{"1": {"fulltext": "Discussions of\\nJfi a si n", "height": "3692", "width": "2388", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,\\nChap, __ Copyright No.\\nShelf ...Qr^sEfr\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "DISCUSSIONS\\nPhilosophical Subjects.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "DISCUSSIONS\\nPhilosophical Questions\\nBY\\nJOHN L. GIRARDEAU, D. D., LL. D.,\\nLate Professor in the Theological Seminary,\\nColumbia, South Carolina.\\nEDITED BY\\nRev. GEORGE A. BLACKBURN,\\nUnder the Auspices of the Synods of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama\\nand Florida.\\nfe\\nRICHMOND, VA.:\\nThe Presbyterian Committee of Publication.\\n1", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "62638\\njjUifoMcry of Conferees\\nUiPlifc HtCt.vti}\\nOCT 18 1900\\nCopyright entry\\nSECOND COPY.\\nDt-iiVfci\u00c2\u00ab*f to\\nomm division,\\nNOV 20 1900\\nCopyright, 1900.\\nBY\\nJAMES K. HAZEN, Secretary of Publication.\\nPrinted by\\nWhittet Shepperson,\\nRichmond, Va.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nPage.\\nPrefatory Note, 7\\nIntroduction 9\\nThe End of Philosophy, 27\\nConsciousness: With Special Reference to\\nSir William Hamilton s Views, 49\\nThe Authority of Consciousness, 85\\ncosmothetic idealism, 97\\nBerkeley s Idealism, Ill\\nObjective Idealism, 156\\nPantheism, 167\\nSir William Hamilton s Doctrine of Causa-\\ntion, 209\\nSpencer s Relativity of Knowledge, 260\\nThe Argument for the Being of God from\\nour Cognitive Nature, 304\\nMr. Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy, 357\\nPhysiological Psychology, 435\\nSpace What is it? 496", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "PREFATORY NOTE.\\nThe frequent references to Sir William Hamilton\\nin these discussions is due to the fact that the students\\nwhom the writer addresses are asked to read the Lec-\\ntures and Discussions of the Scottish philosopher, in con-\\nnection with the delivery of his own views, orally or in\\nwriting, in the class-room. Hamilton s philosophy thus\\nbecomes, to a large extent, a point of departure for dis-\\ncussions which may involve either a defence or a rebut-\\ntal of its doctrines, and sometimes enter a separate and\\nindependent field.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "EDITOR S PREFACE.\\nDr. Girardeau, at his death, left a small trunk full\\nof unpublished manuscript, a large part of which was\\nunsuited for publication, being in the form of notes for\\nuse in the class-room or for help in his own studies. As\\nmuch of it as was suitable was offered by his family for\\npublication to the four Synods having control of the\\nTheological Seminary at Columbia, South Carolina.\\nThe Synods appointed a committee, investing it with\\ndiscretionary power, to consider the proposition. The\\nRev. W. T. Hall, D. D., was appointed by the Synod\\nof South Carolina the Rev. Thos. P. Hay, by the Synod\\nof Florida the Rev. Donald McQueen, by the Synod of\\nAlabama; and the Rev. J. T. Plunket, D. D., and\\nRuling Elder W. C. Sibley, by the Synod of Georgia.\\nThis committee was organized by the selection of Dr.\\nHall as chairman, the Rev. Mr. Hay as business mana-\\nger, and the Rev. Geo. A. Blackburn, representing the\\nfamily of Dr. Girardeau, as editor.\\nWhile every member of the committee has been zealous\\nin furthering the work intrusted to it, the ability and\\npersistence of the Rev. Thos. P. Hay, and the advice", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "6 Editor s Preface.\\nand assistance of the Rev. J. K. TIazen, D. D., Secretary\\nof Publication, have been chiefly instrumental in mak-\\ning it possible to begin publication.\\nThese Discussions were prepared by Dr. Girardeau\\nfor the press they were found in a bundle to themselves\\nmarked complete. He had expressed the desire that,\\nin case any of his manuscript should ever be published,\\nthis would be the first issued. The committee, therefore,\\nafter examining this manuscript, decided that it should\\nbo published first. This explanation is made because it\\nwas thought by many of the friends of the work that his\\nLife and Sermons ought to have preceded this volume.\\nThe capitalization in the book is not that of Dr. Girar-\\ndeau, nor is it exactly what would have been chosen by\\nthe editor. It is the system of the printers, who have\\nconformed to the style or fashion now adopted in the\\nmodern printing office, and in publishing centres.\\nE o apology is needed for offering this book as a part\\nof the literature of the Presbyterian Church. For every\\nsystem of theology must have a system of philosophy\\nassociated with it; and no theology will long remain\\nmore sound than its coordinate philosophy. Every ad-\\nvance, therefore, in sound philosophy is an additional\\nbuttress to true theology.\\nDr. Girardeau has been recognized by the church at\\nlarge as a great preacher; by the ministry as a great", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "Editor s Preface. 7\\ntheologian and preacher and by his students as a great\\nphilosopher, theologian and preacher. His extensive\\nlibrary was more theological than homiletical, and more\\nphilosophical than theological. Probably the study in\\nwhich he naturally took most delight was philosophy.\\nAs to the Discussions themselves, their main purpose\\nis to advance the Scottish school of philosophy. They\\nare not intended to be a system in themselves. This\\nbook is really a supplement to Hamilton s Metaphysics,\\nin connection with which it ought to be studied. It\\nseeks to correct what is considered incorrect in Hamil-\\nton to develop more fully his system and to bring it\\ndown to the present time answering the objections and\\nrefuting the errors of opposing systems in their latest\\nexpressions.\\nThese discussions were prepared by the author in his\\nmature years, some of them having been written, and all\\nof them having been revised by him since 1890. They\\nfairly represent, therefore, his ability, his scholarship,\\nand the final conclusions of his life of study.\\nThe committee hope to follow this, as soon as the way\\nis clear, with one volume of Theological Discussions,\\nand one volume containing his Life and Sermons.\\nGeorge A. Blackburn,\\nColumbia, S. C, Sept. 20, 1900.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION.\\nSome things deserve to be noted as introductory to\\nthe discussions which follow.\\n1. For the sake of clearness somewhat needs to be said\\nconcerning at least some of the leading terms which will\\nbe employed.\\nKnowledge may be regarded as spontaneous or re-\\nflective spontaneous, when it is attained without volun-\\ntary effort in the unimpeded exercise of the cognitive\\npowers; reflective, when the crude materials furnished\\nspontaneously are by the thinking faculty reduced to\\nsome degree of order. ISTo merely spontaneous know-\\nledge can properly be denominated science, nor is all re-\\nflective knowledge entitled to that designation. Most\\nmen reflect to some extent, and perhaps most men in\\nsome measure arrange, classify and systematize their\\nknowledge. Something more is necessary to constitute\\nscientific knowledge. Science is knowledge arranged,\\nclassified and systematized, with the end in view of\\nreaching an ultimate principle of unity. Science aims\\nto be a unifier of knowledge. In this view the writer is\\ndisposed to concur with Mr. Herbert Spencer.\\nScience is, in a broad way and without an excessive\\nrefinement of terms, distinguishable into physical and\\nmetaphysical. It is only a loose, popular usage which", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "10 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ncontradistinguishes science to metaphysics. If it be\\npossible to investigate and systematize the phenomenal\\nfacts of the mind with the end in view of attaining to\\nunity, it is obvious that there may be a metaphysical\\nscience. Physical science is employed in the observa-\\ntion and registry, and also the logical classification of\\nthe phenomenal facts of nature, including those of the\\nbodily organism, but excepting those of the human mind.\\nWhen one passes beyond this field of material phenom-\\nena, he crosses the boundary between physical and meta-\\nphysical science, and enters the domain of the latter.\\nMetaphysical science, or, what is the same thing, mental\\nor intellectual science, is concerned about the phenome-\\nnal facts (including the laws as facts) of the mind, and\\nthe inferential judgments of the mind considered as\\nnoetic.\\nMetaphysics, in the wide sense, and philosophy the\\nwriter regards as for the most part signifying the same\\nthing, and distributable as generic, into psychology and\\nontology. Psychology is the science having for its ob-\\njecirmatter the facts (including the laws considered as\\nfacts) of the mind. Ontology is the science having for\\nits object-matter the inferential judgments of the mind\\ncontemplated not as dianoetic with it, logic has to do\\nbut as noetic. Whether logic should be embraced as an\\ninstance of nomological science, in this distribution, does\\nnot appear to be a matter of much consequence. It is\\nnot usual to speak of it as metaphysical or philosophical,\\nand it might, perhaps with propriety, be assigned the\\nplace of an independent science. Possibly this might\\nbe a classification preferable to that of Hamilton, who", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "Inteoduction. 11\\ndistributes psychology into phenomenological, nomo-\\nlogical (including logic) and inferential.\\nIt is not denied that there is a philosophy of physical\\nscience, as Herbert Spencer claims, but it deserves to\\nbe remembered that such a philosophy is but the deriva-\\ntion by the mind of metaphysical inferences, in the\\nform of ontological, from the phenomenal facts observed\\nand recorded by physical science.\\nIf any should object to this distribution that philoso-\\nphy is wider than metaphysics, inasmuch as it em-\\nbraces in its scope the moral nature, while metaphysics\\ndoes not, be it so. A broader division would then be\\nof philosophy into metaphysics and moral philosophy,\\nmetaphysics being distributable into psychology and\\nontology. But, in strictness, psychology is, in part, con-\\ncerned about the phenomenal facts of the moral nature\\nand ontology, in part, about the inferences which are de-\\nducible from those facts and if we exclude moral phi-\\nlosophy on the ground that it is not concerned about\\nthe intellect proper, on the same ground we would be\\nobliged to exclude the scientific consideration of the\\nfeelings and the will. Further, it may be replied to the\\nobjector that, as psychology partly deals with the phe-\\nnomenal facts of the moral nature, it may come to this\\nthat moral science and by this is here meant the spe-\\ncial science conversant about the moral nature, and not\\nmoral science more generally considered as sometimes\\ncontradistinguished to natural or physical science will\\nhave to be reduced with logic under the head of nomol-\\nogy,as treating of the development and application of the\\nlaws by which our moral nature is governed. As, however,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "12 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe writer has no disposition to be contentious about the\\nuse of terms, which depends so largely upon taste and\\ncustom, let it suffice to have indicated the senses in\\nwhich they will be mainly employed in these discussions.\\n1. It deserves remark, however, that in a narrow sense\\nmetaphysics coincides with ontology. In that sense, they\\nboth pursue the inquiry for ultimate principles funda-\\nmental being and first causes an inquiry which, pushed\\nto the utmost, seeks the Being who is alike the First\\nSubstance and the First Cause. Perhaps, strictly\\nspeaking, this is the signification in which philosophy\\nalso should be used. But the attempt to restrict these\\nterms to that narrow, and it may be proper sense, would\\nbe like rowing against wind and tide. Popular usage\\nwould render its success almost hopeless. The chair\\nwhich Sir William Hamilton filled in the University of\\nEdinburgh was entitled, the Chair of Logic and Meta-\\nphysics, and the learned editors of his works denomi-\\nnate his philosophical lectures, Lectures on Metaphysics,\\nnotwithstanding the fact that they are mainly con-\\ncerned about psychology, and only to a small extent\\nabout ontology. The same nomenclature is well-nigh\\nuniversal in Britain and America. Metaphysics, ac-\\ncordingly, must, at least popularly, be conceded a wider\\nsweep than ontology. The same is true of philosophy;\\nand further, it must be admitted that the usus loquendi\\nmakes philosophy cover a larger field than metaphysics.\\nIt would be eccentric to talk of moral metaphysics, while\\nit is common to speak of moral philosophy. In like\\nmanner, it would be inadmissible to say the metaphysics\\nof science, although it is usual to employ the terms phil-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "LSTTKODUCTKXN 13\\nosophy of science; not as implying that science is phil-\\nosophical, but as designating the effort to account for\\nthe phenomenal facts of science upon unphenomenal\\nand ultimate principles.\\nWhile, then, it may be proper for one to guard him-\\nself against the supposition that his ignorance induces\\nhim to comply with prevailing custom, it would be both\\npedantic and quixotic in him to traverse its current in\\norder to secure technical accuracy. None but an over-\\nmastering genius, which would compel the homage and\\nthe obedience of the learned world, could venture to\\nmake such an attempt.\\n2. These discussions proceed upon the ground that\\nmetaphysical science is progressive.\\nThe taunt is sometimes heard that the science makes\\nno progress. A few considerations will serve to show\\nthat this charge is unwarranted.\\n(1.) For a long time the deductive method too exclu-\\nsively prevailed but the inductive has come to be very\\ngenerally employed, not as extruding the former, but as\\nfurnishing the data upon which it competently proceeds.\\nThis is true even in Germany, where the absolutist phil-\\nosophers were accustomed to speak slightingly of con-\\nsciousness and the processes of the inductive school.\\nThe almost universal habit of now interrogating con-\\nsciousness by painstaking psychological inquiry, for the\\npurpose of ascertaining the facts upon which the con-\\nclusions of metaphysics ought to be based, is certainly\\nan indication of progress.\\n(2.) There has been a decided advance in the enun-\\nciation and development of a priori principles the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "14 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nfundamental laws of thought and belief in relation to\\nthe processes of the logical understanding and the noetic\\nreason, and of the original laws of morality in relation\\nto those of the moral nature, relations indicated, as facts,\\nby psychological investigation.\\n(3.) For centuries the majority of philosophers\\nadopted the hypothesis of representative preception, or\\nhypothetical realism. Especially since the rise of the\\nScottish school, the tendency of philosophical thought\\nhas been marked in the direction of abandoning that\\nhypothesis, and of adopting the opposite theory of the\\nimmediate knowledge of the external world, so far as\\nit is related to our faculties. Progress has been made in\\nthe matters of the duality of consciousness as affirming\\nmatter and spirit to use the exquisite language of\\nHamilton in the synthesis of knowledge and the anti-\\nthesis of existence, and as testifying to the certainty of\\nobjective reality. The thin line of witnesses to the\\none catholic and perennial philosophy of common\\nsense has swelled into the army of modern thinkers.\\n(4.) There has been notable progress in the evolu-\\ntion of the doctrine of presentative and representative\\nknowledge of immediate and mediate cognition.\\n(5.) There has been, in some degree, progress in fix-\\ning the certainty of principles and doctrines, arising\\nfrom the conflict of opinions, analogous to that which\\nin theology has resulted from controversies in the\\nchurch. The scepticism of Hume, for example, stimu-\\nlated profound investigations which have gone far to\\nsettle the all-important question of the certitude of\\nhuman knowledge. The sensationalism of Condillac", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0024.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "LsTTEODUCTION. 15\\nand the French encyclopedists, and the associational-\\nism of the Mills and others, have contributed to define\\nthe difference between the knowledge derived from\\nsense-perception and that originating in certain funda-\\nmental laws of our mental constitution. The absolutist\\ncontroversy has tended to fix the limitations of the\\nmental powers, particularly the boundaries of the think-\\ning faculty, and at the same time it has enhanced con-\\nfidence in the existence of native principles in the mind\\nwhich, while they ground the possibility of experience,\\ndepend upon it in turn for their development. It has\\nmade more distinct the divisions between the domains\\nof conception and faith, and so has clarified the obscure\\ninquiries of ontology by assigning the restrictions under\\nwhich thought proceeds, and by determining the proper\\noffice of faith, and the sweep of the peculiar judgments\\nwhich it necessitates, in contradistinction to those which\\nare the appropriate results of the comparative faculty.\\n3. It is not uncommon to hear it asserted, that the\\nconclusions of physical science are more trustworthy\\nthan those of mental. But it must be remembered that,\\nin the last resort, the physical investigator employs the\\nsame organ as the psychological. The former depends\\non the trustworthiness of consciousness as well as the\\nlatter. It is true that the observer of external phe-\\nnomena employs the senses. But the senses are instru-\\nments through which consciousness operates. The real\\nobserver is consciousness. That this is the fact is proved\\nby the consideration that immediately after death the\\nsense-organs may be as perfect as they were before.\\nHow can we account for their inoperativeness, except", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0025.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "16 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nupon the ground that consciousness has ceased to act\\nthrough them If this be so, the ultimate trustworthi-\\nness of observations made by means of the senses is\\nbased upon the veracity of consciousness. Is it not ob-\\nvious, then, that however different may be their methods,\\nthe physical inquirer and the psychologist alike assume\\nthe necessity of relying upon the deliverances of con-\\nsciousness The ground of certainty to both is pre-\\ncisely the same.\\nIt is, moreover, pertinent to suggest that in the case\\nof the physical investigator the senses intervene between\\nconsciousness and the external facts the relation be-\\ntween them is not immediate 1 while in that of the\\npsychologist nothing comes between consciousness and\\nthe internal phenomena the relation is direct. In\\nview of this fact it is hardly legitimate for the physical\\nobserver to say, that his reports of phenomena are more\\ncertain than those of the psychologist.\\nIt must be added that in relation to conclusions de-\\nrived from phenomenal facts with regard to things\\nwhich are themselves not phenomenal, the physical in-\\nvestigator and the psychologist stand upon the same\\nfoot, so far as trustworthiness is concerned. They both\\nresort to inference. Their method is the same. It will\\nnot be denied that inference is a mental act. They both,\\ntherefore, employ the metaphysical method. Both are\\nliable to the mistakes resulting from wrong inferences,\\nand the trustworthiness of their inferences believed to\\nbe right rests exactly upon the same grounds. That the\\n1 Of course, there is no reference here to an intervening mental\\nmodification.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0026.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "Intkoductiois 17\\nphysical observer should indict the psychologist because\\nof the untrustworthiness of his metaphysical inferences\\nwould be, for the same reason, to indict himself. How,\\nfor example, does the physical man know the existence\\nof his ultimate atoms He has never observed them.\\nIt is clear that he infers them. How does the metaphysi-\\ncal man know his First Cause of all things? He has\\nnever preceived it. It is equally clear that he infers it.\\nThe respective inferences depend upon the same funda-\\nmental laws of our intellectual constitution. If false in\\ntheir application in the one case, they are false in the\\nother if true in the one case, they are true in the other.\\nThe charge of uncertainty and untrustworthiness as to\\nontological results, if preferred by physical science\\nagainst metaphysics, recoils, as to those results, upon\\nitself. Either, then, physical science should refrain\\nfrom the allegation, or confine itself to the simple obser-\\nvation, registry and classification of phenomenal facts.\\nBut should the latter alternative be adopted, what would\\nbecome of Mr. Herbert Spencer and his objections to\\npositivism\\n4. It is one purpose of these discussions to oppose the\\nfollowing philosophical schemes: Idealism in all its\\nforms, pantheism, materialism, and agnosticism. As\\nto physiological psychology, it is admitted that there\\nmay legitimately be attempted a science concerned about\\nthe relations between the mind and the nervous organ-\\nism, and consequently between psychology and physi-\\nology. But the crypto-materialism which is in a greater\\nor less degree insinuated by some of the writers on this\\nsubject, and the undisguised materialism of others, is", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0027.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "18 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nresisted. Sensationalism or pure empiricism on the\\none hand, and, on the other, pure subjectivism as de-\\nveloped in transcendental absolutism, are to a greater\\nor less extent criticised. Herbert Spencer s theory in\\nregard to the relativity of knowledge is antagonized.\\nArgument is presented to show that space and duration\\nare neither relations, nor conditions either of existence\\nor of thought, nor substances, but are perfections of the\\nInfinite Spirit.\\n5. It is necessary to say something definitely in an-\\nswer to the question, What school of philosophy do these\\ndiscussions represent? The answer is, The Scottish\\nschool mainly. It may briefly bo indicated in what\\nrespects they agree with the doctrines of that school,\\nand in what they differ from them.\\n(1.) They concur with it in maintaining the great\\na priori laws and principles contended for by the phil-\\nosophy of common sense; the doctrine of natural real-\\nism or absolute dualism, which affirms the substantive\\ndifference between matter and spirit contrasted in the\\nantithesis of existence, but related in the synthesis of\\nknowledge the immediate knowledge of the external\\nworld, and with. Hamilton the consciousness of the\\nexternal world, so far as it is related to our faculty of\\npreception; the position that the fundamental laws of\\nthought and belief, as Stewart terms them, need to be\\nelicited from latency, and actually developed into formal\\nexpression, by the conditions of conscious experience;\\nthe principle of the conditioned, as stated by Hamilton,\\nso far as it holds that the sphere of positive thought is\\nbounded on all sides by the sphere of the Inconceivable", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0028.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "ItfTKODUCTIOlT. 19\\nthe limitation of consciousness to phenomena, internal\\nand external; the distinction between presentative and\\nrepresentative knowledge; the broader distinction be-\\ntween immediate and mediate knowledge; and the sig-\\nnificance and validity of mediate knowledge. In regard\\nto some of these points Hamilton s utterances are some-\\ntimes difficult to be reconciled with each other, and\\nsometimes incapable of being brought into harmony;\\nbut the statements made above are believed to exhibit\\nhis real, catholic doctrine.\\n(2.) They differ from doctrines held by members of\\nthe Scottish school in these particular respects from\\nthe doctrine of Reid, that we are conscious of the act\\nby which we perceive an external object, but not of the\\nobject itself; from the view of Hamilton, that we are\\nconscious of the act of perceiving the external object,\\nit being here maintained that the act of perceiving the\\nexternal object and the consciousness of that object are\\none and the same; from Hamilton s theory, that con-\\nsciousness is a generic, and not a special faculty, it be-\\ning here, on the contrary, held that it is a special faculty,\\nwith a catholic relation to the operations of all the other\\nfaculties from Hamilton s inconsistent hypothesis, that,\\nin being conscious of the operation of any faculty, we\\nare at the same time conscious of the object about which\\nthat operation is concerned; from Hamilton s position\\nthat every effect is made up of its causes as its constitu-\\nents; from his doctrine in regard to the genesis of the\\ncausal judgment, he referring it to a mental impotence,\\nand it being here contended that it is the affirmation of\\na positive power and from his advocacy of the possibil-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0029.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "20 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nity of an absolute commencement, as illustrated in every\\nfree act of the will.\\n6. Should the question be asked, What ends are\\nsought to be accomplished by these discussions the an-\\nswer is, in the general, that the writer desired clearly\\nto explicate and enounce the views derived from his own\\nreflections, and that this desire was enhanced by the\\nduty, bound upon him professionally, to deliver a brief\\ncourse of philosophical lectures, during each session, in\\nthe institution to which he is attached. More particu-\\nlarly and the answer is given in all modesty the end\\ncontemplated by the writer has been to contribute some-\\nthing, so far as his abilities would allow, towards a fuller\\ndevelopment of the distinctive principles of the Scottish\\nphilosophy.\\nThose principles constrained his adherence by their\\nagreement, in his judgment, with the data of conscious-\\nness and their necessary consequences, with the common\\nconvictions of mankind, and with the doctrines of divine\\nrevelation. But although considered to be for the most\\npart sound and superior to any other system, the Scot-\\ntish philosophy did not appear to be free from certain\\ngrave defects, or to have reached the point of a consum-\\nmate development. This seemed to be true, notwith-\\nstanding the fact that the extraordinary learning and\\nacumen of Sir William Hamilton were employed in the\\neffort to bring it to maturity. Indeed, it must be con-\\nfessed that the attempt of the great philosopher to ex-\\npand, systematize and perfect it was attended with cer-\\ntain inconsistencies of statement and questionable doc-\\ntrinal utterances, together with some ambiguity in his", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0030.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "Inteoduction. 21\\npositions, which resulted unhappily. They exposed him\\nto the unfriendly criticism of his associationalist op-\\nponent, John Stuart Mill, gave some plausibility to the\\nclaim of Herbert Spencer that his agnosticism is justi-\\nfied by Hamilton s doctrine touching the knowledge of\\nthe Infinite, and most unkindest cut of all in-\\nduced some of the supporters of the Scottish philosophy\\nto impute to him the maintenance of the utter incognos-\\ncibility of God, and the atheistic tendencies of that view\\nThe opportunity is thus offered to friends of the\\nScottish philosophy, as having received its fullest ex-\\npansion at the hands of Hamilton, of endeavoring to\\nclear up ambiguities in the form in which he left it, to\\nreconcile incongruities where that is possible, where that\\nis impracticable to correct the wrong or imperfect state-\\nments by those which are most clearly established, and\\neven to disprove untenable positions and substitute in\\ntheir room those which are tenable and in this way to\\nbring the system into harmony with itself. Some little\\nhas been essayed along these lines in these discussions.\\nThis, however, is not all. The effort is also made to\\nbring out into explicit and formal enouncement princi-\\nples which, though implicitly contained in the system,\\ndepend rather upon scattered intimations than upon\\nformulated statements, and thus, in some degree, to as-\\nsist in advancing the Scottish philosophy towards a\\ncompleter and more definite development. Some of the\\npoints will be briefly noticed at which the attainment\\nof this result is sought.\\n(1.) The doctrine in relation to consciousness.\\nThe Scottish philosophers, especially Hamilton, treat", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0031.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "22 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nconsciousness and perception as different powers. In\\nHamilton s case, the reason is plain. He regarded con-\\nsciousness as a generic faculty of cognition containing\\nunder it all the subordinate cognitive faculties as species.\\nConsidering perception as one of these specific powers,\\nhe was of course led to affirm a difference between con-\\nsciousness and perception. In these discussions argu-\\nment is submitted to show that this is an illegitimate re-\\nduction, according to Hamilton s own principles. The\\nargument proceeds on the nature of these powers.\\nIn connection with this, Hamilton s canon that con-\\nsciousness is to the philosopher what the Bible is to the\\ntheologian that is, that it is possessed of supreme au-\\nthoritativeness, needs to be suplemented by the addition\\nto mere consciousness of logical, necessary inferences\\nfrom its data.\\n(2.) The doctrine as to the generic source of know-\\nledge.\\nInstead of consciousness as the generic source of\\nknowledge, the reason or intelligence is here represented\\nas that generic source. Under this undisputed genus\\ncomes the species immediate and mediate knowledge.\\nConsciousness being immediate knowledge, nothing\\nmore and nothing less, is the sole occupant of that cate-\\ngory. The faculty of mediate knowledge includes under\\nit specific faculties of that kind of knowledge namely,\\nthe representative, the thinking, and the believing. At\\nthe root of all these faculties lie their appropriate laws\\nat the root of consciousness the laws of immediate know-\\nledge at the root of the representative faculty the laws\\nof representation; at that of the thinking faculty the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0032.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "Inteoductiok. 23\\nlaws of thought and at that of the believing faculty the\\nlaws of belief. Each one of these faculties, operating in\\nobedience to its own laws, furnishes a specific kind of\\nknowledge peculiar to it; and all these specific know-\\nledges are gathered up into a generic result knowledge.\\nThis reduction gets quit of the vexed question touching\\na generic difference between reason and faith on the one\\nhand, and faith and knowledge on the other. There is\\nno generic difference between them. To this the Scottish\\nphilosophy logically tends.\\n(3.) The doctrine as to a believing faculty.\\nCareful argument is here presented to prove the ex-\\nistence in our cognitive nature of a faculty of belief or\\nfaith. Without such a faculty the Scottish philosophy\\nis restricted to the merely phenomenal, indeed, is rent\\nby self-contradictions. One of its canons is that thought\\ncannot transcend consciousness. A faculty therefore,\\nis postulated which can transcend the materials fur-\\nnished by consciousness. That faculty is faith. It is a\\nfaculty of knowledge.\\n(4.) The doctrine as to the distinct provinces of\\nthought and faith.\\nIt is admitted here that Hamilton is right in affirming\\nthat thought cannot give substance, immortality and\\nGod. They are not thought-judgments. To what power\\nthen are these transcendental apprehensions to be as-\\nsigned He answers, To belief. We believe in the sub-\\nstance of matter, in the substance of the soul, in immor-\\ntality, in God. Now the question is whether these faith-\\njudgments are knowledge. Do we, for instance, know\\nGod His utterances upon this vital question are am-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0033.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "24 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbiguous. At times he intimates that we mediately know\\nhim; at other times, even under challenge, he hesitates\\nto call our belief in God knowledge. But there ought\\nupon this subject to be no hesitation, no uncertain sound.\\nIn these discussions it is contended that our faith in\\nGod is a real knowledge, as valid as immediate know-\\nledge and infinitely more valuable that our faith- judg-\\nments constitute the most significant knowledge that we\\npossess. It is mediate knowledge, but it is vastly more\\nprecious than immediate.\\n(5.) The question, How does thought deal with mat-\\nter that transcends its scope\\nThe difficulty is common to philosophy and theology,\\nhow a science can be constructed which involves an infi-\\nnite element. The thinking faculty is the organ of\\nscience. But it cannot know the infinite. How, then,\\ncan it embrace the infinite in its syllogistic reasoning?\\nIf faith which does apprehend the infinite could reason\\nin regard to it, the difficulty would be met. But faith\\ndoes not deal with logic. The difficulty, therefore, re-\\nturns. The answer here given is that faith and thought\\nare attributes of the same man. It is he who believes\\nand he who thinks. His faith communicates the know-\\nledge of the infinite to his thinking faculty, and the lat-\\nter, receiving the information, uses it symbolically in its\\nlogical processes, somewhat as a child learning algebra\\nexpresses an unknown quantity by x, and reasons from\\nit and about it as if he comprehended it. The matter is\\ngiven by faith, and the form by thought. Take this\\nsyllogism: Only an infinite being had power to create\\nthe universe God is an infinite being, therefore he had", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0034.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "Introduction. 25\\npower, etc. The terms in both premises express un-\\nthinkable realities. Nevertheless the syllogism is valid.\\nThe wonderful synergism of the believing and the think-\\ning faculties solves the problem. Had Hamilton evolved\\nhis principles as he might have done, and as he ought\\nto have done, he would not now, when he is sleeping in\\nhis grave, be unjustly claimed as the logical parent of\\nagnosticism.\\nThe Scottish philosopher was, to some extent, con-\\nfessedly influenced by the views of the profound Ger-\\nman philosopher, Jacobi, and it is a pity that he had not,\\nwith his masterly powers, reduced them disencumbered\\nof certain blemishes to a more systematic form. For a\\ntime the sound principles of Jacobi were overborne by\\nthe brilliant but fallacious speculations of the absolutist\\nschool, and may now, in measure, be lost sight of while\\nthe pendulum of thought vibrates to the opposite ex-\\ntreme of materialism but, with the exception of the de-\\nfects implicated in them, they will, in the destined tri-\\numph of truth in a golden age, be brought to the front\\nand win a wider and happier recognition a consum-\\nmation devoutly to be wished.\\nShould he, who is the Creator of our minds and the\\nEnlightener of their darkness, vouchsafe to use these\\ndiscussions in stimulating some able thinker to advance\\nthe development of the common sense philosophy, and\\nthe Scottish which is its chief exponent, they will not\\nhave been written for naught.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0035.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0036.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0037.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0038.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "DISCUSSIONS\\nOF\\nPhilosophical Questions\\nTHE END OF PHILOSOPHY.\\nPKOCEEDHSTG upon the assumption that the\\nmethod of philosophy is that of analysis and\\nsynthesis, we go on to inquire, What is its end f In the\\ngeneral, the answer is, An ultimate principle of unity,\\na principle, that is, upon which the diversified and in-\\nnumerable elements of the soul, the external world in im-\\nmediate contact with us, and the universe at large, may\\nbe collected into unity. Hamilton says that the end\\nsought by philosophy is a First Cause in the sense of a\\nFirst, Efficient Cause. Agreeing with him as far as he\\ngoes, I am constrained to broaden his statement so as\\nexplicitly to include in the end of philosophy a First\\nSubstance. The end which it seeks may then be con-\\nsidered as an ultimate, fundamental Being, who is\\nalike First Cause and First Substance. The process by\\nwhich we are led from effect to cause is not more im-\\nperative than that by which we are conducted from at-\\ntribute to substance. Given cause, we necessarily infer\\na power which causes, and with equal necessity refer\\n27", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0039.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "28 Discussion s of Philosophical Questions.\\npower as an attribute to a substance in which it inheres.\\nThis Hamilton would of course have admitted, but it\\nwould seem best to give both elements of the process ex-\\npress and formal enouncement. We shall see, it is\\nhoped, as the analysis advances, that this ultimate\\nBeing this Principium Essendi, who is both First\\nCause and First Substance, cannot be either the blind\\nforce of the agnostic, nor the unconscious ground of\\nexistence of the pantheist; that while as Infinite, he\\ntranscends all finite analogy, he is characterized by at-\\ntributes which are dimly but really shadowed forth by\\nthose of finite spirits.\\nIn the attempt to indicate the process by which we\\nseek an ultimate principle of unity, let us notice the\\nmode in which that process operates in the spheres re-\\nspectively of the spiritual and material systems.\\nI. Let us endeavor to observe its operation in the\\nspiritual system.\\n1. It is proper to begin with the individual soul, and\\nshow, if we can, how through our various phenomenal\\nstates and acts we are irresistibly conducted to its unity.\\nOur cognitive operations are diversified. We perceive,\\nimagine, remember, conceive, judge, reason, believe.\\nBut different as these operations are from each other,\\nwe are compelled to observe a feature which is common\\nto them all. They are all cognitive. We are obliged\\nto refer them to one cause of which they are effects.\\nThat cause is a power of cognition. We cannot by any\\neffort assign each of these cognitive functions to a sepa-\\nrate and independent cognitive power. They have one\\nand the same cause. But power is an attribute, and we", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0040.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 29\\nare impelled by a native conviction, call it a funda-\\nmental law of belief or by some other name, to refer an\\nattribute to a substance. Hence we assign this cogni-\\ntive power to a cognitive substance. That substance is\\nwhat we denominate the soul. We affirm a cognitive\\nessence to which the power of cognition belongs, a power\\nwhich causes those phenomenal effects that fall under\\nthe designation of cognitions. Along this special line,\\ntherefore, we are led to a principle of relative unity in\\none intelligent soul. It cannot be one soul that per-\\nceives, another that thinks, and another that believes,\\netc. The supposition cannot for a moment be endured.\\nIt is one and the same soul which energizes in these\\ndiverse ways.\\nA similar process of analysis will hold good in regard\\nto the feelings. The phenomenal manifestations of\\nfeeling are various. These we ascribe to a common\\npower of feeling as their cause, and again attach this\\npower as an attribute to an emotional substance. That\\nsubstance is the soul, which abides one and the same\\nwhile manifesting itself in these different modes. Along\\nthis line also we are conducted to relative unity in one\\nemotional essence, It is not one soul which feels hate,\\nanother which feels love, etc. It is the same soul which\\nexpresses itself in these differing feelings.\\nThe same is true of our voluntary states and acts.\\nThey are many, but we are constrained to collect them\\ninto unity upon a voluntary power, which by an\\nequal necessity we refer to a single voluntary substance.\\nIt would be absurd to speak of several wills, as ex-\\npressed by different inclinations, conations and voli-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0041.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "30 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntions. It is one and the same will which energizes in\\nthese various forms. And it is pertinent to remark that\\nit is in this way that the native conviction of person-\\nality and of our personal identity is mainly elicited\\ninto formal expression. The seat of personality is in\\nthe will. A being might be conceived to possess intelli-\\ngence and feelings without a will, but he could not be\\na person. Thus, in still another method analysis con-\\nducts us to relative unity.\\nThe same process obtains in the sphere of conscience.\\nWe postulate unity for our moral powers in the soul as\\nmoral. Conscious of the laws of rectitude at the root\\nof the conscience, we demand a common seat for them\\nall. It cannot be one soul which delivers the law of\\ntruth, another which enforces the law of justice, and\\nstill another which gives the law of benevolence. It may\\nnot be possible to reduce these laws, intrinsically, to\\nthe same category, but we necessarily infer that they ex-\\npress one and the same moral essence. We are also con-\\nscious of moral perceptions, of moral sentiments, of\\nmoral judgments, of moral emotions which are the\\nsanctions of those judgments, but we cannot believe that\\nthey represent different moral substances we are com-\\npelled to collect them into unity upon the power which\\nwe denominate conscience, and which we necessarily\\nattribute to one and the same soul, developing its moral\\nenergies in these different modes of manifestation. The\\nsame soul which possesses moral laws, perceptions and\\nsentiments, and in accordance with them issues its cate-\\ngorical and penal imperatives, is that which passes judg-\\nment upon itself in the shape of approval or condemna-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0042.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 31\\ntion, reward or punishment, and experiences the satis-\\nfaction of its own favor or the sting of its own remorse.\\nWe are thus led to predicate unity of our moral phe-\\nnomena, and of the power which they manifest, in con-\\nsequence of a common relation to a single moral essence.\\nSo far, in pursuing our analysis, we have been con-\\nducted to points of unity, upon which are collected dis-\\ntinctive phenomena and powers points of unity re-\\nlated to these phenomena and powers, and determined\\nby their peculiar characteristics. Shall we rest here?\\nIs there no higher unity upon which these relative\\nunits may be collected Are there several souls mani-\\nfested by these various operations a cognitive soul, an\\nsesthetical, a voluntary, and a moral With such a re-\\nduction we cannot be satisfied. We are constrained to\\ngo on in our analysis until we reach one soul which, as\\na unit, collects upon its single essence all these dis-\\ntinctive powers, and to which they are referred as at-\\ntributes a soul Which is alike intelligent, emotional,\\nvoluntary and moral.\\n(1.) We necessarily believe in the common relation\\nof the different mental powers to one personal self.\\nEach individual human being is conscious of referring\\nintellectual acts, feelings, volitions, and moral judg-\\nments to himself as one.\\n(2.) Every individual believes in the relation of each\\nmental power to every other mental power as belonging\\nto one and the same personal essence. It is his mental\\nperceptions which affect his feelings, his perceptions\\nand feelings which influence his will, his will through\\nwhich he reflectively determines the current or the direc-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0043.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "32 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntion of his intellectual acts and his feelings. They are\\nall his as one and the same self.\\nFirst, this is proved by one s sense of responsibility\\nfor this reciprocal influence of the mental powers.\\nSecondly, one has no such sense of responsibility for\\nanother man s states or acts unless he influenced them.\\nHe is not responsible for another s states of mind or\\nfeeling which induced a criminal act. The reason is\\nplain. His soul is different from every other man s soul,\\nbut is one and the same soul which expresses itself\\nthrough his different mental powers.\\nThirdly, at fifty years of age one has a sense of re-\\nsponsibility for the influence of his perceptions, imagi-\\nnations and feelings in producing a bad volition, or a\\ncriminal act at twenty.\\n(3.) If certain bodily powers, different from one an-\\nother, are consciously one s own are unified upon one s\\npersonal self; certain mental powers, different from\\neach other, are also consciously one s own are reduced\\nto unity upon himself as one indivisible essence.\\n(4.) The processes of law, human and divine, prove\\nthe unity of the soul; that is, the fact that each indi-\\nvidual man has only one soul. To plead that an intel-\\nlectual soul, and a feeling soul, and a moral soul, con-\\ndemned the criminal act of a voluntary soul would not\\navail to save a man s neck. And the fact that no such\\nplea is ever presented by the ingenuity of man is suffi-\\ncient to show that it would not be regarded as rational.\\nOnly an insane man could use it. The inference is clear.\\nAll the mental powers belong to one and the same soul.\\nBut it may be urged that the quest for unity is not", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0044.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 33\\nyet ended that even though it be admitted that all the\\nvarious mental powers may be collected upon one soul,\\nthat soul may not be simple, but compound. Against\\nthis supposition but two arguments will be used.\\n(1.) The conviction of the race is that the soul is an\\nessence, simple and indivisible. This is proof enough\\nby itself. What all men believe must be true, or human\\nnature is radically deceptive.\\n(2.) The argument of Bishop Butler is submitted:\\nSince consciousness is a single and indivisible power,\\nit should seem that the subject in which it resides must\\nbe so too. For were the motion of any particle of mat-\\nter absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it would\\nimply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to\\nexist, and part not to exist, i. e., part of this matter to\\nmove, and part to be at rest; then its power of motion\\nwould be indivisible; and so also would the subject in\\nwhich the power inheres, namely, the particle of mat-\\nter: for if this could be divided into two, one part might\\nbe moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the\\nsupposition. In like manner it has been argued, and,\\nfor anything appearing to the contrary, justly, that\\nsince the perception or consciousness, which we have of\\nour own existence, is indivisible, so as that it is a contra-\\ndiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the\\nother there; the perecptive power, or the power of con-\\nsciousness, is indivisible too and consequently the sub-\\nject in which it resides i. e., the conscious Being.\\nIt has thus far been shown that in contemplating the\\ndiversified phenomena of consciousness we are impelled\\nto refer them to appropriate causes; that these causes", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0045.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "34 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ninfer several powers, and that these powers as attributes\\nare collected into unity upon the essence of an individual\\nsoul.\\nBut every soul is different from every other soul, and\\nas there are multitudes of souls, the question arises, Can\\nthey be reduced to unity upon one ultimate cause That\\nthey can will first he shown by some general considera-\\ntions, and then by separate proofs derived from the ra-\\ntional, the moral, and the religious nature of man.\\n(1.) Every soul is finite. The consciousness of each\\nproves that fact to itself. Should any exceptional\\nthinker assert the contrary, it can easily be evinced by\\nchallenging him to solve some inexplicable problem\\nand there are many such or to visit the moon, the near-\\nest heavenly body, and give an account of it from obser-\\nvation. It were folly to deny the finiteness of every\\nhuman spirit.\\nNow each was either spontaneously produced, or im-\\nmediately created, or evolved by descent. Spontaneous\\nproduction, as implying an absolute commencement, is\\ncontradictory and absurd; and the hypothesis is now\\nvery generally abandoned. Immediate creation would\\ngive unity to all finite spirits upon the causal production\\nof one Creator. It would be absurd to suppose as many\\ncreators as there are finite spirits, for to create one\\nspirit implies infinite power, and there cannot be as\\nmany infinite powers as there are created spirits. If\\nimmediate creation be denied and evolution affirmed,\\nthen every spirit is held to have descended from one\\noriginal source (by whatever name designated), and\\nsubordinate unity is conceded.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0046.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 35\\nThe dilemma then occurs: That original existence\\nwas either spontaneously generated or immediately\\ncreated. Spontaneous generation must be rejected, im-\\nmediate creation allowed and we are conducted to ulti-\\nmate unity upon a First Cause. Cause infers power,\\nand the ultimate unit must be a First Substance possess-\\ning infinite power.\\nAgain: The plurality of spirits proves the finiteness\\nof each. For, if not finite, they are infinite. But there\\ncannot be more than one Infinite. If two, they would\\nlimit and condition one another, which is contrary to the\\nsupposition of infinity. All spirits, being finite, must\\nhave had a beginning. Either, then, they were sponta-\\nneously produced, or evolved, or immediately created.\\nThey were not spontaneously produced; but if either\\nevolved or immediately created, they infer one, ulti-\\nmate, Infinite Being. Final unity is reached.\\n(2.) The essential likeness between all human souls\\ninfers one origin. Either all had the same cause, or\\neach had a separate cause. If the latter, there would be\\nas many causes as souls. But it is absurd to suppose a\\nmultitude of causes, or even two causes, acting sepa-\\nrately, to produce results essentially the same. Was\\nthere a convention of causes which issued in a common\\nagreement to produce exactly similar effects And\\ncould a convention of causes which, on the supposition,\\nwere finite have determined to do what only an infinite\\ncause could accomplish? If the former that all had\\nthe same cause, we arrive at unity in the First Cause.\\nMore particularly\\n(1.) Consider the soul as intelligent.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0047.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "36 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nFirst, it has a fundamental belief in unity. This\\ncannot meet ultimate satisfaction in relative unities.\\nFor they require, in accordance with its demand, to bo\\nreduced as many to one. The regression of the intelli-\\ngence, in obedience to this fundamental law, is neces-\\nsarily to absolute unity, and that can only be found in an\\nabsolute and infinite Being.\\nSecondly, the soul has a fundamental belief in space,\\nand, as is well-night universally admitted, in space as\\ninfinite. ~Row either space is merely a subjective belief\\nor an objective reality. If the former, the subjective\\nbelief is infinite, which is a contradiction, for an infinite\\nelement cannot be predicated of a finite subject and the\\nbelief itself in infinite space, if it have no objective\\nreality, would be a lie. If the latter, as there caunot\\nbe two infinite realities, independent of each other, space\\nmust be the mode of an infinite substance the view-\\nless, all-comprehending immensity of an Infinite Spirit. 1\\nIf, therefore, the belief be not deceptive, the fundamen-\\ntal intelligence of the soul points to ultimate unity in an\\nultimate Being.\\nThirdly, the soul has a fundamental belief in cause.\\nThis, as has been shown by theists and Christian theo-\\nlogians and conceded by Mr. Herbert Spencer himself,\\nwhen developed upon empirical conditions, inevitably\\nleads through the contingent and finite to a necessary\\nand infinite Cause. But cause supposes power, and\\npower substance; and a necessary and infinite Being is\\nconfessed as reducing everything to ultimate unity upon\\nhis causal efficiency.\\n1 This view is not singular. It was held by Philo, Derodon and\\nSamuel Clarke, and, substantially, by Sir Isaac Newton.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0048.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 37\\nNow, as every soul possesses these fundamental be-\\nliefs, the intelligence of each, like every strand in a\\nspider s web, converges with that of every other to a\\ncommon centre. That centre is the point of absolute\\nand ultimate unity; and that unity is found alone in\\nGod.\\n(2.) Contemplate the soul as moral.\\nThe consciousness of moral obligation the ineradi-\\ncable sense of duty and conviction of responsibility\\ninfers a law-giver, ruler and judge by whose will we\\nare obliged. Either this law-giver, ruler and judge is\\nthe soul itself, or one extraneous to the soul. That the\\nformer supposition cannot be true is conclusively set-\\ntled by the desire and the inability of the soul to escape\\nfrom the condemnation and the punishment which it\\nwould not inflict and yet is compelled to inflict upon\\nitself. It is manifestly under the government of an-\\nother, who is superior to itself. It cannot be either the\\noriginal source or the enforcer of its own morality.\\nBut there are as many moral units as there are souls.\\nWe must seek a higher unity. Of every one of these\\nvarious souls the same things are true as those which\\nhave been affirmed of a single soul. They are all funda-\\nmentally alike as to their moral constitution. This is\\nso evident that it need not be sustained by argument.\\nWhatever special differences may exist in the applica-\\ntion of the laws which lie at the foundation of the moral\\nnature, there can be no denial that all men have a moral\\nnature and are conscious, to some extent, of moral obli-\\ngation. The feeling of duty is a universal characteristic\\nof the race. If this be so, what has been said in regard", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0049.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "38 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nto the individual soul must hold good of every other.\\nBut if this he admitted, the law-giver, ruler and judge\\nof all must he one and the same. It would he infinitely\\ncontradictory and absurd to suppose as many law-\\ngivers, rulers and judges as there are moral subjects.\\nThere has, however, been an ancient hypothesis, de-\\nvised by speculation to meet the obvious fact of the co-\\npresence of moral good and evil in the world, which\\npostulates two original, co-eternal principles or beings,\\nthe one the author of good, the other of evil. Does such\\nan hypothesis possess plausibility enough to arrest our\\nsearch for ultimate unity in the moral sphere\\n(1.) An eternal being would be an infinite being.\\nThe two predications cannot be disjoined. To this it\\nmay be replied that there is no contradiction in suppos-\\ning a thing to be eternal which yet is not infinite. Two\\nlines, for example, may run out ad infinitum; that is,\\nmay be co-eternal. The rejoinder is that, strictly speak-\\ning, no line can be eternal. For a line is a series of\\npoints. E concessO; each point is finite. If finite, it must\\nhave had a beginning. For if it had no beginning, it\\nwould be infinite, which is contrary to the supposition.\\nBut if it had a beginning, it could not be eternal, since\\nthe very definition of an eternal thing is that it had no\\nbeginning, and will have no end. Now, whatever is\\npredicable of all the parts of the series is predicable\\nof the whole. The series of points, the line, therefore,\\ncannot be eternal. If duration be conceived simply as a\\nline, it cannot be eternal. Eternal duration infers a\\nbeing who is infinite, and therefore immense. Such a\\nbeing excludes another infinite and consequently im-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0050.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 39\\nmense being. For each would limit and condition the\\nother, which is contrary to the supposition of infinity\\ninvolving immensity. A finite eternal being is a contra-\\ndiction in terms and two infinite eternal beings would\\nbe a contradiction in reality.\\nNeither can there be an eternal plane. For a plane\\nis a congeries of lines, and what is predicable of one line\\nis predicable of all. As all had a beginning, so must\\nthe plane. If it had a beginning, it could not have been\\neternal.\\nJSTor, further, can there be an eternal sphere, for a\\nsphere is bounded in every direction, consequently in\\nthe direction of length. What then is true of a line\\nmust be true of it. It had a beginning therefore, can-\\nnot be eternal.\\nBut it may be asked, whether a point may not be\\neternal. The answer must be in the negative; for a\\npoint, strictly speaking, is the opposite of the immense.\\nThe immense is the immeasurable. If a point could be\\neternal, it would, in one respect, be immeasurable. It\\nwould in one aspect be immense which involves a con-\\ntradiction, since the immense and a point are the oppo-\\nsite of each other the one being most easily measurable,\\nthe other immeasurable. A point, therefore, cannot be\\neternal. ~No more can any number of points massed\\ninto a bulk, a world, a universe. It may be said that the\\nschoolmen described the eternal Being as a punctum\\nstans. The language is figurative, and cannot be con-\\nstrued in strictness. But whatever may be thought of\\nthe propriety or impropriety of the language, it never\\nentered into the head of a schoolman that there could", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0051.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "40 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbe two such points. He meant one infinite Being, ex-\\nclusive of the possibility of another.\\n(2.) Two infinite beings would be mutually exclu-\\nsive: nothing would be the result of the supposition.\\nEither there is but one infinite being or no infinite be-\\ning. The supposition of two is a contradiction in terms.\\nFor the two would necessarily limit each other that is,\\nboth would be finite, which is contradictory to the sup-\\nposition of the infinity of both.\\n(3.) A fortiori, two infinite beings, one good, the\\nother evil, would be infinitely opposed to each other,\\nfor one would be infinitely good, the other infinitely\\nevil. Good and evil are contrasts, and infinite good and\\ninfinite evil are infinite contrasts. The contradiction,\\nif possible, deepens. The old puzzle is suggested. If\\nan irresistible force should encounter an immovable ob-\\nstacle, what would be the result? The supposition in-\\nvolves a contradiction, and is, therefore, impossible. If\\na force is irresistible, it can encounter no immovable ob-\\nstacle if an obstacle is immovable, it can be encountered\\nby no irresistible force. If a force be infinite, there can\\nbe no infinite force opposed to it. The supposition is\\nimpossible that an infinite good force could be resisted\\nby an infinite evil force. Consequently, there cannot\\nbe two ultimate principles, one of good, the other of\\nevil.\\n(4.) Whatever exists eternally exists by necessity.\\nIf it be true that a being who necessarily exists is in-\\nfinite 1 we would have upon the supposition of two co-\\n1 For an elaborate argument upon this point see Howe s Living\\nTemple,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0052.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 41\\neternal beings two infinite beings, and that hypothesis\\nhas already been convicted of absurdity.\\n(5.) The doctrine of a duality of ultimate beings\\ncontravenes the fundamental faith of the human mind\\nin an infinite Being. Unless that faith be delusive\\nand if it is, our mental constitution is a source of false-\\nhood there cannot be, for reasons already specified,\\nmore than* one eternal Being.\\nIt does not fall within the scope of this discussion to\\nshow how the co-existence of moral good and evil con-\\nsists with the supposition of one infinite, eternal Being.\\nIt is sufficient to have presented reasons which appear\\ninsuperable against the old Manicha?an hypothesis of a\\nduality of ultimate moral beings.\\nTo return now to our inductive argument: Every\\nsoul is conscious of moral obligation, and that fact neces-\\nsarily infers a law-giver, ruler and judge. This again\\nsupposes a Being who is possessed of universal authority,\\nuniversal knowledge and almighty power. More than\\none such being, we have seen, there cannot be for uni-\\nversal dominion, omniscience and omnipotence are\\ncharacteristics of an infinite Being and it is contradic-\\ntory to suppose more than one such Being. AYe have\\nreached our point of ultimate unity we have been con-\\nducted to God, the First Moral Cause, the First Moral\\nSubstance. He who produces moral beings must be a\\nCause possessed of the attribute of morality, and we are\\nby our mental constitution impelled to infer a Sub-\\nstance to whom that attribute belongs. We arrive at a\\nFundamental Moral Being, and, unable to go further,\\nwe bow down and adore.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0053.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "43 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\n(3.) Look at the soul as religious.\\nFirst, man is naturally religious. Of course, the term\\nreligious is here used in its broadest sense, as designating\\na native element of the human constitution, without\\nreference to the rightfulness or wrongfulness of its ex-\\nercise. Man s nature was made to worship, and if\\nthrottled by speculation will still cry out for gratifica-\\ntion in this direction. Rather than not worship, men\\nidealize the objects of nature, the persons they love, or\\neven their consciously imperfect selves, and sublimate\\nthem into deities. The feeling of dependence, the dread\\nof evil, the craving for protection, and the profound\\naesthetic emotions demand a deity to whom supplication\\ncan be addressed and homage paid.\\nSecondly, even in those nations in which the popular\\nmind, following poetic myths, has peopled every wood\\nand mountain, every river and sea, with divinities,\\npolytheism has never commended itself to the philo-\\nsophical intellect. Reflection has always tended to the\\naffirmation of one supreme Intelligence. The religious\\nthinkers of mankind have sought for unity in the ob-\\nject of worship.\\nThirdly, this postulate of the reflective intellect is\\ngrounded in the deepest principles of human nature,\\nand the necessary progression of the human faculties.\\nTor, in the first place, the fundamental principle of\\ncausality requires one First Cause as the explanation\\nof the world of contingent and finite effects. In the\\nsecond place, the sense of obligation imbedded in our\\nmoral nature necessarily leads to one supreme Law-\\ngiver, Governor and Judge. In the third place, it is un-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0054.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 43\\nnatural to suppose that the will is obliged to act in con-\\nformity with many superior wills. One must be ra-\\ngarded as supreme many sovereigns is out of the ques-\\ntion. In the fourth place, the heart must of necessity\\nlove one object supremely; and as the religious nature\\nabsorbs the perceptions of the true furnished by the un-\\nderstanding, the convictions of the right given by the\\nconscience, and the affection for the beautiful, the\\nlovely, the glorious felt by the heart, and gathers them\\nall up into its own sublime unity, it seeks a correspond-\\ning unity in the being whom it loves and adores a\\nunity which collects into itself all that is apprehended\\nas true and right, all that is good, beautiful and glori-\\nous, projected to transcendent, to infinite perfection.\\nIt offers its incense of worship rw dew dpcarofieytaTw.\\nWhat is true of one soul is true of all souls. The\\nworship of all supposes in the Being worshipped the\\npossession of omniscience and omnipotence. That is,\\nhe must be infinite, and as there cannot be more than\\none such Being, we are also conducted by this line of\\ninquiry to ultimate unity.\\nHaving attempted to indicate the process by which\\nwe arrive at an ultimate principle of unity in the\\nspiritual system, intellectual, moral and religious, let\\nus\\nII. Notice the operation of this process in the mate-\\nrial system.\\nThe method by which, in the spiritual sphere, we\\nhave been led to the discovery of ultimate unity holds\\nas well in the material. External perception acquaints\\nus with the phenomena of the world around us. They", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0055.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "44 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nare innumerable, but many, if not most of them, so far\\nforth as this earth is concerned, exist in the form of\\ngiven syntheses, groups of phenomenal properties, and\\nthese, in accordance with a tendency of our minds, we\\nproceed to analyze, and are induced by a fundamental\\nlaw of our constitution to refer to substances of which\\nthey are manifestations, and which constitute to each\\nof these groups respectively a bond of unity. Here we\\nreach subordinate unity at the first stage of our in-\\nquiries. What is true of each one of these separate col-\\nlections of phenomenal qualities holds also of that larger\\ncollection, that complex totality of phenomena which\\nwe call the world. It is capable of being resolved into\\nits component substances, as by synthesis we group them\\ninto its grand unity of complexity. And as for each\\none of these constituent substances to which we refer\\nphenomenal properties as their point of unity, we de-\\nmand a cause, so for the world as a whole. We are not\\nsatisfied with the conclusion that it is uncaused any\\nmore than with a similar conclusion in regard to the\\nsubstances which enter into its composition. Shall we\\nsay that these substances and the world itself which is\\ncomposed of them are self -generated, are spontaneously\\nproduced It is not necessary to adduce a metaphysi-\\ncal proof of the untenableness of this hypothesis, how-\\never incontrovertible that proof may be; we need not\\nappeal to the argument that to make a thing both cause\\nand effect at one and the same time involves a contra-\\ndiction. The experiments of physical science have them-\\nselves, as is confessed, settled the question whether there\\nis in nature such a thing as an absolute commencement;", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0056.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 45\\nthe hypothesis of spontaneous generation has upon\\ngrounds of observation been frankly relinquished.\\nBut there are forces of nature which reveal their ex-\\nistence by their effects. May not the substances which\\nexist be caused by these physical forces Or, may not\\nthe substances and the forces coincide !Now were these\\nsuppositions admissible, and there is no proof that they\\nare, we would still be confronted by the inevitable in-\\nquiry, What is their cause? The supposition of their\\nspontaneous generation would be attended with the same\\ndifficulty as opposes that of the spontaneous generation\\nof material substances, and would be confessed to be\\nfatal upon the hypothesis that substances and forces are\\nthe same. What, then, is their cause? Are there as\\nmany causes as there are forces It is admitted by Mr.\\nHerbert Spencer, the philosophical exponent of the ag-\\nnostic school, that the diverse forces of nature are spe-\\ncial manifestations of one central force, and that this\\ncentral force is infinite and eternal. Mr. Frederic Har-\\nrison has found fault with Mr. Spencer for granting the\\nexistence of but one infinite and eternal force was it\\nbecause he feared that the admission leaned too much\\ntowards theism But it would be contradictory to sup-\\npose the existence of more than one infinite and eternal\\nforce. Here, then, we have unity allowed, and not only\\nthe unity of the multifarious phenomena of this world,\\nbut the unity of all worlds. For an infinite force must\\nbe conceded to operate upon the whole universe. I have\\nno disposition to controvert Mr. Spencer s position, so\\nfar as it establishes the unity of the material system.\\nIt lies in the very direction in which this discussion", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0057.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "46 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntends. The considerations already presented in connec-\\ntion with the intellectual and moral systems show that\\nMr. Spencer s infinite force is but the power in exercise\\nof an Infinite Spirit, the intelligent, moral, personal\\nFirst Cause and First Substance, from whom the uni-\\nverse is not necessarily evolved, but by whom it was\\nfreely produced.\\nApart, however, from this important concession of\\nthe great agnostic, the question arises, Why, in the re-\\ngression of inquiry, we are not conducted to more than\\none ultimate principle as accounting for the material\\nsystem Why one only\\n1. The constitution of the human mind determines it\\ntowards unity. This is a fundamental law. Unity is an\\nultimate category. The mind cannot be satisfied until\\nunity is reached.\\n2. Each separate line of investigation conducts to\\nunity why not all combined The presumption is a\\npowerful one in favor of an ultimate principle which ac-\\ncounts for all existence. Self-consciousness leads us\\nthrough the diverse phenomena, mental and moral, of\\nthe soul to the unity of the soul itself. If external con-\\nsciousness reveals many souls, a kindred process con-\\nducts to a supreme Spirit as the one cause of them all,\\na supreme Law-giver, Ruler and Judge, to whom all are\\nalike accountable. So with the diversified phenomena\\nof matter: one world, one Cause. And as there are\\nmany worlds, analogy of procedure produces the con-\\nviction of one Cause for these many worlds. This pre-\\nsumption is enhanced by the evidence, first, that one law\\nof attraction seems to prevail in all and binds them into", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0058.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "The End of Philosophy. 47\\na harmonious whole; secondly, that the materials com-\\nposing them, so far as known, by the spectroscope, for\\nexample, are alike. One plan infers one planning mind.\\n3. The argument is resistless, founded upon the uni-\\nversally admitted axiom What is predicable of all the\\nparts is predicable of the whole. All matter is finite.\\nFor if some be finite and that is demonstrated by ex-\\nperience no matter can be infinite. Otherwise we\\nwould have infinite matter plus finite, which would be\\na contradiction. We are obliged, therefore, to postu-\\nlate a cause outside of the finite series to account for its\\nbeginning. If there were many causes, they would be\\nfinite; for they would limit and condition each other,\\nand consequently could not be infinite. Each of these\\nwould be an effect, and must have had a cause for its\\nbeginning. We strike the path of an infinite regression\\nof causes and effects which is absurd. The same axiom\\nwould hold in regard to such a series all the parts are\\nfinite, therefore the whole is finite. We must get a\\ncause outside of these causes which is not itself finite.\\nSuch a cause must be infinite. But more than one in-\\nfinite cause would imply a contradiction, since recipro-\\ncal limitation would be the result. We reach, therefore,\\none Infinite Cause. Now, cause necessarily supposes\\npower a cause without energy, potential or active,\\nwould be a contradiction. But power is an attribute.\\nInfinite power infers an infinite Being of whom it is an\\nattribute. We reach One Ultimate Principle prin-\\ncipium essendi the Eirst Cause and the First Sub-\\nstance.\\n4. The fundamental law of belief in the infinite", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0059.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "48 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nnecessitates belief in one Ultimate, Infinite Being.\\nKant has denied that the existence of a concept is a\\nguarantee of the objective reality of the thing con-\\nceived. Very true but the existence of a fundamental\\nlaw of belief is in a different category. It must guar-\\nantee real existence, else our nature is fundamentally\\nfalse. In this respect I must subscribe to such illus-\\ntrious thinkers as Anselm, Descartes, Leibnitz and\\nCousin. True, the fundamental law of belief needs to\\nbe elicited from latency and developed into formal ex-\\npression by the conditions of experience, but when those\\nconditions obtain, it necessarily utters itself in the posi-\\ntive affirmation of a First Cause, who is the First Sub-\\nstance. The name of God is inscribed with his own\\nfinger upon the foundation stones of the human consti-\\ntution, and the light of experience reveals it. Every\\npower of the soul, from its deepest recesses, cries out for\\nGod, and cannot be appeased until it finds him; and\\nfinding him, the soul grasps the principle of ultimate\\nunity. Philosophy has touched her coveted goal; her\\naspirations are satisfied, and speculation is transmuted\\ninto praise.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0060.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "CONSCIOUSNESS:\\nWITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SIR WILLIAM\\nHAMILTON S VIEWS.\\nTHE design of these remarks is to maintain the po-\\nsition, that consciousness is the faculty or power\\nof immediate knowledge; or, in other words, that it is\\nthe complement of internal and external perception\\nthe presentative faculty.\\nI. There is no dispute worth speaking of in regard\\nto the question whether consciousness is the immediate\\nknowledge of the internal, subjective phenomena of our\\nown souls. By immediate knowledge is meant the know-\\nledge of that which is now and here present to us. Of\\nthe phenomenal activities the facts now and here\\npresent of our inward being as contrasted with the ex-\\nternal world of phenomena, it is, on all sides, admitted\\nthat we are conscious. We immediately know them.\\nBut what is denominated internal perception is exactly\\nthe same thing. Perception gives us the knowledge of\\nwhat is now and here present to us internal perception,\\nof the phenomenal facts of our subjective being which\\nare now and here present to us. We are conscious of\\nthem, we perceive them, we immediately know them,\\nthese affirmations are one and the same. The language\\nis different, the thing asserted is identical.\\n49", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0061.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "50 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nII. The second question is, Have we by consciousness\\nan immediate knowledge of the external world If we\\nhave, consciousness, immediate knowledge, and percep-\\ntion, in relation to the external world, are proved to be\\none and the same. If we have not, consciousness and\\nexternal perception are proved to be different.\\nThere are two theories which are here encountered\\nthat of representative perception, and that of Reid, which\\nmakes a distinction between the act by which we per-\\nceive the external world and the consciousness of that\\nact. Of each in the order in which they have been\\nstated.\\nThe theory of representative perception has been va-\\nriously termed hypothetical realism, hypothetical dual-\\nism and cosmothetic idealism. It is denominated rep-\\nresentative perceptionism because it holds that the per-\\nception of the external world is mediated through a\\nmental image which represents it; hypothetical realism\\nor hypothetical dualism, because it hypothecates the real\\nexistence of an external world different from the know-\\ning subject upon a vicarious image in the mind; cos-\\nmothetic idealism, because it posits the external world,\\nthe cosmos, by means of an ideal representation.\\nThe masterly argument of Sir William Hamilton in\\nopposition to this theory appears to me to be irrefrag-\\nable, so far as it goes, with the exceptions that, incon-\\nsistently with his own principles, he concedes the con-\\nsciousness of the act by which we perceive the external\\nworld, and that he represents the external object of\\nvisual perception to be modified by the mind, and to be\\nin contact with the bodily organism. If his view be cor-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0062.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 51\\nrect that in perceiving the external world we are con-\\nscious of it, the concession excepted to, would involve the\\nposition that we are conscious of an act of conscious-\\nness. But of that more anon. The other exception it is\\nnot material to this discussion to signalize. Holding\\nthat, with these exceptions, the argument is convincing,\\nI take leave to refer to it, and at the same time venture\\nto add some considerations which tend in the same direc-\\ntion.\\n1. One great difficulty urged by the representative\\nperceptionist against natural realism is, that it is im-\\npossible that spirit can be brought into such a relation\\nto matter as to suppose the immediate cognition of the\\nlatter. To this it may be replied, that the argument\\nproves too much since it involves the denial of the in-\\ntuition of matter by the divine Spirit. On the suppo-\\nsition that the substance of matter is not identical with\\nthe substance of God, the question must arise in regard\\nto God s knowledge of matter as different from himself.\\nAs it is well-nigh universally admitted that his know-\\nledge is intuitive, and not mediate, whatever inability\\nthere may be on our part to comprehend the relation\\nbetween him and matter, we must admit his immediate\\nknowledge of it. The argument therefore proves too\\nmuch, and is, consequently, invalid. But if we concede\\nthe possibility of the immediate knowledge of matter\\nby him who is a pure Spirit, what difficulty is there in\\nallowing an immediate knowledge of it by the human\\nspirit\\n2. It is assumed, that as cognition is an immanent, and\\nnot a transitive act of the mind, to suppose the mind to", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0063.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "52 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nact immediately upon matter is to suppose it to act out\\nof itself and that would be contradictory to the nature\\nof knowledge and absurd. But why, it may be an-\\nswered, should not the mind act where itself is not?\\nIs it less active than matter is deemed to be One body\\ninfluences another body by the attraction of gravitation,\\nalthough the two are not in contact, but may be at a\\ngreat distance apart. Now, either the force of gravity\\nis a property of matter or of spirit. If the former, the\\ndenial to spirit of the power to act upon what is not part\\nof itself, reduces it in the scale of being to a place in-\\nferior to that of matter, which is absurd. If the latter,\\nit is granted that spirit can act upon matter, and act\\nupon it immediately. If so, the ground of the difficulty\\nis removed.\\n3. It is contended that in order to the immediate\\ncognizance of matter by mind the two should be analo-\\ngous substances.\\n(1.) The argument used above, derived from God s\\nknowledge of material things, also applies here. Is\\nthere an analogy between the infinite Spirit and matter\\n(2.) The position necessarily leads to monism. God\\ncannot act upon matter if it be different from himself\\nas a Spirit. He and the universe are one substance.\\nPure idealism or pure materialism is the inevitable re-\\nsult. Upon this principle the hypothesis of representa-\\ntive perception is utterly illogical. Matter could no\\nmore act upon spirit than spirit can be cognizant of\\nmatter. There is no inter-action possible. Whence\\nthen the representative image If it be a mental modi-\\nfication, how does it bring the mind into a near relation", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0064.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 53\\nto matter It is mind still, and the gulf is not bridged.\\nIf it be material, bow does a thing so destitute of analogy\\nto mind get into the mind If it be neither spiritual\\nnor material, but a tertium quid different from both\\nmind and matter, what, in the name of sense, is it?\\nThe only answer is, Quid\\n4. It may be contended that the existence of a rep-\\nresentative image is not an hypothesis which is framed\\nto account for the fact of an external world, but that it\\nis delivered as a fact by consciousness and the fact of a\\nrepresenting image being given, we must infer the thing\\nrepresented, as when we see an image reflected in a mir-\\nror we infer the existence of the object which caused\\nthe reflection. To this it is replied\\n(1.) If an appeal be taken to the common sense of\\nmankind to determine what the deliverance of conscious-\\nness is, the answer would be to the fact of an external\\nworld.\\n(2.) Consciousness delivers the fact of a mental mod-\\nification when a mental modification exists, and in those\\ncases in which the external object is not now and here\\npresent to our facilities, delivers also the fact of a convic-\\ntion or belief that the vicarious image truly represents a\\npast event or an absent object. But when the external\\nobject is now and here related to our faculties, conscious-\\nness does not deliver to us the fact of an image which\\nrepresents the object, but the object itself. We are no\\nmore conscious of a representing image than we are, in\\nan act of visual perception, of the image of the object\\nupon the retina of the eye. The hypothesis of repre-\\nsentative perception obliterates the distinction between", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0065.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "54 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nperception and the imagination. They become the same\\nfaculty, sustaining different relations at one time to the\\npresent, and at another time to the past or the future,\\nor the absent, or the possible, object.\\n(3.) Our belief that the image reflected in a mirror\\nsupposes an object which causes the reflection will, upon\\nexamination, be found to rest upon experience. If we\\nhad never discovered the fact by observation that the\\nappearance in the mirror was simply a reflection, we\\nwould believe that appearance to be an underived phe-\\nnomenon a real object, and not an illusion. So is it\\nwith children and animals, until their first impressions\\nare corrected. Thus, on the supposition that we medi-\\nately apprehend an external object through its image\\nmirrored in the mind, we could never know the repre-\\nsentative character of the image, without having first\\nbeen cognizant of the object imaged. We may be con-\\nscious of an image as a fact, but we could never know it\\nas an image of something else, without first having\\nknown that which is imaged. Representative knowledge\\npre-supposes, and is grounded in, presentative. How\\ncan that be re-presented which was never presented\\nWe cannot image anything of which, in whole or in part,\\nwe have had no previous intuition. The wildest fancies\\nof the poet, the lunatic, the dreamer, are but compounds\\nof intuitions or percepts. To adopt the hypothesis of\\nrepresentative perception, consequently, is to suppose a\\nknowledge without foundation or reason to put the\\nchild before the mother, the effect before the cause. This\\nsingle consideration is fatal to that hypothesis.\\nThis conclusion, which was reached independently of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0066.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "The Eatuke of Consciousness. 55\\nHamilton s discussion of the question, is clenched by an\\nargument, in which he proves that the representative\\nperceptionist reasons in a circle. On this theory/ he\\nremarks, we do not know the existence of an external\\nworld, except on the supposition that that which we do\\nknow truly represents it as existing. The hypothetical\\nrealist cannot, therefore, establish the fact of the ex-\\nternal world, except upon the fact of its representation.\\nThis is manifest. We have, therefore, next to ask him,\\nhow he knows the fact that the external world is actually\\nrepresented. A representation supposes something rep-\\nresented, and the representation of the external world\\nsupposes the existence of that world. E ow, the hy-\\npothetical realist, when asked how he proves the reality\\nof the outer world, which, ex hypothesis he does not\\nknow, can only say that he infers its existence from the\\nfact of its representation. But the fact of the repre-\\nsentation of an external world supposes the existence of\\nthat world; therefore, he is again at the point from\\nwhich he started. He has been arguing in a circle. There\\nis thus a see-saw between the hypothesis and the fact\\nthe fact is assumed as an hypothesis the hypothesis ex-\\nplained as a fact each is established, each is expounded\\nby the other. To account for the possibility of an un-\\nknown external world, the hypothesis of representation\\nis devised and to account for the possibility of represen-\\ntation, we imagine the hypothesis of an external world.\\nTo put the case more sharply When we ask the rep-\\nresentative perceptionist, How do you know the ex-\\nistence of the external world he answers, Through a\\nmental image which represents it. When we ask him,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0067.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "56 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nHow do you know that the image is representative he\\nreplies, Because there is an external world which it rep-\\nresents. He knows the external world as existing be-\\ncause it is represented; he knows it as represented be-\\ncause it exists.\\nI cannot forbear appending a condensed statement of\\nanother of Hamilton s arguments which he puts in the\\nform of dilemmas\\nEither the mental image represents a real external\\nworld, or it does not. If it does not, the result is pure\\nidealism. But as that is abjured by the representative\\nperceptionist, the first alternative must be accepted.\\nThe question, then, is, What determines the mind to\\nrepresent the external world which, ex hypothesis it does\\nnot immediately perceive\\nNow, again, either the mind blindly determines it-\\nself to this representation, or, it is determined by some\\nintelligent cause different from itself. The former sup-\\nposition is irrational. The mind would represent that\\nof which it knows nothing, and that would violate all\\nthe laws of representation. The latter supposition im-\\nplies a supernatural and miraculous element. But this\\nis unphilosophical, provided a simpler explanation is\\npossible. Tha t is furnished by natural realism, which\\naccepts the datum of consciousness that we immediately\\nknow the external world as a phenomenal reality.\\nIf the hypothesis of representative perception be dis-\\ncarded, we are shut up to the doctrine of an immediate\\nperception of the external world. For there are only\\ntwo conceivable alternatives: either we mediately, or\\nwe immediately, know the external world. If the latter", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0068.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 57\\nbe true, perception is its immediate knowledge. There\\nis no other power to which that knowledge can be at-\\ntributed.\\nThe remaining question is, whether in perceiving the\\nexternal world we are conscious of it. Reid maintained\\nthe view that we are conscious, not of the external ob-\\nject itself, but of the act of perception by which we im-\\nmediately know it that is, he held that consciousness\\nis limited to mental phenomena. The argument of Sir\\nW. Hamilton in opposition to this view is twofold:\\nFirst, the knowledge of relatives is one: in being con-\\nscious of one term of the relation perception, we must\\nbe conscious of the other term the object perceived;\\nsecondly, we could not in consciousness discriminate an\\nact of perception by which we know a certain object\\nfrom another act of perception by which we know a dif-\\nferent object, unless at the same time we were conscious\\nof the object itself which impresses a specific type, a\\nparticular denomination, upon the perceiving act. How\\notherwise, for example, could we be conscious of the\\nperception of a man as contradistinguished to the per-\\nception of a horse were we not also conscious of the man\\nand of the horse\\nConcerning these arguments of Hamilton I would say\\nthat they are valid if regarded as ad hominem that is,\\nas founded upon the supposition of Reid and his fol-\\nlowers, that there is a difference between the act of per-\\nception and the consciousness of that act. But upon\\nHamilton s own principles they must be considered un-\\nnecessary, and as appearing to concede the truth of the\\ndoctrine that perception of the external world and con-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0069.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "58 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nsciousness of it are not one and the same. Granted that\\nthe hypothesis of representative perception is incorrect,\\nthe true answer to the Reidian position is that in per-\\nceiving the external world we are conscious of it that\\nthe act of external perception is the act of consciousness.\\nThis view is enforced by Hamilton s principles and by\\nthe nature of the case.\\n1. Hamilton held that consciousness and immediate\\nknowledge are convertible, A collection of sentences\\nscattered through his lectures will sufficiently evince\\nthis fact. I may here also observe, that, while all phil-\\nosophers agree in making consciousness an immediate\\nknowledge, some, as Reid and Stewart, do not admit\\nthat all immediate knowledge is consciousness. Con-\\nsciousness is an immediate knowledge of the present.\\nWe have, indeed, already shown that consciousness is\\nan immediate knowledge, and, therefore, only of the\\nactual or now-existent. Consciousness and immediate\\nknowledge are thus terms universally convertible; and\\nif there be an immediate knowledge of things external,\\nthere is consequently the consciousness of an outer\\nworld. Perception, or the consciousness of external\\nobjects, is the first power in order Is our per-\\nception, or our consciousness, of external objects medi-\\nate or immediate As, according to Hamilton, per-\\nception is an immediate knowledge of the external world,\\nso must be consciousness, with which he uses perception\\nconvertibly.\\nJSTow, if we are conscious of the perceiving act, Ave are\\nconscious either of a mediate knowledge of the external\\nworld, or of an immediate knowledge of it. If of a", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0070.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 59\\nmediate knowledge, the whole doctrine of Hamilton and\\nof the Scottish school is contradicted. The hypothesis\\nof representative perception is admitted. If of an\\nimmediate knowledge, it follows that we immediately\\nknow that we immediately know the external world.\\nFor consciousness is an immediate knowledge, and so is\\nperception. To be conscious that we perceive is, there-\\nfore, immediately to know an act of immediate knowl-\\nedge. But this is inadmissible, for\\n(1.) It would be excluded by the law of Parcimony.\\n(2.) We would have a regression of acts of immediate\\nknowledge ad infinitum. For if one act of immediate\\nknowledge may be known by another act of immediate\\nknowledge, so may that other act. We could never reach\\nan ultimate act. It is true that Ave may immediately\\nknow an act of mediate knowledge, but the same is not\\ntrue of an act of immediate knowledge. It is autopistic,\\nor rather self -revealing. We cannot go behind it. And\\nthis is perfectly clear upon Hamilton s principles, for\\nwe have seen that he uses consciousness and perception\\nconvertibly. If, then, w T e may be conscious of an act of\\nperception, we may be conscious of an act of conscious-\\nness, and we would strike a regression of conscious-\\nnesses an absurdity which no man has more emphati-\\ncally condemned than Hamilton himself.\\n(3.) If we are conscious of an act of perception, we\\nwould have a percept of a percept. For it is on all hands\\nadmitted that consciousness is a perception of our sub-\\njective phenomena. A subjective phenomena, therefore,\\nof which we are conscious, or which we perceive, is a\\npercept. But the act of perception by which we ap-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0071.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "60 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nprehend the external world is a subjective phenomenon\\nof which we are conscious, or which we perceive, and is,\\ntherefore, a percept. At the same time it terminates\\nupon an external object as its percept. It is manifest,\\ntherefore, that if we are conscious of a perceiving act,\\nwe would have a percept of a percept, which is absurd.\\nTo put the case differently, we would have a perceiving\\nact terminating upon a perceiving act, For an act of\\nconsciousness is a perceiving act, and the perception of\\nan external object is also a perceiving act. To be con-\\nscious, therefore, of the perceiving act is to have a per-\\nceiving act terminating upon a perceiving act as its ob-\\nject a perception of a perception, which is absurd.\\nThe argument might be pursued farther, but enough\\nhas been said to show that upon the supposition of the\\nfalsity of the hypothesis of representative perception,\\nexternal perception, by which we immediately know the\\nexternal world, and consciousness are one and the same,\\nso far as relation to that world is concerned that is,\\nconsciousness also includes the perception of the inner\\nworld.\\nThe conclusion, consequently, has been reached, that\\nconsciousness,- as the complement of internal and exter-\\nnal perception, is the faculty of immediate knowledge,\\nor, briefly, the presentative faculty.\\nIII. To this view sundry objections may be urged:\\n1. It may be objected that it is novel and exceptional.\\nBut, were this objection pertinent, it would not be proved\\nthat the view is, on that account, untrue. Unless ulti-\\nmate truth in every department of psychological inquiry\\nhas been attained, it might happen that even a new con-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0072.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "The !N atuee of Consciousness. 61\\nelusion would be true. The objection, however, does not\\nlie, except in the sense that it is false. Sir W. Hamil-\\nton again and again makes express statements, and still\\nmore frequently gives implicit intimations, which in-\\nvolve the doctrine here maintained. The fact that he\\ndid not formulate it in so many words, and that some-\\ntimes his utterances conflict with it, cannot invalidate\\nhis substantive maintenance of it. The conclusion\\nenunciated in this discussion is really the logical result\\nof his views. It was to be expected that as he over and\\nover asserts the convertibility of the terms, conscious-\\nness, perception and immediate knowledge, some one\\nwould come after him, who, agreeing with him in that\\nrespect, would formally take the ground that conscious-\\nness, perception and immediate knowledge are one and\\nthe same.\\n2. It may be objected, that the spheres of conscious-\\nness and perception are not coincident, that conscious-\\nness does what perception does not, or vice versa. This\\ncould only be substantiated were the differentiating cir-\\ncumstances pointed out, by which one is distinguished\\nfrom the other. Until that is clearly done, the objection\\nhas hardly a nominal value. Stat nominis umbra. I\\nconfess to an inability to detect the peculiar quality.\\n3. It will be objected by those who maintain Hamil-\\nton s position upon that point that the view here con-\\ntended for makes consciousness a special faculty. Ham-\\nilton had, in the nineteenth century, no superior as a\\nphilosopher, and deserves to be held in profound admi-\\nration for his imperial genius and his massive erudi-\\ntion; nor need it detract from his brilliant reputation", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0073.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "62 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nto perceive that he sometimes enunciated views that are\\ninconsistent with each other. Perhaps no thinker has\\never lived who was always self -consistent, or who fore-\\nsaw all the consequences that could be logically deduced\\nfrom his doctrines, some of which would have been re-\\njected by him had they been brought to his attention.\\nLocke, could he have forecast the logical use which was\\nmade of some of his principles by Condillac and the\\nFrench encyclopaedists, and of others in an exactly op-\\nposite direction by Berkeley and ultimately by Hume,\\nwould have modified statements from which, on the one\\nhand, sensationalism and materialism could be devel-\\noped, and, on the other, idealism and scepticism. Could\\nJonathan Edwards, who indignantly denied that God\\nwas the proximate producer of sin, have seen his specu-\\nlations in regard to philosophical necessity in the hands\\nof Emmons logically employed to prove that blasphemy,\\nfalsehood and theft are due to the efficiency of God he\\nmight have endeavored to render impossible a result\\nwhich his piety abjured. And if Sir William Hamil-\\nton himself, who held to faith in God, could have antici-\\npated that from his persistent adherence, even under\\nchallenge, to a technical phraseology which denied the\\nknowledge of the Infinite, there would spring the athe-\\nistic doctrine of the utter unknowableness of God, he\\nwould probably have recoiled from the exaltation of im-\\nmediate knowledge as the only proper knowledge, and\\nthe depression of mediate as scarcely worthy of the\\nname. A history of the inconsistencies and shortsight-\\nedness of great thinkers would afford a lesson suited to\\nhumble the pride of the human intellect.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0074.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "The Eatuke of Consciousness. 63\\nIn holding that consciousness is not a special faculty\\nHamilton was inconsistent with himself. Eegarcling\\nhim as, on the whole, teaching a true doctrine in relation\\nto the nature, office and authority of consciousness, and\\nas, in particular, presenting as able a defence of the\\nwrong doctrine in opposition to the view that conscious-\\nness is a special faculty as can be furnished, I shall at-\\ntempt to show that he is inaccurate, both in his didactic\\nstatements, and in his polemic argument, touching the\\nquestion.\\n(1.) Let us gather up some of his didactic statements.\\nConsciousness comprehends every cognitive act; in other\\nwords, whatever we are not conscious of, that we do not know.\\nWhatever division, therefore, of the mental phenomena may be\\nadopted, all its members must be within consciousness itself,\\nwhich must be viewed as comprehensive of the whole phenomena\\nto be divided; far less should we reduce it, as a special phe-\\nnomenon, to a particular class. Let consciousness, therefore,\\nremain one and indivisible, comprehending all the modifications\\nall the phenomena, of the thinking subject.\\nSuch is the highest or most general classification of the\\nmental phenomena, or of the phenomena of which we are conscious.\\nBut as these primary classes are, as we have shown, all included\\nunder one universal phenomenon the phenomenon of Conscious-\\nness it follows that Consciousness must form the first object of\\nour consideration.\\nConsciousness cannot be defined; we may be ourselves fully\\naware what consciousness is, but we cannot, without confusion,\\nconvey to others a definition of what we ourselves clearly appre-\\nhend. The reason is plain. Consciousness lies at the root of all\\nknowledge. Consciousness is itself the one highest source of all\\ncomprehensibility and illustration.\\nIs there any knowledge of which we are not conscious? Is\\nthere any belief of which we are not conscious? There is not\\nthere cannot be; therefore, consciousness is not contained under\\neither knowledge or belief, but on the contrary knowledge and\\nbelief are both contained under consciousness.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0075.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "64 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nWe know; and we know that we know: these propositions,\\nlogically distinct, are really identical; each implies the other.\\nThe attempt to analyze the cognition I know, and the cognition\\nknow that I know, into the separate energies of distinct faculties,\\nis therefore vain.\\nConsciousness is not one of the special modes into\\nwhich our mental activity may be resolved, but the fundamental\\nform the generic condition of them all. Every intelligent act is\\nthus a modified consciousness and consciousness a comprehensive\\nterm for the complement of our cognitive energies.\\nThese statements, taken by themselves, are not free\\nfrom ambiguity and indefiniteness but tho two which\\nfollow bring out into light the position of which we are\\nin quest. In antagonizing Reid s doctrine that we are\\nnot conscious of the external world, and in professedly\\nattempting to prove that consciousness is not a special\\nfaculty, Hamilton says: Is consciousness the genus\\nunder which our several faculties of knowledge are con-\\ntained as species or, is consciousness itself a special\\nfaculty coordinate with, and not comprehending, these V\\nHe maintains the former alternative. This is definite\\nenough. The other passage is as follows: We distin-\\nguish consciousness from the special faculties, though\\nthese are all only modifications of consciousness only\\nbranches of which consciousness is the trunk, etc. This\\nis also clear.\\nHamilton must be acquitted of the charge which has\\nbeen preferred against him, that he represents conscious-\\nness as a genus, including under it as species not only\\ncognitions, but feelings and volitions. His language is\\nso sweeping as apparently to justify this opinion. But\\nthis is not his meaning. He held that we cannot feel\\nwithout being conscious that we feel that we cannot will", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0076.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "The Eatttbe of Cois sciousiS ess. 65\\nwithout being conscious that we will. That, however,\\nis very different from reducing feeling and willing\\nunder the generic denomination of cognition. But it\\ncan hardly be disputed that he makes consciousness the\\ngenus under which every kind of cognition, nay, every\\ncognitive faculty, is included as a species. It is on this\\naccount that he refuses to consciousness the designation\\nof a special faculty, and claims for it a generic charac-\\nter. It is this doctrine which it is difficult to reconcile\\neither with his catholic teaching or with fact.\\nFirst, if consciousness be a genus under which the\\nspecial faculties of cognition are included the trunk\\nof which they are the branches, it follows that it is a\\ngeneric faculty; for to include faculties as species under\\na genus which is itself not a faculty would be inad-\\nmissible. Further, this being granted, the generic\\nfaculty, consciousness, as confessedly discriminated\\nfrom the feelings and the will (or, to use Hamilton s\\ndistribution, the conative powers), must be admitted to\\nbe a special faculty contained with them under the high-\\nest genus, the mind itself, the bond of unity of all the\\nmental faculties.\\nSecondly, if we confine the question rigidly within\\nthe sphere of cognition, of knowledge, it will still be\\nevident that consciousness must be regarded as a spe-\\ncial faculty. When Hamilton declares consciousness to\\nbe a genus containing under it all the faculties of know-\\nledge, he must mean either all the faculties of immediate\\nknowledge, or all the faculties of knowledge, immediate\\nand mediate.\\nIf all the faculties of immediate knowledge, the re-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0077.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "66 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nduction is, on his own principles, inconceivable, or\\nrather impossible. For there is no faculty of immediate\\nknowledge but consciousness. It is the sole, the ex-\\nhaustive specimen of immediate knowledge, as Mel-\\nchizedek, in the olden time, was the only occupant of his\\norder of priesthood. It is the solitary instance of pre-\\nsentative knowledge. It has already been proved that\\nit is the complement of internal and external perception.\\nThis Hamilton, as has been shown, explicitly admits.\\nThere is no dispute about the question, whether con-\\nsciousness and internal perception are one and the same\\nand upon the question, whether it is identical with ex-\\nternal perception, Hamilton, against Reid, maintains\\nthat it is in perceiving the external world we are con-\\nscious of it. It is, then, ex hypothesis impossible to re-\\nduce internal and external perception as powers of im-\\nmediate knowledge under consciousness as a genus and\\nif you could, the very reduction would demonstrate con-\\nsciousness to be a faculty of immediate knowledge spe-\\ncifically distinguished from the faculties of mediate\\nknowledge.\\nBut if it be insisted upon with Reid and Stewart, who\\nare in this respect exceptional thinkers, that conscious-\\nness and external perception are different, it would fol-\\nlow that as consciousness is universally admitted to be\\nan immediate knowledge of mental phenomena, and ex-\\nternal perception is by those philosophers affirmed to be\\nthe faculty by which we immediately know the external\\nworld, each would be a faculty of immediate knowledge,\\nterminating upon its own peculiar objects, and neither\\nwould contain the other under it. They would be sepa-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0078.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 67\\nrate, but co-ordinate faculties included under the\\ngeneric faculty of knowledge. Thus we would be again\\nshut up to the concession that consciousness is a special\\nfaculty.\\nIt is evident that there is no other power of immediate\\nknowledge which, as specific, can be contained under\\nconsciousness as generic. It is, in that sphere, itself\\nboth genus and species. It fills the ordo of immediate\\nknowledge. If one might be allowed to take an illus-\\ntration from the division of ecclesiastical offices, con-\\nsciousness is to immediate or presentative knowledge\\nwhat the deacon is to the distributing office. There is\\nno genus, distributing officers, under which he is con-\\ntained as species; there is no species, distributing of-\\nficers, which is contained under him as genus. He ex-\\nhausts the order of distribution.\\nIf by the affirmation, consciousness is the genus\\nunder which our several faculties of knowledge are con-\\ntained as species, all the faculties of immediate and\\nmediate knowledge are intended, the first obvious con-\\nsideration is that, if the preceding argument is valid,\\nimmediate knowledge must be excluded; and then the\\nonly question remaining is, Are the specific faculties of\\nmediate knowledge included under consciousness as a\\ngenus\\nThe very statement of this question enforces a nega-\\ntive answer. It is evident that knowledge is a genus\\ncontaining under it the species, immediate knowledge\\nand mediate knowledge. Here the generic attribute,\\nknowledge, is included in both the species, while they\\nare distinguished from each other by the qualities of im-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0079.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "68 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmediateness and mediateness. But it would be utterly\\nillogical to make immediate knowledge a genus contain-\\ning under it mediate knowledge as a species, since the\\ngeneric quality, immediacy, would be included in the\\nspecies, which would then be an immediate-mediate\\nknowledge; and that would invest the species with con-\\ntradictory qualities. Now, it is admitted by Hamilton\\nthat consciousness is immediate knowledge. Conse-\\nquently, it cannot contain under it faculties of mediate\\nknowledge. The reduction ought to be the generic cog-\\nnitive faculty, containing under it the species, faculty of\\nimmediate knowledge, and faculties of mediate know-\\nledge. The definition of consciousness then would be\\nthe faculty of immediate knowledge; knowledge being\\nthe generic quality, and immediate the specific differ-\\nence.\\nBut Hamilton contends that we cannot have mediate\\nknowledge accruing from a representation, a concept, a\\nbelief, without being conscious of the representation,\\nthe concept, the belief. Very true but the distinction is\\nbetween the means of knowing and the objects known.\\nBy means of a representation we know the thing repre-\\nsented, of a concept the thing conceived, of a belief the\\nthing believed. We know by consciousness the represen-\\ntation, the concept, the belief, for they are mental phe-\\nnomena, but we do not know by consciousness the things\\nrepresented, conceived, believed. Take his own posi-\\ntion knowledge is a relation. The relation between\\nconsciousness and the mental phenomena, representa-\\ntion, concept, belief, is immediate knowledge; the rela-\\ntion between these mental acts and their appropriate", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0080.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "The Eatuee of Consciousness. 69\\nobjects is mediate knowledge. Unless, then, immediate\\nknowledge can embrace mediate, consciousness cannot\\ninclude mediate knowledge. Let Hamilton s explana-\\ntion of memory serve as an example. We Lave a mental\\nimage of a past fact. We know the mental image by\\nconsciousness this is immediate knowledge. We know\\nthe past fact by the representative image. This is\\nmediate knowledge it is belief, not consciousness. The\\nknowledge is due to memory, not to consciousness it is\\nan act of representative, and not of presentative, know-\\nledge.\\nIt may be said and this is the only other supposition\\nI can conceive to be possible that though conscious-\\nness be not the mediate knowledge itself, yet we are con-\\nscious of the knowledge as a fact. But this cannot be\\nfor were we conscious of the knowledge, we would be\\nconscious of both terms of the relation implied in the\\nknowledge namely, the representing image and the\\npast fact represented. Hamilton holds that the know-\\nledge of relatives is one. He correctly contends, how-\\never, that we are not conscious of the past fact. If so,\\nwe are not conscious of the knowledge. The same in-\\ndivisible knowing subject knows the whole case in two\\nways presentatively and representatively distinct in\\nthemselves, but reduced to the unity of knowledge. And\\nthe spontaneous transition from the presentative to the\\nrepresentative act is so magically swift, that the distinc-\\ntion between the two can only be reflectively appre-\\nhended.\\nThe formula, I know and I know that I know are\\nthe same, needs to be seriously qualified. As unquali-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0081.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "70 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nfled it is not true. If immediate knowledge is meant,\\nthe formula amounts to this I immediately know that\\nI immediately know; I am conscious that. I am con-\\nscious. This, as tautological, is out of the question. I\\nimmediately know that I mediately know that would\\nhold good, under proper restrictions. For, I am con-\\nscious of a representation which guarantees a reality\\nout of consciousness I am conscious of a belief by which\\nI mediately know substance, occult force and God. But\\nif the meaning be, that my representative knowledge and\\nmy faith knowledge are the contents of consciousness,\\none is compelled to demur. Mediate knowledge cannot\\nbe a part of the contents of immediate. This conducts\\nus to the consideration of\\n(2.) Hamilton s polemic defence of his doctrine that\\nconsciousness is not a special faculty.\\nThere is really but one argument which he employs\\nto prove his point. It is, that in being conscious of any\\ncognitive act or operation we must be conscious of the\\nobject about which it is concerned. Let us hear his own\\nstatement of the case.\\nIf consciousness, says he, has for its object the cognitive\\noperations, it must know these operations, and, as it knows these\\noperations, it must know their objects: consequently, conscious-\\nness is either not a special faculty, but a faculty comprehending\\nevery cognitive act; or it must be held that there is a double\\nknowledge of every object first, the knowledge of that object by\\nits particular faculty, and second, a knowledge of it by conscious-\\nness, as taking cognizance of every mental operation. But the\\nformer of these alternatives is a surrender of consciousness as a\\ncoordinate and special faculty, and the latter is a supposition not\\nonly unphilosophical, but absurd. The whole question,\\ntherefore, turns upon the proof or disproof of this principle, that\\nto be conscious of the operation of a faculty is, in fact, to be", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0082.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "The Nature oe Consciousness. 