{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3981", "width": "2361", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "*o;o o,^", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "^\u00c2\u00b0-n^\\nr..--.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "i", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "WORKS ON CHESS BY FRANKLIN K. YOUNG\\nTHE MINOR TACTICS OF CHESS\\nTHE MAJOR TACTICS OF CHESS\\nTHE GRAND TACTICS OF CHESS\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS\\nSELF-TEACHING CHESSBOARDS", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "Black.\\ni ri ri T i i i r iT|-r|\\nm\\niffli a\\\\ Iff*;\\nlil^^i\\ni\\ni m\\nm\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "CHESS STRATEGETICS\\nILLUSTRATED\\nMILITARY ART AND SCIENCE ADAPTED TO\\nTHE CHESSBOARD\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a212\\nBY ZX\\nJO\\nFRANKLIN K^ YOUNG\\nAUTHOR OF the MINOR TACTICS OF CHESS THE MAJOR\\nTACTICS OF chess; THE GRAND TACTICS OF\\nCHESS THE SELF-TEACHING\\nCHESSBOARD, ETC.\\nPositions anH HEiampUs from f$lorpI}g s ffiames\\nBOSTON\\nLITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY\\n1900", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "42791\\ni-itotrt^ty of Con .if\u00c2\u00ab9s\\nSEP 4 1900\\nC\u00c2\u00abryngh1 \u00e2\u0080\u00a2ntry\\nSECOND COPY.\\nOdnwrvd to\\nOROt\u00c2\u00ab DIVISION,\\nSEP 10 i^no\\n^K/^5/\\nn\\nCopyright, 1900,\\nBy Franklin K. Young.\\nAll rights reserved.\\n74460\\nHntbersttg ^^\u00c2\u00abss\\nJohn Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U. S. A.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "TO\\nOF\\nCHAELES PAUL MOEPHY\\nThe Incomparable Chess-player\\nTHIS PRESENTATION OF THAT ART AND SCIENCE\\nOF WHICH HE IS THE\\nUNEQUALLED EXPONENT\\nWITH PROFOUNDEST REVERENCE\\ni^ost ?^umtlg ts Sctiicatetr\\nBY\\nTHE AUTHOR", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "PREFACE.\\nTHIS book teaches how to apply, in actual play over\\nthe board, that theory of chess fountied upon\\nthe practice of the greater Masters the laws and\\nprinciples of which for the first time are formulated\\nand put into language in the preceding volumes of this\\nseries.\\nNo amount of knowledge, however well classified\\nand arranged, is of avail until those processes whereby\\nit may be put to practical use are made clear.\\nThis is the reason why the theorist, or mere man of\\nlearning, is the most useless of mankind and why the\\nartist, or man of action, is so infinitely his superior in\\nevery walk of life.\\nThat is to say, science of itself is of little value, and\\nas between the two, art is vastly to be preferred for\\nthe reason that a man may know much, but from lack\\nof understanding of the processes whereby only can his\\nknowledge be put to practical use, he, in all directions,\\nis outclassed by a man of little education, but who\\nunderstands the secret for putting to practical use all\\nthe knowledge of which he is possessed.\\nThe three preceding volumes of this series contain\\nthe laws and principles which appertain to the Science", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "Vlll PREFACE.\\nof Chess in this fourth and final volume is illustrated\\nthose Minor, Major, and Grand Processes of Greater\\nLogistics which appertain to the Art of Chessplay.\\nThis book teaches how to combine the processes of\\nthe art of chessplay with the formulas of the science\\nof chess, and discloses those two great secrets which\\ngovern the Science of Strategetics, whether the con-\\ntending pieces are made of wood and ivory or of flesh\\nand blood.\\nBoston, 1900.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nPA E\\nINTRODUCTORY xix\\nThis book the fourth and concluding volume of the Chess Strate-\\ngetics Series.\\nThe Synthetic Method of Chessplay formulated and put into\\nlanguage for the first time in these volumes.\\nUnqualified indorsement of this series of chessbooks by the highest\\nchessic, literary, and military critics.\\nReplete with logic and common sense. Emmanuel Lasker.\\nAfter six months study English critic defeats on even terms opponent\\nwho for years had given him odds and a beating. London [Eng.)\\nSpectator.\\nMost useful to beginners of all standard works. Complete Hoyle.\\nThese books mark an epoch in the literature of chess, The\\nGreen Bag.\\nShow how a game of chess is played by a great player. Providence\\nJournal.\\nBest books on chess are by Franklin K. Young. His books are\\nthe most important productions of modern chess literature.\\nAmerican Chess Magazine.\\nThese books deserve nothing but commendation. New York\\nClipper.\\nReally the higher mathematics of chess. New York Sun.\\nIs to the student of chess what Clausewitz and Von Hohenlohe\\nare to the soldier at arms. Principles of grand strategy and\\nlogistics applied to chess in a unique and scientific way. Author\\nentitled to gratitude of all devotees of the royal game. Army\\nand Navy Register.\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED 3\\nPrinciples underlying science of war and science of chess are\\nthe same 3\\nProcesses of art of warfare and art of chessplay daily used\\nin the mathematics 3", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "X CONTENTS.\\nPAGB\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS confznue(f.\\nBoth sciences based upon the mathematical truth that two men\\ncan whip one man 3\\nThe art consists in those processes whereby the two men are\\nmade simultaneously to attack the one man 3\\nThe forces may properly become a collection of individuals\\ntermed armies and be posted either on the battlefield or\\non the chessboard 3\\nThe fundamental law of war as laid down by Napoleon 3\\nThe race is to the swift and the battle to the strong 4\\nNo use for a man to study strategetics unless equipped with\\nthe ability to reason 4\\nWhat Frederick the Great thought of men who could not or\\nwho would not learn 4\\nDefinition of the word force when used in the military\\nsense 5\\nEirst corollary of the fundamental law of strategetics 5\\nEorce which at a given time is inactive has no value,\\nsays Napoleon 5\\nForce of the chesspieces is equal 6\\nThey differ only in their facilities for bringing force into\\naction 6\\nDifference in their manner of moving typifies topographical\\ndifferences in chessboard 7\\nAs many different surfaces to the chessboard as there are pieces 7\\nMathematical chessboard is a composite of all the topo-\\ngraphical horizons contained in a given situation 7\\nTopographical Horizon 8\\nOf the Pawn 8\\nKnight 9\\nBishop 10\\nEook 11\\nQueen 12\\nKing 13\\nMinor Front 14\\nMajor Front 15\\nGrand Front 16\\nLines or Communication 17\\nPoints 17\\nFirst Law or the Art of Chessplay 18\\nCorollary 1 20\\nCorollary II 21", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. xi\\nPAGE\\nPRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS 22\\nEach chesspiece typifies a complete corps d armee equipped with\\nall its infantry, cavalry, artillery and in highest state of\\ndiscipline and physical vigor 22\\nContending armies equal, each consisting of sixteen com-\\nplete corps d armee 22\\nThese corps, however, are separated from each other by\\nnatural obstacles typified by their different manners of move-\\nment 22\\nThis is in violation of the Napoleonic dictum, Unity is\\nthe soul of strategy 22\\nPossibility of the arrival on the scene of action of corps not con-\\ntained in the original order of battle a most important con-\\nsideration 22\\nChessplayer confronted by a hostile army while eight other\\nhostile corps are advancing against his rear 23\\nThree great objects which must be harmonized in every\\ncalculation 23\\nPrinciple which governs the column of manoeuvre 27\\nPrinciple which governs the column of support 37\\nPrinciple which governs the column of attack 41\\nAt every move those principles must be harmonized for the\\ndefence of the kindred and the attack of the adverse\\nposition 69\\nActual calculations of chessplayer comprehend 96 pieces and\\na board of 176 squares, two-thirds of which are invisible 70\\nSecond Law of the Art of Chessplat 70\\nThied Law of the Akt of Chessplat 71\\nFourth Law of the Art of Chessplat 71\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Major) 75\\nBefore studying this book, student should first master Minor\\nand Major and Grand Tactics 75\\nNo man can attain excellence at chess by climbing in through\\nthe cabin window 75\\nMathematics of war and of chess identical 76\\nBasic axiom of each is that two men can whip one man 76\\nHigher tactics of warfare and of chessplay, the same and com-\\nmon aim of each to attack one man with two men 76\\nAbstract principles governing both sciences simple and indisput-\\nable 76\\nThese principles comprehended and used even by savages 76", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "XU CONTENTS.\\nPAGE\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Major)\u00e2\u0080\u0094 continued.\\nConcrete processes of military art comprehended by only eleven\\nmen out of billions which have inhabited the earth 76\\nResults from fact that minds of average men seldom rise beyond\\nprocesses of simple arithmetic 77\\nInferiority of man of learning to man of action 77\\nTheorist the most useless of mankind 77\\nBetter to have little knowledge with abUity to use it, than vast\\nerudition without faculty to apply it 77\\nMorphy and Napoleon united thorough knowledge of the sci-\\nence with thorough understanding of the art 77\\nAnybody can attack one man with two men if given time\\nenough, and can overwhelm the single man if he make no\\nresistance 78\\nThe proper use of time to overcome the enemy s resistance de-\\nnotes the master at war and at chess 78\\nProcesses of Napoleon and of Morphy are of the differential\\ncalculus 78\\nGenius the faculty for comprehending that truth is true and\\nthat what is wrong never is right 78\\nProcesses of Morphy and Napoleon in no sense miraculous,\\nonly mathematically exact 78\\nPrmciple governs all things 79\\nThe master at war and at chess gains renown by strictly con-\\nforming to strategic laws and merely allowing his opponent\\nto violate these laws and thus become his own executioner 79\\nThese laws taken collectively constitute the theory of warfare,\\nwhether on the battlefield or on the chessboard 79\\nMorphy had a theory in regard to chess Napoleon had a theory\\nin regard to war 79\\nEach thoroughly understood the art of applying his theory for\\nthe overcoming of time and the resistance of the enemy 79\\nReason why mass of mankind are not Morphys nor Napoleons\\nis because they base their conclusions upon results 79\\nCauses not results are the prime elements for success in\\nanything 79\\nNapoleon won his victories before his battles were fought 80\\nHow Jomini watched Napoleon set up a military problem on\\nhis map of Europe 80\\nNapoleon, his map, his dividers, and his little pins surmounted\\nwith diverse colored balls of sealing-wax 80\\nJomini an enthusiastic and industrious historian, but no strate-\\ngist 81", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. xiii\\nPAGE\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS {Uxjo^) continued.\\nQuestions of high tactics/ says Napoleon, would turn La-\\ngrange and Laplace pale 82\\nJomini unable to decipher Napoleon s secret method for calcu-\\nlating victory 82\\nNeither the greater captains at war nor the greater captains at\\nchess ever put into language that system which gave them\\ntheir renown 83\\nWhen they died they took their vast knowledge out of the\\nworld with them 83\\nBut they were unable to obliterate the paths made by their\\narmies over the surfaces of the earth and of the chessboard 83\\nHence can be detected that ^imilarity of plan and procedure\\ncommon to all 83\\nThis similarity of method the basis of the true system both of\\nwarfare and of chessplay 83\\nNapoleon s dictum in regard to the only way to make war 83\\nFrederick s dictum in regard to the art of the great captain 83\\nMathematics the bond which harmonizes strategy, tactics, and\\nlogistics 84\\nThings that are equal to the same thing always are equal to\\neach other 84\\nShylock the Jew was a strategist he realized that he lost his\\nhouse, if he lost the prop by which his house stood 84\\nThe science of war and of chess determines the prop of the\\nenemy s position the art of warfare and of chessplay selects\\nthat process whereby this prop may be removed 85\\nHow Napoleon played at the game of war with a map for a\\nboard and little red and yellow and green images for armies 85\\nHow Napoleon planned decisive movements and combined a\\nlogistic operation 85\\nThe Tactical Key and its relation to the field of battle and the\\nchessboard 86\\nObjects of the lines of manoeuvre in war and in chess 86\\nThe Strategic Key and its relations to a given logistic operation 88\\nFifth Law of the Art of Chesspi-ay 88\\nFirst object of the great general, v/hether at chess or at war, to\\nexactly reconnoitre the situation formed by the combined posi-\\ntions of the contending armies 90\\nNext, to divide up his enemy s force, and then, to act against\\nthe communications of the opposing force thus divided 91\\nNapoleon s process for attacking a divided adverse force, whether\\nlocated on the map or on the chessboard 91", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "XIV CONTENTS.\\nPAGE\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Tsixjo^) continued.\\nThe Topographical Centre 92\\nPrinciple of Topographical Centre 93\\nDemonstration of Topographical Centre 93\\nApplication of this principle of military art and science to\\nchessplay 95\\nSixth Law of the Art of Chessplay 95\\nNapoleon s method for determining the strategic key of any\\nsituation 95\\nApplication of this principle of military art and science to the\\nchessboard 97\\nNapoleon s method for combining a logistic operation 98\\nKindred corps of the centre 99\\nright 100\\nleft 100\\nPoints of Departure 101\\nSeventh Law of the Art of Chessplay 101\\nThe Strategic Vertices 101\\nNapoleon s processes always based upon the violation of the\\nbasic law of strategy by the enemy 101\\nPoints of Manoeuvre 102\\nEighth Law of the Art of Chessplay 102\\nCorps Offensive 102\\nApplication of this principle of military art and science to the\\nchessboard 104\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZONS 106\\nNinth Law of the Art of Chessplay 110\\nOf Class 1 Ill\\n2 112\\n3 113\\n4 114\\n5 115\\n6 .116\\n7 117\\n8 118\\n9 119\\n10 120\\n11 121\\n12 122\\n13 123\\n14 124\\n15 125", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. XV\\nPAGE\\nTACTICAL HORIZONS 126\\nTenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 127\\nOf Class 1 128\\nII 130\\nIII 132\\nIV 134\\nV 136\\nVL 138\\nVII 140\\nVIII 142\\nIX 144\\nX 146\\nLOGISTIC RADII 148\\nEleventh Law of the Art of Chessplay 149\\nPOINTS OFFENSIVE 150\\nStrategetic Horizons 150\\nOf the Second Dimension 1 50\\nFirst Dimension 151\\nGeometrically expressed 152\\nTopography of 154\\nLINES OF MANOEUVRE 159\\nCompound and Complex 159\\nFirst Class Geometrically expressed 160\\nSecond Class Geometrically expressed 162\\nThird Class Geometrically expressed 164\\nLINES OF OPERATION 166\\nAlgebraic expression of 167\\nGeometrically expressed 171\\nTwelfth Law of the Art of Chessplay 170\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Minor) 181\\nMinor logistic processes appertain exclusively to the simple\\nLine of Manoeuvre .181\\nNever contemplate either the gain or the defence of material 181\\nSole object to divide up the opposing force 181\\nIn the opening object of these minor processes is to perpetuate\\nunscientific isolation of adverse pieces which exists to normal\\nposition 181\\nAlways must be combined with line of mobilization or of devel-\\nopment 181\\nThirteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 181", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "XVI CONTENTS.\\nPAGE\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS ^li-^oi^) continued.\\nNever permit Black to establish K P at K 4, Q P at Q 3, and\\nK B at Q B 4, as in this position he may draw the game 1 82\\nWhite should win by the advantage of the first move 183\\nSecret of keeping the advantage for White lies in preventing\\nBlack from playiug K B Q B 4 184\\nAll openings by White which permit this move by Black are\\ninferior 184\\nPlay to compel deployraeDt of Black K B at K 2 184\\nWhite should not castle until he can determine on which side\\nBlack will castle 1 84\\nKeep the Black Q P at Q 2 as long as possible 185\\nCorrect post for Black Q P is at Q 3 so long as White has K P\\nor Kt ready to play to K 5 after Black has castled K R 185\\nBlack never should leave his K B P defended only by his King 186\\nDislodge the Black K Kt from his K B 3 187\\nWlien possible hold Black K P at K 3 187\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS 190\\nClass 1 190\\nII 190\\nIII 190\\nSimple Li e of ^Ianceutre 191\\nGeometrically Expressed 191\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Grand) 195\\nCrucial phase of chessic art and science 195\\nThe irrepressible conflict between theory and practice 195\\nThe theorist a worshipper of abstract propositions, the tactician\\nenamoured of tangible and material detail 195\\nThe theorist and the tactician contrasted 196\\nBoth people also have the utmost contempt for the methods of\\nthe other 196\\nThe theorist despises the lack of system in the tactician, and the\\nlatter mocks at what he calls the egotistical pedantry of the\\nother 196\\nReason why the tactician outranks the theorist in every walk of\\nlife 196\\nThe theorist is handicapped by a world-wide fallacy which ren-\\nders his knowledge of little use to himself or to anybody else 196\\nThe great secret which governs the application of knowledge to\\npractical uses 196\\nThis secret unknown to the theorist but understood by the\\ntactician 196", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. xvii\\nfAGK\\nPROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS (Grand)\u00e2\u0080\u0094 conimuec/.\\nMorphy and Napoleon combined in themselves both the educa-\\ntion of the theorist and the skill of the tactician 197\\nMoreover, they knew the secret whereby is bridged tlie seem-\\ningly impassable gulf between science and art 197\\nThis secret is a method of calculation whereby the principles of\\nthe science and the laws of the art are harmonized and made\\nto co-operate to produce the desired end 198\\nA Genius is one who comprehends that method of calcula-\\ntion whereby are harmonized the principles of the science and\\nthe processes of the art 199\\nThat calculation whereby the true Strategetic Horizon can be\\ndetected is the connecting link between the science of chess\\nand the art of chessplay 201\\nBasic Proposition of Greater Logistics 202\\nTHE TACTICAL SEQUENCE 204\\nFourteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 204\\nFirst Tactical Sequence 205\\nIllustration of the order of marches contained therein 205\\nSecond Tactical Sequence 212\\nIllustration of the order of marches contained therein 212\\nThird Tactical Sequence 217\\nIllustration of the order of marches contained therein .217\\nCORPS DEFENSIVE 222\\nSustaining corps 223\\nSupporting corps 224\\nCovering corps 225\\nSurprised 226\\nSurrounded 227\\nIsolated 228\\nCommanded 229\\nOutflanked 230\\nOutfronted 231\\nCORPS DETACHED 232\\nFifteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 233\\nPLANS OF CAMPAIGN 234\\nFactors subordinate 234\\nSixteenth Law of the Art of Chessplay 234\\nRules for making a Reconnoissance on the Chessboard 235\\nThe strategetic offensive 235\\nThe strategetic defensive 236", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "XVlli CONTENTS.\\nPAGE\\nPRIME LOGISTIC OPERATIONS 237\\nORDERS OF BATTLE 240\\nOffensive 241\\nDefensive 242\\nThe Tactician s Rule 243\\nTHE INITIATIVE 245\\nSeventeenth Law of the Art of Chessplat 248\\nGRAND LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY 249\\nAPPENDIX.\\nThe Battle of Waterloo historicallt and technically\\nillustrated on the chessboard 253\\nCapture of Souhaiu 258\\nPapelotte 260\\nLa Haye Sainte 261\\nthe Park of Hougoumont 262\\nRout of the Dutch Belgians 264\\nBiilovp- attacking at Planchenoit 266\\nturns the French right 267\\nReille attacking Hougoumont 269\\nGrand assault on Mont St. Jean 272\\nFrench army changes front 275\\nArrival of Bliicher 277\\nNapoleon s Last Battle-Line 279\\nDestruction of the Old Guard 282\\nFlight of the French 284", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTORY.\\nIN placing before the public this fourth and final vol-\\nume of the Chess Strategetics Series, the author\\ncompletes a work undertaken merely as a relief from\\nmore arduous labors which has been accorded rec-\\nognition in technical literature far exceeding his expec-\\ntations a recognition which commands his deepest and\\nsincere appreciation.\\nThe synthetic method of chessplay which for the\\nfirst time is formulated and put into language in these\\nvolumes early received the indorsement of Emmanuel\\nLasker, who, in a personal letter to Mr. Edwin C. Howell,\\ncollaborator in Minor Tactics, stated that the new\\nmethod of chessplay was replete with logic and com-\\nmon sense.\\nThis distinguished stamp of approval, placed upon the\\nnew synthetic method by the Chess Champion of the\\nWorld, was supplemented a few months later by recog-\\nnition, high and flattering, in another sphere. The\\nLondon (Eng.) Spectator, in its issue of June 1, 1895,\\ndevoted a page and a half to an intelligent and compli-\\nmentary review of the Minor Tactics of Chess, and\\nstated\\nThe book is clearly written, but an effort is required to\\nmaster the theory and it needs to be mastered entire\\nbefore the light dawns. The reviewer, a poor player,", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "XX INTRODUCTORY.\\nplayed for many years with a friend from whom he usually\\nreceived odds and a beating. After acquiring (by six\\nmonths study) the new theory, he has played a series of\\ngames with the same friend (to whom this theory was un-\\nknown) without taking odds, and has not only won the\\nmajority of the games, but made a much better fight in\\nthose which he lost than he had been able to make before\\nbecoming acquainted with the theory.\\nOn this side of the Atlantic the reception accorded the\\nnew method was equally cordial, and that high authority,\\nR. F. Foster, in his Complete Hoyle said\\nOf all the standard works on the game, The Minor\\nTactics of Chess will be found most useful to beginners.\\nThe appearance of The Grand Tactics of Chess, the\\nsecond volume of the series to be published, marks\\nan epoch in the literature of the game and is, said\\nThe Green Bag, a revelation of the possibilities of\\nchess. The Providence Journal treated the volume\\neditorially, viz.\\nHe (Mr. Young) is brief in his explanations, clear in his\\ndefinitions, and with the aid of diagrams, exemplary in his\\ninstructions. His plan of treating the materials is syste-\\nmatic from beginning to end. He leads the reader up from\\ngeneral principles and laws by a logical course of procedure,\\nand he actually shows how a good game of chess should be\\nplayed how, indeed, it always is played by a great player.\\nIt was at this point in his chess writings that the\\nauthor first came to believe that his work would be un-\\nderstood and appreciated in his own lifetime. This was\\na consummation hardly to be hoped for, it is difficult\\nto teach old dogs new tricks the chess-players of the\\nday were wedded to their books of analysis, and it was\\ntoo much to expect that the new synthetic method would", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTORY. xxi\\nfind converts outside of a rising generation, whose mind\\nwas free from the effect of prior teachings and of estab-\\nlished habit.\\nBut the simple system of logic and common-sense\\nfound supporters, and particularly did it attract to itself\\nthose who are in the daily habit of using their intellects,\\nmen who buy books and who study them, the pro-\\nfessional class. Lawyers, doctors, the clergy, and grad-\\nuates of army and navy colleges eagerly perused the\\nnew argumentative treatises on a game which they all\\nadmire and practise, treatises which went to the root\\nof things, which gave the whys and wherefores, and\\nfitted the reader to evolve for himself better analysis\\nthan he can buy ready-made.\\nBut, more surprising still, the obvious merit of the new\\nsynthetic method carried by storm the very citadel of the\\nestablished order of things Caissic in America and that\\nhigh conservator of things that are The American\\nChess Magazine in its issue for Sei)tember, 1898,\\nsays\\nFor the student who desires to enter the broader chan-\\nnels of chess, the best books are by Franklin K. Young\\nhis Minor Tactics of Chess and his more elaborate Grand\\nTactics are the most important productions of modern chess\\nliterature.\\nBacked by such high indorsements as these, the\\ngrowth of the new system of chessplay naturally was\\nrapid and most satisfying to the author. But that\\nhighest authority whose approval he most desired still\\nwas silent. By his writings it was the object of the\\nauthor to show that the mathematics of the science of\\nwar and the mathematics of the science of chess are\\nidentical, and that the high tactics of warfare and of", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "XXll INTROD UCTOR Y.\\nchessplaj are the same and most of all did the author\\ndesire public recognition of his labors in this regard\\nfrom an admitted military authority.\\nIt was not until the publication of The Major\\nTactics of Chess in December, 1898, that the accuracy\\nof the author s treatment of chessic art and science was\\nplaced beyond dispute.\\nThe New York Clipper pronounced the third volume\\na book which deserves nothing but commendation.\\nThe New York Sun said It is really the higher\\nmathematics of chess, the combination that, to a mind\\nquick at geometrical evolution, will be a means of con-\\nfounding the adversary the insight into it a surprise\\nand delight, and the outcome having the unexpectedness\\nof a happy piece of wit.\\nOn Dec. 23, 1899, that sphinx, for which the author\\nso long had waited, opened its mouth, and with the great\\nvoice of military authority, The Army and Navy Reg-\\nister (Washington, D. C), said\\nThis additional contribution to chess literature from\\nthe able pen of Mr. Young will be received with even more\\ndelight than were his former scientific treatises, as it is\\na more complete development of his unique system. It\\nforms the second volume of the Chess Strategetics Series,\\nand, as the author confesses, may not improperly be termed\\na book of chess tricks. In the words of the text, Major\\nTactics is that branch of the science of chess strategetics\\nwhich treats of the evolutions appertaining to any given\\ninteger of chess force when acting either alone, or in\\nco-operation with a kindred integer, against any adverse\\ninteger of chess force the latter acting alone, or in com-\\nbination with any of its kindred integers. This definition\\nis a little discouraging to the student, but he should take\\nheart, and, if he can handle simple equations, he luill not", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTORY. ^^^H\\nfind the book difficult The secret of Major Tactics in\\nchess is to attack an adverse piece at a time when it cannot\\nmove, at a point where it is defenceless, and with a force\\nthat is irresistible. The hook is to the student of chess\\nwhat Clausewitz and Von Hohenlohe are to the soldier at\\narms. It is not intended for the beginner any more than\\nis a treatise on ballistics recommended for the recruit. In\\nit one finds the 2^^ inci2?les of grand strategy and logistics\\najp plied to chess in a unique and scientific way. The treat-\\nment is so clear and masterful a,s to win for the author\\nthe gratitude of all devotees of the royal game. Every\\nmove is given its place in the plan of attack and defence,\\nand is discussed in the light of examples from the historic\\ncontests of the great generals of the game. In print, paper,\\nand general presentment the book leaves no room for\\nadverse comment.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED,\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON.\\nTHE principles which underlie the science of war\\nand those which underlie the science of chess\\nare one and the same those processes whereby these\\nprinciples are applied in actual warfare and in actual\\nchessplay are nothing more nor less than processes in\\ndaily and common use in the various branches of the\\nmathematics.\\nThe science of mathematics is founded upon the\\nproposition that one and one make two the science\\nof war is founded upon the proposition that two men,\\nall else being equal, can whip one man. The art of\\nwarfare consists in those processes whereby two men\\nare made simultaneously to attack one man, and the\\nart of chessplay consists in these processes whereby\\ntwo kindred chesspieces are made simultaneously to\\nattack a single adverse piece.\\nIn the elaboration of these processes the individual\\nproperly may become a collection of individuals, as, for\\nexample, armies and covpB d armee^ and whether posted\\non the battlefield or on the chessboard but in either\\ncase the law remains the same, a law promulgated by\\none whose authority few will dispute\\nThe fundamental law of war, says Napoleon, is\\nthis, the greater force always overcomes the lesser.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "4 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe reader will observe that the master of military\\nscience does not qualify his statement he does not say\\nthat the greater force usually overcomes the lesser\\nnor that it almost always overcomes the lesser he\\nsays ALWAYS overcomes the lesser.\\nThere are men who up to this moment have held a\\ndifferent opinion. The mind of average humanity is\\nillogical it does not think, it merely receives impres-\\nsions through the senses. Thus its conclusions neces-\\nsarily are based upon results, i. 6?., upon things which\\ncan be seen, heard, and felt, and hence it readily is de-\\nceived and imposed upon through the defects and limita-\\ntions of the bodily organism. Consequently, many men\\nare of the opinion that it is possible for the weak to\\novercome the powerful, for grapes to grow on thorns,\\nfor the tail to wag the dog, and who would be astounded\\nto know that the race is to the swift and the\\nbattle to the strong, the Scriptures to the contrary,\\nnotwithstanding.\\nFurthermore, there are men who even after reading\\nthe law as laid down by the illustrious Corsican will\\ncontinue to hold to their different opinion. Of such,\\nthis is all that need be said he who is not endowed\\nwith an understanding of mathematics sufficient to\\nsense by mere instinct, as it were, the grand mechani-\\ncal fact underlying Napoleon s dictum, should not waste\\nhis time in the perusal of these volumes Nature has\\nnot equipped him for the study of strategetics, whetlier\\nthe latter relate to war or to chess. In the terse sen-\\ntences of Frederick the Great\\nNothing can serve to enlighten stupidity and stub-\\nbornness; a mule would not improve in his tactics, though\\nhe made twenty campaigns with Prince Eugene.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 5\\nBut those who approach this subject with the desire\\nto learn, readily will detect the peculiar wording of the\\nlaw. They will note that the great captain uses the\\nterm, /orce, that he does not say bodies of men,\\nneither does he say greater number of men and\\nthat, in short, he does not say anything whatsoever about\\nmen, either individually or collectively but he says\\nFORCE.\\nNow it is essential that the student of this theory,\\nonce and for all, comprehend that this force which\\nthe great master of military science is talking about\\nhas no relation to inert masses of men, but is a pure\\nmechanical power. li\\\\ war, this force is the weight\\nmultiplied by the square of the velocity of flying pro-\\njectiles from small arms and artillery, and of the bodily\\nimpact of charging men and horses, whereby hostile\\ntroops and material are put hors du combat in chess\\nit is the power inherent in kindred chessmen to elimi-\\nnate adverse pieces from the surface of the chessboard.\\nHence, the first corollary of the fundamental law of\\nStrategetics obviously is\\nA mass of troops or of chessmen does not achieve vic-\\ntory merely because it numerically is superior to the\\nopponent, the mass that wins may be in the aggregate\\neither larger or smaller than the enemy, all that is\\nmatter of indifference, the winning is effected in\\neach and every case by operating against a vital point\\na force i. e., a power to destroy greater than the\\npower to defend which at the given time and place is\\noperated by the enemy. Says Napoleon\\nIt is only the force brought into action which avails\\nin battles and campaigns, the rest does not count.\\nOf this force, as applied to the chesspieces, a most", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "b CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nerroneous idea commonly is held. The Queen, for in-\\nstance, is termed the strongest, or the most power-\\nful of the chesspieces the Rook, the next strongest,\\nand so on. As a matter of fact, the chesspieces are of\\nequal strength: none is either more or less powerful\\nthan the other. The Pawn can capture i. e., destroy\\nany adverse chesspiece by eliminating the latter from\\nthe surface of the chessboard so can the Rook, the\\nBishop, the Knight, and the King the Queen can do\\nno more. Hence, obviously, the force for destruction\\nexerted by one piece is equal to that possessed by any\\nother chesspiece.\\nThe fact that the Queen can attack at eight different\\npoints at one and the same time, and that she can\\ntraverse the length of the chessboard in a single move,\\nare in no sense manifestations of force (for she can\\ncapture and destroy at only one point in a single move,\\nand any other of the pieces is able to do likewise), but\\nof superiority in mobility i. e., in freedom of movement.\\nThis superiority of the Queen over the other pieces in\\nmobility is a tremendous advantage in special positions,\\nand greatly enhances her value in the abstract but this\\nadvantage does not take the form of force, but of\\nextraordinary facilities for bringing force into action. It\\nis as if, of two equal forces, one, the Queen, by virtue of\\ngood roads, could reach the battlefield in an hour while\\nthe other, the Pawn, en route through a broken country,\\nmight require two, three, four, five, or even more hours,\\nto reach the scene of action.