{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2995", "width": "2024", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "5 0^\\n.^x^\\nA\\nS^\\nV*\\nc;^^\\nV\\nv^^ -5-^", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "ft V v.\\n.\u00e2\u0096\u00a0X\\n,,v^\\n.1^ -Tt,\\nV- V-\\nA\\nc\\nCJ-^\\no\\nI.\\nN\\ncS\\no\\\\\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2..^L\\n,00\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0A\\nAV\\n,A-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "Works by Capt. A. T. Mahan\\nTHE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON\\nHISTORY. 1660-1783.\\nTHE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON\\nTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EM-\\nPIRE. Two volumes.\\nTHE LIFE OF NELSON. Two volumes.\\nTHE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA\\nPOWER.\\nLESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND\\nOTHER ARTICLES.\\nTHE PROBLEM OF ASIA.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "The\\nProblem of Asia\\nand\\nIts EiFect upon International\\nPolicies\\nBY\\nA. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.\\nM\\nCTaptam SiniteB States Nabg\\nAuthor of The Interest of America in Sea Power, Lessons of the\\nWar with Spain and Other Articles, The Influence of Sea\\nPower upon History, 1660-1783, The Influence of Sea\\nPower upon the French Revolution and Empire,\\nThe Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the\\nSea Power of Great Britain, etc.\\nBOSTON\\nLITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY\\n1900", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "i V .rtr KtCLtveo\\nOCT 25 1900\\nCepyrighl entry\\n\u00c2\u00bb.Cv XbS:*..V\\nStCONO COPY.\\nOHiv\u00c2\u00abrfld tt\\nOROtR 0(VISX)N,\\nMOV 21 l^UU\\nCopyright, igoo.\\nBy Harper and Brothers\\n(The State Trust Company, Trustee)\\n.Vx-i,\\nCopyright, igoo,\\nBy The North American Review Publishing Company\\nCopyright, igoo.\\nBy a. T. Mahan\\nAll rights reserved\\nUNIVERSITY PRESS JOHN WILSON\\nAND SON CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A,", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "PREFACE\\nI ^HE onward movement of the world is\\nlargely determined, both in rate and in\\ndirection, by geographical and physical conditions.\\nAdd to them racial characteristics, and we probably\\nhave the chief constituents of the raw material,\\nwhich, under varying impulses from within and\\nwithout, is gradually worked up into history.\\nThe process of the manufacture is seen in the\\ncourse of events but these, whether in cur-\\nrent history or in the wholly past, embrace a\\ngreat mass of details, which, by the various and\\nconflicting directions of their action, not only\\nperplex the inquirer with a sense of utter con-\\nfusion, but also cover, and to a first glance effect-\\nually conceal, the determinative conditions. Such\\nconditions, however, there always are and these", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "vi Preface\\nshape and govern the whole range of incidents,\\noften in themselves apparently chaotic in com-\\nbination, and devoid of guidance by any adequate\\ncontrolling forces.\\nIn history entirely past, where an issue has\\nbeen reached sufficiently definite to show that one\\nperiod has ended and another begun, it is possible\\nfor a careful observer to detect, and with some\\nprecision to formulate, the leading causes, and to\\ntrace the interaction which has produced the\\nresult. It is obviously much less easy to discover\\nthe character and to fix the inter-relation of the\\nelements acting in the present; still more to in-\\ndicate the direction of their individual movement,\\nfrom which conjecture may form some conception\\nas to what shall issue as the resultant of forces.\\nThere is here all the difference between history\\nand prophecy.\\nNevertheless, although the one study is more\\ncertain, the other is more urgent. Past history\\ncontains indeed lessons which, well digested, are\\nmost valuable for future guidance but, when the\\nattempt is made to utilize their teachings, con-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "Preface vii\\ntemporary conditions are found to differ so much\\nfrom those preceding them that application be-\\ncomes a matter of no slight difficulty, requiring\\njudgment and conjecture rather than imparting\\ncertainty. Positiveness in such matters, indeed,\\nis the doubtful privilege of the doctrinaire^ and\\ncommonly unfortunate in the result. The in-\\nstruction derived from the past must be supple-\\nmented by a particularized study of the indications\\nof the future.\\nAlthough assuredness of conclusion is denied\\nto this process, we can still be confident that\\nunder all surface conditions, present as past, there\\nmust lie permanent facts, and factors, the detection\\nand specification of which ascertains at least the\\nexistence and character of certain determinative\\nfeatures, and the relations subsisting between\\nthem. Even so much is gain and gain it will\\nremain for the guidance of nations and of man-\\nkind, even though it be not possible to forecast\\nthe precise combination into which, through the\\noperation of unforeseen events, these various\\nfactors will ultimately fall.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "viii Preface\\nThe determination of these distinct factors, in\\na present question of great moment, and, so far\\nas may be, the investigation of their mutual rela-\\ntions, are the objects of the present study. The\\nfirst paper The Problem of Asia aims at the\\nselection and exposition of the great permanent\\nfeatures. It was nearly completed, in its three\\nchapters, by the first of the current year 1900;\\nand therefore antedates entirely the recent out-\\nbreaks in China, although the causes of these\\nwere doubtless operative some time before. The\\nsecond paper, Effect of Asiatic Conditions upon\\nWorld Policies, written in August, attempts to\\ntrace the influences that will be exerted by the\\npermanent features, previously noted, upon the\\npassing political conditions, under \\\\vhich present\\npolicies have to take shape.\\nThe insertion of the third paper Merits of\\nthe Transvaal Dispute has been an afterthought.\\nHaving had occasion in the other articles to re-\\naffirm more than once my conviction of the essen-\\ntial righteousness of the British cause in South\\nAfrica, it has seemed to me pertinent to add", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "Preface ix\\nthereto, in justification of this belief, a summary of\\nthe facts and arguments by which it was reached.\\nIt remains to express my thanks to the propri-\\netors of Harper s New Monthly Magazine\\nand of the North American Review, for their\\nkind permission to reproduce the articles in book\\nform.\\nA. T. MAHAN.\\nSeptember, igoo.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS\\nI. THE PROBLEM OF ASIA\\nFrom Harper s New Monthly Magazine\\nChapter I. March, 1900\\nPage\\nThe paradox of long and short views i\\nApplicable to both personal and corporate life i\\nSpecially illustrated in world movements 2\\nWorld conditions in constant flux 3\\nConsequent effect upon actions of governments 3\\nThe Present the guardian of the Future 3\\nImpulse in United States towards expansion 4\\nClosely related to like movements in Europe 4\\nIllustrations 4\\nEffects upon international relations 5\\nLong and short view illustrated in recent American\\nhistory 5\\nDevelopment of the idea of expansion 6\\nStopped short once at Hawaii 7\\nTo that point the idea essentially defensive 7\\nSudden precipitation of Philippine question 8\\nTime needed to settle firmly new conditions of national\\nresponsibility 9\\nNecessary nevertheless to consider at once the future to\\nwhich they point 9\\nSuch consideration facilitates decision in sudden emer-\\ngencies 10", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "xii Contents\\nChapter I. March, 1900 continued Ymx\\nPresence of mind dependent upon preparation 10\\nOur war with Spain not a disconnected incident 11\\nRapid change in attitude of Japan towards United States\\nconcerning Hawaii 11\\nScope of Monroe Doctrine defined 13\\nIllustrates a general maxim of statesmanship 14\\nIs not applicable to Asia 15\\nForce of tradition upon popular conception of Monroe\\nDoctrine 16\\nPrinciple permanent, application variable 16\\nIncreased importance of European conditions to Amer-\\nican interests 17\\nConsequent necessity of appreciating European inter-\\nnational politics 17\\nThe interest of the world centring upon Asia 18\\nConditions and circumstances of the question should be\\nstudied 18\\nPrimary importance of geographical features 18\\nPolitical problems closely analogous to military 19\\nImportance of communications to both 19\\nFacility of transmission the attribute of sea power 20\\nGeographical analysis of Asian Continent 20\\nClimatic conditions. Monsoons 20\\nImportant middle belt, between 30\u00c2\u00b0 and 40\u00c2\u00b0 North 21\\nUnstable political conditions in this belt 22\\nIn Asia, division is east and west, movement north and\\nsouth 22\\nNecessary to study characteristics of movement 22\\nIn political study, impossible to dissociate Eastern Asia\\nfrom Western 23\\nPresent distribution of stable political forces 24\\nContinuous mass of Russian territory 24", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "Contents xiil\\nChapter I. March, i 900 continued Vp.g^\\nMilitary advantages of Russian position 25\\nIts points of military weakness 26\\nThe geographical position of Great Britain in Asia 27\\nCharacteristics of British military strength 27\\nRelation of India to military power of British Empire 27\\nIntrinsic advantages of India as a base In Asia 28\\nEffect of British and Russian tenures in Asia upon the\\npolicy of the two empires 29\\nSelf-preservation the first natural law of states 29\\nScope to grow essential to self-preservation 30\\nGrowth, like evolution, gives rise to conflict 30\\nNations are trustees for posterity 30\\nRecourse to arbitration conditioned by trusteeship 31\\nThe need and right to grow, factors In the Problem of\\nAsia 31\\nGrowth depends on vigor of organization and freedom of\\nintercourse 31\\nInternal organization a national, not an International ques-\\ntion 32\\nInterchange necessarily Involves other peoples 32\\nFreedom of Interchange In Asia, an Interest common to\\nall commercial states 33\\nConsequent jealousy of Inimical military Influences 33\\nMovements of acquisition already begun 34\\nCommercial possibilities of Asia great, but still Indefinite 35\\nThe question one of scale rather than proportion 35\\nBearing of external communications upon the problem 36\\nCommunications twofold: by sea and by land 36\\nSuggests the multiform struggle between land and sea\\npower 37\\nSea and land power exemplified In Great Britain and\\nRussia 37", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "xiv Contents\\nChapter I. March, iqoo cotitinued\\nPage\\nSuperior copiousness and cheapness of water communica-\\ntions 38\\nTheir consequent preponderance in development of Asia 38\\nControl of communications a question of naval power 3 8\\nMutual influence of land and sea power, when in con-\\ntact 39\\nImportance of the Yang-tse-kiang to sea power 41\\nInterest of commerce in the maintenance of peace 42\\nMilitary force essential to secure peace 42\\nIncapacity of navies to threaten liberty 4a\\nDependence of Russia upon land communications 42\\nThis condition not susceptible of much modification 43\\nConsequent disadvantage of Russia for the pursuits of\\ncommerce 43\\nResultant inevitable tendency to acquire maritime positions 44\\nEffect upon the policy of other states 45\\nObligations of other states to their own people and to\\nthe peoples of Asia 45\\nComplexity and imminence of the Problem of Asia 46\\nChapter II. April, 1900\\nRussia s predominant land power in Asia 47\\nCounterbalance by indirect pressure 47\\nMilitary meaning of diversion 48\\nRelative mutual effect of flanks and centre of a line 48\\nAdvantages of pressure, or of attack, on a flank 48\\nFactors essential to durable peace in Asia 49\\nInternational uneasiness concerning Asia 49\\nDanger of failure to weigh conditions, and forecast future 49\\nPeace within Europe, how preserved at present 50\\nAnalogy in Asia 50\\nIndirect pressure by control of sea and of commerce 51", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "Contents xv\\nChapter II. April, i 900 continued\\nPolitical danger of granting immunity to so-called pri-\\nvate property at sea 52\\nGoods in commercial transit are not private property 53\\nRussia s advance in Asia is by the flanks 55\\nIts objects, threefold access to the sea 56\\nInterests and opportunities of other states 57\\nObjectives of policy in Asia 58\\nTurkey in Asia and Persia topographic features 58\\nPresent internal and political conditions 58\\nAdvance from such conditions in the past, how effected 60\\nInstances India and Egypt 61\\nApplication to future of Western Asia and of China 61\\nTwofold characteristics of movements now in progress 62\\n1. Upon both flanks.\\n2. Antagonism of sea power and land power.\\nArtificial relation of France to Russia 63\\nSolidarity of interest in sea powers 63\\nParticular conditions of each sea power 63\\nRelative military situations on either flank 64\\nImportance of Yang-tse to sea power 65\\nMilitary situations condition policy 65\\nInfluence of position of Chinese capital 66\\nPolitical and military conditions in Western Asia and\\nthe Levant 67\\nConflicting interests of France and Italy in the Medi-\\nterranean 67\\nFrench ambitions in the Mediterranean 67\\nEffects upon security of Suez route 67\\nIndirect interest of the United States and Japan 68\\nMilitary dangers of the Suez route 69\\nIts decisive military superiority to that by Cape of Good\\nHope 70", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "XV i Contents\\nChapter II. April, 1900-\\nEgypt and Asiatic Turkey by position control Suez\\nroute 70\\nConsequent necessity and effect of political development 70\\nDevelopment there can begin only from without 72\\nIts character will depend upon that of the external\\ninfluence 73\\nNo analogue to the Yang-tse in Levantine Turkey 75\\nPolitical effect of railroad from Mediterranean to Per-\\nsian Gulf 76\\nImportance of harmony among sea powers 76\\nRelative commercial value to the world of Eastern and\\nWestern Asia 77\\nSuperior military consequence of Western Asia 77\\nFrench preponderance in West Srn Mediterranean 78\\nConditions change east of Sicily 78\\nPresent difficulties of sea powers maintaining naval force\\nin the Levant -78\\nTo be met only by establishing local political influence 79\\nInalienable strategic importance of Egypt 79\\nIts central position, and double line of communications 80\\nTwofold obligation of Great Britain to hold it 80\\n1 Duty to continue work of regeneration.\\n2. Essential to integrity of British Empire.\\nInexpediency of abandoning Suez route 81\\nNapoleon s saying War cannot be made without\\nrunning risks 82\\nTrue solution of military dilemmas of Suez route 82\\nHistorical importance of Eastern Mediterranean 82\\nThe world s progress east and west, not north and south 83\\nSignificance of Isthmuses of Suez and Panama 84\\nSituation at Suez more critical than at Panama 84\\nEffect of these considerations upon political traditions 85", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "Contents xvii\\nChapter II. April, i goo continued\\nPage\\nDiminished importance of South Africa, and of America\\nsouth of valley of the Amazon 86\\nModifying effect upon Monroe Doctrine 86\\nNecessity of concentrating national effort by excluding\\nminor issues 86\\nThe future of Asiatic peoples 86\\nTheir general stolid conservatism 87\\nEffect of external influences 87\\nGrave possibilities of the Chinese masses 88\\nConsequent importance of the direction imparted by ex-\\nternal impulse 88\\nNecessity for serious study and prevision 89\\nThe result, the introduction of Eastern peoples into the\\nEuropean commonwealth 90\\nRacial characteristics must remain 91\\nParallel in the assimilation of Roman civilization by\\nTeutonic races 91\\nThe Roman law and the imperial idea 91\\nInherited by the centralized Christian Church 91\\nThe Christian tradition the unifying thread of European\\ncivilization 92\\nThe grounds for hope 93\\nSuperior political vitality of a community of states over\\na consolidated empire 94\\nChapter III. May, 1900\\nPresent imminent condition of Asiatic problem\\nRivalries of external nations\\nConsideration due to native populations\\nNot necessarily due to existing native governments\\nPresent uneasiness result of inefficient government\\n96\\n97\\n97\\n98\\n99", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "xviii Contents\\nChapter III. May, 1900 continued y^g^\\nNecessity for action laid upon foreign states 99\\nAlternative methods of action 99\\nConditions of an efficacious solution 100\\nI. Political equilibrium among external powers,\\na. Material and spiritual progress of native inhabi-\\ntants.\\nResults to be expected 101\\nResults attained in Japan loi\\nDifference in conditions between Japan and China 102\\nBest development through diversified influences by dif-\\nfering race-types 102\\nAdvantage of strong oppositions in international polity 103\\nEquilibrium represented by land and sea power in oppos-\\ning scales 104\\nSpecial interest of Teutonic powers 104\\nNecessity of co-operation 104\\nSpecial difficulties attendant upon co-operation of states 104\\nNeed to convince citizens of free states 104\\nSimplicity of Russian political organization 104\\nFrench alliance with Russia 105\\nResultant divergence of interests among Latin states 1 05\\nFrance imperfectly Latin in type 105\\nConsequent defective influence of Latin states in Asiatic\\nproblem 106\\nSlavonic and Teutonic the chief European influences 106\\nPeculiar relation of Japan to the Asiatic problem 106\\nJapan essentially a sea power 106\\nLimitations upon the scope of her action 106\\n1. Because of limited area and wealth.\\n2. Because of restrlctedly local character of her\\ninterests.\\nSimilarity of interests in Japan and the Teutonic states 107", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "Contents xix\\nChapter III. May, i qoo continued\\nPage\\nEssential differences of European civilization, as now\\nfound in both io8\\nJapan racially Asiatic, adoptively European io8\\nAdvantage of this factor to the Asiatic future 109\\nMisunderstandings natural between differing race-types no\\nHow best to be obviated in\\nUnanimity the aim, rather than uniformity in\\nNecessity of mutual respect between races in\\nThe Problem of Asia to be approached in this spirit 113\\nConservative inertia of Asiatic peoples 114\\nJapan the sole exception 114\\nAntagonism of type in Slav and Teuton 114\\nConflict between their interests ..115\\nOpposition must be recognized in order to conciliation 115\\nLand power the prerogative of Slavs 116\\nSea power that of the Teuton states 116\\nThese conditions, being essential, cannot be reversed 116\\nThey may, however, be modified 116\\nRacial and national interests demand such modification 117\\nRussia s need of freer access to the sea 117\\nOpposing exigencies of the Teuton situation 117\\nDirection in which the claim of Russia should be cor-\\ndially conceded 120\\nEssential necessity of Yang-tse valley to the sea powers 120\\nTheir secure access to it to be cordially conceded lao\\nCo-operation between naval states imperative 121\\nLand power more menacing to China than sea power 121\\nReasons 121\\nCommerce essentially tends to peace 122\\nThe future of Asia dependent upon military considera-\\ntions 124\\nThe question of communications 125", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "XX Contents\\nChapter III. May, 1900 continued Page\\nCommunications dominate war 125\\nThe sea the chief medium of world communications 125\\nConsequent influence of sea power upon Asian prob-\\nlem 126\\nSea power exerts its eff ect by indirect pressure, by\\ndiversion 126\\nRight to control maritime commerce is therefore essen-\\ntial to it, and not to be surrendered 126\\nThe three Teutonic states Germany, Great Britain,\\nand the United States 127\\nOnly Germany and Great Britain directly interested in\\nLevant 127\\nRequirements to the establishing of their position there 127\\nPeculiar interest of Great Britain 128\\nInterest of the United States, indirect but real 129\\nIndifference of American citizens to external questions 130\\nUrgent necessity to amend this defect 131\\nPacific Ocean and Eastern Asia the coming chief centre\\nof world interest 131\\nInterests there of the Teutonic states not the same, yet\\nsimilar 133\\nConditions of efficient mutual support 134\\n1. Participation in a common purpose, rather than\\nassumption of a literal obligation.\\n2. Candid recognition of respective interests and\\nspheres of responsibility.\\n3. Abstention from permanent formal obligations.\\n4. Retention of independence in individual state\\naction.\\n5. Results co-operation, not alliance.\\nModifying effect of new conditions upon applications of\\nMonroe Doctrine .....135", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "Contents xxi\\nChapter III. May, iqoo continued\\nPage\\nOnly the United States directly interested in the Carib-\\nbean and its Isthmus 136\\nIncreasing mutual comprehension between the English-\\nspeaking communities 139\\nPromises endurance, because resulting from permanent\\nconditions 139\\nEvidenced in our war with Spain and in the Transvaal\\nhostilities 140\\nTendency of mankind to aggregate into groups greater\\nthan existing nationalities 141\\nWar a principal instrument in this process, historically.\\nInstances 141\\nJustification of war between United States and Spain,\\nand of Great Britain in South Africa 142\\nSecurity of the foundations for Anglo-American co-\\noperation 144\\nEthnic relation of Germany to the English-speaking\\ncommunities 144\\nRelation of Italy to present world movements 145\\nII. EFFECT OF ASIATIC CONDITIONS\\nUPON WORLD POLICIES\\nFrom North American Review, November, 1900\\nExtraordinary events since the writing of preceding\\npapers 147\\nCommon eifect upon European nations 147\\nThe United States and Japan members of European\\ncommonwealth 147\\nJapan s claims to be so considered 148\\nParallel in Teutonic entrance into Roman civilization 149", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "xxii Contents\\nII. Asiatic Conditions cofitinued\\nPage\\nDifference between the conditions of the Roman world\\nthen, and Christian civilization now 149\\nJapan the only Asiatic participant of European progress 150\\nInfluence of insular environment 151\\nRecent events have not changed permanent conditions 152\\nThey do not indicate any change of Asiatic character-\\nistics 152\\nConsequently, no permanent change in national policies 153\\nMomentary necessity for combined action of European\\nstates 153\\nObligation of states during such a passing moment 153\\nPermanent policy resumes sway afterwards 154\\nEurope s community, as well as divergence, of interest\\nin Asia 154\\nRecent declaration of policy by United States Govern-\\nment 155\\nConsistent with our past line of action 155\\nCourse of governments controlled by public opinion 156\\nNecessity for individual citizens to study the conditions 156\\nImperfect knowledge the source of popular fickleness 157\\nSummary of world conditions 157\\nGeneral competition for world s commerce 158\\nEffort to compass end by appropriation of territory, or\\nby establishment of influence 159\\nResults in international antagonism, resting upon armed\\nforce 159\\nFixity of political tenure in Europe and America 159\\nAnalogous condition in Africa and the islands of the\\nsea 159\\nDifferent political status of Asia 160\\nNecessary policy of the maritime powers 161\\nParticular conditions of the United States 162", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "Contents xxiii\\nII. Asiatic Conditions continued\\nPage\\nCommercial and political importance of the Yang-tse\\nvalley 164\\nPresent close contact of Eastern and Western civiliza-\\ntions 165\\nInteraction can no longer be avoided 166\\nGuidance all that can be attempted 166\\nFreedom of thought and speech requisite, as well as\\nfreedom to trade 166\\nPrincipal objects in dealing with Chinese question 167\\n1. Prevention of preponderant control by any one\\nstate.\\n2. Insistence upon the open door for speech,\\nas well as for commerce.\\nBaselessness of outcry against missionary effort 168\\nChristianity an effective part of Western civilization 168\\nCritical importance of present moment 169\\nNecessity for United States to prepare for her part in\\nthe future 169\\nPreparation of purpose and preparation of power 169\\nPreparation of power implies also curtailment of need-\\nless efforts 170\\nPolicy of the United States clearly defined by its gov-\\nernment 170\\nDiverse in spirit from that of some other states 171\\nThe difference calls for watchfulness 171\\nThe open door can be maintained only by readi-\\nness to enforce it 172\\nNational influence depends upon evidence of purpose\\nand of power 172\\nMatters cannot safely be allowed to drift 173\\nIncapacity of China to develop unaided 174\\nAim of recent reactionary movement 174", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "xxiv Contents\\nII. Asiatic Conditions continued Ykgy.\\nMust be resisted 5 by force, if necessary 174\\nThis will be done, even if the United States stands aside 1 74\\nThe signs of the times 175\\nThe Yang-tse valley the great field for commerce and\\nfor sea power 176\\nPowers in competition upon the field 177\\nPower of independent action always limited 177\\nConsequent necessity for co-operation 178\\nCo-operation rests upon community of interests and\\nstandards 178\\nDoes not renounce individual responsibility 178\\nImplies also division of labor 179\\nCo-operation not only local in Asia 179\\nDistributed likewise between the ocean lines of com-\\nmunication 179\\nTwo chief lines from Europe and from America. 179\\nEurope ^na Suez, America via Panama 179\\nDecisive points on each line 180\\nUnder co-operation, the American line is the charge of\\nthe United States, as well as her interest 180\\nOur claim to preponderant consideration in the Carib-\\nbean practically conceded 180\\nNot a barren triumph only, but a responsibility 181\\nUnited States needs effective naval force in both Pacific\\nand Atlantic 181\\nCommunications by canal liable to interruption 182\\ni Military advantages of the interior line 182\\nMilitary use of canal depends mainly on the solidity of\\nour naval power in the Caribbean 183\\nRisk cannot be wholly eliminated from warfare 183\\nProbable security, however, obtainable 184\\nFirst element of security an adequate fleet 1 84", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "Contents xxv\\nII. Asiatic Conditions continued ^kcy.\\nConditions of adequacy defined 184\\nGreat Britain formerly opposed to our preponderance in\\nthe Caribbean 185\\nReasons for her change of attitude in this respect 185\\nHer interest now that we be in naval predominance there 186\\nProbability of her moral support 186\\nHer attitude during the recent war with Spain 187\\nSignificanc of moral support, when based upon com-\\nmunity of interests 187\\nRequires, however, evidence of due preparation of pur-\\npose and of power 189\\nBitterness towards Great Britain shown by some Amer-\\nican citizens 189\\nExaggerated inferences as to action thence drawn 190\\nSentiments, bitter or otherwise, permanent only when\\nbased on actual interest ...190\\nThe United States and Great Britain have common actual\\ninterests and common standards 190\\nBitterness therefore transient, not reflecting real interests 190\\nThe appreciation of such factors by statesmen 190\\nContrary effect upon them of backwardness in military\\nand naval preparation 191\\nDiscussion of general conditions governing naval force\\nneeded by United States 191\\nDifference of level between Eastern and Western civili-\\nzations 191\\nConsequent danger when barriers disappear 192\\nImportance of the Anglo-Saxon type to the final result 192\\nContinuous vitality and power shown by it since known\\nto history 192\\nDuty of the United States to contribute to future racial\\naction 193", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "xxvi Contents\\nII. Asiatic Conditions continued p\\nPrejudices to be sacrificed to this end 194\\nThe Pacific and the East, the sphere for our external\\nexertion 194\\nBearing of Great Britain s friendship upon the size of\\nour navy 195\\nDependence of Great Britain upon her navy vital 197\\nThe United States self-dependent for the necessaries of\\nexistence 198\\nConsiderations determining the size of the United States\\nnavy 198\\nSuperior importance of providing an adequate number of\\ntrained seamen 199\\nThis element of force generally overlooked 199\\nRetrenchment of external responsibilities by United\\nStates 201\\nApplication of Monroe Doctrine extended too far 201\\nThe valley of the Amazon suggests a possible broad\\ndividing belt 202\\nIII. MERITS OF THE TRANSVAAL DISPUTE\\nFrom the North American Review, March, 1900\\nMerits of the Transvaal dispute 203", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "T33T oooe-ooos p:", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2704", "width": "3951", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "THE\\nPROBLEM OF ASIA\\nCHAPTER I\\nIN order to efficiency of action, whether in per-\\nsonal or in corporate life, we have to recognize\\nthe coincident necessities of taking long views\\nand of confining ourselves to short ones. The\\ntwo ideas, although in contradiction logically, are\\nin practice and in effect complementary, as are\\nthe centripetal and centrifugal forces of the uni-\\nverse unless both are present, something is\\nwanting to the due balance of judgment and\\nof decision. This is, indeed, but one of many\\nillustrations that the philosophy of life is best\\nexpressed in paradox. It is by frank acceptance\\nof contrary truths, embracing both without effort\\nto blend them, that we can best direct our course,\\nas individuals or as nations, to successful issues.\\nThis observation receives practical illustration in\\nthe admitted political maxim that a strong oppo-\\nsition is essential to successful representative gov-\\nernment. Thus it is again that only by a minute", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia\\nmastery of details can a solid foundation be laid\\nupon which to build opinion yet unless details\\nare thrust aside, and reflection fastens upon the\\nleading features only of a problem of conduct,\\nit is difficult, if not impossible, clearly to perceive\\nthe mutual relations of the parts and their pro-\\nportions to the whole, upon a just sense of which\\ndepends correctness of appreciation, with conse-\\nquent discretion of action.\\nBeyond all other movement, beyond all cor-\\nporate or even national experience, the progress\\nof the world illustrates the necessities and the\\nuncertainties with which thought has to contend,\\nand under the stress of which it must develop\\ninto policy and assert itself in conduct. This is,\\nof course, an inevitable result of enlargement of\\nscale, and the world movement presents action\\nupon the greatest of all scales. There is vastly\\nmore of detail and of surprise, of the complicated\\nand of the unexpected. Every nation or race\\ndeals with its own problems, those of its in-\\nternal and of its external life but the fortune\\nof each exerts a specific influence upon the gen-\\neral outcome. Not only are those influences\\nvery diverse in themselves, but they cause inces-\\nsant change in the relations of the parts to each", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "The Proble7n of Asia\\nother and to the whole. Relative importance\\nand the nature of that importance are subject to\\ncontinual fluctuation. Enmities succeed to friend-\\nships strength declines to weakness accident,\\nas men call it, in a moment and amid universal\\nastonishment reverses conditions. Still, although\\nliable at any moment to see hopes overthrown,\\ncombinations frustrated, and even the solidest\\nfoundations giving under their feet, nations and\\ntheir rulers must take account of existing tenden-\\ncies, argue from the present to the future, estimate\\nthe relative weight of contemporary factors, and\\nfrom them forecast the probable issue, although\\nit seem to lie beyond the horizon of their own\\ngeneration for in their day they are the guar-\\ndians of posterity, and may not shirk their trust.\\nThey must, in short, take long views, and upon\\nthem in due measure act as opportunity permits\\nyet withal the uncertainties, both of calculations\\nand of events, are so great, the difficulties of pre-\\ndiction and of speculation so obvious, that they\\nare compelled to treat the situation of each\\nmoment in the light of immediate necessities,\\nto take short views, to look primarily to their\\nfeet and to the next step, endeavoring only, if\\nthey may, that this be in the general direction", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia\\nwhich their practical sagacity has indicated as the\\nfar goal of the nation s good.\\nIt would be an interesting study, but one quite\\napart from the object of this paper, to trace the\\ngenesis and evolution in the American people of\\nthe impulse towards expansion which has recently\\ntaken so decisive a stride. To do this ade-\\nquately would involve the consideration of a\\nvolume of details, in order to extricate from them\\nthe leading features which characterize and dem-\\nonstrate the vital sequence in the several stages\\nof advance. The treatment of the matter, how-\\never, would be very imperfect if it failed clearly\\nto recognize and to state that it is but one phase\\nof a sentiment that has swept over the whole\\ncivilized European world within the last few\\ndecades, salient evidences of which are found in\\nthe advance of Russia in Asia, in the division of\\nAfrica, in the colonial ambitions of France and\\nof Germany, in the naval growth of the latter,\\nin the development of Japan, and in the British\\nidea of Imperial Federation, now fast assuming\\nconcrete shape in practical combined action in\\nSouth Africa. Every great state has borne its\\npart in this common movement, the significance\\nof which cannot be ignored. We may not know", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "The Problein of Asia\\nwhence it comes nor whither it goes, but there it is.\\nWe see it and we hear it, and our own share in\\nit has already radically changed our relations\\ntowards foreign states and races. Whatever its\\nfuture, a future it clearly has, to read which men\\nmust lift up their hearts and strain their eyes,\\nwhile at the same time they neglect not the pres-\\nent, but do with their might that which their\\nhand at the moment finds to do.\\nA study of a particular phase of this possible\\nfuture, as it appears to one man, is the object of\\nthis present paper. Before, however, proceeding\\nwith such consideration, it may be interesting,\\nand not inappropriate, to note in briefest outline\\nhow singularly the long view and the short view\\nhave received illustration in the recent course of\\nevents. The intrinsic importance of Cuba, of the\\nWest Indies in general, and of the Isthmus of\\nPanama, to the political, commercial, and military\\ninterests of the United States, was long ago per-\\nceived. To illustrate this by detailed account,\\nfrom the words and actions of public men, would\\nrequire an article rather, perhaps, a volume\\nby itself; but it is easy to note, rising above the\\nsea of incidental details, of diplomatic negotia-\\ntions and governmental recommendations, a few", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia\\nlandmarks, such as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,\\nthe attempt under Grant s administration to\\nannex Santo Domingo, the abortive negotiations\\nfor the purchase of the Danish islands, our treaty\\nwith Colombia guaranteeing the transit of the\\nIsthmus railway. Solicitude, which traced its\\norigin to the early years of the century, increased\\nto conviction as the expansion of the country\\nemphasized the consciousness of a probable\\ndestiny. Deadened temporarily by the outbreak\\nof the civil war, which it antedated by genera-\\ntions, it revived immediately upon its conclusion\\nthe insistence upon the French withdrawal from\\nMexico being a first-fruits of quickened life. For\\nthe moment the long view had yielded to the\\nimperious demands of the short but, the emer-\\ngency over, the nation again lifted its eyes and\\nlooked afar.\\nMeantime events had progressed and continued\\nto progress. New factors had entered into the\\nconditions, while the bearing and importance of\\nold factors were seen more clearly and forcibly,\\nfor time had brought them out of the haze of\\ndistant speculation, and nearer to the decisive\\nmoment of action. The school of thought that\\nlooked to expansion became more incisive and", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0044.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia\\noutspoken, its ideas increasing in scope and in\\ndefiniteness of expression. The long view, rais-\\ning its vision gradually above the Antilles and\\nthe Isthmus, as these drew more into the fore-\\nground, saw beyond them the Pacific, Hawaii,\\nand the beginning of momentous issues in China\\nand Japan. There insight again was baffled\\nunless it may be claimed, as evidence of a wider\\nrange, that the country and the exponents of\\nexpansion, in common with the world at large,\\nhad at last aroused to consciousness of the deter-\\nmining influence of sea power upon the history\\nof the world. Sea power, however, is but the\\nhandmaid of expansion, its begetter and pre-\\nserver; it is not itself expansion, nor did the\\nadvocates of the latter foresee room for advance\\nbeyond the Pacific. Their vision reached not\\npast Hawaii, which also, as touching the United\\nStates, they regarded from the point of view of\\ndefence rather than as a stepping-stone to any\\nfarther influence in the world. So far as came\\nunder the observation of the writer and his\\ninterest in the matter dated back several years\\nthe expansionists themselves, up to the war with\\nSpain, were dominated by the purely defensive\\nideas inherited from the earlier days of our", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0045.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "8 The Problem of Asia\\nnational existence. The Antilles, Cuba, the\\nIsthmus, and Hawaii were up to that time simply\\noutposts positions where it was increasingly-\\nevident that influences might be established dan-\\ngerous to the United States as she then was. Such\\ninfluences must be forestalled if not by imme-\\ndiate action, at least by a definite policy.\\nIt was to such a state of mind that the war\\nwith Spain came and the result has the special\\ninterest of showing the almost instantaneous\\nreadiness with which a seed of thought germinates\\nwhen it falls upon mental soil prepared already\\nto receive it. Reflection and discussion, voice\\nand pen, platform and press, had broken up the\\nfallow ground left untilled by the generations\\nwhich succeeded the fathers of the republic.\\nHabit had familiarized men s minds with the\\nidea of national power spreading beyond the\\nbounds of this continent, and with the reasons\\nthat made it advisable, if not imperative. Though\\nstaggered for an instant by a proposition so\\nentirely unexpected and novel as Asiatic domin-\\nion, the long view had done its work of prepara-\\ntion and the short view, the action necessary\\nat the minute, imposed primarily and inevitably\\nby the circumstances of the instant, found no", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0046.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia\\nserious difficulty of acceptance, so far as concerned\\nthe annexation of the Philippines the widest\\nsweep, in space, of our national extension.\\nWe have for the time being quite sufficient to\\noccupy our activities in accommodating ourselves\\nto these new conditions, and in organizing our\\nduties under them. But while this is true as\\ntouching immediate action, it is not necessarily,\\nnor equally, true as regards thought, directed\\nupon the future. After a brief rest in contem-\\nplation of the present, effi^rt must be resumed,\\nnot merely to note existing conditions, but to\\nappreciate the tendencies involved in them\\nhistory in embryo the issue of which will here-\\nafter concern us or our descendants. Events of\\nrecent years have substantially changed the\\npolitical relations of states, and thereby have\\nimposed such a study of these as shall give point\\nand direction to that long view of the distant\\nfuture which, uncertain though it be in its calcu-\\nlations, and liable to sudden disconcertment, is\\nnevertheless essential, if sagacious and continuous\\nguidance is to be given to the course of a nation.\\nSuch study will require an intelligent and sus-\\ntained resolution for, with the possible exception\\nof the Monroe doctrine, the people of the United", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0047.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "lo The Problem of Asia\\nStates have been by long habit indifferent to the\\nsubject of external policies. They have been so\\nnot only as the result of our particular circum-\\nstances of isolation, but by deliberate intention,\\ninherited from a day when such abstinence was\\nbetter justified than now, and depended upon a\\nwell-known, though misunderstood, warning of\\nWashington against entangling alliances. Under\\nchanged conditions of the world, from the in-\\nfluence of which we cannot escape, it is impera-\\ntive to arouse to the necessity of conscious effort,\\nin order to recognize and to understand broad\\nexternal problems, not merely as matters of\\ngeneral information or of speculative interest, but\\nas questions in which we ourselves have, or may\\nhave, the gravest direct concern, as affecting our-\\nselves or our children.\\nIt is by such long views that is developed the\\nreadiness of decision, in unexpected conjunctures\\nof international politics, which corresponds to\\npresence of mind in common life for ordinarily\\npresence of mind means preparedness of mind,\\nthrough previous reflection upon possible con-\\ntingencies. The need of such readiness of sus-\\ntained apprehension of actual and of probable\\nfuture conditions receives the clearest demon-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0048.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 1 1\\nstration from our recent experience. What more\\nsudden or less expected, what, in a word, more\\nillustrative of a short view resulting in decisive\\naction, taken at a moment s notice, can be ad-\\nduced than that a war begun with Spain about\\nCuba should result in tendering us the position\\nof an Asiatic Power, with the consequent respon-\\nsibilities and opportunities Evidently a mind\\nprepared by deliberation upon contemporary\\noccurrences and tendencies is no mean equipment\\nfor prompt decision in such a case. It is in no\\nwise a disconnected incident that the United\\nStates has been suddenly drawn out of her\\ntraditional attitude of apartness from the struggle\\nof European states, and had a new element forced\\ninto her polity. The war with Spain has been\\nbut one of several events, nearly simultaneous,\\nwhich have compelled mankind to fix their atten-\\ntion upon eastern Asia, and to realize that condi-\\ntions there have so changed as to compel a\\nreadjustment of ideas, as well as of national poli-\\ncies and afEHations. Nothing is more calculated\\nto impress the mind with the seriousness of the\\nimpending problems than the known fact that\\nJapan, which less than four years ago notified\\nour government of her disinclination to our", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0049.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "12 The Problem of Asia\\nannexation of Hawaii, now with satisfaction sees\\nus in possession of the Phihppines.\\nThe ahered conditions in the East have doubt-\\nless resulted as did American expansion-\\nfrom certain preparative antecedents, less obvious\\nat the time of their occurrence, and which there-\\nfore then escaped particular notice but the inci-\\ndents that have signalized the change have been\\ncompacted into a very few years. Hence they\\npossess the attribute of suddenness, which natu-\\nrally entails for a time a lack of precise compre-\\nhension, with the necessary consequence of vague-\\nness in opinion. Nevertheless, there they are\\nmatters of grave international moment to those\\nolder nationalities, from whom heretofore we have\\nheld ourselves sedulously aloof. Side by side with\\nthem is our own acceptance of the Phihppines, an\\nact which we could not rightly avoid, and which\\ncarries with it opportunity. Opportunity, how-\\never, can never be severed from responsibility for,\\nwhether utilized or neglected, a decision, positive\\nor negative, is made, which cannot be dissociated\\nfrom the imputation of moral right or wrong, of\\nintellectual mistake or of wisdom.\\nIt may be well here to consider for a moment\\nthe charge, now often made, that by the accept-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0050.