{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3167", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "5v\\n5V c\\nv\\ny oV\\n^O*\\nJ-\\nV\\nA* v, v", "height": "4497", "width": "2775", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "c*.^--*\u00c2\u00b0o J.-^k-X .\u00c2\u00b0.-^k- J", "height": "4581", "width": "2857", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "HERBERT SPENCER\\nAND HIS CRITICS.\\nBY\\nCHARLES B. WAITE, A. M.,\\nAuthor of u History of the Christian Re-\\nligion to the Year 200, A Conspira-\\ncy Against the Republic, etc.\\nCHICAGO:\\nC. V. Waite Co.\\n1900.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "TWO COPIES RfclOEiVJED,\\nLibrary of Control*\\nOffloe of thu\\nAPR 9 1900\\nK^glitor of Copyright*\\nOCT 26 I90u\\nCopyright 1900\\nCHARLES B. WAITE.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "PREFACE.\\nThe character of this work, so far as it con-\\nsists of extracts from the writings of others, will\\nbe seen from the following letter from one who\\nis well known in the literary world, and who\\nhimself maintained a discussion with Mr. Spen-\\ncer, carried on on both sides with great brill-\\niancy and power:\\n38 Westbourne Terrace, London, W.,\\nFernhurst, Sussex, Aug. 20, 1898.\\nDear Sir: 1 beg to thank you for your courtesy in\\nforwarding to me the series of papers in the Boston-\\nInvestigator, which I should have acknowledged much\\nsooner but for the fact that it was sent to the pub-\\nlishers whilst I was away from home and about the\\ncountry.\\nThe extracts you have so carefully prepared seem to\\nme to have been made with great accuracy and intel-\\nligence, and I think they should be satisfactory to Mr.\\nSpencer, as they are to myself.\\nI am yours faithfully,\\nFrederic Harrison.\\nInterspersed with and following the extracts\\nhere referred to, the author has made criticisms\\nof his own, which, it is hoped, will at least ba\\nfound worthy of thoughtful consideration.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nPAGE\\nChapter I.. ..The New Philosophy Doctrine of\\nthe Unknowable 1\\nII.. ..The New Philosophy continued\\nDoctrine of the Knowable 8\\nIII.. ..The New Philosophy continued-\\nDoctrine of Evolution 12\\nIV.... The New Philosophy continued-\\nSpencers Biology 20\\nV.. ..The New Philosophy continued\\nSpencer s Psychology 27\\nVI.. ..The New Philosophy continued-\\nSubjective Psychology 34\\nVII. ..The New Philosophy continued-\\nSpencer s Sociology 41\\nVIII.. ..The New Philosophy continued-\\nPrinciples of Ethics\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Work on\\nEducation\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Essays, etc 49\\nIX.. ..Criticism by Malcolm Guthrie 58\\nu X... .Spencer and John Stuart Mill 66\\nM XI... Spencer and Frederic Harrison 72\\nXII... .Criticisms and Eulogiums\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Watson\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nBowne\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Robertson 80\\nXIII.... Criticisms continued\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Mansel\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Caird\\nHodgson Max Mueller\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Sidg-\\nwick\u00e2\u0080\u0094 James Martineau Moul-\\nton Professor Green 87\\nXIV.. ..Criticisms continued\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Mears, Atwa-\\nter\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Wynn\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Stebbins\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Alger 94\\nu XV.. ..Criticisms continued\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Bascom\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Lil-\\nly\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Barry\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Quarterly Fair-\\nbairn 101", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "PAGE\\nChap. XVI... .Criticisms continued Review by\\nOrestes A. Brownson 108\\nXVII... .Criticisms by Professor Birks and\\nMons. Littre* 114\\nXVI1L... Criticisms concluded- Wilfred Ward\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094St. George Mivart\u00e2\u0080\u0094 A. J. Bal\\nfour 121\\nXIX.. ..Space and Time\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Consciousness 128\\nXX.. ..The Unknowable.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 First Cause 137\\nXXL. ..Doctrine of the Unknowable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Crea-\\ntion\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Atheism\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Agnosticism 144\\nXXII.... Doctrine of the Unknowable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Dim\\nor Vague Consciousness 153\\nXXIII.. ..Doctrine of the Unknowable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 An-\\ntithesis of Thought 161\\n11 XXIV. Doctrine of the Unknowable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Ideal-\\nism 169\\nXXV.. ..Reconciliation between Science and\\nReligion 177", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "INDEX OF AUTHORS\\nAlger, W. R., 99, 100.\\nAtwater, T. H., 96.\\nBain, Prof., 97, 158, 159.\\nBalfour, A. J., 57, 123-127.\\n181.\\nBarry, Wm., 103,104.\\nBascom, John, Dr., 101,102.\\nBerkeley, Bishop, 36, 174.\\nBirks,Thos. R., 114-118, 174.\\nBowne, B. P., 80-84.\\nBrownson, O. A., 105, 108\\n113, 148.\\nCaird, Principal, 88.\\nComte, Auguste, 9, 56, 70,\\n76, 78, 79, 83, 164, 168.\\nCousin, 81, 82, 165.\\nDarwin, Charles, 97, 121.\\nDescartes, 83.\\nFairbairn, A. M., 105-107.\\nFiske, John, Prof., 97, 183.\\nGreen, Prof., 93.\\nGuthrie, Malcolm, 58-65.\\nHamilton, Sir Wm., 64, 82,\\n87, 88, 130, 155, 156, 164,\\n165, 167,168.\\nHarrison, Frederic, 72,79,\\n121 122\\nHodgson, S. H., 88, 89.\\nHume, David, 36, 174.\\nKant, Emanuel, 89, 90.\\nKepler, 17.\\nLarousse, 63.\\nLaugel, Mons., 118, 119.\\nLilly, W. S., 102, 103.\\nLittr\u00c2\u00a3, E., Mons., 118-120.\\nLocke, 90.\\nMalebranche, 144, 146.\\nMansel, Henry L., 87, 88,\\n155, 156, 164, 168.\\nMartineau, James, 81, 91,\\n92, 133, 163.\\nMears, John W., 94-96.\\nMill, John Stuart, 63, 66-71,\\n82,94,115,123,124, 129,\\n148, 149, 163.\\nMivart, St. George, 122, 123.\\nMoulton, J. F., 92, 93.\\nMueller, Max, 90.\\nNewton, 68.\\nPestalozzi, 54.\\nQuarterly, The, writer in,\\n104, 105.\\nRobertson, John M., 84-86.\\nScaliger, 159.\\nSidgwick, H., 90, 91, 132.\\nStebbins, Rufus P., 99.\\nTyndall, John, 11.\\nVoltaire, 83, 84, 163.\\nVon Baer, 24.\\nWard, Wilfred, 121,122.\\nWatson, R. A., 80.\\nWhewell, Dr., 67.\\nWynn, W. H., Prof., 97-99.\\nYoumans, Prof., 79, 97.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER I.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE OF THE UN-\\nKNOWABLE.\\nNo writer of the Nineteenth Century has had\\ngreater influence in the world of thought than\\nHerbert Spencer. At the same time no one has\\nbeen more severely and unsparingly criticised.\\nThese criticisms, with his replies, have exhib-\\nited an intellectual gladiatorship such as has\\nseldom been witnessed; one which has had the\\neffect to arouse discussion and to stimulate\\nthought and inquiry all along the lines of his\\nphilosophy. His works are now complete.\\nThe labors of a life-time have been brought to a\\nclose.\\nSpencer, as a scientist, is one of the deepest\\nthinkers and one of the ablest and most forcible\\nwriters of this or any other age. As a scientist,\\nstudying the laws of Nature, and tracing those\\nlaws in the changing phenomena of the uni-\\nverse, his greatness will be acknowledged by all.\\nBut his ambition had a broader scope. He as-\\npired to co-ordinate and combine science with\\nphilosophy; not merely with that positive or\\n(1)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "2\\npractical philosophy which consists of the high-\\nest generalizations of science, but with meta-\\nphysical and speculative philosophy as well.\\nThrough such co-ordination and combination,\\nhe not only sought to unify all knowledge, but,\\nconfessedly going beyond the boundaries of sci-\\nence\u00e2\u0080\u0094venturing into unknown regions he un-\\ndertook to establish unknowable existence.\\nNor did he stop here. This combined system\\nof philosophical science he now essayed to co-\\nordinate and combine with theology. His doc-\\ntrine of the Unknowable he himself calls a rnet-\\naphysico-theological doctrine. Proposing to\\nidentify the unknowable of science and philoso-\\nphy with the highest conception of Deity, he at-\\ntempted a reconciliation between science and\\nreligion.\\nTo this vast scheme this combined system\\nof science, philosophy, metaphysics and theolo-\\ngy, he gave the name of\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY.\\nSo far as the system is new so far as it is a\\ndeparture from the landmarks hitherto estab-\\nlished in the fields of science and philosophy\\nit has undergone the critical examination of ma-\\nny thinkers, and must still be subjected to the\\ncrucial test of the sober second thought. It is\\nworthy of note that some of the most trenchant\\ncriticisms have been on the speculative side of\\nthe New Philosophy. That they have not all\\nbeen without effect, has been made manifest by", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "3\\nsuch occasional change in the text of Mr. Spen-\\ncer s works as seemed necessary.\\nIn this work I purpose, first, to give a brief\\nbut complete view of the New Philosophy; sec-\\nondly, to state the salient points of the principal\\ncriticisms which have been made upon it; giv-\\ning such extracts as may best elucidate the\\npoints made; and finally, to examine the doc-\\ntrine of the Unknowable especially in reference\\nto the claim that is made, that this doctrine is\\nsufficient to effect a reconciliation between sci-\\nence and religion.\\nTHE SPENCERIAN PHILOSOPHY.\\nIn giving a synopsis of the New Philosophy,\\nlet us commence with that which, by the author\\nhimself, is ever put foremost:\\nDOCTRINE OF THE UNKNOWABLE.\\nThe Unknowable of Spencer is not the mere\\nnegation of the knowable. He posits the abso-\\nlute and independent existence of the Infinite as\\nUltimate Being, and First Cause.\\nThough Ultimate Being is conceded to be\\nboth unknowable and unthinkable, at the same\\ntime he maintains that it is ;i known with abso-\\nlute certainty as existing.\\nTo this Unknowable he gives many names:\\nCause First Cause Unknown Cause Ulti-\\nmate Cause Incomprehensible Cause Uncon-\\nditioned Cause Absolute Cause Force Un-\\nknown Force Pure Force Absolute Force\\nPower Unknown Power Unknowable Power", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "4\\nIncomprehensible Power Creating Power\\nSustaining Power Universal Power Inscruta-\\nble Power Existence Keal Existence Abso-\\nlute Existence Ultimate Existence Being\\nAbsolute Being Ultimate Being Uncondi-\\ntioned Being Reality Unknown Reality\\nAbsolute Reality Unseen Reality Uncondi-\\ntioned Reality Ultimate Fact Noumenon\\nThe Unknowable The Infinite The Absolute\\nThe Actual The Creating The Inexplicable\\nThe Unconditioned The Unlimited The\\nNon-relative The Unformed\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Incompre-\\nhensible\u00e2\u0080\u0094The Omnipresent\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Unaccounta-\\nble\u00e2\u0080\u0094The Inconceivable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Unthinkable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The\\nSupernatural.\\nSpencer does not claim to arrive at the exist-\\nence of the Unknowable by any process of logic.\\nOn the contrary, he shows in the clearest man-\\nner, that it cannot be reached by any logical pro-\\ncess. He first undertakes to prove the existence\\nof a First Cause. But he immediately cautions\\nhis reader against adopting the conclusion; stat-\\ning that the reasoning is illusive and fallacious,\\nbecause one of the terms in the proposition in\\neach stage of the argument, is unthinkable.\\nThe Unknowable cannot be made the subject of\\nlogical deduction, because, when logic is em-\\nployed for the ascertainment of truth, both\\nterms of every proposition must be such as can\\nbe formulated in thought.\\nHow, then, is the existence of the Infinite to\\nbe posited?", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "5\\nIt is to be clone in three ways:\\nFirst, from a vague or dim consciousness.\\nBesides that definite consciousness of which Logic\\nformulates the laws, there is also an indefinite con-\\nsciousness which cannot be formulated. To say\\nthat we cannot know the Absolute, is by implication\\nto affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial\\nof our power to learn what the Absolute is, there lies\\nhidden the assumption that it is; and the making of\\nthis assumption proves that the Absolute has been\\npresent to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a some-\\nthing. [First Principles, Sec. 26.\\nSpencer holds that we are obliged to form a\\npositive though vague consciousness of that\\nwhich transcends distinct consciousness.\\nOur consciousness of the unconditioned being lit-\\nerally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw mate-\\nrial of thought to which in thinking we give definite\\nforms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real ex-\\nistence is the very basis of our intelligence. As we\\ncan in successive mental acts get rid of all particular\\nconditions and replace them by others, but cannot get\\nrid of that undifferentiated substance of consciousness\\nwhich is conditioned anew in every thought; there ever\\nremains with us a sense of that which exists persistently\\nand independently of conditions. At the same time\\nthat by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevent-\\ned from forming a conception of absolute existence;\\nwe are by the laws of thought equally prevented from\\nridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute ex-\\nistence: this consciousness being, as we have seen, the\\nobverse of our self-consciousness. And since the only\\npossible measure of relative validity among our be-\\nliefs, is the degree of their persistence in opposition to\\nthe efforts made to change them, it follows that this,\\nwhich persists at all times, under all circumstances,", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "6\\nand cannot cease until consciousness ceases, has the\\ni validity of any. [Ibid.\\nHence the existence of the Unknowable is\\nconsidered by Mr. Spencer the most certain of\\nall t rut lis.\\nAnother mode in which he posits the Un-\\nknowable, is by the antithesis of thought:\\nM Prom the very necessity of thinking in relations, it\\nfollows that the Relative itself is inconceivable, except\\na- related to a real Non-relative. AVe have seen that\\nunless a real Xon-relative or Absolute be postulated,\\nthe Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the\\nargument to a contradiction. In the very assertion\\nthat all our knowledge, properly so called, is Kelative,\\nthere is involved the assertion that there exists a Xon-\\nrelative. [Ibid.\\nHence the Non-relative is posited as the an-\\ntithesis and correlative of the Relative the Un-\\nlimited and Unconditioned is posited as the an-\\ntithesis and correlative of the limited and con-\\nditioned, and the Infinite as the antithesis and\\ncorrelative of the finite.\\nThe third mode of arriving at the Unknowa-\\nble, is by postulating it as the highest generali-\\nzation of science.\\nSince the highest generalization of science is\\nthe persistence of force, and since the nature of\\nthis force is unknown, it is assumed to be the\\nratable Power behind all phenomena, which\\n4 in matter and motion.\\nThis Unknown Force is the Incomprehensible\\nr manifested in all phenomena. n The\\nidea in religion, also, is the acknowl-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "7\\nedgment of the existence of an Inscrutable\\nPower. Thus science and religion are brought\\ntogether, and the conflict which has lasted for\\nages, is brought to an end.\\nThis is the reconciliation of religion with sci-\\nence.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "CHAPTEK II.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED\u00e2\u0080\u0094 DOCTRINE OF\\nTHE KNOWABLE.\\nComing into the region of the Knowable, Mr.\\nSpencer defines Philosophy as knowledge of the\\nhighest generality. This is by some writers des-\\nignated as practical or positive philosophy, as\\ndistinguished from speculative philosophy. But\\nhe prefers simply the term Philosophy.\\nScience, he says, consists of truths existing more\\nor less separated; and does not recognize these truths\\nntirely integrated. [First Principles, Sec. 37.] As\\neach widest generalization of Science comprehends and\\nconsolidates the narrower generalizations of its own\\ndivision, so the generalizations of Philosophy compre-\\nhend and consolidate the widest generalizations of Sci-\\nence Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unifled\\nknowledge; Science is partially -unified knowledge;\\nPhilosophy is completely -unified knowledge. [Ibid.\\nAgain: We have this statement of the scope\\nand province of science:\\nScience concerns itself with the co-existences and\\n,uences among phenomena; grouping these at first\\ninto generalizations of a simple or low order, and ris-\\ning gradually to higher and more extended generaliza-\\ntions. [Ibid.\\n(8)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "9\\nHaving thus established the boundary line be-\\ntween science and philosophy, the next step is to\\nfind some data of philosophy; some means by\\nwhich the student of philosophy may know\\nwhen he is making any advance. This data is\\nfound in the assumption that the congruities\\nand incongruities of phenomena, which are at-\\ntested by our consciousness, do really exist.\\n44 The assumption that a congruity or an incongrui-\\nty exists when consciousness testifies to it, is an inevit-\\nable assumption. [First Prin., Sec. 41.\\nThis is one of the data of philosophy; but this\\nis in the process of thought. There must also\\nbe a datum In the product of thought.\\nAuguste Comte thinks it impossible to sub-\\nject to a critical analysis the relation between\\nsubject and object. Mr. Spencer, however,\\nthinks otherwise; and undertakes to analyze this\\nrelation. The conclusion is,\\n44 That the manifestations of the Unknowable fall\\ninto the two separate aggregates constituting the\\nworld of consciousness and the world beyond con-\\nsciousness. [First Prin., Sec. 45.\\n44 The manifestations of the Unknowable, separated\\ninto the two divisions of self and not-self, are re-divis-\\nible into certain most general forms, the reality of\\nwhich Science, as well as Common Sense, from moment\\nto moment assumes. [Ibid.\\nSPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE.\\n44 Our consciousness of Space is a consciousness of\\nco-existent positions. [First Prin., Sec. 47.\\nAnd since a position is not an entity\u00e2\u0080\u0094 since the con-\\ngeries of positions which constitute any conceived", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "10\\nportion of space, and mark its bounds, are not sensible\\nexistences, it follows that the co-existent positions\\nwhich make up our consciousness of Space, are not co-\\nexistences in the full sense of the word, (which implies\\nrealities as their terms,) but are the blank forms of co-\\nexistences left behind when the realities are absent;\\nthat is, are the abstracts of co-existences. [Ibid.\\nSpace is purely relative.\\nIs there an absolute Space which relative Space in\\nsome sort represents Is Space in itself a form or\\ncondition of absolute existence, producing in our\\nminds a corresponding form or condition of relative\\nexistence? These are unanswerable questions.\\n[Ibid.\\nParallel remarks are made concerning time.\\nOur conception of Matter, reduced to its simplest\\nshape, is that of co-existent positions that offer resist-\\nance, as contrasted with our conception of Space, in\\nwhich the co-existent positions offer no resistance.\\n[First Prin., Sec. 48.\\nThe conception of Motion, as presented or repre-\\nsented in the developed consciousness, involves the\\nconceptions of Space, of Time, and of Matter. A\\nsomething that moves; a series of positions occupied\\nin succession; and a group of co-existent positions,\\nunited in thought with the successive ones\u00e2\u0080\u0094 these are\\nthe constituents of the idea. [Ibid.\\nForce is the ultimate of ultimates.\\nThough Space, Time, Matter, and Motion are ap-\\nparently all necessary data of intelligence, yet a psy-\\nchological analysis (here indicated only in rude out-\\nline) shows us that these are either built up of, or ab-\\nstracted from, experiences of force. Matter and Mo-\\ntion, as we know them, are differently conditioned\\nmanifestations of Force. Space and Time, as we know\\nthem, are disclosed along with these different mani-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "11\\nfestations of Force as the conditions under which\\nthey are presented. [First Prin., Sec. 50.\\nOur author next proceeds to comment on the\\nindestructibility of Matter, the continuity of\\nMotion, and the persistence of Force.\\nThe persistence of the relations among forces,\\nordinarily called uniformity of law, is a necessa-\\nry implication from the fact that Force can\\nneither arise out of nothing nor lapse into no-\\nthing.\\nThe Rhythm of Motion forms the subject of\\na chapter, in which Mr. Spencer claims that all\\nmotion is rhythmical. In this doctrine he was\\nsupported by Professor Tyndall.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED \u00e2\u0080\u0094DOCTRINE OF\\nEVOLUTION.\\nAn entire history of any thing must include its ap-\\npearance out of the imperceptible and its disappear-\\nance into the imperceptible. [First Prin., Sec. 93.\\nThe sphere of knowledge is co-extensive with\\nthe phenomenal. Whenever any thing acts upon\\nour senses under a sensible form, unless it ac-\\nquired its form at the moment of perception,\\nand lost its sensible form the moment after per-\\nception,\\nIt must have had an antecedent existence under\\nthis sensible form, and will have a subsequent exist-\\nence under this sensible form. These preceding and\\nsucceeding existences under sensible forms, are possi-\\nble subjects of knowledge; and knowledge has obvi-\\nously not reached its limits until it has united the\\npast, present, and future histories into a whole. [Ibid.\\nSetting out abruptly as we do with some substance\\nwhich already had a concrete form, our history is in-\\ncomplete; the thing had a history preceding the state\\nwith which we started. Hence our theory of things,\\nconsidered individually or in their totality, is confess-\\nedly imperfect so long as any past or future portions\\nof their sensible existences are unaccounted for.\\n[Ibid.\\n(12)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "13\\nPhilosophy has to formulate this passage\\nfrom the imperceptible into the perceptible, and\\nagain from the perceptible into the impercepti-\\nble.\\nThe general law of the redistribution of mat-\\nter and motion, which is required to unify the\\nvarious kinds of changes,\\nMust also be one that unifies the successive changes\\nwhich sensible existences, separately and together,\\npass through. [Ibid.\\nIn recognizing the fact that Science, tracing\\nback the genealogies of various objects, finds\\ntheir components were once in diffused states,\\nand pursuing their histories forwards, finds dif-\\nfused states will again be assumed by them, we\\nhave recognized the fact that the formula re-\\nquired for reducing knowledge to a coherent\\nwhole, mnst be one comprehending the two op-\\nposite processes of concentration and diffusion.\\nThe change from a diffused, imperceptible state, to\\na concentrated, perceptible state, is an integration of\\nmatter and concomitant dissipation of motion; and the\\nchange from a concentrated, perceptible state, to a dif-\\nfused, imperceptible state, is an absorption of motion\\nand concomitant disintegration of matter. [First\\nPrin., Sec. 94.\\nWhen taken together, the two opposite processes\\nthus formulated constitute the history of every sensi-\\nble existence, under its simplest form. \u00e2\u0080\u0094[Ibid.\\nBut neither of these processes is ever wholly\\nunqualified by the other:\\nFor each aggregate is at all times both gaining mo-\\ntion and losing motion. [First Prin., Sec. 96.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "14\\nEvolution, then,\\nUnder its simplest and most general aspect, is the in-\\ntegration of matter and concomitant dissipation of\\nmotion; while dissolution is the absorption of motion,\\nand concomitant disintegration of matter. [First\\nPrin., Sec. 97.\\nSimple Evolution may also be stated to be, a\\nchange from a less coherent form to a more co-\\nherent form, consequent on the dissipation of\\nmotion and integration of matter. [Ibid.\\nThis is the simplest form of Evolution. But\\nthere is not only a primary but a secondary re-\\ndistribution of matter in the parts of an aggre-\\ngate; and this brings us to compound Evolu-\\ntion.\\nThis compound Evolution may be stated thus\\nThe primary redistribution ends in forming aggre-\\ngates which are simple where it is rapid, but w r hich be-\\ncome compound in proportion as its slowness allows\\nthe effects of secondary redistributions to accumulate.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094[First Prin., Sec. 105.\\nTo say that the primary redistribution is accompa-\\nnied by secondary redistributions, is to say that along\\nwith the change from a diffused to a concentrated\\nstate, there goes on a change from a homogeneous\\nstate to a heterogeneous state. The components of the\\nmass while they become integrated also become differ-\\nentiated. [First Prin., Sec. 116.\\nThis is the second aspect under which to study\\nEvolution. While the first is progressive inte-\\ngration, this is progressive differentiation.\\nBoth of these forms of Evolution are ex-\\nplained by illustrations drawn from the various\\nsciences From astronomy, from geology, psy-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "15\\nchology, biology, sociology, philology. Also\\nfrom the arts: painting, sculpture, architecture,\\netc., poetry, and music.\\nEvolution may now be defined as a\\nChange from an incoherent homogeneity to a coher-\\nent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of\\nmotion and integration of matter. [First Prin., Sec.\\n127.\\nBut there is another phase to the doctrine.\\nAt the same time that Evolution is a change from\\nthe homogeneous to the heterogeneous, it is a change\\nfrom the indefinite to the definite. Along with an ad-\\nvance from simplicity to complexity, there is an ad-\\nvance from confusion to order\u00e2\u0080\u0094 from undetermined\\narrangement to determined arrangement. Develop-\\nment, no matter of what kind, exhibits not only a mul-\\ntiplication of unlike parts, but an increase in the dis-\\ntinctness with which these parts are marked off from\\none another. [First Prin., Sec. 129.\\nHere again, many illustrations are given,\\ndrawn from the various sciences. In illustra-\\ntions from the solar system, references are con-\\nstantly made to the nebular theory as probable.\\nIn every instance it is found to accord with the\\ndoctrine of Evolution. Though the nebular the-\\nory is not here adopted, it should be stated that\\nin his Essay on the Nebular Hypothesis, as re-\\nvised in 1890, Mr. Spencer says: Practically\\ndemonstrated as this process now is, we may say\\nthat the doctrine of nebular genesis has passed\\nfrom the region of hypothesis into the region of\\nestablished truth.\\nThe more specific idea of Evolution now reached\\nis\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogene-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "16\\nity. to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, accompanying\\ntlio dissipation of motion and integration of matter.\\n[First Prin.,Sec. 138.\\nThis is the third phase of Evolution.\\nBut the synthesis is not yet complete.\\nThus far, only the redistribution of matter has\\nbeen attended to; the accompanying redistribu-\\ntion of motion having been neglected.\\nIn proportion as Evolution becomes compound-\\nin proportion as an aggregate retains, for a considera-\\nble time, such a quantity of motion as permits sec-\\nondary redistributions of its component matter, there\\nnecessarily arise secondary redistributions of its re-\\ntained motion. As fast as the parts are transformed\\nthere goes on a transformation of the sensible or in-\\nsensible motion possessed by the parts. The parts\\ncannot become progressively integrated, either individ-\\nually or as a combination, without their motions, in-\\ndividually or combined, becoming more integrated.\\nThere cannot arise among the parts heterogeneities of\\nsize, of form, of quality, without there also arising\\nheterogeneities in the amounts and directions of their\\nmotions, or the motions of their molecules. And in-\\ncreasing definiteness of the parts implies increasing\\ndeiiniteness of their motions.\\nIn short, the rhythmical actions going on in each\\naggregate, must differentiate and integrate at the\\nsame time that the structure does so. [First Prin.,\\nSec. m.\\nThis is the fourth and final phase of the doc-\\ntrine of Evolution, which must now be stated as\\nfollows:\\nEvolution is an integration of matter and concom-\\nitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter\\nfrom an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "17\\na definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which\\nthe retained motion undergoes a parallel transforma-\\ntion. [First Prin., Sec. 145.\\nHaving thus completed the synthesis, and\\nhaving stated the doctrine of Evolution in its\\nultimate form, we must now look for some all-\\npervading principle which underlies this all-per-\\nvading process.\\nJust as it was possible to interpret the empiricai\\ngeneralizations called Kepler s laws, as necessary con-\\nsequences of the law of gravitation; so it may be pos-\\nsible to interpret the foregoing empirical generaliza-\\ntions as necessary consequences of some deeper law.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094[First Prin., Sec. 14(\\nThis law is found to be the persistence of\\nforce. [First Prin., Sec. 155.\\nThere is another cause of increasing complex-\\nity another cause which necessitates a change\\nfrom the homogeneous to the heterogeneous;\\nand which, when joined to the first, makes the\\nchange more rapid and more involved. This is\\nthe multiplicity of effects following from a sin-\\ngle force.\\nThe general interpretation of Evolution is not\\nyet complete.\\nThe laws set forth furnish a key to the re-ar-\\nrangement of parts which Evolution exhibits, in\\nso far as it is an advance from the uniform to\\nthe multiform. We must now have a key to this\\nre-arrangement in so far as it is an advance from\\nthe indefinite to the definite. This key is found\\nin the law by virtue of which such portions of\\nthe permanently effective forces acting on any", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "18\\naggregate, as produced sensible motions in its\\nparts, work a segregation of those parts. This\\nis called the law of segregation.\\nThe redistributions of matter going on around\\nus, are ever being brought to conclusions by the\\ndissipation of the motions which affect them.\\nIn all cases, there is a process toward equilibra-\\ntion. This law of equilibration is deducible\\nfrom the persistence of force.\\nThere is a gradual advance toward harmony\\nbetween man s mental nature and the conditions\\nof his existence. Hence we have a warrant for\\nthe belief that Evolution can end only in the es-\\ntablishment of the greatest perfection and the\\nmost complete happiness.\\nDissolution is a process the reverse of that\\ntraced in the history and genesis of Evolution.\\nThe law of equilibration and the law of the\\nrhythm of motion render probable alternate eras\\nof Evolution and Dissolution.\\nThere is no guaranty for the permanent exist-\\nence of the race. The outcome of the processes\\nof equilibration constantly going on, not only on\\nthe surface of the earth but in the solar system,\\nmust be omnipresent death. [First Prin., Sec.\\n176.\\nCarrying the argument still further, based up-\\non what may be called the rhythm of the uni-\\nverse, we are led to infer a subsequent universal\\nlife.\\nAnd thus there is suggested the conception of a\\npast during which there have been successive Evolu-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "19\\ntions analogous to that which is now going on; and a\\nfuture during which successive other such Evolutions\\nmay go on ever the same in principle but never the\\nsame in concrete result. [First Prin., Sec. is3.\\nIn closing a summary of the New Philosophy,\\nit is claimed that it is neither materialistic nor\\nspiritualistic; or rather, that it is as much the\\none as the other.\\nThough the relation of subject and object renders\\nnecessary to us these antithetical conceptions of spirit\\nand matter; the one is no less than the other to be re-\\ngarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which\\nunderlies both. [First Prin., Sec. 194.\\nThe foregoing outline of the New Philosophy\\nmust now be rilled up with a summary of Spen-\\ncer s Biology, Psychology, and Sociology: also\\nof his Data of Ethics with a glance at his\\nother writini", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IV.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED SPENCER S BI-\\nOLOGY.\\nIn the first volume, the author treats of the\\ngeneral principles of the science, as connected\\nwith the doctrine of Evolution.\\nThe four chief elements which, in various com-\\nbinations, make up living bodies, are oxygen, hy-\\ndrogen, nitrogen and carbon. Three are gaseous,\\nand are known only in the aeriform state, while\\ncarbon is known only as a solid.\\nThere is a certain significance in this, when we\\ntake into account the fact that the phenomena\\nof Evolution imply motions in the units that are\\ninvolved in the redistribution of matter and mo-\\ntion. There is a probable meaning in the fact\\nthat organic bodies, which exhibit the phenom-\\nena of Evolution in so high a degree, are mainly\\ncomposed of ultimate units having extreme mo-\\nbility.\\nA portion of organic matter of a living organ-\\nism, contains several of these elements, and their\\nmobility is an aid to the vital processes.\\nMechanical forces produce important changes\\n(20)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "21\\nin organic bodies; but the agency of chief im-\\nportance is chemical affinity.\\nLife. Life is the continuous adjustment of\\ninternal relations to external relations. The\\ndegree of life varies as the degree of correspond-\\nence.