Deo Uno, p. 34.\\nThere is nothing in scientific experience inconsistent with\\nthe belief that those laws and sequences are themselves due to\\na divine will. Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 136, and he adds,\\nthere is nothing to disprove the creation and government of\\nNature by a sovereign will; but is there anything to prove it?\\nP. 137.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 237\\nobtains. What at first seemed confusing was made\\nclear upon the discovery of a deeper or wider law.\\n13. Astronomy more than any other science ^speckiiy\\nimpresses the truth of law and order. The wide\\nexpanse of the heavens studded with countless thou-\\nsand stars has been for ages a subject of meditation\\nwith the peasant and the philosopher. To ordinary\\nobservation these tiny bits of light seem stationary.\\nYet science assures us that some of them are many\\ntimes larger than our own globe; that they move with\\nincredible swiftness, faster, e. g., than an express\\ntrain, or a bullet from a rifle; and that they are in a\\nconstant process of change. The laws which rule their\\nmovements can all be reduced to the simple law of\\ngravitation. This explains the intricate and manifold\\nrelations of one to another. The combinations and\\nadjustments in the heavenly bodies are almost infinite\\nin number and of marvelous delicacy.\\n14. Not only among the large bodies of the plan- and\\netary system does law hold sway; it obtains also with y-\\nthe smallest particles of matter. The science of\\nChemistry presents most beautiful and wonderful illus-\\ntrations of forces in mutual adjustment. The laws\\nwhich govern chemical combinations are very exact\\nand intricate. Each elementary substance combines\\nwith other elements only in definite proportions. The\\nnew substance formed by the combination possesses\\nproperties very different from its elementary parts.\\nMill, Essays on Religion, p. 133; Bowne, Philosophy of\\nTheism, p. 64. The heavens are crystallized mathematics;\\ncrystals are solid geometry; laws of force are numerical;\\nMcCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 128, sq. Thomas\\nHill, Geometry and Faith, A Supplement to the IXth Bridge-\\nwater Treatise; J. Dimon, The Theistic Argument, p. 103;\\nDuke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 73; St. Aug. de Lib. Arb., 1. IL\\nFor invariable laws in the smallest particles of matter.\\nWurtz, The Atomic Theory; McCosh, Method of Divine Gov-\\nernment, p. 117.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "238 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nNevertheless in combination the original elements are\\nnot destroyed. When the compound is dissolved, they\\nreappear with their native properties and activities.\\nThus two parts of Hydrogen combine with one part of\\nOxygen to form water. The compound is a liquid;\\nthe composing elements are gases, which reappear\\nwhen a voltaic current is passed through water.\\nThe Science of Acoustics is founded on the perceived\\nrelation between sound and number. Optics is\\nexpressed in laws relating to angles and numbers; the\\nangles of reflection, of incidence, the powers of refrac-\\ntion are set forth in numerical tables. So likewise the\\nlaw of gravitation, the laws of Kepler are those of\\nform and number. Thus Astronomy is applied Mathe-\\nmatics In all physical investigations we find geo-\\nmetrical symmetry and arithmetical proportions.**\\nboth or- 15. Organic Chemistry presents Combinations\\nganic and r 1 mi\\ninorganic, which are a constant source of wonder. The same\\nelements enter into the formation of substances which\\nhave different or even contradictory properties; thus^\\ne. g., sugar differs but little from the potato in the\\nchemical analysis. The same elements are found in\\nboth, but the proportion is slightly different. So also\\nTea and Strychnia differ not in the elements, but only\\nin the proportion according to which the elements\\ncombine. The former substance is an article of food,\\na pleasing stimulant, soothes after severe labor and\\nhelps to sustain life. The latter is a deadly poison,\\nparalyzes the nerves and almost instantaneously brings\\nthe rigor and pallor of death to the animal frame.\\nThere is no chance in these combinations. If so,\\nwhat confusion would ensue, and how frail would be\\nCf. McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 117; St. Aug.\\nin proving the existence of God again and again appeals to\\nnumbers. De Lib. Arbitrio, 1. II.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0260.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 239\\nthe tenure of life! The proportions, however, though\\nvery fine, are stable and constant, as is shown from\\nthe science and practice of Medicine. Thus diet can\\nbe regulated or changed as bodily needs require, and\\nspecial compounds can be prescribed as medicines for\\nparticular ailments.\\n16. More marvelous still is the fact that the ele- Physics,\\nmentary or simple substances are so few in number\\nwhen compared to the great number of their products.\\nOut of this small number the myriad varieties of inor-\\nganic and organic matter are formed. Physics is a\\nscience which deals with the movements of material\\nbodies. It collects data of the various physical\\nmotions, investigates their modes of action and tries\\nto simplify them by a reduction to law. Hence we\\nhave the laws of motion, of hydraulics, of heat, etc.\\nThey enter into the course of study in our schools.\\nAll the mechanical contrivances which make life so\\npleasant are based upon or are applications of these\\ntruths. The ingenuity of man cannot surpass the\\nworks of nature in precision, intricacy and detail. The\\nsteam-engine speeding along the rails at the rate of a\\nmile a minute, is yet under the firm control of will that jj^flygnj,gto\\nholds the throttle. In like manner behind the forces ^[^J^\\nof nature there is a will which guides and controls all.^^\\n17. Thus the existence of law in the physical world God s gov-\\n_-.. ernmentin\\ngives some conception of the ways of Divme Provi- the physical\\ndence. God governs the material world through the\\nThus Bacon holds that the inductive inquiry into the nat-\\nural causes that maybe found by our Penses within the material\\npart of the universe, and which are the established conditions\\nof the changes that go on around us, so far from dissolving\\nfaith in a dominant providence, should only make those most\\ndevoted to scientific investigation see more clearly than others\\ndo, that full intellectual satisfaction even is not to be attained\\nwithout recognition of the invisible providence of God in the\\nnatural evolution. Eraser, Theism, p. 81.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0261.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "240\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nLaw in or-\\nganic\\nworld.\\nBiology.\\nphysical law. The marvelous contrivances into which\\nthese laws enter point to a directing and governing\\nmind.\\nIII.\\nThe Organic World.\\ni8. The same uniformity of law which reigns\\nsupreme in the material universe is also found in the\\nworld of living beings. This sphere is not unknown\\nto science. At the present time it holds a leading\\nplace in scientific investigation. Biology is yet in\\ncomparative infancy and a wide scope is open for\\nfurther research. Nevertheless the data already col-\\nlected throv/ much light upon the growth of the organ-\\nism. Biology investigates the conditions and laws of\\norganic development. The origin of life is a problem\\nwhich can never be solved by physical science. Not\\nso the laws of life. They can come under careful\\nobservation and be classified. Thus we find that the\\nliving being does not spring instantly into maturity.\\nIts growth is gradual and according to fixed laws. The\\nlaws of nutrition, of assimilation, the phenomena of\\natavism and of sterility, the influence of environment\\nhave been studied and their manner of working care-\\nfully noted.\\n19. These laws may vary in their working by rea-\\nson of the different nature of the living being. Thus,\\ne. g., nutrition in the plant is not carried on in the\\nsame way as in the animal. This difference, hov^^ever,\\nis one of many and does not destroj^ the essential truth\\nwhich prevails throughout the organic knigdom, viz.,\\nthat growth is attained through nutrition.\\n^6 Aug. de Civ. Dei, 1. VIII, ch. 6; 1. X, ch. 4: Confess., 1. X,\\nch, 6; de Lib. Arbit., I. II, ch. 17; de Vera Relig., ch. 29; de\\nGen. ad. Lit., 1. 8, ch. 23-26; Cicero, de Nat. Deor,, 1. II;\\nAthanasius, C. Gentes; Plato, Laws, B. X.\\nBowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 68; Aug. ep. 137, n. 8.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0262.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 241\\n20. If we seek a knowledge of the human organism ^^^p^^-\\nwe go to the sciences of Anatomy and Physiology, oiogj.\\nThe former investigates the structure, the latter the\\nfunctions of human life. The marvelous adaptation\\ntherein revealed is the result of definite laws combined\\naccording to some fixed plan. This combination takes\\nplace with a view to definite needs of life. The\\nadaptation of structure to fulfill some special purpose,\\nor to discharge some special function is a fact which\\nfor ages has filled the thoughtful mind with wonder.\\nNot only do we find it exemplified in the eye and the\\near, but also in every part of the human frame. The\\nlungs, the throat, the stomach, the phenomena of\\nrespiration, of deglutition, of digestion, the skin, the\\ncovering of the teeth, the bones, the very words in\\nwhich we express thought, are all striking illustrations.\\nThey speak of wisdom adapting and combining means\\nfor special ends.\\n21. Let us turn to the study of animal life. Com-\\nparative anatomy gives the data. We find the animal\\nfitted by nature with special means to preserve\\nlife. It has its own weapons of offense and defense.\\nNot one is left unprotected. These means are not\\nall of the same kind. They have not been manu-\\nfactured by any human art; they are the en-\\ndowment of nature and more wonderful than human\\ningenuity could supply. Let us take an illus-\\ntration.\\n22. To Solomon, the wisest of men, the flight of spedaiii-\\nan eagle through the air was something he could not\\nunderstand. Modern science has been able to explain\\nthe fact, but the explanation does not in the least\\nlessen the wonder; on the contary, our admiration is\\nheightened. The laws of gravitation and of atmos-\\npheric resistance, which seem contrary to the possibility\\n16", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0263.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "242 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nof flight, are the very ones by which flight is accom-\\nplished.^\u00c2\u00ae\\n(a) flight of 23. (a) Birds are heavier than the air; if they were\\nlighter, they might float like a balloon, they could not\\nfly. By the law of gravitation, therefore, they should\\nfall to the earth. But another law is brought into play\\nwhich neutralizes the effects of gravitation. This law\\nis the resisting force of the atmosphere. The resisting\\npower acts equally in all directions. In order that the\\nlaw of gravitation be counteracted, atmospheric con-\\nditions must be overcome. This is accomplished when\\nthe body capable of flight presents its maximum\\nsurface to the resistance of the air in the perpendicular\\ndirection and its minimum in the horizontal direction.\\nThe conditions are fulfilled in the anatomy of the bird,\\ne. g.^ by the broad surface of the expanded wing and\\nthe narrow edge as it speeds through the air. But this\\nis not sufficient. A bird motionless with outspreading\\nwings will fall slowly to the ground. The wings do\\nmore than balance the law of gravitation. They strike\\nthe air downwards with such violence that a reaction\\nupwards results. Hence the law of the elasticity of the\\nair and its reacting power against compression.\\n24. That the wings should strike the air so that\\nreaction follows, the wing-muscles m.ust be strong,\\ncompact, of special form and not too heavy. Other-\\nwise the weight of the bird would bring it quickly to\\nthe ground. Hence the strokes of the wings of most\\nbirds are too rapid to be counted. The compression\\nof air in the stroke is achieved by the feathers, quills,\\nand small amount of bone. Again, the conformation\\nof the wing prevents the upward from naturalizing the\\ndownv/ard stroke. Hence we have the convex upper\\nsurface and the concave downward surface. The\\nMartineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 279, sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0264.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 243\\ndifference in power between the two is illustrated in\\nthe umbrella. How much more difficult it is to pull an\\noutstretched umbrella down than to push it upwards!\\nBesides the feathers underlap so that in the downward\\nstroke they present an air-tight surface; whereas in\\nthe upward stroke, they separate and permit the air\\nto escape.\\n25. The problem of flight is not yet solved. Birds\\nmove in a forward direction. A study of this fact\\nopens up another chapter in adaptative structure.\\nThe wing-feathers are set backwards, in the direc-\\ntion opposite to flight. At the base the feathers are\\nstrong and firmly fixed; at the end they are flexible.\\nThus the air compressed by the downward motion of\\nthe wing cannot escape upwards because the feathers\\nunderlap and are air-tight, nor can it escape forwards\\nbecause the front edge of the wing is hard and rigid.\\nIts easiest manner of escape, therefore, is backv/ards\\nand in so doing it lifts the elastic ends of the feathers\\ncommunicating, as it passes along the wing, a forward\\npush to the body. Thus the same volume of air not\\nonly sustains the bird s weight against the force of\\ngravity but imparts also a forward impulse. The bird\\nis therefore sustained and propelled by the same\\nstroke.\\n26. (b) A most interesting study in Natural History (b) means\\nis that which deals with the weapons of offense and Cfg^iifl!\\ndefense employed by animals, either in securing food\\nor in warding off hostile attacks. No living being,\\nhowever small and insignificant, is left defenseless or\\nunprovided. The Author of Nature has provided for\\nall, has given to all the means of sustaining life.\\nThese means are varied. In illustration the attention\\nof the reader is drawn to a phenomenon very curious\\nDuke of Argyll, Reign of Law, ch. III.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0265.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "244 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nindeed, but ver}^ interesting not only from a scientific\\npoint of view, but as an illustration of the workings of\\nDivine Providence. Allusion is made to the phenomena\\nof adapted color for the purpose of concealment.\\nassimilated 8 2 7. The phenomena of assimilated color do not\\ncolor.\\ntake place by accident. We find therein strong evi-\\ndence of purpose and design. It is certain from careful\\nobservation that a natural law governs the process.\\nThe nature of that law, its scope and manner of work-\\ning, have not yet been put to scientific examination.\\nOur present knowledge justifies the inference that the\\nlaw goes into operation only upon the presence of\\ncertain conditions. The combination of these con-\\nditions are indicative of purpose. Thus we know that\\nthe law does not exist in animals which possess other\\nmeans of avoiding danger and only in those animals\\nwhich otherwise would be an easy prey to natural\\nenemies. The law of concealment affects color or\\nstructure. Some animals, e. g.^ the grouse, ptarmigan,\\nwoodcock, exhibit a change in the color of their plum-\\nage. In summer they can hardly be distinguished from\\nthe grass and the foliage of trees and shrubbery. In\\nwinter, however, their feathers are like the driven\\nsnow. That the change is due to organic causes is\\nshown from the fact that it is gradual and natural, like,\\ne. g., the phenom.ena of moulting, and varies with the\\nseasons. Other animals show the phenomena of con-\\ncealment in structure. The Mantidae, e. g., are very\\nmuch like a vegetable growth. With utmost difficulty\\nthey can be distinguished from a leaf or vegetable\\nmatter. The special adaptation of structure as of color\\nis designed for a special purpose. What stronger evi-\\ndence of divine wisdom could be found\\n28. The traces of Divine Providence are therefore\\nvisible throughout the range of organic life. The", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0266.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 245\\nscope of the present work does not permit an exhaus-\\ntive detail. Volumes could be written in support of\\nthe position maintained. Illustrations are to be found\\non every page of Natural History, of Comparative\\nAnatomy, of Physiology, of Biology, of Botany, of\\nLinguistics. The present aim is to establish certain\\nprinciples. These are (a) the existence of laws in the\\norganic kingdom; (b) the adaptation of manifold con-\\nditions convergmg to obtain definite results. The\\nformer shows the method of divine government which\\nprevails in the organic world as a whole. The latter\\nproves the existence of a Divine Providence over every\\nliving thing, from the smallest and most insignificant\\neven to the highest form of organic Ufe.^\\nIV.\\nDifficulties.\\n29, The line of reasoning is scientific and cogent.\\nThe data are drawn from the verified facts of science.\\nThe interpretation is in accord with scientific methods.\\nAnother aspect of the problem can now be considered.\\nIt is the logical sequence of what has preceded. Its\\nforce at first sight negative, in reality adds very much\\nto the argument, by strengthening apparently weak\\nplaces and by imparting solidity and thoroughness to\\nthe whole.\\n30. It might be objected that the conclusion drawn\\nis more certain and universal than is warranted by a\\ncandid examination of the facts. Are there not, it is\\nurged, evident signs of misgovernment in the universe?\\nHow then can we legitimately infer that an All-wise\\nProvidence guideth all things?\\nMcCosh, Method of Divine Government, pp. 11-26.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0267.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "246 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nstated 31. Before an effort be made to face the difficulty,\\nit is wise and even necessary to know the ground on\\nwhich we stand. A calm and judicious estimate can\\nthen be made of the issue. Let us grant that there are\\nevidences of disorder in the physical and in the organic\\nworld. At the same time the evidences for order and\\npurpose are certain and cannot be denied. The former\\ndo not render the latter of no value. On the contrary,\\nthe indications of confusion are very few in compari-\\nson with the facts of purpose and appear, therefore, as\\ndifficulties or exceptions to a well-grounded line of\\nreasoning. Thus the more patent fact is order and\\npurpose. This can only be explained by the existence\\nof a creative and governing mind. For the tendency\\nto order and adaptation is not something externally\\nbestowed upon objects; it springs from and is founded\\nin their intimate constitution. Only a mind that\\ncreated and constituted the things could implant the\\norder whose traces are so visible and marked. In face\\nof this fact the difficulties adduced are few and of\\nminor importance. The presumption for a governing\\nmind is so strong that it cannot be shaken. Even\\nbefore the contrary facts are subjected to a searching\\nanalysis, there is a strong antecedent probability that\\nthey can be explained in the light of the main argument.\\n(c)pertur- 32. (a) It is true that traces of disorder are found\\nStella? ITni- in the planetary system. The moons of Jupiter, the\\nmotion of Uranus, are well-known examples. But it\\nwould be poor logic to infer from these facts that the\\ngovernment of the stellar universe is imperfect. The\\nharmony and order among the heavenly bodies is an\\nevident fact of ordinary and scientific observation.\\nThe interpretation of this order in the form of a theory\\nis something very different from the order itself. Our\\ninterpretations may be weak and imperfect. Every", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0268.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 247\\nday discoveries are made which constrain the mind to\\nalter or throw aside scientific hypothesis. Science\\ngains by the change and nature itself is presented in\\na simpler and more wonderful light.\\nSo too in Astronomy. The signs of disorder (a) as-\\nare viewed in the light of the nebular theory proposed\\nby La Place. Now this theory is not well established;\\nit is unable to account for all the facts. Hence we\\nfind a disposition among scientific men to propose a\\nnew explanation. Prof. Faye has made the attempt.\\nThus the objection fades away in the light of more\\nrecent research. The difficulties are due to a con-\\ntracted view of nature. They enter as harmonious\\nfacts into a larger and truer generalization.\\n8 ZA. The pleasure seeker in our northern woods is(b) meteor-\\nology.\\noften puzzled by the changes of weather. He sets\\nforth in the morning with a clear and bright sky. The\\nwaters of the mountain lake are calm and placid.\\nSuddenly the heavens are overcast, the wind strikes the\\nwater, the waves pitch and seethe as in a tempest.\\nThe storm is of short duration and all is quiet and\\nbright again. In the Alpine regions, where the\\nmountain peaks tower on every side, these storms\\nclothe the scenery with an aspect of grandeur. In the\\nsoft warm sunlight which follows, the glories of the\\nJungfrau shine resplendent. The storms that sweep\\nour eastern coast, the blizzards that devastate the\\nWestern prairies, the hurricanes of the ocean are\\nsimilar phenomena on a grander scale.\\n35. In the wide range of Nature there is nothing\\nmore indicative of confusion and disorder. Language\\nfails to picture our impressions of the scene. We\\nspeak of the elements let loose in a wild and senseless\\nrage. In illustration we instance man so filled with\\nL Origine du Monde, ch. X.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0269.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "248 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\npassion as to be no longer under the guidance of reason.\\nBut strange to say there is order and law in the storm.\\nIn every large city throughout the land there are\\nweather-bureaus which note the conditions of the\\natmosphere and indicate the changes soon to happen.\\nFacts are gathered, compared and classified. The laws\\nwhich guide their play come out every day more plainly\\nand are subject to verification. As yet Meteorology\\nis in its infancy, nevertheless the broad groundwork of\\na science is there detected and constant investigation\\npoints to the near future when another department of\\nnature will be intelligible to men. Modern science,\\ntherefore, can in the words of the Hebrew Psalmist, point\\nto One who rides the whirlwind and rules the storm.\\n^^liifcKine- 3^ objections against our argument\\ndom. drawn from the organic kingdom seem very formida-\\nble. Upon examination we shall find this to be due to\\nexaggeration and to a partial view of the facts. A dis-\\ntorted truth is an error of the most dangerous kind.\\nA common and radical fault with some minds is the\\ninability to study facts impartially. They seem bent\\non swerving to extremes. One explanation seems\\nplausible and is presented without regard to others\\nwhich are equally or more so. This is the chief diffi-\\nculty in the present problem. If we grasp this we shall\\nbe prepared for a candid examination of the facts.\\n^?ih^\u00c2\u00b0of 27 there are many instances\\nBature. where intention has been frustrated. In proof atten-\\ntion is called to the prodigality of Nature in the pro-\\nduction of seeds. On all sides we behold a lavish\\nwaste. In the flowers of the garden, shrubbery, grain,\\ntrees, we see the same foolish expenditure.\\nFinding that of fifty seeds\\nShe often brings but one to bear.*\\nIn Memoriam, LV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0270.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 249\\n38. In putting the objection to the test of criticism, criticism,\\nit is necessary to separate the fact from the inference.\\nThe fact is that a few seeds comparatively bear fruit\u00e2\u0080\u009e nature very\\n_ compu-\\nThe inference drawn is that there is a frustration of cated.\\npurpose. Facts well authenticated cannot be disputed.\\nWe are at liberty, however, to question an inference\\nand a conscientious regard for truth demands that we\\ndo so when just grounds are had. So in the present\\ncase. The order of nature is very complicated and\\nvery partially understood.\\n8 30. To make a bold assertion in real ignorance of (2) acts\\n1 ,1 r r have more\\nthe question is to advance beyond the region of fact than one\\n_, purpose.\\ninto that of pure conjecture. To insist upon one\\nexplanation to the disregard of others is the sign of a\\nbiased and illogical mind. As in the solar system the\\nexceptions indicated by the hypothesis of La Place fit\\nin most harmoniously with the theory of Faye.^* In\\nview of the fact that purpose is universal in Nature,\\nwhy may not the results which appear as exceptions to\\none purpose, be rather the fulfillments of another?\\nThere is no ground whatsoever for holding that an act\\nhas one purpose or intention only. The analogy of a\\nwide experience declares the contrary and is constantly\\nstrengthened by the results of scientific investigation.\\nI^ g-j give an alms with the two-fold intention of\\npleasing God and of relieving a worthy indigent. The\\nseeds of grain so abundant on the stalk have not one\\npurpose only, viz., reproduction; they minister to our\\nwants and form an important article of food. The\\nluxuriant vegetation of the Carboniferous age, at first\\nsight a magnificent waste, enters into our coal-beds,\\nand supplies us with fuel and warmth. How unfortu-\\n2 Butler s Analogy, ch. IV.\\nL Origine du Monde,\\nProf. Jevons, Principles of Science, vol. II, p. 468.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0271.