{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3952", "width": "2584", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.\\nChap. Copyright No.\\nShelf.\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA.", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "ELEMENTS OF ETHICS\\nNOAH K. DAVIS, A.M., Ph.D., LL.D.\\nProfessor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia\\nTpt povrcu irdvres ol avdp ireioi vdfioi vtto ivbs rod\\nBelov Kpariei yap toctovtov okogov idfkei, Kal e^apKiei\\niraai Kal irepiylveTai.. Herakleitos\\nSILVER, BURDETT COMPANY\\nNew York BOSTON Chicago", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "TWO oohes KCE1\\n\u00c2\u00ab\u00c2\u00a3CONB COPY,\\n62478\\nTIOPYRIGHT, 1900,\\nBy SILVER, BUKDETT COMPANY.", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "PBEFACE\\nThis treatise is intended for readers who feel the need of\\na simple, direct and comprehensive theory of morals. Also\\nit is designed to serve as a handbook in institutions for\\nhigher education, where the subject of ethics is usually\\noffered to hearers who, though already well advanced in a\\ncourse of liberal studies, are presumed to have no acquain-\\ntance with this branch of philosophy. My experience in\\nteaching it has led me to give such pupils primarily a\\nrounded scheme, postponing an examination of the various\\nand often conflicting views of philosophical moralists. Ac-\\ncordingly, in this elementary treatise, I have simply pre-\\nsented my preferred theory, starting from a principle,\\nproceeding logically in the development of a complete sys-\\ntem, and indicating cursorily many practical applications.\\nThe preparation has been long and diligent. I have\\nbeen in search of truth, glad to receive light from any source,\\nand have now summed the results of my reading, thinking\\nand teaching for many years in what is here offered to my\\nfellow-teachers, hoping it may be suited to their wants, and\\naid them in imparting high ideals and shaping noble charac-\\nters. Naturally I am solicitous that my work should be\\nwell received and approved, but whatever judgment be fin-\\nally passed upon it, I shall have been conscious of sincere\\ndesire and earnest endeavor to reach and teach sound doc-\\ntrine. This task finished, I shall hardly undertake another,\\nbut rest in the hope that what is now done shall be found", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "iv PREFACE\\nwell done, proving a step toward truth in philosophy, and\\na help toward righteousness in life.\\nAn apology is perhaps needed for overstepping bounds\\nwith so large a bundle of annotations which, since they are\\nnot at all essential to unfolding the theory, might have been\\nomitted, and may be overlooked. This desultory collection\\nof citations from authorities, of quotations from general lit-\\nerature, of discussions on minor points, together with what-\\never occurred to me as illustrative, constitutes in some\\nmeasure a variorum, an anthology. I feel quite sure that\\nthe scholarly reader will be pleased to see the very words of\\neminent writers, that the earnest student will be glad to\\nhave side-lights and finger-posts on the way, and that neither\\nwill be offended if here and there he stumble on an enliven-\\ning trifle.\\nAlso I apologize for the marginal references to my other\\nworks, The Theory of Thought, Elements of Deductive\\nLogic, Elements of Inductive Logic, and Elements of\\nPsychology. As they together with this essay form a con-\\nnected series, the reference from one to another avoids repe-\\ntition of statement, yet preserves continuity of treatment.\\nAcknowledgments are due to Professor Collins Denny of\\nVandeibilt University, once my pupil, now my peer. By\\nhis encouragement the work has been accomplished, by his\\ncritical revision emended, and by his thoughtful suggestions\\nenriched.\\nNOAH K. DAVIS\\nUniversity of Virginia", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS\\nPROLEGOMENA\\nI. Psychological page\\n1. Prerequisite. Mind. Its powers 1\\n2. Practical reason or conscience. Moral judgment 3\\n3. Moral sentiments. Respect. Reverence 4\\n4. Approbation and disapprobation. Their mark 5\\n5. Desire. Distinguished from feeling. Distributed 5\\n6. The moral impulse. Its universality. Its supremacy 6\\n7. Volition. How related to cognition to desire 8\\n8. Analysis of volition. Two conditions. Three elements 10\\n9. Choice or election. Intention. Effort 10\\nII. Philosophical\\n10. Free-will. The power of choice a reality 13\\n\u00c2\u00a711. Intuitions of pure reason. Their reality. Conscience 16\\n12. Personality, imperfect and perfect. Immortality 18\\n13. The Deity, his existence. An argument for 20\\n14. Relations of individuals, spatial, temporal, causative 24\\n15. Teleological relations. The kingdom of ends 26\\n16. The spiritual and psycho-physical realms 29\\n17. Law, its formative elements. Its definition 30\\n18. Its kinds. Natural law. Moral law 32\\nETHICS.\\nFIRST PART OBLIGATION\\nIntroduction\\n19. Moral law a reality. Ethics defined 35\\n20. Two methods avoided 37\\n21. The method adopted in this treatise 38\\nI. Rights\\n22. The claim. Contention for private for public 42\\n23. The task of ethics. A right, how to be treated 43\\nV", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "VI CONTENTS\\nPAGE\\n24. Conscious life a condition and determinant of 43\\n25. Desires the basis. The ethical principle 45\\n26. Kinds of rights, reduced to liberty 49\\nII. Liberty\\n27. Freedom, the power of choosing, a postulate 5*1\\n28. Tour constitutional limitations, and corollary 52\\n29. Freedom absolute. Liberty discriminated 54\\n30. Objective restrictions of liberty 56\\n31. Subjective restrictions. Persuasion. Menace 56\\n32. Warranted restrictions. Unavoidable. Avoidable 58\\nIII. Trespass\\n33. Personal relations determinative of rights 60\\n34. A right implies possible interference. A wrong 61\\n35. Modified statement of the moral principle 63\\n36. Trespass defined. Its wide sense. Limits liberty 64\\n37. Practical difficulties. Partial clearances 66\\n38. Property rights. Adjudication of 68\\n39. The trespass of forced intrusion, of vice, of discourtesy 69\\n40. Personal honor, its offense and defense 71\\n41. Indirect trespass, its parity. Sin is trespass 74\\nIV. The Law\\n42. Its cognitive origin, and its formula 76\\n43. Conscience defined. Inerrant. Uneducable 77\\n44. Imperatives. The moral law categorical 80\\n45. Supremacy of the law. Addressed to the will 82\\n46. The law objective in origin and character 84\\n47. Negative form. Deductions. Decalogue. Civil law 87\\n48. This form inadequate. Positive form 91\\nV. Sanctions\\n49. Consequences ratify and sanctify the law 95\\n50. Subjective sanctions. Moral sentiments 97\\n51. The natural impulse to reward and punish 99\\n52. The subjective objectified, and proportioned 100\\n53. Legalized forms of. Reduction to unity 102\\n54. Pain a penal ordinance. Not an evil 104\\nVI. Right and Wrong\\n55. The meaning and extension of the terms 107\\n56. Their opposition. Determination of cases 109\\n57. Moral quality not outside of volition 112", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS Vii\\nPAGE\\n58. Moral quality a property of the intention 113\\n59. The immediate and the ulterior intention 115\\n60. Imputation of moral quality to other activities 117\\n61. The moral paradox 121\\nVII. Justice\\n62. The positive demand of the moral law 123\\n63. Definitions. Injustice and trespass identified 124\\n64. Corrective and distributive justice 126\\n65. Legalized justice. Its basis. Its imperfection 127\\n66. Equity, its jural and its general sense 129\\n67. Mercy, social, judicial, divine, consists with justice 131\\nVIII. Duty and Virtue\\n68. Duty, meaning of, positive form of 136\\n69. Eight and duty. Corollaries. Other synonyms 137\\n70. Virtuous character, how formed. Virtue defined 139\\n71. The cardinal virtues, summed in justice 141\\n72. Vice is slavery virtue is not liberty 141\\nIX. Selfishness\\n73. The conscious ego, and the represented ego 145\\n74. The so-called love of self, and duty to self 146\\n75. That there is any such duty denied 147\\n76. Citation and interpretation of examples 148\\n77. General characteristics of the doctrine 151\\n78. Argument in support of. First part 153\\n79. Second part. Conclusion 155\\nX. Service\\n80. Extension of the notion of duty. Service obligatory 158\\n81. Illustrative cases. The law restated 159\\n82. The dignity of service. Ministry. Heroism 161\\n83. Distribution of benefits. Participation in. Modified altruism 164\\n84. The using and serving each other as means 165\\n85. Stewardship, in holding and using. In defending 166\\n86. The law of service objectively insufficient 169\\nXI. Charity\\n87. Love obligatory. Definition and distinctions 172\\n88. Affection can be and is commanded 173\\n89. The variations and extension of the obligation 175\\n90. The law of loving service. The law of love 176\\n91. Progress in moral culture. Irregularity of 178\\n92. The law of love, the law of liberty 181", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "viii CONTENTS\\nXII. Welfare page\\n93. Pleasure not the sole content of welfare 183\\n94. Welfare defined. Its imperfect realization 186\\n95. Happiness its reflex. Special conditions 188\\n96. The summwn bonum. Ancient doctrines of 192\\n97. Modern doctrines of. The adopted view 195\\nXIII. Deity\\n98. His existence postulated. Schemes without God 197\\n99. His attributes. Anthropomorphic. The supernatural 199\\n100. No other ground for complete ethical theory 202\\n101. Not the will, but the nature of God, ultimate 203\\n102. Solves obligation. Our s Godward. He to us-ward 205\\nSECOND PAET ORGANIZATION\\nTransition\\n103. A brief summary of the foregoing doctrine 209\\n104. Complex social relations now to be considered 211\\nI. The Man\\n105. Is a duplex organism. His corporeal organization\\n106. His mental organization. Exemplified in desires\\n107. What, if alone or if in society, without affections\\n108. A solitary unreal. Man hardly without affections\\n109. Ethical elements discoverable in personal relations only\\n213\\n214\\n216\\n219\\n220\\nII. The Family\\n110. Variety in obligations due to variety in relations 222\\n\u00c2\u00a7111. Natural order determines the family 223\\n112. The ideal family. Rarely realized 224\\n113. Its organic order to be upheld. Restored 225\\n114. Marriage. Five prerequisites considered 225\\n115. Its dissolution. Legal divorce limitation of 228\\n116. Unmarried members of society. Their disadvantage 230\\n117. Family members, mutual influence and obligation of 230\\n118. Individuality and personality of the family 232\\n119. Its extended life and obligations 233\\n120. Family property, its ownership and management 234\\n121. Testamentary disposition of. By consent 235\\nIII. The Community\\n122. A product of pressure. An organism 237\\n123. Obligation of intercourse. Seclusion condemned 239", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS\\nIX\\nPAGE\\n124. The common law of social decorum 240\\n125. Truthfulness a condition. Deception 241\\n126. Promises. Contracts. Common honesty 243\\n127. Minor organisms subordinate to the whole 244\\n128. Division of labor. Its organic and moral effects 246\\n129. Capital and labor. Socialism. A preference 248\\nIV. The State\\n130. Its purpose. Its content. Limits of this discussion\\n131. Forms of government. Its three essential branches\\n132. The State an organism. Its ethical character\\n133. Its basis the family. Other organic members\\n134. Its individuality and personality wherein manifest\\n135. Diversity of obligations. Civic virtue, patriotism\\n136. Ground of punishment. Right and duty of defense\\n137. The defense of its members and of itself against trespass\\n138. The right to punish is in this defense. Discipline\\n139. Of rebellion, and revolution and of defensive war\\n140. The relations of States. A universal State\\n250\\n251\\n254\\n256\\n259\\n261\\n263\\n265\\n266\\n268\\n269\\nV. The Church\\n141. Religion, its definition and division 272\\n142. Subject, in all its forms, to ethical principles 274\\n143. The Christian Church, incorporating general ethics 277\\n144. Its rise and resistless progress 278\\n145. Elements of its power. Philosophy of its history 281\\n146. Its union with the State. Opposed functions 282\\n147. The Church Universal. Its ethical essence 286", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "Oo~a io-rlv dXrjOrj, oo~a o-e/xva, oo~a 8i/caia, oca ayvd, oo~a Trpoo- f i\\\\f}\\notra ev^rjfJLa, et Tts dperrj xat el ns eTraivos, ravra Aoyt\u00c2\u00a3eo-0e.", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "ELEMENTS OF ETHICS\\nPEOLEGOMESA\\nI. PSYCHOLOGICAL\\n1, Before undertaking an inquiry into the principles of\\nEthics and their chief consequences, it is needful to examine,\\nin a special way, the constitution of the human mind. The\\nwhole doctrine of morals concerns intelligences that are\\nsentient and free, and is derived from their nature and\\nrelations. A preliminary survey of this ground consists in\\na specific study of human nature, in order to a study of\\nhuman relations. The former is a psychological inquiry,\\nand to it we at once proceed.\\nMind is conscious substance. The consideration of sub-\\nstance may be omitted, and mind regarded as merely a com-\\nplement of conscious activities, the knowing and feeling,\\ndesiring and willing. These are modes of consciousness,\\nthe universal characteristic of mental activity. They are\\nposited as generic powers of mind. Each is subdivided into\\ncertain specific powers. The faculty of knowing, or cog-\\nnition, is subdivided into intuition, memory, imagination,\\nand thought. The intuitive intelligence is empirical and\\npure. Empirical or sensuous intuition is perception. Pure\\nor non-sensuous intuition is pure intellect or reason. Pure\\nreason is speculative and practical.\\nThis distribution of mental powers, together with the ex-\\nplication now before us of some of their specific functions,\\n1", "height": "3700", "width": "2332", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "2 PROLEGOMENA\\nis a logical treatment of facts of consciousness in accord with\\napproved introspective psychology. 1\\nLet it be observed that a power, in its most general sense,\\nis simply a possibility of change. Possible mental changes,\\nknown by experience, are classified as powers of mind.\\nThese are called mental capacities and faculties, the one de-\\nnoting power to be changed, to receive by impression, the\\ni An elaborate discussion of the mental powers, according to the fore-\\ngoing distribution, may be seen in my Elements of Psychology. For a con-\\ncise statement of the distribution itself, see idem, 71-78. For its ground,\\nsee 79. For power, see 53. The New Psychology discards this classi-\\nfication, and on various grounds proposes some other. Wundt, in his Human\\nand Animal Psychology, 1, p. 4, says: Wolff is the originator of the so-\\ncalled theory of mental faculties which has influenced psychology down to\\nthe present day. This theory, based upon a superficial classification of\\nmental processes, was couched in terms of a number of general notions,\\nmemory, imagination, sensibility, understanding, etc., which it regarded\\nas simple and fundamental forces of mind. It was left for Herbart, one of\\nthe acutest thinkers of our century, to give a convincing proof of the utter\\nemptiness of this theory. Four pages beyond, however, Wundt speaks of\\nmind and the principal mental functions sense, feeling, idea, and\\nwill, also of our experience of sensations, feelings, and thoughts, and\\nfurther on, p. 17, he says, we are undoubtedly able to pass judgment.\\nThis is quite enough to bring us together for by powers, faculties,\\ncapacities, we mean precisely functions, neither more nor less, and as to\\ntheir logical distribution, we shall gladly accept a new one so soon as it is\\nsettled and proved superior. Meantime we are persuaded that the names of\\nthe various faculties or functions, which have prevailed in science from the\\ntime of Socrates until now, and the distinctions, which are so embedded in\\nall Aryan and Semitic languages that even their critics necessarily use them,\\nare sufficient for our present purpose, readily understood, and not likely to\\npass away at the wave of a wand.\\nA disciple of Wundt says: Association of ideas, thinking, reasoning,\\nused to be considered as separate faculties of the soul, and as show-\\ning the mind doing different things. But this view is now completely\\ngiven up mind does only one thing that one thing is combining.\\nBut this is simply a question of the logical reduction of functions to a sum-\\nmum genus. If it be shown that they are all merely modes of combining\\nrather than modes of consciousness, a new reduction to unity will have been\\nattained, a scientific modification of the science. But such reduction to a\\ngenus does not erase the distinctions among species,", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "PSYCHOLOGICAL 3\\nother denoting power to change, to impart by expression.\\nThe further distribution, particularly of the cognitive facul-\\nties and capacities, is made, not with reference to differences\\ndiscerned in the mental action and reaction, but with refer-\\nence to differences in the objects cognized. The mind re-\\nsponds to the action upon it of objects greatly differing in\\nkind, and its reactions are classified as different modes of\\nknowing. The feelings, desires, and volitions correspond to\\nthe cognitions on which they are severally conditioned, and\\nare classified accordingly.\\nThus the many variations in conscious activity are origi-\\nnally determined objectively, and are merely various modes\\nof consciousness. 1\\n2. Pure intuition is the immediate cognition by reason\\nof a pure idea or necessary truth discerned on some empirical\\noccasion, and abstracted. Such are the ideas of space and\\ntime, and the principles of contradiction and causation.\\nThese are speculative. Likewise, on the occasion of a per-\\nsonal action, pure reason discerns that it has moral quality,\\nthat it is either right or wrong. This implies an abstract\\nintuitive principle marking the distinction, which principle\\ntakes the form of an imperative, enjoining the right and for-\\nbidding the wrong. In this practical form it is recognized\\nas the moral law. We identify the practical reason with\\nconscience, and define conscience as pure reason discerning\\nmoral law. 2\\nThought, or the logical faculty, makes inferences from the\\ndata of intuition. When it subsumes a special case, and\\nconcludes a class of actions, or a particular action, to be\\nright or wrong, this is moral judgment. 3 A moral judgment,\\ni See infra, 106.\\n2 The matter here simply stated is examined infra, 43 sq. See also\\ninfra, 58-60.\\n8 Both intuitions and inferences are judgments see Elements of Psychol-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "4 PROLEGOMENA\\nthen, is a deduction from the moral principle or law, as an\\nultimate major premise, to precepts of less generality, and\\nthence to particular cases of obligation. The ultimate major\\nis purely intuitive the minor is usually empirical in charac-\\nter. The process is strictly logical, requiring only correct\\ninference. It does not differ in its forms from the exercise\\nof thought on other matter, as in Economics, and is dis-\\ntinguished as a moral judgment solely with reference to its\\nmatter, which is ethical.\\n3. Feelings are correlative to cognitions that is, they\\nattend cognitions, coexist with them, and correspond to\\nthem. There are three classes sensations, emotions, and\\nsentiments. Sentiments are divided into sensuous and pure\\nand pure sentiments are subdivided into intellectual and\\nmoral. Only the latter call for present consideration. 1\\nThe basis of all moral sentiment is the cognition of moral\\nlaw by conscience. The vast, weighty and all-pervading\\nfeeling of moral obligation, or sentiment of duty, correlative\\nto conscience, may be taken as generic, as implying the moral\\nsentiments generally.\\nBecause of his relation to moral law, every person has\\nmoral worth or dignity. The sentiment which the contem-\\nplation of this worth inspires is respect. Positive respect is\\nfelt for persons whose habitual conduct conforms to moral\\nlaw disrespect for those who disregard it. A show of un-\\ndue disrespect excites indignation, reasserting worth. The\\nconsciousness of one s own dignity and observance of the\\nlaw inspires self-respect, a sentiment quite distinct from\\npride and vanity, but consistent with humility or the senti-\\nment of subjection to the law. The opposite feeling, arising\\nogy, 212. Throughout the present treatise, however, we shall use the\\nunqualified terra judgment, and the phrase moral judgment, in the specific\\nsense of logical judgment or inference, as distinguished from intuition,\\ni See Elements of Psychology, 231, and 254.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "PSYCHOLOGICAL 5\\nin view of what one is and does in contrast with what he\\nought to be and do, is self-abasement or humiliation.\\nRespect becomes reverence when a person s character and\\nconduct are seen to be an embodiment of moral law. The\\nomniscience and omnipotence of Deity excite our highest ad-\\nmiration and awe; but only before the white heat of his\\nholiness do we feel reverence, deepening into veneration and\\nadoration.\\n4. Another class of moral sentiments relates more espe-\\ncially to particular personal actions. When the agent is some\\nother person, then, according to my judgment on his action,\\nI experience a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation,\\nexciting a disposition to reward or punish him. When the\\nagent is myself in conscious action, then, according to my\\njudgment on my own act, I experience self-approbation or\\nself-condemnation, self-reproach, shame, remorse, together\\nwith a sentiment of ill desert that sometimes prompts a\\nself-surrender to justice. The latter sentiments, while com-\\npatible with pride, are inconsistent with self-respect.\\nThe sentiments of approbation and disapprobation are\\nmarked as pleasant and painful. There is probably no feel-\\ning more pure, more delicate and delightful than self-appro-\\nbation. Self-condemnation, on the contrary, is always painful,\\nand when it deepens to remorse, becomes intolerable. Thus\\nthese sentiments are a natural reward and punishment for\\nright and wrong doing. 1\\n5. Desire is a conscious activity marked by a want imply-\\ning an impulse or tendency toward an object seemingly fitted\\nto the want. This object is quite commonly called the ob-\\nject of desire, but strictly and properly it is an object of cog-\\nnition. For, in order to desire, there must be a co-existing\\ncognition of an object, which object being known and judged\\n1 This point is considered infra, 50.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "6 PROLEGOMENA\\nsuitable to the want comes to be desired. Thus desire is\\nconditioned on cognition. 1\\nA feeling correlative to the cognition is also a condition\\nprecedent to desire. Notwithstanding the intimacy of this\\nrelation, which has caused confusion, feelings and desires\\nshould be clearly set apart. The former are characterized by\\npleasure and pain; the latter by want, a state of unrest\\nwhich must be distinguished from pain, implying an impulse\\nleading to satisfaction which must be distinguished from\\npleasure. Certain feelings, pleasant or painful, excite desire,\\ncertain others attend it, certain others arise on its gratifica-\\ntion but these should not be confused with the desire. For\\ndesire has its own distinctive mark, a want, this being absent\\nfrom feeling. Also the notion that desires are states of pain,\\nand their satisfaction pleasure, is contrary to the facts that\\nthe disquietude of desire is often attended by highly pleasura-\\nble feeling, as in the enjoyment of many kinds of pursuit,\\nand that quite often a satisfaction earnestly sought is at-\\ntended by painful feeling, as in the infliction of punishment.\\nDesires are distributed as the appetites, which have a\\nphysical basis, and are typified by hunger the appetences,\\nwhich are purely psychical, as desire for continued life, for\\npleasure, property, knowledge, power; and the affections,\\nalso purely psychical, as love of kindred, friends, country,\\nmankind, God. The appetites and appetences crave, or im-\\npel to take the affections bestow, or impel to give. There\\nis also a series of opposites called aversions. 2\\n6. Desires often conflict; that is, the gratification of\\nsome one is incompatible with the gratification of some other.\\n1 This is a real condition, that is, a condition of realizing, or of the\\nreality, and should he distinguished from the causal condition and the\\nlogical condition. It is conditio sine qua non or necessitas antecedentis, that\\nwhich must he in order that the other may he. See my Elements of Deduc-\\ntive Logic, 110, for several senses in which the term condition is used.\\n2 See the discussion in Elements of Psychology, 255 sq.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "Psychological 1\\nConflict occurs between members of the same class, but more\\nnotably between members of different classes. In general\\nthere is opposition between the craving and the giving de-\\nsires, between interest that seeks to gain for self, and love\\nwhich seeks to give out from one s own resources what may\\nbenefit another. Hence there appears a need for some con-\\ntrolling principle. It is found in the impulse to duty, the\\ndesire to do right, which by its nature is fitted to subordinate\\nand regulate all other desires.\\nThat this moral impulse is in every human mind becomes\\nevident on the following considerations First, the origin of\\nany impulse to right action is unaccountable, if not native. 1\\nIf native, though often too weak to be effective, it is uni-\\nversal. Secondly, consciousness testifies that there is ever an\\nimpulse to do right rather than wrong, even when contrary\\ndesires prevail. Thirdly, the moral law discerned by con-\\nscience is universal its authority is directed to the will of\\nevery person, commanding right action. But, since any exer-\\ncise of will is conditioned on desire, the behest of moral law\\nwould be fruitless, were there not in everyone an impulse to\\nobedience complementing conscience.\\nNormally the relation of the moral impulse to the other\\ndesires is that of supremacy. This is evident from its direct\\nconnection with the supreme law, the moral law, from whose\\nauthority it derives its force. When impelled in diverse\\ndirections by the appetites, appetences and affections, the\\nmoral impulse urges us to the course indicated by moral\\n1 The hypothesis of evolution, The Natural History of Morals, is pro-\\nposed to explain otherwise its origin. The moral impulse is supposed to be\\nevolved from the natural inclination for pleasure and repugnance to pain,\\nand thus conscience is selfish prudence, merely refined. But we observe\\nthat even in enlightened society highly cultured men often recognize as\\nduties acts that are painfully repugnant, and as immoralities many that are\\nhighly pleasurable. Surely a morality evolved from pleasure and pain\\nwould, on the contrary, condemn the severe virtues, and approve licentious\\nenjoyments. See Darwin s Descent of Man, ch. 3; and infra, 20, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "8 PROLEGOMENA\\njudgment as in accord with moral law. Like conscience, this\\nimpulse is not concerned with the particular matter of ac-\\ntions, but is simply regulative, impelling to compliance with\\nthe judgment. A will wholly good always yields to the\\nmoral impulse. That we so often disregard it shows that our\\nwill is not wholly good. That, nevertheless, we so often do\\nright, is chiefly because subordinate desires frequently coin-\\ncide with and reenforce the moral impulse. Moreover, the\\nmoral impulse incites us to observe the moral quality of par-\\nticular actions, and to search for it when not evident. The\\nobservation and search is effected by the intellect, and issues\\nin a moral judgment. If the intellect were perfect, and the\\nmoral impulse had force conformable to its function, there\\nwould be no wrong doing. 1\\n7. Volition or will closes the circuit of the generic\\npowers. It is the faculty or activity in whose exercise mind\\nchooses between alternative actions conceived as possible,\\nand strives accordingly to modify its own state merely, or to\\nsuperinduce muscular movement.\\nVolition, like cognition, relates to an object. The object\\nof cognition is a fact, something to be known the object of\\nvolition is an act, something to be done. The normal aim\\nof cognition is truth; the normal aim of volition is duty.\\nTruth is the contingent property of a proposition we ex-\\namine it, and if found true, believe it. Duty is the contin-\\ngent property of an action we examine it, and if found due,\\napprove it. Logic states the laws of thought, and the sub-\\njective result of their observance is knowledge. Ethics\\nstates the laws of conduct, and the subjective result of their\\nobservance is virtue.\\nVolition is inferior to cognition as dependent on it for.\\nintelligent guidance. A judgment is prerequisite to any\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 264 sq.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "PSYCHOLOGICAL 9\\nadjusted action a moral judgment, to any righteous action.\\nThrough this moral judgment a good will is furthermore\\ndependent on conscience.\\nVolition is superior to cognition as controlling it. Atten-\\ntion is a concentration of the cognitive consciousness, and to\\neffect this concentration is the sole function of will. All\\nvoluntary effort, even that which issues in muscular move-\\nment, resolves, in the last analysis, into a fixing of attention.\\nBy voluntary attention to this or that object the cognitive\\npowers are directly, and through these all others are indi-\\nrectly, governed. Voluntary attention is thus the sole yet\\nsufficient means of self-control. We have no other, and we\\nneed no other, means of repressing, arousing, directing or\\ncombining our faculties, whether of cognition, feeling or\\ndesire. For instance, a complete withdrawal of cognition\\nfrom a desired object, at once determines for the time a com-\\nplete cessation of the desire.\\nVolition and desire are psychological correlatives, mutually\\nconditioning each other. Desires condition volition by fur-\\nnishing occasion for choice, and efficient causes of consequent\\neffort. Obviously there can be no choice except between\\ndesired objects, and no effort except from impulse. Hence\\ndesires are properly motives, they move us to action. 1 On\\nthe other hand, desires are conditioned on volition. For\\ni A motive is properly that which causes motion. In our psychology the\\nword expresses the prompting, impulsion, pressure, tendency, propensity or\\ninclination of desire. These words are originally mechanical, and in their\\napplication to mind we must beware of a mechanical interpretation. The\\nterm motive is often, though less properly, applied to the reason that deter-\\nmines the choice, also to the final cause, the inducement, the object desired,\\nthe end proposed. But the deliberate preference by which we are moved\\nto act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the principle of\\naction and desire and reason, which are for the sake of something, are the\\norigin of deliberate preference. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. vi,\\nch. 2. Accordingly, in the present treatise, we identify motive with the\\ndesire that prevails.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "10 PROLEGOMENA\\ndesire implies preference or choice, and its impulse implies\\npressure toward endeavor or effort. Clearly there can be no\\nimpulsion except in the presence of something impelled,\\nwhich is the volition. 1\\n8. An analysis of an exercise of volition discovers five\\nessential facts which seem to be ultimate, as follow\\n1. The idea of something to be done, or of an act in order\\nto an end. The end, and therefore the means, is conceived\\nby the agent to be desirable, and the action practicable. This\\nis a product of cognition. 2\\n2. An impulse urging to action. Conflicting impulses\\ncoexist. The one that prevails, with which the volition\\nfinally accords, is the motive. This is an exercise of desire.\\n3. The preference of the conscious ego for one line of\\naction rather than another, or for non-action. This is choice\\nor election.\\n4. The resolution of the choice into an intent to take a\\ncertain course, either instantly or in due time. This is inten-\\ntion.\\n5. An exertion or striving to effectuate the intention, con-\\nstraining, by means of attention, mental changes and muscu-\\nlar movements. This is voluntary effort.\\nThe idea and the impulse are not elements, but are real\\nconditions, of volition. Its elements are choice, intention and\\neffort. 3\\n9. Choice or election is a phenomenon mi generis, oc-\\ncurring only within consciousness, and having no analogue\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 257, and 268 sq. Appetite is the\\nwill s solicitor, and the will is appetite s controller; what we covet according\\nto the one, by the other we often reject. Hooker, Eccles. Pol., bk. i.\\n2 Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and\\ndraw after it the acts of the will, this is certain, it does of necessity precede\\nthem, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports\\nit to the will as amiable. South, Sermon on Matthew, 10 37.\\n3 See Elements of Psychology, 272 sq.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "PSYCHOLOGICAL 11\\nin the material universe. There are two special conditions\\nprecedent, corresponding to the general conditions of volition\\nalready cited. These are\\n1. Alternativity of possible actions, implying independ-\\nence of objective control or causation.\\n2. A like plurality of impulses, counter-checking and re-\\nstraining each other until a judgment is rendered, and the\\nchoice made.\\nDeliberative intelligence, aroused and influenced by the\\nimpelling desires, considers the alternatives, but does not\\ncausally determine the election. 1 That the election accord\\nwith the weightier judgment is normal, but not necessary.\\nGood and weighty reasons are often rejected in favor of\\ntrifles as when one incurs danger to gratify curiosity. Thus\\nchoice is largely independent, both of the judgment which\\npresumes to dictate it, and of the desires which impel it. Its\\nconditions being fulfilled, it is free between the possible alter-\\nnatives. Indeed this is the essence of choice no freedom,\\nno choice no choice, no freedom. We shall inquire pres-\\nently whether there be in reality such a thing as choice.\\nObserve the distinction between choice making and choice\\nmade. When choosing, one is vacillating under the influence\\n1 Intelligence, but not choice, may be fairly likened to a balance, and\\nreasons to the weights. Intellect deliberates (from de and librare, to weigh,\\nfrom libra, a balance). It ponders the facts and the reasons with a view to\\nchoice and decision. Elements of Psychology, 273, note. Deliberate pref-\\nerence, as well as desire, looks always forward in time. Idem, 255.\\nNothing past is the object of deliberate preference; as no one deliberately\\nprefers that Troy should have been destroyed for a man does not deliberate\\nabout what has happened, but about what is future and contingent. For\\nwhat is past does not admit of being undone hence Agathon rightly says\\nOf this alone even God is deprived, the power of making things that are\\npast never to have been. \u00e2\u0080\u0094Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, bk. vi, ch. 2, 6.\\nNon tamen irritum,\\nQuodcunque retro est, efficiet neque\\nDiffinget infectumque reddet,\\nQuod f ugiens semel hora vexit.\\nHorace, Odes, lib. iii, car. xxix.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "12 PROLEGOMENA\\nof opposed reasons and conflicting desires when he has\\nchosen, the question is resolved, his resolution is taken, he\\nhas decided what to do. This issue of choice is intention.\\nIt is static rather than dynamic a state of mind lying be-\\ntween choice and effort, between election and fruition. Its\\nduration is indefinite, varying from an imperceptible instant\\nto any length of time awaiting opportunity. When this offers,\\nthe effort takes place, perhaps blindly, that is, without\\nrenewed or further deliberation, and the thing is done.\\nEffort is the complete and final expression of the free per-\\nsonality or ego. As choice issues in intention, so effort issues\\nin attention, thereby inducing other mental modes, perhaps\\nwith muscular motions. In the effort the subjective voluntary\\naction is complete, even though the intended consequents be\\nimperfect or entirely null.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 13\\nPROLEGOMENA\\nII. PHILOSOPHICAL\\n10. Besides the foregoing psychological doctrines there\\nare a number of principles more strictly philosophical, which\\nalso are prerequisite to Ethics. 1\\n1 There are various opinions as to the proper scope and definition of\\nphilosophy, due mostly to the fact that the word is taken, as is likewise the\\ncase with many other important terms, sometimes in a generic and sometimes\\nin a specific sense.\\nTaken generically it embraces as subordinate branches certain aprioric\\nsciences, called the philosophic sciences, as logic, ethics, aesthetics, episte-\\nmology, metaphysics. This last, metaphysics, which is often loosely re-\\ngarded as synonymous with philosophy, is more strictly the science of\\nreality. It inquires into the real nature of both corporeal and mental\\nobjects, seeking to pass from the subjective to the objective, from thoughts\\nto things. Lotze subdivides it into ontology, rational psychology, and\\ncosmology.\\nOther thinkers take the still wider view that philosophy consists in the\\ndevelopment of a comprehensive and consistent theory of the universe.\\nKulpe, Int. to PhU., 31, 3. Paulsen warmly pronounces Philosophic\\nder Inbegriff aller wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. Einleitung in die Phi-\\nlosophie, S. 34. So also Renan: Philosopher c est connaitre l universe.\\nL universe se compose de deux mondes, le monde physique et le monde\\nmoral, la nature et l hunianite\\\\ L e tude de la nature et de rhumanite est\\ndone toute la philosophic Fragments Philosophiques, p. 292. Likewise\\nWundt defines philosophy as die allgemeine Wissenschaft, welche die\\ndurch die Einzelwissenschaften vermittelten allgemeinen Erkenntnisse zu\\neinem widerspruchslosen System zu vereinigen hat. 1 System der Philo-\\nsophic, S. 21. This accords with the saying of Spencer: Knowledge of\\nthe lowest kind is ununified knowledge science is partially unified knowl-\\nedge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge. Kant, discarding the\\nnarrower scholastic definitions, gives as a world-definition the following\\nPhilosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential\\nends of human reason.\\nTaken specifically, as coordinate with the specific sciences named above,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "14 PROLEGOMENA\\nWhether there be, truly and really, among the mental\\nactivities a choice between alternatives, is properly a metaphy-\\nsical question concerning a reality. For this subjective\\nfreedom is not a fact of consciousness, and thus psycho-\\nlogical for consciousness is cognizant of positive facts only,\\nand the conception of freedom is strictly negative, merely the\\nabsence of constraint. Moreover, an unconsciousness of con-\\nstraint does not prove its absence, for it may conceivably\\nexist out of consciousness. Hence the reality of choice, of\\nfreedom in willing, is a debatable question of metaphysics.\\nSome thinkers hold that the universal conviction of an\\nability to choose is a delusion which philosophy exposes that\\nfreedom is impossible in reality, since it is contrary to the\\nstrictly universal law that every change or event is caused\\nand, indeed, that freedom is impossible even as a conception,\\nfor this would be contradictory to the same law, which is\\na necessary notion. 1\\nNow, if the mental act called a choice be in every respect a\\nchange or event, then it must be allowed that it is caused,\\nand so necessitated to be just what it becomes that there\\nis no real choice, no possible alternative, no freedom. In\\nother words, if the act be essentially a case of causation, then\\nthe doctrine of necessity, of bond-Will, is true.\\nBui it seems reasonable to hold that the fact, as to its\\nessence, is out of the category of causation. In so far as it\\nis an act passing from indecision to decision, it is obviously\\nphilosophy is the science of principles. Ueberweg, Hist, of Phil, 1.\\nIt is thus the investigation and systematic exposition of the fundamental and\\nuniversal truths that underlie all the sciences, the investigation of the pre-\\nsuppositions of science. KtiLPE, Int. to Phil, 31, 4. It is evident that\\nall sciences have their common root in philosophy so restricted; for all\\nspeak of conditions, axioms, laws, forces, possibilities, realities, etc., which\\nthey cannot undertake to establish or explain as applied in diverse senses to\\ndiverse spheres, and therefore are relegated for scientific exposition to phi-\\nlosophy thus specialized.\\ni See my Elements of Inductive Logic, 18.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 15\\nsubject to causal constraint; for the mere presentation to\\nthe will of opposed alternatives, each conceived to be possi-\\nble, as to go or stay, is a cause that necessitates the willing\\nof one I must choose, as we say. 1 But in so far as the\\nfact is merely a preference of this to that, which is its es-\\nsence, it does not appear to be a case of causation for mere\\npreference does not imply a change it is not from that to\\nthis, but only is it this rather than that. Circumstances de-\\ntermine that I shall take a step, but not at all which step\\nshall be taken. As the essence of choice, and that which\\ndistinguishes it from all other mental facts, indeed from all\\nthings else, is simply the taking of one rather than the\\nother of two possible alternatives, and as this does not imply\\ncausation, choice may, for aught that appears, be real, free-\\ndom a reality. Moreover, causal constraint being absent,\\nand no other being conceivable, we may conclude further\\nthat choice, freedom in wilhng, is a reality. 2\\nIt is evident that freedom in willing is a condition of all\\nethical doctrine, a postulate of Ethics. It is conditio sine\\n1 As of two contradictories one mnst be true, and it remains to decide\\nwhich so of two alternatives one must be taken, and it remains to de-\\ncide which.\\n2 See the discussion in Elements of Psychology, 276 sq. The absence of\\ncausal constraint, and our inability to conceive any other, does not imply\\nthe absence of any determining influence whatever, which absence would\\nallow mere caprice, morally worthless causality. Determination is of two\\nkinds, causal determination which implies necessity, and rational determina-\\ntion which consists with freedom. Choice is rationally determined, that is,\\nit accords with some antecedent conditioning reason, good or bad. Delib-\\nerate preference does not exist without intellect (didvota) and reason (wOs).\\nAristotle, Nich. Eth., bk. vi, ch. 2. Desires also condition choice, but\\ndo not causally determine it. The saying that the choice always follows the\\nstronger motive, which claims to settle the whole question, is an unwar-\\nranted assumption that the desire acts causally on the choice, which begs\\nthe whole question. Desire causes, not the choice, but the effort. Kant\\nthus defines desire The faculty of desire is the being s faculty of becom-\\ning by means of its ideas the cause of the actual existence of the objects of\\nthose ideas. Critique of Practical Reason, preface, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "16 PROLEGOMENA\\nqua non if freedom is, duty may be but if freedom is not,\\nduty is not. 1 The responsible must be free. This, for\\nthose holding moral responsibility to be real, is of itself a\\nclear demonstration that freedom, that choice, is real.\\nThere is freedom, then, in the fact of choice. It is not\\nto be found elsewhere. All spontaneous and involuntary\\nchanges are effects determined by one s constitution and\\nenvironment. Every voluntary change is an effect deter-\\nmined, directly or indirectly, by the will. Within the will,\\nthe effort is causally and directly determined by that ante-\\ncedent desire to which preference is yielded, the motive.\\nThe intention is merely choice as a fact, as made. Only in\\nthe act of choosing is there freedom from causation. 2\\n11. In the precedent psychological sketch it is assumed\\nthat the human mind has a faculty of pure intellectual intu-\\nition, the pure reason. 3 The reality of this faculty is like-\\nwise a metaphysical theme, one which has been much\\ndiscussed by philosophic thinkers. Only a brief explanation\\n1 Says Kant While freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, the\\nmoral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. Were there no freedom it\\nwould be impossible to trace the moral law in ourselves at all. Critique of\\nPractical Beason, preface, note. Says Bishop Martensen Only in the\\ndomain of freedom is morality possible. Christian Ethics, p. 3.\\n2 Says Kant Will is that kind of causality attributed to living agents,\\nin so far as they are possessed of reason and freedom is such a property of\\nthat causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign\\ndetermining causes. See Elements of Psychology, 257 n, 272 n, 275 n.\\n3 See supra, 2 also Elements of Psychology, 113 sq., and 124 sq.\\nThe faculty of pure reason, by which the mind cognizes necessary and\\nuniversal ideas and principles, is in Greek termed vovs and in German\\nVernunft that which cognizes contingent matter, Sidvoia and Verstand.\\nAristotle thus defines the former 0 vovs 4 rrl irepl rds dpxds twv votjtwv kcu\\nruv 8vt i)v i} /xtv yap eTncrTTj/xr] tu v /act aTroddi-ews vtu v icrrlv al 8 dpxai dvairo-\\nSeiKToi. Magna Moralia, i, 35. Kant, the highest modern authority in this\\nmatter, defines thus Pure reason (Vernunft) is the faculty which contains\\nthe principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori. Critique of Pure\\nBeason, Int., vii.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 17\\nof the view adopted in the present treatise is practicable in\\nthis connection.\\nWe hold that mind is constituted with power to know\\nboth itself and things other than itself, the conditions of\\ntheir existence, and their relations to each other. This cog-\\nnitive constitution is fitted, not only for the empirical, but\\nalso for the pure intuition of objective reality. Conscious-\\nness, in the presence of some adventitious, empirical matter\\nperceived by sense, external or internal, has, beside and along\\nwith sense, an intellectual power to discern in the total fact\\nan essential element, equally adventitious, but not at all\\nsensuous. This is the power of pure reason. That element\\nof the total which is not the object of sense, is the object of\\nreason both elements are objective and real in the total\\nthing known.\\nA conscious experience, for example, of a succession of\\nmental states given in self -perception, the internal sense, in-\\nvolves time, which is not an object of sense, but is discerned\\nby pure intellect or reason, as a necessary and objectively\\nexisting condition of the succession. Upon the occasion of\\nan experience of body, the empirical intuition implies and is\\nconditioned on a pure intuition of space, a non-sensuous\\nobject occupied by and containing the body. An experience\\nof a change, especially of one that is constrained by conscious\\neffort, noting that the subsequent is not detached but grows\\nimmediately from its antecedent, is an empirical occasion\\nfor the purely intellectual discernment of causation as the\\nnecessary condition of change, of a reality, a force, existing in\\nthe relation of things that change. Now from the law of\\nrelativity, that every mode of consciousness subsists by virtue\\nof an opposition, that every affirmation is also a negation, 1 it\\nfollows, that the idea of causation as constrained action, is\\nnecessarily supplemented by the negative correlative idea of\\ni See Elements of Psychology, 58.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "18 PROLEGOMENA\\nfreedom as unconstrained action. A conscious act, judged\\nto be free, is, in the human mind, an occasion for an intuition\\nof the pure idea of right or duty. Such action, not coming\\nunder the law of causation, is cognized as under a different\\nlaw, the law of obligation.\\nThus time is a condition of event, space a condition of\\nbody, substance a condition of quality, non-contradiction a\\ncondition of thought, cause a condition of change, right a\\ncondition of obligation. Upon the metaphysical question\\nwhether these pure ideas correspond to objective realities, we\\nobserve simply, that they stand prior to things in the relation\\nof condition to conditioned. They must be in order that\\nthings may be the former necessary, the latter contingent.\\nIf a thing be real, its condition must be real.\\nWe have already identified the intuition of duty in its\\nmandatory form, that is, the moral law or law of obligation,\\nwith conscience. Even should the intuitive character of\\nthis discernment be rejected, still it would remain true that\\nconscience, the discerning of moral law, is, like freedom, a\\nnecessary condition, and hence a postulate of Ethics.\\n12. It is here in place to inquire what is meant by a\\nperson. 1 We can readily conceive of beings intelligent and\\nsentient, and having free-will, but not having conscience.\\nIn fact we thus judge of brutes. But beings destitute of\\n1 A word borrowed from the theater where it still plays its part in\\ndramatic personal, impersonation, etc. Its etymology is more curious than\\nhelpful. Lat. persona, personare, to sound through per, through, and\\nsonare, to sound, from sonus, sound. The persona was first a mask used by\\nan actor, then a personage, character, part played by an actor, a person.\\nThe large-mouthed masks worn by the actors were so called from the\\nresonance of the voice sounding through them. Ske at. Persona has come\\nto mean the inner spiritual subsistence that sounds through the mask of ex-\\nternal individuality. It is not the collected fagot of those peculiar visible\\ntraits, which may distinguish but do not compose the man it is the unified\\nsum of those common mental and moral characteristics which make him an\\nanswerable soul.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 19\\nmoral insight, and therefore not morally accountable, are not\\npersons for moral insight or conscience is the differentiating\\nessence of personality. Accordingly we define a person to be\\nan intelligent and sentient being, having free-will, and moral\\ninsight. But, since consciousness is generic of the modes\\nknowing and feeling, desiring and willing, it will be sufficient\\nto define a person as a being conscious of moral insight.\\nIn the knowledge of our shortcomings we recognize our-\\nselves as imperfect persons, and as such subject to the law\\nwith its penalties, of which law we have moral insight.\\nHence the imperfect person, the human person, is a being\\nconscious of obligation.\\nThe notion of an imperfect person is necessarily supple-\\nmented by the correlative notion of a perfect person. This\\nideal person fulfills the requirements of the law by virtue of\\nhis nature, and therefore is superior to obligation, not under\\nthe law, which is for imperfect persons only. Now perfection\\nis complete, consummate wholeness. Hence a perfect person\\nis a being conscious of holiness.\\nIn the knowledge of the narrow limitation of our powers\\nwe recognize ourselves as finite beings. The notion of finite\\nbeing is necessarily supplemented by the correlative notion\\nof infinite being. This notion, combined with that of a per-\\nfect person, constitutes the notion of Deity, a perfect and in-\\nfinite person, or a perfectly harmonious personality infinitated.\\nThe moral law demands of imperfect persons perfection.\\nThis then must be possible, else the law would be brutum\\nfulmen. Now the real object of a will determinable by moral\\nlaw, is its perfect accord with the law. This perfection is\\nholiness, a state which no human being is capable of attaining\\nin this life. But, since it is required as practically necessary,\\nit can be looked for only as the result of progress thereafter\\nin infinitum. Hence, not only the present existence of per-\\nsons, of imperfect persons, but also their immortality, as", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "20 PROLEGOMENA\\ninseparably connected with moral law, is a postulate of\\nEthics. 1\\n13. Whether there be an objectively real being corre-\\nsponding to the notion of Deity, is yet another metaphysical\\nthesis, to which attention is now directed for the reality of\\na superhuman person, the supreme maker, ruler and judge\\nof the universe, is a doctrine essential in complete ethical\\ntheory. Hence, after a very brief consideration, we shall\\nassume it as an additional postulate of Ethics.\\nLogical proof of the existence of God has, in all ages, been\\nearnestly sought by philosophic thinkers, but even yet it is\\nhardly established as an unquestionable philosophical doctrine.\\nVarious forms of the ontological, the teleological, and the\\ncosmological arguments have been proposed, criticised, and\\nreplaced by other forms, without settled result. We cannot\\nhere examine this august theme adequately, but will venture\\nto offer a suggestion. 2\\nLet the cosmological argument be formulated, not a priori\\nas is usual, but d posteriori, adhering strictly to the logical\\n1 So Kant in Critique of Practical Reason the Dialectic, ch. iv.\\n2 How can one be calm when he is called on to prove the existence of\\nGod ?i But let us reason gently, smothering our indignation. Plato in the\\nLaws, 888 a, Ste. The several forms of argument named are effectively-\\ncriticised by Kant, the all-destroyer, in the Critique of Pure Reason the\\nDialectic, bk. ii. ch. 3, 3 sq., concluding in 6 A Supreme Being is,\\ntherefore, for the speculative reason, a mere ideal, though a faultless one, a\\nconception which perfects and crowns the system of human cognition, but the\\nobjective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure\\nspeculative reason. Elsewhere he says Providence has not willed that\\nthose convictions which are most necessary for our happiness should be at\\nthe mercy of subtile and finely-spun reasonings, but has delivered them\\ndirectly to the natural, vulgar understanding. It is altogether necessary\\nthat we should be convinced of God s existence, but not so necessary that\\nwe should be able to demonstrate it. In the Essay Der einzig mogliche\\nBeweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763. It is well\\nworth noting that the Scriptures nowhere offer logical proof of the existence\\nof God but, from the very outset (Genesis 1:1) throughout, it is assumed.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 21\\nmethod for solving the problem Given intermixed effects to\\nfind their cause, a process highly approved and very familiar\\nin physical science. 1\\nA scientific explanation of phenomena is found in their\\ncauses. Looking abroad on the world of nature, we behold\\na bewildering multitude, a vast complexus of objects and\\nevents. To explain these severally, science investigates their\\nproximate or second causes. In explanation of the great\\ntotal, the universe, let us posit hypothetically an adequate\\npersonal first cause. That this is a possible conception is\\nevinced by the fact that it is the faith of millions of men.\\nThe personal cause in the hypothesis is a vera causa, that\\nis, an agency known to be effective in other connections.\\nEvery person knows himself and his fellows to be efficient\\ncauses, originating causes, creators or builders of new things\\nfrom material at hand. We shall claim only this for the\\nposited first cause.\\nThe supposed adequacy of the personal first cause is an\\nindefinite extension of such powers as are known to belong\\nto ordinary persons. It becomes thereby a complete and suf-\\nficient explanation of the totality of the phenomena under\\nconsideration. So the geologist, in positing early cataclysmic\\ncauses, supposes these to be such forces as are now under ob-\\nservation, and that they acted with vastly greater intensity.\\nThus the two prime conditions of a soundly scientific\\nhypothesis are fulfilled in that we posit a vera causa, and\\none that explains all the facts. It is therein superior to\\nDalton s atomic hypothesis which does not posit a vera causa,\\nto Darwin s development hypothesis which does not explain\\nall the facts, 2 and to Huygen s luminiferous ether hypothesis\\n1 See this method of investigation explicated and exemplified in Elements\\nof Inductive Logic, 82 sq.; see also 97.\\n2 See Professor Cown s admissions in his Evo\\\\ution of To-day, p. 117 sq.\\nand Mill s System of Logic, 8th ed. p. 355 note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "22 PROLEGOMENA\\nwhich does neither yet these are generally approved by\\nscientists, and claimed as invaluable parts of the sum of\\npositive knowledge. But our hypothesis, notwithstanding its\\nexcellence, remains an hypothesis, an unproved proposition,\\nunless we can show also that no other hypothesis will explain\\nthe facts.\\nNow a first cause is the only possible explanation for its\\nsole alternative is an infinite regressus of causes, and this\\ncan make no pretense to be an explanation, for evidently it\\nmerely pushes explanation back, away, out of reach, in fact\\ndenies any explanation to be attainable, which is essentially\\nthe agnostic position. Therefore an explanation of the uni-\\nverse must posit a first cause. By like process of proof, that\\nno other hypothesis would explain the facts, Newton estab-\\nlished the theory of gravitation.\\nFurthermore, the first cause must be either personal or\\nimpersonal. The latter alternative is proposed to us in the\\nunintelligent deity of the pantheist, its manifestations being\\nunconsciously worked out by the inward necessities of its\\nnature. This banishes freedom in willing from the universe.\\nMoreover, how an unconscious, unintelligent being, which is\\nnot a person but merely a thing, could originate personal\\nbeings, beings consciously intelligent, is inexplicable which\\nis to say, the impersonal hypothesis does not explain the\\nfacts. Therefore the tenable hypothesis of a personal first\\ncause, no other hypothesis being tenable, having thus fulfilled\\nthe prime and the final conditions of strict logical proof,\\nshould be accepted as an established scientific theory. 1\\n1 By the same logical process the existence of Neptune was proved, before\\nits revelation by the telescope.\\nLord Bacon says It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man s\\nmind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men s minds about to\\nreligion for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered,\\nit may sometimes rest in them, and go no further but when it beholdeth\\nthe chain of them confederate, and linked together, it must needs fly to\\nProvidence and Deity. Essay xvi.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "PHIL OS OPIIICAL 23\\nAn additional word may be said in reference to the moral\\nelement in personality. The moral law, the most important\\nfactor in a world of intelligences, is necessarily referred to\\nthe personal first cause as an expression of his will, which,\\nfurther, is an expression of his nature. This law demands\\nholiness. Therefore his nature must be holy. 1\\nNow it is to be admitted that the foregoing argument, like\\nthe teleological argument, does not establish the infinity of\\nthe divine attributes. The power and wisdom are seen to be\\nindefinitely great, but this falls short of infinite. Moreover,\\nthe bringing into being what was not, is unproved. The\\npersonal first cause herein concluded is, therefore, no more\\nthan the demiurge of the early Greek philosophers, an archi-\\ntect, building with material at hand. But let it be observed\\nthat, while the passing from the indefinitely great to the\\ninfinite may have insufficient logical ground, still it is an\\neasy step for faith. 2 Also be it observed that creation, in\\nan absolute sense, is for philosophy an impossible concep-\\ntion, since it is an attempt to think a relation of one term,\\nwhich is absurd. 3\\nWe have touched briefly upon the great theses of philoso-\\nphy, freedom, immortality, 4 and God. For while Psychology\\nis merely a system of natural order, and Ethics a system of\\n1 The unity of this First Cause may be inferred from the unity of the\\nreciprocal relation existing between parts of the world, as portions of an\\nexisting edifice an inference which all our observation favors, and all prin-\\nciples of analogy support.\\n2 See supra, 12, fourth paragraph.\\n8 Absolute creation means Nothing becomes something. Herein is no\\nsubject, for nothing is well, no thing, a pure and total negation. For like\\nreason annihilation is an impossible conception. Physicists hold it im-\\npossible that any particle of matter, or any pulse of energy, can cease to be.\\nThe Hegelian, however, setting aside the law of contradiction, also holding\\nthat nothing is a thing, and that becoming mediates nothing and something,\\npresumes otherwise.\\n4 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, 3, et al.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "24 PROLEGOMENA\\nnatural jurisprudence, Philosophy is properly a system of\\nnatural theology. Science, in its full comprehension, is\\nknowledge of myself, of the world, and of God. This is its\\nbeginning, its mean, and its end. The problem of the ages\\nis Given self, to find God.\\n14. In preparation for an ethical doctrine founded on\\npersonal relations, it is needful to examine the philosophy of\\nrelations taken in a more general sense.\\nNature, under which term we here include all objective\\nrealities, presents only individual things, or individual groups\\nof things, in certain relations. The things are real, and their\\nrelations are real. This statement assumes the doctrine of\\nNatural Realism, as opposed to Idealism.\\nAn individual, as the form of the word indicates, is a thing\\nor a group of things, indivisible in itself, while divisible from\\nevery other thing. This means that its parts are not kinds\\nof the whole taken generically, but are new individuals, and\\nthat it is distinguishable, at least numerically, from every\\nother thing. Moreover, an individual is, as to its mere exist-\\nence, independent of other things. 1\\nThe general, which is the logical opposite of the individual,\\nhas no objective existence. It is wholly subjective, a state\\nof mind, a conception, a product of thought, or simply a\\nthought. All common nouns, as stone, tree, man, are merely\\nsigns or expressions of thoughts. They have no general\\nobject corresponding to them in nature, and their generality\\nconsists solely in being predicable of any one of a plurality\\nof individual things.\\n1 The Scholastics, following Porphyry, define an individual to he ens in-\\ndivisum in se, et divisum ab omni alio id cujus proprietates alteri simul con-\\nvenire non possunt. Also as ens per se subsistens. Whatever occupies a\\ndistinct portion of space is an individual object of external intuition and\\nwhatever occupies a distinct moment of time, without extension in space, is\\nan individual object of internal intuition. The general notion as such\\nis emancipated from all special relation to space or time. Mansel, Meta-\\nphysics, pp. 37, 39.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 25\\nWhile generalities have no objective reality, the particular\\nrelations of individual things are evidently not less real than\\nthe things themselves, though indeed they are not objects of\\nsensuous but only of intellectual cognition. 1 These relations\\nare reciprocal, and when thoroughly traced, each is seen to be\\nillimitable. All things in the universe are mutually related.\\nPlurality and unity interpenetrate and condition each other.\\nEach is in all, and all in each.\\nFor let us consider that every particle of matter occupies\\nand is contained in space. Each particle is related to every\\nother as to its position, a geometrical relation, and as to its\\nmotion, a mechanical relation. Any change of position\\nplaces it in a different and distinguishable relation. Relative\\nrest and relative motion are the only kinds of rest and mo-\\ntion known. These reciprocal spatial relations combine the\\nplurality of things into the unity of a corporeal whole. 2\\nConsider also temporal relations. Space is extension, hav-\\ning three dimensions time is protension, having but one\\ndimension. Yet every event is related temporally to every\\nother as precedent, simultaneous or subsequent. These rela-\\ntions also are reciprocal, comparative and measurable. They\\ncombine the plurality of events into the unity of an histori-\\ncal whole.\\nTogether with spatial and temporal relations are relations\\nof causative interaction. Every particle of matter hi the\\nuniverse attracts every other. 3 All are in motion, and mutu-\\n1 Some philosophers, in opposing the doctrine of the Absolute or Being\\nwithout relation, emphasize the reality of relations, regarding them indeed\\nas the very essence of all reality. So Lotze Sein heist in Beziehungen\\nstehen, und das Wahrgenommenwerden ist selbst nur eine solche Beziehung\\nneben andern. Grundziige der Metaphysik, 10.\\n2 World and universe are proper synonyms, the latter from Lat. ad unum\\nversus, turned into one, equivalent to e pluribus unum. Aristotle defines\\nNature as the complex of objects having a material constitution and involved\\nin necessary motion or change. Physica, ii, 1 cf. Be Coelo, i, 1.\\n3 Hence each material particle is the center of a sphere of force filling", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "26 PROLEGOMENA\\nally determine each other s motion. A stone falls to the\\nground; the earth rises to meet it. The earth and moon\\nenforce each other to revolve about their common center of\\ngravity. Also, because of their motion and mutual attraction,\\nthe planets and the sun revolve about their common center\\nof gravity, and thereby constitute the solar system a unitary\\nsystem. This system as a whole revolves about some higher\\ncenter of the stellar system, a larger whole. Thus again the\\ncorporeal universe is a unit, more closely bound into one by\\nvirtue of efficient causes. 1 Moreover, these causative inter-\\nactions are continuous throughout time, bringing past, pres-\\nent and future into a more compact historical whole, binding\\nthem into a closer unity by interlinked chains of causes and\\neffects. Thus throughout the universe of space and time,\\nevery individual body is causally related to every other. All\\nact upon each, and each upon all.\\n15. The foregoing are primary conditions of yet another\\nspecific relation of the highest import, the relation of means\\nand end. Its philosophic treatment is teleology, which\\nviews nature as a kingdom of ends. 2 We shall here consider\\nspace. Gravity, unlike energy, is not transmitted, nor transferred, nor\\ntransformed, and is not obstructed. It coexists with its substantial center.\\n1 To the molar motions indicated are to be added molecular motions,\\nincluding all vibratory and chemical action.\\n2 The expression is borrowed from Kant, who says Teleology considers\\nnature as a kingdom of ends. Ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as\\na kingdom of nature. In the first case, the kingdom of ends is a theoret-\\nical idea, adopted to explain what actually is. In the latter, it is a practical\\nidea, adopted to bring about that which is not yet, but which can be realized\\nby our conduct, provided it conforms to this idea. Metaphysic of Morals,\\ninR. and S. ed. of Kant s works, vol. viii, p. 66 note.\\nLeibnitz termed the world when viewed in relation to the rational\\nbeings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each\\nother, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace,\\nand distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature, in which these rational\\nbeings live, under moral laws indeed, but expect no other consequences", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 27\\nthe teleologic relation merely as an existing fact, the end as\\nan effect, not as a design or final cause. 1\\nIn many individual groups of things the relation of means\\nand end may be discerned, binding the components into an\\norganic whole. Accordingly an organism is defined as a group\\nin which all parts are mutually means and end. Each part\\nis for every other also each is for the whole, and the whole\\nfor each all serving all. 2 An organ is a member of an organ-\\nized group, serving all other members as ends. Every con-\\nstitutive part is an organ, an instrument, a means. It has\\ncertain special functions relating to the rest severally and as\\na whole; and when it entirely ceases to perform its office,\\nit ceases to be a member of the organism.\\nIt is not a fancy, nor a mere speculation, but a fact, recog-\\nnized by philosophy and lying at the base of all science, that\\nthe universe is a kingdom of ends, an organism constituted of\\nminor organisms. Space is for bodies, and bodies are for\\nspace. Time is for events, and events are for time. Space\\nwithout body, or time without event, is unthinkable. Gravi-\\ntation draws all bodies toward one center, and radiation\\ndisperses to all bodies the store of energy collected in that\\ncenter. Every star, and every planet, and every satellite, has\\nits peculiar office relative to the rest. The extinction of any\\none would necessitate a readjustment of the whole. Nature,\\nfrom their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in\\nthe world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of\\ngrace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves\\nlimit our participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happi-\\nness, is a practically necessary idea of pure reason. Kant, Critique of\\nPure Reason, Meiklejohn s trans., Bonn s ed. p. 492.\\ni Final cause, the excitant and object of purpose, implying antecedent\\nefficient cause, and inferring First Cause. On the Aristotelic division of\\ncauses into four several kinds, see Elements of Inductive Logic, 14 note.\\n2 The word all is ambiguous, meaning either all as an undistributed unity,\\nor all as a distributed plurality as in Drink ye all of it. In the above\\nformula, and elsewhere in this connection, both meanings are applicable.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "28 PBOLEGOMENA\\nthe great world of all things, is an organized individual, a\\ncosmos.\\nThe earth is a cosmic unity. In its series of periodically\\nrecurring changes, reproductive life is linked with the seasons,\\nand active life with day and night. It is itself made up of\\nrelatively independent organisms. For example, every animal\\nis an organism. Each of its members, even the least, is an\\norgan serving the sustenance of all others, and receiving sus-\\ntenance from all. The head is for its hair, and the hair for\\nthe head, and both for the trunk. Should any organ cease its\\nfunctions, it suffers atrophy, or is cast off as excrementitious\\nand when the chief organs cease their ministry, life ceases,\\nand the integral whole disintegrates. A plant is an organic\\nwhole. The root is for the leaf, and the leaf for the root;\\nand the other parts serve the leaf and root, else these could\\nnot perform their functions. All are reciprocally related as\\nmeans and end. 1 As physiology thus resolves living bodies\\ninto organized organs, so chemistry teaches that all bodies\\nconsist of systems of molecules, and these ultimately of\\nsystems of atoms. 2 Every subordinate is a microcosm repeat-\\ning the macrocosm.\\nSays von Baer, as quoted by Paulsen The animal kingdom cannot\\nexist without the vegetable kingdom this again cannot arise before the\\nstony crust of the earth has been disintegrated into loose soil by physical\\nand chemical influences. We must further presuppose that this soil is\\nwatered by rains from time to time. The rain can fall only on condition\\nthat the water has previously been absorbed by the air, that it has been car-\\nried to a higher stratum and then condensed by a change of temperature.\\nThe water, again, cannot rise unless the earth is heated by the sun s rays.\\nHence the smallest blade of grass really calls into play the entire planetary\\nsystem with all its arrangements and movements, and all the laws of\\nnature. Int. to Phil, p. 232.\\n2 Das Staiibchen, selbst der unfruchtbare Stein,\\nIndem er sein Gesetz hat, muss er wirken\\nTJnd thatig fur das grosse Ganze sein. Goethe.\\nThe relations seen in simple cohesion indicate more than mere resem-\\nblance, an inherent kindred. They indicate on the part of two globules of\\nthe same elementary body a predisposition perfectly reciprocal to cleave to", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 29\\n16. In the kingdom of ends is included the spiritual\\nrealm. We conceive that it contains no isolated elements,\\nthat throughout its sphere there is organized interaction.\\nWithin the range of observation is the human mind, con-\\nstituted by a complement of faculties whose activities are\\nmutually conditioned, and cooperate to a common end. As\\nin the corporeal so in the spiritual sphere, very many of the\\nmost important ends are attained only by means of a com-\\nbination of energies. 1\\nThe universe as a total we conceive to be composed of the\\nspiritual and the corporeal united in an interchange of\\nfunctional activities. Many minor wholes are thus organically\\nconstituted. Each individual man is a double organism con-\\nsisting of body and mind. He is also a member of wider\\ncombinations for none of us liveth to himself, and none\\ndieth to himself. The family is an organic individual, its\\nmembers being normally related for mutual service. Every\\nindividual community or organized society has a constitution,\\nwritten or unwritten, whose essence is a definition of the offices\\nof its members in their service of the common interest. The\\ncity, the state, the nation, has organic laws constituting it an\\nindividual, wherehi its citizens are each for all and all for\\neach. The human race is an organized individual, its members\\nbeing bound into one by natural affinities, and related by\\nteleological interaction. Moreover, the content of an individ-\\none another, to hold real relations. They indicate that no particle exists for\\nitself, bnt that its nature points to relation with other particles. They indi-\\ncate that though each particle thus exists for others, as well as for itself, it\\ndoes not exist indifferently for all others of any sort, but for others of its\\nown kind in the first degree, and then for others of different kinds in a\\nsecond degree. Wm. Arthur, in the Fernly lecture On the Difference\\nbetween Physical and Moral Law, p. 49 London, 1883.\\n1 Says Leibnitz Les ames agissent selon les loix des causes finales par\\nappe titions, fins et moyens. Les corps agissent selon les causes efficientes\\nou des mouvements. Et les deux regnes, celui des causes efficientes et\\ncelui des causes finales, sont harmoniques entre eux. Monadology, 79.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "30 PROLEGOMENA\\nual life cannot be described except relatively to the historical\\nwhole. The entire history of the age and of the entire past\\nis contained in it, and its influence extends throughout the\\nentire future. The kingdom of ends is the universe. Every-\\nwhere there is reciprocity, a relation of mutual interdepen-\\ndence, and altruistic subservience, a universal ministry. All\\nserving all is the fundamental, thorough-going, uniform plan\\nof the world.\\n17. Yet another philosopheme to be considered is the\\nconception of law. It is probable that the notion originated\\nhistorically in the expressed will of a superior in authority\\nand power. But this meaning has become specific, the notion\\nhaving been extended to include generically various uni-\\nformities, though still retaining, perhaps in all of its appli-\\ncations, a covert suggestion of authoritative imposition. We\\nmust look away from this origin for its essence.\\nThe ultimate ground of the notion is in the shock of simi-\\nlarity. 1 When two facts, either things or events, make a\\nstriking impression of similarity, one is regarded as a repeti-\\ntion of the other that is, a phenomenon is said to be repeated\\nwhen the mind of the observer receives impressions so very\\nsimilar as to be indistinguishable except as to place or time.\\nWhen several such impressions recur, the notion of repetition\\nis expanded into the notion of order. This implies a corre-\\nspondence, more or less constant, among the facts, which is\\nreferred either to their inherent nature or to their conformity\\nwith some rule, perhaps a mandate, an order, of a ruler.\\nWhen the order of the facts, either existing or required, is\\nundeviatingly constant, the notion of order is expanded into\\nthe notion of strict uniformity.\\nIt has already been pointed out that objective reality pre-\\nsents only related individuals. Now among real things or\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 59.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 31\\nevents, we observe many cases of naturally existing repeti-\\ntion, order, strict uniformity and, by interposing our force,\\nwe are able to induce uniformities that otherwise would not\\nexist. These uniformities may be severally reduced to the\\nform of a general conception, and the expression of this con-\\nception is a law. Thus a law is an expression of a strict\\nuniformity, either of one observed to exist in nature, or of\\none required to be produced by will. These considerations\\nenable us to make a formal statement of the essential mean-\\ning of this comprehensive and important term in its most\\ngeneral definition, thus A law is a designation of a con-\\nstant order of facts determined by the constitution of the\\nthings.\\nLet it be remarked that the things are those from whose\\nconstant order the law arises, and to which it applies also\\nthat the constitution of a thing is an assemblage of inherent\\nproperties which, being constant causes, determine both the\\nfacts and their constant order or uniformity also that, since\\na plurality of individual things have similar constitutions, the\\nuniformity is intellectively viewed as general, and is expressed\\nin a general formula or law. Hence, furthermore, since a\\nlaw is a form of intellective apprehension, a generality in\\nitself and in its expression, it is entirely subjective, existing\\nonly in mind as a thought. Law has no real existence in the\\nexternal world. Uniformities there are, but these are indi-\\nvidual though similar facts. Their mental reduction, by\\nvirtue of their observed similarity, to a generality is a law,\\nwhich being expressed in language attains thereby only a\\nquasi-objectivity. The very common notion that law pre-\\nvails objectively and reigns throughout the universe, is a\\nrhetorical fiction. Laws are only mental representations,\\nconceptions, intelligent interpretations of recognizable uni-\\nformities. Hence a law, formulated and expressed, is merely\\nand properly a designation, or that which marks out and", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "32 PROLEGOMENA\\nmakes known in general terms a real uniformity, either ob-\\nserved or required. 1\\n18. Laws are primarily of two kinds, formal and mate-\\nrial. Formal laws designate or express merely the forms of\\nmental conception, and thus are intellectual abstractions dis-\\ncharged of all content. Such are the principles of mathe-\\nmatics and of logic. Material law has content it designates\\norder in phenomena.\\nMaterial law is likewise of two kinds, natural and moral.\\nNatural law is a generalization of facts of coexistence, or of\\nevents of orderly succession, in inanimate things, and also in\\nanimate beings apart from their free will. It designates an\\nestablished uniformity which has been found to exist in na-\\nture. Moral law is a mandate addressed to persons. It\\nimplies a possible alternative and the required order, deter-\\nmined by the constitution of its subjects, is sanctioned and\\nenforced by penalty.\\nNatural law is simply indicative moral law imperative.\\n1 See in Elements of Inductive Logic the chapter on Natural Law,\\n90-100. Montesquieu defines thus: Laws in their most extended sig-\\nnification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things.\\nL Esprit des Lois, bk. i, ch. 1, opening sentence. It has been strikingly-\\nsaid A law is a human translation of the divine procedure. Perhaps it\\nwould be more permissible to say A law is an interpretation of cosmic order.\\nHooker, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, defines law in its universal meaning.\\nAlso we have A law is a rule or method according to which phenomena\\nor actions follow each other. Black, Dictionary of Law, ad verb. But:\\nLaw, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of\\naction prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound\\nto obey. Blackstone, Commentaries, Int., \u00c2\u00a72. Thus jurists usually\\nlimit the meaning to what we term moral law; as, A law, properly so\\ncalled, is a command which obliges a person or persons. Austin, as\\nquoted by Black. Again: A law, in the literal and proper sense of the\\nword, may be defined as a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent\\nbeing by an intelligent being having power over him. Austin, Jurispru-\\ndence, 2. Again: Law in its most comprehensive sense is a rule of\\naction for intelligent beings, and in its practical and more limited sense\\nfor men. Minor, Institutes, Int. 2, p. 22, See infra, 47, notes.", "height": "3993", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHICAL 33\\nThe one is a uniformity established, having no alternative\\nthe other is a uniformity enjoined, having an alternative.\\nThe basis of natural law is causation the basis of moral\\nlaw is obligation. In the one the facts come before the law\\nin the other the facts come after the law. The one general-\\nizes real facts that actually are the other designates ideal\\nfacts that ought to be; the former inductively, the latter\\ndeductively.