\\nInductions of Biology. These are: Growth\\nDevelopment Function Waste and Repair\\nAdaptation Individuality Genesis Hered-\\nity Variation Classification Distribution.\\nGrowth is dependent on the available supply\\nof such environing matters as are of like nature\\nwith the matters composing the organism. The\\navailable supply of assimilable matter being the\\nsame, and other conditions not dissimilar, the\\ndegree of growth varies according to the surplus\\nof nutrition over expenditure. This surplus of\\nnutrition over expenditure, is a variable quanti-\\nty; and, other things being equal, upon it de-\\npends the limit of growth.\\nDevelopment is primarily central. All or-\\nganic forms of which the entire history is known,\\nset out with a symmetrical arrangement of parts\\nround a center. This central development may\\nbe distinguished into unicentral, where the pro-\\nduct of the original germ develops symmetri-\\ncally round one center; or multicentral, where\\nthe development is in subordination to many\\ncenters.\\nStkucture and Function. Does Structure\\noriginate Function, or does Function originate", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "22\\nStructure? The answer is not easy; but the au-\\nthor considers that Function must be regarded\\nas taking precedence of Structure. Both Struc-\\nture and Function progress from the homogene-\\nneous, indefinite and incoherent, to the hetero-\\ngeneous, definite and coherent.\\nIn discussing the question of Waste and Re-\\npaik, the author comes to the conclusion that\\nthere are certain physiological units which are\\nconcerned in this process, and which possess an\\norganic polarity not possessed by chemical units\\nnor by morphological units.\\nAdaptation requires that organic types\\nshould be comparatively stable. The structure\\nof any organism being a product of the almost\\ninfinite series of actions and re-actions to which\\nall ancestral organisms have been exposed, it\\nfollows that any unusual actions and re-actions\\nbrought to bear on an individual, can have but\\nan infinitessimal effect in permanently changing\\nthe structure of the organism as a whole.\\nIndividuality. We may consider as an indi-\\nvidual, any center or axis that is capable of in-\\ndependently carrying on that continuous adjust-\\nment of inner to outer relations which consti-\\ntutes Life.\\nGenesis. There is homogenesis, and hetero-\\ngenesis. Homogenesis, in which successive gen-\\nerations are alike, is by sexual genesis, or gamo-\\ngenesis. But in heterogenesis, which is char-\\nacterized by unlikeness of the successive genera-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "23\\ntions. there is agamogenesis occasionally recur-\\nring with gamogenesis.\\nHeredity and Variation. The phenome-\\nna of heredity assimilate with other phenomena.\\nWe must conclude that the likeness of any or-\\nganism to either parent, is conveyed by the spe-\\ncial tendencies of the physiological units derived\\nfrom the parent. Homogeneity being an unsta-\\nble state, variations must occur.\\nThe biological CLASSIFICATION is based upon\\nnatural differences between individuals, species,\\ngenera, orders, and classes.\\nThe subject of Distribution is treated in ref-\\nerence to the distribution of organisms through\\nspace and time.\\nComing to the Evolution f Life, the subject\\nis considered under the Special Creation hypoth-\\nesis, and under the hypothesis of Evolution.\\nThe arguments from Classification, the argu-\\nments from Embryology, from Morphology, and\\nfrom Distribution, are all considered.\\nThe question is treated with reference to the\\nexternal factors and the internal factors in ref-\\nerence to direct and indirect equilibration.\\nThe theory of Special Creation originated in\\nan era of darkness, is unsupported by facts, and\\ncannot be definitely formulated in thought. The\\nEvolution hypothesis has the opposite character-\\nistics. In regard to Classification, the kinship\\nof groups through their lowest members, is just\\nthe kinship which the philosophy of Evolution\\nimplies.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "24\\nEmbryology. Von Baer set forth this re-\\nmarkable induction:\\nIn its earliest stage, every organism has the\\ngreatest number of characters in common with\\nall other organisms in their earliest stages. At\\na stage somewhat later, its structure is like the\\nstructures displayed at corresponding phases by\\na less extensive multitude of organisms. At\\neach subsequent stage, traits are acquired which\\nsuccessively distinguish the developing embryo\\nfrom groups of embryos that it previously re-\\nsembled thus step by step diminishing the\\nclass of embryos which it still resembles. Thus\\nthe class of similar forms is finally narrowed to\\nthe species of which it is a member.\\nThis induction is adopted by Mr. Spencer\\nand made the basis of an argument in favor of\\nthe production of organic forms by a process of\\nEvolution.\\nFrom Morphology an analogous argument is\\ndrawn; while arguments are found also in the\\ndistribution of Flora and Fauna over the globe.\\nIn the second volume of his Biology, Mr.\\nSpencer treats of the problems of Morphology\\n(structure) and of Physiology (function) and\\nof the Laws of Multiplication as applied to or-\\nganisms.\\nMorphology. Evolution implies insensible\\nmodifications and gradual transitions, which ren-\\nder definition difficult which make it impossi-\\nble to separate absolutely the phases of organi-\\nzation from one another. The doctrine that all", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "25\\norganisms are built up of cells, or that cells are\\nthe elements out of which every tissue is devel-\\noped, is but approximately true.\\nIn the course of development, both animals\\nand plants display not only progressive integra-\\ntions, but progressive differentiations of the re-\\nsulting aggregates, both as wholes and in their\\nparts.\\nPhysiology Function. The author next\\nproceeds to consider those differentiations and\\nintegrations of organic functions which have\\nsimultaneously arisen with the processes of inte-\\ngration and differentiation of organic form;\\nhow heterogeneities of action have progressed\\nalong with heterogeneities of structure.\\nThe author holds that there must be a contin-\\nual adaptation of structure, such as opposes to\\nnew outer forces equal inner forces, and that\\nsuch re-adjustment is inheritable.\\nLaws of Multiplication. If organisms have\\nbeen evolved, their respective powers of multi-\\nplication must have been determined by natural\\ncauses. Grant that the countless specialities of\\nstructure and function in plants and animals,\\nhave arisen from the actions and re-actions be-\\ntween them and their environments, continued\\nfrom generation to generation, and it follows\\nthat from these actions and re-actions have also\\narisen those countless degrees of fertility which\\nwe see among them.\\nThe forces preservative of race are two: abil-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "26\\nity in each member of the race to preserve it-\\nself, and ability to produce other members.\\nThere is an opposition in organisms between\\nself-maintenance and maintenance of the race.\\nAssuming other things to remain the same as-\\nsuming that environing conditions as to climate,\\nfood, enemies, etc., continue constant; then, in-\\nevitably, every higher degree of individual evo-\\nlution is followed by a lower degree of race-mul-\\ntiplication, and vice versa.\\nThe author concludes that in man the tenden-\\ncy is to a condition when there will be a sub-\\nstantial balance between the mortality and the\\nnumber of births in a generation.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER V.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED SPENCER S\\nPSYCHOLOGY.\\nThe first volume deals with what is designat-\\ned, in the closing paragraph, as Objective Psy-\\nchology, in contradistinction to Subjective Psy-\\nchology, which is treated in the second volume.\\nIn considering the data of Psychology, the\\nnervous system is described, first, in its struc-\\nture, and secondly, in its functions.\\nThe most striking contrast between the lowest\\nanimals and the highest, is that which exists\\nbetween the small self-mobility of the one and\\nthe great self-mobility of the other. This is il-\\nlustrated by reference to various animals, and\\nleads to an examination of the internal differ-\\nences. Where activity begins to show itself a\\nnervous system begins to be visible. And when\\nthe power of self-government is great, the nerv-\\nous system is comparatively well developed.\\nThere is also an increment of nervous endow-\\nment, corresponding with each increment of com-\\nplexity.\\nThese psychological phenomena, under their\\n(27)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "28\\nobjective aspect, when reduced to their lowest\\nterms, are incidents in the continuous redistri-\\nbution of matter and motion.\\nSTRUCTURE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.\\nThe nervous system is composed of two tis-\\nsues, which both differ considerably from those\\ncomposing the rest of the organism. They are\\nusually distinguished from one another by their\\ncolors, as gray and white, and by their minute\\nstructures, as vesicular and fibrous. Chemical\\nanalyses have not at present thrown more than a\\nflickering light on the constitution of nerve-\\nmatter in general, or on the constitution of one\\nkind of nerve-matter, as contrasted with the oth-\\ner. All that can be asserted with safety is, that\\neach kind contains phosphatic fats and protein\\nsubstances; but that these components are both\\ndifferently distributed and in different states in\\nthe two tissues.\\nThe gray tissue consists of nerve-cells, the\\nwhite of nerve-fibers. Nerve-tubes with their\\ncontained protein threads, and nerve-cells with\\ntheir contained and surrounding masses of\\nchanging protein substance, are the histologic\\nelements of which the nervous system is built\\nup. These elements are put together by means\\nof the peripheral terminations of the nerve-tubes\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094plexuses of fibres, formed of the essential\\nnerve-substance, that are continuous with one\\nanother, and nerve-centers, or ganglions. This\\narrangement of the nervous system is minutely\\ndescribed; also the position and office of the", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "29\\n1 medulla oblongata, or enlarged termination of\\nthe spinal cord, lying within the skull; also the\\ntwo great bi-lobed ganglia, which in man form\\nthe chief mass of the brain the cerebellum\\nand the cerebrum.\\nFUNCTIONS OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.\\nThe initial inquiry is, how the nervous sys-\\ntem serves as at once the agent by which mo-\\ntions are liberated and the agent by which mo-\\ntions are co-ordinated. Three things have to be\\nexplained: 1. What are the causes which on\\nappropriate occasions determine the nervous\\nsystem to set up motion? 2. By what process\\ndoes it liberate the insensible motion locked up\\nin certain tissues, and cause its transformation\\ninto sensible motion? 3. How does it adjust\\nsensible motions into those combinations, sim-\\nultaneous and successive, needful for efficient\\naction on the external world? These questions\\ncover the whole of the functions of the nerv-\\nous system with which we are directly con-\\ncerned.\\nThe functions of the nervous centers may be\\nclassified, approximately, as co-ordinations that\\nare simple, compound and doubly compound.\\nThe centers in which molecular motion is lib-\\nerated, are also the centers in which it is co-or-\\ndinated; and the successively higher and larger\\ncenters which evolve successively larger quanti-\\nties of molecular motion, are also centers in\\nwhich successively more complex co-ordinations\\nare effected.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "30\\nThere are conditions essential to nervous action,\\none of which is, continuity of nerve-substance.\\nlit nee. one of the conditions to nervous action\\nis. absence of much pressure. It is a familiar\\ntruth, also, that nerves and nerve- centers act\\nonly so long as they are furnished with those\\nneedful materials which the blood vessels bring\\nthem.\\nThe author then treats of nervous phenomena\\nas phenomena of consciousness. Feeling is the\\nsubjective correlate of that which we know ob-\\njectively as nervous action.\\nThe more complex feelings conform to the\\nsame general laws to which the simpler feelings\\nconform. In this regard, emotions come in the\\nsame category with sensations, except that emo-\\ntions are of far more involved natures than sen-\\nsations, and imply the co-operation of extremely\\nintricate nervous structures.\\nThat which distinguishes Psychology from\\nthe sciences on which it rests, is, that each of its\\npropositions takes account both of the connect-\\ned internal phenomena and of the connected ex-\\nternal phenomena to which they refer.\\nOf the substance of mind, considered as the\\nsomething of which all particular states of mind\\nare modifications, we are in absolute ignorance.\\nThe proximate components of mind are of two\\nbroadly contrasted kinds\u00e2\u0080\u0094 feelings, and the re-\\nlations between feelings. Feelings of different\\norders cohere with one another less strongly\\nthan do feelings of the same order.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "31\\nDiscussing the relativity of the relations be-\\ntween feelings, Mr. Spencer, after dwelling upon\\nthe many casts in which the ideas and mental\\nimpressions concerning external objects differ\\nfrom each other, comes to the conclusion that\\nthe relations of co-existence, of sequence, and of\\ndifference, as we know them, do not obtain be-\\nyond consciousness.\\nIn the General Synthesis, the author treats of\\nthe correspondence between life and mind. The\\nlowest life is found in environments of unusual\\nsimplicity. The correspondence between the in-\\nternal changes and external relations is at once\\ndirect and homogeneous. The correspondence\\nextends in space and time, and increases in spe-\\nciality, in generality, and in complexity. These\\ncorrespondences must also be co-ordinated and\\nintegrated.\\nIn the Special Synthesis, the nature of intel-\\nligence is considered.\\nThe two ureal classes of vital actions, called\\nPhysiology and Psychology, are broadly distin-\\nguished in this, that while the one includes both\\nsimultaneous and successive changes, the other\\nincludes successive changes only. The briefest\\nintrospection makes it clear that the actions\\nconstituting thought occur, not together, but\\none after another.\\nAs the external phenomena responded to be-\\ncome greater in number and more complicated\\nin kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes\\nto which the common center of communication", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "32\\nis subject, must increase there must result an\\nunbroken series of these nervous changes, the\\nsubjective face of which is what we call a coher-\\nent consciousness.\\nHence the progress of the correspondence be-\\ntween the organism and its environment neces-\\nsitates a gradual reduction of the sensorial\\nchanges to a succession; and, by so doing,\\nevolves a distinct consciousness a conscious-\\nness that becomes higher as the succession be-\\ncomes more rapid and the correspondence more\\ncomplete.\\nAll life, whether physical or psychical, being\\nthe combination of changes in correspondence\\nwith external co-existences and sequences, it re-\\nsults that if the changes constituting psychical\\nlife occur in succession, -the law of their succes-\\nsion must be the law of their correspondence.\\nKeflex action, under its simplest form, is the\\nsequence of a single contraction upon a single\\nirritation.\\nIn instinct the correspondence is between in-\\nner and outer relations that are very simple or\\ngeneral; in reason the correspondence is between\\ninner and outer relations that are complex, or\\nspecial, or abstract, or infrequent.\\nThe experience hypothesis furnishes an ade-\\nquate solution. The genesis of instinct, the de-\\nvelopment of memory and of reason out of it,\\nand the consolidation of rational actions and in-\\nferences into instinctive ones, are alike explica-\\nble on the single principle, that the cohesion be-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "33\\ntween psychical states is proportionate to the\\nfrequency with which the relation between the\\nanswering external phenomena has been repeat-\\ned in experience.\\nThe Will. The development of what we call\\nWill is but another aspect of the general pro-\\ncess which has been considered. Memory, rea-\\nson, and feeling simultaneously arise as the au-\\ntomatic actions become complex, infrequent, and\\nhesitating; and Will, arising at the same time,\\nis necessitated by the same conditions.\\nIn Part V, entitled Physical Synthesis, a\\nmore elaborate statement is made of the genesis\\nand function of the nervous structures.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VI.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED SUBJECTIVE\\nPSYCHOLOGY.\\nThe author begins with the most highly in-\\nvolved intellectual phenomena; those involved in\\ncompound, quantitive reasoning; proceeding\\nthence to the less complex processes imperfect\\nand simple quantitive reasoning; quantitive rea-\\nsoning in general; perfect qualitative reasoning;\\nimperfect qualitative reasoning; and reasoning\\nin general.\\nThe conclusion arrived at is, that reasoning,\\nwhether exhibited in a simple inference or in a\\nchain of such inferences, is the indirect estab-\\nlishment of a definite relation between two\\nthings; and that the achievement of this is by\\none or many steps, each of which consists in the\\nestablishment of a definite relation between two\\ndefinite relations.\\nReasoning presupposes classification, and clas-\\nsification presupposes reasoning. They are dif-\\nferent sides of the same thing the necessary\\ncomplements of each other. The idea underly-\\ning all classification is that of similarity.\\n(34)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "35\\nLikeness of relations is the intuition common\\nto reasoning and classification.\\nPerception. Perception is an establishment\\nof specific relations among states of conscious-\\nness. [Principles of Psychology, Sec. 354 a.\\nThe perception by which any object is known\\nas such or such, is always an acquired percep-\\ntion. Most of the elements contained in the\\ncognition of an observed object, are not known\\nimmediately through the senses, but are medi-\\nately known by instantaneous ratiocination.\\nBefore a visual impression can become a percep-\\ntion of the thing causing it, there must be add-\\ned in thought those attributes in size, solidity,\\nquality of surf; which, when united, con-\\nstitute the nature of the thing as it is known to\\nus. Though tl m to be given in the vis-\\nual impression, it is demonstrable that they are\\nnot so, but have to be reached by inference.\\nAnd the act of knowing them is termed acquired\\nperception, to signify the fact that while really\\nmediate, it appears to be immediate.\\nThe laws relating to the perception of space,\\ntime, motion, and resistance are examined, as\\nwell as the law of perception in general.\\nPerception is more fully defined as a discerning\\nof the relation or relations between states of con-\\nsciousness, partly presentative and partly repre-\\nsentative; which states of consciousness must be\\nthemselves known to the extent involved in the\\nknowledge of their relations. Under its sim-\\nplest form (a form, however, of which the adult", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "36\\nmind has few, if any, examples) perception is\\nthe consciousness of a single relation.\\nAs a final result of this analysis of the intel-\\nlectual faculties, it is found that all mental action\\nwhatever is definable as the continuous differen-\\ntiation and integration of states of consciousness.\\nPassing from the foregoing special analysis to\\na general analysis, the laws relating to the con-\\nnection of the subjective and the objective, or\\nthe ego and the non-ego are next examined.\\nThe author here enters into an elaborate and\\nexhaustive examination of the various phases of\\nidealism, as advocated by Berkeley, Hume, and\\nothers. These he directly antagonizes. He\\ndoes not, however, indorse the common or vul-\\ngar conception in regard to the external world,\\nwhich he calls Crude Realism. He advocates\\na compromise system, which he designates\\nTransfigured Realism.\\nWhile some objective existence, manifested under\\nsome conditions, remains as the final necessity of\\nthought, there does not remain the implication that\\nthis existence and these conditions are more to us than\\nthe unknown correlatives of our feelings and the rela-\\ntions among our feelings. The Realism we are com-\\nmitted to is one which simply asserts objective exist-\\nence as separate from, and independent of, subjective\\nexistence. But it affirms neither that any one mode\\nof this objective existence is in reality that which it\\nseems, nor that the connections among its modes are\\nobjectively what they seem. -[Ibid., Sec. 472.\\nIt is stated elsewhere (Sec. 470) that the ego\\nis the principle of continuity forming into a", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "37\\nwhole the faint states of consciousness, mould-\\ning and modifying them by some unknown en-\\nergy, while the non-ego is the principle of conti-\\nnuity holding together the independent aggre-\\ngate of vivid states of consciousness.\\nCertain corollaries follow from this general\\nanalysis.\\nBefore proceeding to these, a distinction is\\ntaken between cognitions and feelings, and both\\nare classified.\\nCognitions into presentative cognitions, pre-\\nsentative-representative cognitions, representa-\\ntive, and re-representative cognitions.\\nIn like manner. Feelings are classified into\\npreventative, presentative-representative, repre-\\nsentative, and re-representati\\\\\\nDevelopment of Conceptions.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Only after\\nthere have been received many experiences\\nwhich differ in their kinds but present some re-\\nlation in common, can the first step be taken\\naid the conception of a truth higher in gen-\\nerality than these different experiences them-\\nBelvi\\nIn the course of human progress general ideas\\ncan arise only as fast as social conditions render\\nexperiences more multitudinous and varied;\\nwhile at the same time these social conditions\\nthemselves presuppose some general ideas.\\nEach step toward more general ideas is instru-\\nmental in bringing about better and wider social\\nco-operations; so rendering the experiences still\\nmore numerous and varied, more complex, and", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "38\\nderived from a wider area. And then, when the\\ncorrelative experiences have become organized,\\nthere arises the possibility of ideas yet higher\\nin generality, and a further social evolution.\\nThe primitive man has little experience which\\ncultivates the consciousness of what we call\\ntruth. Credulity is the inevitable concomitant\\nof such a state.\\nCriticism can obtain only as fast as the intel-\\nlectual powers in general develop.\\nIn the lower stages of mental evolution imag-\\nination is feeble.\\nThe belief that superstition implies active im-\\nagination, and that the decline of superstition\\nresults when the flights of imagination become\\nrestrained, shows a confusion of thought. This\\nconfusion has been fostered by the habitual an-\\ntithesis of prose and poetry, fact and fiction.\\nThe mental evolution which accompanies civili-\\nzation, makes imagination more vivid, more ex-\\nact, more comprehensive, and more excursive.\\nA distinction is made between reminiscent im-\\nagination and constructive imagination.\\nLanguage of the Emotions. Every feeling,\\nperipheral or central sensational or emotional\\nis the concomitant of a nervous disturbance\\nand resulting nervous discharge, that has on the\\nbody both a special effect and a general effect.\\nThe general effect is this:\\nThe molecular motion disengaged in any nerve-\\ncentre by any stimulus, tends ever to flow along lines\\nof least resistance throughout the nervous system, ex-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "39\\nciting other nerve-centres, and setting up other dis-\\ncharges. The feelings of all orders, moderate as well\\nas strong, which from instant to instant arise in con-\\nsciousness, are the correlatives of nerve-waves contin-\\nually being generated and continually reverberating\\nthroughout the nervous system\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the perpetual nervous\\ndischarge constituted by these perpetually generated\\nwaves, affecting both the viscera and the muscles, vol-\\nuntary and involuntary.\\nEvery particular kind of feeling, sensational\\nor emotional, being located in a specialized ner-\\nvous structure that has relations to special parts\\nof the body, tends to produce on the body an ef-\\nfect that is special.\\nSociality and Sympathy.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The social in-\\nstinct is observed in the lower orders of exist-\\nence.\\nWhen to the general sociality of gregarious\\ncreatures there come to be added the special so-\\ncialities of a permanent sexual relation, and of\\na double parental relation, sympathy develops\\nmore rapidly.\\nThe genesis and explanation of egoistic senti-\\nments is given, and of altruistic sentiments, as\\nconnected with the social system. The egoistic\\nsentiment is partly inherited, partly acquired,\\nbeing associated with the ideas of possession\\nand enjoyment.\\nThe altruistic sentiments are the feelings\\nwhich find satisfaction in the well-being of all,\\nand which are adjusted to a fundamental un-\\nchanging condition to social welfare.\\nThere can be no altruistic feeling but what", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "40\\narises by sympathetic excitement of a corre-\\nsponding egoistic feeling.\\nThe volume closes with a chapter on the aes-\\nthetic sentiments.\\nThe aesthetic activities in general may be ex-\\npected to play an increasing part in human life\\nas evolution advances. While the forms of art\\nwill be such as yield pleasurable exercise to the\\nsimpler faculties, they will in a greater degree\\nthan now, appeal to the higher emotions.\\nIn the later editions of Spencer s Psychology,\\nthe work has been not only enlarged, but in some\\nrespects re-cast; so that, as he himself says in\\none of his prefaces, it may be said it is\\nmore a new work than a new edition; being\\nmore than twice as large as its predecessor.\\nHow far these changes and additions may have\\nbeen made for the purpose of obviating the force\\nof adverse criticisms, it is not easy to determine;\\nbut that some of them were, is sufficiently man-\\nifest.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VII.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY COXTIN UED SPENCER S SO-\\nCIOLOGY.\\nHaving treated of Organic Evolution, Mr.\\nSpencer now comes to what he terms Super-Or-\\nganic Evolution.\\nThat form of Super-Organic Evolution which\\nhuman societies exhibit in their growths, struc-\\ntures, functions and products, is now to be con-\\nsidered. The phenomena to be dealt with are\\ngrouped under the general title of Sociology.\\nEvery society displays phenomena that are ascrib-\\nable to the characters of its units and to the conditions\\nunder which they exist.\\nThese factors or conditions are extrinsic, or\\nexternal, and intrinsic, or internal.\\nThe extrinsic factors are climate, surface, con-\\nfiguration of surface, vegetal productions, Flora\\nand Fauna, etc.\\nThe intrinsic factors are the physical charac-\\nters, the degree of intelligence, and the tenden-\\ncies of thought, etc., of the individual.\\nIn addition to these, there are the progressive\\nmodifications of the environment.\\n(41)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "42\\nThe average primitive man was somewhat in-\\nferior to the average civilized man in size and\\nphysical structure.\\nThe primitive intellect, relatively simpler, de-\\nvelops more rapidly and earlier reaches its\\nlimit. It is characterized by an absence of gen-\\neralized knowledge, and a readiness to accept\\nany explanation, however absurd, of surround-\\ning phenomena.\\nIn examining the ideas of the primitive man,\\nit is seen that\\nBy minds beginning to generalize, shadows must be\\nconceived as existences appended to, but capable of\\nseparation from, material things.\\nThe echo was supposed to come from an invis-\\nible man who dwelt in the place from which the\\necho came; from one who had passed into an in-\\nvisible state, or who would become invisible\\nwhen sought.\\nGhosts. These originated from experiences\\nin dreams. Dream-activities were accepted as\\nreal activities. The dreamer had seen his other\\nself, or double, and he had seen the doubles of\\nhis companions.\\nThis belief in another self belonging to him, har-\\nmonizes with all those illustrations of duality fur-\\nnished by things around, and equally harmonizes with\\nthose multitudinous cases in which things pass from\\nvisible to invisible states, and back again.\\nThe other self, or double, was supposed to\\nhave departed in cases of swoon, apoplexy, cata-\\nlepsy, ecstasy, and other forms of insensibility.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "43\\nIn death, the double had gone away for a longer\\ntime, but still was expected back. This was the\\norigin of the beliefs in resurrection.\\nLet us note the still existing form of this belief.\\nIt differs from the primitive belief less than we sup-\\npose.\\nThe author refers to the saying in the creed:\\n11 By one man sin entered into the world and\\ndeath by sin, as implying that death is not a\\nnatural event,\\nJust as clearly as do the savage creeds which ascribe\\ndeath to some difference of opinion among the gods,\\nor disregard of their injunctions.\\nThe facts are referred to that in the English\\nstate prayer-book,\\nBodily resurrection is unhesitatingly asserted, and\\npoems of more modern date contain detailed descrip-\\ntions of the dead rising again. n\\nAlso thai a prominent English bishop had re-\\ncently preached against cremation as tending to\\nundermine the faith of mankind in a bodily res-\\nurrection. [Principles of Sociology, Sec. 90.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2And now observe, finally, the kind of modification\\nthrough which the civilized belief in resurrection is\\nmade partially unlike the savage belief. There is no\\nabandonment of it; the anticipated event is simply\\npostponed. Supernatural ism, gradually discredited by\\nscience, transfers its supernatural occurrences to re-\\nmoter places in time or space. As believers in special\\ncreations suppose them to happen, not where we are,\\nbut in distant parts of the world; as miracles, admitted\\nnot to take place now, are said to have taken place\\nduring a past dispensation; so reanimation of the body,\\nno longer expected as immediate, is expected at an in-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "44\\ndefinitely far off time. The idea of death differentiates\\nslowly from the idea of temporary insensibility. At\\nfirst, revival is looked for in a few hours, or in a few\\ndays, or in a few years; and gradually, as death be-\\ncomes more definitely conceived, revival is not looked\\ntor till the end of all things. [Ibid.\\nAmong savage races the implication beyond\\ndoubt is, that the duplicate is at first conceived\\nas no less material than its original. The Greek\\nconception of ghosts seems to have been of an\\nallied kind.\\nNor do the conceptions which prevailed among the\\nHebrews appear to have been different. We find as-\\ncribed, now substantiality, now insubstantiality, and\\nnow something between the tw r o. The resuscitated\\nChrist was described as having wounds that admitted\\nof tactual examination, and yet as passing unimpeded\\nthrough a closed door or through walls. [Prin. of So-\\nciology, Sec. 93.\\nBelief in reanimation implies belief in a subse-\\nquent life. The primitive man, incapable of deliberate\\nthought, and without language fit for deliberate think-\\ning, has to conceive this as best he may. Hence a cha-\\nos of ideas concerning the after-state of the dead.\\n[Prin.of Soc.,Sec. 99.\\nThe second life is originally conceived as re-\\npeating the first in conduct, sentiments, and\\nethical code.\\nSuch traits as we may perceive of the after-\\nlife of the departed Greeks, under its ethical as-\\npect, conform to those of Greek daily life.\\n41 Nor in the ascribed moral standard of the Hebrew\\nother-life do we fail to see a kindred similarity, if a less\\ncomplete one. Subordination is still the supreme vir-\\ntue. If this is displayed, wrong acts are condoned, or", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "45\\nare not supposed to be wrong. The obedient Abraham\\nis applauded for his readiness to sacrifice Isaac. There\\nis no sign of blame for so readily accepting the mur-\\nderous suggestion of his dream as a dictate from\\nheaven. [Prin. of Soc, Sec. 107.\\nThe genesis of the ideas of the other world,\\nand of heaven and hell, is traced from the ideas\\nof another life and of the condition of departed\\nspirits.\\nFrom ghosts to gods the transition is natural\\nand easy. Ancestor-worship preceded, or rather\\naccompanied, this transition. Much attention\\nis given to idol-worship and fetichism, which, by\\nmythological writers generally, is thought to be\\nthe earliest form of religion. Mr. Spencer, how-\\nr. holds ghost and ancestor- worship to be the\\nfirst stage, and fetichism the second.\\nAkin to these forms of superstition, is the\\nworship of Nature; particularly in the form of\\nsun, moon and stars.\\nThe foregoing is given as the data of Sociolo-\\ngy. The author now comes to what he terms\\nthe inductions of Sociology.\\nThe question is asked. What is Society? And\\nthe answer is, a Society is an organism.\\nAnalogies are traced between Societies and\\nother organic structures. These analogies are\\nfound in Social Growth, Social Structures, So-\\ncial Functions, Systems of Organs, the Sustain-\\ning System, the Distributing System, and the\\nRegulating System.\\nThe growth of Societies reminds us, by its\\ndegree, of growth in living bodies.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "46\\nThe implication is, that by integrations, direct and\\nindirect, there have in course of time been produced\\nsocial aggregates a million times in size the aggregates\\nwhich alone existed in the remote past. [Prin. of\\nSoc., Sec. 224.