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "250 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nnate that we live so close to our surroundings Objects\\nrun together and intermingle. Only the superficial\\nand narrow relations of particular things impress the\\nmind. If we could withdraw a little distance, the\\nharmony and majesty of Nature s plan would come\\nout in clear light, the relations of particular objects to\\nthe great whole could then be grasped, and in the\\nperception all small differences would sink away.^\\nceiveifreia 4\u00c2\u00b0 perceivc a relation does not imply that\\ntionisnot all Contained in the relation is also known. The many\\nto perceive _\\nall con- particular elements and their intimate connection, are\\ntamed m\\nthe relation, disclosed Only after long and serious study. In like\\nmanner we may perceive intention and yet fail to see\\nall that is intended. Nature presents a concatenation\\nof causes and effects. Everything has an influence of\\nsome kind on its environment and is modified in turn.\\nNot only are natural things viewed as causes and\\neffects; they likewise are means and ends. The\\nimperfect state of scientific knowledge may often lead\\nus to consider as ends what in reality are means. To\\nrest in the knowledge of a proximate purpose and to\\nforget or neglect the existence of a more remote, is\\nto fail at grasping the scientific truth that a natural\\nobject has varied relations and may serve various\\nends.\\n(3)inani- S 41. Another difficulty is drawn from animal life.\\nmallife.\\nComparative Anatomy reveals structures without any\\ne. g. useless apparent purpose. The phenomena of rudimentary\\norgans.\\norgans is a standing objection to the prevalence of\\npurpose. How then, we are asked, can these facts be\\nreconciled with the existence of an all-wise Providence?\\ncnticism. g ^2. An answer to this objection can be found in the\\nvery source from which it has been taken. Comparative\\nW. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, pp. 208-213.\\n5^ Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, ch. IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0272.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "PROVIDENCE. 251\\nAnatomy tells of rudimentary organs but does not posi- J^g_\\nlively assert that they are without purpose. The latter Jj.\\nis an inference based on narrow and partial views. ence.\\n43. Rudimentary organs are not without place or (2) can be\\nrelation in organic life. They reveal the existence\\nof a great plan. Homology of structure is a fact\\nof science. The science of Biology is yet in its\\ninfancy. The phenomena of life-development have\\nnot yet been thoroughly investigated. Our knowledge\\nis therefore limited. Enough is known, however, to\\njustify us in viewing these organs in a wider relation,\\ni. e., to the general type. On this ground we can con-\\nsider them in reference to the past or to the future.\\nThey indicate either what has been or what is yet to\\nbe It is true that particular parts of the organism\\nare of no apparent use to the particular animals. But\\nwhen viewed in relation to the general type, we find\\nthat no one part is useless to all. Throughout animal\\nlife the vertebrate type prevails. At the same time\\nthere is a marvelous adaptability of this type to\\nthe variety of animal life. The fact simply is stated.\\nNo effort is at present made to assign reasons or\\ntheories. Rudimentary organs should be viewed in\\ntheir relations to the general plan of organic life. If\\nso, can we say that they are of no value? Does science\\naffirm that they are altogether useless? May we not\\nview them as factors in a larger plan and a wider pur-\\npose? Science does not gainsay; on the contrary,\\nurges us to do so.^^\\nHuxley shows that it is almost impossible to prove that\\nany structure however rudimentary is useless, and answers\\nHaeckel with the dilemma: either these rudiments are of no use\\nand they ought to have disappeared, or they are of some use\\nand are no arguments against teleology. Dr. Gildea, Is There\\nEvidence of Design in Nature, in Proceedings of Aristotelian\\nSociety, 1889-90, p. 51.\\nJanet, Final Causes, p. 149, sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0273.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "252 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(3)sou\u00c2\u00ab:eof g The difficulty, therefore, fades away in the\\nties not in brighter lisfht of Scientific progrcss. As before in the\\nnature but r fe\\nour inter- material and plant kingdoms, it has its source not in\\npretations\\nof nature, nature, but in our own interpretations of Nature.\\nLarger knowledge and deeper research are the true\\nsolvents of Nature s mysteries. Not that the mind\\ncan hope to grasp all; something will yet remain diffi-\\ncult to understand; nevertheless past experience and\\nthe consciousness of doubts removed will caution us\\nnot to be precipitate and impose our own short-sighted\\nconclusions as the result of careful and exact investi-\\ngation.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0274.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIII.\\nPRAYER.\\nI. Man is the highest and noblest creature in the\\nvisible universe. Endowed with intelligence and free-\\nwill he possesses the characteristic privilege of rational\\nintercourse with his fellows. In his spiritual nature,\\nmade to the image and likeness of God, his soul\\ninstinctively turns to his Maker in aspirations of\\nworship, of hope and of intercession. The relation\\nbetween God and man is far different from that which\\nexists betweeen God and the lower creation. The\\nelement of intelligence is there found. This reveals a\\nspecial aspect of Divine Providence. A question is\\nthus presented of peculiar interest in itself and of vital\\nimportance at the present time. Its solution is neces-\\nsary to obtain a true notion of God; and by certain\\nleaders of scientific thought it has been made an issue\\nin the conflict between religion and unbelief,\\n8 2. The question is two-fold; it concerns God and The\\n/-111- problem.\\nman. Can man pray to God and m answer to prayer,\\ndoes God exercise a special providence over man? In\\nreality it is resolved into a discussion on the physical\\neffects of prayer. Christian Philosophy answers in the\\naffirmative and points to divine interference in the\\nform of special providences and miracles.\\n3, Prayer is not treated in its full theological bear- viz. physi-\\nings. Only one aspect is considered, viz., its relation of prayen\\nto physical science. The purpose is to investigate the\\nstatement whether science has shown the utter\\nabsurdity of any interference on the part of God in\\nanswer to our prayers.\\n[253]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0275.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "254 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n4. God and man are two great facts. The relation\\nof the soul to its maker is religion. This was the pur-\\npose of Christ s coming, of His life and death. He\\ntells of God and also of man. He gathered and\\nexpressed in simple words our natural duties and to\\nthese added the truths He found in the bosom of the\\nFather.^ Man is to know, love and to serve God.\\nBut he must do this in Christ Jesus. The expression\\nof this knowledge, love and service is called worship.\\nThe soul of v/orship is prayer.\\nI.\\nThe Fact.\\nwhat is g 5. Prayer springs from the knowledge of God and\\nthe needs of our souls. It is the elevation of the mind\\nto God. So universal and so natural is the act of\\nprayer that it seems an instinct and part of our being.^\\nAs we open the eyes of the body to the light, so do we\\nraise the soul to God. Between God and the soul\\nthere is a constant intercourse. God acts on the soul;\\nthis IS called His grace. The soul receives God s\\ngrace, co-operates with it and looks up to Him; this is\\nprayer. In prayer the soul raises itself to the pres-\\nence-chamber of God and speaks to Him in direct and\\nfamiliar converse as if there were no other creature in\\nthe wide world.\\nits place in \u00c2\u00a76, Hencc uo uoblcr exercise of the soul; none\\na christian\\n^e. giving more honor to God or drawing down greater\\nblessings. In prayer we look up on high to our Father,\\nthe source and beginning of our being, the hope of an\\nendless blessedness. We thus lead a life which we\\nhope to continue after death in company of angels and\\nsaints who live in the vision and contemplation of God.\\nJohn. T-18.\\n2 Duke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 448.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0276.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 255\\nWe are not alone in the world. Life is made up of\\nfriendships, of the mutual exchange of kindness, love\\nand devotion. Now in prayer we hold converse with\\nGod. We exercise towards Him the virtues of faith,\\nhope, love, sorrow, gratitude, child-Uke devotion.\\nAgain, friendship with the great and good puts at our\\ncommand their wealth and influence. But prayer is\\nthe privilege of God s friends, and as the Holy Fathers\\ntell us, is the key which unlocks the treasures of heaven.\\nNay, more, in dealing with men, God chooses to act\\nafter the manner of men. Hence prayer is the\\nappointed means in His providence by which men are\\ncalled to win eternal crowns. It is called the channel\\nof God s grace to the soul. In prayer we lay open to\\nHim our needs, tell Him of our trials, dangers, tempta-\\ntions; and through prayer, light, strength, hope and\\ncomfort come. A life without prayer is dwarfed and\\nimperfect; and is so through our own fault.\\n8 7. In the Holv Bible the necessity, power and con- prayer in\\n_, The Bible.\\nditions of prayer are set forth in many ways. The\\nprayers of Abraham,^ of Moses,* of Anna,^ of Job are\\nvery beautiful. Every shade and feeling of the soul is\\nexpressed in the Psalms. But we go to Jesus for our\\nprayer. His was a life of continual prayer and converse\\nwith the Father. He was not ahvays occupied in teach-\\ning or in working miracles or in deeds of mercy, but He\\nwas always praying.\\nII.\\nTheory of Modern Science.\\n8. Modern scientists of a certain school recognize Modern\\nthe universal fact of prayer. The impulse to pray is attack\\ntoo deeply imbedded in the human soul, finds expres- p\\nGen. 18-23.\\nExod. 32-10.\\nI Kings 1-12.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0277.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "256\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(i) Mr.\\nTyndall s\\nposition.\\n(a) neces-\\nsary char-\\nacter of\\nnatural\\nlaws.\\nsion in too persistent a manner and enters too inti-\\nmately into the life of the race, to be erased by a mere\\nstroke of the pen. Educated in an atmosphere of\\nscepticism, openly antagonistic or at least indifferent\\nto the claims of religious belief, their general turn of\\nmind and tone of thought leads them to invent and to\\nexaggerate the objections against the Theistic position.\\nApparently frank and ingenuous in word and in method\\nof treatment they would convey the impression of a\\nsincere and impartial mind. That they are conscien-\\ntious is not the subject of discussion. The purpose\\nonly is expressed to treat them as such, and to employ\\nin discussing their words the same spirit of candor and\\nimpartiality which they habitually claim as their glory\\nand justification.\\n9. (i) Mr. Tyndall views the subject of prayer\\nfrom the standpoint of physical science. The strong\\nand secure basis of his inference is the necessary\\ncharacter of natural laws. To him the undeviating\\nuniformity of sequence between consequent and ante-\\ncedent makes the association of both inseparable in\\nthought. In a question of fact experience is the best\\nand sole guide. The strict adherence of this method\\nhas raised modern science to its present preeminence\\nand given to its conclusions a strength and cogency\\nwhich can in vain be assailed. Now a divine interfer-\\nence with the course of nature in answer to prayer is\\nrendered unbelievable by scientific experience. If\\nGod should answer our prayer for physical benefits or\\nto ward off physical calamities, the interposition would\\nassume the form of a physical fact and as such fall\\nAs the Duke of Argyll says: In prayer the question is\\nwhether the reign of law does not preclude the possibility of\\nWill affecting the successive phenomena either of matter or of\\nmind. Reign of Law, p. 63.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0278.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 257\\nunder the tests of experience. Bat the explicit testi-\\nmony of experience is in favor of the necessity and\\ninviolability of natural law. Hence to admit that\\nprayer has a physical effect upon the natural sequence (b) prayer\\nof phenomena would force the mind to admit a contra- denial of\\nthis.\\ndiction. A common testimony, viz., experience, would\\nbear witness to the truth of two opposite and irrecon-\\ncilable facts.\\n\u00c2\u00a710, The inference drawn is against the efScacy of (c) hence\\nprayer. To him a rejection of the inviolable uni- rejected,\\nformity of natural lav/ is a contention too inconceivable\\nfor thought. The evidence in its favor is too strong;\\nits relation to modern scientific progress too funda-\\nmental to be questioned. The only alternative is to\\nreject the contrary hypothesis. Only where, he\\nwrites, the antecedents of a calamity are vague or\\ndistant is it that men think of resorting to prayer to\\nadvert it. Thus prayer has its source in ignorance,\\nand is never employed where our knowledge of the\\nfacts is complete. Then scientific means are resorted\\nto and we look to science, not to God, for help and\\nassistance.\\n\u00c2\u00a711. (2) It does not follow that prayer is of no value (2) true\\nwhatsoever. Modern science has only restricted its priyen^\\nefficacy within certain limits. It is absurd, we are\\ntold, to pray for physical benefits, nevertheless prayer\\nis not without beneficial effect. It is an element in the\\ndevelopment of moral life. Just as I, e. g., by going\\nthrough a course of physical culture will develop the\\nmuscles and become strong. The only advantage\\nFrag, of Scien. Reflec. on Prayer and Natural Law. Justin\\nMartyr says that the Sophists of his time seek to convince us\\nthat the Divinity extends his care to the great whole and to the\\n-several kinds, but not to you or to me, not to men as indi-\\nviduals. Hence it is useless to pray to Him; for everything\\noccurs according to the unchangeable law of an endless series.\\nNeander, vol. I, p, 9.\\n17", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0279.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "258 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nwhich results is the effect of the activity upon the\\nbodily constitution. In like manner prayer gives a\\nspecial tone and strength to character. It is an\\nimportant factor in the culture of the moral life. The\\nman who prays, even though the prayer may never\\nhave obtained a physical effect, yet carries about with\\nhim the fruit of prayer. It is seen in the deepening of\\nspiritual life, in the elevated tone of thought, in the\\nstrength and nobility of high endeavor, in the atmos-\\nphere of sweetness and light which ever seems to\\naccompany him.^\\n12. This theory is not confined to men of science.\\nIt has invaded the pulpit and is preached as the true\\ndoctrine of Christianity. Mr. Tyndall thinks it a\\nwholesome sign for England that she numbers among\\nher clergy men who are wise enough to understand all\\nthis and courageous enough to act up to their knowl-\\nedge. In their hands it is proposed as an aspect in\\nthe Gospel of modern culture.\\ncriticism. 13. (i) In the following section, where the\\n(i) in gene- problem of Special Providence is investigated, a de-\\ntailed examination of this theory will be found. At\\npresent it suffices to indicate the general line of\\ncriticism.\\n(2)neces- 1 4. (2) The necessity and inviolability of physical\\nphysical law are ambiguous tcrms. They require explanation.\\nPrayer is no more a begging for favors or an act of inter-\\ncession. Supplication for outward benefits has given place to\\npetition for spiritual gifts and this to pure aspiration, the desire\\nfor excellence. Recollect, and Impress., O. B. Frothingham,\\np, 296.\\nDrobisch and Herbart teach that while God is Father by\\nreason of creation in the beginning, He now leaves mankind in\\nthe deepest silence as if he no longer had any part in them.\\nPfleiderer, Phil, of Relig., vol. II, p. 226.\\nFragments of Science, 1, c.\\nDuke of Argyll, The Philosophy of Belief, p. 466.\\n^2 Fisher, Faith and Rationalism, p. 128, sq.\\nIf it be true that laws are invariable, it is not less true that", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0280.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 259\\nTo base a theory upon ambiguous phrases is illogical;\\nbut to take advantage of the ambiguity, at least uncon-\\nsciously, with a view to exaggerate and give iron-bound\\nstrength to a favored position is a reflection both on\\nthe reasoning powers of the advocate and on the intel-\\nlectual capacity of the reader. Furthermore the\\nuniformity of nature is no obstacle to free-will in\\nworking out its purposes; on the contrary, it is\\nthe condition absolutely necessary that the will may\\ncarry out its purposes and lend the energies of nature\\nto its sway.\\n15- (3) Again, the conservation of energy is no(3)conser-\\nt V X o vation of\\ndifficulty in the problem of prayer. Scientific experi- energy,\\nment has shown that it does not prevent the interfer-\\nence of free-will either on the movements of the body\\nor on the forces of nature. Therefore we can reason\\na pari to divine interference.\\n\u00c2\u00a716. (4) The view of Mr. Tyndall is partial and (4) theory is\\nexclusi \\\\^e. To him the world is a physical aggregate.\\nNow there is both 2^ physical 2.ndi a moral order. The\\nformer is made up of physical forces and the principle\\nwhich prevails is that of necessity. The latter embraces\\na system of 7?ioral laws and the great principle is that of\\nliberty. The consideration of the physical order gives\\nrise to the mechanical theory; from the study of the\\nmoral order the teleological theory is formed. Just as\\nthe teleological view prevails over and rules the\\nmechanical, so the moral order prevails over and guides\\nthe physical. Hence the universal sway of mind and\\nwill which Mr. Tyndall himself recognized at the\\nclose of his Hfe.\\nthey are subject to endless variation. J. Dimon, The The-\\nistic Argument, p. 112.\\nDuke of Argyll, Philosophy of Belief, p. 464; Dr. Momerie,\\nOrigin of Evil, p. 239.\\nJanet, Traite Elementaire de Philosophie, p. 846.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0281.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "26o\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nprovi-\\ndences,\\nIII.\\nMiracles.\\nPrayer R 17. Christian Philosophy has ever taught that in\\nanswered\\nby miracles ans\\\\\u00c2\u00a5er to Draver God at times interferes with the\\nand special\\nordinary course of physical phenomena. As a result\\nparticular events happen otherwise than they should,\\nand are designated by the special title of miracles.\\nThe word miracle comes from the Latin 77iirari^\\nand signifies an event which excites wonder and\\nadmiration. This is so for two reasons, viz., the\\ncause is hidden, and the event is contrary to that we\\nshould expect.\\ni^. Notion.\\nmiracle.\\n(i) un-\\nknown\\ncause\\n(a) parti-\\nally.\\ni8. To have a clear conception of a miracle it is\\nnecessary to explain what is meant by a hidden or\\nunknown cause. The cause of an event may be\\nunknown in two ways; (a) either partially, to a\\ncertain number only. Thus, e. g., an uneducated man\\nsees wonderful things in every branch of science; he\\nknows not how they happen and he is unable to explain\\nor to trace them to a natural cause. In every sphere\\nof physical science he pauses in wonder before hidden\\nand unknown agencies. Not so, however, with the\\nlearned specialist. He has after laborious study pene-\\ntrated the secrets of natural phenomena. An eclipse\\nis predicted and described in detail by the astronomer.\\nThe wonders of electricty are explained by the student\\nof physics. Some modern writers, taking this meaning\\nof unknown, apply it to the present question. They\\nassert that miracles are the effects of natural unknown\\ncauses, that these causes daily come to our knowledge\\nAristotle, Metaph. I, ch. 2.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0282.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 261\\nwith the result that the sphere of the miraculous is\\nslowly but surely narrowing. They look to the time\\nwhen natural science shall have driven the miracle out\\nof court and regard it only as a relic of a by-gone\\nignorant age\\n19. (b) The cause may be hidden, however, in(b)un-\\nanother manner. This happens when the effect is of jzv\u00c2\u00ab//\u00c2\u00ab/^r.\\nsuch a character that either in substance or in the\\nmanner of occurrence it goes against scientific facts\\nor simply surpasses the known powers of nature.\\nThus, e. g.^ raising the dead to life, or the instantane-\\nous recovery of a mortally sick man are beyond scien-\\ntific explanation. In this case the cause is hidden not\\nto the uneducated only.^^ Science itself stands silent\\nand dumbfounded. It is powerless to give an explana-\\ntion. Science had nothing whatever to do with the\\nevents. They were wrought by other means, far out\\nof proportion to what was accomplished. This, there-\\nfore, is the meaning in which the term hidden or\\nunknown is employed. No effort is made to take\\nadvantage of an ambiguity; rather a definite and\\nrestricted meaning places the problem in clear light,\\nremoves all doubt and opens the way to a decisive\\nsolution.*\u00c2\u00ae\\nModus quo corporibus adhaeret spiritus comprehendi ab\\nhominibus non potest; et hoc tamen homo est. Augustine, de\\nCiv. Dei, 1. 21, ch. 10.\\nQuia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interum est cognita\\net a quibusdam incognita, inde contigit, quod videntium simul\\naliquem effectum aliqui non mirantar; astrologus enim non\\nmiratur videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam, ignarus\\nautem hujus scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans.\\nSic igitur est aliquid mirum quoad hunc, non autem quantum\\nad ilium, Illud ergo simpliciter occultum; et hoc sonat nomen\\nmiraculi, ut scilicet sit de se admiratione plenum non quoad\\nhunc vel quoad ilium tantum. Causa autem simpliciter occulta\\nomni homini est Deus. Ejus essentiam nuUus homo in statu\\nhujus vitae intellectu capere potest. St. Thomas, Sum.\\nTheoL, 1. q. 105, a. 7.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0283.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "262 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nIts true 20. The mind is now enabled to Sfrasp the true\\nnature or\\nconception of a miracle. By a miracle is understood a\\nphysical event which either substantially or in the\\nmanner of its occurrence exceeds the order and power\\neven? Created nature, (a) It is di physical QYQnt, i. e.^ an\\nevent which appeals to the senses and is known by the\\nsenses.\\n(b) extra- g 21. (b) It is an event which is above and beyond\\nordinary. c j\\nthe power or mere natural causes. This is the distinc-\\ntive character of a miracle. It is an extraordinary\\noccurrence. Not only is wonder aroused at the sight,\\nbut the cause completely baffles investigation. It is\\noften urged, especially by men of science, that we do\\nnot know all the laws of nature; therefore, in a particu-\\nlar case we are unable to decide that an event does not\\ntake place by the sole operation of these laws.^^ The\\nthat we do objection is more specious than well founded. It is\\nan the\u00c2\u00b0irws undoubtedly true that natural events have been termed\\nmiracles on hasty and insufficient evidence. Mistakes\\nhappen not only in ordinary daily life but even with\\nmen of learning. Our position is not in the least\\nweakened. How comes it that there is a deep-seated\\nconviction in the minds of men as to the possibility and\\nactual occurrence of true miraculous facts? This con-\\nviction is universal in time and in place. It springs\\nfrom and is a complement to the belief in God. Mis-\\ntakes do not destroy the belief. Facts well authenti-\\nanswer.\\ncated strengthen and confirm it. To these appeal is\\nmade. Our knowledge of natural laws is not exhaustive.\\nThough limited, the knowledge is nevertheless true.\\nThe Duke of Argyll praises Locke for holding that we can\\nnever know what is above nature unless we know all that is\\nwithin nature. Cf. Reign of Law, p. 25, and tells us the bound-\\naries of the natural are not known. P. 18.\\nDemus aliquid posse, quod nos fateamur investigare non\\nposse. In talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis.\\nAug. ep. 137, n. 8.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0284.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 263\\nWe know in particular instances their range and effi-\\nciency. Their properties and sphere of action are not\\naltogether an enigma. Thus, e. g., fire burns, natural\\nlaws cannot restore sight to the born blind, nor life\\nto the dead. When, therefore, in a particular case an\\nevent of the like nature comes to our knowledge, we\\nare justified in inferring that the cause is above nature\\nand that a miracle has taken place. It is not necessary\\nto know all the laws of nature. What is required is a\\nknowledge of the laws having a bearing upon the event\\nin question.\\n\u00c2\u00a722. (c) The event is extraordinary in two ways (c) either\\neither it substantially surpasses the power of natural laws stance or in\\nor simply in the ma7iner of its occurrence. Thus, e. g.^\\nthe glorification of the human body, the restoration of\\nlife to the dead, of sight to the born blind are events\\nwhich are entirely beyond the efficiency of natural\\nforces. Hence we say that the fact itself is a\\nmiracle, that the event itself is utterly beyond natural\\nefficiency.\\n23. Again, an event may be miraculous not so\\nmuch in what has happened as in the manner of its\\noccurrence. Thus, e. g.^ a man may be seriously ill\\nwith fever and immediately regain health; or a storm\\nmay take place instantly in a clear, cloudless sky.\\nThese events might occur in the natural course of\\nthings. Nature restores the sick, and condensation\\nof the atmosphere causes rain to fall. The miracle,\\nhowever, is in the manner of the happening. This is\\nso sudden, so startling that the ordinary course of\\nnature is interrupted and a power above physical law\\nis judged to interfere. The manner in which they take\\nplace is entirely different from the natural. Therefore\\nW. