{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3504", "width": "2015", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "x ^^U\\ni3^^ i f^- K^\\n^c j /i^\\n.xV\\n1 o ,i^\\nt^ v^\\nif", "height": "3418", "width": "1903", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": ",0o\\nA\\nv.\\no\\n:r. .x^-\\nO 0\\ny:\\nh^:-\\n.A\\n3 O\\nA\\n^A^ V-\\nj A^\\nV\\nA\\nA^\\n,A -7*,\\nv^^\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^A", "height": "3418", "width": "1903", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3384", "width": "1774", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3384", "width": "1774", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3398", "width": "1830", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "Digitized by the Internet Archive\\nin 2011 with funding from\\nThe Library of Congress\\nhttp://www.archive.org/details/conversationsonsOOelye", "height": "3398", "width": "1830", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3397", "width": "1862", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATiaNS\\nON THE\\nSCIENCE\\nOF THE\\nHUMAN MIND.", "height": "3397", "width": "1862", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3404", "width": "1942", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "X y\\neONVERSATIONS\\nON THE\\nSCIENCE\\nOF THE\\nHUMAN MIND,\\nBY EZRA STILES ELY, D. D.\\nPastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the City of Philadelphia.\\nPHILADELPHIA:\\nPRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.\\nSOLD Br A. FINLEY, CGBJfEIl OF CHESI^UT AKD JOURTH STREETS.\\nWilliam Fry, Printer,\\n1S\\\\9.", "height": "3398", "width": "1799", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit:\\n3J, YY REMEMBERED, that on the nineteenth day of\\nI Seal. April, in the forty -third year of the Independence of the\\nUnited States of America, A. D^,, 1819, Ezra Stiles Ely,\\nD. D. of the said District, hath deposited in this office the title of\\na Book, the right whereof he claims as author, in the words following,\\nto wit:\\nConversations on the Science of the Human Mind. By Ezra Stiles\\nEly, D. D. Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the city of\\nPhiladelphia.\\nIn conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States,\\nentitled, An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing\\nthe Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprie-\\ntors of such Copies, during the times therein mentioned. And also\\nto the Act, entitled, an Act supplementary to an Act, entitled, an\\nAct for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of\\nMaps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such\\nCopies during the times therein mentioned, and extending the be-\\nnefits thereof to the Arts of designing, engraving, and etching histo-\\nI ical and other, Prints.\\nD. CALDWELL,\\nClerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.", "height": "3377", "width": "1864", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "Contents, ix\\nUses of the word Taste.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 -Emotions. Description of the principal\\nAffections of Man. A rule concerning inordinate Affection. Re-\\ngard. Page lOS\\nCONVERSATION XI.\\nAccount of the Human Passions. Lawful Passions. Some general\\nIjaws of Feeling. Sympathy, Commisei-ation, Compassion, defin-\\ned. Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of\\nour Mental Nature. 125\\nCONVERSATION XII.\\nThe Faculty of Volition, or the Will. Some contemplated action\\nthe object of every Volition. Desire and Preference different from\\nVolition. The Will a dependent Faculty. Perception and Con-\\nception the only independent Faculties of the Mind. Definition of\\nVolition and Motive. Inducement and JSIolive distinguished.\\nSeveral general Rules concerning Volition. An Inference concern-\\ning the importance of regulating oar Thoughts. 133\\nCONVERSATION XIII.\\nThe Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. An Operation of this Faculty\\ndistinguished. Prnof of the Existence of this Faculty. Objects of\\nour Efficiency. Some Operations of Man that are ordinarily per-\\nformed without Volition, may be performed from Voluntary Exer-\\ntion. How the Mind exerts aQ Agency on the Body is unknown\\nby us. The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental\\nFaculties considered. On the Consciousness, Perception, Concep-\\ntion, c. 144\\nCONVERSATION XIV.\\nConsideration of several Attributes of the Soul which are not inhe-\\nrent. Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity. Of Physica\\\\\\nLiberty and Necessity. Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and\\nMetaphysical Necessities. 161", "height": "3377", "width": "1864", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "Contents,\\nCONVERSATION XV.\\nDisposition of Mind. Inclination. Habit.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Imitation. Consideration\\nof several Principles of Human Actions. Principles of Substances,\\nSciences, Actions, and Moral Actions. Sentiments. Instinct.\\nInstinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations. Page 173\\nCONVERSATION XVI.\\nSeveral Complex Operations of Man considered.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Attention, Obser-\\nvation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contem-\\nI)lation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nCompounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name given to\\nseveral successive Conceptions. 186\\nCONVERSATION XVII.\\nImprovement and Injui y of the Original Faculties of the Mind. They\\nhave their Infantile state Exercise and Discipline the chief means\\nof their Improvement. Insanity, a state of mind resulting from\\nsome Injury. Dreaming. 200\\nCONVERSATION XVIII.\\nComparative Mental Science. 208\\nCONVERSATION XIX.\\nRecapitulation of the Principal Doctrines, taught in the preceding\\nConversations. 218", "height": "3405", "width": "1886", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "1%-\\nV\\nrt.\\n^1\\nPREFACE,\\nThe writer of the following pages has endea-\\nvoured to exhibit, in a familiar manner, the Ele-\\nments OF THE Science of the Human Mind.\\nThe sources whence he has drawn his doctrines,\\nare his own consciousness, memory, and reflection;\\nand the writings of Locke, Hume, Price, Hart-\\nley, Lord Karnes, Reid, Stewart, Duncan, Pre-\\nsident Edwards, Beattie, Watts, Condillac, and\\nCogan. What he deems true, and most important\\nin all these celebrated authors, will be found in this\\ncompendium. He disclaims all metaphysics but those\\nof commoJi sense.\\nHe flatters himself, that these Conversations will\\nprove beneficial to Students in Law, Medicine, and\\nDivinity,* and to the most^ intelligent young ladies\\nof our country.\\nNo science is so intimately connected with all\\nother systematic arrangements of knowledge as that\\nof v/hich he has here treated; and he cannot but\\nhope, therefore, that many who have neither time\\nnor patience to peruse many volumes, will do him\\nthe honour of thoroughly examining one.\\nPhiladelphia, January 1st, 1819.\\nA 2", "height": "3405", "width": "1886", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3409", "width": "1926", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nCONVERSATION I.\\nIntroduction. The chief Obstruction to the Advancement of the\\nScience of the Soul. Its utility. Page IS\\nCONVERSATION 11.\\nThe Human Soul defined. Consciousness. Judgment. Axioms.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nSubstances.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Attributes. Mind and Matter distinct things. 21\\nCONVERSATION III.\\nFaculty defined.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Body. Simple and Complex Operations.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Essen-\\ntial and Incidental Attributes \u00e2\u0080\u0094Ten Faculties of the Human Mind\\nenumerated. All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for\\nall his Actions. 32\\nCONVERSATION IV.\\nDefinitions.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Genus and Species. The Faculty of Perception. Five\\nkinds of Perceptions. Instrumentality of bodily Organs.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Conscious-\\nness. 39\\nCONVERSATION V.\\nThe Faculty of Understanding or Conception. Different Operations\\nof this Faculty. Imagination. Discernment. Comprehension.\\nApprehension. Intuition. Some general laws of Conception.\\nThe Importance of this Faculty. SI", "height": "3409", "width": "1926", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "viii Contents.\\nCONVERSATION VI.\\nThe Faculty of Judging. Objects of Judgment. A Truth. A False-\\nhood Classification of Judgments. They are Constitutional or\\nAcquired. The former are consequent on Consciousness, Percep-\\ntion, (Conception, Memory or Conscience. The latter result from\\nReflection, Reasoning, or Testimony. Believing considered.\\nPage 59\\nCONVERSATION VII.\\nThe Faculty of Memory. Objects of Memory. Local Memory.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nClassification of the Operations of Memory. Recollection. Re\\nmembrance. Memory essential to some Conceptions. Time.\\nDuration. Futurity. Identity o Knowledge of our own .continued\\nMental Identity. Personal Identity. 76\\nCONVERSATION VIII.\\nThe Faculty of Reasoning. Premises. Conclusion.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 A Syllogism.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nClassification of Reasonings. Demonstrative and Probable Reason-\\nings. Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings. Analogical,\\nAnalytic, and Synthetic Reasonings. Reasonings a priori, a poste-\\nriori, ad absurdurn, and ad homiuem. 89\\nCONVERSATION IX.\\nThe Faculty of Conscience. Proof that all men have this FacuHy.\\nOther names fpr the same thing. Some general Observations and\\nLaM s concerning the Operations of Conscience. Operations of Con-\\nscience always occasion certain Feelings. 101\\nCONVERSATION X.\\nThe Faculty of Feeling. Feelings distinguished from other, Mental\\nOperation s. One general Law of Feelings. Classification of all\\nHuman Feelings.\u00e2\u0080\u0094Sensations considered. Three Appetites.", "height": "3448", "width": "1871", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATIONS.", "height": "3411", "width": "1797", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "i", "height": "3510", "width": "1958", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATIONS\\nON THE\\nSCIENCE\\nOF THE\\nHUMAN MIND.\\nCONVERSATION I.\\nIntroduction.^ The chief obstruction to the advancement of the\\nScience of the Soul. Its utility.\\nPupil. You have proposed, Sir, to conduct me\\nthrough the thorny maze of Metaphysics; and I\\ndesign to follow you, if not with equal steps, at least\\nwith equal ardour. Once, 1 confess, that I hated\\nevery thing that could be denominated metaphysics.\\nProfessor. You would make me promise too\\nmuch. I have only proposed to teach you the ru-\\ndiments of the science of the human soitl^ which de-\\npartment of knowledge is expressed, in a modern\\nclassification of universal science, by the term An-\\nthropsychia; but which is rather indefinitely called\\nThe Philosophy of the Human Mind, by all our\\nancient writers. This specific science is only one\\nbranch of metaphysics^ which treats of the nature,\\nB", "height": "3300", "width": "1846", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "14 Principal Obstructions to\\nrelations, and operations of all substances and their\\nattributes. But tell me, why do you speak of the\\nthorny maze of metaphysics; and why did you hate\\nthe name of this extensive science?\\nPupiL Because I thought all metaphysical reason-\\nings unintelligible and useless; especially if they re-\\nlated to the human soul. Until you constrained me\\nto study the works of Dr. Reid and his successor,\\nProfessor Stewart, I was ready to despair of obtain-\\ning any distinct and satisfactory conceptions on this\\nsubject.\\nProfessor, Whence arose your principal difficul-\\nties in attempting to acquire a thorough acquaint-\\nance with the human soul?\\nPupil. I had not learned, that in mental science\\na man must primarily regard his own consciousness\\nof what passes within himself, and look to it for the\\nfacts from which he is to reason; just as the natural\\nphilosopher looks to his perception of external ob-\\njects for all the phenomena, whence he is to derive\\nthose general observations, which are called the\\nlaws of nature. In the next place, the writers with\\nwhom r was conversant, did not appear to be mas-\\nters of their subject.\\nProfessor, And what is your chief obstruction\\nnow?\\nPupiL It is either the imperfection of language,\\nor else the imperfect use which metaphysical writers\\nhave made of the terms which they possess;* and I\\nam not able at present to determine which.\\nA specimen of the improper use of terms, and of metaphysical\\njargou, may be given from Hume s Treatise of Human J^ature^ vol. i.", "height": "3355", "width": "1925", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "Mental Science. lo\\nProfessor, It will be my business to convince you,\\nby actual experiment, I hope, that were the same\\nprecision of language to be adopted in teaching that\\nwhich is known of the human soul, as has prevailed\\nin natural philosophy and mathematics, there might\\nbe made as great advances, and enjoyed as much\\ncertainty in Anthrcpsychia^ as in the two last\\nsciences. The same word has been used by the\\nsame writer in two or three different senses, inter-\\nchangeably; and two terms have been adopted to\\ndenote in some instances, the same, and in others\\ndifferent objects. Nothing has contributed so much\\np. 29. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us\\nperceive heat and cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some\\nkind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind,\\nwhich remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea.\\nThis idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces\\nthe new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may\\nbe properly called impressions of reflection, because derived from it.\\nThese again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become\\nideas; which, perhaps, in their turn, give rise to other impressions\\nand ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent\\nto their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and\\nderived from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more\\nto anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral;- and therefore\\nshall not at present be entered upon.**^\\nAny body who can disentangle this skein of terms will obtain more\\ncredit for his patience than for his intelligence; and were all meta-\\nphysics like those of Hume, we should advise mankind to waste no\\ntime upon them. In the language of common sense, an Impression can\\nbe made, strictly speaking, on nothing but material objects. Impres-\\nsions are made on our bodily organs of sense; but in the mind there\\nare no impressions, unless by a figure of speech we call our percep\\ntions or conceptions, by that name. In some places, Mr. Hume speaks\\noi perceptions when he writes the word impr essionsi and of the\\nconception of oxxf perceptions, when he talks of ideas or copies of\\nimpressions.", "height": "3319", "width": "1790", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "16 Precision in Terma\\nto produce your thorny maze as the want of defini-\\ntions for important terms, and a strict adherence to\\nthem when given.* Even President Edwards in his\\nEnquiry into the Freedom of the Will, uses the\\nword necessity to denote a physical necessity, and\\nsometimes nothing more than the certain futurition\\nof an event; in such a manner as to produce no lit-\\ntle obscurity. Locke uses the words understanding\\nand ideas without much precision; for the first he\\nThe difference in the meaning affixed to words, by different wri-\\nters, is one of the greatest impediments to the discoveries of moral\\ntruths, and the most difficult to surmount. Complex terms being fre-\\nquently composed of many parts, and each pai-t intermixing its own\\nsignification, they are frequently exposed to different constructions:\\nand in controversial subjects, if two authors annex different ideas to\\nthe same term, they are taking different courses, and Avill soon steer\\nout of sight of each others argument. Dr. Reid has justly expatiated\\napon the necessity of accurate definitions, without his having always\\nmade them; and his pupil. Dr. Beattie, has very seldom regarded\\nthem. Even that great master of reason, Mr. Locke, who has written\\nJn so satisfactory a manner on the errors occasioned by the abuse of\\nwords, has involved some of his ideas in great obscurity, through the\\nwant of due attention to their precise import. Perhaps no philosopher,\\nancient or modern, has taken greater liberties with language than\\nMr. Hume. Co^aw 5 Ethical Questions.\\n**I know that there are not words enough in any language, to an-\\nswer all the variety of ideas that enter into man s discourses and rea-\\nsonings. But this hinders not that when any one uses any term he\\nmay have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of,\\nand to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present\\ndiscourse. When he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends\\nto dear and distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so. Therefore, there\\ncan be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, when terms are\\nmade use of, which have not such a precise determination. Locke.\\nThere is no greater impediment to the advancemeut of knowledge\\nthan the arhbiguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that we find\\nsects and parties in most branches of science; and disputes, which\\nare carried on from age to age, without being brought to an issue.\\nReid.", "height": "3351", "width": "1788", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "absolutely Necessary* 17\\ncalls a single faculty in some places, and in others\\nit includes the whole human soiil^ with the exception\\nof the ivilL By ideas he sometimes intends notions,\\nconceptions, or opinions, and sometimes images of\\nthe objects of perception, which he supposes to be\\nconveyed to the mind. Reid and Stewart also use\\nseveral terms, such as faculty and power^ both\\nas synonymous and not synonymous; while they\\nemploy many other words, about the meaning of\\nwhich mankind do not agree, without accurately\\ndescribing the meaning which they attach to those\\nsymbols of thought. I am senaible, that the preci-\\nsion of language which I have prescribed to myself\\nin our conversations, will render my style formal\\nand dry; but I flatter myself, that what is lost in\\nease and sprightliness of diction, will be amply\\ncompensated for by the certainty of the knowledge\\nacquired.\\nPupil, Before you proceed to propose your sys-\\ntem, Sir, will you have the goodness to state wherein\\nconsists the usefulness of the science of the human\\nsoul? May we not think and reason, feel and act,\\nwhile we remain in utter ignorance of it?^\\nTis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less,\\nto human nature; and that however wide anj of them mar seem to\\nrun from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even\\nJMathematics, J\\\\atural Philosophy^ and JS^atural Religion^ are in\\nsome measure dependent on the science of Max; since they lie under\\nthe cognizance of man, and are judged of by their powers and faculties.\\nTis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might\\nmake in these sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with the\\nextent and force of human understanding, and could explain the na-\\nture of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in\\nreasoning. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not\\nB 2", "height": "3342", "width": "1862", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "1 8 Utility of the Science\\nProfessor, Can you seriously ask, of what use is\\nthis science? Surely it must be profitable to man to\\nunderstand the nature of his own bodily organs; for\\notherwise he could not employ them aright. You\\nwould laugh at him who should persist in attempt-\\ning to walk on his hands, to see with his ears, to\\nhear with his eyes, and to write with his lips. Of\\nhow much greater importance must it be for him\\nto understand the nature, number, and operations\\nof the faculties of the intelligent, sensitive, and ef-\\nficient part of his complex being? The inherent\\nparts of the constitution of our souls are like mental\\ncomprised in the science of man; and there is none, ^vbich can be\\ndecided Mith any certainty, before we become acquainted -with that\\nscience. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human\\nnature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built\\non a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they\\ncan stand with any security. And, as the science of man is the only\\nsolid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we\\ncan give to this science itself must be laid on experience and obser-\\nvation. Hume s Treatise on Human JVature.\\nBy quoting some admirable sayings from Mr. Hume, we shall not\\nrender ourselves I esponsible for his numerous errors. Mental science\\nis built upon consciousness; which Mr Hume calls experience; and\\nthe testimony of others concerning their consciousness. Our know-\\nledge of the operations of our own minds and of the minds of other\\npeople, he wouW say we have by experience and observation. His re-\\nmark, that mental science lays a foundation for a complete system\\nof the sciences, has been verified in the review of Judge Woodward s\\nsplendid work on Universal Science, contained in the Anakctic Ma-\\ngazine, vol. ix. p. 89, 105, 106.\\n1 have there evinced, that a systematic arrangement of all hu-\\nman sciences may be founded on the operations of two fp.culties,\\nperception and conception; for all our knowledge is of things per-\\nceived through the organs of sense, or of tliings conceived of by the", "height": "3322", "width": "1812", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "of the Human Mind, 19\\n\u00c2\u00a9rgans, by which we perform our mental work and\\nappropriate our own intellectual activity to the pro-\\nmotion of our happiness. To know ourselves, is to\\nbe prepared for profitable exertions, and a cheerful\\ndischarge of duty. If you are thoroughly versed in\\nthe science which you are now pursuing, you will\\nbe able to refer every duty enjoined to the ori-\\nginal constitution of your mind by which it is to be\\nperformed; you will be able to make accurate dis-\\ncriminations; will profitably classify the objects of\\nyour thoughts; will be prepared to investigate every\\nother science, by knowing the foundation of human\\nreasoning, and the talents which we have received\\nfor cultivating it; will be. able to detect error and\\ndefend the truth; and in short will experience all\\nthe advantages which knowledge can boast over ig-,\\nnorance. No man can reason well in any science,\\nor employ his knowledge to advantage, any farther\\nthan he is a good, practical metaphysician. The\\nutility of the science of the human soul will, how-\\never, best appear from the developement of the sci-\\nence itself.*\\nPupil. I can say in its favour, that the pursuit of\\nit has begun to afford me more permanent pleasure\\nWe must, therefore, glean up our experiments in this science,\\nfrom a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they ap-\\npear in the common course of the world, by men s behaviour in com-\\npany, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this\\nkind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish\\n\u00c2\u00a9n them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be\\nmuch superior in utility to any other of human comprehension.*\\nHume.", "height": "3316", "width": "1798", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "2\u00c2\u00a9 A Desideratum*\\nthan all the works of taste; and I hope you will ex-\\nhibit the elements of it so plainly as to banish from\\nthe world metaphysical jargon and nonsense, which\\nusurping the names of philosophy, wisdom, and me-\\ntaphysics, have disgusted many, and induced the\\ngreat body of the people to believe, that one who\\nwould become a metaphysician must renounce com-\\nmon sense.\\nProfessor, A systematic treatise of the kind you\\ndescribe, is greatly to be desired. Such an one does\\nnot exist; for Dr. Reid, who has excelled all other\\nwriters on this subject, employed himself rather in\\ndemolishing an old fabrick, than in building up a\\nnew one. Professor Stewart is but an elegant com-\\nmentator upon Reid, without originality, and with-\\nout any comprehensive arrangement of the topics\\nof mental science.", "height": "3358", "width": "1898", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION II.\\nThe Human Soul defined. Consciousness. Judgment. Axioms.-^-\\nSubstances. Attributes. Mind and Matter distinct things.\\nPupil. Since you last admitted me to your cham-\\nber, Sir, I have paid some attention to Watts on the\\nImprovement of the Mind; and I beg leave to read\\na passage from him. If we would improve our\\nminds, he says, by conversation, it is a great\\nhappiness to be acquainted with persons wiser than\\nourselves. It is a piece of useful advice therefore to\\nget the favour of their conversation frequently, as\\nfar as circumstances will allow: and if they happen\\nto be a little reserved, use all obliging methods to\\ndraw out of them what may increase your own know-\\nledge. Now Sir, I design to ask you questions,\\nand shall plead the advice of Dr. Watts in justifi-\\ncation of my conduct.\\nProfessor, I have known you, for some time past,\\nto be an expert youth at interrogation; and so, with-\\nout apology, proceed, to your full satisfaction.\\nPupil. Well, Sir, what is tlie human soul?\\nProfessor, It is that part of the complex being\\ncalled man, which thinks, feels, wills, and acts.^\\nPupil, Why do you call man a complex being?\\nBy the mind of a man, says Reid, we understand that in liim\\nwhich thinks, remembers, reasons, wills. It is true that mind would\\nbe distinguished from every other substance, should we merely affirm\\nthat it is that -which thinks,- but if the description is extended, it seems\\nto be desirable to characterize it by such terms as include all its opera-", "height": "3324", "width": "1749", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "22 Of Body and Mind.\\nProfessor, Because he evidently consists in part\\nof a substance which does not think, feel, will, and\\nact; which we call body; and of another part that\\ndoes; which is called the soul, or the mind.