LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. Chap. Copyright No. Shelf. ... £ ^ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ELEMENTS OF ETHICS NOAH K. DAVIS, A.M., Ph.D., LL.D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia Tpti\f} } otra ev^rjfJLa, et Tts dperrj xat el ns eTraivos, ravra Aoyt£eo-0e. ELEMENTS OF ETHICS PEOLEGOMESA I. PSYCHOLOGICAL § 1, Before undertaking an inquiry into the principles of Ethics and their chief consequences, it is needful to examine, in a special way, the constitution of the human mind. The whole doctrine of morals concerns intelligences that are sentient and free, and is derived from their nature and relations. A preliminary survey of this ground consists in a specific study of human nature, in order to a study of human relations. The former is a psychological inquiry, and to it we at once proceed. Mind is conscious substance. The consideration of sub- stance may be omitted, and mind regarded as merely a com- plement of conscious activities, the knowing and feeling, desiring and willing. These are modes of consciousness, the universal characteristic of mental activity. They are posited as generic powers of mind. Each is subdivided into certain specific powers. The faculty of knowing, or cog- nition, is subdivided into intuition, memory, imagination, and thought. The intuitive intelligence is empirical and pure. Empirical or sensuous intuition is perception. Pure or non-sensuous intuition is pure intellect or reason. Pure reason is speculative and practical. This distribution of mental powers, together with the ex- plication now before us of some of their specific functions, 1 2 PROLEGOMENA is a logical treatment of facts of consciousness in accord with approved introspective psychology. 1 Let it be observed that a power, in its most general sense, is simply a possibility of change. Possible mental changes, known by experience, are classified as powers of mind. These are called mental capacities and faculties, the one de- noting power to be changed, to receive by impression, the i An elaborate discussion of the mental powers, according to the fore- going distribution, may be seen in my Elements of Psychology. For a con- cise statement of the distribution itself, see idem, §§ 71-78. For its ground, see § 79. For power, see § 53. The "New Psychology" discards this classi- fication, and on various grounds proposes some other. Wundt, in his Human and Animal Psychology, § 1, p. 4, says: " Wolff is the originator of the so- called theory of mental faculties which has influenced psychology down to the present day. This theory, based upon a superficial classification of mental processes, was couched in terms of a number of general notions, — memory, imagination, sensibility, understanding, etc., — which it regarded as simple and fundamental forces of mind. It was left for Herbart, one of the acutest thinkers of our century, to give a convincing proof of the utter emptiness of this theory. ' ' Four pages beyond, however, Wundt speaks of "mind and the principal mental functions . . . sense, feeling, idea, and will," also of " our experience of sensations, feelings, and thoughts," and further on, p. 17, he says, "we are undoubtedly able to pass judgment." This is quite enough to bring us together ; for by powers, faculties, capacities, we mean precisely functions, neither more nor less, and as to their logical distribution, we shall gladly accept a new one so soon as it is settled and proved superior. Meantime we are persuaded that the names of the various faculties or functions, which have prevailed in science from the time of Socrates until now, and the distinctions, which are so embedded in all Aryan and Semitic languages that even their critics necessarily use them, are sufficient for our present purpose, readily understood, and not likely to pass away at the wave of a wand. A disciple of Wundt says: "Association of ideas, thinking, reasoning, . . . used to be considered as separate faculties of the soul, and as show- ing the mind doing different things. But this view is now completely given up . . . mind does only one thing . . . that one thing is combining." But this is simply a question of the logical reduction of functions to a sum- mum genus. If it be shown that they are all merely modes of combining rather than modes of consciousness, a new reduction to unity will have been attained, a scientific modification of the science. But such reduction to a genus does not erase the distinctions among species, PSYCHOLOGICAL 3 other denoting power to change, to impart by expression. The further distribution, particularly of the cognitive facul- ties and capacities, is made, not with reference to differences discerned in the mental action and reaction, but with refer- ence to differences in the objects cognized. The mind re- sponds to the action upon it of objects greatly differing in kind, and its reactions are classified as different modes of knowing. The feelings, desires, and volitions correspond to the cognitions on which they are severally conditioned, and are classified accordingly. Thus the many variations in conscious activity are origi- nally determined objectively, and are merely various modes of consciousness. 1 § 2. Pure intuition is the immediate cognition by reason of a pure idea or necessary truth discerned on some empirical occasion, and abstracted. Such are the ideas of space and time, and the principles of contradiction and causation. These are speculative. Likewise, on the occasion of a per- sonal action, pure reason discerns that it has moral quality, that it is either right or wrong. This implies an abstract intuitive principle marking the distinction, which principle takes the form of an imperative, enjoining the right and for- bidding the wrong. In this practical form it is recognized as the moral law. We identify the practical reason with conscience, and define conscience as pure reason discerning moral law. 2 Thought, or the logical faculty, makes inferences from the data of intuition. When it subsumes a special case, and concludes a class of actions, or a particular action, to be right or wrong, this is moral judgment. 3 A moral judgment, i See infra, § 106. 2 The matter here simply stated is examined infra, § 43 sq. See also infra, §§ 58-60. 8 Both intuitions and inferences are judgments ; see Elements of Psychol- 4 PROLEGOMENA then, is a deduction from the moral principle or law, as an ultimate major premise, to precepts of less generality, and thence to particular cases of obligation. The ultimate major is purely intuitive ; the minor is usually empirical in charac- ter. The process is strictly logical, requiring only correct inference. It does not differ in its forms from the exercise of thought on other matter, as in Economics, and is dis- tinguished as a moral judgment solely with reference to its matter, which is ethical. § 3. Feelings are correlative to cognitions ; that is, they attend cognitions, coexist with them, and correspond to them. There are three classes : sensations, emotions, and sentiments. Sentiments are divided into sensuous and pure ; and pure sentiments are subdivided into intellectual and moral. Only the latter call for present consideration. 1 The basis of all moral sentiment is the cognition of moral law by conscience. The vast, weighty and all-pervading feeling of moral obligation, or sentiment of duty, correlative to conscience, may be taken as generic, as implying the moral sentiments generally. Because of his relation to moral law, every person has moral worth or dignity. The sentiment which the contem- plation of this worth inspires is respect. Positive respect is felt for persons whose habitual conduct conforms to moral law ; disrespect for those who disregard it. A show of un- due disrespect excites indignation, reasserting worth. The consciousness of one's own dignity and observance of the law inspires self-respect, a sentiment quite distinct from pride and vanity, but consistent with humility or the senti- ment of subjection to the law. The opposite feeling, arising ogy, § 212. Throughout the present treatise, however, we shall use the unqualified terra judgment, and the phrase moral judgment, in the specific sense of logical judgment or inference, as distinguished from intuition, i See Elements of Psychology, § 231, and § 254. PSYCHOLOGICAL 5 in view of what one is and does in contrast with what he ought to be and do, is self-abasement or humiliation. Respect becomes reverence when a person's character and conduct are seen to be an embodiment of moral law. The omniscience and omnipotence of Deity excite our highest ad- miration and awe; but only before the white heat of his holiness do we feel reverence, deepening into veneration and adoration. § 4. Another class of moral sentiments relates more espe- cially to particular personal actions. When the agent is some other person, then, according to my judgment on his action, I experience a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, exciting a disposition to reward or punish him. When the agent is myself in conscious action, then, according to my judgment on my own act, I experience self-approbation or self-condemnation, self-reproach, shame, remorse, together with a sentiment of ill desert that sometimes prompts a self-surrender to justice. The latter sentiments, while com- patible with pride, are inconsistent with self-respect. The sentiments of approbation and disapprobation are marked as pleasant and painful. There is probably no feel- ing more pure, more delicate and delightful than self-appro- bation. Self-condemnation, on the contrary, is always painful, and when it deepens to remorse, becomes intolerable. Thus these sentiments are a natural reward and punishment for right and wrong doing. 1 § 5. Desire is a conscious activity marked by a want imply- ing an impulse or tendency toward an object seemingly fitted to the want. This object is quite commonly called the ob- ject of desire, but strictly and properly it is an object of cog- nition. For, in order to desire, there must be a co-existing cognition of an object, which object being known and judged 1 This point is considered infra, § 50. 6 PROLEGOMENA suitable to the want comes to be desired. Thus desire is conditioned on cognition. 1 A feeling correlative to the cognition is also a condition precedent to desire. Notwithstanding the intimacy of this relation, which has caused confusion, feelings and desires should be clearly set apart. The former are characterized by pleasure and pain; the latter by want, a state of unrest which must be distinguished from pain, implying an impulse leading to satisfaction which must be distinguished from pleasure. Certain feelings, pleasant or painful, excite desire, certain others attend it, certain others arise on its gratifica- tion ; but these should not be confused with the desire. For desire has its own distinctive mark, a want, this being absent from feeling. Also the notion that desires are states of pain, and their satisfaction pleasure, is contrary to the facts that the disquietude of desire is often attended by highly pleasura- ble feeling, as in the enjoyment of many kinds of pursuit, and that quite often a satisfaction earnestly sought is at- tended by painful feeling, as in the infliction of punishment. Desires are distributed as the appetites, which have a physical basis, and are typified by hunger ; the appetences, which are purely psychical, as desire for continued life, for pleasure, property, knowledge, power; and the affections, also purely psychical, as love of kindred, friends, country, mankind, God. The appetites and appetences crave, or im- pel to take ; the affections bestow, or impel to give. There is also a series of opposites called aversions. 2 § 6. Desires often conflict; that is, the gratification of some one is incompatible with the gratification of some other. 1 This is a real condition, that is, a condition of realizing, or of the reality, and should he distinguished from the causal condition and the logical condition. It is conditio sine qua non or necessitas antecedentis, that which must he in order that the other may he. See my Elements of Deduc- tive Logic, § 110, for several senses in which the term condition is used. 2 See the discussion in Elements of Psychology, § 255 sq. Psychological 1 Conflict occurs between members of the same class, but more notably between members of different classes. In general there is opposition between the craving and the giving de- sires, between interest that seeks to gain for self, and love which seeks to give out from one's own resources what may benefit another. Hence there appears a need for some con- trolling principle. It is found in the impulse to duty, the desire to do right, which by its nature is fitted to subordinate and regulate all other desires. That this moral impulse is in every human mind becomes evident on the following considerations : First, the origin of any impulse to right action is unaccountable, if not native. 1 If native, though often too weak to be effective, it is uni- versal. Secondly, consciousness testifies that there is ever an impulse to do right rather than wrong, even when contrary desires prevail. Thirdly, the moral law discerned by con- science is universal ; its authority is directed to the will of every person, commanding right action. But, since any exer- cise of will is conditioned on desire, the behest of moral law would be fruitless, were there not in everyone an impulse to obedience complementing conscience. Normally the relation of the moral impulse to the other desires is that of supremacy. This is evident from its direct connection with the supreme law, the moral law, from whose authority it derives its force. When impelled in diverse directions by the appetites, appetences and affections, the moral impulse urges us to the course indicated by moral 1 The hypothesis of evolution, "The Natural History of Morals," is pro- posed to explain otherwise its origin. The moral impulse is supposed to be evolved from the natural inclination for pleasure and repugnance to pain, and thus conscience is selfish prudence, merely refined. But we observe that even in enlightened society highly cultured men often recognize as duties acts that are painfully repugnant, and as immoralities many that are highly pleasurable. Surely a morality evolved from pleasure and pain would, on the contrary, condemn the severe virtues, and approve licentious enjoyments. See Darwin's Descent of Man, ch. 3; and infra, § 20, note. 8 PROLEGOMENA judgment as in accord with moral law. Like conscience, this impulse is not concerned with the particular matter of ac- tions, but is simply regulative, impelling to compliance with the judgment. A will wholly good always yields to the moral impulse. That we so often disregard it shows that our will is not wholly good. That, nevertheless, we so often do right, is chiefly because subordinate desires frequently coin- cide with and reenforce the moral impulse. Moreover, the moral impulse incites us to observe the moral quality of par- ticular actions, and to search for it when not evident. The observation and search is effected by the intellect, and issues in a moral judgment. If the intellect were perfect, and the moral impulse had force conformable to its function, there would be no wrong doing. 1 § 7. Volition or will closes the circuit of the generic powers. It is the faculty or activity in whose exercise mind chooses between alternative actions conceived as possible, and strives accordingly to modify its own state merely, or to superinduce muscular movement. Volition, like cognition, relates to an object. The object of cognition is a fact, something to be known ; the object of volition is an act, something to be done. The normal aim of cognition is truth; the normal aim of volition is duty. Truth is the contingent property of a proposition ; we ex- amine it, and if found true, believe it. Duty is the contin- gent property of an action ; we examine it, and if found due, approve it. Logic states the laws of thought, and the sub- jective result of their observance is knowledge. Ethics states the laws of conduct, and the subjective result of their observance is virtue. Volition is inferior to cognition as dependent on it for. intelligent guidance. A judgment is prerequisite to any 1 See Elements of Psychology, § 264 sq. PSYCHOLOGICAL 9 adjusted action ; a moral judgment, to any righteous action. Through this moral judgment a good will is furthermore dependent on conscience. Volition is superior to cognition as controlling it. Atten- tion is a concentration of the cognitive consciousness, and to effect this concentration is the sole function of will. All voluntary effort, even that which issues in muscular move- ment, resolves, in the last analysis, into a fixing of attention. By voluntary attention to this or that object the cognitive powers are directly, and through these all others are indi- rectly, governed. Voluntary attention is thus the sole yet sufficient means of self-control. We have no other, and we need no other, means of repressing, arousing, directing or combining our faculties, whether of cognition, feeling or desire. For instance, a complete withdrawal of cognition from a desired object, at once determines for the time a com- plete cessation of the desire. Volition and desire are psychological correlatives, mutually conditioning each other. Desires condition volition by fur- nishing occasion for choice, and efficient causes of consequent effort. Obviously there can be no choice except between desired objects, and no effort except from impulse. Hence desires are properly motives, they move us to action. 1 On the other hand, desires are conditioned on volition. For i A motive is properly that which causes motion. In our psychology the word expresses the prompting, impulsion, pressure, tendency, propensity or inclination of desire. These words are originally mechanical, and in their application to mind we must beware of a mechanical interpretation. The term motive is often, though less properly, applied to the reason that deter- mines the choice, also to the final cause, the inducement, the object desired, the end proposed. But " the deliberate preference by which we are moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the principle of action ; and desire and reason, which are for the sake of something, are the origin of deliberate preference." — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. vi, ch. 2. Accordingly, in the present treatise, we identify motive with the desire that prevails. 10 PROLEGOMENA desire implies preference or choice, and its impulse implies pressure toward endeavor or effort. Clearly there can be no impulsion except in the presence of something impelled, which is the volition. 1 § 8. An analysis of an exercise of volition discovers five essential facts which seem to be ultimate, as follow : 1. The idea of something to be done, or of an act in order to an end. The end, and therefore the means, is conceived by the agent to be desirable, and the action practicable. This is a product of cognition. 2 2. An impulse urging to action. Conflicting impulses coexist. The one that prevails, with which the volition finally accords, is the motive. This is an exercise of desire. 3. The preference of the conscious ego for one line of action rather than another, or for non-action. This is choice or election. 4. The resolution of the choice into an intent to take a certain course, either instantly or in due time. This is inten- tion. 5. An exertion or striving to effectuate the intention, con- straining, by means of attention, mental changes and muscu- lar movements. This is voluntary effort. The idea and the impulse are not elements, but are real conditions, of volition. Its elements are choice, intention and effort. 3 § 9. Choice or election is a phenomenon mi generis, oc- curring only within consciousness, and having no analogue 1 See Elements of Psychology, § 257, and § 268 sq. "Appetite is the will's solicitor, and the will is appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject." — Hooker, Eccles. Pol., bk. i. 2 "Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and draw after it the acts of the will, this is certain, it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports it to the will as amiable." — South, Sermon on Matthew, 10 : 37. 3 See Elements of Psychology, § 272 sq. PSYCHOLOGICAL 11 in the material universe. There are two special conditions precedent, corresponding to the general conditions of volition already cited. These are : 1. Alternativity of possible actions, implying independ- ence of objective control or causation. 2. A like plurality of impulses, counter-checking and re- straining each other until a judgment is rendered, and the choice made. Deliberative intelligence, aroused and influenced by the impelling desires, considers the alternatives, but does not causally determine the election. 1 That the election accord with the weightier judgment is normal, but not necessary. Good and weighty reasons are often rejected in favor of trifles ; as when one incurs danger to gratify curiosity. Thus choice is largely independent, both of the judgment which presumes to dictate it, and of the desires which impel it. Its conditions being fulfilled, it is free between the possible alter- natives. Indeed this is the essence of choice ; no freedom, no choice ; no choice, no freedom. We shall inquire pres- ently whether there be in reality such a thing as choice. Observe the distinction between choice making and choice made. When choosing, one is vacillating under the influence 1 Intelligence, but not choice, may be fairly likened to a balance, and reasons to the weights. Intellect deliberates (from de and librare, to weigh, from libra, a balance). It ponders the facts and the reasons with a view to choice and decision. — Elements of Psychology, § 273, note. Deliberate pref- erence, as well as desire, looks always forward in time. — Idem, § 255. " Nothing past is the object of deliberate preference; as no one deliberately prefers that Troy should have been destroyed ; for a man does not deliberate about what has happened, but about what is future and contingent. For what is past does not admit of being undone ; hence Agathon rightly says : ' Of this alone even God is deprived, the power of making things that are past never to have been.' "—Aristotle, Nich. Ethics, bk. vi, ch. 2, 6. "Non tamen irritum, Quodcunque retro est, efficiet ; neque Diffinget infectumque reddet, Quod f ugiens semel hora vexit." — Horace, Odes, lib. iii, car. xxix. 12 PROLEGOMENA of opposed reasons and conflicting desires ; when he has chosen, the question is resolved, his resolution is taken, he has decided what to do. This issue of choice is intention. It is static rather than dynamic ; a state of mind lying be- tween choice and effort, between election and fruition. Its duration is indefinite, varying from an imperceptible instant to any length of time awaiting opportunity. When this offers, the effort takes place, perhaps blindly, that is, without renewed or further deliberation, and the thing is done. Effort is the complete and final expression of the free per- sonality or ego. As choice issues in intention, so effort issues in attention, thereby inducing other mental modes, perhaps with muscular motions. In the effort the subjective voluntary action is complete, even though the intended consequents be imperfect or entirely null. PHILOSOPHICAL 13 PROLEGOMENA II. PHILOSOPHICAL § 10. Besides the foregoing psychological doctrines there are a number of principles more strictly philosophical, which also are prerequisite to Ethics. 1 1 There are various opinions as to the proper scope and definition of philosophy, due mostly to the fact that the word is taken, as is likewise the case with many other important terms, sometimes in a generic and sometimes in a specific sense. Taken generically it embraces as subordinate branches certain aprioric sciences, called the philosophic sciences, as logic, ethics, aesthetics, episte- mology, metaphysics. This last, metaphysics, which is often loosely re- garded as synonymous with philosophy, is more strictly the science of reality. It inquires into the real nature of both corporeal and mental objects, seeking to pass from the subjective to the objective, from thoughts to things. Lotze subdivides it into ontology, rational psychology, and cosmology. Other thinkers take the still wider view that philosophy " consists in the development of a comprehensive and consistent theory of the universe." — Kulpe, Int. to PhU., § 31, 3. Paulsen warmly pronounces "Philosophic der Inbegriff aller wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. ' ' — Einleitung in die Phi- losophie, S. 34. So also Renan: "Philosopher c'est connaitre l'universe. L' universe se compose de deux mondes, le monde physique et le monde moral, la nature et l'hunianite\ L'e'tude de la nature et de rhumanite" est done toute la philosophic " — Fragments Philosophiques, p. 292. Likewise Wundt defines philosophy as "die allgemeine Wissenschaft, welche die durch die Einzelwissenschaften vermittelten allgemeinen Erkenntnisse zu einem widerspruchslosen System zu vereinigen hat. 1 ' — System der Philo- sophic, S. 21. This accords with the saying of Spencer: "Knowledge of the lowest kind is ununified knowledge ; science is partially unified knowl- edge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge." Kant, discarding the narrower scholastic definitions, gives as a " world-definition " the following : "Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason." Taken specifically, as coordinate with the specific sciences named above, 14 PROLEGOMENA Whether there be, truly and really, among the mental activities a choice between alternatives, is properly a metaphy- sical question concerning a reality. For this subjective freedom is not a fact of consciousness, and thus psycho- logical ; for consciousness is cognizant of positive facts only, and the conception of freedom is strictly negative, merely the absence of constraint. Moreover, an unconsciousness of con- straint does not prove its absence, for it may conceivably exist out of consciousness. Hence the reality of choice, of freedom in willing, is a debatable question of metaphysics. Some thinkers hold that the universal conviction of an ability to choose is a delusion which philosophy exposes ; that freedom is impossible in reality, since it is contrary to the strictly universal law that every change or event is caused ; and, indeed, that freedom is impossible even as a conception, for this would be contradictory to the same law, which is a necessary notion. 1 Now, if the mental act called a choice be in every respect a change or event, then it must be allowed that it is caused, and so necessitated to be just what it becomes ; that there is no real choice, no possible alternative, no freedom. In other words, if the act be essentially a case of causation, then the doctrine of necessity, of bond-Will, is true. Bui it seems reasonable to hold that the fact, as to its essence, is out of the category of causation. In so far as it is an act passing from indecision to decision, it is obviously "philosophy is the science of principles." — Ueberweg, Hist, of Phil, § 1. It is thus the investigation and systematic exposition of the fundamental and universal truths that underlie all the sciences, "the investigation of the pre- suppositions of science."— KtiLPE, Int. to Phil, § 31, 4. It is evident that all sciences have their common root in philosophy so restricted; for all speak of conditions, axioms, laws, forces, possibilities, realities, etc., which they cannot undertake to establish or explain as applied in diverse senses to diverse spheres, and therefore are relegated for scientific exposition to phi- losophy thus specialized. i See my Elements of Inductive Logic, § 18. PHILOSOPHICAL 15 subject to causal constraint; for the mere presentation to the will of opposed alternatives, each conceived to be possi- ble, as to go or stay, is a cause that necessitates the willing of one ; I must choose, as we say. 1 But in so far as the fact is merely a preference of this to that, which is its es- sence, it does not appear to be a case of causation ; for mere preference does not imply a change ; it is not from that to this, but only is it this rather than that. Circumstances de- termine that I shall take a step, but not at all which step shall be taken. As the essence of choice, and that which distinguishes it from , all other mental facts, indeed from all things else, is simply the taking of one rather than the other of two possible alternatives, and as this does not imply causation, choice may, for aught that appears, be real, free- dom a reality. Moreover, causal constraint being absent, and no other being conceivable, we may conclude further that choice, freedom in wilhng, is a reality. 2 It is evident that freedom in willing is a condition of all ethical doctrine, a postulate of Ethics. It is conditio sine 1 As of two contradictories one mnst be true, and it remains to decide which ; so of two alternatives one must be taken, and it remains to de- cide which. 2 See the discussion in Elements of Psychology, § 276 sq. The absence of causal constraint, and our inability to conceive any other, does not imply the absence of any determining influence whatever, which absence would allow mere caprice, morally worthless causality. Determination is of two kinds, causal determination which implies necessity, and rational determina- tion which consists with freedom. Choice is rationally determined, that is, it accords with some antecedent conditioning reason, good or bad. " Delib- erate preference does not exist without intellect (didvota) and reason (wOs)." — Aristotle, Nich. Eth., bk. vi, ch. 2. Desires also condition choice, but do not causally determine it. The saying that the choice always follows the stronger motive, which claims to settle the whole question, is an unwar- ranted assumption that the desire acts causally on the choice, which begs the whole question. Desire causes, not the choice, but the effort. Kant thus defines desire : " The faculty of desire is the being's faculty of becom- ing by means of its ideas the cause of the actual existence of the objects of those ideas.'" — Critique of Practical Reason, preface, note. 16 PROLEGOMENA qua non ; if freedom is, duty may be ; but if freedom is not, duty is not. 1 The responsible must be free. This, for those holding moral responsibility to be real, is of itself a clear demonstration that freedom, that choice, is real. There is freedom, then, in the fact of choice. It is not to be found elsewhere. All spontaneous and involuntary changes are effects determined by one's constitution and environment. Every voluntary change is an effect deter- mined, directly or indirectly, by the will. Within the will, the effort is causally and directly determined by that ante- cedent desire to which preference is yielded, the motive. The intention is merely choice as a fact, as made. Only in the act of choosing is there freedom from causation. 2 § 11. In the precedent psychological sketch it is assumed that the human mind has a faculty of pure intellectual intu- ition, the pure reason. 3 The reality of this faculty is like- wise a metaphysical theme, one which has been much discussed by philosophic thinkers. Only a brief explanation 1 Says Kant : " While freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. Were there no freedom it would be impossible to trace the moral law in ourselves at all." — Critique of Practical Beason, preface, note. Says Bishop Martensen : " Only in the domain of freedom is morality possible." — Christian Ethics, p. 3. 2 Says Kant : " Will is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason ; and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign determining causes." See Elements of Psychology, §§ 257 n, 272 n, 275 n. 3 See supra, § 2 ; also Elements of Psychology, § 113 sq., and § 124 sq. The faculty of pure reason, by which the mind cognizes necessary and universal ideas and principles, is in Greek termed vovs and in German Vernunft ; that which cognizes contingent matter, Sidvoia and Verstand. Aristotle thus defines the former : '0 vovs 4v /act aTroddi-ews &vtu>v icrrlv al 8' dpxai dvairo- SeiKToi. — Magna Moralia, i, 35. Kant, the highest modern authority in this matter, defines thus : " Pure reason (Vernunft) is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori." — Critique of Pure Beason, Int., § vii. PHILOSOPHICAL 17 of the view adopted in the present treatise is practicable in this connection. We hold that mind is constituted with power to know both itself and things other than itself, the conditions of their existence, and their relations to each other. This cog- nitive constitution is fitted, not only for the empirical, but also for the pure intuition of objective reality. Conscious- ness, in the presence of some adventitious, empirical matter perceived by sense, external or internal, has, beside and along with sense, an intellectual power to discern in the total fact an essential element, equally adventitious, but not at all sensuous. This is the power of pure reason. That element of the total which is not the object of sense, is the object of reason ; both elements are objective and real in the total thing known. A conscious experience, for example, of a succession of mental states given in self -perception, the internal sense, in- volves time, which is not an object of sense, but is discerned by pure intellect or reason, as a necessary and objectively existing condition of the succession. Upon the occasion of an experience of body, the empirical intuition implies and is conditioned on a pure intuition of space, a non-sensuous object occupied by and containing the body. An experience of a change, especially of one that is constrained by conscious effort, noting that the subsequent is not detached but grows immediately from its antecedent, is an empirical occasion for the purely intellectual discernment of causation as the necessary condition of change, of a reality, a force, existing in the relation of things that change. Now from the law of relativity, that every mode of consciousness subsists by virtue of an opposition, that every affirmation is also a negation, 1 it follows, that the idea of causation as constrained action, is necessarily supplemented by the negative correlative idea of i See Elements of Psychology, § 58. 18 PROLEGOMENA freedom as unconstrained action. A conscious act, judged to be free, is, in the human mind, an occasion for an intuition of the pure idea of right or duty. Such action, not coming under the law of causation, is cognized as under a different law, the law of obligation. Thus time is a condition of event, space a condition of body, substance a condition of quality, non-contradiction a condition of thought, cause a condition of change, right a condition of obligation. Upon the metaphysical question whether these pure ideas correspond to objective realities, we observe simply, that they stand prior to things in the relation of condition to conditioned. They must be in order that things may be ; the former necessary, the latter contingent. If a thing be real, its condition must be real. We have already identified the intuition of duty in its mandatory form, that is, the moral law or law of obligation, with conscience. Even should the intuitive character of this discernment be rejected, still it would remain true that conscience, the discerning of moral law, is, like freedom, a necessary condition, and hence a postulate of Ethics. § 12. It is here in place to inquire what is meant by a person. 1 We can readily conceive of beings intelligent and sentient, and having free-will, but not having conscience. In fact we thus judge of brutes. But beings destitute of 1 A word borrowed from the theater where it still plays its part in dramatic personal, impersonation, etc. Its etymology is more curious than helpful. "Lat. persona, personare, to sound through ; per, through, and sonare, to sound, from sonus, sound. The persona was first a mask used by an actor, then a personage, character, part played by an actor, a person. The large-mouthed masks worn by the actors were so called from the resonance of the voice sounding through them. ' ' — Ske at. Persona has come to mean the inner spiritual subsistence that sounds through the mask of ex- ternal individuality. It is not the collected fagot of those peculiar visible traits, which may distinguish but do not compose the man ; it is the unified sum of those common mental and moral characteristics which make him an answerable soul. PHILOSOPHICAL 19 moral insight, and therefore not morally accountable, are not persons ; for moral insight or conscience is the differentiating essence of personality. . Accordingly we define a person to be an intelligent and sentient being, having free-will, and moral insight. But, since consciousness is generic of the modes knowing and feeling, desiring and willing, it will be sufficient to define a person as a being conscious of moral insight. In the knowledge of our shortcomings we recognize our- selves as imperfect persons, and as such subject to the law with its penalties, of which law we have moral insight. Hence the imperfect person, the human person, is a being conscious of obligation. The notion of an imperfect person is necessarily supple- mented by the correlative notion of a perfect person. This ideal person fulfills the requirements of the law by virtue of his nature, and therefore is superior to obligation, not under the law, which is for imperfect persons only. Now perfection is complete, consummate wholeness. Hence a perfect person is a being conscious of holiness. In the knowledge of the narrow limitation of our powers we recognize ourselves as finite beings. The notion of finite being is necessarily supplemented by the correlative notion of infinite being. This notion, combined with that of a per- fect person, constitutes the notion of Deity, a perfect and in- finite person, or a perfectly harmonious personality infinitated. The moral law demands of imperfect persons perfection. This then must be possible, else the law would be brutum fulmen. Now the real object of a will determinable by moral law, is its perfect accord with the law. This perfection is holiness, a state which no human being is capable of attaining in this life. But, since it is required as practically necessary, it can be looked for only as the result of progress thereafter in infinitum. Hence, not only the present existence of per- sons, of imperfect persons, but also their immortality, as 20 PROLEGOMENA inseparably connected with moral law, is a postulate of Ethics. 1 § 13. Whether there be an objectively real being corre- sponding to the notion of Deity, is yet another metaphysical thesis, to which attention is now directed ; for the reality of a superhuman person, the supreme maker, ruler and judge of the universe, is a doctrine essential in complete ethical theory. Hence, after a very brief consideration, we shall assume it as an additional postulate of Ethics. Logical proof of the existence of God has, in all ages, been earnestly sought by philosophic thinkers, but even yet it is hardly established as an unquestionable philosophical doctrine. Various forms of the ontological, the teleological, and the cosmological arguments have been proposed, criticised, and replaced by other forms, without settled result. We cannot here examine this august theme adequately, but will venture to offer a suggestion. 