{"1": {"fulltext": "HERBERT SPENCER\\nHIS LIFE AND WORKS", "height": "2970", "width": "1967", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS;\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094T~^\\nCliap^^._ Copyright M\\nShelf...\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA.", "height": "2992", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "1", "height": "2998", "width": "1957", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2975", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "HERBERT SPENCER", "height": "2998", "width": "1974", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2937", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "HERBERT SPENCER\\nTHE MAN AND HIS WORK\\nBY\\nHECTOR MACFHERSON\\nAUTHOR OF THOMAS CARLYLK AND ADAM SMITH\\nNEW YORK\\nDOUBLEDAY, PAGE CO.\\n1900", "height": "2993", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "L.ibPary of Coiior-;- i\\nTwo CjpitS REOlilVtD j\\nJUN 30 19C0 j\\nScCC -^0 COPY.\\nDc ;vt;. Orf to\\n0R13LH DtViSiON,\\nV\\nCopyright, 1900,\\nBy hector MACPHERSON.\\nNoriaooU JPresB\\nJ. S. Gushing Co. Berwick Smith\\nNorwood Masa. U.S.A.", "height": "3013", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "PREFACE\\nA PHILOSOPHIC thinker of the first rank is always\\nknown by the amount of literature which his writ-\\nings call forth. Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Hume,\\nKant, Hegel these in their respective spheres were\\nepoch-makers. From the philosophic germs which\\nthey scattered have sprung whole libraries of con-\\ntroversial literature. In like manner Mr. Herbert\\nSpencer has paid the penalty of his great philosophic\\nfame. As an epoch-maker, he, too, has had to pass\\nthrough the fire of hostile criticism. For a great\\nnumber of years liis philosophy has been the battle-\\nground of controversialists who, differing in many\\nways among themselves, have united in their at-\\ntempts to discredit a system of thought which\\nthreatened to destroy long-cherished opinions and\\nstereotyped beliefs. One result of this has been\\nthat to the general public the Synthetic Philosophy,\\nembedded as it has been in the works of critics, has\\nnecessarily appeared in a fragmentary form. My\\nobject in writing this book has been to present to", "height": "3017", "width": "1961", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "vi PREFACE\\nthe general reader Spencerism in lucid, coherent\\nshape. Nothing can take the place of Mr. Spencer s\\nown writings, but mastery of these demands an\\namount of leisure and philosophic enthusiasm which\\nare by no means widespread.\\nIn this design I have had the approval of Mr.\\nSpencer. He has taken a kindly interest in the\\nundertaking, and has freely responded to my request\\nfor material. The book is by no means a slavish\\nreproduction of Mr. Spencer s writings. Taking my\\nstand upon the fundamental ideas of the Synthetic\\nPhilosophy, I have used them in my own way to\\ninterpret and illustrate the great evolutionary\\nprocess.\\nWhile, therefore, Mr. Spencer has been in full\\nsympathy with the aim of the book, he does not\\nstand committed to the detailed treatment of the\\nsubject. The work has indeed been a labor of\\nlove. Should it induce the reader to study Spen-\\ncerism as expounded by the master himself, my\\nreward will be ample.\\nI should be lacking in gratitude did I not express\\nmy obligations to the elaborate work of Mr. John\\nFiske, entitled Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy. No\\nstudent of Spencer can afford to neglect Mr. Fiske s\\nbook, which it would be difficult to rival in point", "height": "3017", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "PREFACE vii\\nof lucidity and intellectual ability. I am also in-\\ndebted to Professor Hudson of California for his\\nadmirable book, Introduction to the Philosophy of\\nHerbert Spencer. In the philosophic and economic\\nparts of the book, I have drawn upon a few para-\\ngraphs in my Carlyle and Adam Smith. Knowledge\\nof a philosopher s system of thought is greatly helped\\nby knowledge of the philosopher himself, and in this\\nrespect I have been exceedingly fortunate. The\\nrecollection of my personal relations with Mr. Spen-\\ncer will ever be to me a priceless possession.\\nHECTOR MACPHERSON.\\nEdinburgh, April, 1900.", "height": "3015", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3017", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS\\nOHAPTBB\\nI. EARLY LIFE\\nII. INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT\\nIII. EVOLUTION OF THE EVOLUTION THEORY\\nIV. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS\\nV. THE COSMOS UNVEILED\\nVI. THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE\\nVII. THE EVOLUTION OF MIND\\nVIII. THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY\\nIX. THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY\\nX. THE ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY\\nXI. THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION\\nXII. THE PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT OF SPENCERISM\\nXIII. THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF SPENCERISM\\n1\\n18\\n39\\n54\\n66\\n84\\n105\\n124\\n146\\n169\\n189\\n201\\n216\\nINDEX\\n235", "height": "3024", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2998", "width": "1957", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER I\\nEARLY LIFE\\nCarlyle has remarked that the history of the world\\nis in the main the history of its great men. There\\nis profound truth in the saying, though in his antip-\\nathy to a purely scientific treatment of civilization\\nCarlyle used his great man theory in fantastic and\\nmisleading fashion. The intellectual contribution\\nwhich each century makes to the progress of the\\nworld takes its hue from the dominating influence\\nof its leading thinkers. True greatness is epoch-\\nmaking. If we wish to discover the place of a\\nthinker in the great evolutionary chain, we must\\napply the epoch-making test. The mind of the\\ngreat man is like an overflowing reservoir which\\nmakes for itself new channels and fertilizes hitherto\\nunknown tracts of thought. Or to use a biological\\nsimile, the sociological effects produced by the great\\nman resemble the changes caused in the fauna and\\nflora of a country by the introduction of a new\\nspecies. Think of the impoverishment which liistory\\nwould sustain by the obliteration of the names, say,\\nB 1", "height": "3027", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "2 HERBERT SPENCER\\nof Paul, Augustine, Calvin. Those thinkers not only-\\nunlocked new forces in their day and generation,\\nbut even yet from their tombs they hold sway over\\nthe minds of countless thousands. Their specula-\\ntions formed the creeds of centuries, and their\\npassionate and yearning musings upon human life\\nand destiny find echo in the souls of some of the\\nnoblest of earth s sons. When the long night of\\nauthority and credulity was drawing to a close,\\nwhen the sun of inquiry was dawning above the\\nhorizon, great thinkers arose who, from the moun-\\ntain tops of science, foresaw the meridian glory of\\nthe Age of Reason.\\nAfter the splendid work of Mr. John Morley, it\\nis superfluous to dwell upon the achievements in\\nthe cause of enlightenment of the intellectual heroes\\nof the Revolution epoch. The great constructive\\nsystems of the past had not only fallen before the\\nassault of Reason, but had become cumberers of\\nthe ground. The decaying creeds of the past not\\nonly impeded the progress of thought, but were a\\nbarrier to social amelioration. Paths had to be\\ncut through the jungle, and, in the name of\\nhumanity, abuses hoary with the sanctity of re-\\nligion had to be attacked. For the pioneering work\\naccomplished, humanity is everlastingly debtor to\\nthe bold thinkers of the Revolution epoch. Not\\ncontent with the work of destruction, they set", "height": "2998", "width": "1957", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "EARLY LIFE 3\\nthemselves to the task of construction. Humanity\\ncannot live on negation. Through the writings of\\nVoltaire, Diderot, and the Encyclopeedists, may be\\ndetected attempts to formulate a conception of\\nman and his destiny which would take the place\\nof the theologic conception which in pre-scientific\\ntimes had done duty for ages as man s attempt to\\nsolve the problem of Existence indeed the idea\\nof the Encyclopoedia rose out of the feeling that\\ndestruction needed to be supplanted by painstaking\\nattempts to attain to a comprehensive, coherent\\ntheory of life, in which humanity would find at\\nonce intellectual satisfaction and emotional har-\\nmony. Out of dissatisfaction with mere negation\\ngrew not only the Encyclopaedia^ but the imposing\\nsystems of Holbach and Helvetius. The time was\\nnot ripe for imposing philosophic systems, for the\\nsimple reason that knowledge of the universe and\\nman had not gone far enough to be organized on\\na scientific basis. No system can endure which\\nrests on premature generalizations and unverified\\nspeculations unconsciously the Rationalists of the\\nRevolution imported into their creed-making the\\nunreliable methods of the Theologians. Still their\\nfailure on the constructive side should not lessen\\nour admiration for the splendid work they did as\\nliberators of humanity. They loosened the hold of\\ndecaying creeds they cleared the dense forest of", "height": "3025", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "4 HERBERT SPENCER\\nthought they pointed the way to the promised\\nland of mental freedom and social progress.\\nAfter the French Revolution had spent its force,\\nprogressive thinkers became alive to the purely\\ndestructive nature of that movement on the in-\\ntellectual side. Among them was Comte a thinker\\nwhose great merits have not had adequate rec-\\nognition. Comte had the true sign of greatness\\nintellectual vision. He was not content, like\\nHume and analytic thinkers generally, to resign\\nhimself to the gloom of the forest, or to smother the\\never-recurring thoughts of man and his destiny in\\nthe petty butterfly attractions of an Epicurean\\nphilosophy. His great ambition was to provide a\\npath and an ideal by which humanity would march\\nboldly on to the expansive uplands and heights of\\ntruth. Comte s methods were distasteful to his\\nEnglish readers. His colossal egoism, his prefer-\\nence for mediaeval modes of thought, and his dis-\\nparagement of individual liberty and reason, set on\\nedge the critical teeth of many who sympathized with\\nhis high-souled endeavors. Destructive critics like\\nHuxley used Comte in order to make sport for the\\nPhilistines. The fatal blow to Comte s influence\\ncame from the new idea of Evolution, which wrecked\\nhis philosophic system as it did the systems of Buckle\\nand Mill. All three thinkers found themselves\\nstranded because of their inability to incorporate", "height": "2998", "width": "1965", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "EARLY LIFE 6\\nthe new views which were to revolutionize philo-\\nsophical as well as scientific thought. Still, in spite\\nof the ridicule of Huxley and the contemptuous\\ntreatment accorded to him in France and England,\\nComte deserves to be held in remembrance as a\\nthinker of fine caliber, prophetic vision, fertile\\nthought, and massiveness of mind.\\nThe dominating idea of the last half of the nine-\\nteenth century is Evolution an idea so far-reaching\\nin its influence, so mesmeric in its power, that at its\\ntouch all other ideas crystallize round it and, as if\\nby magic, yield to its potent sway. The thinker\\nwith whom history will imperishably associate the\\nidea of Evolution is Herbert Spencer. Perhaps in\\nno sphere has the influence of the Evolution theory\\nbeen more indirectly potent than in biography. So\\nlong as man was treated as an extra-mundane\\ncreation there was a natural tendency to concen-\\ntrate attention upon the dramatic and incalculable\\nside of his nature. Emphasis was laid upon the\\ninner psychical factors to the exclusion of those\\nphysical conditions which play such a prominent\\npart in human development. Great men, in the\\nlanguage of Carlyle, were messengers of the Eternal\\nmessengers who so dominated their environment\\nas to baffle all attempts at explanation and classi-\\nfication. Ignorance of the law of evolution natu-\\nrally led to an unintelligent hero-worship which", "height": "3028", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "6 HERBERT SPENCER\\nblinded the intellect to the subtle relations existing\\nbetween man and his surroundings. Herbert Spencer\\nchanged all that. His Principles of Biology fore-\\nshadowed a conception of biography in which the\\ngreat man would no longer be viewed as an incom-\\nprehensible incarnation of supernatural energy, but\\nas the product of certain interpretable forces.\\nBetween the average man and the great man the\\ndifference is mainly this the one remains passive,\\nwhile the other, as has been already said, reacts\\nupon his environment, thereby unlocking new forces\\nand giving a fresh impetus to progress. In coming\\nto the study of Herbert Spencer, we cannot do\\nbetter than use for purposes of biographic inter-\\npretation his own far-reaching principles. Before\\nseeking to understand Spencer the philosopher, it is\\nnecessary to understand Spencer the man. A critical\\nestimate can only lay claim to completeness when\\na picture is given of the philosopher as influenced\\nby his age as well as dominating his age. If the\\ntitle of great is due to those rare souls who have\\nscaled the heights of human thought, and from the\\nPisgah summit have pointed the way to intellectual\\nhorizons undiscoverable by ordinary mortals, upon\\nthe brow of Herbert Spencer must be placed the\\nnever-fading wreath of immortality.\\nHerbert Spencer was born at Derby on 27th April\\n1820. Spencer, like Mill, owed nluch to his father.", "height": "3032", "width": "1973", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "EARLY LIFE 7\\nbut the educational methods pursued were very-\\ndifferent indeed. James Mill had an almost fanat-\\nical belief in education. One of the tenets of\\nthe eighteenth-century philosoj)hy was the modifia-\\nbility of human nature, and the value of systematic\\ntraining. James Mill put his son into training\\nat the earliest possible moment and for years\\nsubjected him to a severe course of mental disci-\\npline. The elder Spencer, in his own way as intel-\\nlectually independent as James Mill, took a more\\nrational view of education. He did not deem it\\nthe highest wisdom to force children into an\\nartificial groove he preferred to trust to the\\nspontaneity of nature. In his view cramming of\\nthe memory with bits of detached knowledge was\\nof little value compared with thorough mental\\nindividuality. Being a teacher by profession, the\\nelder Spencer was in a position to give full sway\\nto his ideas. To this, and not, as has been supposed,\\nto delicate health, was it that young Spencer was\\nsomewhat backward in his early education. He was\\nseven years of age before he could read. In due\\ncourse the boy was sent to a training day-school,\\nbut his progress was not particularly satisfactory.\\nHe did not take kindly to the routine Oj. school life.\\nHe is described as having been restless, inattentive,\\nand by no means pUable. In all lessons in which\\nsuccess depended upon mechanical methods, such", "height": "2998", "width": "1882", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "8 HERBERT SPENCER\\nas learning by rote, young Spencer did not show to\\nadvantage. Knowledge of the fragmentary kind he\\ndid not readily assimilate it was only when his ob-\\nserving and reasoning faculties were called into play\\nthat intellectual progress was discernible. Nature\\nappealed to him more forcibly than books. Science\\nin his youthful days exercised over him a special\\ncharm. One of his favorite occupations is said to\\nhave been the catching and preserving of insects\\nand the rearing of moths and butterflies from eggs\\nthrough larva and chrysalis to their most developed\\nforms.\\nTo his domestic surroundings, more than to his\\nformal school training, the boy was indebted for\\nhis mental development. His father and uncles\\nwere men of pronounced individualities, bold\\nthinkers on religion, politics, and social questions\\ngenerally. In the family circle young Spencer\\nheard all the topics of the day discussed with free-\\ndom and boldness. Such an atmosphere was fatal to\\nthat hereditary reliance upon authority character-\\nistic of average middle-class homes. Moreover, the\\nboy was early taught to think for himself in matters\\nreligious by the example of dissent which he\\nwitnessed weekly in his -own home. His parents\\nwere originally Methodists, but his father had a\\npreference for the Quakers, while his mother re-\\nmained true to the Wesleyan persuasion. On Sun-", "height": "3033", "width": "1973", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "EARLY LIFE 9\\nday mornings young Spencer attended the Quakers\\nmeeting with his father, and in the evening he\\naccompanied his mother to the Methodist chapel.\\nThus early the future philosopher had to reckon\\nwith the personal equation, the domestic bias in\\nmatters theological. There is nothing in Mr.\\nSpencer s writings to show that religion had ever\\ntaken vital hold of him, as it did some of his noted\\ncontemporaries. Mill has left on record how he\\ngrew up outside of religious influences. His father\\ndeliberately kept him from contact with religion on\\nits emotional and ceremonial side. In that case\\nMill s detachment of mind on religious questions\\nwas intelligible but, in regard to Spencer, the\\ncurious thing was that, while moving in the midst\\nof religious influences, he seems to have remained\\ntotally unaffected by them. One would have ex-\\npected to find him, like George Eliot, under the\\nsway of those spiritual ideals and impulses which\\nwere inseparably associated with middle-class\\nEvangelicalism in the first half of the century.\\nIn conversation I once asked Mr. Spencer if, like\\nGeorge Eliot, he had first accepted the orthodox\\ncreed, then doubted, and finally rejected it. His\\nreply was that to him it never appealed. It was\\nnot a case of acceptance and rejection his mind\\nlay outside of it from the first.\\nIn many ways both Mill and Spencer would have", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "10 HERBERT SPENCER\\nfound their philosopliic influence broadened and\\ndeepened had they, in their early days, shared in\\nthe spiritual experiences of their contemporaries.\\nThose thinkers who, under the domination of youth-\\nful enthusiasm, have endeavored to realize super-\\nnatural ideals and, under emotional fervor, to strike\\nthe note of ascetic sanctity, receive an almost\\nintuitive insight into the deeper religious problems\\nof the age an insight denied those who come to\\nthe study of religious psychology with the foot-rule\\nof the logician and the weighing-scales of the\\nstatistician. Many students who have long since\\nbroken away from the bonds of orthodoxy, and\\nwhose minds now soar into the ampler air of\\nspeculative freedom, will be ready to admit that in\\ndealing with religion the minds of both Mill and\\nSpencer work under serious limitations, due to their\\nlack of spiritual receptivity in early daj^s. To this\\nlack of receptivity must be traced the error into\\nwhich Mr. Spencer fell in his First Principles in\\nsupposing that science and religion would find a\\nbasis of agreement in recognition of the Unknowable.\\nThe terms proposed by science resemble those of the\\nhusband who suggested to the wife, as a basis of\\nfuture harmony, that he should take the inside of\\nthe house and she the outside.\\nWhen young Spencer reached his thirteenth year,\\nthe question of his future came up for serious con-", "height": "3017", "width": "2003", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "EARLY LIFE 11\\nsideration. It was deemed wise to trust him to the\\neducational care of his uncle, the Rev. Thomas\\nSpencer, perpetual curate at Hinton, near Bath.\\nThe Rev. Mr. Spencer was a Radical in politics,\\na temperance advocate, an anti-corn law agitator,\\nand an enthusiastic advocate of all measures relating\\nto the welfare of the people a man, in brief, whose\\nlife was shortened by unsparing devotion to ideals\\nwhich are now recognized as realizable, but which\\nthen were treated as the products of a Quixotic\\nmind. The reverend gentleman, himself a dis-\\ntinguished graduate of Cambridge, naturally set\\nhimself to qualify his nephew for a university\\ncareer. His nephew s mind, however, was not cast\\nin the university mould. In his interesting\\nbiographic sketch of Herbert Spencer, Professor\\nHudson sums up very concisely the progress made\\nduring this period The course of study now\\npursued was somewhat more regular and definite\\nthan had been the case at home and the dis-\\ncipline was of a more rigorous character. But\\nsave for this the uncle s method and system did not\\nmaterially differ from those to which young Spencer\\nhad been accustomed while under his father s roof.\\nOnce again his successes and his failures in the\\nvarious studies which he now took up were alike\\nsignificant. In the classic languages to which a\\nportion of his time was daily given very little", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "12 HERBERT SPENCER\\nprogress was made. The boy showed neither taste\\nnor aptitude in this direction rules and vocabularies\\nproved perpetual stumbling-blocks to him; and what\\nlittle was with difficult}^ committed to memory was\\nalmost as soon forgotten. But while for studies\\nof this class there was shown an inaptitude\\nalmost astounding, a counterbalancing aptitude was\\nexhibited for studies demanding a different kind of\\nability constructive and co-ordinating power rather\\nthan a memory for unconnected details. In mathe-\\nmatics and mechanics such rapid advancement was\\nmade that he soon placed himself in these depart-\\nments abreast of fellow students much older than\\nhimself. What was noticeable, too, was his early\\nhabit of laying hold of essential principles, and his\\never-growing tendency towards independent analysis\\nand exploration.\\nClose study of his nephew s mind led the Rev. Mr.\\nSpencer to abandon the idea of a university career.\\nIt has been represented that his uncle was emphatic\\nupon the necessity of a university training, and only\\nreluctantly gave up the idea in consequence of the\\nnephew s obstinacy; but I have it on Mr. Spencer s\\nauthority that this was not the case. In his own\\nwords There was no dispute. My uncle gave up\\nthe idea when he saw that I was unfit. That is to\\nsay, it became clear to the Rev. Mr. Spencer that\\nthe mind of his nephew was of a type which could", "height": "2998", "width": "1989", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "EARLY LIFE 13\\nnot be fitted into the university mould. He saw\\nthat it would follow a bent of its own, and would\\nnot be forced into conventional channels. Much has\\nbeen said of the loss which Spencer has sustained\\nthrough exclusion from the atmosphere and training\\nof university life. In dealing with exceptional minds,\\nwhose evolution is pre-determined along original\\nlines by innate capacity and genius, no good purpose\\nis served by appealing to general rules, which from\\nthe nature of the case can deal only with the\\nexpected and the calculable, not with those out-\\nstanding individualities which defy the ordinary\\nlaws of averages and probabilities. One drawback\\ncertainly was attached to Spencer s exclusion from\\nuniversity life. He was compelled to face not only\\na hostile public, but the insidious opposition of\\nuniversity cliques, who could not bear to see a new\\nthinker of commanding power step forward into the\\nintellectual arena without the hall-mark of uni-\\nversity culture. Had Spencer been the centre of an\\nadmiring group of university disciples his system\\nwould have come into vogue much earlier; it would,\\nin other words, have become fashionable. As it\\nwas, after the gradual decay of home-made philoso-\\nphies, Hegel became the idol of university circles,\\nand Spencer was left, a voice crying in the wilder-\\nness. Notwithstanding all this, Spencer gained more\\nthan he lost by missing the conventional university", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "14 HERBERT SPENCER\\ntraining. However reluctant the Rev. Mr. Spencer\\nwas to abandon his deeply- cherished design, he\\nadmitted in after years that in following the prompt-\\nings of nature his nephew had acted wisely. He\\ndoubtless saw that the very qualities which unfitted\\nhis nephew for the routine of a classical curriculum\\nwere precisely the qualities which gave him his\\ngreat superiority in science and philosophy. A\\ngrinding in dead languages and a saturation in old-\\nworld methods and ideas might have seriously\\nchecked the faculties for observation and massive\\ngeneralization which, when left to develop naturally,\\nhave made their possessor an unrivalled king in\\nquite a new intellectual sphere, in which stand in\\nunique conjunction the widest speculative thought\\nand unparalleled analytic power.\\nThe abandonment of the university design led\\nto a period of uncertainty as to young Spencer s\\nfuture. He returned home. The practical outlook\\nseemed vague and uncertain. In the absence of\\nany well-defined plan, his father secured him an\\nassistantship in a school. The teaching profession\\nwas one in which Spencer might well have shone\\nprovided the curriculum were framed on a rational\\nand scientific basis. As a teacher he would have\\nfound himself out of sympathy with modern systems,\\nand sooner or later his career would have been\\ncut short. One quality invaluable in a teacher he", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "EARLY LIFE 16\\npossessed in a pre-eminent degree that of luminous\\nexposition. Those who have had the privilege of\\nconversing with Mr. Spencer have been at once\\nstruck with the marvellous lucidity of his handling\\nof the most abstruse topics. Into ordinary con-\\nversation he carries the habits of thought and\\nexposition which other men usually leave behind in\\nthe study. There is no pedantry, no formalism:\\nsweep of thought, clearness in statement, fertility\\nof illustration, and lucidity of exposition are wedded\\nto conversational charm. This expository power\\nstruck John Stuart Mill forcibly in his first inter-\\nview with Spencer. A friend of Mill once told me\\nof Mill s admiration for Spencer s power of present-\\ning a full-orbed view of his subject in language\\nat once precise and luminous. It is plain that\\nSpencer would have made an ideal teacher. How-\\never, circumstances rather than design cut short\\nhis pedagogic career. In the autumn of 1837 young\\nSpencer, whose early bent was towards science,\\nespecially on the mathematical and mechanical\\nsides, received and accepted an offer from the\\nresident engineer of the London division of the\\nLondon and Birmingham railway, then in process\\nof construction. For a year and a half he worked\\nin London as a civil engineer, and subsequently,\\nfor two and a half years, on. the Birmingham and\\nGloucester railway. During this time he showed", "height": "2985", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "16 HERBERT SPENCER\\nhis interest in the intellectual side of his profes-\\nsion by contributing several papers to the Civil\\nEngineer Journal^ and his inventive faculties\\nfound scope in the invention of a little instru-\\nment called the velocimeter, for calculating the\\nspeed of locomotive engines. Again his life-\\nplan was destined to be changed. After eight\\nyears at civil engineering, young Spencer was\\nbrought face to face with a crisis by the disasters\\nwhich followed upon the great railway mania. In\\nthe reaction which followed, Spencer, with other\\nyoung men similarly situated, suffered. The demand\\nfor new railways fell off, and consequently the de-\\nmand for civil engineers. At the age of twenty-six\\nSpencer had to begin the world afresh. He re-\\nturned to his home in Derby. Meanwhile Spencer s\\nmind had been branching out in other quarters\\nbesides civil engineering. He was musing upon\\npolitical philosophy and science. In 1842 he con-\\ntributed to a paper called The Nonconformist\\na series of articles on The Proper Sphere of\\nGovernment. These, after due season, appeared\\nlater in pamphlet form. In his home retreat\\nat Derby his mind was still further matured\\nby reading and thinking. Man, however, does not\\nlive by thought alone, so it behooved Spencer to turn\\nhis attention to the bread and butter side of life.\\nHe cast his eyes towards journalism, and after a", "height": "2993", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "1\\nEARLY LIFE 17\\nmiscellaneous period he was, in 1848, in his own\\nwords, invited to take the position of sub-editor of\\nthe Economist newspaper. This post he held till\\n1853. In London he got his feet on the first rung of\\nthe ladder of fame. The history of his long, toil-\\nsome, and heroic ascent is mainly the record of the\\nvarious stages of his mind in the conception and\\nelaboration of that vast system of thought with\\nwhich his name is imperishably associated.\\ni", "height": "2993", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER II\\nINTELLECTUAL ENVIKONMENT\\nWhile engaged in tte work of a civil engineer, and\\nbefore he settled in London, Spencer was quietly-\\npondering over the great intellectual problems of\\nthe time. Naturally he was led by his fondness for\\nscience to study the highest authorities in the vari-\\nous departments. At the age of twenty he began\\nto study Lyell s Principles of Creology. Without\\ndemur he accepted the development as opposed to the\\nspecial creation theory of the earth and man, though\\nlike the rest of his contemporaries he could not trace\\nthe process in its detail, nor understand its nature.\\nIn order to follow the evolution of young Spencer s\\nmind it will be necessary to describe the intellectual\\nenvironment in which it moved in those early days.\\nThe early years of the century were years of great\\nfermentation, theological, philosophic, political, and\\nsocial. The practical energies of the nation, freed\\nfrom the great strain of the continental wars, found\\nnew outlet in the spheres of commerce and industry.\\nScientific study of nature, no longer tabooed by theol-\\n18", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 19\\nogy, demonstrated its utility by an imposing record\\nof inventions and discoveries, whose influence on the\\nnational prosperity was at once dramatic and all-\\nembracing. Such a transformation of the industrial\\nand social order could not take place without exert-\\ning a potent influence upon the higher thought of\\nthe time. Science, which in the practical sphere\\nhad achieved colossal triumphs, and given man power\\nover nature, could not but be greatly influenced by\\nthe new forces which it had called into existence.\\nScience as the worker of miracles became the idol of\\nthe hour at its shrine the popular as well as the\\ncultured intelligence of the day worshipped fer-\\nvently. The printing-press teemed with books for\\nthe diffusion of useful knowledge, while to the more\\nhighly cultured the British Association, established\\nin the first half of the century, proved itself a veri-\\ntable Mecca. The union between science and in-\\ndustry had one effect discoveries, inventions, and\\ntheories came pell mell, to the utter confusion of the\\nmethodical thinker, with his desire to reduce his\\nintellectual knowledge to something like order. In\\nthe whirl of practical details, thought in the wide\\nand comprehensive sense was paralyzed the wood\\ncould not be seen for the trees. In the midst of the\\njubilation over the advance of discovery, in the midst\\nof the eulogiums over the material victories which\\nScience had brought in its train, there were those", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "20 HERBERT SPENCER\\nwho remembered that man does not live by facts\\nalone, those who are ever ready to string facts on\\nthe thread of philosophic or scientific generalizations.\\nSince the days of Bacon and his Novum Organum^\\nthinkers have cherished the ambition to discover\\nknowledge by the slow but sure methods of science,\\nand to weave that knowledge into one comprehensive\\nwhole.\\nIt soon became evident that a new theory of man\\nand his relation to the Universe was following in the\\nwake of science and its discoveries. In Scotland,\\nthe theological spirit, much as it wished, could not\\nprevent the reading public from being influenced by\\nsuch books as Combe s Constitution of Man, and the\\nfamous Vestiges of Creation. On the Continent the\\nsame spirit of scientific inquiry and theorizing was\\nabroad. This desire of science not to remain con-\\ntent with looking upon nature as a huge museum in\\nwhich the highest aim was duly to ticket and label\\nphenomena, found expression in Humboldt s Cosmos,\\nwhich appeared in 1845. About the same time\\nappeared Whewell s History and Philosophy of the\\nInductive Sciences, which was intended to be the\\ncontinuation of the work of Bacon renovated ac-\\ncording to our advanced intellectual position and\\noffice. A thinker of the type of W he well labors\\nunder one distinct disadvantage while he is en-\\ngaged upon ultimate generalizations, discoveries are", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 21\\nbeing made which may knock away the foundation\\nof his entire cosmical structure. Tliis was precisely\\nthe fate of Whewell. As Merz says in his valuable\\nwork on European TliougJit In the year 1857, the\\ndate of the publication of the latest editions of Whew-\\nell s works, nothing was popularly known of energy,\\nits conservation and dissipation, nothing of the varia-\\ntion of species and the evolution of organic forms,\\nnothing of the mechanical theory of heat or that of\\ngases, of absolute measurements and absolute tem-\\nperature even the cellular theory seems to have\\nbeen popular only in Germany. And yet all the\\nproblems denoted by these now popular terms were\\nthen occupying, or had for many years occupied, the\\nattention of the leading thinkers of that period. But\\nwe find no mention of them in Whewell s Works.\\nStill, Whewell did great service to the cause of sci-\\nentific thought. His was a bold attempt to reduce\\nto something like coherence the confused mass of\\nscientific knowledge. Underlying the book was the\\nidea of the organic unity of the sciences and if he\\nfailed to realize his ideal, the reason lay not in his\\nlack of insight, but in the fact that scientists had not\\nthen discovered by observation and experiment the\\nmarvellous unity of nature.\\nThe next great impetus to scientific thought came\\nfrom Comte. In the history of scientific thought the\\nname of Auguste Comte will always occupy an hon-", "height": "2998", "width": "1921", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "22 HERBERT SPENCER\\nored place. It is customary to belittle Comte on\\naccount of his vagaries in connection with the Reli-\\ngion of Humanity, but we must not allow his failings\\nto blind us to the great work he did in the sphere of\\nscientific thought. Science, as has been pointed out,\\nhad a bewildering effect upon the average mind.\\nAlong with the material blessings which came in\\nits train. Science had incidentally come forward as\\na rival to Theology, as an interpreter of Man and\\nthe Universe. In the minds of many people, even\\nthinkers of the caliber of Faraday, the theological\\nand scientific conceptions lived comfortably side by\\nside. But studious readers of the signs of the times\\nhad come to the conclusion that Theology and Sci-\\nence were deadly rivals, yet perplexity existed as to\\nhow they were related in the history of thought and\\nspeculation. It was the merit of Comte to attempt\\nto show the position which Theology, Metaphysics,\\nand Science hold in the progress of humanity.\\nWhether or not we agree with his famous law of\\nthe three stages, this, at least, must be conceded\\nComte by his law has rendered luminous a large tract\\nof history which, in the hands of the average histo-\\nrian, had been a perfect maze. In a rough sort of\\nway we do get a fruitful view of human progress\\nwhen we say with Comte that Theology failed in its\\ninterpretation of the Universe, because it busied itself\\nwith personal causes, while Metaphysics also went", "height": "3017", "width": "1957", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 23\\nwide of the mark because it dealt in entities, whereas\\nScience has been fruitful in so far as it has confined\\nitself to the study of phenomena on the lines of\\nobservation and experiment. In the purely scientific\\nsphere, Comte did great service in his efforts to\\nshow that progress does not take place at haphazard,\\nas a superficial student of the history of discoveries\\nand inventions is apt to think, but that through the\\nseemingly aimless growth of science there is trace-\\nable a definite law. Before Comte the various sci-\\nences were treated as so many distinct branches of\\nman s knowledge of nature. Any classification which\\nexisted was of an artificial kind. For this Comte\\nsubstituted a classification which had the note of\\norganic unity. The sciences, according to him, are\\nsix in number Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics,\\nChemistry, Biology, and Sociology. The merit\\nclaimed for this arrangement by Comte is that the\\norder of their classification is the order in which the\\nsciences have been evolved the order in which they\\nhave passed from the theological or metaphysical into\\nthe scientific stage. If we wish to learn how far\\nscientific conceptions are gaining ground, we have a\\nfairly reliable method if we apply the Comtean classi-\\nfication. In Mathematics, Astronomy, and Physics,\\nthe scientific method pure and simple has long held\\nsway. It is not, however, long since Chemistry and\\nBiology were at the metaphysical stage, with its", "height": "2996", "width": "1877", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "24 HERBERT SPENCER\\nvital principle and such like entities, while in the\\nregion of Sociology prayers for success of war, for\\nindustrial prosperity, etc., show unmistakable signs\\nof the theological stage.\\nValuable as was the work of Comte, it was vitiated\\nby one great defect. In his antipathy to the study\\nof causes, he was led to confuse two things which\\nare quite distinct final or theological, and efficient\\nor mechanical cause. The result of this was that he\\nrefused to trace his six sciences to a common root.\\nAll attempts to get behind phenomena, even to the\\nsubtle laws and forces w^hich seemed to be the key to\\nphenomena, were ruthlessly opposed by Comte. As\\nWard, an American writer, puts it Among the most\\nlamented of Comte s vagaries is his uncompromising\\nhostility to all the modern hypotheses respecting the\\nnature of light, heat, electricity, etc. He classed all\\nthese along with gravitation, and declared that all\\nthe efforts expended in the vain search after origin,\\nnature, or cause were simply squandered. These\\nagencies, according to him, were merely phenomena,\\nand were to be studied only as such. The imaginary\\ninterstellar ether was an ontological conception or a\\nmetaphysical entity to be classed along with phlogis-\\nton and all the spirits of the laboratory and the imag-\\ninary occupants of the bodies of men, animals, and\\ninanimate objects. The undulatory theory of light\\nwas no better than the emission theory, and both", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 25\\nequally vain attempts to know what from the nature\\nof things cannot be known. In fact, the domain of\\nthe unknowable in Comte s philosophy was enormous\\nin its extent, and when we contemplate the little that\\nwas left for man to do we almost wonder how he\\nshould have regarded it worth the labor of writing so\\nlarge a work. The amount of mischief which this\\none glaring fallacy accomplished for Comte s system\\nof Positivism, insinuating itself into every chapter,\\nand more or less vitiating the real truths contained\\nin the work, was so great as to give considerable\\ncolor to the claim that pure Comtism, if it could be\\nmade to prevail and exert its legitimate influence\\nupon human inquiry in the future, would so far crip-\\nple every department of science as to throw it back\\ninto mediaeval stagnation. For it would strike a\\nfatal blow at all true progress in human knowledge\\nby crushing out the very spirit of inquiry, and would\\nquench all interest in phenomena themselves by pro-\\nhibiting the search after the springs and sources\\nthe causes of the phenomena which furnish the\\ntrue life and soul of scientific research.\\nComte failed to realize his ideal, for a reason which\\nexplains the slow progress that has hitherto been\\nmade in the great task of formulating a scientific\\nphilosophy of the Universe. For this two things\\nare needed vast accumulation of facts and great\\nsynthetic power. A scientist with nothing but a", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "26 HERBERT SPENCER\\npassion for facts is simply an intellectual hodman,\\nwhose relation to the philosophical scientist is that of\\na bricklayer s laborer to the architect. On the other\\nhand, great speculative power working upon imper-\\nfect knowledge leads often to sheer absurdity. Wit-\\nness Germany with its natural philosophy. The\\nideal condition is one in which fact and theory go\\nhand-in-hand. Comte came as near as was possible\\nin his day to providing a scientific key to Nature.\\nAll that was needed was for Comte to discover and\\nformulate the law of unity, which, like a golden\\nthread, runs through his six sciences. For logical\\npurposes, it is necessary to treat the various sciences\\nas if they stood for separate independent classes of\\nfacts in Nature, but the discoveries which were tak-\\ning place just at the close of Comte s career substi-\\ntuted the dynamic for the statical conception of\\nNature. Herbert Spencer profited by the new con-\\nception of Nature of which Comte was unable to take\\nadvantage. From the point of view of the scientific\\nthinker, the dominating fact of the century may be\\ndefined as a new conception of Nature. Until Spencer\\nbegan to write, the conception of Nature was that\\nof a colossal machine, the various parts of which\\nwere specially manufactured to fit into their respec-\\ntive places. Unity, of course, there was, but the\\nunity was in the mind of the Supernatural Mechanic,\\nnot in the material of which the machine was con-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 27\\nstructed. Alike in the works of scientists and theo-\\nlogians of the early century, we find a total absence\\nof the thought of organic unity as applied to the\\nCosmos. Not only did the thinkers of the time fail\\nto hit upon the great fact of the unity of the Cosmos,\\nbut they had resigned themselves to the view that it\\nwas impossible to make such a discovery. Caught\\nin the meshes of a false philosophic method, the phi-\\nlosophers of the Rational school placed an arbitrary\\nlimit to speculation. Mill s Logic was the text-book\\nof the school. Mill s admiration of Comte finds\\nexplanation in the fact that the great Frenchman had\\ncarried the method of induction in interpretation of\\nthe Universe to what seemed to be its utmost limit.\\nAccording to Mill, knowledge resolves itself into a\\nrecognition of particulars. What we call a law is\\nsimply a recorded observation that phenomena follow\\neach other in a regular order. There is no inherent\\nnecessity that phenomena should be inter-related.\\nComte s law of the sciences determined nothing as to\\nthe necessary relations between the six sciences which\\nhe named. all that could be said was that the human\\nmind in the course of its progress came to a knowl-\\nedge of the sciences in the way indicated by Comte.