{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3860", "width": "2740", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.\\nBT70 tS\\nChap. Copyright No.\\nShelf.. _\u00e2\u0099\u00a6 H\u00c2\u00a3 5\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA.", "height": "3732", "width": "2596", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3728", "width": "2452", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3743", "width": "2391", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "ELEMENTARY ETHICS\\nl/ BY\\nNOAH K. DAVIS, A.M., Ph.D., LL.D.\\nProfessor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia\\nAN ABRIDGMENT OF THE AUTHOR S\\nELEMENTS OF ETHICS\\nTptcpovrai trdvres oi dvdpwireioi vbpai inrb ewj rod\\nddov Kpartei yap to tovtov 6k6(tov idfkei, /ecu e\u00c2\u00a3ap/c t\\niracri ko.1 ireptylverat. Herakleitos\\nSILVER, BURDETT COMPANY\\nNew York BOSTON Chicago", "height": "3732", "width": "2484", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "575\u00c2\u00b02\\nLibrary \u00c2\u00bbf Conor-ess\\n1 WU COPttS RfcCEfVCB\\nOCT 6 1900\\nCMJfrfgM try\\nSECOND COPY/\\nOMW? ttViSION.\\nOCT 2\\n3^\\nCopyright, 1900,\\nBy SILVER, BURDETT COMPANY.\\nTypography by C. J. Peters Son, Boston.\\nPresswork by Berwick fc Smith.", "height": "3732", "width": "2568", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "PREFACE\\nThis treatise is intended for readers who feel the need of\\na simple, direct and comprehensive theory of morals. Also\\nit is designed to serve as a handbook in institutions for\\nhigher education, where the subject of ethics is usually\\noffered to hearers who, though already well advanced in a\\ncourse of liberal studies, are presumed to have no acquain-\\ntance with this branch of philosophy. My experience in\\nteaching it has led me to give such pupils primarily a\\nrounded scheme, postponing an examination of the various\\nand often conflicting views of philosophical moralists. Ac-\\ncordingly, in this elementary treatise, I have simply pre-\\nsented my preferred theory, starting from a principle,\\nproceeding logically in the development of a complete sys-\\ntem, and indicating cursorily many practical applications.\\nThe preparation has been long and diligent. I have\\nbeen in search of truth, glad to receive light from any source,\\nand have now summed the results of my reading, thinking\\nand teaching for many years in what is here offered to my\\nfellow-teachers, hoping it may be suited to their wants, and\\naid them in imparting high ideals and shaping noble char-\\nacters. Naturally I am solicitous that my work should\\nbe well received and approved, but whatever judgment be\\niii", "height": "3732", "width": "2460", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "iv PREFACE\\nfinally passed upon it, I shall have been conscious of sincere\\ndesire and earnest endeavor to reach and teach sound doc-\\ntrine. This task finished, I shall hardly undertake another,\\nbut rest in the hope that what is now done shall be found\\nwell done, proving a step toward truth in philosophy, and\\na help toward righteousness in life.\\nIt has been thought desirable, in order to offer the work\\nin available forms, that two editions should be simultane-\\nously issued under slightly varied titles. The text of the\\nElementary Ethics is identical with that of the Ele-\\nments of Ethics but to the latter are added psychological\\nand philosophical prolegomena, together with a considerable\\nbody of marginal notes. As these additions are not at all\\nessential to unfolding the theory, they have been omitted\\nfrom the present volume, thereby reducing its cost, yet fur-\\nnishing all that is strictly necessary, and as much as can be\\nadvantageously used in the limited time of many classes of\\nstudents. It is recommended that, while the teacher will\\nsupply orally whatever is needed for the elucidation of the\\ntext, the attention of the pupil be directed to the table of\\nContents. This is a logical analysis of the entire work, fur-\\nnishing a title to every section. It will greatly aid the\\nthoughtful student, both in more clearly apprehending the\\nspecific points, and in grasping the theory as a comprehensive\\nwhole.\\nNOAH K. DAVIS\\nUniversity of Virginia", "height": "3732", "width": "2572", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "COJSTTEWTS\\nFIRST PAET OBLIGATION\\nIntroduction page\\n1. Moral law a reality. Ethics defined 1\\n2. Two methods avoided 2\\n3. The method adopted in this treatise 3\\nI. Rights\\n4. The claim. Contention for private for public 5\\n5. The task of ethics. A right, how to be treated 6\\n6. Conscious life a condition and determinant of 6\\n7. Desires the basis. The ethical principle 7\\n8. Kinds of rights, reduced to liberty 9\\nII. Liberty\\n9. Freedom, the power of choosing, a postulate 11\\n10. Four constitutional limitations, and corollary 11\\n11. Freedom absolute. Liberty discriminated 13\\n12. Objective restrictions of liberty 14\\n13. Subjective restrictions. Persuasion. Menace 15\\n14. Warranted restrictions. Unavoidable. Avoidable 16\\nIII. Trespass\\n15. Personal relations determinative of rights 19\\n16. A right implies possible interference. A wrong 20\\n17. Modified statement of the moral principle 21\\n18. Trespass defined. Its wide sense. Limits liberty 22\\n19. Practical difficulties. Partial clearances 23\\n20. Property rights. Adjudication of 24\\n21. The trespass of forced intrusion, of vice, of discourtesy 26\\n22. Personal honor, its offense and defense 27\\n23. Indirect trespass, its parity. Sin is trespass 29\\nTV. The Law\\n24. Its cognitive origin, and its formula 31\\n25. Conscience defined. Inerrant. Uneducable 32\\n26. Imperatives. The moral law categorical 33\\nv", "height": "3732", "width": "2484", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "yi CONTENTS\\nPAGE\\n27. Supremacy of the law. Addressed to the will 34\\n28. The law objective in origin and character 35\\n29. Negative form. Deductions. Decalogue. Civil law 37\\n30. This form inadequate. Positive form 39\\nV. Sanctions\\n31. Consequences ratify and sanctify the law 41\\n32. Subjective sanctions. Moral sentiments 42\\n33. The natural impulse to reward and punish 43\\n34. The subjective objectified, and proportioned 45\\n35. Legalized forms of. Reduction to unity 46\\n36. Pain a penal ordinance. Not an evil 48\\nVI. Right and Wrong\\n37. The meaning and extension of the terms 50\\n38. Their opposition. Determination of cases 51\\n39. Moral quality not outside of volition 52\\n40. Moral quality a property of the intention 54\\n41. The immediate and the ulterior intention 55\\n42. Imputation of moral quality to other activities 57\\n43. The moral paradox 59\\nVII. Justice\\n44. The positive demand of the moral law 62\\n45. Definitions. Injustice and trespass identified 63\\n46. Corrective and distributive justice 64\\n47. Legalized justice. Its basis. Its imperfection 65\\n48. Equity, its jural and its general sense 67\\n49. Mercy, social, judicial, divine, consists with justice 68\\nVIII. Duty and Virtue\\n50. Duty, meaning of, positive form of 70\\n51. Right and duty. Corollaries. Other synonyms 70\\n52. Virtuous character, how formed. Virtue defined 71\\n53. The cardinal virtues, summed in justice 72\\n54. Vice is slavery virtue is not liberty 73\\nIX. Selfishness\\n55. The conscious ego, and the represented ego 75\\n56. The so-called love of self, and duty to self 76\\n57. That there is any such duty denied 77\\n58. Citation and interpretation of examples 78\\n59. General characteristics of the doctrine 79\\n60. Argument in support of. First part 81\\n61. Second part. Conclusion 82", "height": "3764", "width": "2564", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS Vii\\nX. Service page\\n62. Extension of the notion of duty. Service obligatory 85\\n63. Illustrative cases. The law restated 86\\n64. The dignity of service. Ministry. Heroism 87\\n65. Distribution of benefits. Participation in. Modified altruism 89\\n66. The using and serving each other as means 90\\n67. Stewardship, in holding and using. In defending 91\\n68. The law of service objectively insufficient 93\\nXI. Charity\\n69. Love obligatory. Definition and distinctions 95\\n70. Affection can be and is commanded 96\\n71. The variations and extension of the obligation 97\\n72. The law of loving service. The law of love 98\\n73. Progress in moral culture. Irregularity of 99\\n74. The law of love, the law of liberty 101\\nXII. Welfare\\n75. Pleasure not the sole content of welfare 103\\n76. Welfare denned. Its imperfect realization 105\\n77. Happiness its reflex. Special conditions 107\\n78. The summum bonum. Ancient doctrines of 109\\n79. Modern doctrines of. The adopted view 110\\nXIII. Deity\\n80. His existence postulated. Schemes without God 113\\n81. His attributes. Anthropomorphic. The supernatural 114\\n82. No other ground for complete ethical theory 116\\n83. Not the will, but the nature of God, ultimate 117\\n84. Solves obligation. Our s Godward. He to us-ward 118\\nSECOND PART ORGANIZATION\\nTransition\\n85. A brief summary of the foregoing doctrine 121\\n86. Complex social relations now to be considered 123\\nI. The Man\\n87. Is a duplex organism. His corporeal organization 125\\n88. His mental organization. Exemplified in desires 126\\n89. What, if alone or if in society, without affections 127\\n90. A solitary unreal. Man hardly without affections 130\\n91. Ethical elements discoverable in personal relations only 131", "height": "3716", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "vm\\nCONTENTS\\n92.\\n93.\\n94.\\n95.\\n96.\\n97.\\n98.\\n99.\\n\u00c2\u00a7100.\\n\u00c2\u00a7101.\\n\u00c2\u00a7102.\\n\u00c2\u00a7103.\\n104.\\n105.\\n106.\\n107.\\n108.\\n109.\\n110.\\n111.\\n112.\\n113.\\n114.\\n115.\\n116.\\n117.\\n118.\\n119.\\n120.\\n121.\\n122.\\nII. The Family page\\nVariety in obligations due to variety in relations 133\\nNatural order determines the family 134\\nThe ideal family. Karely realized 135.\\nIts organic order to be upheld. Kestored 135\\nMarriage. Five prerequisites considered 136\\nIts dissolution. Legal divorce limitation of 138\\nUnmarried members of society. Their disadvantage 139\\nFamily members, mutual influence and obligation of 139\\nIndividuality and personality of the family 140\\nIts extended life and obligations 141\\nFamily property, its ownership and management 142\\nTestamentary disposition of. By consent 143\\nIII. The Community\\nA product of pressure. An organism 145\\nObligation of intercourse. Seclusion condemned 146\\nThe common law of social decorum 147\\nTruthfulness a condition. Deception 147\\nPromises. Contracts. Common honesty 149\\nMinor organisms subordinate to the whole 150\\nDivision of labor. Its organic and moral effects 151\\nCapital and labor. Socialism. A preference 153\\nTV. The State\\nIts purpose. Its content. Limits of this discussion\\nForms of government. Its three essential branches\\nThe State an organism. Its ethical character\\nIts basis the family. Other organic members\\nIts individuality and personality wherein manifest\\nDiversity of obligations. Civic virtue, patriotism\\nGround of punishment. Eight and duty of defense\\nThe defense of its members and of itself against trespass\\nThe right to punish is in this defense. Discipline\\nOf rebellion, and revolution and of defensive war\\nThe relations of States. A universal State\\n155\\n156\\n157\\n159\\n160\\n161\\n162\\n163\\n165\\n166\\n167\\nV. The Church\\n123. Keligion, its definition and division 170\\n124. Subject, in all its forms, to ethical principles 171\\n125. The Christian Church, incorporating general ethics 173\\n126. Its rise and resistless progress 174\\n127. Elements of its power. Philosophy of its history 175\\n128. Its union with the State. Opposed functions 176\\n129. The Church Universal. Its ethical essence 178", "height": "3732", "width": "2572", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "ELEMENTARY ETHICS\\nFIKST PABT- OBLIGATION\\nINTRODUCTION\\n1. In looking on the world around and above us, we\\ndiscover, amid an infinite variety of ceaseless changes, a cer-\\ntain uniformity established, which, reduced to comprehensive\\nexpression, is termed the law of gravity. In looking on the\\nworld within us, we discover, amid its incessant changes, a\\ncertain uniformity enjoined, which, reduced to comprehen-\\nsive expression, is termed the law of morality. The law of\\ngravity represents something real, a fixed corporeal order,\\nwith which we have to do in every waking moment of active\\nlife, and to which we must constantly adjust the movements\\nof our bodies. The law of morality also represents some-\\nthing equally real, a required spiritual order, with which we\\nconstantly have to do, a universal mandate overruling all\\nrelations between man and man, to which must be adjusted\\nevery voluntary action and proposed line of conduct. The\\nreality of moral law as an inflexible factor in human life, in-\\nvolved in the essential constitution of human nature, is a\\nscientific truth, as undeniable as the law of gravitation, and\\none whose importance surpasses comparison.\\nScience has been well denned to be a complement of cogni-\\ntions, having, in point of form, the character of logical per-\\nfection; in point of matter, the character of real truth.\\nMore briefly, science is systematized knowledge. There are\\n1", "height": "3728", "width": "2460", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "2 OBLIGATION\\na number of sciences which may be distinguished as sciences\\nof human nature, Ethics being the chief. Pre-supposing\\nand involving more or less knowledge of the others, it as-\\nsumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates principles\\nand rules for the conduct of men individually and collec-\\ntively. In view of its basis, Ethics is the science of rights\\nin view of its system, Ethics is the science of obligation.\\n2. The hypothesis of evolution has been applied to the\\nexplanation of ethical phenomena. Evolution, as a doctrine,\\nis concerned with sequence in the form of a series, without a\\nbeginning and without an end. It can neither ascertain the\\nprimal origin of the series, nor predict its ultimate issue.\\nOnly a small section of the series is accessible to observation,\\nyet it is boldly projected into a prehistoric past, and upon\\nthis hypothetical history is founded an explanation of present\\nphenomena. The speculation is pleasing but hazardous. It\\ninquires how morality has come to be, assuming an origin in\\nsome heterogeneous principle transmuted under the influence\\nof environment. But we are rather concerned to know what\\nmorality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest\\nin mankind of to-day and of history. Inquiry into its genesis\\nand prehistoric development may well be postponed until at\\nleast we have a firm hold upon the thing itself.\\nThere are many moralists who educe their ethical systems\\nfrom the Scriptures. No doubt the light of revelation has\\nenabled the Christian philosopher to advance far beyond the\\nconceptions of the heathen world; his higher height has\\ngiven him a greatly enlarged horizon. But a science may\\nnot borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of\\nits doctrines. More especially we should not confuse science\\nand revelation. These are distinct though concordant means\\nof knowledge, the one aspiring to attain truth by its own\\neffort, the other condescending to impart from its abundant", "height": "3732", "width": "2564", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION 3\\nstore. If Ethics is to take rank with the philosophical\\nsciences, it must have a basis of its own, and build thereon\\nits system. Therefore, in the progress of our proposed in-\\nvestigation, we shall in no case cite Scripture as warrant or\\nas proof, but only for illustration or verification. Still it will\\nbe encouraging to find the elaborated and the revealed doc-\\ntrines in accord, and mutually corroborative.\\n3. A brief sketch of the ground and the process adopted\\nin the present treatise is now in order.\\nThe basis assumed is human nature. Man has an original,\\nnative constitution, which, however much it may be distorted,\\ndisordered and depraved by his perverted free wilfulness, is\\nnevertheless traceable amid its ruins. There are certain fun-\\ndamental and essential features of humanity, which no pro-\\ncess of suppression or violation can ever wholly efface.\\nThere are capacities and faculties whose organic functions in\\ntheir mutual relations, and relatively to their environment,\\nare clearly manifest, however enfeebled by misuse, or de-\\nformed by abuse. The recognition of these features and\\npowers, and a representation of their orderly functioning, is\\nan ideal restoration of human nature to its normal condition,\\nand to its fitting place in the life of the world. This rehabil-\\nitated man we shall call the natural man, and propose to find\\nin him, in the native ordering of his being, a safe and suffi-\\ncient ground for determining his universal though intricately\\nvaried obligation.\\nReferring to the foregoing definitions of Ethics, we observe\\nthat a right in one person is correlative to an obligation in\\nsome other person. A right and an obligation exist only as\\nthey coexist neither can be alone. But rights are logically\\nprior they condition and originate their corresponding obli-\\ngations. For a right, being founded in the nature of its\\npossessor, determines that there be a corresponding obliga-", "height": "3724", "width": "2448", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "4 OBLIGATION\\ntion whereas an obligation cannot be conceived to determine\\na right. Hence we shall take the notion of a right as our\\npoint of departure for a search into the philosophy of\\nmorals.\\nAs already indicated, the matter that constitutes the con-\\ntent of Ethics is real truth. In order to become a science,\\nits matter must be developed in logical form whose perfection\\nis attained through clear, distinct, complete and consistent\\ntreatment. To approximate this ideal a methodical proce-\\ndure is requisite. Beginning with observation, primarily of\\nfacts of consciousness gathered by introspection or furnished\\nby testimony, and secondarily of the behavior of men in\\nsocial relations, present and past, the intellect discovers in\\nthese phenomena the universally determinative notion of\\ninherent rights, native and acquired, and therein discerns a\\nformative principle, imperative in character, and constituting\\nthe common bond of obligation among men. This strictly\\nuniversal and necessary principle is not inductively general-\\nized, but is intuitively discerned. From it deductions are\\nthen made to subordinate truths, until these, arranged in a\\nlogical system, shall extend throughout all lines of human\\nactivity, and comprehend all modes of human obligation.\\nEthics thus constituted is a deductive science.\\nIn this essay the First Part treats of the source and\\ncharacter of Obligation. Its view is confined to the moral\\nbond subsisting in the simple relation of man to man in entire\\nparity and reciprocity. The Second Part treats of the va-\\nrieties of obligation arising from the varieties of relation due\\nto the Organization of men into complex associations.", "height": "3732", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "BIGHTS\\nCHAPTER I\\nEIGHTS\\n4. Every man conceives himself as having certain per-\\nsonal rights which he esteems of great worth, and guards\\nwith jealous care. Throughout life he is chiefly occupied\\nwith enlarging, confirming and defending them. They are\\na sacred possession which he zealously maintains, and whose\\nloss or diminution he regards as degrading his manhood.\\nThis is one of the most striking and significant facts in the\\nhistorical and current activities of mankind.\\nThence arises much of the strife that continually agitates\\nthe world. Among barbaric peoples personal violence is\\ncommonly used to maintain or to recover what one claims\\nto be his personal rights. Among civilized peoples courts\\nof justice are established to determine the relative rights of\\ncontending parties, and an executive is empowered to enforce\\ntheir decrees. Nearly all the litigation abounding in every\\nnation throughout history is a contention for real or imagi-\\nnary rights.\\nWhile each individual man has his own private rights,\\nthere are many of which he is possessed in common with\\nother persons. The maintenance and development of com-\\nmon or public rights is committed to organized society, the\\ntribe, the state, the nation. When the claims of one on\\nanother of these conflict or are questioned, diplomacy assumes\\nto adjust the rights involved. This failing, recourse is had\\nto war. Hence the innumerable battles that mark the tragic\\nhistory of mankind.", "height": "3732", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "6 OBLIGATION\\n5. Evidently the notion of a right, since it is the\\nsource of snch intense particular and social activity, has\\ndeep root in human nature. Also it is evident that, through-\\nout the contentions to which it gives rise, there is an appeal\\nto some common principle or law of widest generality, appli-\\ncable to an infinity of cases, and of the highest practical\\nimportance in the progressive life of humanity. But inas-\\nmuch as this universal and overbearing law is for the most\\npart obscurely discerned and imperfectly formulated, it is\\ninevitable that men should differ often and widely in its ap-\\nplication to particular cases. It is the province of Ethics to\\nsearch out and formulate the law, and to unfold its general\\nbearing on the several classes of its subjects.\\nTo this end let us fix discriminating attention on the no-\\ntion of a right. It is an abstract from personal relations, and\\ncatholic in them. Whenever and wherever two persons\\ncome into any mutually affective relation whatever, then and\\nthere come into being reciprocal rights, and consequent obli-\\ngations. The abstracted notion of a right, being pure and\\nsimple, is as to itself incapable of analysis, and hence of\\nformal definition. But we may examine its conditions, its\\nantitheses, correlatives, and other implications, and thus clear\\nthe conception, and distinguish it by its invariable environ-\\nment and limitations. This analytical process will disclose\\nfundamental and determining elements, fixing clearly the\\nscope and bearing of the notion, and evolving the formative\\nprinciple and the law involved in its essence.\\n6. Life is obviously a primary condition of any right.\\nOnly living beings have rights. The notion is incongruous\\nto a stock or a stone. Among living beings, those alone can\\nbe conceived as having rights that are endowed with a con-\\nsciousness involving at least volition, its primary element,\\nconjoined with some degree of sensibility. A right, then, is", "height": "3732", "width": "2596", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "BIGHTS 7\\na logical property, a mark that belongs to this, and to no\\nother class of beings.\\nBut conscious life is not merely a condition of rights, not\\nmerely what must be in order that rights may be. There is\\nin its very nature that which determines that rights shall be.\\nThey are of its essence. Thus every conscious being neces-\\nsarily has rights by virtue of its ultimate constitution. It is\\nnot necessary that every one so constituted should be aware\\nof the fact, either in detail or in general, not even in the\\nmost obscure way. But the higher orders of conscious be-\\nings recognize relatively to themselves the existence of rights\\nin the lower orders, though these be quite destitute of the\\nnotion.\\n7. Every man has, elemental in his conscious life, cer-\\ntain powers of mind, and thence of body. These powers,\\nfaculties and capacities, belong to his nature, to his original\\nconstitution, and are essential in his make-up as a man, as a\\nhuman being. They are, more specifically, conditions psycho-\\nlogically antecedent to the existence and apprehension of\\nrights, and rights are the natural and necessary consequence\\nof their existence. That is to say, powers and rights are\\nnatural, constitutional, original correlatives.\\nThese native powers are distributed as modes of knowing\\nand feeling, desiring and willing. The members of the latter\\ncouple constitute more particularly the practical side of\\nhuman nature, and are intimately concerned with the exist-\\nence and exercise of rights. Therefore on them especially\\nwe fix our present attention.\\nA desire implies an impulse, occasioned by a want, urging\\nthe will to an activity, relative to other powers, such as\\nseems likely to result in gratification. Every one is actuated\\nby desires which thus motive his conduct. These sources of\\nactivity are the determinants of his welfare, and his rights", "height": "3732", "width": "2424", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "8 OBLIGATION\\nhave in them their ultimate ground. Hence it is only as his\\ndesires, either actual or potential, are infringed that his rights\\nare affected and to that for which he has not and cannot\\npossibly have a desire, e. g., a villa in the moon, he has not\\nand can never possibly have a right. Normal desires, or such\\nas have an instinctive rise, and are in accord with the gene-\\nral order of nature, impel toward the fulfillment of the appro-\\npriate functions of the man in a world of persons and things.\\nThis consideration of its terms brings into clear view the\\ntruth of the principle A man has a right to gratify his normal\\ndesires.\\nEvery volition or act of the will is immediately conditioned\\non desire that is to say, no exercise of the will can occur\\nexcept by virtue of an antecedent desire which as a motive\\nimpels it to action. But notwithstanding this dependence,\\nthe will is to be regarded as central in the personality, since\\nit has the function to control, modify, suppress or arouse the\\nactivity of all other powers, including even its conditioning\\ndesires. Freedom consists in the possibility of this voluntary\\nexercise of one s powers, and without freedom it is evident\\nthat their normal functions cannot be fulfilled, or that free-\\ndom is necessary to the natural working and development of\\nthe entire personality in its existing relations. These con-\\nsiderations bring to light the truth of the principle A man\\nhas a right to a free use of his native powers.\\nThe two statements are not to be taken as distinct princi-\\nples. Together they constitute the mutually dependent and\\ncomplementary parts of the consistent whole A man has a\\nright to a free use of his native, powers in the gratification of\\nhis normal desires.\\nThis principle is the basis of Ethics. It is axiomatic, self-\\nevidently true, not needing or admitting any logical proof;\\nfor the intuitive, synthetic d priori judgment involved in the\\npure notion of a right, finds its immediate application to the", "height": "3776", "width": "2588", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "BIGHTS y\\ndesires and volitions. At first view it may appear thoroughly\\negoistic or selfish in character, but the outcome of a pa-\\ntient and thorough scrutiny of its bearings will reverse\\nthis primary impression. Likewise its formal universality\\nmay seem to sanction unbounded license, but the close in-\\nspection to which we shall submit it will discover very strin-\\ngent limitations, not arbitrarily imposed, but arising from the\\nmatter of its constituent terms, and leading to a disclosure of\\nour varied obligations. Thus there is no need to look be-\\nyond the natural and original constitution of man, despite its\\nweakness, perversion and distortion, to discern the prolific\\nprinciple of morality.\\n8. In view of their objects it is usual to name three\\nkinds of rights the right to life, the right to liberty, the\\nright to property. This division appears in the three funda-\\nmental verbs to be, to do, to have. But the species are not\\nindependent, for each involves the other two as complemen-\\ntary correlatives.\\nIt follows that either two may be regarded as modified\\nforms and be expressed in the terms of the third. Thus, for\\ninstance, life without some measure of liberty in the use of\\ninstrumentalities, could hardly claim the name.\\nAlso, life and liberty are commonly spoken of as forms of\\nproperty; as when one says, my life, his liberty. Indeed\\nrights in general are viewed as forms of property in the fa-\\nmiliar phrases, my rights, our rights, their rights. We cor-\\nrectly say that every man has rights, he owns them, he is\\ntheir proprietor. Some rights he may dispose of at will, others\\nare inalienable except by forfeiture but, so long as they in-\\nhere in him, they are his possession, his own. The sense of\\nproprietorship in rights is very strong, as seen in the tena-\\ncious retention and persistent defense of them when men-\\naced.", "height": "3732", "width": "2376", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "10 OBLIGATION\\nLikewise the several kinds of rights may be reduced to the\\nright to liberty. Conscious life is an aggregate of active\\npowers, and a power is a possibility of change. A right to\\nlife is a right to exercise these powers, a right to self-deter-\\nmined change, which is liberty. Also property in external\\nthings means liberty to make use of them. To be dispos-\\nsessed of any property is to be deprived of this liberty but\\nthe thing is still one s own, and the right to its free use,\\nthough suspended, remains. Thus ownership in external\\nthings is a right to liberty.\\nOf these reductions, the last, though least familiar, is most\\nclearly real, and of widest and deepest import. Hence,\\nwhile we cannot avoid using the language of possession, we\\nshall adhere to the view that every right, in its last analysis,\\nis a right to some phase of liberty, to the untrammeled exer-\\ncise of ability. Manifestly the cardinal element in the princi-\\nple already formulated is a right to liberty in this general\\nsense, and on it our further consideration shall chiefly turn.", "height": "3732", "width": "2620", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 11\\nCHAPTER H\\nLIBERTY\\n9. Freedom means the absence of causal restraint or\\nconstraint. It is a function purely negative, yet a special\\nsubjective property of volition. It is the power of choosing.\\nCausative determination is incompatible with the existence\\nof choice, for in causation there is no alternative, whereas in\\nchoice an alternative is essential. The power of choosing\\nis simply the ability to decide freely for one act or line of\\nconduct rather than for its possible alternate.\\nWhether or not there be in reality a power of choice is an\\nold and difficult question in metaphysics. Without renew-\\ning its discussion, the point is here made that the reality\\nof choice is a necessary condition and hence a postulate of\\nEthics. Whoever is morally responsible must be free. Con-\\nsequently we here assume that in all voluntary activity there\\nis real freedom in measure sufficient for responsibility.\\n10. Certain limitations of freedom need now to be\\nobserved. Freedom lies in the power of choice, and in it\\nalone. All other powers of mind are subject to causation,\\ntheir activities being always definitely determined by causa-\\ntive antecedents. That choice alone is free is a simple fact\\nin human nature, and a very narrow constitutional limitation\\nof our original and originating ability but it is the essential\\ndifference between a creator and the passive work of his\\nhands. It renders possible not only moral obligation, but\\nalso an infinite variety of self-determined activities.", "height": "3724", "width": "2388", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "12 OBLIGATION\\nA choice resolved is intention. The intention accords\\nwith that desire to which preference is given by choice.\\nThe elected desire, if it be for action, induces a voluntary\\neffort whose end is the object desired. This effort consists\\nsolely in an act of attention. The fixing attention more or\\nless intense on a chosen object is the total of possible volun-\\ntary energy. We observe here a second very narrow consti-\\ntutional limitation of human ability. Still this power of\\nattention proves sufficient for the purposes of life, and for\\nfulfilling the demand for moral action and conduct, since by\\nmeans of it we are capable, directly or indirectly, of com-\\nplete self-mastery.\\nBecause determined by the free act of choice, freedom is\\nattributed to the exercise of attention. This freedom, how-\\never, is not absolute, but suffers restriction. That the exer-\\ncise involves effort, a nisus or striving, shows the presence\\nof obstacles within the mind itself. Evidently there is some\\nmental inertia to be overcome, which checks and hmits the\\naction otherwise there would be no occasion for effort, no\\npoint of application whereon to expend energy. Herein is a\\nthird limitation.\\nMental effort is a force or cause, free in that according to\\nchoice it may or may not be put into play, and in that, if put\\ninto play, its intensity may be varied. Now the mental may\\nbe transformed into physical energy, and issue in muscular\\naction. This, too, is accomplished through attention. To\\nmove my arm, I must have an idea of the arm and of it as\\nmoving. Fixing my attention thereon, and willing the reali-\\nzation, the arm moves accordingly. This is inexplicable.\\nWe know it only and simply from experience. But let it be\\nobserved that the direct control of the animal body lies ex-\\nclusively in this power to contract, according to choice, the\\nvoluntary muscles, a limited class, thus producing motion of\\nthe limbs and some other organs, while very many vital", "height": "3772", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 13\\nactivities, as pulsation and digestion, are beyond direct con-\\ntrol. Moreover, when the movable organs are at liberty,\\nstill the extent of their motion is very closely circumscribed.\\nThis discovers a fourth very narrow constitutional limitation\\nof free action, restricting or confining it to the ability to con-\\ntract a muscle, and so to move a member through a small\\nspace. Still it is much, very much, to possess and to have\\nat command a free physical force, free in that it accords with\\nchoice, which force we may use at will, combining it with\\nfixed natural causes, varying its direction and small inten-\\nsity, so as to arrest or modify the operations of nature.\\nIt is a noteworthy corollary that this limitation to loco-\\nmotion extends to the body as a whole, and to all external\\nthings. These we move from place to place, but this is the\\ntotal of our direct physical efficiency. The planter moves a\\nspade and seed from one place to another the forces of na-\\nture do the rest, producing the crop. The smith moves his\\nhammer up and down, the weaver throws his shuttle to and\\nfro; the outcome is fabricated by virtue of the natural\\nforces inherent in the materials. A knowledge of natural\\nforces, and an intelligent, purposeful placing of things so as\\nto take advantage of them, enable men to manage factories,\\nto tunnel Alps, to navigate oceans, to wrap the earth with\\niron, and to cover its face with cities. But in all his infin-\\nitely varied works, man has at command only the single free\\nphysical ability to place or displace things.\\n11. Freedom isolates each man from every other, setting\\nhim apart and alone in the universe. For this center of his\\npersonality is intangible, out of reach of any other being.\\nBy the gift of his image the Deity has made man to this\\nextent independent of himself, putting it beyond his power\\nto cause a human creature willingly to do otherwise than\\nthat creature may choose since therein would be a contra-", "height": "3724", "width": "2472", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "14 OBLIGATION\\ndiction. He may reason and persuade, command and\\nthreaten, but cannot causally coerce the man, for this de-\\nstroys the essential conditions of personality; the man in\\nsuch case is not a man, not a moral being. Much less may\\na fellow-man causally determine his choice. One may de-\\nstroy another s life, but not otherwise his personality. The\\nfreedom of man, within constitutional limits, is absolute.\\nFreedom and liberty are synonymous terms, denoting the\\nabsence of causal determination. They are commonly used\\ninterchangeably, but it will be convenient here to use them\\ndistinctively. Freedom signifies the absence of causal deter-\\nmination antecedent to and effective of election and inten-\\ntion. It is strictly subjective. Liberty signifies primarily\\nthe absence of preventive causes subsequent to intention, of\\nobstacles, impediments or hindrances that interfere more or\\nless effectively with its successful accomplishment. It im-\\nplies the untrammeled exercise of voluntary effort in its\\nnormal function of carrying out the intention. It is objec-\\ntive in that it has reference primarily and especially to\\nexternal difficulties. A prisoner is entirely free in preferring\\nrelease to continued confinement; but not until the door\\nopens is he at liberty. The term is also applied in this sense\\nto purely physical facts as, an unscotched wheel is at lib-\\nerty a spark on powder liberates energy.\\n12. The exercise of liberty or free action, in the sense\\njust indicated, often suffers restrictions that diminish it, even\\nto annihilation. Neglecting impossibilities and impersonal\\ndifficulties, we shall consider only those restraints that arise\\nfrom the conflict of other wills.\\nOne person may effectively interfere with the liberty of\\nanother by using his own muscular force, either directly or\\nby setting obstacles to bar the way. The man thus assailed\\nmay be overpowered by stronger handling, and be fettered or", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 15\\nimprisoned. Also he may be beset and embarrassed in his\\ntaking or keeping possession of property, in producing and\\nimparting. Also any withdrawing or withholding of means\\nwhich he might use to attain a chosen end, is an interference\\nwith his liberty. Such external interferences may occur in\\nan infinite variety of ways, and are cases of causal determina-\\ntion.\\n13. There is, however, a secondary sense, even more im-\\nportant and perhaps more frequent, of the use of the term\\nliberty, in which it signifies the absence, not merely of causal\\nrestriction, but also of any inducement presented to one in-\\nclining him otherwise than he, if unassailed, would be dis-\\nposed. When influences that are not causes are brought to\\nbear on a man pressing him to choose otherwise than he\\nwould, modifying and sometimes reversing his original and\\ncharacteristic preferences, this is properly regarded as a\\nrestriction of his liberty.\\nThe process becomes clear upon a little consideration.\\nThe power of choice is obviously conditioned on cognition.\\nThere must be an idea of an action, and of its possible alter-\\nnate. A judgment is rendered between these, and the choice\\naccords with the weightier reason. Reasons are not causes.\\nA man may be influenced in his choice by them without loss\\nas to his personality, and indeed his every choice is subject\\nto rational determination. The reasons for one alternative\\nare more influential than those for the other, and he freely, of\\nhimself, chooses the former. It is not at all requisite that\\nthe prevailing reasons should be what might be called good\\nreasons they may be very bad, poor, trifling, or even absurd\\nreasons nevertheless they are the rational determinants with\\nwhich the choice accords.\\nNow, a man may not effect, but he may affect another s\\nchoice by presenting such reasons as shall operate through", "height": "3728", "width": "2416", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "16 OBLIGATION\\nthe desires to influence his course. This is done obviously\\nby argument; also one obviously influences by persuasion\\nthe decisions and conduct of his fellows. Even greater in\\nextent is the influence of instruction, as in the education of\\nchildren. Indeed, in the whole process of education, we in-\\nfluence powerfully the general disposition, character, and\\ncourse through life of other persons, thus putting permanent\\nrestraints upon their liberty. So also in social and political\\nrelations, and in religion, restraining influences, or interfer-\\nences with liberty, are constantly exerted by the presentation\\nof reasons.\\nAnother way of embarrassing the will, and so checking\\nliberty, is by reason of threatened harm, as seen particularly\\nin the penalties of the law. The police, the court and the\\npenitentiary offer a constant reason for conformity to law.\\nThe footpad, who presents the alternative of your money or\\nyour life, thereby proposes a reason usually sufficient to de-\\ntermine in favor of yielding the purse. A plea of duress is\\nallowed by the courts in discharge of engagement, or in miti-\\ngation of penalty. Any menace inspiring apprehension in-\\nterferes with liberty, changing the preferable direction of\\naction, or diminishing its range, without bringing to naught\\nthe possible alternative. The weightiest examples of such\\ninterference are to be found in political oppression, in reli-\\ngious persecution, and still more generally in war.\\n14. An important distinction now to be made is between\\nthose interferences, both external and internal, that are war-\\nranted and those that are unwarranted.\\nThe state warrants its officers in the arrest and imprison-\\nment, and even in the execution of offenders against its laws.\\nIt warrants the seizure of goods to satisfy judgments, the\\nconfiscation of private property for public weal, the levying\\nof taxes for its own support, the conscription of citizens for", "height": "3732", "width": "2508", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "LIBERTY 17\\nmilitary service, the bondage of a class as serfs or slaves.\\nAlso by stringent enactments it regulates industry in produc-\\ntion and trade, restricts marriage and divorce, inheritance\\nand bequest, and provides compulsory education. These and\\nmany other restraints on the original liberties of its subjects\\nit imposes, and enforces, if need be, with a strong arm.\\nAside from those enjoined by the state, there are many for-\\nmal restraints in the common intercourse of men which are\\nwarranted by social relations. To these may be added re-\\nstraints within the family circle, especially those arising from\\nthe exercise of parental authority.\\nThe foregoing restrictions of liberty are unavoidable. One\\nmay approve of and willingly comply with them, but his con-\\nsent is not asked he can neither refuse to accept them, nor\\nescape by renouncing them. But there are also many avoid-\\nable restraints that exist by consent, as in contracts, promises,\\nmarriage, and membership in clubs, societies, institutions and\\nchurches, whose requisitions are warranted by being legiti-\\nmate and voluntarily conceded.\\nVery grave questions arise, and will be subsequently con-\\nsidered, respecting the ground of the warrant or right to\\nbind. It is sufficient here to observe that the occasion and\\nextent of warranted interference is determined by the rela-\\ntive rights of the parties. Granting the warrant in the vari-\\nous cases cited, it is evident that they represent a large and\\ndistinct class of restrictions in the range of personal lib-\\nerty.\\nIt seems, then, that every man is surrounded by legitimate\\nchecks on action, having warrant in the rights of others to\\nwhom he is personally related. He cannot transgress a cer-\\ntain circumscribed bound without infringing on their privi-\\nleges, and he is debarred from doing so, as far as practicable,\\nby their conflicting wills. Thus by the rights of others\\neveryone s rights are limited. But within the limits thus set,", "height": "3716", "width": "2416", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "18 OBLIGATION\\nany willful restraint upon one s liberty of action, either exter-\\nnal or internal, being ex vi termini unwarranted, is a violation\\nof his ultimate constitutional right to a free use of his powers\\nin the gratification of his normal desires. On this class of\\ninterferences we proceed to bestow special consideration.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 19\\nCHAPTER III\\nTRESPASS\\n15. Having considered certain conditions and limitations\\nof rights, we are now prepared to examine more particularly\\nthe basis and origin of the notion, together with certain\\nother conditions, correlates and implications that mark the\\nlimits of interference in liberty.\\nThe notion of a right, being pure and simple, is incapable\\nof logical definition. Like all other pure notions it is imme-\\ndiately discerned upon an empirical occasion. The occasion\\nfor this intuition is the experience of a personal relation. It\\nis a matter of common observation that we all stand in vari-\\nous and dissimilar relations to other sentient beings, as of\\nman to man in reciprocal parity, of parent to child, of bene-\\nfactor to beneficiary, of ruler to subject, and many others.