2 Let the cosmological argument be formulated, not a priori as is usual, but d posteriori, adhering strictly to the logical 1 So Kant in Critique of Practical Reason ; the Dialectic, ch. iv. 2 " How can one be calm when he is called on to prove the existence of God ?i But let us reason gently, smothering our indignation." — Plato in the Laws, 888 a, Ste. The several forms of argument named are effectively- criticised by Kant, ' the all-destroyer, ' in the Critique of Pure Reason ; the Dialectic, bk. ii. ch. 3, § 3 sq., concluding in § 6 : "A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere ideal, though a faultless one, a conception which perfects and crowns the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure speculative reason." Elsewhere he says : " Providence has not willed that those convictions which are most necessary for our happiness should be at the mercy of subtile and finely-spun reasonings, but has delivered them directly to the natural, vulgar understanding. ... It is altogether necessary that we should be convinced of God's existence, but not so necessary that we should be able to demonstrate it." — In the Essay : Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, 1763. It is well worth noting that the Scriptures nowhere offer logical proof of the existence of God ; but, from the very outset (Genesis 1:1) throughout, it is assumed. PHILOSOPHICAL 21 method for solving the problem : Given intermixed effects to find their cause, a process highly approved and very familiar in physical science. 1 A scientific explanation of phenomena is found in their causes. Looking abroad on the world of nature, we behold a bewildering multitude, a vast complexus of objects and events. To explain these severally, science investigates their proximate or second causes. In explanation of the great total, the universe, let us posit hypothetically an adequate personal first cause. That this is a possible conception is evinced by the fact that it is the faith of millions of men. The personal cause in the hypothesis is a vera causa, that is, an agency known to be effective in other connections. Every person knows himself and his fellows to be efficient causes, originating causes, creators or builders of new things from material at hand. We shall claim only this for the posited first cause. The supposed adequacy of the personal first cause is an indefinite extension of such powers as are known to belong to ordinary persons. It becomes thereby a complete and suf- ficient explanation of the totality of the phenomena under consideration. So the geologist, in positing early cataclysmic causes, supposes these to be such forces as are now under ob- servation, and that they acted with vastly greater intensity. Thus the two prime conditions of a soundly scientific hypothesis are fulfilled in that we posit a vera causa, and one that explains all the facts. It is therein superior to Dalton's atomic hypothesis which does not posit a vera causa, to Darwin's development hypothesis which does not explain all the facts, 2 and to Huygen's luminiferous ether hypothesis 1 See this method of investigation explicated and exemplified in Elements of Inductive Logic, § 82 sq.; see also § 97. 2 See Professor Cown's admissions in his Evo\ution of To-day, p. 117 sq. ; and Mill's System of Logic, 8th ed. p. 355 note. 22 PROLEGOMENA which does neither ; yet these are generally approved by scientists, and claimed as invaluable parts of the sum of positive knowledge. But our hypothesis, notwithstanding its excellence, remains an hypothesis, an unproved proposition, unless we can show also that no other hypothesis will explain the facts. Now a first cause is the only possible explanation ; for its sole alternative is an infinite regressus of causes, and this can make no pretense to be an explanation, for evidently it merely pushes explanation back, away, out of reach, in fact denies any explanation to be attainable, which is essentially the agnostic position. Therefore an explanation of the uni- verse must posit a first cause. By like process of proof, that no other hypothesis would explain the facts, Newton estab- lished the theory of gravitation. Furthermore, the first cause must be either personal or impersonal. The latter alternative is proposed to us in the unintelligent deity of the pantheist, its manifestations being unconsciously worked out by the inward necessities of its nature. This banishes freedom in willing from the universe. Moreover, how an unconscious, unintelligent being, which is not a person but merely a thing, could originate personal beings, beings consciously intelligent, is inexplicable ; which is to say, the impersonal hypothesis does not explain the facts. Therefore the tenable hypothesis of a personal first cause, no other hypothesis being tenable, having thus fulfilled the prime and the final conditions of strict logical proof, should be accepted as an established scientific theory. 1 1 By the same logical process the existence of Neptune was proved, before its revelation by the telescope. Lord Bacon says : "It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion ; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further ; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate, and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." — Essay xvi. PHIL OS OPIIICAL 23 An additional word may be said in reference to the moral element in personality. The moral law, the most important factor in a world of intelligences, is necessarily referred to the personal first cause as an expression of his will, which, further, is an expression of his nature. This law demands holiness. Therefore his nature must be holy. 1 Now it is to be admitted that the foregoing argument, like the teleological argument, does not establish the infinity of the divine attributes. The power and wisdom are seen to be indefinitely great, but this falls short of infinite. Moreover, the bringing into being what was not, is unproved. The personal first cause herein concluded is, therefore, no more than the demiurge of the early Greek philosophers, an archi- tect, building with material at hand. But let it be observed that, while the passing from the indefinitely great to the infinite may have insufficient logical ground, still it is an easy step for faith. 2 Also be it observed that creation, in an absolute sense, is for philosophy an impossible concep- tion, since it is an attempt to think a relation of one term, which is absurd. 3 We have touched briefly upon the great theses of philoso- phy, freedom, immortality, 4 and God. For while Psychology is merely a system of natural order, and Ethics a system of 1 The unity of this First Cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing between parts of the world, as portions of an existing edifice ; an inference which all our observation favors, and all prin- ciples of analogy support. 2 See supra, § 12, fourth paragraph. 8 Absolute creation means : Nothing becomes something. Herein is no subject, for nothing is — well, no thing, a pure and total negation. For like reason annihilation is an impossible conception. Physicists hold it im- possible that any particle of matter, or any pulse of energy, can cease to be. The Hegelian, however, setting aside the law of contradiction, also holding that nothing is a thing, and that becoming mediates nothing and something, presumes otherwise. 4 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, § 3, et al. 24 PROLEGOMENA natural jurisprudence, Philosophy is properly a system of natural theology. Science, in its full comprehension, is knowledge of myself, of the world, and of God. This is its beginning, its mean, and its end. The problem of the ages is : Given self, to find God. § 14. In preparation for an ethical doctrine founded on personal relations, it is needful to examine the philosophy of relations taken in a more general sense. Nature, under which term we here include all objective realities, presents only individual things, or individual groups of things, in certain relations. The things are real, and their relations are real. This statement assumes the doctrine of Natural Realism, as opposed to Idealism. An individual, as the form of the word indicates, is a thing or a group of things, indivisible in itself, while divisible from every other thing. This means that its parts are not kinds of the whole taken generically, but are new individuals, and that it is distinguishable, at least numerically, from every other thing. Moreover, an individual is, as to its mere exist- ence, independent of other things. 1 The general, which is the logical opposite of the individual, has no objective existence. It is wholly subjective, a state of mind, a conception, a product of thought, or simply a thought. All common nouns, as stone, tree, man, are merely signs or expressions of thoughts. They have no general object corresponding to them in nature, and their generality consists solely in being predicable of any one of a plurality of individual things. 1 The Scholastics, following Porphyry, define an individual to he ens in- divisum in se, et divisum ab omni alio ; id cujus proprietates alteri simul con- venire non possunt. Also as ens per se subsistens. " Whatever occupies a distinct portion of space is an individual object of external intuition ; and whatever occupies a distinct moment of time, without extension in space, is an individual object of internal intuition. . . . The general notion as such is emancipated from all special relation to space or time." — Mansel, Meta- physics, pp. 37, 39. PHILOSOPHICAL 25 While generalities have no objective reality, the particular relations of individual things are evidently not less real than the things themselves, though indeed they are not objects of sensuous but only of intellectual cognition. 1 These relations are reciprocal, and when thoroughly traced, each is seen to be illimitable. All things in the universe are mutually related. Plurality and unity interpenetrate and condition each other. Each is in all, and all in each. For let us consider that every particle of matter occupies and is contained in space. Each particle is related to every other as to its position, a geometrical relation, and as to its motion, a mechanical relation. Any change of position places it in a different and distinguishable relation. Relative rest and relative motion are the only kinds of rest and mo- tion known. These reciprocal spatial relations combine the plurality of things into the unity of a corporeal whole. 2 Consider also temporal relations. Space is extension, hav- ing three dimensions ; time is protension, having but one dimension. Yet every event is related temporally to every other as precedent, simultaneous or subsequent. These rela- tions also are reciprocal, comparative and measurable. They combine the plurality of events into the unity of an histori- cal whole. Together with spatial and temporal relations are relations of causative interaction. Every particle of matter hi the universe attracts every other. 3 All are in motion, and mutu- 1 Some philosophers, in opposing the doctrine of the Absolute or Being without relation, emphasize the reality of relations, regarding them indeed as the very essence of all reality. So Lotze : " Sein heist in Beziehungen stehen, und das Wahrgenommenwerden ist selbst nur eine solche Beziehung neben andern." — Grundziige der Metaphysik, § 10. 2 World and universe are proper synonyms, the latter from Lat. ad unum versus, turned into one, equivalent to e pluribus unum. Aristotle defines Nature as the complex of objects having a material constitution and involved in necessary motion or change. — Physica, ii, 1 ; cf. Be Coelo, i, 1. 3 Hence each material particle is the center of a sphere of force filling 26 PROLEGOMENA ally determine each other's motion. A stone falls to the ground; the earth rises to meet it. The earth and moon enforce each other to revolve about their common center of gravity. Also, because of their motion and mutual attraction, the planets and the sun revolve about their common center of gravity, and thereby constitute the solar system a unitary system. This system as a whole revolves about some higher center of the stellar system, a larger whole. Thus again the corporeal universe is a unit, more closely bound into one by virtue of efficient causes. 1 Moreover, these causative inter- actions are continuous throughout time, bringing past, pres- ent and future into a more compact historical whole, binding them into a closer unity by interlinked chains of causes and effects. Thus throughout the universe of space and time, every individual body is causally related to every other. All act upon each, and each upon all. § 15. The foregoing are primary conditions of yet another specific relation of the highest import, the relation of means and end. Its philosophic treatment is teleology, which views nature as a kingdom of ends. 2 We shall here consider space. Gravity, unlike energy, is not transmitted, nor transferred, nor transformed, and is not obstructed. It coexists with its substantial center. 1 To the molar motions indicated are to be added molecular motions, including all vibratory and chemical action. 2 The expression is borrowed from Kant, who says : ' ' Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends. Ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case, the kingdom of ends is a theoret- ical idea, adopted to explain what actually is. In the latter, it is a practical idea, adopted to bring about that which is not yet, but which can be realized by our conduct, provided it conforms to this idea." — Metaphysic of Morals, inR. and S. ed. of Kant's works, vol. viii, p. 66 note. ' ' Leibnitz termed the world when viewed in relation to the rational beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, ' the kingdom of Grace, ' and distinguished it from the 'kingdom of Nature,' in which these rational beings live, under moral laws indeed, but expect no other consequences PHILOSOPHICAL 27 the teleologic relation merely as an existing fact, the end as an effect, not as a design or final cause. 1 In many individual groups of things the relation of means and end may be discerned, binding the components into an organic whole. Accordingly an organism is defined as a group in which all parts are mutually means and end. Each part is for every other ; also each is for the whole, and the whole for each ; all serving all. 2 An organ is a member of an organ- ized group, serving all other members as ends. Every con- stitutive part is an organ, an instrument, a means. It has certain special functions relating to the rest severally and as a whole; and when it entirely ceases to perform its office, it ceases to be a member of the organism. It is not a fancy, nor a mere speculation, but a fact, recog- nized by philosophy and lying at the base of all science, that the universe is a kingdom of ends, an organism constituted of minor organisms. Space is for bodies, and bodies are for space. Time is for events, and events are for time. Space without body, or time without event, is unthinkable. Gravi- tation draws all bodies toward one center, and radiation disperses to all bodies the store of energy collected in that center. Every star, and every planet, and every satellite, has its peculiar office relative to the rest. The extinction of any one would necessitate a readjustment of the whole. Nature, from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happi- ness, is a practically necessary idea of pure reason. " — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's trans., Bonn's ed. p. 492. i Final cause, the excitant and object of purpose, implying antecedent efficient cause, and inferring First Cause. On the Aristotelic division of causes into four several kinds, see Elements of Inductive Logic, § 14 note. 2 The word all is ambiguous, meaning either all as an undistributed unity, or all as a distributed plurality ; as in Drink ye all of it. In the above formula, and elsewhere in this connection, both meanings are applicable. 28 PBOLEGOMENA the great world of all things, is an organized individual, a cosmos. The earth is a cosmic unity. In its series of periodically recurring changes, reproductive life is linked with the seasons, and active life with day and night. It is itself made up of relatively independent organisms. For example, every animal is an organism. Each of its members, even the least, is an organ serving the sustenance of all others, and receiving sus- tenance from all. The head is for its hair, and the hair for the head, and both for the trunk. Should any organ cease its functions, it suffers atrophy, or is cast off as excrementitious ; and when the chief organs cease their ministry, life ceases, and the integral whole disintegrates. A plant is an organic whole. The root is for the leaf, and the leaf for the root; and the other parts serve the leaf and root, else these could not perform their functions. All are reciprocally related as means and end. 1 As physiology thus resolves living bodies into organized organs, so chemistry teaches that all bodies consist of systems of molecules, and these ultimately of systems of atoms. 2 Every subordinate is a microcosm repeat- ing the macrocosm. ^ Says von Baer, as quoted by Paulsen : "The animal kingdom cannot exist without the vegetable kingdom ; this again cannot arise before the stony crust of the earth has been disintegrated into loose soil by physical and chemical influences. We must further presuppose that this soil is watered by rains from time to time. The rain can fall only on condition that the water has previously been absorbed by the air, that it has been car- ried to a higher stratum and then condensed by a change of temperature. The water, again, cannot rise unless the earth is heated by the sun's rays. Hence the smallest blade of grass really calls into play the entire planetary system with all its arrangements and movements, and all the laws of nature." — Int. to Phil, p. 232. 2 "Das Staiibchen, selbst der unfruchtbare Stein, Indem er sein Gesetz hat, muss er wirken TJnd thatig fur das grosse Ganze sein." — Goethe. The relations seen in simple cohesion "indicate more than mere resem- blance, an inherent kindred. They indicate on the part of two globules of the same elementary body a predisposition perfectly reciprocal to cleave to PHILOSOPHICAL 29 § 16. In the kingdom of ends is included the spiritual realm. We conceive that it contains no isolated elements, that throughout its sphere there is organized interaction. Within the range of observation is the human mind, con- stituted by a complement of faculties whose activities are mutually conditioned, and cooperate to a common end. As in the corporeal so in the spiritual sphere, very many of the most important ends are attained only by means of a com- bination of energies. 1 The universe as a total we conceive to be composed of the spiritual and the corporeal united in an interchange of functional activities. Many minor wholes are thus organically constituted. Each individual man is a double organism con- sisting of body and mind. He is also a member of wider combinations ; for none of us liveth to himself, and none dieth to himself. The family is an organic individual, its members being normally related for mutual service. Every individual community or organized society has a constitution, written or unwritten, whose essence is a definition of the offices of its members in their service of the common interest. The city, the state, the nation, has organic laws constituting it an individual, wherehi its citizens are each for all and all for each. The human race is an organized individual, its members being bound into one by natural affinities, and related by teleological interaction. Moreover, the content of an individ- one another, to hold real relations. They indicate that no particle exists for itself, bnt that its nature points to relation with other particles. They indi- cate that though each particle thus exists for others, as well as for itself, it does not exist indifferently for all others of any sort, but for others of its own kind in the first degree, and then for others of different kinds in a second degree." — Wm. Arthur, in the Fernly lecture On the Difference between Physical and Moral Law, p. 49 ; London, 1883. 1 Says Leibnitz : " Les ames agissent selon les loix des causes finales par appe'titions, fins et moyens. Les corps agissent selon les causes efficientes ou des mouvements. Et les deux regnes, celui des causes efficientes et celui des causes finales, sont harmoniques entre eux." — Monadology, § 79. 30 PROLEGOMENA ual life cannot be described except relatively to the historical whole. The entire history of the age and of the entire past is contained in it, and its influence extends throughout the entire future. The kingdom of ends is the universe. Every- where there is reciprocity, a relation of mutual interdepen- dence, and altruistic subservience, a universal ministry. All serving all is the fundamental, thorough-going, uniform plan of the world. § 17. Yet another philosopheme to be considered is the conception of law. It is probable that the notion originated historically in the expressed will of a superior in authority and power. But this meaning has become specific, the notion having been extended to include generically various uni- formities, though still retaining, perhaps in all of its appli- cations, a covert suggestion of authoritative imposition. We must look away from this origin for its essence. The ultimate ground of the notion is in the shock of simi- larity. 1 When two facts, either things or events, make a striking impression of similarity, one is regarded as a repeti- tion of the other ; that is, a phenomenon is said to be repeated when the mind of the observer receives impressions so very similar as to be indistinguishable except as to place or time. When several such impressions recur, the notion of repetition is expanded into the notion of order. This implies a corre- spondence, more or less constant, among the facts, which is referred either to their inherent nature or to their conformity with some rule, perhaps a mandate, an order, of a ruler. When the order of the facts, either existing or required, is undeviatingly constant, the notion of order is expanded into the notion of strict uniformity. It has already been pointed out that objective reality pre- sents only related individuals. Now among real things or 1 See Elements of Psychology, § 59. PHILOSOPHICAL 31 events, we observe many cases of naturally existing repeti- tion, order, strict uniformity ; and, by interposing our force, we are able to induce uniformities that otherwise would not exist. These uniformities may be severally reduced to the form of a general conception, and the expression of this con- ception is a law. Thus a law is an expression of a strict uniformity, either of one observed to exist in nature, or of one required to be produced by will. These considerations enable us to make a formal statement of the essential mean- ing of this comprehensive and important term in its most general definition, thus : A law is a designation of a con- stant order of facts determined by the constitution of the things. Let it be remarked that the things are those from whose constant order the law arises, and to which it applies ; also that the constitution of a thing is an assemblage of inherent properties which, being constant causes, determine both the facts and their constant order or uniformity ; also that, since a plurality of individual things have similar constitutions, the uniformity is intellectively viewed as general, and is expressed in a general formula or law. Hence, furthermore, since a law is a form of intellective apprehension, a generality in itself and in its expression, it is entirely subjective, existing only in mind as a thought. Law has no real existence in the external world. Uniformities there are, but these are indi- vidual though similar facts. Their mental reduction, by virtue of their observed similarity, to a generality is a law, which being expressed in language attains thereby only a quasi-objectivity. The very common notion that law pre- vails objectively and reigns throughout the universe, is a rhetorical fiction. Laws are only mental representations, conceptions, intelligent interpretations of recognizable uni- formities. Hence a law, formulated and expressed, is merely and properly a designation, or that which marks out and 32 PROLEGOMENA makes known in general terms a real uniformity, either ob- served or required. 1 § 18. Laws are primarily of two kinds, formal and mate- rial. Formal laws designate or express merely the forms of mental conception, and thus are intellectual abstractions dis- charged of all content. Such are the principles of mathe- matics and of logic. Material law has content ; it designates order in phenomena. Material law is likewise of two kinds, natural and moral. Natural law is a generalization of facts of coexistence, or of events of orderly succession, in inanimate things, and also in animate beings apart from their free will. It designates an established uniformity which has been found to exist in na- ture. Moral law is a mandate addressed to persons. It implies a possible alternative ; and the required order, deter- mined by the constitution of its subjects, is sanctioned and enforced by penalty. Natural law is simply indicative ; moral law imperative. 1 See in Elements of Inductive Logic the chapter on "Natural Law," §§ 90-100. Montesquieu defines thus: "Laws in their most extended sig- nification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things." — L'Esprit des Lois, bk. i, ch. 1, opening sentence. It has been strikingly- said : "A law is a human translation of the divine procedure." Perhaps it would be more permissible to say : A law is an interpretation of cosmic order. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, defines law in its universal meaning. Also we have : "A law is a rule or method according to which phenomena or actions follow each other." — Black, Dictionary of Law, ad verb. But: "Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action . . . prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey." — Blackstone, Commentaries, Int., §2. Thus jurists usually limit the meaning to what we term moral law; as, "A law, properly so called, is a command which obliges a person or persons."— Austin, as quoted by Black. Again: "A law, in the literal and proper sense of the word, may be defined as a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him." — Austin, Jurispru- dence, § 2. Again: "Law in its most comprehensive sense is a rule of action for intelligent beings, and in its practical and more limited sense for men."— Minor, Institutes, Int. § 2, p. 22, See infra, § 47, notes. PHILOSOPHICAL 33 The one is a uniformity established, having no alternative ; the other is a uniformity enjoined, having an alternative. The basis of natural law is causation ; the basis of moral law is obligation. In the one the facts come before the law ; in the other the facts come after the law. The one general- izes real facts that actually are ; the other designates ideal facts that ought to be; the former inductively, the latter deductively. We conceive accordingly of the kingdom of ends, the macrocosm, as divided into two realms, the corporeal and the spiritual. Body, which is ever strictly subject to causation, is the substantive content of the former ; and hence its sphere is characterized by necessity, and is the realm of nat- ural law. Mind, whose essence is self-determination, is the substantive content of the latter; and hence its sphere is characterized by freedom, and is the realm of moral law. These two spheres, the realm of physical facts and the realm of moral worths, intersect in the microcosm man, who, be- longing at once to both spheres, is thus the connecting link, the bond of the universe. 1 Moral law, with which alone we are concerned in this treatise, is based upon a single essential principle, which 1 We venture, for the sake of greater clearness, a diagrammatic repre- sentation of the Kingdom of Ends distinguishing its two Realms : Corporeal Sphere ~~~^\^^~ Spiritual Sphere Body / \ Mind Causality /,, \ Volition xt -4. Man _ , Necessity I J Freedom Natural Law \ I Moral Law Realm of Physical Facts J)<^^ Realm of Moral Worths Many moralists and jurists distinguish Divine Law, or the revealed will of the Deity, and Natural Law, or the constitutional order of human na- ture, and Civil Law, or the enactments of the State. See infra, § 47, note. We include all these under the generic term Moral Law, to which is opposed Natural or Physical Law, in accord with more general usage. 34 PROLEGOMENA takes an imperative form, and in this form is recognized as an all-comprehending mandate, as the moral law. It has many subordinate branches or specific applications which apply to every phase of human conduct. Without offering a complete or strictly logical distribution, it will be sufficient just now to point out its most important subordinates. The Decalogue is so widely comprehensive that it is often spoken of as itself the moral law. All municipal laws, both com- mon and statute, of organized states, derive their authority solely from the supreme authority of the moral law. Mili- tary law in all of its details, has no other ground. The laws of all kinds of formally organized societies, such as churches, colleges, clubs, bands, etc., are likewise specializations of the moral law. All the tacit conventions and unwritten laws of social intercourse, including the internal regulations of the family, and even the petty forms of politeness and simple kindness, owe whatever claim they have on us to the one law, the moral law, whence they are derived. This catho- licity of the law throughout human affairs, applying to all human voluntary activity, to all conduct public and private of single persons or of communities, renders the inquiry, on which we are now about to enter, one of supreme impor- tance, and therefore of profoundest interest. ETHICS FIRST PART -OBLIGATION INTRODUCTION § 19. In looking on the world around and above us, we discover, amid an infinite variety of ceaseless changes, a cer- tain uniformity established, which, reduced to comprehensive expression, is termed the law of gravity. In looking on the world within us, we discover, amid its incessant changes, a certain uniformity enjoined, which, reduced to comprehen- sive expression, is termed the law of morality. The law of gravity represents something real, a fixed corporeal order, with which we have to do in every waking moment of active life, and to which we must constantly adjust the movements of our bodies. The law of morality also represents some- thing equally real, a required spiritual order, with which we constantly have to do, a universal mandate overruling all relations between man and man, to which must be adjusted every voluntary action and proposed line of conduct. The reality of moral law as an inflexible factor in human life, in- volved in the essential constitution of human nature, is a scientific truth, as undeniable as the law of gravitation, and one whose importance surpasses comparison. Science has been well defined to be a complement of cogni- tions, having, in point of form, the character of logical per- fection; in point of matter, the character of real truth. 1 1 Hamilton, Logic, § 80. 85 36 OBLIGATION More briefly, science is systematized knowledge. There are a number of sciences which may be distinguished as sciences of human nature, Ethics being the chief. Pre-supposing and involving more or less knowledge of the others, it as- sumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates principles and rules for the conduct of men individually and collec- tively. In view of its basis, Ethics is the science of rights ; in view of its system, Ethics is the science of obligation. 1 i "Ethic, relating to custom. (Lat. from Gk.) Commonly used as ethics, sb. pi. ' I will never set politics against ethics ' ; Bacon (in Todd's Johnson). Erom Lat. ethicus, moral, ethic. Erom Gk. t)0ik6s, ethic, moral. Erom Gk. fjdos, custom, moral nature; cf. e0os, manner, custom. Cognate with Goth, sidus, custom, manner ; with Ger. sitte, custom ; with Skt. svadhd, self-will, strength. And cf. Lat. suetus, accustomed. The Skt. form is easily resolved into sva, one's own self (Lat. se = Gk. «?), and dhd, to set, place (= Gk. 0e); so that Skt. svadhd (= Gk. e-dos) is ' a placing of one's self,' hence self-assertion, self-will, habit." — Skeat. "Moral virtue results from habit, t)6os, whence also it has got its name, t)6lkt], which is only in a small degree altered from €0os." — Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 1. Perhaps this was suggested by Plato : Kvpubrarov yap ovv epupierat Tra.cn rbre irav t)6os did edos. — Laws, vii, 792 e. See also infra, § 21, note. Right, erect, correct, straight, upright, according with truth and duty. Erom A. S. riht, from Teut. base rehta, right ; from the base rak, root rag, to rule, direct; whence Lat. rectus (for regtus), right, pp. of regere, to rule. — Skeat. Used also substantively with a modified meaning. See infra, § 34, note. For etymology of wrong, see infra, § 55, note. Obligation, from vb. to oblige = to bind to, to constrain ; from Fr. obliger, from Lat. obligare, to bind together, from ob, to, and ligare l^o bind. — Skeat. We shall use the word exclusively in its most usual sense of moral constraint, or bounden duty, as distinguished from physical constraint. Deontology, the science of obligation ; from rb 84ov, what is binding, p. of Set, impers. from 5e?w (the Gr. correlate of Lat. obligo), to bind, and X670S, discourse. Bentham chose this word as the title of his system and treatise, using it, as he says, ' ' to represent, in the field of morals, the prin- ciple of utilitarianism, or that which is useful." Whewell objects, and says : "The term deontology expresses moral science, and expresses it well, pre- cisely because it signifies the science of duty and contains no reference to utility." Stewart tells us that "the ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be "Efts tov 84ovtos, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding, the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable." The term is, however, insolens verbum, having been superseded by the word ethics. INTRODUCTION 37 § 20. The hypothesis of evolution has been applied to the explanation of ethical phenomena. Evolution, as a doctrine, is concerned with sequence in the form of a series, without a beginning and without an end. It can neither ascertain the primal origin of the series, nor predict its ultimate issue. Only a small section of the series is accessible to observation, yet it is boldly projected into a prehistoric past, and upon this hypothetical history is founded an explanation of present phenomena. The speculation is pleasing but hazardous. It inquires how morality has come to be, assuming an origin in some heterogeneous principle transmuted under the influence of environment. But we are rather concerned to know what morality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest in mankind of to-day and of history. Inquiry into its genesis and prehistoric development may well be postponed until at least we have a firm hold upon the thing itself. 1 There are many moralists who educe their ethical systems from the Scriptures. No doubt the light of revelation has enabled the Christian philosopher to advance far beyond the conceptions of the heathen world; his higher height has given him a greatly enlarged horizon. But a science may not borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of its doctrines. More especially we should not confuse science and revelation. These are distinct though concordant means of knowledge, the one aspiring to attain truth by its own 1 See supra, § 6, note ; and Elements of Inductive Logic, §§ 75, 85. Professor Huxley, in his Romanes Lecture, affirms that: "The practice of what we call goodness or virtue involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self- restraint ; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual should not merely respect, but shall help his fellows ; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladia- torial theory of existence. ' ' 88 OBLIGATION effort, the other condescending to impart from its abundant store. If Ethics is to take rank with the philosophical sciences, it must have a basis of its own, and build thereon its system. Therefore, in the progress of our proposed in- vestigation, we shall in no case cite Scripture as warrant or as proof, but only for illustration or verification. Still it will be encouraging to find the elaborated and the revealed doc- trines in accord, and mutually corroborative. § 21. A brief sketch of the ground and the process adopted in the present treatise is now in order. The basis assumed is human nature. Man has an original, native constitution, which, however much it may be distorted, disordered and depraved by his perverted free wilfulness, is nevertheless traceable amid its ruins. There are certain fun- damental and essential features of humanity, which no pro- cess of suppression or violation can ever wholly efface. There are capacities and faculties whose organic functions in their mutual relations, and relatively to their environment, are clearly manifest, however enfeebled by misuse, or de- formed by abuse. The recognition of these features and powers, and a representation of their orderly functioning, is an ideal restoration of human nature to its normal condition, and to its fitting place in the life of the world. This rehabil- itated man we shall call the natural man, and propose to find in him, in the native ordering of his being, a safe and suffi- cient ground for determining his universal though intricately varied obligation. 1 1 Professor Birks of Cambridge Univ., Eng., in his Lectures on Moral Science, defines happily thus : "Ethics is the Science of Ideal Humanity." — Lecture ii. The phrase "the natural man" is used scripturally and theologically to mean the man in his present actually disordered state. To avoid confu- sion it should be understood that by the natural man we mean on the con- INTRODUCTION 89 Referring to the foregoing definitions of Ethics, we observe that a right in one person is correlative to an obligation in some other person. A right and an obligation exist only as they coexist ; neither can be alone. But rights are logically prior ; they condition and originate their corresponding obli- gations. For a right, being founded in the nature of its possessor, determines that there be a corresponding obliga- tion ; whereas an obligation cannot be conceived to determine a right. Hence we shall take the notion of a right as our trary, here and throughout, not man as he is, but man as he should be, the normal man. Bishop Butler in the Preface to his Sermons, Whe well's Ed. p. xlii, in the passage beginning, " There are two ways," etc., presents an approved statement of the matter, substantially reproduced in the following : "The question concerning the basis of morals may be put in two different ways, subjectively or objectively. We may ask, What is there in man that constitutes him moral ? what do we mean by morality as an attribute of human nature ? Or, on the other hand, What ground is there for morality in the nature of things, in the order and frame of the universe around and above us ? The answer to the first question constitutes what is called psychological ethics ; the second belongs to metaphysical ethics. The former method, that commonly pursued by British philosophers, addresses itself to our daily usage and self-acquaiutance ; the latter leads up to the first principles of knowledge, to those primary concepts and fundamental necessities of thought that lie behind our ordinary thinking and govern our mental operations unawares, and which form the subject matter of the highest and ultimate philosophy. We set out on the former line of inquiry, asking ourselves what are the facts concerning our ethical constitution, and how we are to interpret them. But we shall find that those facts point us beyond ourselves. The human consciousness is not self-sufficient nor self- explaining. The psychological question pushed far enough in any direction passes, beyond arrest, into the metaphysical. The soul cannot conceive of itself without some corresponding conception of the world and of God." Professor Findlay, of Headingly College, Leeds. See also infra, § 25, where the matter is more distinctly expressed. "The problem of Ethics is to set forth in general outlines the form of life for which human nature is predisposed. . . . This science is related to life as grammar is to language, aesthetics to art, dietetics to bodily life. It sketches the form of the possible and of the allowable, and these forms may be filled with different contents." —Paulsen, Int. to Phil., Appendix. 