71\\nconscious of the object of that operation; for if it can be shown\\nthat the knowledge of an operation necessarily involves the know-\\nledge of its object, it follows that it is impossible to make con-\\nsciousness conversant about the intellectual operations to the\\nexclusion of their objects. And that this principle must be ad-\\nmitted, is what, I hope, it will require but little argument to\\ndemonstrate.\\nThis argument, I shall endeavor to show, is contradic-\\ntory to Hamilton s principles, and in itself inconclusive.\\nFirst, the argument is from the universal to the par-\\nticular: All knowledge of an operation involves the\\nknowledge of its object consciousness is a knowledge of\\nan operation; therefore the consciousness of an opera-\\ntion involves the knowledge of its object. But it is evi-\\ndent that the term knowledge in the major premise is\\nequivocal. The meaning may be All immediate know-\\nledge of an operation involves the immediate knowledge\\nof its object; or, all immediate knowledge of an opera-\\ntion involves the mediate knowledge of its object. Let\\nus examine each alternative in the order stated.\\nAll immediate knowledge of an operation involves the\\nimmediate knowledge of its object. This is exactly the\\nsame as consciousness of an operation involves the con-\\nsciousness of its object, for Hamilton restricts immedi-\\nate knowledge to consciousness, maintains that there is\\nno other immediate knowledge than consciousness and\\nin this he is clearly right. The two propositions, there-\\nfore, are identical. One cannot be treated as universal,\\nthe other as particular. The class and the individual\\nasserted to be in it are one and the same. There is,\\ntherefore, no argumentative progress. There is simply\\nthe affirmation that consciousness or immediate know-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0083.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "72 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nledge of an operation involves the consciousness or im-\\nmediate knowledge of its object. The argument is\\nnaught; the affirmation remains to be proved. This is\\nreally Hamilton s position, and it can be disproved.\\nThe other alternative is, that all immediate knowledge\\nof an operation involves the mediate knowledge of its\\nobject. Now, since immediate knowledge and conscious-\\nness, according to Hamilton, are the same, the proposi-\\ntion amounts to this that consciousness of an operation\\ninvolves the mediate knowledge of its object. This is\\ntrue in the sense that consciousness of an operation\\nconditions and conduces to the mediate knowledge of its\\nobject. But, although this is exactly what Hamilton\\nuniformly teaches, it is not what he means here. He\\nmeans more. He expressly says, as we have seen If\\nconsciousness has for its object the cognitive operations,\\nit must know these operations, and as it knows these\\noperations, it must know their objects and also to\\nbe conscious of the operation of a faculty is, in fact, to\\nbe conscious of the object of that operation. Nothing\\ncould be more explicit. Consciousness not only condi-\\ntions the mediate knowledge of the object of every opera-\\ntion, but it involves it, comprehends it, coincides\\nwith it.\\nThis, then, is the principle for which Hamilton con-\\ntends in his polemic against Reid The consciousness of\\nan operation is the consciousness of its object. As he ap-\\nplies this principle to the concrete cases of perception,\\nimagination and memory, it behooves that each of these\\napplications should be considered and\\nIn the first place, as to external perception. The as-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0084.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 73\\nsertion, in this particular case, is, that the consciousness\\nof the operation of perception is the consciousness of\\nthe object perceived. This has already been criticised\\nin the foregoing discussion, and, therefore, little need\\nbe said about it now. There is no consciousness of the\\noperation of perception. Consciousness is precisely that\\noperation. Otherwise, as Hamilton s doctrine is that\\nwe are conscious of the external object, we would have\\na consciousness of a consciousness, which cannot be al-\\nlowed. The argument, as against Eeid, ought to have\\nbeen that in the very operation by which we perceive the\\nexternal object we are conscious of it. This position he\\ncould have sustained upon the ground of Reid s own\\ndoctrine in opposition to the hypothesis of representa-\\ntive perception namely, that nothing intervenes be-\\ntween the mind and the external object. For, upon the\\nsupposition that consciousness and perception are dif-\\nferent, it must be admitted, either that the operation of\\nperception intervenes between the conscious mind and\\nthe external object, or that the mind must pass through\\nthe state of consciousness to reach the operation of per-\\nception. On either hypothesis there would be no imme-\\ndiate knowledge of the external object.\\nThe question, then, upon Hamilton s principles is\\nnon-existent, whether the consciousness of the operation\\nof perception is the consciousness of the object of that\\noperation.\\nIn the second place, as to the imagination. The affir-\\nmation is, that in being conscious of an operation of the\\nimagination we are conscious of its object that is, in\\nbeing conscious of a mental image we are conscious of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0085.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "74 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe thing imaged. There are two cases in regard to\\nwhich this question may he raised: First, when we\\nimagine an object which has no reality, such as a hippo-\\ngryph or a centaur; secondly, when we imagine an ob-\\nject which has reality, such as a well-known city, or\\nriver, or mountain. Strangely enough, Hamilton con-\\nsiders only the first of these cases. Now, says he with\\nreference to this case, nothing can be more evident than\\nthat the object and the act of imagination are identical.\\nThus, in the example alleged, the centaur imagined and\\nthe act of imagining it are one and indivisible. That\\nis, as there is no objective reality answering to the\\nimage, the image is all. Of course, in being conscious\\nof the image we are conscious of the object imaged, for\\nthe image is the object imaged, the object imaged is the\\nimage. To say, then, that in being conscious of the\\nimage we are conscious of the object imaged, as though\\none act of knowledge involved, comprehended an-\\nother act of knowledge, would be the same as if one,\\ngazing upon the tower of London, should say In being\\nconscious of the tower I am conscious of the tower.\\nWhen a phenomenon is purely a subject-object, or\\npurely an object-object, to say that the consciousness\\nof it is the consciousness of its object, is to employ an\\nunmeaning affirmation.\\nBut it is pertinent to inquire, whether in being con-\\nscious of the image of a real thing we are conscious of\\nthe real thing itself. Hamilton does not argue this spe-\\ncial case. If he had done so, he might have urged that\\nthe knowledge of relatives is one therefore, in knowing\\nthe image we must know the real object imaged. Here", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0086.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "The Natuke of Consciousness. 75\\nthe ambiguity would have to be -unmasked. What know-\\nledge is spoken of Is it meant that having an immedi-\\nate knowledge of the image we have an immediate\\nknowledge of the object imaged That is not possible\\nfor imagination of an object supposes the object to be\\nnot now and here present, and immediate knowledge is\\nof an object now and here present. A contradiction\\nemerges for it is affirmed that immediate knowledge is\\nalways of an object now and here present, but that this\\nimmediate knowledge is of an object not now and here\\npresent. Now, what is true of immediate knowledge is\\ntrue of consciousness. It would, then, involve a contra-\\ndiction to say that in being conscious of an image now\\nand here present we are conscious of the object imaged,\\nwhich is not now and here present. There must be\\nsome other sense in which the maxim, the knowledge of\\nrelatives is one, is applicable.\\nThat other sense is, that in immediately knowing the\\nimage we mediately know the real object imaged. That\\nis true, and is undoubtedly Hamilton s doctrine, when\\nhe speaks apart from this criticism of Reid s hypothesis.\\nBut mediate knowledge is not consciousness. While,\\ntherefore, we are entitled to say, that in knowing the\\nimage we know the real object imaged, we cannot say\\nthat in being conscious of the one we are conscious of\\nthe other. That would be to make immediate knowledge\\nthe same as mediate, presentative knowledge the same\\nas representative.\\nA passage from Hamilton himself will confirm this\\nargument.\\nI call up, he remarks, an image of the High Church [a\\ncathedral edifice in Edinburgh]. Now, in this act, what do I", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0087.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "76 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nknow immediately or intuitively; what mediately or by repre-\\nsentation? It is manifest that I am conscious, or immediately\\ncognizant, of all that is known as an act or modification of my\\nmind, and, consequently, of the modification or act which con-\\nstitutes the mental image of the cathedral. But as, in this opera-\\ntion, it is evident that I am conscious, or immediately cognizant,\\nof the cathedral as imaged in my mind; so it is equally manifest\\nthat I am not conscious or immediately cognizant of the cathedral\\nas existing. But still I am said to know it; it is even called the\\nobject of my thought.\\nYes; but thought is a mediate knowledge. What,\\ntherefore, I mediately know by thought, I do not imme-\\ndiately know by consciousness. I am conscious of the\\nthought, not of the object thought.\\nIn the third place, as to the memory. Hamilton re-\\nfutes Eeid s position that memory is an immediate\\nknowledge of the past. But Hamilton contends that con-\\nsciousness and immediate knowledge are convertible.\\nTherefore, one would infer we cannot be conscious of\\nthe past. How, then, can Hamilton hold that conscious-\\nness, as a generic faculty, includes a knowledge of past\\nobjects remembered? But does he hold this? Let us\\nhear him.\\nIf, he observes, our intellectual operations exist only in\\nrelation, it must be impossible that consciousness can take cogni-\\nzance of one term of this relation, without also taking cognizance\\nof the other. Knowledge, in general, is a relation betiveen a sub-\\nject knowing and an object known, and each operation of our\\ncognitive faculties only exists by relation to a particular object\\nthis object at once calling it into existence, and specifying the\\nquality of its existence. It is, therefore, palpably impossible that\\nwe can be conscious of an act without being conscious of the object\\nto which that act is relative. This, however, is what Dr. Reid and\\nMr. Stewart maintain. They maintain that I can know that I\\nknow without knowing what I know or that I can know the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0088.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 77\\nknowledge without knowing what the knowledge is about; for\\nexample, that I am conscious of perceiving a book without being\\nconscious of the book perceived that 1 am conscious of remem-\\nbering its contents, without being conscious of these contents\\nremembered and so forth. The unsoundness of this opinion must,\\nhowever, be articulately shown, etc.\\nHere Hamilton puts, unaccountably puts, perception\\nand memory upon the same footing. We perceive the\\ncontents of a book, therefore we are conscious of them.\\nMost certainly for the contents of the book are now and\\nhere before us. We gaze upon them we have an in-\\ntuition, an immediate, a presentative knowledge of\\nthem. Likewise, argues Hamilton, we remember the\\ncontents of a book, therefore we are conscious of them.\\nMost certainly not, for the contents of the book are not\\nnow and here present. We do not gaze upon them we\\nhave not an intuitive, an immediate, a presentative\\nknowledge of them; therefore, we are not conscious of\\nthem. What we are conscious of is the mental repre-\\nsentation of the contents of the book, and through that\\nrepresentation we know, not presentatively and imme-\\ndiately, but representatively and mediately, those con-\\ntents; we are not conscious of them. That Hamilton\\nhimself maintained this view will be evinced by the fol-\\nlowing passage, extracted from the very discussion in\\nwhich he attempts to show that consciousness is not a\\nspecial faculty\\nWhat are the contents of an act of memory? An act of mem-\\nory is merely a present state of mind, which we are conscious of,\\nnot as absolute, but as relative to, and representing, another state\\nof mind, and accompanied with the belief that the state of mind,\\nas now represented, has actually been. I remember an event I\\nsaw the landing of George IV. at Leith. This remembrance is", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0089.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "78 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nonly a consciousness of certain imaginations, involving the con-\\nviction that these imaginations now represent ideally what I\\nformerly really experienced. All that is immediately known in\\nthe act of memory is the present mental modification; that is,\\nthe representation and concomitant belief. Beyond the mental\\nmodification we know nothing; and this mental modification is\\nnot only known to consciousness, but only exists in and by con-\\nsciousness. Of any past object, real or ideal, the mind knows and\\ncan know nothing, for, ex hypothesi, no such object now exists; or\\nif it be said to know such an object, it can only be said to know it\\nmediately, as represented in the present mental modification.\\nThis is a convincing statement, and it makes the\\nexplicit declaration that, in heing conscious of an opera-\\ntion of memory, we are not conscious of the object of\\nthat operation. If this be so, what of the thesis con-\\ntended for that consciousness of the operation of any\\ncognitive faculty involves the consciousness of its ob-\\nject\\nMight Hamilton have intended by the object of an\\noperation to designate not the really existing external\\nobject, but the object as subjectively contained in the\\nmental representation the object representing the real\\nexternal object represented? This supposition is op-\\nposed by the fact that he applied the principle to per-\\nception, and it -is perfectly certain that he did not hold\\nthat in the operation of perception there is contained a\\nmental object representing the real external object.\\nThink of the prince of natural realists holding such a\\nview Further, if that supposition is made concerning\\nthe representative faculties, it could not relieve the dif-\\nficulty. For the subjective object contained in the\\nmental operation is the whole ideal matter of the opera-\\ntion. It is impossible to separate between the repre-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0090.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "The Natuke of Consciousness. 79\\nsentative operation and the ideal, representing object,\\nThey are identical. To say, then, that in being con-\\nscions of the operation we are conscious of its object,\\nwould be to say that in being conscious of the operation\\nwe are conscious of the operation. That surely would\\nnot prove consciousness to be a generic and all-compre-\\nhending faculty\\nThe possible supposition, that Hamilton may have\\nmeant that we are conscious of the mediate knowledge\\nfurnished by the operation of a faculty of mediate know-\\nledge, has already, to some extent, been considered. Let\\nus now test it by the mediate knowledge of the Infinite,\\nof God. Can we be conscious of that knowledge Hamil-\\nton contends that we cannot think God, as infinite.\\nOf course, then, we cannot be conscious of him, as in-\\nfinite. But he also holds that we mediately know him,\\nas infinite. How We believe in him, as infinite. Xow,\\nof this belief, as a mental phenomenon, we are conscious.\\nDoes it follow that we are also conscious of the mediate\\nknowledge itself It is clear that this knowledge can-\\nnot exist without involving its object. The object is the\\nvery thing about which it is concerned. The Infinite\\nBeing to speak reverently is its object-matter. Think\\naway that, you annihilate the knowledge. To be con-\\nscious of the knowledge, therefore, is to be conscious\\nof God, as infinite. But that Hamilton denies, and justly\\ndenies. Hence, consciousness of the belief, as an act or\\noperation which is phenomenal, does not involve a con-\\nsciousness of the knowledge which it furnishes.\\nLet us come down to the finite, and also test Hamil-\\nton s position by. belief in human testimony. We read", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0091.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "80 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe Commentaries of Caesar. We believe the testimony,\\nand have a mediate knowledge of the facts reported.\\nNow three things happen. First, we have, as grounded\\nupon the author s descriptions, representative images\\nof the battles as past facts. Through them we have a\\nmediate knowledge of those facts. Are we conscious of\\nthe battles Have we a conscious knowledge of them\\nNo. We are conscious only of the representations\\nthrough which we mediately know. Secondly, we be-\\nlieve in the existence of Julius Caesar. In this case, we\\ncan have no trustworthy representative image. Our\\nknowledge of Csesar is furnished by a belief mediated\\nthrough testimony. Are we conscious of the knowledge\\nof the great commander If so, as he is the object-\\nmatter of the knowledge, we are conscious of Caesar.\\nThat is out of the question, if the knowledge that con-\\nsciousness furnishes is immediate, presentative, intui-\\ntive. Is Julius Caesar now and here present to us He\\nis not even imaged. He is believed in. Thirdly, those\\nwho have never been at Rome know the city, but not\\nthrough a representative image of a thing formerly pre-\\nsented. I never saw Rome. Yet it is at present exist-\\ning. Were I to visit it I would be conscious of it. Now\\nI am not even conscious of an image of it. How, then,\\ndo I know its existence Believing in testimony I\\nmediately know it. I am conscious that I thus believe,\\nthat I thus mediately know Rome. I am not conscious\\nof the knowledge itself, for I am not conscious of Rome,\\nits object-matter; and will probably never be conscious\\nof it, as I never expect to go Romeward Here, then,\\nwe have past events, a non-existent person, and an ex-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0092.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "The Nature of Consciousness. 81\\nisting place, of neither of which we have conscious\\nknowledge. Our knowledge is a faith-knowledge medi-\\nated through testimony.\\nThe last defence which may be resorted to is, that\\nthere is a distinction between a conscious knowledge and\\na consciousness of knowledge. This, however, is an\\nincompetent distinction, for the reason that wherever\\nconsciousness exists there are but two terms conscious-\\nness itself and the object of consciousness and the rela-\\ntion between the two is knowledge, which can be no other\\nthan consciousness. To say that there may be a con-\\nsciousness of a knowledge without conscious knowledge\\nis to say that there may be a knowledge of a knowledge\\nwithout a knowledge of the object of knowledge.\\nTo take opposite ground from that which has been in\\nthis discussion maintained is to make consciousness the\\ngeneric cognitive faculty; that is, the reason or intelli-\\ngence, and to attribute to it all the functions of cogni-\\ntion. It would be distributable into the faculty of im-\\nmediate knowledge, the faculty of mediate knowledge,\\nand the faculty of laws or first principles. It would, by\\nvirtue of this reduction, immediately know, and would\\nalso represent, think, and believe. This cannot be true\\nif consciousness is the faculty or power of immediate\\nknowledge and that it is, is Hamilton s doctrine a doc-\\ntrine which can be established upon solid grounds of\\nreason. On this supposition, it cannot be true, for, it is\\nclear that the essence of the genus, immediate know-\\nledge, could not descend into such species, said to be con-\\ntained under, it as representative knowledge, thought-\\nknowledge, and faith-knowledge.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0093.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "82 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nIs there, then, any knowledge, possessed by us, of\\nwhich we are not conscious The answer is None, of\\nwhich it cannot be said that we are conscious that we\\nknow; much, very much, of which it can be said that\\nwe are not conscious of what we know. In his sweeping\\ndenial of this Hamilton s consistency and discrimina-\\ntion alike failed him. He confounded consciousness\\nwith mediate knowledge. We cannot, it is true, be con-\\nscious without being conscious of the object known in\\nconsciousness but we can mediately know, without be-\\ning conscious of the object mediately known such as\\ncause, substance, occult force, infinity, God. Other-\\nwise, we would have a double knowledge of objects medi-\\nately known namely, a mediate knowledge of them by\\nthe particular faculties appropriate to them, and an im-\\nmediate knowledge of them by consciousness a thing\\nwhich Hamilton himself pronounces not only unphil-\\nosophical, but absurd. Either consciousness is one kind\\nof knowledge, or it comprehends all kinds of knowledge.\\nIt cannot be both. Hamilton affirms that it is both. Be-\\ntween the contradictories I am compelled to elect that\\nwhich makes consciousness a specific knowledge, and\\nreject that which makes it generic. The one indivisible,\\npersonal subject which knows, knows immediately\\nand knows mediately. It were folly to postulate two\\nspecific kinds of knowledge, and reduce them to unity\\nupon one of the species as generic. Both authenticate\\nthemselves, resting ultimately upon the trustworthiness\\nof that fundamental nature, which is at once the pro-\\nduct of God, and the expression of his veracity. We are\\nconscious, we represent, we think, we believe, all these", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0094.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "The Eatuke of Consciousness. 83\\ncognitive processes are brought into unity upon the\\ngeneric faculty of cognition, and the validity of them all\\nis guaranteed by faith in the immutable truth of him\\nwho created the human soul.\\nBefore this discussion is closed two things must be\\nsignalized\\n1. Although it has been maintained that conscious-\\nness is a specific, and not a generic, faculty of cognition,\\nit is not intended that, strictly speaking, it is to be coor-\\ndinated as a species with the specific faculties of repre-\\nsentation, thought, and belief but rather as the faculty\\nof immediate knowledge, with the faculty of mediate\\nknowledge, the latter being distributable into the special\\nfaculties of mediate knowledge the representative fac-\\nulty, the thinking faculty, the believing faculty.\\n2. While it has been contended that consciousness is\\nnot a generic faculty, comprehending all the other facul-\\nties, of cognition it is also maintained that, as the fac-\\nulty of immediate, presentative, intuitive knowledge\\nthe complement of internal and external perception, it\\nsustains a catholic relation to all the others. It is the\\ngeneric condition of their operations. It is the faculty\\nof experience, the original observer, the office of which\\nis to furnish the materials which are employed by the\\nother faculties. It is to them what psychology and\\nphysical science are to philosophy. It explores the\\nfields of the inner and outer worlds, investigates, notes\\nand registers facts. It is, indeed, the organ of the\\npsychologist and the scientist. As i mm ediate know-\\nledge it is the condition necessary to the development of\\nall mediate knowledge.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0095.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "84 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nThe conclusion has thus been reached that conscious-\\nness and perception are one and the same that they are\\ndifferent names for the same special faculty the\\nfaculty of immediate or presentative or intuitive know-\\nledge, sustaining a common relation to all the other\\nfaculties, and furnishing the necessary condition of their\\noperation.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0096.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.\\nrFl HE authority of consciousness depends upon its\\nJL trustworthiness, and the question of its trust-\\nworthiness resolves itself into the question of its verac-\\nity.\\nWhen we speak of the authority of consciousness, two\\nthings are included: first, the authority of conscious-\\nness as the immediate knowledge, the perception, of\\nphenomenal facts, internal and external secondly, the\\nauthority of the necessary inferences derivable from\\nthose facts. These inferences are given in conscious-\\nness, are testified to by it as facts, but the authority of\\nthe inferences themselves rests upon the fundamental\\nlaws of thought and belief. These laws are, in the first\\ninstance, beneath consciousness. They are developed\\ninto activity by the empirical conditions furnished by\\nconsciousness. They then formally express themselves\\nin the necessary inferences derived from the data of\\nconsciousness. The inferences are the explicit evolu-\\ntion into actual thoughts and beliefs of what was pre-\\nviously contained implicity in the phenomenal facts of\\nconsciousness. The authority of consciousness, there-\\nfore, is comprehensively the authority of both the phe-\\nnomenal facts delivered and the inferences logically de-\\nducible from them.\\n85", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0097.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "86 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nThe question is similar to that of the authority of the\\nBible. Of its express statements we are conscious. As\\nfacts they are authoritative, but the good and necessary\\nconsequences which are deducible from the explicit state-\\nments of the Scriptures are of equal authority with the\\nstatements themselves.\\nI proceed briefly to indicate the proofs of the veracity,\\nand consequently the authority of consciousness, con-\\nsidered in this comprehensive sense.\\n1. There can, from the nature of the case, lie no ap-\\npeal from the clear deliverances of consciousness. If\\nwe take such an appeal, it must be made to another con-\\nsciousness, or to nothing. If to a second consciousness\\ndeeper and more authoritative than the first, we are\\nagain compelled to appeal to a third for confirmation of\\nits data. It is plain that we strike the path of a regres-\\nsion of consciousnesses which must be ad infinitum. As\\nthis is absurd, nothing is left us. but to rely upon the\\nfirst clear deliverances of consciousness as possessed of\\ndecisive authority.\\n2. Consciousness is the testimony of God in our na-\\nture. It is fundamental, and it must be admitted by all\\nbut professed atheists that the foundations of our mental\\nconstitution were laid by our Maker. If, then, con-\\nsciousness could be supposed to lie, we would suppose\\nthat it was intended by God to lie that our nature was\\nconstructed by him as an organ of falsehood. This is\\ncontradictory to all our apprehensions of the divine\\ncharacter. To say that our nature may have been the\\nproduct of a malign creator would be to adopt the old\\nManichsean absurdity, and to contradict the principles of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0098.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "The Authobity of Consciousness. 87\\ntheism principles which are enforced by reason itself.\\nRejecting that hypothesis, we must believe that our na-\\nture was created by the God of truth and, as conscious-\\nness is a radical power of that nature, that it expresses\\nthe veracity of God that it is his testimony uttered by\\nour mental constitution.\\n3. If consciousness could be false, the root of our\\nnature would be falsehood. We would be radical liars.\\nThe whole development of our constitution would be in\\nthe direction of falsehood. To advocate such a view\\nwould be to approve lying as a natural and therefore\\njustifiable habit a procedure which the moral sense of\\nmankind would not tolerate, ISTor can it relieve the dif-\\nficulty to take the ground that consciousness may not\\nalways, but only sometimes, deceive. For if it were\\nfalse in one respect, it would be universally untrust-\\nworthy. A prevaricating witness can never be trusted\\nfalsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.\\n4. The practice of mankind, the structure and rela-\\ntions of society, the business and conduct of every-day\\nlife, all depends upon and suppose the veracity of con-\\nsciousness. This is, in itself, sufficient to settle the ques-\\ntion. Even the nihilist could not carry out any plan\\nupon a contrary supposition.\\n5. If the testimony of consciousness were false, all\\nground of certainty would be gone. All beliefs and doc-\\ntrines would be reduced to absolute indifference. Why\\nshould Hume have argued to prove the perfect absence\\nof certitude from human knowledge? Were not, ac-\\ncording to his hypothesis, his own grounds of argument\\ndestitute of all certainty? He refuted his own scepti-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0099.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "88 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ncism. The veracity of consciousness gone, the whole\\nfabric of human knowledge is demolished, as well scien-\\ntific as philosophical, religious as natural. For\\n(1.) Observation through the senses the organ of\\nscience is alone trustworthy, because founded on the\\nveracity of consciousness.\\n(2.) This is still more obvious in regard to phil-\\nosophy. If it canot rely upon consciousness, it could\\nhave no beginning, and what is called philosophy would\\nhave an end. It would be zero.\\n(3.) The same is true of religion. So far as it is\\nnatural, it is grounded in the testimony of conscious-\\nness in regard to the facts of our religious nature, and so\\nfar as it is supernatural, it supposes the deliverances of\\nconsciousness as to the evidences of divine revelation, and\\nits trustworthiness as to the statements of the Scriptures.\\n6. Ultimately, our reliance upon consciousness, as\\nthe immediate knowledge of phenomenal existence, is\\ngrounded in a law of belief imbedded in the very founda-\\ntions of our mental structure. To doubt its veracity,\\ntherefore, would be to discredit the fundamental prin-\\nciples of our nature. We would doubt ourselves, we\\nwould doubt everything. Universal scepticism would\\nresult; all ground of the certainty of knowledge would\\nbe swept away. The vacuity of nihilism would remain\\nnot even a vast and howling wilderness, for there\\nwould be no wilderness, and if there were, there would\\nbe nothing to make it howl. Hamilton remarks truly\\nA fact of consciousness is thus, that whose existence\\nis given and guaranteed by an original and necessary be-\\nlief.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0100.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "The Authority of Consciousness. 89\\n7. So far I have been able heartily to subscribe to\\nwhat Hamilton has delivered in regard to the authority\\nof consciousness but there is one of his positions which\\ndoes not command my assent, if I have correctly appre-\\nhended it. He will be allowed to state it in his own\\nwords. In his Lectures he says\\nThe facts of consciousness are to be considered in two points\\nof view; either as evidencing their own ideal or phenomenal exist-\\nence, or as evidencing the objective existence of something else\\nbeyond them. A belief in the former is not identical with a\\nbelief in the latter. The one cannot, the other may possibly, be\\nrefused. In the case of a common witness, we cannot doubt the\\nfact of his personal reality, nor the fact of his testimony as\\nemitted; but we can always doubt the truth of that which his\\ntestimony avers. So it is with consciousness. We cannot possibly\\nrefuse the fact of its evidence as given, but we may hesitate to\\nadmit that beyond itself of which it assures us. I shall explain\\nby taking an example. In the act of External Perception, con-\\nsciousness gives, as a conjunct fact, the existence of Me or Self as\\nperceiving, and the existence of something different from Me or\\nSelf as perceived. Now the reality of this as a subjective datum\\nas an ideal phenomenon, it is impossible to doubt without doubting\\nthe existence of consciousness, for consciousness is itself this fact;\\nand to doubt the existence of consciousness is absolutely impos-\\nsible; for as such a doubt could not exist, except in and through\\nconsciousness, it would, consequently, annihilate itself. We should\\ndoubt that we doubted. As contained as given, in an act of con-\\nsciousness, the contrast of mind knowing and matter known cannot\\nbe denied.\\nBut the whole phenomenon as given in consciousness may be\\nadmitted, and yet its inference disputed. It may be said, con-\\nsciousness gives the mental subject as perceiving an external\\nobject, contradistinguished from it as perceived; all this we do\\nnot, and cannot, deny. But consciousness is only a phenomenon;\\nthe contrast between the subject and the object may be only\\napparent, not real; the object given as an external reality may\\nonly be a mental representation, which the mind is, by an unknown\\nlaw, determined unconsciously to produce, and to mistake for", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0101.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "90 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nsomething different from itself. All this may be said and be-\\nlieved, without self-contradiction; nay, all this has, by the\\nimmense majority of modern philosophers, been actually said and\\nbelieved.\\nThe same distinction is thus maintained in his Notes\\nto Reid:\\nThere is no skepticism possible touching the facts of con-\\nsciousness in themselves. We cannot doubt that the phenomena\\nof consciousness are real, in so far as we are conscious of them.\\nI cannot doubt, for example, that I am actually conscious of a\\ncertain feeling of fragrance, and of certain perceptions of color,\\nfigure, etc., when I see and smell a rose. Of the reality of these,\\nas experienced, I cannot doubt, because they are facts of conscious-\\nness; and of consciousness I cannot doubt, because such doubt\\nbeing itself an act of consciousness, would contradict, and, conse-\\nquently, annihilate itself. But of all beyond the mere phenomena\\nof which we are conscious, we may without fear of self-contra-\\ndiction, at least doubt. I may, for instance, doubt whether the\\nrose I see and smell has any existence beyond a phenomenal exist-\\nence in my consciousness. I cannot doubt that I am conscious of\\nit as something different from self; but whether it have indeed\\nany reality beyond my mind whether the not-self be not in truth\\nonly self that I may philosophically question. In like manner, I\\nam conscious of the memory of a certain past event. Of the\\ncontents of this memory, as a phenomenon given in consciousness,\\nskepticism is impossible. But I may by possibility demur to the\\nreality of all beyond these contents and the sphere of present\\nconsciousness.\\nThe language here employed is not perfectly clear, at\\nleast not so clear as to exclude all uncertainty touching\\nHamilton s meaning. It may be said that he distin-\\nguishes between the possibility and the validity of doubt\\nin regard to the things which consciousness testifies to.\\nWhile it is possible to doubt in relation to these things,\\nit is not legitimate to entertain the doubt. It is possible,\\nbut not valid. The possibility of such doubt, it is urged,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0102.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "The Authoeity of Consciousness. 91\\nis proved by the fact that so many philosophers have\\nactually indulged it. This, however, is not conclusive.\\nThe question is in regard to the mind in its regular\\ncondition, and in the normal exercise of its faculties.\\nThere have been some who professed to doubt their own\\nexistence, and, of course, the existence of consciousness\\nitself. If possibility of doubt be made the measure of\\nuncertainty, all things are uncertain the existence of\\nourselves, of the universe, of God. Absolute scepticism\\nis not impossible, for there have been avowed Pyrrhon-\\nists in modern as well as in ancient times.\\nA mind that violates its own laws may do anything,\\nmay adopt the wildest and most senseless vagary. The\\ngrotesque fancy of centaurs resulted in the belief of an\\nactual battle between Hercules and those impossible ex-\\nistences. What is impossible to a sane mind is possible\\nto an insane; and the argument is not concerned about\\npossibilities to a disordered intellect. A man may pre-\\ntend to deny the existence of the external world, but if\\nhe persist, in the attempt to accomplish the impossible,\\nthe conclusion must be that, like Fichte, he will be to\\nhimself but the dream of a dream. One may doubt\\nhis inability to fly to the moon, but he would only prove\\nthat in that respect he is a lunatic. It is true that it is\\npossible for him to doubt his inability to perform the\\nfeat, but only as, quoad hoc, a crazy man.\\nTo say, then, that it is impossible to doubt the fact\\nthat consciousness testifies, but possible to doubt that to\\nwhich it testifies, is to take a position concerning which\\nthere may be dispute. The distinction between the cer-\\ntainty of the existence of consciousness and the certainty", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0103.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "92 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof its deliverances vanishes, if the existence of conscious-\\nness itself is susceptible of doubt. This, however, does\\nnot seem to be all that Hamilton s language conveys. It\\nimplies that the knowledge of the things to which con-\\nsciousness testifies is less certain than the knowledge\\nthat consciousness actually testifies. The degree of cer-\\ntainty is less in one case than in the other. This sup-\\nposes that the testimony delivered by consciousness is\\nnot attended with the highest degree of certainty. It\\nis against this position that objection is now offered.\\n(1.) Consciousness never infers. It is the occasion\\nof numerous and most important inferences itself never\\nproduces them. It is not an inferring faculty. It is at\\nthis point that Hamilton, usually the sure-footed ana-\\nlyst, trips. He grounds the possibility of doubt in re-\\ngard to the testimony of consciousness in the supposi-\\ntion that it is sometimes inferential. We may not doubt\\nthe phenomenal contents of consciousness, but we may\\nthe inferences from those contents. In the act of ex-\\nternal perception, he says, consciousness gives, as a\\nconjunct fact, the existence of me or self as perceiving,\\nand the existence of something different from me or\\nself as perceived. Now the reality of this, as a subjec-\\ntive datum, as an ideal phenomenon, it is impossible to\\ndoubt, without denying the existence of consciousness,\\nfor consciousness is itself this fact. This he clearly\\nproves, and then goes on to observe: But the whole\\nphenomenon as given in consciousness may be admitted,\\nand yet its inference denied. This means, as he pro-\\nceeds to explain, that the direct testimony of conscious-\\nness to the phenomenon is undeniable, but its inferential", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0104.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "The Authority of Consciousness. 93\\ntestimony that the phenomenon is external to the me or\\nself is disputable. The direct testimony is to the phe-\\nnomenal existence, the indirect or inferential is to the\\ndistinction between the Ego and the external world, to\\nthe antithesis between the subject knowing and the ob-\\nject known. This accords with the special view which\\nhe elsewhere maintains, that in every act of external per-\\nception, a judgment is furnished by consciousness af-\\nfirming a contrast between the mind and the material\\nobject.\\nSir William s doctrine of the nature and office of con-\\nsciousness cannot be harmonized with this position, and\\nit is a doctrine which is characterized by truth, and\\nplaces the Scottish philosophy as expounded by himself\\nin advance of previous systems. Consciousness is equiva-\\nlent to immediate knowledge; it is the faculty of pre-\\nsentative knowledge. Its office, its sole office, is to give\\nphenomena. It is the observer of facts. This being\\nits province, it never thinks, judges, compares, reasons.\\nConsequently inference, both mediate and immediate,\\nlies out of its field. This must be made by other powers,\\nby the faculties of thought and belief. Hamilton is not\\nconsistent with himself in admitting that the inference\\nof the distinction between the self and an external ob-\\nject is furnished by consciousness. That judgment ac-\\ncompanies the testimony of consciousness to the phe-\\nnomenal facts of the mind and those of matter, but is\\nnot the product of consciousness itself. The judgment,\\nin the form of a special, immediate inference, is en-\\nforced by a fundamental law of belief, an a priori prin-\\nciple of our mental constitution, developed into exercise", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0105.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "94 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nby the conditions of consciousness that is, by the em-\\npirical knowledge of phenomenal facts afforded by con-\\nsciousness.\\nIf, therefore, it were conceded to Hamilton that this\\ninference, and others like it, may possibly be doubted,\\nthat would not affect the authority of consciousness as\\nabsolutely trustworthy in all its testimony concerning\\nphenomenal facts. Hamilton s general doctrine holds\\ngood, without exception, that it is impossible to doubt\\nthe testimony of consciousness to a phenomenal fact\\nwithout doubting the existence of consciousness itself.\\nFor how is it possible to apprehend consciousness itself\\nas a fact without apprehending the object of which we\\nare conscious. Annihilate the object, you annihilate\\nconsciousness. Consciousness is an actual, not a poten-\\ntial, knowledge. It is immediate knowledge actually ex-\\nisting. Think away the object immediately known, you\\nthink away the immediate knowledge.\\nIt remains, therefore, that the knowledge of the things\\nto which consciousness testifies is of the same degree of\\ncertainty as the knowledge of the fact that conscious-\\nness testifies. The authority of consciousness, in its\\nsphere of immediate knowledge, is unimpeachable it\\nis absolute.\\n(2.) While it is true that the inferences derived from\\nthe facts presented in consciousness are not made by\\nconsciousness, but by other faculties, we are entitled not\\nonly to affirm the certainty of the knowledge which con-\\nsciousness directly communicates, but to hold that good\\nand necessary inferences from the facts of conscious-\\nness are of equal validity with the facts themselves. The", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0106.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "The Authoeity of Consciousness. 95\\nknowledge attending these necessary inferences, al-\\nthough mediate, is possessed of certainty equal to the\\nimmediate knowledge involved in consciousness. It is\\na maxim of the highest value, and one universally ad-\\nmitted, that necessary inferences from original proposi-\\ntions or facts are of equal validity and authority with\\nthe propositions or facts from which they are derived.\\nIn this class must be placed the inference from the phe-\\nnomenal facts presented in consciousness to the ex-\\nistence of our souls, of the material universe, and of\\nGod. The knowledge thus attained is the consumma-\\ntion of conscious, immediate knowledge, the crown and\\nglory of its development. By faith we climb up the\\nladder of consciousness, with its foot on earth, to God,\\nto heaven, to immortality.\\n8. The inquiry may be raised whether the veracity of\\nconsciousness may not have been impaired by the fall\\nof man into sin. It may be said that, although the\\nessential constituents of his nature were not destroyed\\nby the fall, they were impaired, and that consciousness\\nmay have shared in the damage that was inflicted by the\\nrevolutionary force of sin. This, I think, cannot be\\nmaintained.\\n1. The fact of sin could not discharge man from his\\nobligation to obey God. The sense of legal obligation\\ncould not be obliterated. Otherwise the perception of\\nguilt would have been destroyed. But the divine Ruler\\ncould not have left himself without a witness in the\\nhuman constitution. That witness is precisely conscious-\\nness. It bears true testimony to the fact of crime, and\\nthus justifies the retributive measures of the divine gov-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0107.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "96 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nernment to the transgressor himself, measures which,\\nwithout such a testimony, would have only the force of\\nmechanical inflictions.\\n(2.) Whether what is done by man be right or wrong,\\nconsciousness as the unerring observer certifies the fact.\\nA witness may lie upon the stand, but his consciousness\\ntells the truth in bearing witness to the lie as a fact.\\nConscience, through the influence of a false understand-\\ning or of corrupt emotions, may render a wrong decision\\nin a concrete case, but consciousness testifies to the wrong\\ndecision as a fact.\\nThe fall obliterated from man s nature the separate\\nquality of holiness, but the essential power of conscious-\\nness remained as the knowledge of sin. It survived the\\nstorm which wrecked the spiritual qualities of the soul,\\nan unerring witness alike to the guilt of man and the\\njustice of God. This alone could ground the conviction\\nin the breast of transgressors that their punishment is\\ninflicted in righteousness. Take away the veracity of\\nconsciousness, and you remove the fidelity of memory,\\nand so the procedures of violated law and penal justice\\nwould be reduced to the arbitrariness of mere brute\\nforce. They might crush, but they could not convince.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0108.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM\\nTHIS title is here adopted in order to align the\\ntheory with other forms of idealism. The theory\\nis also designated by the following names Representa-\\ntive perception, hypothetical realism, and hypothetical\\ndualism. The reason for these different titles was fur-\\nnished in a preceding discussion. The arguments of Sir\\nWilliam Hamilton in refutation of this theory I regard\\nas masterly and convincing. It is now proposed to pre-\\nsent a condensed statement of his arguments, with oc-\\ncasional interpolated notes, which will he indicated hy\\nsquare brackets, and to add some reflections of my own.\\nI. It is urged that nothing can act where it does not\\nexist therefore the mind cannot immediately act upon\\nmatter. The immediate cognition of matter is impos-\\nsible. Hence there must be an intervening something.\\nAnswer\\n1. Consciousness testifies to our immediate percep-\\ntion of matter. Its incomprehensibility makes nothing\\nagainst this deliverance.\\n2. The objection proves too much, and is, therefore,\\nworthless.\\n(1.) It would make the termination of volition on\\nour muscular organism impossible. But consciousness\\nand facts alike affirm it.\\n97", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0109.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "98 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\n(2.) It would prove all action and re-action in the\\nuniverse impossible. That, also, is contradictory to\\nfacts. It would limit each thing to the sphere of its\\nown existence.\\n3. The objection, while denying transitive efficiency\\nto mind, concedes it to matter. The ideal image is the\\nresult of the projection of the material object into the\\nmind, or at least of some influence of that object. The\\ntwo must come together in some way, and the cosmo-\\nthetic idealist assigns more activity to matter in ef-\\nfecting the mysterious junction than to mind, which is\\nabsurd.\\nII. It is contended that mind and matter are sub-\\nstances of the most opposite nature; but what immedi-\\nately knows must be of a nature analogous to that which\\nis known. Answer\\nThe latter assumption is purely gratuitous, and, there-\\nfore, needs no labored refutation. We know nothing, a\\npriori, of the capacities of mind. But our a posteriori\\nexperience contradicts the assumption that mind, as out\\nof analogy to matter, cannot immediately cognize it.\\nThe testimony of consciousness is clear upon this point.\\nIII. It is urged that mind can only know immedi-\\nately that to which it is immediately present but as ex-\\nternal objects cannot come into the mind, nor the mind\\ngo out to them, they can be known only mediately\\nthrough some representative object whether that object\\nbe in the mind and of it, or in the mind but not of it.\\nThere have been several methods of meeting this ob-\\njection\\n1. It has been denied that external objects cannot", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0110.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM. 99\\ncome into the mind; that is, it has been affirmed that\\nthe j may come into the mind. [This Hamilton pro-\\nnounces absurd, and so brushes it aside along with Ser-\\ngeant s argument: I know the very thing; the thing is,\\ntherefore, in my act of knowledge that act is in my un-\\nderstanding; therefore the thing is also.]\\n2. It has been asserted that the mind actually goes\\nout to the external object. Vision, it has been held, is a\\nperceptive emanation from the eye. This was a doctrine\\nof Empedocles, the Platonists, the Stoics, Alexander the\\nAphrodisian, Euclid, Ptolemy, Galen and Alchindus.\\nLord Monboddo pushed it out to absurdity: The mind\\nmust exist where it acts it acts beyond the body there-\\nfore it exists out of the body in the distant object.\\n[Hamilton only states the hypothesis.]\\n3. The view has been held, as by Reid and Stewart,\\nthat though the mind neither sallies out to the external\\nobject, nor does it intrude into the mind though they\\nare not present to each other the agency of God comes\\nin to effect an immediate perception by the mind of the\\nexternal object. This is almost identical with the Car-\\ntesian doctrine of occasional causes or divine assistance.\\nAnswer\\n(1.) This is a mere hypothesis, not a statement of\\nfact.\\n(2.) It assumes an occult principle it is mystical.\\n(3.) It is hyperphysical brings in a deus ex machina.\\n(4.) It is out of harmony with Reid and Stewart s\\ndoctrine of an immediate perception of the external\\nworld. [Here Hamilton introduces his own view as to\\nthe external object which is immediately perceived, in\\nLoire.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0111.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "100 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\norder to show that the doctrine of the immediate percep-\\ntion of the external world is not unintelligible. What-\\never may be thought of this view, it does not contribute\\nanything to the solution of the philosophical riddle, how\\nthe mind conies in contact with external objects. The\\nchasm is not bridged. The bodily organism is matter,\\nhowever near the mind it is held to be.\\nHere also Hamilton argues against the localization of\\nthe mind. But it makes no difference whether it be\\nseated at a point of the brain or occupy the whole body.\\nIf it be in the body, it is localized. Either the soul is\\nsomewhere or it is nowhere. If somewhere, it is in a\\nplace; if nowhere, it is non-existent. The Deity alone\\nis in no place that is, as contained in it or restricted to\\nit. The doctrine of the illocalitas of spirit is unin-\\ntelligible. It certainly is not, as finite, ubiquitous. Pass\\nwith as much speed as possible from point to point of\\nspace, it must, at any given instant of time, be at a cer-\\ntain point and nowhere else. Is not that to be local-\\nized\\nIV. Hume s view was that external objects are only\\nimages. A table, for example, diminishes as we recede\\nfrom it with our gaze fixed upon it. This is answered\\nby referring to the real object perceived that is, one in\\ncontact with the organ of sense. [I have grave doubts in\\nregard to the competency of this answer of Hamilton s,\\nand venture to suggest another. Let a man be stationed\\nat the table, while another recedes from it. To him who\\nkeeps his stand at the table it retains its bulk unchanged.\\nIt cannot, therefore, actually diminish. The explana-\\ntion is to be found in the laws of light and vision. The", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0112.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM. 101\\nillustration given proves it absurd to hold that the ex-\\nternal object perceived really changes with our dis-\\ntance from it. It is impossible that the table could be to\\none man actually of one size and to the other actually of\\nanother. To say that the table is but an image to both\\nmen will not answer, for if a third man should dash the\\ntable to pieces with a hammer, there would be no im-\\npact of the hammer upon the image and that it is a\\nreality independent of any image is proved by the possi-\\nbility of its being broken to pieces by a hammer in the\\nhands of a blind man who could have no image of it\\nmight not even be previously in contact with it by touch,\\nbut be informed what place it occupied.]\\nV. Fichte s argument is that the will must terminate\\non objects within the mind. Hence representative real-\\nities are in and of the mind. Answer\\n1. It is a pure assumption as to the termination of\\nthe will.\\n2. ~No distinction is made between cognitions which\\nmove the will itself and other cognitions the first re-\\nspecting the future, others the present.\\nArguments Against the Theory.\\n1. It is unnecessary. This is proved from the grounds\\nupon which the cosmothetic idealist would vindicate his\\nrejection of the fact of consciousness namely, the im-\\nmediate cognition of the external object.\\n(1.) It is not shown that the alleged fact of conscious-\\nness is impossible.\\n(2.) The alleged incomprehensibleness of the datum\\nof consciousness does not necessitate the representative", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0113.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "102 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nhypothesis. The incomprehensibility of a fact of con-\\nsciousness is no ground for its displacement by a sub-\\nstituted hypothesis. Every ultimate fact of conscious-\\nness must, from the nature of the case, be incomprehen-\\nsible. Every demonstration is deduced from something\\ngiven and indemonstrable.\\n(3.) But let it be supposed that the hypothesis is\\nmore comprehensible than the fact of consciousness;\\nthat would only shift back the difficulty which would\\nhave to be ultimately met. For a comprehensible fact\\ncannot be ultimate. It must be explained by something\\npreceding which grounds its comprehensibility and so\\non by regression until an ultimate fact of consciousness\\nis reached, which ex necessitate, is incomprehensible.\\n(4.) But the representative hypothesis is not, in real-\\nity, more comprehensible than the fact of consciousness\\nthat is, the immediate cognition of the external object.\\nIt maintains this incomprehensible position: that the\\nmind can represent that of which it knows nothing.\\nIt supposes that there can be re-presentation where there\\nhas been no presentation. Further, the hypothesis, in\\nthis view, appears contradictory. The representative\\nhypothesis that of cosmothetic idealism therefore,\\nviolates the first condition of a legitimate hypothesis it\\nis unnecessary, and, besides, explains nothing. It is an\\nincomprehensible solution of an incomprehensible dif-\\nficulty.\\n2. The hypothesis is self -destructive. It destroys the\\ntrustworthiness of consciousness, and so subverts the\\nfoundations of knowledge. Consequently, it annihilates\\nitself.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0114.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM. 103\\n3. The hypothesis assumes the facts which it professes\\nto explain. It invents an hypothesis to explain an\\nhypothesis; and so revolves in a vicious circle. What\\nare the facts which it assumes First, the external ob-\\nject as existing secondly, the mind knowing. For it is\\ndevised to explain the correlation of these facts. Now,\\nwhen we ask the cosmothetic idealist, How do you know\\nthe existence of the external object? he answers,\\nThrough a mental image which represents it. When\\nwe ask him, How do you know that the image is repre-\\nsentative? he replies, Because there is an external ob-\\nject which it represents. He knows the external object\\nas existing because it is represented he knows the ex-\\nternal object as represented because it exists. To put\\nthe case still more compactly: The external object exists\\nbecause represented it is represented because it exists.\\nVerily, this is a circle.\\nIt amounts to this He hypothecates the external ob-\\nject upon a representative image; and he hypothecates\\na representative image upon the external object. It is\\nan hypothesis to explain an hypothesis, and must, there-\\nfore, ramble round and round in a circle, in which it\\never returns to the point from which it started. The\\nfact is, that all which the hypothesis really affirms is\\nthe ideal image, and the logical result would be absolute\\nidealism.\\n[It gives no ground upon which we can know the ex-\\nistence of the external world as different from ourselves.\\nIt only supposes it to exist, and that only by a vicious\\ncircle of hypothetical reasoning; unless it be admitted\\nthat it is legitimate to infer the existence of an object", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0115.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "104 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nreflected in a mirror from the mirrored representation\\nof it previously to an experience by which we verify the\\nrelation between the two. But as Hamilton does not dis-\\ncuss this supposition, it will be reserved for considera-\\ntion in the sequel.]\\nHamilton s fourth argument I omit, in consequence\\nof some doubt as to its validity or, at least, its con-\\nclusiveness, and pass on to\\n5. The hypothesis excludes the fact to be explained\\nfrom the sphere of experience. It thus violates another\\ncanon as to a legitimate hypothesis. All that it grounds\\nin professed experience is a mental image. Of the ex-\\nternal object alleged to be represented we have, ex\\nhypothesi, no empirical knowledge. [Remarks upon\\nthis point are also postponed in connection with the last\\nwhich has been considered, as they seem to be closely re-\\nlated.]\\n6. The hypothesis is destitute of simplicity, and so\\nfurnishes another violation of the laws of a legitimate\\nhypothesis. It must not depend on a subsidiary hypoth-\\nesis must not involve anything hidden or supernatural.\\nThat would be to attempt the explanation of what is\\nhidden by another thing which is hidden; to elucidate\\nthe natural by the supernatural.\\n!N ow, either the mental image represents a real ex-\\nternal world or it does not. If it does not, the result is\\npure idealism. But as that is abjured by the cosmo-\\nthetic idealist, the first alternative must be accepted.\\nThe question then is, What determines the mind to rep-\\nresent the external object, which, ex hypothesi, it does\\nnot immediately perceive", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0116.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM. 105\\nNow, again, either the mind blindly determines itself\\nto this representation, or it is determined by some in-\\ntelligent cause different from itself.\\nThe former supposition is irrational. The mind is\\nsaid to represent that of which it knows nothing, and\\nthat infringes all the laws of representation.\\nThe latter supposition implies a supernatural and\\nmiraculous element, such as are suggested by the\\ntheories of Descartes and Leibnitz.\\nBut this is unphilosophical, provided a simpler ex-\\nplanation is possible. That is furnished by natural\\nrealism which accepts the datum of consciousness, that\\nwe know the external world by immediate perception of\\nits phenomenal reality.\\nSuch is a sketch of Sir William Hamilton s argument\\nin opposition to the theory of cosmothetic idealism or\\nrepresentative perception an argument remarkable\\nalike for its originality, its acuteness and its power.\\nSome Additional Reflections.\\n1. One great difficulty urged against natural realism,\\nwhich affirms the immediate perception by mind of ma-\\nterial phenomena, is that it is impossible that spirit can\\nbe brought into such a relation to matter as to suppose\\nits immediate cognition of it.\\nTo this it may be replied that the argument proves\\ntoo much, since it involves the denial of the intuition of\\nmatter by the divine mind. For the distance between\\nGod, a pure spirit, and matter is infinite. On the\\ntheory that the substance of matter is not identical with\\nthat of God, the question must arise in regard to his", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0117.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "106 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nknowledge of matter as different from himself. And as\\nit is universally admitted by theists that his knowledge\\nis intuitive, and not mediate and indirect, whatever in-\\nability there may be on our part to comprehend the\\nrelation between him and matter, we must admit his\\nimmediate knowledge of it. The argument, therefore,\\nproves too much, and is, consequently, invalid. But if\\nwe concede the immediate knowledge of matter by him\\nwho is pure Spirit, what difficulty is there in admitting\\nthe lesser supposition of an immediate knowledge of it\\nby the human spirit\\n2. It is assumed that as cognition is an immanent,\\nand not a transitive act of the mind, to suppose the mind\\nto act immediately upon matter is to suppose it to act\\nout of itself; and that would be contradictory to the\\nnature of knowledge and absurd.\\nBut why should the mind not act where itself is not\\nIs it less active than matter is deemed to be One body\\ninfluences another body by the attraction of gravitation,\\nalthough the two are not in contact, but may be at a\\ngreat distance apart. Now, either the force of gravita-\\ntion is a property of matter or of spirit. If of matter,\\nthe denial to spirit of a power to act upon that which is\\nnot part of itself reduces it, in the scale of being and\\ndynamical influence, to a place inferior to that of mat-\\nter, which is absurd. If of spirit, it is granted that\\nspirit can act upon matter, and act upon it immediately.\\nThe question of an external medium is not involved on\\none side or the other of this question. If this be so, the\\nground of the difficulty is removed.\\n3. It is contended that in order that the mind should", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0118.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM. 107\\nbe immediately cognizant of matter the two should be\\nanalogous substances.\\n(1.) The argument used above, derived from the di-\\nvine knowledge of material reality, also applies here.\\nIs there an analogy between the Infinite Spirit and mat-\\nter\\n(2.) The position necessarily leads to monism. God\\ncannot act upon matter if it be different from himself\\nas a Spirit. He and the universe are one substance.\\nPure idealism or pure materialism is the inevitable re-\\nsult. Upon this principle the hypothesis of a represen-\\ntative perception is utterly illogical. Matter can no\\nmore act upon spirit than spirit can be cognizant of\\nmatter. There is no interaction possible. Whence,\\nthen, the representative image If it be a mental modi-\\nfication, how does it bring the mind into a near relation\\nto matter It is mind still, and the gulf is impassable.\\nIf it be material, how does a thing so destitute of analogy\\nto mind get into the mind If it be neither spiritual\\nnor material, but a tertium quid, different from both\\nmind and matter, what, in the name of sense, is it 1\\n4. It may be maintained that the existence of a rep-\\nresentative image is not an hypothesis which is framed\\nto account for the fact of an external world, but that it\\nis delivered as a fact by consciousness. But the fact of\\na representing image being given, we must infer the\\nthing represented as, when we see an image reflected in\\na mirror, we infer the existence of the object which\\ncaused the reflection.\\nTo this it is replied\\n(1.) If an appeal be taken to the common judgment", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0119.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "108 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof mankind to determine what the deliverance of con-\\nsciousness is, the answer would be instantly, would be,\\nexcept where there is partisan zeal for an hypothesis,\\nuniversally, to the fact of an external world, or, at least,\\nto the immediate knowledge of an external world.\\n(2.) Consciousness delivers the fact of a mental\\nimage, when a mental modification exists, and, in those\\ncases in which the external object is not present atively\\nrelated to our faculties, delivers also the fact of an in-\\ntuitive conviction or belief that the vicarious image\\ntruly represents a past event, or an absent object. But\\nwhen the external object is now and here related to our\\nfaculties, consciousness does not deliver to us the fact of\\nan image which represents the object, but the object\\nitself. The object is the percept. The hypothesis of\\nrepresentative perception obliterates the distinction be-\\ntween perception and the imagination. They become\\nthe same faculty, sustaining different relations at one\\ntime to the present, and at other times to the past, or\\nthe future, or the absent, or the possible, object. In\\nshort, the name representative perception is a solecism.\\nIt is as if we should speak of a seeing blind man, or of\\nother sameness, or of white blackness.\\n(3.) Our belief that the image reflected in a mirror\\nguarantees an object which causes the reflection will,\\nupon examination, be found to rest upon experience.\\nIf we had never discovered by observation that the ap-\\npearance in the mirror was simply a reflection, we would\\nbelieve that appearance to be an underived phenomenon\\na real object, and not merely an illusion. So is it\\nwith children and animals until their first impressions", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0120.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM. 109\\naru corrected. A child will at first hold out its hand to\\nthe other child in the glass, but soon learns that it is but\\nan image of itself. I remember once taking a large,\\nsagacious pointer-dog to a mirror under a pier-table and\\nshowing him his image. He instantly bristled up,\\ngrowled, evinced every disposition to fight, but was evi-\\ndently reluctant to tackle an animal which, like him-\\nself, was preparing for battle, and was exactly his match.\\nHe was taken by the neck, encouraged to begin hostil-\\nities, and thrust up against the glass, when the explosion\\noccurred. Surprised at the result, he deliberately\\nwalked to the rear of the table and looked between it\\nand the wall to see if the other dog were there. Satis-\\nfied by the reconnoissance, he at once became placid, and\\nnever afterwards could be cheated by the illusion in the\\nglass. He had learned something by experience.\\nOn the supposition that we mediately apprehend an\\nexternal object through its image mirrored in the mind,\\nwe could never know the representative character of the\\nimage without first having been cognizant of the thing\\nimaged. We may be conscious of an image as a fact,\\nbut we could never know it as an image unless we had\\npreviously known that which is imaged. Recognition\\ninfers cognition; representative knowledge pre-sup-\\nposes, and is grounded in, presentative. 1 We cannot\\nimage anything of which, in whole or in part, we have\\nhad no previous intuition. The wildest fancies of the\\npoet and the lunatic are but compounds of presenta-\\ntions. To adopt the hypothesis of representative per-\\n1 To that conclusion my own reflections had led me, before\\nHamilton s argument had been read.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0121.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "110 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nception, therefore, is to suppose a knowledge without\\nfoundation or reason to put the child before the\\nmother, the effect before the cause. This single con-\\nsideration is fatal to that hypothesis.\\nWe have here an instance, it may be added, in re-\\nbuttal of the frequently uttered opinion that meta-\\nphysics makes no progress. For a long time cosmothetic\\nidealism was the common doctrine of philosophers. In\\nestablishing the truer view of the immediate knowledge\\nof the external world the Scottish philosophy made a de-\\ncided advance in developing the science of the human\\nmind.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0122.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "BERKELEY S IDEALISM. 1\\nA SPLENDID edition of Bishop Berkeley s works\\nwas issued, in 1871, by Professor Alexander\\nCampbell Fraser, the incumbent of the Chair of Logic\\nand Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh the\\nchair once illuminated by the genius of the illustrious\\nSir William Hamilton. The elaborate dissertations in\\nwhich the accomplished editor expounds the bishop s\\nidealistic system, and the fact that they have emanated\\nfrom one who has succeeded the great exponent and de-\\nfender of natural realism, have had the effect of calling\\nattention afresh to the principles of Berkeley s phil-\\nosophy. In proceeding to discuss them we deem it im-\\nportant to furnish a brief preliminary statement of the\\nmain features of Berkeley s system\\n1. The denial of abstract ideas.\\n2. The denial of the existence of matter as substance.\\nThere is no such thing as material substance.\\n3. The denial of even the phenomenal existence of\\nmatter, separate from and independent of spirit denial\\nof natural realism. Material things have no reality in\\nthemselves. Whatever reality or casuality material\\nthings possess, is dependent and relative.\\n4. Esse est percipi: the so-called material world de-\\n1 Presbyterian Quarterly, July 1887.\\nIll", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0123.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "112 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\npends for existence upon the perception of spirit. A\\nthing exists only as it is sensibly perceived.\\n5. Ideals, sensations, and sense-given phenomena are\\nthe same. The material or external world of these ideas,\\nsensations or sense-given phenomena depends for ex-\\nistence upon perception that is the perception of spirit.\\nThe existence of our ideas consists in their being per-\\nceived, imagined, thought on.\\n6. These external things or ideas constitute a system\\nof symbols which (1) furnish a medium of communi-\\ncation between different spirits, (2) interpret to finite\\nintelligence the being and casual efficiency of the In-\\nfinite Spirit.\\n7. There is no real causality in the external world\\nof ideas. The only relation between them is that of\\nantecedence and sequence.\\n8. The permanence of the sensible world of ideas is\\ngrounded to us in the fact that our present sensations\\nare signs of the past and of the future. Physical sub-\\nstance and causality (so-called) are only the arbi-\\ntrarily constituted signification of actual sensations.\\nFraser. Substantiality in the material world is per-\\nmanence of co-existence among sensations.\\nCausality of phenomena is permanence or invariable-\\nness among their successions. Fraser. This per-\\nmanence of matter (so-called) is in God. Sensations\\nand sensible things are neither permanent, nor efficient.\\nThe sensible world consists of significant sensations in\\nperpetual flux, and sustained by the divine reason or\\nwill. Fraser.\\n9. We now see what Berkeley meant by ideas. They", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0124.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 113\\nare what are ordinarily termed material things or phe-\\nnomena. They are in the mind, but not of it. Their\\norigin is subjective, but they become objective. Mate-\\nrial phenomena are ideas objectified and externalized.\\nWhat we call the law of nature is only the order of the\\nsuccession of these ideas.\\n10. God calls forth in us our ideas in regular order.\\n11. Real ideas, that is, ideas externalized, do not de-\\npend on our will for their production. Imaginary ideas\\ndepend upon the will. Real or sense-ideas are caused\\nby the Infinite Spirit.\\n12. We are prepared to understand what Berkeley\\nmeant by externality. It is simply externalized ideas\\nnot a phenomenal reality independent of the perception\\nof spirit.\\n13. What then is spirit Berkeley says The mind,\\nspirit or soul is that indivisible, unextended thing which\\nthinks, acts and perceives. That which perceives\\nideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea,\\nnor like an idea. Ideas are things, inactive and per-\\nceived and spirits a sort of beings altogether different\\nfrom them. Hylas Philonous.\\n14. We are directly conscious of the substance of our\\nspirits. This consciousness he sometimes denominates\\nreflection we know, he says, our souls by reflection.\\nThought, volition, perception, these are properly\\nconstituents of the soul; they are in it and of it. But\\nideas, while they are in the soul as sensational impres-\\nsions, are not of it. They are not elements which belong\\nto its substance. They are not the self the Ego.\\nBerkeley distinguishes between real ideas and im-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0125.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "114 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nagined ideas. The real are phenomenal, sensible things\\nthe imagined are purely mental and subjective mere\\nentia rationis. Now it is important to notice his doc-\\ntrine of causality as applied to these two different sorts\\nof ideas. The real, he contends, are not caused by us,\\nbut by the Infinite Spirit, who puts us in relation to\\nthem, or them in relation to us. The imagined are\\ncaused by ourselves. The nature of this causal relation\\nbetween our minds and these imagined ideas he defines\\nfrom the will. They are caused by the will. We can\\nmentally construct, at will, unreal combinations of the\\nreal ideas which we have perceived.\\nWe must also notice his doctrine of the immediacy of\\nour knowledge of real ideas or phenomenal and sensible\\nthings. He was not a hypothetical realist, but rejected\\nthe doctrine of representative perception. Between per-\\nception and these real ideas there is, according to him,\\nno intervening modification of the mind, vicarious and\\nrepresentative of the so-called external reality his real\\nidea. We have an immediate knowledge of it by percep-\\ntion. But while he cannot be ranked as a cosmothetio\\nidealist or hypothetical realist it must not be inferred\\nthat he was a natural realist or absolute dualist. There\\nis in his doctrine, as Prof. Eraser, the interpreter of\\nhis system, endeavors to show, a species of dualism, but\\nit was not that of the Scottish school. It is merely the\\ndualism of the conscious spirit and its own ideas, con-\\nceived as external phenomena. The existence of ma-\\nterial things separate from and independent of spirit,\\nit was the very point of his philosophy to deny.\\nHe is evidently to be classed with monists, who af-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0126.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 115\\nfirm the existence of but one substance, and as he con-\\ntended that this one substance is spirit, he must be as-\\nsigned to the specific class of idealistic monists.\\nLet us now group the features of his system as they\\nhave been enumerated, so as, if possible, to get a brief\\nand comprehensive statement of his theory. If possible,\\nwe say, for any one who attempts to accomplish this will\\nfind himself balked by discrepancies and inconsistencies\\nwhich it is difficult to harmonize, and which reveal the\\nwant of mature elaboration of the theory by its author\\nhimself.\\nThere is no such thing as matter, according to the or-\\ndinary conception of philosophers and the common peo-\\nple. ~No material substance can be proved to exist.\\nIt is therefore to us nothing. Nor are the so-called\\nphenomena of matter realities which have an indepen-\\ndent existence as such. They depend for existence upon\\ntheir being perceived by spirit Esse est percipi their\\nvery being is to be perceived. Abstract the perception\\nof spirit from them, and they are zero. They are conse-\\nquently ideas, not separate from the mind, but in it as\\nimpressed upon it through the media of sensations. In-\\ndeed, they are represented as sensations themselves.\\nPhenomena, which are denominated external, are, there-\\nfore, but objectified ideas or sensations. The mind gone,\\nthey are gone. But these ideas are not limited to any\\none spirit. They are related to the aggregate of finite\\nspirits, and ultimately to the infinite Spirit, Finite\\nspirits being supposed to be out of relation through per-\\nception to these real ideas or sensible phenomena, they\\ncontinue to find the reason of their existence in the per-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0127.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "116 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nception of the omnipresent Spirit. In fact, they are\\ncreatively caused by God are God s ideas. The uni-\\nverse, consequently, is a collection of God s ideas. Who-\\never, then, perceives the universe, or any part of it, per-\\nceives God s ideas, and has presented to him by the ordi-\\nnary experience of the perceptive faculty incontestable\\nevidence of the existence of God as an intelligent and\\nomnipotent Spirit. For all phenomena constitute a\\nsymbolism of sense which is a medium of communica-\\ntion between finite spirits, and which signifies to us the\\ndivine attributes. As we put together letters to form a\\nword, so we collect these sensible symbols to spell out the\\ngreat name of God. These external phenomena, thus\\nsystematized, and having their unity in their relation\\nto the Infinite Spirit as caused by him, have no other\\ncoherence in themselves but that which springs from a\\ndivinely ordained antecedence and sequence. The only\\ncause which operates in them and through them is that\\nwhich originated them; and as God s ideas they meet\\ntheir continuity and persistence alone in his immediate\\nefficiency.\\nIt will be seen from this brief and necessarily inade-\\nquate sketch of Bishop Berkeley s philosophical theory\\nof idealism that his pious purpose as he himself\\navowed it to be in its construction, was to resist and\\noverthrow the prevailing materialism of his times, and\\nto vindicate the doctrine of God s existence, and of his\\nimmediate relation to the phenomenal universe as his\\nproduct against the objections to it which materialists\\nwere wont to urge. It remains to be seen whether, in\\nthe prosecution of this laudable design, he did not go far", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0128.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "Beekeley s Idealism. 117\\ntowards the opposite extreme of asserting, at least by\\nlogical consequence, an idealistic pantheism, which can-\\ncels the difference between the Deity and his works,\\nwhich makes God the universe and the universe God.\\nIn proceeding to consider the theory let us under-\\nstand, at the outset, what are not the questions to be dis-\\ncussed.\\nFirst, it is not the question, whether any so-called\\nmaterial things actually exist as unperceived by some\\nspiritual intelligence, whether any unperceived or un-\\nperceivable matter exists. This cannot be made a ques-\\ntion, since it may be that wherever matter in any form\\nexists, there also finite spirits exist and are in percep-\\ntive relation to it; and since it is certain that no ma-\\nterial things can exist out of relation to God, as an om-\\nnipresent spirit.\\nSecondly, it is not the question, whether any finite\\nthing can have the cause of its existence in itself. The\\nexistence of God being admitted, all matter (so-called)\\nand all finite spirits must be regarded as caused by his\\ninfinite power. Separate being, as caused, they may\\nhave, but it is necessarily derived and dependent.\\nThirdly, it is not the question, whether the material\\nsystem depends for continued existence upon spirit.\\nEvery opponent of materialism admits the fact that it\\ndepends for that existence upon God as the infinite\\nSpirit, In this they all concur with Bishop Berkeley.\\nThey may differ from him as to the mode of the divine\\nconcursus and support,\\nFourthly, it is not the question, whether matter is an\\noriginal and underived cause of any effects, whether it", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0129.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "118 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\npossesses an independent power to cause phenomenal\\nchanges. It may be a question whether matter (so-\\ncalled) is endowed with properties which as second and\\nsubordinate causes are adapted to produce phenomenal\\nchanges, but it is not made a question in this discussion,\\nwhether it has the efficiency of a first and original cause.\\nThat the pure materialist may affirm, but its denial is\\nhere assumed.\\nThese, then, are not questions with which the present\\nargument has to deal, and must consequently be thought\\naway. What, then, are the questions about which it is\\nconcerned\\nI. The first question which falls to be considered is,\\nwhether or not there be such a thing as material sub-\\nstance. Bishop Berkeley denies that its existence can\\nbe proved, and explicitly affirms the contrary. It is one\\nend of these remarks to evince the incompetency of his\\nhypothesis.\\n1. Berkeley begins by denying and ridiculing the\\nalleged existence of what are termed abstract ideas.\\nThe substance of matter is one of these ideas. As there\\nare no such things, there can be no material substance.\\nIt is a play upon words, a mere fancy and crotchet of\\nphilosophers. Now there are two kinds of ideas, de-\\nnominated abstract, which are to be carefully distin-\\nguished from each other. An oversight of the distinc-\\ntion must involve the discussion in confusion. First,\\nby the terms abstract idea is sometimes meant the idea\\nor conception of a phenomenal quality which is com-\\nmon to several individuals, while at the same time they\\npossess other qualities which as peculiar distinguish", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0130.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "Bekkeeey s Idealism. 119\\neach of these individuals from the others. The question\\nbeing, whether such a common quality can in thought\\nbe abstracted from its connection with others and made\\na separate object of contemplation, Bishop Berkeley at\\ntimes takes the negative, and at others seems to admit the\\naffirmative. His ordinary doctrine is, that there can be\\nno such quality to which we can attach an idea. He\\ncontends that what we conceive is an individual thing,\\nin the concrete, whatever it may be, and that we make\\nthat individual the standard with which we compare\\nothers in order to form a class. While pursuing this\\nline of reasoning, he declares it impossible and ridicu-\\nlous that there can be an abstract idea of a common\\nquality in the sense of a quality containing in itself the\\ngeneral marks of different individuals. But, on the\\nother hand, he sometimes speaks of a quality which,\\nalthough particular and not general, sustains a common\\nrelation to several individual objects. He says, for\\nexample: A man may consider a figure merely as tri-\\nangular, without attending to the particular qualities of\\nthe angles, or relations of the sides and again he ob-\\nserves: An idea which, considered in itself, is partic-\\nular, becomes general by being made to represent or\\nstand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. 1\\nThis looks very much like giving up the question as\\nto the possibility of abstract ideas. Once admit that\\nthe abstract idea does not involve a general inclusion in\\nitself of the ideas of all the qualities which belong to a\\nclass of individuals, but is a particular idea that is,\\nan idea of a single quality which holds a common rela-\\n1 Principles of Human Knowledge.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0131.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "120 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntion to several individuals, and that is all that we care\\nto contend for. And Sir William Hamilton, who con-\\ncurs with Berkeley in his nominalism, attributes to him,\\nand himself holds, the doctrine of the possibility of such\\nabstract ideas. The question is, What grounds the re-\\nlation of resemblance between the individuals compos-\\ning what is called a class The answer is, and must be,\\nSome quality which is common to them. And this is\\nthe answer which Hamilton gives in expounding the\\nnominalistic theory.\\nWhen, in maintaining the first mentioned of these\\nviews, Berkeley says that a general notion, or, what is\\nthe same thing, an abstract idea, is merely a name, and\\nthat we delude ourselves when we suppose it anything\\nelse, he loses sight of the obvious consideration that a\\nname is significant, or it is an unmeaning cipher. It is\\nthe symbol of something. If then there be not some\\nquality which is signified by what is called a general\\nterm, the term is mere gibberish. We have seen that\\nBerkeley stated the true doctrine when he granted the\\nexistence of ideas of particular qualities having com-\\nmon relations. It is precisely such ideas or concepts as\\nare symbolized by general terms. If, then, there may\\nbe, according to his own admission, abstract ideas of\\nphenomenal qualities, his general doctrine is invalidated,\\nthat no such things as abstract ideas can exist. This\\nargument, however, has no direct bearing upon the ques-\\ntion in hand, namely, whether there can be the abstract\\nidea of the substance of matter for the abstract idea of\\nphenomenal qualities being conceded, it does not follow\\nthat such an idea of substance may exist. The indirect", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0132.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 121\\noffice discharged by the argument and it is a valuable\\none is to break down the universal affirmation that no\\nabstract ideas are possible.\\nSecondly, there is another kind of abstract idea which\\nit is more pertinent, and indeed which it is vital, to the\\ndiscussion, to consider. It is the abstract idea of things\\nwhich are not phenomenal, but which it is common to\\ninfer as the substrates of phenomenal qualities, as their\\nground of manifestation and their bond of unity. Such\\nan idea is that of cause, which it is usual with men, not\\nbiased by some philosophical hypothesis, to infer from\\nphenomenal changes. Such an idea is that of substance,\\nwhich it is also common to infer from phenomenal qual-\\nities the substance of the soul, the substance of God,\\nand the substance of matter. Berkeley confines our\\nknowledge of matter (so-called) to perception. As it\\nwill be confessed on all hands that we cannot perceive\\nsubstance, it follows from his datum that we have no\\nknowledge of material substance, or, to use his phrase-\\nology, we can have no abstract idea of it the terms mean\\nnothing. The thing signified by them is a chimera.\\nIn the first place, the argumentum ad liominem may\\nbe employed against this view. Bishop Berkeley, as a\\nChristian theologian, admitted the existence of the sub-\\nstance of God. That he, or any one else, could know\\nthat transcendent substance by perception, internal or\\nexternal, is out of the question. How, then, did he con-\\nstrue the apprehension of it The answer must be by\\none of these very abstract ideas of substance which he\\nvehemently rejects. He contends that we know God,\\napart from the direct testimony of revelation, though", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0133.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "122 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthose phenomenal manifestations of himself which he\\ndenominates ideas the objectified, externalized ideas\\nof the Divine Being. Of course, then, he inferred the\\nexistence of the divine substance from these finite mani-\\nfestations. As the substance is not, cannot be, per-\\nceived, it cannot be a concrete percept. What then It\\ncan only be apprehended as an abstract idea. But the\\nbishop s position is that there can be no abstract idea of\\nsubstance. This one, eminent instance to the contrary,\\nnegatives his assertion, and negatives it by virtue of his\\nown confession. But, if we may have an abstract idea\\nof the divine substance, why not of material substance\\nThe alleged impossibility of such an idea will not an-\\nswer. The argument from the incompetency of per-\\nception to furnish it palpably breaks down.\\nIn the second place, Berkeley expressly admits the\\nexistence of the substance of the soul, but he contends\\nthat we know it by consciousness. E ow consciousness\\nis equivalent to immediate knowledge, and unless we\\nutterly misconceive his doctrine, it is precisely that con-\\nsciousness involves such knowledge. But we may safely\\nchallenge the proofs from any quarter that we have im-\\nmediate knowledge, or, what is the same, an intuition of\\nthe substance of the soul. If we have, we can describe\\nit, as we can every object of immediate knowledge. Who\\never succeeded in doing this It is too obvious to re-\\nquire argument that what knowledge of the soul s sub-\\nstance we possess is not derived from a direct gazing\\nupon it in consciousness; it is not an intuition, a per-\\ncept. We immediately and necessarily infer its ex-\\nistence from its phenomenal manifestations of which", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0134.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "Beekeley s Idealism. 123\\nwe are conscious, and therefore have immediate know-\\nledge. The idea, then, which we have of the substance\\nof the soul is an abstract idea. Here we have another\\ninstance of a knowledge of substance which is not di-\\nrectly derived from perception, a knowledge without\\nwhich we must apprehend our mental being as a mere\\nbundle of phenomenal qualities ligated by no bond of\\nunity appearances of something which has no exis-\\ntence, qualities of nothing to be qualified. If, there-\\nfore, the substance of God and the substance of the soul\\ncannot possibly be percepts, we have a knowledge of\\nthem through ideas which are abstracted from any con-\\ncrete appearance. Why not the question recurs why\\nnot a similar abstract idea of the substance of matter\\nThere is certainly nothing in the constitution of our\\nminds to preclude such knowledge. It must be shown\\nthat there is something peculiar in the very nature of\\nwhat is called matter, which exempts it from the possi-\\nbility of being thus apprehended.\\nIn the third place, unless there be some philosophical\\nspeculation which gives their minds a peculiar bent,\\nmen are accustomed to infer the existence of substance\\nfrom perceived phenomena. This is well-nigh a uni-\\nversal law it finds utterance and proof alike in the lan-\\nguage which is almost universal in its employment. The\\nterm phenomenon has scarcely any meaning, unless there\\nis something which grounds appearance, unless all real-\\nity is reduced to mere appearance, and everything\\naround us and within us which is an object of perception\\nis mere shine. 7 The term manifestation implies that\\nthere is something which is manifested. Quality sug-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0135.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "124 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ngests something which is qualified property something\\nto which the thing so denominated belongs. Mode infers\\nsomething which is modified. Attribute guarantees\\nsomething to which somewhat is due. Accident probably\\nsignifies etymologically that which falls upon something\\nelse for support. The term substance itself, which be-\\nlongs to the language of at least every cultivated people,\\nwould be a meaningless collection of letters, unless it\\nsignified something which is under other things and\\nserves in some sort as their support. And we cannot\\nhere forbear remarking that although the bishop makes\\ngreat sport of the thing called substance, and facetiously\\nasks what kind of pillars it has, he very naturally, like\\nordinary mortals, talks of the substance of the soul as\\nsupporting its qualities. We might have craved of him\\nthe favor to tell us what its pillars look like, and how\\nthey hold up qualities\\nThe terms which have been mentioned, used as they\\nare almost universally, sufficiently indicate the common\\nbelief of the race in the existence of substance; and as\\nall of them are more or less commonly applied to the\\nsubstance of matter, the common belief of the race in the\\nexistence of that kind of substance. Berkeley s en-\\ndeavor to show that his theory really interprets this be-\\nlief is only an ingenious attempt to quadrate his specula-\\ntions with the convictions of mankind. It is certainly a\\npowerful presumption against any opinion that it tra-\\nverses universal conviction.\\n2. There pervades all Berkeley s reasoning in sup-\\nport of his theory the confusion of the knowledge of ex-\\nistence with existence itself. If this were an oversight,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0136.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "Bekkeley s Idealism. 125\\nit would certainly be curious, and all the more curious\\nthat it is not noticed by his distinguished commentator,\\nProfessor Eraser. If it were designed as an inherent\\nelement in his system, it behooved him to rebut the pre-\\nsumption which lies against it by an articulate consid-\\neration of it. Whatever may be thought of the doctrine\\nof the relativity of knowledge, as expounded by Sir Wil-\\nliam Hamilton, as a whole, the position that, while all\\nthat is known by us must in some way be in relation to\\nour faculties, still our knowledge is not the measure of\\nexistence, is so obviously true as to commend itself to\\nan almost unquestioning acceptance. In this affirmation\\nthe great Scottish philosopher limits knowledge to per-\\nceptive knowledge, which is substantially Berkeley s po-\\nsition. But Hamilton admitted and contended for the\\ndoctrine that there are realities, transcending perception,\\nwhich must be believed, realities which are close to us,\\nsuch as the occult substance of the soul and the equally\\noccult substance of matter. But however close to us an\\nalleged reality may be, Berkeley declares its non-exis-\\ntence, except it be perceived. Now, the doctrine is so\\nastounding that perceptive knowledge grounds or even\\nconditions real existence, that only arguments of the\\nmost demonstrative character could induce its reception.\\nIt is to violate common sense to say that knowledge is\\nefficiently causal of existence. We necessarily attribute\\nit to power as its efficient cause. Power is productive,\\nknowledge apprehensive. It may direct power, but can-\\nnot be conceived as substituting it. And this is all the\\nmore remarkable, inasmuch as Berkeley holds and at-\\ntention is particularly invoked to the fact that the sen-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0137.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "126 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nsible phenomena which he calls ideas and maintains to\\nbe grounded for existence in perception are caused by\\nthe creative power of God. Granted that he admits\\nrealities which our perceptions cannot reach, and that\\nthey exist because God perceives them, how is that posi-\\ntion to be reconciled with the other, that God causes\\ntheir existence by his will But if God may cause the\\nexistence of realities which, in consequence of their dis-\\ntance from us we cannot apprehend by perception, he\\nmay cause the existence of substance very near to us\\nwhich may equally lie beyond the scope of the mere per-\\nceptive faculty. The truth is that neither our own\\nknowledge, perceptive or not, nor that of other finite\\nbeings, nor that of God himself, is the ground, or effi-\\ncient cause, of existence. It is true that nothing exists\\nwithout God s knowledge, but it is another thing to- say\\nthat nothing can exist except it is produced by his know-\\nledge. If this be true of the Infinite Spirit, much more\\nis it true of our spirits. And if it be true of all know-\\nledge, it certainly is of perception. The mere fact,\\ntherefore, that alleged material substance is out of rela-\\ntion to our perceptions in no degree affects the question\\nof its existence. There may be and probably are a thou-\\nsand existences around us of which we can have no\\nknowledge by perception. God himself is around us and\\nin us, but we perceive him not.\\n3. Berkeley s theory, in restricting the knowledge of\\nmaterial existence to perception, takes no account of the\\nfundamental laws of belief, and the faith- judgments\\nwhich spring from them when elicited into expression\\nby the conditions of experience. It was one of the great", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0138.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "Bekkeley s Idealism. 127\\noffices discharged by Kant and the philosophers of the\\nScottish school that they called attention to the funda-\\nmental forms of thought and belief which are imbedded\\nin the very foundations of our nature. Perception fur-\\nnishes the conditions upon which they emerge into con-\\nsciousness and affirm themselves, but once drawn forth\\nfrom their latency, they originate the grandest know-\\nledges of the human soul. It is not our perceptions, it is\\nour faith- judgments, which impart the highest import\\nto our knowledge, and stamp the loftiest significance\\nupon our duties, our relations and our destiny. It is\\nsuch judgments as cannot be furnished by perception,\\njudgments which give us cause and substance, God and\\nimmortality, that lend the truest dignity to our being.\\nTo leave out of account these fundamental laws with\\ntheir accompanying inferences is to sink out of view by\\nfar the most important elements of our knowledge.\\nNow, it is exactly these principles which lead to the in-\\nference of substance, and it is no wonder that Berkeley,\\nin overlooking them, has been led into the capital error\\nof concluding that because perception cannot affirm the\\nexistence of material substance, therefore it cannot exist.\\nThis is the point at which his theory especially breaks\\ndown.\\nSo far as to Berkeley s denial of the existence of ma-\\nterial substance.\\nII. The second question which claims consideration\\nis, whether phenomenal things, ordinarily termed ma-\\nterial, are as ideas dependent upon the perceptions of\\nspirit; for Berkeley s regulative principle is esse est\\npercipi to be is to be perceived. Let it be observed", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0139.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "12$ Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthat the question is not now in regard to the substance of\\nmatter. That question is discharged. It is in respect\\nto what are ordinarily termed the phenomena of matter.\\nAnd in order that this question may be distinctly ap-\\nprehended let us for a moment recall Berkeley s doc-\\ntrine. He maintains the view that there are no* ma-\\nterial phenomena as such. The phenomena so called are\\ndependent for existence upon the perception of spirits.\\nThey have no separate, independent existence. There\\nis no such thing as a material system. Materiality is\\ndenied and immateriality affirmed. All sensible phe-\\nnomena are ideas, and these ideas are dependent upon\\nperception, and are all in the mind. Properly speaking,\\nthey have no external objective existence, except so far\\nas ideas in the mind can be said to have existence. All\\nthe so-called qualities of matter are contained under this\\ndenomination ideas. These ideas, further, are sensa-\\ntions, for whatever is an object of perception is a sensa-\\ntion. Sensations include all the qualities of so-called\\nmatter the primary as well as the secondary. Ideas,\\nsensible things, real ideas, real things, sensible objects,\\nsensible phenomena, sense-given ideas or objects, sensa-\\ntions these all, however, Berkeley s phraseology and\\neven his statements sometimes vary, are by him treated\\nas the same. This may safely be affirmed to be his\\ncatholic doctrine. The question before us is, then, in\\nregard to the position that all so-called material phe-\\nnomena, as ideas, are dependent for existence upon their\\nbeing perceived by spiritual substance.\\n1. The theory is chargeable with the logical fault of\\nwanting scientific coherence and self -consistency.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0140.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 129\\n(1.) In stating the main principle which regulates\\nit namely, to be is to be perceived, it was absolutely\\nnecessary that the question be met upon the perception\\nof what spirits do material phenomena, or ideas, depend\\nfor existence This question Berkeley answers by say-\\ning that some ideas depend upon the perception of\\nhuman spirits, others upon that of non-human finite\\nspirits, and all upon that of the Infinite Spirit. It would\\nseem to be evident that he started out with the hypothesis\\nthat it is the perception of the individual human spirit\\nwhich conditions phenomenal existence. And to this he\\nadhered until the difficulties attaching to it shut him up\\nto the admission that all phenomenal existence cannot\\ndepend upon the perception of an individual finite spirit.\\nThis is made apparent from the way in which he dealt\\nwith the difficulty raised by the absence of the individual\\nfrom certain phenomenal realities, and the impossibility,\\nconsequently, of his perception conditioning their ex-\\nistence. He states the case himself. While he was pres-\\nent in his study, the existence of the books it contained\\ndepended upon his perceiving them. But was their ex-\\nistence suspended while he was absent and could not\\nperceive them No, he replies, when absent I can\\nimagine them, and the imagination of them conditions\\ntheir existence.\\nSubsequently, he saw the absurdity of this position,\\nand took the ground that their existence depended, in\\nthe absence of all human percipients, upon the percep-\\ntion of the omnipresent Spirit. This ought, in con-\\nsistency, to have led him to the abandonment of the sup-\\nposition that any phenomenal reality depends for ex-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0141.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "130 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nistence upon the perception of human spirits, or even\\nupon non-human finite spirits, and to the assertion of\\nthe view that all phenomenal reality depends for ex-\\nistence upon the perception of the Infinite Spirit, But\\nthis he did not do, and the consequence is that he\\njumbles the perceptions of finite spirits and of the In-\\nfinite Spirit as the ground of phenomenal existence.\\nOne or the other ought to have been affirmed, not both.\\nThey cannot possibly be made the conjoint or common\\nground of phenomenal existence.\\n(2.) Another evidence of inconsistency in the theory\\nlies in the fact that ideas and sensations are treated as\\nthe same for Berkeley says that sensations are internal\\nfeelings, and that ideas are external things. How can\\nmental phenomena be at the same time internal and ex-\\nternal To escape this inconsistency it may be said that\\nthey are not at the same time both internal and external,\\nbut as the same things they are first one and then the\\nother. Let us take that supposition. If they be first\\ninternal and then become external, the difficulty occurs\\nthat as sensations are necessarily subjective feelings,\\nthere would in, the first instance be nothing to originate\\nthem there would be no external reality to which they\\nwould correspond. Another difficulty would be, as ideas\\nand sensations are the same, to account for their be-\\ncoming external. For Berkeley holds that external\\nideas are not caused by the will. But their externaliza-\\ntion could only take place in consequence of some mental\\neffort or energy. They must therefore externalize them-\\nselves, which is absurd, since it is contended that they\\npossess no causal force. These difficulties are fatal to", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0142.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "Bekkeley s Idealism. 131\\nthe supposition that ideas or sensations are first internal\\nand then become external.\\nBut, on the other hand, let it be supposed that they are\\nfirst external and then become internal. The difficulty\\nthen would be to account for the transition. As exter-\\nnal they must be conceived as grounding themselves as\\ninternal, which is absurd; and besides, the supposition\\nis inconsistent with Berkeley s main principle, that per-\\nception grounds ideas or sensations. It cannot be true\\nthat ideas or sensations as external ground themselves\\nas internal, and that perception grounds their existence\\nwhether as internal or external. In addition to this,\\nit is obvious that as a sensation, from the nature of the\\ncase, is a mental feeling, and therefore subjective; it is\\nincompetent to represent it as first external and objec-\\ntive, and then internal and subjective. But whether this\\nreasoning be correct or not, the principal feature of the\\ninconsistency returns in force, namely, that ideas and\\nsensations being treated as the same, it cannot be main-\\ntained that ideas are external phenomena and sensations\\nare internal feelings. If ideas are not external phe-\\nnomena, absolute subjective idealism is the result, and\\nthat Berkeley does not affirm if sensations are not inter-\\nnal feelings, but external phenomena, materialism is\\nthe result, and that it is the main purpose of his phil-\\nosophy to deny.\\n(3.) Still another element of inconsistency may be\\nnoticed. Berkeley contends that there can be no phe-\\nnomenal realities, or, what is the same, there can be no\\nideas, except there be the perception of them by spirit.\\nNow this must mean, if it mean anything, that the per-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0143.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "132 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nception of spirit grounds the existence of ideas. What\\nelse does the great maxim signify esse est percipi, be-\\ning is to be perceived The being of ideas depends on\\ntheir being perceived. Yet Berkeley explicitly says\\nthat ideas are not caused by finite spirits, but caused\\nalone by the will of God. Here the ground of the ex-\\nistence of ideas is declared to be God s will. There are\\nthen two grounds for their existence the perception of\\nfinite spirits and the will of the Infinite Spirit, This\\nis certainly a confusion of thought, If it be said that\\nthe ground of existence which is assigned to finite per-\\nception is different from the cause of existence, the dis-\\ntinction is unintelligible. And, further, if the ground\\nof existence in perception is shifted from finite spirits\\nto the infinite Spirit, inconsistency still emerges, for it\\nis inconsistent to say that the ground or cause of the ex-\\nistence of ideas is at the same time in the perception\\nand in the will of God. Whatever may be thought of\\nthe hypothesis that God s knowledge is the cause of\\nfinite existence, it is not unintelligible. And it is cer-\\ntainly competent to say that God s will, on the other\\nhand, is the cause of finite existence. But it is un-\\nmeaning to say that such a cause is to be referred in the\\nsame sense both to the knowledge and the will of God.\\nSuch are some of the inconsistencies which inhere in\\nBerkeley s theory and if they have been proved to exist,\\nthey cannot but damage its truth.\\n2. Having pointed out the logical inconsistency of\\nBerkeley s theory in its attempt to find a ground of phe-\\nnomenal existence, first in the perception of individual\\nfinite spirit, then in that of a number of finite spirits,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0144.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 133\\nand lastly in that of the Infinite Spirit, or in the percep-\\ntion of both finite spirits and of the Infinite Spirit, we\\nproceed to show that the theory involves real incon-\\nsistencies inconsistencies not merely of arrangement,\\nbut of a metaphysical character. When, as was in-\\nevitable, it became apparent that no individual finite\\nspirit could possibly be at all times in the relation of per-\\nception to any section of phenomenal existence, how-\\never limited, or at any time to the whole of phenomenal\\nexistence, the view had to be abandoned that phenomenal\\nexistence is grounded in the perception of individual in-\\ntelligence. This is conceded by the editor of Berkeley s\\nworks, and was substantially admitted by the bishop\\nhimself. Kecourse was then had to the view that the\\nground of phenomenal existence was to be sought in the\\naggregate perceptions of all finite intelligences. This\\nsupposed that there are no phenomenal realities which\\nare not in relation to the perception of some finite spirits.\\nBut it soon became evident that this supposition could\\nnot be maintained. It is not only a fact which must\\nbe acknowledged that even that small part of phenomenal\\nreality which at some time may be related to the percep-\\ntion of the individual is not at all times so related, but\\nthat there can be no proof of the relation at all times of\\nthe whole or even of a part of phenomenal reality to any\\nfinite perception. On the contrary, it is easy to sup-\\npose the existence of phenomenal reality apart from re-\\nlation to the perception of any finite intelligence. If,\\nfor instance, the moon be uninhabited, its particular\\nfeatures would exist out of relation to intelligent finite\\nbeings, and their existence could not be said to be", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0145.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "134 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ngrounded in the perception of such beings. So, upon the\\ngeologic assumption that the world existed long before\\nit became the home of intelligent beings, its existence\\ncould not have been conditioned by their perception.\\nNor can we resist the conviction that if this globe were\\nnow stripped by some dread catastrophe of all its in-\\ntelligent occupants, it might continue to exist, although\\nout of relation to all human perception. The hypothesis\\nof the existence of spirits, of whom the Bible alone\\nspeaks, is hyperphysical, and therefore cannot enter as\\nan element into a strictly philosophical argument.\\nNow, how were these obstrusive and admitted diffi-\\nculties met by Berkeley s theory In this way the sen-\\nsations which are at any given period of time experi-\\nenced by finite intelligences, although they could not\\nhave been always experienced by them, nor can be in the\\nwhole future experienced by them, are, while experi-\\nenced, signs of past and future sensations. It is easy to\\ndetect the insufficiency of this extraordinary hypothesis,\\nframed to account for the existence of sensations or\\nideas when they stood or will stand in no immediate re-\\nlation to finite perception. Let us not lose sight of the\\nthing to be proved. It is that phenomenal existence\\nabides when no finite being perceives it. The proof fur-\\nnished is, that present sensations, which are perceived,\\nare signs of the existence of past and future sensations.\\nBut it is,ex hypothesi, admitted that thesepastand future\\nsensations are out of relation to perception, and are sig-\\nnified by present sensations which alone are in relation\\nto perception. Now Berkeley s great principle is that\\nperception grounds or conditions phenomenal existence.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0146.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "Bekkeley s Idealism. 135\\nAccording to this principle, then, these past and future\\nsensations or phenomenal realities being conceded to be\\nunrelated to perception can have no existence. It is\\nnot sensations or ideas, according to Berkeley, which\\nground the existence of other sensations or ideas that\\nhe denies but it is always perception which is the reason\\nof their existence. As then the only ground of past and\\nfuture phenomenal existence which is assigned by this\\nhypothesis is significant sensations or ideas, the hypoth-\\nesis is signally out of harmony with the main theory.\\nFurther, it is obvious to remark that the supposition\\nof these significant sensations in order to show that phe-\\nnomenal realities may exist out of relation to finite per-\\nception is a clear abandonment of the principle that any\\nphenomenal realities depend for existence upon the per-\\nception of finite intelligences. If some confessedly exist\\napart from that relation, all may.\\nIf, in reply to this reasoning, it be urged that these\\nsensations which are signs of past and future phenome-\\nnal existences, out of relation to the perception to finite\\nspirits, are signs of phenomenal existence in relation to\\nthe perception of the infinite Spirit, and having its\\nground of continuance in that perception, it must be\\nrejoined that this would be to change the issue. If in an\\nattempt to show that present sensations, as signs, prove\\nthe continued existence of phenomenal realities in rela-\\ntion to finite intelligence, it be at the same time main-\\ntained that their persistence in being is due to God s per-\\nception, the question is altered, and the procedure is\\nillegitimate. This but serves to fortify the stricture\\nalready passed upon the theory that it inconsistently", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0147.