\\nIn this connection the student will observe that the\\nfact of one piece not being able to move on a diagonal,\\nwhile another cannot move on a vertical or a horizontal,\\nand still yet another cannot move on an oblique, is typi-\\ncal merely of those topographical conditions which pre-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON. 7\\nvent a body of troops from crossing an unfordable river,\\nan impassable morass, an impenetrable forest, or an in-\\naccessible range of heights and that the swifter march\\nof one piece as compared with the slower march of an-\\nother piece merely typifies favorable and unfavorable\\nphysical conditions of ground and of troops, which accel-\\nlerate the one army and impede the other.\\nThus, the student readily will see instead of the\\nchessboard having but a single surface common to all\\nthe pieces, that in any given situation there necessarily\\nare as many different surfaces as there are different\\npieces, and that while the material or visible chessboard\\nis a simple matter of one big square, subdivided into\\nsixty-four smaller squares, alternately colored light and\\ndark, that the invisible or mathematical chessboard is\\na composite of all the topographical horizons which ap-\\npertain to the chesspieces contained in the given situa-\\ntion. The student should thoroughly comprehend the\\nappended diagrams illustrative of the topographical\\nhorizons of the various chesspieces, before proceeding\\nfurther.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTOPOGEAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE PAWN.\\nFlGUKB 1.\\nBlack.\\ni\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe Pawn to reach in a single move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON.\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE KNIGHT.\\nFigure 2.\\nBlach.\\nH\\nH\\nB\\nB\\nB\\nH\\nH\\nW^i te.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe Knight to reach in a single move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "10\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE BISHOP.\\nFiGUEE 3.\\nBlack.\\nm\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe Bishop to reach in a single move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON.\\n11\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE ROOK.\\nFigure 4.\\nBlack.\\nm\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe Rook to reach in a single move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "12\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE QUEEN.\\nFigure 5.\\nBlack.\\niHi\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe Queen to reach in a single move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON.\\n13\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON OF THE KING.\\nFigure 6.\\nBlack.\\ni\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe King to reach in a single move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "14\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS,\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON COMPOSITE.\\n{a)\\nFigure 7.\\nBlack.\\ny///M\\n^Si\\ny:^//////^.\\n///A//%9.\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe pieces contained in the Minor Right Oblique Doubly\\nAligned, to reach in a single move. Total, 39.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "TOPQiGRAPEICAL HORIZON.\\n15\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON COMPOSITE.\\n(6.)\\nFigure 8.\\nBlack.\\n////////y/.\\nZ^//////^.\\nifil\\nill\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe pieces contained in the Major Right Oblique Eche-\\nloned en Appui, with Minor Crochet, to reach in a single\\nmove. Total, 45.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "16\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON COMPOSITE.\\nFigure 9.\\nBlack.\\nm.\\niSl!\\nmm\\nm\\nW4m.\\n4m 4a\\ny//////////,\\ni\\nw^^\\nWhite.\\nNote. This diagram shows the points possible for\\nthe pieces contained in the Grand Right Oblique en Ap-\\npui, with Minor Crochet, to reach in a single move.\\nTotal, 49.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON.\\n17\\nLINES OF COMMUNICATION.\\nWhenever the topographical horizons appertaining\\nto two or more kindred pieces contained in the same\\ntopographical zone have one or more points in common,\\nthen, such points are termed Points of Communication,\\nand those horizontals, verticals, diagonals, and obliques\\nappertaining to the given kindred pieces which intersect\\nat such points of communication are term,^d Lines of\\nCommunication.\\nLINES AND POINTS OF COMMUNICATION.\\nFigure 10.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nNote. The line of communication between the two\\nwhite knights takes the form of a triangle composed", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "18 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nof two obliques, the vertex or point of communication\\nbeing White s Q B 6.\\nThe line of communication between the two White\\nRooks takes the form of a vertical (obviously, it equally\\nwell may be a horizontal), every point contained in\\nwhich is a point of communication.\\nThe line of communication between the Queen and\\nthe Rooks takes the form of a quadrilateral, and the\\npoints of communication are K R 2, K R 4, K B 7, and\\nall the points contained in the third horizontal.\\nThe line of communication between the White Queen\\nand the White Bishop is formed of two diagonals, and\\nthe points of communication are K B 4, K 3, K R 2,\\nQ 4, and K B 6.\\nThe line of communication between the White Bishop\\nand the White Pawn is formed of a diagonal, and the\\npoint of communication is Q B 3.\\nObviously, then, whenever two or more kindred pieces\\nare united with each other by lines of communication\\nthey always can support each other in a single move,\\nand in all cases wherein such lines of communication,\\ndo not exist it is impossible for them to give each\\nother such support.\\nHence, to the student, whether of mathematics, of\\nwar, or of chess, it is evident that the following is true\\nand valid\\nFIRST LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nWhenever tivo undefended kindred pieces having no\\nline of communication are simidtaneously attacked hy\\nan adverse force^ then one of the given kindred pieces\\nis lost.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "TOPO GRAPHICAL HORIZON.\\n19\\nNO LINE OF COMMUNICATION EXISTING.\\nFigure 11.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nNote. Both of the White Knights are isolated from\\neach other and are simultaneously attacked by the\\nBlack Queen. No line of communication existing, one\\nof the attacked pieces is lost.\\nIt also will be readily apparent to the student that\\nalthough a line of communication exists, but is nullified\\nfrom any cause, the resultant condition is as though the\\nline of communication did not exist, and again one of\\nthe two adverse pieces is lost by the operation of the\\nforegoing law.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "20\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nHence, the truth of the following corollaries is self-\\nevident\\nCorollary I. If neither of the attacked pieces can\\nmove, then, although a line of communication exists,\\none of the attacked pieces is lost.\\nLINE OF COMMUNICATION NEUTRALIZED.\\n(Corollary I.)\\nElGUEE 12.\\nBlack.\\n1\\nv///////A,_\\nWhite.\\nNote. A line of communication exists between the\\nWhite Knights, but neither Knight can move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL HORIZON.\\n21\\nCorollary II. If neither of the attacked pieces\\ncan occupy the point of communication, then, although\\na line of communication exists, one of the attacked\\npieces is lost.\\nLDs-E OF COMMUNICATION NEUTRALIZED.\\n(Corollary II.)\\nFigure i3.\\nBlack.\\nmm. mm. v//////m\\nm. wm..\\nm////A\\n^mm m.\\nWhite.\\nNote. A line of communication exists between the\\ntwo White Knights, but the point of communication is\\ncommanded by a Black Pawn.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\nIn contemplating the normal position, it is evident to\\nthe student of this theory that there are at the dis-\\nposal both of himself and of his opponent sixteen chessic\\ncorps cfarmee^ all of which are equal in strength, that\\nthe positions of the contending Caissan armies are\\nidentical, and that at the present moment neither has\\nany advantage over the other.\\nBut it is necessary that the student should observe\\nmuch more than this. In addition to recognizing in\\npawn, knight, bishop, rook, queen, and king a com-\\nplete army corps, having its full complement of in-\\nfantry, cavalry, and artillery, and all in the highest\\ncondition of physical vigor, discipline, and equipment,\\nand seemingly arrayed in a single mass, he must\\nrealize that in reality these corps are separated from\\neach other by numerous impassable barriers, in viola-\\ntion of the Napoleonic dictum Unity is the soul of\\nstrategy and, furthermore, lie must fix his attention\\nupon what is one of the greatest considerations known\\nto the science of Strategetics whether applied in war-\\nfare or in chessplay i. e., the possibility of the arrival\\nin the topographical zone of a body of chesspieces not\\nnumbered in the original corps de hataille.\\nIn war, this most important factor for successful cam-\\npaigning has its rise in tlie ability of the commander-in-\\nchief to combine the movements of troops, which, though\\nnot a part of the same tactical formation, yet, through\\nthe harmonious working of the laws of military science.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 23\\nnevertheless, are manoeuvring strategically^ i. e., as a\\nunit. In chess this factor is typified by the power of\\npromotion possessed by the pawns; in consequence of\\nwhich, as the student readily sees, the possibility always\\nexists that one or even all of the kindred pawns, or of\\nthe adverse pawns, may reach the logistic horizon in\\nwhich case, a force enormously greater than the original\\narmies would become precipitated into the theatre of\\nconflict.\\nConsequently, it is imperative for the student thor-\\noughly to realize that the hostile force on his front is\\nbut a part of the difficulties that beset him, and that in\\naddition to the sixteen corps of the enemy that face\\nhim, eight other hostile corps of equal force are ad-\\nvancing against his strategetic rear. To be sure, this\\nsituation has its compensation, otherwise the beautiful\\nmathematical harmony of this incomparable game would\\nbe destroyed, and Leibnitz could not in truth and in\\nrapt admiration have declared, Chess is an exact\\nscience^\\nFor, like as the eight hostile corps are advancing\\nacross the adverse hypothetical zone, their movements\\ndepicted by the advance of the adverse pawns in the\\ntopographical zone, so likewise is to be seen an equal\\nkindred force, marching across the kindred hypotheti-\\ncal zone to the attack of the strategetic rear of the\\nenemy.\\nHence, as the student readily will perceive, the strate-\\ngetic plane is the principal geometric figure in all\\ncalculations which appertain to the practical applica-\\ntion of this theory in actual play. Moreover, it is\\nequally evident that there are three great objects, the\\nattainment of which is the motif of every calculation,\\nviz.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "24 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nI. To destroy the Determinate Adverse Force.\\nII. To occupy the Kindred Logistic Horizon.\\nIII. To defend the Kindred Strategetic Rear.\\nIt also is easy to see that, for the attainment of these\\nobjects, all the powers contained in the Kindred Deter-\\nminate Force must be constantly devoted, and that every\\nmove made must, either directly or indirectly, harmonize\\nin itself the principles upon which those processes for\\nsimultaneously attaining these objects are based.\\nThat is, at every move, the entire force of all the kin-\\ndred pieces must be operated\\nI. To checkmate the adverse King.\\nII. To queen a kindred Pawn.\\nIII. To prevent the queening of an adverse Pawn.\\nThat force, operated by all the kindred pieces, collec-\\ntively, for the purpose of checkmating the adverse King,\\nis termed in this theory\\nThe Column of Attack.\\nThat force, operated by all the kindred pieces, collec-\\ntively, for the purpose of queening a kindred Pawn, is\\ntermed in this theory\\nThe Column of Support.\\nThat force, operated by all the kindred pieces, collec-\\ntively, for the purpose of preventing any adverse Pawn\\nfrom queening, is termed in this theory\\nThe Column of Manceuvre.\\nIn this connection, it is imperative that the student\\nclearly understand that each of these three prime strate-\\ngetic factors is composed of all the kindred pieces and\\nthat, at every turn to move, the threefold duty devolves\\nupon him of selecting that deployment, development,\\nor manoeuvre wdiich in the given situation harmonizes\\nin a single move the requirements of these three great\\ncardinal eleynents.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 25\\nThus, it is obvious tliat the object of the Column of\\nAttack is to gain command of the Objective Plane. Any\\nprocess wliich effects this end is a strategic line of\\noperations and is the completion of a complex line of\\nmanoeuvre. Hence, it is easy to see that the column\\nof attack ceases to exist whenever the net value of the\\nKindred Determinate Force, contained in the Topograph-\\nical Zone, is less than the mobility of the Objective\\nPlane.\\nThe object of the Column of Support is to occupy a\\nl^oint of junction on the kindred logistic horizon. Any\\nprocess which effects this end is a logistic line of\\noperations and is the completion of a compound line\\nof manoeuvre. Hence, it is easy to see that the column\\nof support ceases to exist whenever the last kindred\\nPawn is removed from the board.\\nThe object of the Column of Manoeuvre is to maintain\\na point of impenetrability upon the vertical occupied by\\neach adverse pawn. Hence, it is obvious that the\\ncolumn of manoeuvre ceases to exist upon the removal\\nfrom the board of the last adverse Pawn.\\nIn the performance of their various duties it well\\nmay happen that each of these prime strategetic factors\\nmay meet with more or less resistance from the Adverse\\nDeterminate Force, and in all cases of conflict it is\\nlegitimate for either column to use its full energies to\\ndestroy any or all of the opposing pieces. Aa\\\\j process\\nwhich effects this end is a tactical line of operations,\\nprovided do compensating benefit in time or in position\\nor in material thereby accrues to the enemy.\\nThe attention of the student is now requested to the\\nappended diagram, which shows a strategetic plane\\nand the position of the various prime strategetic factors.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "26\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack.\\ni^ ^i\\ni\\ni\\nfill\\n11\\nlal\\nw\u00c2\u00bb\\n?S\\nfii\\nV///////.\\n^f^%;\\nf\\nf\\nW^l\\nTFA/^e.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 27\\nNote. In this diagram is depicted the Topograph-\\nical Zone and the White Hypothetical and the Black\\nHypothetical Zones.\\nThe White column of attack is represented by the\\nwhite pieces contained in the Topographical Zone the\\nWhite column of support by the White Queens (promot-\\nable factors) contained in the Kindred Hypothetical\\nZone tlie White column of manoeuvre by the White\\nPawns contained in the Adverse Hypothetical Zone.\\nThe Black column of attack is represented by the\\nblack pieces contained in the Topographical Zone;\\nthe Black column of support by the Black Queens\\n(promotable factors) contained in the Kindred Hypo-\\nthetical Zone the Black column of manoeuvre by the\\nBlack Pawns contained in the Adverse Hypothetical\\nZone.\\nThe principle which governs the processes incident\\nto the column of manoeuvre is derived from the fact\\nthat no Paivn can 2?ass a piecs situated on the same\\nvertical. Such point, therefore, is a point of impene-\\ntrability and so long as it exists, it obviously is impos-\\nsible for the given Pawn to pass it, and of course equally\\nimpossible for the given Pawn to reach the logistic\\nhorizon, hence,\\nPRINCIPLE.\\nThe .strategetic rear is clefendecl against an adverse\\nPawn in all eases ivherein a point of imjoenetr ability\\nexists on the vertical a2?2?e7 taining to the given adverse\\nPaiun.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "28\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 29\\nNote. Obviously, it is impossible for any one of the\\npromotable factors {i. e.^ Queens), either with or without\\nthe move, to penetrate to its logistic horizon for the\\nreason that it cannot pass the point occupied by the\\nopposing Pawn.\\nThere are twenty- three basic situations, in which by\\nmeans of the advantage in position a column of ma-\\nnoeuvre may hold in check a numerically superior\\ncolumn of support.\\nThis advantage in position is illustrated by the fol-\\nlowing diagrams", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "80\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack.\\ni\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 31\\nNote. These situations are based upon the fact\\nthat the numerically larger column of support is obliged\\nto move, and that the only moves open to it are viola-\\ntions of the laws of major tactics.\\nConsequently, the inferior column of manoeuvre is\\ntransformed into a column of support then it advances\\nto its logistic horizon and occupies a kindred point of\\njunction, thus becoming a column of attack; then it\\npursues, overtakes, and annihilates the adverse column\\nof support. All this is done, as the student readily sees,\\nin conformity to Prop. YII. of Major Tactics.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "32\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack.\\nm\\nc\\nO O\\no\\nQ-\\no\\n02\\no-\\nu\\nt- o\\nSI\\nO n\\ns r\\n.^3\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2r o\\nTFAiVe.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n33\\nBlack.\\no\\n-tJ\\nm\\nfl\\ncS\\no\\ntH 05\\nt O\\n5 CH\\na\\nt|_J T-S\\nC c5\\na\\nS \u00c2\u00ab4-l\\n-c\\nB\\nXI\\no\\n1^2\\ne\\ng^\\nG Sh\\n.5 flH\\n2 o\\nrJ3 -(J\\no\\nbC\\nc; C\\ng\\nt^\\nS o\\nvA\\no\\nn\\ns\\nC)\\nc^\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a04^\\n-t^ i-i\\no\\no\\npG\\nif\\nS\\n1\\nO\\nO\\nrt\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2r s\\nl^-o\\no\\ns\\n1\\n1\\nH I\\nH pG\\no\\n;zi\\nCS\\nn^\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "34\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBtach\\nm i\u00c2\u00bb\\nm\\nf\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2i\\nl\\nf\\ni\\nw\\nc5 .2\\no\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a05 i\\nX!\\nw\\nc3\\nO\\n-^J\\np\\nc\\nt\u00c2\u00a3\\nJ^\\nc;\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2n\\no\\nX\\no\\ns^\\nV\\n:z;\\ncT\\nCN\\n;:3\\nc\\no\\no\\ns\\no\\no\\nCO\\n1\u00e2\u0080\u0094^\\ntrH\\no\\n-i-3\\nO\\ns\\n_\\nri\\n-4-3\\no\\nc\\n2\\nrt\\n;_\\no\\no\\n-1^\\n1\\nC5\\nE\\nH\\np\u00e2\u0080\u0094 1\\nO\\n12;\\ns\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0g\\nir/u-^e.\\nA -J", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n35\\nBlack.\\ni=l\\na\\no\\no\\nf^\\ns\\n8\\ni=i\\naj\\na\\na\\nB\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0+3\\no\\nO\\no\\nC3\\no\\nil\\nJ_,\\n^-i\\no\\no\\n.2^\\nXI\\n5=1\\nPh\\no\\nt^\\nt-l\\nCi^\\nri\\nn\\no\\nO)\\nbo\\na\\nC\\nc\\n;h\\no\\n0\\no\\nrg\\ns\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2V\\nO)\\nc\\no\\ns\\n13\\no\\nOS\\nr^\\nt4H\\no\\no\\na\\ns\\n~M\\n8\\n9\\no\\nri\\no\\n-M\\nn-i\\n1?\\nC3\\n:-i\\no\\n0)\\nr^\\n-*J\\n-M\\n,__,\\nH\\nc^\\n-(-3\\n1\\nO\\n1\\nTU\\nm\\nrj\\nH\\nrH\\ns\\n4-3\\nW\\nO)\\nr^\\nTFAiYe.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "36\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack.\\n9 1\\nm i\u00c2\u00ab\\nm m\\n]Vh tf:", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 37\\nNote. Either with or without the move, the numer-\\nically inferior column of manoeuvre can destroy in detail\\nthe adverse column of support composed of two promot-\\nable factors, and without the move, it can destroy in\\ndetail the adverse column of support composed of three\\npromotable factors according to Prop. XL of Major\\nTactics.\\nCOLUMN OF SUPPORT.\\nThe principle which governs the processes incident to\\nthe column of support is derived from the fact that, in\\nthe absence of a point of iyni^eyietr ability on its vertical,\\nit is possible for a Pawn to penetrate to the kindred\\nlogistic horizon. Hence\\nPRIXCIPLE.\\nA Point of Junction is open to occupation whenever the\\nnumber of Pawns advancing against the given logistic hori-\\nzon exceeds the number of adverse points of iinpenetrability.\\nThere are four basic positions which underlie all\\nsituations in which the column of support penetrates\\nthrough the adverse column of manoeuvre and gains\\npossession of a point of junction on the logistic horizon,\\nviz.\\n(rt) A position in which there is no point of impene-\\ntrability.\\n(5) In which an adverse point of impenetrability is\\noverlapped by two adjacent kindred supporting elements.\\n(c) In which the point of impenetrability is over-\\nlapped by two separated kindred supporting elements.\\n(f?) In which three points of impenetrability are\\nopposed by three supporting elements, the latter having\\nthe move.\\nThese four basic positions are shown in the following\\ndiao-ram", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "38\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 39\\nNote. These basic situations are founded on the\\nfact that all the points of impenetrability and of resist-\\nance being eliminated from the attitude of the given\\nPawn the latter will queen without capture, according to\\nProps, v., VI., VIII., IX., X., and XL (see The Major\\nTactics of Chess, pp. 110-121).\\nThe student readily will see that the White Queen on\\nthe extreme left of the hypothetical zone has an unim-\\npeded route of march to White s Q R 8 that the White\\nQueens on the centre of the same zone will easily\\nremove the point of impenetrability on their front, by\\nattacking it with one Queen supported by the other\\nQueen, and that if the Black Pawn captures the attack-\\ning Queen, the supporting Queen, by capturing in turn\\nthe Black Pawn, or by merely advancing along its logistic\\nradius, will remain with an unimpeded route of march\\nto its lo2:istic horizon.\\nAgain, if in the example on the extreme right, either\\nWhite Queen attacks the Black Pawn, the result is that\\none of the White Queens will remain with an unimpeded\\nroute of march to its logistic horizon, for whether the\\nBlack Pawn captures the attacking White Queen or ad-\\nvances or remains stationary, the point of impenetrabil-\\nity will be eliminated from the vertical of one, at least,\\nof the White symbols of promotion, and it will be ob-\\nserved that either with or without the move, the White\\nQueens may penetrate to their logistic horizon with\\nequal jfertainty and facility.\\nIn the case of the three Black Queens, the student will\\nobserve that it is imperative that they have the move\\notherwise the white column of manoeuvre will securely\\ncover the white strategetic rear by advancing the centre\\npawn one square towards the black symbols of promo-", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "40\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\ntion. This is the only move to maintain the integrity\\nof the White defence, for if either of the other White\\nPawns advance, Black wins by attacking with one of the\\nBlack Queens the supporting White Pawn whereupon\\none of the Black Queens will find itself in one of the\\nthree situations just described^ and accordingly will be\\nable to penetrate to its logistic horizon.\\nThis same situation results if Black has the first move\\nand he wins by advancing the centre black symbol of\\npromotion one step. See Grand Tactics, page 59.\\nCOLUMN OF SUPPORT.\\nFigure 23.\\nAdolph Anderssen.\\nPaul Morphy.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n41\\nThis position occuiTed in the first game of the match\\nbetween these masters.\\nTHE\\nPLAY.\\nX\\n[ll. MORPHY.\\nHerr Anderssen.\\n50.\\nKt B 6.\\n50. P X Kt.\\n51.\\nQ X P (ck).\\n51. K-Ktl.\\n52.\\nQ Kt 6 (ck).\\n52. K B 1.\\n53.\\nQ X P (ck).\\n53. K-Kl.\\n54.\\nQ Kt 6 (ck).\\n54. K-Q2.\\n55.\\nP E 6.\\n55. Q Q 4.\\n56.\\nP E 7.\\n56. Q X P (ck)\\n57.\\nK Kt 1.\\n57. Kt-Kt4\\n^B\\nP K E 8 (Queen).\\nb^. Q X 2ndQ.\\n59.\\nQ X Kt.\\nCOLUMN OF ATTACK.\\nThe principle which governs the processes. incident to\\nthe Column of Attack is derived from the fact that the\\npossession of that central diagonal ivhich extends toward\\nthe objective j^lane gives such an advantage in mobility\\nthat the consequent facility wdth which the kindred\\npieces may act in co-operation both for attack and for\\ndefence must ultimately lead to the checkmate of the\\nadverse king. Hence\\nPRINCIPLE.\\nAll else being equal, a properly constructed minor stra-\\ntegic front establishes an equality in position a properly\\nconstructed major strategic front establishes the superiority\\nin position and a p roperly constructed grand strategic\\nfront establishes a ivinning advantage in position.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "42\\nCRESS STRATEGETICS.\\nMIXOR EIGHT OBLIQUE {White).\\nMIlsOR LEFT OBLIQUE REFUSED [Black).\\nFigure 24.\\nAdolph Anderssen.\\nPi i pl^H i PI\\n^X^ X ^1 ill\\ni% ^y//////////. WY/z/yy/A\\nWWM\\np ^AkM -mm\\np 1^1\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred at move 14 in the fifth game\\nof the Morphy-Anderssen match.\\nThe student will observe that the White pieces are\\nposted in strict accord with this theory of chessplay,\\nand that collectively they constitute the formation\\ntermed in Minor Tactics^ p. 149, the 0PB2C.\\nIf the student will study carefully these fourteen\\nopening moves and will compare them with the moves", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n43\\ngiven by the so-called analytical authorities, he\\nreadily will see that Morphy made no pretence of con-\\nforming to their dicta, but merely played to establish\\nthe best available primary base, on a strategic front\\ndirected by the right, and so manoeuvring as to prevent\\nBlack advancing his K P to K 4.\\nMINOR LEFT OBLIQUE ALIGNED White).\\nFigure 25.\\nm. bornemann.\\ni I\\nWy///////.,\\nm\\nm\\nfm m\\nHi*\\ny/Tm//.\\nW/A g^\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred on the 18th move at Table\\nNo. 3 in the great blindfold match played at the Caf^\\nde la R^gence, Paris, September, 1858.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "44\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe student will observe that the Black K is castled\\non the Queen s side, and that the White position is\\ndepicted in Grand Tactics, Formula No. 17, page 136.\\nMINOR LEFT OBLIQUE [White).\\nFigure 26.\\nHerr Harrwitz.\\n/A\\n4m\\nW//.\\nm mm,. ^^..-M-..-.^^,,\\n.w//////^.^ -0/////////..\\nfm g pi!\\nPaul Morphy.\\nThis position occurred in the eighth game of the\\nmatch between these nxasters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n45\\nMAJOR RIGHT OBLIQUE (White).\\nFigure 27.\\nAdolph Anderssen.\\nk mi\\ni\\ny^/////y/7\\nffif\\nW/, %y////A\\nf Si IS\\nill-\\niMi\\nm\\ni\u00c2\u00abl\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred in the eleventh game of tlie\\nmatch between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "46\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nMAJOR RIGHT OBLIQUE {Black).\\nFiGUEE 28.\\nPaul Moephy.\\nH. E. B]\\nThis position occurred at the 10th move in the cele-\\nbrated Philidor s Defence between these masters.\\nThe student will observe that Black has wrested from\\nWhite the advantage of the initial move of the game,\\nand has established a formation which properly should\\nbelong to the first player.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n47\\nMAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE {White).\\n(Objective Plane, Left.)\\nFigure 29.\\nm. bornemann.\\nk\\ni 81\\nm fmm m\\nm\\n1\\nm mwM\\nm.....^\u00e2\u0080\u009e^ W^y,,^ iS,\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis situation occurred on the 29th move at Table\\nNo. 3 in the great blindfold exhibition at Paris, 1858.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "48\\nCHESS STRATEGETICI\\nMAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE {^yhite).\\n(Objective Plane, Centre.)\\nElGUKE 30.\\nPaul Moephy.\\nm\\nmi\\n4 i\\n//A\\nAdolph Axderssen.\\nThis position occurred at the 13th move in the third\\nand last game won from Morphy by the great German\\nmaster.\\n4", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS, 49\\nTHE PLAY.\\nHere Anderssen.\\nMr. Morphy.\\n13.\\nB K Kt 5.\\n14.\\nQ-K4.\\n14.\\nQ X Q.\\n15.\\nKt X Q.\\n15.\\nB xR.\\n16.\\nKt X K B.\\n16.\\nB-R4.\\n17.\\nBxP.\\n17.\\nP X P.\\n18.\\nKt X Kt P (ck).\\n18.\\nK K 2.\\n19.\\nB Q Kt 5.\\n19.\\nEx P.\\n20.\\nR- Kl (ck).\\n20.\\nK-B3.\\n21.\\nR-K8.\\n21.\\nB Kt a\\n22.\\nKt Q 6.\\nWhite\\nwon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "50\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nMAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE {White).\\n(When Black Q P cannot occupy Q 3.)\\nFigure 3L\\nPaul Mokphy.\\n///y///^//A\\n11 iBi\\n^_\u00e2\u0080\u009e-\u00e2\u0080\u009e__\u00e2\u0080\u009ei III i\\n\\\\.\\\\..^m ^B\\nM m m. MM.\\nii m km\\nAdolph Anderssen.\\nThis situation occurred in the ninth game of the\\nmatch between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 51\\nTHE PLAY.\\nMe. Morphy.\\nHerr Andeessen.\\n5. Kt-Kt5.\\n5.\\nP-Q3.\\n6. B-KB4.\\n6.\\nP K 4.\\nTo B K 3.\\n7.\\nP-B4.\\n8. QKt-B3.\\n8.\\nP B 5.\\n9. Kt-Q5.\\n9.\\nP X B.\\n10. K Kt B 7 (ck).\\n10.\\nK-B2.\\n11. Q B 3 (ck).\\n11.\\nKt B 3.\\n12. B-B4.\\n12.\\nKt Q 5.\\n13. Kt X Kt (dis ck).\\n13.\\nP-Q4.\\n14. B X P (ck).\\n14.\\nK Kt 3.\\n15. Q K E 5 (ck).\\n15.\\nK X Kt.\\n16. P X P.\\n16.\\nKt X P (ck),\\n17. K-K2.\\nWhite won.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "52\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS\\nGRAND RIGHT OBLIQUE EN APPUI {White).\\nMAJOR LEFT OBLIQUE REFUSED (Black).\\nFigure 32.\\nJudge A. B. Meek.\\ni 11 ^H II.\\nw/////^.\\nYA y/777777/y^.\\n_ m\\nIP\\nm;\\nmm.\\nPaul INIorpht.\\nThis position occurred on the 24th move of a Fian-\\nchetto Defence. It shows the Strategetic Objective\\noccupied by a pawn.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n53\\nGKAND EIGHT OBLIQUE {White).\\nFigure 33.\\nAdolph Andekssen.\\nW\\\\\\nWTm^\\n1\\nm. ^.mm.\\\\4M,\\nm iHi\\nm.,\u00e2\u0080\u009e,,^/ t ^^4\\ny//////m\\nmm,, m\\nI \u00c2\u00a9I\\ne\\ni\\ns\\nPaul Morphy,\\nThis position occurred in the eleventh game of the\\nmatch between these masters. It shows the Strategetic\\nObjective occupied by a piece.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "54.\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nGEAND LEFT OBLIQUE EN APPUI WITH MINOR CROCHET\\n{White).\\nElGUEE 34,\\nS. S. BODEX.\\nm is.\\nV//////y/. //^//tM\\nwy////^.\\nZy/////M.\\ni Ill\\ni\\nmm. m\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred on the 39th move of a Two\\nKnights Defence.\\nf", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n55\\nMINOR RIGHT OBLIQUE REFUSED AND ALIGNED {Black).\\nFigure 35.\\nPaul Morphy.\\nII iwM.\\nm\\nm\\nHi\\nk 4m. i\\nI\\nW W///////A\\nHi/\\nMONGREDIEN.\\nThis position occurred at the 14th move of the\\nseventh game in the match between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "66\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nMINOR LEFT OBLIQUE REFUSED {Black).\\nFigure 36.\\nPaul Morpht.\\nmmi 11\\nii i \u00e2\u0096\u00a0-iM i ill i\\nWi\\nm\u00e2\u0080\u009e\\njZv/////^.\\nMm..\\nm\\ni\\nJudge McConnell.\\nThis situation occurred at the 11th mo^e of a French\\nDefence.\\nBlack s position is the model of this form of defence\\nagainst the Major Right Oblique En Potence.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 57\\nTHE PLAY.\\nJudge McConnell. Mk. Morpht.\\n11.\\nB X P (ck)\\n12. P X B.\\n12.\\nKt X Kt P.\\n13. Q-Q2.\\n13.\\nE-B7.\\n14. Q-Ql.\\n14\\nKt K 6.\\nBlack\\nwon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "58\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nMINOE LEFT OBLIQUE EEFUSED AND ALIGNED {White).\\nFlGUEE 37.\\nPaul Morpht.\\niWi\\nm\\nm mm^..\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^mm/\\n^/S^..^ mm^y,\\n^mi\\nli\\n1! i\\ny^^/^.\\n\\\\w WW\\nHI\\n4m 4k\\nAdolph Andeessen.\\nThis position occurred in the tenth game of the match\\nbetween these masters. It shows the defence of the\\nK Kt at K B 3 by K B-K 2 against the Fianchetto of\\nthe adverse Q B.\\nTHE PLAY.\\nHekk Anderssen. Mr. Morphy.\\n24. B-QKt2.\\n25. Q B 2\\n24. Q-KB2,\\n25. B-K2.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n59\\nMAJOR RIGHT OBLIQUE REFUSED EN POTENCE {Black).\\nFigure 38.\\nPaul Morphy.\\n1\\n4m\\n7//////%\\ni\\ni #Si\\ni% W//////A\\nv//////y J^ 7////////.\\ni\\nm\\ni^\u00e2\u0080\u009e _, W^^^y.\\nJacob Lowenthal.\\nThis position occurred at the 40th move of the ninth\\ngame in the match between these players.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "60\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nMAJOR CROCHET White).\\nFigure 39.\\nMr. Barnes.\\nil\\nfifj\\ni\\n^11 i\\nm\\nmm\\n4^A mmA... mm,\\nm m. M\\nSI\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred at the 24th move in a King s\\nBishop s opening. White won by P-Q Kt 5.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n61\\nTHE ECHELOX White).\\nFigure 40.\\nAdolph Axderssen.\\nm w\\nMi...^,..W//////A ^S^y.\\nII i i u\\nW///MM.\\n,-f^zJ,f^^^^\\nm^m. mAm\\nPaul Moephy.\\nThis situation occurred in the fifth game of the match\\nbetween these masters. It shows the construction of\\ntlie Echelon, the En Appui, and the En Potence in the\\nRight Oblique by White.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "5f\\nr\\n62 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTHE PLAY.\\nMr.\\nMOEPHY.\\nHere Andeessen.\\n15.\\nP K R 3.\\n15. Q B 1.\\n16.\\nK-E2.\\n16. K-Rl.\\n17.\\nE K Kt 1.\\n17. E-KKtl.\\n18.\\nP K Kt 4.\\n18. P-KKt4.\\n19.\\nP K B 4, etc.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n63\\nTHE EN POTENCE {White).\\nFigure 41,\\nStauntox and Owen.\\nm\\nww.^\\nw/////^. y^//////M:,\\nZ^//////yZi\\nV.\\n^////////y /y/^^//\\nMoRPHY and Barnes.\\nThis position occurred at the 21st move in the second\\ngame of the famous consultation contest played at Bir-\\nmingham, England, 1858. White won.