\\nScattered over many regions there are minute\\nhordes\u00e2\u0080\u0094 still extant samples of the primordial\\ntype of society.\\nIn Societies as in living bodies, increase of mass is\\nhabitually accompanied by increase of structure.\\nChanges of structure cannot occur without changes of\\nfunctions/\\nCeremonial and Political Institutions are con-\\nsidered.\\nThe earliest kind of government, the most\\ngeneral kind of government, and the government\\nwhich is ever spontaneously recommencing, is\\nthe government of ceremonial observance.\\n11 That ceremonial restraint, preceding other forms\\nof restraint, continues ever to be the most widely dif-\\nfused form of restraint, we are shown by such facts as\\nthat in all intercourse between members of each socie-\\nty, the decisively governmental actions are usually\\nprefaced by this government of observances. [Prin.\\nof Soc, Sec. 343.\\nPolitical Institutions are preceded by po-\\nlitical organization.\\nThe mere gathering of individuals into a group\\ndoes not constitute them a Society. A Society, in the\\nsociological sense, is formed only when, besides juxta-\\nposition, there is co-operation. But co-operation\\nimplies organization. There is a spontaneous co-\\noperation which grows up without thought during the\\npursuit of private ends; and there is a co-operation", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "47\\nwhich, consciously devised, implies distinct recogni-\\ntion of public ends. [Prin. of Soc, Sec. 440, 441.\\nThe origin and growth of political organiza-\\ntions are traced, as illustrative of the doctrine of\\nevolution. Social types and constitutions and\\nsocial metamorphoses are examined; also the do-\\nmestic relations.\\nThe primitive relations of the sexes Exoga-\\nmy, Endogamy, Promiscuity, Polyandry, Polygy-\\nny, Monogamy, are all carefully considered.\\nMr. Spencer s convictions appear to be in favor\\nof monogamy.\\n3TICAL INSTITUTIONS.\\nThe Religious [dea. a Rightly to trace the evo-\\nlution of Ecclesiastical Institutions, we must know\\nwhence came the ideas and sentiments implied by\\nthem Are these innate, or are they derived\\n44 There is clear proof that minds which have from\\ninfancy been cut off by bodily defects from intercourse\\nwith the minds of adults, are devoid of religious ideas.\\nThe implication is that civilized men have no in-\\nnate tendency to form religious ideas; and this impli-\\ncation is supported by proofs that among various sav-\\nage tribes religious ideas do not exist. [Prin. of Soc,\\nSec. 583.\\nSince, then, religious ideas have not that su-\\npernatural origin commonly alleged, how do they\\noriginate?\\nMr. Spencer thinks they originate in ancestor-\\nworship; giving many illustrations in support of\\nhis theory. The belief in ghosts is considered,\\nalso, as having originated at or about the same\\ntime, and as accompanying ancestor-worship.\\nAmong savage races, the functions of the medi-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "48\\ncine-man and priest were closely related. The\\neldest male descendant was originally the quasi\\npriest, upon whom devolved the duty of propi-\\ntiating the ghosts of ancestors and of prominent\\nchiefs. This priest was frequently, also, the\\nruler. Thus arose the first connection of Church\\nand State.\\nAs society developed the priests became segre-\\ngated and co-ordinated into a separate class.\\nThey contributed in forming the social bond,\\nand sometimes exercised functions of a civil and\\nmilitary character.\\nThus, by a continuous process of evolution,\\nwe arrive at the ecclesiastical institutions of the\\npresent day.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VIII.\\nTHE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONTINUED PRINCIPLES\\nOF ETHICS WORK ON EDUCATION\\nESSAYS, ETC.\\nPRINCIPLES OF ETHIl\\nThe original work, Data of Ethics/ 1 was af-\\nterward enlarged into Principles of Ethics,\\nconsisting of\\nParti. The Data of Kthi\\nPart IT. The Inductions of Ethic\\nPart III. The Kthics of Individual Life.\\nPABT I. -Till. DAI A OF ETHICS.\\nConduct in General, and the Evolution of\\nConduct. Conduct is a whole; ami, in a sense,\\nit is an organic whole\u00e2\u0080\u0094 an aggregate of interde-\\npendent actions performed by an organism.\\nThat division or aspect of conduct with which\\nEthics deals, is a part of this organic whole a\\npart having its components inextricably bound\\nup with the rest.\\nConduct, in its full acceptation, comprehends\\nall adjustment of acts to ends. A large part of\\nordinary conduct is ethically indifferent. [Prin-\\nciples of Ethics, Sec. 1.\\n(49)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "50\\nM Ethics has for its subject matter, that form which\\nuniversal conduct assumes during the last stages of its\\nevolution\u00e2\u0080\u0094 stages displayed by the highest type of be-\\ning when he is forced, by increase of numbers, to live\\nmore and more in presence of his fellows. [Prin. of\\nEthics, Sec. 7.\\nGood and Bad Conduct.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The entanglement of\\nsocial relations is such, that men s actions often sim-\\nultaneously affect the welfares of self, of offspring,\\nand of fellow-citizens. Hence results confusion in\\njudging of actions as good and bad; since actions well\\nlifted to achieve ends of one order, may prevent ends\\nof the other orders from being achieved. [Prin. of\\nEthics, Sec 8.\\nAlways acts are called good or bad according\\nas they are well or ill adjusted to ends. Leav-\\ning other ends aside, we regard as good the con-\\nduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the\\nconduct tending to self-destruction. Parental\\nconduct is called good or bad as it approaches or\\nfalls short of the ideal result, of a progeny, need-\\nful in number and preserved to maturity, who\\nare then fit for a life that is complete in fullness\\nand duration. Lastly, in an associated state,\\nthat form of conduct is most emphatically\\ntermed good, which is such that life may be com-\\npleted in each and in his offspring, not only\\nWithout preventing completion of it in others,\\nbut with furtherance of it in others.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 [Ibid.\\nTaking into account immediate and remote\\neffects on all persons, the good is universally the\\npleasurable.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 [Ibid., Sec. 10.\\nWays of Judging Conduct The Physical\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094The Biological\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Psychological\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "51\\nSociological View. Mr. Spencer claims that\\nall the various ethical theories are characterized\\neither by entire absence of the idea of causa-\\ntion, or by inadequate presence of it. [Prin. of\\nEthics, Sec. 17.\\nThe school of morals properly to be considered as\\nthe still extant representative of the most ancient\\nschool, is that which recognizes no other rule of con-\\nduct than the alleged will of God. It originates with\\nthe savage, whose only restraint beyond fear of his\\nfellow-man is fear of an ancestrai spirit; and whose\\nnotion of moral duty, as distinguished from his no-\\ntion of social prudence, arises from this fear. [Ibid.\\n18.\\nThe pure intuitionists hold that moral percep-\\ntions are innate in the original sense that men\\nhave been divinely endowed with moral facul-\\nties. Even the utilitarian school is very far\\nfrom complete recognition of natural causation.\\nConduct, according to its theory, is to be esti-\\nmated by observation of lvsults.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 [Tbid., Sec. 21.\\nThe PHYSICAL view is, that there is an entire\\ncorrespondence between evolution as physically\\ndefined and moral evolution.\\nThe BIOLOGICAL view is. that the moral man\\nis one whose functions are all discharged in de-\\ngrees duly adjusted to the conditions of exist-\\nence. The performance of every function is, in\\na sense, a moral obligation.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 [Prin. of Ethics,\\nSees. 30, 31.\\nThe PSYCHOLOGICAL view is, that\\nThe pleasures and pains w hieh the moral sentiments\\noriginate, will, like bodily pleasures and pains, become\\nincentives and deterrants so adjusted in their strengths", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "52\\nto the needs, that the moral conduct will be the nat-\\nural conduct. [Ibid., Sec. 47.\\nThe sociological view is, that the highest\\nlife is reached only when, besides helping to\\ncomplete one another s lives by specified reci-\\nprocities of aid, men otherwise help to com-\\nplete one another s lives.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 [Prin. of Ethics, Sec.\\n55.\\nEgoism and Altruism. Egoism comes before\\nAltruism. The acts required for continued self-\\npreservation, including the enjoyment of benefits\\nachieved by such acts, are the first requisites to\\nuniversal welfare.\\nAltruism, defined as being all action which, in\\nthe normal course of things, benefits others in-\\nstead of benefiting self, is no less essential than\\negoism. Self-sacrifice is no less primordial than\\nself-preservation.\\nThough the principles are seemingly in con-\\nflict, yet there is a mode of conciliation.\\nIn its ultimate form, altruism will be the achieve-\\nment of gratification through sympathy with those\\ngratifications of others which are mainly produced by\\ntheir activities of all kinds successively carried on\\nsympathetic gratification which costs the receiver no-\\nthing, but is a gratis addition to his egoistic gratifica-\\ntions. [Prin. of Ethics, Sec. 97.\\nSuch a view as has been set forth\\nu Will not be agreeable to those who lament th6\\nspreading disbelief in eternal damnation; nor to those\\nwho follow the apostle of brute force in thinking that\\nbecause the rule of the strong hand was once good, it\\nis good for all time to come; nor to those whose rever-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "53\\nence for one who told them to put up the sword, is\\nshown by using the sword to spread his doctrine\\namong heathens.\\nFrom the ten thousand priests of the religion of\\nlove, who are silent when the nation is moved by the\\nreligion of hate, will come no sign of assent. [Ibid.,\\nSec. 9a\\nNevertheless, the author does not think it\\nunreasonable to believe that it will eventually\\nbe acted up\\nSPENCER S WORK OH EDUCATION,\\nWit at Knowledge is Most Worth? The\\nornamental comes before the useful. The com-\\nparative worths of different kinds of knowledge\\nhave be n larcely even discussed much\\ndiscussed in a methodic way, with definite\\nresults.\\nThe ultima! f value of any branch of\\nknowledge is, of what use is it in teaching how\\nto live?\u00e2\u0080\u0094 how to minister to self-preservation\\nhow to secure the necessaries of life how to\\nrear and discipline offering- how to maintain\\nproper social and political relations, and how\\nto be best fitted for the leisure part of life, to be\\ndevoted to the gratification of the tastes and\\nfeelii\\nFor all these purposes Mr. Spencer deems\\ncultivation of the sciences indispensable. He\\ndoes not concede that mental discipline requires\\n*Xote.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 This synopsis is confined to that part of the\\nM Principles of Ethics entitled Data of Ethics, the\\nfundamental principles of his doctrine of morals\\nhaving been therein stated.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "54\\nany different course of study from that necessary\\nto prepare for the activities of life.\\nIntellectual Education. The once univer-\\nsal practice of learning by rote, is daily falling\\nmore into discredit. Also, the nearly allied\\nteaching by rules. The particulars first, and\\nthen the generalization, is the new method.\\nThe characteristic of the new method is, an in-\\ncreasing conformity to the methods of Nature.\\nAlike in its order and in its methods, as Pesta-\\nlozzi annunciated, education must conform to\\nthe natural process of mental evolution. We\\nshould proceed from the simple to the complex,\\nfrom concrete to abstract, and from the empir-\\nical to the rational. Furthermore, education\\nshould be a process of self-instruction.\\nMoral Education. Eight conceptions of\\ncause and effect are early formed; and by fre-\\nquent and constant experience are eventually\\nrendered definite and complete. Proper conduct\\nin life is much better guaranteed when the good\\nand evil consequences of actions are rationally\\nunderstood, than when they are merely believed\\non authority.\\nPhysical Education. To conform the regi-\\nmen of the nursery and the school to the estab-\\nlished truths of modern science this is the de-\\nsideratum.\\nspencer s essays and other writings.\\nMr. Spencer s writings have been very volumi-\\nnous. Besides his philosophical and miscella-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "55\\nneous works, he has made contributions,\\nfrom time to time, to various English maga-\\nzines.\\nIt is not within the purview of these articles\\nto speak of his writings, other than those of\\nwhich a synopsis has been given.\\nSuffice it to say, that no one will for a mo-\\nment hesitate to accord to him the highest rank\\namong those who have contributed to the ad-\\nvancement of science and have enlarged the tield\\nof philosophic thought.\\nMr. Spencer appears to have passed through,\\nand to have exemplified in his own person, the\\nthr mental evolution described by\\nComte as the theological, the metaphysical, and\\nthe positive.\\nThe firsl is to be seen in Social Stat-\\nic- written when Mr. Spencer was thirty years\\nof age. In this work he writes of tod s World,\\nof the Divine Idea. of the Divine Rule, of\\nthe Divine Arrangements/ 1 of the creative\\npurj of the Creator s silent command,\\netc.. etc. He refers in high terms to the Christ-\\nian religion, using Language in marked contrast\\nwith that employed in his later writings. He\\nhas also an entire chapter on The Moral Sense\\nsomething which appears strangely to have\\ndropped out of the Data of Ethics.\\nIn Social Statics he speaks of the moral sense\\nas generating moral intuitions [p. 3D]. In the\\nData of Ethics he antagonizes the intuitionists,\\nwho hold that moral perceptions are innate", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "56\\nthat men have boon divinely endowed with moral\\nfaculties.\\nIn Social Statics, human rights are primarily\\nderived from the axiom that human happiness\\nis the divine will [p. 173], and that the duty of\\nman is to conform to the will of God. In the Data\\nof Ethics, the author, speaking of the ancient\\nschool of morals/ that which recognizes no oth-\\ner rule of conduct than the alleged will of God,\\nsays it originates with the savage.\\nIn the first, the theological state, God was\\nruling the world in accordance with divine ar-\\nrangements.\\nIn the second, the metaphysical state, we have\\nthe Unknowable as the Unknown Force, the In-\\nscrutable Power, behind all phenomena.\\nIn the third, the positive state, the Unknowa-\\nble is an abstract, philosophical conception.\\nThe Unknowable was the entity of the met-\\naphysical state, which was substituted for the\\ndivinity of the theological state. It was the in-\\ntermediaire spoken of by Comte, which con-\\nducts one from the theological state to the posi-\\ntive state.\\nIn the positive state of thought, Mr. Spencer\\nuses the term Nature to designate the Un-\\nknowable or Ultimate Cause of things. Na-\\nture is now the great Artificer, and the philos-\\nopher deems it sufficient to study her manifesta-\\ntions.\\nThe progressive character of Mr. Spencer s\\nthought is further illustrated by one of his very", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "57\\nlatest utterances his reply to Mr. Balfour s\\nFoundations of Belief [1895]. Mr. Spencer\\nthere speaks of the Universe as being without\\nconceivable beginning or end, and without intel-\\nligible purp\\nThis is his last and most positive state of\\nthought.\\nIn the theological state, intelligence was as-\\ncribed to the Power behind phenomena.\\nIn the metaphysical state, we were cautioned\\nagainst ascribing to that Power either intelli-\\ngence r the want of intelligence.\\nIn the positive state, it is clearly implied that\\nthe same Power is without intelligible purpose.\\nIn this state, there is no Divine Will, conformity\\nto which was so strongly enjoined in Social\\nStati\\nHaving thus taken a complete survey of the\\nphilosophy of Mr. Spencer, we are now prepared\\nfor an interview with his critics.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IX.\\nCRITICISM BY MALCOLM GUTHRIE.\\nThe most elaborate criticism of Mr. Spencer s\\nphilosophy was made by Malcolm Guthrie, in a\\nvolume of nearly 500 closely printed pages, enti-\\ntled On Mr. Spencer s Unification of Knowl-\\nedge. [London, Truebner Co., 1882.\\nIn his preface Mr. Guthrie says:\\nIn so far as Mr. Spencer s work is viewed as an at-\\ntempt to show the a priori reasonableness of evolution\\nby gradual development, already established in various\\ndepartments of science by a posteriori methods, it may\\nbe held to have accomplished its object; but in so far\\nas it claims to have put together a fr neifork )etf\\nthought commensurate with all the sequences of the\\ncosmos, it must be considered a disjointed structure,\\nfrom which as yet several connected parts are missing.\\nAnd it will be found that the deductive system which\\nMr. Spencer attempts is so mystical in its fundamental\\nideas, as well as so incomplete in its logical connec-\\ntions, that, regarded as a system of philosophy, it is as\\nvague as it is ill-constructed\\nThe attempt to outrun the gradual growth of\\nknowledge by filling in every hiatus with theoretical\\n(58)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "59\\nexplanations, is a positive obstruction to the progress\\nof science\\n4, The writer is not in accord with Mr. Spencer in\\nsupposing that mysticism completes explanations par-\\ntially effected by intelligible methods.\\nMr. Spencer has. according to Mr. Guthrie,\\nsix different methods for the unification of knowl-\\nedge: the Mystical method, the Psychological\\nmethod, the Physical method, the Metaphysical,\\nthe Supraphysical method, and the Symbolical\\nmethod.\\n1. Commenting on tne Mystical Method,\\nMr. Guthrie Bays:\\nIn the book on the Knowable. the Unknowable is\\nalways presenting itself. It meets one at every turn,\\nand each important term is a back-door into the Un-\\nknowable.\\nThe unification must be accomplished within the\\nbounds of knowledge. If the unknowable is mixed up\\nin it, over and beyond the known conditions\u00e2\u0080\u0094 as a fac-\\ntor, but a factor of unknown value\u00e2\u0080\u0094 then, the whole\\norganization or co-ordination of the sciences is vitiated\\nand comes to naught.\\n2. The Psychological Method. The criti-\\ncism on this portion of Mr. Spencer s endeavor\\nto unify knowledge, is that it is vague and\\nmeaningless.\\n3. The Metaphysical Method. Comment-\\ning on Mr. Spencer s illustration of the piano,\\nMr. Guthrie says:\\nIt seems to us that the process which Mr. Spencer\\nhere proposes, is not possible. The only way to\\nfuse the various ideas connected with a piano into the", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "60\\nrequired indefiniteness of general existence would be\\nby fusing the piano itself into general existence by\\ngrinding it into dust, and then we have no idea of a pi-\\nano at all.\\nThe remarkable passage in Spencer referred\\nto by Mr. Guthrie will here be given in full,\\nwith so much of the context as is essential.\\nHow, then, must the sense of this something [that\\nis conditioned in every thought] be constituted Evi-\\ndently by combining successive concepts deprived of\\ntheir limits and conditions.\\nOn thinking of a piano, there first rises in the im-\\nagination its visual appearance, to which are in-\\nstantly added [though by separate mental acts] the\\nideas of its remote sides and of its solid substance. A\\ncomplete conception, however, involves the strings, the\\nhammers, the pedals; and while successively adding\\nthese to the conception, the attributes first thought of\\nlapse more or less completely out of consciousness.\\nNevertheless, the whole group constitutes a repre-\\nsentation of the piano. Now, as in this case we form\\na definite concept of a special existence, by imposing\\nlimits and conditions in successive acts; so, in the con-\\nverse case, by taking away the limits and conditions in\\nsuccessive acts, we form an indefinite notion of gen-\\neral existence. By fusing a series of states of con-\\nsciousness, in each of which, as it arises, the limita-\\ntions and conditions are abolished, there is produced a\\nconsciousness of something unconditioned. [First\\nPrin., Sec. 26.\\nElsewhere Mr. Spencer tells us that the Un-\\nknowable is unthinkable; but here he shows us\\nhow to think of something unknowable, giving\\nfull directions. Taking the piano as an illus-\\ntration, he explains that after having formed a", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "61\\ncomplete concept of the piano, in order to get\\nthe idea of its general existence the idea of an\\nunconditioned piano we must take away one by\\none its limits and conditions. Very well; let us\\nremove from thought first the pedals, then the\\nhammers, strings and dampers. Going further,\\nlet us remove from thought the solid substance\\nof the piano, and, as a last step in the process,\\nits visual appearance. What now remains of\\nthe piano? One would say, nothing whatever.\\nBut according to the author of First Principles,\\nthere still remains to be thought of, an indefi-\\nnitely existing an unconditioned piano.\\nThe pedals, the strings, the hammers, etc., are\\nparts of the piano; and that all the parts of the\\ninstrument, as well as the solid substance of\\nwhich it is composed, can be taken away, and\\nany thing be left, is a doctrine to which I cannot\\nsubscribe. All the parts are equal to the whole.\\nWhen, therefore, all the parts are taken away,\\nthe entire object is gone.\\nMuch has been said concerning the noume-\\nnon, as distinguished from the phenomenon;\\nand since the noumenon is one of the many\\nnames which Mr. Spencer gives to the Unknow-\\nable, it is manifest that the noumenal piano is\\nwhat he supposes to remain after the phenome-\\nnal piano is gone. The doctrine of the noume-\\nnon is that the real object, the Ding an sich,\\nis the noumenon, of which phenomenon is the\\nmanifestation.\\nLet us look into this:", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "62\\nTake a piece of ice. There is the phenomenon\\nice, and, we will say, the noumenon ice. Now,\\nlet the ice be melted into water. The phenome-\\nnon ice is gone. It exists no longer. What has\\nbecome of the noumenon ice? Will it be said\\nit has gone into the water? But water is a phe-\\nnomenon itself, and must have its own noume-\\nnon. If the noumenon ice has gone into the\\nnoumenon water, then the water has, in this\\ncase, two noumena, or a double noumenon.\\nAgain: Let the water be decomposed into oxy-\\ngen and hydrogen gas. Where, now, is or are the\\nnoumenon or noumena of the water? Has it or\\nhave they been cut in two, and has part gone in-\\nto the one gas and part into the other? But\\neach of these gases is supposed to have its own\\nnoumenon.\\nTake another illustration\\nTake the case of a tree: It has, let us say, its\\nnoumenon. Now let the tree be felled, the top\\ncut into fuel and burned, and the trunk sawed\\ninto boards, and used in the construction of a\\nhouse. Where, now, is the noumenon of the\\ntree, or the noumenal tree? Was it divided, and\\ndid a part go into the fuel and thence into ashes,\\nand the other part into the boards and thence\\ninto the house? Does every board have its\\nnoumenon? Does also each of the nails that\\nfasten the boards have its noumenon? The\\nhouse, also, must it not have its own noumenon?\\nIs tlni noumenon a reality, or is it a figment\\nof the imagination a mere philosophico-meta-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "G3\\nphysical abstraction a term without significa-\\ntion?\\nIf the noumenon does not continue to exist af-\\nter the phenomenon has disappeared, then what\\nuse has the noumenon subserved during its\\nexistence? Will it be said that it formed the\\nbase or substratum of the phenomenon? But\\nif the phenomenon could disappear without the\\naid of the noumenon, why could it not appear\\nand continue to exist without the aid of the nou-\\nmenon?\\nThere is in the Dictionnaire Universal of\\nLarousse, a beautiful passage describing the\\nheaven (the firmament) of the peasant and the\\nheaven of the astronomer; and closing with the\\nstatement that while the heaven of the peasant\\nis phenomenal, the heaven of the astronomer is\\nnoumenal. C Le ciel de l astronome est le ciel\\nnoumenal.\\nIt is a fine piece of rhetoric, but as an illus-\\ntration it is entirely inapplicable. The heaven\\nof the astronomer is also a phenomenon; it is, in\\nfact, the same as the heaven of the peasant; on-\\nly, better known.\\nThe noumenon is not the phenomenon better\\nknown. Neither is it matter; nor is it claimed\\nto be such. Matter, in its various forms, makes\\nitself known to our senses, and becomes the sub-\\nject of scientific investigation. But the noume-\\nnon is conceded to be unknowable. Matter is\\nsomething the noumenon is nothing.\\nJohn Stuart Mill says:", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "64\\nNoumena, if they exist, are wholly unknowable by\\nus except phenomenally, through their effects on us.\\n[Examination of Sir William Hamilton s Philosophy,\\nVol. II, p. 181.\\nTo return to our critic. Mr. Guthrie contin-\\nues his criticism as follows:\\n4. The Physical Method. After examin-\\ning this method somewhat in detail, he concludes\\nthat from the Conservation of Energy, and from\\nthe doctrine of the Conservation of the Attract-\\nive Forces, and of the Indestructibility of Mat-\\nter (whatever that is) we are unable to read off\\nthe history of the cosmos; much less can we\\nattain to an explanation of biological processes.\\n5. The Supraphysical Method. By this is\\nmeant a method, not beyond the physical exact-\\nly, but superimposed upon it;\\nThe explanation of all the modes of physical combi-\\nnations and histories, and all their associated develop-\\nments.\\n6. The Symbolic Method. It is\\nThe peculiarity of Mr. Spencer s system that his unifi?\\ncation of knowedge is effected by means of the dis-\\ncernment of the relation of unknowable entities; which\\nentities cannot be represented in thought, and have to\\nbe symbolized by certain signs.\\nMr. Guthrie thinks knowledge cannot be uni-\\nfied in this way.\\nThe pith and point of an extensive criticism\\nof Mr. Guthrie on Spencer s Biology is, that he\\nlias ignored feeling as a factor in the explanation\\nof the processes of life.\\nThe final estimate of Mr. Spencer s work is\\ngiven by Mr. Guthrie as follows:", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "65\\nWith regard to Mr. Spencer s system of philosophy,\\ntaken as a whole, we come to the conclusion that, ad-\\nmirable as is the boldness, magnificent as is the sweep,\\nextraordinary as is the connectiveness of his reason-\\nings, he nevertheless fails in his vast attempt. At the\\nsame time we must admire the grandeur of the outline\\nhe has sketched, acknowledge the greater breadth of\\nview he has given to human speculation, and appre-\\nciate the abounding wealth of suggestion displayed\\nthroughout the work, which not only enriches human\\nknowledge, but is sure to give rise to further earnest,\\nbold and penetrating research into the mysteries of\\nNature.\\nAt the same time we feel that, although deduction\\nmay give unity and consolidation to science, it must\\nbe mainly to experience and induction that we are to\\nlook for the solid increment of knowledge; and it* ever\\nwe arrive at a final unification, which is doubtful, it\\nmust be by the patient labor of the human race\\nthrough ages yet unborn.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER X.\\nSPENCER AND JOHN STUART MILL.\\nMr. Mill, who always appreciated genius, had\\ngreat admiration for Spencer. This feeling was\\nfully reciprocated by Mr. Spencer, who, in a\\nnote to the second volume of his Psychology,\\nspeaks of Mill as one whose agreement he should\\nvalue more than that of any other thinker. And\\nyet these great thinkers, thus highly regarding\\neach other, and both having the benefit of the\\nbest thought of ancient and modern times, could\\nnot, as metaphysicians, think alike.\\nWithout stopping to consider whether or not\\nthis has a tendency to place metaphysics under\\nsuspicion, let us briefly glance at some of the\\npoints wherein these philosophers differ.\\nSpencer, taking an abstruse and metaphysical\\nview of space and time, considers them wholly in-\\ncomprehensible. Mill, on the other hand, saw\\nno difficulty in comprehending a definite portion\\nof space, or even in forming by comparison a\\ntolerably correct notion of infinite space; though\\ninfinity in itself is, of course, incomprehensible.\\nAnd so of time.\\n(66)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "67\\nMill and Spencer differed, also, in some of the\\nfundamentals of logic.\\nAccording to Spencer, the essential test of the\\nvalidity of every proposition that which deter-\\nmines it as having the highest possible certainty\\nis, that its negation is inconceivable. This Mr.\\nMill denied. The views of Mr. Spencer were\\nput forth in an article published in the West-\\nminster Review for October, 1853. This was, in\\npart, a criticism on the controversy between Mr.\\nMill and Dr. Whewell, respecting the nature of\\nnecessary truths. Mr. Mill answered in the next\\nedition of his Logic a reply from Spencer\\nwas afterward published in the Fortnightly Re-\\nview; and a rejoinder from Mill in the later edi-\\ntions of his Logic. The final argument of Spen-\\ncer is given in the eleventh chapter of Part VII\\nof his Psychology.\\nThe arguments on both sides, as they appear\\nin the respective writings, may be summarized\\nthus:\\nSfi:xcer.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 To ascertain whether, along with a cer-\\ntain subject, a certain predicate invariably exists, we\\nhave no other way than to seek for a case in which\\nthe subject exists without it. We conduct the search\\nby trying to replace this invariably existing predicate\\nby some other, or by trying to suppress it altogether\\nwithout replacing it. The failure to conceive the ne-\\ngation is the discovery that along with the subject\\nthere invariably exists the predicate. Hence the in-\\nconceivableness of its negation is that which shows a\\ncognition to possess the highest rank is the criterion\\nby which its unsurpassable validity is known.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "68\\nMill.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 This cannot be a correct test, because propo-\\nna once accepted as true because they withstood\\nthis tost, have since been proved false. There was a\\ntime when men of the most cultivated intellects, and\\nthe most emancipated from the dominion of early pre-\\njudice, could not credit the existence of antipodes;\\nwere unable to conceive, in opposition to old associa-\\ntion, the force of gravity acting upwards instead of\\ndownwards. Newton held an etherial medium to be\\na necessary implication of observed facts; but it is not\\nnow held to be a necessary implication.\\nSpencer.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The propositions erroneously accepted\\nbecause they seemed to withstand the test, were com-\\nplex propositions to which the test was inapplicable.\\nNo errors arising from its illegitimate application can\\nbe held to tell against its legitimate application.\\nMill. -How are we to decide what is a legitimate\\napplication of the test?\\nSpencer.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 By restricting its application to proposi-\\ntions which are not further decomposable. In respect\\nof those questions legitimately brought to judgment\\nby this test, there is no dispute about the answer.\\nFrom the earliest times on record down to our own,\\nmen have not changed their beliefs concerning the\\ntruths of number.. The axiom that if equals be added\\nto unequals the sums are unequal, was held by the\\nGreeks, no less than by ourselves, as a direct verdict\\nof consciousness from which there is no appeal. Each\\nstep in each demonstration of Euclid we accept as they\\naccepted it, because we immediately see that the al-\\nleged relation is as alleged; and that it is impossible\\nto conceive it otherwise.\\nMill. -Hut it must not be forgotten that these axi-\\nomatic truths of which you speak are inductions from\\nexperience. When we have often seen and thought of\\ntwo things together, and have never in any one in-\\nor thought of them separately, there is by", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "69\\nthe primary law of association an increasing difficulty,\\nwhich may in the end become insuperable, of conceiv-\\ning the two things apart. These inseparable associa-\\ntions, which constitute necessities of thought, and are\\nregarded as axioms, are the result of experience.\\nSpencer.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 This view of the matter I accept in part\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094but I regard these data of intelligence as a priori\\nfor the individual, but a posteriori for that entire se-\\nries of individuals of which he forms the last term.\\nThe best warrant men can have for a belief is the per-\\nfect agreement of all preceding experience in support\\nof it; and as, at any given time, a cognition of which\\nthe negation remains inconceivable is, by the hypoth-\\nesis, one that has been verified by all experiences up\\nto that time; it follows, that at any time the incon-\\nceivableness of its negation is the strongest justifica-\\ntion a cognition can have.\\nMill.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Even if it were true that inconceivableness\\nrepresents the net result of all past experience, why\\nshould we stop at the representative when we can get\\nat the thing represented? If our incapacity to con-\\nceive the negation of a given supposition is proof of its\\ntruth, because proving that our experience has hitherto\\nbeen uniform in its favor, the real evidence for the\\nsupposition is not the inconceivableness, but the uni-\\nformity of experience. Xow this, which is the sub-\\nstantial and only proof, is directly accessible. We are\\nnot obliged to presume it from an incidental conse-\\nquence. Jf all past experience is in favor of a belief,\\nlet this be stated, and the belief be openly rested on\\nthat ground; after which the question arises, what that\\nfact may be worth as evidence of its truth.