40 OBLIGATION point of departure for a search into the philosophy of morals. 1 As already indicated, the matter that constitutes the con- tent of Ethics is real truth. In order to become a science, its matter must be developed in logical form whose perfection is attained through clear, distinct, complete and consistent treatment. To approximate this ideal a methodical proce- dure is requisite. Beginning with observation, primarily of facts of consciousness gathered by introspection or furnished by testimony, and secondarily of the behavior of men in social relations, present and past, the intellect discovers in these phenomena the universally determinative notion of inherent rights, native and acquired, and therein discerns a formative principle, imperative in character, and constituting the common bond of obligation among men. This strictly universal and necessary principle is not inductively general- ized, but is intuitively discerned. From it deductions are then made to subordinate truths, until these, arranged in a logical system, shall extend throughout all lines of human activity, and comprehend all modes of human obligation. Ethics thus constituted is a deductive science. 2 / 1 Moral, virtuous, excellent in conduct. From Fr. moral ; from Lat. moralis, relating to conduct, from mor — , stem of mos, a manner, custom. Root uncertain. Derivatives, moral, sb., morals, sb. pi., moralize, "But what said Jaques ? Did he not moralize this spectacle ? " — As You Like It, ii, 1, 44 ; moralist; morality, "I had as lief have the foppery of free- dom as the morality of imprisonment." — Meas. for Meas., i, 2, 125 ; from Fr. moraliU. — Skeat. Moral science or the philosophy of morals is synonymous with ethics. Cicero says: ". . . quia pertinet ad mores, quod ?}dos illi vocant, nos earn partem philosophae, De moribus, appellare solemus ; sed decet augentem linguam Latinum nominare Moralem." — Defato, ch. i, 1. 2 Theories of morals are primarily the authoritative or heteronomous and the autonomous. Heteronomy finds the origin and sanction of moral conduct in constraining precepts whose validity is derived from supreme authority, demanding submission and obedience without condition or ques- tion. It recognizes the Deity, the Church, or the State as lawgiver. The INTRODUCTION 41 In this essay the First Part treats of the source and character of Obligation. Its view is confined to the moral bond subsisting in the simple relation of man to man in entire parity and reciprocity. The Second Part treats of the va- rieties of obligation arising from the varieties of relation due to the Organization of men into complex associations. theological and ecclesiastical view traces obligation to the revealed will of God as ultimate, maintaining that a course is good and right simply because he wills it, and that if he willed otherwise its morality would be otherwise (Crusius, Grotius, Descartes). The political view discerns ultimate authority in the enactments of the State (Hobbes, Kirchmann). Autonomy finds the origin and sanction of morality in spontaneous, original, independent cognitions and impulses. It subdivides into aprio- rism or nativism or intuitionism, and empiricism whose specialized form is evolutionism. The apriorist founds morality on an original, innate, intui- tive activity ; the empiricist refers it to experience, or to a gradual develop- ment. Among apriorists we reckon Cudworth, Clarke, Kant, Fichte, Lotze ; among empiricists, Spencer, Wundt. Empiricism in the special form of evolution, to which allusion has already been made in § 20, is widely approved in the philosophic ethics of to-day. Evidently it is an hypothesis of psychogenesis, of historical psy- chology. But we question "whether ethics really has any necessary interest in an historical and psychological inquiry into the origin of ethical judg- ments. A normative discipline, an art of volition and action, can gain nothing either for the validity or for the systematization of its norms and precepts from the proof of their gradual development under a variety of conditions and influences. . . . Evolutionism is an hypothesis, not a norm ; it gives an explanation of particular facts, but no precepts or laws by which to regulate our conduct ; and hence the antithesis of intuitionism and em- piricism is not of essential significance for Ethics." — Kulpe, Int. to Phil., § 27, 9. Cf. F. Bretano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntniss, 1889 ; and C. M. Williams, Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution, 1893. The view of the present treatise is heteronomous in that it finds the basis of morality in the order of nature taken in its widest sense ; autono- mous or nativist in that it attributes to man the ability to interpret con- stituent nature, and discern his obligation to conform to its order. But the basis and genesis of morality, unless merely a historical, is a philosophical and not an ethical thesis. The problem before us is : Given the simple idea or notion of a right j to find all forms of obligation. 42 OBLIGATION CHAPTER I EIGHTS § 22. Every man conceives himself as having certain per- sonal rights which he esteems of great worth, and guards with jealous care. Throughout life he is chiefly occupied with enlarging, confirming and defending them. They are a sacred possession which he zealously maintains, and whose loss or diminution he regards as degrading his manhood. This is one of the most striking and significant facts in the historical and current activities of mankind. Thence arises much of the strife that continually agitates the world. Among barbaric peoples personal violence is commonly used to maintain or to recover what one claims to be his personal rights. Among civilized peoples courts of justice are established to determine the relative rights of contending parties, and an executive is empowered to enforce their decrees. Nearly all the litigation abounding in every nation throughout history is a contention for real or imagi- nary rights. While each individual man has his own private rights, there are many of which he is possessed in common with other persons. The maintenance and development of com- mon or public rights is committed to organized society, the tribe, the state, the nation. When the claims of one on another of these conflict or are questioned, diplomacy assumes to adjust the rights involved. This failing, recourse is had to war. Hence the innumerable battles that mark the tragic history of mankind. EIGHTS 43 § 23. Evidently the notion of a right, since it is the source of such intense particular and social activity, has deep root in human nature. Also it is evident that, through- out the contentions to which it gives rise, there is an appeal to some common principle or law of widest generality, appli- cable to an infinity of cases, and of the highest practical importance in the progressive life of humanity. But inas- much as this universal and overbearing law is for the most part obscurely discerned and imperfectly formulated, it is inevitable that men should differ often and widely in its ap- plication to particular cases. It is the province of Ethics to search out and formulate the law, and to unfold its general bearing on the several classes of its subjects. To this end let us fix discriminating attention on the no- tion of a right. It is an abstract from personal relations, and catholic in them. Whenever and wherever two persons come into any mutually affective relation whatever, then and there come into being reciprocal rights, and consequent obli- gations. The abstracted notion of a right, being pure and simple, is as to itself incapable of analysis, and hence of formal definition. But we may examine its conditions, its antitheses, correlatives, and other implications, and thus clear the conception, and distinguish it by its invariable environ- ment and limitations. This analytical process will disclose fundamental and determining elements, fixing clearly the scope and bearing of the notion, and evolving the formative principle and the law involved in its essence. § 24. Life is obviously a primary condition of any right. Only living beings have rights. The notion is incongruous to a stock or a stone. Among living beings, those alone can be conceived as having rights that are endowed with a con- sciousness involving at least volition, its primary element, conjoined with some degree of sensibility. 1 A right, then, is 1 The new Psychology considers will as the primary and constitutive 44 OBLIGA TION a logical property, a mark that belongs to this, and to no other class of beings. 1 But conscious life is not merely a condition of rights, not merely what must be in order that rights may be. There is in its very nature that which determines that rights shall be. They are of its essence. Thus every conscious being neces- sarily has rights by virtue of its ultimate constitution. It is not necessary that every One so constituted should be aware of the fact, either in detail or in general, not even in the most obscure way. But the higher orders of conscious be- ings recognize relatively to themselves the existence of rights function of mind ; intelligence, as a secondary development. The leader of this view is Schopenhauer (Willen in der Natur, et al.) ; followed by- Schneider (Der Theirische Wille, 1880), Wundt (System der Philosophic, 1889, and Vorlesungen tiber die Menschen und Thierseele, 2d ed., 1892), Paulsen (Einleitung in die Philosophic, 1893), and many others. It sees the will arising, without perception or intelligence, as a blind craving or in- stinctive impulse, and thereon and thereby a gradual development of intelli- gence as a means to gratification. Thus a jelly-fish, a polyp, an infusory, knows nothing of itself, or of external things ; a mere craving determines its vital activities. Gradually, in the progressive series of animal life, we see intelligence grafted on the will. To instinctive movements are added others guided by perception, and then by intelligent purpose involving deliberation and choice. Also every human being enters the world as a blind will with- out! intellect. The nursling is all will ; its voluntary movements are blindly instinctive. When a craving is satisfied, a feeling of satisfaction arises, otherwise a feeling of discomfort. In pleasurable and painful feelings, the will becomes aware of itself, and of its relation to an environment. Out of feeling, knowledge is gradually evolved, and in the more mature child the will appears saturated with intelligence. In this survey, the will is seen to be the original and constant factor of the life of the soul. At the close of the series, we find it directed towards the same great ends as at the begin- ning, the preservation and evolution of individual life and of the species. Intelligence is the secondary and variable factor, which is gradually imparted to the will as an instrument. So the voluntaristic as distinguished from the intellectualistic Psychology. 1 The rights of man extend, however, beyond his natural life. Our an- cestors still have rights, and posterity has rights, which the living are bound to respect. Yet life, past, present or to come, is a condition of this property. See infra. § 119, BIGHTS 45 in the lower orders, though these be quite destitute of the notion. 1 § 25. Every man has, elemental in his conscious life, cer- tain powers of mind, and thence of body. These powers, faculties and capacities, belong to his nature, to his original constitution, and are essential in his make-up as a man, as a human being. They are, more specifically, conditions psycho- logically antecedent to the existence and apprehension of rights, and rights are the natural and necessary consequence of their existence. That is to say, powers and rights are natural, constitutional, original correlatives. These native powers are distributed as modes of knowing and feeling, desiring and willing. The members of the latter couple constitute more particularly the practical side of human nature, and are intimately concerned with the exist- ence and exercise of rights. Therefore on them especially we Oik our present attention. A desire implies an impulse, occasioned by a want, urging the will to an activity, relative to other powers, such as seems likely to result in gratification. 2 Every one is actuated by desires which thus motive his conduct. These sources of activity are the determinants of his welfare, and his rights have in them their ultimate ground. Hence it is only as his desires, either actual or potential, are infringed that his rights are affected ; and to that for which he has not and cannot possibly have a desire, e. g., a villa in the moon, he has not 1 The wide class of beings having conscious life includes the brute forms of animal life. That brutes have rights is beyond question, though they themselves have no knowledge of the fact. This is recognized by a merciful man ; he does not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn. Also it is recognized in many States by protective laws. See infra, § 68, note. Our proposed inquiry shall be limited, however, to beings of the highest order, and among these, more especially, to human beings. 2 See supra, § 5. 46 OBLIGA TION and can never possibly have a right. Normal desires, or such as have an instinctive rise, and are in accord with the gene- ral order of nature, impel toward the fulfillment of the appro- priate functions of the man in a world of persons and things. This consideration of its terms brings into clear view the truth of the principle : A man has a right to gratify his normal desires. 1 Every volition or act of the will is immediately conditioned on desire ; that is to say, no exercise of the will can occur except by virtue of an antecedent desire which as a motive impels it to action. But notwithstanding this dependence, the will is to be regarded as central in the personality, since it has the function to control, modify, suppress or arouse the 1 Principle, a beginning, a fundamental truth or law, a tenet, a settled rule of action. From Fr. principe, from Lat. principium, from princeps, chief. — Skeat. Cicero says: " Principio autem nulla est origo, nam ex principio oriuntur omnia ; ipsum autem nulla ex re alia nasci potest ; nee enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde." — Tusc. Disp. bk'. i, ch. 23, § 54. Aristotle distinguishes seven different senses of the word apxn, a beginning or first principle, then adds : " Common to all first principles is the being the original from whence a thing either is, or is produced, or is known." — Metaphysics, bk. iv, ch. 1. The term apxh was introduced into philosophy by Anaximander. — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., § 13. A principle is also a designation of order ; a principle of nature is a designation of natural order, physical or psychical /a moral principle is a principle of nature which, in view of possible alternatives, takes imperative form, enjoining one, forbidding the other. Normal, according to rule. A late word. From Lat. normalis, from norma, a carpenter's square, rule, pattern ; Gk. yvtipipas, fern, yvuplprj, well-known ; cf . yvibpuav, an index ; all from the root gna, to know. — Skeat. A thing is normal when strictly conformed to those principles of its con- stitution which make it what it is. Let it be here observed in anticipation of subsequent matter that a man's malevolent desires, as anger, envy, jealousy, misanthropy, are in general abnormal in kind, since they do not conform to the normal principles of the human constitution ; and that his benevolent desires or affections, which are normal in kind, may in general become abnormal in degree, either by in- anity or by excess, temporary or permanent, and need to be invigorated or restrained. BIGH TS 47 activity of all other powers, including even its conditioning desires. Freedom consists in the possibility of this voluntary exercise of one's powers, and without freedom it is evident that their normal functions cannot be fulfilled, or that free- dom is necessary to the natural working and development of the entire personality hi its existing relations. These con- siderations bring to light the truth of the principle : A man has a right to a free use of his native powers. 1 The two statements are not to be taken as distinct princi- ples. Together they constitute the mutually dependent and complementary parts of the consistent whole : A man has a right to a free use of his native powers in the gratification of his normal desires. This principle is the basis of Ethics. It is axiomatic, self- evidently true, not needing or admitting any logical proof; for the intuitive, synthetic a priori judgment involved in the pure notion of a right, finds its immediate application to the desires and volitions. At first view it may appear thoroughly egoistic or selfish in character, but the outcome of a pa- tient and thorough scrutiny of its bearings will reverse this primary impression. Likewise its formal universality may seem to sanction unbounded license, but the close in- spection to which we shall submit it will discover very strin- gent limitations, not arbitrarily imposed, but arising from the matter of its constituent terms, and leading to a disclosure of our varied obligations. Thus there is no need to look be- yond the natural and origirtal constitution of man, despite its 1 "Not only will all these [principles] be found in the enacted laws (vSfwis), but nature herself has marked them out in her unwritten laws (vofxLfxois), and in the moral constitutions of men." — Demosthenes, Be Cor- ona, § 275, Teubner. " Selbstverstandlich ist das ursprungliche Recht der Freiheit, d. h. des freien Gebrauchs seiner Krafte und der freien Wahl der Ziele, worauf sie gerichtet werden. In der Gesellschaft unterliegt dies Recht, wie jedes, Beschrankungen." — Lqtze, Grundzuge der praktisctien Philosophic, § 42. 48 OBLIGA TION weakness, perversion and distortion, to discern the prolific principle of morality. 1 1 See supra, § 21. "In Plato's Republic, as in Butler's Sermons, the human soul is represented as a system, a constitution, an organized whole in which the different elements have not merely their places side by side but their places above and below each other, With their appointed offices ; and virtue or moral Tightness consists in the due operation of this constitution, the actual realization of the organized subordination. We may notice too that Plato, like Butler, is remarkable among moralists for the lucid and forcible manner in which he has singled out from men's springs of action the irascible element (his Ovfweidis ; Butler's Resentment;) and taught its true place and office in a moral scheme." — Whewell, Preface to Butler's Sermons, p. xxxiv. "The foundation of Aristotle's system of ethics is deeply laid in his psychological system. Upon the nature of the human soul the whole fabric is built up, and depends for its support. According to Aristotle, we are endowed with a moral sense, aX ip.irei.piav tuv iVei Ifiv ; that is : Live according to your experience of the course of nature. This anthropological conception of the principle of morals was adhered to by the later Stoics, as in the following dictum of Clement of Alexandria, one of the latest : ri\os elpcu to ftp atcoXotidus rrj rod dvdpwirov Karao-Kevr) ; that is : The end of man is to live agreeably to the natural con- stitution of man. — Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, § 55. " The moral law is not foreign to our nature; it is not imposed upon us by a despot, as was the Continental Embargo at the beginning of this cen- tury, barring the approach to a thousand goods and pleasures. It is rather the law of our own being. Moral laws are natural laws. We may assign to them a transcendental significance or not ; they are, first of all and at all events, natural laws of human life in the sense of being the conditions of its health and welfare. According to the natural course of events, their trans- gression will bring upon nations as well as upon individuals misfortune and destruction, while their observance is accompanied by welfare and peace." — Paulsen, Int. to Phil, bk. i, ch. 1, § 3. EIGHTS 49 § 26. In view of their objects it is usual to name three kinds of rights : the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to property. 1 This division appears in the three funda- mental verbs : to be, to do, to have. But the species are not independent, for each involves the other two as complemen- tary correlatives. It follows that either two may be regarded as modified forms and be expressed in the terms of the third. Thus, for instance, life without some measure of liberty in the use of instrumentalities, could hardly claim the name. Also, life and liberty are commonly spoken of as forms of property; as when one says, my life, his liberty. Indeed rights in general are viewed as forms of property in the fa- miliar phrases, my rights, our rights, their rights. We cor- rectly say that every man has rights, he owns them, he is their proprietor. Some rights he may dispose of at will, others are inalienable except by forfeiture ; but, so long as they in- here in him, they are his possession, his own. The sense of proprietorship in rights is very strong, as seen in the tena- cious retention and persistent defense of them when men- aced. 2 Likewise the several kinds of rights may be reduced to the right to liberty. Conscious life is an aggregate of active powers, and a power is a possibility of change. A right to 1 ' ' All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity ; namely, the en- joyments of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." — Virginia Bill of Rights, § 1. 2 Psychologically the notion mine comes before the notion me. — Lotze. Even behavior is etymologically a having. To behave is a mere compound of the verb to have with the Anglo-Saxon prefix be-, to surround, to shut up, to possess. So conduct is behavior ; from Lat. conductus, pp. of conducere, from con-, for cum, together, and ducere to lead ; to bring together, to col- lect. — Skeat. 50 OBLIGATION life is a right to exercise these powers, a right to self-deter- mined change, which is liberty. Also property in external things means liberty to make use of them. To be dispos- sessed of any property is to be deprived of this liberty ; but the thing is still one's own, and the right to its free use, though suspended, remains. Thus ownership in external things is a right to liberty. 1 Of these reductions, the last, though least familiar, is most clearly real, and of widest and deepest import. Hence, while we cannot avoid using the language of possession, we shall adhere to the view that every right, in its last analysis, is a right to some phase of liberty, to the untrammeled exer- cise of ability. Manifestly the cardinal element in the princi- ple already formulated is a right to liberty in this general sense, and on it our further consideration shall chiefly turn. 1 ' ' Liberty and Right are synonymous ; since the liberty of acting ac- cording to one's will would be altogether illusory if it were not protected from obstruction. There is, however, this difference between the terms. In Liberty the prominent or leading idea is the absence of legal restraint, whilst the security or protection for the enjoyment of that liberty is the secondary idea. Right, on the other hand, denotes the protection, and connotes the absence of restraint." — Austin, Jurisprudence, § 445. LIBERTY 51 CHAPTER II LIBERTY § 27. Freedom means the absence of causal restraint or constraint. It is a function purely negative, yet a special subjective property of volition. It is the power of choosing. Causative determination is incompatible with the existence of choice, for in causation there is no alternative, whereas in choice an alternative is essential. The power of choosing is simply the ability to decide freely for one act or line of conduct rather than for its possible alternate. Whether or not there be in reality a power of choice is an old and difficult question in metaphysics. It has already been briefly considered, and the point made that the reality of choice is a necessary condition and hence a postulate of Ethics. Whoever is morally responsible must be free. Con- sequently we here assume that in all voluntary activity there is real freedom in measure sufficient for responsibility. 1 1 See Supra, §§ 8-10. Aristotle teaches that "morality presupposes liberty. This exists whenever the will of the agent meets no obstacles, and he is able to deliberate intelligently. It is destroyed by ignorance or constraint." — Ueberweg, Hist Phil., § 50. The matter is specially treated in the Nicomachean Ethics, bk. iii, first five chapters. The principle of all moral action is irpoaLpecris, i.e. what is commonly termed choice, or the delib- erately preferring one act or one course of action to any other on moral ground, under the direction of reason, vovs. It is this, he says, which de- termines the moral quality of an act, and distinguishes the habit of virtue. At the threshold of the investigation is the freedom of the human will, and on the establishing of this doctrine depends the whole question of human responsibility. See especially Grote's Aristotle, 2d Ed., 1880, ch. xiii, § 2. 52 OBLIGATION § 28. Certain limitations of freedom need now to be observed. Freedom lies in the power of choice, and in it alone. All other powers of mind are subject to causation, their activities being always definitely determined by causa- tive antecedents. That choice alone is free is a simple fact in human nature, and a very narrow constitutional limitation of our original and originating ability ; but it is the essential difference between a creator and the passive work of his hands. It renders possible not only moral obligation, but also an infinite variety of self-determined activities. A choice resolved is intention. The intention accords with that desire to which preference is given by choice. 1 The elected desire, if it be for action, induces a voluntary effort whose end is the object desired. This effort consists solely in an act of attention. The fixing attention more or less intense on a chosen object is the total of possible volun- tary energy. We observe here a second very narrow consti- tutional limitation of human ability. Still this power of attention proves sufficient for the purposes of life, and for fulfilling the demand for moral action and conduct, since by means of it we are capable, directly or indirectly, of com- plete self-mastery. 2 (Because determined by the free act of choice, freedom is attributed to the exercise of attention. This freedom, how- ever, is not absolute, but suffers restriction. That the exer- 1 An exercise of choice is commonly viewed as directly resolving the question : Shall I do this or that ? The view is narrow, but the fact is even narrower. An election is not primarily between two positive alternatives, but between one positive and its negative. Shall I do this or uot ? Shall I act or refrain ? If the decision is to abstain, then, secondarily, the election may occur between the other positive alternative and its negative. Very often, in deliberation, the two positives seem to be weighed directly against each other, as in two scales of a balance ; but, on close analysis, it appears that there is but one scale, counterpoised by native inertia, in which scale proposed actions are weighed in quick succession. 2 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 89, and 269 sq. LIBERTY 53 cise involves effort, a nisus or striving, shows the presence of obstacles within the mind itself. Evidently there is some mental inertia to be overcome, which checks and limits the action ; otherwise there would be no occasion for effort, no point of application whereon to expend energy. Herein is a third limitation. Mental effort is a force or cause, free in that according to choice it may or may not be put into play, and in that, if put into play, its intensity may be varied. Now the mental may be transformed into physical energy, and issue in muscular action. This, too, is accomplished through attention. To move my arm, I must have an idea of the arm and of it as moving. Fixing my attention thereon, and willing the reali- zation, the arm moves accordingly. This is inexplicable. We know it only and simply from experience. But let it be observed that the direct control of the animal body lies ex- clusively in this power to contract, according to choice, the voluntary muscles, a limited class, thus producing motion of the limbs and some other organs, while very many vital activities, as pulsation and digestion, are beyond direct con- trol. Moreover, when the movable organs are at liberty, still the extent of their motion is very closely circumscribed. This discovers a fourth very narrow constitutional limitation of free action, restricting or confining it to the ability to con- tract a muscle, and so to move a member through a small space. Still it is much, very much, to possess and to have at command a free physical force, free in that it accords with choice, which force we may use at will, combining it with fixed natural causes, varying its direction and small inten- sity, so as to arrest or modify the operations of nature. It is a noteworthy corollary that this limitation to loco- motion extends to the body as a whole, and to all external things. These we move from place to place, but this is the total of our direct physical efficiency. The planter moves a 54 OBLIGATION spade and seed from one place to another ; the forces of na- ture do the rest, producing the crop. The smith moves his hammer up and down, the weaver throws his shuttle to and fro; the outcome is fabricated by virtue of the natural forces inherent in the materials. A knowledge of natural forces, and an intelligent, purposeful placing of things so as to take advantage of them, enable men to manage factories, to tunnel Alps, to navigate oceans, to wrap the earth with iron, and to cover its face with cities. But in all his infin- itely varied works, man has at command only the single free physical ability to place or displace things. 1 § 29. Freedom isolates each man from every other, setting him apart and alone in the universe. For this center of his personality is intangible, out of reach of any other being. By the gift of his image the Deity has made man to this extent independent of "himself, putting it beyond his power to cause a human creature willingly to do otherwise than that creature may choose ; since therein would be a contra- diction. He may reason and persuade, command and threaten, but cannot causally coerce the man, for this de- strpys the essential conditions of personality ; the man in su The moral law is independent of experience, except that i See supra, §§ 17, 18. THE LAW 77 experience must furnish the occasion for its discernment by pure intellect. It is not deduced from some higher law; there is none higher. It does not logically follow from the principle of liberty to gratify desire, but implies or is implied in that principle, and a mere unfolding of the essential con- tent of either is all that is requisite for a clear apprehension of its truth. 1 Indeed the principle and the law are but varied forms of essentially the same necessary truth. As a principle, it is an immediate intuition of pure intellect, hav- ing the light of truth in itself. As a law, its universally binding authority lies in its intuitively imperative truth. § 43. The intuitive cognition of this fundamental, catholic, and universal law, is the sole function of the pure practical reason or conscience. Conscience is pure reason discerning moral law. 2 This faculty has the moral law for its exclusive object, and its exercise is the primary, original, antecedent condition of any moral activity whatever, without which lib- erty has no moral restraint, and volition no moral character. 3 In thus identifying conscience with the pure practical rea- son, we give to the term a clear and sharp definition, fitting it for scientific use by distinguishing it from those other fac- 1 On the distinction between implication and inference, see The Theory of Thought, p. 103 ; and Elements of Deductive Logic, § 78. 2 See supra, § 2, and §11. Also Elements of Psychology, § 267. 3 Conscience, consciousness of good or bad. From Ft. , from Lat. con- scientia, from con-, for cum, together with, and scientia, knowledge, from scienti-, stem of pres. part, of scire, to know, orig. to discern. — Skeat. Consciousness, conscia sibi, and Conscience, conscia obligationis, have the same etymology. For three centuries our language has had the separate terms, like the German Bewusstsein and Gewissen, both being contained in the Old English inwit, in the French conscience, in the Latin conscientia, and in the Greek summa injuria. Laws are expressed in general terms, and being framed with reference to ordinary cases, it often hap- pens that the actual cases involve matter beyond their scope. Moreover, there are many matters requiring adjudication for which the laws make no provision. It is the part of equity to supply such deficiencies by special action. Thence have arisen courts of equity or courts of chancery, distinguishable from courts of law. The decisions of a judge in equity are regulated, when there is no binding precedent or statute, by reference to the original principles of justice which give rise to enacted laws ; hence his decisions are a species of legisla- tion, judicial legislation. In the development and refinement of common and statute law, many of the approved decisions in equity have become incorporated in those systems ; and equity itself, being more and more determined by precedent, has become assimilated to the common law. Hence in many of our States there is a fusion of official function, the same court, sometimes on the same case, sitting now in law, now in equity. Casting off these limitations of its technical and juridical sense, the exercise of equity in the common intercourse of men is the doing what is equal, fair and right. 1 It is the Lesbos from the early Pelasgian occupiers of the island. Polygonal stones were used in it, which could not be measured by a straight rule. Cf. j?Eschylus Fragments, 70 : 'AM' 6 ixkv tk Mafiiov kv/j! tv rpiydvois itcn-epaiviTU) pvdfWLs — where Kv/xa means a waved moulding." — Sib A. Grant, Aristotle 1 s Ethics, bk. v, ch. 10, note. 1 " In the most general sense we are accustomed to call that equity which, in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and right, and which properly arises ez ozquo et bono. In this sense it answers precisely to the definition of justice or natural law, as given by Justinian in his Pandects : Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi. And the word jus is used in the same sense in the Roman law, when it is declared that jus est ars boni et ozqui. ' ' — Story, Comment on Equity, p. 1, JUSTICE 131 equitable between man and man, grounded on equal subjec- tion to moral law or equality of rights among men, whether formulated in contracts, or existing in their merely natural relations. The distinction between equity in this general sense and the justice administered by the courts, that is, between the claims of human charity or natural justice and the claims of legal justice, corresponds nearly with the dis- tinction between imperfect and perfect rights ; a distinction, however, that is merely practical, not essential. 1 Equity, in its wide sense, and natural justice are coextensive, and both are synonymous with right ; etymologically, the opposite of justice is injury, of equity iniquity. The notion of equity and justice limited to jurisprudence, is a narrow and inade- quate view bounded by a rugged horizon ; but in their large and proper meaning they expand over the whole sphere of obligation, and are equivalent to rectitude and righteousness. 2 § 67. Mercy is righteous forbearance toward an offender. It implies kindness or gentleness, and is prompted by pity or compassion. These feelings, when intense, are apt to induce a sentimental aversion to the claims of strict justice. 1 Wolfius says : " Justum appellatur quicquid fit secundum jus perfectum alterius ; cequum vero quod secundum imperfectum." 1 " 1 Cf. supra, § 36, note. 2 " To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is prohibited or commanded by positive laws, is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn the circumference." — Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, bk. i, ch. 1, p. 3. "It is equity to pardon human failings," says Aristotle, "and to look to the lawgiver and not to the law ; to the spirit and not to the letter ; to the intention and not to the action ; to the whole and not to the part; to the character of the actor in the long run and not in the present moment ; to remember good rather than evil, and good that one has received, rather than good that one has done ; to bear being injured, rb dj^x^cu adiKotifievov ; to wish to settle a matter by words rather than by deeds; lastly, to prefer arbitration to judgment, for the arbitrator sees what is equitable, but the judge only the law, and for this an arbitrator was first appointed, in order that equity might flourish." — Rhetoric, bk. i, ch. 13. 132 OBLIGATION Hence mercy is popularly supposed to be in opposition to justice, implying a disposition to overlook injury, and to mit- igate or even wholly remit the penalty that sanctions the law. Such displacement of justice is not righteous forbear- ance, and so is not true mercy, but a weak indulgence of wrong that upholds license and works injustice. True mercy forbears, whatever legal forms may allow, to exceed or to abate the claims of natural justice. 1 Every man is necessarily a judge, not only of his own actions, but also of those of his fellows. Whether his judg- ment find utterance in words and deeds of requital or not, he is bound to be just. Any excess of severity is injustice to the subject; any abatement of righteous rigor is injustice to society whose welfare is involved in the right judgment of 1 It may thereby come into conflict with rigorous legal justice adhering to the letter of the law. Portia's exquisite speech, Merchant of Venice, Act iv, sc. 1, 1. 