\\nNow, so soon as a human mind apprehends a relation between\\ntwo persons, whether the observer be one of the parties or\\nnot, upon that occasion it immediately discerns the concomi-\\ntant existence of mutual rights. Their special character and\\nextent is not immediately discerned, but only that they exist.\\nThe character and extent of the rights discerned are de-\\ntermined by the kind and intimacy of the relation between\\nthe parties. Whenever we undertake to pass moral judg-\\nment on any action, we examine and reflect upon the rela-\\ntion sustained by the persons concerned, and make this the\\nbasis of the judgment, approving or disapproving, mildly or\\nstrongly, as the case may be. We judge that a benefactor\\nhas a right to the gratitude of his rightful beneficiary that", "height": "3732", "width": "2444", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "20 OBLIGATION\\na subject has a right to the forbearance of his rightful ruler,\\nwho, in violating that right, becomes a tyrant. Thus rights\\nvary with relations. Those of parent in child are different\\nfrom those of child in parent those of benefactor in recipi-\\nent, from those of recipient in benefactor; and both differ\\nfrom those lying in elder and younger brothers, and in master\\nand servant. But in all such relations, however they may\\notherwise differ from each other, we see the existence of\\nmutual rights, whose character and extent are determinable\\nonly by, and ascertainable only from, the nature of the rela-\\ntion. It is therefore held as an ethical principle that rights\\nare conditioned on personal relations, discerned in personal\\nrelations, and determined by personal relations.\\nIn attempting to unfold the ethical theory grounded on\\npersonal relations, we shall confine our attention primarily\\nand for the most part to the simple and indifferent relation\\nof man to man, in entire equipoise and reciprocity.\\n16. A slight attention to the notion of a right discovers\\nthat it is conditioned on a social relation. A solitary man,\\none absolved from all fellowship, however entire his liberty,\\nhowever abundant the means of gratifying many desires, has\\nnot, strictly speaking, any rights. Now a right, since it\\nexists only by virtue of a personal relation, near or remote,\\nimplies a liability of conflict between wills at the least, the\\nconceivable possibility of an interference in one s liberty by\\nsome other person. For example, a right to go involves the\\nnotion of possibly being hindered or opposed, not by the\\nphysical difficulties of the way, but by the counteracting will\\nof some other person, which coming into play, the right to\\ngo is orally claimed, and perhaps violently exercised. Any\\nright whatever that any man or people or nation may have,\\nis held in view of a conceivable hindrance or obstruction on\\nthe part of others.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "TRESPASS 21\\nLet it be next observed that not every interference in one s\\nliberty is an interference in his right. Warranted interfer-\\nence does not violate any right, but only unwarranted inter-\\nference. The notion of a right implies that any intelligent\\ninterference with its free exercise is unwarranted, which in-\\nterference is a wrong. Now a right and a wrong are logical\\nantithetical correlatives. The notion of the one necessarily\\ncarries with it the notion of the other, like as the notions of\\nstraight and bent, of order and disorder. A wrong, how-\\never, is conditioned on a right that is, a right must be in\\norder that a wrong may be. Whenever, then, a person\\nknowingly and willingly interferes in my right, checking or\\npreventing or making vain my effort to realize it, thereby\\nrestraining the free course of my powers in seeking to gratify\\nmy normal desires, he does me a wrong. Thus a wrong is a\\nviolation of a right, and it again appears that a right can\\nexist only in view of its conceivable violation, a possible\\nwrong.\\n17. The principle that every man has a right to the free\\nuse of his powers in gratifying his normal desires, may be\\nstated thus Every man has a right to the free use of his\\npowers in so far as he does not interfere in the rights of any\\nother that is, does not violate the right of another, or does\\nno one a wrong. We have just seen that the right of either\\nparty exists only in view of its conceivable violation by the\\nother. The modified expression of the principle brings out\\nthe point that rights in different parties limit each other;\\nor that each of two parties has a sphere of rights which\\ntouches but does not intersect the sphere of the other.\\nThe necessary and universal limitation expressed in the\\nforegoing modified statement of the principle, is merely a\\npartial explication of what is implied in the qualifying term\\nnormal occurring in the prior statement. Normal desires are", "height": "3708", "width": "2392", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "22 OBLIGATION\\nthose that strictly conform to the natural and original con-\\nstitution of man, harmonize with his other powers, and\\naccord with his relations to his fellows and to his general\\nenvironment. Those are abnormal which have not this con-\\ngruity. Normal desires, as acquisitiveness, are limited to\\nsuch gratification as may be attained without interference in\\nthe rights of others. Abnormal desires, as covetousness,\\nimpel to action in disregard of the rights of others. It\\nappears, then, that the latter statement of the moral princi-\\nple modifies the former, not in content, but in expanded\\nexpression only.\\n18. In the further treatment of this matter it will be\\nconvenient to use the word trespass, with some latitude of\\nmeaning, yet quite definitely. A wrong is any violation of a\\nright so is a trespass. The terms have identical extension,\\nindeed are strictly synonymous. We have found that liberty\\nis necessary to the exercise and realization of a right, and\\nthat a violation of a right is an interference in liberty. Also\\nwe have found that a warranted interference in liberty is not\\na violation of any right, not a wrong, not a trespass. It re-\\nmains, then, that a trespass is an unwarranted interference in\\nliberty.\\nIn legal definition a trespass is an unlawful act committed\\nwith force and violence, vi et armis, on the person, property,\\nor relative rights of another. This narrow, technical state-\\nment is intended to designate those forms of trespass which\\nare forbidden by civil law, and have a remedy or a penalty\\ntherein provided. But in common, free and correct usage\\nthe term includes many forms of offense of which civil law\\ntakes no cognizance, indeed any and every act that injures or\\nannoys another, that violates any rule of rectitude or bond of\\nobligation, and we here adopt this comprehensive meaning.\\nOur wide definition gives occasion for another verbal", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "TBESPASS 23\\nvariation in the statement of the moral principle, thus: A\\nman has a right to the free use of his powers, provided he\\ncommit no trespass. On further examination we shall find\\nthat this provision sets very narrow bounds to rightful lib-\\nerty indeed that there is no rightful liberty that does not\\nconform to the limits and consist with the bonds of morality.\\n19. The limit which moral principle puts to the gratifi-\\ncation of desire, that it must not involve a trespass on the\\nright of any one else, gives rise to many and grave practical\\ndifficulties. The line between me and my neighbor which\\nneither should overstep, is often invisible and intangible.\\nTo settle it requires, in a numberless variety of cases, very\\nthoughtful and careful consideration in which a respect for\\npersonal right must dominate the greed of personal interest.\\nIn the intricate, pressing, and ever-changing relations of men\\nin society, it is almost impossible to guard and keep intact\\none s own rights, and to avoid a transgression of the bounds\\nset by the rights of others. Contentions inevitably abound.\\nThence arise vast and costly systems of judicature among all\\ncivilized peoples, systems that become more and more intri-\\ncate as civilization progresses, involving numerous courts of\\nauthoritative decision, whose business is little else than to\\nmark the bounds of rights, and to enforce the law of trespass\\nin its infinitely varied applications.\\nThe practical difficulties attending questions that concern\\ntrespass on rights, may be lessened, especially as to our pri-\\nvate conduct, by clearing the conception in certain respects.\\nTo this end the following observations will be helpful.\\nConflicting claims are seen on every hand, but rights\\nnever conflict. They touch each other, but never overlap.\\nThey limit by excluding each other, and indeed have no\\nother limitation. The same right cannot pertain to different\\npersons and different rights, however similar, are always", "height": "3728", "width": "2392", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "24 OBLIGATION\\nconsistent. Wherever there is contention, there is trespass\\nsomebody is doing a wrong somebody is interfering in the\\nrightful liberty of some one else. Even rights that are\\nshared, and so-called common rights, do not and cannot con-\\nflict, but are entirely consistent in their exercise. Everybody\\nhas a right to drive on a public road, but not so as to inter-\\nfere in the like liberty of any other.\\nOriginal rights are inalienable in the sense that one cannot\\nbe unwillingly deprived of them, except by the extinction of\\nthe objects in which the rights inhere, thus rendering their\\nexercise impossible, which is extreme trespass, as in murder,\\narson, and the like. One may be dispossessed of property,\\nand otherwise violently limited in liberty, but the right re-\\nmains whole, complete, intact so long as its object continues\\nto exist. Derived rights or such as have been conferred by\\nparental, civil, or other authority, may in many cases be\\nwithdrawn by resumption of the grant, by confiscation, or by\\nexercise of eminent domain.\\nRights in general may be alienated by the possessor him-\\nself transferring or forfeiting them. Property rights may be\\ntransferred by exchange, gift or bequest. Property may be\\nalienated also by misdemeanor, the court imposing fines.\\nLiberty of person may be forfeited by crime and the criminal\\nimprisoned, or all liberty with life extinguished on the gal-\\nlows. Being warranted, therein is no trespass.\\n20. For more specific illustrations of rights in their sub-\\njection to trespass, we shall now briefly consider the ground\\nof property and its patent liability to trespass. Property\\nrights are found, in the last analysis, to consist in the origi-\\nnal right of every man to the free exercise of his powers in\\nthe gratification of his normal desires. An infringement on\\nthem is an interference in this liberty, and so is a trespass.\\nMuch the larger part of any man s activity consists in", "height": "3732", "width": "2536", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "TBESPASS 25\\nappropriating, transforming, and using external objects.\\nNatural objects, as land, fruits, ores, to which no one has an\\nearlier claim, are withdrawn from the disposal of every other\\nperson, simply by the taking possession of them. For this\\nact of taking possession, inasmuch as it does not involve a\\ntrespass on any one, is an original right, looking toward the\\ngratification of normal desires. Things thus become private\\nproperty, and any hindrance on the part of others to the\\ntaking possession is a trespass. Moreover, the proprietor\\nmust be left at liberty to transform his property, by his labor\\nand skill, as he wills the products arising therefrom being\\nlikewise his own, to be used freely in further production, or\\notherwise consumed. We shall find hereafter that all prop-\\nerty is held in trust, to be used usuriously and consumed\\nprofitably, else the owner himself becomes a trespasser.\\nMany perplexing questions arise in the adjudication of\\nproperty. It may be that an original appropriation is exces-\\nsive, more than a fair share, and so a trespass beyond bound,\\nbut this is very difficult to determine. Moreover, it con-\\nstantly happens that there are long pauses in the useful ac-\\ntivity of the proprietor of certain material, because of the\\ngreater or less complexity of his plans, or from lack of con-\\ntinuous energy still it is evident that during such indefinite\\npause, his right of property must be respected, and the\\nmaterial thus reserved be left unmolested for his future use.\\nBut if, within a time sufficiently great for the ordering of\\nall circumstances, he give no sign of making that use, the\\nright of property lapses; though it is needful that the inva-\\nlidity of the claim be determined and decreed under special\\nlegal enactment. Finally, it is evident that, while possession\\nis proof presumptive of ownership, material may pass from\\nthe possession of the rightful owner without loss or surrender\\nof the ownership; and therefore, while the presumptive\\nright of the possessor is to be recognized, it should be super-\\nseded by ownership established in action of trover.", "height": "3732", "width": "2376", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "26 OBLIGATION\\n21. Setting aside felonies or high crimes, such as murder\\nwhich utterly destroys all rights and liberty, and robbery\\nwhich lessens the means of their exercise, the most familiar\\nform of trespass is that kind of injury which is done to a\\nman s land or house by intruding into it against his will. It\\nis an old legal maxim that eyery man s house is his castle,\\nand he is entitled to treat as an enemy any one who attempts\\nto enter it without his consent. As to land, the owner is\\nnot bound to fence it, and whether inclosed or not, a neigh-\\nbor is not at liberty to enter on it himself, or to permit his\\ncattle so to do. For in all such cases the liberty of the\\nowner in the use of his house or field is at least liable to\\ninfringement, is jeoparded, which is trespass.\\nIt is perhaps not quite so clear that vice is trespass, yet\\nsufficiently clear. Gambling is a transfer of property deter-\\nmined by an event whose occurrence is believed by all parties\\nto the transfer to be due to chance. Therein is a misuse of\\nmeans, a transfer, without equivalent, of property held in\\ntrust for beneficial ends. This alone makes gambling or bet-\\nting wrong, even in its lightest forms, when there is no un-\\nfairness and when the stake is small. Any disregard of the\\nclaim of others on a productive use of one s means, restricts\\ntheir privileges, and thus is a trespass. Intemperance, the\\nexcessive indulgence of an appetite or of any desire, is an\\nabuse, a weakening, a degradation of powers, to whose fully\\nefficient service others have a rightful claim, and hence it is\\nan overstepping the bounds of liberty, a transgression, an\\ninfringement on the privilege of other persons, a trespass.\\nThe vice of lying, the hearer having a right to the truth, is\\nclearly, even when no further injury appears, a checking or\\nperverting of the hearer s privilege. Slander is of like char-\\nacter, doubling the trespass in the injury to both hearer and\\nsubject, and in its grosser forms is a misdemeanor, liable to\\nlegal action for damages. Much more might be said on the", "height": "3732", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "TBESPASS 27\\nethics of vice, but it is sufficient here to point out that it is\\nessentially trespass.\\nA great many actions of trifling consequence, and hence\\nusually overlooked, have nevertheless essentially the nature\\nof trespass. They differ from crime and vice in degree\\nrather than in kind, all having the specific mark of unwar-\\nranted interference in liberty. When I have a right to go\\nfirst, and another, who knows or might know this, steps in\\nbefore me, my right is violated. Even if the attempt is\\nthwarted by my stepping more quickly, still the integrity of\\nmy right, the entirety of my liberty, has suffered. One who\\nwalks through my garden without leave, or enters my door\\nunbidden, violates my right to be private. One who, with-\\nout warrant of good reason, intrudes on my conversation\\nwith some one else, or interrupts my words to himself, breaks\\nin upon my right of free speech. When we occupy the time\\nor attention of another otherwise than he would, as by send-\\ning a letter or making a visit, we apologize by stating reasons\\nthat occasion and warrant the call. Any intrusion or inter-\\nmeddling with what does not concern one, is a trespass.\\nWhen I am in haste, and some one needlessly detains me, it\\nis a trespass. Pressing the unwilling for a loan or donation,\\nor for an endorsement of any sort, is an embarrassment, a tres-\\npass. Thus in the passing relations of men there are a multi-\\ntude of ways in which one may hinder the preferred action\\nof another, or turn its direction, thereby, lightly perhaps, yet\\nessentially, committing a trespass. The conventional unwrit-\\nten laws of mutual courtesy in social intercourse are regulative\\nof private conduct and protective of private personal rights\\nfrom personal trespass. Politeness is morality in trifles.\\n22. The foregoing mention of slander suggests a class of\\noffenses touching personal dignity that calls for special con-\\nsideration. An impolite act or word to a person worthy of", "height": "3732", "width": "2392", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "28 OBLIGATION\\nrespect is a wrong, inasmuch as it unwarrantably interferes\\nin his liberty. In order that one may use his powers freely\\na certain equanimity is necessary, a mental equilibrium.\\nThis is disturbed by even a slight affront, and he is embar-\\nrassed, his liberty of action is checked. Every upright man\\ncherishes a certain measure of self-respect, and claims a cor-\\nresponding degree of respect from his fellows, a respect pro-\\nportionate to his estimate of his own dignity or moral worth.\\nThese constitute his personal honor. It is very precious and\\nvery sensitive, for no one can fulfill high aims in life unless\\nhe preserve a calm equipoise of his faculties, and the obser-\\nvant deference of his associates.\\nIf an affront be grave, such as giving the lie or other\\nverbal insult, or striking a blow even without physical harm,\\nit overthrows for an indefinite time the serene composure, if\\nnot the entire self-command, requisite to the unbiased exer-\\ncise of one s faculties. Such indignity is intolerable. No\\ndoubt the resentment which arises instinctively often becomes\\nexcessive, putting into violent commotion the whole being,\\nturning it completely away from preferred conduct, and in-\\nducing extreme acts, even such as involve the sacrifice of\\none s life. And indeed in many cases death is better than\\ndishonor for while death is the loss of all rights, dishonor\\nmay fix fetters and settle a slavery that is worse than all loss.\\nAs a man himself defends his life, so he would himself\\ndefend his honor, his most precious possession, essential to a\\nfree life. The anger or resentment that naturally follows\\nindignation is instinctive impulse to self-defense. It is\\nnormal, and therefore rightful in rational furtherance. Too\\nmuch cannot be said in favor of the sacred right and obliga-\\ntion to defend one s rights, and especially one s personal\\nhonor. With the savage this passes over into malice and\\nrevenge, a trespass retaliated by a trespass. But two wrongs\\ndo not make right; this does not restore the prior state.", "height": "3760", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "TBESPASS 29\\nAmong civilized peoples the savagery lingers, particularly in\\nthe restricted form of dueling, for men are rarely willing to\\nsubmit a question touching personal honor to a civil court\\nor to a court of honor. One s honor is a thing too sacred\\nto be weighed in the scales, there is no possible counterpoise.\\nIt is to be personally defended, and in opinions which have\\nprevailed, personally avenged. But higher moral culture\\nbrings its subject to see that he is limited to defense, and to\\nthat mode of defense which will best prevent the trespass,\\nor its repetition, or its imitation. Other remedy is rarely\\npossible. It is hard to be angry, and sin not, yet such is the\\nmoral ideal.\\n23. The various kinds of offense to which we have re-\\nferred are mostly modes of direct trespass, wherein an imme-\\ndiate action unwarrantably checks liberty. Let it be now\\nobserved and hereafter kept in mind that trespass is very\\noften indirect, by mediate action or by inaction. Indirect\\ntrespass by inaction calls for special remark and emphasis,\\nsince the term is commonly used only in the positive sense\\nof direct action.\\nNeglecting to pay a money debt when due is clearly an\\nunwarranted interference in the liberty of the creditor for\\nhe might use the money to gratify a normal desire, but is\\nrestrained and more or less embarrassed by the non-payment.\\nIn general, any withholding, unless by free consent, of\\nwhat it is one s right to possess is plainly akin to theft, and\\nas truly a trespass. A promise of every rightful kind is\\nto be kept, because it may have become a factor with the\\npromisee in ordering his life, and he may be embarrassed by\\nthe disappointment of his confidence. A breach of promise\\ndoing serious injury is a recognized form of trespass, action-\\nable at law. Lack of gratitude to a benefactor, omitting a\\nmeed of praise, failing to show the worthy such outward", "height": "3732", "width": "2392", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "30 OBLIGATION\\nmarks of respect as are conventional, neglecting to pay or to\\nacknowledge any polite attention, these and the like are em-\\nbarrassing, and hence modes of trespassing. If I am using\\nmy right of way, it is all one whether somebody else steps in\\nthe way, or does not step out. In either case he is equally\\nin my way. The act committed in the one case and omitted\\nin the other, is in each a trespass, a restraint of my liberty,\\nand hence the cases are morally identical.\\nThe notion widely prevails that an indirect trespass, espe-\\ncially one omitting to fulfill an obligation, is less offensive\\nthan a direct trespass committing a deed violative of an obli-\\ngation. This is a popular error. In either case, if inten-\\ntional, there is a complete breach of obligation, a wrong, a\\ntrespass. Forgetfulness is more likely to have occurred in\\nthe former than in the latter case, but forgetfulness, though\\nit may palliate, does not wholly excuse an offense. If the\\ndegree of offense be measured by the gravity of its conse-\\nquences, even this will not favor a fault; for it is evident\\nthat very often a neglect of obligation may be as serious as\\nany direct violation. A sentinel who fails to give alarm and\\nthus to prevent surprise, is responsible for the disastrous\\nconsequences, and is condemned to capital punishment. A\\nmoral distinction between actions omitted and those com-\\nmitted is superficial and unessential.\\nSin is transgression of the law of God, disobedience to\\nthe divine command. We shall hereafter show that any tres-\\npass of man on man is trespass on God, violating his will,\\nthwarting his purposes, checking the free course of his de-\\nsigns. There is also indirect trespass on him in neglecting\\nhis personal dues, and direct trespass in counteracting his\\nways. All disaccord with him, whether by action or by inac-\\ntion, whether by sin of commission or by sin of omission, is\\nan unwarranted interference in the divine furtherance of the\\nworld. Thus it comes to light that all trespass is sin, and\\nall sin is trespass.", "height": "3732", "width": "2540", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 31\\nCHAPTER IV\\nTHE LAW\\n24. Let intellective attention be again fixed on the\\nprimary notion of a right. Pure reason immediately dis-\\ncerns that a violation of a right, knowingly and willingly\\ncommitted, is a breach of normal order, a violation of law.\\nAlso it discerns that this law, being violable, is not, like nat-\\nural law, the designation of a constant order of facts that\\nhave no alternates but the designation of an order of facts\\nthat ought to be constant, an order which, though violable,\\nshould be inviolate and universal.\\nMoreover, pure reason discerns the very important and\\nspecial characteristic of this law, that it is obligatory on the\\npotential transgressor. It is addressed to his will, laying\\nupon it a binding obligation, obliging him to conform his\\nactions to its behests. Accordingly it is recognized as an\\nimperative, a command, an order enjoining order on those\\ncapable of disorder.\\nThe order herein designated and demanded is a constantly\\nobservant respect for the rights of others, forbidding any un-\\nwarranted interference in liberty, forbidding trespass. Its\\nformula is: Thou shalt not trespass. This widely yet defi-\\nnitely interpreted is the completely comprehensive Moral\\nLaw, binding all imperfect persons without exception, and at\\nall times, in all places, under all circumstances. Thus it is\\nboth catholic and strictly universal.\\nThe moral law is independent of experience, except that\\nexperience must furnish the occasion for its discernment by\\npure intellect. It is not deduced from some higher law;", "height": "3724", "width": "2400", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "32 OBLIGATION\\nthere is none higher. It does not logically follow from the\\nprinciple of liberty to gratify desire, bnt implies or is implied\\nin that principle, and a mere unfolding of the essential con-\\ntent of either is all that is requisite for a clear apprehension\\nof its truth. Indeed the principle and the law are but\\nvaried forms of essentially the same necessary truth. As a\\nprinciple, it is an immediate intuition of pure intellect, hav-\\ning the light of truth in itself. As a law, its universally\\nbinding authority lies in its intuitively imperative truth.\\n25. The intuitive cognition of this fundamental, catholic,\\nand universal law, is the sole function of the pure practical\\nreason or conscience. Conscience is pure reason discerning\\nmoral law. This faculty has the moral law for its exclusive\\nobject, and its exercise is the primary, original, antecedent\\ncondition of any moral activity whatever, without which lib-\\nerty has no moral restraint, and volition no moral character.\\nIn thus identifying conscience with the pure practical rea-\\nson, we give to the term a clear and sharp definition, fitting\\nit for scientific use by distinguishing it from those other fac-\\nulties which, subordinately and occasionally, are concerned\\nwith moral matter, and whose exercise on such matter is\\nquite commonly and confusedly spoken of as the exercise of\\nconscience. Except the pure practical reason, there is no\\noriginal, distinct, special moral faculty in the human mind.\\nLet it be remarked that conscience, as herein defined, can-\\nnot err. The criterion of a pure intuition is its necessity and\\nuniversality. Conscience in its intuitive discernment discov-\\ners what is necessarily and universally true, and this discern-\\nment, being intuitive, is infallible. It is not, however, itself\\na complete guide of conduct. It must be supplemented by\\nthe logical function of intelligence, by thought, deducing\\nminor rules or the moral quality of particular actions.\\nThought may err, is peculiarly liable to error. Herein is", "height": "3732", "width": "2480", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 33\\nthe explanation of the great diversity of moral judgments\\namong men. The data of pure reason are the same in all\\nhuman minds but the judgments formed in the application\\nof these data often greatly differ, because of illogical think-\\ning. The liability to error is greatly increased by a common\\nacceptance of traditional moral standards, expressed in ready-\\nmade rules, which, if not themselves erroneous, are often im-\\nperfectly comprehended and applied to cases beyond their\\nscope. Thus certain individuals, or large classes of men, or\\nnations, are said to have high or low standards of morality\\naccording to the degree of approach and logical conformity\\nof these standards to the intuition of pure reason.\\nThe moral intuition, like all others, may be cleared by dis-\\ncriminating attention to its occasions, abstracting from the\\nempirical elements, and fixing upon the pure; and further,\\nby distinguishing those abstract notions with which it is lia-\\nble to be confused, as, for example, utility. In this manner\\nonly is conscience capable of improvement, of education.\\nThe accuracy and acumen of the logical faculty, by which\\nthe moral quality of an action is inferred, may be greatly im-\\nproved by intelligent exercise, and thus furnish means for\\nthe refinement of moral character. The moral sentiments\\nmay be intensified and the moral impulse strengthened by\\nindulgent activity, and the will may become more and more\\nsubmissive to its law by habitual observance. Conscience,\\nin its loose general meaning, has these several sources of cul-\\nture but in the narrow scientific sense here adopted, it is\\ncapable only of clearance.\\n26. Turning from the faculty by which the law is cog-\\nnized to the law itself, we observe that this imperative truth\\nis categorical.\\nThere are two classes of hypothetical imperatives, each\\nimplying the practical necessity of a means to an end. The", "height": "3728", "width": "2376", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "34 OBLIGATION\\ncondition in the first of these classes is problematical, being,\\nthough constant, not universal, but merely possible. Exam-\\nples are found in the technical rules of art. If one would\\nbuild a house, he must gather materials, employ skilled labor,\\netc. The condition in the second class is assertorial, being\\nactual, constant and universal. Examples are found in the\\ndictates of prudence. If one would be healthy, he must be\\ntemperate. More generally: If one would be happy, he\\nmust, etc. These rules and dictates command conditionally.\\nThere is no necessity that any one should observe them, ex-\\ncept in case of his willing the antecedent, which, however,\\nin the second class, every one actually does.\\nBut the moral law is a categorical imperative, command-\\ning unconditionally. It is simply, Thou shalt, or Thou shalt\\nnot. There is no hypothetical antecedent expressive of a\\ndefinite end to be attained. Moreover, its behest is in disre-\\ngard of any special consequences, except in so far as these\\nmay enlighten the obligation. Tradition and custom may\\nlikewise illustrate its application, but they neither add to nor\\ntake from its authoritative hoc age. Its authority is in its\\nirrefragable and universal truth, and its truth is in the essen-\\ntial and ultimate nature of the facts. It demands an uncon-\\nditional and immediate obedience as a moral necessity, always\\nand everywhere, amid any and every combination of circum-\\nstances; a blind obedience, if in the dark; an intelligent\\nobedience, if there be light; but always an uncompromising,\\nunswerving obedience.\\n27. The law is sovereign, subjecting all personal powers.\\nEach faculty operates according to its own constitutional\\nfunction, but it is not competent for its own guidance. All\\nothers are dependent on intelligence as a guide, and for the\\nfull and correct performance of this specific guiding function,\\nintelligence is dependent on conscience discerning the law of", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 35\\nconduct. All human activities, whether they issue in exter-\\nnal expression or not, are thus subjected ultimately to the\\nmoral law.\\nIt is the peculiar, the exclusive function of the will to con-\\ntrol all other powers, to bring them into normal and harmo-\\nnious exercise. The sovereign law is therefore addressed to\\nthe will, the executive. It commands choice to conform to\\nits behest. It demands the regulation of all inner activity,\\nand thus the regulation of all outward action. It is the\\nessential informing element in all mandates and minor rules\\nof conduct the hypothetical imperatives, described above as\\nlogically coordinate, being ethically subordinate, subject to\\nits regulation. Even conscience itself is subject to its au-\\nthority the law, dimly seen, demanding the voluntary atten-\\ntion requisite to its being clearly seen in the fullness of its\\nmeaning, lest it be ignorantly violated.\\nThis claim of supremacy, demanding the unconditional\\nsubjection of the entire will, is more or less clearly recog-\\nnized by every one. I see that it is law for me I cannot\\nignore or reject its claim. Yet a will often disregards or\\nrebels against this authority and only when completely sub-\\nmissive and perfectly accordant can a will be pronounced\\nmorally good. For nothing can possibly be conceived in\\nthe world, or even out of it, which can be called good with-\\nout qualification except a good will.\\n28. It has already been indicated that rights are grounded\\non personal relations, and that a discernment of the existence\\nof rights takes place on an empirical occasion, on an obser-\\nvation of such relation in actual life, whether the observer be\\na party or not. Now it is evident that personal relations\\nare strictly objective, and rights objectively determined hence\\nit follows that the moral law, being essentially implied in\\nreally existent rights, is objective in origin and character.", "height": "3728", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "36 OBLIGATION\\nIt is true that human rights are more remotely grounded in\\nhuman nature, and men are spoken of as doing by nature\\nthe things of the law, as being a law unto themselves, as\\nhaving the law written in their hearts. But this does not\\nmake the law in any measure or sense subjective. For man\\nhas a fixed, native constitution of both body and mind he\\ncannot make one hair of his head white or black, nor can he\\nadd to or take from his natural faculties, one of which is con-\\nscience, the eye reading the law written for him in his heart.\\nThis constitution, being independent of his subjective states,\\nis as truly objective as is the solar system, and it is this\\nobjective constitution, acting in conformity with the existing\\nconstitution of nature at large, that is determinative of rights,\\nof obligation, of the law.\\nThus the moral law is, as to its origin, objective in the\\nconstituent order of the world. It does not originate within\\nme, but beyond me. It is not given by me, but to me. It\\ncomes to me from without it is adventitious. The law of\\ncausation, every event is caused, and the law of conduct,\\nthou shalt not trespass, though the one be indicative, the\\nother imperative, the one inviolable, the other violable, are\\nalike in this, that each is independent of the mind apprehend-\\ning it. Conscience is not autonomous, nor is the will. The\\nlaw, objectively determined, is read by conscience, interpreted\\nby the judicial faculty, and executed, under the moral im-\\npulse, by the will.\\nThe objective character of the moral law is indicated by\\nits independence of circumstances and its disregard of conse-\\nquences. Yet still more clearly is this character evidenced\\nin its sameness for all classes and conditions of men. Were\\nits character subjective, or were it liable to any subjective\\nmodification, there might be as many variations of the law\\nas there are minds of men. But, being one and the same for\\nall individual minds, evidently it is not enacted by them, but", "height": "3772", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 37\\nenacted for them. Also, since it is not at all affected by\\nwhat one may think about it, every sane man being accused\\nor excused by his fellowmen in disregard of his peculiar no-\\ntions, it is clear that a law thus common and unalterable by\\nany subjective treatment has the essential character of an\\nobjective reality.\\n29. The law, in the form we have given, is negative\\nThou shalt not. In this form, taken strictly, it forbids a\\nlarge class of actions without enjoining any. Unquestionably\\nthis is its primary and most palpable aspect comprehending\\nour most obvious obligations, the one most clearly and fully\\nrecognized in actual life. As prohibitory, it strikes the most\\nuncultured intellect, is patent to the grossest comprehension,\\nand impresses itself on the humblest capacity, making its ap-\\npearance in the very awakening of the moral consciousness.\\nThis strictly negative or prohibitory aspect of the law is\\ntherefore worthy of specific consideration in this place, re-\\nserving for subsequent examination its positive forms.\\nFrom the law in its prohibitory form many deductions can\\nbe made to secondary laws, having less yet very wide gen-\\nerality, and retaining the character of strict universality.\\nFor example: Trespass is forbidden; Murder is trespass;\\ntherefore Murder is forbidden. In this simple syllogism, the\\nmajor premise is an indicative form of the law intuitively\\ntrue; only the minor premise needs support, which the\\nslightest reflection furnishes; for the right to continue in\\nlife is the highest of rights, it being the condition of all\\nothers, and to kill unwarrantably, which is murder, is the\\ngreatest possible trespass, since it extinguishes all liberty, all\\npossible enjoyment of any right. Maiming is likewise tres-\\npass, for it diminishes one s liberty to realize his rights and\\ntherefore it is forbidden. Cruelty is pain-giving trespass;\\na wrong, not simply because it gives pain, but because", "height": "3728", "width": "2416", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "38 OBLIGATION\\nit thereby unwarrantably interferes in liberty; it there-\\nfore is forbidden. Theft is trespass, a violation of the\\nright of property preventing its free use; and therefore,\\nThou shalt not steal. These are very obvious yet typical\\ncases.\\nThe Decalogue, which the foregoing suggests, is usually\\nspoken of as the moral law. It is eminently, but not ulti-\\nmately. Its ten-fold statement lacks the unity requisite to a\\nphilosophic reduction. Yet it is easily seen that each of the\\nten laws is a simple deduction from the one ultimate law\\nTrespass not. This is the basis. Consequently they are\\nthroughout negative, simply prohibitory. Let us add the\\nobservations, that these prohibitions are, in general, progres-\\nsive from higher to lower offenses, and that all are objective,\\nforbidding outward acts, except the last which is subjective,\\nentering the mind or soul, and forbidding unrighteous desires.\\nThe Ten Words are inadequate. A man may keep them\\nall from his youth up, and yet lack. They are directed\\nsolely against sins of commission. They prohihit certain\\nprominent offenses, but posit no explicit obligation of benev-\\nolence, no duty of love to God or neighbor. They were\\naddressed originally to a people rude, uncultured, whose\\nmoral character was very imperfectly developed by its Egyp-\\ntian experiences. They were for the time as much as could\\nbe borne. Had the law in its fullness been at once revealed,\\nit probably would not have been understood, much less ap-\\npreciated, accepted and practiced. In general, the Old Tes-\\ntament morality is negative and prohibitory.\\nCivil law, under which phrase we include all laws rec-\\nognized, enacted and enforced by an organized State, is\\noriginally negative in its forms. Even after being greatly\\nexpanded, it is still very largely negative in expression and\\nprohibitory in character. Especially is this true of the crim-\\ninal code, which consists of a series of prohibitions of certain", "height": "3732", "width": "2468", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "THE LAW 39\\novert acts. As a science of human rights, civil law is occu-\\npied with classifying and denning the various rights of indi-\\nviduals, of corporations, and of communities in general. As\\nan art of social regulation, it provides for the adjudication of\\nparticular cases, and the enforcement of judicial decrees.\\nThroughout it is a system of enactments deduced from the\\nuniversal and exhaustive law of trespass, which enactments\\nare used as major premises in further deduction the minor\\npremises being the particular cases which the court is con-\\nsidering. Hence it is evident that, in essence, there are not\\nmany laws there is only one law.\\n30. The law in its primarily negative sense, forbidding\\ncertain actions and requiring none, tends to isolate men, to\\nset them apart from each other, to sever their natural rela-\\ntions. It says Let your neighbor be, do not interfere in his\\nliberty, do not step in his way or on his ground, respect his\\nrights. Accordingly, even among highly cultured people,\\nthere are many who, while rigidly conforming their lives to\\nthe prohibitions of the law, apparently have no wider concep-\\ntion of obligation, and know no difference between legality\\nand morality. Indeed there are some who regard the laws of\\nthe State, with all their manifest imperfections and narrow\\ninadequacy, as marking the bounds of obligation, and con-\\nsider it right to claim or do whatever civil law does not\\nforbid, all unforbidden actions being permissible and super-\\nerogatory.\\nA thorough analysis, however, of the conditions and impli-\\ncations of trespass, such as we shall subsequently undertake,\\ndiscovers that the limitation to prohibition is inadmissible,\\nthat it is far from exhausting the moral principle, that there\\nis a positive aspect of this formally negative imperative, that\\nthe injunction placed upon trespass by the universal moral\\nlaw is both a prohibition and a requisition, forbidding to do", "height": "3732", "width": "2400", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "40 OBLIGATION\\nthis but equally requiring to do that, and embracing all par-\\nticular acts and general conduct. The morality of the New\\nTestament advances to this higher positive plane. It does\\nnot abrogate the earlier form of the law, but arises from it, de-\\nmands active benevolence, and so exhausts the obligation of\\nman to man. The influence of this positive presentation of\\nthe law effectively counteracts the isolating tendency of the\\nexclusively negative view, restores and strengthens the mu-\\ntual relations of men, bringing them into fraternal fellow-\\nship, and uniting them by common and indissoluble bonds.", "height": "3760", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 41\\nCHAPTER V\\nSANCTIONS\\n31. The human will originates actions in the sense that\\nit elects one rather than another possibility, and does that\\ninstead of this. It is therefore rightly regarded as the first\\ncause in a series of events whose subsequent members are its\\neffects or consequences. As this mastery of the will is itself\\nsubject to the moral law, the causes and effects in the series\\nare qualified as moral causes and effects. But let it be ob-\\nserved that causation in the mental or spiritual sphere is\\nstill causation, and in that sphere moral causes determine\\ntheir effects as rigidly as, in the physical sphere, physical\\ncauses determine their effects. Moreover, such is the recip-\\nrocal relation between the spiritual and material spheres\\nthat an activity in either may be the cause of an event in\\nthe other.\\nWhen a voluntary act takes place, I have determined it\\nshall be this rather than some other. Until then the deed\\nis merely potential, I am master, I have to do with it. When\\nit becomes actual, then no longer have I to do with it, but it\\nhas to do with me. I cease to be the actor, and become an.\\nobserver, perhaps a sufferer. What is done can never be\\nundone. There may be counteraction, readjustment, restitu-\\ntion, compensation, but there is no restoration or erasure of\\nthe past. The act is unchangeable. It has passed from\\nthe domain of moral law and entered the realm of natural\\nlaw, to become a first link in an irrefragable chain of causes\\nand effects involving my welfare, perhaps completely and\\ninextricably. Often a word unspoken is a sword sheathed at", "height": "3732", "width": "2412", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "42 OBLIGATION\\nmy belt; spoken, it is a drawn sword in the hand of my\\nenemy.\\nExperience in such matter brings reflection, and with it\\nthe wider observation and induction that conformity of voli-\\ntion to moral law is wholesome, non-conformity perilous, per-\\nhaps fatal. These good and evil effects constitute in general\\nthe sanctions of the moral law, they conserve its sanctity,\\nratifying and vindicating its authority, inducing obedience,\\nthat it may be unbroken, whole, holy, sacred in the eyes of\\nits subjects.\\n32. Mandatory law has necessarily penalty affixed. In-\\ndeed the notion of the one seems to imply the other as of its\\nessence for the voice of command without power enforcing\\nit would be mere brutum fulmen, vox et prceterea nihil. Ac-\\ncordingly, in considering the moral order of the world, the\\norder that ought to be, we find that any deviation carries\\nwith it penalty, or rather penalties, as its natural and neces-\\nsary consequence. Let us now examine first those that are\\nwholly subjective.