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "64\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTHE FIANCHETTO [Black),\\nElGURE 42.\\nPaul Morpht.\\nm i\\nm\\nWHfM\\nWm\\nm 4M\\nfm.. m,\\nWa ^Si\\nMr. Mongredien.\\nThis position occurred at the 43d move in the third\\njame between these players.\\nm", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\nQb\\nCROCHET ALIGNED IN DOUBLE FRONT BY THE RIGHT\\nWhite).\\nFigure 43.\\nJacob Lowenthal.\\ni\\nill i M I iii\\n^^.^^^^...^^^^p.\\nM^4M\\ni\\nW///////A rv^ $5^$?2^^\\ni 1^1\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis situation occurred on the 20th move in the\\ntwelfth game of the match between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "66\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nCROCHET ALIGXED IN DOUBLE FRONT BY THE LEFT\\n{White).\\nFigure 44.\\nTheodore Lichtexhein.\\n11\\nmm,.^^f;;;;^J^^M,\\n4^11 i\\nm^lM.\\n1^1 i\\ni %#i~\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred at the 20th move of a Petroff\\nDefence. White won.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS.\\n67\\nMINOR FRONT DOUBLY ALIGNED {White).\\nFigure 45.\\nJacob Lowexthal.\\n^i\\nv/z/zz/yZ Z^zzzzz///\\nWz t^i,.\u00e2\u0080\u009e^,^a Isl\\n1 il i\\nVZ///////Z/\\nWM.\\nif i Pi\\nvy//ZZZy VZy/y/yZZZy\\nm.\\ni mi A fSi\\ny/zzz/vzzz vzzzzzzzzzz\\nIS4\\nI MB\\nM\\nyZZ/rtV/Z\\nyZZZZZZy^.\\nPaul Moephy.\\nThis situation occurred in the fourth game of the\\nmatch between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "68 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe student perceives that the column of attack is\\ncomposed of a force represented by the combined action\\nof all those kindred pawns and pieces which at *any\\ngiven time are contained within the Topographical Zone,\\nand that the movements and operations of the column\\nof attack always are restricted to the limits of the\\nvisible, or material chessboard.\\nIt also is equally evident that the column of support\\nis composed of a force represented by the combined\\naction of all those kindred pawns and pieces which at\\nany given time are contained within the Topographical\\nZone whose operations always are exclusively directed\\nagainst the logistic horizon with the object of occupy-\\ning one or more points of junction with a kindred pawn\\nbut whose movements technically are restricted to the\\nlimits of the kindred Hypothetical Zone, z*. e., to that\\npart of the mathematical or invisible chessboard wliich\\nappertains to the kindred body of chesspieces.\\nLastly, it easily is seen that the column of manoeuvre\\nis composed of a force represented by the combined\\naction of all those kindred pawns and pieces which at\\nany given time are contained within the Topographical\\nZone whose operations are exclusively directed against\\nthe adverse column of support and for the defence of\\nthe kindred strategetic rear, with the sole object of\\npreventing any hostile pawn from penetrating to its\\nlogistic horizon and occupying a point of junction; but\\nwhose movements technically are restricted to the limits\\nof the adverse Hypothetical Zone, i. e., to that part of\\nthe mathematical or invisible chessboard which apper-\\ntains to the adverse body of chesspieces.\\nAs the student already has been taught, whenever a\\nline of operations exists, all principles may be violated,\\nall formations disrupted, which are not germane to the", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 69\\nimmediate calculation i. e.^ in all cases wherein the\\nwinning of the game can be mathematically demon-\\nstrated, either by the checkmate of the adverse king, by\\nthe queening of a kindred pawn, or by the gain of\\nadverse material then, that analytical calculation\\nwhereby such determinate result is obtained is supreme.\\nFor all the elements being known, the situation may\\nbe depicted accurately, and consequently the process is\\nexact and is merely one of simple arithmetic.\\nBut in all other cases, i. e., wherein no line of\\noperations can be demonstrated, then, as the student\\nlikewise has been taught, the situation properly is one\\nof manoeuvre, i. e., one in wliich a systematic attempt is\\nbeing made to bring about the position termed a line\\nof operations.\\nIn this case, one or more of the elements are not\\nknown, the situation, therefore, cannot be exactly de-\\npicted it is first necessary out of the midst of the\\ndifferences which exist to extract harmony conse-\\nquently, the process is one of the differential calculus.\\nHence, as the student already has been taught in such\\nsituations, no principle of strategy nor of tactics, nor\\nof logistics, should be violated no sacrifice of material\\nshould be made, and no formation constructed in ac-\\ncordance with this theory should be disintegrated.\\nThe student thus will easily perceive, that in compli-\\nance to the requirements of these principles, and to the\\nbasic law of the Science of Chess Strategetics of which\\nthese principles are but the corollaries, at every move\\nthe column of attach., the column of support^ and the\\ncolumn of manoeuvre must act together as a unit for\\nthe defence of the kindred and for the attack of the\\nadverse position. It equally is obvious that the three-\\nfold duties which respectively appertain to these columns,", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "70 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\ntaken collectively, are devolved, in the execution, upon\\nthe sixteen corps d\\\\irmi^e which originally constitute the\\nchessic army, e., that these sixteen kindred chesspieces\\nare required, as it were, to multiply themselves threefold,\\nand to perform the labors of forty-eight corps cVarmce\\nand that, instead of contemplating the movements of\\nthirty-two men on a chessboard of sixty-four squares,\\nthe calculations of the chessplayer comprehend the\\ndeployments, developments, manoeuvres, and operations\\nof combined kindred and adverse determinate and hy-\\npothetical forces represented by ninety-six pawns and\\npieces, over the surface of a mathematical chessboard\\ncomposed of one hundred and seventy-six squares tico-\\nthirds of the chesspieces and two-thirds of the chessboard\\nbeing invisible.\\nThe student of strategetics, whether of war or of\\nchess, readily sees the mathematical exactness of this\\nvast chessic proposition, and equally so, that in compre-\\nhensiveness and in profundity it easily is equal to any\\nproposition known to military art and science. Hence,\\nto the soldier and to the chessplayer alike, it is obvious\\nthat the following is true and valid\\nSECOND LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nAt every turn to play and no line of operations existing,\\nahuays act simultaneously u ith the Column of Attack in\\nthe Topographical Zone, icith the Column of Support in\\nthe Kindred Hypothetical Zone, and ivith the Column of\\nManoeuvre in the Adverse Hypothetical Zone, and always\\nreject every move ichich violates those principles governing\\nthe processes incident to these Prime Strategetic Factors.\\nThe student furthermore will see that whenever the\\nkindred force is insufficient to give checkmate it cannot", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "PRIME STRATEGETIC FACTORS. 71\\nwin the game that whenever no kindred pawns remain\\non the board, no further reinforcement of the original\\nkindred force is possible, and that whenever no adverse\\npawns remain on tlie board, there is no longer any\\nnecessity for guarding the strategetic rear. Hence, it is\\nobvious that the following is true and valid\\nTHIRD LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nI. The Column of Attach ceases to exist whenever the\\nnet value of the Kindred Determinate Force is less than\\nthe mobility/ of the Objective Plane.\\nII. The Column of Support ceases to exist whenever\\nthe last hiyidred promotable factor is eliminated,\\nIII. The Column of Manoeuvre ceases to exist whenever\\nthe last kindred point of imp eyietr ability is eliminated.\\nIn the position shown in the diagram following, Black\\nhas a column of support, but no column of attack nor\\ncolumn of manoeuvre while White has columns of attack\\nand of manoeuvre, but no column of support.\\nNote. The student readily perceives that the com-\\nbined White Rook and Knight constitute a column of\\nattack movements, as they jointly are able to command\\nthe Objective Plane that the three Black Pawns are a\\ncolumn of support, and that the White King is a column^\\nof manoeuvre, inasmuch as it can defend the white strat-\\negetic rear against the Black Pawns.\\nFOURTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nIn every situation and at every turn to move., always\\nmanoeuvre either with that kindred Prime Strategetic\\nFactor which has the advantage; or with any Kindred\\nFactor to make subordinate a dominant adverse Prime\\nStrategetic Factor.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "72\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack.\\nm\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GEEATER LOGISTICS\\n(JIAJOK).", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS\\n(MAJOR).\\nThe student who attempts to master this volume with-\\nout having thoroughly familiarized himself with Minor\\nTactics, Major Tactics, and Grand Tactics, will\\nhave his labor for his pains.\\nBefore he can comprehend the art of chessplay, he\\nmust first have thoroughly educated himself in the sci-\\nence of chess it is not possible that one may under-\\nstand the processes of Greater Logistics and the\\ncomplexities of Lines of Manoeuvre and of Operation,\\nuntil he first has fathomed the preparatory intricacies\\nof Lesser Logistics, as interpreted in Lines of Mobiliza-\\ntion and of Development.\\nIn fact, it is now necessary to assume that the student\\nhas the whole chessic theory, as laid down in the three\\npreceding volumes of this series, at his fingers ends, so\\nto speak; and that, in actual play over the board, he\\nis not at loss to know the proper construction of any\\ngiven primary base, to know how to mobilize and how to\\ndevelop any desired strategic front, and how to avoid\\nthose errors in tactics whereby he may fall victim to a\\nsuperior knowledge of routine evolutions on the part of\\nhis opponent.\\nIn other words, there is no climbing in through the\\ncabin window, as the sailors say the road to chessic\\nexcellence is steep and rugged, and even the directness", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "76 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nand clearness of this synthetic method of chessplay\\ncan be of no avail to one who is ignorant of its simplest\\nprocesses.\\nAs the student already has been taught, all calcula-\\ntions having but a single point of command belong ex-\\nclusively to the domain of Major Tactics they are\\ndeterminate propositions, and are solved by simple\\narithmetic and until the student has thoroughly mas-\\ntered them, he should confine his studies to the second\\nvolume of this series. For a similar reason, if the stu-\\ndent is not entirely familiar with the proper construction\\nof the several strategic fronts and of the direction which\\nshould be given to each and if he does not comprehend\\nthe utility of the various supplementary formations\\nwhich appertain to these strategic fronts, he should\\ncontinue the study of Grand Tactics until he has\\nacquired the knowledge which fits him to approach this\\nvolume with some slight idea of its import. In case he\\nis ignorant even of the construction of primary bases,\\nand the reasons therefor, then the Minor Tactics of\\nChess is the book he needs, not this one.\\nAs before has been laid down, both the science of war\\nand the science of chess are based upon the axiom that,\\nall else being equal, two men can whip one. The art of\\nwarfare and the art of chessplay consist in getting the\\ntwo men simultaneously upon the other man s hack. So\\nsimple and so indisputable are the principles and the\\nprocesses appertaining to the science of war in the ab-\\nstract, that even savages utilize them with vigor and\\naccuracy, and every civilized man, whatever his condi-\\ntion, feels himself competent to sit in solemn and final\\njudgment on the profoundest military propositions, re-\\ngardless of the fact that since the dawn of history only\\neleven men, out of many billions, have evinced a thor-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 77\\nough understanding of the concrete processes of the art\\nof warfare.\\nIn chess it is much the same. The practitioner, as a\\nrule, and whatever may be his rank in the chess world,\\nusually overestimates his weight in the chessic scale, a\\nfact upon which the famous master Mackenzie once\\ncommented, We are none of us so strong as we think\\nwe are.\\nThe reason of this is that the minds of ordinary hu-\\nmanity seldom rise above the processes of simple arith-\\nmetic. So long as the proposition is exact, and all of\\nthe elements are known, even the tyro, whether at war\\nor at chess, gets along fairly well his operations in the\\nfield or on the chessboard are successful, and his judg-\\nments, whether in military or in chessic councils, are\\njust and conclusive.\\nThis condition, whether on the chessboard or on the\\nbattlefield, is the triumph of mediocrity, and is due to\\nthe fact that the theorist pure and simple is the most\\npitiably helpless and useless of all human beings. On\\nthe other hand, the man with but little education, yet\\npossessed of the faculty of making full use of what\\nknowledge he has, is the man more properly equipped\\nfor success, whether in chessplay, in warfare, or, for that\\nmatter, in anything else.\\nBut let a man arise who combines the thorough un-\\nderstanding of theory with the thorough understanding\\nof those processes whereby theory is correctly applied,\\nwhether in chessplay or in warfare, and you have\\nMorphy and Napoleon. Those processes, whereby theory\\nproperly is applied in actual warfare or in chessplay, are\\nnot the processes of simple arithmetic. This is the\\nreason why there is but one Morphy in the annals of\\nChess and but one Napoleon in the annals of War. Any-", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "78 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nbody can simultaneously attack one man with two men,\\neither on the chessboard or on the battlefield, if he is\\ngiven time enough, and no resistance is made by the\\nsingle man. But the moment that the unknown ele-\\nments of the single man s resistance and of time and\\ndistance enter into the calculation, then the proposition\\nbeco mes indeterminate it is no longer a sum in simple\\narithmetic, but a problem in the differential calculus.\\nIt is now that the theorist, pure and simple, although\\nutterly impotent, inasmuch as his comprehension of the\\nscience is offset by his lack of understanding of the art,\\nnevertheless rubs his hands and howls with glee at the\\nsight of so-called practical chessplayers or soldiers\\nmere arithmeticians, rather ignominiously overthrown,\\nhorse, foot, and dragoons, as the old saying is, by a\\ngenius, a prodigy, a supernatural intelligence,\\nwhich last, being interpreted, simply means that a man\\nhas come to the top who thoroughly comprehends both\\nthe theory and the art of applying it.\\nThus the student will observe that there is nothing\\nmiraculous in the fact of a boy of twenty-one, in the per-\\nson of Morphy, defeating with ease and in the most bril-\\nliant manner the greatest chessmasters of his day nor\\nin a boy of twenty-six defeating the greatest generals of\\nhis day with equal ease and in an equally brilliant man-\\nner. Both of these prodigies are dead and gone, and\\nboth are by posterity admitted to stand at the head of\\ntheir respective professions. The success of the one was\\ndue to the fact that he had a theory in regard to chess,\\nand thoroughly understood the art of applying this\\ntheory in actual chessplay, for the overcoming of time,\\nof distance, and of the resistance of the opponent the\\nsuccess of the other was due to the fact that he had a\\ntheory in regard to war, and thoroughly understood the", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTTCS. 79\\nart of applying this theory in actual warfare for the\\novercoming of time, of distance, and of the resistance of\\nthe opponent.\\nThe reason why the generality of men are neither\\nMorphys nor Napoleons is because the generality of\\nmen base their conclusions upon results because they\\nare ignorant of the causes which bring about these\\nresults and because they are oblivious to the fact that\\ncauses and not results are the prime essentials for suc-\\ncess, and that in comparison with these causes, mere\\nresults are matters of insignificance, being at most\\nnothing but necessary sequences.\\nConsequently, the generality of men never look deeper\\nthan mere results, and, sillily accepting these latter as\\nprimary elements, they project a horizon lacking in\\nexactness and con\\\\prehensiveness. Then by a simple\\nprocess of addition and subtraction in which all their\\nmental energy not infrequently is expended they gain\\nwhat success they do gain, not as the logical outcome of\\nprofound and accurate calculations, but as the direct out-\\ncome of blunders on the part of the opponent, and because\\nthese blunders happen to be more numerous and more\\negregious than those which they themselves commit.\\nThat is to say, the processes of ordinary chessplayers\\nand of ordinary generals at best are no more than the\\nprocesses of Major Tactics, processes which are simple\\nand exact whose results are determinate, and whose\\nvalidity depends upon the commission of a blunder by\\nthe opponent and not infrequently upon the commission\\nof such a blunder as logically only the tyro in chessplay\\nor in warfare should be guilty of.\\nOn the other hand, the processes of Napoleon and of\\nMorphy are based upon logical deductions as to the\\nrelative values of causes^ whereby harmony of theory is", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "80 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nestablished in the midst of tactical and strategic differ-\\nences created by lack of time, topographical obstacles,\\nand the resistance of the enemy. These processes of the\\ndifferential calculus, infinitely superior to the methods\\nof the average chessplayer and of the average general,\\nare thus defined by Napoleon\\nQuestions of high tactics are indeterminate physico-\\nmathematical problems, which admit of several solutions,\\nand cannot be determined by the formulas of elementary\\ngeometry.\\nEvery school-boy is familiar with the fact that Napo-\\nleon won his victories before his battles were fought\\nby sticking his inap of Europe full of pins surmounted\\nby divers-colored balls of sealing-wax. This perform-\\nance is thus described by the distinguished military\\nwriter. Baron de Jomini\\nNapoleon knew how to collect together, with admirable\\nprecision, upon the decisive point of the zone of operations,\\nhis corps d armee which previously had departed from the\\nmost divergent posts. The choice of this decisive point\\nwas a skilful strategic combination, and the calculation of\\nthe movements of the corj^s (Tarmee was a logistic oj)era-\\ntion which emanated from his closet. Eurnished with a\\ncompass opened at a scale of from seven to eight leagues\\nin a right line, leaning over and sometimes lying down\\nupon his map, where the positions of his corps cVarmee\\nand the presumed position of the enemj^ were marked by\\npins of different colors, he ordered the movements of his\\narmy ivith an assurance of ivhich it icould he difficidt to\\ngive a just idea. Moving the compass with vivacity upon\\nthe map, he judged, in the twinMing of an eye, of the\\nnumber of marches necessary to each of his corps for\\narriving at the point ichere he luished to have it at a given\\nday then placing his pins in these new positions and", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 81\\ncombining the rapidity of the march which it would be\\nnecessary to assign to each of their columns with the\\npossible epoch of their departure, he dictated those in-\\nstimctions which of themselves alone would be a title to\\nglory.\\nThis extract is quoted for more than one reason, and\\namong others to show how easy it is for a man to\\nwTite interestingly, even upon a subject of which he is\\ntotally ignorant. The Baron de Jomini is the most\\nconspicuous example afforded by military annals of a\\ntheorist pure and simple, i. e., a man devoid of the\\nleast understanding of the art. He was educated in\\nthe regular service was personally present in many\\ncampaigns, and for nine years served under Napoleon,\\nwho never would intrust him even with the command of a\\nbattalion in the field. Had Jomini possessed military\\nability equal to his enthusiasm and his industry, he\\nobviously not only would have been the greatest of\\nNapoleon s marshals, but he must have become even\\nthe rival of the illustrious Corsican.\\nThe student who attentively reads the above extract\\nfrom Jomini s Art of War, p. 271, will at once notice\\nan incongruity. Of course, there are a number of incon-\\ngruities, but, in particular, the student will observe that\\nJomini, while seeming to explain Napoleon s calculation,\\nutterly fails,\\n1. To state the rule by which this decisive point is\\nto be determined\\n2. To describe the logistic operation^^^ whereby the\\ncorps d armee were made to concentrate at this decisive\\npoint; or,\\n3. To formulate that grand law of the art of war-\\nfare, whereby Napoleon was enabled to solve in the\\ntivinkling of an eye propositions which on page 305 of", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "82 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nhis Memoirs the great captain describes as problems\\nof transcendant geometry which would have turned\\nLagrange and Laplace pale and of which he further\\nopines, they [Lagrange and Laplace] would have studied\\nmany nights before they could free them from unknown\\nquantities and have brought them to a solution.\\nAs a matter of fact, the Baron de Jomini had no idea\\nof what Napoleon was doing as the latter lay prone upon\\nhis map of Europe, whisking his dividers about over\\nits surface, and sticking a red pin here, a blue pin there,\\nand a yellow pin at some other place. There is a free-\\nmasonry among the great it is not well for the upper\\nstratum that the lower billions, however well these\\nmay theorize, should comprehend the art of warfare, the\\nart of government, or the art of finance, not to men-\\ntion, incidentally, a few other arts intimately connected\\nwith the foregoing. Neither Epaminondas, Alexander,\\nHannibal, Caesar, Gustave Adolphus, Turenne, Prince\\nEugene, Frederic, Washington, nor Napoleon saw fit to\\nput on paper, for the guide and enlightenment of the\\nfuture man on horseback, the laws and processes of a\\ncomplete and specific system of warfare neither did\\nMorphy, Anderssen, McDonnell, De la Bourdonnais,\\nDeschapelles, Philidor, Petroff, Der Laza, Ghulam Kas-\\nsim, Greco, Lolli, Salvio, Stamma, Buy Lopez, Staunton,\\nBuckle, Lowenthal, Harrwitz, nor any whose genius has\\nillumined the literature of chess, see fit to put on\\npaper the laws and processes of a complete and specific\\nsystem of play.\\nBut although these prodigies in chess and in war suc-\\nceeded during their entire lifetimes in not divulging the\\nsecrets of their respective trades, and, dying, could take\\ntheir vast knowledge with them out of the world, it was\\nbeyond the power even of Morphy to conceal the move-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 83\\nments made by the pieces under his guidance over the\\nsurface of the chessboard and beyond the power even\\nof the greatest captain to obliteratej the imprint made by\\nhis armies in march and in battle from the surface of\\nthe earth. Hence, he who intelligently can contemplate\\nthe processes of Morphy and the greater masters in chess,\\nand the processes of Napoleon and the greater captains\\nin war, may readily detect a similarity in their courses\\nof procedure, and these processes, properly classified and\\narranged, obviously may be reduced to a system which\\nlatter may become available as the basis, not only of a\\ntheory, but of the true theory of chess and of war.\\nAlthough the Baron de Jomini understood nothing of\\nthe art of warfare, and but little of the science of war,\\non the other hand, his veracity as to facts which came\\nunder his personal observation is beyond question.\\nTherefore the following statement by the Baron de\\nJomini is of the highest value to the layman\\nIn my presence the Emperor (Napoleon I.) once\\nremarked, I know of but one way of making war, and\\nthat is to act against the enemy s communications.\\nThis, of course, is the positive, the aggressive, the\\nstrategetic-offensive phase of that way of making war\\nwhich is common to all great captains, from Epaminon-\\ndas to Yon Moltke. For the negative, the finessing, the\\ndefensive phase of scientific warfare, we must look to\\nthe words of the ablest of them all\\nThe art of the great captain, said Frederic the\\nGreat, consists in dividing up the enemy s force.\\nBoth of these great soldiers meant the same thing,\\nbut each clothed the idea in words which reflected that\\nmethod for applying this idea in warfare which was dis-\\ntinctively his own. In the first is seen a vast generali-\\nzation, a contempt of detail characteristic of one whose", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "84 CBESS STRATEGETICS.\\nprocesses were nothing if not spectacular and in the\\nsecond is seen the exact, definite conclusion of the\\ngreatest organizer of victory on the battlefield that\\nthe world has ever seen.\\nEach meant to say that to seize upon and to occupy\\nwith your army the central space between two or more\\nsections of a hostile army or, to seize upon and to\\noccupy witli your army the central space between a hos-\\ntile army and its base, is the chief idea in the science of\\nwar; and that so to manoeuvre your army as either to\\ncompel or to outwit the enemy into permitting you thus\\nto seize and to occupy with your army such central\\nspace, is the chief process in the art of warfare.\\nTo effect the perfect union of science and of art is the\\nprovince of mathematics. In this connection, as every\\nmathematician knows,\\nThings tliat are equal to the same thing are equal to\\neach other.\\nEvery student of military science knows that if a su-\\nperior force can unexpectedly be precipitated between\\ntwo inferior bodies of troops, that one and possibly both\\nof the latter will be destroyed.\\nEvery student of this theory knows that if the point\\nof command in any evolution be properly occupied\\nby a kindred Prime Tactical Factor, the adverse force\\nis lost.\\nAny man can understand that if a body of troops,\\nor a body of chesspieces, can take up such a position\\nthat the occupation of this point of command, whether\\non the battlefield or on the chessboard, is assured, such\\noccupation is equivalent to the actual occupation of the\\npoint of command, for things that are equal to the\\nsame thing are equal to each other. That ancient\\nIsraelite, Shylock, was a strategist, and that he under-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 85\\nstood the truth of the foregoing proposition is shown bv\\nhis logical and conclusive statement\\nYou do take my house when you do take the prop\\nby which my house stands\\nThis statement admittedly is true and cliessplayer,\\nsoldier, and mathematician alike, having accepted it as a\\npoint of departure, may now start out in full accord to\\nfind out what the great Corsican was doing as he lay\\nprone on his map of Europe, whisking his dividers over\\nits surface, and sticking into it here and there divers-\\ncolored headed pins.\\nIt is much easier to defeat an enemy than commonly\\nis supposed, says Napoleon the great art lies in not\\nmaking any but decisive movements.\\nThus, logically, it is obvious that when Napoleon,\\nstretched out upon his map of Europe, was whisking his\\ndividers about from point to point, he was planning a\\ndecisive movement Furthermore, as he had selected\\na decisive point, and was combining by a logistic\\nmovement the concentration of his corps d^armee at\\nthat point, it again logically is evident that this deci-\\nsive point was nothing more nor less than one of two\\nthings\\nI. The tactical key of a proposed field of battle or,\\nII. That point whose occupation would insure the\\nsubsequent occupation of the tactical key of a proposed\\nfield of battle.\\nThe military mind will recognize the logic of this\\nassertion at a glance for the benefit of others it may\\nbe well to remark that a diagram goes with this state-\\nment, which will be shown later.\\nNow, the tactical keys always are in the possession\\nof the enemy (unless the situation is merely one of\\nMajor Tactics, and in which the opponent has committed", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "86 CHESS STEATEGETICS.\\na tactical blunder ^hich subjects him to loss, by means\\nof a routine evolution), and the occupation of a tactical\\nkey in actual warfare is the normal outcome of a line\\nof operations and the direct result of a pitched battle.\\nIn the matter under consideration, it is obvious that\\nNapoleon is not planning a battle this is shown by the\\nfact that he has selected, as the decisive point, some\\nplace other than the one at which he then is were a\\nbattle being planned, his corps would be concentrating\\nabout his present headquarters, for on the eve of a\\nbattle the great captain always is with his vanguard.\\nHence, no battle being planned, it is evident that no\\nline of operations exists, for a line of operations consists\\nof a battle or a series of battles. Thus, Napoleon, not\\nbeing engaged in destroying the enemy, is engaged in\\nplanning how to destroy the enemy, and consequently\\nhe is planning and preparing to act upon a line of\\nmanoeuvre.\\nA line of manoeuvre always is directed for one of the\\nthree following purposes\\nIN WARFARE.\\nI. To cut off the adverse army from communication\\nwith its base of operations.\\nII. To cut an army off from communication with a\\nkindred army.\\nIII. To cut portions of the same army off from\\ncommunication with each other.\\nIN CHESSPLAY.\\nI. To cut the bulk of the Determinate Force off from\\ncommunication with the King.\\nII. To cut the Hypothetical Force off from commu-\\nnication with the Logistic Horizon.\\nn", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 87\\nIII. To cut off adverse pieces from commimication\\nwith the bulk of the adverse Determinate Force.\\nEven the layman thus readily may understand that\\nthe objective of a line of manoeuvre necessarily must be\\na point situated between two hostile masses, and that\\nthis point is a decisive point, provided the occupying\\nforce is strong enough to hold one of the hostile masses\\nin check, while with the superior force it falls upon and\\ndestroys the second hostile mass.\\nApplied to chessplay, the student readily sees that\\nthis idea merely is the elaboration of what in Major\\nTactics is termed the subgeometrical symbol. In all\\nsuch situations there being the choice of two battles,\\ni. e., a battle against the one or against the other of the\\nhostile bodies, there necessarily must be two tactical\\nkeys. As it is required that the kindred force, when\\nposted at the decisive point, shall act simultaneously\\nagainst both of these tactical keys, or against those\\npoints whose occupation insures the subsequent occupa-\\ntion of at least one of the given tactical keys, it also\\nis evident that this decisive point always is the centre\\nof that geometric symbol of which the two tactical keys,\\nor those points from whence they are commanded, are\\nperimetal points. Furthermore, it is obvious that the\\nkindred piece which occupies the decisive point must\\nbe that integer of chess force to which this geometric\\nsymbol appertains.\\nBut it will be observed by the student that there is\\nyet another consideration no less important than the\\nforegoing, and that is victory always is decided by\\nthe operation of the basic law of strategetics, the\\ngreater force always overcomes the lesser, and there-\\nfore it is imperative that the radii of offence operated", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "88 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nby the attacking body shall be in excess numerically\\nof the radii of defence operated by the defending body.\\nNow it is obvious that in all situations wherein the\\nforces are equal, one antagonist can obtain no advantage\\nover the other except tkrough the latter s error, and that\\nthe effect of snch error always is to expose two points\\nto be simultaneously attacked when such points can-\\nnot be defended in a single move, that is to say, in the\\nsituation taken as an entirety, the attacking force will\\noperate at least one more radius of oiTence than the\\nnumber of radii of defence operated by the opponent.\\nFurthermore, it is obvious that the point from which\\nthis additional radius of offence is operated is the deci-\\nsive point, and that this decisive point or strategic key\\nnaturally takes the form of the vertex of a triangle, or\\nof the centre of a straight line whose extremities are\\noccupied by tactical keys i. e., of those centres and\\nvertices which in Major Tactics are termed points of\\ncommand. Hence, to the student of war, or of chess,\\nor of mathematics, the following is true and valid\\nFIFTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nWhenever two tactical Jcei/s, or tic o points of command,\\nor a tactical key and a j^oint of command, are situated on\\nthe perimeter of the same geometric symbol, then the centre\\nof the given geometric symbol is the strategic key.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS.\\n89\\nTHE STRATEGIC KEY.\\nFigure 47.\\nPaul Morphy.\\ni^\\nmi\\ni m/iV/\\nHi\\ni\\nip\\n^M fl\\nt#j\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^lAl\\nm. ,jmm..,\\nm isi\\nW////yM\\n^^^P\\nM S a\\nJacob Lowenthal.\\nThis position occurred in the first game of the match\\nbetween these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "90 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTHE PLAY.\\nHekk Lowenthal. IVIk. Moepht.\\n18. P-QE3.\\nHad White played otherwise, he would have lost a\\npawn. Black threatened to occupy the Strategic Key\\n(Black Q Kt 5) with his Q, whence he would command\\nthe undefended White Q and the undefended White\\nQ Kt P. As White could not in a single move have\\ndefended both of the pieces thus simultaneously attacked,\\none of them necessarily would be lost.