\\nPupil, How do you know that you have a body?\\nProfessor, I perceive the properties of a body,\\non which I am conscious that I act.\\nPupiL How do you know you perceive proper-\\nties of a body?\\nProfessor, I am conscious that I perceive several\\nof the properties of my body.\\nPupiL How do you know that you think, feel,\\nwill and act?\\nProfessor, I am conscious of every one of my\\nmental operations.\\nPupil, It seems, then, that we have ultimately\\nthe same proof of a mental operation which we have\\nof the properties and existence of a body.\\nProfessor, The very same; and therefore I as-\\nsert, that the basis of natural history, natural philo-\\nsophy, and the mathematics, is no firmer than the\\nbasis of mental science.*\\ntions. This, Reid has not done, for the mind is a sensitive as well as\\na cogitative being. Besides, to remember and to reason, are operations\\nthat come under the general description of thinking. The reader will\\nsoon conceive that eveiy thing which the mind does may be reduced\\nto the four classes of operations enumerated in the text.\\nIt is not matter, or body, which I perceive by ray senses; but\\nonly extension, figure, colour, and certain othei qualities, which the\\nconstitution of my nature leads me to refer to something, which is ex-\\ntended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with re-\\nspect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but\\nwe are conscious of sensation, thought and volition; operations, which\\nimply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every", "height": "3378", "width": "1866", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "Of Body and Mind, 23\\nFupiL But you have not proved yet, that you\\nhave a soul: you have only shown, that you are\\nconscious of your own mental operations. How do\\nyou know you have a soul?\\nProfessor, Dr. Reid would have answered, that\\nhe was conscious of his own existence; but my opi-\\nnion is, that consciousness is the knowledge which\\none has of his own present mental operations^ and I\\nshall use the word only in this sense. That I exist,\\nis a proposition which 1 judge to be true, so soon\\nas it is stated to me, or framed by my own mind,\\nwithout any reasoning or reflection on the subject.\\nThe proposition is self-evident to every man, and\\nthe act of the mind in judging it to be true, is a\\nconstitutional judgment, I am conscious that I judge\\nmyself to exist; and such is the make of our minds,\\nthat we cannot use a personal pronoun, or an active\\nor passive verb, in the first person singular, or plu-\\nral, without having this constitutional judgment.\\nThere is not a man living, who really doubts his\\nown existence: and the reason is, that the Creator\\nhas so formed, and so governs, the human mind, that\\nit ever thus judges, concerning its own being. Should\\nman too is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all those sen-\\nsations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being; to\\nthat being which he calls himself, a being, which he is led, by the\\nconstit; tion of his naiure, to consider as something distinct from his\\nhodv, and as not litble to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any\\nof his organs. From these considerations it apjiears, that we have the\\nsame evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the exist-\\nence of body; npy, if there be any difference between the two cases,\\nthat we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggest-\\ned to us -by the subjects of our own consciousness, and the other\\nmerely by the objects of our own perceptions. Stexvart.", "height": "3331", "width": "1862", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "24 Foundations of Science.\\nany man wish to judge otherwise, he would find\\nhimself incapable of doing it, and, therefore, we as-\\nsert, that this constitutional judgment is necessary.\\nPupil. You would have me understand, I appre-\\nhend, that necessary, or constitutional judgments,\\nlie at the foundation of the science of the human\\nmind.\\nProfessor, They are the basis of every science:\\nand the foundation on which all our systems of\\nknowledge are erected. Do not the mathematicians\\nbegin their course by settling a few axioms^ And\\nwhat are axioms but self-evident propositions, to\\nwhich every mind, necessarily,- from its constitu-\\ntion, gives assent, so soon as the meaning of them\\nis apprehended?\\nPupiL Some of these constitutional judgments I\\nhope to hear you state ere long; but will you no\\\\^^\\nhave the goodness to tell me, what is the real essence\\nof this thing which thinks, feels, wills, and acts?\\nProfessor. Here I must confess myself unable to\\nanswer you in any other way, than by acknowledg-\\ning my own ignorance, and expressing my persua-\\nsion, that no man in the present life, will ever enjoy\\nthe ability of perceiving the essence of any substance.\\nOne thing I may venture to promise, that when you,\\nor any one else, will teach me to comprehend the\\nessence of matter, I will explain to you the essence\\nof mind. We know no more of the one than of the\\nother.\\nPupiL How, then, do you know that mind and\\nmatter are distinct things; and that there is any es-\\nsential difference between them?\\nProfessor, Your question requires something of", "height": "3364", "width": "1900", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "Attributes, SJ5\\na dissertation, for an answer. I must give you some\\npreliminary statements too, that you may not mis-\\nunderstand me. Observe then, that I use the words\\nmind and soul as synonymous: that any thing to\\nwhich you truly ascribe thought, feeling, volition^\\nor agency, or any or all of these, is what I call a\\nsoul or mind: and that any thing which is the sub-\\nject of inherent attributes is said to subsist, and is\\ncalled a substance.*\\nPupiL But let me know what you intend by in-\\nherent attributes^ before you proceed.\\nProfessor. Any thing attributed to another, which\\nappertains to its original constitution, and without\\nw^hich it would not be the same thing, is an inherent\\nattribute. Were all the inherent attributes of any\\nsubstance to be taken away, v/e should have no\\nknowledge of its existence. Thus, should the facul-\\nties of thought, feeling, volition, and agency be taken\\naway from any thing which we call mind, we should\\nno longer have any knowledge of the existence of\\nthat mind; nor can we even conceive of a substance\\nwhich thinks, and yet has no faculty for thought;\\nwhich feels, wills, and voluntarily acts, and yet has\\nno faculties for performing these mental operations.\\nSubstance I find a very convenient word, and having given the\\nsense in which I shall use it, I see no objection to it, which will not\\nequally militate against Reid and Stewart, when they speak of that\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0which thinks, or of something extended. Mr. Hume tells us, that the\\nidea of substance can be derived neither from impressions of sensa-\\ntion, nor from impressions of reflection. We assent, whpt then?\\ncan we not conceive of substance, as well as o^time, space, and a thou-\\nsand other things? Mr. Locke and Mr. Hume were both erroneous in\\nmantaining that all our ideas are derived either /rem sensation or\\nreflection.\\nc", "height": "3303", "width": "1699", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "26 Body and Mind\\nLet me illustrate what I mean by inherent attri-\\nbutes^ in speaking of matter. Gravity, extension, in-\\nactivity, insensibility, and divisibility are attributes\\nof every particle of matter which we call inherent;\\nbecause we conceive them to inhere in the very na-\\nture of the thing; and were these all taken away,\\nwe could form no notion of the meaning of the word.\\n7natter. Nothing extended, and inactive would then\\nremain. Any number of particles of matter united,\\nor organized, consiitute what we call a body. Now\\nyou ask proof of the accuracy of the prevailing opi-\\nnion, that body and mind are two distinct substances.\\nOf the essence of any substance, you have already\\nlearned, that I do not design to speak. Now! af-\\nfirm, that I am conscious of perceiving some of the\\ninherent attributes of one thing which is called an\\negg; and of another, which is called an apple; and\\nI judge, that the objects of my perception really\\nexist. I cannot doubt their existence. This I find-\\nthen to be a law of my nature, that I should judge\\nthe thing which I perceive to have existence. The\\nmental operation oi judging implies the existence\\nof the faculty which is denominated the judgment.\\nThis faculty, I am conscious, uniformly operates\\nin the same way, in relation to some propositions;\\nso that I no sooner understand the meaning of the\\nproposition, that the things perceived through the\\nbodily organs, called the Jive senses, really exist,\\nthan I judge it to be true. Every other man of a\\nsane mind has, under similar circumstances, a\\nsimilar judgment, which results from the original\\nconstitution, and the established government of the\\nhuman soul. Of this judgment every rational maa", "height": "3377", "width": "1858", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "distinct Things. 27\\nis conscious; and testifies that he is conscious, to his\\ncompanions. I judge, and I am conscious that I\\njudge, therefore, that an eg^^ and an apple .are be-\\nfore me. Bat I also jud^e^ with a like knowledge\\nof my own judgment, that the egg is one substance,\\nand the apple another substance; or that they are\\ntwo distinct material substances. This judgment\\nfollows a previous judgment, that the inherent at-\\ntributes of an egg are different from those of an\\napple; which last judgment immediately follows my\\nperception of the attributes of one and of the other,\\nand my discernment of the difference between those\\nwhich appertain to the one, and those which inhere\\nin the other. Thus, I perceive the shape and tex-\\nture, the colour, taste, and fragrance of the apple; and\\nthen I perceive the shape, texture, colour and taste of\\nthe egg I conceive of a difference between the things\\nperceived in one, and those perceived ip. the other;\\nand then follows my judgment, that they are differ-\\nent things; each of which is called a substance. Of\\nthis judgment I am conscious, and therefore I say,\\nI know that an egg and an apple are two different\\nand distinct substances. An tgg is one thing that\\nsubsists^ to which we attribute a certain number of\\nthings, that being deprived of, it would no longer\\nbe recognized as an egg; and an apple is another\\nthing that subsists; that is, an apple is another sub-\\nstance. In this manner we actually, and philosophi-\\ncally discriminate between different individuals,\\nwhether inanimate, or animate; and between differ-\\nent classes of things. So universal is the practical\\noperation of this philosophy, that in every land, he\\nwould be called a fool, who should affirm, that be-", "height": "3331", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "2S Mind and Matter\\ntween the sun and moon, earth and water, birds and\\nmen, there is no substantial difference. But you\\nwish me to prove, that mind is one substance, and\\nmatter another. Every man may arrive at personal\\nsatisfaction on this subject, precisely in the v/ay\\nthat I do. Thus, I judge involuntarily, and con-\\nstitutionally, that somethings which I call by the\\npronoun exists. I am conscious that I think, feel,\\nwill, and act; and I judge that /have faculties for\\nthinking, feeling, v/illing, and acting; because think-\\ning is an effect, and a faculty for thinking a cause;\\nand because I judge moreover, that every effect\\nmust have some cause. These faculties are inherent\\nattributes of that somethings which I call I; and\\nwere they all taken away there would remain no-\\nthing of which I could have any conception, or de-\\nnominate by any personal pronoun. This somethings\\nwhich is the subject of these attributes, I call mind,\\nor soiiL I may give it this name to distinguish it\\nfrom every thing, which has not some of the same\\nattributes. If I find any thing which has any of\\nthese attributes, I determine to call that a 77iind too;\\nbut if I have knowledge of any thing which has\\nother attributes, but not one of these, I resolve to\\ncall it matter s to distinguish it; because I judge\\nihat those are different substances which are the\\nsubjects of different inherent attributes; and that\\nall thinking, feeling, willing, and acting substances\\nahould be classed under the head of mental sub-\\nstances; while all things not having in my judgment,\\nany of the faculties that produce any of these men-\\nial operations, should be considered as forming an-\\nother class, under the caption of material substances.", "height": "3377", "width": "1902", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "distinct Substances, 29\\nDo I, then, know of any thing in existence, which\\nis to be excUided from the first class, and assigned\\na place in the second? I am conscious, that I per-\\nceive many different objects, around me, in my\\nchamber; and one of them, about two feet in length,\\nI perceive to be in continual motion, while all the\\nrest are stationary. The little moving thing looks\\nme in the face, and (probably thinking that I am\\nsulky, because I am studious^) cries out, with mean-\\ning forehead and eyes, naughty papa! I call the\\nthing my daughter. I am not conscious that she\\nthinks, nor can I be conscious of any thing but of\\nmy own mental operations. But I am conscious,\\nthat I perceive her make such sounds, with her\\nmouth, as I have made from volition, with my own;\\nand I judge, that her speaking and my speaking\\nare similar effects, that must have a similar cause. I\\nknow, that I speak from volition alone; and I judge,\\nthat no one thing could speak without volition:\\ntherefore I conclude, that my daughter speaks from\\nvolition. If she performs the mental operation of\\nvolition, I judge she must have the faculty of voli-\\ntion; and if she has the faculty of volition, the thing\\nin which that attribute inheres belongs to the class\\nof mental substances, I have found, then, another\\nmind besides my own, I judge that my soul exists^\\nand I judge., that another soul exists; and the judg-\\nment in one case is as satisfatory to myself as in the\\nother. The external actions of my little daughter,\\nI call effects, of a thinking cause; and sometimes\\nsigns of thought., because every effect may be de-\\nnominated the sign of a cause. It is a judgment\\nthat results from my mental nature, that 7, xvho am\\nC 2", "height": "3311", "width": "1744", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "30 Mind and Matter distinguished,\\nconscious, exist; and that voluntary action proceeds^\\nfrom a xuilling agent.\\nPupil, I am not impatient, Sir, but it takes you\\na long time to come to the point.\\nProfessor, Well, I perceive on my paper a small\\nthing, which I call a particle of sand; I know, or\\nam conscious, that perceive it; and such is the\\nframe of my mind, that 1 judge the object of per-\\nception to have a real existence. I am conscious too,\\nthat I perceive it to be tangible, solid, extended, and\\ndivisible; to have gravity, and to be capable of mo-\\ntio7i, but not of action; for if left to itself it is sta-\\ntionary; but if I act upon it, motion is the result.\\nThese are some of the inherent attributes of all\\nthose things which I would classify under the gene-\\nral term matter. Having perceived these attributes\\nof the grain of sand, and discerning them to be dif-\\nferent from the attributes of mind, I judge that it\\nis a difftrent thing from that called mind; even a\\ndifferent substance. The perceptible difference be-\\ntween that something which thinks, or feels, or willsj\\nor acts, or does dl these things, and the grain of\\nsand, is certainly greater than the difference between\\nfire and water; and because I perceive in the sand\\nattributes which I find not in mind, and do not per-\\nceive in it any of the attributes which I have found\\nin the soul, therefore I conclude that matter and\\nmind are two distinct substances. In confirmation\\nof my own judgment, I have the testimony of all of\\nmy fellow men, that they have always found in cer-\\ntain things the attributes of a material substance, and\\nhave never found in any of these same substances\\nthe slightest indications of thought, feeling, volition,", "height": "3366", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "Mind and Matter distinguished. 31\\nor efficiency. The same remarks, which I have made\\nconcerning the grain of sand, will apply to every\\nother thing, whether in a simple, or organized state;\\nwhich is solid, extended, insensible, and moveable,\\nbut inactive.\\nPupil, And so you have made it appear, that we\\nperceive nothing but the attributes of matter, and\\nthe external indications of mind; and that we are\\nas well, and as clearly acquainted with the attributes\\nof the former as of the latter.*\\nFrofessor. Yes, and that our judgment concerning\\nthe existence of mental substances, is as solid and\\nsatisfactory, as that the material substances around\\nus exist.\\nThe essence both of body and of mind is unknown to us. We\\nknow certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the lasts\\nand by these only we can define or describe thera. Reid.", "height": "3315", "width": "1801", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION III.\\nFaculty defined. Body. Simple and Complex Operations. Essen-\\ntial and Incidental Attributes. Ten Faculties of the Human Mind\\nenumerated. All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for\\nall his actions.\\nPupil, You have frequently made use of the term\\nfaculty; will you have the kindness to make me\\nfully acquainted with the meaning which you attach\\nto it?\\nProfessor. By a faculty^ in general, I intend any\\ninherent part of the original constitution of a sub-\\nstance by which any distinct operation is performed.\\nA body is any number of organized particles of\\nmatter;* and this may have many bodily faculties.\\nThus the body of a man consists of many members;\\neach of which is a faculty for doing something: and\\nwere all these taken away, there would be no body\\nsubsisting; any more than if the particles of matter,\\nout of which it was organized, were reduced to\\ntheir native elements.\\nA mental faculty is any inherent part of the ori-\\nginal constitution of a mind, by v/hich it performs\\nany simple mental operation.\\n*Dr. Reid says, we define body to be that which is extended,\\nsolid, moveable, divisible; which is the description of matter in gene-\\nral, but not oi body in particular. The definition which I have given,\\ncorresponds with the most general and approved use of the word.", "height": "3375", "width": "1903", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "Mental Operations 3 3\\nPupiL Bat I would know what you mean by a\\nsimple mental operation.\\nProfessor, Any thing which the mind does, is a\\nmental operation: any thing which it performs by\\none of its faculties is a simple mental operation.\\nFor example; if you see, hear, reason, feel, choose,\\nand exert yourself, you perform so many simple\\nmental operations.\\nPupiL Your distinction would lead me to sup-\\npose, that some mental operations are complex.\\nProfessor. They certainly are: for it is the mind\\nwhich reads a paragraph in the Freemai-Cs Journal;\\nand this implies the perception of the words, to-\\ngether with the apprehension of their meaning. A\\nlittle child m\\\\^\\\\, perceive the words before he could\\nread at all. Should you read aloud^ an act of the\\nwill to make articulate sounds, and the exertion of\\nthe faculty of agency, together with those already\\nmentioned, would be included in reading.\\nPupiL It is evident then, because several facul-\\nties are concerned in the several acts, that declaim-\\ning, preaching, pleading, studying, running, fight-\\ning, and praying, are so many complex operations;\\nbut I wish to know if any of them but studying is\\na mental operation. Are running and fighting acts\\nof the mind?\\nProfessor, Some actions are neither exclusively\\nmental, nor exclusively corporal; for mind and body\\nboth are essential to their performance. We ascribe\\nth^m, therefore, to the complex being, man; and\\nsay that man reads aloud, declaims, preaches, prays\\naudibly, pleads, runs, and fights. These actions,\\ntherefore, which require the co-operation of two or", "height": "3307", "width": "1709", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "34 3Iental Operations.\\nmore faculties of man, whether they appertain t\\nthe body or the mind, we call complex operations:\\nbut if two or more mental faculties perform the\\nact, without the necessary intervention of any cor-\\nporal faculty, we call the action performed a com-\\nplex mental operation,\\nPiipiL It would seem to me, that seeing, hearing,\\nsmelling, tasting, touching, reasoning, and choosing,\\nare all of them complex operations.\\nProfessor, In the proper place, perhaps I may\\nconvince you, that they are all simple mental opera-\\ntions; or that they are distinct acts, which may\\nevery one of them be referred to some one mental\\nfaculty.\\nPupil, It would be strange, indeed, if you can\\nconvince me that eating is a mental act.\\nProfessor, Eating and tastings young man, are\\ntwo things, very easily distinguished; and the latter\\nis consequent upon the former. Eating is a complex\\noperation of an animal, who -wills to receive food\\ninto his mouth, and does what he wills, by his agency\\nupon his corporal faculties, given him for the pur-\\npose. Tasting is a perception of the flavour, or of\\nsome quality, or qualities of the food eaten. You\\nknow that in a diseased state of the palate and fauces,\\na man may eat^ and not taste his food. Hence he\\nsays, I have no taste; and sometimes, to express\\nthe same thing, all things taste alike to me.\\nPupil- You have intimated, in a former conver-\\nsation, that power and faculty are not convertible\\nterms; because, I conclude, you have use for thera\\nto signify different things: but if no expression is", "height": "3383", "width": "1923", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "Faculty and Power. 35\\nequivalent to that of mental faculty^ we shall be\\nsadly circumscribed in language.\\nProfessor* Our predicament will not be worse\\nthan that of the mathematicians, who always call a\\ntriangle a triangle. You may, however, call a men-\\ntal faculty a mental organ^ if you choose; and then,\\nyou will have two names for one thing.\\nPup iL Your philosophy would restrict the mean-\\ning of the word faculty as Reid has done, when he\\nsays, I apprehend that the word faculty is most\\nproperly applied to those powers of the mind which\\nare original and natural, and which make a part of\\nthe constitution of the mind.\\nProfessor, I mean by faculty what Reid under-\\nstood by an original and natural power; but I\\nnever call a faculty a power; because power is often\\nand most properly used as synonymous with ability;\\nand includes every thing essential to the production\\nof an effect. You can distinguish, between the exist-\\nence of something in our mental constitution, where-\\nby we reason, when we reason, and which exists\\nwhen not in operation; which is the faculty of rea-\\nsoning; and that which .puts the faculty into opera-\\ntion, so that we actually reason, which together con-\\nstitute the poruer of reasonings can you not?\\nPupil* I remember, at least, that you have else-\\nwhere said, that any thing called a power which is\\nnot adequate to the production of an effect, is a\\npowerless power* What do you think, Sir, of Lord\\nKames s use of the word faculty? He says, man\\nis provided by nature with a sense or faculty that\\nlays open to him every passion by means of its ex-\\nternal expressions.", "height": "3315", "width": "1709", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "36 Bifferent Attributes.\\nProfessor. I think he undoubtedly intended, that\\nevery man is so constituted, that he has the faculty\\nof judgment, by v/hich he involuntarily judges cer-\\ntain external expressions to be signs of internal pas-\\nsions. This faculty he considered to be as natural\\nto the mind as the faculty for smelling; and there-\\nfore he calls it a seiise^ or faculty; and would it not\\nlead to confusion, I would sometimes call a mental\\nfaculty a mental sense too.\\nPupil. In our last conversation, you taught me,\\nthat some attributes of mind and matter are inhe-\\nrent: pray do you class all other attributes under\\nsome general ternci?\\nProfessor. All attributes are inherent^ or such\\nas may be called incidental and extraneous. Any\\nthing, which you ascribe to another, which is not\\nessential to its subsistence, and which therefore\\nmay be considered as being without its essence, I\\ncall an incidental^ or an extraneous attribute. For in-\\nstance, a man may have the faculty of reason, with-\\nout actually reasoning: the faculti/ I call an inherent\\nattribute; but the act of reasoning is i?icidental or\\nextraneous. Solidity, gravity, extension, and divisi-\\nbility are inherent^ or essential attributes of a body;\\nbut the colour, the particular figure, the location,\\nand the motion of the same body, are .incidental;\\nfor an ivory ball will have the former attributes,\\nwhether it is in one place or another; whether it be\\nstained red, or is white, and whether it move, or is\\nstationary. From this example you will not find it\\ndifficult to class most of the attributes of subjects\\nwith which you are intimately acquainted.\\nIf you please, I shall now claim the privilege of", "height": "3393", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "Ten Mental Faculties* 37\\ninterrogating you, on subjects which have been fre-\\nquently presented to your attention; and if you have\\ndoubts about the truth and propriety of any part\\nof the system which I have inculcated, you are at\\nperfect liberty to express them.\\nWhat are the principal inherent attributes of the\\nhuman mind?\\nPupiL They are ten mental faculties; which, for\\nthe want of some new scientific terms, frequently\\nbear the names of the operations which they per-\\nform. They are denominated,\\nI. The Faculty of Perception.\\nII. The Faculty of Consciousness.\\nIII. The Faculty of Understanding.\\nIV. The Faculty of Judging.\\nV. The Faculty of Memory.\\nVI. The Faculty of Reasoning.\\nVII. The Faculty of Conscience,\\nVIII. The Faculty of Feeling.\\nIX. The Faculty of Volition.\\nX. The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency.\\nTo one, or other of these, may be attributed all\\n\u00c2\u00a9ur simple mental operations; and to some two or\\nmore of them, all the complex mental operations,\\nwith which we are acquainted.*\\nUpon a slight attention to the operations of our own minds,\\nsays Professor Stewart, they appear- to he so complicated, and so\\ninfinitely diversified, that it seems to he impossihle to reduce them\\nto any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate\\nexamination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which ap-\\npeared, at first, to be too various for our comprehension, are foimd\\nto be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and un-\\neompounded faculties. (3ondiii.ac remarks, that Centuries must\\nD", "height": "3315", "width": "1709", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "38 Mental Operations,\\nProfessor. What is wanting to account for all the\\noperations of a man?\\nPupiL Would we analize, and reduce to their\\nproper faculties, all the operations of man, we must\\nconsider his bodily as well as mental faculties; for\\nmany things are performed by the co-operation of\\ncorporal and mental organs. We must also consider\\nhis powers^ as well 2is faculties. You could not walk,\\nfor instance, without legs, a volition to use them,\\nand the exertion of the faculty of agency over them.\\nNeither could you eat without a mouth, and the\\nactivity of those mental faculties which are requi-\\nsite to put it in motion.\\nProfessor, Well, let us defer the consideration of\\nthe mental faculties till after dinner.\\nhave passed away before men could have suspected that thought can\\nbe subjected to laws; and even at this time the greatest number of\\nmankind think, without conceiving how it is done.", "height": "3380", "width": "1901", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION IV.\\nDefinitions.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Genus and Species.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Faculty of Perception.\u00e2\u0080\u0094Five\\nkinds of Perceptions.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Instrumentality of bodily Organs. Conscious-\\nProfessor, We resume the consideration of the\\nTen Faculties of the Human Soulj and I shall ex-\\npect my pupil in giving definitions, to remember\\nthe opinion of Dr. Reid, that there are many\\nv\u00c2\u00bb^ords, which, though they need explication, cannot\\nbe logically deftned; and that a logical definition,\\nthat is, a strict and proper definition, must express\\nthe kind of thing defined, and the specific difference,\\nby which the species defined, is distinguished from\\nevery other species belonging to that kind. Hence,\\nno word can be logically defined, which does not\\ndenote a species; because such things only can have\\na specific difference; and a specific difference is es-\\nsential to a logical definition-. On this account there\\ncan be no definition of individual things, such as\\nLondon and Paris. They may, however, be de-\\nscribed in such a way as to distinguish them from\\nall other cities.\\nPup iL I have found some difficulty result from\\nthe use of the words gemis^ species^ and individual:\\nI should like, therefore, to have them explained\\nbefore we proceed.", "height": "3315", "width": "1788", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "40 Genusy Species, and Individual.\\nProfessor, The explanation is easy. We have\\nperceived many objects, whose essential attributes\\nare alike; but whose incidental attributes are un-\\nlike; and we wish to class them, for our own con-\\nvenience. If the essential attributes of any number\\nof things are alike, we class them together, and say,\\nthey are of one genus^ or race. Thus we perceive\\nfifteen persons, v/ho indicate by their actions, the\\nexistence of the same mental faculties within; and\\nthey have evidently the same essential corporal\\nmembers. We say that they are of one genus. For\\nthis genus we wish a name that shall denote any\\none of the fifteen; and which shall distinguish any\\none, and each one, from any thing which belongs\\nto another genus; to the one, for instance, consist-\\ning of animals with four legs; and we call the name\\nman; by which any one of the fifteen persons is\\ndistinguished from a quadruped; and indeed, from\\nevery thing else, but one of his own genus, or gene-\\nral class of things. When I call a being a man, there-\\nfore, every one, who understands the language,\\nknows what kind of a thing I mean; but he knows\\nnot whether I intend a white man, a black man, or\\na red man; that is, he knows not what species of the\\ngenus I would designate. We find it /convenient,\\ntherefore, to make subordinate classes; and the\\ncommon rule is, to put those things together which\\nare alike in some of their principal incidental attri-\\nbutes. The colour of a man is an attribute of this\\ndescription; and we say, therefore, that five of these\\nfifteen men, being of a white colour, shall constitute\\nthe species of -white men; the five that are black,\\nthe species of black men; and the five which are red,", "height": "3381", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "Genus Species^ and Individuals. 41\\nthe species of red me?i. Thus, in the genus, which\\ncontains, by the supposition, fifteen, we have three\\nspecies. Suppose that each species contains a person\\nby the name of John. Now I wish to designate one\\nof these, so that the person to whom I speak, may\\nfix his thoughts on one; that is, on an individual. If\\nI call him a man, I point out only his genus, so that\\nmy auditor knows I do not mean a quadruped, or\\nreptile; but he knows not which of fifteen indivi-\\nduals I n ean. If I call him a xvhite man, he knows\\nthe genus and the species of the thing of which I\\nspeak, but he knows not which of five white men,\\nthat constitute the species of the genus, I mean.\\nLet me speak, then, of John, the white man^ and\\nhe understands me to designate an individual, who\\nis neither John the black man, nor John the red\\nman, nor any one else but the identical one person,\\nof whom I designed to have him think. In like\\nmanner, you may class any number of things, in\\nwhich you can perceive, or apprehend to be, some\\nsimilar and some dissimilar attributes; especially if\\nsome of them are essential, and others only inci-\\ndental.\\nPupil, Might we not have more classes of things?\\nProfessor. Undoubtedly: you might h^ve the\\nprovinces, classes, and orders of Judge Woodward;\\nand to them add, if you please, a genus and species.\\nThus, a person might be your provincial tt rm;\\n2L human person, your classical ii2iVLi^; ^ferncde hu\\nman person^ vour ordinal distifiction; a xvhite female\\nhuman person, \\\\QK-\\\\r generic \u00e2\u0096\u00a0pp-i)ntiorx; a tall white\\nfewxde human person, -fic clnsrnption; and\\nthen Jane, a tall xvhi.- v; ruun an person, would\\nD 2", "height": "3307", "width": "1709", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "10 42 Cksslfications.\\ni\\npoint out the individual, and distinguish her from\\nevery thing not a personi from all persons superior\\nor inferior to human persons; from all males, who\\nmight make another order, of the same class and\\nprovince; from all females, that are not white;\\nfrom all females that are short; and^ from all tall\\nfemales of any other name than Jane.\\nPupil Were these classifications to be generally\\nmade, would Dr. Reid s description of a logical\\ndefinition b^ correct?\\nProfessor. You dejine a word when you clearly\\ndescribe the thing of which that word is a symbol.\\nOf course, you may invent a term, and then define\\nit; that is, point out the limits of its use, by clearly\\nstating what you mean by it. You may dejine an\\nobject of which any word is the sign, by clearly de-\\nscribing that object, so as to distinguish it from\\nevery other object. If you will do this I shall be\\nsatisfied with your answers to my questions.\\nWhat is the faculty of Perception?*\\nPupiU The faculty of Perception in man, is that\\ninherent part of the original constitution of his soul,\\nby which he has knowledge, through the instru-\\nmentality of his bodily organs.\\nThe perception of external objects hy our senses, is an opera-\\ntion of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name ap-\\npropriated to it. It has so in al! languages. And in the English, I\\nknow no word more proper to express this act of the mind than per-\\nception. Seeing, h(^aring, smelling, tasting, and touching, are words\\nthat expre?;s il e operations proper to each sense; perceiving expresses\\nthat which is common to them all. Da. Reij).", "height": "3383", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "Perceptioris, 43\\nProfessor, Give some example of the mental\\noperations called perceptions^ or, show what this\\nfaculty does.\\nPupiL I perceive the sun, through the instru-\\nmentality of my eyes; I perceive a sound, through\\nmy ears; I perceive the hardness of a ball, through\\nmy hand, which touches it; I perceive the fragrance\\nof a rose, through my olfactory organs; and I per-\\nceive the acidity of vinegar, through my organs of\\ntasting; so that seeing^ hearings touching^ smelling^\\nand tasting are so many mental operations, per-\\nformed through the instrumentality of different\\nparts of the body.\\nProfessor* Can you classify all the perceptions\\nof man?\\nPupil. All our perceptions are reducible to five\\nclasses, which take their names from the orga7is of\\nsenses through which we have them.\\nProfessor. I presume that you use the expression\\norgans of sense^ in this case, as synonymous with\\norgans of perception. Be careful always to use it\\nin this manner, and then I have no objection to your\\nasserting, that man has five senses^ or ^ve kinds of\\nperceptions; and of course that he becomes acquaint-\\ned with the attributes of matter only by the men-\\ntal faculty of perception. Sense always means either\\nperception or conception. But why do you speak of\\nperceiving through the instrumentality of the bodily\\nfaculties?*\\nThat nothing external is perceived till first it make an impres\u00c2\u00bb\\nsion upon the organ of sense, is an observation that holds equally in", "height": "3323", "width": "1780", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "44 Perceptions.\\nPupil. Because the bodily organs do not them-\\nselves perceivej and because we find, by experience,\\nthat the soul of a wakeful and sane man does not\\nperceive without them. Sometimes, in figurative\\nlanguage, the operation of the agent is ascribed to\\nthe instrument; and hence our eyes are said to see;\\nbut every one knows, that the eye does not in reality\\nperceive even the inverted image of the object,\\nwhich is formed on its retina. Every one knows,\\ntoo, that were the faculty of perception wanting,\\nwere the soul absent from the material part of the\\ncomplex being, man, the eyes could not see, nor the\\nnose smell, nor the hands handle, nor the palate\\ntaste, nor the ears hear. Hence it is common, and\\nstrictly philosophical, to say, I see^ I hear I taste^\\nI smelly 1 touch; while by the pronoun used we in-\\ntend something evidently different from our bodily\\norgans. Here I wish, however, to question my\\nteacher. Pray, Sir, if the soul has the faculty of\\nperception, which is an essential part of itself, are\\nany bodily organs indispensable to the mental ope-\\nrations of that faculty? Might we not see, hear,\\ntouch, taste, and smell, without the instrumentality\\nof eyes, ears, and the other members of the body?\\nevery one of the external senses. But there is a difference as to oup\\nknowledge of that impression: in touching, tasting, and smelling, we\\nare sensible of the impression; that, for example, which is made upon\\nthe hand by a stone, upon the palate by an apricot, and upon the\\nnostrils by a rose: it is otherwise in seeing and hearing; for 1 am not\\nsensible of the impression made upon ray eye, when 1 behold a tree;\\nnor of the impression made upon my ear, when 1 listen to a song.\\nLord Karnes,", "height": "3381", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "Perceptions, 45\\nMight not the soul, if separated from the body, see\\nmaterial objects?\\nProfessor. You are running furiously into the re-\\ngions of speculation. Stop a little, and I will tell you\\nall philosophy knows on this subject. When man\\nis awake, and in a sane state of mind, he constitu-\\ntionally judges, that he perceives only through his\\nbodily organs: but when sleeping, a man often has\\nmental operations, which he at the time judges to\\nbe perceptions; which are so much like the percep-\\ntions he has had when awake, that he cannot dis-\\ntinguish them, either by any difference in their own\\nnature, or in his feelings, which are consequent on\\nthem; but when he awakes, he knows that his eyes\\nwere closed, and that light did not shine on them,\\nwhen he was conscious of seeing; that no material\\nlips uttered sounds, when he heard; and that no\\nreal object was present, when he embraced and\\nkissed a friend. The consciousness which accom-\\npanied these nocturnal perceptions, was like the con-\\nsciousness of his wakeful hours; and gives proof of\\nthe actual performance of mental acts of seeing\\nand hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting, or of\\nnocturnal actions resembling them, without the in-\\ntervention of material organs. A man who is insane,\\nin like manner has perceptions, which are purely\\nmental, and without the instrumentality of the ex^\\nternai organs; for he sees angels and devils in the\\nair, and hears them address him; or he performs\\nsuch mental operations as a sane man would, were\\nvisible forms of celestial beings presented to his\\nvision; were they to utter real, but seraphic sounds\\nin his ears.", "height": "3315", "width": "1709", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "46 Perceptions,\\nPupil, Is not this wholly the work of imagina-\\ntion?\\nProfessor, The imagination of sleeping and in-\\nsane persons is frequently very active; but when\\nthey see a house with their eyes closed, or the face\\nof a friend; and are conscious of the act, it would\\nbe unjust to say, that they are not conscious of a\\nperception^ when they readily distinguish between\\nperceptions and the work of the imagination. If\\nbodily organs v;ere absolutely essential to perceiving,\\nwe should undoubtedly see objects in the position\\nof their images on the retina; so that we should see\\nall the heads of our friends occupying the place of\\ntheir feet.*\\nThere is no phenomenon in nature more unaccountable, than\\nthe intei course that is carried on between the mind and the external\\nworld: there is no phenomenon which philosophical spirits have shown\\ngreater avidity to pry into and resolve. It is agreed by all, that this\\nintercourse is carried on by means of the senses; and this satisfies the\\nYulgar curiosity, but not the philosophic. Philosophers must have some\\nsystem, some hypothesis, that shews the manner in which our senses\\nmake us acquainted -with external things. All the fertility of human\\ninvention seems to have produced only one hy[)othesis for this pur-\\npose, which, therefore, Ijath been universally received: and that is,\\nthat the mind, like a mirror, receives the images of things from with-\\nout, by means of the senses: so that their use must be to convey these\\nimages into the mind There are laws of nature by which the\\nopera clous of the mind are regulated; there are also laws of nature\\nthat govern the material system; and as the latter are the ultimate\\nconclusions which the human faculties can reach in the philosophy of\\nbodies, so the former are the ultimate conclusions we can reach ia\\nthe philosophy of minds. It is evident, therefore, that the pic-\\ntures upon the retina are, by the laws of nature, a mean of vision;\\nbut in what way they accomplish their end, we are totally ignorant.\\n---Pb. Eeis.", "height": "3410", "width": "1849", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0056.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "Gonsciousness, 47.\\nFupU. It would be a very natural inference from\\nyour doctrine, that a disembodied spirit could per-\\nceive visible and material objects, as truly as any\\nman who has bodily organs at his command.\\nProfessor, I shall not object to such an inference.\\nAt any rate, we know that God is a Spirit, without\\nbodily organs, and that he beholds the works of his\\nhands. He has mental perceptions of material ob-\\njects; and has formed men in his own image; but\\nwhile they continue in the world, his good provi-\\ndence has connected their ordinary intercourse with\\nmatter, with material organization.\\nPupil. Have you not, dear Sir, restricted too\\nmuch the use of the words perceive and perception?\\nIt is customary for a person to say, I perceive\\nyour meaning: I perceive the truth. In short, men\\ntalk about perceiving every object of thought, whe-\\nther visible or invisible.\\nProfessor. It is true: and they use the words very\\nindefinitely, or else figuratively. It is not improper\\nto use the word perceive as we do the verb see^ figu-\\nratively, for mtnx.2\\\\ seeing. Thus we see or perceive a\\ntruth, when we conceive of the meaning of a propo-\\nsition, and judge it to be true. But in philosophical\\ndiscussions, we should avoid indefinite and figura-\\ntive expressions as much as possible, if we would\\narrive at certainty in mental science. I never use,\\ntherefore, perception^ for any act of conception^ or\\nmental seeing of immaterial things.\\nWhat is the faculty of Consciousness?\\nThe faculty of Consciousness in man, is that in-\\nherent part of the original constitution of his soul", "height": "3331", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0057.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "48 (Consciousness.\\nby which he has immediate knowledge of all his\\nown mental operations.*\\nProfessor. We are conscious in every instance,\\nby an act of consciousness, or a mental operation,\\nbearing that name. Now I would ask, have we as\\nmany acts of consciousness as we have other men-\\ntal operations?\\nPupil, Undoubtedly we have an act of conscious-\\nness, for every other mental operation, of which we\\nare conscious.\\nProfessor, Is every act of consciousness subse-\\nquent to, or co-existent with, the mental operation,\\nof which it is the object?\\nPupil, You have taught me, that consciousness\\nis the only ultimate source of knowledge upon the\\nsubject of mental science; and I cannot say, that I\\nam ever conscious of performing two mental ope-\\nrations at once. I must conclude, therefore, that an\\nact of consciousness is immediately consequent upon\\nevery other mental operation. Thus, I perceive and\\nam conscious that I perceive; I conceive, and am\\nconscious that I conceive; I remember, and am con-\\nscious that I remember. The act of consciousness,\\nhowever, is performed so immediately after each\\nConscious7iess is a word used by philosophers, to signify that\\nimmediate knowl,edge which we have of our present thoughts and\\npurposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds.\\nWhence we may observe, that consciousness is only of things present.\\nTo apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in\\npopular discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all\\nsuch confusion of words ought to be avoided in popular discourse. It\\nis likewise to be observed, that consciousness is only of things in the\\nmind, and not of external thin s/ Dn. Reid.", "height": "3388", "width": "1809", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0058.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "Consciousness* 4$\\nother operation, that lam insensible of any lapse\\nof time; and should not wonder if some should\\ndeem consciousness and the object of it, in any par-\\nticular case, simultaneous.\\nProfessor, Of what use is the faculty of con-\\nsciousnessP\\nPupil. Without it, we could not know that we\\nthink, feel, will, and have efficiency. Consequently\\nwe could never have knowledge of our own existence,\\nor of our mental identity. We could never predicate\\nany thing of ourselves, nor act as, responsible, moral\\nagents. Besides, consciousness is as essential to men-\\ntal science, as perception to our knowledge of per-\\nceptible objects, and of the phenomena of natural\\nphilosophy. We could not testify concerning any^\\nthing done by the mind, without consciousness, any\\nmore, than concerning things extraneous to the\\nmind, without the faculty of perception.\\nProfessor. Which source of knowledge is the\\nmost satisfactory, perception or consciousness?\\nPupil. At first thought, people would generally\\nsay, \u00e2\u0080\u00a2^perception; for we are more certain of no-\\nthing, than of what we see, hear, smell, touch and\\ntaste. Yet, upon reflection, every one will judge,\\nthat there is no higher certainty in our perceptions\\nthan in our consciousness; for we may with pro-\\npriety ask a man, how he knows, that he sees the\\nsun, hears the sound of a cannon, smells the fra-\\ngrance of a rose, tastes the flavour of an orange,\\nand touches a marble surface; and he must answer,\\nI am conscious that I do these things; so that\\nthe certain knowledge of owv perceptions the Dselves\\nconsists in our consciousness. We know that we", "height": "3339", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0059.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "50 Consciousness,\\nsee, hear, smell, taste and touch, only by our fa-\\nculty of consciousness. Could we doubt concerning\\nthe operations of this faculty, v/e might doubt whe-\\nther we perceive at all; and consequently whether\\nany external objects of perception exist.\\nProfessor. And thus we should be driven to\\nBishop Berkeley s theory, that there is no material\\nsubstance in existence: and thence to Hume s, that\\nimpressions and ideas are the only things that exist.\\nPupil. Pray, Sir, is our consciousness the result\\nof volition, or not?\\nProfessor. If I will to perform an act, and to be\\nconscious of it; I find an act of consciousness fol-\\nlows the determined act; but I cannot suspend my\\nconsciousness by a volition; and generally I am\\nconscious without any volition on the subject. Could\\nwe cease to be conscious at pleasure, it would be\\nequivalent to the power of destroying our own men-\\ntal existence, by a volition. Should such a power\\nbe given to man, he could escape from the world,\\nand the government of his Maker.", "height": "3351", "width": "1750", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0060.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION Y.\\nThe Faculty of Understanding or Conception.\u00e2\u0080\u0094Different Operations\\nof this Faculty. Imagination. Discernment.- Comprehension.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nApprehension. Intuition. Some general lav/s of Conception.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nThe importance of this Faculty.\\nProfessor, What is the Faculty of Understand-\\ning:\\nPupil, The faculty of understanding in man, is\\nthat inherent part of the original constitution of\\nhis soul, by which he has knowledge of things\\nwhich are not perceived through the instrumenta-\\nlity of the senses.*\\nProfessor, Do you distinguish The Understanding\\nfrom a faculty of understanding?\\nPupil, By a faculty of understanding we intend\\nthat particular faculty which has just been described;\\nbut the expressions, The Understandings and The\\nIntellect^ are often used to comprehend all the fa-\\nculties of the human mind, except those of feeling,\\nvolition, and agency. To the understandings or the\\nintellect^ belong the faculties of Consciousness, Per-\\nIt is plain that one sense cannot judge of the objects of another;\\nthe eye, for instance, of harmony, or the ear of colours. The faculty\\ntherefore, which views and compares the objects of all the senses,\\ncannot be sense. Price s Beviexv, y. IS. In other words, he might\\nhvLve said, conception is n act of mind disXinetArom perceptio?^.", "height": "3339", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0061.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "o2 The Understanding.\\nception. Understanding, Judgment, Reasoning, Me^\\nmory, and Conscience.\\nProfessor, The understanding or the intellect^\\nthen, comprehends seven faculties, called intellectual^\\nof which that of understanding any thing is one.\\nHas this faculty any other name?\\nPupiL It is called Conception by Dr. Reid and\\nothers; for by it we take in a subject,ybrw a notion\\nof a thing, or have an idea of it. We conceive of\\nthe meaning of a term, a clause, a proposition, and\\na sentence. Mathematical points and lines, are ob-\\njects of conception^ which cannot be perceived. All\\nabstract terms^ such as virtue, vice, goodness, state,\\nfaculty, power, liberty, and man, denote objects of\\nwhich we have knowledge only by this faculty.\\nThe science of numbers, or arithmetic, and all\\nthe sciences commonly included under the terms\\nmathematics and metaphysics^ morals and theology^\\nhave their origin in the operations of Conception.\\nWe c^xiTiOt perceive^ but we can conceive of number,\\nspace, quantity, time, spirit, substance, relation,\\nmoral obligation, guilt, and the Deity.\\nProfessor, The operations of the faculty of un-\\nderstanding are numerous: can you classify them?\\nPupil. I have never attempted itj and think it\\nwould be very difficult to do it, in any other manner\\nthan by referring them to the objects upon which\\nthey terminate. Thus, for instance, all conceptions\\nof images formed by the mind, of things which do\\nnot really exist, I would put together in one ^lass,\\nand term them imaginations.^\\nI may conceive or imagine a mountain of gold, or a winged\\nMovBt\\\\ but no man says that he perceives such a creature of ima|;ina^", "height": "3375", "width": "1775", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0062.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "Acts of Conception, 53\\nProfessor, So that The Imagination is nothing but\\nthe faculty of conception employed in forming images,\\nI frankly confess, that The Imagination is not, in\\nmy opinion, a faculty distinct from that which con-\\nceives, or forms notions of things.\\nCan you name some other principal operations of\\nthis faculty of understanding?\\nPupil. Discernment is an operation of the mind,\\nin which it conceives of some difference between two\\nor more objects.\\nComprehension is a firm conception of some\\nextensive or complex object. We discern differ-\\nences; we comprehend difficult and complicated\\nthings.