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, 112.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0285.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "264 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nwe are justified in concluding that another and differ-\\nent agency is at work.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Errors.\\n24. The problem of miracles is one of the leading\\nquestions of the time. Intimately connected with the\\nnotion of God, it enters into and forms an important\\nchapter in any discussion of Theism. Its opponents\\nhave held a leading position in literature and science.\\nThe productions in the defense have been no less bril-\\nliant and learned. The purpose of the latter is to show\\nthat God has a real interest in His creation, and in\\ndivers ways throughout history has given to men a\\npledge of His fatherly love. Taking issue with men\\nof different prepossessions and of various schools of\\nthought, their arguments assume a peculiar form and\\ntone. Sometimes it has happened that in the honest\\ndesire to conciliate an adversary they have taken a line\\nof reasoning which is a virtual surrender of their own\\nposition. A brief classification of erroneous teach-\\n2^ Excedit aliquid facultatem naturae tripliciter: uno modo\\nquantum ad sabstantiam facti, sicut quod duo corpora sint\\nsimul vel quod sol retrocedat, velquod corpus glorificetur, quod\\nnullo modo natura facere potest; et ista tenent summum\\ngradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit facultatem\\nnaturae non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id in quo\\nfit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum et illuminatio caecorum et\\nsimilia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo,\\net potest praestare visum, sed non in caeco; et haec tenent\\nsecundum locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid\\nfacultatem naturae, quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi.\\nSicut cum aliquis siibiio per virtutem divinam a febri curatur,\\nabsque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus; aut\\ncum status aeris divina virtute in pluvias densatur absque\\nnaturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad preces Samuelis et Eliae;\\nat hujusmodi tenent infirmum locum in miraculis. St.\\nThomas, Sum. Theol., 1. q. 105, a. 8.\\n^^W. Macintosh, DD., The Natural History of the Christian\\nReligion; Arthur K. Rogers, The Life and Teaching of Jesus;\\nOtto Pfleiderer, Gifford Lectures; Strauss, Life of Jesus; Renan,\\nLife of Jesus.\\nDuke of Argyll, in Reign of Law, ch. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0286.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 265\\ning, therefore, is of greatest importance to obtain a\\ntrue knowledge of the question under discussion.\\n\u00c2\u00a725. (a) Pantheists of every school unite in reject- (a) Pan-\\ning the possibility of a miracle. This is the logical\\nand consistent development of their fundamental\\nbelief. To them God is everything and everything is\\nGod. The divine is the only reality. We are a part\\nof its substance, or its passing shadows. The real-\\nistic Pantheism of Spinoza teaches that only one sub- Spinoza,\\nstance exists which manifests itself in the phenomena\\nof matter and of thought. This view obtains to a\\ngreat extent in modern science. Its most recent\\nexponent, Mr. Spencer, teaches that this substance is spencer.\\nthe unknowable, that its physical activities alone can\\nbe grasped by the mind, and to the evolution and\\ninterplay of these forces the phenomena of the entire\\nuniverse in all the grades of being and of life can be\\nreduced. Thus every event is the natural outcome of\\ndefinite antecedents. In appearance the doctrine is\\nPantheism; in reality it is Materialism.\\n26. Another form of Pantheism is the Idealism of Hegel.\\nHegel. To him there is only one being which evolves\\ninto the world of nature and of man. This being is\\nthe idea^ the tq fieri. The highest stage of the evolu-\\ntion is reached in human consciousness, where it\\nbecomes conscious of itself; in reality the human mind\\nis but a phase of the divine; at the basis there is no\\ndistinction; we have the consciousness of the divine,\\ninasmuch as the divine reaches consciousness in us.\\n27. The identity of human and divine conscious- Neo-\\nness is proposed by the school of Neo-Hegelians. At\\npresent they form an important factor in philosophic\\nthought. Earnest in soul they accept Hegel s teach-\\ning as the highest exposition of philosophy, and strive\\nto reconcile it with Christian belief. But if all exist-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0287.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "266 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ning things are only a manifestation of the idea in its\\nconstant evolution, if the human consciousness be\\nfundamentally one with the divine, where shall miracle\\nhave place? Every occurrence is miraculous in so far\\nas it is the direct manifestation of divine agency. The\\nidea alone is real; all things else are the phases of that\\nreality. The divine consciousness is one with our\\nown and unfolds its energy in every thought and\\naction.\\n(b) Physical 28. (b) Another modern school of thousfht attacks\\nscientists.\\nthe doctrine of miracles from a far different point of\\nview. Allusion is made to a certain class of physical\\nscientists. Impressed by the reign of law and the uni-\\nformity of natural events, they assum.e that the con-\\nstancy of this order precludes all possibility of divine\\ninterference. To them a miracle is a violation of the\\nlaws of nature. Their basis, therefore, is physical\\nscience. To admit a miracle, they tell us, would be\\nequivalent to the destruction of science.\\ncriticism. g 29. A criticism of this position is not at all diffi-\\ncult. The theory rests upon an ambiguity and an\\nCi)ordr -c ^^^.ggeration. The phrase the order of nature is\\nnature is constant is ambiguous. The word constant, e..\\nconstant.\\nuniform, expresses either a fact or a necessary truth.\\nWith the former meaning no fault can be found. In\\nthe latter sense the phrase is not correct. The uni-\\nformity of nature is a truth of experience. It is not\\nself-evident and is attained only after a long and patient\\nresearch. The great majority of mankind have ever\\nlooked upon this world as liable to interference on the\\npart of higher agencies. Finally, Mr. Mill has shown\\nthat the conviction in uniformity of nature prevails\\nDr. Macintosh, in Natural History of Christian Relig. A.\\nLang, The Making of Religion, p. 18, cites Hume as its first\\npromoter.\\nDuke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 17.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0288.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 267\\nonly among the educated and civilized few. The\\nbelief, therefore, has not the character of a self-evi-\\ndent, necessary and universal principle. To exaggerate\\nan induction from experience into a necessary truth is\\na fallacy. Nevertheless how often are we reminded\\nthat nature s laws are inviolate! This course of rea-\\nsoning fails in the object.\\nS 30. Now a miracle can be in perfect accord with (2) miracle\\nnature s uniformity. For the laws of nature remain stroy order\\nmi 1 1 1 of nature.\\nmtact. The fact of a miracle does not cause them to\\ndisappear. A miracle has nothing to do with laws as\\nsuch. It concerns only a particular event. When a\\nmiracle takes place, the laws of nature are not abro-\\ngated. Only in a particular case their effect is sus-\\npended. Hence the result is other than would happen.\\nFire did not cease to burn when the three children\\nwere protected from its ravages in the furnace; nor\\ndid the law of gravitation cease to have force when\\nJesus walked upon the waves of the sea of Galilee.\\nThe law remains intact; the particular event only is\\ninfluenced.\\n31. A good illustration can be found in our own lUustra-\\nvoluntary activity. I can, by interposing, vary the\\nparticular events of physical forces. Thus I dash\\nwater to my face every morning in opposition to the\\nlaw of gravitation, or I lift a heavy weight or drag a\\nsled up hill, or row against a strong current. These\\nare ordinary and familiar facts. My will interferes\\nwith one course of events by bringing a stronger force\\nto counteract the efficiency of the former. A miracle\\nis somewhat analogous. God interferes with an ordi-\\nnary occurrence. His will is powerful to suspend a\\nlaw in a particular case. The uniformity of nature is\\nnot disturbed. They who reason to the contrary are\\nLogic, B. III. ch. 21.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0289.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "268 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nguilty of the fallacy ignorantia elenchi, e.^ miss-\\ning the point. The difficulty is the creation of their\\nimagination,\\n(c) miracles S 32. (c) Finally, some writers, e. s:,, Hume, Kuenen,\\nare possi- o^\\\\/ j i o\\nbie, but TyndalL and Huxley, deny the actual existence of\\nnever actu-\\nally took miracles. They view the question as a matter of fact.\\nplace.\\nThe mere possibility is granted or dismissed from con-\\nHuxiey. sidcration as irrelevant. Denying the possibility of\\nmiracles, writes Mr. Huxley, seems to me quite as\\nTyndaii. Unjustifiable as speculative atheism. Mr. Tyndall\\nadmits The theory that the system of nature is under\\nthe control of a Being who changes phenomena in com-\\npliance with the affairs of men, is, in my opinion, a\\nperfectly legitimate one. Yet he continues: But\\nwithout verification, a theoretic conception is a m.ere\\nfigment of the intellect, and I am sorry to find us part-\\ning company at this point. They, however, reject\\nmiracles from lack of evidence. No human testimony\\nto them can ever produce credence in events opposed\\nTheir rea- to kuown natural laws. The tendencies of nature more\\nson (a) from\\nnature. than Overbalance whatever men may say to the contrary.\\nFurthermore they attack the testimony itself. The\\nb)deny persous and circumstances are closely examined with\\nhistorical .11. r\\ntestimony, a view to show that the witnesses of the event were\\nnot able to have trustworthy evidence, that the fact\\nitself was a simple natural phenomena. Thus Renan\\nMacintosh, in Natural History of the Christian Religion;\\nHuxley s Hume, p. 133; Present Day Tracts, n. 28, The Origin\\nof the Hebrew Religion, E. R. Conder.\\nSpectator, Feb. loth, 1886; Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law,\\np. 89.\\nFragments of Science, p. 468.\\nP. 469. J. S. Mill assures us that science contains nothing\\nrepugnant to the supposition that every event which takes place\\nresults from a specific volition of the presiding power, provided\\nthat this power adheres in iis particular volitions to general\\nlaws laid down by itself. Cf. Prof. Wilson, Foundations of\\nReligious Belief, p. 339.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0290.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 269\\ntells us that Jesus walked not upon the sea but by the\\nseashore. Strauss explains the gospel miracles as\\nmyths. Huxley takes a real or fancied miracle and\\nassails the evidence leaving the impression; I told you\\nso; all are of the like nature. The ^//-/^r/ objection\\nthat human testimony is worthless in face of nature s\\nuniformity is a strange exaggeration. We have seen criticism.\\nthat the uniformity of nature is an induction from\\nexperience and has not the character of an absolute\\ntruth. Furthermore the occurrence of a miracle by no\\nmeans interferes with the orderly course and system of\\nnature. If human activity can interfere with the ordi-\\nnary course of one or more laws by interposing a con-\\ntrary tendency without destroying the constancy of the\\nlaws or the uniformity of nature, surely the divine can\\ndo the same. Only a particular effect is suspended;\\nthe law remains intact.\\n34. The effort to invalidate human testimony may\\nsucceed in particular cases. Exaggeration may take\\nplace. However, the truth of our thesis does not rest\\nupon a fallacy or an exaggeration. We are the first to\\nreject and repudiate such a method. Strong and free\\nin the full and harmonious accord of reason and revela-\\ntion, the Christian mind is active and eager to study\\nthe truth in all its bearings. The separation of dross\\nfrom the pure ore is a lasting and genuine gain. He\\nworks for the years in building and ornamenting the\\ntemple of truth. The spirit is all the more eager\\nbecause it has the truth as its possession and inherit-\\nance; all the more free to reject what is unsound\\nbecause of the abundant material. That miracles\\nhave been established as well-authenticated facts can-\\nnot be questioned. We do not go to the past. Our\\nown time has witnessed them. Reference is made to\\nthe miracles admitted at Rome in the process of the", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0291.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "270 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ncanonization of saints. The tests are most scientific;\\nthe witnesses are of undoubted intelligence and probity.\\nAn examination of the facts will convince the most\\nsceptical mind.\\nIV.\\nSpecial Providences.\\n35. The providence of God over men is shown to a\\nstriking degree by the miracles wrought in their behalf.\\nThey are extraordinary proofs of His justice and loving\\nkindness. Nevertheless when we kneel to pray morn-\\nwe do not ing and evening we do not beg God to work miracles or\\nalways\\npray for that our livcs shall be constant prodigies of His power.\\nmiracles.\\nThe consciousness of our own littleness in His presence,\\nthe sense of His holiness, greatness and majesty bend\\nthe strong will, bring low the soaring hopes and impart\\nan humble and reverential spirit to our prayer. Even\\nwhen our petitions are most earnest and ardent, the\\nspirit of trust in God s infinite knowledge and all-em-\\nbracing love breathes throughout. We speak to God,\\nof our needs and longings, confident that He will\\nansv/er in His own good way. Hence the place and\\nscope of Special Providences.\\nSpecial R ^6. Bv Special Providences are understood events\\nProvi- J r\\ndences. which happen in the course of Nature through the\\ninstrumentality of natural laws. We cannot discern\\neither in the event itself or in the manner of its hap-\\npening any deviation from the known physical course.\\nWhat we know, however, is that events shape them-\\nselves in response to our prayer. The laws of nature\\nare invariable; they always and of necessity produce\\nthe same effects. One important factor, nevertherless,\\nmust not be forgotten. That the laws of nature pro-\\nduce an effect, the same conditions must be present.\\nIf the conditions vary, the effects also vary. By alter-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0292.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 271\\ning the conditions other tendencies of nature are made i fl ence of\\n_ human will\\npredominant, and the law which would otherwise work on forces of\\nnature.\\nout its effects yields to other and stronger laws.^^ In\\nthis way our wills interfere with the workings of nature.\\n\u00c2\u00a737. The progress of science shows not only new illustrated,\\nlaws but also reveals the manner and means by which\\nwe may subject these laws to our aim and service.\\nThe vast field covered by the practical sciences are a\\nstriking illustration. We do what nature herself could\\nnever do; we make nature a servant to carry out our\\nplans. Rivers are bridged, railways constructed, the (a) from\\ntelegraph and telephone carry messages over seas and mechanics.\\nacross continents. The uniformity of natural laws, far\\nfrom preventing our efforts, is the fundamental and\\nnecessary condition which render them possible. We\\ndo not create new forces, we only set force working\\nagainst force.\\n38. The contention that the uniformity of physical (b)from\\nlaws renders impossible their subordination to a higher\\nwill is opposed to ordinary and scientific experience.\\nEvery move of my body, every notion of the soul\\neffectually proves this assertion groundless. Thoughts\\nand feelings, buried deep in my mind and heart, cause\\nthe eye to sparkle, bring the color to the cheek,\\naccelerate the movements of the limbs, and give anima-\\ntion to the whole bodily frame. In writing to you,\\nkind reader, does not my will move my arm and set\\nthe pen at work? The law of inertia does not prevent\\nmy writing, nor is the law abrogated because I write.\\nOr I may rise from the desk and walk out into the air;\\nor I play at tennis, or bathe in the clear water. Is the\\nlaw of gravitation rendered null and void? Every\\n2^ Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. 96; Noah Porter, Ele--\\nments of Moral Science, p. 564.\\nReign of Law, p. 98.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0293.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "2/2 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nmovement of my waking life is an illustration of the\\nthesis.\\nsciincS^^^ \u00c2\u00a739- Science also comes with its examples. Water is\\ndecomposed into hydrogen and oxygen gases by simply\\npassing through it a current of voltaic electricity.\\nMechanical and chemical combinations in the labora-\\ntory show how one force neutralizes another. The\\nscience of mechanics and of medicine especially render\\nthe truth obvious. Or we pass from physical to livmg\\nelements. Chemical forces serve the vegetable world,\\nand this is under the sway of the animal kingdom\\nVv hich in turn obeys man. Or the elements may be\\nliving men. Here we have the science of government.\\nThe influence of a superior will over an inferior will is\\nillustrated in daily life, in politics, in civil society, at\\nhome, with friends. I may carry out my aim by influ-\\nencing and controlling the desires of others. They\\nwork with me and for me. If I am ambitious, I seek\\nthe favor of those in power; if I am unable to perform\\nan act, I seek a powerful friend to influence others\\nwhere I should fail.\\n40. Now if such power rests with man, if he can\\ndo so much with the forces of nature and his fellow\\nbeings, can God do less? Can we not believe that at\\nour prayer God may cause the conditions of natural\\nphenomena to so combine that through his special\\nagency we obtain our hearts desire, and yet so that\\nto the ordinary observer the event happens in its ordi-\\nnary place and time. To the devout soul, however,\\nall is different. He recognizes God s mercy and is\\ndevoutedly thankful for the Fatherly care. He knows\\nthat God has managed the event in some way. The\\nhidden power and love displayed is the response to the\\nprayer. When, therefore, we pray for rain, or to avert\\na calamity, or to prevent the ravages of plague we beg", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0294.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "PRAYER. 273\\nnot so much for miracles or prodigies of omnipotence.\\nWe ask that He who holds the heavens in His hands,\\nand who searches the abyss will listen to our petition\\nand in His own good way bring about the answer we\\nneed.\\nConclusion.\\n41, How easy, therefore, it is for God to answer\\nour prayer! We do the same for friends every day.\\nThe sphere of our influence is limited, but we can to\\nsome extent bend energies and wills to a good and\\nholy cause. Is God less powerful than we? If nature s\\nlaws remain constant, notwithstanding our interfer-\\nence, does God s will destroy the uniformity?\\n42. But it is said that our prayers are not always\\nanswered. In reply to this we may say that the\\nobjection does not affect our position in the least. If\\na prayer be answered but once, the thesis holds good.\\nIn order that natural laws should v^^ork a result, certain\\nconditions are necessary. So, too, with prayer. That\\nprayer be what it ought, subjective conditions are\\nrequired. Our Lord speaks thus, and the Apostles\\nenumerate them. St. Augustine proposes the query\\nwhy prayers are not always answered and gives a solu-\\ntion. This question may go beyond our knowledge.\\nWe cannot penetrate the mind of God and explain why\\nHe does so or otherwise. We may rest content that\\nHe who reads our hearts knows what we want and what\\nis best for us. However, that God cannot answer\\nprayers for physical benefits because of nature s uni-\\nformity, is a problem within the scope of reason. We\\ncan solve it and the answer is too strong and clear to\\nbe shaken.\\n18", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0295.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "2/4 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n43. There is a providence over all things and over\\nthe lives of men.^* He cares for all, even the lowliest.\\nIn man, His government shows itself not only in the\\npowers of the body and of mind, but in special and\\nextraordinary ways. In answer to our prayer, God\\nworked miracles and causes nature s laws to group\\naccording to our wishes.\\n2* Plato, Laws, B. X. ch. ii; Aristotle, Metaphys. XI, ch. 6;\\nO tu, bone omnipotens, exclaims St. Augustine, qui sic\\ncuras unumquemque nostrum tamquam solum cures; et sic\\nomnes, tamquam singulos. Confess., 1. Ill, ch. II; de Gen.\\nad. Lit. 1. 5, ch. 21.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0296.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIV.\\nPESSIMISM.\\nI. The phenomena of existence and of life affect\\nthe human mind in various ways. By a necessity of\\nnature we fashion views of the world from the contents\\nof individual experience. The extent and nature of\\nour environment, the peculiar disposition and power of\\nthe soul find unconscious expression. What we think\\nand feel gives form and color to our lives. We breathe\\na peculiar atmosphere, and its influence is felt by our\\nassociates or, embodied in the written word, exerts an\\nuplifting or depressing force on future ages.\\n\u00c2\u00a72. The evils of life have at all times strongly Problem oi\\nimpressed the minds of men. The earliest records of\\nhuman speculation show the attempts made at a solu-\\ntion. In the Vedic writings the problem appears and\\nelicits a cry of despair. It is crystallized into a system\\nwith the Parsees and the later Manichaeans. Its\\nmournful tones are heard in Greek poetry. It has\\noccupied the great minds of Christian philosophy, and\\nhas drawn forth the deepest thoughts of an Augustine\\nand a Thomas Aquinas.\\n3. At present we are concerned with one answer Pessimism,\\nonly. Pessimism is an error which is contemporane-\\nous with philosophic thought. Its traces appear in\\nevery stage of history. Its influence upon the minds of\\nthe passing generation has been widespread and pro-\\nfound. The miseries of existence have so impressed\\nthe minds of some as to furnish data whereon is built\\na philosophy of life which sees no good in the world,\\n[275]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0297.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "276\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nrecognizes no beneficent purpose over man, excludes\\nall joy and goodness, and teaches that sorrow and pain\\nand evil alone reign in undisputed sway.\\nHindu\\nmind meta-\\nphysical.\\norigins of\\nBuddhism.\\nUpan-\\nishads.\\nI.\\nBuddhism.\\n4. The problem of life early took possession of the\\nIndian mind. The longing to pierce the veil of mystery\\nwhich envelops his being called forth the highest\\nefforts. Beautiful are some passages of the Sacred\\nBooks. The human soul answers in mournful tones to\\nthe touch of life s realities. The cry may vary in\\nstrength, in its human echoes, but it is ever the same.\\nAgain and again it is heard in the Hindoo Scriptures.\\nThe voice is the voice of humanity, and the answer is\\nwhat humanity alone can give.\\n1\u00c2\u00b0. Origin.\\n5. Before the rise of Buddhism, India already pos-\\nsessed a voluminous literature. Its growth can be\\ndetermined from difference in language and develop-\\nment of thought. The principal periods are the Vedic,\\nthe early Brahmanic, the Upanishads, and the later\\nBrahmanic. No sharp line of demarkation can be\\ndrawn between them. They run into each other and\\noverlap. Viewed in relation to the subject-matter\\nthe Upanishads are by far the most important. They\\nare the earliest remains of Indian Metaphysics.\\n6. The sole problem of the Upanishads is release\\nfrom the miseries of life. The solution proposed is a\\ntransmigration which holds sway from the lowest forms\\nof existence to the highest intelligence. The character\\nof life in the present state shapes the following. Evil-\\ndoing leads to lower forms of life, while the good rise\\nin the scale of existences. The highest stage, how-", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0298.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 277\\never, is not permanent. Gods and men are parts of\\nthe world system. The purest intelligences and most\\nblessed spirits must descend sooner or later to run\\nagain the course. There are stages, no final resting\\nplace, for the soul on its journey. Once the merit has\\nbeen exhausted, the soul falls to a lower sphere to doctrine of\\nbegin its dark and painful ascent. Misery only and mfgration.\\nvanity are found in life. No afterhope to cast a beam\\nof comfort on the chill and gloomy present. Not the\\nfear of death palls the Indian mind, but the dread of\\nbirth. Death brings no surcease to sorrow and suffer-\\ning. As plants spring from seed, and seed falls from\\nthe ripened fruit, so birth and death, death and birth\\nfollow each other with the inexorable rigor of a phy-\\nsical law.^\\nThat once and whereso er and whence begun\\nLife runs its rounds of living, climbing up\\nFrom mote, and gnat, and worm, reptile and fish,\\nBird and shagged beast, man, demon, deva, God,\\nTo clod and mote again.\\n7. Great is the sorrow of the rich at the loss of pessimistic,\\ntheir riches, says the Atma-Purana, of the prince at\\nthe approach of death, of those in paradise at the\\nexpiring of their merits; there is pain in the perform-\\nance of the rites, there is pain in the fruition of the\\nreward, at the thought of its loss, there is pain on the\\nfresh birth in the world. No peace, no rest, no end.\\nActivity was considered as the root of evil. Even good\\nacts at the most prolong the flow of life.\\n8. Buddhism is the logical and natural sequence of Buddhism\\nthe principles set forth in the Upanishads.