\\nIt is now easy for the student to understand that when\\nNapoleon spread out his map on the ground and lay\\ndown upon it, the first thing he did was to stick into\\nit a number of pins, each of which was surmounted by\\na wad of green sealing-wax, and represented a French\\ncorps d^armee and its position at the moment, and then\\nto stick into the map as many pins covered with red\\nsealing-wax as his information led him to decide was\\nthe number and position of the hostile corps d armee.\\nSo far Jomini got the right idea, and the distinguished\\nSwiss also is correct in his statement that Napoleon used\\nhis dividers to estimate distances and the marches of his\\ntroops. But here Jomini s knowledge of the Napoleonic\\nprocess leaves off, and the real understanding of the\\nsubject begins.\\nNapoleon did not determine the decisive strategic point\\nin his closet, as Jomini states. It was only after the\\ngreat Corsican had specified the position of his own, and\\nof the opposing bodies of troops, that he did, or even that\\nhe could, so determine this decisive point and he de-\\ntermined it in this way.\\nAfter Napoleon had marked out on his map the posi-\\ntion of the contending armies, his next step was to find", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 91\\na means for acting against the enemy s communications\\nor, as Frederic puts it, to divide up the enemy s forceP\\nHis method was this\\nLocating the extremities and the configuration of the\\nenemy s strategic front, and noting exactly the relations\\nof the latter to the existing topographical conditions, the\\ngreat Corsican remarked that point which if occupied by\\nhis army would\\n1. Cut the adverse army in two or,\\n2. Would cut the adverse army off from its base.\\nThen, regarding the army thus separated, either from\\nits remaining integrals or from its base. Napoleon\\nlocated, in the position occupied by these two pro-\\nspective isolated integrals, those two points which, if\\noccupied by his troops, would lead to the destruction in\\ndetail of each isolated hostile mass. These commanding\\npoints always are the tactical keys and usually are\\nheights from which the whole of each prospective battle-\\nground may be enfiladed by artillery.\\nIn chessplay, the tactical key always is that point\\nwhose occupation either checkmates the adverse king^\\neliminates an adverse piece from the hoards or queens a\\nkindred pawn.\\nWhenever the hostile army was massed in a single\\nbody, Napoleon always employed the second process, and\\nmanoeuvred to cut the adverse army off from its base\\nwithout exposing his own. But whenever the adverse\\narmy was not massed in a single body, he always made\\nuse of the first process, which in military mathematics\\nmay be expressed thus", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "92 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nFigure 48.\\nd c^\\nD^\\nk: c\\nV Qi\\nA Topographical Centre.\\nB^ Point of Command in left wing.\\nB Point of Command in right wing.\\nC^ Hostile Corps of left wing and tactical keys.\\nD Hostile Corps of right wing and tactical keys.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 98\\nIn order to understand how to locate these points of\\ncommand, the student of war must study the campaigns\\nof the greater captains, and the student of chess must\\nstudy The Major Tactics of Chess.\\nPRINCIPLE.\\nHaving located two tactical keys^ or two points of com-\\nmand^ or a tactical key and a point of command^ connect\\nthese hy their most direct lines of communication and the\\npoints upon such lines equidistant in time between the\\ntwo strategic vertices will he the topographical centre.\\nIt is evident from this diagram that a kindred force\\nposted at the point A commands the communications\\nbetween the points B^ and B^ and thus prevents the ad-\\nverse corps d^armee^ C^, C^, and C^, from co-operating\\nwith the adverse corps d armee^ D^, D^, and D^o Never-\\ntheless, it is equally easy to see that the kindred force\\nwill lose the advantage of this central position, if it per-\\nmit all the adverse corps simultaneously to attack it at\\nA, and consequently it obviously is imperative that the\\nkindred force keep both of the adverse forces divided\\nand at arms length, so to speak, and that it attack them\\nseparately and not at the same time. Hence it follows\\nthat while the kindred superior force is destroying one\\nof the inferior adverse forces, the kindred column on the\\nopposite wing must hold the second hostile force in\\ncheck and prevent it from interfering in the battle, or\\nseries of major tactical evolutions, which is being exe-\\ncuted by the united kindred columns of the centre and\\nleft, against the first-mentioned hostile force.\\nAll this is applicable to chessplay, and may be de-\\npicted on the chessboard thus", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "94\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nFiGrPvE 49.\\nBlack.\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0r^^ w\\np\\nm mm.\\nm\\na I^H\\nA\\nWhite.\\nXoTE. A Tactical Key which, if occupied by an\\nadverse Queen, the existing Objective Plane (Class B)\\nwill be commanded.\\nWhite Q Kt 2 Tactical Key which, if occupied\\nbv any adverse piece, will result in the loss of the\\nWhite Q B.\\nAs the B cannot be posted at White K Kt 2, and as a\\npoint cannot move, there is no Line of Communication.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 9o\\nThe military principle may also be adapted to the\\nchessboard, viz.\\nSIXTH LAW OF THE AET OF CHESSPLAY.\\nHaving located two tactical keys^ tivo points of command^\\nor one tactical key and one point of command^ then con-\\nnect these two points hy logistic radii., and those points at\\nwhich the given logistic radii intersect will he points of\\ncommunication, and that point of communication common\\nto both ivill he the topographical centre.\\nHaving first disposed of this most important prelimi-\\nnary calculation, Napoleon next proceeded to determine\\nthe strategic key of the adverse position, that is, the\\npoint from which his columns of the right and the\\nleft liaving taken up their proper positions against the\\nhostile left and right, respectively he could throw his\\ncolumn of the centre against whichever of the adverse\\nisolated masses that he might choose.\\nConsequently the student of mathematics readily sees\\nthat it is imperative that this decisive point be\\n1. Nearer in time to that topographical centre which\\nin the given situation is the true point of communica-\\ntion, than is any equal adverse force in order to pre-\\nvent its being occupied by the enemy.\\n2. Equidistant in time from the two tactical keys\\nor the two points of command, or the tactical key and\\nthe point of command, in order to be able to attack\\neither with like facility.\\nConsequently the rule for locating this strategic key\\nis easy to deduce, and both Napoleon and the student\\nof mathematics solved the problem Avith equal readi-\\nness, viz.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "96\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nRULE.\\nThe Topographical Centre being given, describe a\\ncircle of which this point is the centre, and whose\\ncircumference passes through the points of command\\nthen draw a second diameter at right angles to the first\\ndiameter, and the point where the second diameter\\nintersects this circumference is the strategic key.\\nThis may be mathematically expressed thus\\nFigure 50.\\nB c\\nTopographical Centre.\\nPoint of Command in hostile left wing.\\nA\\nB^ Point of Command in hostile right wing.\\nC Hostile Corps on left wing and tactical keys.\\nC^\\nDM\\nD V- Hostile Corps on right wing and tactical keys.\\nE Strategic Key.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS.\\n97\\nThis also is applicable to chessplay, and may be de-\\npicted on the chessboard thus\\nFigure 51.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nA Tactical Key.\\nWhite Q Kt 2 Tactical Key.\\nB Strategic Key.\\nBlack Q R 3 Point of Manoeuvre of White corps of\\nthe centre.\\nBlack Q R 3 B Eoute of White corps of the centre.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "98 CHESS stuategetics.\\nThe student thus will perceive that, by the plain and\\nexact process of logical deduction, a tangible situation\\nnow is established and that this situation is composed\\nof a prime strategic point, two prime tactical points,\\none or more known points occupied bj kindred cor/?s\\nd armee, and two or more known points occupied by\\nadverse corps d armee.\\nNapoleon, having thus mathematically determined the\\nstrategic key, then, according to Jomini, proceeded to\\nwhisk his dividers about the map and to calculate the\\nmovements of a logistic operation, in order to get\\neach of his eorys d arime to where he wished to have it\\non a given day.\\nAs neither the Baron de Jomini nor any other mil-\\nitary writer has seen fit to inform us of the nature\\nof this logistic operation, nor to elucidate the pro-\\ncesses incident to its execution, it seems proper and\\neven necessary for us to make the discovery for our-\\nselves.\\nAt the very beginning of this logistical calculation,\\nwe must, of course, get down to first principles and\\ncome at once to a correct understanding of what we\\nwant to do. As a matter of fact, the object of this\\nlogistical operation is to place, in the briefest time, the\\nattacking force at those points where,\\n1. It divides the hostile force into at least two\\nisolated masses.\\n2. Controls the communication between these two\\nor more isolated masses, thus preventing them from\\nreuniting.\\n3. Acts simultaneously against two tactical keys, or\\ntwo points of command, or a tactical key and a point\\nof command and proposes, from a central post, to con-\\nversre a third column ao;ainst one or the other of the\\nJ", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS.\\n99\\nadverse points at a time when it is impossible for such\\nadverse point to be properly reinforced.\\nThis projected situation may be mathematically ex-\\npressed thus\\nbV\\nFigure 52.\\nA\\nC^\\n^B\\nQ\\nA\\nB^\\nE\\na\\nb\\nTopographical Centre.\\nFirst Point of Command, or tactical key.\\nSecond Point of Command, or tactical key.\\nStrategic Key.\\nKindred Corps of the Centre.\\nEight.\\nLeft.\\nFrom this diagram the student readily sees that each\\nof the kindred corps has a specific destination. Napo-\\nleon determined this destination, as the mathematical\\nmind readily perceives, by the following\\nEULE.\\nGiven the strategic key and taking it as a centre,\\ndescribe a circle whose circumference shall pass through\\nthe topographical centre then, unite the strategic key\\nwith the adverse points of command by straight lines,", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "100\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nand the points where these lines intersect the given\\ncircumference will be the destinations of the kindred\\ncolumns of the right and of the left, respectively.\\nObviously, the strategic key always is the destination\\nof the column of the centre.\\nThis position may be depicted on the chessboard thus\\nFigure 53.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nK Kt 1 An Objective Plane of Class B which\\nmay be commanded by a Q at K\\nKt ^2.\\nQ Kt 2 Exposed Point Material.\\nK Kt 2 Q Kt 2 Strategic Plane of Class B capable of\\nbeinf^ commanded hv a Q or E.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 101\\nB Strategic Key whicli in this position\\nshould be occupied by a Q in order to\\nthreaten mate at K Kt 2.\\nQ R 3 Point of Departure of Col. of Centre.\\nQR1= Right.\\nK B 3 Left.\\nC Point of Command in Left Evolution.\\nD Right Evolution.\\nThe military principle may be adapted to the chess-\\nboard, viz.\\nSEVENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nGiven the strategic vertices^ then unite each of these with\\na kindred piece by means of logistic radii which appertain\\nto the kindred piece, and the line formed hy these logistic\\nradii will he the route of the given piece and the number\\nof logistic radii contained in such route will he the number\\nof marches required of the given kindred piece.\\nIt now remains to explain in detail the routes and\\nthe reasons therefor which must be taken by the three\\nkindred columns. The student will recall the Napoleonic\\ndictum, Unity is the soul of strategy, and will ob-\\nserve that Napoleon s calculation is based upon the fact\\nthat this law has been violated by the enemy. Conse-\\nquently the logical mind sees at a glance how imbecile\\nit would be to imitate the error of the opponent, and\\neasily comprehends that these three columns must\\nmarch, not necessarily as a single mass, but at least as\\nthree united masses, i.e.., in such relative position that\\neach may effectively cover and support the others.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "102 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nHence, while not moving as one body, the three col-\\numns yet must constitute the right, the centre, and the\\nleft of a grand army, and must simultaneously move\\ntoward three distinct and specific points, the mere occu-\\npation of which, all else being equal, will insure victory.\\nThus, to the military student and to the mathematical\\nmind it is obvious that the following is true and valid\\nEIGHTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nThe destinations of the Corps Offensive being determined,\\nunite these hy logistic radii with the points of departure,\\nand the resultant lines will he the routes of the kindred\\ncorps respectively.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 103\\nThis situation may be mathematically expressed thus\\nFlGUKE 54.\\n(-^-st.\\nA\\nB-\\nTopographical Centre.\\nPoint of Command in hostile Left.\\nPoint of Command in hostile Right.\\nHostile Corps on Left Wing and Tactical Keys.\\nHostile Corps on Eight Wing and Tactical Keys.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "104\\nCRESS STRATEGETICS.\\nE Strategic Key.\\nF^ Destination of kindred Left Column.\\nF^ Eight Column.\\nG Point of Departure of Centre Column.\\nH Right\\nI Left\\nEG- Route of kindred Column of the Centre.\\nF^I\\nRight.\\nLeft.\\nAll this appertains to chessplay, and the situation\\nmay be depicted on the chessboard thus\\nFlGUKE 55.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 105\\nA Tactical Key in Left Evolution.\\nWhite Q Kt 2 Tactical Key in Kight Evolution.\\nB Strategic Key.\\nQ Corps of the Centre.\\nQ R Corps of the Eight.\\nK R Corps of the Left.\\nC Point of Command in Left Evolution.\\nD Point of Command in Right Evolution.\\nQ R 1 Right Point of Manoeuvre.\\nK B 3 Left Point of Manoeuvre.\\nQ R 3 Central Point of Manoeuvre.\\nQ R 1 D Route of Corps of the Left.\\nQ R 3 B Route of Corps of the Centre.\\nK B 3 C Route of Corps of the Right.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\nThe method whereby the great Corsican constructed\\nhis Strategetic Horizon thus having been outlined, and\\nthe adaptation of this method to the chessboard indicated,\\nthe student readily will understand that the detail pro-\\ncesses which appertain to the method thus adapted to\\nthe chessboard necessarily are but logical sequences,\\nmere corollaries of the general principles laid down in\\nthe preceding volumes of this series.\\nAs the first and a most essential detail in the applica-\\ntion of Napoleon s system of warfare to chessplay, the\\nattention of the student is called to the mathematical\\nfigure formed by combining the strategic key with the\\ntwo tactical keys, or by combining the strategic key\\nwith the two points whence these tactical keys are\\ncommanded.\\nThis mathematical figure is termed in this theory the\\nStrategic Horizon^ and these strategic horizons, it is im-\\nportant for the student to observe, are divided into three\\nclasses, viz.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n107\\nI. Strategic Horizons in which the three vertices\\nwhich appertain to the mathematical figure are a strate-\\ngic key and two tactical keys.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON.\\n(a.)\\nFigure 56.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nNote. The White Kt occupies the strategic key.\\nThe Black K B and R occupy the tactical keys.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "108\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\n11. Strategic Horizons in which the three vertices are\\na strategic key, a tactical key, and a point of command.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON.\\n(6.)\\nFlGUEE 57.\\nBlack.\\nm ./mm..\\nm^/VA\\n^IM\\nm\\nWhite.\\nNote. The White Kt occupies the strategic key the\\nP at Black Q B 5 occupies the tactical key, and the\\npoint of command is Black s K B 4.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n109\\nIII. Strategic Horizons in which the vertices are a\\nstrategic key and two points of command.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON.\\nFlGUKE 58.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nNote. Tlie White Kt occupies the strategic key the\\npoints of command are Black s K B 5 and Q B 4.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "110 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThat vertex contained in the strategic horizon and\\nwhich is designated as the strategic key always is the\\ncentre of a geometric symbol, of which the other two\\nstrategic vertices are points on a common perimeter.\\nIn consequence, there are fifteen mathematical figures\\nwhich appertain to the strategic horizon, and the prac-\\ntical application of these fifteen mathematical figures\\nto the chessboard is governed by the following\\nNINTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nWhatever the form of the strategic horizon, two of its\\nsides always are radii of offence appertaining to the\\nkindred corps of the centre, and the point where these\\nradii intersect always is the strategic key.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\nIll\\nA strategic horizon 1 is limited to the attack of two\\nadjacent tactical keys or to two adjacent points of com-\\nmand situated diagonally on the front. It is typified\\nby the geometric symbol of the Pawn, and in this\\nsystem of chessplay it is designated by the letter t.\\nThe strategic key always is the apex and may properly\\nbe occupied either by the P, B, Q, or K.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON {t).\\nFigure 59.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "112\\nCRESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA strategic horizon 2 is limited to the attack of the\\nlogistic horizon. This attack always is directed against\\ntwo points of junction, one of which also is an exposed\\nPoint Material. It is typified by a right-angled triangle\\nand is designated by tlie letter r. The strategic key\\nalways is a point in the seventh horizontal for White\\nand in the second horizontal for Black, and cannot be\\nproperly occupied except by a kindred P.\\nSTRATEGIC HOEIZOX\\nFiGUEE 60.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n113\\nA strategic horizon 3 is expressed by a triangle\\ncomposed of the obliques which unite the centres of\\nthree knights octagons, the extremities being points\\nof command in evolutions appertaining to the knight,\\nand the vertex being the strategic key. This horizon\\nis designated by the letter 0, and cannot properly be\\noccupied except by a kindred Kt.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON (0).\\nFigure 61.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "114\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA strategic horizon 4 is expressed by an oblique line,\\nupon which are located tlie centres of three knights\\noctagons, the extremities being either tactical keys or\\npoints of command in evolutions appertaining to the\\nKt, and the central point being the strategic key. This\\nhorizon is designated by the letter o, and cannot prop-\\nerly be occupied except by a kindred Kt.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON (o).\\nFigure 62.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nThe oblique line is formed by the white points Q 2,\\nK 4, and K B 6. The centre is the strategic key, and\\nthe extremities are points of command in evolutions\\nappertaining to the Knight.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n115\\nA strategic horizon 5 is expressed by the geometric\\nsymbol of the B. Its sides are diagonals, and the\\nvertex is the strategic key. The latter properly may\\nbe occupied by the B or the Q. The extremities always\\nare either tactical keys or points of command in other\\nBishop s triangles or the centre of a Queen s polygon.\\nIt is designated bv the letter T.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON {T\\\\\\nFigure 63.\\nBlack.\\nm \u00c2\u00bb^J\\nm\\nI v/m;^y._\\nWa ....wm. ^mm.\\nWldte,", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "116\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA strategic horizon 6 is expressed by a diagonal upon\\nwhich are situated the vertices of three Bishop s tri-\\nangles and Queen s polygons, the extremities being\\neither tactical keys or points of command in evolutions\\nappertaining to the Bishop or to the Queen, and any\\npoint between these being the strategic key. This\\nhorizon is designated by the letter i), and cannot\\nproperly be occupied except by a kindred B or Q.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON (D).\\nFigure 64.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nFor the Q, the diagonal is formed by the white points,\\nR 2, Q B 4, and K 6 for the Bishop, the diagonal is\\nformed by the white points, K 4, Q B 6, and Q Kt 7.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n117\\nA strategic horizon 7 is expressed by a diagonal\\ncomposed of three adjacent points, the extremities being\\neither tactical keys or points of command appertain-\\ning to the B, Q, or K, and the central point being\\nthe strategic key. This horizon is designated by the\\nletter d and cannot properly be occupied except by a\\nkindred B, Q, or K.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON [d).\\nFigure 65.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "118\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA strategic horizon 8 is expressed by the geometric\\nsymbol of the Rook. Its sides are right lines, the\\nangle is the strategic key, and the extremities are either\\ntactical keys or points of command in evolutions which\\nappertain to the R or Q. It is designated by the letter\\nQ, and cannot properly be occupied except by the kin-\\ndred R or Q.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON (Q).\\nFigure 66.\\nBlack.\\ny//////m,\\n^1\\ny/. y/////M\\nm\\nWhite.\\nm\\nm\\nm", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n119\\nA strategic horizon 9 is expressed by a right-angled\\ntriangle formed by three adjacent points, the angle\\nbeing the strategic key and the extremities being either\\ntactical keys or points of command in evolutions apper-\\ntaining to the R, Q, or K. It is designated by the letter\\nq, and may properly be occupied only by a kindred R,\\nQ, or E.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON {q).\\nFigure 67.\\nBlack.\\n^mg\\nm^jM\\n1\\nm mm.\\nWy. MA\\nVA Wm^A\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "120\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA strategic horizon 10 is expressed by a straight line\\nformed by three points situated on the same horizontal,\\nthe extremities of which are either tactical keys or\\npoints of command in evolutions appertaining to the\\nR or the Q, and the strategic key being any point\\nbetween. This horizon is designated by the letter H,\\nand properly is occupied only by a kindred R or Q.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON [H).\\nFigure 68.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n121\\nA strategic horizon 11 is expressed by three adjacent\\npoints situated on the same horizontal, the central one\\nbeing the strategic key and the extremities being either\\ntactical keys or points of command in evolutions apper-\\ntaining to the R, Q, or K. This horizon is designated\\nby the letter A, and cannot be properly occupied except\\nby a kindred R, Q, or K.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON {h)\\nFigure 69.\\nBlack.\\nm\\nM yyy////y/yA\\nIf 1 ii\\nm. mm.,.\\nm mm.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "122\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA strategic horizon 12 is expressed by a straight line\\nformed by three points situated in the same vertical,\\nthe extremities being either tactical keys or points of\\ncommand in evolutions appertaining to the R or the\\nQ, and the strategic key being any point between.\\nThis horizon is designated by the letter F and properly\\nis occupied only by a kindred R or Q.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON (F).\\nFigure 70.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n123\\nA strategic horizon 13 is expressed by three adjacent\\npoints situated on the same vertical, the central one\\nbeing the strategic key and the extremities being either\\ntactical keys or points of command in evolutions apper-\\ntaining to the R, Q, or K. This horizon is designated\\nby the letter -y, and cannot be properly occupied except\\nby a kindred R, Q, or K.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON (t).\\nFigure 71.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "124\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA strategic liorizon 1-i is expressed bj the geometric\\nsymbol of the Q, the centre being the strategic key and\\nthe extremities being either tactical keys or points of\\ncommand in evolutions appertaining to the Q. This\\nhorizon is designated by the letter P, and can properly\\nbe occupied only by the kindred Q.\\nSTRATEGIC HORIZON (P).\\nFigure 72.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "STRATEGIC HORIZONS.\\n125\\nA strategic horizon 15 is expressed by the geometric\\nsymbol of the King, the centre being the strategic key\\nand the extremities being either tactical keys or points\\nof command in evolutions appertaining to the Q or K.\\nThis horizon is designated by the letter R^ and properly\\nis occupied only by the kindred Q or K.\\nSTEATEGIC HORIZON {R).\\nFigure 73.\\nBlack.\\ny/y.\\nkmii\\nm...^ i\\ni\\n1 ^H\\nm If\\nWhite.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS.\\nThe student will observe that whenever the strategic\\nhorizon consists of a strategic key and two tactical\\nkeys, the process is direct, and by the occupation of\\none of these tactical keys, either the adverse king is\\ncheckmated, or an adverse piece is captured, or a kin-\\ndred pawn is queened.\\nBut when the strategic horizon contains one or more\\npoints of command, there exists what is termed in this\\ntheory a Tactical Horizon.\\nTactical Horizons are formed by the union of the\\nobjective plane with the logistic horizon, or with the\\ngeometric symbols appertaining to the various integers\\nof chess force, or with the formations appertaining to\\nthe several strategic fronts or by the union of these\\nlatter with each other.\\nTactical Horizons are divided into ten classes and\\nare governed by the following", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS, 127\\nTENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nEvery Corps Offensive must he a competent Prime\\nTactical Factor in that geometric plane against which\\nit is directed.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "128\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class I. is composed of a\\nStrategic Plane. It results from a strategic weakness\\nof Classes I. or 11. it is the legitimate outcome of a\\ncomplex line of manoeuvre and always is the ultimate\\nsituation in a strategic line of operations.\\nTACTICAL HORIZON.\\n(First Class.)\\nFigure 74.\\nPaul Morpht.\\ni\\nm\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2yyM yy/////M,.\\niiili\\ni\\nM #7S7^7?^ mZW/, V/7^y7/.\\nLouis Paulsen.\\nThis position occurred at the First American Chess\\nCongress in the match between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 129\\nTHE PLAY.\\nHerr Paulsen.\\nMk. Mokpht.\\n17.\\nQ X B.\\n18.\\nP X Q.\\n18.\\nE-Kt3(ck).\\n19.\\nK-Rl.\\n19.\\nB-R6.\\n20.\\nE-Ql.\\n20.\\nB Kt 7 (ck).\\n21.\\nK Kt 1.\\n21.\\nB X P ((lis ck),\\n22.\\nK-B 1.\\n22.\\nB Kt 7 (ck).\\n23.\\nK Kt 1.\\n23.\\nB R 6 (ck).\\n24.\\nK-El.\\n24.\\nB X P.\\n25.\\nQ K B 1.\\n25.\\nB X Q.\\n26.\\nRxB.\\n26.\\nR K 7.\\n27.\\nR Q E 1.\\n27.\\nR -K R 3.\\n28.\\nP-Q4.\\n28.\\nB K 6.\\nBlack\\nwon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "130\\nCRESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class II. is formed by the union\\nof a Strategic and a Logistic Plane. It results from a\\nstrategetic weakness of Class lY. it is the legitimate\\noutcome of a complex line of manoeuvre, and always is\\nthe ultimate situation in a strategic or a logistic line of\\noperations.\\nTACTICAL HOEIZON.\\n(Second Class.)\\nFigure 75.\\nPaul Morphy.\\nin\\n^^7^^^\\n7///y.\\nw/////%,\\nI\\nmk\\nV/7P^////.\\nmm m.\\nWa #^S^ V////////A\\nwm i\\nMr. Barxes.\\ni", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 131\\nTHE PLAY.\\nMb. Barnes. Mr. Mobpht.\\n14. Kt Q Kt 5.\\n15. Kt Q R 3. 15. B X K P.\\n16. B X B. 16. Kt Q 6 (ck).\\n17. Q X Kt. 17. P X Q.\\n18. Castles Q E. 18. B x Kt.\\n19. B Kt 3. 19. P Q 7 (ck).\\n20. K-Ktl. 20. B~B4.\\n21. Kt-K5. 21. K-Bl.\\n22. Kt-Q3. 22. E K 1.\\n23. Kt X B. 23. Q X E.\\nBlack won.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "132\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class III. is formed by the\\nunion of a Strategic and a Tactical Plane. It results\\nfrom a strategetic weakness of Class III. it is the legit-\\nimate outcome of a complex line of manoeuvre, and it\\nalways is the ultimate situation in a strategic or a tactical\\nline of operations.\\nTACTICAL HORIZON.\\n(Third Class.)\\nFigure 76.\\nM. Baucher.\\n^#1\\nm^t\\nilli.\u00c2\u00bbl Hi\\nV/w7////.\\nfe\\nM t^^wi.\\npi\\nmztz .m\\nwm, i\\ny//////M\\nmm ^p\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred at Table No. 1 in the famous\\nblindfold exhibition at Paris, 1858.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 133\\nTHE PLAY.\\nMk. Morpht.\\nM. Baucher,\\n22. R-R3.\\n22. P-KE3.\\n23. Q-Q2.\\n23. K-E2.\\n24. Q X B.\\n24. B--Q3.\\n25. E X P (ck).\\n25. K X K.\\n26. E-Q3.\\n2Q. K-E4.\\n27. Q-B 7 (ck).\\nWhite\\nwon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "134\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class lY. is formed by the\\nunion of a Strategic Plane and a Strategic Front. It\\nresults from tactical errors on the part of the opponent\\nit is the legitimate outcome of a simple line of manoeuvre,\\nand properly is preliminary to a complex line of ma-\\nnoeuvre.\\nTACTICAL HOEIZOK\\n(Fourth Class.)\\nFigure 77.\\nPaul Morpht.\\n////////^//A\\nM P\\nm\\ni 4M i\\ny/M,\\nWa. mm.\\nM.i.\\nm i\\nyy//////Y/, *^S3=, ^//y\\nMr. H. E. Bird.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 135\\nTHE\\nPLAY,\\nMr. Bird.\\nMr. Morpht.\\n16.\\nR Q Kt 1.\\n17.\\nCastles Q K.\\n17.\\nB X K B P.\\n18.\\nB X R.\\n18.\\nQ Q R 6.\\n19.\\nP-B3.\\n19.\\nQ X RP.\\n20.\\nP Kt 4.\\n20.\\nQ R 8 (ck).\\n21.\\nK-B2.\\n21.\\nQ R 5 (ck).\\n22,\\nK Kt 2.\\n22.\\nB X Kt P.\\n23.\\nP X B.\\n23.\\nR X Kt P (ck),\\n24.\\nQ X R.\\n24.\\nQ X Q (ck).\\n25.\\nK B 2.\\n25.\\nP-K6.\\n26.\\nB X P.\\n26.\\nB B 4 (ck).\\n27.\\nE-Q3.\\n27.\\nQ B 5 (ck).\\n28.\\nK-Q2.\\n28.\\nQ R 7 (ck).\\n29.\\nK Q 1.\\n29.\\nQ Kt 8 (ck).\\nBlack\\nwon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "136\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class Y. is formed bj the union\\nof two Logistic Planes. It arises from a strategetic\\nweakness of Class Yll. it is the legitimate outcome of\\na compound line of manoeuvi-e, and it always is the\\nultimate situation in a logistic line of operations.\\nTACTICAL HORIZON.\\n(Fifth Class.)\\nFlGUEE 78.\\nHerr Harrwitz.\\nJ \u00e2\u0096\u00a0mma\\nW/4\\n%m Pi\\n4M.\\ni\\n//7^///y\\nPaul Morpht.\\nThis position occurred in the eighth game of the\\nmatch between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 137\\nTHE PLAY.\\nMr. Mokphy.\\nHerr Harrwitz.\\n28.\\nP Kt 5.\\n28.\\nKt Kt 1.\\n29.\\nP-B6 (ck).\\n29.\\nK-Kl.\\n30.\\nP-B 7.\\n30.\\nKt Q B 4.\\n31.\\nP X Kt (Q\\nck).\\n31.\\nKx Q.\\n32.\\nB X Kt.\\n32.\\nB xB.\\n33.\\nQ K 2.\\n33.\\nQ-K3.\\n34.\\nKt Q 2.\\n34.\\nK-E 1.\\n35.\\nB Kt 4.\\n35.\\nQ-K2.\\n36.\\nKt B 3.\\n36.\\nE-Ql.\\n37.\\nP-R4.\\n37.\\nE-Q3.\\n38.\\nK X E.\\n38.\\nPxE.\\n39.\\nQ-B4.\\n39.\\nE-KBl.\\n40.\\nQ-K6.\\n40.\\nB K 6 (ck),\\n41.\\nK-Ql.\\n41.\\nQ Q B 2.\\n42.\\nKt Q 2.\\n42.\\nB-B5.\\n43.\\nKt B 4.\\n43.\\nQ B 4.\\n44.\\nQ-Q5.\\n#4.\\nQ x; Q (ck).\\n45.\\nP X Q.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a245.\\nE-Ql.\\n46.\\nR-B3.\\n46.\\nK Kt 2.\\n47.\\nP-B 3.\\nWhite\\nwon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "138\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class YI. is formed by the\\nunion of a Logistic and a Tactical Plane. It arises from\\na strategetic weakness of Class Y. it is the legitimate\\noutcome of a compound line of manoeuvre, and it is the\\nultimate situation either in a logistic or a tactical line\\nof operations.\\nTACTICAL HOKIZON.\\n(Sixth Class.)\\nFigure 79.\\nPaul Morpht.\\n^P\\nm.l\\nm mm.\\n1 m\\nAdolph Axderssex.\\nThis situation occurred in the tenth game of the match\\nbetween these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 139\\nTHE\\nPLAY.\\nAdolph Anderssen.\\nMk. Morpht.\\n60.\\nP K B 5.\\n61. P X p.\\n61.\\nP-K6.\\n62. B-K7.\\n62.\\nP K 7 (ck).\\n63. R X P.\\n63.\\nR E 8 (ck).\\n64. K-B2.\\n64.\\nKt Q 5 (ck)\\n65. K moves.\\n65,\\nKt X R.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "140\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class VII. is formed by the\\nunion of a Logistic Plane and a Strategic Front. It\\narises from tactical errors on the part of the opponent\\nit is the legitimate outcome of a simple line of manoeuvre,\\nand properly is preliminary to a complex line of ma-\\nnoeuvre.\\nTACTICAL HORIZON.\\n(Seventh Class.)\\nFigure 80.\\nAmateur.\\nV/^^/^..\\n/A\\n1 i^i i\\nHi\\nm. i III mm^_M\\nm\\nm\\ni^^\\nisi^\\nm\\nPaul Morphy.\\nThis position occurred in an exhibition at New Or-\\nleans, Mr. Morphy playing six games simultaneously\\nwithout sight of. boards or men.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 141\\nTHE\\nPLAY.\\nMr. Morpht.\\nAjMATEUR.\\n21. E-K8.\\n21.\\nQ X E.\\n22. Q X R.\\n22.\\nQ-K2.\\n23. Q X KtP (ck).\\n23.\\nQ X Q.\\n24. P B 6.\\n24.\\nQ X Kt P (ck)\\n25. K X Q.\\n25.\\nB X P (ck).\\n26. K X B.