\\nSpencer.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 For the great mass of our cognitions we\\ncannot employ such a method of verification, for sev-\\neral reasons: First, the implied enumeration of experi-\\nences, if possible, would postpone indefinitely the es-\\ntablishment of any conclusion as valid; second, no such\\nenumeration of experiences is possible; and third, if", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "70\\npossible the warrant gained for the conclusion, could\\nnever be as great as that of the test objected to. In each\\nsuccessive step of an argument the dependence of the\\nconclusion upon its premises is a truth of which we\\nhave no other proof than that the reverse is inconceiv-\\nable. And if this be an insufficient warrant for as-\\nserting the necessity of the axiomatic premises, it is an\\ninsufficient warrant for asserting the necessity of any\\nlink in the argument. Logical necessity and mathe-\\nmatical necessity must stand or fall together.\\nWhatever may be thought of this discussion,\\nit has at least the merit of presenting an issue\\nwhich is well defined and fully understood, and\\nunderstood alike by the contending parties.\\nThis is more than can be said of some of the\\nother discussions between the same parties dis-\\ncussions on logical distinctions which turn to\\nsome extent upon the meaning of the terms\\nused.\\nMr. Mill was a more logical writer than Spen-\\ncer, because he looked closely to the mean-\\ning of terms, and to the sense in wilich they are\\nused; something which logic imperatively re-\\nquires, but which Mr. Spencer, as will be seen\\nhereafter, does not always do. Mr. Mill was an\\nacute metaphysician; so is Mr. Spencer; and in\\nboth, as we follow the metaphysical train of\\nthought, we see more than a mere tendency to\\nidealism. This is owing to the attempt to sub-\\nject processes of thought to the same rigid analy-\\nsis that is applied to the phenomena of the phys-\\nical world. Auguste Comte prudently declines\\nthe attempt. Mill, in his analysis of mind and", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "71\\nmatter, comes to the conclusion that matter is\\nnothing but the permanent possibility of sensa-\\ntions; and refuses to recognize the existence of\\nmatter, except under this definition. The con-\\nclusion of Mr. Spencer is not far different. His\\nidealism is, however, more decided, since he dis-\\ntinctly asserts that the relations of co-existence,\\nof sequence, and of difference, as we know them,\\ndo not obtain beyond consciousness.\\nWhile the mind is directed to the objective\\nto the investigation of the phenomena in the\\nworld about us great thinkers substantially\\nagree; but when it is directed to the subjective\\nto the world within the ego they disagree\\nwith each other in nearly every thing except in\\ntheir doabts whether there is any other world\\nthan that which they are investigating.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XI.\\nSPENCER AND FREDERIC HARRISON.\\nIn the Popular Science Monthly for January,\\n1884, appeared an article, republished from the\\nNineteenth Century, written by Herbert Spen-\\ncer, entitled Religion, a Retrospect and Pros-\\npect.\\nTracing the origin of religion to the belief in\\nghosts, Mr. Spencer distinctly recognizes the\\nfact, that in the primitive human mind there ex-\\nists neither religious idea nor religious senti-\\nment.\\nInquiring what may be inferred as to the evo-\\nlution of religion in the future, he concludes\\nthat the religious idea will not disappear, but\\nthat it will continue to undergo changes.\\nCommenting on the changes which religious\\nthought is undergoing and must still undergo,\\nhe says:\\nThe cruelty of a Fijian god, who, represented as de-\\nvouring the souls of the dead, may be supposed to in-\\nflict torture during the process, is small compared with\\nthe cruelty of a god who condemns men to tortures\\n(72)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "73\\nwhich are eternal Clearly, this change can-\\nnot cease until the beliefs in hell and damnation disap-\\npear. Disappearance of them will be aided by an in-\\ncreasing repugnance to injustice. The visiting on Ad-\\nam s descendants through hundreds of generations\\ndreadful penalties for a small transgression which\\nthey did not commit; the damning of all men who do\\nnot avail themselves of an alleged mode of obtaining\\nforgiveness, which most men have never heard of, and\\nthe effecting a reconciliation by sacrificing a son who\\nwas perfectly innocent, to satisfy the assumed necessi-\\nty for a propitiatory victim, are modes of action which,\\nascribed to a human ruler, would call forth expressions\\nof abhorrence; and the ascription of them to the Ulti-\\nmate Cause of things, even now felt to be full of diffi-\\nculties, must become impossible. So, too, must die out\\nthe belief that a Power presen* in innumerable worlds\\nthrough infinite space, and who, during millions of\\nyears of the earth s earlier existence, needed no hon-\\noring by its inhabitants, should be seized with a craving\\nfor praise; and having created mankind, should be an-\\ngry with them if they do not perpetually tell him how\\ngreat he is.\\nMr. Spencer s conclusion is, that the concep-\\ntion of the Deity will continue to enlarge until\\nit finally becomes merged in the consciousness\\nof an Unknowable First Cause.\\nThe article closes thus:\\nAmid the mysteries which become more mysterious\\nthe more they are thought about, there will remain the\\none absolute certainty, that he is ever in presence of\\nan Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things\\nproceed.\\nHarrison. Upon this article Frederic Harri-\\nson wrote a criticism entitled The Ghost of Re-\\nligion, which was published in the Nineteenth", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "74\\nCentury, and republished in the Popular Sci-\\nence Monthly. He begins thus:\\nIn the January number of this review is to be\\nfound an article on Religion, which has justly awak-\\nened a profound and sustained interest. The creed of\\nAgnosticism was there formulated anew by the ac-\\nknowledged head of the evolution philosophy, with a\\ndenniteness such as perhaps it never wore before. To\\nmy mind there is nothing in the whole range of\\nmodern religious discussion more cogent and more\\nsuggestive than the array of conclusions the final out-\\ncome of which is marshaled in these twelve pages. It\\nis the last word of the Agnostic philosophy in its long\\ncontroversy with theology. That word is decisive;\\nand it is hard to conceive how theology can rally for\\nanother bout from such a sorites of dilemma as is\\nthere presented.\\nHe disclaims any attempt to criticise further\\nthan to add a word concerning the Religion of\\nthe Unknowable. To me, he says, it is rath-\\ner the Ghost of Religion.\\nHe thinks the phrase Infinite and Eternal\\nEnergy from which all things proceed savors\\ntoo much of theology. In the Athanasian Creed\\nthe Third Person proceeds from the First and\\nSecond.\\nMr. Harrison differs from Mr. Spencer, some-\\nwhat, as to the origin of religion. He thinks\\nthat fetichism, or Nature-worship, preceded the\\nbelief in ghosts.\\nHis strongest attack, however, is on the Doc-\\ntrine of the Unknowable:\\nLet us take each one of these three elements of re-\\nligion\u00e2\u0080\u0094belief, worship, conduct, and try them all in\\nturn, as applicable to the Unknowable. How mere a", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "75\\nphrase must any religion be of which neither belief,\\nnor worship, nor conduct can be spoken! Im-\\nagine a religion which excludes the idea of worship be-\\ncause its sole dogma is the infinity of nothingness.\\nAlthough the Unknowable is logically said to be\\nSomething, yet the something of which we neither\\nknow nor conceive anything is practically nothing.\\nIt would hardly be sane to make a religion out of the\\nEquator or the Binomial Theorem. But to make a re-\\nligion out of the Unknowable is far more extravagant\\nthan to make it out of the Equator. AVe know some-\\nthing about the Equator.\\nMr. Harrison advocates the Religion of Hu-\\nmanity.\\nHumanity is the grandest object of reverence with-\\nin the region of the real and the known; Humanity,\\nwith the world on which it rests, as its base and envi-\\nronment. n\\nSpencer.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 To this Mr. Spencer replies, in an\\nan article entitled Retrogressive Religion.\\nIn days when dueling was common, says Mr. Spen-\\ncer, and its code of ceremonial well elaborated, a\\ndeadly encounter was preceded by a polite salute.\\nHaving by his obeisance professed to be his antago-\\nnist s very humble servant, each forthwith did his best\\nto run him through the body. This usage is recalled\\nto me by the contrast between the compliments with\\nwhich Mr. Harrison begins his article, The Ghost of\\nReligion, and the efforts he afterwards makes to de-\\nstroy, in the brilliant style habitual with him, all but\\nthe negative part of that which he applauds. After\\nspeaking with too ilattering eulogy of the mode in\\nwhich I have dealt with current theological doctrines,\\nhe does his best, amid flashes of wit coming from its\\npolished surface, to pass the sword of his logic through\\nthe ribs of my argument, and let out its vital principle.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "76\\nMr. Spencer defends his doctrine of the Un-\\nknowable, and accuses Mr, Harrison of not be-\\ning entirely fair in his representation of the\\ndoctrine.\\nHo also defends the ghost-theory as to the or-\\nigin of religion. Then, treating Harrison as an\\navowed advocate of Positivism, he makes an at-\\ntack on the system of Comte, ridiculing Comte s\\nritual in the worship of Humanity.\\nHarrison. The next article of Mr. Harrison\\nis entitled Agnostic Metaphysics.\\nHe states the positions of Mr. Spencer in re-\\ngard to Religion, positions which he, Harrison,\\nregards as constituting a gigantic paradox.\\nThese are:\\nThat the proper object of Religion is a Some-\\nthing which never can be known or conceived,\\nor understood; to which we cannot apply the\\nterms emotion, will, intelligence; of which we\\ncannot affirm or deny personality an Inscruta-\\nble Existence or Unknowable Cause, the Ulti-\\nmate Cause, the All-Being, the Creative Power.\\nThat the essential business of Religion is to keep\\nalive the consciousness of a mystery that cannot\\nbe fathomed; and that we are not concerned to\\nknow what effect this Religion will have as a\\nmoral agent.\\nMr. Spencer says to the theologians: I cannot al-\\nlow you to speak of a First Cause, or a Creator, or an\\nAll Being, or an Absolute Existence, because you\\nmean something intelligible and conceivable by these\\nterms; and I tell you that they stand for ideas that are", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "77\\nunthinkable and inconceivable. But, he adds, I have\\na perfect right to talk of an Ultimate Cause, and a\\nCreative Power, and an Absolute Existence, and an\\nAll-Being, because I mean nothing by these terms\u00e2\u0080\u0094 at\\nleast nothing that can be either thought of or con-\\nceived of; and I know that I am not talking of any\\nthing intelligible or conceivable.\\nQuoting what Mr. Spencer writes in regard to\\na consciousness of a Mystery that cannot be\\nfathomed, Mr. Harrison says:\\nIt would be idle to find for Religion a lower and\\nmore idle part to play in human life, than that of con-\\ntinually presenting to man a conundrum which he is\\ntold he must continually give up.\\nAfter again combating the ghost-theory as to\\nthe origin of all religion, Mr. Harrison closes\\nhis article with an elaborate vindication of Au-\\nguste Comte.\\nSpencer. In his reply, entitled Last Words\\nAbout Agnosticism and the Religion of Hu-\\nmanity, Mr. Spencer says:\\nThose who expected from Mr. Harrison an interest-\\ning rejoinder to my reply, will not be disappointed.\\nThose who looked for points skillfully made which ei-\\nther are or seem to be telling, will be fully satisfied.\\nThose w r ho sought pleasure from witnessing the dis-\\nplay of literary pow r er, will close his article gratified\\nwith the hour they have spent over it.\\nMr. Spencer still further maintains his theory\\nwith regard to the ghost origin of religion. He\\ncomplains of having been misrepresented by Mr.\\nHarrison, closing thus:\\nI end by pointing out, as I pointed out before, that\\nwhile the things L have said have not been disproved,", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "78\\nthe things which have been disproved are things I have\\nnot said.\\nHarbison, Supplementary. Mr. Harrison\\nannounces that he does not intend to continue\\nthe discussion and accepts Mr. Spencer s third\\npaper as closing the debate. Nevertheless, in a\\nshort article, he takes the last word.\\nHe had charged Mr. Spencer with knowing\\nnothing about the philosophy of Auguste Comte;\\na charge which Mr. Spencer had repelled. In\\nsupport of this charge, Mr. Harrison now states\\nthat Comte s waitings consist of eight principal\\nworks, from 1830 to 1856. That in 1864, many\\nyears after Comte s death, and twelve years after\\nComte had finally settled his classification of the\\nsciences, Mr. Spencer wrote a work on The\\nClassification of the Sciences; and Reasons for\\nDissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte,\\nthroughout which work Mr. Spencer speaks of\\nComte as making six sciences.\\nNow, in all Comte s works except the first, he\\nmakes seven sciences. The seven sciences are the A\\nB C of Positivism. In Newton Hall, or any other Pos-\\nitivist school, tables of the seven sciences may be seen,\\nand they occur in tens of thousands of Positivist pub-\\nlications, English and French. Yet for twenty years\\nMr. Spencer has gone on reprinting his Reasons for\\ndissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte, without\\nan inkling of the fact that for thirty-two years Comte s\\nworks speak of seven, not six, sciences as the founda-\\ntion of his Philosophy. Mr. Spencer reprints the w r ork\\nOctober, still with the same blunder. It is as if a\\nwriter on the British constitution persisted in talking\\nabout the four estates of the realm, or as if a man", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "79\\nshould dissent from the Church of England on the\\nground of her having forty-nine Articles of Religion.\\nThis discussion attracted much attention, both\\nin England and in this country. Prof. Youmans\\nspoke of the brilliant manner in which it had\\nbeen conducted on the part of Mr. Harrison,\\nand gave this as a reason why it ought to be\\npublished by Mr. Spencer s friends in this coun-\\ntry previous to an anticipated publication by the\\nPositivists. It was feared that such a publica-\\ntion on their part would give an impetus to the\\nPositive cause.\\nHad Mr. Harrison confined himself to the\\ndoctrine of the Unknowable, and to the attempt\\nto make it the basis of a religion, his superiority\\nin the argument would have been unquestiona-\\nble. By espousing the Eeligion of Humanity,\\nhe gave Mr. Spencer an opportunity, which he\\ndid not fail to improve, to attack and ridicule the\\nworship of Humanity as it had been advocated\\nand prescribed by Comte. It enabled Mr. Spen-\\ncer to make use of the argumentum ad homi-\\nnem. and thus to divert attention from the se-\\nvere attack which had been made upon the doc-\\ntrine of the Unknowable, as a theological dog-\\nma.\\nNote. Comte s seventh science was Morals,\\nwhich he had carved out of Sociology, It was care-\\nless in Spencer to omit it, The omission did not, how-\\never, materially affect his criticism, which was found-\\ned on Comte s arrangement of the sciences, commenc-\\ning with Mathematics, and ending with Sociology.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XII.\\nCRITICISMS AND EULOGIUMS WATSON BOWNE\\nROBERTSON.\\nGospels of Yesterday Drummond; Spencer;\\nArnold. By Robert A. Watson, M. A., London,\\n1888.\\nThe criticism of Mr. Watson, as far as Mr.\\nSpencer is concerned, is directed entirely against\\nthe Data of Ethics.\\nIt is contended that the Data of Ethics fails\\nto present a system of morals adapted to man-\\nkind, especially in its present condition; that\\nthe intense struggle for existence renders it im-\\npossible to adopt a cool, calculating scheme of\\nmixed egoism and altruism such as that offered\\nby Mr. Spencer.\\nTin: Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Being\\nan Examination of the First Principles of\\nins System. By J3. P. Bowne, A. B., New York,\\n1874.\\nThis book is based upon several essays which\\nappeared in the New Englander. These are\\ntli*- titles discussed:\\n(80)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "81\\nWhat is Evolution?\\nLaws of the Unknowable;\\nLaws of the Knowable;\\nPrinciples of Psychology;\\nThe Theistic Argument.\\nThe subjects are handled with a good deal of\\nability. But the work is in style highly contro-\\nversial, and is marred by constant invective and\\nnumerous attempts at satire.\\nIn summing up the doctrine of the Unknowa-\\nble, the following points are taken:\\nSpencer says, religion is impossible, because it in-\\nvolves unthinkable ideas.\\nScience is possible, though it involves the same un-\\nthinkable ideas.\\nGod must be conceived as self-existent, and is,\\ntherefore, an untenable hypothesis.\\nThe fundamental Reality must be conceived as\\nself -existent, and is not an untenable hypothesis.\\nTo deny a thing to thought, says Mr.\\nBowne, and save it to existence, is impossible;\\nbut this had been said before by James Marti-\\nneau.\\nThis saying of Martineau is full of meaning,\\nand goes to the foundation of the doctrine of\\nthe Unknowable. If we cannot think of any\\nthing as existing, then, surely, we have no right\\nto assert its existence. The Absolute, the\\nFirst Cause of the New Philosophy is pro-\\nnounced not only unknowable, but also unthink-\\nable.\\nCousin held that we have an immediate, intui-\\ntive knowledge of God.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "82\\nThis was antagonized by Sir William Hamil-\\nton, who admitted only the finite element in\\nconsciousness. In this, John Stuart Mill agreed\\nwith Hamilton. But Mill, while he held with\\nHamilton that the abstract idea of the Absolute\\nand of the Infinite is only the negation of the\\nrelative and of the finite, yet maintained that\\nsomething infinite can be conceived; as infi-\\nnite space and infinite time.\\nMill did not, like Spencer, claim to arrive at\\nthe existence of Infinite Being by the scientific\\nmethod.\\nHamilton accepted the existence of God as at-\\ntested by a faculty of the human mind called be-\\nlief, which he placed above reason. Spencer\\nantagonized this theory. He, however, by an-\\nother method, arrives at a First Cause, but does\\nnot call it God.\\nSuch is the result of metaphysical specula-\\ntion.\\nNow, if there is any such thing as a science\\nof metaphysics, how is it that no two of four of\\nthe greatest thinkers of modern times can agree\\nupon its first principles?\\nCousin, Hamilton, Mill and Spencer all agree\\nupon the multiplication table, from beginning to\\nend. They agree upon all the demonstrations\\nof Euclid. They agree upon the distance of the\\nsun and moon from the earth, upon the consti-\\ntution and arrangement of the solar system, and\\nupon the movements of the heavenly bodies.\\nThey agree upon the elements in chemistry, and", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "83\\nupon the laws that govern animal life. They\\nagree upon the first principles of all the sciences.\\nBut in metaphysics they disagree upon every\\nthing which is most material.\\nWhen Descartes said Cogito, ergo sum, I\\nthink, therefore I am, that was science; but\\nmetaphysics, as a science, has never been able\\nto get any further. We can assert that we ex-\\nist, because we think. But the moment we ask\\nhow we think, and what it is possible to think\\nof, w T e are lost in the mazes of metaphysical spec-\\nulations.\\nSo long as the most eminent thinkers of the\\nage cannot agree upon the first principles to be\\napplied to the thinking process so long as they\\ncannot agree upon the fundamental laws of\\nthought are we not justified in saying that\\nthere is no such thing as a science of metaphys-\\nics?\\nFor two thousand years, says Comte, during\\nwhich which the metaphysicians have thus cultivated\\npsychology, they have not been able to arrive at a sin-\\ngle proposition intelligible and firmly fixed. They are,\\neven to-day, divided into a multitude of schools which\\ndispute without ceasing concerning the first elements\\nof their doctrines. (Depuis deux mille ans que les\\nmetaphysiciens cultivent ainsi lapsychologie, ils nont\\npu encore convenir d une seule proposition intelligible\\net solidement arretee. Ils sont, meme aujourd hui,\\npartages en une multitude d ecoles qui disputent sans\\ncesse sur les premiers elements de leurs doctrines.)\\nfCours de la Philosophie Positive. 3me Edition, Paris,\\n1869, Vol. I, p 32.\\nWhat, asks Voltaire, have all the philosophers,", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "84\\nancient and modern, taught us? A child is wiser\\nthan they. It does not think about that which it can-\\nnot comprehend. (Un enfant est plus sage qu eux; il\\nne pense pas a ce qu il ne peut concevoir.) [Diction-\\nnaire Philosophique, Article Ame.\\nVoltaire thinks that the great difficulty lies in\\ncomprehending how a being, whatever it may be,\\nhas thoughts; (de comprendre comment un etre,\\nquel qu il soit, a des pensees.)\\nIn another place, writing in that inimitable\\nvein of irony for which he was so distinguished,\\nhe suggests that in every thing relating to met-\\naphysics, we should commence by a sincere sub-\\nmission to the indubitable dogmas of the Church.\\n(Tons les articles qui tiennent a. la metaphysique\\ndoivent eommencer par une soumission sincere aux\\ndogmes indubitables de l Eglise.)\\nModern Humanists. By John M. Robertson,\\nAuthor of Essays towards a Critical Meth-\\nod; Christ and Krishna, c. London, 1891.\\nMr. Spencer undertakes to establish a final recon-\\nciliation between Religion and Science. The\\nso-called reconciliation borders very closely onthe gro-\\nGesque. Religion and Science are to be finally recon-\\nciled when Religion has abandoned every dogma and\\nevery positive belief, and takes the shape of a final\\nnegative proposition that Science never rejected, and\\nhas loiig affirmed. What good has Religion, as\\nsuch, ever done to Science? Forced it to admit the\\niinal mystery of things? Why, Science never denied\\nthat at any stage, and has been affirming it for centu-\\nThe one thing left to religion is, identification of\\nitsell with the final negative proposition of Science.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "85\\nThat is to say, the reconciliation of Keligion and Sci-\\nence consists in Religion, as such, disappearing. The\\npermanent peace is attained when one combatant has\\neaten the other up, leaving not even the tail. I\\nobject to adopting consciously the grim irony of the\\nSpencerian formula to the effect that Religion, thus\\nreduced to the mummy state, has been blissfully rec-\\nonciled with its surviving rival. The phrase recalls\\nthe rhyme about the\\n1 Young lady of Riga,\\nWho went for a ride on a tiger:\\nThey returned from that ride\\nWith the lady inside,\\nAnd a smile on the face of the tiger.\\nYou would hardly say in her epitaph\u00e2\u0080\u0094 if you set up\\na symbolic gravestone that the lady and the tiger\\nwere reconciled.\\nMr. Robertson severely criticizes Mr. Spencer\\nfor his political conservatism, and his refusal to\\nadvocate any of the reforms of the day. He then\\ncloses with the following eulogy:\\nAnd yet again, when all is said, how shall we\\nmeasure our debt to the man whose wide achievement\\nhas laid the enduring foundation for this new art [the\\nstudy of the order of Nature], and whose deeper and\\nsounder teaching has given us the light which his\\nmere temperamental bias would now shut out? Who\\nhas in our day widened and consolidated our knowl-\\nedge as he has done? And what surer contribution\\nis there than that to the reconstruction of our life?\\nSo imperishable is the service that our last words\\nmust needs be the acknowledgment of it. In the name\\nof those who indorse all the criticism we have passed\\non what we reckon the perishable part of the thinker s\\nwork, do we finally turn and say:\\nHail, spiritual Father and honored Master, who first\\ntrained us to shape our path through the forest by the\\neternal guidance of sun and stars! Though we now", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "86\\nmust needs turn against the barriers you have raised,\\nthe gymnastic you yourself have given, and the wood-\\ncraft you yourself have taught, yet would we claim to\\nhold our* elves of your great lineage still; and when we\\nin turn grow wan with many memories/ it is your\\nname and not another s that we shall hand to our\\nchildren as that of the foremost founder of the new\\nline, the greatest herald of the new age.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIII.\\nCRITICISMS CONTINUED\u00e2\u0080\u0094 MANSEL\u00e2\u0080\u0094 CAIRD HODG-\\nSON\u00e2\u0080\u0094 xMAX MUELLER\u00e2\u0080\u0094 SIDG WICK\u00e2\u0080\u0094 JAMES\\nMARTINEAU MOULTON PROFES-\\nSOR GREEN.\\nMost of the criticisms of these writers ap-\\npeared, from time to time, in the British maga-\\nzines, and were replied to by Mr. Spencer in his\\nEssays.\\nDr. Henry L. Mansel. In his Philosophy\\nof the Conditioned (p. 39), Dr. Mansel says:\\nMr. Herbert Spencer, in his work on First Princi-\\nples, endeavors to press Sir W. Hamilton into the ser-\\nvice of Pantheism and Positivism together, by adopt-\\ning the negative portion only of his philosophy\u00e2\u0080\u0094 in\\nwhich, in common with many other writers, he de-\\nclares the absolute to be inconceivable by the mere in-\\ntellect,\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and rejecting the positive portions, in which he\\nmost emphatically maintains that the belief in a per-\\nsonal God is imperatively demanded by the facts of\\nour moral and emotional consciousness. Mr.\\nSpencer takes these negative inferences as the only ba-\\nsis of religion, and abandons Hamilton s great princi-\\nple of the distinction between knowledge and belief.\\nMr. Spencer denies that he takes the negative\\n(87)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "inferences of Hamilton as the only basis of relig-\\nion, and maintains thai he has an indestructible\\npositive basis for the religious sentiment.\\nRev. Principal Caird. Dr. Caird says:\\nHis thesis is that the provinces of science and re-\\nligion are distinguished from each other as the known\\nfrom the unknown and unknowable.\\nDr. Caird inquires whether the knowledge of\\na limit does not imply already the power to\\ntranscend it?\\nMr. Spencer admits that he had himself\\nraised that objection, and repeats what he had\\nonce said in an unpublished note:\\nInstead of positively saying that the Absolute is\\nunknowable, we must say that we cannot tell whether\\nit is unknowable or not.\\nShadworth H. Hodgson. The Future of\\nMetaphysics published in the Contemporary\\nReview for November, 1872.\\nDr. Hodgson, who is acknowledged by Mr.\\nSpencer to be a thinker of subtlety and inde-\\npendence, while he speaks in the highest terms\\nof Spencer s science, criticizes somewhat sharply\\nhis metaphysics. After commenting on the\\nSpencerian doctrine as to the incomprehensibil-\\nity of space and time, he says:\\nIt is bad enough to be told by theologians or by\\npopular philosophers that there are Noumena behind\\nphenomena; but at least there is work for the Noume-\\nnatodo; they are reservoirs of force for interfering\\nwith the laws of Nature. But to be told that there is\\na Noumenon behind phenomena, and that this Nou-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "89\\nmenon is entirely unknowable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 this is a hyperbole of\\nmysticism, a negation of negation, which it would re-\\nquire a greater than Hegel to comprehend.\\nMr. Hodgson holds that the notion of an Un-\\nknowable Substrate or Cause, is an attenuated\\nempirical notion, doing duty as a metaphysical\\none, and occupying the field of metaphysic.\\nWhy, he asks, should Mr. Spencer, with all his\\nwealth in science, and particularly in psychology, cov-\\net the Naboth s vineyard of the metaphysicians?\\nAfter discussing at some length the doctrines\\nof Kant an I Spencer in regard to space and\\ntime, etc., he says:\\nYet Mr. Spencer proceeds to use these inconceiva-\\nble ideas as the basis of his philosophy. For mark, it\\nis space and time as we know them, the actual and\\nphenomenal space and time, to which all these incon-\\nceivabilities attach. Mr. Spencer s result ought, there-\\nfore, logically to be, skepticism. What is his actual re-\\nsult? Ontology. And how so? Why, instead of re-\\njecting space and time as the inconceivable things he\\nhas tried to demonstrate them to be, he substitutes for\\nthem an unknowable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a something which they really\\nare, though we cannot know it\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and rejects that in-\\nstead of them from knowledge.\\nMr. Spencer thinks it strange that Dr. Hodg-\\nson should not be able to understand him bet-\\nter. He repeats what he says he has tried to\\nmake clear,\\nThat the consciousness of an Ultimate Reality, though\\nnot capable of being made a thought, properly so\\ncalled, because not capable of being brought within\\nlimits, nevertheless remains as a consciousness that is\\npositive is not rendered negative by the negation of\\nlimits.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "90\\nMax Mueller.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Professor Mueller thinks\\nSpencer s views are more nearly allied to those\\nof Kant than to those of Locke.\\nTo tins Mr. Spencer demurs, and repeats the\\nreasons he had previously given for dissenting\\nfrotfl Kant. He does not agree with Kant, that\\nspace is the form of all external intuition; nor\\ndoes he agree with him, that the consciousness\\nof space continues when the consciousness of all\\ntilings contained in it is suppressed; nor in the\\ninference thence drawn, that space is an a pri-\\nori form of intuition.\\nSidgwick. In a review of the Principles of\\nPsychology. Mr. H. Sidgwick, after quoting\\nfrom Spencer his statement that\\nA change in the objective reality causes in the sub-\\njective state a change exactly answering to it, so an-\\ns tee ring as to constitute a cognition of it\\nRemarks:\\nHere the something beyond consciousness is no\\nlonger said to be unknown, as its effect in conscious-\\nness constitutes a cognition of it.\\nTo which Mr. Spencer replies:\\nThis apparent inconsistency, marked by the italics,\\nwould not have existed if, instead of a cognition of\\nit. i had said, as I ought to have said, what ice call a\\ncognition of it that is, a relative cognition as distin-\\nguished from an absolute cognition.\\nReferring to the statement of Mr. Spencer that\\nour states of consciousness are the only things\\nwe can know. Mr. Sidgwick claims that Spen-\\ncer is radically inconsistent, because, in inter-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "91\\npreting the phenomena of consciousness, he con-\\ntinually postulates, not an unknown something,\\nbut a something of which he speaks in ordinary\\nterms, as though its ascribed physical characters\\nreally exist as such, instead of being, as Spencer\\nclaims they are, synthetic states of conscious-\\nness.\\nRev. James Martineau. Essay entitled\\nScience, Nescience, and Faith. This will be\\nfound in the third volume of Martineau s Essays.\\nReferring to the criticism contained in this\\nessay, Mr. Spencer says:\\nI have reserved to the last one of the first objections\\nmade to the metaphysico-theological doctrine set forth\\nin First Principles, and implied in the several vol-\\numes that have succeeded it. It was urged by an able\\nmetaphysician, the Rev. James Martineau, in an essay\\nentitled Science, Nescience, and Faith and, effective\\nagainst my argument as it stands, shows the need for\\nsome development of my argument.\\nIn First Principles Mr. Spencer had said:\\nIf the Non-relative or Absolute is present in\\nthought only, and a mere negation, then the relation\\nbetween it and the Relative becomes unthinkable, be-\\ncause one of the terms of the relation is absent from\\nconsciousness. And if this relation is unthinkable,\\nthen is the Relative itself unthinkable, for want of its\\nantithesis; whence results the disappearance of all\\nthought whatever.\\nMR. MARTINEAU S CRITICISM.\\nTake away its antithetic term, and the relative,\\nthrown into isolation, is set up as absolute, and disap-\\npears from thought. It is indispensable, therefore, to\\nuphold the Absolute in existence, as a condition of the", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "92\\nrelative sphere which constitutes our whole intellectual\\ndomain. Beit so. J5nt when saved on this plea\u00e2\u0080\u0094 to\\npreserve the balance and interdependence of two co-\\nrelatives the Absolute is absolute no more; it is re-\\nduced to a term of relation; it loses, therefore, its exile\\nfrom thought; its disqualification is canceled; and the\\nalleged nescience is discharged.\\nt he same law of thought which warrants the ex-\\nistence dissolves the inscrutableness of the Absolute.\\nI admit this, says Spencer, to be a telling rejoin-\\nder; and one which can be met only when the mean-\\nings of the words, as I have used them, are carefully\\ndiscriminated, and the implications of the doctrine\\nfully traced out.\\nHe then proceeds to restate and elucidate the\\nargument:\\nHe does not, he says, commit himself to\\nany propositions respecting the Absolute, con-\\nsidered as that which includes both subject and\\nobject. He prefers the term Non-relative. By\\nthat is to be understood the totality of Be-\\ning minus that which constitutes the individual\\nconsciousness present to us under the forms of\\nrelation.\\nJ. F. Moulton, in the British Quarterly Re-\\nview for October, 1873, and January, 1874.