\\nApprehension is any act of the mind in under-\\nstanding the meaning of a statement. Thus, a per-\\nson speaks to me; I will to attend to him, that I\\nmay understand him; and when I do it, I say,\\napprehend your meaning. It is a figurative expres-\\nsion, and literally signifies to take hold oi any thing.\\nI may apprehend the meaning of a proposition with-\\nout passing any judgment upon it.\\nIntuition is any such conception of the meaning\\nof a proposition, as is immediately followed by a\\njudgment that it is true. This is also a figurative\\nexpression, taken from the act of looking into any\\nthing.\\ntion. Thus perception is distinguished from conception or imagina-\\ntion.\\nLet it be observed therefore, that to conceive, to imagitie^ to ap-\\nprehend, when taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the mind\\nwhich implies no belief or judgment at all. i?e/(/.\\nE 2", "height": "3339", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0063.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "54} Complex IdeaSc\\nProfessor, When the mind, therefore, imagineSj\\ndiscerns^ comprehends^ apprehends^ or performs an\\nact of intuition^ it is the subject of different species\\nof conceptions*\\nPupil, Pray, Sir, has man any complex ideas?\\nProfessor, Every idea is a conception; and every\\nact of conception is a simple operation, Man has,\\ntherefore, no complex ideas. He conceives, however,\\nof complex objects; even as he may see a complex\\nobject; and yet the act of seeing is simple.\\nPupil, Has man any abstract ideas^\\nProfessor, Man conceives of the meaning of ab-\\nstract terms, or has ideas of certain things, which\\nhe resolves to consider as abstracted from certain\\nother things that he knows to be connected with\\nthe former. For instance, I conceive of t\\\\it figure\\nof an ivory ball, abstractad from the colour, and\\nother attributes of the ball. Here the idea is one\\nsimple thing, that may be conceived of as abstract-\\ned from all other mental operations, and even from\\nthe efficient of it; and the object of the idea is a\\nfigure, which is a terra that denotes something that\\n.may be considtred abstractedly from all other attri-\\nbutes of any substance. Abstract terms, or names of\\nthings that may be considered abstractedly from\\nother things with which they are always connected,\\nthere certamly are; but of complex, and abstract\\nideas, I know nothing by my own consciousness,\\nbesides what I have here disclosed.^\\nA great philosopher, Dr. Berkeley, has disputed the received\\nopinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are", "height": "3404", "width": "1861", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0064.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "Laws of Conception* 35\\nFrom your own consciousness of what passes in\\nyour mind, can you give any general laws of con-\\nception?\\nPupil. A few, I think; for I find, that I conceive\\nof every mental operation which I remember to\\nhave performed: and I can renewedly conceive of\\nany remembered past conception, by a voluntary\\nexertion to do it.\\nProfessor, And hence, you naturally conclude,\\nthat other persons whose minds are similarly con-\\nstituted, can do the same, and lay it down as a ge-\\nneral observation, or law of mental operation.\\nPupil. An example may be given, thus: I per-\\nceive a fair female form; I close my eyes, and per-\\nceive it no longer; but I remember that I did per-\\nceive it; I will to conceive of it; and immedistely I\\ndo conceive of it; so that the feeling consequent\\nupon the conception^ is hardly distinguishable from\\nthat v^^^hich followed tht perception.\\nProfessor. Can you conceive of all objects of per-\\nception?\\nPupil. Every object of perception is an object of\\nconception. This is another general rule; but all ob-\\njects of conception are not objects of perception.\\nThus, I conceive of seeing, liearing, smelling, tast-\\nnothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives\\nthem a more extensive signification, and makes them recal upon oc-\\ncasion, other individuals, which are similar to them. Tis a princi-\\nple generally received in philosophy, that every thing in nature is\\nindividual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really\\nexistent, \\\\vhich has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this,\\ntherefore, be absurd m. fact and reality j it must also be absurd ia\\nidea Hume,", "height": "3339", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0065.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "36 Laws of Conception.\\ning, and touching, but I cannet perceive a thought,\\na circle around the earth, or the distance between\\nthe sun and our planet.\\nMoreover, I find, that one man in his present\\nstate, often has different conceptions of the same\\nobject; and that similar conceptions of the same ob-\\nject differ in the degree of their vigour and vivacity.\\nThe state of my body and of my mind, I find by\\nexperience also affects the conceptions of the human\\nmind, both in their nature and degree.\\nProfessor. Can you give any general laws con-\\ncerning the origin of our conceptions?^^\\nPupil. I can account for them generally, in no\\nother manner than by saying, that man has a facul-\\nty of conception, and therefore it is as natural to\\nhim to form conceptions as to breathe. From what\\nWpon a slight attention to the operations of our own mindsj they\\nappear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems\\nto be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence,\\nhowever, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and\\nthe phenomena, which appeared, at first, to be too various for out*\\ncomprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small\\nnumber of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and un-\\ncompounded principles of action. These faculties and principles are\\nthe general laws of our constitution^ and hold the same place in the\\nphilosophy of mind, that the general laws we investigate in physics,\\nhold in that branch of science. In both cases, the laws, which nature has\\nestablished, are to be investigated only by an examination of facts;\\nand in both ^ases, a knowledge of these laws leads to an explanation\\nof an infinite number of phenomena:. Sieivart.\\nNow, as the act of moving large masses, has its laws in the facul-\\nties of the body, and in Ihe levers which our arms acquire the power\\nof using; so the act of thinking has its laws in the faculties of the\\nmind, and in the levers poxvers] which our understanding has like-\\nwise learned to use. Condillac.", "height": "3322", "width": "1841", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0066.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "Origin of Conceptions, St\\nhas been already said, it will be evident, that many\\nof our conceptions are occasioned by our percep-\\ntionsj as those perceptions are occasioned by the\\nexistence of external objects. Our social relations\\ngive rise to other conceptions; and we never attend\\nto the use of our own language by any one, without\\nhaving some apprehension of the meaning of the\\nspeaker, or some conceptions concerning him, and\\nthe subject of his discourse. Hence, the notions of\\nmen very much depend upon education, taken in\\nits most extensive sense; upon the times in which\\nthey live; the events which occur; the temperament\\nof their constitution; and the circumstances of their\\nexistence.\\nProfessor, Are our operations of understanding\\nthe result of our volitions or not?\\nPupiL Many of them result from volition, and\\nmany of them do not. The same is true of percep-\\ntions. Now when I perceive something without\\nwilling it; or even when I will not to perceive it; I\\nfind that an act of conception involuntarHy succeeds\\nit. Thus, I will not to see an obscene picture; some\\none unexpectedly presents it before my eyes; I see\\nit: I close my eyes, and conceive of it, even in op-\\nposition to my volition never to think of it again*\\nSo far, therefore, as our perceptions are involun-\\ntary, our conceptions may be originated without,_or\\neven against our will.\\nWere it otherwise with us, a man could not be\\nplaced in a state of trial by his Maker, unless the\\nman should previously will to be put into a state of\\ntrial for probation.\\nProfessor* Your remarks are just. This faculty", "height": "3342", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0067.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "58 Conceptions*\\nof conception, and its operations, are peculiarly im-\\nportant to man; for without it he would have no\\nscience, or systematic arrangement of knowledge,\\nconcerning any subject. He might, indeed, wtre his\\nother faculties to continue in operation, perceive\\nexternal objects, feel, will, and act, but he could\\nhave no language superior to that of brutes. Be-\\nsides, it will soon appear, that our judgments, rea-^\\nsonings, emotions, conscience, and most important\\nvolitions, are dependent on our conceptions.", "height": "3322", "width": "1763", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0068.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION VI,\\nThe Faculty of Judging. Objects of Judgment. A Truth. AFalse=\\nhood. Classification of Judgments. They are Cfdnstitutional or\\nAcquired. The former are consequent on Consciousness, Fercep=\\ntion, Conception, Memory or Conscience. The latter result from\\nReflection, Reasoning or Testimony. Believing considered.\\nProfessor. What is the Faculty of Judging?*\\nPupil The faculty of judging, or The Judgment\\nin man, is that inherent part of the original consti-\\ntution of his soul, by which he decides that any\\nproposition is true or not true.\\nProfessor, You intentionally make a proposition^\\nin every case, the object of an operation of the\\njudj^ment, I presume.\\nPupiL I do; because every operation of the mind,\\nexcept it be a feelings terminates on some object,\\ndistinct from the operation itself; and because I\\nam conscious, that when I judge, some proposi-\\ntion, some statement, expressed or understood, is\\nthe object of it. Not to judge some proposition to\\nOf the act oi judging. Dr. Reid remarks, that it **is an operation\\nof the mind, so familiar to evei^ man who has understanding, and its\\nnante is so common am so well understoo that it needs no defini-\\ntion We are all conscious of judging, and we can have no stronger\\nevidence of the fact Still, think a correct definition, would prevent\\nor silence objections. Jtidging is a mental decision that a proposition\\ns true or false.", "height": "3339", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0069.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "66 Acts of the Judgment,\\nbe true or false, would in our apprehension be, not\\nto judge at all.\\nProfessor, Can we perform any operation of judg-\\ning, without some previous mental act?\\nPupil* We must conceive of a proposition, before\\nwe can judge that the proposition is true or not\\ntrue; so that there can be no act oi judgment with-\\nout some previous conception. This is one general\\nlaw of mental operation.\\nProfessor. Is there not some reason to suppose^\\nthen, that judging is rather a complex^ than a simple\\noperation of the human mind?\\nPupil, No more than there is reason to think, be-\\ncause a horse goes before the cart, and the cart\\ncomes after him, that they are not distinct things. f\\nThe proposition which is the object of judgment, need not be\\nexpressed by sounds or letters. It is sufficient that it is conceived of\\nfey the mind, There may be judgment which is not expressed. It is\\na solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or\\ndenial, is not at all essential to it. It may be tacit and not expressed.\\nNay, it is well known that men may judge contrary to what they af-\\nfirm or deny; the definition, (that judging is an act of the mind,\\nwhereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another, therefore\\nmust be understood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2nly another name for judgment. Reid.\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0J- Aulthough there can be no judgment without a conception of\\nthe things about which we judgej yet conception may be without any\\njudgment. Judgment can be expressed by a proposition only, and a\\nproposition is a complete sentence; but simple apprehension may be\\nexpressed by a word or words, which maice no complete sentence.\\nWhen simple apprehension is employed about a proposition, every\\nman knows that it is one thing to apprehend, a proposition, that is,\\nto conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to\\nbe true or false. It is self-evident, that every judgment must be either\\ntrue or false; but simple apprehension or conception can neither be\\ntrwe nor false, as was shown before. One judgment may be contradio-", "height": "3367", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0070.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "Acts of the Judgment. 61\\nThe fact, that our Maker has so constituted our\\nminds, that we perform our mental operations in a\\ncertain order, no more destroys the distinctness of\\nthem, than the order observed in the production of\\nflowers and fruits evinces that they are the same.\\nProfessor* What is the object of every true judg-\\nment?\\nPup iU A truth.\\nProfessor. And what is a truth?\\nPupil, 1 shall quote my teacher s language. Any\\nproposition in which is predicated any thing which\\nwas, is, or will be, in relation to an object, is a truth.\\nOn the other hand, that proposition in which any\\nthing is predicated of an object which neither was,\\nnor is, nor will be, is a falsehood. Of course, every\\nuntrue judgment has for its object a falsehood.\\nThe adjective true denotes something pertaining\\nto truth. A true proposition is a truth^\\nProfessor. Can you classify all human judgments?\\nPupil. They are either true or false^ and thus\\nmay be divided into two classes.\\nProfessor. These two classes would include all;\\nbut such a classification would be of little service\\ntory to another; and [but] it is impossible for a man to have two judg-\\nments at the same time, which he perceives [conceives] to be contra-\\ndictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same\\ntime without any difficulty. That the sun is greater than the earth,\\nand that the sun is not greater than the earth, are contradictory pro-\\npositions. He that apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends the\\nmeaning of both. But it is impossible for him to judge both to be true\\nat the same time. He knows that if the one is true, the other must be\\nfalse. For these reasons, I hold it to be certain, that judgment and\\nsimple apprehension are acts of the mind, specifically different.\\nReid,\\nF", "height": "3339", "width": "1798", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0071.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "62 Classification of Judgments,\\nto the cause of science, unless you would give \\\\xb\\na list of truths and falsehoods. Do you think of no\\nclassification more important to the science of mind?\\nPupil. All judgments of the human mind are\\neither constitutional or acquired.\\nProfessor, Distinguish these two classes.\\nPupil. Constitutional judgments are such as im-\\nmediately follow some previous mental operation,\\nwithout requiring any induction, or experience.\\nThey result from the constitution of our minds, and\\nare common to all men of sound mind. Acquired\\njudgments result from some voluntary, inductive\\nprocess, from testimony, or from experience.\\nProfessor. Can you reduce constitutional judg-\\nments to specific classes? You know they are nume-\\nrous.\\nPupil. We may refer them to the different men-\\ntal operations upon which they are consequent, and\\nfrom which they seem spontaneously to arise.\\n1. The co7isciousness of the mind is followed in\\nevery man, by the constitutional judgments, that he\\nexists; that he performs the mental acts of which he\\nis conscious; that another did not perform them; and\\nthat his mental operations are not all alike in species\\nand degree* No man ever doubted these proposi-\\ntions, if we may judge from the universal language\\nof mankind; and all men decide that they are true,\\nso soon as they form any just notions of conscious-\\nness.\\n2. Perception is immediately followed by many\\nconstitutional judgments. We are so constituted,\\nthat we no sooner perceive external objects, than\\nwe judge, that they exist; that they exist without", "height": "3375", "width": "1848", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0072.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "Classification of Judgments* 63\\nus; that they have such qualities as we perceive in\\nthem; and that they are perceived through the or-\\ngan, which is the instrument of their perception.\\nFor instance, when I see a horse running full speed\\ntowards me, I judge that there is a horse, that he\\nis running towards me; that he is of a bay colour;\\nand that he is not something else than I perceive\\nhim to be. In like manner, when we know the\\nnames of things, and perceive them, we judge that\\nwhatever we perceive really exists, and that our\\nsenses do not deceive us. These judgments are com-\\nmon to all; and hence Berkeley and Hume, while\\nthey adopted a theory which excluded the actual\\nbeing of all material objects, as firmly judged, in\\nspite of their efforts to the contrary, as any men,\\nthat the ground was under them, and the sky over\\nthem; that the bodies of their fellow men were\\naround them; and that all the objects of their per-\\nception existed, and were such as they perceived\\nthem to be. Were these constitutional judgments\\nnot to result from our perceptions, these perceptions\\nwould be of no practical use in life; for should we\\nsee a precipice in our path, and not judge, that a\\nprecipice was there, we should never will to avoid\\nit; nor could we conceive of danger from any mate-\\nrial substance.\\n3. Memory gives rise to other constitutional judg-\\nments; for without any effort, learning, or experi-\\nence, we judge, that our own mental actions, which\\nwe remember, actually had existence: and that rve^\\nwho remember^ did exist. If we remember to have\\nheard any one speak, we judge that he did speak;\\nand hence in giving testimony, we are said to affirm", "height": "3315", "width": "1759", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0073.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "6^ ConstitutioJial Judgments*\\nor deny. In testifying, we publish our constitutional\\njudgments, that result from memory; for, when we\\naffirm, that an arraigned person murdered his bro-\\nther in our presence, we declare that we remember\\nto have seen the murderous act performed, and that\\nwe judge the fact to correspond with our remem-\\nbered perception. If we should not judge things to\\nhave been as we remember to have perceived them,\\nour memory would be of no practical utility. All\\n4nen, however, are constitutionally constrained to\\njudge, that they actually have perceived, conceived,\\njudged, inferred, felt, willed, approved, remember-\\ned, been conscious, and acted, as they remember\\nthey have acted, been conscious, remembered, ap-\\nproved, willed, felt, inferred, judged, conceived,\\nand perceived.\\n4. Many of our conceptions are followed hy judg-\\nments^ for which we can account in no other manner,\\nthan by saying, that we are so constituted that we\\nthus judge, v/ithout reasoning, or any voluntary\\neffort. All those conceptions which are properly call-\\ned acts of intuitioji^ are of this description; while\\nother conceptions may, or may not be followed by\\njudgments, according to the circumstances of those\\nconceptions. Thus, I conceive of the meaning of the\\nproposition, I read yesterday and from the cir-\\ncumstance that reynemher to have done it, or am\\ntold by a credible witness that I did it, I judge it\\nto be a truth. But intuition^ without any thing else\\nconnected with it, is the occasion of all those judg-t\\nments, which being expressed in words, are called\\naxioms^ or. self-evident propositions. For example; by\\nbarely looking into the thing, by intuition^ I discover", "height": "3359", "width": "1842", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0074.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "Constitutional Judgments, 65\\nand judge, that there can be no effect without an\\nadequate cause. We no sooner conceive of the\\nmeaning of this proposition, by looking into it^ that\\nis, by intuition^ than we judge that it is a truth.\\nProfessor. Let us call these acts of the judg-\\nment, then, that immediately result from intuition,\\nintuitive judgments. In most sciences these are the\\nmost important of our judgments, because all sys-\\ntematic arrangements of knowledge are founded on\\naxioms. The constitutional judgments, however,\\nthat are consequent upon perceptions^ are most im-\\nportant to the common transactions of life.\\nProceed in your account of constitutional judg-\\nments.\\nPupil, I can think of only one other source of\\nthem; and therefore I remark,\\n5. That an act of conscience is not only preced-\\ned by some judgment, but is also followed imme-\\ndiately by some constitutional judgment. The action\\nof which we disapprove^ we judge ought not to have\\nbeen done. Now conscience approves or disapproves\\nof actions, when compared with some moral law. If\\nwe approve of any contemplated action, we judge\\nthat it ought to be done. We find too, by consult-\\ning our own consciousness, that we judge a moral\\nagent to be praiseworthy or blameworthy, commend-\\nable or censurable, according as we approve or dis-\\napprove of his moral conduct.\\nProfessor, Are you satisfied, that these are con-\\ns:itutional judgments?\\nPupil, I am; for while a man s conscience per-\\nforms diflferent operations at different times, rela-\\ntive to the same object; and while different men\\nF2", "height": "3359", "width": "1842", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0075.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "66 \u00e2\u0082\u00aco72stttiitional Judgments^\\nmutually oppose each other, in their acts of appro-\\nbation, and disapprobation; still, every man judges,\\nat the time in which he really disapproves of any\\nmoral action, that it ought not to be done. It is\\ncommon to all men, to judge immediately after the\\noperation of conscience on the subject, that men are\\nto be justified or condemned, according to their ap-\\nprobation or disapprobation of their moral conduct.\\nProfessor* Hence if the conscience is erroneous,\\nour judgment, concerning the obligation to perform\\ncertain moral actions, will be erroneous also.\\nAre not some constitutional judgments immedi-\\nately consequent upon reasoning, feeling, willing,\\nagency, and even judging?\\nPupil, V^ tx^ feeling used for that species of per-\\nception which you have called touching^ as it some-\\ntimes is, but not by yourself, I should say, that\\nevery feeling through the instrumentality of a bo-\\ndily organ, is followed by judgment^ that we feel^\\nthrough that particular organ. It is probably, how-\\never, more correct to say, that the consciousness\\nand conception of a feeling are followed by a judg-\\nment, that something has occasioned it.\\nProfessor. It is true, we judge, that there can be\\nno feeling without some cause of feeling; but this\\nis an intuitive judgment^ tantamount to our intui-\\ntive knowledge of the truth, that there can be no\\neffect without a cause.\\nYou have already stated, that our consciousness\\nof judging, reasoning, feeling, willing, and agency,\\nis followed by constitutional judgments, that we,\\nwho are conscious, exist; and that we perform the\\nmental operations of which we are conscious.", "height": "3351", "width": "1870", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0076.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "Constitutional Judgments, 67\\nYou have before stated too, that immediately\\nafter perception, we judge concerning the bodily\\norgan of perception, that we have perceived through\\nit. Hence, if you prick a man in the thumb or great\\ntoe, he instantly perceives it by the sense of touch,\\nand has both a judgment that he was pricked in the\\ntoe, or thumb, according as the fact may have been,\\nand a feeling consequent upon the perception.\\nThis instantaneous judgment concerning the place\\nand the mode of our being touched; and indeed,\\nconcerning the organ, or part of an organ employed\\nas an instrumental cause of any perception, is de-\\nsigned, by our Maker, to regulate our voluntary\\nexertions, for the preservation of the body. Without\\nit, we should not know to what part of the body we\\nshould apply preventives or remedies. The painful\\nsensations that immediately follow some percep-\\ntions, are designed to make us immediately xvill to\\napply some remedy or defence to the part, which\\nwe judge to be the organ of that perception which\\noccasions the sensation. Thus I perceive that I\\ntouch some sharp instrument. This act of perceiv-\\ning is in my mind. Instantly I have a painful sen-\\nsation; and I judge that I touch it with the hollow\\nof my right foot. The painful sensation induces me\\nto will the removal of the sharp instrument; and\\nmy judgment directs my hand to the place affected.\\nWere I destitute of a painful sensation in this case,\\nI might not choose to remove the offending object;\\nwere I destitute of judgment concerning the organ\\ntouching the instrument, I should as readily move\\nmy hand for relief to my left elbow as to the hollow\\nof my right foot.", "height": "3283", "width": "1727", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0077.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "@8 Judgment,\\nPupil, Is not every sensation immediately fol-\\nlowed by a constitutional judgment, concerning the\\ncause of that sensation?\\nProfessor, From intuition we judge, that there\\nis no effect without a cause; and consequently so\\nsoon as we conceive of sensation as an effect, we\\njudge that it must have a cause; and hence we learn\\nto look for the cause. These constitutional judg-\\nments, I have before said, are the result of concep-\\ntions and not of sensation. If any constitutional\\njudgment were immediately consequent upon sen-\\nsation, we should naturally expect it would relate\\nto the perception which occasioned it. Thus I per-\\nceive the drawing of a blister plaster on my wrist,\\nand I feel a painful sensation* If any judgment\\nshould constitutionally follow the sensation^ it would\\nnaturally be this; that my perception, through the\\nwrist, is the occasion of my painful sensation. Now\\nI find, by my own consciousness, that I no sooner\\nhave a perception through the wrist, which is a part\\nof my organ of touch, than I judge from perception\\nthat my wrist is the part affected; but I find I must\\nhave some reflection, and must conceive of some\\nconnexion between my perceptions and sensations,\\nor between the application to my wrist, and the\\npainful sensation, before I judge that my pain is\\nproduced by the blister plaster. I should think,\\ntherefore, that this judgment concerning the cause\\nof sensation is acquired^ and is dependent upon ex-\\nperience, and some previous intuitive judgment.