\\n26.\\nP K E 4.\\n27. R-KKtl.\\nWhite\\nWOJl.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "142\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class VIII. is formed by the\\nunion of two Tactical Planes. It arises from a strate-\\ngetic weakness of Class VI. it is the legitimate out-\\ncome of a compound line of manoeuvre, and always is the\\nultimate situation in a tactical Ime of operations.\\nTACTICAL HOKIZON.\\n(Eighth Class.)\\nElGUKE 81.\\nHekk Harewitz.\\nPaul Morphy.\\nThis position occurred in the fourth game of the match\\nbetween these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 143\\nTHE PLAY.\\nMr. Morphy,\\nHere Harrwitz.\\n30.\\nP Q B 5.\\n30. E X P.\\n31.\\nE X P (ck).\\n31. K X E.\\n32.\\nQ-KR5 (ck).\\n32. K-Ktl.\\n33.\\nKt X B (ck).\\n33. K-Kt2.\\n34.\\nKt B 5 (ck).\\n34. K-Ktl,\\n^o.\\nKt X P.\\nWhite\\nwon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "144\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class IX. is formed by the\\nunion of a Tactical Plane and a Strategic Front. It\\narises from tactical errors on the part of the opponent\\nit is the legitimate outcome of a simple line of manoeuvre,\\nand properly is preliminary to a compound line of\\nmanoeuvre.\\nTACTICAL HOKIZON.\\n(Ninth Class.)\\nFigure 82.\\nAdolph Anderssen.\\nmi\\niSil\\nmm wm\\ni\\n/^//////V/, 4^my^. wy////M w/////Z^,\\nJl 1\\nI\\nPaul Morphy.\\nThis position occurred in the third game of the match\\nbetween these masters.\\nIt is a fine study in the construction of the major front\\nby the right when K file is open.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 145\\nTHE\\nPLAY.\\nMr. Morpht.\\nHerr Anderssen.\\n10. R K 1 (ck).\\n10. K-Bl.\\n11. B X B.\\n11. Q X B.\\n12. P Q J3 3.\\n12. P-Q4.\\n13. P X P.\\n13. B-K3.\\n11. Kt B 3.\\n14. P-QE3.\\n15. R-K5.\\n15. E-Ql.\\n16. Q-Kt3.\\n16. Q-K2.\\n17. QR-Kl.\\n10", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "146\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Tactical Horizon of Class X. is formed by the union\\nof a strategic front witli any of the supplementary for-\\nmations appertaining thereto. It arises from errors in\\ntactics on the part of the opponent it is the legitimate\\noutcome of a simple line of manoeuvre, and properly is\\npreliminary to a complex line of manoeuvre.\\nTACTICAL HORIZON\\n(Tenth Class.)\\nElGUEE 83.\\nPaul Morphy.\\nm m\\nm\\nm\\nim\u00c2\u00bbimkm m\\nm mm.\\nBl\\n^AnPK^\\nm m 181\\nW ^^4\\nm ^m.\\nAdolph Anderssen.\\nThis situation occurred in the second game of the\\nmatch between these masters.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "TACTICAL HORIZONS. 147\\nTHE\\nPLAY.\\nHeer Anderssen.\\nMr. Morphy,\\n18.\\nB Q B 5.\\n19. Kt K B 5.\\n19.\\nB X E.\\n20. Q X B.\\n20.\\nKt K 2.\\n21. KKt-KR4.\\n21.\\nKt X Kt.\\n22. Kt X Kt.\\n22.\\nQ-Q2.\\n23. B X P.\\n23.\\nPxB.\\n24. Q-QBl.\\n24.\\nB X QP.\\n2b. Q X E, P, etc.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "LOCxISTIC EADII.\\nThe student, now being familiar with the mathematical\\nforms of the strategic and the tactical horizons, readily\\nsees that these are united to each other and to the strate-\\ngic front by verticals, horizontals, diagonals, and obliques,\\nalong which latter the kindred pieces move from one\\npoint to other points contained within the strategetic\\nhorizon.\\nThese radii of movement, as the student already has\\nbeen informed Major Tactics, p. 18), are entirely\\ndistinct from radii of offence and of defence their char-\\nacter is purely logis-tic, and their direction and extent\\nalways is determinate. A logistic radius always is either\\na vertical, a horizontal, a diagonal, or an oblique, and\\nits extremities always are points of mobilization, devel-\\nopment, manoeuvre, or operation.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "LOGISTIC RADII. 149\\nELEVENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nA Logistic Radius is not valid if it is interrupted hy a\\npoint of impenetrahility or if its terminus is commanded\\nhy an adverse piece.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "POINTS OFFENSIVE.\\nIn the formulas of Grand Tactics, the student per-\\nceives how the primary bases of minor tactics are amal-\\ngamated into the various minor, major, and grand\\nstrategic fronts and by means of the foregoing expla-\\nnations and diagrams the amalgamation of the evolutions\\nof Major Tactics into the strategic front is made equally\\nclear.\\nBut in order that the student may thoroughly compre-\\nhend that method by which the movements of each\\nkindred piece are harmonized for the perfect amalgama-\\ntion of the primary bases of minor tactics, the evolutions\\nof major tactics, and the strategic fronts of grand tac-\\ntics, and by which is made possible a mathematically\\nexact survey of the Strategetic Horizon, it first is neces-\\nsary to explain the two great subdivisions into which\\nthe latter is divided, viz.:\\nStrategetic Horizons are of two dimensions.\\nIn its second dimension the Strategetic Horizon is\\nlimited to the processes of Lesser Logistics (vide Grand\\nTactics, p. 279), and comprehends nothing outside of\\nLines of Mobilization and Lines of Development.\\nThe topography of a strategic horizon of the second\\ndimension is as follows\\n(ci) Normal Posts.\\n(6) Posts of Mobilization.\\n(c) Posts of Development.\\n(d) The Strategetic Objective.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "POINTS OFFENSIVE. 151\\nThe Normal Posts are those points which are occu-\\npied by the pieces originally (vide Minor Tactics,\\npp. 51-56).\\nThe Posts of Mobilization are those points to which\\nthe pieces are deployed in the construction of a minor\\nfront (vide Minor Tactics, pp. 94-169, and Grand\\nTactics, pp. 114-158).\\nPosts of Development are those points to which the\\npieces are developed in the construction of major and\\nof grand strategic fronts (vide Grand Tactics, pp.\\n159-275).\\nThe Strategetic Objective is that point whose proper\\noccupation is the aim of Lines of Mobilization and of\\nLines of Development (vide Grand Tactics, pp. 19-22,\\nand 370).\\nIn its first dimension the Strategic Horizon com-\\nprises both Lines of Manoeuvre and Lines of Operation.\\nThe processes of Greater Logistics are divided into\\nthree classes\\n(a) Minor processes.\\n(b) Major processes.\\n(c) Grand processes.\\nThe major processes of Greater Logistics appertain\\nexclusively to Lines of Operation and to compound and\\ncomplex Lines of Manoeuvre.\\nThe minor processes of Greater Logistics appertain\\nexclusively to simple Lines of Manoeuvre.\\nThe grand processes of Greater Logistics appertain to\\nthat calculation by which in any given situation is\\ndetermined the true strategetic horizon.\\nFollowing is the mathematical expression of a strate-\\ngetic horizon, which comprehends a strategetic weak-\\nness in the adverse position.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "152\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nFigure 84.\\nSTRATEGETIC WEAKNESS\\nPM+TO K", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "POINTS OFFENSIVE. 153\\nT K Tactical Key.\\nS K Strategic Key.\\nTo K Topographical Key.\\nP C Point of Command.\\nP Jf= Point of Manoeuvre.\\nP M Post of Mobilization.\\nP D Post of Development.\\nP D Point of Departure.\\nL R Logistic Padius.\\nN P Normal Post.\\nC L M Compound Line of Manoeuvre.\\nS L M Simple Line of Manoeuvre.\\nX L M Complex Line of Manoeuvre.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "154 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe Topography of a Strategetic Horizon of the first\\ndimeusion is as follows\\n(a) Points of Departure.\\n(5) Points of Manoeuvre.\\n((7) Points of Command.\\n(t?) The Strategic Key.\\n(e) Tactical Keys.\\nThe Objective Plane.\\nThe Strategic Horizon.\\n(A) The Tactical Horizon.\\n(i) The Logistic Horizon.\\n(j) Logistic Radii.\\nA Point of Deparf.ure is one extremity of that Logis-\\ntic Radius of which a Point of Manoeuvie is the other\\nextremity. It always is occupied by a kindred piece.\\nA Point of Manoeuvre is one extremity of that\\nLogistic Radios of which a Point of Command is the\\nother extremity. It may or may not be occupied either\\nby a kindred piece or by an adverse piece.\\nA Point of Command is one extremity of that Logistic\\nRadius of which a Tactical Key is the other extremity\\nMajor Tactics, pp. 50-52). It may or may not be\\noccupied either by a kindred or by an adverse piece.\\nA Tactical Key always is either a point of junction\\nMajor Tactics, p. 68), or a point material ^Major\\nTactics, p. 42), or that point which when occupied by a\\ngiven piece, the adverse king is checkmated. It may\\nor may not be occupied by an adverse piece, but never\\nby a kindred piece.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "POINTS OFFENSIVE.\\n155\\nPOINTS or DEPARTURE, OF MANOEUVRE, AND OF\\nCOMIVIAND.\\nFigure 85.\\nBlack.\\nir^m\\nm\\nWa W////M..\\nV/, ,y//~M\\na.,.,,_w^^^\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0JSI\\nm ^^J\\n1^1 i\\nWhite.\\nNote. The White Q R 1 is the Point of Departure\\nthe White K 1 is the Point of Manoeuvre, and the White\\nK 8 is the Point of Command against the two Tactical\\nKeys, Black K Kt 1 and Q B 1.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "156 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe Strategic Key is that vertex of a mathematical\\nfigure of which either two points of command, or two\\ntactical keys, or a tactical key and a point of command\\nare the other two vertices (see this volume, p. 88).\\nThe Strategic Vertices are those points on the peri-\\nmeter of that geometric symbol of an integer of chess\\nforce of which the strategic key is the centre, and which\\ngeometric symbol constitutes, in the given situation, the\\nstrategic horizon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "POINTS OFFENSIVE.\\n157\\nTHE STRATEGIC VERTICES.\\nFigure 86.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nNote. The Strategic Horizon consists of Black s\\nK 4, and the points occupied by the R and B. The\\nStrategic Key is Black s K 4, and this point, together\\nwith the Tactical Keys (Black K Kt 3 and Q B 5) con-\\nstitute the Strategic Vertices.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "158 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe Objective Plane already has been described\\nMinor Tactics, pp. 42-44, and Grand Tactics, pp.\\n25 and 82-92).\\nThe Logistic Horizon already has been described\\nGrand Tactics, p. 19).\\nThe Tactical Horizon already has been described\\n(see this volume, p. 127).\\nThe Strategic Horizon already has been described\\n(see this volume, p. 106).\\nThe Logistic Radius extends from the Point of De-\\nparture to any other point offensive Major Tactics,\\npp. 18-23).", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "LINES OF MANCEUVRE.\\nLines of Manceuvre are divided into Simple, Com-\\npound, and Complex Grand Tactics, pp. 53, 312, 377-\\n386).\\nCompound and Complex Lines of Manoeuvre are\\ndivided into three classes, viz.\\nA Compound or a Complex Line of Manceuvre of the\\nfirst class is composed of eleven points offensive and\\nten logistic radii, and two of its strategic vertices are\\ntactical keys. It may be mathematically expressed\\nthus:", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "160\\nCHESS Sr R ATE GE TICS.\\nCOMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANGEL^YKE.\\n(First Class.)\\nFigure 87.\\nT.K.\\nRC\\nRM.\\ni PC.\\nRMf PM.\\nRD.\\nPD.*\\n*RD.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "LINES OF MANCEUVRE.\\n161\\nAdapted to the chessboard, this proposition of mili-\\ntary art and science may be represented thus\\nCOMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVRE.\\n(First Class.)\\nFigure 88.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nNote. The White Kt will occupy the strategic key\\nQ 5, and the tactical keys, Black Q Kt 3 and K 2, will\\nbe simultaneously attacked by a superior force.\\n11", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "162\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Compound or a Complex Line of Manoeuvre of the\\nSecond Class is composed of ten points offensive and\\nnine logistic radii, and one of the strategic vertices\\nalways is a tactical key, and the other always is a point\\nof command. It may be mathematically expressed as\\nfollows\\nCOMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVRE.\\n(Second Class.)\\nFigure 89.\\nRMv\\nRD*\\nRM.\\niPD.\\nPM.\\n*PD", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "LINES OF MAN(EUVRE.\\n163\\nAdapted to the chessboard, this proposition of militarj\\nart and science may be represented thus\\nCOMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVKE.\\n(Second, Class.)\\nElGUKE 90.\\nBlack.\\ny/z/z/zz/y^ ^^/z-^-\\n111\\nill\\nfMf\\nWhite.\\nNote. The White Kt will occupy the strategic key\\n(White Q B 5), attacking simultaneously the tactical\\nkey (Black Q R 3) and the point of command (Black s\\nK3).", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "164\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA Compound or a Complex Line of Manoeuvre of the\\nthird class is composed of nine points offensive and\\neight logistic radii, and both of its strategic vertices\\nare points of command. It may be mathematically\\nexpressed thus\\nCOMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUVRE.\\n(Third Class.)\\nFlGUEE 91.\\nPC.\\nRM.4\\nRD-i\\nPM.\\nRD\\nRM,\\nRD.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "LINES OF MANCEUVRE.\\n165\\nAdapted to the chessboard, this proposition of military\\nart and science may be represented thus\\nCOMPOUND OR COMPLEX LINE OF MANCEUYRE.\\n(Third Class.)\\nFigure 92.\\nBlack.\\nBl\\na$ \u00e2\u0096\u00a0^//Jr Vy^\\nil\\nmm\\n^p ^P\\n^i~p\\nWhite.\\nNote.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The White Kt will occupy the strategic key\\n(White KB 4), and threaten to occupy one of the\\npoints of command (White Q 5 and Kt 6).", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "LINES OF OPERATION.\\nLines of Operation are the natural outgrowth of\\nCompound and of Complex Lines of Manoeuvre Grand\\nTactics, pp. 57, 318-337).\\nEvery line of manoeuvre contemplates the bringing\\nabout of a position in which the occupation of two\\nstrategic vertices by a kmdred force is assured and\\nwhen this position is brought about, the line of manoeu-\\nvre becomes transformed into a line of operations.\\nThe process whereby this transformation is brought\\nabout varies in each of tlie three classes of compound\\nand complex lines of manoeuvre but in each and every\\ncase it is contingent upon the inadequacy of the defen-\\nsive resources of the strategic vertices.\\nThe defensive resources of the strategic vertices are\\nexpressed by numerical exponents, and the quantity of\\ntheir defensive powers is denoted by letters, viz.\\n(a) Signifies that the strategic vertices contained in\\nthe given compound or complex line of manoeuvre are\\nnot supported by any kindred piece. This situation is\\ndesignated thus\\nFORMULA FOR LIXE OF MANCEUVTEIE.\\nCxi a, C X 2 a, ot C x 3 a.\\nIn this position, if the corps of the centre can occupy\\nthe strategic key and the enemy cannot defend both\\nstrategic vertices in one move, then the line of ma-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "LINES OF OPERATION. 167\\nnoeuvre may be transformed into a line of operations,\\nand the resulting situation is expressed thus\\nFORMULA FOR LINE OF OPERATION.\\nCxla={TK TK^)SK^^LO.\\nCx2a (TK F C) SK LO.\\nC X 3 a (F C F C) S K^ L 0.\\nThe logistic operation in all the foregoing situations\\nis limited to two marches by the corps of the centre i. e.,\\none march from the Point of Departure to the Point\\nof Manoeuvre, and one march from the Point of\\nManoeuvre to the Strategic Key. This logistic opera-\\ntion is expressed thus\\nFORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADII.\\nC C\\\\\\n(b) This letter signifies that one of the strategic ver-\\ntices contained in the given compound or complex line\\nof manoeuvre is supported by a kindred piece, but that\\nthe other vertex is not supported by a kindred piece.\\nThis situation is designated thus\\nFORMLT.A FOR LINE OF MANCEUVRE.\\nCxlb, Cx2b, or GxSb.\\nIn this position, if the corps of the centre can occupy\\nthe strategic key, while the corps of the right or of the\\nleft occupies a point of command against that tactical\\nkey, or a point of manoeuvre against that point of com-\\nmand defended by the enemy, and if the enemy cannot\\ndefend both of the strategic vertices in one move, then\\nthe line of manoeuvre may be transformed into a line of\\noperations, and the resulting situation is expressed thus", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "168 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nPORMULA FOR LINE OF OPERATION.\\nCxlh= (TX^+ T K (SK^ FC^) L 0.\\nCx2b {TK^- FC) (SK^- F C L 0.\\nCx3b=: (FC^ FC) {SK^ FC^)=LO.\\nThe normal logistic movement in the first two of the\\nforegoing situations is limited to four marches i. e.,two\\nby the corps of the centre, one from the point of depar-\\nture to the point of manoeuvre, and one from the point\\nof manoeuvre to the strategic key, and two \\\\j the corps\\nof the right or of the left, one from the point of depar-\\nture to the point of manoeuvre, and one from the point of\\nmanoeuvre to the point of command. But in the Cx^a\\nthe total number of marches is only three, as the flank-\\ning corps has but one march to make; i. e.^ from the\\npoint of departure to the point of manoeuvre, from which\\nlatter point it attacks the point of command. This\\nlogistic movement is expressed thus\\nFORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADIL\\n(7icl5and Cx2h= C C F C\\\\\\nCxZh= CC^ FC.^\\n(c) This letter signifies that both of the strategic\\nvertices contained in a given line of manoeuvre are sup-\\nported by kindred pieces. The situation is denoted\\nthus\\nFORMULA FOR LINE OF MANCEUVRE.\\nGxlc, Cx2c,ovCx3c.\\nIll this situation, if the corps of the centre can occupy\\nthe strategic key, while the corps of the right and left\\noccupy tlie points of command against their respective\\ntactical keys, or points of manoeuvre against their re-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "LINES OF OPERATION. 169\\nspective points of command, and if the enemy cannot\\ndefend both of the strategic vertices in one move, then\\nthe line of manoeuvre may be transformed into a line of\\noperations, and the resulting situation is expressed thus\\nFORMULA FOR LINE OF OPERATION.\\nCxlc= {TIO TK^) (SIO FC^ P C^) L 0.\\nCx2g^{TK^ PC) {SIO PC PC^) =L0.\\nCx^G= (PC^ P C) (SIO P C^ P C) L 0.\\nThe normal logistic movement in the Cxi c is the\\nmaximum it consists of six marches two by the corps\\nof the centre, i. e.^ one from the point of departure to the\\npoint of manoeuvre, and one from the point of manoeuvre\\nto the strategic key two by the corps of the right, i. e.,\\none from the point of departure to the point of manoeu-\\nvre, and one from the point of manoeuvre to the point of\\ncommand and lastly, two marches by the corps of the\\nleft, i. e., one from the point of departure to the point of\\nmanoeuvre, and one from the point of manoeuvre to the\\npoint of command.\\nFORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADII.\\nCC- CE^ 0^\\nThe normal logistic movement in the Cx 2 c is but\\none march shorter than that of the Qx\\\\g., and exceeds\\nall other normal logistic movements. The corps of the\\ncentre and that flanking corps which is directed against\\nthe tactical key each have two marches to make, but\\nthat flanking corps which is directed against the point of\\ncommand only has to march from the point of departure\\nto the point of manoeuvre, making five marches in all.\\nFORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADIL\\nCC CPy} CL^", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "170 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe normal logistic movement in the Cx^c consists\\nof two marches by the corps of the centre from the point\\nof departure, via the point of manoeuvre to the strategic\\nkey, and one march by each of the corps of the right and\\nthe left from the point of departure to the point of\\nmanoeuvre.\\nFORMULA FOR LOGISTIC RADII.\\nCC2+ CE CL^ 4..\\nThus the student of chess, of mathematics, or of mili-\\ntary science readily will see the validity of the following\\nTWELFTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nI. A compound or a complex line of manoeuvre is\\ntransformed into a line of operations whenever the sum of\\nthe exponents of the corps offensive exceeds the sum of the\\nexponents of the defensive radii luhich appertain to the\\nstrategic vertices and\\nII. A projected logistic movement on a line of operation!\\nis valid whenever the number of inarches to be inade by the\\ncorps offensive is less than the number of marches required\\nto be made by the corps defensive^ in order that the sum\\nof defensive exponents may equal the sum of the exponents\\nof the corps offensive.\\nThere are four mathematical symbols typical of lines\\nof operation, viz.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "LINES OF OPERATION.\\n171\\nLINES OF OPERATION,\\n(a.)\\nFigure 93.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "172 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nIn this situation the line of operations is established\\nfor the reason that the corps offensive occupy the strate-\\ngic key and both points of command.\\nThe corps offensive having the move win by simultane-\\nously attacking, from the strategic key and either point of\\ncommand, the common tactical key, which, not having\\nthe right to play, is immovable, and consequently is un-\\nable to avoid this attack, and being the lesser force is\\nunable to repel it, according to the basic law of the sci-\\nence of Chess Strategetics Grand Tactics, p. 3).\\nThe corps offensive also win without the move, for, a\\nstrategetic weakness existing, neither of the adverse\\nforces are able to support each other in a single move.\\nConsequently, while, by means of the right to play,\\nthe opponent may retire one of his exposed pieces, he\\nobviously is unable simultaneously either to defend or to\\nvacate both tactical keys. Hence, that exposed force\\nremaining immovable at the close of the opponent s right\\nto play is lost according to the preceding demonstration.\\nAdapted to the chessboard, this proposition of military\\nart and science may be represented thus", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "LINES OF OPERATION.\\n173\\nLINE OF OPERATIONS.\\nFiGtrKE 94.\\nBlack.\\nif fc fm\\nmm... SI\\n^!Mli\\nvMa .jmrn.\\nm\\nM\\nTFA/^e.\\nNote. The Black Kt and B occupy tactical keys;\\nthe White B and R occupy points of command, and the\\nstrategic key is occupied by the White Kt. White wins\\neither with or without the move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "174\\nCRESS STRATEGETICS.\\nLINE OF OPERATIONS.\\nElGURE 95.\\nSTRATEGETIC WEAKNESS", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "LINES OF OPERATION. 175\\nIn this situation the corps offensive having the move\\nwin by occupying the strategic key with the corps of the\\ncentre. Inasmuch as the kindred corps of the right\\nand of the left are in possession of both points of com-\\nmand, the situation after the capture of the strategic\\nkey is identical to the final situation in the preceding\\ndiagram.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "176\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nAdapted to the chessboard, this proposition of iQilitary\\nart and science may be represented thus\\nLIXE OF OPERATIONS.\\n(6.)\\nFlGUEE 96.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nNote. The Black Kt and B occupy tactical keys\\nthe White Kt occupies a point of manoeuvre. The\\nstrategic key is White s Q 5. White having the move\\nwill win.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "LINES OF OPERATION.\\n177\\nLINE OF OPERATIONS.\\nFigure 97.\\nSTRATEGETIC WEAKNESS\\nTK\\nObviously the corps offensive having the move vrin by\\noccupying the right point of command with the corps of\\nthe right, the resultant situation being identical to the\\nforegoing situations.\\n12", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "178\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTK\\nTlGUKE 98.\\nSTRATEGETIC WEAKNESS\\nTK\\nThe corps offensive having the move win in this posi-\\ntion by occupying the left point of command with the\\ncorps of the left. The student will observe that no line\\nof operations exists in the last three situations if the\\ncorps offensive have not the move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "PKOCESSES OF GREATER LOaiSTICS\\n(MINOR).", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS\\n(MINOE).\\nThe minor processes of Greater Logistics are con-\\ntained exclusively in simple lines of manoeuvre. These\\nprocesses contemplate neither the gain nor the defence\\nof material, but their sole object always is to divide up\\nthe opposing force and especially to intensify and per-\\npetuate that unscientific isolation of the adverse pieces\\nwhich exists at the beginning of every game of chess.\\nThese processes always must be combined with the\\ndeployments of Lines of Mobilization, in order that the\\nunscientific isolation of the kindred pieces which exists\\nat the beginning of every game of chess may be elimi-\\nnated, at the same time that the isolation of the adverse\\npieces is perpetuated.\\nThis idea is fundamental and underlies all the earlier\\nmoves of the chesspieces. Upon it all debuts which are\\ntrue and valid are based, and no analysis is worthy of\\nconsideration whose every move does not conform to\\nthis basic truth.\\nTHIRTEENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nEvery movement on a Simple Line of Manoeuvre should\\nbe a deploymeyit or a development, and the logistic radius\\nshould have its origin in a normal jjost or in a post of\\nmobilization, and its terminus in a topographical key.\\nIf the student will set up the pieces and inspect the\\nnormal position, he will observe that with the exception", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "182 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nof the knights and the pawns, all of the chesspieces are\\nimmovable, and that many of the latter must remain\\nthus immovable for a number of moves.\\nIn short, it readily may be perceived that before the\\nK R can be brought to K B 1, that the K Kt and\\nthe K B must be moved, and that before the Q R can\\nbe brought to K 1, that the Q Kt, the Q B, the Q, and\\nthe K must be moved.\\nObviously, then, these two pieces (K R and Q R) are\\nisolated from each other, and eight moves must elapse\\nbefore they can be brought into communication at their\\nproper posts in the primary base.\\nAgain, it easily is discernible that the King is unsci-\\nentifically posted at K 1, inasmuch as he not only\\nis dangerously exposed, but he constitutes a point of\\nimpenetrability on the logistic radii of his own pieces\\nand thereby prevents the proper deployment and co-\\noperation of the latter in the formation of the strategic\\nfront.\\nFurthermore, it is easy to see that this isolation of\\nthe K from the two powerful pieces of the right and\\nthe left wings respectively must, if perpetuated, result\\nin a serious, if not a fatal, weakness in the general\\nposition.\\nUnderstanding and accepting this premise, the student\\neasily will see that after the move of 1. P K 4 by\\nWhite, the best and most quickly executed series of de-\\nployments possible to Black are 1. P K 4, 2. Kt Q B\\n8,3. K B B 4, and 4. P Q 3 whereupon results\\nthe following situation", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 183\\nFigure 99.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nThe student now will observe that, these four deploy-\\nments having been completed, Black will have no diffi-\\nculty in making what further deployments are needed,\\nviz. (K Kt B 3 and Castles K R), in order to con-\\ncentrate all his originally scattered pieces into one\\nunited mass, whose communications in all respects\\nare free and protected.\\nThis, then, necessarily, is the fundamental opening\\nformation for Black, and, having established it, he has\\nevery reason to await the outcome of the game with\\nconfidence, for there is no apparent hope of victory for\\nWhite, provided the subsequent play be equally good on", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "184 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nboth sides. The reason why this is so is that White\\nhas frittered awav his inestimable advantage of the\\ninitiative; i. e., instead of intensifying the isolation of\\nthe black pieces, he has Yolimtarily and as the direct\\noutcome of a series of unscientific moves, permitted\\nBlack to make a series of scientifi.c moves and thereby\\nto establish a scientific position, which, although inferior\\n(being by the right refused), still is powerful enough to\\nwithstand any attack which White may bring to bear\\nagainst it, and not improbably, on account of the\\nunscientific processes of White, of becoming by com-\\nparison the superior position and one possessing the\\ngerm of legitimate victory.\\nUpon contemplating this black situation, the student\\nwill note two facts {a) that the Black K B was deployed\\nat Q B 4 before the Black Q P was moved, and that, as\\nthe result of this deployment of the Black K B (5), the\\ncommunication of the Black K wing with the centre is\\nassured, inasmuch as the Black K Kt can readily be\\ndeployed to its proper post at K B 3.\\nA little thought will convince the student that the\\nsingle deployment of K B B 4 has vastly relieved\\nBlack s original situation inasmuch as it not only has\\nbrought this piece into a commanding position from\\nwhence it attacks directly the White K B P (which prior\\nto castling K R is the vulnerable point in the King s\\nposition), but also, by removing a point of impenetra-\\nbility (K B 1) from the logistic radius of the Black K,\\nthat it has insured him the privilege of castling K R\\nand tlie union of the black centre and K wing.\\nHence, it needs no argument to prove that the deploy-\\nment of K B at Q B 4 is of the utmost consequence to\\nBlack, and that a prime object of White s simple line of\\nmanoeuvre sliould be to make this deployment of the\\nBlack K B at Q B 4: impossible.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 185\\nThe student next will observe that the deployment\\nof the Black Q P at Q 3 absolutely perfects this initial\\nblack formation, and that this deployment is second in\\nimportance only to the deployment of the Black K B\\nat Q B 4.\\nThe reason of this is that after the move of P Q 3\\nthe point K 4 is supported, and consequently not only\\nis the Black K P securely defended, but the White K P\\nis prevented from occupying the vertex of a major right\\noblique, and also prevented from either dislodging the\\nBlack K Kt from K B 3, or from making it impossible\\nfor this piece to occupy the last-mentioned point. Just\\nhere, it may be well to explain that the Black Q P is\\nnever properly played to Q 4, whenever the opponent\\ncan establish a valid major strategic front by occupying\\nWhite K 5 with a pawn or with a piece.\\nAgain, after K B B 4 and P Q 3, it is obvious\\nthat the Black Q B will deploy without hindrance, and\\nthat the communications of Black s right, centre, and\\nleft will become free and open, and the mobilization of\\nhis originally isolated masses now easily effected.\\nTherefore, again it is beyond dispute that after 1. P\\nK 4, a prime object of White s Simple Line of Ma-\\nnoeuvre should be to prevent the deployment of the Black\\nQ P at Q 3.\\nThe student now will observe that the position of\\nth\u00e2\u0082\u00ac Black K at K 1 prevents anything like a scientific\\nmassing of the black pieces and that, in short, it is\\nimperative that the Black K castle at the earliest prac-\\nticable moment and usually on the K side. In any\\nevent it obviously is imperative that the point of impene-\\ntrability formed by the Black King be eliminated from\\nthe logistic radius of the Black K R and Q P.\\nTherefore, it also is beyond dispute that a prime", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "186 CRESS STRATEGETICS.\\nobject of White s simple line of manceuvre should be to\\nprevent the Black K from castling.\\nAgain, the student will notice that the Black K B P\\nat K B 2 is the peculiarly weak spot in the black posi-\\ntion prior to castling K R, inasmuch as it is supported\\nonly by the Black K, and consequently if it be captured\\nthat the Black K after taking the adverse piece deprives\\nhimself of the privilege of castling.\\nHence, it equally is beyond dispute that a primary\\nobject of White s simple line of manoeuvre should be to\\nattach the Black KB P at K B2 whenever this P is\\nleft supported only hy the Black K.\\nFinally, the student will easily discern that after\\n1. P K 4 by White and 1. P K 4 by Black, a strate-\\ngic horizon exists for White, the two tactical keys\\nof which are Black K B 2 and K 4, and the strategic\\nkey being White K B 5. The white corps of the centre\\nis the Q, and the white point Q 1 is thus raised from\\nmerely a normal post to a point of manoeuvre. But the\\nstudent readily observes that a line of manoeuvre against\\nthis strategic horizon is not valid, inasmuch as it is not\\nbased on a strategetic weakness for the reason that the\\nBlack Q by deploying at K 2 or K B 3 defeyids both tac-\\ntical keys in a single move. Furthermore, the student\\nwill observe that by deploying the Black K Kt at K B 3\\nthe occupation of the strategic key K R 5 by the White\\nQ is prevented. But that the occupation of this point\\nK R 5 by the White Q is a serious menace to Black\\nboth before and after castling K R, is manifest, and\\nequally so that it is of the utmost importance that the\\nBlack K Kt maintains its post of mobilization at K B 3,\\nor that it keep in easy communication with that point,\\nin order to prevent the occupation of, or to dislodge the\\nWhite Q from the White point K R 5.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 187\\nHence, it also is beyond dispute that a prime object of\\nWhite s simple line of manoeuvre should be to prevent\\nthe posting of the Black K Kt at K B S or, to dislodge\\nthe Black K Kt as soon as possible from this post when-\\never the objective plane is located on the right or on the\\ncentre.\\nThese facts being established, it is not difficult to\\ndetermine, by the process of logical deduction, the proper\\ndeployments for White and for Black which appertain\\nto simple lines of manoeuvre.