\\nSubordinate to reverence for the law revealed by conscience\\nis the sentiment of approbation or of disapprobation, correla-\\ntive to the moral judgment approving or disapproving. These\\ninnate sentiments bear powerfully upon conduct, and thus\\nconstitute sanctions. Indeed they are the original, constitu-\\ntional, and primary sanctions of the law. In the pleasure or\\npain, by which they are strongly marked, we discover native,\\nsubjective reward and punishment.\\nThe moral sentiments are so highly influential that their\\nfunction is often exaggerated, and they are supposed to be\\nsanctions in the sense of being a sure index and an authori-\\ntative exponent of the true moral character of an act or of\\ngeneral conduct. Many a man of high culture will assert his\\nrectitude in a certain case because he experiences the pleasing", "height": "3732", "width": "2484", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 43\\nsentiment of self -approbation, saying: My conscience sanc-\\ntions my course. It is therefore important to remark that\\none s feelings in view of his actions do not, even in the most\\nremote way, furnish any proof of their true moral character.\\nThis would invert the psychological order that posits moral\\nsentiment as dependent on moral judgment. In reality the\\nfeeling of approbation or disapprobation attends a false moral\\njudgment as readily and fully as it does a true one, having\\nno power to discern the difference. Hence these sentiments\\ndo not at all confirm the judgment; but, on the contrary,\\ntheir own justification is wholly dependent on the validity of\\nthe antecedent judgment and this depends ultimately on a\\nclear discernment of the moral law by conscience. Accord-\\ningly we observe that even these sanctions, though original\\nand innate, are liable, as are all other human sanctions, to\\ndistribute reward and punishment unduly, both in kind and\\ndegree.\\nIn the class of subjective sanctions must be included the\\nsilent approval or censure of one s fellows. We are largely\\ndependent for our free welfare on even the private opinions\\nof each other. No man can reasonably be indifferent to the\\njudgment that others form of his conduct, and to the moral\\nsentiments with which it inspires them. Every right-minded\\nman feels this keenly, whether the judgment be just or un-\\njust. He is elated and encouraged by silent commendation\\nhe is depressed and discouraged by condemnation. These\\nalso are potent sanctions ratifying the moral law, and uphold-\\ning its authority.\\n33. From the foregoing considerations it appears that\\nthe notion of violable law carries with it the notions of a gain\\nof worth or dignity in its observance, and of a loss of worth\\nor dignity in its violation also that the one implies the no-\\ntion of merit or desert, of reward due, the other of demerit,", "height": "3732", "width": "2408", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "44 OBLIGATION\\nof penalty due. Furthermore, an observation of meritorious\\nconduct, especially if despite adverse temptation, excites an\\nimpulse to bestow reward; of culpable conduct, a disposi-\\ntion to inflict punishment. These natural impulses have,\\nno doubt, an instinctive origin and play, and so far are con-\\nstitutional but they have also a distinctively rational exer-\\ncise, and so far are susceptible of justification.\\nIn view of one s own conduct, an approving judgment\\nof merit excites the instinctive impulse to reward well-\\ndoing, realized perhaps in some special self-indulgence;\\nwhereas a judgment of demerit incites an instinctive anticipa-\\ntion of punishment, which sometimes is self-inflicted. Crim-\\ninals not infrequently surrender themselves voluntarily to\\npublic justice, that they themselves may have the satisfaction\\nof penance for their misdeeds. Suicide following remorse\\nhas perhaps often the character of self-inflicted punishment.\\nRecompense and retribution are reasonable. It is patent\\nto common sense that the welfare of a community as a whole,\\nand of its several members, is favored by the steady observ-\\nance of the law which requires each to respect the rights of\\nall others and more especially is it evident that a wrong\\ndone, a trespass committed, is a breach of order affecting un-\\nfavorably, not merely the immediate sufferer, but mediately\\nthe welfare of all, even of those whose relation to him is\\nremote. Therefore, when a breach is threatened, all agree\\nthat preventive restraints should be imposed and when a\\nbreach is actually made, that the offender should be punished\\nin such manner and measure as will deter him from repeating\\nthe offense, and deter all observers from like misdeed. If\\nthe community be one of which I am a member, I am dis-\\nposed and indeed bound to take part directly or indirectly in\\ninflicting the deterrent penalty. On the other hand, if some\\none, who, from moral weakness or from lack of moral culture,\\nis specially liable to temptation, conform manfully in a cer-", "height": "3772", "width": "2460", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 45\\ntain action or m general conduct to the social order that\\nought to be, then there is a common judgment that he should\\nbe rewarded, and a prompting to bestow reward in such man-\\nner and measure as shall strengthen his good will, and induce\\nobservers in his class to practice like conduct. This seems\\nto be a reasonable account and justification of the common\\ndisposition of men in their treatment of orderly and disor-\\nderly persons.\\n34. The subjective sanctions in the minds of observers\\ntend to become also objective in public opinion. The judg-\\nment and sentiment usually find expression in outspoken\\nwords of praise or blame, often in modes more forcible, as\\npopular honors, or social ostracism.\\nReprobation of a wrongdoer is, in general, directly pro-\\nportioned to his intelligence and culture. For it is evident,\\nfrom the admitted supremacy of the moral law, that a knowl-\\nedge of one s obligations, implying the possibility of fulfilling\\nthem, diminishes in so far the ground of apologetic defense.\\nConversely, ignorance of facts and circumstances which go to\\ndetermine the moral quality of conduct, is allowed to be a\\npalliation of offense, followed by a mitigation of punishment\\nyet is not allowed as complete excuse, for no human mind\\ncan be absolutely blind to its obligations.\\nThe sentiment and impulse prompting us to reward one\\nwho does well is, speaking generally, in inverse proportion to\\nhis intelligence and culture. A street gamin who finds and\\nrestores my lost purse should have some portion of its con-\\ntent bestowed on him, but I would not offer to reward a\\ngentleman should I commit the blunder, he would be justly\\nindignant. We heartily approve the good deeds of cultured\\npersons, but express rewards are rarely proposed to them.\\nAcademic honors are offered to youth as a stimulus before\\nthe fact, but in mature life honors are indefinite, spontaneous,", "height": "3732", "width": "2464", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "46 OBLIGATION\\nand come after the fact. Titles of nobility are usually\\ngranted as rewards only for some special and signal service.\\nNeither these, nor honorable distinctions of any kind, nor\\nany emoluments, are granted for mere conformity to law.\\nIn the civil code, while to each law is attached a penalty\\nfor its violation, to no law in any enlightened State is at-\\ntached a reward for its observance.\\nThis last observation gives occasion to remark that while,\\nas already stated, penalty is a necessary sanction, essential\\nin the very notion of violable law, reward is only a contin-\\ngent sanction, it may or may not be applied, it is not essen-\\ntial. Moreover, in the progress of moral culture, not only\\ndoes a promise of reward, but also the threat of punishment,\\ngradually lose its influence. Many a man reaches the stage\\nwhere these are, for himself, lost to view, and he fulfills his\\nobligations without regard to either. This is a high, yet\\nnot the highest, degree of culture.\\n35. Another class of sanctions, originating in the fore-\\ngoing, may be discriminated as distinctly objective, being\\nembodied in formal ordinance, and having reference to overt\\nmisdeeds. They are the enactments of an organized State.\\nNo longer recognized as individual judgments, they super-\\nsede the private opinion of the offender, the court and the\\nexecutive, they have passed beyond the more or less sym-\\npathetic opinion of the public, and are objectified in a bind-\\ning penal code.\\nSuch, in general, is the character of all civil law. It\\ncannot be too strongly or repeatedly emphasized that the\\nwhole science and practice of jurisprudence, in all its various\\nbranches, together with the vast and complex system of\\ncourts of judicature, having a prescribed and established\\nform, manner and order for conducting suits and prosecu-\\ntions, and having executive powers, has its ultimate basis", "height": "3772", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 47\\nand justification in the ethical principle of a personal right,\\nand is merely an authoritative explication and application of\\nthe one moral law Thou shalt not trespass.\\nVery many kinds of enacted sanctions of law have been\\ndevised. There can be no doubt that in the early stages of\\norganized society, the spirit of personal vengeance dominat-\\ning, the intent and form of legal punishment was largely\\nretaliatory, a paying back blow for blow. This barbarous,\\nstrict lex talionis is no longer in vogue. It has been ex-\\npunged from the penal code of civilized States, excepting in\\ncase of life for life, which is justified on grounds other than\\nvengeance. For it is evident that, if requital in kind, to\\nsatisfy the thirst for revenge, be the object of punitive\\nmeasures, then it is the purpose of the State, as far as it\\ncan reach, to double the suffering of its members which is\\nabsurd. Whatever of vengeance is compatible with legal\\npunishment, is reserved expressly for a tribunal higher than\\nthe State.\\nUnder a prior topic it was stated that rights may be re-\\nduced to three, a right to life, a right to liberty, and a right\\nto property. In refined codes the penalties correspond, con-\\nsisting exclusively in deprivation of life, or of liberty by\\nimprisonment, or of property by fines, damages or confisca-\\ntion. Flogging has been generally abolished. Restitution,\\nor else compensation, is enforced when practicable, but is\\nnot punishment; hence damages are added. Punishment,\\nthen, is practically the taking away of that the right to which\\nhas been forfeited by trespass, by a transgression of the bounds\\nset by personal relations to personal liberty. Moreover it\\nwas pointed out that the three kinds of rights may be re-\\nduced to one, the right to liberty in the gratification of nor-\\nmal desires. Hence it appears that as all offenses are\\nunwarranted interferences in liberty, so all legitimate pen-\\nalties are warranted interferences in liberty.", "height": "3704", "width": "2448", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "48 OBLIGATION\\n36. Pain is the correlate of restrained or constrained\\nenergy. Each of our powers tends spontaneously, that is,\\nof its own proper nature, without strain, to put forth a defi-\\nnite quantity of free activity. If this amount be realized,\\nthere is pleasure if less, the energy being repressed, or if\\nmore, the energy being overwrought, there is pain. Thus\\nall pleasure arises from the free natural play of our faculties\\nall pain, from their restraint or constraint. The normal is\\npleasurable, the abnormal painful.\\nNaturally we have an inclination to pleasure, and an aver-\\nsion to pain. A desire for pain, simply for its own sake, is\\na psychological impossibility. This constitutional aversion\\nto pain impells one constantly away from abnormal extremes\\ntoward an intermediate normal condition, while the co-operat-\\ning constitutional inclination to pleasure constantly draws\\none, like a pendulum, toward the same golden mean of mod-\\neration and harmonious order.\\nAll trespass, being an interference in natural spontaneous\\nliberty of action, gives pain. All legal penalty, for the same\\nreason, is the infliction of pain rarely in like manner, but\\nalways, if adequate, graduated to correspond in measure with\\nthe degree of trespass, and limited to the pain of repression.\\nMore widely, all sanctions of the moral law, innate or enacted,\\nnatural or artificial, are essentially the same, depending for\\ntheir efficacy on the same element all rewards are pleasures,\\nall punishments pains. These are the natural attraction and\\nrepulsion in the spiritual sphere, tending to maintain a uni-\\nversal equilibrium, and to restore it when disturbed.\\nIt was a mooted question among the ancients whether pain\\nis an evil, and to-day it is still a question. When we con-\\nsider its influence in the preservation of our powers of body\\nand mind, averting the ruinous effects of excess on the one\\nhand, and of inaction on the other; when we observe the\\nworking of the whip of pain in the world of sentient beings,", "height": "3768", "width": "2468", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "SANCTIONS 49\\ntending constantly to harmonize their mutual interests, and\\nadjust their actual relations to the moral order of the uni-\\nverse in a stream of tendency that makes for righteous-\\nness it seems not merely unreasonable to account pain an\\nevil, but that it should be reckoned essential to welfare,\\nreckoned, along with the highest good, essential in the well\\nordering of a world of free activity.\\nThis is the sanction by which the Divine Ruler of the Uni-\\nverse upholds his government against trespass. We instinct-\\nively revolt at the thought that the Deity is the author of\\nsin, the source and sum of evil. But that he is the author\\nof pain cannot be doubted, and is entirely accordant with\\nthe infinite benevolence that proposes and actively seeks to\\naccomplish the highest welfare of humanity.", "height": "3732", "width": "2440", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "50 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER VI\\nRIGHT AND WRONG\\n37. The substantive notions of a right and a wrong, used\\nhitherto, need now to be supplemented by the corresponding\\nqualifying notions of right and wrong.\\nA right is accorded in law; right is according to law.\\nRight lines are straight lines we draw them by means of a\\nrule or ruler. So in the ethical sense, right actions are such\\nas conform to rules of conduct, implying a ruler. More\\ngenerally, they are those conforming to the moral law, any\\ndeviation from strict rectitude being wrong.\\nThe terms a right and right are, in last analysis, coexten-\\nsive. Whatever one has a right to do is right for him to do.\\nThis seems obvious. Yet it is commonly supposed that ex-\\nceptions often occur, and even moralists have taught that a\\nman may have a right to do what is not right. A planter, it\\nis said, has a right to destroy his crop, but it would not be\\nright. This paradox cannot be allowed. It arises perhaps\\nfrom the false notion that one has a moral right to do what-\\never is not forbidden by civil law, which is mere legality, not\\nmorality. The true limitations of rights are not found in\\ncivil law, nor in enactments of any sort, but in the nature\\nand relations of men, which the most elaborate enactments\\nfall far short of denning completely. A producer destroying\\na product of any value, an heir wasting his inheritance, an\\nidler not exercising his ability, is wronging or trespassing on\\nrights of others naturally vested in these things. In the\\nproper ethical sense a right to do a wrong, or to do wrong,\\nis absurd.", "height": "3768", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "EIGHT AND WRONG 51\\nConversely, whatever is right for one to do he has a right\\nto do any interference by any other is a trespass. For, if\\nit be not right, it is wrong, these being contradictories and\\nin doing wrong one always inflicts a wrong, greater or less,\\nnear or remote, on some one affected by his act which, if not\\npunishable, is at least censurable. Hence the terms are co-\\nextensive.\\nA moral right, or simply a right should be distinguished\\nfrom a legal or jural right. The one is generic, the other\\nspecific. The one is accorded in universal moral law, the\\nother is accorded in imperfect and exceptional civil law.\\nA right properly implies both exemption from legitimate\\ninterference in its exercise and an obligation to exercise\\nit whereas a jural right implies immunity merely, not obli-\\ngation. Hence the unqualified term leads to confusion.\\nSometimes indeed there is formal opposition between moral\\nand legal rights, for occasionally unrighteous laws are enacted,\\ntechnically conferring rights that are immoral, authorizing\\nwrongs. A moral right to act is an obligation to act, which\\nis synonymous with right action.\\n38. Right or wrong is the moral quality of a voluntary\\npersonal action. As propositions are always either true or\\nfalse, so actions are always either right or wrong. A true\\nproposition accords with axiomatic logical principle, and a\\nright action accords with axiomatic moral principle. As one\\nof two contradictory propositions must be false or logically\\nabsurd, so one of two incompatible actions must be wrong or\\nmorally absurd. An action that is wrong is a moral self-\\ncontradiction, inconsistent with what may be known to be\\nright or in accord with axiomatic law, and thus is a self-\\ncondemned absurdity.\\nIt has already been stated that on the empirical occasion\\nof a voluntary personal action, we have an intuitive discern-", "height": "3716", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "52 OBLIGATION\\nment by conscience of the existence in it of moral quality,\\nwe discern that it is either right or wrong. But whether\\nthe observed action, as striking a blow, be right or be wrong,\\nis not at all intuitive, not at all discerned immediately by the\\npure practical reason or conscience. Which one of these\\ntwo contrary qualities it has, conscience does not know; it\\nknows only that it must have one or the other.\\nFor evidently the notions of right and wrong imply ac-\\ncord and discord with some general principle requiring all\\nvoluntary activity or personal conduct to conform uniformly\\nto its indications. Hence every case must be subsumed\\nunder that principle in order to ascertain which one of the\\ntwo qualities is predicable of it. This is a logical process.\\nIt is not a discernment of pure reason, but is a reasoning\\nnot conscience, but inference.\\nThe logical process concluding the moral quality in a given\\ncase, is very liable to error. The specific action in which\\nthe moral quality inheres is, as we shall immediately show,\\nsubjective, internal in the agent. Now, when one judges\\nhis own act, though it is open to his direct observation by\\nintrospective self-examination, still, from a lack of clear dis-\\ncernment of the primary principle, or from a lack of logical\\nskill in making the deduction, or from carelessness, he often\\nerrs. Much more is one liable to err when judging the act\\nof another person. For the subjective movement of another\\nis beyond one s observation, and can be known only by his\\nconfessions, his professions, or by his outward perceptible\\nmovements, these together with circumstances being signs\\nfrom which the internal act is inferred. This additional in-\\nference greatly increases the uncertainty of the conclusion,\\nand warns against hasty judgment.\\n39. What is the specific action of which the moral qual-\\nity is a property In other words, what is the distinct and", "height": "3764", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 53\\ninforming fact wherein conscience discerns obligatory moral\\nquality, and whereon we pass discriminating moral judgment\\nIt is to be premised that no fact of causation has moral\\nquality. Whatever is caused is necessitated by its cause to\\nbe just what it is. There is no alternative. Moreover, by\\nthe axiom of uniformity, that like causes have like effects,\\nthere is no variation in effects, if there be none in their\\ncauses. This is the realm of necessity. It is opposed to\\nthe realm of freedom, wherein alone moral quality finds\\nplace for freedom must be allowed as conditio sine qua non\\nof moral action. Only beings having free will are morally\\nresponsible, and among these only such persons as are con-\\nscious of moral obligation.\\nOutward physical or muscular action, therefore, has in\\nitself no moral quality, not even that outward action com-\\nmonly called voluntary. For the movement of the muscles\\nis due to physical causes originating in the brain, and this\\nbrain action causing muscular motion is itself caused by ante-\\ncedent mental action. Hence only to mental action can\\nmoral quality be immediately attributed.\\nThe exercise of conscience discerning moral quality, for\\nlike reason, has in itself no moral quality it is neither right\\nnor wrong. Knowledge of right and wrong, and of the dis-\\ntinction between them, arises on the presentation of a per-\\nsonal action, which empirical occasion is a condition precedent.\\nMoreover, conscience can never have the quality imported\\ninto it for its exercise is originally and essentially involun-\\ntary, the discernment intuitively necessary. The same is\\ntrue of all pure intuitions.\\nAll empirical intuitions, as the sense-perceptions, are like-\\nwise destitute in themselves of moral quality, since they are\\nthe involuntary products of our constitution in the presence\\n\u00c2\u00a9f causative objects.\\nThe exercise of the logical faculty, even in case of moral", "height": "3720", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "54 OBLIGATION\\njudgment, has no moral quality in itself, for it is an effect of\\nvoluntary attention.\\nThe like consideration sets aside, not only all presentations\\nand the representations of thought, but also the representa-\\ntions of mediate perception, memory and imagination, together\\nwith the feelings and desires that attend them. All these are\\nstrictly effects, and therefore destitute in themselves of moral\\nquality.\\n40. Consequently, in our search for the activity which\\nhas moral quality in itself, we are shut up to the volitions.\\nVolition has three constitutive elements, choice, intention,\\neffort.\\nThis last, the effort, which is voluntary attention, is caused\\nby the motive, the desire that prevails, without alternative.\\nHence the effort is a necessitated act, and so without moral\\nquality, in itself neither right nor wrong.\\nThe first element, the choice, viewed simply as an act\\napart from its specific character, is also causally necessitated\\nto take place or occur by the mere presentation of possible\\nalternatives I must choose between them. Hence the simple\\nact of choosing is in itself destitute of moral quality.\\nBut the choice of one alternative rather than the other,\\nthe taking this rather than that, is a fact uncaused, not neces-\\nsitated, free for herein is the specific characteristic and the\\nvery essence of choice. In its resolution choice becomes\\nintention, the intention to do or forbear a certain action.\\nThis central fact, the only fact in human nature or in nature\\nat large that is not caused to be what it is, this resolution,\\nthis intention, purpose, design, this alone is capable of inhe-\\nrent moral quality.\\nAn intention, though not causally determined, is rationally\\ndetermined, is in accord with some one or more reasons.\\nNow the moral law furnishes a reason naturally and therefore", "height": "3732", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "EIGHT AND WRONG 55\\nrightly dominating all others, and since it is the intention\\nonly that intelligently, impellingly, freely, preferably, con-\\nforms to or disregards moral law, it follows that the intention\\nproperly has moral quality, is either right or wrong.\\nMoreover, since the all-dominating moral law, the ultimate\\nand absolute criterion of conduct, is addressed directly and\\nexclusively to choice becoming intention, it follows that the\\nintention is never morally indifferent, is always either right\\nor wrong; right, when it intelligently, reverently and will-\\ningly conforms to the law wrong, when it knowingly violates\\nor merely disregards the law.\\nFrom these considerations it is manifest that the moral\\nlaw applies, not directly to the outward, expressed, objective\\nactivity, but primarily and immediately to the inward, ante-\\ncedent, subjective intention. Hence, if we regard a trespass\\nas an action passing over from one person onto another, a\\nrealization of an intention inflicting injury, the formula of\\nthe moral law should be Thou shalt not intend to do aught\\nthat would involve a trespass. It will be better, however, to\\nregard a trespass as the total activity, including both the\\nsubjective antecedents and the objective consequents, the\\nmoral quality of this total residing in the intention.\\n41. That moral quality is thus a constant property of\\nintention requires some further consideration, especially of\\nthe distinction between the intention to do an act and the\\nulterior intention with which it is done or the purpose.\\nThere is a large class of offenses varying in degree from\\nextreme criminality to comparatively slight culpability, such\\nas murder, stealing, lying, betting, whose very essence is\\ntrespass. Hence the intentional doing of an action of this\\nclass is wrong; or, more closely, the intention to do it is\\nwrong, wrong in itself, being a radical violation of the law of\\ntrespass. Complete, successful action is not requisite to", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "56 OBLIGATION\\nconstitute guilt. An attempt, an overt act, though it fail, is\\nevidence of guilty intention, and therefore condemnable as\\nin the murderous contrivance of Guy Fawkes, and in the\\nvillainous slander of Don John. A mere intention to do\\nthe deed, an intention that, perhaps for want of opportunity,\\nnever passes into overt action, is already a culpable violation\\nof the law. Now what is essentially wrong can never become\\nright, for this would be a contradiction. Hence any of this\\nclass of intents can never be justified by an ulterior end,\\nhowever good, wise, benevolent this may be. No end can\\nsanctify such means. We may never do evil that good may\\ncome.\\nConversely, what is essentially right can never become\\nwrong. The intention to do an act that is right in itself\\nalone considered cannot be vitiated by an ulterior purpose,\\nhowever vicious this may be. Shylock did a righteous act in\\nthe loan of the ducats it was his ulterior purpose that was\\nwicked.\\nThere is another class of intents that, in themselves alone\\nconsidered, have no moral quality; as an intent to give\\nmoney, to take a walk, to write a letter, and very many oth-\\ners. Such are usually spoken of as morally indifferent. But\\nan intent of this sort, being properly of a means to an end,\\nhas the moral quality of the intended end imputed to it in\\nother words, the proposed end sanctifies or vilifies the pro-\\nposed means, this becoming right or wrong according to the\\nultimate purpose, or the intention with which it is done. If\\nI propose to give money, which intent in itself has no moral\\nquality, with the further intent to relieve distress, the intent\\nto give becomes right if to buy votes, it becomes wrong.\\nSo the intended means takes its moral color from the in-\\ntended end for the intention in such case is to be judged\\nin its totality, not in its dependent parts it is dyed through-\\nout with a uniform hue.", "height": "3732", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 57\\n42. The principle that moral quality is imputed to acts\\nwhich in themselves have none, is of wider application.\\nLet us recall the fundamental fact in human nature that\\na free will is the primary condition of moral activity, is the\\ncentral essence of personality, and is most nearly identical\\nwith the ego, is I myself. To it alone of my powers, that is\\nto me myself, the mandate of the moral law is addressed,\\nsince by it alone am I able to direct my powers. For the\\nfunctional property of will is to control, according to its\\nfreely formed intention, by means of attention, directly or\\nindirectly, all other elements of personality, as cognitions,\\nfeelings, desires and muscular motions, awaking or stimu-\\nlating or repressing their activity; and its obligation is to\\nexert this control according to the supreme moral law.\\nThe mastery of the representative cognitions, of mediate\\nperception, memory, imagination and thought, is immedi-\\ndiately accomplished by directing attention to this or that\\nobject as one may choose. They thus have moral quality\\nimported into them, or imputed or attributed to them, accord-\\ning to the intention. For the effort of attention is a passing\\nfrom the sphere of freedom into the sphere of causation or\\nnecessity, and what shall take place in this sphere, being\\ndetermined by the freely formed intention, is marked by\\nthe moral quality of the determinant, becomes essentially\\nright or wrong by imputation. I am morally obligated, for\\ninstance, to exert and regulate my logical faculty in search\\nfor truth, its proper object, especially for such truth as bears\\nupon conduct, lest an error lead to trespass. The moral\\njudgment, by inference from the moral principle, thus dis-\\ncovers reasons determining intentional conduct, and so is\\nobligated, through the will, to a most patient and vigorous\\nexercise, which is also, because of this obligation, a righteous\\nexercise. Neglect of the obligation, or failure to fulfill it,\\nrenders us responsible for our avoidable errors and their con-\\nsequences.", "height": "3728", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "58 OBLIGATION\\nInasmuch as feeling is correlated with knowing, our emo-\\ntions and sentiments are subject to indirect yet efficient con-\\ntrol by means of the direct control of the cognitions with\\nwhich they coordinately cooperate. For, since we can at\\nwill directly transfer attention from object to object, we are\\nable thus indirectly to induce or repress the feelings that\\nattend contemplation. These, therefore, have moral quality\\nimputed to them, those that are normal or orderly being\\nright, those that are abnormal or disorderly either in kind or\\nin degree being wrong. They can and should be controlled,\\nregulated, well-ordered. Because of its vast importance, let\\nbelief be instanced. It is the feeling of conviction, the assur-\\nance of physical or moral certainty that attends or is correla-\\ntive to the recognition of truth. Its opposites are the\\nfeelings of doubt and disbelief. Now obviously, so far as\\nwe are under obligation to search out attainable truth, thus\\nbecoming responsible for our ignorance of what we could and\\nshould know, just so far are we bound to believe and are\\nresponsible for doubt or disbelief of attainable truth these,\\nindeed, being merely correlative statements. Hence we can\\nbe and are reasonably commanded to believe authentic or\\naccessible truth the belief of it is right, the doubt or dis-\\nbelief is wrong.\\nLikewise desires have imputed moral quality. Desire is\\nconditioned on real or imaginary objects of cognition con-\\nsequently it comes and goes with their contemplation. Since\\nthis is under direct control, the desire can be effectively\\nthough indirectly regulated, and is right or wrong according\\nto the volition. But because desire directly solicits choice\\nand becomes the motive in effectuating the intention, it re-\\nceives moral quality in a marked degree. For example,\\ncovetousness, which may be taken as the type of abnormal\\ndesire, is forbidden in the law, Thou shalt not covet the\\nonly one of the Decalogue formally subjective. Thereby I", "height": "3760", "width": "2484", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "BIGHT AND WRONG 59\\nam commanded to suppress covetousness whenever it instinc-\\ntively or spontaneously appears, much more am I forbidden to\\nincite and cherish it. I am required to choose, intend and\\nenforce its cessation for it is abnormal and evil, tending to\\nobjective disorder and trespass. Therefore I do wrong to\\nallow it, and it becomes wrong by the allowance. Normal\\ndesires, which within their limits not only are right in them-\\nselves, but constitute the very basis of all human rights,\\nbecome abnormal and evil by degree, either when weakened\\nby inattention to their objects, or when immoderate and inor-\\ndinate by excess. They then become wrong, because I do\\nwrong in neglecting or failing to regulate them.\\nExternal activities, the movements of the voluntary mus-\\ncles, and their proximate consequences, are, for like reason,\\nright or wrong by imputation. It is only by an observation\\nof his overt acts that one s mental states, thus expressed, can\\nbe judged by other persons. Hence we correctly speak of\\ngood deeds, bad habits, and the reverse, and approve or cen-\\nsure them; but always with reference, though tacit, to the\\nsubjective intention.\\nIt is a weighty and impressive truth that, not only our out-\\nward conduct, but our innermost thoughts, imaginings, feel-\\nings and desires, all at all times, are made by their intentions\\nright or wrong that we are responsible, not only for every\\nidle word, but for every idle thought or wish and that in\\nthe perfected administration of moral government, all these\\nshall be brought into judgment. Who hath ears to hear, let\\nhim hear.\\n43. The many deeds that are essentially trespass, wrong\\nin themselves, are not known to be so intuitively, but only\\nby inference from the moral principle as an ultimate major\\npremise. Hence we are liable to error in judging them,\\nespecially in the less obvious cases. The error arises from", "height": "3732", "width": "2556", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "60 OBLIGATION\\nan obscure or confused apprehension of the ultimate princi-\\nple or law, or from an incomplete or inaccurate knowledge of\\nthe particular case subsumed, or from bad logic in making\\nthe deduction. Hence it sometimes happens that one sin-\\ncerely desiring to do right, having a motive and an ulterior\\npurpose that are right, honestly judging and believing that\\nwhat he is doing is right, may nevertheless be doing what is\\nwrong in itself, essentially, unalterably wrong.\\nAlso it is true that every man in all cases is morally bound\\nto do what in his best judgment seems to him to be right.\\nIn popular phraseology, he must obey his conscience is\\ndoing right, if he acts conscientiously is wrong, if he vio-\\nlate his conscience. Obviously it is implied that one should\\ncarefully exercise his best ability in judging a case, bringing\\nto bear upon it all the light attainable, unobscured by predi-\\nlection, repugnance or passion; then, having done this, he\\nmust conform his conduct to the result of his judgment. If\\ncircumstances require a prompt decision, without time for\\nclose consideration, then a habit of moral thought and a\\nfamiliarity with moral principles greatly enhance the proba-\\nbility of a correct decision; but in any case it is morally\\nnecessary that he intend and do what his moral judgment\\napproves otherwise he becomes a willful offender.\\nNow, putting this and that together, we have the moral\\nparadox, that one in doing what is wrong in itself may be\\ndoing right. This is an inevitable consequence of the imper-\\nfections of moral judgment. Othello was bound by high\\nprinciples of honor, as he understood them and the case, to\\ncommit uxoricide. The infanticide by the Hindu mother is\\nan act of piety. Saul as persecutor verily thought he was\\ndoing God service. Conversely, one in doing what is right\\nin itself may be doing wrong. A judge in granting a right-\\neous suit is doing what is right but if he do it merely to\\nescape annoyance or censure, or to entangle the plaintiff in\\nevil consequences, he is in the same act doing wrong.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "RIGHT AND WRONG 61\\nThis moral paradox involves imperfect persons in dreadful\\nresponsibilities. We are answerable not only for wrong be-\\nlieved to be wrong, but for wrong believed to be right, and\\nfor right believed to be wrong. Tis a strait and narrow\\nway. A legal maxim holds that Ignorantia juris non excusat\\nbut, in equity, ignorance or sincerity in a moral blunder pal-\\nliates, especially in a penitent, though it does not excuse, an\\noffense, and so becomes a ground for mercy by a mitigation\\nor a transfer of punishment. Naturally we do not shudder\\nat the crime of Othello, as we do at those of Macbeth. Saul\\nobtained forgiveness because of ignorance. Divine mercy\\ndictated the prayer: Father forgive them; for they know\\nnot what they do.", "height": "3732", "width": "2548", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "62 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER VII\\nJUSTICE\\n44. Thus far the moral law has been considered chiefly\\nas prohibiting aggressive and injurious acts or lines of action.\\nThe formula, Thou shalt not trespass, primarily forbids what-\\never unwarrantably interferes in another s liberty. Its cor-\\nrecting effect is to put a strong positive check upon the\\nhindering activities of related persons, to the end that every\\none may fully gratify his normal desires it restrains within\\nbounds the course of each, so that all others may freely exer-\\ncise their rightful license. This prohibitory sense is so obvi-\\nous and emphatic that many who are under the law conceive\\nthat by keeping within the prescribed bounds the demands\\nof the law are satisfied, that purity and innocence, which are\\nnegatives, fulfill its behest, that to forbear injurious aggres-\\nsion is the sum of obligation.\\nBut this is a very inadequate conception of the content of\\nthe law, a law enjoining an order of facts that ought to be\\nenjoining in the negative sense of forbidding one class, and\\nenjoining in the positive sense of requiring another class. It\\nlays upon us the injunction both to refrain and to perform.\\nIt says, Thou shalt not transgress stated bounds and by\\nnecessary implication, it also says Thou shalt do many things\\nwithin those bounds. This positive requisition is not less\\nobligatory than the prohibition, and it is merely because of\\nthe imperfection of language, unfitted to express both the\\npositive and negative aspects of one and the same thought\\nor mandate in a single simple formula, that the one is appar-\\nently more emphatic than the other.", "height": "3732", "width": "2540", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 63\\nThe necessary implication of active obligation is readily-\\nexplicated. Trespass is effected either by commission or by\\nomission. That the one is direct, the other indirect, is not a\\ndifference in essence, and either may be a wrong as heinous\\nand as fatal as the other. In the various relations of men,\\nevery one has rightful claims upon the activities of others,\\nand they who omit to fulfill these claims commit a wrong, a\\ntrespass. For, my willful omission of an act to which some\\nother has a right, is a violation of his right, is to leave him\\nunder a restraint of his rightful liberty, which restraint I\\nam bound to remove. To be merely negligent, heedless,\\nthoughtless, careless of another s right to my action, is to\\nembarrass him more or less, is to interfere indirectly in his\\nliberty, and thus is to trespass on him. Therefore, to him\\nthat knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin.\\nThe point here brought squarely to the front has been to\\nsome extent anticipated in several places. In what follows\\nwe shall give it full recognition, and allow its weight to\\nestablish the equilibrium between forbearing and doing, which\\nequilibrium a correct conception requires. Thus it will\\nappear that the law of trespass rightly interpreted applies\\nexhaustively to the relations of man to man, and is compre-\\nhensive of every phase of obligation.\\n45. The term justice is the abstract from the concrete\\nform just. To be just is to concede to everyone his rights\\nand justice is the concession of rights. This is the most\\ngeneral sense. When a right consists in a specific claim on\\nthe action or inaction of some one, the concession of a just\\nman implies his action or inaction in satisfaction of the claim.\\nAccordingly a distinction is sometimes laid down between\\njustitia interna, disposition to do right, and justitia externa,\\nrectitude of conduct. The opposite of justice is injustice,\\nwhich is to refuse or to neglect the concession, and of course", "height": "3732", "width": "2532", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "64 OBLIGATION\\nits actualization. Whoever is treated unjustly, be the injury\\ngreat or small, is thereby restrained, more or less, in his right-\\nful liberty to gratify some normal desire, which restraint is\\nessentially a trespass.\\nIndeed it is quite obvious that injustice is trespass, and\\ntrespass injustice and that the law forbidding trespass is a\\nlaw forbidding injustice. For, according to the moral princi-\\nple, every one has a right, if not trespassing, to gratify his\\nnormal desires .but it is impossible to have this gratification\\nin a multitude of cases except by concession of one s fel-\\nlows hence, if they withhold the concession, they disap-\\npoint his desires, and nullify his claims. For example, I\\nhave a right to the fulfillment of all formal contracts and of\\nall informal promises made to me, whether for money or ser-\\nvice, a right to the payment of all that is my due if the\\ndebtor refuse, or if any one hinder his payment, it is a tres-\\npass, an injustice. Also I have a right to acquire knowledge,\\nproperty, social position and if any one hinder my effort,\\nor neglect due help, he does me a wrong. Again, I have a\\nrightful claim on my fellows for a fair judgment on my char-\\nacter and conduct and to deny me the measure of honorable\\nesteem to which I am entitled is a gross injury to slander\\nme, one still more gross. Moreover, I am naturally a social\\nbeing and if, without warrant, my association with compan-\\nions is prevented or disconcerted, my right is infringed, I\\nsuffer a wrong, a trespass, an injustice. Thus injustice, or\\nits cognate injury, is as truly committed, indirectly, by with-\\nholding or perverting a right, as by directly inflicting damage.\\nAlso it is evident that to prohibit injustice is to command\\njustice. The sole difference is in the negative and positive\\nexpression of the same thing. The injunction, Thou shalt\\nnot trespass, is identical with the injunction, Be thou just.\\n46. Justice taken specifically, with reference to matters", "height": "3760", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 65\\ninvolving gain or loss, is subdivided into corrective and dis-\\ntributive justice.\\nCorrective justice is fairness in exchange, or honesty in a\\ngeneral sense. It is either voluntary, as in trade, in the\\nmarket, in commerce, in fulfilling contracts and promises, in\\npayment of debts, in remuneration for service rendered or\\nit is involuntary and rectoral, enforced by decrees of the\\ncourts in civil cases, as in the settlement of suits, the award\\nof damages, the reparation of illegal trespass.\\nDistributive justice is distinguished from corrective by not\\nincluding the notion of exchange. It is the proper partition\\nof possessions and honors among members of society. It\\ncorresponds to the notion of approbation or censure bestowed\\nin proportion to individual merit or demerit, to the award of\\nprizes, and of penalties in criminal cases. When a man s\\ncourse in life entitles him to the esteem of his fellows, and\\nto such outward honors as express their valuation of his\\nworth, distributive justice requires that these be accorded.\\nFrom the recipient of a benefaction it requires gratitude. It\\nis violated by excessive adulation or by slander even by a\\nsecret misjudging of another s worth. In case of overt in-\\nfraction of law it is satisfied rather than rectified by penalty.\\n47. Justice, in the narrow sense of legal justice, is\\nadministered by courts of law. The civil law, or else the\\ncommon law, and the statute law, which these courts apply\\nto cases, together with the forms by which their proceedings\\nare regulated and their decrees enforced, all have their imme-\\ndiate ground in the authority of the State, their ultimate\\nground in human rights, and all are specific reductions of the\\none law forbidding trespass, commanding justice. Jurispru-\\ndence, in general, is the science of rights as formulated and\\nsanctioned by governing powers. It is the science of enacted\\nlaw, investigating the principles common to all systems of", "height": "3704", "width": "2532", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "66 OBLIGATION\\nlaw. Morality enjoins obedience to the universal, natural\\nlaw, jus naturale, in all possible relations of men jurispru-\\ndence enjoins and exacts obedience to that law only in so far\\nas it is recognized and authorized in the enactments of the\\nState. Thus jurisprudence is a branch of ethics.