\\nWe conceive accordingly of the kingdom of ends, the\\nmacrocosm, as divided into two realms, the corporeal and the\\nspiritual. Body, which is ever strictly subject to causation,\\nis the substantive content of the former and hence its\\nsphere is characterized by necessity, and is the realm of nat-\\nural law. Mind, whose essence is self-determination, is the\\nsubstantive content of the latter; and hence its sphere is\\ncharacterized by freedom, and is the realm of moral law.\\nThese two spheres, the realm of physical facts and the realm\\nof moral worths, intersect in the microcosm man, who, be-\\nlonging at once to both spheres, is thus the connecting link,\\nthe bond of the universe. 1\\nMoral law, with which alone we are concerned in this\\ntreatise, is based upon a single essential principle, which\\n1 We venture, for the sake of greater clearness, a diagrammatic repre-\\nsentation of the Kingdom of Ends distinguishing its two Realms\\nCorporeal Sphere Spiritual Sphere\\nBody Mind\\nCausality Volition\\nxt -4. Man _\\nNecessity I J Freedom\\nNatural Law I Moral Law\\nRealm of Physical Facts J) Realm of Moral Worths\\nMany moralists and jurists distinguish Divine Law, or the revealed\\nwill of the Deity, and Natural Law, or the constitutional order of human na-\\nture, and Civil Law, or the enactments of the State. See infra, 47, note.\\nWe include all these under the generic term Moral Law, to which is opposed\\nNatural or Physical Law, in accord with more general usage.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "34 PROLEGOMENA\\ntakes an imperative form, and in this form is recognized as\\nan all-comprehending mandate, as the moral law. It has\\nmany subordinate branches or specific applications which\\napply to every phase of human conduct. Without offering\\na complete or strictly logical distribution, it will be sufficient\\njust now to point out its most important subordinates. The\\nDecalogue is so widely comprehensive that it is often spoken\\nof as itself the moral law. All municipal laws, both com-\\nmon and statute, of organized states, derive their authority\\nsolely from the supreme authority of the moral law. Mili-\\ntary law in all of its details, has no other ground. The laws\\nof all kinds of formally organized societies, such as churches,\\ncolleges, clubs, bands, etc., are likewise specializations of the\\nmoral law. All the tacit conventions and unwritten laws of\\nsocial intercourse, including the internal regulations of the\\nfamily, and even the petty forms of politeness and simple\\nkindness, owe whatever claim they have on us to the one\\nlaw, the moral law, whence they are derived. This catho-\\nlicity of the law throughout human affairs, applying to all\\nhuman voluntary activity, to all conduct public and private\\nof single persons or of communities, renders the inquiry, on\\nwhich we are now about to enter, one of supreme impor-\\ntance, and therefore of profoundest interest.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "ETHICS\\nFIRST PART -OBLIGATION\\nINTRODUCTION\\n19. In looking on the world around and above us, we\\ndiscover, amid an infinite variety of ceaseless changes, a cer-\\ntain uniformity established, which, reduced to comprehensive\\nexpression, is termed the law of gravity. In looking on the\\nworld within us, we discover, amid its incessant changes, a\\ncertain uniformity enjoined, which, reduced to comprehen-\\nsive expression, is termed the law of morality. The law of\\ngravity represents something real, a fixed corporeal order,\\nwith which we have to do in every waking moment of active\\nlife, and to which we must constantly adjust the movements\\nof our bodies. The law of morality also represents some-\\nthing equally real, a required spiritual order, with which we\\nconstantly have to do, a universal mandate overruling all\\nrelations between man and man, to which must be adjusted\\nevery voluntary action and proposed line of conduct. The\\nreality of moral law as an inflexible factor in human life, in-\\nvolved in the essential constitution of human nature, is a\\nscientific truth, as undeniable as the law of gravitation, and\\none whose importance surpasses comparison.\\nScience has been well defined to be a complement of cogni-\\ntions, having, in point of form, the character of logical per-\\nfection; in point of matter, the character of real truth. 1\\n1 Hamilton, Logic, 80.\\n85", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "36 OBLIGATION\\nMore briefly, science is systematized knowledge. There are\\na number of sciences which may be distinguished as sciences\\nof human nature, Ethics being the chief. Pre-supposing\\nand involving more or less knowledge of the others, it as-\\nsumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates principles\\nand rules for the conduct of men individually and collec-\\ntively. In view of its basis, Ethics is the science of rights\\nin view of its system, Ethics is the science of obligation. 1\\ni Ethic, relating to custom. (Lat. from Gk.) Commonly used as\\nethics, sb. pi. I will never set politics against ethics Bacon (in Todd s\\nJohnson). Erom Lat. ethicus, moral, ethic. Erom Gk. t)0ik6s, ethic, moral.\\nErom Gk. fjdos, custom, moral nature; cf. e0os, manner, custom. Cognate\\nwith Goth, sidus, custom, manner with Ger. sitte, custom with Skt.\\nsvadhd, self-will, strength. And cf. Lat. suetus, accustomed. The Skt.\\nform is easily resolved into sva, one s own self (Lat. se Gk. and dhd,\\nto set, place Gk. 0e); so that Skt. svadhd Gk. e-dos) is a placing of\\none s self, hence self-assertion, self-will, habit. Skeat. Moral virtue\\nresults from habit, t)6os, whence also it has got its name, t)6lkt], which is only\\nin a small degree altered from \u00e2\u0082\u00ac0os. Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 1.\\nPerhaps this was suggested by Plato Kvpubrarov yap ovv epupierat Tra.cn rbre\\nirav t)6os did edos. Laws, vii, 792 e. See also infra, 21, note.\\nRight, erect, correct, straight, upright, according with truth and duty.\\nErom A. S. riht, from Teut. base rehta, right from the base rak, root rag,\\nto rule, direct; whence Lat. rectus (for regtus), right, pp. of regere, to rule.\\nSkeat. Used also substantively with a modified meaning. See infra,\\n34, note. For etymology of wrong, see infra, 55, note.\\nObligation, from vb. to oblige to bind to, to constrain from Fr. obliger,\\nfrom Lat. obligare, to bind together, from ob, to, and ligare l^o bind. Skeat.\\nWe shall use the word exclusively in its most usual sense of moral constraint,\\nor bounden duty, as distinguished from physical constraint.\\nDeontology, the science of obligation from rb 84ov, what is binding,\\np. of Set, impers. from 5e?w (the Gr. correlate of Lat. obligo), to bind, and\\nX670S, discourse. Bentham chose this word as the title of his system and\\ntreatise, using it, as he says, to represent, in the field of morals, the prin-\\nciple of utilitarianism, or that which is useful. Whewell objects, and says\\nThe term deontology expresses moral science, and expresses it well, pre-\\ncisely because it signifies the science of duty and contains no reference to\\nutility. Stewart tells us that the ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue\\nto be Efts tov 84ovtos, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding, the\\noldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the\\nmost unexceptionable. The term is, however, insolens verbum, having\\nbeen superseded by the word ethics.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION 37\\n20. The hypothesis of evolution has been applied to the\\nexplanation of ethical phenomena. Evolution, as a doctrine,\\nis concerned with sequence in the form of a series, without a\\nbeginning and without an end. It can neither ascertain the\\nprimal origin of the series, nor predict its ultimate issue.\\nOnly a small section of the series is accessible to observation,\\nyet it is boldly projected into a prehistoric past, and upon\\nthis hypothetical history is founded an explanation of present\\nphenomena. The speculation is pleasing but hazardous. It\\ninquires how morality has come to be, assuming an origin in\\nsome heterogeneous principle transmuted under the influence\\nof environment. But we are rather concerned to know what\\nmorality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest\\nin mankind of to-day and of history. Inquiry into its genesis\\nand prehistoric development may well be postponed until at\\nleast we have a firm hold upon the thing itself. 1\\nThere are many moralists who educe their ethical systems\\nfrom the Scriptures. No doubt the light of revelation has\\nenabled the Christian philosopher to advance far beyond the\\nconceptions of the heathen world; his higher height has\\ngiven him a greatly enlarged horizon. But a science may\\nnot borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of\\nits doctrines. More especially we should not confuse science\\nand revelation. These are distinct though concordant means\\nof knowledge, the one aspiring to attain truth by its own\\n1 See supra, 6, note and Elements of Inductive Logic, 75, 85.\\nProfessor Huxley, in his Romanes Lecture, affirms that: The practice\\nof what we call goodness or virtue involves a course of conduct which,\\nin all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic\\nstruggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-\\nrestraint in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it\\nrequires that the individual should not merely respect, but shall help his\\nfellows its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest,\\nas to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladia-\\ntorial theory of existence.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "88 OBLIGATION\\neffort, the other condescending to impart from its abundant\\nstore. If Ethics is to take rank with the philosophical\\nsciences, it must have a basis of its own, and build thereon\\nits system. Therefore, in the progress of our proposed in-\\nvestigation, we shall in no case cite Scripture as warrant or\\nas proof, but only for illustration or verification. Still it will\\nbe encouraging to find the elaborated and the revealed doc-\\ntrines in accord, and mutually corroborative.\\n21. A brief sketch of the ground and the process adopted\\nin the present treatise is now in order.\\nThe basis assumed is human nature. Man has an original,\\nnative constitution, which, however much it may be distorted,\\ndisordered and depraved by his perverted free wilfulness, is\\nnevertheless traceable amid its ruins. There are certain fun-\\ndamental and essential features of humanity, which no pro-\\ncess of suppression or violation can ever wholly efface.\\nThere are capacities and faculties whose organic functions in\\ntheir mutual relations, and relatively to their environment,\\nare clearly manifest, however enfeebled by misuse, or de-\\nformed by abuse. The recognition of these features and\\npowers, and a representation of their orderly functioning, is\\nan ideal restoration of human nature to its normal condition,\\nand to its fitting place in the life of the world. This rehabil-\\nitated man we shall call the natural man, and propose to find\\nin him, in the native ordering of his being, a safe and suffi-\\ncient ground for determining his universal though intricately\\nvaried obligation. 1\\n1 Professor Birks of Cambridge Univ., Eng., in his Lectures on Moral\\nScience, defines happily thus Ethics is the Science of Ideal Humanity.\\nLecture ii.\\nThe phrase the natural man is used scripturally and theologically\\nto mean the man in his present actually disordered state. To avoid confu-\\nsion it should be understood that by the natural man we mean on the con-", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION 89\\nReferring to the foregoing definitions of Ethics, we observe\\nthat a right in one person is correlative to an obligation in\\nsome other person. A right and an obligation exist only as\\nthey coexist neither can be alone. But rights are logically\\nprior they condition and originate their corresponding obli-\\ngations. For a right, being founded in the nature of its\\npossessor, determines that there be a corresponding obliga-\\ntion whereas an obligation cannot be conceived to determine\\na right. Hence we shall take the notion of a right as our\\ntrary, here and throughout, not man as he is, but man as he should be, the\\nnormal man.\\nBishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons, Whe well s Ed. p. xlii,\\nin the passage beginning, There are two ways, etc., presents an approved\\nstatement of the matter, substantially reproduced in the following\\nThe question concerning the basis of morals may be put in two\\ndifferent ways, subjectively or objectively. We may ask, What is there\\nin man that constitutes him moral what do we mean by morality as an\\nattribute of human nature Or, on the other hand, What ground is there\\nfor morality in the nature of things, in the order and frame of the universe\\naround and above us The answer to the first question constitutes what is\\ncalled psychological ethics the second belongs to metaphysical ethics. The\\nformer method, that commonly pursued by British philosophers, addresses\\nitself to our daily usage and self-acquaiutance the latter leads up to the\\nfirst principles of knowledge, to those primary concepts and fundamental\\nnecessities of thought that lie behind our ordinary thinking and govern our\\nmental operations unawares, and which form the subject matter of the\\nhighest and ultimate philosophy. We set out on the former line of inquiry,\\nasking ourselves what are the facts concerning our ethical constitution, and\\nhow we are to interpret them. But we shall find that those facts point us\\nbeyond ourselves. The human consciousness is not self-sufficient nor self-\\nexplaining. The psychological question pushed far enough in any direction\\npasses, beyond arrest, into the metaphysical. The soul cannot conceive of\\nitself without some corresponding conception of the world and of God.\\nProfessor Findlay, of Headingly College, Leeds. See also infra, 25,\\nwhere the matter is more distinctly expressed.\\nThe problem of Ethics is to set forth in general outlines the form of\\nlife for which human nature is predisposed. This science is related to\\nlife as grammar is to language, aesthetics to art, dietetics to bodily life. It\\nsketches the form of the possible and of the allowable, and these forms may\\nbe filled with different contents. \u00e2\u0080\u0094Paulsen, Int. to Phil., Appendix.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "40 OBLIGATION\\npoint of departure for a search into the philosophy of\\nmorals. 1\\nAs already indicated, the matter that constitutes the con-\\ntent of Ethics is real truth. In order to become a science,\\nits matter must be developed in logical form whose perfection\\nis attained through clear, distinct, complete and consistent\\ntreatment. To approximate this ideal a methodical proce-\\ndure is requisite. Beginning with observation, primarily of\\nfacts of consciousness gathered by introspection or furnished\\nby testimony, and secondarily of the behavior of men in\\nsocial relations, present and past, the intellect discovers in\\nthese phenomena the universally determinative notion of\\ninherent rights, native and acquired, and therein discerns a\\nformative principle, imperative in character, and constituting\\nthe common bond of obligation among men. This strictly\\nuniversal and necessary principle is not inductively general-\\nized, but is intuitively discerned. From it deductions are\\nthen made to subordinate truths, until these, arranged in a\\nlogical system, shall extend throughout all lines of human\\nactivity, and comprehend all modes of human obligation.\\nEthics thus constituted is a deductive science. 2\\n1 Moral, virtuous, excellent in conduct. From Fr. moral from Lat.\\nmoralis, relating to conduct, from mor stem of mos, a manner, custom.\\nRoot uncertain. Derivatives, moral, sb., morals, sb. pi., moralize, But\\nwhat said Jaques Did he not moralize this spectacle As You Like\\nIt, ii, 1, 44 moralist; morality, I had as lief have the foppery of free-\\ndom as the morality of imprisonment. Meas. for Meas., i, 2, 125 from\\nFr. moraliU. Skeat. Moral science or the philosophy of morals is\\nsynonymous with ethics. Cicero says: quia pertinet ad mores,\\nquod ?}dos illi vocant, nos earn partem philosophae, De moribus, appellare\\nsolemus sed decet augentem linguam Latinum nominare Moralem.\\nDefato, ch. i, 1.\\n2 Theories of morals are primarily the authoritative or heteronomous\\nand the autonomous. Heteronomy finds the origin and sanction of moral\\nconduct in constraining precepts whose validity is derived from supreme\\nauthority, demanding submission and obedience without condition or ques-\\ntion. It recognizes the Deity, the Church, or the State as lawgiver. The", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION 41\\nIn this essay the First Part treats of the source and\\ncharacter of Obligation. Its view is confined to the moral\\nbond subsisting in the simple relation of man to man in entire\\nparity and reciprocity. The Second Part treats of the va-\\nrieties of obligation arising from the varieties of relation due\\nto the Organization of men into complex associations.\\ntheological and ecclesiastical view traces obligation to the revealed will of\\nGod as ultimate, maintaining that a course is good and right simply because\\nhe wills it, and that if he willed otherwise its morality would be otherwise\\n(Crusius, Grotius, Descartes). The political view discerns ultimate authority\\nin the enactments of the State (Hobbes, Kirchmann).\\nAutonomy finds the origin and sanction of morality in spontaneous,\\noriginal, independent cognitions and impulses. It subdivides into aprio-\\nrism or nativism or intuitionism, and empiricism whose specialized form is\\nevolutionism. The apriorist founds morality on an original, innate, intui-\\ntive activity the empiricist refers it to experience, or to a gradual develop-\\nment. Among apriorists we reckon Cudworth, Clarke, Kant, Fichte, Lotze\\namong empiricists, Spencer, Wundt.\\nEmpiricism in the special form of evolution, to which allusion has\\nalready been made in 20, is widely approved in the philosophic ethics of\\nto-day. Evidently it is an hypothesis of psychogenesis, of historical psy-\\nchology. But we question whether ethics really has any necessary interest\\nin an historical and psychological inquiry into the origin of ethical judg-\\nments. A normative discipline, an art of volition and action, can gain\\nnothing either for the validity or for the systematization of its norms and\\nprecepts from the proof of their gradual development under a variety of\\nconditions and influences. Evolutionism is an hypothesis, not a norm\\nit gives an explanation of particular facts, but no precepts or laws by which\\nto regulate our conduct and hence the antithesis of intuitionism and em-\\npiricism is not of essential significance for Ethics. Kulpe, Int. to Phil.,\\n27, 9. Cf. F. Bretano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntniss, 1889 and\\nC. M. Williams, Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution, 1893.\\nThe view of the present treatise is heteronomous in that it finds the\\nbasis of morality in the order of nature taken in its widest sense autono-\\nmous or nativist in that it attributes to man the ability to interpret con-\\nstituent nature, and discern his obligation to conform to its order. But the\\nbasis and genesis of morality, unless merely a historical, is a philosophical\\nand not an ethical thesis. The problem before us is Given the simple idea\\nor notion of a right j to find all forms of obligation.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "42 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER I\\nEIGHTS\\n22. Every man conceives himself as having certain per-\\nsonal rights which he esteems of great worth, and guards\\nwith jealous care. Throughout life he is chiefly occupied\\nwith enlarging, confirming and defending them. They are\\na sacred possession which he zealously maintains, and whose\\nloss or diminution he regards as degrading his manhood.\\nThis is one of the most striking and significant facts in the\\nhistorical and current activities of mankind.\\nThence arises much of the strife that continually agitates\\nthe world. Among barbaric peoples personal violence is\\ncommonly used to maintain or to recover what one claims\\nto be his personal rights. Among civilized peoples courts\\nof justice are established to determine the relative rights of\\ncontending parties, and an executive is empowered to enforce\\ntheir decrees. Nearly all the litigation abounding in every\\nnation throughout history is a contention for real or imagi-\\nnary rights.\\nWhile each individual man has his own private rights,\\nthere are many of which he is possessed in common with\\nother persons. The maintenance and development of com-\\nmon or public rights is committed to organized society, the\\ntribe, the state, the nation. When the claims of one on\\nanother of these conflict or are questioned, diplomacy assumes\\nto adjust the rights involved. This failing, recourse is had\\nto war. Hence the innumerable battles that mark the tragic\\nhistory of mankind.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "EIGHTS 43\\n23. Evidently the notion of a right, since it is the\\nsource of such intense particular and social activity, has\\ndeep root in human nature. Also it is evident that, through-\\nout the contentions to which it gives rise, there is an appeal\\nto some common principle or law of widest generality, appli-\\ncable to an infinity of cases, and of the highest practical\\nimportance in the progressive life of humanity. But inas-\\nmuch as this universal and overbearing law is for the most\\npart obscurely discerned and imperfectly formulated, it is\\ninevitable that men should differ often and widely in its ap-\\nplication to particular cases. It is the province of Ethics to\\nsearch out and formulate the law, and to unfold its general\\nbearing on the several classes of its subjects.\\nTo this end let us fix discriminating attention on the no-\\ntion of a right. It is an abstract from personal relations, and\\ncatholic in them. Whenever and wherever two persons\\ncome into any mutually affective relation whatever, then and\\nthere come into being reciprocal rights, and consequent obli-\\ngations. The abstracted notion of a right, being pure and\\nsimple, is as to itself incapable of analysis, and hence of\\nformal definition. But we may examine its conditions, its\\nantitheses, correlatives, and other implications, and thus clear\\nthe conception, and distinguish it by its invariable environ-\\nment and limitations. This analytical process will disclose\\nfundamental and determining elements, fixing clearly the\\nscope and bearing of the notion, and evolving the formative\\nprinciple and the law involved in its essence.\\n24. Life is obviously a primary condition of any right.\\nOnly living beings have rights. The notion is incongruous\\nto a stock or a stone. Among living beings, those alone can\\nbe conceived as having rights that are endowed with a con-\\nsciousness involving at least volition, its primary element,\\nconjoined with some degree of sensibility. 1 A right, then, is\\n1 The new Psychology considers will as the primary and constitutive", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "44 OBLIGA TION\\na logical property, a mark that belongs to this, and to no\\nother class of beings. 1\\nBut conscious life is not merely a condition of rights, not\\nmerely what must be in order that rights may be. There is\\nin its very nature that which determines that rights shall be.\\nThey are of its essence. Thus every conscious being neces-\\nsarily has rights by virtue of its ultimate constitution. It is\\nnot necessary that every One so constituted should be aware\\nof the fact, either in detail or in general, not even in the\\nmost obscure way. But the higher orders of conscious be-\\nings recognize relatively to themselves the existence of rights\\nfunction of mind intelligence, as a secondary development. The leader\\nof this view is Schopenhauer (Willen in der Natur, et al.) followed by-\\nSchneider (Der Theirische Wille, 1880), Wundt (System der Philosophic,\\n1889, and Vorlesungen tiber die Menschen und Thierseele, 2d ed., 1892),\\nPaulsen (Einleitung in die Philosophic, 1893), and many others. It sees the\\nwill arising, without perception or intelligence, as a blind craving or in-\\nstinctive impulse, and thereon and thereby a gradual development of intelli-\\ngence as a means to gratification. Thus a jelly-fish, a polyp, an infusory,\\nknows nothing of itself, or of external things a mere craving determines its\\nvital activities. Gradually, in the progressive series of animal life, we see\\nintelligence grafted on the will. To instinctive movements are added others\\nguided by perception, and then by intelligent purpose involving deliberation\\nand choice. Also every human being enters the world as a blind will with-\\nout! intellect. The nursling is all will its voluntary movements are blindly\\ninstinctive. When a craving is satisfied, a feeling of satisfaction arises,\\notherwise a feeling of discomfort. In pleasurable and painful feelings, the\\nwill becomes aware of itself, and of its relation to an environment. Out of\\nfeeling, knowledge is gradually evolved, and in the more mature child the\\nwill appears saturated with intelligence. In this survey, the will is seen to\\nbe the original and constant factor of the life of the soul. At the close of\\nthe series, we find it directed towards the same great ends as at the begin-\\nning, the preservation and evolution of individual life and of the species.\\nIntelligence is the secondary and variable factor, which is gradually imparted\\nto the will as an instrument. So the voluntaristic as distinguished from the\\nintellectualistic Psychology.\\n1 The rights of man extend, however, beyond his natural life. Our an-\\ncestors still have rights, and posterity has rights, which the living are bound\\nto respect. Yet life, past, present or to come, is a condition of this property.\\nSee infra. 119,", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "BIGHTS 45\\nin the lower orders, though these be quite destitute of the\\nnotion. 1\\n25. Every man has, elemental in his conscious life, cer-\\ntain powers of mind, and thence of body. These powers,\\nfaculties and capacities, belong to his nature, to his original\\nconstitution, and are essential in his make-up as a man, as a\\nhuman being. They are, more specifically, conditions psycho-\\nlogically antecedent to the existence and apprehension of\\nrights, and rights are the natural and necessary consequence\\nof their existence. That is to say, powers and rights are\\nnatural, constitutional, original correlatives.\\nThese native powers are distributed as modes of knowing\\nand feeling, desiring and willing. The members of the latter\\ncouple constitute more particularly the practical side of\\nhuman nature, and are intimately concerned with the exist-\\nence and exercise of rights. Therefore on them especially\\nwe Oik our present attention.\\nA desire implies an impulse, occasioned by a want, urging\\nthe will to an activity, relative to other powers, such as\\nseems likely to result in gratification. 2 Every one is actuated\\nby desires which thus motive his conduct. These sources of\\nactivity are the determinants of his welfare, and his rights\\nhave in them their ultimate ground. Hence it is only as his\\ndesires, either actual or potential, are infringed that his rights\\nare affected and to that for which he has not and cannot\\npossibly have a desire, e. g., a villa in the moon, he has not\\n1 The wide class of beings having conscious life includes the brute forms\\nof animal life. That brutes have rights is beyond question, though they\\nthemselves have no knowledge of the fact. This is recognized by a merciful\\nman he does not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn. Also it is\\nrecognized in many States by protective laws. See infra, 68, note. Our\\nproposed inquiry shall be limited, however, to beings of the highest order,\\nand among these, more especially, to human beings.\\n2 See supra, 5.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "46 OBLIGA TION\\nand can never possibly have a right. Normal desires, or such\\nas have an instinctive rise, and are in accord with the gene-\\nral order of nature, impel toward the fulfillment of the appro-\\npriate functions of the man in a world of persons and things.\\nThis consideration of its terms brings into clear view the\\ntruth of the principle A man has a right to gratify his normal\\ndesires. 1\\nEvery volition or act of the will is immediately conditioned\\non desire that is to say, no exercise of the will can occur\\nexcept by virtue of an antecedent desire which as a motive\\nimpels it to action. But notwithstanding this dependence,\\nthe will is to be regarded as central in the personality, since\\nit has the function to control, modify, suppress or arouse the\\n1 Principle, a beginning, a fundamental truth or law, a tenet, a settled\\nrule of action. From Fr. principe, from Lat. principium, from princeps,\\nchief. Skeat. Cicero says: Principio autem nulla est origo, nam ex\\nprincipio oriuntur omnia ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest nee\\nenim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde. Tusc. Disp. bk i, ch.\\n23, 54. Aristotle distinguishes seven different senses of the word apxn, a\\nbeginning or first principle, then adds Common to all first principles is\\nthe being the original from whence a thing either is, or is produced, or is\\nknown. Metaphysics, bk. iv, ch. 1. The term apxh was introduced into\\nphilosophy by Anaximander. Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., 13.\\nA principle is also a designation of order a principle of nature is a\\ndesignation of natural order, physical or psychical /a moral principle is a\\nprinciple of nature which, in view of possible alternatives, takes imperative\\nform, enjoining one, forbidding the other.\\nNormal, according to rule. A late word. From Lat. normalis, from\\nnorma, a carpenter s square, rule, pattern Gk. yvtipipas, fern, yvuplprj,\\nwell-known cf yvibpuav, an index all from the root gna, to know. Skeat.\\nA thing is normal when strictly conformed to those principles of its con-\\nstitution which make it what it is.\\nLet it be here observed in anticipation of subsequent matter that a man s\\nmalevolent desires, as anger, envy, jealousy, misanthropy, are in general\\nabnormal in kind, since they do not conform to the normal principles of the\\nhuman constitution and that his benevolent desires or affections, which are\\nnormal in kind, may in general become abnormal in degree, either by in-\\nanity or by excess, temporary or permanent, and need to be invigorated or\\nrestrained.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "BIGH TS 47\\nactivity of all other powers, including even its conditioning\\ndesires. Freedom consists in the possibility of this voluntary\\nexercise of one s powers, and without freedom it is evident\\nthat their normal functions cannot be fulfilled, or that free-\\ndom is necessary to the natural working and development of\\nthe entire personality hi its existing relations. These con-\\nsiderations bring to light the truth of the principle A man\\nhas a right to a free use of his native powers. 1\\nThe two statements are not to be taken as distinct princi-\\nples. Together they constitute the mutually dependent and\\ncomplementary parts of the consistent whole A man has a\\nright to a free use of his native powers in the gratification of\\nhis normal desires.\\nThis principle is the basis of Ethics. It is axiomatic, self-\\nevidently true, not needing or admitting any logical proof;\\nfor the intuitive, synthetic a priori judgment involved in the\\npure notion of a right, finds its immediate application to the\\ndesires and volitions. At first view it may appear thoroughly\\negoistic or selfish in character, but the outcome of a pa-\\ntient and thorough scrutiny of its bearings will reverse\\nthis primary impression. Likewise its formal universality\\nmay seem to sanction unbounded license, but the close in-\\nspection to which we shall submit it will discover very strin-\\ngent limitations, not arbitrarily imposed, but arising from the\\nmatter of its constituent terms, and leading to a disclosure of\\nour varied obligations. Thus there is no need to look be-\\nyond the natural and origirtal constitution of man, despite its\\n1 Not only will all these [principles] be found in the enacted laws\\n(vSfwis), but nature herself has marked them out in her unwritten laws\\n(vofxLfxois), and in the moral constitutions of men. Demosthenes, Be Cor-\\nona, 275, Teubner.\\nSelbstverstandlich ist das ursprungliche Recht der Freiheit, d. h. des\\nfreien Gebrauchs seiner Krafte und der freien Wahl der Ziele, worauf sie\\ngerichtet werden. In der Gesellschaft unterliegt dies Recht, wie jedes,\\nBeschrankungen. Lqtze, Grundzuge der praktisctien Philosophic, 42.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "48 OBLIGA TION\\nweakness, perversion and distortion, to discern the prolific\\nprinciple of morality. 1\\n1 See supra, 21. In Plato s Republic, as in Butler s Sermons, the\\nhuman soul is represented as a system, a constitution, an organized whole\\nin which the different elements have not merely their places side by side\\nbut their places above and below each other, With their appointed offices\\nand virtue or moral Tightness consists in the due operation of this constitution,\\nthe actual realization of the organized subordination. We may notice too\\nthat Plato, like Butler, is remarkable among moralists for the lucid and\\nforcible manner in which he has singled out from men s springs of action the\\nirascible element (his Ovfweidis Butler s Resentment;) and taught its true\\nplace and office in a moral scheme. Whewell, Preface to Butler s\\nSermons, p. xxxiv.\\nThe foundation of Aristotle s system of ethics is deeply laid in his\\npsychological system. Upon the nature of the human soul the whole fabric\\nis built up, and depends for its support. According to Aristotle, we are\\nendowed with a moral sense, aX r07) ri$, a perception of moral beauty and ex-\\ncellence, and with an acuteness on practical subjects, deipdr-qs, which, when\\ncultivated, is improved into (ppovijais, prudence or moral wisdom. Browne\\nAnalytical Introduction to Nic. Eth.\\nThe doctrine of the Stoics is very similar. The supreme end of life is a\\nlife conformed to nature, dfioXoyov^vus rrj 0i/ rei fjjy, the agreement of human\\nconduct with the universal law of nature, of the human with the divine will.\\nZeno defines the ethical end to be harmony with one s own nature Cleanthes,\\nwith the nature of the universe Crysippus, with our own nature and that\\nof the universe together, our nature being but a part of universal nature.\\nThe formula of Crysippus is: Kar ip.irei.piav tuv pv rei o-vp.{Scuv6pT i)v or\\naKojKoijdios rri iVei Ifiv that is Live according to your experience of the\\ncourse of nature. This anthropological conception of the principle of morals\\nwas adhered to by the later Stoics, as in the following dictum of Clement of\\nAlexandria, one of the latest ri\\\\os elpcu to ftp atcoXotidus rrj rod dvdpwirov\\nKarao-Kevr) that is The end of man is to live agreeably to the natural con-\\nstitution of man. Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, 55.\\nThe moral law is not foreign to our nature; it is not imposed upon us\\nby a despot, as was the Continental Embargo at the beginning of this cen-\\ntury, barring the approach to a thousand goods and pleasures. It is rather\\nthe law of our own being. Moral laws are natural laws. We may assign\\nto them a transcendental significance or not they are, first of all and at all\\nevents, natural laws of human life in the sense of being the conditions of its\\nhealth and welfare. According to the natural course of events, their trans-\\ngression will bring upon nations as well as upon individuals misfortune and\\ndestruction, while their observance is accompanied by welfare and peace.\\nPaulsen, Int. to Phil, bk. i, ch. 1, 3.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "EIGHTS 49\\n26. In view of their objects it is usual to name three\\nkinds of rights the right to life, the right to liberty, the\\nright to property. 1 This division appears in the three funda-\\nmental verbs to be, to do, to have. But the species are not\\nindependent, for each involves the other two as complemen-\\ntary correlatives.\\nIt follows that either two may be regarded as modified\\nforms and be expressed in the terms of the third. Thus, for\\ninstance, life without some measure of liberty in the use of\\ninstrumentalities, could hardly claim the name.\\nAlso, life and liberty are commonly spoken of as forms of\\nproperty; as when one says, my life, his liberty. Indeed\\nrights in general are viewed as forms of property in the fa-\\nmiliar phrases, my rights, our rights, their rights. We cor-\\nrectly say that every man has rights, he owns them, he is\\ntheir proprietor. Some rights he may dispose of at will, others\\nare inalienable except by forfeiture but, so long as they in-\\nhere in him, they are his possession, his own. The sense of\\nproprietorship in rights is very strong, as seen in the tena-\\ncious retention and persistent defense of them when men-\\naced. 2\\nLikewise the several kinds of rights may be reduced to the\\nright to liberty. Conscious life is an aggregate of active\\npowers, and a power is a possibility of change. A right to\\n1 All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain\\ninherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they\\ncannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity namely, the en-\\njoyments of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing\\nproperty, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. Virginia Bill\\nof Rights, 1.\\n2 Psychologically the notion mine comes before the notion me. Lotze.\\nEven behavior is etymologically a having. To behave is a mere compound\\nof the verb to have with the Anglo-Saxon prefix be-, to surround, to shut up,\\nto possess. So conduct is behavior from Lat. conductus, pp. of conducere,\\nfrom con-, for cum, together, and ducere to lead to bring together, to col-\\nlect. Skeat.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "50 OBLIGATION\\nlife is a right to exercise these powers, a right to self-deter-\\nmined change, which is liberty. Also property in external\\nthings means liberty to make use of them. To be dispos-\\nsessed of any property is to be deprived of this liberty but\\nthe thing is still one s own, and the right to its free use,\\nthough suspended, remains. Thus ownership in external\\nthings is a right to liberty. 1\\nOf these reductions, the last, though least familiar, is most\\nclearly real, and of widest and deepest import. Hence,\\nwhile we cannot avoid using the language of possession, we\\nshall adhere to the view that every right, in its last analysis,\\nis a right to some phase of liberty, to the untrammeled exer-\\ncise of ability. Manifestly the cardinal element in the princi-\\nple already formulated is a right to liberty in this general\\nsense, and on it our further consideration shall chiefly turn.\\n1 Liberty and Right are synonymous since the liberty of acting ac-\\ncording to one s will would be altogether illusory if it were not protected\\nfrom obstruction. There is, however, this difference between the terms.\\nIn Liberty the prominent or leading idea is the absence of legal restraint,\\nwhilst the security or protection for the enjoyment of that liberty is the\\nsecondary idea. Right, on the other hand, denotes the protection, and\\nconnotes the absence of restraint. Austin, Jurisprudence, 445.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 51\\nCHAPTER II\\nLIBERTY\\n27. Freedom means the absence of causal restraint or\\nconstraint. It is a function purely negative, yet a special\\nsubjective property of volition. It is the power of choosing.\\nCausative determination is incompatible with the existence\\nof choice, for in causation there is no alternative, whereas in\\nchoice an alternative is essential. The power of choosing\\nis simply the ability to decide freely for one act or line of\\nconduct rather than for its possible alternate.\\nWhether or not there be in reality a power of choice is an\\nold and difficult question in metaphysics. It has already\\nbeen briefly considered, and the point made that the reality\\nof choice is a necessary condition and hence a postulate of\\nEthics. Whoever is morally responsible must be free. Con-\\nsequently we here assume that in all voluntary activity there\\nis real freedom in measure sufficient for responsibility. 1\\n1 See Supra, 8-10. Aristotle teaches that morality presupposes\\nliberty. This exists whenever the will of the agent meets no obstacles,\\nand he is able to deliberate intelligently. It is destroyed by ignorance or\\nconstraint. Ueberweg, Hist Phil., 50. The matter is specially treated\\nin the Nicomachean Ethics, bk. iii, first five chapters. The principle of all\\nmoral action is irpoaLpecris, i.e. what is commonly termed choice, or the delib-\\nerately preferring one act or one course of action to any other on moral\\nground, under the direction of reason, vovs. It is this, he says, which de-\\ntermines the moral quality of an act, and distinguishes the habit of virtue.\\nAt the threshold of the investigation is the freedom of the human will, and\\non the establishing of this doctrine depends the whole question of human\\nresponsibility. See especially Grote s Aristotle, 2d Ed., 1880, ch. xiii, 2.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "52 OBLIGATION\\n28. Certain limitations of freedom need now to be\\nobserved. Freedom lies in the power of choice, and in it\\nalone. All other powers of mind are subject to causation,\\ntheir activities being always definitely determined by causa-\\ntive antecedents. That choice alone is free is a simple fact\\nin human nature, and a very narrow constitutional limitation\\nof our original and originating ability but it is the essential\\ndifference between a creator and the passive work of his\\nhands. It renders possible not only moral obligation, but\\nalso an infinite variety of self-determined activities.\\nA choice resolved is intention. The intention accords\\nwith that desire to which preference is given by choice. 1\\nThe elected desire, if it be for action, induces a voluntary\\neffort whose end is the object desired. This effort consists\\nsolely in an act of attention. The fixing attention more or\\nless intense on a chosen object is the total of possible volun-\\ntary energy. We observe here a second very narrow consti-\\ntutional limitation of human ability. Still this power of\\nattention proves sufficient for the purposes of life, and for\\nfulfilling the demand for moral action and conduct, since by\\nmeans of it we are capable, directly or indirectly, of com-\\nplete self-mastery. 2\\n(Because determined by the free act of choice, freedom is\\nattributed to the exercise of attention. This freedom, how-\\never, is not absolute, but suffers restriction. That the exer-\\n1 An exercise of choice is commonly viewed as directly resolving the\\nquestion Shall I do this or that The view is narrow, but the fact is even\\nnarrower. An election is not primarily between two positive alternatives,\\nbut between one positive and its negative. Shall I do this or uot Shall\\nI act or refrain If the decision is to abstain, then, secondarily, the election\\nmay occur between the other positive alternative and its negative. Very\\noften, in deliberation, the two positives seem to be weighed directly against\\neach other, as in two scales of a balance but, on close analysis, it appears\\nthat there is but one scale, counterpoised by native inertia, in which scale\\nproposed actions are weighed in quick succession.\\n2 See Elements of Psychology, 89, and 269 sq.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 53\\ncise involves effort, a nisus or striving, shows the presence\\nof obstacles within the mind itself. Evidently there is some\\nmental inertia to be overcome, which checks and limits the\\naction otherwise there would be no occasion for effort, no\\npoint of application whereon to expend energy. Herein is a\\nthird limitation.\\nMental effort is a force or cause, free in that according to\\nchoice it may or may not be put into play, and in that, if put\\ninto play, its intensity may be varied. Now the mental may\\nbe transformed into physical energy, and issue in muscular\\naction. This, too, is accomplished through attention. To\\nmove my arm, I must have an idea of the arm and of it as\\nmoving. Fixing my attention thereon, and willing the reali-\\nzation, the arm moves accordingly. This is inexplicable.\\nWe know it only and simply from experience. But let it be\\nobserved that the direct control of the animal body lies ex-\\nclusively in this power to contract, according to choice, the\\nvoluntary muscles, a limited class, thus producing motion of\\nthe limbs and some other organs, while very many vital\\nactivities, as pulsation and digestion, are beyond direct con-\\ntrol. Moreover, when the movable organs are at liberty,\\nstill the extent of their motion is very closely circumscribed.\\nThis discovers a fourth very narrow constitutional limitation\\nof free action, restricting or confining it to the ability to con-\\ntract a muscle, and so to move a member through a small\\nspace. Still it is much, very much, to possess and to have\\nat command a free physical force, free in that it accords with\\nchoice, which force we may use at will, combining it with\\nfixed natural causes, varying its direction and small inten-\\nsity, so as to arrest or modify the operations of nature.\\nIt is a noteworthy corollary that this limitation to loco-\\nmotion extends to the body as a whole, and to all external\\nthings. These we move from place to place, but this is the\\ntotal of our direct physical efficiency. The planter moves a", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "54 OBLIGATION\\nspade and seed from one place to another the forces of na-\\nture do the rest, producing the crop. The smith moves his\\nhammer up and down, the weaver throws his shuttle to and\\nfro; the outcome is fabricated by virtue of the natural\\nforces inherent in the materials. A knowledge of natural\\nforces, and an intelligent, purposeful placing of things so as\\nto take advantage of them, enable men to manage factories,\\nto tunnel Alps, to navigate oceans, to wrap the earth with\\niron, and to cover its face with cities. But in all his infin-\\nitely varied works, man has at command only the single free\\nphysical ability to place or displace things. 1\\n29. Freedom isolates each man from every other, setting\\nhim apart and alone in the universe. For this center of his\\npersonality is intangible, out of reach of any other being.\\nBy the gift of his image the Deity has made man to this\\nextent independent of himself, putting it beyond his power\\nto cause a human creature willingly to do otherwise than\\nthat creature may choose since therein would be a contra-\\ndiction. He may reason and persuade, command and\\nthreaten, but cannot causally coerce the man, for this de-\\nstrpys the essential conditions of personality the man in\\nsu ih case is not a man, not a moral being. Much less may\\na fellow-man causally determine his choice. One may de-\\n1 Lord Bacon wrote: Man, whilst operating, can only apply or with-\\ndraw natural bodies; nature, internally, performs the rest. Novum Or-\\nganum, bk. i, aph. 4. Mr. J. S. Mill, apparently unaware of Bacon s\\naphorism, makes the point and expands it, with many illustrations. Politi-\\ncal Economy, bk. i, ch. 1, 2.\\nSon of immortal seed, high-destined man,\\nKnow thy dread gift, a creature yet a cause\\nEach mind is its own center, and it draws\\nHome to itself, and moulds in its thought s span,\\nAll outward things, the vassals of its will,\\nAided hy heaven, by earth unthwarted still.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 55\\nstroy another s life, but not otherwise his personality. The\\nfreedom of man, within constitutional limits, is absolute. 1\\nFreedom and liberty are synonymous terms, denoting the\\nabsence of causal determination. They are commonly used\\ninterchangeably, but it will be convenient here to use them\\ndistinctively. Freedom signifies the absence of causal deter-\\nmination antecedent to and effective of election and inten-\\ntion. It is strictly subjective. Liberty signifies primarily\\nthe absence of preventive causes subsequent to intention, of\\nobstacles, impediments or hindrances that interfere more or\\nless effectively with its successful accomplishment. It im-\\nplies the untrammeled exercise of voluntary effort in its\\nnormal function of carrying out the intention. It is objec-\\ntive in that it has reference primarily and especially to\\nexternal difficulties. A prisoner is entirely free in preferring\\nrelease to continued confinement; but not until the door\\nopens is he at liberty. The term is also applied in this sense\\nto purely physical facts as, an unscotched wheel is at lib-\\nerty a spark on powder liberates energy. 2\\n1 Says Epictetus, the philosophic freedman Put me in chains! No,\\nno You may put my leg in chains, but not even Zeus himself can fetter\\nmy will.\\nJe n ai jamais cru, quant a moi, que la liberte de l homme consistat a\\nfaire ce qu il veut, mais bien a ce qu acune puissance humaine ne lui fit\\nfaire ce qu il ne veut pas. Rousseau, Reveries oVun Promeneur Soli-\\ntaire.\\n2 See Elements of Psychology, 285. The distinction is rarely observed,\\nand the neglect of it has in some instances led to erroneous doctrine. We\\nremark that\\nFreedom is essential in personality Liberty, accidental\\nFreedom is absolute Liberty, merely functional\\nFreedom appertains to choice Liberty, to effort, and beyond\\nFreedom implies free-will Liberty, merely free-agency\\nFreedom is negative of any causality Liberty, of preventive causality\\nFreedom contradicts necessity Liberty consists with necessity\\nFreedom is subject to morality Liberty, to legality\\nFreedom conditions proficiency Liberty, efficiency\\nFreedom is a primary, Liberty a secondary condition of obligation.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "56 OBLIGATION\\n30. The exercise of liberty or free action, in the sense\\njust indicated, often suffers restrictions that diminish it, even\\nto annihilation. Neglecting impossibilities and impersonal\\ndifficulties, we shall consider only those restraints that arise\\nfrom the conflict of other wills.\\nOne person may effectively interfere with the liberty of\\nanother by using his own muscular force, either directly or\\nby setting obstacles to bar the way. The man thus assailed\\nmay be overpowered by stronger handling, and be fettered 01\\nimprisoned. Also he may be beset and embarrassed in his\\ntaking or keeping possession of property, in producing and\\nimparting. Also any withdrawing or withholding of means\\nwhich he might use to attain a chosen end, is an interference\\nwith his liberty. Such external interferences may occur in\\nan infinite variety of ways, and are cases of causal determina-\\ntion.\\n31. There is, however, a secondary sense, even more im-\\nportant and perhaps more frequent, of the use of the term\\nliberty, in which it signifies the absence, not merely of causal\\nrestriction, but also of any inducement presented to one in-\\nclining him otherwise than he, if unassailed, would be dis-\\nposed. When influences that are not causes are brought to\\nbear on a man pressing him to choose otherwise than he\\nwould, modifying and sometimes reversing his original and\\ncharacteristic preferences, this is properly regarded as a\\nrestriction of his liberty.\\nThe process becomes clear upon a little consideration.\\nThe power of choice is obviously conditioned on cognition.\\nThere must be an idea of an action, and of its possible alter-\\nnate. A judgment is rendered between these, and the choice\\naccords with the weightier reason. Reasons are not causes.\\nA man may be influenced in his choice by them without loss\\nas to his personality, and indeed his every choice is subject", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 57\\nto rational determination. The reasons for one alternative\\nare more influential than those for the other, and he freely, of\\nhimself, chooses the former. It is not at all requisite that\\nthe prevailing reasons should be what might be called good\\nreasons they may be very bad, poor, trifling, or even absurd\\nreasons nevertheless they are the rational determinants with\\nwhich the choice accords. 1\\nNow, a man may not effect, but he may affect another s\\nchoice by presenting such reasons as shall operate through\\nthe desires to influence his course. This is done obviously\\nby argument; also one obviously influences by persuasion\\nthe decisions and conduct of his fellows. Even greater in\\nextent is the influence of instruction, as in the education of\\nchildren. Indeed, in the whole process of education, we in-\\nfluence powerfully the general disposition, character, and\\ncourse through life of other persons, thus putting permanent\\nrestraints upon their liberty. So also in social and political\\nrelations, and in religion, restraining influences, or interfer-\\nences with liberty, are constantly exerted by the presentation\\nof reasons.\\nAnother way of embarrassing the will, and so checking\\nliberty, is by reason of threatened harm, as seen particularly\\nin the penalties of the law. The police, the court and the\\npenitentiary offer a constant reason for conformity to law.\\nThe footpad, who presents the alternative of your money or\\nyour life, thereby proposes a reason usually sufficient to de-\\ntermine in favor of yielding the purse. A plea of duress is\\nallowed by the courts in discharge of engagement, or in miti-\\ngation of penalty. Any menace inspiring apprehension in-\\nterferes with liberty, changing the preferable direction of\\n1 See supra, 10, note. Reasons are causoe efficiens cognoscendi, but are\\nnot at all causoe efficiens essendi. They should be clearly distinguished from\\nthe latter class, which is the usual meaning of the unqualified term cause.\\nTor the several kinds of causes see Elements of Inductive Logic, 14, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "58 OBLIGATION\\naction, or diminishing its range, without bringing to naught\\nthe possible alternative. The weightiest examples of such\\ninterference are to be found in political oppression, in reli-\\ngious persecution, and still more generally in war. 1\\n32. An important distinction now to be made is between\\nthose interferences, both external and internal, that are war-\\nranted and those that are unwarranted.\\nThe state warrants its officers in the arrest and imprison-\\nment, and even in the execution of offenders against its laws.\\nIt warrants the seizure of goods to satisfy judgments, the\\nconfiscation of private property for public weal, the levying\\nof taxes for its own support, the conscription of citizens for\\nmilitary service, the bondage of a class as serfs or slaves.\\nAlso by stringent enactments it regulates industry in produc-\\ntion and trade, restricts marriage and divorce, inheritance\\nand bequest, and provides compulsory education. These and\\nmany other restraints on the original liberties of its subjects\\nit imposes, and enforces, if need be, with a strong arm.\\nAside from those enjoined by the state, there are many for-\\nmal restraints in the common intercourse of men which are\\nwarranted by social relations. To these may be added re-\\nstraints within the family circle, especially those arising from\\nthe exercise of parental authority.\\nThe foregoing restrictions of liberty are unavoidable. One\\nmay approve of and willingly comply with them, but his con-\\nsent is not asked he can neither refuse to accept them, nor\\nescape by renouncing them. But there are also many avoid-\\nable restraints that exist by consent, as in contracts, promises,\\nmarriage, and membership in clubs, societies, institutions and\\n1 The legal definition of duress is the state of moral compulsion or\\nnecessity in which a person is induced, by unlawful restraint of his liberty\\nor actual or threatened violence, to make a deed or contract or to fulfil one,\\nor to commit a misdemeanor. See Elements of Psychology, 273, note.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 59\\nchurches, whose requisitions are warranted by being legiti-\\nmate and voluntarily conceded.\\nVery grave questions arise, and will be subsequently con-\\nsidered, respecting the ground of the warrant or right to\\nbind. It is sufficient here to observe that the occasion and\\nextent of warranted interference is determined by the rela-\\ntive rights of the parties. Granting the warrant in the vari-\\nous cases cited, it is evident that they represent a large and\\ndistinct class of restrictions in the range of personal liberty.\\nIt seems, then, that every man is surrounded by legitimate\\nchecks on action, having warrant in the rights of others to\\nwhom he is personally related. He cannot transgress a cer-\\ntain circumscribed bound without infringing on their privi-\\nleges, and he is debarred from doing so, as far as practicable,\\nby their conflicting wills. Thus by the rights of others\\neveryone s rights are limited. But within the limits thus set,\\nany willful restraint upon one s liberty of action, either exter-\\nnal or internal, being ex vi termini unwarranted, is a violation\\nof his ultimate constitutional right to a free use of his powers\\nin the gratification of his normal desires. On this class of\\ninterferences we proceed to bestow special consideration.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "60 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER III\\nTRESPASS\\n33. Having considered certain conditions and limitations\\nof rights, we are now prepared to examine more particularly\\nthe basis and origin of the notion, together with certain\\nother conditions, correlates and implications that mark the\\nlimits of interference in liberty.\\nThe notion of a right, being pure and simple, is incapable\\nof logical definition. Like all other pure notions it is imme-\\ndiately discerned upon an empirical occasion. The occasion\\nfor this intuition is the experience of a personal relation. It\\nis a matter of common observation that we all stand in vari-\\nous and dissimilar relations to other sentient beings, as of\\nman to man in reciprocal parity, of parent to child, of bene-\\nfactor to beneficiary, of ruler to subject, and many others.\\nNow, so soon as a human mind apprehends a relation between\\ntwo persons, whether the observer be one of the parties or\\nnot, upon that occasion it immediately discerns the concomi-\\ntant existence of mutual rights. Their special character and\\nextent is not immediately discerned, but only that they exist.\\nThe character and extent of the rights discerned are de-\\ntermined by the kind and intimacy of the relation between\\nthe parties. Whenever we undertake to pass moral judg-\\nment on any action, we examine and reflect upon the rela-\\ntion sustained by the persons concerned, and make this the\\nbasis of the judgment, approving or disapproving, mildly or\\nstrongly, as the case may be. We judge that a benefactor\\nhas a right to the gratitude of his rightful beneficiary that", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 61\\na subject has a right to the forbearance of his rightful ruler,\\nwho, in violating that right, becomes a tyrant. Thus rights\\nVary with relations. Those of parent in child are different\\nfrom those of child in parent those of benefactor in recipi-\\nent, from those of recipient in benefactor; and both differ\\nfrom those lying in elder and younger brothers, and in master\\nand servant. But in all such relations, however they may\\notherwise differ from each other, we see the existence of\\nmutual rights, whose character and extent are determinable\\nonly by, and ascertainable only from, the nature of the rela-\\ntion. It is therefore held as an ethical principle that rights\\nare conditioned on personal relations, discerned in personal\\nrelations, and determined by personal relations.\\nIn attempting to unfold the ethical theory grounded on\\npersonal relations, we shall confine our attention primarily\\nand for the most part to the simple and indifferent relation\\nof man to man, in entire equipoise and reciprocity.\\n34. A slight attention to the notion of a right discovers\\nthat it is conditioned on a social relation. A solitary man,\\none absolved from all fellowship, however entire his liberty,\\nhowever abundant the means of gratifying many desires, has\\nnot, strictly speaking, any rights. 1 Now a right, since it\\nexists only by virtue of a personal relation, near or remote,\\nimplies a liability of conflict between wills at the least, the\\nconceivable possibility of an interference in one s liberty by\\nsome other person. For example, a right to go involves the\\nnotion of possibly being hindered or opposed, not by the\\n1 To speak of natural rights as belonging to the isolated person (Einzel-\\nperson) is in itself false. By nature man has merely physical and spiritual\\ncapacities, and the possibility of exercising them but he has a right to the\\nlast only in society. A right can only be called natural, in so far as it\\nis not gained through special title, but in so far as it is enough to be a man\\namong men in order to know that others are obligated to respect it.\\nLotze, Grundzuge der praktischen Philosophie, \u00c2\u00a732.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "62 OBLIGATION\\nphysical difficulties of the way, but by the counteracting will\\nof some other person, which coming into play, the right to\\ngo is orally claimed, and perhaps violently exercised. Any\\nright whatever that any man or people or nation may have,\\nis held in view of a conceivable hindrance or obstruction on\\nthe part of others.\\nLet it be next observed that not every interference in one s\\nliberty is an interference in his right. Warranted interfer-\\nence does not violate any right, but only unwarranted inter-\\nference. The notion of a right implies that any intelligent\\ninterference with its free exercise is unwarranted, which in-\\nterference is a wrong. Now a right and a wrong are logical\\nantithetical correlatives. The notion of the one necessarily\\ncarries with it the notion of the other, like as the notions of\\nstraight and bent, of order and disorder. A wrong, how-\\never, is conditioned on a right; that is, a right must be in\\norder that a wrong may be. Whenever, then, a person\\nknowingly and willingly interferes in my right, checking or\\npreventing or making vain my effort to realize it, thereby\\nrestraining the free course of my powers in seeking to gratify\\nmy normal desires, he does me a wrong. Thus a wrong is a\\nviolation of a right, and it again appears that a right can\\nexist only in view of its conceivable violation, a possible\\nwrong. 1\\n1 Right (Lat. jus) as a substantive, a right or rights, denotes a claim\\nof one person against the infringement of others, or a possession which can\\nbe defended against aggression. It is illustrated in such phrases as the right\\nto life, the right to vote, human rights, etc., and essentially means that force\\nmay be legitimately used in the defense of it, though there may not always\\nbe an obligation to do so. Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, ch. iii, 3.\\nA helpful distinction, taken by the Civilians writing subsequently to the\\nrevival of Roman Law, is between jus in rem, a right which avails against\\npersons generally, and jus in personam, a right which avails only against\\nparticular persons.\\nOne instance of the former kind is ownership or property, which is the\\nright to use or deal with some given subject, in a manner, or to an extent,", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 63\\n35. The principle that every man has a right to the free\\nuse of his powers in gratifying his normal desires, 1 may be\\nstated thus Every man has a right to the free use of his\\npowers in so far as he does not interfere in the rights of any\\nother that is, does not violate the right of another, or does\\nno one a wrong. We have just seen that the right of either\\nparty exists only in view of its conceivable violation by the\\nother. The modified expression of the principle brings out\\nthe point that rights in different parties limit each other;\\nor that each of two parties has a sphere of rights which\\ntouches but does not intersect the sphere of the other. 2\\nThe necessary and universal limitation expressed in the\\nforegoing modified statement of the principle, is merely a\\nwhich, though not unlimited, is indefinite. 1 Another is jus servitutis, which\\nis the right to use or deal with, in a given or definite manner, a subject\\nowned by another as, a right of way over another s land a right, against\\nany third party, of a husband relative to his wife, of a parent to his child,\\nof an officer to his subordinate, e.g. a soldier, of a master to his slave, ser-\\nvant, or apprentice, and vice versa. A third is the right styled a monopoly,\\nwhich is jus in rem though having no subject, that is, no specific person or\\nthing over or to which the right exists, or in which it inheres. Of this sort\\nis the exclusive right to a trade mark, and a man s right to- his reputation or\\ngood name. Jura in res are all prohibitive, obligating persons generally to\\nforbear or abstain from interference.\\nInstances of jus in personam are, a right arising from a contract or agree-\\nment or a simple promise, and a right of legal action, with all other rights\\nfounded upon injuries. Jura in personas are either prohibitive or requisitive.\\nSee Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 510 sq., and 1041 sq.\\n1 See supra, 25.\\n2 Fichte, in his Theory of Rights, holds that Since no one with free-\\ndom passes beyond his sphere, and each one therefore limits himself, they\\nrecognize each other as rational and free. This relation of a reciprocity\\nacting through intelligence and freedom between rational beings, according\\nto which each one has his freedom limited by the conception of the possibil-\\nity of the other s freedom, under the condition that this other limits his own\\nfreedom also through that of the first, is called a relation of rights. The\\nsupreme maxim of a theory of rights is therefore this Limit thy freedom\\nthrough the conception of the freedom of every other person with whom\\nthou canst be connected, Schwegler, Hist. Phil, 41,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "64 OBLIGATION\\npartial explication of what is implied in the qualifying ternl\\nnormal occurring in the prior statement. Normal desires are\\nthose that strictly conform to the natural and original con-\\nstitution of man, harmonize with his other powers, and\\naccord with his relations to his fellows and to his general\\nenvironment. Those are abnormal which have not this con-\\ngruity. Normal desires, as acquisitiveness, are limited to\\nsuch gratification as may be attained without interference in\\nthe rights of others. Abnormal desires, as covetousness,\\nimpel to action in disregard of the rights of others. It\\nappears, then, that the latter statement of the moral princi-\\nple modifies the former, not in content, but in expanded\\nexpression only.\\n36. In the further treatment of this matter it will be\\nconvenient to use the word trespass, with some latitude of\\nmeaning, yet quite definitely. A wrong is any violation of a\\nright so is a trespass. The terms have identical extension,\\nindeed are strictly synonymous. We have found that liberty\\nis necessary to the exercise and realization of a right, and\\nthat a violation of a right is an interference in liberty. Also\\nwe have found that a warranted interference in liberty is not\\na violation of any right, not a wrong, not a trespass. It re-\\nmains, then, that a trespass is an unwarranted interference in\\nliberty. 1\\n1 Trespass, a passing over a boundary, a crime, sin, offense, injury from\\nOld French trespas, a decease, departure out of this world. The literal\\nsense is a step beyond or across, so that it has direct reference to the modern\\nuse of trespass in the sense of intrusion on another man s land. From Lat.\\ntrans, across, and passus, a step. Cf. transgression, violation of law from\\nFr. transgression, from Lat. transgressus, pp. of transgredi, to step over, pass\\nover, from trans, across, and gradi, to step, walk. Skeat.\\nIn the Pater Noster we have And forgive us our debts (6 pei\\\\^/xaTa), as\\nwe have also forgiven our debtors (dfaiXtrais.) Matthew, 6 12. In Lukk,\\n11 :4 And forgive us our sins (a/xaprias) for we ourselves also forgiVe\\nevery one that is indebted {6 pd\\\\ovri) to us, The comment in Matthew, 6:14,", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 65\\nIn legal definition a trespass is an unlawful act committed\\nwith force and violence, vi et armis, on the person, property,\\nor relative rights of another. This narrow, technical state-\\nment is intended to designate those forms of trespass which\\nare forbidden by civil law, and have a remedy or a penalty\\ntherein provided. But in common, free and correct usage\\nthe term includes many forms of offense of which civil law\\ntakes no cognizance, indeed any and every act that injures or\\nannoys another, that violates any rule of rectitude or bond of\\nobligation, and we here adopt this comprehensive meaning. 1\\nis For if ye forgive men their trespasses (wap nrT J)fjLa.Ta, from 7rapa7rnrTw, to\\nfall beside or aside, to mistake, err), etc. It is evident that the several terms\\nare used synonymously and interchangeably in a widely comprehensive\\nsense.\\n1 The contrast of the juridical and ethical definitions of trespass gives\\noccasion to note the usual legal distinction between perfect and imperfect\\nrights. Perfect or determinate rights, duties, obligations, officio, juris, are\\nthose recognized and enforced by civil law. Imperfect or indeterminate\\nrights, duties, obligations, officio, virtutis, are those not recognized and\\nenforced by civil law. The former, which we shall call jural rights, are the\\nsole subject of Jurisprudence the latter are customary and conventional,\\nand being equally intrinsic, are included in the more comprehensive science\\nof Ethics. The distinction is practically important as marking the existing\\nlimits of authorized jurisdiction but it is accidental, not essential, and\\nhence of little or no theoretical value.\\nThe phrase perfect right indicates merely that an existing right has been\\nrecognized, defined, and made the subject of judicial decision or perhaps of\\nstatutory enactment. It is thereby perfected in the sense of being established\\nand protected and it has gained weight, since to the original merely human\\nright is added the right of a legal subject or citizen. But it should not be\\nunderstood that an imperfect right, one lacking this authorization, is in itself\\ndefective. Imperfect rights are often of greater weight and sanctity than\\nmany perfect or jural rights e.g., those intimate within the famiy circle,\\nand many others likewise non-jural or merely customary. Hence the no-\\nmenclature is misleading and unfortunate. There is in fact a vast variety of\\nuntold rights which civil law cannot protect and therefore does not recognize.\\nIn the common intercourse of men, their personal relations are so manifold\\nand intricate, so various and variable, that specific definition of rights and\\ntrespass is impossible, except in a comparatively few marked cases passing\\nfrom latent to patent. Very much is necessarily left to the voluntary respect", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "66 OBLIGATION\\nOur wide definition gives occasion for another verbal\\nvariation in the statement of the moral principle, thus A\\nman has a right to the free use of his powers, provided he\\ncommit no trespass. On further examination we shall find\\nthat this provision sets very narrow bounds to rightful lib-\\nerty indeed that there is no rightful liberty that does not\\nconform to the limits and consist with the bonds of morality.\\n37. The limit which moral principle puts to the gratifi-\\ncation of desire, that it must not involve a trespass on the\\nright of any one else, gives rise to many and grave practical\\ndifficulties. The line between me and my neighbor which\\nneither should overstep, is often invisible and intangible.\\nTo settle it requires, in a numberless variety of cases, very\\nthoughtful and careful consideration in which a respect for\\npersonal right must dominate the greed of personal interest.\\nIn the intricate, pressing, and ever-changing relations of men\\nin society, it is almost impossible to guard and keep intact\\none s own rights, and to avoid a transgression of the bounds\\nset by the rights of others. Contentions inevitably abound.\\nThence arise vast and costly systems of judicature among all\\ncivilized peoples, systems that become more and more intri-\\ncate as civilization progresses, involving numerous courts of\\nauthoritative decision, whose business is little else than to\\nmark the bounds of rights, and to enforce the law of trespass\\nin its infinitely varied applications.\\nThe practical difficulties attending questions that concern\\ntrespass on rights, may* be lessened, especially as to our pri-\\nfor rights, and for the universal unwritten law forbidding infringement on\\nthem, which law prevails in all communities of moderate moral culture.\\nThis has developed the English Common Law, whose excellence Aristotle\\nanticipates, saying Customary laws have more weight, and relate to more\\nimportant matters, than written laws and a man may be a safer ruler than\\nthe written law, but not safer than the customary law. Politico,, bk. iii,\\nch. 3, 17, Jowett s trans. Cf. Calderwood, Hand-book of Moral Philosophy,\\nPt. I, ch. 5, 5 sq. (ed. 1872),", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 67\\nvate conduct, by clearing the conception in certain respects.\\nTo this end the following observations will be helpful.\\nConflicting claims are seen on every hand, but rights\\nnever conflict. They touch each other, but never overlap.\\nThey limit by excluding each other, and indeed have no\\nother limitation. The same right cannot pertain to different\\npersons and different rights, however similar, are always\\nconsistent. Wherever there is contention, there is trespass\\nsomebody is doing a wrong somebody is interfering in the\\nrightful liberty of some one else. Even rights that are\\nshared, and so-called common rights, do not and cannot con-\\nflict, but are entirely consistent in their exercise. Everybody\\nhas a right to drive on a public road, but not so as to inter-\\nfere in the like liberty of any other. 1\\nOriginal rights are inalienable in the sense that one cannot\\nbe unwillingly deprived of them, except by the extinction of\\nthe objects in which the rights inhere, thus rendering their\\nexercise impossible, which is extreme trespass, as in murder,\\narson, and the like. One may be dispossessed of property,\\nand otherwise violently limited in liberty, but the right re-\\nmains whole, complete, intact so long as its object continues\\nto exist. Derived rights or such as have been conferred by\\nparental, civil, or other authority, may in many cases be\\nwithdrawn by resumption of the grant, by confiscation, or by\\nexercise of eminent domain.\\nRights in general may be alienated by the possessor him-\\nself transferring or forfeiting them. Property rights may be\\ntransferred by exchange, gift or bequest. Property may be\\nalienated also by misdemeanor, the court imposing fines.\\n1 It is quite commonly supposed that a person often has a right to do\\neither of two things as he may happen or please to choose. But on a close\\nanalysis, as we shall hereinafter see, it appears that in every case the right\\nis limited to one of the two alternative actions, the other being, directly or\\nremotely, a greater or less trespass on some related person. Contrary or\\nopposed rights cannot coexist either for the same or for different persons.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "68 OBLIGATION\\nLiberty of person may be forfeited by crime and the criminal\\nimprisoned, or all liberty with life extinguished on the gal-\\nlows. Being warranted, therein is no trespass.\\n38. For more specific illustrations of rights in their sub-\\njection to trespass, we shall now briefly consider the ground\\nof property and its patent liability to trespass. Property\\nrights are found, in the last analysis, to consist in the origi-\\nnal right of every man to the free exercise of his powers in\\nthe gratification of his normal desires. An infringement on\\nthem is an interference in this liberty, and so is a trespass. 1\\nMuch the larger part of any man s activity consists in\\nappropriating, transforming, and using external objects.\\nNatural objects, as land, fruits, ores, to which no one has an\\nearlier claim, are withdrawn from the disposal of every other\\nperson, simply by the taking possession of them. For this\\nact of taking possession, inasmuch as it does not involve a\\ntrespass on any one, is an original right, looking toward the\\ngratification of normal desires. Things thus become private\\nproperty, and any hindrance on the part of others to the\\ntaking possession is a trespass. Moreover, the proprietor\\nmust be left at liberty to transform his property, by his labor\\nand skill, as he wills the products arising therefrom being\\nlikewise his own, to be used freely in further production, or\\notherwise consumed. We shall find hereafter that all prop-\\nerty is held in trust, to be used usuriously and consumed\\nprofitably, else the owner himself becomes a trespasser.\\nMany perplexing questions arise in the adjudication of\\n1 Freiheit bedeutet nur die allgemeine Moglichkeit des Gebrauchs\\nunserer Fahigkeiten. Aber auch von jeder einzelnen Handlung gilt, dass sie\\nurspriinglich respectirt werden muss, so lange nicht besondere Motive des\\nGegentheils vorhanden sind, und dass es daher sittlich unrecht ist, sowohl sie\\nzu hindern, als auch sich so zu benehmen, als ware sie uberhaupt gar nicht\\ngeschehen. Hieraus folgen zuerst eine Menge kleiner Regelen der guten\\nLebensart, die wir ubergehen, dann aber der Ursprung unserer Begriffe\\nvom Eigenthuin. Lotze, Grundziige der praktischen Philosophie, 43.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 69\\nproperty. It may be that an original appropriation is exces-\\nsive, more than a fair share, and so a trespass beyond bound,\\nbut this is very difficult to determine. Moreover, it con-\\nstantly happens that there are long pauses in the useful ac-\\ntivity of the proprietor of certain material, because of the\\ngreater or less complexity of his plans, or from lack of con-\\ntinuous energy still it is evident that during such indefinite\\npause, his right of property must be respected, and the\\nmaterial thus reserved be left unmolested for his future use.\\nBut if, within a time sufficiently great for the ordering of\\nall circumstances, he give no sign of making that use, the\\nright of property lapses though it is needful that the inva-\\nlidity of the claim be determined and decreed under special\\nlegal enactment. Finally, it is evident that, while possession\\nis proof presumptive of ownership, material may pass from\\nthe possession of the rightful owner without loss or surrender\\nof the ownership; and therefore, while the presumptive\\nright of the possessor is to be recognized, it should be super-\\nseded by ownership established in action of trover. 1\\n39. Setting aside felonies or high crimes, such as murder\\nwhich utterly destroys all rights and liberty, and robbery\\nwhich lessens the means of their exercise, the most familiar\\nform of trespass is that kind of injury which is done to a\\nman s land or house by intruding into it against his will. It\\nis an. old legal maxim that every man s house is his castle,\\nand he is entitled to treat as an enemy any one who attempts\\nto enter it without his consent. As to land, the owner is\\nnot bound to fence it, and whether inclosed or not, a neigh-\\nbor is not at liberty to enter on it himself, or to permit his\\ncattle so to do. For in all such cases the liberty of the\\nowner in the use of his house or field is at least liable to\\ninfringement, is jeoparded, which is trespass.\\n1 See infra, 120.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "70 OBLIGATION\\nIt is perhaps not quite so clear that vice is trespass, yet\\nsufficiently clear. Gambling is a transfer of property deter-\\nmined by an event whose occurrence is believed by all parties\\nto the transfer to be due to chance. 1 Therein is a misuse of\\nmeans, a transfer, without equivalent, of property held in\\ntrust for beneficial ends. This alone makes gambling or bet-\\nting wrong, even in its lightest forms, when there is no un-\\nfairness and when the stake is small. Any disregard of the\\nclaim of others on a productive use of one s means, restricts\\ntheir privileges, and thus is a trespass. Intemperance, the\\nexcessive indulgence of an appetite or of any desire, is an\\nabuse, a weakening, a degradation of powers, to whose fully\\nefficient service others have a rightful claim, and hence it is\\nan overstepping the bounds of liberty, a transgression, an\\ninfringement on the privilege of other persons, a trespass.\\nThe vice of lying, the hearer having a right to the truth, is\\nclearly, even when no further injury appears, a checking or\\nperverting of the hearer s privilege. Slander is of like char-\\nacter, doubling the trespass in the injury to both hearer and\\nsubject, and in its grosser forms is a misdemeanor, liable to\\nlegal action for damages. Much more might be said on the\\nethics of vice, but it is sufficient here to point out that it is\\nessentially trespass.\\nA great many actions of trifling consequence, and hence\\nusually overlooked, have nevertheless essentially the nature\\nof trespass. They differ from crime and vice in degree\\nrather than in kind, all having the specific mark of unwar-\\nranted interference in liberty. When I have a right to go\\nfirst, and another, who knows or might know this, steps in\\nbefore me, my right is violated. Even if the attempt is\\nthwarted by my stepping more quickly, still the integrity of\\nmy right, the entirety of my liberty, has suffered. One who\\nalks through my garden without leave, or enters my door\\n1 See infra, 85, note.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 71\\nunbidden, violates my right to be private. One who, with-\\nout warrant of good reason, intrudes on my conversation\\nwith some one else, or interrupts my words to himself, breaks\\nin upon my right of free speech. When we occupy the time\\nor attention of another otherwise than he would, as by send-\\ning a letter or making a visit, we apologize by stating reasons\\nthat occasion and warrant the call. Any intrusion or inter-\\nmeddling with what does not concern one, is a trespass.