\\nMill, like Comte, considered that scientific men were\\ngoing beyond the inductions of experience when they\\nendeavored to attribute to Nature any kind of inlier-\\nent regularity and necessity. Hence his remark that", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "28 HERBERT SPENCER\\nin some after planet the axiom that two and two make\\nfour might not hold. With Mill a scientific philoso-\\nphy had done its work when it revealed the exist-\\nence of a number of apparently permanent laws whose\\ninter-relation were undiscoverable, and upon which\\nthe regularity of the Cosmos depended. Mill s con-\\nception of the world was that of a collection of facts\\ngrasped by the mind by virtue of the law of associa-\\ntion facts existing by no inherent necessity, but\\nresting in the last analysis on the arbitrary and the\\naccidental. In our Cosmos these facts exist in one\\nway; elsewhere the connection might be totally dif-\\nferent. Thus, as Taine puts it, the Experiential\\nphilosophy, the philosophy which plumed itself upon\\nrefusing to go a step beyond Induction, ends in an\\nabyss of chance, an abyss of ignorance.\\nHere we have the explanation of Mill s curious\\nattitude to religion, as revealed in his posthumous\\nessays. At bottom Mill s conception was that of\\nTheology, with its postulation of an unknown cause\\nwhich at any time may reveal itself in an arbitrary\\nmanner. Mill was bound to admit that things need\\nnot necessarily exist in the connection in which we\\nnow find them. At any moment the connection\\nmight be severed consequently he was driven to\\nadmit that the question of miracles really turned on\\nthe question of evidence. We find the same curious\\nsympathy with theological conceptions in Huxley,", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 29\\nwho was constantly throwing a sop to the theolo-\\ngians, in the admission that he was quite ready\\nto believe the most profound mysteries in religion,\\nif the evidence were forthcoming, on the ground\\nthat Science contains as many mysteries as anything\\nto be found in Theology. In other words, Huxley,\\nlike Mill, contended that it was not possible to\\ndetect in Nature any facts held together by neces-\\nsity. Comte, Mill, and Huxley never got beyond\\nthe interpretative standpoint of Hume, whose Ag-\\nnosticism, it should be remembered, extended to\\nscience as well as to theology. We shall see later\\nthat Spencer s contribution to a scientific conception\\nof the Universe consisted in going beyond Hume,\\nComte, and Mill, in the direction of including all\\ngeneralizations under one generalization, and in\\nsupplementing the inductive method by the deduc-\\ntive, thereby demonstrating the necessary and\\norganic unity of the Cosmos. So much for the\\nscientific conceptions of the Universe which were\\nprevalent among advanced thinkers when Spencer\\nbegan to study science in a broad and comprehensive\\nmanner. Along with the scientific was the philo-\\nsophic conception, which also formed one of the\\nfactors in his intellectual environment.\\nThe French Revolution will always remain a land-\\nmark in modern history. If the student of history\\ndesires to understand the lines of modern thought", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "30 HERBERT SPENCER\\nand life, he must go back to that great political and\\nsocial upheaval. It is a mistake to suppose that the\\nRevolution exhausted its influence mainly in the\\nsphere of public activity. In all departments its\\nreactionary elfect was felt, and in none more so than\\nin Philosophy. What do we mean by Philosophy\\nThe answer to that will be easier when we consider\\nwhat is meant by Science. Science has been defined\\nas the systematization of our knowledge of phe-\\nnomena. In a word. Science deals with the modes\\nof existence Philosophy with the nature of exist-\\nence. It is clear that the conceptions which Phi-\\nlosophy forms of the nature of existence will react\\npowerfully on the conception which Science will\\nform of the modes of existence. Assume that\\nMatter is the ultimate fact, and you are logically\\ncommitted to a materialistic conception of Mind and\\nof Society a conception which must have far-\\nreaching influence upon individual and social evolu-\\ntion. If we wish, then, to find the key to the\\ndevelopment of the nineteenth century, we must go\\nback and try to discover the philosophical concep-\\ntions which dominated the previous era. The\\napostles of the Age of Reason adopted Materialism\\nas their philosophic creed. Voltaire and Rousseau\\nwere Deists, but the influential party in revolu-\\ntionary circles were undoubtedly Materialists. The\\ncreed of Diderot and his apostles was summed up in", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 31\\nHolbach s famous System of Nature, in which eveiy-\\nthing, from the movements of the solar masses to\\nthe movements of the soul, was interpreted in terms\\nof matter. Even before the Revolution the dreari\\nness of the French philosophy struck the highest\\nminds of the time with a kind of despair. Thus\\nGoethe says: The materialistic theory which re-\\nduces all things to matter and motion appeared\\nto me so gray, so Cimmerian, and so dead, that we\\nshuddered at it as at a ghost.\\nIts downfall was inevitable when the Age of Rea-\\nson ended in a carnival of diabolism. As George\\nHenry Lewes puts it The reaction against the\\nphilosophy of the eighteenth century was less a re-\\naction against a doctrine, proved to be incompetent\\nthan against a doctrine believed to be the source\\nof frightful immorality. The reaction was vigorous,\\nbecause it was animated by the horror which agitated\\nEurope at the excesses of the French Revolution.\\nAssociated in men s minds with the saturnalia of\\nthe Terror, the philosophic opinions of Condillac,\\nDiderot, and Cabanis were held responsible for the\\ncrimes of the Convention; and what might be true\\nin those opinions was flung aside with what was\\nfalse, without discrimination, without analysis, in\\nfierce, impetuous disgust. Every opinion which had\\nwhat was called a taint of Materialism, or seemed\\nto point in that direction, was denounced as an", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "32 HERBERT SPENCER\\nopinion unnecessary, leading to the destruction of\\nall religion, morality, and government. In the\\nreaction which followed the French Revolution, we\\nhave a vivid illustration of the close connection\\nwhich exists between philosophy and everyday life.\\nThe sudden contempt into which Materialism fell\\nmay be taken as an instinctive, though irrational,\\ntestimony to the intimate relation which exists be-\\ntween abstract thought and concrete life. It may\\nbe taken for granted that the conceptions which peo-\\nple form of the Universe and of their relation to it\\nwill largely influence the nature of the social bond.\\nMorality and human ideals generally cannot remain\\nunaffected by theories which make Matter or Spirit\\nthe root-principle of the great cosmical scheme. In\\nHolbach s System of Nature we have the material-\\nistic theory worked out logically into a comprehen-\\nsive ethical and sociological creed. In the famous\\nFrench Encyelopcedia of Sciences Materialism had\\nformal embodiment as a system of philosophy.\\nNature was viewed simply as a piece of mechanism,\\nman as the product of a complex molecular arrange-\\nment, mind the development of animal sensations,\\nmorality as a phase of self-interest, religion as a\\nproduct of emotional hallucination, and government\\nas an ingenious arrangement between despotic kings\\nand designing priests to keep the people in slavery.\\nWhen the crash came it was natural that the whole", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 33\\nscheme of Materialistic Philosophy should totter to\\nthe ground. What was to take its place\\nNaturally thinkers looked around for a set of first\\nprinciples which would give repose to their minds\\nas well as stability to the social sj ^stem. The Cath-\\nolic section, headed by de Maistre the Royalists,\\ninspired by Chateaubriand and the Metaphysicians,\\nstimulated by the Eclectic School of Cousin, united\\ntheir forces against Materialism. For a time Eclec-\\nticism held the field, but the work of construction\\nboth in France and Britain needed a new set of\\nfirst principles which neither nation could supply.\\nThe constructive principles were imported from Ger-\\nmany. The Germans Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and\\nHegel attacked the problem of Existence from the\\nspiritual instead of from the material side. To the\\nMaterialists, French and English, of the Revolution\\nschool, the Germans said that the great mystery\\nof Being was insoluble by mechanical methods.\\nReduce Matter, they said, to its constituent atoms\\nand you fail to seize the principle of life it\\nevades you like a spirit. With the Germans\\nespecially Hegel Cosmology and Psychology grew\\nnaturally out of Ontology Nature and Man were\\nincarnations of the Absolute. Coleridge and Car-\\nlyle, in their own peculiar ways, vigorously com-\\nbated the Materialistic Philosophy with its denial\\nof necessary truth, its repudiation of religion, and", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "34 HERBERT SPENCER\\nits substitution of Utilitarianism for a moral sense.\\nWhat Carlyle and Coleridge did for the cultured\\nclass generally Sir William Hamilton did for the\\npurely philosophic section. Though one part of his\\nphilosophy the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowl-\\nedge has been used in the interests of Agnosticism,\\nthe general drift of his influence was anti-material-\\nistic. How formidable a foe he was may be judged\\nby the elaborate attempt of Mill to discredit Ham-\\nilton as an authority. The contrast between the\\ntwo philosophies is well put by Mill in his essay on\\nColeridge. Mill says The German-Coleridgian\\ndoctrine expresses the revolt of the human mind\\nagainst the philosophy of the eighteenth century.\\nIt is ontological, because that was experimental\\nconservative, because that was innovative religious,\\nbecause that was abstract and metaphysical poet-\\nical, because that was matter-of-fact and prosaic.\\nPolitical circumstances were soon to lead to a re-\\nvival of the Experiential as opposed to the Intui-\\ntive school, the school of Hume, Diderot, and Mill,\\nas opposed to Kant and his British interpreters.\\nWith the peace of 1815 the old despotism, under the\\nname of the Holy Alliance, began to press heavily\\nupon Europe. People forgot the evils of Anarchy\\nunder pressure of present despotism. Institutions\\nwhich were looked upon as refuges from the Revolu-\\ntionary storm were now used as prison-houses for", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 35\\nthe free spirit of man. A philosophy which tended\\nto prop up existing institutions, to justify existing\\nbeliefs, and, when questioned, to fall back upon\\ninnate ideas, intuitions of the mind such a philoso-\\nphy became the natural target of thinkers of reform-\\ning proclivities. It was not without reason that the\\npolitical Radicals of the early years of the century\\nwere bitter opponents of the Intuitive School. Mill\\nsenior and Bentham did much to pave the way for\\nthe revival of Empiricism, but the philosopher of the\\nsect was John Stuart Mill.\\nIn Mill s hands Empiricism lost its old fanaticism.\\nSo long as a tliinker of materialistic tendencies never\\ngets beyond the popular ideas of Matter he will have\\nno difficulty in finding in experience a steadfast\\nground of certainty. But Mill was too well versed\\nin psychology, was too acute a thinker, to find repose\\nin the materialism of the old school. By sheer stress\\nof logic, Mill was driven close to Hume s position by\\nhis definition of Matter as a permanent possibility of\\nsensation, and Mind as a permanent possibility of\\nfeeling. With such a hesitating and uncertain cos-\\nmological and psychological creed, it is easy to under-\\nstand Mill s contention that in science there is no\\nsuch thing as necessary truth in ethics no such\\nthing as moral intuition and in politics no such\\nthing as authoritative belief over every department\\nhangs a cloud of uncertainty. In his remarkably", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "36 HERBERT SPENCER\\nsuggestive book on British philosophy, Professor\\nMasson puts this characteristic of Mill s whole\\nphilosophy very well when he says Mr. Mill s\\nlogic corresponds with what the science of logic\\ncould alone be consistently with his fundamental\\npsychological principle. It could not be like the\\nold logic and Hamilton s logic, a science of the\\nnecessary laws of thought, but only a science of the\\nmethod of quest after experimental truth or proba-\\nbility. So in his fine essay on liberty the radical\\nidea is that one can never be surer of anything, be\\nit even the forty-seventh proposition of the first\\nbook of Euclid, than in proportion as the chances of\\ncontradiction are exhausted and the high value set\\nthus upon human freedom, and even upon eccentric-\\nity of thought and action, seems to be grounded on\\nthe conviction that the human race can never know\\nwhat it may attain to in the shape either of knowl-\\nedge or of power, until it has sent out a rush of the\\nlargest number of individual energies simultane-\\nously, and with the least restraint from law or\\ncustom, in all directions. As for the essay on Utilita-\\nrianism, it is expressly a restatement of Paley s and\\nBentham s theory of expediency as the sole possible\\nfoundation of morals, but with a suggestion of this\\nhigher and more exquisite definition of expediency\\ncharacteristic of Mr. Mill, that it means the largest\\npossible amount of pleasure, and the least possible", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 37\\namount of pain, not to you or me or this age or all\\nmankind only, but to the sum-total of sentient exist-\\nence. In short, if I am not mistaken, Mr. Mill s\\nwritings prove that if he thinks of any one particu-\\nlar mode of thought among his contemporaries as\\nbeing more than any other chargeable with the total\\nmass of obstruction, fallacy, and misery that yet rolls\\nin the heart of society, as being more than any other\\nthe False God or Baal or Moloch of the human mind\\nit is the theory of necessary beliefs.\\nIn all this Mill was thoroughly consistent. Hav-\\ning failed to discover any inherent necessity in the\\nCosmos, he was unable to find any such necessity in\\nthe mind of man. Effective enough in its polemic\\nagainst the reigning Intuitionalism as represented\\nby Hamilton, Empiricism, even in the hands of an\\nacute thinker like Mill, was incapable of returning\\nsatisfactory answers to the fundamental problems of\\nPsychology. In regard to the root-question, that\\nrelating to the constitution and function of the\\nmind. Mill remained virtually at the position of\\nLocke. With Mill, as with Locke, the mind was a\\nblank sheet of paper, upon which, by means of the\\nlaw of association, experience was duly registered\\nand transformed into coherent knowledge. In such\\na system there was no room for a \u00e2\u0096\u00a0priori ideas all\\nwas traceable to experience. So far good, but\\nexperience showed that in the mind certain beliefs", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "38 HERBERT SPENCER\\nimpressed themselves with an intuitive force and\\nan absoluteness which found no explanation in\\nthe experience of the individual. The axioms of\\ngeometry and of causality were not reached by the\\nindividual through a purely inductive process. How\\nwere these to be explained? Before Empiricism\\ncould give a rational answer to this question it had\\nto come under the transforming influence of the\\nevolutionary idea. In Psychology as in Cosmology\\nSpencer s contribution was so original as to trans-\\nform the old Experiential system of Mill, and bring\\nto an end the long-standing feud between the\\nIntuitionalists and the Experientialists. That will\\nbe explained in all detail later. Meanwhile, it was\\nnecessary, in order to understand the revolution\\nworked by Spencer in philosophy, to have a clear\\nconception of the problems which came before him\\nfor solution.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III\\nEVOLUTION OF THE EVOLUTION THEORY\\nIt is a mistake to suppose that when he began\\nhis studies Spencer set himself consciously and\\ndeliberately to discover the unifying root of\\nNature s multiform manifestations. At first his\\nmind was mainly directed to questions of a politico-\\nsocial nature. In the early years of the century,\\npolitical thinkers were greatly exercised about Gov-\\nernment, its nature and limits. Brought up in a\\ndemocratic circle, inheriting the traditions of Lib-\\neralism on the side of religious dissent and politi-\\ncal Radicalism, it was natural that Spencer s early\\nthoughts should run in a sociological direction.\\nEver in search of first principles, it was also natural\\nthat he should endeavor to seek the scientific basis\\nof Government. As the earliest products of his\\nthinking, his letters on The Proper Sphere of Grov-\\ne7 7iment, published in the Nonconformist newspaper\\nin 1842, and republished in pamphlet form in 1843,\\ndemand attention. In these letters we find emphatic\\ninsistence on the view that social phenomena con-\\n39", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "40 HERBERT SPENCER\\nform to invariable laws: the ethical progress of man\\nas due to social discipline, the spontaneous nature of\\nsociety, with a consequent discouragement of State\\ninterference and control. Not satisfied with his\\ntreatment of the subject, Mr. Spencer resolved to\\ndeal with it on a more comprehensive scale. In\\n1850 appeared Social Statics, the object of which\\nwas to base his practical views of the nature and\\nscope of Government on a coherent set of first prin-\\nciples. At a later stage of the present work, when\\ndealing with Sociology, an attempt will be made to\\nshow the nature of Spencer s contributions to\\npolitical science as compared with the speculations\\nof previous thinkers from Locke to Mill. Mean-\\nwhile, in tracing the evolution of Mr. Spencer s\\nmind, it is necessary to point out that in Social\\nStatics are to be found the germs of those pregnant\\nspeculations which were to lead to the far-reaching\\ncosifiical generalization which, like a magnet, gathers\\nto itself the scattered detached fragments of scientific\\nthought.\\nIn Social Statics we find Mr. Spencer giving\\nexpression to his dissatisfaction with the prevailing\\nschool of political thought, with which he was, on\\nthe practical side, in close sympathy namely, the\\nUtilitarian school. He felt that on the philosophic\\nside Utilitarianism, as defined by Bentham and his\\nfollowers, lacked theoretic stability. Spencer set", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION THEORY 41\\nhimself to ask and answer the questions What is\\nsociety and What are the relations between man\\nthe unit and society the mass In harmony with\\ntheir fundamental principle, the Utilitarians founded\\ntheir conception of society on Induction. Men, they\\nrecognized, all made happiness the goal of their\\nendeavor. Society is composed of numbers of men\\nin search of happiness; consequently the highest\\ntype of society would be one in which the greatest\\nnumber of its members enjoyed the greatest amount\\nof happiness.\\nHere, as in science and philosophy, the school of\\nBentham and Mill displayed the arbitrary nature\\nof their fundamental principle. No attempt was\\nmade to demonstrate the necessary connection\\nbetween individual and social happiness and the\\ngeneral laws of life. Man was viewed from the\\nstatical standpoint. Human nature was treated\\nafter the style of the eighteenth century philos-\\nophers as a stable product. Human nature is\\neverywhere the same, summed up the eighteenth\\ncentury point of view. The evils of society were\\nheld to be due to bad governments. Let legisla-\\ntion aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest\\nnumber, and all will go well. Now such a mode\\nof reasoning did not commend itself to Spencer.\\nHe argued that before an all-embracing social law\\ncan be legislatively formulated, we must first dis-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "42 HERBERT SPENCER\\ncover what society is, and how man the unit\\nstands related to society. We must not rest con-\\ntent with induction we must discover the necessary\\nbond between the unit and the mass. And when\\nthat is accomplished, we may be in a position to\\ndeduce the necessary laws of that relationship.\\nManifestly at the outset an answer had to be\\ngiven to this question Is society a natural or an\\nartificial product? The rationalist thinkers of the\\neighteenth century favored the view that society\\nwas an artificial product.\\nRousseau, with his famous theory of a state of\\nnature, simply gave expression in exaggerated form\\nto the idea generally entertained that society was\\nlargely the result of manufacture, of deliberate\\ndesign, too often the outcome of base motives.\\nGovernments held an exaggerated importance in\\nthe minds, not only of the eighteenth century\\nthinkers, but also of the school of Philosophic\\nRadicals the Mills and the Benthams. Even John\\nStuart Mill, in his book on Representative Govern-\\nment, shows traces of this view by his constant\\nanxiety lest, in the absence of political checks and\\ncounterchecks, society should proceed along wrong\\nlines. Society, up till Spencer wrote his Social\\nStatics, was viewed almost exclusively from the\\npolitical side. Spencer changed the point of view\\nfrom the political to the biological. It is a common", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION THEORY 43\\nobjection to the Spencerian system of thought that\\nit is simply a revival in modern times of the a priori\\nmethods of the Schoolmen a kind of materialistic\\nHegelism in which facts are made to fit a pre-con-\\nceived theoretic framework. Nothing could be\\nfurther from the truth. I confess myself to have\\nheld some such view. With many others I supposed\\nthat Spencer had started consciously with a vast\\ncosmical theory, and had then explored the realm\\nof science for illustrations and verifications. In\\nconversation Mr. Spencer assured me that such was\\nnot the case. He began with fact; he stuck by\\nthe inductive process and it was only at a certain\\nstage of his scientific exploration that the thought\\nflashed across his mind that the law of biological\\nand social evolution is a universal process, traceable\\nin the cosmical changes and in the latest results of\\ncivilization. But we do not need to rely upon\\nconversation on this point. In one of his essays,\\nReasons for Dissenting from M. Comte^ there is an\\ninteresting autobiographic statement. In reply to\\nthose who classed him erroneously as a follower of\\nComte, Spencer says And now let me point out\\nthat which really has exercised a profound influence\\nover my course of thought. The truth which\\nHarvey s embryological inquiries first dimly indi-\\ncated, which was afterwards more clearly perceived\\nby Wolff, and which was put into a definite shape", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "44 HERBERT SPENCER\\nby Von Baer the truth that all organic develop-\\nment is a change from a state of homogeneity to a\\nstate of heterogeneity this it is from which very\\nmany of the conclusions which I now hold have in-\\ndirectly resulted. In Social Statics there is every-\\nwhere manifested a dominant belief in the evolution\\nof man and of society. There is also manifested\\nthe belief that this evolution is in both cases deter-\\nmined by the incidents of conditions the actions\\nof circumstances. And there is further, in the\\nsections already referred to, a recognition of the\\nfact that organic and social evolution conform to\\nthe same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions\\nof various orders, everywhere determined by natural\\ncauses (beliefs again displayed in the Theory of\\nPopulation and in the Principles of Psychology)\\nthe formula of Von Baer set up a process of organ-\\nization. The extension of it to other kinds of\\nphenomena than those of individual and social\\nbodies is traceable through successive stages. It\\nmay be seen in the last paragraph of an essay on\\nThe Philosophy of Style^ published in October, 1852\\nagain in an essay on Manners and Fashion^ published\\nin April, 1854 and then in a comparativelj ad-\\nvanced form in an essay on Progress Its Law and\\nCause, published in April, 1857. Afterwards there\\ncame the recognition of the need for modifying\\nVon Baer s formula by including the trait of in-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION THEORY 45\\ncreasing definiteness next the inquiry into those\\ngeneral laws of force from which this universal\\ntransformation necessarily results next the deduc-\\ntion of these from the ultimate law of the persist-\\nence of force next the perception that there is\\neverywhere a process of Dissolution complementary\\nto that of Evolution and finally the determination\\nof the conditions under which Evolution and Dis-\\nsolution occur. The filiation of these results is,\\nI think, tolerably manifest. The process has been\\none of continuous development set up by the addi-\\ntion of Von Baer s law to a number of others that\\nwere in harmony with it.\\nIn Appleton s Popular Science Monthly for Feb-\\nruary, 1897, there appeared an article on Mr. Spen-\\ncer, by Professor Hudson of California, in which the\\nevolution of Mr. Spencer s mind is minutely traced,\\nby the aid of an important letter on the subject\\nfrom Mr. Spencer himself. Professor Hudson says\\nI am fortunate in having before me as I write a\\nletter in which he was kind enough to outline for\\nme the important stages in his progress toward the\\ngreat doctrines of the synthetic philosophy. If, in\\nfollowing his account and in occasionally reproduc-\\ning, as I shall venture to do, his own words, I am\\nforced to touch again upon points already brought\\nout, this will scarcely be deemed ground for regret,\\nsince the slight repetition involved will serve per-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "46 HERBERT SPENCER\\nhaps to throw the whole subject into clearer relief.\\nThe simple nucleus of his philosophic system first\\nmade its appearance in Social /Statics, where, in the\\nchapter entitled General Considerations, mention\\nis made of the biological truth that low types of\\nanimals are composed of many like parts not mutu-\\nally dependent, while higher animals are composed\\nof parts that are unlike and are mutually dependent.\\nThis, he writes, was an induction which I had\\nreached in the course of biological studies mainly,\\nI fancy, while attending Professor Owen s lectures\\non the Vertebrate Skeleton. With this was joined\\nthe statement that the same is true of societies,\\nwhich begin with many like parts not mutually\\ndependent, and end with many like parts that are\\nmutually dependent. This also was an induction.\\nAnd then in the joining of these came the induction\\nthat the individual organism and the social organism\\nfollowed this law. Thus the radical conception of\\nthe entire system took shape before Mr. Spencer had\\nbecome acquainted with Von Baer s law, which, as\\nwe have seen, did not occur till two years later.\\nThis law, though applying to the unfolding of the\\nindividual only, had none the less its use. In fur-\\nnishing the expression from homogeneity to hetero-\\ngeneity, it presented a more convenient intellectual\\nimplement. By its brevity and its applicability to\\nall orders of phenomena, it served for thinking much", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION THEORY 47\\nbetter than the preceding generalization, which\\ncontained the same essential thought. The essays\\nwhich followed Social Statics were marked by the\\nestablishment of various separate inductions in-\\nwhich other groups of phenomena were brovight\\nunder this large principle, while in the first edition\\nof the PsycJiology, not only was the same principle\\nshown to comprehend mental phenomena, but there\\nwas also recognized the primary law of evolution\\nintegration and increase of definiteness. What\\nfollowed may best be given in Mr. Spencer s own\\nwords Then it was that there suddenly arose in\\nme the conception that the law which I had sepa-\\nrately recognized in various groups of phenomena\\nwas a universal law applying to the whole Cosmos\\nthe many small inductions were merged in the large\\ninductions. And only after this largest induction\\nhad been formed did there arise the question\\nWhy? Only then did I see that the universal cause\\nfor the universal transformations was the multipli-\\ncation of effects, and that they might be deduced\\nfrom the law of the multiplication of effects. The\\nsame thing happened at later stages. The generali-\\nzation which innnediately preceded the publication\\nof the essay on Progress Its Law and Cause the\\ninstability of the homogeneous was also an in-\\nduction. So was the direction of motion and the\\nrhythm of motion. Then, having arrived at these", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "48 HERBERT SPENCER\\nderivative causes of the universal transformation, it\\npresently dawned upon me (in consequence of the\\nrecent promulgation of the doctrine of the conserva-\\ntion of force) that all these derivative causes were\\nsequences from that universal cause. The question\\nhad, I believe, arisen, Why these several derivative\\nlaws and that came as the answer. Only then did\\nthere arise the idea of developing the whole of the\\nuniversal transformation from the persistence of\\nforce. So you see the process began by being\\ninductive and ended by being deductive and this\\nis the peculiarity of the method followed. On the\\none hand, I was never content with any truth\\nremaining in the inductive form. On the other\\nhand, I was never content with allowing a deductive\\ninterpretation to go unverified by reference to the\\nfacts. The cautious method of induction employed\\nis evident from this extract, and is a sufficient\\nanswer to those who twit Mr. Spencer with dealing\\npurely in hypothesis. Mr. Spencer s great original-\\nity will be found to consist in the unique manner in\\nwhich he has combined the two processes, inductive\\nand deductive. He has taken away the reproach of\\nempiricism from scientific thought, and the reproach\\nof vague theorizing from philosophic thought.\\nThus slowly and unconsciously was Mr. Spencer\\ndrawn on to the path of his great discovery. His\\nstudies in biological and social science, as has been", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "EVOLUTION OP^ EVOLUTION THEORY 49\\nshown, led him to formulate a law of change and\\nprogress, which he suddenly discovered to be the\\nlaw of all change and progress.\\nNotwithstanding Mr. Spencer s protests against\\nbeing classed as a Comtist, the impression still\\nlargely prevails that in aim and method Spencerism\\nand Positivism are fundamentally alike. That they\\nare fundamentally different will be evident from\\ncomparison of the two systems. With Spencer the\\ntask of philosophy was to search for the unifying\\nroot of the Cosmos. The task of the scientist is to\\ndiscover the widest generalizations in particular\\ndivisions of the Cosmos. He formulates the laws\\nof mechanics, of chemistry, of biology, psychology,\\nand sociology. Is it possible to go beyond these\\ngeneralizations Is it possible still further to\\ncombine the generalizations of science under one\\nsupreme generalization, without abandoning the\\nmethods of induction and deduction Are the great\\ndivisions of phenomena arbitrary divisions, the\\nresult of the principle of the division of labor\\nOr is it possible to proceed still further, and show\\nthat the various sciences represent separate yet\\nclosely related stages in the development of the\\nCosmos stages which are not arbitrary departments\\ndevised by man for intellectual convenience, but\\nparts of one all-embracing process In other words,\\nis the Cosmos from star to soul pervaded by one law,", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "50 HERBERT SPENCER\\nor must we be content with the view that a rigorous\\nanalysis brings us down to a number of Permanent\\nCauses or Laws which cannot be reduced to an ulti-\\nmate unity Comte held distinctly by the view\\nthat all attempts to reduce phenomena to a single\\nlaw were chimerical. Such attempts he declared\\nto be as futile as the old theological theorizings\\nabout a First Cause. Man s business, according to\\nComte, is to analyze accurately the circumstances\\nof phenomena and to connect them by the natural\\nrelations of succession and resemblance. Failing\\nto distinguish between final and efficient Causes,\\nComte unwittingly put an arbitrary limit to human\\ninquiry. Content with noting the order of phenom-\\nena, he denied with scorn the right of the intellect\\nto seek for the cosmical causes of phenomena. In\\nharmony with his view Comte treated with contempt\\nthe cell doctrine, which, even while he was writ-\\ning, was revolutionizing physiological science he\\ntabooed all inquiries into the origin of the human\\nrace, he was hostile to all hypothesis about the\\nnature of heat, light, electricity. Because The-\\nology in its search for origins had taken the wrong\\nroad, he would prohibit the search altogether, for-\\ngetful of the fact that knowledge which limits itself\\nto the mere noting of co-existences and resem-\\nblances among phenomena remains at the empirical\\nstage. On the other hand, the Spencerian philoso-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION THEORY 51\\nphy rests upon the possibility of framing, in relation\\nto the Cosmos as a whole, a generalization which\\nshall be verifiable in detail. According to Spencer,\\nthe duty of Philosophy is, taking its stand upon the\\nwidest truths formulated by Science, to form a gen-\\neralization which shall link all phenomena into one\\norganic whole. Comte denied the possibility of any\\nsuch universal Synthesis. He included in one\\nsweeping condemnation philosophies of the Cosmos\\nas well as theologies of the Cosmos. Manifestly\\nSpencerism and Comtism cannot be in fundamental\\nagreement when Comte passionately denounces pre-\\ncisely the speculative methods and results which\\nhave constituted the life-work of Mr. Spencer. Mr.\\nSpencer was not indebted for his fundamental ideas\\nto Comte, for the simple reason that not only had\\nComte no fundamental ideas about the Cosmos, but\\nhe denounced as metaphysicians or theologians in\\ndisguise all who ventured to formulate such ideas.\\nIn short, Spencer could not be indebted to Comte\\nfor his philosophy of the Cosmos, because Comte had\\nno philosophy of the Cosmos he put it forward as\\nhis chief title to fame that he had none.\\nBut, it will be said, Comte claimed to be the\\nauthor of the Positivist Philosophy. It will not do,\\nin order to establish the originality of Mr. Spencer,\\nto assert that Comte was no philosopher, in face of\\nthe fact that it is as a philosopher that he is known", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "52 HEEBERT SPENCER\\nto history. Witliin certain definitely prescribed\\nlimits Comte was a philosopher, and deserves credit\\nfor producing new and fruitful conceptions of great\\nvalue but their value is historical and sociological,\\nnot cosmical. Banishing the idea of efficient cause,\\nComte quite logically was brought to a full stop at\\nhis six sciences. Beyond these he could not go.\\nHere induction had completed its work, and all that\\nan empirical philosophy could do was to show the\\nhistoric relation between the sciences, and organize\\nthem in a social direction. This constituted Comte s\\noriginality. Having dismissed as futile all inquiries\\ninto causes which lay beyond the methods of the\\nmuseum and the laboratory, having relegated ulti-\\nmate laws to the region of the Unknown, Comte\\nwas compelled to organize his philosophy round\\nHumanity instead of the Cosmos. All speculations\\nwhich had no direct relation to human well-being\\nwere placed by him in the same category as theology.\\nSuch a contracted view of man s intellectual capa-\\nbilities gradually transformed his philosophy into a\\nreligion in which intelligence was discouraged and\\nauthority elevated to the front rank as a factor in\\nhuman progress. Conclusive evidence has been\\nadduced to show that Mr. Spencer s conception of\\nphilosophy is fundamentally different from that of\\nComte. Spencer s view of causation, with his insist-\\nence upon the necessary co-relations of phenomena", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION THEORY 53\\nas distinguished from customary association, marks\\noff his system completely from the Empiricism of\\nHume, Mill, and Comte, while his sociological like\\nhis cosmical conceptions have nothing in common\\nwith the Positivist system in fact, the two systems\\nagree only in their acceptance of those ideas which\\nare held by all scientific thinkers, as opposed to theo-\\nlogical conceptions of Man and the Universe. Mean-\\nwhile, before proceeding to study Mr. Spencer the\\nphilosopher, a few pages may fitly be devoted to Mr.\\nSpencer the man.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IV\\nPEKSONAL CHAEACTERISTICS\\nThe ten years from 1850, when lie published his\\nfirst book, Social Statics, till 1860, when he issued\\nthe prospectus of his Synthetic Philosophy, were fruit-\\nful to Mr. Spencer both socially and intellectually.\\nAlthough his writings were not popular, they\\nbrought him into notice in circles where high think-\\ning was sure to be appreciated. The intervals of\\nleisure enjoyed while on the staff of the Economist\\nMr. Spencer utilized in contributing to the leading\\nreviews, notably the Westminster, which at that time\\nhad as sub-editor Mary Ann Evans, destined later to\\ntake the world by storm as George Eliot. In the\\nLife of Creorge Eliot are to be found a number of\\ninteresting references to the rising philosopher. In\\na letter to Mr. Bray about the end of September\\n1851, George Eliot writes On Friday we had\\nFoxton, Wilson, and some other nice people, among\\nothers a Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has just brought\\nout a large work on Social Statics, which Lewes\\npronounces the best book he has seen on the sub-\\n54", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 55\\nject. In another letter to the Brays a year after\\nshe says I went to the opera on Saturday, at\\nCovent Garden, with my excellent friend Herbert\\nSpencer, as Lewes calls him. We have agreed that-\\nthere is no reason why we should not have as much\\nof each other s society as we like. He is a good,\\ndelightful creature, and I always feel better for\\nbeing with him. Writing to Miss Sara Hennell\\nshe expresses herself thus My brightest spot, next\\nto my love of old friends, is the deliciously calm new\\nfriendship that Herbert Spencer gives me. We see\\neach other every day, and have a delightful cama-\\nraderie in everything. But for him my life would\\nbe desolate enough. Again Herbert Spencer\\ndined with us to-day looks well, and is brimful of\\nclever talk as usual. His volume of Essays is to\\ncome out soon. He is just now on a crusade against\\nthe notion of Species. But perhaps the most inter-\\nesting reference is to be found in the extract from\\nthe diary of George Henry Lewes, under date Janu-\\nary 28, 1859 Walked along the Thames towards\\nKew to meet Herbert Spencer, who was to spend the\\nday with us, and we chatted with him on matters\\npersonal and philosophical. I owe him a debt of\\ngratitude. My acquaintance with him was the\\nbrightest ray in a very dreary, toasted period of my\\nlife. I had given up all ambition whatever, lived\\nfrom hand to mouth, and thought the evil of each", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "66 HERBERT SPENCER\\nday sufficient. The stimulus of his intellect, es-\\npecially during our long walks, roused my energy\\nonce more, and revived my dormant love of science.\\nHis intense theorizing tendency was contagious, and\\nit was only the stimulus of a theory which could\\nthen have induced me to work. I owe Spencer\\nanother and deeper debt. It was through him that\\nI learned to know Marian to know her was to love\\nher and since then my life has been a new birth.\\nTo her I owe all my prosperity and all my happi-\\nness. God bless her. In regard to the concluding\\nremarks, rumor has it that Lewes supplanted Spen-\\ncer in the affections of George Eliot. This is not\\nthe case. Mr. Spencer s relations with George Eliot\\nfrom first to last rested on the basis of friendship\\npure and simple.\\nThe reference by Lewes to Mr. Spencer s theoriz-\\ning tendency needs to be supplemented by reference\\nto his passion for facts. He is equally removed\\nfrom the hodmen of science who are content to\\nthrow down before their readers a confused mass of\\nfacts, and the fantastic theorists who weave cosmic\\nspeculations out of their inner consciousness. It is\\nsaid of Cuvier that from the examination of a bone\\nhe could in his mind construct the entire animal.\\nTo Spencer a fact is valuable in so far as it enables\\nhim to place it in organic relation with other facts\\nin an interpretative scheme of thought. He possesses", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 57\\nan instinctive insight into the value of facts. The\\ncombination in his mind of philosophic and scientific\\nqualities, strange as it may seem, has somewhat\\nretarded his fame. The philosopher who soars into\\ncloudland blames Mr. Spencer for his utilitarian\\nhabits of thought, his constant reference to reality,\\nand his resolute refusal to take imaginative flights.\\nThe men of science, on the other hand, are quite\\nwilling to admit his philosophic powers, but they are\\njealous of a thinker who has assimilated the results\\nof science without having gone through the usual\\napprenticeship in the museum and the laboratory.\\nRather than frankly admit that in Mr. Spencer s\\nmind the philosophical and scientific tendencies are\\nuniquely blended, his opponents pursue a policy of\\ndetraction, with the hope of discrediting his influ-\\nence as a speculative thinker and as a master of\\nscientific method.\\nReference has already been made to Mr. Spencer s\\ngreat expository power. In regard to this Dr.\\nHooker once remarked, He talks like a book. It\\nis not to be supposed, however, that there is any-\\nthing like pedantry in his conversation. He is as far\\nas possible removed from the conventional conception\\nof a philosopher, who is supposed to be so wedded\\nto abstract meditation as to be in social life the\\nembodiment of dreary dulness. There is nothing of\\nthe dry-as-dust about Mr. Spencer. I remember how", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "58 HERBERT SPENCER\\nagreeably surprised I was with my first meeting with\\nthe great man. I had expected to meet a grave and\\nsomewhat awe-inspiring philosopher, whose mind\\nwas so absorbed in study of the Cosmos as to make\\nhim impatient of the trivialities of ordinary mortals.\\nInstead, I found myself in presence of a bright,\\nvivacious personality, a man of generous impulses,\\nvery much at home among the actualities of life,\\nand withal brimful of humor. There is no assump-\\ntion of superiority in Mr. Spencer s conversation.\\nIt is racy, pointed, vigorous. His criticisms of\\ncontemporary writers are calm, suggestive, and\\npenetrative and, great as is his fame, he never\\nposes as an oracle, or, in Carlylean style, assumes\\npontifical airs. How far he is removed from every-\\nthing like this is well illustrated by an incident\\nwhich occurred at a London dinner-party. The\\nhostess had invited a friend specially to meet Mr.\\nSpencer. The guest found himself seated beside an\\nelderly gentleman, to whom he addressed the usual\\ncommonplaces. During the evening he was aston-\\nished to hear the elderly gentleman addressed across\\nthe table as Mr. Spencer. In surprise he turned to\\nhim and exclaimed, Are you really Mr. Herbert\\nSpencer Mr. Spencer, smiling blandly, and no\\ndoubt with a merry twinkle in his eye, quietly\\nreplied that he was. Until considerations of health\\nforbade him, Mr. Spencer delighted in the social side", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 59\\nof life. Daily he used to visit the Athenseum Club,\\nnot to study, but to enjoy a game of billiards, of\\nwhich he was passionately fond. There he would be\\nfound with his coat off, as intent upon scoring a\\nvictory against his opponent as he is in wrestling\\nwith a controversialist in the philosophic arena.\\nBut after all, the interest in Mr. Spencer s life is\\nof an intellectual kind. As Emerson says Great\\ngeniuses have the shortest biographies. They live\\nin their writings. Specially does this hold of Mr.