\\nIt is clear, then, that law-makers do not originate obliga-\\ntions their office is merely to interpret and formulate the\\nobligations already existing, and to enact special sanctions.\\nAll laws, organic, municipal, military, international, all ordi-\\nnances, canons, edicts, decrees, treaties and arbitrations, have\\nthe same ultimate basis, the moral law they must be just\\nto be obligatory. Jussum quia justum est. If the law-making\\npower, or, more generally, the constituted authority, depart\\nfrom its function, and promulgate laws or ordinances at vari-\\nance with the one moral law, or for other ends than those of\\npublic and private justice, or in disregard of the original and\\ninalienable rights of the subject, then the enforcement of such\\nlaws and ordinances is unjust rule, is tyranny.\\nOne qualification is needful. If an unrighteous law be\\nnot intolerably oppressive, and does not induce or sanction\\nan immorality in the subject, then he is morally bound to\\nobey it for, since it emanates from constituted authority, a\\nrefusal to obey would be a trespass on the State through its\\naccredited agents. The remedy is a repeal of the law. But\\nif a law be so unjust as to be intolerable, then there is appeal\\nto the higher law, jus naturale, by one as by Hampden, or by\\nmany as by the English colonists in America. This is rebel-\\nlion, resulting perhaps in revolution.\\nThe laws enacted by any human government, however\\nthey may be elaborated and refined in the interest of thorough\\njustice, are nevertheless unavoidably inadequate and imper-\\nfect. They can effectually prohibit only the grosser forms of\\nwrong doing, and secure the practice of mutual justice only\\nin certain definite transactions, the vast majority of existing", "height": "3732", "width": "2464", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 67\\nobligations, many of the weightiest, being beyond the reach\\nof the courts. Moreover, in such cases as come under the\\nlaws, and of which the courts of law take cognizance, it is\\nvery often difficult and sometimes impracticable to determine\\nand administer strict justice. Yet, notwithstanding these\\ninherent defects, the laws and the courts of law are the tense\\nwoof in the texture of social organization.\\n48. Very early in the progress of civilization the prac-\\ntice of equity arose as a complementary extension of legality.\\nThe ancients, in measuring building material of irregular\\nsurface, used a flexible leaden rule. Equity, like a leaden\\nrule, bends to the specialities of each case, while the iron\\nrule of enacted law is inflexible. Circumstances alter cases,\\nand law rigidly applied may work injustice. Summum jus,\\nsumma injuria. Laws are expressed in general terms, and\\nbeing framed with reference to ordinary cases, it often hap-\\npens that the actual cases involve matter beyond their scope.\\nMoreover, there are many matters requiring adjudication for\\nwhich the laws make no provision. It is the part of equity\\nto supply such deficiencies by special action. Thence have\\narisen courts of equity or courts of chancery, distinguishable\\nfrom courts of law. The decisions of a judge in equity are\\nregulated, when there is no binding precedent or statute, by\\nreference to the original principles of justice which give rise\\nto enacted laws hence his decisions are a species of legisla-\\ntion, judicial legislation. In the development and refinement\\nof common and statute law, many of the approved decisions\\nin equity have become incorporated in those systems and\\nequity itself, being more and more determined by precedent,\\nhas become assimilated to the common law. Hence in many\\nof our States there is a fusion of official function, the same\\ncourt, sometimes on the same case, sitting now in law, now\\nin equity.", "height": "3716", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "68 OBLIGATION\\nCasting off these limitations of its technical and juridical\\nsense, the exercise of equity in the common intercourse of\\nmen is the doing what is equal, fair and right. It is the\\nequitable between man and man, grounded on equal subjec-\\ntion to moral law or equality of rights among men, whether\\nformulated in contracts, or existing in their merely natural\\nrelations. The distinction between equity in this general\\nsense and the justice administered by the courts, that is,\\nbetween the claims of human charity or natural justice and\\nthe claims of legal justice, corresponds nearly with the dis-\\ntinction between imperfect and perfect rights a distinction,\\nhowever, that is merely practical, not essential. Equity, in\\nits wide sense, and natural justice are coextensive, and both\\nare synonymous with right etymologically, the opposite of\\njustice is injury, of equity iniquity. The notion of equity\\nand justice limited to jurisprudence, is a narrow and inade-\\nquate view bounded by a rugged horizon but in their large\\nand proper meaning they expand over the whole sphere of\\nobligation, and are equivalent to rectitude and righteousness.\\n49. Mercy is righteous forbearance toward an offender.\\nIt implies kindness or gentleness, and is prompted by pity\\nor compassion. These feelings, when intense, are apt to\\ninduce a sentimental aversion to the claims of strict justice.\\nHence mercy is popularly supposed to be in opposition to\\njustice, implying a disposition to overlook injury, and to mit-\\nigate or even wholly remit the penalty that sanctions the\\nlaw. Such displacement of justice is not righteous forbear-\\nance, and so is not true mercy, but a weak indulgence of\\nwrong that upholds license and works injustice. True mercy\\nforbears, whatever legal forms may allow, to exceed or to\\nabate the claims of natural justice.\\nEvery man is necessarily a judge, not only of his own\\nactions, but also of those of his fellows. Whether his judg-", "height": "3732", "width": "2464", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "JUSTICE 69\\nment find utterance in words and deeds of requital or not, he\\nis bound to be just. Any excess of severity is injustice to\\nthe subject; any abatement of righteous rigor is injustice\\nto society whose welfare is involved in the right judgment of\\nits members. Mercy is shown in forbearing to do or even to\\nthink what is not strictly just.\\nThe judge on the bench must be just. Usually, by the\\nvery terms of the law which he is set to administer, he has a\\nmeasure of discretion but he must not transgress its sharply\\ndefined bounds, and within these he is to use discretion, not\\nlicense. The range is allowed, not for the play of pity or of\\nresentment, but in order that he may mercifully adjust his\\ndecree to the peculiarities of a case. Too great severity is\\ninjustice to a party present; too great leniency is injustice\\nto society whose interest he is empowered to guard. Judicial\\nmercy secures a righteous forbearance of trespass on either,\\nthus not merely coexisting but coinciding with strict justice.\\nThe criminal law is merciful in holding the accused innocent\\nuntil proved guilty, and in giving him the benefit of doubt\\nwhich is but just. With a chief executive or sovereign is\\nlodged a pardoning power. This prerogative of clemency is\\nnot for sentimental exercise, but for the equitable adjustment\\nof penal desert and general welfare. It is mercy, but also it\\nis justice.\\nShall not the judge of all the earth do right Justice and\\njudgment are the habitation of his throne, mercy and truth\\ngo before his face. He is long-suffering and of great mercy,\\nforgiving iniquity and transgression, yet in no case clearing\\nthe guilty. Justice, no less than mercy, is an essential attri-\\nbute to God. He, as absolute sovereign, decrees unbounded\\nmercy to the penitent, and vindicates the claim of immutable\\njustice by a vicarious sacrifice. Such is the Christian scheme\\nsuch is divine mercy.", "height": "3720", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "70 OBLIGATION\\nCHAPTER VIII\\nDUTY AND VIRTUE\\n50. The obligations, both active and passive, laid upon\\nus in the moral law are duties. Duty is the name of a rela-\\ntion, and so requires two terms. Every duty is because of\\nsomething due from one person to another. It is the rela-\\ntion of debtor to creditor. Honesty, honor requires the pay-\\nment of debt. The commercial meaning of dues or debts is\\nmerely a specific application of the essential sense inherent\\nin these terms in their general application to every phase of\\nhuman obligation.\\nTo withhold what is due another is a violation of his\\nright, is an unwarranted interference in his liberty of action,\\nis a trespass, and is forbidden by the moral law. But to\\nforbid non-payment is to command payment. Pay thy dues.\\nOwe no man anything. We must pay what we owe. We\\nought to render to every man his own, that is, what we owe\\nhim. These are but varied expressions of the one injunc-\\ntion, Trespass not, Be thou just, Do thy duty. Ethics may\\nfairly be defined as the science of duty.\\n51. Right and duty are coextensive, merely different\\naspects of the same notion. Right belongs to the action,\\nand is conformity to law. Duty belongs to the agent, and\\nis subjection to law. Hence they imply each other. That\\nwhatever is duty is right, is quite evident. That whatever\\nis right is duty, is readily seen. For, each case as it arises\\nis subsumed under the law, or under rules, maxims of con-\\nduct, deduced from the law, and a conclusion is drawn as to", "height": "3732", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "DUTY AND YIBTTJE 71\\nwhat is right, what ought to be done. Now from given\\npremises, if the terms be unambiguous and the reasoning\\ncorrect, only one conclusion can follow, certainly not two or\\nmore essentially different. Therefore, in every conceivable\\nsituation there is for the moment one and only one course\\nthat is right and this action alone being right it ought or\\nowes to be done. When an action is clearly conceived to be\\nright, that action and that alone is duty.\\nIt is a corollary that duty is but another name for obliga-\\ntion, whose measure is found in the full application of the\\nwhole law to the whole life. Also it follows that duties\\nnever conflict. Often we are confused and in doubt as to\\nthe particular obligation, but of two possible acts, one being\\nright, the other is wrong. There is no divided duty.\\nMoreover, it is wrong, ex vi termini, to do less than one\\nought to do also it is wrong to do more for this is an ex-\\npenditure that is due elsewhere for example, to overpay a\\nbill. Sometimes one ought to do all he can; he is never\\nbound to do more, but frequently less.\\nThe essential identity of justice and right, and of injustice\\nand trespass, has already been indicated. Hence it suffi-\\nciently appears that, right and duty being equivalent, justice\\nand duty are likewise equivalent terms. In a didactic treat-\\nment of ethics, it is far less important to mark the shades of\\ndistinction among these synonymous terms, a right, right,\\njustice, equity, mercy, obligation, duty, than it is to show\\ndistinctly that, as to their essence, they are one and the same,\\nand that a violation of any one is a wrong, an injustice, a\\ntrespass.\\n52. An action conforming to moral law is a virtuous\\naction. This qualification implies a contrary inclination\\novercome by will. It is the doing of justice, the perform-\\nance of duty, in a particular case, wherein the agent was", "height": "3732", "width": "2520", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "72 OBLIGATION\\ntempted to disregard obligation by an opposed desire, against\\nwhich there was a voluntary struggle ending in its subjec-\\ntion. A virtuous person is one with whom the voluntary\\nsuppression of wrong desire is habitual, he subjecting him-\\nself uniformly to the law of duty, and thus molding his\\ncharacter anew. Under the law of habit, that our faculties\\nacquire f acility and strength by exercise, the righteous desires\\nof the virtuous person prevail more and more uniformly,\\nwhile their opposites, denied the nourishment of gratifica-\\ntion, become weaker and suffer atrophy until, finally, when\\nand although all conflict, all struggle, has ceased, the victor,\\nbecause of his victory, is dubbed a perfectly virtuous person.\\nThe abstract name of this mark is virtue. In general,\\nvirtue is the conformity of will to the law discerned by prac-\\ntical reason or conscience. This definition implies that all\\nsubjective activities are regulated, duly coordinated and sub-\\nordinated, so that each fulfills its normal function thus\\nenabling objective activities to attain their highest efficiency.\\nPrimarily it indicates the subjection of the craving to the\\ngiving desires secondarily, the bringing of the members of\\neach class into harmonious cooperation. Otherwise there is\\na continual strife, the lust of the flesh against the spirit and\\ndisorderly preferences of each, that is incompatible with per-\\nfected virtue. Such entire harmony is perhaps an unattainable\\nideal, but in human nature there is a native impulse toward\\nit, and an ability to approximate it. Virtue, then, is a pro-\\nficiency in willing what is conformed to practical reason,\\ndeveloped from the state of natural potentiality by practical\\naction.\\n53. The cardinal virtues, as commonly listed, are forti-\\ntude, prudence, temperance and justice. The distribution\\noriginated with the Greek philosophers, and still holds in\\nmodern literature. They are called cardinal, because the", "height": "3768", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "BUTT AND VIBTUE 73\\nspecific virtues hinge on them, and indeed they seem to be\\nconditions rather than kinds of virtue. Each may be con-\\nsidered a fountain from which virtues flow. The Pythag-\\noreans and Plato regard fortitude, prudence and temperance\\ntogether as the source of justice, and justice as the genius of\\nall duty, of all virtue, the perfection of human nature and\\nof human society. With Aristotle also, justice is perfect\\nvirtue, yet not absolutely, but in reference to others. In\\nthis wide sense we have used the term justice, viewing it as\\nthe sum of all virtues, which are but variations upon its\\nessence, and are universally prescribed in the concrete com-\\nmandment, Be thou just.\\n54. The man who disregards moral law, or in whom the\\ndesire to do right is weak, passes, by frequently yielding to\\ntemptation, under the dominion of other desires. Especially\\nthe appetites are likely, by reckless indulgence, to acquire\\nabnormal vigor, and drive the weakened will helplessly into\\ngross excesses. The appetencies, in men of higher order,\\nmay take control, producing the refined voluptuary, the\\navaricious seeker after material wealth, the secluded scholar\\nabsorbed in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, or\\nthe unscrupulous ruler ambitious of irresponsible power.\\nThe will, whose function it is to regulate these constitutional\\npowers, restraining their exercise, and determining natural,\\nwhich is normal and moral order, forsakes this high office,\\nand becomes their servant. Thus the man is enslaved by\\nhis passions. His moral sense is deafened by their clamor,\\nhis actions are determined by their impelling energy, his\\nindependent self-mastery is lost, and his freedom is limited to\\na choice among contending masters and forms of obedience.\\nTo prevent or to escape from such degraded and deplora-\\nble condition, one must, by good-will working in the light of\\nconscience, bring all his powers into subjection to moral law.", "height": "3728", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "74 OBLIGATION\\nThis regulation will give play to the faculties in their natural\\nrelations and proportions, which is the essence of right action,\\nand will determine uniformity of fit conduct, which is moral\\norder, the order of facts that ought to be. Such virtuous\\nrectification secures peace, harmony, and the dignity of moral\\nexcellence.\\nThe virtue that brings our activities into due conformity\\nwith moral law is usually posited as the necessary condition\\nof soul-liberty, and perfected virtue is identified with per-\\nfected liberty. In surmounting his passions and inclinations,\\none becomes a freedman, a freeman and a master. The sage,\\nsaid the Stoics, feels but is without passion, he is not indul-\\ngent but just to himself and to others, he alone attains to\\nthe complete performance of duty, and thus he alone is free. 1\\nThis is the common doctrine of moralists at the present day,\\nand we are exhorted to the exercise of morality because of\\nthe worth of liberty.\\nThe liberty thus acquired is independence of unrighteous,\\ndiscordant and distracting rulers. The virtuous man is freed\\nfrom the dominion of overweening inclinations, of unholy\\nlusts and passions. It is an ideal state, exciting our admira-\\ntion and emulation. But this liberty is merely relative, not\\nabsolute. In breaking loose from subjective bondage, we\\npass under the objective bondage of law, an exchange of one\\nbondage for another. All language supports this view. We\\nare bound to do duty, obliged or under obligation to be just,\\nforbidden to trespass, and must submit to many pains in\\nfulfilling the demands of an inexorable law, constant vigi-\\nlance being the price of impunity. This is not liberty, but\\nrigorous bondage. It is a voluntary bondage, one that ex-\\npands and ennobles our powers, satisfies the all pervading\\nand overwhelming sense of duty, and harmonizes the man\\nwith himself and with universal order. Still it is bond-\\nage. Strict morality is strict subjection. Absolute liberty is\\nincompatible with law.", "height": "3764", "width": "2532", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 75\\nCHAPTER IX\\nSELFISHNESS\\n55. Names of mental states with the prefix self abound\\nin speech and literature. A few are, self-approbation, self-\\ncondemnation, self-denial, self-control, self-esteem, self-abhor-\\nrence, self-love. Many of this class of expressions probably\\nhave their origin in the fictitious idea of an alter ego. The\\nhuman mind subjectively distinguishes between the ego as\\nconscious and the ego as represented. The former, the con-\\nsciousness of self, is an element in every feeling, is essential\\nto the existence of any feeling, and is itself recognized as a\\nfeeling. The latter, the representation of self, is a normal\\nand habitual cognition, wherein the ego contemplates itself\\nas an object, distinguishes itself from itself, and views this\\nsubjective object as though it were really another self, an\\nalter ego. The idea of an alter ego is strengthened by a\\nconflict of desires the opposed impulses, being a pair, are\\npersonified as two selves. Moreover, the mind regards the\\nobjectified and personified self as a possession of the wholly\\nsubjective self, and capable of being affected by it, which\\nfinds expression in such familiar phrases as one s self, control\\nyourself, I hold myself responsible, and the like. The two\\nare identified in the phrases I myself, he himself, we our-\\nselves, they themselves.\\nThis distinction between the conscious ego and the repre-\\nsented ego, is unreal, inasmuch as it contravenes the essential\\nunity of the ego. Evidently, in thought it is a fiction, in\\nspeech a metaphor. Hence, although it is a natural, a normal", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "76 OBLIGATION\\nmode of mind, there is need of caution lest it mislead us to\\ncommit the fallacy of figure of speech.\\n56. The name self-love is commonly used to denote that\\nlonging for gratification which marks the craving desires\\nwhen their end is self. But love is essentially a desire to\\nbenefit some other one, and this is contrary to the benefit of\\nself. It necessarily implies a relation between two in self\\nthere is really and literally but one. The compound word\\nself-love is, therefore, a contradiction in terms, absurd literally,\\nand can be allowed only as a metaphor derived from the fan-\\nciful idea of an alter ego.\\nBut self-love is merely a misnomer, for the reality of the\\nthing thus absurdly named is unquestionable. It is self-\\ninterest, or simply interest, egoism, selfishness, the opposite\\nof love. For while love is desire to impart, interest is desire\\nto profit. Egoism makes self the end, seeking one s own\\nenjoyment and welfare at cost of or in disregard of another s.\\nPsychologically it is the supremacy of the craving desires,\\nthe appetites and appetencies, over the affections either dis-\\nregarding these, or neglecting their call, or what is worse, a\\nmore intense and refined egoism, making the affections sub-\\nserve self. Clearly the term self-love is a euphemism, filch-\\ning the name of love to sanctify what in truth is its contrary,\\ninterest, egoism, selfishness. That, however disguised, it is\\nto be condemned, will sufficiently appear in the sequel.\\nClosely related to the notion of self-love, is that of duty\\nto self. Can I literally owe myself anything? Can I owe\\nmyself a dollar How is it to be paid By passing it from\\none pocket to another Can I in any manner or measure be\\nindebted to myself Is anything due me from me Duty\\nis essentially the name of a relation between two I myself\\nam but one. I cannot possibly be in debt except to some\\nother one. Hence the phrase duty to self is, in its terms,", "height": "3772", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 77\\nself-contradictory and absurd. It, too, originates in the\\nfancied alter ego, to whom the ego is said to be indebted as\\nto another person. Clearly it is a metaphor, and deductions\\nfrom the generic law of duty to this as a species of duty\\ncommit the subtle fallaeia figurce dietionis. As in the phrase\\nlove of self, so in the phrase duty to self, we detect selfish-\\nness again masquerading, now in the guise and under the\\nsacred name of duty.\\n57. But aside from terms the important question arises\\nDoes not moral law command motives and actions that are\\nselfish, that is, such as find in self an end Moralists very\\ngenerally answer affirmatively, and recognize a wide and\\nweighty class of obligations terminating in self, having re-\\nspect exclusively to self, impelled by self-love, and usually\\nentitled duties to self. For example, they teach that every\\none owes it to himself to be temperate, that moderation, as\\nopposed to excess in all things, is a duty to one s self, for the\\nsake of one s own personality, and in order to self-culture.\\nPopular speech also quite commonly recognizes, and is dis-\\nposed to emphasize, duties to self, usually holding them para-\\nmount. It is heard in the every-day phrases, I owe it to my-\\nself, he was bound in justice to himself so to do, and the like.\\nPostponing for the present a direct argument of the ques-\\ntion, we here observe merely that, if a man be morally bound\\nin any case whatever to make himself an *end, or in other\\nwords, if there be any real thing answering to the lame\\nphrase duty to self, then the moral law as heretofore formu-\\nlated in this treatise is quite inadequate. For trespass\\nnecessarily implies at least two parties, and the given inter-\\npretation of duty and of justice, though very wide, presumes\\nalways a relation between two. Obviously, then, our view\\nof moral obligation, in its widest comprehension, does not\\ninclude the notion of duties to self, indeed it excludes self\\nas an end.", "height": "3712", "width": "2576", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "78 OBLIGATION\\nAnd truly there is no duty to self. In this case the phrase\\nis not merely a misnomer, for there is nothing corresponding\\nto it in any admissible sense. Self is never, can never be a\\nmoral end, but on the contrary, all selfishness or egoism is\\nviolation of moral law. Duties, obligations universally relate\\nto others, and selfishness is sin.\\n58. Let us briefly examine one or two of the duties usu-\\nally classed as duties to self, and indicate their altruistic\\ninterpretation.\\nTemperance, or the control of appetites and passions,\\nbringing them into conformity with reason, subjecting them\\nto moral law, is commonly cited as one of the most compre-\\nhensive and prominent duties to self. Is it my duty to be\\ntemperate Certainly. It is a cardinal virtue. Is it a duty\\nI owe to myself in order to the perfection of my character\\nIs it a discipline in the process of self-culture for the sake\\nof my personal excellence? Assuredly, say nearly all the\\nmoralists, both ancient and modern, it finds in self its end.\\nTo be temperate is a primal duty, a weighty obligation\\nbut it is strictly a duty, an obligation, to others. I owe to\\nGod, my maker and highest benefactor, to modulate into\\nharmony the powers he has given me, that I may fulfill the\\nmission on which he has sent me, and accomplish the work\\nhe has assigned me in the world. I ought to be temperate,\\nhusbanding my energies, that I may serve my family, my\\nneighbor, the community, the state, mankind, as fully and\\ncompletely as possible. Unless I be temperate, I cannot pay\\nthese dues. Moreover, I ought to be an example, in this\\ngolden mean, to my fellows, inclining them to its practice.\\nTemperance is one of the highest obligations. It is the top\\nround in the ladder of Christian graces. It ennobles. Still\\nit is due, not to self, but to those around.\\nThe pursuit of truth for the sake of truth is regarded as a", "height": "3732", "width": "2464", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 79\\nrefined and noble avocation. Knowledge for its own sake\\nis a high sounding phrase; but it is merely a euphemism\\nconcealing the reality, which is knowledge for one s own\\nsake, a refined selfishness. But the worth of knowledge is\\nin its power for good, and he who possesses it in large meas-\\nure is a king among men. Every one is in duty bound to\\nincrease his stores, solely that he may thereby more effi-\\nciently promote the welfare of the present and the coming\\ngenerations.\\nMuch the same may be said of the duty of preserving life\\nand health and strength. These belong not to me save in\\ntrust. They belong to my relatives and friends, to mankind.\\nI am a guardian and agent. So of the duty of physical,\\nmental and moral culture. I am bound to account with\\nusury for the talents intrusted to me. So of cleanliness,\\ndecency, modesty, propriety, in private as well as in public.\\nSo of the preservation of my personal dignity and self-respect,\\nof my honor, sincerity and truthfulness. Even the indul-\\ngence of innocent pleasures should be primarily for recrea-\\ntion, preparing me for renewed efficiency in paying my\\ndues. The supply of necessities should ever be governed\\nby the same general purpose, so that whether we eat or\\ndrink, or whatsoever we do, let all be done for others sake.\\n59. This doctrine is not ascetic, but altruistic. It trans-\\nfers the end of all right action from an exclusive self to its\\nfellows. All righteous conduct is disinterested, unselfish.\\nThe moral law, Trespass not, or Be just, or Do duty, is\\nequivalent to, Withhold no due, but bestow in due measure.\\nWe say in due measure, for not all giving is righteous; a\\nlavish or a disproportionate distribution of means or of ser-\\nvice is wrong, being an expenditure that is due elsewhere.\\nThe virtuous exercise of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, when\\nclearly understood, is not the giving up of what one has a", "height": "3708", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "80 OBLIGATION\\nright to retain and enjoy, but the yielding to another his due,\\ndischarging his rightful claim, according to him a right of\\nwhich he is perhaps quite ignorant. Truly it is a parting\\nwith what I might keep, but what I have no right to keep.\\nIt is free, unconstrained justice.\\nWhile the chief, indeed the only end of life is usefulness,\\nthe promotion of the welfare of those to whom some one is\\nrelated in accord with the relations, he is not thereby ex-\\ncluded from participating in the benefaction. The law, by\\nthis doctrine, forbids his making himself alone the end, and\\nrequires his regard and intent to be constantly beyond him-\\nself but it does not prohibit his sharing, as a member of a\\ncommunity of two or more, the welfare he promotes. It\\ndoes not require self-abnegation, nor entire self-forgetfulness,\\nbut that the inclination, the impulse, the motive and the\\nintention be altogether benevolent.\\nIt is a fact that in the judgment of mankind, for some rea-\\nson or other, the practice of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, the\\nexercise of affection, is held in high esteem, is accounted\\ngenerous, noble, even heroic, and receives the warmest praise\\nwhile, on the other hand, selfishness, exclusive or excessive\\nregard for one s own, is accounted ignoble, ungenerous, mean,\\nand is heartily condemned. Disinterested motives and con-\\nduct are always praised interested motives and conduct are\\nalways blamed. Why is this? Is it a delusion? Is it\\nmerely because when my neighbor works in his own interest,\\nI have less of his help in mine If so, then it is merely my\\nselfishness that prompts me to condemn his. Is there not\\nsome less degrading, some better reason for the universal\\ncondemnation of interested action, and the universal appro-\\nbation of disinterested service Surely there must be, for I\\njudge after this manner of the conduct of the ancients, whose\\nconduct cannot possibly affect me. Yet there is a school of\\nmoralists holding that disinterestedness is a delusion, that", "height": "3732", "width": "2472", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS\\n81\\nhuman nature is incapable of a purely disinterested action,\\nthat all conduct resolves, in the last analysis, into selfnseek-\\ning. It is undeniable that selfishness generally prevails and\\nis dominant. But let us distinguish between the actual and\\nthe potential, and heartily deny the impossibility of disinter-\\nestedness. Nay more, let us hold that purely disinterested\\nconduct has sometimes been actually experienced, and also\\nobserved, and that it is truly the culminating perfection, the\\nrealization of ideal humanity.\\n60. The thesis is presented in the following questions\\nWhy is it that the affections, the giving desires, have a right-\\nful supremacy over the appetites and appetencies, the craving\\ndesires Why is it that the moral law enjoins the practice\\nof affections, impulses to benefit others, and forbids the in-\\ndulgence of impulses craving a gain for self as an end The\\nreason lies deep in human nature.\\nLet it be granted that all constitutional desires have natu-\\nral and therefore rightful aims, and should harmonize, thus\\nsustaining each other in their normal functions. Also, that\\ncraving and giving are contraries, whence a conflict between\\nappetency and affection, which two therefore do not accord\\nbut are in constant and inevitable discord, unless one become\\nsubservient to the other. That our desires should be brought\\ninto functional harmony, will hardly be denied. That this\\nharmony can be attained only by the subservience of one or\\nthe other class, is evident. Which is entitled to supremacy\\nNow suppose affection be made to subserve interest. What\\nis the consequence The impulse to benefit another is ob-\\nscured under the impulse to benefit self. I treat my friend\\nwith apparent and professed affection, using the manner and\\nlanguage of friendship, my real intent being to obtain for\\nmyself a gain. Perhaps I indulge my generous impulses in\\norder to cultivate my generosity, a virtue I desire to possess", "height": "3720", "width": "2548", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "82 OBLIGATION\\nin myself. Evidently this is egoism or selfishness doubly re-\\nfined, and therefore doubly odious. I degrade my friend\\ninto a mere means for my own profit, and so dishonor and\\nwrong him. I do it under the form, and name, and profession\\nof love, when in reality it is the contrary, base, self-seeking\\nhypocrisy. If there be one character the most despicable of\\nall, it is the hypocrite, he whom our Lord denounces in his\\nmost scathing terms.\\nBut such procedure is something more than hypocrisy.\\nIt is the extinction of half of one s nature, of his affections.\\nFor, if I confer a benefit on my neighbor solely in order to\\nbenefit myself, this does not merely subject love to interest,\\nsince love is then no longer love, but simply interest. Love\\nhas ceased to be, and I am wholly, exclusively selfish. This\\nis not the subordination and subservience of affection to\\nappetency, but the complete suppression and extinction of\\naffection. A large part of the normal nature of the man dis-\\nappears, and he stands in opposition to all his fellows. It is\\nuniversal war every man s hand against every other. Surely\\nthis is not the way to personal excellence, to perfection of\\ncharacter. Surely this violates the law. It is amazing that\\nmany moralists should hold it obligatory to cultivate our\\naffections to the end that we may thereby perfect our own\\npersonality, thus advocating a principle which would result\\nin the extinction of affection, and produce a character abso-\\nlutely selfish.\\n61. Suppose, on the contrary, the craving desires be\\nmade subject to the affections. What follows? Are they\\nlikewise extinguished Not at all. It is easy to understand\\nhow my appetency may, without loss, be made to subserve\\nthe ends of affection, craving various objects, not for my own\\nsake as the end, but for the sake of those on whom I would\\nbestow my energies and gains. Thus I may seek pleasure as", "height": "3760", "width": "2464", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "SELFISHNESS 83\\na recreation, as a means of refreshing my powers for more\\nefficient service. I may strive, with great earnestness and\\nactivity, to acquire property and increase my wealth, not\\nfrom the miser s desire to possess, nor the voluptuary s desire\\nto enjoy, but in order that I may bestow on others the bene-\\nfits wealth commands, reserving for myself only such portion\\nas is needful for further beneficence. I may cultivate my\\nintellect, not for the sake of proficiency, but of efficiency.\\nFurther illustration is superfluous. But let us add, I may\\ndesire power in order to greater usefulness and I may desire\\nreputation, the esteem of my neighbors, or even fame, simply\\nbecause my influence in favor of the welfare of others is\\ntherein extended. Evidently the craving desires may crave\\nin order to give, that is, they may become entirely subject to\\nthe affections, and so far from being extinguished, they are\\nthereby refined and ennobled, and their activity enlarged.\\nWe conclude that, since the subjection of the affections\\nwould quench them, but the subjection of the appetencies\\nwould advance them, the affections have rightful supremacy.\\nFurthermore it follows that the right growth of character\\nconsists largely in this subjection of selfish propensities to\\nthe unselfish, and in so directing the former that they be no\\nlonger interested, but disinterested.\\nIf it be objected that there are occasions for the exercise\\nof affection, and other occasions for self-indulgence, the\\nanswer is easy. The claims of near relatives, of friends,\\nof neighbors, of country, of mankind, of God, upon my means\\nand energies, are paramount and exhaustive. Paramount,\\nbecause these are dues, debts, duties, to be paid before self-\\ngratification exhaustive, since the totality of a devoted life\\nfails to requite their righteous demands. Hence no hour, no\\ndollar is my own to spend upon myself alone, regardless of\\nmy overwhelming indebtedness, of my unremitting and end-\\nless obligations.", "height": "3712", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "84 OBLIGATION\\nIt must be allowed that the scheme of character and con-\\nduct here proposed, is ideal, a high ideal, unattained and\\nunattainable by any man. It calls for a declaration of truce-\\nless and internecine war upon selfishness. But selfishness so\\ninterpenetrates, in its many subtle forms and sacred guises,\\nthe human soul, interweaving its delicate fibers and gilded\\nthreads throughout our better nature, that to unravel and\\nwholly displace it seems impossible. The best of men, those\\nmorally most refined, are still more or less influenced by\\nselfish propensities, and occupied with self-seeking. But to\\napproximate, as nearly as may be, the moral ideal, is the true\\nstruggle of a noble life.", "height": "3732", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 85\\nCHAPTER X\\nSERVICE\\n62. The three expressions of the law already considered,\\nTrespass not, Be jnst, Do duty, upon a liberal yet fair inter-\\npretation, taking each in both its positive and its negative\\nsense, are evidently coextensive and have the same content.\\nThis will be allowed. But their common extension may per-\\nhaps be understood to be limited to the obligation to do no\\nharmful injury to another, either positively by direct aggres-\\nsion, or negatively by reserve of what he may justly demand.\\nPractically most persons take this view, holding that, if one\\ncommit no hurtful trespass, pay promptly his manifest dues,\\nbe just in thought and deed, by this simple innocence his\\nobligations are completely fulfilled. Many a man holds him-\\nself acquitted before the tribunal of his own moral judgment,\\nbefore that of his fellow men, and of his final judge, pro-\\nvided he can truly say he has committed no wrong, meaning\\nthereby that he has done no violence to patent rights, and\\nawarded to every one his established claims. This seems to\\nhave been substantially the doctrine of the Stoics. It is a\\nhigh estimate of duty, and one rarely accomplished. Never-\\ntheless, if the notion be thus limited, it is safe to affirm there\\nare obligations higher than duty. But the indicated limita-\\ntion is by no means clear, the line cannot be sharply drawn,\\nand hence it is better to extend the notion of duty to include\\nthese higher and wider obligations.\\nRecurring to the moral principle, a man* has a right to\\ngratify his normal desires, we observe that not merely the", "height": "3724", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "86 OBLIGATION\\nacquiescence, but the assistance, of his fellows, is essential\\nto this gratification. No man can live for himself alone.\\nApart from his natural longing for social intercourse, there\\nare necessities that can be supplied only by the concurrence\\nof those around, and in addition to necessities, there are many\\nnative and normal wants that require the cooperation of\\nothers. Here, then, is a just claim upon their assistance,\\nupon their service. It is his right, and if withheld, he suf-\\nfers trespass. The service cannot be compulsory, from lack\\nof power, except in rare cases, and therefore must be free,\\nwilling service. Now rights are reciprocal. If some one\\nhave a rightful claim upon some other for free service, then\\nthis other has a like claim upon him not, however, by way\\nof repayment, of compensation, but because such claim is\\noriginal with either. Hence no man may live for himself\\nalone. Every one is morally bound to render, within certain\\nlimits, willing service to his fellow men. It is due them\\nfree, willing service is duty.\\n63. The obligation to render mutual service is univer-\\nsally recognized among men. In all the relations of life, this\\nduty, though so imperfectly fulfilled and often grossly vio-\\nlated, is nevertheless judged by all to be binding on all, and\\nits observance to be an essential part of righteous living.\\nThe prompting of instinct, antecedent to moral inference, is\\ndecisive in the matter. Imagine an extreme case. Suppose\\nyourself standing on the brink of deep water in which a\\nstranger is drowning, and it needs only that you reach out\\nyour hand to save him. Ought not you to do it If you\\nwithhold the hand, and disregarding his cries for help and\\nhis manifest need, allow him to drown, would not your in-\\naction be instinctively self-condemned and condemned by all\\nas inhuman Suppose him to be your friend, or your only\\nbrother and, further, suppose that by letting him drown you", "height": "3732", "width": "2464", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 87\\nshall obtain the whole instead of half the inheritance would\\nnot even hesitation be intensely vile Ought not a man to\\nhelp his brother, his father, his mother, his child, his neigh-\\nbor, his fellow man There is but one answer in any candid\\nmind, but one among all cultured peoples.\\nAgain, let us suppose the drowning man to be known as a\\nworthless vagabond, or even as a dangerous criminal whose\\ndeath would be a blessed relief to his family, and to society\\nlet him drown? No. Is it to give him time to repent\\nand reform Hardly. Suppose him, on the contrary, to be\\na godly man, afflicted with painful incurable disease, a dis-\\ntressing burden to himself, and to everybody else let him\\ndrown? No. Stretch forth thy hand. Help, in the name\\nof common humanity. The obligation of helpfulness has no\\nother condition. It is binding in every personal relation.\\nSetting aside the differences in concrete cases, there remains\\nthe common, imperative principle Thou shalt serve.\\nWe have here another form of the law, but let it be ob-\\nserved, not another law. The law is one. The several forms\\nmay be viewed as progressing in comprehension, the second\\nincluding the first, but wider, and so on, until this last ex-\\npands to embrace the larger duty of man. That it includes\\nthe others is evident, for he who rightly serves will not\\ntrespass, and will pay his just dues. But it is preferable to\\ninterpret each as coextensive with the others, only presenting\\na different phase. Thus it may fairly be regarded as a tres-\\npass, as injustice, as undutiful to withhold helpful service,\\nthe moral law being comprised and expressed in the formula\\nServe thy fellows.\\n64. To serve is to promote the welfare of another. He\\nwho does this is a servant. The term as applied to menials\\nhas acquired rather a bad sense, especially when the service\\nis compulsory, and the cognate word servile is distinctly", "height": "3704", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "88 OBLIGATION\\nopprobrious. But no bad sense, indeed only the contrary,\\ncolors the notion of voluntary service, and of this we are\\nspeaking. To serve is to confer a benefit, and he who does\\nthis is a benefactor. A teacher is a servant, though we call\\nhim a master. He is a servant directly of his pupils, indi-\\nrectly of his employers, of the public, of posterity. Poli-\\nticians proclaim themselves servants of the people, which\\ntruly is their office, though the profession be insincere.\\nHusband and wife, parent and child, mutually subserve each\\nother s interests.\\nA servant is a minister, and this is a title of honor. Min-\\nisters of religion are servants of the Church, and as such are\\njustly honored and reverenced. To become a Minister of\\nState is to attain the highest official rank. The Prime Min-\\nister of Great Britain holds a place of exalted dignity. The\\nmotto of the Prince of Wales, descending to him from the\\nBlack Prince, is Hdj trim, I serve, and perhaps no heraldic\\ncognizance is more widely known, or more frequently quoted.\\nA king on his throne is rightly the servant of his subjects\\nand the very King of kings pronounced himself a lowly ser-\\nvant, coming not to be ministered unto but to minister, and\\nbecause of his humble service to humanity, he has the highest\\nthrone.\\nAll service implies sacrifice. In reaching forth my hand\\nto save a drowning brother, there is some expenditure of\\nmental and neural energy, perhaps not measurable, but real.\\nNo service can be rendered without sacrifice, without giving,\\nimparting what is in one s keeping. Hence the law of ser-\\nvice is a law of sacrifice. Culture, in general, is preparation\\nfor yielding a return specifically, as the cultured field is capa-\\nble of yielding fruits, so the cultivated man is one prepared,\\nby what he has acquired, to render services. When a sacri-\\nfice is complete and directed to a noble end, we call it heroic.\\nThe very essence of heroism is the entire sacrifice of self for", "height": "3732", "width": "2468", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 89\\nthe sake of others. It is the object of unbounded admiration\\nand praise. In ancient days it became distinctly a cult.\\nBut heroes and hero worship are not peculiar to antiquity,\\nfor always and everywhere the heart of humanity responds\\nto the call. The heroic sacrifice of the great servant of all\\nis commanding, not merely the admiration, but the adoration\\nof mankind.\\n65. The constant service demanded by moral law is not\\nto be indiscriminate. One is not to serve all others equally.\\nOur obligations to our fellows vary very greatly in extent.