* The same dIvcIoI?^\\nment.\\nBrih. Up. Ill, 9, 28.\\n^Arnold, Light of Asia, p. 96.\\n^Chand. Up. II, 10, 7; Brih. Up, VI, 2, 16; 9, 3; Manavad-\\nharmasastra XII, 54, sq.\\n^Miiller, S. B. E., vol. XV, Introd., p. xxvii.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0299.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "278\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nGotama\\nhowever\\nabolished\\ndistinc-\\ntions.\\nBuddhism\\na common\\nnot a speci-\\nfic term.\\npessimistic theory of life throws its gloomy shadows\\nover the one system as over the other. The same\\ndread of birth is the nightmare to be freed from.\\nGotama, however, made a change in the means\\nemployed to avoid a rebirth. In the Upanishads the\\nstudent is drilled in lower wisdow, e. g., rites and sacri-\\nfices, as a preparation for the higher, e. g., abstraction\\nand meditation. Gotama abolished the distinction\\nand opened the higher path to all. The highest pur-\\npose of the soul is to return to original nothingness\\nand final extinction. All things have sprung therefrom\\nall things have this destination.^ In the words of the\\nSankya-Karita, so through the study of principles,\\nthe conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge\\nis attained, that neither I am, nor aught is mine, nor\\ndo I exist.\\n2\u00c2\u00b0. Teaching.\\n9. Buddhism is a common name designating the\\n.popular faith in many lands. Not only is it applied\\nto existing creeds; it has a history reaching back over\\ntwo thousand years. The study of its development\\nand present condition reveals not Buddhism but\\nBuddhisms. It varies in every land just as it has\\nvaried in the course of time. The reason is that\\nBuddhism in its origin was not a religion. Its founder\\nsimply propounded a philosophy of life. In propagat-\\ning his doctrines the early missionaries did not compel\\nthe inhabitants of other countries to give up their\\nnative beliefs. They adapted Buddhism to the con-\\ndition of those to whom they preached. Hence many\\nvarieties sprang up, crystallized and flourished. The\\nBuddhism of China, e. g., is not the Buddhism of\\nMiiller, Chips from a German Workshop, vol. I, p. 223 sq.\\nChand. Up.\\nPfleiderer, The Phil, of Religion, vol. IV, p. 8.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0300.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 279\\nCeylon.\u00c2\u00ae Just as these forms are not identical with True Bud-\\na A J. J dhism is the\\nthe primitive teaching.* At present we are concerned teaching of\\nonly with the teaching of Gotama as far as this can be\\nlearned from the results of modern critical and his-\\ntorical research.\\n10. Buddhism can be considered as a system ofnotareiig--\\nthought and as a philosophy of life. It has, therefore, phiiosopV.\\na metaphysical and an ethical aspect. Lacking in the\\nconstitutive elements which go to make up a religion,\\nit has no true or just claim to the title. The question\\nis now of primitive Buddhism, not of the later excres-\\ncences which pass under that name. The meta-\\nphysical basis of the system only demands our present\\nattention.\\nII. While seated under the Bo-tree of Benares in The Four\\ndeep meditation upon the Chain of Causation, Truths.\\nthe unending cycle of birth and death, of death and\\nbirth, Gotama, in a flash, or by an inner illumination\\nas his disciples are wont to say, perceived a solution\\nfor the dark sodden veil of mystery and misery which\\nenvelops life. This solution is embodied in the famous\\nFour Noble Truths which form the kernel of his system.\\nAround and from these his moral teaching is developed,\\nand by them is adequatelv understood and explained. ^W Sorrow\\nis universal.\\n12. In the first sermon by which the triumphant\\nchariot-wheel of his doctrine is set in motion the Four\\nTruths are emphatically expressed. They are:\\nI. That sorrow is universal: This, mendicants, is\\nthe noble truth of sorrow; birth is sorrow, old age is\\nsorrow, sickness is sorrow, death is sorrow, the pres-\\nence of the unloved is sorrow, the absence of the loved\\nis sorrow, all that one wishes for and does not get, is\\nBiel, Copleston, Bigandet.\\nRhys Davids, Kellogg.\\nCopleston s Buddhism, p. in.\\nBuddha s Dhammapada, V. igo-192.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0301.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "28o\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(2) desire is\\nthe cause\\nof sorrow.\\nsorrow: Briefly the five elements by which beings\\nhold to existence are sorrow.\\n13. In so far as Gotama states the fact of sorrow,\\nthe words are true. But they only express a partial\\nview of life. Happiness is a fact also. The joy of\\nhard won achievement, of motherhood, of child-like\\ninnocence, of well-doing, the joy which springs from\\nthe right exercise of the higher emotions cannot be\\nignored. To insist upon the sorrows of life to the utter\\nexclusion of the joys is a travesty of truth. To pro-\\nclaim that sorrow is the primal, fundamental and uni-\\nversal fact of conscious existence is an unwarranted\\nassumption or rather a perversion of the testimony of\\nconsciousness. Christian Philosophy admits the coex-\\nistence of happiness and of sorrow, but teaches, as\\nshall be shown, that the former is the primary and\\nfundamental fact, and explains their true ethical mean-\\ning and import,\\n14. (2) That the cause of sorrow is desire. This,\\nmendicants, says Gotama, is the noble truth of the\\ncause of sorrow. Desire that leads from birth to birth,\\nand is accompanied by pleasure and pain, seeking to\\ngratification here and there, namely, desire of sensual\\npleasure, desire of existence, desire of wealth.\\n15. The three-fold division of desire can be reduced\\nto the desire of existence. That sensual gratification\\nleads to sorrow is a truth illustrated on every page of\\nhistory. In giving statement to this, Gotama simply\\nlaid stress upon a fact; but again and again assures\\nhis hearers that the desire of existence is the main and\\nreal cause of sorrow. If all existence is sorrow, as we\\nlearn from the first Truth, then desire of existence is\\nthe true source of sorrow. This desire perpetuates\\nKarma and leads from birth to birth in unvarying\\nChristian Philosophy The Soul, p. 48.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0302.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 281\\nround. With Gotama there is no soul. Individual life\\nis made up of a combination of the five groups of ele-\\nments or Skandhas. Desire is the reason of their\\ncombination into the Karma and causes the Karma to\\nbe perpetuated in other forms. It thus becomes the\\nconstitutive of personal existence.\\n16. (3) That the cessation of sorrow is brought (3) sorrow\\nabout by the eradication of desire, When this fierce destroying-\\ni-\\\\ riir- T desire.\\nthirst {i. e.^ desire) overcomes, fall of poison, in this\\nworld, his sufferings increase like the abounding Birana\\ngrass. This salutary word I tell you, as many as are\\nhere come together: Dig up the root of thirst, as he\\nwho wants the sweet-scented Usira root must dig up\\nthe Birana grass.\\n17. The Third Truth follows from the Second. It criticism.\\nis true that the diminutions of desire cuts off many\\noccasions of disappointment and sorrow. At the same\\ntime it deprives us of the purest and noblest joys.\\nLife is effort, and is shown forth in activity. A great\\nand noble soul is filled with desires of good. Do not\\nthese desires furnish the sweetest joys? It is of\\nCatholic faith that God rewards the longings of the soul\\nfor good, even though we lack the strength or oppor-\\ntunity to put them into execution. In the silence of my\\nroom I may kneel in prayer that God may be glorified\\nby all His creatures, that He may rule in the hearts of\\nall men, that He may give me light and strength to do\\nHis holy will. My desire becomes a swelling hymn of\\npraise. In acting thus, how can I do wrong? He bids\\nme fill my mind and enlarge my heart with such as these.\\n18. Again, the very possession of desire reacts\\nupon temperament and character. It gives elevation\\n2 Kellogg, The Light of Asia and the Light of the World, p.\\n210 sq. Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures of 1881, Rise and Growth\\nof Religion.\\n*Baddha s Dhammapada, ch. XXIV, V, 335-337 sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0303.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "282 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nof mind, it broadens my horizon, it imparts firmness\\nand resource amid the varying happenings of life. Or\\nsuppose I strive to put my hopes into execution. There\\nis energy and joy in the effort, but what exultation\\nof spirit in the achievement! True, reverses come to\\nthe wisest and the best. But there can be no failure\\nin the effort to be good and true. By a v\\\\ford or act I\\ngive sympathy or help to the struggling or downcast.\\nI add to the happiness of others, I cause the sun to\\nbreak through the gloomy cloud, I become greater and\\nbetter in its light and warmth. Happiness is found in\\naction and the cessation of activity cramps the heart\\nand makes life friendless and cheerless.\\n(4) This 19. (4) The Fourth Truth teaches that the one\\nnobfe eight- way to accompiish this end, e., the extinction of\\npat (jgg^j.g^ J5 l-]^g noble eight-fold way. This, O mendi-\\ncants, is the noble truth of the way of living which\\nleads to the extinction of sorrow; it is the noble eight-\\nfold way; right faith, right resolve, right speech, right\\naction, right living, right effort, right recollection,\\nright meditation.\\n8 20. At first siafht these precepts appear beautiful\\ncriticism. jr f i-r\\nand excellent. We are apt to interpret them after our\\nown manner of thinking and in the light of Christian\\nphilosophy. This is to fail utterly in grasping their\\ntrue meaning. The term right has not the same\\nsense in Buddhism as in Christian ethics. The right\\nviews of life, e. g., are those set forth in the Four\\nNoble Truths. They are right only on the admission\\nthat Atheism is true and Pessimism is the only gospel\\nof m.ankind.^^ Ignorance of these truths is the imme-\\ndiate cause of existence in so far as it perpetuates\\n^5 Davids, Buddhism, p. 44 sq. Buddha s Dhammapada, ch.\\nXX, V, 273-276; Copleston s Buddhism, p. 130 sq.\\nIS Kellogg, The Light of Asia and the Light of the World, p.\\n302.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0304.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 283\\nKarma and involves the individual in the eternal chain\\nof causation.\\n21. Thus the doctrine of Pessimism is the dominant Pessimism\\nnote of Buddhism. That all existence is evil, was the Buddhism.\\nspectre ever before the mind. The supreme effort of\\nlife was to cease to live. Nirvana, extinction of\\nlust, was the goal leading to Parinirvana, e., the\\nextinction of being.\\nII.\\nSCHOPPENHAUER.\\n22. This Philosophy of life, so dismal and shorn of Buddhism\\nhope, was the gospel to countless struggling human scloppen-\\nsouls in India over two thousand 3; ears ago. In our\\nown time it has been proposed to European minds as\\nthe panacea for all our woes. About one hundred\\nyears have passed since Sir William Jones brought to\\nEnglish readers the treasures of ancient Hindoo litera-\\nture. His extravagant praises of its worth attracted\\nthe attention of scholars. The number of students\\ninterested in this department of Knowledge constantly\\nincreased. It was reserved, however, for the master-\\nmind of Schoppenhauer to appropriate its philosophy,\\nand to set it forth in a scientific form, becoming thuS\\nthe founder of modern Pessimism.\\n23. In Schoppenhauer two currents of philosophic sources\\nthought converge to form a new system. By nature teaching.\\nand early education a German, he came under the\\ninfluence of Kant and his immediate successors, Fichte,\\nSchelling and Hegel. In after-life a devoted admirer\\nand disciple of Buddhism, he drew therefrom the\\ninspiration and substance of his teaching. Yet the\\nelem,ents of both can be clearly traced.\\nJ. Wordsworth, M,. A., The One Religion; appendix I,\\nby Prof Frankfurter, pp. 371-372.\\nHopkins, The Religions of India, p. 321.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0305.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "284 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfunda- 24. His fuQdamental doctrine is the distinction\\ndoctrine, between the phenomenal and the real world. Thus he\\naccepts Kant s initial principle of the phenomenon and\\nthe noumenon, as also the Maya of Buddhism. The\\nphenomenal world is what is known in sense-experience\\nit exists only to the percipient mind; its real nature is\\npure mental representation (Vorstellung). With\\nFichte he holds that the phenomenal is a world of\\nappearance which depends on the activity of the mind\\nand ceases to exist with the percipient mind. Not so\\nthe real. Sclielling conceives this as absolute thought;\\nHegel, as the idca^ which transcends and enfolds all\\nwuithe that is known as subject and object. To Schoppen-\\none i^y- ha,uer will is the one universal substance and essence\\nof every individual thing. It is manifested in the blind\\ncourses of nature, as well ^s in the deliberate acts\\nof man.^^\\nThe world 25. Hence his definiton of Will as that which con-\\ntains the various manifestations of impulse and feeling.\\nKant taught that the principle of causality held sway\\nonly in the world of phenomena, Vo?^stellung.\\nTherefore will, in as far as it is the absolute and real,\\nis not the cause of the world, but its essence and real\\nbeing. In every individual phenomenon we may dis-\\ntinguish two elements; the will, e., the constant\\nprinciple of being, and a variable phenomenal cause.\\nIn its ceaseless striving, the will is free from all\\ndetermination. In its essential nature unconscious,\\nmotives have no influence over its actions. The signs\\nof purpose everywhere visible in nature are true of\\nphenomena only, not of the real or absolute will; in it\\nthere is no prevision or design. In preserving the dis-\\ntinction between the real and the phenomenal, in\\nessence.\\nSully, Pessimism, p. 84.\\n20 The World as Will, Vol. 2, ch. 28, p. 375.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0306.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 285\\nascribing purpose to the latter and denying it to the\\nformer, Schoppenhauer frequently contradicts himself.\\n26. The phenomenal world is the objectivation of pheno-\\nthe will. This objectivation takes place through the wo?id is\\nmedium of ideas. They are the intermedium between uolfS^m.\\nthe real and the phenomenal. In animals and in man\\nthe manifestation is recognized as the will to live.\\nEvery creature strives for life. Life is the aim and the\\nend of existence. The way is thus presented for a\\nproblem, the solution of which casts a peculiar aspect\\nover his whole system of philosophy. What, he asks, The value\\nis the real value of life? Does the end for which we\u00c2\u00b0^^^^^\\nstrive justify the toil and anxiety employed in the\\nstriving, does its possession yield real satisfaction?\\nThe answer he gives is an emphatic negative. The\\nstriving to live arises not from choice but from a blind\\ninstinct. If life were happy it might have value. But\\nthe preponderance of pain over pleasure shows that\\nhappiness is only an illusive dream. To live is to (i) a priori\\nstrive. Now striving has its source in want or discon-\\ntent. We are not satisfied with what we have, or we toVtrffe^and\\nneed something we have not; therefore we strive f or\\nwhat lies beyond. This of necessity involves suffering.\\n27. As the nature of the will is a continuous striv- (b) real\\ning we can readily understand that lasting satisfaction fj^P^ggJ^^e\\nis impossible. The satisfaction we do at times obtain\\nis only temporary, and marks the starting-point of a\\nnew effort. Schoppenhauer compares the nature of\\nthe will to an insatiable thirst, or a craving hunger.\\nHappiness is like the sweet food, having the power to\\nplease in the mouth, losing it when swallowed. As\\nthe poet expresses it:\\nPleasures are like poppies spread\\nYou seize the flower, the bloom is shed.\\nOr like snow flakes on the river,\\nA moment white, then gone forever.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0307.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "286 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(c) happi- \u00c2\u00a728. Happiness is something negative, e., the\\nness is\\nsomething Satisfaction of a need, the stilling of a pain. But tlie\\nnegative.\\npermanent or real element m our lives is a striving.\\nSatisfaction is instantaneous and fleeting only, and\\ngives way to the strong current of desire which consti-\\n(d) pain is tutes our nature. Hence, new striving, suffering and\\npain. The fact of suffering is essential and universal.\\nIt is of the essence of things, in as far as it is insepara-\\nble from striving. Man, however, suffers more than\\nlower creation; and the more intelligent, the more\\nintense is the suffering.\\n(2) a post- 29. Schoppenhauer concludes to the evil of exist-\\nence from a consideration of man s essential nature.\\nHe reasons also from the data of experience. The\\n(a) progress intellectual development of the individual brings with\\nSsodaif it a larger knowledge and a wider mental range.\\nlarger Dcsircs multiply and are intensified. Thus wants arise\\nand greater ^nd wauts bring Suffering. So also with society and\\nnations. Progress of necessity increases suffering.\\nThe progress we are wont to herald is not a sign of\\nbettermjent, but a sure indication that the world is\\ngrowing worse. Hence to live is to suffer, not through\\nan accident of circumstance, but from a necessity of\\nnature. To earnestly desire life is folly. The con-\\nscious affirmation of will is the source of misery. To\\nthis source can be traced the belief in imm^ortality.\\n(3) means 3\u00c2\u00b0- The Only means of escape from the suffering\\nof escape. q\u00c2\u00a3 existence is the denial of the will to live.\\nHere is found the basis of wise and virtuous conduct,\\nsince this denial is founded in our recognition of the\\ntrue nature of life. What is real is the absolute Will;\\nall else are merely seemings. The veil of Maya over-\\nspreads the real, and is the reason why we apply par-\\nKant, Anthropology, No. LIX.\\nMetman, Le Pessimisme moderne, pp. 81-93.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0308.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 287\\nticular names to individual objects. It is the principle\\nof individualization. But these individual objects are\\nnot real; they constitute the phenomenal world only.\\nBy holding this truth firm in mind we penetrate the veil\\nof Maya, we see that individual things are only seem-\\nings, and grasp the essential oneness of all. The intel-\\nlectual vision of the one underlying reality quiets the\\nWill. It no longer affirms itself as an individual dis-\\ntinct from other Wills. Hence arises true self-denial,\\ndenial of the Self, which culminates in a denial to\\nlive. This state of quiescence is the highest attain-\\nable happiness. We are passive spectators of the pass-\\ning vanities and miseries of life; and are at peace in\\nthe worst of all possible worlds.\\n31. The philosophy of Schoppenhauer is an Ideal- Criticism,\\nism. The initial error lies in the full acceptance of\\nKant s theory of knowledge. If the noumenon, SuTtheory\\ni. e., the real, cannot be grasped by the perceiving edg^e\\nmind, and if the phenomenon, the ideal appear-\\nances, can only become the object of cognition, the\\nsource of the system can be seen at a glance. He\\ninferred the unity of the real from the unity of crea-\\ntion. Unlike Hegel he did not look upon the real 3.?,\\nidea, but as will. With Fichte he considers the objects\\naround to be of the stuff that dreams are made, or, as\\nthe Buddhist would say, illusions caused by Maya\\novershadowing the real. Now Kant s theory rests on\\nthe confusion of sense-perception and intellectual\\nknowledge, on the failure to grasp the true nature and\\npowers of the mind/^* A system, therefore, which\\nrests upon a false basis cannot be true.\\n\u00c2\u00a732. Schoppenhauer maintains as a fundamental (2) funda-\\nprinciple that activity is evil. This is not true. Let principle is\\nfalse.\\nSully, Pessimism, p. loi.\\nChristian Philosophy The Soul, p. 37 sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0309.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "288 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nUS appeal to our conscious experience. Is there not a\\njoy in labor, in putting forth our powers of body or of\\nmind, in the recognition of what we have done as well\\nas in the reasoned hope of what we can do? Grant\\nthat our nature craves for what we have not; the crav-\\ning is not an abnormal thirst; there is what we may\\ncall a healthy desire. The pleasures of sense are to\\nthe generality of men more than a fleeting gratification\\nof crying needs. Diseased minds are sometimes found,\\nbut of these we do not speak. There is in the depths\\nof our nature a well-spring of activity which finds vent\\nin a thousand ways. The high resolve, the courageous\\nendeavor, the fire of enthusiasm, the flush of anger,\\nhave spurred great souls to live and to live so as to\\nmake mankind, nobler, purer, better. The cities in\\nwhich we live, the comforts we enjoy, the books we\\nread, are not the product of men who passed their lives\\nin constant misery. If the highest good w^ere quies-\\ncence and apathy, how miserable would be our lot!\\nHuman nature rebels against such a creed. To live is\\nan inalienable possession of our nature. Man will not\\ncrush out existence. In this is seen the superiority of\\nChristianity. Unlike Buddhism it recognizes the funda-\\nmental desires of human nature, and far from crushing,\\nstrives only to uplift and direct them. Christ came to\\nthose who dwelt in the shadow of the valley of\\ndeath. He came that they might have life and\\nhave it more abundantly. To point out the real\\ndignity and value of life, to offer to mankind the means\\nand aids which purify, ennoble, and make life a priceless\\nblessing has ever been the aim and purpose of our\\nChristian religion.\\n33. The disciples of Schoppenhauer, Bahnsen,\\nFrauenstadt and Taubert modify to some extent the\\nteaching of their master either in its metaphysical or", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0310.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 289\\nethical aspect. The most important, however, is\\nHartman, who presents a system based on the main\\nlines of Schoppenhauer with important additions from\\nSchelling and Hegel.\\nIII.\\nHartman.\\n34. In 1864 Hartman published the Philosophy of doctrine,\\nthe Unconscious, which contains the substance of his\\nphilosophy. He recognizes one ultimate reality;\\nhence his theory is, as with Schoppenhauer, a kind of\\nMonism. The individual objects around us are activi-\\nties or manifestations of the one reality. In this, true\\nto his German antecedents and environment, he pre-\\nsents a form of Pantheism. The world is due to a (j) genesis,\\ncombination of will and idea; the will in itself is an\\nempty form; a definite aim or purpose, e., content,\\nmust come from another source; this is found alone\\nin a mental representation. Hartman claims to agree\\nwith Spinoza, who holds one ultimate substance having\\ntwo attributes. The student, however, readily per-\\nceives that he has ingrafted the idea of Hegel upon the\\nwill oi Schoppenhauer, and beyond underlying both he\\npostulates the absolute of Schelling, which he names\\nthe unco?iscious.\\n\u00c2\u00a735. Thus to Hartman the Unconscious includes (2) The Un-\\nthe will and the idea. He teaches that the manifesta- ^i^^s-\\ntion of unconscious will and intelligence can be recog-\\nnized: (a) Throughout the organic world as, g.^ in (a) in or\\nthe functions of the spinal column, and cerebral Ifodd.\\nganglia, in voluntary and reflex movements, in instinct,\\nin the formation, growth, and the recuperative pro-\\ncesses of the organism, (b) In the human mind, e. g., (b)in man.\\nRoyce. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 259-263.\\nSully, Pessimism, p. 131.\\n19", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0311.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "290\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(3) Matter\\nand mind\\nresolved\\ninto the\\nuncon-\\nscious.\\n(4) Hedon-\\nism in\\nEthics,\\nvalue of\\nlife.\\n(a) a priori\\nlife is suf-\\nfering-.\\nsexual love, feeliag, character, morality, aesthetic judg-\\nment, artistic creations, mysticism, etc.^^ From these\\ndata he infers an all-pervading reality which he terms\\nthe Unconscious.\\n-^6. Matter is made up of innumerable atomic\\nforces. Their activities are merely acts of volition.\\nHence the theory of atomic wills and the resolution of\\nmatter into will. The distinction between matter and\\nmind is thus blotted out. In reality they are identical.\\nOrganic life is the will acting with the purpose or aim\\nof producing higher and still higher forms. The\\norganic evolution, therefore, is not merely mechanical;\\nit is guided and upheld by the direct action of an\\nunconscious will. Individual variation, natural selec-\\ntion and inheritance play only subordinate parts in the\\ndevelopment. Sensation and thought are explained\\nas due to a collision or conflict of v/ills after the same\\nmanner as matter comes into existence by the inter-\\naction of atomic wills. In this we perceive the influence\\nwhich the monads of Leibnitz and the plurality of Her-\\nbart left upon his mind, and how he has tried to recon-\\ncile the plurality with the Monism of Spinoza, Schelling,\\nHegel and S:hoppenhauer.\\n37. Hartman follows Schoppenhauer in viewing life\\nfrom the Hedonist standpoint. Its value is measured\\nby the balance of pleasure over pain. Now by the\\nvery nature of our existence pain always is in excess of\\npleasure. The reason of existence is the blind impulse\\nto will. But to will or to strive implies defect and\\nneed. Thus the will by its nature is never satisfied.\\nLife is never complete, and existence is the result of\\nfolly. Not to be is better than to be. The very rea-\\nson of existence, therefore, becomes the source of pain\\nand sorrow.\\n2 Sully, ib., p. 119.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0312.