181 sq., though familiar, cannot be omitted here. In court, speaking to the defendant, says — Portia. Do you confess the bond ? Antonio. I do. Portia. Then must the Jew be merciful. Shylock. On what compulsion must I ? Tell me that. Portia. The quality of mercy is nottstrain'd, It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath ; it is twice blest ; It blesseth him that gives and him that takes. 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest ; it becomes The throned monarch better than his crown ; His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, The attribute to awe and majesty, Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings ; But mercy is above this sceptred sway ; It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, It is an attribute to God himself ; And earthly power doth then show likest God's When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew, Though justice be thy plea, consider this, That, in the course of justice, none of us Should see salvation ; we do pray for mercy ; And that same prayer doth teach us all to render The deeds of mercy. I have spoke thus much To mitigate the justice of thy plea. JUSTICE 133 its members. Mercy is shown in forbearing to do or even to think what is not strictly just. 1 The judge on the bench must be just. Usually, by the very terms of the law which he is set to administer, he has a measure of discretion ; but he must not transgress its sharply denned bounds, and within these he is to use discretion, not license. The range is allowed, not for the play of pity or of resentment, but in order that he may mercifully adjust his decree to the peculiarities of a case. 2 Too great severity is injustice to a party present; too great leniency is injustice to society whose interest he is empowered to guard. Judicial mercy secures a righteous forbearance of trespass on either, thus not merely coexisting but coinciding with strict justice. 3 The criminal law is merciful in holding the accused innocent until proved guilty, and in giving him the benefit of doubt ; which is but just. 4 With a chief executive or sovereign is 1 "O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God ?' ' — Micah, 6 : 8. 2 Observe that penal justice is quite commonly miscalled justice to an offender. He has a right to fair trial, that is justice to him. But con- demned and punished, this cannot be called justice to him ; for, he having forfeited certain of his rights, the penalty inflicted is not a concession to these, but to the rights of society, and so his just punishment is in justice to the community whose welfare is involved. For the ethical ground of punishment, see infra, § 136. 3 " Mercy but rnurthers, pardoning those that kill." — Borneo and Juliet, Act iii, sc. 1, 1. 212. " Mercy is not itself, that often looks so ; Pardon is still the nurse of second woe." — Measure for Measure, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 298. Isabella. " Yet show some pity. Angelo. I show it most of all when I show justice ; For then I pity those I do not know, Which a dismiss'd offence Avould after gall ; And do him right that, answering one foul wrong, Lives not to act another." — Idem, Act ii, sc. 2, 1. 99 sq. 4 A strict construction, a rigid adherence to the letter of the law, is re- quired, lest liberty in adjudication become license. Hence culprits are not infrequently discharged with impunity, an injustice to society for which 184 OBLIGATION lodged a pardoning power. This prerogative of clemency is not for sentimental exercise, but for the equitable adjustment of penal desert and general welfare. It is mercy, but also it is justice. 1 there seems no remedy ; but, indeed, it is accounted more wholesome for society that a culprit escape condemnation, than that the innocent suffer. See Genesis, 18: 20-38. Beside this, our laws abound in mercies. See trial by jury secured by our Constitution, Article iii, § 2, and certain other merciful provisions in the Amendments, Articles iii-viii. 1 The suffering engendered by injustice is worthy of note. Suppose two persons thoroughly alike in character and standing, condemned for like crimes to like terms of imprisonment, but the one innocent, the other guilty. Which would you prefer to be ? The innocent one. In Xeno- phon's A pology, 28, Appolodorus exclaims: "Tome, Socrates, the hardest part is to see you suffer death without just cause." To which Socrates, stroking the other's hair, replies: " Would you then, dearest Appolodorus, prefer to see me suffer death for a just cause ? " Yet which suffers more ? The innocent one. For in the penalty of guilt there is the solace of expia- tion, which consolation is not with the innocent sufferer. "So it is that to the unregenerate Prometheus Vinctus of a man," says Carlyle, "it is ever the bitterest aggravation of his wretchedness that he is conscious of virtue, that he feels himself the victim, not of suffering only, but of injustice." — Sartor Resartus, ch. 7. But, apart from penalty, which is the greater evil, to do or to suffer injus- tice ? To do injustice. This is Plato's answer in the Gorgias and in the Republic; also Aristotle's in Nic. Eth., bk. v, ch. 11, 6 sq., where he says : " To injure is the worse of the two ; for to injure involves depravity, and is culpable." This is the ground of Plato, who says : "Assuming the three-fold division of the soul, must not injustice be a kind of quarrel between these three, a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal ? The confusion and error of those parts or elements is injustice. For the doing of justice is the working of a natural order and government of one another in the parts of the soul, and the doing of injustice is the opposite." — Republic, bk. iv, 444 Step., Jowett's trans. Trendelenburg, in Naturrecht, § 39, advocates this view. See Lorimer, Institutes of Law, p. 152. So Brutus, in Julius Ccesar, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 63 sq., says: " Between the acting of a dreadful thing And the first motion, all the interim is Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream ; The Genius and the mortal instruments Are then in council ; and the state of man Like to a little kingdom, suffers then The nature of an insurrection." JUSTICE 135 Shall not the judge of all the earth do right ? Justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne, mercy and truth go before his face. He is long-suffering and of great mercy, forgiving iniquity and transgression, yet in no case clearing the guilty. Justice, no less than mercy, is an essential attri- bute to God. He, as absolute sovereign, decrees unbounded mercy to the penitent, and vindicates the claim of immutable justice by a vicarious sacrifice. Such is the Christian scheme ; such is divine mercy. 136 OBLIGATION CHAPTER VIII DUTY AND VIRTUE. § 68. The obligations, both active and passive, laid upon us in the moral law are duties. Duty is the name of a rela- tion, and so requires two terms. Every duty is because of something due from one person to another. It is the rela- tion of debtor to creditor. Honesty, honor requires the pay- ment of debt. The commercial meaning of dues or debts is merely a specific application of the essential sense inherent in these terms in their general application to every phase of human obligation. 1 To withhold what is due another is a violation of his right, is an unwarranted interference in his liberty of action, is a trespass, and is forbidden by the moral law. But to 1 Duty is an abstract term ; due is the concrete, meaning owed as a debt, from p. Fr. , deu, pp. of devoir, from Lat. debere, to owe. Debt is also from Lat. debere, to owe, debita, a sum due. Ought is an old preterite of to owe, to possess (another's property), hence to be in debt. Shakespeare some- times plays upon this early meaning of to owe ; e.g. : " I owe you much, and, like a wilful youth, That which 1 owe [own] is lost." — Merchant of Venice, Act i, sc. 1, 1. 146. " Be pleased then To pay that duty which you truly owe To him that owes [owns] it." — King John, Act ii, sc. 1, 1. 247. With Cicero officium means a duty performed, a service rendered, a func- tion fulfilled as an object of moral obligation. See Be Officiis, i, 3. He uses honestum in the wide sense of what is honorable, decent, virtuous. ' ' Honestum aut ipsa virtus est, aut res gesta virtute ; honestum a virtute divelli non potest.' 1 ' 1 DUTY AND VIRTUE 187 forbid non-payment is to command payment. Pay thy dues. Owe no man anything. We must pay what we owe. We ought to render to every man his own, that is, what we owe him. These are but varied expressions of the one injunc- tion, Trespass not, Be thou just, Do thy duty. Ethics may fairly be defined as the science of duty. 1 § 69. Right and duty are coextensive, merely different aspects of the same notion. Right belongs to the action, and is conformity to law. Duty belongs to the agent, and is subjection to law. Hence they imply each other. That whatever is duty is right, is quite evident. That whatever is right is duty, is readily seen. For, each case as it arises is subsumed under the law, or under rules, maxims of con- duct, deduced from the law, and a conclusion is drawn as to what is right, what ought to be done. Now from given premises, if the terms be unambiguous and the reasoning correct, only one conclusion can follow, certainly not two or more essentially different. Therefore, in every conceivable situation there is for the moment one and only one course that is right ; and this action alone being right it ought or 1 Duty, properly, literally, is a function of persons only, they acting in the light of conscience. Yet a horse is said to be doing its duty when it willingly does its work ; and a clock when it keeps good time. Each is ful- filling its function, but to speak of this as duty is figurative speech. Brutes, since they are without conscience and personality, have no duties, and accordingly relative to them we have, strictly speaking, no rights, but merely property claims. We claim and enforce their service, and take their lives for food. Those that are a nuisance we drive out or kill, as weeds, by virtue of eminent domain. But relative to brutes, they having rights, we have duties ; to our domestic animals, especially, food, shelter and mild usage are due. A pain-giving trespass is cruelty. Hunting, fishing, merely for sport, is a relic of barbarism, is cruel and wrong. Unwarranted vivisec- tion is a crime. See supra, § 24, note ; also, for the views of the present writer, an article on "The Moral Aspects of Vivisection," in The North American Review, for March, 1885. 138 OBLIGATION owes to be done. When an action is clearly conceived to be right, that action and that alone is duty. 1 It is a corollary that duty is but another name for obliga- tion, whose measure is found in the full application of the whole law to the whole life. Also it follows that duties never conflict. Often we are confused and in doubt as to the particular obligation, but of two possible acts, one being right, the other is wrong. There is no " divided duty." Moreover, it is wrong, ex vi termini, to do less than one ought to do ; also it is wrong to do more ; for this is an ex- penditure that is due elsewhere ; for example, to overpay a 1 "Le devoir et le droit sont freres. Leur mere commune est la liberty, lis naissent le meme jour, ils se deVeloppent et ils pe'rissent ensemble. On pourrait meme dire que le droit et le devoir ne font qu'un, et sont le meme etre envisage de deux c6te"s differents. Qu'est-ce, en effet, que mon droit a votre respect, sinon le devoir que vous avez de me respecter, parce que je suis un etre libre ? Mais vous-m§me vous etes un etre libre, et le f ondement de mon droit et de votre devoir devient pour vous le fondement d'un droit £gal, et en moi d'un egal devoir." — Cousin, Du Vrai du Beau et du Bien, Douzieme Legon, § 4. In Lieber's biography we find that his life "was a continual exposition of his favorite motto : ' No right without its duties ; no duty without its rights. ' Whence came it ? A letter to Judge Thayer, in 1869, gives the Genesis of this JDeuteronomy. Lieber, bound for Greece, with his freedom-loving comrades, in 1822, saw at the end of the schooner's yard-arm a little flame. ' That's bad indeed,' said the captain, who explained that the flames (elec- tric lights) were called Castor and Pollux, or St. Elmo's fire. If both appeared, it foretold fine sailing ; if only one, foul weather. ' I thought, ' says Lieber, ' this is like right and duty ; both together, and all is well ; right alone, despotism ; duty alone, slavery.' " — President Gilman, in The Century for Sept. '83, p. 793. Patrick Henry, in his famous argument in the British Debt Cause, deliv- ered in Richmond, Va., Nov., 1791, says : " Rights and obligations are corre- spondent, coextensive, and inseparable ; they must exist together or not at all. ... If then the obligation be gone, what is become of the correspon- dent right ? They are mutually gone." — Wm. Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry, vol. iii, p. 621. Some writers condition rights on duties, reversing the view taken in this treatise. Thus Trendelenburg; also Lotze, Tract. Phil., §32. See also Hyslop, Ethics, ch. x. DUTY AND VIRTUE 139 bill. Sometimes one ought to do all he can; he is never bound to do more, but frequently less. The essential identity of justice and right, and of injustice and trespass, has already been indicated. 1 Hence it suffi- ciently appears that, right and duty being equivalent, justice and duty are likewise equivalent terms. In a didactic treat- ment of ethics, it is far less important to mark the shades of distinction among these synonymous terms, a right, right, justice, equity, mercy, obligation, duty, than it is to show distinctly that, as to their essence, they are one and the same, and that a violation of any one is a wrong, an injustice, a trespass. § 70. An action conforming to moral law is a virtuous action. This qualification implies a contrary inclination overcome by will. It is the doing of justice, the perform- ance of duty, in a particular case, wherein the agent was tempted to disregard obligation by an opposed desire, against which there was a voluntary struggle ending in its subjec- tion. A virtuous person is one with whom the voluntary suppression of wrong desire is habitual, he subjecting him- self uniformly to the law of duty, and thus molding his character anew. Under the law of habit, that our faculties acquire facility and strength by exercise, the righteous desires of the virtuous person prevail more and more uniformly, while their opposites, denied the nourishment of gratifica- tion, become weaker and suffer atrophy ; until, finally, when and although all conflict, all struggle, has ceased, the victor, because of his victory, is dubbed a perfectly virtuous person. The abstract name of this mark is virtue. 2 In general, 1 See supra, § 63. For Kant's doctrine of duty, see infra, § 86. 2 From Lat. virtus, strength, vigor, valor ; cognate with vir, man, man- hood ; equivalent to dper-q, prowess, the Homeric notion of worth, cognate with "Aprjs, Mars, the god of war. Thus virtue implies opposition to be overcome, exertion of strength, vigor in overcoming, a struggle going on. 140 OBLIGATION virtue is the conformity of will to the law discerned by prac- tical reason or conscience. This definition implies that all subjective activities are regulated, duly coordinated and sub- ordinated, so that each fulfills its normal function ; thus enabling objective activities to attain their highest efficiency. Primarily it indicates the subjection of the craving to the giving desires ; secondarily, the bringing of the members of each class into harmonious cooperation. Otherwise there is a continual strife, the lust of the flesh against the spirit and disorderly preferences of each, that is incompatible with per- fected virtue. Such entire harmony is perhaps an unattainable ideal, but in human nature there is a native impulse toward it, and an ability to approximate it. Virtue, then, is a pro- ficiency in willing what is conformed to practical reason, developed from the state of natural potentiality by practical action. 1 In a certain narrowed sense virtue is synonymous with chastity. More properly and widely the factitive forms to chasten, to chastise, from Lat. castus, pure, mean to purify, to correct, by reproof or penalty. " Whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth." Cf. to castigate. As chastity implies purity, so virtue implies victory. Too often " on vante la vertu, mais on la laisse se morfondre. " — Gaboriau. Too often its majestic severity chills us ; ' i probitas laudatur et alget. ' ' — Juvenal. Yet, as said by Plato, ' ' virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, while vice is its disease, weakness and deformity." — Republic, bk. iv, 444, Step. The Lady, in Milton's Comus, 1. 210 sq., beset by " a thousand fantasies," says : " These thoughts may startle well, but not astound The virtuous mind, that ever walks attended By a strong siding champion, Conscience. welcome, pure-eyed Faith ; white-handed Hope, Thou hovering angel girt with golden wings ; And thou unblemished form of Chastity ! 1 see ye visibly, and now believe That He, the Supreme Good, to whom all things ill Are but as slavish officers of vengeance, Would send a glistering guardian, if need were, To keep my life and honour unassail'd . . . Was 1 deceived, or did a sable cloud Turn forth her silver lining on the night? " 1 This last definition is according to Aristotle, Nic. Eth., bk. ii, ch. 6, with whom dper-fi is a 2|ts, a habitus. Virtue has been characterized as DUTY AND VIRTUE 141 § 71. The cardinal virtues, as commonly listed, are forti- tude, prudence, temperance and justice. The distribution originated with the Greek philosophers, and still holds in modern literature. They are called cardinal, because the specific virtues hinge on them, and indeed they seem to be conditions rather than kinds of virtue. 1 Each may be con- sidered a fountain from which virtues flow. The Pythag- oreans and Plato regard fortitude, prudence and temperance together as the source of justice, and justice as the genius of all duty, of all virtue, the perfection of human nature and of human society. With Aristotle also, justice is perfect virtue, yet not absolutely, but in reference to others. In this wide sense we have used the term justice, viewing it as the sum of all virtues, which are but variations upon its essence, and are universally prescribed in the concrete com- mandment, Be thou just. § 72. The man who disregards moral law, or in whom the desire to do right is weak, passes, by frequently yielding to adopted when prompted by inclination or native bent of mind ; as genuine or ethical when prompted by principle. 1 Socrates (according to Xenophon), Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, each pre- sents a varied list. Turning to the O. T. Apocrypha, in the book of Wis- dom, written in Greek, and ascribed by Jerome to Philo of Alexandria, we find, 8:7: "If a man love righteousness, her labors are virtues; for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude ; which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in their life. ' ' Cf. the list of Christian virtues in Galatians 5 : 22, 23. In Nic. Eth., bk. ii, chs. 6-9, Aristotle elaborates his doctrine that "every ethical virtue is a mean state between two vices, one on the side of excess, and the other on the side of defect." Thus courage is the mean between temerity and cowardice ; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid indifference ; liberality, the mean between prodigality and parsimony. Hence the familiar phrase " a golden mean." With reference to prudence, let it be remarked that, taken in its best sense, it is much the same as the wisdom that is from above ; see James 3 : 17. Whenever it is not strictly identical with duty, it is parallel to it, having the same direction, and the two become one there where parallel lines meet. 142 OBLIGATION temptation, under the dominion of other desires. Especially the appetites are likely, by reckless indulgence, to acquire abnormal vigor, and drive the weakened will helplessly into gross excesses. The appetencies, in men of higher order, may take control, producing the refined voluptuary, the avaricious seeker after material wealth, the secluded scholar absorbed in the pursuit of " knowledge for its own sake," or the unscrupulous ruler ambitious of irresponsible power. The will, whose function it is to regulate these constitutional powers, restraining their exercise, and determining natural, which is normal and moral order, forsakes this high office, and becomes their servant. Thus the man is enslaved by his passions. His moral sense is deafened by their clamor, his actions are determined by their impelling energy, his independent self-mastery is lost, and his freedom is limited to a choice among contending masters and forms of obedience. To prevent or to escape from such degraded and deplora- ble condition, one must, by good-will working in the light of conscience, bring all his powers into subjection to moral law. This regulation will give play to the faculties in their natural relations and proportions, which is the essence of right action, and will determine uniformity of fit conduct, which is moral order, ! the order of facts that ought to be. Such virtuous rectification secures peace, harmony, and the dignity of moral excellence. 1 The virtue that brings our activities into due conformity with moral law is usually posited as the necessary condition of soul-liberty, and perfected virtue is identified with per- 1 Virtue is simply natural, vice unnatural ; man is made for virtue as a clock is to keep time. But he finds himself disordered. Self-mastery, har- monizing one's faculties, directing them to the right end, may seem to be within our power, but uniform human experience shows that when we would do good evil is present with us and in us. This state of human nature is fully set forth in the Scriptures, and that, as we cannot unaided accom- plish rectification, we need regeneration. DUTY AND VIRTUE 143 fected liberty. In surmounting his passions and inclinations, one becomes a freedman, a freeman and a master. The sage, said the Stoics, feels but is without passion, he is not indul- gent but just to himself and to others, he alone attains to the complete performance of duty, and thus he alone is free. 1 This is the common doctrine of moralists at the present day, and we are exhorted to the exercise of morality because of the worth of liberty. 2 The liberty thus acquired is independence of unrighteous, discordant and distracting rulers. The virtuous man is freed from the dominion of overweening inclinations, of unholy lusts and passions. It is an ideal state, exciting our admira- tion and emulation. 3 But this liberty is merely relative, not absolute. In breaking loose from subjective bondage, we pass under the objective bondage of law, an exchange of one bondage for another. All language supports this view. We are bound to do duty, obliged or under obligation to be just, forbidden to trespass, and must submit to many pains in 1 So Epictetus the freedman, whose favorite maxim was, Bear and for- bear, Av^xov Kal airix ov i is reported by Arrianus, in the '^Eyx^ipidiov, 8, 9, as saying: "Freedom and slavery are but names respectively of virtue and vice, and both depend on the will. ... No one is a slave (SoOXos) whose will is free. . . . Fortune is an evil bond of the body, vice of the soul ; for he is a slave whose body is free, but whose soul is bound ; and, on the con- trary, he is free whose body is bound, but whose soul is free." 2 ' ' The only perfect conception of liberty is perfect obedience to perfect law." — President Seelye. " Intellectual freedom consists in the subjugation of the understanding to the truth, which delivers from errors, prejudices, and the babble of human opinions. Moral freedom consists in the submission of the will to duty, which is the practical outcome of truth. To do as we ought is liberty ; to do as we like is slavery. Spiritual freedom consists in the bowing down of the whole man to God, who is revealed by the truth, and to serve whom is to be master of self and things." — Alexander McLaren. 3 St. Paul says : "He that was called in the Lord, being a bond-servant (SoOXos), is the Lord's freedman (direXetjdepos) ; likewise he that was called, being free (iXetidepos), is Christ's bond-servant (SoOXos). — 1 Corinthians, 7 : 22. For further discussion of the matter, see infra, § 92, 144 OBLIGATION fulfilling the demands of an inexorable law, constant vigi- lance being the price of impunity. This is not liberty, but rigorous bondage. It is a voluntary bondage, one that ex- pands and ennobles our powers, satisfies the all pervading and overwhelming sense of duty, and harmonizes the man with himself and with universal order. Still it is bond- age. Strict morality is strict subjection. Absolute liberty is incompatible with law. SELFISHNESS 145 CHAPTER IX SELFISHNESS § 73. Names of mental states with the prefix self abound in speech and literature. A few are, self-approbation, self- condemnation, self-denial, self-control, self-esteem, self-abhor- rence, self-love. Many of this class of expressions probably have their origin in the fictitious idea of an alter ego. The human mind subjectively distinguishes between the ego as conscious and the ego as represented. The former, the con- sciousness of self, is an element in every feeling, is essential to the existence of any feeling, and is itself recognized as a feeling. The latter, the representation of self, is a normal and habitual cognition, wherein the ego contemplates itself as an object, distinguishes itself from itself, and views this subjective object as though it were really another self, an alter ego. 1 The idea of an alter ego is strengthened by a conflict of desires; the opposed impulses, being a pair, are personified as two selves. Moreover, the mind regards the objectified and personified self as a possession of the wholly 1 Spirit is capable of becoming its own object. I am I ; at once subject and object. " We rind, on reflection, that what we call our spirit transcends, or is, in a sense, independent of the bodily organism on which it otherwise so entirely depends. Metaphysically speaking, this is seen in our self-con- sciousness, or power of separating one's self as subject from one's self as object, a thing wholly inconceivable as the result of any material process, and relating us at once to an order of being which we are obliged to call immaterial.' 1 — Illingworth, Divine Immanence. See Elements of Psy- chology, § 108 sq., and § 226. 146 OBLIGA TION subjective self, and capable of being affected by it, which finds expression in such familiar phrases as one's self, control yourself, I hold myself responsible, and the like. The two are identified in the phrases I myself, he himself, we our- selves, they themselves. This distinction between the conscious ego and the repre- sented ego, is unreal, inasmuch as it contravenes the essential unity of the ego. Evidently, in thought it is a fiction, in speech a metaphor. Hence, although it is a natural, a normal mode of mind, there is need of caution lest it mislead us to commit the fallacy of figure of speech. § 74. The name self-love is commonly used to denote that longing for gratification which marks the craving desires when their end is self. But love is essentially a desire to benefit some other one, and this is contrary to the benefit of self. It necessarily implies a relation between two ; in self there is really and literally but one. The compound word self-love is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, absurd literally, and can be allowed only as a metaphor derived from the fan- ciful idea of an alter ego. But self-love is merely a misnomer, for the reality of the thing thus absurdly named is unquestionable. It is self- interest, or simply interest, egoism, selfishness, the opposite of love. For while love is desire to impart, interest is desire to profit. Egoism makes self the end, seeking one's own enjoyment and welfare at cost of or in disregard of another's. Psychologically it is the supremacy of the craving desires, the appetites and appetencies, over the affections ; either dis- regarding these, or neglecting their call, or what is worse, a more intense and refined egoism, making the affections sub- serve self. 1 Clearly the term self-love is a euphemism, filch- ing the name of love to sanctify what in truth is its contrary, i See supra, §§ 5, 6. SELFISHNESS 147 interest, egoism, selfishness. That, however disguised, it is to be condemned, will sufficiently appear in the sequel. 1 Closely related to the notion of self-love, is that of duty to self. Can I literally owe myself anything? Can I owe myself a dollar ? How is it to be paid ? By passing it from one pocket to another ? Can I in any manner or measure be indebted to myself ? Is anything due me from me ? Duty is essentially the name of a relation between two ; I myself am but one. I cannot possibly be in debt except to some other one. Hence the phrase duty to self is, in its terms, self-eontradictory and absurd. 2 It, too, originates in the fancied alter ego, to whom the ego is said to be indebted as to another person. Clearly it is a metaphor, and deductions from the generic law of duty to this as a species of duty commit the subtle fallacia figurce dictionis. As in the phrase love of self, so in the phrase duty to self, we detect selfish- ness again masquerading, now in the guise and under the sacred name of duty. § 75. But aside from terms the important question arises : Does not moral law command motives and actions that are selfish, that is, such as find in self an end ? Moralists very generally answer affirmatively, and recognize a wide and weighty class of obligations terminating in self, having re- spect exclusively to self, impelled by self-love, and usually entitled duties to self. 3 For example, they teach that every 1 It must be acknowledged that many eminent authorities hold a contrary- view ; e.g., Aristotle, in Nic. Eth., bk. ix, ch. 8, "Of Self-love" ; Butler, Sermons, Preface, and i, xi ; et al. In "the royal law," Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, the phrase, as thyself, evidently does not command self-love, nor does it sanction it, but merely sets up what is in fact, as men are, a high mark for attainment, one beyond the reach of most of us. There is no Scripture that commands or approves self-love. Cf. supra, § 48, note. 2 Let it be remarked that the term obligation is from the verb to oblige, meaning to bind to, to bind together. Obligation binds, and the binding is of at least two together. Cf. supra, § 19, note. 8 With Kant duties to self are even the source of all other duties. See 148 OBLIGATION one owes it to himself to be temperate, that moderation, as opposed to excess in all things, is a duty to one's self, for the sake of one's own personality, and in order to self-culture. Popular speech also quite commonly recognizes, and is dis- posed to emphasize, duties to self, usually holding them para- mount. It is heard in the every-day phrases, I owe it to my- self, he was bound in justice to himself so to do, and the like. Postponing for the present a direct argument of the ques- tion, we here observe merely that, if a man be morally bound in any case whatever to make himself an end, or in other words, if there be any real thing answering to the lame phrase duty to self, then the moral law as heretofore formu- lated in this treatise is quite inadequate. For trespass necessarily implies at least two parties, and the given inter- pretation of duty and of justice, though very wide, presumes always a relation between two. Obviously, then, our view of moral obligation, in its widest comprehension, does not include the notion of duties to self, indeed it excludes self as an end. And truly there is no duty to self. In this case the phrase is not merely a misnomer, for there is nothing corresponding to it in any admissible sense. ' Self is never, can never be a moral end, but on the contrary, all selfishness or egoism is violation of moral law. Duties, obligations universally relate to others, and selfishness is sin. § 76. Let us briefly examine one or two of the duties usu- ally classed as duties to self, and indicate their altruistic interpretation. Grundlegung, etc., S. 56 sq.; Abbott's trans., p. 65 sq. Elsewhere he says : "Supposing that there are no duties of this kind, then there would be no duties of any kind ; for I can only think myself under obligation to others as far as I am under obligation to myself." Per contra, Martineau says: "Duties to self can be saved from contradiction only by an impossibility, namely, the splitting one's self in two, susceptible of reciprocal obligation." SELFISHNESS 149 Temperance or the control of appetites and passions, bringing them into conformity with reason, subjecting them to moral law, is commonly cited as one of the most compre- hensive and prominent duties to self. Is it my duty to be temperate ? Certainly. It is a cardinal virtue. Is it a duty I owe to myself in order to the perfection of my character? Is it a discipline in the process of self-culture for the sake of my personal excellence? Assuredly, say nearly all the moralists, both ancient and modern, it finds in self its end. To be temperate is a primal duty, a weighty obligation ; but it is strictly a duty, an obligation, to others. I owe to God, my maker and highest benefactor, to modulate into harmony the powers he has given me, that I may fulfill the mission on which he has sent me, and accomplish the work he has assigned me in the world. I ought to be temperate, husbanding my energies, that I may serve my family, my neighbor, the community, the state, mankind, as fully and completely as possible. Unless I be temperate, I cannot pay these dues. Moreover, I ought to be an example, in this golden mean, to my fellows, inclining them to its practice. Temperance is one of the highest obligations. It is the top round in the ladder of Christian graces. It ennobles. Still it is due, not to self, but to those around. 1 1 For the graces, see Galatians, 5 : 22, 23. Closely allied to temperance is economy. Do I owe it to myself to be economical ? No ; yet it is a duty, a real duty. I am but a steward, and am bound to economize my time, my energy, my property, because of my relations. Man is instinctively an econ- omist. He naturally takes the short cut, the straight line. Also he takes what lies near as requiring less reach, and is, when calm, sparing even of unnecessary words. The habit is fostered, perhaps, by mere laziness or other selfish consideration ; but one ought always to prefer frugality of means in attaining his proper ends, because this also is due. Economy generally takes part as one rational determinant in choosing, and often, in cases of light moment, is the sole determinant. Carelessness or thought- lessness, excessive animal spirits, excited nerves, may neglect economy of effort ; but this is waste, and all waste is wrong. To be economical, frugal, 150 OBLIGATION The pursuit of truth for the sake of truth is regarded as a refined and noble avocation. " Knowledge for its own sake " is a high sounding phrase ; but it is merely a euphemism concealing the reality, which is knowledge for one's own sake, a refined selfishness. But the worth of knowledge is in its power for good, and he who possesses it in large meas- ure is a king among men. Every one is in duty bound to increase his stores, solely that he may thereby more effi- ciently promote the welfare of the present and the coming generations. Much the same may be said of the duty of preserving life and health and strength. These belong not to me save in trust. They belong to my relatives and friends, to mankind. I am a guardian and agent. So of the duty of physical, mental and moral culture. I am bound to account with usury for the talents intrusted to me. So of cleanliness, sparing of energy, is prudence, wisdom, duty, both private and public, per- sonal and political, a saving for expenditure elsewhere. ' ' Je lone Veconome ; c'est la richesse des pauvres, et la sagesse des riches.'''' — Dumas. The earlier political economists based their science on the aphorism that men are governed by interest, that in affairs selfishness determines conduct. Hence Carlyle dubbed it " the dismal science." But viewing economy as a duty, this reproach disappears, and Economics, so far as it depends on will, becomes a branch of Practical or Applied Ethics. This, however, would not greatly modify its other principles. For it is remarkable that industry, though so largely directed by interest, works out for society about what would follow from a strict observance of duty. The farmer, the manufac- turer, the merchant, whether laboring for his own or for the common weal, accomplishes in the long run the same general result. ' ' To men is not given that God-like unselfishness that thinks only of others' good ; but in working for themselves they are working for us all. We are so bound together that no man can labor for himself alone. Each blow he strikes in his own behalf helps to mold the universe. Stephenson, to win a fortune, invented the steam engine. Shakespeare wrote his plays to keep up a comfortable home. The ambitious' man, building a pedestal for himself, leaves a monument to posterity. Alexander and Caesar fought for their own ends, but, in doing so, they put a belt of civilization half round the earth." Such is the benefi- cent world-ordering of human affairs. SELFISHNESS 151 decency, modesty, propriety, in private as well as in public. So of the preservation of my personal dignity and self-respect, of my honor, sincerity and truthfulness. Even the indul- gence of innocent pleasures should be primarily for recrea- tion, preparing me for renewed efficiency in paying my dues. The supply of necessities should ever be governed by the same general purpose, so that whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, let all be done for others' sake. 1 § 77. This doctrine is not ascetic, but altruistic. 2 It trans- fers the end of all right action from an exclusive self to its fellows. All righteous conduct is disinterested, unselfish. The moral law, Trespass not, or Be just, or Do duty, is equivalent to, Withhold no due, but bestow in due measure. We say in due measure, for not all giving is righteous ; a 1 See 1 Corinthians, 10: 31. Bobert Browning, in Balaustion's Adven- ture, 1. 