\\nTo near relatives we are bound for more service than to those\\nfurther removed first, because the possibilities are greater\\nsecondly, because service creates debt, and where intercourse\\nis intimate the exchange of benefactions is more frequent;\\nand thirdly, because in certain cases, as of husband and wife,\\nthe minute interdependence calls for minute reciprocation.\\nThe extent of obligation is to be judged by the law of tres-\\npass. My service is due to one in so far as I do not thereby\\ntrespass on the rightful claims of some other. I may, for\\nexample, distribute my fortune in alms so widely as to violate\\nthe rights of my children. Likewise I am bound to promote\\nthe general welfare of the state only in so far as I do not\\nthereby trespass on the rights of individual citizens, or of\\nneighboring states, either by encroachment, or by transferring\\nto either the service due to the other.\\nMoreover, it should be particularly observed that the alien\\nservice required does not preclude the agent from participat-\\ning in the benefit conferred. When a man labors for the\\nwelfare of his family without thinking of or caring for his\\nown individual profit, still, as a member of the family, he\\nshares in the beneficence. When one serves the community\\nor his country, either by promoting or by defending the com-\\nmon interests, it is evident that, since the interests are", "height": "3720", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "90 OBLIGATION\\ncommon, he thereby enlarges his own liberty, and guards his\\nown well being. If he does these things selfishly, himself\\nhis end, then he meanly degrades his family, his country, so\\nfar as in his power lies, to merely useful means which treat-\\nment is unworthy, is a trespass, whatever be the result. But\\nif, with no thought of his own interest or gain, he does those\\nthings unselfishly, making perhaps many painful personal\\nsacrifices, still he shares in the beneficial results, is repaid\\nand rewarded and even should his efforts fail, he neverthe-\\nless enjoys the satisfaction of disinterested intent. Moral\\nlaw does not prohibit any one from acting in a way that shall\\nbenefit himself, but only from thus acting in order that he\\nmay benefit himself.\\nThese modifying considerations forestall the criticism usu-\\nally and justly applied to strict altruism, that if every one\\nshould be constantly sacrificing his own welfare for that of\\nothers, there would be no permanent recipient of benefaction,\\nand the perfection of morality on this basis would be not\\nonly a universal disregard of welfare, but also its annihila-\\ntion. But according to the modified altruism of the present\\ntreatise, moral law does not call for such absolute self-sacri-\\nfice, for the extinction of the natural and healthful desire for\\none s own welfare. It forbids this only as a personal end\\nand the gratification of the desire is provided for, in the\\neconomy of human nature, by the community of interests, so\\nthat whatever promotes the welfare of another redounds to\\nthe benefactor; for, although, in the existing disorder of\\nsociety, the objective return fail entirely, still the subjective\\nsanction is abundant reward.\\n66. In view of the right to service arises the question,\\nin what manner and to what extent may one use another\\nperson. According to Kant, never as a means, but only as\\nan end. He says: The foundation of this principle is:", "height": "3768", "width": "2472", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 91\\nRational nature exists as an end in itself. Accordingly\\nthe practical imperative will be as follows So act as to treat\\nhumanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another,\\nin every case as an end withal, and never as a means only.\\nHe argues that to make use of another person as a means\\nwhereby to accomplish one s end, degrades him from a person\\ninto a mere thing, thus violating his dignity, his worth as a\\nman. Since this is to wrong him grievously, he should be\\ntreated only as an end in himself.\\nThe doctrine is striking, and with qualification it is true.\\nWe should never use another as a means, unless with his\\nown full knowledge and free consent. If, without this, I\\nmyself be used as a mere tool, then, on discovering it, I am\\nindignant, feeling I have been treated unworthily, degraded\\nand wronged, according to the measure of the abuse. But\\nwith the consensus of all parties, the using each other as\\nmeans to rightful ends is justifiable. Indeed, the greater part\\nof the amenities of life, the enjoyment and benefit of social\\nintercourse, kindness, politeness, could not otherwise exist.\\nSuch reciprocal use does not degrade, it ennobles; and by\\nconsenting to become an instrumental means, one becomes a\\nparticipant in beneficence. This privilege of using others is\\nlimited also to rightful ends. One may never seek to use\\nanother even with consent in a way or to an end that is\\nwrong for this would be inducing him to become a partner\\nin wrong doing, which would be doing him a wrong. The\\npoint in Kant s doctrine that I should make myself in mine\\nown person an end, we have previously rejected as the essence\\nof egoism. On the contrary, I ought ever and actively to\\nconstitute myself an intelligent and willing means to the\\nwelfare of others, which is altruism.\\n67. A very important corollary from the general doc-\\ntrine of obligatory service is stewardship. Since unintermit-", "height": "3720", "width": "2520", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "92 OBLIGATION\\nting service is due from each one to others, according to his\\nrelations, it follows that his time, his energy, his ability, his\\ncapital, his estate, whatever he may have in possession or\\nacquire, is in reality not his own, but the property of those\\nothers, and he himself is their steward. The transient in-\\nfluence one may have on his surroundings, his daily walk and\\nconversation, his health of mind and body, his life itself as\\nthe basis of all, these are held in trust, and are to be devoted\\nto the well being of his fellow men! They are the owners;\\nhe, their agent. All is due, all is debt, ever paying, never\\npaid. Not less is comprehended in the law of service.\\nWe are bound, as trustees, not merely for the keeping,\\nbut also for the increase, the accumulation of our holdings.\\nOne s talents, whether of gold, silver or iron, of brain, brawn,\\nbone, of intellect, sensibility, will, are all, whether great or\\nsmall, to be put to usury, and a strict account rendered.\\nThe servant who kept his Lord s pound laid up in a napkin\\nwas condemned as a wicked servant. Possessions are to be\\nused, and used rightly, imbursed and disbursed, as dictated\\nby the law of service, which demands a continuous distribu-\\ntion of our gifts.\\nA further corollary is the obligation to guard and to de-\\nfend possessions. Obviously one is bound to secure what is\\nintrusted to his keeping against all comers, otherwise he can-\\nnot fulfill the obligation to use it in alien service. Guardian-\\nship is itself a service, since it preserves for others their\\nproperty, which preservation is, indeed, a very necessary part\\nof the general service due. Hence my rights are to be\\nwatchfully and zealously guarded. The property in my\\nhands must be carefully protected, to prevent any trespass.\\nMy personal liberty must be maintained free from unwar-\\nranted interference. My bodily welfare, and especially my\\nlife must be courageously defended against hurtful and\\ndeadly violence. The powerful instinct of self-preservaticn", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "SERVICE 93\\nindicates the sacred duty of self-defense, and the original\\nimpulse of natural affection shows the no less sacred duty of\\ndefending the lives intrusted to our care. Violence must be\\nrepelled, if need be, by counter violence. But defense\\nshould not be allowed to pass over, as it strongly tends to\\ndo, into mere vengeance. The impulse to revenge is a male-\\nvolent desire, and hence abnormal, and hence unjustifiable.\\nYet retaliation is sometimes the best and indeed the only\\nmeans of effective defense, in which case it is duty.\\n68. We can imagine a life conducted throughout accord-\\ning to the principles thus far expounded. One might con-\\nceivably be governed, in general and in particular, by a\\nsense of duty, duty being here taken in the limited meaning\\nof outward obedience to the law of trespass, justice and ser-\\nvice, inspired by respect for the law, recognized as demand-\\ning thus much but no more. The whole life being one of\\ninnocence and beneficence, duty is said to be perfectly ful-\\nfilled by this external conformity to the law simply out of\\nrespect for the law, a profound reverence for all pervading\\nmoral obligation, and this alone is what should determine all\\nhuman conduct.\\nThe rigorism of this stoical doctrine is impressive and\\nimposing. It is a severe and noble conception of duty, a\\nhigh ideal. But observe, it does not merely disregard the\\naffections it requires their suppression. If we judge a man\\nto be governed in all his conduct by a sense of duty, fulfill-\\ning carefully, anxiously, assiduously his many obligations,\\nliving a life of sacrificial service, purely because of respect\\nfor the law of duty, we are filled with admiration for so lofty\\na character but if we judge him at the same time destitute\\nof love, we admire him as we admire an iceberg. There is\\nan instinctive repugnance to a person human, yet not hu-\\nmane. And if we find he has laboriously extinguished the", "height": "3696", "width": "2580", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "94 OBLIGATION\\nyearnings of natural affection in favor of an overruling and\\nexclusive conception of absolute duty, we turn from him as\\nfrom a monstrous and repulsive prodigy.\\nThe sense of duty, rising high but stopping with good\\nworks, fails to fulfill the law s demands. In the moral ideal\\nof humanity, there is something higher than this rigid stoi-\\ncism. Were I sick and suffering, and did my friend serve\\nme merely from a sense of duty, I should be displeased, I\\nwould tell him to begone, I will hire a nurse. Is it suffi-\\ncient for a father to guard and promote the welfare of his\\nchild simply out of respect for his rational obligation? Shall\\na mother tend her babe with all the wonderful, beautiful\\nsolicitude and ready self-sacrifice that wins our adoration,\\nmerely because she knows she ought so to do No, there\\nis a higher, nobler impulse, maternal love. Should a hus-\\nband and wife serve each other merely from a sense of duty,\\nit would be a just cause of dissatisfaction, and perhaps of\\ndisunion. The conception of duty, enlarged beyond inno-\\ncence to include beneficence, comes short of obligation. If\\nit be thus limited, then it is legality, not morality, and again\\nthere is something higher than duty, something nobler than\\nservice. We heartily reject a scheme of ethics implying\\nthat a man is under no obligation to love his mother or his\\ncountry, but should purify his character by eliminating all\\nsuch inclinations a scheme that clearly, distinctly enacts\\nThou shalt not love thy neighbor.", "height": "3732", "width": "2480", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "CHARITY 95\\nCHAPTER XI\\nCHARITY\\n69. An argument already offered, having its basis in the\\ngeneral principle that the natural or constitutional powers\\nof man ought to fulfill their normal functions, or, more spe-\\ncifically, that every one has a right to gratify his normal\\ndesires, a right being a duty, concludes the appetites and\\nappetencies to be auxiliary to the affections, which are thus\\nnormally supreme. From this it was directly inferred that\\nself cannot rightly be an end. With equal cogency it is\\nimplied that the object of affection is the normal and right-\\nful end of all endeavor. In other words, the affections,\\nincluded under the general name love, are obligatory they\\nought, in due manner and measure, to be gratified. The\\nmoral law, found in the original and innermost nature of\\nman, enjoins that he love his fellow man.\\nConsider the meaning of affection, love, charity, benevo-\\nlence, these terms being taken synonymously. Love is a\\ndesire, an impulse or inclination toward others, disposing\\none to give out from his own resources what may benefit\\nthem. Let it be kept clearly in mind that love is strictly a\\ndesire. It should not be confused with volition, though the\\nsynonym, benevolence, partakes, etymologically, of the voli-\\ntion; for love is simply the causative antecedent of the\\nvolitional endeavor. It is not a feeling, though attended\\nby peculiar feelings being neither an emotion, though the\\nname is commonly applied to its attendant emotions nor a\\nsentiment, though the sentiments that normally accompany\\nit act and react powerfully to stimulate the desire. Love is", "height": "3700", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "96 OBLIGATION\\nproperly and definitely a desire, relative to a sentient object,\\nwhose welfare it would promote.\\n70. Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of\\nhigh authority, Love cannot be commanded, for it is an\\naffection, and not a volition which alone is subject to com-\\nmand. But love, benevolence, charity, pathological love,\\nas distinguished from practical love which is not properly\\nlove but willing service, can be commanded though truly it\\nis an affection, becoming active only as the subject is affected\\nby an amiable object, that is, an object susceptible of wel-\\nfare. For, although every command is primarily addressed\\nto the will, yet the will, having, by means of voluntary atten-\\ntion, indirect control of all the mental faculties, carries out\\nthe command, if not thwarted by passion, in impressing its\\nsubordinates into the required order. Otherwise the sub-\\njective springs of conduct could have no moral quality.\\nEven belief, a feeling of assurance, of conviction, is com-\\nmanded in the presence of truth and the command is obeyed,\\nand the feeling is induced, by giving attention, sincere heed,\\nto the presented truth. Love, charity, a desire for another s\\nwelfare, may likewise be commanded in the presence of\\namiability, and the command obeyed, the affection induced,\\nby giving like heed to the amiable capacity of the object.\\nHence the love of benevolence can be commanded, since it\\ncan be voluntarily induced, nourished and invigorated.\\nNot only can this love be commanded, but it is com-\\nmanded. The moral law is embedded in and arises from the\\nvery constitution of human nature. Desires awakened by\\nobjects and guided by intelligence are the motives of volun-\\ntary conduct. We have seen that among these the affections\\nare normally supreme, rightly subjecting all other motive\\nimpulses to their ends. Therefore we find that, in order to\\nfulfill their natural functions, the affections must have not", "height": "3732", "width": "2432", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "CHABITT 97\\nmerely free but preeminent exercise, and that this is essen-\\ntially the supreme law of humanity demanding reverent\\nobedience.\\n71. The affections having different objects, have re-\\nceived various names as, conjugal, parental, filial and\\nfraternal love, friendship, kindness, patriotism, philanthropy.\\nIn each of these the affection varies both in kind and degree.\\nThe differences in kind are due to differences in the rela-\\ntions. The differences in degree are regulated by the pos-\\nsibilities. We are not bound to love all others equally, this\\nbeing unnatural. Many ties, many obligations. Those most\\nnearly related are bound to love each other with a special\\nardor as, parents and children.\\nThe sentiment of gratitude excites love for a benefactor\\nor neighbor. It enters largely along with friendship and\\nkindness into the forms and substance of true politeness,\\nwhich is love in littles, and in all its grades is essential to\\nhigh moral culture, and is ennobling.\\nWe are bound to love those whose character and conduct\\nwe abhor, cherishing the desire to remedy the evil in them,\\nand otherwise to better them. We should love even a\\nwicked and active enemy; righteous defensive resentment\\nbeing quite consistent with the impulse to promote, not his\\nevil way, but his well-being whenever opportunity offers or\\ncan be found, and in so far as we do not thereby trespass\\non some other. In civilized warfare after a victory the\\nwounded abandoned by the defeated are cared for humanely.\\nThis is love to enemies we feel the obligation, and call it\\nhumanity.\\nWe are bound to love all men of all races, those in the\\nremotest regions of the globe, our very antipodes, yes, and\\neven the generation yet unborn, in a due manner and meas-\\nure. This is the obligation of philanthropy.", "height": "3716", "width": "2520", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "98 OBLIGATION\\n72. Service fulfilling the law must be, not merely willing\\nservice, but loving service. We have seen that a life of\\nsacrificial service, of active beneficence, determined only by\\nrespect for the law, fails of completeness. Though I be-\\nstow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it\\nprofiteth me nothing. It is essential to duty that love be its\\nspring. The service due is loving service. Let the duplex\\nform of this phrase be noted. Loving is desiring, a subjec-\\ntive motive it is benevolence, well-wishing. Service is\\nacting, an objective motive it is beneficence, well-doing.\\nServing is the normal outcome, the natural consequent, of\\nloving they are psychological correlatives. Neither is com-\\nplete without the other.\\nFor, how is it possible that one should sincerely, willingly,\\nintentionally endeavor to promote another s welfare, unless\\nhe desire the other s welfare All voluntary effort is con-\\nditioned on an antecedent desire, so that the command of\\nintelligent, willing service is a command of intelligent, loving\\nservice. One cannot sincerely strive for another s welfare\\nunless he desire it, and this is love. If it be said, the desire\\nis simply to obey, we reply, a desire to obey a command to\\nserve, is a desire to serve as commanded.\\nOn the other hand, how can there be love not followed by\\nservice As faith without works is dead, so also is love\\nwithout service. If it have any life, it is at least ready and\\nwatchful of opportunity to serve. For generous love impels\\nto service. He who loves will serve, will render willing,\\nactive, self-sacrificing service. Also he who loves will be\\njust, will pay all dues, will not trespass. Bear ye one\\nanother s burdens, and so fulfill the law. Owe no man any-\\nthing, save to love one another, this being the only debt that\\ncannot be finally discharged for he that loveth another hath\\nfulfilled the law. Love is the fulfillment of the law.\\nAll the various presentations of the moral law heretofore", "height": "3764", "width": "2480", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "CHABITY 99\\nconsidered, we now find to be summed in the law of loving\\nservice, Thou shalt love and serve. And indeed we see that\\neven herein is superfluity, for the whole moral law, the total\\nof human obligation, is completely and comprehensively\\nsummed in the single categorical imperative of one syllable,\\nlove. Thou shalt love, is the perfect law, the law of love.\\n73. Progress in moral culture consists in transforming\\nfear into respect, and respect into love. With primitive char-\\nacters, and even with many highly cultured otherwise, the fear\\nof penalty is the chief, often the only, motive of obedience.\\nTo this may be added as one step higher, the hope of reward.\\nIn this is an appeal to the selfish propensities usually pre-\\ndominant in crude humanity. They are not thereby ap-\\nproved, but used to bring the man to at least outward\\nobedience, a step toward inward culture. Thus the law is a\\npedagogue, leading men upward.\\nA thoughtful consideration of one s relations, a clear recog-\\nnition of the law in us, inspires respect for its mandate, and\\nan impulse to observance. Herein is a passing away from\\nthe influence of threats and promises. These are lost to\\nsight, and obedience is determined simply by respect for the\\nlaw. The vast all-pervading sense of moral obligation, a\\nwide comprehensive view of duty, an obedience to the law\\nfor its own sake superior to its sanctions, produces nobility\\nand excellence in moral character. Yet this ideal is cold,\\nhard, stern, repressing as weakness the natural play of tender\\nsympathy, of generous sentiment, of warm inclination toward\\nothers, maintaining a stoical indifference to their weal or\\nwoe, and giving help exclusively out of respect for the law\\nof service. As a scheme of morals, this cannot be purged of\\negoism, of selfishness for necessarily it holds that the so-\\ncalled duties co self are equally or even more imperative than\\nduties to another, those being the basis from which all other\\nduties arise.\\nU\u00c2\u00ab* c", "height": "3716", "width": "2504", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "100 OBLIGATION\\nIn the still higher ideal, cold respect for law is gradually,\\nas culture progresses, replaced by charity, which is the bond\\nof perfectness. As in the second grade the sanctions of the\\nlaw are lost to sight, so in this highest grade the law itself\\ndisappears from view, and its requirements are fulfilled with-\\nout reference to its mandate. It is the fruit of moral\\ngrowth that both subjective and objective activities accord\\nwith the law, not because of its pressure, but because the\\norder and harmony of the natural powers have been restored,\\nand the man does what is right because his dominant im-\\npulses lead thereto, and his free preference finds therein his\\nhighest gratification. He renders loving service in due meas-\\nure to his fellow men, this having become the habit, the\\nsecond nature of his being. He does by nature the things\\nof the law, and having no law, is a law unto himself, showing\\nthe work of the law written in his heart. For love knows\\nno law other than its own impulse.\\nObviously, in the economy of human nature, this progres-\\nsion does not take place uniformly. A criminal at war with\\nsociety at large may be dutiful to his family in other matters\\nbecause of strong domestic affection, and in so far fulfill the\\nlaw of love. The average good citizen knows little and\\ncares less about the criminal code. Its enactments are not\\nfor him. He has not the slightest disposition to do what it\\nforbids, and orders his actions without reference to it. The\\npenitentiary, the jail, the gallows, have no terrors for him.\\nThe police, the courts, the judiciary, he recognizes as social\\nmachinery devised and maintained for the protection of his\\nrights. They have no other meaning for him. He has risen\\nabove the great body of civil law, and is not, properly speak-\\ning, an obedient, but a law-abiding citizen who, without\\nthought of the law, governs his conduct by his own cultured\\npreferences. In his intercourse with friends and acquaint-\\nances, he may still have duties that are irksome and repug-", "height": "3764", "width": "2472", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "CHABITT 101\\nnant which he fulfills from a sense of duty, and therein feels\\nthe tense bonds of obligation. His further moral growth\\nrequires the enlarging and deepening of charitable sympa-\\nthies, so that his conduct may be determined more and more\\nby love, less and less by law doing always the right thing,\\nnot because he ought so to do, but because he wants to do\\njust that thing rather than any other.\\n74. We have seen that so long as one acts merely from\\nrespect for the law, he is in bondage to the law. He has\\npassed perhaps with many a fierce struggle out from a de-\\ngrading slavery to appetites and passions and unbridled lusts,\\nfor of what a man is overcome of the same is he also brought\\ninto bondage, into a voluntary and honorable bondage. His\\nconduct becomes uniform, reduced to the order of facts that\\nought to be, regulated by principles conforming to moral\\nlaw. This is a dignified attitude, a high and rare attain-\\nment. But the man is in bonds, rigid, inexorable, though\\nhonorable, bound under a law that knows no concession or\\nrelaxation. By many moralists this is called liberty. Surely\\nit is not liberty, but strict, the strictest, bondage. It is\\nmoral necessity. Regulus said: I must return. Luther\\ncried I can do no otherwise. Where, then, is liberty, the\\nperfect liberty for which man so ardently longs\\nEvidently when one does more and more as the law\\nrequires, not by virtue of the obligation, but by virtue of\\nhis own native or cultured disposition, he is passing from\\nunder bondage into the realm of liberty. When love takes\\nthe place of constraining duty, the law ceases to be law. Then\\nhe is no longer under law, but under grace then, but not\\ntill then, is he perfectly free. The law commands, Thou\\nshalt love and when through obedience love has become the\\ndominating impulse, confirmed and established, the law as\\nlaw has disappeared. Thus perfect love is perfect liberty.", "height": "3700", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "102 OBLIGATION\\nThen all doing is righteous yet free, since it is done in\\nfree preference to any other. Here and here only is the\\nlonged for liberty to be found. In our imperfection and\\nstruggles with self, which never cease, this highest ideal is\\nnever fully realized in human life. The imperfect person\\nis one conscious of obligation. The perfect person is one\\nconscious of holiness. Perfect persons are not under law\\nso that we may truly say the holy angels and the Deity are\\nunder no obligation to do what they do, but being perfect\\nin love, are perfect in work, and perfect in liberty. Heaven\\nknows no law.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 103\\nCHAPTER XII\\nWELFARE\\n75. The term welfare has been used in the foregoing\\ndiscussion. The corresponding notion is of so great impor-\\ntance in ethical theory as to require special examination.\\nMany philosophers, both ancient and modern, hold that\\nthe total essence of well-being or welfare or happiness is\\npleasure. All activity, they say, resolves ultimately into\\nseeking for pleasure and shrinking from pain, this being a\\nnecessary consequence of the original constitution of the\\nanimal man, fully explaining all his conduct, and determin-\\ning his character in its highest development. The maxi-\\nmum of pleasure attained throughout life is the maximum\\nof welfare. Pleasures are admitted to vary in quantity, and\\neven in quality, the coarse enjoyment of brutal sensuality\\ndiffering widely from the refined enjoyment of delicate sen-\\ntiment. Originally, according to the hypothesis of evolu-\\ntion, all impulsion is brutally selfish gradually it becomes\\npolished by its environment, but with no change of sub-\\nstance. The doctrine is essentially egoistic. Benevolence,\\nin its most generous forms, is explained by the pleasure it\\ngives the benefactor, and a purely disinterested action is pro-\\nnounced a psychological impossibility.\\nWithout renewing the objections to egoism, let it be here\\nobserved that pleasure and pain are qualities belonging to\\nfeeling only. They are not elements of desire or of its grat-\\nification, though indeed they accompany both. We often\\nseek to gratify a desire utterly regardless of the attendant\\npleasure or pain, and hence these are not universal ends.", "height": "3720", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "104 OBLIGATION\\nMoreover, pleasure and pain have in themselves no moral\\nquality, they are neither right nor wrong. But if pleasure\\nwere the ultimate end of human endeavor, then it were\\nethical in the highest degree, and the maximum of pleasure\\nattained would be the maximum of virtue which is absurd.\\nIt is freely admitted that there is a natural and hence uni-\\nversal desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, the reverse\\nbeing psychologically impossible. But pleasure as an object\\nof desire is only one among a large number of appetencies,\\nand it is not the chiefest or strongest or most prevailing, for\\nthere are others that often override it. Now it is evident\\nthat the gratification of one normal desire among many that\\nare coordinate cannot constitute entire well-being for to\\nthis end there must be a measured, harmonized gratification\\nof all native inclinations. Nor can desire for pleasure be,\\neven obscurely, the constantly informing element of the\\nother desires for very often we desire and ardently pursue,\\nnot pain itself, but what we know to be painful we take\\npains to reach a painful end, bitterly demanding satisfaction,\\nand heartily accepting the poignant consequences. Hence\\npleasure, even should it be at a continuous maximum through-\\nout life, cannot of itself be accounted welfare, though indeed\\nin complete welfare it is an ever-present and important factor.\\nOf course one may define welfare as a maximum of pleas-\\nure and discuss it accordingly but it is very certain that\\nthis is not the notion of welfare that prevails among men.\\nNo doubt the notion includes pleasure, but it includes much\\nmore for men condemn, as lacking dignity, a life whose\\nsole aim is pleasure however refined. Who enjoys more\\ndelightful pleasure, according to De Quincey, than the\\nopium-eater? Despite his delicious dreaming, he is judged\\na most pitiful wretch. Even he who devotes himself to\\ngiving pleasure to others, as the professional musician, is\\nheld in slight esteem. So also the comedian. Men enjoy", "height": "3732", "width": "2444", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 105\\nlaughing, but the perpetually funny man is classed with the\\ncircus clown, a lineal descendant of the court jester, whose\\nrank was low, and whose quips were regulated with whips.\\nStill the pleasure giver has a calling, for pleasant recreation\\nis needful to our welfare. But the mere pleasure seeker,\\nstudying his own enjoyment, not occasionally as a recreation\\nbut as the end of living, the devotee of social amenities, the\\nprofessional sportsman, the dissipated spendthrift, the disso-\\nlute libertine, each of these is even more justly reprobated,\\nhardly for lack of wisdom in his way, rather for total lack of\\nwisdom s way. A life of pleasure, whether generous or self-\\nish, even one of simple playful gayety apart from vice, is\\naccounted a wasted life, and wise men take infinite pains to\\nsecure, through much self-denial, a regulated and sober\\nwelfare.\\n76. We are, then, in great need to know, clearly and\\ndistinctly, the meaning of welfare. In accord, with the fun-\\ndamental doctrine of this treatise, the following definition is\\nproposed: Welfare is the gratification of normal desire.\\nFrom this it follows that continuous welfare is the constant\\ngratification of normal desires throughout a complete life.\\nIts attainment calls for self-control, for a measured adjust-\\nment of incompatible gratifications, in order to harmony,, and\\nto the maximum gratification of those desires that are natu-\\nral, normal and in accord with moral law. The primary\\nprinciple is, a man has a right to gratify his normal desires,\\nif he do not trespass. Hence he has a right to welfare but\\nwhether he will attain it or not depends on the intelligent\\nregulation of his desires, together with the possibility of\\ntheir gratification within the given limits.\\nIt has been pointed out that, taken concretely, virtuous\\nconduct is conduct conformed to practical reason or con-\\nscience, and, taken abstractly, virtue is action in conformity", "height": "3712", "width": "2520", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "106 OBLIGATION\\nwith moral law. Also it was observed that virtue implies a\\nstruggle against obstacles. Now, besides the subjective dif-\\nficulties of virtuous endeavor, the judging, choosing and\\nstriving for right life, there are practically numerous and\\ngreat objective difficulties, external obstacles in circum-\\nstances, that oppose one at every turn, preventing the com-\\nplete gratification of virtuous longings. If the subjective\\nintention and effort be accomplished, then, even though the\\nobjective result fail, the chief Condition of welfare is ful-\\nfilled, and its principal element provided. But to complete\\nwelfare, there must be an external realization of the subjec-\\ntive virtuous intent. So it is that, in the actual warfare of\\nlife, though it chastens and strengthens, there is rarely, if\\never, a complete realization of thorough-going welfare.\\nSince we have defined welfare as the gratification of nor-\\nmal desires, and have characterized virtue as being the effort\\nto realize this gratification in loving service, it appears that\\none s welfare consists in seeking disinterestedly to promote\\nthe welfare of others, and that an earnest constant striving\\nto reach this end comprises the sum total of obligation. It\\nis attained on two parallels. First, as a prime condition,\\none should seek, directly and indirectly, by precept, by exam-\\nple, and by whatever influence he may rightly use, to culti-\\nvate in his fellows a virtuous disposition, inducing generous\\nimpulses, and impressing the mandate, Go, and do thou\\nlikewise. Such education is due especially from parents to\\nchildren, from teachers to pupils, from the enlightened civ-\\nilizer to the benighted barbarian. Secondly, he should\\nstrive to remove, in so far as practicable, the external obsta-\\ncles to their welfare lying in the way of his fellows, espe-\\ncially of those more nearly related to him and also to fur-\\nnish out of his own resources all reasonable facilities for\\nthese others to do likewise, thus helping them to modify and\\narrange their circumstances favorably to their own righteous", "height": "3760", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 107\\nends. So doing, he shall himself, without thought of him-\\nself, experience the working of that great natural law of\\nhuman activity, It is more blessed to give than to receive.\\n77. It is now needful to inquire concerning happiness,\\nof which nothing has heretofore been said. The term is\\nvery indefinite, and though in common use, there is difficulty\\nin fixing its meaning. Sometimes we hear that happiness\\nis continuous pleasure. If this be allowed, then happiness\\ncannot be identified with welfare for, as we have seen, wel-\\nfare is something more than pleasure. But, while pleasure\\nis a large, and perhaps an essential ingredient in happiness,\\nthis also seems to have other elements. Then shall not\\nhappiness and welfare be identified? Not strictly; for,\\nthough surely there is an intimate connection between them,\\na distinction remains. It is the distinction of antecedent\\nand consequent in causal relation. Welfare consists in the\\nconstant gratification of right desires. Now, like as pleas-\\nure is the reflex or correlate of spontaneous and unimpeded\\nenergy exerted in any special case, so, in the general course\\nof living, happiness is the reflex or correlate of virtuous and\\nsuccessful conduct. Thus welfare is antecedent, well-being\\nconsequent; the one is dynamic, the other static the one,\\nprosperity, the other, happiness.\\nThere can be no doubt that happiness is universally re-\\ngarded as desirable in the highest degree. Whence it may\\nbe presumed that the desire for happiness is a subjective\\nnecessity, an established uniformity, a natural law in human-\\nity. Also it may be allowed that no man can forecast the\\nparticular circumstances that would make him happy. Yet\\nit seems not impossible for practical ethics to lay down rules\\nof conduct in accord with fundamental principles, which, if\\nfavored by environment and followed intelligently and per-\\nsistently, should conduce to happiness. But only a brief\\ntheoretical consideration is herein admissible.", "height": "3716", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "108 OBLIGATION\\nIt appears, then, there are in general two necessary condi-\\ntions of welfare and its consequent happiness, subjective\\nobservance of moral law, and objective environment favor-\\ning realization. The former is necessary, but insufficient.\\nThe inward satisfaction arising from a full discharge of obli-\\ngation, is an essential and the chief element of happiness\\nbut untoward circumstances may so mar the felicity of a\\nrighteous worker that we deem him stricken, smitten of\\nGod, and afflicted. The most perfect man was a man of\\nsorrows, suffering the contradiction of sinners against him-\\nself. On the other hand, the full possession of health,\\nwealth and honors does not in itself constitute welfare.\\nOutward success only, like that of Alexander, what doth\\nit profit a man There must be prosperity both within and\\nwithout in order to welfare, and to its reflex, happiness.\\nAlso we observe that no one can hopefully make happi-\\nness, however much he may desire it, his immediate object.\\nIt is altogether out of direct reach. The only possible way\\nto it is through its condition, welfare. Hence wisdom dis-\\nregards happiness as an end, not looking beyond welfare,\\nbut seeking this as the end of all endeavor. This attained,\\nhappiness results by a benign law of human nature well-\\nbeing, the sanction of well-doing. A poet has said Happi-\\nness is a wayside flower plucked, it withers in the hand\\npassed by, it is fragrance to the spirit.\\nMoreover, let it be especially observed that, still less can\\nany one hopefully make his own personal happiness his end.\\nIt has been sufficiently shown that, one s own welfare de-\\npends on his seeking the welfare of others. Hence one s\\nown happiness is found only in thus promoting that of\\nothers. Outward duty done for the sake of inward satisfac-\\ntion, fails as duty and as satisfaction. The mother, who\\nwith much self-denial waits upon her sick babe merely be-\\ncause, should the babe die from neglect, she could never for-", "height": "3768", "width": "2480", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "WELFARE 109\\ngive herself and -would suffer the pangs of remorse, that\\nmother is an egoist, and not the mother we adore. She may\\nescape the pain, yet is unhappy, for this is not the outcome\\nof maternal love. Self-seeking in any form is foredoomed to\\nfailure, for it lacks the perfect virtue which, forgetful of\\nself, strives for the welfare of others. Living for one s own\\nhappiness is living for one s self and living for one s self is\\nsure to be a failure. Living for loving service is living for\\nothers and living for others is the sure and only road to\\nwelfare, both theirs and ours, that welfare whose correlate\\nis happiness, both theirs and ours.\\n78. Involved in the notion of welfare is the notion of\\ngood, a term so very ambiguous that its use has thus far\\nbeen avoided. Good things are relatively or absolutely good.\\nThe relatively good are those not good in themselves, but\\nonly as a means to something beyond; as, riches. We seek\\nthem in order to attain those absolutely good, that is, such\\nas are good in themselves, and not good for aught else as,\\nluxuries. What is good for something else has value what\\nis good in itself has worth. An end good in itself is an\\nabsolute end.\\nAbsolute ends are altogether subjective, found only in\\ncertain mental states of sentient beings, more especially of\\npersons, who habitually seek some one end, and only occa-\\nsionally others, as desirable. Ends vary in degrees of excel-\\nlence, as good, better, best. The best, the highest aim of\\nhuman activity, is termed the summum bonum.\\nThe determination of the absolute, the ultimate good, the\\nsummum bonum, as the end of all moral endeavor, was the\\nprimal problem of ancient ethics. The Hedonists found it\\nin pleasure, the highest enjoyment of the present passing\\nmoment. The Epicureans also found it in pleasure, but\\nposited the maximum of enjoyment extending throughout", "height": "3716", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "110 OBLIGATION\\nlife, and called this happiness. Plato solved the problem\\ngrandly by declaring that the highest ultimate good is not\\npleasure, nor wealth, nor knowledge, nor power, but is the\\ngreatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good.\\nHe taught that happiness depends on the possession of this\\nmoral beauty and goodness. Aristotle s ultimatum is happi-\\nness, but with a definition, already noted, that distinguishes\\nit from pleasure, and is hardly exceptionable. The Stoics\\ntaught that the supreme end of life, the ultimate good, is\\nvirtue, that is, a life conformed to nature, the agreement of\\nconduct with the all- regulating law of nature, the human\\nwith the divine will, whereby the sage combines in himself\\nall the essential perfections of deity. We remark that each\\nof these several doctrines is egoistic, finding the summum\\nbonum, the ultimatum of moral endeavor, to be an attainment\\nof the moral agent for and within himself.\\n79. In modern ethics investigation of the summum\\nbonum is less prominent, and various and conflicting views\\nare entertained. The utilitarians teach the right aim and\\nend to be happiness, which is variously and hazily defined.\\nThis doctrine divides into egoism and altruism, according as\\nthe agent regards his own happiness as the end of his\\nendeavor, or makes that of related persons its object. If the\\ngood of a particular person, himself or some other or others,\\nbe the aim, it is called individualism if the good of a com-\\nmunity at large be the aim, it is called universalism, which\\nhas as many forms as there are kinds of community for\\ninstance, social, national, or humanistic universalism. In\\nseeking the good of a community the aim should be the\\ngreatest good of the greatest number.\\nThe dominant form of philosophical ethics at the present\\nday seems to be evolutionism, which affirms that develop-\\nment, progress, prosperity, is the end of moral endeavor.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "WELFARE HI\\nAccording to Spencer, that is good, in the widest sense,\\nwhich serves to accomplish some purpose and the ultimate\\nconscious purpose of all vital activity is the production or\\nretention of pleasure, or the avoidance or removal of pain.\\nAccording to Wundt there is a series of ethical ends, begin-\\nning with self -contentment and self-improvement, rising to\\nsocial ends in public well-being and general progress, and\\nterminating in humanistic ends, chiefly intellectual, which\\nconsist in the continuous improvement of mankind.\\nIn opposition to the foregoing empirical doctrines, is the\\nextreme intuitionism of the Kantians, who make the absolute\\nethical end to lie in obedience, pure and simple, to the objec-\\ntive moral law. Less extreme are the perfectionists, who\\nmake the supreme good to lie in excellence of moral charac-\\nter, which excellence they fail to define clearly, but hold\\nthat it is attained by the active exercise of the intellectual\\nand sensitive nature under the presidency of reason.\\nThe present treatise teaches that the aim and end of life\\nis the harmonious and complete development of the man,\\nindividually, socially, politically and religiously, each one\\ndevoting his constant and total activity to the welfare of his\\nfellows in loving service, thus obeying the perfect law of\\nlove and liberty, and thus attaining, as an unsought conse-\\nquence, both his own and their happiness. The ideal of an\\nultimate and absolute good is that of a complete organism\\nwhose members cooperate in entire harmony which implies\\nthe fulfilling by every organ of its normal functions, and\\nhence the perfect wholeness of the organism. It denotes,\\nnegatively, the absence of all discord, of all impurity; posi-\\ntively, the perfection of functional activity. In the moral\\nsphere, each rational being is himself an organized whole,\\nand also an organized member of wider organisms. Now,\\nsince in every organic whole each member is at once means\\nand end to every other, the law of an intelligent organism", "height": "3704", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "112 OBLIGATION\\nrequires that each member become voluntarily an active\\nimparting means, as well as a passive receptive end. Herein\\nis the ideal of welfare, and the sphere of the moral law,\\nwhich commands every man to seek, not his own, but\\nanother s weal. Its observance regards that wholeness\\nwhich is the summum bonum.\\nThe correlative concomitant of wholeness or holiness is\\nbeatitude or blessedness. This is more than happiness, as\\nholiness is more than virtue. Virtue implies a struggle,\\nand a virtuous being is still under and continuously endeav-\\noring to conform to the law. But in holy beings there is no\\nstruggle, they are not under the law, but dwell in a realm of\\nperfect love, liberty and bliss.