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 291\\ns8. Hartman is not content in showing the failure (b) a\\nof life as the logical result of his phisosophy. He\\nappeals to experience. By a large and wide induction\\nhe attempts to make secure the conclusion reached\\nfrom /?/;Y^r/ reasoning. His exposition of the wretched- more\\nness of life is much more complete and searching than Sfjfsihop-\\nthat of Schoppenhauer. With ruthless hand he shatters p^\\nthe ideals man has venerated, exposes the shams which\\nenter into our conscious existence, and holds up to\\ncontempt and scorn the very objects which are\\nenshrined in the sacred memories of childhood and are\\nthe source and mainspring of high resolves and noble\\ndeeds in after Hfe. To him, woman is a degraded\\nthing. Only a mind besotted, only a soul steeped in\\nthe mire of degradation, only a heart dead to the\\nslightest affection for what is true, beautiful and good,\\ncould inspire the pages inscribed with his name.\\n39. The work of Hartman is a storehouse to those (sv design in\\nwho seek proofs for design in the universe. To him^ersetthe\\nthe world has a rational aim. The rational element, un?on?5\\ne., Hegel s idea, which gives content to the pure\\npotency of will, is the fundamental reason of the world-\\norder. He disagrees, however, with Hegel in affirming\\nthat consciousness is the proximate, not the final end\\nin the evolution of the universe. Hartman holds that\\nthe final end is had in appeasing the cravings and striv-\\nings of the will. This is accomplished by divorcing (b),\u00e2\u0080\u009eaiai,\u00e2\u0080\u009e\\nthe will from the mental representation and thus j o?dSir\u00c2\u00ab\\nreducing it to its primal state of pure potency. The ^^li^^e!\\nconscious denial of will is the means to be employed.\\nThus an antagonism is engendered and the will is\\nreduced to a pure potency.^^\\n\u00c2\u00a740. (i) The system of Hartman is more complete Criticism,\\nand systematic than that proposed by his master. In\\nSully, Pessimism, p. 140.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0313.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "292\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nit are found traces of a synthesis and attempt at recon-\\nciliation of antecedent German Philosophic thought.\\n(i)Pan- Nevertheless it is purely pantheistic and labors with\\ntheistic.\\nthe defects indigenous to every system of Pantheism.\\nThe initial postulate is the fundamental identity of all\\nexisting things. Now consciousness conclusively shows\\nthis to be false. We are distinct one from another;\\nmy conscious life is my own possession. I am not of\\nthe same nature as the stone, or the tree, or the brute.\\n(2) Same \u00c2\u00a741. (2) The conclusion of Hartman s system is\\nwfth schop- the same as Schoppenhauer s. The addition of the\\npen aue.. j.^^jqj^^| element only supplies a defect; it does not\\nalter the nature of the evolution. Therefore the same\\ncriticism which so effectually exposed the conclusions\\nof one, tells with the same effect against the other.\\nLife is not a blunder or a folly; existence is not a\\nfundamental mistake. Such words as enthusiasm,\\nvirtue, heroism, goodness, truth, beauty, find place in\\nthe lowest lives and leave an indelible imprint upon\\nthe page of history.\\n42. (3) The standard of Hedonism which both fol-\\nlow is not the true test of the value of life. The very\\nconsequences to which it leads are a telling argument\\nagainst its truth. Principles which logically result in\\ndespair do not make the world better and give no ray\\nof comfort to struggling human nature. In the follow-\\ning chapter this standard will be closely examined. Its\\nreal worth will be shown to be illusive and inimical to\\nwhat is our highest aim and prize.\\n(3) false\\ntheory of\\nEthics.\\nInfluence\\non Litera-\\nture, e. g.,\\nLeopardi.\\nIV.\\nInfluence.\\n43. The influence of Pessimism upon modern\\nthought has been deep and widespread. To Schoppen-\\nhauer and Hartman it is a well-developed system of", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0314.jp2"}, "315": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 293\\nphilosophy. Leopardi consecrated his poetic genius\\nto express in stirring verse the tale of life s wretched-\\nness.^\u00c2\u00ae He is thus the real poet of Pessimism.^\\nDiffused by them, its teaching has permeated every\\nrank of society and every sphere of life. We find its\\ntraces in conversation, in the papers, on the stage, and\\nthroughout contemporaneous literature. It is seen in\\nQueen Mab, in Misery and Mutability of Shel- SheUey,^^\\nley, in Tennyson s In Memoriam, and Goethe s Goethe,\\nFaust, in the grim Carlyle exposing the shams of Byron.\\nlife, in the fine Byronic despair.\\nCount o er the joys thine hours have seen,\\nCount o er the days from anguish free.\\nAnd know whatever thou hast been,\\nTis something better not to be.\\nMusset complains that he has come too late in a world Mussett.\\ntoo old.^^ Lamartine hears in nature the voice of one Lamartine.\\nlong sigh, and wonders what crime he committed that\\nhe should be born.^^ The tone of disappointment, of\\nthe eternal unfitness of things is dominant in the writ-\\nings of the naturalistic school, in the works of Loti,\\nBourget, George Eliot, and Hall Caine. The excla-gojJ|f-\\nmation of Euripides: Swift-fated and conscious, how g^*?,\\nHall Came.\\nbrief is life s pleasureless portion! ^Ms repeated bygmar\\nthe admiring readers of Omar Khayyam and of Heine, Heine.\\nthe sweet singer of the world pain.\\nHis L amour et la mort.\\n3\u00c2\u00b0 Sombre amant de la mort, pauvre Leopardi. writes\\nMusset.\\nRoyce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 117.\\nJe suis venu trop tard dans un monde trop vieux.\\nLe Desespoir,\\nL homme en se civilisant, n a-t-il fait vraiment que com-\\npliquer sa barbarie et raffiner sa miserie. P. Bourget, Essais\\nde Psychol, contemp., p. 322; R. H, Hutton, Modern Guides\\nof English Thought in Matter of Faith, ch. V, George Eliot.\\nLewes, History of Philosophy.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0315.jp2"}, "316": {"fulltext": "294 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nLiterature 44. It is false, howcver, to hold that literature is\\nnot wholly\\npessimistic, whoily pessimistic. More than one poet, from the\\nanalysis of his own inner consciousness, has sung\\nSweet are the uses of adversity,\\nand more than one toiler along life s highway has\\nlearned that sweet rest comes after labor, and sweet\\nKeats. joy after pain. Keats forms a contrast to Byron,\\nHellenbach has drawn a kind of Optimism from the\\nWords- philosophy of Schoppenhauer, and Wordsworth, the\\nworth.\\npoet of nature, from communion with her various\\nmoods, has learned that\\nWilderness and wood\\nBlank ocean and mere sky, supports that mood,\\nWhich with the lofty, sanctifies the low,\\nand warns us too apt at times to look upon the gloomy-\\nside, that\\nIf life were slumber on a bed of down.\\nToil unimposed, vicissitude unknown,\\nSad were our lot.\\nSir John Lubbock has written the beautiful work on\\nthe Pleasures of Life; the scientific Meliorism of\\nGeorge Eliot and of Sully have been submitted to\\nexhaustive criticism, and OUa La Prune has presented\\nthe Christian standpoint in the philosophic essay La\\nPrix de la Vie. A healthier tone is visible in the\\ndecline of the Positivistic school and in the revival of\\nRomanicism.\\nV.\\nCauses,\\nin general 45 discussion of Pcssimism would not be com-\\nplete without advertence to its causes. A thorough\\nanalysis is difficult and would embrace elements too\\nminute and varying for place in the present dissertation.\\nOlla La\\nPrune.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0316.jp2"}, "317": {"fulltext": "PESSIMISM. 295\\nPeculiarity of temperament, manifold circumstances of\\nlife, fill the soul with sad thoughts and gloomy fore-\\nbodings. Three principle sources, however, can be\\nindicated.\\n46. (a) Philosophical To this head are reduced the spedai:\\nsystems of Buddhism, of Schoppenhauer and of Hart- osophkai.\\nman. The Pessimism which they teach is the logical\\nresult of the attempt to explain the system of the uni-\\nverse. The principles are false; they spring from a\\nfalse theory of knowledge, and lead to a kind of Pan-\\ntheistic Nihilism.\\n\u00c2\u00a747. (b) Ethical: A false theory of life leaves an Ethical,\\nimprint in the form of Pessimism. This is especially\\ntrue of Hedonism^ the recent aspect of ancient Epi-\\ncureanism.- Kant taught that happiness conceived as\\nenjoyment can never be reached. History is replete\\nwith proofs of this statement. Individual experience\\ntells that pleasure is an empty mirage which leaves\\nthe toil-stained seeker sad and disconsolate. A higher\\nmotive should rule our acts. There is a moral order\\nand a moral law universal and imperative to which the\\nindividual must conform, very frequently at the loss of\\npleasure or enjoyment. If we sought pleasure only,\\nwhy struggle against temptation, why row against a\\nstrong contrary current? Only thus is life s prize won,\\nis character formed and men stirred to high and heroic\\ndeeds. Pleasure enervates and softens manhood,\\nlowers the standard of action, kills earnest endeavor\\nand leaves the devotee a prey to scepticism, weariness\\nand disgust.\\n\u00c2\u00a748. (c) Religious: Finally, Pessimism may be Religious.\\ntraced to a denial of a good and just God. Around\\nthis truth are clustered the religious and philosophic\\nSully, Pessimism, p. 67.\\nRoyce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. I, ch. V.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0317.jp2"}, "318": {"fulltext": "296 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nbeliefs which alone give to life a reason and a moral\\nworth, and explain the facts of suffering or of death.\\nHope rests upon faith. Remove this and all the\\nprogress of modern science in vain can comfort the\\nsad and unhappy soul. Life becomes an enigma, with\\nonly its human and sorrowful side apparent. The only\\nrecourse is had in a scientific Meliorism which is a\\nvain dream or the shadow of Pessimism.\\n49. Christian faith alone transforms life and sheds\\nover the lowest and most sad the soft, warm sunlight\\nof its teaching. Virtue can reign in the lowliest\\nhamlet, vice may run riot upon a throne. The goods\\nand ills of life are powerless to alter our worth and\\ndignity they only serve to render it more conspicuous.\\n2^ Metman, Le Pessimisme Moderne, pp. 319, 358.\\nMgr. Gay, Christian Life and Virtues.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0318.jp2"}, "319": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XV.\\nEVIL.\\nI. The existence of evil is a startling fact in indi- fact of evil,\\nvidual experience. When in moments of silent medita-\\ntion we look into our souls, we trace there scars of\\nrepented sins or festering sores of evil habits. The in-\\njustice and malice of men, however much we may battle\\nagainst the conviction, takes deep root in the mind,\\nfills the imagination and hangs over our waking lives\\nlike a dark and heavy pall. The actions of others are\\ncarefully examined, or their biographies are read, and\\nthe same tale of physical or mental suffering is told.\\nThe history of man confirms our judgment and exhibits\\nsorrow, suffering and misery. Our own convictions\\nare read in the physical and animal world. Evil every-\\nwhere exists; life itself is conditioned by pain. In\\nface of these facts how can man admit the existence\\nof a good and merciful God?\\nI.\\nThe Problem.\\n2. The existence of evil, we are told, is widespread.\\nIt is found in inanimate and animate creation, in ani-\\nmals as also in man. It assumes different aspects, nor\\nis it always of the same force. To be thoroughly\\ntreated, the problem should be made definite.\\n3. Evil is the antithesis of good. To understand what is the\\nits nature we must first obtain a clear notion of what^\u00c2\u00b0\u00c2\u00b0\\nis meant by good. The idea of goodness is funda-\\nmental. It enters into the thought of every conscious\\nmind; it is applied to a great variety of objects, and\\n[297]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0319.jp2"}, "320": {"fulltext": "298 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfinds expression in some of the most beautiful passages\\nin literature. Nevertheless the notion is not easy to\\ndefine. The important part it plays in our rational\\nlife, its intimate relation with the ideas of the true and\\nbeautiful, its moral influence on what is highest and\\nnoblest, as well as on what is lowest and base, its con-\\nnection with the generous, the selfish and the aesthetic\\nemotions, are apt to suggest a superficial or partial\\nand erroneous conception. The atmosphere in which\\nwe live, the manner of viewing persons and events,\\nthe value of life itself are in danger of perversion.\\nThey hinge on what we hold to be good. Human\\nnature in the past has sought the good and will seek\\nit in the future.\\nimplies a ft 4^ Goodness is an abstract noun formed from the\\nrelation\\nbased on adjective good. In its primary and concrete signifi-\\nfacts. cation, therefore, it denotes a quality or attribute of\\nthings. Further analysis shows that the attribute or\\nquality which inclines us to call an object good, is not\\nconceived as something absolute. The idea of good,\\nas well as of truth and of beauty, implies a relation.\\nIn the good, the object appeals to the will; in the true,\\nto the mind; in the beautiful, to the aesthetic sense.\\nThe relation is, however, not purely logical; it has a\\nreal objective basis in external objects.\\na subjective 5. Thus the couccpt of the good contains a sub-\\nand obiec- 1 1 rr-.! 1 1\\ntiveeie- jcctive and an objective element, ine objective ele-\\nment in the T 1\\nnotion of mcnt IS the quality or attribute inherent m the object;\\ngoo ness. subjective element is the peculiar relation to the\\nwill or desire. The objective elem.ent is conceived as\\nfundamental; the subjective as constitutive; both\\ncombined form the complete and correct notion. This\\nenables us to understand how it is that writers present\\nconflicting views in the analysis of the good. Some\\nlaying stress on the objective element alone, identify", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0320.jp2"}, "321": {"fulltext": "EVIL.\\n299\\ngoodness with perfection. It is true, perfection is con-\\ntained in the concept of goodness. Hence what is\\nperfect is good. Thus, e. g., God, the most perfect\\nbeing, is the highest good. Nevertheless over and\\nabove the element of perfection, the notion of good-\\nness exhibits a relation to the will which is its char-\\nacteristic mark. Thus Aristotle, St. Thomas, and\\nCicero,^ describe the good as that which is desired or\\nsought by all. Others viewing the subjective to the\\nexclusion of the objective element have been led to\\ntreat of the good as a sentiment, beautiful in itself,\\nbut possessing no reality save as the projection of our\\nhopes and tastes. To the consistent followers of Kant\\nthe good is purely subjective. What is objective is\\nbeyond the reach of the mind. The supremacy of the\\nwill, upon which Kane so strongly insists in his Critic\\nof Judgment, is nothing more than the dictum of the\\nindividual. The logical outcome of his teaching finds\\nhistoric illustration in the sentimentalism of Jacobi and\\nSchleiermacher, in the aesthetic idealism of Fichte and\\nthe Neo-Kantians.\\n6. Finally, some recognize the subjective and the g[l\u00c2\u00b0/J^^^^\\nobjective elements, but, forgetful that the will forP^^^sure.\\ndivers reasons seeks an object apprehended as good,\\nconfound goodness with utility or pleasure. Thus we\\nhave the school of Utilitarianism proposed by Bentley\\nand both Mills, and the ancient theory of the Epi-\\ncureans reappearing under the modern form of\\nHedonism.\\nEthics, 1. I, c. I.\\nC. Gent. 1. I, ch. 37; S. Theol. p. i, q. 5, a. 1. 3, 5, 6; q. 48,\\na. i; q. 60, a. i, 21,\\nDe Finibus, 1. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0321.jp2"}, "322": {"fulltext": "300\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nII.\\nIn the Material World.\\nprincipal of\\nfinality.\\nin nature.\\n7. In a preceding chapter the problem of the Final\\nCause was fully discussed. The conclusion established\\nbeyond question was that ends and purposes exist in\\ncreation. An examination into our inner life shows\\nthat every waking moment is filled with an object in\\nview which guides and controls our thoughts, affec-\\ntions and actions. The explanation is found in the\\nconstitution of our nature. The two great faculties of\\nthe soul are mind and will. A rational act springs\\nfrom their harmonious union. The mind points out\\nthe way and funishes the motives of action. The will\\nimparts the moving power by which the act is put into\\nexecution. To act with a motive is a sign and proof\\nof rational life. Now motive is the reason why our\\nacts combine in a special line for a fixed object; nay,\\nmore, it is the reason why we act at all. In this way\\nour actions are clothed with a purpose and the princi-\\nple of finality rules over our conscious existence.\\n8. The same conclusion is forced upon the mind\\nfrom the consideration of external nature. Ends are\\neverywhere found, and ends suppose and demand pur-\\nposes. The knowledge of the laws which hold sway in\\nthe external world is obtained from the study of the\\nphysical sciences. Pick up whatever branch of science\\nou will, there is always found something in the\\nlanguage or tone of thought which reveals the universal\\nsway of purpose. As in a concerted and well -developed\\ncourse of human action the individual acts conspire\\nand combine under intelligent guidance to form one\\nharmonious and efficient whole, so in the world with-\\nout. The individual objects have a special position in", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0322.jp2"}, "323": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 301\\nthe scheme of things and a definite function to per-\\nform. They bear definite relations to one another, act\\nand interact according to determined and determinable\\nlaws, thus constituting a closely joined, compact and\\nconnected whole. Thus we speak of the system of\\nnature, distinguish grades of existences in creation, and\\ncall the universe a divine fabrication.\\n8 Q. Some modern writers strongly maintain that mechanical\\ntheory not\\nthe physical view of nature is in direct opposition to contra-\\ndictoryto\\nthe religious. By the former they understand thefinaUty.\\nmechanical view; by the latter the teleological. In a\\nformer chapter the question has been discussed, and\\nshown to be not in accord with truth. The error is\\ndue to a confusion of terms occasioned by a narrow\\nframe of mind. The confusion disappears as soon as\\nthe meaning and sphere of both are defined. The\\nmechanical view represents the world as resulting from\\nthe interaction of physical agencies; the teleological\\nas controlled by purposes, whether great or small. B}^\\ninsisting exclusively upon either we are led into error\\nand become one-sided and exaggerated. The truth\\nlies in the harmonious union of both.^\\n10. Two theories conflict only when they give\\ndifferent explanations of the same thing viewed under\\nthe same aspect. There is no conflict when they strive\\nto account for different things or are concerned with\\ndifferent aspects of the same thing. Thus, e.g.^ Physi-\\nology and Anatomy treat of the human body. They\\nThere are harmonies in the works of God beyond painter s\\npencil and poet s pen, falling upon the soul with a more melodi-\\nous rhythm and a sweeter cadence than the most exquisite\\nmusic. McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 135.\\nThis chapter may present some considerations in answer to\\nthe difficulties felt and expressed by Prof. Royce in The\\nReligious Aspect of Philosophy, B. II, ch. I. The line of\\nthought is a development of the Design-Argument which is thus\\nshown not to be a halting half-Theism. lb., p. 279.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0323.jp2"}, "324": {"fulltext": "302 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nare different sciences, yet do not run counter to each\\nother. Physiology treats of the functions of the living\\nbody; Anatomy of the structure of the inanimate\\nframe. In like manner Psychology discusses the\\nnature and activity of the human soul, yet does not\\ndeny that the process of digestion is carried on accord-\\ning to chemical lav/s.\\nmechanical 8 II. The present difficulty is solved in an analogous\\ntheory con-\\ncernsthe manner. The mechanical view ot the universe is con-\\nfinaiity the ccrncd Only with the means or laws of the world-order;\\npurpose, the teleological with the purpose of these laws or with\\nthe order itself. That I have a purpose to accomplish\\nsupposes the existence of means through which only\\nit can be worked out. The means vary according to\\nthe nature of the end desired. Thus I make use of my\\nown words, actions and conduct, or employ the influ-\\nence of friends to secure employment for myself or for\\nothers. Again, in building a house I use stone, brick,\\ncement, wood, according to the principles set forth in\\nthe science of Architecture. Take, e. g.^ the depart-\\nment of Mechanics. In the steam engine, in hydraulics\\nI combine known laws of nature to work out my own\\npurposes. Every day man s dominion over the phy-\\nsical forces is widening. Are these wonderful machines\\nand devices less the proof of definite purposes simply\\nbecause natural forces and material are the means\\nemployed? The mind of man controls and guides phy-\\nsical elements to carry out his own designs. In the\\ndaily life of the humblest artisan or mechanic we find\\nabundant illustration of the manner in which the\\nmechanical and teleological views of the world work in\\nharmonious accord. Traces of mind working behind\\nand through phenomena, prevail throughout the uni-\\nverse. The very existence of the marvelous world-\\norder is a striking proof. The purposes of the divine", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0324.jp2"}, "325": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 303\\nmind are carried out througrh mechanical and physical modern\\nr science in\\na^^encies. In the divine government both views Record with\\n_ f^* Scholastic\\ncoalesce into a grand harmonious unity. The fact that teaching.\\nthroughout nature ends and purposes are everywhere\\nvisible is not only a truth of modern science, it is a\\nfundamental principle of Scholastic Philosophy. Both\\nare in full accord and this unity of teaching prepares\\nthe way for a deeper insight into a truth involved in\\nthe fact and springing from it.\\n12. The existence of ends supposes the existence ends\\nsuppose\\nof tendencies. Thus we speak of an object tending to tendencies.\\nan end. The tendency is a quality or property inherent\\nin the object by which it passes from a state of rest\\ninto activity or varies its form of activity in the pur-\\nsuit of the thing sought. A tendency, therefore, is a\\npower of activity which an object possesses. To speak\\nof an object without a tendency of some kind is to go\\ncontrary to all known experience. For tendency is of\\nthe nature of a thing, and to affirm that a thing is\\nwithout a tendency is equivalent to say that it has no\\nconcrete existence.\\n8 i-^. Tendencies sprinor from the nature of a thing, source and\\nnature of\\nTherefore things of a different nature possess different tendencies.\\ntendencies. A superficial knowledge even of the vari-\\nous sciences brings this home to our minds. The forces\\nof nature, energy of whatsoever kind, human activity,\\nare classed under the common name of tendencies.\\nFor our present purpose we may distinguish two divi-\\nsions only: natural and rational. Natural tendencies\\nembrace the forces which prevail throughout inanimate\\ncreation. The knowledge is found in the physical\\nsciences. Their nature and modes of operation become\\nthe subject of study and experiment. Thus we formu- physical\\nlate the laws of their interaction, e. g., of attraction, tendencies.\\nin virtue of which the myriad bodies of the universe", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0325.jp2"}, "326": {"fulltext": "304 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nhold their appointed round and a harmonious unison\\nprevails. Or we express chemical affinities and pro-\\nportions according to which molecules show special\\ninclinations to one another so as to form special com-\\npounds, e. g., H2O shows how strong is the affinity of\\noxygen to combine with two parts of hydrogen, thus\\nforming the natural element of water. The study of\\nphysical nature is a concerted effort to investigate the\\nproperties of bodies and to express them in a scientific\\nformula. With every discovery or advance in science,\\nthe knowledge of the qualities or properties of things\\nacquires a corresponding increase. But the properties\\nof bodies are nothing more or less than their tendencies\\nor inclinations. By reason of these properties bodies\\nhave definite forms of activity and definite inclinations\\nto the objects which make up the environment.\\nrational S 14. Rational tendencies are the activities of human\\ntendencies.\\nnature. The soul of man has two great potencies or\\npowers; intelligence and will. The will is the source\\nand controlling power of human action. The intelli-\\ngence ministers to our activity in so far as it shows the\\nwill what to do and furnishes motives of action. The\\nrational will is characteristic of human nature and\\nmakes it distinct from lower creation. Beings in the\\nscale of existence below man act by a necessity of\\nnature; in given circumstances they cannot help act-\\ning, and we are enabled with mathematical precision\\nto calculate the direction and intensity of the act.\\nMan alone acts from free-choice, and in acting he is\\nguided by the intellect which supplies motives either\\nfor acting or for abstaining from action, or for doing\\nthe opposite. The will seeks what the intellect appre-\\nhends as good. This good excites the desire, which in\\nturn arouses our activity and thus takes on the char-\\nacter of a final cause. The nature of the rational", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0326.jp2"}, "327": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 305\\ntendency will be analyzed further on; at present the\\nproblem concerns natural activities and inclinations.\\nS iq. A study of the natural tendencies reveals the mutual in-\\nr r 1 1 -1 11, teraction\\nexistence of ends everywhere in the world about us. for mutual\\nperlection.