\\nSpencer, whose seclusion, apart from indifferent\\nhealth, was necessitated by the formidable philo-\\nsophic scheme which he had mapped out for him-\\nself. In 1860, when forty years of age, he published\\nthe prospectus of a colossal scheme, namely, a new\\ntheory of the Cosmos, from its earliest nebular mani-\\nfestations to its highest development in man and\\ncivilization a scheme bold in theoretic conception,\\nand, considering Mr. Spencer s state of health, seem-\\ningly Quixotic in practical design. From this time\\nonward the history of his life is mainly the history of\\na series of heroic endeavors, culminating in heroic\\nachievement. How heroic were these endeavors\\nwill be made clear when the whole circumstances are\\nfully considered. In addition to indifferent health\\nthe result of a nervous breakdown consequent on\\nover-work Mr. Spencer had to face the fact that\\nhe had dedicated his life to an ideal in the realization", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "60 HERBERT SPENCER\\nof which both adequate remuneration and fame must\\nat best have been remote results. In an age when the\\nmain springs of human activity are largely conven-\\ntional, when great deeds are done from desire of im-\\nmediate tangible reward, Mr. Spencer set the bright\\nexample of a career wholly devoted to universal ends,\\nunblemished by that infirmity of noble minds thirst\\nfor popular applause. With a determination positively\\nheroic, an energy positively superhuman, the quiet,\\nself-centred thinker set himself to wrestle with the\\ngreat mysteries of Existence, undeterred by the chilly\\ndreariness of the study, and untempted by the glit-\\ntering allurements of the market-place. In his\\nevidence given before the Copyright Commission,\\nMr. Spencer affords the reader a glimpse of the hard,\\nstiff, lonely battle that had to be fought, uncheered\\nby sympathy, and unrelieved by public approval.\\nThe autobiographic portion of his evidence runs as\\nfollows I published my first work. Social Statics^\\nat the end of 1850. Being a philosophical work, it\\nwas not possible to obtain a publisher who would\\nundertake any responsibility, and I published it at\\nmy own cost. The edition consisted of 750 copies,\\nand took fourteen years to sell. In 1855 I published\\nthe Principles of Psychology. There were 750 cop-\\nies. I gave away a considerable number of copies,\\nand the remainder I suppose about 650 sold in\\ntwelve and a half years. I afterwards, in 1857, pub-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 61\\nlishecl a series of Essays, and, warned by previous\\nresults, I printed only 500 copies. That took ten\\nand a half years to sell. Towards 1860 I began to\\npublish a System of Philosophy. I decided upon the\\nplan of issuing to subscribers in quarterly parts, and\\nto the public in volumes when completed. Before\\nthe initial volume, First Principles, was published, I\\nfound myself still losing. During the issue of the\\nsecond volume. Principles of Biology, I was still\\nlosing. In the middle of the third volume I was\\nstill losing so much that I found I was frittering\\naway all that I possessed. I found that in the course\\nof fifteen years I had lost nearly XI 200, adding\\ninterest, more than X1200, and as I was evidently\\ngoing on ruining myself, I issued to the subscribers\\na notice of cessation. After the issue of the\\nnotice, property came to me in time to prevent the\\ncessation. My losses did not continue very long\\nafter that. The tide turned, and my books began\\nto pay. They were repaid in 1874 that is to say,\\nin twenty-four years after I began I retrieved my\\nposition. In addition he spent nearly X3000 in\\nSociological Tables.\\nThat is to say, in the cause of truth Mr. Spencer\\nfor twenty-four years worked without fee or reward.\\nHis solitary intellectual labors were utterly ignored\\nby the public, and in spite of that he laboriously and\\nheroically toiled up the steep ascent of philosophy.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "62 HERBERT SPENCER\\nIn all this there is a grandeur quite Miltonic. In\\nthe midst of the general neglect Mr. Spencer had the\\nsympathy of a number of philosophic thinkers, who\\nknew his real worth. A number of American admir-\\ners, hearing of his determination to stop the series,\\nforwarded to Mr. Spencer through Mr. Youmans,\\nhis devoted adherent and friend, a purse of money\\nand a gold watch. The money, with characteristic\\nhigh-mindedness, he accepted as a public trust for\\npublic ends. John Stuart Mill, I am informed, also\\nstepped into the breach. He recognized in Mr.\\nSpencer a new thinker of unique caliber, and with\\nmagnanimity far removed from personal rivalry, he\\noffered Mr. Spencer a large sum to enable him to\\ncarry out his great undertaking. Mr. Spencer de-\\nclined the offer, while fully appreciating the spirit\\nin which it was made.\\nThe financial difficulty solved, Mr. Spencer had\\nanother difficulty to face, which proved to be a life-\\nlong one namely, chronic ill-health. In spite of\\nall obstacles, he has the satisfaction of knowing that\\nthe work mapped out forty years ago has been\\naccomplished. In dignified strain he thus records\\nhis impressions in the concluding volume of his great\\nundertaking On looking back on the six-and-\\nthirty years which have passed since the Synthetic\\nPhilosophy was commenced, I am surprised at my\\naudacity in undertaking it, and still more surprised", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 63\\nat its completion. In 1860 my small resources had\\nbeen nearly all frittered away in writing and publish-\\ning books which did not repay their expenses and I\\nwas suffering under a chronic disorder, caused by\\nover-tax of the brain, which, wholly disabling me for\\neighteen months, thereafter limited my work to three\\nhours a day, and usually to less. How insane my\\nproject must have seemed to onlookers may be judged\\nfrom the fact that before the first chapter of the first\\nvolume was finished, one of my nervous breakdowns\\nobliged me to desist. But imprudent courses do not\\nalways fail. Sometimes a forlorn hope is justified by\\nthe event. Though, along with other deterrents,\\nmany relapses, now lasting for weeks, now for months,\\nand once for years, often made me despair of reaching\\nthe end, yet at length the end is reached. Doubtless\\nin earlier days some exultation would have resulted,\\nbut as age creeps on feelings weaken, and now my\\nchief pleasure is my emancipation. Still there is\\nsatisfaction in the consciousness that losses, discour-\\nagements, and shattered health have not prevented\\nme from fulfilling the purpose of my life.\\nThough Mr. Spencer had finished his life-task,\\nthough in the process age had crept upon him and\\nhis physical energies had become weaker, yet were\\nhis philosophic powers unimpaired, his mental vision\\nundimmed, and his intellectual strength unabated.\\nFinding London life distracting, he retired to", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "64 HERBERT SPENCER\\nBrighton, wliere, in comparative solitude, he was\\nenabled, as far as considerations of health would\\nadmit, to round off his great work by bringing it\\nabreast of modern thought. His First Principles,\\ncontaining the groundwork of the system, needed\\nlittle or no attention but in Biology great strides\\nhad been made since his Principles were published,\\nand Mr. Spencer set himself to publish a new and\\nrevised edition. The Principles of Psychology, too,\\nstood in need of revision. The book had borne the\\nbrunt of recent attacks from the new Hegelian\\nschool which had sprung up in Oxford and Glas-\\ngow. These attacks had to be met, and in this\\nand kindred tasks Mr. Spencer found his leisure at\\nBrighton amply occupied. Along with the feeling\\nof satisfaction at the completion of his task was\\nthe feeling of gratification at the steady advance of\\nhis fame and influence. In America, where Mr.\\nSpencer first received recognition, his influence has\\nbeen deep and far-reaching. Even to a greater\\nextent than in England his works have moulded\\nthe religious and philosophic thought of the New\\nWorld. On the Continent his books have been\\ntranslated by enthusiastic disciples, and among\\nOriental thinkers, in India and Japan, the bold and\\nmassive generalizations of the Spencerian philosophy\\nhave found a congenial home. Following in the\\nfootsteps of philosophic fame have come offers of", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 65\\nworldly honor, which Mr. Spencer has steadily\\nrefused. To a thinker whose triumphs have been\\nwon, not in the stifling atmosphere of personal\\nambitions, but in the ample region of pure intel-\\nlectual discovery, the conventional honors of the\\nworld seem pale and shadowy. So far as conven-\\ntional distinctions are concerned, Mr. Spencer pre-\\nfers to end life as he began a devoted, austere\\nworshipper of truth, removed alike from the distrac-\\ntions of the market-place and the allurements of\\nsocial distinction.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER V\\nTHE COSMOS UNVEILED\\nA COMMON charge against Mr. Spencer is tliat he is\\na Materialist. Again and again he has repudiated\\nthe term, but explanation and denial do little to\\nstem the current of misrepresentation. The root\\nerror made by those who accuse the Spencerian\\nphilosophy of being materialistic is due to failure\\nto distinguish between a comprehensive generaliza-\\ntion of the Universe resting upon the data of science,\\nand a philosophic interpretation of that generaliza-\\ntion. Now, there are two ways in which the Uni-\\nverse may be viewed, as natural and supernatural,\\nmechanical, or rather dynamical, and spiritual. The\\nsupernatural or spiritual view has been condemned\\nby history as sterile in the region of fact, and fan-\\ntastic, not to say superstitious, in the region of in-\\nterpretation. Progress in the acquiring of exact\\nknowledge dates from the time when the mechanical\\nview of the world was substituted for the spiritual.\\nWhen Newton substituted his conception of gravita-\\ntion for the angelic theory of planetary movements,\\nhe introduced into the study of the world a mechan-\\n66", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 67\\nical element verifiable in terms of force. Did this\\nconstitute Newton a Materialist When Darwin\\nsubstituted for the spiritual theory of special crea-\\ntions the dynamical conception of a struggle between\\norganisms for a definite amount of life-sustaining\\nforces, was he necessarily a Materialist Now, what\\nSpencer has done is simply to fuse the separate gen-\\neralizations of science into one all-embracing gen-\\neralization. His life-work has been to trace the\\nevolutionary process from star to soul, always,\\nobserve, scientifically interpretable in terms of force.\\nEvery man of science must be a Materialist when\\ndealing with tangible modes of existence and their\\nverifiable laws. The charge of Materialism would\\nbe valid if Mr. Spencer contended that for the ulti-\\nmate explanation of the Universe all that was\\nneeded was the mechanical forces with which men\\nof science deal. Now, Mr. Spencer repudiates as\\nearnestly as his detractors the view that force,\\nwhich on the mechanical side is the final word of the\\nscientific conception of the world, is the final word\\nof the philosophic conception. To the philosophical\\nscientist force is but a symbol: in his view atoms\\nand energies have only a relative value. Indeed, so\\nimpressed is Mr. Spencer with the inadequacy of\\nthe Materialist theory that in his First Principles\\nand his Psychology, he says that it is more rational\\nto conceive the ultimate principle of Existence in", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "68 HERBERT SPENCER\\nterms of Mind tlian Matter. But what the actual\\nnature of the one reality is Mr\u00c2\u00ab Spencer does not\\nundertake to say. Once for all let it be understood\\nthat Spencerism stands on its own merits as the\\nphilosophy of the Knowable, and as the only organ-\\nized body of thought which has its roots in experi-\\nence and is a guide to the understanding of life,\\nboth theoretically and practically. Those who\\nchoose to identify Spencerism with Materialism are\\nsimply blinding themselves with a dust- cloud of\\ntheir own raising.\\nIt tends, greatly to clear the ground for the\\ncomprehension of the Spencerian philosophy if we\\nremember that it cuts itself off entirely from the\\nold metaphysical attempts to solve the absolute mys-\\ntery of existence. In his First Principles Spencer\\nadopts and improves the Hamiltonian demonstra-\\ntion of the relativity of knowledge, holding that,\\nfrom the constitution of the human mind, knowl-\\nedge of noumena is impossible. From this it\\nfollows that Spencer restricts philosophy to the\\nunification of Knowledge, the reduction of phe-\\nnomena to one ultimate law. If the Universe is\\nnot a chaos the laws which underlie phenomena\\nmust be related, and when traced back must merge\\ninto one another as the branches of a tree merge in\\nthe trunk and the trunk in the root. Mr. Spencer s\\ntask was to find the root-principle of phenomenal", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 69\\nexistence. Some one has said that to a thinker\\ncapable of comprehending it from a single point\\nof view, the Universe would present but a single\\nfact, but one all-comprehensive truth. Everything\\ndepends upon the point of view. From the point\\nof view of the supernaturalist the Universe need\\nnot necessarily seem a single fact, one all-compre-\\nhensive truth. The unifying principle may well\\nbe not in the Universe, but in the mind of the\\nCreator. So far indeed from the Universe testify-\\ning to its own unity, or being the manifestation of\\none all-comprehensive truth, supernaturalists have\\nalways postulated the necessity of a revelation as\\ninterpreter of the Universe. Then again, if we\\ntake a mechanical view of the Universe, we do\\nnot readily arrive at the idea of unity. Between\\nthe various parts of a machine there may be no\\nnecessary, inevitable connection. For unity we\\nmust go to the mind of the constructor of the\\nmachine. So long as the purely mechanical con-\\nception of the Universe obtained sway over the\\nminds of philosophers there was no getting beyond\\nPositivism, with its theory that nothing can be\\nknown beyond co-existences and sequences. Mill s\\nintellectual helplessness before the problem, his\\nbelief that there was no inherent necessity at the\\nheart of things instance his declaration that in\\nother worlds two and two mioht make five had", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "70 HERBERT SPENCER\\ntheir origin in the unconscious hold which the old\\nmechanical conception of the Universe had upon\\nhis mind.\\nThe demonstration of the essential and necessary-\\nunity of the Cosmos was only made possible when\\nthe dynamical was substituted for the mechanical\\npoint of view. The dynamical point of view in-\\nvolved the idea of growth, as against manufacture.\\nWhen the Universe began to be viewed as a\\ndynamic process rather than as a manufactured\\nproduct, the way was opened for treating phe-\\nnomena as something more than co-existences and\\nsequences as necessary links in a great cosmical\\nchain. Manifestly we must get a clear grasp of the\\ndynamic conception of the Universe before we can\\nunderstand the law of its evolution. Meanwhile\\nfrom a purely scientific standpoint all that is neces-\\nsary is recognition of the fact that the two great\\ngeneralizations known as the Nebular Theory and\\nthe Conservation of Force have made the dynamic\\ntheory of Matter the necessary basis of a study\\nof the Cosmos. The scientific philosopher who\\ndeals with phenomena with a view to their unifi-\\ncation must necessarily start with Existence when\\nit comes before him in concrete, material fashion.\\nNow, in tracing the Universe, science can get\\nno further back than the nebula, or world-stuff.\\nAccording to the nebular theory the matter which", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 71\\ncomposes the solar system once existed in a dif-\\nfused state. The problem is to discover the laws\\nby which, from a diffused nebulous state, Matter\\nhas increased in concentration and complexity so\\nas to result in the world we now see. Along with\\nthe Nebular theory goes the doctrine of the Con-\\nservation of Force, which, interpreted, means that\\nthe Matter of the Universe is a fixed quantity,\\nand is capable of endless transformations. Viewed\\nthus, the Universe is one fact, the result of one\\ngreat cosmic process namely, the Redistribution\\nof Matter and Motion. When Spencer came upon\\nthe scene, he found the path of discovery cleared\\nby the three great generalizations the universal\\nlaw of Gravitation, the Nebular Theory, and the\\ndoctrine of the Conservation or Persistence of\\nForce. These three isolated generalizations Spencer\\nfused into one by his theory of Evolution. Newton\\nformulated the law of Gravitation, Kant and Laplace\\nused it to explain the origin of stellar and planetary\\nsystems, and Spencer, combining this with the doc-\\ntrine of the Persistence of Force, was led to dis-\\ncover the law of the entire cosmical process from\\nstar to soul. As has been well said, the idea\\nembraced in the word Evolution as employed by\\nSpencer is by far the nearest approach ever yet\\nmade to the conception of an absolutely universal\\nand cosmical law.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "72 HERBERT SPENCER\\nThe problem before Mr. Spencer was this Given\\na Universe composed of a fixed quantity of Matter\\nand Motion, conceived in harmony with the New-\\ntonian law of Gravitation as manifesting co-existent\\nforces of attraction and repulsion, to trace the pro-\\ncess by which the Cosmos evolved from its nebulous\\nto its present state. Spencer s starting-point is the\\nPersistence of Force, on the ground that, reduced\\nto its ultimate analysis, our conception of Matter\\nrests upon forces standing in certain correlations.\\nWhen we say that Force is persistent, we are simply\\ndeclaring that the Force in the Universe is constant\\nis never increased or diminished. This belief\\nrests upon something deeper than a scientific induc-\\ntion it is a psychological necessity. If Force came\\ninto existence and went out of existence, the Uni-\\nverse would be, not a Cosmos, but a Chaos. If\\nForce was liable to sudden creation and annihilation,\\nreasoning would be impossible, because reasoning\\nis simply the classification of the relations among\\nForces. Scientific induction as well as abstract\\nreasoning could not exist unless the forces of Nature\\npersisted that is, continued to exist. The great\\nuniversal fact of the Redistribution of Matter and\\nMotion is no arbitrary fact, but follows naturally\\nfrom the Persistence of Force. It needs little reflec-\\ntion to see that, if Force is persistent, the relations\\namong forces must also persist the one is a corol-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 73\\nlary of the other. In the one as in the other, sci-\\nentific induction and psychological necessity are in\\nentire harmony. When we say that the relations\\namong forces persist, we are simply postulating the\\nlaw of Nature s uniformity, which is the essential\\nbasis of all scientific procedure. As Mill puts it,\\nthe uniformity of the laws of Natui-e is the major\\npremise of all inductions. This belief has a deeper\\nroot than is indicated in the old Experiential and\\nPositive philosophies. Hume, Mill, and Comte\\ntraced our conception of Nature s uniformity to\\nExperience. Hume got no further than custom,\\nand Mill never could reach anything better in the\\nway of certainty. Comte s whole philosophy, rest-\\ning as it does on the idea of recording co-existences\\nand sequences, entirely ignored the element of neces-\\nsity in our conception of Nature s uniformity. Ac-\\ncording to Spencer, the belief in the uniformity of\\nNature is something more than the outcome of expe-\\nrience it is a necessity of thought, which uncon-\\nsciously we bring with us to the interpreting of\\nexperience, and without which experience itself\\ncould not be understood so as to be made the\\nfoundation of scientific certainty. Moreover, the\\nSpencerian conception of Force and its relations\\nthrows a flood of light upon the idea of Cause and\\nits teleological implication. Reduced to its ulti-\\nmate analysis, our belief in the necessity and uni-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "74 HERBERT SPENCER\\nversality of causation is the belief that every\\nmanifestation of force must be preceded and suc-\\nceeded by some equivalent manifestation. That\\nis to say, between cause and effect a natural and\\nnecessary relation exists. How far-reaching is the\\nlaw of the persistence of relations among forces\\nmay be gathered from a remark made by Stallo in\\nhis suggestive book, Concepts of Modern Physics,\\nwhere, without reference to Mr. Spencer at all, he\\nsays The real existence of things is co-extensive\\nwith their qualitative and quantitative determina-\\ntions. And both are in their nature relations,\\nquality resulting from mutual action, and quantity\\nbeing simply a ratio between terms neither of which\\nis absolute. It may be observed in this con-\\nnection that not only the law of causality, the conser-\\nvation of energy, and the indestructibility of matter\\nso called, have their root in the relativity of all\\nobjective reality being indeed simply different\\naspects of this relativity but that Newton s first\\nand third laws of motion, as well as all laws of\\nleast action in mechanics (including Gauss s laws\\nof movement under least constraint), are but corol-\\nlaries from the same principle. And the fact that\\neverything is, in its manifest existence, but a group\\nof relations and reactions, at once accounts for\\nNature s inherent teleology. From this point of\\nview, the laws of Nature are not externally imposed", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 75\\nupon Matter, but are necessarily evolved along with\\nthe evolution of phenomena are, in fact, from\\nthe scientific standpoint, generalized descriptions of\\nNature s actions and reactions.\\nAnother corollary that flows from the Persistence\\nof Force is the transformation and equivalence of\\nforces. If the force in the Universe is a definite\\nfixed quantity, it is evident that forces do not cease\\nto exist when they elude the senses. Changed in\\nform, force must reappear. This corollary from the\\nPersistence of Force has had abundant illustration\\nby science. Thanks to the labors of Meyer, Joule,\\nGrove, and Helmholtz, science is now able to formu-\\nlate, as a fundamental law of Nature, the transfor-\\nmation and equivalence of forces. Helmholtz has\\ndescribed the process with such lucidity that his\\nwords may fitly be quoted If a certain quantity\\nof mechanical work is lost, there is obtained, as\\nexperiments made with the object of determining\\nthe point show, an equivalent quantity of heat, or\\ninstead of this, of chemical force and, conversely,\\nwhen heat is lost, we gain an equivalent quantity\\nof chemical or mechanical force and again,\\nwhen chemical force disappears, an equivalent of\\nheat or work so that in all these interchanges\\nbetween various inorganic natural forces, working\\nforce may indeed disappear in one form, but then it\\nreappears in exactly equivalent quantity in some", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "76 HERBERT SPENCER\\nother form it is thus neither increased nor dimin-\\nished, but remains in exactly the same quantity.\\nThe attempt to extend the law of the transformation\\nand equivalence of forces to organic processes met\\nwith stubborn resistance. It was feared that the\\nreduction of the organic processes, with the mys-\\nteries of life and growth, to the play of mechanical\\nforces would lead straight to Materialism conse-\\nquently for a time an entity called vital force was\\ninvoked in order to combat the coming danger. In\\nhis First Principles^ Spencer in his usual lucid and\\nconvincing manner shows that through all Nature s\\nprocesses, organic and super-organic as well as inor-\\nganic, the law of the transformation and equiva-\\nlence of forces holds good.\\nTwo other corollaries from the Persistence of\\nForce refer to the direction of Motion and the\\nrhythm of Motion. Motion, as Spencer shows by\\nnumerous and striking illustrations drawn from all\\nparts of Nature, always follows the line of least\\nresistance. Whether he is dealing with the move-\\nments of the planets, the forces which go to explain\\nthe condensation and evaporation of clouds, the\\nnutritive and mechanical processes of organic\\nnature, or the economic forces of society, Spencer\\nis able to verify the great all-comprehensive truth\\nthat Motion follows the line of least resistance. It\\nis the same with the truth that Motion is rhyth-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 77\\nmical. Mr. Spencer s treatment of tliis section is\\nspecially profound. It is difficult to know which to\\nadmire most the clearness of his analysis of the\\ncomplex phenomena with which he deals, or the\\nbrilliancy of his power of generalization. So\\nimpressed have some of his contemporaries been\\nwith the marvellous power exhibited in this section\\nthat one of them, a writer of great repute, has\\ndeclared that Mr. Spencer s treatment of the\\nrhythm of Motion offers one of the most brilliant\\nexamples of strict philosophic thinking which the\\nworld has yet produced. Like the other corollaries,\\ndirection of Motion and the rhythm of Motion are\\nshown to be necessary deductions from the Per-\\nsistence of Force. In regard to the former Mr.\\nSpencer says When we seek a warrant for the\\nassumption that of two conflicting forces that is the\\ngreater which produces motion in its own direction,\\nwe find no other than the consciousness that such\\npart of the greater force as is unneutralized by the\\nlesser must produce its effect the consciousness\\nthat the residuary force cannot disappear, but must\\nmanifest itself in some equivalent change the con-\\nsciousness that force is persistent. In regard to\\nrhythm Mr. Spencer also shows that the inductive\\ntruth that all motion is rhythmical rests on the deduc-\\ntive fact that all motion must necessarily be rhythmi-\\ncal The force embodied as a momentum in a given", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "78 HERBERT SPENCER\\ndirection cannot be destroyed and if it eventually\\ndisappears, it reappears in the reaction of the retard-\\ning body, which begins afresh to draw the now\\narrested mass back from its aphelion. Thus,\\nthen, rhythm is a necessary characteristic of all\\nmotion. Given the co-existence everywhere of\\nantagonistic forces a postulate which, as we have\\nseen, is necessitated by the form of our experience\\nand rhythm is an inevitable corollary from the\\npersistence of force. Obviously, we have only got\\npart of the way to the construction of a philosophy\\nin showing that all phenomena rest upon one law\\nthe Persistence of Force and its corollaries. This is\\nonly to show the unity of phenomena, but how are\\nwe to explain the difference It is essential to\\ntrace the One in the Many it is equally essential\\nto trace the rise and progress of the Many. Mr.\\nSpencer had now to show how the Universe as a\\ncosmical product resulted from these laws in other\\nwords he had to formulate the process by which\\nphenomena assume their varied forms in obedience\\nto the law of the Persistence of Force. What was\\nwanted was a formula which would cover the\\nprocess manifested by phenomena in all their mutual\\nactions and inter-actions, from the earliest nebulous\\nexistence to the highest products of civilization.\\nThe law of that process discovered by Mr. Spencer\\nhe calls the law of Evolution. At the end of a", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 79\\nlong inquiry, Avorked out brilliantly by means of the\\ninductive method, Mr. Spencer reaches the law of\\nthe great cosmic process. The redistribution of\\nMatter and Motion which results in the formation\\nof an aggregate, Mr. Spencer calls by the name of\\nEvolution the redistribution which results in the\\ndecay and dissipation of an aggregate he terms\\nDissolution. Evolution is defined as an integration\\nof Matter and concomitant dissipation of Motion,\\nduring which the Matter passes from an indefinite\\nincoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent het-\\nerogeneity, and during which the retained Motion\\ngoes through a parallel transformation. This law\\nholds true of all existences whatsoever. For con-\\nvenience we divide phenomena into sections astro-\\nnomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic but\\nthe process of Evolution is one and its law is one.\\nEvolution of the parts goes on along with evolution\\nof the whole. Not only is Evolution one in prin-\\nciple, but one in fact.\\nWe are still, however, in the region of induction.\\nJohn Stuart Mill would remind us that no number\\nof inductions can establish a necessary law. For\\nanything induction can tell us, there may not be any\\nnecessary connection between facts. They may be\\nfound within our experience existing in a regular\\norder, but as to the necessity of that order induction\\nis silent. Unless, therefore, Mr. Spencer s attempt", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "80 HERBERT SPENCER\\nat a great cosmic philosophy was to prove abor-\\ntive, it was essential that he should not only show\\nhow the cosmic process takes place, but also why it\\ntakes place in one form and could not possibly take\\nplace in another. In other words, he had to deduce\\nthe great world-transformations from the Persistence\\nof Force. Induction and Deduction had, so to\\nspeak, to join hands before Knowledge was unified\\nand philosophy had reached its goal. Taking his\\nstand upon the great cosmical fact of which all other\\nfacts are merely phases namely, the redistribution\\nof Matter and Motion, as shown to follow necessarily\\nfrom the transformation and equivalence of force,\\nalong the line of least resistance, and in rhythmical\\ndirection Spencer had to show that the process\\nwhich results in the formation of aggregates neces-\\nsarily means a process of evolution from a state of\\nindefinite incoherent homogeneity to a state of defi-\\nnite coherent heterogeneity. It is now a fact gen-\\nerally accepted by men of science that the planetary\\nsystem at its origin was an immense nebulous mass\\nat the stage of comparative homogeneity a stage\\nwhich, however, was necessarily being departed from\\nby the attractive force of matter. Motion towards\\nlocal centres of gravity would set up heterogeneities\\nin the masses, which, being subject to unlike forces,\\nwould be rapidly differentiated. In the course of\\nthe redistribution of Matter and Motion the homo-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 81\\ngeneous nebulous fluid, under the operation of strictly\\nmechanical principles, was bound to become hetero-\\ngeneous. The same process is traceable in the solar\\nsystem, in the geologic and organic history of the\\nearth, and in civilization. Not only the Universe,\\nbut all things in it, have advanced from the homo-\\ngeneous to the heterogeneous state. The instability\\nof the homogeneous is greatly increased by another\\nprinciple, which acts with all the force of mechanical\\nnecessity namely, the multiplication of effects\\none cause produces many effects. To this is due\\nthe diversity which we find in Nature.\\nSo far we have traced the passage of the homo-\\ngeneous to the heterogeneous, from the simple to\\nthe complex, as being the result of sheer mechanical\\nnecessity, but no reason has been given why the het-\\nerogeneity should proceed in an orderly definite man-\\nner. If there were only instability of the homogeneous\\nand multiplicity of effects, the Universe might well be\\na chaos. To what is the orderliness of Nature due\\nStill adhering to the principle of mechanical neces-\\nsity, Mr. Spencer shows that like forces produce\\nlike results, unlike forces unlike results, and thus\\nalong with the passage of aggregates from the uni-\\nform to the multiform there also proceeds a change\\nfrom indefiniteness to definiteness of parts. As has\\nbeen well said Segregation, or the clustering of\\nthe like and separation of the unlike parts under the", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "82 HERBERT SPENCER\\naction of forces capable of moving them, produces\\nthe definiteness and individuality of things. Under\\nthe influence of mechanical law the process of the\\nredistribution of Matter and Motion, being the result\\nof antagonistic forces, must reach a point where the\\nforces balance, producing upon us the feeling of\\nharmony or equilibrium in Nature. In its com-\\npleteness the law of Evolution is presented in-\\nductively and verified deductively from the law of\\nthe Persistence of Force, which moves along the\\nline of least resistance in a rhythmical direction,\\nproducing integration by loss of motion and orderly\\ndifferentiation, owing to the instability of the homo-\\ngeneous, the multiplicity of effects, and segregation,\\nresulting in a balance of forces, called equilibration.\\nWhen the balance is overthrown by an increase ot\\nMotion, then disintegration begins, followed by\\nincoherent indefinite heterogeneity, ending in Dis-\\nsolution.\\nBy tracing Nature s processes to their cosmical\\nroot Mr. Spencer has unified phenomena, and in\\nthe act has, of course, unified Knowledge. In\\nhis view the Universe is a complex unity which,\\nwhen reduced to its ultimate analysis, is seen to be\\none fact the Redistribution of Matter and Motion,\\nall phenomena being complex aspects of that one\\nfact. The object of Mr. Spencer s numerous works\\nis to trace the law of evolution through the various", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "THE COSMOS UNVEILED 83\\nbranches of phenomena, organic, super-organic,\\npsychologic, and sociologic, and by means of it to\\nunify and interpret phenomena. Mr. Spencer makes.\\nno attempt to give an absolute explanation of the\\nUniverse. His aim has been to show in what man-\\nner the earth with all its life has been evolved,\\nto trace the cosmical process, to unify phenomenal\\nknowledge, not to dispel mystery or answer ques-\\ntions of the Absolute and Infinite. In his First\\nPrinciples Mr. Spencer has applied his formula to\\nthe evolution of the earth from its nebulous to its\\npresent stage but to bring his scheme of philosophy\\nwithin reasonable compass, he has merely outlined\\nthe inorganic evolution, reserving his strength for\\nthe development of life to which the Principles of\\nBiology are devoted.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VI\\nTHE EVOLUTION OF LIFE\\nWhatever be the ultimate philosophic value of\\nComte s famous law of the three stages, to the\\nstudent of scientific thought it is of great utility.\\nHe learns the close connection that exists between\\nmetaphysical conceptions and scientific discoveries.\\nIf discovery has been slow, the reason is due perhaps\\nmore to a wrong method of metaphysical interpreta-\\ntion than to actual scientific exploration. Facts\\nhave lain around the man of science in abundance,\\nbut he has remained blind to their significance,\\nsimply because his mind was filled with conceptions\\nwhich belong to the metaphysical stage of thought.\\nAt the metaphysical stage, the mind in its search\\nfor causes finds a resting-place in entities or abstrac-\\ntions. Instead of being content with a formula\\nwhich describes all phases of phenomena a kind\\nof intellectual shorthand the mind personifies the\\nprocess, and converts the final result into an initial,\\ndominating, all-controlling agent.\\nIn all regions of phenomena the belief in entities\\n84", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 85\\nhas retarded the progress of knowledge. Light,\\nheat, electricity, magnetism each in turn has been\\nconceived not as the result of certain conditions,\\nbut as a mysterious principle controlling the con-\\nditions. A good example of this is associated with\\nStahl s doctrine of phlogiston, which he used to\\nexplain the theory of combustion. Stahl supposed\\nthat all combustible substances contained a common\\nelement, which he called the Fire Principle. The\\ndiscovery of the doctrine of the Conservation and\\nTransformation of Forces brought to an end, in the\\nrealm of physics and chemistry, the despotic sway\\nof entities, of personified abstractions. But if they\\nno longer govern, they reign in somewhat languid\\nand ornamental fashion. No man of science takes\\nentities into account when dealing with phj^sical\\nand chemical phenomena, but in common speech\\ntheir influence may still be traced. In the popular\\nmind Gravitation, for instance, is thought of as the\\ncause of bodies tending to approach one another,\\ninstead of being simply the name of an observed\\nfact. Chemical affinity, too, is thought of as the\\ncause of the combination of gases, whereas, like\\nGravitation, it is the generalized description of a\\nnatural process.\\nIn one realm, that of Biology, entities not only\\nreign, but govern. So despotically do metaphysical\\nabstractions rule in Biology that they have been", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "86 HERBERT SPENCER\\nthe most formidable opponent to the application of\\nthe Evolution theory to life and its multiform\\nmanifestations. Just as formerly men of science\\nspoke of a Heat Principle and a Fire Principle, so\\nnow they speak of a Vital Principle. It may be\\nsurmised that as metaphysical conceptions have\\nbeen driven out of the purely mechanical and\\nchemical spheres, they must ultimately be banished\\nfrom the higher and more complex world of organic\\nlife. The surmise is transformed into a confident\\nexpectation when it is discovered that the meta-\\nphysical view of phenomena is the result of a natural\\ninfirmity of thought, which can only be cured by a\\nrigorous application of scientific and philosophic\\nanalysis. That infirmity of thought is well expressed\\nby James Hinton when he remarks upon the fact\\nthat the processes of Nature are studied by us in\\nan inverse order we see effects before we see\\ncauses. He illustrates this as follows: Let us\\nconceive that, instead of having invented steam-\\nengines, men had met with them in nature as\\nobjects for their investigation. What would have\\nbeen the most obvious character of these bodies?\\nClearly their power of acting of moving. This\\nwould have become familiar as a Property or\\nendowment of steam-engines long before the part\\nplayed by the steam had been recognized for that\\nwould have required careful investigation and a", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 8T\\nknowledge of some recondite laws, meclianical,\\nchemical, pneumatic. Might it not then have\\nhappened that motion might have been taken as a\\npeculiar characteristic belonging to the nature of\\nthe engine and when after a long time the expan-\\nsion of the steam coincident with this motion was\\ndetected, might it not have been at first regarded\\nas consequence and not as cause Under these\\ncircumstances it would seem the most natural thing\\nin the world to trace the complex activity of the\\nsteam-engine to a Locomotive Principle.\\nHow inadequate as an explanation of biological\\nphenomena is the principle of Vital Force is admi-\\nrably shown by Mr. Spencer in his remarkable\\nchapter, The Dynamic Element in Life, in the\\nnew edition of his Principles of Biology. Those\\nwho write down Mr. Spencer as a Materialist\\nwill find him in that chapter quite at one with the\\nIdealist in admitting the mystery of Life, and the\\nimpossibility of conceiving it to stand in the rela-\\ntion of effect to purely mechanical causes. It is a\\nmistake, however, to suppose that there is some-\\nthing specially inscrutable about life. The inscruta-\\nbility is the same in kind as that which belongs to\\nExistence as a whole. The fall of a stone is quite\\nas inexplicable as the activity of an organism. It\\nis just as impossible to conceive how a stone falls as\\nhow an organism moves. As Mr. Spencer observes,", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "88 HERBERT SPENCER\\nneither Newton nor any one else has been able to\\nconceive how the molecules of matter in the stone\\nare affected not only by the molecules of matter in\\nthe adjacent part of the Earth, but by those form-\\ning parts of its mass eight thousand miles off, which\\nseverally exercise their influence without impediment\\nfrom intervening molecules and still less can we\\nconceive how every molecule of matter in the sun\\nninety-two millions of miles off has a share in con-\\ntrolling the movements of the Earth. Still less can\\nwe conceive the physical process by which electric\\nimpulses are transmitted from one place to another.\\nThe ultimate reason of any phenomenon is unknown;\\nthe fact we know, and the law of the fact we can\\ndiscover. For the evolutionist the one practical\\nquestion in biology is not, Can the mystery of life\\nbe explained but. Can the processes of life be\\ntraced, and the complex phenomena reduced to\\nsomething like unity In other words. Will the\\nSpencerian formula of Evolution, as a movement\\nfrom the simplex to the complex through successive\\nintegrations and differentiations, cover not only the\\npurely mechanical side of Nature, but also those\\nprocesses known as living?\\nAnti-evolutionists deny the application of Mr.\\nSpencer s formula to biology on the ground that\\nbetween non-living and living matter there is a\\ngreat gulf, which cannot be bridged by a theory", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 89\\nthat postulates tlie unity and continuity of all\\nNature s processes. In their view living matter is\\nso unique that by no conceivable process could it be\\nevolved from non-living matter a special creative\\nact is necessary, which at once invalidates the\\nmethods and results of the evolutionist. The\\nassumption here is that there are two kinds of\\nmatter, living and dead. This assumption takes its\\nrise in the old conception of matter as something\\ndead, inert, which can only be energized in two\\nways, either by a specific creative fiat, or by the\\ninfusion of a mysterious vital principle. This crude\\nidea of matter no longer holds sway over the minds\\nof modern philosophers and scientific students.\\nScience and philosophy, long divided by such watch-\\nwords as Materialism and Idealism, are now begin-\\nning to unite in recognition of the fact that Matter\\nis not dead, inert, but alive and everywhere palpi-\\ntating with energies, and that organic life is no\\nspecial creation, but simply a highly specialized and\\ncomplex form of the universal life of Nature. So\\nfar from Mr. Spencer being a Materialist, he might\\nmore correctly be described as an Idealist. So far\\nfrom thinking that life is a product of Matter, he\\nhas clearly indicated that in his view Matter itself\\nis a form of life. In his own words Under one\\nof its aspects, scientific progress is a gradual trans-\\nfiguration of Nature. Where ordinary perception", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "90 HERBERT SPENCER\\nsaw perfect simplicity it reveals great complexity;\\nwhere there seems absolute inertness it discloses\\nintense activity and in what appears mere vacancy\\nit finds a marvellous play of forces. Each genera-\\ntion of physicists discovers in so-called brute-\\nmatter powers which but a few years before the\\nmost instructed physicists would have thought in-\\ncredible. When the explorer of nature sees that,\\nquiescent as they appear, surrounding solid bodies\\nare thus sensitive to forces which are infinitesimal in\\ntheir amounts when the spectroscope proves to\\nhim that molecules on the earth pulsate in harmony\\nwith molecules in the stars when there is forced\\non him the inference that every point in space\\nthrills with an infinity of vibrations passing through\\nit in all directions the conception to which he\\ntends is much less that of a universe of dead matter\\nthan that of a universe everywhere alive alive, if\\nnot in the restricted sense, still in the general\\nsense. At the end of all scientific and philosophic\\ninquiries we come, according to Mr. Spencer, to an\\ninfinite and omnipresent Energy from which all\\nthings proceed. Manifestly this new conception\\nof Life renders unreal the old dispute about non-\\nliving and living matter. Living matter we no\\nlonger think of as something entirely different in\\nkind from non-living matter. We now think of the\\ndifference as one of degree. Matter is alive, not", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 91\\nbecause there has been added to it a special\\nproperty. What we call living matter only seems\\nto us to be specially alive because its movements\\nare of a highly complex nature, and because it is\\norganized on what seems to us to be a principle of\\ninherent self-activity. If the distinction we make\\nbetween living and non-living matter be really an\\nartificial distinction, the result of a natural infirmity\\nof thought, clearly the philosopher who would trace\\nthe process of life must begin his work with the\\nearliest manifestations of living matter.