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "136 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntries to found phenomenal existence alike upon the per-\\nception of finite and of infinite intelligence. The theory\\nought to have been purged of this inconsistency, and to\\nhave sought the ground of phenomenal existence simply\\nand alone in the divine perception. It would in that\\ncase have had, at least, the advantage and the merit of\\nunity.\\n3. It is clear that in those cases in which phenomenal\\nrealities or ideas are in immediate relation to our per-\\nception Berkeley s doctrine is that they depend for ex-\\nistence upon that perception. There is an evident diffi-\\nculty which lies in the way of this hypothesis. Most, if\\nnot all, of the phenomena which come within the scope\\nof our perception operating through the senses are not\\nsimple, but compound. Now, it is certain that some of\\nthe fundamental elements of these complex realities are\\nbeyond the reach ordinarily of sense-perception. It is\\nonly the art of the chemist and of the microscopist which\\ncan avail to reveal to us their sensible existence. Nor\\ncan it be proved that there are not still simpler and more\\nultimate elements in existence than those which even\\nthat art has brought to light. These elements lying out\\nof the reach of perception are, according to Berkeley s\\ntheory, destitute of a ground of existence. As they are\\nnot perceived by us, they do not exist. And yet these\\nvery unperceived and consequently non-existent ele-\\nments are the ground-forms of those complex wholes\\nwhich are obstrusively presented to perception.\\n4. Upon Berkeley s theory representative knowledge\\nis impossible. Let us remember certain of his prin-\\nciples: perception is immediate knowledge of ideas or", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0148.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "Bekkeley s Idealism. 137\\nphenomenal realities. All external phenomenal real-\\nities are known by perception. Their existence depends\\nupon perception. It follows that unless they be per-\\nceived, unless they be immediately known, they can-\\nnot exist. !N ow Berkeley distinguished ideas into two\\nclasses real and imagined. Real ideas are sensible phe-\\nnomena, which are not caused by us, but caused by God s\\nwill. Imagined ideas are mental phenomena of our own\\ncreation they are caused by our wills. From all this it\\nis plain that Berkeley grounded the existence of all phe-\\nnomenal realities in perception. The question then is,\\nWhen we do not perceive these real phenomenal ex-\\nistences, how do we know them The ordinary answer\\nwould be, by representing them in the imagination.\\nApprehending by immediate knowledge, that is, by in-\\nternal perception or consciousness, the representing\\nimages, we necessarily believe in the existence of the\\nobjects represented. We have a knowledge of the\\nformerly presented objects which is mediate, it is true,\\nbut is, at the same time, valid and trustworthy. But\\nBerkeley could not, consistently with his theory, thus\\nanswer. Nothing but perception, that is, immediate\\nknowledge, of the object can ground its real existence.\\nWhere that is wanting, the ideas we cognize are mere\\ncreatures of the imagination, in themselves unreal, and\\nhaving no ground of existence. They represent no\\nrealities; they are spectral and illusory. Representa-\\ntion is not perception: perception alone gives us real,\\nobjective existence; consequently, the representative\\nfaculty cannot give us that sort of reality.\\nLet these remarks be applied to memory as a repre-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0149.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "138 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nsentative faculty. The external, phenomenal facts once\\npresented are no longer in relation to perception. They\\nhave, therefore according to Berkeley s theory, lost their\\nground of existence. To be is to be perceived. They\\nare not perceived, consequently they are not. If we\\nimagine them by the representative faculty, we can\\nhave no guarantee of their reality. All the past, as it\\nhas slided away from relation to our perception, is irre-\\ncoverably gone into the region of unreality. The larg-\\nest section of our knowledge is obliterated. The repre-\\nsentative faculty as one furnishing the knowledge of the\\nreal is nil. This consequence may appear too absurd\\nto be imputed to Berkeley s theory. Let him who thinks\\nso apply the controlling principle, to be is to be per-\\nceived, to the processes of our faculties of representative\\nknowledge, and he must be convinced of the legitimacy\\nof the consequence.\\n5. It revolts common sense to say that a phenomenal\\nreality would cease to exist were there no finite spirit\\nto perceive it that a mountainous pile of rock, for ex-\\nample, would not exist, if some spirit were not perceiv-\\ning it. The case does not bear reasoning. It so tra-\\nverses common conviction that its enouncement pro-\\nvokes derision, and deservedly provokes it. So sen-\\nsible was Bishop Berkeley of this, and also his inter-\\npreter, Professor Eraser, that it was deemed necessary\\nto invoke a hyperphysical ground for the persistence of\\nobjects not perceived by finite beings, and in that way\\nto supplement the deficiencies of the theory. This re-\\ntreat from the hypothesis that phenomenal existence is\\ngrounded in finite perception was its deliberate sacri-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0150.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 139\\nfice. When its friends forsook it, what could be ex-\\npected for it from the tender mercies of its foes When\\nthe Israelites retired from Saul, the Philistines decapi-\\ntated him and fastened his body to the wall of Beth-\\nshan. Why, then, it may be asked, attack an. abandoned\\nhypothesis Is it not most conclusively refuted by the\\nfact that its originators gave it up The answer is, that\\nthey gave it up, and they did not give it up. They con-\\nfessed its insufficiency and continued to speak in defence\\nof it, as one would mention some of the virtues of a for-\\nsaken friend. It is right to shut them up to its com-\\nplete relinquishment and to the advocacy of another\\nhypothesis the grounding of phenomenal existence in\\nGod s perception.\\nNo reasoning, however subtle, supported though it be\\nby the genius of the accomplished Bishop of Cloyne,\\ncan succeed in practically convincing men that their sen-\\nsations are the same with the external, phenomenal\\nthings by which they are surrounded, and which they\\nare accustomed to regard as only the occasions of the\\nsensations. They cannot be argued into the belief that\\nthe pain they feel is the very same with the fire to which\\nthey attribute it with the wood and the flame; that\\nthe sensation of hardness they experience is the same\\nwith the great iron pillar that helps to sustain a massive\\nroof; that the sensation they feel when beholding the\\nglories of the starry heavens is the same with the\\nmeasureless systems that stud the amplitude of space.\\nWhen, in the elegant dialogue in which Berkeley de-\\nfends his theory, Hylas, the representative of the ex-\\nistence of matter, confesses his entire conversion to the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0151.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "140 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nviews of Philonous, the exponent of immaterialism, he\\nutters the confession amidst throes and misgivings which\\nsuggest the nausea and vomiting of a man who, in the\\nintervals of the spasms, endeavors to laud the virtues of\\nthe medicine which has sickened him.\\nThat a powerful presumption lies against a phil-\\nosophical hypothesis which is contrary to the common\\nconvictions and belief of men is explicitly admitted by\\nBerkeley himself, and he exerts his power of argument\\nto show that his view upon this subject is not opposed\\nby the weight of that presumption. He succeeded, as\\nwas to be expected, in persuading his imaginary inter-\\nlocutor, Hylas, of the tenableness of this view, but not\\nmuch is risked by the statement that his argument would\\nnot meet with the same success if addressed to the mass\\nof mankind. It is at least certain that the very need\\nof such an argument supposes that the ordinary belief\\nof men is opposed to the bishop s doctrine.\\n7. That element of Berkeley s theory is incapable of\\njustification, in which the doctrine of the school of asso-\\nciationalism is maintained, that the only relation be-\\ntween sensible phenomena, ordinarily termed material,\\nis one of mere antecedence and sequence. This view\\nflows from his position that the will of God is the only\\ncause which operates in the system of phenomenal rela-\\ntions, that ideas are caused alone by his will, and have\\ntheir connection with each other determined by a\\ncausality which is entirely foreign both to their own\\nintrinsic nature and to the will of finite intelligences.\\n(1.) This doctrine is paradoxical; it is out of har-\\nmony with the common beliefs of the race. Whatever", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0152.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "Beekeley s Idealism. 141\\nphilosophers may hold, it is idle to argue that men in\\ngeneral do not entertain the conviction that there is the\\nrelation of cause and effect between sensible phenomena,\\nand between the will of man and the objects of the ex-\\nternal world. Even those philosophers who hold that\\nthe judgment which affirms the relation of cause and\\neffect is not an original principle of our mental con-\\nstitution, but is the result of experience, maintain the\\nview that it is a necessary judgment unavoidably aris-\\ning from empirical conditions, while the drift of mod-\\nern philosophical thought is towards the assertion of the\\nlaw of causality as one of the fundamental and original\\nelements of our nature. And it cannot well be denied\\nthat this tendency falls in with the ordinary belief of\\nmankind. Is a phenomenal change observed The\\nnatural inquiry which spontaneously arises is, What is\\nits cause Let it be observed that this demand of reason\\nis not made with reference merely to the origination of\\nsubstantial existence or of phenomenal being, but also\\nand most frequently in regard to changes which are\\nrecognized as taking place in the realm of simple phe-\\nnomena. The hypothesis of antecedence and sequence\\ndoes not satisfy this requirement and, to the extent of\\nits involving that hypothesis as an integral element,\\nBerkeley s theory clashes with the instinctive judgments\\nof men.\\n(2.) In regard to the position that the human will\\nexerts no causal influence upon the relations of external\\nphenomenal objects, we venture to take the ground that\\nit contradicts consciousness, for consciousness delivers\\nto us the fact that the will is competent to institute the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0153.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "142 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nrelation of antecedence and sequence between external\\nthings. It can bring them together in that relation.\\nAnd if so, the invariableness of the relation as a law\\nwhich is not subject to voluntary control is disproved by\\na datum of consciousness. Nothing is more common\\nthan the collocation of sensible things by voluntary ac-\\ntion for the purpose of securing desired results. And\\nfurther than this, consciousness also delivers the fact\\nthat the continuance or interruption of the relation is\\nwithin the power of the human will This could be il-\\nlustrated in numberless ways. The hypothesis, then,\\nthat there is a fixed relation of mere antecedence and\\nsequence between so-called material things, which can-\\nnot be affected by the free elections and the causal force\\nof the human will, is evinced to be contradictory to the\\ndeliverances of consciousness, and they must be regarded\\nas decisive, or there is no ground of certitude in ex-\\nistence, no ultimate authority, an appeal to which ought\\nto put an end to strife. Of course, there is no assertion\\nhere of the power of the human will to cause ideas, in\\nBerkeley s sense of the word, as equivalent to phe-\\nnomenal existences. What is affirmed is, that the rela-\\ntions between these ideas are, to a large extent, deter-\\nminable by the causal efficiency of the will.\\nIt might be objected to this view that there is no\\ncausal power in the will itself, and that the only relation\\nbetween mental phenomena themselves, including voli-\\ntions, is that of mere antecedence and sequence. But,\\nhowever Berkeley may have prepared the way, by logi-\\ncal consequence from his hypothesis as to material phe-\\nnomena, for this sceptical result, as he did not himself", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0154.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 143\\nadvocate, or even intimate it, it would be irrelevant here\\nto discuss the question. Were the doctrine of Brown,\\nHume and the Mills under consideration, the case would\\nbe different.\\n8. It is, however, legitimate to say that the theory of\\nBerkeley logically led the way and conduced to the\\nnescience of Hume, and to the agnosticism of the posi-\\ntivist school of the present day. For, if the immediate\\ninference from the testimony of consciousness to the\\nreal, substantial existence of matter as distinct from\\nthat of spirit be refused, the step is easy to the denial of\\nthe inference from its testimony to the real, substantial\\nexistence of spirit, as distinct from matter. The way is\\nopened for the maintenance of any hypothesis which\\nmen may fancy, unembarrassed by the deliverances of\\nconsciousness. Hume took the path to the denial of\\nthe certainty of any substantial existence, and Spencer\\nhas taken that which led him to sink spirit in matter,\\nand to affirm the unknowableness of God himself. Sir\\nWilliam Hamilton is right when he says that conscious-\\nness undoubtedly gives us in the same indivisible act the\\nexistence of spirit and that of matter, related in the\\nsynthesis of knowledge and contrasted in the antithesis\\nof existence. Any other doctrine must logically tend to\\nabsolute idealism, or materialism, or nihilism; and we\\nare disposed to think that there is no logical halting\\nplace between the acceptance of the deliverances of con-\\nsciousness in their simplicity and integrity and the\\nadoption of the desolating doctrines of atheists and\\nnihilists. These remarks are reluctantly made in regard\\nto the logical tendencies of Berkeley s theory. The", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0155.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "144: Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\npious bishop would have repudiated with horror the con-\\nsequences which a rigid logic in the unscrupulous hands\\nof infidels has deduced from it but still, in the light of\\nthe developments which followed his death, it must, in\\ncandor, be allowed that his theory was the egg from\\nwhich was hatched the philosophical scepticism of David\\nHume.\\n9. There is another difficulty in Berkeley s theory\\nwhich is so obvious that it cannot fail to be noticed.\\nHow, it may be demanded, does it ground our knowledge\\nof other personal spirits than ourselves Berkeley holds\\nthat we know our own spirits, as thinking, willing, per-\\nceiving, essences in a word, as personal substances, by\\nself -consciousness. All that is objective to us must be\\nknown by the perception of ideas. These ideas he care-\\nfully distinguishes from the properties of spirit. As our\\nown ideas are not part and parcel of ourselves as spirits,\\nso neither are ideas part and parcel of other spirits than\\nourselves. How, then, do we know other spirits? As\\nwe cannot be conscious of them as spirits, our knowledge\\nis limited to the perception of ideas. But perception is,\\nin this case, restricted to bodily organisms, and the lan-\\nguage spoken or written through the instrumentality of\\nthese organisms. Now, according to Berkeley, they and\\nthe words produced by them are non-spiritual; they are\\nmerely ideas. Granted then that we apprehend these\\nideas by perception, the question is, how we know the\\nspiritual substances to which they seem to be related, and\\nto which, in the judgment of common sense, they are re-\\nlated. Consciousness alone can give us spirit; percep-\\ntion only gives us ideas. This difficulty cannot pos-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0156.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 145\\nsibly be met by saying that we infer the existence of\\nother spirits from these ideas, for Berkeley vehemently\\ndenies that we can infer occult realities from phenom-\\nena. The ideas are phenomena, consequently we are\\nnot allowed to derive the inference from them to spirit-\\nual essences. If, inconsistently with the principles of\\nthe theory, it be admitted that we must infer their ex-\\nistence, that we must have a faith- judgment which af-\\nfirms it, the logical consequence would be that in the\\nsame way we might be entitled from phenomena, which\\nBerkeley asserts to be non-spiritual, to infer the ex-\\nistence of non-spiritual substance that is, in the ordi-\\nnary language of men, to infer from material phenom-\\nena the existence of material substance. As this would\\ncontradict the very principles of the idealistic theory,\\nthere can be no resort to inference to ground the know-\\nledge of any substance, spiritual or non-spiritual. It\\nwould seem, then, to be evident that upon Berkeley s\\ntheory we can have no knowledge of other personal\\nspirits than ourselves.\\nIn reply to this reasoning it may be said that Berke-\\nley regarded ideas or sensible phenomena as a system\\nof symbols a language by means of which spirits hold\\nintercourse with each other. He did; but how that\\nopinion or hypothesis of his helps the matter, it is diffi-\\ncult to see. For, even in our own case, he holds that\\nideas do not ground the existence of spirit, but the con-\\ntrary: the perception of spirit grounds the existence of\\nideas. We do not get the knowledge of our own spirits\\nby ideas we get it by the immediate testimony of self-\\nconsciousness. How, then, can the perception of ideas", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0157.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "146 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ngive us the knowledge of other spirits We cannot be\\nconscious of them; we cannot perceive them we per-\\nceive only ideas, and they are non-spiritual. How,\\nthen, do we know them The theory furnishes no an-\\nswer to this momentous question. It fails to account\\nfor, nay, it renders impossible, the knowledge by the\\nindividual personal spirit of other spirits like itself,\\nand so destroys the possibility of communion between\\nspirit and spirit: of all society based upon the fellow-\\nship and reciprocal action of personal intelligences of\\nthe family, the church, the State. I know my own body\\nonly as a collection of ideas, from which it is illegitimate\\nto infer the existence of my spirit. In the same way I\\nknow other human bodies; they are simply bundles of\\nideas from which I cannot infer the existence of other\\nspirits. It would seem then that one personal spirit\\ncan know the existence of other personal spirits neither\\nby consciousness, nor by external perception, nor by in-\\nference from phenomenal qualities or acts.\\nNo doubt it will be urged in answer to this grave alle-\\ngation that there is another means of knowledge by\\nwhich spirits may become acquainted with each other s\\nexistence that has been left out of account in this in-\\ndictment. What should hinder their knowing each\\nother by the testimony of each to its own existence?\\nBut the difficulty is not removed. How is this testimony\\ndelivered? The answer must be: through words, either\\nspoken or written. These words, however, are, accord-\\ning to Berkeley s theory, a part of those sensible phe-\\nnomena which he calls ideas. Certainly they are cog-\\nnized through sense, and thus become objects of per-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0158.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "Beekeley s Idealism. 147\\nception. How, then, can we go beyond these percepts\\nto reach the existence of other spirits than ourselves\\nShall we infer from them that existence This we are\\ndebarred from doing by Berkeley s principles. From\\nperceived phenomena to argue the existence of unper-\\nceived substance this is in no case warrantable; if it\\nwere, we might be unphilosophical enough even to be-\\nlieve in the substance of matter as revealed by sensible\\nphenomena As, therefore, the testimony which other\\nspirits than myself furnish must itself be a collection of\\nideas, I am shut off from depending upon it as a means\\nof knowing their existence.\\nIn order to turn the edge of this criticism, it may be\\ncharged with misconceiving Berkeley s doctrine, for he\\ndistinctly teaches that ideas are not caused by the per-\\nsonal will of finite spirits, and as testimony delivered\\nin language is caused by personal will, it cannot be con-\\nsidered as belonging to the category of ideas. To this\\nit is obvious to reply that the testimony must consist\\neither of sounds or of written characters. As sounds are\\nperceived through the sense of hearing, they are, accord-\\ning to Berkeley, sensations. They could be perceived\\nin no other way, and in no other way could they be cog-\\nnizable by us. They are consequently to be classed with\\nBerkeley s ideas. Written or printed characters are\\nperceived through the sense of sight. They also are sen-\\nsations, and, therefore, to be ranked among his ideas.\\nWe must return then to the assertion that as they are\\nideas, they can, upon the bishop s principles, afford no\\nground for knowing spirit. If they be ideas, they are\\nnot caused by spirit, and we are excluded from referring", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0159.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "148 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthem as effects to a spiritual cause. But if it must be\\nadmitted that they are caused by the personal will of\\nspirit, there are some ideas which are caused by spirit,\\nand Berkeley is made to contradict himself, since he\\naffirms of all ideas that they have no such cause. The\\nonly escape from this contradiction would lie in holding\\nthat they are not ideas and that would be to deny their\\nphenomenality, which has been already shown to be im-\\npossible. To say that Berkeley proves the existence of\\nGod by the phenomenal world as his ideas is no answer,\\nfor he holds that God s ideas are caused by his will.\\nConsequently, it would be legitimate to infer from them\\nas effects his personal existence. There is no analogy\\nbetween the cases. It has thus been evinced that upon\\nBerkeley s theory one spirit cannot know the existence\\nof other spirits.\\n10. We come now, in the last place, briefly to con-\\nsider that aspect of Berkeley s theory to which, in the\\nfinal analysis, it was brought by himself namely, that\\nall phenomenal realities, commonly called material, are\\nGod s ideas. Let it be noticed that we do not depart\\nfrom his own definition of ideas, as distinguished from\\nthought, volition and perception, which he is careful to\\ndesignate as the properties of spirit alone, God s ideas,\\nthen, will be treated in accordance with his own notion\\nof them, as distinct from God s thoughts and from his\\nperception. His doctrine is that the so-called material\\nuniverse is a collection of God s ideas, created by his\\nwill, and dependent for existence upon his perception.\\nAt the same time it must not be forgotten that Berkeley\\nto the last also contended that there are phenomenal", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0160.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "Bebkeley s Idealism. 149\\nrealities which are human ideas, not indeed caused by\\nthe human will, but dependent upon human perception\\nfor their existence. In regard to this final devel-\\nopment of his theory we make the following observa-\\ntions\\n(1.) God s ideas are represented as being identical\\nwith fleeting, sensible phenomena, which, if any mean-\\ning can be attached to the language, is shocking to com-\\nmon sense,\\n(2.) God s ideas are in part corruptible, for it is\\nmanifest that some phenomenal realities, as, for in-\\nstance, the human body, are corruptible. They dissolve,\\ndecay and rot, and what sense can be attached to the\\naffirmation that divine ideas are thus corruptible it\\ntasks the power of man to conceive,\\n(3.) As all phenomenal existences are God s ideas,\\nand some are man s ideas, some are both divine and\\nhuman ideas at one and the same time. This involves\\na contradiction and an absurdity.\\n(4.) As all ideas are said to be sensations, God is\\nsaid to have sensations.\\n(5.) As all ideas are God s ideas, and some ideas are\\nour sensations, some of God s ideas are our sensations.\\n(6.) As all ideas depend upon perception for ex-\\nistence, for esse est percipi, God s ideas depend upon his\\nperception for existence yet Berkeley contends that\\nGod s ideas are caused by his will, which is the same aa\\nto say that they depend for existence upon his will.\\nNow, either his perception and his will are held to be\\nthe same, and that is absurd, or they are held to be dif-\\nferent, and then the contradiction emerges that his ideas", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0161.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "150 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndepend for existence upon his perception, and at the\\nsame time depend for existence upon his will.\\n(7.) Either God s ideas are held to he a part of him-\\nself or not. If they are not, the contradiction ensues\\nthat they are affirmed to he his ideas, and not his ideas\\nat one and the same time. If they are a part of him-\\nself, as the universe is said to he a collection of God s\\nideas, it is a part of himself, and idealistic pantheism is\\nthe inevitable result.\\n(8.) God s ideas and his will are made one and the\\nsame. We cannot resist the conviction forced upon us\\nby the analogies of our own being that force is an ex-\\npression of will. But there are forces in operation in\\nthe so-called material system, and that fact Berkeley ad-\\nmits. Now that system being, according to him, nothing\\nbut God s ideas, it follows that its forces as phenomenal\\nare parts of his ideas, and consequently that his ideas\\nand his will are the same. But if they be said to be the\\nsame, a contradiction occurs. For God s ideas are said\\nto be caused by his will, and a thing cannot without a\\ncontradiction be said to be caused by itself.\\n(9.) Berkeley admitted the fact of creation. But\\nthe universe, he contends, is God s ideas. Consequently,\\nGod created his own ideas. But Berkeley, in his Siris,\\nconfesses his leanings to the Platonic doctrine of eternal\\nideas, and so Professor Eraser interprets him. We have\\nthen an eternal creation, which is a contradiction in\\nterms, for that which is created had a beginning, and\\nthat which is eternal had no beginning. But if it be\\nheld notwithstanding, as Origen maintained, that an\\neternal creation is possible, and further, that the uni-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0162.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 151\\nverse was eternally created, we have a Christian version\\nof the old Greek doctrine of the eternity of matter, or,\\nin Berkeley s phrase, of the phenomenal sensible system.\\nOne fails to see how this congeries of absurdities and\\ncontradictions can be denied as logically involved in\\nBerkeley s theory, if it comprise as integral elements\\nthe two positions, that sensible phenomena or ideas are\\ndependent for existence upon the perception of finite\\nspirit, and that they are at the same time dependent for\\nexistence upon the perception of the Infinite Spirit. If\\nthe first of these elements be eliminated from the theory,\\nin order to save it from self-contradiction and reduce it\\nto unity, it is confessed that the bulk of Berkeley s\\nwritings, in which it is defended, are nothing worth;\\nthey have lost their significance and their interest. If\\nit be retained, it must be granted that his most ardent\\nadmirers would find it an office which would task their\\nutmost ability to adjust it to his latest thinking. What\\nhis latest thinking was, we collect from his Siris, which\\nwas the production of his age. In that remarkable spec-\\nulation we find him speaking in terms of approbation\\nof Plato s eternal ideas, the only true realities in con-\\nformity with which the universe of unreal and fleeting\\nphenomena was brought into being. It cannot be denied\\nthat this subjects him to the criticism of changing the\\nmeaning of his terms. The term ideas, which plays\\nthe most important part in his previous reasoning as\\nrepresenting created phenomena of sense, is now made\\nto signify the uncreated thoughts the eternal ideals\\nand archetypes of the Infinite Mind. Formerly ideas\\nwere treated by him as phenomenal objects, sensible", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0163.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "152 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthings, dependent for existence upon finite perception\\nnow they are magnified as the concepts of the eternal\\nintelligence.\\nThere are two hypotheses, each maintained by a writer\\nof genius, upon one of which it is conceivable that an at-\\ntempt might be made to relieve this inconsistency. One\\nis that of the elder President Edwards, who was a corn-\\ntemporary of Berkeley, was preaching at Northampton\\nwhen the dean was sojourning in Rhode Island, and held\\nan idealistic theory which, to a remarkable extent, coin-\\ncided with that of the latter. The other is that sup-\\nported in his work on metaphysics by Professor Borden\\nP. Bowne, of Boston University.\\nA few remarks will be made touching the hypothesis\\nof Edwards, but that of Professor Bowne must be re-\\nserved for separate consideration. In regard to the\\nquestion, how sensible things, which, with Berkeley, he\\nheld to be ideas, could continue to exist without finite\\nminds to perceive them, Edwards took the ground that\\nthey exist in God s uncreated idea. Now, if all that the\\nNew England philosopher meant was that all phenome-\\nnal things are transcripts of the ideas which eternally\\nexisted in the divine mind, what theist would care to\\ndeny the doctrine? But this was evidently not his\\nmeaning. The difficulty which he is meeting is this:\\nA sensible thing or idea is supposed to be in actual ex-\\nistence, but unperceived by any finite mind. How is\\nits existence to be accounted for He distinguishes.\\nSome things exist as created ideas, some in God s un-\\ncreated idea. The thing supposed exists in God s un-\\ncreated idea. There he finds its ground. But", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0164.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 153\\nFirst, if, upon the supposition, the thing is in actual\\nexistence, although unperceived by any finite mind, it\\nmust be a created idea, for why attempt to account for\\nthe existence of an idea unperceived by finite mind, un-\\nless, being created, it might be perceived by such a mind\\nIt is, therefore, contradictorialy represented as at the\\nsame time a created idea, and as being only in God s\\nuncreated idea.\\nSecondly, if it be only in God s uncreated idea, and\\nyet, as Edwards holds, in actual existence in that idea,\\nwhy suppose its creation The law of parcimony would\\nexclude the creation of an idea which is already actually\\nexistent in uncreated idea? The fact is that we have\\na finite thing represented as actually existent, and not\\ncreated at the same time, which amounts to this, that it\\nis actually existent, and not actually existent, created,\\nand not created, at the same time. How the master of\\nargumentation by contradictories could have slipped\\ninto this contradiction it is hard to understand, except\\nupon the principle that he who refuses to accept the\\ndata of consciousness has no safeguard against any\\nerror. The question whether a thing may not actually\\nexist in God s uncreated idea, but which neither actually\\nexists, nor may actually exist, in relation to our intelli-\\ngence, is for us a non-existent question. We may as\\nwell inquire into the ground of existence of inhabitants\\nof Alcyone, or even of our sun. But, whatever may be\\nthought of Edward s speculation, his uncreated idea\\ncannot lift Berkeley out of his inconsistency. For, if he\\ntaught anything, it was this that all sensible things or\\nideas are created by the divine will; and how God s", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0165.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "154 Discussion s of Philosophical Questions.\\nuncreated ideas could be created by bis will, it would\\ntake more than Berkeley s or Edwards abilities to\\nshow.\\nThis discussion of the idealism of Bishop Berkeley,\\nhowever inadequate it may be, cannot well be deemed un-\\ntimely. The main current of thought at the present\\ntime, in consequence of the prodigious advance of the\\nphysical sciences, and the absorption of many acute\\ninvestigators in the contemplation of outward phenom-\\nena, may be setting in the direction of materialism. But\\nas one extreme of speculation tends to produce another,\\nit is probable, it may almost with safety be predicted,\\nthat there will come a powerful re-action towards ideal-\\nism. The distinguished editor of Berkeley s Works not\\nobscurely intimates his leaning to the theory they main-\\ntain 1 and the brilliant reviewer of Herbert Spencer s\\nphilosophy 2 declares himself an objective idealist.\\nAs in the past the philosophical intellect has vibrated\\nbetween the opposite extremes of materialism and ideal-\\nism, it is to be expected that there will be a similar oscil-\\nlation in the future.\\nMeanwhile the sober student of the facts of conscious-\\nness, and the Christian theist who accepts the obvious\\nteachings of the Bible, will be content, as heretofore, to\\ntread a middle path. They will continue to affirm the\\ndifference between the indissoluble and deathless spirit\\nwith its grand endowment of intellectual beliefs and\\nmoral intuitions, on the one hand, and divisible, cor-\\n1 In this opinion we are sustained by Dr. Noah Porter App. to\\nUeberweg s Hist. Phil., Vol. II., p. 438.\\nProfessor Bowne.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0166.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s Idealism. 155\\nraptible matter, on the other; and holding to the doc-\\ntrine of creation as the only safe moorage, they will re-\\nfuse to sublimate the world to unity with God, or sink\\nGod to identity with the world. Of any other theory,\\nwhatever may be its prestige, the similitude may be\\nused, which was beautifully employed by Cardinal Pole,\\nin a letter to the elegant scholar, Sadolet, with reference\\nto the Platonic philosophy since the introduction of the\\ndivine system of Christianity\\nEst in conspeetu Tenedos, notissima fama\\nInsula, dives opum, Priami dum regna manebant;\\nNunc tantum sinus, et statio malefida carinis.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0167.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "OBJECTIVE IDEALISM.\\nPEOEESSOB BOEDER P. BOWNE, of Boston\\nUniversity, in his able work on metaphysics,\\nclaims to be an objective idealist. What objective\\nidealism is, in his conception of it, may be compendi-\\nously described in his own words\\nIn discussing matter and force, we saw the difficulty which\\nattends the atomic theory of matter viewed as an ontological fact,\\nand we decided for the view that the elements are not properly\\nthings, but only constant forms of the action of the Infinite accord-\\ning to fixed laws. In addition, the discussion of interaction has\\nshown that the impersonal finite can lay no claim to existence.\\nFor, as impersonal, it is without subjectivity; and, as finite, its\\nobjective action is mediated by the infinite; that is, it is done by\\nthe infinite. It has, then, no longer any reason for existence; and\\nthere is no longer any ground for affirming its existence. It does\\nnothing, and is nothing but a form of thought based upon the\\nactivity of something not itself. This view we reproduce as our\\nfinal verdict. Matter and material things have no ontological,\\nbut only a phenomenal, existence. Their necessary dependence\\nand lack of all subjectivity make it impossible to view them as\\ncapable of other than phenomenal existence. This world-view,\\nthen, contains the following factors 1 The Infinite energizes\\nunder the forms of space and time; (2) the system of energizing\\naccording to certain laws and principles, which system appears in\\nthought as the external universe; and (3) finite spirits, who are\\nin relation to this system, and in whose intuition the system takes\\non the forms of perception. 1\\nElsewhere he represents the universe as God s\\nthoughts objectified. As it was incumbent on him to\\n1 Metaphysics, pp. 465, 466.\\n156", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0168.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "Objective Idealism. 157\\nshow how this objectification takes place, he maintains\\nthat God s thoughts and his acts are the same that is,\\nif the language means anything, in thinking the universe\\nGod produced it and being thus acted or produced, it\\ncontinues as God s thoughts continuously acted out.\\nThe doctrine of continuous creation is more than ob-\\nscurely hinted in this theory; it is expressly referred\\nto as illustrating the theory. We may, he says, get\\nsome hint of what this may mean from the scholastic\\ndoctrine of preservation or continuous creation. Such\\ncreation could be nothing more than a movement of the\\ndivine activity according to the idea of the thing. 1\\nThis theory professes to differ from Berkeley s in the\\nfollowing particulars\\nIn the first place, it does not ground phenomenal 2\\nexistence in the perception of finite spirit. It denies\\nreal existence to the phenomenal universe, and makes\\nit simply the objectified and concrete forms of the divine\\nthoughts. These are apprehended by us under the\\nforms of perception that is, to us they would have no\\nexistence were they not perceived. They would still be\\nGod s thoughts, but we could not know them. In this\\nrespect, it must be granted that the theory is not identi-\\ncal with Berkeley s at least, in its earlier shape.\\nIn the second place, Berkeley s ideas, or phenomenal\\nexistences, were, in his first thinking, inert and passive\\nthey were created by the divine will, and have their\\n1 Metaphysics, p. 466.\\n2 The word phenomenal is used here in the sense of these\\nwriters. I believe that there are phenomena of spirit as well as\\nof matter.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0169.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "158 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ncondition of being in the intelligent apprehension of\\nspirit. According to Professor Bowne, the phenomenal\\nuniverse is a collection of God s thoughts, and its ele-\\nments are, therefore, active. The phenomenal elements\\nhave in themselves no real existence, not even derived\\nand dependent, but are simply the concrete and observ-\\nable expressions of God s intelligent activity. In this\\nregard, also, the two theories differ, and I cannot help\\nthinking that the Bishop s has the advantage, to the\\nextent of avoiding a tendency to idealistic pantheism, so\\nfar as the non-spiritual universe is concerned a ten-\\ndency which seems to be lodged in the theory of the\\nAmerican metaphysician.\\nIn the third place, Berkeley, in his earlier specula-\\ntions, distinguished between ideas or phenomenal reali-\\nties and thoughts as properly belonging to spirit alone\\nand, on the supposition of the universal validity of this\\ndistinction, must be construed as having discriminated\\nthe phenomenal universe as a collection of God s created\\nideas from his eternal thoughts. On the other hand,\\nProfessor Bowne represents the phenomenal elements of\\nthe universe as. being the divine thoughts themselves.\\nThis constitutes another point of difference between his\\ntheory and Berkeley s at least, in its earlier and most\\nelaborated form.\\nBut, on the supposition that Berkeley s theory, in its\\nlatest stage of development, involved the doctrine that\\nthe so-called material universe is but a manifestation of\\nGod s thoughts, an expression simply of his intelligent\\nactivity, the two theories must be regarded as so far\\ncoinciding; and what has been advanced by the later", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0170.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "Objective Idealism. 159\\nphilosopher comes in relevantly for consideration as\\napplied to the views of the earlier. There is, it must be\\nconfessed, room for serious doubt as to the legitimacy\\nof this supposition and it is bnt just to Berkeley that\\nthe grounds of this doubt should be indicated. It is, in\\nthe first place, not likely that he ever abandoned a doc-\\ntrine so vital to theism as that of the creation of the\\nuniverse, non-spiritual as well as spiritual, by the power\\nof God. If, however, he be regarded as having, in his\\nlast speculations, which led him to speak admiringly of\\nthe Platonic ideas, adopted a theory identical with that\\nof Professor Bowne, he relinquished the fact of creation\\nas related to the so-called material universe; for the\\nProfessor holds that only spirit is created, while the\\nimpersonal finite was not created, but evolved from the\\nintelligent activity of God. He remarks: We must\\nsay, then, that only self-hood suffices to mark oif the\\nfinite from the infinite and that only the finite spirit\\nattains to substantial otherness to the infinite. Apart\\nfrom this, there is nothing but the infinite and its mani-\\nfold activities. The impersonal finite attains only to\\nsuch otherness as an act or thought has to its subject.\\nFinally, the spirit must be viewed as created. It is\\nextremely doubtful whether Berkeley ever came to hold\\nthis view. In the second place, it is supposable that\\nBerkeley meant by his encomiums upon Plato s ideas\\nsimply that they were eternal concepts in the divine\\nmind, in conformity with which the universe of phe-\\nnomenal ideas has been fashioned, archetypes, of which\\nso-called material realities are the ectypes. There would\\n1 Met., p. 137.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0171.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "160 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbe confusion of language in the affirmation that ideas\\nare the copies of ideas. Still, it is conceivable that he\\nmay have intended to say, that ideas as phenomenal and\\ntemporal are transcripts of ideas as transcendental and\\neternal. Such a construction of his views would not\\nimplicate them in Professor Bowne s theory, that the\\nphenomenal universe is God s thought.\\nBut while it is due to Berkeley to give him the benefit\\nof this doubt, it must still be allowed that in his Siris,\\nwhich embodied his latest reflections, he affords some\\ncolor to the supposition that he leaned to the adoption\\nof views very like those expressed in the theory of Pro-\\nfessor Bowne. Some brief strictures upon that theory\\nwill now be adventured.\\n1. Either it is maintained, in this theory, that God is\\nthe Creator of the phenomenal universe, or it is not. If\\nit is, then, as that universe is said to be a collection of\\nGod s thoughts, or his thought, objectified and made\\nperceivable by finite spirit, God is represented as the\\nCreator of his thoughts. This is self-contradictory and\\nabsurd for, in the first place, no analogy derived from\\nthe constitution of the human mind would lead to the\\nview that thought is creatively caused by will. In the\\nsecond place, if God s thoughts, any of them, were cre-\\nated, they had a beginning, and the inifinity and perfec-\\ntion of the divine intelligence are denied, which is\\nequivalent to the denial of a God. If it is not main-\\ntained that God is the creator of the phenomenal uni-\\nverse, as that universe is said to be an assemblage of his\\nthoughts, or if the expression be preferred his\\nthought, it is contended that it is evolved from his", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0172.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "Objective Idealism. 161\\nintelligence as a part of himself and idealistic panthe-\\nism is affirmed, so far forth as the so-called material\\nsystem is concerned; and how such a theory consists\\nwith the fundamental principles of theism it passes one s\\nability to comprehend for, surely, whatever, upon those\\nprinciples, the relation of God to the material universe\\nmay be conceived to be, it is one which does not involve\\nthe identity of God with any part of the created system\\nin no sense is the universe he, or he the universe. This\\nit is of the last consequence to theism to maintain.\\nIf, in resistance to the first member of this dilemma,\\nit be said that God may be the creator of his acts what-\\never may or may not be held as to the truth of this posi-\\ntion, the answer is incompetent to the supporters of the\\ntheory under consideration, for it asserts the identity of\\nGod s acts and his thoughts. Consequently, the contra-\\ndictoriness and absurdity charged upon the position, that\\nGod is the creator of his thoughts, are equally imputable\\nto the position that he is the creator of his acts. They\\nare, as related to the non-spiritual universe, held to be\\none and the same, and are, therefore, susceptible of com-\\nmon predication.\\n2. It is affirmed, in this theory, either that the phe-\\nnomenal universe is infinite, or that it is finite. If\\ninfinite, either it is God or not. If it be God, pantheism\\nis the result. If it be not God, there are two separate\\ninfinities, and they would be mutually exclusive and\\nas God must exist and the universe be excluded, nihilism\\nis the result. If the phenomenal universe be affirmed\\nto be finite, as it is held to be God s thoughts, some of\\nGod s thoughts are finite; and how that can be main-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0173.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "162 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntained by a theist it is impossible to see. It is intelligible\\nthat God. may manifest himself finitely, but that is quite\\na different thing from saying that his thoughts are finite.\\nFinite thoughts of an infinite being that is a contra-\\ndiction. ]STor can it be believed that any aggregation of\\nfinite thoughts, however multiplied, could ever amount\\nto the infinite. But if it could, the universe as that\\naggregate would be infinite, and the difficulties opposing\\nthe supposition of two infinities would again be encoun-\\ntered.\\n3. This theory necessitates the absurd inference that\\nGod s thoughts are contingent, fluctuating, corruptible;\\nfor, if anything is universally admitted, it is that these\\npredicates may be affirmed of the world as phenomenal.\\nIt is no answer to say that there are laws and forces\\nwhich are fixed, uniform, permanent. Besides these\\nelements of nature, the unchanging character of which\\nis not, strictly speaking, phenomenal, but inferred, there\\nare others which are certainly subject to a perpetual\\nflux and since all the parts of the phenomenal universe\\nare said to be God s thoughts, these contingent, mutable,\\nevanescent parts are his thoughts, and the absurdity is\\nnot removed.\\n4. The question must be encountered by the main-\\ntainors of this theory, What meaning can be attached to\\nthe affirmation that the phenomenal universe consists of\\nthe objectified thoughts of God The divine thoughts\\nare supposed to be first immanent and subjective, and\\nthen to become transitive and objective. It is incum-\\nbent on the supporters of this theory to show how this\\nis possible. What is the nature, what the effect of such", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0174.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "Objective Idealism. 163\\nan objectification of the divine thoughts as constitutes\\nthe world of phenomena, and renders it perceivable by\\nfinite intelligence According to the common theistic\\ndoctrine, God, in conformity with his thoughts, or, what\\nis the same thing, his intelligent plan, by an exercise of\\ncreative power, originates realities, which are different\\nfrom himself, and, therefore, different from the thoughts\\nof which they are the transcripts and reflections. Al-\\nthough the fact of creation, in its strict acceptation, is\\ntranscendental, in the sense that it cannot be conceived\\nby the thinking faculty, it is not contradictory to the\\nlaws in accordance with which the processes of the reason\\nare conducted. On the contrary, the thinking faculty\\nfurnishes, in connection with cosmical phenomena first\\nperceived by the presentative faculty, then represented\\nin the imagination, and finally mounting into concepts\\nunder thought-relations, the empirical conditions upon\\nwhich a faith- judgment is reached that positively affirms\\nthe fact of creation. This is conceded by the abettors\\nof the theory before us, with reference to the origination,\\nby causal efficiency, of personal spirits. They deny it,\\nhowever, in relation to sensible and impersonal phe-\\nnomena. Such phenomena are not created; they are\\nthe objectified thoughts of God.\\nThe supposition of creation being, upon this theory,\\nexcluded as furnishing an account of the existence of\\nthe so-called material universe, there are, the being of\\nGod assumed, but three suppositions that need to be\\ntaken into account: first, that of the dualists, who con-\\ntend for the co-eternity of God and matter as two inde-\\npendent substances; secondly, that of the eleatics, who", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0175.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "164 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndeny the existence of the world, and admit only the\\nreality of the Infinite; thirdly, that of the pantheists,\\nwho reduce the infinite and the finite to unity upon the\\nsame substance. That of spontaneous generation is\\nthrown out of account.\\nThe co-eternity of God and matter is professedly\\ndenied by the theory under consideration, for it denies\\nthe existence of matter, as ordinarily apprehended but,\\nat the same time, it admits sensible, impersonal phe-\\nnomena, which are cognized under the forms of percep-\\ntion. Now these phenomena are held to be the thoughts\\nof God and as they are not created they must be eternal.\\nThe theory, therefore, agrees with the dualistic, so far as\\nit asserts the eternity of the phenomenal universe. Its\\nadvocates may possibly disclaim the holding of this\\nhypothesis, but logic inevitably deduces it from the\\ntheory itself. Either, the phenomenal universe was\\ncreated or not. If created, it begun. If not, it did not\\nbegin that is, it is eternal. The theory denies that it\\nwas created. Consequently it affirms its eternity. There\\nis no pause here to consider the question whether crea-\\ntion may not be eternal. Although backed by the name\\nof Origen, an eternal creation is self-contradictory and\\nabsurd. This theory is to be acquitted of maintaining\\nthe independence of the phenomenal universe, but not\\nof holding its eternity.\\nIn answer, it may be said and it is the only reply\\nwhich, to my mind, is conceivable that it is the mani-\\nfestation of the divine thoughts which constitutes the\\nphenomenal universe. One can easily perceive the dif-\\nference between manifested and unmanifested thoughts,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0176.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "Objective Idealism. 165\\na difference only of relation to percipients, but how the\\nthoughts themselves are intrinsically different it is hard\\nto see. The thoughts which are manifested are the very\\nsame as those which existed before manifestation. If\\nmanifestation made new thoughts, it would be creation,\\nand that the theory denies. What then Why this the\\nthoughts of God are eternal; the phenomenal universe\\nis the thoughts of God; therefore, it is eternal. This\\nelement of the dualistic doctrine cannot be grafted upon\\na theory professedly theistic.\\nThe second hypothesis that of the eleatics denies\\nthe existence of the finite. Now that is what is done by\\nthe theory of Professor Bowne, so far as the so-called\\nmaterial system is concerned. The theory denies to it\\nreal existence, and affirms that the only real existence\\nwhich appears is that of God s ever-active thoughts.\\nWe have, then, a slice of the eleatic hypothesis in this\\ntheory: not that it denies the existence of finite spirit,\\nbut so far as it denies that of finite matter.\\nThe pantheistic hypothesis makes the so-called finite\\nmaterial system the evolution and manifestation of the\\ninfinite substance. Now, as this theory posits a phe-\\nnomenal system, but makes it the evolution and mani-\\nfestation of God s eternal thoughts, it is impossible to\\nperceive how it differs, in this respect, from the hypothe-\\nsis of idealistic pantheism. The personality of God is\\naffirmed by it; otherwise, how could it assume to be a\\ntheistic theory? but creation of the material world is\\ndenied, and that is pantheistic. The evolution of the\\nfinite phenomenal system from the infinite being is\\naffirmed that, pro tanto, is pantheistic. We have, then,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0177.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "166 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nan element of the pantheistic hypothesis in this\\ntheory.\\nThe result of the analysis which has been instituted\\nis the proof that the theory under consideration is partly\\ntheistie, partly dualistic, partly eleatic, and partly pan-\\ntheistic. It would be a splendid instance of a compre-\\nhensive eclecticism, were it not for the unhappy fact that\\nit attempts to integrate into unity jarring and irrecon-\\ncilable elements. Unity, the great quest of philosophical\\ninquiry, is the crown of a theory, but it cannot be won\\nby an assemblage of contradictions. The acuteness of\\nthis speculation will elicit admiration, but its self-\\ninconsistency will provoke a smile.\\nHumano capiti cervicem pictor equinam\\nIungere si velit, et varias inducere plumas\\nUndique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum\\nDesinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,\\nSpectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?\\nTo the sacrifice of the doctrines of natural realism,\\nand the creation of the material system, the theistie\\nphilosopher and the Christian theologian cannot quietly\\nconsent. The battle for them is for altars and fire-\\nsides. They are essential alike to a true philosophy\\nand a true theology.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0178.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "PANTHEISM,\\nTHE cardinal principle of pantheism is, that there\\nis but one substance. It is in the highest sense a\\nmonistic system. Not only does it deny the dualism of\\nfinite spirit and matter, but it also denies the difference\\nbetween finite spirit and matter as a common substance,\\non the one hand, and the infinite substance on the other.\\nAll that is finite is reduced to unity upon the primordial,\\ninfinite substance, which is called God. God is every-\\nthing, and everything is God.\\nThere are three principal forms in which pantheism\\nhas been advocated\\nI. Spinozist pantheism, which affirms that God, as the\\none substance, is both thought and extension, that this\\nsubstance manifests itself in what is called finite spirit,\\nand also in what is called matter.\\nII. Idealistic pantheism, which affirms that the one\\nsubstance is simply spirit: matter is nothing.\\nIII. Materialistic pantheism, which affirms that the\\none substance is simply matter spirit is nothing.\\nIt will be seen that all these forms of the theory are\\ncollected into ultimate unity by the assertion of the\\nexistence of but one substance, primordial and infinite.\\nThe leading features of the theory are\\n1. There is but one substance in existence.\\n2. That substance is impersonal God is not a person.\\n167", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0179.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "168 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\n3. That substance is not creative: strictly speaking,\\nGod creates nothing.\\nThe order of this statement of elements will be fol-\\nlowed in the presentation of arguments against the pan-\\ntheistic theory.\\nI. Let us consider the position that there is but one\\nsubstance in existence.\\n1. The explicit testimony of consciousness is opposed\\nto it. That testimony is, that the ego and the non-ego\\nare different, though related, realities. In interpreting\\nthe testimony of consciousness, we are warranted in\\nderiving from it those necessary inferences which are\\nimplicitly contained in it, and the evolution of which is\\nenforced by the fundamental laws of belief, the original\\nprinciples of cognition, which lie at the root of our\\nmental nature. As we are obliged to infer, from the\\ninternal phenomena of our minds which are presented\\nto consciousness, the existence of a subject which they\\nmanifest, and which is the bond of unity between them,\\nso we are constrained to infer from the external phe-\\nnomena presented to consciousness the existence of a\\nsubstance similarly related to them.\\nIf these inferences are denied, our nature is an organ\\nof deceit. The deliverances of consciousness, and the\\nnecessary inferences which flow from them, are, apart\\nfrom a supernatural revelation, our only ultimate\\ngrounds of certitude. Kefuse credence to them, and the\\nhypotheses which are advanced in regard to any reality,\\nto any alleged existence, to the primordial substance\\nitself, are mere vagaries. Pantheism, like every other\\ntheory, vanishes into the mists of nescience.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0180.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 169\\nIt is plain that if, upon grounds of consciousness, we\\ncannot affirm the substance of mind or matter, we can-\\nnot assert the substance of God. All is a dream the\\ndream of a dream. Upon what possible ground will\\nthe pantheist found his proofs, if the data of conscious-\\nness are pronounced untrustworthy It is evident that\\nontology must begin with consciousness. If not, it has\\nno assignable beginning, and is in the category of an\\nabsolute commencement.\\n2. It is impossible to reduce the incompatible quali-\\nties of spirit and matter to unity upon the same sub-\\nstance. If this cannot be done in regard to finite sub-\\nstance, infinitely less can it be accomplished in relation\\nto the infinite substance. The problem before the great\\nabsolutist speculators of Germany was to reduce all\\nthings to ultimate unity. The apparent chasm between\\nspirit and matter had to be bridged. Eichte was con-\\nsistent in his earlier thinking, when he affirmed pure,\\nsubjective idealism. Matter, as such, had no real ex-\\nistence: all that is, is the Ego. There was, indeed,\\nthe thesis and the antithesis of the Ego and the non-Ego,\\nbut this opposition was by an ultimate synthesis brought\\ninto unity in an exclusive subjective idealism but the\\nproblem was encountered in a different manner by\\nSchelling and Hegel. Acknowledging the material\\nreality of physical nature, they had the thesis and anti-\\nthesis of matter and the absolute spiritual substance to\\novercome. The synthesis by which that result was\\nachieved is, if the whole thing is not misconceived, one\\nof the extraordinary curiosities of philosophical specu-\\nlation. The Absolute develops by a sort of self-aliena-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0181.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "170 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntion into nature, and so passes into alterity, or other-\\nness than itself. Not content with this marvellous exile\\nin a foreign sphere, it seeks to return to its identity.\\nThe leap would be too sudden, the transition too abrupt,\\nfrom nature to the Absolute though one, for the life of\\nhim, cannot see why, if it was accomplished to nature, it\\nmight not as well be effected from it. The passage, in\\nthis wonderful circumnavigation, is first made from\\nnature to spirit, and then back to the Absolute. The\\nself-alienation is completely removed, and there ensues\\nan absolute self-reconciliation. We are not told, by the\\nnarrators of this transcendental voyage, what, after the\\nAbsolute has got home to itself, becomes of nature but\\nthat in passing. What is here emphasized is the con-\\nfession, uttered by these deep, very deep, thinkers who\\nwore the crown of the Kantian development, of the\\notherness of matter to spirit, and their desperate conatus\\nto reduce the formidable alterity to the repose of indif-\\nference, the unity of identity. A becomes, by self-\\nestrangement, non-A, and again non-A becomes A in\\nthat transcendent sphere in which all difference disap-\\npears, and contradiction and identity are one and the\\nsame in the bosom of the Absolute. A German may\\nperhaps get a glimpse of some meaning in all this, but\\nan Englishman, unless he chanced to be born of a Ger-\\nman mother, may safely be defied to point out where, in\\nthis profound history of God, one spark of intelligi-\\nbility gleams. He would exclaim, Matter I know, and\\nspirit I know, but who is this material-spiritual Abso-\\nlute?\\nIt is no wonder that Kant is reported to have had no", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0182.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 171\\nuse for Christianity, and that he applied to man in his\\npresent moral condition the superlative nonsense of the\\naphorism Because I ought, I can that Fichte groaned\\nout the mournful lament: I myself am the dream of a\\ndream that Schelling regarded the so-called Bible 1\\nas the greatest hindrance to the progress of true religion\\nand, with the ecstasy of the lunatic, affected to gaze in\\nthe rapture of intellectual intuition upon the Absolute\\nitself; and that Hegel reached the climax (or the\\nbathos) of human speculation in the identity of the Abso-\\nlute and Nothing Nor is it any wonder that, when from\\nthe summit to which these eagles of philosophic fancy\\nhad soared, the down-grade began, Schopenhauer\\nshould have pointed to pessimism as the last iron-bound\\nstation of poor, human nature, the only escape from\\nwhich is through the impossible negation of all appetite,\\ndesire and volition, or that Hartmann should have found\\nin the unconscious the final goal of philosophy. In\\none respect, perhaps he was right: in the judgment of\\ncharity he may have been unconscious of the folly that\\nhe wrote.\\n3. Consciousness affirms the existence of finite sub-\\nstances, and the difference of one from another. If this\\ntestimony be refused, an end is put to argument: the\\nfoundation of philosophy is destroyed. If it be accepted\\nit is impossible to reduce different substances to unity\\nupon another substance; for\\n(1) As it is absurd to regard substance as mode, one\\nsubstance cannot be a mode of another substance.\\n1 Schwegler, Hist. Phil., Sec. xliii., Schelling.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0183.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "172 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\n(2) Two differing substances cannot be modes of a\\ncommon substance.\\n(3) We would have different substantial manifesta-\\ntions of one and the same substance which is not only\\ninconceivable, but absurd.\\n4. The pantheist holds that the universe is an evolu-\\ntion of the primordial substance. Its phenomena are\\nmodes of that substance but the law of evolution can-\\nnot, without absurdity, be conceived to operate in the\\nproduction of contrasted and contradictory modes. It\\nis manifest, however, unless our faculties cheat us, that\\nthese modes are often contrasted and sometimes contra-\\ndictory. This alleged process of evolution is, therefore,\\nself-destructive. It is, of course, conceivable that con-\\ntrasts, leading to ultimate unity, should characterize\\nthe government of a free intelligence, who is not only\\nnecessary substance, but elective cause; but the same\\nis not predicable of a process enforced simply by im-\\npersonal necessity. The pantheist s Becoming is sui-\\ncidal, his necessary substance the source of conflicting\\nforces. Like the Spartan boy, it utters no groan while\\nin the cloak of its dignity is enfolded the fox which is\\ngnawing at its vitals.\\nEither this one substance relatively one is charac-\\nterized by intrinsic unity, or it is not. If it is, it is\\nimpossible to see how contradictory modes can manifest\\nit. If it is not, there is no unity predicable of the\\nfluctuating phenomena of the universe. They have no\\ncommon ground. Nothing but chance and contingency\\nemerge. Law is denied, and chaos is the principle of the\\nworld. How God can be affirmed it passes the power of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0184.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 173\\nreason to conjecture. Let it be observed, that the pan-\\ntheist denies the existence of personal, creative will.\\nHe must, then, account for change in the manifestations\\nof the impersonal substance upon some other ground.\\nWhat other ground Evolution That supposes unity\\nin the thing evolved. Is it necessity That equally\\ninfers unity. If a number of primordial forces be\\npostulated to account for inconsistent manifestations,\\nthe relative unity of the primordial substance is denied\\nbut that the pantheist affirms it is the core of his theory.\\nSo that if intrinsic unity be affirmed or denied of the\\nprimordial substance, the pantheist is confronted by in-\\nsuperable difficulties.\\nII. Against the pantheistic doctrine of the imperson-\\nality of God as the Absolute substance the following\\narguments are submitted\\n1. The consciousness of our own personality irre-\\nsistibly leads to the inference of God s personality. It\\nis an indubitable faith-judgment.\\n(1) This may be conclusively proved upon panthe-\\nistic grounds themselves. Most pantheists admit the\\nfact of our own personality as attested by consciousness.\\nIndeed, they maintain the extraordinary position that\\nGod comes to personal consciousness in man but their\\ntheory necessarily involves the evolution of the finite\\nand phenomenal from the one infinite substance. This\\nlaw of evolution supposes that the thing evolved is, at\\nleast, virtually and potentially in that from which the\\nevolution proceeds. This has been the old, accepted\\nview, as the etymology of the term evolution indicates.\\nThe declaration is both surprising and revolutionary,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0185.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "174 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nwhich is made by Professor Sully, in the last edition of\\nthe Encyclopedia Britannica, that this view is no longer\\nheld by evolutionists; that what they now understand\\nby the law of evolution is the law of progress. The Pro-\\nfessor performs a singular and conspicuous function:\\nhe pulls down the flag of evolution, and hauls up another\\nin its place. The terms of the controversy are changed,\\nthe issue is shifted. It is no longer evolution, but pro-\\ngression, whatever that may mean. Believing that the\\nevolutionary pantheist will not accede to this incontinent\\nsurrender of his old principles, I proceed with the argu-\\nment upon the supposition that his prescriptive views\\nare retained.\\nIf the thing evolved is implicit e in the evolver, as our\\nadmitted personality must, according to the pantheist,\\nbe evolved from God, it follows that he must be poten-\\ntially possessed of personality he cannot be impersonal.\\nIn fact, the denomination by the pantheist of God as\\nHe is a concession wrung from him to God s personality.\\nFor, the hypothesis, that in this particular he speaks\\nmetaphorically, would be very like an insult to one who\\nprofesses to sink the imagination in the profoundest\\nspeculations of the pure reason. To return from this\\nslight digression it is impossible that personality could\\nbe evolved from impersonality. The proposition that\\nGod comes to personal consciousness in the personality\\nof man, if it mean anything, must mean that he origi-\\nnally possessed a potential personality. If it does not\\nsignify that, it is meaningless. If the pantheist concede\\nthis, he gives up his doctrine of the impersonality of\\nGod. If he deny it, he gives up his doctrine of the evo-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0186.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 175\\nlution of the finite from the infinite. The dilemma is\\nfatal.\\nGranted, then, that we are personal beings, it follows,\\nfrom the essential principles of the pantheistic theory,\\nthat God is personal. Were he not, we could not be if\\nwe be, he must be.\\nIf it be replied, that the impersonal substance devel-\\nops, by a process of Becoming, into personality, the\\nrejoinder is easy, that, upon such a supposition, perfec-\\ntion is denied to the perfect Being, fulness to the In-\\nfinite; that a change occurs in the absolute substance,\\nnot merely in its manifestations, but in its very essence\\nand, finally, that this change is a degradation of the\\ninfinite and absolute into the finite and relative: an\\nunbecoming Becoming, forsooth This is but an instance\\nof that amazing circumgyratory process already ad-\\nverted to by which the Absolute abdicates its crown\\nin order to enjoy the pleasure of resuming it by which\\nit first steps down and out in order to step up\\nand in\\n(2) There is another method by which the same con-\\nclusion may be reached upon the principles of panthe-\\nism. Are we possessed of personality If the pantheist\\nanswers in the affirmative, it follows that, as we are\\nnot different from God, but are manifestations of his\\nsubstance, God is personal in our personality; which is\\nto relinquish the doctrine of his impersonality. Is that\\ndenied It follows that God and we are not one, and the\\nfundamental assumption of pantheism is abandoned.\\n(3) If it be admitted that God, originally impersonal,\\ncomes to personal consciousness in man, it follows that", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0187.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "176 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nman is God improved; for it must be granted that a\\nbeing possessed of personality is greater than one desti-\\ntute of it; and if God had it not until he attains it in\\nman, humanity is the crown of the divine development,\\nthe climax of the divine glory and then these ineffable\\nabsurdities result that the absolute and infinite reaches\\na higher degree of perfection in the finite, that infinite\\nstrength is supplemented by finite weakness, and that\\nGod is conscious of increased excellence in beings who\\nare, if honest, obliged to confess their degradation from\\ntheir first ideal, and to criminate themselves for folly,\\nmeanness and shame.\\nThe force of this reduction to absurdity could only\\nbe blunted by showing that personality, instead of being\\na perfection, is really an imperfection. Without labor-\\ning to refute this paradox, it is sufficient to say that the\\nwhole fabric of human society, of the family, the church,\\nand the state the whole social development of man\\nrests on the fact of personality as its corner-stone. Re-\\nmove it, and mankind becomes a mere aggregation of\\nunits, with no relation subsisting between them but the\\npossession by each individual of a nature similar to that\\nof others. Every impersonal man would be a machine,\\nlike an ancient war-chariot, armed with scythes to mow\\ndown the impersonal machines around him just as the\\nimpersonal God of the pantheist, a centre of repulsion\\nto the universe, can only become a centre of attraction\\nby borrowing his personality from man that is, as he\\nand man are one, he is both a centre of repulsion and one\\nof attraction, both impersonal and personal, at the same\\ntime", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0188.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 177\\nIt may be urged that this argument is inconsistent,\\ninasmuch as, at one time, it charges the pantheist with\\ndegrading the Infinite substance by representing it as\\ndescending to the finite, and, at another, imputes to him\\nthe absurdity of elevating it by conceiving it as coming\\nto personal consciousness in man. The inconsistency\\nis not in the argument, but in the self-repugnant ele-\\nments of the pantheistic theory. It is that theory which\\ndevelops the Absolute downwards, even into physical\\nnature, and again develops it upwards into human con-\\nsciousness. The argument has only pursued it into its\\nown self-destroying absurdities.\\n(4) If God comes to personal consciousness in. man,\\nhe must have as many personal consciousnesses as there\\nare men, and, therefore, would be as many persons as\\nthere are men; for a personal humanity which is not\\nindividual would be contradictory to our fundamental\\nconceptions. The solemn processes of human law,\\nwhich, with all their weighty results, are based upon the\\nnotion of personal rights, would be a tissue of farces.\\nThe only escape from the above-mentioned absurd conse-\\nquence would lie in maintaining the view that person-\\nality attaches to generic humanity alone, and not to\\nindividual human beings and that is so extravagant a\\nsupposition that it is not asserted even by those who,\\nlike Cousin, affirm the impersonality of the human rea-\\nson. But if it be conceded that God is not as many\\npersons as there are human persons, nor generic hu-\\nmanity as personal, it is admitted that men as persons\\nare different from God; and then the following conse-\\nquences ensue: first, the pantheistic theory is aban-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0189.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "178 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndoned, for it asserts the identity of man with God and,\\nsecondly, man being possessed of personality and God\\nnot, man would pro tanto be greater than God, the finite\\ngreater than the infinite and such an absurdity it would\\ntake the capacity of an Absolutist speculator to swallow.\\n(5) The consciousness of personality involves the\\nnecessary judgment that other persons are different from\\nourselves but it is absurd to say that different and often\\nconflicting personalities are evolved from an impersonal\\nsubstance. That personality should be evolved from\\nimpersonality is contradictory enough; but that mil-\\nlions of personalities differing from each other and\\nfrequently contending to death against each other should\\nbe evolved from one impersonal substance this is a\\ncontradiction of contradictions.\\n(6) Consciousness delivers to us the law of causality\\nas fundamental to our constitution. The chief empi-\\nrical condition upon which that law is elicited into\\nenergy is furnished by the will. Will supposes per-\\nsonality. Thus we get personal will which is causal\\nso far as the production of phenomenal changes is con-\\ncerned. If we cannot infer the causality of God s per-\\nsonal will, we are confronted by two results first, our\\npersonal causality could not have been evolved from the\\ndivine substance, and that would contravene pantheistic\\nprinciples; and, secondly, we would be greater than\\nGod, and that would contradict reason and religion\\nalike.\\n2. It is one of the elements of pantheism, that the\\nprimordial substance is simply a necessary substance,\\ndestitute of personality and elective freedom, and an-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0190.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 179\\nother is, that all its cosmical manifestations, involving\\ninnumerable changes, are determined by an invincible\\nnecessity. These co-existent elements of the scheme are\\ncontradictory to each other and, if this can be evinced,\\nthe theory will be proved to be fatally, because self-\\ndestructively, inconsistent with itself.\\nA merely necessary, an impersonal, substance if the\\nterms mean anything is one which must immutably be\\nprecisely what it is. It can, at no period of its existence,\\nbe other than it eternally was for, if it change, it is not,\\nex hypothesi, what it once was; which is the same as\\nto say that it was not necessarily what it was. Change\\nimplies something more than simple necessity. Was it\\nnecessary that it should have always been what it was\\nThis question must be answered affirmatively, upon the\\nsupposition that it ever was a necessary substance. A\\nsimply necessary substance which changes is a contradic-\\ntion in terms.\\nSeveral answers may be given to this argument against\\nthe consistency of pantheism\\n(1) It may be said that the necessary substance is\\nfree. This was maintained by Spinoza. He attributed\\nto the substance which he called God a free necessity;\\nbut what he meant by this language was merely a spon-\\ntaneous necessity, or a necessary spontaneity it matters\\nnot which and to say that this exhausts the notion of\\nfreedom is to contradict the most obvious facts of con-\\nsciousness and observation and if from them we cannot\\nreason by analogy to God s freedom, we use the term\\nwithout any definite meaning when we apply it to him.\\nBy analogy, I say, but an analogy which, while real, is", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0191.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "180 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof course checked and modified by the infinite distance\\nbetween ourselves as finite and God as infinite. Now\\nthere is another sort of freedom than that of spontaneity.\\nIt is that of otherwise determining, facultas aliter se\\ndeterminandi the power to elect between contrary\\nalternatives. With spontaneity necessity may coincide,\\nbut not with the latter kind of freedom. But take the\\nposition of the pantheist as he states it, it follows that\\nwhatever direction the spontaneity originally took, that\\ndirection it must always take. It proceeds by the law\\nof evolution, and all evolution is necessity; but some\\nof the changes which occur in the phenomenal manifes-\\ntations of the primordial substance are changes which\\ninvolve contrast and contradiction. The change from\\nholiness to sin, or from sin to holiness, from a good\\ncharacter to a bad, or from a bad to a good, are clear\\ninstances of this kind. These changes it is simply im-\\npossible to adjust to the hypothesis of mere spontaneity.\\nTo say that there may be a spontaneous change from\\ngood to bad, or from bad to good, is to speak absurdly.\\nIf a thing is necessarily good, it cannot become bad if\\nnecessarily bad,, it cannot become good. The necessary\\nfreedom, or the free necessity, of the pantheist cannot\\naccount for changes which actually occur. If it be said\\nthat such changes do not occur, the ground is taken that\\nour faculty of observation is mendacious, and then its\\ntestimony to the occurrence of any changes is untrust-\\nworthy; and consequently the affirmation of the pan-\\ntheist, that the one substance manifests itself in phe-\\nnomenal changes, has no foundation upon which to rest.\\nHe simply raves when he uses such language.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0192.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 181\\n(2) It may be urged that the primordial substance is\\nalso a necessary and eternal cause, that is, a cause acting\\nnecessarily and eternally. This is self-contradictory.\\nA cause, if human language is worth anything, is the\\ncorrelative of an effect. A necessary and eternal cause\\nsupposes a necessary and eternal effect but an effect is\\na thing which begins to be. As necessary and eternal it\\ncould not begin; as effect it must have begun. Such\\nan effect is one, therefore, which begun to be, and did\\nnot begin to be. If, then, the Absolute substance was a\\nnecessary and eternal cause, it was a necessary and eter-\\nnal contradiction.\\nFurther, if it were not only an eternally operating,\\nbut an infinitely operating, cause, as even Cousin con-\\ntends, and was eternally determined by necessity to put\\nforth its causal energy infinitely, it follows that the\\nuniverse must have been eternal and complete. There\\ncould be no room for farther exertion of causal efficiency,\\nand, consequently, no room for change. The universe\\nmust continue to be immutably and exactly what it\\neternally was; but changing phenomena are affirmed\\nby the pantheist as manifestations of the primordial\\nsubstance. Here, then, we have another self contradic-\\ntion and still further, the universe must be infinite as\\nwell as eternal. If not, a part only of the infinite sub-\\nstance was determined by necessity to causal exertion,\\nand a part not, which would be contradictory to the\\nposition that the infinite substance as one is determined\\nby necessity but if the universe be infinite, there could\\nbe no finite changes of which it would be suscejDtible. If\\nthere were, the infinite would be finite, and another con-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0193.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "182 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntradiction emerges, which none but an assertor of an\\ninfinito-finite substance could stomach.\\n(3) It may be contended that, as the theist admits the\\nnecessity of the divine Being, he is encumbered by the\\nvery difficulties which have been urged against the pan-\\ntheist. To meet this charge it is hardly needful to do\\nmore than state the positions of the respective parties.\\nBoth agreeing that God is a necessary substance, they\\ndiffer in the following respects: The pantheist denies\\nthat he is a person; the theist affirms that he is. The\\npantheist, so far as he admits that he is cause, holds\\nthat he is so by virtue of an immanent necessity that\\nis, he never transcends the limits of his own being, but\\nsimply evolves its contents: he never creates. The\\ntheist holds that God is a free cause that is, he is free\\nto create or not to create, to exercise or not to exercise\\ncertain of his perfections at least, to manifest or not\\ncertain aspects of his perfections, in relation to objects\\nwhich, as created, are not himself.\\nWhile, therefore, the pantheist makes a necessary sub-\\nstance change, as such, the theist is chargeable with no\\nsuch inconsistency: he holds that, as substance, God\\nabides unchanged and unchangeable. While the pan-\\ntheist makes the Infinite become finite, the theist is not\\nguilty of that huge contradiction: he holds that the\\nInfinite God creates the finite. The pantheist makes\\nphenomena manifestations of the primordial substance\\nitself, in this sense, that they are its modes; the theist\\nholds that phenomena are effects of the causal will of\\nGod. When he says that God manifests himself finitely,\\nhe does not intend to assert, with the pantheist, the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0194.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 183\\nsupreme contradiction that the finite is part of the\\nInfinite, but that the finite products of the will of\\nGod, reveal, to a certain extent, his existence and na-\\nture.\\nThe pantheist ascribes only spontaneity to his abso-\\nlute substance; the theist also attributes elective free-\\ndom to God, that is, the freedom which elects between\\nalternatives. This is a point of great consequence. It\\nis, it is almost needless to say, the doctrine of the theist\\nthat God is spontaneously and necessarily holy. Holi-\\nness is his life the infinite love of the infinite norm\\nof rectitude in his being and character. Xecessarily\\nholy, he cannot act except holily but it is not his doc-\\ntrine that God is under the necessity of acting whenever\\nhe acts. He is not fate he is a free, Personal Cause.\\nBetween acts which are alike holy he is free to choose\\nand he is free to perform a conceivable act which is\\nholy, or to abstain from performing it. The pantheist\\nholds that the universe is a necessary emanation of the\\nprimordial substance; but the theist maintains that\\nGod, in the exercise of his elective freedom, might, con-\\nsistently with his intrinsic holiness and happiness, have\\nrefrained from creating the universe.\\nThe pantheist will, in reply, allege that the theist is\\nobliged to admit change in the modes of the divine will,\\nas, for example, a change from a will purposing to\\ncreate and a will actually to create. Concerning that\\nquestion I have spoken elsewhere, and will now make\\nbut a single remark. Let it be conceded that the theist\\nencounters the difficulty of at least an apparent change\\nin the modes of the divine will, that difficulty is vastly", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0195.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "184- Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nless than that created by the pantheist s doctrine of\\nchange in the divine substance. In the one case there\\nis a modification of an attribute, in the other of the\\nessence which grounds attributes. It may be said that\\nthe distinction is without a difference that the attri-\\nbutes and essence of God are identical. It is true that\\nsome theologians maintain I cannot help thinking for\\nutterly insufficient reasons that view, although out of\\nall analogy with our convictions in regard to our own\\nconstitution, in regard to our souls essentially consid-\\nered, and the powers which manifest them. \u00c2\u00a3sTo strenu-\\nous endeavor to secure unity can avail to obliterate the\\nvenerable distinction between substance and attribute,\\nor to reduce intelligence and will to one and the same\\nattribute, identical with each other because identical\\nwith the same essence.\\n3. We are conscious, at least to some extent to what\\nextent will not now be inquired of elective freedom\\nas causal agents that is, freedom to do or not to do\\ncertain acts. This kind of liberty is utterly incon-\\nsistent with the evolution of a substance proceeding in\\nall its modifications upon the principle of rigid necessity,\\nthe principle demanded by the pantheistic theory.\\n(1) This elective freedom to do or not to do, to\\nchoose between differing alternatives cannot, without\\ncontradiction, be supposed to be evolved from necessity.\\nFor whatever necessarily is could not possibly be other-\\nwise; If it could be, one and the same thing would be\\nnecessarily determined in two different directions.\\n(2) Elective freedom, if evolved, requires an elec-\\ntively free substance from which it is evolved but an", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0196.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 185\\nelectively free substance must be personal. It is\\nabsurd to ascribe suck freedom to impersonal sub-\\nstance.\\n(3) If we are electively free, God is electively free, or\\nwe are freer than God but if he be electively free, he is\\na personal cause who may or may not, in certain respects,\\nexercise his causal efficiency.\\n4. TTe are conscious of moral qualities. Among the\\nfacts to which consciousness distinctly and unequivo-\\ncally testifies is a sense of duty, necessarily inferring\\nmoral responsibility. This calls for an objective law-\\ngiver, ruler and judge, or our moral nature is a lie but\\nto talk of an impersonal substance as administering\\nmoral law is to utter unmeaning gibberish. Our moral\\nnature, therefore, demands a personal God.\\nBut, if he be an impersonal substance let the sole-\\ncism be pardoned and human beings, as moral, are\\nnecessary, finite modifications of him or it( one of\\ntwo positions must be assumed by the pantheist either\\nthere are no such things as moral distinctions, and sin\\nand crime, as manifestations of God, are good or these\\ndistinctions are admitted to be valid, and then the same\\nimpersonal substance, proceeding by the law of neces-\\nsity, evolves itself in the most contradictory modes. If\\nthe first of these alternatives be elected, and the distinc-\\ntions between sin and holiness, duty and crime, are\\nheld to be nothing, pantheism stands self-convicted of\\nbeing, what some caustic writer pronounces it, Pandia-\\nbolism. If the second alternative be chosen, and a neces-\\nsary and impersonal substance be held to evolve itself\\nin albsolutely contradictory modes, the system which", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0197.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "186 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nwould necessitate such a doctrine would relinquish its\\ntitle to be considered rational. It would be a philosophy\\nfor a madhouse.\\n5. If God were an impersonal substance, it is perfectly\\nobvious that religion would be an impossibility. Any\\npretence to it would be a mockery and a sham. If we\\ncannot say, Thou, to God, it needs no argument to\\nconvince us that we can neither pray to him, nor praise\\nhim, nor obey him. To say, He, Him, would be to\\ncontradict the fundamental principle of the theory: to\\ncall an impersonal substance He, would be to make the\\nimpersonal personal. If we could be supposed to wor-\\nship what we term God at all, we would, of course, begin\\nour homage with the address O Impersonal Substance,\\ninfinite, eternal, and changeable, we besesch It to hear\\nus. Let its blind eye look upon us; let its deaf ear\\nlisten to the voice of our supplications let its heart, that\\nknows no pity, commiserate our necessities; let its\\ninfinite and eternal energy that has no hands supply\\nour wants and relieve our woes Is it not inexplicable\\nthat some theologians, in a semi-apologetic tone, should\\nallow themselves to concede the religious warmth and\\nfervor of such a system Warm It is colder than\\nthe rocks on Torneo s hoary brow. It takes away our\\nGod, the source of light and love, and leaves us to freeze\\nin the darkness of despair.\\nBut experience in moments of critical emergency\\nproves that the religion which demands a personal God\\ncannot be pitched out of our nature with the fork of a\\nperverse speculation. We instinctively cry for help to\\none who is able to save unto the uttermost; and this", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0198.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 187\\nsure instinct of prayer 7 is vindicated by the judicial\\nreflections of reason.\\nIt constitutes one of the most formidable counts in the\\nindictment of this impious and detestable hypothesis\\nthat, driving us with our worship from the altar of God,\\nit not only legitimates, but logically necessitates the\\nworship of man. God comes to consciousness in man.\\nIf, therefore, we are to worship at all, inasmuch as we\\ncan only worship a conscious God, we must offer our\\nhomage to man. This is the climax of execrable wicked-\\nness. The worship of leeks, onions and garlic, I hesitate\\nnot to say, would be preferable to this spume of Schelling\\nand Hegel, Carlyle and Compte, Emerson and Mill. If\\nwe must enthrone a creature in the seat of God, by all\\nmeans let it be a vegetable or a reptile rather than the\\nmonster who first dethrones his Maker, and then usurps\\nhis crown. If a hero is called for to receive conspicuous\\nworship, a hero of more than a hundred battles, let the\\nDevil be summoned to the throne. He has more being,\\nmore intelligence, more courage and more impiety than\\nany of the sons of men, and no man would be restrained\\nfrom worshipping him by the personal consciousness of\\nthe Devil s sins. But that one conscious of his own\\nwickedness should worship himself, or a sinner like him-\\nself, or fallen humanity idealized, sublimated, apothe-\\nosized this is the consummation of folly and crime, and\\nwere it universal the damnation of the race would\\nslumber not.\\n6. Were this doctrine true, it would follow that indi-\\nvidual immortality would be impossible. What would\\nbe the individual A phenomenon that appeareth for a", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0199.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "188 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nlittle time, and then vanisheth away; glittering for a\\nmoment on the surface of infinite being, like phospho-\\nrescent foam on the sea, and then re-absorbed into the\\nimpersonal substance whence, for its brief hour, it\\nemerged. The future, the unutterable glory, the trans-\\ncendent heavenly home, the blissful fellowship with\\nGod and angels, which Christianity reveals all would\\nbe swept away by the besom of this desolating doctrine\\nand this is the philosophy we are asked to accept in the\\nplace of the gospel\\n7. The pantheistic theory renders miracles impos-\\nsible. That a system proceeding by an undeviating reign\\nof necessity should admit of supernatural interpositions\\nis, of course, inconceivable. The position of the pan-\\ntheist is logically taken, when he denies the possibility of\\nmiracles; but were that true, God cannot prove a\\nreligion to be from him. Christianity is incapable of\\nbeing proved. What remains a Let us eat and drink\\nto-morrow we die. They have taken away our Saviour,\\nour God, our heaven let us wallow like swine in the\\nsty of Epicurus\\nIII. The third leading feature of the pantheistic\\ntheory is its denial of creation. That, on the assumption\\nof the existence of the material and spiritual systems,\\nthey are not identical has in the previous discussions\\nbeen evinced. Idealism and materialism have been\\nshown to be destitute of adequate support. They are\\nparadoxes which traverse the common sense of mankind.\\nIt is now proposed briefly to show that the universe is\\nfinite, and, therefore, was created.\\n1. Matter is finite.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0200.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 189\\n(1) This is the common belief of the race. The pre-\\nsumption is terribly against one who would contradict it.\\n(2) Matter is divisible. The fact that division cannot\\nbe actually effected in some cases affords no proof that\\nmatter is incapable of division. The experiments of the\\nlaboratory prove the belief that matter can be further\\ndivided than it has been. The quest for a minimum\\nstimulates the effort to go on with division.\\n(3) If matter is divisible, it is mutable.\\n(4) If it be divisible and mutable, it cannot be in-\\nfinite. A divisible and mutable infinite is a contradic-\\ntion in terms.\\n(5) We necessarily infer from the facts of conscious-\\nness that our bodies are finite. One absolutely knows\\nthat his body cannot pass through the desk on which he\\nwrites. Our material organisms are limited and con-\\nditioned on every side. It is certain that some matter\\nis finite.\\n(6) If some matter is finite, no matter can be infinite.\\nOtherwise, we would have infinite matter plus finite\\nmatter, which is a contradiction.\\nUnless it can be shown that there is a general sub-\\nstance of matter, of which material phenomena are\\nspecial manifestations, it is not difficult to see that the\\nsubstance of matter is finite. Every phenomenal form\\nor manifestation of matter is evidently finite; and if\\nthe material substance, which we are led by a funda-\\nmental belief to infer, is one which corresponds with\\nsuch specific phenomena, the only general notion we\\ncan frame of the substance of matter is that of a con-\\ngeries of special and, therefore, finite substances. If", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0201.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "190 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthat were admitted, it would follow that, as what is\\npredicable of all the parts is predicable of the whole,\\nand finiteness is predicable of all material substances,\\nfiniteness is predicable of the substance of matter as a\\nwhole. But it is impossible to prove the existence of a\\ngeneric substance of matter which reduces all material\\nphenomena to unity. If that be so, it is impossible to\\nprove the infinity of matter.\\nThis reasoning is countenanced by the speculations\\nof those philosophers who have affirmed the eternity of\\nmatter, and the admissions of scientific men of the\\npresent day. The atoms of Democritus were the very\\nopposite of an infinite whole and the ultimate particles\\nthe elements, molecules, or what-not of atheistic\\nevolutionists are equally so. To assert the infinity of\\nseparate, and, therefore, limited and conditioned, atoms,\\nis to affirm a contradiction. We are at liberty, then, to\\nreturn to the position that as some matter is finite no\\nmatter can be infinite.\\nTo this it may be objected, that the same reasoning\\nwould prove that no spirit can be infinite but the objec-\\ntion does not hold, because the analogy which grounds it\\nis deceptive. Material bodies have the property of dis-\\nplacing, at least, of limiting and conditioning, other\\nmaterial bodies but the same cannot be proved of spirit.\\nIt may be so, but we do not, and, for aught that appears\\nto the contrary, cannot know it. Until, however, it can\\nbe shown that spirit must displace spirit, it cannot be\\ninferred from the fact that there are some finite spirits,\\nthat no spirit can be infinite. There may be a spirit\\nwhich pervades all matter, and every other spirit, uncon-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0202.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 191\\nditioned and -unlimited by either. For this we have the\\ntestimony of the Bible. Its positive doctrine as to the\\ninfinity of the divine Spirit cannot be legitimately con-\\ntradicted by any merely probable speculations.\\nThe remark has just been made that the existence of\\none general substance of matter cannot be proved, and\\nthat it is, therefore, impossible to prove the infinity of\\nmatter. But is it possible to furnish positive proof that\\nthere cannot be such a general substance of matter\\nWe reach the substance of matter alone by inference.\\nIt is not an object of perception, of consciousness. It\\nis not presentatively given, and, consequently, cannot\\nbe presentatively known. That which is perceived, and,\\ntherefore, immediately known, is phenomenal proper-\\nties. From them we are led by an irresistible law of\\nbelief immediately and necessarily to infer the substance\\nto which they belong, which they manifest, and upon\\nwhich they are collected into unity. Now, it may be\\nsafely affirmed that the substance cannot be more exten-\\nsive than the sum of its phenomenal properties. Are\\nthey limited? So must it be. But each phenomenal\\nproperty is limited. It would be absurd to deny this.\\nIf all are limited, the sum is necessarily limited, or\\ncontradiction emerges for it is universally granted that\\nwhat is true of all the parts of a whole is true of the\\nwhole itself.\\nAre we, then, justified in inferring from the fact of\\nthe sum of material properties being limited, that the\\nsubstance is limited to which they pertain We are\\nfor the only knowledge we can have of material sub-\\nstance is derived from its properties. If there could be", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0203.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "192 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmaterial substance greater than the aggregate of its\\nproperties, it would be unknown to us and unknowable\\nby us. Not only would it be impossible to affirm its\\nexistence for how could we assert that to exist of which\\nwe know nothing but such substance could not exist,\\nfor the reason that it would be, to some extent, unquali-\\nfied by any property that is, to the extent to which it\\nwould transcend properties. Substance and property,\\nlike husband and wife, are correlatives: no wife, no\\nhusband; no property, no substance. The very term\\nsubstance would lose its significance and become an\\nunmeaning cipher, if it were not used as related to\\nproperty. No part of matter, therefore, can be un-\\nqualified by properties but it is certain that the com-\\nplement of material properties is finite; consequently\\nthe whole of material substance must also be finite.\\n2. Our spirits are finite. This requires no protracted\\nargument.\\n(1) We are conscious of the limitation of our facul-\\nties. He who would deny the fact would afford the\\nstrongest proof that his faculties are limited.\\n(2) We know by observation and testimony that there\\nare other human spirits than our own. They limit and\\ncondition each other, and are, therefore, all of them\\nfinite. If there be non-human spirits, which we have\\nreason to believe, their difference from ourselves, and\\ntheir plurality, would prove them to be finite, for many\\ndiffering infinites would be a supreme contradiction.\\n3. If both matter and spirits, human and non-human,\\nare finite, the universe which is composed of them is\\nfinite. But if finite, it began.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0204.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 193\\nHere it may be contended that, although the universe\\nmay be conceded not to be infinite, still it may be eter-\\nnal but if it be finite, it follows conclusively that it can-\\nnot be eternal for bvery finite thing must have had a be-\\nginning. If it had ho beginning it would in one respect\\nbe infinite that is, as to duration, which is contrary\\nto the supposition, and that a thing should be partly\\ninfinite and partly finite, finito-infinite, would be self-\\nrepugnant and absurd. If, then, the universe is finite,\\nit began; if it began, it cannot be eternal; for eternity\\nis without beginning and end.\\nAgain. Either mind and matter are co-eternal, or\\nmatter precedes mind, or mind precedes matter. The\\nfirst supposition would destroy the infinity of both, for\\nthey would limit and condition each other but if mat-\\nter connot be infinite, it cannot be eternal. The second\\nsupposition is met by the following presumption: Our\\nexperience teaches us that matter never changes its\\nformal type, except by the action of intelligence upon it.\\nA log of wood, or a block of stone, only passes into struc-\\ntural shape and order by virtue of the purpose and skill\\nof the human mind. A statue is never the result of\\nmerely material forces; not even a fowl-coop is. As\\nmind precedes the arrangement of matter into order\\nand beauty, we warrantably infer that intelligence pre-\\nceded the cosmical organization of the universe. As the\\norganization of matter never, experience being our in-\\nformant, issues in intelligence, but the contrary is true,\\nit is a presumption, at least, that intelligence precedes\\nthe existence of matter. The whole force of analogy\\nwould go to show that, if matter and mind are not co-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0205.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "194 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\neternal, mind precedes matter. It is absurd to suppose\\nthat intelligence is the last result of evolution, for the\\ncontemplation of such a result of the process must have\\nproceeded from intelligence. If man be the crown of\\nrace-development in this world, then there must have\\nbeen at its beginning an intelligence at least equal to\\nthat of man. The supposition that germ-cells, or any\\ninfinitesimal particles of matter, could without intelli-\\ngence, without plan, without direction, have developed\\nthemselves into the City of God, or the Principia, or the\\nParadise Lost, is inconceivably absurd. Intelligence be-\\ngins where the end is intelligence. Why not admit a\\ncreating God, and end the business\\nWhat has been said with reference to matter will\\napply with increased emphasis to mind.\\n4. If the universe began, there are two alternatives;\\neither it came into existence spontaneously, or it is an\\neffect produced by a cause other than itself either it\\nwas uncaused or caused.\\n(1) It could not exist spontaneously. Both meta-\\nphysics and physics consign the hypothesis to the cate-\\ngory of impossibilities. Spontaneous existence would\\nbe an absolute commencement. That supposition would\\ncontradict the fundamental belief of the human mind,\\nthat everything which begins to be has a cause; and\\nwould, moreover, involve the self-contradiction that the\\nsame thing is at once cause and effect. The attempt of\\nSir William Hamilton to show that in the free causation\\nof the human will we find an instance of absolute com-\\nmencement has, in a preceding discussion, been evinced\\nto be groundless.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0206.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 195\\nIn this independent and impregnable judgment actual\\nexperiments, eagerly and exhaustively instituted, have\\nled physical science to concur, as is illustrated by the\\nfollowing utterance of Professor Huxley\\nFor my own part, I conceive that with the particulars of\\nM. Pasteur s experiments before us, we cannot fail to arrive at\\nhis conclusion, and that the doctrine of Spontaneous Generation\\nhas received a final coup de grace. x\\n(2) The universe is an effect of a cause other than\\nitself. As it could not have been produced by itself, so\\nit must have been produced by a cause antecedent and\\nextraneous to itself. The only escape from this conclu-\\nsion is in supposing it to have been absolutely uncaused.\\nThe argument may be resorted to which was employed\\nby Kant, in order to discredit the cosmological proof of\\nGod s existence If it be maintained that the principle\\nof causality demands a cause for every new appearance,\\nor, in general, for everything that exists, the same prin-\\nciple would exact a cause for God s existence; and, if\\nit be replied that his existence is uncaused, then the\\nsame may be true of the existence of the universe. To\\nthis it is answered\\nAs the world consists of finite parts we are obliged, in\\nthe quest of a first cause, to pass by regression through\\nthe series of relative effects and causes to a beginning.\\nHowever far we may, by analysis, proceed in this regres-\\nsion, we will be confronted at every step by relative pro-\\nduction, of effects caused from previously existing ma-\\nterial. Say that the world itself may have been produced\\nout of pre-existent material, this only shifts the question\\n1 Orig. Species, Lect., III.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0207.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "196 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nfrom this world to the universe. We are forced to ask\\nthe cause of the universe of matter itself. Here the\\nsame process is necessary, of a regression through finite\\neffects and causes to an ultimate cause. Now a regres-\\nsion of the finite must conduct either to an infinite series,\\nor to a beginning of the series. An infinite series is\\nimpossible. The old argument against it is incontestable\\nthat whatsoever is predicable of all the parts of a\\nwhole is predicable of the whole itself. Every part of\\nthe series is finite therefore, the whole series is finite\\nbut the principle of cause holding, we must believe that\\nthe universe had a cause. This cause could not have\\nbeen itself. E concesso, spontaneous generation is ruled\\nout. It could not have been in the initial point of the\\nseries, for that is contrary to the previous concession, and\\nwould make the first element in the series both cause\\nand effect the effect of itself. The universe must have\\nhad a cause outside of itself. Whatever, then, may be\\nheld in regard to God, as caused or uncaused, it is clear\\nthat the universe could not have been uncaused. It can-\\nnot be inferred that if God is uncaused, so may the uni-\\nverse be. Kant s may be uncaused is met by the positive\\nproof that it is caused. Otherwise, our intellectual\\nnature is fundamentally false and were that granted,\\nno dependence could be placed upon the testimony of\\nour moral nature to God s existence, a testimony which,\\nKant contended, was alone incapable of subversion. Our\\nnature is one, and the tongues of all her powers unite\\nin the mia glossa, which affirms and worships God. We\\nhave now reached the conclusion that the universe was\\ncaused by a power other than itself.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0208.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 197\\n5. A cause which begins existence is creative; and\\nthe cause which began and, therefore, created the uni-\\nverse is God, who is himself uncaused.\\nAlthough the principle of cause is applicable to all\\nfinite existence, it cannot be applied to an infinite sub-\\nstance. What is, in this respect, predicable of the finite\\nis not of the infinite. God must be an exception to the\\nscope of the principle for the cause of the universe, as\\na series of finite elements, must have been either in or\\nout of itself. In itself, it has been shown, it could not\\nhave been. Out of itself, therefore, it must have been.\\nIf not in, but out of, itself, it could not be finite, for all\\nthat is finite is in the universe, and that supposition is\\nexcluded. It must, therefore, be infinite, since between\\nfinite and infinite there is no middle supposition pos-\\nsible. If the cause of the universe be infinite, it could\\nnot have been caused, for an effect is conditioned by its\\ncause; but this cause, being infinite, must be uncondi-\\ntioned, or a contradiction ensues.\\nStill further, there can be but one such Being, who,\\nhimself uncaused, is the Cause of all else.\\nFirst. There cannot be two infinite substances, or\\ntwo infinite causes. The supposition is self-contradic-\\ntory.\\nSecond. This Being must be either caused by some-\\nthing out of himself, or caused by himself, or uncaused.\\nThe first supposition is impossible, for the infinite can-\\nnot begin, nor be conditioned. The second is inadmis-\\nsible, if for no other reason for these: that cause and\\neffect would be identical, which is absurd, and God\\nwould be represented as being before he began to be, or", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0209.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "198 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nas beginning after he already was which is, if possible,\\nstill more absurd. The third supposition, consequently,\\nis true the Being who is the cause of the universe is\\nuncaused. He is, therefore, independent and uncondi-\\ntioned. Another supposed uncaused being must like-\\nwise be independent and unconditioned; but two such\\nbeings would at the same time be independent of and\\nunconditioned by each other, and dependent on and con-\\nditioned by each other; which is an infinite contra-\\ndiction.\\nThe cause, therefore, which begins the existence of the\\nuniverse is the Creator, and the Creator is God.\\nIf to all this the pantheist reply, that he holds the\\nbeginning of the universe as a general modification, and\\nof its parts as special modifications, of the infinite sub-\\nstance, the rejoinder is that this is no answer to an\\nargument the purpose of which is to prove a beginning\\nof the universe in the sense of origination, of production\\nfrom no pre-existent substance. If that proof has been\\nestablished, the pantheist s so-called beginning by evolu-\\ntion or emanation has been disproved. According to\\nhim an exploding rocket and the commencement of the\\nuniverse are on the same footing, except that the former\\nis a lesser and the latter a greater educt of the same pri-\\nmordial substance. The alternatives are: the creation\\nof the universe, or its eternity. If created, it was not\\neternal and the pantheistic hypothesis fails.\\nA few observations, in conclusion, will be made in\\nregard to the fundamental errors of the pantheistic\\nschool.\\n1. The distinction between substance and property,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0210.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 199\\non the one hand, and cause and effect, on the other, is\\nobliterated. The two categories are confounded, and\\nmade the subject of common predication. This is done\\nwith reference to the human soul itself, and, therefore,\\nthe plainest deliverances of consciousness are contra-\\ndicted. To say that the power of thought is not a\\nquality of the substance of the soul, but an effect of it\\nas a cause or that an act of thought is a property of the\\nsoul, and not an effect caused by the power of thought,\\nwould be to deny a distinction affirmed in consciousness,\\nand embodied in the languages of the race. Now an\\nanalogy between us and God, not in degree, but kind, is\\nwell-nigh universally admitted. In violating conscious-\\nness, therefore, we deny the inferences it necessitates\\nwith reference to the nature of God but the pantheist\\ngoes farther than this, and is, consequently, still more\\nburdened with the difficulty now urged. He maintains\\nthe identity of man with God, and, still further, affirms\\nthat God comes to consciousness in man. He is, there-\\nfore, involved in the contradiction of denying to God\\nthe distinction between substance and cause, as he is\\nAbsolute, and of being compelled to admit it of him, as\\nhe is conscious in man. But what matter Why urge\\nself-contradiction against the logic of the pantheist when\\nhis infinite and necessary substance evolves and mani-\\nfests itself in contradictions by virtue of the law of its\\nbeing\\n2. The distinction between a necessary and a free\\ncause is denied. There is no need to dwell particularly\\nupon this point. The argument just employed equally\\napplies here. The pantheist violates alike the dictates", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0211.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "200 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof consciousness, and the demands of his own theory.\\nIf we are conscious of free causality, then, according to\\nhim, God, who comes to consciousness in us, is also\\nconscious of free causality. Yet he is affirmed to be a\\nnecessary cause. The pantheist is confronted by a fatal\\ndilemma If he assert the development of free causality\\nout of necessary, he talks nonsense if he deny the con-\\nsciousness of free causality, he wipes out responsibility,\\nsubverts government and unhinges society. He is dan-\\ngerous to the interests of mankind, and he and his\\nschool should be banished as a colony to Anticyra. A\\nliberal use of hellebore might possibly qualify them for\\nrestoration to the fellowship of the species.