\\nObjects have definite inclinations to one another. The\\nnear presence of an object arouses another to act.\\nThus we explain the marvelous combination of activi-\\nties in inanimate as well as in animate nature; e., g.^\\nthe phenomena of growth. The mutual interaction\\neverywhere visible is for the mutual perfecting of the\\nobjects concerned. The object sought perfects the\\nobject seeking, just as this in turn is perfected by\\nthe possession of that to which it tends.\\n16. What impresses the student of nature is the subordina-\\ndefiaite subordination of activities. One object leads tendencies,\\nto another, which in turn ministers to another in\\nthe various spheres of physical science. Natural\\ntendencies are the means by which one object acts\\nupon and perfects another, just as this object is con-\\nceived as the source or cause arousing the activity or\\ntendency. If this object were not present there would\\nbe no motion or tendency; only a potency to action\\nor an inclination to act which would lie dormant owing\\nto the absence of a movine: cause. Thus is opened\\nexplained\\nup to the mind the notion and function of the final by the\\nFinal\\ncause, as an object which arouses the dormant energy cause.\\nor potency of another and becomes the end cf the\\nother s activity.\\n17. We are thus led on to a further consideration.\\nObjects do not act upon one another at haphazard.\\nThere are definite tendencies to definite ends. The\\nmarvelous order in the universe and the harmony\\n^This enables the student to understand the raeani-irj ^f\\nappetitus naturalis, sensitivus^ rationalis so frequent in\\nScholastic Philosophy.\\n20", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0327.jp2"}, "328": {"fulltext": "306 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nwhich reigns throughout can only thus be explained.\\nThere are determined relations and tendencies. The\\nreason must be sought in the nature of the things\\nthemselves/\\nrevear 1 8. Tendencies suppose a natural fitness or agree-\\nfitnesse between things. An object seeks another in so\\nfar as it perfects the other in some way. Thus the\\nanalysis of inclinations reveals the fitness or agreement\\nof things. But fitness and agreement shows the idea and\\nexistence of goodness. We have seen that the notion\\nnotkfnof of goodness implies a perfection or quality in an object\\ngoodness, ^j^j^.]-^ arouscs the activity of the agent, fits into its\\nnatural constitution and perfects it either in being or\\nin activity. Whatever, therefore, possesses a fitness for\\nthe agent in the sense that it excites to action and\\nperfects the agent in any way is said to be good.\u00c2\u00ae Now\\nthis is the object of every natural tendency. From\\nthis it follows that good is coexistent with tendencies;\\nit is their reason and explanation. But tendencies are\\nuniversal throughout nature; therefore goodness holds\\nuniversal sway.\\nuniversal^ 1 9. The cxistencc of goodness as a fundamental,\\nandfunda- universal element in nature is the necessary conse-\\nmental\\nelement in quencc of the arg-ument from desisrn.\u00c2\u00ae The universe\\nnature. 7\\nis a vast system of beings different in nature joined\\none to another and forming a harmonious whole.\\nOne object ministers to another so as to constitute\\na compact well-connected unity. The tendencies\\nor natural inclinations are the means employed\\nby the Divine Architect to connect being to being.\\nThese inclinations are potencies possessed by every\\nUrraburu, Ontolog. Disp. 7, c. 3, a. 2.\\nBonum habet raiionem causae finalis. St. Thomas,\\n1. q. 5, a. 2, ad. i; verum est in anima sed bonum in rebus,\\n1. q. 16, a. I.\\nCard. Satolli, de Deo, q. 5, a. 4.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0328.jp2"}, "329": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 307\\nobject; they only become activities through some\\nexternal and exciting or moving cause. The reason\\nwhy an object moves or arouses another from a state\\nof potency to action is because it possesses a quality\\nwhich perfects and is fitting to the nature of the agent.\\nNow the possession by a being of a quality which\\ndraws another being to it as to an end and perfects that\\nbeing is what constitutes the notion of goodness.\\nThus an intimate analysis of the world-order shows\\nthat goodness is the basal element; it is a part of its\\nvery constitution and its reign is universal and supreme.\\nIII.\\nIn Human Life.\\n20. The existence of evil in human life is a problem evil in\\nmuch more interesting and difficult. Its closeness tomore^\\nour daily lives, its apparent contradiction to the\\nfundamental desire of happiness, make it a part of our\\nconscious selves. It enters into every philosophical\\ntreatise which proposes to explain the mysteries of\\nour being. Many theories have been advanced differ-\\ning in point of view and in the strength of reasoning.\\nThe true solution is found in the profound study of\\nman s nature. Thus Kant and Fichte viewed the\\nproblem from an ethical standpoint. The aim is true\\nbut the exposition is vitiated by an erroneous phil-\\nosophy.\\n21. The purpose is not to trace the development the ques-\\nof the question in the past. That pertains to the His-\\ntory of Philosophy. Its present phases are of more\\nvital importance. They naturally spring from the\\n\u00c2\u00aeSo also Brown in Phil, of Human Mind, Lect. 93; cf. Mc-\\nCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 32; Sully, Pessimism\\np. 68.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0329.jp2"}, "330": {"fulltext": "3o8\\nHedonism.\\n(i) subjec-\\ntive.\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nethical theories of life. What concerns us at present,\\ntherefore, is to investigate the standard and value of\\nhuman life.\\n1\u00c2\u00b0. Hedonist Theory.\\n22. Hedonism is the theory of those who teach that\\npleasure is the end of conduct and the criterion of\\nmorality. Set forth in persuasive language by Epi-\\ncurus, it deeply influenced ancient Greek and Roman\\ncivilization. Proposed in our own times by men of\\ngreat authority it has reappeared under a new name\\nas a philosophy of moral conduct. Its various phases\\npermit a wide scope of human activity. Thus there\\nare intellectual, aesthetic and sensuous pleasures. The\\nconsistent Hedonist, therefore, may be an apostle of\\nintellectual culture, a lover of the beautiful, or a\\nseeker of sensuous gratification. These forms do not\\nappear separated by a rigid line of demarkation. His-\\ntory shows that they inevitably run one into the other.\\nThe influences of a Christian environment, the natural\\npromptings of a noble soul may preserve the individual\\nfrom contamination. But there is nothing in the\\ntheory itself which restricts to one class of pleasures\\nonly, which forbids the disciple from seeking pleasure\\nin the full realization of all his desires. Its legitimate\\nconsequences are seen in a pessimistic tone of thought,\\nin the drama and novel of modern sensualism.\\n23. (i) The theory of Hedonism is subjective.\\nAs such it is variable. What pleases one does not\\nalways please another. Hence there is no stable\\n1 Cicero, de Fin, I, 9; II, 3; Tuscul. Ill, 18.\\n12 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. I, p. i;\\nHodgson, Theory of Practice, vol. TI, ch. 2.\\nE. g., Marius the Epicurean, cf. James Seth, Ethical Prin-\\nciples.\\nRoyce, The Religious Aspect -^f Philosophy, B. I, ch. V.\\nW. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, p. 65.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0330.jp2"}, "331": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 309\\nfoundation for human conduct. But this is contrary\\nto the testimony of consciousness and is contradicted\\nby the universal practice of human legislation. An\\nexamination of our inner life shows that conduct is\\nnot governed by mere subjective desire. There is a\\nconstraining power over our acts which cannot be\\nexplained by the subjective constitution of the indi-\\nvidual alone. Else whence the remorse and sorrow\\nwhich follow evil deeds, the approbation and peace in\\nthe soul of the righteous? Conscience, the guide, wit-\\nness and judge of oar life, is the voice of a law outside\\nand beyond us. Everywhere legislation is controlled\\nby a principle which supposes an objective moral\\norder. The existence, therefore, of an objective rule\\nand guide of morality is a complete refutation of the\\ntheory of pleasure.^\\n24. (2) It is wrong to maintain t\\\\\\\\2it pleasiu^e is t liQ pleasure\\ntrue and only meaning of good. The good is the object meaning of\\nof our desire inasmuch as its possession perfects our\\nnature. But in seeking our own perfection we often\\nundergo suffering. Thus, e. g.^2. physician gives bitter\\nmedicine, or performs a painful operation in order that\\nhealth be restored or life saved. Again, I undertake\\nexcruciating mental labor, or face trials and death on\\nthe battlefield. My efforts are by no means the dic-\\ntates of pleasure; they are accompanied by pain, dis-\\nappointment and bodily suffering. Yet they are a good.\\nThus all through life I seek the good^ in seeking\\nit I acquire virtue, and I acquire virtue at the dic-\\ntates of duty. Where, then, are these words in\\nthe vocabulary of the Hedonist and what is their\\n\u00c2\u00bb6 W. S. Lilly, Right and Wrong, ch. Ill; J. Ming, S. J., Data\\nof Modern Elhics, ch. IV; H. Meyer, S. J., Institutiones Juris\\nNaturalis, ch. II.\\nWalter Hill, S. J., Ethics, p. 17.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0331.jp2"}, "332": {"fulltext": "3IO\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(3) conse-\\nquences.\\n(a) selfish-\\nness and\\ndisgnst.\\n(b) Utili-\\ntarianism,\\nmeaning? Whether it pleases or not heroism is a\\nnoble thing!\\n25. (3) That Hedonism is not the true theory of\\nmoral life is shown by its consequences. These are\\ntwo-fold: (a) It has fostered what is base and ignoble\\nin our nature. The consistent seeker of pleasure is\\nnot a great and good man. The higher springs of\\naction are closed to him. He is his own end and the\\nacquisition of pleasure is the aim of existence. Hence\\nthe development of a supreme selfishness.^^ (b) The\\nweakness of Hedonism gave rise to another school of\\nmorals. This, in the hands of Mill, is called by the\\nterm Utilitarianism. It is an attempt at an improve-\\nment by the introduction of the element, Altruism.\\nA critical\\nattention.^\\nexamination, therefore, demands our\\nUtiiitaria\\nnism.\\nitsprinci- 26. John Stuart Mill, a disciple of Bentham,\\npie: The i 1 r f\\ngreatest recoguizcd tnc weakness of nis master s position and\\nSiTgreatest attempted to strengthen it by supplying the defect.\\nnumoer. j^.^ individual good which is the\\nstandard of conduct, but the greatest possible good\\nfor the greatest number. He is thus the parent of\\nthe altruistic spirit which pervades modern ethical\\nliterature. In teaching that pleasure should be esti-\\nmated by quality as well as quantity he departs from\\nBentham. He admits that pleasure is not a principle\\nJanet, Theory of Morals, pp. 11, 122.\\nTennyson, The Palace of Art. A good negative criticism is\\ngiven by Prof. Royce, in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,\\nB. I, ch. VII.\\nPlato, Philetus and Republic, B. IX; Lecky, European\\nMorals, vol. I, ch. I; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, vol.\\nII; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, B. I., c. 4; IV, c. I; Muir-\\nhead, The Elements of Ethics, B. Ill, ch. I.\\nJohn Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism; J. Martineau, Types of\\nEthical Theories, B. II, Br. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0332.jp2"}, "333": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 311\\nsufficient in itself, but that it is necessary to make\\na choice between pleasures. Hence the principle of\\nutility.\\n\u00c2\u00a727. In setting forth the basis of Utilitarianism, two\\nthe passage from individual to general pleasure, ^^^Pj^\\nwhich gives rise to the fundamental principle, e. g./^ona-i\\nthe greatest good for the greatest number, its advocates\\nseparate into two schools, viz., Empirical and Intui-\\ntional. The former, with Mill and Bain, seek an\\nempirical criterion for the quality of pleasure either in\\nlegislation with Hobbes or in the general estimate of\\nmankind. Hence the theory of Empirical Ethics.\\nThe latter, with Sidgwick, teaches that we have an\\nimmediate faculty of rational intuition which informs\\nus that the good of others is as desirable an end of\\nconduct as our own happiness. Thus we have the\\ntheory of Intuitional Ethics.\\nS 28. Mr. Spencer in the Data of Ethics attempts a Spencer\\nr 1 t 1 11- 1 1 attempts a\\nreconciliation of both schools by introducing the ele- reconciiia-\\ntion in his\\nment of evolution. According to this doctrine the Evoiution-\\n1 -11 ary Ethics.\\nexperience laboriously acquired by the individual is\\ntransmitted to succeeding generations,^^ In the course\\nof time the store of accumulated wisdom increases and\\nbecomes the precious heritage of the past. Thus what\\nis empirical with the race becomes intuitional with the\\nindividual; the true basis for a reconciliation between\\nEgoism and Altruism is found, and rational laws hold\\nJanet, Theory of Morals, p. 13.\\nUtilitarianism,\\n^*Bain, Moral Science, p. 27; Emotions and Will, p. 203.\\n^^Th. Meyer, S. J., Institutiones Juris Naturalis, ch. Ill;\\nRoyce, The Relig-ious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 164, 165, 166.\\nMethods of Ethics, p. 379.\\nDewey, Outlines of Ethics, p. 46 sq.\\n2^ In Germany Ernest Laas teaches the same doctrine.\\nPfleiderer, Phil, of Religion, p. 177.\\n29 Ribot, English Psychology; Leslie Stephens; Science of\\nEthics.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0333.jp2"}, "334": {"fulltext": "312 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nsway instead of mere empirical calculations and rules.\\nHence the theory of Evolutionary Ethics which is a\\nsynthesis of the best elements in Hedonism, in Empiri-\\ncal and Intuitional Utilitarianism. Under the title of\\nScientific Meliorism, this theory finds able exponents\\nin George Eliot and Mr. Sully.\\nCriticism. 29. (i) Mr. Spencer s theory of Evolution is\\nonly a specious effort at reconciliation. In reality\\ncer stheory it Icavcs the difficultv uusolvcd. The teaching of\\nis false\\n(a) assump- moral growth by evolution is a pure assumption and\\nis contradicted by facts. It is not true that primitive\\nman Vi^as a savage, as the doctrine must assume. Com-\\n(b) refuted parativc philology and historical investigation show\\nby facts.\\nthat in the earliest known times man had ideas of\\nreligious and moral truth and expressed these ideas in\\nlanguage and institutions which show a high grade of\\nintelligence. Again, how in this theory account for\\ndeteriorating nations and civilizations? Yet every-\\nwhere history points to facts of degeneration. That\\nknowledge acquired by parents is transmitted by\\norganic evolution is a statement advanced without\\nproof. Genius is never thus evolved. The ethical\\nvalue of our present civilization is not due to the law\\nof evolution, but to the influence of Christian teaching.^\\n(2)Sidg- g 30. (2) Mr. Sidgwick teaches that the results of\\nwick s S o J b,\\ntheory the act are the only tests of its righteousness.^^ Moral\\nIS false:\\nmoral good orQod or cvil, therefore, depends on the consequences\\nand evil do x- ~i\\nnot depend of the act. If the consequences be good, the act is\\non results\\nof the act. good if the consequences be bad, the act is bad. But\\nwhat then becomes of the distinction everywhere\\nrecognized between the acts of man and human acts?\\nThe former are acts performed by man when asleep or\\n30 W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, 170, sq.; J. Ming, S. J., The\\nData of Modern Ethics, ch. HI.\\n31 Methods of Ethics, B. I, c. IV; B. IV, c. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0334.jp2"}, "335": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 313\\nwithout consciousness; the latter are those which\\nspring from mind and free-will. According to Mr.\\nSidgwick there is no moral distinction. Nevertheless\\nthere is a distinction and a very great one. It is found\\nin motive and free-will which belong to the latter class\\nonly. Hence not consequences but motives and free-\\nchoice which antedate the act give to it a moral value.\\nOnly thus can we account for the moral laws of right\\nand wrong. Finally, to make consequences the test\\nof morality is to teach an impossible criterion. How\\ncan any one calculate the possible results of his acts?\\n\u00c2\u00a731- (3) Just as Utilitarianism defeats Hedonism, (3) Hedon-\\nso does Hedonism overthrow Utilitarianism. The utiiftarian-\\nbasis of Mr Mill s teaching is utility. But utility is ea^h other.\\nnot a principle. The useful is what serves a purpose;\\nhence a means to an end.^^ Now to Utilitarianism,\\nthis end can only be pleasure. Yet it has been shown\\nthat pleasure cannot be an end.\\n32. (4) Above pleasure and above utility there is (4) law of\\nthe law of duty. Our inner consciousness bears wit-both.^\\nness to the fact. The dictates of this law must be\\nobeyed. We know what is right and what is wrong.\\nWq are constrained to do the one and avoid the other,\\neven at the sacrifice of earthly honors and posses-\\nsions.^* True, we can refuse to obey, but the refusal\\ndoes not destroy the dictate of conscience; it ever\\nabides, like Banquo s ghost, the avenger even of a\\nsecret wrong.\\n32 T. R. Birks, First Principles of Moral Science, ch. III.\\n33 Mr. Wallace contends that there is in nature a sense of\\nright and wrong antecedent to and independent of utilit^v. Cf.\\nNatural Selection, p. 353; cf. also Forum, April, 1891 Will\\nMorality Surviv^e Faith.\\n34 Mallock, Is Life Worth Living, p. 47.\\n3* Sophocles, Shakspere, Goethe, as Mr. Mallock justly\\nobserves, depict man struggling or failing to struggle after\\nright. In Macbeth the impression left is not that Duncan shall\\nsleep forever, but that Macbeth shall sleep no more; not the", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0335.jp2"}, "336": {"fulltext": "314 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n3\u00c2\u00b0. The Theory of Christian Philosophy.\\nevil in i5 -1%. Christian Philosophy teaches that man is a\\nanimal life.\\nrational animal. In common with the brute he has a\\nperfect animal nature. But over and above he possesses\\nthe characteristic endowment of intelligence and free-\\nwill. In discussing the nature and value of evil, it is\\nnecessary to clearly understand what part pain plays in\\nanimal life.\\nthe Animal g 34. Scientists speak of an animal Kingdom. The\\nterm is based upon and expresses the existence of\\norder in the anim^al world. This order is constituted\\nby the unity and harmony of tendencies. The animal\\ntendenaes. has faculties of scnsc, e. g., sight, hearing, etc., which\\narouse tendencies of various kinds. In the exercise\\nof these tendencies it seeks and acquires that which\\nperfects its being. Animal tendencies can be reduced\\nlre1)Ttwo to two main classes; v^^hat conduces to the preservation\\nfiaTses. of the individual and of the species. Besides the\\norgans of sense, the animal possesses instinct. Instinct\\nis a positive element and accompanies the operations\\nof the senses. The study of instinct and of animal\\nsanction of activitv rcvcals another element in animal life, viz.,\\npleasure\\nand of pain, the Sanction of pleasure and of pain. The sensitive\\nlife of animals is the source and principle of their\\naction. But in acting they have no reason to guide\\nthem. They have, however, the lav/ of pleasure and of\\npain. Physical evil is the pain which results from the\\nlesion of an organ. Physical good is the pleasure which\\nfollows the true satisfaction of animal tendencies.\\nThus animal pleasure is an instrument to preserve,\\njust as animal pain is a natural means to restore the\\nextinction of a dynasty, but the ruin of a character. In Measure\\nfor Measure and Faust, the strugfgle is centered in female\\nchastity; this makes Isabella heroic, Margarite unfortunate.\\nIn Antigone the purpose is to live up to the enduring laws of\\nGod. Is Life Worth Living, p. 136.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0336.jp2"}, "337": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 3,-5\\nproper order.^\u00c2\u00ae The animal seeks pleasure and flies the con-\\nstitutive\\nfrom pain. In so doinof it conduces to the maintenance element of\\nthe order.\\nof order. The sensation of pain makes the sufferer\\nseek to put an end to the pain. The cessation of pain\\nis the cessation of organic disorder. To destro}^ pain\\nis equivalent to the destruction of sensitive life, t. e.,\\nthe animal itself. Is not this fact the indication of\\nwisdom? Cruelty does not consist in inflicting pain, meaning of\\nbat in taking pleasure in causing suffering. There is\\nno proof that God is cruel in the pains of animals.\\nThey alone do not make up animal existence. The\\npleasure derived from the exercise of tendencies form\\nthe main feature. Pain only enters in as a small part place of\\nof animal life, and even then its function is to restore ^nlmiuife.\\nthe animal organism, to direct animal tendencies, so\\nthat pleasure may again prevail.\\n8 34^. Furthermore, in the observation of animal pain animal not\\nlike human\\nwe are prone to exaggeration. We estimate the suffer- pain.\\ning by the standard of human sensibility. This is a\\nT -m- r cc J (i) element\\nradical error. The intensity of oar suffering is due to of inteiu-\\nmemory of the past, to provision of the future, toiackSg.\\nassociation with others.^\u00c2\u00ae But animals have no intelli-\\ngence. The past and future do not accentuate their\\npain. Their suffering is confined to the present only.\\nFinally, in limiting pain to the present, we do not\\ntake into account the difference of temperament. This\\ndifference has an important bearing on human pain,\\nhow much more so with the brute? Its nervous encJhT\\norganization is not so delicate and sensitive as ours. Janlmion^.\\nThat very fact lessens the keenness of their suffering.\\nMr. Mill admits this in Essays on Religion, pp. 190,\\nigi.\\ns Bonniot. S. J., Le Probleme du mal, b. Ill, ch. II; b. IV,\\nch. 5; Chadbourne, Natural Theology, p. 119.\\n38 R. F. Clark, S. J., The Existence of God, ch. III.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0337.jp2"}, "338": {"fulltext": "3i6\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ngood means\\nnot only\\npleasure^\\nutility.\\nsuvtmui\\nhomitn.\\nThe moral\\norder.\\nconscience\\na witness\\nto it.\\nNatural sympathy leads us, therefore, into a vital\\nerror.\\n35- We have seen that the good admits of more\\nthan one meaning. It may ^\\\\%x{\\\\iY pleasure^ and on this\\nmeaning is based the theory of Hedonism. Or it m.ay\\nsignify utility^ whence arises the theory of Utilitarian-\\nism. The defect in these theories was shown to lie in\\nthe claim to be the supreme and sole guide of human\\nconduct. But has another meaning, viz., that, the\\npossession of which, enobles and perfects our nature\\nin the highest and best possible manner.* This leads\\nto the conception of the highest good., the summum\\nbonujn, the discussion of which forms so important a\\nplace in the philosophy of Plato and of the Christian\\nFathers, especially St. Augustine.\\n2,^. Just as a physical order prevails in the material\\nworld, and an animal kingdom in animal nature, so\\nthere is a moral order in the world of man. With this\\ndifference, however, that man alone has the govern-\\nment and guidance of his own acts. Material bodies\\nexert tendencies by a physical necessity; animals act in\\nan analogous necessity governed by the feelings of\\npleasure and of pain; man alone possesses intelligence\\nand free-will, by these he guides and becomes the\\nresponsible agent of his actions.\\n37. But man is not independent in the sense that\\nhe is a law to himself. In the soul of every rational\\ncreature there is a hidden monitor which proclaims\\nthe ineradicable distinction between good and evil.\\nIts dictates are part and parcel of our conscious selves.\\n2^ J, R, IlHngworth, in Lux Mundi, The Problem of Pain;\\nProf. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 232.\\nFranzelin. De Des Uno, p. 227.\\nHence the distinction in Philosophical manuals of bonum\\ndelectabile, bo7iu?n utile, boniini honestum.\\n^St. Augustine, de Beata Vita; De Mor. Eccles., 1. i, c. 3;\\n1. 2, c. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0338.jp2"}, "339": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 317\\nIts voice is ever heard in the deep silence of the soul,\\ntelling what we should do or what we should avoid,\\nrewarding with the tone of approval or censuring with\\nthe pangs of remorse, The voice of conscience is the\\nwitness of a higher law which has its basis in God.\\nThus we have the conception of a moral order.\\n8 ^8. By obedience to the dictates of this law man God is the\\nbasis of the\\nseeks the sfood. The possession of this s^ood perfects moraiiaw;\\n1 theultimate\\nhis nature. Christian philosophy teaches that God end of\\nhuman\\nIS not only the basis of the moral law, but He is also conduct,\\nthe supreme and ultimate end of human conduct.\\nThe life of Christ is an illustration of this truth. He\\neverywhere proclaims that we must seek God above all\\nthings, that He alone is our true and ultimate good,\\nand in possession of Him we shall be truly happy.**\\nAs a means to obtain this end, our highest good, He\\nenforces the natural precepts of the moral law; sets\\ntfi em forth more clearly, and adds thereto the rules of\\nChristian conduct. Thus revelation throws a flood of\\nlight upon our end and the means to obtain it. We\\nsee more plainly the nature and extent of our duties,\\nwhat we should seek and what we should avoid.\\n39. We are now enabled to investigate the nature nature of\\nof evil. In works of art, evil is a defect of aptitude,\\na defect in the application of the aptitude, a defect in\\nthe union of the aptitude with the destination. The\\ndestination determines the value of the work. In\\nworks of nature and in the acts of man likewise, the\\ndestination determines the value. Evil, therefore, is\\nwhatever destroys the destination. It is seated\\n*^St. Augustine, De Mor. Eccles. I, 13; de Civ. Dei, XIX, 4;\\nHill, Moral Phil., p. i, ch. i.\\nSecutio igitur Dei, beadtatis appetitus est; consecutio\\nautem, ipsa beatitas. Aug. de Mor. Eccl. 1. r, n. 18.