\\nNaturally Mr. Spencer begins his Principles of\\nBiology by a consideration of the constitution of\\norganic matter. It is no part of the biologist s\\nduty to discuss the speculative question of the\\norigin of life. The mathematician does not con-\\ncern himself with what Quantity, Space, and\\nTime are nor the physicist with what Force is.\\nIn like manner the biologist has to deal with the\\nmanifestations of life, not with origins. As a\\nphilosophic biologist, Mr. Spencer has accomplished\\nhis task when he shows that the phenomena of\\nlife conform to the process of evolution which he\\nhas traced in the inorganic sphere. At the outset\\nan apparently formidable obstacle meets us in the\\nattempt to interpret organic evolution by means\\nof the Spencerian formula. In its simplest form\\nevolution may be described as an integration of", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "92 HERBERT SPENCER\\nmatter and concomitant dissipation of motion. But\\nwhen we come to study organic matter, we dis-\\ncover the two processes no longer working in\\nantagonism, but in unison. Unless motion can be\\nconserved instead of being entirely dissipated,\\nthere cannot be secured those secondary phases\\nof evolution known as functional activities. The\\nproblem is to secure at one and the same time\\nstructural fixity with functional mobility. How\\nis motion to be retained in an organism without\\nproducing the natural consequence of disintegra-\\ntion? In the case of organic bodies these ap-\\nparently contradictory conditions are reconciled.\\nIn organic bodies matter is combined in a form\\nwhich embodies an enormous amount of motion\\nalong with a great degree of concentration. Both\\nin his First Principles and Principles of Biology\\nMr. Spencer subjects matter in its earliest or\\nprotoplasmic state to a rigorous analysis, the\\nresult of which is to show that the essential\\ncharacteristic of living matter is the union of\\ngreat molecular activity along with a degree of\\ncohesion that permits of temporary fixity of arrange-\\nment. The phenomena of life, so far as the man\\nof science is concerned, are inseparably associated,\\nnot with unique properties, but with modes of\\nmotion. Science has amply justified Mr. Spencer s\\nreasonings. Thus we find Sir Michael Foster from", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 93\\nthe practical point of view unconsciously endorsing\\nthe Spencerian line of thought, as follows The\\nmore these molecular problems of physiology are\\nstudied the stronger becomes the conviction that\\nthe consideration of what we call structure and\\ncomposition must, in harmony with the modern\\nteachings of physics, be approached under the\\ndominant conception of modes of motion. The\\nphysicists have been led to consider the qualities\\nof things as expressions of internal movements\\neven more imperative does it seem to us that the\\nbiologist should regard the qualities of protoplasm\\n(including structure and composition) as in like\\nmanner the expressions of internal movements.\\nHe may speak of protoplasm as a complex sub-\\nstance, but he must strive to realize that what he\\nmeans by that is a complex whirl, an intricate\\ndance, of which what he calls chemical composi-\\ntion, histological structure, and gross configuration\\nare, so to speak, the figures to him the renewal\\nof protoplasm is but the continuance of the dance,\\nits functions and actions the transference of the\\nfigures. It seems to us necessary, for a satis-\\nfactory study of the problems, to keep clearly before\\nthe mind the conception that the phenomena in\\nquestion are the result, not of properties of kinds\\nof matter, but of kinds of motion. Organic\\nevolution begins with homogeneous living matter,", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "94 HERBERT SPENCER\\nwith protoplasm in its most elementary form.\\nOwing to its molecular instability matter changes\\nin the direction of the heterogeneous, becomes\\ndifferentiated. In other words, there results multi-\\nplication of organs, with their respective functions.\\nFrom the amceba, whose entire body may be said\\nto consist of a single organ, its stomach, to the\\nhuman being, the differentia is immense. Yet the\\nprocess is not abrupt, but transitional each stage is\\na link in the great evolutionary chain. Hand in\\nhand go integration, differentiation, and segregation.\\nDifferent parts of an organism become co-ordinated,\\nthe result being a moving equilibrated system, a\\ncoherent individuality. Manifestly if life is con-\\nceived as a mode of motion, as the resultant of com-\\nplex molecular activities, it cannot be understood\\nexcept in relation to its environment, the medium\\nof these activities. So long as a Vital Principle\\nwas postulated, the inner activities of an organism\\nreceived an undue importance, almost to the ex-\\nclusion of the environing agencies. Mr. Spencer\\nshowed that life was no entity, but a relation.\\nVital phenomena are the product, not of an inherent\\nprinciple of life, but of the organism and its medium,\\nthe, inner forces in vital correlation with the outer\\nforces. According to his celebrated definition, Life\\nis the continuous adjustment of internal to external\\nrelations. In his First Principles and Principles of", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 95\\nBiology Mr. Spencer has shown that the evolution of\\norganic life, from the humblest protoplasmic forms\\nin which it is found to the highest types with all\\ntheir structural and functional complexities, is from\\nthe homogeneous to the heterogeneous, by means of\\nsuccessive integrations and differentiations.\\nIt should not be forgotten that the evolution of\\norganic life is simply a specialized form of cosmical\\nevolution, consequently a close correspondence exists\\nbetween organisms and their environment. Given\\nan environment gradually increasing in heteroge-\\nneity, and it follows that in order to survive and\\npropagate themselves organisms must, in adapting\\nthemselves, also increase in heterogeneity. Parts\\nof the organisms restrict themselves to certain\\nprocesses, and thus by specialization a sort of divi-\\nsion of labor takes place, the result of which is to\\ncreate structural and functional complexities. This\\nprocess, called direct equilibration, would be power-\\nless without indirect equilibration, better known as\\nDarwin s law of Natural Selection a law which\\nshould not be confounded with the law of Evolution,\\nit being at most a brilliant confirmation of Mr.\\nSpencer s cosmical generalization. By means of the\\nstruggle for existence everywhere going on among\\norganisms, there is secured the killing-out of the\\nunfit, and the survival and perpetuation of those\\norganisms characterized by successful variations,", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "96 HERBERT SPENCER\\nwhich by the law of heredity become structural and\\nfunctional. Palaeontology confirms this by showing\\nthat each geological epoch had its own class of\\norganisms in correspondence with the environment,\\nthus proving that organic has gone hand-in-hand\\nwith inorganic evolution. Embryology adds further\\nconfirmation, by showing that the human organism\\nin its evolution from the germ cell summarizes the\\nancestral development in being progress from an\\nindefinite incoherent protoplasmic homogeneity to\\nthe definite coherent heterogeneity of the fully\\ndeveloped body through successive integrations and\\ndifferentiations all of which, as Mr. Spencer indi-\\ncates, are necessitated by the law of the Persistence\\nof Force, and its corollaries.\\nWithout transgressing at undue length upon the\\nwork of specialists, and making this summary of\\nMr. Spencer s views severely technical, it would be\\nimpossible to do justice to the elaborate and pains-\\ntaking manner in which the theory of Evolution is\\napplied to the construction of what has been aptly\\ncalled a working thought-model of organisms and\\nspecies, in their development, racial history, and\\neveryday activities. Mr. Spencer has done more\\nthan reconstruct Biology on new lines he has linked\\nthe science to human affairs by his bold and luminous\\ngeneralization on the multiplication of the human\\nrace a generalization which, on account of its", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 97\\nbearing on the famous theory of Malthus, is of\\nperhaps greater interest to the sociologist than to\\nthe biologist. Those who are acquainted with the\\nsocial aspirations of the French Revolution thinkers\\ndo not need to be told of the enthusiastic hopes\\nwhich were entertained of the human race from the\\nAge of Reason, which it was believed had dawned\\nupon humanity. According to the Encyclopaedists,\\nwith the destruction of the great enemies of progress.\\nPriestcraft and Kingcraft, the reign of equality and\\nbrotherhood would be inaugurated. The specula-\\ntions of Condorcet summed up the creed and the\\nhopes of the eighteenth century reformers. Like\\nthe spectre at the banquet, Malthus appeared with\\nhis gloomy prophecies of the future. By his theory\\nof population Malthus seemed to prove that human\\nills were untouched by political and social revolu-\\ntion were inherent in the nature of things. With\\ngreat parade of statistics and imposing display of\\nlogic, the English parson contended that he had\\ndiscovered a law against which the philosophic opti-\\nmists would battle in vain, the law that human\\npopulation increases at a quicker rate than human\\nsubsistence. Poverty and misery as a consequence\\ninevitably followed at the heels of civilization.\\nAccording to Malthus there was no cover set for\\nthe poor man at Nature s table. Godwin and his\\nfellow-optimists strove hard to weaken the force of", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "98 HERBERT SPENCER\\nthis pessimistic theory but coinciding as they did\\nwith the misery of the Revolution wars, the specu-\\nlations of Malthus appeared to have an immovable\\nroot in actual experience.\\nTo Mr. Spencer was reserved the honor of formu-\\nlating a biological theory which, while doing justice\\nto the elements of truth in Malthusianism, pointed\\nthe way to a solution which removed the dark\\nshadow of pessimism from civilization. As the re-\\nsult of profound study of the phenomena of multi-\\nplication, Mr. Spencer discovered that Individuation\\nand Genesis are in necessary antagonism advance\\nof the one necessitates decrease of the other. The\\nerror of Malthus lay in the assumption that Gene-\\nsis was an absolute instead of a relative factor of\\norganic life. According to Mr. Spencer, Genesis\\nvaries with Individuation. The higher and more\\ncomplex the organism, the lower the rate of increase.\\nIn an advancing state of civilization where nerve\\nand brain development are the dominating factors,\\nthe rate of population necessarily declines. Mr.\\nSpencer presents his theory in condensed form as\\nfollows The necessary antagonism of Individua-\\ntion and Genesis not only fulfils the a priori law of\\nmaintenance of race, from the monad up to Man, but\\nensures final attainment of the highest form of this\\nmaintenance a form in which the amount of life\\nshall be the greatest possible and the births and", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 99\\ndeaths the fewest possible. From the beginning\\npressure of population has been the proximate cause\\nof progress. It produced the original diffusion of\\nthe race. It compelled men to abandon predatory\\nhabits and take to agriculture. It led to the clear-\\ning of the earth s surface. It forced men into the\\nsocial state made social organization inevitable and\\nhas developed the social sentiments. It has stimu-\\nlated to progressive improvements in production,\\nand to increased skill and intelligence. It is daily\\nthrusting us into closer contact and more mutually\\ndependent relationships. And after having caused,\\nas it ultimately must, the due peopling of the globe,\\nand the raising of its habitable parts into the\\nhighest state of culture after having perfected all\\nprocesses for the satisfaction of human wants after\\nhaving, at the same time, developed the intellect into\\ncompetence for its work, and the feelings into fitness\\nfor social life after having done all this, the press-\\nure of population must gradually approach to an\\nend. And thus we find Mr. Spencer in Sociology\\nacting the part of reconciler between the Optimists\\nand the Pessimists, just as in Psychology he put an\\nend to the feud between the Intuitionalists and the\\nExperientialists.\\nThe Principles of Biology created a new era in\\nthe study of Nature. When it appeared, master\\nminds were under the spell of metaphysical concep-\\ntiTC.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "100 HERBERT SPENCER\\ntions of life, and the real facts of organic develop-\\nment were obscured, on the one hand by the\\nerroneous notion about the origin of life-forms, and\\non the other by the forbidding nomenclature of\\ndry-as-dust specialists men whose vision was so\\nnarrowed by pedantic devotion to details that they\\ncould not see the wood for trees. By his pierc-\\ning vision into the heart of Nature s process, and\\nhis marvellous co-ordinating faculty, Mr. Spencer\\nbrought order out of confusion, and by the touch of\\nhis philosophic magic wand revealed a new world of\\nsurpassing interest and beauty. Biological science\\nhas made great strides since his work appeared, but\\nthe strides have been mainly along the lines which\\nwere indicated half a century ago by the unique\\ngenius of the author of the Principles of Biology.\\nThat the progress of biological knowledge has\\nbeen mainly on the lines laid down by Mr. Spencer\\nis evident from the revised edition of the Principles\\nof Biology published in 1898 and 1899. Since the\\npublication of the work in 1864 men of science\\nhave accumulated facts in great abundance, but\\nthese, instead of conflicting with the conceptions\\nof Mr. Spencer, harmonize with his philosophic\\nground-plan. Since 1864 biologists have busied\\nthemselves largely with the astonishing phenomena\\nof Metabolism, cell-life, and the questions of\\nheredity as raised by Professor Weismann. In the", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 101\\nnew edition these problems are attacked with an\\nacumen and vigor which abundantly show that\\nat the age of four-score Mr. Spencer s intellectual\\nvision has not become dim, nor his intellectual force\\nabated. Notwithstanding this, there is a tendency\\nin some quarters to question Mr. Spencer s method\\nof dealing with the intricate and minute facts of\\norganic life on philosophic principles a method\\napt to be superficially confounded with the a priori\\nspeculations of the old Nature philosophers. Dis-\\ntinguished men of science, however, bear ungrudg-\\ning testimony to the great practical value of Mr.\\nSpencer s biological philosophy. In a letter dated\\n1898, a portion of which Mr. Spencer kindly permits\\nme to quote, Professor Lloyd Morgan says To\\nnone of my intellectual masters do I owe a deeper\\ndebt of gratitude than to you. And in a review\\nof the revised edition Professor Morgan remarks\\nWhat strikes one most forcibly on reading the\\nPrinciples of Biology in this new and enlarged\\nedition is the extraordinary range and grasp of its\\nauthor, the piercing keenness of his eye for essen-\\ntials, his fertility in invention, and the bold sweep\\nof his logical method. In these days of increasingly\\nstraitened specialism it is well that we should feel\\nthe influence of a thinker whose powers of generali-\\nzation have seldom been equalled, and perhaps never\\nsurpassed. In the same strain men of the stamp of", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "102 HERBERT SPENCER\\nSir Joseph Hooker and Professor Ray Lankester\\nhave borne testimony to the great and enduring\\nwork which Mr. Spencer has done in the biological\\nfield. On the Continent Mr. Spencer s labors have\\nmet with hearty and generous appreciation. In the\\nJanuary number of the Revue Scientifique for 1899\\nappeared the following The work of 1864 itself\\nhas unquestionably had a profound influence upon\\nthese improvements [in the domain of biology since\\n1864] in suggesting new inquiries and aims. Biolo-\\ngists cannot do without consulting the revised work\\nnew on many points of the English philoso-\\npher and doing so, they will find in it many\\nprecious ideas and suggestions from which their\\nexperimental work will benefit largely. And like\\nus they will be full of admiration for this work, so\\nall-compact and admirably arranged, so crammed\\nwith facts and ideas, of the philosopher who has\\nexercised such a profound influence upon the science\\nof his time. Professor Yves Delage, Professor of\\nZoology and Comparative Anatomy at the Sorbonne,\\nin the preface to his work. The Structure of the\\nProtoplasma and Theories on Heredity^ etc., says\\nWhat I have called positive experiment is often\\nas difficult to conceive as to accomplish, and if a\\nphilosopher counsels it, and a naturalist corroborates\\nit as well, it may so happen that the former has\\nnot the least part in the success. The example of", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE 103\\nH. Spencer is proof of it. With him the philosopher\\nis coupled with the naturalist, but, so to speak, with\\na non-practising naturalist. I do not know if he\\ndissected animals or practised the ingenuities of\\ntechnical histology. Who would dare deny, how-\\never, that he has rendered important services to\\nBiology? He possesses deep knowledge of bio-\\nlogical questions, and arguments drawn from anat-\\nomy, histology, or embryogeny do not in any way\\nembarrass him.\\nIn the same connection my friend Professor\\nArthur Thomson of Aberdeen, the distinguished\\nScottish Biologist, has favored me with the fol-\\nlowing Mr. Spencer has a genius for seizing\\nessentials and leaving out distracting details, for\\ndisposing facts in big groups, for disclosing what\\none might call rational relationships and, in this\\nrespect, quite ajjart from the evolution theory, his\\nPrinciples of Biology was an epoch-making work.\\nI mean that even as a balance-sheet of the facts of\\nlife, the book is a biological classic consciously or\\nunconsciously we are aU standing on his shoulders.\\nIndeed, many of us have had the experience of re-\\ndiscovering clear ways of relating facts which we\\npresently find much better done in a brief paragraph\\nin the Principles. But then the great work was\\nmuch more than a careful balance-sheet of the facts\\nof life not that this was little, it was the introduc-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "104 HERBERT SPENCER\\ntion of order, clearness, breadth of view, and gave\\nbiology a new start it also displayed the facts of\\nlife and the inductions from these for the first time\\nclearly in the light of evolution. I mean that if the\\nevolution idea is an adequate modal formula, then we\\nneed to think of growth, development, differentiation,\\nintegration, reproduction, heredity, death all the big\\nfacts in the light of this. This was not Darwin s\\nline, he was a great evolutionist, but surely not philo-\\nsophic. Spencer s problems are not less real because\\nmore general, though many who talk of organism,\\ngrowth, differentiation, etc., glibly, and without\\never feeling the problems behind every word, would\\nprobably not admit this. I cannot say that I have\\nany great sympathy with those who call Spencer\\nan abstract biologist, a philosophical biologist, etc.,\\nand mean thereby to suggest that he is not in touch\\nwith, and is not treating of, the real facts of life. I\\nshould rather think that he got nearer the realities\\nthan any one else. But I suppose the false antithesis\\nbetween philosophy and science will have a lingering\\ndeath, since even Spencer s work has not killed it.\\nWhen regard is had to the profound influence and\\nepoch-making nature of the Principles of Biology.,\\nMr. Spencer may be allowed, with pardonable pride,\\nto express in the preface of his new edition a feeling\\nof gladness at surviving long enough to present his\\nwork in a finished and modernized form.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VII\\nTHE EVOLUTION OF MIND\\nIn dealing with biological phenomena it was pointed\\nout that one great source of error was the fact that\\nthe processes of Nature are necessarily studied in\\nan inverse order. We see effects before we discover\\ncauses. Ignorant of the slow complex processes of\\nNature, the mind naturally seeks for causes suffi-\\nciently striking and dramatic to account for impos-\\ning effects. As already remarked, had we been\\nignorant of the mode of construction of a steam\\nengine, we should naturally have attributed its\\npower of motion to a property, or, in other words,\\nto a Locomotive Principle. In the absence of scien-\\ntific knowledge man naturally falls back upon enti-\\nties as causes of phenomena. We have seen the\\npart which entities have played in Biology. Even\\nyet many scientific men, in dread of Materialism,\\ncling to the Vital Principle as the chief and domi-\\nnating cause of life and its multiform manifestations.\\nWhen we come to the study of mind, we are not\\nsurprised to find that here, even more than in life\\n105", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "106 HERBERT SPENCER\\nin general, entities have played an important part.\\nThe marvels of consciousness, the mysteries of brain\\nand mind, are so overpowering that the first impulse\\nof the student is to look for the cause altogether\\noutside of ordinary cosmic forces. Primitive man\\ncould find no cause adequate to the effect short of\\nsupernatural power. In his view, God formed man\\nof the dust of the earth, and breathed into him a\\nliving soul. As the theological conception faded\\naway, its place was taken by the metaphysical con-\\nception. Instead of a supernatural agent acting out-\\nside of the Cosmos, the metaphysicians postulated an\\nagent within the organism. Just as a Vital Prin-\\nciple was invoked to explain life in general, so an\\nIntelligent Principle was invoked to explain the con-\\nscious life of man in particular. Philosophers pic-\\ntured the mind as being somewhat like a political\\nState where intellect and conscience ruled by a kind\\nof divine right. Their authority was liable to be\\noverturned. Evil, in fact, was the result of mental\\nand moral anarchy. The lower passions were in\\nrevolt against the higher. Thus we have Butler\\nplaintively remarking that if Conscience had power\\nas it had right, it would rule the world. The pro-\\ncess of thought was personified until the intellect\\nbecame, not a generalized term, but an active agent.\\nAs Samuel Bailey says: The faculties have been\\nrepresented acting like independent agents, giving", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 107\\nbirth to ideas, passing them on to each other mutually,\\nand transacting their business among themselves.\\nIn this kind of phraseology the mind often appears\\nlike a sort of field in which perception, reason, mem-\\nory, imagination, will, conscience, the passions, pro-\\nduce their operations like so many powers, either\\nallied or hostile.\\nMr. Spencer revolutionized Psychology by abolish-\\ning the absolute distinctions which metaphysicians\\nhad drawn between mind and the outer world,\\nbetween subject and object. He dethroned entities\\nand abstractions by the simple process of represent-\\ning mind and matter, not as two antithetical sub-\\nstances, but as two phases of one cosmical process.\\nMr. Spencer has made it impossible to speak of the\\nmental life of man as being under the control of\\na Principle of Intelligence, or mysterious Entity,\\nwhich creates and directs thought. In the Spen-\\ncerian philosophy Psychology stands in close and\\nnecessary relation to Biology. In both departments\\ntwo all-mastering conceptions hold sway the con-\\ntinuity of phenomena, and the intimate relations\\nbetween the organism and its environment. If\\nthere is no absolute distinction between non-living\\nand living matter, it follows that between the\\nearliest and the latest manifestation of psychical\\nlife there can be no absolute demarcation. Between\\nthe humblest expressions of life in the animal world", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "108 HERBERT SPENCER\\nand the highest manifestations in the intellect of\\nman, the difference is not one of kind but of degree.\\nThe Spencerian Psychology is based, not on the\\npre-evolution view that mind is an entity with\\nsupernaturally endowed capacities, capable of being\\nstudied apart from its material mechanism, but on\\nthe idea that the mental faculties are evolved by\\nslow and imperceptible gradations, along with a\\nslowly evolving mechanism, in response to move-\\nments in the environment. And thus we are\\nbrought back to Mr. Spencer s definition of life as\\nthe continuous adjustment of internal to external\\nrelations. The organism, however humble, can only\\ncontinue in existence by maintaining a correspond-\\nence with its environment. Where the environment\\nis simple, the organism is simple. A plant s vital\\nprocesses display adjustment solely to the continu-\\nous co-existences of certain forces surrounding its\\nroots, and vary only with the variations produced\\nin these elements and forces by the sun. The life\\nof a worm is made up of actions referring to little\\nelse than the tangible properties of adjacent things.\\nProgress towards higher life implies ability in the\\norganism to respond to more special and more com-\\nplex movements in the environment. Among the\\nhumbler organisms the correspondences in the envi-\\nronment are so few that the same structures are\\ncapable of performing diverse functions, but a study", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 109\\nof biology shows that division of Labor takes place,\\nso that in presence of a complex environment organ-\\nisms, in order to live, must develop complex struc-\\ntures. Biologically speaking, the degree of life\\nvaries with the degree of correspondence. At a\\ncertain stage in the evolution of life, the environ-\\nment becomes so complex that the correspondence\\ncannot be maintained automatically by the organism,\\nhowever greatly differentiated in structure and func-\\ntion. There comes a limit, for instance, to the ca-\\npacity of sight and hearing to discriminate, as it\\nwere, automatically among the external changes.\\nAt this limit life purely physical shades into life\\npsychical. In the higher animals the ability to\\nrespond to complex external relations is associated\\nwith a specialized form of matter called nerve mat-\\nter, which in its highest development is associated\\nwith Consciousness. The science of Psychology,\\nthen, in the strict sense of the terra, begins with the\\ndawning of Consciousness. Or, as it must be other-\\nwise expressed. Psychology is that dejpartment of\\nscience which deals with the evolution of Conscious-\\nness by means of which, and under the direction of\\nwhich, the mind maintains its correspondence with\\nan environment no longer purely material, but in-\\ncluding history, society, and all the influences which\\nflow from the atmosphere of conscious life and\\nthought in a word, of civilization. It is impossi-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "110 HERBERT SPENCER\\nble in brief space to indicate in detail the masterly-\\nmanner in which Mr. Spencer shows the close and\\nintricate correspondence between life and its environ-\\nment, and the unrivalled skill with which he traces\\nthe dual process of evolution of mind and its environ-\\nment, developing from the simple to the complex by\\nsuccessive integrations and differentiations.\\nThe problem of Psychology, on the subjective\\nside, is to discover and determine the evolutionary\\nprocess of Consciousness in other words, the law\\nof intelligence. If life in general is definable as\\ncorrespondence between internal and external re-\\nlations, obviously mental life in particular, or intelli-\\ngence, must be included in the definition. It is idle\\nto inquire into the ultimate nature of Consciousness\\nor Intelligence. We know no more about the start-\\ning-point of Consciousness than we do about the\\nstarting-point of Matter. In both cases we begin\\nwith the homogeneity which we find in Nature, and\\nwith that as the basis we try to discover the cause\\nof all the complex developments. In its ultimate\\nanalysis Mr. Spencer fiends Intelligence to rest upon\\nthe recognition of likeness and unlikeness between\\nprimary states of feelings. Grant to the mind the\\npower of recognizing and distinguishing feelings,\\nand it is plain that the entire mental life of hu-\\nmanity, from that of a savage to, say, a Newton, is\\nthe result of continuous differentiation and Integra-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 111\\ntion of states of consciousness. What is the law of\\nintelligence The law is no other than the associa-\\ntion of ideas. When any two psychical states,\\noccur in immediate succession, an effect is produced,\\nsuch as that if the first subsequently recurs, there\\nis a certain tendency for the second to follow it.\\nUpon this law all education is based, and upon it\\nrests the cogency of the sayings, Practice makes\\nperfect, and Habit is second nature. What,\\nthen, are the evolutionary stages in the growth of\\nintelligence The first stage is reflex action, in\\nwhich a single impression produces a single sensation.\\nReflex action scarcely comes within the domain of\\nPsychology, as, being automatic, it is performed\\nwithout consciousness. Its significance consists in\\nthe fact that it is the connecting link between bio-\\nlogical and psychological phenomena. Instinct is\\na highly developed form of reflex action. With in-\\nstinct we have a combination of movements follow-\\ning a combination of impressions, but in the course\\nof development the environment becomes so complex\\nthat even highly developed instinctive actions are\\nnot able to maintain their automatic responses to\\nthe environment. The co-ordination becomes ir-\\nregular. So long as the actions between the organ-\\nism and the environment are automatic, memory\\ncannot exist. Memory emerges when the corre-\\nspondence is not complete. When the adaptation is", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0096\u00a0m\\n112 HERBERT SPENCER\\nre-formed, when the adaptation is again complete,\\nmemory lapses into instinct, as may be seen in the\\nfact that a musician, who at first strains his faculties\\nto remember the notes of a new piece, by and by\\nplays the tune automatically, even so far as to carry\\non a conversation at the same time. That is to say,\\nhe plays instinctively, without memory being called\\ninto exercise. What of Reason? Is it a super-\\nnatural endowment, or an evolutional product?\\nAccording to Spencer, Reason cannot be absolutely\\ndemarcated from Instinct. The difference between\\nthem is one of degree, not of kind. So long as the\\nadjustments between internal and external relations\\nare simple and permanent, they are made instinc-\\ntively. Instinct may be defined as unconscious\\nadjustments. When the adjustments are many,\\ncomplex, and temporary, deliberation comes into\\nplay. Reason may be defined as conscious adjust-\\nments. The process of evolution is thus luminously\\nsketched by Mr. Spencer While on the one\\nhand instinctive actions pass into rational actions\\nwhen from increasing complexity and infrequency\\nthey become imperfectly automatic, on the other\\nhand rational actions pass by constant repetition\\ninto automatic or instinctive actions. Similarly we\\nmay here see that, while on the one hand rational\\ninferences arise when the groups of attributes and\\nrelations cognized become such that the impressions", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 113\\nof them cannot be simultaneously co-ordinated, on\\nthe other hand rational inferences pass by constant\\nrecurrence into automatic inferences or organic in-\\ntuitions. The genesis of instinct, the develop-\\nment of memory and reason out of it, and the\\nconsolidation of rational actions and inferences into\\ninstinctive ones are alike explicable on the single\\nprinciple that the cohesion between psychical states\\nis proportionate to the frequency with which the\\nrelation between the answering external phenomena\\nhas been repeated in experience. At this stage\\nemerges Mr. Spencer s great philosophical contribu-\\ntion, whereby he revolutionized the science of Psy-\\nchology by bringing to an end the historic feud\\nbetween the Intuitionalists and the Experientiahsts.\\nIn order to appreciate the full force of the Spen-\\ncerian theory of reconciliation, it is necessary to\\npresent a historical sketch of the famous philosophic\\nfeud, beginning with John Locke. Locke s whole\\nsystem of metaphysics rests on the idea that the\\nmind or soul exists as an agent independent of the\\nexternal world. The problem he set himself to\\nsolve was the exact relation between the mind and\\nthe world. Dissatisfied with the theory of innate\\nideas, Locke took up the position that all knowledge\\ncomes through the senses, consequently ideas are\\nthe counterparts of sensations. The question which\\nimmediately faced Locke was this What is that", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "114 HERBERT SPENCER\\ntiling called Matter which is the basis of all our\\nknowledge He saw that all the properties of\\nMatter could not exist exactly as they seemed to\\nexist, because many of them were conditioned by\\nthe mind itself. Light and heat, he saw, did not\\nexist as properties apart from the mind they\\nexisted only in relation to the mind. But if matter\\nis clothed by the mind with secondary qualities,\\nwhat guarantee is there that the primary qualities\\nare not also in some ways conditioned by the\\nmind The result of Locke s inquiry was to leave\\nthe mind just where Descartes left it in the posi-\\ntion of a self-acting entity. He dethroned innate\\nideas, but he put nothing in their place. With\\nDescartes the mind was a constitutional monarch,\\nconditioned in all its workings by innate ideas.\\nWith Locke the mind was still a monarch, but one\\nwhose system of government had fallen into anarchy.\\nBerkeley detected the fatal consequences of Locke s\\nphilosophy. In order to dispel anarchy he got rid of\\nLocke s dilemma about the primary and secondary\\nqualities of matter by abolishing matter altogether.\\nAccording to Berkeley, Spirit, not Matter, was the\\nreal substance of the Universe. At this stage Hume\\nappears, and in effect says to Berkeley If there\\nis no evidence of the existence of matter as a per-\\nmanent substance, there is a like want of evidence\\nfor the existence of mind as a permanent substance.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 115\\nWhat, says Hume, we are conscious of is not an\\nentity called mind, but a chain of feelings linked\\ntogether by association. In the hands of Hume\\nthe reasonings of Locke and Berkeley ended in\\nscepticism. Locke s theory, like Berkeley s, was\\nformulated in the interests of Theology. Locke\\nhoped to find in Causation a stepping-stone to a\\ngreat First Cause Hume, by substituting Associa-\\ntion for Causation, knocked the props from Theol-\\nogy. By resolving mind as an entity into a series\\nof feelings linked by association, Hume also knocked\\nthe props from Psychology. Hume drove Theology\\nand Philosophy into bankruptcy that is what con-\\nstitutes him an epoch-making force in the history of\\nthought.\\nHume s destructive criticism roused into philo-\\nsophic activity Immanuel Kant, whose contribution\\nto the problem took the shape of innate forms of\\nthought, instead of the innate ideas of Descartes.\\nGreat as are the differences among the Germans,\\nthey all, from Kant to Hegel, endeavor to break\\nthe force of Hume s criticism by re-establishing in a\\nmore plausible and subtler form the conception of\\na self-acting Ego, a spiritual agent endowed with\\npotencies and capabilities, with forms of thought\\napart from experience. An attempt has been made\\nin England to modernize Kant and Hegel, but it can-\\nnot be said that the attempt, headed by the late Pro-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "116 HERBERT SPENCER\\nfessor Green, has been a success. Neo-Kantianism,\\ninstead of the old forms of thought, postulates a\\nsingle active self-conscious principle, a transcen-\\ndental unifying principle, the one subject which\\nsustains the world and is the real knower in all finite\\nintelligences. Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison effec-\\ntively disposes of this latest attempt to construct an\\nIdealistic theory when he says it is of a piece with\\nthe Scholastic Realism which hypostatized humanitas\\nor homo as a universal substance, of which individual\\nmen were in a manner the accidents. Similarly\\nhere the notion in general the pure Ego which\\nis reached by abstraction from the individual is\\nerected into a self -existent reality, an eternally\\ncomplete self-consciousness, of which the individual\\nis an imperfect representation or mode. Hume s\\ndestructive theory was far-reaching. If the mind\\nwas no entity, but a process, clearly a blow was\\nstruck at innate ideas and intuitive forms of thought.\\nNaturally Hume s conception of mind commended\\nitself to the Experiential philosophers like the two\\nMills, in their crusade against the intuitional theory\\nof morals. With John Stuart Mill, mind resolves\\nitself, as with Hume, into a permanent possibility\\nof feeling. Mill s philosophy was transitional.\\nEffective enough in its polemic against the reigning\\nIntuitionalism, Empiricism, even in the hands of an\\nacute thinker like Mill, was incapable of returning", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 117\\nsatisfactory answers to the fundamental problems of\\nPsychology. In regard to the root question, that\\nrelating to the constitution and function of the mind,\\nMill remained virtually at the position of Locke.\\nWhen the Darwinian theory of man s origin began\\nto gain general acceptance, it was evident that\\nPsychology would be profoundly influenced. If no\\nbreak was discoverable in the evolution of animal\\nforms, the difficulty was increased of making the\\nhuman mind an isolated entity with a specially\\ncreated constitution, in which were embedded a\\npriori forms of thought. Equally difficult was it to\\nconceive the mind as possessing nothing but a\\nsusceptibility to impressions. Thinkers began to\\nask whether the Darwinian theory did not involve\\nthe view that mind also was gradually evolved from\\na lower form of life. Pursuing this line of thought,\\n^ven before Darwin popularized it, Spencer reached\\nthe far-reaching conclusion that what had hitherto\\nbeen accepted as necessary truths by the Intuition-\\nalists, and which the school of Mill never could\\nresolve into individual experiences, were beliefs\\nwhich, though a pi iori to the individual, were a\\nposteriori to the race.\\nHere, indeed, was a luminous conception a\\nconception by the aid of which Empiricism was able\\nto make most serious inroads upon the Kantian\\nanswer to Locke and Hume. As Mr. Fiske puts", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "118 HERBERT SPENCER\\nit Locke was wrong in calling the infant s mind\\na blank sheet upon which experience is to write\\nknowledge. The mind of the infant cannot be\\ncompared to a blank sheet, but rather to a sheet\\nalready written over here and, there with invisible\\nink, which tends to show itself as the chemistry of\\nexperience supplies the requisite conditions. Or,\\ndropping metaphor, the infant s mind is co-related\\nwith the functions of a complex mass of nerve-tissue,\\nwhich already has certain definite nutritive ten-\\ndencies. The school of Leibnitz and Kant was\\nwrong in assuming a kind of intuitional knowledge,\\nnot ultimately due to experience. For the ideas\\nformerly called innate or intuitional are the results\\nof nutritive tendencies in the cerebral tissue, which\\nhave been strengthened by the uniform experience\\nof countless generations until they have become as\\nresistless as the tendency of the dorsal line of the\\nembryo to develop into a vertebral column. The\\nstrength of Locke s position lay in the assertion that\\nall knowledge is ultimately derived from experience\\nthat is, from the intercourse between the organism\\nand the environment. The strength of Kant s posi-\\ntion lay in the recognition of the fact that the brain\\nhas definite tendencies, even at birth. The doctrine\\nof Evolution harmonizes these two seemingly opposite\\nviews, by showing us that in learning we are merely\\nacquiring latent capacities, by more or less powerful", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 119\\nnutritive tendencies, which are transmissible from\\nparent to child.\\nWhat Kant described as a^n on principles Spencer\\ndeclared to be racial experiences which, by their\\nconstancy and universality, have become organic\\nforms of thought operating with all the force of\\nintuitions. Manifestly, Spencer s matchless con-\\ntribution to Psychology was rendered possible by\\nhis destruction of the old conception of mind as a\\nself-centred entity with supernatural endowments\\nor metaphysical properties, and the substitution of\\nthe conception of mind as co-related with matter\\nmirroring its movements, and subject to the law of\\nreciprocity. Mind, in the Spencerian view, is no\\nentity, but a specialized form of a universal process,\\nand evolving in correspondence with its environment.\\nUp till Spencer began to write, mind had been almost\\nexclusively studied by the introspective method.\\nIt was treated as an abstraction, and even followers\\nof Hume, like Mill, who had given up the old idea\\nof a separate mental substance, never realized the\\nimportance of associating Psychology with Biology,\\nand studying mental processes in their earlier pre-\\nhuman manifestations.\\nMr. Spencer s two volumes on Psychology are not\\nonly an epoch-making work in the region of meta-\\nphysics, but they have also proved the forerunner\\nof a new method in the study of brain and nerve", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "120 HERBERT SPENCER\\ndissolution as well as of evolution. So long as\\nthe mind was treated as an entity, so long was\\nPsychology barren in the region of practical life.\\nWhen, however, the conception of mind as co-\\nrelated in structure and function to a material\\norgan and a nervous system became clear to Mr.\\nSpencer, it was plain that mental processes could\\nonly be adequately studied through their physical\\nequivalents. If the development of intelligence\\nkeeps pace with a developing nervous organization\\nand increased complexity of brain, if the process of\\nevolution is not divisible into two sections, one\\nphysical and one mental, there is no escape from\\nthe conclusion that the lapse from intelligence, or\\nmental dissolution, will have its physical equivalent\\nin the shape of a disordered nervous organization\\nand diseased brain structure. In that case Psy-\\nchology, as expounded by Mr. Spencer, becomes a\\nvaluable aid to the practical physician. That it is\\nso, I am assured by no less an authority than Dr.