\\nWhen I am in haste, and some one needlessly detains me, it\\nis a trespass. Pressing the unwilling for a loan or donation,\\nor for an endorsement of any sort, is an embarrassment, a tres-\\npass. Thus in the passing relations of men there are a multi-\\ntude of ways in which one may hinder the preferred action\\nof another, or turn its direction, thereby, lightly perhaps, yet\\nessentially, committing a trespass. The conventional unwrit-\\nten laws of mutual courtesy in social intercourse are regulative\\nof private conduct and protective of private personal rights\\nfrom personal trespass. Politeness is morality in trifles.\\n40. The foregoing mention of slander suggests a class of\\noffenses touching personal dignity that calls for special con-\\nsideration. 1 An impolite act or word to a person worthy of\\nrespect is a wrong, inasmuch as it unwarrantably interferes\\nin his liberty. In order that one may use his powers freely\\na certain equanimity is necessary, a mental equilibrium.\\nThis is disturbed by even a slight affront, and he is embar-\\nrassed, his liberty of action is checked. Every upright man\\ncherishes a certain measure of self-respect, and claims a cor-\\nresponding degree of respect from his fellows, a respect pro-\\n1 In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity.\\nWhatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent\\nwhatever on the other hand is above all value and therefore admits of no\\nequivalent, has a dignity. Whatever has reference to the general inclinations\\nand wants of mankind has a market value whatever, without presupposing\\na want, corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the mere\\npurposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value but that which con-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "72 OBLIGATION\\nportionate to his estimate of his own dignity or moral worth.\\nThese constitute his personal honor. It is very precious and\\nvery sensitive, for no one can fulfill high aims in life unless\\nhe preserve a calm equipoise of his faculties, and the obser-\\nvant deference of his associates.\\nIf an affront be grave, such as giving the lie or other\\nverbal insult, or striking a blow even without physical harm,\\nit overthrows for an indefinite time the serene composure, if\\nnot the entire self-command, requisite to the unbiased exer-\\ncise of one s faculties. Such indignity is intolerable. No\\ndoubt the resentment which arises instinctively often becomes\\nexcessive, putting into violent commotion the whole being,\\nturning it completely away from preferred conduct, and in-\\nducing extreme acts, even such as involve the sacrifice of\\none s life. And indeed in many cases death is better than\\ndishonor for while death is the loss of all rights, dishonor\\nmay fix fetters and settle a slavery that is worse than all loss.\\nAs a man himself defends his life, so he would himself\\ndefend his honor, his most precious possession, essential to a\\nfree life. The anger or resentment that naturally follows\\nindignation is instinctive impulse to self-defense. It is\\nnormal, and therefore rightful in rational furtherance. 1 Too\\nmuch cannot be said in favor of the sacred right and obliga-\\nstitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself,\\nthis has not merely a relative worth, which is value, but an intrinsic worth,\\nwhich is dignity. Skill and diligence in labor have a market value\\nwit, lively imagination, and humor have a fancy value fidelity to promises\\nand benevolence from principle have an intrinsic worth. The worth of\\nthis disposition is dignity, rising infinitely above all value, with which it can-\\nnot for a moment be brought into comparison or competition without violat-\\ning its sanctity. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 64, R and S.\\n1 It is not natural but moral evil it is not suffering, but injury, which\\nraises that anger or resentment, which is of any continuance. The natural\\nobject of it is not one, who appears to the suffering person to have been only\\nthe innocent occasion of his pain or loss, but one who has been in a moral\\nsense injurious either to ourselves or others. Butler, On Resentment,\\nSermon, viii.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 73\\ntion to defend one s rights, and especially one s personal\\nhonor. With the savage this passes over into malice and\\nrevenge, a trespass retaliated by a trespass. But two wrongs\\ndo not make right; this does not restore the prior state.\\nAmong civilized peoples the savagery lingers, particularly in\\nthe restricted form of dueling, for men are rarely willing to\\nsubmit a question touching personal honor to a civil court\\nor to a court of honor. 1 One s honor is a thing too sacred\\nto be weighed in the scales, there is no possible counterpoise.\\nIt is to be personally defended, and in opinions which have\\nprevailed, personally avenged. 2 But higher moral culture\\nbrings its subject to see that he is limited to defense, and to\\nthat mode of defense which will best prevent the trespass,\\nor its repetition, or its imitation. Other remedy is rarely\\npossible. It is hard to be angry, and sin not, yet such is the\\nmoral ideal. 3\\n1 In the proposed Arbitration Treaty between England and the United\\nStates, 1897, it was expressly reserved that differences involving the national\\nhonor of either party should not be adjudicated by the court of arbitration.\\nSee infra, 85.\\n2 The duello, a relic of barbarism, has its folly on its face. It proposes\\nto defend honor by adding dishonor, and proves nothing but savage audacity.\\nDueling is a double crime, compounded of murder and suicide. Being an\\nintent to kill with malice prepense, it is murder. Being a willful offering of\\none s life, it is suicide. That both parties consent is null, for neither has a\\nright to offer his life. The crime is doubled again in the two parties to it.\\nTrespass and the violation of trust can no further go.\\nLet it be added here that the vice of gambling is analogous. What duel-\\ning is to murder and suicide, that gambling is to theft and waste. It too\\nis doubly doubled. The mutual consent, having no ground in right, is\\nnull. It is a transfer of property without title, an all around violation of\\ntrusts. See infra, 85, note.\\n3 Retribution is agreeable to conscience that is to say, the returning\\nof a corresponding measure of reward or of punishment to a will which has\\noccasioned a definite measure of weal or woe. It is to be observed, however,\\nthat while we can very easily deduce from the foregoing the moral obligation\\nof gratitude, we cannot, on the contrary, by any means so immediately\\ndeduce our right to execute the punishment.\\nAntiquity saw in the person merely a product of nature whose Intel-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "74 OBLIGATION\\n41. The various kinds of offense to which we have re-\\nferred are mostly modes of direct trespass, wherein an imme-\\ndiate action unwarrantably checks liberty. Let it be now\\nobserved and hereafter kept in mind that trespass is very\\noften indirect, by mediate action or by inaction. Indirect\\ntrespass by inaction calls for special remark and emphasis,\\nsince the term is commonly used only in the positive sense\\nof direct action.\\nNeglecting to pay a money debt when due is clearly an\\nunwarranted interference in the liberty of the creditor for\\nhe might use the money to gratify a normal desire, but is\\nrestrained and more or less embarrassed by the non-payment.\\nIn general, any withholding, unless by free consent, of\\nwhat it is one s right to possess is plainly akin to theft, and\\nas truly a trespass. A promise of every rightful kind is\\nto be kept, because it may have become a factor with the\\npromisee in ordering his life, and he may be embarrassed by\\nthe disappointment of his confidence. A breach of promise\\ndoing serious injury is a recognized form of trespass, action-\\nable at law. Lack of gratitude to a benefactor, omitting a\\nmeed of praise, failing to show the worthy such outward\\nmarks of respect as are conventional, neglecting to pay or to\\nacknowledge any polite attention, these and the like are em-\\nbarrassing, and hence modes of trespassing. If I am using\\nmy right of way, it is all one whether somebody else steps in\\nligible aim must be to unfold itself as beautifully and happily as possible.\\nChristian culture, which conceives of man as having a calling and a task\\nallotted to him on earth by God, naturally finds in this the reason for re-\\ngarding as wanton wickedness every willful abbreviation of such testing thus\\nimposed upon him. Accordingly our conceptions of personal honor are dif-\\nferent from those of antiquity. But although we still believe so much to be\\ndue to our honor, the significance of our belief nevertheless is that such ob-\\nligations are owing not to us as definite individual persons, but to that con-\\nception of personality in general which has a living expression in us also,\\nand to its worth in the connected system of the ordering of the world.\\nLotze, Practical Philosophy, 13, and 33.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "TBESPASS 75\\nthe way, or does not step out. In either case he is equally\\nin my way. The act committed in the one case and omitted\\nin the other, is in each a trespass, a restraint of my liberty,\\nand hence the cases are morally identical.\\nThe notion widely prevails that an indirect trespass, espe-\\ncially one omitting to fulfill an obligation, is less offensive\\nthan a direct trespass committing a deed violative of an obli-\\ngation. This is a popular error. In either case, if inten-\\ntional, there is a complete breach of obligation, a wrong, a\\ntrespass. Forgetfulness is more likely to have occurred in\\nthe former than in the latter case, but forgetfulness, though\\nit may palliate, does not wholly excuse an offense. If the\\ndegree of offense be measured by the gravity of its conse-\\nquences, even this will not favor a fault for it is evident\\nthat very often a neglect of obligation may be as serious as\\nany direct violation. A sentinel who fails to give alarm and\\nthus to prevent surprise, is responsible for the disastrous\\nconsequences, and is condemned to capital punishment. A\\nmoral distinction between actions omitted and those com-\\nmitted is superficial and unessential. 1\\nSin is transgression of the law of God, disobedience to\\nthe divine command. We shall hereafter show that any tres-\\npass of man on man is trespass on God, violating his will,\\nthwarting his purposes, checking the free course of his de-\\nsigns. There is also indirect trespass on him in neglecting\\nhis personal dues, and direct trespass in counteracting his\\nways. All disaccord with him, whether by action or by inac-\\ntion, whether by sin of commission or by sin of omission, is\\nan unwarranted interference in the divine furtherance of the\\nworld. Thus it comes to light that all trespass is sin, and\\nall sin is trespass.\\n1 See Ezekiel, 33 6-8. Cf. Matthew, 21 28-31.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "76 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER IV\\nTHE LAW\\n42. Let intellective attention be again fixed on the\\nprimary notion of a right. Pure reason immediately dis-\\ncerns that a violation of a right, knowingly and willingly\\ncommitted, is a breach of normal order, a violation of law.\\nAlso it discerns that this law, being violable, is not, like nat-\\nural law, the designation of a constant order of facts that\\nhave no alternates but the designation of an order of facts\\nthat ought to be constant, an order which, though violable,\\nshould be inviolate and universal.\\nMoreover, pure reason discerns the very important and\\nspecial characteristic of this law, that it is obligatory on the\\npotential transgressor. It is addressed to his will, laying\\nupon it a binding obligation, obliging him to conform his\\nactions to its behests. Accordingly it is recognized as an\\nimperative, a command, an order enjoining order on those\\ncapable of disorder. 1\\nThe order herein designated and demanded is a constantly\\nobservant respect for the rights of others, forbidding any un-\\nwarranted interference in liberty, forbidding trespass. Its\\nformula is Thou shalt not trespass. This widely yet defi-\\nnitely interpreted is the completely comprehensive Moral\\nLaw, binding all imperfect persons without exception, and at\\nall times, in all places, under all circumstances. Thus it is\\nboth catholic and strictly universal. k\\nThe moral law is independent of experience, except that\\ni See supra, 17, 18.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 77\\nexperience must furnish the occasion for its discernment by\\npure intellect. It is not deduced from some higher law;\\nthere is none higher. It does not logically follow from the\\nprinciple of liberty to gratify desire, but implies or is implied\\nin that principle, and a mere unfolding of the essential con-\\ntent of either is all that is requisite for a clear apprehension\\nof its truth. 1 Indeed the principle and the law are but\\nvaried forms of essentially the same necessary truth. As a\\nprinciple, it is an immediate intuition of pure intellect, hav-\\ning the light of truth in itself. As a law, its universally\\nbinding authority lies in its intuitively imperative truth.\\n43. The intuitive cognition of this fundamental, catholic,\\nand universal law, is the sole function of the pure practical\\nreason or conscience. Conscience is pure reason discerning\\nmoral law. 2 This faculty has the moral law for its exclusive\\nobject, and its exercise is the primary, original, antecedent\\ncondition of any moral activity whatever, without which lib-\\nerty has no moral restraint, and volition no moral character. 3\\nIn thus identifying conscience with the pure practical rea-\\nson, we give to the term a clear and sharp definition, fitting\\nit for scientific use by distinguishing it from those other fac-\\n1 On the distinction between implication and inference, see The Theory\\nof Thought, p. 103 and Elements of Deductive Logic, 78.\\n2 See supra, 2, and \u00c2\u00a711. Also Elements of Psychology, 267.\\n3 Conscience, consciousness of good or bad. From Ft. from Lat. con-\\nscientia, from con-, for cum, together with, and scientia, knowledge, from\\nscienti-, stem of pres. part, of scire, to know, orig. to discern. Skeat.\\nConsciousness, conscia sibi, and Conscience, conscia obligationis, have the\\nsame etymology. For three centuries our language has had the separate\\nterms, like the German Bewusstsein and Gewissen, both being contained in\\nthe Old English inwit, in the French conscience, in the Latin conscientia, and\\nin the Greek rvvel8ri rls, from rw and eideiv, to see together. The Modern\\nEnglish and the German discrimination is an aid to clear expression, but the\\nindiscriminate oneness in other languages is significant. It indicates that\\nconscience is a special functioning of consciousness that we have no proper\\nconsciousness of conduct except in terms of conscience.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "S\\n78 OBLIGATION\\nulties which, subordinately and occasionally, are concerned\\nwith moral matter, and whose exercise on such matter is\\nquite commonly and confusedly spoken of as the exercise of\\nconscience. Except the pure practical reason, there is no\\noriginal, distinct, special moral faculty in the human mind. 1\\n1 Conscience in popular usage signifies any or all exercise of mind con-\\ncerning the morality of action. The moral judgments are attributed to\\nit, also the moral sentiments, and the moral impulse; as in the familiar\\nphrases, a scrupulous or an inconsiderate conscience, a tender or hardened,\\nan approving or upbraiding conscience, a restraining or constraining con-\\nscience. In such indefinite sense no scientific use can be made of the term.\\nMoralists find a limiting definition necessary, but they do not altogether\\nagree as to its comprehension. Many definitions include the moral judgment\\nor decision respecting cases some include also the moral sentiments 2,\\n3). It is not a disagreement in doctrine, but merely as to the extent of the\\nmeaning of a term in the exposition of doctrine. We gather for comparison\\na few definitions by recognized authorities, as follow\\nBy conscience, or the moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we\\ndiscern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain\\naffections in respect to this quality. Wayland, Moral Science, bk. i, ch.\\n2, 1.\\nConscience is the mental faculty or feeling which recognizes and reveals\\nthe distinction between right and wrong. McCosh, Divine Government,\\nbk. iii, ch. 1, 4.\\nA perception of the right, together with a feeling of approbation or\\ndisapprobation. Cook, Conscience, Lee. i.\\nConscience is that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to\\neach individual for the guidance of his conduct. Calderwood, Hand-\\nbook of Moral Philosophy, Pt. L, div. i, ch. 4, 1 (ed. 1872).\\nNothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude\\nor pravity of our own actions. Locke, Essay, bk. i, ch. 3, 8.\\nThe principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart,\\ntemper, and actions, is conscience for this is the strict sense of the word,\\nthough it is sometimes used so as to take in more. Butler, Sermon i.\\nThat principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our\\nheart, temper, and actions. You cannot form a notion of this faculty,\\nconscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.\\nIdem, Sermon ii.\\nConscience is man s practical reason, which holds before him his law\\nof duty in every case, so as either to acquit or condemn him. Kant,\\nTugendlehre, p. 205. The consciousness of an inner tribunal in man,\\nbefore which his thoughts accuse or else excuse one another, is conscience,", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 79\\nLet it be remarked that conscience, as herein defined, can-\\nnot err. The criterion of a pure intuition is its necessity and\\nuniversality. Conscience in its intuitive discernment discov-\\ners what is necessarily and universally true, and this discern-\\nment, being intuitive, is infallible. It is not, however, itself\\na complete guide of conduct. It must be supplemented by\\nthe logical function of intelligence, by thought, deducing\\nminor rules or the moral quality of particular actions.\\nThought may err, is peculiarly liable to error. 1 Herein is\\nthe explanation of the great diversity of moral judgments\\namong men. The data of pure reason are the same in all\\nhuman minds but the judgments formed in the application\\nof these data often greatly differ, because of illogical think-\\ning. The liability to error is greatly increased by a common\\nacceptance of traditional moral standards, expressed in ready-\\nmade rules, which, if not themselves erroneous, are often im-\\nperfectly comprehended and applied to cases beyond their\\nscope. Thus certain mdividuals, or large classes of men, or\\nnations, are said to have high or low standards of morality\\nIdem, p. 293. Conscience must be conceived as a subjective principle\\nwhich declares our responsibility to God for our actions. Idem, p. 295.\\nConscience is that act of the mind by which we apply to a particular\\ncase, to an action to be performed or already performed, the general rules\\nprescribed by moral law. Janet, Elements of Morals, 10.\\nThere must be a voice of conscience which gives direction in particular\\ncases concerning the praise-worthiness or blame-worthiness of an action pre-\\nsented before it. Lotze, Practical Philosophy, 3.\\nDie ganze Seite unseres Wesens, wodurch wir uns urteilend zu uns selbst\\nals wollenden oder handelden Wesen verhalten, heisst Gewissen. Paulsen,\\nEinleitung in die Philosophie, Anhang.\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 219. Eight reason, Hobbes calls\\ntrue, that is, concluding from true principles rightly framed, because that\\nthe whole breach of the Laws of Nature [the Moral Law, see supra, 18,\\nnote] consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly, of those men who do\\nnot see those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others. Be\\nCive, vol. ii, p. 16, note. On the diversities of moral judgment, see Lecky,\\nMistory of European Morals, vol. 1, p. 93 sq., Am. ed., 1870,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "80 OBLIGATION\\naccording to the degree of approach and logical conformity\\nof these standards to the intuition of pure reason.\\nThe moral intuition, like all others, may be cleared by dis-\\ncriminating attention to its occasions, abstracting from the\\nempirical elements, and fixing upon the pure and further,\\nby distinguishing those abstract notions with which it is lia-\\nble to be confused, as, for example, utility. In this manner\\nonly is conscience capable of improvement, of education.\\nThe accuracy and acumen of the logical faculty, by which\\nthe moral quality of an action is inferred, may be greatly im-\\nproved by intelligent exercise, and thus furnish means for\\nthe refinement of moral character. The moral sentiments\\nmay be intensified and the moral impulse strengthened by\\nindulgent activity, and the will may become more and more\\nsubmissive to its law by habitual observance. Conscience,\\nin its loose general meaning, has these several sources of cul-\\nture but in the narrow scientific sense here adopted, it is\\ncapable only of clearance. 1\\n44. Turning from the faculty by which the law is cog-\\nnized to the law itself, we observe that this imperative truth\\nis categorical.\\nThere are two classes of hypothetical imperatives, each\\n1 Beings like ourselves, in a world like this, compounded of a soul and\\nsense, wrought upon by wild, struggling forces within and without, require\\nfor tolerable existence, some ideal scheme of life, some law lodged in the\\nunderstanding and informing the will. Otherwise we are lost at the outset,\\nand bound for shipwreck as certainly as any vessel sailing into wintry seas\\nwithout chart or compass, rudder or pilot. Morality is the chart, drafted\\nby religion; rectitude is the compass; duty, the rudder; and conscience,\\nthe steersman at the helm. Only, in this case, pilot and rudder are not\\nthings separate from the vessel it is the ship of life herself, thrilling with\\nintelligence and purpose in every part, that bends her forces to the direction\\nof her course, and wins her perilous way through reefs and quicksands,\\nagainst buffeting storm and treacherous current, till she reaches the far\\nhaven where she would be. Professor Findlay.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 81\\nimplying the practical necessity of a means to an end. 1 The\\ncondition in the first of these classes is problematical, being,\\nthough constant, not universal, but merely possible. Exam-\\nples are found in the technical rules of art. If one would\\nbuild a house, he must gather materials, employ skilled labor,\\netc. The condition in the second class is assertorial, being\\nactual, constant and universal. Examples are found in the\\ndictates of prudence. If one would be healthy, he must be\\ntemperate. More generally: If one would be happy, he\\nmust, etc. These rules and dictates command conditionally.\\nThere is no necessity that any one should observe them, ex^\\ncept in case of his willing the antecedent, which, however,\\nin the second class, every one actually does.\\nc But the moral law is a categorical imperative, command-\\ning unconditionally. It is simply, Thou shalt, or Thou shalt\\nnot. There is no hypothetical antecedent expressive of a\\ndefinite end to be attained. Moreover, its behest is in disre-\\ngard of any special consequences, except in so far as these\\nmay enlighten the obligation. Tradition and custom may\\nlikewise illustrate its application, but they neither add to nor\\ntake from its authoritative hoc age. Its authority is in its\\nirrefragable and universal truth, and its truth is in the essen-\\nSeveral distinct kinds of necessity, commonly expressed by must, should\\nbe noted. These are as follow\\n1. Philosophical intellective, having no possible or conceivable opposite\\ne.g., pure ideas and axioms.\\n2. Psychical and physical causative, having no possible, yet a conceiv-\\nable, opposite; e.g., a percept, a falling stone.\\n3. Moral; volitive, having both conceivable and possible opposite e.g.,\\nobliged to keep a promise.\\n4. Practical tentative, having problematic opposite requisite as means\\nto an end; e.g., suitable tools.\\n5. Logical; probative, having sophistic opposite; requisite in order to\\ntruth; e.g., the syllogism.\\nCf. Elements of Psychology, 119; and Calderwood, Hand-book of Moral\\nPhilosophy, Pt. I, ch. 5, 6, (ed. 1872).", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "82 OBLIGATION\\ntial and ultimate nature of the facts. It demands an uncon-\\nditional and immediate obedience as a moral necessity, always\\nand everywhere, amid any and every combination of circum-\\nstances a blind obedience, if in the dark; an intelligent\\nobedience, if there be light; but always an uncompromising,\\nunswerving obedience. 1\\n45. The law is sovereign, subjecting all personal powers. 2\\nEach faculty operates according to its own constitutional\\n1 The foregoing distribution is from Kant s Grundlegung zur Jfietaphysik\\nder Sitten, S. 38 sq., R. and S. It may be presented as follows\\nImperatives, addressed to Will, are\\nI. Hypothetical, implying practical necessity, good as a means.\\nA. Problematical, possible, constant but not universal.\\nRules of art or skill\\nTechnics, Economics, Rhetoric, etc.\\nB. Assertorial, actual, constant and universal.\\nDictates or counsels of prudence\\nPursuit of happiness.\\nII. Categorical, implying moral necessity, good in itself.\\nUnconditioned and no ulterior end, constant and universal.\\nCommands or laws of morality.\\n2 It is commonly conceded that Butler, in his sermons Upon Human\\nNature, established the supremacy of conscience. He argues from the com-\\nplex constitution of the soul, and the combination in it of higher and lower\\nfaculties, with their various and conflicting aims, that the control of a supe-\\nrior internal principle is indispensable. The title prefixed by Gladstone to\\n19 reads Conscience dejure claims universal rule, if we follow the law of\\nour nature. In this section occurs Butler s famous saying of conscience\\nHad it strength, as it has right had it power, as it has manifest authority,\\nit would absolutely govern the world.\\nAll this is quite as true now as it was a century and a half ago but even\\nby Butler s own definition of conscience (given supra, 43, note), as a\\nprinciple that surveys and approves or disapproves, the argument seems to\\napply not so directly to conscience as to the law which conscience discerns,\\nor rather to the authority of which the law is merely the expression. It is\\nnot conscience, but the law, that is supreme, and a good will obeys, not\\nconscience, but the lawful authority which it recognizes.\\nThe authority of conscience is not found in any predominating force be-\\nlonging to it as a faculty, but altogether in the character of the truth which\\nit discovers. The authority is not found in the nature of the faculty itself.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 83\\nfunction, but it is not competent for its own guidance. All\\nothers are dependent on intelligence as a guide, and for the\\nfull and correct performance of this specific guiding function,\\nintelligence is dependent on conscience discerning the law of\\nconduct. All human activities, whether they issue in exter-\\nnal expression or not, are thus subjected ultimately to the\\nmoral law. 1\\nIt is the peculiar, the exclusive function of the will to con-\\ntrol all other powers, to bring them into normal and harmo-\\nnious exercise. The sovereign law is therefore addressed to\\nthe will, the executive. It commands choice to conform to\\nits behest. It demands the regulation of all inner activity,\\nand thus the regulation of all outward action. It is the\\nessential informing element in all mandates and minor rules\\nof conduct; the hypothetical imperatives, described above as\\nlogically coordinate, being ethically subordinate, subject to\\nits regulation. Even conscience itself is subject to its au-\\nthority the law, dimly seen, demanding the voluntary atten-\\ntion requisite to its being clearly seen in the fullness of its\\nmeaning, lest it be ignorantly violated. 2\\nThe faculty is a power of sight, such as makes perception of self-evident\\ntruth possible to man, and contributes nothing to the truth which is perceived.\\nTo the truth itself belongs inherent authority, by which is meant absolute\\nright of command, not force to constrain. Caldekwood, Hand-book of\\nMoral Philosophy, Pt. I, div. i, ch. 4, 5, (ed. 1872).\\n1 Besides subordinate rules, there must be a supreme rule of human\\naction for the succession of means and ends, with the corresponding series\\nof subordinate and supreme rules, must somewhere terminate and only that\\nwhich is conformable to the supreme rule is absolutely right. Whewell,\\nElements of Morality.\\n2 Practical reason shows us that the vocation and dignity of man is not\\nultimately rooted in knowledge, but in the volitional side of his nature.\\nHere also lie the deepest roots of our being in conscience, in the conscious-\\nness of the moral law, we become aware of our real essence. We possess\\nthe immediate certainty that the real essence of our being is grounded on\\nreality itself, that we belong, not to nature as it appears to the senses and\\nthe understanding, but to absolute reality itself, and therefore come to be-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "84 OBLIGATION\\nThis claim of supremacy, demanding the unconditional\\nsubjection of the entire will, is more or less clearly recog-\\nnized by every one. I see that it is law for me I cannot\\nignore or reject its claim. Yet a will often disregards or\\nrebels against this authority and only when completely sub-\\nmissive and perfectly accordant can a will be pronounced\\nmorally good. For nothing can possibly be conceived in\\nthe world, or even out of it, which can be called good with-\\nout qualification except a good will. 1\\n46. It has already been indicated that rights are grounded\\non personal relations, and that a discernment of the existence\\nof rights takes place on an empirical occasion, on an obser-\\nvation of such relation in actual life, whether the observer be\\na party or not. 2 Now it is evident that personal relations\\nlieve in the absolute teleological order of things, in a moral world-order, of\\nwhich the natural order is but an external reflection. Hence I believe\\nthat the world is the revelation of an all-wise and all-good God, even though\\nmine eyes fail to see him, and my understanding comprehend him not.\\nPaulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, closing sentences Thilly s translation.\\n1 The opening sentence of Kant s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik Sitten\\nwhich statement seems to have been fairly anticipated by Epictetus, who\\nsaid Apart from will there is nothing either good or bad. See Ency.\\nBrit, vol. viii, p. 472. Subsequently Kant adds Ein guter Wille ist\\ndas Einzige, was an und fur sich gut ist, er hat absoluten Wert, ganz un-\\nabhangig von dem, was er in der Welt ausrichtet und durchsetst. On this\\ndoctrine Janet remarks La bonne volonte* est bonne par elle-meme, et il\\nn est point ne cessaire d attendre les r^sultats pour la juger telle. La bonne\\nvolonte* est done le seul bien veritablement absolu. Or, si nous analysons\\nl id\u00c2\u00a3e de la bonne volonte, qu y trouvons nous rien autre chose, selon\\nKant, que la volonte* de faire son devoir et faire son devoir, ce n est pas\\nseulement agir conform ment au devoir, e est agir par devoir une conformity\\nexterieure avec la loi du devoir n a qu une valeur legale, et ne prend de\\nvaleur morale que si elle est int^rieurement accompagn^e de la volonte* de\\nfaire son devoir la moralite* ne consiste done que dans cette volonte* meme.\\nSubsequently he objects C est confondre ici l objectif et le subjectif.\\nC est faire sans le vouloir de l e*tat de conscience du sujet le principe absolu\\nde la moralite*. La Morale, ch. 2.\\n2 See supra, 33, and 42.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "TEE LAW 85\\nare strictly objective, and rights objectively determined hence\\nit follows that the moral law, being essentially implied in\\nreally existent rights, is objective in origin and character.\\nIt is true that human rights are more remotely grounded in\\nhuman nature, 1 and men are spoken of as doing by nature\\nthe things of the law, as being a law unto themselves, as\\nhaving the law written in their hearts. But this does not\\nmake the law in any measure or sense subjective. For man\\nhas a fixed, native constitution of both body and mind he\\ncannot make one hair of his head white or black, nor can he\\nadd to or take from his natural faculties, one of which is con-\\nscience, the eye reading the law written for him in his heart.\\nThis constitution, being independent of his subjective states,\\nis as truly objective as is the solar system, and it is this\\nobjective constitution, acting in conformity with the existing\\nconstitution of nature at large, that is determinative of rights,\\nof obligation, of the law.\\nThus the moral law is, as to its origin, objective in the\\nconstituent order of the world. It does not originate within\\nme, but beyond me. It is not given by me, but to me. It\\ncomes to me from without it is adventitious. The law of\\ncausation, every event is caused, and the law of conduct,\\nthou shalt not trespass, though the one be indicative, the\\nother imperative, the one inviolable, the other violable, are\\nalike in this, that each is independent of the mind apprehend-\\ning it. Conscience is not autonomous, nor is the will. The\\nlaw, objectively determined, is read by conscience, interpreted\\nby the judicial faculty, and executed, under the moral im-\\npulse, by the will.\\nThe objective character of the moral law is indicated by\\nits independence of circumstances and its disregard of conse-\\nquences. Yet still more clearly is this character evidenced\\nin its sameness for all classes and conditions of men. Were\\n1 See supra, 25, and notes.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "86 OBLIGATION\\nits character subjective, or were it liable to any subjective\\nmodification, there might be as many variations of the law\\nas there are minds of men. But, being one and the same for\\nall individual minds, evidently it is not enacted by them, but\\nenacted for them. Also, since it is not at all affected by\\nwhat one may think about it, every sane man being accused\\nor excused by his fellowmen in disregard of his peculiar no-\\ntions, it is clear that a law thus common and unalterable by\\nany subjective treatment has the essential character of an\\nobjective reality. 1\\n1 Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration\\nand awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them the starry\\nheavens above and the moral law within. 1 have not to search for them\\nand conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the\\ntranscendent region beyond my horizon I see them before me and connect\\nthem directly with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins\\nfrom the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my\\nconnexion therein to an unbounded extent with worlds upon worlds and\\nsystems of systems, and moreover into limitless times of their periodic mo-\\ntion, its beginning and continuance. The second begins from my invisible\\nself, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity, but\\nwhich is traceable only by the understanding, and with which I discern that\\nI am not in a merely contingent but in a universal and necessary connexion,\\nas I am also thereby with all those visible worlds. The former view of a\\ncountless multitude of worlds annihilates as it were my importance as an\\nanimal creature, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital\\npower, one knows not how, must again give back the matter of which it was\\nformed to the little planet it inhabits. The second on the contrary infinitely\\nelevates my worth as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral\\nlaw reveals to me a life independent on animality and even on the whole\\nsensible world, at least so far as may be inferred from the destination\\nassigned to my existence by this law, a destination not restricted to con-\\nditions and limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite. Kant,\\nCritique of the Pure Practical Beason, Conclusion Abbott s translation.\\nCf. supra, 45, note.\\nOf this famous peroration Hamilton says I do not know a better ex-\\nample of the sublime. Metaphysics, Lecture 46. It is an unconscious\\nparaphrase of the nineteenth Psalm. The two productions strikingly con-\\ntrast the poet and the philosopher, the heart and the head, the ancient and\\nthe modern.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 87\\n47. The law, in the form we have given, is negative\\nThou shalt not. In this form, taken strictly, it forbids a\\nlarge class of actions without enjoining any. Unquestionably\\nthis is its primary and most palpable aspect comprehending\\nour most obvious obligations, the one most clearly and fully\\nrecognized in actual life. As prohibitory, it strikes the most\\nuncultured intellect, is patent to the grossest comprehension,\\nand impresses itself on the humblest capacity, making its ap-\\npearance in the very awakening of the moral consciousness.\\nThis strictly negative or prohibitory aspect of the law is\\ntherefore worthy of specific consideration in this place, re-\\nserving for subsequent examination its positive forms.\\nFrom the law in its prohibitory form many deductions can\\nbe made to secondary laws, having less yet very wide gen-\\nerality, and retaining the character of strict universality.\\nFor example Trespass is forbidden Murder is trespass\\ntherefore Murder is forbidden. In this simple syllogism, the\\nmajor premise is an indicative form of the law intuitively\\ntrue only the minor premise needs support, which the\\nslightest reflection furnishes; for the right to continue in\\nlife is the highest of rights, it being the condition of all\\nothers, and to kill unwarrantably, which is murder, is the\\ngreatest possible trespass, since it extinguishes all liberty, all\\npossible enjoyment of any right. Maiming is likewise tres-\\npass, for it diminishes one s liberty to realize his rights and\\ntherefore it is forbidden. Cruelty is pain-giving trespass\\na wrong, not simply because it gives pain, but because\\nit thereby unwarrantably interferes in liberty; it there-\\nfore is forbidden. Theft is trespass, a violation of the\\nright of property preventing its free use; and therefore,\\nThou shalt not steal. These are very obvious yet typical\\ncases.\\nThe Decalogue, which the foregoing suggests, is usually\\nspoken of as the moral law. It is eminently, but not ulti-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "88 OBLIGATION\\nmately. Its ten-fold statement lacks the nnity requisite to a\\nphilosophic reduction. Yet it is easily seen that each of the\\nten laws is a simple deduction from the one ultimate law\\nTrespass not. This is the basis. Consequently they are\\nthroughout negative, simply prohibitory. Let us add the\\nobservations, that these prohibitions are, in general, progres-\\nsive from higher to lower offenses, and that all are objective,\\nforbidding outward acts, except the last which is subjective,\\nentering the mind or soul, and forbidding unrighteous desires. 1\\nT- On the points in the foregoing paragraph let it be remarked\\n1. Canon Farrar, in his Sermons on the Ten Commandments, inverts the\\ntrue order by entitling them A Voice from Sinai, or the Eternal Basis of\\nthe Moral Law. 1\\n2. We are reminded of the Pythagorean Decad (circa 500 1 1\\nB.C.), wherein the scale of universal truth is symbolized by 111\\nthe series of numbers ten, 5e*ds, being their sum, thus\\n3. The first commandment forbids confronting Jehovah\\nwith other gods in opposition, set up as rival objects of service and adora-\\ntion. Evidently it would be a trespass upon his exclusive right. The\\nsecond forbids degrading the spiritual nature of God by graven images, and\\nalso forbids idolatry for a worship through images inevitably becomes a\\nworship of images. The third forbids perjury, a trespass on him in whose\\nname an oath is taken, and to whom fulfillment is due. The fourth expressly\\nclaims the memorial Sabbath as his own its violation is a trespass on this\\nreservation. The fifth enjoins honor of parents, whose dishonor would be a\\ntrespass, not only on them, but also on him through his natural and visible\\nrepresentatives.\\n4. The fourth commandment is grammatically positive, but its appended\\ninterpretation is negative. The fifth is positive, if we construe to honor posi-\\ntively, but it may mean only to respect, which is primarily negative.\\n5. The progression in the first table, which concerns our relation to\\nsuperiors, is from high treason against the divine King, down to disrespect\\nfor appointed human authority in the second, which concerns our relation\\nto equals, it is from murder, down to the subjective impulse to trespass,\\nthus guarding the sacredness of personal life, of wedded life, of property,\\nand of reputation.\\n6. A correspondence between the two tables may be noted. The first\\ncommandment in each relates to the extinction of all rights the second in\\neach, to their corruption, idolatry being often called adultery the third in\\neach, to the violation of a property the fourth in each, to a reservation or\\nclaim the fifth in each, to a right disposition.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "TEE LAW 89\\nThe Ten Words are inadequate. A man may keep them\\nall from his youth up, and yet lack. They are directed\\nsolely against sins of commission. They prohibit certain\\nprominent offenses, but posit no explicit obligation of benev-\\nolence, no duty of love to God or neighbor. They were\\naddressed originally to a people rude, uncultured, whose\\nmoral character was very imperfectly developed by its Egyp-\\ntian experiences. They were for the time as much as could\\nbe borne. Had the law in its fullness been at once revealed,\\nit probably would not have been understood, much less ap-\\npreciated, accepted and practiced. In general, the Old Tes-\\ntament morality is negative and prohibitory. 1\\n7. To the second and to the third commandment is appended a menace\\nto the fourth, a supporting reason, without which the violation would not,\\nperhaps, appear so clearly a trespass to the fifth, a promise. The fifth of\\nthe first table makes an easy transition from the divine character of the\\nfirst table to the human of the second. In neither is any mandate of love\\nto God or to neighbor. But see Deuteronomy, 6:5; and Leviticus, 19 18.\\n8. The naturalness of the Decalogue, its manifest Tightness, and its uni-\\nversality, are well illustrated in the following heathen summary of the less\\nobvious First Table. Socrates, conversing with Hippias, asks\\nDost thou know, Hippias, any unwritten laws\\nThose in every country, replied Hippias, that are held binding touching\\nthe same things.\\nCanst thou say that men made them\\nWhy, how could all men come together when they do not speak the same\\nlanguage\\nThen who do you suppose made those laws\\nI think, Socrates, that gods gave those laws to men for with all men it\\nis thought right first of all to reverence gods.\\nIs it everywhere thought right to honor parents\\nIt is so indeed. Xenophon, Memorabilia, bk. iv, ch. 4.\\n1 Edersheim tells us that the Rabbis divide the Law of Moses into 248\\naffirmative, and 265 negative, commandments. But this includes the Cere-\\nmonial, as distinguished from the Moral Law. Our Lord s comment on the\\nprayer he taught his disciples (Matthew 6 9-15), emphasizing trespasses,\\nirapaimbfiaTa, is an echo of Old Testament morality. It expands the point,\\nand this point only, perhaps as the one least intelligible and acceptable.\\nSee supra, 36, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "90 OBLIGATION\\nCivil law, under which phrase we include all laws rec-\\nognized, enacted and enforced by an organized State, 1 is\\noriginally negative in its forms. Even after being greatly\\nexpanded, it is still very largely negative in expression and\\nprohibitory in character. Especially is this true of the crim-\\ninal code, which consists of a series of prohibitions of certain\\novert acts. As a science of human rights, civil law is occu-\\npied with classifying and denning the various rights of indi-\\nviduals, of corporations, and of communities in general. As\\nan art of social regulation, it provides for the adjudication of\\nparticular cases, and the enforcement of judicial decrees.\\nThroughout it is a system of enactments deduced from the\\nuniversal and exhaustive law of trespass, which enactments\\nare used as major premises in further deduction the minor\\npremises being the particular cases which the court is con-\\nsidering. Hence it is evident that, in essence, there are not\\nmany laws there is only one law. 2\\n1 Civil law, in a general sense, the law of a state, city, or country spe-\\ncifically, the Roman law, the municipal law of the Roman empire, com-\\nprised in the Institutes, Code, and Digest of Justinian and the Novel\\nConstitutions. Blackstone. We use the phrase in the generic sense\\nonly, which corresponds to Kent s definition of municipal law in general,\\nas y a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the law-making power of a state.\\nCommentaries, vol. I, p. 447. This includes lex non scripta, or Common\\nLaw, and the lex scripta, or Statute Law. It is co-ordinate with Interna-\\ntional Law, Constitutional Law, and Ecclesiastical or Canon Law. See\\nsupra, 17, note. The word civil has about twelve different meanings\\nit is applied to all manner of objects which are perfectly disparate. As\\nopposed to criminal, it means all law not criminal as opposed to ecclesias-\\ntical, it means all law not ecclesiastical as opposed to military, it means\\nall law not military and so on. Even jus privatum is sometimes also\\ncalled jus civile. Austin, Jurisprudence, 1030.\\n2 Moralists have much to say about The Moral Law, but few venture\\nto formulate it, thus failing to answer the all important question What is\\nthe moral law Some formulas that have been given will interest the reader.\\nA reasonable being ought to act reasonably. Hence, Obey reason.\\nHlCKOK.\\nIt is right for men to use their powers for their natural (or rational)", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 91\\n48. The law in its primarily negative sense, forbidding\\ncertain actions and requiring none, tends to isolate men, to\\nset them apart from each other, to sever their natural rela-\\ntions. It says Let your neighbor be, do not interfere in his\\nliberty, do not step in his way or on his ground, respect his\\nrights. 1 Accordingly, even among highly cultured people,\\nends. This is the intuition, the immediate recognition of Moral Law.\\nThat principle which determines what is right, determines what is law for\\nme. Caldekwood.\\nRespect the freedom of others. Cousin.\\nLimit thy freedom through the conception of the freedom of every\\nother person with whom thou canst be connected. Fichte\\nBe a person, and respect others as persons. Hegel.\\nAct at every instant with thy whole moral energy, endeavoring to do\\nthy whole moral work. Schleiermacher.\\nThere is but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act on that\\nmaxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become\\nuniversal law. Kant. See supra, 44.\\nOf Kant s famous categorical imperative be it noted that, like several of\\nthe other forms given above, it has, as he himself says, no content, it is a\\nform only. We venture the criticism that a law of conduct should tell us\\nwhat to forbear or to do it should have matter as well as form. Again,\\nhis imperative clearly has a tincture of the utility which he discards, in that\\nit makes the consequences determine the right or wrong of actions for,\\nwhy can I not will theft to be universal because it would be ruinous.\\nBut, indeed, this imperative seems to be, not a law, but a rule by which to\\ntest conduct. I take a straight-edged rule or ruler, and laying it on my\\npaper, draw a right line, or test one already drawn. Why is it known to\\nbe right Because it conforms to the rule. Now this rule is not the law of\\na straight line. Its law, in the Cartesian co-ordinate geometry, is the linear\\nequation a x -f b y c, wherein a, b and c are fixed numbers, and x and y\\nvariables which is a very different thing from my wooden ruler. Likewise,\\na law of conduct, and a rule by which to guide or test conduct, are very dif-\\nferent things. Kant s empty imperative is not properly a law but it is a\\nrule, by which we may know the moral quality of certain conduct by bring-\\ning to view its natural consequences, these not (causce essendi) making, but\\nmerely (causce cognoscendi) showing, its quality. For a violation of moral\\nJaw results in evil, and vice versa, and when the application of the law itself\\nto a case is obscure, the patent consequences will enlighten us. See infra,\\n48, note.\\n1 The most original obligation of man in intercourse is that of leaving\\nevery other unmolested until that other has disclosed his purpose to enter", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "92 OBLIGATION\\nthere are many who, while rigidly conforming their lives to\\nthe prohibitions of the law, apparently have no wider concep-\\ntion of obligation, and know no difference between legality\\nand morality. Indeed there are some who regard the laws of\\nthe State, with all their manifest imperfections and narrow\\ninadequacy, as marking the bounds of obligation, and con-\\nsider it right to claim or do whatever civil law does not\\nforbid, all unforbidden actions being permissible and super-\\nerogatory. 1\\nA thorough analysis, however, of the conditions and impli-\\ncations of trespass, such as we shall subsequently undertake,\\ndiscovers that the limitation to prohibition is inadmissible,\\nthat it is far from exhausting the moral principle, that there\\nis a positive aspect of this formally negative imperative, that\\nthe injunction placed upon trespass by the universal moral\\nlaw is both a prohibition and a requisition, forbidding to do\\nthis but equally requiring to do that, and embracing all par-\\nticular acts and general conduct. 2 The morality of the New\\nTestament advances to this higher positive plane. It does\\nnot abrogate the earlier form of the law, but arises from it, de-\\nmands active benevolence, and so exhausts the obligation of\\ninto some intercourse. No one therefore has any right to force unsolicited\\nservices upon another; although each one is at the same time bound to\\nbehave with good will toward the intentions of every other, as soon as they\\nare made known to him. Lotze, Practical Philosophy, 41.\\n1 The Greeks held that the State should provide by legislative enactments\\nfor the moral education of the people. Accordingly Aristotle says What\\nlaw does not command, it forbids. Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 11, 1. On\\nthis, Michelet remarks The Greeks recognized the principle that it was the\\nduty of their State to support the sanctions of virtue by legislative enact-\\nments the moral education of the people formed part of the legislative\\nsystem. Hence the rule which Aristotle states Quae lez non jubet, vetat.\\nThe principles of our [the German] law, on the contrary, are derived\\nfrom the Roman law, which confines itself in all cases to forbidding wrongs\\ndone to society. Hence the rule with us is exactly the contrary Quo2 lez\\nnon vetat, permittit. The Ethics of Aristotle, p. 195,\\n2 See supra, 41,", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 93\\nman to man. 1 The influence of this positive presentation of\\nthe law effectively counteracts the isolating tendency of the\\n1 Thus The Royal Law, according to the scripture: Thou shalt love\\nthy neighbor as thyself. James, 2 8. Cf. the rule All things whatso-\\never ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them\\nfor this is the law and the prophets. 1 Matthew, 7 12. This contravenes\\nthe old Lex Talionis Do unto others as they do unto you and resounds in\\nthe Anglo-Saxon Put yourself in his place. It has sometimes been mis-\\ntaken for the moral law, perhaps because of the addendum, which, however,\\ndoubtless means By this ye may fulfill the law. For evidently it is a rule\\nmerely, a form without content, a guide or test of conduct. Even as a rule\\nit is inadequate, for it does not provide for 1st. Duties to self but in this\\nwe hold it correct; there are no duties to self (see infra, 74, sq.). 2d.\\nBenevolence one might say, I want no alms, and so am not bound to give\\nalms. The usual gloss, in like case, is supposed to correct this, but it\\ndoes not correct the next point. 3d. Legal justice by it a judge should\\nalways discharge the accused. The gloss, if it be right, begs the whole\\nmatter.* We note also that the rule makes self-love the test and measure\\nof obligation; but so too does the royal law; probably, however, not the\\nultimate test and absolute measure, yet setting a mark we may hardly reach.\\nNotwithstanding these exceptions, it is rightly called The Golden Rule\\nfor its intrinsic worth and practical value are of the highest. As a rule easy\\nof apprehension, if not of observance, in the vast majority of actual cases,\\nnone can exceed its simplicity, its clearness, its wisdom, its excellence.\\nKant s categorical imperative (supra, 47, note), taken as a rule, is superior\\nin philosophical comprehension, but vastly inferior in practical application.\\nWe accept the one as The Golden Rule of Philosophy, and the other as\\nThe Golden Rule of Christianity.\\nIn the Confucian analects, bk. xv, ch. 23, we find: Tsze-kung asked\\nsaying: Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all\\none s life The Master replied Is not reciprocity such a word What you\\ndo not want done to yourself do not do to others. Cf. bk. v, ch. 1.\\nFrom Samuel Cox, on Ecclesiastes, p. 315. Cf. Legge, Chinese Classics,\\nvol. i.\\nIsocrates (d. 338 b.c.) said: What you are angry at when inflicted on\\nyou by others, this do not do to others.\\nAristotle (d. 322 b.c), being asked how we should behave towards our\\nfriends, replied As we should wish them to behave toward us.\\nHenry More, in Enchiridion Ethicum, gives the following revision: The good\\nwhich you prefer for yourself in given circumstances, you ought to prefer for another\\nin the same circumstances, so far as it is possible without injury to any third person.\\nNoema, 14, p. 29,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "94 OBLIGATION\\nexclusively negative view, restores and strengthens the mu-\\ntual relations of men, bringing them into fraternal fellow-\\nship, and uniting them by common and indissoluble bonds.\\nTobit said to his son Do that to no man which thou hatest. Apocrypha,\\nv, 15.\\nHillel (d. 4 b.c.) said: Quod tibi ipsi odiosum est, proximo ne facias,\\nnam hoc est tota lex. The Talmud, as quoted by Wetstein.\\nPhilo Judaeus (d. cir. a.d. 45) said: One must not himself do what he\\nhates to have done to him.\\nSeneca (d. a.d. 65) says: We should give as we would wish to receive.\\nThe didax n or Teaching of the Apostles (2d century), followed by the\\nApostolic Constitutions, vii, 2, says: All things whatsoever thou wouldst\\nnot have befall thee, thou, too, do not to another.\\nThese early forms are all negative, except that of Aristotle (about friends),\\nof Jesus, and of Seneca. That the thought occurred to so many ancient\\nsages indicates its natural origin.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 95\\nCHAPTER V\\nSANCTIONS\\n49. The human will originates actions in the sense that\\nit elects one rather than another possibility, and does that\\ninstead of this. It is therefore rightly regarded as the first\\ncause in a series of events whose subsequent members are its\\neffects or consequences. As this mastery of the will is itself\\nsubject to the moral law, the causes and effects in the series\\nare qualified as moral causes and effects. But let it be ob-\\nserved that causation in the mental or spiritual sphere is\\nstill causation, and in that sphere moral causes determine\\ntheir effects as rigidly as, in the physical sphere, physical\\ncauses determine their effects. Moreover, such is the recip-\\nrocal relation between the spiritual and material spheres\\nthat an activity in either may be the cause of an event in\\nthe other. 1\\nWhen a voluntary act takes place, I have determined it\\nshall be this rather than some other. Until then the deed\\nis merely potential, I am master, I have to do with it. When\\nit becomes actual, then no longer have I to do with it, but it\\nhas to do with me. I cease to be the actor, and become an\\nobserver, perhaps a sufferer. What is done can never be\\nundone. There may be counteraction, readjustment, restitu-\\ntion, compensation, but there is no restoration or erasure of\\nthe past. The act is unchangeable. It has passed from\\nthe domain of moral law and entered the realm of natural\\nlaw, to become a first link in an irrefragable chain of causes\\n1 See supra, 10, note and 18.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "96 OBLIGA TION\\nand effects involving my welfare, perhaps completely and\\ninextricably. Often a word unspoken is a sword sheathed at\\nmy belt; spoken, it is a drawn sword in the hand of my\\nenemy. 1\\nExperience in such matter brings reflection, and with it\\nthe wider observation and induction that conformity of voli-\\ntion to moral law is wholesome, non-conformity perilous, per-\\nhaps fatal. These good and evil effects constitute in general\\nthe sanctions of the moral law, they conserve its sanctity,\\nratifying and vindicating its authority, inducing obedience,\\nthat it may be unbroken, whole, holy, sacred in the eyes of\\nits subjects. 2\\n1 Be the stern and sad truth spoken, that the breach which guilt has\\nonce made into the human soul, is never, in this mortal state, repaired.\\nHawthorne, Scarlet Letter, ch. 18.\\nEvery word and act is a portion of the living, breathing past, that\\nhaving once been is immortal in its every part and moment, incarnating as\\nit does the very spirit of immortality, an utter incapacity to change. As\\nthe act was, as the word hath been spoken, so shall act and word be forever\\nand forever. Haggard, Jess, ch. 30.\\nCf. James, 3: 5-12; and Proverbs, 25: 11; also Homer, Iliad, bk. ii,\\n455, and bk. xi, 155.\\n2 A sanction, in the proper sense of the term, means nothing more nor\\nless than a penalty incurred by a violation of a law. If a man systemati-\\ncally takes every pleasure as it flies, he becomes liable to a physical sanc-\\ntion, or, in other words, pain, disease, death. If he transgresses the known\\nlaw of the land, he comes under the political sanctions of legal punishment.\\nIf he defies the ordinances of society, he pays the penalty for his eccen-\\ntricity in the social sanction of ostracism. But are any of these moral\\nsanctions, moral penalties incurred by an immoral agent Perhaps it will\\nbe enough to accept on this point the answer of Mill The ultimate sanction\\nof all morality is a subjective feeling in our minds. Edinburgh Review\\nfor April, 1883, p. 236. See Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 41, 42.\\nThe difference between sanction and obligation is simply this Sanction\\nis evil incurred, or to be incurred, by disobedience to command. Obligation\\nis liability to that evil in event of disobedience. It is not infrequently\\nsaid that sanctions operate on the will. It were more correct to say\\nthat sanctions operate on the desires. The party obliged is averse from\\nthe conditional evil, he wishes or desires to avoid it, in order to\\nthis, he must fulfil the obligation. We are told by Hobbes, in his Essay", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 97\\n50. Mandatory law has necessarily penalty affixed. In-\\ndeed the notion of the one seems to imply the other as of its\\nessence for the voice of command without power enforcing\\nit would be mere brutum fulmen, vox et prceterea nihil. Ac-\\ncordingly, in considering the moral order of the world, the\\norder that ought to be, we find that any deviation carries\\nwith it penalty, or rather penalties, as its natural and neces-\\nsary consequence. Let us now examine first those that are\\nwholly subjective.\\nSubordinate to reverence for the law revealed by conscience\\nis the sentiment of approbation or of disapprobation, correla-\\ntive to the moral judgment approving or disapproving. These\\ninnate sentiments bear powerfully upon conduct, and thus\\nconstitute sanctions. Indeed they are the original, constitu-\\ntional, and primary sanctions of the law. In the pleasure or\\npain, by which they are strongly marked, we discover native,\\nsubjective reward and punishment. 1\\nThe moral sentiments are so highly influential that their\\nfunction is often exaggerated, and they are supposed to be\\nsanctions in the sense of being a sure index and an authori-\\ntative exponent of the true moral character of an act or of\\ngeneral conduct. Many a man of high culture will assert his\\nrectitude in a certain case because he experiences the pleasing\\non Liberty and Necessity, that the habitual fear of punishment maketh men\\njust, it frames and moulds their wills to justice. The plain and simple\\ntruth is this that it tends to quench wishes which urge to breach of duty,\\nor are adverse to that which is jussum or ordained. Austin, Jurispru-\\ndence, 650, 655.\\n1 See supra, 4. The intensity and ardor of these sentiments in the\\nhealthy mind, the singular delicacy, variety, and complexity of which they\\nare susceptible, their long continuance and power to color and temper our\\nwhole experience, the way in which they break out from unsuspected\\ndepths, and in their painful forms of remorse or indignation will sometimes\\nby a sudden upheaval rend the entire fabric of a man s previous life, or\\nchange the current of a nation s history this incomparable vividness and\\nelectric force of the moral feelings proves that the conscience, whose servants", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "98 OBLIGATION\\nsentiment of self-approbation, saying My conscience sanc-\\ntions my course. It is therefore important to remark that\\none s feelings in view of his actions do not, even in the most\\nremote way, furnish any proof of their true moral character.\\nThis would invert the psychological order that posits moral\\nsentiment as dependent on moral judgment. In reality the\\nfeeling of approbation or disapprobation attends a false moral\\njudgment as readily and fully as it does a true one, having\\nno power to discern the difference. Hence these sentiments\\ndo not at all confirm the judgment; but, on the contrary,\\ntheir own justification is wholly dependent on the validity of\\nthe antecedent judgment and this depends ultimately on a\\nclear discernment of the moral law by conscience. Accord-\\ningly we observe that even these sanctions, though original\\nand innate, are liable, as are all other human sanctions, to\\ndistribute reward and punishment unduly, both in kind and\\ndegree.\\nIn the class of subjective sanctions must be included the\\nsilent approval or censure of one s fellows. We are largely\\ndependent for our free welfare on even the private opinions\\nof each other. No man can reasonably be indifferent to the\\njudgment that others form of his conduct, and to the moral\\nsentiments with which it inspires them. Every right-minded\\nthey are, is the sovereign factor of personality. These thunders and light-\\nnings of the soul are wielded by that power which sits on the throne of our\\nbeing. Prof. Findlay, Headingly College, Leeds.\\nHe, that lias light within his own clear breast,\\nMay sit in the centre, and enjoy bright day\\nBut he, that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,\\nBenighted walks under the mid-day sun,\\nHimself is his own dungeon.\\nComus, 1. 381 sq.\\nCf. Milton s Prose Works, i, 217. Also Proverbs, 4: 18, 19:\\n11 The path of the righteous is as the light of dawn,\\nThat shineth more and more unto the perfect day\\nBut the way of the wicked is as darkness,\\nThey know not at what they stumble.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 99\\nman feels this keenly, whether the judgment be just or un-\\njust. He is elated and encouraged by silent commendation\\nhe is depressed and discouraged by condemnation. These\\nalso are potent sanctions ratifying the moral law, and uphold-\\ning its authority.\\n51. From the foregoing considerations it appears that\\nthe notion of violable law carries with it the notions of a gain\\nof worth or dignity in its observance, and of a loss of worth\\nor dignity in its violation also that the one implies the no-\\ntion of merit or desert, of reward due, the other of demerit,\\nof penalty due. Furthermore, an observation of meritorious\\nconduct, especially if despite adverse temptation, excites an\\nimpulse to bestow reward; of culpable conduct, a disposi-\\ntion to inflict punishment. These natural impulses have,\\nno doubt, an instinctive origin and play, and so far are con-\\nstitutional but they have also a distinctively rational exer-\\ncise, and so far are susceptible of justification.\\nIn view of one s own conduct, an approving judgment\\nof merit excites the instinctive impulse to reward well-\\ndoing, realized perhaps in some special self-indulgence\\nwhereas a judgment of demerit incites an instinctive anticipa-\\ntion of punishment, which sometimes is self-inflicted. Crim-\\ninals not infrequently surrender themselves voluntarily to\\npublic justice, that they themselves may have the satisfaction\\nof penance for their misdeeds. 1 Suicide following remorse\\nhas perhaps often the character of self-inflicted punishment.\\nRecompense and retribution are reasonable. It is patent\\nto common sense that the welfare of a community as a whole,\\nand of its several members, is favored by the steady observ-\\n1 I am sorry that such sorrow I procure\\nAnd so deep sticks it in my penitent heart\\nThat I crave death more willingly than mercy\\nTis my deserving, and I do entreat it.\\nMeasure for Measure, Act v, sc. 1, 1. 479 sq.\\nam", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "100 OBLIGATION\\nance of the law which requires each to respect the rights of\\nall others and more especially is it evident that a wrong\\ndone, a trespass committed, is a breach of order affecting un-\\nfavorably, not merely the immediate sufferer, but mediately\\nthe welfare of all, even of those whose relation to him is\\nremote. Therefore, when a breach is threatened, all agree\\nthat preventive restraints should be imposed and when a\\nbreach is actually made, that the offender should be punished\\nin such manner and measure as will deter him from repeating\\nthe offense, and deter all observers from like misdeed. If\\nthe community be one of which I am a member, I am dis-\\nposed and indeed bound to take part directly or indirectly in\\ninflicting the deterrent penalty. On the other hand, if some\\none, who, from moral weakness or from lack of moral culture,\\nis specially liable to temptation, conform manfully in a cer-\\ntain action or in general conduct to the social order that\\nought to be, then there is a common judgment that he should\\nbe rewarded, and a prompting to bestow reward in such man-\\nner and measure as shall strengthen his good will, and induce\\nobservers in his class to practice like conduct. This seems\\nto be a reasonable account and justification of the common\\ndisposition of men in their treatment of orderly and disor-\\nderly persons.\\n52. The subjective sanctions in the minds of observers\\ntend to become also objective in public opinion. The judg-\\nment and sentiment usually find expression in outspoken\\nwords of praise or blame, often in modes more forcible, as\\npopular honors, or social ostracism.\\nReprobation of a wrongdoer is, in general, directly pro-\\nportioned to his intelligence and culture. For it is evident,\\nfrom the admitted supremacy of the moral law, that a knowl-\\nedge of one s obligations, implying the possibility of fulfilling\\nthem, diminishes in so far the ground of apologetic defense.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 101\\nConversely, ignorance of facts and circumstances which go to\\ndetermine the moral quality of conduct, is allowed to be a\\npalliation of offense, followed by a mitigation of punishment\\nyet is not allowed as complete excuse, for no human mind\\ncan be absolutely blind to its obligations. 1\\nThe sentiment and impulse prompting us to reward one\\nwho does well is, speaking generally, in inverse proportion to\\nhis intelligence and culture. A street gamin who finds and\\nrestores my lost purse should have some portion of its con-\\ntent bestowed on him, but I would not offer to reward a\\ngentleman should I commit the blunder, he would be justly\\nindignant. We heartily approve the good deeds of cultured\\npersons, but express rewards are rarely proposed to them.\\nAcademic honors are offered to youth as a stimulus before\\nthe fact, but in mature life honors are indefinite, spontaneous,\\nand come after the fact. Titles of nobility are usually\\ngranted as rewards only for some special and signal service.\\nNeither these, nor honorable distinctions of any kind, nor\\nany emoluments, are granted for mere conformity to law.\\nIn the civil code, while to each law is attached a penalty\\nfor its violation, to no law in any enlightened State is at-\\ntached a reward for its observance. 2\\nThis last observation gives occasion to remark that while,\\nas already stated, penalty is a necessary sanction, essential\\nin the very notion of violable law, reward is only a contin-\\ngent sanction, it may or may not be applied, it is not essen-\\ntial. Moreover, in the progress of moral culture, not only\\ndoes a promise of reward, but also the threat of punishment,\\ngradually lose its influence. Many a man reaches the stage\\nwhere these are, for himself, lost to view, and he fulfills his\\n1 See Luke, 23 34 Hebrews, 5 2 i Timothy, 1 13 See also infra,\\n\u00c2\u00a761.\\n2 The occasional rewards offered for the detection of felons, having a pur-\\npose quite different, are not exceptions.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "102 OBLIGATION\\nobligations without regard to either. This is a high, yet\\nnot the highest, degree of culture. 1\\n53. Another class of sanctions, originating in the fore-\\ngoing, may be discriminated as distinctly objective, being\\nembodied in formal ordinance, and having reference to overt\\nmisdeeds. They are the enactments of an organized State.\\nNo longer recognized as individual judgments, they super-\\nsede the private opinion of the offender, the court and the\\nexecutive, they have passed beyond the more or less sym-\\npathetic opinion of the Dublic, and are objectified in a bind-\\ning penal code.\\nSuch, in general, is the character of all civil law. It\\ncannot be too strongly or repeatedly emphasized that the\\nwhole science and practice of jurisprudence, in all its various\\nbranches, together with the vast and complex system of\\ncourts of judicature, having a prescribed and established\\nform, manner and order for conducting suits and prosecu-\\ntions, and having executive powers, has its ultimate basis\\nand justification in the ethical principle of a personal right,\\nand is merely an authoritative explication and application of\\nthe one moral law Thou shalt not trespass. 2\\n1 Those writers who disparage the morality of the New Testament as\\nemploying an inferior class of motives because it appeals to fear of future\\npunishment and to hope of reward in heaven, seem strangely incapable of\\nappreciating the real scope and spirit of Christian morality. The true glory\\nof Christianity as taught in the New Testament is the almost measureless\\nrange of its motives, ascending from the hope and fear which can reach the\\nlowest degradation to which man can descend, up to the purest spirit of dis-\\ninterested love of which human beings are capable. Robinson, Principles\\nand Practice of Morality, p. 143, note. Cf. infra, 91.\\n2 Jurists quite commonly distinguish civil law from moral law, and legal\\nobligation from moral obligation. This distinction has crept into common\\n.speech, conveying the erroneous impression that these are two coordinate\\nkinds of law or obligation, having a different origin and a distinct essence,\\nso as to be not only logically opposed, but sometimes, indeed often, in actual,\\npractical opposition. Whereas in fact no obligation can possibly bind a", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 108\\nVery many kinds of enacted sanctions of law have been\\ndevised. There can be no doubt that in the early stages of\\norganized society, the spirit of personal vengeance dominate\\ning, the intent and form of legal punishment was largely\\nretaliatory, a paying back blow for blow. 1 This barbarous,\\nstrict lex talionis is no longer in vogue. It has been ex-\\npunged from the penal code of civilized States, excepting in\\ncase of life for life, which is justified on grounds other than\\nvengeance. For it is evident that, if requital in kind, to\\nsatisfy the thirst for revenge, be the object of punitive\\nmeasures, then it is the purpose of the State, as far as it\\ncan reach, to double the suffering of its members which is\\nabsurd. Whatever of vengeance is compatible with legal\\npunishment, is reserved expressly for a tribunal higher than\\nthe State. 2\\nUnder a prior topic it was stated that rights may be re-\\nduced to three, a right to life, a right to liberty, and a right\\nto property. In refined codes the penalties correspond, con-\\nsisting exclusively in deprivation of life, or of liberty by\\nhuman will that is not a moral obligation, and all jurisprudence or politics\\nin general is strictly a subordinate branch of applied Ethics. Aristotle s\\nPolitics is a continuation of his Ethics. In concluding the latter treatise, he\\nsays Since all former writers have passed over without examination\\nthe subject of legislation, it would perhaps be better for us to examine it\\nourselves, and, in short, the whole subject of politics, in order that the\\nphilosophy of human nature, may, as far as in us lies, be completed. The\\ntransition is in the closing sentence Let us then make a commencement.\\nNic. Eth. bk. x, ch. 9.\\n1 See Exodus, 21 23-25 Leviticus, 24 17-21 Deuteronomy, 19 21 and\\ncf. Matthew, 5 38, 39. Aristotle says Some people think that retaliation\\nis absolutely just, as the Pythagoreans said for they defined justice simply\\nas retaliation to another. But retaliation does not fit in with the idea either\\nof distributive or of corrective justice and yet they would have that this is\\nthe meaning of the Rhadamanthian rule If a man suffers what he has done,\\nstraightforward justice would take place for in many points it is at vari-\\nance. Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 5, 1. See also Butler, On Resentment, Ser-\\nmon, viii.\\n2 See Deuteronomy, 32 35 and Romans, 12 19.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "104 OBLIGATION\\nimprisonment, or of property by fines, damages or confisca-\\ntion. Flogging has been generally abolished. Restitution,\\nor else compensation, is enforced when practicable, but is\\nnot punishment; hence damages are added. 1 Punishment,\\nthen, is practically the taking away of that the right to which\\nhas been forfeited by trespass, by a transgression of the bounds\\nset by personal relations to personal liberty. Moreover it\\nwas pointed out that the three kinds of rights may be re-\\nduced to one, the right to liberty in the gratification of nor-\\nmal desires. Hence it appears that as all offenses are\\nunwarranted interferences in liberty, so all legitimate pen-\\nalties are warranted interferences in liberty. 2\\n54. Pain is the correlate of restrained or constrained\\nenergy. Each of our powers tends spontaneously, that is,\\nof its own proper nature, without strain, to put forth a defi-\\nnite quantity of free activity. If this amount be realized,\\nthere is pleasure; if less, the energy being repressed, or if\\nmore, the energy being overwrought, there is pain. Thus\\nall pleasure arises from the free natural play of our faculties\\nall pain, from their restraint or constraint. The normal is\\npleasurable, the abnormal painful. 3\\n1 See Exodus, 22 1 sq. and cf. Luke, 19 8.\\n2 See supra, 23, 27, 29. The ground on which the State is warranted\\nin inflicting punishment, is examined infra, 136 sq. The Constitution of\\nthe United States provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,\\nor property, without due process of law. Amendments, Article v. Also\\nthat excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor\\ncruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Idem, Art. viii. In San\\nFrancisco an ordinance was passed declaring that any male person confined\\nin the county jail should have the hair of his head cut to within an inch of\\nhis scalp. To a Chinaman the loss of his queue was regarded not only as a\\ndisgrace, but as entailing suffering after death. This kind of punishment\\nwas declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Cokek, Govern-\\nment of the United States, ch. xviii.\\n3 See Psychology, 228 also, Hamilton, Metaphysics, Lecture xlii sq.\\nThis doctrine of pleasure aud pain originated with Aristotle see especially\\nNic. Eth., bk. x, ch. 4.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 105\\nNaturally we have an inclination to pleasure, and an aver-\\nsion to pain. A desire for pain, simply for its own sake, is\\na psychological impossibility. This constitutional aversion\\nto pain impels one constantly away from abnormal extremes\\ntoward an intermediate normal condition, while the co-operat-\\ning constitutional inclination to pleasure constantly draws\\none, like a pendulum, toward the same golden mean of mod-\\neration and harmonious order.\\nAll trespass, being an interference in natural spontaneous\\nliberty of action, gives pain. All legal penalty, for the same\\nreason, is the infliction of pain rarely in like manner, but\\nalways, if adequate, graduated to correspond in measure with\\nthe degree of trespass, and limited to the pain of repression.\\nMore widely, all sanctions of the moral law, innate or enacted,\\nnatural or artificial, are essentially the same, depending for\\ntheir efficacy on the same element all rewards are pleasures,\\nall puirishments pains. These are the natural attraction and\\nrepulsion in the spiritual sphere, tending to maintain a uni-\\nversal equilibrium, and to restore it when disturbed. 1\\nIt was a mooted question among the ancients whether pain\\nis an evil, and to-day it is still a question. When we con-\\nsider its influence in the preservation of our powers of body\\nand mind, averting the ruinous effects of excess on the one\\nhand, and of inaction on the other; when we observe the\\nworking of the whip of pain in the world of sentient beings,\\ntending constantly to harmonize their mutual interests, and\\nadjust their actual relations to the moral order of the uni-\\nverse in a stream of tendency that makes for righteous-\\nness, it seems not merely unreasonable to account pain an\\nevil, but that it should be reckoned essential to welfare,\\n1 Pain, suffering, anguish from Fr. peine, penalty, from Lat. poena,\\npunishment, penalty, pain cognate with Gk. irotvf), a ransom, generally re-\\nquital, also vengeance, penalty. Root uncertain, but perhaps, like Skt. pti,\\nfrom Aryan root pu, to purify. Punish, to chasten, same origin. Skeat.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "106 OBLIGATION\\nreckoned, along with the highest good, essential in the well\\nordering of a world of free activity.\\nThis is the sanction by which the Divine Ruler of the Uni-\\nverse upholds his government against trespass. We instincts\\nively revolt at the thought that the Deity is the author of\\nsin, the source and sum of evil. But that he is the author\\nof pain cannot be doubted, and is entirely accordant with\\nthe infinite benevolence that proposes and actively seeks to\\naccomplish the highest welfare of humanity.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 107\\nCHAPTER VI\\nEIGHT AND WRONG\\n55. The substantive notions of a right and a wrong, used\\nhitherto, need now to be supplemented by the corresponding\\nqualifying notions of right and wrong.\\nA right is accorded in law; right is according to law.\\nRight lines are straight lines we draw them by means of a\\nrule or ruler. So in the ethical sense, right actions are such\\nas conform to rules of conduct, implying a ruler. More\\ngenerally, they are those conforming to the moral law, any\\ndeviation from strict rectitude being wrong. 1\\n1 The use of topical terms such as right and wrong, justice, duty,\\nought, service, charity or love, good is avoided in this treatise, until the\\nterm occurs in place, is defined and discussed. The term welfare is an ex-\\nception. For etymology of right, see 19, note. Wrong perverted\\nfrom Anglo-Saxon wrang, pt. t. of wringan, to wring, twist, bend aside\\ncognate with wry, and awry, this compounded of on and wry on the twist.\\nCf. Lat. tortus from torquere. Skeat.\\nGoodness in actions is like unto straightness wherefore that which is\\ndone well we term right. For, as the straight way is most acceptable to him\\nthat travelleth, because by it he cometh soonest to his journey s end, so in\\naction, that which doth lye the evenest between us and the end we desire,\\nmust needs be fittest for our use. Hooker, Eccles. Pol., hk. i, 8.\\nWhat is rectitude or Tightness as the characteristic of an action Ac-\\ncording to Price and others, this term denotes a simple and primitive idea,\\nand cannot be explained. It might as well be asked, what is truth, as the\\ncharacteristic of a proposition It is a capacity of our rational nature to see\\nand acknowledge truth but we cannot define what truth is. We call it the\\nconformity of our thoughts with the reality of things. But it may be doubted\\nhow far this explanation makes the nature of truth more intelligible. In like\\nmanner, some explain rectitude by saying that it consists in a congruity be-\\ntween an action and the relations of the agent. It is the idea we form of an", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "108 OBLIGATION\\nThe terms a right and right are, in last analysis, coexten-\\nsive. Whatever one has a right to do is right for him to do.