\\nBonniot, S. J., Le Probleme du mal, 1. II, c. 3; St. Thomas,\\nC. Gent, 1. II, c. 4: 1. IV, c. 7.\\nThis meets the contendon of Prof. Knight that the", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0339.jp2"}, "340": {"fulltext": "3l8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nprincipally in the will, for by the possession of free\\ndetermination man can seek or refuse to obtain his\\ndestiny. Evil, therefore, is a defect; it is the priva-\\ntion of a good demanded by the destination of a being.\\nIt supposes a positive subject. Of itself it is nothing,\\nfor all that exists is good in virtue of its reality. All\\nthat exists, however, is not perfect, e., it has not all\\na thing the reality it should have. The absence of that reality\\ngood by n r\\nwhatithas, IS the rcason why a being that is good m virtue of\\nis evil by r i i\\nwhat it has v/hat it has, is rendered evil by reason of what it has\\nshould not, but should have. Now a being can be evil either\\nin its constitution, or in its operations, or in its destina-\\ntion. Thus defects in the animal constitution of man\\nrender him an imperfect animal. They are not of\\nhesu- necessity evils for 77tan. The refusal of the will to\\nobey the dictates of the moral law is the supreme evil.\\nwiiitoobV^^^ moral order is thus destroyed. This evil is an\\nimperfection of operation and results in the failure to\\nreach his proper destination. Other evils in life may\\nhelp the attainment of our last end; they are, there-\\nfore, evils only in a relative sense.\\n40. Let us turn now to a study of man s nature.\\nHe is called a rational animal. Possessing a perfect\\nanimal nature, he has also the distinctive properties of\\nintellect and free-will. The life of man is essentially\\nj^ a development. In early years he appears only an\\nhood law of animal; the sisfns of reason appear later on. As an\\nPleasure\\na;idpain animal the young: child is g-overned by the animal law\\nrules. J J= o J.\\nof pleasure and of pain. The cry of the infant indi-\\ncates an organic need or disorder; it is thus a natural\\ninstrument for the preservation of life. With the dawn\\nwith dawn t\\nof reason of rcason he IS under the sway of a higher law. JNever-\\nknov^ied^e thcless all through life he retains his two-fold nature.\\nmoraUaw. As an animal he is subject to the inclination after\\nargument from Design constrains us to admit a designer of evil.\\nAspects of Theism, p. 73.\\npreme evil\\nis in the\\nrefusal of\\nwill to ob\u00e2\u0082\u00ac\\nmoral law", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0340.jp2"}, "341": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 319\\nsensitive goods, as a rational being he is under obedi-\\nence of a moral law which inclines to higher goods.\\nThe needs of food and clothing which when unsatisfied\\ncause pain, are at the basis of all industrial progress.\\n_,, J r conflict of\\nThe inclination to sensitive goods otten comes in con- the two\\nst3.nd3,rcis\\nflict with the dictates of the moral law. This conflict\\nis called temptation. Thus, e. g,, fear in presence of\\ndanger is a law of animal life. But if the moral law\\nimposes an obligation to brave danger, e. g.^ in the\\ndischarge of duty, fear becomes a temptation. We\\nshould struggle against it and do what we ought to do.\\nThus temptation is the attraction of pleasure and the\\nshunning of pain; and is due to the instinctive and\\npassionate promptings of our animal nature. These\\nmovements are good in themselves, e. g., in the animal;\\nthey only become an evil in as far as they conflict with\\na higher law, e. g,, the moral order. Hence good\\nthings may become an evil, just as evil things,\\npains, may become a good in as far as they are instru-\\nments for the preservation of order. physical\\npain and\\n41. The distinction can now be made between phys- n^o^ai eviL\\nical pain and moral evil. The one is not the other;\\nthey should not be confounded. Even in man physical\\npain is not of necessity an evil; it may be a natural\\ninstrument for the preservation of order. Man still\\nretains his animal nature. Ill deeds entail not only\\nsuffering of mind, e. g., remorse, shame, etc.; they\\nalso give rise to bodily pain. The mental suffering and inst rument\\nbodily pain thus become natural signs of disorder or vadon^^*^\\nexcess, and natural instruments for the restoration of orden\\nthe right order and harmony which should rule our\\nMartineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p. 77.\\nUt, quoniam bonorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti\\nsumus, amaritudine poenarum erudiamur. Aug. De Vera\\nRel. XV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0341.jp2"}, "342": {"fulltext": "320 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nlives. Again, the anticipation of pain is often a pre-\\nventative of evil acts and a stimulation to good. The\\nknowledge that we shall suffer, if we do evil, is a strong\\nmotive to good. The factor of pain thus stretches\\nout to the future as well as holds connection with\\npainan t^he past. Finally, pain helps in a higher manner. It\\nfor virtue, prescnts occasions for actions which are the crown and\\nglory of Christian manhood. The virtues of self-con-\\ntrol, of self-sacrifice, of fortitude, of patience which\\nenter into the formation of perfect character, blossom\\nonly in presence of suffering. Without these human\\naction would lose its value, and virtue would degener-\\npain shows ate into selfishness. Suffering shows the value of life.\\nthe true\\nvalue of it calls US to a consciousness of our destiny. It reminds\\nlife\\nus that we have not here an abiding dwelling-place.\\nThe thought of an immortal blessedness hallows and\\ntransforms our grief, just as the warm sun breaking\\nthrough the rain clouds diffuses its soft v/arm light\\nover nature, and makes the drops on flower and leaf\\nsparkle like jewels.\\nconclusion. g 42. A brief summ_ary of the line of thought can\\nnow be made. Everywhere throughout nature tenden-\\ncies are found. Tendencies are a proof of the final\\ncause. The essence of the final cause is the good.\\nOf necessity material and animal nature seek what is\\ngood. Thus the reign of goodness is universal and\\nsupreme. Man, however, is free in the guidance of\\nhis acts. He also seeks the good. But the truly good\\nin human life is not found in pleasure nor in utility.\\n49 J. J. Ming, S. J., lib. cit., ch. VII; J. R. Illingworth, The\\nProblem of Pain, in Lux Mundi.\\nLecky, European Morals, vol. I, p. 136; Seneca, de Prov.;\\nde Beata Vita XV; Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. I, p.\\n94; St. Aug., De Vera Relig. XV; Adv. Marc, 1. II, ch. 14; De\\nMor. Eccles., 1. I, ch. VI.\\nSt. Paul, To the Corinthians, II, ch. IV.\\nMill s objection to God s goodness rests on ambiguity and", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0342.jp2"}, "343": {"fulltext": "EVIL. 321\\nIt is had in obedience to moral law enlightened by-\\nChristian faith. Thus moral order is preserved. If\\nevil enters into human life, it is owing to the viola-\\ntion of order by free-will. Pains are not an evil as\\nsuch. They are natural instruments whereby sensitive\\nbeings are constrained to maintain order. As such\\nthey become subservient to good. In no way, there-\\nfore, can the existence of evil be ascribed to God.\\nCreation viewed as His work proclaims His wisdom and\\ngoodness.\\n43. The doctrine is the teaching of Optimism.\\nBy this we do not mean to say that the present world\\nis the best possible world. Leibnitz thought so\\nbecause he felt the position necessary for the defense\\nof the Christian concept of God. Such a theory, how-\\never, is not at all required and is in patent contradic-\\ntion to daily experience. The optimism here set forth\\nis not absolute, it is only relative. We do not teach\\nthat the world is made up of the best possible things\\nand natures. God could have made us angels, instead\\nof frail mortal human nature. We only proclaim the\\nrule of order and harmony. Each individual, while\\nnot the best possible, is nevertheless best adapted by\\nnature to minister to the wants and perfection of\\nothers. Throughout there is an adaptation of means\\nto ends; all converging to declare and make manifest\\nthe glory of the Creator, to show forth His eternal\\nwisdom, goodness and power.\\nfalse meaning of the word happiness. Cf, Essay on Relig.,\\np. IQ4; Nature, p. 65.\\nCatholica fides est: omne quod dicitur malum, aut\\npeccatum, aut poenam peccati. St. Aug., Lib. Imp. de Gen.,\\nch. I.\\n^^Thus St. Thomas sees in goodness the reason of creation.\\nDivina bonitas est ratio cur Deus velit alia a se, C. Gent.,\\nI, 86; and this is made the authoritative teaching of Catholic\\nphilosophy. Cf. Concilium Vaticanum, sess. Ill, cap. 2; St.\\nAug. Confess., 1 XIII, ch. I.\\nRom. I, 20; St. Augustine, De Vera Relig., n. 76.\\n21", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0343.jp2"}, "344": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XVI.\\nNATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL.\\nThe I. A philosophy of Theism would not be complete\\nproblem\\nWithout the discussion of a problem involved therein.,\\non whose clear conception the scope and nature of the\\ntreatise depends. The meaning and sphere of the\\nNatural and the Supernatural is a fundamental issue in\\nany treatise on Natural or Revealed Religion. These\\nwords stand for something more or less definite in the\\nmind of every thinking man. The ideas which they\\nconvey are as ancient and as widespread as the exist-\\nence of religion itself. In our own times the great\\nadvance in knowledge and the use of modern methods\\nin history and the physical sciences have inspired the\\neffort to purge out the old leaven of error and super-\\nstition from the common heritage of man s highest\\nconvictions and behefs. In this conflict the question\\nof the Natural and the Supernatural has been one of\\nthe outposts most bitterly attacked and most ten-\\naciously defended. It is wise, therefore, before enter-\\ning upon the discussion, to carefully examine the\\nground, to weigh the resources at our command and\\nto know the strength of the position.\\nI.\\nTheory of Positivism.\\nThe 2. Positivism as a system of philososphy arose in\\n^^gnostic pj-^j^^g under Auguste Comte about fifty years ago. Its\\ninfluence upon modern thought has been wide and\\nprofound. Starting with a system of definite ideas, it\\ngradually assimilated itself to a peculiar mental atmos-\\n[322]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0344.jp2"}, "345": {"fulltext": "r ositivism.\\nNATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 323\\nphere of the places whither it was carried until at\\npresent it is distinguished rather as a tone of thought\\nor a certain aspect of things than as a clear and\\nsystematic body of doctrine. Thus it is often con-\\nfounded with Agnosticism and its adherents have been\\nclassed Agnostics. More frequently it has been\\nclaimed as the exclusive property of modern science,\\nand, by a certain class of thinkers its subtle meta-\\nphysics has been spread broadcast as the well-ascer-\\ntained conclusions of scientific research and experiment.\\nFor this reason the view of Positivism is often called\\nthe Agnostic or the scientific view.^\\n\u00c2\u00a73. Positivism teaches that direct observation of teaching of\\nand experimentation on facts is the only method of\\nknowledge. By facts is understood the phenomena\\nwhich are grasped by the senses. Thus the only order\\nof existence is the material. Beyond the material\\nthere is nothing. What is termed absolute and supra-\\nsensible is merely the product of the fancy. Comte\\nassures us that there is a striking resemblance between\\nthe childhood of the individual and of the race. Then\\nthe imagination holds complete sway; fable, not cold\\nhistoric truth is attractive and the world is peopled with\\ncreations of childish wonder. This he calls the theo-\\nlogical or imaginative stage and is illustrated in Fetich-\\nism, Polytheism, Monotheism. In reality there is no\\nGod, no angel, no soul. The man of science whose\\nmind has been trained to investigate the positive facts\\nof nature and of mankind looks back with a feeling of\\npleasure tinged with regret that he cannot believe as\\nhe did when a child, but must accept the cold, stern\\nrealities of life. He considers that these beings of\\nfancy are good for children, but should have no place\\nwith full-grown men.\\nChristian Philosophy The Soul, ch. IV.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0345.jp2"}, "346": {"fulltext": "324\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY\\nThe super-\\nnatural.\\nIdea of\\nhumanity.\\n4. The supernatural, therefore, is a fiction of the\\nmind, a sweet delusion,^ a chimera, or a product of dis-\\nordered reasoning.^ The natural alone exists; it alone\\nis the object of knowledge and by natural is under-\\nstood physical nature. Physical science thus becomes\\nthe only aim of an intellectual man. To know^ nature\\nis the sole and highest ambition. Not that this knowl-\\nedge can lead to anything higher. Physical science\\nshows man his true place in the world and furnishes\\nwhat conduces to his real perfection as an individual\\nand as a member of society. Thus the physical\\nsciences lead up to Sociology, Comte s last and greatest\\neffort. Man s well-being is to be obtained by physical\\nmeans. He is purely an animal; Physiology is not\\ndifferent in nature from Psychology; and all human\\nphenomena can be explained by the action of the\\nenvironment upon the organism.\\n5. Comte felt that the idea of God could not be\\nwholly eradicated from the human mind by his princi-\\nples. He invented a substitute which, much to the\\nThe rational attitude of a thinking mind towards the\\nsupernatural, whether in natural or revealed religion, is that of\\nscepticism as distinguished from belief on the one hand and\\nfrom atheism on the other. J. S. Mill, Essays on Religion,\\np. 242. With the result that the whole domain of the super-\\nnatural is removed from the reign of Belief into that of simple\\nHope, lb., p. 244.\\n2 In many scientific treatises and in magazine articles we find\\nthe word supernatural used to designate what is at variance\\nwith or in violation of natural law. Duke of Argyll, Reign of\\nLaw, p. 5; Miiller, Natural Religion, p. 119.\\nThe influence of this teaching upon English thought is very\\ngreat. Thus the Duke of Argyll writes The truth is that\\nthere is no such distinction between what we find in nature and\\nwhat we are called upon to believe in Religion as that which\\nmen pretend to draw between the Natural and the Super-\\nnatural. Reign of Law, p. 50. And Christianity does not\\ncall on us to believe in any exception to the universal prev-\\nalence and power of law. P. 51. Yet we find him teaching\\nThe superhuman and in this sense the supernatural element,\\ni e., the ideal conformity and unity of conception, e. g., the\\nvertebrate plan. P. 31,", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0346.jp2"}, "347": {"fulltext": "NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 325\\ndiscredit of his vaunted scientific metliod, is nothing\\nmore than a fiction of the mind. No such being as\\nGod exists, nevertheless he invented a God for his pur-\\npose. Man is the apex of the animal series, the highest\\nproduct of nature. Now science shows and helps on\\nthe progress of mankind. This idea of human progress\\nand development is uppermost in every mind and uni-\\nfies by a common purpose the divine elements of\\nstruggling humanity. The idea of humanity thus\\nbecomes a center of unity for the followers of the new\\nphilosophy and is held up as an object of worship.\\nThe highest aim is the perfection of the race. Man\\nshould strive for this, should keep it ever in his\\nthoughts, should hold it in reverence and homage. But\\nthe perfection of the race is accomplished by means o^\\nthe physical sciences. Therefore the Natural is our\\nonly knowledge and our only possession. The Super-\\nnatural does not exist.\\n6. (i) The fundamental error of this theory is the criticism,\\nfalse doctrine concerning the scope and limits of human\\nknowledge. The senses do not constitute the only theory^of\\nchannel through which we acquire truth. We ^re\\nmoral and intelligent beings. The existence of Ethics,\\nof Metaphysics, of Theodicy as sciences show that the\\nmind can grasp what is above and beyond sense. The\\npossession of a spiritual nature, of higher faculties\\nmark man out as distinguished from the brute. Intel-\\nlect can never be degraded to the level of sense. It is\\nthe crown and the characteristic of human nature.\\nA philosophy that ignores this is false to man s true\\ndignity and must inevitably fail.\\n7. (2) It is false to teach that the early history of (2) false\\nnations can be compared to infancy in the sense that^^^\\nthe contents of our beliefs are the mere creations of\\nfancy, and possess no objective validity and give way", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0347.jp2"}, "348": {"fulltext": "326 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nto the matarer reflections of sober years. Historic\\nresearch has shown that pure and noble truths were in\\nthe possession of mankind far back at the very dawn\\nof time. Darkness of the understanding and weakness\\nof the will may have obscured these truths for a time.\\nThey shine forth again with renewed splendor and are\\nconfirmed by the most laborious and exact scientific\\nreasoning.^\\nII.\\nTheory of Pantheism.\\n8. By the natural, the Positivistic theory under-\\nstands the physical world only. This lies within the\\nscope of sense-experience, our only source of knowledge.\\nWhat is beyond the range of sense does not exist. The\\nsupernatural, therefore, has no meaning and conveys\\nno story any other than the product of childish or\\nirrational fancy.\\ndoctrine. \u00c2\u00a79. To this the present theory presents a Strange con-\\ntrast. The Pantheist holds that there is no distinction\\nbetween nature and God. The world about us is the\\nemanation from or a manifestation of one divine sub-\\nstance. Whether the one reality be termed substance\\nwith Spinoza, or the ego with Fichte, or the absolute\\nwith Schelling, or the idea with Hegel, is of little\\npractical moment. These are only different forms of\\npresenting the same teaching.\\ninfluence. lo. The influence of this school is not confined to\\nwritings strictly philosophical. It is found in poetry\\nand in literature. Matthew Arnold, Carlyle, Words-\\nworth, Shelley in England, Emerson, Alcott and the\\nConcord school in America disseminate its teachings.\\nModified somewhat by philosophic and scientific dis-\\ncussion, it is known to-day as the Neo-Kantian or Neo-\\nChristian Philosophy, p. loi sq.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0348.jp2"}, "349": {"fulltext": "NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 32/\\nHegelian system. The leading thinkers in England\\nand America welcome it as a last recourse from a\\nrampant materialistic scepticism. Nothing can happen\\nin nature that contradicts or transcends its laws; noth-\\ning above nature, or contrary to nature, for the power\\nof nature, is as infinite and unlimited as the power of\\nGod. There are no real miracles or supernatural natural and\\noccurrences, and the notion of miracle is only of natural,\\nsubjective importance. The idea of miracle is based\\non ignorance of natural causes. For all God s opera-\\ntions follow necessarily from His nature as the pro-\\nperties of a triangle from its nature. Thus to Herder Herder,\\nrevelation is not supernatural in its contents. Jacobi jacobi.\\nsays God s existence is more evident and certain than\\nour own and therefore requires no proof; our spiritual\\nconsciousness is for us directly transformed into a\\nconsciousness of God.^\\nII. Emerson teaches that the one eternal im ma- Emerson,\\nnent being is the soul. It is the universal background\\nof our own particular existence. He writes that the\\ncurrents of this Being circulates through me and I am\\npart and parcel of God. Visible objects are merely\\nprojections of God, the web or clothing of the Soul.^\\nIt is everywhere manifest and everywhere the same.\u00c2\u00ae\\nTo Mr. Green there is one eternal divine substance. Green.\\nThis is the universal self-consciousness. He teaches\\nthat consciousness has a double character, unity and\\nmanifold. As a unity it is an end realizing itself in\\nand through the manifold; as a manifold it is subject\\nPfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, vol. I, pp. 218, 229.\\nThe same teaching runs through the Idea of God, by J. Fiske,\\np. 109.\\nTo Goethe also the world is the woven and flowing garment\\nwhich at once hid and manifested God s essence. Cf. Fair-\\nbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p. 196. He\\ntaught that Spinoza was a Christian Thei:^t. lb.\\n^Nature; Over-Soul; The Transcendentalist; Wood-Notes.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0349.jp2"}, "350": {"fulltext": "328\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nto change, a means to an end. The consciousness of\\nthe individual is a manifestation of the one universal\\ndivine self-consciousness.^ In our own country Dr.\\nRoyce. Royce is an ardent advocate of Pantheistic Idealism.\\nTo him the whole universe is nothing more or less\\nthan a system of ideas. All minds are in essence\\none, and the whole world of ideas constitute essen-\\ntially one world with which each individual is\\nidentified.\\nThe logical 12. The teaching of Pantheism on the problem of\\ninference is\\nthat the the Natural and the Supernatural is thus easily grasped.\\nnatural or\\nthe super-\\nnatural\\nalone\\nexists.\\nPantheism assumes logically a Theistic or an Antithe-\\nistic form. In the latter there is no place for the\\nSupernatural; the Natural alone exists. In the former\\nthere is no place for the Natural. If I am part and\\nparcel of God, if my intelligence is a portion of the\\nuniversal divine self-consciousness, the word Natural\\nis devoid of meaning.\\n13. Some modern writers on Theism accept this\\nphilosophy as a ground work. They speak of an intui-\\ntion of the divine, of the divine idea in the conscious-\\nness, and draw therefrom a proof for the existence of\\nGod. The aim is to reconcile Hegel s philosophy with\\nChristian belief. They forget, however, that the two\\nare fundamentally opposed and to combine both is to\\nsacrifice truth in the interests of an unnatural harmony.\\nGod is not the world, and the world is not God.\\n^T. H. Green, Proleg. to Ethics, p. 182; W, Fairbrother, The\\nPhilosophy of T. H. Green, p. 157; Pres. Schurman, Belief in\\nGod, p. 227,\\nInspirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. XI.\\nSpencer, First Principles, 34.\\nThe Monistic development of this theory is seen in Pfieiderer\\nand Lipsius. I o them the natural and the supernatural are\\ndifferent sides of the same process. That which on the divine\\nside is viewed as Revelation, is, on the human side, simply the\\ndevelopment of man s moral and religious consciousness. Cf.\\nPfieiderer, Phil, of Religion, vol. IV, pp. 46, 94.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0350.jp2"}, "351": {"fulltext": "NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 329\\nHuman reason is a participation of the divine light,*\\nnevertheless a created thing. From the consideration\\nof our mental life we may reason to God, but we do\\nnot see God in the mind, nor is our reason the posses-\\nsion of God in the sense that human and divine con-\\nsciousness are in essence one and the same. We can\\nunderstand how it is that men of devout religious\\nnature should attempt a reconciliation. The criticism\\nis that the peculiar frame-work of the philosophic\\nsystem renders a reconciliation impossible. Their\\nminds are prepared to accept truth and eagerly seek\\nthe truth. Through no conscious fault, however, they\\npossess error and falsehood.\\nIV.\\nTheory of Dr. Bushnell.\\n14. Some forty years ago the Rev. Dr. Bushnell history,\\nattempted a solution of the present problem in a work\\nentitled Nature and the Supernatural. The volume\\nis interesting both for the novelty of the doctrine set\\nforth and for the broad scope and apparently unbiased\\ntone of thought. He recognizes that Natural and\\nSupernatural are two different words in the English\\nlanguage, which have different meanings and admit of\\ndifferent application. Far from hedging or explaining\\naway the difficulty, he boldly faces the task and broaches\\nan explanation which was eagerly taken up by the\\nreligious world. Succeeding writers on the Theistic\\ncontroversy accepted the theory as the simplest\\nsolution of an anxious problem. We find it per-\\nmeating contemporaneous thought and broached by\\nwriters like Prof. Knight, Dr. S. Harris/ Prof.\\n\u00c2\u00bb3 St. Thomas, i, _q. 84, a. 5.\\nAspects of Theism.\\nPhilosophic Basis of Theism.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0351.jp2"}, "352": {"fulltext": "330\\nCHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\ndoctrine.\\nhuman\\nagency\\nis super-\\nnatural.\\nnot entirely\\nhowever.\\nBascom, Coleridge/^ Noah Porter/^ and Prof.\\nFraser.\\n15. To Dr. Bushnell the Natural is what is under\\nthe law of cause and effect. Nature is that world\\nof substance, whose laws are laws of cause and effect,\\nand whose events transpire in orderly succession under\\nthose laws. The supernatural is what is outside\\nthe range of cause and effect. It is that range of\\nsubstance, if any such there be, that acts upon the\\nchain of cause and effect in nature from without the\\nchain, producing, thus, results that by mere nature\\ncould not come to pass.\\n16. So much for the definitions. He then proceeds\\nto illustrate and make clear his meaning. We, as\\npowers of activity, are not in the line of cause and\\neffect; we are free in our own choice of actions or of\\nobjects. The idea of our personality is therefore\\nsupernatural. The whole range of human agency over\\nthe powers of nature is supernatural.^ Acts which\\nspring from human liberty, e. g,^ lifting a weight,\\ncriminal or artificial acts are supernatural. Man\\nstands out clear and sovereign as a being supernatural\\nand his definition is that he is an original power acting\\nnot in the line of causality but from himself.\\n17. Nevertheless, he continues, it is erroneous to\\nthink that man is wholly supernatural. In certain\\nparts or departments of the soul, e. g., memory,\\nappetite, passion, attention, imagination, association,\\ndisposition, the will-power is held in contact with con-\\nThe New World, June, 1895, art. The Philosophical Basis\\nof the Supernatural.