\\nPupil. But why should not sensation be followed\\nby a judgment concerning the instrumental cause of\\nit, as well as perception?", "height": "3351", "width": "1802", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0078.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "Acquired yudgments. 69\\nProfessor, Our business is to ascertain, in mental\\nscience, what mental operations actually are per-\\nformed, and not tp conjecture what might be.\\nIt will appear, however, in its proper place, that\\nour sensations themselves are all consequent upon\\nperceptions; so that if a judgment concerning the\\norgan of perception immediately follows the per-\\nception, there is no need of another judgment, to\\nthe same effect, consequent upon sensation.\\nPupil, I wish to know, if we could ever have\\nany correct judgments concerning the nature of\\nReasoning, Feeling, Willing, Agency and Judg-\\nment, without having first performed these mental\\noperations?\\nProfessor, I think not; but then you will please\\nto remember, that our judgment concerning the na-\\nture of these operations is consequent upon our\\nconception of them; immediately after the perform-\\nance of the acts themselves. Wq jud^e; then are con-\\nscious of judging; then judge that we actually have\\njudged; then conceive of the nature of the act of\\njudging; and then judge that the act is such as we\\nconceive it to be. The same is true of the other\\noperations just mentioned; apd vf ithoMt conceiving\\nof the nature of them, we never form any judg-\\nment concerning their nature.\\nLet us now hear what you have to offer concern-\\ning acquired judgments.\\nPupil, Acquired judgments include all operations\\nof the judgment which do not result immediately\\nfrom our constitution. We denominate them ac-\\nquired^ because we learn to form them. We arrive", "height": "3315", "width": "1802", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0079.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "TO Refiective Judgments,\\nat them by reflection^ reasonings and attention t\u00c2\u00bb\\ntestimony.\\nProfessor, Judgments resulting from reflection,\\nmay be called reflective judgments. Of this descrip-\\ntion are the judgments formed on the bench, and m\\nthe common acts and intercourse of life, from the\\nconsideration of a variety of circumstances. Our\\nexperience is a common subject of reflection; and\\nfrom the two, we judge, that fire will burn us; that\\nwater will flow down an inclined plane in future;\\nthat the wringing of the nose will bring forth blood;\\nthat the sun will rise to morrow; and thousands of\\nof similar judgments.\\nThe result of every course of reasoning is an in-\\nductive judgment; and of all our judgments, these,\\neven while they are most applauded among men,\\nare most liable to impeachment, and subsequent\\ncondemnation. Constitutional judgments are never\\nreversed by us; reflective judgments sometimes are;\\ninductive judgments frequently are.\\nHave you any distinct appellation for those judg-\\nments which have some testimoriy for their object?\\nPupil, Believing is an operation of the faculty of\\njudging, which has some proposition which is a\\nmatter of testimony for its object. The proposition,\\nI think, I judge to be true, because I am con-\\nscious of thinking. It is constitutional with every\\nman, who thinks and is conscious, thus to judge,\\nso soon as he conceives of the proposition. But if\\nyou assert, that you are now thinking of faith I\\nbelieve the assertion to be a truth. I cannot know\\nthat it is true, by any other faculty which I possess\\nthan that of judgment. The ground of my judgment", "height": "3322", "width": "1818", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0080.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "Believing^ 71\\n13 your testimony; and my previous judgment con-\\ncerning your veracity.\\nProfessor. Is an act of believing- or of faith, an\\nacquired judgment? Do we not constitutionally ac-\\ncredit testimony?\\nPupil, The utterance of truth or falsehood, is a\\nvoluntary act. Indeed, if men speak at all, it is from\\nvolition. If they speak what they judge to be truth,\\nor falsehood, it is from volition to do so.\\nNow we find it to be a fact, that all men choose\\nto speak the truth, until they think that some benefit\\nwill result from speaking falsehood, or from con-\\ncealing the truth. This is a general law of human\\nnature.\\nProfessor. But why do men naturally choose to\\nspeak the truth, under the circumstances which you\\nhave stated?\\nPupil. I am conscious, that the utterance of what\\nI think to be truth, and the recollection that I have\\nspoken the truth, are followed by pleasing emotions;\\nwhile the utterance of known falsehood is attended\\nwith painful ones. I c/zoc?5f, therefore, to speak the\\ntruth, and not to speak falsehood, because of the\\npleasure consequent upon the former, and the pain\\nthat I know by experience attends the latter. I\\njudge, moreover, that the experience of other per-\\nsons corresponds with my own. Hence all men\\nblush and feel shame, at the consciousness of lying,\\nunless they have become in some measure hardened\\nby habit. Hence, men naturally feel anger at the\\nperson who accuses them of intentional falsehood.\\nProfessor, It is the constitution of our minds\\nwhich has connected painful emotions with con-", "height": "3323", "width": "1797", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0081.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "j^2 Believing.\\nsciousness of lying, and agreeable ones with the\\nconsciousness of personal veracity; and it is our ex-\\nperience of this constitution, which induces us to\\nform the habit of uttering truth at all times, unless\\nwhen we conceive that some advantage, which we\\nprefer to these agreeable emotions, or on account of\\nwhich we are willing to endure the painful ones,\\nwill result from telling an untruth.\\nPupil, This constitutional connexion, I remem-\\nber to have heard you say, constitutes a predisposi-\\ntion in all men to utter truth.\\nThere is also in men, a constitutional predispo-\\nsition to believe the testimony which they hear. It\\nis constituted by the natural connexion which sub-\\nsists between the painful feelings consequent upon\\nthe discovery that we have been deceived, and the\\nagreeable feelings which we find consequent upon\\nthe discovery, and even the accrediting of truth.\\nTo believe our neighbour, when he speaks, is natu-\\nrally agreeable; to disbelieve him, unpleasant. Hence\\nchildren believe the testimony of their parents, and\\nof all who speak to them until they learn to doubt,\\nin consequence of having experienced deception.\\nProfessor, If then, mankind have a natural pre-\\ndisposition in their mental constitution to speak\\ntruth, and to accredit testimony, I ask again, if be-\\nlieving is not a constitutional^ rather than an ac-\\nquired judgment?\\nPupil, Had no obliquity of the human mind oc-\\ncurred, perhaps it might have been constitutional\\nwith us to give our assent to every statement made;\\nand credulity would never have been knov/n: but\\nthe facts now are these; that we find in mankind a", "height": "3351", "width": "1845", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0082.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "Believing. 73\\nconstitutional predisposition to veracity and cortfi-\\ndence; and that, nevertheless, no article of testimony,\\nwhen proposed to us, is at once, from the consti-\\ntution of our minds, judged to be true. I affirm,\\ntherefore, since every act of believing terminates on\\nsome proposition which is a matter of testimony,\\nand since we do not constitutionally judge the tes-\\ntimony to be true, that believing is not a constitu-\\ntional judgment. It is acquired^ and commonly in\\nthe following manner.\\nWe consider the character of the testifier; and\\nif we judge that he neither can, nor will utter false-\\nhoods, then we subsequently judge that which we\\nknow he has testified to be true. Hence, the act of\\nbelieving any one s testimony, is commonly subse-\\nquent to some prior judgment concerning the author\\nof the testimony. It is owing to this, that a judge\\nconsiders the character of a witness, when he wishes\\nto form a just estimate of the testimony which he\\ngives; for we well know, that the solemnities of an\\noath v/ill not induce some men to tell the truth to\\ntheir own real, or conceived disadvantage.\\nWhen a person is previously judged by us to be\\na competent witness; to be a man of integrity, des-\\ntitute of an unwise credulity, and well acquainted\\nwith the subject of which he speaks, we very readily\\njudge that his testimony is true. On the other hand,\\nif a notorious liar, a foolishly credulous person, and\\none manifestly ignorant of the subject concerning\\nwhich he testifies, should utter the truth in our\\npresence, his testimony would not be accredited,\\nunless in our judgment some other circumstances,\\nG", "height": "3339", "width": "1783", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0083.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "74 Believing- and Asseiit.\\nwith which we are acquainted, should corroborate\\nit.\\nIf we judge a proposition to be true from our\\nown reflection on it, or from intuition, we ought\\nnot to call this judgment an act of believing.\\nProfessor. Yet men frequently say, that they be-*\\nlieve any proposition, which they judge to be true;\\nwhether it be a matter of testimony or not. Is this\\ncorrect language?\\nPupil, Certainly not, if they would desire to dis-\\ntinguish things by a difference in words, which are,\\nor should be, the signs of conceptions^ or ideas, or\\nof some other mental operations. I think the word\\nbelief has be^n very generally used for other acts\\nof judgment than those of which it is properly de-\\nscriptive, in consequence of our figuratively as-\\ncribing acts of testimony to objects that cannot lite-\\nrally testify. Thus we say, that our senses testify;\\nwhen really they speak nothing; and hence we talk\\nof believing them. This will do well enough in figu-\\nrative, poetical, rhetorical discourse; but not in\\nscientific discussions, or didactic theology.\\nProfessor. What we personally know to be true,\\nwe should say we judge or knoxv to be true; and\\nwhen we judge that some statement is true, which\\nanother declares is true, not because we have per-\\nsonal knowledge on the subject, but for some other\\nreasons, we should use the language of belief.\\nPupil. What is assent?\\nProfessor. Ir is a judgment, resulting from re-\\nflection, that some proposition which anotiier states\\nto us is true.\\nPupil. What is dissent?", "height": "3351", "width": "1881", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0084.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "Conviction and Persuasion, 75\\nProfessor, It is a judgment that some proposition\\nwhich another declares to be true, is not true.\\nPupil, Is consent a judgment?\\nProfessor, It is generally used to denote a voli-\\ntion to comply with some proposed agreement, or\\nto acceed to some proffered terms. It is not a judg-\\nment.\\nIt may not be superfluous to remark, that an act\\nof beliefs and an act of faith are synonymous ex-\\npressions; that 2LUY judgment of the truth of a pro-\\nposition, which results from meditation or the exer^\\ntions which others make to produce the judgment\\nin our minds, is called A conviction; and that any\\njudgment^ which moves us to a volition to act in\\nconformity with that judgment, is called A persua-\\nsion.", "height": "3351", "width": "1881", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0085.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION VII.\\nThe Faculty of Memory. Objects of Memory. Local Memory.\\nClassification of the Operations of Memory. Recollection. Re-\\nmembrance. Memory essential to some Conceptions. Time.\\nDuration. Futurity. Identity. Knowledge of our own continued\\nMental Identity. Personal Identity.\\nProfessor, What is the Faculty of Memory?\\nPupil. The Faculty of Memory in man, is that\\ninherent part of the original constitution of his\\nsoul, by which he has present knowledge of his past\\nmental operations.\\nProfessor. You make mental operations the ob-\\njects of memory: are there no other objects upon\\nwhich the acts of this faculty terminate?\\nPupil. I judge, that there are not; because I am\\nconscious of remembering nothing but mental ope-\\nrations.\\nProfessor. Do you not retnember your absent fa-\\nther s face?\\nPupil. It is very commonly said, that we remem-\\nber material objects; but when I carefully examine\\nmy own mind, I find, that I am conscious of re-\\nmembering my perceptions^ and even my conceptions\\nof my father s face. I remember too, the feelings\\nwhich were consequent upon the sight of his face.\\nI remember^ moreover, that I have formerly remem-\\nbered these things. In short, I remember, at differ-\\nent times, the simple operations of each faculty; and", "height": "3322", "width": "1916", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0086.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "Memory* 77\\nthose complex ones which result from two or more\\nfaculties; but I remember nothing but what has\\npassed in my own mind.\\nProfessor. I cannot say that I am conscious of\\nremembering any thing else: for had I never seen\\nWest s celebrated painting of Christ healing in the\\ntemple, I should not say that I remember it; and\\nwhen I use such language, my meaning is, that I\\nremember my seeing it\u00c2\u00bb In the same manner, when\\nwe commit words to memory, so as to repeat them,\\nmemoriter, we remember our perception of them,\\neither by the eye or the ear. Hence, a memoriter\\npreacher, when delivering his discourse, remembers\\nthe perceptions which he has had of the words, pa-\\nragraphs, and pages of his manuscript; so that he\\nturns over leaves in his mind; as I have heard\\none say he did, when reciting it to the people.\\nBe it remembered, however, that it is a much\\nmore profitable employment to remember concep-\\ntions, judgments and reasonings, than perceptions of\\nwords, or other things.\\nA man who remembers his perceptions through\\nhis eyes, more readily than any other mental opera-\\ntions, is said to have a local memory; or a memory\\nthat is particularly exercised about positions and\\nplaces.\\nA man who can more easily remember concep-\\ntions, judgments, and reasonings, than his percep-\\ntions of words, has acquired one of the most im-\\nportant habits of memory.\\nPupil, I know a person who can remember the\\ndate of the birth of every relative which she has,\\nand they are numerous; but hardly any thing else.\\nG2", "height": "3339", "width": "1716", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0087.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "78 Different Operations\\nProfessor. She will serve as an example of local\\nmemorij, I knew a man too, who, from the inspec-\\ntion of maps, could accurately describe the position\\nof every known country, river, sea, lake, ocean, and\\nmountain under the sun; and he hardly remembered\\nany thing else. The origin of this local memory\\nwill be explained when we treat of hahit.\\nCan you classify the operations of human me-\\nmory?\\nPupiL They might be arranged into ten classes,\\ncorresponding with the ten faculties of the human\\nmind, whose operations are remembered.\\nProfessor, That would be a very natural classifi-\\ni:ation. Do you think of any other?\\nPupil. All our operations of memory are per-\\nformed either without, or with, voluntary effort to\\nproduce them: and thus may be divided into two\\nclasses.\\nAny act of memory which is consequent upon\\nsome volition, is called an act of reminiscence or\\nRECOLLECTION.\\nAny act of memory not resulting from some vo-\\nlition to recollect, is called remembrance.\\nRecollection, therefore, is consequent upon some\\nvolition to recollect; but I may rememher without\\nwilling to do it; and even when I desire and xvill\\nnot to do it. An act of memory may be either recol-\\nlection or remembrance.\\nProfessor. Do you conceive of any resemblances\\nbetween the faculties of Consciousness and Memory^\\nand their respective operations?\\nPupiL Consciousness has for its objects nothing\\nbut our own mental operations. The same is true", "height": "3319", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0088.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "of Memory* f%\\nof memory.. Could we cease to be conscious^ or to\\nrernejnher^ at pleasure, in consequence of simply\\nwilling not to be conscious, and not to remember,\\nwe might escape from all punishment; and even\\nfrom the moral government of parents, civil rulers,\\nand our Maker himself. These are resemblances.\\nProfessor, State the most prominent difference\\nbetween Consciousness and Memory.\\nPupiL We are conscious of present mental ope-\\nrations; we remember the past. Thus consciousness\\nmakes us know what we are now doing; and me-\\nmory, what we have done. Memory gives per-\\npetuity, or at least continuance to our knowledge.\\nProfessor. Could we have any knowledge of time^\\nor duration^ without memory?\\nPupil. We conceive of time and duration: we do\\nnot remember them: but as we should probably have\\nno conceptions of perception without having actually\\nseen, heard, smelt, touched, and tasted; so it is\\nmost likely we should never have conceived of time\\nand duration^ had we never remembered past men-\\ntal operations. At any rate, should we conceive of\\nperceptions, of time, of duration, and of futurity,\\nwithout having exercised oi^r senses and memory,\\nour conceptions would be of that class which we\\nhave termed imaginations.\\nProfessor, We find it to be a law of our consti\u00c2\u00bb\\ntution, that some conceptions of some things, shall\\nbe subsequent to some acts of perception or of me-\\nmory. I have particularly observed in children in-\\ndications, that they had no conceptions of the mean-\\ning of the terms, to-day^ yesterday and to-morrow;\\nno conceptions of time past, duration, and futurity;\\nuntil they had exercised the faculty of memory.", "height": "3282", "width": "1775", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0089.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "80 Of Memory.\\nOften I told my little daughter, when two years of\\nage, that to-morrow I would do something if we\\nshould live; and she has answered, yes. Papa,\\nwe live; and for a considerable time could not\\nconceive of the difference between living now^ and\\nat some future time. Memory, therefore, is actually\\nexercised by children, before they learn to conceive\\nof time.\\nPupiL Dots personalidentzttf consist m conscious-\\nness^ as Mr. Locke affirms that it does; or in Me-\\nmoryP\\nProfessor. In neither. Identity is an object oicon*\\nception; not of consciousness^ nor of memory. In\\nforming an idea of identity^ we cojiceive of some\\nbeing as having existed in past time, and as existing\\nat present, or at some subsequent time; so that with-\\nout having some notion of past and of present time,\\nwe could not conceive of identity. Memory, there\\nfore, is as necessary to our conceiving of identity,\\nas it is to our conceiving of past and present time.\\nWe next conceive^ that this being which now exists,\\nis the same which did exist; and this is our conception\\nof the identity of a being. If we conceive, that any\\nthing now is., and from any past time has continued\\nto be essentially what it was^ we coJiceive of iden-\\ntity; and if we judge that this conception is a con-\\nception of a truth or of a falsehood, we judge con-\\ncerning the identity of the thing; that it is the same\\nthing that it was, or that it is not the same thing\\nthat it was.\\nI perceive a watch hanging over the mantle-piece.\\nI conceive of the meaning of the proposition, that\\nwatch is the same which hung there yesterday. This", "height": "3322", "width": "1929", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0090.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "Of Identity. 81\\nis a conception concerning identity. judge the pro-\\nposition to be a truth; and this is a judgment con-\\ncerning the identity of the watch.\\nNow let me arise and examine the watch. It has\\nthe same appearance externally, which I remember\\nI perceived it had yesterday. I still judge it to be\\nthe same. Let us open it. The wheels that I ex-\\npected to find within are not to be seen. I reverse\\nmy judgment concerning identity^ and say, this is\\nnot the same watch which hung here yesterday.\\nThe identity of the case I recognize; but it is not\\nthe watch that it was; for some of the essential\\nparts of the watch are gone. Now let me take it to\\na watch-maker; and let him supply all the internal\\nparts of a watch. I still recognize the identity of\\nthe case; but I jadge that the internal parts are nexv^\\nIt is no longer the same watch; unless by watch I\\nmean merely the case of a watch.\\nAgain, let us suppose that on opening the watch,\\ninstead of finding any wheels gone, every thing\\nappears within and without, as I remember the\\nwatch I took down from the same nail did yester-\\nday. I now judge this to be the very same watch I\\ntook down yesterday; because it looks like the same\\nand I know there is no other silver watch in my\\nhouse. Under present circumstances I cannot doubt\\nits identity. But I may have a wrong judgment in\\nthis case, for here come ten audible witnesses, who\\nall testify, that one of them took down my silver\\nwatch from that nail last night; that they took it\\nto an artist; that he melted the silver case, in their\\npresence; and that he melted every internal part se-\\nparately; but having done all this, he refashioned", "height": "3342", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0091.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "82 Of Identity*\\nthe whole again, in the very mould in which it Was\\nmade, so that every part now appears just as it did\\nbefore it was i educed to a fluid; and that they re-\\nstored it to the nail. I believe the witnesses: can I\\npredicate identity of this watch, and of the watch\\nthat hung there yesterday? I cannot. Had I seen\\neach part in the crucible, in a fluid state, I might\\nhave said, these are the identical particles of silver\\nwhich composed my case; and these the identical\\nparticles of brass that composed the wheels; and co\\nof the rest: but this is a new^ another watch; formed\\nout of the materials of the old one. Want of con-\\ntinued existence as a watch has destroyed its iden-\\ntity as a watch.\\nLet us now change the subject, and instead of a\\nwatch, speak of a particular human soul, or mind.\\nThis mind now exists: and has the ten constituent\\nfaculties of every human mind. If we judge this\\nsame mind existed at some time before the present,\\nand has now the same faculties which it then had,\\nwithout having ceased to be, between the two given\\npoints of time, we predicate of it identity. Should\\nthis mind, however, be annihilated, or cease to be;\\nand should another be erected like it, it would be\\nanother^ and not the same mind.\\nPupil, I remember you have said in your Quar-\\nterly Theological Reviexv^ that mental identity con-\\nsists in the continued existence of all the constituent\\nmental faculties of that mind of which we predicate\\nidentity. Take away any one of the ten faculties\\nfrom any human mind, and the identity of that mind\\nwould cease. The identity of the other faculties\\nmight be continued, but the mind constituted by", "height": "3319", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0092.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "Mental Identity. 83\\nten faculties would cease to exist; and the being\\nthat should retain the nine would be a different\\nmental being from any now called human.\\nProfessor, Can you discriminate between mental\\nidentity^ and the knowledge which the mind has of\\nits identity?\\nPupiL Very easily! for a man may be in a swoon;\\nhe may be destitute of all mental operations; and\\nyet his mental faculties may all continue in exist-\\nence, and be the very same that had being before\\nthe swoon*\\nOur knowledge of our own mental identity we\\nhave by the operations of consciousness and memory;\\nwhich has led many erroneously to suppose, that\\npersonal identity consists in consciousness, or in\\nmemory, or in both. We might as well say that the\\nidentity of a table consists in consciousness^ as that\\nthe identity of a moral agent consists in knowings\\nthat he is the same being to-day, that he was yes-\\nterday! garter ly Theological Review,\\nProfessor, Tell me, then, since you have ex-\\nplained what you mean by mental identity^ how a\\nman comes by his knowledge that he is the same\\nmental being that existed and acted yesterday?\\nPupil, I perform a mental action; I am conscious\\nof it; and upon being conscious, constitutionally\\njudge, that I now exist. Again, I remember t\\\\i2it I\\nwas conscious in some past moment; and I consti-\\ntutionally judge, that I did then exist. Now should\\nthe question be started, whether this thijig denoted\\nby that I call myself bt- a mind or not, I should\\nanswer, that by or myself I mean one individual\\nmind. Should it be demanded, Is your mind that", "height": "3339", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0093.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "84 Mental Identity.\\ndid exist, and now exists, one and the same mindf\\nI answer, that I judge it, upon reflection, to be the\\nsame, in all its constituent faculties; for I am con-\\nscious of now performing all the different mental\\noperations which I remember that I did perform;\\nwhence I infer^ that the mind is possessed of the\\nsame faculties, and is essentially the same.\\nProfessor. But how do you know, that you have\\nnot ceased to exist between the time of your present\\nconsciousness, and that past time in which you re-\\nmember that you did perform certain actions?