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "DEITY 113\\nCHAPTER XIII\\nDEITY\\n80. The existence of God is a postulate of Ethics. A\\nspeculative system may be evolved from the mere conception\\nof a deity, a conception such as is found, with many modifi-\\ncations and varying in degree from obscure to clear, in every\\nhuman mind. But a true ethical theory, thoroughly estab-\\nlished as a correct representation of its matter, to be complete\\nand fully rounded out in accord with the demands of philo-\\nsophical system, must posit as essential, not merely the con-\\nception, but the reality of Deity. We might adopt, relative\\nto ethical system, the saying of Voltaire that if God did\\nnot exist, it would be necessary to invent him but all nature\\ncries out to us that he does exist.\\nIn modern times the attempt has been made, especially by\\nthe Comteists, to devise a system of humanitarian ethics,\\nshutting out even the thought of God. To give such scheme\\nphilosophic unity and completeness,, its authors have been\\nnecessitated to find a common end for all lines of moral activ-\\nity, and they propose the general welfare of Humanity.\\nThis Humanity is personified, and set up as an object of rev-\\nerence, and even of worship. Or the deity recognized in\\nthe affairs of the world is the Stream of Tendency that\\nmakes for righteousness, which is the Eternal, not our-\\nselves. A modified view substitutes the Unknowable,\\nwhich, notwithstanding the negation, is defined to be forma-\\ntive force, working according to its inner necessity. But\\nit is very certain that a generalized abstraction, rhetorically\\npersonified by a capital letter, will never satisfy the minds", "height": "3696", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "114 OBLIGATION\\nand hearts of men, nor even meet the demands of a godless\\nphilosophy. Such proposed end of human endeavor is at\\nmost either a logical generalization, gathering up in an ab-\\nstract formula the moral causes manifest in secular history,\\nor an enfeebled pantheism. True ethical theory, however,\\narises, not from impersonal generalities, but from individual\\nmen and combinations of rational beings in their actual rela-\\ntions not from intellectual abstractions, but from concrete\\nrealities the most vivid and stern.\\nOne point may be particularly noticed. Ethical schemes\\nthat do not recognize a personal sovereign Deity are unable\\nto provide for the perfect administration of justice they find\\nno court of appeal beyond the consensus of men. Now,\\nfrom the patriarchal day of Job until this late and enlight-\\nened day of ours, it has been and still is the common convic-\\ntion of thoughtful observers that the distribution of rewards\\nand punishments, the avenging of wrongs, the adjustment of\\nclaims, in the historical life of our race, fail of righteousness.\\nBut such is the profound faith of mankind in the ultimate\\ntriumph of the principle of universal justice that this further\\nconviction prevails There must of necessity be a supreme\\ncourt of appeal which shall, in an after life, administer retri-\\nbution, vindicate justice, and establish righteousness. Unless\\nthere be such provision, there is no ground for faith in the\\nunity and supremacy of moral law.\\n81. The ethical theory herein proposed posits as essen-\\ntial the real existence of a personal Deity. The one eternal\\nGod, from everlasting to everlasting, the almighty maker of\\nthe world, himself a spirit and the father of our spirit, the\\nfounder and center of all truth, the supreme ruler and final\\njudge, unfailing in strict justice while abounding in tender\\nmercy, a perfect person conscious of holiness and ruling in\\nlove he it is on whom an intelligent faith rests as the", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "DEITY 115\\noriginal source of authority, as legislator, judge and executor\\nin one, who shall finally perfect all righteousness.\\nTo those objecting to the anthropomorphic character of\\nthis conception, a sufficient reply is that no other kind of\\nnotion is possible to the human mind. For us God is thus,\\nor he is not. Holding this to be the true conception does\\nnot degrade the Deity to the human rank, but lifts the\\nhuman to the divine. He has made us in his image, a little\\nlower than divinity, that in his likeness we may become par-\\ntakers in his glory.\\nShould it be objected that the introduction of a supernatu-\\nral element into an explanation of natural phenomena is\\nunscientific, we admit this to be true of physical science,\\nwhich is concerned with second causes only, having no re-\\ncourse to a first cause. Bacon in Iris Organum, and Newton\\nin his Principia, make frequent and devout reference to the\\nDeity, though not as a factor in their systems but Laplace,\\nit is said, when asked by Napoleon why he made no reference\\nto God in his Mechanique Celeste, replied Sire, I had no\\nneed of that hypothesis. So the physics of to-day very prop-\\nerly makes no mention of the Deity. But in metaphysics\\nthe chief problem is the existence of God. Ethics, which\\nalso is not a science of material nature, but of human nature,\\nof man on his spiritual side, in like manner transcends\\nphysics. It treats exclusively of mental states and acts, of\\nphenomena of the soul or spirit. The facts on which its\\ntheory is based are subjective facts of direct observation by\\nintrospection, which are combined with inferences from them\\nand from observed external activities. Here we are wholly\\nwithin the spiritual sphere. A clear distinction may be\\nmade, by a difference in degree, between the human and the\\nsuperhuman, but who shall draw the line between the natu-\\nral and the supernatural To posit in the spiritual sphere\\na, supreme personal spirit, so far from being unscientific, is", "height": "3692", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "116 OBLIGATION\\nsimply to complete the content of the sphere with a substance\\nand its attributes, with the conscious personality of a rational\\nbeing, in kind like to that which gives rise to the theory\\nand therefore this complementing of the scheme is strictly\\nscientific.\\n82. The ground from which the doctrine of this treatise\\nhas thus far been developed, is the natural constitution of\\nman. His several powers of intellect and will, his emotional\\ncapacity, and the impulse to activity in his motive desires,\\nhave each a normal and cooperative function. Herein is dis-\\ncerned the principle that it is right to gratify normal desire,\\ntogether with the supreme law of humanity commanding the\\nconstant order of facts that ought to be, the single impera-\\ntive of trespass, duty, justice or loving service. Now, it may\\nreasonably be asked whether the common constitution of\\nhuman beings is to be regarded as an ultimate ground, an\\noriginal source of obligation, beyond which there is no\\ndeterminant.\\nPositivism answers affirmatively, which consists with its\\nrigid empiricism. But we have tried to show that there is\\nfor us something more than experience. Evolutionism finds\\nan antecedent determinant in the environment, a combina-\\ntion of second causes, under whose influence the human con-\\nstitution has been developed. But when we consider the\\ngreat variety of environment to which the several races of\\nmankind have been subjected, we should expect, on this\\nview, to find a corresponding variety of constitution, and\\nconsequent varieties of moral law whereas, however great\\nthe variations in degree especially of intelligence, and the\\nvariety of constructions built upon the law, still, throughout\\nhistory and everywhere, mankind is one, and the law is one.\\nThis essentially permanent uniformity points distinctly\\nto an origin for the human constitution in a cause beyond", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "DEITY 117\\nitself and its environment, and, on the principle of like effect\\nlike cause, to a common cause, to a unity in the originating\\ncause. The existence of an omnipotent and consistent\\nmaker and ruler, is the only satisfactory explanation of these\\nsignificant facts that has been or can be offered, and this\\nexplanation alone fulfills the demand of ethical theory.\\n83. Many theistic moralists hold that the will of God\\nis the original and ultimate ground of obligation. He has\\nmade us as it hath pleased him, revealing his will in us, and\\nin our relations to each other and to himself. A reverent\\ninterpretation of nature and of history enables us to under-\\nstand his will more clearly, and to these he has added a\\ndistinct revelation of it in the holy scriptures. Had it\\npleased him to make us and our surroundings otherwise, or\\nmerely to issue different, even contrary, commandments, our\\nobligations would have been different from what they are,\\nsince his express will is their sole, sufficient and final\\nground.\\nThat the will of God, however revealed, defines our obliga-\\ntions is unquestionable. But we cannot regard his authority\\nas decisive, if it be merely arbitrary for this view implies\\nthe possibility of contradictions that are revolting. Should\\nhe capriciously command lying, murder, theft, all heaven\\nand earth would rebel. The doctrine unwittingly represents\\nhim as a tryant ruling by fear, liable to transient whims\\ninverting right and wrong, disordering order, compounding\\nfelony, falsifying truth, thereby divesting his intelligent\\nsubjects of all reliable knowledge of himself and of his crea-\\ntions. Such notion is psychologically, philosophically and\\nlogically absurd.\\nWe must look beyond the will of God for the ultimate\\ndeterminant of obligation, into that which determines his\\nwill, into his original, eternal, essential nature. Necessarily", "height": "3688", "width": "2520", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "118 OBLIGATION\\nand rightly we conceive of him as a spirit, having harmoni-\\nous attributes constituting his nature, in which is no vari-\\nableness nor shadow of turning. Being in himself the\\nembodiment of truth, it is impossible for him to he being\\nessentially just, he can never justify crime such self-contra-\\ndiction would dethrone him, would be the suicide of God.\\nHis omnipotence is not absolute, but limited to what accords\\nwith his nature, and his every action is confined to the strait\\nand narrow way of righteousness. The macrocosm, the\\nworld, answering his fair idea, conforms in the fixed\\nmaterial laws to his unchanging essence, and the uniformity\\nof nature is the faithfulness of God. The microcosm, man,\\nthe express image of his person, is formed to conform in the\\nfixed moral law to the same unchanging essence, and the\\noneness of justice is the righteousness of God. It is not\\nthe will, but the nature of the Deity that is the original and\\nultimate ground of obligation.\\n84. The final problem in our obligation to each other\\nis now readily solved. The prior examination of human\\nnature found it constituted for a free and harmonious play\\nof its powers in the exercise of loving service, and this was\\nrecognized as the sum of obligation. Further examination\\nhas disclosed that human nature is derived from and akin to\\nthe divine nature, so that in promoting the welfare of each\\nother, men are conforming to the divine will arising from\\nthe divine nature. The maker and ruler has given to every\\nman more or less ability to promote the common welfare, and\\nholds him accountable for its exercise. Whoever unwar-\\nrantably interferes with this service trespasses both on the\\nservant and on the served, and thereby violates the divine\\nwill and nature. Much has been said about the divine\\nright of kings. Every man s right is a divine right both\\nbecause of its origin, and because it involves the right of the", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "DEITY 119\\nDeity himself. Hence the sacredness of human rights, and\\nthe paramount obligation to respect them. Arising from the\\nvery nature of God, they are invariable, inalienable, irrevo-\\ncable, grounded in eternal justice and truth, and he who\\nwould violate them is at war with the inflexible Almighty.\\nAlong with our obligation to each other is our obligation\\nto God. To him is due, in the most comprehensive sense,\\nloving service. We are bound to love God for his own sake,\\nand all others for God s sake. The recognition of him as\\nour personal creator and ruler, and of our obligation to him\\nas his creatures and subjects, leading to adoration, is religion,\\nthe binding of man to God. Thus ethics expands over reli-\\ngion by comprehending the author of our being, the father\\nof our spirit, the eternal One from whom all our obligations\\narise, and in whom all our obligations end. He desires all\\nthat is disorderly to become orderly, and calls upon his\\nrational free creatures to gratify, so far as in them lies, this\\ndesire hence it is hardly too much to say that our conduct\\naffects the welfare and happiness of Our Father. To serve\\nrightly our fellows for his sake, is to serve him and a tres-\\npass upon a fellow man is a trespass upon him. Moreover,\\nhe has a supreme right to our reverential worship, and omit-\\nting or neglecting it is using our freedom, which having\\ngiven he will not revoke, to restrict his liberty in gathering\\nup his due.\\nContemplating, inversely, the relation of God to man, we\\nobserve that the obligation is not properly reciprocal. We\\ncannot think of the Deity as under any obligation, under\\nany law, under anything for this contradicts his essentially\\nabsolute supremacy and sovereignty. But while it cannot\\ncorrectly be said that he is bound to be steadfast in purpose,\\nand faithful in promise, it is very certain that he will be\\nthus, and all that is righteous, because of his ultimate\\nnature. Now, as the universality of physical, psychical and", "height": "3704", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "120 OBLIGATION\\nethical law indicates his unity, so does the total content of\\nethical law, loving service, indicate his benevolence. He\\nseeks the welfare and consequent happiness of his sentient\\ncreatures in his own constant loving service of them, both\\nby direct providence, and by the obligation laid upon them\\nto serve each other. Hence are we confident of his inexor-\\nable and perfected justice, essential to entire welfare, in\\nwhich justice every life shall eventually be complete also\\nof his tender mercy to the erring, he having opened a way,\\nthrough infinite self-sacrifice, whereby to be just and yet\\njustify the penitent, and secure to him eternal welfare and\\nblessedness. Our God is no egoist, but an altruist. He did\\nnot make us, nor does he rule us, for his own glory, but for\\nour own beatitude. God is love.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "ELEMENTARY ETHICS\\nSECOND PAET-OEGA]SriZATION\\nTRANSITION\\n85. A glance over the course thus far pursued will\\nprepare for further advance. The purpose of Ethics is to\\nbring our ordinary moral judgments, so far as they tally with\\nenlightened conscience, into a coherent system, discovering\\nin them a principle which shall give it philosophic unity,\\nand also furnish, if we would not have a mere castle in the\\nair, a foundation on which to build. Beginning with the\\ncommon notion of a right, its condition is at once seen to be\\na reciprocal relation between persons, each having orderly\\nclaims upon the other, which claims compose his rights.\\nThese rights are grounded in the very constitution of human\\nnature, which, moved by its normal desires, seeks their grati-\\nfication. The fundamental right is a right to liberty in this\\npursuit. This is the primary principle of Ethics. An inten-\\ntional violation of a right, an interference in one s proper\\nliberty, is a wrong, a trespass, which being a subversion of\\nconstituted order, is forbidden. This is the moral law, dis-\\ncerned by conscience, and supported by subjective and objec-\\ntive sanctions.\\nObligation takes several forms whose essence is one. Pri-\\nmarily its law forbids aggressive trespass, then equally it\\nforbids retentive and neglective trespass. From these emerge\\n121", "height": "3704", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "122 ORGANIZATION\\nthe comprehensive forms of justice, duty, virtue, service and\\nlove, the last pair being the choice expression simply because\\nit brings more clearly forward the common essence. For, in\\nexamining the springs of action, the affections are seen to be\\nnaturally paramount, all other desires ancillary and disinter-\\nested. They are inconsistent with interested motives whose\\nends, lying within the agent himself, are selfishly opposed\\nto loving service. The ideal man expends his energies in\\nserving the interests of his fellows without thought of his\\nown as separate and independent, but only as involved in\\nthe common welfare.\\nIt should be observed that there are three principal notions\\npervading the discussion, which grow out from the funda-\\nmental notion of rights. These are:\\n1st. Trespass, in its direct and indirect sense, which as\\nforbidden expresses the whole of obligation.\\n2d. Trust, in the active sense of mutual confidence that\\nthe law of trespass will be observed; and in the passive\\nsense of stewardship, of being a trustee of all possessions,\\nincluding life itself.\\n3d. Defense, meaning the right and duty to guard trusts\\nby resisting encroachment on them which is the only prem-\\nise that can warrant an interference in another s liberty.\\nA strict and generous conformity to law results in common\\nwelfare. Welfare consists of liberty and continuous success\\nin the exercise of benevolence and beneficence. The correl-\\native criterion and natural consequence of welfare is happi-\\nness, which involves the special pleasure arising from a\\nconsciousness of disinterested conduct, and in general that\\narising from the satisfaction of enlarged and harmoniously\\nregulated desires. But it is the essential dignity of benevo-\\nlence rather than the resultant happiness that makes common\\nwelfare the proper aim and end of endeavor.\\nFinally, the general constitution or nature of mankind is", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "TRANSITION 123\\nnot the ultimate ground of obligation. A practical ethics\\nmay be built upon it, but complete theory needs to look\\nbeyond, into the nature of the Maker, which is the ultimate\\ndeterminant of all nature, and more especially of the native\\nobligation which binds his rational creatures to each other\\nand to himself.\\n86. We are to pass now from the consideration of obli-\\ngation, a binding together, to that of organization, a working\\ntogether. Heretofore the simple reciprocal relation of man\\nto man, with occasional anticipations of other relations, has\\nbeen the basis of our explanation. This view has proved\\nsufficient for the development of certain ethical principles,\\nand their application to the case supposed. But human\\nrelations are mostly complex, consisting largely of relations\\nof the individual man to societies, and of societies to their\\nindividual members, and also of societies to each other. In\\nconsidering hereafter these complex relations, it will be\\nfound that the same principles without addition are applica-\\nble to solve the obligations involved. The right aim of\\nsociety, in its various organic forms, is likewise the common\\nwelfare, to be sought under the impulse of love. Every\\nmoral agent is a member of some system in whose welfare\\nhis own is bound up, and thus sharing his own beneficence,\\nhe finds his welfare, not in opposition to or deprivation of\\nothers or in any self-seeking, but in union with his kind.\\nThe advantage of organized effort is familiar in the notion\\nof help, the combination of several energies to accomplish a\\nsingle purpose, one will directing many forces to the same\\nend. The will may be that of one man, as a Caesar, a Loy-\\nola, a Richelieu, a Napoleon, a Bismarck, overmastering and\\nbringing to unity the wills of a multitude or, turning from\\nautocracy to democracy, the unity of many wills may be the\\nresult of a free consensus, as in a republic, and in voluntary", "height": "3704", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "124 ORGANIZATION\\nassociations of all kinds. In this oneness of will the divided\\nbecomes an individual, a Briareus. What is subjectively\\nplural is objectively single. The individuality is complete\\nin its solidarity, and the combination is to be judged as an\\nundivided whole, whether it be a family, a mercantile firm, a\\nsociety, an army, or a nation.\\nLikewise let it be observed that conscience is catholic, and\\nthe law it reveals universal. Now a combination of men for\\na common purpose or purposes must be duly regulated by\\nthe common conscience. An organized association is respon-\\nsible for its official actions. Even a nation may do right or\\nwrong, and accordingly is honored or censured and perhaps\\npunished. As a common will makes it an individual, so a\\ncommon conscience makes it a person for as a body it is\\nconscious of obligation, and thus is a person. This organic\\npersonality, though not wholly independent of, yet is to be\\ndistinguished from, the private and persistent personality of\\nthe members taken severally, for it implies a mass of super-\\nadded obligations dominating the whole. Thus an organism,\\nor that wherein all parts and the whole are mutually means\\nand end, is recognized, when it consists of men, as an indi-\\nvidual personality, subject in all functional activity, both\\ninternal and external, to the moral law.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "THE MAN 125\\nCHAPTER I\\nTHE MAX\\n87. It will be well, as introductory- to the subsequent\\nmatter and for the sake o\u00c2\u00a3 its clear treatment, to examine\\nhere the organic character of the human constitution.\\nEach individual man is a completely organized being.\\nPrimarily he consists of a body and a mind or spirit. He is\\nessentially a duality. A human body without a mind is not\\na man it is merely a corpse. A mind without a body is\\nscience knows not what. The disembodied human spirit\\nmay furnish matter for revelation, but since it presents no\\nphenomena for our observation, it is beyond the reach of\\nscience. The man we study is a body and mind. These\\nare coordinate. Both being essential, we cannot say which\\nhas priority in efficiency, any more than we can say which\\nblade of a pair of shears does the more work. They cooper-\\nate, and neither can perform its functions apart from the\\nother. Thus the body is for the mind, and the mind is for\\nthe body. Each is a means serving the other as an end, so\\nthat together they constitute a duplex organic whole.\\nEvidently the body is itself an organism. The limbs are\\nfor the sustenance of the trunk, and the trunk is for the\\nsustenance of the limbs. If the body suffer mutilation, the\\nloss may in a measure be compensated by an increased or a\\nspecialized activity of other organs, yet it is a defect. The\\nheart supplies the brain with blood, the brain supplies the\\nheart with energy. Moreover, each subsidiary organ is itself\\nan organism. The visual organ, the eye, serving as a guide\\nto the movements of the whole, is composed of various", "height": "3700", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "126 OE GANIZA TION\\norgans, as the cornea, the lens, the retinal screen, each of\\nwhich is a means to every other as an end. Thus the whole\\nbody is an organism composed of many organisms, to each of\\nwhich every other and the whole brings its contribution.\\n88. The mind is a complement of faculties, an assem-\\nblage of functions. Its several generic powers, knowing and\\nfeeling, desiring and willing, are reciprocally related. Each\\nclass is a means to the others as ends, enabling them to fulfill\\ntheir normal functions. Were there no intelligence, there\\ncould be no emotion or sentiment were there no intelligence\\nand feeling, there could be no desire were there no desire,\\nthere could be no volition and were there no motived voli-\\ntion, there could be no intelligence higher than mere brutal\\nreceptivity. Each serves the other and the whole.\\nWe must be on our guard lest we transfer to this spiritual\\nsphere our notions of corporeal organs. These organs are\\ndistinct entities standing apart in space whereas the mental\\nfaculties and capacities are simply properties or functions of\\none and the same entity whose substance has no relation to\\nspace, except through the incorporating body. It is never-\\ntheless evident that these generic properties are mutually\\nrelated as means and end. Hence they are organized as to\\ntheir functions, and the mind, by virtue of this constitution,\\nis a spiritual organism.\\nFurthermore, the specific powers are organically related,\\neach special faculty being supported in the exercise of its\\nfunctions by each and all the rest of its class. It will be\\nbest to exemplify this by the desires, with which, as motives\\nof the will, we are here particularly concerned.\\nThe desires are primarily divided into the craving desires,\\nor appetites and appetencies, whose function impels to\\nacquire, and the giving desires, or affections, whose func-\\ntion impels to impart. This opposition is merely logical,", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "TEE MAN 127\\nfor actually, in their naturally constituted order, they coop-\\nerate, the former seeking to acquire in order that the latter\\nmay be prepared to impart. The suppression or hinderance\\nof either would be a mutilation, worse than the amputation\\nof a leg or arm. As already pointed out, the exercise of the\\ncraving desires in disregard of the affections, is abnormal,\\nleading to a distraction of the affections from their proper\\nobjects, and to a subversion of their functions; also the\\nexercise of the affections in disregard of the appetites and\\nappetencies, is abnormal, leading to inefficiency from lack of\\nresources supplying what affection would bestow; but, if\\nboth classes be exercised according to their constitutional\\nrelations, each with regard to the other, then the offices they\\nare naturally fitted to fulfill are performed, their several and\\ncombined efficiency is attained, and their exercise is normal.\\nEach is for the other.\\nThe same principle is applicable to all the various mental\\npowers both in particular and in general, thus showing the\\nmind as a whole to be an organism consisting of minor or\\nsubsidiary organisms so delicately adjusted that an excess or\\ndeficiency or distortion in the action of any one disorders\\nevery other and the whole.\\n89. Let us try for a moment to imagine what a man\\nmight be and become if he were somehow so separated from\\nall objects of affection that it could have no play. We need\\nnot suppose him incapable of affection, but only that it be\\nwholly dormant from lack of call. Allow that this solitary can\\nprovide the necessaries of life, and even many of its luxuries,\\nand that he can successfully engage in self-culture. Pru-\\ndently caring for his body, he is temperate, and enjoys phys-\\nical health and strength. Under the impulse of craving\\npropensities, he acquires a wealth of means to further enjoy-\\nment, and his cultured intellect gathers and delights in treas-\\nures of knowledge.", "height": "3688", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "128 ORGANIZATION\\nNow we point out that, in this imaginary case, there is\\nstrictly nothing moral or immoral; for, it is the relation\\nto rational beings, including Deity, or at least to sentient\\nbeings, and not merely the possession of a rational nature,\\nthat determines the existence of rights and obligation. No\\ntrespass is possible, in case of an absolute solitary, for there\\nare no rights or counter rights. No duty is done, for there\\nis no one to whom a debt is due. There is no virtue or\\nvice, for there is no law demanding conformity. There is\\nno justice or injustice, for there is no claimant. Nor can\\nthere be loving service. Indeed, this isolated man is desti-\\ntute of actual conscience, for no occasion would bring the\\npotential to an actual discernment of moral law. He has no\\nresponsibility, is not a moral being, not human, not a man,\\nunus homo, nullus homo, not a person, since he has no con-\\nsciousness of obligation. With him nothing is either right\\nor wrong even suicide would not be a crime. Truly it is\\nnot good that the man should be alone. Pleasures we allow\\nhe may have, even the intellectual; otherwise they are less\\nthan brutal, for the brute enjoys at least instinctive affec-\\ntion. But the solitary can never be happy, certainly not\\nwith that happiness which ripens into blessedness.\\nIt appears, then, that man is essentially a moral being,\\nand therefore essentially a social being. So let us change\\nour supposition from one solitary to one in society, whose\\naffections, however, are wholly dormant because of his entire\\nselfishness. Guided by the counsels of prudence, negatively\\nin avoiding harm, positively in securing personal benefit, he\\nmay accomplish the correct functioning of his physical or-\\ngans, and maintain his body in wholesome condition. Also\\nhe may wisely discipline his intellectual powers, and regulate\\nhis passions and emotions, and so attain a high grade of effi-\\nciency. Moreover, by observing certain rules of art, using\\nhis fellows as means to secure his own ends, he may accu-", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "THE MAN 129\\nmulate wealth, power, and fame. Such seem to have been the\\ncharacter and aims of the more refined peoples of antiquity,\\nespecially of the Greeks. Their self-culture, looking solely\\nto the beautiful development of the individual man, was\\nvery sensitive to the aesthetic elements essential to excel-\\nlence, while the ethical elements were more lightly esteemed\\nand often disregarded. The tendency was strongly egoistic,\\nseeking the enjoyment of a fair personality, and its secure\\ntenure against infringement. And in modern times such\\nself-culture is widely and highly approved, many moralists\\nmaking it the basis of their systems.\\nThe supposition of a cultured man in society without nat-\\nural affection is monstrous. Unlike the solitary, he is a\\nmorally responsible person, for conscience in him is actual,\\nthe law is upon him, and in his disregard of all save his own\\ninterests, he is a law-breaker, thoroughly immoral. Yet,\\nstrange to say, he may be a good neighbor and citizen for,\\nif one selfishly serve his own interest with far-sighted pru-\\ndence and wide-reaching wisdom, this works out for society\\nvery much the same result as if his energies were wholly\\ndevoted to thoroughly unselfish, disinterested, loving ser-\\nvice. Such is the economical ordering of human affairs.\\nBut it does not so work for the man himself. Though far\\nfrom criminal or even disorderly, though he do not sin with\\nhis lips, and though he practice, for his own ends, a large\\nbeneficence, yet, without benevolence, he is a whited sepul-\\ncher, a hypocrite, a moral monster. More likely, however,\\nthe inward corruption breaks forth, poisoning the air and\\nmultiplying ills. This has usually been the historical result.\\nThese considerations illustrate the fact that men are social\\nbeings in the sense of interdependence, not merely for the\\ncommon needs of pleasurable living, but also for moral devel-\\nopment by the exercise of mutual affection, through which\\nalone the dignity of complete manhood is attainable.", "height": "3700", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "130 ORGANIZATION\\n90. But in real human life there is not and cannot be\\nthorough seclusion. A solitary is a mere negation, a meta-\\nphysical abstraction, a logical ghost. We find ourselves in\\na world of fellow beings from whom it is impossible to be\\ncompletely absolved. Even a Selkirk on his desert isle not\\nonly remembers his former associations, but contemplates\\nthe possibility of a return to the world, and hence is bound\\nto comport himself with reference to it, to care for and culti-\\nvate his powers as far as may be in view of that possibility.\\nBut should he reasonably despair of a return among men,\\nstill he may not neglect his personal dignity, or ever, even\\nunder the greatest suffering, take his own life for he can-\\nnot know his future here, and one relation, the chiefest of\\nall, persists. He is bound by indissoluble obligations to his\\nmaker, law-giver and judge, whose claims are never released,\\nand whose honor is involved.\\nAlso let it be remarked that the individual owes his exis-\\ntence, as well as the possibility of its continuance and of all\\nmoral culture, so much to the human society in which he is\\nordinarily included, that it is rare to find one so totally de-\\npraved as to be entirely destitute of all natural affection.\\nA mother gives birth to her child; therein and thereafter\\nthe moral tie binds. No distance of place or time can atten-\\nuate it to nothingness, no violence can sever it, even death\\nspares a bond in dutiful memories rendered more precious\\nand sacred by loss. Can a woman forget her sucking child,\\nthat she should not have compassion on the son of her\\nwomb Hardly is it possible. Can a son forget the mother\\nwho bore him, that he should not have compassion for her\\npains, her nurture, her watchings, her tender caresses?\\nHardly, yet perhaps less rare. Shall he not, even in mature\\nyears, honor his father and mother with kindly watch-care\\nand grateful memories? Surely, even amid a godless civ-\\nilization, or even amid a barbarous heathenism, Nature", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "THE MAN 131\\nwill enforce in some measure her claims for loving ser-\\nvice.\\n91. If we view each man, then, as an organism of orga-\\nnized organs, these standing to each other and to the whole\\nin a relation of interdependence, and if we observe that he\\nhas the power of self-direction and control, it is clear that it\\nis within him to conserve and cultivate his natural powers\\nby regulating their organic relations, and that the bringing\\nof all the corporeal and spiritual powers with which he is\\nendowed by nature into full activity and harmonious coop-\\neration, is the discharge of obligation and the perfection of\\nmanhood. But also it is clear that the constitution of the\\nman, apart from his affections, furnishes no ethical element,\\nno basis for an ethical system. His subsidiary powers of\\nbody and mind are not persons, and there is no moral ele-\\nment that does not involve a personal relation.\\nSuch relation is necessarily implied in the existence and\\nexercise of affection. There must be a sentient object, one\\ncapable of benefit, to whom there is conscious obligation.\\nHerein, and herein only, personality appears herein, and\\nherein only, moral character has its root and growth. The\\naffections being psychologically and ethically essential to\\nintegral manhood, it follows that a man cannot be truly\\nand rightly a man apart from his fellows, and in his\\nrelations to them his conscience discerns the moral law de-\\nmanding the exercise of righteous affections, and claiming\\nrecognition as the supreme law of humanity.\\nThere is no need to consider further the individual man.\\nWe have noted him as a typical organism, pointing out that,\\napart from his relations to others, that is, in him alone, there\\nis no ethical element. In the prior part of this treatise the\\nreciprocal relations of man to man, in their ethical aspect,\\nhave been discussed at length. True the mere coexistence", "height": "3704", "width": "2488", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "132 ORGANIZATION\\nof two persons may correctly be construed as an organism,\\neach being for the other and both for the pair; especially\\nexemplified by partners in business, they being formally uni-\\nfied. But to view the simple relation of man to man as an\\norganism would lead to no conclusions other than those\\nalready attained, and hence we may now dismiss this simple\\ncase also, and proceed to consider more intricate relations.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "TEE FAMILY 133\\nCHAPTER II\\nTHE FAMILY\\n92. A study of the simple relation of man to man has\\nenabled us to discover the principles of obligation, with their\\napplication in equivalent intercourse. This exposition, how-\\never, though fundamental and widely comprehensive, is not\\nexhaustive, and not adequate to the demands of right living.\\nFor, in actual life, the relations subsisting among men exhibit\\nmany varieties in kind, and those of the same kind many\\ndifferences in degree; also these relations are subject to\\nmany and extreme changes, often amounting to reversal, due\\nto growth, activity, and the ceaseless mutations of inter-\\ncourse. Now, since all obligations originate in and corre-\\nspond to present relations, it follows that the special duty of.\\na man to some one on his right hand is rarely quite similar\\nto what is due to some one on his left also that his duty to\\neither is often quite unlike the duty of that other to him\\nand further, that his duty to any one to-day frequently\\ndiffers greatly from what is due to the same one to-morrow.\\nIt is needful, therefore, to consider the kinds of relations in\\nwhich men stand to each other, and their variations, in order\\nto determine the corresponding obligations.\\nThe relations that obtain among men exhibit many varie-\\nties chiefly because of differences in social organization\\nunder which general title, therefore, human relations and\\nconsequent obligations may be distributed and discussed.\\nThe procedure involves the principle that the perfection of\\nnatural order, its harmony and stability, require that each\\nmember fulfill its office in the several organisms to which it", "height": "3704", "width": "2480", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "134 ORGANIZATION\\nbelongs. This is a natural principle, physical and psychical\\nand ethical, being applicable to the universe considered as\\nan organic whole, as well as to each of its organized mem-\\nbers, and specially, as we have just seen, to the microcosm,\\nman. In society at large each one is morally bound to fulfill\\nhis functions as a member of the whole, and also as a mem-\\nber of each of those subordinate and constitutive organisms\\nin which he is integrant. A study, then, of the chief con-\\nstituents of society will bring into view the various kinds\\nand degrees of duty corresponding to these functional rela-\\ntions, whose variations determine the variations of personal\\nobligation under the sole but universal law of loving service.\\nTo this study we now proceed.\\n93. Nature presents in both animals and plants a fun-\\ndamental fact in sex. This is a primary, inerasable distinc-\\ntion that cuts all higher forms of animated beings, and\\nespecially the total of humanity together with every subordi-\\nnate class of mankind, into two portions, delicately marked\\nby anatomical and physiological variations which extend\\nthroughout the body, being discoverable even in the brain.\\nThe physical differences are normally attended by mental and\\nmoral differences which though less definite are not less deep,\\npermanent and universal. In these differences originate an\\nappetite and an affection which often become passionate,\\ntending on the one hand toward the deepest degradation, and\\non the other to the highest exaltation. Hence it comes that\\nthe relation of the sexes is perhaps the most powerful social\\nfactor in every community, both savage and civilized.\\nHerein the pointing of nature is distinctly to marriage and\\noffspring. It sets apart a pair, a male and female, for each\\nother, their exclusive union being spontaneously guarded by\\nhygienic barriers, and by a prompt jealousy, fierce and fatal.\\nOffspring brings into play strong parental instincts, prompt", "height": "3732", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 135\\ning protection, provision and nurture until maturity. Thus\\nthe family is preeminently a natural institution, which in\\nsome important respects takes precedence of all others, and\\nis fundamental in the constitution of society.\\n94. The ideal family in modern society consists of a\\nmature man and woman, not differing greatly in age, who of\\ntheir own free will, have entered with civil and ecclesiastical\\nforms, into the marriage bond, are living together as husband\\nand wife, and providing for their yet unemancipated chil-\\ndren. Their children are first a son, then a daughter, again\\na son, then another daughter. The parents, beside each\\nother, have both a son and a daughter, and each child has\\nboth a brother and a sister. These exhaust the family rela-\\ntions. To complete this ideal, add a home, giving common\\nshelter, furnishing conveniences, and serving as a local habi-\\ntation and center of union.\\nWhat support this ideal receives from ethical principles\\nwill be more clearly seen after a detailed consideration of\\nthe several relations involved. But we make at once the\\nobvious remark that it is not often fully realized, because of\\nfailure or irregularity in births, intervention of death, or ex-\\ntreme poverty. Still, even in such incomplete families, the\\nrelations are generally sufficient for the unfolding of the\\ndomestic virtues, the building of character, and the enjoy-\\nment of home life.\\n95. It is evident that a family is an organic union of\\nseveral persons, as indicated in their common surname, and\\nin the correlative terms husband and wife, parent and child,\\nfather or mother and son or daughter, brother and sister;\\neach of these implying the existence of the other. Ethically\\neach member is related to every other, and to the whole, as\\nat once means and end. The existence of relations among", "height": "3708", "width": "2472", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "136 ORGANIZATION\\nthese persons determines that there be corresponding obliga-\\ntions, and the variety of relations determines a variety in\\nthe obligations. The particular kind and degree of the obli-\\ngation of each member, is determined by the special function\\nbelonging to that member in maintaining the orderly unity\\nof the organism. Just this much is the duty of each, and\\nno more.\\nIf, however, there be, as there often is, disorder, distrac-\\ntion or failure on the part of some one member, requiring addi-\\ntional and special efforts on the part of the others to restore\\nand maintain order and efficiency, then their duty is enlarged\\nto meet the requisition. An excellent analogy is seen in the\\nphysical organism of the individual man. Each of the organs\\nof his body contributes to the healthful action of every other,\\nand all the others contribute to sustain each one. Moreover,\\nwhen any one is disordered, there is a disturbance more or\\nless general, a sympathetic suffering of all allied organs, and\\na feverish effort of nature to restore the normal condition.\\n96. In the actual case of a man and a woman obeying\\nthe beck of nature, and entering into the marriage relation,\\nlet the distinct personality of each, and their entire moral\\nequivalence, be granted then several important truths are\\nlogically consequent.\\nFirst. In consenting to this union, both parties are to\\nexercise their unbiased free will. Any unwarranted inter-\\nference, objective or subjective, in the liberty of either is a\\ntrespass the more grievous because of its far reaching conse-\\nquences. It is true that circumstances often warrant or even\\nrequire a hindering interference, extending perhaps to pro-\\nhibition, on the part of parents especially, or of friends, or of\\nthe State but it is obvious that, in a matter so extremely\\ndelicate, and of such vast importance to those immediately\\nconcerned, the warrant should be very clear. Compulsory", "height": "3764", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 137\\nmarriage, on the other hand, is never warrantable, and is one\\nof the grossest forms of trespass.\\nSecondly. Actual marriage, or the yielding of each to the\\nother of what is peculiar to the distinct personality, works no\\ndetriment to the honor of either party, provided it be accom-\\npanied by an entirely voluntary, mutual and unreserved sur-\\nrender of all the interests of life into the common keeping\\nof both. Thereby the pair, without losing the distinct\\npersonality, become a single individual personality. In this\\nfusion, their honor, social standing, property and prospects\\nare rightly held in common by each for the other, by each\\nfor both, by both for each. The two are one. Their joint\\nwelfare and happiness is an inseparable compound.\\nThirdly. In the pair thus unified there should be but one\\nwill. A constant endeavor to harmonize opinions, senti-\\nments and desires, wherein a firm adherence to principle is\\ncombined with a yielding even in matters of importance,\\nresults in a singleness of will that is essential to the perfec-\\ntion of the union. A tie so sacred should never be loosened\\nby willful discord. Custom has established on firm and suf-\\nficient grounds that, generally speaking, the control in detail\\nof interests outside the home shall be in the hand of the hus-\\nband, and those within the home shall be subject to the man-\\nagement of the wife. But, while the decisions of each\\nshould be as far as possible in accord with the views and\\nwishes of the other, yet, in case of a permanent differ-\\nence, the final decision should be left to the one in whose\\nprovince the matter in question belongs.