\\nHughlings Jackson, who in a private letter to me\\nstates that he has found Mr. Spencer s Principles\\nof Psychology more useful than any other works\\non psychology in the study of those diseases of the\\nnervous system which have a mental side. I\\nbelieve that Mr. Spencer s doctrines of Evolution\\nand Dissolution are of very great value in the\\nmethodical analysis of cases of insanity, and further", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 121\\nthat, on the basis these doctrines supply, relations\\nof different kinds of disease of the highest cerebral\\ncentres to one another can be traced, and also re-\\nlations of disease of these centres to diseases of\\nlower centres of the nervous system. Another dis-\\ntinguished authority. Dr. Mercier, whose writings\\nhave done much to elucidate the pathological as-\\npects of mental evolution, writes me as follows\\nMy idea of the value of Spencer s work is that he\\nhas done for co-ordinations in Time what Newton\\ndid for co-ordinations in Space, and by so much as\\nthe intricacy and multiplicity of the former exceed\\nthose of the latter, by so much does Spencer s\\nachievement exceed Newton s. In my own official\\nwork in Neurology, Psychology, and especially in\\nPathology, I may almost say in the case of the\\ntwo former and quite in the case of the latter, he\\nhas reduced chaos to order. He has at any rate\\ndiscovered the fundamental principles of these\\nsciences, and whatever systems are erected in\\nthese sciences in the future must be erected on\\nthe foundations he has laid. I am at present\\nengaged upon a book on Psychology in which I\\nam essaying to expand and apply his principles, to\\nsupplement and fill in his outlines. This is suffi-\\ncient answer to those who contend that the Spence-\\nrian philosophy, like the Hegelian, is a fantastic piece\\nof theorizing, having little or no basis in reality. It", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "122 HERBERT SPENCER\\nis Mr. Spencer s merit as a psychologist that to the\\nkeenest speculative vision he unites a devotion to\\nfact so minute as to give his writings the stamp at\\nonce of philosophic profundity and eminent practical\\nutility.\\nBut, exclaims the startled reader, if mental\\nlife develops from biological life by unbroken stages,\\nthere is no escape from Materialism. Foreseeing\\nthis objection, Mr. Spencer has been careful to point\\nout that the terms Matter and Mind are after all\\nsymbols, not absolute existences. When the philo-\\nsophical scientist endeavors to understand the nature\\nof Matter and Mind, he is baffled.\\nThough he may succeed in resolving all properties\\nof objects into manifestations of force, yet, says Mr.\\nSpencer, he is not thereby enabled to realize what\\nforce is. Similarly, though analysis of mental actions\\nmay finally bring him down to sensations as the\\noriginal materials out of which all thought is\\nwoven, he is none the forwarder for he cannot in\\nthe least comprehend sensation cannot even con-\\nceive how sensation is possible. He sees that the\\nmaterialist and spiritualist controversy is a mere\\nwar of words. In all directions his investiga-\\ntions eventually bring him face to face with the\\nunknowable. He learns at once the greatness and\\nthe littleness of human intellect, its power in\\ndealing with all that comes within the range of", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 123\\nexperience its impotence in dealing with all that\\ntranscends experience. He feels, with a vividness\\nwhich no others can, the utter incomprehensibleness\\nof the simplest fact considered in itself. He alone\\nsees that absolute knowledge is impossible. He\\nalone knows that under all things lies an impene-\\ntrable mystery. Students who have not gone to\\nthe root of his philosophy conclude that because\\nSpencer, as distinct from Hegel, treats of the evolu-\\ntion of concrete Matter instead of abstract Spirit,\\ntherefore he is a Materialist. What Mr. Spencer\\nsays is that thought is conditional upon brain\\nstructure, and that increasing complexity of brain\\nstructure is paralleled by increasing complexity of\\nintelligence in both cases the law of evolution\\nholds good. He is no Materialist. Like Job,\\nGoethe, Carlyle, and all kindred thinkers, Mr.\\nSpencer stands uncovered before the Power behind\\nphenomena that mysterious, awe-inspiring Power,\\nthe source of all phenomena, material and mental,\\nthe Infinite and Eternal, before which, now as of\\nold, the fit attitude of the human soul is one of\\nsacred silence and devout humility.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VIII\\nTHE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY\\nWhat is called progress in the purely organic world\\nhas been seen to consist in a series of structural and\\nfunctional changes from a relatively simple state of\\norganization. Does social progress conform to the\\nsame law According to Mr. Spencer, the formula\\nwhich is applicable to purely physical phenomena\\nembraces also social phenomena. Society, like an\\norganism, begins in a state of relative simplicity,\\nand by a series of structural and functional changes,\\nreaches a state of relative complexity. The task\\nwhich lies before the Sociologist is that of tracing\\nthe evolution of society through its various stages,\\nfrom the primitive tribe to the highest form of\\ncivilization. Here as elsewhere he is not primarily\\nconcerned with the question of origin. In treating\\nof cosmical evolution, the evolutionist commences\\nwith the nebulse in dealing with organic evolution\\nhe begins with indifferentiated protoplasm and in\\nstudying the development of society his starting-\\npoint is primitive man as historically discernible.\\n124", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 125\\nThe task of the evolutionist is clearly defined he\\nhas to discover the cause and law of social progress.\\nHis first duty is to endeavor to get back to the\\nstarting-point of human history, to the doings of\\nprimitive man.\\nWhatever view is taken of man s relation to the\\nanimal world, one thing is certain his condition\\nwhen history first catches a glimpse of him was not\\nfar removed from animalism. Primitive man was\\na creature of appetites and instincts controlled by\\nrigorous necessities. Led by the senses, he was\\nutterly devoid of morality in any real sense of the\\nterm. Marriage was unknown the social bond\\nweak and uncertain life resolved itself into a\\nbitter struggle for existence among a discordant\\nmass of antagonistic units. In a word, society was\\nin a fluid state resembling the nebulae of the pre-\\nplanetary period. By what means was a start made\\nin the direction of social integration To the Soci-\\nologist the answer to this question is of fundamen-\\ntal importance. Once the cause of social progress\\nis discovered, we have within our grasp the key to\\ncivilization. The cause of social progress must be\\nfound in the nature of primitive man. A reference\\nto JNIr. Spencer s Principles of Psychology shows that\\nwhether the habits of an animal shall be solitary\\nor gregarious depends upon the relation between\\nthe two most general functions self -maintenance", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "126 HERBERT SPENCER\\nand race-maintenance. Those animals which can\\nadequately provide for their own wants lead solitary\\nlives whereas those which cannot supply their\\nindividual wants live and act in concert. Now of\\nall animals man is least fitted to lead a solitary life\\nsome kind of co-operation with his fellows is an\\nindispensable necessity. Here, then, is the germ of\\nsociality. The germ is increased by the necessities\\nof race-maintenance. It is a physiological fact that\\nthe higher and more complex the physical and mental\\norganization, the longer the period of infancy. How-\\never crude and unsatisfactory the affection between\\nmother and child in primitive times, it must have\\nbeen kept alive and increased during the period of\\ninfancy. Not that domestic relations had any co-\\nherence or stability. There is good reason to believe\\nthat the family was not the earliest form of social\\norganization. A species of domestic communism\\nseems to have preceded famil}^ life, but under what-\\never form, the tie between mother and child was\\nenduring. Civilization on its highest and noblest\\nside is rooted in motherhood. Even in primitive\\nsociety the strength of affection fostered by the\\nmaternal relationship did something to counteract\\nthe force of the purely selfish feeling, and to increase\\nthe fund of sociality. Sooner or later the family as\\nan institution was bound to evolve from tribal chaos\\nand when it did evolve the first step was taken in", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 127\\nthe path of civilization. Upon primitive man, when\\nthe stage of the family was reached, two pressing\\nduties devolved self-maintenance and family-main/-\\ntenance. In other words the cause of social activity\\nwas man s desire to provide for his own wants and\\nthe wants of those dependent upon him. Comte,\\nfollowed by Mill, makes the intellect the chief cause\\nof progress. According to them, civilization is\\nprompted and controlled by ideas. Ideas play a\\ngreat and ever-increasing part in civilization, but\\nthey are not the prime cause. Progress has an\\neconomic root. In order to live, in order to main-\\ntain correspondence with his environment, man, like\\nplants and animals, must have adequate sustenance.\\nThe first task imposed upon primitive man by the\\nrigors of his environment was not to get true ideas,\\nwas not intellectual culture, but the gratification of\\nhis physical requirements. He had to live, and the\\nfirst necessity was to supply his material needs. The\\ncause of social progress lies not in the intellectual\\nbut in the physical side of human nature. Society\\ntook its rise from the fact that man by co-operating\\nwith his fellows was abler to supply his wants than by\\nindividual effort. Not that there was any formal con-\\ntract, as Locke and Rousseau would have us believe.\\nPrimitive men formed themselves instinctively into\\ntribes in order to lessen the stern struggle for existence.\\nWith the formation of tribes the struggle for", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "128 HERBERT SPENCER\\nexistence entered upon a new phase. In primitive\\ntimes, owing to man s ignorance of natural laws\\nand processes, population constantly outran the\\nmeans of subsistence. Darwin has familiarized the\\nmodern mind with the view of Nature as an arena\\nin which plants and animals are engaged upon a life-\\nand-d^ath struggle for existence, a struggle in which\\nonly the fittest survive. In this arena primitive\\nman also fought. We moderns have greatly lessened\\nthe force of the struggle, because by science we\\nhave learned to make the means of subsistence out-\\nstrip the increase of population. But in early times\\nlife was a perpetual struggle for the means of sub-\\nsistence, and naturally the struggle took the form of\\nwars between tribes. With an increasing popula-\\ntion and a stationary food supply tribes had either\\nto starve or steal. A policy of annexation was\\nthrust upon men by sheer necessity.\\nIt needs little reflection to see that wars must\\nhave been an integrating factor of great force.\\nMilitarism must greatly have increased the cohesive-\\nness of the tribal bond in Spencerian phraseology,\\nit made for social integration. Under Militarism\\nthe individual was necessarily subordinated to the\\ntribe or state. This subordination was intensified\\nby primitive religions which, by deifying the chief\\nor king, identified the law of the tribes or kingdom\\nwith the will of Heaven. Thus it was that under", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 129\\nthe military regime humanity was ruled both by the\\ndead and the living indeed, the rule of the dead\\nwas the stronger, inasmuch as the ruler was only-\\nobeyed so long as he voiced religion and tradition.\\nThe development of primitive humanity becomes\\ninteUigible when we describe it as progress from\\nthe tribal stage to a complex military stage by a\\nseries of integrations and differentiations. But the\\nmilitary regime contained one fatal defect. The\\ntask of procuring sustenance became subordinated\\nto that of aggression. War, which in the earlier\\nstages was a means to an end, became ultimately\\nan end in itself. The nation was divided into\\nworkers and warriors. Under the influence of reli-\\ngion and patriotism, war was glorified as the main\\nfunction of life, and to the military ranks gravi-\\ntated the best talent of the community. In the\\nwords of Buckle The three most distinguished\\nstatesmen Greece ever produced, Solon, Themisto-\\ncles, and Epaminondas, were distinguished military\\ncommanders. Socrates, supposed by some to be the\\nwisest of the ancients, was a soldier and so was\\nPlato and so was Antisthenes, the celebrated\\nfounder of the cynics. Archytas, who gave a new\\ndirection to the Pythagorean philosophy, and Me-\\nlissus, who developed the Eleatic philosophy, were\\nboth of them well-known generals, famous alike in\\nliterature and in war. Among the most eminent", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "130 HERBERT SPENCER\\norators, Pericles, Alcibiades, and Demostlienes were\\nmembers of the military profession as also were the\\ntwo greater tragic writers, iEschylus and Sophocles.\\nThe most philosophic of all the Greek historians\\nwas certainly Thucydides, but he, as well as Xeno-\\nphon and Polybius, held high military appointments,\\nand on more than one occasion succeeded in chang-\\ning the fortunes of war.\\nWhile war was held in the highest honor, indus-\\ntrial labor was held in the greatest contempt. As\\na consequence, slavery, as we see from the political\\nwritings of Aristotle, was viewed as the normal\\nstate of the lower orders. Following this, there\\ncould be no such thing as distribution of wealth\\namong the people. Among ancient nations the\\nfunction of the people was to minister to the pleas-\\nure of the rich, who held a monopoly of power and\\nwealth. Of all the nations of antiquity Greece\\ncame nearest to the modern ideal, but she fell\\nbecause she endeavored to import a democratic\\nconstitution, suitable to the industrial regime, into\\nthe military regime. Greece struck the note of\\nfreedom and individuality, but she was a premature\\ndevelopment. Greece was born out of due season.\\nIn a warlike epoch, a democratic community, resting\\nupon slavery, and devoting its resources to military\\naggrandizement, could not hope permanently to\\nresist the encroachment of a world-wide military", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 131\\npower. Greece fell a prey to Rome. Rome in her\\nturn fell a prey to Militarism with its false eco-\\nnomic system. Much has been said of the causes\\nof Rome s decline and fall. Many causes were\\nat work religious, moral, social, and political, but\\nunderlying them all was the one cause which was\\nat the root of the decay of ancient civilization,\\nnamely, the unequal distribution of wealth, with\\nthe resulting slavery of the populations. Instead\\nof production of wealth by means of science and\\nindustry, there was annexation of wealth by means\\nof war and conquest. Instead of distribution of\\nwealth on the lines of intelligence and industry,\\nthere was monopoly of wealth on the lines of\\nmilitary force and slavery. The result of this was\\nthe corruption of the governing classes and the\\ndeterioration of the lower classes. So long sub-\\nordinated to the State, and treated as a mere chat-\\ntel, the individual was totally unfit to cope with the\\nfierce liberty-loving independent barbarians who\\nbroke up the Roman Empire. Under the military\\nregime humanity failed to solve the first necessity\\nof life that of adequately providing for its own\\nsustenance. The great economic experiment in the\\nhands of Militarism had proved a colossal failure.\\nRome arrested human progress, and Rome was over-\\nthrown by the progressive instincts of humanity,\\nwhich nothing can permanently thwart.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "132 HERBERT SPENCER\\nFrom the ruins of the Roman Empire there arose,\\nslowly but surely, a new social order. This time,\\nowing to the widespread anarchy, society was reor-\\nganized, not on the basis of the family or the tribe,\\nbut on the feudal system. At first it seemed as\\nif one kind of despotism had simply been exchanged\\nfor another. Feudalism was nothing if not despotic,\\nand it was difficult to see how society would avoid\\nthe rock upon which it had already split, the rock\\nof Militarism. But in the heart of Feudalism lay\\nhidden the germ of progress. When society began\\nto assume a relatively settled form, when all the\\ngreat lords dependants were not needed for mili-\\ntary duty, a number were settled around the estates\\nas hinds and artificers. This social differentia-\\ntion had far-reaching consequences. The moment\\nan attempt was made to provide for human neces-\\nsities by means of labor instead of by war, that\\nmoment a new hope dawned upon the horizon of\\nhumanity. From the small body of artificers which,\\nslave-like, clung to the bounty of the great feudal\\nlords, sprang Industrialism with all its world-trans-\\nforming influences. Guizot traces the earlier evo-\\nlution of Industrialism as follows No sooner was\\nsociety a little settled under the feudal system than\\nthe proprietors of fiefs began to feel new wants, and\\nto acquire a certain degree of taste for improvement\\nand cultivation; this gave rise to some little com-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 133\\nmerce and industry in the towns in their domains\\nwealth and population increased within them\\nslowly for certain, but still they increased. By\\nand by the industrial serfs in the towns of the\\nlords domain began to feel their power. They\\nbecame what the slaves of the ancient world never\\nbecame, an important factor in the social system.\\nTo prevent the town serfs from increasing in inde-\\npendence, the lords resorted to harsh and despotic\\nmeasures. Between the two a great struggle for\\nsupremacy took place. It ended in the triumph of\\nthe burghers, who freed the towns from the harass-\\ning rule of the feudal law. From this dates the\\nemancipation of industry. Henceforth freedom was\\ngiven to a new power in the State. The satisfaction\\nof human wants was to be accomplished not by war,\\nbut by peaceful industry. The individual man was\\nat last permitted to secure his own sustenance by\\nmeans of labor, instead of having the fruits of his\\nlabor taken from him by war and slavery. When\\nsociety acknowledged the right of the individual\\nto be what Nature intended him to be, a being\\nformed for self-maintenance, the first stage was\\nreached in the evolution of an enduring civilization.\\nThe great problem of social evolution is to preserve\\nthe spontaneity and freedom of primitive humanity\\nalong with the social restraints and influences which\\nare needful for the cohesion of society. In Spen-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "134 HERBERT SPENCER\\ncerian language, the difficulty is to allow the cohe-\\nsive or integrating forces in society to have due\\ninfluence without stamping out the principle of\\nvariation or differentiation, upon which progress\\ndepends. In the organic world Darwin has made\\nus familiar with the truth that plants and animals\\nwhich do not respond to the variation in the en-\\nvironment are doomed to disappear in the struggle\\nfor existence. We have seen that ancient civiliza-\\ntion disappeared from the same causes. Religion,\\nGovernment, economic error, all tended to produce\\nindividual and social stagnation. The different\\nnations failed to adjust themselves to outer rela-\\ntions, and Nature in her sternest mood stamped\\nthem out of existence.\\nIt is now to be seen how modern civilization set\\nitself to solve the problem of uniting social cohesive-\\nness with individual variability. Modern civiliza-\\ntion in so far as it has been progressive has proceeded\\nby successive integrations and differentiations. We\\nhave already seen the cause of social progress to lie\\nin man s efforts to satisfy his material wants. When\\nthat cause is not allowed to operate, there results\\nindividual and social stagnation. The operation,\\nwhen allowed to take place, must follow a definite\\nlaw. What, then, is the law of social progress?\\nThe law is that where material prosperity, the result\\nof industry, is the most widely distributed, the", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 135\\ngreater is man s progress intellectually, morally, and\\nsocially. This has been so well stated by an Amer-\\nican author, Mr. Gunton, who has so admirably\\napplied the doctrine of evolution to social phi-\\nlosophy, that his words deserve to be reproduced:\\nThe progress of society towards greater complexity\\nof organization, in which the necessity of physical\\neffort is diminished, intellectual power and personal\\nfreedom increased, and moral character elevated, is\\nalways in the ascending order from the material to\\nthe intellectual and moral; the material being the\\nbasis, the intellectual the means, and the moral\\nqualities the result. By overlooking the funda-\\nmental importance of the economic side of society\\ngreat confusion has been imported into the study of\\ncivilization. One writer, De Tocqueville, mars a\\nseries of otherwise profound generalizations by trac-\\ning the social and political phenomena of modern\\nsocieties to the passion for equality, which in his\\nview is the distinctive note of democracy. To what\\nis the passion for equality due? Had De Tocque-\\nville pursued the subject further, he would have\\nfound that the passion for equality has its root in\\nthe economic necessity of man to secure equal rights\\nas a primary condition of self-maintenance. Men\\ndid not agitate for political freedom from an abstract\\nlove of freedom they sought for political rights as\\na means of securing the right to labor, and the", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "136 HERBERT SPENCER\\nright to the fruits of their labor. Like De Tocque-\\nville, Comte went astray in attributing civilization\\nto an abstract law like that of the three stages,\\ninstead of to the economic law that mankind seek to\\nsatisfy their material wants along the line of least\\nresistance.\\nWhen industry began to assert itself, two great\\npowers of resistance blocked the way, the State\\nand the Church. In the Middle Ages the people\\nwere ground under two despotisms, the Roman\\nCatholic Church, and the State, as represented by\\nthe feudal lords and monarchy. How were these\\nsuccessfully attacked The common view is that\\nthe Roman Catholic Church had its despotic power\\nweakened by the Protestant movement, and that the\\ndespotism of the Crown and the lords was weakened,\\nin this country at least, by the unique concessions\\narising from the Crown and embodied in Magna\\nCharta. That the revolt against Roman Catholicism\\nhad a deeply religious side no one would deny.\\nBut what made the revolt a success A clew to the\\nanswer is had when it is remembered that the Church\\nof Rome came into collision with the new industrial\\nideal. The teaching of the Church, as Mr. Lecky\\nwell shows, was based on monastic, ascetic, and\\nother ideals which were totally incompatible with\\nthe industrial and commercial spirit. At every\\nturn industry and commerce found themselves ham-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 137\\npered by laws and teachings which not only repressed\\nindividual effort and initiative, which are the roots\\nof Industrialism, but which treated the accumula-\\ntion of wealth and devotion to money-getting as\\nsinful. A religious system which ran counter to\\nthe economic tendencies of the new industrial epoch\\nwas bound to come into collision with the growing\\nintelligence which a life of secular activity directly\\nand indirectly fostered. It was no accident that the\\nReformation, and for that matter political freedom,\\nmade greatest progress in those countries where the\\ntowns had gained the greatest success in their con-\\ntest with the feudal regime.\\nIt is a significant fact that England was the only\\ncountry in which the Free Towns were not over-\\npowered by either the Church, the Monarchy, or the\\nBarons and consequently it was the only country\\nin which religious, social, and political progress was\\nnot arrested. The middle classes became a power\\nin the State when they wrested the control of the\\ntowns from the barons, and the same classes, imbued\\nwith the spirit of freedom and intelligence, the out-\\ngrowth of the industrial regime, broke the back alike\\nof Papal domination and aristocratic and monarchic\\ndespotism.\\nOne of the elements of perplexity which confront\\nthe student of civilization is the manner in which\\nphenomena, which were at first effects, ultimately", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "138 HERBERT SPENCER\\nbecome causes. The desire for material satisfaction,\\nwhich is the primary cause of social progress, leads\\nnaturally to increased knowledge of Nature. In-\\ncrease of intelligence, the effect, becomes itself the\\ncause of further increase of material prosperity, and\\nthus social differentiation, which began instinctively,\\nis followed consciously and with rational purpose.\\nNo thinker has done more to show the close psycho-\\nlogical connection between this double process of\\ncivilization than Mr. Spencer, and no thinker has\\ndone more to focus the historical effects of the process\\nthan Comte. Upon the mind of the student, Comte s\\npicture of the Middle Ages, the fall of the feudal\\nregime, and the rise of the industrial epoch, has\\nall the effect of a panoramic vision. Were it for\\nnothing else than his magnificent historical survey,\\nComte would be entitled to everlasting remembrance\\nby philosophic students of intellectual, social, and\\npolitical evolution.\\nIt is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate in\\ndetail the value of the various discoveries in science,\\nthe increase of knowledge, the rapid progress of\\ninventions, upon the development of civilization,\\nespecially on the side of complexity and variability.\\nTo these we must largely attribute the great contrast\\nbetween the fixity of ancient civilization and the\\nflexibility of modern civilization. But two causes\\nmust be signalized as exerting a momentous influ-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 139\\nence upon the great evolutionary course of society,\\nnamely the substitution of Free Trade for Protec-\\ntion, and the substitution of machine for hand laboi*.\\nIn the past these have produced great effects, the\\nfull force of which, however, will not be felt till\\nthe removal of disturbing influences in the form of\\ncertain politico-economic delusions. Even yet the\\nold superstition about the evil effect of machinery is\\nalive in the mind of working men; and they are not\\nto blame when they can quote the depreciatory words\\nof Mill in his Political Economy. And as regards\\nFree Trade, the world is yet far from admitting the\\ntruth of the great economic conceptions of Adam\\nSmith, who did for the industrial what Newton did\\nfor the physical world.\\nWhat is the precise relation of Adam Smith s\\neconomic gospel to the evolution of society? No\\ngreater evidence that the primary cause of social\\nprogress is not ideas, but desires, is had than the\\nunreasoning way in which mankind carried into the\\nindustrial era the ideas and methods which pertained\\nto Militarism. What a sad commentary upon human\\nintelligence is the fact that not till the time of\\nAdam Smith was the true theory of trade and com-\\nmerce formulated in a scientific form. For centuries\\ntrade and commerce were conducted under the influ-\\nence of an economic theory which kept alive the old\\nfeatures of antagonism that belonged to the military", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "140 HERBERT SPENCER\\nperiod. Under the influence of Protection trade and\\ncommerce, instead of uniting mankind, kept alive\\nfeelings of disunion. War, instead of dying away\\nin presence of a higher type of civilization, was\\nmade an instrument of national aggrandizement.\\nNations labored under the delusion natural enough\\nwhen wealth and conquest were synonymous that\\nthey could only become prosperous by beggaring their\\nneighbors. In the words of Adam Smith: Each\\nnation has been made to look with an invidious eye\\nupon the prosperity of all the nations with which it\\ntrades, and to consider their trade as its own loss.\\nCommerce, which ought to be among nations, as\\namong individuals, a bond of union and friendship,\\nhas become the most fertile source of discord and\\nanimosity. The intelligent adoption of Adam\\nSmith s doctrine as the corner-stone of foreign policy\\nis only a matter of time and when Free Trade is\\nuniversal, humanity will advance from the stage of\\nnationalism to that of internationalism. When that\\nday arrives, wars will cease. As I have expressed it\\nin my work on Adam Smith: Free Trade rests,\\nnot like mercantilism, on national independence,\\nbut on national interdependence. Under Free Trade\\nthe progress of one nation makes for the progress of\\nall. Fleets and armies are no longer needed to\\nsecure a monopoly of trade, to preserve the balance\\nof power, because in obedience to an economic law", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 141\\nthose countries which are industrially equipped will\\nshare in the trade of other countries, even in the\\nteeth of protective tariffs. Free Trade is not synony-\\nmous with a clash of interests, but in essence means\\nmutually advantageous exchange of services. Once\\nthis view is reached, there flashes on the mind the\\nvision of a time when the whole world will be bound\\ntogether by the golden chain of self-interest, a self-\\ninterest which recognizes that, given the conditions\\nof liberty and justice, the gain of one is the gain of\\nall. Free Trade thus appears in its true light as,\\nfrom the economic side, the application of Christian\\nethics to the international sphere. Nations, instead\\nof being hated rivals, each armed to the teeth, lying\\nin wait for the other, are seen to be members of a\\ngreat federation, each developing its sources to the\\nutmost, and exchanging its products in harmony and\\nwith mutual profit. What a stride from the fero-\\ncious tribal rivalries of primitive man, and the scenes\\nof carnage among the great military nations of the\\npast, to the doctrine of world-wide peace taught by\\nAdam Smith! Well might Richard Cobden de-\\nscribe Free Trade as the international law of God\\nAlmighty.\\nWhat an ennobling vision of humanity would\\nhave been vouchsafed Adam Smith had he realized\\nthe extraordinary beneficent impetus which would\\nbe given to his economic gospel in the age of", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "142 HERBERT SPENCER\\nmachinery. Wonder is often expressed at the ste-\\nrility of the intellect of the ancients in the domain\\nof inventions and machinery. How could it have\\nbeen otherwise? Even in Greece civilization was\\nrepresented by an aristocratic elect maintained in\\nidleness and affluence by a slave population whose\\nmaterial wants were few, limited, and stationary.\\nApart from the fact that ancient thinkers looked\\nupon labor as the peculiar work of slavery, and were\\ntherefore not likely to desire methods of saving\\nlabor, there was not a population sufficiently devel-\\noped to cause a demand for machine-made goods,\\nwhich cannot be produced at a profit unless in large\\nand increasing quantities. Until the lower classes\\nhad advanced so far in material prosperity that there\\narose among them a variety of desires other than the\\npurely material social and intellectual desires\\nthere could be no market for the products of ma-\\nchinery. The time was ripe when in England there\\nhad arisen a large and comparatively intelligent\\nmiddle class who were so far removed from the\\nclaims of physical necessity as to enjoy the pleasures\\nand luxuries of life.\\nIn what way, then, does the substitution of\\nmachine for hand labor help forward the evolution\\nof society? In other words, how does machinery\\ncontribute to the material prosperity, intellectual\\nimprovement, and moral elevation of the people?", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 143\\nIn pre-machinery days, when the market for labor\\nwas small and uncertain, and when the wages bill\\nwas the main element in cost, high profits could\\nonly be received by cheap labor. When the market\\nwas large and increasing, the superiority of machine\\nover hand labor turned to the advantage of the\\nworker. The advantage is twofold. Intelligence\\non the part of the worker becomes an important fac-\\ntor in mechanical superiority; consequently it is to\\nthe advantage of the master to grant high wages to\\nthe intelligent worker. Moreover, as the object\\nof higher wages is to cheapen production, it follows\\nthat the worker, who is also a consumer, benefits in\\nthe cheapening of products brought about by his\\nhighly paid labor. Thus in a twofold manner the\\nworking population profits by machinery by higher\\nwages and by their increased purchasing power. In\\nthe words of an American economist: A reduction\\nin the price puts commodities within the reach of\\nanother large class who were previously unable to\\nconsume them, and the market is thereby extended,\\nthus enlarging the income without raising the rate\\nof profit all of which tends to further increase the\\ndemand for labor and to improve the general well-\\nbeing of the community.\\nA civilization resting upon hand-made goods\\nnecessarily involves the hopeless poverty of the\\nworkers. In such a civilization labor must neces-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "144 HERBERT SPENCER\\nsarily be cheap and necessaries dear; whereas in the\\nmachinery era the situation is reversed wages are\\nincreased and the necessaries of life cheapened.\\nWhen we say that wages are increasing, what does\\nthat imply but that man the worker is increasing in\\nvalue and when we say that the necessaries of life\\nare being cheapened, what does that mean but that\\nfor the consumer, who is also the worker, life is\\nbecoming easier and more comfortable The ancient\\ncivilizations fell because man the worker was of no\\nvalue he was treated as a commodity to be bought\\nand sold as an instrument to be used for the selfish\\nenjoyment of a minority, whose corruption brought\\nsocial ruin. Modern civilization contains the ele-\\nments of endurance because man the worker is in-\\ncreasing in value with every increase in intelligence\\nand morality. As man the worker is also man the\\nconsumer, it is clear that every advance in intelli-\\ngence, leisure, and morality must raise the standard\\nof society till intellectual and aesthetic pleasures\\nbecome no longer the monopoly of a rich and cul-\\ntured few, but the heritage of the many. And thus\\nwe come to understand the Spencerian definition of\\nsocial progress as a complex process of adjustment\\nwith a complex environment, comprising not only\\nmaterial sustenance but all other intellectual, social,\\nand ethical pleasures which distinguish a being of\\ngreat potential qualities. Civilization is simply", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 145\\nthe process of adjustment on a large scale whereby\\nman s whole nature, physical, intellectual, and\\nmoral, develops in all its marvellous complexity\\nin response to an environment also increasing in\\ncomplexity.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IX\\nTHE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY\\nIn the preceding chapter an attempt was made to\\nformulate the cause and law of social evolution.\\nThe cause is not intellectual, as Comte and Mill\\nbelieved, but economic. Social activity has its\\norigin, not in the intellectual side of human nature,\\nbut in the primitive passions and instincts which\\nman shares with the animal creation. Man, like the\\nanimal, must provide for his material wants, and as\\nindividual man is the weakest of animals, in order\\nto maintain with success the struggle for existence\\nhe is driven to associate with his fellows. Moreover,\\nas was shown, the germ of sociality fostered by\\nfamily life somewhat softens the fierce play of ego-\\nism and lays the foundation of altruism, which in\\nthe higher forms of civilization flowers in the shape\\nof patriotism, philanthropy, and all the heroic virtues\\nwhich link man with the divine. In dealing with\\nthe political evolution of society it is essential not\\nto lose sight of the economic root. Once the eco-\\nnomic root is overlooked, the thinker falls into the\\n146", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 147\\nerror of attributing political constitutions either to\\nthe deliberate intentions of despots, as with Hobbes,\\nor to a social contract, as with Locke and Roussfeau,\\nor to considerations of utility, as with Bentham.\\nIf the economic root is kept steadily in view, the\\npolitical history of humanity becomes intelligible.\\nA flood of light is thrown upon the origin of\\npolitical constitutions by Mr. Spencer s comparison\\nof society to an organism. What are the distin-\\nguishing characteristics of the animal organization?\\nIn order that an animal shall live, the animal must\\nbe possessed of a threefold structure it must be\\nable to maintain itself by the assimilation of food;\\nit must have a distributing system, by means of\\nwhich food is carried to various parts of the body;\\nand it must have a defensive system, by means of\\nwhich it can regulate its movements in presence of\\nenemies. In the most primitive form of society this\\nthreefold constitution exists in the germ. The tribe\\nmust provide itself with food, must secure the means\\nof subsistence. The manner in which this is done\\ndetermines the nature of the other two structures\\nthe distributive and the regulative. In primitive\\ntimes, owing to man s ignorance, the productive\\npower of Nature does not keep pace with the increase\\nof population consequently the system of distribu-\\ntion does not, as in later times, take the form of\\nfriendly barter, of exchange, but of forcible appro-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "148 HERBERT SPENCER\\npriation. War is the normal state of primitive\\nsociety. Under these conditions, the political or\\nregulative structure is the natural outgrowth of the\\neconomic structure. In other words, political con-\\nstitutions are determined by economic conditions.\\nThat this is so is evident from a study of early\\nsocieties. Where the economic conditions are simple,\\nthe distributive and regulative systems are simple.\\nWhere the economic conditions are complex, the\\ndistributive and regulative agencies also increase in\\ncomplexity. Society, in the course of its develop-\\nment, obeys the Spencerian law of progress from the\\nsimple to the complex through successive integra-\\ntions and differentiations. Societies are divisible\\ninto two kinds Military and Industrial. Not that\\nthese have existed separately. Under the military\\nregime industry necessarily existed, and under the\\nindustrial regime militarism has never been wholly\\nabsent. We call a regime military when industrial\\nresources are used to support the military system\\nin carrying out the national ideal of war. We call\\na regime industrial when industry is the national\\nideal, the army simply being used for defensive\\npurposes. Given a tribal kingdom, a nation pre-\\ndominantly military, resting upon the idea that\\neconomic prosperity depends upon the forcible ap-\\npropriation of territory, and the political constitution\\nwill evolve along certain natural and necessary lines.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 149\\nIn brief, political constitutions are determined by\\nsocial necessities. Where these involve war, as\\nmust be the case where prosperity is believed to- be\\nsynonymous with forcible possession of territory,\\neverything will be sacrificed for military efficiency.\\nThe army will simply be the nation mobilized\\nindustry will be exploited in the interest of war,\\nand the individual will be subordinated to the State.\\nThe method of regimentation, so conspicuous in the\\narmy, will be extended to all classes of the com-\\nmunity; individual liberty will be reduced to a\\nminimum. In a word, an economic conception of\\nlife which rests on war necessarily involves a political\\nconstitution resting on despotism.\\nHistory abundantly justifies these generalizations.\\nIn tribes where wars are rare, individual freedom\\nis greatest. With difficulty can the Chief secure\\nobedience. Even he himself is allowed to command\\nonly so long as he pays due deference to tribal\\ncustoms which, though unwritten, have all the\\ncoercive force of laws. With war, the situation\\nundergoes a change. In presence of enemies the\\nloosely connected units form themselves instinc-\\ntively into a compact mass under the bravest\\nleader the tribe undergoes a process of integration.\\nThe democratic form of government which manifests\\nitself even in primitive tribes in a peaceful regime\\ngives place to a military dictatorship. At this", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "150 HERBERT SPENCER\\nstage there is no difference between the military\\norganization and the political organization. The\\ndictators who determine questions of defence and\\noffence naturally settle questions of a purely civic\\ncharacter. Industry, being an adjunct of the military\\nsystem, comes under the sweep of the principle of\\nregimentation which naturally belongs to a state\\nof war. Be the outward form of government what\\nit may monarchical or oligarchical those in pos-\\nsession of power in the military regime carry into\\nthe internal management of the nation the principle\\nof regulation or despotism, which in the army is an\\nabsolute necessity. The individual has no rights\\nagainst the State. He is valued only in so far as he\\ncontributes to the security of the State. In the\\nancient world, where war was the main occupation,\\nthe individual was used simply as an instrument for\\nthe glorification of the State. The State might\\ngrant him privileges he could demand no rights.\\nIn Rome, as the result of social stability, philoso-\\nphers began to talk about the law of Nature, and\\nprogress in the recognition of individual rights might\\nhave been made but for the eruption of barbarism,\\nwhich overthrew the ancient civilization, and once\\nmore placed Might on the throne of the world. The\\nlong reign of militarism was necessary in order to\\nproduce order out of confusion, and, of course, under\\nfeudalism despotism again reigned supreme. The", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 151\\nmilitary dictator under feudalism was as much the\\npolitical dictator as under the great despotic govern-\\nments of the ancient world. To quote from Mr.\\nSpencer Up to the tenth century each domain in\\nFrance had its bond, or only partially free, work-\\nmen and artisans, directed by the seigneur, and\\npaid in meals and goods. Between the eleventh\\nand fourteenth centuries the feudal superiors\\necclesiastical or lay regulated production and\\ndistribution to such extent that industrial and com-\\nmercial licenses had to be purchased from them\\nin the subsequent monarchical stage, it was a legal\\nmaxim that The right to labor is a royal right\\nwhich the prince may sell and subjects may buy\\nand onwards to the time of the Revolution the\\ncountry swarmed with officials who authorized\\noccupation, directed processes, examined products.\\nIn the old English period the heads of guilds were\\nidentical with the local political heads ealdormen,\\nwick-port, or burgh reeves and the guild was itself\\nin part a political body. Purchases and bargains\\nhad to be made in presence of officials. Agri-\\ncultural and manufacturing processes were pre-\\nscribed by law. Dictations, of kindred kinds, though\\ndecreasing, continued to late times. Down to the\\nsixteenth century there were metropolitan and local\\ncouncils, politically authorized, which determined\\nprices, fixed wages, etc.