\\nIn the first article Mr. Moulton attacks Spen-\\ncer s position, that the first and second laws of\\nmotion are to be accepted as axioms of physical\\nscience. This position Mr. Spencer defends and\\nmaintains in an elaborate reply.\\nI n the second article in the British Quarterly\\nMr. Moulton returns to the attack, which draws\\nanother reply.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "Reduced to its briefest form, sajj Mr. Spencer,\\nthe argument is this:\\nIf definite quantitative relations [of proportionali-\\nty] between causes and effects be assumed a priori,\\nthen the second law of motion is an immediate corol-\\nlary. If there are not definite quantitative relations\\n[of proportionality] between causes and effects, all the\\nconclusions drawn from physical experiments are in-\\nvalid.\\nProfessor Green, in the Contemporary Re-\\nview for February, 1881, comments on the posi-\\ntion of Spencer, that the object is constituted by\\nthe aggregate of vivid states of consciousness.\\nSpencer denies that this is his position; say-\\ning the allegation is made in face of the con-\\nspicuous fact that I identify the object with the\\nnexus of this aggregate.\\nProfessor Green says:\\nAnd in the sequel the separation of themselves on\\nthe part of the states of consciousness into two great\\naggregates, vivid and faint, is spoken of as a differen-\\ntiation between the antithetical existences w T e call ob-\\nject and subject. If words mean any thing, then Mr.\\nSpencer plainly makes the object an aggregate of\\nconscious states.\\nProfessor Green points out that since Spencer\\nclaims that the object consists of states of con-\\nsciousness, he cannot at the same time consist-\\nently say that it exists beyond consciousness.\\nProf. Green here touches upon Spencer s sys-\\ntem of idealism; a system which the author de-\\nnominates Transfigured Realism. This will\\nbe made the subject of a subsequent chapter.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIV.\\nCRITICISMS CONTINUED MEARS ATWATER\\nWYNN STEBBINS ALGER.\\nMR. SPENCER S RELIGION.\\nReview in the Bibliotiieca Sacra for April,\\n1874, by John W. Mears, Albert Barnes Pro-\\nfessor of Intellectual and Moral Philoso-\\nphy in Hamilton College, N. Y.\\nIt is a long time since purely English philosophy\\nhas produced so able, so comprehensive and so daring\\na thinker as Herbert Spencer. Unlike Mr. Mill, he con-\\nstructs rather than criticises\\nTheoretically, indeed, not an Atheist, his philosophy\\ndenies the possibility of all practical relations between\\n(iod and man, if, indeed, it be not fairly chargeable\\nwith denying the existence of any thing that could\\nproperly be called God\\n11 is First Principles commences with an attempted\\nreconciliation of religion and science, which is remark-\\nable as coming from the side of science, and as proving\\nthat the pressure for such a reconciliation is felt in\\nthat quarter as well as in the other\\nIt is nut an attempt to reconcile science with a re-\\nligion, or with the true religion, but with an ultimate\\nabstraction, void of all positive qualities, which Spen-\\ncer chooses to call the religious idea.\\n(94)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "95\\nAfter enumerating some of the claims which\\nMr. Spencer makes, he asks:\\nWhat lurking postulate silently shapes and projects\\nall these assumptions to the surface This, conscious-\\nly or unconsciously, but this certainly that Herbert\\nSpencer is the most religious man that the world has\\never seen. In his view alone, of all mankind s, the true\\nreligion is perfectly represented. Not Moses and the\\nprophets, not Jesus Christ himself nor his apostles,\\nnot the fathers nor the reformers, not Buddha nor\\nConfucius, not Zoroaster nor Mohammed, approached\\nthe true knowledge of religion, which now, at last, has\\nbeen attained by this modern Englishman. All were\\nin error. The impiety of the pious is expressly de-\\nnounced by Mr. Spencer. The results of what he calls\\nscience are more religious than religion. In short, the\\nwhole dust-heap of the world s religions has been sift-\\ned, and its one inconsiderable and unnoticed item of\\nvalue has been detected; and he who recognizes and\\nholds that, may, should, cast all the rest away, and he\\nwill be the real possessor of religion\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and that man is\\nMr. Spencer. All that the world imperfectly and dim-\\nly aspired after, in its sublimest experiences, has been\\nclearly disclosed and realized in the ontology of Mr.\\nSpencer.\\nThe writer here comments upon the attempt\\nof Mr. Spencer to reduce all religious ideas to\\nthe consciousness of unknowable existence.\\nAnd am I in a world, and have I a nature which,\\naccording to Mr. Spencer himself, points with inevita-\\nble, inexorable logic to a supreme, all-embracing Pow-\\ner, of whom I yet am bound by religious duty to ab-\\njure utterly all knowledge? A most monstrous per-\\nversion\\nI cannot but know, I cannot but believe that I\\nknow something of God in every thing I know. Spen-\\ncer himself calls him the power which the universe", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "96\\ntnaniftsts to us, the Ultimate Cause, the Ultimate Ex\\nam surrounded on every hand by themeth-\\ni his manifestation; my very existence is made\\nup of them. I am myself but one of these methods of\\nthe divine manifestation. How can he be in any sense\\nmanifested, it he is in every sense utterly inscruta-\\nNay, all that is vast, transcendent in Nature,\\nteaches me that he is glorious; all the objects that\\nswell my bosom with emotions of beauty, grandeur,\\nand sublimity, teach me that beauty, grandeur and\\nsublimity belong to the divine nature; all that stretches\\nout into the illimitable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and what smallest object does\\nnot V testifies of his infinity.\\nT. H. ArwATra, in the Princeton Review.\\nIn the Review for April, 1865, appeared an ar-\\nticle entitled Herbert Spencer s Philosophy\\nAtheism, Pantheism, and Materialism.\\nThe New Philosophy is antagonized as being\\nAtheistic. Speaking of the relativity of knowl-\\nedge, the writer says:\\nThis relativity of knowledge is perfectly consistent\\nwith a true and genuine knowledge of things as they re-\\nally are. Not necessarily that we know all pertaining\\nto them. Much remains unknown by the most accom-\\nplished botanist about the merest blade of grass. But\\nwhat in the due use of our faculties we do know, we\\nknow truly. Otherwise we do not know it at all. Not\\nto know truly, is not to know at all.\\nThe writer quotes from Spencer the follow-\\ning:\\n-The common notion that there is a line of demar-\\nii reason and instinct, has no foundation\\nwhatever in fact. [Psy., p. 572.\\ni the following:", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "97\\nThere is a series of insensible steps by which brute\\nrationality may pass into human rationality/ [Ibid,\\np. 573.\\nFrom these and other doctrines contained in\\nthe New Philosophy, Mr. Atwater concludes\\nthat it is a system of Atheism.\\nProfessor Wynn. While Professors You-\\nmans, Fiske, and other admirers of Spencer\\nlook upon his philosophy as a system of Theism,\\nmany other writers consider it decidedly Athe-\\nistic.\\nFor instance, Professor W. H Wynn, of the\\nState Agricultural College of Ames, Iowa, in the\\nseventh volume of the Lutheran Quarterly,\\nw r rites thus:\\nEvolution and correlation are with him [Spencer]\\nthe key wherewith all the mysteries of the universe\\nare unlocked. With Darwin conveniently on the one\\nhand, and Bain on the other, he threads his way\\nthrough the First Principles of things, through aeons\\nof world formations, etc Nor does he rest\\nhere. Civilization, with all its network of agencies\\nand institutions, its governments, its economies, its\\narts, its philosophies, its religion, all proceed\\nin accordance with the same inflexible laws which\\nrolled the nebulous masses into systems, and in due\\ntime will resolve them again into their primeval dust.\\nIt is noticeable that, amid all these stupendous gener-\\nalizations, Mr. Spencer nowhere discovers a presiding\\nmind. It is difficult to see how he could suppress the\\ninference, but it is the special feature of his system,\\nfor which he claims the merit of originality, that he\\nhas been able to build it all up without the hypothesis\\nof a God.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "98\\nSo far as these writers undertake to make the\\nAtheist ic character of the New Philosophy a mat-\\nter of opprobrium, success can only be realized\\namong their religious readers.\\nAs a matter of fact, they are unquestionably\\ncorrect.\\nThere is a difference of opinion as to what\\nthe word religion means, or ought to mean.\\nBut can there be any difference as to the mean-\\ning of the word God Can there be a God\\nwithout attributes and without intelligence?\\nWill it for a moment be contended that there\\never existed on the face of the earth a people\\nwho believed in and worshiped such a God?\\nThe Agnostic says he does not know whether\\nthere is any God or not; that all he knows any\\nthing about, outside of his own mind, is the vis-\\nible and tangible universe, and the actions of or-\\nganized beings; in other words, what is called\\nphenomena. He is content to study the laws of\\nNature; that is, the methods according to which\\nthese phenomena co-exist and succeed one an-\\nother.\\nMr. Spencer goes further. He says he knows\\nof the existence of something else something\\nwhich originated all this, and which holds it to-\\ngether. He positively knows that this some-\\nthing exists. He is more certain of its existence\\nthan he is of the existence of phenomena. He\\ndoes not call it God, because he does not ascribe\\nto it the attributes of a God. He does not be-\\nin a God unless the Unknowable is God.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "99\\nBut the Unknowable is not God; therefore he\\ndoes not believe in any God at all.\\nMr. Spencer has not believed in a God since\\nhe passed out of the theological state of thought\\nin which he wrote Social Statics.\\nStebbins. In Old and New for October,\\n1870, Rufus P. Stebbins, of Ithaca, N. Y., makes\\ntwo points, one on the Unknowable, one on the\\nKnowable, of Spencer.\\n1. That the same law of consciousness, from which\\nSpencer posits the Unknowable Power as First\\nCause, obliges him to posit it as an intelligent First\\nCause.\\n2. That his theory of Evolution from a nebulous\\nmist, and Dissolution to the same, and again Evolu-\\ntion and again Dissolution, kept up in endless succes-\\nsion or rhythm, is defective in this: That to sustain\\nthis theory it would be necessary that all the motion\\nshould be changed into heat at once, and not in por-\\ntions and through vast periods, as would be the case.\\nThis slow process would counteract and prevent any\\nsuch Dissolution as would be necessary to a re-com-\\nmencement of the process of Evolution.\\nW. K. Alger. In the Christian Examiner\\nfor May, 1808, is a dissertation on Emerson,\\nSpencer and Martineau, by W. R. Alger.\\nThe writer makes a somewhat elaborate at-\\ntempt to show that the doctrine of the Unknow-\\nable is Theism in its highest form.\\nThe following paragraph will best illustrate\\nhis trend of thought:\\nThere is, then, no just ground for the belief which\\nLoft.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "100\\nalarms so many, that the detection of this sophism\\nwill prove fatal to morality and religion. Refrain from\\nthinking the divine Psychology a counterpart of the hu-\\nman. Outline Deity no more as a man on the azure\\ninfinity\u00e2\u0080\u0094 paint not his countenance in the mirror of\\nimaginative contemplation. Still he is the One without\\nwhom the Many could not be. Still, we have for our\\nguidance his working scheme revealed in the order\\nand laws of the creation. The sum of the conditions\\nnecessary for the perfect evolution and maintenance of\\nuniversal order and life, constitutes a symbol of au-\\nthority and a body of rules not to be escaped. What-\\never else goes or stays, the laws of the whole in itself\\nand in relation to the parts, and the laws of the parts\\nin themselves and in relation to each other and the\\nwhole, constitute the grounds of a system of religion\\nand morality whose sanctity and sanctions are intrh\\nsic and eternal.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XV.\\nCRITICISMS CONTINUED BASCOM LILLY BAR-\\nRY THE QUARTERLY FAIRBAIRN.\\nJohn Bascom, LL. D., President of the Univer-\\nsity of Wisconsin, in Bibliotheca Sacra for\\nOctober, 1876.\\nThe writer holds that the evolution doctrine,\\ncarried to its legitimate results, destroys all lib-\\nerty of thought or action.\\nWe grant that all which constitutes the dumb show,\\nthe ostensible marks, of liberty, may be present to hu-\\nman action under the interpretation of evolution.\\nMotives are there; action follows upon them; the mind\\nhesitates between them, decides between them, if you\\nwill, chooses between them; no symbol of a free action\\nfails to appear, and to be apparently operative in its\\nappropriate way. If, therefore, the power to use such\\nwords as motives, devices, obedience, disobedience,\\nrelieves one from the charge of fatalism, the evolu-\\ntionist is not a fatalist; but if by fatalism is meant\\nsuch an inclosing of rational with physical activities,\\nsuch a subordination of both to immutable laws that\\nonly one result ever has been possible\u00e2\u0080\u0094 has been con-\\ntained in the forces actually operative- then the evolu-\\ntionist is, and must be, a fatalist.\\nThe doctrine of philosphical necessity, here al-\\nluded to by President Bascom, or, to use a word\\n(101)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "102\\npreferred by some philosophers, philosophical\\ndeterminism, a doctrine which pervades the\\nwritings of Mr. Spencer, and is a cardinal fea-\\nture of his philosophy, is one to which no\\nthoughtful Positivist or Agnostic will object.\\nWhatever difficulty there may be in reconciling\\nthe doctrine with actual individual freedom, can-\\nnot affect the validity of the doctrine itself,\\nwhich stands on eternal foundations.\\nNor can there be any reasonable doubt that\\nthis law, as maintained by Mr. Spencer, applies\\nequally to the human mind. What guaranty\\nhave you that the first friend you meet will not\\nthrust a dagger into your bosom? Only this\\nguaranty: that the conduct of your friend is\\ngoverned by law. If you knew T all the laws that\\ngovern his action, you could tell precisely every\\nthing he will do. You do not know them all;\\nbut you know sufficient of them to rest assured\\nthat he will not do the act referred to so long as\\nhe remains in his sane mind.\\nW. S. Lilly, in the Contemporary Review\\nfor May, 1889.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2The sentiment of a First Cause, infinite and abso-\\nlute, is, according to Mr. Spencer, the eternal and se-\\ncure basis of all religion. The Deity whom, hidden\\nmore or loss under anthropomorphic disguises, the vo-\\nof all creeds ignorantly worship, declares he un-\\nto them as the Unknowable.\\now, if he is right in holding that the Absolute is\\nout of relation to thought, he is certainly wrong in af-\\nfirming a?*?/ consciousness of it Mr. Spencer\\ningenuously confesses, indeed, the consciousness of", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "103\\nsomething which is yet out of consciousness is myste-\\nrious. [Prin. of Psy., Sec. 448.] The mystery is akin\\nto one of which we read in the history of Earon Mun-\\nchausen, who, upon a certain occasion, is related to\\nhave lifted himself out of a river by his own periwig.\\nUpon Mr. Spencer s own showing, only by going\\nout of ourselves, only by transcending what he over\\nand over again lays down dogmatically as the impass-\\nable limits of intellect, can we attain to any acquaint-\\nance with the Absolute. To affirm that a thing is, and\\nthat it is unknowable, is a contradiction in terms.\\nWilliam Barry, in the Dublin Review for\\nApril, 1888. After treating of what the writer\\ncalls the destructive stage of Spencer s philos-\\nophy, he comes to the constructive stage\\nHis constructive stage opens with one of the most\\ncurious sentences ever penned by man. There still re-\\nmains, he says, at page 87, the final question\u00e2\u0080\u0094 what\\nmust we say concerning that which transcends knowl-\\nedge Say Why, nothing, of course. What is there\\nto say except I do not know. But he goes on:\\nAre we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phe-\\nnomena Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly\\nfrom our minds every thing but the relative Won-\\nderful words, and containing some of the most ambig-\\nuous middles I have ever seen. Observe, all knowl-\\nedge is relative, none can transcend phenomena. Yet\\nit is now whispered in our ear that we need not utter-\\nly exclude from our minds what we do not in any way\\nknow; and that we may believe, though the nature of\\nintelligence forbids, I will not say proof, but the very\\nconception of that which we are asked to believe.\\nMr. Spencer is the one conspicuous thinker, at any\\nrate, in our time, who has proposed to reconcile relig-\\nion and philosophy by means of an axiom which makes\\nboth impossible\\nBetween thought and being, Mr. Spencer fixes an", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "104\\ninfinite gulf. That which is, he declares to us, cannot\\nbe known. To him the meeting-place of religion and\\nphilosophy is not a Divine Intuition, but eternal nes-\\nBCience. Thought can solve no problems, not even its\\nown; or more truly, it is made to confess that its own\\nproblem is forever insoluble.\\nThe Quarterly. In the Quarterly for Octo-\\nber. 1873, was a review of Spencer s Psycholo-\\ngy, then lately published, and of First Princi-\\nples, published in 1867, and Essays, in 1868.\\nIn this article, it is claimed that the new sys-\\ntem of philosophy involves the denial of all\\ntruth.\\nThe writer says:\\nThat we can know nothing but phenomena, that ev-\\nery thing absolute escapes us as being forever un-\\nknowable, and beyond the ken of the human intellect\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094is a cardinal principle with Mr. Spencer, who dis-\\ntinctly tells us that all objective agencies productive\\nof -subjective affections are not only unknown, but\\nalso unknowable.\\nBut every philosophy, every system of knowledge,\\nmust start with the assumption (implied or expressed)\\nthat something is really knowable that something is\\nabsolutely true. Either this system of philos-\\nophy itself is relative and phenomenal only, or it is ab-\\nsolutely and objectively true. But it must be merely\\nphenomenal if every thing known is merely phenome-\\nnal. Its value, then, can be only relative and phenom-\\nenal that is, it has no absolute value, does not corre-\\nspond with objective reality, and is therefore false.\\nJ ut if it is false that our knowledge is only relative,\\nthen some of our knowledge must be absolute; but this\\nthe fundamental position of the whole phi-\\nphy\\nvery assertor of such a philosophy must be in the", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "105\\nposition of a man who saws across the branch of a tree\\nat a point between himself and the trunk,\\nThis criticism concerning the relativity of\\nknowledge, which, as will be seen in a subse-\\nquent article, was also very cogently urged by\\nMr. Brownson, has reference only to the doc-\\ntrine of the relativity of knowledge as held by\\nMr. Spencer; that is, that all knowledge is re-\\nlated to the Unknowable Absolute. The criti-\\ncism has no application to the relativity of\\nknowledge in the sense that all our knowledge\\ncomes through cognizing the relations between\\nphenomena.\\nThe best example, says this writer, that\\ncan be adduced of pure, unprejudiced, and yet\\nlearned and cultivated human reason, is fur-\\nnished by the mind of Aristotle.\\nPrincipal Fairbairn in the Contemporary\\nReview for July, 1881. Principal A. M. Fair-\\nbairn, in criticising the doctrine of the Unknow-\\nable, speaks of the consciousness from which\\nthe Absolute is posited, as follows:\\nFor example, Mr. Spencer describes it as the ab-\\nstract of all thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. [First\\nPrin., p. 95.] This abstract he represents as formed by\\ncombining successive concepts deprived of their lim-\\nits and conditions.\\nThis is certainly not a very luminous remark in the\\nmouth of one who had so strenuously reasoned that\\nto conceive was to condition, to limit. But such as\\nit is, there it stands. What does it mean? That by\\nremoving the conditions or limits under which indi-\\nvidual objects are conceived, there remains the indef-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "106\\nthought of the unlimited. Abolish the con-\\nditions ami limits under which a given thing is con-\\nen veil, and what remains? Has an object (our au-\\nthor being witness) any being to thought save as con-\\nditioned or limited?\\nWhat exists to consciousness is known; speech of\\nit is possible only where knowledge is. It is\\nimpossible to place cause and effect in relation, and\\nthen declare the cause non-relative. It is as impossi-\\nble to affirm a consciousness of the Absolute, and then\\ndeelare it unknown. Declare this Power un-\\nknown, and we must divorce it from all relation to the\\nuniverse and consciousness, to the phenomena alike\\nof nature and of mind. Outside thought it is\\nimpossible for thought to get, for every symbol it uses\\nhas been framed by its own act and is the result of its\\nown processes.\\nWhile Mr. Spencer grandly dismisses all religious\\nsystems as unthinkable hypotheses, he does not mean\\nman to be without a religion. As he boldly essays the\\nreconstruction of the universe, it is but proper that he\\nshould introduce man to a new deity, and inaugurate\\na religion conformable to the new order. And what\\nso lit as that this novel deity should be the extraordi-\\nnary entity or non-entity which he has so variously\\nnamed the Unknown, the Unknowable, the Ultimate\\nReality, the Unconditioned Cause, the Inscrutable\\nPower, the Absolute, the Non-relative, the Uncondi-\\ntioned Being, and the Unknown Force. This poly-\\nDomic, extensively described, but indescribable Some-\\nwhat is to be the God of the future, and awe for this\\nmultifarious and multinomial inscrutability, its relig-\\nion.\\nWe cannot reverence, or love, or obey, or worship\\nthe Unknown; these imply that we know the object,\\nand are known to it; that it possesses the moral quali-\\nhat can awaken our reverence and love, and com-\\nmand our obedience and worship.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "107\\nBut let this transfigured religion of omniscient Ag\\nnosticism be tried by a simpler test\u00e2\u0080\u0094 is it capable of\\nrealization, of practical embodiment?\\nI confess to a secret regard for the Keligion of Hu-\\nmanity It has moral passion and purpose in it, is ca-\\npable of creating and directing enthusiasm for the\\nrights and liberties and against the wrongs and op-\\npressions of man. But this religion of Agnosticism,\\nthis humiliation of the reason before a blank abstrac-\\ntion, created by thought to paralyze thought, is but an\\ninsult to the spirit, an insolent yet feeble mockery of\\nthe hopes, the loves, the ideals, the inspirations, the\\nconsolations and reverences, that have been at once\\nsymbolized for our race and realized in it, by the grand\\nold thing named Religion.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XVI.\\nCRITICISMS CONTINUED REVIEW BY ORESTES A.\\nBROWNSON.\\nIn the Catholic World for February, 1872, ap-\\npeared an article entitled The Cosmic Philoso-\\nphy the same being a review of the second edi-\\ntion (1871) of Spencer s First Principles.\\nThe writer summarizes the doctrine of the\\nUnknowable, and examines the assertion that all\\nknowledge is relative, and the positing of a\\nSomething underlying phenomena of which they\\nare the appearances. But this Infinite Some-\\nthing, which is the reality of the cosmos, is ab-\\nsolutely unknowable, and even unthinkable.\\nHow, then, can it be asserted?\\nBoth religion and science, says Mr. Spencer,\\nagree that the Infinite Keality, or Something, is\\nabsolutely unknowable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 absolutely inscrutable.\\nConsequently the ultimate scientific ideas are\\nidentical with the ultimate religious ideas. Both\\nreligion and science are fused together, and rec-\\nonciled without any compromise, and the old\\nfeud between them extinguished in the bosom\\nof the infinite unknowable.\\nHe makes a solitude and calls it peace. n\\n(108)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "109\\nTlie cosmists, by asserting that only phe-\\nnomena are cognizable, and subjecting man to\\nthe common cosmic law, include him in the cos-\\nmic phenomena, and make him simply an ap-\\npearance, or manifestation of the unknowable,\\nwithout any real or substantive existence of his\\nown.\\nFurthermore, by declaring the phenomenal cannot\\nbe thought in and by itself without the Infinite Some-\\nthing that underlies it as its ground or reality, and then\\ndeclaring that something to be unknowable, unthink-\\nable even, the new system declares that there is no\\nknowable, and consequently no science or knowledge\\nat all. The new system of philosophy, then, reconciles\\nscience and religion only in a universal negation; that\\nis, by really denying both. This can hardly satisfy ei-\\nther a scientist or a Christian.\\nMr. Spencer starts with the assumption that all re-\\nligions, including Atheism, have a verity in common as\\nwell as an error. 13 ut what verity is common\\nto truth and falsehood, to Theism and Atheism The\\nverity common to religion and science, that the solu-\\ntion of the cosmic mystery is unknowable But that\\nis not a verity; it is a mere negation, and all truth is\\naffirmative.\\nThe writer rehearses what Mr. Spencer says\\nrespecting the three suppositions which may be\\nmade concerning the origin of the universe:\\nthat it is self-existent, or that it is self-created,\\nor that it is created by an external agency.\\nThe second supposition he rejects as the pan-\\ntheistic hypothesis; which is a mistake, for no\\nPantheist or any body else asserts that the uni-\\nverse creates itself. The Pantheist denies that\\nit is created at all; and the philosopher denies", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "110\\nthat it creates itself; for, since to create is to act,\\nself-creation would require the universe to act\\nbefore it existed\\nThe first supposition, the self-existence of the uni-\\nverse, the author denies, not because the universe is\\nmanifestly contingent and must have had a beginning,\\nand therefore a cause or creator; but because self -ex-\\nistence is absolutely inconceivable; an impossible idea.\\nHe says: self -existence is rigorously inconceiva-\\nble, and this holds true, whatever be the nature of the\\nobject [subject] of which it is predicated. Whoever ar-\\ngues that the atheistical hypothesis is untenable be-\\ncause it involves the impossible idea of self -existence,\\nmust perforce admit that the theistical hypothesis is\\nuntenable if it contains the same impossible idea.\\nBut who ever argued that the atheistical hypothesis is\\nuntenable because it involves the idea of self -exist-\\nence V Atheism is denied because it asserts the self-\\nexistence of that which cannot be, and is known not\\nto be, self-existent.\\nBut it is evident that the author rejects alike self-\\nexistence and creation; that the cosmos is self -exist-\\nent, or that it is created by an independent, self-exist-\\nent and super-cosmic creator. How, then, can he as-\\nsert the existence of the cosmos, real or phenomenal,\\nat all The cosmos either exists or it does not. If it\\ndoes not, that ends the matter. If it does, it must be\\neither created or self-existent; for the author rejects\\nan infinite series as absurd, and self-creation as only\\nan absurd form of expressing self-existence. But as\\nthe author denies self-existence, whatever the subject\\nof which it is predicated, and also the fact of crea-\\ntion, it follows rigorously, if he is right, that the cos-\\nmos does not exist. The author cannot take refuge in\\nhis favorite nescio, or say, we do not know the origin\\nof the cosmos, for he has positively denied it every\\npossible origin; and therefore has, by implication, de-\\nnied it all existence.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "Ill\\nThe Comtists restrict, in theory, all knowledge to\\nsensible things, their mutual relations, dependencies,\\nand the conditions and laws of their development\\nand progress; but they at least admit that these may\\nbe objects of science and positively known. But our\\ncosmic philosopher denies this, and asserts the relativ-\\nity of all knowledge. But relative knowledge\\n[in Mr. Spencer s sense] is simply no knowledge, be\\ncause in it nothing is known. The relativity\\nof all knowledge, then, is simply the denial of all\\nknowledge. It is idle, then, for Mr. Spencer to talk of\\nscience.\\nMr. Spencer labors hard to prove the relativity of\\nall knowledge. He either proves it or he does not. If\\nhe does not, he has no right to assert it; if he does, he\\ndisproves it at the same time. If the proof is not ab-\\nsolute, it does not prove it; if it is absolute, then it is\\nnot true that all knowledge is relative; for the proof\\nmust be absolutely known, or it cannot be alleged.\\nWe either know that all knowledge is relative, or we\\ndo not. If we do not, no more need be said; if we do\\nknow it, then it is false, because the knowledge of the\\nrelativity of knowledge is itself not relative. The as-\\nsertion of the relativity of all knowledge, therefore,\\ncontradicts and refutes itself. .No man can doubt\\nthat he doubts, or that doubt is doubt, and therefore\\nuniversal doubt or skepticism is impossible, and not\\neven assertable. The same argument applies to the\\npretense that all knowledge is relative.\\nRejecting creation, the author cannot assert the re-\\nlation of cause and effect; rejecting cause and effect,\\nhe cannot assert even the cosmic phenomena. They\\nare not able to stand on their own bottom, and there-\\nfore not at all, unless the Something of which they are,\\nas he says, manifestations, is a cause producing and\\nsustaining them. AVe submit, then, that Mr. Spencer s\\ndoctrine of the unknowable, and the relativity of all\\nknowledge, estops him from asserting any thing as", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "112\\nknowable, for it really denies all the knowable and all\\nthe real\u00e2\u0080\u0094 omne scibile et omne reale\\nIn the second part of Mr. Spencer s work on\\nThe Knowable, the cosmos is a ceaseless evo-\\nlution; is, so to speak, in a state of perpetual\\nMux and reflux, in which diffusion of one group\\nof phenomena is followed by the birth of anoth-\\ner, in endless rotation, or life from death, and\\ndeath from life. Dissolution follows concentra-\\ntion in eternal alternation, or both go on to-\\ngether.\\nThis is not a new doctrine, but substantially the\\ndoctrine of a school of Greek philosophers, warred\\nagainst both by Plato and Aristotle, that all things are\\nin a state of ceaseless motion, of growth and decay, in\\nwhich corruption proceeds from generation, and gen-\\neration from corruption, in which death is born of life,\\nand life is born of death. Our cosmic philosophers on-\\nly repeat the long since exploded errors of the old cos-\\nmists. But pass over this.\\nThe author is treating of the knowable. We ask\\nhim, then, how he contrives to know that there is any\\nsuch evolution as he asserts. Does he know\\nthat he is only a certain concentration of matter and\\nforce resulting from a certain diffusion or loss of mo-\\ntion an he not only think but prove it? But all\\nproof, all demonstration, as all reasoning, nay, sensible\\nintuition itself, depends on the principle of cause and\\neffect; for, unless we can assert that the sensation\\nwithin is caused by some object without, that affects\\nthe sensible organism, we can assert nothing outside\\nof us, not even a phenomenon or external appearance.\\nHow does the author know, or can he know, that he\\ndiffers from the ape only in the different combination\\nof matter, motion and force?\\nMr. Spencer, in his work on Biology, asserts that", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "113\\nlife results from the mechanical, chemical, and elec-\\ntrical arrangement of the particles of matter. If this\\nwere so, it would, on the author s own principles, ex-\\nplain nothing. It would be only saying that a certain\\ngroup of phenomena is accompanied by another group,\\nwhich we call life, but not that there is any causal re-\\nlation between them. That the supposed arrangement\\nof the particles of matter originates the life, Mr. Spen-\\ncer cannot assert without the intuition of cause, and\\ncauses he either denies or banishes to the unknowable.\\nMr. Spencer protests against being regarded as an\\nAtheist, for he denies the self -existence of the universe,\\nand neither affirms nor denies the existence of God.\\nBut Atheist means simply no-tlieist; and, if he does\\nnot assert that God is, he certainly is an Atheist. It is\\nnot necessary, in order to be an Atheist, to make a pos-\\nitive denial of God. What is asserted is not\\nGod, and is not pretended to be the God of theism, but\\nthe reality or substance of the cosmos, and indistin-\\nguishable from it. It is the real, as the phenomena\\nare the apparent, cosmos.\\nThe author denies that he is a Pantheist, for he de-\\nnies the hypothesis of self -creation; but, if he is not a\\nPantheist, it is only because he does not call the un-\\nknowable infinite power or being which he asserts as\\nthe reality of the cosmos, that is, the real cosmos, by\\nthe name of God. Dens; or Theos. But, asserting that\\npower as the reality or substance of the cosmic phe-\\nnomena, is precisely what is meant by Pantheism.\\nThe only difference between Atheism and Pan-\\ntheism is purely verbal. The Atheist calls the reality\\nasserted, cosmos or Nature, and the Pantheist calls it\\nGod; but both assert one and the same thing.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XVII.\\nCriticisms by Professor Birks and Monsieur\\nLittre.\\nProfessor Birks. First Principles was\\ncriticised in 1876, by Professor Thomas Rawson\\nBirks, of Cambridge, England.\\nThe Professor criticizes severely some of Mr.\\nSpencer s statements in regard to the forces of\\nattraction and repulsion, denying that matter\\ncan both attract and repel by the same law.