1212 sq., and 1723 sq., speaking of Herakles banqueting between his labors, expands the aphorism, JSfeque semper arcum tend.it Apollo, thus : He was — " glad to give Poor flesh and blood their respite and relief In the interval 'twixt tight and fight again — All for the world's sake ; frank and free, Out from the labor into the repose, Ere out again and over head and ears F the heart of labor, all for love of men ; Making the most o' the minute, that the soul And body, strained to height a minute since, Might lie relaxed in joy, this breathing-space, For man's sake more than ever ; till the bow, Restrung o' the sudden, at first cry for help, Should send some unimaginable shaft True to the aim and shatteringly through The plate-mail of a monster, save man so." 2 Altruistic, from Lat. alter, other, regardful of others. See infra, § 83, note. Ascetic, from Grk. d6fxos &v eavrcp, the refined and free-spirited will behave, as being a law unto himself. Again in Galatians, 5 : 23, we find : Kara £ twv tolo6twv ovk % adpuv, he who looks upward) ; certain it is that what makes man to be man, is that he alone can turn his face to heaven ; certain it is that he alone yearns for something that neither sense nor reason can supply." — Max Muller, Science of Religion, Lee. 1. " Pronaque ciim spectent animalia ccetera terram, Os homini sublime dedit, coelumque tueri Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollei'e valtus." — Ovid, Metamorphoseon, i, 2. DEITY 201 erly makes no mention of the Deity. But in metaphysics the chief problem is the existence of God. Ethics, which also is not a science of material nature, but of human nature, of man on his spiritual side, in like manner transcends physics. It treats exclusively of mental states and acts, of phenomena of the soul or spirit. The facts on which its theory is based are subjective facts of direct observation by introspection, which are combined with inferences from them and from observed external activities. Here we are wholly within the spiritual sphere. 1 A clear distinction may be made, by a difference in degree, between the human and the superhuman, but who shall draw the line between the natu- ral and the supernatural ? 2 To posit in the spiritual sphere a supreme personal spirit, so far from being unscientific, is simply to complete the content of the sphere with a substance and its attributes, with the conscious personality of a rational being, in kind like to that which gives rise to the theory ; and therefore this complementing of the scheme is strictly scientific. 3 1 See supra, § 18, note. 2 Professor F. Godet, in his Defence of the Christian Faith, Lee. 4, p. 148, Lyttleton's translation, seeks to do so. He defines the supernatural as "any modification of being in nature which is not the effect of the forces with which it is endowed, or of the laws under whose command those forces act. ' ' Of such modifications he finds two cases, ' ' the one existing in nature itself, man; the other, above nature, God," both characterized as super- natural beings by freedom. Passing by the errors of viewing laws as causes, and natural laws as mandatory, we remark that to say the freedom of man, a being within nature, " is not the effect of the forces with which it [nature] is endowed," is inept, unless "nature" be restricted by definition to a meaning more narrow than that commonly understood in scientific discus- sion. Freedom is not something superadded to man's nature ; it is the very law of his being, and essential also in the nature of a personal Deity. See Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, ch. 2. 3 Should anyone flippantly say that the introduction of the Deity into ethical theory renews the Deus ex machina of the ancient drama, a god let down at last, from the machinery overhead, to disentangle the imbroglio on the stage, the answer is easy. Theism posits God as the only explanation 202 OBLIGATION § 100. The ground from which the doctrine of this treatise has thus far been developed, is the natural constitution of man. His several powers of intellect and will, his emotional capacity, and the impulse to activity in his motive desires, have each a normal and cooperative function. Herein is dis- cerned the principle that it is right to gratify normal desire, together with the supreme law of humanity commanding the constant order of facts that ought to be, the single impera- tive of trespass, duty, justice or loving service. Now, it may reasonably be asked whether the common constitution of human beings is to be regarded as an ultimate ground, an original source of obligation, beyond which there is no determinant. Positivism answers affirmatively, . which consists with its rigid empiricism. But we have tried to show that there is for us something more than experience. Evolutionism finds an antecedent determinant in the environment, a combina- tion of second causes, under whose influence the human con- stitution has been developed. But when we consider the great variety of environment to which the several races of mankind have been subjected, we should expect, on this view, to find a corresponding variety of constitution, and consequent varieties of moral law ; whereas, however great the variations in degree especially of intelligence, and the variety of constructions built upon the law, still, throughout history and everywhere, mankind is one, and the law is one. 1 of cosmic order, as both establishing and maintaining. If from the drama of human life his part be left out, then indeed it were a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel. But on recognizing him as its author, director, and principal personage, present throughout, combining, regulating, overruling the great lines of action amid a free play of characters, the whole becomes intelligible, the obscure clear, and the ultimate solution foreseen. 1 The pessimism of Pascal led him to say, in Pensges, that justice on one side of the Pyrenees is a different thing from justice on the other side. But even Hobbes found place to say : " The laws of Nature [meaning of Human DEITY 203 This essentially permanent uniformity points distinctly to an origin for the human constitution in a cause beyond itself and its environment, and, on the principle of like effect like cause, to a common cause, to a unity in the originating cause. 1 The existence of an omnipotent and consistent maker and ruler, is the only satisfactory explanation of these significant facts that has been or can be offered, and this explanation alone fulfills the demand of ethical theory. § 101. Many theistic moralists hold that the will of God is the original and ultimate ground of obligation. He has made us as it hath pleased him, revealing his will in us, and in our relations to each other and to himself. A reverent interpretation of nature and of history enables us to under- stand his will more clearly, and to these he has added a distinct revelation of it in the holy scriptures. Had it pleased him to make us and our surroundings otherwise, or merely to issue different, even contrary, commandments, our obligations would have been different from what they are, since his express will is their sole, sufficient and final ground. That the will of God, however revealed, defines our obliga- tions is unquestionable. But we cannot regard his authority as decisive, if it be merely arbitrary ; for this view implies the possibility of contradictions that are revolting. Should he capriciously command lying, murder, theft, all heaven and earth would rebel. The doctrine unwittingly represents him as a tyrant ruling by fear, liable to transient whims inverting right and wrong, disordering order, compounding felony, falsifying truth, thereby divesting his intelligent Nature; see supra, § 18, note] are immutable and eternal. What they forbid can never be lawful ; what they command can never be unlawful." — JDe Cive, vol. ii, p. 46. 1 See Elements of Inductive Logic, § 21 ; and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 384 of Meiklejohn's translation. 204 OBLIGATION subjects of all reliable knowledge of himself and of his crea- tions. Such notion is psychologically, philosophically and logically absurd. 1 We must look beyond the will of God for the ultimate determinant of obligation, into that which determines his will, into his original, eternal, essential nature. Necessarily and rightly we conceive of him as a spirit, having harmoni- ous attributes constituting his nature, in which is no vari- ableness nor shadow of turning. Being in himself the embodiment of truth, it is impossible for him to lie ; being essentially just, he can never justify crime ; such self-contra- diction would dethrone him, would be the suicide of God. His omnipotence is not absolute, but limited to what accords with his nature, and his every action is confined to the strait and narrow way of righteousness. The macrocosm, the world, " answering his fair idea," conforms in the fixed material laws to his unchanging essence, and the uniformity of nature is the faithfulness of God. The microcosm, man, the express image of his person, is formed to conform in the fixed moral law to the same unchanging essence, and the oneness of justice is the righteousness of God. It is not the will, but the nature of the Deity that is the original and ultimate ground of obligation. 2 1 " Amongst the rational principles of morality," says Kant, "the onto- logical conception of perfection, notwithstanding its defects, is better than the theological conception which derives morality from an absolutely perfect divine will." If we avoid a gross circle tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain, ' ' the only conception of the divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of the attributes of desire for glory and dominion, combined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance ; and any system of morals erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality." — Grundlegung, etc., Abbott's trans., p. 89. 2 " Here is the Ground of Right ; the nature and character of God, the great designer and creator of all things ; and my nature and character so far as I am the expression of this creator and his design. I am right when energizing and controlling myself in accordance with these ; my rights are DEITY 205 § 102. The final problem in our obligation to each other is now readily solved. The prior examination of human nature found it constituted for a free and harmonious play of its powers in the exercise of loving service, and this was recognized as the sum of obligation. Further examination has disclosed that human nature is derived from and akin to the divine nature, so that in promoting the welfare of each other, men are conforming to the divine will arising from the divine nature. The maker and ruler has given to every man more or less ability to promote the common welfare, and holds him accountable for its exercise. Whoever unwar- rantably interferes with this service trespasses both on the servant and on the served, and thereby violates the divine will and nature. Much has been said about the divine right of kings. Every man's right is' a divine right ; both because of its origin, and because it involves the right of the Deity himself. Hence the sacredness of human rights, and the paramount obligation to respect them. Arising from the very nature of God, they are invariable, inalienable, irrevo- cable, grounded in eternal justice and truth, and he who would violate them is at war with the inflexible Almighty. Along with our obligation to each other is our obligation whatever may be necessary to my so doing. By knowing and doing the right, I attain to excellence ; excellence brings enjoyment ; and in the two combined I find blessedness." — A. T. Bledsoe in Southern Review for Oct., 1875, p. 436. The theistic moralist may learn much from heathen philosophy. " This then, as it appears to me," says Cicero, "has been the decision of the wisest men, that law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor estab- lished by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding and forbidding. Therefore they called that primal and supreme law the mind of God enjoining or for- bidding each separate thing in accordance with reason. On which account it is that this law, which the gods have given to the human race, is so justly praised. For it is the reason and mind of a wise Being equally able to urge us to good, and to deter us from evil." — Laws, i, 4. 206 OBLIGATION to God. To him is due, in the most comprehensive sense, loving service. We are bound to love God for his own sake, and all others for God's sake. 1 The recognition of him as our personal creator and ruler, and of our obligation to him as his creatures and subjects, leading to adoration, is religion, the binding of man to God. 2 Thus ethics expands over reli- gion by comprehending the author of our being, the father of our spirit, the eternal One from whom all our obligations arise, and in whom all our obligations end. He desires all that is disorderly to become orderly, and calls upon his rational free creatures to gratify, so far as in them lies, this desire ; hence it is hardly too much to say that our conduct affects the welfare and happiness of Our Father. 3 To serve rightly our fellows for his sake, is to serve him ; and a tres- pass upon a fellow man is a trespass upon him. Moreover, he has a supreme right to our reverential worship, and omit- ting or neglecting it is using our freedom, which having given he will not revoke, to restrict his liberty in gathering up his due. Contemplating, inversely, the relation of God to man, we observe that the obligation is not properly reciprocal. We 1 (Which brings the peace of God that passeth understanding. " D'un cceur qui t'aime, Mon Dieu, qui peut troubler la paix? II cherche en tout ta volonte supreme, Et ne se cherche jamais. Sur la terre, dans le ciel meme, Est-il d'autre bonheur que la tranquille paix D'un cceur qui t'aime ? " — Eacine, Athalie, close of Act iii. 2 Religion, from Lat. religio ; etymology doubtful. ' ' Allied to religens, fearing the gods, pious ; and therefore not derived from religare, to bind, as often supposed." — Skeat. Lactantius of the third century, followed by Augustine of the fifth, and many others, held that it is from re-ligare, to bind back or anew. This, however, seems to refer to the Tall, which is hardly allowable to an ante-classical word. 3 "To do good and to communicate forget not; for with such sacrifices God is well pleased." — Hebrews, 13 : 16. DIETY 207 cannot think of the Deity as under any obligation, under any law, under anything ; for this contradicts his essentially absolute supremacy and sovereignty. But while it cannot correctly be said that he is bound to be steadfast in purpose, and faithful in promise, it is very certain that he will be thus, and all that is righteous, because of his ultimate nature. 1 Now, as the universality of physical, psychical and ethical law indicates his unity, so does the total content of ethical law, loving service, indicate his benevolence. He seeks the welfare and consequent happiness of his sentient creatures in his own constant loving service of them, both by direct providence, and by the obligation laid upon them to serve each other. Hence are we confident of his inexor- able and perfected justice, essential to entire welfare, in which justice every life shall eventually be complete ; also of his tender mercy to the erring, he having opened a way, through infinite self-sacrifice, whereby to be just and yet justify the penitent, and secure to him eternal welfare and blessedness. Our God is no egoist, but an altruist. He did not make us, nor does he rule us, for his own glory, but for our own beatitude. God is love. 1 We speak of his justice and holiness, but never of his duty or virtue. u No imperatives hold for the divine will, or in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law. ' ' — Kant, Grundlegung, u. s. w. § 43. Ilav to aw/ACL (TvvapixoXoyovjxevov kcu cru/x/3i/?a£o/Aevov Sta 7rdo~r)f South Carolina, that there is no instance in that State since the Revolution of a divorce of any kind, either by sentence of a court of justice or l\v act of the legislature. In all other States divorce a vinculo may be granted by courts of justice for adultery. In New York the jurisdiction of the courts as to absolute divorce for causes subsequenl bo marriage Is confined to the single case of adultery; but in most of the other States, In addition to adultery, intolerable ill-usage, or willful desertion, or unheard of absence, or habitual drunkenness, or some of them, will authorize a decree for divorce a vinculo under different modifications and restrictions." — Kim. Commenr taries, iv, 105. The laws relating bo divorce have undergone many oha since the publication of these Commentaries in 1830. 230 ORGAKIZATIOK § 116. Persons of full age, and emancipated from parental authority, often do not marry for some years, or perhaps never marry. The social status of such persons is more or less abnormal according as they are more or less absolved from family connection. For the family is the basis of social organization, and since these are now but external appen- dages to some one, they cannot be accounted more tk a a fractional members of society at large. 1 Such persons are unhappily at great disadvantage in respect of moral culture. For the conditions of complete develop- ment are lacking to those destitute of the familiar objects around which the strongest and best affections of the human soul gather and grow, and whose lack it is not possible fully to compensate by other lines of moral activity. In these other lines, however,. exceptional attainments are often made, commanding high respect, and rounding out a useful life. § 117. When the family circle is completed by the birth of children, a new and wide field is opened for the cultiva- tion of ethical graces. Moral possibilities, which otherwise are forever latent, become patent. The potential becomes actual, and nature has not planted in vain. No man is ever wholly a man until he is a husband and a father ; and, more emphatically, no woman is wholly a woman until she is a wife and mother. A babe is a pledge of love, an additional and powerful tie, a sacred trust, calling out and taxing the moral energies, and making an unlimited demand on loving service. All that is beautiful in human nature blooms under the influence of this fertilizing relation. It is easy to adore the Madonna. 2 1 It is at least curious to note that a prerequisite to membership in the ancient Jewish Sanhedrin was that one should be a husband and a father ; perhaps because this would qualify him to be a wiser and more compassion- ate judge. See Bunsen, Hippolytus, ii, 344. 2 It is a famous saying of Froebel : " Kommt, lasst uns unsern Kindern TEE FAMILY 231 The familiar care and provident rearing of children con- stantly exercises the domestic virtues, tending directly to the perfection of manhood and womanhood. The responsibility and difficulty are of the gravest. The culture should be dominated by the view that, in the order of nature, the child is destined to moral independence, and to membership in society. In being prepared for this, it has many and very sacred rights. Its parents are bound, as their function in the family organism, to provide for its healthful maintenance suitable to their rank in society, for its education, intellec- tual, moral and religious, and, in general, for its present and prospective welfare. Great laxity of restraint is likely to be ruinous; but, on the other hand, severe restrictions, a rigid molding of character, opinions, and religious creed, is hardly less to be deprecated as an injurious trespass on the right of the child to generous culture, and the free growth of its individuality. 1 The office of brothers and sisters in this organic relation is affectionate sympathy, and mutual helpfulness, which should extend throughout life. As sons and daughters they are bound to honor father and mother by a willing and pleased obedience to their rightful authority, and by a prompt readiness to promote their welfare. Also they are bound to guard sedulously the honor of the family name, and to seek actively the advancement of the common interest. leben. Come, let us live for, with and in our children. Then will the life of our children bring us peace and joy, then shall we begin to grow wise, to be wise. 1 ' — Education of Man, § 42. i " The feeling of community, first, uniting a child with its mother, father, brothers and sisters, and resting on a higher spiritual unity, to which later is added the unmistakable discovery that father, mother, brothers, Bisters, human beings in general, feel and know themselves to be in community and unity with a higher principle, with humanity, with God — this feeling of community is the very first germ, the very first beginning of all true reli- gious spirit, of all genuine yearning for unhindered oniflcation with the Eternal, with God. 1 '— idem, §21. 232 OE GANIZA TION § 118. This human institution, the family, is preeminently natural, being physically determined. Those born into it are involuntarily and inseparably its members. By its pri- macy it stands as the unit of society and of the State, with- out derogation from the distinct personality, moral status and obligation of its individual members. Yet it is a whole. Even when some part or parts are lacking, it is still a unit. It is not a logical whole, a genus, for its parts are not species or kinds of family. It is an integral whole ; not col- lective, as a cluster of grapes, but organic, as a flower whose central organs, stamen and pistil, yield germ and seed, within a corolla. It is an individual, indivisible in itself, and sepa- rate from every other. Less clear perhaps, but not less true, is it that a family is a single personality. The definition of a person is a being conscious of obligation. Now there is a consciousness com- mon to all members of a family, an intelligent apprehension of moral law which is the same in each, a judgment which, under the influence of common interest, is assimilated into one, a pervading sentiment, a united impulse to effectuate a single will. The obligation of some one family as an organic whole to some one man as its benefactor, or to some other family, or to general society, is matter of familiar speech and acknowledgment, and the common consciousness of such obligation constitutes its unique personality, quite distin- guishable from the peculiar personality of its several mem- bers. To this conception of its distinct personality may be added the possession of family traits in features, manners, customs, habits, and in general, of character, often sharply marked. Moreover, what wounds one member, wounds all ; the honor, dignity and welfare of the whole, is in common keeping. 1 1 This moral solidarity is not a product of refined civilization. In rude, primitive ages it found abundant recognition ; for example, in the infliction THE FAMILY 233 § 119. The individual personality of a family as an organ- ized unit, distinct from the personality of its members, is manifest in the significant fact that it claims a life beyond the present generation. Its ancestry, extending back for ages is its pride, and its posterity in an indefinite future is its hope. What it has been confers titles of honor, and what it may become excites anxious solicitude. The death of a member breaks in upon its present entirety, but does not interrupt its continuity. Only by sterility and death com- bined is it extinguished, and this is accounted a special loss to society, a public and private misfortune. 1 A family of the present generation, inheriting the honor and wealth of the same family in preceding generations, rec- ognizes its moral obligation to maintain and rightly use the trust, thus discharging a sacred debt due the dead. Also it recognizes its moral obligation to the coming generation in provision for its welfare, thus discharging a sacred debt due descendants, including those yet unborn. That one is thus bound to pay debts due the deceased and the unborn, is not fanciful sentiment, nor figurative speech, but real, literal ethics. Current expressions and approved literature recog- nize in many ways the obligation as especially incumbent on of punishment due to the offense of a single member upon the whole of his family ; the guilt of one, it was held, making all alike guilty. This Lingers with us in the social ostracism of an innocent member of a dishonored or disreputable family. Put merit for guilt, gratitude and love for vengeance, and we have a law of the moral order holding good Coral! time, for the high- est civilization, for the most, refined moral consciousness. 1 Witness the deification and worship of ancestry, bo commoD among heathen peoples, ancient and modern. The law of primogeniture in Eng- land, and in most of the States of Europe, by which, the father dying intes- tate, his eldest son inherits the real estate, i.e. land- and buildings, in pref- erence to and in exclusion of all other members of the family, clearly Intends to confirm its continuity. So also the practice of entail. The preference In inheritance of males to females, found in ancient Jewish, Athenian (but not in Roman) law, and in the laws of some modern Stale.-., e.g. the Salic law, likewise Was apparently intended tO perpetuate more distinctly the family. 234 ORGANIZATION the family, whose individuality and personality extend through generations that come and go, yet perpetuate its organic unity. § 120. The foregoing considerations enable us to under- stand more clearly the ethical principles that regulate the holding and disposing of property. 1 Property owned by either party at time of marriage, and that acquired afterward, is, by virtue of the marriage, the common property of the family. That either husband or wife should have property at disposal apart from and inde- pendently of , the other, though often it is so arranged, con- tradicts the unity of the relation, drawing a line of separation and making a distinction that ought never to exist. Such an arrangement is inconsistent with that entire surrender of all the interests of life into the common keeping which the marriage bond requires; and in so far the marriage is but partial. The reserve implies a distrust that is chilling, and likely to produce a discord that is fatal. It is a withholding trespass. Evidently, then, the family property should not be largely ventured in trade, or otherwise disposed of, without the free consent of all members, including the children, in whom also property rights are vested by birth, when they become suffi- ciently mature to appreciate and rightly judge the interests involved. Yet, be it remembered, that each and all should seek, by a reasonable yielding, to assimilate their views and wishes, thereby attaining a unity of will which thus becomes the will of the family. Also it is evident that the management of the family prop- erty in detail must be left to some one member. This seems naturally to devolve upon the husband and father who, according to the usual and approved order, takes charge of 1 See supra, § 38. THE FAMILY 235 the family interests outside of home, and hence is best acquainted with public affairs. Because property is held and ordinary business transacted in his name, he is apt to regard himself as exclusive and irresponsible owner. This error, pervading society, stands greatly in need of correction. 1 § 121. Distribution by testament of the property of a family is, for like reasons, by the hand and in the name of its ostensible head ; also for the reason that, preparatory to his decease, when the house band is loosed, and the family disintegrated, there is need of a special and provisory adjust- ment of property rights by the one to whom their care has been chiefly committed. In any such adjustment the united consensus of all members should be had, so that together with the avoidance of any actual trespass, complaint of wrong may also be forestalled. Testamentary distribution gives rise to many difficult questions which largely occupy the courts. The funda- mental principles involved are, however, sufficiently clear. A producer has a right to use and dispose of his products at will, and this will must be effective beyond his decease, else a great incentive to industry and accumulation would be lost, projects for the benefit of the coming generation would not be devised and driven, and social progress would be hindered, inasmuch as each generation would have to make a new be- ginning. But let it be observed that the home management and industry, its provision for rest and refreshment, its cheer- ing influence, its trifling comforts even, are very important elements in the efficiency of the producer, and thereby enter 1 In the United States, when the head of a family dies intestate, distri- bution to the survivors, is made of the property according to civil statute. and guardians of minors are appointed. There are differences, bul lie ex- istence in any form of such statutes is a distinct, recognition l>v the State that property rights in what was an undivided possession inhere in each member of a disrupted family. 236 ORGANIZATION into his product; so that all members of the home circle, but especially the husband and wife, are partners in business, and since they share in the producing, are entitled to share in the production, both in consuming and in disbursing. Beside this, it should be distinctly recognized that all posses- sions are held and managed as trusts, and their agreed testa- mentary distribution should be regulated accordingly. The testator is bound to provide suitably for the family, thus dis- charging his primary obligation as its trustee. A surplus may rightly become matter of bequest to collaterals, to friends, or to the general public, in the founding or endowing hospi- tals, schools, libraries, and such like benefactions, according to the best judgment of the trustee representing the family in this discharge of its alien obligations. THE COMMUNITY 237 CHAPTER in THE COMMTXNTTY § 122. Human beings manifest a strong disposition to gather into groups more or less permanent. In some of these population is massed, as in cities ; in others it is more sparse, as in villages, hamlets, neighborhoods. Hence in any inhab- ited region, it is easy to point out centers of population, though the circumference be quite indefinite. Besides the gregarious instinct of the human animal, there are many rational determinants of this tendency, both economical and' ethical. Every one owes his existence to progenitors and also is indebted for its continuance, for all physical means, conveniences and comforts of living, for all intellectual and moral culture, so entirely to association, more or less intimate, with his fellows, that all the interests of life, his whole wel- fare, is bound up with them. Strict independence is a prac- tical impossibility. 1 1 "La nature de rhomme le parte a vivre en soci£te\ Quelle qu'en soit la cause, le fait se manifeste en toute occasion. Partout ou Ton a rencontre' des hommes, ils vivaient en troupes, en herdes, en corps de nation. Peut- etre est ce afin d'unir leur forces pour leur surety commune ; peut-etre arm de pourvoir plus ais^ment a leur besoins ; toujours il est vrai qu'il est dans la nature de rhomme de se reunir en socidte\ comme font les abeilles et plusieurs especes d'animaux ; on remarque des traits communs dans toutes ces reunions d'hoinmes, en quelque parti du mondequ'ils habitent." — Say, Cours d' Econ. Polit. " The impulse which leads to combination lies in the necessity of supple- menting the force of the individual by that of others, without which the aims of life are not completely attainable. Here belong not merely the con- ceivable advantages which one receives from another, but above all the social intercourse itself, without which a really human development is incon- ceivable." — Lotze, Tract. Phil., § 56. 238 OB GANIZA TION A group of people thus specially related by living in prox- imity is a community. 1 This is not merely a collection but a body of people ; for the necessities of its members which draw them together determine at once an organic constitution. 2 Each member contributes more or less directly to the welfare of every other, and to the welfare of the whole, in which welfare he participates. The variations of function are deter- mined by the pressure of various needs, and by the fitness of various abilities to meet them. There is a tacit consensus in the distribution of these functions ; but since there is no formal and definite enactment of a constitution, the com- munity is often spoken of as unorganized society ; whereas, though not formally, yet it is essentially an organism, neces- sitated by the interdependence of its members. 3 1 " Common = public, general, usual, vulgar; Fr. from Lat. com-, for cum, with, and munis, complaisant, obliging, binding by obligation." — Skeat. Community, from Lat. communitas, fellowship, from cum-, together with, mutually, and munis, ready to serve. 2 " Quam fluctus diversi, quam mare conjuncti." 3 " A quoi bon la socie'te' ? Eestez dans la nature. Soyez les sauvages. Otaiti est un paradis. Seulement, dans ce paradis on ne pense pas. Mieux vaudrait encore un enfer intelligent qu'un paradis bete. Mais non, point d'enfer. Soyons la socie'te' humaine. Plus grande que nature ? Oui. Si vous n'ajoutez rien a la nature, pourquoi sortir de la nature ? Alors, con- tentez-vous du travail comme la fourmi, et du miel comme Pabeille. Restez la b§te ouvriere au lieu d'etre 1' intelligence reine. Si vous ajoutez quelque chose a la nature, vous serez n^cessairement plus grand qu'elle ; aj outer, c'est augmenter, c'est grandir. La socie'te', c'est la nature sublimed. Je veux tout ce qui manque aux ruches, tout ce qui manque aux f ourmilieres, les monuments, les arts, la poCsie, les heros, les ge'nies. Porter des fardeaux kernels, ce n'est pas la loi de Phomme. Non, non, non, plus de parias, plus d'esclaves plus de forcats, plus de damne's ! je veux que chacun des attri- buts de Phomme soit un symbole de civilisation et un patron de progres ; je veux la liberte devant Pesprit, PegalitC devant le cceur, la fraternity devant Pame. Non ! plus de joug ! Phomme est fait, non pour trainer des chaines, mais pour ouvrir des ailes. Plus d'homme reptile. Je veux la transfiguration de la larve en lepidoptere, je veux que le ver de terre se vivante, change en fieur et s'envole." — Victor Hugo, Quatrevingt-Treize, p. 495. THE COMMUNITY 239 § 123. Recur to the primary ethical principle that every one has a right to gratify his normal desires, and to this, be- side, that it is his obligation not merely passively to allow their impulse, but actively to seek their gratification, and it is manifest that the fulfillment of obligation is impracticable apart from society. 1 For, no class of normal desires can properly be gratified without reference to associates ; but especially the affections, which are conditioned on the presen- tation of sentient objects, can have no exercise in solitary life. In such life the chief est, indeed the sole function of humanity is perverted and comes to naught. Mankind is a brother- hood, and it is only by close fraternization, only by being a man among men, that it is possible to be wholly a man. Whoever lives his life in its natural and rightful fullness is a constant recipient from his fellows of the necessary means, for which he is dependent on them, and therefore is constantly incuriing an indebtedness which requires a constant reciprocal activity to repay. These considerations forbid an ascetic life, which, under the guise of righteous self-denial, renounces invigorating en- joyment, and thus leads to such an impoverishment of spirit- ual power that its dues go unpaid. 2 Nor can the life of a recluse be approved, which seeks self-sufficiency in solitude and retired contemplation, or an escape from thronging ills by a timid retreat into privacy, idle ease, and indifference to the common welfare. Likewise we must condemn the life of a reserved student who, enamored of truth, withdraws from familiar intercourse, and in the scholarly seclusion of his library seeks to accumulate knowledge with no intent or thought of sharing it, and thereby promoting the well-being even of his compeers. 3 These several forms of social seques- i See supra, §§ 25, 35. 2 See supra, § 77. 8 " We are right in being enthusiastic for science only on accr.ir.it of the fact, partly that we discern the usefulness of its impulse for the sum-total of 240 OR GANIZA TION tration can be approved only when they are temporary, and for the purpose of recuperation and preparation for better service in subsequent life. Thus only can they be acquitted of selfishness, and accepted as transient phases of that active life of practical benevolence which alone develops the moral dignity of true manhood. 1 § 124. The reciprocal obligations of the members of a com- munity are recognized in a code of social intercourse, an unwritten common law, which prevails throughout and regu- lates communication. This law, like the unwritten Common Law of the courts, is a detail of rights and duties. Both sys- tems originated in the exigencies of popular intercourse, and human life so well as to renounce all claim to see a special application for every individual (einzelne) truth, and partly that the general character of truth, its consistency, and the manifoldness of the consequences that follow with certainty from a few principles, places before our eyes an actualization (Verwirklichung) of what we ought to attain in the moral world by our own conduct." — Lotze, Tract. Phil., § 30. 1 Moral isolation is not in being retired, but in being selfish. One may be "Tar from the madding crowd's ignoble strife," yet in a communion that braces and strengthens ; and amid the turmoil of the throng, he may be apart, alone. 41 To sit on rocks, to muse o'er flood and fell, To slowly trace the forest's shady scene, Where things that own not man's dominion dwell, And mortal foot hath ne'er, or rarely heen ; To climb the trackless mountain all unseen, With the Avild flock that never needs a fold ; Alone o'er steeps and foaming falls to lean ; This is not solitude ; 'tis but to hold Converse with nature's charms, and view her stores unrolled. But 'midst the crowd, the hum, the shock of men, To hear, to see, to feel, and to possess, And roam along, the world's tired denizen, With none who bless us, none whom we can blesd } Minions of splendour shrinking from distress ! None that, with kindred consciousness endued, If we were not, would seem to smile the less Of all that flatter'd, follow'd, sought and sued ; This is to be alone ; this, this is solitude." — Byron, Childe Harold, Canto ii, 25, 26. THE COMMUNITY 241 by degrees have been fully developed : and both are but va- riations, explications and applications of the law of trespass. The conventions of society are known as the rules of good breeding and good manners. They require comity, a proper consideration and respect for the minor rights of each other, a delicate regard for one another's wishes, feelings and pe- culiarities, a prompt attention to wants, their serviceable anticipation, a complaisant readiness in assistance ; this is politeness. In the denser portions of a community there is constant call for its exercise, so that people, even those of otherwise indifferent culture, become by attrition polished, that is, polite ; they are civil, and the higher ranks are cour- teous or courtly in address. To this must be added the spe- cial code of social etiquette observed in refined circles, which descends to minutise, and is so rigid in its required decorum that an infraction of it is sometimes less readily condoned than \dce. All such conventionalities arise from the union or consolidation of interests and responsibilities, and betoken the solidarity of the community. 1 § 125. A prime condition of the wholesomeness of a com- munity is the truthfulness of its members. The obligation to be truthful in both word and deed is clear. Every one has a right to certain services from his fellow-man, and a usually just and sometimes very important claim is for an opinion, judgment, information, direction, advice, sympathy. If these be reserved when due, it is a trespass, a restriction of a rightful liberty to use and profit by them. Still greater i " Nicht die Sittlichkeit regiert die Welt, sondern eine verhartete Form derselben : die Sitte. Wie die Welt nun einmal geworden ist, verzeiht sic eher eine Verletzung der Sittlichkeit als eine Verletzung der Sitte. Wohl den Zeiten und den Volkern, in denen Sitte und Sittlichkeit noch Kins ist. Aller Kampf dreht sich darum, den Widersprueh dieser Beiden aufznheben und die erstarrte Form der Sitte wiederum iiir die innere Sittlichkeit fliissig zu machen." — Auerbach. 