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "152 HERBERT SPENCER\\nUnder Militarism, whether in the ancient world\\nor in the modern feudal world, one process may be\\ndetected, namely, the integration of tribes into com-\\nmunities, communities into kingdoms, and kingdoms\\ninto nations. In all cases the inspiring motive was\\nthe desire for territory by means of war. No doubt\\nother causes such as religion came into operation,\\nbut the root-motive of social evolution was economic\\nthe desire for wealth on the part of the governing\\nclasses. War was the instrument of this desire, and\\nindustrial workers were valued solely as providing\\nrevenue for the ruler and a commissariat for the\\narmy. Under such economic conditions, the political\\nconstitution rested upon despotism, though the form\\nwhich it took differed in different countries. It\\nmatters little about the form whether monarchical,\\noligarchical, or feudal if the result is the same,\\nnamely, the subordination of the individual to the\\nState. Social integration is an indispensable factor\\nin progress, but in studying organic evolution we\\nsaw that an equally important factor is differentia-\\ntion, and the power which an organism possesses\\nof varying in response to varying agencies in the\\nenvironment. Now the political constitutions which\\nevolved alongside of Militarism made no provision\\nfor the factor of differentiation. Everything was\\nfixed by statutes. In industry, in religion, in politics,\\nvariations which would have been profitable to civ-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 153\\nilization were crushed out. The laborer who\\nclaimed the right to work for himself was treated\\nas a rebel serf, the religious man who claimed a\\nright to dissent from the church was a heretic, and\\nthe political man who rose against consecrated\\ndespotism was a traitor. Manifestly, under the\\nmilitary regime, progress was impossible. Progress\\nwas in danger of being arrested by a political\\nsystem of despotism. Whence was salvation to\\ncome\\nIn the previous chapter it was shown that a new\\nera appeared when Industrialism began to be of\\nmore importance than Militarism. When, thanks\\nto feudalism, something like social security had\\nbeen reached, not war but industry became the\\nmeans of procuring wealth. Such a far-reaching\\nchange in human affairs could not take place with-\\nout having a marked effect upon political constitu-\\ntions. With the rise of the Free Cities the old\\ndoctrine of Might upon which political despotism\\nrested gave place to a new doctrine of Right.\\nWith the rise of commerce and industry, the nat-\\nural rights of man, which had been hidden from\\nview during the long reign of militarism, clamored\\nfor recognition. The long contest between the feu-\\ndal barons and the freemen was something deeper\\nthan a squabble over charters. At bottom the\\ndemand of the city-dweller was the demand that", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "154 HERBERT SPENCER\\nno longer sliould the individual be subordinated to\\nthe ruling power, that the individual had certain\\nnatural rights with which no political power, king,\\nknight, or legalized government, could meddle. The\\nabolition of serfdom had its root in the feeling that\\nthe individual should no longer receive his freedom\\nas a privilege from his feudal superior, but could\\ndemand it as a right and the victory of the towns\\nover the barons implied that men of industry and\\ncommerce had a right to the fruits of their labor.\\nThe key to the political evolution of society in this\\ncountry, from Magna Charta to the last Reform Bill,\\nis found in the fact that the long period was a con-\\ntest between the old despotic elements in the British\\nConstitution founded on Might, and the growing\\nindustrialism with its demand for the recognition\\nof the fundamental rights of man rights, more-\\nover, which have a biological and psychological jus-\\ntification the right to live, the right to think, the\\nright to labor, and the right to the products of labor.\\nThe various modifications in the British Constitution,\\nfrom the absolutism of the Stuarts to the constitu-\\ntionalism of the Hanoverians, the oligarchy of the\\nLords, and the democracy of the Reform period,\\nrepresent successive stages in the great contest\\nbetween the old despotism under which the indi-\\nvidual had no rights as against the State, and the\\nmodern view that the duty of the State is not to con-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 155\\nfer rights but to safeguard the prime rights of man,\\nto which the State itself owes its existence and its\\nrationality.\\nIn confirmation of the view that the political\\nconstitution of a particular period is conditioned by\\nthe dominant economic force, is the fact that Magna\\nCharta, the starting-point of England s political\\nfreedom, was the product of the industrial and\\ncommercial conflict with the military despotism of\\nthe Crown. True, in the contest the burghers had\\nthe co-operation of the barons, who single-handed\\nwere unable to cope with the king. All the same\\nthe rights embodied in Magna Charta secured the\\nburghers against the violence of the barons as well\\nas against the despotism of the king. By Magna\\nCharta it was declared that no freeman shall be\\ndeprived of his freehold liberties or free customs,\\nbe executed, or outlawed, but by lawful judgment\\nof his peers or by the law of the land. Here was\\na great advance upon the military regime, which by\\nentirely subordinating the individual to the State\\nconceded privileges but denied rights. Magna\\nCharta established in England the doctrine that the\\nindividual had a right which the State dare not\\noverride, namely, the right to justice. Fifty years\\nlater, another right was wrested by the burghers\\nfrom the State the right to take part in the\\ncouncils of the nation by returning representatives", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "156 HERBERT SPENCER\\nto Parliament. After the reign of King John, the\\ntowns were granted charters which gave them mu-\\nnicipal independence, including the right to make\\ntheir own laws, elect their own magistrates and\\njudges, levy their own taxes, etc. The economic\\nrevolution by which the Free Cities rose and flour-\\nished gave an impetus to the political revolution\\nwhich later destroyed the absolutism of the Stuarts,\\nweakened the power of the aristocracy, and paved\\nthe way for the reformed Parliament in which the\\nCorn Laws were repealed, slavery abolished. Free\\nTrade declared, the legal code purified, and restric-\\ntive laws which pressed heavily upon labor re-\\nmoved from the statute book.\\nFurther confirmation of the view that political\\nevolution is conditioned by economic evolution is\\nhad in the fact that in those countries where the\\nFree Cities were destroyed, where economic progress\\nwas arrested, the political evolution received a\\ncheck, and a retrograde movement to despotism\\ntook place. In Spain charters were granted to\\nthe towns early in the eleventh century, and in the\\ntwelfth they were represented in the Cortes. The\\nbenefits of these political reforms were lost by\\nthe religious wars which raged. In Spain militarism\\nwas too strong for industrialism, which gradually\\ngrew weaker and weaker until, in the fifteenth\\ncentury, the burghers ceased to be represented in", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 157\\nthe Cortes. With the weakening of economic forces\\nin Spain began the decline of that great nation in\\nwealth and political freedom. In Italy the cause\\nof political freedom was also arrested by the fall\\nof the Free Cities. The decline of material pros-\\nperity was followed by the loss of all that makes\\nfor progress. In France likewise the fall of the\\nFree Cities led to the revival of political despotism\\nand social misery. In France the burghers were\\nworsted in their struggle with the barons, the\\nfeudal system was re-established in a form so odious\\nas to lead to the great Revolution. The Free\\nCities, the outcome of economic forces, by ultimately\\ndestroying the political system of militarism and\\nerecting a political constitution on the idea of\\nRight instead of Might, were the birthplaces of\\nmaterial prosperity, and as a consequence became the\\nnurseries of civilization.\\nAn American writer, a thinker thoroughly imbued\\nwith the evolutionary philosophy, sums up the close\\nrelation between economic and political evolution as\\nfollows: If we examine the progress of political\\nand religious freedom, we shall find that it has\\nalways followed the line of the material prosperity\\nof the masses, rising where that rose, falling where\\nit fell, and becoming permanent only where indus-\\ntrial improvement had been general and continuous.\\nEngland was the only country in which the Free", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "158 HERBERT SPENCER\\nTowns were not overpowered by either the Church,\\nthe Monarchy, or the Barons, and consequently it\\nwas the only country in which social and political\\nprogress was not arrested. The Cortes of Spain,\\nthe States- General of France, and the Republics\\nof Italy rose and passed away, scarcely leaving\\ntheir imprint upon the national character, while the\\nEnglish House of Commons has ever stood out as a\\nconspicuous feature of modern civilization.\\nThe remark has already been made that in the\\ncomplex phenomena of social life it frequently hap-\\npens that effects become themselves potent causes.\\nThus political constitutions, which are really the\\neffects of economic causes, by and by become the\\ncauses of increased economic prosperity. How,\\nthen, did legislation influence economic progress\\nIf we study the great legislative reforms of the\\npast from Magna Charta to the Reform Bill, we\\nfind that they may all be summed up in three\\nwords Life, Liberty, and Property. Whether we\\nstudy Magna Charta, the Reformation, Free Trade,\\nPolitical Emancipation, we find throughout them all\\nthe assertion of the right of man to live, to think,\\nto labor, and to retain the products of his labor.\\nLegislative reform has mainly consisted in repealing\\ndespotic measures which, congenial to the military\\nregime, and sometimes beneficent, were fruitful in\\nevil when carried forward to the industrial epoch.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 159\\nOf late years a new theory of political evolution\\nlias become popular a theory which cannot possibly\\nmeet with the endorsement of the Evolution phi-\\nlosophy as here expounded. From the Spencerian\\npoint of view, any theory which advocates increased\\npower of the State, whether in the form of Socialism,\\nCollectivism, or Trade Unionism, stands condemned\\nas a retrograde movement, as an attempt to revive\\nparts of the political and regulative system which\\nbelong to the regime of Militarism. If man has\\nnatural rights, manifestly no power on earth has a\\nright to infringe them, be the motive what it may.\\nUnder a military regime men may have to risk their\\nlives and their property to defend the national\\nexistence, but in a civilization resting upon pacific\\nindustry no body of men can have a mandate to\\ntamper with the rights of their fellows. The funda-\\nmental principle of Liberalism which finds ample\\njustification in the Evolution philosophy is this\\nEvery man is to do that which he wills, provided\\nhe infringes not the equal freedom of any other\\nman. Socialism, Collectivism, and Trade Unionism,\\nin their respective spheres, are attempts to destroy\\nthe initiative and energy of the individual from\\nwhich have sprung the best elements in civilization,\\nand revive the principle of regimentation which\\nbelongs to the military epoch a principle wliich\\nmakes man a slave, an automaton, a machine. In", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "160 HERBERT SPENCER\\ntlie organic world progress is secured by the survival\\nof profitable variations by giving free play to the\\nprinciple of differentiation. Subordinate the man\\nto the State, and at once order is secured at the\\nexpense of progress, and for the healthy evolution\\nof civilization we have a repetition of the old pater-\\nnal communities of Peru, which were so lacking\\nin stamina that they fell before the first blast of\\nmisfortune. It is no coincidence, but a natural\\nsequence, that Socialist ideas at home should lead\\nto revival of Militarism abroad. If it is legitimate\\nto legislate in the interests of the people in domes-\\ntic matters, it becomes equally legitimate to attend\\nto their interests abroad. If Parliament is com-\\npetent to legislate on behalf of labor at home, it\\nis also competent to secure an increase of trade\\nabroad by means of diplomatic scheming involving\\nthe risk of war. The revival of Militarism means the\\nrevival of despotism, the decay of prosperity, the\\ndecay of political and individual liberty, and a\\nlowering of those national ideals which have inspired\\nthe best and truest of Englishmen in their heroic\\nbattle for justice and freedom.\\nThis retrograde movement receives intellectual\\nassistance from a school of political philosophers\\nwho deny that man possesses natural rights. In\\ntheir view rights are creations of the State con-\\nsequently there are no first principles in politics,", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 161\\nonly expediencies. If this theory be correct, Mili-\\ntarism and Socialism cannot be combated on purely\\nintellectual grounds. What has the Evolution\\ntheory to say to this doctrine, which is simply a\\nrevival of the social contract theory of Hobbes,\\nRousseau, and Bentham The idea of a social\\ncontract has its root in the error into which Comte\\nand Mill fell, namely, the belief that progress is\\nthe result of knowledge acquired and deliberately\\norganized. Now nothing but confusion results till\\nthe truth is recognized that man s first steps in\\nprogress are made not by means of his intellect,\\nbut through the spontaneous operations of his in-\\nstincts, desires, and passions. Hobbes had a glimpse\\nof this truth, but he missed its significance by his\\ndefective view of human nature. Man, with Hobbes,\\nis purely a selfish animal, and therefore with him\\nthere was no road out of individual isolation to\\nsocial co-operation except by the way of deliberate\\ncalculation of the benefits to be derived from the\\nsocial state and deliberate submission to a despot.\\nBentham, like Hobbes, had a low view of human\\nnature. The only difference between them was that\\nthe one saw no hope of social organization except\\nthrough a despotic monarchy, whereas the other\\npinned his faith to a utilitarian democracy. The\\nend which Hobbes sought to gain by absolutism,\\nBentham, and for that matter Rousseau, sought to", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "162 HERBERT SPENCER\\ngain by a popularly elected government whose aim\\nwas the greatest happiness of the greatest number.\\nFor the rights of man, which had fallen into dis-\\ncredit by the excesses of the French Revolution, Ben-\\ntham substituted the happiness of man.\\nHad Bentham and his followers stopped to analyze\\ntheir political creed rigorously, they would have dis-\\ncovered that it is impossible to divorce the idea of\\nhappiness from that of rights. What is meant by\\nthe popular saying that self-preservation is the first\\nlaw of nature What is the meaning of the phrase,\\nstruggle for existence The meaning plainly is that\\nman, like the animal, asserts the right to live, the\\nright, that is, to exercise his powers and faculties.\\nWhen this right is admitted, happiness follows as\\na natural consequence. Surrounded on all hands by\\nenemies and obstacles, primitive man finds existence\\nso precarious that, urged on not by deliberate reason-\\ning but by the instinct of self-preservation, he joins\\nhimself to his fellows. He does not look to govern-\\nment to procure happiness he expects government\\nto safeguard his freedom and security, which are the\\nconditions of happiness. Primitive man loses his\\nfreedom in ways already indicated. Governments,\\ntribal and other, rob him of his freedom, and then\\nbegins the contest between the individual and the\\nState. If it is the function of governments to legis-\\nlate for the greatest happiness of the greatest number.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION pF SOCIETY 163\\nsuch a social state is quite compatible with the un-\\nhappiness of the minority, and thus under Bentham\\nas under Hobbes the individual has no claims against\\nthe State, which fulfils its duty when the happiness\\nof the majority is secured. On the other hand, if\\nthe function of the State is to safeguard the rights\\nof man the right to live, to think, and to labor\\nthen the requisite conditions are secured for the in-\\ndividual to realize his own happiness. By making\\nhappiness the direct aim of legislation you deprive\\na minority of their happiness by making liberty the\\ndirect aim, you produce happiness as a natural con-\\nsequence, or at least you make the happiness of the\\nindividual the direct result of his own conduct. If\\nhe chooses to abuse his right to liberty, he cannot\\nblame the State for his unhappiness, whereas under\\nthe Benthamite constitution the happiness of the\\nminority is necessarily interfered with to increase\\nthe happiness of the majority. Or as it might be\\nput otherwise, happiness in man is the natural con-\\nsequence of the development of his instincts, de-\\nsires, and faculties. This development cannot take\\nplace unless under favorable conditions in other\\nwords, where liberty to develop is secure. Thus the\\nconclusion is reached that so far from society being\\ndependent upon government for its existence, gov-\\nernment is simply an effort to procure the necessary\\nconditions for the proper development of society.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "164 HERBERT SPENCER\\nSociety exists before government. Governments do\\nnot exist for the purpose of laying down the prin-\\nciples of social co-operation. Social co-operation\\ngrows out of the desire of men for one another s\\nsociety for purposes of mutual help. The true func-\\ntion of government is to see that the individual in\\nthe assertion of his liberty does not encroach upon\\nthe liberty of his fellow. Nowhere has the distinc-\\ntion between society and government been more\\nclearly stated than in the writings of Paine, the\\nauthor of The Rights of Man A great part of that\\norder which reigns among mankind is not the effect\\nof government. It had its origin in the principles\\nof society and the nature and constitution of man.\\nThe mutual dependence and reciprocal interest which\\nman has in man and all the parts of a civilized com-\\nmunity upon each other create the great chain of\\nconnection which holds it together. The more per-\\nfect civilization is, the less occasion has it for\\ngovernment, because the more does it regulate its\\nown affairs and govern itself. Government is\\nnothing more than a national association acting upon\\nthe principles of society a definition very differ-\\nent from the one given by those who deny the rights\\nof man, namely, that society is the creation of gov-\\nernment and needs to be regulated by paternal\\nmethods.\\nIn their practical results these opposing theories", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 165\\nmay be studied in the Old and New Liberalism.\\nAbout the time of the French Revolution, Liberalism\\nunderwent an important change a change which\\nBurke was the first to detect. Rousseau shifted the\\nfoundation of Liberalism from natural rights to\\npolitical rights. According to the French thinker,\\nthe fundamental right of man was not the right to\\nliberty, but to an equal share in the government of\\nthe country. The people in the exercise of their\\npolitical rights being in the majority were sovereign\\nwhat, and only what, they legislatively declared to\\nbe rights were treated as rights. The hitherto\\naccepted natural rights (liberty and property) could\\nbe annihilated by the fiat of the all-powerful majority.\\nIt is this French theory of political thought which\\nhas passed into British politics under the name of\\nthe New Liberalism. According to the Old Liber-\\nalism, every man has a right to his own property;\\naccording to the New Liberalism the majority have\\na right to encroach upon other people s property in\\norder, as Mr. Chamberlain s Radical programme\\nputs it, to increase the comforts and multiply the\\nluxuries of the masses. The Old Liberals would\\nhave spurned such an interpretation of their creed.\\nIn their view, justice and liberty had nothing to do\\nwith majorities and minorities. They fought against\\nslavery, not because it was supported by a powerful\\nminority, but because slavery was a violation of the", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "166 HERBERT SPENCER\\nfundamental right of man to personal liberty. The\\nOld Liberals fought for toleration, not on the major-\\nity principle, but on the principle that no power on\\nearth had a right to interfere with liberty of con-\\nscience. The Old Liberals advocated an extended\\nfranchise, not in order to shift absolute power from\\nthe classes to the masses, but in order to give every\\ncitizen the power to protect his interests. In other\\nwords, with the Old Liberals an extended franchise\\nwas meant to be a safeguard, not an engine of\\noppression. The Old Liberals strove to secure for\\nevery man equality of opportunity; the New Liberals\\nare striving to procure equality of conditions. They\\ntell Lazarus, who has been sitting at the rich man s\\ngate, to take his place boldly at the rich man s table.\\nIn Australia the New Liberalism has borne its logical\\nfruit. Some years ago, at a meeting in Sydney of\\nthe unemployed, one speaker demanded that the\\nGovernment should give as a right, not as a favor,\\nsix shillings a day and guarantee work for twelve\\nmonths. He further advised the unemployed not to\\nsubmit to insults to their independence! On the\\nprinciples of the New Liberalism there is nothing\\nto prevent the unemployed, if they are in the\\nmajority legislatively, dividing the wealth of the\\ncountry among the masses. The passion for equality\\nwhen divorced from the passion for justice becomes a\\npotent instrument of national demoralization. On", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 167\\none occasion, when Turgot was asked to confer a\\nbenefit on the poor at the cost of the rich, he replied\\nWe are sure to go wrong the moment we forget\\nthat justice alone can keep the balance true among\\nall rights and interests. France forgot that, and\\nwent terribly wrong. The Liberal party of the\\npresent day is in danger of making the same fatal\\nmistake.\\nTo Mr. Spencer belongs the credit of bridging the\\ngulf between the two views. Agreeing with Hobbes\\nand Bentham that government is a necessity, he\\ndiffers with them as to the origin of that necessity.\\nWhere Hobbes, Bentham, and Rousseau make hap-\\npiness the motive of legislation, Spencer makes it\\nthe result. According to Spencer the legislation\\nhas to do, not with happiness, but with justice. By\\ntracing the social instincts of man to their biological\\nand psychological roots, Spencer shows that the\\nmotive power of all progress, organic and super-\\norganic, in animal and man, is the desire for freedom\\nto develop. Grant this, and the first and indis-\\npensable condition of happiness is secured. The\\npractical bearing of these two views of society is far-\\nreaching. If the function of government is directly\\nto produce social happiness, there is no escape from\\npaternal legislation, which in practice leads to the\\nrule of a despotic majority. If on the other hand\\nthe function of the government is to maintain the", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "168 HERBERT SPENCER\\nliberty of the individual, so far as he does not en-\\ncroach upon the like liberty of his fellows, then not\\nonly is despotism impossible, but the way is open\\nfor the development of all kinds of energies and\\ntalents in short, for the growth of those individual\\nvariations which in the social as in the natural world\\nare the real elements of all enduring progress. The\\ntwo factors, order and progress, which previous\\nthinkers were unable to reconcile, are in the Spen-\\ncerian theory brought into a union at once philo-\\nsophically satisfying and politically fruitful.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER X\\nTHE ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY\\nTwo things filled the soul of Kant with awe the\\nstarry heavens above and the moral laws within.\\nWhat more natural than that the reflective as well\\nas the unreflective portion of mankind should attrib-\\nute these marvellously mysterious phenomena to the\\ndirect creative act of the Deity? How plausible\\nseemed the primitive theory that God created the\\nheavens and the earth by His Almighty fiat, by the\\nword of His power. For ages the human mind in\\ndealing with the starry heavens clung to the concep-\\ntion of creation. Similarly with the moral sense.\\nMan, it was believed, was created with a keen sense\\nof right and wrong, with a faculty called Conscience,\\nwhich was described as God s viceregent in the soul.\\nHow was this conception harmonized with the ad-\\nmitted tendency of man to do wrong? Either Con-\\nscience spoke with an uncertain voice, or some great\\nanarchic revolution had taken place in the soul of\\nman whereby God s viceregent was deposed, or Con-\\nscience itself was the product of circumstances, man\\n169", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "170 HERBERT SPENCER\\nbeing really at the mercy of his passions, like a\\nrudderless ship in a stormy sea. The theory of the\\nfall of man held sway in one shape or another for\\nages. Man, it was believed, was created as perfect\\nas the starry heavens, but by virtue of free will, man\\nhad the power of thwarting the design of the Creator;\\nby one act of disobedience man entered upon a career\\nof racial rebellion. Man, it was said, knew the right\\nbut preferred the wrong. Conscience reigned but\\ndid not govern. With the decsij of theological con-\\nceptions, the theory of a separate faculty called Con-\\nscience, whose function it was to preside over the\\nethical side of human nature, fell into discredit.\\nGreat efforts were made to preserve in metaphysical\\nform the essential idea of the theologic conception.\\nThinkers who had departed widely from the old\\nsupernaturalism still endeavored to keep alive the\\nidea that man was born with an intuitive sense of\\nright and wrong. Discarding the theological foun-\\ndation, they made strenuous efforts to make Con-\\nscience a fundamental attribute of human nature.\\nAdherents of the intuitive theory of morals were\\nfaced with one supreme difficulty that of account-\\ning for the diverse and contradictory views of\\nmorality existing in different ages of the world and\\namong different races of man. On the theological\\ntheory these diversities and contradictions were\\nplausibly explained by the fall of man. Discarding", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 171\\nthe supernatural view of man, the intuitive thinkers\\nwere incapable of bringing these views into harmony\\nwith history and experience.\\nHow was the difficulty to be met If Conscience\\nis not a supernatural germ implanted in man by\\nGod, and if the facts of life are incompatible with\\nthe intuitive theory of an innate sense of right and\\nwrong, where is the solution of the problem to be\\nfound? Another set of thinkers professed to have\\ndiscovered the key to the problem. They declared\\nthat Conscience is not primary but derivative. In\\ntheir view man s desire for happiness is primary,\\nConscience being compounded of several elements,\\nnotably the element of coercion which follows from\\nthe conflict between contending passions in the\\nindividual and contending individuals in society.\\nThe efforts of the Utilitarians, from Bentham to\\nJ. S. Mill, were devoted to the attempt to show\\nhow the belief in Conscience, the sense of right\\nand wrong, may be traced to individual experiences\\nof happiness and unhappiness. The Utilitarian\\nschool failed in the sphere of ethics, as it failed,\\nas was shown, in the sphere of economic history,\\nby giving undue prominence to conscious reflection\\nas an element in primitive progress. Primitive\\nmen did not seek to acquire wealth from con-\\nscious motives, nor did they, as Locke believed,\\ndraw up a social compact from a deep sense of the", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "172 HERBEET SPENCER\\nbenefits of social co-operation. No more did primi-\\ntive men make utility the avowed and consciously\\npursued means of securing the greatest amount of\\nhappiness. Primitive man was not, as the Utili-\\ntarians assumed, a reasoning and calculating animal.\\nThe Evolution theory in the realm of ethics success-\\nfully attacked the problem which the Utilitarians\\nfound insoluble. So long as morality as a science\\nwas viewed from the standpoint of empiric Indi-\\nvidualism, Utilitarianism as advocated by Mill had\\ngreat difficulty in repelling critical attacks. Spencer\\ncame to the rescue by substituting the racial for the\\nindividual standpoint. As he puts it in his letter\\nto Mill Just in the same way that I believe the\\nintuition of space possessed by any living individual,\\nto have arisen from organized and consolidated experi-\\nences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed\\nto them their slowly developed nervous organizations\\njust as I believe this intuition, requiring only to\\nbe made definite and complete by personal experi-\\nences, has practically become a form of thought,\\napparently quite independent of experiences so do I\\nbelieve that the experiences of utility organized and\\nconsolidated through all past generations of the\\nhuman race, have been producing corresponding ner-\\nvous modifications, which, by continued transmission\\nand accumulation, have become in us certain facul-\\nties of moral intuition certain emotions to right", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 173\\nand wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis\\nin the individual experiences of utility. In his\\nhighly original work, The Origin and Crrowth of the\\nMoral Instinct^ Mr. Alexander Sutherland goes to\\nthe root of the failure of Benthamite Utilitarianism,\\nwhen he says To the individual in actual life, the\\ntest as to the rightness of an action is never sup-\\nplied by a consideration of its usefulness to the race.\\nThe true test he finds within himself in his instinct\\nof sympathy. The philosopher is justified in prov-\\ning that these sympathies have grown up and\\nexist within us in order to minister to the use and\\npreservation of the species, and it thus happens that\\nwhile morality is founded on sympathy, sympathy\\nis founded on utility. It would be doing a gross\\ninjustice to men such as Bentham, Austin, and Mill,\\nto imagine that they were not themselves clear-\\nsighted enough fully to perceive this chain of causa-\\ntion. But they lost their hold of a general assent\\nby suffering the middle link to drop out of view\\nand the public, which acts rightly, not by reason of\\nany abstract notion of utility, but by the inward im-\\npulse of sympathy and duty, has always resented\\nwhat seemed to be the application of a cold and\\npragmatical principle to a warm and beautiful senti-\\nment. Discarding alike the theological theory of\\nman as supernaturally created and endowed with\\nConscience, and the Utilitarian theory of man as", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "174 HERBERT SPENCER\\nguided by reason and consciously testing right and\\nwrong by experiences of utility, the evolutionist\\nbases his ethical philosophy on the view of man in\\nhis primitive stage as not much removed from the\\nanimal, and under the control of desires, passions,\\nand instincts. In his view the ethical evolution of\\nman is co-related with the economic, political, and in-\\ntellectual evolution of society. Ethical codes are not\\nsupernaturally imposed upon mankind, nor are they\\nintellectually elaborated from experiences of utility\\nthey are evolved in the course of man s struggle\\nfor existence, and are determined by that struggle\\nin its threefold aspects the struggle for self -main-\\ntenance, family-maintenance, and race-maintenance.\\nIn dealing with economic evolution, the question\\nwas as to the material result increase and distri-\\nbution of wealth. In dealing with political evolution\\nthe question was as to the conditions that of liberty\\nor despotism under which the economic forces\\nwork. In dealing with ethical evolution we are\\nconcerned with the effect of the economic and politi-\\ncal evolution on the feelings and sentiments of man,\\nand the reaction of those feelings and sentiments\\nupon society. In this connection it is necessary to\\nrecall the words used in a previous chapter in treat-\\ning of the root-passions of society Whether the\\nhabits of an animal shall be solitary or gregarious\\ndepends upon the relation between the two most", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 175\\ngeneral functions self -maintenance and race-main-\\ntenance. Those animals which can adequately pro-\\nvide for their own wants lead solitary lives whereas\\nthose which cannot supply their individual wants\\nlive and act in concert. Now of all animals man is\\nleast fitted to lead a solitary life some kind of\\nco-operation with his fellows is an indispensable\\nnecessity. Here then, is the germ of sociality.\\nTo this must be now added the remark that in\\nsociality we have the germ of morality. The two\\nthings are distinct though closely related. Sociality\\nmay exist without morality, as among the lower\\nanimals, but morality cannot exist without sociality.\\nFor a true understanding of ethical evolution it is\\nessential to trace the gradual and subtle manner in\\nwhich sociality shades into morality. In order that\\nwe may be able to trace the various stages, it is\\nnecessary to have a clear idea of the end which\\nNature has in view in social evolution. Unless we\\nunderstand the aim of Nature, no intelligent under-\\nstanding is possible of the process. The aim of\\nNature is to favor the existence of those individuals,\\nfamilies, and organized societies who are most suc-\\ncessful in maintaining themselves in presence of\\nnumerous competitors. We call conduct ethical in\\nthe highest sense which consciously furthers the\\nefficiency of the individual, the species, and the social\\nstate. In no existing society has this ideal been", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "176 HERBERT SPENCER\\nrealized, but we must keep this ideal in view if we\\nwish to trace the various stages in the ethical process.\\nManifestly such a process would be impossible, were\\nit not for the element of sociality. Those very\\npassions which stamp man as a selfish animal contain\\nthe germ of sympathy which in higher civilizations\\nblossoms into altruism and all the virtues and graces\\nwhich adorn humanity. Adam Smith was right in\\nmaking sympathy the basis of morals, but in the\\nabsence of knowledge it was impossible for him to\\nanalyze sympathy, which is a complex quality, into\\nits simpler social elements. How does sympathy\\nevolve from the rude selfish passions of primitive\\nman Sympathy develops out of sociality, to which\\nprimitive man is driven like the animal by his pas-\\nsions and necessities. Primitive man is not a con-\\nscious co-worker with Nature he is carried on by\\nforces over which he has no control, the tendency\\nof which he cannot detect, and the aim of which he\\ncannot understand. The rate at which sympathy\\ndevelops is the measure of ethical evolution. Sym-\\npathy is the root of all the virtues.\\nOn the ethical side, the struggle which is every-\\nwhere found in Nature resolves itself into a struggle\\nbetween the selfish and sympathetic sides of human\\nnature. Other things being equal, Nature favors\\nthe sympathetic man at the expense of the un-\\nsympathetic; the family and tribe bound together", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 177\\nby sympathy are more than a match for families\\nand tribes which are torn by internal dissensions,\\nand in which individual selfishness reigns supreme.\\nSo important are the sympathetic instincts that we\\ncan detect in the animal world the beginning of\\nthe great ethical evolution which in mankind has\\nreached such an advanced stage. In the earlier\\nstages of animal life, Nature secures the perpetua-\\ntion of species by means of an extraordinary indi-\\nvidual fertility. Among fishes the average mother\\ndeposits more than 600,000 spawn, out of which\\nperhaps one or two remain to maintain the existence\\nof the species. Nature scatters the germs of life with\\nprodigious prodigality, so as to make sure that in\\nthe midst of the prodigious destruction a few of the\\ngerms will be saved. Under such conditions, where\\nthere is no parental care, sociality is impossible.\\nThis stage, which may be called that of competitive\\nfertility, gives place to another stage, that where\\nsuccess in the struggle for existence is determined\\nby higher nerve organization, and increased brain\\npower and intelligence. Mr. John Fiske has demon-\\nstrated conclusively that one result of increase in\\nnerve and brain organization is prolongation of\\ninfancy. Thus we find in the more highly organized\\nanimals a close connection between parent and\\nyoung. The period of helplessness draws forth the\\nemotional power of the parents, and among the", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "178 HERBERT SPENCER\\nhigher class of animals we detect features of conduct\\nquite human, as when the mother monkey rushes\\nwith her young to a hiding-place and then turns\\nand faces death with a sense of satisfaction. Through\\nthe animal world the strength of the sympathetic in-\\nstincts are in direct relation to the period of infancy,\\nwhich again is determined by the slowness with\\nwhich the complex nervous system and brain evolve.\\nWhen we come to primitive man the process be-\\ncomes distinctly traceable. To make this plain, it\\nis necessary to bear in mind the description in a\\nprevious chapter of primitive man from the purely\\neconomic side. Primitive man was a creature of\\nappetites and instincts, controlled by rigorous neces-\\nsities. Marriage was unknown; the social bond\\nweak and uncertain life resolved itself into a bitter\\nstruggle for existence among discordant units.\\nHowever crude and unsatisfactory the affection be-\\ntween mother and child in primitive times, it must\\nhave been kept alive and increased during the period\\nof infancy. The family is the ethical unit as it is\\nthe economic and political unit. In treating of bio-\\nlogical evolution, it was seen that environment is\\nthe controlling cause. Unless an animal can adapt\\nitself to its environment, unless its structure and\\nfunctions are in harmony with its surrounding, it\\nmust perish. It is the same with emotions and\\nsentiments. Called forth by the environment, they", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 179\\nare determined in their nature and force by the\\nenvironment. Now, what is the environment which\\nconfronts the family as the ethical unit? The en-\\nvironment is no other than other families whose\\nattitude is that of chronic hostility. Inside the\\nfamily circle certain narrow, rude, but powerful sen-\\ntiments hold sway such as paternal and fraternal\\nsympathy, courage, self-sacrifice, and the martial\\nvirtues generally. But there comes a time when,\\nfor purposes of protection, families join to families,\\nand the clan is formed. This extension of the\\nenvironment leads to extension of the sympathies,\\nwhich, no longer confined to the family circle, em-\\nbrace all who are associated together in defence of the\\nclan. With the extension of sympathy inside the\\nclan area, there still exists a feeling of hostility to\\nall outside. The feeling of clannishness is greatly\\ndeepened by religion, by bringing into operation the\\nsanction of departed chiefs, and by the commands\\nissued by living chiefs, whose governments become\\nincreasingly despotic with the increase of hostile\\nrelations with tribal enemies. Along with the mili-\\ntary regime there evolves an appropriate ethical code.\\nThe finer and tenderer virtues can have no place in\\na state of society in which war is the dominating\\nform of activity, where industry is left to slaves,\\nand where cannibalism and infanticide are recog-\\nnized features of the national life. In the military", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "180 HERBERT SPENCER\\nregime the sympathetic qualities of human nature,\\nfostered by family life and man s need for social\\nco-operation, are arrested, and the few virtues which\\nwar calls into exercise are of a hard, imperious, and\\nloveless type. How potent war is in arresting ethical\\nevolution is shown by the fact that in all the ancient\\ncivilizations, from the barbaric empires of the East\\nto the comparative civilizations of Greece and Rome,\\nno room was found for the specifically Christian vir-\\ntues of gentleness, charity, mercy, benevolence, and\\nforgiveness. Morality is not the root but the fruit\\nof civilization, and hence in a national life based\\non antagonism to other national lives, those pecul-\\niarly civilized virtues which we identify with love\\nof humanity as such, could not possibly blossom.\\nIn Greece and Rome, in the minds of a few phi-\\nlosophers, there dawned the idea of an environment\\nbeyond the confines of the tribe, the nation, and the\\nempire. Thanks to the world-wide conquests of\\nRome, the idea of a humanity beyond racial boun-\\ndaries began to dawn upon the mind of philosophers,\\nbut at best the feeling was more sentimental than\\nreal. Socrates spoke of himself as a citizen of the\\nworld, and Roman Jurists were familiar with the\\nidea of a humanity resting, not upon blood relation-\\nships and national privileges, but on natural rights.\\nThe Founder of Christianity gave this idea vivid\\nand practical form when He boldly declared for the", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 181\\nbrotherhood of man on the basis of one Father in\\nHeaven. Evolutionists have not done justice to the\\ngreat impetus given to the evolutionary process by\\nthe Founder of Christianity. Enamoured of massive\\ngeneralizations, students of evolution have sometimes\\nunder-estimated the immense power in history of\\ngreat personalities, who, by unlocking new forces\\nin human nature, have frequently done more than\\ngeneral causes to modify the course of civilization.\\nUnhappily personal influences tend to be transient,\\nand thus it has happened that the pacific creed of\\nthe Founder of Christianity gradually was pressed\\ninto the service of war, and ended, in the Middle\\nAges, in narrowing the idea of human brotherhood\\ntill it became synonymous with a theological concep-\\ntion narrower even than the tribal conception with\\nits dogma of destruction to all outside the pale.\\nChristianity on the ethical side failed because the\\nideas of its Founder were in advance of the time.\\nThe Sermon on the Mount came into conflict with\\nthe ethical ideas of the military regime, which lasted\\ntill the economic revolution produced by the doctrine\\nof Free Trade. In fact, the military regime is not\\nyet extinct, as may be seen by the revival of Protec-\\ntion theories in our day, logically accompanied by\\nthe increase of armaments as a condition of increased\\ntrade and commerce.\\nStill the economic doctrine of Adam Smith is", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "182 HERBERT SPENCER\\ndestined to have incalculable influence upon ethical\\nevolution. The relation of the doctrine of Free\\nTrade to ethics is thus stated in my book on Adam\\nSmith: At the first blush it would seem as if,\\nfrom the Darwinian point of view, Nature was given\\nover to universal warfare. In In Memoriam Tenny-\\nson has given fit poetic expression to the sombre,\\nnot to say gloomy, thoughts which force themselves\\nupon the cultured observer of Nature. Now it is\\nusually forgotten that in order to emphasize the\\nrationality of his view of the origin of the marvellous\\nvariety and complexity of species, it was necessary\\nfor Darwin to call special attention to the struggle\\nfor existence and its prime cause, namely, the ten-\\ndency of population to outrun the means of sub-\\nsistence. There are two other tendencies, however,\\nwhich, as not bearing on his particular problem,\\nDarwin did not specify, but which must be taken\\ninto account in any philosophical survey of History,\\nnamely, the tendency of man, in order to relieve the\\nintensity of the struggle for existence, to unite with\\nhis fellows, and the tendency of man towards in-\\ncreasing intelligence by which he can increase the\\nproductive power of nature, thereby checking the\\nfierce struggle which in the animal world goes on\\nbetween population and subsistence. See how these\\ntwo tendencies give to human evolution the quality\\nof hopefulness. The fierce struggle for existence,", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 183\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0vvhich among animals leads to warfare, among men\\nhas the same result in the earlier days of primitive\\nlife. But by virtue of his dawning intelligence and\\nthe germs of co-operation developed in family life,\\nmen discover the advantages of union. Whereas\\nanimals fight one another for food which is more or\\nless scarce, men by co-operative methods begin to\\ngrow food, thereby increasing the productive power\\nof nature. In order to facilitate the process comes\\ndivision of labor, which leads to barter and thus,\\ninstead of a fierce struggle for existence between\\nisolated individuals, we have the beginning of a\\nnew method, that of co-operative assistance in the\\nstruggle for existence, and for result great increase\\nin the total means of subsistence, and great increase\\nin the individual share. The individual who co-\\noperates with his fellows may not get all he would\\nlike, but he gets infinitely more than if he had earned\\nhis livelihood in solitary fashion.