\\n3. The transcendental philosophers, pantheists and\\nabsolutists disregard the limitations upon the human\\nfaculties, in that they deal with the measures of faith\\nas if they were the measures of thought. Since Jacobi\\nvindicated himself from the charge of appealing to hu-\\nman and ecclesiastical authority when he insisted upon\\nfaith as the organ of transcendental truth, it has become\\nalmost superfluous for those who, in the general, concur\\nwith him in that position to guard themselves from like\\ngross misapprehension. The answer of that great\\nthinker was sufficient namely, that instead of invoking\\nexternal authority, he appealed to the innermost,\\na priori principles of the soul. His defect consisted in\\ndivorcing the testimony of faith from the the empirical\\nprocesses of the discursive understanding; in making\\nour faith-apprehensions direct revelations, intuitions of\\ntranscendental facts, instead of viewing them as existing\\nat first as latent aptitudes or fundamental laws, de-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0212.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 201\\npending for formal expression, in the shape of inferen-\\ntial judgments, upon the conscious processes of the per-\\nceptive, the representative and the comparative facul-\\nties. He affirmed too sharp a dualism between the ener-\\ngies of what he properly termed the faculty of faith\\nand those of the faculty of thought. Different in their\\nnature as they are, they are closely related and interde-\\npendent in respect to their attainments. The human\\nmind is one, and all its powers, however diverse, co-\\noperate in the production of joint results. This much\\nof a precautionary character has been briefly said in\\norder to forestall any misconception with reference to\\nwhat may follow.\\n(1) These philosophers were right in affirming the\\nexistence of the Infinite; in treating with contempt a\\nphilosophy, if such it could be designated, which would\\nconfine itself to the narrow domain of phenomena,\\nwhether physical or psychological; and in demanding\\nan unphenomenal reality as answering to the profound-\\nest principles and yearnings of the human spirit. In a\\nword, they were right in asserting the claims of ontology,\\nin contradistinction to a mere scientific analysis and\\nclassification of the facts of external nature or of the\\nmind itself. There is a degree of truth in the a priori\\narguments of such thinkers as Anselm, Descartes and\\nLeibnitz for the existence of an infinite and perfect\\nBeing. From the lowest foundations of our nature there\\ncomes a cry for such a Being. He is not the creature of\\na mere negation of thought he is the positive affirma-\\ntion of intelligence. The argument is in itself insuffi-\\ncient; it cannot be completed without the complemen-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0213.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "202 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntary addition of a posteriori elements but it furnishes\\nalike the indispensable starting point of those elements,\\nand the climax of their development. Justice compels\\nthis acknowledgment, but\\n(2) These philosophers committed the fault, the intel-\\nlectual crime, of confounding the infinite with the finite,\\nthe indemonstrable with the demonstrable, the incompre-\\nhensible with the comprehensible.\\nIt is admitted that the infinite, the indemonstrable,\\nthe incomprehensible are, as facts, delivered to us by the\\nreason in the discharge of its highest cognitive func-\\ntions. But in performing this high office it acts as a\\ncomplement of faiths, mysterious and inexplicable in\\ntheir origin, and developed into actual judgments upon\\nthe empirical conditions furnished by the processes of\\nthe intuitive, the imaginative and the dianoetic facul-\\nties. Were we restricted to the operation of these sub-\\nordinate powers we could never apprehend infinite, in-\\ndemonstrable and incomprehensible realities. They are\\nconfined in their matter and, therefore, in their range\\nto the phenomenal. There are necessary, uncontingent\\ntruths which transcend their scope, and, while it is true\\nthat to some extent they use those truths in the proced-\\nures of the reasoning faculty, they are indebted for\\nthe origination and delivery of them, to the reason as\\nthe place of principles, the seat of faith. These first\\nprinciples are given. The very roots from which the\\ntree of knowledge grows, they belong to that funda-\\nmental nature which, from the necessity of the case,\\nmust have been inserted by the hand which created our\\nbeing. So far from being the results of education, the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0214.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 203\\nproducts of culture, they underlie, legitimate, necessitate\\nall cognitive energy. They are the bases, not the fruits,\\nof demonstration. In themselves indemonstrable, they\\nmust be accepted by the very necessities of our mental\\nconstitution, and thus accepted from the hand that laid\\nthe foundations of our nature, they ground the demon-\\nstrative operations of the elaborative faculty. Deny\\nthem, in the madness of a perverse contradictoriness, or\\ndemand their proofs in order to their acceptance, and\\nthere can be no start of the reasoning process the mind\\nbecomes a blank, a desert barren of ideas, an engine\\nwithout its motive power. Intellectual stagnation\\nresults.\\nWhat, then, was the error of the pantheistic and ab-\\nsolutist philosophers It was, first, that they treated\\nfaith- judgments as though they were concepts. Instead\\nof accepting the infinite, and what they called the Abso-\\nlute as data of belief, incapable of analysis and com-\\nparison, they dealt with them as data of thought, to\\nwhich those processes are applicable. It is obvious that\\na concept of the dianoetic understanding may be\\nanalyzed into its contents. The stuff of which it is com-\\nposed is supplied by perception and representation, nor\\ncan it transcend that material. It is also obvious that\\none concept may be compared with others, and that it\\nis in this way of comparison that the premises of argu-\\nments are framed. Now dealing with the infinite as if it\\nwere a concept based upon intuition and representation,\\nthese philosophers made the attempt impossible to\\neven their Titanic powers to analyze it into its con-\\ntents, and to make it a term of comparison in syllogistic", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0215.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "204 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nprocesses. Of course, they failed. As well might they\\nhave endeavored to comprehend the ocean in a thimble\\nas to pack the infinite into the narrow capacity of their\\nthinking faculty. They made the prodigious mistake\\nof substituting the dianoetic for the noetic reason, of\\nregarding noumena as phenomena in short, of enthron-\\ning conception in the seat of faith. This, in brief, was\\ntheir first great error.\\nTheir second error was, that they refused to receive\\nsome of the judgments of faith. Upon the very same\\nground as that upon which we know the infinite, we also\\nknow cause and personality. Both of these latter ap-\\nprehensions are indemonstrable and incomprehensible.\\nThey are furnished by faith, and are to be accepted on\\nthe ground of the veracity of our radical nature as\\nreflecting the veracity of its Author. There is no justifi-\\ncation for receiving the datum of the infinite and refus-\\nthe data of cause and personality. When, therefore,\\nthese philosophers separated between them, accepting\\nthe former and rejecting the latter, they violated our\\nmental nature: they tore asunder elements which were\\nbound together in the unity of our intellectual consti-\\ntution, and trampled under foot some of its fundamental\\npostulates. They set the mind against itself in un-\\nnatural conflict, divided its house, and the necessary\\nalternatives were; either that the house should fall, or\\nthat the revolutionary intruders should be resisted and\\nexpelled. The latter alternative, as might have been\\nexpected, has been realized. The erectors of a Babel of\\npride have had their tongues split, and every man s\\nhand, by a just retribution, has been lifted against his", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0216.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 205\\nfellow. One extreme by reaction breeds another, and\\nthe world now beholds the land of Fichte, Schelling and\\nHegel tending to the crypto-materialisrn of a physio-\\nlogical psychology\\n4. This school is open to the criticism of neglecting\\nto profit by the example of the Greek philosophers. If\\nCousin is right, idealism and sensualism (better, per-\\nhaps, empiricism) have ever been the poles of philo-\\nsophic thought. In Plato, on the one hand, and Aristotle\\non the other, these two great principles received a defi-\\nnite and typical shape, and their respective followers\\nmore and more widened the interval between the lines\\nof their seperate development. The result was a pro-\\ntracted conflict between theories both grounded in prin-\\nciples equally belonging to our fundamental constitution,\\nand a failure to evince their harmonious and comple-\\nmentary operation as corresponding with the unity of\\nthe human mind. When the freedom of speculation\\nwas secured by the decay of the dominating influence of\\na false ecclesiastical system, Descartes and Bacon pro-\\njected modern philosophy along the same old tracks of\\nidealism and empiricism. Not that the Frenchman was\\nexclusively an idealist, or the Englishman exclusively\\nan empiricist, but the prominent trend of the former s\\nthinking was in the direction of idealism, and the latter\\nin that of sensualism. The pantheists and transcenden-\\ntalists, inexcusably unmindful of the lessons of the past,\\nagain violated the harmony of philosophy and the unity\\nof the mind by giving to their speculations an exclu-\\nsive development of idealism. Having launched forth\\nin search of the Absolute, without the compass of experi-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0217.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "206 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nence, they foundered in an ocean of mists without bottom\\nand without shore.\\nFurthermore, they were doubly inexcusable for going\\nfarther than the Greek idealists ever went, in affirming,\\nas the last conclusion of philosophy, an absolute some-\\nthing, or, with Hegel, nothing, without consciousness or\\npersonality, and evolving, by the law of immanent neces-\\nsity, into the matter and spirit of the universe a climax\\nof folly which the regulated genius of the Greek never\\nreached.\\n5. It may be added that these philosophers are liable\\nto the grave charge of having contemned the modifying\\ninfluence of the Bible and Christianity upon the course\\nof modern philosophy. It cannot be successfully denied\\nthat the Bible, as well as philosophy, utters itself in the\\nsphere of ontology. It declares the existence of a per-\\nsonal God, who is the creator of the world, and its provi-\\ndential preserver and ruler. This testimony is, for its\\nown sake, entitled at least to be respectfully considered.\\nContemplated simply from the point of view of its on-\\ntology, the Bible justly challenges attention but even\\nwere the boast of philosophy allowed, that it is an alto-\\ngether independent inquirer in a field which it claims\\nfor its own research, and not to be trammelled by reli-\\ngion in any form, yet so far as the Bible assumes to\\nspeak on philosophical questions, as to a certain extent\\nit unquestionably does, it is entitled to the same rights.\\nWhen, therefore, philosophy and the Bible meet on the\\nsame field a field which both legitimately occupy and\\nannounce opposite doctrines, the question of superior\\nauthority inevitably arises; and it is clear that it can", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0218.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "Pantheism. 207\\nonly be decided upon grounds of evidence; and then\\nthe tremendous mass and force of the evidence which\\nsupports the authority and the truth of the Bible, which\\ndifferentiates it as well from philosophy, ontologically\\nconsidered, as from every form of extra-biblical revela-\\ntion, not only necessitate examination, but demand\\nassent. What analogous evidence has mere philosophy\\nto submit? None, absolutely none, which the Bible,\\nminus its extraordinary credentials, does not possess.\\nAdd those credentials, and there is no possibility of com-\\nparison, for one of the terms to be compared has no\\nexistence. It would be a comparison of an alleged\\nsupreme evidence and none. It would be madness to\\nsay that historical evidence cannot outweigh the abstract\\ninferences of the speculative intellect.\\nNow the whole volume of evidence, external, internal,\\nand experimental, in favor of the Bible and Christi-\\nanity these modern sages affect to throw out of account,\\nand arrogate to themselves the right to pursue their own\\nindependent investigations and to reach their own\\nseparate conclusions. What has been the issue This\\nThat, as before the first advent to this despairing earth,\\nof an incarnate God, philosophy had failed in its utmost\\ndevelopment, and the world by wisdom knew not God/\\nso is it now. Modern philosophy, blindly and arrogantly\\nrefusing to bow to God s supernatural revelation of him-\\nself, and insisting upon walking in the light of its own\\nsparks, has scaled the summit of speculation, and thence\\nproclaims a God unknown in heaven, earth, or hell.\\nAgain, the verdict must be, that the world by wisdom\\nknows not God. Is it not time for the close of this", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0219.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "208 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\npresent period of audacious speculation, of profound\\nignorance of divine things, of widespread infidelity, and\\nthe introduction of that golden age, when the know-\\nledge of the LORD shall cover the earth as the waters\\ncover the sea?", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0220.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON S DOCTRINE\\nOF CAUSATION.\\nPart I.\\nIN the consideration of Hamilton s doctrine in regard\\nto causation, some comments will first be made upon\\nhis views concerning the nature of cause itself, and then\\nhis theory, with reference to the origin of the causal\\njudgment, will be examined.\\nI. There are two special views in regard to cause,\\nwhich he very much insists upon, and which, if not\\nentirely defective, need greater qualification than he\\nhimself imposes upon them.\\n1. He maintains that every effect is the product of\\nmore than one cause is the product of concurring\\ncauses. Every effect, he declares, is only produced\\nby the concurrence of at least two causes. Had he\\naffirmed that this is ordinarily the case, no valid objec-\\ntion could be taken to the position but the assertion is\\nunqualified the predication is made of every effect,\\nand it is affirmed that it is only produced by a con-\\ncurrence of causes. Nor is the utterance cited at all\\nsingular, or peculiar to the connection in which it stands.\\nIt is true that in one place Hamilton does impose a\\nqualification upon this general law. I have already,\\n1 Met. Lect., p. 42.\\n209", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0221.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "210 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nhe observes, noticed to you tbe error of philosophers in\\nsupposing that anything can have a single cause, of\\ncourse, I speak only of second causes. Of the causation\\nof the Deity we can form no possible conception. Of\\nsecond causes, I say, there must almost always be at\\nleast a concurrence of two to constitute an effect. 1 The\\nuse of the word almost here is noteworthy. It obviously\\nlimits the scope of the maxim for which he contends.\\nYet, it is strange that the limitation is admitted in im-\\nmediate connection with the exposure of the alleged error\\nthat anything can have a single cause. I know of no\\nother instance in which the qualification is employed.\\nIt is the common doctrine of Hamilton that every effect\\nis produced by con-causes.\\n(1) The assertion of this law is made in the very\\nmidst of a discussion, the design of which is to prove that\\nthe end sought by philosophy is a first cause of effects,\\nand the discover of unity in that one, ultimate cause.\\nNow if a series of effects begin in a cause which imparts\\nunity to the whole, it is perfectly clear that the first\\neffect in the series can have but one cause. Ex hypothesi,\\nanalysis, carried back regressively, conducts us to an\\nultimate cause, and consequently a plurality, or even a\\nduality, of causes is excluded. The universal affirma-\\ntion of Hamilton, that every effect must have more than\\none cause, is invalidated by his own doctrine touching\\nthe quest by philosophy of an ultimate cause, as satisfy-\\ning the demand for unity.\\nIt will, no doubt, be objected that injustice has been\\ndone to Hamilton by this criticism, since he is only\\n1 Met. Led., p. 554.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0222.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 211\\nspeaking of second causes. To this objection the reply\\nis obvious.\\nIn the first place, the scope of the discussion, in which\\nthe passage which has been cited as the occasion of these\\nremarks occurs, does include, in fact, a reference to the\\nefficiency of God as the first cause. Hamilton had not\\nlong before elaborately argued that one of the most\\nuseful ends of philosophy is to conduct us to the know-\\nledge of the divine existence and the divine causality.\\nThe discussion, therefore, cannot simply apply to second\\ncauses.\\nIn the second place, the scope of the discussion must,\\nfrom the very nature of the case, involve the causal\\nefficiency of God. For what, according to Hamilton,\\ndoes philosophy seek He answers, Unity. How is this\\nto be attained He replies, By an analysis of effects\\ninto their causes, an analysis to be continued until we\\narrive at the first cause. Now if, as he contends, every\\nsecond cause is itself an effect, which is produced by\\nmore than one cause, it would follow that, upon his own\\ndoctrine, philosophy would be doomed to perpetual dis-\\nappointment in its search for unity along the line of\\nsecond causes. The nisus is confessed; but it is one,\\nlike the labor of the Danaides, destined to everlasting\\nfailure. Its sweat evaporates into nothing. Nature\\nwould cheat us with an illusive hope; but this effort,\\ninduced by the fundamental laws of the mind, is an\\ninspired prophecy of a definite result. There must be\\nsome point, in the regression through effects and causes,\\nat which the demand, the insatiable thirst, for ultimate\\nunity may be satisfied. That last point, that Ultima", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0223.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "212 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nThule, of our investigations can, of necessity, only be\\nreached when we apprehend one simple, uncompounded\\ncause, which, by its sole efficiency, originates the whole\\nseries of second causes and effects, and therefore stamps\\nthe series as a system, in itself complex indeed, but\\ncharacterized by the attribute of unity. Hamilton s dis-\\ncussions, consequently, cannot be restricted to second\\ncauses, but must involve the first cause. In this view\\nof it, it is liable to the charge of inconsistency. The\\nuniversal affirmation that every effect is only produced\\nby concurrent causes needs to be seriously modified.\\nOtherwise, it is not true.\\nIt may also be objected, that Hamilton is not speaking\\nmerely of efficient causes. His affirmation includes all\\nkinds of causes for he says By cause, be it observed,\\nI mean everything without which the effect could not he\\nrealized. But in answer it may be said, that he ex-\\npressly uses the terms efficient causes. The ends the\\nfinal causes of philosophy as we have seen, are two:\\nfirst, the discovery of efficient causes secondly, the gen-\\neralization of our knowledge into unity two ends, how-\\never, which fall together into one, inasmuch as the\\nhigher we proceed in the discovery of causes, we neces-\\nsarily approximate more and more to unity. Here he\\nnot only limits the view to efficient causes, but declares\\nthat it is in approaching the ultimate efficient cause we\\napproximate to unity. The only kind of causes of\\nwhich, in this relation he speaks, are those which pro-\\nduce effects, abundant proof of which might be adduced\\nfrom the language that he constantly employs. In the\\npassage just quoted he explicitly discriminates final", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0224.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 213\\ncauses from efficient, the former leading to the discovery\\nof the latter. Formal causes Hamilton was too good a\\nmetaphysician, too thoroughly acquainted with Aristotle,\\nto rank with efficient, or to represent them as cooperat-\\ning with efficient in the production of effects. To say\\nthat material and instrumental causes are co-efficients\\nin producing the effect is to say that the marble and the\\nchisel produce the statute. The one is but the matter,\\nthe other the instrument, which the efficient cause, the\\nproducer, uses. If it be still urged that Hamiltou\\ntreated material and instrumental causes as efficient, it\\nmust be said that he used his terms with an inaccuracy\\nstrange in so precise a thinker, and that he confounded\\nproducing causes with the conditions upon which they\\noperate that, in other words, he coordinated occasional\\nwith efficient causes. It is perfectly manifest that if\\nthere be a first cause, enforcing unity, it cannot be either\\na material or an instrumental cause, nor can it be one\\ncombining both; it must be simply an efficient cause.\\nThis leads to the remark that the reason why so much is\\nhere made of this question is that, if philosophy conducts\\nus, as it certainly does, to God as the First Cause of all\\nthings, it points out as the goal of its inquiries, not a\\ncomplex, but simply an efficient, cause. He is abso-\\nlutely one, not many. Even Mr. Herbert Spencer refers\\nevery effect to an infinite and eternal energy.\\nIt may further be objected that Hamilton speaks of\\ncauses, only so far as they are apprehensible to thought\\nas they are conceivable by the thinking faculty and\\nthat he does not include the data of faith. This objec-\\ntion is rendered plausible by the following remarkable", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0225.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "214 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\npassage remarkable as penned by Sir William Hamil-\\nton:\\nThese first causes do not indeed lie within the reach of\\nphilosophy, nor even within the sphere of our comprehension; nor,\\nconsequently, on the actual reaching them does the existence of\\nphilosophy depend. But as philosophy is the knowledge of effects\\nin their causes, the tendency of philosophy is ever upwards; and\\nphilosophy can, in thought, in theory, only be viewed as accom-\\nplished which in reality it never can be when the ultimate\\ncauses\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the causes on which all other causes depend have been\\nattained and understood. x\\nThe objection, apparently supported by this passage,\\nwould be valid were philosophy, like logic, confined to\\nthe domain of thought; but I have not so understood\\nHamilton in other utterances. Philosophy is not a mere\\nregistry of concepts. It is vastly more. Passing out-\\nside of the facts of psychology the field of empirical\\nknowledge it peculiarly expatiates in the realm of in-\\nferences. Let us hear Hamilton himself when discours-\\ning of the divisions of philosophy\\nIn the First Branch the Phenomenology of mind philos-\\nophy is properly limited to the facts afforded in consciousness,\\nconsidered exclusively in themselves. But these facts may be such\\nas not only to be objects of knowledge in themselves, but likewise\\nto furnish us with grounds of inference to something out of them-\\nselves. Although, therefore, existence be only revealed to\\nus in phenomena, and though we can, therefore, have only a rela-\\ntive knowledge either of mind or of matter still by inference and\\nanalogy, we may legitimately attempt to rise above the mere\\nappearances which experience and observation afford. Thus, for\\nexample, the existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul are\\nnot given us as phenomena, as objects of immediate knowledge;\\nyet, if the phenomena actually given do necessarily require, for\\ntheir rational explanation, the hypotheses of immortality and of\\n1 Met. Led., p. 41.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0226.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 215\\nGod, we are assuredly entitled, from the existence of the former,\\nto infer the reality of the latter. Now, the science conversant\\nabout all such inferences of unknown being [i. e., not immediately\\nknown] from its known [immediately known] manifestations, is\\ncalled Ontology, or Metaphysics Peoper. We might call it\\nInferential Psychology.\\nThis is wisely and truly spoken and, if so, one fails\\nto see why, from the phenomenal effects of the universe,\\nwe are not entitled to infer a First Cause. The only\\nquestion is, whether such inference is knowledge. It\\nwould be trivial to say that it cannot be knowledge be-\\ncause it is not immediate knowledge; that is, that\\ninvolved in consciousness that a species cannot be\\nincluded under a genus, because it is not another species\\nIt is, indeed, mediate knowledge, but its mediateness\\nin no degree derogates from either its reality or its im-\\nportance. Of what real and ultimate advantage would\\nbe our immediate knowledge of mere phenomena, did\\nit not condition the higher, the eternal knowledge of our\\nsouls, of immortality, of God What folly it would be\\nto dignify the perception of the vesture, incompar-\\nable, though it be, in which the Deity condescends to\\narray himself, with the name of knowledge, and to deny\\nthat appellation to the apprehension of the Deity him-\\nself The First Cause is none the less known because\\nhe cannot be thought cannot be conceived and compre-\\nhended and the same, although in a far lower degree,\\nis true of finite cause. ~No cause is thought; it is be-\\nlieved. Thought furnishes its phenomenal manifesta-\\ntions, and faith, proceeding upon these thought-\\nconditions, affirms cause itself.\\n1 Met. Led., p. 88.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0227.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "216 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\n(2) The sweeping affirmation that every effect is the\\nproduct of more than one cause meets another limitation\\nin the causal efficiency of the human soul. Here the\\nquestion is disembarrassed of relation to the hyper-\\nphysical causality of God, at least as immediately\\nexercised. Hamilton speaks of first causes/ as among\\nthe ends sought by philosophy in its endeavor to attain\\nto unity. These first causes are, of course, viewed by\\nhim as specific, derived, relative, not as generic, original,\\nabsolute. This determination is admitted. JSTow, upon\\nthis assumption, the human soul must be assigned a\\nplace among these first causes; and as it is confessed\\nto be one and indivisible, it must be regarded as being,\\nin relation to its own activities, a single and not a con-\\ncurrent cause.\\nLet us think, away from the question before us, the\\nconcursus of the Deity with the operations of the soul.\\nThat, contemplated in a certain sense, is granted; but\\nthe fact is now left out of account. The problem is con-\\ncerned about the causal activities of the soul, considered\\napart from the agency of God. Let us also purge the\\nquestion in hand of all reference to social effort. That,\\nit is needless -to say, involves a concurrence of causes,\\nthe cooperation of soul with soul in the production of\\njoint results; but the inquiry is now restricted to the\\nrelation of an individual soul to its own separate acts.\\nHamilton, his whole school, and all sober thinkers,\\nadmit that the soul is a substance, and that, as such, it is\\ncharacterized by simplicity. Now is it denied or con-\\nceded that it is also a cause? If denied, one to com-\\npare Mantua with Borne is compelled to adopt a view", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0228.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 217\\nof the soul akin to that which the pantheist holds in\\nregard to God. The latter contends that the universe,\\nwith all its phenomenal facts and occult forces, is an\\nemanation from one primordial substance, which he, by\\na tremendous solecism, calls God. Hence the name,\\npantheist. The latter would maintain that all the activi-\\nties, all the phenomenal acts, of the soul are but a sponta-\\nneous evolution from its substance. He would, there-\\nfore, be fairly entitled to the appropriate name of pan-\\npsychist. To the one, God is all, and all is God to the\\nother, the soul is all, and all is the soul, within the sphere\\nin which it manifests itself. The faculties of cognition,\\nthe feelings and the will may be admitted to be powers\\ninherent in and qualifying the soul as it is a substance;\\nbut actual thoughts, feelings, volitions, are products\\nwhich are caused by the soul operating through those\\npowers. There is, however, no need now to argue this\\nquestion. The hypothesis, that the soul is simply a\\nsubstance and not a cause, would have been scouted by\\nthe great Libertarian who zealously contended that the\\nsoul is the free, undetermined cause of its own acts, and\\nin that fact grounded its responsibility, indeed the very\\npossibility of a moral government. The argument is\\nad hominem.\\nIf, on the other hand, it be conceded that the soul is\\na cause as well as a substance, it must also be granted\\nthat the regression, by analysis through its subjective\\neffects and minor causes, conducts us to the soul itself,\\nas relatively the ultimate cause of the series but, as it\\nis confessed that it is one and indivisible, it must be so,\\nboth as a cause and a substance and we are constrained", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0229.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "218 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nto allow that, in this instance, there are effects which\\nare not the products of concurrent causes.\\nHamilton could not, in answer to this, have resorted\\nto the necessitarian view, that the outward circum-\\nstances to which the soul is related its external environ-\\nment determine its causal activity. He was no neces-\\nsitarian. Nor did he maintain, but expressly argued\\nagainst, the supposition that the causal efficiency of the\\nsoul is determined by a subjective spontaneity in the\\ndetermination of which it had no agency. This is but\\nanother phase of the necessitarian hypothesis. In this\\nhe was clearly right, so far forth as man in the condition\\nin which he was created is concerned and even one,\\nwho holds that the first free decision of the soul for evil,\\ndetermined ever afterwards, without supernatural,\\ndivine interposition, its moral spontaneity in the direc-\\ntion of evil, maintains that it is responsible for the acts\\nwhich it causally produces in conformity with that\\nspontaneous condition.\\nIf, in rebuttal, it be urged that the motives which\\nlead to every act are complex, and that we have not\\nescaped from the necessity of supposing a concurrence\\nof causes for .every effect, the rejoinder is threefold.\\nFirst, it is denied that motives are efficient causes. Sec-\\nondly, if the motives are conceived as not caused by the\\nsoul, but as springing from it simply as a substance, it\\nis conceded that they have a single ground of existence\\nin the substance of the soul which is a unit. Thirdly,\\nthe motives which spontaneously arise from the very\\nmake of the soul must by its elective action, through\\nthe will, be appropriated ere they become the proximate", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0230.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 219\\ninducements to determinate acts. However many and\\ncomplex the motives may be which, conduce to volition,\\nit is, after all, the one, indivisible soul itself which must\\nbe regarded as the ultimate cause of its acts. But if this\\nbe so, we have the operation of a single efficient cause\\nin the production of effects.\\nThe same kind of argument, mutatis mutandis, may,\\nfor aught I know to the contrary, be employed in regard\\nto the elementary forces of nature. What proof, for\\ninstance, is there of a concurrence of causes in the at-\\ntraction of gravity It operates in a vacuum. When\\nlightning kills a man, what causes concur with it To\\nsay that there must be a concurrence of a negative and\\npositive-electric state is to confound receptivity with\\nactivity, and mere conditions with efficient causes.\\n(3) If Hamilton s doctrine be true, it would follow\\nthat, in the regression from effects to causes, instead of\\napproximating unity more and more, we would be more\\nand more multiplying particulars, and increasing diver-\\nsity. Starting with a given effect we would have at\\nleast two causes. Viewing them in turn as effects,\\nanalysis would give us two causes for each of them,\\nmaking four. For each of these four considered as\\neffects we would have two which would yield eight. We\\nwould increase the number of particular causes at every\\nstep. The subjoined table will illustrate what is meant", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0231.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "220 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nBut take the contrary view, and we first encounter\\nrelative and subordinate first causes, which are single,\\nand we refer them to one ultimate and supreme cause,\\nthus\\nGOD.\\nThe conscious activities of each human soul must, for\\nexample, be assigned to that single soul as their relative\\nfirst cause. What is true of one is true of all; but all\\nthese souls as subordinate first causes, characterized by\\nunity, must be attributed as effects to the causal effi-\\nciency of God.\\n2. The second special hypothesis of Hamilton, in\\nregard to the nature of cause, to which attention is now\\nasked, cannot be more clearly expressed than in his own\\nlanguage. He says\\nWe have .seen that causes (taking that term as\\nsynonymous for all without which the effect would not\\nbe) are only the co-efficients of the effect an effect being\\nnothing more than the sum or complement of all the\\npartial causes, the concurrence of which constitutes its\\nexistence. 1\\nThe same view is propounded in connection with his\\ntheory of the conditioned in its application to cause. It\\n1 Met. Led., p. 68.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0232.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 221\\nis, in fact, the office which it is summoned to discharge,\\nin that relation which attaches to it its chief significance,\\nand on account of which its validity is now challenged.\\nThe view, as stated by Hamilton in an unqualified form,\\nis exposed to serious objections.\\n(1) It does not appear that, in every case, all the\\nreputed co-efficients of an effect enter into its very con-\\nstitution. Take his instance of a neutral salt. He\\nmentions three con-causes of its production an acid, an\\nalkali, and a translating force, say, the human hand.\\nGranted that the two former enter into the composition\\nof the salt, and go to constitute it, what becomes of the\\ntranslating force Does either the hand itself as a col-\\nlection of nerves, muscles and bones, or the force exerted\\nby the hand, enter into the salt Surely neither of them\\nis one of its constituents. Here, then, we encounter an\\nobvious limitation.\\nThere are effects in relation to which it is impossible\\nthat Hamilton s law should hold good. A man, for in-\\nstance, is killed by a pistol-shot. Here the effect is\\ndeath. How can it, in any sense, be considered as the\\nsum or complement of the causes which produced it\\nIs death a compound of the homicide s volition, the\\nweapon, the pulling of a trigger, the explosion of powder,\\nthe propulsion of a ball, and its penetration into the\\nbody Should it be said that the power of the man who\\nfired the shot, acting through these conditions, passes\\ninto act in the effect, death, a contradiction is asserted\\nfor death is the negation of life, and how a positive\\nliving power enters into it and constitutes it is impos-\\nsible to see. The fact is that Hamilton s law seems to", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0233.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "222 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nexclude the whole class of events as contradistinguished\\nto substances and qualities.\\nThere are, indeed, effects into which the cause does\\nnot enter at all as a constituent. The cause ceases to act\\nupon the occurrence of the effect, and, in the particular\\nrelation in which it has acted, ceases to exist. It ex-\\npires, quoad hoc, in the transition. It does not pass over\\ninto the effect. The illustration just given of death by\\na pistol-shot is in point. Not one of the so-called con-\\ncurrent causes enters into the effect as a constituent of it.\\nThey all expire in the transition. To this it may be\\nreplied that the argument from the transitoriness of the\\ncauses is vain, since there are instances in which the\\neffects themselves are but instantaneous and evanescent\\nbut the rejoinder is that the argument based upon the\\nexpiration of the causes in the moment of production\\nhas been employed with reference to effects which con-\\ntinue after the causes have vanished. Death, as an\\neffect, continues after the pistol-shot has ceased. It was\\nenough for the purpose in view namely, the disproof\\nof Hamilton s universal affirmation, to adduce some in-\\nstances in which it does not hold. Another sort of argu-\\nment, however, was also used namely, that from the\\nnature of the case: it cannot be true that causes always\\nenter as constituents into the effect. The supposition is\\nabsurd. It is in accordance with that argument that this\\nparticular objection is to be met, From the equal transi-\\ntoriness of the causes and the effect produced by them\\nnothing is gained in favor of the law that causes enter\\ninto and constitute the effect. Take, an example fur-\\nnished by the illustration already employed. The sound", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0234.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 223\\nof a pistol-shot is a transitory event, it immediately\\nexpires; but it would be absurd to suppose that the\\nhomicide s volition, the pointing of the weapon, the\\npulling of the trigger, the impact of the hammer upon\\nthe cap, and the explosion of the powder entered as con-\\nstituents into that sound as one of the effects. For\\naught that appears to the contrary, the same is true of\\nthose mental and moral acts which are instantaneous,\\nwhich expire at their occurrence.\\n(2) The law in question meets another and a decided\\nlimitation in the case of the divine causality in relation\\nto human acts unless we assume the principle of the\\npantheist, and merge all effects into the First Cause,\\nsimply as modifications of the original substance, on\\nwhich supposition we abandon the theory of free causa-\\ntion. Blind necessity would rule all relations. But if\\nwe admit that the divine Being is a free cause, it may be\\nasked how he, as cause, or his acts as causes, can be ap-\\nprehended as passing into effects and becoming a part\\nof their composition. If, for example, God s power\\nenters as an element into my power, which, by a creative\\nact, it has caused, the unmixed responsibility of which\\nI am conscious for my free moral acts is not a fact,\\nunless it can be shown that a thing can act independently\\nof another thing, which, ex hypothesis is part of itself.\\nThis consideration is damaging to Hamilton, inasmuch\\nas he was a staunch assertor of the pure freedom of the\\nwill as grounding moral obligation.\\nIf, again, it be urged that Hamilton speaks only of the\\npositive concept of cause, and, therefore, not of the crea-\\ntive causality of God, as originating existence, which", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0235.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "224 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthough he believes he pronounces to be inconceivable;\\nit is replied that, upon the supposition of the validity\\nof the law that every effect is the sum and complement\\nof the causes that produce it, the power of our wills\\nmust be believed to be caused by an act of God s power,\\nand as we are conscious of exercising our power in will-\\ning we must be conscious of exercising that which it\\nembraces as an element, which goes to constitute it, viz.,\\nGod s power, and surely we are able to form a concept\\nof that of which we are conscious and so we must be\\nconscious of the effect, within us, of the divine causality,\\nand would be able to form a corresponding concept of\\nthe exercise of our own causality as embracing that of\\nGod which would destroy Hamilton s favorite doctrine\\nof the pure freedom of the will as conditioning respon-\\nsibility. That is, to be explicit, we would be conscious\\nof exercising a power into which God s power enters as\\nan integer, and, therefore, could not be conscious of\\nexercising only our own power. The consequence would\\nbe that we are not wholly responsible for the acts of our\\nwills. But consciousness, according to Hamilton s con-\\ntention, and to truth as well, does testify that we are.\\nHis doctrine. in regard to consciousness is inconsistent\\nwith his view of the complementary nature of effects.\\nAs has been already intimated, the chief interest\\nattaching to the questions which have been discussed lies\\nin their bearing upon the all-important subject of the\\ncreative causality of God. If we apply to that subject\\nthe law that every effect is produced by a concurrence of\\ncauses, we must suppose that in the act of creation,\\nstrictly speaking creation in the first instance there", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0236.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 225\\nwas a concurrence of causes in the production of the\\neffect. But the supposition of a concurrence of strictly\\nefficient causes must be ruled out since, manifestly, God\\nalone is the efficient cause. The cooperation with his\\nefficiency of any other cause in the creative act would\\ninvolve the absurdity of the concurrence of the finite\\nwith the infinite in accomplishing what only the infinite\\ncan achieve for none but an infinite power could create,\\nand as there cannot be two infinite beings, since they\\nwould limit and condition each other, which is contrary\\nto the supposition of infinity, any other cause of creation\\nthan God himself must needs have been finite.\\nBut let this be granted, and the ground may still be\\ntaken that the unity the absolute singularity of the\\nDeity as creator does not conflict with the supposition\\nthat the concurrence of divine causes, causes existing\\nonly in himself, was necessary to the production of the\\ncreated effect. ]N ow, what causes The material cause\\nis excluded by the nature of the creative act, considered\\nstrictly. There was, ex hypothesis no material antece-\\ndently to creation out of which the effect could be pro-\\nduced. Creation itself produces all materials. Hamil-\\nton, if he is not misunderstood, would have denied this,\\ninasmuch as he held that creation is but the actualization\\nof the virtual power of God. According to that view\\nthe divine power, considered virtualiter, was that out of\\nwhich the universe was produced. In this sense, a ma-\\nterial cause concurred with the efficient in the creative\\nact. This doctrine, to my mind, logically leads to pan-\\ntheism. All things were created by the power of God,\\nnot out of it. They are in him, but they are not He.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0237.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "226 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nThis view does not compromise the doctrine of God s\\nimmensity and omnitude. He is not displaced by either\\nmatter or spirit. We cannot believe that space is dis-\\nplaced by either. Shall we say, then, that all things\\nwere produced from or out of space, as a material used\\nby the creative cause The sum of God s being is not\\nincreased by creation, but it is another thing to say that\\nthe sum of all other being than he is not increased by it.\\nTo say that it is not, because what is created and appears\\nto begin, was really contained in God s power, virtually\\nexisted before it actually became phenomenal, is to con-\\nfound the material cause with the efficient. It is pre-\\ncisely God s power which is the efficient cause in crea-\\ntion power is the very essence of efficient cause. The\\naffirmation that the divine power, exercised in creation,\\nis, at one and the same time, both efficient and material\\ncause, is a contradiction in terms.\\nAn instrumental cause as concurring in the creative\\nact must also be ruled out. The very apprehension of\\ncreation proper is that it is immediate that is, exclusive\\nof a medium. An instrumental cause is one through\\nwhich anything is produced. It is the means of produc-\\ntion. It is -idle to discuss the question whether, outside\\nof God himself, there could have been such a cause.\\nBefore creation, there was nothing extraneous to God,\\nnothing but God himself. As to the question whether\\nthere was in the divine being itself an instrumental\\ncause through which the efficient cause operated, it is\\nenough to ask that such a cause be indicated. Until that\\nis done, the question is non-existent.\\nBut what of the formal and the final cause Is it not", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0238.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 227\\nnecessary to suppose that even the divine causality was\\nexercised in accordance with a concept of the form of\\nthings to be created, and of the end to be subserved by\\nthem Let it be borne in mind that the question is in\\nregard to the efficient production of effects. The dis-\\ntinction must not be overlooked, between what was neces-\\nsary in their production, and what was necessary to their\\nproduction. There is plausibility in the view that the\\nmaterial and the instrumental cause concur in the pro-\\nduction of an effect. It may be contended that they are,\\nin a sense, producing but who would dream of affirming\\nthe same of the formal and the final cause The truth is,\\nthat neither the material nor the instrumental cause is\\na part of the power which produces. They are both the\\nproducts of power of the divine power, for it is that\\nwhich is under consideration. This difficulty can only\\nbe avoided by regarding those causes as intrinsic to the\\ndivine power itself as forming, so to speak, a part of\\nits contents, a position which has already, to some extent,\\nbeen criticised.\\nAs to formal and final causes, we may adopt one or the\\nother of two theories. We may, with some of the school-\\nmen and the modern objective idealist (in part), hold\\nthat God s knowledge is identical with his power, his\\nintelligence with his will. Upon that supposition, the\\nconcurrence of formal and final causes with efficient in\\nthe divine causality is out of the question, for, accord-\\ning to the theory, they are one and the same. If intelli-\\ngence be the power that creates, it is very certain that\\nintelligence cannot cooperate with power, unless a thing\\ncan cooperate with itself.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0239.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "228 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nBut if we adopt the view that God s intelligence and\\nwill are not identical, then, first, we reject the theory\\nthat his intelligence causes the universe just as it causes\\nits own thoughts, that the universe is the objectified\\nthought of God whatever that remarkable phraseology\\nmay mean. Secondly, we must hold that the determina-\\ntions of the divine will are not arbitrary, but, to speak\\nreverently, directed by the divine intelligence. At the\\nsame time we must also believe that the divine will is\\nthe seat of causal efficiency. Its determinations and\\nexercise accord with infinite wisdom, but it is not\\nwisdom, it is the power of the will, which is causally\\nefficient. Wisdom is a sine qua non of creation, but it\\nis not wisdom, it is power that creates. Intelligence is\\nin order to the creative act; it is not a co-efficient in-\\nproducing it. It is power that produces. If, therefore,\\nwe seek unity by regression along the line of causes\\nand Hamilton tells us that it is along that line we must\\nseek it we are conducted through all subordinate\\ncauses, however characterized by relative unity, ulti-\\nmately to the will of God, the primal fountain of power,\\nthe efficient cause of the universe of being. Thus far in\\nregard to the unqualified dictum: every effect is pro-\\nduced by a concurrence of causes, in its application to\\nthe divine causality an application with which we are\\nauthorized to deal, not by the concepts of the thinking\\nfaculty, which are incompetent to apprehend the In-\\nfinite, but by the judgments of the believing faculty,\\nabout which philosophy and religion are alike con-\\ncerned. The question is a difficult one, and opens up\\nmeasureless expanses to investigation, but no more in\\nrelation to it can here be said.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0240.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Docteine of Causation. 229\\nConcerning the application to the divine causality of\\nthe other dictum: every effect is the sum and comple-\\nment of its causes, but little need be added. Such an\\napplication would seem to be impossible. It cannot be\\ntrue that the intelligence and power of God even if\\nthey be viewed as con-causes enter into and constitute\\nfinite effects. If God be immaterial he cannot become\\na part of the material system if he be infinite he can-\\nnot become a part of the finite. To say that he is not a\\npart of them, he is the material and the finite, is to fra-\\nternize with the pantheist.\\nI cannot close this part of the discussion without\\nrepeating the conviction already expressed in the course\\nof these discussions. It is that the First Cause is not,\\nas such, the ultimate principle of unity. That principle\\nis the First Substance as Fundamental Being, who, in\\nthe exercise of the attribute of infinite power, is the\\npersonal cause of all being but his own. The ultimate\\nanswer to that qustioning impulse that ever asks,\\nWhy can only be reached when we apprehend by faith\\nthe divine essence itself, uncaused, necessary, self-\\nexistent, of which the divine causality is but the omnipo-\\ntent energy. The infinite, personal substance is the\\nabsolute goal of all inquiry. Itself incomprehensible, it\\nis the explanation as it is the free origin of the universe.\\nHere philosophy and religion together rest: here they\\nkneel together and render their united worship.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0241.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "230 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nPart II.\\nI PROCEED now to examine Hamilton s doctrine in\\nregard to the origin of the causal judgment.\\nLet us hear him state, for the most part, in his own\\nlanguage, his position, in the first place, in regard to the\\ntheory of the conditioned, and, in the second place, con-\\ncerning the application of that theory to the origin of\\nthe causal judgment.\\nWhat is the conditioned What the unconditioned\\nHe answers: The conditioned is that which is alone\\nconceivable or cogitable the unconditioned, that which\\nis inconceivable or incogitable. x\\nThe unconditioned, as generic, he distributes into two\\nspecific aspects as repugnant opposites. The one is\\nthat of unconditional or absolute limitation; the other\\nthat of unconditional or infinite illimitation. The one\\nwe may, therefore, in general call the absolutely uncon-\\nditioned, the other the infinitely unconditioned; or,\\nmore simply, the absolute and the infinite the term\\nabsolute expressing that which is finished or complete,\\nthe term infinite that which cannot be terminated or\\nconcluded. 2\\nHe thus, in general terms, states what he denomi-\\nnates the law of the conditioned The law of mind, that\\nthe conceivable is in every relation bounded by the\\ninconceivable, I call the law of the conditioned. 3\\nAgain he says, more particularly The conceivable lies\\nl Met. Led., p. 530. 2 Ibid., p. 530. 8 Ibid.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0242.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Docteine of Causation 231\\nalways between two inconceivable extremes. 1 I lay\\nit down as a law which, though not generalized by\\nphilosophers, can be easily proved to be true by its appli-\\ncation to the phenomena that all that is conceivable in\\nthought lies between two [inconceivable] extremes,\\nwhich, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be\\ntrue, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one [upon\\nthe principle of excluded middle] must. 2 The words\\nin brackets are elsewhere employed by himself. What\\nhe here speaks of as conceivable in thought he in other\\nplaces terms positive thought.\\nHaving collected from himself his theory of the con-\\nditioned, let us attend to his application of that theory\\nto the causal judgment.\\nIt would be superfluous to quote Hamilton in proof\\nof his rejection of the hypothesis that the notion of\\ncause is simply that of invariable antecedence and\\nsequence. He fully admits the productive character of\\ncauses in relation to phenomenal changes. Cause is, in\\na word, efficient. Hence the legitimacy of the term\\neffect a term abusively employed by the advocates of\\nthe hypothesis of antecedence and sequence.\\nHe explicitly concedes the necessity of the causal\\njudgment. It is plain, he remarks, that the observa-\\ntion, that certain phenomena are found to succeed cer-\\ntain other phenomena, and the generalization consequent\\nthereon, that these are reciprocally causes and effects,\\ncould never of itself have engendered not only the\\nstrong, but the irresistible belief, that every event must\\nhave a cause. 3 We have here to account not only for\\n1 Met. Led., p. 528. 2 Ibid., p. 527. Ibid., p. 544.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0243.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "232 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\na strong, but for an absolutely irresistible, belief.\\nDo we find that the causal judgment is weaker in the\\nyoung, stronger in the old There is no difference. In\\neither case there is no less and no more the necessity in\\nboth is absolute. 2 It is enough, upon this point, to\\nadd that, in the table of theories he has furnished, he\\nformally includes his own theory under the general class\\nof a priori principles. 3\\nBut he distributes a priori necessity into two kinds\\nnegative and positive.\\nIt is agreed, he observes, that the quality of necessity is\\nthat which discriminates a native from an adventitious element of\\nknowledge. When we find, therefore, a cognition which contains\\nthis discriminative quality, we are entitled to lay it down as one\\nwhich could not have been obtained as a generalization from expe-\\nrience. This I admit. But when philosophers lay it down not\\nonly as native to the mind, but as a positive and immediate datum\\nof an intellectual power, I demur. It is evident that the\\nquality of necessity in a cognition may depend on two different\\nand opposite principles, inasmuch as it may either be the result\\nof a power, or of a powerlessness, of the thinking principle. In\\nthe one case, it will be a Positive, in the other a Negative, neces-\\nsity. 4\\nOn the one hand, he attributes to a positive necessity\\nthe origin of the notion of existence and its modifica-\\ntions, the principles of identity, and contradiction, and\\nexcluded middle, the intuitions of space and time,\\netc. 5\\nOn the other hand, he ascribes to a negative necessity\\nthe origin of the notion of cause and effect, and of sub-\\nstance and phenomenon or accident. Both are only\\nl Met. Led., p. 545. Ibid., p. 545. Ibid., p. 540.\\n*Ibid., p. 525. *Ibid., p. 525.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0244.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 233\\napplications of the principle of the conditioned, in dif-\\nferent relations.\\nAlthough the principle of causality is assigned by\\nHamilton to the class of pure or a priori conditions of\\nintelligence, he holds that it is not original, but derived\\nnot original, in the sense of a primary, affirmative\\ndatum, a special, positive principle which is a revelation\\nof intelligence, but derived, in the sense that it is neces-\\nsitated by and conditioned upon a mental inability, a\\nmental impotence. The eighth and last opinion [that\\nheld by himself among the eight enumerated] is that\\nwhich regards the judgment of causality as derived and\\nderives it not from a power, but from an impotence, of\\nmind; in a word, from the principle of the condi-\\ntioned. 2 It is not, however, derived from experience\\nThe causal principle is considered not as a result, but\\nas a condition, of experience. 3 That is, if I under-\\nstand Hamilton, it is not originated by experience, but\\nby a native inability of the mind which antedates and\\nconditions experience.\\nWhat is the causal judgment Hamilton says\\nWhen we are aware of something which begins to be, we are,\\nby the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it\\nhas a Cause. But what does the expression that it has a cause\\nsignify? If we analyze our thought, we shall find that it simply\\nmeans, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence,\\ntherefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance\\nhad previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly\\nunable to realize in thought the possibility of the complement of\\nexistence being either increased or diminished.\\nElsewhere more briefly\\nx Met. Led., p. 532. 2 Ibid., p. 547. Ibid., p. 538.\\n4 Ibid., p. 532.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0245.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "234 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nIt is the inability we experience of annihilating in thought\\nan existence in time past, in other words, our utter impotence of\\nconceiving its absolute commencement, that constitutes and ex-\\nplains the whole phenomenon of causality.\\nAgain\\nTo say that a thing previously existed under different forms,\\nis only, in other words, to say, that a thing had causes. 2\\nWhat, now, is the bearing of the theory of the condi-\\ntioned upon the causal judgment. To cite all the pas-\\nsages which are necessary to furnish a full answer to\\nthis question would be tiresome. The sum is this The\\nlaw that all positive thought (or conception) lies between\\ntwo inconceivable and contradictory extremes, one of\\nwhich, upon the principle of excluded middle, must be\\ntrue, controls the specific positive thought (of concept)\\nof cause. It, therefore, lies between two inconceivable\\nand contradictory extremes. They are, on the one hand,\\nan absolute commencement, and, on the other, an infinite\\nseries of relative commencements. As we are impotent\\nto think an absolute commencement, we are compelled to\\nthink that what begins to be had a previous existence in\\nanother form, or other forms that is, that its present\\nform is but the effect of its previous form or forms.\\nSuch is the genesis of the causal judgment.\\nBut betwixt the two contradictory extremes between\\nwhich that positive thought of cause lies, we are com-\\npelled to choose one as true, and reject the other as\\nfalse. The extreme of an absolute commencement is\\nproved to be the true alternative by a deliverance of\\nconsciousness, either direct or indirect. How In this\\n1 Met. Led., p. 554. 2 Ibid., p. 554.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0246.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Docteine of Causation. 235\\nway In every free act of the will, of which we are con-\\nscious, we are conscious, directly or indirectly, of an\\nabsolute commencement. As the authority of conscious-\\nness is ultimate, we must accept its testimony to the fact,\\nalthough inconceivable.\\nThis last point is important, and it will be confirmed\\nby quotations from Hamilton\\nIf, says he, the causal judgment be not an express affirma-\\ntion of mind, but only an incapacity to think the opposite; it\\nfollows, that such a negative judgment cannot counterbalance the\\nexpress affirmative, the unconditional testimony of consciousness\\nthat we are, though we know not how, the true and responsible\\nauthors of our actions, nor [not?] merely the worthless links in\\nan adamantine series of effects and causes. x\\nThe same view is elsewhere presented with only some\\nvariation in the language\\nIf the causal judgment be not an affirmation of mind, but\\nmerely an incapacity of positively thinking the contrary, it fol-\\nlows that such a negative judgment cannot stand in opposition to\\nthe positive consciousness the affirmative deliverance that we\\nare truly the authors the responsible originators, of our actions,\\nand not merely links in the adamantine series of effects and\\ncauses. 2\\nIn favor of our moral nature, the fact that we are free is\\ngiven us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of Duty,\\nin the consciousness of our moral accountability. 3\\nHow, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible in man or\\nGod, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand. But\\npractically, the fact, that we are free, is given to us in the con-\\nsciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness\\nof our moral accountability. i\\nThere is no conceivable medium between Fatalism and Casu-\\nalism; and the contradictory schemes of Liberty and Necessity are\\n1 Discussions, p. 596. Met. Lect., p. 557. 3 Ibid., p. 558.\\n4 Disc, p. 597.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0247.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "236 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthemselves inconceivable. For, as we cannot compass in thought\\nan undetermined cause an absolute commencement the funda-\\nmental hypothesis of the one; so we can as little think an infinite\\nseries of determined causes of relative commencements the fun-\\ndamental hypothesis of the other. The champions of the opposite\\ndoctrines are thus at once resistless in assault, and impotent in\\ndefence. 1 Each is hewn down, and appears to die under the home-\\nthrusts of his adversary; but each again recovers life from the\\nvery death of his antagonist, and, to borrow a simile, both are\\nlike the heroes in Valhalla, ready in a moment to amuse them-\\nselves anew in the same bloodless and interminable conflict. The\\ndoctrine of Moral Liberty cannot be made conceivable, for we can\\nonly conceive the determined and the relative. As already stated,\\nall that can be done is to shew 1\u00c2\u00bb, That for the fact of Liberty\\nwe have, immediately or mediately, the evidence of consciousness;\\nand, 2o, That there are, among the phenomena of mind, many facts\\nwhich we must admit as actual, but of whose possibility we are\\nwholly unable to form any notion/ 2\\nIf our intellectual nature be not a lie if our consciousness\\nand conscience do not deceive us in the immediate datum of an\\nAbsolute Law of Duty (to say nothing of an immediate datum of\\nLiberty itself) we are free, as we are moral agents. 3\\nAnother passage is cited, for the reason that it ap-\\npears to throw some light upon the end which Hamilton\\ncontemplated in this remarkable speculation.\\nWe admit, he tells us, that the consequence of this doctrine\\nis that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the Condi-\\ntioned is impossible. Departing from the particular, we admit\\nthat we can never, in our highest generalizations, rise above the\\nFinite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be\\nnothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of\\nan existence, which, in itself, it is our highest wisdom to recognize\\n1 Gladium, non scutum, habent.\\n2 Hamilton s Reid, p. 602, note. The illustration might have\\nbeen omitted from the quotation as not necessary to the point in\\nview; but it is inserted on account of its great beauty. Kant\\ngives it in substance.\\n8 Ibid., p. 624.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0248.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 237\\nas beyond the reach of philosophy; in the language of St. Austin,\\nCognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci. x\\nYet, in the very midst of this discussion, Hamilton is\\nconstrained to admit a source of knowledge which\\ntranscends the compass of thought.\\nBy a wonderful revelation, says he, we are thus, in the very\\nconsciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative\\nand finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something\\nunconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality.\\nHamilton s position having been stated, for the most\\npart in his own words, the way is open for a considera-\\ntion of its merits. Before, however, the grounds of\\ndissent are submitted, it is proper that the points of\\nconcurrence should be distinctly indicated. I admit\\nFirst, That Hamilton is right in maintaining that the\\nrelation between what are termed causes and effects is\\nnot that of mere antecedence and sequence, even though\\ninvariable, but that it is a relation supposing productive-\\nness. The thing which begins to be not only follows\\nanother thing denominated its cause, but is produced\\nby it that is, it is really an effect, not simply a sequent.\\nSecondly, That Hamilton s theory of the conditioned\\nis correct, so far forth as it holds that the thinking\\nfaculty is bounded on all sides by the unthinkable, that\\nthe power of conception is in every direction limited by\\nthe inconceivable in a word, that thought cannot appre-\\nhend, much less comprehend, the absolute and infinite\\nthat the power to apprehend that which transcends\\nthought, to rise to the infinite and affirm it as a datum\\n1 Discussions, p. 14.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0249.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "238 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof intelligence, belongs to belief or f aitb. In tbis respect\\nbe bas enounced a master-distinction, wbicb is suited to\\nunravel some of tbe profoundest difficulties alike of\\nphilosophy and of religion.\\nThirdly, That tbere are at tbe root of our mental con-\\nstitution certain native principles, fundamental laws of\\nthought and belief, necessities of thinking and believing\\nthat these laws are at first implicit and beneath con-\\nsciousness; that, while they are not dependent for ex-\\nistence upon any conditions of experience, they are\\ndependent for formal expression upon the empirical\\nconditions furnished by perception, representation and\\nconception; that, when thus elicited from latency and\\ndeveloped into definite shape, they become great judg-\\nments, standards, criteria, in accordance with which\\nthe processes of thought and faith are enforced and\\nregulated. Here there is, in this discussion, not only no\\ndispute, but full and cordial agreement, with Hamilton s\\nviews, views in which he concurred with the ablest and\\nsoundest thinkers of ancient and modern times. 1\\nFourthly, That the causal judgment is characterized\\nby necessity. It is not contingent; we must form it.\\nBut assenting to Hamilton s doctrine of its necessity, I\\nam compelled to differ with him in regard to the specific\\ncharacter of this necessity. He maintains that it is\\nnegative. On the contrary, the true view would seem\\nto be, that it is positive. This touches a vital point in\\nHamilton s theory, and it will be more particularly con-\\nsidered as the discussion advances.\\n1 See Hamilton s Supplementary Dissertations to his edition\\nof Reid: Note A, On the Philosophy of Common Sense, p. 770.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0250.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 239\\nWith these admissions, I pass on to state certain\\nreasons which oppose the acceptance of Hamilton s\\nspecial theory in relation to cause.\\n1. His position, that we are bound, by an immediate\\nor a mediate datum of consciousness, to accept the fact\\nof an absolute commencement, may, upon his own prin-\\nciples, be proved untenable.\\nIn applying the law of the conditioned to the sub-\\nject of cause, he holds that the causal judgment lies\\nbetween the inconceivable and contradictory extremes\\nof an absolute commencement and an infinite series of\\nrelative commencements. Of these, upon the principle\\nof excluded middle, one must be true. The alternative\\nwhich, in this case, we must elect as true is that of an\\nabsolute commencement. Why 1 Because it is certified\\nto us, immediately or mediately, by consciousness. It\\nis the evidence of consciousness, and that alone, which\\nhe pleads in support of the alleged fact.\\nWhat is an absolute commencement? It is, says\\nHamilton, a cause which is not itself an effect. It is\\nthat which begins to be without any cause for its exist-\\nence^ a beginning without a beginner. This we are\\nutterly unable to think, to conceive, for we are unable\\nnot to think that everything which begins had a previous\\nexistence in another form. The sum of existence\\ncannot be increased. We are, therefore, obliged to\\nrefund every apparently new existence into the old\\ncomplement of existence, to which no addition can be\\nmade.\\nBut the fact of an absolute commencement, thus\\ninconceivable, is delivered to us, immediately or me-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0251.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "240 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndiately, by consciousness, the testimony of which cannot\\nbe resisted.\\nNow, argues Hamilton, the alleged existence of a\\nspecial, original principle, or law, which necessitates the\\npositive affirmation, that everything which begins to be\\nmust have had a cause, is contradicted by the deliverance\\nof consciousness to the fact of an absolute commence-\\nment. Hence he concludes that the causal judgment is\\nthe result, not of a power of mind, but of a mental impo-\\ntence.\\nIn what way is this testimony given us How does\\nconsciousness deliver to us the fact of an absolute com-\\nmencement In every free moral act of the will. Every\\nsuch act must be either determined or undetermined. If\\ndetermined, it is not free, but necessary. If unde-\\ntermined, it is not necessary, but free. Now we are\\nconscious that in every moral act of the will, we are not\\ndetermined to it, we are free in its performance. We\\nhave the positive consciousness the affirmative deliv-\\nerance that we are truly the authors the responsible\\noriginators, of our actions. Every free moral act\\nbeing an absolute commencement, in being conscious of\\nthe former, we have the proof of the latter. The testi-\\nmony of consciousness, let it be observed, is the only\\nproof which Hamilton adduces in favor of an absolute\\ncommencement. It is, therefore, evident that the ques-\\ntion turns upon the fact of such testimony: Does con-\\nsciousness furnish it? As Hamilton states, that this\\ntestimony is given immediately or mediately, it will be\\nnecessary to disjoin the two suppositions and consider\\nthem separately.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0252.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 241\\n(1.) Upon his own principles it can be evinced that\\nconsciousness does not immediately give us the fact of\\nan absolute beginning. He expressly and uniformly\\nteaches that consciousness is only possible in cases in\\nwhich immediate knowledge is involved. We are con-\\nscious only of that which we immediately know; and\\nthe object of immediate knowledge he defines as that\\nwhich is now and here present. Indeed he explicitly\\nacknowledges that consciousness is convertible with im-\\nmediate knowledge. With him, further, the terms in-\\ntuitivo, presentativo and immediate, as characterizing\\nknowledge, are treated as equivalents. There can\\nscarcely be any mistake as to his doctrine upon this\\nsubject. He illustrates it very clearly in the case in\\nwhich we reproduce a past event in memory. The event\\nitself, as past, is only mediately known through a vica-\\nrious image in the mind. What we immediately know\\nis, not the past event itself, but the mental modification\\nwhich represents it. Now, says he, we are conscious of\\nthe representing image as immediately known, but of\\nthe past event, as only mediately apprehended, we have,\\nwe can have, no consciousness. If, then, we are con-\\nscious of an absolute commencement, it follows from\\nhis own doctrine that it is immediately known that it\\nis intuitively, presentatively, given; but if so, we are\\nface to face with it, we perceive it, and, of course, can\\nsubsequently construe it in thought for it will not be\\ndenied that we can conceive what has been perceived.\\nThe perceivable is the very ground of the conceivable;\\nthe percept becomes, in thought-relations, the concept.\\nEvery object immediately known may become an object", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0253.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "242 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof mediate knowledge, and thought is mediate know-\\nledge. But Hamilton holds that the fact of an absolute\\ncommencement, as one of the contradictory extremes\\nbetween which the positive judgment of cause is placed,\\nis inconceivable it cannot be conceived as possible.\\nHis position, therefore, involves the self-contradictory\\nassertion that an inconceivable fact, which cannot be\\nimmediately known, is apprehended in an act of imme-\\ndiate knowledge; that is, an act of consciousness. He\\nrefutes himself We are conscious only of that which is\\nimmediately known that which is immediately known\\ncannot be inconceivable, and, to convert the terms, that\\nwhich is inconceivable cannot be immediately known\\nbut an absolute commencement is inconceivable. What\\nconclusion can be drawn, but that we cannot be conscious\\nof it?\\nIt being kept in mind that the question now is in\\nregard to the immediate testimony of consciousness, it is\\nquestionable whether, in being conscious of a moral act,\\nwe are conscious of its freedom. The assumption of\\nHamilton that we are is challenged.\\nFirst. He maintains that we are conscious of acts,\\nnot of states of mind. The act expresses the mental\\nhabitude, but not being directly conscious of the latter,\\nwe immediately infer its existence from the conscious-\\nness of its phenomenal manifestation in actual energy.\\nIt is the transition from a latent state, condition, habi-\\ntude, into exercise of which we are conscious. This\\ndoctrine I not only believe to be correct, but possessed\\nof great practical value. Applying it to the special\\ninstance in hand, we would be led to the view that, while", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0254.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 243\\nwe are conscious of a moral act of the will, a moral voli-\\ntion, as phenomenal, and, therefore, an object of imme-\\ndiate knowledge, we are not at the same time conscious\\nof the freedom which the volition is assumed to express.\\nIf we know that, it is by an immediate inference an\\ninference so swiftly formed that the freedom appears to\\nbe involved in the act as a datum of consciousness. It\\nhappens in this case, as in hundreds of others, that\\nreflection is needed to disentangle the inference from\\nthe fact of consciousness which grounds it. We are\\nconscious of the moral act, and, by necessary inference,\\nwe instantaneously believe in the state of freedom which\\nin the act energizes into exercise.\\nSecondly. Either the freedom, of which we are said\\nto be conscious, is spontaneous, or it is elective that is,\\ninvolving a power to the contrary. This vitally impor-\\ntant distinction is justly signalized by Hamilton him-\\nself and he correctly maintains that the spontaneity of\\nthe will is consistent with necessity, while its elective\\nfreedom is inconsistent with it. Now, according to this\\ntrue position, if, on the one hand, we are, in the con-\\nsciousness of a moral act, conscious of spontaneity, we\\nare conscious of that which consists with necessity, and\\nthe very fact for which Hamilton contends is over-\\nthrown; but if, on the other hand, we are said to be\\nconscious of elective freedom of power to the contrary,\\nthe power of otherwise determining the ground is\\ntaken that, in being conscious of the act when perform-\\ning it, we are conscious that we might have refrained,\\nthat we might have chosen the contrary alternative.\\nAdmit that the opposite alternative was deliberately", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0255.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "244 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nrejected, and as that is, in the moment of the act s per-\\nformance, a past fact, it is clear that we cannot be con-\\nscions of it. We remember it. We may believe that we\\nhave the power of otherwise determining, and that, in\\nthis particular instance, we may have exerted it differ-\\nently, but, upon Hamilton s doctrine of consciousness\\nas immediate knowledge, in which I thoroughly concur,\\nthese things cannot be objects of consciousness. They\\nare only mediately known.\\nThirdly. It may be urged that we are conscious of\\nthe motives which induce acts, and that in being con-\\nscious of the acts, we are, at the same time, of the\\nmotives. It is granted that we are conscious of motives,\\ninasmuch as they are transitive movements in immanent\\nstates of mind but there are several difficulties in this\\nview. In the first place, the question occurs, Are the\\nmotives themselves free If so, how If spontaneous,\\nthey consist with necessity. If deliberately elective, the\\nchoice between contrary alternatives, being a past fact,\\ncannot be delivered to us by consciousness. In the sec-\\nond place, motives expire at the moment that the acts\\nwhich they induce are performed. We cannot, there-\\nfore, in being conscious of the acts, be conscious of the\\nmotives, for, ex hypothesis they are past. If, further, it\\nbe contended that we were conscious of the motives, the\\ndifficulty returns that, in having been conscious of them,\\nthe question is whether we were conscious of their free-\\ndom, in the sense in which Hamilton regards freedom\\nin this relation. In the third place, the question con-\\ncerning motives would be irrelevant and damaging to\\nHamilton s position for, if in proof of the freedom of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0256.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 245\\nacts we have recourse to that of motives to the perform-\\nance of the acts, we admit that the motives exert a\\ncausal influence upon the acts, for, according to Hamil-\\nton, all must be considered as cause which contributes to\\nthe occurrence of a phenomenal change. But, in this\\nparticular discussion, he maintains that a free action of\\nthe will is uncaused, and hence is to be regarded as an\\nabsolute commencement.\\nFourthly. It cannot escape notice that the very lan-\\nguage in which Hamilton states the proof from con-\\nsciousness that the free moral acts of the will are, as\\nuncaused, instances of absolute commencement, dis-\\nproves the proof. We are conscious, he says, that we are\\nthe true authors, the responsible originators of our moral\\nacts. If, then, Ave produce them, we originate them, we\\ncause them, or the language is unmeaning; but if we\\ncause them, they are not uncaused not absolute begin-\\nnings. It makes no difference to say that it is the\\ngeneric power in the will, not its specific determinations,\\nwhich is here represented as a cause of acts. Generic or\\nspecific, the will is the cause of acts. They are not\\nuncaused. The question is given up but this special\\naspect of the subject may again be adverted to.\\n(2.) It having been shown that the fact of an absolute\\ncommencement cannot, upon Hamilton s own principles,\\nbe immediately given in a datum of consciousness, it\\nremains to inquire whether it can be mediately given in\\nsuch a datum. By this language Hamilton must be\\nunderstood to mean that from a direct datum of con-\\nsciousness we derive the necessary inference of an abso-\\nlute commencement, and of that inference we are con-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0257.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "246 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nscions. He furnishes a special instance from onr con-\\nsciousness of an uncompromising law of duty/ we\\ninfer that we are the true authors, the responsible origi-\\nnators of our moral acts. They are free, in the sense\\nof being undetermined, and, therefore, uncaused.\\nHence our responsibility for them hence the very con-\\nception of a moral government.\\nOne might, were he disposed to be technically exact,\\npause here to inquire whether, in accordance with Ham-\\nilton s definition of consciousness, we are conscious of a\\nlaw of duty. We are conscious of, we immediately\\nknow, a sense, a feeling, a conviction, of duty, and we\\nnecessarily infer a law which obliges us, and enforces\\nupon us the sanctions of reward and punishment; but\\nthis will not be dwelt upon. It is cheerfully admitted\\nthat our necessary inferences from the data of conscious-\\nness are of equal validity with those data themselves,\\nand this, notwithstanding the fact that Hamilton him-\\nself, in a certain place, disputes their equal certainty.\\nIt is also readily admitted that, from the direct deliv-\\nerances of consciousness, we immediately and necessarily\\ninfer, and believe that we are the authors and origina-\\ntors of our moral actions; but we are forced by that\\ninference and belief to hold that if we are authors we\\nare the producers, if the orginators we are the efficient\\ncauses, of our moral actions and how that harmonizes\\nwith the affirmation that those actions are instances of\\nan absolute commencement, it passes ingenuity to see.\\nHamilton also argues in favor of an absolute com-\\nmencement from our direct consciousness of the fact of\\nliberty; but", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0258.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 247\\nIn the first place, according to his own doctrine, we\\ncan have no direct consciousness of liberty. What is\\nliberty but the power to will freely our acts We are\\nconscious of the acts, not of the power which they phe-\\nnomenally express. Were we conscious of power we\\ncould describe it as we can every object of perception or\\nimmediate knowledge but who ever perceived power\\nWe believe in its existence; we perceive its manifesta-\\ntions. We are not directly conscious of the fact of\\nliberty.\\nIn the second place, if, from the consciousness of the\\nfact of liberty, supposing the fact to be a datum of con-\\nsciousness, we infer that there is in every free moral act\\nan absolute commencement, the same consequences\\nwould result, as have already been pointed out. We\\nwould infer that we are the authors, the originators, of\\nour moral acts, which is tantamount to saying that we\\nare their causes. The inference would, therefore, be, not\\nthat they are absolute commencements, but that they are\\nnot. That which is in any way caused cannot be said\\nabsolutely to commence it is a relative commencement.\\nIt will ever be to my mind a matter of amazement that\\nhe who affirmed that we are the authors and originators\\nof our moral acts should maintain that they are uncaused\\nthat they are not produced, not originated, but abso-\\nlutely begin.\\nIf Hamilton could have meant to imply that,\\nalthough, in being conscious of a free act of the will,\\nwe are not directly conscious of an absolute commence-\\nment, yet we infer from the consciousness of liberty the\\npower to produce the free act, and that is an absolute", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0259.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "248 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ncommencement, the question is abandoned; for the\\nadmission that the power to produce, or, what is the\\nsame, to originate moral acts would be an admission\\nthat they are produced by that power as their cause, and\\nthe commencements would not be absolute, but relative.\\nIf he meant that we are conscious of a belief in an\\nabsolute commencement, the question arises, Whence\\nthat belief? Now he contends, and properly contends,\\nthat our beliefs in transcendent reality that is, reality\\nwhich is incogitable are elicited into activity by the\\nconditions of conscious experience from fundamental\\nlaws of belief native to our mental constitution. Would\\nhe, then, have held that there is, among those connatural\\nprinciples, the law of belief in absolute commencements,\\nlike those in space, duration, etc., and that this law is\\ndeveloped from latency into formal expression by the\\nempirical condition of the consciousness of free acts of\\nthe will Certainly not. While he exceptionally held\\nthat there is no fundamental law of causality, he did not\\naffirm, he would not have affirmed, that there is a funda-\\nmental law of non-causality. Consciousness, therefore,\\ndoes not mediately and indirectly give us a belief in the\\nfact of an absolute commencement.\\nYet, as Hamilton contends that we must, upon the\\ntestimony of consciousness, believe an absolute com-\\nmencement in the case of free moral acts, a serious\\ndifficulty occurs. If our mental impotence to conceive\\nan absolute commencement necessitates the judgment\\nthat all things are caused, why should not the positive\\ntestimony of consciousness to an absolute commence-\\nment necessitate the judgment that some things are", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0260.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 249\\nuncaused This contradiction Hamilton does not\\nattempt to relieve, and it may be more than doubted\\nwhether he could have relieved it. The truth is that he\\nwas wrong in both positions that of the origin of the\\ncausal judgment in an impotence of the mind to conceive\\nanything as uncaused, and that of the testimony of con-\\nsciousness that some things are uncaused.\\nThe conclusion from the whole argument is that con-\\nsciousness neither immediately nor mediately testifies\\nto an absolute commencement.\\nThe real state of the case is that when conscious of\\nany act of the will that is, any volition we believe in\\nour power to produce it. The power in the will we\\nbelieve to be its cause. It is not an uncaused commence-\\nment but the power of the will to produce it we believe\\nto be caused by the creative power of God. The chain\\nof cause and effect is thus uninterrupted, the first link\\nbeing fastened to the throne of God, the cause of\\ncauses.\\nIt will be said that, in asserting the generic power of\\nthe will to be the cause of its acts, no account is taken of\\nthe causes of its specific determinations. I have, for\\nexample, the power to will walking, but what is the\\ncause of the specific volition to walk eastward rather\\nthan westward The generic power accounts for both,\\nbut for neither in contradistinction to the other. The\\nreply is, first, that all the specific determinations of the\\nwill are acts of the will volitions and each and all are\\nimmediately referable to the power of the will as their\\ncause. To say that one specific determination must\\noriginate from another preceding it, and so on ad infini-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0261.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "250 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nturn, is to deny the power of the will to choose the\\npower considered by Edwards himself to be its definitive\\ncharacteristic. The will itself has the power to elect\\nbetween the alternative of walking in one direction or\\nin the opposite. Secondly, the question whether this\\nelection is not determined by the apprehensions of the\\nunderstanding, and not by the decision of the will the\\nquestion between the determinist and his opponents is\\none irrelevant to the present discussion for if it were\\ngranted that the specific volition is determined by the\\nlast view of the understanding, it is conceded that it is\\ncaused by the power of the understanding that it is\\nnot an absolute commencement, an uncaused cause.\\nWere that question pertinent, I would say that the\\nwill has the mysterious, divinely given, power to appro-\\npriate the representations of the understanding, the\\nimpulses of the feelings and the prescriptions of the\\nconscience, and to assimilate them into its own sponta-\\nneity. They become directions to its specific determina-\\ntions, furnish the final, not the efficient, causes of those\\ndeterminations. The power of the will itself is their\\nreal, though derived and dependent, efficient cause. It\\nis in this elective power of the will that our personal\\nresponsibility is grounded. 1\\n2. Hamilton s statement touching the relation to two\\ncontradictory extremes of the causal judgment is liable\\nto serious objection.\\nIt is not intended now to criticise his theory of the\\nconditioned in its general application to positive\\n1 This question is considered at some length in the writer s\\ntreatise on The Will in its Theological Relations.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0262.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 251\\nthought, hut its special applicatiou to cause. According\\nto him, as we have seen, the causal judgment lies between\\nis conditioned by two inconceivable extremes, which\\nare contradictories. Upon the principle of excluded\\nmiddle, one of these must be true. These contradictory\\nextremes are: an absolute commencement and an\\ninfinite series of relative commencements. This state-\\nment of the case is exposed to challenge. The real\\ncontradictories are: an absolute commencement and a\\nrelative commencement. To state them in other but\\nequivalent words a commencement which had no cause,\\nand a commencement which had a cause. A commence-\\nment without a cause, a commencement from a cause\\nthese, in the first instance, are the real contradicto-\\nries.\\nNow of these one must be false, the other true for\\nthere is no possibility of a middle supposition. On\\nHamilton s own principles, it has been already shown\\nthat the alternative of an absolute commencement must\\nbe rejected. It is the false member of this pair of\\ncontradictories. The other, therefore, must be true\\nnamely, a commencement from a cause, a relative com-\\nmencement.\\nThere, then, emerges another pair of contradictories\\na self-caused series of commencements and a series of\\ncommencements caused by a power outside of itself\\nself -caused caused by another. To state the contradic-\\ntion distinctly: a series of commencements self -caused;\\na series of commencements not self-caused.\\nIn Hamilton s statement of the two contradictories\\nwhich exclude a middle, there is the confusion of a single", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0263.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "252 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nelement with a series of elements. The comparison\\nought, in the first instance, to be limited to single ele-\\nments. A thing must be regarded either as absolutely\\nbeginning that is, beginning without a cause or as\\ncaused. To bring in a series prematurely is to destroy\\nthe true state of the question.\\nNow, having settled the question, which of the two\\ncontradictories as to a single existence is true, we are\\nprepared to take up the further question, which of these\\ncontradictories is true a self-caused series, or a series\\nbegun by an extraneous cause. The first supposition\\ncannot be true, because it involves self-contradiction. A\\nseries, ex vi termini, consists of parts, limited and condi-\\ntioned parts. Each of these must have had a beginning,\\nand that beginning must have had a cause. What is\\npredicable of all the parts is predicable of the whole.\\nConsequently, the whole series must have had a begin-\\nning that is, the whole series must have been caused. 1\\nAnd as no part has the cause of its beginning in itself,\\nneither can the series as a whole. As no part is abso-\\nlutely commenced, neither is the series. We are shut\\nup, then, to adopt the other contradictory namely, that\\nthe series had a cause extraneous to itself.\\nHaving thus stated the case as it really is, let us more\\nparticularly examine its distinct elements.\\n(1.) Let us look at the hypothesis of an absolute com-\\nmencement.\\nFirst. We have seen that, upon Hamilton s own\\nprinciples, consciousness cannot deliver to us the fact.\\nConsciousness supposes immediate knowledge, and as\\n1 See Discussion of the Argument for the Being of God, etc.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0264.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 253\\nwhat is admitted to be inconceivable cannot be imme-\\ndiately known, an absolute commencement cannot be an\\nobject of consciousness. That proof of the alleged fact\\nis destroyed.\\nSecondly. We cannot believe the alleged fact. It\\nis as incredible, as it is inconceivable. It contradicts\\nour fundamental convictions. We cannot believe that\\nfinite power can produce something out of nothing, or\\nthat any finite thing can exist, any event can occur, with\\nnothing as its cause. The maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit,, so\\nfar as the power of the creature is concerned, is impreg-\\nnable; but a cause which is not an effect springs from\\nnothing. On the contrary, every finite cause, we must\\nbelieve, is itself caused by something.\\nThirdly. What is it which Hamilton affirms that we\\nare impotent to conceive This that the sum or com-\\nplement of existence is increased by a free act of the\\nwill, or, more broadly, by any cause in the production\\nof its effect. True; a free act of the will does not\\nincrease the sum of existence that is, of existing being.\\nISTo finite act can add to the complement of being, for\\nno finite act can create being but finite power is com-\\npetent to effect a change, to a certain extent, in the\\nphenomena of existing being; and such change alters\\nthe form or mode of being without making a substantive\\naddition to it. We are, therefore, not impotent to con-\\nceive an addition to the phenomenal charges of being;\\nand as every change demands a cause for it, we are\\npositively led to postulate for it a cause. This is not\\nthe result of impotence, but a fruit of power; not of a\\nnegative, but a positive, necessity.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0265.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "254 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nFourthly. If these things be so, Hamilton s argu-\\nment against the view that the law of causality is\\noriginal and underived breaks down. That argument is\\nthat nothing is to be assumed as an original, special\\nprinciple of the mind, operating by a positive necessity,\\nwhich can be shown to result from a mere mental power-\\nlessness. The causal judgment, he contends, is in this\\ncategory: it is enforced by a negative necessity occa-\\nsioned by an inability of the mind to conceive the\\ncontrary. Hence there is no original, fundamental law,\\nno special, positive principle, of causality in the mind.\\nHis minor namely, that the causal judgment is derived\\nfrom a mental impotence has been shown to be incon-\\nclusive. The law of parsimony, consequently, does not\\nexclude the supposition of an original and fundamental\\nlaw of belief in the relation of cause and effect.\\nFifthly. The other argument of Hamilton against\\nsuch a positive, fundamental law of belief also gives\\nway to-wit, that, as consciousness affirms the fact of an\\nabsolute commencement, it contradicts the hypothesis of\\nan original law which demands a cause for everything\\nwhich begins to be and that our nature would be self-\\ncontradictory and mendacious on the supposition of the\\nexistence of such a law and of the testimony of conscious-\\nness in opposition to it; but we have seen that con-\\nsciousness makes no such affirmation. The contra-\\ndiction, therefore, does not exist.\\nSixthly. We fall back, then, upon the doctrine that\\nthe law of causality is fundamental and underived that\\nis, an original, special, positive principle in the human\\nconstitution. It stands the tests of such a principle. It", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0266.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Doctrine of Causation. 255\\nis self-evident it is simple it is necessary. Its neces-\\nsity is proved by its universality.\\nSeventhly. If, with exceptional and perverse thinkers,\\nthe ground be taken that there is no such thing as the\\nrelation between cause and effect, but that consciousness\\nmerely affirms a relation of antecedence and sequence,\\nit is submitted that the doctrine of an absolute com-\\nmencement is out of harmony with that hypothesis for\\nan absolute commencement supposes the absence of any\\nantecedent having a peculiar relation to it. It is out\\nof relation to any antecedent it absolutely begins.\\nUpon every supposition, therefore, which can be made\\nan absolute commencement is excluded. It is both incon-\\nceivable and incredible: it is, as to the experience of\\nfinite beings, impossible. The hypothesis of casualism\\nis shown to be untenable.\\n(2.) We have seen that the first pair of contradictories\\nwhich we encounter is this: an uncaused commence-\\nment a caused commencement; in other words, an\\nabsolute commencement a relative commencement.\\nThe first member has been disproved. Upon the prin-\\nciple of excluded middle, therefore, we are shut up to\\nadopt the second as true that is, what begins to be is\\ncaused. The hypothesis of causation is established.\\nNow, then, there emerges another pair of contradic-\\ntories an uncaua 3d series of relative commencements\\na caused series of relative commencements the first the\\nhypothesis of fatalism, the second, that of theism. Upon\\nthe principle of excluded middle, one of these must be\\ntrue, the other false.\\nThe hypothesis of an uncaused series of relative com-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0267.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "256 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmencement that of fatalism is self-contradictory,\\nand therefore false. Each element in the series is a\\nrelative commencement that is, each is caused. But\\nwhat is predicable of all the parts is predicable of the\\nwhole. As no part is uncaused, neither can the whole\\nbe uncaused. The first link in the series is caused. To\\nsay that all the parts, including the first, are caused,\\nand that the whole is uncaused, is a contradiction. The\\nhypothesis, being self-contradictory, must be discarded.\\nThe other member of this pair of contradictories must,\\nthen, be accepted as true namely, a caused series of\\nrelative commencements. The hypothesis of theism is\\nestablished.\\nThere are two additional considerations which may\\nbe suggested with reference to Hamilton s statement of\\nhis contradictories\\nFirst. If our inability to conceive an absolute com-\\nmencement compels us to judge that everything which\\nappears to begin had a previous existence in another\\nform that is, that it did not really begin, why should\\nnot, by parity of reason, our inability to conceive an\\ninfinite series of relative commencements necessitate the\\njudgment that it began? Hamilton substantially ad-\\nmits the latter of these alternatives, but evades the\\ndifficulty created by this consideration. It involves,\\nhowever, as serious a contradiction as any which he has\\nsignalized.\\nSecondly. If his contradictory extremes are both\\ninconceivable, how is the contradiction apprehended?\\nThe law of contradiction he emphasizes as one of\\nthought. In order that the contradiction may be", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0268.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Docteine of Causation. 257\\nthought, must not the contradictory extremes be them-\\nselves thought But he holds that they are unthinkable.\\nThis difficulty is noticed for the purpose of calling atten-\\ntion to the fact that Hamilton overlooks the great princi-\\nple that in nearly all our mental processes, certainly in\\nthose concerned about transcendental reality, our\\nthought- judgments and our faith- judgments are insepa-\\nrably connected. They cannot be divorced without\\nmaking the principle of antinomy dominate our mental\\nconstitution. Kant s, Hamilton s and Manse? s antilo-\\ngies may all be got rid of, or brought into harmony upon\\nthe principle to which attention has just been directed.\\nThe apparent self-contradictoriness of the human reason\\nwill, to a great extent, vanish, if we will apprehend\\nthought and faith as discharging, according to God s\\nappointment, joint and complementary offices. As long,\\non the one hand, as philosophy assays the impossible\\ntask of confining itself to the limited sphere of thought,\\nit shuts against itself the gates of ontology; while, on\\nthe other hand, if it substitutes the measures of thought\\nfor those of faith, it may indeed assume to enter the\\nboundless field of ontology, but it will be like a boy\\nattempting to compass the ocean with his fishing-line.\\nTo do the former is, with the sensualist, to crawl like a\\nworm upon the earth to do the latter is, with the abso-\\nlutist, to soar into the heavens upon the waxen wings\\nof Icarus. What God hath joined together, let not man\\nput asunder.\\nThis leads to the further remark that Sir William\\nHamilton has, in this discussion, greatly erred by speak-\\ning of knowledge as restricted to thought, and by inti-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0269.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "258 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmating that a science incorporating into itself the\\nunconditioned would be impossible. If either of these\\npositions were true, philosophy, like theology, would\\nbe impossible. A science of philosophy, or a science of\\ntheology, dealing only with the matter supplied by the\\nthinking faculty, and discarding the revelation, as\\nHamilton himself calls it, of our fundamental laws of\\nbelief, would, let it be repeated, a sheer impossibility.\\nNeither of them is simply a science of the conditioned,\\nor a science of the unconditioned but both weave into\\none great, harmonious whole, the conditioned and the\\nunconditioned, the finite and the infinite, the judgments\\nof thought and the judgments of faith.\\n3. Hamilton s theory concerning cause seems, at a\\nvital point, to be based upon a shadowy distinction\\nthe distinction between an inability not to form the\\ncausal judgment and the positive necessity of forming it.\\nOne finds it difficult to perceive any distinction worth\\nmentioning between the propositions I cannot but judge\\nthus and so; I must judge thus and so. True, one is\\nnegative, the other positive but they express the same\\nthought.\\nFurthermore, the same predication may be made in\\nregard to all our original, fundamental laws of belief.\\nSome principles at the foundation of our mental nature\\nHamilton admits to be special and positive for example,\\nbelief in existence, space, time. Now is it not competent\\nto say that we are unable not to believe in. existence, in\\nspace, in time Is this not true The sort of inability\\nwhich he affirms in regard to our judgments touching\\ncause and substance, as differentiating them, appears to", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0270.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "Hamilton s Docteine of Causation. 259\\nbe equally predicable of those touching existence, space\\nand time and if this is not a mistake, nothing is gained\\nby Hamilton s use of the law of parsimony in this mat-\\nter. His negative necessity practically merges into a\\npositive, his mental powerlessness into a mental power.\\nAfter all, according to the illustrious philosopher\\nhimself, we must believe in cause and if the foregoing\\narguments have not wholly failed, they have shown that\\nthe principle of causality is one of the special, original,\\nunderived laws of belief, concerning which he says with\\nequal truth and beauty\\nBy a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very conscious-\\nness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and\\nfinite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something beyond\\nthe sphere of all comprehensible reality.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0271.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "THE AGNOSTIC DOCTRINE OF THE\\nRELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE, AS\\nEXPOUNDED BY MR. HERBERT\\nSPENCER.\\nTHE doctrine of Mr. Spencer seems to be that only\\nthat which conies under the cognizance of the pre-\\nsentative, the representative and the thinking faculties is\\nknowable; all else is unknowable. Phenomena as ob-\\njects of sensation, perception, imagination and thought\\nare known the reality which underlies them cannot be\\nknown. It is not in relation to our faculties, and what-\\nsoever is not in relation to them is unknowable. That\\nMr. Spencer includes thought as a ground of knowledge\\nis evident from the following utterance, when he is pro-\\nfessedly discussing the relativity of knowledge: a Thus,\\nfrom the very nature of thought, the relativity of our\\nknowledge is inferable in three several ways. As we\\nfind by analyzing it, and as we see it objectively dis-\\nplayed in every proposition, a thought involves relation,\\ndifference, likeness. Whatever does not present each of\\nthese does not admit of cognition. And hence we may\\nsay that the unconditioned, as presenting none of them,\\nis trebly unthinkable. Whatever, then, is unthink-\\nable is unknowable. Thought is the measure of cogni-\\ntion.\\n1 First Principles, p. 82.\\n260", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0272.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 261\\nBut Mr. Spencer affirms a reality which transcends\\nthought. This he denominates the absolute the ulti-\\nmate of ultimates, upon which religion and science are\\ndestined to be harmonized. This absolute something he\\ndesignates as fundamental reality. What is it? It is\\nforce the central and universal force of which the spe-\\ncific forces of nature are expressions, and upon which\\nthey are correlated into unity. This force he character-\\nizes as an infinite and eternal energy. But this won-\\nderful, transcendent, infinite reality, which is funda-\\nmental to the universe, is unknowable. It is out of re-\\nlation to our faculties of knowledge. It is the uncon-\\nditioned, and consequently lies beyond the conditioning\\npredicates of relation, difference, likeness.\\nOf this unknowable, absolute, infinite thing it is af-\\nfirmed that it exists. It is not nothing. It is, it op-\\nerates, it causes it is the explanation of phenomena\\nthe key of the universe. It is just here that Mr. Spencer\\nprofessedly breaks with the agnostic positivist of the\\nschool of Comte. The French agnostic affirms noth-\\ning beyond the phenomenal, the English affirms funda-\\nmental reality a force which is all-pervading and col-\\nlects all special forces into its comprehensive unity.\\nNow, the question necessarily arises, Whence this af-\\nfirmation What can we affirm of that concerning\\nwhich we confessedly know nothing? How does Mr.\\nSpencer meet this difficulty? His answer is: that we\\nare indefinitely conscious of the absolute and funda-\\nmental reality. This grounds our ability to make any\\naffirmation in regard to it, and necessitates that affirma-\\ntion. Let us pause to emphasize this mode of appre-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0273.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "262 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nhending the absolute, which at the same time is unknow-\\nable. It is indefinite consciousness.\\nIt is not now intended to submit this theory of relative\\nknowledge to anything like a thorough examination, but\\nonly to indicate briefly the points at which it is con-\\nceived to break down.\\n(1.) Mr. Spencer arbitrarily and unjustifiably limits\\nthe number of the human faculties. Grant him his as-\\nsumption, that there are no other faculties but those\\nwhich are either pre-supposed by that of thought as con-\\nditioning its exercise, or constitutive of thought itself,\\nand one would have little disposition to deny that what\\nis out of relation to these faculties would be out of rela-\\ntion to the human mind as cognitive, and consequently\\ncould not by us be known, for it is conceded that what is\\nout of all relation to our faculties cannot by us be known.\\nBut if there be any other cognitive faculty or power\\nthan those which Mr. Spencer enumerates, the case\\nwould, of course, be vastly different. What would be\\nout of relation to them would be in relation to that sup-\\nposed to exist in addition to them. If, for example, we\\nhave a believing faculty, over and beyond the thinking\\nfaculty, whajs is out of relation to thought might be in\\nrelation to faith. It behooved Mr. Spencer to show\\nconvincingly that there is, that there can be, no such ad-\\nditional faculty before he could establish his position\\nthat what is not related to the thinking faculty is not re-\\nlated to cognition at all that the unthinkable is neces-\\nsarily the unknowable. In defect of such proof, his ar-\\ngument fails to specify all the suppositions possible, and\\nwould be therefore fatally defective. But more of this\\nanon.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0274.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Eelativitt of Knowledge. 263\\n(2.) Mr. Spencer unwarrantably confounds the\\nknow able and the thinkable. He makes them the sub-\\nject of common predication. Only what is thinkable is\\nknowable. This is a tremendous assumption, and needs\\nto be established by the clearest and most incontestable\\nproofs. If he has not furnished them, or if it can be\\nshown that, in consequence of this identification of the\\ncogitable and the cognoscible, he involves himself in\\nself-contradiction, the foundation is swept from the ag-\\nnostic feature of his system.\\nFirst, it is sometimes intimated that Mr. Spencer has\\ncarried out the views of Sir William Hamilton upon this\\nsubject to their logical conclusion. This is a great mis-\\ntake. How far Mr. Spencer has claimed to concur with\\nthe doctrine of the Scottish philosopher, and how far\\nto differ from it, I do not undertake to say. It is cer-\\ntain that he did profess to adopt it to some extent. For,\\nin discriminating his position from that of M. Compte\\nin regard to the cardinal principles connected with the\\nrelativity of knowledge which are distinctive of the\\npositive philosophy, he remarks 1 Such clarifications\\nof ideas on these ultimate questions as I can trace to any\\nparticular teacher I owe to Sir William Hamilton.\\nThis justifies the questions, Does Mr. Spencer s doc-\\ntrine of the unknowable coincide with that of Hamil-\\nton Did the views of the Scottish philosophers logi-\\ncally conduce to those of the agnostics It must be ad-\\nmitted that Hamilton did at times restrict the term\\nhioivledge to what is immediately known. It is this\\ncircumstance which has occasioned the grievous charge\\n1 Recent Discussions, etc., p. 122.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0275.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "264 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthat he denied the cognoscibility of God. He might, it\\nwould seem, have effectually answered Professor Calder-\\nwood s criticism upon his doctrine of the infinite by\\nsimply affirming that he maintained a knowledge of the\\nInfinite. This, however, he did not do. Notwithstand-\\ning this, it may be shown, from his catholic teachings,\\nthat a negative answer must be returned to the fore-\\ngoing questions.\\nIn the first place, he expressly makes a distinction be-\\ntween immediate and mediate knowledge. Conscious-\\nness, says he, is an immediate, not a mediate, know-\\nledge. It may be proper here, he remarks in another\\nplace, to consider more particularly a matter of which\\nwe have hitherto treated only by the way I mean the\\ndistinction of immediate or intuitive, in contrast to\\nmediate or representative knowledge. After pro-\\nnouncing this distinction most important, and elabo-\\nrately expounding it, he proceeds to observe: Such are\\nthe two kinds of knowledge which it is necessary to dis-\\ntinguish, and such are the principal contrasts they pre-\\nsent, The names given in the schools to the im-\\nmediate and mediate cognitions were intuitive and ab-\\nstractive, meaning by the latter term not merely what\\nwe, with them, call abstract knowledge, but also the rep-\\nresentations of concrete objects in the imagination of\\nmemory. Other passages might be cited to the same\\neffect, but these are sufficient to show that Hamilton re-\\ngarded knowledge as generic, containing under it two\\nspecies, immediate and mediate. Of course, his mediate\\nknowledge must be knowledge, or the terms are unmean-\\ning and the reduction absurd.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0276.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 265\\nIn the second place, he affirmed the knowledge,\\nthrough memory, of the past. This, in opposition to\\nReid, he denied to be immediate knowledge, and conse-\\nquently admitted that there is a knowledge, a valid\\nknowledge, which is not immediate. Let one explicit\\ntestimony suffice:\\nWe are said, for example, to know a past occurrence, when\\nwe represent it to the mind in an act of memory. We know the\\nmental representation, and this we do immediately and in itself,\\nand are also said to know the past occurrence, as mediately know-\\ning it through the mental modification which represents it. Now,\\nwe are conscious of the representation as immediately known, but\\nwe cannot be said to be conscious of the thing represented, which,\\nif known, is only known through its representation. If, there-\\nfore, mediate knowledge be in propriety a knowledge, conscious-\\nness is not co-extensive with knowledge.\\nHamilton is obliged, in accordance with common\\nsense, to allow a knowledge of the past through memory\\na knowledge which is not immediate, for the events\\nknown are not phenomenal to consciousness. Any other\\nview would be absurd in theory, and impossible in fact.