\\nThis seems obvions. Yet it is commonly supposed that ex-\\nceptions often occur, and even moralists have taught that a\\nman may have a right to do what is not right. A planter, it\\nis said, has a right to destroy his crop, but it would not be\\nright. 1 This paradox cannot be allowed. It arises perhaps\\nfrom the false notion that one has a moral right to do what-\\never is not forbidden by civil law, which is mere legality, not\\nmorality. The true limitations of rights are not found in\\ncivil law, nor in enactments of any sort, but in the nature\\nand relations of men, which the most elaborate enactments\\nfall far short of defining completely. A producer destroying\\na product of any value, an heir wasting his inheritance, an\\nidler not exercising his ability, is wronging or trespassing on\\nrights of others naturally vested in these things. In the\\nproper ethical sense a right to do a wrong, or to do wrong,\\nis absurd.\\nConversely, whatever is right for one to do he has a right\\nto do any interference by any other is a trespass. For, if\\naction, when it is, in every way, conformable to the relations of the agent\\nand the circumstances in which he is placed. On contemplating such an\\naction, we approve of it, and feel that if we were placed in such circum-\\nstances, and in such relations, we should be under an obligation to perforin\\nit. Now the circumstances and relations in which man is placed arise from\\nhis nature, and from the nature of things in general and hence it has been\\nsaid, that rectitude is founded in the nature and fitness of things that is,\\nan action is right when it is fit or suitable to all the relations and circum-\\nstances of the agent. Fleming, Vocabulary, ad verb.\\n1 The adjective right has a much wider signification than the substantive\\nright. Everything is right which is conformable to the supreme rule of\\nhuman action but that only is a right which, being conformable to the\\nsupreme rule, is realized in society and vested in a particular person. Hence\\nthe two words may often be properly opposed. We may say that a poor\\nman has no right to relief, but it is right he should have it. A rich man has\\na right to destroy the harvest of his fields, but to do so would not be right.\\nWhewell, Elements of Morality, bk. i, 84.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 109\\nit be not right, it is wrong, these being contradictories and\\nin doing wrong one always inflicts a wrong, greater or less,\\nnear or remote, on some one affected by his act which, if not\\npunishable, is at least censurable. Hence the terms are co-\\nextensive.\\nA moral right, or simply a right should be distinguished\\nfrom a legal or jural right. 1 The one is generic, the other\\nspecific. The one is accorded in universal moral law, the\\nother is accorded in imperfect and exceptional civil law.\\nA right properly implies both exemption from legitimate\\ninterference in its exercise and an obligation to exercise\\nit whereas a jural right implies immunity merely, not obli-\\ngation. Hence the unqualified term leads to confusion.\\nSometimes indeed there is formal opposition between moral\\nand legal rights, for occasionally unrighteous laws are enacted,\\ntechnically conferring rights that are immoral, authorizing\\nwrongs. A moral right to act is an obligation to act, which\\nis synonymous with right action.\\n56. Right or wrong is the moral quality of a voluntary\\npersonal action. As propositions are always either true or\\nfalse, so actions are always either right or wrong. A true\\nproposition accords with axiomatic logical principle, and a\\nright action accords with axiomatic moral principle. As one\\nof two contradictory propositions must be false or logically\\n1 A party has a right when another or others are bound or obliged by\\nthe law to do or to forbear towards or in regard of him. Austin, Lectures\\non Jurisprudence, 576. A legal or jural right signifies that which jurists\\ndenominate a faculty, which resides in a determinate party or parties by\\nvirtue of a given law, and avails against a party or parties other than the\\nparty or parties in whom it resides. It is manifest that right as signify-\\ning faculty, and right as signifying justice, are widely different though not\\nunconnected terms. But nevertheless the terms are confounded by many\\nof the writers who attempt a definition of right, and their attempts to deter-\\nmine the meaning of that very perplexing expression are, therefore, mere\\njargon. Idem, 264, note. Cf Mill, Logic, bk. v, ch. 7, 1 (p. 569).\\nAlso cf supra, 36, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "110 OBLIGATION\\nabsurd, so one of two incompatible actions must be wrong or\\nmorally absurd. An action that is wrong is a moral self-\\ncontradiction, inconsistent with what may be known to be\\nright or in accord with axiomatic law, and thus is a self-\\ncondemned absurdity. 1\\nIt has already been stated that on the empirical occasion\\nof a voluntary personal action, we have an intuitive discern-\\nment by conscience of the existence in it of moral quality,\\nwe discern that it is either right or wrong. But whether\\nthe observed action, as striking a blow, be right or be wrong,\\nis not at all intuitive, not at all discerned immediately by the\\npure practical reason or conscience. Which one of these\\ntwo contrary qualities it has, conscience does not know it\\nknows only that it must have one or the other. 2\\n1 In the moral relation of one man to another, we distinguish the one as\\nhaving a right and hence susceptible of a wrong, the other as doing right or\\nwrong. Let p represent a patient having a certain right, and a an agent to\\nwhom this right relates. If a respects this right, by either acting or not\\nacting as the case may require, then he does right, and the right of p is ad-\\njusted but if a defaults, then he does wrong, and p suffers a wrong, a tres-\\npass. Thus a wrong is conditioned on and coexists with a right whereas\\nthe qualities right and wrong, being contradictories in form and contraries\\nin fact, cannot co-exist in one and the same action. Right and wrong are\\nmarks pi kinds of action while merit in the one kind, and demerit in the\\nother, are marks of degree. See Elements of Deductive Logic, 23, and 125.\\nIn addition let it be noted that whatever accords with universal order is\\nright and whatever disaccords with universal order is wrong. A special\\norder when at variance with universal order is wrong, as in systematic vice\\nor tyrannical rule and a special disorder when resolving into universal\\norder is right, as in reformation or revolution. In general, however, dis-\\norder is wrong or whatever is irregular is wrong. Moreover, whatever is\\nright is reasonable, rational and whatever is wrong is unreasonable, irra-\\ntional. A wrong is a blunder sin is folly what is wicked is stupid crime\\nis craze intelligent prudence does right. Said a certain one I have often\\nbeen called a scoundrel, but no one ever yet called me a fool. If he was a\\nscoundrel, then he was a rank fool. Furthermore, nature is a system of\\nuniversal order 15) hence it is natural to do right, unnatural to do\\nwrong and sin is the most unnatural thing in the world.\\n2 The primary element is a simple irreducible perception of the distinc-", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 111\\nFor evidently the notions of right and wrong imply ac-\\ncord and discord with some general principle requiring all\\nvoluntary activity or personal conduct to conform uniformly\\nto its indications. Hence every case must be subsumed\\nunder that principle in order to ascertain which one of the\\ntwo qualities is predicable of it. This is a logical process.\\nIt is not a discernment of pure reason, but is a reasoning\\nnot conscience, but inference. 1\\nThe logical process concluding the moral quality in a given\\ncase, is very liable to error. The specific action in which\\nthe moral quality inheres is, as we shall immediately show,\\nsubjective, internal in the agent. Now, when one judges\\nhis own act, though it is open to his direct observation by\\nintrospective self-examination, still, from a lack of clear dis-\\ncernment of the primary principle, or from a lack of logical\\ntion between right and wrong. This distinction appears among the\\nnecessary ideas of the human mind. It is a phenomenon in the psychology\\nof the human race. It is developed, in the presence of the facts and rela-\\ntions of life, as something provided for in the normal and necessary action\\nof the rational self-conscious ego. It must be viewed as an intuition of the\\nreason. It cannot be otherwise accounted for. In its nature it is not a\\nfeeling, though it gives rise to feeling. It is not a volition, for it comes\\nirrespective of choice, and asserts its own rights before the will. It is not a\\nmere experience, though it arises on occasion of experience. The idea\\nstands for something beyond experience, experience being limited to the\\nprofitable, the enjoyable or the painful. We experience the useful and the\\nagreeable, but the right, the ethical idea, must be perceived or rationally\\nseen, as a super-sensible reality in the ideal realm of the demands of duty.\\nIt is not a perception of the relations themselves, but of a distinction as to\\nsomething due in human relations and life. Valentine, Theoretical\\nEthics, ch. iv, 4.\\nDean Stanley says that Livingstone never tired of repeating that he\\nfound among the native races of Africa that same feeling of right and wrong\\nwhich he found in his own conscience and that it needed only to be\\ndeveloped and enlightened to make a perfect character.\\nAristotle, in Rhetoric, bk. i, ch. 13, says There does exist naturally a\\nuniversal sense of right and wrong, which in a certain degree all intuitively\\napprehend.\\n1 See supra, 2, 3, 43,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "112 OBLIGATION\\nskill in making the deduction, or from carelessness, he often\\nerrs. Much more is one liable to err when judging the act\\nof another person. For the subjective movement of another\\nis beyond one s observation, and can be known only by his\\nconfessions, his professions, or by his outward perceptible\\nmovements, these together with circumstances being signs\\nfrom which the internal act is inferred. This additional in-\\nference greatly increases the uncertainty of the conclusion,\\nand warns against hasty judgment.\\n57. What is the specific action of which the moral qual-\\nity is a property In other words, what is the distinct and\\ninforming fact wherein conscience discerns obligatory moral\\nquality, and whereon we pass discriminating moral judgment\\nIt is to be premised that no fact of causation has moral\\nquality. Whatever is caused is necessitated by its cause to\\nbe just what it is. There is no alternative. Moreover, by\\nthe axiom of uniformity, that like causes have like effects,\\nthere is no variation in effects, if there be none in their\\ncauses. This is the realm of necessity. It is opposed to\\nthe realm of freedom, wherein alone moral quality finds\\nplace for freedom must be allowed as conditio sine qua non\\nof moral action. Only beings having free will are morally\\nresponsible, and among these only such persons as are con-\\nscious of moral obligation. 1\\nOutward physical or muscular action, therefore, has in\\nitself no moral quality, not even that outward action com-\\nmonly called voluntary. For the movement of the muscles\\nis due to physical causes originating in the brain, and this\\nbrain action causing muscular motion is itself caused by ante-\\ncedent mental action. Hence only to mental action can\\nmoral quality be immediately attributed.\\n1 See Elements of Inductive Logic, 18, 19. Also see supra, 10, and\\n18, note.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "EIGHT AND WRONG 113\\nThe exercise of conscience discerning moral quality, for\\nlike reason, has in itself no moral quality it is neither right\\nnor wrong. Knowledge of right and wrong, and of the dis-\\ntinction between them, arises on the presentation of a per-\\nsonal action, which empirical occasion is a condition precedent.\\nMoreover, conscience can never have the quality imported\\ninto it for its exercise is originally and essentially involun-\\ntary, the discernment intuitively necessary. The same is\\ntrue of all pure intuitions.\\nAll empirical intuitions, as the sense-perceptions, are like-\\nwise destitute in themselves of moral quality, since they are\\nthe involuntary products of our constitution in the presence\\nof causative objects.\\nThe exercise of the logical faculty, even in case of moral\\njudgment, has no moral quality in itself, for it is an effect of\\nvoluntary attention.\\nThe like consideration sets aside, not only all presentations\\nand the representations of thought, but also the representa-\\ntions of mediate perception, memory and imagination, together\\nwith the feelings and desires that attend them. All these are\\nstrictly effects, and therefore destitute in themselves of moral\\nquality.\\n58. Consequently, in our search for the activity which\\nhas moral quality in itself, we are shut up to the volitions.\\nVolition has three constitutive elements, choice, intention,\\neffort. 1\\nThis last, the effort, which is voluntary attention, is caused\\nby the motive, the desire that prevails, without alternative.\\nHence the effort is a necessitated act, and so without moral\\nquality, in itself neither right nor wrong.\\nThe first element, the choice, viewed simply as an act\\napart from its specific character, is also causally necessitated\\n1 See supra, 7-9.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "114 OBLIGATION\\nto take place or occur by the mere presentation of possible\\nalternatives I must choose between them. Hence the simple\\nact of choosing is in itself destitute of moral quality.\\nBut the choice of one alternative rather than the other,\\nthe taking this rather than that, is a fact uncaused, not neces-\\nsitated, free for herein is the specific characteristic and the\\nvery essence of choice. In its resolution choice becomes\\nintention, the intention to do or forbear a certain action.\\nThis central fact, the only fact in human nature or in nature\\nat large that is not caused to be what it is, this resolution,\\nthis intention, purpose, design, this alone is capable of inhe-\\nrent moral quality.\\nAn intention, though not causally determined, is rationally\\ndetermined, is in accord with some one or more reasons. 1\\nNow the moral law furnishes a reason naturally and therefore\\nrightly dominating all others, and since it is the intention\\nonly that intelligently, impellingly, freely, preferably, con-\\nforms to or disregards moral law, it follows that the intention\\nproperly has moral quality, is either right or wrong.\\nMoreover, since the all-dominating moral law, the ultimate\\nand absolute criterion of conduct, is addressed directly and\\nexclusively to choice becoming intention, it follows that the\\nintention is never morally indifferent, is always either right\\nor wrong; right, when it intelligently, reverently and will-\\ningly conforms to the law wrong, when it knowingly violates\\nor merely disregards the law.\\nFrom these considerations it is manifest that the moral\\nlaw applies, not directly to the outward, expressed, objective\\nactivity, but primarily and immediately to the inward, ante-\\ncedent, subjective intention. 2 Hence, if we regard a trespass\\n1 See supra, 10, note.\\n2 Acts may be distinguished into external and internal. By external,\\nare meant corporeal acts, acts of the body by internal, mental acts, acts of\\nthe mind. Thus, to strike is an external or exterior or overt act to in-", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 115\\nas an action passing over from one person onto another, a\\nrealization of an intention inflicting injury, the formula of\\nthe moral law should be Thou shalt not intend to do aught\\nthat would involve a trespass. It will be better, however, to\\nregard a trespass as the total activity, including both the\\nsubjective antecedents and the objective consequents, the\\nmoral quality of this total residing in the intention.\\n59. That moral quality is thus a constant property of\\nintention requires some further consideration, especially of\\nthe distinction between the intention to do an act and the\\nulterior intention with which it is done or the purpose.\\nThere is a large class of offenses varying in degree from\\nextreme criminality to comparatively slight culpability, such\\nas murder, stealing, lying, betting, whose very essence is\\ntrespass. Hence the intentional doing of an action of this\\nclass is wrong; or, more closely, the intention to do it is\\nwrong, wrong in itself, being a radical violation of the law of\\ntrespass. Complete, successful action is not requisite to\\nconstitute guilt. An attempt, an overt act, though it fail, is\\nevidence of guilty intention, and therefore condemnable as\\nin the murderous contrivance of Guy Fawkes, and in the\\nvillainous slander of Don John. 1 A mere intention to do\\ntend to strike, an internal or interior one. Bentham, Principles of Morals\\nand Legislation, ch. vii, 11. It is the common habit of thought and speech\\nto attribute moral quality directly to the external act, and this habit is con-\\nfirmed by the practice of the civil courts requiring at least an overt act for\\nindictment. Yet the courts seek evidence of intention as the ultimate de-\\nterminant. Murder implies criminal intent accidental homicide is distin-\\nguished from murder merely by the absence of such intent. Says the Duke,\\nspeaking of Angelo\\nHis act did not o ertake his bad intent,\\nAnd must be buried but as an intent\\nThat perished by the way. Thoughts are no subjects,\\nIntents but merely thoughts.\\nMeasure for Measure, Act v, sc. 1, 1. 445, sq.\\n1 See Much Ado About Nothing. In his Institutes of the Criminal Law,\\np. 85, Professor Rosshirt, of Heidelberg, defines an attempt thus: Eine", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "116 OBLIGATION\\nthe deed, an intention that, perhaps for want of opportunity,\\nnever passes into overt action, is already a culpable violation\\nof the law. Now what is essentially wrong can never become\\nright, for this would be a contradiction. Hence any of this\\nclass of intents can never be justified by an ulterior end,\\nhowever good, wise, benevolent this may be. No end can\\nsanctify such means. We may never do evil that good may\\ncome. 1\\nConversely, what is essentially right can never become\\nwrong. The intention to do an act that is right in itself\\nalone considered cannot be vitiated by an ulterior purpose,\\nhowever vicious this may be. Shylock did a righteous act in\\nthe loan of the ducats it was his ulterior purpose that was\\nwicked.\\nThere is another class of intents that, in themselves alone\\nconsidered, have no moral quality; as an intent to give\\nmoney, to take a walk, to write a letter, and very many oth-\\ners. Such are usually spoken of as morally indifferent. But\\nan intent of this sort, being properly of a means to an end,\\nhas the moral quality of the intended end imputed to it in\\nother words, the proposed end sanctifies or vilifies the pro-\\nHandlung, welche die Hervorbringung eines Verbrechens zum zwecke hat,\\nohne den bezweckten verbrecherischen Thatbestand wirklich zu machen,\\nist ein Versuch. In civil law the intention (consilium, cogitaiio) is recog-\\nnized as crime, provided it is evidenced by an attempt or overt act. Where\\na criminal intention is evidenced by an overt act, the party is punished in\\nrespect of the criminal intention, commonly with less severity than if the\\ndeed were fully accomplished. Even confession without overt act is insuffi-\\ncient to legal condemnation, for it may be due to insanity, or be invented.\\nFeuerbach says The reference of the fact as effect to the determination of\\nthe will as cause, settles or fixes the legal character of the latter. In conse-\\nquence of that reference, or by reason of the imputation of the fact, the\\ndetermination of the will is held or adjudged to be guilt which guilt is the\\nground of the punishment applied to the party. Institutes of Penal Law\\nin Germany, p. 79.\\n1 It is not permitted to an honest man to corrupt himself for the sake\\nof others. Rousseau. See Romans, 3: 7, 8.", "height": "3972", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 117\\nposed means, this becoming right or wrong according to the\\nultimate purpose, or the intention with which it is done. If\\nI propose to give money, which intent in itself has no moral\\nquality, with the further intent to relieve distress, the intent\\nto give becomes right if to buy votes, it becomes wrong.\\nSo the intended means takes its moral color from the in-\\ntended end for the intention in such case is to be judged\\nin its totality, not in its dependent parts it is dyed through-\\nout with a uniform hue. 1\\n60. The principle that moral quality is imputed to acts\\nwhich in themselves have none, is of wider application.\\nLet us recall the fundamental fact in human nature that\\na free will is the primary condition of moral activity, is the\\ncentral essence of personality, and is most nearly identical\\nwith the ego, is I myself. To it alone of my powers, that is\\nto me myself, the mandate of the moral law is addressed,\\nsince by it alone am I able to direct my powers. For the\\nfunctional property of will is to control, according to its\\nfreely formed intention, by means of attention, directly or\\nindirectly, all other elements of personality, as cognitions,\\nfeelings, desires and muscular motions, awaking or stimu-\\n1 While one is bound to use a wise economy in the choice of a means,\\nhe is not otherwise particularly concerned about its right or wrong, unless\\nso qualified in itself. When assured of a right end, he pursues it by any\\navailable means not wrong in itself. For instance, I am obliged to write a\\nletter I procure pens, ink and paper, seat myself at my desk, handle my\\npen, etc., without any thought of the moral quality of these subsidiary acts.\\nAgain, I owe a large money debt in order to pay, I am diligent in business,\\nprudent in expenditure, active and frugal, without thought of the moral\\nquality of a multitude of details, except of their honesty, involved in the\\nintermediate process. In general, it is needless and would be impracticable\\nto examine and judge each of our minor actions separately. Having given\\nattention to the moral quality of the end in view, we need to judge only\\nthat no adopted means is wrong in itself. Assured of that, we confidently\\npursue a righteous end.\\nOn Moral Intention, see Janet, Theory of Morals, bk. iii, chs. 1, 2.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "118 OBLIGATION\\nlating or repressing their activity; and its obligation is to\\nexert this control according to the supreme moral law.\\nThe mastery of the representative cognitions, of mediate\\nperception, memory, imagination and thought, is immedi-\\ndiately accomplished by directing attention to this or that\\nobject as one may choose. They thus have moral quality\\nimported into them, or imputed or attributed to them, accord-\\ning to the intention. For the effort of attention is a passing\\nfrom the sphere of freedom into the sphere of causation or\\nnecessity, and what shall take place in this sphere, being\\ndetermined by the freely formed intention, is marked by\\nthe moral quality of the determinant, becomes essentially\\nright or wrong by imputation. I am morally obligated, for\\ninstance, to exert and regulate my logical faculty in search\\nfor truth, its proper object, especially for such truth as bears\\nupon conduct, lest an error lead to trespass. The moral\\njudgment, by inference from the moral principle, thus dis-\\ncovers reasons determining intentional conduct, and so is\\nobligated, through the will, to a most patient and vigorous\\nexercise, which is also, because of this obligation, a righteous\\nexercise. Neglect of the obligation, or failure to fulfill it,\\nrenders us responsible for our avoidable errors and their con-\\nsequences.\\nInasmuch as feeling is correlated with knowing, our emo-\\ntions and sentiments are subject to indirect yet efficient con-\\ntrol by means of the direct control of the cognitions with\\nwhich they coordinately cooperate. 1 For, since we can at\\nwill directly transfer attention from object to object, we are\\nable thus indirectly to induce or repress the feelings that\\nattend contemplation. These, therefore, have moral quality\\nimputed to them, those that are normal or orderly being\\nright, those that are abnormal or disorderly either in kind or\\nin degree being wrong. They can and should be controlled,\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 221, 229.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "RIGHT AND WMON 119\\nregulated, well-ordered. Because of its vast importance, let\\nbelief be instanced. It is the feeling of conviction, the assur-\\nance of physical or moral certainty that attends or is correla-\\ntive to the recognition of truth. 1 Its opposites are the\\nfeelings of doubt and disbelief. Now obviously, so far as\\nwe are under obligation to search out attainable truth, thus\\nbecoming responsible for our ignorance of what we could and\\nshould know, just so far are we bound to believe and are\\nresponsible for doubt or disbelief of attainable truth these,\\nindeed, being merely correlative statements. Hence we can\\nbe and are reasonably commanded to believe authentic or\\naccessible truth the belief of it is right, the doubt or dis-\\nbelief is wrong. 2\\nLikewise desires have imputed moral quality. Desire is\\nconditioned on real or imaginary objects of cognition con-\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 227.\\n2 Christianity conditions salvation on belief hence the supreme impor-\\ntance of this matter. Mr. Lecky, in his History of Rationalism in Europe,\\npresumes passim that no one can be held responsible for his belief. Cf his\\nHistory of European Morals, vol. i, p. 412 sq. Mr. Bailey, in his Essays on\\nthe Formation of Opinions, argues to that effect, saying: Those states of\\nthe understanding which we term belief, doubt, and disbelief, inasmuch\\nas they are not voluntary, nor the result of any exertion of the will\\nimply neither merit nor demerit in him who is the object [sic] of them.\\nIn relation to the same subject one may believe, and another doubt, and a\\nthird disbelieve, and all with equal innocence. The Westminster Beview\\nindorses Mr. Bailey in this also Sir James Mackintosh, in his Progress of\\nEthical Philosophy, he insisting that in no case are we responsible for our\\nopinions or beliefs, because, as he says, they are wholly independent of our\\nwills. This is erroneous psychology. See a controverting article, by Albert\\nT. Bledsoe, in the Southern Review for July, 1871. Austin says If I love\\ndarkness and hate the light, I refuse to examine the proofs which might\\nrender the truth resistless, and dwell with complacency upon every shadow\\nof proof which tends to confirm my prepossession. For this reason, non-\\nbelief may be blameable when, for example, it is the result of insufficient\\nexamination, refusal to examine, partiality or antipathy indirectly removable,\\netc. Lectures on Jurisprudence, 661.\\nA saying attributed to Lord Brougham, which infidelity has adopted, is\\n4 It makes no difference what a man believes, if only he is sincere. This", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "120 OBLIGATION\\nsequently it comes and goes with their contemplation. Since\\nthis is under direct control, the desire can be effectively\\nthough indirectly regulated, and is right or wrong according\\nto the volition. 1 But because desire directly solicits choice\\nand becomes the motive in effectuating the intention, it re-\\nceives moral quality in a marked degree. For example,\\ncovetousness, which may be taken as the type of abnormal\\ndesire, is forbidden in the law, Thou shalt not covet the\\nonly one of the Decalogue formally subjective. Thereby I\\nam commanded to suppress covetousness whenever it instinc-\\ntively or spontaneously appears, much more am I forbidden to\\nincite and cherish it. I am required to choose, intend and\\nenforce its cessation for it is abnormal and evil, tending to\\nobjective disorder and trespass. Therefore I do wrong to\\nallow it, and it becomes wrong by the allowance. Normal\\ndesires, which within their limits not only are right in them-\\nselves, but constitute the very basis of all human rights, 2\\nbecome abnormal and evil by degree, either when weakened\\nby inattention to their objects, or when immoderate and inor-\\ndinate by excess. They then become wrong, because I do\\nwrong in neglecting or failing to regulate them.\\nExternal activities, the movements of the voluntary mus-\\ncles, and their proximate consequences, are, for like reason,\\nright or wrong by imputation. It is only by an observation\\nof his overt acts that one s mental states, thus expressed, can\\nbe judged by other persons. Hence we correctly speak of\\ngood deeds, bad habits, and the reverse, and approve or cen-\\nsure them; but always with reference, though tacit, to the\\nsubjective intention.\\nis a denial of objective truth, and of creeds. A similar denial is made of\\nobjective duty. But no amount of sincerity can release one from the respon-\\nsibility and dreadful consequences of believing a lie.\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 255, 257.\\n2 See supra, 25.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "RIGHT AND WRONG 121\\nIt is a weighty and impressive truth that, not only our out-\\nward conduct, but our innermost thoughts, imaginings, feel-\\nings and desires, all at all times, are made by their intentions\\nright or wrong that we are responsible, not only for every\\nidle word, but for every idle thought or wish; and that in\\nthe perfected administration of moral government, all these\\nshall be brought into judgment. Who hath ears to hear, let\\nhim hear.\\n61. The many deeds that are essentially trespass, wrong\\nin themselves, are not known to be so intuitively, but only\\nby inference from the moral principle as an ultimate major\\npremise. Hence we are liable to error in judging them,\\nespecially in the less obvious cases. The error arises from\\nan obscure or confused apprehension of the ultimate princi-\\nple or law, or from an incomplete or inaccurate knowledge of\\nthe particular case subsumed, or from bad logic in making\\nthe deduction. Hence it sometimes happens that one sin-\\ncerely desiring to do right, having a motive and an ulterior\\npurpose that are right, honestly judging and believing that\\nwhat he is doing is right, may nevertheless be doing what is\\nwrong in itself, essentially, unalterably wrong.\\nAlso it is true that every man in all cases is morally bound\\nto do what in his best judgment seems to him to be right.\\nIn popular phraseology, he must obey his conscience is\\ndoing right, if he acts conscientiously is wrong, if he vio-\\nlates his conscience. Obviously it is implied that one should\\ncarefully exercise his best ability in judging a case, bringing\\nto bear upon it all the light attainable, unobscured by predi-\\nlection, repugnance or passion then, having done this, he\\nmust conform his conduct to the result of his judgment. If\\ncircumstances require a prompt decision, without time for\\nclose consideration, then a habit of moral thought and a\\nfamiliarity with moral principles greatly enhance the proba-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "122 OBLIGATION\\nbility of a correct decision; but in any case it is morally\\nnecessary that he intend and do what his moral judgment\\napproves otherwise he becomes a willful offender.\\nNow, putting this and that together, we have the moral\\nparadox, that one in doing what is wrong in itself may be\\ndoing right. This is an inevitable consequence of the imper-\\nfections of moral judgment. Othello was bound by high\\nprinciples of honor, as he understood them and the case, to\\ncommit uxoricide. The infanticide by the Hindu mother is\\nan act of piety. Saul as persecutor verily thought he was\\ndoing God service. Conversely, one in doing what is right\\nin itself may be doing wrong. A judge in granting a right-\\neous suit is doing what is right but if he do it merely to\\nescape annoyance or censure, or to entangle the plaintiff in\\nevil consequences, he is in the same act doing wrong. 1\\nThis moral paradox involves imperfect persons in dreadful\\nresponsibilities. We are answerable not only for wrong be-\\nlieved to be wrong, but for wrong believed to be right, and\\nfor right believed to be wrong. Tis a strait and narrow\\nway. A legal maxim holds that Ignorantia juris non excusat\\nbut, in equity, ignorance or sincerity in a moral blunder pal-\\nliates^ especially in a penitent, though it does not excuse, an\\noffense, and so becomes a ground for mercy by a mitigation\\nor a transfer of punishment. 2 Naturally we do not shudder\\nat the crime of Othello, as we do at those of Macbeth. Saul\\nobtained forgiveness because of ignorance. Divine mercy\\ndictated the prayer Father forgive them for they know\\nnot what they do.\\n1 E.g. Shylock. Cf. Luke, 18 1-6, where Avenge, EkS/k^o^, means\\nDo me justice of (margin, II. V.), or Deliver me from the justice of the\\ncase being presupposed. This judge was unjust, unrighteous, Kpirr)s rijs\\nadiidas, because his eKdlicrjo-is came of self-regard, and not from a sense of\\nduty. Alford, Com. ad. loc.\\n2 See Leviticus, ch. 4; Numbers, 15: 24-29; Luke, 12: 48, and 23: 34;\\nActs, 17 30 i Timothy, 1 13.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 123\\nCHAPTER VII\\nJUSTICE\\n62. Thus far the moral law has been considered chiefly\\nas prohibiting aggressive and injurious acts or lines of action.\\nThe formula, Thou shalt not trespass, primarily forbids what-\\never unwarrantably interferes in another s liberty. Its cor-\\nrecting effect is to put a strong positive check upon the\\nhindering activities of related persons, to the end that every\\none may fully gratify his normal desires it restrains within\\nbounds the course of each, so that all others may freely exer-\\ncise their rightful license. This prohibitory sense is so obvi-\\nous and emphatic that many who are under the law conceive\\nthat by keeping within the prescribed bounds the demands\\nof the law are satisfied, that purity and innocence, which are\\nnegatives, fulfill its behest, that to forbear injurious aggres-\\nsion is the sum of obligation.\\nBut this is a very inadequate conception of the content of\\nthe law, a law enjoining an order of facts that ought to be\\nenjoining in the negative sense of forbidding one class, and\\nenjoining in the positive sense of requiring another class. It\\nlays upon us the injunction both to refrain and to perform.\\nIt says, Thou shalt not transgress stated bounds and by\\nnecessary implication, it also says Thou shalt do many things\\nwithin those bounds. This positive requisition is not less\\nobligatory than the prohibition, and it is merely because of\\nthe imperfection of language, unfitted to express both the\\npositive and negative aspects of one and the same thought\\nor mandate in a single simple formula, that the one is appar-\\nently more emphatic than the other.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "124 OBLIGATION\\nThe necessary implication of active obligation is readily\\nexplicated. Trespass is effected either by commission or by\\nomission. That the one is direct, the other indirect, is not a\\ndifference in essence, and either may be a wrong as heinous\\nand as fatal as the other. 1 In the various relations of men,\\nevery one has rightful claims upon the activities of others,\\nand they who omit to fulfill these claims commit a wrong, a\\ntrespass. For, my willful omission of an act to which some\\nother has a right, is a violation of his right, is to leave him\\nunder a restraint of his rightful liberty, which restraint I\\nam bound to remove. To be merely negligent, heedless,\\nthoughtless, careless of another s right to my action, is to\\nembarrass him more or less, is to interfere indirectly in his\\nliberty, and thus is to trespass on him. Therefore, to him\\nthat knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin.\\nThe point here brought squarely to the front has been to\\nsome extent anticipated in several places. 2 In what follows\\nwe shall give it full recognition, and allow its weight to\\nestablish the equilibrium between forbearing and doing, which\\nequilibrium a correct conception requires. Thus it will\\nappear that the law of trespass rightly interpreted applies\\nexhaustively to the relations of man to man, and is compre-\\nhensive of every phase of obligation.\\n63. The term justice is the abstract from the concrete\\nform just. 3 To be just is to concede to everyone his rights\\nand justice is the concession of rights. This is the most\\n1 Dans une action criininelle, entre celui qui fait et celui qui laisse faire,\\ncelui qui laisse faire est lepire, \u00c2\u00a3tant le lache. Victor Hugo, Quatrevingt\\nTreize, p. 451.\\n2 See supra, especially 41, and 48.\\n3 Just and justice are from the Latin jus, a right, founded on nature,\\ncustom, or enacted law, lex. The original sense of 5k?;, a right, was custom,\\nusage, manner (cf. e0os, supra, 19, note); hence Skcuos, just. According\\nto Plato, justice, biKatoavvT), is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfill-\\nment by each part of its peculiar function. Even piety, 6 rt6r^s, is justice in", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 125\\ngeneral sense. When a right consists in a specific claim on\\nthe action or inaction of some one, the concession of a just\\nman implies his action or inaction in satisfaction of the claim.\\nAccordingly a distinction is sometimes laid down between\\njustitia interna, disposition to do right, and justitia externa,\\nrectitude of conduct. 1 The opposite of justice is injustice,\\nwhich is to refuse or to neglect the concession, and of course\\nits actualization. Whoever is treated unjustly, be the injury\\ngreat or small, is thereby restrained, more or less, in his right-\\nful liberty to gratify some normal desire, which restraint is\\nessentially a trespass.\\nIndeed it is quite obvious that injustice is trespass, and\\ntrespass injustice and that the law forbidding trespass is a\\nlaw forbidding injustice. For, according to the moral princi-\\nple, every one has a right, if not trespassing, to gratify his\\nnormal desires but it is impossible to have this gratification\\nin a multitude of cases except by concession of one s fel-\\nlows hence, if they withhold the concession, they disap-\\npoint his desires, and nullify his claims. For example, I\\nhave a right to the fulfillment of all formal contracts and of\\nall informal promises made to me, whether for money or ser-\\nreference to the gods. See Republic, bks. i and ii. According to Aristotle,\\njustice, in its general sense, is the practice of all virtue towards others,\\nri)s 8\\\\t)s dpeTijs XPV pos \\\\\\\\ov. It is the most perfect virtue, because\\nit is the perfect exercise of all virtue. Nic. Eth., bk. v, chs. 1, 2. Cicero\\nsays justice is, negatively, neminem loedere, positively, suum cuique reddere,\\nor animi affectio suum cuique tribuens. Be Finibus, v, 23, 65. Grotius, the\\njurist, makes the notion of justice the fundamental principle of his great\\nwork, De Satisfactione.\\n1 This distinction is neatly marked by Horace in his sketch of the man\\nwho is only outwardly just. He is one\\nQui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat,\\nQuo multae magnseque secantur judice lites,\\nQuo res sponsore, et quo causae teste tenentur.\\nSed videt liunc oranis domus et vicinia tota\\nIntrorsus turpem, speciosum pelle decora.\\nEpistles, i, 16, 41 sq.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "126 OBLIGATION\\nvice, a right to the payment of all that is my due if the\\ndebtor refuse, or if any one hinder his payment, it is a tres-\\npass, an injustice. Also I have a right to acquire knowledge,\\nproperty, social position; and if any one hinder my effort,\\nor neglect due help, he does me a wrong. Again, I have a\\nrightful claim on my fellows for a fair judgment on my char-\\nacter and conduct and to deny me the measure of honorable\\nesteem to which I am entitled is a gross injury to slander\\nme, one still more gross. Moreover, I am naturally a social\\nbeing and if, without warrant, my association with compan-\\nions is prevented or disconcerted, my right is infringed, I\\nsuffer a wrong, a trespass, an injustice. Thus injustice, or\\nits cognate injury, is as truly committed, indirectly, by with-\\nholding or perverting a right, as by directly inflicting damage.\\nAlso it is evident that to prohibit injustice is to command\\njustice. The sole difference is in the negative and positive\\nexpression of the same thing. The injunction, Thou shalt\\nnot trespass, is identical with the injunction, Be thou just.\\n64. Justice taken specifically, with reference to matters\\ninvolving gain or loss, is subdivided into corrective and dis-\\ntributive justice.\\nCorrective justice is fairness in exchange, or honesty in a\\ngeneral sense. It is either voluntary, as in trade, in the\\nmarket, in commerce, in fulfilling contracts and promises, in\\npayment of debts, in remuneration for service rendered or\\nit is involuntary and rectoral, enforced by decrees of the\\ncourts in civil cases, as in the settlement of suits, the award\\nof damages, the reparation of illegal trespass.\\nDistributive justice is distinguished from corrective by not\\nincluding the notion of exchange. It is the proper partition\\nof possessions and honors among members of society. It\\ncorresponds to the notion of approbation or censure bestowed\\nin proportion to individual merit or demerit, to the award of", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 127\\nprizes, and of penalties in criminal cases. When a. man s\\ncourse in life entitles him to the esteem of his fellows, and\\nto such outward honors as express their valuation of his\\nworth, distributive justice requires that these be accorded.\\nFrom the recipient of a benefaction it requires gratitude. It\\nis violated by excessive adulation or by slander even by a\\nsecret misjudging of another s worth. In case of overt in-\\nfraction of law it is satisfied rather than rectified by penalty. 1\\n65. Justice, in the narrow sense of legal justice, is\\nadministered by courts of law. The civil law, or else the\\ncommon law, and the statute law, which these courts apply\\nto cases, together with the forms by which their proceedings\\nare regulated and their decrees enforced, all have their imme-\\ndiate ground in the authority of the State, their ultimate\\nground in human rights, and all are specific reductions of the\\none law forbidding trespass, commanding justice. Jurispru-\\ndence, in general, is the science of rights as formulated and\\nsanctioned by governing powers. It is the science of enacted\\nlaw, investigating the principles common to all systems of\\nlaw. Morality enjoins obedience to the universal, natural\\nlaw, jus naturale, in all possible relations of men jurispru-\\ndence enjoins and exacts obedience to that law only in so far\\nas it is recognized and authorized in the enactments of the\\nState. Thus jurisprudence is a branch of ethics. 2\\nIt is clear, then, that law-makers do not originate obliga-\\ntions their office is merely to interpret and formulate the\\n1 The distinction is from Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. v, chs. 3, 4. He also\\ndistinguishes commutative justice, or retaliation, ch. 5; cf. supra, 53.\\nMoreover he distinguishes political and economical justice, ch. 6 and sub-\\ndivides the former into natural and legal, ch. 7.\\n2 The design and object of laws is to ascertain what is just, honorable,\\nand expedient and when that is discovered, it is proclaimed as a general\\nordinance, equal and impartial to all. This is the origin of law, which, for\\nvarious reasons, all are under obligation to obey, but especially because all", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "128 OBLIGATION\\nobligations already existing, and to enact special sanctions.\\nAll laws, organic, municipal, military, international, all ordi-\\nnances, canons, edicts, decrees, treaties and arbitrations, have\\nthe same ultimate basis, the moral law they must be just\\nto be obligatory. Jussum quia juxtum est If the law-making\\npower, or, more generally, the constituted authority, depart\\nfrom its function, and promulgate laws or ordinances at vari-\\nance with the one moral law, or for other ends than those of\\npublic and private justice, or in disregard of the original and\\ninalienable rights of the subject, then the enforcement of such\\nlaws and ordinances is unjust rule, is tyranny. 1\\nOne qualification is needful. If an unrighteous law be\\nnot intolerably oppressive, and does not induce or sanction\\nan immorality in the subject, then he is morally bound to\\nobey it for, since it emanates from constituted authority, a\\nrefusal to obey would be a trespass on the State through its\\naccredited agents. The remedy is a repeal of the law. But\\nif a law be so unjust as to be intolerable, then there is appeal\\nto the higher law, jus naturale, by one as by Hampden, or by\\nmany as by the English colonists in America. This is rebel-\\nlion, resulting perhaps in revolution. 2\\nThe laws enacted by any human government, however\\nthey may be elaborated and refined in the interest of thorough\\njustice, are nevertheless unavoidably inadequate and imper-\\nlaw is the invention and gift of Heaven, the sentiment of wise men, the\\ncorrection of every offense, and the general compact of the state to live in\\nconformity with which is the duty of every individual in society. Demos-\\nthenes, Oration i, contra Aristogiton.\\nThe law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God\\nhimself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over\\nall the globe, in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are of any\\nvalidity, if contrary to this and such of them as are valid derive all their\\nforce, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.\\nBlackstone, Commentaries, Int. 2, p. 41.\\n1 See supra, 37, fourth paragraph.\\n2 Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, bk. i, ch. 13, refers to Antigone s defense of", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 129\\nfeet. They can effectually prohibit only the grosser forms of\\nwrong doing, and secure the practice of mutual justice only\\nin certain definite transactions, the vast majority of existing\\nobligations, many of the weightiest, being beyond the reach\\nof the courts. Moreover, in such cases as come under the\\nlaws, and of which the courts of law take cognizance, it is\\nvery often difficult and sometimes impracticable to determine\\nand administer strict justice. Yet, notwithstanding these\\ninherent defects, the laws and the courts of law are the tense\\nwoof in the texture of social organization.\\n66. Very early in the progress of civilization the prac-\\ntice of equity arose as a complementary extension of legality.\\nThe ancients, in measuring building material of irregular\\nsurface, used a flexible leaden rule. Equity, like a leaden\\nrule, bends to the specialities of each case, while the iron\\nrule of enacted law is inflexible. 1 Circumstances alter cases,\\nher revolt in burying Polynices as an example of appeal to natural justice.\\nTurning to Act. ii, scene 5, we find that Creon, the ruler, asks\\nAnd didst thou dare to disobey my law\\nAntigone replies\\nI had it not from Jove, nor the just gods\\nWho rule below nor could I ever think\\nA mortal s law of power or strength enough\\nTo abrogate th unwritten law divine,\\nImmutable, eternal, not like these\\nOf yesterday, but made ere time began.\\n1 Equity, rb taov, rb emeticis, vs. to 51kcliov, rb vo/xlk6u, is that kind of justice\\nwhich corrects the irregularity cr rigor of enacted law. Just and equi-\\ntable are the same, not that justice which is according to law, but\\nwhich is the correction of the legally just. It is a correction of law\\nwherever it is defective owing to its universality. Aristotle, Nic. Eth.,\\nbk. v, ch. 10. In the early Roman Empire, however, cequitas, jus oequum,\\nwas jus gentium, the law applied to subject peoples, as distinguished from\\njus proetorium, the law Urbis Romce; later, the two were fused into jus civile,\\nthe Roman law.\\nThe leaden rule was used in the Lesbian architecture, which u appears to\\nhave been a kind of Cyclopean masonry, and may have remained in", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "130 OBLIGATION\\nand law rigidly applied may work injustice. Summum jus\\nsumma injuria. Laws are expressed in general terms, and\\nbeing framed with reference to ordinary cases, it often hap-\\npens that the actual cases involve matter beyond their scope.\\nMoreover, there are many matters requiring adjudication for\\nwhich the laws make no provision. It is the part of equity\\nto supply such deficiencies by special action. Thence have\\narisen courts of equity or courts of chancery, distinguishable\\nfrom courts of law. The decisions of a judge in equity are\\nregulated, when there is no binding precedent or statute, by\\nreference to the original principles of justice which give rise\\nto enacted laws hence his decisions are a species of legisla-\\ntion, judicial legislation. In the development and refinement\\nof common and statute law, many of the approved decisions\\nin equity have become incorporated in those systems and\\nequity itself, being more and more determined by precedent,\\nhas become assimilated to the common law. Hence in many\\nof our States there is a fusion of official function, the same\\ncourt, sometimes on the same case, sitting now in law, now\\nin equity.\\nCasting off these limitations of its technical and juridical\\nsense, the exercise of equity in the common intercourse of\\nmen is the doing what is equal, fair and right. 1 It is the\\nLesbos from the early Pelasgian occupiers of the island. Polygonal stones\\nwere used in it, which could not be measured by a straight rule. Cf.\\nj?Eschylus Fragments, 70 AM 6 ixkv tk Mafiiov kv/j! tv rpiydvois itcn-epaiviTU)\\npvdfWLs where Kv/xa means a waved moulding. Sib A. Grant, Aristotle 1 s\\nEthics, bk. v, ch. 10, note.\\n1 In the most general sense we are accustomed to call that equity\\nwhich, in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and\\nright, and which properly arises ez ozquo et bono. In this sense it answers\\nprecisely to the definition of justice or natural law, as given by Justinian in\\nhis Pandects Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique\\ntribuendi. And the word jus is used in the same sense in the Roman law,\\nwhen it is declared that jus est ars boni et ozqui. Story, Comment on\\nEquity, p. 1,", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 131\\nequitable between man and man, grounded on equal subjec-\\ntion to moral law or equality of rights among men, whether\\nformulated in contracts, or existing in their merely natural\\nrelations. The distinction between equity in this general\\nsense and the justice administered by the courts, that is,\\nbetween the claims of human charity or natural justice and\\nthe claims of legal justice, corresponds nearly with the dis-\\ntinction between imperfect and perfect rights a distinction,\\nhowever, that is merely practical, not essential. 1 Equity, in\\nits wide sense, and natural justice are coextensive, and both\\nare synonymous with right etymologically, the opposite of\\njustice is injury, of equity iniquity. The notion of equity\\nand justice limited to jurisprudence, is a narrow and inade-\\nquate view bounded by a rugged horizon but in their large\\nand proper meaning they expand over the whole sphere of\\nobligation, and are equivalent to rectitude and righteousness. 2\\n67. Mercy is righteous forbearance toward an offender.\\nIt implies kindness or gentleness, and is prompted by pity\\nor compassion. These feelings, when intense, are apt to\\ninduce a sentimental aversion to the claims of strict justice.\\n1 Wolfius says Justum appellatur quicquid fit secundum jus perfectum\\nalterius cequum vero quod secundum imperfectum. 1 1 Cf. supra, 36, note.\\n2 To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is prohibited or\\ncommanded by positive laws, is like saying that the radii of a circle were\\nnot equal till you had drawn the circumference. Montesquieu, Spirit\\nof the Laws, bk. i, ch. 1, p. 3.\\nIt is equity to pardon human failings, says Aristotle, and to look\\nto the lawgiver and not to the law to the spirit and not to the letter to the\\nintention and not to the action to the whole and not to the part; to the\\ncharacter of the actor in the long run and not in the present moment to\\nremember good rather than evil, and good that one has received, rather than\\ngood that one has done to bear being injured, rb dj^x^cu adiKotifievov to\\nwish to settle a matter by words rather than by deeds; lastly, to prefer\\narbitration to judgment, for the arbitrator sees what is equitable, but the\\njudge only the law, and for this an arbitrator was first appointed, in order\\nthat equity might flourish. Rhetoric, bk. i, ch. 13.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "132 OBLIGATION\\nHence mercy is popularly supposed to be in opposition to\\njustice, implying a disposition to overlook injury, and to mit-\\nigate or even wholly remit the penalty that sanctions the\\nlaw. Such displacement of justice is not righteous forbear-\\nance, and so is not true mercy, but a weak indulgence of\\nwrong that upholds license and works injustice. True mercy\\nforbears, whatever legal forms may allow, to exceed or to\\nabate the claims of natural justice. 1\\nEvery man is necessarily a judge, not only of his own\\nactions, but also of those of his fellows. Whether his judg-\\nment find utterance in words and deeds of requital or not, he\\nis bound to be just. Any excess of severity is injustice to\\nthe subject; any abatement of righteous rigor is injustice\\nto society whose welfare is involved in the right judgment of\\n1 It may thereby come into conflict with rigorous legal justice adhering\\nto the letter of the law. Portia s exquisite speech, Merchant of Venice,\\nAct iv, sc. 1, 1. 181 sq., though familiar, cannot be omitted here. In court,\\nspeaking to the defendant, says\\nPortia. Do you confess the bond\\nAntonio. I do.\\nPortia. Then must the Jew be merciful.\\nShylock. On what compulsion must I Tell me that.\\nPortia. The quality of mercy is nottstrain d,\\nIt droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven\\nUpon the place beneath it is twice blest\\nIt blesseth him that gives and him that takes.\\nTis mightiest in the mightiest it becomes\\nThe throned monarch better than his crown\\nHis sceptre shows the force of temporal power,\\nThe attribute to awe and majesty,\\nWherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings\\nBut mercy is above this sceptred sway\\nIt is enthroned in the hearts of kings,\\nIt is an attribute to God himself\\nAnd earthly power doth then show likest God s\\nWhen mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew,\\nThough justice be thy plea, consider this,\\nThat, in the course of justice, none of us\\nShould see salvation we do pray for mercy\\nAnd that same prayer doth teach us all to render\\nThe deeds of mercy. I have spoke thus much\\nTo mitigate the justice of thy plea.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 133\\nits members. Mercy is shown in forbearing to do or even to\\nthink what is not strictly just. 1\\nThe judge on the bench must be just. Usually, by the\\nvery terms of the law which he is set to administer, he has a\\nmeasure of discretion but he must not transgress its sharply\\ndenned bounds, and within these he is to use discretion, not\\nlicense. The range is allowed, not for the play of pity or of\\nresentment, but in order that he may mercifully adjust his\\ndecree to the peculiarities of a case. 2 Too great severity is\\ninjustice to a party present; too great leniency is injustice\\nto society whose interest he is empowered to guard. Judicial\\nmercy secures a righteous forbearance of trespass on either,\\nthus not merely coexisting but coinciding with strict justice. 3\\nThe criminal law is merciful in holding the accused innocent\\nuntil proved guilty, and in giving him the benefit of doubt\\nwhich is but just. 4 With a chief executive or sovereign is\\n1 O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but\\nto do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God\\nMicah, 6 8.\\n2 Observe that penal justice is quite commonly miscalled justice to an\\noffender. He has a right to fair trial, that is justice to him. But con-\\ndemned and punished, this cannot be called justice to him for, he having\\nforfeited certain of his rights, the penalty inflicted is not a concession to\\nthese, but to the rights of society, and so his just punishment is in justice\\nto the community whose welfare is involved. For the ethical ground of\\npunishment, see infra, 136.\\n3 Mercy but rnurthers, pardoning those that kill.\\nBorneo and Juliet, Act iii, sc. 1, 1. 212.\\nMercy is not itself, that often looks so\\nPardon is still the nurse of second woe.\\nMeasure for Measure, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 298.\\nIsabella. Yet show some pity.\\nAngelo. I show it most of all when I show justice\\nFor then I pity those I do not know,\\nWhich a dismiss d offence Avould after gall\\nAnd do him right that, answering one foul wrong,\\nLives not to act another.\\nIdem, Act ii, sc. 2, 1. 99 sq.\\n4 A strict construction, a rigid adherence to the letter of the law, is re-\\nquired, lest liberty in adjudication become license. Hence culprits are not\\ninfrequently discharged with impunity, an injustice to society for which", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "184 OBLIGATION\\nlodged a pardoning power. This prerogative of clemency is\\nnot for sentimental exercise, but for the equitable adjustment\\nof penal desert and general welfare. It is mercy, but also it\\nis justice. 1\\nthere seems no remedy but, indeed, it is accounted more wholesome for\\nsociety that a culprit escape condemnation, than that the innocent suffer.\\nSee Genesis, 18: 20-38. Beside this, our laws abound in mercies. See\\ntrial by jury secured by our Constitution, Article iii, 2, and certain other\\nmerciful provisions in the Amendments, Articles iii-viii.\\n1 The suffering engendered by injustice is worthy of note. Suppose two\\npersons thoroughly alike in character and standing, condemned for like\\ncrimes to like terms of imprisonment, but the one innocent, the other\\nguilty. Which would you prefer to be The innocent one. In Xeno-\\nphon s A pology, 28, Appolodorus exclaims: Tome, Socrates, the hardest\\npart is to see you suffer death without just cause. To which Socrates,\\nstroking the other s hair, replies: Would you then, dearest Appolodorus,\\nprefer to see me suffer death for a just cause Yet which suffers more\\nThe innocent one. For in the penalty of guilt there is the solace of expia-\\ntion, which consolation is not with the innocent sufferer. So it is that to\\nthe unregenerate Prometheus Vinctus of a man, says Carlyle, it is ever\\nthe bitterest aggravation of his wretchedness that he is conscious of virtue,\\nthat he feels himself the victim, not of suffering only, but of injustice.\\nSartor Resartus, ch. 7.\\nBut, apart from penalty, which is the greater evil, to do or to suffer injus-\\ntice To do injustice. This is Plato s answer in the Gorgias and in the\\nRepublic; also Aristotle s in Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 11, 6 sq., where he says\\nTo injure is the worse of the two for to injure involves depravity, and is\\nculpable. This is the ground of Plato, who says Assuming the three-fold\\ndivision of the soul, must not injustice be a kind of quarrel between these\\nthree, a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul\\nagainst the whole soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made\\nby a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural\\nvassal The confusion and error of those parts or elements is injustice.\\nFor the doing of justice is the working of a natural order and government\\nof one another in the parts of the soul, and the doing of injustice is the\\nopposite. Republic, bk. iv, 444 Step., Jowett s trans. Trendelenburg, in\\nNaturrecht, 39, advocates this view. See Lorimer, Institutes of Law, p.\\n152. So Brutus, in Julius Ccesar, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 63 sq., says:\\nBetween the acting of a dreadful thing\\nAnd the first motion, all the interim is\\nLike a phantasma, or a hideous dream\\nThe Genius and the mortal instruments\\nAre then in council and the state of man\\nLike to a little kingdom, suffers then\\nThe nature of an insurrection.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 135\\nShall not the judge of all the earth do right Justice and\\njudgment are the habitation of his throne, mercy and truth\\ngo before his face. He is long-suffering and of great mercy,\\nforgiving iniquity and transgression, yet in no case clearing\\nthe guilty. Justice, no less than mercy, is an essential attri-\\nbute to God. He, as absolute sovereign, decrees unbounded\\nmercy to the penitent, and vindicates the claim of immutable\\njustice by a vicarious sacrifice. Such is the Christian scheme\\nsuch is divine mercy.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "136 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER VIII\\nDUTY AND VIRTUE.\\n68. The obligations, both active and passive, laid upon\\nus in the moral law are duties. Duty is the name of a rela-\\ntion, and so requires two terms. Every duty is because of\\nsomething due from one person to another. It is the rela-\\ntion of debtor to creditor. Honesty, honor requires the pay-\\nment of debt. The commercial meaning of dues or debts is\\nmerely a specific application of the essential sense inherent\\nin these terms in their general application to every phase of\\nhuman obligation. 1\\nTo withhold what is due another is a violation of his\\nright, is an unwarranted interference in his liberty of action,\\nis a trespass, and is forbidden by the moral law. But to\\n1 Duty is an abstract term due is the concrete, meaning owed as a debt,\\nfrom p. Fr. deu, pp. of devoir, from Lat. debere, to owe. Debt is also from\\nLat. debere, to owe, debita, a sum due. Ought is an old preterite of to owe,\\nto possess (another s property), hence to be in debt. Shakespeare some-\\ntimes plays upon this early meaning of to owe e.g.\\nI owe you much, and, like a wilful youth,\\nThat which 1 owe [own] is lost.\\nMerchant of Venice, Act i, sc. 1, 1. 146.\\nBe pleased then\\nTo pay that duty which you truly owe\\nTo him that owes [owns] it.\\nKing John, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 247.\\nWith Cicero officium means a duty performed, a service rendered, a func-\\ntion fulfilled as an object of moral obligation. See Be Officiis, i, 3. He\\nuses honestum in the wide sense of what is honorable, decent, virtuous.\\nHonestum aut ipsa virtus est, aut res gesta virtute honestum a virtute divelli\\nnon potest. 1 1", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "DUTY AND VIRTUE 187\\nforbid non-payment is to command payment. Pay thy dues.\\nOwe no man anything. We must pay what we owe. We\\nought to render to every man his own, that is, what we owe\\nhim. These are but varied expressions of the one injunc-\\ntion, Trespass not, Be thou just, Do thy duty. Ethics may\\nfairly be defined as the science of duty. 1\\n69. Right and duty are coextensive, merely different\\naspects of the same notion. Right belongs to the action,\\nand is conformity to law. Duty belongs to the agent, and\\nis subjection to law. Hence they imply each other. That\\nwhatever is duty is right, is quite evident. That whatever\\nis right is duty, is readily seen. For, each case as it arises\\nis subsumed under the law, or under rules, maxims of con-\\nduct, deduced from the law, and a conclusion is drawn as to\\nwhat is right, what ought to be done. Now from given\\npremises, if the terms be unambiguous and the reasoning\\ncorrect, only one conclusion can follow, certainly not two or\\nmore essentially different. Therefore, in every conceivable\\nsituation there is for the moment one and only one course\\nthat is right and this action alone being right it ought or\\n1 Duty, properly, literally, is a function of persons only, they acting in\\nthe light of conscience. Yet a horse is said to be doing its duty when it\\nwillingly does its work and a clock when it keeps good time. Each is ful-\\nfilling its function, but to speak of this as duty is figurative speech.\\nBrutes, since they are without conscience and personality, have no duties,\\nand accordingly relative to them we have, strictly speaking, no rights, but\\nmerely property claims. We claim and enforce their service, and take their\\nlives for food. Those that are a nuisance we drive out or kill, as weeds, by\\nvirtue of eminent domain. But relative to brutes, they having rights, we\\nhave duties to our domestic animals, especially, food, shelter and mild\\nusage are due. A pain-giving trespass is cruelty. Hunting, fishing, merely\\nfor sport, is a relic of barbarism, is cruel and wrong. Unwarranted vivisec-\\ntion is a crime. See supra, 24, note also, for the views of the present\\nwriter, an article on The Moral Aspects of Vivisection, in The North\\nAmerican Review, for March, 1885.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "138 OBLIGATION\\nowes to be done. When an action is clearly conceived to be\\nright, that action and that alone is duty. 1\\nIt is a corollary that duty is but another name for obliga-\\ntion, whose measure is found in the full application of the\\nwhole law to the whole life. Also it follows that duties\\nnever conflict. Often we are confused and in doubt as to\\nthe particular obligation, but of two possible acts, one being\\nright, the other is wrong. There is no divided duty.\\nMoreover, it is wrong, ex vi termini, to do less than one\\nought to do also it is wrong to do more for this is an ex-\\npenditure that is due elsewhere for example, to overpay a\\n1 Le devoir et le droit sont freres. Leur mere commune est la liberty,\\nlis naissent le meme jour, ils se deVeloppent et ils pe rissent ensemble. On\\npourrait meme dire que le droit et le devoir ne font qu un, et sont le meme\\netre envisage de deux c6te s differents. Qu est-ce, en effet, que mon droit a\\nvotre respect, sinon le devoir que vous avez de me respecter, parce que je\\nsuis un etre libre Mais vous-m\u00c2\u00a7me vous etes un etre libre, et le f ondement\\nde mon droit et de votre devoir devient pour vous le fondement d un droit\\n\u00c2\u00a3gal, et en moi d un egal devoir. Cousin, Du Vrai du Beau et du Bien,\\nDouzieme Legon, 4.\\nIn Lieber s biography we find that his life was a continual exposition of\\nhis favorite motto No right without its duties no duty without its rights.\\nWhence came it A letter to Judge Thayer, in 1869, gives the Genesis of\\nthis JDeuteronomy. Lieber, bound for Greece, with his freedom-loving\\ncomrades, in 1822, saw at the end of the schooner s yard-arm a little flame.\\nThat s bad indeed, said the captain, who explained that the flames (elec-\\ntric lights) were called Castor and Pollux, or St. Elmo s fire. If both\\nappeared, it foretold fine sailing if only one, foul weather. I thought,\\nsays Lieber, this is like right and duty both together, and all is well\\nright alone, despotism duty alone, slavery. President Gilman, in The\\nCentury for Sept. 83, p. 793.\\nPatrick Henry, in his famous argument in the British Debt Cause, deliv-\\nered in Richmond, Va., Nov., 1791, says Rights and obligations are corre-\\nspondent, coextensive, and inseparable they must exist together or not at\\nall. If then the obligation be gone, what is become of the correspon-\\ndent right They are mutually gone. Wm. Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry,\\nvol. iii, p. 621.\\nSome writers condition rights on duties, reversing the view taken in this\\ntreatise. Thus Trendelenburg; also Lotze, Tract. Phil., \u00c2\u00a732. See also\\nHyslop, Ethics, ch. x.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "DUTY AND VIRTUE 139\\nbill. Sometimes one ought to do all he can; he is never\\nbound to do more, but frequently less.\\nThe essential identity of justice and right, and of injustice\\nand trespass, has already been indicated. 1 Hence it suffi-\\nciently appears that, right and duty being equivalent, justice\\nand duty are likewise equivalent terms. In a didactic treat-\\nment of ethics, it is far less important to mark the shades of\\ndistinction among these synonymous terms, a right, right,\\njustice, equity, mercy, obligation, duty, than it is to show\\ndistinctly that, as to their essence, they are one and the same,\\nand that a violation of any one is a wrong, an injustice, a\\ntrespass.\\n70. An action conforming to moral law is a virtuous\\naction. This qualification implies a contrary inclination\\novercome by will. It is the doing of justice, the perform-\\nance of duty, in a particular case, wherein the agent was\\ntempted to disregard obligation by an opposed desire, against\\nwhich there was a voluntary struggle ending in its subjec-\\ntion. A virtuous person is one with whom the voluntary\\nsuppression of wrong desire is habitual, he subjecting him-\\nself uniformly to the law of duty, and thus molding his\\ncharacter anew. Under the law of habit, that our faculties\\nacquire facility and strength by exercise, the righteous desires\\nof the virtuous person prevail more and more uniformly,\\nwhile their opposites, denied the nourishment of gratifica-\\ntion, become weaker and suffer atrophy until, finally, when\\nand although all conflict, all struggle, has ceased, the victor,\\nbecause of his victory, is dubbed a perfectly virtuous person.\\nThe abstract name of this mark is virtue. 2 In general,\\n1 See supra, 63. For Kant s doctrine of duty, see infra, 86.\\n2 From Lat. virtus, strength, vigor, valor cognate with vir, man, man-\\nhood equivalent to dper-q, prowess, the Homeric notion of worth, cognate\\nwith Aprjs, Mars, the god of war. Thus virtue implies opposition to be\\novercome, exertion of strength, vigor in overcoming, a struggle going on.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "140 OBLIGATION\\nvirtue is the conformity of will to the law discerned by prac-\\ntical reason or conscience. This definition implies that all\\nsubjective activities are regulated, duly coordinated and sub-\\nordinated, so that each fulfills its normal function thus\\nenabling objective activities to attain their highest efficiency.\\nPrimarily it indicates the subjection of the craving to the\\ngiving desires secondarily, the bringing of the members of\\neach class into harmonious cooperation. Otherwise there is\\na continual strife, the lust of the flesh against the spirit and\\ndisorderly preferences of each, that is incompatible with per-\\nfected virtue. Such entire harmony is perhaps an unattainable\\nideal, but in human nature there is a native impulse toward\\nit, and an ability to approximate it. Virtue, then, is a pro-\\nficiency in willing what is conformed to practical reason,\\ndeveloped from the state of natural potentiality by practical\\naction. 1\\nIn a certain narrowed sense virtue is synonymous with chastity. More\\nproperly and widely the factitive forms to chasten, to chastise, from Lat.\\ncastus, pure, mean to purify, to correct, by reproof or penalty. Whom\\nthe Lord loveth, he chasteneth. Cf. to castigate. As chastity implies\\npurity, so virtue implies victory. Too often on vante la vertu, mais on la\\nlaisse se morfondre. Gaboriau. Too often its majestic severity chills us\\ni probitas laudatur et alget. Juvenal. Yet, as said by Plato, virtue is\\nthe health and beauty and well-being of the soul, while vice is its disease,\\nweakness and deformity. Republic, bk. iv, 444, Step. The Lady, in\\nMilton s Comus, 1. 210 sq., beset by a thousand fantasies, says\\nThese thoughts may startle well, but not astound\\nThe virtuous mind, that ever walks attended\\nBy a strong siding champion, Conscience.\\nwelcome, pure-eyed Faith white-handed Hope,\\nThou hovering angel girt with golden wings\\nAnd thou unblemished form of Chastity\\n1 see ye visibly, and now believe\\nThat He, the Supreme Good, to whom all things ill\\nAre but as slavish officers of vengeance,\\nWould send a glistering guardian, if need were,\\nTo keep my life and honour unassail d\\nWas 1 deceived, or did a sable cloud\\nTurn forth her silver lining on the night?\\n1 This last definition is according to Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 6,\\nwith whom dper-fi is a 2|ts, a habitus. Virtue has been characterized as", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "DUTY AND VIRTUE 141\\n71. The cardinal virtues, as commonly listed, are forti-\\ntude, prudence, temperance and justice. The distribution\\noriginated with the Greek philosophers, and still holds in\\nmodern literature. They are called cardinal, because the\\nspecific virtues hinge on them, and indeed they seem to be\\nconditions rather than kinds of virtue. 1 Each may be con-\\nsidered a fountain from which virtues flow. The Pythag-\\noreans and Plato regard fortitude, prudence and temperance\\ntogether as the source of justice, and justice as the genius of\\nall duty, of all virtue, the perfection of human nature and\\nof human society. With Aristotle also, justice is perfect\\nvirtue, yet not absolutely, but in reference to others. In\\nthis wide sense we have used the term justice, viewing it as\\nthe sum of all virtues, which are but variations upon its\\nessence, and are universally prescribed in the concrete com-\\nmandment, Be thou just.\\n72. The man who disregards moral law, or in whom the\\ndesire to do right is weak, passes, by frequently yielding to\\nadopted when prompted by inclination or native bent of mind as genuine\\nor ethical when prompted by principle.\\n1 Socrates (according to Xenophon), Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, each pre-\\nsents a varied list. Turning to the O. T. Apocrypha, in the book of Wis-\\ndom, written in Greek, and ascribed by Jerome to Philo of Alexandria, we\\nfind, 8:7: If a man love righteousness, her labors are virtues; for she\\nteacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude which are such\\nthings as men can have nothing more profitable in their life. Cf. the list\\nof Christian virtues in Galatians 5 22, 23.\\nIn Nic. Eth., bk. ii, chs. 6-9, Aristotle elaborates his doctrine that\\nevery ethical virtue is a mean state between two vices, one on the side of\\nexcess, and the other on the side of defect. Thus courage is the mean\\nbetween temerity and cowardice temperance, the mean between inordinate\\ndesire and stupid indifference liberality, the mean between prodigality and\\nparsimony. Hence the familiar phrase a golden mean.\\nWith reference to prudence, let it be remarked that, taken in its best\\nsense, it is much the same as the wisdom that is from above see James\\n3 17. Whenever it is not strictly identical with duty, it is parallel to it,\\nhaving the same direction, and the two become one there where parallel\\nlines meet.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "142 OBLIGATION\\ntemptation, under the dominion of other desires. Especially\\nthe appetites are likely, by reckless indulgence, to acquire\\nabnormal vigor, and drive the weakened will helplessly into\\ngross excesses. The appetencies, in men of higher order,\\nmay take control, producing the refined voluptuary, the\\navaricious seeker after material wealth, the secluded scholar\\nabsorbed in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, or\\nthe unscrupulous ruler ambitious of irresponsible power.\\nThe will, whose function it is to regulate these constitutional\\npowers, restraining their exercise, and determining natural,\\nwhich is normal and moral order, forsakes this high office,\\nand becomes their servant. Thus the man is enslaved by\\nhis passions. His moral sense is deafened by their clamor,\\nhis actions are determined by their impelling energy, his\\nindependent self-mastery is lost, and his freedom is limited to\\na choice among contending masters and forms of obedience.\\nTo prevent or to escape from such degraded and deplora-\\nble condition, one must, by good-will working in the light of\\nconscience, bring all his powers into subjection to moral law.\\nThis regulation will give play to the faculties in their natural\\nrelations and proportions, which is the essence of right action,\\nand will determine uniformity of fit conduct, which is moral\\norder, the order of facts that ought to be. Such virtuous\\nrectification secures peace, harmony, and the dignity of moral\\nexcellence. 1\\nThe virtue that brings our activities into due conformity\\nwith moral law is usually posited as the necessary condition\\nof soul-liberty, and perfected virtue is identified with per-\\n1 Virtue is simply natural, vice unnatural man is made for virtue as a\\nclock is to keep time. But he finds himself disordered. Self-mastery, har-\\nmonizing one s faculties, directing them to the right end, may seem to be\\nwithin our power, but uniform human experience shows that when we would\\ndo good evil is present with us and in us. This state of human nature is\\nfully set forth in the Scriptures, and that, as we cannot unaided accom-\\nplish rectification, we need regeneration.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "DUTY AND VIRTUE 143\\nfected liberty. In surmounting his passions and inclinations,\\none becomes a freedman, a freeman and a master. The sage,\\nsaid the Stoics, feels but is without passion, he is not indul-\\ngent but just to himself and to others, he alone attains to\\nthe complete performance of duty, and thus he alone is free. 1\\nThis is the common doctrine of moralists at the present day,\\nand we are exhorted to the exercise of morality because of\\nthe worth of liberty. 2\\nThe liberty thus acquired is independence of unrighteous,\\ndiscordant and distracting rulers. The virtuous man is freed\\nfrom the dominion of overweening inclinations, of unholy\\nlusts and passions. It is an ideal state, exciting our admira-\\ntion and emulation. 3 But this liberty is merely relative, not\\nabsolute. In breaking loose from subjective bondage, we\\npass under the objective bondage of law, an exchange of one\\nbondage for another. All language supports this view. We\\nare bound to do duty, obliged or under obligation to be just,\\nforbidden to trespass, and must submit to many pains in\\n1 So Epictetus the freedman, whose favorite maxim was, Bear and for-\\nbear, Av^xov Kal airix ov i is reported by Arrianus, in the ^Eyx^ipidiov, 8, 9, as\\nsaying: Freedom and slavery are but names respectively of virtue and\\nvice, and both depend on the will. No one is a slave (SoOXos) whose\\nwill is free. Fortune is an evil bond of the body, vice of the soul for\\nhe is a slave whose body is free, but whose soul is bound and, on the con-\\ntrary, he is free whose body is bound, but whose soul is free.\\n2 The only perfect conception of liberty is perfect obedience to perfect\\nlaw. President Seelye.\\nIntellectual freedom consists in the subjugation of the understanding to\\nthe truth, which delivers from errors, prejudices, and the babble of human\\nopinions. Moral freedom consists in the submission of the will to duty,\\nwhich is the practical outcome of truth. To do as we ought is liberty to\\ndo as we like is slavery. Spiritual freedom consists in the bowing down of\\nthe whole man to God, who is revealed by the truth, and to serve whom is\\nto be master of self and things. Alexander McLaren.\\n3 St. Paul says He that was called in the Lord, being a bond-servant\\n(SoOXos), is the Lord s freedman (direXetjdepos) likewise he that was called,\\nbeing free (iXetidepos), is Christ s bond-servant (SoOXos). 1 Corinthians, 7 22.\\nFor further discussion of the matter, see infra, 92,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "144 OBLIGATION\\nfulfilling the demands of an inexorable law, constant vigi-\\nlance being the price of impunity. This is not liberty, but\\nrigorous bondage. It is a voluntary bondage, one that ex-\\npands and ennobles our powers, satisfies the all pervading\\nand overwhelming sense of duty, and harmonizes the man\\nwith himself and with universal order. Still it is bond-\\nage. Strict morality is strict subjection. Absolute liberty is\\nincompatible with law.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 145\\nCHAPTER IX\\nSELFISHNESS\\n73. Names of mental states with the prefix self abound\\nin speech and literature. A few are, self-approbation, self-\\ncondemnation, self-denial, self-control, self-esteem, self-abhor-\\nrence, self-love. Many of this class of expressions probably\\nhave their origin in the fictitious idea of an alter ego. The\\nhuman mind subjectively distinguishes between the ego as\\nconscious and the ego as represented. The former, the con-\\nsciousness of self, is an element in every feeling, is essential\\nto the existence of any feeling, and is itself recognized as a\\nfeeling. The latter, the representation of self, is a normal\\nand habitual cognition, wherein the ego contemplates itself\\nas an object, distinguishes itself from itself, and views this\\nsubjective object as though it were really another self, an\\nalter ego. 1 The idea of an alter ego is strengthened by a\\nconflict of desires; the opposed impulses, being a pair, are\\npersonified as two selves. Moreover, the mind regards the\\nobjectified and personified self as a possession of the wholly\\n1 Spirit is capable of becoming its own object. I am I at once subject\\nand object. We rind, on reflection, that what we call our spirit transcends,\\nor is, in a sense, independent of the bodily organism on which it otherwise\\nso entirely depends. Metaphysically speaking, this is seen in our self-con-\\nsciousness, or power of separating one s self as subject from one s self as\\nobject, a thing wholly inconceivable as the result of any material process,\\nand relating us at once to an order of being which we are obliged to call\\nimmaterial. 1 Illingworth, Divine Immanence. See Elements of Psy-\\nchology, 108 sq., and 226.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "146 OBLIGA TION\\nsubjective self, and capable of being affected by it, which\\nfinds expression in such familiar phrases as one s self, control\\nyourself, I hold myself responsible, and the like. The two\\nare identified in the phrases I myself, he himself, we our-\\nselves, they themselves.\\nThis distinction between the conscious ego and the repre-\\nsented ego, is unreal, inasmuch as it contravenes the essential\\nunity of the ego. Evidently, in thought it is a fiction, in\\nspeech a metaphor. Hence, although it is a natural, a normal\\nmode of mind, there is need of caution lest it mislead us to\\ncommit the fallacy of figure of speech.