\\nTroublous times lie before us ere modern states-\\nmen incorporate into their foreign policy the great\\ntruth which Adam Smith taught, namely, that all\\nhuman interests are harmonious. Mankind does not\\nseem yet advanced enough ethically to make the\\npassage from nationalism to internationalism in\\npacific fashion. On the path of civilization there\\nare great stages tribal, national, and international.\\nThe state of hostility, as we have seen, is the normal", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "184 HERBERT SPENCER\\nstate of the race in early times. Outside of the tribe\\nall is hatred, revenge, and bloodshed. The neces-\\nsities of life compel kindred tribes to amalgamate.\\nTowards those tribes which remain outside the union\\na policy of hostility is still pursued. Another step\\nis taken when the tribes amalgamate over a still\\nlarger area, and the nation evolves. Within the\\nnational area, we find reciprocity of interests taking\\nthe place of the old idea of antagonism of interests\\nthe descendants of the old Highland clans live and\\nwork peacefully with one another, whereas their\\nancestors lived in a state of feud. What brought\\nabout this change? The necessities of life have\\ntaught the descendants of the old fighting clansmen\\nthe truth that peaceful co-operation is more profit-\\nable and pleasurable than the old regime of hostility.\\nIf the student desires to see how the tribal stage\\nmerges into the national, through the gradual substi-\\ntution of co-operation for hostility, he has only to\\nperuse Guizot s book on civilization, where the pro-\\ncess is traced in impressive panoramic fashion. The\\nnineteenth century has borne the greatest share in\\nthe work of nation-creation. Out of the chaos of\\nconflicting interests have been evolved the various\\nharmonies which give to the respective nationalities\\na common unity. The course of national evolution\\nhas reached its natural end, and the energies of the\\nvarious peoples are seeking international outlets.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 185\\nThe scramble in China, the race for territory in South\\nAfrica, the expansion of Britain in Egypt, what are\\nall these but evidence of the fact that civilization\\nis beginning to overflow its old boundaries, and is\\nbecoming world-wide in its aspirations? It is a\\nsuggestive fact that humanity has always been under\\nthe delusion that war is a necessary factor at each\\nevolutionary stage. We have had tribal wars and\\nnational wars, and now we have a widespread belief\\nthat international interests are so antagonistic that\\nwar is unavoidable. Thus we find influential public\\nmen so saturated with the idea of the necessity of\\nwar that the national resources are spent enthusias-\\ntically in increasing warlike armaments, and speeches\\nare made by prominent leaders with the object of\\nstirring up the war spirit of the nation. One day\\nwe are on the eve of war with Russia in China,\\nanother day we are all but in the death-grips with\\nFrance in the Soudan, and at some future day we\\nmay find ourselves in conflict with America over\\nthe Open Door. The doctrine of Adam Smith and\\nRichard Cobden is treated as an exploded supersti-\\ntion. But the time is coming when its principles\\nwill be found to have deep international significance.\\nWhat Cobden saw with clear and unerring vision\\nwas that Free Trade, which, as was seen in the abo-\\nlition of the Corn Laws, broke down the monopoly\\nof landowners to the advantage of the consumer,", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "186 HERBERT SPENCER\\nwould, when logically developed, break down national\\nmonopolies in the interest of humanity as such, apart\\nfrom purely national distinctions. And thus, by\\nsubstituting reciprocity of interests for antagonism\\nof interests. Free Trade would render huge arma-\\nments as needless between nations as hostile tariffs.\\nFree Trade, according to Cobden, was something\\nmore than a bringer of cheap food to the people it\\nwas the application of the moral law to international\\naffairs by the simple process of making the interest\\nof consumers all over the world to consist in peace-\\nful industry and the free spontaneous exchange of\\nthe products of their labor for the common good.\\nNot only is Cobdenism the practical application to\\nindustry of the ethics of Christianity from the side\\nof economics, but it is also a potent factor in the\\ndevelopment of humanity on historic lines as inter-\\npreted by the Evolution philosophy. The future of\\ncivilization depends upon the success with which\\nstatesmen grasp the fact that humanity is drawing\\na stage nearer the realization of the ideal of poets\\nand prophets, the ideal of universal felicity through\\ncomradeship resting on the basis of reciprocity of\\ninterests.\\nHuman history, beginning with a sordid struggle\\nfor existence and an ethical code steeped in blood,\\nends with a harmonious civilization resting upon\\nthe all-embracing conception of human brotherhood.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 187\\nMan and society, no longer at war, are destined to\\nform one harmonious whole on the basis of reciprocity\\nof service. With the magic wands of Reason, Sci-\\nence, and Industry, man on the basis of an egoism\\nwhich is gradually being transfigured by sympathy,\\nwill yet lay the foundation of a new social order, in\\nwhich peace, not strife, shall reign. Above the din\\nof conflicting interests and warring passions may be\\nheard, by those who listen in the spirit of evolution-\\nary science, the inspiring tones of the humanitarian\\nevangel Peace on earth, and good will among men.\\nTo those who have been accustomed to look at\\nman and society from the old point of view, this\\ntheory of ethical development will be sufficiently\\nstartling. But if the Spencerian theory is true,\\nthere is no escape from the conclusion that morality\\nis a natural product of social evolution. It is the\\nconsequence rather than the cause of progress. No\\ndoubt as society advances the effect in turn becomes\\na cause. In a higher state of civilization morality\\nis pursued as its own end. Like art and knowledge,\\nmorality becomes detached from utility, and is pur-\\nsued for its own sake. From the realities of life\\nideals emerge. The artistic genius, enamoured of\\nhis ideals, pursues them without regard to immediate\\nutility. The philosopher, consumed with a passion\\nfor knowledge, sets at naught the attractions of the\\nmarket-place he follows Truth though the heavens", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "188 HERBERT SPENCER\\nfall. So, too, with the devotee of goodness. His\\nmind responds intuitively to high and noble deeds,\\nand his soul quivers with a subdued delight at the\\nthought of virtue. In him the experiences of the\\nrace have become organic instincts he thinks not of\\nhappiness he soars into the ampler air of virtue.\\nThe good man is not good because of the connection\\nbetween happiness and goodness he is good because,\\nthanks to the triumph of morality in the long ances-\\ntral past, his whole being is responsive to disinter-\\nested motives, and thrills with altruistic fervor.\\nSuch men increase the social fund of morality, and\\nbecome in their turn potent causes in social develop-\\nment. In our devotion to general causes, let us not\\nforget the part played in evolution by those rare\\nsouls who, by the purity of their lives and the\\nmagnetism of their natures, tune the souls of their\\nfellows to noble issues. As I have expressed it\\nelsewhere, many pleasures and pains are the funda-\\nmental elements of life, but they are no more to be\\nidentified with the ethical fruits of civilization than\\nis the rose-bush and its fragrance with the soil at\\nits roots. By means of the subtle chemistry of\\nSympathy man purifies the passions of human nature,\\nand by pressing them into the service of the ideal\\ninvests them with an ethical purpose which, when\\nincarnated in the moral pioneers of the race, becomes\\nfragrant of the divine.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XI\\nTHE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION\\nWhat of religion Is it also a natural product of\\nthe great evolutionary process Here we enter upon\\na thorny path. The evolutionist who seeks to give\\na natural account of religion has to reckon at the\\noutset with the two antagonists with whom he was\\nconfronted in the ethical arena the Supernaturalist\\nand the Intuitionalist. The Supernaturalist s con-\\nception of religion follows naturally from his con-\\nception of man and his origin. Grant the truth\\nof the biblical account of man s creation, probation,\\nand fall, and a highly plausible theory is provided of\\nman s religious history. In man s original relation\\nto the Creator we have an explanation of the reli-\\ngious sentiment and the fall of man abundantly\\naccounts for the existence of evil which, like a\\nmalevolent being, has ever dogged the footsteps of\\nhumanity.\\nSo true does this theory seem to be to human\\nexperience, that for centuries it did not occur to\\nthinkers to doubt the authenticity of the biblical\\n189", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "190 HERBERT SPENCER\\nrecord. Belief in the record was strengthened\\nwhen the Old Testament was bound up with the\\nhistory and fortunes of the Jews. Spinoza, in this\\nas in much else centuries ahead of his time, threw\\ndoubt upon the biblical record and since his day,\\nespecially within the last fifty years, the attitude\\nof thinkers, even within the Church, has undergone\\nan entire change. By admitting the presence in\\nthe Bible of large slices of legendary matter, the\\nHigher Critics have knocked away the foundation\\nof the orthodox theory of religion. Relegate to the\\nregion of myth the supernatural creation of man and\\nhis disobedience, and at once the mind is prepared\\nfor the reception of the evolution theory of the rise\\nof man. Human misery and wretchedness, no longer\\nthe result of Divine displeasure, become the natural\\nconsequences of man s unequal contest with his\\nenvironment. Religion, like ethics, is seen to be\\ndetermined by the struggle for existence is, in\\nshort, the intellectual and emotional reflection of\\nthat struggle.\\nThe Intuitionalists, while admitting the breakdown\\nof the supernatural theory, refuse to subscribe to the\\nview that the religious sentiment has no immovable\\nsubjective roots. Many Intuitionalists opposed super-\\nnaturalism on the ground that it failed to place reli-\\ngion on a rational basis. Rejecting the dogmas of\\nthe fall and original sin, the Intuitionalists of the", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 191\\neighteenth and nineteenth centuries fell back upon\\na supposed natural religion. Great as are the differ-\\nences between the Deists of the last century and the\\nTheists of to-day as represented by the late Dr. Mar-\\ntineau, they agree in holding that man is endowed\\nwith the capacity of forming enlightened views of\\nDeity, and of rising by a process of intuition into a\\nknowledge of, and communion with. Deity. In their\\nview, supernaturalism as held in the Established\\nChurches is a deformation of natural religion. In\\norder to free religion from its supernatural corrup-\\ntions, Lord Herbert published his famous treatise, in\\nwhich he labored to show that Reason when interro-\\ngated on rational principles testified to the univer-\\nsality of belief in God, moral worship, and a future\\nrecompense. These truths, according to Lord Her-\\nbert, shone full upon primitive man till obscured by\\nthe fraud and deception of priests. The same idea\\nprompted Locke in his work on The Reasonableness\\nof Christianity. Christianity, in so far as it was a\\nsupernatural system, was simply the republication\\nof Natural Religion. Christianity in this view has\\nintroduced nothing new it only brought the original\\ntrue religion of reason again to light, by removing\\nthe false additions to it but it soon again fell under\\nthe same fate of superstitious distortion by mysteri-\\nous dogmas. As regards their fundamental posi-\\ntions, John Locke and James Martineau were at one.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "192 HERBERT SPENCER\\nIn the sphere of religion as in philosophy, David\\nHume proved a destructive force. He combated\\nthe idea of intuitive religious ideas, just as he com-\\nbated the belief in intuitive intellectual concep-\\ntions. In regard to religion, Hume went beyond\\nmere theorizing; he justified his attack upon reli-\\ngious Intuitionalism by his work The Natural History\\nof Religion. In that work we have a precursor of\\nthe evolutionary theory as applied to religion.\\nAccording to Hume, religion has its roots not in\\nthe reason but in the passions. Primitive man was\\nnot prompted to worship, as the Deists held, by feel-\\nings of gratitude, wonder, awe, aroused by calm con-\\ntemplation of the works of Nature. Hume clearly\\nsaw that the faculty of contemplation, and the feel-\\nings of gratitude, wonder, and awe, were products\\nof a high state of civilization, and could not exist\\nin primitive man, who was really at the mercy of\\nhis passions and his imagination. In that case.\\nMonotheism was not the oldest form of religion.\\nThe monotheistic conception demanded a higher\\ntype of intellect than early man possessed. Man s\\nearly religion, according to Hume, was not monothe-\\nistic but fetichistic. Ignorance of the forces of\\nNature drove primitive man to personify them, to\\nclothe them with his own qualities greatly enlarged.\\nIn a word, maii_created Godin his own image\\nIn the absence of definite knowledge of primitive", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 193\\nman, Hume s sketch of the origin and development\\nof religion is largely speculative but his main posi-\\ntion, that religion takes its rise in the passions rather\\nthan the reason, is amply justified by the Evolution\\nphilosophy. Primitive man vras not religious be-\\ncause he was a reasoning contemplative being he\\nwas driven to religion through ignorance and fear.\\nFrom one point of view, indeed, religion is just\\nanother name for primitive man s theory of the\\nworld and of his relation to it a theory, observe,\\ndirectly suggested to him by his contest with his\\nenvironment. Just as primitive man s economic,\\npolitical, and ethical ideals were determined by his\\nenvironment, so his religious ideals had a like origin.\\nTo primitive man the environment was in the main\\nhostile. Nature was as unfriendly as neighboring\\ntribes. Ignorant of the laws and forces around him,\\nprimitive man must have lived in terror. How could\\nhe explain those forces except on the supposition\\nthat somehow or other they were manifestations\\nof intelligences akin to the human, though vastly\\ntranscending it in power What was the attitude\\nof primitive man to those overwhelming nature-\\nforces Clearly the same in kind, though greatly\\ndiffering in degree, as the attitude of man to a\\nformidable tribesman, chief, or king, namely, the\\nattitude of abject submission showing itself in con-\\nduct of a propitiatory kind. Out of this grew all", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "194 HERBERT SPENCER\\nthose rites and ceremonies whose object was to\\nward off the anger and obtain the favor of the\\ngod.\\nHow did primitive man conceive of the mysterious\\npower or powers which wielded the forces of nature\\nAccording to Mr. Spencer the gods were deified an-\\ncestors, and the earliest form of the religious senti-\\nment was ancestor-worship. In his admirable little\\nbook, The Idea of Grod, Mr. John Fiske thus describes\\nthe Spencerian view of the origin of religion It\\nwas in accordance with this primitive theory of\\nthings that the earliest form of religious worship\\nwas developed. In all races of men, so far as can\\nbe determined, this was the worship of ancestors.\\nThe other self of the dead chieftain continued after\\ndeath to watch over the interests of the tribe, to\\ndefend it against the attack of enemies, to reward\\nbrave warriors, and to punish traitors and cowards.\\nHis favor must be propitiated with ceremonies like\\nthose in which a subject does homage to a living\\nruler. If offended by neglect or irreverent treat-\\nment, defeat in battle, damage by flood or fire,\\nvisitations of famine or pestilence, were inter-\\npreted as marks of his anger. Ancestor-worship\\nwhen reduced to its psychological root is found to\\nrest upon primitive man s conceptions of a double\\npersonality. By means of it dreams, swoons,\\ntrances, are explained. What happens in sleep", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 195\\nand unconsciousness The hypothesis of the other\\nself explains the savage s wanderings during sleep,\\nand accounts for the presence in his dreams of\\nparents, comrades, or enemies known to be dead\\nand buried. In swoons and trances the other self\\nis believed to be temporarily absent from the body\\nand at death the soul is believed to have gone to the\\nghost world. It still exercises influence upon its\\nold environment friendly or hostile, according to\\nits relations with its former associates. In the case\\nof a departed chief two feelings spring up among the\\nmembers of the tribe, desire to do him honor, and\\na desire to secure his favor. Out of this spring\\nsacred places. His tomb grows into a temple, the\\ntomb itself becomes an altar upon which provisions\\nare placed a custom which is the germ of religious\\noblations and festivals. Closely connected with this\\nare propitiatory sacrifices as a means of securing the\\nfavor and support of the god in battle.\\nBy what process does ancestor-worship, with its\\nfew simple ceremonies, grow into Polytheism and\\nMonotheism with their complex institutions, priest-\\nhoods, and ritual Religious like ethical sentiments\\nand ideas are determined by economic necessities and\\npolitical structures. The expansion of the family\\ninto the tribe, and the tribe into the kingdom, leads\\nto an expansion of the religious idea. Here, as in\\nthe economic and political spheres, war has great", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "196 HERBERT SPENCER\\ninfluence in moulding the ideas and sentiments\\nof primitive man. In the words of Mr. Spencer:\\nThe overrunnings of tribe by tribe and nation by\\nnation, which have been everywhere and always\\ngoing on, have necessarily tended to impose one\\ncult upon another, not destroying the worship of the\\nconquered the conquerors bring in their own wor-\\nships either carrying them on among themselves\\nonly, or making the conquered join in them. In\\neither case the result is a multiplication of deities,\\npriests, creeds, and rituals. The monotheistic idea\\ndoes not evolve till one people either by superiority\\ntriumphs over all rivals, or where circumstances, as\\nin the case of the Jews, render the worship of the\\ntribal deity of such a fanatical and exclusive nature\\nthat no amount of military pressure can bring them\\nto adopt the religion and worship the gods of the\\nconquered.\\nOne important fact to be noted in the evolution\\nof religion is that the characters of the deities are\\nalso determined by the economic environment of the\\ntribe. Where war is viewed as the natural method\\nof tribal and national expansion, the deity is repre-\\nsented as favoring the warlike sentiments. The\\ngods of Militarism demand human sacrifice, take\\ndelight in scenes of cruelty, authorize as in the\\nOld Testament the wholesale slaughter of men,\\nwomen, and children. No greater evidence that", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 197\\nthe God of the Jews, and of Christianity, is a prod-\\nuct of evolution could be had than the following,\\nfrom Deuteronomy xx. 10-18 And if it (the city)\\nwill make no peace with thee, but will make war\\nagainst thee, then thou shalt besiege it and when\\nthe Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands,\\nthou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of\\nthe sword. But of the cities of these people,\\nwhich the Lord thy God doth give thee for an\\ninheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that\\nbreatheth; but thou shalt utterly destroy them.\\nHow true is it that man creates God in his own\\nimage.\\nHighly suggestive is the fact that with the change\\nfrom militarism to industrialism the character of\\nthe Deity also undergoes a change. Since mankind\\ngrasped the truth that national prosperity was\\nbetter secured by industry than by war, two im-\\nportant results followed the laws of Nature began\\nto be studied, and encouragement was given to the\\nindustrial virtues, which favored peaceful co-opera-\\ntion, as opposed to the militant virtues, which made\\nfor strife. It was no coincidence that Christianity\\nsprang up during a time when the world was at\\npeace. The conception of the Deity under the\\nfigure of a Father filled with love and compassion,\\nwho showered his gifts alike on the just and the\\nunjust, could not possibly have arisen during a time", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "198 HERBERT SPENCER\\nof tribal or national warfare. It was no coinci-\\ndence either that the sweet and winsome gospel of\\nJesus of Nazareth was transformed during the tur-\\nmoil of the Middle Ages into a gospel of hate, and\\npromulgated by means of the thumbscrew, the\\nrack, the sword, and the scaffold. Nor is it a\\ncoincidence that to-day, when the war spirit is\\nrampant, the clergy should be declaring that the\\nSermon on the Mount is impracticable, and that the\\npowder-cart is a more potent factor in spreading\\ncivilization than the Cross of Christ. So long as\\nnations act upon the belief that the prosperity of\\nthe one can only be had through the impoverishment\\nof others, so long they will view war as a necessary\\nfactor in civilization, and so long will the clergy\\nworship, not the All-Pitiful Father of Jesus Christ,\\nbut the bellicose tribal deity of the Jews.\\nIn another way Industrialism strikes at the root\\nof supernaturalism by the rapidity with which\\nit seizes and popularizes the conception of law.\\nThe primitive theory of the Universe rests upon\\nthe idea of the miraculous. Truth was sought not\\nby observation but by divination prosperity was\\nthe result not of industry but of war, tempered\\nwith faith in the god of battles disease was not\\nthe result of breach of Nature s laws, but of spiritual\\npossession. In such an atmosphere Industrialism\\ncould not possibly thrive; and accordingly we find", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION 199\\nthat when man began to turn his attention to\\npacific industry, study of Nature took the place of\\nfantastic theorizings about extra-mundane exist-\\nences, and activities which previously were lost in\\nthe quicksands of superstition were turned in the\\nfruitful direction of intellectual progress and social\\namelioration. There is a striking connection between\\nthe decline of the theological spirit and the rise of\\nthe humanitarian spirit. In its early days Theology\\nembraced in its sweep all phases of human activity\\nPolitics, Industry, Art, Science, and Philosophy.\\nThe result was the stagnation of the human intellect\\nand the hardening of the human heart. Even at its\\nbest the theological ideal as it affects society cannot\\ncompare with the humanitarian ideal. It is far more\\nimportant, as Diderot has remarked, to work for the\\nprevention of misery than to multiply places of\\nrefuge for the miserable.\\nThe place hitherto occupied by Theology will\\nhenceforth be taken by Science. The religious sen-\\ntiments will no longer be under the guidance of a\\ntheory of life which, under all its transformations, is\\nidentical at root with the ancestor- worship of primi-\\ntive man. Science will increase rather than dimin-\\nish the feelings of wonder, awe, and humility which\\nare the real roots of religious feeling, and so long\\nas this is the case, man need not fear that with the\\ndecay of Theology a blight will fall upon the earth.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "200 HERBERT SPENCER\\nThe religious sentiment, so long distorted by The-\\nology, is made up of two distinct feelings a feeling\\nof relationship with Nature as expressed by Words-\\nworth, which the Evolution philosophy has greatly\\nintensified, and a deep sense of the unity, trust-\\nworthiness, and beneficence of the great cosmic\\nforces. Now as of old it is true that underneath\\nthe righteous are the everlasting arms.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER Xn\\nTHE PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT OF SPENCERISM\\nSo far, the Spencerian theory has been presented\\non the purely scientific side as a philosophy of the\\nCosmos. In dealing with the knowable, Mr. Spen-\\ncer s great aim has been to frame into one all-compre-\\nhensive generalization the separate generalizations\\nof Science in other words, to trace from star to\\nsoul the working of one universal evolutionary pro-\\ncess, scientifically interpretable in terms of Force.\\nFor purposes of convenience, phenomena are divided\\ninto astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, and\\nsociologic, but through these divisions one process\\nholds sway. While the Cosmos as a whole is evolv-\\ning from simplicity to complexity, by successive\\nintegrations and differentiations, the parts are also\\nsubject to the same law of evolution. So under-\\nstood, says Mr. Spencer, evolution becomes not\\none in principle only, but in fact. But man is not\\nsatisfied with positive knowledge. For practical\\npurposes science suffices, but no sooner has the\\nphilosophic mind brought phenomena within the\\nsweep of mechanical explanations, than it discovers\\n201", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "202 HERBERT SPENCER\\nthat Force, wliicli is the last word of science, is far\\nfrom being the last word of philosophy. To the\\nphilosopher, Force is but a symbol atoms and\\nenergies have only relative validity. What is the\\nnature of that Reality of which Force is a symbol?\\nThe Spencerian answer to that question in no way\\naffects the great evolutionary generalization as ex-\\npounded in previous chapters. As remarked in an\\nearlier portion of this book, Spencerism stands on\\nits merits as the philosophy of the knowable, and\\nthe only organized body of thought which has its\\nroots in experience, and is a guide to the under-\\nstanding of life theoretically and practically.\\nApart from practical life, science has great\\nintellectual and emotional bearings. Deeper than\\npurely mechanical interpretations of Nature lie\\nfundamental questions of thought and being. So\\nlong as man is endowed with intelligence, he\\nwill never cease from attempts to solve the\\ngreat Sphinx riddle of existence. Generation after\\ngeneration of storm-tossed thinkers have sighed\\nin vain for a glimpse of the haven of intellec-\\ntual and emotional rest. Oppressed by a sense of\\nthe unfathomable niystery of life, deeply reflective\\nnatures, with Job-like sadness, have been prostrated\\nin the dust by a feeling of mental helplessness and\\nmoral perplexity. Undismayed by the failure of\\nphilosophers and religionists from Plato to Hegel,", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT 203\\nand from Job to Newman, men to-day are as busy as\\never in their attempts to find an answer to the riddle\\nof the Sphinx. Behind phenomena with their fleet-\\ningness, is there a permanent Power, and, if so, can\\nwe discover its nature Can we ascribe to it per-\\nsonality Can science, as interpreted by philosophy,\\nthrow some light upon the great and fundamental\\nquestion of purpose Have the vast cosmical trans-\\nformations which science reveals a definite signifi-\\ncance Is humanity, in the words of Mr. Fiske, a\\nmere local incident in an endless series of aimless\\ncosmical changes What answer has the Spencerian\\nphilosophy to give to these questions? In philos-\\nophy as in science the starting-point of inquiry is\\nself-consciousness. The evolution of consciousness\\nhas been traced by Mr. Spencer from its earliest\\ndim manifestations in animal life to its highest\\nmanifestations as cultured intelligence. Here the\\ntask of the scientific evolutionist ends but the\\nphilosophic evolutionist must proceed further he\\nhas to determine, if possible, the nature and limits\\nof intelligence. Is the mind of man rigidly con-\\nfined to the world of positive verifiable fact, or\\ndoes it possess capacities which link it to an extra-\\nmundane existence\\nPhilosophy is rooted in Psychology. The central\\nquestion upon which all other questions rest is this\\nWhat is the nature of Knowledge? Upon Episte-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "204 HERBERT SPENCER\\nmology rest Cosmology and Ontology. It is useless\\nto endeavor to discover the real significance of\\nthe World and Being until we discover the nature\\nand limits of Knowledge. In differences of psycho-\\nlogical theory, all differences among philosophers\\ntake their rise. What, then, is Mr. Spencer s\\npsychological theory viewed from the standpoint\\nof philosophy The answer to the questions How\\ndo we know How does Knowledge develop has\\nalready been given in the chapter dealing with the\\nEvolution of Mind. The question now is What\\nis the nature and limitation of Knowledge The\\nanswer to this is involved in the reply to this further\\nquestion What do we know To this the Spence-\\nrian reply is We know things in their relations.\\nThis view is summed up in the phrase Relativity of\\nKnowledge. Even since Hume, with his rigorous and\\nsomewhat sceptical analysis of mind, the idea of the\\nrelativity of human knowledge has held an important\\nplace in philosophical discussions. Kant, whose aim\\nwas to overthrow Hume s Empiricism, placed the\\ndoctrine of Relativity in a stronger position than\\never by his artificial theory of the categories of\\nknowledge. In his famous essay, Sir William Hamil-\\nton made the relativity of knowledge the basis of\\nhis attack on the Absolute of German philosophers.\\nWe think in relation, said Hamilton, and there-\\nfore by the very nature of the mind we are debarred", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT 205\\nfrom knowledge of the unrelated, the Absolute.\\nMr. Spencer has elaborated and strengthened the\\nHamiltonian position by a careful analysis of the\\nnature and the development of intelligence. If, as\\nMr. Spencer shows, all knowledge is classifying,\\nobviously our knowledge of one thing is impossible,\\nexcept through all knowledge of other things. A\\nthing is perfectly known only when it is in all\\nrespects like certain things previously observed\\nthat in proportion to the number of respects in\\nwhich it is unlike them is the extent to which it is\\nunknown and that hence, when it has absolutely\\nno attribute in common with anything else, it must\\nbe absolutely beyond the bounds of knowledge.\\nThe doctrine of Relativity is so abundantly in\\nharmony with science, that it might be left to stand\\nwithout further elaboration, were it not that it has\\nbeen vigorously attacked in recent years by the\\nHegelian school of philosophers. Instead of dwell-\\ning, with Mr. Spencer, on the inherent relativity of\\nintelligence, it may be desirable to look at the sub-\\nject from a different point of view. Not only do we\\nthink in relation, but Nature itself is one huge mass\\nof relativity. In dealing with Nature, we deal not\\nwith inherent substances but with bundles of rela-\\ntions. The impression which the observer first forms\\nof Nature is, that it is composed of numerous in-\\ndependent passive substances which are energized", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "206 HERBERT SPENCER\\nby independent forces. Of the actual existence of\\nMatter as an independent substance, the observer\\nentertains no doubt. Matter is supposed to exist in\\nthree forms, solid, liquid, and gaseous, each with\\nits different properties, to which the individuality\\nof objects is supposed to be due. The atomic theory\\nis based upon the idea of Matter as made up of sub-\\nstances incomprehensively small, to whose properties\\nand combinations the complexity of the Cosmos is\\ndue. Let us examine the so-called properties of\\natoms. That hardness is a property of the atom is\\nnot doubted by the man of science. But what is\\nhardness It is not a property at all it is a rela-\\ntion. Hardness is simply the measure of the resist-\\nance offered to the separation of molecules from one\\nanother. Obviously, there is no sense in talking\\nof hardness in a single atom. Again, we cannot\\nconceive of atoms apart from color of some kind.\\nBut what is color? Is it a property of matter?\\nColor is not a property of matter it is due to cer-\\ntain vibratory motions in the atoms, and is related\\nto the rate of energy. If all substances were at\\nabsolute zero in temperature, there would be no\\nvibratory motions, and consequently no color. Sub-\\nstance itself would be invisible. The same holds\\ngood of inertia, mass, heat, the primary as well\\nas the secondary properties, which are no longer\\nviewed as properties but as conditions of matter.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT 207\\nMatter is not a thing but a state, and except in\\nrelation has no existence. No force in Nature can\\nbe isolated from other forces. As has been said,\\nWhat we call solids, liquids, and gases, with all\\nthe laws that belong to each of them, are simply the\\nrelations of heat-energy to groups of atoms, not the\\nproperties or laws that may be asserted of atoms as\\nsuch. Nature resolves itself into a scene of un-\\nvarying activity, and what appear to us to be dis-\\ntinct existences, isolated and independent, are really\\nrelative conditions of that activity. For this view\\nof Nature we are indebted to the theory of the con-\\nservation and transformation of Forces which on\\nthe philosophic side rests on the view that Nature\\nis not an assemblage of existences, but a bundle of\\nforces whose existences are known to us by the\\nrelative states in which they manifest themselves.\\nHelmholtz expresses the dynamic conception of Na-\\nture when he says, Every property or quality of a\\nthing is in reality nothing but its capability of pro-\\nducing certain effects on other things. Stallo, in\\nhis book Concepts of Modern Science^ sums up the\\nnew view which has emerged from the doctrine of\\nthe conservation and transformation of Forces as\\nfollows The real existence of things is co-extensive\\nwith their qualitative and quantitative determina-\\ntions, and both are in their nature relations, quality\\nresulting from mutual action, and quantity being", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "208 HERBERT SPENCER\\nsimply a ratio between terms neither of which is\\nabsolute. Every objectively real thing is thus a\\nterm in a numberless series of mutual implications,\\nand forms of reality beyond these implications are\\nas unknown to experience as to thought. There is\\nno absolute material quality, no absolute material\\nsubstance, no absolutely physical unit, no absolutely\\nsimple physical entity, no absolute physical constant,\\nno absolute standard, either of quantity or quality.\\nThere is no form of material existence which is either\\nits own support or its own measure, and which abides\\neither quantitatively or qualitatively otherwise than\\nin perpetual change in an unceasing flow of muta-\\ntions. And thus what Mr. Spencer finds to be true\\nof mind, that it works on the principle of Relativity,\\nscience also finds to be true of the Cosmos, where\\nRelativity reigns supreme.\\nHow do the Hegelians get their Absolute They\\nquarrelled with Hamilton for making the Absolute\\nequivalent to pure identity, an abstraction of the\\nintellect, an absolute unit which the Hegelians have\\nno difficulty in showing cannot possibly exist. The\\nquarrel of the Hegelians with Hamilton and Spencer\\nis that they identify the Absolute with something\\nout of relation, and then declare that the Absolute\\nis unknowable because they have placed it outside\\nthe arena of knowledge. The Absolute as the nega-\\ntion of all relation is an absurdity it cannot be", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT 209\\nknown, because if it exists it exists out of relation\\nto thought. How, then, do the Hegelians conceive\\nthe Absolute Not as the negation of relations, but\\nas the unification of relations. With Hegel the\\nAbsolute is not a barren identity, a sterile unity,\\nbut a unity reached through differences. The Abso-\\nlute, according to Hegel, is an identity which\\nmanifests itself through distinctions. Now what,\\nafter all, is Hegel s Absolute but simply another\\nname for the totality of cosmic relations? Hegel\\ndoes not place the Absolute on one side and the\\nRelative on the other. Viewing the Universe as a\\nwhole, and combining in thought process and prod-\\nuct, he calls the result the Absolute. His system\\nrests upon the relativity of thought and being, but\\nby laying hold of the ideas of reciprocity and devel-\\nopment, and looking at the process in its totality,\\nHegel makes Nature an absolute unity manifesting\\nitself in perpetual differences. Hegel s system dif-\\nfers from Materialism simply in making logic instead\\nof matter, the idea instead of the atom, the starting-\\npoint. Strip Hegelism of its misty phraseology, and\\nits Absolute is no other than the Relative with its\\nroots in human experience and human thought. As\\nagainst Hamilton s notion of the Absolute, Hegel s\\npolemic was highly effective; but reduced to its\\nultimate analysis, his Absolute differs in no essen-\\ntial from Spencer s doctrine of Relativity. Where", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "210 HERBERT SPENCER\\nSpencer contents himself with tracing the evolution\\nand defining the limits of self-consciousness, Hegel\\ndeifies the logical process and calls it God.\\nIf, then, we can only know things in their rela-\\ntions, the question immediately emerges What do\\nwe know of things? How does the world stand\\nrelated to our consciousness Is the material world\\nreally what it seems? A partial answer has been\\ngiven by the insight which is obtained of the Uni-\\nverse when discussing the relativity of knowledge.\\nThe world is not what it seems, an assemblage of\\nindependent things composed of substances with\\ntheir respective properties. The multiform energies\\nof Nature are reducible to one form of activity protean\\nin its manifestations. The phenomena of Nature\\nare due not to the combined action of numerous\\nagents endowed with substance and acted upon by\\npowers, but to the ceaseless transformations of Force\\nor Energy. As James Hinton expresses it in one of\\nhis suggestive chapters on Nature We are obliged\\nto think of the forces as one, because, in fact, they\\nwill not remain distinct. We cannot practically\\nisolate any one of them, except for some special and\\ntemporary purpose it is constantly escaping from us\\nand passing off into other forms. Motion resolves\\nitself in sound and heat heat flies off in motion, in\\nchemical or electric change electricity is lost in\\nsparks of light, in magnetism, in mechanical disrup-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT 211\\ntions, in the production of chemical power chemical\\npower no sooner acts than it is no more chemical,\\nand must be recognized in explosions, in electric\\ncurrents, in heat. No force can be permanently\\nretained if we need to preserve any one, we must\\nperpetually generate it afresh. Nor can we isolate\\nany of the forces from the rest in our thought of\\nNature, any more than in our operations upon her.\\nTo do so would be for the intellect to choose un-\\nreason to create disorder where order reigns. We\\nshould be perpetually losing our force without rea-\\nson, and finding it reappear without necessity. We\\ncan only follow one, by recognizing the essential\\nsameness of them all. Owing to the limited\\ncapacity of our senses, which only perceive a few of\\nthe multitudinous processes which are really taking\\nplace in Nature, we continually lose the chain of her\\noperations. Its links are ever passing out of the\\nsphere of our perception and, reappearing at a dis-\\ntant spot or point of time, they produce on us the\\nimpression of original and disconnected actions.\\nFrom this cause from this imperfection of our\\nsenses arose the false conception of the various\\nforces as distinct existences or causes from this\\ncause it was that that false conception so long\\nmaintained its sway. If our sense had been pene-\\ntrating enough to follow the entire course of Nature s\\naction, and to recognize it in every shape, that", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "212 HERBERT SPENCER\\nthought never could have arisen. And thus it is\\nthat reason sets it aside, by supplementing sense,\\nand teaching us to recognize the existence of that\\nwhich we cannot see. By tracing the strict chain of\\ncausation throughout Nature, it substitutes unvary-\\ning activity for imaginary agents. Nor can\\nwe better picture the activity of Nature to our minds\\nthan by conceiving it as a vast, even a limitless,\\nmultitude of vibrations a rush and whirl, a maze,\\nof actions to and fro shifting their place, changing\\ntheir mode, yielding to each other, modified and\\naltered in endless ways ceasing and recommencing\\nin every quarter, with nothing constant but that\\nthe exactness of the balance be maintained.\\nIs the conception of Force as the fundamental\\nfact of the Universe philosophically satisfying?\\nMany critics have assumed that Mr. Spencer is\\na Materialist because his system is founded upon\\nthe persistence of Force, overlooking the fact that\\nMr. Spencer, when viewing the Cosmos from the\\nside of philosophy, distinctly states that Force is\\nnot the ultimate Reality, but simply the symbol\\nof that Reality. To make Force the ultimate\\nReality would be to do violence to the principle\\nof relativity, which forbids the reduction of the\\nUniverse to a unit. Unity and duality are relative\\nconceptions, and therefore all materialistic theories,\\nwhether resting upon a static or dynamic concep-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT 213\\ntion, the Atomic theoiy or the theory of Energy,\\nare ruled out of court. Mr. Spencer s theory of\\nthe world grows naturally and logically out of his\\nPsychology. True to his doctrine of the relativity\\nof knowledge, Mr. Spencer recognizes that Force,\\nthough a scientific ultimate, has only a relative\\nvalue as a philosophic explanation, inasmuch as the\\nidea of Force is derived from our muscular activity.\\nOn this point he is quite explicit. In First Prin-\\nciples^ at the conclusion of the chapter, The Per-\\nsistence of Force, Mr. Spencer says But, now,\\nwhat is the force of which we predicate persistence\\nIt is not the force we are immediately conscious of\\nin our own muscular efforts, for this does not persist.\\nBy the persistence of Force, we really mean\\nthe persistence of some Cause which transcends our\\nknowledge and conception. In asserting it we\\nassert an Unconditioned Reality, without beginning\\nor end. Similarly, in the concluding chapter, Mr.