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 13\\nance of the Philippines, and, still more, by any\\nfurther use of the opportunities they may give\\nus, we abandon the Monroe doctrine. The\\nargument, if it can be allowed that name, derives\\nsuch force as it has from appeal to prejudice a\\nword which, although it has an invidious asso-\\nciation, does not necessarily imply more than\\nopinion already formed, and which, if resting on\\nsolid basis, is entitled to full respect, unless, and\\nuntil, it refuses to face new conditions. The\\nMonroe doctrine, however, commits us only to\\na national policy, which may be comprehensively\\nsummarized as an avowed purpose to resist the\\nextension of the European system to the Amer-\\ni ican continents. As a just counterweight to this\\npretension, which rests in no wise upon inter-\\nnational law, but upon our own interests as we\\nunderstand them, we have adopted, as a rule of\\naction, abstention from interference even by\\nsuggestion, and much more by act in ques-\\ntions purely European.\\nOf these complementary positions, neither the\\none nor the other possesses any legal standing,\\nany binding force, of compact or of precedent.\\nWe are at liberty to abandon either at once,\\nwithout incurring any just imputation of unlaw-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0051.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "14 The Problem of Asia\\nful action. Regarded, however, purely as a\\nmatter of policy, and as such accepted as wise,\\nby what process of reasoning is it to be estab-\\nlished that either the one rule or the other bars\\nus, on the ground of consistency, from asserting\\nwhat we think our rights in Asia? In its incep-\\ntion the Monroe doctrine was, I suppose, a\\nrecognition of the familiar maxim of statesmen\\nthat geographical propinquity is a source of\\ntrouble between nations, which we, being favored\\nby natural isolation, proposed to avert and to\\nthis proposition the determination to keep clear\\nof questions internal to Europe was an inevitable\\ncorollary. We took advantage, in short, of an\\nopportunity extended to us by fortunate con-\\nditions to assure our national quiet. But there\\nare provinces other than geographical in which\\nthe interests of nations approach and mingle,\\nand in those we have never been deterred by the\\nMonroe doctrine from acting as our duties or\\nour interests demanded. It has never, that I\\nknow, been seriously wished to compass our\\nends by the acquisition of European territory,\\nfor it would be neither expedient nor justifiable,\\neven if possible, to unsettle conditions the per-\\nmanency of which is the secure evolution of cen-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0052.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 1 5\\nturies of racial and national history but we have\\nhad no scruples of justice or of expediency as to\\nextension of territory in this hemisphere, where\\nno such final adjustments had been reached.\\nNow in Asia we are confronted at this moment\\nby questions in which our interests will probably\\nbe largely involved. There is no more inconsis-\\ntency in taking there such action as the case de-\\nmands than there has been in any international\\ndifference we have hitherto had with a Euro-\\npean power while if such action should in-\\nvolve use of territory, directly or incidentally, by\\npossession or by control sphere of influence\\nit will only be because decadent conditions there\\nshall hereafter have resulted in a lack of power,\\neither to perpetuate a present system or to resist\\nencroachments which the progress of the world\\nunder the impulse of more virile states is sure\\nto entail. There is certainly no desire, but\\nrather unwillingness, on the part of the United\\nStates to undertake such an addition to her\\nresponsibilities, otherwise sufficiently great both\\nher traditions and her present policy are neces-\\nsarily adverse to such action. Still it must be\\nconsidered as a possible contingency, however\\ndeplorable, for, if life departs, a carcass can be", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0053.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "1 6 The Problem of Asia\\nutilized only by dissection or for food the\\ngathering to it of the eagles is a natural law, of\\nwhich it is bootless to complain. The onward\\nmovement of the world has to be accepted as a\\nfact, to be advantageously dealt with by guidance,\\nnot by mere opposition, still less by unprofitable\\nbewailing of things irretrievably past.\\nThe Monroe doctrine has been and continues\\nto be a good serviceable working theory, resting\\non undeniable conditions. But, having now a\\nlifetime of several generations, it has acquired an\\nadded force of tradition, of simple conservatism,\\nwhich has a bad as well as a good side. For\\ntradition tends to invest accepted policy with\\nthe attribute of permanency, which only excep-\\ntionally can be predicated of the circumstances\\nof this changing world. The principles upon\\nwhich an idea rests may conform to essential, and\\ntherefore permanent, truth but application con-\\ntinually varies, and maxims, rules, doctrines, not\\nbeing the living breath of principles, but only\\ntheir embodiment the temporary application\\nof them to conditions not necessarily permanent\\ncan claim no exemption from the ebb and\\nflow of mundane things. We should not make\\nof even this revered doctrine a fetich, nor per-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0054.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 1 7\\nsuade ourselves that a modification is under no\\ncircumstances admissible.\\nFor instance, it has become probable that,\\nwhatever our continued adherence to the doc-\\ntrine itself, we may have somewhat to readjust\\nour views of its corollary that concerning\\napartness from European complications. It is\\nnot, indeed, likely, in any view that can be\\ntaken within our present horizon, that we should\\nfind reason for intervention in a dispute localized\\nin Europe itself; but it is nevertheless most\\nprobable that we can never again see with indif-\\nference, and with the sense of security which\\ncharacterized our past, a substantial, and still less\\na radical, change in the balance of power there.\\nThe progress of the world has brought us to a\\nperiod when it is well within the range of possi-\\nbilities that the declension of a European state\\nmight immediately and directly endanger our\\nown interests might involve us in action, either\\nto avert the catastrophe itself or to remedy its\\nconsequences. From this follows the obvious\\nnecessity of appreciating the relations to our-\\nselves of the power inherent in various countries,\\ndue to their available strength and to their\\nposition what also their attitude towards us,", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0055.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia\\nresultant from the temper of the people, and the\\nintelligent control of the latter by the government\\ntwo very different things, even in democratic\\ncommunities. Herein, again, we only share the\\ncommon fate of all nations for not only do all\\ntouch one another more closely than of old, but\\nand especially in Asia conditions external\\nto all are drawing the regard of all towards a\\ncommon centre, where as yet nothing certain is\\ndetermined, where the possibilities of the future\\nare many, and diverse, and great.\\nIn so large a question as the future of Asia,\\nupon which are now converging, from many\\nquarters, streams of influence representing the\\ninterests, not of nationalities only, but of the\\nlarger groups which we know as races, it is well\\nto study first the broad geographical features, in\\ntheir several attributes such as disposition,\\narea, physical characteristics, distances and\\nthereafter the present political distribution, with\\nthe possibihties which result from both. To\\nthese considerations, pertaining to the continent\\nitself, must be added an appreciation of the en-\\nvironing circumstances, even if distant, which\\nare involved in the territorial situation of other\\nnations, Asiatic or European in their relative", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0056.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 19\\nstrength and its kinds political, economical,\\nmilitary, naval in their readiness of access to\\nthe continent of Asia the length, nature, and\\nfacilities of the communications to and fro the\\nAsiatic positions, if such there be, now held by\\nthem secondary bases, whence their influence,\\npolitical or military, may be brought to bear.\\nFor the problem of Asia is a world problem,\\nwhich has come upon the world in an age when,\\nthrough the rapidity of communication, it is wide\\nawake and sensible as never before, and by elec-\\ntrical touch, to every stirring in its members, and\\nto the tendency thereof. But sensitiveness is not\\nthe same thing as understanding, any more than\\nsymptoms are identical with diagnosis. Study Is\\nrequisite and as a preliminary it may be ob-\\nserved that political problems into which the\\nelement of geography enters have much in com-\\nmon with military strategy. There will be found\\nin both a centre of interest an objective the\\npositions of the parties concerned, which are the\\nbases of their strength and operations, even when\\nthese are peaceful and there is the ability to\\nproject their power to the centre of interest, which\\nanswers to the communications that play so lead-\\ning a part in military art, because power that can-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0057.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "20 The Problem of Asia\\nnot be transmitted freely ceases in so far to be\\noperative power. It is, in fact, this quality,\\nfacility of transmission, that has made sea power\\nso multifold in manifestation and in efficiency.\\nAs we look at the continent of Asia, in its\\nlength and breadth, we may note, first, that it lies\\nwholly north of the equator, and in great part\\nbetween the northern tropic and the arctic circle\\nthat is, in the so-called temperate zone. The\\ninferences as to climate which might be drawn\\nfrom this are deceptive, owing to modifications\\noccasioned by physical conditions. The great\\nplains of the north and of the south of Siberia\\nand of India are subject, respectively, to ex-\\ntremes of cold and of heat, due primarily to the\\nvast extent of land in the continent itself, which\\nprecludes the moderating power of the sea from\\nexercising extensive influence. The effect of this\\nimmense region upon temperature is most strik-\\ningly shown in the monsoons, the periodical\\nwinds which alternate with the seasons as land\\nand sea breezes change with night and day but\\nwhich during their continuance have the steadi-\\nness characteristic of the permanent trades. This\\nphenomenon, which prevails throughout the\\nIndian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, and the China", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0058.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 21\\nSea, is attributable to the alternate heating and\\ncooling of the continent, as the sun moves north\\nor south of the equator, inducing a periodical set\\nof the atmosphere from the northeast during\\nthe winter, and from the southwest during the\\nsummer.\\nWithin its main outlines, the greatest breadth\\nof the continent from east to west is about five\\nthousand statute miles, following the thirtieth\\ndegree of north latitude but along the fortieth\\nthis distance is increased by some hundreds of\\nmiles, through the projection of two peninsulas\\nAsia Minor on the west, and Korea on the\\neast. Between these two parallels are to be found,\\nspeaking roughly, the most decisive natural\\nfeatures, and also those political divisions the\\nunsettled character of which renders the problem\\nof Asia in the present day at once perplexing and\\nimminent. Within this belt are the Isthmus of\\nSuez, Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, the\\ngreater part of Persia, and Afghanistan with\\nthe strong mountain ranges that mark these two\\ncountries and Armenia the Pamir, the huge\\nelevations of Tibet, and a large part of the valley\\nof the Yang-tse-kiang, with the lower and most\\nimportant thousand miles of that river s course.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0059.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "22 The Problem of Asia\\nWithin it also are the cities of Aleppo, Mosul,\\nand Bagdad, of Teheran and Ispahan, of Merv\\nand Herat, Kabul and Kandahar, and in the\\nfar east of China, Peking, Shanghai, Nanking,\\nand Han-kow. No one of these is in the terri-\\ntory of a state the stability of which can be said\\nto repose securely upon its own strength, or even\\nupon the certainty of non-interference by ambi-\\ntious neighbors. The chain of the Himalayas is\\nexterior to, but only a little south of, the zone\\nindicated. Although Japan is extra-continental,\\nit may be interesting to note that the greater part\\nof her territory and the centre of her power lie\\nalso within the belt, and extend almost across it,\\nfrom north to south.\\nWithin these bounds, speaking broadly and\\nnot exclusively, is the debatable and debated\\nground. North and south of it, in similar wide\\ngeneralization, political conditions are relatively\\ndetermined, though by no means absolutely fixed.\\nAlong the northern and southern borders, where\\nexterior impulses impinge, there are uncertainty\\nand jealousy, aggression and defence, not as yet\\nmilitary, but political. Still, whatever its form,\\nsuch action is at bottom that of conflicting, if not\\ncontending, impulses. The division of Asia is", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0060.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 23\\neast and west movement is north and south.\\nIt is the character of that movement, and its\\nprobable future, as indicated by the relative forces,\\nand by the lines which in physics are called those\\nof least resistance, that we are called to study; for\\nin the greatness of the stake, and in the relative\\nsettledness of conditions elsewhere, there is assur-\\nance that there will continue to be motion until\\nan adjustment is reached, either in the satisfaction\\nof everybody, or by the definite supreniacy of\\nsome one of the contestants. Practically, if not\\nlogically, equilibrium may consist in decisive\\noverweight, as well as in an even balance\\nanother paradoxical truth.\\nThat the dividing line of unsettled political\\nstatus is along the belt defined may be ascertained\\nby a brief examination of a map. That move-\\nment is from and to the north and the south Is a\\nmatter of history not yet a generation old\\nand of names familiar to all readers of news.\\nThe mere sound of Turkestan, Khiva, Merv,\\nHerat, Kandahar, Kabul, attests the fact as do\\nManchuria and Port Arthur. Thus both in the\\nwestern half and in the extreme east is observed\\nthe same tendency, which would be still more\\namply demonstrated by an appeal to history but", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0061.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "24 The Problem of Asia\\nlittle more remote. It is, in fact, no longer con-\\nsistent with accuracy of forecast to draw a north\\nand south line of severance to contemplate east-\\nern Asia apart from western to dissociate, prac-\\ntically, the conditions and incidents in the one\\nfrom those in the other. Both form living parts\\nof a large problem, to which both contribute\\nelements of perplexity. The relations of each to\\nthe other, and to the whole, must therefore be\\nconsidered.\\nAccepting provisionally the east and west belt\\nof division as one stage in the process of analysis,\\nwe may profitably consider next the character and\\ndistribution of the forces whose northward and\\nsouthward impulses constitute the primary factors\\nin the process of change already initiated and still\\ncontinuing. Upon a glance at the map one\\nenormous fact immediately obtrudes itself upon\\nthe attention the vast, uninterrupted mass of\\nthe Russian Empire, stretching without a break\\nin territorial consecutiveness from the meridian of\\nwestern Asia Minor, until to the eastward it\\noverpasses that of Japan. In this huge distance\\nno political obstacles intervene to impede the\\nconcentrated action of the disposable strength.\\nWithin the dominion of Russia only the distances", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0062.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 25\\nthemselves, and the hindrances unquestionably-\\ngreat and. manifold imposed by natural condi-\\ntions, place checks upon her freedom and fulness\\nof movement. To this element of power cen-\\ntral position is to be added the wedge-shaped\\noutline of her territorial projection into central\\nAsia, strongly supported as this is, on the one\\nflank, by the mountains of the Caucasus and the\\ninland Caspian Sea wholly under her control\\nand on the other by the ranges which extend from\\nAfghanistan, northeasterly, along the western\\nfrontier of China. From the latter, moreover,\\nshe as yet has no serious danger to fear.\\nThe fact of her general advance up to the\\npresent time, most of which has been made within\\na generation, so that the point of the wedge is now\\ninserted between Afghanistan and Persia, must be\\nviewed in connection with the tempting relative\\nfacility of farther progress through Persia to the\\nPersian Gulf, and with the strictly analogous\\nmovement, on the other side of the continent,\\nwhere long strides have been made through\\nManchuria to Port Arthur and the Gulf of\\nPe-chi-li. Thus, alike in the far east and in the\\nfar west, we find the same characteristic of\\nremorseless energy, rather remittent than inter-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0063.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "26 The Problem of Asia\\nmittent in its symptoms. Russia, in obedience\\nto natural law and race instinct, is working, geo-\\ngraphically, to the southward in Asia by both\\nflanks, her centre covered by the mountains of\\nAfghanistan and the deserts of eastern Turkestan\\nand Mongolia. Nor is it possible, even if it were\\ndesired, to interfere with the internal action, the\\nmutual support, of the various sections of this\\nextended line, whose length under the physical\\nand political conditions is less an element of\\nweakness for the Russian centre cannot be\\nbroken. It is upon, and from, the flanks of this\\ngreat line that restraint, if needed, must come;\\nthe opposition of those who, with no ill-will to\\nRussia, no grudging of her prosperity, neverthe-\\nless think that undue predominance is an unsound\\ncondition in any body politic in the parliament\\nof man, if we may say so, as well as in that of a\\nnation. In the federation of the world, if it ever\\ncome to pass, healthy politics will need an oppo-\\nsition of parties, drawn doubtless along national\\nor racial lines.\\nAs north and south are logically opposed, so it\\nmight be surmised that practically the opposition\\nto this movement of Russia from the north would\\nfind its chief expression to the south of the broad", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0064.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 27\\ndividing belt, between the thirtieth and fortieth\\nparallels. In a measure this is so, but with a very\\nmarked distinction, not only in degree but in\\nkind. In the progress of history, in which, as it\\nunrolls, more and more of plan and of purpose\\nseems to become evident, the great central penin-\\nsula of southern Asia, also projecting wedge-\\nshaped far north into the middle debatable zone,\\nhas come under the control of a people the heart\\nof whose power is far removed from it locally,\\nand who, to the concentration of territory charac-\\nteristic of Russia s geographical position, present\\nan extreme of racial and military dispersal. India,\\ntherefore, is to Great Britain not the primary\\nbase of operations, political and mihtary for\\nmilitary action is only a specialized form of poli-\\ntical. It is simply one of many contingent\\nsecondary bases, in different parts of the world,\\nthe action of which is susceptible of unification\\nonly by means of a supreme sea power. Of these\\nmany bases, India is the one best fitted, by near-\\nness and by conformation, both for effect upon\\nCentral Asia and for operations upon either ex-\\ntremity of the long line over which the Russian\\nfront extends. Protected on the land side and\\ncentre by the mountains of Afghanistan and the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0065.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "28 The Problem of Asia\\nHimalayas, its flanks, thrown to the rear, are\\nunassailable, so long as the navy remains pre-\\ndominant. They constitute also frontiers, from\\nwhich, in the future as in the past, expeditions\\nmay make a refreshed and final start, for Egypt\\non the one hand, for China on the other and, it\\nis needless to add, for any less distant destination\\nin either direction.\\nIt is not intrinsically only that India possesses\\nthe value of a base to Great Britain. The cen-\\ntral position which she holds relatively to China\\nand to Egypt obtains also towards Australia and\\nthe Cape of Good Hope, assisting thus the con-\\ncentration upon her of such support as either\\ncolony can extend to the general policy of an\\nImperial Federation. Even in its immediate\\nrelations to Asiatic problems, however, India is\\nnot unsupported. On land and in the centre,\\nthe acquisition of Burmah gives a continuous\\nextension of frontier to the east, which turns the\\nrange of the Himalayas, opening access, political\\nor peaceful, for influence or for commerce, to\\nthe upper valley of the Yang-tse-kiang, and to the\\nwestern provinces of China proper. By sea, the\\nStraits Settlements and Hong-kong on the one\\nside, Aden and Egypt on the other, faciliate.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0066.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 29\\nas far as land positions can, maritime enterprises\\nto the eastward or to the westward, directed in\\na broad sense upon the flanks of the dividing\\nzone, or upon those of the opposing fronts of\\noperations that mark the deployment of the\\nnorthern and southern powers, which at the pres-\\nent time are most strongly established upon\\nAsian territory.\\nThe British and Russian territorial develop-\\nments in Asia, as thus summarized, constitute the\\nlocal bases, upon which depend not merely move-\\nment, peaceful or warlike, if such take place, but\\nthe impulse to action, defensive or offensive, felt\\nby either nation. Were they not where they\\nare, much that now engages their attention would\\npass unremarked but, being there, there arise\\nfrom the positions exterior opportunities and\\ndangers, which neither state should nor can neg-\\nlect. It becomes therefore necessary to consider,\\nand to summarize, what those dangers and oppor-\\ntunities are for they constitute the external\\ninterests, which in the political field correspond\\nto the objectives of strategy in the Art of War.\\nThe first law of states, as of men, is self-preser-\\nvation a term which cannot be narrowed to\\nthe bare tenure of a stationary round of existence.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0067.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "30 The Problem of Asia\\nGrowth is a property of healthful life, which does\\nnot, it is true, necessarily imply increase of size\\nfor nations, any more than it does for individuals,\\nwith whom bodily, and still more mental, devel-\\nopment progresses long after stature has reached\\nits limit but it does involve the right to insure\\nby just means whatsoever contributes to national\\nprogress, and correlatively to combat injurious\\naction taken by an outside agency, if the latter\\noverpass its own lawful sphere. When a differ-\\nence between two states can be brought to the test\\nof ascertained and defined right, this carries with\\nit a strong presumption in favor of submission\\nbut when a matter touches only advantage, not\\nqualified by law or by prescription, and the\\nquestion therefore is one of expediency, it is\\njustly and profitably considered in the light of\\nself-preservation. This includes the right of\\ngrowth, common to both, which is not legal but\\nnatural, and consequently less capable of precise\\ndefinition. It is a great gain, not only to the\\nparties concerned, but to mankind at large, when\\neach candidly regards in this Hght the claims of\\nan opponent as well as its own, and seeks to\\nstrike a fair balance by mutual concession or\\nimpartial arbitration but it still remains true", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0068.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 31\\nthat in such a transaction governments and\\neven nations are not principals, but agents,\\nhaving in charge that which is not their own,\\nbut their trust, for the generation that then\\nis and for those which are to follow. Relinquish-\\nment, therefore, and recourse to arbitration, are\\nconditioned by the element of trusteeship, and\\ncannot be embraced in that spirit of simple self-\\nsacrifice which is so admirable in the individual\\nman dealing with what is wholly his own.\\nIt is therefore not enough to direct attention\\nto the security, in territorial tenure, of the two\\nparties who at the present moment are the princi-\\npal exponents of the contending impulses in Asia.\\nThere must be considered also the need and right\\nto grow, as these may be affected either by their\\nown opposing tendencies, or by conditions now\\nexisting in Asia itself, and localized for the most\\npart in the dividing belt of debatable ground.\\nNor can the question be confined to the two\\nmost prominent disputants. The right to grow,\\nof the world in general, and of other states in\\nparticular, is involved in these Asian problems,\\nin the development and utilization of this vast\\ntract, so long isolated from a share in the general\\norder.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0069.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "32 The Problem of Asia\\nGrowth depends upon two correlative factors\\nupon vigor of internal organization which gives\\npower to assimilate and upon freedom of inter-\\nchange with external sources of support. In the\\nfamily of civilized states, the former is solely\\nthe concern of the nation itself; intervention\\nfrom without, in the internal order of a commun-\\nity, is generally held to be permissible only when\\nits stage of political development corresponds\\nto that of childhood or of decay. The matter,\\nin fact, is one properly and naturally internal,\\nonly exceptionally and accidentally one for inter-\\nference from outside. It is quite different with\\nfreedom of interchange for that, depending\\nupon conditions external to the country, implies\\nnecessarily external acquiescence, both of the\\npeople with whom interchange is had, and of\\nthose whose interests are involved in the inter-\\nvening channels of communication.\\nThe methods of the British or Russian internal\\nadministration are therefore outside of such a\\ndiscussion as this, except in so far as they indicate\\nthe probable effect upon other countries of the\\nextension of these methods to territory desired,\\nbut not yet obtained. This is, indeed, a most\\nserious consideration, and one that cannot fail", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0070.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 33\\nto weigh heavily in the determination of policies.\\nThe ubiquitous tendency to territorial expansion,\\nwhich is so marked a feature in European states\\nof the period, results in a corresponding contrac-\\ntion of the ground free equally to all and, as\\nthis narrows, there cannot but be increasing jeal-\\nousy of every movement which carries a threat\\nof exclusive control, whether by acquisition or\\nby predominant influence, especially if the latter\\ndepend not upon fair commercial struggle in\\nopen markets, but upon the alien element of\\nmilitary or political force.\\nWhatever, therefore, may be the commercial\\npossibilities involved in the application of modern\\nmethods to the further development of the coun-\\ntries and peoples which lie between the zones of\\nBritish and Russian power in Asia, one single\\ninterest will be common to all the nations who\\nseek by commerce by interchange to pro-\\nmote their own healthy national growth. Each\\nalike will desire that it, individually, have its\\nequal chance in the field, unhindered by the\\ninimical influence of a foreign power, resting not\\nupon fair competition, but upon force, whether\\nexerted by open act or by secret pressure. Noth-\\ning is more dreaded, nor will be more resented\\n3", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0071.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "34 The Problem of Asia\\nmore productive of quarrel than such inter-\\nposition. In the final analysis the question is as\\nyet essentially military. Time, much time, will\\nbe needed for the process of development but\\nthe movement is already in progress through\\nwhich, by the acquisition of new positions, and\\nby the consolidation of power both in them and\\nin territory already held, advantage will be gained\\nfor the exercise of control.\\nWhat has just been said applies to all the belt\\nlying, roughly, between the thirtieth and fortieth\\nparallels, and not to China only, although the\\nlatter, through her huge area and population, and\\nher seeming helplessness, has naturally attracted\\nthe greater attention. The question also is, for\\nthe present, quite independent of the aggregate\\nresults of development, which not impossibly\\nmay fall very short of the rosy hopes of trade\\nsuggested by the mere words four hundred\\nmillions of people. Those results, being so far\\nin the future as to defy exact prediction, affect\\nthe question much as a variable quantity does a\\nmathematical problem that is, not at all, so\\nfar as the process of investigation is concerned,\\nthe effect being shown only when different values\\nare assigned to it in the final expression. Be that", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0072.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 35\\nvariable quantity the result of development\\ngreat or small, its possibilities are great, and as\\nsuch it must be taken into account in discussing\\nthe political problem of obviating now the chance\\nof any exclusive, or unduly preponderant, usu-\\nfruct then.\\nOn this account, in regarding the central zone\\nof Asia as a source whence the nations of the\\nworld, by mutual exchange or benefit, can both\\ninvigorate their own life and that of the Asiatics,\\nit seems quite just and reasonable to discard all\\nattempt to estimate by detail how abundant that\\nsource may prove to be. Even if utilization be\\nconfined to the labor and capital employed in\\ndeveloping internal communications, the mutual\\neffect will be great enough to merit considera-\\ntion. How much more the future may hold is\\nindifferent to the necessary forecast the short\\nview of the present. The problem, into the\\nfinal solution of which enter all the factors\\nmilitary and naval power, military and naval\\npositions, communications external and internal,\\ncommercial operations and benefits is less one\\nof proportion than of scale and the scale will\\ndepend upon the value of that unknown and\\nvariable quantity, the potential wealth of the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0073.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "36 The Problem of Asia\\ncountries concerned, when they shall have be-\\ncome fully developed members of the inter-\\nnational body.\\nThe contribution, direct and indirect, which\\nthese regions may eventually make to the general\\nprosperity of the world is the substantial interest\\nwhich is now attracting the attention of the\\nnations. From their aim to control or to share\\nit, it corresponds to the objective of strategy in\\nmilitary operations. Accepting provisionally the\\nconclusion just reached as to its present indeter-\\nminate value, we have next to consider the ques-\\ntion of approaches from without, which in their\\nturn answer to the communications that play so\\nleading a part in the policy of war. Communi-\\ncations that are wholly internal fall into the cate-\\ngory of commercial development, except where\\nthey may form sections of a great, international\\nline.\\nIt will be apparent at once that communica-\\ntions approaches from without are of two\\nchief kinds by sea and by land. In these\\nheads of division they recall the essential differ-\\nences between the two European powers now\\nmost solidly settled on Asiatic soil. These con-\\ncurrent facts and factors suggest, what will", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0074.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 37\\nhereafter become increasingly apparent, that we\\nhave here again a fresh instance of the multiform\\nstruggle between land power and sea power.\\nConsequently, it is not improbable that the\\nrecognition and constant recollection of this\\nperennial contest may serve better than any\\nother clew to guide us through this complicated\\ninquiry, and to reach an adjustment between the\\ntwo antagonists that can most certainly and most\\neasily be maintained. Such an adjustment would\\nbe one in which the respective aggregates of\\npower, whatever its component parts on either\\nside, should approach equality, in amount and in\\ndisposition, while causes of friction should at the\\nsame time be minimized. If these two conditions\\nthe smallest friction, and equality of power\\nbe insured, there will follow from them the least\\ndisposition to break the peace.\\nLines of communication by sea, whatever their\\nstarting-point and their course, extend as far as\\nships can float and navigate. So far they exist\\nindependent of man s power, which does not\\ndetermine their existence, but the use of them.\\nIn copiousness they exceed, irretrievably, the\\nutmost possibilities of land travel. This is con-\\nsequent, partly, upon the greater obstacles to", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0075.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "38 The Problem of Asia\\ntransit imposed by the ground under its most\\nfavorable conditions, and partly upon the undue\\nexpense incurred, owing to the same obstacles, in\\nattempting by increase of width, or by multiplica-\\ntion of tracks, to rival the expanses of water\\nroutes. As a highway, a railroad competes in\\nvain with a river the greater speed cannot\\ncompensate for the smaller carriage. Because\\nmore facile and more copious, water traffic is for\\nequal distances much cheaper and, because\\ncheaper, more useful in general. These dis-\\ntinctions are not accidental or temporary they\\nare of the nature of things, and permanent.\\nOnly where there is no water communication,\\nor when excess of distance by water as compared\\nwith that by land counterbalances the intrinsic\\nadvantages of the former, can there be compe-\\ntition in cheapness and in generalness of use. It\\nis necessary to insist upon these facts for the far\\ngreater speed of the railroad gives a very differ-\\nent impression to the average mind, which is\\nprone to forget the limitations in capacity. Traf-\\nfic, or exchange of goods, depends in aggregate\\nresult not upon speed only but upon the amounts\\nthat can be steadily delivered in long equal\\nperiods of time.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0076.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 39\\nThese inherent advantages of water communi-\\ncations will probably insure their preponderance,\\nin exploiting the development of the regions now\\nunder consideration. But, as has before been\\nobserved, the existence of sea communications is\\none thing the use of them is another. The\\nlatter depends upon power, and that power\\nmanifested in two ways, namely, by pure naval\\nstrength upon the ocean, and by a combination\\nor conflict, it may be of naval and military\\nstrength, where the ocean touches or penetrates\\nthe land. There, where they meet, opposition\\non the score of military power, which underlies\\npolitical power, is of course accentuated, and the\\nbalance must be determined. Such local deter-\\nmination, however, does not affect merely the\\nneighborhood in which it is exerted. The\\nnature, extent, and decisiveness of territorial con-\\ntrol, established by power resting upon the sea,\\nconstitute a centre of political influence, corres-\\nponding to a base of military operations, from\\nwhich are radiated efi ects which reach far inland,\\nand exert a force commensurate in difliision and\\nin degree to that of the base from which they\\nissue.\\nThus land power is modified by the proximity", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0077.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "40 The Problem of Asia\\nof the sea and correspondingly, whenever the\\nocean touches the land, the circumstance at once\\nconditions sea power, which no longer represents\\na single factor, but becomes a resultant, depen-\\ndent in character upon the contrasted strengths\\nof opposing forces. This is seen, in different\\nphases and degrees, in the entrances of seaports\\nand of navigable rivers in the ascent of the\\nlatter in the effect of islands as well as of coast-\\nlines upon strategy in straits such as Gibral-\\ntar, or canals like Suez. In all these cases the\\npower of the land to interfere with that of the sea\\nis easily obvious. It is seen again, in the most\\nextreme form, where an international water route\\nis interrupted, as at the Isthmus of Panama,\\nby land transit like the portage between\\ntwo inlands streams or where, from the close\\napproach of the land, such interruption can\\nreadily be caused. This liability naturally is\\ngreatest with artificial water routes, of which the\\nSuez Canal is the most conspicuous existing ex-\\nample but it would receive illustration also in\\nthe case of a railway from the Mediterranean to\\nthe Persian Gulf, which undoubtedly will be a\\nfeature of the future development of Asia.\\nConsidering the respective prerogatives of the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0078.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 41\\nland and of the sea, regarded as channels of com-\\nmunication, and their mutual influence when in\\ncontact, there can be little doubt that with China,\\nas with other countries that enjoy a sea frontier^\\nthe latter will be the more fruitful medium of\\npromoting commerce the interchange where-\\nby nations in vigorous life sustain and develop\\ntheir strength through contact with outside\\nsources, which, in return, are thus not exhausted,\\nbut renewed. This general tendency will receive\\nspecial impulse and force from the Yang-tse-\\nkiang, which, being navigable by steamers a\\nthousand miles from its mouth, extends so far\\nthe access from the sea to the heart of this great\\nvalley of China. And as with the country pos-\\nsessing the seaboard, so with those whose ap-\\nproach to her is through it, and by the sea.\\nThe greater ease, and therefore the greater co-\\npiousness, of the stream of traffic result in a\\ncorresponding increase in the wealth the gain\\nwhich is the concrete expression of the mutual\\nbenefit. Greater benefit entails greater interest\\ninterest in the maintenance and promotion of\\nthe more favorable conditions that is, those who\\nare deriving the largest good from the exchange\\nfrom commerce will be most anxious to", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0079.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "42 The Problem of Asia\\ncontinue and to develop it, and, as commerce\\nthrives by peace and suffers by war, it follows\\nthat peace is the superior interest of those coun-\\ntries which approach by the sea. It is, indeed, a\\nreiterated commonplace that the interest of a\\ncommercial state is peace. Such countries will\\nindeed need to support their policy of peace by\\nreadiness to resort to war if need be but locally\\nsuch military preparation as they may have will\\nbe essentially defensive, not aggressive. This\\nresults also from another cause for, while they\\nhave the greater interest and the stronger control\\none approaching, in fact, to decisiveness\\nover the sea communications, their power of\\nterritorial control cannot directly outweigh that\\nof a state whose frontiers are conterminous with\\nthe region in dispute. It is this limited capacity\\nof navies to extend coercive force inland that has\\ncommended them to the highest political intelli-\\ngence, as a military instrument mighty for de-\\nfence, but presenting no menace to the liberties\\nof a people.\\nThe distribution of the Russian dominion and\\nthe concentration of its mass, already alluded to,\\ncombined with the fact of its irremediable re-\\nmoteness from an open sea, render inevitable its", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0080.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 43\\ndependence upon land routes for the bulk of its\\nintercourse with the debatable ground of Asia.\\nNatural conditions are so hopelessly adverse,\\nthat it is difficult to see what possible political\\nextension can seriously modify them. By this is\\nmeant that, wherever Russia now touches the sea,\\nor can shortly touch it, the points are so remote\\nfrom the heart of her territory that access to it\\nfrom them must, after all, be chiefly by land.\\nThe benefit of sea commerce, therefore, will ex-\\ntend from her seaboard only to a distance short\\nrelatively to the extent of the empire while the\\nlocalities immediately benefited are comparatively\\nsmall, and not especially adapted to those forms\\nof development which sea commerce promotes.\\nThey have the further disadvantage that they are\\nupon enclosed seas, liable, therefore, to be defi-\\nnitively shut by a hostile power land or sea,\\nas the case may be. It is sufficient merely to\\nglance at the Dardanelles and the approaches to\\nthe Baltic to see the force of this remark.\\nFrom these conditions it results that, if the\\ncomparative advantages and results of land and\\nwater traffic are as has been stated above, Russia\\nis in a disadvantageous position for the accumula-\\ntion of wealth which is but another way of say-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0081.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "44 The Problem of Asia\\ning that she is deficient in means for advancing\\nthe welfare of her people, of which wealth is at\\nonce the instrument and the exponent. This\\nbeing so, it is natural and proper that she should\\nbe dissatisfied, and dissatisfaction readily takes\\nthe form of aggression the word most in favor\\nwith those of us who dislike all forward movement\\nin nations. Her tendency necessarily must be to\\nadvance, and it is already sufficiently pronounced\\nto be suggestive of ultimate aims. It would be a\\ncurious speculation to consider how far the syste-\\nmatic forward designs often attributed to her, as\\nin the rumored will of Peter the Great, simply\\nreflect the universal consciousness of her evident\\nneeds and consequent restlessness. This is\\npossibly the largest single element in the horo-\\nscope of Asia, and it may be stated thus Only\\nparts of the Russian territory, and those, even in\\nthe aggregate, small and uninfluential compara-\\ntively to the whole, enjoy the benefits of mari-\\ntime commerce. It is therefore the interest of\\nRussia not merely to reach the sea at more\\npoints, and more independently, but to acquire,\\nby possession or by control, the usufruct of\\nother and extensive maritime regions, the returns\\nfrom which shall redound to the general pros-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0082.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 45\\nperity of the entire empire. To this statement\\nmust necessarily be added the consideration of\\nthose peculiarities of Russian internal administra-\\ntion and general policy, which, after annexation,\\ntend to the substantial exclusion of other states\\nfrom much that they have enjoyed prior to Rus-\\nsian occupation.\\nIt is a mistake, and a deplorable mistake, when\\nrecognizing conditions of conflicting interests, as\\nhere indicated, to see in them only grounds for\\nopposition and hostility. States that are more\\nfortunate in the extent of their seaboard, and in\\nphysical conditions which facilitate the circula-\\ntion of the life-blood of trade throughout their\\norganization, owe at the least candor, if not\\nsympathy, to the fetters under which Russia\\nlabors in her narrow sea-front, in her vast and\\ndifficult interior, and in a climate of extreme\\nrigor.\\nNevertheless, while such an attitude should be\\nobserved and maintained, there remains the duty\\nto their own people and associated with these,\\nbut dominating both, the moral obligations to\\nthe populations and to the governments still\\nmore immediately concerned those of the\\ndebatable zone in changes which seem impend-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0083.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "46 The Proble7n of Asia\\ning. We are not in the presence of a simple\\nproblem, easily decided by reference merely to\\nexisting rights natural, prescriptive, or legal\\nor to the firmly established principles of a highly\\ndeveloped society of individuals or of nations.