\\nQuoting from Mr. Spencer the statement that\\nthe widest, deepest, and most certain of all\\nfacts is that the Power which the universe man-\\nifests to us, is wholly inscrutable, the Professor\\nthus comments thereon:\\nSuch, briefly, is the sum of the whole doctrine; and\\nit contains five or six self-contradictions. That\\nit exists; that it is not an attribute, but either thing or\\nperson; that it is one person or thing, and not many;\\nthat it is distinct from the universe which manifests\\nit; that it is really manifested by the universe; that it\\nis a Power and not a mere Impotence; are six truths\\naffirmed concerning it in the very definition which\\nspeaks of it as utterly inscrutable and unknown.\\n(114)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "115\\nAnd if we add to these the statements which pres-\\nently follow, that it stands in a relation of contrast to\\nthe Relative, (p. 91.) that it is the persistent body cf a\\nthought to w r hich we can give no shape, and the object\\nof an irresistible belief, (p. 93.) that it is a something,\\nthe concept of which is formed by combining many\\nconcepts, deprived of their limits and conditions/ (p.\\n95,) that it is an actuality lying behind appearances/\\n(p. 97,) that it is in such close relation to the relative\\nrealities, that every change in one may be viewed as\\nrepresenting an answering change in the other, so that\\nthe relatives and absolutes are practically equivalent,\\n(p. 162,) and finally, that more or less constant relations\\nin the absolute beyond consciousness are matter of ex-\\nperience, and generate like relations in our states of\\nconsciousness, (Test of Truth, p. 548,) we may see the\\nforce of Mr. Mill s satirical remark, that the doctrine\\nrecognizes as attainable a surprising and almost pro-\\ndigious amount of knowledge of the Unknowable.\\n[Modern Phys. Fat., etc., pp. 20, 27.\\nComing to the department of Physics, and the\\ndiscussion of the laws of Force. Professor Birks\\ngives eleven different hypotheses of scientists in\\nregard to the composition of matter.\\nThe Professor affirms that all these theories\\nagree in offering a hypothesis more or less defi-\\nnite, and capable of becoming the subject of\\nmathematical reasoning and calculation.\\nThe doctrine laid down in the First Principles has\\na character precisely opposite. It is a physical theory\\ncomposed simply of abstract, metaphysical terms, that\\nmay be applied indifferently to a thousand varying hy-\\npotheses, and cannot therefore advance us a single\\nstep in the path of genuine discovery. But it has a\\nstill worse fault. It is not only vague and indefinite,\\nbut self-contradictory.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "116\\nProfessor Birks points out seventeen maxims\\nupon which he says Mr. Spencer insists in his\\ntheory of the constitution of matter. After spe-\\ncifying these in detail, he says that all but two\\nare untrue, self-contradictory, or absurd.\\nQuoting from Mr. Spencer the following:\\nMatter cannot be conceived except as manifest-\\ning forces of attraction and repulsion; we are\\nobliged to think of all objects as made up of\\nparts that attract and repel each other; Profes-\\nsor Birks proceeds:\\nHere we have been told, just before, that w r e can-\\nnot decide whether the phenomena of change arise\\nfrom both attractions and repulsions, or from one of\\nthese two kinds of force only. And now we are told\\nthe exact reverse, that we are obliged to believe in that\\nduality of the action of force which has just been pro-\\nnounced to be beyond the range of our knowledge, and\\nto be inconceivable. This constant oscillation and\\nconfusion of thought is most wearisome and vexatious\\nfor any reader who desires really to gain insight into\\nthe questions in debate. [Mod. Ph. F., p. 208.\\nThe passage in First Principles concerning\\ncentral forces had, previous to this attack, been\\nseverely criticised. It was omitted in the later\\neditions.\\nIn an Appendix to one of these editions\\nof First Principles, Mr. Spencer explains\\nwhy he had omitted the passage in question\\nfrom the later editions. He says that the pass-\\nage was suppressed to remove a stumbling-block\\nout of the way of future readers, and to deprive\\nopponents of the opportunity of evading the", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "117\\ng( neral argument of the chapter by opening: a\\nside-issue on a point not essential to its argu-\\nment.\\nMoreover. Mr. Spencer denies that he assert-\\ned that there were any central forces of matter\\nacting or manifesting themselves in the way\\nstated. He says that what was included in his\\nrtion. was.\\nThat gin n a central force, and such is the law accord-\\ning to which it will vary. Nothing is said concerning\\nthe existence i any central for\\nAnd in illustration of his argument, he asks:\\nWhen I assert that of the heat radiating in all di-\\nrections from a point, the quantity falling on a given\\nsun jiiare of the dis-\\ntance in. do 1 thereby assert the necessary ex-\\nistence of the heat which conforms to this law?\\nAn ordinary thinker would reply:\\nM Yee, you do. 5fouare here referring to a law which\\nippoeedtohaye been established from observations\\nand experiments on the action or manifestation of\\nheat. If there is no heat, there is no law of heat. If\\nyon assert the law, you by necessary implication assert\\nthe existence of heat.\\nBecause Professor Birks so understood him,\\nMr. Spencer thinks he did him great injustice.\\nHe says:\\nMy proposition\u00e2\u0080\u0094 central forces vary universally as\\nthe squares of the distances, he actually transforms\\ninto the proposition\u00e2\u0080\u0094 there is a cosmical force which\\nvaries inversely as the squares of the distances.\\nWell, was not Mr. Spencer w r riting about a\\ncosmical force? Whatever might be his views", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "118\\nas to the nature of force, he here, by necessary\\nimplication, asserts its existence.\\nHis argument that the statement of a law in\\nphysics does not necessarily imply the existence\\nof that of which the law is asserted, is as if he\\nwere to say, when speaking of the evolution of\\nsociety: I do not mean by this to assert that\\nthere is any such thing as a society; but only,\\nif there were a society, this is the way in which\\nit would be evolved. Or, Given a society, and\\nthis would be the law of its evolution.\\nCRITICISM BY MONS. LITTEE.\\nMons. E. Littre, the eminent French philolo-\\ngist and philosopher, in his preface to the\\nCours de Philosophie Positive of Auguste\\nComte, has occasion to refer to the philosophy\\nof Mr. Spencer.\\nHe says that M. Laugel considers Spencer as\\nbelonging to the Positivist school, while at the\\nsame time speaking of him as a metaphysician.\\nThese two qualifications, says M. Littre,\\nare incompatible. He who is a metaphysician\\nis not a positivist he who is a positivist is not\\na metaphysician.\\nM. Littre quotes M. Laugel as saying of\\nMr. Spencer that he divides the objects of\\nhuman thought into two categories: that\\nwhich can be known, and that which cannot\\nbe known; the Knowable and the Unknowable.\\n(Ce qui peut etre connu, et ce qui ne peut pas", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "119\\netre connu; le cognoscible et rincognoscible.)\\nM. Laugel then states the doctrine of reconcili-\\nation of religion and science.\\nCommenting on these extracts, M. Littre\\nsays:\\nThere is confusion here, so that one cannot, I fear,\\nkeep his word either with faith or science. The confu-\\nsion is in the assimilation made between the object of\\nfaith and the result of science.\\nTo my mind. continues M. Littre, a union which\\nbrings together the two Unknowables under one head\\nis more nominal than real; the Unknowable of faith\\nbeing the object itself of faith, and the Unknowable of\\nscience being a limit at which one is stopped. To be\\nan object, or to be a limit, are two ideas entirely dis-\\ntinct. (Etre objet ou etre limite sont deux notions\\ntn s distinctes.)\\nThe unknowable is really the unknown; and upon\\nthe unknown no one can base anything. (Sur Vincon-\\nnu mil n^ put Hen fonder.) From the side of the\\nKnotrable has come progress, and consequently its\\nsocial regime. est du cote du cognoscible qu ont\\npasse* les progres et par consequent leur regime so-\\ncial.)\\nFrom all time, faith has determined the Unknowa-\\nble; that is to say, has taught the beginning and end\\nof things. This instruction should preserve its char-\\nacter or lose it.\\nIf it should preserve it, since science declares the\\nUnknowable indeterminable, the result would be just\\nwhat it really is, division and conflict. The reconcili-\\nation which Mr. Spencer supposes to come from the\\nUnknowable cannot be effected.\\nIf, on the contrary, faith renounces its determina-\\ntions, its instruction loses its character; it becomes con-\\nfounded with that of science. There is, not conciliation,\\nbut absorption. Then it can complain that there has", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "120\\nbeen given it an empty word in place of its realities;\\n(un mot vide en place de ses realites;) and that in the\\nvariable limit which science designates the unknowa-\\nble, it does not obtain even a faint glimmering of\\nwhat it believes and hopes.\\n.Mr. Spencer has well perceived how he has been\\nled to determine the Unknowable; calling it that pow-\\ner of which the universe is the manifestation while\\ndeclaring inconsequent and contradictory any asser-\\ntions whatever relative to its nature, its acts, its mo-\\ntives. Nothing shows better than this the impossibil-\\nity of the attempted reconciliation. (Rien ne montre\\nmieux que ceci Timpossibilit^ de la conciliation ten-\\ntee.)\\nThe attempt to confound the Unknowable of sci-\\nence with that of faith has, then, suffered shipwreck (a\\ndone \u00c2\u00a3choue).", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XVIII.\\nCRITICISMS CONCLUDED. WILFRED WARD ST.\\nGEORGE MIVART A. J. BALFOUR.\\nTHE CLOTHES OF RELIGION.\\nWilfred Ward, in the National Review\\nfor June, 1884. Referring to the discussion\\nbetween Messrs. Spencer and Harrison, the writ-\\ner, after quoting from one of Mr. Harrison s ar-\\nticles, says:\\nThis is, to my mind, quite unanswerable common\\nsense. Mr. Spencer has no right\u00e2\u0080\u0094 has, indeed, no log-\\nical power\u00e2\u0080\u0094 to have his cake after he has eaten it.\\nTo suppose that by dressing up nothing he can make\\nit something\u00e2\u0080\u0094 to conceive that out of the state-\\nments nothing can be known, and a sort of a something\\nexists beyond our knowledge, we can evolve the abso-\\nlutely certain existence of an unknowable object of\\nworship, consisting of an Infinite and Eternal Energy\\nwhence all things proceed, is to introduce a new spe-\\ncies of Evolution which Mr. Spencer himself could\\nhardly sanction w r hen in his right mind. The leap is\\nvery great; and Darwin confesses that Natura non\\nfacit saltum. (Nature makes no leaps.)\\nThe writer claims that the Religion of Hu-\\n(121)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "122\\nmanity, advocated by Harrison, is no better than\\nthe Religion of the Unknowable of Spencer.\\nThe truth seems to be that these philosophers, hav-\\ning conspired together to kill all religion the very es-\\nsence of which is a reallv existing personal God,\\nknown to exist, and accessible to the prayers of His\\ncreatures and having, as they suppose, accomplished\\ntheir work of destruction and put Religion to death,\\nhave proceeded to divide its clothes between them.\\nThe saying of the Psalmist, which was applied to\\nother slayers of their God, may be used of these also\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nDiviserunt sibi vestimenta mea et super vestem meam\\nmiserunt sortem. (They parted my garments among\\nthem and upon my vesture they cast lots.)\\nThe ideas of Infinity, Eternity, and Power, which\\nhave hitherto clothed the Deity, fell to Mr. Spencer s\\nshare; together with the correlative emotion of awe.\\nMr. Harrison came in for a larger quantity. Bro-\\ntherly love, the improvement, moral, mental and ma-\\nterial, of our fellow-men, self-sacrifice for the general\\ngood, devotion to an ideal here are some of the\\nclothes of religion which Mr. Harrison and the Posit-\\nivists have appropriated.\\nMr. Spencer dresses up the Unknowable with Infin-\\nity, Eternity, and Energy; Mr. Harrison dresses up\\nHumanity with Brotherly Love and the worship of an\\nIdeal. But the clothes won t fit. The world may be\\nduped for a time, and imagine that where the garments\\nare, there the reality must be; but this cannot last. It\\nis not the cowl that makes the monk, and it is not the\\nclothes that make religion.\\nSt. George Mivart in the Dublin Ke-\\nview. An elaborate and exhaustive criticism of\\nSpencer s Psychology appeared in the Dublin\\nReview at various times during the years extend-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "123\\ning from 1874 to 1880. It consisted of nine\\nparts, and was entitled An Examination of Mr.\\nHerbert Spencer s Psychology. Part I was\\npublished in the October number, 1874, and Part\\nIX in the January number, 1880.\\nMr. Mivart antagonizes Spencer s Psychology\\nin important points.\\nIn the fourth article, published in the April\\nnumber, 1877, in closing his criticism on the first\\nvolume, he says:\\nThis first volume, therefore, full as it is of ingen-\\nious and suggestive physiological thoughts, and admir-\\nable as a thesaurus of explanations of brute psychisms,\\nleaves the arguments for the radical distinctness of\\nintellect from sensation, not only unimpaired, but re-\\ninforced.\\nAfter reviewing the first part of the second\\nvolume, he says:\\nAt the end of these eight chapters, we must, then,\\n(as it appears to me,) recognize the futility of Mr. Spen-\\ncer s attempt to reduce the reasoning process to even\\nan intellectual reflex comparison of relations as such;\\na fortiori, then, he fails to reduce it to that sort of au-\\ntomatic action which he seems alone to recognize.\\nThe Foundations of Belief: By Rt. Hon. A.\\nJ. Balfour, London, 1895. Where the physi-\\ncist assumes actual atoms, and motions, and\\nforces, Mill saw nothing but permanent possi-\\nbilities of sensation, and Spencer knows no-\\nthing but the Unknowable.\\nSpeaking of the Unknowable, Mr. Balfour\\nsays:", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "124\\nFor any thing I am here prepared to allege to the\\ncontrary, this may be real enough; but unfortunately,\\nit has not the kind of reality imperatively required by\\nscience. It is not in space. It is not in time. It pos-\\nsesses neither mass nor extension, nor is it capable of\\nmotion. Its very name implies that it eludes the\\ngrasp of thought, and cannot be caught up into formu-\\nlae. Whatever purpose, therefore, such an object may\\nsubserve in the universe of things, it is as useless as a\\npermanent possibility itself to provide subject-matter\\nfor scientific treatment.\\nIf these [the Unknowable of Spencer and the per-\\nmanent possibilities of sensation of Mill] be all that\\ntruly exist outside the circle of impressions and ideas,\\nthen is all science turned to foolishness, and evolution\\nstands confessed as a mere figment of the imagination.\\nMan, or rather I become not merely the centre of the\\nworld, but am the world. Beyond me and my ideas\\nthere is either nothing, or nothing that can be known.\\nThe problems about which we disquiet ourselves in vain,\\nthe origin of things and the modes of their develop-\\nment, the inner constitution of matter and its relations\\nto mind, are questions about nothing, interrogations\\nshouted into the void. The baseless fabric of the sci-\\nences, like the great globe itself, dissolves at the touch\\nof theories like these, leaving not a rack behind.\\n[Foundations of Belief, pp. 125, 126.\\nCommenting on wliat Mr. Spencer says as to\\nthe conclusions of Science, Mr. Balfour quotes:\\nTo ask whether science is substantially true, is [he\\nobserves] much like asking whether the sun gives\\nlight [First Frin., p. 19.] It is, I admit, very much\\nlike it. But then, on Mr. Spencer s principles, does the\\nsun give light? After due consideration, we shall\\nhave to admit, 1 think, that it does not. For it is a\\nstatement which, if made intelligently, not only in-\\nvolves the comprehension of matter, space, time, and", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "125\\nforce, which are, according to Mr. Spencer, all incom-\\nprehensible; but there is the further difficulty that, if\\nhis system is to be believed, what we are conscious of\\nas properties of matter, even down to weight and resist-\\nance, are but subjective affections produced by object-\\nive agencies which are unknown and unknowable.\\n[Prin. of Psy., Vol. II, p. 49?.\\nIt w T ould seem, therefore, either that the sun is a\\nsubjective affection, in which case it can hardly be\\nsaid to give light or, it is unknown, and unknowa-\\nble, in which case no assertion respecting it can be re-\\ngarded as supplying us with any very flattering speci-\\nmen of scientific certitude. [Foundations of Belief r\\np. 295.\\nTo this Mr. Spencer replies by saying that\\nMr. Balfour holds the same view; citing page\\n284 of Balfour s Foundations of Belief.\\nBut all that Mr. Balfour there says is that\\nwhen two friends read together the same de-\\nscription of a landscape, it does not stir within\\nthem precisely the same quality of sentiment, or\\nevoke precisely the same subtle associations;\\narguing thence that if no representation of the\\nsplendors of Nature can produce in us any per-\\nfect identity of admiration, we cannot expect\\nthe definitions of theology or science to produce\\nin us any perfect identity of belief.\\nIt certainly seems difficult to discover, in any\\nthing that is here said by Mr. Balfour, sufficient\\nto justify the statement that he holds the same\\nview as Spencer in regard to ultimate scientific\\nideas. The point was whether Mr. Spencer, in\\naccordance with the principles of his philoso-\\nphy, had sufficiently recognized the objective", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "126\\nexistence of the material world. There is assur-\\nedly no admission that he had done so in what\\nBalfour had said concerning the different effect\\nwhich the same description of a landscape would\\nhave upon two individuals.\\nSo far from agreeing with Mr. Spencer in his\\nview as to the entire unreliability of sense per-\\nceptions, Mr. Balfour says:\\nBy the very constitution of our being we seem\\npractically driven to assume a real world in corre-\\nspondence with our ordinary judgments of perception/\\n[Foundations of Belief, p. 255.\\nThe fact that two persons are differently af-\\nfected by the contemplation of a landscape, so\\nfar from proving that the landscape itself is\\nmerely a subjective affection of each, or a state\\nof his consciousness, proves directly the reverse:\\nthat the landscape is there, and that the two\\npersons are differently affected by it because\\nthey are themselves differently constituted. On\\nthe other theory there would be two landscapes,\\nwhile now there is but one. They are both\\nlooking at the same landscape. Where one sees\\nwater the other sees water; where one sees trees\\nthe other sees trees; and where one sees a moun-\\ntain the other sees a mountain; though these ob-\\njects, either in themselves or when grouped to-\\ngether, may make a somewhat different impres-\\nsion upon each.\\nThe fact that the two persons see at the same\\ntime and in the same place, what they find in con-\\nversation to be in its outline and general fea-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "127\\ntures the same landscape, proves that the\\nlandscape itself, as they know it, exists or ob-\\ntains beyond the consciousness of either. They\\nknow it was there before they saw it, and they\\nknow that after they shall have ceased to look\\nupon it, it will still remain in the same portion\\nof universal space.\\nThe criticisms quoted in this work, taken to-\\ngether, constitute a symposium of the views of\\nsome of the best writers and most profound\\nthinkers of the latter half of the present century\\nrepresentatives of all shades of opinion, from\\nthe Positivist and Agnostic to the Deist and the\\nChristian; also of both phases of Christian be-\\nlief, Catholic and Protestant.\\nThe few chapters that remain will be devoted\\nto an examination of the Spencerian metaphys-\\nical philosophy, with particular reference to the\\ndoctrine of the Unknowable, and to the claim\\nthat is made that that doctrine has effected a\\nreconciliation between Science and Eeligion.\\nIn pursuing this examination, the writer hopes\\nat least to be able to make his statements intel-\\nligible. Any thing in metaphysics which is rea-\\nsonable and true ought to be capable of being\\nbrought home to the comprehension of every\\ncareful and thoughtful reader.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XIX.\\nSPACE AND TIME CONSCIOUSNESS.\\nSPACE AND TIME.\\nSpeaking of space and time, Mr. Spencer\\nsays:\\nTo say that space and time exist objectively, is to\\nsay that they are entities. The assertion that they are\\nnon-entities is self -destructive: non-entities are non-\\nexistences; and to allege that non-existences exist ob-\\njectively, is a contradiction in terms. [First Princi-\\nples, Sec. 15.\\nSince, therefore, we\\nCannot conceive of space and time as entities, and\\nare equally disabled from conceiving them as either\\nthe attributes of entities or non-entities, and since we\\nare compelled to think of them as existing and yet can-\\nnot bring them within those conditions under which\\nexistences are represented in thought, the conclusion\\nis that space and time are wholly incomprehensible.\\n[Ibid.\\nIs there not an unnecessary difficulty here\\nraised by the ambiguous use of the terms exist\\nand existences Existence is here used as sy-\\nnonymous with entity; being; substance; and a\\n(128)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "129\\nnon-entity is declared to be a non-existence.\\nBut exist has another meaning equally legiti-\\nmate, that is, to manifest itself; to continue to\\nbe. In this sense space and time exist object-\\nively. They are manifested; they continue to\\nbe.\\nAgain:\\nOf space and time we cannot assert either limita-\\ntion or the absence of limitation.\\nIs this correct? On the contrary, do we not,\\nevery day, in the ordinary transactions of life,\\nassert limitation both of space and time? Of\\nspace we assert limitation every time we make a\\nmeasurement of any portion of the space about\\nus, for any purpose whatever. And of time we\\nassert limitation whenever we speak of a year, a\\nday, or an hour. If the statement had been,\\nWhen we speak of space and time generally,\\nwe do not assert either limitation or the absence\\nof limitation, it would have been correct. But\\nthat would have been another proposition.\\nOnce more:\\nSpace and time are wholly incomprehensible. We\\nare compelled to think of them as existing, and yet\\ncannot bring them within those conditions under\\nwhich existences are represented in thought.\\nWhat is the difficulty in comprehending a lim-\\nited portion of space or a limited period of time?\\nWhen thinking of space, as John Stuart Mill\\njustly remarks:\\nWe leave to it all that belongs to it as space\u00e2\u0080\u0094 its\\nthree dimensions, with their geometrical properties.\\nIf an object which has these well marked posi-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "130\\ntive attributes, is unthinkable because it has a nega-\\ntive attribute as well, the number of thinkable objects\\nmust be remarkably small. [Examination of Sir W.\\nHamilton s Philosophy.\\nCONSCIOUSNESS.\\nNor is Mr. Spencer always exact in his defini-\\ntions. Thus he says:\\nConsciousness implies perpetual change and the per-\\npetual establishment of relations between its success-\\nive phases. [First Prin., Sec. 19.\\nHere is an ambiguity in the use of the word\\nperpetual, which must have been employed in\\nthe sense of continuous or successive.\\nIn the explanations which preceded this state-\\nment, the author had said:\\nOur states of consciousness occur in succession. Is\\nthis chain of states of consciousness infinite or finite\\nWe cannot say infinite; not only because we have indi-\\nrectly reached the conclusion that there was a period\\nwhen it commenced, but also because all infinity is in-\\nconceivable an infinite series included. We cannot\\nsay finite; for we have no knowledge of either of its\\nends. Go back in memory as far as we may, we are\\nwholly unable to identify our first states of conscious-\\nness; the perspective of our thoughts vanishes in a dim\\nobscurity where we can make out nothing. Similarly\\nat the other extreme. We have no immediate knowl-\\nedge of a termination to the series at a future time.\\n[First Prin., Sec. 19.\\nHere the author says we cannot say that the\\nchain of states of consciousness is infinite, be-\\ncause we have reached the conclusion that there", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "131\\nwas a period when it commenced. This is equiv-\\nalent to saying, we cannot say that the chain\\nof states is infinite because we have reached the\\nconclusion that it is finite. Yet in the very\\nnext sentence he says we cannot say the chain is\\nfinite, because we have no knowledge of either\\nof its ends. But when we reached the conclu-\\nsion that there was a period when it com-\\nmenced, did we not assert a knowledge of one\\nof its ends?\\nHe further says:\\nGo back in memory as far as we may, we are wholly\\nunable to identify our first states of consciousness.\\nBut is that material? Does the existence or\\nnon-existence of any thing in our experience de-\\npend upon the memory of it? Go back in mem-\\nory as far as we may, we are wholly unable to\\nidentify the moment of our birth. Therefore\\nwe were never born.\\nThat the child has its first states of conscious-\\nness, is manifest from the origin of conscious-\\nness, as given by the author himself. He says:\\nDuring the first stage of incipient intelligence, be-\\nfore the feelings produced by intercourse with the out-\\ner world have been put in order, there ore no cogni-\\ntions, strictly so called; and, as every infant shows us,\\nthese slowly emerge out of the confusion of unfolding\\nconsciousness as fast as the experiences are arranged\\ninto groups\u00e2\u0080\u0094 as fast as the most frequently repeated\\nsensations, and their relations to each other, become\\nfamiliar enough to admit of their recognition as such\\nor such, whenever they recur. [First Prin., Sec. 24.\\nHere is an admirable, scientific statement of", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "132\\nthe origin of consciousness. At first, there is\\nnone. Then, it is gradually unfolded, like a\\nflower. Is there any difficulty here in seeing a\\nfirst state of consciousness? And because the\\nindividual, in after years, cannot remember, or\\nis not aware of, the first state of consciousness,\\ndoes that prove there was none?\\nNot only does Mr. Spencer show the origin\\nof consciousness in the child, but he traces the\\norigin of consciousness in animals.\\nBut when Mr. Sidgwick called attention to a\\npassage wherein Spencer, in describing that\\ndifferentiation of the physical from the psychical\\nlife which accompanies advancing organization\\nand advancing development of the nervous sys-\\ntem, had said, as nervous integration advances\\nthere must result an unbroken series of the\\nchanges constituting psychical life there\\nmust arise a consciousness, Mr. Spencer says:\\nNow, I admit, that here is an apparent incon-\\nsistency. I ought to have said that there must\\nresult an unbroken series of these changes,\\nwhich, taking place in the nervous system of a\\nhighly organized creature, gives coherence to its\\nconduct, and along with which we assume con-\\nsciousness, because consciousness goes along\\nwith coherent conduct in ourselves. Seeing\\nthat the tracing of the origin of consciousness\\nthus distinctly would not consist with the doc-\\ntrine of the Unknowable, which he had based up-\\non a dim or vague consciousness for, if the\\ndoctrine is placed upon this basis, animals also", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "133\\nshould have a consciousness of the Unknowable\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094he here, for the first time, implies doubt or\\nuncertainty as to the existence of consciousness\\nin animals.\\nBut the existence of consciousness in animals\\ncannot be ignored by Mr. Spencer, who says\\n(Psychology, p, 572) that the common notion\\nthat there is a line of demarcation between rea-\\nson and instinct has no foundation whatever in\\nfact; and (ibid. p. 573) that there is a series of\\ninsensible steps by which brute rationality may\\npass into human rationality.\\nNor is animal consciousness habitually ig-\\nnored by Mr. Spencer. Thus, in his criticism\\nof Bain on the Emotions and the Will, he speaks\\nseveral times of the consciousness of birds.\\n[Essays, Vol. I, p. 256.\\nSo, also, in his discussion with Mr. Marti-\\nneau, he speaks of the newly hatched chicken as\\nhaving feeling, and therefore consciousness.\\n[lb. p. 378.\\nTo come back to the subject of states of con-\\nsciousness. Mr. Spencer says we cannot say\\nthat the chain of states of consciousness is in-\\nfinite and we cannot say that it is finite. But if\\nthere be any such chain, it must be either finite\\nor infinite in duration. Hence this is equivalent\\nto asserting that we cannot say that there is any\\nchain of consciousness at all.\\nAgain, he says we cannot say that the\\nchain of states (of consciousness) is finite, be-\\ncause we do not know the other end of the chain.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "134\\nWe have no immediate knowledge of a termination\\nto the series at a future time.\\nNeither have we any immediate knowledge of\\nany future state of consciousness. And if the\\nfact that we do not know in advance the last\\nstate of consciousness, proves that there is to be\\nno last state of consciousness; then the fact that\\nwe do not know in advance any future state of\\nconsciousness, proves that there is to be no fu-\\nture state of consciousness.\\nThe author follows up these statements with a\\nformal argument to prove that there can be no\\nlast state of consciousness. Thus:\\nIf ceaseless change of state is the condition on\\nwhich alone consciousness exists, then when the sup-\\nposed last state has been reached by the completion of\\nthe preceding change, change has ceased; therefore\\nconsciousness has ceased; therefore the supposed last\\nstate is not a state of consciousness at all; therefore\\nthere can be no last state of consciousness. [First\\nPrin., Sec. 19.\\nWhatever apparent validity there may be in\\nthis very abstruse argument, is owing to the use\\nof the term ceaseless. Strike that out, and\\nsubstitute successive, and the whole argument\\nfalls to the ground. The changes in the states\\nof consciousness will continue to be success-\\nive so long as consciousness lasts; which is all\\nthat can be expected. When the nervous\\nsystem on which consciousness depends for\\nits existence, gives way, then consciousness\\nceases.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "135\\nIn his Principles of Biology. Vol. I. Sec. 1,\\nMr. Spencer speaks of nervous disturbances\\nwhich are communicated to the chief nervous\\ncentre, and there constitute consciousness.\\nThese disturbances are caused by the changes\\nin the relations of phenomena, which produce\\nsensations of touch and pressure, of heat and\\ncold, etc.\\nDoes not the consciousness thus produced\\ncease when the nervous system is destroyed?\\nIs it claimed that there is, in the Spencerian\\nphilosophy, any form of consciousness that does\\nnot depend upon the nervous system? If not,\\nthen what is the difficulty in arriving at the last\\nstate of consciousness?\\nWhat validity can there be in an argument\\nframed for the purpose of disproving a fact\\nwhich is not only attested by the experience of\\nall mankind, but which necessarily results from\\nthe author s own philosophy?\\nWhen a person has arrived at the last stage\\nof his conscious existence, then is his last state\\nof consciousness. Though he may not know\\nthat it is the last, yet it nevertheless is, in fact,\\nhis last state of consciousness. No fine-spun,\\nmetaphysically constructed argument can over-\\nthrow this plain fact, the truth of which is\\nknown to all the world. We should hesitate\\nto believe that this ingenious argument had\\nbeen made in aid of the doctrine of the immor-\\ntality of the soul. That doctrine ought to be\\npermitted to stand or fall on its own merits,", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "136\\nwithout the adventitious assistance of reasoning\\nwhich seems strangely out of place when we con-\\nsider the system of philosophy in which it ap-\\npears.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XX.\\nTHE UNKNOWABLE. FIRST CAUSE.\\nWe cannot rightly affirm the existence of any\\nthing unless we know that it exists. And we\\nmust know not only that it exists, but that it ex-\\nists in relation, since we know nothing except as\\nit exists in relation. But if it exists in relation,\\nthen it is knowable. To say of any thing, there-\\nfore, that it exists, is to say that it is knowable;\\nand to say that it is unknowable is to say that we\\ncannot affirm that it exists.\\nAgain:\\nThe Unknowable is also unthinkable. It is\\ntrebly unthinkable. [First Principles, Sec. 24.\\nThe fact that any other hypothesis is unthink-\\nable cannot be formulated in thought is, in\\nthe mind of Mr. Spencer, a fatal objection. The\\nAtheistic theory of the origin of the universe is\\nrejected for that reason. The Theistic theory is\\nrejected for the same reason. Pantheism, for the\\nsame reason. It is not, he says, a question of\\nprobability or credibility, but of conceivability.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094[First Prin., Sec. 11.\\n(137)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "138\\nEach of these theories is equally vicious,\\nequally unthinkable. [Ibid.\\nIn the first volume of the Principles of Biol-\\nogy, Sec. 171, speaking of the Evolution hy-\\npothesis, as opposed to the hypothesis of the\\nspecial creation of living beings, the author says\\nof the latter, It is not even a thinkable hypoth-\\nesis; and speaks of it as being, for that reason,\\nillusive. Of the former, on the contrary, he\\nsays:\\nInstead of being a mere pseud- idea, we saw that it\\nadmitted of elaboration into a definite conception\u00e2\u0080\u0094 so\\nshowing its legitimacy as a hypothesis.