\\nSpencer states his position thus Over and over\\nagain it has been shown, in various ways, that the\\ndeepest truths we can reach are simply statements\\nof the widest uniformities in our experience of the\\nrelations of Matter, Motion, and Force are but\\nsymbols of the unknown Reality. A power of which\\nthe nature remains forever inconceivable, and to\\nwhich no limits in time or space can be imagined,\\nworks in us certain effects. The interpretation", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "214 HERBERT SPENCER\\nof all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and\\nForce is nothing more than the reduction of our\\ncomplex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols\\nand when the equation has been brought to its lowest\\nterms, the symbols remain symbols still. What com-\\npels us to treat Force, not as the ultimate Reality,\\nbut as a symbol The theory of the relativity of\\nknowledge. In the words of James Hinton What-\\never be that secret activity in Nature of which all\\nthe forces are exhibitions to our senses, we know\\none thing respecting it, namely, that it is not force.\\nForce is a sensation of our own, and is no more to be\\nattributed to the objects in connection with which\\nwe feel it than are the brightness of a color or the\\nsweetness of a taste. The feeling from which\\nwe derive the idea of force rests upon a conscious-\\nness of difficulty, of opposition, of imperfect ability.\\nIt arises from resisted effort. In fact, it is our own\\nimperfection we ascribe to Nature when we imagine\\nthat our feeling of force truly represents its working.\\nThe Spencerian philosophical attitude to the great\\nproblem is summed up in the concluding words of\\nhis Ecclesiastical Institutions But one truth\\nmust grow ever clearer the truth that there is an\\nInscrutable Existence everywhere manifested, to\\nwhich we can neither find nor conceive beginning or\\nend. Amid the mysteries which become the more\\nmysterious the more they are thought about, there", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "PHILOSOPHIC ASPECT 215\\nwill remain the one absolute certainty that he [the\\nphilosopher] is ever in presence of an Infinite and\\nEternal Energy from which all things proceed.\\nThus the Spencerian philosophy shades into religion,\\nand finds expression in the note of interrogation of\\nZophar, the Naamathite, the friend of Job Canst\\nthou by searching find out God Canst thou find\\nout the Almighty unto perfection", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIII\\nTHE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF SPENCERISM\\nThat the negative attitude of the Spencerian.\\nphilosophy towards religion should give great dis-\\nsatisfaction was only what was to be expected.\\nThe human mind is not easily reconciled to an\\nattitude of suspense. Theologians challenged the\\nviews of Mr. Spencer on historical and religious\\ngrounds. They dissented from his evolutionary\\nsketch of religion as originating in ancestor-worship,\\nand they repudiated his conclusion that man s re-\\nligious conceptions and aspirations are ineffective\\nattempts to solve the insoluble, and have no objec-\\ntive validity. Idealistic philosophers, on the other\\nhand, combated Spencerism on the ground that\\nhis religious negativism had its root in a defective\\npsychology. If mind is chained to experience, if\\nthe senses are the only inlets of knowledge, there\\ncan be no pathway to the supernatural except by\\nmiraculous interposition, of which Idealistic philoso-\\nphers are not enamoured. Clearly, if the super-\\nnatural was to be saved from the blight of nega-\\n216", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 217\\ntivity, it could only be by a new analysis of the\\nmind in order to discover principles transcending\\nexperience. Of course, by this method, Christianity\\nas a revealed religion could not hope to be vindicated.\\nIndeed, the Idealist philosophers had no wish to\\ncome to the rescue of the religion of the churches.\\nHegelians, as a school, have turned their backs upon\\npopular supernaturalism. Their aim rather has been\\nto give a philosophical basis to Theism as opposed\\nto Agnosticism.\\nThe position of the Idealist has been stated thus\\nThere is something more in the world of experi-\\nence than a mere succession of sense-data. Sense-\\nexperience sets the mind to working on its own\\naccount and causes it to deliver itself of truths\\nwhich are not contained in any of our actual experi-\\nences or in all of them together, but which extend\\nover a wider ground than experience can possibly\\ncover. The theory of innate ideas is no longer\\nheld. The new view rather is that the mind is\\npossessed of innate capacities, the power of assimi-\\nlating and interpreting sense-data. Consciousness,\\nsay the Idealists, cannot at once be the product and\\nthe interpreter of experience. Self-consciousness,\\naccording to the Neo-Kantians, is impossible except\\non the assumption that in the mind there exists a\\nunifying spiritual principle which, so to speak, sits\\nat the loom of Time and weaves the isolated unre-", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "218 HERBERT SPENCER\\nlated threads of experience into an organized cohe-\\nrent whole.\\nHave we not here an illustration of the tendency\\nof the mind to which attention has already been\\ncalled that of personifying the processes of Nature,\\nof converting the final product into an initial, all-\\ncontrolling agent? Just as Idealistic biologists\\nexplained life-processes by means of an entity\\ncalled the Vital Force, so Idealistic psychologists\\npostulate an entity called the Self-conscious Prin-\\nciple as the primary agent in converting sense-data\\ninto Knowledge. These philosophers fall into their\\nmistake through neglect of the great fact of rela-\\ntivity upon which Nature and Consciousness alike\\ndepend. They assume that Mind and Matter exist\\nas separate independent entities, whereas they are\\nsimply relative existences. The one apart from\\nthe other is unthinkable. We know nothing of Mind\\napart from Matter, and nothing of Matter apart\\nfrom Mind. As Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison\\nhas admirably pointed out The ultimate fact of\\nknowledge is neither pure subject nor pure object,\\nneither a mere sense nor a mere ego, but an ego or\\nsubject conscious of sensations. It is not a mere\\nunity, but a unity in duality. For purposes of\\nanalysis philosophers distinguish between the sub-\\nject and the object, but when they forget that the\\ndistinction is purely logical, and has no counterpart", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 219\\nin Nature, when, in a word, they treat a logical\\nabstraction as a concrete reality, they are guilty of\\nthe scholastic error of constructing the world out\\nof universals. This is exactly the error into which\\nProfessor Green fell. Proceeding on the assumption\\nthat consciousness is not the result of the action and\\ninteraction of matter and mind, but is the work of\\na single spiritual principle. Professor Green bridges\\nthe gulf which separates the human and the divine\\nby identifying this Spiritual Principle with the\\nuniversal or divine self-consciousness. In his hands\\nhuman consciousness, which he elevated to the rank\\nof an entity, becomes a reproduction in the human\\norganism of the eternal complete self-consciousness.\\nThus at one stroke the process of knowledge in the\\nmind is transformed into an agent. By personify-\\ning knowledge Professor Green reaches the concep-\\ntion of an eternal Knower who sustains the world,\\nand who reproduces himself in the mind of man.\\nLet us see to what this attempt to secure a The-\\nistic ground for the universe leads. What support\\ndoes religion get from the Neo-Kantian and Hege-\\nlian attempts to identify human consciousness with\\nan eternal complete self-consciousness From a\\nworld of spirits to a supreme Spirit, says Professor\\nWard, is a possible step. On this line of advance.\\nIdealists like Green and Ward hope to secure a basis\\nfor Natural Theology. The great difficulty which", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "220 HERBERT SPENCER\\nfaces Idealism is the problem of personality. The\\nbasis of the system is the identity of the human\\nand the divine self-consciousness. Now human self-\\nconsciousness is the product of two factors, the Ego\\nand the Non-Ego. We cannot think of self-con-\\nsciousness as a unity it is a unity in duality. It\\nmanifests itself through a constant reduction of\\ndifferences to identity. Can we conceive of a divine\\nself-consciousness working by analogous methods?\\nManifestly, if the two forms of self-consciousness\\nare the same in kind, if the human is a reproduction\\nof the divine, God must be, like man, a thinking,\\nfeeling, progressive Intelligence. Hegel saw this\\ndifficulty, and boldly represented Deity as the\\nproduct of evolution! Lotze, who opposed Hegel-\\nism, approached the problem from another point,\\nbut when he came to deal with the question of\\ndivine personality, he was intellectually stranded.\\nDeal with generalities after the fashion of Green\\nand Ward, claim a monopoly of intellectual haziness,\\nand antagonistic views can live in the mind comfort-\\nably enough together, but bring them into the day-\\nlight of analysis, and the unity of Idealistic Theism\\nis seen to be the unity of a landscape in a fog. How\\ntrue this is may be seen by the shifts to which Lotze\\nis driven to render intelligible his conception of a\\ndivine personality. In his History of Modern Phi-\\nlosophy^ Dr. Hoffding thus discusses the theistic", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 221\\nposition of Lotze Lotze conceives the world-prin-\\nciple as an Absolute Personality, and he defends the\\ntransference of the concept of personality to the\\nAbsolute Being as follows The Absolute Being\\nmust be personal, because personality alone pos-\\nsesses inner independence and originality, while the\\nconcept of personality only finds imperfect realiza-\\ntion in finite beings who are dependent on external\\nconditions. Lotze, it is true, admits that a personal\\nlife involves resistance to be overcome and the fac-\\nulty of suffering and receiving as well as of working.\\nBut if it is asked. How can an Absolute Being, sub-\\nject to no limitations, suffer? Lotze answers that\\nthe feeling of the Deity must be set in motion by\\nthe inner happenings of its own creative imagina-\\ntion But it is a great question whether such a\\nself-created opposition can have any serious signifi-\\ncance, especially since it can at any moment be\\ndestroyed at will. Personalities, as we know them,\\nat least have to fight against barriers which are\\nneither self-created nor easily set aside the anal-\\nogy on which Lotze builds, therefore, seems to break\\ndown at the critical point. Moreover, according to\\nthe most probable interpretation of his confused and\\nhesitating utterances on the subject, Lotze diverges\\nfrom Weisse in holding that the form of time is not\\napplicable to the Absolute Being a personal being\\nwhich does not develop in time, a timeless life and a", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "222 HERBERT SPENCER\\ntimeless suffering and working these are concepts\\nwhicli make too great demands on our power of draw-\\ning analogies\\nThe attempt to rise from the human self -con-\\nsciousness to a divine self-consciousness by means\\nof the principle of psychological identity lands us in\\nbewildering contradictions. Abolish the idea of an\\nenvironment and you abolish the exciting cause\\nof man s psychical nature his reason, his feelings,\\nhis will. But for God the Uncreated, the Eternal,\\nthere can be no environment, and consequently there\\ncan be no need for what is understood by reason,\\nfeeling, and will, which are all marks of imperfec-\\ntion, and have their root in biological phenomena.\\nGod the all-Perfect, the all-Knowing, cannot be con-\\nceived as reaching knowledge through a process\\nof reasoning, and as little can He be conceived\\nas loving and sorrowing, which are distinctive\\nmarks of finiteness. Considerations such as these\\nled Spinoza to empty his conception of Deity of all\\nanthropomorphic qualities. In his view, to make\\nthe term God embrace the conception of a mag-\\nnified human personality, and of the Uncreated, the\\nRelated, the Eternal One, was as illogical as to em-\\nbrace under the term dog the barking animal of\\nthat name and the dog-star, Sirius.\\nThe same considerations led Mr. Spencer, in defin-\\ning his philosophical attitude towards Theism, to", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 223\\nwrite as follows To believe in a divine con-\\nsciousness men must refrain from thinking what is\\nmeant by consciousness must stop short with verbal\\npropositions and propositions which they are de-\\nbarred from rendering into thoughts will more and\\nmore fail to satisfy them. Of course like difficulties\\npresent themselves when the will of God is spoken\\nof. So long as we refrain from giving a definite\\nmeaning to the word will, we may say that it is\\npossessed by the Cause of All Things as readily as\\nwe may say that love of approbation is possessed\\nby a circle but when from the words we pass to\\nthe thoughts they stand for, we find that we can\\nno more unite in consciousness the terms of the one\\nproposition than we can those of the other. Who-\\never conceives any other will than his own must do\\nso in terms of his own will, which is the sole will\\ndirectly known to him, all other wills being only\\ninferred. But will, as each is conscious of it, pre-\\nsupposes a motive, a prompting desire of some kind.\\nAbsolute indifference excludes the conception of will.\\nMoreover will, as implying a prompting desire, con-\\nnotes some end contemplated as one to be achieved,\\nand ceases with the achievement of it some other\\nwill referring to some other end taking its place.\\nThat is to say, will like emotion necessarily supposes\\na series of states of consciousness. The conception\\nof a divine will, derived from that of the human", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "224 HERBERT SPENCER\\nwill, involves, like it, localization in space and time.\\nThe willing of each end excludes from consciousness\\nfor an interval the willing of other ends and there-\\nfore is inconsistent with that omnipresent activity\\nwhich simultaneously works out an infinity of ends.\\nIt is the same with the ascription of intelligence.\\nNot to dwell on the seriality and limitation implied\\nas before, we may note that intelligence, as alone\\nconceivable by us, presupposes existences indepen-\\ndent of it and objective to it. It is carried on in\\nterms of changes primarily wrought by alien activi-\\nties the impressions generated by things beyond\\nconsciousness, and the ideas derived from such im-\\npressions. To speak of an intelligence which exists\\nin the absence of all such alien activities, is to use a\\nmeaningless word. If to the corollary that the First\\nCause, considered as intelligent, must be continually\\naffected by independent objective activities, it is\\nreplied that these have become such by act of crea-\\ntion, and were previously included in the First\\nCause, then the reply is that in such case the First\\nCause could, before this creation, have had nothing\\nto generate in it such changes as those constituting\\nwhat we call intelligence, and must therefore have\\nbeen unintelligent at the time when intelligence\\nwas most called for. Hence it is clear that the\\nintelligence ascribed, answers in no respect to that\\nwhich we know by the name. It is intelligence", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 225\\nout of which all the characters constituting it have\\nvanished.\\nSuppose we accept as valid the Idealistic con-\\nception of a supreme self-conscious principle as\\nthe ground of existence, the question arises as to\\nthe relation to it of the human self-consciousness.\\nConsciousness in man, according to Idealism, is the\\nhighest form in which existence appears. Apart\\nfrom the Supreme Spiritual Principle, man has no\\nexistence. He is the incarnation under imperfect\\nphysical conditions of the Supreme Principle. What\\nguarantee is there that this physically conditioned\\nconsciousness will exist as an entity after the break-up\\nof material conditions? There is no more guar-\\nantee in the case of Idealism than in the case of\\nMaterialism. No thinker of any note now defends\\nMaterialism. Sun worship, indeed, is a more digni-\\nfied attitude towards the Cosmos than atom worship,\\nand prostration before the soul of the Universe is\\nmore creditable to the savage than deification of\\nether. To what were vagaries of materialistic\\nscientists due? They were due to the neglect,\\ncommon to men of science, of philosophic thinking.\\nMaterialists were entirely unaware of the fact that\\nnot one step can be taken in scientific generalization\\nwithout the aid of certain all-embracing categories\\nof thought. Philosophy has got past the stage of\\nviewing the Universe as made up of an infinite\\nQ", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "226 HERBERT SPENCER\\nnumber of isolated particulars, or even as the out-\\ncome of one material force. To the highest philos-\\nophy of the day, the Universe is an organic unity.\\nAccording to Idealism this cannot be mechanical.\\nIt can only be likened to one thing the spiritual\\nprinciple in man. For all practical purposes, how-\\never, it signifies little whether mind is the temporary\\nembodiment of a Spiritual Principle or a specialized\\nform of Matter. In either case man is a bubble\\non the great stream of time. We may discourse of\\nthe bubble in the language of poetry or of science\\nthe result is the same absorption in the universal.\\nIdealism equally with Materialism leaves man a\\nprisoner in the hands of necessity. The only dif-\\nference is that while Materialism puts round the\\nprisoner s neck a plain unpretentious noose, Idealism\\nadds fringes and embroidery. Materialism in plain\\nblunt language passes sentence of death, while Ideal-\\nism indulges in a poetic funeral oration.\\nThe conclusion that Idealism affords no resting-\\nplace for the religious instincts and aspirations of\\nman is forcing itself upon the more thoughtful of\\northodox theologians. Thus we find Professor\\nIverach in a review of the late Principal Caird s\\nlast work, writing as follows Idealism starts\\nfrom the self, and strives to interpret the experience\\nof the self. Our thought constitutes the world we\\nknow and live in. It exists for us in thinkable\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0r.xnw.MIUi.i.i|-U. \u00e2\u0096\u00a0\u00e2\u0096\u00a0MIJIIMIIULl,", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 227\\nrelations, and it is easy to prove this, as is done in\\nthe book before us, that this constant amidst the\\nvariable, not given by them but above them, is\\nsomething which sense does not and cannot provide\\nis, and can only be, the self-conscious, spiritual\\nself, the unifying, constitutive power of thought.\\nFrom the self-conscious, spiritual self, idealism\\nswiftly proceeds on its way to the conclusion that\\nas for the world in which this self-conscious self\\nlives and moves the self is necessary, so for the\\nuniverse of things and persons an absolute self-\\nconsciousness, a constitutive power of thought, is\\nnecessary. As the objective world of the self is\\nin relation to the self, so the universe is the objec-\\ntive of the absolute self. If the world is cast into\\nthe life of God, if the world is regarded as the other\\nof God, one may strive as he may, but he cannot\\navoid the path which leads swiftly to pantheism.\\nConscious of the weakness of Idealism, other\\nexpounders of Theism, such as Professor Eraser, the\\nwell-known editor of Berkeley, attack the problem\\nfrom another point of view. In Professor Eraser s\\nGifford lectures there are no sleight of hand methods\\nof the Hegelian type. The difficulties in the way of\\nTheism are fairly faced. The Professor covers a\\nlarge piece of historical and critical ground, in\\nwhich he deals with Hume, Spinoza, Hegel, Spencer.\\nAgainst all the arguments drawn from philosophy", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "228 HERBERT SPENCER\\nand from contemplation of the evils of life, the Pro-\\nfessor puts faith in the goodness and omnipotence of\\nGod a position he takes up as the only way to give\\na rational meaning to life, and to ward off pessimistic\\ndespair. When we come to analyze the Professor s\\nreasoning and study his results critically, we are sur-\\nprised at the slender foundations upon which his\\nTheistic structure rests. When the average man\\nthinks of God, he thinks of Him as a Person who\\ncan be moved by appeals, and who possesses in infi-\\nnite degree the best qualities of the best men. This\\nconception of Deity lies at the root of the belief in\\nmiracles and revelation. Take away, or render pale\\nand shadowy, the idea of personality, or tie the hands\\nof Deity with the ropes of physical necessity and in-\\nvariability of law, and at once the average man ceases\\nto be interested in Theism, and hands it over to the\\nphilosopher. If Professor Eraser wishes to give vital-\\nity to Theism, he must bring into relief the idea of\\npersonality. If the God of philosophic thought is\\nnot personal in the understood sense of the term, phil-\\nosophic Theism comes perilously near Agnosticism.\\nLet us listen to Professor Eraser on this decisive\\npoint of personality The personality of God\\nneed not mean that the Being adumbrated in Nature\\nand Man is embodied and individual self-conscious life,\\nlike the human that God is organized and extended,\\nas man now is or omnipresent as in sensuous imagi-", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 229\\nnation or that God has a conscious experience, that\\nis subject like ours to cliange of conscious state.\\nPersonality in man, moreover, implies memory; but\\nwe are not bound to suppose that the religious con-\\nception of the universe implies memory in the Per-\\nfect Person with whom all experience brings us\\ninto constant intercourse. Also a human intelli-\\ngence of the world involves reasoning, on the part\\nof human persons but it does not follow that the\\nPerfect Person who speaks to us in the universe of\\nNature and Man must be conscious of deducing con-\\nclusions from premises, or of generalizing under con-\\nditions of inductive calculation. The personality\\nof God is a formula which implies that, in relation to\\nus or at the human point of view the Universal\\nPower, manifested in nature and in man, must be\\nregarded at last ethically, not physically therefore\\nas an imperfectly conceived Person, not as an imper-\\nfectly conceived Thing. After all, we do not get\\nmuch beyond the conclusions reached by David Hume\\nand Herbert Spencer. In his dialogues on religion,\\nHume admits that in the agency discoverable in the\\nworld we trace the operation of qualities akin to\\nthose we know as human. Spencer, too, admits\\nthat the Power of which all phenomena are mani-\\nfestations may be more readily conceived under\\nmental than material symbols. With Hume and\\nSpencer, Professor Eraser admits the impossibility of", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "230 HERBERT SPENCER\\nfinding God by tlie cognitive process, and stumbles\\nat the difficulties of reconciling the existence of evil\\nwith, divine personality. What is the note which\\ndifferentiates this view from Agnosticism He\\nfalls back upon faith in the conception that the\\nworld is so framed as to give man in the long run\\nrational and emotional satisfaction. The question at\\nonce arises In matters of fundamental importance,\\nare the dictates of the heart more authoritative than\\nthe conclusions of the head Are man s aspirations\\nthe measure of Nature s possibilities? Or is it the\\nduty of man to make his aspirations conform to\\nNature s actualities To these questions all mytholo-\\ngies and theologies give one answer; science and\\ncritical philosophy gi-ve another.\\nProfessor Eraser declares for Theism as the only\\nbreakwater to pessimism. If there is not a Deity for\\nman to trust, and a future existence for man to ex-\\npect, life must be declared a despairful tangle. Now,\\nbefore Theism gives an optimist flavor to human\\nthought, something would need to be known of the\\nnature of the future existence postulated by Pro-\\nfessor Eraser. There is nothing captivating in the\\nthought of a prolongation of life, apart from its value\\nand conditions. The Greeks believed in life after\\ndeath, but they got little satisfaction out of their\\ncreed, because of the dreariness of their conceptions.\\nWho, again, can rest satisfied with the conception of", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 231\\nimmortality embodied in Calvinism Who would\\nnot prefer the annihilation of the entire human race\\nto a future in which a few revelled in heavenly bliss,\\nwhile the vast majority endured forever the pangs\\nof Tophet To assume, therefore, as Theists do, that\\nthe bare expectation of life after death is a consol-\\ning thought, is to go in the teeth of history and\\nhuman nature. In order to find a resting-point for\\nhis optimism, the Theist must declare for the neces-\\nsity of a revelation. The supernaturalist can score\\nagainst the Theist by simply asking whether it is\\nreasonable to suppose that the great question of\\nman s destiny would be left to vague surmisings\\nand melancholy musings. Professor Eraser feels the\\nforce of this consideration. No doubt he realizes\\nthe fact that when once the miraculous element is\\nintroduced, the question enters the historical sphere,\\nwhere again Hume meets us with his formidable\\nessay on miracles. Speculative philosophy will help\\nus little in dealing with Hume. Light, if it comes,\\nwill come from a deeper study of history, keener\\nscientific penetration into the nature and purpose\\nof life, and a more exhaustive psychological study\\nof man. Already science, when reduced to its last\\nanalysis, supplies a rational basis for the belief in a\\nmysterious awe-inspiring Power, and fosters a sense\\nof dependence on that Power. It remains to be\\nseen whether science, as interpreted by philosophy,", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "232 HERBERT SPENCER\\ncan throw some light upon the great and funda-\\nmental question of purpose. Already science, in\\nthe form of the Evolution theory, has lightened\\nthe burden of this question, so far as this earthly\\nscene is concerned. The problem of evil and pain\\nis not so formidable to us as it was to Hume. We\\nare discovering significance in the earthly drama.\\nA reverential Agnosticism does not preclude the\\nhope that in the future man may secure for himself\\na harmonious conception of the world and human\\ndestiny, by means of which he will no longer find\\nhimself an orphan wandering in a dreary wilderness,\\nbut the heir of all the ages, the interpreter of Nature\\nand co-worker with the Eternal.\\nWhatever the future has in store for philosophy,\\none prediction may confidently be made, that humanity\\nwill owe to Herbert Spencer an everlasting debt of\\ngratitude. Forty years ago he set himself a colossal\\ntask. He resolved to give to the world a new system\\nof philosophy. Ill-health dogged the footsteps of the\\nphilosopher all through the long spell of years, and\\nat times it seemed as if the Synthetic Philosophy\\nwould be left an unfinished monument of splendid\\naudacity. Handicapped by ill-health, uncheered by\\npopular sympathy, unrewarded by the reading public,\\nHerbert Spencer went his lonely way with a courage\\nakin to heroism. Now he sees his task completed.\\nOnly those who have been privileged with Mr.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "RELIGIOUS ASPECT 233\\nSpencer s friendship fully know the difficulties with\\nwhich he had to battle, and can estimate the victory\\nhe has won. Many thinkers in the flush of opening\\nmanhood have conceived great systems of thought,\\nand entered upon far-reaching projects. But too\\noften the glow of intellectual enthusiasm has died\\naway in presence of the daily drudgery of lonely\\ntoil. Even those who get beyond the Coleridgean\\nstage of weaving philosophic dreams, find their ideal\\nreceding as they get entangled in the pleasures,\\nanxieties, and ambitions of Vanity Fair. Herbert\\nSpencer has refused to soil his robes in Vanity\\nFair. He has treated the baubles of the passing\\nhour with philosophic indifference. Into old age\\nhe has carried the intellectual vigor of youth,\\nand the mellow wisdom of ripe manhood. He has\\nnever wavered in his devotion to the great interpre-\\ntative and constructive ideas with which his name is\\nassociated and thus the reader has the rare pleasure\\nof studying a system of thought which, from start\\nto finish, breathes the spirit of continuity. There\\nare no gaps to fill in the various volumes hang on\\nFirst Principles like golden beads upon a golden\\nstring. Herbert Spencer may rest from his labors\\nwith the proud consciousness that with his own right\\nhand he has carved his path from obscurity to a\\nphilosophic throne. He now stands among the\\nsceptred immortals.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n^schylus, 130.\\nAge of Reason, foreseen, 2; and\\nMaterialism, 30; end of, 31;\\nhopes entertained from, 97.\\nAlcibiades, as soldier, 130.\\nAmerica, Spencer s admirers in,\\n62,64.\\nAncestor-worship, 194 ff.\\nAntisthenes, 129.\\nAppleton s Popular Science\\nMonthly, article on Spencer in,\\n45.\\nArchytas, 129.\\nAristotle, on slavery, 130.\\nAugustine, influence of, on world, 2.\\nAustralia, New Liberalism in, 166.\\nBacon, Francis, 20.\\nBentham, Jeremy, aids revival of\\nEmpiricism, 35 and Utilitarian-\\nism, 40, 41, 147; and Social Con-\\ntract theory, 161 ff and Con-\\nscience, 171.\\nBerkeley, 114-115.\\nBritish Association, the, 19.\\nBrotherhood of man, the, 180-181,\\n186-188.\\nBuckle, Henry Thomas, 4, 5\\nquoted, 129.\\nBurghers, rise of, 133 and Magna\\nCharta, 155 first represented in\\nParliament, 156 in Spain, Italy,\\nand France, 156-158.\\nCaird, Principal, 226.\\nCalvin, influence of, on world, 2\\nconception of immortality, 231.\\nCarlyle, Thomas, quoted, 1, 5 and\\nMaterialism, 33.\\nCatholic Church, in Middle Ages,\\n136.\\nChamberlain, Joseph, 165.\\nChateaubriand, 33.\\nChemical affinity not a cause,\\n85.\\nChrist, ethical theory of, 181.\\nCivil Engineer Journal, the, Spen-\\ncer s papers in, 16.\\nCivilization, modern, and social\\nproblem, 134 ff.\\nClan, the, 179.\\nCobden, Richard, 141, 185-186.\\nColeridge, 33, 233; Mill s essay on,\\nquoted, 34.\\nCollectivism, 159.\\nCommerce, true theory of, first\\nformulated, 139 ff. and rights\\nof man, 153.\\nCommunism, domestic, 126.\\nComte, Auguste, 4, 5, 73 merits of\\nhis work, 21-24 defects, 24-26\\nSpencer not a follower of, 43;\\non attempts to reduce phenom-\\nena to a single law, 50; on cell\\ndoctrine, 50 his philosophy and\\nSpencer s, 52 on the cause of\\nprogress, 127, 161 mistakes cause\\n235", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "236\\nINDEX\\nof civilization, 136 his fine pic-\\nture of the Middle Ages, 138.\\nConcepts of Modern Physics,\\nStallo s, 74.\\nConcepts of Modern Science,\\nStallo s, 207.\\nCondorcet, 97.\\nConscience, Kant s views on, 169\\nff. the Utilitarians idea of, 171.\\nConsciousness, and Psychology,\\n109 fe.\\nConservation of Forces, 70, 71, 85,\\n207.\\nConstitution of Man, Comhe s, 20.\\nContinent, Spencer s disciples on\\nthe, 64.\\nCo-operation, indispensable to\\nman, 126 origin of, 183.\\nCopyright Commission, Spencer s\\nevidence before, 60.\\nCorn Laws, the, 156, 185.\\nCortes, Spanish towns and the,\\n156-157.\\nCousin, Victor, 33.\\nCuvier, 56.\\nDarwin, Charles, 67, 95, 117, 134,\\n182.\\nDelage, Professor Yves, quoted,\\n102.\\nDemosthenes, a soldier, 130.\\nDescartes, 114.\\nDeuteronomy, quoted, 197.\\nDiderot, aims of writings of, 3;\\ncreed of, summed up by Hol-\\nbach, 30-31; quoted, 199.\\nDissolution, definition of, 79.\\nDynamic Element in Life, The,\\n87.\\nEcclesiastical Institutions, Spen-\\ncer s, 214.\\nEclecticism, 33.\\nEconomist, the, Spencer sub-editor\\nof, 17.\\nEgo, German philosophers self-\\nacting, 115.\\nEmerson, Ralph Waldo, quoted, 59.\\nEncyclopsedia of Sciences, the, 3,\\n32.\\nEncyclopaedists, the, 3, 97.\\nEpaminondas, 129.\\nEuropean Thought, Merz s, 21.\\nEvans, Mary Ann. See George\\nEliot.\\nExperiential philosophy, the, 27-\\n28; revival of, 34; Spencer s in-\\nfluence on, 38.\\nFamily, in social organization,\\n126 ff the ethical unit, 178-179.\\nFetichism man s early religion,\\n192.\\nFeudalism, 132; despotism su-\\npreme under, 150.\\nFichte, Johann Gottlieb, 33.\\nFire Principle, Stahl s, 85.\\nFirst Principles, Spencer s, 10, 68,\\n76, 83, 94, 213.\\nFiske, John, quoted, 117-119,203;\\non prolongation of infancy, 177\\nThe Idea of God, 194.\\nFoster, Sir Michael, 92-93.\\nEraser, Professor, criticised, 227 ff.\\nFree Cities, in England, 137 rise\\nof, 153; in Spain, Italy, and\\nFrance, 156 ff.\\nFree Trade, 139, 141, 156, 158 re-\\nlation to ethics, 181 ff. Cobden s\\nclear view of, 185-186.\\nFrench Revolution, the, 29-30, 157.\\nGauss s laws, 74.\\nGenesis, Individuation and, 98.", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n23T\\nGeorge Eliot, 9, 54-56.\\nGodwin, William, 97.\\nGoethe, 31, 123.\\nGravitation, law of, 71; a name\\nand not a cause, 85.\\nGreat man theory, 1.\\nGreece, cause of fall of, 130.\\nGreen, Professor, 219 ff.\\nGrove, Sir William R., 75.\\nGuilds, 151.\\nGuizot, on Industrialism, 132-133;\\nhis book cited, 184.\\nGunton, 135.\\nHamilton, Sir William, 34, 68, 204-\\n205, 208, 209.\\nHappiness man s chief goal, 41.\\nHegel, 33, 115, 123; favorite in\\nUniversity circles, 13, 64 his\\nAbsolute, 208 ff. represented\\nDeity as product of Evolution,\\n220.\\nHelmholtz, quoted, 75, 207.\\nHelvetius, philosophic system of,\\n3.\\nHennell, Miss Sara, 55.\\nHerbert, Lord, 191.\\nHeredity, 100.\\nHero-worship, result of ignorance\\nof law of evolution, 5, 6.\\nHigher Criticism, the, 190.\\nHinton, James, quoted, 86, 210-\\n212, 214.\\nHistory of Modem Philosophy,\\nHoffding s, 220-222.\\nHobbes, Thomas, 147 and Social\\nContract theory, 161 ff.\\nHoffding, Dr., 220-222.\\nHolbach, philosophic system of, 3;\\nhis System of Nature, 31, 32.\\nHooker, Dr., 57.\\nHooker, Sir Joseph, 102-103.\\nHouse of Commons, origin of, 156\\nconspicuous in modern civiliza-\\ntion, 158.\\nHudson, Professor, quoted, 11-12,\\n45^6.\\nHumanity, in Comte s philosophy,\\n52.\\nHume, David, 73, 204; his Agnos-\\nticism, 29; continues Locke and\\nBerkeley s reasonings, 114-115;\\nin sphere of religion, 192 ff.\\ndialogues on religion, 229 essay\\non miracles, 231.\\nHuxley, T. H., criticises Comte, 4;\\nand the Theologians, 28-29.\\nIdea of God, The, Fiske s, 194.\\nIdealist, Spencer termed an, 89.\\nIdealists, the, 216 ff.\\nIdeas, part i^layed by, in civiliza-\\ntion, 127.\\nIndia, Spencer s followers in, 64.\\nIndividual, subordinated to State\\nin Greece and Rome, 131.\\nIndividuation and Genesis, 98.\\nIndustrialism, origin of, 132;\\ngrowth of, 133; and Roman\\nCatholicism, 136-137 and Mili-\\ntarism, 148; and religion, 197 ff.\\nInfancy, comparative length of\\nperiod of, 126 Fiske s theory of\\nprolongation of, 177.\\nIn Memoriam, 182.\\nInstinct, Reason and, 112 ff.\\nIntelligence, law of. 111.\\nIntuitionalists, the, 189 ff.\\nItaly, Free Cities in, 157.\\nIverach, Professor, quoted, 226-\\n227.\\nI Jackson, Dr. Hughlings, on Prin-\\ncijiles of Psychology, 12,0-121,", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "238\\nINDEX\\nJapan, Spencer s works welcomed\\nin, 64.\\nJob, 123, 203; quoted, 215.\\nJoule, J. P., 75.\\nJurists, the Roman, 180.\\nKant, Immanuel, 33; explains\\nstellar and planetary systems by\\nlaw of gravitation, 71; roused\\nto philosophic activity by Hume,\\n115, 204; on Conscience, 169 ff.\\nKnowable, philosophy of the, 68.\\nLabor, held in contempt by Greeks,\\n130; effect of substitution of\\nmachine for hand, 139, 142 ff\\ndivision of, 183.\\nLankester, Professor Ray, 102.\\nLaplace, 71.\\nLaw of gravitation, 71, 85.\\nLaw of the three stages, Comte s,\\n22,84.\\nLecky W. E. H. on Roman Catholi-\\ncism and Industrialism, 136-137.\\nLegislation, influence of, on eco-\\nnomic progress, 158.\\nLeibnitz, school of, criticised by\\nJohn Fiske, 118.\\nLewes, George Henry, 31-32, 54,\\n55, 56.\\nLiberalism, Old and New, 165 ff.\\nLocke, John, 37, 147; metaphysi-\\ncal system of, 113 ff on co-oper-\\nation, 127 and the Social Con-\\ntract, 171 The Reasonableness\\nof Christianity, 191.\\nLogic, J. S. Mill s, 27.\\nLotze, 220 ff.\\nLyell, Sir Charles, his Principles\\nof Geology, 18.\\nMachinery, effect of use of, 139,\\n142 ff.\\nMagna Charta, 136, 154, 155, 158.\\nMaistre, J. M. de, 33.\\nMalthusianism, 97 ff.\\nManners and Fashion, Spencer s,\\n44.\\nMartineau, Dr. James, 191.\\nMasson, David, on J. S. Mill s\\nphilosophy, 36-37.\\nMaterialism and apostles of Age of\\nReason, 30-31 regarded as sys-\\ntem of philosophy, 32; fall of,\\n33 Hegel s Absolute system and,\\n209.\\nMaterialist, Spencer not a, 66 ff.,\\n122-123, 177.\\nMatter, and Motion, 79 ff. Mind\\nand, symbolic terms only, 122.\\nMelissus, as military commander,\\n129.\\nMercier, Dr., on value of Spencer s\\nwork, 121.\\nMerz, his European TJiought,\\nquoted, 21.\\nMetaphysicians, the, and Cousin, 33.\\nMiddle Ages, narrow view of\\nbrotherhood of man in, 181.\\nMiddle class in England, 137, 142.\\nMilitarism, 128 ff., 148; formation\\nof nations under, 152; Spencerian\\nview of, 159-160; ethical code\\nunder, 179-180 human sacrifice\\nunder, 196.\\nMill, James, 7, 35.\\nMill, John Stuart, 4, 5, 73 admires\\nSpencer, 15 his Logic, 27 and\\nSir William Hamilton, 34; and\\nEmpiricism, 35; Masson on, .36-\\n37; his Representative Govern-\\nment, 42 offers Spencer finan-\\ncial assistance, 62 limit of his\\nphilosophy, 69 on formation of\\na law from inductions, 79 on the", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n239\\nmind, 116; makes intellect chief\\ncause of progress, 127 on evil\\neffect of machinery, 139; on\\nConscience, 171.\\nMind and Matter, symbolic terms\\nonly, 122.\\nMonotheism, Hume on, 192; growth\\nfrom ancestor-worship, 195-196.\\nMorality, impossible without so-\\nciality, 175; product of social\\nevolution, 187.\\nMorgan, Professor Lloyd, quoted,\\n101.\\nMorley, John, 2.\\nMotherhood, civilization rooted in,\\n126.\\nMotion, direction and rhythm of,\\n76 ff,; Matter and, 79 ff.\\nNatural History of Religion, The,\\nHume s, 192.\\nNatural Religion, 191.\\nNatural Selection, law of, 95.\\nNature, aim of, in social evolution,\\n175 ff.\\nNebular Theory, 70, 71, 80.\\nNeo-Kantianism, 116, 217, 219.\\nNewton, Sir Isaac, 66-67, 71, 74;\\nSpencer s work as compared to\\nthat of, 121.\\nNonconformist, The, Spencer s pa-\\npers in, 16, 39-40.\\nOld Testament, slaughter of hu-\\nman beings authorized in the,\\n196-197.\\nOrderliness of nature, due to what\\n81.\\nOrganism, society compared to an,\\n147-148.\\nOrigin and Growth of the Moral\\nInstinct, Sutherland s, 173.\\nOther self, hypothesis of the, 194r-\\n195.\\nPaine, Thomas, 164.\\nParliament, burghers first repre-\\nsented in, 155-156.\\nPaul, influence of, on world, 2.\\nPericles, as soldier, 130.\\nPersistence of Force, Spencer s\\nstarting-point, 72 ff.\\nPersonality, Professor Fraser on,\\n228-229.\\nPhilosophy of Style, Spencer s, 44.\\nPhilosophy, definition of, 30 duty\\nof, according to Spencer, 51.\\nPhlogiston, Stahl s doctrine of, 85.\\nPlato, as soldier, 129.\\nPolitical Economy, Mill s, 139.\\nPolybius, as soldier, 130.\\nPolytheism, 195.\\nPositivism and Spencerism,49, 53;\\nComte claimed to be author of,\\n51.\\nPri7iciples of Biology, Spencer s,\\n6, 83, 91 ff., 94; creates new era\\nin study of Nature, 99 ff Lloyd\\nMorgan on, 101; Professor Ar-\\nthur Thomson on, 103-104.\\nPrinciples of Geology, Lyell s, 18.\\nPrinciples of Psychology, 44, 125;\\nDr. Hughlings Jackson s com-\\nments on, 120-121.\\nPringle-Pattison, Professor Seth,\\n116; quoted, 218.\\nProgress Its Law and Cause,\\nSpencer s, 44, 47.\\nProgress, cause of social, 127\\nSpencerian definition of social,\\n144.\\nProper Sphere of Government,\\nThe, Spencer s, .39.\\nProtection, influence of, on trade", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "240\\nINDEX\\nand commerce, 140; a survival\\nof military regime, 181.\\nProtestant movement, the, 136.\\nPsychology, revolutionized by\\nSpencer, 107; science of begins\\nwith dawning of consciousness,\\n109; philosophy rooted in, 203.\\nRadical programme, Chamber-\\nlain s, 165.\\nRational school, the, 27-28.\\nReason and Instinct, 112 ff.\\nReasonableness of Christianity,\\nThe, Locke s, 191.\\nReasons for Dissenting from M.\\nComte, Spencer s, 43.\\nRedistribution of Matter and Mo-\\ntion, 72.\\nReflex action. 111.\\nReform Bill, the, 156, 158.\\nRegimentation, method of, 149.\\nRelativity of Elnowledge, doctrine\\nof, 34.\\nRelativity, doctrine of, 204; at-\\ntacked by Hegelian school, 205.\\nReligion, influence of, on Mill and\\nSpencer, 9.\\nRepresentative Government, Mill s,\\n42.\\nRights of Man, Paine s, 164.\\nRome, cause of fall of, 131 ethical\\neffect of world-wide conquest of,\\n180.\\nRousseau, a Deist, 30; his theory\\nof state of nature, 42; on co-\\noperation, 127; and Social Con-\\ntract theory, 147, 161.\\nRoyalists, the, and Chateaubriand,\\n33.\\nSchelling, 33.\\nScience, definition of, 30.\\nSermon on the Mount, the, 181;\\nto-day declared impracticable by\\nclergy, 198.\\nSlavery, among Greeks, 130; in\\nMiddle Ages, 133.\\nSmith, Adam, 139 176, 181 ff.;\\nhis doctrine treated as an ex-\\nploded superstition, 185.\\nSocial Contract, the, 127, 147,\\n161 ff. Locke s, 171.\\nSocialism, a retrograde movement,\\n159.\\nSociality, co-operation the germ of,\\n126 may exist without morality,\\n175.\\nSocial Statics, Spencer s, 40, 46,\\n54, 60.\\nSocrates, a soldier, 129; a citizen\\nof the world, 180.\\nSolon, 129.\\nSophocles, as soldier, 130.\\nSpain, militarism dominant in, 156-\\n157.\\nSpencer, the elder, 7, 8.\\nSpencer, Herbert, birth of, 6 un-\\naffected by religious influences,\\n9, 10; education, 11-14; a civil\\nengineer, 15; sub-editor of the\\nEconomist, 17 earliest products\\nof his thinking, 39-40 personal\\ncharacteristics, 54-65; relations\\nwith George Eliot, 56 and Amer-\\nicans, 62, 64; his influence in\\nEurope and the East, 64, 102;\\ndisregards worldly honors, 65,\\n233.\\nSpencer, Rev. Thomas, 11 ff.\\nSpinoza, 190.\\nStallo, 74 his Concepts of Modern\\nScience, 207-208.\\nState, the, in Greece and Rome,\\n130-131; in Middle Ages, 136; in", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\n241\\ntime of war, 150; modern view\\nof duty of, 154-155; Spencerian\\nview of, 159 ff.\\nState of nature, theory of, 42.\\nStructure of the Protoplasma,\\nDelage s, quoted, 102-103.\\nStuart dynasty, 154, 15G.\\nSutherland, Alexander, 173.\\nSydney, meeting of unemployed\\nin, 106.\\nSympathy, basis of morals, 176;\\npurifies human nature, 188.\\nSynthetic Philosophy, Spencer s,\\nprospectus issued, 54.\\nSystem of Nature, Holbach s, 31,\\n32.\\nSystem of Philosophy, Spencer s,\\n61.\\nTaine, quoted, 28.\\nTennyson, Alfred, 182.\\nTheists, the, 191.\\nThemistocles, 129.\\nTheology, Mill s philosophic con-\\nception that of, 28; Hume\\nknocked props from, 115; sup-\\nplanted by science, 199-200.\\nTheory of Population, Spencer s,\\n44.\\nThomson, Professor Arthur,\\nquoted, 103-104.\\nThree stages, Comte s law of the,\\n22, 84.\\nThucydides, as soldier, 130.\\nTocqueville, Alexis de, 135.\\nTrade, true theory of, 139 \u00c2\u00a3f.\\nTrade Unionism, Spencerian view\\nof, 159.\\nTribe, formation of the, 127 ff.;\\neffect of expansion of, on the\\nreligious idea, 195-196.\\nTurgot, quoted, 167.\\nUniversity cliques, opposition of,\\nto Spencer, 13, 64.\\nUtilitarianism, Spencer s feeling\\ntoward, 40 ff.\\nUtilitarians, the, 40 ff. and Con-\\nscience, 171\\nVestiges of Creation, The, Spen-\\ncer s, 20.\\nVital Force, 86; inadequate as\\nexplanation of biological phe-\\nnomena, 87.\\nVital Principle, postulated, 86, 4;\\nmany scientists still cling to the,\\n105-106.\\nVoltaire, aims of writings of, 3;\\na Deist, 30.\\nVon Baer, 44, 45.\\nWages, effect of machinery on,\\n143-144.\\nWar, see Militarism.\\nWard, Professor, 24-25, 219 ff.\\nWealth, distribution of, in Greece\\nand Rome, 130-131.\\nWeismann, Professor, 100.\\nWhewell, William, 20-21.\\nWordsworth, William, 200.\\nXenophon, as military commander,\\n130.\\nZophar, 215.", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "JUN 301900", "height": "3017", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2977", "width": "1811", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3017", "width": "1887", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerma00macp_0260.jp2"}}