\\n74. The name self-love is commonly used to denote that\\nlonging for gratification which marks the craving desires\\nwhen their end is self. But love is essentially a desire to\\nbenefit some other one, and this is contrary to the benefit of\\nself. It necessarily implies a relation between two in self\\nthere is really and literally but one. The compound word\\nself-love is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, absurd literally,\\nand can be allowed only as a metaphor derived from the fan-\\nciful idea of an alter ego.\\nBut self-love is merely a misnomer, for the reality of the\\nthing thus absurdly named is unquestionable. It is self-\\ninterest, or simply interest, egoism, selfishness, the opposite\\nof love. For while love is desire to impart, interest is desire\\nto profit. Egoism makes self the end, seeking one s own\\nenjoyment and welfare at cost of or in disregard of another s.\\nPsychologically it is the supremacy of the craving desires,\\nthe appetites and appetencies, over the affections either dis-\\nregarding these, or neglecting their call, or what is worse, a\\nmore intense and refined egoism, making the affections sub-\\nserve self. 1 Clearly the term self-love is a euphemism, filch-\\ning the name of love to sanctify what in truth is its contrary,\\ni See supra, 5, 6.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 147\\ninterest, egoism, selfishness. That, however disguised, it is\\nto be condemned, will sufficiently appear in the sequel. 1\\nClosely related to the notion of self-love, is that of duty\\nto self. Can I literally owe myself anything? Can I owe\\nmyself a dollar How is it to be paid By passing it from\\none pocket to another Can I in any manner or measure be\\nindebted to myself Is anything due me from me Duty\\nis essentially the name of a relation between two I myself\\nam but one. I cannot possibly be in debt except to some\\nother one. Hence the phrase duty to self is, in its terms,\\nself-eontradictory and absurd. 2 It, too, originates in the\\nfancied alter ego, to whom the ego is said to be indebted as\\nto another person. Clearly it is a metaphor, and deductions\\nfrom the generic law of duty to this as a species of duty\\ncommit the subtle fallacia figurce dictionis. As in the phrase\\nlove of self, so in the phrase duty to self, we detect selfish-\\nness again masquerading, now in the guise and under the\\nsacred name of duty.\\n75. But aside from terms the important question arises\\nDoes not moral law command motives and actions that are\\nselfish, that is, such as find in self an end Moralists very\\ngenerally answer affirmatively, and recognize a wide and\\nweighty class of obligations terminating in self, having re-\\nspect exclusively to self, impelled by self-love, and usually\\nentitled duties to self. 3 For example, they teach that every\\n1 It must be acknowledged that many eminent authorities hold a contrary-\\nview e.g., Aristotle, in Nic. Eth., bk. ix, ch. 8, Of Self-love Butler,\\nSermons, Preface, and i, xi et al. In the royal law, Thou shalt love\\nthy neighbor as thyself, the phrase, as thyself, evidently does not command\\nself-love, nor does it sanction it, but merely sets up what is in fact, as men\\nare, a high mark for attainment, one beyond the reach of most of us. There\\nis no Scripture that commands or approves self-love. Cf. supra, 48, note.\\n2 Let it be remarked that the term obligation is from the verb to oblige,\\nmeaning to bind to, to bind together. Obligation binds, and the binding is\\nof at least two together. Cf. supra, 19, note.\\n8 With Kant duties to self are even the source of all other duties. See", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "148 OBLIGATION\\none owes it to himself to be temperate, that moderation, as\\nopposed to excess in all things, is a duty to one s self, for the\\nsake of one s own personality, and in order to self-culture.\\nPopular speech also quite commonly recognizes, and is dis-\\nposed to emphasize, duties to self, usually holding them para-\\nmount. It is heard in the every-day phrases, I owe it to my-\\nself, he was bound in justice to himself so to do, and the like.\\nPostponing for the present a direct argument of the ques-\\ntion, we here observe merely that, if a man be morally bound\\nin any case whatever to make himself an end, or in other\\nwords, if there be any real thing answering to the lame\\nphrase duty to self, then the moral law as heretofore formu-\\nlated in this treatise is quite inadequate. For trespass\\nnecessarily implies at least two parties, and the given inter-\\npretation of duty and of justice, though very wide, presumes\\nalways a relation between two. Obviously, then, our view\\nof moral obligation, in its widest comprehension, does not\\ninclude the notion of duties to self, indeed it excludes self\\nas an end.\\nAnd truly there is no duty to self. In this case the phrase\\nis not merely a misnomer, for there is nothing corresponding\\nto it in any admissible sense. Self is never, can never be a\\nmoral end, but on the contrary, all selfishness or egoism is\\nviolation of moral law. Duties, obligations universally relate\\nto others, and selfishness is sin.\\n76. Let us briefly examine one or two of the duties usu-\\nally classed as duties to self, and indicate their altruistic\\ninterpretation.\\nGrundlegung, etc., S. 56 sq.; Abbott s trans., p. 65 sq. Elsewhere he says\\nSupposing that there are no duties of this kind, then there would be no\\nduties of any kind for I can only think myself under obligation to others\\nas far as I am under obligation to myself. Per contra, Martineau says:\\nDuties to self can be saved from contradiction only by an impossibility,\\nnamely, the splitting one s self in two, susceptible of reciprocal obligation.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 149\\nTemperance or the control of appetites and passions,\\nbringing them into conformity with reason, subjecting them\\nto moral law, is commonly cited as one of the most compre-\\nhensive and prominent duties to self. Is it my duty to be\\ntemperate Certainly. It is a cardinal virtue. Is it a duty\\nI owe to myself in order to the perfection of my character?\\nIs it a discipline in the process of self-culture for the sake\\nof my personal excellence? Assuredly, say nearly all the\\nmoralists, both ancient and modern, it finds in self its end.\\nTo be temperate is a primal duty, a weighty obligation\\nbut it is strictly a duty, an obligation, to others. I owe to\\nGod, my maker and highest benefactor, to modulate into\\nharmony the powers he has given me, that I may fulfill the\\nmission on which he has sent me, and accomplish the work\\nhe has assigned me in the world. I ought to be temperate,\\nhusbanding my energies, that I may serve my family, my\\nneighbor, the community, the state, mankind, as fully and\\ncompletely as possible. Unless I be temperate, I cannot pay\\nthese dues. Moreover, I ought to be an example, in this\\ngolden mean, to my fellows, inclining them to its practice.\\nTemperance is one of the highest obligations. It is the top\\nround in the ladder of Christian graces. It ennobles. Still\\nit is due, not to self, but to those around. 1\\n1 For the graces, see Galatians, 5 22, 23. Closely allied to temperance is\\neconomy. Do I owe it to myself to be economical No yet it is a duty,\\na real duty. I am but a steward, and am bound to economize my time, my\\nenergy, my property, because of my relations. Man is instinctively an econ-\\nomist. He naturally takes the short cut, the straight line. Also he takes\\nwhat lies near as requiring less reach, and is, when calm, sparing even of\\nunnecessary words. The habit is fostered, perhaps, by mere laziness or\\nother selfish consideration but one ought always to prefer frugality of\\nmeans in attaining his proper ends, because this also is due. Economy\\ngenerally takes part as one rational determinant in choosing, and often, in\\ncases of light moment, is the sole determinant. Carelessness or thought-\\nlessness, excessive animal spirits, excited nerves, may neglect economy of\\neffort but this is waste, and all waste is wrong. To be economical, frugal,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "150 OBLIGATION\\nThe pursuit of truth for the sake of truth is regarded as a\\nrefined and noble avocation. Knowledge for its own sake\\nis a high sounding phrase but it is merely a euphemism\\nconcealing the reality, which is knowledge for one s own\\nsake, a refined selfishness. But the worth of knowledge is\\nin its power for good, and he who possesses it in large meas-\\nure is a king among men. Every one is in duty bound to\\nincrease his stores, solely that he may thereby more effi-\\nciently promote the welfare of the present and the coming\\ngenerations.\\nMuch the same may be said of the duty of preserving life\\nand health and strength. These belong not to me save in\\ntrust. They belong to my relatives and friends, to mankind.\\nI am a guardian and agent. So of the duty of physical,\\nmental and moral culture. I am bound to account with\\nusury for the talents intrusted to me. So of cleanliness,\\nsparing of energy, is prudence, wisdom, duty, both private and public, per-\\nsonal and political, a saving for expenditure elsewhere. Je lone Veconome\\nc est la richesse des pauvres, et la sagesse des riches. Dumas.\\nThe earlier political economists based their science on the aphorism that\\nmen are governed by interest, that in affairs selfishness determines conduct.\\nHence Carlyle dubbed it the dismal science. But viewing economy as a\\nduty, this reproach disappears, and Economics, so far as it depends on will,\\nbecomes a branch of Practical or Applied Ethics. This, however, would\\nnot greatly modify its other principles. For it is remarkable that industry,\\nthough so largely directed by interest, works out for society about what\\nwould follow from a strict observance of duty. The farmer, the manufac-\\nturer, the merchant, whether laboring for his own or for the common weal,\\naccomplishes in the long run the same general result. To men is not given\\nthat God-like unselfishness that thinks only of others good but in working\\nfor themselves they are working for us all. We are so bound together that\\nno man can labor for himself alone. Each blow he strikes in his own behalf\\nhelps to mold the universe. Stephenson, to win a fortune, invented the\\nsteam engine. Shakespeare wrote his plays to keep up a comfortable home.\\nThe ambitious man, building a pedestal for himself, leaves a monument to\\nposterity. Alexander and Caesar fought for their own ends, but, in doing\\nso, they put a belt of civilization half round the earth. Such is the benefi-\\ncent world-ordering of human affairs.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 151\\ndecency, modesty, propriety, in private as well as in public.\\nSo of the preservation of my personal dignity and self-respect,\\nof my honor, sincerity and truthfulness. Even the indul-\\ngence of innocent pleasures should be primarily for recrea-\\ntion, preparing me for renewed efficiency in paying my\\ndues. The supply of necessities should ever be governed\\nby the same general purpose, so that whether we eat or\\ndrink, or whatsoever we do, let all be done for others sake. 1\\n77. This doctrine is not ascetic, but altruistic. 2 It trans-\\nfers the end of all right action from an exclusive self to its\\nfellows. All righteous conduct is disinterested, unselfish.\\nThe moral law, Trespass not, or Be just, or Do duty, is\\nequivalent to, Withhold no due, but bestow in due measure.\\nWe say in due measure, for not all giving is righteous a\\n1 See 1 Corinthians, 10: 31. Bobert Browning, in Balaustion s Adven-\\nture, 1. 1212 sq., and 1723 sq., speaking of Herakles banqueting between his\\nlabors, expands the aphorism, JSfeque semper arcum tend.it Apollo, thus\\nHe was\\nglad to give\\nPoor flesh and blood their respite and relief\\nIn the interval twixt tight and fight again\\nAll for the world s sake\\nfrank and free,\\nOut from the labor into the repose,\\nEre out again and over head and ears\\nF the heart of labor, all for love of men\\nMaking the most o the minute, that the soul\\nAnd body, strained to height a minute since,\\nMight lie relaxed in joy, this breathing-space,\\nFor man s sake more than ever till the bow,\\nRestrung o the sudden, at first cry for help,\\nShould send some unimaginable shaft\\nTrue to the aim and shatteringly through\\nThe plate-mail of a monster, save man so.\\n2 Altruistic, from Lat. alter, other, regardful of others. See infra, 83,\\nnote. Ascetic, from Grk. d r/o7 m, exercise, training. Asceticism, a dis-\\ntorted out-growth from early Stoicism, is the exercise of the soul in suppress-\\ning and stifling many of the normal impulses, apparently holding that\\nwhatever is natural is wrong. The early Stoics taught, on the contrary,\\nthat whatever is natural is right (see supra, 25, notej, which is also the\\ndoctrine of the present treatise. Bentham, rather cynically, says Asceti-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "152 OBLIGATION\\nlavish or a disproportionate distribution of means or of ser-\\nvice is wrong, being an expenditure that is due elsewhere.\\nThe virtuous exercise of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, when\\nclearly understood, is not the giving up of what one has a\\nright to retain and enjoy, but the yielding to another his due,\\ndischarging his rightful claim, according to him a right of\\nwhich he is perhaps quite ignorant. Truly it is a parting\\nwith what I might keep, but what I have no right to keep.\\nIt is free, unconstrained justice.\\nWhile the chief, indeed the only end of life is usefulness,\\nthe promotion of the welfare of those to whom some one is\\nrelated in accord with the relations, he is not thereby ex-\\ncluded from participating in the benefaction. The law, by\\nthis doctrine, forbids his making himself alone the end, and\\nrequires his regard and intent to be constantly beyond him-\\nself but it does not prohibit his sharing, as a member of a\\ncommunity of two or more, the welfare he promotes. It\\ndoes not require self-abnegation, nor entire self-forgetfulness,\\nbut that the inclination, the impulse, the motive and the\\nintention be altogether benevolent.\\nIt is a fact that in the judgment of mankind, for some rea-\\nson or other, the practice of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, the\\nexercise of affection, is held in high esteem, is accounted\\ngenerous, noble, even heroic, and receives the warmest praise\\nwhile, on the other hand, selfishness, exclusive or excessive\\nregard for one s own, is accounted ignoble, ungenerous, mean,\\nand is heartily condemned. Disinterested motives and con-\\nduct are always praised interested motives and conduct are\\ncism approves of actions in as far as they tend to diminish the agent s hap-\\npiness, and disapproves of them in as far as they tend to augment it.\\nPrinciples of Morals and Legislation, ch. 2, 3. Says Gibbon: The\\nascetics renounced the business and the pleasures of the age, abjured the\\nuse of wine, of flesh, and of marriage, chastised the body, mortified [put to\\ndeath] their affections, and embraced a life of misery, as the price of eternal\\nhappiness. Decline and Fall, ch. 37.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 153\\nalways blamed. Why is this? Is it a delusion? Is it\\nmerely because when my neighbor works in his own interest,\\nI have less of his help in mine If so, then it is merely my\\nselfishness that prompts me to condemn his. Is there not\\nsome less degrading, some better reason for the universal\\ncondemnation of interested action, and the universal appro-\\nbation of disinterested service Surely there must be, for I\\njudge after this manner of the conduct of the ancients, whose\\nconduct cannot possibly affect me. Yet there is a school of\\nmoralists holding that disinterestedness is a delusion, that\\nhuman nature is incapable of a purely disinterested action,\\nthat all conduct resolves, in the last analysis, into self-seek-\\ning. 1 It is undeniable that selfishness generally prevails and\\nis dominant. But let us distinguish between the actual and\\nthe potential, and heartily deny the impossibility of disinter-\\nestedness. Nay more, let us hold that purely disinterested\\nconduct has sometimes been actually experienced, and also\\nobserved, and that it is truly the culminating perfection, the\\nrealization of ideal humanity.\\n78. The thesis is presented in the following questions\\nWhy is it that the affections, the giving desires, have a right-\\nful supremacy over the appetites and appetencies, the craving\\ndesires Why is it that the moral law enjoins the practice\\nof affections, impulses to benefit others, and forbids the in-\\n1 So Spencer in The Data of Ethics and others. In the egoistic school\\nof Ethics it is maintained that human nature is incapahle of a strictly disin-\\nterested action, that the expectation of one s own profit or reward enters\\ninto all cases of personal sacrifice as the fundamental, informing motive.\\nBut this cannot he said of extreme cases involving, under the impulse of\\nduty, the sacrifice of life itself. There is often a total giving away of self,\\nas in defensive warfare, with no thought of reward beyond death, in order\\nthat those who remain may have their rights. We claim, in opposition to\\nHobbes, Mandeville, Rochefoucauld, Spencer, and the rest, that purely dis-\\ninterested actions are not only possible, but often actual.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "154 OBLIGATION\\ndulgence of impulses craving a gain for self as an end The\\nreason lies deep in human nature.\\nLet it be granted that all constitutional desires have natu-\\nral and therefore rightful aims, and should harmonize, thus\\nsustaining each other in their normal functions. Also, that\\ncraving and giving are contraries, whence a conflict between\\nappetency and affection, which two therefore do not accord\\nbut are in constant and inevitable discord, unless one become\\nsubservient to the other. That our desires should be brought\\ninto functional harmony, will hardly be denied. That this\\nharmony can be attained only by the subservience of one or\\nthe other class, is evident. Which is entitled to supremacy\\nNow suppose affection be made to subserve interest. What\\nis the consequence The impulse to benefit another is ob-\\nscured under the impulse to benefit self. I treat my friend\\nwith apparent and professed affection, using the manner and\\nlanguage of friendship, my real intent being to obtain for\\nmyself a gain. Perhaps I indulge my generous impulses in\\norder to cultivate my generosity, a virtue I desire to possess\\nin myself. Evidently this is egoism or selfishness doubly re-\\nfined, and therefore doubly odious. I degrade my friend\\nint6 a mere means for my own profit, and so dishonor and\\nwrong him. I do it under the form, and name, and profession\\nof love, when in reality it is the contrary, base, self-seeking\\nhypocrisy. If there be one character the most despicable of\\nall, it is the hypocrite, he whom our Lord denounces in his\\nmost scathing terms.\\nBut such procedure is something more than hypocrisy.\\nIt is the extinction of half of one s nature, of his affections.\\nFor, if I confer a benefit on my neighbor solely in order to\\nbenefit myself, this does not merely subject love to interest,\\nsince love is then no longer love, but simply interest. Love\\nhas ceased to be, and I am wholly, exclusively selfish. This\\nis not the subordination and subservience of affection to", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 155\\nappetency, but the complete suppression and extinction of\\naffection. A large part of the normal nature of the man dis-\\nappears, and he stands in opposition to all his fellows. It is\\nuniversal war every man s hand against every other. Surely\\nthis is not the way to personal excellence, to perfection of\\ncharacter. Surely this violates the law. It is amazing that\\nmany moralists should hold it obligatory to cultivate our\\naffections to the end that we may thereby perfect our own\\npersonality, thus advocating a principle which would result\\nin the extinction of affection, and produce a character abso-\\nlutely selfish. 1\\n79. Suppose, on the contrary, the craving desires be\\nmade subject to the affections. What follows? Are they\\nlikewise extinguished Not at all. It is easy to understand\\nhow my appetency may, without loss, be made to subserve\\nthe ends of affection, craving various objects, not for my own\\nsake as the end, but for the sake of those on whom I would\\nbestow my energies and gains. Thus I may seek pleasure as\\na recreation, as a means of refreshing my powers for more\\nefficient service. I may strive, with great earnestness and\\nactivity, to acquire property and increase my wealth, not\\nfrom the miser s desire to possess, nor the voluptuary s desire\\nto enjoy, but in order that I may bestow on others the bene-\\nfits wealth commands, reserving for myself only such portion\\nas is needful for further beneficence. I may cultivate my\\nintellect, not for the sake of proficiency, but of efficiency.\\nFurther illustration is superfluous. But let us add, I may\\ndesire power in order to greater usefulness and I may desire\\nreputation, the esteem of my neighbors, or even fame, simply\\nbecause my influence in favor of the welfare of others is\\ntherein extended. Evidently the craving desires may crave\\nin order to give, that is, they may become entirely subject to\\n1 \u00c2\u00a7o Janet in The Theory of Morals and others.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "156 OBLIGATION\\nthe affections, and so far from being extinguished, they are\\nthereby refined and ennobled, and their activity enlarged. 1\\nWe conclude that, since the subjection of the affections\\nwould quench them, but the subjection of the appetencies\\nwould advance them, the affections have rightful supremacy.\\nFurthermore it follows that the right growth of character\\nconsists- largely in this subjection of selfish propensities to\\nthe unselfish, and in so directing the former that they be no\\nlonger interested, but disinterested.\\nIf it be objected that there are occasions for the exercise\\nof affection, and other occasions for self-indulgence, the\\nanswer is easy. The claims of near relatives, of friends,\\nof neighbors, of country, of mankind, of God, upon my means\\nand energies, are paramount and exhaustive. Paramount,\\nbecause these are dues, debts, duties, to be paid before self-\\ngratification exhaustive, since the totality of a devoted life\\nfails to requite their righteous demands. Hence no hour, no\\ndollar is my own to spend upon myself alone, regardless of\\nmy overwhelming indebtedness, of my unremitting and end-\\nless obligations.\\nIt must be allowed that the scheme of character and con-\\nduct here proposed, is ideal, a high ideal, unattained and\\nunattainable by any man. It calls for a declaration of truce-\\nless and internecine war upon selfishness. But selfishness so\\ninterpenetrates, in its many subtle forms and sacred guises,\\nthe human soul, interweaving its delicate fibers and gilded\\nthreads throughout our better nature, that to unravel and\\n1 The acquisitions of my appetencies are my resources. Affection giving\\nout from these does, not impoverish, but only imparts so much as can and\\nshould be spared, economically reserving what is needed for continued effi-\\nciency. Sacrifice should rarely be total. In some cases the giving, as in the\\ncase of knowledge, does not diminish the store, nor does it weaken ability,\\nbut recuperates, refreshes, strengthens. Moreover, affection stimulates ac-\\nquisition, so as to enlarge its available resources, which is the legitimate\\nfunction of the appetencies,", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 157\\nwholly displace it seems impossible. The best of men, those\\nmorally most refined, are still more or less influenced by\\nselfish propensities, and occupied with self-seeking. But to\\napproximate, as nearly as may be, the moral ideal, is the true\\nstruggle of a noble life. 1\\n1 Even Saint Paul confessed to falling grievously short, but still kept up\\nthe struggle. See Philippians, 3 12-16. Says Carlyle David s life and\\nhistory, as written for us in those psalms of his, I consider to be the truest\\nemblem ever given of a man s moral progress and warfare here below. All\\nearnest souls will ever discern in it the faithful struggle of an earnest human\\nsoul toward what is good and best. Struggle, often baffled sore, baffled\\ndown into entire wreck, yet a struggle never ended ever with tears, repen-\\ntance, true, unconquerable purpose begun anew. Poor human nature Is\\nnot a man s walking in truth always that r a succession of falls Man can\\ndo no other. In this wild element of a life he has to struggle upward now\\nfallen, now abased and ever with tears, repentance, and bleeding heart he\\nhas to rise again, struggle again, still onward. That his struggle be a faith-\\nful, unconquerable one, that is the question of questions. \u00e2\u0080\u0094Heroes and\\nHero Worship.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "158 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER X\\nSERVICE\\n80. The three expressions of the law already considered,\\nTrespass not, Be just, Do duty, upon a liberal yet fair inter-\\npretation, taking each in both its positive and its negative\\nsense, are evidently coextensive and have the same content.\\nThis will be allowed. But their common extension may per-\\nhaps be understood to be limited to the obligation to do no\\nharmful injury to another, either positively by direct aggres-\\nsion, or negatively by reserve of what he may justly demand.\\nPractically most persons take this view, holding that, if one\\ncommit no hurtful trespass, pay promptly his manifest dues,\\nbe just in thought and deed, by this simple innocence his\\nobligations are completely fulfilled. Many a man holds him-\\nself acquitted before the tribunal of his own moral judgment,\\nbefore that of his fellow men, and of his final judge, pro-\\nvided he can truly say he has committed no wrong, meaning\\nthereby that he has done no violence to patent rights, and\\nawarded to every one his established claims. This seems to\\nhave been substantially the doctrine of the Stoics. It is a\\nhigh estimate of duty, and one rarely accomplished. Never-\\ntheless, if the notion be thus limited, it is safe to affirm there\\nare obligations higher than duty. But the indicated limita-\\ntion is by no means clear, the line cannot be sharply drawn,\\nand hence it is better to extend the notion of duty to include\\nthese higher and wider obligations.\\nRecurring to the moral principle, a man has a right to\\ngratify his normal desires, we observe that not merely the", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 159\\nacquiescence, but the assistance, of his fellows, is essential\\nto this gratification. No man can live for himself alone.\\nApart from his natural longing for social intercourse, there\\nare necessities that can be supplied only by the concurrence\\nof those around, and in addition to necessities, there are many\\nnative and normal wants that require the cooperation of\\nothers. Here, then, is a just claim upon their assistance,\\nupon their service. It is his right, and if withheld, he suf-\\nfers trespass. The service cannot be compulsory, from lack\\nof power, except in rare cases, and therefore must be free,\\nwilling service. Now rights are reciprocal. If some one\\nhave a rightful claim upon some other for free service, then\\nthis other has a like claim upon him not, however, by way\\nof repayment, of compensation, but because such claim is\\noriginal with either. Hence no man may live for himself\\nalone. Every one is morally bound to render, within certain\\nlimits, willing service to his fellow men. It is due them;\\nfree, willing service is duty.\\n81. The obligation to render mutual service is univer-\\nsally recognized among men. In all the relations of life, this\\nduty, though so imperfectly fulfilled and often grossly vio-\\nlated, is nevertheless judged by all to be binding on all, and\\nits observance to be an essential part of righteous living.\\nThe prompting of instinct, antecedent to moral inference, is\\ndecisive in the matter. Imagine an extreme case. 1 Suppose\\nyourself standing on the brink of deep water in which a\\nstranger is drowning, and it needs only that you reach out\\nyour hand to save him. Ought not you to do it? If you\\nwithhold the hand, and disregarding his cries for help and\\nhis manifest need, allow him to drown, would not your in-\\n1 Extreme cases bring an informing principle more clearly to light, and\\nhence are preferable for illustration. A principle, if true, will be thoroughly\\napplicable to either extreme.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "160 OBLIGATION\\naction be instinctively self-condemned and condemned by all\\nas inhuman Suppose him to be your friend, or your only\\nbrother and, further, suppose that by letting him drown you\\nshall obtain the whole instead of half the inheritance would\\nnot even hesitation be intensely vile Ought not a man to\\nhelp his brother, his father, his mother, his child, his neigh-\\nbor, his fellow man There is but one answer in any candid\\nmind, but one among all cultured peoples.\\nAgain, let us suppose the drowning man to be known as a\\nworthless vagabond, or even as a dangerous criminal whose\\ndeath would be a blessed relief to his family, and to society\\nlet him drown? No. Is it to give him time to repent\\nand reform Hardly. Suppose him, on the contrary, to be\\na godly man, afflicted with painful incurable disease, a dis-\\ntressing burden to himself, and to everybody else let him\\ndrown No. Stretch forth thy hand. Help, in the name\\nof common humanity. The obligation of helpfulness has no\\nother condition. It is binding in every personal relation.\\nSetting aside the differences in concrete cases, there remains\\nthe common, imperative principle Thou shalt serve. 1\\ni An historical case occurring in the north of Holland, early in the year\\n1569, is narrated by Motley, in The Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part iii, ch. 5,\\nthus A poor Anabaptist, guilty of no crime but his fellowship with a per-\\nsecuted sect, had been condemned to death. He had made his escape,\\nclosely pursued by an officer of justice, across a frozen lake. It was late in\\nthe winter, and the ice had become unsound. It trembled and cracked\\nbeneath his footsteps, but he reached the shore in safety. The officer was\\nnot so fortunate. The ice gave way beneath him, and he sank into the lake,\\nuttering a cry for succor. There were none to hear him, except the fugitive\\nwhom he had been hunting. Dirk Willemzoon, for so was the Anabaptist\\ncalled, instinctively obeyed the dictates of a generous nature, returned,\\ncrossed the quaking and dangerous ice, at the peril of his life, extended his\\nhand to his enemy, and saved him from certain death. Unfortunately for\\nhuman nature, it cannot be added that the generosity of the action was met\\nby a corresponding heroism. The officer was desirous, it is true, of avoiding\\nthe responsibility of sacrificing the preserver of his life, but the burgomaster\\nof Asperen sternly reminded him to remember his oath. He accordingly", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 161\\nWe have here another form of the law, but let it be ob-\\nserved, not another law. The law is one. The several forms\\nmay be viewed as progressing in comprehension, the second\\nincluding the first, but wider, and so on, until this last ex-\\npands to embrace the larger duty of man. That it includes\\nthe others is evident, for he who rightly serves will not\\ntrespass, and will pay his just dues. But it is preferable to\\ninterpret each as coextensive with the others, only presenting\\na different phase. Thus it may fairly be regarded as a tres-\\npass, as injustice, as undutiful to withhold helpful service,\\nthe moral law being comprised and expressed in the formula\\nServe thy fellows. 1\\n82. To serve is to promote the welfare of another. He\\nwho does this is a servant. The term as applied to menials\\nhas acquired rather a bad sense, especially when the service\\nis compulsory, and, the cognate word servile is distinctly\\nopprobrious. But no bad sense, indeed only the contrary,\\ncolors the notion of voluntary service, and of this we are\\nspeaking. To serve is to confer a benefit, and he who does\\nthis is a benefactor. A teacher is a servant, though we call\\nhim a master. He is a servant directly of his pupils, indi-\\nrectly of his employers, of the public, of posterity. Poli-\\narrested the fugitive, who, on the 16th of May following, was burned to\\ndeath under the most lingering tortures.\\n1 It is worth noting that Geometry, the science of Space, arises from the\\nthree axioms of Non-inclosure, Strailness, and Possible parallelism that\\nLogic, the science of Thought, arises from the three axioms of Non-contra-\\ndiction, Identity, and Excluded middle; and that Ethics, the science of\\nRights, arises from the three axioms of Non-trespass, Justice, and Loving\\nservice. If in any of these several groups we try to deduce one of the\\naxioms from the other two, we find that the axiom to be inferred is neces-\\nsarily presupposed in the other two. Like the sides of a triangle, each\\ngives, in its own existence, the existence of the other two. They are co-\\nordinate and complementary, distinct, yet inseparable. Accordingly we\\nview the ethical axioms as different phases and expressions of an essence\\nthat is one and the same,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "162 OBLIGATION\\nticians proclaim themselves servants of the people, which\\ntruly is their office, though the profession be insincere.\\nHusband and wife, parent and child, mutually subserve each\\nother s interests.\\nA servant is a minister, and this is a title of honor. 1 Min-\\nisters of religion are servants of the Church, and as such are\\njustly honored and reverenced. To become a Minister of\\nState is to attain the highest official rank. The Prime Min-\\nister of Great Britain holds a place of exalted dignity. The\\nmotto of the Prince of Wales, descending to him from the\\nBlack Prince, is Edj tunt, I serve, and perhaps no heraldic\\ncognizance is more widely known, or more frequently quoted.\\nA king on his throne is rightly the servant of his subjects\\nand the very King of kings pronounced himself a lowly ser-\\nvant, coming not to be ministered unto but to minister, and\\nbecause of his humble service to humanity, he has the highest\\nthrone.\\nAll service implies sacrifice. In reaching forth my hand\\nto save a drowning brother, there is some expenditure of\\nmental and neural energy, perhaps not measurable, but real.\\nNo service can be rendered without sacrifice, without giving,\\nimparting what is in one s keeping. Hence the law of ser-\\nvice is a law of sacrifice. Culture, in general, is preparation\\nfor yielding a return specifically, as the cultured field is capa-\\nble of yielding fruits, so the cultivated man is one prepared,\\nby what he has acquired, to render services. When a sacri-\\nfice is complete and directed to a noble end, we call it heroic.\\nThe very essence of heroism is the entire sacrifice of self for\\n1 Minister, a servant, from Lat. minus, less cf to administer, and ad-\\nministration. Master, from Lat. magister, from majus, more cf magistrate.\\nIn the Virginia Bill of Rights, 2, it was perhaps first (June, 1776) authori-\\ntatively declared: That all power is vested in, and consequently derived\\nfrom, the people that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all\\ntimes amenable to them. This great democratic principle is the gift of\\nChristianity. See infra, 146, note.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 163\\nthe sake of others. It is the object of unbounded admiration\\nand praise. In ancient days it became distinctly a cult.\\nBut heroes and hero worship are not peculiar to antiquity,\\nfor always and everywhere the heart of humanity responds\\nto the call. The heroic sacrifice of the great servant of all\\nis commanding, not merely the admiration, but the adoration\\nof mankind. 1\\n1 Gladness be with thee, Helper of our world\\nI think this is the authentic sign and seal\\nOf Godship, that it ever waxes glad,\\nAnd more glad, until gladness blossoms, bursts,\\nInto a rage to suffer for mankind,\\nAnd recommence at sorrow drops like seed\\nAfter the blossom, ultimate of all.\\nSay, does the seed scorn the earth and seek the sun?\\nSurely it bas no other end and aim\\nThan to drop, once more die into the ground,\\nTaste cold and darkness and oblivion there\\nAnd thence rise, tree-like grow through pain to joy,\\nMore joy and most joy, do man good again.\\nBrowning, in Balaustion s Adventure, 1.1917 sq.; spoken of Herakles.\\nIt is fitting here to observe that standard literature, especially of history,\\nbiography, and prose and poetic fiction, owes its position largely, perhaps\\nchiefly, to its ethical elements, thereby appealing to the profound interest\\nwhich men universally take in questions of right and wrong. Narratives of\\nmere adventure, sentiments, mysteries, intricate plots, novelties, extrava-\\ngancies, though of highest rhetorical finish, command but a passing atten-\\ntion, or have but an ephemeral popularity while such as rightly apply\\nethical principles to life, hold permanently a high place in the esteem of the\\nworld. A skillful account of difficult duties well done, of brave endurance\\nby an innocent sufferer, of resistance to sore temptation or the fall and\\nrising again of the tempted, of stern repulsion of aggression, of struggles for\\nliberty, of the heroic self-sacrifice of patriots, never fails to stir the heart of\\nour common humanity, and to inspire a noble emulation. Very familiar to\\nus all are the sturdy manhood and piety of Crusoe, the heroism of Leonidas\\nand his Spartan band, the lofty steadfastness of Luther, the warning cry of\\nd Assas, the simple truthfulness of Jeanie Deans, it being divinely impossi-\\nble for her to lie, the vacillation of Prince Hamlet, the torture of Othello,\\nthe unscrupulous ambition of Lady Macbeth, the wifely faithfulness of\\nImogene, the .mmaculate chastity of Isabella, and the filial piety of Cordelia.\\nMinor incidents and characters are mere accessories. Shakespeare s most\\nfamous works, resolving questions of casuistry or developing the inevitable\\nconsequences of injustice, oppression and crime, are ethical treatises. They", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "164 OBLIGATION\\n83. The constant service demanded by moral law is not\\nto be indiscriminate. One is not to serve all others equally.\\nOur obligations to our fellows vary very greatly in extent.\\nTo near relatives we are bound for more service than to those\\nfurther removed first, because the possibilities are greater\\nsecondly, because service creates debt, and where intercourse\\nis intimate the exchange of benefactions is more frequent;\\nand thirdly, because in certain cases, as of husband and wife,\\nthe minute interdependence calls for minute reciprocation.\\nThe extent of obligation is to be judged by the law of tres-\\npass. My service is due to one in so far as I do not thereby\\ntrespass on the rightful claims of some other. I may, for\\nexample, distribute my fortune in alms so widely as to violate\\nthe rights of my children. Likewise I am bound to promote\\nthe general welfare of the state only in so far as I do not\\nthereby trespass on the rights of individual citizens, or of\\nneighboring states, either by encroachment, or by transferring\\nto either the service due to the other.\\nMoreover, it should be particularly observed that the alien\\nservice required does not preclude the agent from participat-\\ning in the benefit conferred. When a man labors for the\\nwelfare of his family without thinking of or caring for his\\nown individual profit, still, as a member of the family, he\\nshares in the beneficence. When one serves the community\\nor his country, either by promoting or by defending the com-\\nmon interests, it is evident that, since the interests are\\ncommon, he thereby enlarges his own liberty, and guards his\\nown well being. If he does these things selfishly, himself\\nhis end, then he meanly degrades his family, his country, so\\nfar as in his power lies, to merely useful means which treat-\\nment is unworthy, is a trespass, whatever be the result. But\\nif, with no thought of his own interest or gain, he does those\\ndiscuss matter of deepest and of universal interest, and constitute a hand-\\nbook of morals for mankind. See infra, 133, note.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 165\\nthings unselfishly, making perhaps many painful personal\\nsacrifices, still he shares in the beneficial results, is repaid\\nand rewarded and even should his efforts fail, he neverthe-\\nless enjoys the satisfaction of disinterested intent. Moral\\nlaw does not prohibit any one from acting in a way that shall\\nbenefit himself, but only from thus acting in order that he\\nmay benefit himself.\\nThese modifying considerations forestall the criticism usu-\\nally and justly applied to strict altruism, that if every one\\nshould be constantly sacrificing his own welfare for that of\\nothers, there would be no permanent recipient of benefaction,\\nand the perfection of morality on this basis would be not\\nonly a universal disregard of welfare, but also its annihila-\\ntion. But according to the modified altruism of the present\\ntreatise, moral law does not call for such absolute self-sacri-\\nfice, for the extinction of the natural and healthful desire for\\none s own welfare. 1 It forbids this only as a personal end\\nand the gratification of the desire is provided for, in the\\neconomy of human nature, by the community of interests, so\\nthat whatever promotes the welfare of another redounds to\\nthe benefactor; for, although, in the existing disorder of\\nsociety, the objective return fail entirely, still the subjective\\nsanction is abundant reward.\\n84. In view of the right to service arises the question,\\nin what manner and to what extent may one use another\\nperson. According to Kant, never as a means, but only as\\nan end. He says The foundation of this principle is\\nRational nature exists as an end in itself. Accordingly\\nthe practical imperative will be as follows So act as to treat\\nhumanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another,\\n1 Nor does Christianity make this call, though it is often charged with so\\ndoing. See supra, 79, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "166 OBLIGATION\\nin every case as an end withal, and never as a means only. 1\\nHe argues that to make use of another person as a means\\nwhereby to accomplish one s end, degrades him from a person\\ninto a mere thing, thus violating his dignity, his worth as a\\nman. Since this is to wrong him grievously, he should be\\ntreated only as an end in himself.\\nThe doctrine is striking, and with qualification it is true.\\nWe should never use another as a means, unless with his\\nown full knowledge and free consent. If, without this, I\\nmyself be used as a mere tool, then, on discovering it, I am\\nindignant, feeling I have been treated unworthily, degraded\\nand wronged, according to the measure of the abuse. But\\nwith the consensus of all parties, the using each other as\\nmeans to rightful ends is justifiable. Indeed, the greater part\\nof the amenities of life, the enjoyment and benefit of social\\nintercourse, kindness, politeness, could not otherwise exist.\\nSuch reciprocal use does not degrade, it ennobles; and by\\nconsenting to become an instrumental means, one becomes a\\nparticipant in beneficence. This privilege of using others is\\nlimited also to rightful ends. One may never seek to use\\nanother even with consent in a way or to an end that is\\nwrong for this would be inducing him to become a partner\\nin wrong doing, which would be doing him a wrong. The\\npoint in Kant s doctrine that I should make myself in mine\\nown person an end, we have previously rejected as the essence\\nof egoism. On the contrary, I ought ever and actively to\\nconstitute myself an intelligent and willing means to the\\nwelfare of others, which is altruism.\\n85. A very important corollary from the general doc-\\ntrine of obligatory service is stewardship. Since unintermit-\\nting service is due from each one to others, according to his\\n1 From Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten, Auflage der K. and S.,\\nSeite 57 Abbott s translation, p. 67.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 167\\nrelations, it follows that his time, his energy, his ability, his\\ncapital, his estate, whatever he may have in possession or\\nacquire, is in reality not his own, but the property of those\\nothers, and he himself is their steward. The transient in-\\nfluence one may have on his surroundings, his daily walk and\\nconversation, his health of mind and body, his life itself as\\nthe basis of all, these are held in trust, and are to be devoted\\nto the well being of his fellow men! 1 They are the owners\\nhe, their agent. All is due, all is debt, ever paying, never\\npaid. Not less is comprehended in the law of service. 2\\n1 Hence the deep criminality of suicide. Stoicism came short of the\\ndoctrine of service, and taught that the sage is lord of his life. From this\\nteaching and the example of Zeno, together with the pessimism of the death-\\ncounseling Hegesias, resulted the horrible prevalence of suicide among the\\nancient Greeks and Romans. On the battle field of Philippi (b.c 42), when\\ntheir cause was lost, Cassius, Titinius, and hundreds of the nobles of Rome,\\ntogether with Brutus, the noblest Roman of them all, in despair of the\\nRepublic, took refuge in self-slaughter. These did not see that suicide is\\nthe vile, and wicked deed of a coward and thief. La voix de l honneur de\\nl homme lui cria-t-elle que se soustraire par la mort a la responsabilite de\\nses acts est une insigne lachete\\\\ Si irreparable que paraisse le mal qu on a\\nfait, il y a toujours areparer. Gaboriau. Le suicide est un vol fait\\nau genre humain. Rousseau. It is more, it is the fraud of a trustee,\\na total violation of a most sacred trust, it is robbery of both man and God\\na strange mixture of cowardice and rashness. With open-eyed timidity he\\nflees from the passing ills of life, and with blind temerity rushes unbidden\\ninto the eternal presence, hurling himself against the thick bosses of Jeho-\\nvah s buckler.\\n2 In Measure for Measure, Act i, sc. 1, 1. 30 sq., the Duke, a personifica-\\ntion of watchful and retributive providence, says\\nThyself and thy belongings\\nAre not thine own so proper as to waste\\nThyself upon thy virtues, they on thee.\\nHeaven doth with us as we with torches do,\\nNot light them for themselves for if our virtues\\nDid not go forth of us, twere all alike\\nAs if we had them not. Spirits are not finely touch d\\nBut to fine issues, nor Nature never lends\\nThe smallest scruple of her excellence,\\nBut, like a thrifty goddess, she determines\\nHerself the glory of a creditor,\\nBoth thanks and use.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "168 OBLIGATION\\nWe are bound, as trustees, not merely for the keeping,\\nbut also for the increase, the accumulation of our holdings.\\nOne s talents, whether of gold, silver or iron, of brain, brawn,\\nbone, of intellect, sensibility, will, are all, whether great or\\nsmall, to be put to usury, and a strict account rendered. 1\\nThe servant who kept his Lord s pound laid up in a napkin\\nwas condemned as a wicked servant. Possessions are to be\\nused, and used rightly, imbursed and disbursed, as dictated\\nby the law of service, which demands a continuous distribu-\\ntion of our gifts. 2\\nA further corollary is the obligation to guard and to de-\\nfend possessions. Obviously one is bound to secure what is\\nintrusted to his keeping against all comers, otherwise he can-\\nnot fulfill the obligation to use it in alien service. Guardian-\\nship is itself a service, since it preserves for others their\\nproperty, which preservation is, indeed, a very necessary part\\nof the general service due. Hence my rights are to be\\nwatchfully and zealously guarded. The property in my\\nhands must be carefully protected, to prevent any trespass.\\nMy personal liberty must be maintained free from unwar-\\nranted interference. 3 My bodily welfare, and especially my\\nlife must be courageously defended against hurtful and\\ndeadly violence. The powerful instinct of self-preservation\\nindicates the sacred duty of self-defense, and the original\\n1 Talent, a weight or sum of money, natural gift or ability, inclination.\\nFr. from Lat. from Grk. See Trench, Study of Words. We derive the\\nsense of ability from the parable in Matthew xxv [cf. Luke 19 11-27], our\\ntalents being gifts of God. Skeat.\\n2 The pernicious vice of betting or gambling in any of its many forms is\\nsufficiently condemned by the fact that it is a misuse of trust funds. Money\\nis transferred without equivalent, and while the winner takes something for\\nnothing, which is clearly akin to theft, the loser abandons his charge,\\nwhereby somebody other than himself, somebody to whom his service is\\ndue, suffers a loss, a wrong, a trespass. See supra, 39.\\n8 Le premier des biens est la liberty. Le plus saint des devoirs de\\nl homme est de la conserver. Dumas.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 169\\nimpulse of natural affection shows the no less sacred duty of\\ndefending the lives intrusted to our care. Violence must be\\nrepelled, if need be, by counter violence. But defense\\nshould not be allowed to pass over, as it strongly tends to\\ndo, into mere vengeance. The impulse to revenge is a male-\\nvolent desire, and hence abnormal, and hence unjustifiable.\\nYet retaliation is sometimes the best and indeed the only\\nmeans of effective defense, in which case it is duty. 1\\n86. We can imagine a life conducted throughout accord-\\ning to the principles thus far expounded. One might con-\\nceivably be governed, in general and in particular, by a\\nsense of duty, duty being here taken in the limited meaning\\nof outward obedience to the law of trespass, justice and ser-\\nvice, inspired by respect for the law, recognized as demand-\\ning thus much but no more. The whole life being one of\\ninnocence and beneficence, duty is said to be perfectly ful-\\nfilled by this external conformity to the law simply out of\\nrespect for the law, a profound reverence for all pervading\\nmoral obligation, and this alone is what should determine all\\nhuman conduct. 2\\n1 See supra, 40 and infra, 136 sq., where an application of this doc-\\ntrine of defense shows more fully its great importance. But let it be\\nobserved here that defense is the sole warrant for interference in another s\\nliberty. In a profound and wide sense I am my brother s keeper, and must\\ndefend him from the trespass of others, which is a warrant for my interfer-\\nence in their liberty. Conversely, I am bound to defend them from him in\\ncase he attempts doing a wrong, and thus have a warrant for my interfer-\\nence in his liberty. See supra, 32.\\n2 Such is the doctrine of Kant. He says Duty is the necessity of act-\\ning from respect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the\\neffect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it. Now an\\naction done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and\\nwith it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine\\nthe will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this\\npractical law, and consequently the maxim to follow this law even to the\\nthwarting of all my inclinations. Grundlegung, u. s. w. Auflage der\\nR. and S., Seite 20; Abbott s trans., pp. 22, 23. The implication is that", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "170 OBLIGATION\\nThe rigorism of this stoical doctrine is impressive and\\nimposing. It is a severe and noble conception of duty, a\\nhigh ideal. But observe, it does not merely disregard the\\naffections it requires their suppression. If we judge a man\\nto be governed in all his conduct by a sense of duty, fulfill-\\ning carefully, anxiously, assiduously his many obligations,\\nliving a life of sacrificial service, purely because of respect\\nfor the law of duty, we are filled with admiration for so lofty\\na character but if we judge him at the same time destitute\\nof love, we admire him as we admire an iceberg. There is\\nan instinctive repugnance to a person human, yet not hu-\\nmane. And if we find he has laboriously extinguished the\\nyearnings of natural affection in favor of an overruling and\\nexclusive conception of absolute duty, we turn from him as\\nfrom a monstrous and repulsive prodigy.\\nThe sense of duty, rising high but stopping with good\\nworks, fails to fulfill the law s demands. In the moral ideal\\nof humanity, there is something higher than this rigid stoi-\\ncism. 1 Were I sick and suffering, and did my friend serve\\nlove is not a duty for this conception of obligation excludes all personal\\ninclination, teaching that an action determined by love alone is not a moral\\naction, and that one wherein love mingles with duty is morally impure,\\nbeing contaminated by inclination.\\n1 The poets sometimes rise above the philosophers. Lowell, in The\\nVision of Sir Launfal, tells of the knight going to search for the Holy\\nGrail, who, as he rode out of his castle s gate, saw a leper awaiting alms.\\nNot moved with compassion (Mark, 1: 41), but with loathing, he tossed him a\\npiece of gold, and without a word, rode on.\\nThe leper raised not the gold from the dust\\nBetter to me the poor man s crust,\\nBetter the blessing of the poor,\\nThough I turn me empty from his door.\\nThat is no true alms which the hand can hold\\nHe gives nothing but worthless gold\\nWho gives from a sense of duty.\\nThe Holy Supper is kept indeed\\nIn whatso we share with another s need\\nNot what we give, but Avhat we share,\\nFor the gift without the giver is bare.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 171\\nme merely from a sense of duty, I should be displeased, I\\nwould tell him to begone, I will hire a nurse. Is it suffi-\\ncient for a father to guard and promote the welfare of his\\nchild simply out of respect for his rational obligation? Shall\\na mother tend her babe with all the wonderful, beautiful\\nsolicitude and ready self-sacrifice that win our adoration,\\nmerely because she knows she ought so to do No, there\\nis a higher, nobler impulse, maternal love. Should a hus-\\nband and wife serve each other merely from a sense of duty,\\nit would be a just cause of dissatisfaction, and perhaps of\\ndisunion. The conception of duty, enlarged beyond inno-\\ncence to include beneficence, comes short of obligation. If\\nit be thus limited, then it is legality, not morality, and again\\nthere is something higher than duty, something nobler than\\nservice. We heartily reject a scheme of ethics implying\\nthat a man is under no obligation to love his mother or his\\ncountry, but should purify his character by eliminating all\\nsuch inclinations a scheme that clearly, distinctly enacts\\nThou shalt not love thy neighbor.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "172 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER XI\\nCHARITY\\n87. An argument already offered, having its basis in the\\ngeneral principle that the natural or constitutional powers\\nof man ought to fulfill their normal functions, or, more spe-\\ncifically, that every one has a right to gratify his normal\\ndesires, a right being a duty, concludes the appetites and\\nappetencies to be auxiliary to the affections, which are thus\\nnormally supreme. 1 From this it was directly inferred that\\nself cannot rightly be an end. With equal cogency it is\\nimplied that the object of affection is the normal and rights\\nful end of all endeavor. In other words, the affections,\\nincluded under the general name love, are obligatory they\\nought, in due manner and measure, to be gratified. The\\nmoral law, found in the original and innermost nature of\\nman, enjoins that he love his fellow man.\\nConsider the meaning of affection, love, charity, benevo-\\nlence, these terms being taken synonymously. Love is a\\ndesire, an impulse or inclination toward others, disposing\\none to give out from his own resources what may benefit\\nthem. Let it be kept clearly in mind that love is strictly a\\ndesire. It should not be confused with volition, though the\\nsynonym, benevolence, partakes, etymologically, of the voli-\\ntion for love is simply the causative antecedent of the\\nvolitional endeavor. 2 It is not a feeling, though attended\\ni See supra, 78, 79.\\n2 Benevolence, from Lat. bene, well, and volens, wishing, willing. Bene-\\nficence, from bene, and faciens, doing. Endeavor, from Fr. en, in, and", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "CHABITY 173\\nby peculiar feelings being neither an emotion, though the\\nname is commonly applied to its attendant emotions nor a\\nsentiment, though the sentiments that normally accompany\\nit act and react powerfully to stimulate the desire. Love is\\nproperly and definitely a desire, relative to a sentient object,\\nwhose welfare it would promote. 1\\n88. Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of\\nhigh authority, Love cannot be commanded, for it is an\\naffection, and not a volition which alone is subject to com-\\nmand. 2 But love, benevolence, charity, pathological love,\\ndevoir, duty, Charity, love; from Lat. caritatem, ace. of caritas, dearness,\\nfrom cams, dear; c/., cherish, caress. We use the beautiful word charity,\\ndydirrj, in this wide sense which is imbedded in our early literature, not ap-\\nproving the reduction to almsgiving and like external acts, which it has suf-\\nfered in common speech. The Revisers of The English New Testament\\nunfortunately make the concession, and in 1 Corinthians, xiii, replace it\\nby love, which term, besides marring the rhythm, is quite as ambiguous in\\nusage, and as liable to be misunderstood. The words chastity and virtue\\nhave suffered a like reduction to a certain narrow and less delicate sense;\\nsee supra, 70, note.\\n1 The so-called love of complacency especially should be distinguished\\nfrom the love of benevolence. Complacency is the quiet, pleasurable feeling\\nthat arises on contemplating with approbation the character or conduct of\\nanother. It hardly differs from the feeling of approbation, and as one may\\nhave self-approbation, so also he may be self-complacent. Complacency is\\nstrictly a feeling, a sentiment, and not a desire, and it is a misnomer to call\\nit love. The love of benevolence alone is love. Hence it is quite possible\\nto love one whose character and conduct are abhorrent. Jesus loved both\\nJudas and John, but his love of John was mingled with and strengthened by\\ncomplacency.\\n2 Love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for\\nduty s sake even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination, nay,\\nare even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practi-\\ncal love [i.e. service], and not pathological [i.e. affection], a love which is\\nseated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense, in principles of action,\\nand not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be com-\\nmanded. It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand\\nthose passages of Scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor,\\neven our enemy. Kant, Grundlegung, S. 19 Abbott s trans., p. 21. See", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "174 OBLIGATION\\nas distinguished from practical love which is not properly\\nlove but willing service, can be commanded though truly it\\nis an affection, becoming active only as the subject is affected\\nby an amiable object, that is, an object susceptible of wel-\\nfare. For, although every command is primarily addressed\\nto the will, yet the will, having, by means of voluntary atten-\\ntion, indirect control of all the mental faculties, carries out\\nthe command, if not thwarted by passion, in impressing its\\nsubordinates into the required order. Otherwise the sub-\\njective springs of conduct could have no moral quality.\\nEven belief, a feeling of assurance, of conviction, is com-\\nmanded in the presence of truth and the command is obeyed,\\nand the feeling is induced, by giving attention, sincere heed,\\nto the presented truth. 1 Love, charity, a desire for another s\\nwelfare, may likewise be commanded in the presence of\\namiability, and the command obeyed, the affection induced,\\nby giving like heed to the amiable capacity of the object.\\nHence the love of benevolence can be commanded, since it\\ncan be voluntarily induced, nourished and invigorated.\\nNot only can this love be commanded, but it is com-\\nmanded. The moral law is embedded in and arises from the\\nvery constitution of human nature. Desires awakened by\\nobjects and guided by intelligence are the motives of volun-\\ntary conduct. We have seen that among these the affections\\nare normally supreme, rightly subjecting all other motive\\nimpulses to their ends. Therefore we find that, in order to\\nin Luke, 6: 27-38, where this practical love specifically is commanded.\\nElsewhere Kant says: Love to God, considered as an inclination (patholo-\\ngical love), is impossible, for he is not an object of the senses. The same\\naffection toward men is possible no doubt, but cannot be commanded, for\\nit is not in the power of any man to love anyone at command; therefore it\\nis only practical love that is meant in that pith of all laws, Love God above\\neverything, and thy neighbor as thyself. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,\\nAuflage der K. und S., Seite 210; Abbott s trans., p. 250.\\ni See Supra, 60.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "CHAEITT 175\\nfulfill their natural functions, the affections must have not\\nmerely free but preeminent exercise, and that this is essen-\\ntially the supreme law of humanity demanding reverent\\nobedience.\\n89. The affections having different objects, have re-\\nceived various names as, conjugal, parental, filial and\\nfraternal love, friendship, kindness, patriotism, philanthropy.\\nIn each of these the affection varies both in kind and degree.\\nThe differences in kind are due to differences in the rela-\\ntions. The differences in degree are regulated by the pos-\\nsibilities. We are not bound to love all others equally, this\\nbeing unnatural. Many ties, many obligations. Those most\\nnearly related are bound to love each other with a special\\nardor as, parents and children.\\nThe sentiment of gratitude excites love for a benefactor\\nor neighbor. It enters largely along with friendship and\\nkindness into the forms and substance of true politeness,\\nwhich is love in littles, and in all its grades is essential to\\nhigh moral culture, and is ennobling. 1\\nWe are bound to love those whose character and conduct\\n1 Friendship is discussed by Aristotle at length in Nic. Eth. bks. viii and\\nix. On gratitude, see Elements of Psychology, 254. The royal law, Thou\\nshalt love thy neighbor as thyself, suggested the reasonable question, Who\\nis my neighbor Luke, 10 25 sq. The answer, in the parable, is, The\\nSamaritan was neighbor to the wounded man, because he showed mercy on\\nhim. Hence the wounded man was bound to love the Samaritan as himself.\\nThis is the obligation of gratitude to a benefactor. The parable does not, as\\ncommonly supposed, teach philanthropy, but gratitude, and the love that\\nwould requite benefaction. My benefactor is my neighbor, come he from\\nthe far east or west, from a despised race or a hostile camp, and I am told\\nto love him as myself. The added injunction, Go and do thou likewise,\\nis philanthropic in tone, but it is no part of the parable, no part of the an-\\nswer. There is no Scripture commanding us to love everybody as in fact we\\nlove ourselves. The new commandment, John, 13 34, is to a special class,\\nand sets up a higher and purer standard. See supra, 74, note, and 48,\\nnote.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "176 OBLIGATION\\nwe abhor, cherishing the desire to remedy the evil in them,\\nand otherwise to better them. We should love even a\\nwicked and active enemy righteous defensive resentment\\nbeing quite consistent with the impulse to promote, not his\\nevil way, but his well-being whenever opportunity offers or\\ncan be found, and in so far as we do not thereby trespass on\\nsome other. In civilized warfare after a victory the wounded\\nabandoned by the defeated are cared for humanely. This is\\nlove to enemies we feel the obligation, and call it humanity.\\nWe are bound to love all men of all races, those in the\\nremotest regions of the globe, our very antipodes, yes, and\\neven the generation yet unborn, in a due manner and meas-\\nure. This is the obligation of philanthropy. 1\\n90. Service fulfilling the law must be, not merely willing\\nservice, but loving service. We have seen that a life of\\nsacrificial service, of active beneficence, determined only by\\nrespect for the law, fails of completeness. 2 Though I be-\\nstow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it\\nprofiteth me nothing. It is essential to duty that love be its\\nspring. The service due is loving service. Let the duplex\\nform of this phrase be noted. Loving is desiring, a subjec-\\ntive motive it is benevolence, well-wishing. Service is\\nacting, an objective motion it is beneficence, well-doing.\\nServing is the normal outcome, the natural consequent, of\\nloving they are psychological correlatives. Neither is com-\\nplete without the other.\\nFor, how is it possible that one should sincerely, willingly,\\nintentionally endeavor to promote another s welfare, unless\\n1 Friends, parents, neighbors, first it will embrace,\\nOur country next, and next all human race.\\nWide and more wide, th o erflowing of the mind\\nTakes every creature in of every kind.\\nEarth smiles around, in boundless beauty dressed,\\nAnd heaven reflects its image in her breast. Pope.\\n2 See supra, 86.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "CHARITY 177\\nhe desire the other s welfare All voluntary effort is con-\\nditioned on an antecedent desire, so that the command of\\nintelligent, willing service is a command of intelligent, loving\\nservice. One cannot sincerely strive for another s welfare\\nunless he desire it, and this is love. If it be said, the desire\\nis simply to obey, we reply, a desire to obey a command to\\nserve, is a desire to serve as commanded.\\nOn the other hand, how can there be love not followed by\\nservice As faith without works is dead, so also is love\\nwithout service. If it have any life, it is at least ready and\\nwatchful of opportunity to serve. For generous love impels\\nto service. He who loves will serve, will render willing,\\nactive, self-sacrificing service. Also he who loves will be\\njust, will pay all dues, will not trespass. Bear ye one\\nanother s burdens, and so fulfill the law. Owe no man any-\\nthing, save to love one another, this being the only debt that\\ncannot be finally discharged for he that loveth another hath\\nfulfilled the law. Love is the fulfillment of the law. 1\\nAll the various presentations of the moral law heretofore\\nconsidered, we now find to be summed in the law of loving\\nservice, Thou shalt love and serve. And indeed we see that\\neven herein is superfluity, for the whole moral law, the total\\nof human obligation, is completely and comprehensively\\n1 See Galatians, 6:2; Romans, 13:8, 10. Love is natural, normal;\\nhate, unnatural, abnormal. It is to the credit of human nature, that,\\nexcept where its selfishness is brought into play, it loves more readily than\\nit hates. Hatred, by a gradual and quiet process, will even be transformed\\ninto love, unless the change be impeded by a continually new irritation of\\nthe original feeling of hostility. Hawthorne, Scarlet Letter, ch. 13.\\nDas Gesetz der Liebe soil walten, und was das Naturgesetz in den\\nDingen, das ist das Sittengesetz und das Recht im Menchen. Auer-\\nbach, Auf der Hbhe.\\nFirst of all was Chaos next in order,\\nEarth with her spacious hosom then\\nLove, who is preeminent among the Immortals.\\nHesiod, as quoted by Aristotle in Metaphysics, bk. i, ch. 4.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "178 OBLIGATION\\nsummed in the single categorical imperative of one syllable,\\nlove. Thou shalt love, is the perfect law, the law of love. 1\\n91. Progress in moral culture consists in transforming\\nfear into respect, and respect into love. With primitive char-\\nacters, and even with many highly cultured otherwise, the fear\\nof penalty is the chief, often the only, motive of obedience.\\nTo this may be added as one step higher, the hope of reward.\\nIn this is an appeal to the selfish propensities usually pre-\\ndominant in crude humanity. They are not thereby ap-\\nproved, but used to bring the man to at least outward\\nobedience, a step toward inward culture. Thus the law is a\\npedagogue, leading men upward. 2\\nA thoughtful consideration of one s relations, a clear recog-\\nnition of the law in us, inspires respect for its mandate, and\\nan impulse to observance. Herein is a passing away from\\nthe influence of threats and promises. These are lost to\\n1 General benevolence is the great law of the whole moral creation.\\nButler, Sermon viii.\\nO high imperative, how dost thou impend\\nOver our guilty consciences, that know\\nAnd yet ignore, fear yet transgress, admire\\nAs -best, and yet pursue the way that s worse\\nWhat statesman, or what scholar, or what man\\nIs there who knows not that this law, if kept,\\nWould work man s perfect weal who doth not know\\nThat man was made to keep the law of love,\\nAnd keeps it not that love sums all his duty,\\nAll his need and, did it once prevail,\\nLove would ensure all right, include all virtue,\\nCompel obedience to each lower law,\\nPerfect man s being and fulfill his end\\nHenry W. Bankin, The Law of Love.\\nThe law ordained, Thou shalt love, and love ordained that law. Man\\ncould not keep it. Then love ordained the gospel, God so loved. Thus,\\nThou shalt love, is the whole of The Law; and, God so loved, is the whole\\nof The Gospel. This is so clear, that it is at once Law and Gospel for chil-\\ndren and for savages and yet it is so deep in its limpid clearness that no\\nphilosopher can fathom it. Duncan, Colloquia Peripatetica.\\n2 See Galatians, 3 24, 25 2 Corinthians, 5:11; and cf. supra, 52, last\\nparagraph.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "CHARITY 179\\nsight, and obedience is determined simply by respect for the\\nlaw. 1 The vast all-pervading sense of moral obligation, a\\nwide comprehensive view of duty, an obedience to the law\\nfor its own sake superior to its sanctions, produce nobility\\nand excellence in moral character. Yet this ideal is cold,\\nhard, stern, repressing as weakness the natural play of tender\\nsympathy, of generous sentiment, of warm inclination toward\\nothers, maintaining a stoical indifference to their weal or\\nwoe, and giving help exclusively out of respect for the law\\nof service. As a scheme of morals, this cannot be purged of\\negoism, of selfishness for necessarily it holds that the so-\\ncalled duties to self are equally or even more imperative than\\nduties to another, those being the basis from which all other\\nduties arise.\\nIn the still higher ideal, cold respect for law is gradually,\\nas culture progresses, replaced by charity, which is the bond\\nof perfectness. As in the second grade the sanctions of the\\nlaw are lost to sight, so in this highest grade the law itself\\ndisappears from view, and its requirements are fulfilled with-\\nout reference to its mandate. It is the fruit of moral\\ngrowth that both subjective and objective activities accord\\nwith the law, not because of its pressure, but because the\\norder and harmony of the natural powers have been restored,\\nand the man does what is right because his dominant im-\\npulses lead thereto, and his free preference finds therein his\\nhighest gratification. He renders loving service in due meas-\\n1 It argues a low degree of insight into the nature and dignity of man,\\nsays Froebel, if the incentive of reward in a future world is supposed to\\nbe needed in order to insure a conduct worthy of his nature and destiny. If\\nthe human being is enabled at an early period to live in accordance with\\ngenuine humanity, he can and should at all times appreciate the dignity of\\nhis being and at all times the consciousness of having lived worthily and in\\naccordance with the requirements of his being, should be his highest reward,\\nneeding no addition of external recompense. The Education of Man,\\n88. See supra, 86.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "180 OBLIGATION\\nure to his fellow men, this having become the habit, the\\nsecond nature of his being. He does by nature the things\\nof the law, and having no law, is a law unto himself, showing\\nthe work of the law written in his heart. For love knows\\nno law other than its own impulse. 1\\nObviously, in the economy of human nature, this progres-\\nsion does not take place uniformly. A criminal at war with\\nsociety at large may be dutiful to his family in other matters\\nbecause of strong domestic affection, and in so far fulfill the\\nlaw of love. The average good citizen knows little and\\ncares less about the criminal code. Its enactments are not\\nfor him. He has not the slightest disposition to do what it\\nforbids, and orders his actions without reference to it. The\\npenitentiary, the jail, the gallows, have no terrors for him.\\nThe police, the courts, the judiciary, he recognizes as social\\nmachinery devised and maintained for the protection of his\\nrights. They have no other meaning for him. He has risen\\nabove the great body of civil law, and is not, properly speak-\\ning, an obedient, but a law-abiding citizen who, without\\n1 See Colossians, 3:14; 1 John, 4:18. See the progress as stated in\\n2 Peter, 1: 5-7. He who does good with inclination, and with love to his\\nneighbor, stands on a higher plane than he who is doing it with a constant\\nvictory over himself. Stahl, Rechts- und Staats-Lehre, i, 158. Sympa-\\nthy, fellowship in the needs of others, philanthropy, is the source from\\nwhich flows everything that Ethics prescribes under the name of duties of\\nvirtue and love. It is the source of all actions which have moral value, the\\nsole genuine moral motive, and the firmest and surest pledge of moral de-\\nportment. Schopenhauer, Grund-Probleme, 133.\\nIt is curious to note that the words of St Paul, in Romans, 2 14, oItol\\nvdfjiov /it) exovres iavroTs elcriv v6/ulos, these, not having a law, are a law unto\\nthemselves, have a counterpart in Aristotle s Ethics, bk. iv, ch. 8, \u00c2\u00a710, 6 8r)\\nxaptas Kal eXevdtpios Si/rws olov i 6fxos v eavrcp, the refined and free-spirited\\nwill behave, as being a law unto himself. Again in Galatians, 5 23, we\\nfind Kara twv tolo6twv ovk ttlv p6/jlos, against such there is no law and\\nin Aristotle s Politico,, bk. iii, ch. 13, we have Kara 5\u00c2\u00a3 tQv toloOtwv otic e m\\nv6/xos dvrol yap etVi v6/ios y against such there is no law for they themselves\\nare a law.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "CHARITY 181\\nthought of the law, governs his conduct by his own cultured\\npreferences. In his intercourse with friends and acquaint-\\nances, he may still have duties that are irksome and repug-\\nnant which he fulfills from a sense of duty, and therein feels\\nthe tense bonds of obligation. His further moral growth\\nrequires the enlarging and deepening of charitable sympa-\\nthies, so that his conduct may be determined more and more\\nby love, less and less by law doing always the right thing,\\nnot because he ought so to do, but because he wants to do\\njust that thing rather than any other.\\n92. We have seen that so long as one acts merely from\\nrespect for the law, he is in bondage to the law. 1 He has\\npassed perhaps with many a fierce struggle out from a de-\\ngrading slavery to appetites and passions and unbridled lusts,\\nfor of what a man is overcome of the same is he also brought\\ninto bondage, into a voluntary and honorable bondage. His\\nconduct becomes uniform, reduced to the order of facts that\\nought to be, regulated by principles conforming to moral\\nlaw. This is a dignified attitude, a high and rare attain-\\nment. But the man is in bonds, rigid, inexorable, though\\nhonorable, bound under a law that knows no concession or\\nrelaxation. By many moralists this is called liberty. Surely\\nit is not liberty, but strict, the strictest, bondage. It is\\nmoral necessity. Regulus said I must return. Luther\\ncried I can do no otherwise. Where, then, is liberty, the\\nperfect liberty for which man so ardently longs 2\\nEvidently when one does more and more as the law\\nrequires, not by virtue of the obligation, but by virtue of\\nhis own native or cultured disposition, he is passing from\\ni In\u00c2\u00a7 72, supra; cf. \u00c2\u00a786.\\n2 See 2 Peter, 2 :19. For the several kinds of necessity, see supra, 44,\\nnote. Christians are servants, bond-servants, slaves, 8ov\\\\oi. They are no\\nlonger their own they are bought with a price. See Romans, 6 10-22\\n1 Corinthians, 7: 21-23; Luke, 2 29.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "182 OBLIGATION\\nunder bondage into the realm of liberty. When love takes\\nthe place of constraining duty, the law ceases to be law. Then\\nhe is no longer under law, but under grace then, but not\\ntill then, is he perfectly free. The law commands, Thou\\nshalt love and when through obedience love has become the\\ndominating impulse, confirmed and established, the law as\\nlaw has disappeared. Thus perfect love is perfect liberty. 1\\nThen all doing is righteous yet free, since it is done in\\nfree preference to any other. Here and here only is the\\nlonged for liberty to be found. In our imperfection and\\nstruggles with self, which never cease, this highest ideal is\\nnever fully realized in human life. The imperfect person\\nis one conscious of obligation. The perfect person is one\\nconscious of holiness. Perfect persons are not under law;\\nso that we may truly say the holy angels and the Deity are\\nunder no obligation to do what they do, but being perfect\\nin love, are perfect in work, and perfect in liberty. Heaven\\nknows no law.\\n1 Love and liberty grow out of the same root in the reality of their\\nmeaning, as in the origin of the words which express it both arising from\\nthe Teutonic base Lub.\\nThe view presented is in accord with the true doctrine of antinomianism,\\nor Christian liberty. See John, 8 32 15 12-15 Galatians, 5 1, 13, 14\\nJames, 1:25.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 183\\nCHAPTER XII\\nWELFARE\\n93. The term welfare has been used in the foregoing\\ndiscussion. The corresponding notion is of so great impor-\\ntance in ethical theory as to require special examination.\\nMany philosophers, both ancient and modern, hold that\\nthe total essence of well-being or welfare or happiness is\\npleasure. All activity, they say, resolves ultimately into\\nseeking for pleasure and shrinking from pain, this being a\\nnecessary consequence of the original constitution of the\\nanimal man, fully explaining all his conduct, and determin-\\ning his character in its highest development. The maxi-\\nmum of pleasure attained throughout life is the maximum\\nof welfare. Pleasures are admitted to vary in quantity, and\\neven in quality, the coarse enjoyment of brutal sensuality\\ndiffering widely from the refined enjoyment of delicate sen-\\ntiment. Originally, according to the hypothesis of evolu-\\ntion, all impulsion is brutally selfish gradually it becomes\\npolished by its environment, but with no change of sub-\\nstance. The doctrine is essentially egoistic. Benevolence,\\nin its most generous forms, is explained by the pleasure it\\ngives the benefactor, and a purely disinterested action is pro-\\nnounced a psychological impossibility. 1\\n1 Bentham begins his treatise on The Principles of Morals and Legis-\\nlation as follows Nature has placed man under the governance of two\\nsovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what\\nwe ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand\\nthe standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects,\\nare fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "184 OBLIGATION\\nWithout renewing the objections to egoism, let it be here\\nobserved that pleasure and pain are qualities belonging to\\nfeeling only. They are not elements of desire or of its grat-\\nification, though indeed they accompany both. We often\\nseek to gratify a desire utterly regardless of the attendant\\npleasure or pain, and hence these are not universal ends. 1\\nMoreover, pleasure and pain have in themselves no moral\\nquality, they are neither right nor wrong. But if pleasure\\nwere the ultimate end of human endeavor, then it were\\nethical in the highest degree, and the maximum of pleasure\\nattained would be the maximum of virtue; which is absurd. 2\\nIt is freely admitted that there is a natural and hence uni-\\nversal desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, the reverse\\nbeing psychologically impossible. But pleasure as an object\\nof desire is only one among a large number of appetencies,\\nand it is not the chiefest or strongest or most prevailing, for\\nthere are others that often override it. Now it is evident\\nthat the gratification of one normal desire among many that\\nare coordinate cannot constitute entire well-being for to\\nthis end there must be a measured, harmonized gratification\\nof all native inclinations. Nor can desire for pleasure be,\\neven obscurely, the constantly informing element of the\\nother desires for very often we desire and ardently pursue,\\nnot pain itself, but what we know to be painful we take\\npains to reach a painful end, bitterly demanding satisfaction,\\nall we think every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will\\nserve but to demonstrate and confirm it. The principle of utility, recog-\\nnizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the\\nobject of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and\\nof law. Cf. J. S. Mill s treatise on Utilitarianism.\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 228, 256 and supra, 5.\\n2 The principle of private felicity, says Kant, which some make the\\nsupreme principle of morality, would be expressed thus Love thyself above\\neverything, and God and thy neighbor for thine own sake. Kritik der\\npraktischen Vernunft, S. 210, note.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "Welfare 185\\nand heartily accepting the poignant consequences. Hence\\npleasure, even should it be at a. continuous maximum through-\\nout life, cannot of itself be accounted welfare, though indeed\\nin complete welfare it is an ever-present and important factor. 1\\nOf course one may define welfare as a maximum of pleas-\\nure and discuss it accordingly but it is very certain that\\nthis is not the notion of welfare that prevails among men.