\\nReverting to the initial move of White, i. e., 1. P K 4,\\nit is first all-important that the student understand and\\naccept once and for all the basic truth which underlies\\nall true processes appertaining to Black, viz,\\nBlack never should adopt the Left Oblique Refused\\nafter White has initiated the open game by P K\\nThe reason for this is that, in order to prevent being\\noverwhelmed by White s Major Right Oblique, Black\\nwill be obliged to play prematurely P Q 4 in the open-\\ning, and thus to leave his K 4 unsupported by a black\\npawn at Q 3, which will permit White again to establish\\nthe Major Right Oblique by Kt K 5.\\nFurthermore, the obverse of this equally is true, and\\nthe student will understand, once and for all, that\\nWhenever Black adopts the close game, White never\\nshould permit the exchange or the advance of the Black\\nK P, but should confine it immovable at Black s K S.\\nThus, by memorizing these few and simple basic\\ntruths, the student readily will grasp the true processes\\nwhich apply to what is termed the opening of a game of\\nchess. Furthermore, he readily will note the absurdities\\nof the books of so-called chess analj^sis, most of\\nwhich are manufactured by fourth and fifth class chess-\\nplayers, and all of which are destitute of anything in the", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "188 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nnature of a scientific foundation. For it is easy to see\\nthat, such books being governed by no system of play,\\ntliey necessarily and admittedly are in a continual state\\nof transition i. e., what is true to-day is false to-mor-\\nrow, and vice versa. Finally, it is an open secret that\\nthe cliess-master puts no reliance whatever in such\\nbooks of analysis, but makes his own analysis as he\\nneeds it.\\nThus, White opens the game by 1. P K 4, for the\\nreason that he at once establishes the open game and\\ndictates Black s reply by threatening to play 2. F Q 4,\\nwhich would insure to White a major front, either by\\nthe right by P K 5, or to the left by P Q 5, accord-\\ningly as Black s formations should make most advisable.\\nWhite, of course, on his initial move can play 1. P Q 4,\\nand 1. Kt K B 3 but to these Black s best reply is\\n1. P K B 4, by which reply Black will prevent the\\ndeployment of the White K P at K 4 and establish the\\nClose Primary Base 3 A (C P B 3 A, see Minor Tac-\\ntics, pp. 166-168), having the preferable position and a\\nstrong counter-attack against the White K.\\nIn reply to White s moves of 1. P Q 4 and 1. Kt\\nK B 3, Black safely may reply 1. P Q 4, but the\\nreply of 1. P K B 4 is preferable, for the reason that\\nin the latter instance Black s strategic front extends\\ntowards the White K, and his advantage in position\\narises from the fact that White s strategic front will not\\nextend towards the Black K, so long as Black can pre-\\nvent the exchange or the advance to K 4 of the White\\nK P, which Black should hold immovable on W^hite s K 3.\\nAny initial move made by White other than 1. P K 4\\nand 1. Kt K B 3 always should be met by Black with\\n1. P K 4. The reason of this is that mathematically\\nWhite should wi7i the game hy the advantage of the first", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 189\\nmove. This advantage, derived from the first move,\\nconsists in the ability of White to establish his minor\\nfront on that great central diagonal extended toivards that\\nside of the hoard on tvhich Black luill castle.\\nConsequently, Black having originally a lost game, can\\nwin only by becoming transformed into White, so to\\nspeak i. e., hy establishing his j^ieces on the great central\\ndiagonal leading towards the White King^ and preventing\\nWhite from establishing his pieces on the great central\\ndiagonal leading toward the Black King.\\nIn either case, it is obvious that the opposing king s\\npawns must be posted at their fourth squares, and that\\nhe ivho can post his own K P at K 4, and prevent the op-\\nponent from so doing, thereby attains a decided advantage.\\nThus, it follows that all initial moves except 1. P K 4\\non the part of White are inferior for the reason that by\\nno other move can White be certain of establishing his\\nstrategic front upon the strategetic centre.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS.\\nAs the student readily perceives, it should be the ob-\\nject of every movement made on a simple line of manoeu-\\nvre on the part of White to deploy a kindred piece and,\\nmoreover, to deploy the given piece to that point whereat\\nit prevents the deployment of the Black K B at Q B 4,\\nor of the Black Q P at Q 3, or of the Black K Kt at K B 3,\\nor to prevent the Black K from castling, or to capture\\nthe Black K B P at K B 2.\\nWhenever such point exists, it is termed in this theory\\na Topographical Key.\\nTopographical Keys are divided into three classes,\\nviz.\\nI. Those which are combined with a Post of Mobiliza-\\ntion.\\nII. Those which are combined with a Post of Devel-\\nopment.\\nIII. Those which are not combined either with a\\nPost of Mobilization or with a Post of Development.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS.\\n191\\nSIMPLE LINE OF MANCEUVRE.\\nFigure 100.\\nTK PM TK TK+PP\\nNP Normal Post.\\nTK Topographical Key.\\nTK PM Topographical Key Post of Mobilization.\\nTK PD Topographical Key Post of Development.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "192\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nAdapted to the chessboard, this proposition of military\\nart and science may be expressed thus\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL KEY COMBINING POST OF\\nMOBILIZATION.\\nFigure 101.\\nBlack.\\n^I^mmi\\n11 imikmt m i\\nm\\nm\\nm\\nv/. y///////A\\nWhit\\nNote. White played on his last move P to Q 4,\\nwhereby he deployed his Q P to its proper post in the\\nstrategic front, and prevented Black from playing\\nK B Q B 4.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "TOPOGRAPHICAL KEYS.\\n193\\nTOPOGEAPHICAL KEY COMBINING POST OF\\nDEVELOPxMENT.\\nFigure 102.\\nBlack.\\nif iimimi mi i\\nm\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0mm\\ny/////////A.\\n^^m\\n1^1\\nWhite.\\nNote. \u00e2\u0080\u0094White played on his last move P to Q 5,\\ndeveloping the major front by the left against the cramped\\nBlack centre.\\n13", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "194\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTOPOGRAPHICAL KEY NOT COMBINING EITHER A POST\\nOF MOBILIZATION OR A POST OF DEVELOPMENT.\\nFigure 103.\\nBlack.\\nm\\nI\\n//////////a\\nV//. ^y^/////////.\\n11 i 11 i i i\\nm ii^j^A\\niB PI\\nv/z/M.\\nWA\\ni^i i\\nTFA/fe.\\nNote White played on his last move K B to Q Kt 5.\\nThis move is played to prevent Black from playing\\n3. K B Q B 4, and is made without regard to the Line\\nof Mobilization or of Development.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "GEAND PROCESSES OF GREATER\\nLOGISTICS.\\nThe student now arrives at the crucial phase of\\nchessic art and science as interpreted in this theory.\\nThe first three books of this series in which the\\nknowledge derived from the experience of the greater\\nchessmasters is classified and systematically arranged\\nfor the purpose of presenting a complete and concrete\\nsystem of chessplay for the benefit of the student\\ntogether with the present volume, which exploits the\\nmethod whereby this theory is applied in practice\\nwould perhaps be written in vain, did the author at this\\npoint lay down his pen.\\nTo the layman, whether in war or in chess, this fact\\nwell may seem inconceivable, and he properly may hold\\nthat the value of a completed science and of an art whose\\nprocesses are formulated, is indisputable. As an abstract\\nproposition this is true, and it literally would be true if\\nall men were possessed of an understanding of art and\\nof science in equal proportions.\\nBut it is matter of common knowledge that the man\\nwho merely is a theorist, and the man who merely is\\nan artist, is to be found in droves, so to speak. The\\nfirst is a worshipper of abstract propositions and falls\\nin prostrate adoration before the shrine of scientific\\nprinciple the latter, heedless of cause and effect and\\nenamoured of tangible and material details, revels in the\\ncomplexities of the present moment, without regard for\\nthe thing whicii ought to be, or perhaps may yet be.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "196 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBoth of these people have the utmost contempt for\\neach other s methods. The one despises the lack of\\nsystem in the other, and the latter mocks at what seems\\nto him but egotistical pedantry.\\nIn the various walks of life, as on the chessboard and\\non the battlefield, the mere artist wins against the mere\\ntheorist. The reason for this is that the first knows\\nmore than he himself is aware of, much more than he\\ncan put into language, and vastly more than the mere\\ntheorist gives him credit for knowing. Furthermore,\\nlie possesses the ability to utilize all the knowledge that\\nhe possesses.\\nOn the other hand, the mere theorist usually lacks\\nall understanding of the art of applying his vast fund\\nof knowledge, and, in addition, he is handicapped by\\na fallacy which is world-wide and common to all theo-\\nrists, viz,\\nThe theorist thinks the true use of knowledge is to\\nbring about an ideal condition, in order to secure an ad-\\nvantage; when, as a matter of fact, the true use of knowl-\\nedge is to derive all i^ossible advantage from the condition\\nwhich exists. This is the great secret which governs the\\napplication of knowledge to practical uses.\\nHence, singularly enough, it is the artist, the tactician,\\nthe contemner of principle, who unconsciously/ bases his\\nprocesses upon the fundamental law wliich governs the\\npractical utilization of knowledge while it is the mere\\ntheorist, the stickler for order, system, and the infal-\\nlibility of cause and effect, who, ignorant of the art,\\nincessantly and unwittingly violates that basic law upon\\nwhich the system he so idolizes is founded.\\nThis simple fact explains many seeming incongrui-\\nties it shows why the mere artist, the man of action,\\nis a far more potent factor in the world than the mere", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "GRAND PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 197\\ntheorist or man of learning. It shows that science er\\nse is of far less avail than is art j^er se and justifies the\\nproverb of the ancient Persian\\nA pound of knowledge requires for its application\\nten pounds of common sense.\\nBut there is another type of man who at long inter-\\nvals becomes manifest in the flesh, and before whom\\nthe mere scientist and the mere artist are as nought.\\nThe world, for want of a better name, sees fit to term\\nsuch a character a genius, to regard him as in-\\nspired in some particular way, and assumes that his\\npowers of mind are supernatural. Such a man was\\nMorphy in chess, and Epaminondas, Alexander, Hannibal,\\nCaesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene,\\nFrederic II., Washington, Napoleon, and Yon Moltke\\nin war. A character who thus combines in himself\\nboth the erudition of the theorist and the discrimination\\nof the artist is so rare, both in chess and in war, that\\nthe former has produced but a single and the latter but\\neleven examples, out of the billions who have populated\\nthe earth during the last twenty-four centuries.\\nIt is very easy and probably very complimentary to\\nterm such a character a genius, and it unquestionably\\nsaves much mental labor to assume that his superior\\nunderstanding is supernatural.\\nNevertheless, it is a singular circumstance that the\\nminds of these great men invariably have run in similar\\nchannels, and that their processes were so nearly iden-\\ntical that it has seemed possible to the student of war,\\nof chess, and of mathematics to reduce these processes\\nto a system, and thereby to show that the only differ-\\nence between these supernatural processes and the\\nordinary processes of nature lies in the mere fact that\\nthe former are not understood.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "198 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nIt is the history of chess and of war that men who\\nwere extremely skilful in the art were able to under-\\nstand but little of the science, and, vice vei^sa^ that men\\nprofoundly erudite in matters relating to the science\\nwere able to comprehend but little of the art. That is,\\nwhile these men had the same facilities and the same\\nopportunities, neither could comprehend the secret of\\ncombining both the art and the science, and ultimately\\neach would abandon tlie one branch and devote him-\\nself exclusively to the other. Why this peculiar fact\\nis so, we do not know but that it is so, is established\\nby the history of mankind from the beginning of the\\nworld, and for want of a better reason its cause\\nis ascribed to the difference in temperament among\\nmen.\\nHence, the mere tactician and the mere theorist have\\nall sooner or later found themselves in exactly the\\nsituation that the student of these volumes finds himself\\nat the present moment. Past masters either in the\\nknowledge of the game or in the art of utilizing what\\nknowledge they were possessed of, nevertheless, they\\nwere forced to admit that there was a limit beyond\\nwhich their processes did not apply, and where neither\\nthe theorist nor the tactician could do more than grope\\nand, furthermore, that it was when lost in this impene-\\ntrable maze that they were routed, horse, foot, and\\ndragoons by the so-called genius in the person of\\nMorphy or Napoleon; who for some reason or other\\nappeared to have no difficulty wha*tever in finding his\\nway about in what to his victims was a night of Stygian\\nblackness.\\nThus it appears that in the last analysis the term\\ngenius, as applied to the greater masters of chess and\\nof war, is used by the world at large to designate men", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "GRAXD PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 199\\nwho were alike superlatively equipped both in the theory\\nand in the practice of their respective professions.\\nFurthermore, it appears that the genius possessed\\nby these great characters consisted in the fact that they\\nknew how to bridge that vast impassable gulf which\\nseparates the tactician and the theorist, and to produce,\\nby a method unknown to the mere artist or to the\\nmere scientist, tJie perfect co-operation of theory and\\npractice.\\nObviously, then, perfect comprehension of a science,\\nor perfect comprehension of an art, is not enough to\\nmake of any man a genius. In addition to this he\\nalso must perfectly comprehend that method of calcvlation\\nwhereby in any situation the laws of the art and the\\nprinciples of the science may be reduced to mathematical\\nharmony, in order that these may perfectly co-operate\\nfor the attainment of a mutually desired end.\\nIt therefore is evident that the science of chess strate-\\ngetics culminates in that calcidation whereby the prin-\\nciples upon which the art of chessplay is founded are\\ncorrectly interpreted and properly applied to any given\\nsituation on the cliessboard.\\nBy his understanding of the minor and the major\\nprocesses of greater logistics the student is enabled to\\ntreat correctly any chessic condition which may be com-\\nprehended in a single strategetic horizon. But when two\\nor more strategetic horizons are contained at the same\\ntime in a given topographical zone, it is imperative that\\nthe student be equipped with knowledge which will enable\\nhim to detect the true strategetic horizon and to describe\\nthe true course of procedure i. e., in the vernacular of\\ntlie game, to pick out the best move:\\nThe student, therefore, must clearly understand that\\nthere is a difference between Science the knowledge of", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "200 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nwliat to do and Art the understanding of how to do\\nit and that this difference is all the difference in the\\nworld.\\nIf, in a game of chess, the ojjpo sing force had no poiver\\nof movement, all chess knowledge would be limited to\\nLines of Mobilization and Lines of Development, and\\nthe whole art of chessplay would be contained hi the\\nprocesses of Lesser Logistics.\\nAll the conditions would be known, the proposition\\nwould be exact, the calculations would be merely those\\nof simple arithmetic, and White would Avin by establish-\\ning his pieces on a grand front by the right oblique.\\nBut it so happens that the opposing force not only is\\nable to move, but it is capable of being moved with\\nvigor and effect and the resultant of all this is that the\\nopposing force possesses, and can exert, a foicer for\\nresistance which in common practice is quite equal to\\nthe power of attack put forth by White.\\nLi war, this fact is emphasized, and often laughably\\nexaggerated. The basic proposition of military science\\nis that two men can whip one but the history of war is\\nthe story of the victory of the under dog, and in actual\\nwarfare the difficulty always is to prevent the one man\\nfrom trouncing seriatim both of his usually unprepared\\nand isolated enemies.\\nAgain, the powers for attack and the powers for resist-\\nance possessed by the opposing forces are indeterminate\\nand irregularly distributed.\\nThe reason for this is, that while the right of move-\\nment appertains equally to every chesspiece, not more\\nthan one chesspiece can be moved at any given turn to\\nplay, and consequently the vigor and effect of any given\\nmove is problematical, and is dependent upon and pro-\\nportionate to the support subsequently accorded it by kin-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "GRAND PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 201\\ndred pieces and to the resistance offered to it by adverse\\npieces.\\nHence, it follows that it is imperative, from the midst\\nof the strategic, tactical, and topographical differences\\nwhich exist in every situation on the chessboard or on the\\nbattlefield, to establish mathematical harmony, and it is\\nobvious that this harmony consists in consolidating as a\\nunit the total strength of the kindred force, and in di-\\nrecting it against the strategic vertices of the true strate-\\ngetic horizon, whenever a strategetic weakness exists in\\nthe adverse position and against the To2:)ographical Key^\\nwhenever a strategetic weakness does 7iot exist in the\\nadverse position.\\nWith the minor processes of Greater Logistics which\\nappertain exclusively to simple lines of manoeuvre, and\\nwith the major processes of Greater Logistics which ap-\\npertain to compound and to complex lines of manoeuvre,\\nand to lines of operation, the student already is familiar,\\nand, given the True Strategetic Horizon^ he will have no\\ndifficulty in detecting and describing the Strategic Ver-\\ntices, the Points of Command, of Manoeuvre, and of\\nDeparture, the Topographical, Tactical, and Strategic\\nKeys, and the Logistic Radii.\\nThat calculation whereby the True Strategetic Horizon\\nis detected in the midst of a number of strategetic hori-\\nzons coexisting in any given situation on the surface of\\nthe chessboard is the connecting link hetiveen the science of\\nchess and the art of chessidlay it is that manifestation of\\ngenius, whereby the greater master at chess and the\\ngreater master at war so easily and so completely over-\\nthrows his adversaries, and it is the touchstone by the\\nuse of which the mere theorist and the mere tactician\\nmay come to realize the full scope and the intellectual\\nmagnificence both of chess and of war, viz.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "202 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBASIC PROPOSITION OF GREATER LOGISTICS.\\nTheorem.\\nTo determine the TEUE Strategetic Horizon^ the true\\nTactical EvrAution^ and the true Tactical Sequence.\\nLocate a tactical key in the adverse position^ the occupa-\\ntion of which hy a given Mndred piece will\\n{a) Checkmate the adverse king\\n(b) Or^ queen a kindred pawn\\n(c) Or, win a hostile piece\\nand connect this tactical key^ by a logistic radius, ivith\\nthat point of command ichich, at the given time, is occu-\\npied hy the given kindred piece.\\nLocate a second hut vacant point of command, which,\\nif occupied hy a second kindred piece, zvill operate radii\\nof offence simultaneously against a second and third\\ntactical keys in the adverse position and connect this\\npoint of command, hy a logistic radius, vAth that point\\nof manoeuvre ichich, at the given time, is occupied hy the\\ngiven second kindred piece.\\nThen, if either the given second or third tactical keys,\\ntogether ivith the strategic key (to he determined) and a\\nthird point of command occupied hy a third kindred\\npiece, are contained in the same vertical, the same hori-\\nzontal, or the same diagonal, and if the first tactical key\\nand the tactical key last specified are hoth situated on the\\nperimeter of that geometric symbol ivhich appertains to\\nthe third kindred piece, hut are not situated in the same\\ntopographical horizon\\n(a) The occupation of the given second point of com-\\nmand is the TRUE TACTICAL EVOLUTION\\n(h) The tacticcd keys situated on the perimeter of this\\ngeometric symbol, together with the strategic key, -which\\nalways is the centre of the given geometric symbol, con-", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "GRAND PROCESSES OF GREATER LOGISTICS. 203\\nstitute the strategic vertices of the TRUE strategetic\\nHORIZON\\n{c) Of which the third kindred piece is the column of the\\ncentre the first kindred piece is the column of the rights\\nor of the left, and the second kiyidred piece is the column\\nof the left or of the right, respectively and the arrange-\\nment of moves required to occupy the strategic vertices\\nconstitutes the true tactical sequence.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUE^XE.\\nThe Tactical Sequence consists of those marches\\nTvhereby the Corps Offensive leave their respective points\\nof departure or of manceuvre and advance along the\\nlogistic radii which appertain to the true strategetic\\nhorizon, to their respective points of command against\\nthe strategic vertices.\\nrOURTEEXTH LAW OE THE AET OE CHESSELAY.\\nA projected march hy a Corps Offensive is valid when\\nit is directed against a Point Offensive, and\\n(a) When such Point Offensive is the point of com-\\nmand in a tactical horizon of which the given Corjjs\\nOffensive is the prime tactical factor\\n{h) And luhen one of the tactical Jcegs contained in the\\ngiven tactical horizon is situated on the perimeter of that\\ngeometric symbol of which the strategic key of the true\\nstrategetic horizon is the centre\\n(c) And when the exponent of the given Corps Offensive\\nis not less than the defensive exponent of either of those\\ntactical keys which are contained in the given tactical\\nhorizon\\n(d) And when such march is in propter sequence with\\nthe other marches of the kindred Corps Offensive,\\nAll marches which properly appertain to Corps Offen-\\nsive are combined in three distinct ways, each of which", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 2U5\\nmethods constitutes a series of movements and is termed\\na Prime Logistic Operation, viz.\\nFIRST TACTICAL SEQUENCE.\\nMarch M. 1. This march always is made either by\\nthe column of the Right or of the Left, which advances\\nfrom a point of manoeuvre along an open logistic radius,\\nand occupies a point of command against one of the\\ntactical keys contained in that strategic weakness, which\\nat the given time exists in the adverse position.\\nMarch No 2. This march always is made by that\\nflank column which is not engaged in making March\\nNo. 1. It always advances from a point of manoeuvre\\nalong an open logistic radius, and occupies a ])oint of\\ncommand against two or more tactical keys, one of\\nwhich latter is contained in the perimeter of the same\\ngeometric symbol with that tactical key attacked by\\nthe first kindred column, but not in the same topo-\\ngraphical horizon.\\nMarch No. 3. This march always is made by the\\ncolumn 01 the centre, which advances from a point of\\nmanoeuvre along an open logistic radius, and occupies a\\npoint of command simultaneously against the strategic\\nkey of the true strategetic horizon and a tactical key.\\nMarch No. This march always is made by the\\ncolumn of the centre, which advances from a point of\\ncommand along an open logistic radius and occupies\\nthe strategic key of the true strategetic horizon.\\nMarch No. 5. This march always is made by that\\nkindred column, whether of the Centre, Right, or Left,\\nwhich can by that single move either win a hostile\\npiece, queen a kindred pawn, or preferably checkmate\\nthe adverse king.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "206\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nFIRST TACTICAL SEQUENCE.\\nFigure 104.\\nMr. Bukille.\\nm\u00c2\u00b1\\nIliBi\\nis\\ne ^i5?^\\ntiii\\nisi J|\\n^s^..^ fiii.\\nmmA\\n1\\nI\\nMr. Youxg.\\nXoTE. In this situation it is obvious that if Black\\nhad the move he would win by playing P to Q 4.\\nHence, White must either act on a line of operations,\\nor he must act on a simple line of manoeuvre and pre-\\nvent the advance of the Black Q P.\\nAn exact reconnoissance of the situation shows that\\nthe Black force is divided into two s:reat isolated masses,", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE, 207\\nand that only one of these masses i. e,, that composed\\nof the Black K, Q, R, K P, K Kt P, and K R P\u00e2\u0080\u0094 is in\\naction.\\nAccording to Napoleon s dictum it is necessary for\\nWhite to act either against the communications of these\\ntwo isolated masses or against the communications of\\nthe active adverse mass with its base i. e., the Black K.\\nThe latter course would be brilliantly decisive, but in\\nthis case no strategic line of operations can be mathe-\\nmatically demonstrated.\\nThus it is White s sole resource, being inferior in\\nforce, to act on a simple line of manoeuvre and endeavor\\nto perpetuate and to intensify the unscientific isolation\\nof Black s divided army.\\nBut the exact reconnoissance of the general situation\\nalso shows that there is a prospective complex line of\\nmanoeuvre open to White, provided that the Black Q\\ncan be compelled or enticed to withdraw the radius of\\ndefence which is operating for the support of Black K 2.\\nThis prospective complex line of ma^qmjvre results\\nfrom the fact that White s corps of the iSt (White Q)\\nalready occupies a point of command against one tactical\\nkey (Black K Kt 2) and remotely against a second\\ntactical key (Black s K K 1) and that if the White K P,\\nwhich occupies a point of manoeuvre, can advance to its\\npoint of command (Black s K 2), and from whence it\\nwould attack simultaneously two tactical keys (Black\\nK B 1 and K 1), the White K B also would be brought\\ninto co-operation with the White Q.\\nBut although this is so, it still is the fact that this\\nprospective complex line of manoeuvre never may be\\nrealized, and, as the student must always recollect, the\\nmost pressing need ahvays must first he attended to.\\nTherefore, although White should hold in view the", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "208 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\npossibility of this prospective attack against the Black\\nK, nevertheless, he on his turn to play must be governed\\nby the principles of the simple line of manoeuvre, as his\\nimmediate object is to prevent the play of P to Q 4 by\\nBlack.\\nThat is to say, White must dictate Black s next move\\ni. White must retain the initiative. White no^\\napplies the tactician s rule, and at once sees that he\\ncan compel the Black Q to perform two functions; viz,.\\nto defend the Black K 2 and at the same time to pro-\\ntect itself against attack, and White further sees that\\nsuch onus, if thrown on the Black Q, will prevent the\\nmove of P to Q 4 by Black, and will dictate as his next\\nmove a move by the Black Q.\\nThis, of course, is just what White wants to do and\\nhe can do this in three ways viz., by Kt Q R 4, by\\nB K 3, or by P Q Kt 4.^\\nEither of these moves by White is equivalent, in wai\\nto outflanking a hostile corps which is defending a\\nstrategic point. A detachment made for such a pur-\\npose may be sacrificed if such sacrifice insures a line\\nof operations. j\\nConsequently, White selects his Q Kt P as a Corps\\nDetached to be sacrificed as the most judicious method\\nto fulfil the requirements of the immediate simple line\\nof manoeuvre and to bring about the prospective com-\\nplex line of manoeuvre, and he plays:\\n]\\\\[k. Young.\\n1. P_QKt4.\\nIf the Black Q retreats to Q 3 or to K 2, then the\\ncomplex line of manoeuvre begins, and the initiative is\\nretained for White by Kt K 4, or B K Kt 5. So\\nBlack plays", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 209\\nMr. Burille.\\n1. Q X Kt P.\\nStill White must keep to the simple line of manoeuvre\\nin order to retain the initiative and to prevent Black\\nfrom playing P Q 4 so he continues\\n2. E Q Kt 1. 2. Q X Kt.\\nBlack evades the snare laid for him by the offer of the\\nWhite Q; i. e., Black could have played 2. R K B 8\\n(ck);3.BxR,QxQ;4.P-K7,Q-K3; 5. B-R3,\\nP-Q4; 6. KtxQP, PxKt; 7. B-QKt5, B-Q2;\\n8. R K B 1, and White wins.\\nOf course, Black by taking the Kt permits White to\\nact on a complex line of manoeuvre against the Black K.\\nThe situation is replete with instruction for the student\\nof this theory.\\n3. B-KR6.\\nThis is another sacrifice of a Corps Detached to\\ndictate Black s reply and thus to retain the initiative,\\nand is the beginning of the strategic line of operations.\\n3. P X B.\\nBlack must avert the mate at the expense of a move\\nand thus permit the White column of the centre to\\noccupy its point of manoeuvre (White K B 1). This\\ncapture by Black also uncovers the Black K Kt 1 to the\\ncombined attack of the White Q and K B.\\n4. P-K7.\\nWhite now advances his corps of the left to a point\\nof command whereat it attacks simultaneously two tac-\\ntical keys (Black K 1 and K B 1).\\n4. R-Kl.\\n14", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "210 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThe Black R thus attacked is obliged to preserve it-\\nself and to support the kindred point of junction against\\nthe attack of the White K P. It thus acts as a part of\\nthe column of manoeuvre by constituting itself a point\\nof impenetrability.\\nBut by so doing, as the student readily sees, the\\nBlack R abandons the strategic key, i. e. (Black K B 2),\\nfor it is evident that if a White R be posted at Black s\\nK B 2, it simultaneously Tvill attack both Black K B 1 and\\nK Kt 2, both of which are tactical keys, and thus the\\nstrategic horizon will be complete, with the strategic ver-\\ntices occupied by the Corps Offensive, and consequently\\nit will be a winning position for White.\\n5. E-KBl.\\nThe White Corps of the Centre now occupies its point\\nof manoeuvre and at the same time simultaneously\\nattacks the strategic key and a tactical key, according\\nto the grand law of chessplay as laid down in this\\ntheory.\\n5. Q-QB4.\\nThe student will observe that although Black has\\ncaptured three detached corps for which White has\\nno further use, his position not only is not further\\ndeveloped, but on account of the removal of the Black\\nK Kt P from K Kt 2, it is even weaker than before\\nhis first move, and that White still retains the initiative\\nand the right to move.\\n6. R B 7.\\nThe White Corps of the Centre now occupies the\\nstrategic key from whence it simultaneously attacks", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 211\\nthe two tactical keys, which also are attacked by the\\nCorps of the Right and of the Left, respectively. The\\nposition now is a winning position for White either with\\nor without the move.\\n6. R-Ktl.\\nBlack, obviously, cannot prevent both the threatened\\nmate and the threatened occupation of the logistic\\nhorizon by the White K P.\\n7. E X E P (ek). 7. K x E.\\n8. Q X E (ck).\\nCheckmate.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "212 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nSECOND TACTICAL SEQUENCE.\\nMarch JVo. 1. This march always is made by the\\ncolumn of the Right or of the Left, which advances\\nfrom a point of manoeuvre along an open logistic radius\\nand occupies a point of command against one of the\\ntactical keys contained in the strategetic weakness\\nwhich at the given time exists in the adverse position.\\nMarch JVo. 2. This march always is made by the\\ncolumn of the centre, which advances from a point of\\nmanoeuvre along an open logistic radius and occupies\\nthe strategic key of the true strategetic horizon.\\nMarch No. 3. This march always is made by that\\nflank column which is not engaged in making March\\nNo. 1. It always advances from a point of manoeuvre\\nalong an open logistic radius and occupies a point of\\ncommand against two or more tactical keys, one of\\nwhich latter is contained in the perimeter of the same\\ngeometric symbol with that tactical key attacked by\\nthe first kindred column, but not in the same topograph-\\nical horizon.\\nMarch No. 4- This march always is made by that\\nkindred column, whether of the Centre, Right, or Left,\\nwhich can most effectively occupy a tactical key and in\\none move win a hostile piece, queen a kindred pawn, or,\\npreferably, checkmate the adverse king.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE.\\n213\\nSECOND TACTICAL SEQUENCE.\\nFigure 105.\\nMr. Youxg.\\nMr. Harlow.\\nNote. This situation shows each of the three Black\\nCorps Offensive posted on a point of manoeuvre.\\nThe strategetic weakness in the White position is that\\nof Class III. (see Grarud Tactics, p. 36). It consists of\\nthe undefended White^ B and the White K Kt P, which\\nlatter is defended only by the White K.\\nThe strategic horizon thus is formed, beiug composed\\nof that part of the second horizontal which extends", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "214 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nfrom White s K Kt 2 to his Q Kt 2. The strategic kej\\nis White K 2, and this point is connected by an open\\nlogistic radius with Black s Q R 3, an adverse point of\\nmanoeuYre which at the present moment is occupied by\\nthe Black Q.\\nAn open logistic radius leads from White s Q Kt 2 to\\nBlack s Q Kt 1, which latter is a point of command for\\nthe Black Q R. This piece is connected with its point\\nof command by an open logistic radius extending from\\nthe point of manoeuvre, Black Q R 1.