\\nWe are confronted with the imminent dissolution\\nof one or more organisms, or with a readjustment\\nof their parts, the results of which, should either\\ncome to pass, will be solid and durable just in\\nproportion as the existence and force of natural\\nfactors either are accurately recognized, or else\\nreach an equilibrium by free self-assertion, allow-\\ning each to find its proper place through natural\\nselection. Such a struggle, however, as is im-\\nplied in the phrase natural selection, involves\\nconflict and suffering that might be avoided, in\\npart at least, by the rational process of estimating\\nthe forces at work, and approximating to the\\nnatural adjustment by the artificial methods of\\ncounsel and agreement, which seem somewhat\\nmore suitable to the present day.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0084.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER II\\nIN the relation of land power to the future of\\nMiddle Asia between the parallels of\\nthirty and forty north natural conditions have\\nbestowed upon Russia a pre-eminence which\\napproaches exclusiveness. The share of other\\nstates, where any exists, is incidental and with\\none conspicuous exception, which will be in-\\ndicated later, is deficient either in numbers, posi-\\ntion, or organization. This predominance will\\nenable Russia to put forth her strength un-\\nopposed, directly, by any other of the same\\nnature, in quarters outside of the extreme range\\nthat can with any probability be predicated of sea\\npower. But where immediate opposition is not\\nfeasible, adequate restraint is frequently imposed\\nby force exerted, or capable of exertion, in other\\nquarters, by land or by sea dependent, as all\\nforce is, partly upon its own intrinsic value and\\npartly upon positions occupied. Such pres-\\nsure is possible, more or less, in all conditions", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0085.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "48 The Problem of Asia\\nof life, where interests are extensive, various, or\\nscattered. It is notably so in international life,\\nwhere action in one quarter is continually hin-\\ndered by the consciousness of weakness else-\\nwhere. Brought into action for military ends,\\nthis means of constraint is known technically as\\ndiversion.\\nTo distraction and enfeeblement of this kind,\\nshould cause be given by the pursuance of a\\npolicy too selfishly exclusive, Russia is particu-\\nlarly liable, from her vast extent, inadequate\\ninternal communications, the number and power\\nof the nations whose interests will suffer from\\nsuch exclusion, and from the very favorable\\npositions occupied by them for action that falls\\nunder the general head of diversion. The facility\\nfor this is the greater because the positions thus\\noccupied, or open to occupation upon advan-\\ntageous terms, are upon the Russian flanks, and,\\nother things approaching equality, pressure or\\nattack of a given amount upon a flank is applied\\nto greater effect than upon the centre of a line,\\nfor the simple reason that each flank is more\\nremote from the other than the centre is from\\neither; concentration of effort, offensive or defen-\\nsive, therefore, is more easily practised between", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0086.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 49\\nthe centre and a flank than between the flanks\\nthemselves. So many and great, indeed, are the\\nopportunities of opposing states, due to position\\nand strength, that, after all allowance made for\\nthe feebleness of alliances, or rather of co-opera-\\ntion, when compared with force concentrated in a\\nsingle hand, it may still be believed that in\\npotentiality the land and sea powers approach\\nthat condition of equilibrium which has been\\nmentioned as one of the two factors that will tend\\nto promote a peaceful and durable solution of the\\nproblem of Asia.\\nUnhappily the other factor, freedom from\\nfriction, is now conspicuous chiefly by its absence.\\nWithout attempting to pronounce upon the\\nreasonableness of the feeling, it may safely be\\nsaid that uneasiness, which is the mental equiva-\\nlent of friction, is now notoriously prevalent in\\nthe councils of nations. In order that the worst\\nresult of such uneasiness war may be timely\\nand effectually averted, a general appreciation of\\nthe conditions, and of the attitude necessary to\\nbe taken, is indispensable. Failing that, nations\\ndrift. Through ignorance of their strength and\\nof their weakness, of the strength and weakness\\nof those opposed to them, and of the elements in", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0087.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "50 The Problem of Asia\\nwhich strength or weakness consists, states and\\ngovernments hesitate to act when action is op-\\nportune, are hasty when time is not ripe. In\\neither case they act amiss, and incur danger, less\\nor more whereas, when thoroughly aroused to\\nfacts as they actually are, to the possibilities which\\nthey contain, and attentive to the preparations\\nwhich circumstances demand, the common readi-\\nness and resulting mutual respect promote a\\nmeasuredness and precision of action that more\\nthan aught else tend to preserve peace, by fore-\\nstalling the occurrence of situations whence there\\nis no escape but by war. It is doubtless this\\nappreciation of relative powers and positions,\\njoined to care so to maintain their own as to\\nrender a conflict arduous, even if not of uncer-\\ntain issue, that now most effectually preserves\\npeace among the states of Europe.\\nIn like manner the nations closely concerned\\nin the future of Asia using the name in the\\nbroad sense that shall cover the entire continent\\nwill most surely reach a solution of peace by a\\nrational valuation of present advantages and dis-\\nadvantages, of the interests at stake, and of the\\ncombinations possible, in the East and then by\\nmaking provision, corresponding to their necessi-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0088.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "The Problem, of Asia 51\\nties and resources, and to their numbers and\\npositions, as shown by these calculations. Thus\\nwill result an adjustment of power answering to\\nthe facts of the case, and a mutual understanding,\\ntacit rather than expressed conditions which are\\nthe logical opposites of friction and uneasiness,\\nand which, as they already do in Europe itself,\\nwill avert war and preserve a healthy balance of\\ncontrol in these remote scenes of conflicting as-\\npirations. Similarly, in this our study, having\\nestimated the opportunities and drawbacks in-\\nherent in the position of Russia, we have next to\\nconsider those of the states which would naturally\\noperate as checks upon her too exclusive pre-\\ndominance. In doing this, incidental account of\\ncourse must be taken, not only of natural con-\\nditions, but of the artificial combinations, or\\nalliances, which notoriously exist. The wisdom\\nof the latter, as corresponding to a real national\\ninterest, is not here in question with such facts\\nwe have to deal simply as they are.\\nAmong the means of successful diversion\\nwhich natural conditions put in the hands of sea\\npower, the control of commerce is probably the\\nmost decisive. It corresponds to, and counter-\\nbalances, that exclusiveness of command which", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0089.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "52 The Problem of Asia\\nland power has over the interior of countries\\ninaccessible to navigation nor is there, upon the\\nface of the deep, the home and realm of sea\\npower, any other equivalent compensation for this\\nexclusion from the land. In itself the sea is a\\nbarren tenure only as the great common, the\\nhighway of commerce, the seat of communica-\\ntions, does it possess unique character and value.\\nThe concrete expression of this singular impor-\\ntance of the sea is the merchandise in transit, the\\nincrement from which constitutes the material\\nprosperity of nations. Surrender control of that,\\nand the empire of the sea is like unto Samson\\nshorn of his hair. It becomes the sea powers,\\ntherefore, in view of the solidarity of their interest\\nin the approaching future, to consider seriously\\nhow far they will yield to the cry, now increas-\\ningly popular, for loosing the hold which, when\\nbelligerents, they have heretofore had over com-\\nmerce in its broader sense. In view of the\\nlimitation of their means, otherwise, for enforcing\\ntheir necessary policy, they should at least delay,\\nand maturely weigh the general question, before,\\nin deference to supposed particular advantage,\\nthey pledge themselves antecedently to the\\ngreater immunities now clamorously demanded.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0090.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 53\\nTime should be taken before signing away pre-\\nrogatives sanctioned by long prescription, such as\\nthe seizure of so-called private property, em-\\nbarked on mercantile venture: the claim of which\\nto the title private is open to grave challenge.\\nThe acceptance of precise definitions upon a\\nsubject essentially so variable in its character as\\ncontraband of war is also to be deprecated nor\\nwould it be amiss, while thus studying the whole\\nsubject, to review, in the light of the probable\\nfuture, the concession that, on the sea, enemy s\\ngoods are covered by the neutral flag a maxim\\nwhich the eminent Liberal statesman Charles\\nFox said was neither good law nor good\\nsense. The empire of the sea is doubtless\\nthe empire of the world doubtless also its\\nsceptre can be abdicated; but is it wise to do\\nso?\\nMerchandize belonging to private individuals,\\nbut in transit to other countries for commercial\\nexchange, is not private property in the ordi-\\nnary sense of the word. It is a commonplace\\nthat money is the sinews of war. When em-\\nbarked in foreign trade, the merchandize of indi-\\nvidual citizens is engaged in making money for\\nthe state it plays a most important part in the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0091.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "54 The Problem of Asia\\ncirculation of the life-blood throughout the or-\\nganization of the belligerent country. It differs\\nessentially from internal trade. The latter, com-\\ning from and returning to the nation itself, ex-\\ncluding other states in its course, resembles\\nmerely the functional activities of the animal\\nbody, which distribute to the various parts only\\nthat which the body already possesses. The\\nbody does not cannot live off itself; it\\nsimply assimilates and distributes that which it\\nreceives from outside, and this indispensable ex-\\nternal nutriment corresponds to external com-\\nmerce in the body political and economical,\\ndrawing support to the state from outside\\nsources. From these sources, maritime com-\\nmerce is the great channel of communication\\nhence its supreme importance to the support of\\nwar. To interrupt internal trade produces de-\\nrangement of functional processes, which may\\nconduce to the end of a war, or may not. If it\\ndoes not so conduce, it stands condemned as\\ncausing useless suffering. As to the stoppage of\\nexternal commerce, by capturing the so-called\\nprivate property embarked, there can be no\\ndoubt about the effect. It conduces directly to\\nthe ends of war by producing a bloodless ex-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0092.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 55\\nhaustion, compelling submission, and that at the\\nleast expense of life and suffering.\\nIt has been said that, viewing Russia as a\\nwhole, relatively to the middle zone of Asia,\\nher advance has been, and promises still to\\nbe, by the flanks rather than by the centre.\\nSuch certainly are the present tendencies and\\nindications. It is upon the flanks also, and\\nupon the flanks chiefly, that opposition can\\nbe effectually made; but such opposition will be\\nof the most forcible character, not only on\\naccount of the advantage already stated, inherent\\nto flank attacks generally, but because it will be\\nupon the line of the sea frontier the seaboard\\nand accordingly upon the access to the sea,\\nwith which the interior, for its best welfare,\\nrequires untrammelled communication. It will\\nbe also in the hands of powers which, by the\\nnature of their strength, and by their local posi-\\ntions in Asia, are essentially powers of the sea.\\nLet us, then, examine the conditions upon the\\nflanks first, as involving objects of interest\\nobjectives of policy control of which may be\\ncoveted and secondly, with reference to the\\npositions the local tenure of the states which\\nmay be aiming there to exert influence, whether", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0093.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "56 The Problem of Asia\\nfor advance or for its prevention, and to their\\nintrinsic strength for such purposes.\\nAccepting the estimates already made of Rus-\\nsia s position and necessary aims, her interests\\nmay be condensed into access to the sea as exten-\\nsive and as free as possible on the east by the\\nChinese seaboard on the west in two directions,\\nviz., to the Persian Gulf, by way of Persia,\\nand to the Mediterranean, from the Black Sea,\\nor through Asia Minor. Such plans are dedu-\\ncible, not from knowledge of the councils of\\nthe Russian government, but from the history\\nof the recent past, and from the clear natural\\nconditions indicating the lines which offer least\\nresistance to forward movement, whether in the\\nphysical obstacles to be overcome, or in the\\nopposition of the populations. It is allowable to\\nadd to these conjectured projects the common\\nsurmise of Russian design upon India. This, if\\nentertained, would be an advance by the centre\\nrather than by a flank but even here a study of\\nthe map would seem to show that progress\\nthrough Persia would not only approach the gulf,\\nbut if successful would turn would outflank\\nthe mountains of Afghanistan, avoiding the diffi-\\nculties presented by the severe features of that", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0094.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 57\\ncountry and by the character of its inhabitants.\\nRussia would thus obtain a better position, both\\nin itself and in its communication with the north,\\nfor beginning and sustaining operations in India\\nitself\\nSuch movements as here supposed on the part\\nof Russia, upon the two flanks, might politically\\naffect the interests of other states in a manner to\\narouse decided and reasonable antagonism for\\nexerting which they have formidable facilities, by\\nposition and otherwise. These advantages, how-\\never, rest ultimately upon the sea, and conse-\\nquently they will not, unless carefully improved,\\noutweigh or even equal the predominance\\nby land which Russia has, owing to her territorial\\nnearness and other conditions already mentioned.\\nMoreover, as contrasted with the political unity\\nof Russia and her geographical continuity, the\\ninfluences that can possibly be opposed to her are\\ndiverse and scattered. They find, however, a\\ncertain unifying motive in a common interest, of\\nunfettered commerce and of transit in the regions\\nin question. It is upon the realization of this\\ninterest, and upon the accurate appreciation of\\ntheir power to protect it and not upon artificial\\ncombinations that correct policy or successful", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0095.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "58 The Problem of Asia\\nconcert in the future must rest. Effective co-\\noperation between nations depends upon the\\nnecessity imposed by a common interest; the\\nmore clear and general, therefore, the understand-\\ning of the interest and of attendant conditions,\\nthe more certain and abiding the co-operation.\\nThe regions whose political and social future is\\nin doubt, and to be determined possibly by the\\nrelative effect exerted upon their inhabitants by\\nthe contrasting powers of the land and of the sea,\\nin the struggle of these to influence commercial\\nconditions, constitute the objectives of policy.\\nThey are, on the east, the Chinese Empire, and\\nmore particularly China proper on the west, Tur-\\nkey in Asia and Persia. The latter two are con-\\nterminous, the line of division being marked by a\\nlofty but not impracticable mountain chain, extend-\\ning to the southeast from the ranges. of Armenia\\nnearly to the Persian Gulf Being substantially\\ndevoid of railroads, this tract is commercially\\nbackward, judged by modern standards. Its area,\\nomitting Arabia, is about a million square miles,\\ndistributed between two lines, roughly parallel,\\nindicated on the south by the Mediterranean and\\nthe Persian Gulf, on the north by the Black and\\nCaspian seas. The breadth thus bounded is", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0096.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 59\\nabout five hundred miles one-half the distance\\nfrom New York to Chicago. The interior is\\nsusceptible of great development, and, specifi-\\ncally, it offers opportunity for railroad communi-\\ncation from the Mediterranean to the head of the\\nPersian Gulf, branching through Persia to the\\nborders of India. From such a trunk line once\\nin operation, lateral extensions would of course\\nfollow as improvements increase.\\nThe question of dealing with countries such as\\nthese and China, in which governments and\\npeoples alike are content to be stationary, neither\\nknowing nor desiring progress, is so troublesome\\nthat it will be postponed until the day when the\\noutside more advanced civilization has need of\\nthem or until, as now with China, the future\\nneed is emphasized by a present consciousness of\\nits imminence, and by a movement, more or less\\ngeneral, to obtain positions that can be utilized\\nfor control or influence. Whatever the nature\\nof such influences, be they most contrary one to\\nanother, they have always this in common they\\nneed some circumstance of advantage, in the\\npossession of visible power and position, which\\nalone the native occupants understand as a motive\\nfor concession. According as the relative im-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0097.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "6o The Problem of Asia\\npulses from the north and from the south com-\\npare in unmistakable force, so will they prevail.\\nThere can be, of course, no question of dispos-\\nsessing the present inhabitants, that being neither\\npracticable nor desirable. The rational object\\ncan only be to induce them to place themselves\\nunder such conditions as shall contribute to their\\nregeneration, to their own benefit and that of the\\nworld at large. Whether this shall be effected\\nby a gradual assumption of rule, as in India, or by\\nactuating the government in nominal possession,\\nas now in Egypt, is a matter of detail concerning\\nwhich prediction is impossible. Results in such\\ncases are matters less of formal preordainment\\nthan of growth of evolution stage by stage.\\nIn the past the history of such changes has\\ncommonly been that private commercial enter-\\nprise leads the way, and that the incapacity of the\\nlocal government permits the occurrence of abuses,\\nwhich necessitate the interference of a foreign\\nstate to protect the rights of its citizens. Inter-\\nference cannot be confined to mere remedy of the\\npast and engagements for the future, but seeks\\nprevention by guarantees, usually of such a de-\\nscription as to confer a certain degree of local\\nrule. This, in turn, partaking of the vitality of its", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0098.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 6i\\nmother-country, tends to grow, as all life does.\\nThe seed, having been sown, germinates and\\nthrives after its manner, which is not the manner\\nof the soil but, once planted, it is ineradicable.\\nWhether it overspreads the land depends not upon\\nthe native resistance, but upon its meeting counter-\\nacting influence of a nature essentially akin to its\\nown.\\nThis process is in India a matter of past history,\\nwhich had its crisis in the days when Clive and\\nDupleix represented the rival alien influences of\\nGreat Britain and of France but it has received\\nvarious illustrations in our own time. In Egypt\\nits evolution is but lately complete, and there, as\\nin India, quite contrary to what may have at first\\nbeen expected, has resulted in the dominance of\\na single state. In China it has begun, and is still\\nin progress. There it presents as yet only the\\ncompetition of several nations it remains to be\\nseen whether, as has been the case in India and\\nin Egypt, this condition will be radically modified\\nby some sudden unanticipated event. That Asia\\nMinor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia will\\nremain indefinitely strangers to experience of a\\nlike nature, is not to be imagined. There is no\\nreason why they should, and there are very evi-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0099.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "62 The Problem, of Asia\\ndent conditions which indicate that, although\\npostponed, the first step is sure to be taken and\\nthe consequences sure to follow, although we can-\\nnot now foretell the time of the beginning nor the\\ncharacter of the issue.\\nWhatever the stage reached in a particular case,\\nthe general phenomenon has received sufficient\\ndemonstration to be accepted as a fact, in the\\nlight of which it becomes advisable to study the\\npresent, and to provide that the future should be\\nless accidental than the past. This study can\\nbegin and rest upon the two generalizations\\nalready made first, that the scenes of present\\nmovements are upon the two flanks of the same\\nlong line, the continuity of which is emphasized\\nby the extension of Russian territory and, sec-\\nond, that, from the obvious conditions, the strug-\\ngle as arrayed will be between land power and\\nsea power. The recognition that these two are\\nthe primary contestants does not ignore the cir-\\ncumstance that neither is a pure factor, but that\\neach side will need and will avail itself, in degree,\\nof the services of the other element that is, the\\nland power will try to reach the sea and to utilize\\nit for its own ends, while the sea power must\\nobtain support on land, through the motives it", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0100.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "The Probletn of Asia 63\\ncan bring to bear upon the inhabitants. To the\\nsecond of these generahzations there is one con-\\nspicuous artificial exception. France, which on\\nthe immediate scene of interest is naturally a sea\\npower, becomes by her formal and essentially\\nsubsidiary alliance with Russia an element of the\\nland power in relation to the East. Other than\\nthat, the proclivities of the states concerned follow\\ntheir natural interests a condition which, by its\\ngreater healthfulness, promises a longer endur-\\nance. Hence ensues solidarity of interest between\\nGermany, Great Britain, Japan, and the United\\nStates, which bids fair to be more than momen-\\ntary, because the conditions seem to be relatively\\npermanent.\\nLet us consider and state the conditions for,\\ntaken together with those of Russia, they consti-\\ntute the military, and therefore the political,\\nsituation on the flanks. Three of these states\\nare preponderantly maritime, and in the matter\\nof military force decisively naval. Germany is\\ndifferent yet her commercial growth of late\\nyears places her necessarily on the side of those\\nwho wish commerce in these undeveloped regions\\nto be unfettered. In common with the others,\\nshe must seek to provide against an exclusive", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0101.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "64 The Problem of Asia\\ncontrol there, because she cannot expect such\\nto fall to her. That she already seeks such pro-\\nvision is known, by the large additions proposed\\nto her navy. We may assume, therefore, that in\\nChina, should necessity arise, the four states\\nwould be found following a common line of\\naction, dependent upon naval force. Such force\\nwould find its bases near at hand, and yet, by\\nsimple naval predominance, adequately shielded\\nfrom land attack with the exception of Ger-\\nmany, which at Kiaochau is more vulnerable.\\nJapan is protected by her strictly insular position,\\nand Hong-kong by remoteness from the centres\\nof possibly hostile land power. In the possession\\nof the Philippines, the United States has we\\nmay almost say forced upon her a base simi-\\nlarly secure.\\nThese conditions insure control of the sea to\\ntheir navies, as now constituted. The power of\\nthe four states, if alive to the necessities of the\\ncase, outweighs in bases and in ships, in passive\\nand in active force, in foundation and in super-\\nstructure, the naval possibilities of Russia and of\\nFrance. But this pure sea power receives aid\\nfrom land conditions. Upon one flank of the\\nRussian line lies the army of Japan upon the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0102.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 65\\nother, five thousand miles away, that of Germany.\\nThe latter consideration, by its bearing upon the\\nproblem of Asia, illustrates the direct interest of\\nthe United States in the continued vigor of a\\nEuropean nation. The two extremes of the\\nRussian line, thus open to attack, are most in-\\nadequately connected by rail. The Philippines\\nand Hong-kong lie similarly upon the eastern\\nflank of the general position, separated from it\\nonly by water distances which are comparatively\\nshort and absolutely safe. To these supports,\\nand to the facilities for action by land power, is\\nto :be added the long access for sea power into\\nthe interior afforded by the Yang-tse-kiang.\\nBattle-ships can ascend as far as Nanking, 230\\nmiles from the sea, and vessels of very consider-\\nable fighting power to Han-kow, 400 miles\\nfarther. Steamers of a kind much employed\\nin the American civil war can go to Ichang, a\\nthousand miles from the river s mouth.\\nA military situation is also a political condi-\\ntion, the right understanding of which conduces\\nto peace. Advantages such as the above, coupled\\nwith a reasonable certainty that there is no pur-\\npose to use them for political aggression how-\\never actively they may be employed for the\\nS", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0103.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "66 The Problem of Asia\\noffensive in case war unhappily arises tend to\\nprevent attempts to obtain commercial monopoly\\nthrough military force. There is, however, one\\nvery weak element in the position of the sea\\npowers, and that is the location of the Chinese\\ncapital. Because of the nature of their force,\\ninadequate of itself to local territorial expansion,\\ntheir aim must be to develop China through the\\nChinese, to invigorate and to inspire, rather than\\nto supersede, the existing authority. It is to be\\nwished, therefore, that the seat of government,\\ndespite the force of tradition, could be shifted to\\nthe Yang-tse-kiang, throwing itself frankly upon\\nthe river, as the core round which to develop a\\nrenewed China. Unless this be done, and in\\ncase the Peking authorities yield, as is the custom\\nof Orientals, to the nearest strong pressure, it can\\nhardly fail that a rival and opponent rule should\\ngradually arise in the valley of the Yang-tse.\\nThe feebleness of the central government lends\\nitself to such a revolution, which would be only\\na further development of the local independence\\nalready found. It may perhaps be for the wel-\\nfare of humanity that the Chinese people and\\nterritory should undergo a period of political\\ndivision, like that of Germany anterior to the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0104.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 67\\nFrench Revolution, before achieving the race\\npatriotism which, in our epoch, is tending to bind\\npeoples into larger groups than the existing\\nnationalities. The issue is one that passes hu-\\nman foreordainment but the contemplation of\\nthe two alternatives is not amiss to the prepara-\\ntion of the statesman.\\nFrom our summary it seems evident that the\\nfour maritime states named can, by their positions\\non the eastern side of Asia, seriously impede\\nadvance from the north. On the western flank,\\nembracing Persia and Asiatic Turkey, with the\\nLevant Basin of the Mediterranean, conditions\\nare less clear. The centre of the Russian\\nstrength is nearer, the sea power of France more\\nat hand to support the Russian navy of the\\nBlack Sea circumstances which favor a local\\npredominance that for centuries has been, and\\nstill is, a leading ambition of France. As an\\noffset, the engagements of Italy in the present\\nstate of international alliances, and her national\\nsympathy, based upon evident interest, should\\nprompt her active support to any combination\\nthe natural tendency of which shall be to insure\\nthe balance of power in the Mediterranean, and the\\nconsequent free use of the Suez Canal. The", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0105.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "68 The Problem of Asia\\nconspicuous political sagacity of her people can-\\nnot fail to realize that her geographical position,\\nclose to Malta and central as regards the Medi-\\nterranean Basin, enables her, by means of her\\npowerful navy, to be a factor of decisive import-\\nance in this field, the most influential and yet\\nmost precarious link in the chain of European\\ncommunications with the farther East. Neither\\nimmediate interest nor local circumstances of\\nadvantage justify either Japan or the United\\nStates in expending here any part of the energies\\nthey require for more pressing duties and the\\npeople of the latter would certainly be loath,\\nprobably to the point of refusal, to help per-\\npetuate the abused power of the Sultan the\\nmore so because their traditional friendship for\\nRussia can be alienated only by the latter pro-\\nmoting a policy distinctly hostile to their interests.\\nYet, while this is so, Americans must accept and\\nfamiliarize their minds to the fact that, with their\\nirrevocable entry into the world s polity, first by\\nthe assertion of the Monroe doctrine, and since\\nby their insular acquisitions above all, the\\nPhilippines and by the interests at stake in\\nChina, they cannot divest themselves of concern,\\npractical as well as speculative, in such a question", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0106.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "The Proble^it of Asia 69\\nas the balance of power in the Levant, or at the\\nentrance of the Persian Gulf In predominance\\nin those quarters is involved, for the present at\\nleast, control of the shortest way from our\\nAtlantic coast to our new possessions that by\\nway of the Red Sea but still more is this road\\nvaluable to Great Britain and to Germany, whose\\npolicy in China is naturally in accord with, and\\ntherefore should be a support to our own. Con-\\nsequently, what affects them in the one region\\nnecessarily affects us in the other.\\nThe question of Persia and Asia Minor,\\nregarded from the point of view of our study,\\nconcerns the safety of the shortest connection of\\nour natural supporters with the point of interest\\ncommon to us and to them. It is not their only\\nroute, and in so far its importance is lessened.\\nIts value to them also suffers diminution, in the\\nopinion of many, from the hazardous nature of\\nthe voyage in time of war, through the narrow\\nwaters of the Mediterranean, the yet more con-\\ntracted Red Sea, and with the very vulnerable\\nlink between them, the Suez Canal. When to\\nthis is added the length of the Mediterranean\\n2000 miles from Gibraltar to Suez and the\\npresence of the French navy, strongly based on", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0107.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "70 The Problem of Asia\\nthe northern and southern coasts, it is not re-\\nmarkable that a representative school of thought\\nin Great Britain favors the frank relinquishment\\nof so dangerous a course, and regards the canal\\nsimply as a convenience of peace. Yet while\\npresent political tenures continue, and still more\\nif they are strengthened and developed on exist-\\ning lines, it should be possible to reduce the\\nperils of this transit, as expressed above, to a\\ndegree that would cast the balance in its favor, at\\nleast as an interior line for strictly military pur-\\nposes, and against the greater security, but also\\nmuch greater length, of the voyage around the\\nCape of Good Hope.\\nIt is evident, however, that while such military\\nsecurity, if realized, depends primarily upon naval\\nforce, that force must rest for its foundation, its\\nbase, upon a reasonably secure territorial prepon-\\nderance in the eastern Mediterranean, the great\\nstrategic centre of the route upon a political\\ncondition there which shall assure, not a mere\\noutpost like Gibraltar and Malta, but the sup-\\nport of an extensive population attached by ties\\nof interest. The nucleus of such a combination\\nalready exists in the British occupation of Egypt,\\nwhich, as before remarked concerning India,", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0108.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 71\\nand the same is true of the Philippines, not\\nonly confers an advantage, but entails an impulse\\nto action. Be the insecurity of the canal route\\nwhat it may, the work of Great Britain in Egypt\\ncarries an obligation to insure its continuance\\ndespite a state of war and the effort necessary\\nto secure Egypt will secure the canal, except\\nagainst momentary closure by the premeditated\\nsinking of a vessel. It is hardly to be supposed,\\nhowever, that such a mishap cannot be avoided\\nby a rigorous military control of vessels in transit,\\nand of the pilotage, which will prevent sinking in\\nmid-channel. Moreover, even if the canal be\\nchoked, the way remains far the shortest, in\\ntime, for military purposes, requiring only the\\ntransfer of troops or munitions of war across the\\nnarrow neck of land.\\nUnder conditions of war, the continuance of\\nEgypt in its present tenure, and the security of\\nthe shortest route to the East, both depend ulti-\\nmately upon the permanent political bias of the\\nregion now called Turkey in Asia, and in a sub-\\nsidiary degree upon that of Persia. That this is\\nso will readily appear if we imagine that, instead\\nof the existing misrule, Turkey in Asia Asia\\nMinor, Syria, and Mesopotamia formed a", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0109.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "72 The Problem of Asia\\nhighly developed modern state, with an efficiently\\norganized army and navy. Nothing can be said\\nnow of the power of France in the western half\\nof the Mediterranean that would not be as true,\\nand truer, of the control of such a state over\\nmuch greater issues. In its presence, if hostile,\\nEgypt would be insecure, as she was in the days\\nof the Ottoman vigor and the strategic import-\\nance of Egypt s position is a commonplace of\\nthe ages. This imagined state, touching the\\nBlack Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea,\\nand the Levant, would control the issues from\\nvast territories to the outer world. It does\\nnot now exist but the creation of such a polit-\\nical entity, and its development on healthy\\nlines, are as much one of the problems of Asia,\\nand as important, as China itself. The latter is\\nprimarily and chiefly a region simply of produc-\\ntion the other, while not barren in this aspect,\\nwould fulfil the far more vital role of controlling\\ncommunications. In superiority of interest to\\nthe world at large, therefore, it far excels.\\nIn order to constitute here a political condition\\nsusceptible of durable progress, in place of the\\npresent impotent misrule, a process of develop-\\nment must begin from without for it is suffi-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0110.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 73\\nciently demonstrated that there is no internal\\nsource of regeneration under the actual tenure.\\nWhatever shall happen, the existing populations\\nmust remain but the fate of the government, be\\nthat near or remote, will depend upon its faculty\\nof accommodation to the dominant, though alien,\\npressure. During the stages of advance, through\\nmilitary organization and economical administra-\\ntion, both comformable to the genius of the out-\\nside force, be that Russian or Western, the fleet\\nthat there finds its territorial base of action will\\ncontinue to be, not native, but that of the exter-\\nnal power for a navy is the most delicate, most\\nspecialized form of military institutions, and\\nhence the latest to mature into independent life.\\nNevertheless, during the period of tutelage, the\\nresult upon the maritime strategic field will be\\nthe same as though the naval organization, as\\nwell as the military, were composed of the inhabi-\\ntants themselves. Both embodying the genius\\nof the educating power, the combination of the\\ntwo will control in her interest this central posi-\\ntion of the world.\\nIt is clear, indeed, that here and in China, as\\nwell as in Egypt, and wherever a numerous\\npopulation already exists, the regeneration pre-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0111.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "74 The Problem of Asia\\ncursory to full attainment of civilization must\\nproceed through, and by, the inhabitants already\\nin possession of the soil. Concerning this there\\ncan be, and should be, no dispute. It appears\\nlittle less certain that these now have not, either\\nin themselves or in their existing governments,\\nthe power to begin and to continue the necessary\\nreformation. The question therefore is, under\\nwhat impulse, under the genius of what race or\\nof what institutions, is the movement to arise and\\nto progress The determination of the answer\\ndepends upon a struggle, peaceful or otherwise,\\nbetween the external powers, a conflict inevit-\\nable, irrepressible, because of their opposing\\npolitical institutions, themselves the expression\\nof the yet more vital force of contrasted national\\ncharacters. Whatever the scene or the nature of\\nthe contest, whether it be decided upon the\\ndebatable ground itself or exterior to it, upon\\nland or upon sea, by peaceful competition or by\\nthe arbitration of war, the issue depends upon a\\nbalance of force. That it is impossible of pre-\\ndiction is no reason for abandoning an attempt to\\nappreciate the conditions. Quite the contrary\\nfor, be the result what it may, there will enter\\ninto its determination not merely blind force, of", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0112.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "The Problem, of Asm 75\\nnumbers or of position, but intelligent direction\\nas well, which shall be guided step by step, as\\nemergency succeeds emergency, by informed under-\\nstanding of the importance and character of the\\nelements of the problem, and by a forecast a\\nlong view of the ends to be desired. This\\nwill be the more necessary on the part of the sea\\npowers if they have the common interest that has\\nbeen asserted for, not being under a single head,\\ncommunity of action, without which they will be\\npowerless, can proceed only from an accord based\\nupon accurate comprehension of the issues at\\n\u00c2\u00a7take.\\nIt must be observed that there is not in\\nLevantine Turkey any free waterway, such as in\\nChina is given by the Yang-tse-kiang, opening a\\nconstant, ready access to the interior from the\\nsea, although a certain analogy thereto is pre-\\nsented by the re-entrant angle formed by the\\ncoasts of Syria and Karamania, nigh to the apex\\nof which lies the British island of Cyprus. The\\ndevelopment of the interior, upon which alone is\\nto be based that influence upon the inhabitants\\nwhich shall bring them as a factor into the sphere\\nof international relations, must be by land com-\\nmunications by railroad the main line of", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0113.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "76 The Problem of Asia\\nwhich, in the absence of watercourses navigable\\nby large ships, will here form the core, around\\nand from which the influences of civilization will\\ngrow. Failing immediate direct action by foreign\\ngovernments, such development will fall to pri-\\nvate enterprise, and will in its beginnings natu-\\nrally follow the lines of least resistance and great-\\nest advantage, which will be in the comparatively\\neasy country that lies between and gives access to\\ntwo seas the Mediterranean and the Persian\\nGulf. Whatever the particular direction of such\\na road which will depend chiefly upon local\\nconsiderations it must at once assume political,\\nand therefore strategic, importance. This fact\\nwill probably induce a certain rivalry based\\nupon military as well as commercial reasons to\\nobtain the concession for building.\\nThe recognition of a community of interest in\\nthe general question of Asia, as depending upon\\nland and upon sea power, should influence those\\nwho possess the latter to guard sedulously against\\npermitting this rivalry to degenerate into antag-\\nonism. This, if done, would illustrate conspic-\\nuously the healthful effect of broad general views\\nupon immediate particular action. The nation\\nthat lays and administers such a road will, if", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0114.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 77\\npolitically discreet, affect the surrounding country\\nby the daily evidences of benefit, conferred and to\\nbe expected and thus, step by step, promoting\\norganization and improvement, will secure that\\nfirm mass of territorial support which, when\\nunited to a sea power otherwise preponderant,\\nwill determine control. It is almost needless to\\nsay that the raw material of military power is in\\nthese regions abundant and good.\\nThe considerations heretofore presented show\\nthe conditions and the possibilities upon the two\\nextremities, or flanks, of that middle zone of Asia\\nwhich is defined broadly by the thirtieth and\\nfortieth parallels of north latitude. From them\\nit may be inferred, concisely, that while the\\neastern regions China and its dependencies\\nare of more immediate commercial concern to the\\nrest of the world, and the decision of their future\\nmore imminent, those upon the west, finding\\ntheir centre about the Levant and Suez, possess\\nfar greater military and ultimate importance,\\nbecause they affect the question of communica-\\ntions between Europe, India, and China; not to\\nspeak of Australia, which also is therein in-\\nterested, though less exclusively dependent.\\nUnless Great Britain and Germany are prepared", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0115.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u00a2j^ The Problem of Asia\\nto have the Suez route to India and the Far\\nEast closed to them in time of war, they cannot\\nafford to see the borders of the Levant and the\\nPersian Gulf become the territorial base for the\\nnavy of a possible enemy, especially if it appear\\nthat the policy of the latter in the Pacific runs\\nseriously counter to their own. From Gibraltar\\nto India the Suez route is throughout compara-\\ntively narrow, and therefore stations which flank\\nit as Gibraltar, Algiers, Toulon, Malta, Aden,\\nand the Persian Gulf can more effectively exert\\ncontrol, because their comparative nearness can-\\nnot be overcome by a circuitous course. In the\\nwestern basin of the Mediterranean such control,\\nso far as dependent upon positions, irrespective\\nof mobile force in ships a most important\\nqualification is at present in the hands of\\nFrance but once past Sicily and Malta, the\\nmaritime situation changes with the geographical\\nand political distribution. There is there no\\nlocal dominant naval state, and the existence of\\nsuch depends upon the political future of Asiatic\\nTurkey and Persia.\\nIt will be objected that for Great Britain and\\nGermany to maintain their fleets in the Levant,\\ndependent for re-enforcement and supply upon", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0116.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 79\\nthe home countries, is to occupy a position the\\ncommunications of which, on account of the\\nexposed stretch from Gibraltar to Malta, are\\nunendurably defective, as the strength of a chain\\nis that of its weakest link. The objection is\\nperfectly sound, though not necessarily decisive\\neven under present conditions, but it only makes\\nclearer the need of a more solid territorial estab-\\nlishment in the Levant one which, through the\\ndevelopment of Asiatic Turkey, could afford a\\nlocal self-sufficing base of naval operations. For,\\nafter all, nothing, not the sanding-up of the canal\\nitself, can change the natural conditions which\\nmake Egypt the strategic centre of the chief\\nhighway between the East and West. It ap-\\nproached this even in the days of sailing-ships, as\\nNelson and Napoleon then recognized. Steam\\nhas made it so decisively and before the canal\\nwas dug, travel had reverted to this route. In\\nthese days of big nations, Egypt, from its com-\\nparatively restricted habitable area, must remain\\nthe appendage of some greater state. Of which\\nIs it not apparent that the nearer at hand the\\nstronger the tenure, because more susceptible of\\nconsolidation As positions now are, British\\npower territorially consolidated in the Levant,", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0117.