242 OR GANIZA TION is the trespass, if they be misstated, thereby misinforming and misleading the recipient, for then his trust is violated, his confidence outraged. If the claim be allowed, the expres- sion by word or deed must be true to the thought. 1 But the claim is not always just, not always to be allowed. We are not always bound to speak; often it is right and wise to be silent. Nor, if we speak, are we always bound to tell the whole truth ; in which case the extent of the reserve is matter for conscientious judgment, having care not to mis- lead by the partial statement. This right of private reserve is superseded by the courts in the interest of society at large, and the witness required to tell the whole truth without reserve. Whether deceit in any form is ever justifiable is a ques- tion that has been discussed for centuries, and is still unset- tled. On the one hand it is affirmed that deceit is in its very nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of right and justice ; and on the other hand it is asserted that certain emergencies may justify a departure from ordinary rules of conduct, and render deceit not only justifiable bat obligatory. This question of the ages is not to be answered in a few words. We must be content here with saying : first, that a lie is never justifiable ; secondly, that not every deception is to be accounted a lie, e.g., the myth of Santa Claus ; and thirdly, if the definition of a deception be allowed wider scope than the definition of a lie, yet is a deception so rarely right and duty that every one should practice habitual truth- fulness, deviating from it with great hesitation, and only when the justification is beyond all question. 2 1 See Elements of Psychology, §§ 218, 251. In north China, a request for information is usually introduced, by the polite phrase: "May 1 borrow your light ? " 2 See Trumbull's J. Lie Never Justifiable; especially ch. vi, which cites many authorities ancient and modern, heathen and Christian, pro and contra. To these add Kant, who, in a tractate Uberein vermeintes Recht aus Men- THE COMMUNITY 243 § 126. The general obligation to be truthful takes a num- ber of specific forms. Beside this duty in the commonplace talking of familiar intercourse, we place the formal tie of a promise, written, oral, or indirectly implied in mere behavior. The obligation in such case is strengthened by the fact that the promisee, in reliance on the faithfulness of the promiser, may in his life conduct order important matters with refer- ence to the promise, and suffer injury or even disaster should it fail. A promise given under an essential misunderstand- ing, or, since we cannot accurately forecast the future, in case the duty of its observance is superseded by some higher unforeseen duty with which it is radically inconsistent, is null. This does not endorse the loose aphorism that a bad promise is better broken than kept ; for, if its badness work merely the private personal injury of the promiser, unless ruinous in an intolerable extreme, he is not thereby dis- charged of the obligation. We commend him that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not. A promise made under compulsion cannot be claimed by the promisee, yet it meas- urably binds the promiser because of respect for his word. In no case, however, is a promise obligatory if the fulfillment be criminal, for it can never be duty to commit crime. A contract or covenant differs from a simple promise in that it implies an exchange of services, and reciprocal obliga- tion. 1 It is usually under the protection of special statute, an outcome of the moral element, of that mutual trust which is the basis of social order. Contracts are of endless variety, schenliebe zu liigen (Auflage R. unci S. vii, S. 205) pronounces strongly for the negative. A translation of this tractate is appended to Abbott's h'anVs Theory of Ethics, p. 431 sq. Cf. Lotze, Grundziige, § 4"». 1 "A contract is an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing." — Blackstokb, <'<>mmentaries, etc, bk. ii, p. 442. The Constitution of the United States, Article i, Section 10, Forbids any State to enact a "law impairing tin; obligation of contracts/ 1 which clause has given rise to a vast deal of litigation. 244 OR GANIZA TION and affect nearly every detail of private and public life ; and if their binding character were not fully recognized there would be no security in affairs. A deception practiced by either party in making a contract invalidates it; but both parties must abide the consequences of carelessness, thought- lessness, or stupidity. Common honesty in trade, and in business dealings gener- ally, is another form of truthfulness. Exchange of services, of goods, and of other forms of property, has the advantage of being estimated numerically in the medium of exchange, money, which gives exactness to the mutual obligation, and sharply expresses its violation. The interests involved in such transactions are so widely interlaced that fraud excites general indignation and reprobation. There is hardly any form of trespass that incurs such deep and lasting disgrace as dishonesty. 1 § 127. The membership of an organized community does not consist in merely so many men, women and children, standing singly as discrete elements coalescing into a con- crete body. A strong tendency to such individualism has marked the nineteenth century, in France, in England, and even more positively in the United States. It cries out for 1 It is worth noting that honor and honesty are, etymologically, the same word. Cf. Cicero's usage of honesias. "The advantage to mankind," says Mill, " of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life ; the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable." — Polit. Econ., bk. i, ch. 7, § 5. Says Professor James : "A social organism of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the cooperation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is ever attempted." — The Will to Believe, p. 24. THE COMMUNITY 245 liberty, equality, fraternity, and demands that creed, race, and even sex shall be ignored on the forum, at the polls, and in the schools. Now, while each individual man and woman is a distinguishable member of society, it should be observed, in opposition to individualism, that each is primarily a mem- ber of a family whereby he or she is socialized, that the family is properly the organized and organizing unit of so- ciety, and that a community consists fundamentally of asso- ciated families. This incidentally appears in the fact that the social standing of the individual is in general determined by that of his family, above which it is difficult to rise, and below which one rarely falls. The question, What is he? asks after his vocation ; but, Who is he ? asks after his family. A variety of minor organizations are usually formed by voluntary association, which also are integrant members ; as, social or literary clubs, and benevolent societies. Beside these are business firms of two or more members, stock com- panies, cooperative associations, and guilds or trade-unions. Such combinations for more effective achievement are often legally incorporated, and usually have a contract or articles of agreement, or a written organic law or constitution, stating the ends they seek and the means, and defining the functions of members and officers as duties ; the variations in duty arising from a specializing of functions so as to constitute an efficient cooperative whole. A special class of subordi- nate organisms is seen in the schools, which also usually have a formal constitution and laws defining the duties of members, official and unofficial. They are instituted specially to meet the debt due the next generation, are essential to the perpetuity rather than to the maintenance of society, and form a bond, a historical enchainment, between its present and its future. Each of the foregoing minor organizations is itself a mem- 246 OB GANIZA TION ber of the community, having, as already said of the family, an individual personality distinguishable from the individual personality of its components. 1 Moreover, although the bounds of any single community be ill defined, still commu- nities are recognized as more or less distinct from one another. Now each of these as an organic whole has not only obligations to its various members, but also to neighbor- ing communities with which it is in communication. Thus the community as a whole is an individual, a personality, with a conscience, and a moral judgment in the consensus of its members, which passes upon its own character and con- duct, upon that of its several members, and upon that of affiliated communities. § 128. The organic nature of a community distributing various functions or offices and consequent duties among its members, is clearly seen in its division of labor. The neces- sities of life necessitate labor, but no one by his own labor alone can surely supply even these, much less can he produce the many requisites to comfortable living. The civilized man has many desires or wants that have become so habitual as to be classed as necessaries. 2 For the full gratification of these he is dependent on the productive labor of his fellows. Hence the pressure of such wants molds the community into an organism, in which each works for every other, and they for him ; also he labors for the welfare of the whole, and the end of the whole is the welfare of each. Thus a simple community will comprise a shoemaker, a tailor, a carpenter, a blacksmith, a shopkeeper, a printer, a doctor, a lawyer, a schoolmaster, and a curate. These exchange services or 1 See supra, § 118. 2 Said Voltaire: "Le superflu, c'est le vrai n^cessaire." This paradox was revived by Charles Boyle, saying :' " Only give me the luxuries of life, and I will dispense with the necessaries." THE COMMUNITY 247 products, and a variety of duties is a consequence of the organization. A discussion of division of labor is not proper to a treatise on Ethics, but belongs rather to the theory of Economics. 1 It is appropriate, however, to observe that, in addition to its economical advantage, it has the moral advantage of giving rise to the common virtues of honesty, industry, and respect for order, and to a sense of personal responsibility, the re- sponsibility of each worker to his fellows and to the commu- nity at large. Besides, it originates the conception of a vocation, a calling, and establishes each worker in a position, changed from a mere man into a member, whereby he is no longer just like all others, but assumes a place and mark specially his own. 2 Extreme division of labor, however, de- presses the intellectual status of the laborer, narrows his spiritual horizon, and assimilates his activity to that of an automatic mechanism. The distribution of functions brings about social classifica- tion. Mere laborers are distinguished from farmers and mechanics, and these from skilled artisans, and these again from artists and the professional class whose work is mostly intellectual. Greater honor always attaches to the finer, and less to the coarser kinds of labor. This has the wholesome effect of inducing effort to rise into what is accounted a higher social rank, and is thus a powerful stimulus to civil- ization. But here also an abatement must be made. ( llasses strongly marked tend to become castes, in which form their 1 See supra, § 70, note. 2 The familiar word vocation implies Providential superintendence and appointment to special service. The reality of tliis is perhaps not commonly recognized. Still " die sittliche Weihe des Berufs," or the moral consecra- tion of callings, has great influence in the regulation <>f society. It acts like "the expulsive power of a new affection," ejecting all that is Inconsistent and unworthy, and assimilating all that is concordant ami befitting in a new- consecration. 248 ORGANIZATION wholesome effect disappears, ambitious effort is paralyzed, improvement discouraged, and civilization restrained. § 129. In a prosperous community, one whose wealth in general is increasing, capital or the wealth destined to repro- ductive consumption tends to accumulate in the hands of those more intelligently industrious, and thereby a special class is formed, the capitalists. These are marked off from the wage-earners whom they employ in their large and enlarging industrial enterprises. Now the economical advan- tages of large capital engaged in extensive and systematic industry are obvious, yet just because of the greater uni- formity, abundance and cheapness of its products, the ability of the small free crafts to subsist is curtailed, which reduces the larger portion of the community to the position of wage- earners under the mastership of the capitalists, on whom their livelihood depends. The evils of this division of soci- ety, and of this enforced relation, have become familiar in what are known as labor troubles. The grasping selfishness of moneyed power induces oppression; and the sense of injustice, and the dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution of ! the amenities of life, induce violent revolt. Certain remedial schemes, under the generic name of socialism, have attained notoriety and many advocates. They propose a reorganization of society, giving it a more definite and compact solidarity. In general, they would abolish com- petition in labor, wages, and particular or private ownership of " property, especially of land ; substituting work under the stimulus of public spirit, an equal distribution of products, and a common ownership and disposition of all fixed property by closely organized society. A still more radical scheme of reorganization, called communism, proposes to abolish also the family, substituting for domestic relations and the gov- ernment of parental authority, temporary unions, and a com- THE COMMUNITY 249 munistic care for the nurture and education of offspring. Attempts to maintain such schemes in practical operation have hitherto failed. A discussion of socialism as to its economical value, and even as to its ethical worth, must be passed by with the gen- eral remark that the evils of society as actually constituted arise, not from contrived injustice, but from a lack of moral equipoise. In the ideal community, which moral culture seeks to attain, there would be no tolerated trespass upon the rights of even the humblest member ; and in the absence of just cause of revolt, all would be content in the station determined by merit, by the relative value of services. Until this Utopia be realized, a more intelligent apprehension of the inseparable interests of capital and labor would conduce to greater harmony, to mutual respect, and to a wider recogni- tion of reciprocal rights. 1 Meantime, remedy against oppres- sion by either party should be sought, not in turbulence and disorder, but in appeal to that which is set for the guardian- ship of rights, to the strong arm of the State. 1 " Voici une sage et belle devise : Prendre pour point de depart et pour point d'appui de tout progres le devoir du rich plutot que le droit des pauvres ; de sort que l 1 accord dtit pu se faire entre les deux adversaires, a Taide de quelque concessions, en somme assez peu douloureuses. ' ' — Revue des deux Mondes, 1883, p. 725. 250 OBQAN1ZATIOK CHAPTER IV THE STATE § 130. It is essential to any widely associated life of men that there should be definite and effective provision for the protection of rights. For in every community evil-doers, or at least doers disposed to trespass, are so many, active and strong, that its several members are not competent, without combination, to maintain intact their rightful liberties. Moreover, certain important interests of the total community are best served by concerted action, indeed many cannot otherwise be served. To attain these two general ends, the safeguard of rights and the advancement of the common weal, the one protecting, the other promoting, is the purpose of the State. 1 1 " The society of many families, instituted for mutual and lasting advan- tage, is called a village, Kw/xy. . . . When many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a State, 7r6Xts, and con- tains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence. It is first founded that men may live, and continued that they may live happily [i.e., in the perfect practice of virtuous energies. — bk. vii, ch. 8]. For which reason every State is the work of nature, since the first social ties are such ; for to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by its tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house. Besides, its own final cause and its end must be the perfection of any thing ; but a government complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident, that a State is one of the works of nature, and that man is naturally a political animal, woXirucbvffiop, and that whosoever is natu- rally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, AttoXis, must be either inferior or superior to man ; just as the person reviled in Homer : ' No tribe, nor State, nor home hath he.' For he whose nature is such as this, must needs be a lover of strife, and as solitary as a bird of prey. " — Aristotle, Polilica, bk. i, ch. 2. THE STATE 251 The established State occupies a definite territory. It em- braces several, perhaps many distinguishable communities usually of one race and language, having common manners, customs and traditions. It consists primarily of the whole body of people, the body politic, including all officers of gov- ernment ; but the term is often, secondarily, limited to the official class, the sovereign body having supreme power held in trust for the common weal, which class, however, is more properly termed the government. 1 It is not within the scope of this treatise to discuss the relative merits of different forms of state government, nor to trace the historical evolution of the State through the abuses, turmoils, and civil wars which, because of the imperfect or erroneous views and the selfish ambition of statesmen and rulers, have embarrassed its development. We shall attempt no more than to sketch the essential features of its constitu- tion, and to indicate its exclusively ethical basis, its thor- ough-going ethical character, and the varieties of moral obligation imposed on its members by its specific and peculiar organization. § 131. Governments are distinguished as monarchic, aris- tocratic or republican, and democratic. Some combine ele- ments of each of these principal forms ; as, Great Britain. No exclusive preference can be given to any one form. That is best which best accords with the historical traditions and habits of its subjects, is suitable to their grade of intellectual and ethical culture, and is administered in the interest of the public rather than of the rulers. 2 1 When a number of States, whose people as a body come of a common stock, natus, are confederated under a general government, this is properly a Nation ; as, the German Nation, especially prior to the unification in 1870, and the nameless Nation formed by the United States. When a number cf otates of distinct nationality are united under a common government, this is properly an Empire ; as, the Roman Empire, and the British Empire. 2 The very best form of government, according to Aristotle, is the aris- 252 ORGANIZATION Every well-ordered State, whatever be its form of govern- ment, has essentially a Constitution, unwritten or written, positively decreed, and loyally observed by its officials and citizens. 1 The Constitution is the fundamental organic law, organizing the body politic. It has three essential features tocracy of intellectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities be found, in their highest development, in a few persons, or only in one. The Virginia Bill of Rights, § 8, says: "Of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best, which is capable of producing the great- est degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of mal-administration. " "A government is to be judged," says Mill, "by its action upon men, and by its action upon things ; by what it makes the citizens, and what it does for them ; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of them." — Representative Government, p. 43. 1 England has no formally enacted and written Constitution. The gov- ernment, originally an absolute monarchy, has been reduced to a limited monarchy by Magna Charta and numerous subsequent Acts of Parliament, which stand in lieu of a formal Constitution, and insure to the people re- publican liberty. The Constitution of the United States is a written and formally enacted document. Its preamble is : " We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tran- quillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Thus is declared the multiple end, essentially a duplicate, to protect and to pro- mote welfare. The articles which follow enact the specific means for attain- ing the end, reciting the functions or duties, with limitations, of the various officers of the government. In a republican government, whose legitimate procedures are determined ultimately by the will of the majority, the Constitution is an aegis for the minority, shielding it from the caprice of popular whims. In general, it is protective of citizens from the tyranny of magistrates. " The powers must be administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger than the social feelings. And hence, the powers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community. That by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant by constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to govern- ment," — Cai^houn, A Disquisition on Government^ p. 7, THE STATE 253 arising from the very nature of the State, the legislative, the judicial, the executive. The functions of the three are some- times embodied in one person ; as, an absolute monarch. In many cases they are irregularly distributed to a number of persons ; but the historical trend is clearly to separate them as distinct departments intrusted to a distinct personnel ; as, in each of the States of our Union, and in the Federal whole. The function of the Legislature is to enact statutory laws within the limits and in pursuance of the organic law, the Constitution. As a necessary corollary it has authority to affix penalties to these laws to insure their observance, and power to lay and collect taxes for the support of the govern- ment, and for the execution of its measures. 1 The function of the Judiciary is to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of the legislated statutes, to interpret their application, to sanction and decree the penalty for violation. When not otherwise directed by statute, the inferior courts proceed in accord either with the Roman or Civil Law, as in the States of continental Europe, or with the English Com- mon Law, which has been adopted as the basis of jural rights in the United States. 2 1 Legislation for the general welfare is to be distinguished from legisla- tion for the welfare of individuals, which is favoritism, or to benefit some distinct social group, which is class legislation. These are illegitimate. 2 Except in Louisiana, where the Napoleonic Code, a modification of the Justinian, is recognized. For Roman or Civil Law, see supra, § 47, note. The English or Common Law, lex non scripta, derives its authority from long usage or established custom, and has been immemorially received and recognized by the English tribunals. The historical source of this system cannot be traced. The origin of the Common Law, says Lord Hale, is as undiscoverable as the head of the Nile ; which is true historically, but phil- osophically its origin in human rights is easily discerned. Its settled rules and principles have not been authoritatively codified ; they are found only in the records of courts, and reports of juridical decisions. Statute Law, lex scripta. is a body of laws or rules of action prescribed or enacted by the legislative power, providing for specific and exceptive cases, and promul- gated and recorded in writing. 254 ORGANIZATION The function of the Executive is to enforce the laws and carry out the measures enacted by the Legislature. The execution of laws respecting crime, and of those respecting property rights, is intrusted to the inferior courts with their police and prison auxiliaries, backed by the superior courts, and by the chief executive, be he governor, or president, or king. Measures for the public weal, as the coinage of money, the care and disbursement of the public funds, the system of public education, the postal system, the improvement of har- bors and waterways, the making of treaties, and many others, are carried into effect by this branch of the government. Also the chief executive is commander in chief of the army and navy, wherewith to insure domestic tranquillity, and the common defense against foreign aggression, invasion, or other form of trespass. 1 § 132. Now be it observed that the State is a complete, authoritative and powerful organization. Its foundation is on human rights, its superstructure is a fortress against tres- pass, a lodgment of justice, an abode of public duty and patriotic service. The structure is not new ; for the human race, so long as it has existed, has been busied in building, remodeling, repairing, improving, and maintaining in differ- ent jforms, through all the vicissitudes of history, this emi- nently ethical institution. 1 " What constitutes a State? Not high-raised battlement or labored mound, Thick wall or moated gate ; Not cities proud with spires and turrets crowned ; Not bays and broad-armed ports, Where, laughing at the storm, rich navies ride ; Nor starred and spangled courts, Where low-browed baseness wafts perfume to pride. No ; men, high-minded men, With powers as far above dull brutes endued In forest, brake, or den, As brutes excel cold rocks and brambles rude ; Men, who their duties know, And know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain." — Sib William Jones, THE STATE 255 Recalling the definition of an organism, that each member is at once means and end for every other, and the whole for each and each for the whole, we observe : first, that each citizen in his action as such, as in voting, or paying a tax, or serving on a jury or in the army, and likewise each officer of any department in exercising his special function, is thereby expending energy as a means for the profit, directly or re- motely, of every other individual member of the State ; sec- ondly, that in so far as each member is profited thereby, he is an end ; thirdly, that the whole as a systematized means finds its end in guarding and promoting the liberty, privileges, rights and property of each individual member separately taken; and fourthly, that it is the function of each officer and citizen to become a means whereby to maintain the integ- rity and efficiency of the State in all its departments as an end. In ancient times this last relation was emphasized, the people are for the State ; as in the Roman Constitution, and in the Spartan Constitution so greatly admired by Aristotle. In modern times the reverse relation is emphasized, the State is for the people ; as in the Virginia Rill of Rights, which has been generally accepted as their Magna Charta by the United States. 1 The right relation, however, between the governing and the governed is one of constant reciprocity. The mutual obligations are dissimilar, but in delicate and admirable equipoise. 2 Moreover, in observing that the ends in every view are the preventing of trespass and the promoting of welfare, it is evident that the raison d'etre of the organization, and its informing element is strictly ethical. It would be easy to 1 See supra, § 82, note ; and infra, § 146, note. 2 A mere allusion may be permitted to the famous old Roman fable of "The Belly and the Members," as told by Menenius Agrippa in the early days of the city. Livy, ii, 32. The analogy illustrates a profound truth ; hence an effective and long-lived story. But see supra, § 109, note. 256 ORGANIZATION treat in detail of the duties of citizens to the State, and of the duties of the State to citizens, showing them to be strictly and exclusively moral obligations of high order, all coming under the law of trespass as prohibitions or as requisitions ; and it is well worth repeating that all laws of civil government are amplifications and specifications of the law of trespass. 1 The Legislature originates no law abso- lutely. Having discovered certain rights unguarded or in abeyance, it is obligated to enact specific laws to meet the specific cases ; and these laws derive their authority ulti- mately, not from the enacting body, nor from the whole people whom it represents, but from the fundamental impera- tive principle of right and justice, the moral law. 2 § 133. Mention has already been made of the strong tendency in recent days to individualism, of the disposition to lay stress upon the individual personality of each man and woman, slighting the unity of society in favor of its disparate plurality. 3 It is evidently a reaction against the centralizing tendency of former times, which regarded the State as comprised in one man, 4 or in one set of men, and all others as fused to a mass whose sole relation to the state was subservience. Both views are exaggerations, between 1 See supra, § 65. 2 "For even Tarquin had the light of reason deduced from the nature of things, which incites to good actions and dissuades from evil ones ; and which does not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in writing, but from the first moment that it exists ; and its existence is coeval' with the divine mind. Therefore the true and supreme law, whose com- mands and prohibitions are equally authoritative, is the right reason of the sovereign Deity." — Cicero, Laws, bk. ii, ch. 4. "Law in general," says Montesquieu, "is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth ; the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be the particular cases in which human reason is applied." — V Esprit des Lois, Tome ii, ch. 3. 3 See supra, § 127. 4 Said Louis XIV : "L'&at ! C'est moi." THE STATE 257 which lies the truth. Both violate the organic character of the State, the latter excessively integrating, the former dis- integrating. Against individualism we point out that the State is not an aggregate of men and women, nor are individual men and women its originating units. The unit of the State is the family. 1 As a city is composed of houses, so is a State of homes. The representative head of a family judges and acts for it hi uniting with others to organize, or in the far more usual case, to conduct the affairs of the already organ- ized State. To him alone is properly committed the right of suffrage, as the one best capable of guarding and promoting all interests outside the domestic sphere. 2 It has been wisely said that the two pillars upon which the whole structure of the State reposes, are the sanctity of the family relations and of the judicial oath. 3 Should a blind Samson bow 1 " It is clear," says Aristotle, " that a State is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a State cannot exist ; but all of them together do not constitute a State, which is a community of well-being in families and in aggregations of families called villages or com- munes, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life." — Politico,, bk. iii, ch. 9. He distributes society as follows : ofoos, a house, home, or family ; Ku}fxr] , a village, neighborhood, or community ; w6\is, a city, municipality, or State. — Idem, bk. i, ch. 2. 2 That bachelors of twenty-one or more years of age, notwithstanding their incomplete social status, are admitted to citizenship, is a concession to the prospect of their becoming heads of families, and to their usefulness in public affairs ; e.g., in the army. A sharp -line of franchise is necessary ; it is best furnished primarily by sex and age. See supra, §§114 (3), 116. Wisdom from experience dictates there should be also educational and prop- erty qualifications for franchise. Its extension to ignorant paupers, espe- cially to those of other races and nationalities, has always proved disastrous. The presence in the State of a proletariat incapable of a voice in its affairs, should be recognized as unavoidable ; so that it is not the total people, but only a selected portion that rules, the portion which most contributes to the consistence of society, and therefore is privileged to represent it. 3 For 'oath' we would substitute the more general 'truth,' inspiring trust ; see supra, § 125. Aristotle, in Politica, teaches that human society 258 OR GANIZA TI ON himself on these, the whole edifice would fall with disaster to ruins. 1 The State is thus constituted primarily of a congeries of families organized into the larger whole. But beside these are many other organizations holding membership in the State, to whom protection is due ; as, business firms, stock companies, and corporations generally, including incorporated towns and cities. These are endowed by the State with large powers, and thus become subordinate municipalities, each imperium in imperio? Also each department of the State, and each of its subdivisions, as a court, an army, is itself a subsidiary organism. can be resolved into the two ultimate elements, sexual relation and private property. Upon these the State is founded. The first is necessary for its continuance, and both for its welfare. His recognition of private property as a twin pillar, rather than merely a buttress, of civic organization, is more likely to be apprehended and approved in modern times. i "In Troilus and Cressida, Shakespeare has indicated the deep moral relation of the family and the nation, and its significance in the story of Troy. The war had its origin in the violation of the purity of marriage life, and it was this which involved the city in destruction. The doom which overtakes Troilus and Cressida is the reflex borne on through the years, and on to the close of the city, of the moral judgment upon Paris and Helen. There is an expression not only in the catastrophe, but through the whole drama, of the organic and moral relation of the family and the State." — Mtjlford, The Nation, p. 282. See supra, §82, note. Thus it teaches that the natural and moral consequence of the disrupted family is the disrupted State. What the wise Ulysses therein says of the State, may be applied to the drama itself : " The providence that's in a watchful State Knows almost every grain of Plutus' gold, Finds bottom in th' uncomprehensive deeps, Keeps pace with thought, and almost, like the gods, Does thoughts unveil in their dumb cradles. There is a mystery — with whom relation Durst never meddle — in the soul of State, Which hath an operation more divine Than breath, or pen, can give expressure to." — Act iii, sc. 3, 1. 196 sq. 2 On the social and moral effects of the affranchisement of the cities, see Guizot, History of Civilization, vol. i ? Lee. 7, ^3 THE STATE 259 § 134. The State as an organized whole, while distin- guished by special characteristics, has features resembling those of its elementary and subsidiary members. It is logi- cally indivisible in itself, an individual. Its subdivisions are not kinds, but departments, into which it is logically severed. As a self-subsisting individual, it has a life whose beginning is sometimes out of sight in remote antiquity, as that of Greece ; and whose continuity does not depend on that of its several members. We are born into it, we live within it, we die out from it ; we are but its transient accidents. A man looks forward to his end, and makes provision for it by testament ; a State, looking forward with expectation of in- definite continuity, makes no provision for cessation, which, indeed, as with Poland, rarely occurs. 1 Moreover, a State is a personality. It has an intelligence and a culture of its own, and it has a will of its own. Also it has a conscience of its own. 2 Often it incurs debt, and with unconstrained honesty meets its obligation. If it fail, it is dishonored and disgraced before the world, and causes 1 "Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut seterna sit." — Cicero, Be Republica, bk. iii, ch. 23, § 34. " It is not composed of its present occu- pants alone, but it embraces those who are, and have been, and shall be. There is in it the continuity of the generations, it reaches backward to the fathers and onward to the children, and its relation is manifest in its rever- ence for the one and its hope for the other. . . . The work of the individ- ual is brief, and in its isolation would be almost vain, but in the continuity of the nation it is inwrought in the longer social development. Thus, also, a single generation, in its furthest advance, achieves but little in comparison with the long line of the generations in the nation, and if there is laid on any the necessity of battle, still the holiest triumph is that in which the life of the nation in its continuity is maintained. ' ' — Mulford, The Nation, pp. 6, 9. , 2 " The conception of the magistracy is significant to a certain extent of the common conscience of the people, which is made thereby to confront the changeable will of the individuals, precisely as within the spirit of the individual the consciousness of moral laws that are universally binding confronts the momentary frames of mind. 1 ' — Lotze, Practical Philosophy, §63. 260 OR GANIZA TION guilty shame in every citizen, though he himself be blame- less. 1 Sometimes States commit crime as States, and are punished by other States, or by ordinary providence. Usu- ally they are very jealous of national honor, and an offense arouses national indignation. 2 i One generation in a State incurs debts to be paid by subsequent gener- ations, and these accept the burden without question ; as, war debts, bonds issued for improvements, and the like. The historical enchainment is also seen in the provision by law for general public instruction, which recognizes a debt due the coming generation. This obligation of the State is felt to be so weighty that not only in many modern but in some ancient States, as in early Greece, compulsory education has been adopted ; see Plato, Crito, 50d, and 51c, e, Step. ; cf. Aristotle, Nic. Mh., bk. x, ch. 9, §§ 7, 13, 14, who in this last place says : " It would be best that the State should pay attention to education, and on right principles, and that it should have power to enforce it ; but if neglected as a public measure, it would seem to be the duty of every individual to contribute to the virtue of his children and friends, or at least to make this his deliberate purpose." " The State," says Burke, " ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper, and coffee, calico or tobacco, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all per- fection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living and those who are dead and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and the invisible world according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appropriate place." — Reflexions on the Revo- lution in France, Select Works edited by Payne, Clarendon Press, vol. ii, pp. 113, 114. 