\\nIf the past could not be known, the business of life, the\\nrelations of society and the processes of courts would be\\nreduced to the category of the hypothetical. Past busi-\\nness contracts would be matters of surmise, a man at\\nthree score years and ten could only conjecture that he\\nhad had a wife and children, and a murderer would be\\nhanged in consequence of a guess. To say that our own\\nhistory is not an object of knowledge, because it is not\\nnow and here present in consciousness, would be to\\nstultify the human intelligence, to subvert morality, and\\nto represent the world as a lunatic asylum. It is true\\nthat Hamilton by a stubborn use of a technicality", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0277.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "266 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nand this obstinacy has caused him to be greatly misun-\\nderstood and misstated continually affirms the con-\\nvertibility of knowledge with immediate knowledge;\\nand yet he is ever compelled to admit a mediate know-\\nledge. In this he is inconsistent with himself, and no\\nexpositor of his catholic views, who desires to do him\\njustice, can avoid harmonizing him with himself by\\npointing out the view maintained by him in regard to\\nknowledge as generic, including under it two specific\\nforms of knowledge, immediate and mediate. That he\\nshould have assigned a pre-eminence to that which is\\nimmediate over that which is mediate, is one of the\\nmost serious defects of his philosophy. It was to exalt\\nmeans above ends.\\nIn the third place, Hamilton maintained a distinction\\nbetween empirical and philosophical knowledge. Hav-\\ning illustrated the distinction, he thus recapitulates:\\nThere are two kinds and degrees of knowledge. The first is\\na knowledge that a thing is and it is called the knowledge\\nof the fact, historical or empirical knowledge. The second is a\\nknowledge why or how a thing is and is termed the know-\\nledge of the cause, philosophical, scientific, rational knowledge.\\nThat he makes the latter kind of knowledge not only\\ntranscend sense-perception, and consciousness but\\nthought, is evinced by the following passage with which\\nthe discussion of the distinction closes\\nPhilosophy thus, as the knowledge of effects in their causes,\\nnecessarily tends, not towards a plurality of ultimate or first\\ncauses, but towards one alone. The first cause the Creator it\\ncan indeed never reach, as an object of immediate knowledge; but\\nas the convergence towards unity in the ascending series is mani-\\nfest, in so far as that series is within our view, and as it is even\\nimpossible for the mind to suppose the convergence not continuous", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0278.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "Spexcek s Eexativity of Knowledge. 267\\nand complete, it follows unless all analogy be rejected unless\\nour intelligence be declared a lie that we must, philosophically,\\nbelieve in that ultimate or primary unity, which, in our present\\nexistence, we are not destined in itself to apprehend.\\nThere are three things in this utterance that are note-\\nworthy. First, that he allows of knowledge which is con-\\ntradistinguished to immediate secondly, that he affirms\\na knowledge which overpasses thought, since he steadily\\navers that we cannot think a Creator a God; and\\nthirdly, that he characterizes belief as a kind of know-\\nledge we have a philosophical knowledge of the ulti-\\nmate or primary unity by believing in it.\\nIn the fourth place, he ranks among the cognitive\\nfaculties that which he denominates the regulative,\\nwhich he considers as the locus principiorum the seat\\nof the fundamental laws of thought and belief. These\\nhe sometimes characterizes as primary cognitions,\\nand in one place while speaking of them says: Being\\nas primary, inexplicable; as inexplicable, incompre-\\nhensible, [they] must consequently manifest themselves\\nless in the character of cognitions than of facts, of which\\nconsciousness assures us under the simple form of feel-\\ning or belief. These roots of cognition develop them-\\nselves not alone in thought, but also in faith. It is mani-\\nfest, then, that Hamilton assigned to the beliefs, actually\\nspringing from this cognitive root, the character of\\nknowledge. Otherwise he would have contradicted him-\\nself at a point fundamental to his system.\\nIn the fifth place, in expounding the philosophy of\\nthe conditioned, upon which he staked much of his\\nreputation as a philosophical thinker, he lays down this\\nlaw of positive thought: All that is conceivable in", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0279.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "268 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthought lies between two extremes, which, as contra-\\ndictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which,\\nas mutual contradictories, one must. These mutual\\ncontradictories, as inconceivable, are, of course, inap-\\nprehensible by thought. Were thought the only power\\nwe possessed, we could not know even their existence.\\nBut, upon the principle of excluded middle, one of these\\nunthinkable extremes must be true. Now, if we may be\\nconvinced that one of them is true, we must know the\\nfact. How it could be to us true, without our knowing\\nit to be true, it is impossible to see. The conclusion is\\nirresistible that Hamilton held the inconceivable the\\nunthinkable, to be knowable. The limits of thought\\nwere not, to him, the limits of knowledge. While we\\ncannot think the unconditioned, for to think is to condi-\\ntion, we may yet know it. How He answers, By\\nbelieving in it.\\nIn the sixth place, he explicitly affirms our knowledge\\nof God. Mind, he observes, rises to its highest dig-\\nnity when viewed as the object through which, and\\nthrough which alone, our unassisted reason can ascend\\nto the knowledge of a God. The Deity is not an object\\nof immediate .contemplation; as existing and in himself,\\nhe is beyond our reach we can know him only mediately\\nthrough his works. Again he says We must believe\\nin the infinity of God; but the infinite God cannot by\\nus, in the present limitation of our faculties, be com-\\nprehended or conceived. A Deity understood would be\\nno Deity at all and it is blasphemy to say that God only\\nis as we are able to think him to be. We know God ac-\\ncording to the finitude of our faculties but we believe", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0280.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "Spencek s Relativity of Knowledge. 269\\nmuch that we are incompetent properly to know/\\n[that is, to know immediately.\\nHere we have Hamilton s doctrine of the cognosci-\\nbility of God. We cannot perceive, or conceive him.\\nHe is not thinkable. We are not conscious of him, and\\nas he contends that thought cannot transcend conscious-\\nness, he holds that God is not an object of thought, as\\nhe is infinite. In this he has the support of almost all\\ntheologians. But we know him mediately by faith\\nthat is, our knowledge of him is inferential, the inference\\nbeing a special faith-judgment, enforced by the funda-\\nmental laws of belief elicited into formal expression by\\nthe conditions of experience. What is peculiar to Ham-\\nilton s view is that this knowledge is not affirmed to be\\nknowledge proper which he, I must think, arbitrarily\\nconfines to consciousness as the complement of internal\\nand external perception. But whatever may have been\\nhis view in regard to the question of restricting the\\nterm knowledge, in rigid propriety of speech, to that\\nwhich is immediate, he certainly admitted and main-\\ntained a knowledge of occult realities transcending the\\nphenomenal sphere of material substance, the soul,\\nGod and immortality. In a word, he was no agnostic,\\neither professedly or by necessary implication and\\nIn the seventh place, all doubt in regard to his posi-\\ntion is removed, and his doctrine rendered conspicu-\\nously clear, by what he has said concerning the subject\\nitself of the relativity of knowledge.\\nWhatever we know, he remarks, or endeavor to know, God\\nor the world mind or matter the distant or the near we know,\\nand can know, only in so far as we possess a faculty of knowing", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0281.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "270 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nin general; and we can only exercise that faculty under the laws\\nwhich control and limit its operations. However great, and\\ninfinite, and various, therefore, may be the universe and its con-\\ntents these are known to us, not as they exist, but as our mind\\nis capable of knowing them.\\nThese considerations serve to show how wide is the\\ndifference between the views of Hamilton and those of\\nMr. Spencer. The latter limits the knowable to the\\nthinkable, and therefore maintains that as the Infinite\\nis unthinkable, it is unknowable. The former, while he\\ntoo held that the Infinite is unthinkable, and, in that\\nsense, unknowable, also maintained that the Infinite is\\nbelievable, and, in that sense, knowable. In other words,\\nwhile Hamilton denied that God can be immediately\\nknown, he affirmed that he is mediately known. We\\ncannot know him, as infinite, by thought; we can, and\\ndo, by faith. He did not identify the thinkable and the\\nknowable, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as logi-\\ncally responsible for the agnostic doctrine that God is\\naltogether unknowable.\\nBut with these explanations which a candid and im-\\npartial exposition of his doctrine requires it is to be\\nregretted that so great a man as Hamilton, Christian\\nphilosopher as he was, should sometimes have asserted\\nunqualifiedly that God, as infinite, is unknowable. It\\nwould have been better had he contented himself with\\nmaintaining that the Deity is not, as infinite, an ob-\\nject of consciousness, of conception, of thought in a\\nword, that he is not comprehensible. This would have\\nbeen sufficient to have evinced his opposition to the doc-\\ntrine of the German absolutists and of Cousin and, in\\ndoing this, he would have been sustained by the decla-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0282.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "Spestcek s Relativity of Knowledge. 271\\nrations of the sacred Scriptures and by the verdict of all\\ntrue theology. In adhering to the employment of the\\nterm unknowable in application to the Infinite to God,\\nwhen his terminology was criticised by those who had\\nnot thoroughly grasped his meaning, he rendered him-\\nself liable to be misunderstood, and even misrepre-\\nsented, by those who ought to have been his friends and\\nsupporters a fact which has received an illustration in\\nthe hostile construction of his views by such writers as\\nDr. Henry Calderwood, Dr. James McCosh and Dr.\\nCharles Hodge.\\nSecondly, in confounding the thinkable and the know-\\nable, Mr. Spencer has made the prodigious philosophi-\\ncal blunder of restricting all knowledge within the con-\\nfines of the thinking faculty. If the thinking faculty\\nthe discursive, the comparative, the elaborative, the\\nreasoning, faculty is, in its operations, confined to the\\nmaterials furnished by perception internal and exter-\\nnal; if, to use Hamilton s language, Thought cannot\\ntranscend consciousness/ and there be no other faculty\\nendowed with a higher power and possessed of a wider\\nscope, it must be conceded that the incogitable would be\\nthe unknowable. This is Mr. Spencer s position, al-\\nthough we shall see as the discussion advances that in\\nmaintaining it he is inconsistent with himself. That\\nthere is a power or faculty the name is immaterial\\nwhich passes beyond the limits of perception, which\\ntranscends consciousness, and soars beyond the flight of\\nthought, I shall now endeavor to show. If this can be\\ndone, it will be proved that the thinkable does not ex-\\nhaust the contents of the knowable that we can know", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0283.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "272 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nwhat we cannot think. Keference is had to the believ-\\ning faculty, or briefly, faith, containing implicitly the\\npower to believe, and energizing explicitly into the spe-\\ncial acts of belief or faith.\\nBelief or faith the words will be used interchange-\\nably is, as the product of a power, an energy actually\\nexerted, frequently complex. Its initial element is in-\\ntellectual assent, and so far it is cognitive but it often\\ninvolves the feeling of trust, and sometimes an act of\\nthe will deliberately electing to concur with the assent\\nof the understanding and the feeling of the heart. A\\nstudent, engaged upon a geometrical theorem may as-\\nsent to an axiom, with no consciousness of feeling. One\\nmay listen to a statement of fact with the same absence\\nof emotion. But where one s personal interests are con-\\ncerned the intellectual assent is colored by the feeling\\nof reliance, and in case a struggle occurs between con-\\nflicting evidence and feelings the mental assent is ac-\\ncompanied by the election of the will as well as by the\\nemotion of trust. It is almost needless to remark that\\nthe purport of the present discussion requires that our\\nview be limited to that aspect of faith in which it is\\nsimply cognitive. The very question is, whether there\\nbe such a cognitive power as one of belief, and whether\\nit evolves into actual knowledge.\\nIn the first place, there is a powerful antecedent pre-\\nsumption in favor of the existence of such a faculty.\\nMan is so helpless and dependent that his nature would\\nseem to be left without sufficient provision for its wants,\\nwere it not warranted by its very constitution to believe\\nin a power higher and greater than itself and than all", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0284.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 273\\nthe forces which threaten it, to which it could appeal\\nfor help in distress, protection from danger and suc-\\ncor in need. Without such a faith, or at least without a\\ntendency to it, the nature of man would be to him an in-\\nsoluble puzzle. Reflection could only lead to the con-\\nclusion that it was either the product of chance, or had\\nits origin in a malignant source. The case would be dif-\\nferent were men able to defend themselves from evil by\\nthe exercise of sagacity and precaution. This, how-\\never, is not so. No amount of forethought, no ac-\\nquaintance with physical forces, no mastery of science,\\nand no knowledge of remedial agencies avail to ward\\noff the visitation of calamity or the stroke of death.\\nCould men help themselves, very few would suffer and\\ndie. It is no answer to this to say that men do suffer\\nand die whether or not they believe in a Higher Power,\\nfor it might be that such a belief conditions the trans-\\nmutation of suffering into happiness and death into\\nlife a supposition actually confirmed by the Scrip-\\ntures as a professed revelation from heaven.\\nThis presumption is verified by the well-nigh uni-\\nversal experience of the race. ~Ro tribe of men, of whom\\nwe have any trustworthy account, has been destitute of\\nsome belief in a superior power a belief which grounds\\na kind of natural religiousness. The fact that in some\\ninstances it is feeble and hardly appreciable, constitutes\\nno objection to this view. Its feeble existence proves its\\nexistence. Reason is but little developed in some speci-\\nmens of the human race, but who would argue from that\\nfact that there are some tribes of men wholly devoid of\\nreason Were there no intelligence, there could be no", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0285.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "274 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\neducation. That all men are possessed of a belief\\ngreater or less in a superior power is admitted by Mr.\\nSpencer himself in his account of the genesis and evo-\\nlution of the religious sentiment. Concede that it be-\\ngins in Fetichism, it begins. Fetichism, the evolution-\\nist himself being judge, is but the expression of a feel-\\ning, a principle, a faith call it what one may which\\nis native to the human breast. There is a natural ten-\\ndency in men, growing out of or concurring with their\\nhelplessness and dependence to believe in some higher\\npower able to bless or to curse. That fact proves the\\nexistence in man of a believing faculty. If not, the\\ntendency has no cause.\\nIn addition, it deserves remark that the ghosts, the\\nother selves of the dead, which, according to Mr.\\nSpencer, haunt burial places, hover about the abodes of\\nthe living, and become objects of worship to ignorant\\nsavages, are not perceived by them, but only believed in.\\nWho ever really saw a human spirit? Who ever per-\\nceived one? Who, then, is able to think one? But\\nthese ignorant barbarians worship them as present. For\\nwhat reason except that they believe in them Imagine\\nthem they cannot, for imagination depends for its ma-\\nterials upon perception; nor can imagination combine\\nthose materials into a human spirit, for, confessedly,\\nit is one and uncompounded. Even the physiological\\npsychologist would hardly contend that he can create by\\nfancy the image of a human soul and what he cannot\\ndo it is not supposable that a Bushman could. The\\nsame is true, in a higher degree, if possible, of M.\\nCompte s and Mr. Frederic Harrison s ideal humanity", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0286.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "Spencek s Kelativity of Knowledge. 275\\nas an object of worship. It is a pure abstraction. As\\nsuch, it certainly cannot be perceived. Otherwise it\\nwould be an abstraction and a phenomenon at one and\\nthe same time. It must therefore be an object of faith.\\nAnd so we have from all these writers an admission of\\nthe existence of faith as grounding the possibility of\\nworship.\\nIn the second place, there are things innumerable,\\nthe effects of which are matters of daily observation,\\nthat are utterly incomprehensible. They lie beyond\\nthe compass of perception, and therefore are unthink-\\nable. And yet we are so profoundly convinced of their\\nexistence that we may be truly said to know it. No one\\nhas ever perceived the occult forces of nature, the effects\\nof which he observes. Who has ever perceived gravity,\\nor electricity, or magnetism, or chemical affinity And\\nyet can he doubt their existence If he cannot perceive\\nthem, if he is not conscious of them as they are in them-\\nselves, he cannot think them. How, then, does he ap-\\nprehend their existence? The answer is, by believing\\nin it. What can we perceive of life itself? Nothing.\\nHave we then no apprehension of it We believe in it.\\nIn all these cases we know by believing. From the ef-\\nfects which are phenomenal we infer the forces them-\\nselves as their causes. That inference is simply a judg-\\nment of faith. There is no other way of accounting for\\nour conviction of the unperceivable and incogitable\\nreality. We are so constituted as to believe in existences\\nwhich we cannot comprehend. What we are able to per-\\nceive of the universe, vast as it is, is but little compared\\nwith the immeasurable systems which we are convinced", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0287.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "276 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nstretch away beyond observation into boundless space.\\nWhy the conviction? We believe. We know because\\nwe believe. Have we, then, no faculty of faith\\nTo this it may be replied that we can imagine reaches\\nof the stellar universe beyond the scope of perception.\\nCertainly. But that imagination is only of objects\\nanalogous to those of perception, and constitutes no\\nguarantee of their existence. The representations of\\nthe imagination assure us of corresponding objective\\nrealities, only when they reproduce in the images actual\\npercepts. Otherwise, imagination gives only the pos-\\nsible. The imagination of worlds beyond the revelations\\nof the telescope could never certify us of their real ex-\\nistence. But of that existence we are convinced. The\\nconviction is the offspring of faith.\\nIn the third place, the sciences, both the exact and\\nthe physical, begin, continue and end with faith.\\nTheir fundamental principles are undemonstrated\\nand indemonstrable. They are axiomatic pre-supposi-\\ntions spontaneously suggested by the very constitution\\nof our nature, which are necessarily accepted as the\\nfoundations and conditions of every process of thought.\\nThey are relied upon with the most perfect conviction\\nof their truth but if this conviction is not engendered\\nby rational proof, if it is not the result of reasoning,\\nthere is but one other way of accounting for it, and that\\nis, that it is a faith. By a necessity of our mental con-\\nstitution we believe these indemonstrable principles to\\nbe true. Science begins with faith.\\nWhen, in accordance with these inspirations of na-\\nture, science has begun the exploration of the field of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0288.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "Spencek s Relativity of Knowledge. 277\\nphenomenal facts, the inquiry is never satisfied with the\\nverification of existing hypothesis, the attainment of\\npositive results. There follows each generalization that\\nhas been reached the belief that a further interrogation\\nof nature will ensue in still higher and broader generali-\\nzations, with an increasing approximation to unity with-\\nout which the quest of truth cannot be satisfied. It is\\nfaith in these future realizations that furnishes the\\nstimulus to an unremitting investigation of phenomena.\\nWe push inquiry without fainting, because we have an\\nabiding belief that it will conduct to further and grander\\nresults. As science begins, so it continues, with faith.\\nFaith in future achievements is the prophecy of which\\nthe established conclusions of science are the fulfilment.\\n~Not is this all. It cannot be all. The constitution of\\nour minds inexorably demands that we go on. The\\nunappeasable principle of causality a questioning im-\\npulse, as Professor Tyndal interprets it, goads us on\\nto the inquiry concerning origins and ends. We may,\\nreflectively, but cannot, in fact, effect a schism between\\nthe one indivisible mind, as scientific, and as philosophi-\\ncal. The same man who has pursued a certain line of\\nphysical investigation, until he has secured a satisfac-\\ntory registration of particular facts, and a somewhat\\ncomplete grouping into classes and generalization into\\nlaws, cannot rest contented at this point. He inevitably\\nraises the questions, How? and Why? the answers to\\nwhich are expected to give the causes, efficient and final,\\nof universal order and special adaptations. But when,\\nunder the constraint of this inborn necessity, he crosses\\nthe boundaries which circumscribe the domain of phe-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0289.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "278 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nnomena, he abandons, e concesso, the instruction of per-\\nception and thought. He cannot perceive the unper-\\nceivable, he cannot think the unthinkable. He can\\nneither perceive nor think the occult causes behind the\\nveil of phenomena. What remains but that he acknow-\\nledge the guidance of faith the only power which is\\nthe apocalypse of the unperceivable and incogitable?\\nThe forces, the power, the causes which by their phe-\\nnomenal effects enforce the conviction of their existence\\nare not data of consciousness, but postulates of faith.\\nSo strong, indeed, as well as natural, is this tendency\\nto believe that even when the facts of observation do not\\njustify the conclusions of thought, it not unfrequently\\nhappens that scientific investigators themselves hasten\\nto accept suppositions and imaginary results as though\\nthey had been proved, and pronounce established and\\naxiomatic certain laws the existence of which may at\\nthe; same time be mooted in the circles of science. In\\nthese cases, the disposition to believe is a temptation\\nagainst which it behooves a sober judgment to guard.\\nThis is not rashly said: a volume might be filled with\\ninstances in illustration of the fact,\\nIn the fourth place, the current of philosophical\\nthought is more and more setting towards the assertion\\nof faith as a cognitive power.\\nThe emergence into notoriety of the common sense\\nphilosophy, as a system, has marked decided progress\\nin the development of psychology. Appealing to con-\\nsciousness as the basis of investigation, and respecting\\nthe convictions of the race, it treads a safe, middle path\\nbetween the extreme of a transcendental absolutism on", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0290.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 279\\nthe one hand, and that of a sensuistic associationalism\\non the other. One of the great offices which it has dis-\\ncharged is that it has brought into prominence, empha-\\nsized, and at least has begun the systematic develop-\\nment of what its most learned expounder has character-\\nized as the one perennial doctrine of philosophy a\\ndoctrine which has flowed like an unintermitting stream\\nthrough centuries of fluctuating philosophical opinion\\nuntil it has swelled into the volume of a majestic river.\\nThe sceptic, like Horace s rustic, has waited on its bank\\nto see it dry up, but\\nLabitur, et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.\\nThis doctrine is, that there lie at the very foundations\\nof the mind as cognitive, original principles, in the\\nshape of laws of thought and belief. To this funda-\\nmental faculty, this locus principiorum, the roots of\\nevery cognitive faculty converge, and from it are de-\\nrived the life and vigor of them all. These general laws\\nbecome, in relation to each power of cognition, special\\nlaws determining and regulating its processes the\\ngeneric regulative principles express themselves in ap-\\nplication to the particular cognitive faculties, as specific\\nstandards in conformity with which the functions of\\neach are performed. The representative faculty has its\\nown peculiar laws lying at its root and necessitating\\nand controlling the evolution of that kind of mediate\\nknowledge which belongs to it. So is it with the think-\\ning faculty: the laws of thought regulate its processes.\\nAnd so, also, I must think, is it with a believing faculty,\\nthe results of which are determined by the laws of belief.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0291.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "280 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nThat identity, contradiction and excluded middle\\nare fundamental laws of thought, few perhaps would\\ndeny. Why not also admit that space and duration,\\nsubstance and cause are fundamental laws of belief?\\nThey abide, equally with the laws of thought, the appli-\\ncation of the tests of ultimate principles. They are\\nabsolutely simple, self-evident, and necessary. If one\\nmust admit that a thing is the same as itself, that a thing\\nis not that which is contradictory to it, that of two con-\\ntradictories one must be true, the other false, he must\\nalso admit that objects exist in space, that events occur\\nin time, that qualities infer a substance, and that phe-\\nnomenal changes are due to causes. But as it is im-\\npossible to think space and duration, or to think sub-\\nstance and cause, they must be apprehended by belief.\\nApprehend them we most assuredly do. If not by the\\npresentative faculty, and consequently not by the re-\\npresentative, if not by thought for how can thought\\ntranscend the materials furnished by the presentative\\nand representative faculties we postulate, we must\\nhave a power which accounts for the apprehension.\\nThere is no other which answers the demand but faith.\\nLet us take space as an example, concerning the ex-\\nistence of which in some way, either as an ens rationis\\nor an ens reale, there is no dispute. It is conceded to\\nbe infinite. Now, either it is purely subjective, or it is\\nobjective. If subjective, it must in some manner qual-\\nify or modify the subject. But the subject is finite;\\nand to affirm an infinite qualification, or modification,\\nof a finite subject, would be to speak contradictorily.\\nIs space, then, objective? If so, it is an infinite object.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0292.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "Spencee s Kelativity of Knowledge. 281\\nHow, then, is it apprehended by a finite subject? If\\nwe say that we think it, as to think is to condition, to\\nlimit, to comprehend, we say that the unconditioned\\nis conditioned, the illimitable limited, the incomprehen-\\nsible comprehended. Must we then deny all apprehen-\\nsion of space? It is, ex hypothesis apprehensible in\\nsome way. Are we not shut up to the position that we\\napprehend it by faith\\nIt is not intended to say that the laws of belief are\\nbeliefs any more than to say that the laws of cognition\\nare cognitions, or that the laws of thought are thoughts.\\nThese laws, however, are not mere abstract canons or\\nrules; they are tendencies, energetic principles, necessi-\\nties of cognizing, thinking, believing. It is not that we\\nmay, but we must, cognize, think, believe, in obedience\\nto them.\\nIf, then, there is a faculty by which we think in con-\\nformity with the laws of thought, one fails to see why\\nthere is not a faculty by which we believe in conformity\\nwith the laws of belief. The latter is as much a faculty\\nof cognition as the former. If in actually complying\\nwith one law of cognition, we know, why not attain\\nknowledge when we comply with another? Either the\\nbeliefs enforced by the laws of belief are delusive, or\\nthey are not. If delusive, they spring from fundamen-\\ntal principles which are deceptive, and our nature is\\nradically false. If not, they are trustworthy know-\\nledges. Our beliefs are the products and expressions\\nof nature they are among the springs of action and the\\nguides of life, and if they are not entitled to the de-\\nnomination of knowledge, our nature is an organ of de-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0293.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "282 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nceit; and as our nature is ourselves, it deceives itself,\\nand is an engine of self-destruction. They are not pre-\\nsumptions, hypotheses, guesses; they are valid know-\\nledges. It is not a presumption, or an hypothesis, or a\\nguess on the part of a man that he was born of his\\nmother. He knows it. But he cannot have known it\\nby consciousness, or by thought, for thought cannot\\ntranscend consciousness. How can he know it except by\\nfaith in her testimony? He knows it by believing it.\\nIt may be said that it is a necessary inference from her\\nacts. Granted but her acts and her words are her tes-\\ntimony, and the inference from it to the fact is a faith-\\ninference. Is it not faith that credits testimony\\nThe laws of belief are, upon the conditions of ex-\\nperience which are furnished by consciousness, elicited\\nfrom latency, and find expression in special acts in-\\nferences, convictions, judgments. What are these but\\nexercises of faith Why, then, refuse to faith the title\\nof a faculty, and to its products the denomination of\\ncognitions It is as much entitled to this honor as is\\nthought.\\nTo this it may be objected that there would be an un-\\nnecessary multiplication of cognitive faculties. The\\nquestions then arise, Is it necessary, in any degree, to\\ndistinguish these faculties And if so, is it necessary\\nto rank faith as a distinctive faculty It is superfluous\\nto observe that no distinction of faculties supposes a di-\\nvision of the mind, considered essentially. As such it\\nis one and indivisible. But with this essential unity\\nthere consists a distinction of attributes. In the general,\\ncognition is not feeling, neither cognition nor feeling is", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0294.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 283\\nvolition. The perception of the distinction between in-\\ntellectual truth and intellectual error is not the same\\nwith that of the distinction between dntj and crime.\\nHence it is legitimate to distribute the generic faculties\\nin accordance with peculiar properties which obviously\\ndifferentiate them from each other. So, narrowing the\\nview, it is with the cognitive faculty itself. Perception\\nis not imagination. In the one case, we immediately\\napprehend objects in the other, we represent them.\\nMemory represents the past; imagination does more;\\nit images the distant, the possible, the future. There\\nis consequently a distinction which cannot be refused\\nbetween the representative functions of the memory,\\nand some of those belonging to the imagination. Again,\\nthought differs from perception and representation. It\\nis marked off from them by a peculiar property. The\\nusual sub-distribution of these cognitive powers is there-\\nfore justifiable, not merely for convenience sake, but be-\\ncause grounded in fact. Xow it is evident that faith is\\na cognitive conviction that is different from the product\\nof any of the faculties that are usually denominated\\ncognitive, and if that be true, the power which pro-\\nduces so peculiar a conviction, deserves, on that account,\\nto be assigned a distinct and coordinate place among the\\ncognitive faculties.\\nThat there is such a characteristic property belong-\\ning to faith the comman usage of language attests. If\\nthe demand be pressed for a designation of the differ-\\nentiating attribute, I would answer that it is intellectual\\nassent, grounded upon testimony. The peculiar convic-\\ntion accompanying this assent would seem to be an im-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0295.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "284 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmediate and necessary inference from the testimony\\ncognized to the truth of what is testified to. It is some-\\ntimes said that we believe in the existence of an object\\nof which we are conscious that is, of an object imme-\\ndiately known; and sometimes that we believe in the\\ntruth of a proposition established by reasoning that is,\\none mediately known through the comparative process\\nof the thinking faculty. And it may be argued that be-\\nlief is too wide and ambiguous to constitute a differen-\\ntiating property. But a careful analysis may reveal two\\nthings. First, that this language is not loosely or\\nabusively employed; and, secondly, that faith, while a\\nparticular power, sustains a catholic relation to all our\\ncognitive operations.\\nWhen by consciousness we immediately know the\\nexistence of an object, it is not that at one and the same\\ntime we directly know it by faith. The knowledge\\nthrough consciousness and the conviction through faith\\nare not identical. Faith assents to the testimony of con-\\nsciousness, and immediately and necessarily infers the\\nfact testified to. It is not its office primarily to give us\\nthe fact, This is the office of consciousness. But may\\nwe not be deceived The danger is destroyed by our\\nbelieving the testimony of consciousness. 1 If the ques-\\ntion be pressed, Why believe that testimony The an-\\nswer is, that consciousness is the voice of nature, and\\nnature the product of God. The testimony of conscious-\\n1 1 interpret Dr. Reid to mean this, when he says that we\\nbelieve in the external world as immediately known by Perception.\\nWe do not directly know it by believing in it. We immediately\\nknow it by perceiving it. But we have a faith-conviction of the\\ntruth of the immediate perception.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0296.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Kelativity of Knowledge. 285\\nness is the testimony of God. The ultimate ground of\\nassent, therefore, is the veracity of God. If our nature,\\nin its normal and unperverted condition, deceives us,\\nGod its author deceives us. From a conclusion so\\nshocking all but atheists would recoil. Here we must\\nrest. To go further is to raise the question of the di-\\nvine existence.\\nThe same course of reasoning will apply to the con-\\nclusions of the thinking faculty in its regular condition.\\nIt expresses the nature, which reflects the truth of its\\nMaker. We believe in its conclusions, not because faith\\nactually does the thinking, but because we are so consti-\\ntuted that we assent to the testimony of the discursive\\nfaculty, as, in its just operations, uttering the testimony\\nof God.\\nThe same is also true in regard to memory. I am con-\\nstrained to accept Sir William Hamilton s exposition of\\nits operation as correct. The past event is out of rela-\\ntion to consciousness the faculty of immediate know-\\nledge. We are not conscious of it. But it is repre-\\nsented by a mental modification vicarious of it. This\\nrepresentation we immediately know by consciousness,\\nand mediately know the event itself. Now, what is the\\nnature of this mediate knowledge? Why are we con-\\nvinced that the event really occurred We believe the\\ntestimony of the ideal representation. So strong is this\\nfaith that it has sometimes been put into the category\\nof intuitive evidence. That is, we entertain a conviction\\nof the reality of the past event, analogous to that we ex-\\nperience when we have an immediate intuition or per-\\nception of an object. It is this which grounds the sub-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0297.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "286 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\njeetive certainty of our own history. And in addition\\nto this, it may here be remarked, we believe in our per-\\nsonal identity. We know by faith that we at fifty years\\nof age are the very same persons who performed cer-\\ntain acts at twenty. To say that we are conscious of our\\npast personality, or that we immediately know it in\\nmemory, is to contradict the laws of immediate know-\\nledge. Our conviction of personal identity is an inde-\\nstructible faith.\\nWhether or not we believe in the occurrence of future\\nevents ideally anticipated by the imagination depends\\nupon the question whether they are imagined as merely\\npossible or not. If as merely possible, we do not and\\ncannot believe in their certain occurrence. If we be-\\nlieve, it is on the ground that their occurrence is made\\ncertain either by the operation of necessary laws or by\\nthe prophetic declarations of an omniscient Being, im-\\nmediately or mediately made. In either case we re-\\npose faith in testimony in the former, in the testimony\\nof nature, which is indirectly the testimony of its\\nauthor in the latter, in the admitted testimony of God,\\nverbally imparted.\\nThe analysis has been pursued far enough to show\\nthat faith is fundamental and radical, sustaining to the\\noperation of all our cognitive powers the relation of an\\nultimate guarantee of their truth. The authority of\\nconsciousness is final, because believed. The senses are\\ntreated as veracious witnesses, because believed. The\\nrepresentations of memory are relied upon, because be-\\nlieved. The processes of the thinking faculty are de-\\npendent on, because believed. Take away faith in the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0298.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "Spencee s Kelativity of Knowledge. 287\\noperations of our cognitive powers and there would re-\\nmain no ultimate certitude of human knowledge. Even\\nHume, the desolator, who attempted to abolish all\\nhuman beliefs, believed in the uniformity of nature,\\nand the in variableness of antecedence and sequence!\\nWithout such a faith, to what would his celebrated ar-\\ngument against the credibility of miracles amount?\\nNo; faith is too deeply imbedded in our constitution\\nto be cast out. It is nature, and cannot be expelled\\nNaturam expelles f urea, tamen usque recurret,\\nEt mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix.\\nWhat has thus far been said has gone to show that\\nfaith is one of the cognitive powers sustaining a catho-\\nlic relation to every other as a voucher for the know-\\nledge which it imparts. Were this the place to sug-\\ngest a distribution of the cognitive powers, I would say\\nthat the reason or intelligence, as the generic faculty of\\ncognition, may be distributed specifically into the facul-\\nties of immediate and mediate knowledge. Of the\\nformer, the presentative faculty consciousness, as the\\ncomplement of internal and external perception, is the\\nexhaustive instance. The faculties of mediate know-\\nledge may be subordinately distributed into the repre-\\nsentative, 1 the thinking, and the believing faculties.\\n1 The Memory is here included under the denomination, Repre-\\nsentative. To this it may be objected that the Conservative Func-\\ntion of Memory is not representative. But the question is, What is\\nconserved, or retained? The answer must be. I conceive, a repre-\\nsentation of the past fact. I hold, with the Scottish School, that\\nan external object is perceived, not through an ideal image, but\\nimmediately. The object, however, when thus intuitively appre-\\nhended, strikes an impression of itself upon the mind, by which", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0299.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "288 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nAt the root of each lie the laws peculiar to it: the laws\\nof representation, those of thought, and those of belief.\\nIn the fifth place, the ground may be at least very\\nplausibly maintained that in what is called intuitive\\nevidence, the immediate inference by which it proceeds\\nis one which is drawn, not by thought, but by faith.\\nThe element of comparison is absent, which is confessed\\nto exist as conditioning every conclusion arrived at by\\nthe thinking faculty. The inference is not made by\\nconsciousness, or by the imagination, for it is not their\\nprovince to infer. To what power, then, can the imme-\\ndiate inference which characterizes intuitive evidence be\\nreferred but faith\\nIn the sixth place, a very large part of human know-\\nledge is derived from testimony external, objective\\ntestimony and faith is precisely the organ by which it\\nis received. This is the very ground of historical know-\\nledge. Remove it, and history is converted into a tissue\\nof fables. To say that this is belief and not knowledge\\nis to trifle with the subject. The testimony of veracious\\nwitnesses is a ground of knowledge valid enough to\\njustify the hanging of a man. It would be absurd to\\nsay that the witnesses knew the fact in question, but the\\njury only believed. The fallacy is dissipated by the\\nit is represented. This representation is latent beneath conscious-\\nness, until by the operation of certain laws (Suggestion, Associa-\\ntion, etc.) it is caused to emerge into consciousness. Either this,\\nor Presentative knowledge continues after the presentative rela-\\ntion has ceased, and the object presented has vanished from the\\nsphere of objective reality at least, to the human mind; and to\\nthis difficulty another must be added namely, that a presentative\\nknowledge may exist which is confessedly out of consciousness,\\nthe presentative faculty.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0300.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "Spencek s Relativity of Knowledge. 289\\ndistinction between immediate and mediate knowledge.\\nThe witnesses immediately, the jury mediately, knew\\nthe fact.\\nIn the seventh place, it may be briefly observed that\\ncredulity, as the exaggeration and abuse of faith, is at\\nthe same time its proof, for that which has no existence\\ncannot be exaggerated or abused. The philosophical\\nskeptic is no more free from credulity than the religious.\\nTo a group of his officers, whom he overheard talking in\\nan infidel strain, the great Napoleon is reported to have\\nsaid, Gentlemen, there is nothing you will not believe\\nbut Christianity. And to the agnostics it might be\\nsaid, Gentlemen, there is nothing you will not believe\\nbut faith. To deny the existence of faith one would be\\nobliged to deny that he believed anything for if there\\nwere anything he believed, he would contradict his\\nnegation. If it be replied that what has been said only\\nserves to prove a feeling of faith and not a cognition,\\nthe rejoinder is easy, that he who indulges the feeling\\nwithout a rational ground for it, confesses to the weakest\\nform of credulity.\\nIn the eighth place, arguments have been presented,\\nup to this point, to show that faith, as to its nature, is\\na cognitive power, entitled to a coordinate place among\\nthe faculties denominated cognitive, and, as to its office,\\nit has been evinced that it acts as a voucher, confirming\\nthe testimony of the other faculties. I have thus\\nendeavored to prove that, in confounding the thinkable\\nand the knowable, Mr. Spencer has committed the mis-\\ntake of restricting knowledge within the confines of the\\nthinking faculty but to be complete the argument must", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0301.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "290 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nproceed one step further. It behooves to be shown that\\nfaith discharges another and a distinctive office that of\\noriginating knowledge which it is beyond the competency\\nof the other cognitive powers to furnish. They are\\nconfined, in their operations to the phenomenal sphere.\\nThis is transparently clear with reference to the pre-\\nsentative and representative faculties; but it may be\\ndoubted whether it holds good of the faculty of thought.\\nFor example, in those instances in which thought forms\\ngeneral notions, in consequence of its power to appre-\\nhend abstract truth, it may be supposed that it passes\\nbeyond the sphere of the phenomenal. A distinction\\nis here necessary to be taken between the products of\\nthought alone, which are used in arguments, and the\\nproducts of another power, which are so used for there\\nare elements in reasoning which are in themselves\\nunthinkable, and, therefore, incomprehensible. Where-\\never notions of space, cause, substance and the infinite\\nenter into the composition of arguments, it must be\\nremembered that they do not originate in thought. In\\nwhat power they originate, it is the purpose of the\\nensuing argument to show. The man is one and indi-\\nvisible, and when his knowledge which transcends\\nthought is communicated to the thinking faculty, it is\\nemployed by that faculty symbolically; just as, in an\\nequation, x may stand for a number or quantity, which\\nit is impossible to think.\\nBut these abstract notions what are they and how\\nare they generated Let us take an example. Here is\\na promiscuous collection of white and black men. They\\nare separated into two companies, classes, of white men", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0302.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 291\\nand of black men. What is the principle of division\\nand classification The resemblance between indi-\\nviduals. How is that resemblance grounded Upon\\nthe quality of color some are white, some are black.\\nThe quality of color is, we say, abstracted we form an\\nabstract notion of whiteness and of blackness. What is\\nthe explanation The phenomenal quality, white color,\\nor black color, is perceived to inhere in a certain indi-\\nvidual; another individual is observed to have a like\\nphenomenal quality. They are classed together. The\\nabstract notion here is simply the apprehension of a\\nparticular quality which belongs respectively to different\\nindividuals a single circumstance with a common rela-\\ntion. It is manifest that the sphere of the phenomenal\\nhas not been overpassed. The same is true of the\\nqualities of beauty and ugliness, as determined by the\\nlaws of the sesthetical faculty; but the case appears to\\nbe different in regard to the qualities of power, virtue,\\nand the like. We perceive their effects in certain indi-\\nviduals and are, therefore, able to think the effects but\\nwe cannot perceive power and virtue in themselves. To\\nsay, then, that we think them is to concede to thought\\nthe ability to transcend consciousness. What we call\\nthe abstract notions of power and virtue, are inferences\\nfrom phenomenal effects, and are due to a faculty which\\ntranscends thought.\\nIn fine, thought, in its elaborations, its comparisons,\\nits judgments, uses the materials supplied by the pre-\\nsentative and the representative faculties, and they are\\nphenomenal in their character. The elements which\\nare constitutive of its processes are concepts, and they", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0303.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "292 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nare percepts represented, and employed in thought-\\nrelations.\\nWhat, then, is that power which transcends the phe-\\nnomenal sphere, and affirms existence, which thought\\nis incompetent to give Let us take the apprehension\\nof the infinite. That, as an extreme apprehension,\\ninvolving all lower ones of a transcendental character,\\nis suited to be a test. Mr. Spencer admits, as we have\\nseen, the apprehension of the infinite. Now there are, to\\nmy mind, but four conceivable suppositions as to the\\nway in which it can be apprehended either, first, by the\\nnegative protest of thought or, secondly, by the imagi-\\nnation or, thirdly, by what Mr. Spencer terms indefi-\\nnite consciousness 7 or, fourthly, by faith.\\nFirst. The negative protest of thought. By this it is\\nmeant if it mean anything, which is very doubtful\\nthat thought having, in its nisus, reached the highest\\nconcept possible to it, denies all limitation of that con-\\ncept, and thus in a negative way suggests at least the\\npossibility of the infinite. A great writer remarks\\nIt is a saying of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and it\\nhas generally been accepted as a sufficient indication of the truth\\nthat in ascending from the creature to God we proceed by the\\nmethod of causality, of negation, and of eminence. In the way of\\ncausality I am constrained to affirm that every perfection which\\nis contained in the effect was previously contained in the cause.\\nBut as the perfections of the creature exist under many limitations\\nand conditions which are inconsistent with the notion of the\\nInfinite, I am led in the way of negation to remove those restric-\\ntions and defects, and to posit the perfections in the abstract.\\nThen by the way of eminence I strive to represent these perfec-\\ntions as expanded even to infinity. Thought struggles to magnify,\\nuntil it sinks back upon itself exhausted in the effort.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0304.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 293\\nWell, one cannot help asking, if it sinks back ex-\\nhausted in the struggle to reach the infinite, how, in\\nthe name of reason, does it ever reach it It stops\\ninfinitely short of it, but in some unaccountable way gets\\nto it. There is still another difficulty. All limitation\\nis thought away from perfections, and thus unlimited\\nthey are posited in the abstract. Is not this as near the\\ninfinite as thought can come But this becomes the\\nstarting point for an exhausting effort to expand the\\nperfections to infinity. One is reminded of the frog in\\nthe fable, who expanded himself until he burst and\\nthat was the end of the expanding process.\\nThis criticism is passed upon the foregoing statement,\\nonly if it be viewed as describing the way in which\\nthought is supposed to reach the infinite. The very first\\nstep, in the way of causality, 1 is one which the thinking\\nfaculty could not take, for cause itself cannot be con-\\nceived. It is a datum of faith. If the process is con-\\nsidered as one in which thought and faith are co-factors,\\nit not unreasonably commended itself to general accept-\\nance.\\nThe most serious difficulty attending this mode of\\nreaching the apprehension of the infinite is that a power\\nis ascribed to thought, which it is at the same time\\ngranted, that it does not possess. The supposition is\\nthat thought has arrived at the climax of its efforts, that\\nit has formed a concept beyond which it can no further\\ngo. It then denies to that concept all limitation. The\\nquestion arises, What right, what ability, has it to make\\nthe denial It has gone as far as it possibly can, and\\n1 Some writers give the way of causality via causalitatis as\\nthe last.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0305.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "294 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthen goes vastly further for the denial of limitation is\\ntantamount to the assertion of illimitation that is, to a\\npositive affirmation of infinity. If the challenge be\\nmade, upon what ground is the negative protest based\\nthe answer must be, Either, there is no ground, and the\\nprotest being conceded to be groundless, is zero; or,\\nthere is some ground, and then it is claimed that thought\\nhas some knowledge beyond its highest and ultimate\\nconcept, and a contradiction ensues. The right of\\nthought to deny limitation upon its ultimate concept is\\nnot original it is borrowed from faith. The statement\\nis elliptical; the faith-element is left out. Thought\\nstops at a point beyond which it can make no predication\\nwhatsoever, and faith adds the protest against limita-\\ntion.\\nSecondly. Imagination. This is easily disposed of.\\nImagination has, indeed, a distant flight, but it cannot\\noutsoar its own wing. If finite substance and power\\ncannot be imagined, it is certain that infinite cannot;\\nand as to the phenomenal universe itself, all that imagi-\\nnation can do is to grasp the skirt of the infinite. No\\nessence can be imaged, nor can any image compass the\\nmaterial universe. Infinitely less can the infinite be\\nimaged.\\nThirdly. Indefinite Consciousness. Mr. Spencer s\\ndoctrine is that we are indefinitely conscious of the\\ninfinite, and that it is, at the same time, unknowable.\\nThis is extraordinary. One may use terms in a signifi-\\ncation peculiar to himself; but unless Mr. Spencer is\\ngreatly misunderstood, he employs the term conscious-\\nness in its usual acceptation. He holds that we know", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0306.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "Spexcep/s Eeeativity of Knowledge. 295\\nphenomena by consciousness. He does not even make\\nReid s distinction between consciousness, as the power\\nby which we know internal phenomena and perception,\\nas that by which we know those that are external. ^Now\\nit is obvious that there may be a difference of degree in\\nthe clearness or definiteness of our conscious knowledge\\nof phenomenal existences; but it is impossible to see\\nhow an indefinite consciousness is consistent with the\\ntotal absence of knowledge. Some consciousness, some\\nknowledge this would seem to be incontrovertible. If,\\ntherefore, we have some consciousness and an indefi-\\nnite consciousness is some consciousness of the infinite,\\nit would follow that we have some knowledge of it.\\nHow, then, can it be unknowable\\nEither Mr. Spencer does not limit consciousness to\\nthe apprehension of the phenomenal, internal and exter-\\nnal, or he does. If he does not, he has no right to\\nemploy the term in a sense which would be utterly para-\\ndoxical, one in the adoption of which he would break\\nwith catholic usage. If he does, he is obliged to acknow-\\nledge that the infinite is phenomenal. That would be\\nto outrage common sense, and also to contravene his own\\nposition that the infinite is unknowable precisely because\\nit is not phenomenal. Further, if we are indefinitely\\nconscious of the infinite, we have an indefinite imme-\\ndiate knowledge of it, and since immediate knowledge\\nconditions thought, we would be able indefinitely to\\nthink the infinite, and that would contradict Hr. Spen-\\ncer s doctrine that it is wholly unthinkable, and, there-\\nfore, wholly unknowable.\\nIf, by indefinite consciousness, Mr. Spencer means", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0307.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "296 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbelief, he uses his terms not only loosely, but abusively\\nbut, on that supposition, he partially enounces the doc-\\ntrine contended for in this discussion only partially,\\nit is true, for while he would hold an indefinite belief\\nin the infinite, a definite belief in it is here maintained\\nand while he refuses to call that belief knowledge, it is\\nhere claimed to be knowledge, not immediate, but,\\nalthough mediate, yet valid, significant, priceless.\\nThe conclusion is that Mr. Spencer s indefinite con-\\nsciousness is incompetent to account for the apprehen-\\nsion of the infinite; and yet it must be borne in mind\\nthat he admits the existence of the infinite, and was,\\ntherefore, compelled to assign some cause for its appre-\\nhension. 1\\nFourthly. Faith. If all the suppositions which are\\npossible in the case have been shown to be untenable but\\nthis one, it is entitled to be accepted as true. It has\\nalready been evinced that there are at the bottom of our\\nmental constitution, considered as cognitive, certain\\nfundamental laws of thought and belief, just as there\\nare at the root of the feelings laws of taste, of the will\\nlaws of efficiency and choice, and of the conscience laws\\nof morality or rectitude. Some of the laws of belief\\nhave already been specified, and it is now added that\\namong them is the law of belief in the infinite. These\\nlaws in the first instance in their connate, primitive\\ncondition, are latent beneath consciousness, and are\\nonly elicited into definite, formal expression as actual\\n1 In this discussion I have hitherto employed the term appre-\\nhension in relation to the infinite, as less ambiguous than notion,\\nor idea. It is the most general term that can be used.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0308.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 297\\nbeliefs, upon the conditions furnished by conscious ex-\\nperience. Thev are aptitudes, tendencies, necessities,\\nwhich as laws regulate the processes of the believing\\nfaculty, and when empirically developed enforce the\\nformation of specific beliefs. These beliefs, as cogni-\\ntive, as formal knowledges, are justly characterized as\\nnative notions, for the reason that they are the educts\\nof native principles, and not the products merely of\\nexperience. I proceed to show that the apprehension,\\nthe cognition, of the infinite, is one of these native\\nnotions, evolved, through empirical conditions, from\\nthe fundamental law of belief in the infinite. It is\\noriginal, not derivative.\\nIn the first place, it is simple and ultimate. It is\\nperfectly clear that it is not composite, and, therefore,\\ncannot be resolved into anything simpler. Supposing\\nthe existence of the infinite, it is granted ex vi termini\\nthat it is one, simple, indivisible. So, likewise, must be\\nthe notion of the infinite. It is impossible to analyze\\ninto anything more simple and ultimate either the in-\\nfinite itself or its apprehension.\\nIn the second place, it is self-evident. It is certain\\nthat the notion exists. How, then, did it originate\\nManifestly not in any process of thought. The infinite\\nis not a percept it is not an image it is not a concept\\nit is not proved by reasoning it is not thought out. It\\nis, therefore, autopistic and self-evident it reveals itself\\nin its own light.\\nIn the third place, it is characterized by necessity.\\nThe first proof of this, which I urge, is derived from\\nthe necessity of believing in space. It is very generally", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0309.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "298 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nadmitted to be infinite. To set bounds to space, says\\nDr. Samuel Clarke in his answer to Butler s Sixth Let-\\nter, is to suppose it bounded by something which itself\\ntakes up space, and that is a contradiction or else that\\nit is bounded by nothing; and then the idea of that\\nnothing will still be space, which is another contradic-\\ntion. Space, says Kant, is represented as an in-\\nfinite quantity, and Hamilton observes: We are alto-\\ngether unable to conceive space as bounded as finite;\\nthat is, as a whole beyond which there is no further\\nspace. As, then, we cannot deny space, we cannot deny\\nthe infinite; for if we believe in space as infinite, we\\nbelieve in the infinite, else we believe and do not believe\\nin the infinite at the same time. In fine, the necessity of\\nbelieving in space involves the necessity of believing in\\nthe infinite. The notion of the infinite is, therefore,\\nnative.\\nThe same is true of the necessity of believing in dura-\\ntion. Like space, it is admitted to be infinite. The\\nnotion, or faith- judgment, of the infinite, as evolved\\nfrom an original law of belief is necessary, and there-\\nfore native. It is a common verbal mistake to coordinate\\nspace and time.. Space is infinite, and, strictly speaking,\\ntime is finite. The antithesis is between place and time,\\non the one hand, as being both finite, and space and dura-\\ntion, on the other, as being both infinite. We think place\\nas a part of space, and time as a part of duration. These\\nthought-judgments, derived from conscious experience,\\nbecome the conditions upon which are elicited from laws\\nof belief faith- judgments in infinite space and infinite\\nduration in other words, in immensity and eternity.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0310.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 299\\nA second proof is drawn from the general prevalence\\nof belief in the infinite.\\nIn the first place, to establish the necessity of this\\nbelief, it is not requisite to prove its absolute univer-\\nsality. It may be conceded that it is not developed\\namong certain rude and savage tribes, and it must be\\nadmitted that in some schools of philosophic and scien-\\ntific speculation it has been denied. Investigation into\\nthe condition of the former more and more, as it pro-\\nceeds, is evincing the fact that in every tribe of men,\\nhowever degraded, there exists a belief in a superior\\npower. 1 This constitutes a potential germ from which\\nthe belief in the infinite is inevitably developed, when-\\never the affirmation of the infinite is distinctly made.\\nReason and conscience are developed from a condition\\nin which at first they seem scarcely to be in existence;\\nbut it would be mere sophistry to argue that they are not\\nconnatural elements of the human constitution. In\\nregard to the denial of a belief in the infinite by certain\\nspeculators, it is sufficient to say that the exception\\nproves the rule. The acknowledgment of the infinite\\nhas been imbedded in the theosophies involved in Ori-\\nental religions, in the philosophies of Greece and Rome,\\nand pervades the thought of the Christian centuries. It\\ndeserves to be remarked that the denial of the infinite\\nhas been made principally by those who were acquainted\\nwith the Bible and the doctrines of Christianity. For\\nthis there is a profound reason. Besides the tendency\\nof certain minds to throw themselves into opposition to\\naccepted dogmas, and even to traverse the general con-\\n1 Upon this point, see Mr. Tylor s Primitive Culture.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0311.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "300 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nvictions of mankind a contradictoriness which can\\nonly be accounted for by referring it to pride and the\\nlove of reputation it cannot be overlooked that the\\nadmission of the infinite by one who knows the Bible\\nand Christianity would carry with it the admission of\\nan infinite lawgiver, ruler and judge, and of the inflic-\\ntion of punishment upon the transgressors of his law.\\nNeither his father nor himself, John Stuart Mill in-\\nforms us, was a dogmatic atheist. The God, whose\\nexistence they denied, was one of retributive justice.\\nThis fact speaks volumes. It is typical and representa-\\ntive. Take away infinite justice and eternal retribution,\\nand it is more than likely that not only would denial of\\nthe infinite cease, but skepticism in regard to the exist-\\nence of an infinite God. Why not A key to the per-\\nplexing problems of the universe would be found, and\\nmen would hasten to place themselves under the pro-\\ntecting wing of boundless philanthropy and power but\\nwhatever may be thought of this, the class who deny the\\ninfinite are numerically too insignificant to be taken\\ninto account in an estimate of the convictions of the\\nhuman race. Mr. Spencer himself, the great exponent\\nof the current .agnostic philosophy, does not belong to\\nthat class he admits the infinite.\\nIn the second place, the well-nigh universal employ-\\nment of the term infinite argues the necessity of a belief\\nin its existence. Either this, or the term is an unmean-\\ning cipher, and the language in which it is used is mere\\njargon. Words symbolize things: this word must,\\ntherefore, signify something. Nor will it do to say that\\nnothing more is meant than the indefinite for language", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0312.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 301\\nitself notes a distinction between the indefinite and the\\ninfinite that is, to be more explicit, between the un-\\nlimited and the illimitable, between that which is not\\nlimited and that which cannot be limited. In addition\\nto this, it may be doubted whether thought alone can\\ngive the indefinite, whether it does not always give only\\nthe definite. If so, it is the province of faith to give\\nboth the indefinite and the infinite.\\nIn the third place, the terms finite and infinite are\\ncorrelatives. Granted the validity of the one, that of the\\nother is conceded. Hamilton, in his Critique of Cou-\\nsins Philosophy, denies the justness of this position.\\nHe contends that the reality of the finite does not involve\\nthe reality of the infinite. As one of these terms is, in\\nthought, the negation of the other, instead of the reality\\nof the infinite being suggested, it may be denied. The\\ncorrelation does not necessitate correality but this\\nonly holds good when the terms are used in regard to\\nthe same thing. It would be a contradiction to say that\\nthe same thing is finite and infinite; but there is no\\ncontradiction when, of different things, it is affirmed,\\nthat one is finite and the other infinite.\\nIn the next place, even in the sphere of thought cor-\\nrelatives involving a negation of one of the members do\\nnot always suppose the non-existence of the member to\\nwhich the negative is attached. Socrates as husband,\\nand Xanthippe as wife are correlatives; but to affirm\\nthat Socrates was not Xanthippe would certainly not be\\nto deny the existence of the latter. It is clear that even\\nthe negation would suppose her existence. Further, of\\nthe correlatives finite and infinite, one member of the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0313.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "302 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nrelation is supplied by thought, the other by faith.\\nHamilton was right in asserting, against Cousin, that\\nthe concept finite does not suggest or imply the concept\\ninfinite; but he was, to my mind, wrong in not admit-\\nting that the concept finite is the correlative of the faith-\\nnotion infinite, and that the reality of the finite involves\\nthe reality of the infinite. Had he done this he would\\nhave carried out his own doctrine touching the mode in\\nwhich we know the infinite namely, mediately by\\nfaith. Cousin was wrong in maintaining that in think-\\ning the finite we think the infinite. He would have\\nbeen right had he held that the finite as thought sug-\\ngests the infinite as believed.\\nThese considerations are sufficient to show that the\\ncognition of the infinite is a native notion, elicited by\\nthe conditions of experience from an original and funda-\\nmental law of belief.\\nIt is not necessary to the purpose of this particular\\ndiscussion to go further, and evince the existence of\\nfundamental laws of belief, enforcing a special faith\\nin an infinite being, who is a person and a cause;\\nalthough that, I conceive, might be done. All that the\\nargument in hand demanded was the establishment of\\nsuch a law and such a faith in relation to the infinite,\\nfor the reason that it was designed to disprove the asser-\\ntion of Mr. Spencer that the infinite, as being out of\\nrelation to our cognitive faculties, is unknowable.\\nIn the last place, the argumentum ad hominem may\\nbe still further pressed against Mr. Spencer, on the\\nground of his admission that the forces of nature are\\nknowable. Science claims to be knowledge, as the very", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0314.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Relativity of Knowledge. 303\\netymology of the term implies; but the scientific man\\ndoes not limit his knowledge to the mere phenomenal\\nfacts, cognized by sense-perception. How, then, does he\\nknow occult force which is beyond the reach of percep-\\ntion and reveals itself only by phenomenal, perceivable\\neffects If he says that he does not know it, he admits\\nhis ignorance of gravity, electricity, magnetism and\\nchemical affinity he would abdicate the seat of science.\\nIf he says that he does know it, although unperceivable\\nand therefore unthinkable, he gives up his position for\\nif we may know any force, albeit not a datum of thought,\\nwe may know infinite force. ISTor can Mr. Spencer\\nrefuse the inference, inasmuch as he reduces all special\\nforces to unity upon a universal force, which he desig-\\nnates as an infinite and eternal energy.\\nThe argument must here close. It has been shown\\nthat, though the infinite, as such, is out of relation to\\nthought, it is in relation to faith; and as it has been\\nproved that faith is one of the cognitive powers of the\\nhuman mind, the infinite is knowable.\\nWhat remains to be said must be remitted to a discus-\\nsion in general of the doctrine of agnosticism.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0315.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "THE ARGUMENT FOR THE BEING OF\\nGOD FROM OUR COGNITIVE NA-\\nTURE.\\nIT is one of the most amazing features of the his-\\ntory of our race that the question in regard to the\\nfact of God s existence should ever have been raised. It\\nis a mournful proof of the folly and impiety to which\\nsin has reduced mankind. One feels like making an\\napology beforehand for discussing the question. Yet\\nit is conceivable that unf alien intelligences would take\\ndelight in reflectively demonstrating the spontaneous\\nfaith in God s existence, which is the necessary product\\nof their nature. And, further, the question is forced\\nupon us in our fallen condition in consequence of the\\ndenial of the divine existence by the atheist, and of the\\ncompetency of its proofs by the positivist and the ag-\\nnostic.\\nThe view of the argument is just, which some writers\\npropound, that it is not so much a demonstration of\\nthe divine existence as originally a doubtful and de-\\nbatable fact, as it is an exposition and defence of our\\nspontaneous faith in the fact; or rather, that it is the\\nreflective construction of the spontaneous processes by\\nwhich the native tendency to believe in the divine ex-\\nistence is developed into actual faith. It is, from this\\npoint of view, vindicated against the position, main-\\ntained by some, that it is gratuitous, if not irreverent.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0316.jp2"}, "315": {"fulltext": "Akgumk^tt foe the Being of God. 305\\nThe argument, in its completeness, involves proofs\\nfrom every source from the whole world within us\\nand the whole world without us. Everything has a\\ntongue that proclaims the being of God, and the union\\nof these tongues makes a chorus of unbroken and perfect\\nharmony. The result is a mighty testimony of con-\\ncurrent witnesses combined into indivisible unity.\\nThe chief purpose of these remarks is to show that\\nthe a priori and the a posteriori arguments constitute\\none joint and inseparable argument for the existence of\\nGod. They are complementary to each other, inter-\\ndependent and incapable of disjunction. The argu-\\nment for one God behooves to be itself one. The proofs,\\nlike globules of quicksilver running into one mass, or\\ntributaries emptying into a great river, flow together\\nand coalesce in one powerful demonstration.\\nIt is not unusual to state these arguments, a priori\\nand a posteriori, as each possessed of individual com-\\npleteness. This occasions the discussion of each upon\\nits own separate merits, and the result has been to im-\\npeach the validity of each. This is especially evinced\\nin the tendency so common in recent times to discredit\\nwhat is called the a priori or ontological argument. It\\nis said that Kant gave it its death-blow. This is the\\nconsequence of confusion in the estimation of the force\\nof the whole argument for the divine existence. Each\\nline of proof, the a priori and the a posteriori, is sound\\nand tenable up to its measure. There are two extremes\\nto be avoided. One is to consider each, by itself, as suf-\\nficient and conclusive the other, to regard the a priori\\nelement as possessed of no force in the general con-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0317.jp2"}, "316": {"fulltext": "306 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nstruction of the argument. The truth is, that each\\nbrings its own valuable contribution to the whole demon-\\nstration each is absolutely indispensable to the develop-\\nment of the other, and both in conjunction to the in-\\ntegrity of the argument. In a word, they are not two\\narguments; they are but one. It cannot be too fre-\\nquently or too urgently insisted upon that the judg-\\nments of thought and those of faith combine in the\\nstructure of the proof as a whole.\\nThere are two statements of the import of these ar-\\nguments, neither of which lies beyond criticism. The\\nfirst is, that the argument a priori is one from cause to\\neffect the argument a priori is one from effect to cause.\\nThe second is, that the former is one from our funda-\\nmental intuitions the latter is from effect to cause.\\nThe first of these statements is at once attractive and\\ndeceptive on account of the apparently accurate anti-\\nthesis which it presents. One member exactly matches\\nthe other. There is simply an inversion of order, first\\nfrom cause to effect, then from effect to cause. But it\\nis too narrow in both members. The argument a priori\\nis not confined to one fundamental law of our constitu-\\ntion it is derived from many of its fundamental laws.\\nThe argument a posteriori is not alone from effect to\\ncause, but from the conditions of experience, whatever\\nthey may be, upon which our fundamental laws are de-\\nveloped into formal expression so far as they are re-\\nlated to the subject of the divine existence. The argu-\\nment is not merely from effects, but, in the general,\\nfrom phenomenal facts.\\nThe second of these statements is not liable to the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0318.jp2"}, "317": {"fulltext": "Akgument foe the Beijstg of God. 307\\ncharge of being too narrow in respect to its first member.\\nIt correctly represents the argument as derived from our\\nfundamental laws. It is open to objection, however, in\\nregard to that first member, in that it characterizes those\\nlaws as intuitions. The term intuitions is too ambiguous\\nto be employed in a statement so sharply formal. It is\\nvery often used to signify the perceptions of objects\\npresentatively given. The meaning, as here used, is\\nthat of fundamental laws of our mental constitution,\\nand that phraseology or one equivalent to it should be\\nadopted. The second member, namely, that the a pos-\\nteriori argument is from effect to cause, is liable to the\\ncriticism passed upon the second member of the first\\nstatement. It is too narrow. This can be easily illus-\\ntrated. We have a fundamental law of belief in sub-\\nstance and property. If now, reasoning merely from\\neffect to cause, we legitimately attain to the First\\nCause, the process is inadequate. We must also con-\\nclude from property to substance in favor of a First\\nSubstance. The two sorts of argument, as complemen-\\ntary to each other, are necessary to give us the First\\nSubstance, who is the First Cause. Other illustrations\\nof the same thing will be supplied in the development\\nof the argument.\\nThe statement, as I conceive, ought to be: The argu-\\nment for the existence of God is derived from the funda-\\nmental laws of our constitution in connection with the\\nfacts of experience.\\nHere each element, the a priori and the a posteriori,\\nis given, but in its due proportion and under its neces-\\nsary limitatidfis. Particularly let it be noticed that", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0319.jp2"}, "318": {"fulltext": "308 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthere is no denial of the a priori element as a constituent\\nof the argument as a whole. On the contrary, its force\\nis admitted, under proper restrictions. Indeed, it is\\nconceded to be the basis of the argument, but it cannot\\ncomplete it without the conditions of conscious obser-\\nvation. Both elements go to constitute the totality of\\nthe argument, to bring it into the unity of one great\\nwhole a finished demonstration.\\nThe order of these respective elements is the funda-\\nmental laws, or pure a priori principles, are first as to\\nexistence, but out of consciousness the conditions of\\nexperience, the a posteriori elements, are second in the\\norder of existence, but first in consciousness then there\\nfollow, thirdly, conscious faith-judgments, formally ex-\\npressing the fundamental laws as developed upon em-\\npirical conditions. I proceed to consider\\nThe Argument feom our Cognitive Nature.\\n1. First in order comes the fundamental law of ex-\\nistence. It can hardly be disputed that there is such a\\nlaw an aptitude, tendency, necessity, constitutional pre-\\ndisposition, to believe in existence, and to affirm it.\\nThis emerges, into consciousness upon conditions of ex-\\nperience. We perceive, or are conscious of, the effects\\nof existence, and by an immediate and necessary in-\\nference we form a faith-judgment in existence itself.\\nThe question of the kind of existence is determined by\\nother laws as developed from latency by experience.\\nFor instance, the famous aphorism of Descartes, Cogito,\\nergo sum, although brief, is easily separable into two\\nparts. First, from thought, as a phenomenal fact de-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0320.jp2"}, "319": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 309\\nlivered by consciousness, the inference is immediate\\nand necessary to a thinking subject which exists.\\nSecondly, the judgment that this thinking subject is I\\ndepends on another law, that of personality. Since the\\nphenomenon of thought is subjective, it is necessarily\\ninferred, in accordance with that law, that it is myself\\nthat is the subject phenomenally manifested. The two\\ninferences are practically inseparable, but they may be\\nreflectively disjoined. So with many of our formal\\njudgments.\\nThis fundamental law of existence is in itself incap-\\nable of conducting us to God, but it is the starting point\\nof the process which does. We must begin with it.\\nHowe and Clarke commence their arguments with the\\nassumption that something now exists. The arguments\\nof Anselm, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Cousin start with\\nthe same indispensable assumption.\\n2. The argument from the fundamental law of causal-\\nity to a First Cause. Whether this be a fundamental\\nlaw of belief is a question which cannot here be con-\\nsidered. I have discussed it in a criticism of Sir W.\\nHamilton s theory of causation. ^N or can the question\\nwhether the relation of cause and effect be one involv-\\ning production or merely one of antecedence and se-\\nquence be now undertaken. It is assumed, in accordance\\nwith the convictions of the race, that cause implies pro-\\nducing power.\\nAs soon as the law of causality begins to be elicited\\ninto expression by conscious experience we begin to\\nform the faith- judgments that every perceivable ex-\\nistence, and every change which occurs, must have had", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0321.jp2"}, "320": {"fulltext": "310 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\na cause. This argument from cause may be presented\\nin two forms\\n(1.) From the contingency and changeableness of\\nthe world to a necessary First Cause. That the parts\\nof the world are contingent and changeable is proved by\\nconsciousness and observation. What is true of all the\\nparts is true of the whole. Whatsoever is contingent\\nand changeable began. If the world began, it had a\\ncause which began it. This cause must have been either\\nin itself or out of itself. If in itself, the world sponta-\\nneously began. This is out of the question. The cause\\nmust therefore have been out of itself. This cause\\nmust have necessary existence. Were it contingent, we\\nwould have the same regression in quest of a necessary\\nbeing which was its cause. But a regression of the\\ncontingent to infinity is self-contradictory. We attain\\nto a necessary First Cause of the world. There are\\nspecious objections urged against the validity of this\\nargument.\\nFirst. The position is challenged that there is con-\\nclusive proof of the contingency and changeableness of\\nthe world. It is contended that while the phenomenal\\nmanifestations of matter are contingent and changeable,\\nits substance is not. Substantially considered, matter\\nis eternal. But matter cannot be eternal, for\\nIn the first place, it is not infinite. It is certain that\\nsome mater is finite. If so, no matter can be infinite,\\nsince we would have infinite matter plus finite, which\\nis a contradiction.\\nIn the second place, if matter is not infinite, it can-\\nnot be eteranl, for only that which is infinite can be", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0322.jp2"}, "321": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 311\\neternal. If it be said that matter may be infinite in one\\nrespect, namely, duration, without being infinite in all\\nrespects the answer is, that this involves an absurdity,\\nfor matter would be partly infinite and partly finite.\\nThat is contradictory to our apprehension of infinity as\\na perfect and indivisible totality.\\nIn the third place, if matter is characterized by ex-\\ntension, it is divisible into parts. But what is predicable\\nof all the parts is predicable of the whole. As, on the\\nsupposition, all the parts limit and condition each\\nother, the whole must be limited and conditioned that\\nis, must be finite. All matter is finite. We reach again\\nthe conclusion that matter, being finite, cannot be eter-\\nnal.\\nIn the fourth place, if matter be eternal, it is, as has\\nbeen shown, infinite. Eternity is embraced in the no-\\ntion of infinity. If infinite, it is necessary. It must\\never be what it was. It could not change in form, for\\nthe infinite has no form. Form implies limitation.\\nBut matter does change in form, that is incontro-\\nvertible. Therefore it cannot be infinite, and hence can-\\nnot be eternal.\\nIn the fifth place, if, as has been proved, that matter\\nis finite, it began. If that be denied, it is affirmed that\\nmatter is infinite in duration, which is contrary to the\\nsupposition that it is finite. If it began, it cannot be\\neternal, for the very definition of an eternal thing is,\\nthat it had no beginning and will have no end.\\nIf matter is not eternal, the conclusion remains im-\\npregnable, that as it is contingent and changeable, it\\nmust have a cause which is necessary.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0323.jp2"}, "322": {"fulltext": "312 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nSecondly. It is objected by Herbert Spencer that the\\nconception of self-existence and of a First Canse leads\\nto insoluble contradictions. We cannot conceive them,\\nand, consequently, cannot know them. Respecting the\\norigin of the universe/ he remarks, three verbally in-\\ntelligent suppositions may be made. We may assert that\\nit is self -existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is\\ncreated by an external agency. Which of these supposi-\\ntions is most credible it is not needful here to inquire.\\nThe deeper question into which this finally merges is,\\nwhether any one of them is even conceivable in the true\\nsense of the word. 1\\nIn the first place, Mr. Spencer is extravagantly wrong\\nin subordinating credibility to conceivability in rep-\\nresenting it as impossible for us to believe what we can-\\nnot conceive. In answer it would be sufficient to say\\nthat upon this ground we could not believe in the ex-\\nistence of the universe about the origin of which this\\nquestion is concerned, for it is perfectly certain that no\\nhuman mind can conceive it. The whole question would\\nbe non-existent, for the universe itself would be out of\\nrelation to our faculties, and, therefore, to us non-ex-\\nistent, Mr. Spencer, no doubt, believes in the origin of\\nlife, but can he conceive it If he can, he would be bet-\\nter entitled than was Raymond Lully to the honor of\\nbeing styled Doctor Illuminatus. We are environed by\\nnumerous facts which we must believe, although it is\\nonly their phenomenal manifestations which we can\\nconceive.\\nMr. Spencer cites Sir W. Hamilton, and quotes\\n1 First Principles, p. 30, New York Ed.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0324.jp2"}, "323": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 313\\nlargely from Dr. Mansel, in support of his views. He\\nmisconceived them. The former expressly asserts that\\nwe are compelled to believe much that we cannot con-\\nceive, and the latter, in his Limits of Religious Thought,\\ndid not intend to impugn the transcendental faiths of\\nTheism and Christianity. His argument was aimed at\\nthe processes of the absolutist philosophy. Its defect\\nconsisted in not emphasizing the positive office of faith,\\nand thus exposing itself to misconstruction.\\nMr. Spencer is right in holding that we cannot con-\\nceive self -existence and a First Cause, and utterly wrong\\nin concluding that, therefore, we cannot believe in them.\\nThe truth is, that while we cannot think them, for the\\ntether of thought is short, we are compelled by the laws\\nof our constitution to believe in them. This is even true\\nof existence and cause, let alone self-existence and a\\nfirst cause.\\nIn the second place, Mr. Spencer, in explanation of\\nthe universe, affirms an infinite and eternal energy.\\nKow it is obvious that this necessarily infers both self-\\nexistence and a first cause self-existence for that which\\nis infinite and eternal, is e concesso, uncaused; a first\\ncause, for if there be any cause, an infinite and eternal\\nenergy could have had no cause before it. Although he\\ncontradicts his theory of knowledge, Mr. Spencer is\\nright in affirming an infinite and eternal energy; he is\\nunphilosophical in stopping here, in not going on ex-\\nplicitly to affirm a being to whom this infinite and\\neternal energy belongs for such a being is implicitly\\nsuggested by the affirmation is necessarily inferrible\\nfrom it.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0325.jp2"}, "324": {"fulltext": "314 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nThirdly. Kant, in order to discredit the cosinological\\nproof of God s existence, offered this objection: If it\\nbe maintained that the principle of causality demands a\\ncause for every new appearance, or, in general, for\\neverything that exists, the same principle would exact\\na cause for God s existence; and if it be replied that\\nhis existence is uncaused, then the same may be true of\\nthe existence of the universe but, briefly\\nIn the first place, Kant s inference that the world may\\nhe uncaused is met by the positive proof that it is caused.\\nwhatever view may be held as to God, it is certain that\\nthe world was caused.\\nIn the second place, if the world were uncaused, it\\nmust either have begun spontaneously, or it is infinite.\\nThe hypothesis of spontaneous generation must be\\nthrown out of account. ~No one now fathers it. If\\ninfinite, we have two infinite substances, and that\\nimplies one infinite substance too many. Two would\\ncondition each other, and, therefore, neither could be\\ninfinite; which is contrary to the supposition. If the\\nuniverse be uncaused, God is contained in it, unless the\\nwild dream be entertained that there can be two un-\\ncaused substances. If contained in it, he is either finite\\nor infinite. If finite, he is not God. If infinite, one\\ninfinite substance is contained in another infinite sub-\\nstance, which is harder to believe than that one incom-\\npressible atom of matter is contained in another.\\nIn the third place, one finds it difficult to conceive\\nas has often been remarked why, if we may infer an\\ninfinite moral ruler from the fundamental facts of our\\nmoral nature, we may not equally infer an infinite", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0326.jp2"}, "325": {"fulltext": "ARGUMENT FOE THE BEING OF GoD. 315\\nmaker from the fundamental law of causation in our\\nintellectual. The great assertor of transcendental ideas\\nwas certainly inconsistent with himself. A rigorous\\nsubjectivity ought to have excluded every objective\\nexistence, or it ought not to have been maintained at all.\\n(2.) Another form in which the argument may be\\nstated is from the finiteness of the world to a first cause.\\nThat is finite which is limited and conditioned. All\\nhuman spirits are limited and conditioned, therefore\\nfinite. This is the indubitable testimony of conscious-\\nness. Matter is finite. It is divisible into parts. These\\nparts limit and condition each other. Granted the\\nexistence of indivisible atoms these atoms limit and\\ncondition each other. What is predicable of all the parts\\nis predicable of the whole. Matter as a whole is, there-\\nfore, finite. The world, consisting of spirit and\\nmatter, is, consequently, finite.\\nIf the world is finite, it began. If it began, it must\\neither have spontaneously began, or have been begun by\\na cause outside of and antecedent to itself. The former\\nsupposition is inadmissible; the latter, therefore, is\\ntrue. We reach a first cause of the world.\\nThere are only two objections to his argument which\\nappear to me to deserve consideration.\\nFirst. It has been objected that while the finiteness\\nof a single series cannot be denied, the supposition of\\nan infinite series of series involves no contradiction.\\nThe following argument has been supposed possible in\\nsupport of this extraordinary position: a Is a past\\neternity any more impossible to be made up of the\\naddition of an infinite number of finite parts than an", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0327.jp2"}, "326": {"fulltext": "316 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nabstract infinite future Surely not. !Now there is to\\nbe just such an infinite future: namely, your and my\\nimmortality, which, although it may not be measured\\nby solar days and years, will undoubtedly be composed\\nof parts of successive time infinitely multiplied but to\\nthis future eternity, it would be exactly parallel to\\nobject that we make each link in it have an end, while\\nthe whole is endless; which would involve the same\\nabsurdity, of a chain extended forward after the last\\nlink was ended. The answer again is there is no last\\nlink, the number thereof being infinite. In a word, what\\nmathematician does not know that infinitude may be\\ngenerated by the addition of finites repeated an infinite\\nnumber of times V 9\\nIn reply, it is enough to say that the terms used are\\nutterly misleading. Throughout the indefinite is put\\nfor the infinite, although between them there is an\\ninfinite difference. There can be, strictly speaking, no\\npast eternity. The distinction verbally made between\\na past and a future eternity is a mere thought-distinction\\nto aid our feeble faculties. Faith affirms an eternity\\nwhich is a perfect, indivisible unity. An infinite\\nnumber is an impossibility. The infinite and number\\nare incongruous apprehensions. Numbers of finites\\nmay be indefinitely multiplied, but there must ever be\\nan infinite want of approximation to the infinite. There\\ncannot be an infinite future not to God, for with\\nhim, strictly speaking, there is no past and no future;\\nhe is; not to finite beings, for, although immortal, they\\nare not eternal. Project immortality indefinitely, and\\nbetween it and eternity there must be an infinite chasm.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0328.jp2"}, "327": {"fulltext": "Akgument foe the Being oe God. 317\\nThe very fact of progressiveness excludes eternity.\\nThat infinitude may be generated by the addition of\\nfinites repeated an infinite number of times may be\\nmathematically correct, for the simple reason that the\\ninfinite of the mathematician is not the infinite of the\\nmetaphysician. It is the indefinite of thought. The\\nvery terms generation of infinity would be absurd and\\nso the terms infinite series and infinite series of series\\nsymbolize no idea. They are mere words signifying\\nnothing. As well talk of a triangular, pink, raw-edged\\ninfinite\\nSecondly. It may be objected, with some plausibility,\\nthat God being admitted, matter may be infinite, for it\\nwould not displace him. This is true of the material\\nuniverse as now existing. The theist holds that he is\\npresent at every point of it, that he knows its every\\natom. If God now co-exists with matter without being\\ndisplaced, why not eternally? If with finite matter,\\nwhy not with infinite Infinite matter would no more\\nconflict with his being or attributes than does finite.\\nIn the first place, this is a mere hypothesis but it\\nhas been shown by positive proofs that matter is finite.\\nFacts cannot be met by the supposition of a possi-\\nbility.\\nIn the second place, according to the supposition,\\nmatter would be uncaused, and, therefore, self-existent\\nand independent of God. This supposes a limitation\\nupon his power which is contrary to the admission of\\nhis infinity; for\\nHis power to create would be limited. He could not\\ncreate anything material, for, on the supposition, matter", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0329.jp2"}, "328": {"fulltext": "318 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nwould be infinite, and incapable of addition. All matter\\nbeing infinite, it would have no parts to be created. It\\nmay be said that this would not limit his power consid-\\nered as potentiality. That might be, but it is clear that\\nthe exercise of his power would be limited. It could\\nonly be exercised in creating spirits.\\nHis power to annihilate would be limited. He could\\nnot, without a contradiction, be supposed to annihilate\\nthe infinite and self -existent and as matter, according\\nto the supposition of its infinity, would be indivisible\\ninto parts, he could annihilate no part of matter.\\nHis power to control matter would be limited, indeed\\ndestroyed for it would be contradictory to suppose that\\nwhat is infinite and self -existent could be subject to\\ncontrol.\\nHis power would be limited by the necessity under\\nwhich he would lie to conform to the laws of matter.\\nUnoriginated by him, and independent of him, he could\\nonly work in the material system by obeying its laws\\nall of which is contradictory to the admission that he is\\nan infinite God.\\nTwo considerations may be added which go to prove\\nthat matter cannot be infinite.\\nOne is that spirits are conscious of finiteness, and as\\nspirit is greater than matter, a fortiori, matter cannot\\nbe infinite. If to this the materialist reply that spirit is\\nbut matter, so much the worse for his case; for the\\nspirit is certainly conscious of finiteness, and it would\\nfollow that some matter is finite, and, therefore, none\\ncould be infinite; and, further, if the better part of\\nmatter is finite, much more the inferior.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0330.jp2"}, "329": {"fulltext": "Aegumeistt foe the Being of God. 319\\nAnother consideration is that were matter infinite, it\\nwould have the power of self-motion bnt some matter,\\nconfessedly, has not. Therefore, if some has, and some\\nhas not, self-motion, it wonld follow that the infinite is\\npartly self -moved and partly not; which is contradic-\\ntory to the nature of the infinite.\\nThe position of the pantheist, so far as it may be\\nrelated to this argument, will not be examined here. It\\nhas been considered in a separate discussion. 1\\n2. The argument from the fundamental law of sub-\\nstance to a first substance.\\nSo far the argument has validly conducted us to a\\nnecessary first cause but it may be contended, as Her-\\nbert Spencer does contend, that this first cause is only a\\nforce or energy. The purpose of this branch of the\\nargument is to show that the first cause is also the first\\nsubstance.\\nSir W. Hamilton, in excepting causality from the\\ncategory of fundamental, original, under ived principles,\\nalso excepted substance from that category. He has not,\\nhowever, in regard to the judgment touching substance,\\ndeveloped his views as he did with reference to the\\ncausal judgment. We may reasonably conjecture that\\nhis method of argument was the same in both cases. As\\nhe ascribed the judgment as to cause to a negative neces-\\nsity arising from a mental powerlessness not to admit\\ncauses when we perceive phenomenal changes, so, no\\ndoubt, he attributed the judgment as to substance to an\\nanalogous mental impotence not to affirm substances\\nwhen we cognize properties. But what real and im-\\n1 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0331.jp2"}, "330": {"fulltext": "320 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nportant difference is there between the results of the two\\nkinds of necessity the negative and the positive? To\\nsay that we cannot hut admit, is practically all one with\\nsaying that we must admit. To maintain that we cannot\\nbut affirm cause, we cannot but affirm substance, is\\ntantamount to maintaining that we must affirm both.\\nWithout the repetition here of discussion in relation\\nto this point, the present argument will begin with the\\nassumption that there is in our mental constitution a\\nfundamental, original, underived law or principle neces-\\nsitating the judgment of substance, when properties are\\nempirically apprehended.\\nPhenomena being perceived, we necessarily infer the\\nsubstances which they manifest. This is done in one of\\ntwo ways: immediately or mediately. Certain phe-\\nnomenal manifestations we consider as properties, and\\nimmediately conclude from them to substance as from\\ndivisibility to the substance which is divisible. Other\\nphenomena we contemplate as effects, and while we im-\\nmediately infer some causal power, we mediately\\nthrough power as a property, infer substance to which\\npower as a property belongs. From power to substance\\nthe inference, is immediate, but from the phenomena\\nperceived we mediately infer through power the sub-\\nstance to which as a property it pertains.\\nJust here it is proper to remark that needless confu-\\nsion results from the attempt to distinguish, as sharply\\nas has been done, between power, force and energy.\\nThat question will not now be raised. It is immaterial\\nto the present argument. If it be granted that there\\nare powers, forces, energies, which inhere in this finite", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0332.jp2"}, "331": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 321\\nsystem, and which manifest themselves to observation\\nby their phenomenal effects, we necessarily refer them\\nto the natural substances to which they belong as proper-\\nties. The inference is legitimate to the existence of\\nthese substances; but these substances, with their fur-\\nniture of powers, forces, energies, we must refer to a\\nfirst causal power which produced them. The world\\nitself, as has been shown by the preceding argument\\nfrom causality, must be ascribed to this primordial\\ncausal power. We are, then, compelled, by the law of\\nsubstance and property, to infer from this first causal\\npower a first substance, to which, as an attribute, it\\nbelongs. To no lower substance can it be assigned, since\\nevery other substance was produced by the first cause.\\nIt would be absurd to make the producing power an\\nattribute of a thing produced by it. We have been con-\\nducted by the fundamental law of cause and effect to a\\nfirst cause. We are now conducted by the equally funda-\\nmental law of substance and property to a first sub-\\nstance, as being the first cause. We are led to no merely\\nabstract power, or force, or energy.\\n3. The argument from the law of personality to the\\npersonality of the first substance.\\nIt is not necessary to this argument to indicate the\\nway in which the conviction of our personality arises,\\nwhether the testimony of consciousness immediately\\naffirms the fact, or whether a fundamental law of belief,\\ndeveloped upon the conditions furnished by the con-\\nsciousness of our internal phenomena, enforces imme-\\ndiately, necessarily and with inconceivable swiftness the\\ninference to the fact. We are indubitably convinced", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0333.jp2"}, "332": {"fulltext": "322 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthat we are persons. This is true of all human\\nbeings.\\nThe question then occurs, What account can be given\\nof the fact How came we to be persons The old\\nGreek hypothesis of man s autochthonous origin will\\nscarcely be maintained. If we take the path of cause\\nand effect, we demand of the Spencerian evolutionist,\\nwho affirms an impersonal first cause, how the effect\\ncomes to contain more than the cause which produced\\nit to possess an element which was not virtually or\\npotentially in its cause. How came an impersonal cause\\nto produce a personal effect If he reply that the theist\\nis pressed by the same kind of difficulty, for, How came\\na spiritual cause to produce a material effect the rejoin-\\nder is, briefly, that the theist affirms a free Creator.\\nActing freely and not necessarily, he caused some being\\nnot analogous to his own. If he could not have done this\\nhe would not have been omnipotent. This is one thing\\nbut it is another to say that a cause, acting in conformity\\nto a rigid necessity, could have produced an effect out of\\nall analogy to itself.\\nIf we take the path of substance and property, we\\ndemand of the. pantheist, who affirms an impersonal first\\nsubstance, how the thing evolved comes to contain an\\nelement which was not potentially involved in the\\nevolver an evolver developing in accordance with a\\nlaw of blind, immanent necessity. It will not answer to\\nsay that the principle of development was that of pro-\\ngression. 1 That would sacrifice the law of evolution, a\\nlaw vital to the theory of the pantheist.\\n1 Prof. Sully, in the Encyclopaedia Britannica: On Evolution.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0334.jp2"}, "333": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 323\\nIf, then, we were caused by a first substance, we are\\nentitled, we are necessitated, to believe that that sub-\\nstance is personal. E o other just account can be given\\nof our own personality.\\nIt is added that, granted the personality, then, also,\\nthe intelligence, affections, will and moral nature, of the\\nfirst substance are admitted. Not that it is intended to\\nsay that these are constituent elements of personality;\\nnot at all. The belief in personality is as simple and\\nunresolvable, as it is self-evident and necessary; but\\nintelligence, feelings, will, and moral qualities, if we\\nmay judge from the analogy of our own being, are as\\nconstituent elements of the nature, the essence, sponta-\\nneous conditions upon which the person acts. On the\\none hand, wherever these conditions exist, they demand\\npersonality, and, on the other hand, wherever there is\\npersonality, it requires these conditions of its activity.\\nIn a word, the first substance is not only the first cause,\\nbut a personal spirit.\\n4. The argument from the fundamental law of belief\\nin the infinite to the infinity of the substantive, personal,\\nfirst cause.\\nLet it be borne in mind that by such a fundamental\\nlaw of belief is intended, not a formal faith- judgment\\nthat the infinite is, but a constitutional aptitude, pre-\\ndisposition, tendency, necessity, which, when developed\\nupon the conditions of conscious experience, leads to\\nsuch a formal faith- judgment enforces the positive\\naffirmation of the infinite. As the alleged fact of such\\na law will, no doubt, be disputed, some of the reasons\\nwill be stated which constrain belief in its existence.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0335.jp2"}, "334": {"fulltext": "324 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\n(1.) The first proof will be derived from the necessity\\nof belief in space. Space is well-nigh universally ad-\\nmitted to be infinite; but if we necessarily believe in\\nspace, and believe it to be infinite, we believe in the\\ninfinite. If not, we believe and do not believe in the\\ninfinite at the same time; which is a manifest contra-\\ndiction. In fine, the necessity of believing in space\\ninvolves the necessity of believing in the infinite. The\\nsame kind of argument is derivable from the necessity\\nof believing in duration. Like space it is admitted to\\nbe infinite. Place and time are, strictly speaking,\\nthought-judgments springing from conscious experience,\\nand they become the conditions upon which are elicited\\nfrom laws of belief faith- judgments in infinite space and\\ninfinite duration. Grant the necessity of believing in\\ninfinite space and duration, you grant the necessity of\\nbelieving in the infinite.\\n(2.) A second proof is drawn from the almost uni-\\nversal prevalence of a belief in the infinite among man-\\nkind, evincing a fundamental tendency to the formation\\nof that belief.\\nFirst. This again is proved by the universal tendency\\nto belief in the- infinity of space.\\nSecondly. It is also proved by the universal tendency\\nto belief in a superior power. This is conceded by\\nHerbert Spencer himself. This tendency, when devel-\\noped upon the conditions of experience, takes formal\\nshape in the faith-judgment, which affirms an infinite\\npower.\\nThirdly. It makes no difference that the tendency to\\nbelieve in the infinite may not be developed among cer-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0336.jp2"}, "335": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 325\\ntain savage tribes, or in densely ignorant persons in\\ncivilized communities. Reason, conscience, taste, may\\nbe undeveloped, but it would be utterly sophistical to\\ninfer from that fact that there is no reason, or con-\\nscience, or taste capable of being developed. How could\\nthat be developed which did not exist Education sup-\\nposes an original power susceptible of being educated.\\nNor does it make any difference that the infinite is\\ndenied by some on speculative grounds. These excep-\\ntions serve but to call attention to the rule. They no\\nmore affect the general belief of the race than would a\\nfew drops of ink the ocean into which they might be\\ninfused.\\nFourthly. The Avell-nigh universal employment of\\nthe word infinite argues the necessity of believing in its\\nexistence. Either this, or the term is meaningless.\\nFifthly. The terms finite and infinite are correla-\\ntives. The apprehensions symbolized by them are, there-\\nfore, correlatives. In his celebrated Critique on Cousin,\\nHamilton denies this. As one of these terms is, in\\nthought, the negation of the other, instead of the reality\\nof the infinite being suggested, it may be denied. The\\ncorrelation does not necessitate correality but\\nIn the first place, to say of something that it is not\\nfinite is to admit the thing of which the predication is\\nmade. Otherwise the predication is made of zero and\\nto deny the finiteness of that thing, so far from denying\\nits existence, is to affirm both its existence and its\\ninfinity.\\nIn the second place, even in the sphere of mere\\nthought, correlatives involving a negation of one of the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0337.jp2"}, "336": {"fulltext": "326 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmembers do not always suppose the non-existence of\\nthe member which is the subject of the negation. Socra-\\ntes as husband and Xanthippe as wife are correlatives\\nbut to affirm that Socrates was not Xanthippe would\\nnot be to deny the existence of the latter, nor her exist-\\nence as the wife of the philosopher. On the contrary,\\nthe negation supposes her existence.\\nIn the third place, Hamilton s criticism only holds\\ngood when the same thing is the subject of affirmation\\nand negation. To affirm that a thing is finite is to deny\\nthat the same thing is infinite. The law of identity\\nwould be violated but to say that another thing is not\\nfinite, instead of denying that it exists, is to affirm its\\nexistence as infinite.\\nIn the fourth place, Hamilton unaccountably con-\\nfounds the spheres of thought and belief. If Cousin\\nmeant that, in thinking the finite, we also think the cor-\\nrelative infinite, he was wrong, and Hamilton, in that\\nregard, was right in his criticism. If Hamilton meant\\nthat, in thinking the finite, we do not believe in the\\ninfinite, he was not only wrong, but inconsistent with\\nhis own doctrine, that we are under the necessity of be-\\nlieving in the infinite, although we cannot think it.\\nThese considerations suffice to show that there is,\\nimbedded in our mental constitution, a law adapting and\\nconstraining us to believe in the infinite. When, there-\\nfore, in accordance with the other fundamental laws\\nwhich have been indicated, we are led to believe in a\\npersonal being, who is the first substance and the first\\ncause, we are incited by this law to affirm that he is\\ninfinite. In a word, we affirm the infinite God.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0338.jp2"}, "337": {"fulltext": "Abgument foe the Being of God. 327\\nSuch is an outline of what is denominated the cosmo-\\nlogical argument for the divine existence.\\n5. The next branch of the argument from our rational\\nnature is what is called the teleological, or, after Kant,\\nthe physico-theological the proof from final causes or\\nfrom design. The argument here is from the funda-\\nmental law of causation, combined with those of unity\\nand sufficient reason, when developed upon the condi-\\ntions of experience, to an intelligent designer of the\\nuniverse.\\n1.) Whether we look within us or without us, we are\\namazed at the multiformity of nature. We are con-\\nfounded by the almost limitless variety that confronts\\nus on every hand, in the organic and inorganic realms,\\nin the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual do-\\nmains. Phenomenal plurality and difference obtrude\\nthemselves on our observation in the worlds above us,\\nthe world around us, and the world within us. The\\ninsatiable demand for unity, ever crying out from the\\ndepths of our souls, forbids our being satisfied with this\\nbewildering multifariousness. The principle of unity\\nenforces the belief that the whole wondrously diversified\\nscene can be reduced to harmony upon some all-\\ncomprehending plan; that the universe, complex and\\nseemingly boundless as it is, is a cosmos, and not a vast,\\nconfused, howling wilderness.\\n(2.) This demand, created by the fundamental prin-\\nciple of unity within us, is alike, in a measure, appeased\\nand gratified by the appearance of order, which meets\\nus on every side. That this result should be reached, it\\nis not necessary that we should know the ends of this", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0339.jp2"}, "338": {"fulltext": "328 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\norder. It utters a general lesson which is easily learned.\\nSome final cause we are compelled to suppose as its\\nexplanation, or the analogy of our own experience is\\nutterly deceptive. JSTor can we evade the conviction that\\nit originates in an intelligent, organizing mind, as its\\nefficient cause. Such is the majestic sweep of this all-\\nprevailing orderliness that it would be preposterous to\\nassign it to more than one cause. A pervading law, in\\naccordance with which all specific laws operate a law\\nof laws it bespeaks one source alone from which it\\nemanates, one sovereign authority which it expresses.\\n(3.) The argument to a supreme intelligence is im-\\nmensely enhanced by special adaptations, too numerous\\nto be counted, too exquisite to be sufficiently admired.\\nNot only is science at every stride in its magical progress\\nwidening our apprehensions of general order springing\\nfrom the reign of law, but multiplying the instances of\\nparticular adjustments of the most surprising and mar-\\nvellous character. It were difficult to say whether the\\nrevelations of the telescope or those of the microscope\\nimpress us with the greater astonishment; whether the\\ngrand march of astronomy or the minute analysis of\\nentomology thrills us with the profounder feeling. We\\nstand between two oceans, the great and the small, and\\nlistening in wondering awe to the mysterious sounds of\\nboth, we gather them up into a hymn of rapturous ado-\\nration to a supreme intelligence. To deny intelligence\\nas the cause of this general order, and these special\\nadaptations, and as the bond of unity to all, is to stifle\\nthe voice of reason herself. Of such frenzy no other\\naccount can be furnished than the hope that, in sinking", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0340.jp2"}, "339": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 329\\nout of view a God of intelligence, men may get rid of a\\nGod of retributive justice.