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "8o The Problem of Asia\\nand with a preponderant fleet, can dominate the\\nentire Mediterranean for this, after all, is a\\nsmall sea, which a superior fleet centrally placed\\ncan control to the full extent of security, as\\nsecurity is understood in war, and without diffi-\\nculties exceeding those common to all military\\noperations. Such a fleet would require simply to\\nbe able to receive harbor support at either end\\nof the sea for, while it must be able in case of\\nurgency to go to either Gibraltar or Suez, with\\nthe certainty of finding needed supplies on the\\nspot, it is not necessary to the protection of either\\nthat it be locally present. Nelson at Sicily and\\nat Naples covered Sidney Smith before Acre and\\nAlexandria. Granted a secure base of supplies\\nin the Levant, Italy too little considered in\\nthe question of the East and Malta have the\\npower, so far as position goes, to. dominate the\\nMediterranean from east to west.\\nNot only is Great Britian for her own credit\\nbound to hold Egypt, but the central position of\\nthe latter with reference to the whole Eastern\\nworld is such that, even under present drawbacks,\\nit is hard to conceive any conditions in which\\nsupplies can fail to pour in from several quarters.\\nIn military situation, Egypt approaches an ideal", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0118.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 8i\\nfor to a local concentration of force, defensive\\nand offensive, operative in two directions, towards\\nGibraltar or towards India, it adds several streams\\nof supply, so diverse in origin that no one navy\\ncan take position to intercept them all. Reduced\\nto the fewest, they flow in by two channels, the\\nRed Sea and the Mediterranean how shall any\\none fleet close both? If the Mediterranean be\\nblocked, the Red Sea remains, always the shortest\\nroute for India, Australia, and the Cape, to aid\\nto the full extent of their resources, the sole\\nessential being to provide that their resources be\\nadequate. In the same case. Great Britain her-\\nself has the Cape route. If this be thought over-\\nlong, all the more reason not to abandon that of\\nSuez antecedent to necessity arising. Does some\\ntemporary cause, disaster or other, make the fleet\\nitself temporarily inferior What retreat surer\\nthan that of passing the canal from the Mediter-\\nranean to the Red Sea, or the reverse As for\\npermanent naval inferiority, be it incurred at\\nany time or any place, it means, of course,\\nthe collapse of British resistance.\\nIn short, submitted to strict military analysis,\\nit would appear that the proposition to abandon\\nthe Mediterranean and the Suez route, in favor\\n6", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0119.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "82 The Problem of Asia\\nof the Cape, is a strategic policy defensive rather\\nthan offensive, and proceeds from the assump-\\ntion probably not recognized that in some\\nway war, to use Napoleon s jibe, can be\\nmade without running risks. The truer solution\\nfor a state already holding Malta and Gibraltar\\nwould seem to be to grasp Egypt firmly, to\\nconsolidate local tenure there, and to establish\\nin India, Australia, and the Cape sources of\\nnecessary supply, whether manufactories or\\ndepots, in ammunition and stores, against the\\nchance of temporary interruption on the side of\\nEngland. If this be true under conditions of\\nisolation, it is yet more true at a period when the\\ninterests of both Italy and Germany coincide\\nin general direction with those of Great Britain.\\nWhatever decisions may be reached as to\\npractical expediency, based upon th^ limitations\\nof a nation s power, the considerations that have\\nbeen presented show convincingly the overmas-\\ntering and permanent influence of the strategic\\ncentre in the Levant, due to the aggregation\\nthere of several features, each of which is of the\\nfirst natural importance. It is difficult to resist\\nthe conclusion that these inalienable characteris-\\ntics will ever invest the region, as a whole, with", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0120.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 83\\nthe significance which in successive past epochs\\nemphasized the names of Alexandria and of Con-\\nstantinople, as the concrete expression of great\\ncomplex facts. To our own age the like mean-\\ning is conveyed more impressively by the word\\nSuez for in that little isthmus and its canal is\\nconcentrated for western Europe the question of\\naccess to the greater East. All the considera-\\ntions that have been advanced as regards Asiatic\\nTurkey, Persia, Egypt, the basin of the Mediter-\\nranean, etc., are in this connection but accessory,\\nderiving their importance from the effect they\\nmay have upon the great line of communications\\nwhose most critical point is at the neck of land\\nwhich joins Africa and Asia. Will it be the\\ndictate, of prudence even, to forsake this line, for\\nthe long circumnavigation by the Cape of Good\\nHope? To pose the question with somewhat\\nof brutal candor, is this shorter road possessed\\nonly by favor, subject to the will and power of\\nforeign states Is such a conclusion necessary,\\nin view of evident rivalry of interests among other\\ncountries? And is it possible, without self-\\ninflicted national humiliation, under the existing\\nconditions, which are the results, the testimonials\\nof a career that, step by step, has been increas-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0121.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "84 The Problem of Asia\\nmgly to the lasting honor of Great Britain as a\\nbenefactor of mankind\\nFor some time to come, to the full reach of\\nthe farthest view opened by present indications,\\nthe world s general movement of assimilative\\nprogress will be, not north and south, but east\\nand west in both ways upon Asia, which now\\noffers the greatest stimulant to all the tendencies\\nthat impel advance. The course and influence\\nof these eastern and western movements will be\\nmodified and concentrated by the two isthmuses,\\nPanama and Suez, where the shortest line com-\\npels the removal of natural obstacles by artificial\\nmeans, which in the case of the latter have\\nalready been successful. Speaking broadly, the\\ntwo canals will mark a line of division, south of\\nwhich the efforts of commerce and of politics will\\nbe intrinsically much less important than those\\nwhich occur to the north. Great, however, as\\nwill be the consequence of both canals, that of\\nSuez must remain the greater partly because\\nthere is not to it nor in any near future can\\nbe such an alternative as is presented by the\\ntranscontinental railroads of America; partly\\nbecause there cluster about it natural conditions\\n^the Strait of Gibraltar, the Black Sea and", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0122.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 85\\nDardanelles, the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab-\\nel-Mandeb, the political decadence of Turkey\\nthat have no equivalent in the case of the Ameri-\\ncan isthmus, and also international jealousies, to\\nwhich the existing political distribution of the\\nWestern Hemisphere is less conducive.\\nIf the generalizations of the last paragraph be\\ncorrect, the question naturally arises, should they\\nentail any modification in political habits of\\nthought Concerning this, if the assertions them-\\nselves, and the precedent statements upon which\\nthey rest, are accepted, it follows, first, that they\\nbecome the primary consideration in the direction\\nto be given to external policy; by which is not\\nmeant that all other considerations are excluded,\\nbut that, being secondary, they are to be viewed\\nwith strict reference to the first, as subordinate or\\ncontributory to it. This affects the importance\\nof South Africa to Great Britain, in so far as\\neffort there affects the necessary concentration up-\\non the Isthmus of Suez. As regards the United\\nStates, the value of the Caribbean Sea, being the\\noutworks of the Central American isthmus, is in\\nevery aspect largely inreased, and all indications\\nof political change affecting it even remotely must\\nbe sedulously watched but, on the American", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0123.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "86 The Problem of Asia\\ncontinent, south of the points whence influence\\ncan be eflfectually exerted upon the isthmus, the\\nMonroe doctrine loses much of its primacy. If\\nnational honor demand, we can continue to assert\\nit in its utmost present extension; but in view\\nof the rapid pronounced transfer of the world s\\nambitions and opportunities to Asia, it is un-\\ndeniable that the centre of interest has shifted\\nafar, for us as for others. If the new stake be\\nas large and as imminent as is believed, it is to be\\npondered whether we do not weaken our power\\nfor efficient action there by continuing pledged to\\nthe political which is the military protection\\nof states that bear us no love. Concentration\\nexclusiveness of purpose is the condition of\\nsuccessful action in national policy, as well as in\\nmilitary enterprise. Rightly understood, the\\nsouthern extremities of the Eastern and Western\\nhemispheres must for the time stand aside, as of\\nsubsidiary interest to the greater movements\\nelsewhere occurring.\\nSo far in our discussion attention has been\\nfixed almost exclusively upon the peoples and\\nthe states external to Asia, or at least to the\\nmiddle zone of so-called debatable ground, in\\napparent oversight of the teeming population of", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0124.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 87\\nthe latter. It has seemed, doubtless, as though\\nthese were being regarded as not even pawns in\\nthe game, but only as the stake to go to the\\nstronger. Such, however, has not been the case.\\nThe condition of these peoples is not that of\\nsheep to be owned, although in some respects it\\nmuch resembles that of sheep without a shep-\\nherd for strong and virile as may be their\\nnative characters in individual manifestation,\\nmuch of the force of the Asiatic is expended in\\nmaintaining a dogged stationariness of develop-\\nment, which has settled at last into an apparent\\nimpotency for self-regeneration, whether of social\\ninstitutions or of government. If this generali-\\nzation be approximately correct and there is\\nmuch to justify it in the known conditions it\\nfollows either that these races must remain thus\\nimmobile for an indeterminate future, which is\\nunthinkable, or else that movement, progress,\\nreform, must start from external impulses. \\\\n\\nthe latter case the question of the source and\\ncharacter of these impulses, in themselves, and in\\nthe changes that they would tend to beget in\\nmethods, and ultimately in character, organiza-\\ntion, and action, is evidently of the first import-\\nance to the world. If the eiFective impulse", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0125.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "88 The Problem of Asia\\nshould be mainly Slavonic, there will be a result\\nof one character if Teutonic, of another if\\nAsiatic, yet a different. Again, it will matter\\nmuch whether races essentially homogeneous\\nremain nationally one or whether, from local\\ndistinctions now existing, they pass, at least for a\\ntime, into a condition of division into states\\npolitically independent and rivals. Far as the\\nresult lies beyond our present horizon, it is diffi-\\ncult to contemplate with equanimity such a vast\\nmass as the four hundred millions of China\\nconcentrated into one effective political organiza-\\ntion, equipped with modern appliances, and\\ncooped within a territory already narrow for it.\\nThe character of the civilization which it is des-\\ntined to receive, from the influences now sur-\\nrounding and impinging upon it, will go far to\\ndetermine the future of the world for civiliza-\\ntion, in final analysis, means, not material devel-\\nopment in the external environment, but the\\nelevation of personal, and, through personal, of\\nnational character.\\nIt is not, therefore, in negligence of the future\\nof these peoples, but in consequence of the im-\\nmense importance to them, and to all, of the\\ndirection that future shall take, that the question", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0126.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 89\\nof the character and relative strength of the\\nexternal contestants for influence possesses such\\nimmediate interest. The variance of the latter\\nif such it be is the opening chapter of a\\nlong history, the end of which is involved in no\\nsmall degree in these its beginnings. It is a long,\\nlong view, and foresight unquestionably fails to\\nsee the end; but this far it can surely reach\\nthat the elements of danger and of good are so\\ncertainly great that there must now be serious\\nprevision, by careful measurement of conditions,\\nsustained watchfulness, and vigorous effort, to\\ninsure that nothing unduly sudden or extreme\\noccur nothing revolutionary that there shall\\nbe gained time, the great element of safety, by\\nthe operation of which transformation is retarded\\ninto evolution. For whatever the character of\\nthe process, the result cannot be to obliterate the\\nqualities of these races, but to introduce them as\\nfactors into our existing civilization, from which\\nthey have for ages stood apart in like manner as\\nthe Teutonic genius entered into the civilization\\nof Rome, not by sudden convulsion though\\nwith many a throe but through a protracted\\nprocess of development, under the reciprocal in-\\nfluence of race characteristics essentially as diverse.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0127.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "90 The Problem of Asia\\nalmost, as those of opposite sexes. That the\\nresult was thus happily protracted, to our own\\ngreat gain at this present moment, was due, as\\nMommsen has indicated, to the foresight the\\nlong view- of Caesar partial, doubtless, even in\\nso great a man, partly, it may be, even uncon-\\nscious, but seeing, nevertheless, unto conviction,\\nfrom afar, the dangers that the conditions foretold,\\nand turning his attention with the intuition of\\ngenius to the provision of a barrier, by advancing\\nthe borders and consolidating the outworks of the\\nRoman state, until positions were held which\\nshould insure delay the primary, though not\\nthe final, aim of all defensive dispositions.\\nOur first necessity, therefore, is to recognize\\nthat for European civilization in its turn has now\\narrived an important period, a day of visitation\\nthat a process has begun which must end either\\nin bringing the Eastern and Western civilizations\\nface to face, as opponents who have nothing in\\ncommon, or else in receiving the new elements,\\nthe Chinese especially, as factors which, however\\nthey may preserve their individuality as is\\ndesirable, and as the Latin and the Teuton still\\ndo have been profoundly aifected by long-\\ncontinued intimate contact, and in such wise as-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0128.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 91\\nsimilated that the further association may proceed\\nquietly to work out peacefully its natural results.\\nTo effect this does not demand the merging of\\nnational characteristics, but it does require more\\nthan material development, even the indwelling\\nof a common spirit, a gift far more slow of\\ngrowth than the process of material advance.\\nThus as the Latin civilization at the moment of\\ndecisive confrontation with Teutonic vigor found\\nits expression in the Roman law and the imperial\\nidea, of which the centralized Church was the\\nnatural inheritor, our own, while embodying\\nmany diverse national types, finds its unity in\\nthe hallowing traditions of a common Christian-\\nity which is not the unimproved inheritance of\\na single generation, a talent laid up in a napkin,\\nbut an ever-swelling volume of inbred spiritual\\nconvictions, transmitted habits of thought, which,\\nby their growth from generation to generation,\\nattest their unimpaired vitality.\\nMeasured by this standard, the incorporation\\nof this vast mass of beings, the fringe of which\\nalone we have as yet touched, into our civiliza-\\ntion, to the spirit of which they have hitherto\\nbeen utter strangers, is one of the greatest prob-\\nlems that humanity has yet had to solve but to", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0129.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "92 The Problem of Asia\\nus, having the light of past experience, there is\\nconcerning it no ground for doubt, much less for\\nfear. The success with which, in our society of\\nnations, the Latin and the Teuton types mingle,\\nwithout losing their individuality or their respec-\\ntive spheres of manifestation and of influence,\\nhas been due mainly, if not exclusively, to that\\none spirit which during the critical period found\\nits home in the hearts of each, and became the\\ncommon possession of races so diverse and for so\\nlong estranged. In its sign, in truth, they con-\\nquered, for it broke down the wall of partition\\nbetween them, as between the Jew and the Gen-\\ntile, reconciling the antagonism of ages without\\nimpairing the permanence of type. We may be\\nsure, therefore, that the difficulty now before us\\nof long estrangement, present lack of mutual\\ncomprehension, and ultimate unity to be attained\\ncannot be adequately regarded from the stand-\\npoint of mere commercial advantages the short\\nview of immediate interests. However such con-\\nsiderations may serve to further a policy suited\\nto the wants of the distant future, it will be only\\nas they are in a direction generally right, the\\ndetermination of which must be otherwise esti-\\nmated. All the factors already indicated in this", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0130.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 93\\npaper, and such others as may hereafter appear in\\nit or elsewhere, should be contemplated not only\\nin the light of immediate advantage, but of that\\ngreat inevitable future, when, aroused to the con-\\nsciousness of power, and organized by the appro-\\npriation of European methods, these peoples, and\\nespecially China, shall be able to assert an influ-\\nence proportionate to their mass, and to demand\\ntheir shares in the general advantage. Those\\nwho live in that day will recognize then, what\\nour duty to them requires us to realize now, how\\nimmense the importance to the world that their\\ndevelopment has been not merely material, but\\nspiritual that time shall have been secured for\\nthem to absorb the ideals which in ourselves are\\nthe result of centuries of Christian increment.\\nFor the gaining of this necessary time, we and\\nour posterity have much to hope from the fact\\nthat our present world of civilization consists of\\nstrong opposing nationalities, and is not one huge,\\nconsolidated imperium, such as that of which\\nCaesar laid the foundation, driven thereto be-\\ncause the individual declension of the Roman\\ncitizen had destroyed the material from which the\\nmore healthful organism of earlier days could\\nhave been reconstituted. It is a weighty tribute", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0131.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "94 T^h^ Problem of Asia\\nto his genius, and to the wisdom of the more\\neminent among his successors, that by their adroit\\nskill of adjustment an organization should have\\nperpetuated its energy so long after vitality had\\ndeparted from its frame. Fixed in this mould\\nof arrested, or fulfilled, development, knowing\\nonly intestine turmoil, without recognized rival\\nto stimulate it in the struggle for existence, and\\nso to preserve it from stagnation and consequent\\ndecay, the great, centralized, unified world of that\\nepoch resembled a building whose stability de-\\npends not upon solidity of foundation, but upon\\nthe equilibrium of a house of cards. The ex-\\nample may be commended to the study of those\\nwho, by increase of international organization, and\\nconsequent diminution of individual state action,\\nwould push to a similar fatal unification, under a\\ncentralized authority, our own world of civiliza-\\ntion, already sufficiently bound in the traditions\\nand customs which inevitably accumulate, like\\npapers in pigeon-holes, about all continuous\\nactivities, political or individual. Contrast with\\nthis, and with the disorders into which Charle-\\nmagne s empire fell, after that unified organization\\nwas shattered by the lapse of centralized authority\\ninvolved in his personal death, the energy of the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0132.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 95\\nbroken warring communities that rolled back the\\nSaracenic invasion and evolved the subsequent\\nsocial order of Europe, but whose strength lay in\\nthe strenuous vitality fostered by constant com-\\npetition among themselves. Nothing more fatal\\ncan be devised for the states of our civilization,\\nand for that civilization itself, than the habit,\\nhappily not yet acquired, of looking for the\\nsolution of doubts and the adjustments of inter-\\nests to a central external authority, the analogue\\nof governmental fostering care for the private\\ncitizen of paternalism. The health of the\\ncommunity of states, as of the community of f\\ncitizens, depends upon the vigor of the individual\\nmembers, of which rational self-sufficingness is an\\ninevitable attendant. The rivalries of national in-\\nterests, and the sharp competitions thence arising,\\nserve to perpetuate the strong contrasts of race\\ntemperament and political methods which now ex- I\\nist among us and this virility of national charac-\\nters, born and sustained in conflict, will on the one!\\nhand intensify the inner impulse communicated tol\\nthe Asiatic, and on the other, by their very counter-\\naction, will retard the day of formal exterior con-\\nformity, the premature arrival of which, complete\\nin form but imperfect in spirit, is to be dreaded.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0133.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III\\nTHE accentuating rivalry between the states\\nof our civilization arising from the unstable\\nconditions of China, long uneasily felt, but not\\nformally avowed, is now approaching a moment\\nresembling that fixed for the unveiling of a statue.\\nThe presence of the statue is no secret, the very\\nfolds of the drapery betray its outlines, yet it is\\nas it were ignored, until the date fixed for dis-\\nplay. From yesterday to to-morrow things\\ncontinue essentially as they have been yet we\\nall know by experience how profound the change,\\nthe increased sense of imminence and of respon-\\nsibility, when the curtain falls, and facts long\\ndissembled are looked straight in the face.\\nWithout moving, we have traversed years of\\nevent. Action that seemed susceptible of\\nindefinite procrastination appears now to have\\nbeen too long deferred. Opportunities which\\nmight have been seized are seen to have passed\\nirretrievably, because in heedlessness or indolence", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0134.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 97\\nwe noted not the day of visitation. But, as has\\nbeen remarked, it is not China alone that Hes\\nwithin the debatable zone. With but slight\\nmodification of phrase, what has been said of her\\nmay be affirmed of Afghanistan, of Persia, and of\\nAsiatic Turkey, on the other flank of the line.\\nIn contemplating the possibilities of action, it\\nmust be repeated that consideration for the popu-\\nlations involved should have precedence of the\\ninterests of external nations even of the one,\\nor ones, taking action. This is not said as a\\ncover or an apology for measures the originating\\nmotive of which may be national self-interest.\\nSelf-interest is not only a legitimate, but a funda-\\nmental, cause for national policy one which\\nneeds no cloak of hypocrisy. As a principle it\\ndoes not require justification in general statement,\\nalthough the propriety of its application to a\\nparticular instance may call for demonstration.\\nBut as a matter of preparation, for dealing wisely\\nand righteously with this great question, against\\nthe chance of occasion arising, a mental prepara-\\ntion which no government can afford to post-\\npone, the very first element of a just and\\nfar-seeing decision must be the determination to\\nbear in mind, and to give due precedence to, the\\n7", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0135.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "98 The Problem of Asia\\nnatural rights and the future development of the\\npeoples most directly affected. The phrase\\nnatural rights is chosen expressly to indicate\\nthose that result from the simple fact of being\\nborn in this distinct from political or legal\\nrights, which depend upon other fitnesses than\\nthat of merely being a man. Thus the claim of\\nan indigenous population to retain indefinitely con-\\ntrol of territory depends not upon a natural right,\\nbut upon political fitness, shown in the political\\nwork of governing, administering, and develop-\\ning, in such manner as to insure the natural right\\nof the world at large that resources should not\\nbe left idle, but be utilized for the general good.\\nFailure to do this justifies, in principle, compul-\\nsion from outside the position to be demon-\\nstrated, in the particular instance, is that the\\nnecessary time and the fitting opportunity have\\narrived.\\nThe interests of the populations in these coun-\\ntries is by no means necessarily identical with\\nthose of the present governments, nor with the\\ncontinuance of the latter in either form or per-\\nson. These are not representative, in the sense\\nthat they either embody the wishes or promote\\nthe best welfare of the subject. They repre-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0136.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 99\\nsent at most the incapacity of the people to\\ngovern themselves, and in their defects are the\\nresults of generations of evolution from a false\\nsystem, unmodified by healthy opposition. Being\\nwhat they are, should necessity demand their\\ndiscontinuance, there need be no tenderness in\\ndealing with them as institutions, whatever con-\\nsideration may be shown to the incumbents of-\\nthe moment.\\nIt is, in fact, the inefficiency of the govern-\\nments that chiefly gives rise to the present un-\\neasiness. Were they otherwise, the balance of\\nstrength which now exists between the land and\\nthe sea powers, as already indicated, and the\\ncommercial interest of the latter in the preserva-\\ntion of peace, would naturally and easily deter-\\nmine their maintenance against any aggression\\nthat overpassed the fortunes common to all\\nstates, and threatened their permanence or inde-\\npendence. As it is, confronted with the immi-\\nnent probability of a dissolution, neither the\\ntime nor the circumstances of which can be fore-\\nseen, the result of causes either internal or exter-\\nnal, or both, other nations are compelled to seek\\nthe preservation of their own interests, by means\\nwhich may employ the existing governments, If\\nLof", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0137.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "loo The Problem of Asia\\nthese are equal to the task, or may supersede\\nthem. That either alternative is repugnant to\\nthe genius and traditions of the United States, it\\nis needless to say. Under the government of no\\nparty will she willingly initiate a process so con-\\ntrary to her preferences, and the grave issues of\\nwhich cannot be foreseen but equally, under no\\ngovernment can she stand by and see substantial\\ninjury done to the welfare of her citizens by the\\nundue preponderance of an inimical system of\\noccupation or of influence.\\nAccepting the existence of the problem in the\\nterms so far stated, a solution may be attempted.\\nGranting outside interference at all, which not\\nonly is most likely, but has actually begun,\\nthe successful issue would be found in a condi-\\ntion of political equilibrium between the external\\npowers, whereby the equality of opposing forces,\\nresting each on stable foundations, should pre-\\nvent the undue preponderance of any one state,\\nor of any one force resulting from a combination\\nof states, and which at the same time should pro-\\nmote, at the utmost rate consistent with healthy\\ngrowth, the material and spiritual development\\nof the populations affected. Thus would be\\nhastened the desirable day when the latter, while", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0138.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia loi\\nstill retaining their special traits and aptitudes,\\nshall have been successfully grafted on to the\\ncivilization of Europe, which, whatever its short-\\ncomings, certainly has produced the best fruits in\\nthe individual, social, and political well-being of\\nits members. This vital change effected, these\\nnew branches will then be able to discharge all\\nfunctions of self-dependent and self-governing\\npeoples, such as now constitute the international\\ncommonwealth. Is it too much to say that in\\nJapan, being a country of manageable dimensions,\\nour own day has witnessed just such a change\\ndemonstrating the possibility of absorbing the\\nbenefits, intellectual as well as material, of a\\nsystem hitherto alien, and of entering into the\\ncommunity of its life without sacrificing national\\nindividuality And while it is doubtless true\\nthat Japan has not experienced the governmental\\nparalysis of China, she has, since she felt the\\nimpulse of the foreigner, passed through a revo-\\nlution of institutions, from which only recently\\nshe has emerged, to the general admiration, into\\nthe full enjoyment of all international dignity\\nand privilege. It is evident, however, that the\\nduration of such a process depends in some con-\\nsiderable degree upon the bulk of the subject by", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0139.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "I02 The Problem of Asia\\nwhich it is undergone and when this is large, as\\nin China, the effect of external impulses will be\\naccelerated in proportion to the number of\\npoints, or to the extent of surface, to which they\\nare applied. Making every allowance for the\\nadaptability of the people of Japan, to which so\\nmuch of her success is to be attributed, it may\\nplausibly be inferred that her comparative small-\\nness of area and of population facilitated her pro-\\ngress; and that accordingly many points of contact\\nwill be favorable to the development of the\\ngreatly superior mass of China, by distributing\\nthe external influences among areas correspond-\\ning to those centres through which the respective\\npowers may act.\\nTo such diifusion of influences, and to assur-\\nance of equilibrium, the presence and differing\\ninterests of many states will tend. Nor will it\\nbe without benefit that the effects produced will\\nrepresent very great differences of characteristics,\\ncorresponding to the national types engaged.\\nIn so great an aggregate as that of China, variety\\nand contrast of result would be intrinisically\\ngood and if they promoted political subdivision,\\nthat also probably would be beneficial, both for\\nthe internal administration of the country and for", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0140.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 103\\nthe general political equilibrium of the world.\\nAs has before been said, it is scarcely desirable\\nthat so vast a proportion of mankind as the\\nChinese constitute should be animated by but\\none spirit and moved as a single man. If not a\\ndiversity of governments, at the least a strong\\nantagonism of parties, embodying opposite con-\\nceptions of national policy, is to be hoped, as\\nconducive to the| healthful balance of herself and\\nof other countries. It was not wholly a mistake\\nthat some in the ancient world deprecated the\\nruin of Carthage, and the disappearance of her\\ninfluence upon the international relations of the\\nday, with the consequent fall of Rome into cor-\\nruption within and excess without, through the\\nabuse of power to which no adequate external\\ncheck remained.\\nThere is therefore no cause to lament the\\nrivalries, nor the conflict of systems, represented\\nby the various nationalities which are now impress-\\ning China with the consciousness of the urgency\\nof their demands. The facts exist, beyond the\\nchance of speedy reversal, and must now be\\naccepted as they are conditions of the immediate\\npresent, elements of the short view, by which\\ncurrent auction must be modified. It is unpracti-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0141.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "I04 The Problem of Asia\\ncal to expend emotion in regret for the inevitable\\nit is better utilized as a stimulus to action, pre-\\nventive or remedial. The necessity now is to\\ntake the next steps as nearly as possible in the\\ndirection of the ultimate goal, the ascertainment\\nof which has been the object of what has so far\\nbeen said in other words, to seek the speedy\\nestablishment of conditions under which there shall\\nbe a balance of influence between land power\\nand sea power, and at the same time a mini-\\nmum of friction between the two ensue. The\\nproblem, from its nature, especially demands study\\nby the Teutonic nations, Germany, Great Brit-\\nain, and the United States for to them, represent-\\ning as they do one party to the case, co-operation\\nnot alliance, nor even pledge is necessary,\\nand co-operation must depend upon identity of\\nconviction, resting upon community of interest.\\nA single state like Russia, equipped with a govern-\\nment embodying the simplest conception of polit-\\nical unity, escapes the embarrassment inevitable\\nto several nations, of more complex organization,\\nin which the wills of the citizens have to be\\nbrought, not to submission merely, but to accord\\nand that upon a matter not only of national\\npolicy, but of international understanding.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0142.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 105\\nOf other countries, France, it may be presumed,\\nis by her artificial connection engaged to some\\nextent to the policy of Russia in the East\\nwhether for better or for worse will depend upon\\nthe coincidence of this with her natural interests\\nthere. At present, the principal result of the\\nalliance is to emphasize the divergence of interests\\ninternal to the group of Latin nations. This\\nis probably inevitable, both as a historical con-\\nsequence of their too great proximity, and from\\ntheir present conflicting ambitions in the Medi-\\nterranean. Nor can there be left out of account\\nhere the sincerely cordial interest, both past and\\npresent, of the English-speaking nations in the\\nprogress and confirmation of Italian unity. This\\ncan scarcely fail to strengthen, by all the subtile\\nforce of sentiment, on the one side and the other,\\nthe bond of a common interest in the Mediter-\\nranean, which is created and unified by the his-\\ntoric and unceasing eflForts of France for a pre-\\nponderance there, intolerable to other states. In\\nface of an immediate urgency like this, especially\\nwhen supported by the might of Russia, it is\\nunreal to appeal to an argument so phantasmal\\nas a common Latinity for France, after all, is\\nLatin but imperfectly, in organization rather than", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0143.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "io6 The Problem of Asia\\nin temperament. The Gallic admixture, whatever\\nits advantages, apparently carries with it a lack\\nof the steadfastness essential to the endurance of\\npolitical combination. From these relations of\\nantagonism follow two chief results first, that the\\nFrench positional control of the western Mediter-\\nranean is much weakened and again, that there\\nis no third racial genius comparable, in political\\ninfluence, to the two by which the European\\npressure upon Asia is chiefly constituted, the\\nSlavonic and the Teutonic.\\nThere remains to consider Japan, the import-\\nance of whose part is evident, because she is the\\none nation, Asiatic in genius as in position, which\\nby efficiency of action, internal as well as external,\\nhas established and maintained its place as a fully\\nequipped member of the commonwealth of states,\\nunder recognized international law. It has al-\\nready been noted that the essential elements of\\nher strength, being insular, place her inevitably in\\nthe ranks of the Sea Powers, and whatever ambi-\\ntions of territorial acquisition upon the continent\\nshe may entertain must be limited in extent,\\nbecause of the limited number of her own popu-\\nlation compared to that of the mainland adjacent\\nfarther than which, of course, it is not supposable", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0144.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 107\\nthat she can wish to extend her activities. West-\\nern Asia and the Mediterranean, for example,\\nthough inseparably a part of the broad world\\nquestion which centres just now about China, are\\nclearly beyond the scope of Japan. Like the\\nUnited States, local conditions emphasize her\\nprimary interests in a particular region and in\\none continent. Unlike the United States, the\\ncontractedness of her area denies the expectation\\nof a superfluity of force, disposable in remoter\\nquarters while the nearness, in Asia, of great\\nrival powers diminishes still further the possibility\\nof distant enterprises. Narrow restriction in local\\nterritorial occupancy, however, is common to all\\nthe interested states except, perhaps, Russia.\\nThe others, on account of their distance, as Japan\\non account of her size, must expect to affect\\nChina by impulses imparted to the inhabitants\\nthrough commercial and political relations, sup-\\nported militarily by sea power, which, from its\\nmobility, will be operative not only in the im-\\nmediate locality, but wherever else throughout\\nthe world its force can be felt in checking an\\nopposing influence as, for instance, in the con-\\ntrol of commerce to its own advantage and to the\\ninjury of an enemy.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0145.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "io8 The Problem of Asia\\nIn the kind and methods of their power, and\\nin their immediate interests, the Teutonic group\\nand Japan are at one it is in the nature of the\\ninfluence transmitted that they will differ, because\\nthe original genius and, still more important, the\\ninherited traditions of the two are different.\\nJapan has exhibited remarkable capacity and dili-\\ngence in the appropriation and application of\\nEuropean ways but these are to her as yet an\\nexternal acquisition, a piece of property, not a\\npart of herself. In the European peoples these\\nsame ways, as they now exist, are the exponents\\nof national character, of habits of thought, the out-\\ncome of centuries of evolution, in which a trans-\\nmitted civilization, once exterior, has undergone an\\nassimilative process under the operation of distinc-\\ntive national faculties and environment. Such a\\nresult carries with it the assurance of perma-\\nnence; not, indeed, in the form of stationariness,\\nbut in nature and direction of movement. Japan,\\nin fact, from our point of view, is still under the\\ndisadvantage, by no means irretrievable, that the\\nexterior and material characteristics of European\\ncivilization have been received too recently and\\nrapidly for entire assimilation. In the short time\\nthat has elapsed since national political conversion", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0146.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 109\\nbegan, it is not possible that change can have\\npenetrated far below the surface, modifying essen-\\ntial traits and modes of thought. This, indeed,\\ncan be effected healthfully only by the gradual\\nprocesses of evolution.\\nIn the matter before us, co-operation not\\nformal alhance between Germany, Great Brit-\\nain, and the United States would be a strictly\\nnatural condition, carrying with it a fair promise\\nof continuance, because, being based upon a com-\\nmon interest, its exertion would be governed by\\nideas substantially the same in origin, in tradition,\\nand in spirit. The accession of Japan as a part-\\nner, if it take place, as may be hoped, will be the\\nexpression of a political phase, more or less last-\\ning of an expediency, resting upon the fact that,\\nland and sea power being for the time in opposi-\\ntion, her place is with the latter. But even so,\\nand while acting together loyally for common\\nends, the subtile essential characteristics of race\\nmust make themselves felt, must impart a diver-\\ngence of ideals and of influences, not by any means\\nnecessarily hostile. Japan, like China, is Asiatic\\nthe appreciativeness and energy with which she\\nhas embraced European standards and ways are a\\nfavorable omen, giving perhaps the surest promise", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0147.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "no The Problem of Asia\\nas yet in sight that these shall pass into the\\nAsiatic life and remodel it, as the civilization of\\nRome passed into the Teutonic tribes. But the\\nresult in the latter case has been a Teutonic civil-\\nization, not a mere extension of that of Rome.\\nSo here, what we have to hope for is a renewed\\nAsia, not another Europe and to this end the\\nwilling acceptance nay, initiative of an Asiatic\\nnation is perhaps the most potent factor.\\nIt must, however, be recognized and candidly\\naccepted that difference of race characteristics,\\noriginal and acquired, entails corresponding tem-\\nporary divergence of ideal and of action, with\\nconsequent liability to misunderstanding, or even\\ncollision. Such recognition is a necessary, as well\\nas a most important, antecedent to provision for\\nthe future, in which we all hope for the prevalence\\nof justice and peace. Divergence of interests\\ngenerates contention, even among those of the\\nsame household but where there exists a com-\\nmunity of feeling and tradition to which appeal\\ncan be made, there is already a beginning of\\nreconciliation, that is less easily found where mis-\\nunderstanding results from divergence of temper-\\nament and ideals. Both sources of difficulty are\\npresent in our problem. The contrary interests", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0148.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia ill\\nand the positions of the land and the sea powers\\nhave been examined at some length. The differ-\\nences of temperament that are now meeting in\\nAsia have been more casually indicated, but they\\nmay be summed up in the three races, the Asiatic,\\nthe Slavonic, and the Teutonic, neither of which\\nprobably can yet give to the others the perfect\\ncomprehension expressed in the word unanim-\\nity. It is a prime necessity to recognize these\\ndiversities, to appreciate them, and to accept them,\\nas being not causes of complaint, but difficulties\\nto be smoothed not by abolishing them, which\\nis impossible, but by allowing to each fair play,\\nso long as it grows by its own inner energy, and\\ndoes not attempt propagation by the alien means\\nof armed compulsion. From such tolerant temper\\nwill ensue an adjustment corresponding to the\\ntrue value of each element involved, which can-\\nnot be expected if essential differences are ignored,\\nand the expectation of uniformity take the place\\nof that of unanimity, confounding oneness of spirit\\nwith oneness of operation. The distant solution,\\nwhich all three races should desire, for the common\\ngood of Europe and of Asia, is not the subversion\\nof Asiatic genius or institutions, but the quiet in-\\ntroduction of the European leaven which itself.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0149.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "112 The Problem of Asia\\neven when long accepted, is modified in form by-\\nracial genius and that this should be effected\\nunder conditions of mutual respect and kindli-\\nness, which will ensure its spread, if it possesses\\nthe advantages which we think.