\\nPupil. I now remember, that when I was two\\nyears of age, I saw my paternal grandfather incline\\nhis chair backwards, until he tumbled over; and\\nfrom my constitution I judge, without being able\\nto doubt the truth of my judgment, that who now\\nremember, now exist; and that who now exist,\\ndid then exists when I remember to have seen what\\noccurred. That I, who now exist, am the same in-\\ndividual that did then exist, is implied in the con-\\nstitutional judgment, that who now remember^ did\\nthen exist.\\nNow, if I state the proposition, I have continued\\nto exist from the time of the most remote mental\\niteration which I remember^ until the present time,\\nin which I remember it, without any cessation of\\nbeing; I conceive the meaning of it, and judge that\\nit is a truth.\\nProfessor. You do indeed thus judge, and so\\ndoes every other rational man. All, who remember,\\njudge, that they have continued to exist, uninter-\\nruptedly, from the time in which they remember\\nany thing; but the question is, how come they by", "height": "3322", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0094.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "Mental Identity. 85\\nthis judgment? Is it a constitutional or an acquired\\njudgment? Answer this question, and you will then\\nshow, hoxv a man obtains knowledge of his continued\\nmental identity.\\nIf the judgment is constitutional^ it will be in-\\nstantly formed in your mind, without any reasoning\\nor deliberation on the subject. If it is constitutional,\\nno circumstances can make you seriously doubt it.\\nTo assist you in forming a correct opinion on\\nthis subject, let me state a fact.\\nSome years ago, a man in Northampton in Mas-\\nsachusetts, took his axe, his beetle and wedges, and\\nwent into the woods to cut, and split, some fencing\\nstuff. He went alone, and soon after returned in a\\nstate of delirium. He continued an active, ingenious,\\ncrazy person, for seven years. Near the expiration\\nof that time, he began to indicate approaching sanity\\nof mind; when one day, standing by his fire, and\\ninstantly turning round, he asked, Boys, have you\\nbrought in that axe, the beetle and wedges?\\nWhat axe, father? asked his sons.\\nWhy, the one I just left in the woods, said he:\\nI had a pain in my head, and came home, and left\\nit, with the beetle and wedges. His sons and fa-\\nmily told him, that seven years ago, he went into\\nthe woods; that he had been disordered in mind\\never since; and that they never had been able to\\nfind the implements which he then carried with\\nhim.\\nHe went with his sons to the spot, on which he\\nhad left his farming utensils. The helve of the axe,\\nand the whole of the beetle, except the iron rings,\\nhad mouldered under the leaves, and returned to\\nH", "height": "3342", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0095.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "86 Mental Identity,\\ndust. The axe, and the wedges, and the rings were\\nbrought home; but the restored naan never was\\nable to remember any thing that occurred during\\nseven years; and could judge, only from testimony^\\nand reflection^ that he had continued to exist during\\nthat portion of his life. His judgment of his con-\\ntinued identity was certainly acquired. The truth of\\nthe anecdote may be relied on: I had the account\\nfrom the late President Dwight, a native of North-\\nampton.\\nPupil, This man constitutionally judged, that he\\nexisted, at each, and every time, in which he re-\\nmembered any one of his mental operations.\\nProfessor. All men do the same.\\nPupil. Could we then remember something for\\nevery moment of our existence, we should consti-\\ntutionally judge, that we had existed in every mo-\\n\u00c2\u00bbient, from the present, to the most remote, time,\\nin which we remember any thing done.\\nProfessor, True; but then no man does remem-\\nber something done by himself, in every moment of\\ntime, during which he judges that he has continued\\nto exist; and hence no man constitutionally judges\\nhimself to be the subject of a continued mental\\nidentity.\\nPupil, Then the judgment that a man has con-\\nterning his own continued mental identity, must be\\nacquired; and I am confident that all men have it;\\nfor no man judges, that he has at any one time\\nceased to exist, since his existence began; and all,\\nfrom time to time, remember certain things, which\\ninduce the judgment, that they existed at each par-\\nticular time referred to by memory. All remember", "height": "3322", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0096.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "Mental Identitij. 87\\ntoo, some of their mental operations which were\\nperformed during sleep; and hence judge that they\\nexist in time of sleep. In this way they seem to ar-\\nrive at the judgment, that they have never ceased\\nto exist, since they can remember any thing.\\nProfessor, One thing, then, is certain, that if a\\nman has ever, for a moment, ceased to exist, since\\nhis mental existence began, he does not knov/ it:\\nfor he judges that he existed at every time of per-\\nforming any remembered actj nor can he believe it,\\nfor no one has ever testified to his temporary ex-\\ntinction of mental being.\\nPupiL I should like to hear your account oi per-\\nsonal identity. Do you distinguish it from mental\\nidentity?\\nProfessor. When we speak of a human person^\\nwe mean an individual man, consisting of body and\\nsoul. Neither the one nor the other alone consti-\\njtutes a person. Now the question may be asked,\\ncan personal identity be predicated of any one who\\npasses from infancy through all the usual changes\\nto old age?\\nThe most important part of the human being, the\\nmind, continues essentially the same, from the cra-\\ndle to the grave. The body-undergoes numerous\\nchanges; but there are portions of it, which continue\\nfrom the birth to the dissolution of the frame, by a\\nprocess of corruption. Perfect personal identity,\\ntherefore, cannot with truth be predicated of any\\nman, at two different periods of his life; and yet\\nthe identity of the mental being, the moral agent,\\nmay be predicated of one from his birth, to any fu-\\ntore period of his existence.", "height": "3342", "width": "1719", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0097.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "38 Personal Identity\\nPupil, What, then, does an old man mean, when\\nhe says, I am the very s2iVf\\\\Q person that you knew,\\nwhen I was a little boy?\\nProfessor, He intends to assert his mental iden-\\ntity, and the fact, that he who now thinks and\\nspeaks, was once the inhabitant of the little frame\\nof the boy mentioned; which frame has grown and\\nchanged, from time to time, until it presents its\\npresent appearance of an old man.", "height": "3322", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0098.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION VIII.\\nThe Faculty of Reasoning. Premises. Conclusion. A Syllogism.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nClassification of Reasonings. Demonstrative and Probable Reason-\\nings. Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings. Analogical,\\nAnalytic, and Synthetic Reasonings. Reasonings a priori, h. poste-\\nriori, ad absurdum, and ad hominem.\\nProfessor. What is the Faculty of Reasoning?\\nPupil. The faculty of Reasoning in man, is that\\ninherent part of the original constitution of his soul,\\nby which he infers conclusions from premises.\\nProfessor. What is the result of every operation\\nof reasoning?\\nPupil. An inferred judgment.* In reasoning we\\nalways deduce something before unknown from\\nsomething previously known.\\nProfessor* What is logic?\\nPupil. The science of Reasoning: or a systematic\\narrangement of all we know about the operations of\\nthe Faculty of Reasoning.\\nReasoning is the process by which we pass from one judgment\\nto another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, therefore,\\nthere must be a proposition inferred, and one or more from which it\\nis inferred. And this power of inferring, or draAving a conclusion, is\\nonly another name for reasoning; the proposition inferred, being call-\\ned the conclusion, and the proposition or propositions, from which it\\nis inferred, the premises -^Reid.\\nH2", "height": "3323", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0099.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "90 Reasoning.\\nProfessor. Could any man reason without having\\nsome previous operations of judgment?\\nPupih He could not, for reasoning implies some\\nprevious judgments and an inference from them.\\nWithout admitted axioms, or self-evident proposi-\\ntions, or acquired judgments, reasoning could never\\ncommence; but when by reasoning we have estab-\\nlished any judgment, it may be used as one of the\\npremises, from which we derive another conclusion.\\nProfessor. Your account would make every act\\nof reasoning imply a syllogism, expressed or under-\\nstood.\\nPupil. A syllogism is nothing more than the ex-\\nhibition of a process of reasoning. It consists of\\nthree propositions, the two first of which are called\\npremises^ and the last the conclusion.\\nIt very frequently happens, however, that we\\nstate one truth, and infer another from it, without\\nnaming one of our premises, because it is so obvious\\nas to be understood by every one. An argument of\\nthis kind is called an Enthymeme. Thus we might\\nsay, because God is a just being, the just man will\\nbe justified by him. The last clause of this sen-\\ntence is an inference; the first clause is one of the\\npremises, from which it is derived; and the other\\nis understood. The whole chain would be express-\\ned thus:\\nBy a just being a just man will be justified:\\nGod is a just being:\\nTherefore, a just man will be justified by him.\\nThe i rst of these three propositions is a truth,\\n30 generally known and admitted, that in reasoning\\nfrom it, few would take the trouble to state it: and", "height": "3322", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0100.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "Reasonings, 91\\nin like manner, we omit thousands of axioms, and\\ngenerally admitted principles of reasoning.\\nProfessor, Can you classify human reasonings?\\nPupiL They are either true or false. The rea-\\nsoning of any one, in any particular instance, is false,\\nwhen the inference from the premises is not a le-\\ngitimate one, or when either of the premises is false.\\nAn inference may be legitimate, and yet false, when\\neither of the premises is false; and the reasoning\\nmay be false, when an illegitimate conclusion is\\ndrawn from true premises.\\nProfessor, What is the usual difference between\\nthe reasonings of a/oo/and 2i madman?\\nPupil. Tht fool states true premises^ and infers\\nfrom them an illegitimate conclusion. His infe-\\nrences do not naturally, and in the view of rational\\nmen, flow from his premises. The madman^ on the\\nother hand, states false premises and argues conclu-\\nsively from them. Should we admit his premises we\\ncould not avoid admitting his inferences.\\nProfessor* You may give another classification\\nof human reasonings.\\nPupil. Dr. Reid has said, The most remarkable\\ndistinction of reasonings is, that some are probable,\\nothers demonstrative. Hence, I should say, that\\nin probable reasonings, the conclusion is probably\\ntrue; but in demonstrative reasonings, the conclu-\\nsion is demonstrably true. Demonstrative reason-\\ning is called demonstration.\\nProfessor. What is the prominent distinction be-\\ntween probable and demonstrative reasonings?\\nPupil. In demonstrative reasoning, each of the\\npremises is judged to be certainly true, and the con-", "height": "3339", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0101.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "92 Logic* Definition,\\nelusion is judged necessarily to result from them:\\nbut in probable reasonings one at least of the pre-\\nmises admits of some doubt.\\nProfessor. Give an instance of demonstration.\\nPupil. Things which are equal to the same, are\\nequal to one another:\\nThe sum of seven and three, and the sum o(Jive\\nand jfive are equal to the same number, ten:\\nTherefore the sum of seven and three, and the sum\\nof Jive and five are equal to one another.\\nThe first proposition in this syllogism is a ma-\\nthematical axiom; the second is an intuitive judg-\\nment, and neither the one nor the other of these\\npremises can be doubted by any offe, who under-\\nstands the meaning of the terms used. The conclu-\\nsion necessarily follows; and a different conclusion\\ncannot be judged even possible.\\nProfessor. In DuncarCs Elements of Logic, we\\nhave a similar example.\\nEvery number that may be divided into two\\nequal parts, is an even number:\\nThe number eight may be clivided into two equal\\nparts:\\nTherefore the number eight is an even number.\\nHere the first proposition is a definition of a word;\\nand if you judge it to be correct, from a conception\\nof the meaning of the terms, the conclusion will\\ninevitably follow; for every man will, from intuition,\\njudge, that the second proposition is true.\\nPupil. But I judge, that the definition is not cor-\\nrect; for it would prove every number to be an even\\nnumber. Thus^i;^ as w^ell as eight may be divided\\ninto two equal parts Two and a half are part of", "height": "3351", "width": "1933", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0102.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "Reasonings. 93\\niive, equal to two and a half^ the other part of five.\\nThus every number may be divided into two equal\\nparts. He would have been correct had he said,\\nEvery number, the units of which may be di-\\nvided into two equal parts, is an even number:\\nfor we could not divide the units composing the\\nnumber five into two equal parts. One unit would\\nremain after we had made two equal parts, each of\\nwhich should contain twoj and by the definition we\\nare to make two even parts by the units, without di-\\nviding a single unit into halves. Hence txvo^ fi^^\\nsix, eighty and ten are called even numbers; for they\\ncan be equally divided without leaving a unit for\\nthe remainder; and Q?ie, three, fi ^^t seven, and nine^\\nare called uneven or odd numbers; because the units\\nthat compose them cannot be divided into two equal\\nnumbers of units.\\nProfessor, You are correct. Duncati^s Logic\\nmight, without any detriment to the cause of\\nscience, be dismissed from our colleges. Can you\\ngive as good a criticism on Dr. Reid s division of\\ndemonstrative reasonings into metaphysical and ma-\\nthematical reasonings. You know he says, The\\nreasonings I have met with that can be called strict-\\nly demonstrative, may, I think, be reduced to two\\nclasses. They are either metaphysical, or they are\\nmathematical.\\nPupil, Mathematics, strictly speaking, are things\\nlearned; and metaphysics include all things known\\nconcerning the nature, relations, operations and at-\\ntributes of all beings which exist. Mathematical rea-\\nsonings, therefore, ought to include all reasonings\\nconcerning things learned; and metaphysical rea-", "height": "3339", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0103.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "94 Reasonings,\\nsonings, all reasonings concerning all beings, oi\\nevery description. Some have restricted the mean-\\ning of mathematics and metaphysics; so as to denote\\nby the former, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra,\\ngeometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry,\\nastronomy, and the mensuration of solids,* and by\\nthe latter, the science of all immaterial substances.\\nBut such a restriction would not suit Dr. Reid s\\nclassification of reasonings; for the axioms of ma-\\nthematical science, (using mathematical in the re-\\nstricted sense.) are such propositions as the mind\\nof man, from intuition^ judges to be true; and so\\npartake of a metaphysical nature. It is extremely\\ndifficult, therefore, to class our reasonings of a de-\\nmonstrative kind, under the two heads of metaphy-\\nsical and mathematical^ whether these words be used\\nin a restricted, or in their most extensive sense.\\nThe fact is, deinonstrative reasoning may be em-\\nployed in any, and every science, which contains\\naxioms^ or is founded on constitutional judgments.\\nProfessor, Well: give me an example of Proba*\\nble Reasoning,\\nPupil, What the sun has done uninterruptedly\\nfor a thousand years past it will do to-morrow:\\nThe sun for a thousand years past has uninter-\\nruptedly illuminated the portion of earth on which\\nwe live:\\nTherefore the sun will to-morrow illuminate it.\\nOf the truth of the first proposition in this conca*\\ntenation, we cannot be certain, unless the Creator of\\nthe sun and earth should assert it. It is possible the\\nsun may not illuminate Philadelphia, and the ad-\\njacent country. It is possible j in the nature of things,", "height": "3322", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0104.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "Reasonings, 95\\nthat it should be annihilated. Were this first propo-\\nsition infaUibly certain, as a self-evident truth is to\\nour minds, the inference could not be doubted; the\\nfirst could not be otherwise than as it is stated. The\\nreasoning, therefore, is not demonstrative: and it\\ncannot be demonstrated that the sun will shine here\\nto-morrow. He may be completely shorn of his\\nbeams, for a day, or a month, or for ever. Probably^\\ntherefore, might with propriety be inserted in the\\nfirst of these premises, and in the conclusion; as it\\nmay in every instance of probable reasoning. What\\nthe sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand\\nyears past, it will probably do to-morrow. There-\\nfore, it \\\\Y\\\\\\\\\\\\ probably shine on us to-morrow.\\nProfessor. Were it deducible from any self-evi-\\ndent truth, that day and night, seed time and harvest,\\nsummer and winter, should never cease while the\\nworld exists, that they should not cease would\\nprobably never have been made a matter of direct\\nrevelation.\\nProbable reasonings admit of many degrees of\\nprobability; and \\\\x^on judgments which are probably\\ntrue, we are obliged to act in the greater part of our\\naffairs.*\\nProbable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative\\nby this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the\\nhighest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot\\nindeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption\\nfor it, because, as there may be ])robabilities on both sides of a ques-\\ntion, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet a\\nsligl. t presumption does not beget that degree of conviction which is\\nimplied in saying a thip;; is probably true. But that the slightest pos-\\nsible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence,", "height": "3342", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0105.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "96 Analogical Reasoning\\n6-.\\nAnalogical reasonings are nothing more than a\\nspecies of probable reasonings, in which one or both\\nof the premises is a matter of analogy. The syl-\\nlogism you have just given is an instance; for the\\nproposition, that what the sun has done it will con^\\ntinue to do^ is a judgment which we learn to form\\nfrom analogy.\\nA few other distinctions I will name. They re-\\nspect modes of reasoning.\\nWhen we form judgments by observation and\\nexperience, or in any other way, concerning indivi-\\ndual things, and make them the premises whence\\nwe infer general or universal truths, we are said to\\npursue the analytic mode of reasoning. Thus, we\\njudge from observation, that one gravid substance\\ngravitates to the centre of the earth; as Sir Isaac\\nNewton judged, that the apple did. Again, we\\njudge from what we perceive, that another, and\\nanother, and another, similar substance does the\\nsame; until we have formed this judgment concern-\\ning every gravid body, with which we are acquaint-\\ned. Then we reason thus.\\nWood, stone, lead, water, earths, c. gravitate\\ntowards the centre of the earth:\\nWood, stone, lead, water, earths, c. are all the\\ngravid bodies with which we are acquainted^\\nthat such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to a\\nmoral certainty. Thus a man s having observed the ebb and flow of\\nthe tide to-day, affords some sort of presumijtion, though the lowest\\nimaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow; but the observation\\nof this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has\\nbeen observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.\\nBntler s .Analogy.", "height": "3322", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0106.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "Modes of Reasoning, 97\\nTherefore, all the gravid bodies with which we\\nare acquainted gravitate towards the centre of the\\nearth.\\nThe first of these propositions should enumerate\\nin the place of the \u00c2\u00a3ffc. which we have introduced\\nfor the sake of brevity, every gravid substance, with\\nwhich we are acquainted, and then the inference\\nwould be as certain as those constitutional judg-\\nments which follow our perceptions.\\nShould we choose to adopt the synthetic mode of\\nreasonings we might now make some general truth\\none of our premises, and from it infer some parti-\\ncular truth; thus:\\nAll the gravid bodies with which we are ac-\\nquainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth:\\nStone is one of the gravid bodies with which we\\nare acquainted:\\nTherefore, stone gravitates towards the centre of\\nthe earth.\\nYou will readily apprehend, that many sciences\\nare reared by analytical reasonings; but that being\\nalready established they may be taught in the syn-\\nthetic method, I do not affirm that every systematic\\narrangement of knowledge, on any subject, called a\\nscience, is made by analytical deductions j for many\\nconstitutional judgments are themselves general\\nprinciples. Those sciences which are generally in-\\ncluded under the title of natural philosophy and na-\\ntural history, are all formed originally by analy-\\ntical reasonings: but arithmetic, algebra, geometry,\\ntrigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy,\\nand mensuration of solids, have grown out of the\\nsynthesis of axioms and definitions*\\nI", "height": "3342", "width": "1779", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0107.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "98 Modes of Reasoning,\\nPupil, Do not the sciences of natural philosophy\\nand history depend very much upon analogical,\\nprobable reasonings?\\nProfessor. Undoubtedly they do; and therefore\\nI wonder, that men of sense should deem natural\\nphilosophy any more capable of certainty than men-\\ntal science. The conclusion, that all gravid bodies\\nwill gravitate to the centre of the earth to-morrow^\\nis derived from nothing more certain than analogy;\\nand from analogy alone can the natural historian\\njudge, that all human bodies which he has not dis-\\nsected, have viscera essentially similar to those\\nwhich he has dissected; and that the same medi-\\ncines in similar circumstances, will produce similar\\neffects, on the living subject to-morrow, which they\\nhave done to-day.\\nPupil. I have heard old logicians talk much about\\nreasonings a posteriori^ a priori^ ad absurdum^ and\\nad hominem. Will you explain them?\\nProfessor, Reasonings a priori^ are inductions\\nconcerning effects from their causes. The premises^\\nof course, in a priori reasonings, must predicate\\nsomething concerning the cause of a thing; and the\\nconclusion from the premises, some inference con-\\ncerning an effect of that cause. I give an example,\\nfrom Dr. S. Clark, on the being and attributes of\\nGod.\\nA Being in his own nature infinite, omnipresent,\\nand inielligent, must be infinitely wise:\\nThe Supreme Being is in his own nature, infi-\\nnite, omnipresent, and intelligent:\\nTherefore the Supreme Being must be infinitely\\nwise.", "height": "3322", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0108.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "Modes of Reasoning, 99\\nHere the nature of the Supreme Being is consi-\\ndered as the cause of his infinite wisdom; which is\\nan infinite, unchangeable effect, of this Infinite,\\nUnchangeable Cause.\\nReasonings a posteriori^ are inductions concern-\\ning causes from their effects. The premises, in\\nreasonings of this kind, must predicate something\\nconcerning effects. One example will suffice.\\nEvery intelligent creature must have had an in-\\ntelligent Creator;\\nMan is an intelligent creature:\\nTherefore man must have had an intelligent\\nCreator.\\nHere man is the effect^ concerning which it is\\npredicated, that he must have had an intelligent\\nCreator: and the Creator is the cause of man s ex-\\nistence; concerning which cause we infer, that he is\\nintelligent.\\nReasoning ad absurdum^ is an act of reason in\\nwhich you infer some absurd proposition^ with a\\ndesign to establish the converse of that conclusion.\\nThis mode of reasoning is adopted, because it is an\\nundisputed principle of reasoning, that if a proposi-\\ntion be false^ the converse of it must be true: and if\\na proposition be true^ the converse of it must be false.\\nThus we may assert.\\nThat God is a good beings or\\nThat God is not a good being.\\nEach of these propositions is the converse of the\\nother; and every one will readily judge, upon the\\nslightest examination, that if either is true, the other\\nmust be false.\\nReasoning ad homznem^ is a reasoning at a man;", "height": "3304", "width": "1793", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0109.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "100 Reason*\\nor an act of reasoning in which you take a man s\\nown propositions, whether true or false, for your\\npremises, with a design to refute some of his asser-\\ntions, or to convince him of some truth.\\nPupiL Do you make any distinction between\\nReason^ and iho. faculty of reasoning f\\nProfessor, The faculty of reasoning is sometimes\\ncalled the Reason of a man; but reason more com-\\nmonly denotes the result of our intellectual opera-\\nrations. Hence we say, that our reason teaches us,\\nsuch and such a truth. A reason for an action, is a\\nmotive; and the reason of an event, means the occa-\\nsion or instrumental cause of that event.", "height": "3359", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0110.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION IX.\\nThe Faculty of Conscience. Proof that all men have this Faculty.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nOther names for the same thing. Some general Obseryations and\\nLaws concerning the Operations of Conscience.