\\nAdd to these considerations the inferences necessarily\\nspringing from the law of the sufficient reason, it matters\\nlittle whether, regarded as a law of thought or of real\\nbeing, and the proof is completed that there is a being of\\npower, intelligence and wisdom adequate to the produc-\\ntion of the wondrous order, and the admirable adjust-\\nments which pervade the universe. Then, finally, we\\nsupplement this separate teleological proof by the cosmo-\\nlogical, especially as it involves the necessary faith-\\njudgment enforced by the fundamental law of belief in\\nthe infinite, and we are thus irresistibly impelled to\\naffirm the infinite God, who is as well the organizer as\\nthe creator of the universe. We are compelled to con-\\nsolidate the two arguments by the unity which reigns in\\nour faculties.\\nTo this argument from design sundry objections have\\nbeen urged, which will be briefly noticed.\\nFirst. It is objected that this argument only proves\\nvast intelligence in arranging the universe, not power in\\nproducing it an Architect, not a Creator. Kant, who\\nuses this objection, has himself gone far to neutralize it\\nby the following admissions:\\nThis proof will always deserve to be treated with\\nrespect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and most in con-\\nformity with human reason. It gives life to the study\\nof nature, deriving its own existence from it, and thus\\nconstantly acquiring new vigor. It reveals aims and\\nintention where our own observation would not by itself\\nhave discovered them, and enlarges our knowledge of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0341.jp2"}, "340": {"fulltext": "330 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nnature by leading us towards that peculiar unity the\\nprinciple of which exists outside nature. This know-\\nledge reacts again on its causey-namely, the transcen-\\ndental idea and thus increases the belief in a supreme\\nauthor to an irresistible conviction. It would, there-\\nfore, be not only extremely sad, but utterly vain to\\nattempt to diminish the authority of that proof. 1\\nWithout considering the question, whether Kant can\\nbe harmonized with himself, let us note the answers\\nwhich may be furnished to the objection in hand.\\nIn the first place, even if it were granted that this\\nteleological argument, separately considered, would not\\navail to prove the infinity of God, or his creative relation\\nto the universe, it need not on that account be pro-\\nnounced worthless. It would still serve the purpose of\\nproving vast power, vast intelligence, vast wisdom, in-\\nconceivably vast, in the architect and organizer of the\\ncosmical universe; and it might be contended that, as\\nit is intended to accomplish only that result, it has not\\nfailed as an argument. The admission made by the\\nobjection shows its success in this regard; and as it\\nachieves this great end, it may be urged that it is to be\\ninterwoven with the general argument in order to\\nenhance and round it as a complex whole; that it dis-\\ncharges the office of a separate strand in strengthening a\\ncable. It is not the cable, but is invaluable in its compo-\\nsition. In a word, it may be fairly said that even though\\nit were incomplete in itself, it is indispensable to the\\ncompleteness of the argument as a whole. Upon the\\n1 Transcend. Dialectic Max Miiller s Trans, of Crit. Pure\\nReason, Vol. II., p. 534.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0342.jp2"}, "341": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 331\\nsupposition that a first cause of the universe has been\\notherwise proved, it certainly negatives the position that\\nthat cause is a blind force operating by necessity\\nmerely a an infinite and eternal energy. But\\nIn the second place, it is not as clear as the objectors\\nsuppose it to be, that the teleological argument does not\\nof itself avail to prove a first cause, who is the creator\\nof the universe. Upon this point the Bev. Professor\\nBobert Flint, of Edinburgh, has the following acute and\\nstriking observations\\nIt is remarkable, too, that those who have urged this objection\\nhave never felt that before employing it they were bound to satisfy\\nthemselves and to prove to others that order is a mere surface or\\nsuperficial thing outside of matter, superimposed on it. If order\\nbe something inherently and intrinsically in matter be of its very\\nessence belong to what is ultimate in it; if matter and its form\\nbe inseparable then the author of its order must have been also\\nthe author of itself; and all that this objection shows us is, that\\nthose who have employed it have had mistaken notions about the\\nnature of matter. Now, as I have already had to indicate, modern\\nscience seems rapidly perfecting the proof of this. The order in\\nthe heavens, and in the most complicated animal organisms,\\nappears to be not more wonderful than the order in the ultimate\\natoms of which they are composed. The balance of evidence is\\nin favor of the view that order extends as far and penetrates as\\ndeep as matter itself does. The human intellect is daily learning\\nthat it is foolish to fancy that there is anywhere in matter a\\nsphere in which the Divine Wisdom does not manifest itself in and\\nthrough order.\\nThere is still another remark to be made on the objection\\nunder consideration. The immediate inference from the order of\\nthe universe is to an intelligent former of the universe, not to a\\ncreator. But this does not preclude the raising of the question,\\nIs it reasonable to believe the former of the world merely its\\nformer? Must not its former be also its creator? On the con-\\ntrary, the inference that the order of the world must be the result\\nof intelligent agency ought to suggest this question to every seri-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0343.jp2"}, "342": {"fulltext": "332 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nous and reflective mind, and it should even contribute something to\\nits answer. The order of the universe must have originated with\\nintelligence. What is implied in this admission? Clearly that\\nthe order of the universe cannot have originated with matter\\nthat matter is unintelligent, and cannot account either for intelli-\\ngence or the effects of intelligence. The supposition that matter\\nis eternal must in this case be supplemented by the admission that\\nmind is eternal. In other words, the affirmation that the former\\nof the world is merely its former the denial that its former is\\nalso its creator means dualism, the belief in two distinct eternal\\nexistences an eternal mind and eternal matter. Whoever is not\\nprepared to accept this hypothesis must abandon the affirmation\\nand the denial from which it necessarily follows. And who can,\\nafter due deliberation, accept it? The law of parsimony of causes\\nabsolutely forbids our assuming, for the explanation of anything,\\nmore causes than are necessary to account for it. It forbids,\\ntherefore, our belief in an eternal matter and an eternal mind,\\nunless we can show reason for holding that one of them alone is\\nnot a sufficient cause of the universe. Now those who grant the\\ninference from order to intelligence, themselves admit that mat-\\nter is not a sufficient First Cause of the universe as it actually\\nexists. Do they find any person admitting that mind would be an\\ninsufficient First Cause? Do they themselves see any way of\\nshowing its insufficiency? Do they not even perceive that it would\\nbe foolish and hopeless to try to show that an eternal mind could\\nnot create a material universe, and that all they could show would\\nbe, the here quite irrelevant truth, that the human mind is igno-\\nrant of the manner in which this could be done? If the answers\\nto these questions are what I believe they must be, it must also\\nbe acknowledged that the former of the universe can only be\\nrationally thought of as also its creator. x\\nTo these considerations it may be added, in the third\\nplace, that if the thinking faculty cannot, in consequence\\nof the evidences of design in the universe, affirm the\\nexistence of an infinite God, neither can it deny that\\nexistence. In fact, it cannot deny a vast finite intelli-\\n1 Theism, pp. 171-174.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0344.jp2"}, "343": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 333\\ngence and power lying beyond all possible bounds of\\nconception. The telescope, for example, has revealed\\nstretches of the universe which were never dreamed of in\\nthought. Beyond these expanded ranges of being the\\nimagination is able to pursue her flight. She may\\nimagine systems now unperceived, even by the tele-\\nscope, analogous to those which come under observation\\nbut were one to go on for a life-time, day by day and\\nnight by night, in his imagination to add systems to\\nsystems, he would in age be perfectly convinced that\\nthere yet lie measureless systems beyond, and that no\\nsensible approximation had been made to a grasp even\\nof finite being. What is here intimated is that, at the\\noutmost verge of the imagination s possibilities, there\\ncannot be a denial of a still greater scope of finite exist-\\nence than has been actually compassed; that, on the\\ncontrary, the presumption is that fathomless depths of\\nbeing lie beyond the line of the imagination and that,\\nso far from a denial of the infinite being possible, a\\npositive presumption is created in its favor by the in-\\nability of thought or imagination to limit the finite.\\nWere it possible for the conceiving faculty to measure\\nthe vast finite and affix its boundaries, the case would be\\ndifferent but this it cannot possibly do and as, there-\\nfore, it cannot deny the unlimited, no more is it com-\\npetent to deny the illimitable. As it cannot deny the\\nindefinite, it cannot the infinite. A vast intelligence\\nsuggested by the teleological argument certainly is be-\\nyond the comprehension of thought and it may be an\\ninfinite intelligence. This possibility is at least hinted\\nby that argument. Now the mind of man is one and", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0345.jp2"}, "344": {"fulltext": "334 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe fundamental law of belief in the infinite, which\\naccompanies the cosmological argument and projects it\\nto the positive affirmation of an infinite first cause and\\nfirst substance, also attends the teleological and exalts it\\nto the positive affirmation of an infinite intelligence.\\nThis is a well-nigh universal fact, and no exceptional\\nspeculation or perverse skepticism can successfully gain-\\nsay it. Men, in general, refuse to concede that the\\nintelligence displayed in this wondrous universe is finite.\\nSecondly. It is objected that the argument from\\ndesign, instead of inferring an infinite and perfect, con-\\nducts us to a finite and imperfect intelligence. The\\nremarkable proof of this position is that design implies\\ncontrivance, and contrivance supposes choice, and there-\\nfore limitation. The designer depends on means,\\ninstead of immediately producing results by his fiat;\\nbut one answer will here be given.\\nIntelligence without wisdom is defective. The high-\\nest intelligence embraces the greatest wisdom. Wisdom\\nis exercised in the selection of the means fitted to secure\\ncontemplated ends. The highest wisdom displays itself\\nin the choice of the best means to produce the noblest\\nends. Were the intelligence exhibited in the arrange-\\nment of the universe destitute of wisdom, it would be\\ndefective but the order and adjustments of the universe\\nevince, in the selection of the most fitting means to\\nsecure transcendently noble ends, the most consummate\\nwisdom. This consideration is sufficient to refute the\\nobjection before us, and to prove the intelligence con-\\ncerned about the fashioning of the universe to have been\\nperfect. What a strange objection is this, proceeding", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0346.jp2"}, "345": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 335\\nas it does upon the supposition that the possession of\\nperfect wisdom infers an imperfect intelligence One\\nwould imagine that John Stuart Mill was sorely pressed\\nfor arguments against God when he excogitated this.\\nThirdly. The teleological argument has been flip-\\npantly dubbed as the carpenter theory. It is objected\\nthat the theist represents God as a mere mechanic or\\nartificer. It is hard to see either the relevancy or the\\nconsistency of this objection. How is it relevant? No\\ntheist holds that the divine being is simply a constructor\\nof mechanisms. Even if, with Lotze, the extreme\\nground were taken that the universe is a mechanism, it\\ncertainly would not be denied that it involves organisms.\\nThe theist contends that God is the author of organized\\nbeings containing a principle of reproduction, and de-\\nvelopment according to the laws of life. How, then,\\ndoes he represent God as a mere carpenter? It is\\nenough to say that Mr. Spencer and others in urging\\nthis objection against the teleology of the theist mis-\\nrepresent it.\\nFurther, how is the objection consistent Mr.\\nSpencer maintains that there is an infinite and eternal\\nenergy, which furnishes the ground and explanation\\nof the universe an unknown, but fundamental, reality.\\nHe also holds that this force proceeds by the inflexible\\nlaw of evolution in the development of all things. Now,\\neither this infinite and eternal energy is itself the prin-\\nciple of evolution, that out of which the universe is\\ndeveloped, or not. If the former, how can he account\\nfor the element of design in the intelligence of a Newton,\\nfor example, or a Napoleon It will not be contended", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0347.jp2"}, "346": {"fulltext": "336 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthat the Principia of Newton, or the campaigns of Na-\\npoleon were the results of mere fortuity, that they hap-\\npened by chance. It will not be denied that the Prin-\\ncipia and the campaigns were planned to secure ends,\\nthat they had designs in view. How, then, did these\\nintelligences, containing the element of design, come to\\nbe evolved out of an ultimate energy entirely destitute\\nof such an element If it be replied that it was possible\\nfor intelligence, characterized by the element of design,\\nto have been developed from an energy devoid of it,\\nabsurdity results. If, that the primordial energy\\ncontained potentially the element of design, then it may\\nhave designed the mind of a Newton or a Napoleon;\\nand, further, it must itself have formed the designs of\\nthose great men, since, ex hypothesi, they were evolved\\nout of it, and could not, therefore, have been substan-\\ntially different from it.\\nIf the infinite and eternal energy is not itself the\\nprinciple of evolution, it follows that it caused the\\nprimal element or elements which constituted the evolv-\\ning source. Now, either those elements contained in\\nthem potentially the feature of design, or not. If they\\ndid, how could they have originated from a causal energy\\ndestitute of design, devoid of personality, and operating\\nby a blind, unintelligent law of necessity If they did\\nnot, how came intelligent, designing minds to be evolved\\nout of them? If Mr. Spencer s infinite and eternal\\nenergy was not characterized by purpose, it had not the\\nsense of a carpenter. If it was, it had not the dignity\\nof a carpenter, for he is independent of that which he\\nconstructs and superior to it. Evolution makes the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0348.jp2"}, "347": {"fulltext": "Abgument foe the Being of God. 337\\nbuilder and the house one and the same, the organizer\\nand the organism identical. To my mind, the so-called\\ncarpenter theory has the advantage; but invest, as\\nthe theist does, the carpenter with the power to create\\nlife, and to regulate its development, and the theory\\nrises to immeasurable superiority. In fine, if Mr.\\nSpencer s theory of evolution admits design, his objec-\\ntion to the teleological argument is inconsistent with his\\ntheory; and if it does not, his theory is self -contradic-\\ntory.\\nKant characterizes the argument from the speculative\\nreason for the existence of God as sophistical. He\\nmaintains that the physico-theological (teleological) and\\nthe cosmological proofs depend upon the ontological, and\\nas he holds that to be invalid, he pronounces the whole\\nargument inconclusive. Now it is true, as has already\\nbeen conceded, that the cosmological and the teleological\\narguments are necessitated and enforced by a priori\\nelements in the form of fundamental laws of belief in\\nour mental constitution. They are partly ontological;\\nbut it is not true that they are founded upon the so-called\\nontological argument, contemplated as a separate and\\nfinished whole, possessed of self-sufficient validity.\\nIn its original and, as is claimed by its friends, its\\npurest form as presented by Anselm, the ontological\\nargument concludes from the idea or concept of\\nabsolutely perfect being to its necessary existence, and\\nfrom its necessary existence to its actual existence. The\\nform in which it was put by Leibnitz, and in which it\\nwas criticised by Kant is briefly A being whose essence\\ninfers his existence, if it is possible, is; but God is a", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0349.jp2"}, "348": {"fulltext": "338 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbeing whose essence infers his existence therefore, God\\nif he is possible, is.\\nKant s refutation, succinctly stated, is in the general\\nFrom the concept of an ideal being, it is illegitimate to\\nconclude to a real, objectively existent, being. This po-\\nsition he presses in a specific form by appealing to his\\ndistinction between an analytical and a synthetical prop-\\nosition. An analytical proposition is one in which the\\npredicate adds nothing to the subject, but simply evolves\\nits contents. It is merely explicative. A synthetical\\nproposition is one in which the predicate adds something\\nsubstantively to the subject. It is amplincative. In the\\nanalytical proposition you would be guilty of a contra-\\ndiction should you deny the predicate of the subject,\\nbut there would be no contradiction were you to deny\\nboth the predicate and the subject. In the synthetical\\nproposition there would be no contradiction in denying\\nthe predicate of the subject, since that holds good only\\nof identical judgments involved in analytical proposi-\\ntions.\\nNow here the proposition is either analytical or syn-\\nthetical. If analytical, the predicate, existence, is\\naffirmed of being, the subject, which already contains\\nexistence, and naught but tautology results and, while\\nit would be contradictory to deny existence of the subject\\nbeing, if the being were not merely assumed, but pre-\\nviously proved, there is no contradiction in this instance,\\nfor the being is merely assumed, as it is the very design\\nof the argument to prove it. Both predicate and subject\\nmay, without contradiction, be denied. If the proposi-\\ntion is synthetical, it is admitted that the predicate", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0350.jp2"}, "349": {"fulltext": "Argument foe the Being of God. 339\\nexistence (real, objective existence) adds something to\\nthe subject not already contained in it; but there would\\nbe no contradiction in denying the predicate of the sub-\\nject, inasmuch as such a contradiction is possible only\\nwhere identical judgments are involved, and this propo-\\nsition, as confessedly synthetical, does not involve an\\nidentical judgment. Real existence, then, may, without\\na contradiction, be denied of the being conceived. The\\npeculiar force of this member of the dilemma depends\\non Kant s doctrine, that real existence is derived from\\nthe sphere of phenomena alone. Therefore, this propo-\\nsition, considered as synthetical, employs an empirical\\npredicate of a purely ontological subject. In short, if\\nthe proposition be analytical, it is worthless if syntheti-\\ncal, it is impossible.\\nThe answer to all this is that both the refutation, and\\nthe argument against which the refutation is directed,\\nare founded upon the fallacious assumption that it is\\npossible to form a concept of an absolutely perfect or\\ninfinite being. Kant s ideas of the pure reason are, as\\nhe himself terms them, concepts. His concepts of the\\nunderstanding are but groupings into unity of the repre-\\nsentations of sense-intuitions and his ideas of the pure\\nreason are but higher conceptual groupings into unity\\nof the concepts of the understanding. Now, as, at the\\nbottom, concepts depend upon perception for the mate-\\nrials which they elaborate in thought-relations, it is\\ncertain that no percept can furnish the materials for a\\nconcept of a perfect or infinite being. There can be,\\ntherefore, no concept, strictly speaking, of such a being.\\nConsequently, no valid argument, in the form of a regu-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0351.jp2"}, "350": {"fulltext": "340 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nlar syllogism constructed of concepts, can be legitimately\\nframed for the existence of an infinite being. Neither\\ncan there be a valid argument to the contrary, which\\nadmits the possibility of a concept of an infinite being.\\nBoth kinds of argument are baseless.\\nCousin, who allows the force of Kant s criticism of\\nthe Leibnitzian syllogism, adds one of his own\\nThis syllogism, he says, is perfectly regular, and there is\\neither no such thing as logic in the world, or the conclusion is\\ndemonstrated. But what is the nature of this conclusion? Ac-\\ncording to the laws of logic itself, it should be conformable to the\\nnature of the major and minor premises united. Let us examine\\nthese premises. The major, as Leibnitz says, is an identical axiom\\n(axioma identicum) It is a general and abstract proposition.\\nThe existence and the essence spoken of are taken in a purely\\nabstract point of view. As to the minor, it contains a general\\ndefinition of God, in which the existence of this being is also con-\\nsidered in an abstract point of view, and not as a real being, since\\nit is this reality itself which is required in the conclusion, and to\\nsuppose it in the minor would be to make a petitio principii, to\\nbeg the question. If, then, the major is abstract, and the minor\\npartakes of the same character, I ask again, What should be the\\nnature of the conclusion? Necessarily an abstract conclusion, in\\nwhich existence is taken abstractly, as in the premises. From the\\ncombination of the two abstract premises, nothing but an abstrac-\\ntion can follow. The syllogism, therefore, though good in itself,\\nhas, and can have, no other than a syllogistic value. The exist-\\nence which it involves can be only existence in general, an abstract\\nstate, destitute of any true reality. 1\\nWhile, however, he admits the unwarrantableness of\\na regular syllogism starting with a major premise con-\\ntaining the concept of a perfect being, Cousin contends\\nthat the Cartesian argument is to be vindicated when\\nstated in a certain form. What is that form That in\\n1 The Phil, of Kant, Lect. VI.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0352.jp2"}, "351": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 341\\nwhich Descartes presents the argument for one s own\\nexistence Cogito, ergo Sum/ He holds that this is\\nnot a syllogism, but an enthymeme. If, however, Sir\\nWilliam Hamilton is right, the enthymeme is but a\\nsyllogism, imperfectly expressed, in which either the\\nmajor premise, or the minor, or the conclusion may be\\nwanting it is not a peculiar species of reasoning. 1 But\\nthat question aside, Cousin s meaning evidently is that\\nfrom the affirmation, think, we pass immediately to\\nthe affirmation, exist. So, from the affirmation, I am\\nimperfect or finite, we pass immediately to the affirma-\\ntion, a perfect or infinite being exists.\\n!N~ow, what is the nature of that passage What sort\\nof act is it Here this usually perspicuous writer uses\\nterms so various and apparently incongruous with each\\nother to express one and the same act that it is difficult\\nto grasp his meaning perfectly. Extracts from himself\\nwill illustrate this. Sometimes he uses perception to\\ndesignate the act. The indirect, it may be, but real\\nperception of the me. It is the living perception of a\\nliving thought in a living personal self. The syllo-\\ngism of Leibnitz, as it stands, justifies the objections of\\nKant but they vanish when it is traced to its source, to\\nthe true Cartesian proof, just as the objections of Kant\\nagainst the substantial reality of the me vanish in restor-\\ning to the cogito, ergo sum its true meaning, and when\\ninstead of attempting to construct a syllogism, we invest\\nit with the unquestionable authority of an immediate\\nand spontaneous perception. Frequently he employs\\nthe terms conception, conceive. The primitive concep-\\n1 Logic, pp. 276 ff. Boston Ed.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0353.jp2"}, "352": {"fulltext": "342 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntion of the reason. It is an immediate conception,\\nresting upon no principle, on nothing intermediate.\\nAt the same time that I recognize the imperfection of\\nmy own being, I conceive a perfect being. The truth\\nis that primitively the reason, as soon as it conceives the\\nimperfection of my being, conceives a perfect being.\\nYou can imagine a gorgon, a centaur, to exist, and you\\ncan imagine them not to exist but is it in your power,\\nthe finite and the imperfect being given, to conceive or\\nnot to conceive the infinite and the perfect etc. Very\\noften he adopts the term idea, so often as to make it\\nneedless to quote.\\nHe also uses the word reveals. No major premise\\ncan fill up the gap which separates being from thought,\\nphenomena from substance, attribute from subject. It\\nis reason itself which, by its own inherent power, over-\\nleaps this abyss, which reveals (the word is here per-\\nfectly legitimate) the hidden, but real subject of every\\nphenomenon, of every thought. Sometimes he even\\nresorts to the term consciousness. I am, therefore, a\\nsubstance which knows itself by a science the most cer-\\ntain of all, since it is the most immediate, conscious-\\nness. A primitive and permanent fact of conscious-\\nness. [This in regard to the Cartesian proof of God s\\nexistence.] The term judgment also occurs. Now,\\nthis character of finite cannot be given to us, as we have\\nseen, without the reason instantly entering into exercise,\\nand passing this judgment, that there is something in-\\nfinite, if there is something finite. This judgment is\\nelsewhere spoken of as a spontaneous conviction.\\nFinally, Cousin uses the term faith. Speaking of sav-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0354.jp2"}, "353": {"fulltext": "Abgument eoe the Beijstg of God. 343\\nages lie says You rna y be sure that what they see of\\nthemselves and of the world does not suffice them, and\\nthat they are humbled and exalted in the intimate faith\\nin the existence of something infinite, perfect, that is,\\nof God. x\\nOf these terms, designating the act by which we pass\\nfrom imperfect or finite to the perfect or infinite, some\\nmust, if rigorously construed, be rejected as inappli-\\ncable. That we perceive, are conscious of, that we may\\nconceive, ourselves as imperfect, as finite this is evi-\\ndent but it is equally manifest that, strictly speaking,\\nwe cannot perceive or be conscious of, and that we can-\\nnot conceive, a perfect or infinite being. The terms\\nreveals, revelation, are, in a certain sense, proper, but\\nthey are vague and indefinite they do not describe the\\nnature of the act by which the alleged revelation is\\nmade; and they are also liable to the interpretation\\nthat by them is meant an act by which we are conscious\\nof, have an immediate intuition of, the perfect and\\ninfinite, a sense in which Jacobi employed them in-\\ncorrectly, in this relation. In the sense in which Sir\\nW. Hamilton used them, they are, to my mind, admis-\\nsible and correct. The term judgment is that which\\nexpresses the true nature of the mental act by which we\\npass from the imperfect to the perfect, from the finite\\nto the infinite. Conscious that we are imperfect, that\\nwe are finite we judge that there is a perfect, an infinite,\\nbeing. This judgment is an inference, a necessary and\\nimmediate inference, so swiftly, so instantaneously de-\\n1 These citations are made from his Lectures on Phil, of Kant,\\nand his Course of Hist. Mod. Philosophy.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0355.jp2"}, "354": {"fulltext": "344 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nrived from the consciousness of our imperfection, our\\nfiniteness, that the difference between the datum of\\nconsciousness and the inference from it is appreciable\\nonly to reflection. Contemporaneous they may be, but\\nin the order of thought or nature they differ and may be,\\ntherefore, reflectively disjoined. The imperfect, the\\nfinite, being given, there must be the perfect, the in-\\nfinite; and this necessary judgment is immediately\\npassed immediately, both in the sense that there is no\\nintervening medium, no middle, and in the sense that\\nthere is no perceptible interval of time, between the\\nconscious experience and the inferential judgment.\\nBut were there any reasonable objection to this mode\\nof stating the matter, this form of statement may be\\nadopted: The conscious experience of imperfection, of\\nfiniteness constitutes the condition upon which the judg-\\nment affirming a perfect, an infinite, being, is necessa-\\nrily and immediately passed. The practical result is\\nthe same but the former mode of statement is to be pre-\\nferred, for this reason: a necessary and immediate\\ninference from a datum is confessedly of equal validity\\nand authority with the datum itself. Now we need the\\nassurance of the incontestable authority of the judgment\\naffirming a perfect, an infinite being; and as a datum\\nof consciousness is possessed of such authority, a neces-\\nsary and immediate inference from it is equally authori-\\ntative. The inference would appear to be necessitated\\nby the correlation between the two apprehensions, im-\\nperfect or finite and perfect or infinite. It is as\\nnecessary as the inference from husband to wife.\\nWhat, however, is here contended for is that, given", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0356.jp2"}, "355": {"fulltext": "Aegument foe the Being of God. 345\\nthe conscious experience of imperfection and finiteness,\\nthe judgment affirming a perfect, or, what is the same,\\nan infinite, being, is necessary and immediate. It is a\\nspontaneous conviction of our souls enforced by the\\noperation of a fundamental law of our constitution.\\nThe necessity and immediateness of the judgment ren-\\nders the proposition, There is a perfect or infinite being,\\nself-evident.\\nThis, however, is not all that is required for an eluci-\\ndation of the subject. The important question arises,\\nBy what faculty or power is this judgment passed\\nNegatively, the answer is that it is not thought, for\\nthought cannot transcend consciousness, and conscious-\\nness cannot supply the materials for this judgment. It\\nis not a thought- judgment. It was in proceeding upon\\nthat supposition that the transcendental or absolutist\\nphilosophy took its fundamental departure from the\\ntruth. 1 Affirmatively, the answer is that the judgment\\nby which the mind passes necessarily and immediately\\nfrom the imperfect to the perfect, from the finite to the\\ninfinite, is formed by faith. It is a faith- judgment.\\nConscious of the phenomenal imperfect or finite, we\\nstrive by imagination and conception to think the per-\\nfect, the infinite. We expand the concept of the former\\nto the highest possible degree. But, of necessity, we\\nreach only the relatively perfect, the vast finite. Awak-\\nened from latency by this condition furnished in expe-\\nrience, the innate capacity of faith, and, in this par-\\nticular relation, the fundamental law of belief in the\\ninfinite, necessitate and enforce the judgment which\\n1 See Discussion of Pantheism.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0357.jp2"}, "356": {"fulltext": "346 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\naffirms the perfect, the infinite. 1 As faith is, so far\\nforth as it is intellectual, a specific function of the\\nreason, this is the highest affirmation of intelligence. It\\nis not a mere negative protest of thought, denying all\\nlimitation upon its most exalted concept it is a positive\\njudgment.\\nIs, then, the argument from a faith- judgment, affirm-\\ning a perfect, an infinite, being, a pure a priori argument\\nfor the existence of God It certainly contains an\\na priori element, but the question, whether it is, as\\na priori, complete and self-sufficient, independently of\\na posteriori elements, must be answered in the negative.\\nLet it be borne in mind that an a posteriori argument is\\none in which we set out from experience, and in the\\na priori, we throw aside all experience, and conclude\\nfrom the mental apprehension of a perfect, an infinite,\\nbeing to his existence.\\n1. We must set out with the conviction of our own\\nexistence for were we non-existent, any argument for\\nthe existence of another being, grounded upon the\\nmental processes of one non-existent would be, of course,\\nitself non-existent. This conviction of our existence is\\nfounded, in the last analysis, upon consciousness. It\\nmatters not, so far as this argument is concerned,\\nwhether it is held that we are directly conscious of\\nexistence, or that we necessarily and immediately infer,\\nor, at least, judge, that we exist in consequence of the\\nconsciousness of mental phenomena. In either case con-\\n1 The question whether there be a Faculty of Faith is con-\\nsidered in the Discussion of Herbert Spencer s Relativity of\\nKnowledge.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0358.jp2"}, "357": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 347\\nsciousness is supposed, and that implies experience. We\\nstart, then, in the a priori argument for God s existence\\nwith the conscious experience which leads to the convic-\\ntion of our own. It is conditioned upon that experience\\nas an a posteriori element.\\n2. In the a priori argument there is also supposed the\\nconscious experience of our imperfection, our finiteness.\\nIt is impossible to doubt this datum of consciousness.\\nThis conscious experience conditions our judgment that\\nthere is a perfect, an infinite, being. Here again we\\nhave an empirical, an a posteriori, element entering into\\nthe argument as a whole.\\nIn regard to both of these empirical elements, it may\\nbe contended that while their existence is not denied,\\nthey do not enter as integers into the a priori argument\\nitself; that that proof exists concurrently and coordi-\\nnately with them, but is as native to the mind as they\\nthat we are as directly conscious of God, as the\\nall-perfect being, as we are of our existence and of\\nour imperfections in short, that we have a God-\\nconsciousness. But, in the first place, this, as an\\nalleged fact, is denied. Consciousness is limited to the\\nphenomenal, internal or external, and to say that God\\nis, in himself, phenomenal is to gainsay common sense,\\nas well as the best philosophy and the catholic theology\\nof the ages. In the second place, if we are conscious of\\nGod, it would not only follow that, as the proof of his\\nexistence furnished by the direct testimony of conscious-\\nness would be, in itself, complete and irrefragable, no\\na priori argument, in syllogistic form, would be needed\\nbut, also, that the so-called a priori proof would become", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0359.jp2"}, "358": {"fulltext": "348 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\npurely empirical and a posteriori, since the proof fur-\\nnished by consciousness is confessedly of that character.\\nHere the argumentum ad hominem is as irresistible as it\\nis necessary.\\nIt may be replied that, in being conscious of a con-\\ncept, a belief whatever the mental act may be called\\nof a perfect or infinite being, we have a conscious know-\\nledge of him as conceived, as believed. The rejoinder is\\nthat while this might, in a sense, be true, were it only a\\nconcept which was the subject of the affirmation, the\\nfact is, as has already been shown, that no concept,\\nstrictly speaking, of God is possible. It may, however,\\nbe contended that, in having a belief in God of which\\nwe are conscious, we are also conscious of him as be-\\nlieved in. This is a profound mistake. There are\\nmany things of which we have a conscious belief, while\\nof the things themselves we have no consciousness. We\\nhave, for example, a conscious belief in the essence of\\nour souls. Would it not be sheer folly to say that we\\nare conscious of that essence itself But, as that ques-\\ntion was considered in another discussion, 1 no more will\\nbe now said in relation to it.\\n3. A judgment however denominated afiirming\\nthe existence of a perfect or infinite being, would not,\\nby itself, affirm the existence of attributes qualifying\\nthat being. It would be simply apprehended as the\\nprimordial substance of the Spinozan pantheist. It\\ncertainly would not be God, a personal spirit, a freely\\nacting cause, possessed of wisdom, power, holiness, jus-\\ntice, goodness and truth. Now, how do we get the\\n1 Discussion on the Nature of Consciousness.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0360.jp2"}, "359": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 349\\napprehension of attributes The answer must be, From\\nexperience. We observe certain effects which we neces-\\nsarily ascribe to attributes as their causes. Certain\\nphenomenal changes which we observe, for instance, we\\nassign to the attribute of power as their cause. So with\\nother attributes. It may be said that this is a begging\\nof the question that we are obliged to do no more than\\nto recognize these effects as related to forces inherent in\\nnature, and these forces we are not compelled to appre-\\nhend as attributes but this is not to beg the question,\\nfor we proceed in accordance with the analogies of our\\nown being. Certain effects produced by ourselves we\\ninevitably assign to power, to intelligence, to justice,\\nto mercy, and these proximate causes we know to be\\nattributes of our souls. They are not mere indepen-\\ndently operating forces. In like manner, perceiving\\neffects which could not be produced by ourselves or any\\nother human beings, we irresistibly assign them to proxi-\\nmate causes, which again, by a necessary law, we refer\\nas attributes to substance; and as we are not satisfied\\nshort of unity, we ascribe them to one supreme sub-\\nstance. Thus we apprehend, not a substance naked and\\nunqualified, but one so and so characterized we appre-\\nhend God.\\nShould it be urged that while this may hold in regard\\nto a belief in an infinite being, it would not hold con-\\ncerning a concept of an all-perfect being, that such a\\nconcept, from the nature of the case, embraces attributes\\nin its contents, it would be sufficient to repeat what has\\nalready been said, that we can have no concept of such\\na being.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0361.jp2"}, "360": {"fulltext": "350 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nIf, therefore, our belief in the attributes of God\\nand without attributes he would not be God is condi-\\ntioned upon our conscious observation of phenomena,\\nanother proof is added of the position that empirical, or\\na posteriori,, elements cannot be detached from the\\na priori constituent in the argument for the existence of\\nGod.\\n4. To the foregoing reasoning the Anselmic argument,\\nas stated and acutely defended by Dr. Shedd, and by him\\npronounced to be the purest form of the ontological\\nargument for the being of God, 1 constitutes no exception.\\n(1.) Anselm himself used the terms idea and con-\\nception interchangeably with reference to a perfect\\nbeing, and Dr. Shedd expressly employs idea and\\nconcept convertibly in the same relation. In the case\\nof the great Schoolman it might be pleaded, but in that\\nof the learned and able author of the Dogmatic Theology\\nit cannot, that the precise signification of conception\\nand its product the concept was not definitely settled.\\nThat the latter regarded the concept in its strict and\\nproper sense is evinced by the fact that he employs it\\nas an element of the argument evolved in the form of a\\nregular syllogism but, as it has been already contended,\\nno concept of an all-perfect being is possible. It takes\\nno elaborate argument to show that the apprehension of\\nsuch a being transcends the scope of the logical under-\\nstanding, and it is clear that the concept is to be assigned\\nto that faculty. This is not captious criticism, for if we\\ncan conceive God we can, at least in a measure, compre-\\nhend him, and if anything is certain, it is that he is\\n1 Dogmatic Theology, pp. 224 ff.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0362.jp2"}, "361": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 351\\nutterly incomprehensible. This is the testimony alike\\nof philosophy and of divine revelation. We firmly\\nbelieve in the infinite God, but who, by searching with\\nthe organ of the thinking reason, can find him out\\nA concept is a class-notion; but it is evident that\\nsuch language cannot be applied to an infinite being.\\nHe constitutes no class. He is wholly unique and singu-\\nlar. As he is infinite, there is nothing like him, nothing\\nwith which he can be compared, no quality common\\nbetween him and anything else. He is not a species\\nincluded under a genus, else he were not infinite. He is\\nnot himself a genus, including species under him, for on\\nthat supposition the species included under him would\\ninclude his essence in them, since the essence of the\\ngenus descends into the species. He is not subject to\\nthe laws of logic, or, what is the same thing, he cannot,\\nas infinite, be conceived. This it is true, is expressly\\nadmitted in Dr. Shedd s defence of Anselm s argument\\nand yet it is held that Anselm constructed the ontologi-\\ncal argument in a syllogistical form. This makes it\\nemploy the concept of a perfect being as a class-notion,\\nwhich will be evinced by a full development of the argu-\\nment, which really embraces two syllogisms. The first\\nis If we have the concept of a perfect being, we have\\nthat of its necessary existence; we have the concept of\\na perfect being; therefore, we have the concept of its\\nnecessary existence. The second is: If we have the\\nconcept of the necessary existence of a being, the being\\nmust actually exist we have such a concept therefore,\\nthe being must actually exist.\\nOn the supposition, therefore, that we have a concept", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0363.jp2"}, "362": {"fulltext": "352 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof an all-perfect being, we are led to make it a sumption,\\nimplying a sub-sumption, in a syllogistic process. We\\nget quit of this inconsistency, and of the whole difficulty,\\nin adopting the view that we believe in an infinite being,\\nwhen the fundamental laws of belief are elicited into\\nformal expression upon the conditions of conscious ex-\\nperience.\\n(2.) Those who maintain that we have the conscious-\\nness of God s existence are involved in the inconsistency\\nof trying to prove what is already certain, and neither\\nneeds further proof nor is capable of it. Although the\\nevidence, remarks Dr. Shedd, for the divine existence\\nwhich is most relied upon in scripture, and which is\\ncommon to all men, is that of immediate consciousness,\\nyet certain syllogistic arguments have been constructed\\nwhich have the following uses, 1 etc. Again he says\\nA proof of the divine existence is found in man s God-\\nconsciousness, considered as a universal and abiding\\nform of human consciousness. 2 This language is too\\nexplicit to bear the construction that we are conscious\\nof the idea or concept of God it expressly affirms\\nthe immediate consciousness of God.\\nBut the consciousness of an object is itself the most\\nindubitable evidence of its existence. The conscious-\\nness of an object seen is ocular demonstration of its\\nexistence. This is the assumed standard of certainty.\\nNo other proof is demanded. The thing is autopistic.\\nWere we, then, conscious of God, we would have unde-\\nniable proof of his existence in that fact. Any other\\nproof would be as superfluous as carrying coals to New-\\ncastle. Of each of the usual proofs it might with truth\\n1 Dogmat. Theol., p. 221. Ibid., p. 210.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0364.jp2"}, "363": {"fulltext": "Argument eor the Being oe God. 353\\nbe said that its occupation is gone. That we are not\\nconscious of God is proved because, in the first place, if\\nwe were conscious of him, we could describe him. What-\\never we are conscious of we can describe but it is\\nevident that we cannot describe God. To describe some\\nof his finite manifestations of himself is not to describe\\nhim, as the infinite God. In the second place, conscious-\\nness includes in its scope only the finite, and only so\\nmuch of even the finite as is in relation to it. We may\\nbe conscious, for instance, of a section of a mountain\\nrange, or of the ocean, but only of that section of either\\nwhich comes within the comprehension of vision. We\\nmay infer, or believe, upon testimony, that there is a\\nvaster section which lies beyond the reach of the eye, but\\nwe are not conscious of it. So we may be conscious of a\\npart of the finite, phenomenal manifestations of the\\ninfinite, while we cannot be conscious of even them as\\na whole; but of a part of the infinite we can have no\\nconsciousness whatever, for the simple reason that the\\ninfinite has no parts. We must either be conscious of it\\nas a whole, or not conscious of it at all, and that a finite\\nbeing can be conscious of the infinite as a whole is\\nsupremely absurd. God is not an object of presentative,\\nintuitive, immediate knowledge. We immediately infer\\nhis existence, but cannot immediately know him. Im-\\nmediate inference gives mediate knowledge. Conscious-\\nness never knows inf erentially and mediately nor does\\nit know representatively it knows presentatively, intui-\\ntively in a word, immediately. Such knowledge of\\nGod no finite being can possibly have. To say that we\\nmay have a partial consciousness of him is the same as", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0365.jp2"}, "364": {"fulltext": "354 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nto say that we may have a consciousness of a part of\\nhim. To be partially conscious of a mountain range or\\nof the ocean is to be conscious of a part of them but it\\nhas already been seen that we can have no consciousness\\nof a part of the infinite, since it is a great whole indivis-\\nible into parts, either real or imaginary. To say that\\nwe may have an indefinite consciousness 7 of the infinite\\nis to say nothing in regard to its extent or scope, but\\nmerely to point out that it is not clear, as to its nature,\\nwithin the limits to which it is restricted and that is\\nto affirm nothing as to its apprehension of the infinite,\\nwhich infinitely transcends those limits. In the third\\nplace, consciousness is limited to phenomena, either\\nwithin us or without us, and that God is a phenomenon,\\nor an aggregate of phenomena, it were blasphemy to\\naffirm.\\nTo all this it may be replied That consciousness is\\ntreated with a technical narrowness which is unwar-\\nrantable; that it has a wider scope than has been\\nassigned to it that necessary and immediate inferences\\nfrom consciousness are consciousness itself, upon the\\nuniversally admitted principle that such inierences are\\nof equal validity with that from which they are derived.\\nThe solution of this difficulty, which arises from some\\nconfusion of thought, is to be found in the consideration\\nthat consciousness itself, and necessary and immediate\\ninferences from it, are of equal validity with each other,\\nbut they are not precisely the same. A representative\\nimage may be a good and necessary consequence from a\\npercept of consciousness, but the representing image is\\nno more that percept than imagination is consciousness,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0366.jp2"}, "365": {"fulltext": "Argument for the Being of God. 355\\nA concept may be logically inferable from percepts, but\\na concept is not a percept, any more than conception is\\nconsciousness. Beliefs may be necessarily and imme-\\ndiately inferred from the percepts of consciousness, but\\nbeliefs can no more be said to be percepts or acts of con-\\nsciousness than belief to be consciousness. The distinc-\\ntion admits of general application. A geometrical\\ntheorem consists of necessary inferences from axioms,\\nbut it were a solecism to call the inferences the axioms.\\nA law necessarily infers certain obligations, but who\\nwould assert that the obligations are the law? While\\nnecessary inferences from geometrical axioms are of\\nequal validity with the axioms, and while obligations\\nwhich are necessarily inferred from a law are of equal\\nvalidity with the law, theorems are not the same with\\naxioms, nor obligations the same with law. So is it\\nwith consciousness. Immediate and necessary infer-\\nences from its data are of equal validity with itself, but\\nthey are not the same as consciousness itself. In fine,\\nconsciousness only perceives; it never infers. The\\ninferences from its percepts must be derived by other\\nfaculties.\\nThis discussion of the proof furnished by our cogni-\\ntive nature for the being of God will be closed with a\\npassage from Cousin, which affords a striking testimony\\nto the view which has been advocated\\nThese two proofs/ he observes, are excellent, I repeat; and\\ninstead of choosing between them, it is necessary, like the human\\nmind, to accept and employ them both. In fact, they so little\\nexclude each other that each of them contains somewhat of the\\nother. The argument a priori, for example, supposes an element\\na posteriori, a datum of observation and experience; for if the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0367.jp2"}, "366": {"fulltext": "356 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nidea of the infinite and of the perfect leads directly to God, and if\\nthis idea is given by reason, and not by experience, it is not given\\nto us independently of all exeperience, since reason would never\\ngive it to us without the simultaneous or anterior idea of the\\nfinite and of the imperfect, which is derived from experience only\\nhere the experimental datum is borrowed from consciousness, and\\nnot from the senses; and again we may say that every phenome-\\nnon of consciousness supposes a sensitive phenomenon, simultan-\\neous or anterior. An element a posteriori intervenes, then, as a\\ncondition of the demonstration a priori. So if we reflect upon it,\\nthe proof by experience or a posteriori implies an element purely\\nrational or a priori. In fact, on what condition do you conclude\\nfrom nature to God? On the condition that you admit or at least\\nthat you employ the principle of causality; for if you are deprived\\nof this principle, you will contemplate, you will forever study the\\nworld, you will forever adore the order and the wisdom which\\nreign in it, without ever elevating yourself to the supposition\\nthat all this is but an effect, that all this must have a cause. Take\\naway the principle of causality, and there are no more causes for\\nus, there is no longer either need or possibility of seeking or of\\nfinding any, and induction no longer goes from the world to God.\\nNow, the principle of causality has clearly an experimental con-\\ndition; but it is not itself borrowed from experience; it supposes\\nit and is applied to it, but it governs and judges it; it belongs\\nproperly to the reason. Behold, then, in its turn, an element\\na priori in the proof a posteriori. Finally, so many differ-\\nent effects, of which experience does not always show the connec-\\ntion, might well conduct not to a single cause and to God, but to\\ndifferent causes and to a plurality of gods; and history justifies\\nthis belief. You then clearly see that the proof a posteriori, which\\nat first needs the principle of causality, needs other principles still\\nwhich direct the application of causality to experience, principles\\nwhich in order to govern experience should not come from it, and\\nshould come from reason. The argument a posteriori therefore\\nsupposes more than one element a priori. 1\\n1 Course of Hist. Mod. Phil., pp. 422, 423 Wright s Trans.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0368.jp2"}, "367": {"fulltext": "MR. SPENCER S AGNOSTIC PHIL-\\nOSOPHY.\\nIN a preceding discussion, Mr. Herbert Spencer s\\ntheory of the relativity of knowledge was some-\\nwhat carefully considered. It will, therefore, not now\\nbe subjected to particular examination. That theory\\nmay fairly be regarded as furnishing the fundamental\\nelement of agnosticism. It is the justification of a\\nsystem professing to deal with the unknowable. Ag-\\nnosticism avowedly differs from positivism, so far at\\nleast as the former is maintained by Mr. Spencer and\\nhis school. The latter claims not to be a philosophy, but\\na scientific arrangement of phenomenal knowledge. All\\nthat is phenomenal may be known, and known with\\ncertainty. All that transcends phenomena is unknown,\\nand therefore cannot be scientifically handled; but\\naccording to Mr. Spencer s statements, in his Recent\\nDiscussions, in which he repels the allegation that he is\\na positivist of the school of Compte, agnosticism, while\\nit includes what is deemed true in positivism, goes be-\\nyond it. It does not regard itself as restricted to the\\nconstruction and classification of phenomenal facts, but\\nas entitled to deduce inferences from them and to deal\\nwith those inferences philosophically. It is an ontology\\nas well as a phenomenology. Admitting, with the posi-\\ntivist, the unknowableness of what overpasses the limits", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0369.jp2"}, "368": {"fulltext": "358 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nof the phenomenal, it further claims to consider these\\nunknowable elements as the object-matter of a legitimate\\nphilosophy. As, then, its specific difference contradis-\\ntinguishing it to positivism is its philosophical treatment\\nof the unknowable, it may justly be defined as the\\nphilosophy of the unknowable. Wonderful philosophy\\nIt passeth knowledge. Every intellectual effort\\nexerted about any subject supposes knowledge some\\nknowledge at least. Philosophy, consequently, supposes\\nknowledge; but knowledge necessarily implies things\\nknown. The differentiating property of this philosophy\\nis the knowledge of things that are not, and cannot be,\\nknown. It is not only the knowledge, but the formally\\nsystematized knowledge, of the unknowable the cogni-\\ntion, the philosophical cognition of the incognoscible.\\nWere this all, the egregious absurdity of its funda-\\nmental position, of its very essence as a pretended phil-\\nosophy, would put it beyond the pale of discussion but\\nthis formidable difficulty Mr. Spencer attempts to relieve\\nby the statement that the fundamental reality, the ulti-\\nmate force, the infinite and eternal energy, which is\\nunknowable, .is apprehended by an indefinite conscious-\\nness. We are, although absolutely ignorant of it,\\nindefinitely conscious of it but consciousness, to the\\nextent to which it exists, whether great or small, is\\nknowledge. Who ever heard of an unknowing conscious-\\nness? It would be equivalent to an unconscious con-\\nsciousness, an unknowing knowledge. The proposition,\\ntherefore, that we are indefinitely conscious of anything\\nis tantamount to the proposition that we indefinitely\\nknow it. Mr. Spencer, consequently, utters the contra-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0370.jp2"}, "369": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 359\\ndiction We have no knowledge of the ultimate force\\nwe have some knowledge of it. That this is no peculiar\\nconstruction of his position by an individual mind is\\napparent from the fact that it has been given by other\\nminds. It is so patent that any one who stops to reflect\\nupon his language must perceive it. Dr. McCosh, for\\ninstance, observes: Though the discoverer of the un-\\nknown says it is unknowable, yet it turns out that he\\nknows a great deal about it, and gives us information\\nabout it. He tells us that it exists and is a reality and\\nsurely this is some knowledge. He knows it to be with-\\nout limit, and speaks of it as a force or power.\\nHe knows that it is a cause producing an effect, and that\\nit is the cause of all that is known. Surely the known\\ncause of a known thing is so far known. x The agnostic\\nphilosophy, in short, is founded upon a contradiction in\\nterms We cannot know the infinite, but Ave do know it\\nwe are entirely ignorant of it, but we are partially\\nacquainted with it; we indefinitely know the unknow-\\nable.\\nThis is the first indictment which may be submitted\\nagainst the agnostic philosophy. It is radically self-\\ncontradictory. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, this\\nself-contradictoriness gives it its polemic life, its fight-\\ning chance. It may be compared to the occupant of a\\ncastle with two apartments communicating with each\\nother by a secret passage. Assail him in one, and he\\nretreats to the other. Followed and forced to retire\\nfrom the second, he flies back to the first. Prove that\\nthe agnostic is wrong when he asserts the unknowable-\\n1 Realistic Philosophy, Vol. II., p. 269.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0371.jp2"}, "370": {"fulltext": "360 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nness of the infinite, and he covers himself with the\\naffirmation that it is partially knowable. Prove that his\\ncharacterization of the infinite is inadequate, and he\\ndefends himself by affirming its unknowableness. First\\nhe does not know, then he knows in part, and finally\\nvindicates his knowledge of a mutilated infinite by\\npleading that he does not know it. The theory is two-\\nheaded. Cut off one head, and while you address your-\\nself to the excision of the other, the first grows again.\\nTurn upon it, and the second resumes its place. The\\nbeliever in a supernatural revelation would speedily end\\nthe contest by employing it to cauterize the wounds, as\\nIolaus was fabled to have seared with fire the bleeding\\nnecks of the Lerna3an Hydra, with which Hercules was\\ncontending. But as the argument is philosophical, an-\\nother resort must be had, and there is really no need to\\ninvoke supernatural interposition. The knot does not\\nrequire it. All that is necessary is to strike the two\\nheads against each other until they are simultaneously\\ndestroyed by the battery. Demand of the agnostic if he\\nasserts the unknowableness of the infinite. His answer\\nis, Yes. Demand of him if he asserts the indefinite\\nknowledge of the infinite. Again his reply is, Yes.\\nThen, sir, one must retort Your unknowableness can-\\ncels your knowableness, and your knowableness your\\nunknowableness. You commit philosophical suicide\\nyou are felo-de-se.\\n2. If this be so, it may be asked, Why not stop just\\nhere Why pursue the matter any further Why not\\nleave the system to its fate, the inevitable fate of every\\nsystem which is founded upon contradictory assump-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0372.jp2"}, "371": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 361\\ntions, which contains in itself the elements of its own\\ndestruction It may, in the first place, be answered\\nWhile those who have submitted it to a careful exami-\\nnation may perceive the fact that the edifice is based\\nupon incongruous and explosive materials, it may be\\ndifferent with others, especially young and aspiring\\nstudents. !N ot having scrutinized its foundation, but\\nallured by its fair and imposing appearance as a whole,\\nor by the attractiveness of the several parts which con-\\nstitute it, they enter it unconscious of the danger of ruin\\nto which it and its occupants are exposed. If, by an\\nexamination which removes its external garniture and\\nreveals the unsafe character of the superstructure itself,\\nits insecure joints and the unsoundness of the materials\\nwhich compose it, any ingenuous youth should be de-\\nterred from accepting its dangerous shelter, the result\\nwould justify the task. Nor will this sort of labor be\\nentirely worthless, if any who believe in God and rever-\\nence his name should by it be dissuaded from hanging\\nabout the porches of this doubtful structure, and tamper-\\ning with its peril, like the celebrated Eoman naturalist\\nand pantheist who is said to have lost his life by ap-\\nproaching, for scientific purposes, too near a discharging\\nvolcano. To speak without figure, it may be serviceable\\nto call the attention of those who have not observed the\\nself-contradiction lodged in the general principle of the\\ntheory as to knowledge to the untenableness of its par-\\nticular elements.\\nIn the second place, it may not be uninteresting or\\nuseless to show that its fundamental fallacy affects its\\nspecial developments. Perhaps it will be found that the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0373.jp2"}, "372": {"fulltext": "362 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ngenius of self-contradiction which pervades its funda-\\nmental assumptions infuses itself into all its particular\\nfeatures. Corrupt at the root, it is natural to expect that\\nit will be corrupt throughout. To evince this would\\nnot be uninteresting, since another and a signal illustra-\\ntion will be afforded of the law that false logical prin-\\nciples must conduct to false logical consequences; and\\nit would not be useless, for this philosophical specula-\\ntion tends to influence all the moral and religious\\ninterests of mankind, to exert a revolutionary effect\\nupon the consentient faiths of the human race. It is\\nnot only the religionist, but the philanthropist, who is\\nimpelled to subject to a critical investigation all the\\nprominent doctrines of a system so radical in its ten-\\ndencies, so far-reaching in its results.\\nIn the third place, it is not necessary, nor, perhaps,\\nsufficient to restrict the discussion to the proof of the\\nself-contradiction inherent in the agnostic theory, but\\none is warranted in examining both of the contradictory\\nparts of the theory, because each, separately from the\\nother, is essentially atheistic. The self-contradiction\\ninvalidates the. theory as a whole, because it is convicted\\nby it of a want of that coherence, which is vital to the\\nintegrity of the system but while this must be insisted\\nupon as damaging to the system, as such, it is legitimate\\nto take up each member of the pair of contradictories,\\nand exhibit its falsity if for no other reason, for this\\nwere these contradictories the only two which are pos-\\nsible, we would, upon the principle of excluded middle,\\nbe compelled to accept one of them as true; but if a\\nthird supposition is possible, it might happen that it", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0374.jp2"}, "373": {"fulltext": "Spencek s Agnostic Philosophy. 363\\nwould prove to be the true alternative. The argument,\\nin that case, would be obliged to show the untruth of\\nboth of the original pair of contradictories, before the\\ntruth of the third supposition could be established.\\nISTow, in the instance of this particular argument with\\nthe agnostic, both of the contradictories he asserts are\\natheistic; but the third supposition of theism exists.\\nTo establish this third alternative, both of the agnostic\\nsuppositions must be disproved namely, the supposi-\\ntion of the absolute unknowableness of the infinite, and\\nthat partial knowableness of the infinite, which he\\naffirms for if either of them be true, atheism is estab-\\nlished, and, consequently, theism overthrown. The fact\\nthat these contradictory affirmations are contained in\\nMr. Spencer s theory has already been evinced.\\nThe first of these inconsistent positions, to-wit, that\\nthe infinite is unknowable, is atheistic for if the infinite\\nbe unknowable, God is unknowable, since any other than\\nan infinite God that is, a finite God is a contradic-\\ntion in terms. A finite God would be no God at all;\\nbut if God be unknowable, he is, to us, non-existent. He\\nwould be out of all relation to our faculties. The agnos-\\ntic may condescend ex gratia to say that he does not\\npositively deny the possibility of a God he may exist,\\nbut he does not, and cannot, know the fact. As he does\\nnot mean, through excess of modesty, to confess excep-\\ntional ignorance, he must be construed as affirming that\\nGod is unknowable by the whole race. Those who\\nimagine that they know him are deluded fanatics.\\nThere is no such knowledge as they dream of possessing.\\nIf Mr. Spencer cannot know him, who else can? If,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0375.jp2"}, "374": {"fulltext": "364 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthen, we cannot know that God exists, he is to us zero.\\nThis is atheism. To say, No knowledge of God, is to\\nsay, No God. It has been the purport of the foregoing\\ndiscussions to disprove the hypothesis of the unknow-\\nableness of God. What follows will be mainly concerned\\nwith Mr. Spencer s knoivable unknowable.\\nThe second of the contradictory positions of the agnos-\\ntic namely, that the infinite is indefinitely known is\\nalso atheistic. It is insisted upon, that this statement of\\nthe position is correct. An indefinite consciousness of\\nthe infinite is some knowledge of it, or it is nothing the\\nterms have no meaning. Mr. Spencer affirms a trans-\\ncendental reality. This, of course, is something. If it\\nwere not, if it were nothing, nothing could be predicated\\nof it except that it is nothing. Here, then, we have an\\nexisting something. To this transcendental reality he\\nproceeds to assign attributes which characterize it. He\\nascribes to it power for he denominates it a force, an\\nenergy; and until somewhat is written more clearly\\nthan has as yet been, concerning the difference between\\nforce and energy, one feels himself entitled to use these\\nterms interchangeably. Force is power in energy. To\\ntalk of force abstractly from power which it expresses is\\nto speak unintelligently. This reality is, therefore,\\npowerful. He also attributes to it infinity. He ex-\\npressly designates it as an infinite energy. Here, then,\\nis a characteristic attribute which differentiates this\\nreality from all that is finite. He declares it to be\\neternal. He assigns to it the attribute of eternity that\\nis, it never began, and will never end. Further, he\\nadmits its omnipresence. We have, then, an infinite,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0376.jp2"}, "375": {"fulltext": "Spehceb s Agnostic Philosophy. 365\\neternal, omnipotent and omnipresent reality. Beyond\\nthis Mr. Spencer does not go. He knows enough about\\nthis transcendental, fundamental reality to ascribe to it\\nthese attributes, but he does not know enough about it to\\nsay that it is spiritual, or personal, or intelligent, or\\nmoral. The inquiry naturally springs up, Why did he\\nstop where he did If certain phenomena justified the\\ninferences to infinity, eternity, omnipotence and omni-\\npresence, why should not others, equally obvious as data\\nof consciousness, have legitimated the inferences to per-\\nsonality, intelligence and morality\\nIt is difficult to perceive a valid reason for this arrest\\nput upon the development of necessary inferences which\\nMr. Spencer, as far as he went, was right in making,\\nunless it be that he full well knew that to develop the\\ninferences deducible from all the phenomena would con-\\nduct to God. It is fairly to be concluded that he meant\\nto exclude the doctrine of God s existence but whatever\\nmay have been the reason of this extraordinary and un-\\nphilosophical procedure, it is perfectly clear that a\\nreality, which is affirmed to be simply an infinite and\\neternal energy, is not God and it is equally clear that\\nthe limits imposed upon the enumeration of attributes\\nwere designed to exclude the doctrine of God s existence.\\nThis branch of the theory, therefore, with its inade-\\nquate characterization of the infinite reality, is\\natheistic.\\nTo this it may be objected that a theological element\\nis unwarrantably introduced into a purely philosophical\\ndiscussion. This demurrer, however, cannot be admit-\\nted. There is a sphere of inquiry in which philosophy", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0377.jp2"}, "376": {"fulltext": "366 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nand theology meet and blend. It is that of ontology.\\nFrom its very nature philosophy cannot properly be\\nrestricted in its inquiries to the field of natural science,\\nor of mental science, or of moral science, or of logical\\nscience. It passes beyond the consideration of phe-\\nnomena and phenomenal laws, and pushes its inquiries\\ninto origins and ends. It demands causes for all that\\nappears to be, nor is it satisfied until it arrives at some\\nultimate cause in which all minor causes find their\\ncentre and bond of unity something which is the ex-\\nplanation of everything else, the key of the universe.\\nThis is Mr. Spencer s procedure as he is a philosopher\\nand so far he is unquestionably right. In this respect,\\nhe is, as to his intentions at least, incomparably superior\\nto the mere positivist. He finds his fundamental reality\\nin a force which is the first cause, the ultimate of ulti-\\nmates. Of this force he gives the characteristics it is\\ninfinite and eternal. This is his ontology.\\n~No more can theology be confined to the phenomena\\nand phenomenal laws of the religious nature, to religious\\nstates, acts and duties. It also makes a demand for\\norigins and ends. Why not Is it not as well as phil-\\nosophy entitled to institute these inquiries Now, the\\nBible has its first cause, its ultimate of ultimates. This,\\nwith Mr. Spencer, it describes as an infinite and eternal\\nenergy, but it goes beyond him and affirms that it is also\\na spiritual, intelligent, personal, creative being. This\\nis its ontology. Let it be supposed, for the moment, that\\nit made no pretension to be a supernatural revelation,\\nbut to be simply the recorded results of human specu-\\nlation, as the agnostic assumes it to be. On that suppo-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0378.jp2"}, "377": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 367\\nsition, it would, so far as its cosmogony is concerned, be\\nmerely a philosophy. It would be an ontological specu-\\nlation. Where, then, would be the difference, with\\nreference to ontology, between philosophy and theology\\nJSTone whatever, from the point of view of the nature of\\ntheir procedures. The difference would only consist in\\nthe doctrines they might enounce in regard to the ulti-\\nmate being and its relation to the universe. Concerning\\ntheir views of the conceded fundamental reality, the\\nbiblical ontologist and the agnostic ontologist join issue.\\nThe one affirms God, the other excludes him. The con-\\ntest, upon the hypothesis made, is legitimate and fair.\\nThe contestants occupy the same field, raise the same\\nquestions and address themselves to their solution with\\nthe same rational organs of investigation. Where, then,\\nis the unwarrantableness, where the possibility, of intro-\\nducing a distinctively theological element into the\\ndiscussion a Dens ex maclmia According to the con-\\ntention of the agnostic himself, it would be reason\\ndebating with reason upon the field of reason and the\\nbiblical ontologist confidently undertakes to prove, upon\\nrational grounds, that the atheistic position of the\\nagnostic is irrational. The objection to his doing this\\nbecause he is called a theologian is simply ad captandum.\\nUnfrock him, and you but strip him for the fight in the\\nlists of philosophy. The ontology of the Bible is cer-\\ntainly somebody s ontology, as much so as the agnostic s\\nis his. The fact of its existence cannot be denied.\\nThere it is in black and white, a phenomenal reality. It\\nmust be met. It bestrides the path of the agnostic and\\ndisputes his passage. To treat it with affected contempt", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0379.jp2"}, "378": {"fulltext": "368 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmay be convenient, but would argue an arrogant conceit\\nill-befitting a philosopher; to go round it would infer\\na timidity as little becoming a hero; and to ignore it\\nwould stamp one no scientific registrar of facts.\\nThere are two general aspects in which the Bible may\\nbe contemplated, which are obvious upon the slightest\\ninspection of its contents. The one is that in which it\\nclaims to state natural truths, the other that in which it\\nprofesses to enounce redemptive truths. Let us limit\\nour attention to the first of these aspects. Either the\\nBible as claiming to state natural truths is not a super-\\nnatural revelation, or it is. If it be contended that it is\\nnot, that contention could not affect the fact that it does\\nclaim to state natural truths. It would remain true that\\nit furnishes an ontology. To say, then, that the appeal\\nto it, in that respect, is illegitimate, because a profess-\\nedly hyper-physical element is introduced, would be to\\nspeak without meaning. Ex hypothesis an authority is\\ninvoked which would be purely natural but before the\\nagnostic is entitled to take the ground that the Bible, so\\nfar as it claims to state natural truths, is not a super-\\nnatural revelation, he must overthrow all the evidences\\nto the contrary. To assume the fact would be unscien-\\ntific and unphilosophical. It is sublimely preposterous\\nfor the agnostic to make that assumption. The ontology\\nof the Bible chronologically preceded his. It professes,\\nas his does not, to be supported by a tremendous mass\\nof miraculous, and, therefore, supernatural evidence. It\\nhas commanded the suffrages of by far the most enlight-\\nened part of the human race, and, despite all opposition,\\nit is daily increasing the number of its adherents, and", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0380.jp2"}, "379": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 369\\nannounces its purpose to overcome every enemy and\\ncapture the world. It cannot, therefore, be dismissed\\nwith a sneer. It is no bare negation. It is a positive\\nresisting force which menaces the agnostic. In reply to\\nhis declaration I do not know whether there be a God\\na declaration of ignorance it proclaims its positive\\nknowledge of God, and proclaims it from the house-tops\\nwith a tone of triumphant confidence which resounds in\\nevery tongue of earth, and is tremulous with no presage\\nof defeat. It challenges the agnostic to try conclusions\\non the field of battle, and when he dismisses its heralds\\nwith their beards shaven and their nakedness exposed, it\\navenges the indignity by storming his strongholds. Fas\\nest ah hoste doceri; and if Mr. Spencer would deign to\\nhearken to the counsel of a foe, he would prefix to his\\nponderous and growing system a refutation of the evi-\\ndences which sustain the claim of the Bible to be a\\nsupernatural revelation, or at least not die until he had\\nappended to it such a refutation. Let him, in this\\nregard, imitate the example of the English deists. May-\\nhap his success will be greater than theirs. As it is,\\nwhile he fondly imagines that, with his Medusa s head\\nthe knowable unknowable advanced to the front, he is\\npushing on to ultimate victory, he leaves behind him an\\nundefeated army, is exposed to continual attacks from\\nan enemy that hangs on his flanks, and is destined to\\nencounter an innumerable and still unconquered host\\nbefore him with its entrenchments stretched across his\\nroad. Mr. Spencer can only complete his system by this\\nnegative work of demolition. Otherwise, its positive\\nbulk, its enormous size, will only enhance the danger of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0381.jp2"}, "380": {"fulltext": "370 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\na catastrophe. The more he elevates the pile, the more\\nwill it topple to a fall.\\nIn rehuttal of this demand made upon him, the ag-\\nnostic will, no doubt, say that the requirement is as\\nabsurd as it is arbitrary that the intrinsic merits of a\\ntheory are those by which it must be judged, and that,\\nif a theory is in itself better than another, it deserves,\\non that account, to be preferred, and, from the nature\\nof the case, displaces the other. The fittest must survive.\\nIn the abstract, it is conceivable that this rule of judg-\\nment would hold. Were the circumstances attending\\ntwo rival theories the same or analogous, their intrinsic\\nmerits would constitute the basis of comparison between\\nthem. Here, however, we have a concrete case in which\\nthe circumstances environing two competing doctrines\\nare vastly different. One of them claims that in addi-\\ntion to the intrinsic probability of its truth arising from\\nits internal qualities, there is the extrinsic proof,\\namounting to certainty, which is furnished by historical\\nevidence. The biblical ontology makes this claim, and,\\nfurther, it professes that this historical evidence evinces\\nthe fact of supernatural intervention. This claim to\\nextrinsic proof of the highest character the advocate of\\nthe agnostic theory must rebut. He will reply that his\\ntheory is supported by the uniformity of nature; but\\nwere this allegation admitted and it is not, for it begs\\nthe question still one clear instance of proved miracu-\\nlous and supernatural interposition, invading the known\\ncourse of nature, would wreck his method of proof One\\nexception to the uniform course of nature would destroy\\nthe supposition of its absolute uniformity, as one crook", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0382.jp2"}, "381": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 371\\nin a line which has been straight for ever so great a\\ndistance would upset the hypothesis of its straightness.\\nThe only resort of the agnostic is, with Strauss and the\\npantheists, to deny the possibility of the miracle. A\\nsingle instance of miraculous fact, however, would nega-\\ntive his hypothesis of the antecedent impossibility of\\nmiracles. Let the agnostic lay aside his colored glasses\\nfor a while, and dispassionately consider the prophetic\\ndeclaration in the thirtieth chapter of Ezekiel: There\\nshall be no more a prince of the land of Egypt, and he\\nmay be convinced that there is such an instance. There\\nare many more like it, but ah uno disce omnes. It is not\\nintended to enter into the merits of the argument. It is\\nonly designed to signalize the logical necessity resting\\nupon the agnostic, not only to prove his own ontology,\\nbut also to disprove the claim which the ontology of the\\nBible makes to be supported by historical evidence of\\nits supernatural origin. Failing that, his system, how-\\never imposing, may be likened to a parable in the\\nmouth of fools, and a certain domestic bird, both of\\nwhich are noted for standing on one leg; or, to speak\\nmore technically, it will afford an illustration, on a\\ngigantic scale, of a violation of the destructive disjunc-\\ntive conditional syllogism.\\nIf, on the other hand, the Bible as claiming to state\\nnatural truths is a supernatural revelation, there is an\\nend of the question: agnosticism is nullified.\\n3. The questions arise, What right has one, who has\\nnot devoted himself to scientific pursuits (in the common\\nEnglish acceptation of scientific) to discuss a system\\nwhich bases itself upon the conclusions of science Is", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0383.jp2"}, "382": {"fulltext": "372 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nhe not unfitted, to the office which he undertakes These\\nquestions are pertinent, and require serious answers.\\nThe treatment of facts may be regarded in several\\naspects. First, one may content himself with the obser-\\nvation of facts, including their physical and natural\\nrelations, and the careful registration of the results of\\nthat personal scrutiny. In his case the consciousness,\\nwhich is common to men, becomes intensified in its\\nrelation to facts. The spontaneous consciousness, by\\nan effort of will, is arrested in its natural course, and\\ndetained in connection with phenomena. In a word,\\nattention is fixed upon phenomenal facts. Investigation\\nensues. The recorded results of this investigation are\\nproperly denominated scientific. Secondly, one may go\\non, and, in addition to this careful study of facts, and\\nthe record of its results, he may proceed to consider the\\nlogical relations of the facts to each other that is, those\\nrelations which are conceived as grounding their syn-\\nthetic arrangement into a system and by analysis,\\nabstraction and generalization, may attempt their classi-\\nfication. In this case, he applies, it is true, the organ\\nof logic to the data of observation and experiment but\\nthe systematized arrangement of the facts which is\\naccomplished- is also properly regarded as falling under\\nthe designation of science. Indeed, this may be consid-\\nered as science in the truest sense of the term. Classifi-\\ncation is the legitimate end for which research was\\ninstituted.\\nNow, if one, without an original observation of facts,\\nshould criticise the reported results of those who were\\noriginal observers, it is evident that he would act not", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0384.jp2"}, "383": {"fulltext": "Spestcek s Agnostic Philosophy. 373\\nonly illegitimately, but foolishly. He would pit igno-\\nrance against knowledge but when the results of origi-\\nnal investigation have been put upon record, and one\\nshould patiently, candidly and thoroughly examine that\\nrecord, it is difficult to see why he is not entitled to pass\\njudgment upon the competency of such classifications\\nas may have been made. He is in possession of the\\nmaterials upon which a judgment may be formed, ma-\\nterials derived from the original observers themselves,\\nand he is as much justified in using his logic as were\\nthose observers theirs. Upon this principle Mr. Spencer\\nhimself, if I be not mistaken, professes in great measure\\nto proceed. Having been only to a limited extent an\\nactual experimenter, he derives his information of phe-\\nnomenal facts and their physical relations from those\\nwhom he regards as able and trustworthy observers.\\nUsing their reports concerning the facts, he makes, in a\\nbroad sense at least, his own classifications and con-\\nstructs his own system. He would seem to have been,\\nby consent, if not by express agreement, nominated to\\nthat office by the school to which he belongs. While,\\nhowever, these things are so, it is not the purport of this\\nbrief paper to challenge Mr. Spencer s classifications.\\nWith his statements of facts, and with his scientific\\narrangement of facts, it is not principally concerned,\\nexcept in regard to his doctrine of the relativity of know-\\nledge, and the allegations of fact which it involves and\\nthat theory has, in the main, been already criticised;\\nbut\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nThirdly, one may transcend the strictly scientific\\nfunctions which have been indicated; he may pass bo-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0385.jp2"}, "384": {"fulltext": "374 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\njond the boundaries which circumscribe what is com-\\nmonly designated science, as the complement of empirical\\nknowledge, and undertake to philosophize. He then\\nenters upon the domain of philosophical knowledge as\\ncontradistinguished to empirical. This he may do both\\nas regards natural and mental science, viewed as the\\nobservers and classifiers of physical and intellectual phe-\\nnomena. As soon as this function is assumed, the\\nprocedure is one by which inferences are derived from\\nphenomenal facts as empirically known. In a word, one\\nbegins to construct an ontology. This Mr. Spencer does.\\nHe is both a scientific man and a philosopher. It is not\\nby any means designed to convey the impression that in\\nthis he acts illegitimately. On the contrary, the consti-\\ntution of man is such that it is hard to see how such a\\ncourse can be avoided. One may, as has already been\\nremarked, refrain from giving expression to philo-\\nsophical inferences from scientific facts, and purposely\\nconfine himself to the function of recording the results\\nof observation and logical classification; but, as a\\nthinker, how can he restrain the spontaneous tendency\\nof the mind to seek for causes, and to pursue the quest\\nfor some ultimate principle of unity? and, if, by his\\nvery make, he is impelled to do this, his right must be\\nconceded to give utterance to the judgments he has been\\nled to form. The mind is one, and its unity, if it does\\nnot enforce the necessity of developing all of its funda-\\nmental laws, at least, furnishes a warrant to proceed in\\nthe actual development of them all. The same man\\nwho is scientific is also metaphysical, although by dis-\\nposition or education, or both combined, he may be pre-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0386.jp2"}, "385": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 375\\ndominantly one or the other. It is true that the scien-\\ntific man is apt to be a poor metaphysician, and the\\nmetaphysician likely to be a poor scientific man, for a\\nuniversal genius possessed of all learning is a rarity, if\\nnot an impossibility. Bacon was no exception to this\\nrule; but one s right to be both a scientific man and a\\nmetaphysician cannot be disputed. He is free to try his\\npowers in both directions, and, if he please, to take the\\nenormous risks of the trial. Possibly he may prove to\\nbe the universal genius, and master of all knowledge.\\nThe fact that so glorious a diadem has never yet been\\nworn does not necessarily infer that it never will be.\\nThe quarrel, then, is not with Mr. Spencer s claim to\\nbe both scientific and philosophical; it is with the\\ndoctrines of his philosophy. One has the same right to\\ndiscuss his inferences from phenomenal facts as he has\\nto make them, to derive his knowledge of facts from\\nothers as well as Mr. Spencer has yea, to get his infor-\\nmation from Mr. Spencer himself; and is no more\\nbound, in order to be qualified for the discussion, to be\\nan experimenter and expert in science than Mr. Spencer\\nwas. The meeting is on the field of ontology, and upon\\nequal terms. The territory contended for is not that\\nwhich is covered by Mr. Spencer s mass of scientific\\nstatements it is the narrow one of inferences. The\\nissue is definite. Upon inferential grounds he excludes\\nthe affirmation of God s existence; upon inferential\\ngrounds his atheistic position will be disputed. No pro-\\nfession is made of neutrality of mind in relation to the\\nquestion involved. When one has examined the evidence\\nin a case and has reached settled conclusions, the time", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0387.jp2"}, "386": {"fulltext": "376 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nfor inquiry is past. The attempt to destroy his inner-\\nmost convictions brings on a death-grapple with the\\nassailant. The design of the discussion, therefore, is to\\nimpeach the agnostic system at the bar of reason, and to\\nconvict it of self-contradiction and folly. The challenge\\ncomes from the agnostic side and, although the weapon\\nof defence may be but a pebble, it will be slung at the\\nforehead of the Goliath who hesitates not to defy the\\nliving, personal, creative God, to treat with undisguised\\ncontempt the proofs of his existence, and to enthrone in\\nhis room a blind force compelled by a blind necessity\\nto gender all things by a blind evolution.\\n4. Mr. Spencer denominates his system a System of\\nPhilosophy, and it is so characterized by his adherents\\nand critics. The questions then occur, To what place\\nin the ranks of philosophies shall it be assigned or, Is\\nit a wholly new and peculiar philosophy If Sir Wil-\\nliam Hamilton s division be accepted, and there is per-\\nhaps no better, philosophers are distributable first into\\nthe two general classes of nihilists, who deny substance,\\nand substantialists, who admit it. Under the class\\nnihilists there are no species. The substantialists again\\nare divisible into two classes, monists and dualists, or\\nthose who allow of but one substance, and those who\\naffirm two. The monists are of three sorts materialists,\\nwho make the one substance material; idealists, who\\nmake it spiritual, and absolute identitists, who make it\\nneither predominantly material nor spiritual, but\\nequally material and spiritual, both elements being in\\nabsolute equipoise with each other. The class dualists\\nare distributable into two subordinate classes: hypo-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0388.jp2"}, "387": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 377\\nthetical dualists hypothetical realists, cosmothetic\\nidealists, representative peroeptionists) on the one hand,\\nand absolute dualists (absolute or natural realists, im-\\nmediate perceptionists) on the other.\\nMr. Spencer is not a nihilist, for he admits both phe-\\nnomenal and transcendental reality. He is not a dualist\\nof either kind, for he repels the imputation to him of\\ndualism. In replying to a critic of his views he says\\nYet he either knows, or has ample means of knowing, that I\\ndeny every such second cause: indeed, he has himself classed me\\nas an opponent of dualism. x\\nIt is not necessary to adduce any further testimony\\nthan this to prove that he does not consider himself as a\\ndualist. He professes to be neither a materialist nor a\\nspiritualist. He remarks:\\nThe interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter,\\nMotion, and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our\\ncomplex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols; and when\\nthe equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the symbols\\nremain symbols still. Hence the reasonings contained in the fore-\\ngoing pages afford no support to either of the antagonist hypothe-\\nses respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications\\nare no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic, and no\\nmore spiritualistic than they are materialistic. Any argument\\nwhich is apparently furnished to either hypothesis, is neutralized\\nby as good an argument furnished to the other. 2\\nIs Mr. Spencer, then, an advocate of absolute iden-\\ntity The answer will be, No, or Yes, in correspondence\\nwith the meaning attached to the terms of the question.\\nIf the meaning be, is he a monist, in the sense that he\\nholds to but one substance, equally material and spirit-\\n1 Letter appended to his Principles of Biology, Vol. I., p. 491.\\n3 Ibid., pp. 491, 492.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0389.jp2"}, "388": {"fulltext": "378 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nual? Mr. Spencer, if he is not misunderstood, would\\nanswer in the negative. If the meaning be, is he an\\nadvocate of absolute identity, in a sense peculiar to him-\\nself, he would reply in the affirmative. He is a monist,\\nholding to absolute identity, according to his own con-\\nception of those terms. What is his conception? He\\nclaims to be a monist, in the sense, not that he holds to\\none substance, but to one ultimate force. Of this one\\nforce, eternally immanent in all things, matter and\\nmotion are but the forms in which it expresses itself, or,\\nto use Mr. Spencer s language, the modes by which it\\nis conditioned. These conditioning modes, so far as\\nmanifested to us, are symbolized by our thoughts. We\\nthink them in terms of matter and motion. He cannot,\\ntherefore, be reduced, if we allow his own professions, to\\neither of the classes into which Hamilton, and one is\\napt to suppose reason itself, exhaustively distributes\\nphilosophers. Indeed, he claims a new and exceptional\\nposition. He entitles his perhaps most celebrated work,\\nThe First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.\\nHe is the originator of a new philosophy.\\nIt may be thought that Mr. Spencer has been incor-\\nrectly represented as not being a substantialist. That\\nthe characterization is not unjust can, it is believed, be\\nmade apparent by his own authority. He denies, or\\nrather ridicules, the existence of moral substance.\\nSpeaking of three different suppositions respecting the\\norigin of things, which he pronounces literally un-\\nthinkable, he says\\nExperiment proves that the elements of these hypotheses\\ncannot even be put together in consciousness; and we can enter-\\ntain them only as we entertain such pseud-ideas as a square fluid", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0390.jp2"}, "389": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 379\\nand a moral substance only by abstaining from the endeavor to\\nrender them into actual thoughts. x\\nSo much for moral substance. H\u00c2\u00a9 denies and scouts\\nit; but if he rejects moral substance, he is logically\\nbound to reject mental substance, notwithstanding the\\nfact that he expressly admits the latter; for he justly\\nreasons that if there be the quality of intelligence there\\nmust be a recondite substance which it manifests. By\\nparity of reasoning, as he concedes the quality of\\nmorality, he ought to admit an occult substance which\\nis manifested by it. As, however, he repudiates a sub-\\nstance which is moral, he is under the logical necessity\\nof denying a substance which is mental. From his point\\nof view, a mental substance ought to be as ridiculous as\\na square fluid. The truth is that he does not use the\\nterm substance in the sense in which substantialists em-\\nploy it. He means by it force. This does not save him\\nfrom inconsistency, for if there be an unknowable\\nmental force, for the same reason there ought to be an\\nunknowable moral force; but, allowing him his own\\nillogical position, that there is a mental substance which\\nis the unknown substrate of what he calls mind, it is\\nclear that it is not a substance, in the ordinary accepta-\\ntion of the word. It is held by him to be force a mere\\nmode of the primordial force, which, as the ultimate of\\nultimates, is immanent in all things, in things called\\nmaterial and in things called mental. It is one of the\\nforms in which the ultimate force is by evolution de-\\nveloped. It is evident, then, that Mr. Spencer only\\nholds that there is mental substance, so far as he holds\\n1 First Principles, pp. 35, 36.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0391.jp2"}, "390": {"fulltext": "380 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthat force is substance, or substance is force. That this\\nis his doctrine might be shown by a multitude of quota-\\ntions. Let one suffice:\\nAnd this brings us to the true conclusion implied throughout\\nthe foregoing pages the conclusion that it is one and the same\\nUltimate Reality which is manifested to us subjectively and ob-\\njectively. For, while the nature of that which is manifested under\\neither form proves to be inscrutable, the order of its manifesta-\\ntions throughout all mental phenomena proves to be the same as\\nthe order of its manifestations throughout all material phenom-\\nena. The Law of Evolution holds of the inner world as it does of\\nthe outer world. 1\\nThe case is plain. Mind is motion; motion is force\\nmoving. All motion is but the effect and manifestation\\nof the ultimate force. Mind, consequently, is the\\nevolved motion of the ultimate force. To say that mind\\nas motion is but the known manifestation of an unknown\\npostulate is but to say that the unknown postulate is a\\nforce manifested by motion. Phenomenal or unphe-\\nnomenal, mind is force moving or non-moving. Mr.\\nSpencer can call the unperceived mental postulate sub-\\nstance if he please, but he means force and until force\\nand substance are proved to be identical, he cannot be\\nranked as a substantialist.\\nThe same is. true of matter. Mr. Spencer represents it\\nas a mode, a form of expression, a something, of the\\nultimate force which is immanent and operative in the\\nuniverse. It is the primordial force evolved in a certain\\nway. All may be summed up in what he says of matter\\nas relative and absolute:\\nWhence it becomes manifest that our experience of force is\\nthat out of which the idea of Matter is built. Matter, as opposing\\n1 Prin. Psychology, Vol. I., p. 627.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0392.jp2"}, "391": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 381\\nour muscular energies, being immediately present to consciousness\\nin terms of force; and its occupancy of Space being known by an\\nabstract of experiences originally given in terms of force; it\\nfollows that forces, standing in certain correlations, form the\\nwhole content of our idea of Matter.\\nSuch being our cognition of the relative reality, what are we\\nto say of the absolute reality? We can only say that it is some\\nmode of the Unknowable, related to the Matter we know, as cause\\nto effect. x\\nIt is obvious that Mr. Spencer s material substance is\\nmaterial force. He is entitled to his own nomenclature,\\nbut he speaks a different dialect from the family of\\nsubstantialists.\\nWhat, then, is Mr. Spencer He is not a nihilist, nor\\na substantialist, either as dualist or monist, either as ma-\\nterialist, or idealist, or absolute identitist. He is an\\nenergist. His system assumes to be a system of energism.\\nHis philosophy is the philosophy of force. Whether it\\nhas the force of philosophy, is another question. As a\\ntheory of knowledge it is that of the knowable unknow-\\nable as an ontology it is that of blind force, proceeding\\nby the law of evolution. As a physicist, he contends\\nfor an immaterial matter; as a psychologist for an\\nunintelligent intelligence. No doubt, however, his\\nsystem has plenty of force in it. As the jurist of the\\nuniverse, he would have it governed by the law Might\\nmakes right. Force is everything. Force circum-\\ngyrates, evolves, dissipates, equilibrates, and dissolves\\nthe universe; and then circumgyrates, evolves, dissi-\\npates, equilibrates, and dissolves it again; and so on\\nand on, through this law of roundaboutness, it operates\\n1 First Principles, p. 167.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0393.jp2"}, "392": {"fulltext": "382 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nin saecula saeculorum. Yes, Mr. Spencer has excogi-\\ntated a new system. His philosophy is force, his the-\\nology is force, his god is force. The long ascending\\nseries of philosophies and theologies have evolved into\\na climax of intellectual speculation beyond which, as\\nultimate, the human intelligence cannot go and unless\\nthe human species is on the point of being transmuted\\ninto one of grander and loftier powers adequate more\\nfully to grasp the unknowable, the present dispensation\\nof the universe must be at the apex of the evolving\\nprocess, and is henceforward destined, through the dis-\\nsipation and equilibration of force, to sink into dissolu-\\ntion. Whether the succeeding dispensation, which shall,\\nby rotary force, emerge from the nebulous debris of the\\npresent, will evolve a newer and higher philosophy, it\\nmight bo rash to conjecture. It may be that no higher\\nis inwrapped in the possibilities of the immeasurable\\nfuture, and that the philosophic culmination of evolution\\nhas been reached. Certainly no human intellect of this\\npresent time can imagine anything sublimer than the\\nconsciousness of absolute mystery. 1\\n5. All philosophy pursues the quest for ultimate unity.\\nIt cannot rest satisfied short of its attainment. Mr.\\nSpencer is, it is believed, recognized as the most promi-\\nnent philosopher of the school of evolution. It is true\\nthat to Professor James Sully was assigned the distin-\\nguished office of writing that section of the article in the\\nEncyclopedia Britannica on Evolution, which treats of\\nEvolution in Philosophy, and from this circumstance\\nit may be inferred that he ranks high as a philosopher\\n1 First Principles.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0394.jp2"}, "393": {"fulltext": "Spencek s Agnostic Philosophy. 383\\nof evolution; but Professor Sully himself, in that\\narticle, says of Mr. Spencer, The thinker who has done\\nmore than any one else to elaborate a consistent phil-\\nosophy of evolution on a scientific basis is Mr. Herbert\\nSpencer. E ow, Mr. Spencer more than once justly\\ndescribes philosophy as the unifier of science, and\\nexpresses himself very precisely to that effect in these\\nwords: To bring the definition to its simplest and\\nclearest form: Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-\\nunified knowledge; science is partially -unified know-\\nledge; philosophy is completely-unified knowledge.\\nWe are justified, then, in asking of Mr. Spencer, as the\\nphilosophical unifier of science, what the ultimate unity\\nis which he has reached. To get the answer to this\\nquestion we are obliged to contemplate his philosophy\\nin two aspects aspects imposed upon it by himself\\nfirst, as a theory of knowledge, and, secondly, as an\\nontological scheme.\\n(1.) In his First Principles he begins with a disserta-\\ntion, first, on the Unknowable, and, secondly, on the\\nLaws of the Knowable. In the first part of this dis-\\ncussion he makes the attempt to effect a reconciliation\\nof science and religion, upon the unknowable as a postu-\\nlate fundamental and common to both. Now, it must\\nbe evident to every one, except Mr. Spencer, that an\\neffort to reconcile two systems which he regards as\\nconflicting, upon any other ground than upon one which\\ninvolves some element of knowledge some known prin-\\nciple possessed by both, would be as extraordinary an\\nenterprise as was ever undertaken by man but, as he\\n1 First Principles, p. 171.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0395.jp2"}, "394": {"fulltext": "384 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ninsists upon the unknowable as the only possible basis\\nof a mutual understanding, there would present itself to\\nhim a tougher difficulty than the reconciliation of science\\nand religion, as he views them; it would be the diffi-\\nculty of effecting a reconciliation of the unknowable and\\nthe knowable. They must not only be reconciled with\\neach other, but there must be some method by which\\nthey shall be reduced to ultimate unity. It would not\\ndo to say that this is a demand of philosophy, and Mr.\\nSpencer limits the scope of philosophy to the knowable\\nfor call his speculations in regard to the unknowable\\nwhat one may, they are certainly of the nature of infer-\\nences, as could easily be shown by his own express\\nadmissions, and they are, therefore, philosophical\\nwhether Mr. Spencer concedes the fact or not. He\\ncannot legitimately term some of his inferences philo-\\nsophical, and deny the appellation to other inferences\\nwhich he makes. Further, his inferences as to the\\nexistence of the unknowable have, in his judgment, force\\nand reality enough to constitute a platform upon which\\nscience and religion can stand together, and shake hands\\nwith each other. Surely, he would not denominate such\\ninferences theological. What else can they be but philo-\\nsophical? Either the unknowable is given by Mr.\\nSpencer s science or by his philosophy. By his science\\nis out of the question; therefore, by his philosophy:\\nthis is the only possible conclusion. Further still, if\\nMr. Spencer limits his philosophy to the knowable, as\\nhe defines knowable, it goes no farther than the scientific\\nknowledge of the phenomenal, since he says force, even\\nas relative, passes understanding and if relative force", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0396.jp2"}, "395": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 385\\nis included in the knowable, his philosophy would stop\\nshort of absolute force, and would, therefore, fail to\\nreach ultimate unity.\\nBut, leaving out of view the question with reference\\nto the term philosophy, we cannot fail to observe that\\nMr. Spencer assumes to have wrought out a system,\\na new system, which consists of two parts the un-\\nknowable and the knowable. E ow it is fair to demand\\nunity in this system. Otherwise, it is not a system it is\\nan incoherent jumble of materials. There must be some\\npoint at which the unknowable and the knowable shall\\ncome together, and be ultimately unified. That point\\ncan be no other than one which shall make the unknow-\\nable knowable, the knowable unknowable. Mr. Spen-\\ncer s system, therefore, at last heads up in the flat\\ncontradiction of the unknowable-knowable, or the\\nknowable-unknowable. So much for the quest of unity\\nin his theory of knowledge.\\n(2.) It has already been sufficiently pointed out that\\nMr. Spencer professes to be neither exclusively a ma-\\nterialist nor exclusively a spiritualist. He acknowledges\\nboth matter and mind, and speaks of the substance of\\neach the fundamental postulate of the manifestations\\nof each and it has been shown that he represents both\\nas modes of the ultimate force immanent and operative\\nin all things, our conceptions of matter and mind being\\nbut symbols of those modes of force which we call ma-\\nterial and mental substance. Here, it must be confessed,\\nthat he collects matter and mind into unity upon force.\\nBoth, he holds, are modes of force, and these different\\nmodes of force condition one and the same ultimate", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0397.jp2"}, "396": {"fulltext": "386 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nforce. They are not- two different kinds of force, but\\ndifferent faces by which the same force is manifested.\\nThis looks very much like unity. His ontological system\\nand his apparent aversion to the term ontology can\\nmake no real difference his ontological system would\\nseem to be characterized by ultimate unity. This neces-\\nsitates the question, Has Mr. Spencer reduced his\\nscheme to ultimate unity? and that question calls up\\nanother, Will his alleged ultimate principle of unity do\\nwhat he claims for it\\nThese questions must be answered in the negative,\\nupon the incontestable ground that an unknown and\\nunknowable principle of unity can be no principle of\\nunity. Mr. Spencer explicitly settles this matter in two\\nmarvellous ways. Speaking of the difficulties which\\nbeset the man of science, he says:\\nSupposing him in every case able to resolve the appearances,\\nproperties, and movements of things, into manifestations of Force\\nin Space and Time; he still finds that Force, Space, and Time\\npass all understanding. Similarly, though the analysis of mental\\nactions may finally bring him down to sensations, as the original\\nmaterials out of which all thought is woven[!], yet he is little\\nforwarder; for he can give no account of sensations themselves\\nor of that something which is conscious of sensations. Objective\\nand subjective things he thus ascertains to be alike inscrutable in\\ntheir substance and genesis. In all directions his investigations\\neventually bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma. 1\\nHere Mr. Spencer maintains that relative forces are,\\nin themselves, apart from their phenomenal manifesta-\\ntions, inscrutable. They pass all understanding. If\\nthey could be conceived they would, in some degree, be\\nunderstood. If they pass all understanding, they must\\n1 First Prin., pp. 66, 67.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0398.jp2"}, "397": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 387\\nbe inconceivable. This is affirmed of material and\\nmental forces, which are but conditioning modes of the\\nabsolute and ultimate force.\\nOf course, if this is true of relative force, it is\\na fortiori true of absolute force. There is no need to\\ncite passages in order to evince what Mr. Spencer every-\\nwhere asserts that the ultimate force is unknowable.\\nHe pronounces it not a relative, but an absolute mys-\\ntery. 1\\nHow, then, can what Mr. Spencer calls force, although\\nhe professes to know nothing about it, although unknow-\\nable and absolutely mysterious, be a principle of unity\\nto which his philosophic system is ultimately reducible\\nDoes philosophy, which assumes to be an illustrious form\\nof knowledge, which Mr. Spencer himself not incor-\\nrectly designates as the unifier of science, logically\\ngathering up its multitudinous facts into splendid gen-\\neralizations, and referring them to original causes and\\nall-pervading laws does philosophy ultimate in a\\nblank? Is this to unify science to affirm of its last\\nconclusions that they are incapable of being known, to\\nguess at its final principle\\nIt will not do to say that Mr. Spencer restricts the\\noffice of philosophy to relative force for he pronounces\\nrelative force unknowable. The question would be,\\nHow can philosophy subordinately unify the facts of\\nscience upon a relative force, of which the unifying\\norgan knows nothing? And if his philosophy, when\\ndischarging a confessedly legitimate function, cannot\\nreach subordinate unity in unknowable relative prin-\\n1 First Prin., p. 46.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0399.jp2"}, "398": {"fulltext": "388 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nciples, how can Mr. Spencer s system, as a whole, attain\\nto ultimate unity in an unknowable absolute principle\\nISTor will it do to say that, although we do not, and\\ncannot, know force, relative or absolute, our knowledge\\nbeing confined to its phenomenal manifestations, yet\\nwe are indefinitely conscious of it. Either this\\nindefinite consciousness of it is some knowledge or it is\\nnot. If it is, Mr. Spencer is reduced to self-contradic-\\ntion; for he would affirm that we possess some know-\\nledge of what is unknowable. If it is not, the existence\\nof force, relative or absolute, being altogether unknown,\\nwould be a mere supposition and it is clear that such a\\nsupposition would not be sufficient to ground the exist-\\nence of an ultimate principle of unity to which the\\nknown facts of the universe are sought to be reduced.\\nFurther, Mr. Spencer s attempted solution of the\\ndifficulty attending the apprehension of unphenomenal,\\ntranscendental existence, by attributing that apprehen-\\nsion to an indefinite consciousness, which, at the same\\ntime, is not knowledge is utterly inconsistent with\\nanother solution of the same difficulty which he fre-\\nquently suggests, without appearing to perceive the\\nincongruity between them, or making any effort to\\nharmonize them. He maintains that relative force,\\nmaterial and mental, as modes conditioning the absolute\\nforce, and the absolute force itself, are postulates made\\nnecessary by the empirical observation of phenomenal\\nfacts. We cannot know mental substance, we cannot\\nknow material substance, but they are fundamental\\npostulates. Much less can we know the absolute, the\\nultimate reality, but it is the inevitable postulate alike", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0400.jp2"}, "399": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 389\\nof science and religion; here they meet and kiss each\\nother.\\nThe question occurs, By what organ are these postu-\\nlates enforced A postulate is something demanded.\\nThese postulates of Mr. Spencer are manifestly things\\nwhich are necessarily inferred from or supposed by\\ncertain other things which are given. Given certain\\nmental phenomena, we necessarily infer or suppose\\nmental substance. So with material phenomena. We\\ndo not know the mental or material force which is a\\nconditioning mode of the absolute force, nor do we know\\nthe absolute force, but we necessarily infer or suppose\\ntheir existence we postulate them. Now, what does\\nthe inferring or supposing the postulating It surely\\ncannot be consciousness. It is not its business to infer\\nor suppose. It immediately knows. The objects upon\\nwhich it terminates are percepts. It never infers or\\nsupposes anything. If another power makes the infer-\\nence or supposition, consciousness apprehends the\\nmental act; but it does not originate it. It neither\\nmediately nor immediately infers. It is evident that\\nthe postulation of relative and absolute force, lying as\\nthey do beyond consciousness, is done by an act of\\njudgment. Consciousness gives the phenomenal facts\\nwhich necessitate their postulation, but that is all that\\nconsciousness accomplishes. Some other power must\\nform the judgment, occasioned by these empirical facts,\\nthat occult force exists. It is not needful now to show\\nwhat the power is which infers, supposes postulates\\ntranscendental reality. It has already been evinced that\\nas consciousness cannot do it, and as thought cannot", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0401.jp2"}, "400": {"fulltext": "390 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ntranscend consciousness, thought cannot do it and that\\nit is the believing power which forms these judgments\\nas to existences that lie beyond the reach of consciousness\\nand thought. They are faith- judgments and faith-\\njudgments are as valid grounds of knowledge as are\\nthought- j udgments.\\nBut what it is of importance to signalize here is that\\nconsciousness, indefinite or definite, cannot do the postu-\\nlation of relative and absolute force, which Mr. Spencer\\nadmits to be a necessary procedure of intelligence. If\\nthis be so, he utterly fails to show how his transcendental\\nrealities of relative and absolute force becomes appre-\\nhensible how we become aware of their existence. If\\nhe attributes them to indefinite consciousness, and at\\nthe same time asserts that they are necessarily inferred,\\nhe employs affirmations which are inconsistent with each\\nother, and yet makes no attempt to reconcile them. His\\nindefinite consciousness cannot give ultimate unity: it\\nwere absurd to think so and he does not tell us how or\\nwhy we postulate it.\\nThe conclusion is that Mr. Spencer fails to reduce\\nhis system to ultimate unity. The system, as such, is,\\ntherefore, a failure. It does not advance one step be-\\nyond positivism for he not only asserts that we can\\nknow nothing of the absolute or ultimate force, but that\\nwe can know nothing of relative force, of matter and\\nmental substance. What, then, can we know beyond the\\nphenomenal Is not this the position of the positivist\\nMr. Spencer vehemently repudiates the positivist posi-\\ntion in regard to transcendental reality, and then\\nelaborately argues in its favor. He reminds one of the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0402.jp2"}, "401": {"fulltext": "Speis t cek s Agnostic Philosophy. 391\\nmother described by Shakespeare, who abuses her child,\\nbut when another follows her example, hugs it to her\\nbosom, and fondly caresses it.