\\nIt is again a paradox but yet truth to say-\\nthat these conditions of equity and kindliness are\\nonly to be maintained by the presence of force\\nby just self-assertion, taking the shape of insistence\\nupon equality of opportunity, and supporting its\\ndemand by such evident preparation of means as\\nwill compel due attention. Preparation readi-\\nness insures consideration and consideration\\nnecessarily takes the form of courtesy, as well as\\nimposes study and realization of conditions.\\nBoth tend to peace, by removing impediments to\\nthe full play and due effect of the many factors\\nposition, numbers, race, temperament, political\\ninstitutions, national aptitudes of every kind\\nby whose freedom to work their natural results,\\nand to attain their natural levels, the adjustment\\nof evolution, the only secure result, will be\\nreached.\\nConsideration worthy of the name implies\\ncandid acceptance of all the factors, and patient\\neffort to appreciate them but while this is in", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0150.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 113\\none way a very complex process, because there\\nare many details, it is simplified in conception by\\nthe recognition of a very few distinguishing fea-\\ntures. There must be the speculative forecast\\nof the distant future, hand in hand with the\\nconsciousness of what at the moment is possible\\nand there must also be embraced, in due relative\\nproportions, the sense of primary duty to one s\\nown country, and an unremitting regard to the\\nreal exigencies and needs of other peoples. For\\nthe latter, as well as the former, are part of the\\naccount and states in their community, as well\\nas citizens in their commonwealths, should be\\ncharacterized by a public spirit which, while giv-\\ning precedence properly to interests especially in\\ntheir charge, is convinced also that these are best\\nsecured not by obstinately withstanding the pro-\\ngress of others, but by providing for its reasonable\\nsatisfaction.\\nIn this spirit, then, let us give consideration to\\nthe demands of to-day, in the light of the long\\nview of the distant future as so far set forth for\\nacceptance. In the present backward political\\ncondition of Asia, which accurately reflects the\\nwant of political aptitude in its peoples, the lack\\nof effective organization deprives her great mass", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0151.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "114 The Problem of Asia\\nof population of the power of effective initiative,\\nlimiting its present function to a load of inertia,\\nof passive resistance to change, which is, indeed,\\nno contemptible factor in the evolution of the\\nfuture, but against which no immediate provision\\nis necessary. In organized preparation for ad-\\nvance, Japan alone represents the Asiatic; and\\nJapan, so long as in this respect by herself, is not\\nbig enough to contribute the weight upon which,\\nas well as upon force of impulse, momentum de-\\npends. For the moment Japan is perforce con-\\nfined to deciding which of the two other contend-\\ning races is by character and ambitions most\\nfavorable, both to her immediate interests and to\\nthe free ultimate development of Asia in the line\\nof its natural capacities and upon these consid-\\nerations she must shape her course.\\nBetween the two other races, the Slav and the\\nTeuton, there are well-recognized racial diverg-\\nencies, which find concrete expression in differ-\\nences, equally marked, of political institutions, of\\nsocial progress, and of individual development.\\nIt is reasonable to believe that these differences\\nare partly fundamental, deep-seated in the racial\\nconstitution, and partly the result of the environ-\\nment amid which either has passed its centuries", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0152.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 115\\nof growth. There is between them the antago-\\nnism that results from lack of mutual comprehen-\\nsion, while to that is added a conflict of interests,\\nsuch as is inherent in their relative positions in\\nAsia, as heretofore analyzed, and in their conse-\\nquent necessary ambitions. To deal satisfactorily\\nwith such a condition it is first of all necessary to\\nadmit it not to gloze truth with a thin and use-\\nless veneer of uncandid professions of good-will,\\ndiluted by mental reservations. That done, it\\nmay be profitably asked whether parallel lines\\nmay not run in one direction instead of in oppo-\\nsition whether it may not be possible for us\\neven to converge, accepting one another as we\\nare, not exacting uniformity, but finding in the\\none object which attracts our aims a centre of\\nunanimity rather than of discord. This, however,\\nis impracticable unless each recognizes the crucial\\nnecessities of the other.\\nThere can be little doubt that beyond substan-\\ntial differences of racial characteristics, which find\\nnecessary expression in modes of action for\\naction is the materialization of spirit the acci-\\ndental line of separation between the two races,\\ndefining their interests and their ambitions, is\\ndenoted by the ideas of land power and sea", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0153.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "ii6 The Problem of Asia\\npower. This distinction proceeds alike from\\npresent possession and from present want. It\\ninheres in their positions, both absolutely, and as\\nrelated to the common objects of interest or of\\ndesire in Asia. It attaches conspicuously to the\\nquestion of communications, of access to those\\nobjects. The Teuton, under the three great\\nnational heads, possesses the sea, from which the\\nSlav is almost debarred. The Teuton is inferior\\nin land power, for, in all his branches and settle-\\nments, he is geographically far removed from\\nAsia, with which a great part of the Slavonic\\ntenure is coterminous. The communications of\\nAsia with the outer world are fullest by way of\\nthe sea and here again it is the Teuton that\\nleads, as well in naval as in commercial develop-\\nment, and by a superiority which admits no\\nrival.\\nEssentially, this relative condition cannot be\\nreversed it can only be modified, and that to\\nthe extent of reasonable concession, not of\\nequality. Its maintenance, being in the line of\\nnature s dispositions, is a rule of healthy policy,\\nthat will dictate or control national demands for\\nlocal influence or possession, as aff*ecting pre-\\nponderance upon the element with which the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0154.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "The Problem, of Asia 117\\nracial strength is identified. On the other hand,\\nit must equally be recognized that each race\\nabsolutely requires some foothold, though an\\ninferior one, on the field which is not primarily\\nits own and this common, reciprocal need indi-\\ncates the quarters in which mutual concession\\nmust smooth the way towards adjustment.\\nFor instance, it is abundantly clear that Russia\\ncan never be satisfied with the imperfect, and\\npolitically dependent, access to the sea afforded\\nher by the Baltic and the Black Sea, under pres-\\nent conditions. It is to the writer equally clear\\nthat the European members of the Teutonic\\nfamily, Germany and Great Britain, cannot pos-\\nsibly admit her predominance in the Levant\\nand through this over the Suez route which\\nwould be acquired if the enclosed naval basin of\\nthe Black Sea were converted into an impregnable\\nbase, for exit and for entrance, by the acquisition\\nof the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. There\\nis not in the world a parallel to this combination\\nof advantages for the secure development, drill,\\nand egress at will, of a formidable fleet while its\\nsituation relatively to the canal would revolution-\\nize commercial conditions, in so far as dependent\\nupon naval power. So strong is my conviction", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0155.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "1 1 8 The Problem of Asia\\nupon this point that, while heartily wishing the\\nsuccess of the British arms in the current war in\\nSouth Africa, I should see compensation even\\nfor utter defeat and loss in the necessity for Great\\nBritain then to concentrate upon the Mediter-\\nranean and the Levant, and, in accord with\\nGermany, to preserve a predominance about the\\nisthmus, including Asia Minor thus assuring\\na route necessary to both nations, and for which\\nthat by the Cape of Good Hope is no adequate\\nalternative/\\nHow and where, then, can concession be made\\nto the sea wants of Russia There are two\\nquarters remaining, and only two neither wholly\\nsatisfactory, and by that very fact confirming the\\nessential isolation of the Slav from the sea.\\nThey will be repeated, with a brief mention of\\nthe advantages and disadvantages of each to the\\ntwo parties chiefly concerned. There is the\\nPersian Gulf, reached by land through Persia\\nfrom the shores of the Caspian and there is the\\nseaboard of China, to which access is had through\\nSiberia. The former involves an aggression\\nupon Persia, or concession from her for it can\\nin no way be considered adequate to Russia s\\nThese words were written December 12, 1899.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0156.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 119\\nambitions unless it carries with it extensive and\\nconsecutive territorial possession, from her present\\nsouthern limits in East Turkestan to the borders\\nof the gulf. If this be obtained, Russia is placed\\nupon the flank of India she controls one issue\\nof any possible railroad from the Mediterranean\\nthrough the valley of Mesopotamia, and abso-\\nlutely interposes between it and its prolongation\\nto India. Besides this, although the Persian\\nGulf has no such absolute control of the route\\nto the East, via Suez, as is conferred by predomi-\\nnance in the Levant, it nevertheless does afford\\na flanking position, and entails a perpetual menace\\nin war. In addition, it may be remarked that\\nthe maintenance there, by Russia, of a navy\\nsufficient to be a serious consideration to the\\nfleets of Great Britain, and to those who would\\nbe her natural allies upon the sea in case of com-\\nplications in the farther East, would involve an\\nexhausting effort, and a naval abandonment of\\nthe Black Sea, or of the China Sea, or of both.\\nNaval divisions distributed among the three could\\nnot possibly give mutual support. Such a situa-\\ntion, contrasted with the secure, though long,\\naccess to the China sea coast, through territory\\neither her own or under facile control, and with", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0157.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "I20 The Problem of Asia\\na fleet concentrated there, on the spot of greatest\\ninterest to the world, presents drawbacks so\\nobvious that there is no motive, in the good of\\nRussia, for the other states to consent to an\\narrangement which carries with it hazard to them.\\nOn the other hand, it appears unreasonable,\\nand needlessly provocative of bad feeling, to\\nobject to her reaching the sea on the seaboard of\\nChina. Thus, here again, by an inevitable oper-\\nation of a line of least resistance, we find on the\\neastern flank of the debatable zone, as on the\\nwestern, the clustering of the nationalities, the\\ngathering of the eagles, around a central interest,\\nwhich derives its disputable character from the\\nmoribund condition of the local government.\\nIn acknowledgment of their willing acquies-\\ncence in this coast tenure, opening free communi-\\ncation into the seas of the world, the sea powers\\nmay reasonably claim equal candor of admission\\nthat the navigable stream of the Yang-tse-kiang\\nis their necessary line of access into the land, and\\nthe nucleus essential to the local spread of their\\ninfluence. Like all arrangements here suggested,\\nthis reciprocal agreement should not be in the\\nnature of formal convention, but of an under-\\nstanding which is not arbitrary, but rests upon", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0158.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 121\\nexisting facts that receive recognition in a spirit\\nof mutual concession. It carries the corollary\\nthat there shall not be established upon the\\nbanks of the Yang-tse-kiang, by fortification or\\notherwise, any military tenure by which its waters\\ncan be forcibly closed to the sea powers. That\\nthe latter, under such conditions, will refrain dur-\\ning peace from using their own naval strength to\\ndebar others from commercial use of the river is\\ninsured partly by the settled policy of the one\\namong them that now has the greatly preponder-\\nant navy, partly by the mutual watchfulness be-\\ntween themselves which is inseparable from all\\ncombinations of states. In this instance co-oper-\\nation among the naval nations depends upon a\\ncommon opposition to a particular movement,\\nnaturally antagonistic to them, and upon a com-\\nmon interest, which, being accurately understood,\\nwill prevent measures that inure to the dispro-\\nportionate sway of any one of them.\\nIn fact, as regards possible aggression upon\\nChina, land power, being the prerogative of a\\nsingle state, near at hand, is far more to be feared\\nthan sea power for the latter is distributed\\namong several, the bases of whose national\\nstrength are remote, and moreover it is in its", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0159.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "122 The Problem of Asia\\nmethods more promotive of benefit, for it finds\\nthe sources of its vigor in commerce only\\nsecondarily in force. It is therefore especially\\ninterested in elevating, rather than in subjugating,\\nthose with whom it deals, and the aim here, for\\nthe welfare of the world, should not be compul-\\nsion, but influence not the appropriation of\\nthese countries, by one or by many, but the\\ngradual evolution of their inhabitants, through\\nmaterial progress, and through mental contact\\nwith a civilization that has so far given the highest\\nindividual and social results. That such a pro-\\ncess should be underlain by force force of in-\\ntrusion on the part of the outside influences,\\nforce of opposition among the latter themselves\\nmay be regrettable, but it is only a repetition\\nof all history. Force has been the instrument by\\nwhich ideas have lifted the European world to\\nthe plane on which it now is, and it still supports\\nour political systems, national and international,\\nas well as our social organization.\\nIn summary, therefore, and with respect both\\nto the remote future and to immediate policy, the\\nissue of events in the seas of China and in the\\nLevant, in the extreme east and extreme west of\\nAsia, will depend upon the presence of force.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0160.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 123\\nevident in positions occupied and in numbers\\navailable. This condition, at once natural and\\ninevitable, dictates co-operation not formal,\\nbut none the less clearly conscious between\\nthe Teutonic nations, because of their fundamen-\\ntal identity of interest, which is the material\\nfactor, and because the conduct to which that in-\\nterest and the nature of their power alike impel is\\nanimated by one spirit. That is the spirit of\\ncommerce of interchange essentially free,\\nand desirous of an influence which, although it\\ncan and must be maintained by naval force locally\\ndisplayed, cannot be widely diffused by the same\\nagency because the conditions of its strength\\nnarrowly limit its extension inland, making it for\\nthis chiefly dependent upon native local support.\\nFor effects, present and future, the sea powers\\nmust rely upon evident benefit following from\\nassociation with them a means which induces\\nacceptance, not submission. Their force, resting\\non the sea, can serve only to frustrate attempts to\\nexclude themselves, or, if occasion arise, to aid\\nthe populations concerned in resistance to subjec-\\ntion. To accomplish these things they must work\\ntogether; not in the letter of alliance, which fetters,\\nbut in the spirit of accord, which comprehends-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0161.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "124 The Problem of Asia\\nFrom existing elements of opposition, the\\nfuture of Asia will remain a question in which\\nmilitary considerations must predominate until,\\nat least, antagonism shall have passed into ad-\\njustment. Thus regarded, the nature and direc-\\ntion of effective co-operation are indicated by the\\ngeographical conditions which constitute the\\nstrategic situation. These have been discussed\\nat large in the previous papers. It is enough to\\nrecall here, in summary, that the chief centre of\\ninterest, because of its extent and present un-\\nsettled state, is China, around which, however,\\nare grouped the other wealthy districts, continen-\\ntal and insular, which constitute eastern Asia,\\nfrom Java to Japan. These markets of the\\nfuture are the near objectives of the political and\\nmilitary discussions which now attract attention\\nbut beyond them, in any statesmanlike view, lies\\nthe remote future result upon Asiatics of the im-\\npressions they may receive in absorbing and\\nassimilating European civilization. Will they,\\nfrom the effects thus wrought upon them, enter\\nits community, spiritually, as equals, as inferiors,\\nor as superiors politically, as absorbing, or ab-\\nsorbed\\nExcept Russia and Japan, the several nations", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0162.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 125\\nactively concerned in this great problem rest, for\\nhome bases, upon remote countries. We find\\ntherefore two classes of powers those whose\\ncommunication is by land, and those who depend\\nupon the sea. The sea lines are the most num-\\nerous and easy, and they will probably be deter-\\nminative of the courses of trade. Among them\\nthere are two the advantages of which excel all\\nothers for Europe by Suez, from America by\\nway of the Pacific Ocean. The latter will doubt-\\nless receive further modification by an isthmian\\ncanal, extending the use of the route to the\\nAtlantic seaboard of America, North and South.\\nCommunications dominate war broadly con-\\nsidered, they are the most important single\\nelement in strategy, political or military. In its\\ncontrol over them has lain the pre-eminence of\\nsea power as an influence upon the history of\\nthe past and in this it will continue, for the at-\\ntribute is inseparable from its existence. This is\\nevident because, for reasons previously explained,\\ntransit in large quantities and for great distances\\nis decisively more easy and copious by water than\\nby land. The sea, therefore, is the great medium\\nof communications of commerce. The very\\nsound, commerce, brings with it a suggestion", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0163.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "126 The Problem of Asia\\nof the sea, for It is maritime commerce that has\\nin all ages been most fruitful of wealth and\\nwealth is but the concrete expression of a nation s\\nenergy of life, material and mental. The power,\\ntherefore, to insure these communications to\\none s self, and to interrupt them for an adversary,\\naffects the very root of a nation s vigor, as in\\nmilitary operations it does the existence of an\\narmy, or as the free access to rain and sun\\ncommunication from without does the life of a\\nplant. This is the prerogative of the sea\\npowers and this chiefly if not, indeed, this\\nalone they have to set oflT against the disad-\\nvantage of position and of numbers under which,\\nwith reference to land power, they labor in Asia.\\nIt is enough. Pressure afar off -diversion is\\nadequate to relieve that near at hand, as Napoleon\\nexpected to conquer Pondicherry on the banks\\nof the Vistula. But if the sea powers embrace\\nthe proposition that has found favor in America,\\nand, by the concession of immunity to an\\nenemy s commerce in time of war, surrender their\\ncontrol of maritime communications, they will\\nhave abdicated the sceptre of the sea, for they\\nwill have abandoned one chief means by which\\npressure in one quarter the sea balances", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0164.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 127\\npressure in a remote and otherwise inaccessible\\nquarter. Never was moment for such abandon-\\nment less propitious than the present, when the\\ndetermination of influence in Asia is at stake.\\nOf the three Teutonic nations Germany,\\nGreat Britain, and the United States the two\\nformer alone are Immediately interested in the\\nLevant because, independent of its local re-\\nsources, the most vulnerable part of their neces-\\nsary communication with the East is there. For\\nits protection they have ample naval strength, if\\nto the latter adequate local support is given.\\nFor this there is a nucleus in the central posi-\\ntions of Egypt and Cyprus, flanked as these are\\nby Aden on the one side, by Malta and Gibral-\\ntar on the other but there is further needed,\\nunquestionably, in the region defined by the\\nBlack Sea and the Mediterranean, the Caspian\\nand the Persian Gulf, that predominance of politi-\\ncal influence which rests upon consciousness of in-\\nterest implanted in the inhabitants upon their\\ndependence for security against a dreaded aggres-\\nsion and upon their sense of benefit, anticipated\\nfor the future as well as bestowed in the past and\\npresent.\\nPreponderance such as this is conferred by", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0165.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "128 The Problem of Asia\\ncommercial enterprises for the development of\\na country, provided the nation by which they are\\nundertaken supports them by its power, ex-\\npressed by its wealth, and, in case of necessity,\\nby its organized military forces. This is the\\nnecessary aim of the states which find in the\\nSuez Canal their shortest route to the farther\\nEast. It is more particularly that of Great\\nBritain, because she has extensive responsibilities\\nin India, which may at any time require the use\\nof that shortest route, not for commerce merely,\\nbut for troops. For the latter purpose, even the\\nblocking of the canal, necessitating transshipment\\nof troops and goods, would only lessen, not\\ndestroy, the gain in time over the Cape voyage.\\nGermany s interest, while differing in kind and\\nin degree, is no less real and the irreversible\\nfact remains that in the entrance of the Black\\nSea, in the valley of Mesopotamia, and in the\\ntable-lands of Asia Minor, by virtue of their\\nnatural features, of their extent, and of their\\ncentral position, rests an ultimate control of the\\neastern Mediterranean, resembling that exercised\\nsome centuries ago by the Ottoman Turks. In\\nthe days of sails, however, loss of control did not\\ninvolve exclusion from the best sea road to the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0166.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 129\\nEast, as it now would. The matter is pre-\\neminently the concern of Germany and Great\\nBritain; but with theirs is associated that of Italy,\\nbecause France has deliberately cast in her lot\\nwith Russia, which, by the nature of things, must\\nbe opposed alike to Latin and Teutonic pre-\\ndominance in the regions named. It lies beyond\\nthe scope of United States activities, but not\\noutside of our lively solicitude. It affects us in\\nthat it touches to the quick the freedom and\\nrapidity of intercourse with the East on the part\\nof those whose policy there must run even with\\nours, because of the similarity which characterizes\\nalike our strength and our interests.\\nTo state such a fact as this, with the reasons\\nsupporting it, is simply to indicate what has been\\nbefore called the long view, the distant goal,\\nwhich, to borrow a simile from the sea, may be\\nsteered for direct when the wind of circumstances\\nis fair but with the many complications that\\nexist, or that may arise, each generation of states-\\nmen must contend as the seaman of a few years\\nback contended with contrary winds or currents.\\nBut, while so doing, they will not be helped, but\\nhindered, if amid present difficulties they lose\\nsight of ultimate aims; as if, to continue our\\n9", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0167.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "I ^o The Problem of Asia\\nparallel, the seaman forgot his destination in his\\nattention to the wind. Neither in politics nor in\\nseamanship can the course at any moment set\\ndisregard the port desired, nor in either pro-\\nfession does neglect of charted data conduce to\\nsuccess.\\nThe people of the United States and their\\nsuccessive governments have not now, nor are\\nlikely to have hereafter, in connection with the\\nfuture of Asia, to consider any such complicated\\nconditions as are presented by the surroundings\\nof the Suez Canal and of the Levant. Our diffi-\\nculty at present does not proceed from outside\\nconditions, but from those internal to our own\\nnational habits of thought, which in the past\\nhave been distinctly averse to studying external\\npolitical problems, and even to admitting their\\nexistence, until pressed home upon our conscious-\\nness by an immediate emergency. Startling as\\nhas been the effect produced upon public senti-\\nment by the recent exigency which threw the\\nPhilippines upon our hands, it must be remem-\\nbered that a mental temperament evolved and\\ningrained by generations of acceptance, not merely\\ninert, but willing, must tend to revert, as passing\\ntime dulls the sharp impression and lively emo-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0168.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "Xhe Problem of Asia 131\\ntions that followed the war with Spain. Most\\npersons have experienced that, in forming or in\\nbreaking habits, the first few days under the im-\\npulse of a recent resolve are comparatively easy,\\nbut that to them succeeds an uninteresting monot-\\nonous period of struggle, which too often issues\\nin apathetic surrender to former conditions.\\nWith nations the tendency is the same. To\\nresist it, where resistance is necessary, there is\\nrequired a comprehension of facts, and a recogni-\\ntion of the duties and interests involved; for in\\nthese, distant or immediate, are to be found the\\nonly unanswerable reasons and durable motives\\nfor national policy.\\nThe argument of these papers rests upon the\\nassumption, now quite generally accepted, that in\\nthe wide movement of expansion which has char-\\nacterized the last quarter of the closing century,\\nthe Pacific Ocean in general and eastern Asia in\\nparticular are indicated as the predominant objects\\nof interest, common to all nations, both in the\\nnear and in the remote future. Within the home\\ndominions of the European and the American\\npowers no marked territorial changes are to be\\nexpected but in the outer world, where con-\\nditions are unsettled, and towards which all eyes", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0169.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "132 The Problem of Asia\\nare turned, regions even extensive derive their\\npresent significance less from their intrinsic value\\nthan from their bearing upon access to the central\\n^objects named. South Africa, for instance, if\\nMr. Bryce s estimate is correct, receives from its\\ngreat gold-fields but a temporary importance,\\ndestined soon to disappear by their exhaustion\\nbut as an important outpost on one of the high-\\nroads to India and the farther East it has some\\npermanent value, which may be more or less, but\\nin any event demands consideration.\\nThe Isthmus of Suez, the Levant, and Persia\\nin like manner possess inherent advantages; but\\nit has been attempted to show that the enjoy-\\nment of these is a less pressing concern than\\nthe establishment there of political conditions\\nwhich may affect the future control of the Suez\\nroute.\\nThese, and the other factors named, by their\\nparticular values and their mutual influence, con-\\nstitute the strategic features of the general world\\nsituation involved in the problem of Asia. With\\nthem nations have to deal in the light of their\\nindividual interests, checked by due respect to\\nthe rights of others, measuring the latter not\\nexclusively by the rule of conventional ideas,", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0170.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 133\\nessentially transitory, but by the standards of\\neternal justice, which human law can express only\\nimperfectly. Nor does the mighty power of\\nsentiment fail to find due place in such a scheme\\non the contrary, when healthy in character, it\\nreceives from the considerations that have been\\nadduced the intelligent direction which alone\\nmakes it operative for good. But a very large\\npart of a nation s wisdom consists in reinforcing\\nits own strength by co-operation with others,\\nbased upon a substantial identity of interests\\nand if such identity is found combined with com-\\nmunity of character and tradition, fostering com-\\nmunity of ideals, the prospect of continued and\\nharmonious co-operation is greatly increased.\\nFrom the sense of such kinship springs a sound\\naffection, which redeems interest from much of\\nthe selfishness associated with the word. Such is\\nthe triple bond which may unite Germany, Great\\nBritain, and the United States not in alliance,\\nbut in solidarity of action, founded upon the rock\\nof common interest, and cemented by the ties\\nof blood.\\nIn eastern Asia and the Pacific, although the\\ninterests of the United States are not identical\\nwith those of Germany and of Great Britain, they", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0171.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "1 34 The Problem of Asia\\nare alike not the same, but similar. Rightly-\\nunderstood, while the three nations will be com-\\npetitors, seekers of the same end, they should\\nnot be antagonists. For this reason our sym-\\npathy should go with the others in whatsoever,\\nby facilitating their influence, tends towards the\\nfurtherance of the common policy. This needs\\nespecially to be understood in matters affecting\\nthe communications with the East for there, the\\neffect being indirect, and exercised in quarters\\nremote from our own activities, understanding\\nand sympathy are less easily aroused, and greater\\nattention is required to comprehend. That upon\\nsuch instructed appreciation of facts, when fully\\nassimilated, there should follow a certain mutual\\nregard, will be natural. Like will to like.\\nIn return we may claim, and will doubtless\\nreceive, the same intelligent recognition and sym-\\npathy that we ourselves extend. Upon no other\\ncondition than a clear perception, where the\\nrespective paths and duties lie apart, can we reach\\nthat accord which will enable us to act in concert\\nwhere they coincide. Of the two great lines of\\ncommunication Suez and Panama the former,\\nas a matter of political action, is wholly theirs\\nthe latter, necessarily ours. If it should ever", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0172.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 135\\nhappen that either group come to the help of the\\nother on its own ground, either by active inter-\\nference or by unmistakable moral support, as\\nGreat Britain is reported to have withstood for-\\neign combination against us at the opening of the\\nSpanish war, it must not be with any idea of\\nsubsequent claim to local political interference.\\nWe work together when mutual interest requires,\\nbut in accordance with well-understood con-\\nditions beyond that we stand clear of each\\nother s business, knowing that misplaced med-\\ndling separates closest friends.\\nThe writer has too often already discussed,\\ndirectly or incidentally, the strategic situation\\nwhich finds its centre in Panama to repeat the\\nsame here; but one or two remarks about Mon-\\nroe doctrine may be not out of place. Accepting\\nas probably durable the new conditions, which\\nhave so largely modified the nation s external\\npolicy in the direction of expansion, there is in\\nthem nothing to diminish, but rather to intensify,\\nthe purpose that there shall be no intrusion of\\nthe European political system upon territory\\nwhence military effect upon the Isthmus of\\nPanama can be readily exerted. For instance,\\nshould a change anticipated by some occur, and", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0173.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "1 36 The Problem of Asia\\nHolland enter the German Empire, it will be\\nadvantageous that it should even now be under-\\nstood, as it then would be necessary for us to\\nsay, that our consent could not be given to\\nCura9ao forming part of that incorporation.\\nThe Isthmus of Panama in addition to its\\nspecial importance to us as a link between our\\nPacific and Atlantic coasts sums up in itself\\nthat one of the two great lines of communication\\nbetween the Atlantic and the farther East which\\nespecially concerns us, and we can no more con-\\nsent to such a transfer of a fortress in the Carib-\\nbean, than we would ourselves have thought of\\nacquiring Port Mahon, in the Mediterranean, as\\na result of our successful war with Spain.\\nConsideration of interests such as these must\\nbe dispassionate upon the one side and upon the\\nother and a perfectly candid reception must be\\naccorded to the views and the necessities of those\\nwith whom we thus deal. During the process\\nof deliberation not merely must preconceptions\\nbe discarded, but sentiment itself should be laid\\naside, to resume its sway only after unbiassed\\njudgment has done its work. The present ques-\\ntion of Asia, the evolution of which has taken\\ndays rather than years, may entail among its", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0174.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 137\\nresults no change in old maxims, but it neverthe-\\nless calls for a review of them in the light of\\npresent facts. If from this no difference of\\nattitude results, the confirmed resolve of sober\\nsecond thought will in itself alone be a national\\ngain. This new Eastern question has greatly\\naffected the importance of communications, en-\\nhancing that of the shorter routes, reversing\\npolitical and military as distinguished from\\nmercantile conditions, and bringing again into\\nthe foreground of interest the Mediterranean,\\nthus reinvested with its ancient pre-eminence.\\nFor the same reason the Caribbean Sea, because\\nof its effect upon the Isthmus of Panama, attains a\\nposition it has never before held, emphasizing the\\napplication to it of the Monroe doctrine. The\\nPacific has advanced manifold in consequence to\\nthe United States, not only as an opening mar-\\nket, but as a means of transit, and also because\\nour new possessions there, by giving increased\\nopportunities, entail correspondingly heavier\\nburdens of national responsibility. The isthmian\\ncanals, present and to come, Suez and Panama,\\nsummarize and locally accentuate the essential\\ncharacter of these changes, of which they are at\\nonce an exponent and a factor. It will be no", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0175.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "138 The Problem of Asia\\nlight matter that man shall have shifted the Strait\\nof Magellan to the Isthmus of Panama, and\\nthe Cape of Good Hope to the head of the\\nMediterranean.\\nThe correlative of these new conditions is the\\ncomparative isolation, and the dwindled conse-\\nquence, of the southern extremes of Africa and\\nAmerica, which now lie far apart from the\\nchanged direction imposed upon the world s\\npolicies. The regions there situated will have\\nsmall effect upon the great lines of travel, and\\nmust derive such importance as may remain to\\nthem from their intrinsic productive value. Does\\nthere, then, remain sound reason of national\\ninterest for pressing the Monroe doctrine to the\\nextent of guaranteeing our support to American\\nstates which love us not, and whose geographical\\nposition, south of the valley of the Amazon, lies\\noutside of effective influence upon the American\\nisthmus Does the disposition to do so arise\\nfrom sound policy, or from sentiment, or from\\nmere habit And, if from either, do the facts\\njustify retaining a burden of responsibility which\\nmay embarrass our effective action in fields of\\ngreater national consequence just as South\\nAfrica may prove a drain upon Great Britain s", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0176.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 139\\nnecessary force about Suez In short, while the\\nprinciples upon which the Monroe doctrine reposes\\nare not only unimpaired, but fortified, by recent\\nchanges, is it not possible that the application of\\nthem may require modification, intensifying their\\nforce in one quarter, diminishing it in another\\nNot the least striking and important of the\\nconditions brought about by the two contempo-\\nrary events the downfall of the Spanish colonial\\nempire and the precipitation of the crisis in east-\\nern Asia has been the drawing closer together\\nof the two great English-speaking nationalities.\\nDespite recalcitrant objections here and there by\\nunwilling elements on both sides, the fact remains\\nconcrete and apparent, endued with essential life,\\nand consequent inevitable growth, by virtue of a\\nclearly recognized community of interest, present\\nand future. It is no mere sentimental phase,\\nthough sentiment, long quietly growing, had\\nsufficiently matured to contribute its powerful\\n1 Since these words were written the troubles In China, and the\\nnecessity of Great Britain to draw troops from India for service\\nthere, have enforced this particular illustration of the military\\nembarrassments that may attend widely extended political respon-\\nsibility. It is clearly the part of wisdom to retrench these where It\\ncan honorably be done, limiting minor activities, and concentrat-\\ning purpose upon the necessary and greater external interests of the\\nnation.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0177.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "140 The Problem of Asia\\ninfluence at the opportune moment but here, as\\never, there was first the material, identity of\\ninterest, and not till afterwards the spiritual,\\nreciprocity of feeling, aroused to mutual recog-\\nnition by the causes and motives of the Spanish\\nwar. That war, and the occurrences attendant,\\nproclaimed emphatically that the two countries,\\nin their ideals of duty to the suffering and op-\\npressed, stood together, indeed, but in compara-\\ntive isolation from the sympathies of the rest of\\nthe world.\\nThe significance of this fact has been accentu-\\nated by the precision with which in the United\\nStates the preponderance of intelligence has dis-\\ncerned, and amid many superficially confusing\\ndetails has kept in mind, as the reasonable guide\\nto its sympathies, that the war in the Transvaal\\nis simply a belated revival of the issue on which\\nour own Revolution was fought, viz., that when\\nrepresentation is denied, taxation is violent op-\\npression. The principle is common to Great\\nBritain and to us, woven into the web of all her\\nhistory, despite the momentary aberration which\\nled to our revolt. The twofold incident the\\ntwo wars and the sympathies aroused, because in\\nboth each nation recognized community of prin-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0178.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "The Problem of Asia 141\\nciple and of ideals indicates another great\\napproximation to the unity of mankind which\\nwill arrive in due time, but which is not to be\\nhurried by force or by the impatience of dreamers.\\nThe outcome of the civil war in the United States,\\nthe unification of Italy, the new German Empire,\\nthe growing strength of the idea of Imperial Fed-\\neration in Great Britain, all illustrate the tendency\\nof humanity to aggregate into greater groups,\\nwhich in the instances cited have resulted in\\npolitical combination more or less formal and\\nclearly defined. To the impulse and establish-\\nment of each of these steps in advance, war has\\nplayed a principal part. War it was which pre-\\nserved our Union. War it was which completed\\nthe political unity of Italy, and brought the\\nGermans into that accord of sentiment and of\\nrecognized interest upon which rest the founda-\\ntions and the continuance of their empire. War\\nit is which has but now quickened the spirit of\\nsympathy between Great Britain and her colonies,\\nand given to Imperial Federation an acceleration\\ninto concrete action which could not otherwise\\nhave been imparted and it needed the stress of\\nwar, the threat of outside interference with a\\nsister nation in its mission of benevolence, to", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0179.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "142 The Problem of Asia\\nquicken into positive action the sympathy of\\nGreat Britain with the United States, and to\\ndispose the latter to welcome gladly and to return\\ncordially the invaluable support thus offered.\\nWar is assuredly a very great evil not the\\ngreatest, but among the greatest which afflict\\nhumanity. Yet let it be recognized at this mo-\\nment, when the word Arbitration has hold of popu-\\nlar imagination, more perhaps by the melody of\\nits associations, like the Mesopotamia of the\\npreacher, than by virtue of a reasonable con-\\nsideration of both sides of the question, of which\\nit represents only one, that within two years two\\nwars have arisen, the righteous object of either of\\nwhich has been unattainable by milder methods.\\nWhen the United States went to war with Spain,\\nfour hundred thousand of the latter s colonial\\nsubjects had lost their lives by the slow misery\\nof starvation, inflicted by a measure Reconcen-\\ntration which was intended, but had proved in-\\nadequate, to suppress an insurrection incited by\\ncenturies of oppression and by repeated broken\\npledges. The justification of that war rests upon\\nour right to interfere on grounds of simple\\nhumanity, and upon the demonstrated inability\\nof Spain to rule her distant colonies by methods", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0180.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "The P rob lent of Asia 143\\nunharmful to the governed. It was impossible\\nto accept renewed promises, not necessarily-\\nthrough distrust of their honesty, but because\\npolitical incapacity to give just and good adminis-\\ntration had been proved by repeated failures.\\nThe justification of Great Britain s war with the\\nTransvaal rests upon a like right of interference\\nto relieve oppression and upon the broad\\ngeneral principle for which our colonial ancestors\\nfought the mother-country over a century ago,\\nthat taxation without representation is tyranny.\\nGreat Britain, indeed, did not demand the\\nfranchise for her misgoverned subjects, domiciled\\nabroad she only suggested it as a means where-\\nby they might, in return for producing nine-\\ntenths of the revenue, obtain fair treatment from\\nthe state which was denying it to th em. But be\\nit remembered, not only that a cardinal principle\\nupon which English and American liberty rests\\nwas being violated, but that at the time when the\\nforeigners were encouraged to enter the Transvaal\\nfranchise was attainable by law in five years, while\\nbefore the five years had expired the law was\\nchanged, and the privilege withdrawn by ex post\\nfacto act.\\nIn each of these wars one of the two nations", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0181.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "144 Problem of Asia\\nwhich speak the English tongue has taken a part,\\nand in each the one engaged has had outspoken\\nsympathy from the other, and from the other\\nalone. The fact has been less evident in the\\nTransvaal war, partly because the issue has been\\nless clear, or less clearly put, chiefly because many\\nforeign-born citizens of the United States still\\ncarry with them the prepossessions of their birth-\\nplace, rather than those which should arise from\\nperception of their country s interest.\\nNevertheless, the foundations stand sure. We\\nhave begun to know each other, in community\\nof interest and of traditions, in ideals of equality\\nand of law. As the realization of this spreads,\\nthe two states, in their various communities, will\\nmore and more closely draw together in the unity\\nof spirit, and all the surer that they eschew the\\nbondage of the letter of alliance. To complete\\nthe group, ethnically and spiritually, there is\\nneeded the accession of the other branches of the\\nTeutonic family, of which the German Empire is\\nthe great exponent. The race can afford to wait\\nfor this, and it would certainly be injudicious to\\nprecipitate its coming by a forcing process still,\\nit may be remarked that the period of incipiency,\\nin which the Anglo-American concord of tendency", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0182.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "The Problem, of Asia 145\\nstill remains, is the most favorable moment for the\\nentrance of a third party, akin to the other two.