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Operations of Con-\\nscience always occasion certain Feelings.\\nProfessor, What is the faculty of Conscience?\\nPup iU The faculty of conscience in man, is that\\ninherent part of the original constitution of his souly\\nby which he performs mental operations of a re-\\nligious character.\\nProfessor, You would have it understood, I pre=\\nsume, that the religion of which you speak in this\\ncase may be either true or false rational or absurds\\nScrittural^ Deisttcal^ or Atheistical,\\nPupil, I would; because all men have a religion\\nof some sorty as we judge every rational being, who\\nhas a conscience, must have; but I should be far\\nfrom deciding, that all religions are equally good,\\nor that one may be contradictory to another, and\\nboth be true.\\nProfessor, How do you know that all men have\\na conscience?\\nPupil, All men with whom we are acquainted,\\nor of whom we have ever read, approve of some\\nmoral actions, and disapprove of others; according\\nto the moral law which they have either formed or\\n12", "height": "3347", "width": "1793", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0111.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "102 Conscience.\\nadopted. The law may, in the judgment of others,\\nbe reasonable or unreasonable; but so long as a man\\napproves of the law, in his own mind, he will ap-\\nprove of conformity to it, and disapprove of the\\ntransgression of it.\\nNow every act of mental approbation, or disap-\\nprobation, is a mental operation of which a man is\\nconscious; and which, every man may readily be\\nconvinced, is distinct from any operation of any\\nothtr faculty. It is because men are conscious of\\nthese acts of conscience, and judge them to be dif-\\nferent from other simple operations of the soul, that\\nthey have given them distinct names.\\nFrom the general principle, that there can be no\\neffect without an adequate cause, we infer, that all\\nmen who approve or disapprove of any moral action,\\nmust have a faculty of mind by which they perform\\nthese operations: and this faculty we call Conscience.\\nSome denominate it the Moral Faculty^ and others\\nthe Moral Sense,\\nProfessor., How do men commonly express their\\napprobation or disapprobation of moral actions?\\nPupil. They affirm or deny, that they are right\\nor xvrong. They say, that such particular actions\\nought^ or ought not to be done: and that they are\\neither morally good^ or morally evil. In short, their\\nmodes of expressing the dictates of their consciences\\nare very numerous. Had they no consciences, they\\nwould never speak of a sense of moral obligation^\\nrectitude^ virtue^ piety^ and religion; unless they\\nwere to imagine things, of which, from experience,\\nthey could form no conceptions.\\nProfessor. The fact that men either mentally ac--", "height": "3383", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0112.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "Conscience, 103\\ncuse or excuse themselves, for their own conduct, is\\nanother proof that they have consciences: and their\\nattempts to make other men approve or disapprove\\nof certain courses of conduct, are evidence that they\\nthink other men have consciences as well as them-\\nselves.\\nPupiL May not every operation of conscience be\\nresolved into judgment and feeling and so be ac-\\ncounted a complex, instead of a simple operation?\\nProfessor, After mature reflection upon what\\npasses within me, I feel constrained to express my\\njudgment, that the approbation or disapprobation of\\na moral law or action, is neither a judgment^ nor a\\nfeelings but a single act, that seems to partake of\\nboth. I am conscious that I judge the proposition,\\nmen ought not to steals to be true: I am conscious\\nof certain feelings too, consequent upon this judg-\\nment; and I am conscious, moreover, of approving\\nof the proposition as a rule. The acts of ^w^a^mj^\\nthis moral rule to be true, and of feeling content-\\nment with it, or love for it; appear to my mind to\\nbe as distinct from a conscientious approbation of it,\\nas any acts of memory from those of reasoning. As\\na particle is a word distinct from every other part\\nof speech, and yet partakes of the nature of a verb\\nand of a noun, so it appears to me, that an act of\\nconscience partakes of the nature of a judgment and\\nof a feeling, and yet is distinct from each, and every\\nother kind of mental operation.\\nIt is by this faculty that I experience what is\\ncalled a sense of obligation^ and a sense of account-\\nability.\\nPerhaps you are able to enumerate some general", "height": "3331", "width": "1754", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0113.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "i\u00c2\u00a94 Conscience*\\nlaws concerning the operations of conscience, which\\nwill serve to distinguish them from other mental\\nacts.\\nPupil. I am conscious of approving or disapprov-\\ning actions only when I remember that I have com-\\npared them with some rule of moral conduct, and\\njudged them to be conformable or not conformable\\nto it.\\nProfessor, Every operation of conscience, then,\\nrelative to moral actions, presupposes an act of the\\njudgment.\\nPupil, Certainly; for I never approve of any ac-\\ntion without previously judging that it is right; that\\nis, conformable to some rule of action, which I have\\nlaid down.\\nAgain; I never judge any law to be reasonable,\\nequitable, and obligatory, without some previous\\nconception concerning it: the same is true of my\\njudgmenr concerning actions; it is consequent upon\\nsome conception of them, and of their relation to a\\nlaw: so that my moral approbation is consequent\\nupon my judgment, and my judgment upon my con-\\nceptions.\\nProfessor, Ultimately, then, our dictates of con-\\nscience are dependent on our conceptions; and hence\\nwe learn the importance of having right concep-\\ntions, or a right understanding of things; for if a\\nman verily thinks, (conceives and judges,) that he\\nought to do many things against Jesus of Nazareth,\\nhis conscience will approve of the action. Hence\\nwe hear of the blinding and perversion of conscience.\\nIt is by having a darkened understanding, that men\\napprove of what is wrong in the judgment of more", "height": "3367", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0114.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "Conscience. 105\\nenlightened and exalted minds. If you would pro-\\nduce in a man a good conscience, rectify his con-\\nceptions and judgments.\\nPupiL It must be owing to this connexion be-\\ntween the operations of Conception and Judgment,\\nand those of Conscience, that the most ignorant\\npeople, generally speaking, are the most vicious.\\nProfessor. Undoubtedly; their consciences in\\nmany cases are not exercised at all; and in other\\ninstances, from wrong notions concerning law, duty,\\nand the nature of moral actions, they approve of\\nmoral evil.\\nPupiL It is another peculiar law of Conscience,\\nthat if a man acts contrary to his own moral appro-\\nbation, he immediately disapproves of his own trans-\\ngression. In figurative language. Conscience alv/ays\\nmakes a man condemn himself, for not doing what\\nshe approves, and for doing what she condemns. A\\nsimilar law exists in relation to no other mental ope-\\nration. We may act contrary to any other mental\\noperation, and she will not infallibly condemn us.\\nIndeed she often approves of our yielding our own\\njudgment, for the sake of peace; and requires oppo-\\nsition to some of our most ardent emotions; but if\\nany man dare to act contrary to his Conscience,\\nhowever uninformed, or misinformed, she may be,\\nConscience will surely scourge him. It is for this\\nreason she has been called the Vicegerent of God\\nin the soul; and is often compared to an impartial\\nJudge.\\nProfessor, Dr. Reid has very well remarked;\\nConscience prescribes measures to every appetite,\\naffection, and passion, and says to every other prin-", "height": "3302", "width": "1769", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0115.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "106 Conscience*\\nciple of action, so far thou mayest go, but no fur-\\nther. We may indeed transgress its dictates, but\\nwe cannot transgress them with innocence, nor even\\nwith impunity. We condemn ourselves, or, in the\\nlanguage of Scripture, our heart condemns usy when-\\never we go beyond the rules of right and wrong,\\nwhich Conscience prescribes. Other principles of\\naction may have more strength, but this only has\\nauthority. Its sentence makes us guilty to ourselves,\\nand guilty in the eyes of our Maker, whatever other\\nprinciple may be set in opposition to it. It is evi-\\ndent, therefore, that this principle has, from its na-\\nture, an authority to direct and determine, with re-\\ngard to our conduct; to judge, to acquit, or to con-\\ndemn, and even to punish; an authority which be-\\nlongs to no other principle of the human mind.\\nPupil. It is another law of Conscience, that every\\nact of disapproving of our own past conduct, should\\nbe immediately followed by some emotion of shame^\\nself- contempt^ or disgust with ourselves: and ano-\\nther, that disapprobation of the past conduct of\\nothers should occasion in us the emotions oi disgust,\\naversion^ discontentment contempt or indignation in\\nrelation to them.\\nOn the other hand, approbation of our own or our\\nneighbour s past moral actions, is immediately fol-\\nlowed by some agreeable affection in our own minds.\\nProfessor, Operations of Conscience, then, are\\nalways productive of pleasure or pain.\\nPupil. And in this way Conscience rewards or\\npunishes men in the present life.\\nProfessor, Is there any distinction between those", "height": "3375", "width": "1998", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0116.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "Conscience, 107\\noperations of conscience, which respect the conduct\\nof other men; and those which regard ourselves?\\nPupth When we approve or disapprove of our\\nown conduct, our consequent emotions are more\\nardent, than those which ordinarily follow our ap-\\nprobation or disapprobation of the conduct of our\\nfellow men. This has led Dr. Wylie to divide the\\noperations of conscience into those of seoscience and\\nheteroscience; or into acts of conscience that respect\\nourselveSy and acts of conscience that respect others*\\nThese may be considered as two classes of opera-\\ntions performed by one faculty. Our general rulcj\\ntherefore, may be expressed thus: acts of seoscience\\nare commonly followed by emotions more pleasing\\nor more painful than those which are consequent\\nupon heteroscience^", "height": "3323", "width": "1781", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0117.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION X.\\nThe Faculty of Feeling.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Feelings distinguished from other Mental\\nOperations. One general Law of Feelings. Classification of all\\nHuman Feelings.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Sensations considered. Three Appetites.\\nUses of the Avord Taste.~Emotions.-~Description of the principal\\nAffections of Man .-\u00e2\u0080\u0094A rule concerning inordinate Affection. Re-\\ngard.\\nProfessor, What is the faculty of Feeling?\\nPupil, The faculty of feeling in man, is that\\ninherent part of the original constitution of his soul,\\nby which he experiences feelings. This is the sen-\\nsitive faculty.*\\nProfessor, Can you define those mental opera-\\ntions that you c feelings?\\nPupil. If I cannot define them, I am conscious\\nof them, and therefore I know that I am the sub-\\nject of them. I can distinguish them from all other\\nmental operations, by stating this fact, that they\\nhave no object distinct from themselves; whereas\\nevery other mental operation has some object upon\\nwhich it terminates. If I perceive it is some object\\nwithout the mind, which is presented through our\\nIt is the mind that feels; it is to the mind alone that the sensa-\\ntions belong, says CondiUac, very truly; but feeling he unhappily\\nuses for perceiving, and sensations for perceptions. Hence he says,\\nwe hbve nve sorts of sensations. The iToind feels through sight,\\nhearing, smell, taste, and chiefly through touch.", "height": "3375", "width": "1938", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0118.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "Pleasure and Pain, 109\\nbodily senses; if I conceive^ it is of some substance,\\nor attribute, or image, or meaning of a word, clause,\\nor sentence; if we judge or reason^ some proposition\\nis the object; if we are conscious or have memory^\\nit is of some mental operation; if we approve or dis-\\napprove^ it is something of a moral nature; if we\\nwi//, it is to do, or not do, some action; and if we\\nexert our efficiency^ it is upon some mental faculty\\nor bodily organ; but if we feel^ it must be some\\nfeelings and nothing else.\\nProfessor, In what consists all human happiness\\nor unhappiness?\\nPupil, In human feelings. Were we destitute of\\nthese, we should feel neither pleasure nor pain. All\\nthe happiness or unhappiness, which we derive from\\nour thoughts^ is inherent in the feelings which they\\nproduce; for, if we have any degree of the one or\\nthe other, we feel it.\\nProfessor, It seems necessary for you to define\\nthe word thought; that no misconception may arise\\nfrom the manner of your using it.\\nPupil, Any operation of any one of the seven fa-\\nculties of The Understanding, I call a thought.\\nAgency, volition, and feeling are mental operations,\\nwhich we exclude from the^ catalogue of thoughts;\\nand they are excluded in all languages.\\nProfessor, You would assert then, I suppose, as\\na general rule, that men never have any feeling ex-\\ncept in consequence of some thought, volition, or\\nefficiency,^\\nIt is a fact universally admitted, that no emotion or passion ever\\nstarts up in the mind without a cause: if 1 love a person, it is for good\\nK", "height": "3339", "width": "1709", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0119.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "110 Classification oj Human Feelings,\\nPupil. Upon self-examination, I judge, that every\\nfeeling I ever had, was preceded by some thought,\\nvolition, or efficiency, which was the occasion of it.\\nIf our feelings were not dependent on some previ-\\nous mental operation, or upon some antecedent, it\\nwould be very absurd to inquire, what is the occa-\\nsion of our having one feeling and not another; or\\nwhy we feel as we do. If we give the reason for\\nQMY feeling in any particular instance, it will uni-\\nformly prove to be some thought^ volition^ or men-\\ntal agency*\\nProfessor* Human feelings are very numerous:\\ncan you classify them?\\nPupil, I can recite your classification, which\\nseems to me to be correct.\\nAll human feelings may be divided into sen-\\nsations and emotions.\\nOur Sensations* are those feelings which are\\nimmediately consequent upon omx perceptions of ob-\\njects without the mind, through the five bodily\\norgans of sense.\\nOur Emotions are ihost feelings which are con-\\nsequent upon other mental operations than our per-\\nceptions^ by the organs of sense.\\nqualities, or good offices: if I have resentment, against a man, it must\\nbe for some injury done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under\\nno distress of body nor of mind. Lord Karnes. We must conceive,\\nwe shouid say, of some good quality, or office; of some injury, or of\\nsome distress, before we can feel love, resentment, or pitz/; for we\\nmay feel if all these are imaginary things; but we cannot feel without\\nsome conception of them as real.\\nSensations, says Price, is only a mode of feeling in the\\nmind. JBmew of Morals, p. 19.", "height": "3359", "width": "1893", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0120.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "Classification of Human Feelings, 111\\nEmotions are subdivided into Affections and\\nPassions.\\nAffections are those emotions of the mind which\\nare naturally pleasurable to us.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2^Passions are those emotions of the mind which\\nare naturally painful to us.\\nThis brief classification includes every feeling of\\nwhich we are conscious.\\nProfessor, According to this account of sensa-\\ntions^ they are always consequent upon perceptions.\\nHow do you know that men do not feel through\\ntheir bodily organs when they have no perceptions?\\nIs it not common for men to say, I feel that this\\nis smooth, this rough, this soft, and this hard? Do\\nthey not tell you, that they feel pain in their eyes,\\nwhen oppressed with too much light; and in their\\nfingers when they are cold?\\nPupil* It is customary, indeed, for people to say,\\nthat they feel., whenever they perceitie any thing;\\nand they speak of feeling as if it were equivalant\\nto perception,, because every perception is followed\\ninstantly by a feeling of some kind. Feeling too is\\noften used for touching; but because a feelings dis-\\ntinct from the perception of a thing by the touchy is\\nconsequent upon every act of touching, we should\\ndistinguish in our language between touching and\\nfeeling.\\nProfessor. Now, for the proof that the particular\\nkind of feeling which we call sensation is always\\nconsequent upon perception.\\nQuarterly Theological Review, voil. i. p. 454.", "height": "3342", "width": "1813", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0121.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "112 Sensations,\\nPupil. Well, then, when I put my finger upon\\na polished surface, I am conscious that I touch or\\nperceive something smooth; and I am conscious that\\nI have an agreeable sensation immediately following\\nthe perception. When I touch a rough, and espe-\\ncially a prickly substance, I am conscious that a\\nvery difFerent/^^/i/z^, or sensation^ immediately fol-\\nlows the act of touchin^^ from what I experienced\\nwhen I touched something smooth and polished. I\\nfind the same to be true, when I attend to any ope-\\nration of seeing, hearing, smelling, or tasting: so\\nthat my consciousness teaches me, that every per-\\nception to which I attend, is followed by some sen-\\nsation: and no man can say that his perceptions to\\nwhich he does not attend, are not thus followed,\\nunless he can testify to that of which he knows no^\\nthing.\\nThat I never h2iv^ 2i sens alio n^^ but in consequence\\nof some perception, I deduce from the fact, that I\\nDr. Hartley has well said, Sensations are those internal feel-\\nings of the mind, which arise from the impressions made by external\\nobjects upon the several parts of our bodies.* Another sentence that\\ndeserves, from its obvious truth, to be cited, can scarcely be found in\\nLis Observations on J^Ian.^* That work is a fanciful attempt to ex-\\nIain ho-w all mental operations may be imputed to the instrumental\\nagency oi vibratio7is in the injiiiitesimalivhite me diiUary particles in the\\nsubstance of the brain, spinal marroio^ andnerves. That there are an}\\nsuch vibrations he has not pi oved; and no one can affirm, from his\\nown observation, feeling, reason, consciousness, or experience of any\\nsort. Dr. Hartley, however, admits, that these vibrations are merely\\nthe instrumental, and not the efficient causes, of sensations, and other\\nmental operations^ so that he no more accounts for the intercourse\\nbetween the soul and body than those vho confess it to be inoompre_\\nLensible.", "height": "3359", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0122.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "Sensations. 113\\nam able to trace my sensations to some antecedent\\nperceptions.\\nAgain, I know that objects of perception have\\nbeen sometimes presented to my bodily senses, and\\nthat I had no sensations in consequence of their\\nphysical action on my body, until I perceived them.\\nFor example, I have been walking the streets in\\nsuch a state of mental occupation, that I have not\\nperceived a friend whose image, I subsequently\\nlearned, must have been formed on the retina of my\\neyes; and not perceiving him, I had no such a sen-\\nsation of a pleasurable nature as always follows the\\nperception of his animating face. Had my sensation\\nbeen immediately dependent on physical impression^\\nI should have had a pleasing sensation from the\\nimage of my friend in my eye, without perceiving\\nhim. I give another instance. I have been so en-\\ngaged in study for some time, as not to perceive\\nthe pricking of a pin; and I felt no painful sensation\\nuntil I had perceived it.\\nProfessor, All who have attentively examined\\ntheir own mental operations, must have found, that\\nthe faculty of Conception, and several other facul-\\nties, are often so busily engaged as not to afford\\nthe faculty of Perception leisure, or opportunity, to\\noperate. Hence a very thoughtful man may ride\\nthrough a fine country, and perceive very few of\\nits beauties. Such a person is frequently called an\\nabsent man; for indeed he seems to be like one ab-\\nsent from the objects of perception that surround\\nhim. When engaged in writing, I do not hear the\\nconversation, which passes in the usual tone, in my\\nchamber; and very frequently mental science so\\nK2", "height": "3353", "width": "1756", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0123.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "^14\u00c2\u00bb Sensations*\\nengages my Reason, Judgment, Memory, and Con-\\neeption, that the shrill voices of my children, pulling\\nat my knee, to ascend into my lap, are scarcely per-\\nceived, while the same action of the modulated at-\\nmosphere on my ears, at other times, would be the\\noccasion of my hearing every syllable. So long as I\\ndo not hear the noise of my children, it gives me\\nno painful sensation.\\nPupil. Your remarks have brought to my re-\\nmembrance this fact, that men who feel acute sen-\\nsations of pain, from the gout, rheumatism, or other\\ndisease, may for a time, by close attention to some\\nimportant, interesting study or business, avoid feel-\\ning the pain.\\nProfessor, By their energetic attention to some\\nintellectual subject, they preclude, for the time, all\\nperception of objects through their senses; especially\\nthe operation of inflammation, or other disease, upon\\nthe organs of touch; and so have no sensations^ be-\\ncause they have no perceptions. Not long since, I\\nwas wounded on the knee; and the pain was intense\\nso long as I perceived any thing through my knee;\\nbut for a little time, when I could deeply engage\\nmy mind in the study of mental science, or theolo-\\ngical inquiry, or devotional exercises, I had no sen-\\nsations of pain from my knee, because I ceased to\\nperceive through the wounded part.\\nI lay it down, therefore, as a fundamental law,\\nthat man has no sensation except in consequence of\\nsome antecedent perception.\\nCan you reduce our sensations to classes?\\nPupiL They may be divided into as many classes\\nSis we have species of perceptions, or bodily organs", "height": "3359", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0124.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "Sensations, 115\\nof sense. They are sensations consequent on seeing,\\nhearing, smelling, touching, or tasting.* In each of\\nthese classes we may find as many sensations as\\nwe have ever performed acts of perception. Every\\ndistinct colour, when seen, is the occasion of a dis-\\ntinct sensation; and so is every modification of\\nfigure, v/ith every other visible object.\\nProfessor, What do you mean by The Appetites\\nof man?\\nPupil, Any sexual sensation, any sensation from\\nhunger, and any sensation from thirst, is an appe-\\ntite. The appetites of course include three species of\\nsensations, which are the most powerful and influ-\\nential. The word appetite is derived from appeto,\\nto catch at, or earnestly seek any thing. The appe-\\ntites, figuratively speaking, may be said, to catch at^\\nor earnestly seek^ that which will gratify them.\\nOur other sensations generally derive their\\nnames, when they have any, from the qualities of\\nexternal things, which, being perceived, occasion\\nthose sensations. Usually we couple an adjective,\\ndescriptive of the quality, with the verb feel. Thus\\nwe say, I feel hot, I feel cold, I feel warm, c. f\\nThe philosophical explanation of these expressions\\nEvery feeling, pleasant or painful, must be in the mind; and yet,\\nbecause in tasting, touching, and smelling, we are sensible of the im-\\npression made upon the organ, we are led to place there also the plea-\\nsant or painful feeling caused by that impression; but, with respect to\\nseeing and hearing, being insensible of the organic impression, we are\\nnot misled to assign a wrong place to the pleasant or painful feelings\\ncaused by that impression; and therefore we naturally place them ia\\nthe mind, where they really are. Lord Kames.\\nt Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 457.", "height": "3359", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0125.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "116 Sensations,\\nis this. I perceive hot air^ or some other hot sub-\\nstance; I have a sensation of a peculiar kind, conse-\\nquent upon the perception of heat: I perceive cold\\nair, water, ice, or some other cold substance, and\\nhave a sensation from the perception of coldness;\\nI perceive warm air, or something else of a warm\\nquality, and I have a sensation of warmth, Cold^ hot^\\nand warm are adjectives, that must agree with some\\nnoun, or name of a thing, of which they denote some\\nquality.\\nIf we touch a rough object, the feeling conse-\\nquent upon the perception of the roughness by the\\ntouch, we call a sensation of roughness* In like\\nmanner, we speak of feelings, or sensations, of\\nsmoothness, hardness, softness, and the like. A great\\nmultitude of sensations are consequent upon our\\nperceptions through the eye, for which we have no\\ndistinguishing terms. Every different effect pro-\\nduced in or upon the body, being perceived, occa-\\nsions a distinct feeling. Thus from the pricking of\\na pin we have one sensation; from the act of pinch-\\ning, another; from the gout in the system, another;\\nfrom tasting twenty different liquors, twenty more;\\nand instead of naming each distinct and different\\nsensation, we merely say, that we feel pleasure or\\npain, in the part of the body, which we judge to be\\nthe organ affected, or the bodily instrument of the\\nparticular perception, that occasions the feeling.\\nProfessor. What do you mean by pleasure and\\npain?