\\n6. Let us examine Mr. Spencer s doctrine concern-\\ning what he calls the fundamental reality, the inscru-\\ntable power, the absolute force, the ultimate force, the\\nfirst or ultimate cause, the ultimate of ultimates.\\n(1.) With reference to the knowledge of its nature,\\nhe contradicts himself.\\nFirst. He affirms that we can know nothing about it\\nthat it is unknowable. He labors to show that this is\\nthe final conclusion both of religion and science, and\\nthat it is upon this agnostic conclusion a reconciliation\\nbetween religion and science becomes possible. They\\nagree in affirming an absolute mystery. They are, in\\nthis relation, joint confessors of absolute ignorance. It\\nis unnecessary to furnish citations from Mr. Spencer s\\nwritings to prove that he holds this position. He asserts\\nor implies it everywhere.\\nSecondly. He affirms the existence of this unknow-\\nable reality. Some passages will be quoted in proof\\nof this\\nTo sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument We have\\nseen how, in the very assertion, that all our knowledge, properly\\nso-called, is Relative, there is involved the assertion that there\\nexists a Non-relative. We have seen that unless a real\\nNon-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes\\nabsolute; and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And on\\ncontemplating the process of thought, we have equally seen how\\nimpossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality\\nlying behind appearances; and how, from this impossibility,\\nresults our indestructible belief in that actuality. x\\n1 First Prin., pp. 96, 97.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0403.jp2"}, "402": {"fulltext": "392 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nThough the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be\\nknown, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive\\nexistence is a necessary datum of consciousness; that so long as\\nconsciousness continues, we cannot for an instant rid it of this\\ndatum; and that thus the belief which this datum constitutes[!]\\nhas a higher warrant than any other whatever. x\\nMagnetism, heat, light, etc., which were awhile since spoken\\nof as so many distinct imponderables, physicists are now beginning\\nto regard as different modes of manifestation of some one universal\\nforce; and in so doing are ceasing to think of this force as com-\\nprehensible. 2\\nIn his First Principles he admits the power mani-\\nfested to ns through all existence, 3 frequently allows\\nthe existence of an ultimate cause/ 4 and near the\\nclose of his discussion on the Reconciliation of Religion\\nand Science, says\\nHe [that is, a member of the school which Mr. Spencer repre-\\nsents], like every other man, may properly consider himself as\\none of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown\\nCause; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain\\nbelief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief. 5\\nThirdly. Mr. Spencer gives us a characterization\\na description of the attributes of the ultimate reality.\\nIt is power, force, energy, cause. It is omnipotent,\\nomnipresent, infinite, eternal. It is characterized by\\nunity. In a comparatively recent paper he designates it\\nas an infinite and eternal energy a limitation which\\nelicited a protest from Mr. Harrison. We have, then,\\nan existence characterized by the attributes of infinity,\\neternity, unity, power and ubiquity. It is useless to go\\ninto a spasm of quotations to prove this allegation it is\\njustified everywhere in Mr. Spencer s works.\\n1 First Prin., p. 98. 2 Ibid., p. 105. 3 Ibid., p. 112.\\n*Ibid. p. 113, and elsewhere. B Ibid., p. 123.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0404.jp2"}, "403": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 393\\nNow, put together these affirmations that a thing is\\nunknowable; that, nevertheless, it exists; and that it\\nis characterized by certain definite attributes and you\\nhave a stupendous contradiction which must sink Mr.\\nSpencer s system. No plea of indefinite consciousness,\\nor of necessary postulation, or of a belief constituted of\\na datum of consciousness can avert the catastrophe.\\n(2.) He is self -contradictory as to the relation of the\\nultimate reality to the origin of the universe.\\nFirst. He declares that no hypothesis in regard to the\\norigin of the universe is tenable. Referring to the\\ndifferent attempts which have been made to solve this\\nproblem, he says:\\nA critical examination, however, will prove not only that no\\ncurrent hypothesis is tenable, but also that no tenable hypothesis\\ncan be framed. x\\nSecondly. He affirms that the unknowable ultimate\\nforce is the cause of the universe. Proof that he makes\\nthis affirmation has already been furnished; but that\\nwhich causes anything originates it at least, that which\\nis the ultimate or first cause of anything originates it.\\nIs not this an hypothesis respecting the origin of the\\nuniverse No hypothesis can be framed concerning it\\nhere is an hypothesis which Mr. Spencer frames con-\\ncerning it. He cannot know the cause of the universe\\nbut he knows that the ultimate force is its cause.\\nThirdly. He elaborately discusses three suppositions\\nwhich may be made respecting the origin of the universe\\nnamely, either that it is self -existent or that it is\\nself-created or that it is created by an external agency.\\n1 First Prin., p. 30.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0405.jp2"}, "404": {"fulltext": "394 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nTouching these suppositions his concluding comment is\\nin these words:\\nHere, then, respecting the nature of the universe, we seem\\ncommitted to certain unavoidable conclusions. The objects and\\nactions surrounding us, not less than the phenomena of our own\\nconsciousness, compel us to ask a cause; in our search for a cause\\nwe discover no resting place until we arrive at the hypothesis of a\\nFirst Cause; and we have no alternative but to regard this First\\nCause as Infinite and Absolute. These are inferences forced upon\\nus by arguments from which there appears no escape. It is hardly\\nneedful, however, to show those who have followed us thus far,\\nhow illusive are these reasonings and their results. But that it\\nwould tax the reader s patience to no purpose, it might easily be\\nproved that the materials of which the argument is built, equally\\nwith the conclusions based on them, are merely symbolic concep-\\ntions of the illegitimate order. x\\nHere we have several first-rate contradictions.\\nIn the first place, he elsewhere affirms the ultimate\\nforce to be infinite and eternal. Of course, then, it is\\nself -existent for, if not self-existent, it derived its\\nexistence from a cause preceding it it begun, which is\\ncontrary to the supposition that it is infinite and eternal\\nbut Mr. Spencer identifies the universe with the ultimate\\nforce. He explicitly and repeatedly says that the ulti-\\nmate force is immanent in the universe, not simply as\\npresent and abiding in it as theists affirm of God but\\nas being the very content of the universe. Matter,\\nspirit, motion are but modes of manifestation of the\\nultimate force. They are it as manifested. He is not a\\nprogressionist, but distinctively an evolutionist. He\\nrepudiates progressionism. All things, therefore, ac-\\ncording to him, are evolved out of the ultimate force;\\n1 First Prin., pp. 38, 39.", "height": "3540", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0406.jp2"}, "405": {"fulltext": "Spekcek s Agnostic Philosophy. 395\\nthey are relative forces modifying and manifesting the\\nultimate and absolute. It logically follows, then, that\\nthe universe is self-existent. Of things which are the\\nsame with each other, the same predication may be\\nmade. We have, then, the contradiction of the affirma-\\ntion and the denial of the self -existence of the universe.\\nSuppose that this be objected to on the ground that\\nmatter, spirit, motion, are but parts of the ultimate\\nforce, and, therefore, not liable to the same predication\\nwith it the answer would be that parts of the ultimate\\nforce would, on the supposition, not be self-existent,\\nwhile that force itself is self-existent, and that position\\nis self -contradictory for two reasons first, the infinite\\ncan have no parts; and, second, the infinite cannot be\\npartly self-existent and partly not self -existent but\\nMr. Spencer affirms the ultimate force to be infinite, and\\nrelative force to be the same with it.\\nIn the second place, Mr. Spencer pronounces the judg-\\nment that the first cause is infinite and absolute to be\\nillusive, to be a symbolic conception of the illegitimate\\norder. E ow Mr. Spencer elsewhere maintains that the\\nultimate force is infinite and absolute. ~No matter by\\nwhat process he reaches this conclusion, whether by\\nindefinite consciousness, or belief constituted of a datum\\nof consciousness, or by necessary inference, he reaches\\nit and asserts it. He, therefore, affirms the contradiction\\nthat the conclusion to a first cause as infinite and abso-\\nlute is at once illusive and valid.\\nIn the third place, he is not only confronted with that\\ncontradiction in regard to the existence of the absolute,\\nbut also with the contradiction that the ultimate force", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0407.jp2"}, "406": {"fulltext": "396 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nis absolute and not absolute. The absolute, according\\nto him, is that which is out of all relation at least, is\\nthat which, as an absolute mystery, is not known to\\nhave any relation and yet, he maintains that all things,\\nmaterial and spiritual, are modes by which the absolute\\nmanifests itself. Are the modes of manifestation out\\nof relation to that which they manifest Are they also\\nout of relation to that to which the manifestation is\\nmade to the conscious observers of the phenomenal\\nmanifestations This is marvellous the absolute is\\nnot known to be in relation to aught else the absolute\\nis manifested to the consciousness of all men. The\\nabsolute is the unconditioned and the conditioned it is\\nthe absolute and the relative.\\nIn the fourth place, we encounter a contradiction in\\nregard to the first cause. It is almost superfluous to\\nremark that the first cause and the ultimate cause are\\none and the same. It is termed ultimate when viewed\\nas reached by an analytical and regressive procedure of\\nthe mind it is the last cause thus attained. It is\\ndenominated first when contemplated as the original\\nefficient, or producer, of all things. Let this be granted,\\nand the contradiction becomes apparant. Mr. Spencer\\ndeclares the process by which a first or ultimate cause\\nis reached to be illusive, and the judgment affirming it\\nto be based on merely symbolic conceptions of the ille-\\ngitimate order. Now he distinctly and repeatedly main-\\ntains the existence of an ultimate cause of the universe.\\nHis ultimate force is the ultimate cause. If not, if his\\nultimate force is produced by the ultimate cause, it is\\nnot the ultimate force, since, ex hypothesi, it was pro-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0408.jp2"}, "407": {"fulltext": "Speis t cee s Agnostic Philosophy. 397\\nduced by the force of the ultimate cause. There would\\nthen he a force preceding the ultimate force, which is a\\ncontradiction but we understand Mr. Spencer as identi-\\nfying the ultimate force and the ultimate cause. This\\njudgment, therefore, of an ultimate cause, however\\nderived, he affirms, and must regard as valid. He is\\nconsequently reduced to the contradiction of maintain-\\ning that the judgment of an ultimate or first cause is\\nboth illusive and valid.\\nTo this it will, no doubt, be replied that the charge\\nof contradiction is based upon a misconstruction of Mr.\\nSpencer s position that he was contending against the\\nlegitimacy of an argument in favor of a first cause,\\nfounded upon concepts as its materials an argument\\nwhich, using subordinate concepts, professes to arrive\\nat the final concept of a first cause whereas, he reaches\\nan ultimate cause in an entirely different way; and it\\nwill be said that he fairly justifies himself by the author-\\nity of the Christian philosophers, Hamilton and Mansel.\\nThis defence of Mr. Spencer s position is utterly vain.\\nHamilton, and especially Mansel, contended against\\nthe doctrine in regard to the infinite and absolute, which\\nwas held by the transcendental absolutists of Germany.\\nThe latter developed the radical fallacy of Kant, that\\nthe ideas of the pure reason, which give transcendental\\nmatter, are but higher concepts grouping into ultimate\\ngeneralizations the concepts of the understanding which\\nthat faculty cannot reduce to unity. The judgments\\nwhich affirm the infinite and absolute are concepts\\nthey are the products of thought. This the British\\nphilosophers denied, and rightly denied. They showed", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0409.jp2"}, "408": {"fulltext": "398 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthat the mere thinking faculty, when it makes the impos-\\nsible attempt to conceive the infinite, becomes entangled\\nin a network of insoluble antinomies. Now did Mr.\\nSpencer simply pursue the laudable end of these phi-\\nlosophers, no objection would here be offered to his\\nposition. It is true that Hamilton and Mansel, having\\naccomplished this negative office, ought to have gone on,\\nand applied their mighty powers to the positive\\nexplication and systematic arrangement of those faith-\\njudgments which alone, and which legitimately, affirm\\nthe infinite to have formally developed the profound\\nviews of Jacobi, without the errors which crippled the\\nspeculations of the German Plato.\\nBut, up to the point at which they disproved the\\nabsolutist assumption that it is competent to conception\\nto give the infinite, they were right and up to that\\npoint Mr. Spencer is right, so far as he concurs with\\nthem. That being conceded, it is, on the other hand,\\nidle to justify Mr. Spencer in his illegitimate extension\\nof their views beyond the limit to which, as theistic and\\nChristian philosophers, they meant them to be restricted.\\nHe uses them in an argument designed, not only to\\nrefute absolutism, but theism; and it can be regarded\\nas nothing less than an outrage to cite Hamilton and\\nMansel as being, either explicitly or by logical inference,\\nin his favor, so far as his anti-theistic position is con-\\ncerned. These distinguished men denied that we can\\nthink an infinite first cause, as creator, but they did not\\ndream of denying his existence. They affirmed it as a\\ndatum of faith. What conception or thought cannot do,\\nthe higher faculty of faith does. They impaired their", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0410.jp2"}, "409": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy.\\nposthumous influence, and left themselves exposed to\\nmisconstruction, by failing to show how the transcenden-\\ntal judgments of faith are symbolically, but validly,\\nemployed by the logical faculty in the construction of the\\ntheistic argument. Notwithstanding this defect, their\\nauthority is abusively invoked in an effort to prove that,\\nbecause the theistic argument is not composed of con-\\ncepts as its materials, it is illusive and invalid. It doe9\\nnot, therefore, at all help Mr. Spencer to defend him\\nby saying that he was contending against the legitimacy\\nof an argument in favor of a first cause founded upon\\nconcepts as its materials, and by alleging that, in this\\nrespect, he is supported by the splendid authority of\\nHamilton and Mansel.\\nFurther, although Mr. Spencer may have succeeded\\nin showing that an argument for a first or ultimate\\ncause founded upon concepts is illusive, he himself\\nprofesses to hold the existence of a first or ultimate\\ncause. The question is, How does he ground its affirma-\\ntion If he says that it is a necessary postulate, the\\nquestion is, What is it that postulates He is compelled\\nto answer, The thinking faculty; but that faculty pro-\\nceeds by concepts as its materials, and so he is reduced\\nto the contradiction of affirming and denying that we\\nreach the first or ultimate cause by conception. If he\\nsays that we are indefinitely conscious of it, he is embar-\\nrassed by his admission of the Hamiltonian canon:\\nthought cannot transcend consciousness which certainly\\nimplies that thought can go up to the limits of conscious-\\nness. If, therefore, we are indefinitely conscious of the\\nultimate cause, we can indefinitely think or conceive it", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0411.jp2"}, "410": {"fulltext": "400 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nand we are surprised by the contradiction: we cannot\\nand we can conceive the ultimate cause. Again, if it he\\ntrue that conception cannot transcend consciousness, it\\nis equally true that consciousness cannot transcend con-\\nception; and we meet the further contradiction: we\\ncannot conceive the first cause, but we are conscious of\\nit. If he says that we apprehend the ultimate cause by\\na belief consisting of a datum of consciousness, he con-\\nfounds belief with consciousness he identifies them;\\nfor that which consists of a thing is of the same nature\\nwith it; but who ever heard that belief and conscious-\\nness are one and the same If he says that we appre-\\nhend the ultimate cause simply by belief, he gives up his\\nwhole agnostic philosophy, and incontinently surrenders\\nto the theist. Taking Mr. Spencer, then, on either of\\nthe various roads and they are divergent by which\\nhe seeks to reach the first or ultimate cause, he is led to\\neither self-contradiction or self-inconsistency.\\nMr. Spencer elaborately endeavors to prove what few\\nwould deny that there can be no conception of self-\\nexistence, or self-creation, or creation by external\\nagency. Granted. Hamilton and others had abundantly\\nproved that before him. Common sense had always\\nproved it. The fallacy consists in supposing that there\\nis any respectably supported hypothesis favoring the\\nconception of the origin of the universe. The question\\nis in regard to a belief in its origin. No sensible man\\nbelieves in the self-existence of the finite. Almost all\\nmen believe in the self-existence of the infinite. Mr.\\nSpencer himself believes in it. Else why his affirmation\\nof an infinite and eternal energy But if he believes in", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0412.jp2"}, "411": {"fulltext": "Spencek s Agnostic Philosophy. 401\\nit, the whole question of the conception of it is\\ndismissed.\\nMr. Spencer, moreover, argues in favor of the extra-\\nordinary supposition that the ultimate cause transcends\\nintelligence and will. This hypothesis is advocated for\\nthe purpose of vindicating his somewhat heated declara-\\ntion that he neither affirmed nor denied personality. 1\\nTouching this palpably atheistic position, he remarks:\\nThis, which to most will seem an essentially irreligious posi-\\ntion, is an essentially religious one nay, is the religious one, to\\nwhich, as already shown, all others are but approximations. In\\nthe estimate it implies of the Ultimate Cause, it does not fall\\nshort of the alternative position, but exceeds it. Those who\\nespouse this alternative position make the erroneous supposition\\nthat the choice is between personality and something lower than\\npersonality; whereas the choice is between personality and some-\\nthing higher. Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being\\nas much transcending Intelligence and Will as those transcend\\nmechanical motion? It is true that we are totally unable to\\nconceive any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason\\nfor questioning its existence it is rather the reverse. 2\\nThis is a desperate attempt, made with clenched teeth,\\nto get quit of a personal God. How little force there is\\nin it will be made to appear by one or two obvious con-\\nsiderations.\\nFirst. Mr. Spencer admits human personality. The\\nfollowing passage is in proof\\nAs a preparation for dealing hereafter with the principles of\\nsociology, I have, for some years past, directed much attention to\\nthe modes of thought current in the simpler human societies and\\nevidence of many kinds, furnished by all varieties of uncivilized\\nmen, has forced on me a conclusion harmonizing with that lately\\nexpressed in this Review by Prof. Huxley namely, that the sav-\\n1 First Prin., p. 108. 2 Ibid., p. 109.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0413.jp2"}, "412": {"fulltext": "402 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nage, conceiving a corpse to be deserted by the active personality\\nwho dwelt in it, conceives this active personality to be still\\nexisting, etc. 1\\nMr. Spencer, then, must concede the legitimacy of\\narguing from our own personal will. Now he may be\\nsafely challenged to show how we get our belief in cause,\\nexcept as it is conditioned by the conscious volitions of\\nour own wills by which certain phenomenal changes are\\neffected. Think away this genesis of the causal judg-\\nment, and naught would remain but the observation of\\nthe relation of antecedence and sequence; and to call\\nthat relation one of cause and effect would be to abuse\\nthe language and insult the intelligence of mankind.\\nThe law of causality is a fundamental element of our\\nintellectual constitution, but it is the efficiency of our\\nwills, when exerted, that affords the concrete experience\\nwhich brings out the law into formal expression in\\nactual judgments affirming the relation of cause and\\neffect. Take away the exercises of the will, and the law\\nof causality would be entirely dormant. Take away the\\nintelligence, and there would be no law of causality.\\nThe existence of the law supposes the intelligence, and\\nthe consciousness of its empirical development supposes\\nthe will.\\nHow, then, it may be demanded, does Mr. Spencer\\nget his affirmation of an ultimate cause He employs\\nhis own intelligence and will, which alone give him the\\napprehension of cause, to show that the ultimate cause\\ntranscends intelligence and will. Granted that he may\\nget force, the question is pressed, How does he get\\n1 Recent Disc., pp. 34, 35.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0414.jp2"}, "413": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 403\\ncause If his ultimate force is not possessed of intelli-\\ngence, it is unconscious. If it is devoid of will, it is\\nimpersonal. It is a blind, unconscious, impersonal\\nforce. He has no ground upon which to affirm of it that\\nit is a cause. Were he to say that he neither affirms nor\\ndenies of it causality, just as he says that he neither\\naffirms nor denies of it personality, the case would be\\nsomewhat different; but he affirms that the ultimate\\nforce is the ultimate cause. Such an affirmation is\\narbitrary and groundless. He is reduced to the alterna-\\ntive of holding that, although called cause, it is in the\\ncategory of antecedence and sequence and then he must\\nmaintain that it is either an infinite and eternal antece-\\ndent, or an infinite and eternal series of antecedents and\\nsequents. An infinite antecedent it cannot be, for an\\nantecedent is limited and conditioned by its sequent;\\nand no mere antecedent could be infinite, which implies\\nthe absence of limitation and conditions. Neither could\\nit be an eternal antecedent, for an antecedent, from its\\nvery nature, supposes temporal succession, and is condi-\\ntioned by time in its relation to its sequent. Nor yet\\ncould it be held to be an infinite and eternal series of\\nantecedents and sequents for a series consists of parts.\\nEach of these parts limits and conditions some other\\npart, and is consequently finite but what is predicable\\nof all the parts is predicable of the whole. Therefore,\\nthe whole must be finite. The supposition of infinity is\\ndestroyed. Further, as each of the parts is finite, it\\nbegan. The whole, therefore, began, and the supposi-\\ntion of eternity is impossible.\\nFurther, an infinite cause must be one to which all", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0415.jp2"}, "414": {"fulltext": "404: Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe perfections that it is possible to predicate of cause\\nactually belong; for if it is deficient in any of these\\nperfections, it is not infinite. The infinite is the perfect.\\nBut Mr. Spencer does not assign to his ultimate cause\\nintelligence, will, personality, and it may be added\\nmoral character, perfections which are attributable to\\na cause. Consequently his ultimate cause cannot be\\ninfinite. Yet he affirms it to be infinite and eternal.\\nSecondly. The attempt to get quit of intelligence\\nand personal will in the ultimate cause is vain, because\\nsuch a cause could not originate the universe, so far as\\nit involves intelligence and personal will in its constitu-\\nent parts. Mr. Spencer admits the existence of the\\nintelligence and personal will of men. The question is,\\nHow did they originate? His answer must be, In the\\ncausal agency of the ultimate force but is this causal\\nagency creative? He answers, No. How, then, do\\nhuman intelligence and will originate? He replies, In\\nthe ultimate force evolving itself by the law of immanent\\nnecessity. The further question then presses, How can\\nan unintelligent, impersonal force be a cause of intelli-\\ngence and personal will by evolution\\nThe theist concedes that as God is a free cause he may\\nproduce existence, which is essentially different in na-\\nture from his own. He is, he holds, a pure spirit, but\\nbeing a free cause, he may create matter but did the\\ntheist hold that God evolves matter, he would contradict\\nhimself. In the same way, Mr. Spencer contradicts\\nhimself when he contends that an unintelligent, imper-\\nsonal cause, which is, therefore, not free, but necessary,\\nevolves from itself intelligence and personality. An", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0416.jp2"}, "415": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 405\\nultimate free cause may, by its free acts, produce exist-\\nences which are essentially different from each other,\\neven contradictory to each other spirit and matter,\\nfor example but an ultimate necessary cause could not\\ndo the same, for it operates, by the law of its being, in\\none necessary mode, which excludes variation. Two\\nnecessary modes of operation, resulting in contradictory\\neffects, would imply self-contradiction in the operating\\ncause and if it be said that the contradictory modes of\\noperation are grounded in contradictory necessary laws\\nor principles in the original cause itself, the case is\\nreduced to egregious absurdity an ultimate self-\\ncontradictory cause Two insuperable difficulties oppose\\nMr. Spencer s hypothesis of an unintelligent and imper-\\nsonal ultimate cause one, that it produces, by evolution\\nfrom itself, intelligent and personal existences which are\\nessentially different from itself; the other, that it\\nevolves unintelligent and impersonal existences and\\nalso intelligent and personal existences which are essen-\\ntially different from each other. The truth is that Mr.\\nSpencer perpetrates a solecism when he denominates his\\nultimate force a cause. It does not produce, it evolves.\\nIt is not efficient, it is only effluent. So much for an\\nultimate cause which probably transcends intelligence\\nand personality for an hypothesis that would make an\\nunintelligent and impersonal thing infinitely superior\\nto an intelligent and personal being.\\n(3.) Mr. Spencer is self -contradictory with reference\\nto the relation of his ultimate force to the evolution of\\nthe universe.\\nLet us get a general view of his theory in regard to", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0417.jp2"}, "416": {"fulltext": "406 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthis matter. The universe is subject to two great pro-\\ncesses, which are complementary to each other, namely,\\nevolution and dissolution. Evolution consists in the\\nintegration of matter dissolution in the dissipation of\\nmotion. What is evolved always tends to be dissolved.\\nThe final result of the operation of these two antago-\\nnistic forces is the dissolution of the universal system\\ninto a nebular mass but force is persistent, and motion\\nindestructible. This necessitates a reverse distribu-\\ntion of matter. The nebular stuff begins again to\\nrotate, and the competing forces of evolution and disso-\\nlution are started upon a fresh race, to end in a like\\nresult. This goes on forever. He himself furnishes a\\nmarvellous picture of this interminable circumgyration\\nof universes\\nMotion, as well as Matter, being fixed in quantity, it would\\nseem that the change in the distribution of Matter which Motion\\neffects, coming to a limit in whichever direction it is carried, the\\nindestructible Motion thereupon necessitates a reverse distribu-\\ntion. Apparently, the universally co-existent forces of attraction\\nand repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all\\nminor changes throughout the universe, also necessitate rhythm in\\nthe totality of its changes produce now an immeasurable period\\nduring which the attractive forces predominating, cause universal\\nconcentration,. and then an immeasurable period during which the\\nrepulsive forces predominating, cause universal diffusion alter-\\nnate eras of Evolution and Dissolution. And thus there is sug-\\ngested the conception of a past during which there have been\\nsuccessive Evolutions analogous to that which is now going on;\\nand a future during which successive other such Evolutions\\nma y g\u00c2\u00b0 on ever the same in principle, but never the same\\nin concrete results.\\nThese counter-working forces of evolution and disso-\\n1 First Prin., pp. 536, 537.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0418.jp2"}, "417": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 407\\nlution Mr. Spencer brings into unity in persistent force.\\nThe whole integrating process of evolution is to be\\nultimately referred to persistent force. So, also, the\\nwhole disintegrating process of dissolution is to be\\nultimately assigned to persistent force. Both processes\\nare unified upon the same principle\\nWe even saw grounds for the belief that the far vaster masses\\ndispersed at almost immeasurable intervals through space, will,\\nat a time beyond the reach of finite imaginations, share the same\\nfate; and that so universal Evolution will be followed by uni-\\nversal Dissolution a conclusion which, like those preceding it, we\\nsaw to be deducible from the Persistence of Force.\\nIt may be added that in so unifying the phenomena of Dis-\\nsolution with those of Evolution, as being manifestations of the\\nsame ultimate law under opposite conditions, we also unify the\\nphenomena presented by the existing universe with the like phe-\\nnomena that have preceded them and will succeed them so far,\\nat least, as such unification is possible to our limited intelli-\\ngences.\\nThe recognition of a persistent Force, ever changing its mani-\\nfestations, but unchanged in quantity throughout all past time\\nand all future time, is that which we find alone makes possible\\neach concrete interpretation, and at last unifies all concrete inter-\\npretations. 2\\nLet it be observed that this unifying persistent force\\nis the same with Mr. Spencer s fundamental reality,\\nwhich he variously designates as the ultimate force, the\\nultimate cause, the infinite and eternal energy, the ulti-\\nmate of ultimates, and the way is open for the criticisms\\nwhich will be made.\\nFirst. It would seem manifest that it is incorrect to\\nterm Mr. Spencer the philosopher of evolution. He is\\nthe professed philosopher of evolution and dissolution.\\n1 First Prin., p. 550. 2 Ibid., p. 552.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0419.jp2"}, "418": {"fulltext": "408 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nHe is not only an evolutionist, but a dissolutionist. His\\nis not merely an evolving, but a dissolving philosophy\\n(and since he wills it so to be, so mote it be An out-\\nsider has no right to quarrel with the names selected by a\\nfamily, but it is respectfully suggested that the analysis\\nalready in these remarks submitted is correct in repre-\\nsenting Mr. Spencer s philosophy as the New Philosophy\\nof Force. His ultimate reality, upon which he reduces\\neverything to unity, is an energy which, from itself,\\nevolves the systems of the universe and evermore dis-\\nsolves them; and then evermore evolves again the\\nsystems which it has dissolved.\\nSecondly. He makes the infinite finite, and the finite\\ninfinite. He holds that his ultimate force is infinite.\\nHe also contends that matter and motion and he in-\\ncludes mind in motion as relative forces are, as we\\nhave seen, modes of manifestation of the infinite force,\\nISFow matter and motion are finite. They are, as Mr.\\nSpencer would allow, limited and conditioned. The\\nmodes of a thing are the thing itself modified. The\\nconclusion is obvious that Mr. Spencer represents the\\ninfinite force as evolving itself into the finite; which is\\na stupendous contradiction. The pantheist objects to\\nthe theistic doctrine, that it makes the creative will of\\nan infinite being in its acts terminate upon the finite;\\nbut such a difficulty is nothing compared with that\\ninhering in the pantheistic doctrine that the infinite\\nbecomes the finite. The difference between the panthe-\\nist and Mr. Spencer that the former makes an infinite\\nsubstance, the latter an infinite force, become by evolu-\\ntion finite does not affect the application of this reduc-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0420.jp2"}, "419": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 409\\ntio ad absurdum to the agnostic philosopher. It will\\nnot answer to say that the infinite force and its modes\\nare not one and the same, and hence not susceptible of\\ncommon predication. Abstract matter and mental sub-\\nstance from the infinite force, and what becomes of the\\ninfinite force itself? What is it that is immanent in\\nmatter and spirit considered as different from the ulti-\\nmate force Further, if the modes matter and motion\\nare different from the ultimate force, another contra-\\ndiction is admitted namely, that the evolver is evolved\\ninto something different from itself.\\nThe contradiction that the infinite becomes finite\\ninvolves the other contradiction, which has been men-\\ntioned, that the finite is infinite. Mr. Spencer concedes\\nthe finiteness of matter and motion; but he says that\\nthey are the infinite force as modified. It follows that\\nthe finite relative forces, being said to be the absolute\\nforce as modified, are what the infinite force is infinite.\\nThe case being viewed from both sides, the side of the\\ninfinite evolved into the finite, and the side of the finite\\nidentified with the infinite, Mr. Spencer is reduced to\\nthe contradiction of asserting an infinite-finite force.\\nThirdly. Mr. Spencer makes the infinite pass\\nthrough innumerable changes. It passes through all\\nthe changes to which the inorganic and the organic\\nworlds are subject. It is evolved, it is nebular, it is\\nrotated, it is crystallized, it is organized, it is differen-\\ntiated, it is equilibrated, it is dissipated, it is dissolved.\\nIt is not that the infinite force decrees and effects these\\nchanges, it is the infinite force itself which is thus\\nchanged. Else what means evolution It needs scarcely", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0421.jp2"}, "420": {"fulltext": "410 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nto be observed that the theistic doctrine is not liable to\\nthis objection. That an infinite being should freely\\ncause changes is credible; but that an infinite force,\\nacting by necessity, should evolve into changing modes\\ndifferent from each other, as, for example, inorganic\\nand organic, dead and living this involves self-\\ncontradiction, and, therefore, passes the limits of belief.\\nA revolving, evolving, dissolving infinite is something\\nthat imposes too severe a tax upon even a boundless\\ncredulity.\\nFourthly. Mr. Spencer makes the unconditioned\\ncause conditioned. That he represents the ultimate\\ncause as unconditioned will be conceded by every reader\\nof his works. For instance, he says, Force, as we\\nknow it, can be regarded only as a certain conditioned\\neffect of the unconditioned cause. But it is held that\\nrelative force is the conditioning manifestation of the\\nabsolute force, which is the same with the unconditioned\\ncause. This unconditioned cause does not manifest\\nitself by created effects the hypothesis of creation is\\nrejected but through modes which are evolved from\\nitself and condition itself. The universe is the condi-\\ntioned manifestation of the infinite evolving force\\nthat is, in other words, it is the infinite force as condi-\\ntioned in order to be manifested. There is no other way\\nin which the conditioned manifestation of an infinite\\nevolving force can be apprehended. The unconditioned\\ncause is ever conditioning itself in the evolution of the\\nuniverse. The universe is itself as conditioned.\\nEither the universe is spontaneously generated; or\\n1 First Prin.y p. 170.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0422.jp2"}, "421": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 411\\nit is created or it is evolved. To say the first would be\\nto break with science to affirm the second would be to\\nagree with theism ]\\\\Ir. Spencer holds neither he con-\\ntends that it is evolved. Well, then, the universe is the\\nevolving force as evolved; but the universe is condi-\\ntioned. The contradiction cannot be escaped of a con-\\nditioned unconditioned cause as the evolver of the\\nuniverse.\\nThat Mr. Spencer has not been here misrepresented\\nwill appear from the following utterance\\nI recognize no forces within the organism, or without the\\norganism, but the variously-conditioned modes of the universal\\nimmanent force; and the whole process of organic evolution is\\neverywhere attributed by me to the co-operation of its variously-\\nconditioned modes, internal and external. That this has been all\\nalong my general view, is clearly shown in the closing paragraph\\nof First Principles. x\\nFifthly. Mr. Spencer gives us a logical distribution\\nof the ultimate infinite force, which is as curious as it\\nis self-contradictory. This force is divided by him into\\nself-evolved generic modes by which it is conditioned\\nspace-occupying force which is not a working force;\\nand working force, which again is distributed into act-\\nual and potential force. The first of these the space-\\noccupying kind of force has, he tells us, no specific\\nname. Touching the other specific kind of force, he\\nremarks\\nFor the second kind of force, distinguishable as that by which\\nchange is either being caused or will be caused if counterbalancing\\nforces are overcome, the specific name now accepted is Energy.\\nSo we have actual energy/ and potential energy.\\n1 Letter appended to Vol. I. of First Principles of Biology,\\np. 491.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0423.jp2"}, "422": {"fulltext": "412 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nIn the first place, here is an infinite force divided\\ninto two different kinds of force. The infinite is di-\\nvided, which is a contradiction; and it is divided into\\ndifferent and mutually exclusive species, which is, if\\npossible, a worse contradiction.\\nIn the second place, we have an infinite force sup-\\nposed to be checked by counterbalancing forces, and\\nchecked when it is actually energizing, which is a contra-\\ndiction.\\nIn the third place, we have an infinite force checked\\nby, and unable to overcome, counterbalancing forces,\\nwhich are evolved from itself that is, checked and\\nfoiled by itself, which is a contradiction.\\nIn the fourth place, as Mr. Spencer has among his\\nmore recent utterances formally denominated the ulti-\\nmate force an infinite and eternal energy, we have\\nthe genus infinite force distributed into the species non-\\nworking force and working force (or energy). Of\\ncourse, energy as working is specifically differentiated\\nfrom force as not working and then we have one of the\\nspecies (energy) made the genus (infinite and eternal\\nenergy), which amounts to the distribution of the genus\\nenergy into the two species, non-energy and energy.\\nThis is so strange that we attribute it not to Mr. Spencer\\nhe is too good a logician but to his unspeakable\\nhypothesis, which led him to attempt logical work upon\\nan unknowable subject. Perhaps it is as good a logical\\ndistribution as could have been effected of an inconceiv-\\nable thing. It is possible that Mr. Spencer would say\\nthat when he called the infinite force an energy he meant\\npotential energy but, then, potential energy as generic", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0424.jp2"}, "423": {"fulltext": "Spenceb s Agnostic Philosophy. 413\\nwould include under it the species actual energy; and\\nsince the essence of the genus descends into the species,\\nwe would have the genus potential energy including\\nunder it the species potential-actual energy. It is a pity\\nthat Mr. Spencer did not adhere to the term force for\\nhis ultimate reality. His energy has proved a snare to\\nhim.\\nSixthly. Mr. Spencer s doctrine as to the connection\\nof the ultimate force with the evolution of religion\\nand morality is beset with self-contradiction and\\nabsurdity.\\nIn the first place, he represents his ultimate reality as\\nproceeding without the least compliance with truth, by\\nevolving all the antagonistic religious beliefs which have\\nexisted in the world. Religion as a fact could not be\\ndenied, and it had to be accounted for. Accordingly, it\\nwas assigned, along with everything else, to that great\\nevolution which is the cause of the universe, with all its\\ncontents. In Mr. Spencer s opinion, religion has been\\ngradually evolved. Beginning with fetichism, it has,\\nunder the sure guidance of evolution, passed through\\nthe stages of polytheism and monotheism up to agnosti-\\ncism or atheism. As each of these beliefs is to be\\nattributed to the ultimate reality evolving itself, each is\\nto be treated with respect, not only on account of a com-\\nmon parentage with the others, but also because of a\\nreal adaptation to the natures of those who defend\\nit. 1 These beliefs, although absolutely contradictory\\nto each other, were or are right, considering the circum-\\nstances in which they were or are entertained. Fetich-\\n1 First Prin., pp. 119, 122.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0425.jp2"}, "424": {"fulltext": "414: Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nism was right, in its circumstances so was polytheism\\nand so, notwithstanding the kicks he administers to it,\\nthe great agnostic with a sardonic smile and a conde-\\nscending air concedes the worship of the one, living, per-\\nsonal Grod to be. Not only were these contradictory be-\\nliefs necessary products of evolution, and, therefore, not\\nto be condemned, while they successively existed in the\\npast, but the same is true of them, so far as they are\\ncontemporary beliefs. We must recognize them as\\nelements in that great evolution of which the beginning\\nand the end are beyond our knowledge or conception\\nas modes of manifestation of the unknowable; and as\\nhaving this for their warrant. So, then, the fetichism\\nof the African bone-worshipper, the polytheism of the\\nAsiatic pagan, the uni-personal monetheism of the Mo-\\nhammedan, the trinitarian theism of the Christian, and\\nthe agnostic atheism of Mr. Spencer are all synchronous\\nmanifestations of the ultimate reality, and have their\\nwarrant in that fact.\\nEvery religious thinker, therefore, who, like Mr.\\nSpencer, is in advance of his time, should consider that\\nhe is a higher product of the evolutionary force which\\nhas gradually worked upwards through lower forms of\\nbelief. He should justify his propagation of his views\\nby this reflection\\nHe, like every other man, may properly consider himself as\\none of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown\\nCause; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain\\nbelief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief.\\nHence the sympathy which Mr. Spencer inculcates\\n1 First Prin., p. 123.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0426.jp2"}, "425": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 415\\nfor beliefs antagonistic to one s own a sympathy which\\nhe professes to feel for theism and Christianity at the\\nsame time that he visits them with his scorn, and is\\ndoing his best to exterminate them\\nOur toleration therefore should be the widest possible. Or\\nrather, we should aim at something beyond toleration, as com-\\nmonly understood. In dealing with alien beliefs our endeavor\\nmust be, not simply to refrain from injustice of word or deed, but\\nalso to do justice by an open recognition of positive worth\\nWe must qualify our disagreement with as much as may be of\\nsympathy. x\\nThat is, as he, Mr. Spencer, has killed our God, he\\nwill be gracious enough to shed a tear with us at the\\nfuneral\\nThe cool indifference to truth exhibited in these senti-\\nments must strike the most cursory reader. Perhaps\\nhe will say that Mr. Spencer is to be excused, since the\\nultimate force which evolved him is the acknowledged\\nauthor of untruth.\\nIn the second place, all the conflicting theories of\\nmorality which have ever existed, or still exist, are alike\\nthe products of the same evolutionary force. There is\\nno need to enlarge upon this point. What was urged in\\nrelation to religion is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to\\nmorality. In itself non-moral, this force evolves itself\\ninto morality and immorality. As evolved, it is both\\nsaint and criminal.\\nIn the third place, it follows, from these views, that\\nthe ultimate force is, through the necessary process of\\nevolution, the producer of sanctity and impiety, of\\n1 First Prin., p. 122.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0427.jp2"}, "426": {"fulltext": "416 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nvirtue and crime. Wonderful force Characterized by\\nunity, it causes, by the necessary law of evolution,\\nopposites the most contradictory to each other. The\\nprinciple of organized life, it is the principle of death\\nit brings forth life and death from the same evolving\\nwomb. Itself is life, itself is death. The bigoted relig-\\nionist who butchers his fellowman for dissenting from\\nhim is but the evolutionary force in one of its products\\nbutchering itself in another of its products. The assas-\\nsin who murders his neighbor is but the same evolu-\\ntionary force in one of its products murdering itself in\\nanother of its products. Not only does it discharge the\\ntranscendent office of ever evolving and dissolving the\\nvast universe through immeasurable periods, but it\\ndaily evolves and dissolves the finite parts of its infinite\\nself in innumerable instances. Concentrating in its\\nunity the several functions of the Parcse, it spins from\\nitself the thread of every separate life, allots its measure-\\nment, and with fatal scissors cuts it off. Mortal-\\nimmortal force! Ever dying in all its parts, and ever\\nliving as a whole\\nIn the fourth place, Mr. Spencer s theory, logically\\nconstrued, makes the ultimate force worship itself. As\\nan infinite and eternal energy, it is held by him to be the\\nobject of worship. As every worshipper is evolved from\\nthis ultimate force, it certainly comes to this that it\\nworships itself. Mr. Spencer girds savagely at the\\nChristian doctrine in this contemptuous manner.\\nSpeaking of the difficulty which the agnostic, as the per-\\nfection of evolution, experiences in dealing patiently\\nwith that doctrine, he says", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0428.jp2"}, "427": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 417\\nHe may think it needless as it is difficult, to conceal his\\nrepugnance to a creed which tacitly ascribes to the Unknowable a\\nlove of adulation such as would be despised in a human being. x\\nWhether Mr. Spencer s object of worship is liable to\\nthe same contemptuous fling or not, it is certain that\\nthe Christian is not silly enough to offer adulation to\\nan abstract Something which could not appreciate it, or\\nto represent his God as offering worship to himself.\\nSeventhly. Mr. Spencer s evolution has no telic\\nsignificance; it obliterates teleology. He admits the\\ninfinity of his ultimate force, but denies to it personal\\nwill. Consequently the evolution of the universe from\\nthat force is purposeless but the marks of general order\\nand of special adaptations are everywhere so conspicuous\\nas to have been generally acknowledged by philosophers\\nas well as by the mass of mankind. The inference is\\nirresistible to an intelligent Designer. This inference\\nMr. Spencer s theory repudiates. The evolved persons\\nare designers, but the evolver of the persons is not a\\ndesigner. The contradiction is obvious. The objection\\nof Kant and others to this argument that it fails to prove\\ninfinity whether tenable or not has no bearing upon\\nthe present question, for the reason that Mr. Spencer\\nadmits the infinity of the evolutionary force. What is\\npertinent in the argument is that the evidences of design\\nprove a designer. Mr. Spencer can only evade the force\\nof the argument by denying the marks of purpose in\\nthe universe, and in doing this he breaks with philosophy\\nand the common sense of the race. The odds are\\nsupremely against him.\\n1 First Prin., p. 120.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0429.jp2"}, "428": {"fulltext": "418 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nBut this recitation of self-contradictions grows monot-\\nonous. Let us gather up some of them, at least, in one\\nconcluding statement\\nThis ultimate force as infinite is unknowable; as\\nevolved it is knowable: it is the unknowable-knowable.\\nAs infinite it is immutable; as evolved it is mutable: it\\nis the immutable-mutable. As infinite it is without\\nparts; as evolved it has parts: it is the indivisible-\\ndivisible. As infinite it is perfect; as evolved it de-\\nvelops, and is therefore imperfect: it is the perfect-\\nimperfect. As infinite it is uncaused; as evolved it is\\ncaused; it is the uncaused-caused. As infinite it is\\ncause as evolved it is effect it is cause and effect. As\\ninfinite it is indissoluble; as evolved it is dissoluble:\\nit is the indissoluble-dissoluble. As infinite it is eternal\\nas evolved it is temporal it is the eternal-temporal. As\\ninfinite it is unconditioned as evolved it is conditioned\\nit is the unconditioned-conditioned. As infinite it is\\nabsolute; as evolved it is relative: it is the absolute-\\nrelative. As infinite it is unorganized; as evolved it\\nis in the animal and vegetable kingdoms organized it is\\nthe unorganized-organized. As infinite it is unintelli-\\ngent as evolved it is intelligent it is the unintelligent-\\nintelligent. As infinite it is impersonal; as evolved it\\nis personal: it is the impersonal-personal. As infinite\\nis is worshipped as evolved it is the worshipper it is\\nthe worshipped-worshipper. As infinite it is non-moral\\nas evolved it is both moral and immoral it is the non-\\nmoral-moral-immoral. In a word, it is the Infinite-\\nFinite.\\nIt could only be paralleled, and that in a finite degree,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0430.jp2"}, "429": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 419\\nby a material thing which might be characterized as\\nunextended-extended, indivisible-divisible, non-resistant-\\nresistant, impenetrable-penetrable, spherical-flat, circu-\\nlar-square, high-low, long-short, thick-thin, wide-narrow,\\nblack- white, solid-liquid, and deep-shallow; especially\\ndeep-shallow.\\nIt may be said that this is sheer extravagance. That\\nit is not, but, on the contrary, is sober fact, is shown by\\na single disjunctive argument. In regard to the exist-\\nence of the finite universe there are but four conceivable\\nhypotheses Either its self -existence, or its creation, or\\nits spontaneous generation, or its evolution. The first\\ntwo Mr. Spencer everywhere rejects the third he also\\nrejects; 1 the fourth that of evolution is, therefore,\\nexclusive of the others. It follows indisputably that\\nthe finite universe which is evolved from or out of the\\ninfinite, ultimate force is that force as evolved. To say\\nthat Mr. Spencer only asserts that the parts, the con-\\ntents, of the universe are modes of the infinite force is\\nnothing worth. A thing and its modes are essentially\\nidentical. The explanation only serves to illuminate\\nthe contradictoriness of his theory for who ever heard\\nof finite modes of the infinite\\n7. Some things remain to be said briefly respecting\\nMr. Spencer s positions as to evolution itself.\\n(1.) Mr. Spencer s system does not deal with inor-\\nganic evolution. It is by no means intimated that the\\nomission is intentional. Mr. Spencer tells us that it is\\nnot. 2 But the omission is a fact. The system, there-\\nfore, is incomplete. Evolution is attempted to be\\n1 Prin. Biology, Vol. I., p. 480. 2 Prin. Biology, Vol. I., p. 479.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0431.jp2"}, "430": {"fulltext": "420 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nexplained only in part. Should Mr. Spencer hereafter\\nremedy the defect, he will have two questions to answer\\nhow inorganic matter came to be evolved from his pri-\\nmordial force, and how, in the process of evolution, the\\ntransition was effected from the inorganic to the organic.\\nIn regard to the first question, it will behoove him to\\nshow how, if his ultimate force is living, the non-living\\ncan be evolved from the living or, how, if the ultimate\\nforce is non-living, it is active enough to evolve anything,\\nand how, on that supposition, the living can be evolved\\nfrom the non-living. In answering the other question,\\nhow the inorganic is evolved into the organic, it is to be\\nhoped indeed, it may be expected, from our knowledge\\nof his scientific qualities, his patience in analysis and\\nhis honesty in generalization that he will not resort to\\nthe remarkable hypothesis of some, that the evolutionary\\nforce is subject to spasms, and that in one of its paroxys-\\nmal efforts it leaped over the great and wide chasm\\nbetween the inorganic and the organic between death\\nand life. One is almost inevitably reminded of the\\nextraordinary exploit celebrated in the line of a vener-\\nable household classic, And the cow jumped over the\\nmoon. Until these questions are answered by Mr.\\nSpencer, the law of evolution comes short, so far as\\nhe is concerned, of being a generalization founded upon\\na sufficient induction; it is halted at a critical point.\\nWe may expect from him scientific proofs, not the mere\\nvagaries of the imagination.\\n(2.) ~Not only does Mr. Spencer not indicate the con-\\nnection between inorganic and organic evolution, which\\nmust be done before any systematic account of the evo-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0432.jp2"}, "431": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 421\\nlutionary process can be complete, but his brilliant\\nattempt to expound organic evolution is destitute of a\\ncompetent basis. He begins with the mere assumption\\nthat life, in the first instance, is evolved. No proofs of\\nthis postulate are furnished. Indeed, Mr. Spencer\\nblunders in his effort to define life. He himself con-\\nfesses that the definition is only an approximate one.\\nAn examination of this approximate definition at once\\nshows that he endeavors to define, not life itself, but its\\nfunctions, relations and results. The fundamental ele-\\nment if such an expression can be applied to a simple\\nand indivisible principle which he gives is the co-\\nordination of actions\\nI have myself proposed to define Life as the co-ordination of\\nactions; and I still incline towards this definition as one answer-\\ning to the facts with tolerable precision. x\\nBut it is clear that both the conception s actions and\\nthe coordination of actions presuppose the conception\\nof life itself as a principle of action, and of coordination\\nof actions. We have here no account of life itself, and\\nconsequently no account of the process by which it has\\nbeen evolved. Until the question is answered, What is\\nevolved one fails to see how the other question can be\\nanswered, How is it evolved? But Mr. Spencer knows\\nhow to evolve the unknowable. Perhaps he would say\\nthat we are indefinitely conscious of what life is, and\\nthat is sufficient to ground a scientific account of its\\nevolution. Science, however, is knowledge and Mr.\\nSpencer distinguishes indefinite consciousness from\\nknowledge. Not only, then, is there no account of inor-\\n1 Prin. Biology, Vol. L, p. 60.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0433.jp2"}, "432": {"fulltext": "422 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nganic evolution and of its relation to organic evolution,\\nbut Mr. Spencer s endeavor to explain organic evolution\\nis u the baseless fabric of a vision. His biology aston-\\nishes us in two respects: by the mastery of scientific\\nknowledge which it evinces, and by the fact that it rests\\non no foundation. It may be that this is an instance of\\nthe law mentioned by Mr. Spencer that scientific evolu-\\ntion must begin somewhere abruptly. 1\\nThis is the more remarkable because Mr. Spencer\\npronounces biology of supreme importance in relation\\nto the question of the origin of species. Comparing his\\nviews with those of M. Compte, he says\\nHow organic beings have originated, is an inquiry which\\nM. Compte deprecates as a useless speculation: asserting, as he\\ndoes, that species are immutable.\\nThis inquiry, I believe, admits of answer, and will be an-\\nswered. That division of Biology which concerns itself with the\\norigin of species I hold to be the supreme division, to which all\\nothers are subsidiary. For on the verdict of Biology on this\\nmatter must wholly depend our conception of human nature, past,\\npresent, and future our theory of the mind and our theory of\\nsociety.\\n(3.) It deserves notice that Mr. Spencer makes\\ngeology unavailable to both the opponents and the advo-\\ncates of evolution. It is excluded from the field of\\nevidence bearing on the question. Speaking of Hugh\\nMiller s arguments against the development hypothesis,\\narguments which he derived from geology, he remarks\\nWhile we purpose showing that his arguments against the\\nDevelopment Hypothesis are based on invalid assumptions, we\\ndo not purpose showing that the opposing arguments are based\\non valid assumptions. We hope to make it apparent that the\\n1 Recent Discussions, p. 187. 2 Ibid., p. 128.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0434.jp2"}, "433": {"fulltext": "Spen-cek s Agnostic Philosophy. 423\\ngeological evidence at present obtained is insufficient for either\\nside; further, that there seems little probability of sufficient\\nevidence ever being obtained; and that if the question is eventu-\\nally decided, it must be decided on other than geological data. 1\\nThis opinion of the great evolutionist merits the\\nattention of those who as confidently expound the secrets\\nof geology as though they had been contemporaries of\\nthe Ascidia and to whom the language might be em-\\nphatically used which was addressed by Daniel Webster\\nto the veteran survivors of the American revolutionary\\nwar, Venerable men you have come down to us from\\na former generation.\\n(4.) Mr. Spencer furnishes us a disproof of organic\\nevolution in his attempt to account for the origin of\\nanimal-worship. His own language will be employed\\nin the development of the steps of the argument:\\nThe rudimentary form of all religion is the propitiation of\\ndead ancestors, who are supposed to be still existing, and to be\\ncapable of working good or evil to their descendants\\nSavages habitually distinguish individuals by names that are\\neither directly suggestive of some personal trait or fact of per-\\nsonal history, or else express an observed community of character\\nwith some well-known object. Now, in the earliest savage\\nstate this metaphorical naming will, in most cases, commence\\nafresh in each generation must do so, indeed, until surnames of\\nsome kind have been established. I say in most cases, because\\nthere will occur exceptions in the cases of men who have distin-\\nguished themselves. If the Wolf, proving famous in fight, be-\\ncomes a terror to neighboring tribes, and a dominant man in his\\nown, his sons, proud of their parentage, will not let fall the fact\\nthat they descended from the Wolf nor will this fact be forgotten\\nby the rest of the tribe, who hold the Wolf in awe, and see some\\nreason to dread his sons.\\nLet the tradition of the ancestor fail to keep clearly in view\\n1 Illustrations of Univer. Progress, p. 354.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0435.jp2"}, "434": {"fulltext": "424 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe fact that he was a man called the Wolf let him be habitually\\nspoken of as the Wolf, just as when alive; and the natural mis-\\ntake of taking the name literally will bring with it, firstly, a\\nbelief in descent from the actual wolf, and, secondly, a treatment\\nof the wolf in a manner likely to propitiate him a manner\\nappropriate to one who may be the other self of the dead ancestor,\\nor one of the kindred, and therefore a friend.\\nDescent from the Wolf will inevitably come to mean descent\\nfrom the animal known by that name. And the ideas and senti-\\nments which, as above shown, naturally grow up around the belief\\nthat the dead parents and grandparents are still alive, and ready,\\nif propitiated, to befriend their descendants, will be extended to\\nthe wolf species. x\\nNow it is evident that this ingenious account of the\\norigin of worship which may he paid to the wolf, or to\\nany other animals, admits that the worshippers are\\nmistaken in supposing that they are actually descended\\nfrom the animals worshipped. Mr. Spencer talks like\\nany other civilized man of common sense about the\\nillusory belief of savages respecting human descent from\\nan animal ancestry. What becomes, then, of his organic\\nevolution If the analysis had been written in order to\\ndisprove the hypothesis of the evolution of species from\\nspecies it could hardly be more complete and convincing.\\nMr. Spencer ought to be able to convince himself. Is\\nthat which is foolish in poor savages wise in persons of\\nscientific culture? If, as Mr. Spencer professes, he is\\ndescended from animal ancestors, it is certain that none\\nof them could have been caught in so powerful a trap\\nas that which he has here constructed for himself, and\\nwhich holds him with a grip of steel, else had Mr.\\nSpencer not have descended. The Australian and the\\n1 Recent Discussions, pp. 34-42.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0436.jp2"}, "435": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 425\\nTasmanian display their ignorance in believing that they\\ndescended from animals, but the supremely cultivated\\nscholars and gentlemen of Britain exhibit their superior\\nknowledge in believing the same thing Verily, these\\ncoryphaei of science must be perpetrating a hoax upon\\ntheir contemporaries.\\n(5.) In a comparison of the theory of creation and\\nthat of evolution, Mr. Spencer contradicts himself, and\\nvirtually concedes the immense superiority of the former\\ntheory to the latter. After expounding the nebular\\nhypothesis, and remarking that, while the genesis of\\nthe solar system, and of countless other systems like it,\\nis thus rendered comprehensible, the ultimate mystery\\ncontinues as great as ever, he goes on to observe\\nThe Nebular Hypothesis throws no light on the origin of\\ndiffused matter; and diffused matter as much needs accounting\\nfor as concrete matter. The genesis of an atom is not easier to\\nconceive than the genesis of a planet. Nay, indeed, so far from\\nmaking the Universe a less mystery than before, it makes it a\\ngreater mystery. Creation by manufacture is a much lower thing\\nthan creation by evolution. A man can put together a machine;\\nbut he cannot make a machine develop itself. That our\\nharmonious universe once existed potentially as formless diffused\\nmatter, and has slowly grown into its present organized state,\\nis a far more astonishing fact than would have been its forma-\\ntion after the artificial method vulgarly supposed. Those who\\nhold it legitimate to argue from phenomena to noumena may\\nrightly contend that the Nebular Hypothesis implies a First\\nCause as much transcending the mechanical God of Paley, as\\nthis does the fetish of the savage. 1\\nOne cannot help noticing either the partisan blindness\\nor the unfairness of this self-contradictory passage.\\nFirst. He makes the genesis of the universe both\\n1 Illust. Univ. Progress, pp. 298, 299.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0437.jp2"}, "436": {"fulltext": "426 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ncomprehensible and absolutely mysterious. He can only\\nbe saved from this contradiction by the supposition that\\nhe used genesis as convertible with formation. That\\nsupposition is opposed, in the first place, by the consid-\\neration that ordinary usage would be violated, and, in\\nthe second place, that in this very passage he employs\\ngenesis in the sense of origination, as when he speaks of\\nthe genesis of an atom 7 for it would be absurd to\\nspeak of the formation of an atom, in the sense of con-\\nstruction, fashioning, arrangement. It must mean\\norigination, if it mean anything. An atom is taken to\\nmean something simple, uncompounded, indivisible.\\nAs it confessedly has no parts, it cannot be constructed.\\nIf brought into existence, it must be by creation its\\ngenesis must be creation. Must there be added, then, to\\nthe swollen list of Mr. Spencer s self-contradictions the\\ncomprehensible-incomprehensible?\\nSecondly. Mr. Spencer declares that the genesis of\\nan atom is as inconceivable as the genesis of a planet.\\nHere he must mean by genesis creation origination;\\nfor he has just before asserted the comprehensibleness\\nof the formation the structural putting together of the\\nsolar system as a collection of planets from nebular\\nmatter. We have, then, the point-blank confession by\\nhim that evolution is utterly incompetent to account for\\nthe origination of the universe. In this he is certainly\\nright; but Mr. Spencer has all along maintained the\\ntheory that the universe is evolved from the ultimate\\ninfinite force. This is his philosophy and as his evo-\\nlution must, like his science of evolution, begin some-\\nwhere abruptly, we have the assertion that evolution", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0438.jp2"}, "437": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 427\\ndoes account for the origination of the universe. Lo,\\nanother contradiction an origination of the universe\\nwhich can be accounted for; an origination of the\\nuniverse which cannot he accounted for\\nThirdly. Mr. Spencer, after admitting that the origi-\\nnation of an atom, and consequently of the universe, by\\nevolution is inconceivable, tries hard to get out of the\\ndifficulty by asserting that the doctrine of creation is in\\na worse difficulty; for creation by manufacture is a\\nmuch lower thing than creation by evolution. In the\\nfirst place, there is no such thing conceivable as creation\\nby evolution, but it is much higher than creation by\\nmanufacture In the second place, creation by manu-\\nfacture is as much inconceivable as creation by evolution\\nboth are inconceivable but one conceiving these two\\ninconceivable nonentities must conceive that one of them\\nis much lower than the other In the third place, crea-\\ntion by manufacture is an absurd piece of balderdash\\nthat has no other paternity than that of Mr. Spencer\\nand his fellow-atheists. Certainly, neither Paley, nor\\nany other man of sense, not to say Christian, ever\\ndreamed of a manufacture of something out of nothing.\\nManufacture supposes preexisting materials. The sup-\\nposition that the affirmers of creation out of nothing\\nmean manufacture out of something is either the silly or\\nthe dishonest spawn of the atheistic imagination.\\nCreation from nothing is inconceivable, but it is not\\nself-contradictory. Evolution from nothing is not only\\ninconceivable, but self-contradictory. The evolution of\\nsomething out of nothing is a contradiction in terms.\\nAs evolution supposes the thing to be evolved, while", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0439.jp2"}, "438": {"fulltext": "428 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ncreation, strictly speaking, supposes nothing upon which\\nit is effected, the very contrary of what Mr. Spencer\\nasserts is true namely, that evolution is a much lower\\nthing than creation. What Mr. Spencer, with equal\\ncontemptuousness and unfairness, calls creation by\\nmanufacture is really the origination of that which is\\nsupposed to be evolved. The question is, What fur-\\nnished the material for the start of the evolving process\\nThat question, which the evolutionist must face, ex-\\nplodes Mr. Spencer s attempt to substitute an evolving\\nforce for a personal creator except upon the hypothesis\\nthat the evolving force is itself the material out of\\nwhich the evolution proceeds an hypothesis the self-\\ncontradictoriness and absurdity of which has already in\\nthis discussion been sufficiently exposed.\\nIt comes at last to the alternative of an absolute com-\\nmencement or of creation. Neither is conceivable, but\\nthat of an absolute commencement is self-contradictory,\\nand in the form of spontaneous generation is abandoned\\nby science itself. The other alternative that of crea-\\ntion by an infinite personal creator must, therefore, be\\naccepted as true.\\n(6.) The following sharp retort of Mr. Spencer must\\nbe briefly noticed before these criticisms are brought to\\na close\\nIn a debate upon the development hypothesis, lately narrated\\nto me by a friend, one of the disputants was described as arguing\\nthat as, in all our experience, we know no such phenomenon as\\ntransmutation of species, it is unphilosophical to assume that\\ntransmutation of species ever takes place. Had I been present, I\\nthink that, passing over his assertion, which is open to criticism,\\nI should have replied that as, in all our experience, we have never", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0440.jp2"}, "439": {"fulltext": "Spencer s Agnostic Philosophy. 429\\nknown a species created, it was, by his own showing, unphilo-\\nsophieal to assume that any species ever had been created. x\\nFirst. Let it be supposed that neither the special\\ncreationist nor the evolutionist had ever witnessed a\\nconcrete example of his theory, there would result an\\nequipoise between the two doctrines in this regard, and\\nnothing would be gained on either side. The question\\nwould not be Avorth discussing but\\nSecondly. The special creationist does not maintain\\nthat we are to expect special creations. On the contrary,\\nhe holds that special creation occurred in the beginning\\nof the present cosmical order, and that there is no need\\nthat species should again be created, unless that order\\nshould come to an end, and another should take its place.\\nThe species oak-tree has been in existence from the time\\nthat observation began to be recorded, and the special\\ncreationist looks for no change of that species. If he\\nhad looked for it, he would certainly have shared the\\ndisappointment of the evolutionist.\\nOn the other hand, the evolutionist contends for an\\nuninterrupted process of specific transmutations. Ac-\\ncording to his hypothesis, we would be led to expect\\nsome instances of transmutation of species as at least\\nlikely to occur in the experience of the race in historic\\ntimes. Have all the lines of evolution had precisely the\\nsame periods to run? Has every particular evolution\\nof species had an immeasurable period to run Have\\nall these periods spanned the age of man on the earth\\nIf so, where is the consistency or the sense of evolution-\\nists trying their very best by selective breeding, in the\\n1 Illust. Univ. Progress, p. 377.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0441.jp2"}, "440": {"fulltext": "430 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ncourse of a few years, to disprove the stubborn law of\\nhybridism by producing one clear instance of transmu-\\ntation of species Is there no expectation of seeing one\\nsuch fact Ah, that troublesome law of hybridity\\nHas Professor Huxley ceased to regard it as a menace\\nto the Darwinian hypothesis x\\nThirdly. The theory of evolution of species into spe-\\ncies is confronted with numerous facts incapable of ad-\\njustment to it. There are no facts which contradict\\nthat of special creation.\\nBut, in the foregoing extract, Mr. Spencer intimates\\nthat the assertion we know no such phenomenon\\nas transmutation of species is open to criticism a\\nmild, a singularly mild, way of insinuating that we do\\npossess such knowledge. Now, what are his proofs In\\nthe first place, that the theory of evolution is much more\\nprobable than that of special creation In the second\\nplace, that millions of varieties have been produced,\\nand are being produced still In the third place, that\\nevolutions of species intra speciem are continually and\\nmarvellously occurring, as, for example, the wonderful\\nevolution of the oak from the acorn, of the man from\\nthe infant _\u00e2\u0096\u00a0 If any one thinks this a caricature, let him\\nread the argument in the Illustrations of Universal\\nProgress, which follows the passage that has been cited.\\n8. Mr. Spencer s philosophy, although ridiculously\\npretending to include an ethical element as a product\\nof evolution, makes no provision, and, from the nature\\nof the case, can make no provision, for a moral govern-\\nment, proceeding upon the great principle of justice,\\n1 Huxley s Origin of Species.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0442.jp2"}, "441": {"fulltext": "Spe^cep/s Agnostic Philosophy. 431\\nissuing a moral law as its rule, and administering\\nrewards to the good, punishments to the had. The con-\\nception of such a government by a non-moral ultimate\\nforce, evolving itself alike into virtue and vice, duty\\nand crime, is a supreme absurdity. An infinite scorpion\\ncontinuing to live, yet eternally darting its venomed\\nfangs into its own body, would furnish a poor illustra-\\ntion. What there is of character, the most brilliant\\ncrown of human nature and human achievement, of\\npiety and justice, of purity and truth, of charity, philan-\\nthropy and pity, of patriotism, honor and duty of the\\nnoblest principles and sentiments that inspire the heart\\nof man, is bound, in obedience to the necessarily-\\noperating law of dissolution, to sink, along with every\\nbase passion and criminal feature of humanity, into a\\ncommon mass of nebulous matter. Think of it char-\\nacter reduced to nebulous stuff What a philosophy\\nThere is a book, venerable with age, replete with\\nwisdom, and blazing with genius; containing the first\\ncosmogony which ever was written, proclaiming a per-\\nsonal God, a perfect moral code, the genesis and develop-\\nment of sin, an atoning Saviour, a renovating Spirit, a\\nsource of consolation amid life s trials, a peaceful death\\nbed, and a heavenly home of transcendent beauty, glory\\nand bliss a book which has, uninjured, passed through\\nan incessant storm of hostile criticism from Celsus to\\nthe closing decade of the nineteenth century, has through\\nall that period received the suffrages not only of saints,\\nbut philosophers, has always refused to be coordinated\\nwith the theosophies of the world, and is more and more\\ndisplacing them and pushing them out of existence,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0443.jp2"}, "442": {"fulltext": "432 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndisseminating its doctrines in well-nigh all the languages\\nof earth, and winning its way to almost universal accept-\\nance this book, it might have been supposed, would\\nsimply, as a religious philosophy, have been regarded\\nwith some respect, and treated with some decency by\\neven the consummate flower of evolution the head of\\nthe scientific agnostics. The expectation was ill-\\nfounded. He pours the gall and wormwood of sovereign\\ncontempt upon it and its doctrines. He pronounces its\\nhistories myths, spurns its God, spits upon its ethics,\\ntramples under foot its cross, and vilifies its Holy Ghost.\\nWhat right and title to arrogance so autocratic has\\none who affects to render worship to a god of forces\\na blind, impersonal thing that is neither conscious of the\\nworship paid to it, nor of evolving the worshipper, nor\\nof its own existence I have not spoken depreciatingly\\nof Mr. Spencer s powers. He is a giant. He has piled\\nmountain upon mountain of scientific facts but stand-\\ning like a Titan upon the loftiest peak, and wielding\\nthe thunder-bolts of modern scientific hypotheses, he\\nwill be disappointed in reaching the heavens and scaling\\nthe battlements of biblical truth. He vividly describes\\nthe fright that seizes religion when face to face with\\nscience. 1 Is he not mistaken Why should religion\\nthe true religion be frightened Has she not, without\\nalarm, looked in the face the deists of Britain, the\\nencyclopedists of France, and, more formidable than\\nthey, the rationalistic scholars and the transcendental\\nphilosophers of Germany She still survives and it is\\nhardly probable that she would tremble lest the Bible s\\n1 First Prin., p. 101.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0444.jp2"}, "443": {"fulltext": "Spexcee s Agnostic Philosophy. 433\\nconsistent philosophy of creation should be overthrown\\nby a new speculative system, the cohesive principle of\\nwhich is that of self-contradiction, the parts of which\\nare only restrained from flying to pieces through the\\nforce of mutual repulsion by the temporary constriction\\nof ^fr. Spencer s genius.\\nMr. Spencer s system is not philosophical enough to\\nbe entitled to the designation human, for it conditions\\nits success upon the suppression of the common reason\\nand the common sentiment of mankind. It is not\\nreligious enough to be honored by the epithet heathenish,\\nfor the heathen profess to worship some god. The\\nAthenians were religious enough to erect an altar to\\nthe unknown God; the agnostics can erect no altar,\\nunless it be one inscribed to the Unknowable Mystery.\\nYet they tell us that they have a religion. What can its\\nessence be but folly? what its ritual but pompous jar-\\ngon There would seem to be but one resort to them\\nto worship themselves as the highest products of evolu-\\ntion and that would be tantamount to worshipping\\nincarnate self-contradictions. One would prefer to pay\\nhis homage to abstract logic, for that has, at least, the\\nmerit of being self -consistent, and is chargeable with no\\nmoral defect.\\nThe foreo oing argument has not been concerned about\\nthe scientific aspects of Ifr. Spencer s system, but about\\nhis fundamental assumptions. Grant him his cry:\\nGreat is the Diana of Evolution and the maid of\\nfrozen chastity may. for aught one cares, be the prolific\\nmother of ever so numerous a progeny of rotations,\\ndifferentiations, segregations, and equilibrations; may", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0445.jp2"}, "444": {"fulltext": "434 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\neven be given to habitual dissipation, which may bring\\non dissolution. It is this great Diana of evolution and\\nher reputed sire Blind Energy whose existence has\\nbeen challenged as a creation of Spencerian mythology.\\nIt is such substitutes for providence and for God that\\none labors for ability to contemn.\\nIt will only be added that, in one respect, it may be\\nconceded, Mr. Spencer has furnished a conspicuous\\nproof of the evolution for which he contends. His\\nsystem is an instance of a homogeneous nebula, revolving\\nin circles, differentiating wonderfully into the hetero-\\ngeneous, and destined by an inevitable dissipation of\\nforce to ultimate in dissolution.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0446.jp2"}, "445": {"fulltext": "PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.\\nSUCH is the somewhat remarkable title of what\\nclaims to be a new and progressive science. It has\\nbeen observed by more than one writer favorable to\\nthe new science, that most of those who have written\\nin regard to the question have been professed physiolo-\\ngists. This fact is significant, in view of the ground\\nassumed by many, that this new science is destined to\\nwork a revolutionary change in what they call the old\\npsychology. The psychologist is advertised that the\\nform in which he has been accustomed to view and to\\nstate his science must undergo important, and, it may be,\\nradical alterations. He is informed that his method of\\ninquiry has not been sufficiently scientific that is, that\\nhe has not proceeded by experiment, the results of which\\ncan be tested by external observation. To the psycholo-\\ngist, therefore, the questions raised by what is called the\\nscience of Physiological Psychology are of very great\\nsignificance. They involve the right of psychology to be\\nregarded as an independent science.\\nIn any treatment of this subject, almost everything\\nwill depend upon the point of view from which it is\\ncontemplated. We may assume or deny the assumption,\\nthat the mind and the body are essentially different, that\\nthe former is spiritual, the latter material. If we adopt\\nthe first supposition namely, that the mind and the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0447.jp2"}, "446": {"fulltext": "436 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbody are different substantive entities it would follow\\nthat as they cannot be reduced to unity, cannot be\\ntreated as identical, there are two different sciences\\nwhich are conversant about them respectively. As all\\nsciences are defined from the object-matter about which\\nthey are concerned, we would have to consider psychology\\nas the science which is concerned about the mind, and\\nphysiology as one of the sciences which are concerned\\nabout the body. They could no more be reduced to the\\nunity of one and the same science than could the mind\\nand the body be reduced to the unity of one and the same\\nsubstantive entity.\\nBut as the mind and the bodily organism are obviously\\nrelated to each other, as they act and react upon one\\nanother, there may be, even upon the assumption of\\ntheir essential difference, a special science which would\\nbe concerned about their relation a science which may,\\nnotwithstanding its objectionable ambiguity, be con-\\nceded the title of physiological psychology.\\nThe subject, however, may be contemplated from\\nanother point of view. The second supposition may be\\nadopted; and the inquiry may begin, either with the\\nassumption of the substantive identity of mind and\\nbody, or with the assumption that such an identity may\\nbe proved by a thorough-going series of experiments.\\nIt is not here proposed, even were there ability to do\\nso, to enter into an exposition or discussion of the details\\nof the subject. What is intended is, first, to make some\\nremarks concerning the one science of physiological\\npsychology, in accordance with the claim that it can\\nonly be admitted to exist as contradistinguished to physi-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0448.jp2"}, "447": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 437\\nology on the one hand, and to psychology on the other;\\nsecondly, to offer some criticisms npon the counter-claim\\nthat physiology and psychology are reducible to the\\nunity of one and the same science, with the name of\\nphysiological psychology and, thirdly, to consider the\\nultimate ground upon which it is claimed that what have\\nbeen usually regarded as the two different, but related,\\nsciences of physiology and psychology may be reduced\\nto unity as one and the same science to-wit, that the\\nmind and the body are, in the last analysis, not two\\ndifferent, although related, entities, but one and the\\nsame entity.\\nI. Let us begin with the admission of the legitimacy\\nof the attempt to construct a science which is concerned\\nabout the relations of the mind and the body; and the\\nterm mind is here used, not in its restricted sense as\\nsynonymous with the intellect proper, the cognitive\\npower, but in its widest signification, as employed inter-\\nchangeably with the term soul.\\n1. The most satisfactory work upon this subject, on\\nthe whole, which I have encountered is the Physiological\\nPsychology of Prof. G. T. Ladd, of Yale University.\\nIt is sufficiently elaborate to satisfy a not extravagant\\ndemand for minuteness of detail it is marked by con-\\nspicuous ability; and it is impartial enough to disarm\\nof most of their prejudices both the pure psychologist\\nand the pure physiologist. One can perceive no ground\\nat all for discontent on the part of the latter, since the\\nbulk of the work is occupied with physiological investi-\\ngation and exposition, and the former, although at first", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0449.jp2"}, "448": {"fulltext": "438 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nlie may feel that too much is conceded for him, and may\\ntremble for fear the ark of his science may be surren-\\ndered to the materialistic physiologist, will be likely,\\nere he gets through, to see that his apprehensions were\\ngroundless. As Professor Ladd is one of the fairest and\\nand most moderate of the advocates of a physiological\\npsychology, let us hear him in explanation of the\\nscience\\nWe may define Physiological Psychology as the science which\\ninvestigates the phenomena of human consciousness from the\\nphysiological point of view or method of approach. Remember-\\ning the cautions which have already been expressed, we may also\\nsay that it is the science of the human mind as investigated by\\nmeans of its relations to the human physical organism. A\\nmore accurate definition, however, requires that something further\\nbe said concerning the nature and method of that science which\\nfurnishes the adjective [physiological] to our compound term.\\nHuman physiology is the science of the functions (or modes of\\nthe behavior in its correlated action) of the human physical\\norganism. As studied at present it implies an acquaintance with\\nthe fields of gross and special microscopic anatomy (histology),\\nof embryology and the general doctrine of development, of biology,\\nincluding the allied phenomena of plant life, of molecular\\nphysics and chemistry as related to the structure and action of\\nthe bodily tissues, and of other forms of kindred knowledge. It is\\nonly a relatively small part of this vast domain, however, with\\nwhich Physiological Psychology has directly to deal; for it is\\nonly a part of the human organism which has any direct relation\\nto the phenomena of consciousness. As will appear subsequently,\\nit is with the nervous system alone that our science has its chief\\nimmediate concern. Indeed, it might be described though in a\\nstill somewhat indefinite, but more full and complete, way as the\\nscience which investigates the correlations that exist between the\\nstructure and the functions of the human nervous mechanism and\\nthe phenomena of consciousness, and which derives therefrom\\nconclusions as to the laws and nature of the mind. x\\n1 Phys. Psychology, p. 4.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0450.jp2"}, "449": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 439\\nIn this descriptive definition of the science with which\\nhe is dealing, Professor Ladd, first, acknowledges, if he-\\nis not misunderstood, that it is concerned about the\\nrelations of mind and body as constituting its proper\\nobject-matter, and so far the psychologist, holding, as\\nhe does, to the existence of the mind as a separate\\nessence, has nothing to object; but, secondly, one look-\\ning at this account of the science from that point of view\\nof the psychologist is hardly prepared to receive, without\\nsome qualifying explanation, the statement that, investi-\\ngating a the correlations that exist between the structure\\nand the functions of the human nervous mechanism and\\nthe phenomena of consciousness, physiological psychol-\\nogy derives therefrom conclusions as to the laws and\\nnature of the mind. The psychologist admits that,\\nfrom these correlations, it is legitimate to derive con-\\nclusions as to the modes in which the mind receives\\nimpressions from the bodily organism, and through it\\nfrom the external world, and in which it transmits its\\nactivities to the bodily organism, and through it to the\\nexternal world and also as to the laws by which that\\ninteraction of the mind and external matter is con-\\ntrolled. But he is not ready to concede that from that\\nsource conclusions may be derived as to the nature of\\nthe mind itself, and the laws by which that nature is\\ngoverned. This science is concerned about the correla-\\ntions of mind and body, and not directly about the\\nnature and the laws of either the mind or the body.\\nPsychology, the peculiar province of which is to deal\\nwith the one, and physiology, the distinctive office of\\nwhich is to deal with the other, furnish the conditions", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0451.jp2"}, "450": {"fulltext": "440 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nupon which the construction of this new science becomes\\npossible; but it is no more competent to talk of the\\nphysiologist, as such investigating the laws and nature\\nof the mind itself than to speak of the psychologist, as\\nsuch discharging a similar office in regard to the\\nnervous mechanism itself. This we must maintain, or\\nacknowledge what most of the cultivators of the new\\nscience claim the unity of psychology and physiology,\\nand consequently the unity of mind and body.\\n2. It is an undeniable fact that the mind and the\\nbody are intimately related, that they constantly act and\\nreact upon each other. The induction upon which this\\ngeneralization is based is too wide, too extended, too\\ncontinuous to allow of any question as to its validity.\\nThere is no need to enter into specifications. The\\nstrictest psychologist must admit that the body acts upon\\nand influences the mind, and the strictest physiologist\\nmust confess that the mind acts upon and influences the\\nbody. It is this closeness of intimacy, this uniformity\\nof interaction between the two, which, considered by\\nitself alone, occasions the possibility of idealism, or of\\nmaterialism, or of absolute identity. It gives rise to a\\npresumption in favor of either a two-faced unity or\\nan absolute unity, a presumption which must be checked\\nby other facts derived from the constitution of the body\\nand the nature of the mind. This admitted reciprocal\\ninfluence renders a psycho-physical science legitimate\\nand interesting a science which shall be devoted to the\\ninvestigation of the facts, the nature, and the laws per-\\ntaining to that influence. Let the development of the\\nscience proceed. It is sometimes more than hinted that", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0452.jp2"}, "451": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology. 441\\nthe psychologist would discourage its cultivation because\\nlie fears that materialism may be established. With\\nequal justice might it be intimated that the physiologist\\nwould be opposed to its advancement because of his\\napprehension that idealism may be proved.\\nCertainly the psychologist entertains no fear that the\\nmind will ever be evinced to be material. Whether,\\nupon the supposition of the essential difference betwixt\\nspirit and matter, this new science will, in the attempt\\nto solves the problem of the mode of their interaction,\\nsucceed better than the old methods of solution furnished\\nby the hypotheses of physical influence, of a plastic\\nmedium, of occasional causes, and of preestablished har-\\nmony, remains to be seen. The presumption against its\\nsuccess is formidable; but modern science, like the\\nlamp of Aladdin, is achieving undreamt-of wonders.\\nPerhaps it may yet throw a bridge across this hitherto\\nimpassable chasm. That it will ever avail to show that\\nthe problem is non-existent, that there is no chasm, and,\\ntherefore, no bridge is needed, credat Judaeus Apella,\\nnon ego.\\n3. The conditions required for the development of a\\nscience of physiological psychology are such that it must\\nprove an extremely difficult thing to reach trustworthy\\nand satisfactory results. It has been remarked that\\nyoung inquirers are rushing into the field as adven-\\nturers do to a newly-discovered mine. Let them rush,\\nbut it behooves them to sit down and count the cost of\\nthe enterprise, the conditions which are necessary to its\\nsuccessful prosecution.\\n(1.) In order to one s thorough-going evolution of the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0453.jp2"}, "452": {"fulltext": "442 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nscience, he will need to possess a competent knowledge\\nboth of psychology and physiology, for the reason that\\neach is necessary to supply the means by which this\\nintermediary science can alone be constructed. Not\\nthat, as has already been intimated, it is meant that\\nthey supply the materials out of which a physiological\\npsychology is to be built up for that would be to sup-\\npose it a composite science, a supposition which is here\\nthrown out of account but they give knowledge without\\nwhich, as presupposed, no progress could be made in its\\norigination or development. In order to understand the\\nrelation between psychology and physiology, both terms\\nof the relation must be understood. Neither a mere\\npsychologist nor a mere physiologist could be a physio-\\nlogical psychologist. He must be both a psychologist\\nand a physiologist. The difficulty which would attend\\nthe attempt to master both of these sciences sufficiently\\nto qualify one to construct a new science depending upon\\nthem, in a great degree, for its trustworthy development\\nthis difficulty is enough to deter the youthful rushers\\ninto the new field from haste in reaching, and especially\\nin emitting, their conclusions. Some smatterers, how-\\never, alike in psychology and physiology, armed with a\\nvocabulary of technicalities, have announced the conclu-\\nsion that the old psychology, which began with the\\nmistakes of Aristotle, and has for ages perpetuated itself\\nthrough the blunders of misled genius, blunders blindly\\nfollowed by such men as Descartes and Locke, Reid,\\nStewart and Hamilton, having come to the hour of\\ndoom, must yield to the stabs of Fechner, Helmholtz\\nand Wundt, of Ribot, Spencer and Bain, and folding", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0454.jp2"}, "453": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 443\\nits musty drapery about it, fall gracefully at the base of\\nHerbart s statue. A little more mastery of both psychol-\\nogy and physiology, accompanied by a little more\\nmodesty, would suggest some delay in gazetting the\\ndeath of the old psychology.\\n(2.) This is not all. !Not only must there be a compe-\\ntent understanding of the sciences of psychology and\\nphysiology, but the relations between the mind and the\\nnervous organism must at least to some tolerable\\nextent be understood. These relations, according to\\nmost of the more recent investigators, exist in the region\\nof the brain. Now a psycho-physical science, it is\\nacknowledged by all its advocates, proceeds, on its physi-\\ncal side, by the method of external observation and\\nphysical experiment. It follows that, in order to its\\nbeing adequate, this method must be employed upon the\\nbrain of the living subject the living subject, because\\nthere are no activities in the brain of a dead man. It is\\nevident that the relations to be observed and experi-\\nmented upon are between psychical and physical activi-\\nties. The brain of the living, active man must, there-\\nfore, be the object of observation and experiment. E~o\\npost mortem process will answer. The obvious difficul-\\nties in the way of such experimentation have been con-\\nfessed by writers of opposite schools. M. Ribot, who\\npronounces absurd the question of the relations between\\nthe soul and the body as distinct substances, and talks\\napprovingly of a psychology without a soul, says\\nAs the whole experimental method reposes definitely in the\\nprinciple of causation, physiological psychology has two systems\\nof means at its disposal: to determine effects from their causes\\n(for example, sensation from excitation) to determine causes", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0455.jp2"}, "454": {"fulltext": "444 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nfrom their effects (internal states from the actions that exhibit\\nthem). There is, moreover, need that one, at least, of the two\\nterms of this indissoluble couple called the causal nexus be out-\\nside of ourselves, outside of consciousness; that there be a\\nphysical happening as such accessible to experiment. Without\\nthis condition, the experimental method cannot be employed. In\\nthe order of the phenomena that we call purely internal (the\\nreproduction of ideas, their association, etc. the cause and effect\\nare in ourselves. Although we cannot doubt that the law of\\ncausality reigns there as elsewhere; although, in some cases, the\\ncause can with certainty be determined; yet, as both causes and\\neffects are in us, and give no external value, their physical con-\\ncomitants being little known or inaccessible, all experimental\\nresearch in what concerns them is necessarily impossible. x\\nProfessor Ladd makes these striking observations\\nExner has well said that a physiology of the cerebral cortex\\nin the sense in which there is a physiology of the muscle, etc.,\\nscarcely exists at the present time. The reasons for such a de-\\nficiency lie partly in the very nature of this organ, and the place\\nit holds within the animal economy; as well as partly, perhaps,\\nin certain prejudices which have hindered the physical theory of\\na material structure so intimately related to the action of the\\nmind. The cerebral cortex of the animals is experimentally ap-\\nproached only by overcoming immense difficulties. Moreover,\\nthose physical and chemical processes of the cerebral substances,\\nto which we must look for any strictly scientific understanding of\\nits physiology, are placed almost utterly beyond reach of investi-\\ngation. Reasoning must fill up with conjecture the great gaps\\nthat lie between a very complex series of physical occurrences,\\nonly a part of which are observable, on the one side, and on the\\nother, an equally complex group of psychical occurrences. 2\\nIt must be confessed that the difficulties which oppose\\nthe attainment of any definite results from experimental\\nobservation are very great, both on the side of the bodily\\n1 German Psychol, of To-day. Trans, by Prof. J. M. Baldwin,\\npp. 13, 14.\\n2 Physiol. Psychology, p. 254.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0456.jp2"}, "455": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology. 445\\norganism and on that of the conscious mind. On the\\nside of the body, there is the opacity of the cranium,\\nwhich debars direct observation, except in cases in which\\nparts of it are removed by injury; and even then the\\narea of the brain that is disclosed to view is small, and\\nthe injury itself which causes the aperture induces an\\nabnormal condition of the nervous system. The three\\nlines of evidence bearing on the action of the brain,\\nwhich, according to Professor Ladd s statement, are\\nusually relied upon, are so imperfect that their results\\nare matters of debate among experimenters and ob-\\nservers themselves. These are the evidences from ex-\\nperimentation, from pathology, and from histology and\\ncomparative anatomy. These, even so far as they go, are\\nattended with doubt and uncertainty, and are employed\\noften, not without danger and not without hindrance, on\\nethical grounds but the chief consideration is that they\\ncannot, from the nature of the case, go far enough to\\nyield satisfactory results. The analogy furnished by\\nexperiments upon the brain of living animals cannot be\\nverified by similar experiments upon the brain of the\\nliving human subject. The inferential argument, de-\\nrived from this source, is, to a great extent, a mere\\nbegging of the question.\\nOn the side of the mind, the difficulties are no less\\nformidable. Here the appeal must be to consciousness\\nalone; but consciousness is a very poor informant in\\nregard to the states, or even the activities, of the brain,\\nand, consequently, of the relations subsisting between\\nthem and the states and activities of the mind. We\\nknow by experience that we are far more distinctly con-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0457.jp2"}, "456": {"fulltext": "446 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nscions of a cramp in a finger or a toe than we are of the\\nmolecular agitations in the mass of the cerebrum.\\nWere it supposed that, under the application of some\\npowerful electric light, the cranium might be rendered\\ntransparent, and the inner structure of the brain of a\\nsound living man be revealed to microscopic observation,\\nit might happen that a synchronous correspondence\\nwould be noticeable between certain acts of the mind\\nand certain movements in the cerebral mass; but even\\nupon that extraordinary supposition not yet realized\\nin fact it would be impossible to observe the mental\\nacts themselves, and might be impossible to observe the\\ncorresponding agitations in the cerebral nerves for, if,\\nwhen some great nerve is under the dissecting knife,\\nlaid open to inspection, no microscope reveals its molec-\\nular movements, what reason would there be for believ-\\ning that such movements would be perceptible in the\\nextremely attenuated nerves which ramify through the\\nphysical mass of the brain\\nSuch are some of the difficult conditions upon which,\\nwith the admission of an essential difference between\\nthe mind and the body, the attempt must be made to\\nconstruct a psycho-physical science. Such a science may\\nbe legitimate, and may be in the process of formation,\\nbut the likelihood is that, whatever may be its growth,\\nit must ever continue to be incomplete. Its advance-\\nment towards perfection must be, for obvious reasons,\\nmore difficult than that of either psychology or physi-\\nology, between which it mediates, and the relations of\\nwhich, inadequately mastered as they themselves are, it\\nprofesses to expound. Still, so long as it is not denied", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0458.jp2"}, "457": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 447\\nthat psychology and physiology are different and incom-\\nmiscible sciences, growing out of the substantive and\\nindestructible difference between the immortal spirit\\nand its mortal environment, it is not intended to dis-\\nparage the claims or the aspirations of a psycho-physical\\nscience. What it is designed to say is that the old\\npsychologist, and the old physiologist as well, will be\\nmore apt to reap substantial fruits, each from the culti-\\nvation of his own field, than will this new adventurer\\nthe physiological psychologist; and to this opinion one\\nis naturally led by the fact that the labors which have\\nso far been expended in the new field have chiefly inured\\nto the advantage of physiology, notwithstanding that\\nthe title Physiological Psychology seems to be in the\\ninterest of psychology.\\nII. I proceed to submit some criticisms upon the\\nclaim that psychology and physiology are reducible to\\nunity as one and the same science, under the names of\\nphysiological psychology and psycho-physics.\\n1. The presumption is mightily against this claim.\\nFrom the days of Plato and Aristotle, the great body\\nof philosophers, scholars and scientific thinkers have\\nadmitted the distinction between the sciences of psychol-\\nogy and physiology a distinction founded upon the\\nconceded difference between the mind and the body.\\nThis presumption can neither be ignored nor despised.\\nIt is venerable and deserves to be treated with respect.\\nIt is true that there have been pure idealists and pure\\nmaterialists. They were naturally led, by their funda-\\nmental assumption of monism, to regard the science of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0459.jp2"}, "458": {"fulltext": "448 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nmind and that of matter as radically one and the logic\\nof their views consistently enforced the reduction of the\\ngenerally acknowledged two sciences to unity. They,\\nhowever, have been exceptions to the general rule. This\\nclass, let it be observed, were pure idealists or pure ma-\\nterialists. Such men, for instance, as Plato and Berke-\\nley, although predominantly idealistic, could not be\\nincluded in it. Neither could Aristotle be assigned to it,\\nalthough predominantly empirical, since he admitted a\\ndistinction between matter and spirit. This was the\\njudgment of so profound a historian of philosophy as\\nSchwegler; and Sir W. Hamilton, whose learning as\\na critic of philosophy has perhaps never been surpassed,\\nargued to prove that Aristotle was a natural realist.\\nTo this it must be added that by no means all of the\\nmodern advocates of psycho-physics have favored the\\nreduction of psychology and physiology to unity as one\\nand the same science. Those who have done so are as\\nyet exceptional thinkers, such as Helmholtz, Ribot and\\nperhaps Wundt, on the continent, and the British\\nwriters Spencer and Bain. Lotze is charged by Ribot,\\nin his German Psychology of To-day, not only with\\nhaving been too pure a psychologist, but with having\\nbeen too much of a metaphysician. Even Fechner, who\\nis represented as deriving his true glory from his\\nwork in psycho-physics, is quoted by the reviewer of the\\nGerman psychology as saying: I understand by\\npsycho-physics an exact theory of the relations of soul\\nand body, and, in a general way, of the physical world\\nand the psychical world. M. Ribot himself thus pro-\\nceeds to interpret Fechner s doctrine", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0460.jp2"}, "459": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 449\\nThe sciences of nature, long since in possession of their\\nprinciples and method, are upon a road of continuous progress.\\nOn the other hand, the sciences of spirit psychology and logic\\nat least, have also had their foundations in a measure laid. On\\nthe contrary, the science of the reciprocal relations of body and\\nspirit is far less advanced than the two groups of sciences just\\nnamed, between which it occupies an intermediate position.\\nTo all this, no doubt, it will be answered, that science\\nhas broken the shackles of mediaeval despotism, that it\\nis no longer amenable to authority, and that it has de-\\nmonstrated by actual instances its right and its ability\\nto revolutionize the opinions of the world. All this may\\nbe conceded. The liberty of science to pursue its inde-\\npendent investigations is now, on almost all hands,\\nfreely admitted. It is as vain to check it as to attempt to\\nput a yoke upon light. The effort may be relegated to\\nthe Vatican as the heir of mediaeval principles. But\\nthere are two considerations which cannot be over-\\nlooked.\\nIn the first place, opinions which have been univer-\\nsally held have never yet been revolutionized by unveri-\\nfied hypotheses, whether those opinions have been phil-\\nosophical, scientific or religious. They constituted\\npresumptions that had to be overthrown by proofs. In\\nsome cases the proofs have rebutted the presumptions,\\nbut there have been others, in which the proofs have\\ndemolished the hypotheses, and the old doctrines have\\nheld their seat. Let the proofs be furnished that the\\nsoul and the body are not as they have been believed to\\nbe from the beginning of the world different entities,\\nand the proofs will consequently be supplied that the\\nsciences of psychology and physiology are not as has", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0461.jp2"}, "460": {"fulltext": "450 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbeen generally maintained two distinct sciences.\\nUntil the proofs are forthcoming, no ingenious hypothe-\\nsis will rebut the presumption derived from the ancient\\nfaith of the race.\\nIn the second place, the instances in which a thorough-\\ngoing revolution of opinion has been effected have occur-\\nred in the physical or in the speculative sphere. In the\\nformer, may be mentioned the opinions formerly held\\nas to the centre of the solar system, the figure of the\\nearth and the existence of antipodes in the latter, the\\nviews which prevailed among philosophers, that a mental\\nimage intervenes in sense-perception between the per-\\ncipient subject and the external object, and that con-\\nsciousness is restricted to the cognizance of subjective\\nphenomena but in the moral sphere the case is different.\\nThe geo-cerutric theory as to the planetary system has\\nbeen demolished, but the theo-centric theory as to the\\nmoral system never has, although atheists, both scientific\\nand philosophic, have been hammering at it for ages.\\nSo with regard to the accountability of man to a moral\\nlawgiver and ruler, the seat of responsibility in the\\npersonal self, the existence of conscience, and the like.\\nThe doctrines concerned about the foundations of morals\\nand religion have always stood, and stand now, impreg-\\nnable. They have never been revolutionized. Now the\\nhypothesis which is here combatted strikes at the very\\nfoundations of morals and religion. Science some\\nscience may elaborately try to prove that there is no\\nreal difference between a moral principle and a sensa-\\ntion. If it succeed, it would accomplish the moral\\ndisintegration of society, and plant its flag of triumph", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0462.jp2"}, "461": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 451\\nupon the wreck if it fail, it must experience the fate of\\nthe unsuccessful revolutionist. Science is free; let it\\nrevolutionize, if it can, for, as Burke says, Hoary-\\nheaded error is not the more venerable on that account. 7\\nIf it cannot, it will have to confess that hoary-headed\\ntruth has on that account a venerable presumption in its\\nfavor.\\n2. The investigations of the sciences of psychology\\nand physiology proceed by different methods.\\n(1.) It is uot designed to say that the ultimate source\\nof authority in these sciences is different. In both the\\nappeal for ultimate authority must be made to conscious-\\nness. Neither can reach higher proof than conscious-\\nness; and, therefore, both stand, in this regard, upon\\nthe same foot. The claim, although often preferred by\\nthe exalters of natural science in contradistinction to\\nmental, is utterly inadmissible that the proof of the\\nbody s existence and activities rests upon surer ground\\nthan that of the mind s. Ultimately, the proof of the\\nformer depends upon the testimony of consciousness.\\nLet the question be asked, Why am I sure of bodily\\npleasure or pain as facts? and the answer must be,\\nBecause I am conscious of them. The ground of cer-\\ntainty is the same as that upon which I depend in regard\\nto mental phenomena I am conscious of them. Take\\naway consciousness, and what would remain of our\\nknowledge of the phenomenal changes in our own\\nbodies As much as remains to the body in the coffin,\\nto a corpse shocked by galvanism or undergoing the\\nprocess of cremation.\\n(2.) Eor is it intended to say that the statement of", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0463.jp2"}, "462": {"fulltext": "452 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe difference between the sciences is satisfactory, which\\nis sometimes made namely, that one pursues the\\nmethod of internal, the other the method of external,\\nobservation. The inquiry at once arises, as observation\\nimplies an observer, What is the observer Manifestly,\\nthe mind for no one would be so destitute of mind as\\nto assert that observation may proceed without a mind\\nto observe but observation by the mind, whether inter-\\nnal or external, is precisely consciousness. The mind s\\ninstrument of observation is its consciousness. So that,\\nwhether the mind observes internal or external phe-\\nnomena, its chief, its primary instrument of observa-\\ntion is attention, which is but intensified consciousness.\\nIn this respect, therefore, the sciences of psychology and\\nphysiology are not different, but similar.\\nSo far for the observer and the main instrument of\\nobservation but if the question be, What is it which is\\nobserved what the objects upon which observation\\nterminates the answer must be in the one case, that of\\ninternal observation, the phenomena of the mind in the\\nother, that of external observation, the phenomena of\\nthe body, and one cannot help pausing to say that the\\nadmission of a difference between the two methods pi\\ninternal and external observation is the admission of the\\ndifference between the two sciences employing them,\\neach being concerned about an object-matter different\\nfrom that with which the other deals. There could be\\nno unification of these sciences.\\n(3.) The real difference between the methods of the\\ntwo sciences is that one proceeds purely by conscious-\\nness, while the other, besides involving consciousness,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0464.jp2"}, "463": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 453\\nproceeds by experiment with material, or, if that word\\nbe objected to, mechanical instruments. Psychology\\nknows no instrument of investigation but consciousness,\\nbecoming, in this relation, introspection. Physiology\\nuses the hand, the scalpel, the microscope, the galvanic\\nbattery, the electric machine, mechanical excitants, and\\nnicely constructed contrivances for measuring the in-\\ntensity of influences upon the nervous system, and the\\ntime occupied by the passage of nerve-currents from the\\nend-organs of the body to the brain, and from the brain\\nto those organs. The living subject is here spoken of.\\nUpon the body of a dead man other instruments, chemi-\\ncal, for example, may be employed but how such post\\nmortem experiments could prove anything in regard to\\npsychic states or acts, it may be left to him to show who\\nmaintains the identity of psychology and physiology.