\\nIn Section 118, also, of that work, writing on\\nthe same subject, he says of the special creation\\nhypothesis, that it is illusive because of the im-\\npossibility of realizing it in thought.\\nYet the doctrine of the Unknowable, which is\\nconfessedly open to the same objection, he not\\nonly considers a legitimate hypothesis, but asks\\nus to accept as the most certain of all truths.\\nFIRST CAUSE.\\nThe Unknowable is posited as First Cause.\\nIt is said that persistence of force is the highest\\ngeneralization of science; and that known force,\\nor force as known to us, which persists, is but\\nthe symbol or correlative of an unknown force,\\nwhich unknown force is posited as First Cause\\nof all phenomena.\\n1. What is meant by persistence of force as\\nthe highest generalization of science?", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "139\\nForce is not an entity. Force is an attribute.\\nPersistence of force is the persistence with\\nwhich matter, whether at rest or in motion, man-\\nifests certain degrees of force under certain con-\\nditions, and the persistence with which force,\\nthough disappearing under certain conditions,\\nreappears, or is again manifested, under other\\nconditions.\\nIn aid of the doctrine of the Unknowable, Mr.\\nSpencer considers force an entity. At times,\\nagain, he looks upon it as an open question\\nwhether force is an entity or not. For instance,\\nhe says:\\nLeaving undiscussed the question whether it is pos-\\nsible to conceive of force apart from extending some-\\nthing exercising it, etc.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 [Essays, Vol. II, p. 98.\\nBut it is not possible to conceive of force\\napart from extruding something exercising it;\\nfor the simple reason that whenever force ap-\\npears, it appears as having been exercised by an\\nextended something.\\nThe idea of resistance, says Mr. Spencer, cannot\\nbe separated in thought from the idea of an extended\\nbody which offers resistance. [First Prin., 1897, Sec.\\n16, p. 55.\\nNow, if resistance, being a manifestation of\\nforce, cannot be separated in thought from the\\nidea of an extended body which offers resist-\\nance, then it is at least a fair inference, that no\\nmanifestation of force can be separated in\\nthought from the idea of an extended body\\nwhich manifests such force.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "140\\nAccordingly we find Mr. Spencer announcing\\nsubstantially this very proposition. Speaking\\nof force, he says:\\nWe cannot imagine it except through the instru-\\nmentality of something having extension. [First\\nPrim, 2d Edition, Sec. 18, p. 60.\\nIs force here treated as an entity, or as an at-\\ntribute?\\n2. The next question is, how do we arrive at\\nthe truth of the proposition that persistence of\\nforce is the highest generalization of science?\\nThe process is the familiar one of abstraction\\nand generalization.\\nAccompanying the process, there are two other\\ncognate processes: inductive and deductive rea-\\nsoning. We make investigations of the phe-\\nnomena of the external world, and by induction\\narrive at conclusions concerning the attributes\\nwhich can properly be predicated of objects.\\nThe process of deductive reasoning has been\\ngoing on, also, at the same time reasoning of\\nwhich, as is well known, abstraction and gener-\\nalization are at the very foundation.\\nMark, now, that all the time, in the progress\\nof this threefold process, we have been dealing\\nwith attributes. We have not been following a\\nchain of cause and effect. That is a different\\nthing entirely. Not but that cause and effect\\nhave been from time to time considered in con-\\nnection with these processes. The relation of\\ncause and effect sometimes coincides with that\\nof premise and conclusion. An occasional coin-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "141\\ncidence does not, however, change the character\\nof the process. Writers on logic have specified\\nthe confounding of these relations as one of the\\nmost fruitful sources of confusion of thought.\\nSince, then, we have arrived at the persist-\\nence of force by a process which has all the way\\nbeen a logical one since we have all the way\\nbeen dealing in attributes, and have not been\\nfollowing a chain of cause and effect how does\\nit come that when we have arrived at the highest\\nattribute, we can turn around and predicate that\\nattribute as First Cause and Ultimate Being?\\nForce may be a cause of certain effects. So\\nmay other attributes. But force being an attri-\\nbute, neither force as known to us, nor unknown\\nforce, can be First Cause, or Absolute Being.\\nIf force as known to us is an attribute, then un-\\nknown force is an unknown attribute, and cannot\\ntherefore be First Cause and Absolute Being.\\nIn his Essay on the Nature of Electricity,\\nMr. Spencer says:\\nIt cannot be that what in the first case produces a\\nchange of state, in the second case produces an entity.\\nSo here we may say, it cannot be that what\\nin all the previous stages of this process has been\\nan attribute, becomes in the last stage an entity.\\nIn science, a cause is at the same time the effect\\nof another cause, or other causes. But here we\\nhave posited for us a cause which is not the ef-\\nfect of any other cause. It is said to be out of\\nrelation. But a cause cannot be out of relation.\\nThe effect is admitted to be related to its", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "142\\ncause, but it is claimed that the cause is not re-\\nlated to its effect. We have a relative, but no\\ncorrelative relation without correlation.\\nIf Mr. Spencer has a right to posit an Un-\\nknowable as the cause of phenomena, why has\\nnot another person, A, the same right to posit a\\nsecond Unknowable behind the first; and B, a\\nthird behind the second; and so on? An end-\\nless chain of Unknowables would be much more\\nreasonable than a single Unknowable; because\\nsuch a chain would have an analogy in the chain\\nof causation known to science.\\nMr. Spencer, in combating the theory of the\\nself-creation of the universe, shows that such a\\ntheory would require two existences, one behind\\nthe other; which is exactly what the doctrine of\\nthe Unknowable requires. Assuming that such\\na hypothesis, besides being inconceivable, upon\\nwhich he lays great stress, would imply, behind\\nactual existence, potential existence passing in-\\nto actual existence, he reasons thus:\\nMoreover, even if it were true that potential exist-\\nence is conceivable as a different thing from actual ex-\\nistence, and that the transition from the one to the\\nother can be mentally realized as a self-determined\\nchange, we should still be no forwarder: the problem\\nwould simply be removed a step back. For whence the\\npotential existence This would just as much require\\naccounting for as actual existence; and just the same\\ndifficulties would meet us. Respecting the origin of\\nsuch a latent power, no other suppositions could be\\nmade than those above named self -existence, self-cre-\\nation, creation by external agency. The self-existence\\nof a potential universe is no more conceivable than we", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "143\\nhave found the self-existence of the actual universe\\nto be. The self-creation of such a potential universe\\nwould involve over again the difficulties here stated\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nwould imply behind this potential universe a more re-\\nmote potentiality; and so on, in an infinite series, leav-\\ning us at last no forwarder than at first. While to as-\\nsign as the source of this potential universe an external\\nagency, would be to introduce the notion of a poten-\\ntial universe for no purpose whatever. [First Princi-\\nples, Sec. 11.\\nNow, let us paraphrase this passage by sub-\\nstituting for potential existence the Unknow-\\nable; and we have the following:\\nMoreover, even if it were true that the Unknowable\\nis conceivable as a different thing from actual existence,\\nand that the transition from the one to the other can\\nbe mentally realized as a self-determined change, we\\nshould still be no forwarder: the problem would simply\\nbe removed a step back. For whence the Unknowa-\\nble This would just as much require accounting for\\nas actual existence; and just the same difficulties\\nwould meet us. Respecting the origin of such a latent\\npower, no other suppositions could be made than those\\nabove named self -existence, self-creation, creation by\\nexternal agency. The self-existence of an Unknowa-\\nble is no more conceivable than we have found the\\nself -existence of the actual universe to be. The self-\\ncreation of such an Unknowable would involve\\nover again the difficulties here stated would imply\\nbehind this Unknowable a more remote Unknowable;\\nand so on, in an infinite series, leaving us at last no\\nforwarder than at first. While to assign as the source\\nof the Unknowable an external agency, would be to\\nintroduce the notion of an Unknowable for no purpose\\nwhatever.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XXI.\\nTHE UNKNOWABLE CONTINUED CREATION ATHE-\\nISM AGNOSTICISM.\\nCreation, according to the theological sense of\\nthe term, has generally been understood to im-\\nply creation of the world out of nothing. In\\nthe beginning God created the heaven and the\\nearth.\\nThe Miltonian conception of creation from\\nchaos is not inconsistent with the theory of evo-\\nlution.\\nMalebranche held that all phenomena are\\npresented to the mind by continued and suc-\\ncessive creations from instant to instant.\\nLa conservation des creatures est une creation\\ncontinue.\\nThese are the three theories of creation; and\\nit is difficult to conceive any other theory.\\nThe first and third are repudiated by Mr.\\nSpencer. Speaking of the theory of creation at\\nthe beginning, he says:\\nThe production of matter out of nothing is the real\\nmystery\\n(144)", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "145\\nEven supposing that the genesis of the universe\\ncould really be represented in thought as the result of\\nan external agency; the mystery would be as great as\\never; for there would still arise the question\u00e2\u0080\u0094 how\\ncame there to be an external agency To account for\\nthis, only the same three hypotheses are possible\u00e2\u0080\u0094 self-\\nexistence, self -creation, and creation by external agen-\\ncy. Of these, the last is useless; it commits us to an\\ninfinite series of such agencies, and even then leaves\\nus where we were. Those who cannot conceive\\na self-existent universe, and who therefore assume a\\ncreator as the source of the universe, take for granted\\nthat they can conceive a self-existent creator. The\\nmystery which they recognize in this great fact sur-\\nrounding them on every side, they transfer to an al-\\nleged source of the great fact; and then suppose that\\nthey have solved the mystery. But they delude them-\\nselves. As was proved at the outset of the argument,\\nself -existence is rigorously inconceivable; and this\\nholds true, whatever be the nature of the object of\\nwhich it is predicated. Whoever agrees that the athe-\\nistic hypothesis is untenable because it involves the\\nimpossible idea of self-existence, must perforce admit\\nthat the theistic hypothesis is untenable if it contains\\nthe same impossible idea. [First Prin., Sec. 11.\\nThe Unknowable is posited not only as First\\nCause, but as The Creating Power. In what\\nsense is the Unknowable the Creating Power?\\nWhich mode of creation will be adopted for the\\nUnknowable? Will it be claimed that the uni-\\nverse was created by the Unknowable as an ex-\\nternal agency? If so, by a slight paraphrase,\\nwe have from Mr. Spencer himself the following\\nargument:\\nEven supposing that the genesis of the universe\\ncould really be represented in thought as the result of", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "146\\nan Unknowable; the mystery would be as great as ev-\\ner; for there would still arise the question how came\\nthere to be an Unknowable To account for this, only\\nthe same three hypotheses are possible\u00e2\u0080\u0094 self-existence,\\nself-creation, and creation by another Unknowable.\\nOf these, the last is useless; it commits us to an infinite\\nseries of such Unknowables; and even then leaves us\\nwhere we were. Those who cannot conceive a\\nself-existent universe, and who therefore assume an\\nunknowable Creating Power as the source of the uni-\\nverse, take for granted that they can conceive a\\nself-existent, unknowable Creating Power. The mys-\\ntery which they recognize in this great fact surround-\\ning them on every side, they transfer to an alleged\\nsource of the great fact\u00e2\u0080\u0094 to an unknowable and un-\\nthinkable Creating Power. They then suppose that they\\nhave solved the mystery. But they delude themselves.\\nAs was proved at the outset of the argument, self-ex-\\nistence is rigorously inconceivable; and this holds\\ntrue, whatever be the nature of the object of which it\\nis predicated\u00e2\u0080\u0094 whether it be called the Creator, First\\nCause, the Unknowable, or the Creating Power. Who-\\never agrees that the atheistic hypothesis is untenable\\nbecause it involves the impossible idea of self -exist-\\nence, must perforce admit that the hypothesis of the\\nUnknowable is untenable if it contains the same im-\\npossible idea.\\nWe may therefore discard the idea of the cre-\\nation of the universe by the Unknowable as an\\nexternal agency. How then can the Unknowa-\\nble be the Creating Power? Shall we adopt the\\ntheory of Malebranche, and say theUnknowable\\nprojects phenomena into the universe by contin-\\nuous creation? But this theory also is rejected\\nby the author of First Principles.\\nWe are, then, forced to the conclusion that it", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "147\\nis in the creation by evolution that the Unknow-\\nable is considered the Creating Power. But ev-\\nolution is a process of unfolding in accordance\\nwith the primordial laws of matter and motion.\\nSince these laws are stable and uniform in\\ntheir operation, what office is there for the Un-\\nknowable to perform in the work of creation?\\nIs it to see that the laws are kept in operation?\\nThis might be inferred from the fact that one of\\nthe titles of the Unknowable is, The Sustain-\\ning Power. But since no intelligence is as-\\ncribed to the Unknowable, how is it to know\\nwhether the laws are properly carried out or not?\\nAnd if it should know or should find out that\\nsomething was going wrong, how could the\\nwrong be righted, since no activity is ascribed\\nto the Unknowable? It is difficult to see what\\nwould be its function in the process of creation\\nby evolution.\\nThere is, therefore, no possible sense in\\nwhich the Unknowable can be the Creating or\\nSustaining Power. And how came the Unknow-\\nable into existence? It is called the First\\nCause\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the Ultimate Cause. But the Ultimate\\nCause must be uncaused; and if uncaused, it\\nmust be self-existent. Mr. Spencer says, self-\\nexistence is rigorously inconceivable. How\\nthen can he assume an Unknowable as the Creat-\\ning Power of the universe? Are not a Creat-\\ning Power and a Creator the same thing? How\\ncan he object to the doctrine of creation by a\\nCreator, on the ground that the Creator would", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "148\\nbe self-existent, and therefore inconceivable, and\\nat the same time maintain the existence of a\\nCreating Power which must be equally self-ex-\\nexistent and equally inconceivable? Why has\\nnot the Theist as much right to have an incon-\\nceivable Creator as the author of First Principles\\nhas to have an inconceivable Creating Power?\\nATHEISM.\\nThe existence of a God is inconceivable, and the\\nnecessity of such an existence in a universe gov-\\nerned by law, is inconceivable. But it is equally\\ninconceivable how the universe could have exist-\\ned from all eternity, and could now be drifting\\nthrough the ages without any sustaining power\\nor controlling mind, and without any definite\\npurpose as to the final outcome.\\nJohn Stuart Mill has shown that truth does\\nnot rest on the foundation that the contrary is\\ninconceivable. If a proposition is not only in-\\nconceivable but at the same time contradictory\\nor absurd, then it is to be rejected; but not\\nmerely because it is inconceivable.\\nIf that were so, then, as has been shown by\\nDr. Brownson whose criticism of Spencer is in\\nsome respects the most searching and cogent of\\nall it can easily be proved that there is no ex-\\nisting cosmos. The argument will run thus:\\nWhat is inconceivable is not true.\\nIt is inconceivable that there should be a created\\ncosmos; and it is inconceivable that there should be a\\ncosmos existing from all eternity.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "149\\nBut if there be a cosmos, it either was created or is\\nself-existent.\\nTherefore, it is not true that there is any existing\\ncosmos whatever.\\nThe converse argument will run as follows:\\nIt is true that there is an existing cosmos.\\nIt is inconceivable that this cosmos should have been\\ncreated, cr should have existed forever.\\nBut one or the other is true.\\nTherefore, something is true that is inconceivable.\\nThe corollary to this is the proposition of Mr.\\nMill, that merely because any thing is inconceiva-\\nble, we cannot therefore say that it is false; and\\nthe further proposition that we cannot say that\\nany thing is necessarily true, the contrary of\\nwhich is inconceivable.\\nTo affirm that God does not exist, and to say\\nthat we cannot affirm that God exists, are two\\nvery different propositions. And the difference\\nbetween them is the difference between Atheism\\nand Agnosticism.\\nIn discussing the relative merits of Atheism\\nand Agnosticism, we must define certain terms,\\nto wit: God, Theism, Atheism, Agnosticism.\\nBy the term God I mean a supreme intelli-\\ngent Being, as the definition is given in Web-\\nster. By the term Theism is meant a belief in\\nthe existence of a supreme intelligent Being;\\nand by the term Atheism, a disbelief or denial\\nof the existence of such a Being.\\nBut it is claimed that the word Atheist being\\nderived from the Greek Theos, meaning God,", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "150\\nand A, the Greek Alpha, which is privative,\\nAtheism simply means without Theism, or with-\\nout any belief in God, and does not necessarily\\nimply denial of his existence. This is not en-\\ntirely correct. It is true that Alpha is privative,\\nbut the term privative does not mean merely\\nwithout. It implies not only privation, but ne-\\ngation, and gives a negative force to a word.\\nThe office which Alpha performs can best be\\nillustrated by some examples\\nThe Greek boulomai means to will, to wish, to be\\nwilling. A-bouleo means to be unwilling. The force of\\na-bouleo would not be maintained if a person simply\\nhad no will upon the subject. He must be positively\\nunwilling. It is equivalent to ou (not) and boulomai.\\nA-bouleo oa boulomai. [Liddell Scott.\\nThe Greek glukus means sweet. A-glukees means\\nnot sweet, sour, harsh. It would not be sufficient that\\na thing should be without sweetness.\\nDiallasso means to reconcile. A-diallaktos, irrecon-\\ncilable. That a person is not reconciled to his enemy,\\nor is without being reconciled, is not sufficient. He\\nmust refuse to be reconciled.\\nSeebo, to worship, to be religious; a-sebee.s, ungodly,\\nunholy, profane.\\nIn the following instance, alpha is merely privative:\\nDikazo, to judge. A-dikastos, without judgment giv-\\nen, undecided.\\n[t depends upon the nature of the attribute quali-\\nfied or of the act performed. If in this case the Greek\\nverb had meant to judge favorably, then the prefix\\nwould have indicated adverse judgment.\\nThus it will be seen that the etymological\\nsignification of the word Atheism is not far dif-\\nferent from its popular signification.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "151\\nAGNOSTICISM.\\nBy the term Agnosticism is meant the posi-\\ntion of one who denies that he has any knowl-\\nedge concerning the existence of a God, or any\\nevidence sufficient for a faith in such a Being.\\nBut he does not deny the existence of such a Be-\\ning. He falls back upon his ignorance. The sub-\\nject may be illustrated by the following catechism\\nQUESTION.\\nIs there a God\\nANSWER.\\nBy the Atheist and Agnostic in unison. What do\\nyou mean by a God?\\nQUESTION.\\nBy a God I mean a supreme intelligent Being. Is\\nthere such a Being\\nANSWER.\\nBy the Atheist. No.\\nBy the Agnostic. I do not know.\\nThe Agnostic and the Comtist are at one so\\nfar as the existence of God is concerned. Nei-\\nther of them affirms or denies anything upon\\nthe subject. Neither the Agnostic nor the\\nComtist philosophy is atheistic. Neither of\\nthese philosophies goes behind phenomena\\nneither of them searches for a first cause. The\\nSpencerian metaphysical philosophy goes behind\\nphenomena it searches for a first cause, and\\nfinds it in something which it calls the Unknow-\\nable; but it is not God. It looks where God\\nshould be, but finds him not. Nowhere in phe-\\nnomena, nor in the incomprehensible, or at least\\nthe uncomprehended, mysteries of matter, nor\\nyet in the immeasurable beyond, does it find a\\nplace for God.", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "152\\nNeither the Agnostic nor the Comtist claims\\nto know of the existence of any thing behind\\nthe phenomena of the universe. The Spenceri-\\nan metaphysical philosopher affirms that he\\nknows of the existence of something behind phe-\\nnomena. While he does not affirm categorically\\nthat it is not God, yet this existence, having nei-\\nther attributes nor intelligence, cannot be God.\\nThe Spencerian metaphysical philosopher does,\\ntherefore, in effect, deny the existence of God;\\nsince he substitutes for him another existence,\\nwhich leaves no place for God in the universe.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XXn.\\nDOCTRINE OF THE UNKNOWABLE DIM OR VAGUE\\nCONSCIOUSNESS.\\nThe existence of the Unknowable is posited\\nfrom a dim or vague consciousness; from an in-\\ncomplete thought. It is admitted that the Un-\\nknowable cannot be distinctly formulated in\\nthought; that when the consciousness becomes\\nvivid, the Unknowable disappears. But it is\\nclaimed that from a faint or dim consciousness\\nfrom half-formed thoughts we may posit that\\nwhich is the most certain of all truths. This is\\nequivalent to asserting that when we are in a\\na dreamy state when we are in a reverie we\\nare in the best possible condition for the ascer-\\ntainment of truth. Let us see how this condi-\\ntion of mind is described:\\nManifestations that occur under the conditions\\ncalled those of perception are ordinarily far\\nmore distinct than those which occur under the con-\\nditions known as those of reflection, or memory, or\\nimagination, or ideation. These vivid manifestations\\ndo, indeed, sometimes differ but little from the faint\\n(153)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "154\\nones. When nearly dark, we may be unable to decide\\nwhether a certain manifestation belongs to the vivid\\norder or the faint order\u00e2\u0080\u0094 whether, as we say, we really\\nsee something, or fancy we see it.\\nDuring what we call our states of activity, the vivid\\nmanifestations predominate. It is only on lapsing in-\\nto the unconsciousness termed sleep, that manifesta-\\ntions of the vivid order cease to be distinguishable as\\nsuch, and those of the faint order come to be mistak-\\nen for them.\\nWhen, as we say, absorbed in thought, the disturb-\\nance of the faint current is but superficial. There\\nmeanwhile flows on a main stream of faint manifesta-\\ntions wholly unrelated to the vivid manifestations\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nwhat we call a reverie, perhaps, or it may be a process\\nof reasoning. And occasionally, during the state\\nknown as absence of mind, this current of faint mani-\\nfestations so far predominates that the vivid current\\nscarcely affects it at all. Manifestations of the\\none order are vivid, and those of the other are faint.\\nThose of the one order are originals, while those of the\\nother order are copies. [First Prin., Sec. 43.\\nWe fail to see in this any thing that gives a\\npeculiar value to the faint manifestations. On\\nthe contrary, it shows that a faint consciousness\\nis such as we have when in a reverie, or in a\\ndreamy condition.\\nLet us now turn to Sec. 26 of First Principles,\\nwhere the subject is examined more closely, with\\nreference to the Unknowable:\\nBesides that definite consciousness of which logic\\nformulates the laws, there is also an indefinite con-\\nsciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides com-\\nplete thoughts, and besides the thoughts which though\\nincomplete admit of completion, there are thoughts\\nwhich it is impossible to complete, and yet which are", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "155\\nstill real in the sense that they are normal affections\\nof the intellect.\\nIt is rigorously impossible to conceive that our\\nknowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, with-\\nout at the same time conceiving a Reality of which\\nthey are appearances; for appearance without reality\\nis unthinkable. Strike out from the argument the\\nterms Unconditioned, Infinite, Absolute, with their\\nequivalents, and in place of them write negation of\\nconceivability, or absence of the conditions under\\nwhich consciousness is possible, and you find that the\\nargument becomes nonsense. Truly to realize in\\nthought any one of the propositions of which the ar-\\ngument consists, the Unconditioned must be repre-\\nsented as positive and not negative. [This in reply to\\nSir William Hamilton, who says that the notion of the\\nunconditioned is only negative; and in reply to Mr.\\nMansel, who says that the infinite must be regarded as\\nthe mere negation of thought.] How, then, can it be a\\nlegitimate conclusion from the argument that our con-\\nsciousness of it is negative An argument, the very\\nconstruction of which assigns to a certain term a cer-\\ntain meaning, but which ends in showing that this\\nterm has no such meaning, is simply an elaborate sui-\\ncide. Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a def-\\ninite consciousness of the Absolute is impossible to us,\\nunavoidably presupposes an indefinite consciousness\\nof it.\\nClearly, the difference here is owing mainly\\nto a different use of terms. Mr. Mansel and Sir\\nWilliam Hamilton explain that by the terms ab-\\nsolute and unconditioned they mean merely the\\nnegation of the knowable. But when Mr. Spen-\\ncer uses these terms, he means the positive ex-\\nistence of the Unknowable; and, insisting upon\\nthe terms being taken in the sense in which he", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "156\\nuses them, and urging that the argument made\\non the other side requires the same meaning to\\nbe given to them, he claims that there is an in-\\nconsistency.\\nIt will be noticed that he lays much stress\\nupon the fact that it is necessary that the Un-\\nconditioned be represented as positive in order\\nto realize in thought any one of the propositions\\nof which the argument consists.\\nIn determining whether there be an Unknow-\\nable or not, Mr. Spencer rigorously insists that\\nthe propositions of which the argument consists\\nshall be realized in thought. But that the Un-\\nknowable itself should be realized in thought,\\nhe considers of no consequence.\\nAgain We fail to see how the distinction be-\\ntween definite and indefinite consciousness has\\nany thing to do with this argument. If the ar-\\ngument is good, it is because the very terms\\nmade use of imply the positive existence of the\\nUnconditioned. Does Mr. Spencer mean to fall\\nback upon an indefinite consciousness to make\\ngood an argument which w r ould otherwise be in-\\nvalid or uncertain? If his conclusion follows\\nfrom the premises, he does not need an indefi-\\nnite consciousness to sustain the argument. If\\nit does not follow, how can the indefinite con-\\nsciousness make it good? Surely he cannot\\nmean to appeal for evidence of the Unknowable\\nto the indefinite consciousness of Hamilton and\\nMansel, neither of whom concedes any con-\\nsciousness of such an existence.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "157\\nFurther along in the same section, he comes\\nstill more closely to the question:\\nAnd here we come face to face with the ultimate\\ndifficulty:\u00e2\u0080\u0094 How can there possibly be constituted a\\nconsciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when,\\nby its very nature, consciousness is possible only un-\\nder forms and limits? If every consciousness of ex-\\nistence is a consciousness of existence as conditioned,\\nthen how, after the negation of conditions, can there\\nbe any residuum In each concept there is an\\nelement which persists. The persistence of\\nthis element, under successive conditions, necessitates\\na sense of it as distinguished from the conditions, and\\nindependent of them. The sense of a something that\\nis conditioned in every thought, cannot be got rid of\\nbecause the something cannot be got rid of. How,\\nthen, must the sense of this something be constituted?\\nEvidently by combining successive concepts deprived\\nof their limits and conditions\\nWe have emphasized the last sentence, be-\\ncause it contains a complete statement of the\\ndoctrine of the Unknowable. The question is\\nthus very fairly stated:\\nHow can there possibly be constituted a conscious-\\nness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very\\nnature, consciousness is possible only under forms and\\nlimits?\\nThe answer is:\\nBy combining successive concepts deprived of their\\nlimits and conditions.\\nNow, if this can be done, then, we admit, the\\ndoctrine of the Unknowable can be established.\\nTo say that we can do this, is to say that con-\\ncepts which are possible only under form and", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "158\\ncondition, can be deprived of their forms and\\nconditions, and then combined together.\\nWe can think only in relation. Take away\\nthe relations existing in thought, and you take\\naway the thought. Neither a dim nor a vivid\\nconsciousness will remain.\\nNot only are these limits and conditions\\nnecessary to thought, but in consciousness they\\nare necessary to the continuance of thought.\\nUnless these concepts, after being formed, can be\\ncontinued in successive existence, they cannot\\nbe combined, even if they could be deprived\\nof their limits and conditions.\\nThe continued concepts, those denominated\\nby our author faint manifestations, are, he as-\\nsures us, copies of the vivid manifestations.\\nBut copies cannot be more potent than the orig-\\ninals; therefore both classes of manifestations,\\nthe vivid and the faint, are equally dependent\\non form and condition for their existence.\\nThis view of the matter is confirmed by Prof.\\nBain. He says:\\nThe really fundamental separation of the powers\\nof the Intellect is into three facts called (1) Discrimi-\\nnation, the Sense, Feeling, or Consciousness of Differ-\\nence; (2) Similarity, the Sense, Feeling, or Conscious-\\nness of Agreement; [these two divisions correspond\\nto the vivid consciousness of Spencer;] and (3) Retent-\\niveness, or the power of Memory or Acquisition. (This\\nlast division corresponds to the faint consciousness\\nof Spencer.)\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Mind and Body, N. Y., 1894, pp. 82,83.\\nSpeaking of Retention, Acquisition, or Mem-\\nory, which he defines as the power of continu-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "159\\ning in the mind impressions that are no longer\\nstimulated by the original agent, Prof. Bain\\nsays:\\nIt must be considered as almost beyond a doubt\\nthat [apparently quoting from the elder Scaliger] the\\nrenewed feeling occupies the very same parts and in\\nthe same manner as the original feeling, and no other\\nparts nor in any other manner that can be assigned.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094[Ibid., p. 89.\\nThe copies must hare the same limits and\\nconditions as the originals. How, then, can\\nsuccessive concepts be \u00e2\u0096\u00a0\u00e2\u0080\u00a2deprived of their limits\\nand conditions To deprive a thought of its\\nlimits and conditions is to strike it out of exist-\\nence.\\nInasmuch, then, as the vivid and faint mani-\\nfestations stand upon the same foundation, and\\nthe faint are copies of the vivid, which are the\\nmore to be relied upon?\\nWe have the authority of Mr. Spencer him-\\nself for saying that the faint manifestations are\\nnot so reliable as the vivid. Writing upon the\\nsame subject in another place, he says:\\nDeliverances of consciousness given in the vivid\\nterms we call sensations, excite a confidence immeas-\\nurably exceeding the confidence excited by the deliv-\\nerances given in the faint terms we distinguish as\\nideas.\\nAfter giving illustrations, he concludes as fol-\\nlows:\\nBy all persons, then, and in all cases, where the\\ncharacters of the acts of consciousness are in other\\nrespects the same, the deliverances given in vivid\\nterms are accepted in preference to those given in faint", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "160\\nterms. Obscure perceptions are rejected rather than\\nclear ones; remembrances which are definite are trust-\\ned rather than those which are indefinite; and above\\nall, the deliverances of consciousness composed of\\nsensations are unhesitatingly preferred to those com-\\nposed of the ideas of sensations. [Psychology, Sec.\\n410.\\nAnd speaking of a certain theory, he says:\\nIt could not be accepted without asserting that\\nthings are most certainly known in proportion as they\\nare most faintly perceived.\\nAnd yet, notwithstanding this distinct verdict\\nin favor of the vivid manifestations when com-\\npared with the faint manifestations, we are asked\\nto accept the Unknowable as the most certain\\nof all truths, when posited from a dim, vague,\\nindefinite consciousness; while it is admitted\\nthat before a vivid consciousness before a com-\\nplete thought the Unknowable disappears.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XXIII.\\nDOCTRINE OF THE UNKNOWABLE ANTITHESIS OF\\nTHOUGHT.\\nIt is claimed that we are under the necessity\\nof predicating the positive existence of the Un-\\nknowable as the antithesis of thought.\\nWhat is an antithesis? It is something set\\nover against something else.