\\nIn conclusion a further remark may be offered.\\nBoth the signs of the times and obvious motives\\nfor action point to a probable permanent co-\\noperation between the communities which speak\\nthe English tongue, as well as to a possible, if\\nmuch less assured, coincidence of action with the\\nempire the language and people of which come\\nfrom the same stock, though differentiated by\\nprolonged separation. But upon the horizon of\\nthe future may be descried a further omen of\\nfavorable augury. Various causes have conspired\\nduring the passing century to depress the visible\\npower and influence of the Latin communities in\\nEurope, compared to those grouped as the Teu-\\ntonic. The unification of Italy is the one con-\\nspicuous exception. To this let there be added\\nthe strategic central position of the new state in\\nthe Mediterranean, which is to Europe far more\\neven than the Caribbean can be to America, and\\nalso the political considerations which have forced\\nher and France into the opposite scales of the\\npolitical balance.\\nThis attitude of Italy cannot but be fully con-\\nfirmed by the clear necessity, to Latin and to", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0183.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "146 The Problem of Asia\\nTeuton, to insure that predominance in the\\nLevant which is essential to both, because, as sea\\npowers, secure use of the Suez Canal is to them\\nvital. The significance of this is that, by the\\nforce of circumstances, Italy, the modern repre-\\nsentative of that which is most solid, politically,\\nin the original Latin strain, remains in the in-\\ntimacy of political attachment with the Teutonic\\nPowers. This assures us the continued associa-\\ntion of that Latin element which has contributed\\nso much to the composite result of our Christian\\ncivilization and it still more points on to the\\ntime when that element, the lineal inheritor of\\nRoman greatness, seeing more clearly where its\\ninterests lie, shall find in Italy the centre and the\\npattern which shall restore it, in renewed glory,\\nto the commonwealth of states that already owes\\nto it so much.\\nNote Since concluding these papers the writer has met\\nthese recent words of Sir W. W. Hunter (introduction to\\nHistory of British India), whose regretted death has just\\nremoved one of the most widely informed students of Asian\\nquestions I hail the advent of the United States in the East,\\nas a new power for good, not alone for the island races that\\ncome under their care, but also in that great settlement of\\nEuropean spheres of influence in Asia, which, if we could see\\naright, forms a world problem of our day.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0184.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "THE EFFECT OF ASIATIC CONDI-\\nTIONS UPON WORLD POLICIES\\nSINCE the latest of the preceding papers was\\npenned, the speculative forecast of the long\\nview in political matters, whether pertaining to\\nthe nation or to the world, characterized as it in-\\nevitably has to be by general and contingent\\nestimates, has perforce given place for the\\nmoment to that narrower but far more vivid\\nrealization of present transient conditions which\\nis imposed by an immediate necessity. A com-\\nmon risk of an immense calamity, and a common\\ninsult received, have forced upon the nations of\\nEuropean civilization the recognition of their\\nsolidarity of interest as towards Asia, in so far,\\nthat is, as she adheres to her immemorial con-\\nservatism, antagonistic to the standards of con-\\nduct which we have reached, through an age-long\\nprogress that is still in continuance.\\nIn the European family are evidently to be in-\\ncluded the people of the United States, as direct\\ninheritors therefrom by blood and by accepted", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0185.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "148 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\ntradition, and also, more significantly still, Japan,\\nif her claim be admitted, as I think it should be.\\nHer accession is indeed the more creditable to\\nher national genius, because she enters the group\\nin the more difficult and more self-determinative\\ncharacter of a convinced, and therefore willing,\\nconvert not ignoring, nor depreciating, her own\\nracial distinctiveness and historic past, but having\\nthe wisdom to see and to associate to herself the\\nadvantages in a system, not only of practice, but\\nof thought as well, foreign to- her previous habits.\\nIf nothing more than the mere adoption of ob-\\nvious material improvements constituted the\\ndevelopment of Japan, little but apprehension\\ncould be excited by the aptitudes she has dis-\\nplayed but in that she shows herself open as\\nwell to influence by the ideals, intellectual and\\nmoral, which by gradual evolution have pos-\\nsessed us, there is the better hope. It is well\\nworthy of consideration whether we may not see\\nin Japan the prepared soil, whence the grain of\\nmustard seed, having taken root, may spring up\\nand grow to the great tree, the view of which may\\nmove the continental communities of Asia to seek\\nthe same regenerating force for their own renewal.\\nIn this conversion, Japan is repeating the ex-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0186.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 149\\nperience of our Teutonic ancestors, as they came\\ninto contact with the Roman poHty and the\\nChristian Church with the advantage to her and\\nto us that it may reasonably be claimed for our\\npresent civilization that it is not now in the con-\\ndition of incipient political^ and advanced moral,\\ndecadence which Rome had then reached, and\\nwhich the Christian leaven, though it had begun\\nto permeate, had not been able sensibly to retard.\\nIt is well for us, and for Japan as an influence in\\nAsia, that the vitality and virility of the European\\nstates, including America, are not on the decrease,\\nbut on the increase, for good and not for evil.\\nHer own participation in the spirit of the institu-\\ntions of Christendom, as distinguished from its\\nexterior manifestations in material results, is yet\\ntoo recent to permit of maturity, of strength to\\nstand alone. She needs still the support and en-\\ncouragement given by the example of great visible\\nsuccess wrought by a quickening spirit, of which\\nthe secret lies beneath the surface, which can be\\nlearned and understood by effort, but can be ap-\\npropriated, made one s own, only by the disci-\\npline of long practice and the transforming\\npower of a new ideal. To such discipline and\\ninfluence Japan must be content to submit her-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0187.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "150 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nself not as to a yoke externally imposed, but\\nby her own convinced acquiescence. In do-\\ning this may she have the cordial good-will of\\nEuropean governments, looking to see in her,\\nnot a reproduction of themselves, which might\\nwell be but a deceitful imitation, but an\\nAsiatic people renewed from within by the power\\nto which we ourselves owe all that we have or,\\nbetter, are. What maketh one to differ from\\nanother. Of the continued stable progress of\\nEuropean states there are two certain indications\\none, in internal development, in individual\\ngrowth the other, in the tendency to externa]\\naction, the cessation of which in a healthy, mature\\nexistence national or personal is the precur-\\nsor of decay at hand, if not indeed the indication\\nof decay already begun.\\nIn Japan, and as yet in Japan alone, do we\\nfind the Asiatic welcoming European culture, in\\nwhich, if a tree may fairly be judged by its fruit,\\nis to be found the best prospect for the human\\nrace to realize the conditions most conducive to\\nits happiness, personal liberty, in due combina-\\ntion with restraints of law sufficient to, but not in\\nexcess of, the requirements of the general welfare.\\nIn this particular distinctiveness of characteristic.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0188.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 151\\nwhich has thus differentiated the receptivity of\\nthe Japanese from that of the continental Asiatic,\\nwe may perhaps see the influence of the insular\\nenvironment that has permitted and favored the\\nevolution of a strong national personality and\\nin the same condition we may not err in finding a\\npromise of power to preserve and to propagate,\\nby example and by influence, among those akin\\nto her, the new polity which she has adopted, and\\nby which she has profited, afibrding to them the\\nexample which she herself has found in the\\ndevelopment of European peoples. The secur-\\nity and isolation of an insular position contrib-\\nutes, as nothing else can, to the strength of that\\nquality in states which in men we call person-\\nality and in states as in men no other quality is\\nso influential. Nor should strength of person-\\nality be confounded with immobility, any more\\nthan firmness is identified with obstinacy. The\\npersistence of Asia in its social conservatism\\nhas been passive the strength of the rock it\\nmay be, but also that of vitality lost in petrifica-\\ntion. Rocks neither grow nor flower of them-\\nselves they change only by decay.\\nWhile the urgency of the present* conditions\\n1 Written in early August, 1900.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0189.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "152 Eff^(^i of Asiatic Conditions\\nin China, in which all the great European\\nnations, with ourselves and Japan, have an equal\\nconcern, is evident, and constrains the action of\\nthe Powers to a common end, if not too concerted\\naction, it is clear enough that only on the surface\\ncan there seem to be any departure, other than\\ntemporary, from the policy heretofore pursued by\\neach state. In substantia], determinative condi-\\ntions there has been no change. The outrage of\\nPekin and the tragedy of the Christian mission-\\naries in China are merely a startling illustration\\nof the possibilities which have all along been\\nknown to lurk under the surface the more cer-\\ntainly because, as a rule, the Oriental, whether\\nnation or individual, does not change. What has\\nhappened this year in China is just as likely,\\nunless fear exercise its constraining force, to recur\\nin the East now as it was a thousand years ago,\\nbecause the East does not progress. With our-\\nselves also like things, though on a smaller scale,\\nhappen now, revealing the brute that underlies us\\nall but they are far less frequent than five cen-\\nturies past, they are less condoned, they are not\\nthe work of governments, nor usually of the more\\nrational elements of our communities. They are\\nmost frequently the offspring of fears rooted in", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0190.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 153\\nignorance, also a condition not wholly unfamiliar\\nin the more backward parts of civilized Christian\\nstates but in none of these so universal in distri-\\nbution, nor in such keeping with the general\\ntone of society, from the government down, as in\\nthe ancient immobile civilizations of Asia.\\nDespite recent events in China, therefore, and\\nthe consequent momentary effect upon national\\naction, the momentary insistence of the short\\nview, there is no necessary change in the con-\\nditions which control national policies because\\nthese, for the reasons given in the preceding\\npapers, rest, primarily even, upon permanent\\nconditions, chiefly external to China, and com-\\nmensurate in extent with the compass of the\\nglobe from east to west. For the moment, a com-\\nmon wrong and a common danger have imposed\\nupon the honor of nations the obligation of\\nloyal, concerted action to avenge not to revenge\\nthe crime, and to exact surety for the future\\nagainst recurrence and for such surety nothing\\nequals condign punishment for the past, a\\nlively sense, through experience, of disfavors to\\ncome in case of repeated offence. While such\\naction is being taken, it becomes the nations as\\nit would honorable gentlemen or good citizens", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0191.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "154 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nto sink political differences in mutual considera-\\ntion, to cease from the competition of interests,\\nuntil the common object demanded by the exi-\\ngency of the moment has been accomplished by\\nthe enforcement of just retribution. But when\\nthis shall have been done, it will no longer be in-\\ncumbent upon them to shut their eyes to facts\\nand conditions which have not ceased to exist,\\nand have only been temporarily superseded by\\ncircumstances of more immediate concern. It\\nmay, however, be profitable not to dismiss the\\nrecent past from consideration, before first observ-\\ning that it has taught forcibly that mutual rivalry,\\nconflict of interest, though a part of the\\ntruth, is but part as towards Asia in its present\\nconditions, Europe has learned that it has a com-\\nmunity of interest, as well as a divergence. That\\ncommunity of interest may be defined as the\\nneed of bringing the Asian peoples within the\\ncompass of the family of Christian states not by\\nfetters and bands imposed from without, but by\\nregeneration promoted from within. This prin-\\nciple, in intellectual appreciation and in practical\\nobservance, is perfectly compatible with the dili-\\ngent safeguarding of individual national interest\\nby precautions of whatsoever kind. It looks and", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0192.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 155\\nworks towards a far distant future, in which it\\nsees, not a dream, but a goal, directive of a\\ngeneral course which meanwhile has to be contin-\\nually accommodated to the exigencies of the pass-\\ning day.\\nIt is not too much to claim that the govern-\\nment of the United States, representing the\\nnational sovereignty which by our system rests in\\nthe great community of individual citizens, has\\nnot only recognized, but has, in its recent defini-\\ntion of its attitude, formulated, in express terms,\\nboth of these complementary and superficially\\ncontradictory ideas the obligation of asserting\\nour own rights and protecting our own interests\\nagainst all comers, and, coincidently therewith,\\nof respecting, not only the government of China,\\nbut the national individuality. It is perfectly\\nconsistent with this view of duty to assist both\\ngovernment and people to renew and confirm\\nthe national life not by fussy interference on\\nour part, but by generous sympathy, supple-\\nmented only as far as necessary by active sup-\\nport. And this declaration of our government\\nis the more significant, because, while unquestion-\\nably elicited by recent occurrences, it expresses\\nas its main motive a purpose of non-interference", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0193.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "156 -^^(T/ of Asiatic Conditions\\nguaranteed by the general assent of our people\\nthrough a long period of past years, to which\\nit adds, by way of qualification, definitions of\\nnew duties and policies consequent upon novel\\nconditions recently arisen. Herein is found\\ncombined, in close approach at least to a due\\nproportion, both the idealism of rational states-\\nmanship, which looks over and beyond the\\npassing hour, joined to the practical capacity that\\nadapts itself readily to the exigencies of the mo-\\nment, modifying its action by them, as a seaman\\nputs the helm down and goes about when an\\nuncharted shoal appears ahead, resuming his\\ncourse when he again sees the water clear in the\\ndirection he means to follow.\\nBut while all this is true, and of most en-\\ncouraging omen for the future in that it witnesses\\nto the sagacity of our leadership in the past, it\\nbehooves us of the mass, who ultimately con-\\nfirm or reject and who therefore control the\\naction of those in authority, to look particularly to\\nthe coincidence and sequence of events during the\\nfew momentous years just gone by, in order that\\nby studying the signs of the times we may under-\\nstand at once the opportunities they extend and\\nthe consequent obligations they impose. This", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0194.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditio7is 157\\nwe owe, not to ourselves only, but to posterity,\\nto which we hold the relation of a trustee to\\na ward. Our leaders, when a call for action\\ncomes, cannot outstrip by very much the recog-\\nnized wishes of the people and if these are to\\nkeep abreast of conditions, they must be at pains,\\nnot merely to comprehend them as they are, but\\nto view them together, and to estimate tendency\\nby indications. There is a double process the\\nobservation of facts, and the rational deductions\\nfrom them, the data, and the practical conclu-\\nsion drawn, which fixes the broad general lines of\\nnational determination. These established, and\\nthe support of the nation thus settled, details\\nand daily management may be left to the govern-\\nment, strong before the world in the ascertained\\nbacking of its followers. The populace, which\\nall we in the mass are, is often accused of fickle-\\nness it is so, however, not from inherent in-\\nstability, but because, where ignorance exists,\\nconditions easily assume different appearances,\\nand moods waver with the fleeting impressions\\nthus produced. The remedy for this is solid\\nunderstanding, obtained by mental toil.\\nWhat are the facts, summarily outlined In\\nthe general progress of events it has come to", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0195.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "158 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\npass, in this closing year of a century, that the\\ncommerce of the world which implies as a\\nmain incident the utilization of the sea, the chief\\nmedium of commerce has become the prize\\nfor which all the great states of the world are in\\ncompetition. Some, possibly, do not expect ever\\nto be leaders but all either wish a greater share\\nthan they now have, or at the least to preserve\\ntheir present proportion. This includes not\\nonly the power to produce, mainly an internal\\nquestion, but the power to exchange freely\\nthroughout as large a section of the world s\\npopulation as can be reached. In this com-\\npetition the most of states are, as a matter of\\npolicy, unwilling to trust entirely to the opera-\\ntion of what we may call not quite accurately\\nnatural forces. The race as hitherto run, or\\nthe particular conditions of some more favored\\nnations, the United States, for example, so\\nrichly dowered with the raw material of wealth,\\nand with energy to use it, have resulted in\\ngiving some a start which puts the remainder at\\na disadvantage, if the issue is left to purely\\ncommercial causes to superiority in quantity or\\nquality of production, for instance, or to greater\\nability of management, either in intelligence or", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0196.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 159\\neconomy. Issues determined in this manner are\\nmore solid, but they require time longer than\\nimpatience wishes to concede hence, the desire\\nto hasten prosperity by extending territorial\\ncontrol and reserving to one s self commercial\\nadvantage in the regions mastered. This result\\nmay be reached either by direct annexation, or by\\npreponderant political influence but both these\\nmean, ultimately, physical force, exerted or poten-\\ntial, and this generates opposing force, averse\\nfrom allowing its own people to be deprived by\\nsuch means. Thus competition becomes con-\\nflict, the instrument of which is not commercial\\nemulation, but military power land or sea.\\nIn Europe and in America territorial occupancy\\nis now politically fixed and guaranteed, so far as\\nbroad lines are concerned. Any changes of boun-\\ndaries now possible, if effected, would produce no\\nmaterial result in universal commercial conditions.\\nAustralasia also is occupied, and the political\\ndependence of the islands of the sea has been\\ndetermined by arrangements between civilized\\nstates, more or less artificial, but internationally\\nfinal. The huge continent of Africa, with ex-\\nceptions small and inconsequential relatively to\\nits area, is in the same condition. Its commercial", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0197.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "i6o Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nrelations, therefore, will be prescribed by states\\nwhose established right to do so will not be con-\\ntested. Moreover, in the regard of commerce,\\nthe fewness and backwardness of its inhabitants\\nas yet make Africa a field of minor importance.\\nThere remains, therefore, Asia, the conditions\\nof which from the stand-point of world politics\\nhave been the subject under investigation in the\\npreceding papers. The results of the discussion\\nin them conducted are embodied in certain broad\\nconclusions which, for the sake of further con-\\nsideration, especially as touching the policy of\\nthe United States, should here be summarized.\\nAs a consequence of analysis, it was seen that the\\nportion of Asia which is as yet in a position of\\npolitical instability, and therefore open to serious\\nchange by foreign influences, lies mainly between\\n30\u00c2\u00b0 and 40\u00c2\u00b0 north latitude, a belt of six hundred\\nmiles width, within which are the greater part of\\nTurkey in Asia, of Persia, of Afghanistan, and\\nof the Chinese Empire, including much of the\\nvalley of the Yang-tse-Kiang, the great central\\nregion of China. North and south of the par-\\nallels mentioned, a decisively preponderant and\\nwell established political power rests in the hands,\\nrespectively, of Russia and of Great Britain the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0198.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions i6i\\none dependent mainly upon the land, the other\\nupon the sea, for the element of military force\\nupon which commercial control depends, when\\nexclusive possession is either sought or resisted.\\nIt was pointed out that the whole question of\\ncontrol of commerce with the far East by politi-\\ncal intrusion viewed apart from the question\\nof competition by purely commercial methods\\nreally turned, in the actual conditions of the\\ncivilized world, upon the competing forces of\\nland and of sea power. In the problem of Asia,\\nand within the limits of the continent, these\\nfactors of military strength find their local repre-\\nsentation in Russia and in Great Britain, two\\nstates which also possess in numbers, relatively\\nto the whole world, the greatest army and greatest\\nnavy, and the commercial methods of which\\npresent probably the sharpest contrasts between\\nfreedom of trade and despotic exclusion, either\\nby absolute prohibition or insurmountable\\npreference.\\nIt was further argued, however, that the terri-\\ntorial positions of the other great states, in-\\ncluding the United States, being exterior to\\nthe continent, threw them necessarily upon sea\\npower, so far as military force in the further\\nII", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0199.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "1 62 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nEast is concerned, ranging them therefore along-\\nside of Great Britain in general purpose, though\\nby no means consequently in formal alliance.\\nNot only their methods, but their objects, must\\nresemble hers for like her, owing to their geo-\\ngraphical remoteness and imperative interests in\\nother parts of the world, they are deficient in\\ndisposable means for readily projecting their mili-\\ntary power inland in China. This defect, though\\nobvious enough before, is now receiving convinc-\\ning illustration. It applies less forcibly to the\\nUnited States than to Europe, because by our\\nshortest route we are nearer because the ocean,\\nministering so powerfully to our defence, liber-\\nates us proportionately for external action be-\\ncause our numbers are so great and increasing\\nand because our Asian base in the Philippines,\\nbeing insular, and as distant from Europe as\\nChina itself, shares the defensive quality of our\\nown land. Nevertheless, the width of the\\nPacific, like the distance of South Africa from\\nGreat Britain, imposes upon such military efforts\\na difficulty which must ever disincline us to them,\\nwhen avoidable. Japan is near, but the limits of\\nher area place limits upon population and resultant\\nwealth, which must long restrict her power.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0200.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 163\\nFor the reasons given, the desire of all these\\nstates must be to effect their commercial aims, not\\nby show of military force, still less by violence,\\nbut by motives of advantage, mutual to them-\\nselves and China, of which commerce and its gains,\\nthough not the worthiest or most benignant result,\\nare the most obvious and convincing expression.\\nIn its train we may hope will follow those moral\\nand spiritual ideals, the appropriation of which\\noutweighs material well-being in the thought of\\nthose who believe that man does not live by bread\\nonly, and in which alone can surely be found the\\nhappy renewal of Asia. So far therefore as there\\nis, or is likely to be, contest for pre-eminence in\\nAsia, and specifically in China, the states con-\\ncerned except Russia, and possibly France,\\nbecause of her alliance with Russia are driven\\nperforce to throw themselves chiefly upon sea\\npower in the broadest sense of the word. On\\nthe one side sea power is represented by mari-\\ntime commerce, by which, and by which alone,\\nthey expect themselves to benefit, and by reci-\\nprocity of benefit to influence China. On the\\nother side it is by sea power in the military sense,\\nof navies, and of action on the seaboard and\\nnavigable waters, that they must maintain their", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0201.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "164 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nposition and rights in the trade of China in case\\nthe attempt is made, whether by gradual en-\\ncroachment or by instant violence, to exclude\\nthem in whole or in part, or to fetter their\\nfreedom of access. In view of the possibility\\nof such an attempt, the military and political\\nfeatures of the general situation have been\\ndiscussed in the previous papers, and, with a\\nsingle exception, need no repetition of emphasis\\nhere.\\nThat single exception is the stream and valley\\nof the Yang-tse-Kiang. Its importance is, in the\\neyes of the writer, sufficiently great, both in the\\ncommercial and political sense, to warrant some\\nfurther insistence. This need be at no great\\nlength, just because, when once stated, the con-\\nditions are too clear to require enlargement.\\nThe stream penetrates far inland, and through a\\ncontrolling part of its course is accessible directly\\nfrom the sea by very large vessels. The valley,\\nin its broadest comprehension, depends upon the\\nriver for Its readiest intercourse with the outside\\nworld, and it intervenes geographically between\\nnorthern and southern China, whether for distri-\\nbution of merchandize or for operations of war.\\nInfluence established there possesses, conse-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0202.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 165\\nquently, the advantages of the interior position,\\nand of open and constant communication, through\\nthe river, with its base the sea. Preponderant\\ncommercial importance and a climate compara-\\ntively moderate reinforce the advantages resultant\\nupon the other conditions, and the whole con-\\nstitutes this central, east and west, section of the\\nEmpire by far the most considerable of all in\\npolitical possibilities. For these reasons the\\nouter world of maritime states can most readily\\nand beneficently act upon China in this quarter,\\nand China herself can hence distribute the bene-\\nfits she receives more widely and evenly through-\\nout her area. Seed sown here will yield a\\nhundredfold, as to thirtyfold elsewhere.\\nThe expansion of commerce, and the benefit\\nresulting therefrom, are, however, only part of\\nthe objects that necessitate European pressure\\nupon the China of our day. The close approach\\nand contact of Eastern and Western civilization,\\nand the resultant mutual effects, are matters\\nwhich can no longer be disregarded, or postponed\\nby any arguments derived from the propriety of\\nnon-interference, or from the conventional rights\\nof a so-called independent state to regulate its\\nown internal affairs. They have ceased to be its", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0203.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "1 66 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nown in the sense of Chinese isolation. Contact\\nand interaction have begun the process can\\nneither be turned back nor arrested. All that\\ncan profitably be attempted is to direct, by so\\nshaping conditions that the higher elements of\\neither civilization can act as freely as do the\\nmotives of pecuniary profit which, though per-\\nfectly proper, are lower as well as stronger. As\\nthe nations have insisted that we shall be allowed\\nto sell and to buy, without pretending that the\\nChinese subject should be compelled to trade\\nwith us, leaving his personal action free to the\\nmotives of gain that operate with mankind so\\nthey will have to insist that currency be per-\\nmitted to our ideas, liberty to exchange thought\\nin Chinese territory with the individual Chinaman,\\nthough equally without any compulsion resting\\nupon him to listen even, much less to embrace.\\nThere is no tenable argument against the latter\\ndemand that does not equally hold against the\\nformer. On the contrary, if the advantage to us\\nis great of a China open to commerce, the danger\\nto us and to her is infinitely greater of a China\\nenriched and strengthened by the material ad-\\nvantages we have to offer, but uncontrolled in the\\nuse of them by any clear understanding, much", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0204.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 167\\nless any full acceptance, of the mental and moral\\nforces which have generated and in large measure\\ngovern our political and social action. Our fail-\\nure perfectly to realize in practice our principles in\\nsuch matters does not invalidate the merit of the\\nprinciple, nor negative the fact that we do derive\\nbenefit even from imperfect conformity. We\\nget less good, doubtless, than we should, and\\ncould, but for our dereliction from our standards;\\nbut the appeal can confidently be made to history\\nthat those faithful to the ideas have been the\\nleaven that has worked effectually so far, even\\nthough much yet remains for it to accomplish.\\nIt would appear then that the principal objects\\nto be kept in view in dealing with the Chinese\\nquestion, are, i. Prevention of preponderant\\npolitical control by any one external state, or\\ngroup of states and, 2. Insistence upon the\\nopen door, in a broader sense than that in which\\nthe phrase is commonly used that is, the door\\nshould be open not only for commerce, but also\\nfor the entrance of European thought and its\\nteachers in its various branches, when they seek\\nadmission voluntarily, and not as agents of a for-\\neign government. Not only is the influence of\\nthe thinker superior in true value to the mer^", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0205.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "1 68 Effect of Asiatic Co7iditions\\ngain of commerce, but also there is actual dan-\\nger to the European family of nations, in case\\nChina should develop an organized strength\\nwhence has been excluded the corrective and\\nelevating element of the higher ideals, which in\\nEurope have made good their controlling influ-\\nence over mere physical might. Rationally, from\\nthis point of view, there is much that is absurd\\nin the outcry raised against missionary effort, as\\na thing incompatible with peaceful development\\nand progress. Christianity and Christian teach-\\ning are just as really factors in the mental and\\nmoral equipment of European civihzation as any\\nof the philosophical or scientific processes that\\nhave gone to build up the general result. Opin-\\nions differ as to the character and degree of the\\nInfluence of Christianity, in estimates qualitative\\nand quantitative, but the fact of influence can-\\nnot be denied. From the purely political stand-\\npoint Christian thought and teaching have just\\nthe same right no less, if no more to admis-\\nsion into China as any other form of European\\nactivity, commercial or intellectual. Nor is the\\nfact of offence taken by classes of Chinamen a\\nvalid argument for exclusion. The building of a\\nrailroad is not a distinctively Christian act, but it", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0206.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Cojtditions 169\\noffends large numbers of Chinese, who are never-\\ntheless compelled to acquiesce if their govern-\\nment consent whereas the consent of the\\nChinese government to missionary effort will\\ncompel no Chinaman to listen to a Christian\\nteacher. Every step forward in the march that\\nhas opened China to trade has been gained by\\npressure; the most important have been the re-\\nsult of actual war. Commerce has won its way\\nby violence, actual or feared thought, both\\nsecular and Christian, asks only freedom of\\nspeech.\\nConceding the critical importance of the present\\nmoment in the history of the world, admitting\\nthat movements intellectual and political, long in\\nprogress in China, are now reaching a turning\\npoint determinative of great future issues, it is\\nessential to the United States that her individual\\ncitizens should seriously consider, and within\\nthemselves settle, the part the country ought to\\nplay, and the preparation necessary to that part.\\nThere is the preparation of purpose, and there is\\nthe preparation of power. Preparation of purpose\\nis a mental and moral process, resulting in convic-\\ntion as to right and wrong, followed by the con-\\nscious adoption of a course of action, the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0207.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "170 Effect of Asiatic Conditio7is\\nformation of a policy, general in outline but\\ndefinite in object. Preparation of power is a\\nmaterial act, and consists of two correlative\\nelements, viz. i. Provision of force, to the\\nextent needed and, 1. Curtailment of obligation,\\nof responsibility, actual or contingent, pres-\\nent or promissory, in direction and in amount,\\nbeyond that which is demanded by the clear\\nnecessities of the political conditions. In short,\\neconomy of exertion, because it husbands strength,\\nis the complement of the process of development\\nwhich creates or augments strength.\\nOur policy and our power, therefore, are the\\ntwo leading lines upon which consideration and\\nreflection must concentrate their energy. As\\ntowards the immense world question, commensu-\\nrate only with international relations in their\\nwidest sense, of which China is the central issue,\\nthe general world conditions upon which policies\\nshould turn have been the subject of study in the\\npreceding papers. The elements of the problem,\\nof the political strategy, as seen by the\\nauthor, have in them been indicated. As towards\\nChina herself, and, in particular, the recent\\nastounding events have drawn from our govern-\\nment a declaration, of purpose and of principles,", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0208.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Co7iditions 171\\nwhich may fairly be said to represent a policy\\nrealized in our past action, and to affirm it for the\\npresent and future. Our people have not now\\nto evolve a policy, but to decide whether that of\\nthe past justifies itself to their conscience, to their\\nsense of right and wrong, and embodies their\\npurpose of the present. This still existent\\npolicy may, I apprehend, fairly be stated to be the\\ndetermination to have equal commercial privileges,\\nand withal to respect to the utmost the integrity\\nof Chinese territory, and the individuality of the\\nChinese character in shaping its own govern-\\nment and polity. We meddle not with their\\nnational affairs until they become internationally\\nunendurable.\\nBut in the very enunciation of this policy we\\nare confronted by the fact that it is diverse from\\nthat of some other states, as shown by their acts\\nin special instances, and plausibly to be inferred\\nfrom their general course and obvious tendency.\\nSuch divergence is not always necessarily a cause\\nfor alarm, but it is for watchfulness and it must\\nbe taken into account, as an element influential\\nupon our own policy, not perhaps in general con-\\nception or as towards China, but in the matter of\\ndeciding upon the preparation we need, and the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0209.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "172 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nfreehandedness to be maintained in external rela-\\ntions of lesser importance. Needless external\\npreoccupations might greatly embarrass us, in case\\ndivergence from our policy should develop into\\nopposition to our interests, or to those of civili-\\nzation in general.\\nBriefly, we cannot be sure of the commercial\\nadvantages known as the open door, unless we\\nare prepared to do our share in holding it open.\\nWe cannot count upon respect for the territory\\nof China, unless we are ready to throw, not only\\nour moral influence, but, if necessity arise, our\\nphysical weight into the conflict to resist an ex-\\npropriation, the result of which might be to\\nexclude our commerce and neutralize our influ-\\nence. Our influence we believe, and have a\\nright to believe, is for good it is the influence\\nof a nation which respects the right of peoples to\\nshape their own destinies, pushing even to exag-\\ngeration its belief in their ability to do so. But it\\nis vain to hope for national influence in China,\\nunless representative Chinese recognize not\\nonly integrity of our purpose towards themselves,\\nbut our evident abihty and intention to support\\nthem against demands which overpass reasonable\\nlimits, having regard not to our own immediate", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0210.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 173\\ninterests only, but to the general interest of the\\nworld, from which we cannot dissociate ourselves\\nin this matter without ultimate national injury.\\nSuch limits may not be capable of precise defini-\\ntion, before an occasion arises but that a general\\nprinciple, satisfactory as a guide in our own\\ngeneral action, and for general understanding by\\nothers, can be affirmed, is evidenced by the clear\\ntenor of the recent declaration of our government\\ncommunicated to foreign capitals.\\nTo those who are able to receive it, and I\\nbelieve there are many, I would say that it is\\nimpossible for our government which is our\\npeople to allow the question of China, in the\\nstage which it has now reached, to drift at the\\nsport of circumstances. That China should\\ndevelop normally from within, by willing accep-\\ntance and gradual appropriation of sounder politi-\\ncal views and higher intellectual ideals, is right.\\nNations cannot be born, or reborn, in a day nor\\ncan? the raw material of individual men, per-\\nsonally excellent, be manufactured into a living\\nnational organism by mere external pressure.\\nGrowth processes are from within and presume\\nantecedent vitality, inherent or imparted. But\\nvigor for self-renewal, or to receive and assimilate", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0211.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "1 74 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nnutriment from without, unforced or unaided,\\ndoes not constitute the condition of China to-day,\\nas it did constitute, approximately at least, that\\nof Japan a half-century ago though even Japan\\nhas owed to external pressure the opportunity of\\nwhich she has richly availed herself, but which\\nshe certainly did not seek of her own initiative.\\nChina not only has repelled, as Japan once did,\\nbut after long years of contact and opportunity\\nshe continues to repel the admission of the leaven\\nwhich alone can permeate and vivify her dead-\\nness. The reactionary movement in progress at\\nthe present moment^ aims at severing communi-\\ncation with the only possible source of real life.\\nIt is permissible, nay, incumbent, to resist it to\\ninsist. In the general interest, by force if need be,\\nthat China remain open to action by European\\nand American processes of life and thought. She\\nmay not cannot be forced to drink, but she\\nmust at least allow the water to be brought\\nto her people s doors. If the United States\\nstands wholly aside, this work will be done\\nall the same, lacking only our Individual con-\\ntribution to it. Can we without responsibility to\\n1 Written August lo, 1900. The relief force reached Pekin\\nAugust 15.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0212.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 175\\nGod and man decline our aid, which our respect\\nfor nationality and personality carried at times\\nto an excess even absurd will render especially\\ndisinterested, as well as especially helpful through\\nthe confidence it commands?\\nThe part offered to us is great, the urgency is\\nimmediate, and the preparation made for us,\\nrather than by us, in the unwilling acquisition of\\nthe Philippines, is so obvious as to embolden\\neven the least presumptuous to see in it the\\nhand of Providence. Our highest authority,\\nwhile rebuking rash judgment, rebukes also with\\nat least equal severity the failure to read the\\nsigns of the times. This, therefore, we must\\nseek to do. Our decision is momentous, in view\\nof the possibilities involved in acceptance or in\\nrefusal, and of the wide range of interests and\\nduties to be considered and co-ordinated in count-\\ning the cost of either course. Decision is the\\npreparation of purpose the cost embraces both\\nthe preparation of power and all that is involved\\nin its future exertion, as far as we can foresee.\\nAnd in order to the due running of the race before\\nus, to the full exhibition of strength at decisive\\npoints, it is necessary to lay aside every unneces-\\nsary weight, to put away from ourselves, even at", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0213.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "176 Effect of Asiatic Conditio7is\\nsome sacrifice, cherished prepossessions, long-\\nstanding prejudices, which, if retained, would\\nfutilely disseminate our force. What One has\\ncalled the single eye, and Napoleon phrased as\\nexclusiveness of purpose, is a necessary condition\\nof effective action.\\nAssuming our resolution to maintain our com-\\nmercial rights and to exert influence in China, by\\nencouraging and supporting native action, though\\nnot by any assumption of authority or acquisition\\nof territory, the valley of the Yang-tse is clearly\\nindicated as the central scene of our general in-\\nterest, however we may be momentarily diverted,\\nas by the recent occurrences in Pekin, to action\\ndifferent in character and direction from our fixed\\nusual policy. The open door, both for com-\\nmerce and for intellectual interaction, should be\\nour aim everywhere in China but it can most\\neasily be compassed in this middle region, and\\nthere find the surest foundation for impression\\nupon other parts, because there sea power can\\nmost solidly establish itself. The very fact that\\nsea-going steamers can go as far as Hankow, six\\nhundred miles from the sea, and thence take car-\\ngoes, without shifting bulk, to any great port of\\nthe world, shows without further insistence that", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0214.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 177\\nthis valley is the decisive field where commerce,\\nthe energizer of material civilization, can work to\\ngreatest advantage, and can most certainly receive\\nthe support of the military arm of sea power,\\nwhich, where force enters into world politics, is\\nthe main reliance of the Teutonic peoples. It\\nmust also for some time to come be the main\\nreliance of the Chinese people in resistance to\\nforeign domination, as distinguished from legiti-\\nmate foreign influence.\\nOur attention in the farther East thus local-\\nized, concentrated, for the very reason that effort\\nseeking to cover a given area works more advan-\\ntageously from a centre than by dispersion at\\npoints of a circumference, we shall find ourselves\\none of several powers rivals in interest, compet-\\nitors, with the danger, incident to competition,\\nof degenerating into antagonism. The fact does\\nnot call upon us to circumscribe our independ-\\nence of action by formal alliance with one, or\\ndeclared opposition to another; but it does\\ndemand that we rid our minds of the caricature\\nof independence, which receives frequent expres-\\nsion in words, probably because it reflects a con-\\ndition of our popular consciousness. Each man\\nand each state is independent just so far as there", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0215.