\\nThe claim which such a scientist sets up is preposter-\\nous, that the activities of the mind can be measured. To\\npretend that physical measurements can be applied to\\nthe mind, in any sense, is miserably to beg the question\\nof the unity of the mind and the body and if the pure\\nmaterialist has never yet, by all the ingenuity of the\\nmost elaborate arguments, succeeded in reducing the\\nmind and the bodily organism to the unity of one sub-\\nstantive entity, it is not likely that it will be accom-\\nplished by the materialistic psycho-physicist through\\nmeasurements with his mechanical instruments. His\\nmeasurements necessarily are judged of by the senses.\\nCan they penetrate into the arcana of the mind When\\nhe can see a thought, or hear a feeling, or touch a voli-\\ntion, when he can taste a moral judgment, or smell a", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0465.jp2"}, "464": {"fulltext": "454 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nreligious sentiment lie may succeed in applying to\\nthem his mechanical instruments; hardly until then.\\nHe deceives himself when he supposes that in measuring\\nthe physical he is measuring the psychical. These meas-\\nurements must be understood as applicable only to the\\nphysical conditions upon which mental energy, intellec-\\ntual, aesthetical, voluntary or moral is manifested. They\\ncan only be expressed in the terms of physical science,\\nand it is absurd at least, it begs the question to\\nassume their applicability to the mental energies, con-\\nsidered as such. These energies cannot be subjected to\\nphysical measurement, either as regards intensity or\\ntime.\\nIt deserves to be considered, further, that the measure-\\nments, such as they are, are of necessity only partial.\\nA sympathetic reviewer in the Encyclopedia Britannica\\nof Weber s law [concerning the measurement of psychic\\nphenomena] makes these remarks\\nWeber s law, it must be added, holds only within certain\\nlimits. In the chemical senses of taste and smell experiments\\nare almost impossible. It is not practicable to limit the amount\\nof the stimulus with the necessary exactitude, and the results\\nare further vitiated by the long continuance of the physiological\\neffects. The same considerations apply with still more force to\\nthe organic sensations, and the results in the case of temperature\\nsensations are completely uncertain. The law is approximately\\ntrue in the case of sight, hearing, pressure, and the muscular\\nsense most exactly in the case of sound. As this is the sense\\nwhich affords the greatest facilities for measuring the precise\\namount of the stimulus, it may perhaps be inferred that, if we\\ncould attain the same exactitude in the other senses, with the\\nelimination of the numerous disturbing influences at work, the\\nlaw would vindicate itself with the same exactitude and certainty.\\nIt is further to be noted, however, that even in those senses in\\nwhich it has been approximately verified, the law holds with", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0466.jp2"}, "465": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 455\\nstringency only within certain limits. The results are most exact\\nin the middle regions of the sensory scale; on the contrary, when\\nwe approach the upper or lower limit of sensibility, they become\\nquite uncertain.\\nBut lest this citation from even an advocate of\\nWeber s law of psychic measurement should be imputed\\nto the anxiety of Dr. Dry-as-dust to save the old\\npsychology from utter discomfiture, let us listen to the\\nwords of the canonist of scientific experimentation, the\\nable expounder of the philosophy of associational empi-\\nricism. Says John Stuart Mill\\nBut if, on the other hand, it is out of our power to produce\\nthe phenomenon, and we have to seek for instances in which\\nnature produces it, the task before us is one of quite a different\\nkind. Instead of being able to choose what the concomitant cir-\\ncumstances shall be, we have now to discover what they are;\\nwhich, when we go beyond the simplest and most accessible cases,\\nit is next to impossible to do, with any precision and complete-\\nness. Let us take, as an exemplification of a phenomenon which\\nwe have no means of fabricating artificially, a human mind.\\nNature produces many; but the consequence of our not being able\\nto produce it by art is, that in every instance in which we see a\\nhuman mind developing itself, or acting upon other things, we\\nsee it surrounded and obscured by an indefinite multitude of\\nunascertainable circumstances, rendering the use of experimental\\nmethods almost delusive. We may conceive to what extent this\\nis true, if we consider, among other things, that whenever nature\\nproduces a human mind, she produces, in close connection with\\nit, also a body; that is, a vast complication of physical facts, in\\nno two cases perhaps exactly similar, and most of which (except\\nthe mere structure, which we can examine in a sort of coarse way\\nafter it has ceased to act) are radically out of the reach of our\\nmeans of exploration. If, instead of a human mind, we suppose\\nthe subject of investigation to be a human society or state, all the\\nsame difficulties recur in a greatly augmented degree.\\nWe have thus already come within sight of a conclusion,\\nwhich the progress of the inquiry will, I think, bring before us\\nwith the clearest evidence; namely, that in the sciences which", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0467.jp2"}, "466": {"fulltext": "456 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndeal with phenomena in which artificial experiments are impos-\\nsible (as in the case of astronomy), or in which they have a very\\nlimited range (as in physiology, mental philosophy, and the\\nsocial science), induction from direct experience is practiced at\\na disadvantage generally equivalent to impracticability; from\\nwhich it follows that the methods of those sciences in order to\\naccomplish anything worthy of attainment must be, to a great\\nextent, if not principally, deductive.\\nMr. Mill was a stout maintainer of the derivation of\\nall our knowledge from experience, but lie did not sink\\nthe mind and the body, on the one hand, or, on the other,\\npsychology and physiology into absolute unity. The\\njudicious considerations just quoted from such a man\\nought to bridle the impetuosity of the rushers, mechani-\\ncal apparatus in hand, into the field of physiological\\npsychology, in order to demonstrate by physical meas-\\nurement of psychic acts that the mind and the brain are\\nthe same, and that psychology and physiology are\\nreducible to unity.\\n(4.) This argument going to show that, in view of the\\nfact that psychology and physiology proceed in their\\ninvestigations by different methods, they cannot be one\\nand the same science, is, in some quarters, met by a\\ndenial that they employ different methods, and the asser-\\ntion that they use but one method or, at least, ought to\\nuse but one method. The method of internal observa-\\ntion and reasoning (or, as Stuart Mill calls it, deduc-\\ntion) is inadequate, false, effete. The old psychology,\\ntherefore, which employed that method must give way\\nto the new-comer, physiological psychology, or experi-\\nmental psychology. Its day is over, and it must be\\n1 Logic, Am. Ed., pp. 219, 220.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0468.jp2"}, "467": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 457\\nsummarily consigned to oblivion. This is the position\\nboldly maintained by M. Ribot, who, by the way, refers\\nto Stuart Mill as sustaining him; but if the passage\\nabove cited from Mr. Mill is taken into consideration,\\nit appears that the appeal to his authority, in this par-\\nticular matter, is erroneous and vain. The passages in\\nwhich M. Ribot assumes this stand are so dogmatic and\\nsupercilious that several extracts will be given. They\\nwill serve to indicate the animus and drift of some\\nmagnifiers of the science of psycho-physics.\\nAlthough it has cut a good figure enough, the old psychology\\nis doomed. In the new surroundings that have recently grown up\\nthe conditions of its existence have disappeared. Its methods do\\nnot suffice for the increasing difficulties of the task, for the grow-\\ning exigencies of the scientific spirit. It is compelled to live upon\\nits past. In vain its wisest representatives attempt a compromise,\\nand repeat in a loud voice that it is necessary to study facts, to\\naccord a large share to experience. Their concessions amount\\nto nothing. However sincere their intentions, in fact they do not\\nexecute them. As soon as they put hand to the work, the taste\\nfor pure speculation seizes upon them. Besides, no reform is\\npossible of that which is radically false, and the old psychology\\nrests upon an illegitimate conception, and should perish with\\nthe contradictions that are in it. The efforts that are made to\\naccommodate it to the exigencies of the modern spirit, to work a\\nchange in its real nature, bring only delusion. Its essential\\ncharacteristics remain always the same; one can show it in few\\nwords. In the first place, it is possessed of the metaphysical\\nspirit; it is the science of the soul; internal observation,\\nanalysis, and reasoning are its favorite processes of investigation;\\nit distrusts biological science, associates with it only in reluctance\\nand by necessity, and is ashamed to acknowledge its debt. Feeble\\nand old, it makes no progress, and asks only to be let alone, that\\nit may spend its age in peace. 1\\nFor the old school, since taste for internal observation and\\n1 Germ. Psychol., etc. Tran., p. 2.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0469.jp2"}, "468": {"fulltext": "458 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nsubtilty of spirit were exclusive signs of a call to psychology, the\\nprogramme summed itself up in two words observation and rea-\\nsoning. Internal observation is, without doubt, the first step;\\nthere is always a necessary process of verification and interpreta-\\ntion; but it cannot be a method [N. B.]. To maintain this is to\\nforget or to disown entirely the conditions of a scientific method.\\nIf psychology can be constructed in this way, good eyes and fixed\\nattention will suffice for the construction of physiology.\\nFor the vague and common-place formula of the relations of\\nsoul and body, as the old school employs it, for the arbitrary and\\nbarren hypothesis of two substances acting upon each other, let us\\nsubstitute the study of two phenomena which have, for each\\nparticular case, so constant a connection that they can be most\\nexactly designated as one phenomenon of a double face. 2\\nUpon these excerpts from a diatribe, with judicial\\nsolemnity consigning the old psychology along with\\nthe old theology, of course to a seat on the bank of the\\nLethe, there to suck its thumb and drivel upon its beard,\\nuntil, in a fit of somnolence, it falls into the stream and\\nits meaningless existence is ended, one cannot restrain a\\nfew reflections.\\nFirst. The lofty disdain is admirable, with which\\nM. Ribot uses his psycho-physical staff to castigate\\nAristotle, Scaliger and Leibnitz, Kant and Cousin,\\nLocke and Reid, Stewart, Hamilton and the multitu-\\ndinous host of the old psychologists. Begone, he cries,\\nto your merited oblivion and, presto, they disappear\\ninto the chasm opened at the stamp of the great magi-\\ncian, and its jaws close over them forever.\\nSecondly. M. Ribot must have discovered a hitherto\\n1 Germ. Psychol., etc., Tran. p. 3.\\n2 Ibid., p. 8. One is reminded of Dr. Bain s double-faced\\nunity of the meaning of which it remains to inquire. Here\\nwe have explicitly a double-faced phenomenon; and the marvel is\\nthat it is two phenomena, and yet only one phenomenon!", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0470.jp2"}, "469": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 459\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2unknown race of peculiarly wise psychologists, whom he\\nrepresents as with loud outcries and vain attempts at\\ncompromise summoning their deaf brethren to the duty\\nof paying attention to facts and experience. Does he\\nmean to say that there is a class of psychologists who\\ndeny that mental phenomena are facts, and confine expe-\\nrience to the external and sensible sphere? who regard\\nconsciousness as illusory in witnessing to the existence\\nof subjective activities, and as discharging its whole\\noffice in testifying to nervous impressions If there be\\nsuch a tribe of psychologists they would verily be rarae\\naves in terris, and M. Ribot would be entitled to the\\nlaurels of a discoverer. One craves to know who they\\nare and where they may be found.\\nThirdly. Our learned critic finds fault with the old\\npsychology, especially because it professes to be a\\nscience of the soul/ whereas the truth is that the only\\ngenuine psychology is a psychology without a soul. It\\nhas perpetrated the unpardonable blunder of supposing\\nthat there is any soul. It is thus founded on an illegiti-\\nmate conception. This is a damaging blow inflicted on\\nthe old psychology it knocks the spirit, all the life and\\nsoul, out of it but, without a pause to discuss the ques-\\ntion whether there be no soul and the body is the whole\\nof man, or to notice the remarkable admission made by\\nM. Ribot, that he is a man of no soul, one may properly\\nraise the inquiry with what consistency M. Ribot himself\\nemploys the term psychology. It certainly means, if\\nanything, a discourse concerning the soul it is a soul-\\nlogy. As M. Ribot expunges the psychical element the\\nsoul from man, he ought in consistency to strike out", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0471.jp2"}, "470": {"fulltext": "460 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthe psychical member in the word psychology, and\\nreduce it to the significant term logy and then pursuing\\nthe path of consistent expurgation he ought to change\\nthe compound title physiological psychology into physio-\\nlogical logy but as M. Kibot is too much of a scholar to\\nfather that jargon, let him consummate his consistency\\nby calling his science not physiological psychology, but\\nwhat he really means namely, physiology.\\nFourthly. To come directly to the point under con-\\nsideration that of method it may be asked what\\nM. Kibot can mean by his assertions concerning internal\\nobservation.\\nIn the first place, he says that there is no soul to be\\nobserved. Consequently, one must infer, internal obser-\\nvation is an observation of nothing. The whole process\\nor method (call it by what name you please) supposed\\nto be pursued by the old, radically false, psychology is a\\ndelusion; but he also says, Internal observation is,\\nwithout doubt, the first step. As there is nothing to be\\ninternally observed, there can, of course, be no internal\\nobservation. Nevertheless, internal observation is the\\nfirst step This contradiction could not be evaded by\\nsaying that the internal observation intended is one of\\nexternal phenomena, one originating from within and\\nterminating on facts without for observation is always\\ndefined from its object-matter. That is internal which\\nis concerned about internal facts, that external which is\\nconcerned about external facts. If M. Kibot did not\\nsee this, or seeing it would deny, he may be a brilliant\\nreciter of other men s opinions, but he has held his own\\npowers of analysis and discrimination in reserve.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0472.jp2"}, "471": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 461\\nIn the second place, although internal observation\\nis, without doubt, the first step in the process of investi-\\ngation, it cannot be a method. This can only mean\\nthat it cannot be a whole method. Suppose that to be so,\\nand where is the error in characterizing it as a part of\\na method, or as one of the methods pursued by psychol-\\nogy But if, argues he, internal observation is allowed\\nto be a psychological method, external observation may\\nwith equal justice be regarded as a physiological method\\nwhich is absurd for if psychology can be con-\\nstructed in this way, good eyes and fixed attention will\\nsuffice for the construction of physiology. Does\\nM. Ribot mean gravely to affirm that physiology pro-\\nceeds alone by the method of experimentation What\\nwould experiment avail without observation Why,\\nthen, may not physiology be said to employ the methods\\nof external observation and experiment but if so, what\\nobjection can there be to saying as he himself inti-\\nmates that internal observation is one of the methods\\nemployed by psychology, the others being, according to\\nhis statement, analysis and reasoning All this is\\ncaptious. As well might we say that it is wrong to\\nspeak of the methods of analysis and synthesis, or of\\nanalysis or synthesis being a method, inasmuch as they\\nare only one method. It can make no material difference\\nwhether they be called two methods, each complemen-\\ntary to the other, or one joint method. If M. Eibot\\nadmits that internal observation is the first step in inves-\\ntigation and he does he concedes that it is the first\\nelement of a method, a legitimate method and then he\\ncontradicts himself, for he asserts that it is falsely", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0473.jp2"}, "472": {"fulltext": "462 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nemployed by the old psychology. He might, however,\\nreply that what he insists upon is the insufficiency of\\ninternal observation alone; the necessity of its results\\nbeing verified and interpreted by external experiments\\nand as the old psychology depended upon an internal\\nobservation which was not thus confirmed, its internal\\nobservation was worthless. This brings us to the next\\nconsideration.\\nIn the third place, M. Ribot assigns as a reason why\\ninternal observation is the first step in investigation this\\na There is always a necessary process of verification and\\ninterpretation. The enunciation is ambiguous. It\\nmight be construed as meaning that internal observation\\nprecedes, or that it succeeds, verification and interpre-\\ntation. If, as is probable, it be meant that it precedes\\nthem, and is verified and interpreted by them, it is\\nconfessed that the mind, as an independent observer,\\nfurnishes materials for verification and interpretation\\nby external, physical experiment and then the question\\nis given up, for it is clear that a mere physical phenome-\\nnon cannot observe itself, and submit its observations\\nfor confirmation by the physical experiments, either of\\nitself, or of other phenomena like itself. M. Ribot may\\nbelieve this-. There may have been men who believed\\nthat the moon is made of green cheese; which is about\\nas reasonable as to believe that a physical phenomenon\\ncan observe, and experiment upon, itself. If it be meant\\nthat internal observation succeeds the verification and\\ninterpretation of external experiment, How can it be\\nrepresented as the first step in the investigating process\\nIt may be said that this is an ungrounded supposition", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0474.jp2"}, "473": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 463\\nbut a recent writer, who is professedly a great admirer\\nof Wunxlt, expressly says On the one hand, empirical\\ninvestigation must precede rational interpretation, and\\nthis empirical investigation must be absolutely unham-\\npered by fetters of dogmatism and preconception on\\nthe other hand, rational interpretation must be equally\\nfree in its own province. Empirical psychology\\nmust be concerned chiefly with the latter only as far as\\nrational inferences can be confirmed empirically in the\\nstage of development reached. This is indeed to secure\\nthe process at both ends, like the fastening of a suspen-\\nsion bridge by a buttress at each extremity: physical\\nexperiment is verified by rational interpretation, and\\nrational interpretation by physical experiment.\\nSo much is spoken ambiguously and unclearly in\\nregard to internal observation, or introspection, that, to\\nsecure clearness, one is compelled to resort to a dilemma.\\nEither the method of introspection supposes the soul,\\ncontradistinguished to the physical organism, or it does\\nnot. If the former, it is conceded that there are two\\ndistinct methods of investigation which cannot be con-\\nfounded. Internal observation would be concerned\\nabout the soul and external about the body the one\\npsychological in its character, the other physiological.\\nIt would follow that, as the tAvo methods could not be\\nreduced to one, neither can the two sciences of psychol-\\nogy and physiology be brought into unity.\\nIf the latter, if the method of introspection does not\\nsuppose the soul as contradistinguished to the physical\\norganism, it would indeed follow, from that supposition,\\nthat what is termed introspection would relate to the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0475.jp2"}, "474": {"fulltext": "464 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbodily organism alone. All that would be meant is that\\nthose parts of the body which are not superficial, but\\nveiled from the senses, must be investigated by internal\\nobservation, and those parts which are subject to sensible\\ninspection by external observation. Upon this hypothe-\\nsis, however, the difference is acknowledged between\\ninternal and external observation. The question, then,\\nmust be pressed, What is the differentia of internal\\nobservation or introspection What peculiar and dis-\\ntinctive office does it discharge The mind or the soul,\\nas a psychical entity contradistinguished to the physical\\norganism, has been discarded. It must be thought away.\\nConsequently, the physical organism alone exists as the\\ninvestigator and the object to be investigated. Now,\\nwhat is the process by which the brain, the heart, the\\nnerves afferent and efferent, are introspected? If the\\nanswer be, By consciousness, that implies, whatever else\\nmay be meant, a knowledge which something has of\\nitself. Now, what is that something The reply to that\\nquestion must not bring back the banished mind. It can-\\nnot, one must insist, be said to be a psychical something.\\nThat would be a soul, or the term is wrested from its\\nobvious significance. It cannot be said to be a mental\\nsomething, for that would be a mind. That which is\\nmental, and at the same time not mind, is not only\\ninconceivable, but self-contradictory. It must, there-\\nfore, be a physical, a bodily, something. Using the\\nbrain as representative of the whole nervous system, for\\nthe sake of brevity and the avoidance of a cumbersome\\nmultiplication of terms, it comes to this, that the brain\\nis conscious of itself. By its own consciousness it is\\ncapable of introspecting itself.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0476.jp2"}, "475": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology. 465\\nBut what does this amount to but maintaining that\\nthe brain has a mental power of internally observing\\nitself? and what is this but to bring back the mind,\\nwhich, by the hypothesis, was excluded. It is like the\\npitching out of nature with a fork; it is sure to come\\nback again. No, it may be replied, there is no mental\\nentity to which this power is to be attributed the men-\\ntal power attaches to the brain itself; but it must be\\nrejoined That which has a mental power belonging to\\nit must be a mental thing, a mental entity, else there is\\nan incongruity between the nature of the power and the\\nnature of the thing to which it belongs. It cannot be\\nsaid that the power is independent, that it implies no\\nentity to which it appertains, for it would follow that\\nthe power would not belong to the brain, and so it would\\nnot be the brain s power by which it is conscious of\\nitself; which would be to contradict the supposition\\nwith which we set out namely, that the brain knows\\nitself by its consciousness. The only other supposition\\nis that the consciousness, by which the brain knows\\nitself, is a physical knowledge, a corporeal conscious-\\nness a position which is not only a pure paradox as\\ntraversing the common usage of mankind, but a flat con-\\ntradiction to the particular usage of these very writers\\nthemselves, who uniformly speak of psychical and men-\\ntal powers and entitle their science psycho-physics or\\nphysiological psychology.\\nIt will not do to say that the question is a superfluous\\none, for there is no introspection. That would involve\\nself-contradiction. M. Eibot has already been quoted\\nas maintaining that the first step in investigation is in-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0477.jp2"}, "476": {"fulltext": "466 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nternal observation and what is that but introspection\\nThe question, then, returns, What is the something\\nwhich does the introspecting And, further, how does\\nit accomplish it Is it contended that it is the brain\\nwhich introspects itself It must be asked, How If\\nthe answer be, that the brain knows itself by a power\\nanalogous to that which the old psychologist imputes\\nto his supposititious but non-existent mind, that would\\nsimply be to deny and affirm a mind in the same\\nbreath: to deny that there is a mind which is not the\\nbrain, and to affirm that there is a mind which is the\\nbrain.\\nThis analysis leads us to a definite issue. He who\\ndenies that there are two separate but related methods\\nof investigation the one psychological, the other phys-\\niological, and affirms but one and the same method,\\ntakes this ground because, in his view, there are not two\\nseparate though related things to be investigated, but\\none and the same thing. This one thing is in one aspect\\npsychical and in another physical. So the one method\\nof its investigation is in one aspect psychical and in an-\\nother physical. Consequently there are not two separate\\nthough related sciences, psychology and physiology, but\\none and the same science with two aspects namely,\\npsycho-physics or physiologico-psychology. Of course,\\na science of the relations between a psychical entity and\\na physical entity is, according to this view, an impos-\\nsibility.\\nThe further consideration of this definite issue is for\\nthe present postponed, in order to give room for another\\nspecification in regard to method.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0478.jp2"}, "477": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 467\\nFifthly. The charge is preferred against the old\\npsychologists, that they proceed upon the method of\\nmetaphysics. The point of this indictment is that, as\\nthey employed a false method, they reached a false\\nresult. Xo true psychology can be a product of the\\nmetaphysical method. The old psychology is such pro-\\nduct; consequently, it must be regarded as a false\\npsychology. The only true method is that which pro-\\nceeds by observation and experiment. In this way alone\\ncan a true psychology be attained. There are not\\ntwo methods; there is only one the physiologico-\\npsychological, or psycho-physical.\\nThis criticism is not without justice, so far as those\\nthinkers are concerned, who, like Hegel and some of the\\nHegelians, first construct a metaphysical system, and\\nfrom it deduce a psychology. This is, indeed, a false\\nmethod of procedure. Psychology must begin with the\\nobservation of subjective phenomena, and by induction\\narrive at its generalizations but this is not the sense in\\nwhich the censure is passed. The charge is that the old\\npsychologists no sooner begin, by observing mental facts,\\nthan they proceed to speculate metaphysically, and to\\nstrive after metaphysical conclusions by the process of\\ninference.\\nThere is, it may be, a tendency on the part of some\\npsychologists to hasten unduly to the adoption of meta-\\nphysical inferences, but where this is the case the fault\\nis not in psychology itself, but in those who profess to\\nemploy its methods. The disposition, moreover, to run\\ninto this vicious procedure is not peculiar to psycholo-\\ngists. Every science has cultivators who are satisfied", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0479.jp2"}, "478": {"fulltext": "468 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nwith an insufficient induction of facts, and treat unveri-\\nfied hypotheses as established theories and it would be\\njust as fair to charge the physical sciences with inherent\\ndefectiveness of method because of this fault of some\\nscientists, as to censure the old physchology on account\\nof the undue precipitancy of some psychologists in\\nforming their general conclusions.\\nAll this, however, supposes the legitimacy of adopting\\nmetaphysical conclusions derived from a competent ob-\\nservation of psychical facts; but the gravamen of the\\ncharge under consideration is that the psychologist has\\nno right to deal with metaphysics at all, and that his\\nintroduction of it into his methods is to vitiate psychol-\\nogy itself, and destroy its claim to be considered a\\nscience in any proper sense. Now, none but a positivist\\nof the strict Comptist school can consistently take this\\nground. Pie limits the province of science to phenom-\\nena. If he generalizes, the result is a mere collection\\nof phenomena. If he arrives at unity and one cannot\\nsee how he can ever arrive at it where more than one\\nphenomenon is concerned the so-called unity is a mere\\nbundle of related phenomena. The thing he reaches is\\nsimply an assemblage of individual percepts but there\\nare, if we may credit Mr. Herbert Spencer s statement,\\nvery few scientific men, who maintain this position, who\\nare mere phenomenalists. The great majority affirm\\nand act upon the right to infer unphenomenal existence\\nfrom phenomenal facts and so far as appears, this is\\nnot only legitimate, but necessary. What scientific man\\nis there who does not assert the existence of force But\\nwhat scientific man is there who could justly claim that", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0480.jp2"}, "479": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 469\\nforce is phenomenal, in itself considered, apart from its\\nmanifestations Who would say that gravity, or any\\nother physical force, is observed by sense-perception?\\nHere, then, at the boundary of the phenomenal sphere\\nevery science touches the metaphysical; and to say\\nthat psychology, the science which does not primarily\\nemploy sense-perception, but chiefly relies upon the con-\\nsciousness of mental phenomena, is the only one which\\nhas no right to conclude to the unphenomenal, the meta-\\nphysical, is to talk absurdly. Let the positivist, if he\\nplease, gather up his phenomena and ligate them with\\nsome phenomenal bond, much as one ties together a\\nbundle of sticks with a piece of twine, and let him, if he\\nwill, call that a unity, no other scientific man, much less\\nthe psychologist, will be satisfied with his method. The\\npsychologist, notwithstanding the opprobrium of being\\ncharacterized as a fossil, will continue to collect the\\nsubjective phenomena of thinking, feeling and willing\\nupon an unphenomenal substance which thinks, feels\\nand wills. Call this metaphysics, and decry it, if one\\nchooses, but it is the necessary progress of the human\\nreason. Man is one. He cannot disintegrate himself.\\nHe who notes facts is impelled to go on and search for\\ntheir origins, their ends, their unity. He may, by an\\neffort of will, restrain himself to mere observation and\\nregistration but if this be all which is entitled to the\\nappellation of science, there are few, if any, sciences. It\\nis curious that M. Ribot, who urges this indictment of\\nbeing metaphysical against the old psychology, refers\\nwith approval to the opinion of Herbart, that it is\\nperhaps a necessity inherent in all psychology, even the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0481.jp2"}, "480": {"fulltext": "470 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nexperimental, to set out with some metaphysical\\nhypothesis.\\nIII. It remains, in accordance with the scheme of the\\ndiscussion, to consider the ultimate ground upon which\\nit is claimed that what have been usually regarded as\\nthe two different, but related, sciences of physiology and\\npsychology may be reduced to unity as one and the same\\nscience to-wit, that the mind and the body are, in the\\nlast analysis, not two different, although related, entities,\\nbut one and the same entity.\\nThere are some who, like Herbart, are spiritualists,\\nmaintaining that the soul is a simple, spiritual essence\\ndistinct from the bodily organism, but are, at the same\\ntime, associationalists in their psychology. Most, how-\\never, of the associationalist school of the present day\\nhold to the unity of the soul and the body. They con-\\ntend that they are one and the same entity. These\\nagain are subdivided into two classes first, those who,\\nlike M. Ribot, cannot be reckoned as substantialists, and\\nhold that the one entity is a phenomenon. They may\\nbe denominated phenomenalists or cerebralists. Sec-\\nondly, there are others who, like Professor Bain, profess\\nto admit that the one entity is a substance, but a sub-\\nstance which is alike mental and physical in the words\\nof Dr. Bain, a double-faced unity. All of these\\nthinkers are characterized by a common feature: they\\nagree in maintaining the doctrine of the associationalist\\nschool, that all knowledge originates in sense-experience,\\nand is developed from the materials furnished by it, in\\naccordance with the law of association.\\n1 Germ. Psychol., etc., p. 45.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0482.jp2"}, "481": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 471\\n1. I propose, therefore, without going into an elabor-\\nate discussion of that doctrine, to make some remarks\\nupon it, inasmuch as it favors the view of the unity of\\nthe soul and the body, and consequently of psychology\\nand physiology.\\n(1.) The consideration must be pressed, that, as water\\ncannot rise higher than its source, so, according to the\\ntheory before us, no knowledge, no principles, of the\\nhuman being can transcend the sense-experience in\\nwhich it is claimed that they originate. Dr. Dabney, in\\nhis able work on The Sensualistic Philosophy in the\\nNineteenth Century, makes, upon this point, remarks\\nwhich challenge attention:\\nBishop Butler grounded his immortal argument for the spir-\\nituality of that which thinks in us, partly upon the fact that the\\nmind not only performed acts of sense-perception through its\\nmaterial organs, but performed also abstract acts of intelligence,\\nsuch as the conception of general ideas, and of spirit, and God,\\nindependently of all organs of sense. Materialists now object\\nthat he was mistaken in his facts; they think they have proved\\nby physiological experiments and reasonings (see page 132) that\\nno mental act takes place, not even the most abstract, independent\\nof molecular brain-action. And this asserted fact is advanced with\\na triumphant air, as though it destroyed our argument. Turrettin,\\nwho used the same argument with that just cited from Butler s\\nAnalogy, two hundred years ago, has acutely anticipated and ex-\\nploded this objection. Suppose it be granted that a molecular\\nbrain-action does accompany the mind s action in thinking an\\nabstract thought, as that of God, spirit, self; can a nerve organ\\ngive the mind that purely spiritual idea? No cause can give\\nwhat it has not. How is it possible for an organ essentially\\nmaterial to give a result from which the material is absolutely\\nabstracted? A liver can secrete bile from blood; but the bile is\\nas truly a material liquid as the blood. Hence we confirm the\\ntestimony of our own consciousness that, in abstract thought, as\\nin spontaneous volition, the causative action is from the mind", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0483.jp2"}, "482": {"fulltext": "472 Discussion s of Philosophical Questions.\\ntowards the nerve organ. The excitement of the nerve-matter is\\nconsequence, and the spirit s spontaneity is cause. In objective\\nperception, the cognition of the new sense-idea in the conscious-\\nness follows the excitement of the nerve-matter, in the order of\\ncausation. And just so surely, in the case of spontaneous thought,\\nfeeling, and volition, mental action precedes the action of the\\nnerve-matter (if there is any) in the order of causation. So that\\nin the sense of Turrettin and Bishop Butler, these acts of soul are\\nindependent of material actions still; and the inference holds as\\nto the soul s distinct existence. 1\\nAgainst this reasoning sundry difficulties may be\\nsuggested. First, it may be asked, whether effects must\\nexist potentially in causes whether effects must be like\\ntheir causes. Secondly, it may be urged as an argumen-\\ntum ad hominem against the spiritualist that he holds\\nGod to be a spirit, and yet admits that he is the cause of\\nmatter which is wholly unlike himself. Thirdly, it may\\nbe said that the spiritualist contends that the mind is\\nspirit, and yet allows that it operates upon matter and\\nproduces material effects. Why may not matter operate\\nupon spirit and produce spiritual effects Fourthly,\\nthe ground may be taken that the first cause in a series\\nmay start into operation causes which are not like itself,\\nthe first being simply the condition upon which the other\\ncauses are brought into independent activity; and, if\\nso, sense-perceptions may be merely the conditions upon\\nwhich abstract and general notions may be formed.\\nFirst. The first and the fourth of these difficulties\\nmay be discharged by the reply that it is incompetent to\\nthe associationalist to raise them, for the reason that he\\nacknowledges the maxim: Like causes, like effects.\\nIt is incumbent upon him to show how, in accordance\\n^p. 161, 162.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0484.jp2"}, "483": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology. 473\\nwith that maxim sense-perception can be a cause of\\nabstract notions and beliefs in transcendental reality.\\nThe argument of Turrettin, Butler and Dabney holds\\nagainst him on his own ground.\\nSecondly. The second difficulty, as addressed to the\\nconcessions of the spiritualist, he is bound to meet. His\\nanswer is that God is a creative, and therefore, an\\nalmighty cause. He is also a free cause. He is not held\\nto be a cause operating in virtue of a blind, immanent\\nnecessity. If he could not create existences, which are\\nnot identical with himself, or unlike himself, he would\\nnot be omnipotent and free and that would be contrary\\nto the supposition that he is God. The analogy does not\\nhold between him and us as finite, which is used against\\nthe spiritualist.\\nThirdly. The third difficulty is one which does not\\nbear upon the position of the spiritualist, but does bear\\nwith peculiar force upon that of the associationalist.\\nThe latter contends that the materials out of which\\nabstract notions, beliefs in space, duration, cause, self,\\nand God, and moral convictions and religious sentiments\\nare constructed are furnished and only furnished by\\nsense-perception. Upon his principle, that like causes\\nare followed by like effects, it behooves him to hold and\\nto show that there is an analogy between these notions,\\nbeliefs, convictions and sentiments, on the one hand,\\nand the percepts derived from sense on the other. It\\nwill not do for him to say that they merely precede and\\nsucceed each other in a uniform manner. He must\\npoint out the resemblance between them. On his theory,\\nthe very stuff which is the basis of all mental concepts,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0485.jp2"}, "484": {"fulltext": "474 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nbeliefs, convictions, the highest as well as the lowest, is\\nsupplied by sense-experience. This he must show, or\\nbreak down in the development and application of his\\nfundamental ]aw. That he is unable to show this will be\\nevinced as the argument proceeds.\\nThe spiritualist is not pressed by this difficulty. True\\nhe concedes that there is interaction between the mind\\nand the nervous system, especially the brain and, fur-\\nther, that this interaction is in a certain sense causal;\\nbut it is with him an important question, what sort of\\ncausal influence is involved in this interaction. Upon\\nthat question it is sufficient to say that the causal rela-\\ntion is not one which necessarily supposes that the\\nnature of the cause is infused, is transmitted, into the\\neffect. It is a causa sine qua non. A given sensation\\ncauses a corresponding perception, in the sense that it\\nso conditions the perception that without it the percep-\\ntion would not take place, but it would be illegitimate\\nto contend that feeling enters into the nature of the\\ncognitive act. So when a perception induces a certain\\nsensation, it would be equally unwarrantable to hold\\nthat the cognition forms an element of the feeling. ISTo\\nproof can be produced in favor of the position that the\\nnervous influences terminating upon the brain constitute\\nelements of mental acts. The psychical changes which\\nfollow them cannot be proved to be so related to the\\nmolecular agitations of the brain that the former are\\nconstituted of the latter. It cannot be shown that there\\nis an actual transmission into the psychical acts of the\\ninfluence of the cerebral motions. All that can be proved\\nis that the one class of activities conditions the other.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0486.jp2"}, "485": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 475\\nScience will have to go much farther than it has reached\\nas yet to prove that brain-motions are of the same\\nnature with mental acts.\\nBut whatever may be thought of the conclusiveness of\\nthis argument touching the causal relation of sense-\\nperceptions to the higher mental products, it is clear\\nthat, as water cannot rise higher than its source, no\\nresults of sense-perception can, in their nature, trans-\\ncend the nature of sense-perception, the associationalist\\nhimself being judge. Sensation conduces to perception.\\nPerception is the first, the lowest, stage of cognition.\\nPercepts, therefore, are fundamental in the development\\nof knowledge. The difficulty being now passed by,\\nwhich just here lies across the path of the associational-\\nist namely, of showing that there is a likeness between\\npercepts and sensations, in accordance with the prin-\\nciple like causes, like effects it must be admitted that\\nimagination and conception which presuppose percepts\\nas the very materials upon which they proceed cannot\\noverpass them. The former combines them into new\\nideal wholes, and the latter classifies them in accordance\\nwith thought-relations. Locke s reflection cannot be\\ninvoked, since it does nothing more than is accomplished\\nby imagination and conception; unless it be conceded\\nthat reflection supposes and employs a priori powers of\\nthe mind, and then the question would be given up by\\nthe associationalist. Percepts being the materials with\\nwhich the building up of knowledge proceeds, it is evi-\\ndent that the whole edifice, to the topmost point of its\\nspire, is composed of percepts. They are combined,\\narranged, classified, but they are percepts still. No", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0487.jp2"}, "486": {"fulltext": "476 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nimagination, no conception, no reflection, can get higher\\nthan the percept and, since the associationalist limits\\nperception to sense-experience, they cannot get higher\\nthan the sense-percept. How, then, can we account for\\nsuch apprehensions as those of space, duration, the\\ninfinite, and the like? Will it be contended that they\\nare constructed, by virtue of the law of association, out\\nof the materials supplied by sense-perception? If so,\\nhow This leads us to the next consideration.\\n(2.) The view has here been maintained that, upon\\nthe principle of the associationalist school that all our\\nknowledge originates in sense-experience, and is devel-\\noped from it, none of our knowledge can transcend\\nperception but it is the common belief of mankind and\\nthe doctrine of well-nigh all philosophers that our appre-\\nhensions of infinite space and duration do transcend\\nperception. Now, if they do, some other source must\\nbe assigned them than sense-perception. The question\\nthen occurs, How do these sensualistic empiricists ex-\\nplain the genesis of what are commonly denominated\\nthe abstract notions 7 involving an infinite element\\nAs to abstract space several explanations have been\\ngiven. a Locke would have us infer the notion from the\\ncomparison -of two bodies seen separated in space.\\nJames Mill and his followers would derive it from a\\nmuscular sense, recognizing the absence of resistance,\\nso that space is but our sense-perception of the extended\\nnot resisting. Dr. Thomas Brown would resolve it into\\na form of our notion of succession, given us by the\\nmuscular sense, during the progressive contraction of\\nsome set of muscles. Dr. Dabney, from whose Sensual-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0490.jp2"}, "487": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 477\\nistic Philosophy 1 this statement of theories has been\\ntaken, proceeds to pass upon them the following criti-\\ncisms\\nAll the plans have this common vice, that the notion of ab-\\nstract space has to be assumed at the beginning, in order to carry\\non the genesis of it. Thus, when Locke compared two bodies as\\nseparated, he must have had the notion of space already in his\\nmind, in order to represent to himself the word separated. This\\nis too plain for dispute. It is as impossible for the mind to con-\\nceive a body, without positing it in space, as it is to conceive an\\nattribute without referring it to a being or entity. Our abstract\\nnotion of space is the mental locus, which must be given by the\\nmind itself, in order to think the idea of body. Nor does the intro-\\nduction of a muscular sense help the matter. According to its\\nown advocates and patrons, such a sense simply perceives resist-\\nance. It could never give us, then, a direct perception of exten-\\nsion. On this scheme, just as much as any other, the latter notion\\nmust be furnished by the reason, and it must be in order to the\\nmind s construing its abstract idea of extension empty of resist-\\nance. Were Dr. Thomas Brown s method valid, it would but\\nresolve the notion of space into another form of our notion of suc-\\ncessive time, and this we shall show to be underived.\\nThese strictures are true, but it is proposed in these\\nremarks to pursue a somewhat different line of argument\\nnamely, to show the impossibility of arriving at the\\ninfinite by the road of sense-perception. Let us hear\\nM. Ribot, as he expounds the method by which this\\nimpossibility is overcome. He is stating the respective\\npositions of the two schools of a priori and a posteriori\\npsychology\\nLet us define the difference between the two schools of psy-\\nchology by an example. The transcendentalists examine our ideas\\nof space and time; they find that each contains in itself in an\\nindissoluble manner the idea of the infinite. Naturally we have no\\nx Pp. 251, 252.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0491.jp2"}, "488": {"fulltext": "478 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nexperimental knowledge of the infinite all our ideas derived from\\nexperience are ideas of finite things. Nevertheless, it is impossible\\nto conceive of time and space otherwise than as infinite, and it is\\nimpossible to derive them from experience these are the necessary-\\nconceptions of the mind. The a posteriori psychologist, on his\\nside, sees clearly that we cannot think of time and space otherwise\\nthan as infinite, but he does not consider them as an ultimate\\nfact. He sees in it an ordinary manifestation of one of the laws\\nof the association of ideas the law that the idea of a thing irre-\\nsistibly suggests the idea of another thing with which it has often\\nbeen found by experience to be intimately united. As we have\\nnever had any experience of a point in space without other points\\nbeyond it, nor of a point in time without other points which\\nfollow it, the law of inseparable association causes us to be unable\\nto think of any point in time or space, however distant, without\\nimmediately imagining [N. B.] other points yet more distant.\\nThis explains their infinitude without introducing necessity. 1\\nLet it be observed that there is here an unmistakable\\nadmission of the infinite We cannot think of time and\\nspace otherwise than as infinite. One might stop to\\nchallenge the accuracy of this language on two accounts\\nfirst, because time, from the nature of the case, is finite\\nit can be measured. He ought to have used the term\\nduration. Secondly, it is impossible to think infinite\\nduration and space; but let that pass. Did M. Ribot,\\nlike Dr. Bain, deny the infinite, the argument of Dr.\\nDabney would be pertinent, that space and duration,\\neven as finite, are not objects of perception. But let us\\ngrant to M. Ribot, for the sake of argument, that, in\\nperceiving related objects and events, we perceive the\\ndistance, the interval, between them. Let us take the\\ninstance of space. How stands the case, as he describes\\nit We perceive the space between two objects related\\n1 English Psychology. Trans., pp. 86, 87.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0492.jp2"}, "489": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 479\\nby association. We also perceive the distance between\\nthe second object and a third beyond it; and also of a\\nfourth beyond the third and so on until we reach the\\nlast object related to the faculty of perception that is,\\none beyond which we can perceive no other. What then\\nWe imagine an object beyond the last one perceivable,\\nand go on to imagine others with the distances between\\nthem, beyond and still beyond. Thus we reach infini-\\ntude, without introducing necessity.\\nE ow either the infinite is here employed in its strict\\nand accepted sense of the illimitable, or it is not. If it\\nis not, only the big finite is spoken of, and the whole\\nexposition is trivial. If it is, the ground is taken that\\nthe infinite as the illimitable is attained to by the imagi-\\nnation, through the addition of limited sections of space\\nto limited sections of space. As every one of these sec-\\ntions is confessedly limited, lying as they do between\\nimagined points which bound it, the whole series of\\nsections must be limited, in accordance with the impreg-\\nnable maxim that what is predicable of all the parts is\\npredicable of the whole. Consequently, the whole is\\nlimited, or, what is the same thing, finite. ~Ro imagined\\naddition of finite to finite can give the infinite but, if\\nthe imagination the power appealed to cannot reach\\nthe infinite, it is unsupposable that any other power\\nproceeding a posteriori can reach it. We are shut up to\\nthe conclusion that as we do certainly have an apprehen-\\nsion of the infinite, and the imagination cannot furnish\\nit, that apprehension must be assigned to an a priori\\nsource. This explanation of the experimental method\\nby which we get the infinite palpably breaks down, and", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0493.jp2"}, "490": {"fulltext": "480 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nas it is not likely that any other, pursuing the same\\nroad, will be more successful, we are entitled to rest in\\nthe conviction that all our knowledge is not derived from\\nsense-experience.\\nFurther, it has, in these remarks, been contended that\\nif all our knowledge originates in sense-perception, no\\nknowledge can rise higher than the sense-percept. It\\nmay be urged, on the contrary, that the imagination\\ntranscends perception. There is a sense in which this\\nis true, as has already been conceded. The imagination\\nhas the power of combining, arranging, classifying the\\nmaterials with which it deals but what are these ma-\\nterials They are percepts, represented by the imagi-\\nnation. Combine, arrange, and classify, subtract, add,\\nand multiply, as it may, the material of all these pro-\\ncesses is percepts. It is often remarked that the imagi-\\nnation is a creative power as in the case of the poet,\\nfor example. The language is figurative. It certainly\\nis not true that the imagination creates something from\\nnothing. What, then, does it create? The answer is,\\nnew and often surprising wholes, but these wholes are\\nbut the aggregates of previously existing materials.\\nThey may exist in the form of concepts, and the philo-\\nsophic genius may combine them into a system, which,\\nas such, had no previous existence but concepts are but\\npercepts as thought under the forms of the logical under-\\nstanding. Concepts of concepts second intentions, in\\nthe language of the schoolmen cannot transcend the\\nparticular materials furnished by perception, or, what\\nis the same, by consciousness. The imagination of the\\nastronomer, in its attempt to compass the universe, but", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0494.jp2"}, "491": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 481\\nuses the intervals between perceived stars. Add them\\ntogether, multiply them, as he may, and he will inevi-\\ntably be baffled in his endeavor to imagine space which\\nis not inter-stellar. He can never escape from the\\nimagination of limits. All this would be true were the\\nnisus of the imagination to proceed in only a single\\ndirection that of length but the difficulty is immeas-\\nurably enhanced when it attempts to radiate from a\\ncentre outwards in every direction to compass the\\ninfinite spherically. What can it accomplish in its\\nutmost flights Only the image of a firmament that is\\nall-enclosing; but if that were reached, only the finite\\nwould be attained; for what is enclosed is bounded;\\nand yet beyond that all-enclosing firmament of the\\nimagination, beyond which it cannot go, we are com-\\npelled to believe that there is space which no firmament\\nembraces. What is that belief what can it be but the\\noffspring of an a priori necessity Let any one try\\nthe experimental method in his attempt to reach infinite\\nspace, and, if he is not willing to deny his consciousness,\\nhe will confess the utter inadequacy of that method.\\nThe apprehension of the infinite transcends sense-\\nperception in its highest results, as used by conception\\nand the imagination. It cannot, therefore, originate\\nin it.\\nBut if, as Dr. Dabney argues, the space between\\npoints or objects is unperceivable, if the terminating\\nobjects as phenomenal are all that is perceived, and the\\nspace between them as unphenomenal is not perceived,\\nthe bottom drops out of the theory. There would be no\\nsense-perceptions to start with in the architectonic enter-\\nprise of building up the idea of infinite space.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0495.jp2"}, "492": {"fulltext": "482 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nIn the following utterance I understand Professor\\nBain, whom John Stuart Mill, in an article in the Edin-\\nburgh Review, claimed as belonging essentially to the\\nassociation school, to deny the existence of the infinite\\nin denying the possibility of conceiving infinite space:\\nThe only real notion that we can ever form of extension, as\\nempty space, is a sweep between two resistances infinite\\nspace, where the points, or termini, of resistance are done away\\nwith, is therefore an incompetent, irrelevant, impossible concep-\\ntion; it does not comply with the conditions indispensable to the\\nnotion. 1\\nOne must be indulged in a few comments upon this\\nposition\\nIn the first place, as Professor Bain acknowledges no\\npower in belief or faith to give us knowledge transcend-\\ning that furnished by conception, in denying the possi-\\nbility of conceiving infinite space, he denies the possi-\\nbility of apprehending it. For the same reason he is\\nbound to deny the possibility of apprehending anything\\ninfinite. It is inconceivable, and, therefore, beyond the\\nreach of the human faculties. As all termini are done\\naway with on the supposition of infinite space, there is\\nno possibility of measuring it, and consequently no\\nchance of building up the notion of its infinity. There-\\nfore, away with it! The school of sense-experience\\ncannot tolerate it; and so, as there are no stadia by\\nwhich we can measure anything infinite, there is no\\npossibility of constructing the notion of it. The so-\\ncalled infinite must go. It is, in the words of Mr. J. S.\\nMill, a nonsensical abstraction.\\n1 Mental Science, pp. 48, 49.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0496.jp2"}, "493": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 483\\nIn the second place, the doctors of the associationalist\\nschool differ. We have heard M. Ribot asserting the\\ninfinite, and attempting to show how the apprehension\\nis reached npon the principles of that school. Dr. Bain\\nproves that upon those principles it cannot be reached.\\nDr. Bain certainly has the advantage of the argument.\\nWe cannot reach the infinite by the method of sense-\\nexperience. The doing away with termini of measure-\\nment is the doing away with the infinite but\\nIn the third place, this explodes the associationalist\\nschool. In attempting to disprove the infinite it destroys\\nitself. It has been shown that the effort to reach the\\ninfinite by the road of sense-perception is vain; and\\nDr. Bain virtually confesses this in denying infinite\\nspace. A school which is either unable to account for\\nthe apprehension of the infinite, or boldly denies it,\\ncannot live. John Stuart Mill himself admits that if\\nwe endeavor to assign limits to space, we are compelled\\nto believe that there is space beyond those limits and,\\nas Samuel Clarke shows, if we suppose that beyond\\nthose limits there is nothing, we are obliged to believe\\nthat that nothing is space.\\nI had purposed to subject to special examination Pro-\\nfessor Bain s objections to the doctrine of innate ideas\\nand principles, but their detailed discussion would\\nprotract this discussion to an undue length; nor is it\\nnecessary. They may be easily refuted by the applica-\\ntion to them of the single law of belief in the infinite.\\nFor example, under the head of his first objection, and as\\nan instance sustaining it, he cites space, and asks, with\\n1 Mental Science, p. 182 ff.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0497.jp2"}, "494": {"fulltext": "484 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nreference to his analysis of space whether it is\\nnot sufficient, and if not, demands to be informed what\\nelement there is that cannot be identified with muscular\\nfeeling and sensation, under the intellectual properties\\nof difference, agreement and retentiveness. The ready\\nanswer is, its infinity. So, under his second objection,\\nhe says The unquestionable rule being that our know-\\nledge is gained through movement and sense (intellec-\\ntual functions cooperating), the burden lies with the\\nadvocate of innate truth to make good any exceptions to\\nthis rule. The reply is, infinite space and infinite\\nduration are exceptions to this unquestionable rule.\\nHis third objection is On the theory of nominalism,\\ninnate general ideas would involve innate particulars.\\nThis he enforces by the remark, If an abstraction, or\\ngenerality, be nothing but a host of particulars identified\\nand compared, the abstraction is nothing without the\\nparticulars. The answer is, on no theory do the ab-\\nstractions or generalities of infinite space and infinite\\nduration involve particulars. They are characterized\\nby absolute simplicity.\\nSo one might go on through all six of his objections,\\nbut these examples must suffice. Dr. Bain observes that\\nin the present position of the controversy in question,\\nthe chief alleged innate (speculative) principles are the\\naxioms of mathematics, and the law of causation. He\\nforgets God the consummate end of all human\\ninquiry. Even Mr. John Stuart- Mill not unfrequently\\ncondescends to speak of the deity as at least a possibility,\\nbut one is struck by the conspicuous absence from Dr.\\nBain s book on Mental Science of allusions to the exist-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0498.jp2"}, "495": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 485\\nence of such a being. This, however, is eminently\\nconsistent. A psychology without a sonl is the correla-\\ntive of a philosophy without a God. This is science, and\\nas science has to do only with facts, and God is not a\\nfact, the scientific man can have nothing to do with God\\nWhat if it should turn out that God will have something\\nto do with him\\nThe conclusion to which we come is that the infinite\\nwill not down at the bidding of the associationalist, and\\nthe associationalist cannot get up to the infinite. His\\ntheory is infinitely a failure.\\nThere are other arguments against this doctrine\\nwhich, were I writing a volume on this particular sub-\\nject, would need to be developed. Their consideration\\nmust here be foregone, and, really, enough has been\\nsaid, if it has been shown that, in the instance of the ap-\\nprehension of the infinite, as applicable to space, to du-\\nration, to God, the theory breaks down. Falsus in uno,\\nfalsus in omnibus. It is false in principle.\\n2. A previous analysis conducted us to a definite\\nissue, the further consideration of which was deferred\\nfor a time. I come now to some notice of that issue. It\\nis, whether the brain and the so-called mind are one and\\nthe same. It is tantamount to at least, in the last\\nanalysis, it involves the old question between the spir-\\nitualist and the materialist but the issue is presented in\\na new form. There is the refusal to admit that either\\nthe so-called mind or the so-called body is a substance\\na substratum or support of qualities which constitutes\\ntheir bond of unity and the assumption that the mind\\nand the brain come together in one and the same entity,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0499.jp2"}, "496": {"fulltext": "486 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nwhich is neither spiritual nor material, but is simply\\nmental and physical at one and the same time. We\\nhave, then, the hypothesis of a psycho-physical entity or\\nsomething, which is neither substantively material nor\\nsubstantively immaterial, nor both. This something is\\nwhat M. Eibot calls one phenomenon of a double face,\\nand Dr. Bain a double-faced unity.\\n(1.) We have seen that M. Kibot rejects and ridicules\\nthe hypothesis of two substances, and substitutes for it\\nthat of two phenomena which have, for each particular\\ncase, so constant a connection that they can be most\\nexactly designated as one phenomenon of a double face.\\n(2.) With this hypothesis of M. Eibot that of Dr.\\nBain, although expressed differently, is in real agree-\\nment. He denominates so-called mind the subject, and\\nso-called matter the object. The defining characteristic\\nof mind as the subject is the absence of extension.\\nMind, then, is unextended. The defining characteristic\\nof matter, the object, is extension. Matter, of course,\\nis phenomenal, since he holds its essence to be inertia.\\nIs mind also phenomenal Let us hear Dr. Bain The\\nonly account of mind strictly admissible in scientific\\npsychology consists in specifying three properties or\\nfunctions feeling, will or volition, and thought or in-\\ntellect through which all our experience, as well objec-\\ntive as subjective, is built up. 1 That these properties\\nor functions are phenomenal will be made to appear\\nfrom what he says as to substance. Discarding an occult\\nsubstate of matter, he makes its essence to be inertia.\\nLikewise, rejecting an occult substance of mind the\\n1 Mental Science, pp. 1, 2.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0500.jp2"}, "497": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 487\\nview of the substantialists he says: According to\\nthe other view, the substance of mind is the three funda-\\nmental and defining attributes those powers or func-\\ntions which, being present, constitute mind, and in\\nwhose absence we do not apply the name. They are\\nfeeling, volition, and intellect. 1 That this is his own\\nview is evident from its correspondence with his defini-\\ntions just specified. !Now either the mind is, in the last\\nanalysis, substantive or phenomenal. Since Dr. Bain\\nholds that it is not substantive, he must hold that it is\\nphenomenal. That there may be a thing which is\\nneither substantive nor phenomenal is, so far as I know,\\nmaintained by none. That Dr. Bain s hypothesis is\\nreally coincident with M. Ribot s is, therefore, apparent.\\nIt is true that he employs the word substance, but, as has\\nbeen evinced, in a sense entirely different from that of\\nthe substantialists.\\nIn addition to what has alreadv been urged in the\\ncriticism of this extraordinary hypothesis, a few consid-\\nerations will be subjoined.\\nFirst. All the arguments may be advanced against it\\nwhich, in the controversy with the materialist, are drawn\\nfrom the impossibility of bringing utterly incompatible\\nattributes into unity upon one and the same thing.\\nEspecially is this sort of argument possessed of an ad\\nhominem force as addressed to the express concessions\\nof Dr. Bain. He defines mind as unextended, and mat-\\nter as extended. His unit is, therefore, both unextended\\nand extended. There is no extension in one of its faces,\\nand plenty of it in the other. His metaphor of a\\n1 Mental Science, p. 99.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0501.jp2"}, "498": {"fulltext": "488 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndouble-faced unity is, to say the least of it, infelici-\\ntous. What a phenomenal face lacking extension can\\nmean, and how it is connected with a face as extended\\nas the brain in the same phenomenon, it is hard to con-\\njecture; but, not to press the figure, an unextended-\\nextended phenomenal thing what, in the name of\\nimagination or belief, can it be\\nSecondly. These writers fail to represent the human\\nbeing as a unit. In their last analysis, human nature is\\na compound. Take M. Kibot s bold account of the case.\\nTwo phenomena are brought into so constant a connec-\\ntion that they can be most exactly designated as one\\nphenomenon. In the first place, one craves to know\\nhow it is possible for two phenomenal things to be one\\nphenomenal thing. These writers are men of science\\nand view the matter from a scientific point, To what\\nanalogy of a scientific character can they appeal To\\nchemical affinity? Would they say, for instance, that\\nthe combination of hydrogen and oxygen can be exactly\\ndesignated as one phenomenon Is water a unit Can\\nit not be decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen again\\nStrictly speaking, where is the unity of water? and,\\nstrictly speaking, where is the unity of each of the con-\\nstituents Is it not said that hydrogen, for example,\\nwhich is assumed as the unit of atomic weight, is itself\\ndiatomic and yet we are told that mind and body are\\na single phenomenon This is simply reckless assertion.\\nIn the second place, there is not merely the combination\\nof one phenomenon with another phenomenon to con-\\nstitute a third phenomenon, which is the unity with a\\ndouble face, but there are sets of mental phenomena,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0502.jp2"}, "499": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology. 489\\nand sets of physical phenomena, which themselves need\\nto be reduced to unity before this marvellous double-\\nfaced unity can be constituted out of them. What a\\nshort-hand method of unification is this of M. Ribot!\\nIn the third place, even the atomic components, of which\\nthe ultimate chemical elements are said to consist, are\\nunphenomenal. Who has ever perceived an atom The\\nvery basis is lacking of this pretended association of\\nphenomena. It is as impossible to get a phenomenal\\nfoundation for it as it is to fabricate a phenomenal unit\\nfrom it. This is true on the physical side alone; how\\nmuch more apparent is the impossibility on the mental\\nLet us see whether it fares better with Dr. Bain s\\nstatement of the case. He appears to perceive the\\nnecessity of first separately reducing to unity each of\\nthe sets of phenomena before he reaches the ultimate\\nunity of the sets themselves in his psycho-physical,\\ndouble-faced entity. Distinguishing, as to matter, be-\\ntween the fundamental, constant, inerasible attributes,\\nand those that are variable, fluctuating, or separable,\\nhe says, Thus, as regards matter/ the property iner-\\ntia is fundamental and irremovable. Further, The\\nsubstance of body, or matter generally, would thus be\\nwhat is common to all body inertia. 1 Xow we have\\nseen that in his opening chapter, on Definitions, he\\nmakes matter and the object, or object-world, the same,\\nand remarks, The department of the object, or object-\\nworld, is exactly circumscribed by one property, exten-\\nsion. Two things only will be said of this account of\\nthe unification of matter. In the first place, unless Dr.\\n1 Mental Science, Appendix, pp. 98, 99.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0503.jp2"}, "500": {"fulltext": "490 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nBain can show the identity of extension and inertia, he\\nuses contradictory affirmations, and it would task his\\npowers to evince that identity. In the second place, this\\nfundamental and unifying something is expressly called\\nan attribute, a property but if it be, it is obviously\\nnot ultimate. It must be an attribute, a property of\\nsomething, or the words are employed abusively. Yet\\nthis thing is the unity to which so-called matter is\\nreduced. But leaving Dr. Bain s matter as substantially\\nimmaterial, let us consider briefly his unification of\\nmind.\\nThe unity of mind consists in the three fundamental\\nand defining attributes the powers or functions of\\nfeeling, volition, and intellect. It is in the conjunc-\\ntion of these three that unity must be sought. Now\\nIn the first place, attributes suppose something to\\nwhich they belong. Attributes of what If of nothing,\\ncontradiction emerges. If of something common to the\\nattributes themselves, absurdity obtains.\\nIn the second place, powers and functions are treated\\nas the same; but functions are the results of powers.\\nGranted, however, that they are the same, what exercises\\nthe powers discharges the functions If nothing, the\\nwords are unmeaning. If something belonging to the\\npowers or functions themselves, the affirmation is ab-\\nsurd.\\nIn the third place, Dr. Bain does not tell us could\\nhe? what that something is which reduces to unity\\nfeeling, volition, and thought. According to him, it\\nmust be an element in which they are conjoined, a\\ngeneric something which is at one and the same time", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0504.jp2"}, "501": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 491\\nfeeling, volition and thought, without being either spe-\\ncifically. As he denies a feeling, willing, thinking sub-\\nstance, one may safely challenge Dr. Bain to point out\\nwhat the unit is which feels, wills, and thinks.\\nIn the fourth place, if another alternative mentioned\\nby Dr. Bain be considered, the result is no better. It is\\nto call the total of any concrete the substance, and each\\none of its properties, mentioned singly, a quality, or\\nattribute. But as substance, properly speaking, is dis-\\ncarded, the total of a concrete is simply a collection of\\nphenomena, and it amounts to this the phenomena are\\nphenomena of a collection of themselves\\nIt is sufficient for the refutation of these wretched\\nattempts of associationalists to unify the powers of the\\nhuman mind to cite the opinion of John Stuart Mill\\nand their school has produced no more powerful thinker\\nthat there is a bond which organically unites all our\\nconsciousnesses,\\nI hold it to be indubitable, he observes, that there is some-\\nthing real in this bond, real as the sensations themselves; and\\nwhich is not simply a product of the laws of thought without any-\\nthing which corresponds to it. That original element\\nwhich has no community of nature with anything answering to\\nour names, and to which we can give no other name than its own\\nwithout implying some false or unsteady theory, is the ego. x\\nIf, then, these writers are logically obliged to admit,\\ninstead of two phenomenal faces, a multitude of such\\nfaces, and utterly fail to indicate the unit to which these\\nfaces are attached, their hypothesis of a double-faced\\nunity hopelessly breaks down.\\nThis discussion must here be arrested, and I must\\n1 Quoted by Eibot, Eng. Psychol., p. 122.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0505.jp2"}, "502": {"fulltext": "492 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nexpress the conviction that the arguments of the monistic\\nphysiological psychologists add no force to those of the\\nout-and-out materialist, I have endeavored to refute the\\nreasoning of the former, rather than to furnish positive\\nproofs of the separate existence of the soul. Such proofs\\nhave been abundantly supplied in the protracted contro-\\nversy with the materialists but in relation to the com-\\nparatively recent questions raised by the school of sensu-\\nalistic associationalism touching what they denominate\\nphysiological psychology, I would make special refer^\\nence to the very able arguments of Dr. R. L. Dabney in\\nhis Sensualistic Philosophy, and of Prof. G. T. Ladd, in\\nthe latter part of his Physiological Psychology.\\nI desire, in this connection, to place on record two\\ncases bearing upon this question of the difference be-\\ntween the soul and the body, which fell under my per-\\nsonal observation, and exercised an influence upon my\\nthinking concerning the subject.\\nThe first is that of Capt. Kinsey Burden King, an\\nintelligent planter, of St. Paul s Parish, Colleton\\nCounty, South Carolina. I had been studying afresh\\nBishop Butler s argument in favor of a future life, and\\nhad come to the conclusion that the presumption created\\nby the fact that the mind often increases in vigor in\\nproportion to the decay of the body was too uncertain\\nto be relied upon, even as a probable proof. That is\\ntrue in certain diseases, pulmonary, for example; but\\nthe opposite seems true when the brain is paralyzed.\\nWhile in that mental attitude towards the Bishop s argu-\\nment, I was one night called up to see my friend, who", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0506.jp2"}, "503": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 493\\nwas dying. I found hira lying in a perfectly comatose\\ncondition, as motionless as a corpse, with his large, black\\neyes fixed, with an unwinking gaze, in a certain direc-\\ntion upon the ceiling. The physician was endeavoring,\\nwith loud calls to him, and a spoon of calomel pressed to\\nhis lips, to get him to take the medicine. Failing in his\\neffort, he turned away and said, Mrs. King, I am sorry\\nthat I can do no more for him.\\nSome one then suggested to her to speak to him. Put-\\nting her mouth near his ear she said to him, in little\\nmore than an ordinary tone, My dear, wouldn t you\\nlike to see Bunner (a pet name for their little boy).\\nWhat a transformation that question effected Putting\\nhis elbow behind him, the almost lifeless man raised\\nhimself and sat up in bed, asking, Where is he V 3 The\\nlittle fellow, who was sleeping in another room across a\\npassage, was brought to him. Leaning forward, he took\\nthe child in his arms, called him his darling, and kissed\\nhim repeatedly. The scene was thrilling, and the room\\nwas filled with the weeping of the friends who were\\npresent. Standing at the foot of the bed, and moved\\nto tears, I was saying to myself, Old Bishop, I believe\\nyou were right. Here is a dark lantern. Just now I\\nsaw no light. Xow the door is thrown open, and the\\nbrilliant light is pouring out its rays. The dying man\\nthen sank back with the child clasped to him in his left\\narm, and relapsed into his former comatose and motion-\\nless condition. Look! thought I, the door of the\\nlantern is closed, but the bright lamp within is burning\\nas brilliantly as it did a few moments ago. The thick\\nwalls of clav have shut it in. It cannot shine through", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0507.jp2"}, "504": {"fulltext": "494 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nthem, but it is there shining all the same. Old Bishop, I\\nbelieve you were right. Very soon after, my friend\\ndied. Still a lingering doubt remained. May not the\\nquestion have shocked the nervous system into temporary\\naction There was no spontaneous mental action. That\\ndoubt was removed by the other case.\\nIt was that of the Rev. Robert Robertson Small, a\\nyoung preacher of Shreveport, Louisiana, on his way to\\nSouth Carolina to be married. Upon his arrival at the\\nhome of his parents in Charleston, he was prostrated by\\nan attack of typhus fever. He lay ill for a month and\\ndied. On the last night of his life he lay dying for\\nabout six hours, during which time his body was motion-\\nless, his arms lying alongside of him, and his eye for\\none looked across the line of vision of the other fixed,\\nas in Captain King s case, with steady, unwinking gaze,\\napparently at a certain point of the ceiling. There was\\nno sign of life, save a slight breathing, which gradually\\nbecame fainter and fainter. Towards morning, without\\nbeing touched or spoken to, in the midst of silence which\\nreigned in the chamber, a smile played upon his sunken\\nfeatures, and, lifting both hands, he stretched them out\\nin the direction in which he was seemingly looking.\\nThe smile faded away, and the arms fell back to their\\nformer position. After a short interval the same smile\\nand the same reaching forth of the hands occurred, suc-\\nceeded by the ITippoeratic face and the motionlessness\\nof the arms. Then, the third time, the same thrilling\\nsigns of mental activity were exhibited; but this time\\nthe smile became beaming and indicative of inward rap-\\nture, the arms were stretched to their utmost tension,", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0508.jp2"}, "505": {"fulltext": "Physiological Psychology/ 495\\nand the lips moved in a whispered utterance. One\\nstanding near his head leaned down to hear, and reported\\nhim as having said, Earth is receding heaven. The\\nlight gradually vanished from his face, the corpse-like\\nrepose was resumed, and shortly afterward he ceased to\\nbreathe.\\nAll this I saw with my own eyes. The facts convinced\\nme. Aiy speculative doubt was gone. It was clear that\\nthe soul is capable of existence and activity separately\\nfrom the bodily organism. !N*o afferent nerve had trans-\\nmitted a current of influence to the brain but the soul\\nitself, moved by its anticipation of immortal bliss, had\\nstirred the almost dead body to smiles of ecstasy and\\nwords of hope.\\nTis true, tis certain man, though dead, retains\\nPart of himself; th immortal mind remains.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0509.jp2"}, "506": {"fulltext": "SPACE\u00e2\u0080\u0094 WHAT IS IT?\\nTTT HATE VEE, space may be supposed to be, it is, so\\nV V far as I know, very generally admitted to be\\ninfinite and this admission would seem to be demanded\\nby necessity, for it is impossible to conceive it as finite.\\nTo set bounds to space, says Dr. Samuel Clarke, is to\\nsuppose it bounded by something which itself takes up\\nspace, and that is a contradiction: or else that it is\\nbounded by nothing and then the idea of that nothing\\nwill still be space, which is another contradiction.\\nEither it is nothing, or it is something. An infinite\\nnothing is impossible; for nothing is a negation of\\nwhich the only affirmation possible is that it is not exist-\\nent; but to say that it is infinite is to make another\\naffirmation of it, which is contrary to the definition. An\\ninfinite nothing is either nonsense, or it is a contradic-\\ntion in terms. If it be something, the following sup-\\npositions are possible Either, first, it is a relation or,\\nsecondly, it is a condition or, thirdly, it is a substance\\nor, fourthly, it is an attribute of substance.\\n1 Is space a relation If it be, it must either be a\\nrelation between finite things, or between God and finite\\nthings. Take the first supposition that it is a relation\\nbetween finite things.\\n1 Answer to the Sixth Letter appended to his Demonstration,\\netc. This Letter was written by another than Butler, who wrote\\nthe first five.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0510.jp2"}, "507": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 497\\nIn the first place, an infinite relation between finite\\nthings, if it does not imply a contradiction, is at least\\ninconceivable. A finite thing cannot be everywhere;\\nneither can two or more finite things. Between these\\nfinite things, therefore, a relation must be finite. An\\ninfinite relation must extend everywhere; but to say\\nthat space is a finite relation contradicts the assumption\\nthat it is infinite.\\nIn the second place, a relation implies objects between\\nwhich it exists. These objects are, from the nature of\\nthe case, the terms of the relation. The relation is,\\ntherefore, terminal it terminates on two or more\\nthings. This necessarily implies that it is bounded, and\\nin each particular case by the objects between which it\\nexists; but space is admitted to be infinite; and we\\nwould have, upon the supposition, a limited, or finite,\\ninfinite, which is a palpable contradiction.\\nIn the third place, we would have, upon this hypothe-\\nsis, as many relations as there are objects between which\\nthey could exist. Each of these relations would, of\\ncourse, be bounded by its terms, and the double contra-\\ndiction would emerge, of a number of infinite relations,\\nand a number of bounded relations which are one infinite\\nrelation.\\nIn the fourth place, we cannot conceive of space as\\nthus limited to an existence between terms or bounda-\\nries. We are compelled to conceive it as existing beyond\\nas well as between finite objects whatever they may be;\\nbut that which goes beyond two or more finite objects,\\nand infinitely beyond them, cannot be said to be simply\\na relation between them. Let us instance two worlds.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0511.jp2"}, "508": {"fulltext": "498 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nSpace cannot be conceived as terminating with these\\nworlds. It must be conceived as lying infinitely beyond\\nthem. What is predicable of two is predicable of any\\nnumber of worlds, or systems of worlds. We can con-\\nceive the universe as limitable, but we cannot so con-\\nceive space, as a whole. As a whole, it is conceived as\\nhaving a comprehension greater than the universe for\\nwe are forced to conceive the universe as existing in it.\\nSpace, therefore, cannot be regarded as astricted to two\\nor more points in the universe, even those the most\\nremote from each other. It has no terms, and conse-\\nquently cannot be simply a relation.\\nIn the fifth place, against the hypothesis that space is\\nonly a relation may be urged its incapability of displace-\\nment. It may be admitted that, for purposes of thought,\\nwe may assign limits, in a certain sense, to it; just as\\nwe may conceive of the limited exercise even of a divine\\nattribute for example, of power or justice or mercy;\\nbut we cannot conceive of a divine attribute, as to its\\nintegrity, being limited. That would be to conceive the\\ninfinite as finite. So we may conceive of a limited por-\\ntion of space, but we cannot conceive of space as an\\ninfinite whole being limited. Within the limits which\\nin thought we may assign to it, be they greater or less,\\nwe cannot conceive of it as being displaced. It is up to,\\nin, through and beyond, any two or more objects. We\\nmay represent, for purposes of thinking, these walls as\\nlimiting space, and call it the space within the walls, but\\nwe cannot avoid conceiving it as in and through the\\nwalls, and as existing beyond them; but that of which\\nthese things may be affirmed cannot be defined to be a", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0512.jp2"}, "509": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 499\\nmere relation between two or more finite things. Ob-\\njects are related to each other in space, but space is not\\nsimply a relation between them. So much for the first\\nsupposition, that space is a relation between finite\\nthings.\\nLet us take the second supposition that it is a rela-\\ntion between God and finite things. Upon this supposi-\\ntion one or more of the terms of the relation must be\\nregarded as finite. Now as no finite things, multiply\\nthem as you will, are everywhere, the relation being in\\none direction bounded by them cannot extend to the\\ninfinitude of God. It is, therefore, not an infinite rela-\\ntion. It stops at points within and not up to God s im-\\nmensity. There may be relations there are between\\nan infinite being and finite things, but they are not\\ninfinite relations. I speak of local relations, for they\\nalone are relevant to the argument. An infinite relation\\nbounded in one direction by a finite object is inconceiv-\\nable. Space, then, as infinite, can be conceived neither\\nas a relation between finite things, nor as a relation\\nbetween God and finite things.\\n2. Is space a condition If it be, it must be consid-\\nered either as a condition of existence or as a condition\\nof thought. Is it a condition of existence It cannot\\nbe affirmed to be a condition of God s existence; for if\\nthat position be intelligible, it is maintained that the\\ninfinite, and, therefore, unconditioned, Being is condi-\\ntioned, and conditioned by something out of himself.\\nThat would involve two contradictions: first, that an\\nunconditioned being is conditioned; secondly, that an\\ninfinite being is conditioned by an infinite something", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0513.jp2"}, "510": {"fulltext": "500 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nwhich is not himself that is, that there are two separate\\ninfinities, one of which conditions the other.\\nIf, further, it be held that the condition is not out of\\nbut within the divine being, it may be replied that we\\ncan make no distinction between conditions and attri-\\nbutes of the infinite being. It is not competent to us to\\nspeak of conditions either of the existence or energies\\nof God. The language is unintelligible, and the notion\\nit professes to symbolize, zero.\\nMoreover, if space be a condition of God s existence,\\nthen either there are said to be two conditions of his\\nexistence, or space and the necessity of the divine exist-\\nence are affirmed to be one and the same. If there be\\nany sense in which it may be said that there is a condi-\\ntion of the divine existence which may well be denied\\nthe only one which would appear tolerable is that in\\nwhich necessity is considered such a condition. It has\\nbeen said that his being is conditioned by a necessity\\nincomprehensibly inhering in itself. To say that space\\nis such a condition is to confound it with the necessity\\nof God s existence, which is absurd for then it would\\nfollow that all things exist in the necessity of the divine\\nexistence.\\nYet again if space be a condition of the divine ex-\\nistence, then it is either a condition of our apprehension\\nof the divine existence, or a condition of that existence\\nitself. If the former, as it is an irresistible conviction of\\nour minds that all finite things exist in space a con-\\nviction explicitly acknowledged even by Kant it\\nwould follow that it is an irresistible conviction\\nof our minds that all finite things exist in a condition", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0514.jp2"}, "511": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 501\\nof our apprehension of the divine existence; which is\\nabsurd. If the latter namely, that space is a condition\\nof the divine existence itself it would follow that, in\\naccordance with the same irresistible conviction, all\\nfinite things exist in a condition of the divine existence\\nwhich is also absurd.\\nBut if space cannot be shown to be a condition of\\nGod s existence, may it not be merely a condition of\\nfinite existence If it be merely the condition of finite\\nexistence, say of the existence of the universe, it would\\nfollow that, as it is admitted that space is infinite, and\\nthe universe finite, space is where the universe is not\\nand then it would further follow that there is a condi-\\ntion of existence where nothing exists to be conditioned\\nwhich is absurd. To this it cannot be objected that the\\nsame difficulty inheres in the supposition that space is\\nan attribute of God s substance the immensity of an\\ninfinite Spirit for, it being admitted that God exists,\\nhis attributes must equally exist, whether there be any\\nfinite existence to be conditioned by them or not. But if\\nspace be not an attribute of the divine substance, but a\\ncondition of finite existence, it is, ex hypothesi, simply\\nand merely a condition of finite existence, and therefore\\nwould not itself exist except in relation to such exist-\\nence. So that the supposition is necessitated that the\\nexistence of the condition is itself conditioned upon the\\nexistence to which it is related. But an infinite condi-\\ntion, having no other reason for its existence than its re-\\nlation to finite things, is an absurdity.\\nWhat has been said in regard to the supposition that\\nspace is a condition of the existence of the universe", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0515.jp2"}, "512": {"fulltext": "502 Discussions op Philosophical Questions.\\nwould, of course, hold with greatly increased force of\\nthe supposition that it is the condition of the existence\\nof any particular finite thing.\\nFurthermore, if space is affirmed to be merely a condi-\\ntion of existence, then either it is nothing or something\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0094an ens or a non-ens. If nothing, it is incapable of\\npredication, for of nothing nothing can be affirmed or\\ndenied. Nothing, therefore, cannot be said to be the\\ncondition of something. If it be replied that this predi-\\ncation is possible in regard to it namely, that existence\\nis denied to it then, as a condition must have some sort\\nof existence, it is denied that space can be a condition,\\nand that would be to abandon the supposition that, as\\nnothing, it is a condition of existence. If, on the other\\nhand, space be something, an entity, then it is either a\\nrational or real entity an ens rationis, or an ens reale.\\nIf the former, as every ens rationis is an element or a\\nproduct of some mind, space, as a condition of existence,\\nis either an element or product of a finite mind, or of the\\ninfinite mind. If of a finite mind, we would have an\\ninfinite element of a finite thing or an infinite product\\nof a finite factor, either of which suppositions is contra-\\ndictory and absurd. If of the infinite mind, as every\\nens rationis must be conceived as either an element or a\\nproduct of the reason, space, as a condition of existence,\\nis either an element or a product of the divine reason.\\nIf an element, as no element can be the totality of that\\nin which it exists, we have a condition of God s existence\\nwhich does not correspond with the totality of his being\\nwhich cannot be admitted. If a product, as every\\nproduct is dependent upon the thing producing it, we", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0516.jp2"}, "513": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 503\\nhave a dependent existence conditioning the existence\\nof that on which it depends which is contradictory and\\nabsurd.\\nIt must be added that it is unintelligible to affirm that\\nan ens rationis conditions the existence of the ratio.\\nThat which has its ground of existence in the reason\\ncannot be said to be a condition of the reason. This\\napplies equally to the infinite being and to finite beings.\\nThe reason, or intelligence, is an element of existence\\nin either case and, as an ens rationis cannot condition\\none of the elements of an existence, it cannot condition\\nthat existence as a whole.\\nIt may, however, be said that a divine ens rationis\\nmay condition the existence of other beings than God.\\nTo this I answer that God s ideas, which are real know-\\nledges, cannot be distinguished from his intelligence,\\nand to say that the divine intelligence, as conditioning\\nfinite existence, is space, is to admit that space is an\\nattribute of God, and that would be to gainsay the\\nhypothesis that space is not an attribute of God, but a\\nmere condition of existence, and so to give up the ques-\\ntion. So much for the supposition that space, as a\\ncondition of existence, is an ens rationis a mere mental\\nentity.\\nIf space, as a condition of existence, be an ens reale\\na real entity, and is, according to the hypothesis, differ-\\nent from God, we would have two real beings, which are\\nco-existing, but independent, infinities; and that in-\\nvolves a contradiction, for two real infinite beings must\\nbe supposed to limit and condition each other which\\nis to deny that either is infinite, since no infinite being\\ncan be limited and conditioned.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0517.jp2"}, "514": {"fulltext": "504 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nTo state the case in another form Either space is a\\nsubjective or an objective condition of existence. If\\nsubjective to God, it is a divine property, which is to\\ngive up the question. If objective to God, we have an\\ninfinite objective existence conditioning another infinite\\nexistence, both as subjective and objective; and that\\ninvolves a contradiction. If subjective to finite beings,\\nwe have: first, an infinite subjectivity of finite subjects;\\nsecondly, the subjectivity of finite beings conditioning\\ninorganic objective existence for example, the subjec-\\ntivity of the inhabitants of the Alpine region condition-\\ning the objective existence of the Alps; thirdly, the\\nsubjectivity of organic beings conditioning the objective\\nexistence of other organic beings for instance, the sub-\\njectivity of men conditioning the objective existence of\\nanimals fourthly, the subjectivity of finite intelligent\\nbeings conditioning the objective existence of other\\nfinite intelligent beings and since action and reaction\\nare necessarily implied, the subjectivity of those objec-\\ntive existences thus conditioned, in turn, by their\\nsubjectivity, conditioning the objective existence of those\\nbeings, whose subjectivity conditioned their own objec-\\ntive existence. In all of these cases contradiction and\\nabsurdity emerge. Space cannot be the subjective\\ncondition in finite beings of objective existence.\\nIf, on the other hand, space be an objective condition\\nof the existence of finite beings, we have the absurdity,\\nalready emphasized, of an infinite objective existence\\nconditioning the existence of finite beings, as its only\\noffice: as its only office, I say, for, according to the\\nhypothesis, it is not an attribute of God. That an in-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0518.jp2"}, "515": {"fulltext": "Space What is It 505\\nfinite something should exist merely to condition the\\nexistence of finite beings, is inconceivable.\\nI have thus endeavored to show the incompetency of\\nthe hypothesis that space is merely a condition of\\nexistence.\\nIs space, then, merely a condition of thought Or, to\\nbroaden the statement of the question, in order to avoid\\nambiguity, is it merely a condition or form of our sub-\\njective processes, having no real objective existence\\nseparate from and independent of them? As Kant\\nseems to me to have maintained this view, it is well to\\nget, if we can, some clear apprehension of his doctrine\\non the subject. In the first place, he admits the infinity\\nof space. In the second place, he holds that it contains\\nall phenomenal finite existences. In the third place, he\\ndefined it to be an a priori form of intuition. By intui-\\ntion he understood the representations impressed\\nthrough sensation upon the perceptive faculty by exter-\\nnal phenomena empirically related to it and he held it\\nto be the only subjective representation referring to\\nsomething external that would be called a priori objec-\\ntive. In other words, it is the only a priori subjective\\nform which grounds the possibility of empirical know-\\nledge of external phenomena. In the fourth place, he\\naffirmed the empirical reality of space, so far as every\\npossible external experience is concerned, and at the\\nsame time maintained its transcendental ideality; but\\nhow does this bear upon the question of the separate\\nand independent objective existence of space? Let him\\nanswer. We maintain, he says, that space is nothing,\\nif we leave out of consideration the condition of a", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0519.jp2"}, "516": {"fulltext": "506 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\npossible experience, and accept it as something on which\\nthings by themselves are in any way dependent.\\nA writer s meaning is always liable to be miscon-\\nceived, and it becomes us to be cautious in interpreting\\nthis language of the great German philosopher in ex-\\npounding his doctrine of space. It might, perhaps, be\\nsaid that, in asserting that space is not to be accepted as\\nsomething on which things by themselves are in any way\\ndependent, Kant meant that things, considered as sub-\\nstantial realities, are not dependent on space; but it\\nwould seem clear that he was speaking of things as\\nphenomenal realities things as appearing to us through\\ntheir phenomenal existence or it might be said that his\\nmeaning was that if things be viewed as phenomenal\\nrealities, although they may have an existence apart\\nfrom their relations to our subjective form of intuition,\\nyet have not their cause or ground of existence in space,\\nbut in something else, separate from our subjective\\nprocess say, for instance, in the creative and upholding\\npower of Gocl. This interpretation, however, it would\\nappear, is precluded by the express language, space is\\nnothing if we leave out of view the condition of a pos-\\nsible experience that is, an experience of human\\nbeings. His doctrine, so far as I am able to collect it\\nfrom his own exposition of it, is that space is an a priori\\nsubjective form what is equivalent to a necessary\\nprinciple or fundamental law of the common sense\\nschool; and that this law, as anteceding experience, is\\nelicited into expression by the empirical relation of our\\nminds to external phenomena. It gives to these phe-\\nnomena their form, in the sense that they would be", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0520.jp2"}, "517": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 507\\nnothing apart from it. In a word, he denies that space\\nhas any objective existence independent of the a priori\\nsubjective form of intuition. With this doctrine Ham-\\nilton and the common sense school are in accord, as\\nagainst the sensational philosophy, so far as the affirma-\\ntion is concerned that there is an original principle, a\\nfundamental law, of our mental constitution, which\\ngrounds belief in space; but the common sense school\\ndiffers with Kant in that it asserts the independent\\nobjective reality of space. For example, when Hamilton\\nspeaks of the maximum and minimum of space, and of\\nits conceived divisibility, he cannot mean to refer simply\\nto a native cognition, a subjective form of thought.\\nTaking Kant s doctrine in regard to space, as it has\\nnow been represented, to deny its independent objective\\nreality as an object of knowledge to us, I proceed to state\\nsome of the reasons which oppose its reception.\\n(1.) A distinction must be made between the pictures\\nof the imagination and native principles or fundamental\\nlaws of belief. It certainly would be illegitimate it\\nwould be wild to infer, from the grotesque combina-\\ntions of once presented objects by the pictorial imagina-\\ntion, that there are objective realities which answer to\\nthem, and which their subjective existence demands;\\nbut where there is a fundamental form, to use Kant s\\nterm, or a necessary law of belief or thought, we are\\nwarranted in postulating for it a corresponding objective\\nreality. Not that such a reality is directly given, but\\nthe conditions of experience being furnished, the sub-\\njective form or law is elicited into expression, and the\\nobjective reality is affirmed. Take, for instance, the", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0521.jp2"}, "518": {"fulltext": "508 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nlaw of causality. If it be admitted to be implicitly con-\\ntained in our mental constitution, there is required as\\nanswering to it the existence of real causes and when\\nthose empirical conditions obtain which bring us into\\ncontact with external phenomena, the observation of\\nphenomenal changes occasions, in accordance with the\\nsubjective law, the affirmation of real, objective causes,\\nwhich depend upon that law indeed for their knowledge,\\nbut not for their existence. Kant himself argued from\\nthe subjective existence of the fundamental concept of\\nmoral responsibility to the objective existence of a moral\\nlaw, and pressed, as irresistible, the inference from it\\nto a moral ruler. Why he did not consider the same\\nprocedure valid in the sphere of intelligence it is diffi-\\ncult to see. His inconsistency in this matter has been\\nfrequently animadverted upon by subsequent philos-\\nophers. If our nature does not deceive us in the one\\nsphere, why should it be regarded as deluding us in the\\nother\\nGiven, then, the necessary subjective form of space-\\nintuition, we legitimately demand for it a corresponding\\nobjective reality. As objective phenomenal changes,\\nonce observed in experience, lead to the positing of\\nobjective causes which have a ground of existence apart\\nfrom our subjective processes, so the observation in\\nexperience of objects having spatial relations leads to\\nthe belief in space as an objective existence, grounded in\\nsomething different from our mental forms.\\n(2.) It is admitted by Kant that space is all-\\ncontaining. He holds it to embrace all external phe-\\nnomenal existences for, he observes, first of all, we", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0522.jp2"}, "519": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 509\\ncan imagine one space only, and if we speak of many\\nspaces, we mean parts only of one and the same space.\\nNor can these parts be considered as antecedent to the\\none and all-embracing space. This view of space would\\nalso follow from his concession that it is infinite. E ow\\neither the all things contained in space are real or they\\nare not realities, or, as Julius Miiller would say, mere\\nshine. If they be real, then\\nFirst. From the position that space is merely a form\\nof intuition, and therefore, purely subjective, it follows\\nthat all things are contained in the form of intuition of\\na finite mind. The inference may be characterized as\\ntoo ridiculous to be derived from anything Kant ever\\nsaid but ridiculous or not, it is necessarily drawn from\\nhis doctrine as to the purely subjective nature of space\\nand it deserves to be noticed that the acute mind of\\nFichte pushed that doctrine out to this as its logical\\nresult. His pure subjective idealism was the developed\\nresult, in his hands, of Kant s speculations.\\nSecondly. What human being, it may be asked, pos-\\nsesses this omnitude, this extraordinary capacity of\\nembracing in his subjectivity all external phenomenal\\nexistences And what is true of one human being must\\nbe true of every one. The wonder multiplies in propor-\\ntion to the number of these all-embracing individual\\nsubjectivities. Each contains all things so that there\\nare as many phenomenal universes as there are human\\nbeings to contain them and, further, every man being\\nphenomenal to every other man is contained in him, and\\nbesides, in all whose perceptive faculties are in relation\\nto him; but, at the same time, he also includes them.\\nThis is a marvel of marvels.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0523.jp2"}, "520": {"fulltext": "510 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nIf the all things contained in space that is, in the\\nsubjective form of intuition denominated space be\\nunreal, then\\nFirst. Our nature would be an engine of falsehood\\nand Kant s philosophy an instrument of deceit; for\\nassuredly the universal, and therefore necessary, con-\\nviction of the race is that the external phenomenal\\nexistences which we perceive are realities.\\nSecondly. If the things which are contained in space\\nare not objective realities, we would crave to know what\\nthere would be, to be contained in it. It is admitted to\\nbe all-containing, but, on the supposition, there is\\nnothing real to be contained and what the unreal con-\\ntents of space may be it passes our ability to see; but\\nthey are real, says Kant, though real only to our sub-\\njective form of intuition. Well, grant it; and let us\\nsuppose that all human beings were dead. The universe\\nof phenomenal existence would fail to continue, since\\nthat upon which it depended is extinct. This would be\\nthe idealism of Berkeley, so far as human perception is\\nconcerned. Nor does Kant shelter himself under the\\nrefuge to which the Bishop of Cloyne betook himself\\nunder the pressure of this inevitable difficulty the de-\\npendence of all phenomenal things upon the perceptions\\nof the Divine Being. These considerations, briefly pre-\\nsented, are sufficient to stumble the hypothesis of the\\nsage of Konigsberg in relation to the nature of space.\\nOthers may be presented, apart from the speculations\\nof Kant, against the doctrine that space is a mere con-\\ndition of thought.\\nIn the first place, space cannot be merely a condition", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0524.jp2"}, "521": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 511\\nor f orm of thought, for we cannot conceive its annihila-\\ntion. This is contended for by Kant and Hamilton, and\\nis proved by every effort to form snch a conception which\\nthe mind can make. We may, it is said, conceive the\\nannihilation of all things that are contained in space,\\nbut not of space itself. This is true, for if we make the\\nattempt in thought to annihilate space, all that is\\nattained is the removal of something called space from\\nin finite vacuity; but that vacuity we are compelled to\\nbelieve is the same thing as space. Now we are able to\\nconceive the annihilation of every human being, and\\nconsequently the non-existence of every condition or\\nform of human thought. This shows that space cannot\\nbe merely an element of human subjectivity. Indeed,\\nit would remain if the universe of phenomena were\\nblotted out of existence. It is simply out of the question\\nto make it merely a condition of human thought.\\nIn the second place, if space be merely a condition\\nof thought, it is either a purely mental and subjective\\ncondition or an external and objective condition. If\\npurely subjective, there is, ex hypothesis no objective\\nreality to which it corresponds, and it would follow that\\nit cannot transcend the contents of subjectivity but as\\nthat is limited and space is admitted to be infinite, a\\ncontradiction ensues. If space as a condition of thought\\nis external and objective, as everything external and\\nobjective must, in the first instance that is, as per-\\nceived and apart from inferences be apprehended as\\nphenomenal, space is phenomenal and as it is infinite,\\nit must be the infinite phenomenal manifestation of an\\ninfinite substance, and that contradicts the supposition", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0525.jp2"}, "522": {"fulltext": "512 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\nimmediately under consideration namely, that space\\nis merely a condition of thought, and not a mode of\\nsubstance. It would also contradict the remoter suppo-\\nsition that space, as a condition merely, is not an attri-\\nbute of God.\\nIf it be said that its being a phenomenon does not\\nguarantee a substance to which it is attached, but that\\nit has an independent phenomenal reality, we would\\nhave an infinite phenomenal reality which is neither\\nGod nor an attribute of God, and that involves the sup-\\nposition of two infinite realities independent of each\\nother, which is a contradiction. So far for the suppo-\\nsition that space is a condition.\\n3. Is space a substance\\n(1.) If it be a substance, then, ex hypothesi, it is an\\ninfinite substance. There would, therefore, be two in-\\nfinite substances, God and space; but they would be\\nexclusive of each other. It is a contradiction to suppose\\nthe co-existence of two infinite substances, for they\\nwould condition and limit each other, and neither, conse-\\nquently, could be infinite. We are compelled to suppose\\nthem one and the same, or to deny the existence of one\\nof them. Either they are identical or mutually exclu-\\nsive.\\n(2.) If space be a substance, it is either a material or\\nan immaterial substance. If material, then, as it is\\nadmitted to be infinite, we would have an infinite ma-\\nterial substance; which involves a contradiction of a\\ntwo-fold character: first, that of a material substance\\naffirmed to be infinite for it is certain that some matter\\nis finite, and therefore no matter can be infinite; sec-", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0526.jp2"}, "523": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 513\\nondly, that of two infinite substances different from each\\nother; for God and matter are certainly different sub-\\nstances, and, on the supposition, we would have God as\\ninfinite, and an infinite material substance besides but,\\nas has been shown, two infinite substances are exclusive\\nof each other.\\nIf space be immaterial, we would have two infinite\\nspiritual substances, and contradiction emerges. There\\nwould be two infinite spirits but as a spirit is a per-\\nsonal intelligence, there would be two infinite personal\\nintelligences and as personal intelligence is active, two\\ninfinite personal activities or infinite actors that is,\\ntwo infinite creators, and then two infinite rulers and\\ntwo infinite co-existent sovereignties all of which in-\\nvolves supreme contradictions. It is scarcely necessary\\nfurther to consider the hypothesis that space is a sub-\\nstance. It is one which is seldom maintained.\\n4. Is space an attribute of substance?\\nThis is the only remaining supposition. If the others\\nhave been removed, we are entitled, in accordance with\\nthe law which governs an argument like this, to hold that\\nthis is established. If space be an attribute, as it is\\nconceded to be infinite, it is an infinite attribute. It\\nmust then be regarded as the attribute of an infinite\\nsubstance, since it is plainly contradictory to affirm an\\ninfinite attribute of a finite substance. As an infinite\\nsubstance is postulated for an infinite attribute, and\\nthere can be and is but one infinite substance namely,\\nGod it follows that space is an attribute of the divine\\nsubstance.\\nI conclude this line of thought with the following", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0527.jp2"}, "524": {"fulltext": "514 Discussions of Philosophical Questions.\\ndisjunctive statement as to- the relation between God and\\nspace Either he is without space, or he is within space,\\nor he and space are equally immense.\\nIf he be without space, it is limited as contained in\\nhim but it is admitted to be infinite, nor can we resist\\nthe belief that it is. If so, nothing can be without its\\ncomprehension, and therefore God cannot be without it.\\nIf he be within space, he is not co-extensive with it.\\nHe is, therefore, limited as contained in space but that\\nwould destroy the notion of his existence as God. The\\nsupposition is monstrous.\\nThe third supposition remains true that God and\\nspace are co-extensive; but as nothing can be co-\\nextensive with the infinite Being but his own attributes,\\nspace must be regarded as one of those attributes. What\\nis it, what can it be, but the immensity of the infinite\\nSpirit If so, we have in our irresistible belief in space\\none of the most obtrusive evidences of the existence of\\nthat infinite God in whom we live and move and have\\nour being. Atheism would be self-convicted of folly,\\nsince it could employ no argument the thoughts and\\nexpression of which would not confessedly imply and\\nconcede the existence of space, that is, the immensity of\\nGod.\\nTo recapitulate: Either space is a relation, or a\\ncondition of existence, or a condition of thought, or a\\nsubstance, or an attribute of substance. These suppo-\\nsitions exhaust the possibilities in the case. If there be\\nany other supposition the argument would, as disjunc-\\ntive, break down. But I have not met any hypothesis\\nwhich cannot be reduced to one or another of those", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0528.jp2"}, "525": {"fulltext": "Space What is It? 515\\nwhich have been signalized. Now, if space has been\\nshown to be neither a relation nor a condition of exist-\\nence, nor a condition of thought, nor a substance, it mnst\\nbe a mode or attribute of substance the only remaining\\nsupposition but it has been evinced to be contradictory\\nand absurd to make it the mode or attribute of any other\\nsubstance than that of God. The conclusion, conse-\\nquently, is that it is a mode or attribute of God s\\nsubstance.\\nThis position is not novel, for it was maintained by\\nthat subtle metaphysician, Dr. Samuel Clarke, and by\\nAugustin long before; 1 but the reasons for it, which\\nhave been here given, I have not met with anywhere.\\nThe same line of argument may be employed, mutatis\\nmutandis, to show that duration is but a term equivalent\\nto the eternity of the infinite Spirit.\\n1 Let no one ask of me where God was before he created the\\nworld. He was himself Time. He was himself Space. Quoted by\\nDr. John Duncan, Colloquia Peripatetica, p. 138. The same view\\nis maintained bv Philo, Derodon and Newton.", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0529.jp2"}, "526": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0530.jp2"}, "527": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0531.jp2"}, "528": {"fulltext": "OCT 181900", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0532.jp2"}, "529": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3440", "width": "2132", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0533.jp2"}, "530": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3692", "width": "2388", "jp2-path": "discussionsofphi00gira_0534.jp2"}}