\\nNo doubt the notion includes pleasure, but it includes much\\nmore for men condemn, as lacking dignity, a life whose\\nsole aim is pleasure however refined. Who enjoys more\\ndelightful pleasure, according to De Quincey, than the\\nopium-eater? Despite his delicious dreaming, he is judged\\na most pitiful wretch. Even he who devotes himself to\\ngiving pleasure to others, as the professional musician, is\\nheld in slight esteem. So also the comedian. Men enjoy\\nlaughing, but the perpetually funny man is classed with the\\ncircus clown, a lineal descendant of the court jester, whose\\nrank was low, and whose quips were regulated with whips.\\nStill the pleasure giver has a calling, for pleasant recreation\\n1 The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but\\nself -conservation. Such was the doctrine of Crysippus, the Stoic. Pleasure,\\nsaid he, is the natural result, k-Ki^hv-qiw. of successful effort to secure what is\\nin harmony with our nature. It follows upon activity, but should never be\\nmade the end of human endeavor. Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. 55. If hap-\\npiness means the absence of care and the inexperience of painful emotion,\\nsays Froude, then the best securities for it are a hard heart and a good\\ndigestion. Carlyle dubbed this view of happiness the pig philosophy,\\nand also says Man s unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness it\\nis because there is an Infinite in him, which with all his cunning, he cannot\\nquite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance Ministers and Uphol-\\nsterers and Confectioners undertake, in joint stock company, to make one\\nShoeblack Happy They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two for\\nthe Shoeblack also has a soul quite other than his stomach and would\\nrequire, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation,\\nsimply this allotment, no more, and no less God s infinite universe altogether\\nto himself, therein to enjoy infinitely, and till every wish as fast as it rose*\\nSartor Besartus, bk. ii, ch. 9.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "186 OBLIGATION\\nis needful to our welfare. But the mere pleasure seeker,\\nstudying his own enjoyment, not occasionally as a recreation\\nbut as the end of living, the devotee of social amenities, the\\nprofessional sportsman, the dissipated spendthrift, the disso-\\nlute libertine, each of these is even more justly reprobated,\\nhardly for lack of wisdom in his way, rather for total lack of\\nwisdom s way. A life of pleasure, whether generous or self-\\nish, even one of simple playful gayety apart from vice, is\\naccounted a wasted life, and wise men take infinite pains to\\nsecure, through much self-denial, a regulated and sober\\nwelfare.\\n94. We are, then, in great need to know, clearly and\\ndistinctly, the meaning of welfare. In accord with the fun-\\ndamental doctrine of this treatise, the following definition is\\nproposed: Welfare is the gratification of normal desire.\\nFrom this it follows that continuous welfare is the constant\\ngratification of normal desires throughout a complete life.\\nIts attainment calls for self-control, for a measured adjust-\\nment of incompatible gratifications, in order to harmony, and\\nto the maximum gratification of those desires that are natu-\\nral, normal and in accord with moral law. The primary\\nprinciple is, a man has a right to gratify his normal desires,\\nif he do not trespass. Hence he has a right to welfare but\\nwhether he will attain it or not depends on the intelligent\\nregulation of his desires, together with the possibility of\\ntheir gratification within the given limits.\\nIt has been pointed out that, taken concretely, virtuous\\nconduct is conduct conformed to practical reason or con-\\nscience, and, taken abstractly, virtue is action in conformity\\nwith moral law. Also it was observed that virtue implies a\\nstruggle against obstacles. 1 Now, besides the subjective dif-\\nficulties of virtuous endeavor, the judging, choosing and\\ni See supra, 70.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 187\\nstriving for right life, there are practically numerous and\\ngreat objective difficulties, external obstacles in circum-\\nstances, that oppose one at every turn, preventing the com-\\nplete gratification of virtuous longings. If the subjective\\nintention and effort be accomplished, then, even though the\\nobjective result fail, the chief condition of welfare is ful-\\nfilled, and its principal element provided. But to complete\\nwelfare, there must be an external realization of the subjec-\\ntive virtuous intent. So it is that, in the actual warfare of\\nlife, though it chastens and strengthens, there is rarely, if\\never, a complete realization of thorough-going welfare.\\nSince we have defined welfare as the gratification of nor-\\nmal desires, and have characterized virtue as being the effort\\nto realize this gratification in loving service, it appears that\\none s welfare consists in seeking disinterestedly to promote\\nthe welfare of others, and that an earnest constant striving\\nto reach this end comprises the sum total of obligation. It\\nis attained on two parallels. First, as a prime condition,\\none should seek, directly and indirectly, by precept, by exam-\\nple, and by whatever influence he may rightly use, to culti-\\nvate in his fellows a virtuous disposition, inducing generous\\nimpulses, and impressing the mandate, Go, and do thou\\nlikewise. Such education is due especially from parents to\\nchildren, from teachers to pupils, from the enlightened civ-\\nilizer to the benighted barbarian. 1 Secondly, he should\\nstrive to remove, in so far as practicable, the external obsta-\\ncles to their welfare lying in the way of his fellows, espe-\\ncially of those more nearly related to him and also to fur-\\nnish out of his own resources all reasonable facilities for\\nthese others to do likewise, thus helping them to modify and\\narrange their circumstances favorably to their own righteous\\n1 Semita certe\\nTranquillae per virtutem patet unica vitae.\\nJuvenal, lib. iv, sat. 10,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "188 OBLIGATION\\nends. So doing, he shall himself, without thought of him-\\nself, experience the working of that great natural law of\\nhuman activity, It is more blessed to give than to receive. 1\\n95. It is now needful to inquire concerning happiness,\\nof which nothing has heretofore been said. The term is\\nvery indefinite, and though in common use, there is difficulty\\nin fixing its meaning. 2 Sometimes we hear that happiness\\nis continuous pleasure. If this be allowed, then happiness\\ncannot be identified with welfare for, as we have seen, wel-\\nfare is something more than pleasure. But, while pleasure\\nis a large, and perhaps an essential ingredient in happiness,\\nthis also seems to have other elements. 3 Then shall not\\nhappiness and welfare be identified? Not strictly; for,\\nthough surely there is an intimate connection between them,\\na distinction remains. It is the distinction of antecedent\\nand consequent in causal relation. Welfare consists in the\\nconstant gratification of right desires. Now, like as pleas-\\nure is the reflex or correlate of spontaneous and unimpeded\\n1 Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he himself said:\\nM Kdpt6v eariv fidXKov 8id6vcu r) Xa/i^drnv. Acts, 20: 35. Words not found\\nelsewhere.\\n2 Happy, from hap, a word of Scandinavian origin, meaning fortune,\\nchance, accident seen in hap-hazard, hapless, haply, happen, perhaps, and\\nmishap cf. Ger. Gliick, luck, and Gliickselig, blissful Fr. bonheur, from\\nbon, and heur, luck Lat. felix, from which, felicity Grk. euruxia, good-hap,\\nand eidaifuovia, a good Sal/xcov, genius, fate, destiny, fortune, providence.\\nHappiness, says Coleridge, is not, I think, the most appropriate term\\nfor a state, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap, that\\nis, chance. Aids to Reflection, i, p. 31.\\n3 We can only have the highest happiness, says George Eliot, in her\\nepilogue to Romola, by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest\\nof the world as well as for ourselves and this sort of happiness often brings\\nso much pain with it that we can tell it from pain only by its being what we\\nwould choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good.\\nWe think, says Aristotle, that pleasure should be mixed up, irapa/xefiixBai,\\nwith happiness. Nic. Eth., x, 7, 3. Yet it hath been said, Blessed are\\nthey that mourn,", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 189\\nenergy exerted in any special case, so, in the general course\\nof living, happiness is the reflex or correlate of virtuous and\\nsuccessful conduct. Thus welfare is antecedent, well-being\\nconsequent; the one is dynamic, the other static the one,\\nprosperity, the other, happiness. 1\\nThere can be no doubt that happiness is universally re-\\ngarded as desirable in the highest degree. Whence it may\\nbe presumed that the desire for happiness is a subjective\\nnecessity, an established uniformity, a natural law in human-\\nity. Also it may be allowed that no man can forecast the\\nparticular circumstances that would make him happy. 2 Yet\\nit seems not impossible for practical ethics to lay down rules\\nof conduct in accord with fundamental principles, which, if\\n1 Oh happiness our heing s end and aim,\\nGood, Pleasure, Ease, Content, what er thy name,\\nThat something still which prompts the eternal sigh,\\nFor which we bear to live, or dare to die\\nWhich, still so near us, yet beyond us lies,\\nO erlooked, seen double, by the fool and wise\\nPlant of celestial seed, if dropped below,\\nSay in what mortal soil thou deign st to grow.\\nWhere grows Where grows it not? If vain our toil\\nWe ought to blame the culture, not the soil.\\nAsk of the learned the way? The learned are blind;\\nThis bids to serve, and that to shun mankind\\nSome place the bliss in action, some in ease,\\nThose call it pleasure, and contentment these\\nSome, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end in pain,\\nSome, swelled to gods, confess e en virtue vain;\\nOr indolent, to each extreme they fall,\\nTo trust in everything, or doubt of all.\\nPope, Essay on Man.\\n2 There is one end, says Kant, which may be assumed to be actually\\nsuch to all rational beings, and therefore one purpose which they not inertly\\nmay have, but which we may with certainty assume that they all actually\\nhave by a natural necessity, and this is happiness. To be happy is a pur-\\npose which we may presuppose with certainty and a priori in every man.\\nbecause it belongs to his being. The notion of happiness is bo Indefi-\\nnite that although every man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say defi-\\nnitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills. He Ifl\\nunable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him\\ntruly happy, been use to do so he would have need to be omniscient.\\nExcerpts from Grundlegung, u. s. w., S. I:; Abbott s trans, p. Wag.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "190 OBLIGATION\\nfavored by environment and followed intelligently and per-\\nsistently, should conduce to happiness. But only a brief\\ntheoretical consideration is herein admissible.\\nIt appears, then, there are in general two necessary condi-\\ntions of welfare and its consequent happiness, subjective\\nobservance of moral law, and objective environment favor-\\ning realization. The former is necessary, but insufficient.\\nThe inward satisfaction arising from a full discharge of obli-\\ngation, is an essential and the chief element of happiness\\nbut untoward circumstances may so mar the felicity of a\\nrighteous worker that we deem him stricken, smitten of\\nGod, and afflicted. The most perfect man was a man of\\nsorrows, suffering the contradiction of sinners against him-\\nself. On the other hand, the full possession of health,\\nwealth and honors does not in itself constitute welfare.\\nOutward success only, like that of Alexander, what doth\\nit profit a man There must be prosperity both within and\\nwithout in order to welfare, and to its reflex, happiness.\\nAlso we observe that no one can hopefully make happi-\\nness, however much he may desire it, his immediate object.\\nIt is altogether out of direct reach. The only possible way\\nto it is through its condition, welfare. Hence wisdom dis-\\nregards happiness as an end, not looking beyond welfare,\\nbut seeking this as the end of all endeavor. This attained,\\nhappiness results by a benign law of human nature well-\\nbeing, the sanction of well-doing. A poet has said: Happi-\\nness is a wayside flower plucked, it withers in the hand\\npassed by, it is fragrance to the spirit.\\nMoreover, let it be especially observed that, still less can\\nany one hopefully make his own personal happiness his end.\\nIt has been sufficiently shown that, one s own welfare de-\\npends on his seeking the welfare of others. Hence one s\\nown happiness is found only in thus promoting that of\\nothers. Outward duty done for the sake of inward satisfac-", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 191\\ntion, fails as duty and as satisfaction. The mother, who\\nwith much self-denial waits upon her sick babe merely be-\\ncause, should the babe die from neglect, she could never for-\\ngive herself and would suffer the pangs of remorse, that\\nmother is an egoist, and not the mother we adore. She may\\nescape the pain, yet is unhappy, for this is not the outcome\\nof maternal love. Self-seeking in any form is foredoomed to\\nfailure, for it lacks the perfect virtue which, forgetful of\\nself, strives for the welfare of others. Living for one s own\\nhappiness is hving for one s self and living for one s self is\\nsure to be a failure. Living for loving service is living for\\nothers and living for others is the sure and only road to\\nwelfare, both theirs and ours, that welfare whose correlate\\nis happiness, both theirs and ours. 1\\n1 Aristotle s eudemonistic theory makes happiness, evdai/xovla, the highest\\ngood and ultimate end of human endeavor. He holds that happiness de-\\npends on the rational or virtuous activity of the soul continuously exercised,\\ndefining it to be the energy of the soul according to the best virtue in a com-\\nplete life, and saying that with normal activity pleasure is joined as its\\nblossom and natural culmination. Yet he hardly distinguishes happiness\\nfrom virtue, saying, in the Politica, vi, 9, 3, that it consists in an active\\nexertion and perfected habit of virtue, aperies evepyeia /cat XPW^ to rfkeios.\\nNowhere does he seem to have a conception of the higher demand of moral\\nlaw, that dutiful service must be loving service. See Grote, Aristotle (Second\\nEdition, 1880), ch. xiii, Ethica, for a critical examination of the doctrine.\\nThe Stoics did not surpass the Stagirite. They taught that the end of\\nman is to live agreeably to the natural constitution of man, vfKos ehai rb tfv\\ndKoXovdojs tt) tov avdpdoirov KarasKevy. Self-conservation is virtue, and virtue\\nis sufficient for happiness not that it renders one insensible to pain, but\\nbecause by it one rises superior to pain. Seneca, Epistola. 9. See Ueber-\\nweg, Hist. Phil., 55. The doctrine of these cultured but heathen Greeks,\\nwhich for many centuries exerted a powerful influence upon the European\\nthought, has not a breath of the charity that suffereth long and is kind, and\\nthat never faileth.\\nSpinoza, with a like view of virtue, and no thought of charity, taught\\nidentity, saying, Virtue is happiness. His dictum is, Beatitudo non est vir-\\ntutis prcemium, sed ipsa virtus.\\nKant teaches that All the elements which belong to the notion of hap-\\npiness are altogether empirical trans, p. 49), and the hope to attain it", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "192 OBLIGATION\\n96. Involved in the notion of welfare is the notion of\\ngood, a term so very ambiguous that its use has thus far\\nbeen avoided. Good things are relatively or absolutely good.\\nThe relatively good are those not good in themselves, but\\nonly as a means to something beyond as, riches. We seek\\nthem in order to attain those absolutely good, that is, such\\nas are good in themselves, and not good for aught else as,\\nluxuries. What is good for something else has value what\\nis good in itself has worth. An end good in itself is an\\nabsolute end. 1\\nAbsolute ends are altogether subjective, found only in\\ncertain mental states of sentient beings, more especially of\\npersons, who habitually seek some one end, and only occa-\\nsionally others, as desirable. Ends vary in degrees of excel-\\nlence, as good, better, best. The best, the highest aim of\\nhuman activity, is termed the summum bonum.\\nThe determination of the absolute, the ultimate good, the\\nsummum bonum, as the end of all moral endeavor, was the\\nprimal problem of ancient ethics. 2 The Hedonists found it\\nin pleasure, the highest enjoyment of the present passing\\nmoment. The Epicureans also found it in pleasure, but\\nposited the maximum of enjoyment extending throughout\\nlife, and called this happiness. Plato solved the problem\\ngrandly by declaring that the highest ultimate good is not\\nin any measure depends on our following the dictates, precepts or counsels,\\nconsilia, of prudence, the hypothetical imperative, quite distinct from the\\nintuitive categorical imperative or moral law. See supra, 44, note.\\nThis sets happiness entirely apart from morality. His fundamental doctrine\\nthat Kespect for the moral law is the only and undoubted moral motive\\ntrans, p. 243), is fatally defective in this exclusion of all sanction, as\\nwell as in ignoring the very essence of duty, the love that perfects service,\\nthat at once consummates and dissolves obligation.\\n1 See supra, 40, note\\n2 This method of procedure is criticised by Kant in the Analytic of Pure\\nPractical Reason; see Abbott s trans., p. 219 sq. See also Sidgwick s\\nMethods of Ethics, bk. i, ch. 9, and bk. iii, ch. 14.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 193\\npleasure, nor wealth, nor knowledge, nor power, but is the\\ngreatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good.\\nHe taught that happiness depends on the possession of this\\nmoral beauty and goodness. 1 Aristotle s ultimatum is happi-\\nness, but with a definition, already noted, that distinguishes\\nit from pleasure, and is hardly exceptionable. The Stoics\\ntaught that the supreme end of life, the ultimate good, is\\nvirtue, that is, a life conformed to nature, the agreement of\\nconduct with the all- regulating law of nature, the human\\nwith the divine will, whereby the sage combines in himself\\nall the essential perfections of deity. We remark that each\\nof these several doctrines is egoistic, finding the summum\\nbonum, the ultimatum of moral endeavor, to be an attainment\\nof the moral agent for and within himself. 2\\n97. In modern ethics investigation of the summum\\nbonum is less prominent, and various and conflicting views\\nare entertained. 3 The utilitarians teach the right aim and\\nend to be happiness, which is variously and hazily defined.\\nThis doctrine divides into egoism and altruism, according as\\nthe agent regards his own happiness as the end of his\\nendeavor, or makes that of related persons its object. If the\\ngood of a particular person, himself or some other or others,\\nbe the aim, it is called individualism if the good of a com-\\nmunity at large be the aim, it is called universalism, which\\nhas as many forms as there are kinds of community for\\ninstance, social, national, or humanistic universalism. In\\n1 See Symposium, pp. 202 e, 240 e and Gorgias, p. 508 b, Step. Cf. Mat-\\nthev), 5 48.\\n2 See Cicero, Be Finibus Bonorum et Malorum and Augustine, Be\\nSummo Bono. Also supra, 2- r note.\\n3 On the matter of this section, which is necessarily very brief, see Mar-\\ntineau s Types of Ethical Theory, Sidgwick s History of Ethics. Ktilpe S\\nIntroduction to Philosophy, 27-30, Janet s Theory of Morals, bk. i, chs.\\n3, 4, and Wundt s Ethical Systems.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "194 OBLIGATION\\nseeking the good of a community the aim should be the\\ngreatest good of the greatest number. 1\\nThe dominant form of philosophical ethics at the present\\nday seems to be evolutionism, which affirms that develop-\\nment, progress, prosperity, is the end of moral endeavor.\\nAccording to Spencer, that is good, in the widest sense,\\nwhich serves to accomplish some purpose and the ultimate\\n1 Bacon struck the keynote of utilitarianism when he made the common\\nweal the end of moral endeavor. He was followed by Hobbes, Cumberland,\\nLocke and Paley, and later by Bentham, Comte and J. S. Mill. Hutche-\\nson, in his Inquiry (1725) p. 177, says That action is best which produces\\nthe greatest happiness for the greatest number; and that worst which in like\\nmanner occasions misery. The phrase here italicized has become famous,\\nand is still the recognized principle of the utilitarians and humanitarians.\\nHutcheson anticipated Bentham, to whom the phrase is usually attributed,\\nby at least three-fourths of a century. To it other schools object that hap-\\npiness is indeterminable, and that what actions would reach the greatest\\nnumber is even more indeterminable.\\nBy utility is meant that property in any object whereby it tends to pro-\\nduce happiness, and the doctrine in morals is that an action which produces\\nutility is a right action because utility produces happiness. See Bentham s\\nPrinciples of Morals and Legislation, ch. 1, and J. S. Mill s Utilitarianism.\\nTo this it is objected that useful action can be known to be such only from\\nobservation extending over a vast range of facts through a vast period of\\ntime, which renders it impossible for any except the learned and wise to\\njndge what is right, especially in any new combination of circumstances.\\nSee Wayland s Moral Science, p. 38 sq. Grole s Utilitarianism; Lecky s\\nHistory of European Morals, ch. 1.\\nFurthermore we object that an action proving useful does not make it\\nright, which reverses the order of production, but can only logically show\\nit to be right. The utility is causa cognoscendi, not causa essendi, of Tight-\\nness. An action that conforms to the law, is right, regardless of conse-\\nquences. When the application of the law to a case is obscure, we may\\nforecast from experience the consequences, and if we regard these as tending\\nto welfare, we may infer the action to be morally right since we have\\nalready judged that all right action, and it only, has this tendency. Thus\\nits consequences help us to know what action is right, but do not make it\\nright. Let it be remarked that in the proposition, an action is right be-\\ncause it is useful, the word because is ambiguous and misleading. It may\\nmean either efficiently producing cause, or logically informing cause, i e. a\\nreason. The utility of an action is the latter only.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 195\\nconscious purpose of all vital activity is the production or\\nretention of pleasure, or the avoidance or removal of pain.\\nAccording to Wundt there is a series of ethical ends, begin-\\nning with self-contentment and self-improvement, rising to\\nsocial ends in public well-being and general progress, and\\nterminating in humanistic ends, chiefly intellectual, which\\nconsist in the continuous improvement of mankind. 1\\nIn opposition to the foregoing empirical doctrines, is the\\nextreme intuitionism of the Kantians, who make the absolute\\nethical end to lie in obedience, pure and simple, to the objec-\\ntive moral law. 2 Less extreme are the perfectionists, who\\nmake the supreme good to lie in excellence of moral charac-\\nter, which excellence they fail to define clearly, but hold\\nthat it is attained by the active exercise of the intellectual\\nand sensitive nature under the presidency of reason. 3\\nThe present treatise teaches that the aim and end of life\\nis the harmonious and complete development of the man,\\nindividually, socially, politically and religiously, each one\\n1 See Spencer s Data of Ethics, and Wundt s The Facts of the Moral\\nLife. Also Williams s A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the\\nTheory of Evolution, and Darwin s Descent of Man, ch. 3. See also supra,\\n6 note 20 and 21, note.\\n2 According to Kant, Virtue is not the entire, complete good as an ob-\\nject of desire to reasonable, finite beings for, to have this character it\\nshould be accompanied by happiness, not as it appears to the interested\\neyes of our personality, which we conceive as an end of itself, but accord-\\ning to the impartial judgment of reason, which considers virtue in general,\\nin the world, as an end in itself. Happiness and virtue, then, together con-\\nstitute the possession of the sovereign good in an individual, but with this\\ncondition, that the happiness should be exactly proportioned to the morality,\\nthis constituting the value of the individual, and rendering him worthy of\\nhappiness. The sovereign good, consisting of these two elements, repre-\\nsents the entire or complete good, but virtue must be considered as the\\nsupreme good, because there can be no condition higher than virtue whilst\\nhappiness, which is unquestionably always agreeable to its possessor, is not\\nof itself absolutely good, but supposes as a condition, a morally good con-\\nduct. From Fleming s Vocabulary, ad verb., p. 68.\\n3 See Janet s Theory of Morals, particularly bk. i, ch. 3.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "196 OBLIGATION\\ndevoting his constant and total activity to the welfare of his\\nfellows in loving service, thus obeying the perfect law of\\nlove and liberty, and thus attaining, as an unsought conse-\\nquence, both his own and their happiness. The ideal of an\\nultimate and absolute good is that of a complete organism\\nwhose members cooperate in entire harmony which implies\\nthe fulfilling by every organ of its normal functions, and\\nhence the perfect wholeness of the organism. It denotes,\\nnegatively, the absence of all discord, of all impurity; posi-\\ntively, the perfection of functional activity. 1 In the moral\\nsphere, each rational being is himself an organized whole,\\nand also an organized member of wider organisms. Now,\\nsince in every organic whole each member is at once means\\nand end to every other, the law of an intelligent organism\\nrequires that each member become voluntarily an active\\nimparting means, as well as a passive receptive end. Herein\\nis the ideal of welfare, and the sphere of the moral law,\\nwhich commands every man to seek, not his own, but\\nanother s weal. 2 Its observance regards that wholeness\\nwhich is the summum bonum.\\nThe correlative concomitant of wholeness or holiness is\\nbeatitjude or blessedness. This is more than happiness, as\\nholiness is more than virtue. 3 Virtue implies a struggle,\\nand a virtuous being is still under and continuously endeav-\\noring to conform to the law. But in holy beings there is no\\nstruggle, they are not under the law, but dwell in a realm of\\nperfect love, liberty and bliss.\\n1 See supra, 15, 16.\\n2 See 1 Corinthians, 10 24, 33, and Galatians, 6 2.\\n3 Carlyle, in Sartor Resartus, bk. ii, ch. 9, notes a difference between\\nhappiness and blessedness. Hesiod and Homer, in speaking of the gods,\\ncall them, in an absolute sense, pd/tapes, blessed ones.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "DEITY 197\\nCHAPTER XIII\\nDEITY\\n98. The existence of God is a postulate of Ethics. 1 A\\nspeculative system may be evolved from the mere conception\\nof a deity, a conception such as is found, with many modifi-\\ncations and varying in degree from obscure to clear, in every\\nhuman mind. But a true ethical theory, thoroughly estab-\\nlished as a correct representation of its matter, to be complete\\nand fully rounded out in accord with the demands of philo-\\nsophical system, must posit as essential, not merely the con-\\nception, but the reality of Deity. We might adopt, relative\\nto ethical system, the saying of Voltaire that if God did\\nnot exist, it would be necessary to invent him but all nature\\ncries out to us that he does exist.\\nIn modern times the attempt has been made, especially by\\nthe Comteists, to devise a system of humanitarian ethics,\\nshutting out even the thought of God. To give such scheme\\nphilosophic unity and completeness, its authors have been\\nnecessitated to find a common end for all lines of moral activ-\\nity, and they propose the general welfare of Humanity.\\nThis Humanity is personified, and set up as an object of rev-\\nerence, and even of worship. 2 Or the deity recognized in\\nthe affairs of the world is the Stream of Tendency that\\n1 See supra, 13.\\n2 See Frederick Harrison s Apologia pro nostra Fide, in Fortnightly He-\\nview for Nov., 1888. In a work by II. Gruber, Der Positivimus, u. g. to.,\\n1891, may be seen an account of the ceremonies of the orthodox positivists\\nof France and England. They have their liturgy, prayers, sacraments, pil-\\ngrimages, everything but God his place is supplied by Humanity.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "198 OBLIGATION\\nmakes for righteousness, which is the Eternal, not our-\\nselves. 2 A modified view substitutes the Unknowable,\\nwhich, notwithstanding the negation, is defined to be forma-\\ntive force, working according to its inner necessity. 2 But\\nit is very certain that a generalized abstraction, rhetorically\\npersonified by a capital letter, will never satisfy the minds\\nand hearts of men, nor even meet the demands of a godless\\nphilosophy. Such proposed end of human endeavor is at\\nmost either a logical generalization, gathering up in an ab-\\nstract formula the moral causes manifest in secular history,\\nor an enfeebled pantheism. True ethical theory, however,\\narises, not from impersonal generalities, but from individual\\nmen and combinations of rational beings in their actual rela-\\ntions not from intellectual abstractions, but from concrete\\nrealities the most vivid and stern. 3\\n1 Matthew Arnold.\\n2 Herbert Spencer.\\n3 If, as is the case, wrote Cardinal Newman, we feel responsibility,\\nare ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voice of conscience, this\\nimplies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are\\nashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If in doing wrong we feel the\\nsame tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a\\nmother if on doing right we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind which\\nfollows on receiving praise from a father we certainly have within us the\\nimage of some Person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose\\nsmiles we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct\\nour pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feel-\\nings within us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent\\nbeing.\\nMan is not mere understanding, says Professor Paulsen, he is above\\neverything else a willing and feeling being. Peelings of humility, reverence,\\nyearnings after perfection, with which his heart is inspired by the contem-\\nplation of nature and history, determine his attitude to reality more imme-\\ndiately and profoundly than the concepts and formulae of science. Out of\\nthese feelings arises the trust that the world is not a meaningless play of\\nblind forces, but the revelation of a great and good being whom he may\\nacknowledge as akin to his own innermost essence.\\nOur human consciousness, says Professor Findlay, being without a\\ncounterpart or explanation in the world of nature, reaches out to some over-", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "DEITY 199\\nOne point may be particularly noticed. Ethical schemes\\nthat do not recognize a personal sovereign Deity are unable\\nto provide for the perfect administration of justice they find\\nno court of appeal beyond the consensus of men. Now,\\nfrom the patriarchal day of Job until this late and enlight-\\nened day of ours, it has been and still is the common convic-\\ntion of thoughtful observers that the distribution of rewards\\nand punishments, the avenging of wrongs, the adjustment of\\nclaims, in the historical life of our race, fail of righteousness.\\nBut such is the profound faith of mankind in the ultimate\\ntriumph of the principle of universal justice that this further\\nconviction prevails There must of necessity be a supreme\\ncourt of appeal which shall, in an after life, administer retri-\\nbution, vindicate justice, and establish righteousness. Unless\\nthere be such provision, there is no ground for faith in the\\nunity and supremacy of moral law. 1\\n99. The ethical theory herein proposed posits as essen-\\ntial the real existence of a personal Deity. The one eternal\\nGod, from everlasting to everlasting, the almighty maker of\\nthe world, himself a spirit and the father of our spirit, the\\nfounder and center of all truth, the supreme ruler and final\\njudge, unfailing in strict justice while abounding in tender\\nmercy, a perfect person conscious of holiness and ruling in\\nlove he it is on whom an intelligent faith rests as the\\nconsciousness, some personal God in whom it may rest and find its element.\\nThe finite spirit demands the infinite, as each atom of matter the boundless\\nspace. See supra, 50, note.\\n1 In the corrupted currents of this world\\nOffence s gilded hand may shove by justice,\\nAnd oft tis seen the wicked prize lt8( If\\nBuys out the law but tis not BO above\\nThere is no shuffling, there the action lies\\nIn his true nature, and we ourselves compell d\\nEven to the teeth and forehead of our faults\\nTo give in evidence.\\nHamlet, Act iii, sc. 5, 1. 07 sq.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "200 OBLIGATION\\noriginal source of authority, as legislator, judge and executor\\nin one, who shall finally perfect all righteousness.\\nTo those objecting to the anthropomorphic character of\\nthis conception, a sufficient reply is that no other kind of\\nnotion is possible to the human mind. For us God is thus,\\nor he is not. Holding this to be the true conception does\\nnot degrade the Deity to the human rank, but lifts the\\nhuman to the divine. He has made us in his image, a little\\nlower than divinity, that in his likeness we may become par-\\ntakers in his glory. 1\\nShould it be objected that the introduction of a supernatu-\\nral element into an explanation of natural phenomena is\\nunscientific, we admit this to be true of physical science,\\nwhich is concerned with second causes only, having no re-\\ncourse to a first cause. Bacon in his Organum, and Newton\\nin his Principia, make frequent and devout reference to the\\nDeity, though not as a factor in their systems but Laplace,\\nit is said, when asked by Napoleon why he made no reference\\nto God in his Mechanique Celeste, replied Sire, I had no\\nneed of that hypothesis. So the physics of to-day very prop-\\n1 Nothing less than personality in the Deity will satisfy humanity. Pan-\\ntheism freely uses the name of God, and Spinoza, perhaps the most famous\\nof pantheists, was surnamed the God intoxicated. But this God is not\\nour God. The God of the pantheist is Nature, impersonal, unconscious,\\nnecessitated. See infra, 142. Pantheism can never he a religion, meeting\\nthe demand of the soul for a sympathizing person as an object of adoration,\\npetition, worship. If we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all\\nreligions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable,\\nto utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God. Whether\\nthe etymology which the ancients gave of the Greek word dvdpuiiros, man, be\\ntrue or not (they derived it from 6 vu adpuv, he who looks upward) certain\\nit is that what makes man to be man, is that he alone can turn his face to\\nheaven certain it is that he alone yearns for something that neither sense\\nnor reason can supply. Max Muller, Science of Religion, Lee. 1.\\nPronaque ciim spectent animalia ccetera terram,\\nOs homini sublime dedit, coelumque tueri\\nJussit, et erectos ad sidera tollei e valtus.\\nOvid, Metamorphoseon, i, 2.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "DEITY 201\\nerly makes no mention of the Deity. But in metaphysics\\nthe chief problem is the existence of God. Ethics, which\\nalso is not a science of material nature, but of human nature,\\nof man on his spiritual side, in like manner transcends\\nphysics. It treats exclusively of mental states and acts, of\\nphenomena of the soul or spirit. The facts on which its\\ntheory is based are subjective facts of direct observation by\\nintrospection, which are combined with inferences from them\\nand from observed external activities. Here we are wholly\\nwithin the spiritual sphere. 1 A clear distinction may be\\nmade, by a difference in degree, between the human and the\\nsuperhuman, but who shall draw the line between the natu-\\nral and the supernatural 2 To posit in the spiritual sphere\\na supreme personal spirit, so far from being unscientific, is\\nsimply to complete the content of the sphere with a substance\\nand its attributes, with the conscious personality of a rational\\nbeing, in kind like to that which gives rise to the theory\\nand therefore this complementing of the scheme is strictly\\nscientific. 3\\n1 See supra, 18, note.\\n2 Professor F. Godet, in his Defence of the Christian Faith, Lee. 4, p.\\n148, Lyttleton s translation, seeks to do so. He defines the supernatural\\nas any modification of being in nature which is not the effect of the forces\\nwith which it is endowed, or of the laws under whose command those forces\\nact. Of such modifications he finds two cases, the one existing in nature\\nitself, man; the other, above nature, God, both characterized as super-\\nnatural beings by freedom. Passing by the errors of viewing laws as causes,\\nand natural laws as mandatory, we remark that to say the freedom of man,\\na being within nature, is not the effect of the forces with which it [nature]\\nis endowed, is inept, unless nature be restricted by definition to a\\nmeaning more narrow than that commonly understood in scientific discus-\\nsion. Freedom is not something superadded to man s nature it is the very\\nlaw of his being, and essential also in the nature of a personal Deity. See\\nBushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, ch. 2.\\n3 Should anyone flippantly say that the introduction of the Deity into\\nethical theory renews the Deus ex machina of the ancient drama, a god let\\ndown at last, from the machinery overhead, to disentangle the imbroglio on\\nthe stage, the answer is easy. Theism posits God as the only explanation", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "202 OBLIGATION\\n100. The ground from which the doctrine of this treatise\\nhas thus far been developed, is the natural constitution of\\nman. His several powers of intellect and will, his emotional\\ncapacity, and the impulse to activity in his motive desires,\\nhave each a normal and cooperative function. Herein is dis-\\ncerned the principle that it is right to gratify normal desire,\\ntogether with the supreme law of humanity commanding the\\nconstant order of facts that ought to be, the single impera-\\ntive of trespass, duty, justice or loving service. Now, it may\\nreasonably be asked whether the common constitution of\\nhuman beings is to be regarded as an ultimate ground, an\\noriginal source of obligation, beyond which there is no\\ndeterminant.\\nPositivism answers affirmatively, which consists with its\\nrigid empiricism. But we have tried to show that there is\\nfor us something more than experience. Evolutionism finds\\nan antecedent determinant in the environment, a combina-\\ntion of second causes, under whose influence the human con-\\nstitution has been developed. But when we consider the\\ngreat variety of environment to which the several races of\\nmankind have been subjected, we should expect, on this\\nview, to find a corresponding variety of constitution, and\\nconsequent varieties of moral law whereas, however great\\nthe variations in degree especially of intelligence, and the\\nvariety of constructions built upon the law, still, throughout\\nhistory and everywhere, mankind is one, and the law is one. 1\\nof cosmic order, as both establishing and maintaining. If from the drama\\nof human life his part be left out, then indeed it were a comedy to those who\\nthink, a tragedy to those who feel. But on recognizing him as its author,\\ndirector, and principal personage, present throughout, combining, regulating,\\noverruling the great lines of action amid a free play of characters, the whole\\nbecomes intelligible, the obscure clear, and the ultimate solution foreseen.\\n1 The pessimism of Pascal led him to say, in Pensges, that justice on one\\nside of the Pyrenees is a different thing from justice on the other side. But\\neven Hobbes found place to say The laws of Nature [meaning of Human", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "DEITY 203\\nThis essentially permanent uniformity points distinctly\\nto an origin for the human constitution in a cause beyond\\nitself and its environment, and, on the principle of like effect\\nlike cause, to a common cause, to a unity in the originating\\ncause. 1 The existence of an omnipotent and consistent\\nmaker and ruler, is the only satisfactory explanation of these\\nsignificant facts that has been or can be offered, and this\\nexplanation alone fulfills the demand of ethical theory.\\n101. Many theistic moralists hold that the will of God\\nis the original and ultimate ground of obligation. He has\\nmade us as it hath pleased him, revealing his will in us, and\\nin our relations to each other and to himself. A reverent\\ninterpretation of nature and of history enables us to under-\\nstand his will more clearly, and to these he has added a\\ndistinct revelation of it in the holy scriptures. Had it\\npleased him to make us and our surroundings otherwise, or\\nmerely to issue different, even contrary, commandments, our\\nobligations would have been different from what they are,\\nsince his express will is their sole, sufficient and final\\nground.\\nThat the will of God, however revealed, defines our obliga-\\ntions is unquestionable. But we cannot regard his authority\\nas decisive, if it be merely arbitrary for this view implies\\nthe possibility of contradictions that are revolting. Should\\nhe capriciously command lying, murder, theft, all heaven\\nand earth would rebel. The doctrine unwittingly represents\\nhim as a tyrant ruling by fear, liable to transient whims\\ninverting right and wrong, disordering order, compounding\\nfelony, falsifying truth, thereby divesting his intelligent\\nNature; see supra, 18, note] are immutable and eternal. What they\\nforbid can never be lawful what they command can never be unlawful.\\nJDe Cive, vol. ii, p. 46.\\n1 See Elements of Inductive Logic, 21 and Kant s Critique of Pure\\nReason, p. 384 of Meiklejohn s translation.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "204 OBLIGATION\\nsubjects of all reliable knowledge of himself and of his crea-\\ntions. Such notion is psychologically, philosophically and\\nlogically absurd. 1\\nWe must look beyond the will of God for the ultimate\\ndeterminant of obligation, into that which determines his\\nwill, into his original, eternal, essential nature. Necessarily\\nand rightly we conceive of him as a spirit, having harmoni-\\nous attributes constituting his nature, in which is no vari-\\nableness nor shadow of turning. Being in himself the\\nembodiment of truth, it is impossible for him to lie being\\nessentially just, he can never justify crime such self-contra-\\ndiction would dethrone him, would be the suicide of God.\\nHis omnipotence is not absolute, but limited to what accords\\nwith his nature, and his every action is confined to the strait\\nand narrow way of righteousness. The macrocosm, the\\nworld, answering his fair idea, conforms in the fixed\\nmaterial laws to his unchanging essence, and the uniformity\\nof nature is the faithfulness of God. The microcosm, man,\\nthe express image of his person, is formed to conform in the\\nfixed moral law to the same unchanging essence, and the\\noneness of justice is the righteousness of God. It is not\\nthe will, but the nature of the Deity that is the original and\\nultimate ground of obligation. 2\\n1 Amongst the rational principles of morality, says Kant, the onto-\\nlogical conception of perfection, notwithstanding its defects, is better than\\nthe theological conception which derives morality from an absolutely perfect\\ndivine will. If we avoid a gross circle tacitly presupposing the morality\\nwhich it is to explain, the only conception of the divine will remaining to\\nus is a conception made up of the attributes of desire for glory and dominion,\\ncombined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance and any\\nsystem of morals erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to\\nmorality. Grundlegung, etc., Abbott s trans., p. 89.\\n2 Here is the Ground of Right the nature and character of God, the\\ngreat designer and creator of all things and my nature and character so far\\nas I am the expression of this creator and his design. I am right when\\nenergizing and controlling myself in accordance with these my rights are", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "DEITY 205\\n102. The final problem in our obligation to each other\\nis now readily solved. The prior examination of human\\nnature found it constituted for a free and harmonious play\\nof its powers in the exercise of loving service, and this was\\nrecognized as the sum of obligation. Further examination\\nhas disclosed that human nature is derived from and akin to\\nthe divine nature, so that in promoting the welfare of each\\nother, men are conforming to the divine will arising from\\nthe divine nature. The maker and ruler has given to every\\nman more or less ability to promote the common welfare, and\\nholds him accountable for its exercise. Whoever unwar-\\nrantably interferes with this service trespasses both on the\\nservant and on the served, and thereby violates the divine\\nwill and nature. Much has been said about the divine\\nright of kings. Every man s right is a divine right both\\nbecause of its origin, and because it involves the right of the\\nDeity himself. Hence the sacredness of human rights, and\\nthe paramount obligation to respect them. Arising from the\\nvery nature of God, they are invariable, inalienable, irrevo-\\ncable, grounded in eternal justice and truth, and he who\\nwould violate them is at war with the inflexible Almighty.\\nAlong with our obligation to each other is our obligation\\nwhatever may be necessary to my so doing. By knowing and doing the\\nright, I attain to excellence excellence brings enjoyment and in the two\\ncombined I find blessedness. A. T. Bledsoe in Southern Review for Oct.,\\n1875, p. 436.\\nThe theistic moralist may learn much from heathen philosophy. This\\nthen, as it appears to me, says Cicero, has been the decision of the wisest\\nmen, that law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor estab-\\nlished by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle which\\ngoverns the entire universe, wisely commanding and forbidding. Therefore\\nthey called that primal and supreme law the mind of God enjoining or for-\\nbidding each separate thing in accordance with reason. On which account\\nit is that this law, which the gods have given to the human race, is so justly\\npraised. For it is the reason and mind of a wise Being equally able to urge\\nus to good, and to deter us from evil. Laws, i, 4.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "206 OBLIGATION\\nto God. To him is due, in the most comprehensive sense,\\nloving service. We are bound to love God for his own sake,\\nand all others for God s sake. 1 The recognition of him as\\nour personal creator and ruler, and of our obligation to him\\nas his creatures and subjects, leading to adoration, is religion,\\nthe binding of man to God. 2 Thus ethics expands over reli-\\ngion by comprehending the author of our being, the father\\nof our spirit, the eternal One from whom all our obligations\\narise, and in whom all our obligations end. He desires all\\nthat is disorderly to become orderly, and calls upon his\\nrational free creatures to gratify, so far as in them lies, this\\ndesire hence it is hardly too much to say that our conduct\\naffects the welfare and happiness of Our Father. 3 To serve\\nrightly our fellows for his sake, is to serve him and a tres-\\npass upon a fellow man is a trespass upon him. Moreover,\\nhe has a supreme right to our reverential worship, and omit-\\nting or neglecting it is using our freedom, which having\\ngiven he will not revoke, to restrict his liberty in gathering\\nup his due.\\nContemplating, inversely, the relation of God to man, we\\nobserve that the obligation is not properly reciprocal. We\\n1 (Which brings the peace of God that passeth understanding.\\nD un cceur qui t aime,\\nMon Dieu, qui peut troubler la paix?\\nII cherche en tout ta volonte supreme,\\nEt ne se cherche jamais.\\nSur la terre, dans le ciel meme,\\nEst-il d autre bonheur que la tranquille paix\\nD un cceur qui t aime\\nEacine, Athalie, close of Act iii.\\n2 Religion, from Lat. religio etymology doubtful. Allied to religens,\\nfearing the gods, pious and therefore not derived from religare, to bind, as\\noften supposed. Skeat. Lactantius of the third century, followed by\\nAugustine of the fifth, and many others, held that it is from re-ligare, to\\nbind back or anew. This, however, seems to refer to the Tall, which is\\nhardly allowable to an ante-classical word.\\n3 To do good and to communicate forget not; for with such sacrifices\\nGod is well pleased. Hebrews, 13 16.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "DIETY 207\\ncannot think of the Deity as under any obligation, under\\nany law, under anything for this contradicts his essentially\\nabsolute supremacy and sovereignty. But while it cannot\\ncorrectly be said that he is bound to be steadfast in purpose,\\nand faithful in promise, it is very certain that he will be\\nthus, and all that is righteous, because of his ultimate\\nnature. 1 Now, as the universality of physical, psychical and\\nethical law indicates his unity, so does the total content of\\nethical law, loving service, indicate his benevolence. He\\nseeks the welfare and consequent happiness of his sentient\\ncreatures in his own constant loving service of them, both\\nby direct providence, and by the obligation laid upon them\\nto serve each other. Hence are we confident of his inexor-\\nable and perfected justice, essential to entire welfare, in\\nwhich justice every life shall eventually be complete also\\nof his tender mercy to the erring, he having opened a way,\\nthrough infinite self-sacrifice, whereby to be just and yet\\njustify the penitent, and secure to him eternal welfare and\\nblessedness. Our God is no egoist, but an altruist. He did\\nnot make us, nor does he rule us, for his own glory, but for\\nour own beatitude. God is love.\\n1 We speak of his justice and holiness, but never of his duty or virtue.\\nu No imperatives hold for the divine will, or in general for a holy will;\\nought is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily\\nin unison with the law. Kant, Grundlegung, u. s. w. 43.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "Ilav to aw/ACL (TvvapixoXoyovjxevov kcu cru/x/3i/?a\u00c2\u00a3o/Aevov Sta 7rdo~r) s\\n6\\\\ prj s rr} iTrixoprjyLas, kclt ivepyecav iv fxerpw ivos c/cao-rov /xepovs,\\nrrjv av\u00c2\u00a3r]0~iv tov a-co^aa/ros 7rotetrat eh oikoSo^v kavTov iv ayd7rjj.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "ETHICS\\nSECOND PAET-OKGANIZATION\\nTRANSITION\\n103. A glance over the course thus far pursued will\\nprepare for further advance. The purpose of Ethics is to\\nbring our ordinary moral judgments, so far as they tally with\\nenlightened conscience, into a coherent system, discovering\\nin them a principle which shall give it philosophic unity,\\nand also furnish, if we would not have a mere castle in the\\nair, a foundation on which to build. Beginning with the\\ncommon notion of a right, its condition is at once seen to be\\na reciprocal relation between persons, each having orderly\\nclaims upon the other, which claims compose his rights.\\nThese rights are grounded in the very constitution of human\\nnature, which, moved by its normal desires, seeks their grati-\\nfication. The fundamental right is a right to liberty in this\\npursuit. This is the primary principle of Ethics. An inten-\\ntional violation of a right, an interference in one s proper\\nliberty, is a wrong, a trespass, which being a subversion of\\nconstituted order, is forbidden. This is the moral law, dis-\\ncerned by conscience, and supported by subjective and objec-\\ntive sanctions.\\nObligation takes several forms whose essence is one. Pri-\\nmarily its law forbids aggressive trespass, then equally it\\nforbids retentive and neglective trespass. From these emerge\\n209", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "210 OR GANIZA TION\\nthe comprehensive forms of justice, duty, virtue, service and\\nlove, the last pair being the choice expression simply because\\nit brings more clearly forward the common essence. For, in\\nexamining the springs of action, the affections are seen to be\\nnaturally paramount, all other desires ancillary and disinter-\\nested. They are inconsistent with interested motives whose\\nends, lying within the agent himself, are selfishly opposed\\nto loving service. The ideal man expends his energies in\\nserving the interests of his fellows without thought of his\\nown as separate and independent, but only as involved in\\nthe common welfare.\\nIt should be observed that there are three principal notions\\npervading the discussion, which grow out from the funda-\\nmental notion of rights. These are:\\n1st. Trespass, in its direct and indirect sense, which as\\nforbidden expresses the whole of obligation.\\n2d. Trust, in the active sense of mutual confidence that\\nthe law of trespass will be observed; and in the passive\\nsense of stewardship, of being a trustee of all possessions,\\nincluding life itself.\\n3d. Defense, meaning the right and duty to guard trusts\\nby resisting encroachment on them which is the only prem-\\nise that can warrant an interference in another s liberty.\\nA strict and generous conformity to law results in common\\nwelfare. Welfare consists of liberty and continuous success\\nin the exercise of benevolence and beneficence. The correl-\\native criterion and natural consequence of welfare is happi-\\nness, which involves the special pleasure arising from a\\nconsciousness of disinterested conduct, and in general that\\narising from the satisfaction of enlarged and harmoniously\\nregulated desires. But it is the essential dignity of benevo-\\nlence rather than the resultant happiness that makes common\\nwelfare the proper aim and end of endeavor.\\nFinally, the general constitution or nature of mankind is", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "TRANSITION 211\\nnot the ultimate ground of obligation. A practical ethics\\nmay be built upon it, but complete theory needs to look\\nbeyond, into the nature of the Maker, which is the ultimate\\ndeterminant of all nature, and more especially of the native\\nobligation which binds his rational creatures to each other\\nand to himself. 1\\n104. We are to pass now from the consideration of obli-\\ngation, a binding together, to that of organization, a working\\ntogether. Heretofore the simple reciprocal relation of man\\nto man, with occasional anticipations of other relations, has\\nbeen the basis of our explanation. This view has proved\\nsufficient for the development of certain ethical principles,\\nand their application to the case supposed. But human\\nrelations are mostly complex, consisting largely of relations\\nof the individual man to societies, and of societies to their\\nindividual members, and also of societies to each other. In\\nconsidering hereafter these complex relations, it will be\\nfound that the same principles without addition are applica-\\nble to solve the obligations involved. The right aim of\\nsociety, in its various organic forms, is likewise the common\\nwelfare, to be sought under the impulse of love. Every\\nmoral agent is a member of some system in whose welfare\\nhis own is bound up, and thus sharing his own beneficence,\\nhe finds his welfare, not in opposition to or deprivation of\\nothers or in any self-seeking, but in union with his kind.\\n1 The doctrine that the moral law is discoverable in the constitution of\\nhuman nature brings to light the profound ethical significance of the motto\\ninscribed over the portal of the temple at Delphi: Know thyself. See in\\nElements of Psychology, opposite p. 1, Plato s comment as found in\\nCharmides, 164d, Step.\\nPerhaps the first who declared the unity and divinity of the law was\\nHerakleitos of Ephesus (circa 500 b.c.) who, in Fragment 91, says: All\\nhuman laws are nourished by (or fed by, and so get their strength from)\\nOne, the divine (or of God) for it has power (strength, force) so much as\\nhe wills, and it has enough for all, and more than enough. Sec his words\\non the title-page of this volume, and cf. his koiv6s (\u00c2\u00a3w6s) \\\\6yos in Fr. 92.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "212 ORGANIZATION\\nThe advantage of organized effort is familiar in the notion\\nof help, the combination of several energies to accomplish a\\nsingle purpose, one will directing many forces to the same\\nend. The will may be that of one man, as a Csesar, a Loy-\\nola, a Richelieu, a Napoleon, a Bismarck, overmastering and\\nbringing to unity the wills of a multitude or, turning from\\nautocracy to democracy, the unity of many wills may be the\\nresult of a free consensus, as in a republic, and in voluntary\\nassociations of all kinds. In this oneness of will the divided\\nbecomes an individual, a Briareus. What is subjectively\\nplural is objectively single. The individuality is complete\\nin its solidarity, and the combination is to be judged as an\\nundivided whole, whether it be a family, a mercantile firm, a\\nsociety, an army, or a nation.\\nLikewise let it be observed that conscience is catholic, and\\nthe law it reveals universal. Now a combination of men for\\na common purpose or purposes must be duly regulated by\\nthe common conscience. An organized association is respon-\\nsible for its official actions. Even a nation may do right or\\nwrong, and accordingly is honored or censured and perhaps\\npunished. As a common will makes it an individual, so a\\ncommon conscience makes it a person for as a body it is\\nconscious of obligation, and thus is a person. This organic\\npersonality, though not wholly independent of, yet is to be\\ndistinguished from, the private and persistent personality of\\nthe members taken severally, for it implies a mass of super-\\nadded obligations dominating the whole. Thus an organism,\\nor that wherein all parts and the whole are mutually means\\nand end, is recognized, when it consists of men, as an indi-\\nvidual personality, subject in all functional activity, both\\ninternal and external, to the moral law.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "THE MAN 213\\nCHAPTER I\\nTHE MA^\\n105. It will be well, as introductory to the subsequent\\nmatter and for the sake of its clear treatment, to examine\\nhere the organic character of the human constitution.\\nEach individual man is a completely organized being.\\nPrimarily he consists of a body and a mind or spirit. He is\\nessentially a duality. A human body without a mind is not\\na man it is merely a corpse. A mind without a body is\\nscience knows not what. The disembodied human spirit\\nmay furnish matter for revelation, but since it presents no\\nphenomena for our observation, it is beyond the reach of\\nscience. The man we study is a body and mind. These\\nare coordinate. Both being essential, we cannot say which\\nhas priority in efficiency, any more than we can say which\\nblade of a pair of shears does the more work. They cooper-\\nate, and neither can perform its functions apart from the\\nother. Thus the body is for the mind, and the mind is for\\nthe body. Each is a means serving the other as an end, so\\nthat together they constitute a duplex organic whole. 1\\n1 For definition of organism, see supra, 15. Ever since Plato declared\\nthe end of philosophy to be unity, science has constantly been seeking the\\nreduction of the many to one and in the history of philosophy we find a\\ndoctrine of the absolute. But does not the ultimate constitution of the uni-\\nverse of things seem rather to be essentially duplex essential, since each\\nthing depends for its actuality upon some other ultimate, since analysis of\\nwhat is essentially a pair is annihilation God and the world creator and\\ncreature the spiritual and the corporeal spheres mind and matter subject\\nand object; means and end; time and space; attraction and repulsion\\nlove and hate; heaven and hell; good and evil; and so on indefinitely.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "214 OHQANIZATION\\nEvidently the body is itself an organism. The limbs are\\nfor the sustenance of the trunk, and the trunk is for the\\nsustenance of the limbs. If the body suffer mutilation, the\\nloss may in a measure be compensated by an increased or a\\nspecialized activity of other organs, yet it is a defect. The\\nheart supplies the brain with blood, the brain supplies the\\nheart with energy. Moreover, each subsidiary organ is itself\\nan organism. The visual organ, the eye, serving as a guide\\nto the movements of the whole, is composed of various\\norgans, as the cornea, the lens, the retinal screen, each of\\nwhich is a means to every other as an end. Thus the whole\\nbody is an organism composed of many organisms, to each of\\nwhich every other and the whole brings its contribution. 1\\n106. The mind is a complement of faculties, an assem-\\nblage of functions. 2 Its several generic powers, knowing and\\nThat contraries are first principles of entities is a Pythagorean doctrine (see\\nAristotle s Metaphysics, bk. i, ch. 5). Necessarily we conceive things by\\nvirtue of their oppositions (see Elements of Psychology, 56 sq.), and if the\\nrealities correspond with our conceptions, the universe is a system of coun-\\nterparts (see supra, 14-18).\\nPhilosophic materialism on the one hand, and idealism on the other,\\nteach monism, the unity of the human being, of self but the prevailing\\ndoctrine in philosophy is dualism, and such is the common notion of man-\\nkind. This dualism of mind and body is usually thought of as limited to\\nmankind, or at most extended to animals but, in the very dawn of philoso-\\nphy, two centuries before Plato, the Ionians taught hylozoism, v\\\\r), matter,\\nand fry), life, that all matter is endowed with life, or, as Thales expressed it,\\nall things to be full of gods, ir vra T\\\\r}pr} dedv ehai. Aristotle, Be Anima,\\ni, 5. This doctrine, with some modification, has in our day been revived\\nunder the title panpsychism or the universal subconsciousness of matter.\\nSee Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, bk. i, ch. 1, 5.\\n1 In the physical constitution of an organized being, says Kant, we\\nassume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be\\nfound in it but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose.\\nGrundlegung, etc., Abbott s trans, p. 13. What follows on pp. 14-16 will\\nrepay thoughtful reading.\\n2 See supra, 1, and note also 16.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "THE MAN 215\\nfeeling, desiring and willing, are reciprocally related. Each\\nclass is a means to the others as ends, enabling them to fulfill\\ntheir normal functions. Were there no intelligence, there\\ncould be no emotion or sentiment were there no intelligence\\nand feeling, there could be no desire were there no desire,\\nthere could be no volition and were there no motived voli-\\ntion, there could be no intelligence higher than mere brutal\\nreceptivity. Each serves the other and the whole.\\nWe must be on our guard lest we transfer to this spiritual\\nsphere our notions of corporeal organs. These organs are\\ndistinct entities standing apart in space whereas the mental\\nfaculties and capacities are simply properties or functions of\\none and the same entity whose substance has no relation to\\nspace, except through the incorporating body. 1 It is never-\\ntheless evident that these generic properties are mutually\\nrelated as means and end. Hence they are organized as to\\ntheir functions, and the mind, by virtue of this constitution,\\nis a spiritual organism.\\nFurthermore, the specific powers are organically related,\\neach special faculty being supported in the exercise of its\\nfunctions by each and all the rest of its class. It will be\\nbest to exemplify this by the desires, with which, as motives\\nof the will, we are here particularly concerned.\\nThe desires are primarily divided into the craving desires,\\nor appetites and appetencies, whose function impels to\\nacquire, and the giving desires, or affections, whose func-\\ntion impels to impart. 2 This opposition is merely logical,\\nfor actually, in their naturally constituted order, they coop-\\nerate, the former seeking to acquire in order that the latter\\nmay be prepared to impart. The suppression or hinderance\\nof either would be a mutilation, worse than the amputation\\nof a leg or arm. As already pointed out, the exercise of the\\ni See Elements of Psychology, 77, 78, 149, 154.\\n2 See supra, 5, 6.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "216 OE GANIZA TION\\ncraving desires in disregard of the affections, is abnormal,\\nleading to a distraction of the affections from their proper\\nobjects, and to a subversion of their functions; also the\\nexercise of the affections in disregard of the appetites and\\nappetencies, is abnormal, leading to inefficiency from lack of\\nresources supplying what affection would bestow; but, if\\nboth classes be exercised according to their constitutional\\nrelations, each with regard to the other, then the offices they\\nare naturally fitted to fulfill are performed, their several and\\ncombined efficiency is attained, and their exercise is normal. 1\\nEach is for the other.\\nThe same principle is applicable to all the various mental\\npowers both in particular and in general, thus showing the\\nmind as a whole to be an organism consisting of minor or\\nsubsidiary organisms so delicately adjusted that an excess or\\ndeficiency or distortion in the action of any one disorders\\nevery other and the whole.\\n107. Let us try for a moment to imagine what a man\\nmight be and become if he were somehow so separated from\\nall objects of affection that it could have no play. We need\\nnot suppose him incapable of affection, but only that it be\\nwholly dormant from lack of call. Allow that this solitary can\\nprovide the necessaries of life, and even many of its luxuries,\\nand that he can successfully engage in self-culture. Pru-\\ndently caring for his body, he is temperate, and enjoys phys-\\nical health and strength. Under the impulse of craving\\npropensities, he acquires a wealth of means to further enjoy-\\nment, and his cultured intellect gathers and delights in treas-\\nures of knowledge.\\n1 See supra, 78, 79. It should be observed that the term affection is\\nused here and heretofore in its popular sense of benevolence. In its wider\\ngeneric and scientific sense affection is of two kinds, benevolent and malevo-\\nlent. See Elements of Psychology, 262, 263. In general the benevolent\\naffections are normal, the malevolent abnormal.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "TEE MAN 217\\nNow we point out that, in this imaginary case, there is\\nstrictly nothing moral or immoral; for, it is the relation\\nto rational beings, including Deity, or at least to sentient\\nbeings, and not merely the possession of a rational nature,\\nthat determines the existence of rights and obligation. No\\ntrespass is possible, in case of an absolute solitary, for there\\nare no rights or counter rights. No duty is done, for there\\nis no one to whom a debt is due. There is no virtue or\\nvice, for there is no law demanding conformity. There is\\nno justice or injustice, for there is no claimant. Nor can\\nthere be loving service. Indeed, this isolated man is desti-\\ntute of actual conscience, for no occasion would bring the\\npotential to an actual discernment of moral law. He has no\\nresponsibility, is not a moral being, not human, not a man,\\nunus homo, nullus homo, not a person, since he has no con-\\nsciousness of obligation. With him nothing is either right\\nor wrong even suicide would not be a crime. 1 Truly it is\\nnot good that the man should be alone. Pleasures we allow\\nhe may have, even the intellectual; otherwise they are less\\nthan brutal, for the brute enjoys at least instinctive affec-\\ntion. But the solitary can never be happy, certainly not\\nwith that happiness which ripens into blessedness. 2\\nIt appears, then, that man is essentially a moral being,\\nand therefore essentially a social being. So let us change\\nour supposition from one solitary to one in society, whose\\naffections, however, are wholly dormant because of his entire\\nselfishness. Guided by the counsels of prudence, 3 negatively\\nin avoiding harm, positively in securing personal benefit, he\\nmay accomplish the correct functioning of his physical or-\\ngans, and maintain his body in wholesome condition. Also\\nhe may wisely discipline his intellectual powers, and regulate\\nhis passions and emotions, and so attain a high grade of effi-\\nciency. Moreover, by observing certain rules of art, using\\n1 See supra, 85, note. 2 See supra, 1)7. 8 See sujna, 44.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "218 ORGANIZATION\\nhis fellows as means to secure his own ends, 1 he may accu-\\nmulate wealth, power, and fame. Such seem to have been the\\ncharacter and aims of the more refined peoples of antiquity,\\nespecially of the Greeks. Their self-culture, looking solely\\nto the beautiful development of the individual man, was\\nvery sensitive to the aesthetic elements essential to excel-\\nlence, while the ethical elements were more lightly esteemed\\nand often disregarded. The tendency was strongly egoistic,\\nseeking the enjoyment of a fair personality, and its secure\\ntenure against infringement. And in modern times such\\nself-culture is widely and highly approved, many moralists\\nmaking it the basis of their systems.\\nThe supposition of a cultured man in society without nat-\\nural affection is monstrous. Unlike the solitary, he is a\\nmorally responsible person, for conscience in him is actual,\\nthe law is upon him, and in his disregard of all save his own\\ninterests, he is a law-breaker, thoroughly immoral. Yet,\\nstrange to say, he may be a good neighbor and citizen; for,\\nif one selfishly serve his own interest with far-sighted pru-\\ndence and wide-reaching wisdom, this works out for society\\nvery much the same result as if his energies were wholly\\ndevoted to thoroughly unselfish, disinterested, loving ser-\\nvice. Such is the economical ordering of human affairs.\\nBut it does not so work for the man himself. Though far\\nfrom criminal or even disorderly, though he do not sin with\\nhis lips, and though he practice, for his own ends, a large\\nbeneficence, yet, without benevolence, he is a whited sepul-\\ncher, a hypocrite, a moral monster. More likely, however,\\nthe inward corruption breaks forth, poisoning the air and\\nmultiplying ills. This has usually been the historical result. 2\\nThese considerations illustrate the fact that men are social\\n1 See supra, 84.\\n2 See the catalogues in Romans, 1:28-32, and 2 Timothy, 3 1-5. Cf.\\nColossians, 3: 5-8.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "THE MAN 219\\nbeings in the sense of interdependence, not merely for the\\ncommon needs of pleasurable living, but also for moral devel-\\nopment by the exercise of mutual affection, through which\\nalone the dignity of complete manhood is attainable.\\n108. But in real human life there is not and cannot be\\nthorough seclusion. A solitary is a mere negation, a meta-\\nphysical abstraction, a logical ghost. We find ourselves in\\na world of fellow beings from whom it is impossible to be\\ncompletely absolved. Even a Selkirk on his desert isle not\\nonly remembers his former associations, but contemplates\\nthe possibility of a return to the world, and hence is bound\\nto comport himself with reference to it, to care for and culti-\\nvate his powers as far as may be in view of that possibility.\\nBut should he reasonably despair of a return among men,\\nstill he may not neglect his personal dignity, or ever, even\\nunder the greatest suffering, take his own life for he can-\\nnot know his future here, and one relation, the chiefest of\\nall, persists. He is bound by indissoluble obligations to his\\nmaker, law-giver and judge, whose claims are never released,\\nand whose honor is involved.\\nAlso let it be remarked that the individual owes his exis-\\ntence, as well as the possibility of its continuance and of all\\nmoral culture, so much to the human society in which he is\\nordinarily included, that it is rare to find one so totally de-\\npraved as to be entirely destitute of all natural affection.\\nA mother gives birth to her child therein and thereafter\\nthe moral tie binds. No distance of place or time can atten-\\nuate it to nothingness, no violence can sever it, even death\\nspares a bond in dutiful memories rendered more precious\\nand sacred by loss. Can a woman forget her sucking child,\\nthat she should not have compassion on the son of her\\nwomb Hardly is it possible. Can a son forget the mother\\nwho bore him, that he should not have compassion for her", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "220 ORGANIZATION\\npains, her nurture, her watchings, her tender caresses?\\nHardly, yet perhaps less rare. Shall he not, even in mature\\nyears, honor his father and mother with kindly watch -care\\nand grateful memories Surely, even amid a godless civili-\\nzation, or even amid a barbarous heathenism, Nature will\\nenforce in some measure her claims for loving service. 1\\n109. If we view each man, then, as an organism of orga-\\nnized organs, these standing to each other and to the whole\\nin a relation of interdependence, and if we observe that he\\nhas the power of self-direction and control, it is clear that it\\nis within him to conserve and cultivate his natural powers\\nby regulating their organic relations, and that the bringing\\nof all the corporeal and spiritual powers with which he is\\nendowed by nature into full activity and harmonious coop-\\neration, is the discharge of obligation and the perfection of\\nmanhood. But also it is clear that the constitution of the\\nman, apart from his affections, furnishes no ethical element,\\nno basis for an ethical system. His subsidiary powers of\\nbody and mind are not persons, and there is no moral ele-\\nment that does not involve a personal relation. 2\\n1 We could not live in society unless we had some of the qualities of\\nthe moral character. We should be what Hobbes supposed us to be, mere\\nbrutes with intelligence enough to see that it is best to give up something in\\norder to attain a greater good. Honesty then were honesty only because it\\nis the best policy.\\n2 The trifling of comparing society with a living organism, that is to\\nsay, that of a man or an animal, and of making the functions of the latter\\nthe pattern for its regulation, is altogether fruitless. The essential differ-\\nence is overlooked, that every such living organism serves a single individual\\nsoul with very many wholly impersonal parts while in society many indi-\\nvidual persons unite themselves into a community which does not exist\\napart from them as a distinct being. Lotze, Practical Philosophy, 49.\\nPlato committed this trifling in taking the organization of the individual\\nman as the pattern for the constitution of his ideal republic. Also Freder-\\nick II As men are born and live for a certain period, and at last die of\\nage or infirmity, so also States are constituted they flourish for some cen-\\nturies and then at last cease to exist, Antimacchiavelli, ch, 9. So also", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "THE MAN 221\\nSuch relation is necessarily implied in the existence and\\nexercise of affection. There must be a sentient object, one\\ncapable of benefit, to whom there is conscious obligation.\\nHerein, and herein only, personality appears herein, and\\nherein only, moral character has its root and growth. The\\naffections being psychologically and ethically essential to\\nintegral manhood, it follows that a man cannot be truly\\nand rightly a man apart from his fellows, and in his\\nrelations to them his conscience discerns the moral law de-\\nmanding the exercise of righteous affections, and claiming\\nrecognition as the supreme law of humanity.\\nThere is no need to consider further the individual man.\\nWe have noted him as a typical organism, pointing out that,\\napart from his relations to others, that is, in him alone, there\\nis no ethical element. In the prior part of this treatise the\\nreciprocal relations of man to man, in their ethical aspect,\\nhave been discussed at length. True the mere coexistence\\nof two persons may correctly be construed as an organism,\\neach being for the other and both for the pair; especially\\nexemplified by partners in business, they being formally uni-\\nfied. But to view the simple relation of man to man as an\\norganism would lead to no conclusions other than those\\nalready attained, and hence we may now dismiss this simple\\ncase also, and proceed to consider more intricate relations.\\nHerbert Spencer We find not only that the analogy between society and\\na living creature is borne out, but that the same definition of life applies to\\nboth/ Social Statics, p. 490. Elisha Mulford says The logical fallacy\\nof defining an ethical by a physical organism, and limiting the one to the\\nconception of the other, appears in Draper s Civil Polity. But nations\\ndo not exist in history in this limitation in a physical sequence they ap-\\npear under the conditions of a moral life, and their growth or decay Ifl\\ntraced, not in necessary, but in moral causes. The Nation, p. I s note.\\nAnd von Mohl says: These conceptions of the State and Its correspon-\\ndences based on physical science appear from time to time, partly throng)]\\nan altogether sickly tendency of thought, and partly through a mystical and\\nfanciful conceit. 1 Encyklopadie der Staatsicissenschat lcn. p. M.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "222 ORGANIZATION\\nCHAPTER II\\nTHE FAMILY\\n110. A study of the simple relation of man to man has\\nenabled us to discover the principles of obligation, with their\\napplication in equivalent intercourse. This exposition, how-\\never, though fundamental and widely comprehensive, is not\\nexhaustive, and not adequate to the demands of right living.\\nFor, in actual life, the relations subsisting among men exhibit\\nmany varieties in kind, and those of the same kind many\\ndifferences in degree also these relations are subject to\\nmany and extreme changes, often amounting to reversal, due\\nto growth, activity, and the ceaseless mutations of inter-\\ncourse. Now, since all obligations originate in and corre-\\nspond to present relations, it follows that the special duty of\\na man to some one on his right hand is rarely quite similar\\nto what is due to some one on his left also that his duty to\\neither is often quite unlike the duty of that other to him\\nand further, that his duty to any one to-day frequently\\ndiffers greatly from what is due to the same one to-morrow.\\nIt is needful, therefore, to consider the kinds of relations in\\nwhich men stand to each other, and their variations, in order\\nto determine the corresponding obligations.\\nThe relations that obtain among men exhibit many varie-\\nties chiefly because of differences in social organization\\nunder which general title, therefore, human relations and\\nconsequent obligations may be distributed and discussed.\\nThe procedure involves the principle that the perfection of\\nnatural order, its harmony and stability, require that each\\nmember fulfill its office in the several organisms to which it", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 223\\nbelongs. This is a natural principle, physical and psychical\\nand ethical, being applicable to the universe considered as\\nan organic whole, as well as to each of its organized mem-\\nbers, and specially, as we have just seen, to the microcosm,\\nman. In society at large each one is morally bound to fulfill\\nhis functions as a member of the whole, and also as a mem-\\nber of each of those subordinate and constitutive organisms\\nin which he is integrant. A study, then, of the chief con-\\nstituents of society will bring into view the various kinds\\nand degrees of duty corresponding to these functional rela-\\ntions, whose variations determine the variations of personal\\nobligation under the sole but universal law of loving service.\\nTo this study we now proceed.\\n111. Nature presents in both animals and plants a fun-\\ndamental fact in sex. This is a primary, inerasable distinc-\\ntion that cuts all higher forms of animated beings, and\\nespecially the total of humanity together with every subordi-\\nnate class of mankind, into two portions, delicately marked\\nby anatomical and physiological variations which extend\\nthroughout the body, being discoverable even in the brain.\\nThe physical differences are normally attended by mental and\\nmoral differences which though less definite are not less deep,\\npermanent and universal. In these differences originate an\\nappetite and an affection which often become passionate,\\ntending on the one hand toward the deepest degradation, and\\non the other to the highest exaltation. Hence it comes that\\nthe relation of the sexes is perhaps the most powerful social\\nfactor in every community, both savage and civilized.\\nHerein the pointing of nature is distinctly to marriage and\\noffspring. It sets apart a pair, a male and female, for each\\nother, their exclusive union being spontaneously guarded ln-\\nhygienic barriers, and by a prompt jealousy, fierce and fatal.\\nOffspring brings into play strong parental instincts, prompt-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "224 ORGANIZATION\\ning protection, provision and nurture until maturity. Thus\\nthe family is preeminently a natural institution, which in\\nsome important respects takes precedence of all others, and\\nis fundamental in the constitution of society. 1\\n112. The ideal family in modern society consists of a\\nmature man and woman, not differing greatly in age, who of\\ntheir own free will, have entered with civil and ecclesiastical\\nforms, into the marriage bond, are living together as husband\\nand wife, and providing for their yet unemancipated chil-\\ndren. Their children are first a son, then a daughter, again\\na son, then another daughter. The parents, beside each\\nother, have both a son and a daughter, and each child has\\nboth a brother and a sister. These exhaust the family rela-\\ntions. To complete this ideal, add a home, giving common\\nshelter, furnishing conveniences, and serving as a local habi-\\ntation and center of union.