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "178 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nis strength to go alone, and no farther. When\\nthis limit is reached, if farther steps must be\\nmade, co-operation must be accepted. In that\\ncase the only certain foundation for harmony of\\naction and continuance of relations is to be\\nfound in common interests and common habits\\nof thought. Where the latter are traditional,\\nstriking their roots deep in the past, community\\nof ideas and identity of action in matters of right\\nand wrong become most probable. Of all the\\nnations we shall meet in the East, Great Britain\\nis the one with which we have by far the most\\nin common in the nature not in the identity\\nof our interests there, and in our standards of\\nlaw and justice. Co-operation, therefore, is indi-\\ncated but it is a mistake to assume that co-oper-\\nation, which act by act is voluntary, necessitates\\nor implies abnegation of that moral responsibility,\\ninvolved in freedom of choice at each moment, in\\nthe retention and observance of which alone is\\nreal independence of action preserved, and which\\na treaty of alliance, or of arbitration. If un-\\nconditioned may impair culpably, because it\\npledges the unknown future. Hereabouts lies\\nthe fallacy of much popular oratory on more\\nthan one subject.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0216.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 179\\nTo assure the open door in its fullest sense,\\nrequires power in evidence, not merely localized in\\nChina itself, but asserted over the maritime lines\\nof communication especially over the shortest.\\nThis inevitable extension of effort shows at once\\nthe necessity of co-operation among states of\\ndivision of labor, mutually, if tacitly, recognized.\\nIn the antagonism of policy between land and\\nsea power which now exists, no one nation of\\nthose dependent upon the latter is competent to\\ndevelop and sustain the whole gigantic scheme.\\nNarrowed down even to the decisive points,\\nwhich all control must be in politics as in war, the\\ntask overpasses the strength of any one state.\\nIn final analysis the great lines of communica-\\ntion to the farther East are two, from Europe\\nand from America. The former is by way of\\nSuez, the latter by the Pacific but the present\\ndistribution of our national wealth, and its com-\\nmunications with our seaboard, require, and\\ndoubtless will insure, the opening of access for\\nour Atlantic slope by way of the Central Ameri-\\ncan Isthmus. In that case the American line of\\ncommunications to China may be correctly said\\nto be by Nicaragua, or Panama, as that\\nof Europe is by way of Suez and as the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0217.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "i8o Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nMediterranean, Egypt, Asia Minor, the Red\\nSea, and Aden, designate the points decisive of\\ncontrol by the one route, so do the Caribbean\\nSea and the continental surroundings of the\\nfuture canal, with Hawaii and the Philippines, fix\\nthose of the other, the importance of which to\\nourselves make it our especial interest.\\nThat it should be our special interest, however,\\nis not all. It is also our charge, from the stand-\\npoint of international relations, as well as from\\nthat of our duty to the present and future of our\\nown country. I do not mean here to affirm an\\nobligation of benevolence to other nations, strong\\nenough to take care of themselves. I mean, on\\nthe contrary, that because of great common inter-\\nests with Great Britain especially, though not\\nsolely in the Pacific commerce of the future,\\nand in the nature of the development of China,\\nwe need to receive and to give support, and should\\nbe ashamed to receive more than we give, in pro-\\nportion to our means and opportunities. Grad-\\nually, as we have grown in strength, we have\\nmade good our claims to preponderant consider-\\nation in the Caribbean and at the Isthmus; we\\nhave obtained acquiescence where we once met\\nopposition from Great Britain herself. Is this", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0218.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions i8i\\na mere selfish, and in so far barren, triumph of\\nnational diplomacy, or an opportunity involving\\nfurther duty Certainly the latter not because\\nBritish welfare, regarded alone, is a concern for\\nour action, but because community of interests,\\nand duty to the world s future, centring about\\nChina, impose mutual support. This cannot be\\nassured in matters pertaining to the East merely\\nby accord localized there. It requires also such\\na grip upon our special great line of communica-\\ntions thither, from both our coasts, as shall give\\nassurance that the force of our distant action can-\\nnot be impaired by any weakening of a link\\nessential to its continuity.\\nFrom the conditions, we must be in effective\\nnaval force in the Pacific. We must similarly be\\nin effective force on the Atlantic not for the\\ndefence of our coasts primarily, or immediately,\\nas is commonly thought, for in warfare, how-\\never much in defence of right, the navy is not\\nimmediately an instrument of defence but of\\noffence, but because the virtual predominance\\nof our naval power in the Caribbean is essential\\nto preserve the use of the Isthmian Canal to our\\ncommerce, and to give our navy quick access to\\nthe Pacific.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0219.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "1 82 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nWe are confronted, in short, with the necessity\\nof providing a weight that shall be decisive or\\nat least shall contribute largely to decisiveness\\nin both the Pacific and the Caribbean. It is\\nobvious that, to be decisive, weight is not always\\nnecessarily a great weight, but depends upon the\\nalready existing relative conditions of the oppos-\\ning scales. The conditions now, however, are not\\nsuch that an inconsiderable naval force on our\\npart can secure for us the consideration we natu-\\nrally think due us in the councils of the world,\\nnor discharge the obligations incumbent upon us\\nas a member of the family of states, whose inter-\\nests, often conflicting, must be adjusted on a\\nbasis of righteousness, and so maintained by\\ndemonstration of power. Our calculations must\\nalso take into account the fact that, when the\\ncanal is in operation, our Pacific and Atlantic\\nfleets can communicate for mutual support only\\nby an artificial route, too easily interrupted.\\nThis loses us in great measure the military ad-\\nvantage of an interior line, which a natural strait\\nwould give the advantage by which a force cen-\\ntrally situated operates eff ectually in two direc-\\ntions, reinforcing the situation in the one or the\\nother, as needed. Thus a navy of consideration", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0220.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditio7zs 183\\nat Malta can act towards Gibraltar or Suez the\\nway is open as far as the water is concerned, the\\nquestion therefore is one of force only but at\\nSuez the power to act towards both India and\\nthe Mediterranean depends not upon military\\nforce alone, but upon the canal being open.\\nSuez, however, being on the natural level\\nthroughout, is much less easily susceptible of\\nprolonged interruption than a canal dependent\\nupon locks, as any Central American canal\\nmust be.\\nAs, therefore, for the exertion of our commer-\\ncial and moral influence in the East it is of press-\\ning importance to bring our Atlantic slope into\\nclose communication by a canal at the Isthmus,\\nwhich will serve our material interests, more-\\nover, in other ways, so it is of equal impor-\\ntance that we assure the use of the canal, once\\nthere, by the solidity of our naval position in the\\nCaribbean. But, as this is a military question,\\nlet there here be interposed the caution, than\\nwhich none is more clearly written on the pages\\nof military history, that substantial security does\\nnot mean absolute security. There is no such\\nthing in war as absolute certainty; risk cannot be\\neliminated wholly from any military situation.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0221.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "184 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nwhether of passive defence or of offensive action.\\nI suppose it is much the same in all callings\\nbut for war certainly a reasonable preponderance\\nof chances in one s favor is all that can be\\nassured. Napoleon has asserted this in almost\\nidentical words in one of his pithy phrases.\\nMay we then dismiss the effort for probable\\nsecurity because we cannot have absolute Do\\nmen do so in any circumstances Certainly not\\nsuccessful men. Let us then consider what con-\\nditions, if realized, would give the best prospect\\nof preserving to our use the Isthmian Canal.\\nThe first, without which all others are of no avail,\\nis our own strength, demonstrated by a fleet\\navailable for immediate action there, of power\\ngreat enough not to overcome any naval force\\nthat might conceivably be brought against us, for\\nthat would be beyond our means, but to make\\nit evidently inexpedient, politically, for the great-\\nest navy to contest our predominance in the\\nCaribbean. This insures us, by a single military\\nprovision, a primacy of consideration which will\\nresult in the prevalence of our policy and, in\\ndirect consequence of our policy so maintained,\\nin the security of the canal which, it should be\\nrepeated; is an essential element of our influence", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0222.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 185\\nin the Pacific and in China. The provision of\\nthe fleet, however, is the first step, without which\\nthe others cannot follow.\\nNow the only Power that in the past has been\\nseriously disposed to contest this preponderance\\nhas been Great Britain. The West Indies and\\nSouth America have till very lately been with\\nher controlling objects of commercial, and there-\\nfore of political, consideration. This attitude\\nhas been largely traditional from the eighteenth\\ncentury, when the sugar of the one was a chief\\nitem of her trade, and the once Spanish colonies\\nof the other presented a coveted field for exploi-\\ntation, estimated then much as China is now.\\nForty or fifty years ago, therefore, we were\\ndirectly antagonized in the Caribbean by the\\nnation having the strongest navy in the world,\\nand convinced that our policy in brief the\\nMonroe Doctrine was irreconcileable with her\\ninterests. The events of the last half century\\nhave changed this, and, what is more important.\\nGreat Britain, though within but a very few\\nyears, now recognizes the change. The West\\nIndies, which in the opening years of this expiring\\ncentury entertained one-fourth of British com-\\nmerce, are become a factor relatively insignifi-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0223.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "1 86 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\ncant and while South America has not wholly\\ndisappointed the hopes of former days, its devel-\\nopment has not kept pace with the interests that\\nhave grown up elsewhere.\\nWe find, therefore, on the part of the greatest\\nof naval states, a politic disposition to acquiesce\\nin our naval predominance in the Caribbean\\nand this disposition is bound to increase, because\\nit rests securely upon two facts that will remain\\npermanent for a time far beyond the horizon\\nof this generation. These facts are, first, that\\nGreat Britain s interests elsewhere are so great\\nthat she must unload herself of responsibility for\\nthe Caribbean, and, second, that some of the\\nprincipal among those major interests of hers are\\nso evidently coincident in character with ours,\\nthat we cannot but follow, though perfectly in-\\ndependently, the same general line of policy, and\\nin so doing support her. It is, therefore, her\\ninterest that we remain strong, and since an\\nessential element of our strength is in the Carib-\\nbean, we may prudently reckon upon the moral\\nsupport of Great Britain in any political clash\\nwith other nations there, unless we take a stand\\nmorally indefensible.\\nThere is no reason seriously to doubt that just", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0224.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 187\\nsuch support was given during the late war with\\nSpain. On the contrary, the writer has been\\nassured, by an authority in which he entirely\\ntrusts, that to a proposition made to Great Brit-\\nain, to enter into a combination to constrain the\\nuse of our power, as Japan was five years ago\\nconstrained by the joint action of Russia, France,\\nand Germany, the reply was not only a passive\\nrefusal to enter into such combination, but an\\nassurance of active resistance to it, if attempted.\\nIf actions speak louder than words, such a fact\\noutweighs paragraphs of demonstration of future\\nprobabilities, based though this be upon the clear-\\nest arguments from existing conditions. Call such\\nan attitude friendship, or policy, as you will,\\nthe name is immaterial the fact is the essential\\nthing and will endure, because it rests upon solid\\ninterests. Not every saying of Washington is as\\ntrue now as it was when uttered, and some have\\nbeen misapplied but it is just as true now as\\never, that it is vain to expect governments to act\\ncontinuously on any other ground than national\\ninterest. They have no right to do so, being\\nagents and not principals.\\nMoral support, expressed in popular bias, and\\nresting upon community of interest and of politi-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0225.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "1 88 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\ncal standards, is a weighty political factor. It\\ncarries with it not only the force of opinion, but\\nuncertainty on the part of an antagonist as to\\nwhether moral support may not become material\\nwhether the cold friend may not at short notice\\nbecome the hot ally. Great Britain no longer\\nhas occasion to feel antagonism towards us in the\\nCaribbean, and any traditional sentiment of that\\nsort which may remain in her older men must\\ndisappear from popular consciousness, because\\ncontradicted by the facts. Antagonism, resting\\nonce on real opposition of interest, is being dis-\\nplaced by realization of the community of interest\\nknown as the open door, and of community in\\npolitical principles, the outgrowth of traditions\\nwhich, having been not stagnant but progressive,\\nhave now by evolution reached the stage of wil-\\nling the integrity of China and its free develop-\\nment from within. From this, it is but a short\\nstep to a national support of China against for-\\neign domination, or annexation, or partition, a\\npolicy identical in principle with the Monroe\\nDoctrine but to take this, either state needs a\\nreasonable security of the other s co-operation.\\nAs far as community of interest and of standard\\ngoes, the assurance is there, nor is the evidence", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0226.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 189\\nof national feeling absent but there is wanting\\non our part the assurance of the national purpose,\\nnot by compact, but by action, of which\\naction a first instalment is the provision of force.\\nWe cannot expect the nations, friendly or the\\nreverse, to take our purpose seriously, unless\\nthey see us firm in provision as well as in speech.\\nIt may be objected, in Great Britain as well as\\nhere, that if there be among some of our citizens\\na clear appreciation of the advantage of common,\\nthough mutually independent, action, there is in\\nvery many of us a loudly expressed bitterness of\\nfeeling towards her and that this will impede,\\nif not prevent, mutual support in external matters\\nof common interest. It is possible to admit the\\nfact of the bitterness expressed, without accepting\\nthe conclusion. Sentiment is mighty, mightier\\nat moments than interest but where interest\\nrests on real and permanent conditions, and senti-\\nment on impressions which are transient and\\nunreal, there can be no doubt which will prevail\\nwith the victory ever won by truth. The interest\\nis real. The open door expresses a policy as\\nimportant to us as to Great Britain more im-\\nportant to us than to her, if our export trade take\\non the superior proportions anticipated by some", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0227.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "190 Eff^ ^i of Asiatic Conditio7ts\\nserious thinkers. The standards also really exist.\\nWe, like her, and she, like us, at the present time\\nshrink from partition and annexation as evils\\nevil in principle, and evil in the consequent\\nburden entailed. Despite current prejudice dili-\\ngently fostered, it will at no distant day be recog-\\nnized also by our people that the annexation of\\nthe Boer republics was a measure forced upon\\nGreat Britain, as the annexation of the Philip-\\npines has been upon ourselves, and as was the\\nannexation, against its will, a generation ago, of the\\nSouthern Confederacy regardless of the fact that\\nit then possessed all the elements of a de facto\\ngovernment, resting upon the willing allegiance of\\nthe great majority of the inhabitants. The senti-\\nment in the United States which to-day withstands\\nmovement in the direction of our common interests\\nis partly traditional, like that which survives in\\nGreat Britain concerning the Caribbean partly,\\nas is notorious, it is the transference to United\\nStates politics of foreign prepossessions by citizens\\nforeign-born, in their own persons or in those of\\ntheir parents. Such sentiment is transient for\\nit is unreal in that it does not correspond to the\\nfacts of the United States interests. A sagacious\\nstatesman will see in this the assurance of the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0228.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Condi tio7zs 191\\nultimate trend of sentiment. But such an one\\nwill also reckon, with very different certitude,\\nupon our national backwardness to provide the\\norganized force, especially the naval, with-\\nout which the attempted expression of national\\nwill, on emergency, becomes the clumsy and\\nabortive gestures of a flabby and untrained giant.\\nTo pronounce definitely upon the amount of\\nsuch force is either to utter a dogmatic personal\\nopinion, or to enter upon a prolonged technical\\ndiscussion unsuitable to this paper and occasion.\\nTo indicate its general character and its points of\\napplication is another matter for quality, as\\ndistinct from quantity, rests upon general con-\\nsiderations, which, being at once few and obvious,\\nmay be readily summarized and, whether accepted\\nor rejected, readily understood.\\nThe Atlantic, north of the equator, is the ocean\\nof that old community of European civilization\\nupon which, from our point of view, the welfare\\nof humanity rests. Interior to this community\\nthe boundaries of the great states are, in leading\\noutline, so fixed and recognized that, whatever\\nclashes may arise over external interests, there\\nis no probability of large changes of territorial pos-\\nsession and consequent local political control.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0229.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "192 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nThe Pacific is different it is a new-comer into\\nbroad world interests. As the Atlantic some four\\ncenturies ago, with the widening outlook that fol-\\nlowed the discovery of America and of the Cape\\nof Good Hope, succeeded to the central position\\nonce held by the Mediterranean, so now the last\\nhalf century it is scarcely more has received\\nin the course of events its discovery, its revela-\\ntion, of conditions which existed indeed, as did\\nAmerica before Columbus, but had been as yet\\nunknown, because unappreciated. And upon the\\ndiscovery has followed the apprehension of what\\nis to happen when the barriers are breaking down\\nbetween two civilizations which stand upon such\\ndifferent levels politically, economically, so-\\ncially, and in standards moral and intellectual\\nas do the West and the East.\\nIn estimating the issue, it is difficult to ex-\\naggerate the importance, as a factor, of that par-\\nticular type of political freedom, of aptitude for\\nself-government, and of tenacious adherence to\\nrecognized law by which alone freedom and\\nself-government consist with orderly progress\\nthat has been embodied in the race loosely called\\nAnglo-Saxon. This type has proved its vitality\\nand its worth by continuous existence and con-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0230.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 193\\nsistent development, from the home of its origin,\\non the continental shores of the North Sea,\\nthroughout its abode in Great Britain, and in its\\nsubsequent transplantation to the over-sea coun-\\ntries which have now become the United States\\nand the self-governing colonies of the British\\nEmpire. These traditions, remaining ever the\\nsame in general idea, have been translated into\\nparticular action by the hundred successive genera-\\ntions that have applied them to their own con-\\nditions, as these varied from age to age. Thus\\nprogressing, they have in our day reached a\\ndevelopment, in principles and methods, the due\\ninfluence of which upon the future, by consistent\\npolitical support, is the charge ahke of Great\\nBritain and the United States. For, play with\\nwords and facts as we may, assert the composite\\ncharacter of the population of the United States,\\nwhich none will deny, the truth remains\\nthat the strength of our people as of Great\\nBritain, herself a congeries of races, rests in\\nthe common political and legal tradition, pre-\\nserved and intensified under conditions of separa-\\ntion nothing less than insular, which both have\\ninherited by unbroken transmission from the\\nold home, where the forefathers of the one race\\n13", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0231.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "194 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\ndwelt when history first knew them. This type,\\nby its virile power of adaptation, has not only\\npredominated over, but absorbed and assimilated,\\nall other social and racial types with which it has\\nbeen brought into political association. Many\\nmagicians stood before Pharaoh, but Aaron s rod\\nswallowed all the others.\\nTo the full expression of this political force,\\ngreat alike in its nobility and in its vitality, the\\nUnited States owes to mankind her due contribu-\\ntion for in it is one of the greatest hopes in\\nour own national opinion the very greatest hope\\nof humanity. A great door and an effectual\\nis here open to us, and it is needless to say that\\nthere are many adversaries. And if to such con-\\ntribution is essential the dismissal of old pre-\\npossessions, the recognition of facts hitherto not\\nunderstood, resulting in a co-operation which\\nshall not sacrifice independence of conscience by\\npledges, whether of alliance or of arbitration,\\nthis price should be cheerfully paid as should\\nbe also that of any other exertion within our\\nreasonable power to make.\\nThe sphere for our external exertion in this\\ncause is clearly indicated as the Pacific and the\\nEast, incident to which is predominance in the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0232.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 195\\nCaribbean by a navy of such size that, with Great\\nBritain eliminated as a probable opponent,\\nbecause of the radical changes in world conditions\\nand of the coincidence of our interests with hers\\nin the great questions of the near future, and\\nwith her support indicated to the extent of the\\ninterests common to her and to us, we need have\\nno substantial reason to apprehend interference\\nthere. The consideration here advanced bears so\\nheavily upon the national advantage, in the\\nmatter not only of security but of expense in\\nReeded preparation, if Great Britain should be\\nconsidered as a probable enemy instead of a\\nprobable ally, that it becomes a matter of\\npatriotic duty to every citizen to consider whether\\nhe does well to cherish old animosities to reflect\\nwhether the period in which, historically, these\\nprejudices have their rise is not now as wholly\\npast as the voyage of Columbus; or whether,\\nperchance, they are simply transplanted to our\\nsoil from Europe by a process in that case\\nmost misnamed of naturalization. It is no\\ntrue naturalization which grafts upon our politics\\nsentiments drawn from abroad, and foreign to\\nour interests or duties.\\nRelations between Great Britain and ourselves", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0233.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "196 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nthat rested upon mutual understanding of com-\\nmon interests and common traditions would far\\nexceed in potential force any formal alliance,\\nwhich for many reasons would be greatly to be\\ndeprecated. The perception of community of\\ninterest involves also inevitably the recognition of\\nopposition, not only in form, but in spirit, inher-\\nent in other political systems with which in Asia\\nwe shall be brought into contact, possibly into\\ncollision. The two considerations coincidence\\nof interest on the one side, and opposition of\\npolitical methods on the other would each have\\na just weight in determining the measure of our\\nnaval preparation, and would modify seriously, in\\nthe writer s apprehension, the application of the\\nprinciple by him stated only four years ago, by\\nwhich the amount of our naval force should be\\ndetermined.-^ The principle is not affected. If\\ncorrect then, as I believe, it is correct now but\\nthere is in my mind no question that national\\npolicies have since then so developed, and inter-\\nnational relations consequently so changed, that\\napplication to the new conditions will necessarily\\ngive a new result. We are forced now, in con-\\nsidering the national attitude proper to be as-\\nInterest of American Sea Power, pp. 1 79-1 81.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0234.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 197\\nsumed, to dismiss from mind the nearer past,\\nbecause, from its very closeness, it confuses the\\nsense of proportion, and to throw ourselves\\nback upon the remote past, upon the origins\\nof institutions, and upon the national spirit\\nembodied in them, in order to recognize what\\nare our real affinities, which should rightly and\\nprofitably direct our action in the immediate\\nfuture.\\nIn our calculations as to our necessary pre-\\nparations under such conditions, it would not be\\npresuming an unfair burden to Great Britain to\\nreckon in part upon her supreme navy as a factor\\nin a possible co-operation, and division of labor.\\nIt would be so only if we grudged our due pro-\\nportion of a naval effort tending to the common\\nadvantage. Community of interest in objects\\nimplies mutual interest in each other s strength.\\nTo Great Britain the navy she maintains is indis-\\npensable to national safety, to the British Islands\\nas such, and to the integrity of the widely dis-\\npersed British Empire. Whatsoever relations to\\nother states she may temporarily entertain, this\\nshe must always have while on the other hand\\nshe is at no such need of internal development as\\nstill weighs heavily upon our national resources.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0235.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "igS Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nContrary to her, we need not to fear vital injury\\nby an external blow to our communications with\\nthe world. For simple internal safety and main-\\ntenance we can depend upon ourselves, and we\\nhave no distant possessions vital to our mere ex-\\nistence, however useful they may be to our exter-\\nnal development and influence. But in the great\\nfuture of the world to which our political condi-\\ntions seem to call upon us to co-operate, for the\\ngood of both and of the world at large, each is\\ninterested to see the other grow in strength.\\nThere need, therefore, be no captiousness on the\\npart of Great Britain, nor any mortification on\\nour part, if the proportions of military navy\\nwhich we could contribute to the common end\\nbe modest, compared to hers, and that we devote\\nresources to a development of national internal\\nvigor which will inure to the common strength.\\nThe two efforts will be not contradictory, but\\ncomplementary.\\nOur fleet must, however, be adequate, keeping\\nin view the amount of support to which Great\\nBritain would be limited by her extensive respon-\\nsibilities. It must be adequate, considering those\\nwho might oppose us, whether in the East or in\\nthe Caribbean. It must be adequate, considering", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0236.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 199\\nthat on account of our merely national interests,\\nas represented by our two ocean coasts, we must\\nbe able to exert naval power in both the Pacific\\nand the Atlantic, remembering, also, that the\\nfuture canal, while facilitating support between\\nour fleets on either side, is nevertheless open to\\ninterruption by force or treachery. As regards\\nother nations, the principle before alluded to is\\nnot aifected it is merely modified by the differ-\\ning positions now occupied by Great Britain and\\nby ourselves, brought about chiefly by the recog-\\nnition of changes and events in the East.\\nInsistence, however, should be laid upon one\\nelement of naval strength, which in mention\\nis so usually omitted that it is reasonable to infer\\nthat it is most inadequately appreciated. We\\nhear much of ships built, and of the mechanical\\nresults attained in them, as evidenced by speed,\\ngun-power, armor, etc. but we hear rarely of\\nour great deficiency in trained men to run these\\nmachines in their various forms, for a gun is a\\nmachine quite as really as the propelling power\\nof a vessel. To meet this defect, which is not\\nonly actual but great, there is no resource but the\\nmaintenance of a standing force of enlisted men,\\nas well as of commissioned officers. A hundred", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0237.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "200 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nyears ago, when the engines were sails and guns\\nsimple tubes, the merchant seaman was already\\nan engineer, and the gun handling was easily\\nacquired indeed merchant ships also not infre-\\nquently carried cannon. There was, therefore, a\\nlarge recruiting ground of efficient men always at\\nhand, though bitter experience showed how the\\ncommerce of the country could suffer from such\\nheavy drafts upon its seamen.\\nThis resource no longer exists. A certain\\nproportion of the engine-room force may possibly\\nbe drawn from the merchant service, but for the\\ngun handling, upon which the fate of war de-\\npends, the deck hand of the merchant steamer is\\nuseless for intelligent action he can do no more,\\nat the most critical moment of opening hostilities,\\nthen pull and haul. It is a safe generalization\\nto say that not more than one-third of a ship s\\ncompany in war can safely be composed of such\\nmaterial. Therefore, to calculate the standing\\nforce of a navy, in peace and for war, the rule\\nwould be to estimate the fixed force, on a war\\nfooting, for each ship on the list, built or build-\\ning. Two-thirds of the total obtained by adding\\nthese several results, would represent the size of\\nthe standing force, the established personnel, of", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0238.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "Effect of Asiatic Conditions 201\\nthe fleet in peace. When war arises, the other\\nthird may be sought outside.\\nCoincidently with the development of our\\npower, we should, in order to effectiveness of\\naction, consider also the retrenchment of respon-\\nsibility. Briefly, this remark is intended to raise\\nthe question, in view of the tremendous advance\\nin importance of the Pacific and Asia, whether\\nthe extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the\\nextent of supporting the independence of the states\\nof extreme South America against all European\\ninterference, is a position now either wise or\\ntenable Great Britain suffers many strains by\\nthe dispersion of her Empire, but it is at least\\nher Empire, bone of her bone and flesh of her\\nflesh. But what part have we, naturally or polit-\\nically, in the foreign communities foreign in\\nblood and in tradition south of the valley of\\nthe Amazon. That they do not love us is\\nnotorious probably, indeed, they love us less\\nbecause of our supposed purpose of interposition,\\nwhich they doubtless would welcome in a strait,\\nbut which in ordinary times causes them chiefly\\nmortification and apprehension. Within range\\nof effect upon the Isthmus, certainly, our clear\\ninterest forbids toleration of any acquisition.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0239.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "202 Effect of Asiatic Conditions\\nthrough possession or through influence, by a\\ngreat foreign state more so now than ever\\nbefore but for the American communities be-\\nyond that range, our professed poHtical concern is\\nto us a waste of strength, as it is to them distaste-\\nful. The great valley of the Amazon, not unlike\\nthat of the Yang-tse, though far more practicable,\\nindicates easily a great commercial zone in which\\nthe open door might profitably be assured by\\ninternational understanding, and which also might\\nvery wisely be accepted in our national con-\\nsciousness as interposing a broad effectual belt\\nbetween the region where the Monroe Doctrine\\nis applicable, and that where, for any useful pur-\\npose, it ceases to apply.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0240.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "THE MERITS OF THE TRANSVAAL\\nDISPUTE\\nIN contemporary disputes, passionate and par-\\ntial assertion rarely fails to play as conspic-\\nuous a part as truth with the result that there\\naccumulates round the question at issue, and round\\nthe merits of the respective parties to it, a cloud\\nof imperfect or erroneous statements, which not\\nonly confuse, but obscure. When such is the\\ncase, bystanders, who wish to understand, must\\nbe at the pains, first, to obtain a sufficient mastery\\nof the various incidents and pleas which consti-\\ntute the case on either side, and, second, to\\nreject by elimination such of these attendant cir-\\ncumstances as are irrelevant or superfluous. The\\nresiduum of decisive factors, thus obtained, will\\ncommonly be found not too complicated or too\\ndoubtful to admit of a correct appreciation. The\\nyield of the process will usually be twofold, viz.,\\nthe facts, and the principle, upon both of which\\njust judgment depends.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0241.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "204 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nThe dispute between Great Britain and the\\nTransvaal, from which war has resulted, forms\\nno exception to the general experience. On the\\ncontrary, passion and feeling, with their usual\\nconcomitant of hasty and vehement prejudgment,\\nenter largely while the facts of the case are\\nnumerous, and sufficiently complicated to require a\\nvery real mental effort to catalogue, comprehend,\\nand appreciate them in their relative importance.\\nI assume, however, that they are in their entirety\\nsufficiently familiar to all readers of the North\\nAmerican, through the numerous articles of the\\nlast three issues. It is fair, therefore, to presup-\\npose some acquaintance with the detailed occur-\\nrences, extending over the past fifty or sixty\\nyears, which have resulted in the war of to-day.\\nAs a first elimination, it may be affirmed with\\nprobable exactness that the events and dis-\\nputes precedent to the Pretoria Convention, in\\n1 88 1, may now be dismissed from consideration.\\nThey possess, indeed, historical interest, useful\\nto an understanding of conditions, but are no\\nlonger pertinent to the discussion of right. That\\nConvention, with its successor, the London Con-\\nvention of 1884, being acts in which both parties\\nconsented, regularized and legalized their political", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0242.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 205\\nrelations. Whatever the latter may previously\\nhave been, is now immaterial the two conven-\\ntions settled them then, and, conditional upon\\ndue observance on either side, remained the\\nstandard until the advent of war, which dissolves\\nall conventions between belligerents, except such\\nas pertain to the state of war itself. Our\\npurpose here being to investigate the respective\\nright and wrong, moral and political, in the con-\\nduct of both parties, which resulted in the quarrel,\\nthe outbreak of hostilities, in October, 1899,\\nmarks the termination, as the Convention of\\nPretoria, in 1881, marks the beginning, of the\\nperiod under examination.\\nTo make war is a moral action, to be judged\\nby moral standards. The statement is applicable,\\nnot merely to the general question of waging\\nwar, but to all acts which lead up to war as ap-\\npHcable to defensive war as to offensive. It is\\nas wicked to maintain wrong by force as it is\\ngood to enforce right by arms, when it cannot\\nbe otherwise insured.\\nIn political, as in personal, questions of moral\\nconduct, I apprehend that judgment falls under\\nthree principal heads Justice, Expediency or\\nPolicy, Duty. They answer to the questions", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0243.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "2o6 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nIs this within my right? Is it wise to enforce\\nit? Is it my duty to do so As Saint Paul says,\\na thing may be lawful, but not expedient the\\nlawfulness and the expediency alike are elements\\nof moral decision. Again, a man may without\\nwrong waive a purely personal right, but when\\nthe rights of others are involved by the same\\nconcession, the question of duty to those affected\\nenters as, for instance, a father s action as affect-\\ning his children. The contemplated act may be\\nlawful, it may be expedient at the moment, yet\\nduty may forbid. By universal consent. Duty,\\nwhen it clearly enters into a case, is paramount.\\nIt is the first in obligation, though not necessa-\\nrily the first in order, of moral considerations.\\nWar exists in South Africa because Great\\nBritain has determinedly followed a certain course\\nof action, which falls under two principal divi-\\nsions insistence, first, that a large alien popula-\\ntion in the Transvaal must be relieved from\\ngrievous political and social wrongs under which\\nit is laboring and, second, that she has, in deal-\\ning with the Transvaal in this matter, a particular\\nright and duty as distinguished from those gen-\\neral rights which all nations possess as members\\nof the international community. This particular", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0244.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 207\\nright is called suzerainty, a term admittedly\\nvague at the present day that is, the word\\nitself does not, in default of particular definitions,\\nexpress the extent of the rights of the possessor\\nof the suzerain. It is inherited from the feudal\\nsystem, where the obligations of tenure under a\\nsuzerain were of different kinds and degrees.\\nIn the case of the Transvaal and Great Britain,\\nthe political relationship independent of the\\nword itself is indicated by the character of the\\nConventions of Pretoria and of London. In\\nboth, the document is in the nature of a grant\\nfrom a superior to a dependent.^ The former\\nand earlier consists of a Preamble and Arti-\\ncles. The preamble expressly states, On\\nbehalf of Her Majesty, that, complete self-\\ngovernment, subject to the suzerainty of Her\\nMajesty will be accorded to the inhabitants\\nof the Transvaal, upon the following terms and\\n1 When the Transvaal deputation visited the country in 1883,\\nthey asked, that the relation of a dependency, publici juris, in\\nwhich our country now stands to the British Crown, may be\\nreplaced by that of two contracting Powers (C. 3947, p. s), and\\nthey submitted a draft treaty to give effect to their views. This\\ndraft treaty Lord Derby entirely rejected, observing that it was,\\nneither in form nor in substance such as Her Majesty s Govern-\\nment could adopt. Parliamentary Papers, C. 9507, p. 34.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0245.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "2o8 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nconditions these terms, etc., being expressed in\\nthe articles thirty-three in number. In the\\nConvention of 1884, an introductory clause\\nnot styled preamble in the document itself\\nreads Her Majesty has been pleased to take\\nthe said representations (of the Government of\\nthe Transvaal) into consideration, and has been\\npleased to direct, and it is hereby declared, that\\nthe following articles of a new Convention shall,\\nwhen ratified by the Volksraad, be substituted for\\nthe articles embodied in the Convention of August\\n3, 1881. In both cases there is a grant from\\none in authority over the other, the latter accept-\\ning and in both cases terms articles are\\naffixed to that grant of complete self-govern-\\nment, which is the substance of each. It has\\nbeen contended by the Transvaal statesmen that\\nthe omission, in the second convention, of\\nthe words, subject to the suzerainty of Her\\nMajesty, which were in the preamble of the\\nfirst, abolished the suzerainty in fact. The suffi-\\ncient reply to that is that the same construc-\\ntion abolishes the complete self-government\\ngranted for the one phrase and the other occur\\nonly in the first Convention, in the preamble. To\\n1 My italics.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0246.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 209\\nthe latter the second makes no allusion, but it is\\nexplicit as to the substitution of one set of articles\\nfor the other.\\nSir Alfred Milner justly observed/ Whether\\nthe relationship created by the Conventions is\\nproperly described as suzerainty is not, in my\\nopinion, of much importance. It is a question\\nof etymological rather than of political interest.\\nStill, the tenacity with which the rulers of the\\nTransvaal clung to the renunciation of the word\\nhas given it substantial significance for, in the\\nend, three months after Milner wrote the above\\nsentences, they offered to concede nearly, if not\\nquite, all that he had suggested for the benefit of\\nthe Uitlanders, upon two or three conditions,\\nchief among which was that a precedent shall\\nnot be formed by the present intervention\\nfor similar action in future, and that Her\\nMajesty s Government will not insist further upon\\nthe assertion of suzerainty, the controversy on this\\nsubject being tacitly allowed to drop. This the\\nBritish Government refused,^ and the Transvaal\\nwithdrew its offer. It was too evident that the\\n1 Parliamentary Papers, C. 9507, p. 6.\\n2 Parliamentary Papers, C. 9521, p. 44.\\n3 Ibid. pp. 45, 50 C. 9507, p. 33.\\n14", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0247.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "2IO Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nrelinquishment of the word would be understood\\nto mean a concession of non-dependence, and of\\nnon-responsibility to Great Britain, in all matters\\nnot expressly reserved. For the substance of\\nsuzerainty is the existence of dependence in the\\nvassal, except so far as independence is conceded.\\nComplete self-government is not indepen-\\ndence. The explicit reservation by Great Britain\\nof the right to nullify any treaty, or engagement,\\nentered into by the Transvaal with a foreign\\ncountry,^ necessarily reserved with it responsibil-\\nity for its relations with the outside world for\\nwhen treaties or engagements cannot be indepen-\\ndently concluded, although dealings may be had\\nand business carried on, it is impossible to guar-\\nantee satisfactory relations of any kind. The\\nwhole includes the parts final ratification con-\\nditions and embraces all the antecedents.\\nThe troubles which led up to this war suffi-\\nciently illustrate this. Among the Uitlanders in\\nwhose behalf Great Britain interposed were the\\nsubjects of many foreign States. In particular\\ndifficulties connected with these, the Transvaal\\nagents might, by concession or otherwise, reach\\na satisfactory arrangement with the Powers con-\\n1 Art. 4, Convention of 1884, Parliamentary Papers, C. 3914.