2 "The State is bound," says the Bishop of Peterborough, Eng., "by precisely the same morality that binds the individual ; for morality is not a duty of positive, but of natural obligation, and is binding therefore on all men under all possible circumstances. The State may not, any more than the individual may, act immorally in the discharge of its trust. As he may not lie or steal for his wards, so neither may the State. It may not, for instance, in the interests of its citizens, plunder the property of other States, THE STATE 261 Also this distinct individual personality is manifest in the familiar recognition of national calamities, national pros- perity, national blessing, and national thanksgiving ; all these being clearly distinguished from what befalls this and that man, or this and that family. Withal there is a national character, as seen by contrast of the English, French, and Spanish peoples, more or less common to the individual citizens, but attributed to the nationality rather than to the man. It is only in a clear recognition of the distinct and unique personality of the State that a full and correct con- ception can be had of civic interest, of common welfare, and of public obligation. 1 § 135. Let us here give a passing glance at the great vari- ety of duties devolving upon a man because of his member- ship in a variety of organizations, each involving a special class or series of obligations. First as a member of a family, whose name he bears, he has peculiar obligations to each of or lie to them, or take unfair advantage of them in any way. Similarly in all its dealings with its own subjects it must be scrupulously and equally just. But this is a natural and not a distinctively Christian obligation. Morality and justice were not created, nor even revealed, by Christ ; they existed, and were known to exist, before the giving of the Sermon on the Mount, and would have continued to exist had that discourse never been spoken, or had He who spoke it never appeared among men." — Govern- ment and the Sermon on the Mount. 1 Much that is here said of the State may be, indeed has been already, said of the family ; supra, §§ 118, 119 ; cf. § 127. It was perhaps the inti- mate relation of the family and the State that gave rise to the paternal theory : As is a father to his children, so is a ruler to his subject. In his- tory, since the patriarchs, we find paternalism affected by kings and magis- trates generally. But this is not the doctrine of modern civics. The State is an organization sui generis, not patterned after the family, or any other organized body. See supra, § 109, note. Furthermore, the theory, promulgated by Rousseau in his famous Du Contrat social, ou Principes du Droit politique, which attributes the origin of the State to a social contract binding in perpetuity, has not survived the French Revolution. 262 OB GANIZA TION the other members and to the whole. Then as a member of polite society, as a business man in the market, on change or in professional relations, as one of a club, or company, or as- sociation, or church, he enters into many varied relations ; t and, since obligation is founded on relation, these many varied relations determine, not only a multiplication but also a diver- sity, in kind and degree, of obligations. No man compre- hends life until he is made to see by how many organic fila- ments he is bound to his fellows ; how utterly impossible it is for him to separate his interests and his fortunes from theirs ; in how many ways the welfare of those who are round about him depends upon the working, in due manner and measure, of that part of the organism which he occupies. With membership in the State, whether as a citizen sim- ply or as an official also, arises another distinct series of obli- gations, often of a very exacting and absorbing character. 1 Upon the sincere discharge of these by rulers and subjects depend the health and strength, the wholesome welfare, of the body politic. No merely perfunctory conduct, no dis- play of avowed patriotism, can replace genuine civic virtue. 2 1 The relations and consequent obligations in the family and in the State are alike in this, that they are both involuntary and indissoluble. A man becomes a member by birth, and finds himself already under bonds. Con- sent is not asked. There is an important sense in which it is true that States " derive their just powers from the consent of the governed ■" (Decla- ration of Independence, postulate), and that "all power is vested in, and consequently derived from the people ' ' ( Virginia Bill of Bights, § 2) ; but this does not apply to the individual man. If dissatisfied, he may transfer his allegiance, removing himself and his effects, but this is merely an ex- change, and not a dissolution of bonds. 2 It was Horace Walpole, I believe, who said: "Patriotism! the last refuge of a scoundrel." Oliver Cromwell said to the men of England : "You glory in the ditch which guards your shores, but I tell you that your ditch will not save you, if you do not reform yourselves. ' ' Says the Virginia Bill of Bights, § 15: "No free government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence TRB STATU 26B It is sorrowful to observe that public duties are ordinarily performed from dread of penalty or hope of reward, or per- haps from the higher motive of respect for the law. But in extraordinary junctures, in crises, in war, the service ren- dered, even when enforced, is often loving service, the com- pulsory is lost in the voluntary, and the dormant good-will of the people arouses to free and devoted exercise. This loving service of the State is the noble affection of true patriotism. § 136. What is the justification of legal punishment? What is the ground on which rests the acknowledged right of society organized as a State to deprive a member offend- ing against its laws of his property, his liberty, his life? What is the warrant? This grave question has been vari- ously answered. It is the right of the stronger, the com- bined force of many against one, the right of might, say some. It is the right of vengeance, of revenge for injury, transferred from the sufferer to the more capable and effect- ive State, say others. Yet others say, in lofty words, the dignity and authority of the law must be vindicated; the broken law must have its integrity restored, must be made whole again, rendered holy, sanctified, reconsecrated in the eyes of all before whom it has been violated, and this is the end of penalty. Let us seek firmer ground, some more rational justification. 1 to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.'" 1 That might gives right, that whatever a man can he may rightly do, take, hold, enforce, is the brutal maxim of barbarians. There is a sense, however, in which might confers right. What one cannot do is not duty ; but, the condition of ability supplied, many things, within the limit of tres- pass, thereby become duties with their correlative rights. Noblesse oblige. In unorganized society, says Lotze, each man avenges his wrongs with all his might ; but this is inadequate, either as insufficient or excessive. Hence organized society takes from him the right of private vengeance, undertaking 264 ORGANIZATION At the beginning of this treatise it was pointed out as a familiar fact in history that men are exceedingly tenacious of their rights, defending their claims with great pertinacity. This is obviously the ultimate explanation of most quarrels between individual men, of suits and prosecutions before the courts, of contests between states or nations leading to inter- necine wars. Evidently by the common judgment of men every one has a right to defend a right. This judgment is clearly correct. For, if we once more fix discriminating attention on the primary, necessary, and universal notion of a right, we discern, implied in its exclu- sive ownership, this addendum to the original conception, a right to defend a right. Whatever possession is truly my own, I may retain and use, I may protect it from all damage, especially from trespass, I have a right, indeed am bound, to defend it against all comers. Evidently the right and obli- gation to defend my right is an essential implication in the demand for maintenance of moral order. Again, of my pos- sessions I am steward and guardian, they are trusts. A neglect to conserve and defend, within limits, a trust, is an indirect trespass upon all who have a claim upon me for its keeping and using. An attempted or threatened trespass upon my life, liberty or property, is to be resisted, else I my- self become a trespasser. Thus defense is not a mere con- tingent privilege, but a necessary obligation. 1 Further, the obligation to defend a right implies a recipro- cal loss of right in the aggressor. By becoming a trespasser he forfeits in some corresponding degree his right to liberty, in extreme cases even to life. One attempting assassination, to avenge him in due measure. This is legal punishment. See Tract. Phil, § 52; cf. § 13 (3). Also cf. Butler, Sermons viii and ix. But revenge is essentially wrong. Can such wrong become right by transference ? Civil law nowhere recognizes that its penalties are retributive. Whatever is righteous in vengeance is reserved to a higher tribunal. 1 See supra, § 85. TEE STATE 265 or arson, or burglary, is killed, if this be the only preventive means, by his intended victim, with regret, with sorrow in- deed, but without compunction. In the right of defense lies the warrant for interference in the liberty of a trespasser, which interference is not, therefore, itself a trespass. § 137. In an unrestrained intercourse of men, with their various abilities physical and mental, and with the varied opportunities afforded by wealth and station, the stronger trespass upon the weaker. An oppressor may perhaps con- sole himself with the brute maxim that might makes right, but the oppressed is not thereby relieved and quieted. Be- sides, impelled by selfish interests, men combine in couples, or squads, or large bands, and thus accumulate force to over- come the weaker. To inhibit such predicament society is organized into a State, constituted by a combining majority ; which organization is not oppressive but rather protective of the minority, the organic law becoming its shield, a defensive weapon, against popular caprice. The body politic employs agents, empowered by general consensus, to frame, apply and enforce particular laws in accord with the general purpose. 1 To accomplish the chief end of its existence, the protec- tion of its subjects in their rightful liberty, the government must, as far as practicable, defend, both at large and in de- tail, the original and acquired rights of individual men, of trade firms, of legalized corporations, of all subordinate com- i The historical origin of States has rarely perhaps been just thus. Yet many a clan, or tribe, or people has organized, on a patriarchal or on a military basis, for defense of common and private rights from aggression of similar bodies, as well as for conquest. More often, it may be, States have arisen from the skillful and selfish handling of the strong, seeking to enlarge and perpetuate their power. While the progress of civilization has failed to enlighten many, others have been gradually modified to approximate at least the form and intent indicated. Our discussion, however, is not con- cerning historical origin, but of the ground on which the ideal State, the State as it ought to be, is justified in exercising punitive powers. 266 ORGANIZATION binations of its citizens for legitimate purposes ; the right of private defense being transferred, except in emergency, to the more potent and equable agency. In order to fulfill this great trust, the government must defend itself. Its officers must be protected in the discharge of their legitimate func- tions against violence or intimidation. It must prevent the high crimes of regicide and treason, must resist the insurrec- tion of a disaffected minority, or the aggression of a foreign power. As an individual personality it is bound to preserve its integrity and efficiency by vigorous self-defense. It is clear that a State, as a faithful trustee, is bound, first, to pre- serve its own existence, and secondly, to restrain, to resist, and, if need be, to destroy whatsoever and whomsoever assails its authority or attacks the interests committed to its charge. Self-preservation, and the preservation of all that is intrusted to it, are moral obligations of every State. § 138. Therein is the ultimate ground that justifies legal punishment. It is discovered in the obligation to exert pro- tective defense of rights. All legal penalties are set for the defense of rights. They inflict pain on the law-breaker, are a jpainful interference in his liberty, warranted by the prin- ciple of defense. They deter him from repetition of the offense, and they deter observers from like misconduct, thus defending the rights involved. Practically imperfect as it is, no other means is known by which to effect defense against offense, except this of inflicting pain on offenders in propor- tion to the gravity of their misdeeds. The punishment, as to kind and degree, is determined by what is past and cannot be reinstated ; its purpose is to determine what is future, and is deterrent, preventive of further or like trespass. Thus the sufficient, rational, and only righteous ground of legal penalty is the protective defense of rights. The principle applies to the divine government of the THE STATE 267 world. The natural sanctions of universal moral law are the typical antecedents of the artificial sanctions of civil law, and go far in an explanation of the righteousness of pain. 1 The sovereign Deity has rights on which men trespass as well as on the rights of his subjects. He defends these and his authority by the appointed natural pains attending dis- order, and by special penalties affixed to special offenses. Sin is essentially trespass on Deity, and the punishment of sin is self-defense, and the defense of all under his protec- tion. To have any other gods before him is high treason. 2 Deterrent defense is disciplinary. This gives title to houses of correction or reformatories set especially for re- claiming youthful offenders, and to penitentiaries where felons do penance, rendering them penitent, leading to reformation. So imprisonment generally, and also fines are disciplinary, not only of the offender, but of the observer, and even capi- tal punishment has this salutary effect on society. Thus the law is a schoolmaster, a pedagogue, leading to higher life. But this, with the State, is not its original, nor its avowed, nor indeed its ultimate purpose, but is an accessory. The State is not an educational, but a protective institution, and reformation is not the end, but a means of preventing tres- pass. Its enacted sanctions, among which are no rewards, are not incentive, but deterrent. Indeed, in the last analysis, any and every warranted interference in liberty is a defense against trespass, or, no interference in a person's liberty has 1 See supra, § 54. 2 That the purpose of civil punishment is deterrent, is the common doc- trine of jurists. It is here carried one step further back to the ultimate ground of a right and duty in defense of trust. The Church has always very generally held that the only legitimate end of civil punishment is the prevention of crime. The doctrine merges justice into benevolence. It is because God has a view to the welfare of his rational creatures, that he visits sin and moral disorder with punishment. Leibnitz defines justice to be benevolence guided by wisdom ; and Tertullian says : " Qmne hoc justi- ti» opus procuratio bonitatis est," 268 OBGANIZA TION ever a warrant save in defense against trespass. In the domestic sphere parents punish to chasten. Chastisement is punishment intended to benefit the sufferer. It is often and rightly inflicted with no wider or further view ; but this whip of love means more, and the chastening has its only complete justification in forestalling the trespasses of perhaps a remote future. Our Father, in the abundance of his love, chastens his children, not only that the erring may turn and live, but more largely that all who might sutler from the persisting error may be spared the harm, and loss, and sorrow. § 139. The right of a government to suppress mob turbu- lence or riots of any kind, is obviously the right and duty to defend domestic tranquillity ; and to quell an insurrection against magisterial authority, is clearly to exercise the right and duty of self-defense. The inverse right of revolution has the same basis. The ends of the State being the defense of rights and the promotion of the common welfare, " when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu- bitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." 1 Evidently, if a government be con- tinuously oppressive to the body of the people, their original and sacred right of self-defense justifies them in subverting it, and substituting one that promises better things. 2 1 Virginia Bill of Eights, § 3. Cf. American Declaration of Indepen- dence. Unjust laws, such as are not intolerably oppressive, of which exam- ples continually abound, ought, until repealed, to be obeyed by all concerned, from respect for the dignity and integrity of the State. In such case it is duty patiently to suffer injustice. 2 In usage of the terms, the distinction between revolution and rebellion is not always clear. Generally, if a revolt succeed, it is called respectfully a revolution ; if it fail, it is stigmatized as a rebellion ; the justice of the cause being disregarded in favor of the historical result. Treason or rebel- lion against righteous civil authority, is rankest offense. "Whoever lays THE STATE 269 War has no other justification. A war of conquest is plainly the crimes of murder, arson, robbery, and the rest of the foul catalogue, many times multiplied. On the other hand, a defensive war, provided all other honorable means of rectification have failed, is thoroughly righteous. That a State repel vi et armis the encroachment, the aggression, the trespass of another, is a moral obligation of highest order. A brave and conscientious people, possessing civic rights inherited to be fostered and transmitted, maintains them, even against overwhelming numbers and resources, and does not surrender, but dies in defending its trusts, warring until resistance becomes madness. Defense may fire the first gun, may invade the enemy's territory, may sweep his commerce from the sea, thus to conquer immunity and peace ; but, to be justified, all proceedings must originally and continuously be intentional and essential defense. This is so clearly recog- nized by civilized States in modern times that, whenever war between them occurs, each party loudly claims to be acting on the defensive, thus seeking to justify its action in its own eyes, and in the eyes of the rest of mankind. § 140. Geographic, climatic, and other conditions deter- mine that there shall be many States. Differences of race, language, religion, tradition, the genius and general culture of the people, further determine different forms of govern- ment, as monarchies, republics, democracies. These, the world over, have both common and conflicting interests, and are otherwise more or less intimately related. Their relations are adjusted by resident ambassadors and consuls, and by occasional diplomatic correspondence, forming and perform- ing treaties of commerce, and of alliance, fixing boundaries, violent hands upon the State, assails the conditions of all moral life, and therefore the crime is regarded as the greatest." — Trendelenburg, quoted by Mulford, The Nation, p. 16. 270 ORGANIZATION and regulating minor matters. The trend of civilization has long been towards a brotherhood of peoples, and the enter- prise of the nineteenth century has so vastly increased the facilities of intercommunication, by multiplying roads of rapid transit, by tunneling Alpine barriers, by devising a swift and safe crossing of seas, by weaving over the globe a network of electric wires and submarine cables, that civic isolation has now almost entirely disappeared, and the na- tions are fusing and welding together. This intimate inter- course and manifold relation is subject to the one universal moral law of trespass not. There is no other obligation in all the comity of nations. 1 1 In the foregoing- discussion it sufficiently appears that the sole purpose of the State is the welfare of its constituents. It is in no sense a philan- thropic institution. The United States, for example, and the several States, in their manifold functions, are for the benefit of their own people, and not for the good of France, or Spain, or Mexico, or Canada, or any country or people not within their territorial limits. No government has a right to do charity outside its own jurisdiction, or to legislate for or to govern an alien people. A man may charitably give away money which is his own, but governments, federal, state, municipal, have no money except that ob- tained by taxation. Its possession and disbursement is a trust of the people whose agents they are, to be exercised only within sharply defined constitu- tional limitations which make no provision for philanthropy. To use it for other purposes than the welfare of the taxpayers, to use it to relieve oppressions or sufferings of remote or adjacent peoples, is illegitimate, a departure from right and duty, and liable to the grossest abuses. It is sometimes alleged that it is the right and duty of our government so to intervene in foreign affairs as to extend the area of civil liberty, to save others from misgovernment, to prevent persecution, and to establish the true religion. But what is liberty, right government, true religion ? "We may determine these questions for ourselves, but we are not required nor authorized to determine them for others. No State is bound to incur cost or danger in the interest of others, this being detrimental to its own interest and that of its subjects, but rather therefore is it bound to abstain rigorously from all unnecessary interference in foreign affairs. The exercise of wide philanthropy, and the propagation of our high civilization, of our free insti- tutions, of our cherished religion, belong exclusively to voluntary associa- tions organized for the purpose, and more especially to the Christian Church, THE STATE 271 The increasing intimacy of these civic relations brings clearly into view the organic unity of mankind, and suggests the conception of a universal State, whose mighty function shall be to secure international justice without war. This ideal is becoming in a measure realized. " Its realization," says Dr. Seelye, "does not require, indeed, in the actual condition of men, would not permit that all particular States should lose their individuality of government or institutions, and be merged in what might be deemed the visible embodi- ment of the one universal State. The universal State has no visible embodiment. Yet it is not thereby without reality or power. In our modern world nothing has shown itself more real or potent. What we call international law, or the law of nations, unknown except in the vaguest, faintest way in ancient times, is recognized in our day as a sovereignty in human affairs, equally majestic and mighty. It has no visible throne ; it does not utter itself through the voice of a mon- arch, or the votes of a legislature or people ; it has no courts to expound, nor any fleets or armies to enforce its dictates ; but it guides kings, and legislatures, and peoples, and courts, and fleets, and armies in our times, with an authority whose manifestation of power is steadily increasing. There is nothing so characteristic of modern politics as the sway which international law, a development of the one moral law, is continually gaining among existing nations. There is no other point in which the politics of the present day are so clearly distinct from those of the ancient world. But international law is nothing other than the voice of the one universal State. It is the State in the highest exhibition of it yet given in history." The State thus organizing is a whole, is one and indivisible, uniting through itself more and more manifestly its constituent organizations, without effa- cing their distinct individuality, and presenting to the vision of political philosophy a world of united States, 272 OE GANIZA TION CHAPTER V THE CHUKCH § 141. Religion, in its widest sense, viewed subjectively, is belief in presiding, superhuman, spiritual power, earnest enough to influence moral character and conduct; viewed objectively it is a body of doctrine relative to such power, instructing and regulating its votaries. Religion is of two kinds, natural and revealed ; the former relying for its be- lief and doctrine on reason alone ; the latter claiming to have in addition . information communicated by the higher power. The negative member of this dichotomy is natural reli- gion. Under scientific treatment it is entitled natural theol- ogy. It proceeds independently of historical, racial and local influences, discarding the dogmas of tradition, author- ity and custom, and upon rational grounds investigates the evidence furnished by nature of the reality and character of a higher power. More particularly, it seeks proof of the existence of God, his unity and personality, the kind and degree of his attributes, his will concerning us, the distinc- tion between right and wrong, good and evil, our relation and obligation to him, and our destiny both here and here- after. Revealed religions, which Diderot calls the heresies of natural religion, seek in general to impose their systems far less by reason than by persuasion with appeal to emotion and passion. Historically they have been largely character- ized by superstition or extreme reverence and fear of what is unknown or mysterious, and by fanaticism or ignorant, irra- THE CHTJBCH 273 tional worship of deities, with excessive rigor in opinions and practice. Witness the prevailing Asiatic and African cnlts. Christianity, however, is a revealed religion claiming to be in entire accord with natural religion, to be at its basis strictly rational, and to demand no more of its adherents than a reasonable faith in its transcendent doctrine. 1 1 It is an old saying that man is a religious animal. This differentiates, distinguishes him. His very nature determines that he shall look upward and worship. Among Aryan races, even the name which is above every name, at which every knee shall bow, is one, and tells of filial adoration. "In exploring the ancient archives of language," says Max Muller, "we find that the highest god received the same name in the ancient mythology of India, Greece, Italy, and Germany, and retained that name whether wor- shipped on the Himalayan mountains, or among the oaks of Dodona, on the Capitol, or in the forests of Germany. His name was Dyaus in Sanskrit, Zeus in Greek, Jovis in Latin, Tiu in German. These names are not mere words. They bring before us the ancestors of the whole Aryan race, thou- sands of years it may be before Homer and the Veda, worshipping an unseen Being, under the selfsame name, the best, the most exalted name they could find in their vocabulary, under the name of Light and Sky. . . . We have in the Veda the invocation Dyaus pitar, the Greek ZeO irarep, the Latin Jupiter; and that means in all the three languages what it meant before these three languages were torn asunder ; it means Heaven-Father. . . . Thousands of years have passed since the Aryan nations separated to travel to the North and the South, the West and the East; they have each formed their languages, they have each founded empires and philosophies, they have each built temples and razed them to the ground ; they have all grown older, and it may be wiser and better ; but when they search for a name for what is most exalted and yet most dear to every one of us, when they wish to express both awe and love, the infinite and the finite, they can but do what their old fathers did when gazing up to the eternal sky, and feeling the presence of a Being as far as far, and as near as near can be ; they can but combine the selfsame words, and utter once more the primeval Aryan prayer, Heaven-Father, in that form which will endure forever, Our Father which art in heaven." — The Science of Beligion, Lee. iii. " Im Innern ist ein Universum auch, Daher der Volker loblicber Gebrauch, Dass jeglicher das Beste was er kennt, Er Gott, ja seinen Gott benennt, Im Himmel und Erden iibergiebt, Ihn fiirobtet und womoglicb liebt." — Goethe. 274 ORGANIZATION § 142. It has already been pointed out that a theory of Ethics to be complete as to its system must include the rec- ognition of a personal God, and of man's relation to him, and consequent obligation to render him loving service. This does not mean that there may not be practical morality even of very high grade in the various relations among men, with- out religion, without any acknowledgment of God; but it means that a scheme of morality without God is necessarily incomplete, has no ultimate support, no philosophic unity, and cannot be expanded into a scientifically systematized theory. Herein it appears that natural religion is the cap- stone, or rather the key-stone, of Ethics. Oriental scholars testify that Confucianism is simply and solely a body of inconsistent, ill assorted and often erroneous ethical doctrines, that Buddhism, the confession of one-third of the human race, is little else, and that both are distinctly atheistic. 1 Hinduism is pantheism, and pantheism, whether taught by the Brahman or by the god-intoxicated Spinoza, or by the haughty Hegelian, is merely a refined and enlarged, a generalized feticism. It denies the intelligence and freedom, the personality of its god. Now, since ethics with its com- plement religion is grounded in and arises from relations among persons, an impersonal being can have no part therein. Man cannot trespass on the world of nature, on the moun- tains, the continents, the ocean, or the stars, but only on him who intelligently and freely produced them, and to whom therefore they belong. The impersonal, so-called god of the pantheist is not at all the God of the ethical and reli- gious philosopher. Pantheism is essentially atheism. The mythical polytheistic cult of the ancient Greeks, in 1 "Buddhism is no religion at all, and certainly no theology, hut rather a system of duty, morality and benevolence, without any real deity, prayer or priest."— Monjer Williams, Hinduism, p. 74. Indeed testimonies abound, THE CHURCH 275 form adopted by the skeptical Romans, and by them diffused over the Empire, was doubtless originally a deified personifi- cation of natural objects and forces, and an apotheosis of heroes. It was replaced in the philosophic thought of An- axagoras and of his successors by a strict monotheism, shin- ing forth clearly in the famous hymn of Cleanthes. 1 Thus unaided philosophy early reached and taught esoterically a remarkably pure natural religion, which, though it seems not to have taken practical form, nevertheless gave to the ethics of the Stoics a coherence, a consistency, an ultimatum and completeness that secured its permanence and general accep- tance even to this day. 2 All religions, and even atheistic cults, come within the scope of Ethics. We have already seen that a man is re- sponsible for his beliefs. 3 Every belief relating to conduct, be its subject true or false, carries with it obligations, duties; for. every one is bound, whatever be its error, to conform his conduct to the results of his moral judgment, or, as it is com- monly expressed, is bound to obey his conscience. In reli- 1 The text of the Hymn may be seen in Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, § 54 ; and a translation in Mayor's Ancient Philosophy, p. 177. A metrical rendering of the opening lines is as follows : — " Thou, who amid the Immortals art throned the highest in glory, Giver and Lord of life, who hy law disposest of all things, Known hy many a name, yet One Almighty forever, Hail, O Zeus ! for to Thee should each mortal voice he uplifted ; Offspring are we too of thine, we and all that is mortal around us." 2 See supra, § 100. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel says: "The idea of God constitutes the general foundation of a people. Whatever is the form of a religion, the same is the form of a State and its constitution ; it springs from religion, so much so that the Athenian and the Roman States were possible only with the peculiar heathendom of those peoples, and even now a Roman Catholic State has a different genius and a different constitu- tion from a Protestant State. The genius of a people is a definite individual genius, which becomes conscious of its individuality in different spheres ; in the character of its moral life, its political constitution, its art, religion and science." 8 See supra, § 60, note. 276 ORGANIZATION gion it is not otherwise. Ethical principles prevail within the shrine. They are immutable and all pervading. They are the ground not only from which natural religion arises, but on which revealed religion descending must take its stand to find a firm support. Shall an exception be made in favor of Christianity ? Not at all. Christianity is preeminently ethical. Indeed in a philosophic view its great strength lies in the exact conform- ity of its teaching to the universal and eternal ethical princi- ples which it enlightens, widens, exalts and refines. It came not to destroy but to fulfill the law more enduring than heaven and earth. The Sermon on the Mount speaks of the Kingdom of heaven and of the fatherhood of God, but it con- tains no distinctively Christian doctrine, and is occupied otherwise with applications of purely ethical principles. It might fairly be entitled a Lecture on Practical Ethics. These principles determine what is due in domestic, in social, and in civic order, and are likewise fundamental in religious order. Hence it is that so much is discovered to be common to all those religions, both natural and revealed, that have attained to the dignity of a system. 1 1 Bishop Bigandet of Ava, in his Life and Legend of Gaudama, p. 494, says: "The Christian system and the Buddhistic, though differing from each other in their respective objects and ends as much as truth from error, have, it must be confessed, many striking features of an astonishing resem- blance. There are many moral precepts equally commanded and enforced in common by both creeds. It will not be rash to assert that most of the moral truths prescribed by the gospel are to be met with in the Buddhistic scriptures." Mozoomdar, one of the leaders in a new religious movement in India, belonging to the high caste of his people, and reputed as learned in almost all the wisdom of certain kinds in England and America as well as in India, says : " Every great religion of which I have any knowledge has worshipped God either through the forces of nature, or in the form of heroes and great men, or through their own spiritual instincts. No religion, however idola- trous, has been able to shake off this threefold medium. The Vedas wor- shipped God through the forces of nature. David and Elias also saw the THE CHURCH 277 § 143. In general it is true that wherever cults develop, even those full of superstition, there arises a priesthood pro- fessing the function of mediator to propitiate the super- human power. The priesthood becomes organized, and unites with the State, seeking its protection, using its au- thority, and lending in turn its potent influence to strengthen the secular government. So it has been with the Christian Church, an organization that prevails to-day throughout Europe and America. To it we will now give special attention. In the Christian Church we find a purified and exalted ethical doctrine, including natural religion, supplemented and complemented by revelation. Christianity is differentiated from other religions by the teaching that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the incarnate Son of. God, making atonement- by the cross, and ever living as Savior and King. 1 It is this differentia only that Christian polemics has to defend against infidelity. Its expansion constitutes Christology. With this a treatise on Ethics has nothing to do ; it is concerned only with the generic elements expanded into natural religion. manifestations of God's power and wisdom in natural objects so glorious that no argument, no logic, no sophistry, could overcome the simplicity of their natural religion. Behold, also, God's attributes in the different deities wor- shipped in the Hindu Pantheon ! We cannot escape the conclusion that the processes of religious development have been universal. . . . Every nation has had its different surrounding circumstances. Its climate is different ; its geography, its bodily constitution, its mental temperament, its history, all different. That these differences should have deeply affected religious development is not at all wonderful. But the sense of trust, love, and holi- ness in all religions is the same or similar, only the "forms disagree. . . . Yet I declare that even in the midst of all this variety there is so much in common that the student is wonder-struck at the fact of unity. In the midst of all the controversies and conflicts that afflict the religious world, we come across fundamental truths which are so similar that we are struck by the thought that they must have a common soul, a common impulse, a common origin, and a common aim." 1 For the best possible definition of Christianity, see John 3 : 16. 278 ORGANIZATION For, all the great virtues that stand out as cardinal have had existence among all peoples from the beginning. The decalogue, excepting perhaps the sabbath-day law, contains nothing new. All moral obligations binding men to God and to each other originate, not in legislation, but in the nature which God gave to man, and are determined in detail by the variations in his complex relations. The virtues have been developing through all the ages among all peoples, and are developing to-day under a better understanding, a fuller comprehension, a more subservient recognition of personal relations and their consequent obligations. No doubt Chris- tianity has been and still is powerfully influential in their higher development, giving brighter light over a widening horizon ; but Christianity did not originate them, it merely found them, enlarged them, enlightened them. Manifestly, the all-informing, all-embracing, fundamental law of Chris- tian activity, is the ethical, altruistic law of loving service. 