\\nWhat support this ideal receives from ethical principles\\nwill be more clearly seen after a detailed consideration of\\nthe several relations involved. But we make at once the\\noovious remark that it is not often fully realized, because of\\nfailure or irregularity in births, intervention of death, or ex-\\ntreme poverty. Still, even in such incomplete families, the\\nrelations are generally sufficient for the unfolding of the\\ndomestic virtues, the building of character, and the enjoy-\\nment of home life. 2\\n1 It is noteworthy that the zoologist and the anthropologist, in their logi-\\ncal distribution of the animal kingdom into genera, species and sub-species,\\nnever recognize, even in the most insignificant varieties, sex as marking a\\nclass. This indicates that scientifically a male and female together consti-\\ntute one individual of a kind. So in the story of Eden this essential oneness\\nis singularly emphasized see Genesis, 1 27 and 5:1, 2.\\n2 Home, its perfect trust and truth, its simple holiness, its ex-\\nquisite happiness, is to the world what conscience is to the human mind.\\nBUXWER,", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 225\\n113. It is evident that a family is an organic union of\\nseveral persons, as indicated in their common surname, and\\nin the correlative terms husband and wife, parent and child,\\nfather or mother and son or daughter, brother and sister;\\neach of these implying the existence of the other. Ethically\\neach member is related to every other, and to the whole, as\\nat once means and end. The existence of relations among\\nthese persons determines that there be corresponding obliga-\\ntions, and the variety of relations determines a variety in\\nthe obligations. The particular kind and degree of the obli-\\ngation of each member, is determined by the special function\\nbelonging to that member in maintaining the orderly unity\\nof the organism. Just this much is the duty of each, and\\nno more.\\nIf, however, there be, as there often is, disorder, distrac-\\ntion or failure on the part of some one member, requiring addi-\\ntional and special efforts on the part of the others to restore\\nand maintain order and efficiency, then their duty is enlarged\\nto meet the requisition. An excellent analogy is seen in the\\nphysical organism of the individual man. Each of the organs\\nof his body contributes to the healthful action of every other,\\nand all the others contribute to sustain each one. Moreover,\\nwhen any one is disordered, there is a disturbance more or\\nless general, a sympathetic suffering of all allied organs, and\\na feverish effort of nature to restore the normal condition.\\n114. In the actual case of a man and a woman obeying\\nthe beck of nature, and entering into the marriage relation,\\nlet the distinct personality of each, and their entire moral\\nequivalence, be granted; then several important truths are\\nlogically consequent.\\nFirst. In consenting to this union, both parties are to\\nexercise their unbiased free will. Any unwarranted inter-\\nference, objective or subjective, in the liberty of either is a", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "226 ORGANIZATION\\ntrespass the more grievous because of its far reaching conse-\\nquences. It is true that circumstances often warrant or even\\nrequire a hindering interference, extending perhaps to pro-\\nhibition, on the part of parents especially, or of friends, or of\\nthe State but it is obvious that, in a matter so extremely\\ndelicate, and of such vast importance to those immediately\\nconcerned, the warrant should be very clear. Compulsory\\nmarriage, on the other hand, is never warrantable, and is one\\nof the grossest forms of trespass.\\nSecondly. Actual marriage, or the yielding of each to the\\nother of what is peculiar to the distinct personality, works no\\ndetriment to the honor of either party, provided it be accom-\\npanied by an entirely voluntary, mutual and unreserved sur-\\nrender of all the interests of life into the common keeping\\nof both. 1 Thereby the pair, without losing the distinct\\npersonality, become a single individual personality. In this\\nfusion, their honor, social standing, property and prospects\\nare rightly held in common by each for the other, by each\\nfor both, by both for each. The two are one. Their joint\\nwelfare and happiness is an inseparable compound.\\nThirdly. In the pair thus unified there should be but one\\nwill. A constant endeavor to harmonize opinions, senti-\\nments and desires, wherein a firm adherence to principle is\\ncombined with a yielding even in matters of importance,\\nresults in a singleness of will that is essential to the perfec-\\ntion of the union. A tie so sacred should never be loosened\\nby willful discord. Custom has established on firm and suf-\\nficient grounds that, generally speaking, the control in detail\\nof interests outside the home shall be in the hand of the hus-\\nband, and those within the home shall be subject to the man-\\nagement of the wife. But, while the decisions of each\\nshould be as far as possible in accord with the views\\nand wishes of the other, yet, in case of a permanent differ-\\n1 See Lotze, Practical Philosophy, 35.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "TBE FAMILY 227\\nence, the final decision should be left to the one in whose\\nprovince the matter in question belongs. 1\\nFourthly. The union may not be enlarged by the addi-\\ntion of another partner. Polyandry or polygamy, common\\namong brutes, is inadmissible among persons, it being incon-\\nsistent with the moral equivalence of the sexes. If more\\nthan one of either sex be bound to one of the other, the plu-\\nrality is severally deprived of the rank of equal fellowship,\\nand degraded to a thing useful merely as a means.\\nFifthly. While it may be doubted whether there be physi-\\nological reasons why the marriage of persons of near consan-\\nguinity should not be permitted, the ethical reasons are\\nI We quote from Victor Hugo s Quatrevingt-Treize, n p. 492, part of a\\ndialogue\\nGauvain reprit\\nEt la femme qu en faites-vous\\nCimourdain repondit\\nCe qu elle est. La servante de Phomme.\\nOui. A une condition.\\nLaquelle\\nC est que l homme sera le serviteur de la femme.\\nY penses-tu s 6cria Cimourdain, Phomme serviteur! jamais.\\nL homme est maitre. Je n admets qu une royaut6, celle du foyer.\\nL homme chez lui est roi.\\nOui, A une condition.\\nLaquelle\\nC est que la femme y sera reine.\\nC est-a-dire que tu veux pour Phomme et pour la fciiiiiic.\\nL egalite\\\\\\nL ^galite y songes-tu les deux etres sont divers.\\nJ ai dit l egalite\\\\ Je n ai pas dit l identite\\\\\\nII y eut encore une pose, comme une sortede trfive entre ces deux esprits\\nec,hangeant des eclairs. Cimourdain la rompit.\\nEt Penfant a qui le donnes-tn\\nD abord au pere qui l engendre, puis a la mere !li I enfante, puis an\\nmaitre qui Peleve, puis 6 la cite qui Le virilise, puis a la patrie qui est la\\nmere supreme, puis a Phumanite qui est la grande Bleule.\\nTu ne paries pas (1\u00c2\u00ab- Dieu.\\nChacun de ces degree, pere, mere, maitre, citd, patrie, humanil\\nun des Echelons de l ^chelle qui uiontu a Dieu. 1", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "228 ORGANIZATION\\nclearly good and sufficient. The marriage of members of\\nthe same family would bring about such au admixture of\\nmoral relations as to confuse the functions of its members,\\nrendering them perplexing and distracting, and so disorder-\\ning the harmony of its system. Hence the State, in the\\ninterest of the family, and of general society whose moral\\nhealth is involved with that of the family, prohibits such\\nmarriage as incestuous, tending to disturb the normal opera-\\ntion of the family organism, and to check the unfolding of\\nits peculiar beauty and worth. 1\\n115. Marriage is indissoluble, except by death or crime.\\nIf death sever the bonds, a new marriage of the survivor\\ncannot be prohibited by the State, for civil law is properly\\nconcerned with temporal relations only, and so the question\\nof second marriage must be left to the religious convictions\\nof the parties. A formal dissolution of marriage is justified\\nspecially by the crime of conjugal infidelity, this being a vio-\\nlation of its peculiar significance and manifest purpose, and\\nitself an actual breaking of the vow.\\nLegal questions concerning divorce, with permit of new\\nmarriage, present many difficulties, especially on plea of\\ncruelty or desertion. But it is clear that a wished-for disso-\\nlution cannot rightly be decreed merely because of disease,\\npoverty, misfortune, disappointed expectation, incompati-\\nbility, whatever this may mean, or the dissatisfaction of one\\nor both parties, or even because of wickedness and crime\\nthat does not victimize home. None of these can be allowed\\nas sufficient ground for entire divorce, if society would pre-\\nserve its moral health, so largely dependent on the sanctity\\n1 For like reason it forbids the marriage of certain collateral relatives.\\nEnglish statute forbids even the marriage of a man with his deceased wife s\\nsister, for which certainly no physiological, and perhaps no sufficient reason\\ncan be given, other than the liability of intermixing moral relations.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 229\\nof marriage. Relief may be had in extreme cases by a legal\\nrecognition of actual separation, without a severance of the\\nmoral bond that forbids a new relation. 1\\n1 Among heathen peoples, ancient and modern, the marriage tie has\\nalways been loose, and divorce facile. In Christendom the reverse is gen-\\nerally true, influenced by the law of marriage gathered from Genesis, 2 24\\nMatthew, 19 9 Mark, 10 2-12 Luke, 16 18 and 20 27-3G Romans,\\n7 2, 3 1 Corinthians, 7 10-14. The principle informing these precepts\\nwas incorporated in the Canons of the Church at an early date, and in 1502,\\nthe Council of Trent decreed marriage indissoluble from any cause. Soon,\\nhowever, under the influence of the Reformation, the distinction was made\\nbetween separation a vinculo matrimonii, or complete divorce, and separa-\\ntion a mensd et toro, which latter, in extreme cases, the Canons allowed.\\nConstantine prohibited, circa 315, by special edict, divorce on simple\\nconsent of the parties and the States of Europe have ever since recognized\\nmarriage as a civil contract, and, with fluctuating severity and laxity, have\\nrestricted divorce, on grounds of civil polity.\\nIn England, until of late, marriage was, by the Canon Law, indissoluble\\nbut, after the Reformation, separation a mensd et toro was allowed, by de-\\ncree of Ecclesiastical Court, neither party being permitted to marry again\\nwhile complete divorce with this privilege could be granted only by special\\nact of Parliament. Late statutes, 20, 21 Vic. c. 85, et al., have made great\\nchanges. Jurisdiction in divorce cases is transferred to a special Civil Court,\\nin which either spouse may obtain a decree of complete divorce on ground\\nof adultery and judicial separation from board and couch may be secured\\n~on ground of cruelty or desertion, in which case the woman thereby becomes\\nfemme sole in regard of property.\\nIn America the practice varies in different States. In several of them\\nno divorce is granted but by special act of the legislature, and in others the\\nlegislature itself is restricted from granting them, but it may confer the\\npower on courts of justice. So strict and scrupulous has been the policy f\\nSouth Carolina, that there is no instance in that State since the Revolution\\nof a divorce of any kind, either by sentence of a court of justice or l\\\\v act\\nof the legislature. In all other States divorce a vinculo may be granted by\\ncourts of justice for adultery. In New York the jurisdiction of the courts\\nas to absolute divorce for causes subsequenl bo marriage Is confined to the\\nsingle case of adultery; but in most of the other States, In addition to\\nadultery, intolerable ill-usage, or willful desertion, or unheard of absence, or\\nhabitual drunkenness, or some of them, will authorize a decree for divorce\\na vinculo under different modifications and restrictions. Kim. Commenr\\ntaries, iv, 105. The laws relating bo divorce have undergone many oha\\nsince the publication of these Commentaries in 1830.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "230 ORGAKIZATIOK\\n116. Persons of full age, and emancipated from parental\\nauthority, often do not marry for some years, or perhaps\\nnever marry. The social status of such persons is more or\\nless abnormal according as they are more or less absolved\\nfrom family connection. For the family is the basis of social\\norganization, and since these are now but external appen-\\ndages to some one, they cannot be accounted more tk a a\\nfractional members of society at large. 1\\nSuch persons are unhappily at great disadvantage in respect\\nof moral culture. For the conditions of complete develop-\\nment are lacking to those destitute of the familiar objects\\naround which the strongest and best affections of the human\\nsoul gather and grow, and whose lack it is not possible fully\\nto compensate by other lines of moral activity. In these\\nother lines, however,. exceptional attainments are often made,\\ncommanding high respect, and rounding out a useful life.\\n117. When the family circle is completed by the birth\\nof children, a new and wide field is opened for the cultiva-\\ntion of ethical graces. Moral possibilities, which otherwise\\nare forever latent, become patent. The potential becomes\\nactual, and nature has not planted in vain. No man is ever\\nwholly a man until he is a husband and a father and, more\\nemphatically, no woman is wholly a woman until she is a\\nwife and mother. A babe is a pledge of love, an additional\\nand powerful tie, a sacred trust, calling out and taxing the\\nmoral energies, and making an unlimited demand on loving\\nservice. All that is beautiful in human nature blooms under\\nthe influence of this fertilizing relation. It is easy to adore\\nthe Madonna. 2\\n1 It is at least curious to note that a prerequisite to membership in the\\nancient Jewish Sanhedrin was that one should be a husband and a father\\nperhaps because this would qualify him to be a wiser and more compassion-\\nate judge. See Bunsen, Hippolytus, ii, 344.\\n2 It is a famous saying of Froebel Kommt, lasst uns unsern Kindern", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "TEE FAMILY 231\\nThe familiar care and provident rearing of children con-\\nstantly exercises the domestic virtues, tending directly to the\\nperfection of manhood and womanhood. The responsibility\\nand difficulty are of the gravest. The culture should be\\ndominated by the view that, in the order of nature, the child\\nis destined to moral independence, and to membership in\\nsociety. In being prepared for this, it has many and very\\nsacred rights. Its parents are bound, as their function in\\nthe family organism, to provide for its healthful maintenance\\nsuitable to their rank in society, for its education, intellec-\\ntual, moral and religious, and, in general, for its present and\\nprospective welfare. Great laxity of restraint is likely to be\\nruinous; but, on the other hand, severe restrictions, a rigid\\nmolding of character, opinions, and religious creed, is hardly\\nless to be deprecated as an injurious trespass on the right of\\nthe child to generous culture, and the free growth of its\\nindividuality. 1\\nThe office of brothers and sisters in this organic relation\\nis affectionate sympathy, and mutual helpfulness, which\\nshould extend throughout life. As sons and daughters they\\nare bound to honor father and mother by a willing and\\npleased obedience to their rightful authority, and by a\\nprompt readiness to promote their welfare. Also they are\\nbound to guard sedulously the honor of the family name,\\nand to seek actively the advancement of the common interest.\\nleben. Come, let us live for, with and in our children. Then will the life\\nof our children bring us peace and joy, then shall we begin to grow wise, to\\nbe wise. 1 Education of Man, 42.\\ni The feeling of community, first, uniting a child with its mother, father,\\nbrothers and sisters, and resting on a higher spiritual unity, to which later\\nis added the unmistakable discovery that father, mother, brothers, Bisters,\\nhuman beings in general, feel and know themselves to be in community and\\nunity with a higher principle, with humanity, with God this feeling of\\ncommunity is the very first germ, the very first beginning of all true reli-\\ngious spirit, of all genuine yearning for unhindered oniflcation with the\\nEternal, with God. 1 idem, \u00c2\u00a721.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "232 OE GANIZA TION\\n118. This human institution, the family, is preeminently\\nnatural, being physically determined. Those born into it\\nare involuntarily and inseparably its members. By its pri-\\nmacy it stands as the unit of society and of the State, with-\\nout derogation from the distinct personality, moral status\\nand obligation of its individual members. Yet it is a whole.\\nEven when some part or parts are lacking, it is still a unit.\\nIt is not a logical whole, a genus, for its parts are not\\nspecies or kinds of family. It is an integral whole not col-\\nlective, as a cluster of grapes, but organic, as a flower whose\\ncentral organs, stamen and pistil, yield germ and seed, within\\na corolla. It is an individual, indivisible in itself, and sepa-\\nrate from every other.\\nLess clear perhaps, but not less true, is it that a family is\\na single personality. The definition of a person is a being\\nconscious of obligation. Now there is a consciousness com-\\nmon to all members of a family, an intelligent apprehension\\nof moral law which is the same in each, a judgment which,\\nunder the influence of common interest, is assimilated into\\none, a pervading sentiment, a united impulse to effectuate a\\nsingle will. The obligation of some one family as an organic\\nwhole to some one man as its benefactor, or to some other\\nfamily, or to general society, is matter of familiar speech and\\nacknowledgment, and the common consciousness of such\\nobligation constitutes its unique personality, quite distin-\\nguishable from the peculiar personality of its several mem-\\nbers. To this conception of its distinct personality may be\\nadded the possession of family traits in features, manners,\\ncustoms, habits, and in general, of character, often sharply\\nmarked. Moreover, what wounds one member, wounds all\\nthe honor, dignity and welfare of the whole, is in common\\nkeeping. 1\\n1 This moral solidarity is not a product of refined civilization. In rude,\\nprimitive ages it found abundant recognition for example, in the infliction", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 233\\n119. The individual personality of a family as an organ-\\nized unit, distinct from the personality of its members, is\\nmanifest in the significant fact that it claims a life beyond\\nthe present generation. Its ancestry, extending back for\\nages is its pride, and its posterity in an indefinite future is\\nits hope. What it has been confers titles of honor, and what\\nit may become excites anxious solicitude. The death of a\\nmember breaks in upon its present entirety, but does not\\ninterrupt its continuity. Only by sterility and death com-\\nbined is it extinguished, and this is accounted a special loss\\nto society, a public and private misfortune. 1\\nA family of the present generation, inheriting the honor\\nand wealth of the same family in preceding generations, rec-\\nognizes its moral obligation to maintain and rightly use the\\ntrust, thus discharging a sacred debt due the dead. Also it\\nrecognizes its moral obligation to the coming generation in\\nprovision for its welfare, thus discharging a sacred debt due\\ndescendants, including those yet unborn. That one is thus\\nbound to pay debts due the deceased and the unborn, is not\\nfanciful sentiment, nor figurative speech, but real, literal\\nethics. Current expressions and approved literature recog-\\nnize in many ways the obligation as especially incumbent on\\nof punishment due to the offense of a single member upon the whole of his\\nfamily the guilt of one, it was held, making all alike guilty. This Lingers\\nwith us in the social ostracism of an innocent member of a dishonored or\\ndisreputable family. Put merit for guilt, gratitude and love for vengeance,\\nand we have a law of the moral order holding good Coral! time, for the high-\\nest civilization, for the most, refined moral consciousness.\\n1 Witness the deification and worship of ancestry, bo commoD among\\nheathen peoples, ancient and modern. The law of primogeniture in Eng-\\nland, and in most of the States of Europe, by which, the father dying intes-\\ntate, his eldest son inherits the real estate, i.e. land- and buildings, in pref-\\nerence to and in exclusion of all other members of the family, clearly Intends\\nto confirm its continuity. So also the practice of entail. The preference In\\ninheritance of males to females, found in ancient Jewish, Athenian (but not\\nin Roman) law, and in the laws of some modern Stale.-., e.g. the Salic law,\\nlikewise Was apparently intended tO perpetuate more distinctly the family.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "234 ORGANIZATION\\nthe family, whose individuality and personality extend\\nthrough generations that come and go, yet perpetuate its\\norganic unity.\\n120. The foregoing considerations enable us to under-\\nstand more clearly the ethical principles that regulate the\\nholding and disposing of property. 1\\nProperty owned by either party at time of marriage, and\\nthat acquired afterward, is, by virtue of the marriage, the\\ncommon property of the family. That either husband or\\nwife should have property at disposal apart from and inde-\\npendently of the other, though often it is so arranged, con-\\ntradicts the unity of the relation, drawing a line of separation\\nand making a distinction that ought never to exist. Such\\nan arrangement is inconsistent with that entire surrender of\\nall the interests of life into the common keeping which the\\nmarriage bond requires; and in so far the marriage is but\\npartial. The reserve implies a distrust that is chilling, and\\nlikely to produce a discord that is fatal. It is a withholding\\ntrespass.\\nEvidently, then, the family property should not be largely\\nventured in trade, or otherwise disposed of, without the free\\nconsent of all members, including the children, in whom also\\nproperty rights are vested by birth, when they become suffi-\\nciently mature to appreciate and rightly judge the interests\\ninvolved. Yet, be it remembered, that each and all should\\nseek, by a reasonable yielding, to assimilate their views and\\nwishes, thereby attaining a unity of will which thus becomes\\nthe will of the family.\\nAlso it is evident that the management of the family prop-\\nerty in detail must be left to some one member. This seems\\nnaturally to devolve upon the husband and father who,\\naccording to the usual and approved order, takes charge of\\n1 See supra, 38.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 235\\nthe family interests outside of home, and hence is best\\nacquainted with public affairs. Because property is held\\nand ordinary business transacted in his name, he is apt to\\nregard himself as exclusive and irresponsible owner. This\\nerror, pervading society, stands greatly in need of correction. 1\\n121. Distribution by testament of the property of a\\nfamily is, for like reasons, by the hand and in the name of\\nits ostensible head also for the reason that, preparatory to\\nhis decease, when the house band is loosed, and the family\\ndisintegrated, there is need of a special and provisory adjust-\\nment of property rights by the one to whom their care has\\nbeen chiefly committed. In any such adjustment the united\\nconsensus of all members should be had, so that together\\nwith the avoidance of any actual trespass, complaint of wrong\\nmay also be forestalled.\\nTestamentary distribution gives rise to many difficult\\nquestions which largely occupy the courts. The funda-\\nmental principles involved are, however, sufficiently clear.\\nA producer has a right to use and dispose of his products at\\nwill, and this will must be effective beyond his decease, else\\na great incentive to industry and accumulation would be lost,\\nprojects for the benefit of the coming generation would not\\nbe devised and driven, and social progress would be hindered,\\ninasmuch as each generation would have to make a new be-\\nginning. But let it be observed that the home management\\nand industry, its provision for rest and refreshment, its cheer-\\ning influence, its trifling comforts even, are very important\\nelements in the efficiency of the producer, and thereby enter\\n1 In the United States, when the head of a family dies intestate, distri-\\nbution to the survivors, is made of the property according to civil statute.\\nand guardians of minors are appointed. There are differences, bul lie ex-\\nistence in any form of such statutes is a distinct, recognition l v the State\\nthat property rights in what was an undivided possession inhere in each\\nmember of a disrupted family.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "236 ORGANIZATION\\ninto his product; so that all members of the home circle, but\\nespecially the husband and wife, are partners in business,\\nand since they share in the producing, are entitled to share\\nin the production, both in consuming and in disbursing.\\nBeside this, it should be distinctly recognized that all posses-\\nsions are held and managed as trusts, and their agreed testa-\\nmentary distribution should be regulated accordingly. The\\ntestator is bound to provide suitably for the family, thus dis-\\ncharging his primary obligation as its trustee. A surplus\\nmay rightly become matter of bequest to collaterals, to friends,\\nor to the general public, in the founding or endowing hospi-\\ntals, schools, libraries, and such like benefactions, according\\nto the best judgment of the trustee representing the family in\\nthis discharge of its alien obligations.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 237\\nCHAPTER in\\nTHE COMMTXNTTY\\n122. Human beings manifest a strong disposition to\\ngather into groups more or less permanent. In some of these\\npopulation is massed, as in cities in others it is more sparse,\\nas in villages, hamlets, neighborhoods. Hence in any inhab-\\nited region, it is easy to point out centers of population,\\nthough the circumference be quite indefinite. Besides the\\ngregarious instinct of the human animal, there are many\\nrational determinants of this tendency, both economical and\\nethical. Every one owes his existence to progenitors and\\nalso is indebted for its continuance, for all physical means,\\nconveniences and comforts of living, for all intellectual and\\nmoral culture, so entirely to association, more or less intimate,\\nwith his fellows, that all the interests of life, his whole wel-\\nfare, is bound up with them. Strict independence is a prac-\\ntical impossibility. 1\\n1 La nature de rhomme le parte a vivre en soci\u00c2\u00a3te\\\\ Quelle qu en soit\\nla cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout ou Ton a rencontre\\ndes hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en corps de nation. Peut-\\netre est ce afin d unir leur forces pour leur surety commune peut-etre arm\\nde pourvoir plus ais^ment a leur besoins toujours il est vrai qu il est dans\\nla nature de rhomme de se reunir en socidte\\\\ comme font les abeilles et\\nplusieurs especes d animaux on remarque des traits communs dans toutes\\nces reunions d hoinmes, en quelque parti du mondequ ils habitent. Say,\\nCours d Econ. Polit.\\nThe impulse which leads to combination lies in the necessity of supple-\\nmenting the force of the individual by that of others, without which the\\naims of life are not completely attainable. Here belong not merely the con-\\nceivable advantages which one receives from another, but above all the\\nsocial intercourse itself, without which a really human development is incon-\\nceivable. Lotze, Tract. Phil., 56.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "238 OB GANIZA TION\\nA group of people thus specially related by living in prox-\\nimity is a community. 1 This is not merely a collection but a\\nbody of people for the necessities of its members which draw\\nthem together determine at once an organic constitution. 2\\nEach member contributes more or less directly to the welfare\\nof every other, and to the welfare of the whole, in which\\nwelfare he participates. The variations of function are deter-\\nmined by the pressure of various needs, and by the fitness of\\nvarious abilities to meet them. There is a tacit consensus in\\nthe distribution of these functions but since there is no\\nformal and definite enactment of a constitution, the com-\\nmunity is often spoken of as unorganized society whereas,\\nthough not formally, yet it is essentially an organism, neces-\\nsitated by the interdependence of its members. 3\\n1 Common public, general, usual, vulgar; Fr. from Lat. com-, for\\ncum, with, and munis, complaisant, obliging, binding by obligation.\\nSkeat. Community, from Lat. communitas, fellowship, from cum-, together\\nwith, mutually, and munis, ready to serve.\\n2 Quam fluctus diversi, quam mare conjuncti.\\n3 A quoi bon la socie te Eestez dans la nature. Soyez les sauvages.\\nOtaiti est un paradis. Seulement, dans ce paradis on ne pense pas. Mieux\\nvaudrait encore un enfer intelligent qu un paradis bete. Mais non, point\\nd enfer. Soyons la socie te humaine. Plus grande que nature Oui. Si\\nvous n ajoutez rien a la nature, pourquoi sortir de la nature Alors, con-\\ntentez-vous du travail comme la fourmi, et du miel comme Pabeille. Restez\\nla b\u00c2\u00a7te ouvriere au lieu d etre 1 intelligence reine. Si vous ajoutez quelque\\nchose a la nature, vous serez n^cessairement plus grand qu elle aj outer,\\nc est augmenter, c est grandir. La socie te c est la nature sublimed. Je\\nveux tout ce qui manque aux ruches, tout ce qui manque aux f ourmilieres,\\nles monuments, les arts, la poCsie, les heros, les ge nies. Porter des fardeaux\\nkernels, ce n est pas la loi de Phomme. Non, non, non, plus de parias, plus\\nd esclaves plus de forcats, plus de damne s je veux que chacun des attri-\\nbuts de Phomme soit un symbole de civilisation et un patron de progres\\nje veux la liberte devant Pesprit, PegalitC devant le cceur, la fraternity\\ndevant Pame. Non plus de joug Phomme est fait, non pour trainer des\\nchaines, mais pour ouvrir des ailes. Plus d homme reptile. Je veux la\\ntransfiguration de la larve en lepidoptere, je veux que le ver de terre se\\nvivante, change en fieur et s envole. Victor Hugo, Quatrevingt-Treize,\\np. 495.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 239\\n123. Recur to the primary ethical principle that every\\none has a right to gratify his normal desires, and to this, be-\\nside, that it is his obligation not merely passively to allow\\ntheir impulse, but actively to seek their gratification, and it\\nis manifest that the fulfillment of obligation is impracticable\\napart from society. 1 For, no class of normal desires can\\nproperly be gratified without reference to associates but\\nespecially the affections, which are conditioned on the presen-\\ntation of sentient objects, can have no exercise in solitary life.\\nIn such life the chief est, indeed the sole function of humanity\\nis perverted and comes to naught. Mankind is a brother-\\nhood, and it is only by close fraternization, only by being a\\nman among men, that it is possible to be wholly a man.\\nWhoever lives his life in its natural and rightful fullness is a\\nconstant recipient from his fellows of the necessary means,\\nfor which he is dependent on them, and therefore is constantly\\nincuriing an indebtedness which requires a constant reciprocal\\nactivity to repay.\\nThese considerations forbid an ascetic life, which, under\\nthe guise of righteous self-denial, renounces invigorating en-\\njoyment, and thus leads to such an impoverishment of spirit-\\nual power that its dues go unpaid. 2 Nor can the life of a\\nrecluse be approved, which seeks self-sufficiency in solitude\\nand retired contemplation, or an escape from thronging ills\\nby a timid retreat into privacy, idle ease, and indifference to\\nthe common welfare. Likewise we must condemn the life\\nof a reserved student who, enamored of truth, withdraws\\nfrom familiar intercourse, and in the scholarly seclusion of\\nhis library seeks to accumulate knowledge with no intent or\\nthought of sharing it, and thereby promoting the well-being\\neven of his compeers. 3 These several forms of social seques-\\ni See supra, 25, 35. 2 See supra, 77.\\n8 We are right in being enthusiastic for science only on accr.ir.it of the\\nfact, partly that we discern the usefulness of its impulse for the sum-total of", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "240 OR GANIZA TION\\ntration can be approved only when they are temporary, and\\nfor the purpose of recuperation and preparation for better\\nservice in subsequent life. Thus only can they be acquitted\\nof selfishness, and accepted as transient phases of that active\\nlife of practical benevolence which alone develops the moral\\ndignity of true manhood. 1\\n124. The reciprocal obligations of the members of a com-\\nmunity are recognized in a code of social intercourse, an\\nunwritten common law, which prevails throughout and regu-\\nlates communication. This law, like the unwritten Common\\nLaw of the courts, is a detail of rights and duties. Both sys-\\ntems originated in the exigencies of popular intercourse, and\\nhuman life so well as to renounce all claim to see a special application for\\nevery individual (einzelne) truth, and partly that the general character of\\ntruth, its consistency, and the manifoldness of the consequences that follow\\nwith certainty from a few principles, places before our eyes an actualization\\n(Verwirklichung) of what we ought to attain in the moral world by our own\\nconduct. Lotze, Tract. Phil., 30.\\n1 Moral isolation is not in being retired, but in being selfish. One may\\nbe Tar from the madding crowd s ignoble strife, yet in a communion\\nthat braces and strengthens and amid the turmoil of the throng, he may\\nbe apart, alone.\\n41 To sit on rocks, to muse o er flood and fell,\\nTo slowly trace the forest s shady scene,\\nWhere things that own not man s dominion dwell,\\nAnd mortal foot hath ne er, or rarely heen\\nTo climb the trackless mountain all unseen,\\nWith the Avild flock that never needs a fold\\nAlone o er steeps and foaming falls to lean\\nThis is not solitude tis but to hold\\nConverse with nature s charms, and view her stores unrolled.\\nBut midst the crowd, the hum, the shock of men,\\nTo hear, to see, to feel, and to possess,\\nAnd roam along, the world s tired denizen,\\nWith none who bless us, none whom we can blesd\\nMinions of splendour shrinking from distress\\nNone that, with kindred consciousness endued,\\nIf we were not, would seem to smile the less\\nOf all that flatter d, follow d, sought and sued\\nThis is to be alone this, this is solitude.\\nByron, Childe Harold, Canto ii, 25, 26.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 241\\nby degrees have been fully developed and both are but va-\\nriations, explications and applications of the law of trespass.\\nThe conventions of society are known as the rules of good\\nbreeding and good manners. They require comity, a proper\\nconsideration and respect for the minor rights of each other,\\na delicate regard for one another s wishes, feelings and pe-\\nculiarities, a prompt attention to wants, their serviceable\\nanticipation, a complaisant readiness in assistance this is\\npoliteness. In the denser portions of a community there\\nis constant call for its exercise, so that people, even those of\\notherwise indifferent culture, become by attrition polished,\\nthat is, polite they are civil, and the higher ranks are cour-\\nteous or courtly in address. To this must be added the spe-\\ncial code of social etiquette observed in refined circles, which\\ndescends to minutise, and is so rigid in its required decorum\\nthat an infraction of it is sometimes less readily condoned\\nthan \\\\dce. All such conventionalities arise from the union\\nor consolidation of interests and responsibilities, and betoken\\nthe solidarity of the community. 1\\n125. A prime condition of the wholesomeness of a com-\\nmunity is the truthfulness of its members. The obligation\\nto be truthful in both word and deed is clear. Every one\\nhas a right to certain services from his fellow-man, and a\\nusually just and sometimes very important claim is for an\\nopinion, judgment, information, direction, advice, sympathy.\\nIf these be reserved when due, it is a trespass, a restriction\\nof a rightful liberty to use and profit by them. Still greater\\ni Nicht die Sittlichkeit regiert die Welt, sondern eine verhartete Form\\nderselben die Sitte. Wie die Welt nun einmal geworden ist, verzeiht sic\\neher eine Verletzung der Sittlichkeit als eine Verletzung der Sitte. Wohl\\nden Zeiten und den Volkern, in denen Sitte und Sittlichkeit noch Kins ist.\\nAller Kampf dreht sich darum, den Widersprueh dieser Beiden aufznheben\\nund die erstarrte Form der Sitte wiederum iiir die innere Sittlichkeit fliissig\\nzu machen. Auerbach.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "242 OR GANIZA TION\\nis the trespass, if they be misstated, thereby misinforming\\nand misleading the recipient, for then his trust is violated,\\nhis confidence outraged. If the claim be allowed, the expres-\\nsion by word or deed must be true to the thought. 1\\nBut the claim is not always just, not always to be allowed.\\nWe are not always bound to speak; often it is right and\\nwise to be silent. Nor, if we speak, are we always bound to\\ntell the whole truth in which case the extent of the reserve\\nis matter for conscientious judgment, having care not to mis-\\nlead by the partial statement. This right of private reserve\\nis superseded by the courts in the interest of society at large,\\nand the witness required to tell the whole truth without\\nreserve.\\nWhether deceit in any form is ever justifiable is a ques-\\ntion that has been discussed for centuries, and is still unset-\\ntled. On the one hand it is affirmed that deceit is in its\\nvery nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of right\\nand justice and on the other hand it is asserted that certain\\nemergencies may justify a departure from ordinary rules of\\nconduct, and render deceit not only justifiable bat obligatory.\\nThis question of the ages is not to be answered in a few\\nwords. We must be content here with saying first, that a\\nlie is never justifiable secondly, that not every deception is\\nto be accounted a lie, e.g., the myth of Santa Claus and\\nthirdly, if the definition of a deception be allowed wider\\nscope than the definition of a lie, yet is a deception so rarely\\nright and duty that every one should practice habitual truth-\\nfulness, deviating from it with great hesitation, and only\\nwhen the justification is beyond all question. 2\\n1 See Elements of Psychology, 218, 251. In north China, a request for\\ninformation is usually introduced, by the polite phrase: May 1 borrow\\nyour light\\n2 See Trumbull s J. Lie Never Justifiable; especially ch. vi, which cites\\nmany authorities ancient and modern, heathen and Christian, pro and contra.\\nTo these add Kant, who, in a tractate Uberein vermeintes Recht aus Men-", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 243\\n126. The general obligation to be truthful takes a num-\\nber of specific forms. Beside this duty in the commonplace\\ntalking of familiar intercourse, we place the formal tie of a\\npromise, written, oral, or indirectly implied in mere behavior.\\nThe obligation in such case is strengthened by the fact that\\nthe promisee, in reliance on the faithfulness of the promiser,\\nmay in his life conduct order important matters with refer-\\nence to the promise, and suffer injury or even disaster should\\nit fail. A promise given under an essential misunderstand-\\ning, or, since we cannot accurately forecast the future, in\\ncase the duty of its observance is superseded by some higher\\nunforeseen duty with which it is radically inconsistent, is\\nnull. This does not endorse the loose aphorism that a bad\\npromise is better broken than kept for, if its badness work\\nmerely the private personal injury of the promiser, unless\\nruinous in an intolerable extreme, he is not thereby dis-\\ncharged of the obligation. We commend him that sweareth\\nto his own hurt, and changeth not. A promise made under\\ncompulsion cannot be claimed by the promisee, yet it meas-\\nurably binds the promiser because of respect for his word.\\nIn no case, however, is a promise obligatory if the fulfillment\\nbe criminal, for it can never be duty to commit crime.\\nA contract or covenant differs from a simple promise in\\nthat it implies an exchange of services, and reciprocal obliga-\\ntion. 1 It is usually under the protection of special statute,\\nan outcome of the moral element, of that mutual trust which\\nis the basis of social order. Contracts are of endless variety,\\nschenliebe zu liigen (Auflage R. unci S. vii, S. 205) pronounces strongly for\\nthe negative. A translation of this tractate is appended to Abbott s h anVs\\nTheory of Ethics, p. 431 sq. Cf. Lotze, Grundziige, 4\\n1 A contract is an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or\\nnot to do a particular thing. Blackstokb, mmentaries, etc, bk. ii,\\np. 442. The Constitution of the United States, Article i, Section 10, Forbids\\nany State to enact a law impairing tin; obligation of contracts/ 1 which\\nclause has given rise to a vast deal of litigation.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "244 OR GANIZA TION\\nand affect nearly every detail of private and public life and\\nif their binding character were not fully recognized there\\nwould be no security in affairs. A deception practiced by\\neither party in making a contract invalidates it; but both\\nparties must abide the consequences of carelessness, thought-\\nlessness, or stupidity.\\nCommon honesty in trade, and in business dealings gener-\\nally, is another form of truthfulness. Exchange of services,\\nof goods, and of other forms of property, has the advantage\\nof being estimated numerically in the medium of exchange,\\nmoney, which gives exactness to the mutual obligation, and\\nsharply expresses its violation. The interests involved in\\nsuch transactions are so widely interlaced that fraud excites\\ngeneral indignation and reprobation. There is hardly any\\nform of trespass that incurs such deep and lasting disgrace\\nas dishonesty. 1\\n127. The membership of an organized community does\\nnot consist in merely so many men, women and children,\\nstanding singly as discrete elements coalescing into a con-\\ncrete body. A strong tendency to such individualism has\\nmarked the nineteenth century, in France, in England, and\\neven more positively in the United States. It cries out for\\n1 It is worth noting that honor and honesty are, etymologically, the same\\nword. Cf. Cicero s usage of honesias. The advantage to mankind, says\\nMill, of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and\\ncranny of human life the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet\\neven this is incalculable. Polit. Econ., bk. i, ch. 7, 5. Says Professor\\nJames A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it\\nis because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the\\nother members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is\\nachieved by the cooperation of many independent persons, its existence as\\na fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those\\nimmediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a\\nship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which\\nnot only is nothing achieved, but nothing is ever attempted. The Will to\\nBelieve, p. 24.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 245\\nliberty, equality, fraternity, and demands that creed, race, and\\neven sex shall be ignored on the forum, at the polls, and in\\nthe schools. Now, while each individual man and woman is\\na distinguishable member of society, it should be observed,\\nin opposition to individualism, that each is primarily a mem-\\nber of a family whereby he or she is socialized, that the\\nfamily is properly the organized and organizing unit of so-\\nciety, and that a community consists fundamentally of asso-\\nciated families. This incidentally appears in the fact that\\nthe social standing of the individual is in general determined\\nby that of his family, above which it is difficult to rise, and\\nbelow which one rarely falls. The question, What is he?\\nasks after his vocation but, Who is he asks after his\\nfamily.\\nA variety of minor organizations are usually formed by\\nvoluntary association, which also are integrant members as,\\nsocial or literary clubs, and benevolent societies. Beside\\nthese are business firms of two or more members, stock com-\\npanies, cooperative associations, and guilds or trade-unions.\\nSuch combinations for more effective achievement are often\\nlegally incorporated, and usually have a contract or articles\\nof agreement, or a written organic law or constitution, stating\\nthe ends they seek and the means, and defining the functions\\nof members and officers as duties the variations in duty\\narising from a specializing of functions so as to constitute\\nan efficient cooperative whole. A special class of subordi-\\nnate organisms is seen in the schools, which also usually\\nhave a formal constitution and laws defining the duties of\\nmembers, official and unofficial. They are instituted specially\\nto meet the debt due the next generation, are essential to the\\nperpetuity rather than to the maintenance of society, and\\nform a bond, a historical enchainment, between its present\\nand its future.\\nEach of the foregoing minor organizations is itself a mem-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "246 OB GANIZA TION\\nber of the community, having, as already said of the family,\\nan individual personality distinguishable from the individual\\npersonality of its components. 1 Moreover, although the\\nbounds of any single community be ill defined, still commu-\\nnities are recognized as more or less distinct from one\\nanother. Now each of these as an organic whole has not\\nonly obligations to its various members, but also to neighbor-\\ning communities with which it is in communication. Thus\\nthe community as a whole is an individual, a personality,\\nwith a conscience, and a moral judgment in the consensus of\\nits members, which passes upon its own character and con-\\nduct, upon that of its several members, and upon that of\\naffiliated communities.\\n128. The organic nature of a community distributing\\nvarious functions or offices and consequent duties among its\\nmembers, is clearly seen in its division of labor. The neces-\\nsities of life necessitate labor, but no one by his own labor\\nalone can surely supply even these, much less can he produce\\nthe many requisites to comfortable living. The civilized man\\nhas many desires or wants that have become so habitual as to\\nbe classed as necessaries. 2 For the full gratification of these\\nhe is dependent on the productive labor of his fellows.\\nHence the pressure of such wants molds the community\\ninto an organism, in which each works for every other, and\\nthey for him also he labors for the welfare of the whole, and\\nthe end of the whole is the welfare of each. Thus a simple\\ncommunity will comprise a shoemaker, a tailor, a carpenter,\\na blacksmith, a shopkeeper, a printer, a doctor, a lawyer, a\\nschoolmaster, and a curate. These exchange services or\\n1 See supra, 118.\\n2 Said Voltaire: Le superflu, c est le vrai n^cessaire. This paradox\\nwas revived by Charles Boyle, saying Only give me the luxuries of life,\\nand I will dispense with the necessaries.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0260.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 247\\nproducts, and a variety of duties is a consequence of the\\norganization.\\nA discussion of division of labor is not proper to a treatise\\non Ethics, but belongs rather to the theory of Economics. 1\\nIt is appropriate, however, to observe that, in addition to its\\neconomical advantage, it has the moral advantage of giving\\nrise to the common virtues of honesty, industry, and respect\\nfor order, and to a sense of personal responsibility, the re-\\nsponsibility of each worker to his fellows and to the commu-\\nnity at large. Besides, it originates the conception of a\\nvocation, a calling, and establishes each worker in a position,\\nchanged from a mere man into a member, whereby he is no\\nlonger just like all others, but assumes a place and mark\\nspecially his own. 2 Extreme division of labor, however, de-\\npresses the intellectual status of the laborer, narrows his\\nspiritual horizon, and assimilates his activity to that of an\\nautomatic mechanism.\\nThe distribution of functions brings about social classifica-\\ntion. Mere laborers are distinguished from farmers and\\nmechanics, and these from skilled artisans, and these again\\nfrom artists and the professional class whose work is mostly\\nintellectual. Greater honor always attaches to the finer, and\\nless to the coarser kinds of labor. This has the wholesome\\neffect of inducing effort to rise into what is accounted a\\nhigher social rank, and is thus a powerful stimulus to civil-\\nization. But here also an abatement must be made. llasses\\nstrongly marked tend to become castes, in which form their\\n1 See supra, 70, note.\\n2 The familiar word vocation implies Providential superintendence and\\nappointment to special service. The reality of tliis is perhaps not commonly\\nrecognized. Still die sittliche Weihe des Berufs, or the moral consecra-\\ntion of callings, has great influence in the regulation f society. It acts like\\nthe expulsive power of a new affection, ejecting all that is Inconsistent\\nand unworthy, and assimilating all that is concordant ami befitting in a new-\\nconsecration.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0261.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "248 ORGANIZATION\\nwholesome effect disappears, ambitious effort is paralyzed,\\nimprovement discouraged, and civilization restrained.\\n129. In a prosperous community, one whose wealth in\\ngeneral is increasing, capital or the wealth destined to repro-\\nductive consumption tends to accumulate in the hands of\\nthose more intelligently industrious, and thereby a special\\nclass is formed, the capitalists. These are marked off from\\nthe wage-earners whom they employ in their large and\\nenlarging industrial enterprises. Now the economical advan-\\ntages of large capital engaged in extensive and systematic\\nindustry are obvious, yet just because of the greater uni-\\nformity, abundance and cheapness of its products, the ability\\nof the small free crafts to subsist is curtailed, which reduces\\nthe larger portion of the community to the position of wage-\\nearners under the mastership of the capitalists, on whom\\ntheir livelihood depends. The evils of this division of soci-\\nety, and of this enforced relation, have become familiar in\\nwhat are known as labor troubles. The grasping selfishness\\nof moneyed power induces oppression; and the sense of\\ninjustice, and the dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution\\nof the amenities of life, induce violent revolt.\\nCertain remedial schemes, under the generic name of\\nsocialism, have attained notoriety and many advocates. They\\npropose a reorganization of society, giving it a more definite\\nand compact solidarity. In general, they would abolish com-\\npetition in labor, wages, and particular or private ownership\\nof property, especially of land substituting work under the\\nstimulus of public spirit, an equal distribution of products,\\nand a common ownership and disposition of all fixed property\\nby closely organized society. A still more radical scheme of\\nreorganization, called communism, proposes to abolish also\\nthe family, substituting for domestic relations and the gov-\\nernment of parental authority, temporary unions, and a com-", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0262.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 249\\nmunistic care for the nurture and education of offspring.\\nAttempts to maintain such schemes in practical operation\\nhave hitherto failed.\\nA discussion of socialism as to its economical value, and\\neven as to its ethical worth, must be passed by with the gen-\\neral remark that the evils of society as actually constituted\\narise, not from contrived injustice, but from a lack of moral\\nequipoise. In the ideal community, which moral culture\\nseeks to attain, there would be no tolerated trespass upon\\nthe rights of even the humblest member and in the absence\\nof just cause of revolt, all would be content in the station\\ndetermined by merit, by the relative value of services. Until\\nthis Utopia be realized, a more intelligent apprehension of the\\ninseparable interests of capital and labor would conduce to\\ngreater harmony, to mutual respect, and to a wider recogni-\\ntion of reciprocal rights. 1 Meantime, remedy against oppres-\\nsion by either party should be sought, not in turbulence and\\ndisorder, but in appeal to that which is set for the guardian-\\nship of rights, to the strong arm of the State.\\n1 Voici une sage et belle devise Prendre pour point de depart et pour\\npoint d appui de tout progres le devoir du rich plutot que le droit des\\npauvres de sort que l 1 accord dtit pu se faire entre les deux adversaires, a\\nTaide de quelque concessions, en somme assez peu douloureuses. Revue\\ndes deux Mondes, 1883, p. 725.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0263.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "250 OBQAN1ZATIOK\\nCHAPTER IV\\nTHE STATE\\n130. It is essential to any widely associated life of men\\nthat there should be definite and effective provision for the\\nprotection of rights. For in every community evil-doers, or\\nat least doers disposed to trespass, are so many, active and\\nstrong, that its several members are not competent, without\\ncombination, to maintain intact their rightful liberties.\\nMoreover, certain important interests of the total community\\nare best served by concerted action, indeed many cannot\\notherwise be served. To attain these two general ends, the\\nsafeguard of rights and the advancement of the common weal,\\nthe one protecting, the other promoting, is the purpose of\\nthe State. 1\\n1 The society of many families, instituted for mutual and lasting advan-\\ntage, is called a village, Kw/xy. When many villages join themselves\\nperfectly together into one society, that society is a State, 7r6Xts, and con-\\ntains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence. It is first\\nfounded that men may live, and continued that they may live happily [i.e.,\\nin the perfect practice of virtuous energies. bk. vii, ch. 8]. For which\\nreason every State is the work of nature, since the first social ties are such\\nfor to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by\\nits tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is\\nthe nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house. Besides,\\nits own final cause and its end must be the perfection of any thing but a\\ngovernment complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best.\\nHence it is evident, that a State is one of the works of nature, and that man\\nis naturally a political animal, woXirucbvffiop, and that whosoever is natu-\\nrally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, AttoXis, must be either inferior\\nor superior to man just as the person reviled in Homer No tribe, nor\\nState, nor home hath he. For he whose nature is such as this, must needs\\nbe a lover of strife, and as solitary as a bird of prey. Aristotle,\\nPolilica, bk. i, ch. 2.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0264.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 251\\nThe established State occupies a definite territory. It em-\\nbraces several, perhaps many distinguishable communities\\nusually of one race and language, having common manners,\\ncustoms and traditions. It consists primarily of the whole\\nbody of people, the body politic, including all officers of gov-\\nernment but the term is often, secondarily, limited to the\\nofficial class, the sovereign body having supreme power held\\nin trust for the common weal, which class, however, is more\\nproperly termed the government. 1\\nIt is not within the scope of this treatise to discuss the\\nrelative merits of different forms of state government, nor to\\ntrace the historical evolution of the State through the abuses,\\nturmoils, and civil wars which, because of the imperfect or\\nerroneous views and the selfish ambition of statesmen and\\nrulers, have embarrassed its development. We shall attempt\\nno more than to sketch the essential features of its constitu-\\ntion, and to indicate its exclusively ethical basis, its thor-\\nough-going ethical character, and the varieties of moral\\nobligation imposed on its members by its specific and peculiar\\norganization.\\n131. Governments are distinguished as monarchic, aris-\\ntocratic or republican, and democratic. Some combine ele-\\nments of each of these principal forms as, Great Britain.\\nNo exclusive preference can be given to any one form. That\\nis best which best accords with the historical traditions and\\nhabits of its subjects, is suitable to their grade of intellectual\\nand ethical culture, and is administered in the interest of the\\npublic rather than of the rulers. 2\\n1 When a number of States, whose people as a body come of a common\\nstock, natus, are confederated under a general government, this is properly\\na Nation as, the German Nation, especially prior to the unification in 1870,\\nand the nameless Nation formed by the United States. When a number cf\\notates of distinct nationality are united under a common government, this is\\nproperly an Empire as, the Roman Empire, and the British Empire.\\n2 The very best form of government, according to Aristotle, is the aris-", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0265.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "252 ORGANIZATION\\nEvery well-ordered State, whatever be its form of govern-\\nment, has essentially a Constitution, unwritten or written,\\npositively decreed, and loyally observed by its officials and\\ncitizens. 1 The Constitution is the fundamental organic law,\\norganizing the body politic. It has three essential features\\ntocracy of intellectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities\\nbe found, in their highest development, in a few persons, or only in one.\\nThe Virginia Bill of Rights, 8, says: Of all the various modes and\\nforms of government, that is best, which is capable of producing the great-\\nest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against\\nthe danger of mal-administration.\\nA government is to be judged, says Mill, by its action upon men,\\nand by its action upon things by what it makes the citizens, and what it\\ndoes for them its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves,\\nand the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by\\nmeans of them. Representative Government, p. 43.\\n1 England has no formally enacted and written Constitution. The gov-\\nernment, originally an absolute monarchy, has been reduced to a limited\\nmonarchy by Magna Charta and numerous subsequent Acts of Parliament,\\nwhich stand in lieu of a formal Constitution, and insure to the people re-\\npublican liberty.\\nThe Constitution of the United States is a written and formally enacted\\ndocument. Its preamble is We the People of the United States, in\\norder to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tran-\\nquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and\\nsecure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain\\nand establish this Constitution for the United States of America. Thus\\nis declared the multiple end, essentially a duplicate, to protect and to pro-\\nmote welfare. The articles which follow enact the specific means for attain-\\ning the end, reciting the functions or duties, with limitations, of the various\\nofficers of the government.\\nIn a republican government, whose legitimate procedures are determined\\nultimately by the will of the majority, the Constitution is an aegis for the\\nminority, shielding it from the caprice of popular whims. In general, it is\\nprotective of citizens from the tyranny of magistrates. The powers must\\nbe administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger\\nthan the social feelings. And hence, the powers vested in them to prevent\\ninjustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by\\nthem converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community.\\nThat by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant\\nby constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to govern-\\nment, Cai^houn, A Disquisition on Government^ p. 7,", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0266.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 253\\narising from the very nature of the State, the legislative, the\\njudicial, the executive. The functions of the three are some-\\ntimes embodied in one person as, an absolute monarch. In\\nmany cases they are irregularly distributed to a number of\\npersons but the historical trend is clearly to separate them\\nas distinct departments intrusted to a distinct personnel as,\\nin each of the States of our Union, and in the Federal whole.\\nThe function of the Legislature is to enact statutory laws\\nwithin the limits and in pursuance of the organic law, the\\nConstitution. As a necessary corollary it has authority to\\naffix penalties to these laws to insure their observance, and\\npower to lay and collect taxes for the support of the govern-\\nment, and for the execution of its measures. 1\\nThe function of the Judiciary is to sit in judgment on the\\nconstitutionality of the legislated statutes, to interpret their\\napplication, to sanction and decree the penalty for violation.\\nWhen not otherwise directed by statute, the inferior courts\\nproceed in accord either with the Roman or Civil Law, as in\\nthe States of continental Europe, or with the English Com-\\nmon Law, which has been adopted as the basis of jural rights\\nin the United States. 2\\n1 Legislation for the general welfare is to be distinguished from legisla-\\ntion for the welfare of individuals, which is favoritism, or to benefit some\\ndistinct social group, which is class legislation. These are illegitimate.\\n2 Except in Louisiana, where the Napoleonic Code, a modification of the\\nJustinian, is recognized. For Roman or Civil Law, see supra, 47, note.\\nThe English or Common Law, lex non scripta, derives its authority from\\nlong usage or established custom, and has been immemorially received and\\nrecognized by the English tribunals. The historical source of this system\\ncannot be traced. The origin of the Common Law, says Lord Hale, is as\\nundiscoverable as the head of the Nile which is true historically, but phil-\\nosophically its origin in human rights is easily discerned. Its settled rules\\nand principles have not been authoritatively codified they are found only\\nin the records of courts, and reports of juridical decisions. Statute Law,\\nlex scripta. is a body of laws or rules of action prescribed or enacted by the\\nlegislative power, providing for specific and exceptive cases, and promul-\\ngated and recorded in writing.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0267.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "254 ORGANIZATION\\nThe function of the Executive is to enforce the laws and\\ncarry out the measures enacted by the Legislature. The\\nexecution of laws respecting crime, and of those respecting\\nproperty rights, is intrusted to the inferior courts with their\\npolice and prison auxiliaries, backed by the superior courts,\\nand by the chief executive, be he governor, or president, or\\nking. Measures for the public weal, as the coinage of money,\\nthe care and disbursement of the public funds, the system of\\npublic education, the postal system, the improvement of har-\\nbors and waterways, the making of treaties, and many others,\\nare carried into effect by this branch of the government.\\nAlso the chief executive is commander in chief of the army\\nand navy, wherewith to insure domestic tranquillity, and the\\ncommon defense against foreign aggression, invasion, or other\\nform of trespass. 1\\n132. Now be it observed that the State is a complete,\\nauthoritative and powerful organization. Its foundation is\\non human rights, its superstructure is a fortress against tres-\\npass, a lodgment of justice, an abode of public duty and\\npatriotic service. The structure is not new for the human\\nrace, so long as it has existed, has been busied in building,\\nremodeling, repairing, improving, and maintaining in differ-\\nent jforms, through all the vicissitudes of history, this emi-\\nnently ethical institution.\\n1 What constitutes a State?\\nNot high-raised battlement or labored mound,\\nThick wall or moated gate\\nNot cities proud with spires and turrets crowned\\nNot bays and broad-armed ports,\\nWhere, laughing at the storm, rich navies ride\\nNor starred and spangled courts,\\nWhere low-browed baseness wafts perfume to pride.\\nNo men, high-minded men,\\nWith powers as far above dull brutes endued\\nIn forest, brake, or den,\\nAs brutes excel cold rocks and brambles rude\\nMen, who their duties know,\\nAnd know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain.\\nSib William Jones,", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0268.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 255\\nRecalling the definition of an organism, that each member\\nis at once means and end for every other, and the whole for\\neach and each for the whole, we observe first, that each\\ncitizen in his action as such, as in voting, or paying a tax, or\\nserving on a jury or in the army, and likewise each officer of\\nany department in exercising his special function, is thereby\\nexpending energy as a means for the profit, directly or re-\\nmotely, of every other individual member of the State sec-\\nondly, that in so far as each member is profited thereby, he is\\nan end thirdly, that the whole as a systematized means finds\\nits end in guarding and promoting the liberty, privileges,\\nrights and property of each individual member separately\\ntaken; and fourthly, that it is the function of each officer\\nand citizen to become a means whereby to maintain the integ-\\nrity and efficiency of the State in all its departments as an\\nend. In ancient times this last relation was emphasized, the\\npeople are for the State as in the Roman Constitution, and\\nin the Spartan Constitution so greatly admired by Aristotle.\\nIn modern times the reverse relation is emphasized, the State\\nis for the people as in the Virginia Rill of Rights, which\\nhas been generally accepted as their Magna Charta by the\\nUnited States. 1 The right relation, however, between the\\ngoverning and the governed is one of constant reciprocity.\\nThe mutual obligations are dissimilar, but in delicate and\\nadmirable equipoise. 2\\nMoreover, in observing that the ends in every view are\\nthe preventing of trespass and the promoting of welfare, it\\nis evident that the raison d etre of the organization, and its\\ninforming element is strictly ethical. It would be easy to\\n1 See supra, 82, note and infra, 146, note.\\n2 A mere allusion may be permitted to the famous old Roman fable of\\nThe Belly and the Members, as told by Menenius Agrippa in the early\\ndays of the city. Livy, ii, 32. The analogy illustrates a profound truth\\nhence an effective and long-lived story. But see supra, 109, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0269.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "256 ORGANIZATION\\ntreat in detail of the duties of citizens to the State, and of\\nthe duties of the State to citizens, showing them to be\\nstrictly and exclusively moral obligations of high order, all\\ncoming under the law of trespass as prohibitions or as\\nrequisitions and it is well worth repeating that all laws of\\ncivil government are amplifications and specifications of the\\nlaw of trespass. 1 The Legislature originates no law abso-\\nlutely. Having discovered certain rights unguarded or in\\nabeyance, it is obligated to enact specific laws to meet the\\nspecific cases and these laws derive their authority ulti-\\nmately, not from the enacting body, nor from the whole\\npeople whom it represents, but from the fundamental impera-\\ntive principle of right and justice, the moral law. 2\\n133. Mention has already been made of the strong\\ntendency in recent days to individualism, of the disposition\\nto lay stress upon the individual personality of each man\\nand woman, slighting the unity of society in favor of its\\ndisparate plurality. 3 It is evidently a reaction against the\\ncentralizing tendency of former times, which regarded the\\nState as comprised in one man, 4 or in one set of men, and all\\nothers as fused to a mass whose sole relation to the state\\nwas subservience. Both views are exaggerations, between\\n1 See supra, 65.\\n2 For even Tarquin had the light of reason deduced from the nature\\nof things, which incites to good actions and dissuades from evil ones and\\nwhich does not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in\\nwriting, but from the first moment that it exists and its existence is coeval\\nwith the divine mind. Therefore the true and supreme law, whose com-\\nmands and prohibitions are equally authoritative, is the right reason of the\\nsovereign Deity. Cicero, Laws, bk. ii, ch. 4.\\nLaw in general, says Montesquieu, is human reason, inasmuch as it\\ngoverns all the inhabitants of the earth the political and civil laws of each\\nnation ought to be the particular cases in which human reason is applied.\\nV Esprit des Lois, Tome ii, ch. 3.\\n3 See supra, 127.\\n4 Said Louis XIV L at C est moi.", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0270.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 257\\nwhich lies the truth. Both violate the organic character of\\nthe State, the latter excessively integrating, the former dis-\\nintegrating.\\nAgainst individualism we point out that the State is not\\nan aggregate of men and women, nor are individual men\\nand women its originating units. The unit of the State is\\nthe family. 1 As a city is composed of houses, so is a State\\nof homes. The representative head of a family judges and\\nacts for it hi uniting with others to organize, or in the far\\nmore usual case, to conduct the affairs of the already organ-\\nized State. To him alone is properly committed the right of\\nsuffrage, as the one best capable of guarding and promoting\\nall interests outside the domestic sphere. 2 It has been wisely\\nsaid that the two pillars upon which the whole structure of\\nthe State reposes, are the sanctity of the family relations\\nand of the judicial oath. 3 Should a blind Samson bow\\n1 It is clear, says Aristotle, that a State is not a mere society, having\\na common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of\\nexchange. These are conditions without which a State cannot exist but\\nall of them together do not constitute a State, which is a community of\\nwell-being in families and in aggregations of families called villages or com-\\nmunes, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Politico,, bk. iii,\\nch. 9. He distributes society as follows ofoos, a house, home, or family\\nKu}fxr] a village, neighborhood, or community w6\\\\is, a city, municipality,\\nor State. Idem, bk. i, ch. 2.\\n2 That bachelors of twenty-one or more years of age, notwithstanding\\ntheir incomplete social status, are admitted to citizenship, is a concession to\\nthe prospect of their becoming heads of families, and to their usefulness in\\npublic affairs e.g., in the army. A sharp -line of franchise is necessary\\nit is best furnished primarily by sex and age. See supra, \u00c2\u00a7\u00c2\u00a7114 (3), 116.\\nWisdom from experience dictates there should be also educational and prop-\\nerty qualifications for franchise. Its extension to ignorant paupers, espe-\\ncially to those of other races and nationalities, has always proved disastrous.\\nThe presence in the State of a proletariat incapable of a voice in its affairs,\\nshould be recognized as unavoidable so that it is not the total people, but\\nonly a selected portion that rules, the portion which most contributes to the\\nconsistence of society, and therefore is privileged to represent it.\\n3 For oath we would substitute the more general truth, inspiring\\ntrust see supra, 125. Aristotle, in Politica, teaches that human society", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0271.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "258 OR GANIZA TI ON\\nhimself on these, the whole edifice would fall with disaster\\nto ruins. 1\\nThe State is thus constituted primarily of a congeries of\\nfamilies organized into the larger whole. But beside these\\nare many other organizations holding membership in the\\nState, to whom protection is due as, business firms, stock\\ncompanies, and corporations generally, including incorporated\\ntowns and cities. These are endowed by the State with\\nlarge powers, and thus become subordinate municipalities,\\neach imperium in imperio? Also each department of the\\nState, and each of its subdivisions, as a court, an army, is\\nitself a subsidiary organism.\\ncan be resolved into the two ultimate elements, sexual relation and private\\nproperty. Upon these the State is founded. The first is necessary for its\\ncontinuance, and both for its welfare. His recognition of private property\\nas a twin pillar, rather than merely a buttress, of civic organization, is\\nmore likely to be apprehended and approved in modern times.\\ni In Troilus and Cressida, Shakespeare has indicated the deep moral\\nrelation of the family and the nation, and its significance in the story of\\nTroy. The war had its origin in the violation of the purity of marriage\\nlife, and it was this which involved the city in destruction. The doom\\nwhich overtakes Troilus and Cressida is the reflex borne on through the\\nyears, and on to the close of the city, of the moral judgment upon Paris\\nand Helen. There is an expression not only in the catastrophe, but through\\nthe whole drama, of the organic and moral relation of the family and the\\nState. Mtjlford, The Nation, p. 282. See supra, \u00c2\u00a782, note. Thus\\nit teaches that the natural and moral consequence of the disrupted family\\nis the disrupted State. What the wise Ulysses therein says of the State,\\nmay be applied to the drama itself\\nThe providence that s in a watchful State\\nKnows almost every grain of Plutus gold,\\nFinds bottom in th uncomprehensive deeps,\\nKeeps pace with thought, and almost, like the gods,\\nDoes thoughts unveil in their dumb cradles.\\nThere is a mystery with whom relation\\nDurst never meddle in the soul of State,\\nWhich hath an operation more divine\\nThan breath, or pen, can give expressure to.\\nAct iii, sc. 3, 1. 196 sq.\\n2 On the social and moral effects of the affranchisement of the cities, see\\nGuizot, History of Civilization, vol. i Lee. 7,\\n^3", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0272.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 259\\n134. The State as an organized whole, while distin-\\nguished by special characteristics, has features resembling\\nthose of its elementary and subsidiary members. It is logi-\\ncally indivisible in itself, an individual. Its subdivisions are\\nnot kinds, but departments, into which it is logically severed.\\nAs a self-subsisting individual, it has a life whose beginning\\nis sometimes out of sight in remote antiquity, as that of\\nGreece and whose continuity does not depend on that of\\nits several members. We are born into it, we live within it,\\nwe die out from it we are but its transient accidents. A\\nman looks forward to his end, and makes provision for it by\\ntestament a State, looking forward with expectation of in-\\ndefinite continuity, makes no provision for cessation, which,\\nindeed, as with Poland, rarely occurs. 1\\nMoreover, a State is a personality. It has an intelligence\\nand a culture of its own, and it has a will of its own. Also\\nit has a conscience of its own. 2 Often it incurs debt, and\\nwith unconstrained honesty meets its obligation. If it fail,\\nit is dishonored and disgraced before the world, and causes\\n1 Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut seterna sit. Cicero, Be\\nRepublica, bk. iii, ch. 23, 34. It is not composed of its present occu-\\npants alone, but it embraces those who are, and have been, and shall be.\\nThere is in it the continuity of the generations, it reaches backward to the\\nfathers and onward to the children, and its relation is manifest in its rever-\\nence for the one and its hope for the other. The work of the individ-\\nual is brief, and in its isolation would be almost vain, but in the continuity\\nof the nation it is inwrought in the longer social development. Thus, also,\\na single generation, in its furthest advance, achieves but little in comparison\\nwith the long line of the generations in the nation, and if there is laid on\\nany the necessity of battle, still the holiest triumph is that in which the life\\nof the nation in its continuity is maintained. Mulford, The Nation,\\npp. 6, 9.\\n2 The conception of the magistracy is significant to a certain extent of\\nthe common conscience of the people, which is made thereby to confront\\nthe changeable will of the individuals, precisely as within the spirit of the\\nindividual the consciousness of moral laws that are universally binding\\nconfronts the momentary frames of mind. 1 Lotze, Practical Philosophy,\\n\u00c2\u00a763.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0273.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "260 OR GANIZA TION\\nguilty shame in every citizen, though he himself be blame-\\nless. 1 Sometimes States commit crime as States, and are\\npunished by other States, or by ordinary providence. Usu-\\nally they are very jealous of national honor, and an offense\\narouses national indignation. 2\\ni One generation in a State incurs debts to be paid by subsequent gener-\\nations, and these accept the burden without question as, war debts, bonds\\nissued for improvements, and the like. The historical enchainment is also\\nseen in the provision by law for general public instruction, which recognizes\\na debt due the coming generation. This obligation of the State is felt to be\\nso weighty that not only in many modern but in some ancient States, as in\\nearly Greece, compulsory education has been adopted see Plato, Crito,\\n50d, and 51c, e, Step. cf. Aristotle, Nic. Mh., bk. x, ch. 9, 7, 13, 14,\\nwho in this last place says It would be best that the State should pay\\nattention to education, and on right principles, and that it should have\\npower to enforce it but if neglected as a public measure, it would seem to\\nbe the duty of every individual to contribute to the virtue of his children\\nand friends, or at least to make this his deliberate purpose.\\nThe State, says Burke, ought not to be considered as nothing better\\nthan a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper, and coffee, calico or\\ntobacco, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved\\nby the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence,\\nbecause it is not a partnership in things subservient to the gross animal\\nexistence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all\\nscience, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all per-\\nfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many\\ngenerations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living,\\nbut between those who are living and those who are dead and those who\\nare to be born. Each contract of each particular State is a clause in the\\ngreat primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher\\nnatures, connecting the visible and the invisible world according to a fixed\\ncompact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all\\nmoral natures each in their appropriate place. Reflexions on the Revo-\\nlution in France, Select Works edited by Payne, Clarendon Press, vol. ii,\\npp. 113, 114.\\n2 The State is bound, says the Bishop of Peterborough, Eng., by\\nprecisely the same morality that binds the individual for morality is not a\\nduty of positive, but of natural obligation, and is binding therefore on all\\nmen under all possible circumstances. The State may not, any more than\\nthe individual may, act immorally in the discharge of its trust. As he may\\nnot lie or steal for his wards, so neither may the State. It may not, for\\ninstance, in the interests of its citizens, plunder the property of other States,", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0274.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 261\\nAlso this distinct individual personality is manifest in the\\nfamiliar recognition of national calamities, national pros-\\nperity, national blessing, and national thanksgiving all these\\nbeing clearly distinguished from what befalls this and that\\nman, or this and that family. Withal there is a national\\ncharacter, as seen by contrast of the English, French, and\\nSpanish peoples, more or less common to the individual\\ncitizens, but attributed to the nationality rather than to the\\nman. It is only in a clear recognition of the distinct and\\nunique personality of the State that a full and correct con-\\nception can be had of civic interest, of common welfare, and\\nof public obligation. 1\\n135. Let us here give a passing glance at the great vari-\\nety of duties devolving upon a man because of his member-\\nship in a variety of organizations, each involving a special\\nclass or series of obligations. First as a member of a family,\\nwhose name he bears, he has peculiar obligations to each of\\nor lie to them, or take unfair advantage of them in any way. Similarly in\\nall its dealings with its own subjects it must be scrupulously and equally\\njust. But this is a natural and not a distinctively Christian obligation.\\nMorality and justice were not created, nor even revealed, by Christ they\\nexisted, and were known to exist, before the giving of the Sermon on the\\nMount, and would have continued to exist had that discourse never been\\nspoken, or had He who spoke it never appeared among men. Govern-\\nment and the Sermon on the Mount.