\\nFourthly. The union may not be enlarged by the addi-\\ntion of another partner. Polyandry or polygamy, common\\namong brutes, is inadmissible among persons, it being incon-\\nsistent with the moral equivalence of the sexes. If more\\nthan one of either sex be bound to one of the other, the plu-\\nrality is severally deprived of the rank of equal fellowship,\\nand degraded to a thing useful merely as a means.", "height": "3708", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "138 OBGANIZA TION\\nFifthly. While it may be doubted whether there be physi-\\nological reasons why the marriage of persons of near consan-\\nguinity should not be permitted, the ethical reasons are\\nclearly good and sufficient. The marriage of members of\\nthe same family would bring about such an admixture of\\nmoral relations as to confuse the functions of its members,\\nrendering them perplexing and distracting, and so disorder-\\ning the harmony of its system. Hence the State, in the\\ninterest of the family, and of general society whose moral\\nhealth is involved with that of the family, prohibits such\\nmarriage as incestuous, tending to disturb the normal opera-\\ntion of the family organism, and to check the unfolding of\\nits peculiar beauty and worth.\\n97. Marriage is indissoluble, except by death or crime.\\nIf death sever the bonds, a new marriage of the survivor\\ncannot be prohibited by the State, for civil law is properly\\nconcerned with temporal relations only, and so the question\\nof second marriage must be left to the religious convictions\\nof the parties. A formal dissolution of marriage is justified\\nspecially by the crime of conjugal infidelity, this being a vio-\\nlation of its peculiar significance and manifest purpose, and\\nitself an actual breaking of the vow.\\nLegal questions concerning divorce, with permit of new\\nmarriage, present many difficulties, especially on plea of\\ncruelty or desertion. But it is clear that a wished-for disso-\\nlution cannot rightly be decreed merely because of disease,\\npoverty, misfortune, disappointed expectation, incompati-\\nbility, whatever this may mean, or the dissatisfaction of one\\nor both parties, or even because of wickedness and crime\\nthat does not victimize home. None of these can be allowed\\nas sufficient ground for entire divorce, if society would pre-\\nserve its moral health, so largely dependent on the sanctity\\nof marriage. Relief may be had in extreme cases by a legal", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 139\\nrecognition of actual separation, without a severance of the\\nmoral bond that forbids a new relation.\\n98. Persons of full age, and emancipated from parental\\nauthority, often do not marry for some years, or perhaps\\nnever marry. The social status of such persons is more or\\nless abnormal according as they are more or less absolved\\nfrom family connection. For the family is the basis of social\\norganization, and since these are now but external appen-\\ndages to some one, they cannot be accounted more than\\nfractional members of society at large.\\nSuch persons are unhappily at great disadvantage in respect\\nof moral culture. For the conditions of complete develop-\\nment are lacking to those destitute of the familiar objects\\naround which the strongest and best affections of the human\\nsoul gather and grow, and whose lack it is not possible fully\\nto compensate by other lines of moral activity. In these\\nother lines, however, exceptional attainments are often made,\\ncommanding high respect, and rounding out a useful life.\\n99. When the family circle is completed by the birth\\nof children, a new and wide field is opened for the cultiva-\\ntion of ethical graces. Moral possibilities, which otherwise\\nare forever latent, become patent. The potential becomes\\nactual, and nature has not planted in vain. No man is ever\\nwholly a man until he is a husband and a father and, more\\nemphatically, no woman is wholly a woman until she is a\\nwife and mother. A babe is a pledge of love, an additional\\nand powerful tie, a sacred trust, calling out and taxing the\\nmoral energies, and making an unlimited demand on loving\\nservice. All that is beautiful in human nature blooms under\\nthe influence of this fertilizing relation. It is easy to adore\\nthe Madonna.\\nThe familiar care and provident rearing of children con-", "height": "3708", "width": "2456", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "140 OR GANIZA TION\\nstantly exercises the domestic virtues, tending directly to the\\nperfection of manhood and womanhood. The responsibility\\nand difficulty are of the gravest. The culture should be\\ndominated by the view that, in the order of nature, the child\\nis destined to moral independence, and to membership in\\nsociety. In being prepared for this, it has many and very\\nsacred rights. Its parents are bound, as their function in\\nthe family organism, to provide for its healthful maintenance\\nsuitable to their rank in society, for its education, intellec-\\ntual, moral and religious, and, in general, for its present and\\nprospective welfare. Great laxity of restraint is likely to be\\nruinous; but, on the other hand, severe restrictions, a rigid\\nmolding of character, opinions, and religious creed, is hardly\\nless to be deprecated as an injurious trespass on the right of\\nthe child to generous culture, and the free growth of its\\nindividuality.\\nThe office of brothers and sisters in this organic relation\\nis affectionate sympathy, and mutual helpfulness, which\\nshould extend throughout life. As sons and daughters they\\nare bound to honor father and mother by a willing and\\npleased obedience to their rightful authority, and by a\\nprompt readiness to promote their welfare. Also they are\\nbound to guard sedulously the honor of the family name,\\nand to seek actively the advancement of the common interest.\\n100. This human institution, the family, is preeminently\\nnatural, being physically determined. Those born into it\\nare involuntarily and inseparably its members. By its pri-\\nmacy it stands as the unit of society and of the State, with-\\nout derogation from the distinct personality, moral status\\nand obligation of its individual members. Yet it is a whole.\\nEven when some part or parts are lacking, it is still a unit.\\nIt is not a logical whole, a genus, for its parts are not\\nspecies or kinds of family. It is an integral whole not col-", "height": "3732", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 141\\nlective, as a cluster of grapes, but organic, as a flower whose\\ncentral organs, stamen and pistil, yield germ and seed, within\\na corolla. It is an individual, indivisible in itself, and sepa-\\nrate from every other.\\nLess clear perhaps, but not less true, is it that a family is\\na single personality. The definition of a person is a being\\nconscious of obligation. Now there is a consciousness com-\\nmon to all members of a family, an intelligent apprehension\\nof moral law which is the same in each, a judgment which,\\nunder the influence of common interest, is assimilated into\\none, a pervading sentiment, a united impulse to effectuate a\\nsingle will. The obligation of some one family as an organic\\nwhole to some one man as its benefactor, or to some other\\nfamily, or to general society, is matter of familiar speech and\\nacknowledgment, and the common consciousness of such\\nobligation constitutes its unique personality, quite distin-\\nguishable from the peculiar personality of its several mem-\\nbers. To this conception of its distinct personality may be\\nadded the possession of family traits in features, manners,\\ncustoms, habits, and in general, of character, often sharply\\nmarked. Moreover, what wounds one member, wounds all\\nthe honor, dignity and welfare of the whole, is in common\\nkeeping.\\n101. The individual personality of a family as an organ-\\nized unit, distinct from the personality of its members, is\\nmanifest in the significant fact that it claims a life beyond\\nthe present generation. Its ancestry extending back for\\nages is its pride, and its posterity in an indefinite future is\\nits hope. What it has been confers titles of honor, and what\\nit may become excites anxious solicitude. The death of a\\nmember breaks in upon its present entirety, but does not\\ninterrupt its continuity. Only by sterility and death com-\\nbined is it extinguished, and this is accounted a special loss\\nto society, a public and private misfortune.", "height": "3712", "width": "2464", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "142 ORGANIZATION\\nA family of the present generation, inheriting the honor\\nand wealth of the same family in preceding generations, rec-\\nognizes its moral obligation to maintain and rightly use the\\ntrust, thus discharging a sacred debt due the dead. Also it\\nrecognizes its moral obligation to the coming generation in\\nprovision for its welfare, thus discharging a sacred debt due\\ndescendants, including those yet unborn. That one is thus\\nbound to pay debts due the deceased and the unborn, is not\\nfanciful sentiment, nor figurative speech, but real, literal\\nethics. Current expressions and approved literature recog-\\nnize in many ways the obligation as especially incumbent on\\nthe family, whose individuality and personality extend\\nthrough generations that come and go, yet perpetuate its\\norganic unity.\\n102. The foregoing considerations enable us to under-\\nstand more clearly the ethical principles that regulate the\\nholding and disposing of property.\\nProperty owned by either party at time of marriage, and\\nthat acquired afterward, is, by virtue of the marriage, the\\ncommon property of the family. That either husband or\\nwife should have property at disposal apart from and inde-\\npendently of the other, though often it is so arranged, con-\\ntradicts the unity of the relation, drawing a line of separation\\nand making a distinction that ought never to exist. Such\\nan arrangement is inconsistent with that entire surrender of\\nall the interests of life into the common keeping which the\\nmarriage bond requires; and in so far the marriage is but\\npartial. The reserve implies a distrust that is chilling, and\\nlikely to produce a discord that is fatal. It is a withholding\\ntrespass.\\nEvidently, then, the family property should not be largely\\nventured in trade, or otherwise disposed of, without the free\\nconsent of all members, including the children, in whom also", "height": "3760", "width": "2476", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "THE FAMILY 143\\nproperty rights are vested by birth, when they become suffi-\\nciently mature to appreciate and rightly judge the interests\\ninvolved. Yet, be it remembered, that each and all should\\nseek, by a reasonable yielding, to assimilate their views and\\nwishes, thereby attaining a unity of will which thus becomes\\nthe will of the family.\\nAlso it is evident that the management of the family prop-\\nerty in detail must be left to some one member. This seems\\nnaturally to devolve upon the husband and father who,\\naccording to the usual and approved order, takes charge of\\nthe family interests outside of home, and hence is best\\nacquainted with public affairs. Because property is held\\nand ordinary business transacted in his name, he is apt to\\nregard himself as exclusive and irresponsible owner. This\\nerror, pervading society, stands greatly in need of correction.\\n103. Distribution by testament of the property of a\\nfamily is, for like reasons, by the hand and in the name of\\nits ostensible head also for the reason that, preparatory to\\nhis decease, when the house band is loosed, and the family\\ndisintegrated, there is need of a special and provisory adjust-\\nment of property rights by the one to whom their care has\\nbeen chiefly committed. In any such adjustment the united\\nconsensus of all members should be had, so that together\\nwith the avoidance of any actual trespass, complaint of wrong\\nmay also be forestalled.\\nTestamentary distribution gives rise to many difficult\\nquestions which largely occupy the courts. The funda-\\nmental principles involved are, however, sufficiently clear.\\nA producer has a right to use and dispose of his products at\\nwill, and this will must be effective beyond his decease, else\\na great incentive to industry and accumulation would be lost,\\nprojects for the benefit of the coming generation would not\\nbe devised and driven, and social progress would be hindered,", "height": "3700", "width": "2480", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "144 OB GANIZA TION\\ninasmuch as each generation would have to make a new be-\\nginning. But let it be observed that the home management\\nand industry, its provision for rest and refreshment, its cheer-\\ning influence, its trifling comforts even, are very important\\nelements in the efficiency of the producer, and thereby enter\\ninto his product so that all members of the home circle, but\\nespecially the husband and wife, are partners in business,\\nand since they share in the producing, are entitled to share\\nin the production, both in consuming and in disbursing.\\nBeside this, it should be distinctly recognized that all posses-\\nsions are held and managed as trusts, and their agreed testa-\\nmentary distribution should be regulated accordingly. The\\ntestator is bound to provide suitably for the family, thus dis-\\ncharging his primary obligation as its trustee. A surplus\\nmay rightly become matter of bequest to collaterals, to friends,\\nor to the general public, in the founding or endowing hospi-\\ntals, schools, libraries, and such like benefactions, according\\nto the best judgment of the trustee representing the family in\\nthis discharge of its alien obligations.", "height": "3732", "width": "2460", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 145\\nCHAPTER III\\nTHE COMMUNITY\\n104. Human beings manifest a strong disposition to\\ngather into groups more or less permanent. In some of these\\npopulation is massed, as in cities in others it is more sparse,\\nas in villages, hamlets, neighborhoods. Hence in any inhab-\\nited region, it is easy to point out centers of population,\\nthough the circumference be quite indefinite. Besides the\\ngregarious instinct of the human animal, there are many\\nrational determinants of this tendency, both economical and\\nethical. Every one owes his existence to progenitors and\\nalso is indebted for its continuance, for all physical means,\\nconveniences and comforts of living, for all intellectual and\\nmoral culture, so entirely to association, more or less intimate,\\nwith his fellows, that all the interests of life, his whole wel-\\nfare, is bound up with them. Strict independence is a prac-\\ntical impossibility.\\nA group of people thus specially related by living in prox-\\nimity is a community. This is not merely a collection but a\\nbody of people for the necessities of its members which draw\\nthem together determine at once an organic constitution.\\nEach member contributes more or less directly to the welfare\\nof every other, and to the welfare of the whole, in which\\nwelfare he participates. The variations of function are deter-\\nmined by the pressure of various needs, and by the fitness of\\nvarious abilities to meet them. There is a tacit consensus in\\nthe distribution of these functions; but since there is no\\nformal and definite enactment of a constitution, the com-\\nmunity is often spoken of as unorganized society whereas,", "height": "3700", "width": "2416", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "146 ORGANIZATION\\nthough not formally, yet it is essentially an organism, neces-\\nsitated by the interdependence of its members.\\n105. Recur to the primary ethical principle that every\\none has a right to gratify his normal desires, and to this, be-\\nside, that it is his obligation not merely passively to allow\\ntheir impulse, but actively to seek their gratification, and it\\nis manifest that the fulfillment of obligation is impracticable\\napart from society. For, no class of normal desires can\\nproperly be gratified without reference to associates; but\\nespecially the affections, which are conditioned on the presen-\\ntation of sentient objects, can have no exercise in solitary life.\\nIn such life the chiefest, indeed the sole function of humanity\\nis perverted and comes to naught. Mankind is a brother-\\nhood, and it is only by close fraternization, only by being a\\nman among men, that it is possible to be wholly a man.\\nWhoever lives his life in its natural and rightful fullness is a\\nconstant recipient from his fellows of the necessary means,\\nfor which he is dependent on them, and therefore is constantly\\nincurring an indebtedness which requires a constant reciprocal\\nactivity to repay.\\nThese considerations forbid an ascetic life, which, under\\nthe guise of righteous self-denial, renounces invigorating en-\\njoyment, and thus leads to such an impoverishment of spirit-\\nual power that its dues go unpaid. Nor can the life of a\\nrecluse be approved, which seeks self-sufficiency in solitude\\nand retired contemplation, or an escape from thronging ills\\nby a timid retreat into privacy, idle ease, and indifference to\\nthe common welfare. Likewise we must condemn the life\\nof a reserved student who, enamored of truth, withdraws\\nfrom familiar intercourse, and in the scholarly seclusion of\\nhis library seeks to accumulate knowledge with no intent or\\nthought of sharing it, and thereby promoting the well-being\\neven of his compeers. These several forms of social seques-", "height": "3768", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 147\\ntration can be approved only when they are temporary, and\\nfor the purpose of recuperation and preparation for better\\nservice in subsequent life. Thus only can they be acquitted\\nof selfishness, and accepted as transient phases of that active\\nlife of practical benevolence which alone develops the moral\\ndignity of true manhood.\\n106. The reciprocal obligations of the members of a com-\\nmunity are recognized in a code of social intercourse, an\\nunwritten common law, which prevails throughout and regu-\\nlates communication. This law, like the unwritten Common\\nLaw of the courts, is a detail of rights and duties. Both sys-\\ntems originated in the exigencies of popular intercourse, and\\nby degrees have been fully developed and both are but va-\\nriations, explications and applications of the law of trespass.\\nThe conventions of society are known as the rules of good\\nbreeding and good manners. They require comity, a proper\\nconsideration and respect for the minor rights of each other,\\na delicate regard for one another s wishes, feelings and pe-\\nculiarities, a prompt attention to wants, their serviceable\\nanticipation, a complaisant readiness in assistance; this is\\npoliteness. In the denser portions of a community there\\nis constant call for its exercise, so that people, even those of\\notherwise indifferent culture, become by attrition polished,\\nthat is, polite they are civil, and the higher ranks are cour-\\nteous or courtly in address. To this must be added the spe-\\ncial code of social etiquette observed in refined circles, which\\ndescends to minutiae, and is so rigid in its required decorum\\nthat an infraction of it is sometimes less readily condoned\\nthan vice. All such conventionalities arise from the union\\nor consolidation of interests and responsibilities, and betoken\\nthe solidarity of the community.\\n107. A prime condition of the wholesomeness of a com-\\nmunity is the truthfulness of its members. The obligation", "height": "3708", "width": "2536", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "148 ORGANIZATION\\nto be truthful in both word and deed is clear. Every one\\nhas a right to certain services from his fellow man, and a\\nusually just and sometimes very important claim is for an\\nopinion, judgment, information, direction, advice, sympathy.\\nIf these be reserved when due, it is a trespass, a restriction\\nof a rightful liberty to use and profit by them. Still greater\\nis the trespass, if they be misstated, thereby misinforming\\nand misleading the recipient, for then his trust is violated,\\nhis confidence outraged. If the claim be allowed, the expres-\\nsion by word or deed must be true to the thought.\\nBut the claim is not always just, not always to be allowed.\\nWe are not always bound to speak; often it is right and\\nwise to be silent. Nor, if we speak, are we always bound to\\ntell the whole truth in which case the extent of the reserve\\nis matter for conscientious judgment, having care not to mis-\\nlead by the partial statement. This right of private reserve\\nis superseded by the courts in the interest of society, and the\\nwitness required to tell the whole truth without reserve.\\nWhether deceit in any form is ever justifiable is a ques-\\ntion that has been discussed for centuries, and is still unset-\\ntled. On the one hand it is affirmed that deceit is in its\\nvery nature irreconcilable with the eternal principles of right\\nand justice and on the other hand it is asserted that certain\\nemergencies may justify a departure from ordinary rules of\\nconduct, and render deceit not only justifiable bat obligatory.\\nThis question of the ages is not to be answered in a few\\nwords. We must be content here with saying first, that a\\nlie is never justifiable secondly, that not every deception is\\nto be accounted a lie, e.g., the myth of Santa Claus and\\nthirdly, if the definition of a deception be allowed wider\\nscope than the definition of a lie, yet is a deception so rarely\\nright and duty that every one should practice habitual truth-\\nfulness, deviating from it with great hesitation, and only\\nwhen the justification is beyond all question.", "height": "3772", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 149\\n108. The general obligation to be truthful takes a num-\\nber of specific forms. Beside this duty in the commonplace\\ntalking of familiar intercourse, we place the formal tie of a\\npromise, written, oral, or indirectly implied in mere behavior.\\nThe obligation in such case is strengthened by the fact that\\nthe promisee, in reliance on the faithfulness of the promiser,\\nmay in his life conduct order important matters with refer-\\nence to the promise, and suffer injury or even disaster should\\nit fail. A promise given under an essential misunderstand-\\ning, or, since we cannot accurately forecast the future, in\\ncase the duty of its observance is superseded by some higher\\nunforeseen duty with which it is radically inconsistent, is\\nnull. This does not endorse the loose aphorism that a bad\\npromise is better broken than kept for, if its badness work\\nmerely the private personal injury of the promiser, unless\\nruinous in an intolerable extreme, he is not thereby dis-\\ncharged of the obligation. We commend him that sweareth\\nto his own hurt, and changeth not. A promise made under\\ncompulsion cannot be claimed by the promisee, yet it meas-\\nurably binds the promiser because of respect for his word.\\nIn no case, however, is a promise obligatory if the fulfillment\\nbe criminal, for it can never be duty to commit crime.\\nA contract or covenant differs from a simple promise in\\nthat it implies an exchange of services, and reciprocal obliga-\\ntion. It is usually under the protection of special statute,\\nan outcome of the moral element, of that mutual trust which\\nis the basis of social order. Contracts are of endless variety,\\nand affect nearly every detail of private and public life and\\nif their binding character were not fully recognized there\\nwould be no security in affairs. A deception practiced by\\neither party in making a contract invalidates it but both\\nparties must abide the consequences of carelessness, thought-\\nlessness, or stupidity.\\nCommon honesty in trade, and in business dealings gener-", "height": "3700", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "150 ORGANIZATION\\nally, is another form of truthfulness. Exchange of services,\\nof goods, and of other forms of property, has the advantage\\nof being estimated numerically in the medium of exchange,\\nmoney, which gives exactness to the mutual obligation, and\\nsharply expresses its violation. The interests involved in\\nsuch transactions are so widely interlaced that fraud excites\\ngeneral indignation and reprobation. There is hardly any\\nform of trespass that incurs such deep and lasting disgrace\\nas dishonesty.\\n109. The membership of an organized community does\\nnot consist in merely so many men, women and children,\\nstanding singly as discrete elements coalescing into a con-\\ncrete body. A strong tendency to such individualism has\\nmarked the nineteenth century, in France, in England, and\\neven more positively in the United States. It cries out for\\nliberty, equality, fraternity, and demands that creed, race, and\\neven sex shall be ignored on the forum, at the polls, and in\\nthe schools. Now, while each individual man and woman is\\na distinguishable member of society, it should be observed,\\nin opposition to individualism, that each is primarily a mem-\\nber of a family whereby he or she is socialized, that the\\nfamily is properly the organized and organizing unit of so-\\nciety, and that a community consists fundamentally of asso-\\nciated families. This incidentally appears in the fact that\\nthe social standing of the individual is in general determined\\nby that of his family, above which it is difficult to rise, and\\nbelow which one rarely falls. The question, What is he?\\nasks after his vocation but, Who is he asks after his\\nfamily.\\nA variety of minor organizations are usually formed by\\nvoluntary association, which also are integrant members as,\\nsocial or literary clubs, and benevolent societies. Beside\\nthese are business firms of two or more members, stock com-", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 151\\npanies, cooperative associations, and guilds or trade-unions.\\nSuch combinations for more effective achievement are often\\nlegally incorporated, and usually have a contract or articles\\nof agreement, or a written organic law or constitution, stating\\nthe ends they seek and the means, and defining the functions\\nof members and officers as duties; the variations in duty\\narising from a specializing of functions so as to constitute\\nan efficient cooperative whole. A special class of subordi-\\nnate organisms is seen in the schools, which also usually\\nhave a formal constitution and laws defining the duties of\\nmembers, official and unofficial. They are instituted specially\\nto meet the debt due the next generation, are essential to the\\nperpetuity rather than to the maintenance of society, and\\nform a bond, a historical enchainment, between its present\\nand its future.\\nEach of the foregoing minor organizations is itself a mem-\\nber of the community, having, as already said of the family,\\nan individual personality distinguishable from the individual\\npersonality of its components. Moreover, although the\\nbounds of any single community be ill defined, still commu-\\nnities are recognized as more or less distinct from one\\nanother. Now each of these as an organic whole has not\\nonly obligations to its various members, but also to neighbor-\\ning communities with which it is in communication. Thus\\nthe community as a whole is an individual, a personality,\\nwith a conscience, and a moral judgment in the consensus of\\nits members, which passes upon its own character and con-\\nduct, upon that of its several members, and upon that of\\naffiliated communities.\\n110. The organic nature of a community distributing\\nvarious functions or offices and consequent duties among its\\nmembers, is clearly seen in its division of labor. The neces-\\nsities of life necessitate labor, but no one by his own labor", "height": "3680", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "152 OB GANIZA TION\\nalone can surely supply even these, much less can he produce\\nthe many requisites to comfortable living. The civilized man\\nhas many desires or wants that have become so habitual as to\\nbe classed as necessaries. For the full gratification of these\\nhe is dependent on the productive labor of his fellows.\\nHence the pressure of such wants molds the community\\ninto an organism, in which each works for every other, and\\nthey for him also he labors for the welfare of the whole, and\\nthe end of the whole is the welfare of each. Thus a simple\\ncommunity will comprise a shoemaker, a tailor, a carpenter,\\na blacksmith, a shopkeeper, a printer, a doctor, a lawyer, a\\nschoolmaster, and a curate. These exchange services or\\nproducts, and a variety of duties is a consequence of the\\norganization.\\nA discussion of division of labor is not proper to a treatise\\non Ethics, but belongs rather to the theory of Economics.\\nIt is appropriate, however, to observe that, in addition to its\\neconomical advantage, it has the moral advantage of giving\\nrise to the common virtues of honesty, industry, and respect\\nfor order, and to a sense of personal responsibility, the re-\\nsponsibility of each worker to his fellows and to the commu-\\nnity at large. Besides, it originates the conception of a\\nvocation, a calling, and establishes each worker in a position,\\nchanged from a mere man into a member, whereby he is no\\nlonger just like all others, but assumes a place and mark\\nspecially his own. Extreme division of labor, however, de-\\npresses the intellectual status of the laborer, narrows his\\nspiritual horizon, and assimilates his activity to that of an\\nautomatic mechanism.\\nThe distribution of functions brings about social classifica-\\ntion. Mere laborers are distinguished from farmers and\\nmechanics, and these from skilled artisans, and these again\\nfrom artists and the professional class whose work is mostly\\nintellectual. Greater honor always attaches to the finer, and", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "THE COMMUNITY 153\\nless to the coarser kinds of labor. This has the wholesome\\neffect of inducing effort to rise into what is accounted a\\nhigher social rank, and is thus a powerful stimulus to civil-\\nization. But here also an abatement must be made. Classes\\nstrongly marked tend to become castes, in which form their\\nwholesome effect disappears, ambitious effort is paralyzed,\\nimprovement discouraged, and civilization restrained.\\n111. In a prosperous community, one whose wealth in\\ngeneral is increasing, capital or the wealth destined to repro-\\nductive consumption tends to accumulate in the hands of\\nthose more intelligently industrious, and thereby a special\\nclass is formed, the capitalists. These are marked off from\\nthe wage-earners whom they employ in their large and\\nenlarging industrial enterprises. Now the economical advan-\\ntages of large capital engaged in extensive and systematic\\nindustry are obvious, yet just because of the greater uni-\\nformity, abundance and cheapness of its products, the ability\\nof the small free crafts to subsist is curtailed, which reduces\\nthe larger portion of the community to the position of wage-\\nearners under the mastership of the capitalists, on whom\\ntheir livelihood depends. The evils of this division of soci-\\nety, and of this enforced relation, have become familiar in\\nwhat are known as labor troubles. The grasping selfishness\\nof moneyed power induces oppression; and the sense of\\ninjustice, and the dissatisfaction with the unequal distribution\\nof the amenities of life, induce violent revolt.\\nCertain remedial schemes, under the generic name of\\nsocialism, have attained notoriety and many advocates. They\\npropose a reorganization of society, giving it a more definite\\nand compact solidarity. In general, they would abolish com-\\npetition in labor, wages, and particular or private ownership\\nof property, especially of land substituting work under the\\nstimulus of public spirit, an equal distribution of products,", "height": "3704", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "154 ORGANIZATION\\nand a common ownership and disposition of all fixed property\\nby closely organized society. A still more radical scheme of\\nreorganization, called communism, proposes to abolish also\\nthe family, substituting for domestic relations and the gov-\\nernment of parental authority, temporary unions, and a com-\\nmunistic care for the nurture and education of offspring.\\nAttempts to maintain such schemes in practical operation\\nhave hitherto failed.\\nA discussion of socialism as to its economical value, and\\neven as to its ethical worth, must be passed by with the gen-\\neral remark that the evils of society as actually constituted\\narise, not from contrived injustice, but from a lack of moral\\nequipoise. In the ideal community, which moral culture\\nseeks to attain, there would be no tolerated trespass upon\\nthe rights of even the humblest member and in the absence\\nof just cause of revolt, all would be content in the station\\ndetermined by merit, by the relative value of services. Until\\nthis Utopia be realized, a more intelligent apprehension of the\\ninseparable interests of capital and labor would conduce to\\ngreater harmony, to mutual respect, and to a wider recogni-\\ntion of reciprocal rights. Meantime, remedy against oppres-\\nsion by either party should be sought, not in turbulence and\\ndisorder, but in appeal to that which is set for the guardian-\\nship of rights, to the strong arm of the State.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 155\\nCHAPTER IV\\nTHE STATE\\n112. It is essential to any widely associated life of men\\nthat there should be definite and effective provision for the\\nprotection of rights. For in every community evil-doers, or\\nat least doers disposed to trespass, are so many, active and\\nstrong, that its several members are not competent, without\\ncombination, to maintain intact their rightful liberties.\\nMoreover, certain important interests of the total community\\nare best served by concerted action, indeed many cannot\\notherwise be served. To attain these two general ends, the\\nsafeguard of rights and the advancement of the common weal,\\nthe one protecting, the other promoting, is the purpose of\\nthe State.\\nThe established State occupies a definite territory. It em-\\nbraces several, perhaps many distinguishable communities,\\nusually of one race and language, having common manners,\\ncustoms and traditions. It consists primarily of the whole\\nbody of people, the body politic, including all officers of gov-\\nernment but the term is often, secondarily, limited to the\\nofficial class, the sovereign body having supreme power held\\nin trust for the common weal, which class, however, is more\\nproperly termed the government.\\nIt is not within the scope of this treatise to discuss the\\nrelative merits of different forms of state government, nor to\\ntrace the historical evolution of the State through the abuses,\\nturmoils, and civil wars which, because of the imperfect or\\nerroneous views and the selfish ambition of statesmen and", "height": "3700", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "156 ORGANIZATION\\nrulers, have embarrassed its development. We shall attempt\\nno more than to sketch the essential features of its constitu-\\ntion, and to indicate its exclusively ethical basis, its thor-\\nough-going ethical character, and the varieties of moral\\nobligation imposed on its members by its specific and peculiar\\norganization.\\n113. Governments are distinguished as monarchic, aris-\\ntocratic or republican, and democratic. Some combine ele-\\nments of each of these principal forms; as, Great Britain.\\nNo exclusive preference can be given to any one form. That\\nis best which best accords with the historical traditions and\\nhabits of its subjects, is suitable to their grade of intellectual\\nand ethical culture, and is administered in the interest of the\\npublic rather than of the rulers.\\nEvery well-ordered State, whatever be its form of govern-\\nment, has essentially a Constitution, unwritten or written,\\npositively decreed, and loyally observed by its officials and\\ncitizens. The Constitution is the fundamental organic law,\\norganizing the body politic. It has three essential features\\narising from the very nature of the State, the legislative, the\\njudicial, the executive. The functions of the three are some-\\ntimes embodied in one person as, an absolute monarch. In\\nmany cases they are irregularly distributed to a number of\\npersons but the historical trend is clearly to separate them\\nas distinct departments intrusted to a distinct personnel as,\\nin each of the States of our Union, and in the Federal whole.\\nThe function of the Legislature is to enact statutory laws\\nwithin the limits and in pursuance of the organic law, the\\nConstitution. As a necessary corollary it has authority to\\naffix penalties to these laws to insure their observance, and\\npower to lay and collect taxes for the support of the govern-\\nment, and for the execution of its measures.\\nThe function of the Judiciary is to sit in judgment on the", "height": "3732", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 157\\nconstitutionality of the legislated statutes, to interpret their\\napplication, to sanction and decree the penalty for violation.\\nWhen not otherwise directed by statute, the inferior courts\\nproceed in accord either with the Roman or Civil Law, as in\\nthe States of continental Europe, or with the English Com-\\nmon Law, which has been adopted as the basis of jural rights\\nin the United States.\\nThe function of the Executive is to enforce the laws and\\ncarry out the measures enacted by the Legislature. The\\nexecution of laws respecting crime, and of those respecting\\nproperty rights, is intrusted to the inferior courts with their\\npolice and prison auxiliaries, backed by the superior courts,\\nand by the chief executive, be he governor, or president, or\\nking. Measures for the public weal, as the coinage of money,\\nthe care and disbursement of the public funds, the system of\\npublic education, the postal system, the improvement of har-\\nbors and waterways, the making of treaties, and many others,\\nare carried into effect by this branch of the government.\\nAlso the chief executive is commander in chief of the army\\nand navy, wherewith to insure domestic tranquillity, and the\\ncommon defense against foreign aggression, invasion, or other\\nform of trespass.\\n114. Now be it observed that the State is a complete,\\nauthoritative and powerful organization. Its foundation is\\non human rights, its superstructure is a fortress against tres-\\npass, a lodgment of justice, an abode of public duty and\\npatriotic service. The structure is not new for the human\\nrace, so long as it has existed, has been busied in building,\\nremodeling, repairing, improving, and maintaining in differ-\\nent forms, through all the vicissitudes of history, this emi-\\nnently ethical institution.\\nRecalling the definition of an organism, that each member\\nis at once means and end for every other, and the whole for", "height": "3692", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "158 ORGANIZATION\\neach and each for the whole, we observe: first, that each\\ncitizen in his action as such, as in voting, or paying a tax, or\\nserving on a jury or in the army, and likewise each officer of\\nany department in exercising his special function, is thereby\\nexpending energy as a means for the profit, directly or re-\\nmotely, of every other individual member of the State sec-\\nondly, that in so far as each member is profited thereby, he is\\nan end thirdly, that the whole as a systematized means finds\\nits end in guarding and promoting the liberty, privileges,\\nrights and property of each individual member separately\\ntaken; and fourthly, that it is the function of each officer\\nand citizen to become a means whereby to maintain the integ-\\nrity and efficiency of the State in all its departments as an\\nend. In ancient times this last relation was emphasized, the\\npeople are for the State as in the Roman Constitution, and\\nin the Spartan Constitution so greatly admired by Aristotle.\\nIn modern times the reverse relation is emphasized, the State\\nis for the people as in the Virginia Bill of Rights, which\\nhas been generally accepted as their Magna Charta by the\\nUnited States. The right relation, however, between the\\ngoverning and the governed is one of constant reciprocity.\\nThe mutual obligations are dissimilar, but in delicate and\\nadmirable equipoise.\\nMoreover, in observing that the ends in every view are\\nthe preventing of trespass and the promoting of welfare, it\\nis evident that the raison d etre of the organization, and its\\ninforming element is strictly ethical. It would be easy to\\ntreat in detail of the duties of citizens to the State, and of\\nthe duties of the State to citizens, showing them to be\\nstrictly and exclusively moral obligations of high order, all\\ncoming under die law of trespass as prohibitions or as\\nrequisitions and it is well worth repeating that all laws of\\ncivil government are amplifications and specifications of the\\nlaw of trespass. The Legislature originates no law abso-", "height": "3732", "width": "2452", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 159\\nlutely. Haying discovered certain rights unguarded or in\\nabeyance, it is obligated to enact specific laws to meet the\\nspecific cases; and these laws derive their authority ulti-\\nmately, not from the enacting body, nor from the whole\\npeople whom it represents, but from the fundamental impera-\\ntive principle of right and justice, the moral law.\\n115. Mention has already been made of the strong\\ntendency in recent days to individualism, of the disposition\\nto lay stress upon the individual personality of each man\\nand woman, slighting the unity of society in favor of its\\ndisparate plurality. It is evidently a reaction against the\\ncentralizing tendency of former times, which regarded the\\nState as comprised in one man, or in one set of men, and all\\nothers as fused to a mass whose sole relation to the state\\nwas subservience. Both views are exaggerations, between\\nwhich lies the truth. Both violate the organic character of\\nthe State, the latter excessively integrating, the former dis-\\nintegrating.\\nAgainst individualism we point out that the State is not\\nan aggregate of men and women, nor are individual men\\nand women its originating units. The unit of the State is\\nthe family. As a city is composed of houses, so is a State\\nof homes. The representative head of a family judges and\\nacts for it in uniting with others to organize, or in the far\\nmore usual case, to conduct the affairs of the already organ-\\nized State. To him alone is properly committed the right of\\nsuffrage, as the one best capable of guarding and promoting\\nall interests outside the domestic sphere. It has been wisely\\nsaid that the two pillars upon which the whole structure of\\nthe State reposes, are the sanctity of the family relations\\nand of the judicial oath. Should a blind Samson bow\\nhimself on these, the whole edifice would fall with disaster\\nto ruins.", "height": "3696", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "160 ORGANIZATION\\nThe State is thus constituted primarily of a congeries of\\nfamilies organized into the larger whole. But beside these\\nare many other organizations holding membership in the\\nState, to whom protection is due as, business firms, stock\\ncompanies, and corporations generally, including incorporated\\ntowns and cities. These are endowed by the State with\\nlarge powers, and thus become subordinate municipalities,\\neach imperium in imperio. Also each department of the\\nState, and each of its subdivisions, as a court, an army, is\\nitself a subsidiary organism.\\n116. The State as an organized whole, while distin-\\nguished by special characteristics, has features resembling\\nthose of its elementary and subsidiary members. It is logi-\\ncally indivisible in itself, an individual. Its subdivisions are\\nnot kinds, but departments, into which it is logically severed.\\nAs a self-subsisting individual, it has a life whose beginning\\nis sometimes out of sight in remote antiquity, as that of\\nGreece and whose continuity does not depend on that of\\nits several members. We are born into it, we live within it,\\nwe die out from it we are but its transient accidents. A\\nman looks forward to his end, and makes provision for it by\\ntestament a State, looking forward with expectation of in-\\ndefinite continuity, makes no provision for an end.\\nMoreover, a State is a personality. It has an intelligence\\nand a culture of its own, and it has a will of its own. Also\\nit has a conscience of its own. Often it incurs debt, and\\nwith unconstrained honesty meets its obligation. If it fail,\\nit is dishonored and disgraced before the world, and causes\\nguilty shame in every citizen, though he himself be blame-\\nless. Sometimes States commit crime as States, and are\\npunished by other States, or by ordinary providence. Usu-\\nally they are very jealous of national honor, and an offense\\narouses national indignation.