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0248.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 2 1 1\\ncerned, which might obviate the necessity of an\\nengagement but if it became necessary to enter\\ninto engagements, the reserved right of Great\\nBritain entailed not only power, but responsibil-\\nity, for the two are inseparable. Upon respon-\\nsibility follows obligation to procure a remedy\\nfor conditions provocative of just reclamation by\\nforeign States and this obligation outweighs, in\\nmoral force, that political expediency or interest\\nwhich, by common consent, justifies interfer-\\nence in the affairs of a neighboring State, when\\nthese threaten your own peace or welfare, as, for\\ninstance, when we lately interfered with Spain in\\nCuba, a course in which our obligation was not\\nlegal, but moral. Our own keen national sense\\non this subject is evidenced by our Monroe Doc-\\ntrine. In the Americas we object to foreign\\ninterference carried beyond certain limits, because\\nthe matter comes too near home for our peace\\nand interest. Well, Great Britain, which rules\\nby far the greater part of South Africa, and is\\npredominant there as we are here, objects to\\nforeign interference in the Transvaal, her states-\\nmen having even used the Monroe Doctrine as\\nillustrative of her policy in that respect. Conse-\\nquently, when she established the Transvaal as a", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0249.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "212 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nself-governing but dependent State, she, in addi-\\ntion to the right resting upon general interest in\\na neighbor, reserved a check upon its relations\\nwith foreign States.\\nThe right to interpose as she has done the\\nfirst, in order, of the moral considerations\\nrests upon two grounds First, of general policy,\\nin the necessity of remedying conditions in a\\nneighboring State, which threaten one s own tran-\\nquillity or welfare as when we intervened in\\nCuba and in the Venezuela business and, second,\\nupon the specific right of suzerainty, retained in\\nthe Acts which constituted the Transvaal into\\nthe South African Republic. For those not\\nsatisfied, as I am, with the technical verbal argu-\\nment in proof of this retention (given above), the\\npurpose and understanding of the British Gov-\\nernment in the transaction were affirmed in Par-\\nliament by its negotiator. Lord Derby, on March\\n17, 1884, the Convention, having been signed\\nFebruary 27, less than three weeks before. It\\nhas been said that the object of the Convention\\nhad been to abolish the suzerainty of the British\\nCrown. The word suzerainty is a very vague\\nword, and I do not think it is capable of any\\nprecise legal definition. Whatever we may under-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0250.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 213\\nstand by it, I think it is not very easy to define.\\nBut I apprehend, whether you call it a protector-\\nate, of a suzerainty, or the recognition of Eng-\\nland as a paramount Power, the fact is that a\\ncertain controlling power is retained when the\\nState which exercises this suzerainty has a right to\\nveto any negotiations into which the dependent^\\nState may enter with foreign Powers. Whatever\\nsuzerainty meant in the Convention of Pretoria,\\nthe condition of things which it implies still\\nremains although the word is not actually em-\\nployed, we have kept the substance. We have\\nabstained from using the word, because it was not\\ncapable of legal definition, and because it seemed\\nto be a word which was likely to lead to miscon-\\nception and misunderstanding. It is clear that\\nDerby, overlooking the retention of the preamble\\nof 1 88 1, understood himself to have abandoned,\\nnot the thing, but the word, because the latter\\nwas indeterminate owing to the historical appli-\\ncations which constitute its definition being so\\nvaried.\\nPassing with these remarks from the question\\nof Great Britain s rights, I take up next that of\\nher duty, under the conditions existing prior to\\n1 My italic. Pari. Papers, C. 9507, p, 34.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0251.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "214 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nthe war leaving to the end a brief summary of\\nthe reasons which, in my opinion, constitute\\nthe expediency, or poHcy, of her action in the\\npremises.\\nIt is a commonplace, that responsibility is the\\ncomplement of power. It is also the foundation\\nof duty. A person responsible has a duty to do,\\nwhen occasion arises. In refusing the Transvaal\\nthat independence in foreign relations which\\nwould enable other States to hold it directly\\naccountable. Great Britain retained, in so far,\\nresponsibility that foreigners should be so treated\\nas to give no just ground for reclamations. In\\nthe case of wrongdoing by a dependent, one s\\nduty, or responsibility, is not limited to cor-\\nrection upon complaint of grievance. Even for\\nsingle, unforeseen, acts of wrong, reparation may\\nbe exacted but for a continuous act, or con-\\ndition, clearly known, the duty of remedial\\nmeasures is such that the failure to institute them\\nis just cause for complaint. A foreign State, in\\nits care for its citizens abroad, does not, for\\nredress, look below the supreme power of the\\nState where they are domiciled. From the latter\\nit demands justice, nor does it concern itself with\\nthe methods by which justice is reached those", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0252.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 215\\nare part of the internal affairs of the other coun-\\ntry. The home government of the injured man\\nsees only the injury and the responsible power\\nthat is, the supreme Government. When Italian\\ncitizens were lynched in New Orleans some years\\nago, the Italian Government had before it two\\nfacts: violence done to its citizens, and the\\ngovernment of the country where the violence\\noccurred. The laws and courts of the United\\nStates, State sovereignty, the laws of Louisiana,\\nwere nothing to it part of the internal ma-\\nchinery of our Government. The injured per-\\nsons and the responsible Power were the only\\nthings with which Italy then had concern.\\nThe political relation of the Transvaal to Great\\nBritain is certainly not the same as that of one\\nof our States to the central Government but\\nGreat Britain, by retaining the ultimate control\\nof foreign relations, and by her well-defined pur-\\npose not to permit interference in the Transvaal\\nby a foreign Power, was responsible for conditions\\nof wrong to foreign citizens within its borders.\\nShe had surrendered the right to interfere, as\\nsuzerain, with internal affairs but she had not\\nrelieved herself, as by a grant of full independence\\nand sovereignty she might have done, from re-", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0253.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "2i6 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nsponsibility for injury due to internal mal-admin-\\nistration any more than the United States was\\nrelieved of the responsibility to Italy by the State\\nsovereignty of Louisiana. The responsibility\\nthus remaining gave the right to require, not that\\nthis or that change should be made in the internal\\nadministration of the Transvaal, but that the con-\\ndition of the foreign population should in some\\nway be made socially and economically tolerable.\\nThe method was not her affair, but the result\\nwas. Internal affairs and external relations are\\nlogically separable but mutual interaction takes\\nplace between them.\\nCitizens of other States, however, formed a\\nminority of the Uitlander population a majority\\nwere British subjects. To these the duty of\\nGreat Britain was that of a State to its citizens\\nresiding in foreign countries, everywhere through-\\nout the world. If they received wrong, she had\\nthe duty of reclamation; if the wrong were con-\\ntinuous, she owed sustained diplomatic pressure\\nfor a change of action if this were refused, she\\nhad, by international law, the right of war.\\nWhen the exercise of this last right becomes a\\nduty, is a question for the sole decision of the\\ninjured State. In this particular the Transvaal", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0254.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 217\\nstood to her, by her own act, in the relation of an\\nindependent State. Control of internal affairs\\nhad been conceded to it, and to demand, as\\nsuzerain, a change of the laws, would have been\\nto break the compact. The British Govern-\\nment, says Mr. Bryce, always admitted that\\nthey had no right to demand the franchise an\\nassertion which demonstrates the correctness of\\ntheir attitude, and which is most fully substanti-\\nated by the papers submitted to Parliament.\\nBut it was no breach of compact to demand that\\nexisting wrongs should be righted, leaving to the\\nTransvaal authorities the determination of the\\nmethods the internal arrangements by which\\nthe result was reached. Such pressure rests on\\ninternational law, would be as applicable to a\\ndifficulty with the United States as to one with\\nthe Transvaal, and, if wrongs sufficiently great\\nexisted, it was the duty of Great Britain to exert\\nsuch pressure. This was her second duty. There\\nwas a third that will be mentioned later.\\nDid such wrongs exist In my judgment\\nthere certainly did, and of a character and extent\\nthat, if not remedied, would justify war. Of\\ncourse, when one comes to estimate injury, great\\n1 Impressions of South Africa, Second Edition, p. xxxiv.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0255.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "2i8 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\ndifferences of opinion will be manifested. It is\\nnot every small wrong that makes it expedient to\\ngo to law nor does even serious damage consti-\\ntute an unendurable wrong. But, if it be hard\\nto measure wrongs in degree, it is less difficult to\\nv^alue them in kind to recognize an underlying\\nprinciple, and to see that when this is violated by\\nrulers, there is planted a root of bitterness which\\nsooner or later must bear its evil fruit, and which\\ntherefore cannot be too soon extirpated. I prefer\\nhere, first, to state the character of the Transvaal\\nGovernment in its relation to the Uitlanders in\\nthe words of Mr. Bryce, for not only are his\\nmoderation and candor universally recognized,\\nbut he has not approved the course of his own\\ncountry in so far as war has by it been made in-\\nevitable. The position of the Transvaal Gov-\\nernment, although it had some measure of legal\\nstrength, was, if regarded from the point of view\\nof actual facts, logically indefensible and materially\\ndangerous. They or rather the President\\nand his advisers committed the fatal mistake\\nof trying to maintain a government which was at\\nthe same time undemocratic and incompetent.\\nAn exclusive government may be pardoned\\nif it is efficient an inefficient government, if it", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0256.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispttte 219\\nrests upon the people. But a government which\\nis both inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight\\nof odium under which it must ultimately sink\\nand this was the kind of government which the\\nTransvaal attempted to maintain. They ought,\\ntherefore, to have either extended their franchise\\nor reformed their administration.\\nReform of the franchise was what the British\\nGovernment suggested, but could not demand\\nfor it had no control of the internal affairs. But,\\nunderlying all this undemocratic and inefficient\\ngovernment, was unwillingness to acknowledge\\nthe fundamental principle, by the maintenance of\\nwhich liberty has made each painful step upward,\\nviz., that taxation rests in the hands of the taxed\\ncommunity, acting through its representatives,\\nwhile enlargement of the basis of representation\\nis one of the particular notes of modern political\\nadvance. The Uitlanders produced more than\\nnine-tenths of the revenue, but the terms upon\\nwhich they were admitted to the franchise were\\nso exorbitant as to be prohibitory. Especially\\ngrievous was the condition that between naturali-\\nzation and franchise a long period intervened,\\nduring which the man had lost his old citizenship\\n1 Impressions of South Africa, Second Edition, p. xviii.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0257.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "220 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nwithout acquiring the privileges of the new.\\nWhile in that position he was no man s man,\\nhaving lost his hold on one country, while in the\\nother he had obtained no right, but only duties\\nsuch as compulsory military service, and the pay-\\nment of taxes, in the levying of which he not\\nonly had no vote at the polls, but no organ of\\nspeech, no adequate representative, in the deliber-\\nations of the Legislature.^ The political sin of\\nthe Transvaal against the Uitlander, therefore, was\\nno mere matter of detail of less or more but\\nwas fundamental in its denial of elementary\\npolitical right.\\nConsider the conditions of the franchise in\\nJune last, at the time of the Bloemfontein Con-\\nference, between Sir Alfred Milner and President\\nKriiger. In 1882, one year after the Convention\\nof Pretoria, the period for attaining the full\\nfranchise, which in the earlier days of the com-\\nmunity had been one or two years, was fixed at\\nfive years. In 1885 came the gold discoveries,\\nwith the inflow of the mining population, and in\\n1 The gold fields, in which district live most of the Uitlanders,\\nwho alone are far more numerous than all the burghers in the\\nTransvaal, had but two representatives in a House of 28. C.\\n9404, p. 54.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0258.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 221\\n1890 the time was extended to fourteen years.\\nNor was this all, although extremely oppressive,\\njudged by all modern standards, when it is con-\\nsidered that the men to whom it applied were\\nthose who were developing the resources of the\\nState and producing nine-tenths of its revenue.\\nThe law was made applicable to those already in\\nthe country so that men who had entered in 1886\\nand the intervening years, however valuable as\\nmembers of the community, were unable to\\nacquire full citizenship in five years, according to\\nthe conditions of their immigration, but were\\ncompelled to wait fourteen. To this were at-\\ntached other vexatious regulations, which made\\nit an onerous task for a man to establish his\\nclaims, and left it in the power of the authorities\\nto retard and thwart him in his effort to gain\\ncitizenship. Above all, by a singular provision\\nthen introduced, an interval of twelve years was\\ninterposed between naturalization and full fran-\\nchise the latter consisting in power to vote for\\nmembers of the First Volksraad, in which the\\nvalid legislative power of the Republic is concen-\\ntrated. During this period, a man, having\\nbecome by naturalization a citizen of the Trans-\\nvaal, lost the protection his native country would", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0259.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "22 2 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\ngive him, in case of injustice, but acquired no real\\nshare in the government of his new State.\\nThat any men of EngHsh or American origin\\nwould rest quietly under such political treatment\\nis most improbable but it is impossible unless\\nadministration be such as to give them all the\\nbenefits of pure and efficient government. This,\\nhowever, was not the case, as Mr. Bryce has said.\\nInto the details of mis-government there is not\\nhere space to go they must be sought in the\\nmany books on the subject. A Boer partisan\\ncynically observes, In the Transvaal the poor\\nhave the power, and compel the rich to pay the\\ntaxes the truth being, however, that an armed\\nminority holds the power, compels the majority\\nto pay the taxes, denies it representation, and\\nmisgoverns it with the money extorted.\\nSuch internal administration must entail exter-\\nnal complications. In the neighboring British\\ncolonies there is a large Dutch population, which\\neverywhere possesses equal political rights with\\nits British fellow-subjects. The wrath of the\\nlatter was stirred by the inequality and indignity\\nsuffered by their countrymen in the Transvaal\\nand the political agitation instituted by the Uit-\\n1 Hillegas Oom Paul s People, p. 232.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0260.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 223\\nlanders was warmly seconded by the men of\\nEnglish blood in the surrounding districts. Both\\ncarried their appeals to the home Government,\\nand the latter was made to feel that the loyalty\\nand contentment of the colonist, upon which\\ndepends the integrity of the Empire, require that\\nthe latter not only be just itself, but shall exact\\njustice for its citizens when clearly refused to\\nthem by others. That this view of the South\\nAfrican colonists was shared by the other parts\\nof the Empire is shown by the enthusiasm with\\nwhich, not Great Britain alone, but Canada and\\nAustralia espoused the cause of the Uitlander.\\nThe wrongs of the latter, by intensifying a com-\\nmon sentiment, have done more to rivet Im-\\nperial Federation than aught that planning and\\norganization could contrive.\\nThe British Government has for nearly a\\ndecade been confronted with the conditions which\\nresulted last year in the Bloemfontein Confer-\\nence. At this the British representative ex-\\npressly disclaimed any intention of giving\\norders or commands. There had been long\\ndisagreements between the two States, which were\\nincreasing instead of diminishing. In his opinion,\\n1 Parliamentary Papers, C. 9404, p. 16.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0261.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "2 24 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nthe cause of the most serious differences arises\\nout of the poHcy pursued by the Government of\\nthe South African Republic toward the Uitlander\\npopulation, If that Government, of its own\\naccord, would afford a more liberal treatment to\\nthe Uitlanders, this would not increase British\\ninterference, but enormously diminish it. If\\nthey were in a position to help themselves they\\nwould not always be appealing to us under the\\nConvention. As a definite proposition he sug-\\ngested that the full franchise should be given to\\nevery foreigner who had resided for five years in\\nthe Republic thus reverting to the law of 1882.\\nTo this could be attached a property qualification\\nwhich would prevent so many new voters as\\nwould outnumber the old burghers. Also, as\\nthe Uitlanders mostly live in one district of the\\nRepublic, and in order that their representatives\\nshould not be in a contemptible minority, he\\nproposed that there should be a certain number\\nof new constituencies in the First Volksraad.^\\nThe Conference separated without reaching an\\nagreement. On June 15, the Raad adjourned, to\\nallow members to consult their constituencies.\\nOn July 3 it reassembled, and in the course of\\n1 Parliamentary Papers, C. 9404, pp. 14, 15. Ibid. p. 3.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0262.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 225\\nthe month passed an act granting naturalization\\nand full franchise to residents of seven years, hav-\\ning certain property qualifications. Not only was\\nthe period thought too long, but to the process\\nof obtaining these rights were attached conditions\\nso complicated as to be unsatisfactory to the Uit-\\nlanders and to the British Government for it\\nwas believed that they could, and would, be used\\nto defeat the applicant. A request of the British\\nGovernment for an opportunity of making its\\nviews known on this new franchise law was\\nrefused, on the ground that the First Volksraad\\nhad now passed the law and finally fixed it.\\nDiplomacy cannot go on when one side invokes\\nthe law of its land to close discussion. The\\nSouth African Republic overlooked the fact that,\\nwhere parties disagree, agreement must mean\\nacceptance by both, whether with or without war.\\nBeing thus dissatisfied, the British Govern-\\nment, on August I, invited the Transvaal to\\nappoint delegates, to discuss with British dele-\\ngates, whether the Uitlanders will be given\\nimmediate and substantial representation by the\\nFranchise Law recently passed, together with\\nother measures connected with it such as in-\\n1 Parliamentary Papers, C. 9518, pp. 51, 58.\\nIS", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0263.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "226 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\ncrease of seats and, if not, what additions or\\nalterations may be necessary to secure that\\nresult. To this Commission of Inquiry the\\nTransvaal Government was averse, assigning as\\nits reason that joint inquiry would prejudice the\\nright of full independence in internal affairs and\\non August 15, intimated that it was willing to\\nmake the following proposals, provided that Her\\nMajesty s Government are willing not to press\\ntheir demand for the proposed joint inquiry into\\nthe political representation of the Uitlanders.\\nThese proposals were A five years retrospec-\\ntive franchise, which was Milner s suggestion at\\nBloemfontein ten seats in a First Volksraad of\\nthirty-six members and certain other minor\\nconcessions.^ With these propositions, however,\\nwere coupled three conditions, one of which was\\na provision for arbitration, to which the British\\nGovernment acceded tentatively. The other\\ntwo, already quoted, were That Her Majesty s\\nGovernment will agree that the present interven-\\ntion shall not form a precedent for future similar\\naction, and that in the future no interference in\\nthe internal affairs of the Republic will take\\n1 Parliamentary Papers, C. 9518, p. 30.\\n2 Ibid. C. 9521, p. 44. Ibid. p. 46.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0264.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 227\\nplace; and that Her Majesty s Government will\\nnot further insist on the assertion of suzerainty.\\nThe latter was refused to the former the reply\\nwas that, Her Majesty s Government cannot,\\nof course, debar themselves from their rights\\nunder the Conventions, nor divest themselves of\\nthe ordinary obligations of a civilized Power to\\nprotect its subjects in a foreign country from in-\\njustice. The British Government had not\\ninterfered in the internal affairs of the Transvaal,\\nas implied by the latter. Seeing the oppression\\nof its citizens there, and the resulting friction\\nbetween the two governments, it had demanded\\nrelief, suggesting that a liberal franchise would\\nmost surely afford this, and it had refused to\\naccept, as adequate, measures that in its judg-\\nment were inadequate but further than sugges-\\ntion no claim to intervention, as suzerain, was\\nadvanced. Of course, the compulsion of force\\nof possible war hung in the background, as it\\ndoes in all diplomatic disputes of a critical nature\\nbetween States, even mutually independent.\\nDissatisfied with this reply, the Transvaal\\nwithdrew its offer. The subsequent negotia-\\ntions are important as elucidatory, but may be\\nParliamentary Papers, C. 9521, pp. 46,47. Ibid. p. 50.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0265.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "2 28 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nneglected, as not otherwise essential to the merits\\nof the case. On October 9, the Transvaal issued\\nits ultimatum. In my opinion, the question who\\ndeclared war is immaterial, except for the moral\\neffect upon the sentiment that condemns all wars,\\njudges mainly by feeling and preconception, and\\nlooks little into causes. Briefly stated, the argu-\\nment in my mind runs thus: There were in the\\nTransvaal some sixty thousand Uitlanders and\\nthirty thousand Boers of an age fit for suffrage.\\nOf the former the great majority were British\\nsubjects. They were oppressively misgoverned,\\nand were denied both franchise and representa-\\ntion. In a Volksraad of twenty-eight there were\\nfrom their district only two, in the choice of\\nwhom they had no adequate voice. They raised\\nthe revenue, from less than a million, to twenty\\nmillion dollars. Their appeals for good adminis-\\ntration and for fair treatment were disregarded.\\nThey had entered the country by encouragement\\nof the Government,^ many of them at a time\\nwhen five years residence conferred the franchise\\n1 President Kriiger s estimate. Parliamentary Papers, C.\\n9404, p. 19.\\n2 Letter of Ewald Esselen, Secretary to Transvaal Deputation in\\nLondon, December 21, 1883. Contemporary Re vie^w, February,\\n18985 Article, Real Grievances of the Uitlanders.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0266.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 229\\nbut before they could obtain it the period was\\nincreased to fourteen years. The laws were un-\\nstable and easily altered confused, purposely or\\nnot, so that the difficulties of qualifying were\\nenormously increased. Unable to become citi-\\nzens, unprotected, and unable politically to pro-\\ntect themselves, they appealed, as every domiciled\\nforeigner does, to their home government. In-\\nnumerable complaints cumbered the files and\\nembarrassed the relations of the two States.\\nAgitation spread throughout South Africa, defin-\\ning itself on lines of race feeling, never wholly\\nextinguished, and threatening the deplorable an-\\ntagonisms that thence arise. The elements of a\\nconflagration were all there, and the atmosphere\\nrising to the kindling point. To compose the\\ntrouble. Great Britain suggested a plan eminently\\nreasonable, unfair only to the Uitlanders, to whom\\nit gave far less than all white men throughout\\nSouth Africa receive at British hands, and she re-\\nfused to accept as satisfactory anything less than\\nthe minimum of remedy for let it be continually\\nremembered that the franchise was sought, not\\nmainly as an act of justice, but as the most\\npromising means of escape from a position\\nbecome unendurable.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0267.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "230 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nThe franchise, says Mr. Bryce, did not\\nconstitute a legitimate cause of war. In this\\nit appears to me there is a confusion of idea, or a\\nbegging of the question. The question is begged,\\nif it is impHed that the cause of the war was a\\ndemand, based on suzerainty, for an extended\\nfranchise. That would not be a legitimate cause.\\nBut, in so far as a cause good in morals is legiti-\\nmate, the denial of an adequate franchise was a\\nlegitimate cause of war, because, in the absence\\nof an adequate alternative, it kept in a condition\\nof intolerable oppression a number of British\\ncitizens who had been invited to commit their\\npersons and their fortunes to the protection of\\nthe Transvaal Government, in order to develop\\nthe resources of the country. Great Britain had\\nthe highest moral duty to see that those people\\nreceived not the franchise necessarily but\\nfair treatment and decent government. There is\\nnot an American pro-Boer partisan that would\\nhave endured for six months the conditions of\\nthe Uitlanders, without appeal to his govern-\\nment, if it were in a position to aid.\\nThat race differences were at the bottom of the\\nwar is an interesting philosophical explanation,\\n1 Impressions of South Africa, Second Edition, p. xxxiv.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0268.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 231\\nand has its value. It is true, indeed, in great\\npart, as a fact for I trust no American or Eng-\\nlish community in the present day could, with-\\nout its own blood boiling in its veins, give to any\\nindwellers such treatment as the Boers have given\\nthe Uitlanders. But whatever part race differ-\\nences have played, it has been as an ultimate\\ncause, not as a proximate. The occasion of the\\nwar has been as described.\\nTo the occasion, also, every consideration of\\nduty and of expediency combined to compel\\nGreat Britain to constitute a third duty already\\nalluded to the duty to the Empire. The\\npeace of South Africa was not merely imperilled\\nit was destroyed, unless the conditions were\\nhealthfully and radically changed. Whether\\nthere was any widespread, organized conspiracy\\nto supplant British rule by Dutch, is a matter\\nonly of inference but it appears to me beyond\\ndoubt that a considerable number of Boers\\nthroughout South Africa cherished that purpose,\\nconsciously, and had succeeded in setting in\\nmotion feelings and conditions of which the\\nTransvaal was the centre that would, unless\\nabruptly checked, result in the subversion of\\nBritish rule. We in America, who know the", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0269.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "232 Merits of the Transvaal Dispute\\nhistory of Secession, know to what lengths small\\nbeginnings, ably guided, can go. The political\\ncomplexion, tenure, and stability of South Africa,\\nhowever, are not a concern of the British Isles\\nonly, but of the British Empire. My profes-\\nsional opinion does not attach supreme, exclusive,\\nnaval importance to the Cape route as compared\\nwith that of Suez but the mass of sound British\\nopinion does, and its commercial value is beyond\\ndispute. To India and to Australia it is of the\\nfirst consequence to Great Britain and to Atlan-\\ntic Canada hardly less. The Cape is one of the\\nvital centres in the network of communications\\nof the whole Empire. To let it go, wrenched\\naway through culpable remissness, would be to\\ndissolve the Empire and justly. A government\\nis not worthy to live, that, having shown to all\\nits subjects the impartiality and liberality which\\nGreat Britain has to British and Dutch alike\\nthroughout South Africa, should supinely ac-\\nquiesce in the conditions of the Transvaal, as\\ndepicted, or fail to take heed that the Dutch\\nAfrikander, as a class, has so little learned the\\nlessons of political justice and true liberty, that\\nhis sympathies are with the Boer oppressor rather\\nthan with the Uitlander oppressed. Under such", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0270.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "Merits of the Transvaal Dispute 233\\nconditions it wou]d have been imperial suicide to\\nhave allowed the well-known, though under-\\nvalued, military preparations of the Transvaal to\\npass unnoticed, defiant oppression to continue,\\nand race disaffection to come to a head, until the\\nfavorable moment for revolt should be found in\\na day of imperial embarrassment. To every sub-\\nject of the Empire the Government owed it to\\nsettle at once the question, and to establish its\\nown paramountcy on bases that cannot be shaken\\nlightly.\\nNote. The Parliamentary Papers referred to in the foot-\\nnotes contain the official correspondence of both parties to the\\nnegotiations.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0271.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0272.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "Uniform with The Problem of Asia,^ and Lessons of the\\nWar with Spain, and Other Articles.\\nTHE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN\\nSEA POWER, Present and Future.\\nBy Capt. a. T. Mahan. With two maps showing strate-\\ngic points. Crown 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. ^2.00.\\nCONTENTS\\nI. The United States Looking Out- VI. Preparedness for Naval War.\\nward. VII. A Twentieth Century Out-\\nII. Hawaii and our Sea Power. look.\\nIII. The Isthmus and our Sea Power. VIII. Strategic Features of the Gulf\\nIV. Anglo-American Alliance. of Mexico and the Caribbean\\nV. The Future in Relation to Amer- Sea.\\nican Naval Power.\\nAll the civilized world knows Captain Mahan is an expert on\\nnaval matters. His present position on the Board of Strategy,\\ndirecting the American fleets, has made him even more conspicuous\\nthan usual. These papers, in the light of the present war, prove\\nCaptain Mahan a most sane and sure prophet. It seems hard to\\nimagine any topics more fascinating at the present time. No ro-\\nmance, no novel, could possibly equal such essays as these, by such\\nan author, in present public interest. So many of his theories\\nhave come to reality as to be positively remarkable. The Criterion.\\nThe last paper, Strategic Features of the Caribbean Sea and\\nthe Gulf of Mexico, written only last year, deals with problems\\nthat now confront the people of the United States in the shape of\\npractical questions that will have to be decided for the present and\\nthe future. It is well within the bounds of truth to say that an\\nintelligent comprehension of these questions is not possible without\\na reading of the present volume. Philadelphia Inquirer.\\nHis paper on Hawaii is timely at this moment, as it treats of the\\nannexation of the Sandwich Islands from the point of view which our\\nstatesmen might well take, rather than from the professional view\\nwhich a naval officer might be expected to hold. Philadelphia\\nTelegraph.\\nThe substance of all these essays concerns every intelligent voter\\nin this country. Boston Herald.\\nLITTLE, BROWN, COMPANY, Publishers\\n254 Washington Street, Boston.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0273.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER\\nUPON HISTORY, 1660-1783. By Capt.\\nA. T. Mahan. With 25 charts illustrative of great naval\\nbattles. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. ^4.00.\\nCaptain Mahan has been recognized by all competent judges, not\\nmerely as the most distinguished living vsrriter on naval strategy, but\\nas the originator and first exponent of what may be called the\\nphilosophy of naval history. London Times.\\nNo book of recent publication has been received with such en-\\nthusiasm of grateful admiration as that written by an officer of the\\nAmerican Navy, Captain Mahan, upon Sea Power and Naval\\nAchievements. It simply supplants all other books on the subject,\\nand takes its place in our libraries as the standard work. Dean\\nHole, in More Memories.\\nAn altogether exceptional work there is nothing like it in the\\nwhole range of naval literature. The work is entirely original\\nin conception, masterful in construction, and scholarly in execution.\\nThe Critic.\\nCaptain Mahan, whose name is famous all the world over as that\\nof the author of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, a\\nwork, or rather a series of works, which may fairly be said to have\\ncodified the laws of naval strategy. The Westminster Gazette.\\nAn instructive work of the highest value and interest to students\\nand to the reading public, and should find its way into all the libra-\\nries and homes of the land. Magazine of American History.\\nA book that must be read. First, it must be read by all school-\\nmasters, from the head-master of Eton to the head of the humblest\\nboard-school in the country. No man is fit to train English boys\\nto fulfil their duties as Englishmen who has not marked, learned,\\nand inwardly digested it. Secondly, it must be read by every\\nEnglishman and Englishwoman who wishes to be worthy of that\\nname. It is no hard or irksome task to which I call them. The\\nwriting is throughout clear, vigorous, and incisive. The book\\ndeserves and must attain a world-wide reputation. Colonel\\nMaurice, of the British Army, in the United Service Magazine.\\nLITTLE, BROWN, COMPANY, Publishers\\n254 Washington Street, Boston", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0274.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER\\nupon the French Revolution and Km-\\nP^re. By Capt. a. T. Mahan. With 13 maps and\\nbattle plans. 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. ^6.00.\\nA highly interesting and an important work, having lessons and\\nsuggestions v?hich are calculated to be of high value to the people\\nof the United States. His pages abound with spirited and careful\\naccounts of the great naval battles and manoeuvres which occurred\\nduring the period treated. Ne^w Tork Tribune.\\nCaptain Mahan has done more than to write a new book upon\\nnaval history. He has even done more than to write the best book\\nthat has ever been written upon naval history, though he has done\\nthis likewise for he has written a book which may be regarded\\nas founding a new school of naval historical writing. Captain\\nMahan s volumes are already accepted as the standard authorities of\\ntheir kind, not only here, but in England and in Europe generally.\\nIt should be a matter of pride to all Americans that an officer of\\nour own. navy should have written such books. Theodore\\nRoosevelt, in Political Science ^arterly.\\nTHE LIFE OF NELSON: The Em-\\nbodiment of the Sea Power of Gre at\\nBritain. By Capt. a. T. Mahan. With 19 por-\\ntraits and plates in photogravure and 21 maps and battle\\nplans. 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. ^8.00.\\nCaptain Mahan s work will become one of the greatest naval\\nclassics. London Times.\\nThe greatest literary achievement of the author of The In-\\nfluence of Sea Power upon History. Never before have charm of\\nstyle, perfect professional knowledge, the insight and balanced\\njudgment of a great historian, and deep admiration for the hero\\nbeen blended in any biography of Nelson. London Standard.\\nLITTLE, BROWN, COMPANY, Publishers\\n254 Washington Street, Boston", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0275.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "CAPTAIN MAHAN S LIFE OF NELSON\\nNEW POPULAR EDITION\\nCOMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME\\nTHE LIFE OF NELSON. The Em-\\nbodiment of the Sea Power of Great\\nBritain. By Capt. a. T. Mahan. With 1 2 portraits\\nand plates in half-tone and a photogravure frontispiece.\\nCrown 8vo. Cloth. 750 pages. ^3.00.\\nIt is not astonishing that this standard life is already passing into\\na new edition. It has simply displaced all its predecessors except\\none, that of Southey, which is the vade-mecum of British patriotism,\\na stimulant of British loyalty, literature of high quality, but in no\\nsense a serious historical or psychological study. The reader\\nwill find in this book three things an unbroken series of verified\\nhistorical facts related in minute detail 5 a complete picture of the\\nhero, with every virtue justly estimated but with no palliation of\\nweakness or fault 5 and lastly a triumphant vindication of a thesis\\nnovel and startling to most, that the earth s barriers are continental,\\nits easy and defensible highways those of the trackless ocean.\\nCaptain Mahan has revealed the modern world to itself. American\\nHistorical Re vie-TV, July, 1899.\\nCaptain Mahan s masterly life of Nelson has already taken its place\\nas the final book on the subject. Mail and Express, New York._\\nOne never tires of reading or reflecting upon the marvellous\\ncareer of Horatio Nelson, the greatest sea captain the world has\\nknown. Captain Mahan has written the best biography of Lord\\nNelson that has yet been given to the world. Chicago E^jening\\nPost.\\nHis biography is not merely the best life of Nelson that has ever\\nbeen written, but it is also perfect, and a model among all the\\nbiographies of the world. Pall Mall Gazette.\\nLITTLE, BROWN, COMPANY, Publishers\\n254 W^ashington Street, Boston", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0276.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "Uniform with The Problem of Asia, and The Interest\\nof America in Sea Power.\\nLESSONS OF THE WAR WITH\\nSPAIN, and Other Articles. By ALFRED\\nT. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D., Captain United States\\nNavy, author of The Interest of America in Sea Power,\\nThe Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783,\\nThe Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution\\nand Empire, The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of\\nthe Sea Power of Great Britain, and of a Life of\\nFarragut. Crown 8vo. Cloth. ^2.00.\\nThis recent work by Captain Mahan, the leading writer on\\nnaval warfare, is of great interest and value. Captain Mahan s\\nposition as a member of the American Board of Strategy\\ngave him exceptional opportunity for analyzing the events of the\\nWar with Spain and perceiving its meaning. Starting out with the\\noriginal design of eliciting some of the lessons of this war, he has\\nadded to the work the further purpose of presenting, simply and\\nclearly, the fundamental conceptions of warfare in general and\\nnaval warfare in particular. The volume supplements in a way\\nCaptain Mahan s previous book, The Interest of America in Sea\\nPower, which, though it appeared before the war, was considered\\nremarkable for the foresight with which it presented important\\nquestions that later confronted the American people.\\nCaptain Mahan stands at the head of his profession in knowl-\\nedge of naval strategy and naval affairs generally. He was a\\nmember of the Advisory Board in the Navy Department during the\\nwar with Spain, and had full knowledge of everything that took\\nplace so far as the navy was concerned. Philadelphia Press.\\nCONTENTS\\nLessons of the War with Spain, 1898.\\nIntroductory Comprehension of Military and Naval Matters\\npossible to the People, and important to the Nation.\\nI. How the motive of the War gave Direction to its Earlier Movements.\\nStrategic Value of Puerto Rico. Consideration on the Size and\\nQualities of Battleships. Mutual Relations of Coast Defence and\\nNavy.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0277.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, Continued\\nCONTENTS, continued\\nII. The Effect of Deficient Coast-Defence upon the Movements of the\\nNavy. The Military and Naval Conditions of Spain at the Out-\\nbreak of the War.\\nIII. Possibilities open to the Spanish Navy at the Beginning of the War.\\nThe Reasons for Blockading Cuba. First Movements of the Squad-\\nrons under Admirals Sampson and Cervera.\\nIV. Problems presented by Cervera s Appearance in West Indian Waters.\\nMovements of the United States Divisions and of the Oregon.\\nFunctions of Cruisers in a Naval Campaign.\\nV. The Guard set over Cervera. Influence of Inadequate Numbers upon\\nthe Conduct of Naval and Military Operations. Camara s Rush\\nthrough the Mediterranean, and Consequent Measures taken by the\\nUnited States.\\nThe Peace Conference and the Moral Aspect of War.\\nThe Relations of the United States to their New Dependencies.\\nDistinguishing Qualities of Ships of W^ar.\\nCurrent fallacies upon Naval Subjects.\\nA most admirable review of the war with Spain. The\\nlessons deduced are both impressive and rational. Detroit Journal.\\nThe essays upon the war with Spain are a very instructive and\\ninteresting analysis of the naval operations in the West Indies, and,\\nconsidered as a discussion of the war as actually conducted, could\\nnot easily be improved. The author s professional knowledge and\\nhis study of the broader problems of naval strategy give lucid expo-\\nsitions of the recurring critical situations in the Caribbean Sea, while\\nhis position as a member of the strategy board at Washington makes\\nhis explanation of the reasons which controlled the conflict author-\\nitative. The Nation, N. Y.\\nThey deal authoritatively with very great and vital questions.\\nThere are no more significant passages of his book than those in\\nwhich he urges his countrymen, in tlie calm which has followed the\\nstorm of war, to look well to their gates and to prepare an\\nadequate armored fleet against the inevitable next emergency.\\nBoston Journal.\\nA suggestive and illuminating book. Buffalo Express.\\nShould be read by every American who wishes to see what a\\nprofound thinker and naval expert thinks of the events of the last\\ntwo years. Minneapolis Journal.\\nLITTLE, BROWN, COMPANY, Publishers\\n254 Washington Street, Boston.", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0278.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0279.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0280.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2860", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "problemofasiaits00maha_0281.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "s\\nX .^v^\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2X\\nc^- _\\n.H t^^\\nxO e.,\\nx*?-\\nV\\na I V\\n.0 o\\no.\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^^c.^\\nc^\\n.y-\\n^S t\\nDeacidified using the Bookkeeper process.\\nNeutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide\\nTreatment Date; March 2003\\nPreservationTechnologies\\nA WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION\\n111 Thomson Park Drive\\nCranberry Township. 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