\\nAll thought is in relation. What is the na-\\nture of this relation? It is the relation of ob-\\njects to ourselves and to each other; not their\\nrelation to something existing in some other\\nmode than that in which these objects exist. If\\nsuch were the relation that enables the individ-\\nual to cognize the external world, then the argu-\\nment for the unknowable might be good. But\\nit is the relation of things with each other that\\nrenders them cognizable. Phenomena cannot\\nbe related to the Unknowable, because, by the\\nhypothesis, the Unknowable is out of relation.\\nOne of its many names is the Non-Relative.\\nHow can any thing be in relation to that which\\nis entirely out of relation?\\n(161)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "162\\nThe Unknowable is said to be behind phe-\\nnomena. If behind, then it is outside. And\\nhow can the relations between objects throw any\\nlight upon any thing outside of the objects\\nthemselves? No relation can prove the exist-\\nence of any object outside the terms of the rela-\\ntion. The relation of A to B cannot prove the\\nexistence of C. But it proves the existence of\\nA and B, else they could not be in relation. Let\\nA and B be two objects in the external world;\\nand let be the Absolute or Unknowable. The\\nrelation is between A and B not between A and\\nB on the one side and on the other.\\nWhen I look at a chair in the room in which\\nI am sitting, what is it that enables me to cog-\\nnize the chair? Is it not the relation between\\nthe chair and the other objects in the room? as\\nalso the relation between the chair and the\\nroom, and between the chair and room on the\\none side and myself on the other? Or is it the\\nrelation between all these and some unknown\\npower which may be supposed to have brought\\nthem into existence As well might it be said\\nthat what enables me to cognize the chair is the\\nrelation between the chair and the cabinet-mak-\\ner who manufactured it, or between the chair\\nand the tradesman who sold it. Manifestly it is\\nneither the one nor the other. Much less is it a\\nrelation existing between the chair and some-\\nthing behind the chair, the cabinet-maker, and\\nthe tradesman.\\nWhat enables us to cognize phenomena is not", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "163\\na relation supposed to exist between the phe-\\nnomena and the noumena, but the relations per-\\nceived to exist between the phenomena them-\\nselves.\\nThe relation that renders cognition possible,\\nis the relation between things knowable; not\\nbetween the knowable and the unknowable.\\nThings in themselves knowable become, through\\ntheir relation to each other, subjects of cogni-\\ntion. After that, the boundaries of knowledge\\nare extended by proceeding, not from the know-\\nable to the unknowable, but from the known to\\nthe unknown. As Voltaire says: On va d ordi-\\nnaire du eonnu a l inconnn.\\nLet it be borne in mind that there is no anal-\\nogy between the antithesis claimed for the Un-\\nknowable, and that insisted upon by James Mar-\\ntineau (Essays, Vol. 3, p. 204) in regard to in-\\nfinite space and time. His argument, that you\\ncannot say that you know the moon to be differ-\\nent from the son, and at the same time say you do\\nnot know it to be different from the infinite\\nspace in which it moves; and that you cannot\\nSay you know Ciesar s life and date to be other\\nthan Seneca s, and at the same time say you do\\nnot know either from the infinite time in which\\nit appears is a good argument. Here there is\\nan antithesis. By contrast and correlation, we can\\nform some idea an indefinite idea it is true\\nbut some idea of infinite time and space; as John\\nStuart Mill justly maintains. But of the Un-\\nknowable we can form no idea whatever, be-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "164\\ncause here there is no antithesis of thought.\\nIf the Unknowable furnishes an antithesis for\\nthought, how is it that it is said to be not only\\nunknowable but unthinkable? If any thing is\\nan antithesis of thought, can it at the same time\\nbe outside the boundaries of thought? If a\\nthought be in antithesis, can either term of the\\nantithesis be outside the thought?\\nIt is not correct to say (as in First Princi-\\nples, Sec. 26) that the Noumenon is every\\nwhere named as the antithesis of the Phenome-\\nnon. It is not so named by Mr. Mansel, nor\\nby Sir William Hamilton. It is not so named\\nby Auguste Comte, nor by many others.\\nAgain, it is asserted that appearance without\\nreality is unthinkable. But the reality, ac-\\ncording to Mr. Spencer himself, is equally un-\\nthinkable. The argument therefore is, that in\\norder to think of something that is thinkable, it\\nis necessary to think of something that is not\\nthinkable. In order to understand anything of\\nwhat is knowable, it is necessary to predicate\\nthe positive existence of something unknowable.\\nIn order to think in relation, it is necessary to\\nthink out of relation. But to think out of\\nrelation is impossible. Therefore, in order to\\nthink, it is necessary not to think.\\nWhat is reality? It is this objective world in\\nwhich we live, move, and have our being. It is\\nthis which is the basis of all science the source\\nof all positive knowledge. It is the only reality\\nwhich we know or can know.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "165\\nFurther, our author says:\\nIt is a doctrine called in question by none, that\\nsuch antinomies of thought as whole and part, equal\\nand unequal, singular and plural, are necessarily con-\\nceived as correlatives; the conception of a part is im-\\npossible without the conception of a whole; there can\\nbe no idea of equality without one of inequality. And\\nit is admitted that in the same manner the Rela-\\ntive is itself conceivable as such only by opposition to\\nthe Irrelative or Absolute. [First Prin., Sec. 26.\\nThe answer to this may be given in the lan-\\nguage of Sir William Hamilton:\\nOne of these correlatives is nothing beyond\\nthe negation of the other.\\nCorrelatives, he says, certainly suggest each oth-\\ner; but correlatives may or may not be equally real\\nand positive. In thought, contradictories necessarily\\nimply each other; for the knowledge of contradictories\\nis one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far\\nfrom guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing\\nelse than its negation. Thus every positive notion\\n(the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a nega-\\ntive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not);\\nand the highest positive notion, the notion of the con-\\nceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in\\nthe notion of the inconceivable. But though these\\nmutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real\\nthe negative is only an abstraction of the other, and in\\nthe highest generality even an abstraction of thought\\nitself. [Hamilton s Criticism of Cousin.\\nMr. Spencer replies to this by reaffirming his\\nformer position, and adds:\\nIf the Xon-Relative or Absolute is present in\\nthought only as a mere negation, then the relation be-\\ntween it and the Relative becomes unthinkable, be-\\ncause one of the terms of the relation is absent from", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "166\\nconsciousness. And if this relation is unthinkable,\\nthen is the relative itself unthinkable for want of its\\nantithesis; whence results the disappearance of all\\nthought whatever.\\nHere we cannot refrain from again making a\\nslight paraphrase; and we will have the argu-\\nment running thus:\\nIf the Non-Relative or Absolute is present in\\nthought as a Reality, then, this Reality being unthink-\\nable, any relation between it and the Relative becomes\\nunthinkable; because one of the terms of the relation\\nis absent from consciousness. And if this relation is\\nunthinkable, then is the relative itself unthinkable;\\nwhence results the disappearance of all thought what-\\never.\\nWhat is the verdict of consciousness on this\\nquestion? Does consciousness say that in order\\nto think of something that can be thought of,\\nit is necessary to think of something that can-\\nnot be thought of? Does consciousness tell us\\nthat in order to think in relation it is necessary\\nto think out of relation Does it tell us that in\\nin order to cognize something that exists, we\\nmust recognize as existing something which we\\ndo not know to exist?\\nMr. Spencer repeatedly speaks of depriving\\nthought of its limits and conditions for the pur-\\npose of establishing a consciousness of the Un-\\nknowable. But he overlooks the fact that he\\nhad already claimed that the existence of\\nthe Unknowable is a necessary condition of\\nthought.\\nIf the Unknowable is a necessary condition of", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "167\\nthought, then, in depriving thought of its limits\\nand conditions, he eliminates the Unknowable,\\nwhich was the most essential condition. If\\nthe Unknowable was a necessary condition of\\nthought, why not let it remain? What the ne-\\ncessity for depriving thought of that or any oth-\\ner condition for the purpose of establishing the\\nexistence of that which had already been predi-\\ncated as necessary? Why not let thought re-\\nmain, with its necessary limits and conditions?\\nWhat the necessity for this abstruse metaphys-\\nical process? Why take thought to pieces mere-\\nly for the purpose of reconstructing it?\\nFirst, thought is to be deprived of its limits\\nand conditions; and then, successive concepts,\\nconsisting of unconditioned thought which is\\nreally no thought at all are to be combined to-\\ngether in order to form a consciousness of the\\nUnknowable. And thus thought is to get back\\nthe condition of which it has been deprived; a\\ncondition which, according to the author of\\nFirst Frinciples, was in the first place, and all\\nthe time has been, necessary to its existence.\\nMr. Spencer replies to Hamilton that while\\nhe (Hamilton) does not admit the existence of\\nthe Unknowable as an antithesis of thought, he\\ndoes admit the same existence on the authority\\nof divine revelation. This is the argumentum\\nad hominem and while it may be good as\\nagainst Hamilton, it is not good against one who\\ndoes not accept the revelation, and who denies\\nthat he has any dim or vague consciousness of", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "168\\nthe Unknowable. What answer will be made to\\nsuch a one? Will he be contradicted, and\\ntold that he has borne false testimony against\\nhis consciousness? Or will he be told that he\\ndoes not know w T hat his consciousness testifies?\\nMr. Spencer himself says that no one knows\\nwhat is in the consciousness of a person except\\nthat person himself. How, then, can he say\\nwhat is in the consciousness of others?\\nThe fact that Auguste Comte and Sir William\\nHamilton and Mr. Mansel deny that they have\\nany consciousness of the positive existence of\\nthe Unknowable as the antithesis of thought,\\nis of itself sufficient to entirely overthrow this\\nbranch of the argument in favor of the Unknow-\\nable, as existing in universal consciousness.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XXIV.\\nDOCTRINE OF THE UNKNOWABLE IDEALISM.\\nWe are thus forced to the conclusion that the re-\\nlations of co-existence, of sequence, and of difference,\\nas we know them, do not obtain beyond conscious-\\nness. [Principles of Psychology, Vol I, Chap. IV.,\\nSec. 93.\\nThis proposition is not only, as the author\\nsays, apparently incredible it is really incred-\\nible. It is incredible because it is contrary to\\nthe universal experience of mankind.\\nThe proposition is, that the relations of co-ex-\\nistence, etc., as we know them, do not obtain be-\\nyond consciousness.\\nLet us suppose that we consist of four per-\\nsons: A, B, C, and D. Our consciousness is not\\nin common. Each has his own consciousness,\\nand the consciousness of each is beyond that of\\neach of the others. The question is, whether\\nthe relations of co-existence, of sequence, and\\nof difference, as we, the four, know them, obtain\\nbeyond consciousness.\\nThese relations, though they may be at times\\nsomewhat different, are, as we find by compari-\\n(169)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "170\\nson, substantially the same in the consciousness\\nof the four. Now, the very fact that the rela-\\ntions obtain in the consciousness of A, proves\\nthat they obtain beyond the consciousness of B,\\nC, and D. And, in like manner, the very fact\\nthat they obtain in the consciousness of B, O,\\nand D, or either of them, proves that they ob-\\ntain beyond the consciousness of A.\\nWhat, then, is the cause of these subjective\\nrelations which are beyond the consciousness\\nof each, and which, at the same time, are within\\nthe consciousness of each? We do not obtain\\nthem one from the other. They must, there-\\nfore, have corresponding relations in the exter-\\nnal world, existing beyond consciousness. We\\nall know that the relations obtain, not only in\\nour own consciousness, but in the consciousness\\nof others; and we know that there is no other\\nexplanation of this than the existence of the\\nmaterial world around us, in the relations of\\nco-existence, of sequence, and of difference.\\nLet us bring this question of idealism to a\\npractical test:\\nSuppose a person to go into a dark room,\\nthinking it to be empty, while in fact there are\\nseveral stoves in various portions of the room.\\nHe soon perceives relations of co-existence, of\\nsequence, and of difference obtaining in the\\nroom. He not only has the persistent conscious-\\nness of those relations, but he has at the same\\ntime a painful impression that while he was on his\\nway to the room, and before he had entered it,", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "171\\nthose relations obtained in the room, beyond his\\nconsciousness. When he strikes against one of\\nthese stoves, whose ideas or whose subjective af-\\nfections or relations or states of consciousness\\ndoes he hit against? Surely, not his own; for he\\ndid not know the stoves were there. If these rela-\\ntions obtained beyond his consciousness when\\nhe did not know of their existence, do they not\\nequally obtain beyond his consciousness, now\\nthat he does know of their existence? Or do re-\\nlations which previously obtained beyond his\\nconsciousness now become merged into his con-\\nsciousness, and thereby lose the separate exist-\\nence which they previously had?\\nIt is plain that the relations of co-existence,\\nof sequence, and of difference, as we know them,\\ndo in fact obtain beyond consciousness.\\nThere are other tests, also, for correcting the\\nindividual consciousness other ways of ascer-\\ntaining whether the relations in consciousness\\nhave corresponding relations, which are known\\nto us, beyond consciousness.\\nFor instance: Take some of the illustrations\\nmade use of by Mr. Spencer for the purpose of\\nproving his concluding proposition. He says:\\nThe consciousness of a given relation of two posi-\\ntions in space must vary quantitatively with variation\\nof bodily bulk. Clearly, a mouse, which has to run many\\ntimes its own length to traverse the space which a man\\ntraverses at a stride, cannot have the same concep-\\ntion of this space as a man. Distances which\\nseemed great to the boy, seem moderate to the man and\\nbuildings once thought imposing in height and mass,", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "172\\ndwindle into insignificance. A small or mod-\\nerate magnitude is under-estimated when a great mag-\\nnitude has just before occupied the attention. A\\nbuilding that appeared large when it stood amid\\nsmaller buildings, loses much of its seeming largeness\\nif a far larger building is erected close to it. Or, to take\\na better case\u00e2\u0080\u0094 when the sun is seen in the midst of the\\nsky, with none but great angular spaces between it and\\nthe horizon, it looks very much less than it does when\\nclose to the horizon, w T here the angular space it sub-\\ntends is comparable side by side with small angular\\nspaces. Apparent size depends on distance\\nfrom the eye, and apparent form changes with every\\nchange in the point of view.\\nWe are thus driven to the conclusion that what we\\nperceive as space-relations, cannot be, either in their\\nnatures or degrees, like those connections among ex-\\nternal things to which they are due. They change\\nboth qualitatively and quantitively with the struc-\\nture, the size, the state, and the position of the percip-\\nient. And when we see that what is objectively con-\\nsidered the same connection between things, may, as a\\nspace-relation in consciousness, be single or double-\\nwhen we remember that, according as we are near or\\nfar off, it may be too large to be simultaneously per-\\nceived or too small to be perceived at all it becomes\\nimpossible to suppose any identity between this ob-\\njective connection and some one of the multitudinous\\nsubjective relations answering to it. [Prin. of Psy-\\nchology, Vol I., pp. 213 to 215.\\nThis is a different conclusion from the one\\nw T hich we are examining. It will not be claimed\\nthat there is any identity between the object-\\nive connections and the relations in conscious-\\nness. The question is, w T hether the relations of\\nco-existence, etc., as we know them, obtain be-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "173\\nyond consciousness. The foregoing argument\\namounts to this: Our senses often deceive us\\nfrequently we do not see things as they are;\\ntherefore, we do not see them at all. Hence, we\\nhave no certain knowledge of things which we\\nperceive in the external world.\\nOn the subject of knowledge, the position of\\nMr. Spencer is anomalous. He has no positive\\nknowledge that what he sees, hears and feels, has\\nany objective existence. But he knows that\\nsomething which he cannot see, hear, or feel,\\ndoes really exist.\\nThe knowable he does not know; but the un-\\nknowable he knows.\\nHence, ignorance consists in knowledge of\\nwhat can be known, and knowledge consists on-\\nly in the knowledge (ignorance) of what is en-\\ntirely unknowable.\\nIn other words:\\nWhat we know, we do not know; but what we\\ndo not know, we know.\\nAnd are we thus to pervert the English lan-\\nguage in aid of a new system of philosophy?\\nThere are tests by which to correct the illu-\\nsions of consciousness. If a house looks larger\\nor smaller than it is, by measurement we can\\nfind out how large it really is. This test of\\nmeasurement we apply even to the sun. By\\nmathematical calculation, based upon measure-\\nment, we come to form an adequate and true\\nconception of the size of the sun; and thus the\\nsun, as we know it, obtains beyond conscious-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "174\\nness, in its relations of co-existence and of dif-\\nference, among the heavenly bodies.\\nAgain: The erroneous impression derived\\nfrom one of the senses may be corrected by\\nimpressions derived from the other senses.\\nAlso the erroneous impressions of one person\\nmay be corrected by comparing them with the\\nimpressions of other individuals and with the\\ncollected experiences of mankind. So, also,\\nthey may be compared with the previous expe-\\nriences of the same individual. His present\\nimpressions of an object can be co-ordinated\\nwith and corrected by his past impressions of\\nthe same object.\\nThe idealism of Spencer is different from that\\nof Berkeley and of Hume. While Berkeley\\nleaves nothing existing beyond consciousness,\\nSpencer leaves something existing; but what is\\nit? After stating that the relations of co-ex-\\nistence, of sequence, and of difference, as we\\nknow them, do not obtain beyond consciousness,\\nhe proceeds to explain what there is beyond\\nconsciousness:\\nMore certain, then, than the relativity of relations,\\nas we conceive them, is the existence of non-relative\\nforms to which they refer; since proof of the first in-\\nvolves perpetual assumption of the last. There is\\nsome ontological order whence arises the phenomenal\\norder we know as space; there is some ontological or-\\nder whence arises the phenomenal order we know as\\ntime; and there is some ontological nexus whence\\narises the phenomenal relation we know as difference.\\nThese, then, are what obtain beyond con-", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "175\\nsciousness: Non-relative forms, two ontological\\norders, and an ontological nexus. But what are\\nnon-relative forms? The very term form im-\\nplies a relation. It is impossible to think of a\\nform except in relation. What, then, is a non-\\nrelative form? And what is an ontological or-\\nder? or an ontological nexus? The term onto-\\nlogical is not known to science.\\nWe have been told in First Principles, that\\nthe Unknowable exists out of relation; and one\\nof the numerous names given to it is The Non-\\nrelative. Non-relative forms, then, are no-\\nthing more nor less than forms of the Unknow-\\nable. And the ontological orders which give\\nrise to the relations of co-existence and of se-\\nquence, as we know them, are orders of the Un-\\nknowable. So, also, the ontological nexus which\\ngives rise to the relation of difference, as we\\nknow it, is a nexus of the Unknowable.\\nThus there are only forms of consciousness\\nwithin, and forms of the Unknowable without.\\nBut these forms of the Unknowable cannot be\\ncognized. Mr. Spencer does not recognize a\\ncomplete cognition at all; only something which\\nwe call a cognition; that is, a relative cogni-\\ntion as distinguished from an absolute cogni-\\ntion. [Essays, Vol. II, p. 241.\\nThe doctrine of the Unknowable, with its ac-\\ncompanying idealism, results, therefore, in the\\nfinal analysis, in complete skepticism.\\nThat such should be the outcome of the doc-\\ntrine of the Unknowable, is not surprising. It", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "176\\nis a doctrine speculative and metaphysical in\\nthe highest degree. When a writer professedly\\nenters into the region beyond phenomena; when\\nhe institutes a search for a first or ulti-\\nmate cause; when he enters upon a discus-\\nsion of the relations of the non-relative and the\\nunknowable; when he undertakes to explain the\\ninexplicable; when he asks us to contemplate\\nthe unthinkable, it is not strange that he should\\nfail to make himself understood. Where there\\nis nothing to be communicated, nothing but\\nthat fact can be made clear.\\nThere remains to be examined, in the\\nclosing chapter, the reconciliation between sci-\\nence and religion.", "height": "4599", "width": "2813", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER XXV.\\nRECONCILIATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RE-\\nLIGION.\\nAs shown in the preceding chapters, Mr.\\nSpencer does not recognize the separate exist-\\nence of the external world, or cosmos. In this\\nhe is consistent. For, if there be an existing\\ncosmos, it is either self-existent, or it was\\nbrought into being by a self-existent Creator.\\nBut self-existence Mr. Spencer holds to be rig-\\norously inconceivable and every thing that is\\ninconceivable, except the Unknowable, he re-\\njrcts. Then 1 being no self-existence, there can\\nbe no cosmos. His idealism involves the same\\nconclusion.\\nThe universe, then, does not exist. But some-\\nthing exists? Yes: what is it? Not anything\\nknown, nor even anything knowable; but some-\\nthing entirely unknowable.\\nThe Unknowable, then, exists. Do we know\\nit exists? Yes; this is the most certain of all\\ntruths. Though it is unknowable, inconceiva-\\nble, and even unthinkable, yet we know that it\\n(177)", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "178\\nexists; it is inextricable from consciousness; it\\nis the antithesis of thought.\\nWhat is this Unknowable? Has it intelli-\\ngence? No. Has it activity? No. Has it any\\nattributes? No. Has it any relation to the\\nuniverse? No. Though it is the creating pow-\\ner, it has created nothing. Though it is first\\ncause, it is not the cause of any effect. But\\nwhile the Unknowable has effected nothing, the\\ndiscovery of it has effected a reconciliation be-\\ntween Science and Religion.\\nScience and Religion are radically different in\\ntheir character, in their province, and in their\\nobjects. This necessarily makes them different\\nin their methods. And here is where they have\\nbeen brought most into conflict. Their antago-\\nnism, therefore, has been essentially and mainly\\nan antagonism of methods. The method of Sci-\\nence has been a method of investigation and de-\\nliberation. Its primary functions consist in the\\ncollection of facts, the weighing of evidence, and\\nthe drawing of conclusions. The method of Re-\\nligion is just the reverse. It comes with what\\nit claims to be the truth, and says, Receive\\nit.\\nThis conflict Mr. Spencer proposes to recon-\\ncile nay, claims to have reconciled by a doc-\\ntrine. But since the antagonism is not based\\nupon a doctrine, how can it be reconciled by a\\ndoctrine? How can a difference of method be\\nharmonized by a doctrine? It is not an antag-\\nonism of doctrine. Science has never denied", "height": "4685", "width": "2820", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "179\\nthat God could not be known in his essence,\\nand religion has never denied that things could\\nnot be known in their essence.\\nThe antagonism being not in doctrine but in\\nmethod, the only way in which a reconciliation\\ncould be effected, would be to induce Science to\\nbelieve without evidence which would be im-\\npossible or to induce Religion to submit its\\nclaims to investigation, and to the weighing of\\nevidence\\nIt is said that the more scientific Science be-\\ncomes, the more nearly it is brought to a recog-\\nnition of the Omnipotent Unknowable; while\\nthe more religious Religion becomes, the more\\nit ignores every thing but this same Unknowable\\nExistence. By the mere announcement of this\\nprinciple, it is claimed that the reconciliation\\nhas been effected.\\nFirst, is it true that the recognition of the pos-\\nitive existence of the Unknowable is the highest\\nresult of science? When and where has such a y\\nthing been stated by any scientist except by the\\nauthor of the New Philosophy?\\nThe scientists of the nineteenth century ignore\\nthe entities of the schoolmen they recognize\\nthe fact that the boundaries of science lie be-\\ntween the known and the unknown. How much\\nof the unknown is unknowable they do not un-\\ndertake to say. Mr. Spencer himself was at one\\ntime wavering on this point. A note had been\\nprepared by him, which read as follows:\\nInstead of positively saying that the absolute is", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "180\\nunknowable, we must say that we cannot tell whether\\nit is knowable or not.\\nAnd the author says that then, in 1873, the\\nnote still bore the wafers by which it had been\\nattached to the original manuscript. Why he\\nomitted that note, he could not then remember.\\n[Essays, Vol. II, p. 220.\\nSecondly: Is it true that the recognition of\\nthe Unknowable is the highest element in relig-\\nion? On the contrary, is it not true that relig-\\nion presupposes the existence of an object of\\nworship, which, though unknown and unknowa-\\nble in its essence, may become known in its re-\\nlations to man? Such an object of worship is\\nsupposed to have attributes which can bring it\\ninto communication with man. Has any other\\nkind of religion ever been known in the history\\nof the race?\\nAll the religions of history have been anthro-\\npomorphic. Such is the religion of the Brah-\\nmins as interpreted by the incarnations. Such,\\nalso, is the Buddhist religion. The conceptions\\nof the Islamite are anthropomorphic. The re-\\nligion of the Jews was intensely anthropomor-\\nphic. The Christian religion has not only adopt-\\ned and incorporated the religion of the Jews,\\nbut it has, in addition, an anthropomorphic sys-\\ntem of its own. Without an anthropomorphic\\nGod, what becomes of faith, of reverence, of\\nworship, of love, of sacrifice, of gratitude, and\\nof hope?\\nWhen Paul saw an altar which the Athenians", "height": "4685", "width": "2820", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "1S1\\nhad erected to the Unknown God, he said,\\nWhom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I\\nunto you/ He recognized the fact that in or-\\nder to be made the object of worship and the\\nbasis of a religion, God must be made known,\\nin other words, he must be made anthropomor-\\nphic. Man must be made to believe that the\\nobject be worships is in so far like himself as to\\npossess like thoughts and feelings, so that a\\nbond of sympathy can be established. Thence\\nis opened up a whole world of relations which\\nelse are impossible. And nothing less than this\\nis religion. God, being believed to be infinite\\nin those attributes which are possessed by man\\nin a finite degree, and which, therefore, he can\\nunderstand attributes of love, mercy, justice,\\nwisdom, goodness, and power becomes intelli-\\nitiy an object of love and worship; a being to\\nbe propitiated.\\nThe God of the religionists, though he may\\nbe unknowable, is not unthinkable; for he is\\nprojected from human thought. But the Un-\\nknowable of Spencer is not only unknowable,\\nbut, as he himself admits, unthinkable, as well.\\nHence, it is an abstraction; nay, more, a nega-\\ntion of all thought whatever, as Sir William\\nHamilton maintains. We can truly say that so\\nfar as we know it does not exist. Mr. Balfour\\nremarks that so far as he knows it may be true\\nenough that the Unknowable exists, but he\\nclaims that it is outside of science and of all sci-\\nentific research; and. he might have added, out-", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "182\\nside of all legitimate scientific speculation. So\\nfar as we know, the Unknowable is nothing.\\nSome critics have commented on the fact that\\nthe term Unknowable, wherever it is used by\\nthe author of First Principles, appears with\\nan initial capital letter; and so, also, of every\\nterm which is used as its equivalent. This crit-\\nicism, though it might at first appear to be a tri-\\nfling one, is not entirely without force, if the use\\nof the capital letter be looked upon as an at-\\ntempt to make something out of nothing. Such\\nan attempt would of course be futile. The Un-\\nknowable is unknowable still; the Unthinkable\\nis unthinkable still; and Nothing can never be\\nmore than nothing.\\nThe attempt, therefore, to reconcile Science\\nand Religion by means of the Unknowable, is\\nan attempt to reconcile something with some-\\nthing else through the intermediation of no-\\nthing. The religionist is asked to withdraw his\\nthoughts from the contemplation of his highest\\nideal, and turn them into the blank void of no-\\nthingness. If he can succeed in doing this,\\nthen the old-time antagonism between Religion\\nand Science is removed.\\nWith what sort of religion has the reconcilia-\\ntion been effected? Not with the Christian re-\\nligion. This has been repeatedly antagonized\\nby Mr. Spencer. Nor has the reconciliation\\nbeen effected with any religion which has as an\\nessential element any system of morality.\\nIt is a remarkable fact that there is no con-", "height": "4685", "width": "2820", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "183\\nnection between Spencer s Data of Ethics and\\nthe Unknowable. On the contrary, the author\\nof the Data of Ethics states explicitly that there\\nis no relation between morality and the Un-\\nknowable. The following is his language:\\nRight, as we can think it, necessitates the thought\\nof not-right, or wrong, for its correlative; and hence\\nto ascribe Tightness to the acts of the Power manifest-\\ned through phenomena, is to assume the possibility\\nthat wrong acts may be committed by this Power.\\nHut how came there to exist, apart from this Power,\\nconditions of such kind that subordination of its acts\\nto them makes them right and insubordination wrong?\\nHow can Unconditioned Being be subject to condi-\\ntions beyond itself V [Data of Ethics, Sec. 99.\\nAt the banquet given to Mr. Spencer in New\\nYork, in l vs _. Professor Fiske, the i^reat expos-\\nitor S ncer in this country, in his after-din-\\nner Bpeech, made a mistake when he undertook\\nto connect the moral law with the Unknowable.\\nHuman responsibility, said Professor Fiske on that\\nision, is made more strict and solemn than ever\\nwhen the eternal Power that lives in every event of\\nthe universe is thus seen to be, in the deepest possible\\nsense, the author of the moral law that should guide\\nour lives.\\nThe Professor here essayed to establish for\\nMr. Spencer a doctrine which he had himself\\nexpressly repudiated.\\nSince, then, the Unknowable is not subject to\\nthe moral law, nor in any way connected with it,\\nand has no moral character, what becomes of the\\nreconciliation between Science and Religion?", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "184\\nIf there be a reconciliation, must it not be with\\na religion devoid of morality?\\nHere we have a doctrine which ignores mo-\\nrality, which its own author distinctly discon-\\nnects from his own system of ethics, and which\\nat the same time he sets up as the mediator be-\\ntween Science and Religion.\\nWhat Science is, we all know; what Religion\\nis or has been, is equally w^ell established. Bui\\nefforts are now being made to change the mean-\\ning of the term Religion. Should those ef-\\nforts succeed should the word acquire a signif-\\nication far different from the meaning which\\nhas been attached to it in all the ages of the\\npast, then and not till then will there be a rec-\\nonciliation between Science and Religion.\\ni", "height": "4685", "width": "2820", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "O\\nV\\nt s\\n8 \u00c2\u00ab,*V\\ni VV\\n4\\n\u00c2\u00b0o\\nDeacidified using the Bookkeeper process\\nv Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide\\n*V\u00c2\u00bb r^ Treatment Date: August 2004\\nPreservationTechnologies\\njlV 1 C A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION\\n.Q 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive\\nr Cranberry Township. PA 16066\\nV?^\\n(724) 779-21 1 1", "height": "4685", "width": "2820", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "4/\\n4?\\nA\u00c2\u00b0* .i\\nJ-\\na vv v\\nDOBBS BROS. \u00c2\u00ab,W0?\u00c2\u00a3* T \u00c2\u00bb%5^tfV C *J?M%*\\nDEC 81;\\nhi ST. AUGUSTINE\\nFLA.\\n*\u00c2\u00bb.^v v\\n\u00c2\u00ab5\\nO o M\\ntP^V J*yJCi**^ 4s\u00c2\u00a3\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2kKWA*. v,* v\\nw", "height": "4739", "width": "2767", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4685", "width": "2820", "jp2-path": "herbertspencerhi00wait_0202.jp2"}}