\\nAnother open logistic radius leads from White s\\nK Kt 2 to Black s K Kt 3, which latter is a point of com-\\nmand for the Black K R. This piece is connected with\\nits point of command by an open logistic radius extend-\\ning from the point of manoeuvre, Black K B 3.\\nFollowing the rule which governs the first march in\\nthe Second Tactical Sequence, one of the Black flanking\\ncorps is deployed to its point of command. This choice\\nnecessarily falls on the Black Q R, inasmuch as no\\nline of operation exists, it would be inadvisable to allow\\nthe White column of support the advantage of a passed\\npawn on the centre by B x Kt, which obviously would\\nhave to be done in order to play K R K Kt 3.\\nHence, Black correctly deploys an inactive piece on\\nthe complex line of manoeuvre, viz.\\nMr. Youxg.\\n1. QR-QKtl.\\nObviously the White Q B cannot retreat to Q B 1, as\\nin that case the White Q B P would fall victim to the\\nBlack Kt, which in this situation is a Corps Detached\\nand prevents the occupation of the supporting posts,\\nWhite KB 2 by the White R, and Q 2 by the White Q.\\nThe P at Black s QR7 also is a Black Corps Detached", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 215\\npreventing the White Q R from occupjing the supporting\\npost, White Q Kt 1. White moved, viz.\\nMk. Harlow.\\n2. Q-QBl.\\nThis was a fatal error. It is imperative that White\\nin a single move support the attacked tactical key\\n(White Q Kt 2) and also defend the strategic key (White\\nK 2). The only move to do both of these things simul-\\ntaneously was to play Q Q B 2.\\n2. Q-K7.\\nAccording to rule, the second march of a Corps Offen-\\nsive in the Second Tactical Sequence always is made by\\nthe corps of the centre. White haying left the strategic\\nkey of the position undefended, Black at once occupies\\nit with his Q, thus simultaneously attacking both tactical\\nkeys (White Q Kt 2 and White K Kt 2).\\nThis situation will command the attention of every\\nstudent of strategetics, whether of war or of chess. It is\\nthe exact replica on the chessboard of those evolutions\\nwhereby Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, the\\nvictory upon which he most prided himself.\\n3. R X P.\\nIt made no difference what White played. War,\\nsays Napoleon, is a business of positions. White\\nloses, not because Black has two pawns plus, but because\\ntwo Black Corps Offensive occupy two of the strategic\\nvertices of the position and dictate Wliite s next move.\\n3. B X Kt.\\nHere the student again sees the co-operation of a kin-\\ndred corps detached. The White Kt prevented the\\noccupation by Black s KR of the point of command,", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "216 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nBlack KKt3. White cannot take the Black KB, for\\nhe must prevent the Black K R from occupying its point\\nof command, as then all three of the Black Corps Offen-\\nsive would become posted on the strategic vertices, which\\nwould win offhand for Black, either with or without the\\nmove. (See Fig. 93.)\\n4. Q-Ql.\\nWhite, of course, is beaten. But to prolong the con-\\ntest he adopts the only course, and plays to subordinate\\nthe dominant adverse Prime Strategetic Factor.\\nThat is to say, White is threatened with checkmate\\nby the Black Q he removes this danger for the time\\nbeing.\\n4. Q X Q.\\nThis is to dictate White s next move, and thus to gain\\nthe necessary time to save the Black K B.\\n5. E X Q.\\nWhite thus saves his King.\\n5. B X B P.\\nAs the result of his tactical line of operation, Black\\nhas a piece and two pawns ahead, and, of course, wins\\neasilv.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 217\\nTHIRD TACTICAL SEQUENCE.\\nMarch No. 1. This march always is made by the\\ncolumn of the centre, which advances from a point of\\ncommand along an open logistic radius and occupies\\nthe strategic key of the true strategetic horizon.\\nMarch No. 2. This march always is made by the\\ncolumn of the Right or Left, which advances from a\\npoint of manceuvre along an open logistic radius and\\noccupies a point of command against two or more\\ntactical keys, one of which latter is contained in the\\nperimeter of that geometric symbol with a tactical key\\nattacked by the column of the centre, but not in the\\nsame tactical horizon.\\nMarch No. 3. This march always is made by the\\nkindred flank column which is not engaged in March\\nNo. 2. It always is directed from a point of manoeuvre\\ntoward a point of command against two tactical keys in\\nthe adverse position and under like conditions.\\nMarch No. J^. This march always is made by that\\nkindred column, whether of the Centre, Right, or Left,\\nwhich can most effectively occupy a tactical key, and\\nby that single move either win a hostile piece, queen\\na kindred pawn, or, preferably, checkmate the adverse\\nking.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "218\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nTHIRD TACTICAL SEQUENCE.\\nElGUKE 106.\\nMr. Waee.\\nm i\\nm^^. mm\\nisii\\n7/- ^^^z//\\nM7////\\nA\\nlai\\n4/////M\\nMe. Young.\\nNote. Tins is a most instructive situation and am-\\nply will repay the closest scrutiny. Herr Steinitz, in the\\nInternational Chess Magazine, states that White s\\nplay is of a high order.\\nAn exact reconnoissance of the situation shows that\\nthe dominant Prime Strategetic Factor is White s col-\\numn of support. This results from the fact tliat his\\naligned Q P and Q B P outfront the P at Black s Q B 2.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 219\\nThis advantage is supplemented by the fact that\\nWhite, having the move, can establish the grand front\\nby the left oblique and all this is intensified by the\\nfurther facts that White can retain the initiative by\\nattacking the Black Q, and thus dictate Black s next\\nmove.\\nThus, in obedience to the laws of the art, Wl;iite\\nplays\\nMr. Young.\\n1. P-QB6.\\nThis is the march of a corps detached for the purpose\\nof nullifying the defensive force of a corps defensive\\n(Black Q), and so enable the White Q to capture the\\nBlack Q Kt P. It also combines the true line of devel-\\nopment according to the principles of Grand Tactics.\\nMr. Ware.\\n1. Q-QBl.\\nThis was a tactical error, as thereby Black posts his\\nQ and R on the vertices of the geometric symbol of the\\npawn.\\n2. Q X P.\\nThis is the march of the corps of the centre from the\\npoint of departure to the point of manoeuvre.\\n2. P X P.\\nBlack plays to regain the pawn and to expose the\\nWhite K.\\n3. P-Q6.\\nThis is the march of a detached corps for the purpose\\nof nullifying the point of impenetrability at Black s\\nQ B 2 in order to clear the logistic radius for the ad-\\nvance of the White corps of the left to its point of com-\\nmand (Q B 7) against the tactical key (Q B 8). White", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "220. CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\npreserves the initiative by threatening P Q 7 on his\\nnext turn to play.\\n3. P X Q P.\\nThis seems to be Black s best defence. But the loss\\nof time permits White to seize the strategic key (White s\\nQ Kt 7).\\n4. B X K B P.\\nThis is the march of a detached corps made for the\\npurpose of capturing adverse material (Black K B P)\\nand for retaining the initiative, i. e. dictating Black s\\nreply.\\n4. E B 1.\\nBlack should have played R K 2, thus defending the\\nstrategic key (Black Q Kt 2) against the White Q.\\n5. Q Kt 7.\\nThis is the first march of the third tactical sequence.\\nThe White corps of the centre (Q) occupies the strategic\\nkey (White Q Kt 7) and operates simultaneously against\\nthe tactical keys (White Q B 8 and Q Kt 2).\\n5. B-K jH^\\nMr. Ware failed to comprehend the mathematics of\\nthis situation.\\n6. B X Q P.\\nThe White corps of the right moves from the point\\nof manoeuvre (White Q Kt 4) and occupies the point of\\ncommand (White Q 6), thus attacking the corps defen-\\nsive (Black K B) which guards the tactical key (White\\nQ Kt 2). The White Q B is secure in this movement,\\nas it is sustained by tlie White Q for the Black K B\\ncannot act at two points at once, and consequently it\\ncannot both defend the tactical key (White Q Kt 2) and", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "THE TACTICAL SEQUENCE. 221\\ncapture the White Q B at Black s Q 3. Furthermore,\\nWhite retains the initiative, as he threatens to play\\nQ B X B on his next move.\\n6. B-Kt2.\\nSeemingly, there is no more preferable alternative.\\nTo avoid a strategic line of operation Black is compelled\\nto submit to loss of material.\\n7. B X R.\\nThe White corps of the right takes possession of the\\nspoil resulting from the superiority in position.\\n7. Q X B.\\nBlack also is forced to withdraw his point of impene-\\ntrability on the logistic radius of the White corps of the\\nleft.\\n8. P B 7.\\nThe march of the White corps of the left against the\\ntactical key (White Q B 8), in which movement it is\\nsupported by the White corps of the centre posted on\\nthe strategic key (White Q B 7).\\n8. Q X B.\\n9. P-B 8 (Qck).\\nThe march of the White corps of the left from the\\npoint of command, and occupation of the tactical key,\\nwhich is a point of junction in the kindred logistic\\nhorizon.\\nThat is, White s column of support has forced its way\\nto the battlefield, and the united White columns of\\nattack and of support will now easily overwhelm the\\nsingle Black column of attack.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "CORPS DEFENSIVE.\\nThose chesspieces which in a given situation are\\nengaged in protecting other kindred pieces, or in oppos-\\ning tlie occupation of points offensive by adverse corps,\\nare termed in this theory Corps Defensive.\\nThis species of chess-force is divided into three\\nclasses, viz.\\n(a) Sustaining Corps.\\n(5) Supporting Corps.\\n(c) Covering Corps.\\nSustaining Coiys are those which at a given time are\\ndefending a given point or piece, by threatening to\\ninflict upon the opponent a greater loss if such point or\\npiece be captured.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "CORPS DEFENSIVE.\\n223\\nThis threat of the sustaining corps always assumes\\none or two forms\\n{a) To capture the adverse piece should it capture the\\nkindred point or piece.\\nTo capture some other adverse piece or point of\\ngreater value than that which is lost.\\nSUSTAINING CORPS.\\nFigure 107.\\nBlack.\\ni\\ny/, //77777\\nWhite.\\nNote. The White Kt is a sustaining corps, as it will\\nwin the Black Q by Kt to K B 6 (ck) if Black K B\\ntakes the White R.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "224:\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nSupporting Corps are those which at a given time\\nprotect a given piece or point by directing against it a\\nradius of defence.\\nSUPPORTING COEPS.\\nFiGUEE 108.\\nBlack.\\nmm mm ^m\\nim i m\\n1^y..\u00e2\u0080\u009e %S^A,\\n-mm.\\nW\\nm w/m.\\ni M\\nWhite.\\nThe Black Q B P and Q R P are supporting corps, as\\nthey protect the Black K B against the attack of the\\nWhite R.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "CORPS DEFENSIVE.\\n225\\nCovering Corps are those which in a given situation\\nintercept an adverse radius of offence which otherwise\\nwould fall upon a kindred piece or point.\\nCOVERING CORPS.\\nFigure 109.\\nBlack.\\nw\\nM.\\\\JM...\\nifili\\nW\u00c2\u00a3m m.\\n\u00c2\u00a9PI\\nm\\nfeM^ wmA,\\ny/////////.\\nWhite.\\nNote. The Black Kt is a covering corps, as it covers\\nthe Black K B P from the attack of the White R.\\n15", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "226\\nCEESS STRATEGETICS.\\nAll else being equal, a Corps Defensive is lost when-\\never it is attacked bj an adverse force and is unable to\\nretire, or to be properly supported, covered, or sustained,\\nA Corps Defensive is unable to retire\\n(a) When it is not its turn to move.\\nCORPS DEFENSIVE SURPRISED.\\nFigure 110.\\nBlack.\\nm//M. m\\nm i\\n1 W/WA\\nWMi. MW/i. m.\\nWhite.\\nWhite to move and win.\\nIn this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be\\nsurprised.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "CORPS DEFENSIVE. 227\\n(5) When there is no point to which it can move.\\nCORPS DEFENSIVE SURROUNDED.\\nFigure 111.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nWhite wins either with or without the move.\\nIn this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be\\nsurrounded.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "228\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\n(c) When it is posted in support of a more important\\nkindred piece, which latter also is attacked.\\nCORPS DEFENSIVE OUTNUMBERED.\\nFigure 112.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nWhite wins either with or without the move.\\nIn this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be\\noutnumbered.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0260.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "CORPS DEFENSIVE.\\n229\\n(fZ) When it is covering a more important kindred\\npiece.\\nCORPS DEFENSIVE COMMANDED.\\nFiGUKE 113.\\nBlack.\\nWhite.\\nWhite wins either with or without the move.\\nIn this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be\\ncommanded.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0261.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "230\\nCHESS STRATEGETICS.\\n(e) When it is posted in support to prevent the occu-\\npation of a point offensive.\\nCOEPS DEFENSIVE OUTFLANKED.\\nFigure 114.\\nBlack.\\nw--*.\\n\u00c2\u00bbi\\ns^ m\\nVA y//////M\\nWa m m.\\nWhite.\\nWhite, having the move, wins a piece by R takes Kt\\nas the Black K B cannot leave Black K B 3 unsupported\\non account of the White Kt winning the Black Q by\\nKt B 6 (ck).\\nIn this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be\\noutflanked.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0262.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "CORPS DEFENSIVE.\\n231\\nWhen it is posted to cover and prevent the occu-\\npation of a Point Offensive.\\nCOEPS DEFENSIVE OUTERONTED.\\nFigure 115.\\nBlack.\\nm.\\nm\\\\wM\\ni\\nv/////////:\\n^_\\nWhite.\\nWhite, having the move, wins a piece by P to K 5, as\\nthe Black Kt must cover the tactical key, Black K B 1.\\nIn this situation the Corps Defensive is said to be\\noutfronted.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0263.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "COKPS DETACHED.\\nA Corps Detached is any chesspiece which, in a\\ngiven situation, although actively participating in an\\noffensive movement, is not a corps of the Centre, nor\\nof the Right, nor of the Left.\\nThose marches which appertain to Corps Detached\\nare termed Secondary Logistic Operations, and the\\nobject of such movements always is to eliminate or to\\nneutralize the resistance of adverse Corps Defensive.\\nAlthough a Corps Detached always acts independ-\\nently of the remaining kindred pieces, nevertheless it\\nalways must be a strategetic mass governed in its deploy-\\nments, developments, manoeuvres, and operations by the\\nlaws of the art of chessplay, and at all times it must\\nact in harmony with the Prime Strategetic Factors.\\nA Corps Detached eliminates or neutralizes an adverse\\nCorps Defensive, by either surprising, surrounding, out-\\nnumbering, commanding, outflanking, or outf routing a\\ncompromised adverse piece.\\nThe Queen or the Knight can surprise and capture\\nany adverse piece.\\nThe King, Rook, or Bishop can surprise and capture\\nany adverse piece except the Queen.\\nThe Pawn cannot surprise and capture any adverse\\npiece.\\nThe Queen can surround and capture an adverse\\nKnio ht or Pawn.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0264.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "CORPS DETACHED. 233\\nThe King can surround and capture an adverse\\nKnight or Pawn.\\nThe Rook can surround and capture an adverse\\nKnight or Pawn.\\nThe Bishop can surround and capture an adverse\\nKnight or Pawn.\\nThe Knight can surround and capture an adverse\\nKnight or Pawn.\\nAny piece aided by kindred pieces can surround and\\ncapture any adverse piece.\\nAny piece aided by adverse pieces can surround and\\ncapture any adverse piece.\\nAny piece can command, outflank, and outfront any\\nadverse piece.\\nAny two pieces can outnumber any adverse piece.\\nEvery movement of a Corps Detached is governed by\\nthe following\\nFIFTEENTH LAW OE THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nAt every turn to move note tJiose points which hy the\\nlast move of the opponent are left uncovered^ unsupported.,\\nand unsustained and ivhether the occupation of such\\npoint hy a kindred piece will outfront, outflank^ surround,\\noutnumber, command, or surpi^ise one or more adverse\\npieces. And if so, combine this tactical defect with a\\nsimilar defect in some other part of the adverse position.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0265.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "PLANS OF CAMPAIGN.\\nAny given plan of campaign may endure for many\\nmoves, or it may become vitiated after a few moves, or\\nit may be changed at every move but in all cases the\\ntrue plan of campaign is governed by the following\\nSIXTEENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nI. In every true jjilan of campaign, the Prime Logistic\\nOperation ahuays emanates from that Kindred Prime\\nStrategetic Factor ivhich dominates the given situation\\nand always takes direction towards the natural objective\\nof the given Kindred Prime Strategetic Factor.\\nII. In all cases ivherein the given situation is domi-\\nnated hy an adverse Prime Strategetic Factor, the Prime\\nLogistic operation cdivays emanates from that Kiyidred\\nPrimie Strategetic Factor ivhich at the given time is best\\ncalculated to reduce the dominant adverse Prime Strate-\\ngetic Factor to a Factor Subordinate.\\nIII. A true plan of campaign never contemplates a\\nPrime Logistic Operation by a Factor Subordinate.\\nBy means of this law the student readily sees that\\nevery true plan of campaign changes as the relative\\nvalue of the opposing^ Prime Strategetic Factors changes,\\nnnd that the duration of any plan of campaign, there-\\nfore, is indeterminate and may be altered with each\\nsucceedino; move.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0266.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "PLANS OF CAMPAIGN. 235\\nHence, obviously it is imperative that, at every turn\\nto move, the entire situation be exactly reconnoitred.\\nThis is done in the following manner, viz.\\nRULES FOR MAKING A RECONNOISSANCE ON THE\\nCHESSBOARD.\\n(a) Compare the opposing columns of manoeuvre,\\nand note that one which has the advantage.\\n(6) Specify in what this advantage consists.\\n(c) Compare the opposing columns of support, and\\nnote that one which has tiie advantage.\\n{d) Specify in what this advantage consists.\\n(e) Compare the opposing columns of attack, and\\nnote that one which has the advantage.\\nSpecify in what this advantage consists.\\nAt every turn to move, the plan of campaign should\\nbe either strategetically offensive or strategically defen-\\nsive.\\n(a) If offensive, it should combine those measures\\nwhereby that column in which the kindred force lias\\nthe advantage may be made the Predominant Prime\\nTactical Factor in the given situation.\\nIf defensive, it should combine those measures\\nwhereby that column in which the adverse force has\\nthe advantage may be reduced to a subordinate Prime\\nTactical Factor in the given situation.\\nA plan of campaign should be offensive whenever the\\nkindred force has the advantage\\n1. With the column of attack, with the column of\\nsupport, and with the column of manoeuvre.\\n2. Both with the column of attack and with the\\ncolumn of support.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0267.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "23G CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\n3. Both with the column of attack and with tlie\\ncolumn of manoeuvre.\\n4. Both with the column of support and with the\\ncolumn of manoeuvre.\\n5. With the column of attack, no offsetting advan-\\ntage appertaining to the adverse column of support.\\n6. With the column of support, no offsetting advan-\\ntage appertaining to the adverse column of attack.\\nA plan of campaign should be defensive whenever the\\nopponent has the advantage\\n1. Both with the column of attack and with the\\ncolumn of support.\\n2. With the column of attack, no offsetting advan-\\ntage appertaining to the kindred column of support.\\n3. With the column of support, no offsetting ad-\\nvantage appertaining to the kindred column of at-\\ntack.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0268.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "PRIME LOGISTIC OPERATIONS.\\nHaving decided on the plan of campaign, the logistic\\noperation will either be a line of manoeuvre or a line of\\noperation each of which may or may not combine with\\nitself a line of mobilization or a line of development.\\nWhenever the logistic operation takes the form of a\\nline of manoeuvre, the latter always is either\\n1. Simple,\\n2. Compound, or\\n3. Complex.\\nThe simple line of manoeuvre always should be adopted\\nwhenever an exact reconnoissance of the entire situation\\nat any given turn to move shows no strategetic weakness\\nin the adverse position.\\nA simple line of manoeuvre preferably should com-\\nbine with itself a line of mobilization or a line of\\ndevelopment in direction it should be coincident with\\nthe dominant Kindred Prime Tactical Factor, and at\\nevery move it should either occupy the topographical\\nkey, or attack simultaneously the topographical key and\\none or more tactical keys in the adverse position.\\nThe compound line of manoeuvre always should be\\nadopted whenever an exact reconnoissance of the entire\\nsituation at any given turn to move shows a true strat-\\negetic horizon whose vertices constitute an adverse\\nstrategetic weakness of either Class lY., V., YI., or\\nYIL, in a direction coincident with the dominant kin-\\ndred Prime Tactical Factor.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0269.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "238 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nA compound line of manoeuvre preferably should\\ncombine with itself a line of mobilization or a line of\\ndevelopment in direction it should be coincident with\\nthe dominant Kindred Prime Tactical Factor, and at\\nevery move it should attack simultaneously two or\\nmore tactical keys in the adverse position.\\nA complex line of manoeuvre always should be\\nadopted whenever an exact reconnoissance of the entire\\nsituation at any given turn to move shows a true\\nstrategetic horizon whose vertices constitute an adverse\\nstrategetic weakness of Classes I., II., and III., in a\\ndirection coincident with the dominant Kindred Prime\\nStrategetic Factor.\\nA complex line of manoeuvre preferably should com-\\nbine with itself either a line of mobilization or a line of\\ndevelopment in direction it should be coincident with\\nthe dominant Kindred Prime Strategetic Factor, and at\\nevery move it should attack simultaneously two or more\\ntactical keys in the adverse position.\\nWhenever the logistic movement takes the form of a\\nline of operation the latter always is either\\nI. Strategic.\\n11. Tactical.\\nIII. Logistic.\\nWhen the line of operation is strategic, it is coin-\\ncident with the kindred column of attack and always\\ntakes direction towards the objective plane. The tac-\\ntical key always is that point from which the Prime\\nTactical Factor may command the ultimate objective\\nplane, and the Prime Tactical Factor always is that\\nCorps Offensive whose exponent of force is equal to the\\nnet mobility of the adverse king.\\nWhen the line of operation is logistic, it is coincident\\nwith the kindred column of support and always takes", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0270.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "PRIME LOGISTIC OPERATIONS. 239\\ndirection towards the kindred logistic horizon. The\\ntactical key always is a point of junction, and the\\nPrime Tactical Factor always is a kindred pawn.\\nWhen the line of operation is tactical, it may be coin-\\ncident either with the column of attack, or with the\\ncolumn of support, or with the column of manoeuvre.\\nThe tactical key always is a point occupied by an\\nadverse piece, and the Prime Tactical Factor alw^ays is\\na kindred piece posted on the centre of its own geo-\\nmetric symbol at a time when the tactical key is a\\npoint on the perimeter of the same geometric symbol.\\nWhether the line of operations be strategic, tactical,\\nor logistic, every move of a Corps Offensive should simul-\\ntaneously attack two or more inadequately defended tac-\\ntical keys^ both of which are not situated in the same\\ntopographical horizon.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0271.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "ORDERS OF BATTLE.\\nHaving determined whether the balance of advantage\\nis with the kindred or with the adverse force, and\\nwhether, in consequence, the kindred plan of campaign\\nis to be strategetically offensive or strategetically defen-\\nsive and having designated the Prime Logistic Opera-\\ntion and determined the true strategetic horizon, the true\\ntactical evolution, and the true tactical sequence of moves\\nappertaining to the corps offensive the next step is to\\ndepict the correct order in which the corps offensive shall\\nbe brought into action against the strategic vertices, if\\na strategetic weakness exists in the adverse position, or\\nagainst the topographical key, if no strategetic weakness\\nexists in the adverse position, or how the corps de-\\nfensive shall be brought into action in order to neutral-\\nize the dominant adverse prime strategetic factor.\\nIt is thus easy to see that all orders of battle neces-\\nsarily are divided into two classes\\nI. Offensive.\\nIT. Defensive.\\nOffensive orders of battle are of three kinds\\n(a) Those in which the corps offensive are manoeu-\\nvred according to the first tactical sequence.\\n(5) Tliose in which the corps offensive are manoeu-\\nvred according to the second tactical sequence.\\n{c) Those in which the corps offensive are manoeu-\\nvred according to the third tactical sequence.\\nThe fundamental idea of strategetics, whether of war\\nor of chess, is that the strategetic offensive always wins,", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0272.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "ORDERS OF BATTLE. 241\\nand the strategetic defensive alwaj-s loses. Consequently,\\nit is obvious that no valid system of defensive tactics is\\npossible since any defensive system must lose and\\nequally so it is only by assuming the offensive strateget-\\nically that the chessplayer, or the military commander,\\ncan hope to achieve, or even to deserve, victory.\\nBut of course situations will necessarily and fre-\\nquently arise, both in warfare and in chessplay, wherein\\neven the greatest master and the greatest captain will\\nfind himself, for reasons beyond his control, at least\\ntemporarily compelled to act on the strategetic defensive.\\nAccording to all writers on strategetics, the defending\\nparty admittedly is in a bad pickle, and all these writers\\ninvariably have left him in that condition. For the first\\ntime by any author, the basic law of defensive tactics\\nwas announced on page 349 of The Grand Tactics of\\nChess, viz.\\nThe nature of the offensive is constructive, and the\\nnature of the defensive is destructive, and the prime ener-\\ngies of the defence always must be devoted to destroying\\nthose formations which the attack labors to erect.\\nHence, it is clear that the defensive order of battle\\nmust absolutely conform to the adverse offensive order of\\nbattle^ and that its prime object must be to reduce the\\ndominant adverse prime tactical factor to a subordinate\\nfactor^ viz.\\n1. By eliminating the adverse corps offensive.\\n2. By commanding the adverse points offensive.\\n3. By obstructing the adverse logistic radii.\\nThus it is that these special duties of detail appertain\\nparticularly to the defending force, viz.\\n(a) To adequately cover, support, and sustain all\\nkindred tactical keys.\\n16", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0273.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "242 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\n(b) To maintain a point of impenetrability on every\\nadverse pawn altitude.\\n(c) To permit no corps defensive to be outfronted^\\noutflanked, commanded, outnumbered, surrounded, or\\nsurprised.\\ni) To prevent the development of the adverse minor\\nfront into a major front directed towards the kindred\\nprime strategetic point.\\nBut it is not sufficient for the defending chessplayer^\\nor for the defending military commander, to limit him-\\nself to the strategetic defensive, even though the latter\\nbe supplemented by the tactical offensive.\\nOn the contrary, the defending party must seize the\\nfirst opportunity/ to assume the strategetic offensive, in\\naccordance with the following (see Grand Tactics,\\np. 249)\\nHaving the strategetic defensive, assume the strate-\\ngetic offensive at the earliest possible moment and hav-\\ning assumed the strategetic offensive, deploy, develop,\\nmanoeuvre, and operate as though having the strategetic\\noffensive originally.\\nHence, it is obvious to the student, whether of chess,\\nof war, or of mathematics, that at every turn to play\\nthe defending player either should occupy an adverse\\ntactical key, or should unite with a deployment or devel-\\nopment an attack against one or more adverse tactical\\nkeys.\\nIn order that even the veriest tyro may be able to\\nunderstand what this means, the following dictum is\\nlaid down in simple and unmistakable language", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0274.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "ORDERS OF BATTLE. 243\\nTHE TACTICIAN S RULE.\\nAt every turn to play^ the piece moved^ whether white or\\nhlack^ and whether acting on the offensive or on the defen-\\nsive^ should either directly, hy its own movement or\\nindirectly.) hy opening a way for the movement of some\\nother kindred piece or^ hy the comhining of its own move-\\nment with the disclosed movement of some other kindred\\npiece attack and threaten to capture on the next turn to\\nplay two or more points or adverse pieces, such capture\\nwinning the game.\\nThis is the rule invariably followed by the mere\\ntactician, and the rule invariably ignored by the mere\\ntheorist.\\nBecause he tries to conform to this rule, and thereby\\nto profit to the uttermost by the condition which exists,\\nis the reason why the tactician, the artist, the man of\\naction, achieves success to the measure of his natural\\nability and it is because he utterly ignores this rule\\nand seeks to establish an ideal condition, instead of\\nseeking to profit to the uttermost by the condition which\\nexists, that the mere theorist, the scientist, the man of\\nlearning, meets with failure in practice.\\nThe reason why the strategist infinitely is superior\\nboth to the theorist, the man who cannot apply his\\nsystem, and to the tactician, the man who has no system\\nother than to hit every head he sees, simply is because\\nthe strategist avails himself both of the system of the\\ntheorist and of the tactician s rule.\\nThat is to say, by means of his understanding of\\ntheory, the strategist readily detects the flaws created\\nin the adverse position by his opponent s violations of\\nthose laws which govern the art of chessplay. These", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0275.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "244 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nflaws the tactician usually fails to observe, and in\\nconsequence he most frequently gives a false direction\\nto his lines of mobilizationj of development, and of\\nmanoeuvre.\\nHaving given the proper direction to the lines of\\nmovement along which his pieces are to deploy, the\\nstrategist now avails himself of the tactician s rule\\nin order to extract all j^ossible advantage from the situa-\\ntion ivJiich exists.\\nThe conclusion thus deduced is truly laughable. The\\ntactician, bedazzled like a child by the elegance and\\nmagnificence of the details of the Art, is too lazy to\\ndevote the time and the application necessary to com-\\nprehend that Science upon which his beloved art is\\nfounded while the theorist, with his soul enraptured\\nby the beatific visions of the idealist, refuses to recognize\\nthe truth of the mathematician s axiom Things that\\nare equal to the same thing are equal to each\\nOTHER\\nHence, in the last analysis of this question, it is\\nobvious that the strategist the man who combines\\ngreat knowledge with great skill in its application\\nbeats the tactician on account of his inadequate knowl-\\nedge, and beats the theorist on account of his inadequate\\nskill while in a contest between the theorist and the\\ntactician, the latter wins, notwithstanding the vast\\nknowledge of the former, for the reason that the tac-\\ntician can apply in practice all the knowledge of which\\nhe is possessed which the theorist cannot do.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0276.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "THE INITIATIVE.\\nThis perfect combination in a single move both of the\\ntactician s rule and of the theorist s system produces\\nthat element which bridges the seemingly impassable\\nabyss that is fixed between Science and Art between\\nTheory and Practice between the man of learning\\nand the man of action.\\nThis element, for which there is no verbal equivalent\\nin any language, is what was meant by Frederic the\\nGreat when he wrote\\nHe who gains TIME gains everything\\nIt is what was meant by Napoleon when he said\\nAsk me for anything except TIME\\nIn the use of the word time, there is concealed a\\nfar deeper significance than is apparent in the respective\\nstatements of these illustrious strategists, a far more\\nsubtle meaning than is conveyed by the measurement\\nof days and hours.\\nWhat they both meant is that element which in this\\ntheory of chess strategetics is termed, for want of a\\nbetter and more explicit word, the initiative.\\nMere time., as measured by the clock, does not signify\\nthe initiative^ although the initiative comprehends time,\\ni. e., days, hours, minutes, and seconds, inasmuch, and\\nin the same way, as the whole comprehends all its\\nparts.\\nAgain, whether in campaigning, and on the field of\\nbattle, as well as on the chessboard, it is possible for\\na force to be in motion and not to he possessed of the", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0277.