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 161\\nAlso this distinct individual personality is manifest in the\\nfamiliar recognition of national calamities, national pros-\\nperity, national blessing, and national thanksgiving all these\\nbeing clearly distinguished from what befalls this and that\\nman, or this and that family. Withal there is a national\\ncharacter, as seen by contrast of the English, French, and\\nSpanish peoples, more or less common to the individual\\ncitizens, but attributed to the nationality rather than to the\\nman. It is only in a clear recognition of the distinct and\\nunique personality of the State that a full and correct con-\\nception can be had of civic interest, of common welfare, and\\nof public obligation.\\n117. Let us here give a passing glance at the great vari-\\nety of duties devolving upon a man because of his member-\\nship in a variety of organizations, each involving a special\\nclass or series of obligations. First as a member of a family,\\nwhose name he bears, he has peculiar obligations to each of\\nthe other members and to the whole. Then as a member of\\npolite society, as a business man in the market, on change or\\nin professional relations, as one of a club, or company, or as-\\nsociation, or church, he enters into many varied relations;\\nand, since obligation is founded on relation, these many varied\\nrelations determine, not only a multiplication but also a diver-\\nsity, in kind and degree, of obligations. No man compre-\\nhends life until he is made to see by how many organic fila-\\nments he is bound to his fellows how utterly impossible it\\nis for him to separate his interests and his fortunes from\\ntheirs in how many ways the welfare of those who are\\nround about him depends upon the working, in due manner\\nand measure, of that part of the organism which he occupies.\\nWith membership in the State, whether as a citizen sim-\\nply or as an official also, arises another distinct series of obli-\\ngations, often of a very exacting and absorbing character.", "height": "3696", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "162 ORGANIZATION\\nUpon the sincere discharge of these by rulers and subjects\\ndepend the health and strength, the wholesome welfare, of\\nthe body politic. No merely perfunctory conduct, no dis-\\nplay of avowed patriotism, can replace genuine civic virtue.\\nIt is sorrowful to observe that public duties are ordinarily\\nperformed from dread of penalty or hope of reward, or per-\\nhaps from the higher motive of respect for the law. But in\\nextraordinary junctures, in crises, in war, the service ren-\\ndered, even when enforced, is often loving service, the com-\\npulsory is lost in the voluntary, and the dormant good-will\\nof the people arouses to free and devoted exercise. This\\nloving service of the State is the noble affection of true\\npatriotism.\\n118. What is the justification of legal punishment?\\nWhat is the ground on which rests the acknowledged right\\nof society organized as a State to deprive a member offend-\\ning against its laws of his property, his liberty, his life?\\nWhat is the warrant This grave question has been vari-\\nously answered. It is the right of the stronger, the com-\\nbined force of many against one, the right of might, say\\nsome. It is the right of vengeance, of revenge for injury,\\ntransferred from the sufferer to the more capable and effect-\\nive State, say others. Yet others say, in lofty words, the\\ndignity and authority of the law must be vindicated; the\\nbroken law must have its integrity restored, must be made\\nwhole again, rendered holy, sanctified, reconsecrated in the\\neyes of all before whom it has been violated, and this is the\\nend of penalty. Let us seek firmer ground, some more\\nrational justification.\\nAt the beginning of this treatise it was pointed out as a\\nfamiliar fact in history that men are exceedingly tenacious of\\ntheir rights, defending their claims with great pertinacity.\\nThis is obviously the ultimate explanation of most quarrels", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 163\\nbetween individual men, of suits and prosecutions before the\\ncourts, of contests between states or nations leading to inter-\\nnecine wars. Evidently by the common judgment of men\\nevery one has a right to defend a right.\\nThis judgment is clearly correct. For, if we once more\\nfix discriminating attention on the primary, necessary, and\\nuniversal notion of a right, we discern, implied in its exclu-\\nsive ownership, this addendum to the original conception, a\\nright to defend a right. Whatever possession is truly my\\nown, I may retain and use, I may protect it from all damage,\\nespecially from trespass, I have a right, indeed am bound, to\\ndefend it against all comers. Evidently the right and obli-\\ngation to defend my right is an essential implication in the\\ndemand for maintenance of moral order. Again, of my pos-\\nsessions I am steward and guardian, they are trusts. A\\nneglect to conserve and defend, within limits, a trust, is an\\nindirect trespass upon all who have a claim upon me for its\\nkeeping and using. An attempted or threatened trespass\\nupon my life, liberty or property, is to be resisted, else I my-\\nself become a trespasser. Thus defense is not a mere con-\\ntingent privilege, but a necessary obligation.\\nFurther, the obligation to defend a right implies a recipro-\\ncal loss of right in the aggressor. By becoming a trespasser\\nhe forfeits in some corresponding degree his right to liberty,\\nin extreme cases even to life. One attempting assassination,\\nor arson, or burglary, is killed, if this be the only preventive\\nmeans, by his intended victim, with regret, with sorrow in-\\ndeed, but without compunction. In the right of defense lies\\nthe warrant for interference in the liberty of a trespasser,\\nwhich interference is not, therefore, itself a trespass.\\n119. In an unrestrained intercourse of men, with their\\nvarious abilities physical and mental, and with the varied\\nopportunities afforded by wealth and station, the stronger", "height": "3692", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "164 OR GANIZA TION\\ntrespass upon the weaker. An oppressor may perhaps con-\\nsole himself with the brute maxim that might makes right,\\nbut the oppressed is not thereby relieved and quieted. Be-\\nsides, impelled by selfish interests, men combine in couples,\\nor squads, or large bands, and thus accumulate force to over-\\ncome the weaker. To inhibit such predicament society is\\norganized into a State, constituted by a combining majority\\nwhich organization is not oppressive but rather protective of\\nthe minority, the organic law becoming its shield, a defensive\\nweapon, against popular caprice. The body politic employs\\nagents, empowered by general consensus, to frame, apply\\nand enforce particular laws in accord with the general pur-\\npose.\\nTo accomplish the chief end of its existence, the protec-\\ntion of its subjects in their rightful liberty, the government\\nmust, as far as practicable, defend, both at large and in de-\\ntail, the original and acquired rights of individual men, of\\ntrade firms, of legalized corporations, of all subordinate com-\\nbinations of its citizens for legitimate purposes the right of\\nprivate defense being transferred, except in emergency, to\\nthe more potent and equable agency. In order to fulfill this\\ngreat trust, the government must defend itself. Its officers\\nmust be protected in the discharge of their legitimate func-\\ntions against violence or intimidation. It must prevent the\\nhigh crimes of regicide and treason, must resist the insurrec-\\ntion of a disaffected minority, or the aggression of a foreign\\npower. As an individual personality it is bound to preserve\\nits integrity and efficiency by vigorous self-defense. It is\\nclear that a State, as a faithful trustee, is bound, first, to pre-\\nserve its own existence, and secondly, to restrain, to resist,\\nand, if need be, to destroy whatsoever and whomsoever\\nassails its authority or attacks the interests committed to its\\ncharge. Self-preservation, and the preservation of all that\\nis intrusted to it, are moral obligations of every State.", "height": "3764", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 165\\n.120. Therein is the ultimate ground that justifies legal\\npunishment. It is discovered in the obligation to exert pro-\\ntective defense of rights. All legal penalties are set for the\\ndefense of rights. They inflict pain on the law-breaker, are\\na painful interference in his liberty, warranted by the prin-\\nciple of defense. They deter him from repetition of the\\noffense, and they deter observers from like misconduct, thus\\ndefending the rights involved. Practically imperfect as it is,\\nno other means is known by which to effect defense against\\noffense, except this of inflicting pain on offenders in propor-\\ntion to the gravity of their misdeeds. The punishment, as to\\nkind and degree, is determined by what is past and cannot\\nbe reinstated its purpose is to determine what is future, and\\nis deterrent, preventive of further or like trespass. Thus the\\nsufficient, rational, and only righteous ground of legal penalty\\nis the protective defense of rights.\\nThe principle applies to the divine government of the\\nworld. The natural sanctions of universal moral law are the\\ntypical antecedents of the artificial sanctions of civil law,\\nand go far in an explanation of the righteousness of pain.\\nThe sovereign Deity has rights on which men trespass as\\nwell as on the rights of his subjects. He defends these and\\nhis authority by the appointed natural pains attending dis-\\norder, and by special penalties affixed to special offenses.\\nSin is essentially trespass on Deity, and the punishment of\\nsin is self-defense, and the defense of all under his protec-\\ntion. To have any other gods before him is high treason.\\nDeterrent defense is disciplinary. This gives title to\\nhouses of correction or reformatories set especially for re-\\nclaiming youthful offenders, and to penitentiaries where felons\\ndo penance, rendering them penitent, leading to reformation.\\nSo imprisonment generally, and also fines are disciplinary,\\nnot only of the offender, but of the observer, and even capi-\\ntal punishment has this salutary effect on society. Thus the", "height": "3692", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "166 ORGANIZATION\\nlaw is a schoolmaster, a pedagogue, leading to higher life.\\nBut this, with the State, is not its original, nor its avowed,\\nnor indeed its ultimate purpose, but is an accessory. The\\nState is not an educational, but a protective institution, and\\nreformation is not the end, but a means of preventing tres-\\npass. Its enacted sanctions, among which are no rewards,\\nare not incentive, but deterrent. Indeed, in the last analysis,\\nany and every warranted interference in liberty is a defense\\nagainst trespass, or, no interference in a person s liberty has\\never a warrant save in defense against trespass. In the\\ndomestic sphere parents punish to chasten. Chastisement is\\npunishment intended to benefit the sufferer. It is often and\\nrightly inflicted with no wider or further view but this whip\\nof love means more, and the chastening has its only complete\\njustification in forestalling the trespasses of perhaps a remote\\nfuture. Our Father, in the abundance of his love, chastens\\nhis children, not only that the erring may turn and live, but\\nmore largely that all who might suffer from the persisting\\nerror may be spared the harm, and loss, and sorrow.\\n121. The right of a government to suppress mob turbu-\\nlence or riots of any kind, is obviously the right and duty to\\ndefend domestic tranquillity; and to quell an insurrection\\nagainst magisterial authority, is clearly to exercise the right\\nand duty of self-defense. The inverse right of revolution\\nhas the same basis. The ends of the State being the defense\\nof rights and the promotion of the common welfare, when\\nany government shall be found inadequate or contrary to\\nthese purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu-\\nbitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or\\nabolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive\\nto the public weal. Evidently, if a government be con-\\ntinuously oppressive to the body of the people, their original\\nand sacred right of self-defense justifies them in subverting\\nit, and substituting one that promises better things.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 167\\nWar has no other justification. A war of conquest is\\nplainly the crimes of murder, arson, robbery, and the rest of\\nthe foul catalogue, many times multiplied. On the other\\nhand, a defensive war, provided all other honorable means of\\nrectification have failed, is thoroughly righteous. That a\\nState repel vi et armis the encroachment, the aggression, the\\ntrespass of another, is a moral obligation of highest order.\\nA brave and conscientious people, possessing civic rights\\ninherited to be fostered and transmitted, maintains them,\\neven against overwhelming numbers and resources, and does\\nnot surrender, but dies in defending its trusts, warring until\\nresistance becomes madness. Defense may fire the first gun,\\nmay invade the enemy s territory, may sweep his commerce\\nfrom the sea, thus to conquer immunity and peace but, to\\nbe justified, all proceedings must originally and continuously\\nbe intentional and essential defense. This is so clearly recog-\\nnized by civilized States in modern times that, whenever war\\nbetween them occurs, each party loudly claims to be acting\\non the defensive, thus seeking to justify its action in its own\\neyes, and in the eyes of the rest of mankind.\\n122. Geographic, climatic, and other conditions deter-\\nmine that there shall be many States. Differences of race,\\nlanguage, religion, tradition, the genius and general culture\\nof the people, further determine different forms of governs\\nment, as monarchies, republics, democracies. These, the\\nworld over, have both common and conflicting interests, and\\nare otherwise more or less intimately related. Their relations\\nare adjusted by resident ambassadors and consuls, and by\\noccasional diplomatic correspondence, forming and perform-\\ning treaties of commerce, and of alliance, fixing boundaries,\\nand regulating minor matters. The trend of civilization has\\nlong been towards a brotherhood of peoples, and the enter-\\nprise of the nineteenth century has so vastly increased the", "height": "3696", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "168 ORGANIZATION\\nfacilities of intercommunication, by multiplying roads of\\nrapid transit, by tunneling Alpine barriers, by devising a\\nswift and safe crossing of seas, by weaving over the globe\\na network of electric wires and submarine cables, that civic\\nisolation has now almost entirely disappeared, and the na-\\ntions are fusing and welding together. This intimate inter-\\ncourse and manifold relation is subject to the one universal\\nmoral law of trespass not. There is no other obligation in\\nall the comity of nations.\\nThe increasing intimacy of these civic relations brings\\nclearly into view the organic unity of mankind, and suggests\\nthe conception of a universal State, whose mighty function\\nshall be to secure international justice without war. This\\nideal is becoming in a measure realized. Its realization,\\nsays Dr. Seelye, does not require, indeed, in the actual\\ncondition of men, would not permit that all particular States\\nshould lose their individuality of government or institutions,\\nand be merged in what might be deemed the visible embodi-\\nment of the one universal State. The universal State has no\\nvisible embodiment. Yet it is not thereby without reality or\\npower. In our modern world nothing has shown itself more\\nreal or potent. What we call international law, or the law\\nof nations, unknown except in the vaguest, faintest way in\\nancient times, is recognized in our day as a sovereignty in\\nhuman affairs, equally majestic and mighty. It has no visible\\nthrone it does not utter itself through the voice of a mon-\\narch, or the votes of a legislature or people it has no courts\\nto expound, nor any fleets or armies to enforce its dictates\\nbut it guides kings, and legislatures, and peoples, and courts,\\nand fleets, and armies in our times, with an authority whose\\nmanifestation of power is steadily increasing. There is\\nnothing so characteristic of modern politics as the sway which\\ninternational law, a development of the one moral law, is\\ncontinually gaining among existing nations. There is no", "height": "3764", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "THE STATE 169\\nother point in which the politics of the present day are\\nso clearly distinct from those of the ancient world. But\\ninternational law is nothing other than the voice of the one\\nuniversal State. It is the State in the highest exhibition of\\nit yet given in history. The State thus organizing is a\\nwhole, is one and indivisible, uniting through itself more and\\nmore manifestly its constituent organizations, without effa-\\ncing their distinct individuality, and presenting to the vision\\nof political philosophy a world of united States.", "height": "3720", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "170 ORGANIZATION\\nCHAPTER V\\nTHE CHUKCH\\n123. Religion, in its widest sense, viewed subjectively,\\nis belief in presiding, superhuman, spiritual power, earnest\\nenough to influence moral character and conduct; viewed\\nobjectively it is a body of doctrine relative to such power,\\ninstructing and regulating its votaries. Religion is of two\\nkinds, natural and revealed the former relying for its be-\\nlief and doctrine on reason alone the latter claiming to\\nhave in addition information communicated by the higher\\npower.\\nThe negative member of this dichotomy is natural reli-\\ngion. Under scientific treatment it is entitled natural theol-\\nogy. It proceeds independently of historical, racial and\\nlocal influences, discarding the dogmas of tradition, author-\\nity and custom, and upon rational grounds investigates the\\nevidence furnished by nature of the reality and character of\\na higher power. More particularly, it seeks proof of the\\nexistence of God, his unity and personality, the kind and\\ndegree of his attributes, his will concerning us, the distinc-\\ntion between right and wrong, good and evil, our relation\\nand obligation to him, and our destiny both here and here-\\nafter.\\nRevealed religions, which Diderot calls the heresies of\\nnatural religion, seek in general to impose their systems far\\nless by reason than by persuasion with appeal to emotion\\nand passion. Historically they have been largely character-\\nized by superstition or extreme reverence and fear of what is\\nunknown or mysterious, and by fanaticism or ignorant, irra-", "height": "3724", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 171\\ntional worship of deities, with excessive rigor in opinions\\nand practice. Witness the prevailing Asiatic and African\\ncults. Christianity, however, is a revealed religion claiming\\nto be in entire accord with natural religion, to be at its basis\\nstrictly rational, and to demand no more of its adherents\\nthan a reasonable faith in its transcendent doctrine.\\n124. It has already been pointed out that a theory of\\nEthics to be complete as to its system must include the rec-\\nognition of a personal God, and of man s relation to him, and\\nconsequent obligation to render him loving service. This\\ndoes not mean that there may not be practical morality even\\nof very high grade in the various relations among men, with-\\nout religion, without any acknowledgment of God; but it\\nmeans that a scheme of morality without God is necessarily\\nincomplete, has no ultimate support, no philosophic unity,\\nand cannot be expanded into a scientifically systematized\\ntheory. Herein it appears that natural religion is the cap-\\nstone, or rather the keystone, of Ethics.\\nOriental scholars testify that Confucianism is simply and\\nsolely a body of inconsistent, ill assorted and often erroneous\\nethical doctrines, that Buddhism, the confession of one-third\\nof the human race, is little else, and that both are distinctly\\natheistic. Hinduism is pantheism, and pantheism, whether\\ntaught by the Brahman or by the god-intoxicated Spinoza, or\\nby the haughty Hegelian, is merely a refined and enlarged, a\\ngeneralized feticism. It denies the intelligence and freedom,\\nthe personality of its god. Now, since ethics with its com-\\nplement religion is grounded in and arises from relations\\namong persons, an impersonal being can have no part therein.\\nMan cannot trespass on the world of nature, on the moun-\\ntains, the continents, the ocean, or the stars, but only on\\nhim who intelligently and freely produced them, and to\\nwhom therefore they belong. The impersonal, so-called god", "height": "3692", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "172 OR GANIZA TION\\nof the pantheist is not at all the God of the ethical and reli-\\ngious philosopher. Pantheism is essentially atheism.\\nThe mythical polytheistic cult of the ancient Greeks, in\\nform adopted by the skeptical Romans, and by them diffused\\nover the Empire, was doubtless originally a deified personifi-\\ncation of natural objects and forces, and an apotheosis of\\nheroes. It was replaced in the philosophic thought of An-\\naxagoras and of his successors by a strict monotheism, shin-\\ning forth clearly in the famous hymn of Cleanthes. Thus\\nunaided philosophy early reached and taught esoterically a\\nremarkably pure natural religion, which, though it seems not\\nto have taken practical form, nevertheless gave to the ethics\\nof the Stoics a coherence, a consistency, an ultimatum and\\ncompleteness that secured its permanence and general accep-\\ntance even to this day.\\nAll religions, and even atheistic cults, come within the\\nscope of Ethics. We have already seen that a man is re-\\nsponsible for his beliefs. Every belief relating to conduct,\\nbe its subject true or false, carries with it obligations, duties\\nfor every one is bound, whatever be its error, to conform his\\nconduct to the results of his moral judgment, or, as it is com-\\nmonly expressed, is bound to obey his conscience. In reli-\\ngion it is not otherwise. Ethical principles prevail within\\nthe shrine. They are immutable and all pervading. They\\nare the ground not only from which natural religion arises,\\nbut on which revealed religion descending must take its\\nstand to find a firm support.\\nShall an exception be made in favor of Christianity? Not\\nat all. Christianity is preeminently ethical. Indeed in a\\nphilosophic view its great strength lies in the exact conform-\\nity of its teaching to the universal and eternal ethical princi-\\nples which it enlightens, widens, exalts and refines. It came\\nnot to destroy but to fulfill the law more enduring than\\nheaven and earth. The Sermon on the Mount speaks of the", "height": "3764", "width": "2504", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 173\\nKingdom of heaven and of the fatherhood of God, but it con-\\ntains no distinctively Christian doctrine, and is occupied\\notherwise with applications of purely ethical principles. It\\nmight fairly be entitled a Lecture on Practical Ethics.\\nThese principles determine what is due in domestic, in social,\\nand in civic order, and are likewise fundamental in religious\\norder. Hence it is that so much is discovered to be common\\nto all those religions, both natural and revealed, that have\\nattained to the dignity of a system.\\n125. In general it is true that wherever cults develop,\\neven those full of superstition, there arises a priesthood pro-\\nfessing the function of mediator to propitiate the super-\\nhuman power. The priesthood becomes organized, and\\nunites with the State, seeking its protection, using its au-\\nthority, and lending in turn its potent influence to strengthen\\nthe secular government. So it has been with the Christian\\nChurch, an organization that prevails to-day throughout\\nEurope and America. To it we will now give special\\nattention.\\nIn the Christian Church we find a purified and exalted\\nethical doctrine, including natural religion, supplemented and\\ncomplemented by revelation. Christianity is differentiated\\nfrom other religions by the teaching that Jesus of Nazareth\\nis the Christ, the incarnate Son of God, making atonement by\\nthe cross, and ever living as Savior and King. It is this\\ndifferentia only that Christian polemics has to defend against\\ninfidelity. Its expansion constitutes Christology. With\\nthis a treatise on Ethics has nothing to do it is concerned\\nonly with the generic elements expanded into natural religion.\\nFor, all the great virtues that stand out as cardinal have\\nhad existence among all peoples from the beginning. The\\ndecalogue, excepting perhaps the sabbath-day law, contains\\nnothing new. All moral obligations binding men to God", "height": "3692", "width": "2528", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "174 ORGANIZATION\\nand to each other originate, not in legislation, but in the\\nnature which God gave to man, and are determined in detail\\nby the variations in his complex relations. The virtues have\\nbeen developing through all the ages among all peoples, and\\nare developing to-day under a better understanding, a fuller\\ncomprehension, a more subservient recognition of personal\\nrelations and their consequent obligations. No doubt Chris-\\ntianity has been and still is powerfully influential in their\\nhigher development, giving brighter light over a widening\\nhorizon but Christianity did not originate them, it merely\\nfound them, enlarged them, enlightened them. Manifestly,\\nthe all-informing, all-embracing, fundamental law of Chris-\\ntian activity, is the ethical, altruistic law of loving service.\\n126. Historically the Christian Church emerged from\\nJudaism very weak in numbers, and in social influence. Its\\norganization, comparable to a shepherd with his flock, was\\nextremely simple and apparently feeble. But its native\\nstrength was soon manifested. The original hundred and\\ntwenty speedily became as many thousands. Local churches\\nwere multiplied. The heresy was propagated with an\\nactivity, energy and devoted zeal that knew no bounds. It\\nspread into Asia Minor, it invaded Europe, and entered\\nRome. The vast power of the State, then mistress of the\\ncivilized world, was put forth to suppress the rising super-\\nstition, and in the course of three centuries ten fierce and\\nbloody persecutions, extending throughout the Empire, and\\nwaged with all the implacable might of the Roman power,\\nsought to crush it, and failed. Gathering new and greater\\nstrength from adversity, it successfully resisted the oppressor,\\nconquered the conqueror, and shared the throne of the\\nCaesars.\\nThis affiliation of the Church with the State, in the middle\\nof the fourth century, together with an increasing complexity", "height": "3768", "width": "2504", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 175\\nand solidarity of organization, gave even greater efficiency to\\nits propagandism. Apparently weakened by the schism into\\nEast and West, into Greek and Latin, it nevertheless with-\\nstood the floods of barbarians that overwhelmed and over-\\nthrew the Empire, converted and snbdned them, saved\\nChristianity for Europe, and ruled the continent throughout\\nthe mediaeval centuries. In modern times, beginning with\\nthe sixteenth century, a further division of the Western\\nChurch into Catholic and Protestant, with many subdivi-\\nsions, has occurred, which seems to have stimulated rather\\nthan impaired its zealous activity. Thus during two millen-\\nniums, amid the rise and fall of States and Empires, the\\nChurch has maintained its growing power, and to-day Chris-\\ntendom embraces Europe and America, and is pressing its\\njurisdiction into Asia, Africa, and the isles of the sea.\\n127. What therein determines this unique persistence\\nand expanding potency is not far to seek. First, there is an\\nexalted, purified and extended morality, approving itself to\\nthe heart and conscience of humanity as in accord with its\\nideal constitution and the natural order of life among men,\\nwhich morality is taught in precept and urged in practice.\\nSecondly, there is an enlarged and enlightened view of our\\nrelation and obligation to God as Our Father, giving to\\nnatural religion a clearness and cogency never attained in\\nthe schools of philosophy. Thirdly, there is a well settled\\nclaim of a divine origin, of a divine founder in the person of\\nJesus of Nazareth, of a divine revelation promising redemp-\\ntion to the faithful and eternal blessedness to the righteous.\\nWe would not ignore but heartily approve the further claim\\nof the Church that it is multiplied, upheld and impelled by\\nthe immanent Spirit of God but, from a historic and philo-\\nsophic point of view the aforementioned principles go far\\ntoward explaining the phenomenal strength and growth of", "height": "3692", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "176 ORGANIZATION\\nthis the most durable and comprehensive of all human\\norganizations.\\nMoreover, consider the ends for which the Church pro-\\nposes itself as the means. It claims to have solved the\\nproblem of life, to interpret its meaning, and to offer sure\\nguidance to the faithful. Maintaining that our terrestrial\\nlife is teleologically justified only by the fact that it is related\\nto a higher life, to a life beyond, and therefore has import,\\nnot as an end in itself, but as a period of preparation and\\nprobation for eternal life, it proclaims to restless humanity\\nCome unto me, and find your promised rest. We may con-\\ncede that the teleology of history has never reached a system\\nformally more complete than the philosophy of the Church.\\nHeaven and eternal happiness the goal of historical life, the\\nearth its temporal scene of action, its central point the incar-\\nnation of God and the foundation of the Kingdom of heaven\\non earth, all past ages leading up to this culmination which\\nshall determine the entire future, the whole course of history\\nbounded by the day of creation on the one hand and the day\\nof judgment on the other, these indeed constitute such a\\ngrand philosophy of history that Hegel s or Comte s barren\\nabstractions are mere nothing when compared with the fruits\\nfill, concrete conception. Under the shield of this massive\\ndoctrine, and by right of its divine ordination, the Church is\\nclaiming ownership and actively seeking possession of the\\nwhole world in the name of its living King.\\n128. In the fourth century the Church was incorporated\\nwith the State. It is generally admitted by ecclesiastical his-\\ntorians that, from and after the time of Constantine, the ori-\\nginal constitution of the Church was overlaid by a vast body\\nof human additions, particularly by the hierarchy, assimilating\\nthe magistracy by a long gradation of ecclesiastical dignities\\nor powers, rising upward from the primitive pastor or curate", "height": "3764", "width": "2512", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 177\\nto the bishop, to the pope or patriarch; and that by these\\nand other results of the alliance of the Church with the\\nEmpire, its simplicity was lost, its purity corrupted, and the\\nprior relations of the clergy and laity injuriously affected.\\nYet it was of immense advantage to European civilization\\nthat a moral influence, a moral power, a power resting entirely\\nupon moral convictions, upon moral opinions and sentiments,\\nshould have established itself in society, just at the period\\nwhen it seemed on the point of being crushed by an over-\\nwhelming physical force. Had not the thoroughly organized\\nChurch at this time existed, the whole world must have\\nfallen a prey to mere brute power. It alone possessed a\\nmoral power; it maintained and promulgated the idea of\\na precept, of a law superior to all human authority it pro-\\nclaimed that great truth which forms the only foundation of\\nour hope for humanity, namely, that there exists a law above\\nall human law, which, by whatever name it be called, whether\\nreason, or the law of God, or what not, is, at all times and in\\nall places, eternally one and the same.\\nIn the course of the centuries, however, the alliance of the\\nChurch with the State proved unwholesome. An arrogant\\nand ambitious clergy endeavored to render its rule entirely\\nindependent of the people, to bring them under authority, to\\ntake possession of their mind and life without the conviction\\nof their reason or the consent of their will. Claiming to be\\nin possession of the keys, it exercised a spiritual lordship of\\nalmost unbounded power. It endeavored with all its might\\nto establish a theocracy, to usurp the temporal authority of\\nthe State, to establish universal dominion. The struggle for\\nsupremacy between the Church and the State, always at the\\nexpense of the liberties of the people, often resulted in the\\nsubjugation and subservience of the latter; and the former,\\nasserting its catholicity, was for centuries the dominant power\\nover Europe. Ecclesiastical dissension and division, in some", "height": "3696", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "178 ORGANIZATION\\nStates, broke this dominion, but the ill-starred communion of\\nthe two organizations has persisted, an unholy alliance, con-\\nfusing the sacred with the secular to the prejudice of both. 1\\nThe end, the ultimate purpose for which the State exists,\\nand that for which the Church exists, are quite distinct, and\\ntheir rightful means of attaining their ends have little in\\ncommon. The proper function of the State is concerned with\\nthe material prosperity, the external wealth of its citizens\\nthe proper function of the Church is concerned with the\\nspiritual prosperity, the internal weal of its clergy and laity.\\nThe one seeks to protect and promote the health and wealth\\nof the body politic the other to edify and multiply its adhe-\\nrents. Membership in the one is quite involuntary in the\\nother it is essentially voluntary. The one upholds its au-\\nthority by physical force; the other by moral force alone,\\nhaving no penalties beyond censure and excommunication.\\nThe State has sharply marked geographical limits which it\\nmay not transgress the Church, expanding its realm, freely\\ninvades all other realms. The former is in no sense a propa-\\ngandist the latter is essentially a missionary. In their union\\nthe lines of demarcation become obscured, and each under-\\ntakes more or less the office of the other, leading to a strug-\\ngle for mastery and a consequent hinderance of efficiency.\\nChristendom has greatly suffered, and is still suffering from\\nthis error. And not without warning. For, at the very\\norigin of the Church, their prospective divorce, their separate\\nfunctions, their distinct work and harmonious adjustment,\\nwere declared in the profoundly wise prescription of its\\nfounder Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar s, and\\nunto God the things that are God s. 1\\n129. A local church politically free, and constituted\\nsimply of a pastor, deacons and lay members, is strictly and\\ndistinctly an organism. Very generally, local churches come", "height": "3776", "width": "2504", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "THE CHURCH 179\\ninto organic union with each other, constituting synods, con-\\nferences, councils. These again organize into yet more com-\\nprehensive ecclesias or general assemblies, officered by a\\nhierarchy of priests, bishops, and other clergy, whose consti-\\ntutional functions are formally defined. All the various\\ngroups of church organization, of various denomination, not-\\nwithstanding their differences and dissensions, are furthermore\\nin reality organized into a holy Church universal, one truly\\ncatholic, by their common acceptance of the New Testament\\nas organic and ultimate law, interpreted, and in some cases\\nmodified, as in the Church of Rome, by ecclesiastical au-\\nthority. In the universal and intensely active Christian\\nChurch, with its many subsidiary organizations, their officers\\nand members, we discover the most extensive, complete and\\npowerful organism ever known, and one which is rapidly\\nrealizing the ancient dream of universal empire in an organic\\nunification of mankind.\\nFrom the varied relations obtaining in this Christian body,\\nwherein all are members one of another, arises a multiplicity\\nof special obligations and active duties calling for a never\\nflagging constancy and devotion, and heartily recognized as\\ndisplacing by superior claim all conflicting calls. Each mem-\\nber confesses that he belongs to the Church, and does not\\nhesitate to name this servitude as a sufficient reason for his\\nspecial conduct. On the other hand, the Church belongs to\\nhim, serving to edify his spiritual worth. Moreover, it is a\\ncommon brotherhood, a communion, a fellowship one with\\nanother, and with the divine head, all working together for\\nnearness and likeness to God. These obligations ramify\\nthroughout every other class of duties, intensify and sanctify\\nthem. The Christian man among men, the Christian father,\\nmother, son and daughter, the Christian member of the com-\\nmunity where his lot is cast, the Christian man of affairs, the\\nChristian citizen and statesman, is more closely bound in", "height": "3676", "width": "2548", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "180 ORGANIZATION\\neach and all of these relations by virtue of his Christian con-\\nfession, and finds therein new and higher, the highest motives\\nfor ordering all his conduct on the principles inculcated by\\nthe Christian Church. Thus this spiritual organism enters\\ninto, and exerts a dominant influence over, all the relations\\nand obligations of our temporal life, while looking and pre-\\nparing for the eternal life beyond.\\nIt has been pointed out that natural religion in its origin\\nand perfection is ethics, also that the Christian religion is\\nethics extended, confirmed, refined. The revelation of God\\nin Christ reconciling the world unto himself, expands obliga-\\ntion heavenward, and widens its horizon to embrace all man-\\nkind. The ethics of every day life, which is not itself\\ndistinctively Christian, finds its complement in the doctrines\\nof the Church. The teachings of the Teacher have enlight-\\nened human reason, cleared the moral judgment, exalted the\\nmoral sentiments, purified motives, and subdued the will.\\nThe realm is enlarged, but it is the realm of ethics still,\\ninvolving conscience, obligation, duty, gratitude, love. We\\nfound the moral law to be Thou shalt not trespass either by\\ninvasion of rights or by evasion of dues, having an equivalent\\nin Be thou just, and in Thou shalt love and serve. Chris-\\ntianity lays no other mandate. The loving service of God,\\nand of his Christ, and of his creatures, a fellowship in mutual\\nself-sacrifice, is its very essence and clear definitions of\\nduty, pressing incentives to activity, and divinely ordained\\nmeans of efficiency, are supplied by its organized Church.\\nFINIS.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "IIN DEX\\nThe number refers to the page. For general topics, see Table of Contents.\\nActions, the moral quality of, 55.\\nAffection, the supremacy of, 81, 127.\\nAlter ego, the fiction of, 75, 77.\\nAltruism, the modified doctrine of, 79, 90.\\nArgument against egoism, 81.\\nAttention, the means of self-control, 57.\\nBasis of ethics in human nature, 3, 9, 116.\\nBeneficence, or beneficial service, 98.\\nBenevolence, love, charity, defined, 95, 98.\\nChoice and intention, 11, 12, 54.\\nincapable of coercion, 13.\\nChristianity an expansion of ethics,172,180.\\nits persistence and potency, 175.\\nChurch, the universal, an organism, 178.\\nits solidarity, 179.\\nand state, union of, 174, 176.\\ntheir distinct functions, 178.\\nConscience defined, inerrant, 32.\\ndiscrimination of, 52.\\nCruelty defined, a trespass, 37.\\nCults, the heathen, 171.\\nCulture, progress in moral, 46, 88, 99.\\nDecalogue and the moral law, 38.\\nDefense of personal honor, 28.\\nof all trusts obligatory, 92, 122.\\nassumed by the state, 164.\\nin form of legal punishment, 165.\\nDefinition of science, 1.\\nof ethics, 2, 70.\\nof trespass, 22.\\nof cruelty, 37.\\nof pleasure and pain, 48.\\nof justice, 63.\\nof jurisprudence, 65.\\nof virtue, 72.\\nof love, charity, benevolence, 95.\\nof welfare, 105.\\nof organism, 111, 121.\\nof religion, 170.\\nDeity, a personal, postulated, 114, 171.\\nnature of, the ultimate ground, 117.\\nsuperior to obligation, 119.\\nDesires, logical distribution of, 126.\\nDisinterested action, 80.\\nDivision of labor, moral aspect of, 151.\\nDivorce, ground of, 138.\\nDuties to self, fictitious, 76.\\nEquity corrective of legality, 67.\\nEthics defined, 2, 70.\\nbasic principle of, 8, 21.\\nEvolution of morals, 2, 103, 110, 116.\\nFamily, an individual personality, 124, 141.\\nthe ideal, an organism, 135, 141.\\nthe unit of the state, 159.\\nFreedom defined, its limitations, 11.\\nand liberty discriminated, 14.\\nthe condition of morality, 53, 57.\\nGambling, a trespass, 26.\\nGood, relative and absolute, 109.\\nGovernment, kinds and department of ,156.\\nends of, 158.\\nHappiness and welfare distinguished, 107.\\nHeroism, its essence, 88.\\nHonor, personal, 28.\\nHumanitarian ethics, 113.\\nImperatives, hypothetical, categorical, 33.\\nDidividualism, the tendency to, 150.\\nDatention and attention, 12.\\nmoral quality in, 55.\\nIntuition of ethical principle, 4, 6, 8.\\nof the notion of a right, 19.\\nof the moral law, 31.\\nJudgment, the moral, errant, 33, 52.\\nJurisprudence defined, 65.\\nJustice defined, 63.\\n181", "height": "3692", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "182\\nINDEX\\nKant, on using another person, 90.\\nhis scheme of morality rejected, 93.\\nKnowledge for its own sake, 73, 79.\\nLaw, the moral, 31.\\nand penalty, sanctions of civil, 42, 46.\\nof retaliation in kind, 47.\\npositive forms of, 62, 64, 70, 87, 99.\\nof service, 87.\\nof love, the perfect, 99.\\nLiberty and freedom discriminated, 14.\\ninterference in, 14, 16, 21.\\nincompatible with law, 74.\\nperfected in love, 101.\\nLimits of human ability, 13.\\nLove of self, egoism, selfishness, 76.\\nor charity, benevolence, defined, 95.\\nmay be and is commanded, 96.\\nkinds of, degrees of, 97.\\nthe perfect law of, 99.\\nperfected, liberty perfected, 101.\\nMarriage, the pointing of nature, 134.\\nits moral conditions, 136.\\nMercy and justice identified, 68.\\nMerit and demerit, judgment of, 43.\\nMethod of this treatise, 4.\\nMind, its powers distributed, 7, 126.\\nMinister, dignity of the title, 88.\\nMoral law, negative form of, 31, 37.\\ncategorical, supremacy of, 34.\\nobjectivity of, 35.\\npositive forms of, 62, 64, 70, 85, 87, 99.\\nquality in intention, 55.\\nquality imputed, 58.\\nparadox, 60.\\nculture, progress in, 46, 88, 99.\\nNormal and abnormal desires, 22.\\nOrganism defined, 111, 121, 157.\\nPain and pleasure, 48, 103.\\nPerson, perfect and imperfect, 114, 124.\\nPersonal relations condition rights, 20, 35.\\nPositivism, the Comteists, 113, 116.\\nPrinciple of ethics, 8, 21.\\nProperty, ground of, 24.\\nin family relations, 142.\\ninheritance of, 143.\\nPunishment, various forms of, 47.\\nlegal, its warrant, 162, 165.\\nReasons not causes, 15.\\nReligion, definition and divisions of, 170.\\nheathen cults, 171.\\nChristian, differentiated, 173.\\nRight and a right coextensive, 50.\\nand wrong, conscience, 52.\\nand duty coextensive, 70.\\nof revolution, 166.\\nRights prior to obligations, 3.\\nthe notion of, pure and simple, 6, 19.\\nkinds of, reduced, 9.\\nconditioned on personal relations, 20, 35.\\nof property, 24.\\nmoral and legal, 51.\\nSacrifice, implied in service, 88.\\nlimitations of, 89.\\nScience defined, 1.\\nScriptures, how used, 2.\\nSelf as an end, excluded, 77, 81.\\nSentiments, the moral, 42.\\nService, the law of, 87.\\nSin defined, a trespass, 30.\\nSlander, a trespass, 26.\\nSocial intercourse, ends of, 147.\\nSocialism, its moral aspects, 153.\\nSolitary, destitute of rights, 20, 127, 130.\\nState, an individual personality, 124, 160.\\nthe unit of the, 159.\\na universal, 168.\\nStewardship, the using of trusts, 92.\\nSummum bonum, 109.\\nSupernatural and superhuman, 115.\\nTemperance, an altruistic virtue, 78.\\nTrespass defined, 22.\\nindirect, by reservation, 29, 62, 122.\\nidentified with injustice, 64.\\nTrusts, all possessions are, 92, 122.\\nTruthfulness, fundamental in society, 147\\nUtilitarianism, kinds of, 110.\\nVirtue defined, 72.\\nVolition, its elements, 54.\\nWar, its sole justification, 167.\\nWarranted interference in liberty, 16.\\nWelfare, defined, 105.\\nconditions of, 108.\\nattainment of, 111.\\nWill, its freedom and limitations, 11.\\nWill of God, not the ultimate ground, 117.", "height": "3732", "width": "2496", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3692", "width": "2516", "jp2-path": "elementaryethics00davi_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3732", 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