\\n1 Much that is here said of the State may be, indeed has been already,\\nsaid of the family supra, 118, 119 cf. 127. It was perhaps the inti-\\nmate relation of the family and the State that gave rise to the paternal\\ntheory As is a father to his children, so is a ruler to his subject. In his-\\ntory, since the patriarchs, we find paternalism affected by kings and magis-\\ntrates generally. But this is not the doctrine of modern civics. The State\\nis an organization sui generis, not patterned after the family, or any other\\norganized body. See supra, 109, note.\\nFurthermore, the theory, promulgated by Rousseau in his famous Du\\nContrat social, ou Principes du Droit politique, which attributes the origin\\nof the State to a social contract binding in perpetuity, has not survived the\\nFrench Revolution.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0275.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "262 OB GANIZA TION\\nthe other members and to the whole. Then as a member of\\npolite society, as a business man in the market, on change or\\nin professional relations, as one of a club, or company, or as-\\nsociation, or church, he enters into many varied relations t\\nand, since obligation is founded on relation, these many varied\\nrelations determine, not only a multiplication but also a diver-\\nsity, in kind and degree, of obligations. No man compre-\\nhends life until he is made to see by how many organic fila-\\nments he is bound to his fellows how utterly impossible it\\nis for him to separate his interests and his fortunes from\\ntheirs in how many ways the welfare of those who are\\nround about him depends upon the working, in due manner\\nand measure, of that part of the organism which he occupies.\\nWith membership in the State, whether as a citizen sim-\\nply or as an official also, arises another distinct series of obli-\\ngations, often of a very exacting and absorbing character. 1\\nUpon the sincere discharge of these by rulers and subjects\\ndepend the health and strength, the wholesome welfare, of\\nthe body politic. No merely perfunctory conduct, no dis-\\nplay of avowed patriotism, can replace genuine civic virtue. 2\\n1 The relations and consequent obligations in the family and in the State\\nare alike in this, that they are both involuntary and indissoluble. A man\\nbecomes a member by birth, and finds himself already under bonds. Con-\\nsent is not asked. There is an important sense in which it is true that\\nStates derive their just powers from the consent of the governed (Decla-\\nration of Independence, postulate), and that all power is vested in, and\\nconsequently derived from the people Virginia Bill of Bights, 2) but\\nthis does not apply to the individual man. If dissatisfied, he may transfer\\nhis allegiance, removing himself and his effects, but this is merely an ex-\\nchange, and not a dissolution of bonds.\\n2 It was Horace Walpole, I believe, who said: Patriotism! the last\\nrefuge of a scoundrel.\\nOliver Cromwell said to the men of England You glory in the ditch\\nwhich guards your shores, but I tell you that your ditch will not save you,\\nif you do not reform yourselves.\\nSays the Virginia Bill of Bights, 15: No free government, or the\\nblessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence", "height": "3986", "width": "2631", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0276.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "TRB STATU 26B\\nIt is sorrowful to observe that public duties are ordinarily\\nperformed from dread of penalty or hope of reward, or per-\\nhaps from the higher motive of respect for the law. But in\\nextraordinary junctures, in crises, in war, the service ren-\\ndered, even when enforced, is often loving service, the com-\\npulsory is lost in the voluntary, and the dormant good-will\\nof the people arouses to free and devoted exercise. This\\nloving service of the State is the noble affection of true\\npatriotism.\\n136. What is the justification of legal punishment?\\nWhat is the ground on which rests the acknowledged right\\nof society organized as a State to deprive a member offend-\\ning against its laws of his property, his liberty, his life?\\nWhat is the warrant? This grave question has been vari-\\nously answered. It is the right of the stronger, the com-\\nbined force of many against one, the right of might, say\\nsome. It is the right of vengeance, of revenge for injury,\\ntransferred from the sufferer to the more capable and effect-\\nive State, say others. Yet others say, in lofty words, the\\ndignity and authority of the law must be vindicated; the\\nbroken law must have its integrity restored, must be made\\nwhole again, rendered holy, sanctified, reconsecrated in the\\neyes of all before whom it has been violated, and this is the\\nend of penalty. Let us seek firmer ground, some more\\nrational justification. 1\\nto justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by a frequent\\nrecurrence to fundamental principles.\\n1 That might gives right, that whatever a man can he may rightly do,\\ntake, hold, enforce, is the brutal maxim of barbarians. There is a sense,\\nhowever, in which might confers right. What one cannot do is not duty\\nbut, the condition of ability supplied, many things, within the limit of tres-\\npass, thereby become duties with their correlative rights. Noblesse oblige.\\nIn unorganized society, says Lotze, each man avenges his wrongs with all\\nhis might but this is inadequate, either as insufficient or excessive. Hence\\norganized society takes from him the right of private vengeance, undertaking", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0277.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "264 ORGANIZATION\\nAt the beginning of this treatise it was pointed out as a\\nfamiliar fact in history that men are exceedingly tenacious of\\ntheir rights, defending their claims with great pertinacity.\\nThis is obviously the ultimate explanation of most quarrels\\nbetween individual men, of suits and prosecutions before the\\ncourts, of contests between states or nations leading to inter-\\nnecine wars. Evidently by the common judgment of men\\nevery one has a right to defend a right.\\nThis judgment is clearly correct. For, if we once more\\nfix discriminating attention on the primary, necessary, and\\nuniversal notion of a right, we discern, implied in its exclu-\\nsive ownership, this addendum to the original conception, a\\nright to defend a right. Whatever possession is truly my\\nown, I may retain and use, I may protect it from all damage,\\nespecially from trespass, I have a right, indeed am bound, to\\ndefend it against all comers. Evidently the right and obli-\\ngation to defend my right is an essential implication in the\\ndemand for maintenance of moral order. Again, of my pos-\\nsessions I am steward and guardian, they are trusts. A\\nneglect to conserve and defend, within limits, a trust, is an\\nindirect trespass upon all who have a claim upon me for its\\nkeeping and using. An attempted or threatened trespass\\nupon my life, liberty or property, is to be resisted, else I my-\\nself become a trespasser. Thus defense is not a mere con-\\ntingent privilege, but a necessary obligation. 1\\nFurther, the obligation to defend a right implies a recipro-\\ncal loss of right in the aggressor. By becoming a trespasser\\nhe forfeits in some corresponding degree his right to liberty,\\nin extreme cases even to life. One attempting assassination,\\nto avenge him in due measure. This is legal punishment. See Tract. Phil,\\n52; cf. 13 (3). Also cf. Butler, Sermons viii and ix. But revenge is\\nessentially wrong. Can such wrong become right by transference Civil\\nlaw nowhere recognizes that its penalties are retributive. Whatever is\\nrighteous in vengeance is reserved to a higher tribunal.\\n1 See supra, 85.", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0278.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "TEE STATE 265\\nor arson, or burglary, is killed, if this be the only preventive\\nmeans, by his intended victim, with regret, with sorrow in-\\ndeed, but without compunction. In the right of defense lies\\nthe warrant for interference in the liberty of a trespasser,\\nwhich interference is not, therefore, itself a trespass.\\n137. In an unrestrained intercourse of men, with their\\nvarious abilities physical and mental, and with the varied\\nopportunities afforded by wealth and station, the stronger\\ntrespass upon the weaker. An oppressor may perhaps con-\\nsole himself with the brute maxim that might makes right,\\nbut the oppressed is not thereby relieved and quieted. Be-\\nsides, impelled by selfish interests, men combine in couples,\\nor squads, or large bands, and thus accumulate force to over-\\ncome the weaker. To inhibit such predicament society is\\norganized into a State, constituted by a combining majority\\nwhich organization is not oppressive but rather protective of\\nthe minority, the organic law becoming its shield, a defensive\\nweapon, against popular caprice. The body politic employs\\nagents, empowered by general consensus, to frame, apply and\\nenforce particular laws in accord with the general purpose. 1\\nTo accomplish the chief end of its existence, the protec-\\ntion of its subjects in their rightful liberty, the government\\nmust, as far as practicable, defend, both at large and in de-\\ntail, the original and acquired rights of individual men, of\\ntrade firms, of legalized corporations, of all subordinate com-\\ni The historical origin of States has rarely perhaps been just thus. Yet\\nmany a clan, or tribe, or people has organized, on a patriarchal or on a\\nmilitary basis, for defense of common and private rights from aggression of\\nsimilar bodies, as well as for conquest. More often, it may be, States have\\narisen from the skillful and selfish handling of the strong, seeking to enlarge\\nand perpetuate their power. While the progress of civilization has failed\\nto enlighten many, others have been gradually modified to approximate at\\nleast the form and intent indicated. Our discussion, however, is not con-\\ncerning historical origin, but of the ground on which the ideal State, the\\nState as it ought to be, is justified in exercising punitive powers.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0279.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "266 ORGANIZATION\\nbinations of its citizens for legitimate purposes the right of\\nprivate defense being transferred, except in emergency, to\\nthe more potent and equable agency. In order to fulfill this\\ngreat trust, the government must defend itself. Its officers\\nmust be protected in the discharge of their legitimate func-\\ntions against violence or intimidation. It must prevent the\\nhigh crimes of regicide and treason, must resist the insurrec-\\ntion of a disaffected minority, or the aggression of a foreign\\npower. As an individual personality it is bound to preserve\\nits integrity and efficiency by vigorous self-defense. It is\\nclear that a State, as a faithful trustee, is bound, first, to pre-\\nserve its own existence, and secondly, to restrain, to resist,\\nand, if need be, to destroy whatsoever and whomsoever\\nassails its authority or attacks the interests committed to its\\ncharge. Self-preservation, and the preservation of all that\\nis intrusted to it, are moral obligations of every State.\\n138. Therein is the ultimate ground that justifies legal\\npunishment. It is discovered in the obligation to exert pro-\\ntective defense of rights. All legal penalties are set for the\\ndefense of rights. They inflict pain on the law-breaker, are\\na jpainful interference in his liberty, warranted by the prin-\\nciple of defense. They deter him from repetition of the\\noffense, and they deter observers from like misconduct, thus\\ndefending the rights involved. Practically imperfect as it is,\\nno other means is known by which to effect defense against\\noffense, except this of inflicting pain on offenders in propor-\\ntion to the gravity of their misdeeds. The punishment, as to\\nkind and degree, is determined by what is past and cannot\\nbe reinstated its purpose is to determine what is future, and\\nis deterrent, preventive of further or like trespass. Thus the\\nsufficient, rational, and only righteous ground of legal penalty\\nis the protective defense of rights.\\nThe principle applies to the divine government of the", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0280.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 267\\nworld. The natural sanctions of universal moral law are the\\ntypical antecedents of the artificial sanctions of civil law,\\nand go far in an explanation of the righteousness of pain. 1\\nThe sovereign Deity has rights on which men trespass as\\nwell as on the rights of his subjects. He defends these and\\nhis authority by the appointed natural pains attending dis-\\norder, and by special penalties affixed to special offenses.\\nSin is essentially trespass on Deity, and the punishment of\\nsin is self-defense, and the defense of all under his protec-\\ntion. To have any other gods before him is high treason. 2\\nDeterrent defense is disciplinary. This gives title to\\nhouses of correction or reformatories set especially for re-\\nclaiming youthful offenders, and to penitentiaries where felons\\ndo penance, rendering them penitent, leading to reformation.\\nSo imprisonment generally, and also fines are disciplinary,\\nnot only of the offender, but of the observer, and even capi-\\ntal punishment has this salutary effect on society. Thus the\\nlaw is a schoolmaster, a pedagogue, leading to higher life.\\nBut this, with the State, is not its original, nor its avowed,\\nnor indeed its ultimate purpose, but is an accessory. The\\nState is not an educational, but a protective institution, and\\nreformation is not the end, but a means of preventing tres-\\npass. Its enacted sanctions, among which are no rewards,\\nare not incentive, but deterrent. Indeed, in the last analysis,\\nany and every warranted interference in liberty is a defense\\nagainst trespass, or, no interference in a person s liberty has\\n1 See supra, 54.\\n2 That the purpose of civil punishment is deterrent, is the common doc-\\ntrine of jurists. It is here carried one step further back to the ultimate\\nground of a right and duty in defense of trust. The Church has always\\nvery generally held that the only legitimate end of civil punishment is the\\nprevention of crime. The doctrine merges justice into benevolence. It is\\nbecause God has a view to the welfare of his rational creatures, that he\\nvisits sin and moral disorder with punishment. Leibnitz defines justice to\\nbe benevolence guided by wisdom and Tertullian says Qmne hoc justi-\\nti\u00c2\u00bb opus procuratio bonitatis est,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0281.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "268 OBGANIZA TION\\never a warrant save in defense against trespass. In the\\ndomestic sphere parents punish to chasten. Chastisement is\\npunishment intended to benefit the sufferer. It is often and\\nrightly inflicted with no wider or further view but this whip\\nof love means more, and the chastening has its only complete\\njustification in forestalling the trespasses of perhaps a remote\\nfuture. Our Father, in the abundance of his love, chastens\\nhis children, not only that the erring may turn and live, but\\nmore largely that all who might sutler from the persisting\\nerror may be spared the harm, and loss, and sorrow.\\n139. The right of a government to suppress mob turbu-\\nlence or riots of any kind, is obviously the right and duty to\\ndefend domestic tranquillity and to quell an insurrection\\nagainst magisterial authority, is clearly to exercise the right\\nand duty of self-defense. The inverse right of revolution\\nhas the same basis. The ends of the State being the defense\\nof rights and the promotion of the common welfare, when\\nany government shall be found inadequate or contrary to\\nthese purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu-\\nbitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or\\nabolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive\\nto the public weal. 1 Evidently, if a government be con-\\ntinuously oppressive to the body of the people, their original\\nand sacred right of self-defense justifies them in subverting\\nit, and substituting one that promises better things. 2\\n1 Virginia Bill of Eights, 3. Cf. American Declaration of Indepen-\\ndence. Unjust laws, such as are not intolerably oppressive, of which exam-\\nples continually abound, ought, until repealed, to be obeyed by all concerned,\\nfrom respect for the dignity and integrity of the State. In such case it is\\nduty patiently to suffer injustice.\\n2 In usage of the terms, the distinction between revolution and rebellion\\nis not always clear. Generally, if a revolt succeed, it is called respectfully\\na revolution if it fail, it is stigmatized as a rebellion the justice of the\\ncause being disregarded in favor of the historical result. Treason or rebel-\\nlion against righteous civil authority, is rankest offense. Whoever lays", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0282.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 269\\nWar has no other justification. A war of conquest is\\nplainly the crimes of murder, arson, robbery, and the rest of\\nthe foul catalogue, many times multiplied. On the other\\nhand, a defensive war, provided all other honorable means of\\nrectification have failed, is thoroughly righteous. That a\\nState repel vi et armis the encroachment, the aggression, the\\ntrespass of another, is a moral obligation of highest order.\\nA brave and conscientious people, possessing civic rights\\ninherited to be fostered and transmitted, maintains them,\\neven against overwhelming numbers and resources, and does\\nnot surrender, but dies in defending its trusts, warring until\\nresistance becomes madness. Defense may fire the first gun,\\nmay invade the enemy s territory, may sweep his commerce\\nfrom the sea, thus to conquer immunity and peace but, to\\nbe justified, all proceedings must originally and continuously\\nbe intentional and essential defense. This is so clearly recog-\\nnized by civilized States in modern times that, whenever war\\nbetween them occurs, each party loudly claims to be acting\\non the defensive, thus seeking to justify its action in its own\\neyes, and in the eyes of the rest of mankind.\\n140. Geographic, climatic, and other conditions deter-\\nmine that there shall be many States. Differences of race,\\nlanguage, religion, tradition, the genius and general culture\\nof the people, further determine different forms of govern-\\nment, as monarchies, republics, democracies. These, the\\nworld over, have both common and conflicting interests, and\\nare otherwise more or less intimately related. Their relations\\nare adjusted by resident ambassadors and consuls, and by\\noccasional diplomatic correspondence, forming and perform-\\ning treaties of commerce, and of alliance, fixing boundaries,\\nviolent hands upon the State, assails the conditions of all moral life, and\\ntherefore the crime is regarded as the greatest. Trendelenburg, quoted\\nby Mulford, The Nation, p. 16.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0283.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "270 ORGANIZATION\\nand regulating minor matters. The trend of civilization has\\nlong been towards a brotherhood of peoples, and the enter-\\nprise of the nineteenth century has so vastly increased the\\nfacilities of intercommunication, by multiplying roads of\\nrapid transit, by tunneling Alpine barriers, by devising a\\nswift and safe crossing of seas, by weaving over the globe\\na network of electric wires and submarine cables, that civic\\nisolation has now almost entirely disappeared, and the na-\\ntions are fusing and welding together. This intimate inter-\\ncourse and manifold relation is subject to the one universal\\nmoral law of trespass not. There is no other obligation in\\nall the comity of nations. 1\\n1 In the foregoing- discussion it sufficiently appears that the sole purpose\\nof the State is the welfare of its constituents. It is in no sense a philan-\\nthropic institution. The United States, for example, and the several States,\\nin their manifold functions, are for the benefit of their own people, and not\\nfor the good of France, or Spain, or Mexico, or Canada, or any country or\\npeople not within their territorial limits. No government has a right to do\\ncharity outside its own jurisdiction, or to legislate for or to govern an\\nalien people. A man may charitably give away money which is his own,\\nbut governments, federal, state, municipal, have no money except that ob-\\ntained by taxation. Its possession and disbursement is a trust of the people\\nwhose agents they are, to be exercised only within sharply defined constitu-\\ntional limitations which make no provision for philanthropy. To use it\\nfor other purposes than the welfare of the taxpayers, to use it to relieve\\noppressions or sufferings of remote or adjacent peoples, is illegitimate, a\\ndeparture from right and duty, and liable to the grossest abuses.\\nIt is sometimes alleged that it is the right and duty of our government so\\nto intervene in foreign affairs as to extend the area of civil liberty, to save\\nothers from misgovernment, to prevent persecution, and to establish the\\ntrue religion. But what is liberty, right government, true religion We\\nmay determine these questions for ourselves, but we are not required nor\\nauthorized to determine them for others. No State is bound to incur cost\\nor danger in the interest of others, this being detrimental to its own interest\\nand that of its subjects, but rather therefore is it bound to abstain rigorously\\nfrom all unnecessary interference in foreign affairs. The exercise of wide\\nphilanthropy, and the propagation of our high civilization, of our free insti-\\ntutions, of our cherished religion, belong exclusively to voluntary associa-\\ntions organized for the purpose, and more especially to the Christian Church,", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0284.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 271\\nThe increasing intimacy of these civic relations brings\\nclearly into view the organic unity of mankind, and suggests\\nthe conception of a universal State, whose mighty function\\nshall be to secure international justice without war. This\\nideal is becoming in a measure realized. Its realization,\\nsays Dr. Seelye, does not require, indeed, in the actual\\ncondition of men, would not permit that all particular States\\nshould lose their individuality of government or institutions,\\nand be merged in what might be deemed the visible embodi-\\nment of the one universal State. The universal State has no\\nvisible embodiment. Yet it is not thereby without reality or\\npower. In our modern world nothing has shown itself more\\nreal or potent. What we call international law, or the law\\nof nations, unknown except in the vaguest, faintest way in\\nancient times, is recognized in our day as a sovereignty in\\nhuman affairs, equally majestic and mighty. It has no visible\\nthrone it does not utter itself through the voice of a mon-\\narch, or the votes of a legislature or people it has no courts\\nto expound, nor any fleets or armies to enforce its dictates\\nbut it guides kings, and legislatures, and peoples, and courts,\\nand fleets, and armies in our times, with an authority whose\\nmanifestation of power is steadily increasing. There is\\nnothing so characteristic of modern politics as the sway which\\ninternational law, a development of the one moral law, is\\ncontinually gaining among existing nations. There is no\\nother point in which the politics of the present day are\\nso clearly distinct from those of the ancient world. But\\ninternational law is nothing other than the voice of the one\\nuniversal State. It is the State in the highest exhibition of\\nit yet given in history. The State thus organizing is a\\nwhole, is one and indivisible, uniting through itself more and\\nmore manifestly its constituent organizations, without effa-\\ncing their distinct individuality, and presenting to the vision\\nof political philosophy a world of united States,", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0285.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "272 OE GANIZA TION\\nCHAPTER V\\nTHE CHUKCH\\n141. Religion, in its widest sense, viewed subjectively,\\nis belief in presiding, superhuman, spiritual power, earnest\\nenough to influence moral character and conduct; viewed\\nobjectively it is a body of doctrine relative to such power,\\ninstructing and regulating its votaries. Religion is of two\\nkinds, natural and revealed the former relying for its be-\\nlief and doctrine on reason alone the latter claiming to\\nhave in addition information communicated by the higher\\npower.\\nThe negative member of this dichotomy is natural reli-\\ngion. Under scientific treatment it is entitled natural theol-\\nogy. It proceeds independently of historical, racial and\\nlocal influences, discarding the dogmas of tradition, author-\\nity and custom, and upon rational grounds investigates the\\nevidence furnished by nature of the reality and character of\\na higher power. More particularly, it seeks proof of the\\nexistence of God, his unity and personality, the kind and\\ndegree of his attributes, his will concerning us, the distinc-\\ntion between right and wrong, good and evil, our relation\\nand obligation to him, and our destiny both here and here-\\nafter.\\nRevealed religions, which Diderot calls the heresies of\\nnatural religion, seek in general to impose their systems far\\nless by reason than by persuasion with appeal to emotion\\nand passion. Historically they have been largely character-\\nized by superstition or extreme reverence and fear of what is\\nunknown or mysterious, and by fanaticism or ignorant, irra-", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0286.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "THE CHTJBCH 273\\ntional worship of deities, with excessive rigor in opinions\\nand practice. Witness the prevailing Asiatic and African\\ncnlts. Christianity, however, is a revealed religion claiming\\nto be in entire accord with natural religion, to be at its basis\\nstrictly rational, and to demand no more of its adherents\\nthan a reasonable faith in its transcendent doctrine. 1\\n1 It is an old saying that man is a religious animal. This differentiates,\\ndistinguishes him. His very nature determines that he shall look upward\\nand worship. Among Aryan races, even the name which is above every\\nname, at which every knee shall bow, is one, and tells of filial adoration.\\nIn exploring the ancient archives of language, says Max Muller, we\\nfind that the highest god received the same name in the ancient mythology\\nof India, Greece, Italy, and Germany, and retained that name whether wor-\\nshipped on the Himalayan mountains, or among the oaks of Dodona, on the\\nCapitol, or in the forests of Germany. His name was Dyaus in Sanskrit,\\nZeus in Greek, Jovis in Latin, Tiu in German. These names are not mere\\nwords. They bring before us the ancestors of the whole Aryan race, thou-\\nsands of years it may be before Homer and the Veda, worshipping an unseen\\nBeing, under the selfsame name, the best, the most exalted name they could\\nfind in their vocabulary, under the name of Light and Sky. We have\\nin the Veda the invocation Dyaus pitar, the Greek ZeO irarep, the Latin\\nJupiter; and that means in all the three languages what it meant before\\nthese three languages were torn asunder it means Heaven-Father.\\nThousands of years have passed since the Aryan nations separated to travel\\nto the North and the South, the West and the East; they have each formed\\ntheir languages, they have each founded empires and philosophies, they\\nhave each built temples and razed them to the ground they have all grown\\nolder, and it may be wiser and better but when they search for a name for\\nwhat is most exalted and yet most dear to every one of us, when they wish\\nto express both awe and love, the infinite and the finite, they can but do\\nwhat their old fathers did when gazing up to the eternal sky, and feeling\\nthe presence of a Being as far as far, and as near as near can be they can\\nbut combine the selfsame words, and utter once more the primeval Aryan\\nprayer, Heaven-Father, in that form which will endure forever, Our Father\\nwhich art in heaven. The Science of Beligion, Lee. iii.\\nIm Innern ist ein Universum auch,\\nDaher der Volker loblicber Gebrauch,\\nDass jeglicher das Beste was er kennt,\\nEr Gott, ja seinen Gott benennt,\\nIm Himmel und Erden iibergiebt,\\nIhn fiirobtet und womoglicb liebt.\\nGoethe.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0287.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "274 ORGANIZATION\\n142. It has already been pointed out that a theory of\\nEthics to be complete as to its system must include the rec-\\nognition of a personal God, and of man s relation to him, and\\nconsequent obligation to render him loving service. This\\ndoes not mean that there may not be practical morality even\\nof very high grade in the various relations among men, with-\\nout religion, without any acknowledgment of God; but it\\nmeans that a scheme of morality without God is necessarily\\nincomplete, has no ultimate support, no philosophic unity,\\nand cannot be expanded into a scientifically systematized\\ntheory. Herein it appears that natural religion is the cap-\\nstone, or rather the key-stone, of Ethics.\\nOriental scholars testify that Confucianism is simply and\\nsolely a body of inconsistent, ill assorted and often erroneous\\nethical doctrines, that Buddhism, the confession of one-third\\nof the human race, is little else, and that both are distinctly\\natheistic. 1 Hinduism is pantheism, and pantheism, whether\\ntaught by the Brahman or by the god-intoxicated Spinoza, or\\nby the haughty Hegelian, is merely a refined and enlarged, a\\ngeneralized feticism. It denies the intelligence and freedom,\\nthe personality of its god. Now, since ethics with its com-\\nplement religion is grounded in and arises from relations\\namong persons, an impersonal being can have no part therein.\\nMan cannot trespass on the world of nature, on the moun-\\ntains, the continents, the ocean, or the stars, but only on\\nhim who intelligently and freely produced them, and to\\nwhom therefore they belong. The impersonal, so-called god\\nof the pantheist is not at all the God of the ethical and reli-\\ngious philosopher. Pantheism is essentially atheism.\\nThe mythical polytheistic cult of the ancient Greeks, in\\n1 Buddhism is no religion at all, and certainly no theology, hut rather\\na system of duty, morality and benevolence, without any real deity, prayer\\nor priest. Monjer Williams, Hinduism, p. 74. Indeed testimonies\\nabound,", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0288.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 275\\nform adopted by the skeptical Romans, and by them diffused\\nover the Empire, was doubtless originally a deified personifi-\\ncation of natural objects and forces, and an apotheosis of\\nheroes. It was replaced in the philosophic thought of An-\\naxagoras and of his successors by a strict monotheism, shin-\\ning forth clearly in the famous hymn of Cleanthes. 1 Thus\\nunaided philosophy early reached and taught esoterically a\\nremarkably pure natural religion, which, though it seems not\\nto have taken practical form, nevertheless gave to the ethics\\nof the Stoics a coherence, a consistency, an ultimatum and\\ncompleteness that secured its permanence and general accep-\\ntance even to this day. 2\\nAll religions, and even atheistic cults, come within the\\nscope of Ethics. We have already seen that a man is re-\\nsponsible for his beliefs. 3 Every belief relating to conduct,\\nbe its subject true or false, carries with it obligations, duties;\\nfor. every one is bound, whatever be its error, to conform his\\nconduct to the results of his moral judgment, or, as it is com-\\nmonly expressed, is bound to obey his conscience. In reli-\\n1 The text of the Hymn may be seen in Ueberweg s History of Philosophy,\\n54 and a translation in Mayor s Ancient Philosophy, p. 177. A metrical\\nrendering of the opening lines is as follows\\nThou, who amid the Immortals art throned the highest in glory,\\nGiver and Lord of life, who hy law disposest of all things,\\nKnown hy many a name, yet One Almighty forever,\\nHail, O Zeus for to Thee should each mortal voice he uplifted\\nOffspring are we too of thine, we and all that is mortal around us.\\n2 See supra, 100. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel says: The\\nidea of God constitutes the general foundation of a people. Whatever is\\nthe form of a religion, the same is the form of a State and its constitution\\nit springs from religion, so much so that the Athenian and the Roman States\\nwere possible only with the peculiar heathendom of those peoples, and even\\nnow a Roman Catholic State has a different genius and a different constitu-\\ntion from a Protestant State. The genius of a people is a definite individual\\ngenius, which becomes conscious of its individuality in different spheres in\\nthe character of its moral life, its political constitution, its art, religion and\\nscience.\\n8 See supra, 60, note.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0289.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "276 ORGANIZATION\\ngion it is not otherwise. Ethical principles prevail within\\nthe shrine. They are immutable and all pervading. They\\nare the ground not only from which natural religion arises,\\nbut on which revealed religion descending must take its\\nstand to find a firm support.\\nShall an exception be made in favor of Christianity Not\\nat all. Christianity is preeminently ethical. Indeed in a\\nphilosophic view its great strength lies in the exact conform-\\nity of its teaching to the universal and eternal ethical princi-\\nples which it enlightens, widens, exalts and refines. It came\\nnot to destroy but to fulfill the law more enduring than\\nheaven and earth. The Sermon on the Mount speaks of the\\nKingdom of heaven and of the fatherhood of God, but it con-\\ntains no distinctively Christian doctrine, and is occupied\\notherwise with applications of purely ethical principles. It\\nmight fairly be entitled a Lecture on Practical Ethics.\\nThese principles determine what is due in domestic, in social,\\nand in civic order, and are likewise fundamental in religious\\norder. Hence it is that so much is discovered to be common\\nto all those religions, both natural and revealed, that have\\nattained to the dignity of a system. 1\\n1 Bishop Bigandet of Ava, in his Life and Legend of Gaudama, p. 494,\\nsays: The Christian system and the Buddhistic, though differing from\\neach other in their respective objects and ends as much as truth from error,\\nhave, it must be confessed, many striking features of an astonishing resem-\\nblance. There are many moral precepts equally commanded and enforced\\nin common by both creeds. It will not be rash to assert that most of the\\nmoral truths prescribed by the gospel are to be met with in the Buddhistic\\nscriptures.\\nMozoomdar, one of the leaders in a new religious movement in India,\\nbelonging to the high caste of his people, and reputed as learned in almost\\nall the wisdom of certain kinds in England and America as well as in India,\\nsays Every great religion of which I have any knowledge has worshipped\\nGod either through the forces of nature, or in the form of heroes and great\\nmen, or through their own spiritual instincts. No religion, however idola-\\ntrous, has been able to shake off this threefold medium. The Vedas wor-\\nshipped God through the forces of nature. David and Elias also saw the", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0290.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 277\\n143. In general it is true that wherever cults develop,\\neven those full of superstition, there arises a priesthood pro-\\nfessing the function of mediator to propitiate the super-\\nhuman power. The priesthood becomes organized, and\\nunites with the State, seeking its protection, using its au-\\nthority, and lending in turn its potent influence to strengthen\\nthe secular government. So it has been with the Christian\\nChurch, an organization that prevails to-day throughout\\nEurope and America. To it we will now give special\\nattention.\\nIn the Christian Church we find a purified and exalted\\nethical doctrine, including natural religion, supplemented and\\ncomplemented by revelation. Christianity is differentiated\\nfrom other religions by the teaching that Jesus of Nazareth\\nis the Christ, the incarnate Son of. God, making atonement- by\\nthe cross, and ever living as Savior and King. 1 It is this\\ndifferentia only that Christian polemics has to defend against\\ninfidelity. Its expansion constitutes Christology. With\\nthis a treatise on Ethics has nothing to do it is concerned\\nonly with the generic elements expanded into natural religion.\\nmanifestations of God s power and wisdom in natural objects so glorious that\\nno argument, no logic, no sophistry, could overcome the simplicity of their\\nnatural religion. Behold, also, God s attributes in the different deities wor-\\nshipped in the Hindu Pantheon We cannot escape the conclusion that the\\nprocesses of religious development have been universal. Every nation\\nhas had its different surrounding circumstances. Its climate is different\\nits geography, its bodily constitution, its mental temperament, its history,\\nall different. That these differences should have deeply affected religious\\ndevelopment is not at all wonderful. But the sense of trust, love, and holi-\\nness in all religions is the same or similar, only the forms disagree.\\nYet I declare that even in the midst of all this variety there is so much in\\ncommon that the student is wonder-struck at the fact of unity. In the\\nmidst of all the controversies and conflicts that afflict the religious world,\\nwe come across fundamental truths which are so similar that we are struck\\nby the thought that they must have a common soul, a common impulse, a\\ncommon origin, and a common aim.\\n1 For the best possible definition of Christianity, see John 3 16.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0291.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "278 ORGANIZATION\\nFor, all the great virtues that stand out as cardinal have\\nhad existence among all peoples from the beginning. The\\ndecalogue, excepting perhaps the sabbath-day law, contains\\nnothing new. All moral obligations binding men to God\\nand to each other originate, not in legislation, but in the\\nnature which God gave to man, and are determined in detail\\nby the variations in his complex relations. The virtues have\\nbeen developing through all the ages among all peoples, and\\nare developing to-day under a better understanding, a fuller\\ncomprehension, a more subservient recognition of personal\\nrelations and their consequent obligations. No doubt Chris-\\ntianity has been and still is powerfully influential in their\\nhigher development, giving brighter light over a widening\\nhorizon but Christianity did not originate them, it merely\\nfound them, enlarged them, enlightened them. Manifestly,\\nthe all-informing, all-embracing, fundamental law of Chris-\\ntian activity, is the ethical, altruistic law of loving service. 1\\n144. Historically the Christian Church emerged from\\nJudaism very weak in numbers, and in social influence. Its\\norganization, comparable to a shepherd with his flock, was\\n1 j It is sufficiently evident, says Guizot, that morality may exist in-\\ndependently of religious ideas that the distinction between moral good and\\nevil, and the obligation to avoid evil and to cleave to that which is good, are\\nlaws as much acknowledged by man, in his proper nature, as the laws of Logic,\\nspringing likewise from a principle within him, and finding likewise their\\napplication in his life. Granting all this, and yielding up to morality its\\nindependence, the question naturally arises Whence cometh morality, and\\nwhither doth it lead This obligation to do good, is it a fact standing by\\nitself, without author, without aim Doth it not conceal, or rather doth it\\nnot reveal an origin, a destiny reaching beyond the world By this ques-\\ntion, which arises spontaneously and inevitably, morality leads man to the\\nporch of religion, and opens to him a sphere whence it was not borrowed.\\nHistory of Civilization, Lecture V. The real novelty of Christian Ethics,\\nsays Dr. Broadus, lies in the fact that Christianity offers not only instruc-\\ntion in moral duty, but spiritual help in acting accordingly. Commentary\\non Matthew, p. 161.", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0292.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "TBE CHUKCH 279\\nextremely simple and apparently feeble. But its native\\nstrength was soon manifested. The original hundred and\\ntwenty speedily became as many thousands. Local churches\\nwere multiplied. The heresy was propagated with an\\nactivity, energy and devoted zeal that knew no bounds. It\\nspread into Asia Minor, it invaded Europe, and entered\\nRome. The vast power of the State, then mistress of the\\ncivilized world, was put forth to suppress the rising super-\\nstition, and in the course of three centuries ten fierce and\\nbloody persecutions, extending throughout the Empire, and\\nwaged with all the implacable might of the Roman power,\\nsought to crush it, and failed. Gathering new and greater\\nstrength from adversity, it successfully resisted the oppressor,\\nconquered the conqueror, and shared the throne of the\\nCaesars. 1\\n1 We can be at no loss to discover the cause of this triumph. No other\\nreligion, under such circumstances, had ever combined so many distinct ele-\\nments of power and attraction. Unlike the Jewish religion, it was bound\\nby no local ties, and was equally adapted for every nation and for every\\nclass. Unlike Stoicism, it appealed in the strongest manner to the affections,\\nand offered all the charms of a sympathetic worship. Unlike the Egyptian\\nreligions, it united with its distinctive teaching a pure and noble system of\\nethics, and proved itself capable of realizing it in action. It proclaimed,\\namid a vast movement of social and national amalgamation, the universal\\nbrotherhood of mankind. Amid the softening influence of philosophy and\\ncivilization, it taught the supreme sanctity of love. To the slave, it was the\\nreligion of the suffering and the oppressed. To the philosopher it was at\\nonce an echo of the highest ethics of the later Stoics, and the expansion of\\nthe best teaching of the school of Plato. To a world, grown very\\nweary of gazing on the cold and passionless grandeur which Cato realized\\nand Lucan sung, it presented an ideal of compassion and of love, an ideal\\ndestined for centuries to draw around it all that was greatest, as well as all\\nthat was noblest on earth, a Teacher who could weep by the sepulchre of his\\nfriend, who was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. It was\\nbecause Christianity was true of the moral sentiments of the age, because it\\nrepresented faithfully the supreme type of excellence to which men were\\nthen tending, because it corresponded with their religious wants, aims, and\\nemotions, because the whole spiritual being could then expand and expatiate\\nunder its influence, that it planted its roots so deeply in the hearts of men.\\nLecky, History of European Morals, ch. iii, p. 387 sq.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0293.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "280 ORGANIZATION\\nThis affiliation of the Church with the State, in the middle\\nof the fourth century, together with an increasing complexity\\nand solidarity of organization, gave even greater efficiency to\\nits propagandism. Apparently weakened by the schism into\\nEast and West, into Greek and Latin, it nevertheless with-\\nstood the floods of barbarians that overwhelmed and over-\\nthrew the Empire, converted and subdued them, saved\\nChristianity for Europe, and ruled the continent throughout\\nthe mediaeval centuries. 1 In modern times, beginning with\\nthe sixteenth century, a further division of the Western\\nChurch into Catholic and Protestant, with many subdivi-\\nsions, has occurred, which seems to have stimulated rather\\nthan impaired its zealous activity. Thus during two millen-\\nniums, amid the rise and fall of States and Empires, the\\nChurch has maintained its growing power, and to-day Chris-\\ntendom embraces Europe and America, and is pressing its\\njurisdiction into Asia, Africa, and the isles of the sea. 2\\n1 Strikingly similar is the historical spread of Buddhism, propagated\\nfrom India over eastern Asia and Japan, by its lofty ethics, and the promise\\nof Karma and Nirvana and of Mohammedanism, propagated from Arabia\\nover western Asia and northern Africa, by the sword and the Koran, with\\nits promise to the faithful of a paradise of houris. Mohammedanism swept\\nChristianity out of Asia and Africa, excepting the feeble remnants in Arme-\\nnia and Abyssinia and Christianity in southern Europe was threatened\\nwith a like fate from the invasions of the northern barbarians overthrowing\\nthe Roman Empire. Humanly speaking, it is not too much to aver,\\nsays Guizot, that in the fourth and fifth centuries, it was the organized\\nChristian Church that saved Christianity the Church with its institutions,\\nits magistrates, its authority, which struggled so vigorously to prevent the\\ninternal dissolution of the Empire, which struggled against the barbarian,\\nand in fact overcame the barbarian, it was this Church that became the\\ngreat connecting link, the principle of civilization, between the Roman and\\nthe barbarian worlds. Hist. Civ., Lee. ii. Cf. Lectures V, and VI, on\\nThe Christian Church.\\n2 Christianity enjoyed no privileges and claimed no immunities when it\\nboldly confronted and confounded the most ancient and most powerful reli-\\ngions of the world. Even at the present day it craves no mercy, and it\\nreceives no mercy. Unless our religion has ceased to be what it was, its", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0294.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 281\\n145. What therein determines this unique persistence\\nand expanding potency is not far to seek. First, there is an\\nexalted, purified and extended morality, approving itself to\\nthe heart and conscience of humanity as in accord with its\\nideal constitution and the natural order of life among men,\\nwhich morality is taught in precept and urged in practice.\\nSecondly, there is an enlarged and enlightened view of our\\nrelation and obligation to God as Our Father, giving to\\nnatural religion a clearness and cogency never attained in\\nthe schools of philosophy. Thirdly, there is a well settled\\nclaim of a divine origin, of a divine founder in the person of\\nJesus of Nazareth, of a divine revelation promising redemp-\\ntion to the faithful and eternal blessedness to the righteous.\\nWe would not ignore but heartily approve the further claim\\nof the Church that it is multiplied, upheld and impelled by\\nthe immanent Spirit of God but, from a historic and philo-\\nsophic point of view the aforementioned principles go far\\ntoward explaining the phenomenal strength and growth of\\nthis the most durable and comprehensive of all human\\norganizations.\\nMoreover, consider the ends for which the Church pro-\\nposes itself as the means. It claims to have solved the\\nproblem of life, to interpret its meaning, and to offer sure\\nguidance to the faithful. Maintaining that our terrestrial\\nlife is teleologically justified only by the fact that it is related\\nto a higher life, to a life beyond, and therefore has import,\\nnot as an end in itself, but as a period of preparation and\\nprobation for eternal life, it proclaims to restless humanity\\ndefenders should not shrink from any trial of strength. Max Muller,\\nScience of Religion, Lee. i. Let me, the writer of this treatise, reverently\\nadd, that a religion which cannot abide the most searching investigation of\\nphilosophy and of physical science, a Bible which cannot pass unscathed the\\nfire of adverse criticism, of skeptical, hostile criticism, that religion, that\\nBible are not for me. Let research go freely on, free from all check save\\nfact and logic the result, we need not fear.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0295.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "282 ORGANIZATION\\nCome unto me, and find your promised rest. We may con-\\ncede that the teleology of history has never reached a system\\nformally more complete than the philosophy of the Church.\\nHeaven and eternal happiness the goal of historical life, the\\nearth its temporal scene of action, its central point the incar-\\nnation of God and the foundation of the Kingdom of heaven\\non earth, all past ages leading up to this culmination which\\nshall determine the entire future, the whole course of history\\nbounded by the day of creation on the one hand and the day\\nof judgment on the other, these indeed constitute such a\\ngrand philosophy of history that Hegel s or Comte s barren\\nabstractions are mere nothing when compared with the fruit-\\nful, concrete conception. 1 Under the shield of this massive\\ndoctrine, and by right of its divine ordination, the Church is\\nclaiming ownership and actively seeking possession of the\\nwhole world in the name of its living King.\\n146. In the fourth century the Church was incorporated\\nwith the State. It is generally admitted by ecclesiastical his-\\ntorians that, from and after the time of Constantine, the ori-\\nginal constitution of the Church was overlaid by a vast body\\nof human additions, particularly by the hierarchy, assimilating\\nthe magistracy by a long gradation of ecclesiastical dignities\\nor powers, rising upward from the primitive pastor or curate\\nto the bishop, to the pope or patriarch and that by these\\nand other results of the alliance of the Church with the\\nEmpire, its simplicity was lost, its purity corrupted, and the\\nprior relations of the clergy and laity injuriously affected. 2\\n1 Translated, with some verbal adaptation, from Paulsen s Einleitung in\\ndie Philosophie, Berlin, 2d ed.. 1893 bk. I, ch. ii, 3 (p. 178).\\n2 If it be assumed that Platonism was among the causes which led to\\nthe development of the medieval hierarchy, its influence must be conceived\\nas mainly indirect and exerted through the doctrines of Philo, the Neo-\\nPlatonists, and the Church Fathers, all of whom had been especially attracted\\nand influenced by the Platonic doctrine of the ultra-phenomenal world. But", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0296.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 283\\nYet it was of immense advantage to European civilization\\nthat a moral influence, a moral power, a power resting entirely\\nupon moral convictions, upon moral opinions and sentiments,\\nshould have established itself in society, just at the period\\nwhen it seemed on the point of being crushed by an over-\\nwhelming physical force. Had not the thoroughly organized\\nChurch at this time existed, the whole world must have\\nfallen a prey to mere brute power. It alone possessed a\\nmoral power; it maintained and promulgated the idea of\\na precept, of a law superior to all human authority it pro-\\nclaimed that great truth which forms the only foundation of\\nour hope for humanity, namely, that there exists a law above\\nall human law, which, by whatever name it be called, whether\\nreason, or the law of God, or what not, is, at all times and in\\nall places, eternally one and the same. 1\\nIn the course of the centuries, however, the alliance of the\\nChurch with the State proved unwholesome. An arrogant\\nand ambitious clergy endeavored to render its rule entirely\\nindependent of the people, to bring them under authority, to\\ntake possession of their mind and life without the conviction\\nof their reason or the consent of their will. Claiming to be\\nin possession of the keys, it exercised a spiritual lordship of\\nalmost unbounded power. It endeavored with all its might\\nto establish a theocracy, to usurp the temporal authority of\\nthe State, to establish universal dominion. The struggle for\\nsupremacy between the Church and the State, always at the\\nexpense of the liberties of the people, often resulted in the\\nsubjugation and subservience of the latter and the former,\\nasserting its catholicity, was for centuries the dominant power\\nwhatever judgment may be passed on the question of historic dependence,\\nand setting aside many specific differences, the general character of the Pla-\\ntonic State and that of the Christian hierarchy of the Middle Ages are\\nessentially the same. Ueberweg, Hist. Phil, 43, note,\\n1 Guizot, Hist. Civ., Lee. ii.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0297.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "284 OR GANIZA TI ON\\nover Europe. Ecclesiastical dissension and division, in some\\nStates, broke this dominion, but the ill-starred communion of\\nthe two organizations has persisted, an unholy alliance, con-\\nfusing the sacred with the secular to the prejudice of both. 1\\nThe end, the ultimate purpose for which the State exists,\\nand that for which the Church exists, are quite distinct, and\\ntheir rightful means of attaining their ends have little in\\ncommon. The proper function of the State is concerned with\\nthe material prosperity, the external wealth of its citizens\\nthe proper function of the Church is concerned with the\\nspiritual prosperity, the internal weal of its clergy and laity.\\nThe one seeks to protect and promote the health and wealth\\nof the body politic the other to edify and multiply its adhe-\\nrents. Membership in the one is quite involuntary in the\\nother it is essentially voluntary. The one upholds its au-\\nthority by physical force the other by moral force alone,\\nhaving no penalties beyond censure and excommunication.\\nThe State has sharply marked geographical limits which it\\nmay not transgress the Church, expanding its realm, freely\\ninvades all other realms. The former is in no sense a propa-\\ngandist the latter is essentially a missionary. In their union\\nthe lines of demarcation become obscured, and each under-\\ntakes more or less the office of the other, leading to a strug-\\ngle for mastery and a consequent hinderance of efficiency.\\nChristendom has greatly suffered, and is still suffering from\\n1 Still, Mr. Gladstone, an eminent Statesman, in one of his later Essays,\\nstrongly advocates the maintenance of the union but, on the other hand,\\nthe Bishop of Peterborough, a high Ecclesiastic of the established Church\\nof England, in a recent Essay, says The Church is not and cannot become\\nthe State. These words stand for two wholly distinct and different societies,\\nhaving different aims, different laws, and different methods of Government.\\nThe State exists for the preservation of men s bodies the Church for the\\nsalvation of their souls. The aim of the State, even put at its highest, is\\nthe welfare of its citizens in this world the aim of the Church is their holi-\\nness here in order to their welfare hereafter. The duty of the Church is to\\neradicate sin; the duty of the State is to punish and prevent crime.", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0298.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 285\\nthis error. And not without warning. For, at the very\\norigin of the Church, their prospective divorce, their separate\\nfunctions, their distinct work and harmonious adjustment,\\nwere declared in the profoundly wise prescription of its\\nfounder Render unto Cassar the things that are Caesar s, and\\nunto God the things that are God s. 1\\n1 According to Plato, the chief end of the State is the training of its citi-\\nzens to virtue. Our object, says he, in founding the State is that, not\\na class, but that all may be made as happy as possible. Republic, iv,\\n420 b. Elsewhere he teaches that happiness depends on culture and justice,\\nfor the possession of moral beauty and goodness. Gorgias, 470 e. Accord-\\ning to Aristotle, the State originated for the protection of life, but ought\\nto exist for the promotion of morally upright living, its principal function\\nbeing the development of moral capacity in all its citizens, but especially in\\nthe young by education. The end is of higher order than the causes which\\nbrought it into being rj ttoXls yivofxevr) /xev o$v rod eve/ca, oScra 8e rod ev \u00c2\u00a3r)v.\\nPolitica i, 2. The end is good living, eD Ifiv, that is-, the morality of the\\ncitizens and their happiness as founded on virtue. Id. vii, 8. These eminent\\nauthorities seem hardly to have distinguished the political from the religious\\ninstitutions, and there can be no doubt that their views greatly influenced\\nthose of statesmen and ecclesiastics of the Roman and mediaeval periods.\\nOnly in quite modern times, and particularly in America, has a complete\\nseparation been made between Church and State. An entering wedge was\\ndriven by Lord Baltimore in 1634, and another by Roger Williams in 1635,\\nwho as pioneers founded colonies with a guaranty, the one of religious tol-\\neration, the other of religious liberty. But it was reserved for the State of\\nVirginia, in its reorganization as an independent commonwealth, formally\\nto enact the divorce as an integral part of its organic law. The Virginia\\nBill of Rights, adopted June 12th, 1776, closes with 16, as follows: That\\nreligion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of dis-\\ncharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or\\nviolence and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of\\nreligion, according to the dictates of conscience and that it is the mutual\\nduty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each\\nother. The Bill of Rights was incorporated with the State Constitution,\\nenacted June 29th, 1776 and, in pursuance of its provision, the famous\\nStatute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, drawn by Thomas Jefferson, was\\nenacted December 16th, 1785. See Code of 1849, ch. 76. Other States in-\\ncluded the same principle in their several Constitutions, and at the instance\\nof Virginia, it was incorporated in the Constitution of the United States, as\\na part of Amendment First, thus Congress shall make no law respecting", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0299.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "286 ORGANIZATION\\n147. A local church politically free, and constituted\\nsimply of a pastor, deacons and lay members, is strictly and\\ndistinctly an organism. Very generally, local churches come\\ninto organic union with each other, constituting synods, con-\\nferences, councils. These again organize into yet more com-\\nprehensive ecclesiaB or general assemblies, officered by a\\nhierarchy of priests, bishops, and other clergy, whose consti-\\ntutional functions are formally defined. All the various\\ngroups of church organization, of various denomination, not-\\nwithstanding their differences and dissensions, are furthermore\\nin reality organized into a holy Church universal, one truly\\ncatholic, by their common acceptance of the New Testament\\nas organic and ultimate law, interpreted, and in some cases\\nmodified, as in the Church of Rome, by ecclesiastical au-\\nthority. In the universal and intensely active Christian\\nChurch, with its many subsidiary organizations, their officers\\nand members, we discover the most extensive, complete and\\npowerful organism ever known, and one which is rapidly\\nrealizing the ancient dream of universal empire in an organic\\nunification of mankind.\\nFrom the varied relations obtaining in this Christian body,\\nwherein all are members one of another, arises a multiplicity\\nof special obligations and active duties calling for a never\\nflagging constancy and devotion, and heartily recognized as\\ndisplacing by superior claim all conflicting calls. Each mem-\\nber confesses that he belongs to the Church, and does not\\nhesitate to name this servitude as a sufficient reason for his\\nspecial conduct. On the other hand, the Church belongs to\\nhim, serving to edify his spiritual worth. Moreover, it is a\\ncommon brotherhood, a communion, a fellowship one with\\nanother, and with the divine head, all working together for\\nan establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. In\\nthe United States there is, therefore, at last a severance of Church and\\nState, and each pursues its end without let or hinderance from the other,", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0300.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 287\\nnearness and likeness to God. 1 These obligations ramify\\nthroughout every other class of duties, intensify and sanctify\\nthem. The Christian man among men, the Christian father,\\nmother, son and daughter, the Christian member of the com-\\nmunity where his lot is cast, the Christian man of affairs, the\\nChristian citizen .and statesman, is more closely bound in\\neach and all of these relations by virtue of his Christian con-\\nfession, and finds therein new and higher, the highest motives\\nfor ordering all his conduct on the principles inculcated by\\nthe Christian Church. Thus this spiritual organism enters\\ninto, and exerts a dominant influence over, all the relations\\nand obligations of our temporal life, while looking and pre-\\nparing for the eternal life beyond. 1\\nIt has been pointed out that natural religion in its origin\\nand perfection is ethics, also that the Christian religion is\\nethics extended, confirmed, refined. The revelation of God\\nin Christ reconciling the world unto himself, expands obliga-\\n1 To one who admits the organic unity of the human race, says Dr.\\nGladden, the notion that Christ s law is ultra-rational is absurd. It is and\\nmust be the law of the organism. It is the simple scientific expression of\\nthe relation of the members to the body. The boud that unites us to our\\nfellows is, therefore, one that we cannot sunder. To sever ourselves from\\nour kind is self-mutilation. This is not some counsel of perfection for\\nsaints it is the fundamental fact of life. All our industry, all our social\\norganization, must conform to it. No man liveth unto himself. Our daily\\nwork is a social function. Wealth is valueless and impossible apart from\\nhuman fellowship. Not to keep this steadily before us in our administra-\\ntion of all our affairs is to be false to the primary human obligation. To set\\nup natural law in the social world or the business world, as distinct from\\nand contrary to the Christian law, is not only unmoral, it is unscientific.\\nLove is the fulfilling of all law. And not only do these ideas make our life\\nsacred and love our daily regimen, they ought to fill us also with confidence\\nand courage. The kingdom that we pray for and fight for is not a mere\\nhope, it is a solid reality. When we say that we are working together with\\nGod, we know what we mean. We can discern his working, and can be\\nconfident that we are helping in the fulfilment of his great designs. The\\nsigns of his presence and power are everywhere. Muling Ideas oj the\\nPresent Age, ch. x.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0301.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "288 ORG A NIZA TION\\ntion heavenward, and widens its horizon to embrace all man-\\nkind. The ethics of every day life, which is not itself\\ndistinctively Christian, finds its complement in the doctrines\\nof the Church. The teachings of the Teacher have enlight-\\nened human reason, cleared the moral judgment, exalted the\\nmoral sentiments, purified motives, and, subdued the will.\\nThe realm is enlarged, but it is the realm of ethics still,\\ninvolving conscience, obligation, duty, gratitude, love. We\\nfound the moral law to be Thou shalt not trespass either by\\ninvasion of rights or by evasion of dues, having an equivalent\\nin Be thou just, and in Thou shalt love and serve. Chris-\\ntianity lays no other mandate. The loving service of God,\\nand of his Christ, and of his creatures, a fellowship in mutual\\nself-sacrifice, is its very essence and clear definitions of\\nduty, pressing incentives to activity, and divinely ordained\\nmeans of efficiency, are supplied by its organized Church.\\nFINIS.", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0302.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\nThe number refers to the page. For general topics, see Table of Contents.\\nAlford, on the unjust judge, 122 n.\\nAlter ego, 145, 146, 147.\\nAltruism of the doctrine, 151.\\netymology of, 151 n.\\nArgument for existence of God, 20,\\nAristotle, cited on motive, 8 n.\\non deliberation, 11 n.\\non condition of choice, 15 n.\\non definition of pure reason, 16 n.\\non definition of Nature, 25 n.\\non etymology of ethics, 36 n.\\non principle, 46 n.\\non the basis of ethics, 48 n.\\non liberty, 51 n.\\non customary laws, 66 n.\\non prohibition of law, 92 n.\\non the golden mean, 93 n.\\non Ethics and Politics, 103 n.\\non pleasure and pain, 104.\\non retribution, 103 n.\\non intuition of right, 111 n.\\non meaning of justice, 125 n.\\non Antigone s defense, 128 n.\\non equity, 129 n., 131 n.\\non doing injustice, 134 n.\\non definition of virtue, 140.\\non the golden mean, 141 n.\\non self-love, 147 n.\\non love, from Hesiod, 177 n.\\nand Paul, certain words of, 180 n.\\non happiness, 191 n.\\non hylozoism, 214 n.\\non the state, 250 n.\\non best form of the state, 251 n.\\non purpose of the state, 257 n, 285 n.\\nelements of society, 258 n.\\non compulsory education, 260 n.\\nArnold, Matthew, cited on deity, 197.\\nArthur, on physical and moral law, 28 n.\\nAuerbach, on law of love, 177 n.\\non custom vs. morals, 241 n.\\nAugustine, on summum bonum, 193 n.\\nAustin, definition of law, 32 n.\\non liberty and right, 50 n.\\non distribution of rights, 62 n.\\non ambiguity of civil, 90 n.\\non effect of sanction, 96 n.\\non legal right, 109 n.\\non responsibility for belief, 119 n.\\nAxioms, the three, 161 n.\\nBacon, cited on providence, 22 n.\\non meaning of ethics, 26 n.\\non limit of man s power, 54 n.\\non utility, 194 n.\\nBailey, on belief and disbelief, 119 n.\\nBasis of ethics, 28, 47, 48 n.\\nBelief, responsibility for, 119.\\nBentham, his use of deontology, 36 n.\\non overt action, 114 n.\\non asceticism, 151 n.\\non utility, 183 n., 194 n.\\nBishop of Ava, on Buddhism, 276 n.\\nBishop of Peterborough, on state, 260 n.\\non church and state, 284 n.\\nBlack, on definition of law, 32 n.\\nBlackstone, definition of law, 32 n.\\non civil law, 90 n.\\non superiority of moral law, 138 n.\\non definition of contract, 243 n.\\nBledsoe, on ground of right, 204 n.\\nBroadus, on Christian Ethics, 278 n.\\nBrougham, on sincerity in belief, 119 n.\\nBrowne, cited on Aristotle s ethics, 48 n.\\nBrowning, on recreation, 151 n.\\non self-sacrifice, 163 n.\\nBrutes, rights of, 45 n., 137 n.\\nBuhver, on home, 224 n.\\nBurke, the state a partnership, 260 n.\\nButler, on methods in ethics, 39 n.\\non anger, 72 n.\\non definition of conscience, 78 n.\\non supremacy of conscience, 82 n.\\non self-love, 147 n.\\n289", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0303.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "290\\nINDEX\\nButler, on law of love, 178 n.\\nByron, on solitude, 240 n.\\nCalderwood, definition of conscience, 78 n.\\non authority of conscience, 82 n.\\non the law, its formula, 90 n.\\nCalhoun, on a constitution, 252 n.\\nCarlyle, on suffering injustice, 134 n.\\non moral progress, 157 n.\\non happiness, 185 n., 196 n.\\nCategorical imperative, 81, 91 n.\\nCharity, etymology of, 173 n.\\nChoice, its conditions and issue, 11.\\nreality of, 14.\\nChristians, bond-servants, 143 n., 181 n.\\nChristianity, differentia of, 277.\\nChurch and state, separation of, 285 n.\\nCicero, on definition of ethics, 40 n.\\non principle, 46 n.\\non meaning of justice, 125 n.\\nhis ofticium and honestum, 136 n.\\non highest good, 193 n.\\non origin of law, 245 n.\\non supreme law, 256 n.\\non continuity of the state, 259 n.\\nCivil law, taken generically, 90.\\nCleanthes, hymn of, 275.\\nCoker, on unusual punishment, 104 n.\\nCommon law, anticipated, 60 n.\\nits origin, 252 n.\\nComplacency, love of, 173 n.\\nComteists, their doctrine, 107.\\nCondition, its kinds, 6 n.\\nConflict of desires, its regulation, 6.\\nConscience, definition of, 3, 77, 78 n.\\na postulate of ethics, 18.\\nsupremacy of, 82 n., 97 n.\\nConstitution, English, 252 n.\\nConstitution, U. S., on punishment, 104 n.\\non validity of contracts, 243 n.\\npreamble of, 252 n.\\non church and state, 286 n.\\nContract, Rousseau s social, 261 n.\\nCousin, formula of the law, 91 n.\\non right and duty, 138 n.\\nCook, definition of conscience, 78 n.\\nCosmological argument modified, 20.\\nCown, cited on evolution, 21 n.\\nCreation, absolute, 23 n.\\nCromwell, to men of England, 262 n.\\nCruelty, definition of, 137 n.\\nDecalogue examined, 87, 88 n.\\nDefense of possessions, 168.\\npersonal and national, 72, 266.\\nDefinition of mind, 1.\\nof pure intuition or reason, 3, 16 n.\\nof conscience, 3, 77, 78 n.\\nof desire, 5, 15 n.\\nof volition or will, 8.\\nof philosophy, 13 n.\\nof person, perfect and imperfect, 19.\\nof individual, 24 n.\\nof nature, 25 n.\\nof organism, 27, 212\\nof law, 31, 32 n.\\nof science, 35.\\nof deontology, 36 n.\\nof ethics, 36, 38 n., 40 n.\\nof virtue, 36 n., 140.\\nof moral, 40 n.\\nof principle, 46 n.\\nof normal, 46 n.\\nof duress, 58 n.\\nof pleasure and pain, 104.\\nof attempt, 115.\\nof justice, 124, 131 n., 267 n.\\nof cruelty, 137 n.\\nof duty, Kant s, 169 n.\\nof welfare, 186.\\nof supernatural, 201 n.\\nof contract, 243 n.\\nof religion, 272.\\nDeity, existence of, 20.\\nDeliberation, prior to choice, 11, 15 n.\\nDemosthenes, on moral principle, 47 n.\\non origin of law, 127 n.\\nDeontology, etymology of, 36 n.\\nDesire, defined and divided, 5, 6, 45.\\nDetermination, causal, rational, 15 n.\\nDivorce, history of, sketched, 229 n.\\nof church and state, 285.\\nDuality of the universe, 213 n.\\nDueling a crime, 73 n.\\nDumas, on defense of liberty, 168 n.\\nDuncan, on law of love, 178 n.\\nDuress, legal definition of, 58 n.\\nDuty, etymology of, 136 n.\\ndefinition of, Kant s, 169 n.\\nto self, 147.\\nEarth, a cosmic unity, 28.\\nEconomy, duty of, 149 n.\\nEdersheim, on number of laws, 89 n.\\nEffort, its issue in attention, 12.\\nEpictetus, on liberty, 55 n., 143 n.\\nEthics, etymology of, 36 n.\\nof standard literature, 163 n.\\nEtymology of person, 18 n.\\nof ethics, 36 n.", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0304.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n291\\nEtymology of obligation, 36 n.\\nof right, 36 n., 107 n.\\nof deontology, 36 n.\\nof moral, 40 n.\\nof principle, 46 n.\\nof conduct, 49 n.\\nof trespass, 64 n.\\nof conscience, 77 n.\\nof pain, 105 n.\\nof wrong, 107 n.\\nof just, 124 n.\\nof duty, 136 n.\\nof virtue, 139 n.\\nof altruism, 151 n.\\nof minister, 162 n.\\nof .talent, 168 n.\\nof endeavor, 172 n.\\nof benevolence, 172 n.\\nof charity, 173 n.\\nof Greek for man, 200 n.\\nof religion, 206 n.\\nof common, 238 n.\\nEvolution of the moral impulse, 7 n.\\nhypothesis of, 37, 41 n.\\nof ethics, 194, 202.\\nFarrar, on the commandments, 88 n.\\nFeuerbach, on legal guilt, 116 n.\\nFichte, on theory of rights, 63 n.\\non formula of the law, 91 n.\\nFindlay, on methods in ethics, 39 n.\\non moral power, 80 n.\\non supremacy of conscience, 97 n.\\nt\u00e2\u0080\u0094 on personality of deity, 198 n.\\nFirst cause, existence of, 20.\\nFleming, on rectitude, 107 n.\\nFreedom, the essence of choice, 11.\\na postulate of Ethics, 15.\\nand liberty discriminated, 55.\\nFroebel, on future reward, 179 n.\\non our children, 230 n., 231 n.\\nFroude, on happiness, 185 n.\\nGaboriau, on suicide, 167 n.\\nGambling a vice, 73 n.\\na trespass, 168 n.\\nGibbon, on asceticism, 152 n.\\nGladden, on Christian law, 287 n.\\nGod, existence of, 20.\\nGodet, definition of supernatural, 201 n.\\nGoethe, on part for whole, 28 n.\\non love of God universal, 273 n.\\nGolden rule, 93 n.\\nGolden mean, 141 n.\\nGood, kinds of, 192.\\nGrant, on the Lesbian rule, 129 n.\\nGratitude as commanded, 175.\\nGrote, cited on Aristotle, 191 n.\\nGrotius, on justice, 125 n.\\nGuizot, on cities, 258 n.\\non morality and religion, 278 n.\\non Christianity saved, 280 n.\\non church and civilization, 283.\\nHaggard, on immortality of acts, 96 n.\\nHamilton, definition of science, 35.\\non Kant s peroration, 86 n.\\nHappiness the reflex of welfare, 188 n.\\nHarrison, Frederick, cited, 197 n.\\nHawthorne, on repair of guilt, 96 n.\\non love and hate, 177 n.\\nHegel, formula of the law, 91 n.\\non the idea of God, 174 n.\\nHenry, Patrick, on rights and duties, 138 n.\\nHerakleitos, on unity of the law, 211 n.\\nHickok, formula of the law, 90 n.\\nHillel, the golden rule, 94 n.\\nHobbes, on right reason, 79 n.\\non the effect of sanction, 96 n.\\non law of human nature, 202 n.\\nHooker, on appetite and will, 10 n.\\non definition of law, 32 n.\\non rectitude, 107 n.\\nHonor, personal, 71.\\nHorace, on looking forward, 10 n.\\non the outwardly just, 125 n.\\nHugo, Victor, on criminal neglect, 124 n.\\non moral parity of sexes, 227 n.\\non excellence of society, 238 n.\\nHumanity personified, 197.\\nHutcheson, on utility, 194 n.\\nHuxley, on evolution of morals, 37 n.\\nHyslop, on rights, 62 n.\\nIllingworth, on mind as object, 145 n.\\nIntuition, pure, defined, 3, 16 n.\\nof the ethical principle, 40, 43, 47.\\nof the notion of a right, 60.\\nof the moral law, 76.\\nof right vs. wrong, 110.\\nJames, on mutual trust, 244 n.\\nJanet, definition of conscience, 78 n.\\non Kantian good will, 84 n.\\non personal excellence, 155 n.\\nJefferson, on religious freedom, 285 n.\\nJones, Sir Wm,, on the state, 254 n.\\nJudgment, the moral, distinguished, 3.\\nJustice, definitions of, 267 n.\\nJuvenal, on virtue, 140 n., 187 n.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0305.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "292\\nINDEX\\nKant, on philosophy, 13 n.\\non definition of desire, 15 n.\\non will as causality, 16 n.\\non freedom and the law, 16 n.\\non definition of pure reason, 16 n.\\non postulates of Ethics, 20 n.\\non proof of existence of God, 20 n.\\non theses of philosophy, 23 n.\\non kingdom of ends, 26 n.\\non value and dignity, 71 n.\\non definition of conscience, 78 n.\\non imperatives, 82 n.\\non good will, 84.\\non excellence of moral law, 86 n.\\non municipal law, 90 n.\\non formula of the law, 91 n.\\non duties to self, 147 n.\\non using other persons, 165.\\non duty, 169 n.\\non love as commanded, 173 n.\\non private felicity, 184 n.\\non happiness, 189 n., 191 n., 195 n.\\non method, 192 n.\\non perfection as principle, 204 n.\\non imperatives for divine will, 207 n.\\non organism 214 n.\\non deception, 242 n.\\nKingdom of ends, 26, 33 n.\\nKnowledge for its own sake, 150.\\nKiilpe, on philosophy, 13 n.\\non theories of morals, 41 n.\\nLaw of relativity, 17.\\nits ultimate ground, 30.\\nits definition and kinds, 31, 32.\\nthe moral, 76, 96 n.\\nthe royal, 93 n.\\ncivil and moral, 102 n.\\nof love, 176.\\nLecky, on varieties of judgment, 79 n.\\non responsibility for belief, 119 n.\\non triumph of Christianity, 279 n.\\nLeibnitz, on the two realms, 26 n., 29 n.\\non definition of justice, 267 n.\\nLesbian rule, 129 n.\\nLex talionis, 103.\\nLiberty and right, 49, 50 n.\\nand freedom discriminated, 55.\\nand law, 143.\\nin perfect love only, 181.\\nLieber, on right and duty, 138 n.\\nLimit of man s power, 54.\\nLiterature, standard, ethics of, 163 n.\\nLivingstone, on right and wrong, 111 n.\\nLocke, definition of conscience, 78 n.\\nLotze, on divisions of metaphysics, 13 n.\\non reality of relations, 25 n.\\non right to freedom, 47 n.\\non possession, 49 n.\\non ground of property, 68 n.\\non retribution for injury, 73 n.\\non definition of conscience, 78 n.\\non natural rights, 61 n.\\non non-interference, 91 n.\\non society unlike man, 220 n.\\non enthusiasm for science, 239 n.\\non common conscience, 259 n.\\non ground of punishment, 263 n.\\nLowell, on the gift and the giver, 169 n.\\nLove as commanded, 173.\\nas law, 176.\\nand liberty, etymology of, 182 n.\\nMansel, definition of individual, 24 n.\\nMartensen, cited on freedom, 16 n.\\nMartineau, on duties to self, 148 n.\\nMcCosb, definition of conscience, 78 n.\\nMcLaren, Alex., on freedom, 143 n.\\nMetaphysics, divisions of, 13 n.\\nMichelet, on prohibition of law, 92 n.\\nMill, cited on evolution, 21 n.\\non limit of man s power, 54 n.\\non the ultimate sanction, 96 n.\\non utilitarianism, 184 n., 194 n.\\non mutual trust, 244 n.\\non government, how judged, 252 n.\\nMilton, cited on conscience, 98 n.\\non chastity, 140 n.\\nMind, its own object, 145 n.\\nMinister, etymology of, 162 n.\\nMinor, definition of law, 32 n.\\nMontesquieu, definition of law, 32 n.\\non just and unjust, 131 n.\\non law in general, 256 n.\\nMotive, the desire that prevails, 8 n.\\nMotley, on helping an enemy, 160 n.\\nMozoomdar, on universal religion, 276 n.\\nMoore, Henry, the golden rule, 93 n.\\nMoral judgment distinguished, 3.\\nsentiment examined, 4, 5.\\nimpulse, its function, 7.\\nMorality and revelation, 261 n.\\nMorals, definition of, 40 n.\\ntheories of, distributed, 40 n.\\nMulford, on ethical vs. physical, 221 n.\\non Shakespeare s the state, 258 n.\\non continuity of the state, 259 n.\\nMiiller, on man looking upward, 200 n.\\non the universal prayer, 273 n.\\non Christianity persistent, 280 n.", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0306.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n293\\nNecessity, kinds of, 81 n.\\nNeighbor, who is my, 175 n.\\nNew Psychology, a criticism, 2 n.\\nits method, 43 n.\\nNewman, on personality of deity, 198 n.\\nNormal defined, 46 n.\\nObligation, etymology of, 36 n.\\nOrganism, definition of, 27, 212.\\nOught, its origin and meaning, 136 n.\\nOvid, on man looking upward, 200 n.\\nPain and pleasure, Bentham on, 183 n.\\nas punishment, 103.\\nPantheism, 274.\\nPaternoster, use of terms in, 64 n, 89 n.\\nPaternal theory of the state, 261 n.\\nPaulsen, cited on philosophy, 13 n.\\nfrom von Baer, on nature, 28 n.\\non problem of ethics, 39 n.\\non basis of ethics, 48 n.\\non definition of conscience, 78 n.\\non conscience and reality, 83 n.\\non personality of deity, 198 n.\\non philosophy of the church, 282.\\nPerfect and imperfect rights, 65 n.\\nPerson, etymology of, 18 n.\\ndefinition of, 19.\\nPhilosophy, various definitions of, 13 n.\\nPlato, cited on existence of God, 20 n.\\non definition of ethics, 36 n.\\non doing injustice, 134 n.\\non virtue and vice, 140 n.\\non highest good, 193 n.\\non know thyself, 211 n.\\non the state, its pattern, 220 n.\\non compulsory education, 260 n.\\non end of the state, 285 n.\\nPleasure and pain defined, 104.\\nPope, on philanthropy, 175 n.\\non happiness, 189 n.\\nPositivists, their ritual, 197 n.\\nPowers of mind distributed, 2, 45.\\nPrinciple defined, 46 n.\\nthe moral, 46, 47.\\nProperty, ground of, 68.\\nPure intuition or reason, 3, 16 n, 76.\\nPythagorean definition of virtue, 36 n.\\nthe decad, 88 n.\\nRacine, on peace of God, 20G n.\\nRankin, on law of love, 178 n.\\nRealms of kingdom of ends. 33 n.\\nReason, or pure intuition, 3, 16 n, 76.\\nReasons not causes, 57.\\nRelations, philosophy of, 24.\\nReligion, etymology of, 206 n.\\ndefinition of, 272.\\nRenan, on philosophy, 13 n.\\nResponsibility, condition of, 16.\\nRevolution and rebellion, 268 n.\\nRight, etymology of, 36 n, 107 n.\\nand aright coextensive, 108.\\nRights, basis of, 46, 47.\\ndistribution of, in Civil Law, 62 n.\\nmoral and legal, 109.\\nVirginia Bill of, 49 n., 162 n., 252 n.\\n262 n., 268, 285 n.\\nRobinson, on scripture incentives, 102 n.\\nRoman law, rights distributed, 62 n.\\nRousseau, on liberty, 55 n.\\non altruistic limit, 116 n.\\non suicide, 167 n.\\non contract social, 261 n.\\nSanction, its meaning, 96 n.\\nSay, on society natural to man, 237 n.\\nSchleiermacher, formula of the law, 91 n.\\nSchopenhauer, on duty of love, 180 n.\\nSeeley, on perfect liberty, 143 n.\\non a universal state, 271.\\nSeneca, the golden rule, 94 n.\\non happiness, 191 n.\\nSentiments, the moral, examined, 4, 5.\\nServants, Christians, 143 n., 181 n.\\nSidgwick, cited on method, 192 n.\\nShakespeare, cited on moralize, 40 n.\\non self-condemnation, 99 n.\\non intent and act, 115 n.\\non justice and mercy, 132 n., 133 n.\\non intending injustice, 134 n.\\non owe and own, 136 n.\\non talents as trusts, 167 n.\\non final justice, 199 n.\\non the state, 258 n.\\nSin defined, a trespass, 75.\\nSophocles, Antigone s defense, 128 n.\\nSouth on condition of volition, 10 n.\\nSpencer, oh knowledge, 13 n.\\non interested action, 153 n.\\non the Unknowable, 198.\\non society like man, 221 n.\\nSpinoza, on happiness, 191 n.\\nStahl, on loving service, 180 n.\\nState not philanthropic, 270 n.\\nStewart, on definition of virtue, 36 n.\\nStewardship, 166.\\nStoics, their ethical basis, 98 n.\\ntheir doctrine of pleasure, 185 n.\\ntheir doctrine of happiness, 191 n.", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0307.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "294\\nINDEX\\nStory, on equity, 130 n.\\nSuicide, 167 n.\\nSurnnium bonum, 192.\\nTalents as trusts, 168.\\nTeleology, 26,\\nTheories of morals distributed, 40 n.\\nTrendelenburg, on treason, 268 n.\\nTrespass, etymology of, 64 n.\\nTrumbull, on lying, 242 n.\\nUeberweg, cited on philosophy, 13 n.\\non principle, 46 n.\\non doctrine of Stoics, 48 n., 185 n.\\non Aristotle on liberty, 51 n.\\non Platonism and Christianity, 282 n.\\nUtilitarianism, 193.\\nValentine, on intuition of rights, 110 n.\\nVice a trespass, 69.\\nVirginia Bill of Rights, see Rights.\\nVirtue, etymology of, 139 n.\\nVoltaire, on existence of God, 197.\\nVoltaire, on luxui-ies, 246 n.\\nVolition or will denned, 8.\\nits relations and exercise, 9, 10.\\nVocation, its meaning, 247 n.\\nWar, its sole justification, 269.\\nWayland, definition of conscience, 78 n.\\nWelfare, definition of, 186.\\nWhewell, on deontology, 36 n.\\non Plato and Butler, 48 n.\\non supreme law, 83 n.\\non right and a right, 108 n.\\nWill or volition defined, 8.\\nits relations and exercise, 9, 10.\\nWilliams, Monier, on Buddhism, 274 n.\\nWolfius, definition of justice, 131 n.\\nWrong, etymology of, 107 n.\\nWundt, on mental faculties, 2 n.\\non philosophy, 13 n.\\nXenophon, on summary of the law, 89.\\non suffering injustice, 134 n.", "height": "4000", "width": "2704", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0308.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3956", "width": "2603", "jp2-path": "elementsofethics00dav_0309.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.\\nNeutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide\\nTreatment Date: Dec. 2004\\nPreservationTechnologies\\nA WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION\\n1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive\\nCranberry Township. 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