\\nAids to Reflection,\\nScience and Sentiment, p. 285.\\nPhilosophy of Theism, pp. 249, 255, 269.\\nNature and the Supernatural, p. 43.\\nP. 45.\\nP. 44.\\n23 P. 51.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0352.jp2"}, "353": {"fulltext": "NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 33 I\\nditions and qualities that are partly dominated by laws\\nof cause and effect. As far as they are concerned, man\\nis pure nature. He is only a power superior to cause\\nand effect at the particular point of volition where his\\nliberty culminates, and where the ministration he is to\\nmaintain over his whole nature centers. Hence all win is\\nthe functions of the soul, will alone excepted, are natural,\\nnature. Whatever is will, or is the effect of free\\nagency is above nature. Thus true manly heroism is\\nsupernatural, and character is supernatural. All free\\nagencies, the created and the uncreated, are, as being\\nfree, essentially supernatural in their agency.\\n18. (i) The advantages of the theory are at criticism,\\nfirst sight obvious. For this reason it has com-\\nmended itself to many minds perplexed at difficulties bil and^^\\nwhich seemed to defy solution. By fixing the scope Jeous.^\\nof the supernatural so as to include free action, whether\\ncreated or uncreated, the truth of its existence was\\nestablished beyond question. If my free choice, or\\nthe influence which I exert over the forces of nature\\nare supernatural, then I am directly and immediately\\nconscious that the supernatural is a reality. The\\nsphere of miracles is likewise extended and I cannot\\ngainsay their possibility. For, in this theory, miracles\\nwould not be specifically different from human action.\\nHence the truth of the miracle could be proved by\\nshowing the power of the will over inanimate nature.\\n^4 lb.\\nlb.\\n5\u00c2\u00ab P. 56.\\nP. 85. So also with John Stuart Mill. Nature means not\\neverything which happens, but only what takes place without\\nthe agency or without the voluntary and intentional agency of\\nman. General Result, pp. q, 64, on Nature. Dr. Momerie\\ninclines to the same view. Basis of Belief, p. 14,\\nThis criticism is made by Mr. Lecky relative to the Duke\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2of Argyll. Cf. Reign of Law, ch. I.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0353.jp2"}, "354": {"fulltext": "332 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\n(2) not of 19. (2) The benefits obtained by the sacrifice of\\ntruth are only apparent. They are never lasting or of\\nreal value. The extension of the supernatural beyond\\njust limits, the restriction of the scope of the natural,\\ndo not advance us a step nearer the solution. The\\n(3)errone- distinction is confusing, and under severe analysis\\nstands without warrant. According to Dr. Bushnell\\nthe natural embraces physical and animal nature. But\\nwhy exempt man? Is he not within the limits of\\nnature? And is not the will a natural endowment? In\\nthe exercise of voluntary action man is not transcend-\\ning the sphere of his own nature.\\nIV.\\nTheory of Christian Philosophy.\\nits import- 20. The distinction between the Natural and the\\nChrisdan Supernatural is a cardinal one in Christian Theology,\\nphilosophy. Incarnation of the Son of God and the fruits\\nof the Redemption, the superabundant riches of\\ngrace and of glory were made manifest to men.\\nIn developing the teaching the Fathers of the Church\\nmade use of v/ords and phrases best fitted to express\\nwith fullness and precision the meaning of these great\\ntruths. Thus in course of time certain words became\\ncrystallized in Catholic teaching, having borne through\\nthe fire of criticism the precious heritage of divine\\ntruth,\\nfiaturai. 21. Natural is that which belongs to nature.\\nSupernatural is what is above nature. The whole dis-\\ncussion, therefore, centers on the meaning and scope\\nof the word nature,\\nmature. 22. The word Nature is employed in more than\\n(i) cause of one scnsc. In poetic language and in Pantheistic\\nteaching Nature is spoken of as the producing cause or", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0354.jp2"}, "355": {"fulltext": "NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL. 333\\ngovernor of the universe. Again, we are wont to ask\\nwhat is the nature of such and such a fact or phenome-\\nnon. In this sense the word nature is used for essence (2) essence\\nand the answer we expect is supposed to indicate how\u00c2\u00b0\\nthe fact or phenomenon is constituted. Yet in strict\\nphilosophical language nature means more than\\nessence. It signifies the essence of an object viewed (3) essence\\nviewed as a\\nas the principle or source of the activities which the principle of\\naction.\\nobject exercises.\\n82^. Viewing^ the term Nature in this latter sense, hence its\\nscope and\\nwe can clearly perceive that Nature means (a) what- meaning.\\never pertains to the essence of a thing inasmuch as it\\nis a constitutive part; (b) whatever is required for the\\nspecific perfection of a natural object; (c) whatever is\\nwithin the scope and limits of an object acting accord-\\ning to the laws of its own intimate constitution. If we\\nemploy the term nature, not in an individual, but in a\\ncollective sense, then the Natural means whatever\\ndoes not exceed the activities and exigency of the\\nbeings which go to make up our visible universe.^\\n24. With this firm in mind we can say that the application.\\nNatural means (a) the material universe with its forces,\\nas set forth in the Physical Sciences; (b) the organic\\nworld, the properties and activities of living bodies, as\\nexplained in Biology, Physiology, Anatomy, Zoology,\\netc. (c) everything that pertains to the constitution\\nof human nature, not only bodily organism and\\nlife, but the higher powers of mind and of will as\\nexposed in Psychology, the course of man s history on\\nthe earth, e.g., Anthropology, the duties and relations\\nto fellow-men in society, e. g., Ethics, Sociology, Poli-\\ntics, etc. The powers of mind and of will, therefore,\\nare natural. The knowledge we acquire by the use of\\nour mental faculties, the power we exercise over our\\nSchrader, de Triplici Ordine.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0355.jp2"}, "356": {"fulltext": "aatural.\\n334 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nfellow men, the creative products of genius, are within\\nthe scope and sphere of the natural. Language\\njustifies our exposition. We speak not only oi physical\\nnature or of organic nature with Dr. Bushnell, but we\\ndiscourse about Jmman nature. Thus the word natu7-e\\nin its collective sense, e., the natural order, embraces\\nthe beings and activities of not one or two, but of\\nthe three great spheres of natural objects,\\nsuper- 25. The definition of Supernatural now is made\\nvery simple. It means whatever is beyond and above\\nthe scope and exigencies of nature. The word is\\nemployed to designate whatever belongs to the\\neconomy of divine grace. Thus revelation, sanctifica-\\ntion, the light and strength we obtain in prayer through\\nthe merits of Christ are supernatural. Created nature\\nby itself is unable to elicit supernatural acts; they are\\nover and above its power; they depend on free gifts\\nbestowed by God for our justification. Above nature,\\nthey nevertheless perfect nature by raising the soul to\\na participation of the uncreated life of God.\\nWhat man has ascertained by the unaided exercise of his\\nown powers is termed natural. J. Dimon, The Theistic Argu-\\nment, p. 22.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0356.jp2"}, "357": {"fulltext": "CONCLUSION. 335\\nCONCLUSION.\\nThus the principles of sound philosophy show that\\nour belief in God has a basis in fact. The data were\\ndrawn from our own nature and from the world with-\\nout. They are the well-established results of the\\nmodern sciences. In reasoning from these facts, we\\npursue a course that cannot be questioned. The\\nprinciples of reasoning employed are at the very\\nfoundation of thought. Falsely stated at times their\\ntruth comes out upon closer analysis.^\\nIt is often urged that our conceptions of God repre-\\nsent Him as a human being. The difficulty is more\\nspecious than real. The explanation is found in the\\nexamination of our mental life. Composed of body\\nand soul we are so constituted that sense impressions\\narouse thought, and that the mind in action expresses\\nits thoughts by sense images. Thought and sensa-\\ntion are different, yet go together in our conscious\\nlives. Thus abstract and immaterial concepts are\\nexpressed from the data of sense-experience. So we\\nmust express God from the content of our own knowl-\\nedge. In representing Him we choose the highest\\nsymbols of our conscious experience. In the visible\\nworld man is the highest and noblest creature. God\\nis therefore expressed after the analogy of man. At\\nIt is not true, therefore, to hold that theism is the funda-\\nmental postulate of our total life. It cannot be demonstrated\\nwithout assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking\\nall our interests Strictly proved by nothing\\nimplicit in everything. Prof. Bowne, in Philosophy of\\nTheism, p, iv. This savors of Kant, ib., p. 32. In the same\\nbreath Prof. Knight calls God the great postulate and the\\nuniversal essence of all things. Aspects of Theism, p. 28.\\nSt. Aug. De Gen. Contra Manich., 1. I, n. 27; Quaest, in\\nLevit. 93; De Gen. ad Lit., 1. VT, n. 20; Mr. Fiske admits this.\\nIdea of God, p. 135.", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0357.jp2"}, "358": {"fulltext": "336 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nthe same time we are conscious that the expression is\\nimperfect and insufficient. We confess that the limi-\\ntations of our minds do not enable us to represent God\\nas He really is and as we conceive Him to be. Pure\\nthought passes beyond the bounds of sense, yet in\\nexpression must make use of the data derived from\\nsense. Thus viewed anthropomorphism presents no\\ndifficulty. We do not make God like ourselves.* We\\nemploy the highest figures we know and admit that\\nthey fall far short of the reality.\\nThe various proofs alleged in the preceding pages\\nshould not be viewed as separate and distinct. They\\ncoalesce into a unity. The various sciences represent\\neach only a part of created nature. The universe in\\nits entirety cannot be known from one alone. We do\\nnot confine our reasoning to one grade of existences\\nnor to one kind of proof. All things come from God\\nand all reveal the hand of their maker. But they do\\nnot reveal Him in the same manner. The world of\\nthought points to a foundation Truth; conscience and\\nthe moral order tell that He is just and righteous.\\nThe unity in the ever-changing multiplicit) of external\\nthings show that one Being of intelligence and will is\\nthe cause of the wonderful adaptions we see about us,\\nthe reason of their conditioned dependent existence,\\nand the sufficient cause for their movement. The order\\n3 St. Aug. De Mor. EccL, n. 17; De Vera Relig., n. 99;\\nConfess., 1. I, ch. IV; 1. VII, ch. I; 1. VI, ch III. Yet Mr.\\nFiske tells us that the knell of anthropomorphic or Augustinian\\ntheism has already sounded. Idea of God, p .134.\\nFiske, Idea 0/ God, ch. VIII, develops this view; criticised\\nby Prof. Knight, Aspects of Theism, pp. 129, 211.\\n5 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolychum, I, cap, IV.\\nQuod et reriim creatarum sit effector (Deus), et lumen\\ncognoscendarum, et bonum agendarum; quod ab lUo nobis sit\\net principium naturae et Veritas doctrinae et felicitas vitae.\\nSt. Aug. De Civ. Dei, 1. VIII, ch. 9.\\nJanet, Traite Elementaire, p. 848", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0358.jp2"}, "359": {"fulltext": "CONCLUSION. 337\\nprevalent in the material, organic and human world\\nreveals a Providence which guides all to their appointed\\nend, and exerts a special care over man. The notion\\nof goodness is obtained from the analysis of finality\\nand is made more evident in the study of human life.\\nThus from a close study of nature we rise to the knowl-\\nedge of a great and good God.^ Christian revelation\\ntakes these fundamental aspects and throws greater\\nlight upon them. God reveals Himself in His own\\ndivine Son.\\nThe purpose of this volume is to collect the scattered\\nrays of light which flash in upon the mind from created\\nnature and to show that they converge behind the\\nworld of sense in what the agnostic falsely calls the\\nGreat Unknown. God is and can be known. The soul\\ninstinctively rises to Him in prayer. The acquisition\\nof modern knowledge does not lead us to throw aside\\nthe belief of childlike piety. A closer study of nature\\nand of life grounds still deeper in the mind the truth\\nlearned when a child. In the sublime song of the\\nPsalmist we may say The heavens show forth the\\nglory of God, or with St. Augustine, **Donot seek\\nwithout; enter into thy own self; in the inner man\\ndwelleth the truth.\\nMr. Muller s criticism that the three famous arguments,\\nCosmological, Ontological and Teleological, have collapsed\\nbefore the tribunal of Formal Logic, is by no means sound.\\nPhysical Religion, p. 240.\\nSt. Augustine, De Lib. Arb., 1. I, n. 5.\\n0 De Vera Relig. 27", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0359.jp2"}, "360": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0360.jp2"}, "361": {"fulltext": "INDEX.\\nAbiog-enesis, 1O2.\\nAbsolute, 19.\\nAbstract unity, 217.\\nAcoustics, 238.\\nAct, pure, 228 and potency, 113\\nAges, intellectual, 5; middle, 5 20-\\nscientific, 12.\\nAgnosticism, 5, 6, 9, n, 58 influence\\nof, 6, 22 ongm of, 7, 12 doctrine,\\n7, 16, 166, 322 causes, 8, 14 to\\nprinciple of, 19; remedy for m\\ntrue form, 21.\\nAnatomy, 241.\\nAncestor worship, 50.\\nAnthropology, no; theory of, 41.\\nAnthropomorphism, 335.\\nApologetics, 12, 60.\\nAppearances, 10.\\nA Priori argument, 64; forms, 65-\\nhistory, 89. o\\nAristotle, 6, 20, 145, 177.\\nArt and nature, 159.\\nAryan, 35.\\nAssociation school, 10, 19, 57.\\nAstronomy, 77, 103, 237, 247.\\nAttraction, 135, 139.\\nAvesta, 33.\\nBam, 10.\\nBampton Lectures, 12.\\nBentham, 10.\\nBerkeley, 9, 81.\\nBible, 24, 38.\\nBiogenesis, 107.\\nBiology, 24, 106, 240.\\nBrahman, 193, 195.\\nBuddhism, 275.\\nBushnell, Dr., 329.\\nConscience, 83; its office, 87, ^i6-\\nargument from, 88.\\nConsciousness, 72 divine and human.\\n57, 69 and idea of God, 63.\\nContradiction, principle of, ^6.\\nContingency, argument from, 95,\\nCousm, 184.\\nCreation, 179, 202, 207.\\nCriticism, The Higher, 24.\\nCame, Hall, 24.\\nGalvanism, 15.\\nCarlyle, 16.\\nCategories, 9.\\nCausality, n, 117, 237; nature of, ng\\ntermed, 121 with Hume, 122 with\\nMill, 125; final, 149, 151; efficient,\\n151 argument from, 126.\\nChance, 157, 170, 173.\\nChang-e, fact of, 96.\\nChemistry, 97; elements limited, gS\\nbasis, loi.\\nColor, assimilation of, 244\\nCollective unity, 211.\\nDarwinism, 168 and finality, 170.\\nDeism, 22.\\nDemocritus, 14.\\nDesCartes, 8, 46, 81.\\nDesires, fundamental, 83, 91,\\nDieii-Progres, 82.\\nDualistic Theory, 200, 206.\\nDynamic Theory, 137.\\nE.\\nEarth, formation of, 106.\\nEleatic school, 179.\\nEliot, George, 6, 14, 24.\\nEmanation Theory, 180, 204\\nEmpiricism, 8.\\nEnergy, conservation of, loi, 106 2 ;q\\npotential and kinetic, 136.\\nErigena, 179, 183.\\nEssence, 9, 72 composition, existence\\nand, 225.\\nEthics 13, 84, 154; evolutionary, 311.\\nEthical, culture, 220 Dualism, 201\\nEvil, problem of, 275, 297 in human\\nlife, 307 in animal life, 314 nature\\nof, 317 and pain, 319\\nEvolution, and belief in God 41\\n49, 53 with Hegel, 68 theory of, 165\\nExcluded Middle, principle of, 76\\nExisting and possible, 72.\\nExtraordinary, 263.\\nF.\\nFact and inference, 251\\nFaith and Existence of God, 59 mor-\\nal, 79.\\nFatalism of Spinoza, 189.\\nFathers, 60.\\nFeeling, theory of, 59, 80.\\nretichism, 39.\\nFichte and ontological proof. 68 re-\\nligion with, 221. c\\n[339]", "height": "3403", "width": "2172", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0361.jp2"}, "362": {"fulltext": "340\\nINDEX.\\nFinality, principle of, 149, 164, 305\\nproof of* 158 method of, 175 inter-\\nnal and external, 177 not a sign of\\nimperfection, 178 complicated, 24.9\\nwith Hartman, 291 in material\\nworld, 300.\\nFinite, 11.\\nFirst Principles, 17, of thought, 75.\\nFiske, 3, 22, 161.\\nFlight, phenomenon of, 241.\\nForces not alike 162.\\nFour Noble Truths, 279.\\nFundamental Desires, 83. gi.\\nO.\\nGathas, 33.\\nGeneration, spontaneous, 107.\\nGeology, 105.\\nGhost-worship, 50.\\nGnostic, 182.\\nGod, problem of, i; existence of, 71;\\nmessage about, i; idea of, pp. 3, 60,\\n63, 70, 231; not only an object of\\nfaith, 12, 17; unknowable, 15; know-\\nable, 21, 337; in Calvinism, 15; belief\\nin God a psychological fact, 13, 26;\\nuniversal in place, 27; in time, 29;\\nexpression of the belief, 28, 43; not a\\nphilosophical unity, 31; names for,\\n32; a self-existent unity, 36; origin\\nof belief, 45, 95; existence of God not\\na postulate, 59, 79; two-fold knowl-\\nedge of, r i; belief in God a psycho-\\nlogical necessity, 69; not in any cate-\\ngory, 227; a pure act, 228; not a soul,\\n228; proofs for God coalesce, 336.\\nGood, love of, 92; nature of, 297, 306;\\nand pleasure, 309; and utility, 311,\\n316; and evil, 318.\\nGotama, 278.\\nGrote, 18.\\nH.\\nHamilton, 11, 20,\\nHappiness, longing for, 92.\\nHarmony in physical and mental\\nworlds, 77.\\nHarrison, 14, 22.\\nHartley, 10.\\nHartman, 200, 289.\\nHedonism, 290, 292, 308, 313.\\nHegel, 13, 57, 79 division of his fol-\\nlowers, 67; and ontological argu-\\nment, 68 doctrine, 215.\\nHindus, Sacred Books of, 30; Panthe-\\nism of, 179.\\nHistory, Philosophy of, 2, 5; of thought,\\n5; of Religion, 29, 62.\\nHumanity, Religion of, 80, 218, 324.\\nHume, 9, 50.\\nHuxley, 6, 12, 16, 163.\\nI.\\nIdeal appearances, 10.\\nIdealism, 9, 17; phenomenal, 19; true,\\n82.\\nIdeas, innate, 8, 47; belief in God, 45\\nwith Plato, 46; with DesCartes, 46\\nwith Leibnitz, 47 with Hegel, 68\\nuniversal, 31; singular and particu\\nlar, 72; with Royce, 81.\\nIdentity, personal, 70.\\nIdolatry, 32, 39.\\nIgnorance, fact of, 80.\\nImmanence of God, 229.\\nIndividual, the measure of things, 18.\\nIndividuality in Buddhism, 195.\\nInfinite, 12; known by special faculty,\\n58 inconceivable, 59 number, 112\\nseries, 114 in space and time, 115\\nmotion, 143 with Fichte, 199.\\nInscrutable, 15.\\nInstinct, 153, 173.\\nIntellect, 59 and sense, 20 and truths\\n73-\\nIntelligible, 74.\\nIntuition, forms of, 9; of God, 57, 58,\\nJCant, 9, II, 17, 20, 79.\\nKinetic energy, 136.\\nKnowledge, theory of, 8, 59, 60, 287\\nforms of, 9 materials of, 9 with\\nTyndall, 14 object of, 17 relativity\\nof, 17, 82 simple and comprehen-\\nsive, 21 of God twofold, 61 of\\nvisible world, 97.\\nli.\\nLaw, of inertia, 19, 135, 138 of con-\\nservation of matter, 105 of conser-\\nvation of energy, loi, 136; of\\ndissipation of energy, 102 meaning\\nof, 234 reign of, 236 natural, 256,\\n262.\\nLife, explanation of, 14 desire of, 92\\nbeginning of, 106, no; preservation\\nof, 243 value of, 285, 290.\\nLinguistics, 42, 71.\\nLiterature, 6, 26.\\nLogic, 6, 13, 18, 20, 75 of Mill, 10\\nlogical principles, 76 composition,\\n227.\\nM.\\nMan, achievements of, s study of, 26\\nprimitive condition of, 54 acts for a\\npurpose, 84.\\nManifestation theory, 189, 205.\\nMansel, 12, 19.\\nMaterialism, 113.\\nMathematics, 77, m.\\nMatter, nature of, 206.\\nMaya, 195.\\nMechanical. 271 combination, 74\\ntheory, 135, 161, 167, 301.\\nMental Life, 64, 70, 79, 83.\\nMetaphysics, 13, 24, 78 principles\\nof, 75-\\nMetaphysical society, 7 compound,\\n224.\\nt Meteorology, 247.", "height": "3419", "width": "2106", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0362.jp2"}, "363": {"fulltext": "INDEX.\\n341\\nMethod employed, 2, 30, 63, 232.\\nMill, J. S., 10, 16, 18, 20, 50 and caus-\\nality, 125 James, 10.\\nMind, powers of, 8 in universe, 82,\\n174.\\nMiracles, 260, 266 possible not actual,\\n268.\\nModern thought, 3.\\nMonism, 69, 165.\\nMonotheism, primitive, 30, 40.\\nMoral, man, 83, 85 law, 83 sanction,\\n86, 318 order, 84, 316.\\nMorality and God, 83 with Kant, 89\\neffects of, 90 independent, 222.\\nMotives, 155.\\nMovement, fact of, 96, 129 nature of,\\n130; definition of, 130; with Hegel,\\n132 kinds of, 133 argument from,\\n134, 144 due to external cause, 140\\ninfinite series of, 143 circular, 143\\nand attraction, 135.\\nMutation, 140.\\nN.\\nNature, meaning of, 332 unity of\\nphysical, 84 of man religious, 93\\nuniformity of, 125 and art, 159\\nprodigality of, 248 order of, 249\\nlaws of, 262 and supernatural,\\n322 in Christian Philosophy, 332.\\nNebula theory, 104.\\nNeo-Hegelians and belief in God, 69\\nand miracles, 265.\\nNeo-Kantians, 22, 24, 80.\\nNeo-Platonism, 183.\\nNoble Eight-Fold Path, 282.\\nNomenalism, 20, 71.\\nNothing and creation; 203.\\nNoumenon, 10, 17.\\nObjects, external, 9.\\nOntological argument, 65 with Neo-\\nHegelians, 69.\\nOntologism, 56, 57.\\nOntology, 75.\\nOrder, argument from, 147 and final\\ncause, 148 is intrinsic, 176 and\\nprovidence, 233 of nature constant,\\n266 of nature and miracles, 267.\\nOrganic Kingdom, purpose in, 248.\\nOrgans, bodily, 152 useless, 250.\\nP.\\nPain, problem of, 286 and pleasure,\\n314, 318 and evil, 319.\\nPantheism, 16, 46, 212 ethical, 382, 176\\nCosmic 4, 22 Idealistic, 69 and de-\\nsign, 172 forms of, 172, 179, 214 and\\nthe supernatural, 326.\\nParker, Theodore, 16.\\nPasteur, 109.\\nPessimism, 93, 275, 292.\\nPhenomenalism, 10, 194.\\nPhenomena, 9, 14, 17 and final cause,\\n150 worship of natural, 31.\\nPhilology, 30 and primitive man, 42\\nand Christian doctrine of God, 62.\\nPhilosophy, Christian, 3, 347 of His-\\ntory, 2, 5 problem of, 8 English,\\n10 of the Conditioned, n synthetic,\\n16 modern, 17, 20 of Mind, 21, 25,\\n71 false, 10 scholastic, 71.\\nPhysics, 99, 239 physical compounds,\\n226 effects of prayer, 253 laws, 258\\nscientists and miracles, 266.\\nPhysiology, 152, 241.\\nPlato, 46, 64, 71, 145.\\nPolytheism, 36.\\nPositivism, 13, 19, 23, 323.\\nPossible things, 72.\\nPotential energy, 136 unity, 213.\\nPrayer. 253 and modern scientists,\\n255 value of. 257.\\nPriestley, 10.\\nPrinciples First, 17, 22.\\nProtestantism, 15.\\nProvidence, 231 in material world,\\n235 special, 270 Psychology, 14,\\n153.\\nM.\\nRealism, 71.\\nReason, practical and theoretical, 60,\\n79 operations of, 76.\\nReid, II.\\nRelativity of Knowledge, 82.\\nReligion, 2, 63; natural, 16; and science,\\n17 philosophy of, 23 history of, 29,\\n63 nature, 30 Vedic, 32 of hu-\\nmanity, 80 man s nature religious,\\n93-\\nRevelation ver. philosophy and his-\\ntory, 23 feeling, a channel of, 60 a\\nsource for knowledge of God, 61.\\nRitschel, 22, 24.\\nRoyce, 89, 91.\\nS.\\nScepticism, 9, 16, 46, 58, 81 and this\\nage, 2 and XVIII Century, n.\\nSchelling, 79, 200.\\nScholastic philosophy, 71 and modern\\nscience, 303.\\nSchoolmen, 60, 65,\\nSchoppenhauer, 200, 283.\\nSchurman, 6.\\nScience, 6 physical, 12, 24, 272 value,\\n13 methods, 14, 15 and religion, 17.\\nScotch School, 4.\\nSelf, the, 191, 194.\\nSense, 8 and intellect, 20 and the\\ninfinite, 59.\\nSeries, infinite, 114 of causes and\\neffects, 127.\\nSex, 153.\\nSocrates, 5, 7 his work, 6, 9, 20.\\nSophists, 6, i8.\\nSorrow, in Buddhism, 279.\\nSoul, II made in image of God, 61\\nnot identical with God, 70; longings\\nof, 83 in Buddhism, 194 its nature,\\n326 and spirit, 229.", "height": "3419", "width": "2106", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0363.jp2"}, "364": {"fulltext": "342\\nINDEX.\\nSpencer, 6; lo, 14, 22. 49 and idea of\\nGod, 50 and finality, 163, 167.\\nSpinoza, 22, 188 and fatalism, 189.\\nSpontaneous generation, 107.\\nSt. Augustine, 3, 64, 78.\\nSt. Thomas, 3, 5, 20, 23.\\nStoics, 179, 187,\\nStructure, 134.\\nSubstance, 9, 11.\\nSystem, solar, 104 perturbations in,\\n246 human, 152.\\nTendency, 154 rational, 304 subor-\\ndination of, 305.\\nTennyson, 24.\\nTheistic, 3, 4 argument, 11 philoso-\\nphy, II, 57.\\nTheodicy, 23.\\nTheosop hy and idea of God, 55 pan-\\ntheistic, 55 and special faculty, 58.\\nThermo-Dynamics, 100.\\nThought, 8, 86 history of, 5 modern,\\n10 religious, 15 Gospel of modern,\\n24 problem of modern, 25 God a\\npostulate of, 58\\nTranscendentalism, in New England,\\n58 German, 198 theory of, 190.\\nTransmigration, 277.\\nTruth, rehgious, 15 false presenta-\\ntions of, 15 its nature, 18 objective,\\n59, 74, 79; reign of, 77; knowledgre\\nof, 80 aspiration for, 91.\\nTyndall, 6, 14, 49.\\nU.\\nUnbelief, 15.\\nUnconscious, the, 289.\\nUnitarians, 16.\\nUnity, at basis of things, 77 of phys-\\nical nature, 84 of moral life, 85 of\\nGod, 209 simple, 211, 223 collective,\\n211 potential, 213 abstract, 217.\\nUnknowable, 11, 14, 19 can be known,\\n22.\\nUnknown cause, 260.\\nUpanishads, 31, 181, 187 sage of the,\\n196 problem of the, 276.\\nUtilitariarism, i6, 299, 310.\\nVaruna, 34.\\nVedanta, 191.\\nVedas, 30.\\ni W.\\nWard, Mrs. Humphrey, 7, n.\\nWill, with Shoppenhauer, 284.\\nWorld, not self-created, 14 physical,\\n76 visible, 97 stellar, 104 had a\\nbeginning, 115 limited, 116 de-\\npendent, 202 government of, 239\\norganic, 240 phenomenal, 285.\\nSD 18", "height": "3419", "width": "2106", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0364.jp2"}, "365": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3419", "width": "2106", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0365.jp2"}, "366": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3419", "width": "2106", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0366.jp2"}, "367": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3419", "width": "2106", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0367.jp2"}, "368": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00b0o\\no\\n-v A *^te!i^\u00c2\u00ab^ aT\\n9*0\\nC^ **^*C Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.]\\n%j^ V ^i^ Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide I\\n^b -4.^ \u00c2\u00ab*fc^*\u00c2\u00ab^ Treatment Date: Dec. 2004\\n^c^^j^*^ ^jp Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 9^\\n^bv^ f PreservationTechnologies\\nQ^ i^ H A VifORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION t:\\nj^ 1 11 Thomson Park Drive 1\\nI ti* **r^^\u00c2\u00ab Cranberry Township, PA 16066\\n^5* a {724)779-2111", "height": "3419", "width": "2106", "jp2-path": "christianphiloso02dris_0368.jp2"}, "369": {"fulltext": ".,o\\n.._\\n;\u00c2\u00abk:.\\n\u00c2\u00b0.-,-.-.v\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2Ji\\nV\\nD0B8SBR0S. %1* A\\nt..\u00c2\u00bb^RY B.ND.NO t O O *i\\nST. 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