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "246 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\ninitiative, and it is possible for a force to be at rest and\\njet at the same time to have the initiative.\\nThat is to say, while the initiative expresses motion\\nand is expressed by motion, it does not necessarily imply\\nmotion, and, as a matter of fact, a force may have the\\ninitiative and yet be in a state of absolute rest.\\nThus, as the student readily perceives, the fact that a\\nbody of chessmen situated on the chessboard, or a body\\nof troops in the field, have the move, or are in motion, is\\nmerely an incident among other incidents. True, this\\nincident may be of greater or less advantage, or it may\\neven be positively detrimental, but in no case does the\\nfact of itself constitute the initiative, although in every\\ncase it is contained in and is a part of the initiative.\\nThe word time, as used by Napoleon and Frederic\\nthe Great, and the term the initiative, as used in this\\ntheory, signify that in a given situation a given force\\noccupies such a position relative to the opposing force,\\nthat either with or without the move, i.e., the state\\nof being or of not being in motion, it dictates the next\\nstep taken hy the opponent compels him to do what of\\nchoice he would not do, and what according to the laws\\nof strategetics he ought not to do and as the result of\\nwhich, his position after he has availed himself of his\\nsubsequent opportunity to move, is weaker than it was\\nbefore.\\nAgain, a given force may be possessed of the strate-\\ngetic offensive, and yet not have the initiative. This is\\nthe scientific fact which is the salvation of the defending\\nplayer. Did the strategetic offensive carry with it the\\ninitiative, a force once compelled to adopt the strategetic\\ndefensive would be without resource.\\nBut it so happens that a force on the strategetic de-\\nfensive may, by a single inferior move of the opponent,", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0278.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "THE INITIATIVE. 247\\nacquire the initiative then by proper use of this inesti-\\nmable element, it may, as the logical sequence, wrest the\\nstrategetic offensive from the opponent.\\nThis peculiarly subtle and inestimable element the\\ninitiative is the Promethean spark of strategetics,\\nwhether the latter relate to chessplay or to warfare by\\nits proper use all things are accomplished on the battle-\\nfield and on the chessboard without it nothing.\\nIt is because that a profound, although unconscious,\\nappreciation of this element pervades the tactician s\\nrule, that success and honors, often in measure most as-\\ntonishing, even to the recipient himself, is the constant\\nreward of the man of action, and whether in warfare or\\nin chessplay and it is because this vital element in the\\npractice of warfare and of chessplay has no place in the\\nscience either of war or of chess that the theorist, the\\nman of learning, is comparatively but a child at the di-\\nrecting either of a chessic army or of troops in the field.\\nThe secret of the irresistible power of the initiative,\\nwhen properly availed of, is that by its means a force,\\nnumerically not more than an equal, and possibly even\\nthe inferior force, is raised to the superior force at the\\ngiven time and in the given situation.\\nThis outcome results from the fact that the one player s\\nmove is dictated hy his enemy, and the ultimate effect of\\nsuch dictation must be fatal, inasmuch as it tempora-\\nrily makes a player commander-in-chief, not only of his\\nown army, but also of the hostile army which he seeks\\nto destroy.\\nHence, it is obvious that, in the last analysis of the\\nterm, what is meant by the initiative is something en-\\ntirely distinct from chessic art and science, although it\\nindissolubly is connected with the highest interpretation\\nof each.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0279.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "248 CHESS STR ATE GE TICS.\\nIn short, the initiative is a condition in fact, it is the\\nonly condition in which the perfect application of strate-\\ngetic knowledge to warfare and to chessplay hy means of\\nthe processes of their resiyective arts, is possible. In other\\nwords, it is the bridge which unites the principles and\\nformulas of strategetic science with the processes of the\\nstrategetic art.\\nThat condition which properly is termed the initiative\\nexists whenever the opponent s immediate move is dic-\\ntated by inexorable requirements appertaining to the\\ngiven situation, over which he has no control, and when\\nhe is compelled to submit to such dictation and to move\\nin accordance therewith.\\nIn every situation the initiative is governed by the\\nfollowing:\\nSEVENTEENTH LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nAt every turn to play dictate the opponents reply,\\neither\\nStrategically, i.e., hy occupying a topographical key,\\nand threatening on the next move to occupy another topo-\\ngrajyhical key or.\\nTactically^ i, e., by occupying^ or by threatening on the\\nnext move to occupy, an inadequately defended tactical\\nkey.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0280.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "GRAND LAW OF THE ART OF\\nCHESSPLAY.\\nThe complete adaptation of military art and science\\nto the chessboard is contained in the following supreme\\nlaw, that law which since the dawn of history has\\ngoverned the processes utilized by the greater captains\\non every battlefield and in every campaign, whether of\\nwar or of chess.\\nGRAND LAW OF THE ART OF CHESSPLAY.\\nSection L\\nAt every turn to play^ exactly reconnoitre the given sit-\\nuation to determine the dominant Prime Strategetic Fac-\\ntor and whether it is contained in the kindred or in the\\nadverse position.\\nHaving located the dominant Prime Strategetic Factor\\nin the kindred position^ specify the resultant adverse\\nstrategetic weaknesses and describe the True Strategetic\\nHorizo7i.\\nHaving described the True Strategetic Horizon^ desig-\\nnate the Corps Offensive^ the Corjjs Defensive, and the\\nCorps Detached mark out the True Evolution and depict\\nthe True Tactical Sequence.\\nThe True Tactical Sequence having been depicted, locate\\nthe adverse Points of Impenetrability situated on the\\nKindred Logistic Radii and the adverse Points of Re-\\nsistance to the occupation of the Points Offensive by the\\nKindred Corps Offensive,", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0281.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "250 CHESS STRATEGETICS.\\nThen having decided on the Plan of Campaign^ and,\\nhaving selected the proper Prime Logistic Operation^ and\\nhaving determined the Order of Battle^ and havirig the\\nright to move\\nCombine the initiative ivith the occupation of that point\\nby a Corps Detached^ which occupation will either out-\\nfront^ outflank^ command^ surprise, surround, or outnum-\\nber an adverse Corps Defensive, which in the given strat-\\negetic horizon is either a point of impenetrability or the\\norigin of a point of resistance.\\nAll the adverse points of resistance and of impenetra-\\nbility on a given logistic radius having been nullified by\\nthe Kindred Corps Detached, then\\nCombine the initiative with the occupation of the points\\nof command and of the strategic key by the Corps Offen-\\nsive according to the tactical sequence governing the order\\nof battle adopted.\\nSection II.\\nWhenever the dominant Prime Strategetic Factor is\\nfound to be contained in the adverse position, then:\\nCombine the initiative with the occupation of that point\\nby a Kindred Corps Defensive which will reduce the\\nadverse dominant Prime Strategetic Factor to a Subordi-\\nnate Prime Strategetic Factor.\\nHaving reduced the adverse dominant Prime Strategetic\\nFactor to a subordinate Prime Strategetic Factor, then\\nCombine the initiative with the occupation of that p)oint\\nby a Kindred Corps Defensive which will reduce the\\nadverse Prime Strategetic Factor next dominant to a\\nsubordinate Prime Strategetic Factor, and so continue\\nuntil the adverse Prime Strategetic Factors are so reduced\\nthat all are dominated by a Kindred Prime Strategetic\\nFactor ivhereupon ^proceed according to Section I.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0282.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0283.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0284.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nHISTORICALLY AND TECHNICALLY ILLUSTRATED\\nON THE CHESSBOARD.\\nThis world-renowned encounter took place in Belgium\\non the afternoon and evening of June 18, 1815.\\nThe French army, 68,000 men, directed by Napoleon\\nin person and when engaged in destroying 70,000 British\\nunder the command of the Duke of Wellington, was\\nattacked both in flank and rear, and utterly routed by\\n65,000 Germans led by Field-Marshal von Bliicher.\\nTOPOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD.\\nWhite.\\nK Kt 1. Hamlet of Mont St. Jean.\\nK R 2. Stone chateau of Hougoumont.\\nK Kt 2.\\nK B 2. [-Plateau of Mont St. Jean.\\nK2.\\nK B 4. Park of Hougoumont.\\nK 3. Farmhouse of La Haye Sainte.\\nQ 4. Hamlet of Papelotte.\\nQ 5. Hamlet of Smolhaiu.\\nQ B 4. Hamlet of La Haie.\\nQ Kt 4. Hamlet of Frischermont.\\nQ R 3. Chapel of St. Lambert.\\nK B file. Charleroi road.\\nK R file. Mvelles road.\\nSecond Horizontal. Wavre road.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0285.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "254 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nBlack.\\nParmhouse of La Belle Alliance.\\nHeights of La Belle Alliance.\\nHamlet of Planchenoit.\\nHamlet of Pajeau.\\nSeyexth Horizoxtal. Gembloux road.\\ncojmposition of the contending armies.\\nThe Allies {White).\\nEyGLISH.\\nCommanded by the Duke of VTellington.\\nK. Duke of Wellington, Maitland s Boot Guards, Bruns-\\nwick and Nassau contingent.\\nPirst Corps Prince of Orange.\\nK E. Two divisions English regular infantry under\\nGen. Alten.\\nK Kt. Coldstream Guards Gen. Perponcher s light\\nhorse, Gens. Chasse s and Colbert s cavalry.\\nQ Kt. Dutch-Belgic contingent under Gen. Bylandt and\\nGen. Steadman s infantry division.\\nSecond Corps Lord Hill.\\nAnglo-Hanoverian Auxiliaries.\\nK P. Gen. Ponsonby s dragoons.\\nQ P. Gen. Picton s cavalry division.\\nK B P. Gen. Coleville s infantry division.\\nK Kt P. Gen. Clinton s\\nKRP. Gen. Lambert s\\nEnglish regular cavalry Lord Uxbridge.\\nK B. Gen. Yandeleur s light horse.\\nQ B. Gen. Vivian s hussars.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0286.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 255\\nGermans.\\nCommanded by Field-Marshal Prince von BlUcher.\\nQ.\\n_ -Fourth Army Corps Gen. Biilow.\\nQ Kt P..\\n2d Q. I p.^.g^ _ ^g^^ Ziethen.\\nQ B P. 3\\n_J^ Second Army Corps Gen. Pirch.\\nFrench Army {Black),\\nK. The Emperor Napoleon I. and staff.\\nK Kt. Cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard Gen. Kel-\\nlerman.\\nQ Kt. Cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard Gen. Mil-\\nhaud.\\nK R. Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard Gen. Morand.\\nK P. (a) Division infantry Prince Jerome Bona-\\nparte. (IS) Infantry division Gen. Donze-\\nlotte. (c) Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard\\nGen. Friant.\\nK B P. Artillery of the Imperial Guard.\\nQ. Eeserve, Field Artillery Corps.\\nFirst Corps d^Armee Count D Erlon.\\nQ P. Infantry division Gen. Durutte.\\nQ Kt P. Gen. Guyot.\\nQ B P. Lancers Gen. Jaquinot.\\nSecond Corps d^Armee Count Reille.\\nQ R. Two divisions infantry Gens. Bachelu and\\nGirard.\\nK Kt P. Infantry division Gen. Foy.\\nK R P. Light cavalry Gen. Pire.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0287.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "256 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nSixth Corjjs d Ar/nee Count Lobau.\\nK B. (a) Part of light cavalry Gen. D Homond.\\n(p) The Young Guard Gen. Duhesme.\\nQ B. Two divisions infantry Gens. Simmer and\\nJeannin.\\nQ E P. Infantry division Gen. Teste.\\nTechnical and Descriptive.\\nRUr LOPEZ OPENING.\\nThe Feexch (Black). The Allies (White).\\n1. P-K4.\\n(11 A.M.) Prince Jerome, younger brother of the\\nEmperor, opens the battle of Waterloo by attacking the\\nPark of Hougoumont.\\n1. P K 4.\\nPonsonby s English dragoons covering La Haye Sainte.\\n2. Kt-KB 3.\\nMilhaud s cuirassiers taking position in support of the\\ncoming assault against the English centre.\\n2. Q Kt B 3.\\nBylandt s Dutch and Belgians advancing in support of\\nLa Haye Sainte.\\n3. K B Kt 5.\\nFrench light cavalry moving against the English left\\nwing.\\n3. P Q K 3\\n(12.30 P.M.) Advance guard of the German Fourth\\nArmy Corps occupying St. Lambert.\\n4. B R 4.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0288.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 257\\nGen. D Homond taking post at Pajeau on the lookout\\nfor the expected French right wing under Marshal\\nGrouchy.\\n4 Kt K B 3.\\nEnglish regular troops moving to the support of\\nHougoumont.\\n5. P Q B 3.\\nJaquinoi s lancers advancing to the attack of La Haye\\nSainte.\\n5. P-QKt4.\\nBillow s vanguard driving back French light cavalry.\\n6. B B 2.\\nThe Sixth French Corps cVArmee under Count Lobau\\nmasses about Planchenoit to cover the French rear and\\nright wing against Biilow.\\n6. KB-B4.\\nYandeleur s cavalry opening up communication with\\nBiilow, and covering English left wing.\\n7. Castles.\\nNapoleon and the Imperial Guard taking position on\\nthe heights of La Belle Alliance.\\n7. Castles.\\nThe Duke of Wellington and his reserves taking posi-\\ntion at Mont St. Jean.\\n8. P-Q4.\\n(1 P.M.) Marshal Ney leads D Erlon s corps to\\nthe attack of the English left and centre.\\n8. P X P.\\nOverthrow of Durutte s division by Ponsonby s dra-\\ngoons.\\n9. P X P.\\n17", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0289.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "258\\nTHE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nPonsonbv s dragoons destroyed bj Jaquinot s lancers.\\nD Erlon carries Souhain by the bayonet.\\n9. B-K2.\\nVandeleur s cavalry falling back on Mont St. Jean\\nbefore D Erlon.\\n((7) This movement in defence of the right wing\\nseems forced for if 9. B Kt 3, P K 5 10. Kt\\nK sq. B X R P (ck. 11. K x B, Kr Kr 5 (ck)\\n12. K Kt sq. Q K P 5 and Black wins.\\nPOSITIOX AFTER WHITE S XDTTH MOVE.\\n(About 2 P.M.)\\nThe Feexch.\\na\\ni i k\\np\\nmm,\\nill i\\nv/-.\\n^^i^^^^^ WM A\\no\\nThe Allies.\\nCapUire of Soiihain by D Erlon s Corps.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0290.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 259\\n10. P-Q5.\\nD Erlon storms the town of Papelotte.\\n10. Kt-QR4.\\nBvlandt s Dutch and Belgians retiring before\\nD Erlon.\\n11. P-Ko.\\nD Erlon s corps advancing to the attack of La Haye\\nSainte.\\n11. Kt-Kl.\\nEnglish outposts retiring to the main lines of\\ndefence.\\n12. Kt Q B 3.\\nMilhaud s cuirassiers taking position on the French\\nright.\\n12. P-Q3.\\nPicton s English cavalry supporting La Haye Sainte.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0291.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "260\\nTHE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nPOSITION APTER WHITES TWELFTH MOVE.\\nAbout (3 P.M.)\\nThe Pezxch.\\nHi J\\nM\\n4 S/\\nM,\\ni Mk\\n0/////////.^\\ni\\n1 iSI\\nm mm...\\n^a Hi\\ny///////M,\\nMi.\\n/^x\\nThe Allies.\\nCapture of Papelotfe by D*Erl(ni*s Corps.\\n13. Q-Q3.\\nThe French reserve artillery brought ev wasse into\\naction against the English right and centre.\\n13. P K B 4.\\nGen. Coleville s division holding the Park of Hougoii-\\nmont.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0292.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n14. P-K6.\\n261\\nGen. Donzelotte s division of D Erlon s corps carries\\nLa Haye Sainte.\\nPOSITION AFTER BLACK S FOURTEENTH MOVE.\\n(About 3.30 P.M.)\\nThe French.\\ni\\ny/////^.\\ni m i\\nm my//M\\nM. %/////A\\nw//wf\\nmm\\n111\\nwm.\\nm-shM\\nThe Allies.\\nCapture of La Haye Sainte by D Erlon s Corps.\\n14. P Q B 3.\\nVanguard of the First German Army Corps under\\nGen. Ziethen engaging part of D Erlon s corps near\\nPapelotte.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0293.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "262 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n15. P-KKt4.\\nGen. Foy s division of Reille s corps attacking the\\nPark of Hougoumont.\\n15. P X Q P.\\nPart of D Erlon s corps overthrown near Papelotte by\\nZiethen.\\n16. P X P.\\nFoy drives the English from the Park of Hougoumont.\\nPOSITION AFTER WHITE S SIXTEENTH MOVE.\\n(About 4 P.M.)\\nThe Erexch.\\nm\\nm..\\\\..^m^\\nm ^#^1\\nWM 181.^ ^^Ili.\\nm.\\nI\\n^J\\nThe Allies.\\nCapture of the F arh of Mougnumont by Reiile^a Corps,", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0294.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 263\\n16. Kt K B 3.\\nColdstream Guards and other English regulars defend-\\ning Hougoumont.\\n17. QB-B4.\\nLobau moving on the centre to the support of D Erlon.\\n17. B Q Kt 2.\\nEnglish cavalry supporting Ziethen.\\n18. Q R Q B 1.\\nReille s remaining divisions moving into action against\\nHougoumont.\\n18. Kt-QB5.\\nBylandt s Dutch and Belgians attacking the French\\nright.\\n19. P-QKt3\\nGen. Guyot s division attacking Bylandt.\\n19. E-Q B 1.\\nBillow s main body advancing to the attack of\\nPlanchenoit.\\nThe doubled and isolated Queen s Pawns render\\nWhite s game lost by its nature.\\nThis sacrifice of the Q Kt for the purpose of restoring\\nthe integrity of his Pawn position seemingly is White s\\nonly resource.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0295.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "26^\\nTHE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nPOSITION AFTER WHITE S NINETEENTH MOVE.\\n(About 4.30 P.M.)\\nThe Eeench.\\nI\\nfSs^i _\u00e2\u0096\u00a0- m\\nm\\nWMi\\ni^rsi\\n1\\nfm wm wM.\\nmi\\n6 \u00c2\u00bbl\\nThe Allies.\\nJ *Erlon destroys the Dutch and Belgian Contingent,\\n20. P X Kt.\\nGuyot destroys the Dutch and Belgian troops under\\nBylandt.\\n20. P X P.\\nZiethen repulses Guyot s division and attacks the\\nFrench artillery.\\n21. Q-K2.\\nThe French artillery falls back before Ziethen.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0296.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 265\\n21. P-Q4.\\nEnglish and Germans covering the advance of Biilow\\nagainst Planchenoit.\\n22. QR-Ql.\\nReille s reserves moving to tlie attack of Hougoumont.\\n22. Q _ Q R 4.\\nBiilow attacking the French right in force.\\n23. B-Q2.\\nLobau s corps again concentrated at Planchenoit to\\noppose Biilow.\\n23. P-QKt5.\\nBiilow marching on Planchenoit.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0297.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "266\\nTHE BATTLE OE WATERLOO.\\nPOSITION ATTEE WHITE S TWEXTT-THIPwD MO^ E.\\n(About 5 P M.)\\nThe Fee -ch-\\nVyh:7T//A\\ntt\\nM, ms\\n%^A\\ni A H\\nFa^\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^M Cl H\\ny/z/y/zM, Wyy:/z yy. i^^^\u00e2\u0080\u009e\\nfti\\n^H e^\\nIS A-\\nm\\nThe Allies.\\nBiiloiv assaulting FlancheJioit.\\n24. Kr (J E 4,\\nMilhaud covering the French right wing against\\nBlilow.\\n24. K E Q 1.\\nEnglish resailars supporting Ziethen on the centre.\\n25. B Q B 1.\\nLobau covering the rear of the French armv against\\nBiilow.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0298.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n267\\n25. B-QB3.\\nEnglish cavalry co-operating with BUlow against\\nMilhaud.\\n2Q. Kt Kt2.\\nMilhaud manoeuvring in support of Lobau s corps and\\ncovering the rear of the French army against Billow.\\n2Q. Q X R P.\\nBillow overthrows Gen. Teste s infantry division and\\nturns the right flank of the French army.\\nPOSITION AFTER WHITE S TWENTY-SIXTH MOVE.\\n(About 5.15 p. M.)\\nThe Erench.\\nSdl^ ^1^\\nmi m\\ny/^^^^ ^r77f}777 ^^y^//y.\\n1\\nkm.i-\\nm ^hM\\nisi^ in.\\nm,.\\ni\\nThe Allies.\\nSUlow turns the French Right Flanh,", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0299.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "268 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n27. Kt-K5.\\nKellerman s cuirassiers charging the English on\\nMont St. Jean.\\n27. B Q Kt 4. f\\nEnglish cavalry co-operating with Btilow in the attack\\nof Planchenoit.\\n.28. Kt-KB7.\\nKellerman breaks the English centre and establishes\\nthe French cavalry on the crest of Mont St. Jean.\\n28. E-Kl.\\nEnglish infantry moving to the support of Welling-\\nton s centre.\\n29. E-Q4.\\nReille s reserves marching to the attack of Hougou-\\nmont.\\n29. B-QB4.\\nEnglish cavalry covering Wellington s left wing.\\n30. E K E 4.\\nReille s corps massed against Hougoumont.\\n30. P-QKt6.\\nBillow attacking Lobau s corps at Planchenoit in\\nforce.\\n31. B-Ql.\\nLobau falling back before Btilow.\\n31. P Q B 6.\\nBillow driving before him the entire French right", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0300.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n32. E X K R P.\\n269\\nReille s corps attempting to take Hougoumont by\\nstorm.\\nPOSITION AFTER BLACK S THIRTY-SECOKD MOVE.\\n(About 5.30 P.M.)\\nThe French.\\nm^ %^^A\\n11\\nm\\n/^/////M,\\nII\\nm.\\n,-Zy////^,\\ni m\\ns ill\\n^M\\nW//////A V/\\nm ^bI 4^/^, ^K\\nThe Allies\\nReille s Corps destroyed at Sougoumont.\\n32. Kt X E.\\nReille s divisions are practically annihilated by the\\ndefenders of the stone chateau at Hougoumont.\\n33. Q-KR5.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0301.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "270 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nThe entire French reserve artillery advances en masse\\nto the support of the French troops attacking Mont\\nSt. Jean.\\n33. E-QB2.\\nGerman troops in march for Planchenoit, temporarily\\nsupporting English left wing.\\n34. Q-Kt6.\\nFrench artillery massed in front of, and enfilading\\nthe entire English position.\\n34. Kt K B 3.\\nEnglish regulars manceuvring for the defence of\\nHougoumont.\\nUndoubtedly the proper line of defence against the\\nlines of attack arising from 35. Kt R 6 (ck), 35. Q\\nKt6,35. K-Rsq, 35. B- K R 6, 35. P- KB 6, etc.\\n35. B K Kt 5.\\nPart of Lobau s corps brought from the extreme right\\nto aid in the attack on Mont St. Jean.\\n35. Kt-E2.\\nEnglish retiring before the attack of Lobau.\\n36. B K E 6.\\nLobau assailing Mont St. Jean.\\n36. B-KBl.\\nEnglish troops concentrating on Mont St. Jean for\\nthe defence of the English centre.\\n37. B K B 3.\\nPart of Lobau s corps attacking the English left flank\\nwhich is covered by Ziethen.\\n37. E-QB4.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0302.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 271\\nPart of Billow s corps supporting Ziethen.\\nTo prevent 38. B X Q P followed by P K 7 and\\nKt Kt 5 (dis ck) and Q x Kt mate.\\n38. Kt Q 3.\\nMilhaud advancing to the support of Kellerman at\\nMont St. Jean.\\n38. Q-E6.\\nBillow momentarily checked and thrown on the\\ndefensive.\\nThe Q R obviously is immovable and must be pro-\\ntected.\\nIf 88. B X Kt, B X Kt P 39. B x B, Kt R 6 (ck)\\n40. K R sq, Q X R (ck) 41. Kt or B interposes,\\nP K 7 and Black wins.\\n39. Kt (Q 3) K 5.\\nMilhaud unites with Kellerman at Mont St. Jean.\\n39. R-K2.\\nEnglish infantry manoeuvring to support Wellington s\\ncentre.\\nTo prevent 40. B x Kt P; 41. B X B, Kt R 6 (ck)\\n42. K R sq, Kt K 5) B 7 mate.\\n40. B Q B 1.\\nPart of Lobau s corps is withdrawn from the attack of\\nMont St. Jean and returned to Planchenoit to oppose\\nthe further advance of Bulow.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0303.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "272\\nTHE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nPOSITION ATTEPv BLACK S FOETIETH 3I0VE.\\n(About 6 p. M.)\\nThe FEEycH.\\n6\\ni WM...\\ni \u00e2\u0096\u00a0mm\\n1\\nm\\nWm 1^ ^aa^\\n^^\u00c2\u00ab^\u00e2\u0084\u00a2^^k;^\u00e2\u0084\u00a2\\n1 e^.^-\\nThe Allies.\\nGrand assault against Jlont St, Jean,\\n40. Q X B.\\nBillow destroys nearly half of Lobau s corps at\\nPlanchenoit.\\nThis is White s only move to prevent the immediate\\nloss of the game. viz.\\nIf 40. P Kt 7. 4M. Kt E 6 (ck).\\n41. K-E 1. 41. Q-KB 7. A.\\n42. Kt-KB3. B. 42. Kt Kt 6 (ck).", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0304.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 273\\n43.\\nK-R2.\\n43.\\nKt X B (ck).\\n44.\\nK-El. a\\n44.\\nKt Kt 6 (ck).\\n45.\\nK-R2.\\n45.\\nKt X R. D.\\n46.\\nB-Kl. E.\\n46.\\nQ Kt 6 (ck).\\n47.\\nKt-El. F.\\n47.\\nKt B 7 (ck).\\n48.\\nB X Kt.\\n48.\\nPxB.\\n49.\\nR Q B 1. G,\\n49.\\nB K R 6.\\n50.\\nP X B.\\n50.\\nQ X P (ck).\\n51.\\nKt E 2.\\n51.\\nKt R 6.\\nCheckmate.\\nA.\\nIf 41. Kt (K 5) B 7 (ck) 42. R x Kt, and White\\nescapes with a draw.\\nB.\\nThe only move to avert mate by either 42. Q Kt 8\\n(ck); or by 42. Kt Kt 6 (ck). If R X Q, obviously\\nBlack mates on the move.\\nC.\\nSeemingly White is now without resource.\\nD.\\nThe correct line of attack which apparently leads to a\\ndirect mate against the best play.\\nE.\\nIf 46. PxB queening, Q Kt 6 (ck) 47. K R sq,\\nKt B 7 mate.\\nF.\\nWhite cannot play 47. B X Q, on account of P x B\\n(ck) 48. K R sq, Kt B 7 mate.\\nG.\\nTo prevent 51. P B 8 queening (ck) etc.\\nIf 49. Kt R2, Q KR5; and mates next move by\\neither 50. P B 8 queening (ck) or 50. Kt Kt 6 (ck),\\netc.\\n18", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0305.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "274 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO,\\n41. E X Q.\\nBillow driven from Planchenoit by the Imperial Guard\\nunder Gen. Morand.\\n41. P-QKt7.\\nBillow s remaining divisions again assailing Planche-\\nnoit.\\n42. E-Kl.\\nThe Imperial Guard advancing from the extreme right\\nto attack Mont St. Jean.\\nIf 42. Kt R 6 (ck) 43. K R sq, Q B 7 44. P\\nX R queening (ck), K Kt 2 45. Q X Kt, Kt Kt 6\\n(ck) 46. Q X Kt, Q X Q 47. B B 7, and White wins.\\n42. Kt-KB3.\\nEnglish troops manoeuvring for the defence of Wel-\\nlington s centre.\\n43. B-KR5.\\nRemains of Lobau s corps brought from the centre to\\nthe attack of Mont St. Jean.\\n43. B-Kl.\\nEnglish troops concentrating for the defence of Mont\\nSt. Jean.\\nTo prevent 44. Kt R 6 (ck) 45. K R sq, Q B\\n7 46. R X Q, Kt X R (ck) 47. K R 2, B Kt 6\\nmate.\\n44. K-Kt2.\\nNapoleon abandons the Charleroi road and takes the\\nNivelles road for his line of communication with France.\\nThis move with its attendant combinations seems\\nBlack s only resource in this crisis.\\n44. P B 7.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0306.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n275\\nBillow captures Planchenoit and establishes his corps\\non the right flank and rear of the position originally\\noccupied by the French army.\\n45. E-K3.\\nThe Imperial Guard takes post in front of La Haye\\nSainte.\\nPOSITION AFTEE BLACK S FORTY-FIFTH MOVE.\\n(About 7 P.M.)\\nThe French.\\n^^m\\nm mm\\nm\\nW/////Z9,\\niM\\ni\\nm 4B^/.\\nThe Allies.\\nTlve Frencli Army cJianges Front,\\nGrand change of front by the French army, to oppose\\nWellington on the left and Btilow on the right.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0307.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "276 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n45. P Q B 8 (queening).\\nArrival of the main body of Ziethen s corps.\\n46. E-KE3.\\nThe Imperial Guard marching to the attack of Mont\\nSt. Jean.\\n46. P-QKt 8 (queening).\\nArrival of Pirch s corps, led by Field-Marshal Prince\\nvon Bliicher.\\nThe queening of these pawns is White s only resource.\\nThe one paralyzes Black s attack against the adverse\\nking by preventing Kt E, 6 (ck) and the other pro-\\nvides the winning counter-stroke.\\n47. B-Ql.\\nThe Young Guard covering the right wing of the\\nFrench army against the entire German army.\\nObviating temporarily White s menace of 47. Q\\nK R 8, mate and disclosing a threatened mate by\\n48. R-KR8(ck).", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0308.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n211\\nPOSITION AFTER BLACK S FORTY-SEVENTH MOVE.\\n(About 7.30 P.M.)\\nThe French.\\ni\\nm\\nwrn^ i^\\nM.\\nThe Allies.\\nTine arrival of Sliicher*\\n47. Q _ K 5 (ck).\\nBliicher attacking in force all along the French front\\nto let the English army breathe.\\nThis check with the succeeding sacrifice of the Q is\\nthe only method by which the checkmate of the White\\nKing can be averted.\\n48. B K B 3.\\nThe Young Guard covering the rear of the French\\narmy against Bliicher.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0309.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "278 TEE E ATI II :e ~^zirloo.\\n4S. Q X B (ck).\\nDestraction of the Young Guard by Blucher.\\n49. E X Q.\\nPirch s Corps repulsed bj the I- ri: Guard under\\nGen. Morand.\\nThe only more if Kt x Q VThite wins by B x Kt.\\n49. B Q K: 4\\nEnglish cayalry co-operating with Blucher in the at-\\ntack of La Belle Alliance.\\n50. P- KB 3.\\nXapoleon preparing a line of retreat for the French\\narmy by the Xivelles road.\\nTo prevent 50. Q K B 8 (ck), K Kr 3 51. Q K\\nK: S k K mores 52- Q x Q. and wins.\\n50. R-QBT.\\nBillow s divisions co-operating with Bliicher in the\\nattack of La Belle Alliance.\\nThreatening to win by 51. Q K B 8 (ck). K E 2\\n52 E X K B P (ck), etc.\\nol K-KE2.\\nThe French army taking its final stand.\\nSecuring temporary safety as the White Queen cannot\\nabandon the control of White s K E 3 square on account\\nof Black s menace of K: Pt 6 (ck) etc.\\n51. B Q Kt 2.\\nEnglish infantry preparing to co-operate with Blucher.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0310.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n279\\nPOSITION AFTER WHITE S EIETY-FIRST MOVE.\\n(About 8.30 P.M.)\\nThe French.\\nI\\nSI\\nm.\\\\\u00e2\u0080\u009emm..\\nUM^V/. VA\\nA ^//////Va\\nwM.\\nw/^\\ni\\n1 li^is\\n111 WM m.\\nThe Allies.\\nNajioleoti^s Last Line of Battle,\\n52. Kt-KKt5.\\nKellerman begins the last assault on Mont St. Jean\\nthe final military movement of Napoleon s Grande\\nArmSe.\\n52. B K 1.\\nEnglish troops concentrating to defend Wellington s\\ncentre.\\nTo prevent 53. Q B 7 (ck) 54. R x Q, P X R (ck)\\n55. K R sq, Kt Kt 6 mate.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0311.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "280 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\n53. Kt (K 5) B 7.\\nMilhaud supporting Kellerman s manoeuvre.\\n53. B Q 3 (ck).\\nUp, Guards, and at them To prevent the draw\\nby perpetual check allow the King to retrograde to the\\nQueen s wing and to strengthen and co-operate with the\\nattack against the Black King.\\n54. K-Kt2.\\nDisorganization manifest among the French at La\\nBelle Alliance.\\n54. E-QKt8.\\nEnglish co-operating with Blticher against the French\\nright.\\nA crushing and decisive manoeuvre which forces the\\ngame through sheer weight of material.\\n55. Kt E 6 (ck).\\nMilhaud s last charge.\\n55. K B 1.\\nEnglish rallying by the left. If 55. K R 1, Black\\nwins.\\nm. P-K 7 (ck).\\nGen. Friant s column of the Imperial Guard on the\\ncrest of Mont St. Jean.\\noQ K X P.\\nDestruction of the Imperial Guard under Gen. Friant.\\nIf 57. B X P, Kt K 6, mate.\\n57. Q X P (ck).\\nFrench artillery, almost devoid of infantry support,\\nstill keeping up the battle.\\n57. K-Ql.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0312.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 281\\nWellington forming a second line of battle.\\nbS. Q X Kt (ck).\\nLast effort of the French to restore the battle.\\nbS, K B 1.\\nEnglish rallying by the left.\\n59. Q K 6.\\nFrench artillery taking post to cover the flight of\\nthe surviving French.\\n59. B-Q2.\\nEnglish cavalry charging the French artillery.\\n60. Q Kt 8 (ek).\\nFrench artillery retreating toward Nivelles road.\\n60. K-Kt2.\\nWellington completes his second line of battle.\\n61. R Q Kt 3 (ck).\\nImperial Guard under Morand opposing the junction\\nof Bliicher s and Wellington s forces.\\nThe only resource to avert immediate mate by 62. Q\\nK R 8, etc.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0313.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "282\\nTHE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.\\nPOSITION AFTEE BLACKS SIXTY-FIRST MOVE.\\n(Abouc 9 P.M. I\\nThe Fee CH.\\ni\\nmm\\nU777.. ,.,^/y^y^. V////^////}\\nW\\nmm. mm.\\n11\\n1\\nm -Wm\\nm.\\n9k\\nra ^i\\nThe Allies.\\nDestruction of the Old Guard.\\n61. E X E.\\nMorancVs Infantrv of the Imperial Guard destroyed\\nnear Planchenoit.\\n62. Kt K 4.\\nKellerman s cuirassiers coverins- the centre of the\\nFrench army. To prevent 63. R K Kt 6 (ck). followed\\nhy 64. Q K Kt 8. mate.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0314.jp2"}, "315": {"fulltext": "THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 283\\n62. E X B P (ck).\\nBillow storms La Belle Alliance and captures the\\nartillery of tlie Imperial Guard.\\n63. Kt X Pv.\\nKellerman checks Billow and covers tlie French right\\nagainst Bliicher.\\nIf 63. K X R, White mates in two moves by Q K 6\\n(ck), etc.\\n63. R K Kt 6 (ck).\\nEnglish regulars cliarging on La Belle Alliance.\\n64. Q X P.\\nTemporary repulse of the English infantry by the\\nFrench artillery of the line.\\n64. B X Q.\\nCapture of the entire French artillery by the English\\ncavalry.\\nQ o. Kt (R 6) Kt 4.\\nMilhaud unites with Kellerman at La Belle Alliance\\nto cover the flight of the surviving French.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0315.jp2"}, "316": {"fulltext": "28-i\\nTHE BATTLE OE WATERLOO.\\nPuSniOX AFTER BLACK S SIXTY-FIFTH MOVE.\\n(About 9.30 P.M.)\\nThz FKi: XH.\\nmm mm\\ny..M WM-R-WM.\\nW/m, WE% w^M\\nw^^.^\\n1 m.\\nm._\\nmm\\n^M, WMi ,.W/ M-\\n1 fei\\nThe Allies\\nMilhaud s and KeJlerinan s Cuirassiers covering\\nthe FfigJit of the French.\\n1\\\\\\nA D 7.5.", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0316.jp2"}, "317": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0317.jp2"}, "318": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0318.jp2"}, "319": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0319.jp2"}, "320": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u00a2V\\n,-t\u00c2\u00b0.c\\n.\u00c2\u00abi\\nV si\\n;V", "height": "3893", "width": "2337", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0320.jp2"}, "321": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0096\u00a0ft.\\n^^rr.-^\\n^Ov\\\\\\n.0\\n^o-n^.\\nh*\\n^o.", "height": "3893", "width": "2177", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0321.jp2"}, "322": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4053", "width": "2435", "jp2-path": "chessstrategicsi00youn_0322.jp2"}}