1 § 144. Historically the Christian Church emerged from Judaism very weak in numbers, and in social influence. Its organization, comparable to a shepherd with his flock, was 1 j"It is sufficiently evident," says Guizot, " that morality may exist in- dependently of religious ideas ; that the distinction between moral good and evil, and the obligation to avoid evil and to cleave to that which is good, are laws as much acknowledged by man, in his proper nature, as the laws of Logic, springing likewise from a principle within him, and finding likewise their application in his life. Granting all this, and yielding up to morality its independence, the question naturally arises : Whence cometh morality, and whither doth it lead ? This obligation to do good, is it a fact standing by itself, without author, without aim ? Doth it not conceal, or rather doth it not reveal an origin, a destiny reaching beyond the world ? By this ques- tion, which arises spontaneously and inevitably, morality leads man to the porch of religion, and opens to him a sphere whence it was not borrowed." — History of Civilization, Lecture V. " The real novelty of Christian Ethics," says Dr. Broadus, " lies in the fact that Christianity offers not only instruc- tion in moral duty, but spiritual help in acting accordingly." — Commentary on Matthew, p. 161. TBE CHUKCH 279 extremely simple and apparently feeble. But its native strength was soon manifested. The original hundred and twenty speedily became as many thousands. Local churches were multiplied. The * heresy ' was propagated with an activity, energy and devoted zeal that knew no bounds. It spread into Asia Minor, it invaded Europe, and entered Rome. The vast power of the State, then mistress of the civilized world, was put forth to suppress the rising ' super- stition,' and in the course of three centuries ten fierce and bloody persecutions, extending throughout the Empire, and waged with all the implacable might of the Roman power, sought to crush it, and failed. Gathering new and greater strength from adversity, it successfully resisted the oppressor, conquered the conqueror, and shared the throne of the Caesars. 1 1 " We can be at no loss to discover the cause of this triumph. No other religion, under such circumstances, had ever combined so many distinct ele- ments of power and attraction. Unlike the Jewish religion, it was bound by no local ties, and was equally adapted for every nation and for every class. Unlike Stoicism, it appealed in the strongest manner to the affections, and offered all the charms of a sympathetic worship. Unlike the Egyptian religions, it united with its distinctive teaching a pure and noble system of ethics, and proved itself capable of realizing it in action. It proclaimed, amid a vast movement of social and national amalgamation, the universal brotherhood of mankind. Amid the softening influence of philosophy and civilization, it taught the supreme sanctity of love. To the slave, it was the religion of the suffering and the oppressed. To the philosopher it was at once an echo of the highest ethics of the later Stoics, and the expansion of the best teaching of the school of Plato. ... To a world, grown very weary of gazing on the cold and passionless grandeur which Cato realized and Lucan sung, it presented an ideal of compassion and of love, an ideal destined for centuries to draw around it all that was greatest, as well as all that was noblest on earth, a Teacher who could weep by the sepulchre of his friend, who was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. ... It was because Christianity was true of the moral sentiments of the age, because it represented faithfully the supreme type of excellence to which men were then tending, because it corresponded with their religious wants, aims, and emotions, because the whole spiritual being could then expand and expatiate under its influence, that it planted its roots so deeply in the hearts of men." — Lecky, History of European Morals, ch. iii, p. 387 sq. 280 ORGANIZATION This affiliation of the Church with the State, in the middle of the fourth century, together with an increasing complexity and solidarity of organization, gave even greater efficiency to its propagandism. Apparently weakened by the schism into East and West, into Greek and Latin, it nevertheless with- stood the floods of barbarians that overwhelmed and over- threw the Empire, converted and subdued them, saved Christianity for Europe, and ruled the continent throughout the mediaeval centuries. 1 In modern times, beginning with the sixteenth century, a further division of the Western Church into Catholic and Protestant, with many subdivi- sions, has occurred, which seems to have stimulated rather than impaired its zealous activity. Thus during two millen- niums, amid the rise and fall of States and Empires, the Church has maintained its growing power, and to-day Chris- tendom embraces Europe and America, and is pressing its jurisdiction into Asia, Africa, and the isles of the sea. 2 1 Strikingly similar is the historical spread of Buddhism, propagated from India over eastern Asia and Japan, by its lofty ethics, and the promise of Karma and Nirvana ; and of Mohammedanism, propagated from Arabia over western Asia and northern Africa, by the sword and the Koran, with its promise to the faithful of a paradise of houris. Mohammedanism swept Christianity out of Asia and Africa, excepting the feeble remnants in Arme- nia and Abyssinia ; and Christianity in southern Europe was threatened with a like fate from the invasions of the northern barbarians overthrowing the Roman Empire. "Humanly speaking, it is not too much to aver," says Guizot, "that in the fourth and fifth centuries, it was the organized Christian Church that saved Christianity ; the Church with its institutions, its magistrates, its authority, which struggled so vigorously to prevent the internal dissolution of the Empire, which struggled against the barbarian, and in fact overcame the barbarian, it was this Church that became the great connecting link, the principle of civilization, between the Roman and the barbarian worlds." — Hist. Civ., Lee. ii. Cf. Lectures V, and VI, on The Christian Church. 2 " Christianity enjoyed no privileges and claimed no immunities when it boldly confronted and confounded the most ancient and most powerful reli- gions of the world. Even at the present day it craves no mercy, and it receives no mercy. Unless our religion has ceased to be what it was, its THE CHURCH 281 § 145. What therein determines this unique persistence and expanding potency is not far to seek. First, there is an exalted, purified and extended morality, approving itself to the heart and conscience of humanity as in accord with its ideal constitution and the natural order of life among men, which morality is taught in precept and urged in practice. Secondly, there is an enlarged and enlightened view of our relation and obligation to God as Our Father, giving to natural religion a clearness and cogency never attained in the schools of philosophy. Thirdly, there is a well settled claim of a divine origin, of a divine founder in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, of a divine revelation promising redemp- tion to the faithful and eternal blessedness to the righteous. We would not ignore but heartily approve the further claim of the Church that it is multiplied, upheld and impelled by the immanent Spirit of God ; but, from a historic and philo- sophic point of view the aforementioned principles go far toward explaining the phenomenal strength and growth of this the most durable and comprehensive of all human organizations. Moreover, consider the ends for which the Church pro- poses itself as the means. It claims to have solved the problem of life, to interpret its meaning, and to offer sure guidance to the faithful. Maintaining that our terrestrial life is teleologically justified only by the fact that it is related to a higher life, to a life beyond, and therefore has import, not as an end in itself, but as a period of preparation and probation for eternal life, it proclaims to restless humanity : defenders should not shrink from any trial of strength." — Max Muller, Science of Religion, Lee. i. Let me, the writer of this treatise, reverently add, that a religion which cannot abide the most searching investigation of philosophy and of physical science, a Bible which cannot pass unscathed the fire of adverse criticism, of skeptical, hostile criticism, that religion, that Bible are not for me. Let research go freely on, free from all check save fact and logic ; the result, we need not fear. 282 ORGANIZATION Come unto me, and find your promised rest. " We may con- cede that the teleology of history has never reached a system formally more complete than the philosophy of the Church. Heaven and eternal happiness the goal of historical life, the earth its temporal scene of action, its central point the incar- nation of God and the foundation of the Kingdom of heaven on earth, all past ages leading up to this culmination which shall determine the entire future, the whole course of history bounded by the day of creation on the one hand and the day of judgment on the other, these indeed constitute such a grand philosophy of history that Hegel's or Comte's barren abstractions are mere nothing when compared with the fruit- ful, concrete conception." 1 Under the shield of this massive doctrine, and by right of its divine ordination, the Church is claiming ownership and actively seeking possession of the whole world in the name of its living King. § 146. In the fourth century the Church was incorporated with the State. It is generally admitted by ecclesiastical his- torians that, from and after the time of Constantine, the ori- ginal constitution of the Church was overlaid by a vast body of human additions, particularly by the hierarchy, assimilating the magistracy by a long gradation of ecclesiastical dignities or powers, rising upward from the primitive pastor or curate to the bishop, to the pope or patriarch ; and that by these and other results of the alliance of the Church with the Empire, its simplicity was lost, its purity corrupted, and the prior relations of the clergy and laity injuriously affected. 2 1 Translated, with some verbal adaptation, from Paulsen's Einleitung in die Philosophie, Berlin, 2d ed.. 1893 ; bk. I, ch. ii, § 3 (p. 178). 2 " If it be assumed that Platonism was among the causes which led to the development of the medieval hierarchy, its influence must be conceived as mainly indirect and exerted through the doctrines of Philo, the Neo- Platonists, and the Church Fathers, all of whom had been especially attracted and influenced by the Platonic doctrine of the ultra-phenomenal world. But THE CHURCH 283 Yet " it was of immense advantage to European civilization that a moral influence, a moral power, a power resting entirely upon moral convictions, upon moral opinions and sentiments, should have established itself in society, just at the period when it seemed on the point of being crushed by an over- whelming physical force. Had not the thoroughly organized Church at this time existed, the whole world must have fallen a prey to mere brute power. It alone possessed a moral power; it maintained and promulgated the idea of a precept, of a law superior to all human authority ; it pro- claimed that great truth which forms the only foundation of our hope for humanity, namely, that there exists a law above all human law, which, by whatever name it be called, whether reason, or the law of God, or what not, is, at all times and in all places, eternally one and the same." 1 In the course of the centuries, however, the alliance of the Church with the State proved unwholesome. An arrogant and ambitious clergy endeavored to render its rule entirely independent of the people, to bring them under authority, to take possession of their mind and life without the conviction of their reason or the consent of their will. Claiming to be in possession of the keys, it exercised a spiritual lordship of almost unbounded power. It endeavored with all its might to establish a theocracy, to usurp the temporal authority of the State, to establish universal dominion. The struggle for supremacy between the Church and the State, always at the expense of the liberties of the people, often resulted in the subjugation and subservience of the latter ; and the former, asserting its catholicity, was for centuries the dominant power whatever judgment may be passed on the question of historic dependence, and setting aside many specific differences, the general character of the Pla- tonic State and that of the Christian hierarchy of the Middle Ages are essentially the same." — Ueberweg, Hist. Phil, § 43, note, 1 Guizot, Hist. Civ., Lee. ii. 284 OR GANIZA TI ON over Europe. Ecclesiastical dissension and division, in some States, broke this dominion, but the ill-starred communion of the two organizations has persisted, an unholy alliance, con- fusing the sacred with the secular to the prejudice of both. 1 The end, the ultimate purpose for which the State exists, and that for which the Church exists, are quite distinct, and their rightful means of attaining their ends have little in common. The proper function of the State is concerned with the material prosperity, the external wealth of its citizens ; the proper function of the Church is concerned with the spiritual prosperity, the internal weal of its clergy and laity. The one seeks to protect and promote the health and wealth of the body politic ; the other to edify and multiply its adhe- rents. Membership in the one is quite involuntary ; in the other it is essentially voluntary. The one upholds its au- thority by physical force ; the other by moral force alone, having no penalties beyond censure and excommunication. The State has sharply marked geographical limits which it may not transgress ; the Church, expanding its realm, freely invades all other realms. The former is in no sense a propa- gandist ; the latter is essentially a missionary. In their union the lines of demarcation become obscured, and each under- takes more or less the office of the other, leading to a strug- gle for mastery and a consequent hinderance of efficiency. Christendom has greatly suffered, and is still suffering from 1 Still, Mr. Gladstone, an eminent Statesman, in one of his later Essays, strongly advocates the maintenance of the union ; but, on the other hand, the Bishop of Peterborough, a high Ecclesiastic of the established Church of England, in a recent Essay, says : " The Church is not and cannot become the State. These words stand for two wholly distinct and different societies, having different aims, different laws, and different methods of Government. The State exists for the preservation of men's bodies ; the Church for the salvation of their souls. The aim of the State, even put at its highest, is the welfare of its citizens in this world ; the aim of the Church is their holi- ness here in order to their welfare hereafter. The duty of the Church is to eradicate sin; the duty of the State is to punish and prevent crime." THE CHURCH 285 this error. And not without warning. For, at the very origin of the Church, their prospective divorce, their separate functions, their distinct work and harmonious adjustment, were declared in the profoundly wise prescription of its founder : Render unto Cassar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's. 1 1 According to Plato, the chief end of the State is the training of its citi- zens to virtue. " Our object," says he, "in founding the State is that, not a class, but that all may be made as happy as possible." — Republic, iv, 420 b. Elsewhere he teaches that happiness depends on culture and justice, for the possession of moral beauty and goodness. — Gorgias, 470 e. Accord- ing to Aristotle, the State originated for the protection of life, but ought to exist for the promotion of morally upright living, its principal function being the development of moral capacity in all its citizens, but especially in the young by education. The end is of higher order than the causes which brought it into being ; rj ttoXls yivofxevr) /xev o$v rod eve/ca, oScra 8e rod ev £r)v. — Politica i, 2. The end is good living, eD Ifiv, that is-, the morality of the citizens and their happiness as founded on virtue. Id. vii, 8. These eminent authorities seem hardly to have distinguished the political from the religious institutions, and there can be no doubt that their views greatly influenced those of statesmen and ecclesiastics of the Roman and mediaeval periods. Only in quite modern times, and particularly in America, has a complete separation been made between Church and State. An entering wedge was driven by Lord Baltimore in 1634, and another by Roger Williams in 1635, who as pioneers founded colonies with a guaranty, the one of religious tol- eration, the other of religious liberty. But it was reserved for the State of Virginia, in its reorganization as an independent commonwealth, formally to enact the divorce as an integral part of its organic law. The Virginia Bill of Rights, adopted June 12th, 1776, closes with § 16, as follows: "That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of dis- charging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence ; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience ; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each other." The Bill of Rights was incorporated with the State Constitution, enacted June 29th, 1776 ; and, in pursuance of its provision, the famous Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, drawn by Thomas Jefferson, was enacted December 16th, 1785. See Code of 1849, ch. 76. Other States in- cluded the same principle in their several Constitutions, and at the instance of Virginia, it was incorporated in the Constitution of the United States, as a part of Amendment First, thus : " Congress shall make no law respecting 286 ORGANIZATION § 147. A local church politically free, and constituted simply of a pastor, deacons and lay members, is strictly and distinctly an organism. Very generally, local churches come into organic union with each other, constituting synods, con- ferences, councils. These again organize into yet more com- prehensive ecclesiaB or general assemblies, officered by a hierarchy of priests, bishops, and other clergy, whose consti- tutional functions are formally defined. All the various groups of church organization, of various denomination, not- withstanding their differences and dissensions, are furthermore in reality organized into a holy Church universal, one truly catholic, by their common acceptance of the New Testament as organic and ultimate law, interpreted, and in some cases modified, as in the Church of Rome, by ecclesiastical au- thority. In the universal and intensely active Christian Church, with its many subsidiary organizations, their officers and members, we discover the most extensive, complete and powerful organism ever known, and one which is rapidly realizing the ancient dream of universal empire in an organic unification of mankind. From the varied relations obtaining in this Christian body, wherein all are members one of another, arises a multiplicity of special obligations and active duties calling for a never flagging constancy and devotion, and heartily recognized as displacing by superior claim all conflicting calls. Each mem- ber confesses that he belongs to the Church, and does not hesitate to name this servitude as a sufficient reason for his special conduct. On the other hand, the Church belongs to him, serving to edify his spiritual worth. Moreover, it is a common brotherhood, a communion, a fellowship one with another, and with the divine head, all working together for an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." In the United States there is, therefore, at last a severance of Church and State, and each pursues its end without let or hinderance from the other, THE CHURCH 287 nearness and likeness to God. 1 These obligations ramify throughout every other class of duties, intensify and sanctify them. The Christian man among men, the Christian father, mother, son and daughter, the Christian member of the com- munity where his lot is cast, the Christian man of affairs, the Christian citizen .and statesman, is more closely bound in each and all of these relations by virtue of his Christian con- fession, and finds therein new and higher, the highest motives for ordering all his conduct on the principles inculcated by the Christian Church. Thus this spiritual organism enters into, and exerts a dominant influence over, all the relations and obligations of our temporal life, while looking and pre- paring for the eternal life beyond. 1 It has been pointed out that natural religion in its origin and perfection is ethics, also that the Christian religion is ethics extended, confirmed, refined. The revelation of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, expands obliga- 1 " To one who admits the organic unity of the human race," says Dr. Gladden, " the notion that Christ's law is ultra-rational is absurd. It is and must be the law of the organism. It is the simple scientific expression of the relation of the members to the body. The boud that unites us to our fellows is, therefore, one that we cannot sunder. To sever ourselves from our kind is self-mutilation. This is not some counsel of perfection for saints ; it is the fundamental fact of life. All our industry, all our social organization, must conform to it. No man liveth unto himself. Our daily work is a social function. Wealth is valueless and impossible apart from human fellowship. Not to keep this steadily before us in our administra- tion of all our affairs is to be false to the primary human obligation. To set up natural law in the social world or the business world, as distinct from and contrary to the Christian law, is not only unmoral, it is unscientific. Love is the fulfilling of all law. And not only do these ideas make our life sacred and love our daily regimen, they ought to fill us also with confidence and courage. The kingdom that we pray for and fight for is not a mere hope, it is a solid reality. When we say that we are working together with God, we know what we mean. We can discern his working, and can be confident that we are helping in the fulfilment of his great designs. The signs of his presence and power are everywhere." — Muling Ideas oj the Present Age, ch. x. 288 ORG A NIZA TION tion heavenward, and widens its horizon to embrace all man- kind. The ethics of every day life, which is not itself distinctively Christian, finds its complement in the doctrines of the Church. The teachings of the Teacher have enlight- ened human reason, cleared the moral judgment, exalted the moral sentiments, purified motives, and, subdued the will. The realm is enlarged, but it is the realm of ethics still, involving conscience, obligation, duty, gratitude, love. We found the moral law to be Thou shalt not trespass either by invasion of rights or by evasion of dues, having an equivalent in Be thou just, and in Thou shalt love and serve. Chris- tianity lays no other mandate. The loving service of God, and of his Christ, and of his creatures, a fellowship in mutual self-sacrifice, is its very essence ; and clear definitions of duty, pressing incentives to activity, and divinely ordained means of efficiency, are supplied by its organized Church. FINIS. INDEX The number refers to the page. For general topics, see Table of Contents. Alford, on the unjust judge, 122 n. Alter ego, 145, 146, 147. Altruism of the doctrine, 151. — etymology of, 151 n. Argument for existence of God, 20, Aristotle, cited on motive, 8 n. — on deliberation, 11 n. — on condition of choice, 15 n. — on definition of pure reason, 16 n. — on definition of Nature, 25 n. — on etymology of ethics, 36 n. — on principle, 46 n. — on the basis of ethics, 48 n. — on liberty, 51 n. — on customary laws, 66 n. — on prohibition of law, 92 n. — on the golden mean, 93 n. — on Ethics and Politics, 103 n. — on pleasure and pain, 104. — on retribution, 103 n. — on intuition of right, 111 n. — on meaning of justice, 125 n. — on Antigone's defense, 128 n. — on equity, 129 n., 131 n. — on doing injustice, 134 n. — on definition of virtue, 140. — on the golden mean, 141 n. — on self-love, 147 n. — on love, from Hesiod, 177 n. — and Paul, certain words of, 180 n. — on happiness, 191 n. — on hylozoism, 214 n. — on the state, 250 n. — on best form of the state, 251 n. — on purpose of the state, 257 n, 285 n. — elements of society, 258 n. — on compulsory education, 260 n. Arnold, Matthew, cited on deity, 197. Arthur, on physical and moral law, 28 n. Auerbach, on law of love, 177 n. — on custom vs. morals, 241 n. Augustine, on summum bonum, 193 n. Austin, definition of law, 32 n. — on liberty and right, 50 n. — on distribution of rights, 62 n. — on ambiguity of civil, 90 n. — on effect of sanction, 96 n. — on legal right, 109 n. — on responsibility for belief, 119 n. Axioms, the three, 161 n. Bacon, cited on providence, 22 n. — on meaning of ethics, 26 n. — on limit of man's power, 54 n. — on utility, 194 n. Bailey, on belief and disbelief, 119 n. Basis of ethics, 28, 47, 48 n. Belief, responsibility for, 119. Bentham, his use of deontology, 36 n. — on overt action, 114 n. — on asceticism, 151 n. — on utility, 183 n., 194 n. Bishop of Ava, on Buddhism, 276 n. Bishop of Peterborough, on state, 260 n. — on church and state, 284 n. Black, on definition of law, 32 n. Blackstone, definition of law, 32 n. — on civil law, 90 n. — on superiority of moral law, 138 n. — on definition of contract, 243 n. Bledsoe, on ground of right, 204 n. Broadus, on Christian Ethics, 278 n. Brougham, on sincerity in belief, 119 n. Browne, cited on Aristotle's ethics, 48 n. Browning, on recreation, 151 n. — on self-sacrifice, 163 n. Brutes, rights of, 45 n., 137 n. Buhver, on home, 224 n. Burke, the state a partnership, 260 n. Butler, on methods in ethics, 39 n. — on anger, 72 n. — on definition of conscience, 78 n. — on supremacy of conscience, 82 n. — on self-love, 147 n. 289 290 INDEX Butler, on law of love, 178 n. Byron, on solitude, 240 n. Calderwood, definition of conscience, 78 n. — on authority of conscience, 82 n. — on the law, its formula, 90 n. Calhoun, on a constitution, 252 n. Carlyle, on suffering injustice, 134 n. — on moral progress, 157 n. — on happiness, 185 n., 196 n. Categorical imperative, 81, 91 n. Charity, etymology of, 173 n. Choice, its conditions and issue, 11. — reality of, 14. Christians, bond-servants, 143 n., 181 n. Christianity, differentia of, 277. Church and state, separation of, 285 n. Cicero, on definition of ethics, 40 n. — on principle, 46 n. — on meaning of justice, 125 n. — his ofticium and honestum, 136 n. — on highest good, 193 n. — on origin of law, 245 n. — on supreme law, 256 n. — on continuity of the state, 259 n. Civil law, taken generically, 90. Cleanthes, hymn of, 275. Coker, on unusual punishment, 104 n. Common law, anticipated, 60 n. — its origin, 252 n. Complacency, love of, 173 n. Comteists, their doctrine, 107. Condition, its kinds, 6 n. Conflict of desires, its regulation, 6. Conscience, definition of, 3, 77, 78 n. — a postulate of ethics, 18. — supremacy of, 82 n., 97 n. Constitution, English, 252 n. Constitution, U. S., on punishment, 104 n. — on validity of contracts, 243 n. — preamble of, 252 n. — on church and state, 286 n. Contract, Rousseau's social, 261 n. Cousin, formula of the law, 91 n. — on right and duty, 138 n. Cook, definition of conscience, 78 n. Cosmological argument modified, 20. Cown, cited on evolution, 21 n. Creation, absolute, 23 n. Cromwell, to men of England, 262 n. Cruelty, definition of, 137 n. Decalogue examined, 87, 88 n. Defense of possessions, 168. — personal and national, 72, 266. Definition of mind, 1. — of pure intuition or reason, 3, 16 n. — of conscience, 3, 77, 78 n. — of desire, 5, 15 n. — of volition or will, 8. — of philosophy, 13 n. — of person, perfect and imperfect, 19. — of individual, 24 n. — of nature, 25 n. — of organism, 27, 212 — of law, 31, 32 n. — of science, 35. — of deontology, 36 n. — of ethics, 36, 38 n., 40 n. — of virtue, 36 n., 140. — of moral, 40 n. — of principle, 46 n. — of normal, 46 n. — of duress, 58 n. — of pleasure and pain, 104. — of attempt, 115. — of justice, 124, 131 n., 267 n. — of cruelty, 137 n. — of duty, Kant's, 169 n. — of welfare, 186. — of supernatural, 201 n. — of contract, 243 n. — of religion, 272. Deity, existence of, 20. Deliberation, prior to choice, 11, 15 n. Demosthenes, on moral principle, 47 n. — on origin of law, 127 n. Deontology, etymology of, 36 n. Desire, defined and divided, 5, 6, 45. Determination, causal, rational, 15 n. Divorce, history of, sketched, 229 n. — of church and state, 285. Duality of the universe, 213 n. Dueling a crime, 73 n. Dumas, on defense of liberty, 168 n. Duncan, on law of love, 178 n. Duress, legal definition of, 58 n. Duty, etymology of, 136 n. — definition of, Kant's, 169 n. — to self, 147. Earth, a cosmic unity, 28. Economy, duty of, 149 n. Edersheim, on number of laws, 89 n. Effort, its issue in attention, 12. Epictetus, on liberty, 55 n., 143 n. Ethics, etymology of, 36 n. — of standard literature, 163 n. Etymology of person, 18 n. — of ethics, 36 n. INDEX 291 Etymology of obligation, 36 n. — of right, 36 n., 107 n. — of deontology, 36 n. — of moral, 40 n. — of principle, 46 n. — of conduct, 49 n. — of trespass, 64 n. — of conscience, 77 n. — of pain, 105 n. — of wrong, 107 n. — of just, 124 n. — of duty, 136 n. — of virtue, 139 n. — of altruism, 151 n. — of minister, 162 n. — of .talent, 168 n. — of endeavor, 172 n. — of benevolence, 172 n. — of charity, 173 n. — of Greek for man, 200 n. — of religion, 206 n. — of common, 238 n. Evolution of the moral impulse, 7 n. — hypothesis of, 37, 41 n. — of ethics, 194, 202. Farrar, on the commandments, 88 n. Feuerbach, on legal guilt, 116 n. Fichte, on theory of rights, 63 n. — on formula of the law, 91 n. Findlay, on methods in ethics, 39 n. — on moral power, 80 n. — on supremacy of conscience, 97 n. t— on personality of deity, 198 n. First cause, existence of, 20. Fleming, on rectitude, 107 n. Freedom, the essence of choice, 11. — a postulate of Ethics, 15. — and liberty discriminated, 55. Froebel, on future reward, 179 n. — on our children, 230 n., 231 n. Froude, on happiness, 185 n. Gaboriau, on suicide, 167 n. Gambling a vice, 73 n. — a trespass, 168 n. Gibbon, on asceticism, 152 n. Gladden, on Christian law, 287 n. God, existence of, 20. Godet, definition of supernatural, 201 n. Goethe, on part for whole, 28 n. — on love of God universal, 273 n. Golden rule, 93 n. Golden mean, 141 n. Good, kinds of, 192. Grant, on the Lesbian rule, 129 n. Gratitude as commanded, 175. Grote, cited on Aristotle, 191 n. Grotius, on justice, 125 n. Guizot, on cities, 258 n. — on morality and religion, 278 n. — on Christianity saved, 280 n. — on church and civilization, 283. Haggard, on immortality of acts, 96 n. Hamilton, definition of science, 35. — on Kant's peroration, 86 n. Happiness the reflex of welfare, 188 n. Harrison, Frederick, cited, 197 n. Hawthorne, on repair of guilt, 96 n. — on love and hate, 177 n. Hegel, formula of the law, 91 n. — on the idea of God, 174 n. Henry, Patrick, on rights and duties, 138 n. Herakleitos, on unity of the law, 211 n. Hickok, formula of the law, 90 n. Hillel, the golden rule, 94 n. Hobbes, on right reason, 79 n. — on the effect of sanction, 96 n. — on law of human nature, 202 n. Hooker, on appetite and will, 10 n. — on definition of law, 32 n. — on rectitude, 107 n. Honor, personal, 71. Horace, on looking forward, 10 n. — on the outwardly just, 125 n. Hugo, Victor, on criminal neglect, 124 n. — on moral parity of sexes, 227 n. — on excellence of society, 238 n. Humanity personified, 197. Hutcheson, on utility, 194 n. Huxley, on evolution of morals, 37 n. Hyslop, on rights, 62 n. Illingworth, on mind as object, 145 n. Intuition, pure, defined, 3, 16 n. — of the ethical principle, 40, 43, 47. — of the notion of a right, 60. — of the moral law, 76. — of right vs. wrong, 110. James, on mutual trust, 244 n. Janet, definition of conscience, 78 n. — on Kantian good will, 84 n. — on personal excellence, 155 n. Jefferson, on religious freedom, 285 n. Jones, Sir Wm,, on the state, 254 n. Judgment, the moral, distinguished, 3. Justice, definitions of, 267 n. Juvenal, on virtue, 140 n., 187 n. 292 INDEX Kant, on philosophy, 13 n. — on definition of desire, 15 n. — on will as causality, 16 n. — on freedom and the law, 16 n. — on definition of pure reason, 16 n. — on postulates of Ethics, 20 n. — on proof of existence of God, 20 n. — on theses of philosophy, 23 n. — on kingdom of ends, 26 n. — on value and dignity, 71 n. — on definition of conscience, 78 n. — on imperatives, 82 n. — on good will, 84. — on excellence of moral law, 86 n. — on municipal law, 90 n. — on formula of the law, 91 n. — on duties to self, 147 n. — on using other persons, 165. — on duty, 169 n. — on love as commanded, 173 n. — on private felicity, 184 n. — on happiness, 189 n., 191 n., 195 n. — on method, 192 n. — on perfection as principle, 204 n. — on imperatives for divine will, 207 n. — on organism , 214 n. — on deception, 242 n. Kingdom of ends, 26, 33 n. Knowledge for its own sake, 150. Kiilpe, on philosophy, 13 n. — on theories of morals, 41 n. Law of relativity, 17. — its ultimate ground, 30. — its definition and kinds, 31, 32. — the moral, 76, 96 n. — the royal, 93 n. — civil and moral, 102 n. — of love, 176. Lecky, on varieties of judgment, 79 n. — on responsibility for belief, 119 n. — on triumph of Christianity, 279 n. Leibnitz, on the two realms, 26 n., 29 n. — on definition of justice, 267 n. Lesbian rule, 129 n. Lex talionis, 103. Liberty and right, 49, 50 n. — and freedom discriminated, 55. — and law, 143. — in perfect love only, 181. Lieber, on right and duty, 138 n. Limit of man's power, 54. Literature, standard, ethics of, 163 n. Livingstone, on right and wrong, 111 n. Locke, definition of conscience, 78 n. Lotze, on divisions of metaphysics, 13 n. — on reality of relations, 25 n. — on right to freedom, 47 n. — on possession, 49 n. — on ground of property, 68 n. — on retribution for injury, 73 n. — on definition of conscience, 78 n. — on natural rights, 61 n. — on non-interference, 91 n. — on society unlike man, 220 n. — on enthusiasm for science, 239 n. — on common conscience, 259 n. — on ground of punishment, 263 n. Lowell, on the gift and the giver, 169 n. Love as commanded, 173. — as law, 176. — and liberty, etymology of, 182 n. Mansel, definition of individual, 24 n. Martensen, cited on freedom, 16 n. Martineau, on duties to self, 148 n. McCosb, definition of conscience, 78 n. McLaren, Alex., on freedom, 143 n. Metaphysics, divisions of, 13 n. Michelet, on prohibition of law, 92 n. Mill, cited on evolution, 21 n. — on limit of man's power, 54 n. — on the ultimate sanction, 96 n. — on utilitarianism, 184 n., 194 n. — on mutual trust, 244 n. — on government, how judged, 252 n. Milton, cited on conscience, 98 n. — on chastity, 140 n. Mind, its own object, 145 n. Minister, etymology of, 162 n. Minor, definition of law, 32 n. Montesquieu, definition of law, 32 n. — on just and unjust, 131 n. — on law in general, 256 n. Motive, the desire that prevails, 8 n. Motley, on helping an enemy, 160 n. Mozoomdar, on universal religion, 276 n. Moore, Henry, the golden rule, 93 n. Moral judgment distinguished, 3. — sentiment examined, 4, 5. — impulse, its function, 7. Morality and revelation, 261 n. Morals, definition of, 40 n. — theories of, distributed, 40 n. Mulford, on ethical vs. physical, 221 n. — on Shakespeare's the state, 258 n. — on continuity of the state, 259 n. Miiller, on man looking upward, 200 n. — on the universal prayer, 273 n. — on Christianity persistent, 280 n. INDEX 293 Necessity, kinds of, 81 n. Neighbor, who is my, 175 n. New Psychology, a criticism, 2 n. — its method, 43 n. Newman, on personality of deity, 198 n. Normal defined, 46 n. Obligation, etymology of, 36 n. Organism, definition of, 27, 212. Ought, its origin and meaning, 136 n. Ovid, on man looking upward, 200 n. Pain and pleasure, Bentham on, 183 n. — as punishment, 103. Pantheism, 274. Paternoster, use of terms in, 64 n, 89 n. Paternal theory of the state, 261 n. Paulsen, cited on philosophy, 13 n. — from von Baer, on nature, 28 n. — on problem of ethics, 39 n. — on basis of ethics, 48 n. — on definition of conscience, 78 n. — on conscience and reality, 83 n. — on personality of deity, 198 n. — on philosophy of the church, 282. Perfect and imperfect rights, 65 n. Person, etymology of, 18 n. — definition of, 19. Philosophy, various definitions of, 13 n. Plato, cited on existence of God, 20 n. — on definition of ethics, 36 n. — on doing injustice, 134 n. — on virtue and vice, 140 n. — on highest good, 193 n. — on know thyself, 211 n. — on the state, its pattern, 220 n. — on compulsory education, 260 n. — on end of the state, 285 n. Pleasure and pain defined, 104. Pope, on philanthropy, 175 n. — on happiness, 189 n. Positivists, their ritual, 197 n. Powers of mind distributed, 2, 45. Principle defined, 46 n. — the moral, 46, 47. Property, ground of, 68. Pure intuition or reason, 3, 16 n, 76. Pythagorean definition of virtue, 36 n. — the decad, 88 n. Racine, on peace of God, 20G n. Rankin, on law of love, 178 n. Realms of kingdom of ends. 33 n. Reason, or pure intuition, 3, 16 n, 76. Reasons not causes, 57. Relations, philosophy of, 24. Religion, etymology of, 206 n. — definition of, 272. Renan, on philosophy, 13 n. Responsibility, condition of, 16. Revolution and rebellion, 268 n. Right, etymology of, 36 n, 107 n. — and aright coextensive, 108. Rights, basis of, 46, 47. — distribution of, in Civil Law, 62 n. — moral and legal, 109. — Virginia Bill of, 49 n., 162 n., 252 n. 262 n., 268, 285 n. Robinson, on scripture incentives, 102 n. Roman law, rights distributed, 62 n. Rousseau, on liberty, 55 n. — on altruistic limit, 116 n. — on suicide, 167 n. — on contract social, 261 n. Sanction, its meaning, 96 n. Say, on society natural to man, 237 n. Schleiermacher, formula of the law, 91 n. Schopenhauer, on duty of love, 180 n. Seeley, on perfect liberty, 143 n. — on a universal state, 271. Seneca, the golden rule, 94 n. — on happiness, 191 n. Sentiments, the moral, examined, 4, 5. Servants, Christians, 143 n., 181 n. Sidgwick, cited on method, 192 n. Shakespeare, cited on moralize, 40 n. — on self-condemnation, 99 n. — on intent and act, 115 n. — on justice and mercy, 132 n., 133 n. — on intending injustice, 134 n. — on owe and own, 136 n. — on talents as trusts, 167 n. — - on final justice, 199 n. — on the state, 258 n. Sin defined, a trespass, 75. Sophocles, Antigone's defense, 128 n. South on condition of volition, 10 n. Spencer, oh knowledge, 13 n. — on interested action, 153 n. — on the Unknowable, 198. — on society like man, 221 n. Spinoza, on happiness, 191 n. Stahl, on loving service, 180 n. State not philanthropic, 270 n. Stewart, on definition of virtue, 36 n. Stewardship, 166. Stoics, their ethical basis, 98 n. — their doctrine of pleasure, 185 n. — their doctrine of happiness, 191 n. 294 INDEX Story, on equity, 130 n. Suicide, 167 n. Surnnium bonum, 192. Talents as trusts, 168. Teleology, 26, Theories of morals distributed, 40 n. Trendelenburg, on treason, 268 n. Trespass, etymology of, 64 n. Trumbull, on lying, 242 n. Ueberweg, cited on philosophy, 13 n. — on principle, 46 n. — on doctrine of Stoics, 48 n., 185 n. — on Aristotle on liberty, 51 n. — on Platonism and Christianity, 282 n. Utilitarianism, 193. Valentine, on intuition of rights, 110 n. Vice a trespass, 69. Virginia Bill of Rights, see Rights. Virtue, etymology of, 139 n. Voltaire, on existence of God, 197. Voltaire, on luxui-ies, 246 n. Volition or will denned, 8. — its relations and exercise, 9, 10. Vocation, its meaning, 247 n. War, its sole justification, 269. Wayland, definition of conscience, 78 n. Welfare, definition of, 186. Whewell, on deontology, 36 n. — on Plato and Butler, 48 n. — on supreme law, 83 n. — on right and a right, 108 n. Will or volition defined, 8. — its relations and exercise, 9, 10. Williams, Monier, on Buddhism, 274 n. Wolfius, definition of justice, 131 n. Wrong, etymology of, 107 n. Wundt, on mental faculties, 2 n. — on philosophy, 13 n. Xenophon, on summary of the law, 89. — on suffering injustice, 134 n. Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township. PA 16066 (724)779-2111