\\nQuarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 458.", "height": "3351", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0126.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "Taste, Emotions* 117\\nPupil. Pleasure and pain are attributes of feel-\\ning; and the feeling really is in the mind. We say\\nthe pain is in one of our bodily organs of percep-\\ntion, merely because we have the painful sensation\\nthrough the instrumentality of that organ. For the\\nsame reason we say the pleasant taste is in our\\nmouth.\\nProfessor, What do you mean by taste?\\nPupil. An act of tasting is a mental perception\\nthrough the mouth, palate, and tongue. An act of\\ntasting is sometimes called a taste; and the sensa-\\ntion consequent upon this act of tasting is also fre-\\nquently called a taste. The term moreover is figu-\\nratively used to denote nice discernment^ especially\\nin works of imagination, and the lively emotions\\nconsequent upon that nice discernment.\\nAccurate discrimination upon moral subjects^ ac-\\ncompanied by lively emotions^ is frequently called\\nmoral taste.\\nTo apply taste to the operations of Conception,\\nJudgment, Emotions, and the works of Imagina-\\ntion, such as painting, music, and sculpture, will\\nanswer in figurative, but not in philosophical dis-\\ncourse.\\nProfessor, Under the general term feelings you\\nhave included sensations and emotwns; and under\\nthe term emotions you include affections and pas-\\nsions. Let us have your account of the affections.\\nPupil. Every one is conscious of having those\\nmental operations which we call affections,^ and is\\nQuarterly Theological Review, tol. i. p. 458.", "height": "3314", "width": "1772", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0127.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "118 Various Affections\\nable to conceive of them. It is only requisite to de-\\nscribe, and distinguish them as clearly as possible.\\nAll of them we cannot be expected to enumerate;\\nfor not all of our emotions have distinct names.\\nMany of them require a circumlocution to express\\nthem.\\nThe account which I give is but a recitation, with\\na few interpolations, from the ^arterly Theological\\nReview. Among the AFFECTIONS we enume-\\nrate,\\nI. Love, which is a pleasing emotion, consequent\\nupon the conception and judgment, that some ob-\\nject is lovely, either on account of some of its in-\\nherent attributes, or because it is calculated, to pro-\\nmote some agreeable feeling in ourselves.\\nThe emotion of love is a generic expression, which\\nincludes several species; which are designated, gene-\\nrally, according to the object upon which the men-\\ntal operation terminates, or else according to the\\nrelation of the person who loves. Hence we have,\\n1. Paternal love, which is the love a father exer-\\ncises. 2. Maternal love, which is the love a mother\\nfeels. 3. Conjugal love, which is the love married\\npersons exercise towards each other as partners.\\n4. Filial lovey which a sister exercises. 5. Fraternal\\nlove, which a brother feels. 6. Social love, which is\\nthe love of society. 7. Personal, or Self-love; which\\nis the love of ourselves. 8. Selfishness, which is the\\ninordinate love of one s self. 9. Benevolence, which\\nis love of the happiness of others. 10. Complacencyy\\nwhich is the love of an object for its inherent attri-\\nbutes, or for its own sake. 11. The love of fame", "height": "3351", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0128.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "of the Human Mind, 119\\nthe love of knowledge^ the love of power and the\\nlove of happiness^ which need no explanation.\\nII. Joy is another strong affection, consequent\\non some thought of an event or object, past, pre-\\nsent, or expected, which we deem very desirable\\nfor ourselves, or in relation to others.* When we\\nthink again of any source of joy, and feel a new,\\nsimilar emotion, we are said to rejoice, Gladness\\nis an inferior degree of joy; it may be excited by\\nIncidents, agreeable or disagreeable in themselves,\\nwhich are not of sufficient moment to raise the ec-\\nstasies of joy. f\\nIII. Contentment is an affection consequent up-\\non our judgment, that the thing with which we are\\ncontented, is not to be dispraised, blamed, or high-\\nly commended. It is a feeling which often results\\nfrom contemplating conduct, circumstances, cha-\\nracters, or events that neither displease, nor afford\\nmuch, if any, positive gratification.\\nIV. Satisfaction is an emotion which we ex-\\nperience, when we judge, that any object is fit,\\nsuitable, reasonable, or what might have been ex-\\npected; or in consequence of thinking of the accom-\\nplishment of some desire. Hence we say, we are\\nsatisfied with your conduct,^ when any one has\\nconducted as we should have desired him; and\\nhence the Christian says, in relation to the Supreme\\nIn no situation doth joy rise to a greater height, than upon the\\nremoval of any violent distress of mind or body; and in no situation\\ndoth sorrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what\\nmakes us happy. Lord Karnes.\\nt Cogan s Philosophical Treatise, p. 64", "height": "3342", "width": "1789", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0129.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "120 Afcctiom,\\nobject of this affection, I shall he satisfied, xvhen\\nI axvake in thy likeness J\\nV. Cheerfulness is a moderate affection which\\nwe experience, in consequence of some thought about\\nobjects with which we are contented. It has for its\\nobject generally our present state, and future pros-\\npects. It is a feeling which occupies a place between\\ngladness and contentment; being inferior to the first,\\nand superior to the last. It is generally of longer\\ncontinuance than any more ardent emotion.\\nVI. Desire is an affection which we feel in con-\\ntemplating an object, which we love, and do not\\npossess; or an action, that we judge would promote\\nour happiness by being accomplished. A Wish is\\nthe verbal expression of a desire.\\nVII. Hope is an affection consequent upon the\\ndesire of some object, which we judge to be both\\ngood and probably attainable. We may desire that\\nwhich we think we shall never be able to obtain;*\\nbut we hope only for that, which we have some\\nexpectation that we, or others, shall obtain, or re-\\nceive.\\nVIII. Delight is an ardent emotion which we\\nexperience on obtaining an object desired or hoped\\nfor; or in consequence of juf^ging something to be\\nwhat we highly approve of, and ardently love.\\nIX. Confidence is an emotion consequent upon\\nsome act of faith, in relation to the word of the\\nFull conviction of the impossibility of gratifying any desire, will,\\nhowever, commonly prevent the recun-ence of desire, after the thing;\\nof which we despair.", "height": "3319", "width": "1683", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0130.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "Affections. 121\\nperson in whom we confide. We never confide in\\nany person, without previously judging that he is\\ntrue, and competent to promote the happiness we\\nexpect.\\nX. Gratitude is an emotion consequent on a\\njudgment, that some one has intended to confer, or\\nhas actually conferred, a favour on us.\\nThankfulness is the name we give any grate-\\nful emotion, when it moves us to a verbal expres-\\nsion of our gratitude^ and the actual expression of\\ngratitude is thanksgiving,\\nXI. Resignation is an emotion which we feel\\nin consequence of some judgment, that it is wise,\\nproper, best, or necessary, upon the whole, to yield\\nour will to the will of another. It is an affection\\nwhich often moves us to resolve, that we will make\\nno resistance.\\nXII. Patience is an emotion consequent upon a\\njudgment that it is reasonable and best to wait and\\nendure. It is a feeling which moves in us the de\u00c2\u00ab\\ntermination to suffer without complaining.\\nXIII. Humility is an emotion that results from\\nsome thought of comparative unworthiness. Of\\ncourse, it implies some previous judgment, that the\\nperson or law, with which we compare ourselves,\\nis worthy and excellent.\\nXIV. Meekness is an emotion which we expe-\\nrience, subsequently to some thought of insult or\\ninjury, and to a persuasion that it is not right, or\\nsuitable for us to avenge the insult or injury. It is\\nthat feeling which prevents our choosing to retaliate,\\nChrist felt meekness^ when he was sensible of the\\ninjury done him, and yet opened not his mouth,\\nL", "height": "3331", "width": "1789", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0131.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "122 Affections^\\nXV. Pity is an emotion consequent upon oui*\\njudgment that another suffers pain, or is exposed\\nto suffering, and a desire to afford relief.\\nSome may question whether this should not be\\ncalled a passion instead of an affection; but appeal\\nbeing made to consciousness, the last umpire in\\nmatters of this sort, we are compelled to say, that\\nwe have never felt pity without having some degree\\nof satisfaction in the emotion.\\nXVI. Esteem is an emotion consequent upon\\nour appiobation of a person s moral character, or a\\njudgment that the object esteemed possesses worth,\\nXVII. Respect is a feeling consequent upon\\na judgment, that a person possesses some degree,\\nat least, of both wisdom and goodness.\\nVeneration is a name given to a high degree of\\nrespect, for persons eminent in wisdom and good-\\nness.\\nXVIII. Reverence is an emotion consequent\\nupon some thought of a being, whom we judge to\\nbe great and powerful, as well as wise and good;\\nor of something appertaining to such a being. Holy\\nreverence regards aj^erson, or the attributes of a\\nperson, divinely great, powerful, wise, and good:\\nand hence we are said to feel holy reverence for\\nGod and his house; for his word and ordinances.\\nXIX. Admiration is a sudden emotion, con-\\nsequent upon the thought of something sublime, or\\nmore than commonly excellent in some respect.\\nXX. Surprise is an emotion that results from\\nthe apprehension of something novel and unex-\\npected.\\nXXI. Wonder is an emotion consequent upon", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0132.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "Affections. 12S\\nthe apprehension of something deemed strange, or\\nunaccountable.\\nAstonishment is a name given to a very great\\ndegree of wonder.\\nXXII. Amazement is a feeling consequent upon\\nsome thought of something novel, unexpected, great,\\nand intricate.\\nXXIII. Curiosity is an emotion consequent\\nupon the judgment that something new to us, may\\nbe perceived, understood, or felt, to the promotion\\nof our happiness.\\nProfessor How do you know that Surprise,\\nWonder, Astonishment, Amazement and Curio-\\nsity, should not be classed with our passions?\\nPupil. I know from my own experience, that\\nthey afford me pleasure; and I judge that they are\\nfelicitous to others, for those who have felt these\\nemotions desire to feel them again; and take pains\\nto excite them. The chief pleasure experienced in\\nattention to a play, a novel, and a volume of travels\\nor history, consists in the mental operations of this\\nkind, which are excited by such attention. The\\npleasure found in these mental affections, induces\\nmen to travel far from home; or sit for hours in the\\nodious atmosphere of a theatre. It is the pleasure\\nfound in these emotions that induces the ignorant\\nto listen to every tale of horror, superstition, ima-\\ngination, and wild romance.\\nProfessor. Since all our affections are, in their\\nown nature, felicitous, will it not follow, that every\\naffection is lawful an\u00c2\u00abl proper?\\nPupiL It is to be remarked, that we may feel\\nan affection for an improper object; or for a proper", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0133.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "124 Affections,\\nobject in an unreasonable degree; and every such\\nemotion is called an inordinate affection. When an\\ninordinate affection induces an evil volition^ it is\\nsaid to be a malevolent affection. It should be re-\\nmembered, moreover, as a general law of feeling,\\nThat every inordinate affection produces some\\npassion^ which is in some degree painful. Selfish\\nness^for instance^ is an inordinate love of one s self,\\nwhich invariably occasions in the person who exer-\\ncises it, some emotion of pride, grief, anger, resent-\\nment, shame, or the like.\\nProfessor, Is not Regard an affection?\\nPupil. Regard is a general term, used to denote\\nany emotion exercised in relation to any object.\\nHence we have aff ectionate and passionate regards.\\nI regard a man, if I feel any emotion relative to\\nhim, whether it be good or bad, pleasing or pain-\\nful. If I have no regard to a man, he excites in\\nme no emotions, whether favourable or unfavour^-\\nable to himself.", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0134.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XI.\\nAccount of the Human Passions. Lawful Passions. Some general\\nLaws of Feeling. Sympathy, Commiseration, Compassion, defin-\\ned. Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of\\nour Mental Nature.\\nProfessor, Let us now have your description of\\nthe Passions of man.\\nPupil, I shall proceed with my recitation from\\nyour Review; and intersperse a few of my own re-\\nmarks.\\nProfessor, Proceed; and make such alterations\\nand remarks as you deem meet.\\nPupil, Among the PASSIONS we enumerate,\\nI. Hatred, which is an unhappy feeling, con-\\nsequent upon some painful sensation, or some\\nthought of an object which we judge to be hateful\\nin itself, or unfavourable to ourselves, or to some\\none whom we love. It is an emotion directly oppo-\\nsite to love,\\nII. Sorrow is a strong passion consequent upon\\nsome thought of an event past, present, or ex-\\npected, which we judge to be very undesirable for\\nourselves, or in relation to others.\\nIII. Grief is an emotion, consequent upon the\\ndisapprobation of some conduct in ourselves, or in\\nsome one whom we love or esteem. We haU the\\nL 2", "height": "3321", "width": "1744", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0135.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "126 Human Passions.\\nbad conduct of our enemies; but we grieve only for\\nourselves, or some beloved object.\\nIV. Sadness is a passion of some continuation,\\nconsequent upon some thought of the loss of, the\\nwant of, or the despair of, something good, but\\nnot in an exalted degree. It is a feeling inferior to\\nsorrow and grief, but superior to discontent.\\nV. Discontent is a passion that we experience\\nin consequence of some judgment, that the thing\\nwith which we are discontented deserves to be dis-\\npraised or censured, but not in a great degree. It\\ngenerally refers to some state, or substance.\\nVI. Dissatisfaction is a passion which we\\nfind consequent on some judgment, that the object\\nof our dissatisfaction is unfit, unsuitable, unreasona-\\nble, or different from what we might have expected\\nor desired.\\nVII. Disappointment is the passion which we\\nfeel in consequence of not obtaining some expected\\ngood.\\nVIII. Despair is a deep and settled passion, con-\\nsequent on a full conviction, that there is no longer\\nany reason to hope for some object which we desire.\\nIX. Aversion is a passion, dependent for its\\nexistence on the thought of something so offensive\\nin its own nature, that we wish to think of it no\\nmore. Figuratively speaking, we wish to turn away\\nour mind from an object of aversion.\\nX. Disgust is a strong emotion, consequent\\nupon some strong disapprobation of some person\\nor conduct, on account of something in him or his\\nconduct, obscene, base, mean, or vulgar.\\nXI. Ingratitude is a feeling consequent upon", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0136.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "Human Passions, 127\\nthe remembrance of a favour done or intended, and\\nsome hatred of, or disgust at, the benefactor.\\nXII. Pride is a feeling, which one experiences\\nin consequence of some judgment of his own com-\\nparative worthiness.\\nIt is 3n emotion which we always experience, in a\\ngreater or less degree, when we think of ourselves\\nmore highly, and of others less highly, than we\\nought to think.\\nXIII. Vanity is a passion, consequent upon a\\njudgment, that we excel others in something, for\\nwhich we desire them to admire and esteem us. It\\nmoves a man to display his mental, or other endow-\\nments, of which he is vain.\\nXiV. Suspicion is an emotion, consequent on\\nsome sentiment, that persons or things probably\\nare not, or will not be, what they appear, or promise\\nto be.\\nA Doubt is the expression of some suspicion\\nconcerning the truth of a proposition.\\nXV. Jealousy is a passion, consequent on some\\nfear th another has obtained, or will obtain, some\\ngood, which we had hoped to enjoy ourselves.\\nXVI. Anger is a passion, consequent upon some\\nthought of an insult, or injury, intended or expe-\\nrienced. It is a feeling, which often moves the will\\nto purposes of resentment, or of revenge.\\nWrath is a strong, but Rage the strongest spe-\\ncies of anger.\\nXVII. Fretfulness is a feeling, which we ex-\\nperience in consequence of some unpleasant sensa-\\ntions, or disappointments, or vexations, which we", "height": "3326", "width": "1750", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0137.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "128 Human Passions.\\njudge to be of no great magnitude; and yet, of which\\nwe will to complain.\\nXVIII. Vexation is a painful emotion, conse-\\nquent upon a rapid succession of little occurrences,\\ncontrary to our desires, and calculated to interrupt\\nthe train of our thoughts, or to impede the course\\nof our business.\\nXIX. Fear is a passion consequent upon the\\njudgment, that we, or the objects for which we fear,\\nare in danger of experiencing some kind of evil.\\nTerror is a high degree of fear, in consequence\\nof some great evil apprehended.\\nDread is long continued fear, especially of evil,\\nthe nature of which we do not fully comprehend.\\nXX. Horror is a passion, that results from the\\nthought of sometliing peculiarly, or unexpectedly,\\nevil, in one s character, conduct, or situation.\\nXXI. Indignation is a strong emotion, result-\\ning from our thoughts concerning some action or\\nconduct, which we judge peculiarly meritorious of\\nfeelings of resentment, and the manifestation of dis-\\npleasure.\\nXXII. Resentment is an emotion consequent\\non some thought of an insult or injury, and a judg-\\nment that it is fit, best, or right, to evince our dis-\\npleasure against the offending party.\\nXXIII. Contempt is an emotion, that immedi-\\nately follows our judgment that a person is desti-\\ntute of wisdom, power, and goodness, and deserves\\nto be treated accordingly.\\nXXIV. Disdain is a feeling, that results from\\nthe judgment, that a person, or an action is not only\\ndestitute of wisdom, power, and goodness, but is", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0138.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "The Passions. 129\\ncalculated to dishonour all who have intercourse\\nwith the one, or do not feel indignation at the\\nother.\\nXXV. Envy is an emotion, consequent on a con-\\nception of something desirable that is the property\\nof others, and the feeling of selfishness. It is that\\npassion which would induce the volition to appro-\\npriate the envied object to ourselves, could we do\\nit with impunity.\\nXXVI. Malignity is a feeling, exercised in re-\\nlation to sentient beings, in consequence of some\\nemotion of hatred, anger, envy, suspicion, jealousy,\\nor other passions of which they have been the oc-\\ncasion. It induces us to wish them injury.\\nMalice is an inferior degree of malignity; and\\nis excited by, and employed about little things.\\nXXVII. Cruelty is a passion consequent upon\\nthe conception of suffering, hatred to the sufferer,\\nand a desire to inflict pain unnecessarily.\\nXXVIII. Lust is a passion consequent on some\\nvolition to indulge some appetite, or other feeling,\\nin an unlawful manner.\\nXXIX. Shame is a passion, that results from a\\nconviction of the disgrace of some one in whom we\\nfeel interested; or from the ktiowledge of our own\\nweakness, folly, inferiority, wickedness, or expo-\\nposure to disapprobation and punishment.\\nProfessor. Your list is sufficiently extended. What\\ndo you mean by malevolent passion?\\nPupil. Any passion which ordinarily induces m\\nthe mind which feels it, an evil volition.\\nProfessor. Since all oar passions are in their own", "height": "3302", "width": "1756", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0139.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "130 The Passions,\\nnature infelicitous, I would ask, whether any ot\\nthem may be lawfully indulged?\\nPupil. In an evil world, or in a state in which\\nthere are any evils, there must be objects to which\\nsome passions are suitable. Hence any passion ex-\\nercised in relation to a suitable object, and in a\\nreasonable degree, is called a suitable^ reasonably\\nlawful^ or sacred passion.\\nIt is also to be had in remembrance, as a general\\nlaw of feeling, That suitable^ reasonable^ lawful or\\nsacred passions are always followed by some agreea-\\nble affection. Ultimately, therefore, it is for our hap-\\npiness to exercise right passions, notwithstanding\\nthey are in their own nature, in some degree painful.\\nProfessor. If I hate base, mean, and unworthy\\nconduct, I am conscious that I subsequently find\\nsatisfaction^ from thinking that I have felt as I\\nought to have done. We may be said to find hap-\\npiness in hating evil, feeling aversion from sin, fear-\\ning God, having holy resentment^ being disgusted\\nwith obscene conduct; and in grief sadness^ sorrow^\\nand even shame, for such things as we know ought\\nto excite these emotions in us; not because the pas-\\nsions themselves are agreeable, but because they are\\ninstantly followed by some affection that is. We love^\\nesteem^ or respect ourselves for these passions; or\\nwe feel some degree of gladness, contentment, or\\nsatisfaction because we have felt as our consciences\\ntell us we ought to have done; or the hope of ap-\\nprobation, or of other rewards, springs up in the\\nsoul.\\nQuarterly Theological Review, rol i. p. 465.", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0140.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "Laws of Feeling. 131\\nHaving tak,e\u00c2\u00ab a general survey of human feelings,\\nperhaps yoU can state some other laws, than those\\nwhich we have already contemplated.\\nPupil I think I can a few.\\nRule I. The nature and degree of every feeling,\\nwhether it be a sensation, passion, or affection, are\\ndependent on, and according to, the nature and de-\\ngree of the antecedent bodily or mental operation\\nwhich is the occasion of it.\\nProfessor, Give a brief illustration of this rule.\\nPupil, If I attend to objects of perception, my\\nacts of perception will be weak or vigorous, in pro-\\nportion to the impression on my bodily organs; and\\nmy sensations will in kind, and in vivacity, ardour,\\nstrength, or weakness and dulness, be in proportion\\nto the perceptions which occasion them. My affec-\\ntions and passions, in like manner, will be propor-\\ntionate to the vigour or debility of those conceptions,\\njudgments, or other operations of mind, that give\\nrise to them.\\nProfessor. Very good. Give another general rule\\nconcerning feelings.\\nPupil. Rule II. The contemplation of a feeling\\nin others, when we do not judge it to be an evil\\nfeeling, is commonly followed by a similar feeling\\nin our ownjninds; which is called a fellow-feeling.\\nRule III. The contemplation of any feeling in\\nanother, which we disapprove, at the time, com-\\nmonly excites in us disgust.\\nProfessor, What do you understand by Sympa-\\nthy?\\nPupil. When our thought of any passion^ felt by\\nanother, is the occasion of our experiencing a simi-", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0141.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "i 32 Laxvs^ of Feeling\\\\\\nlar passion, it is called an act of Sympathy, or a\\nsympathetic emotioju^\\nProfessor. What do you mean by Commisera-\\ntion?\\nPupil. Commiseration is sorrow experienced\\nby us, in consequence of some conception of the\\nmisery of another.\\nProfessor, What is Compassion?\\nPupil. Any sympathetic emotion occasioned by\\nthe despair^ sorrow^ g^ief sadness., or fear of ano-\\nther, we call Compassion.\\nProfessor, It seems to be a general conclusion\\nfrom your whole account of the operations of the\\nheart and the intellectual faculties., that our Crea-\\ntor has made the intellectual paramount to the sen-\\nsitive part of our mental nature. He designed that\\nour understanding should regulate our passions and\\naffections; and that our perceptions through the\\nbodily organs, should limit our sensations.\\nIn this, our heart has the pre-eminence over our\\nintellect^ that all our happiness consists in the ope-\\ntions of the former.\\nPupil. It may be added, that all our unhappiness\\ntoo, cbnsists in our feelings; but it is the province\\nof intellect to promote such feelings as are agree-\\nable, and to prevent such as are painful.\\nEmotions are raised in us, not only by the qualities and actions\\nof ot.heis, but also by theii- feelings: I cannot behold a man in distress,\\nwithovit pai taking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his\\npleasure. Zorrf Karnes,", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0142.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XII.\\nThe Faculty of Volition, or the Will.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Some contemplated actioa\\nthe object of every Volition.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Desire and Preference different froni\\nVolition.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Will a dependent Faculty.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Perception and Con-\\nception the only independent Faculties of the Mind.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Definition of\\nVolition and VIotive. Inducement and Motive distinguished.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nSeveral general Rules concerning Volition. An Inference concern-\\ning the importance of regulating our Thoughts.\\nProfessor. What is the faculty of Volition?\\nPupiL The faculty of volition in man, is that in-\\nherent part of the original constitution of his soul,\\nby which he chooses, determines, resolves, purpo-\\nses, or wills, to perform, or not perform, any con-\\ntemplated action, of which he judges himself ca-\\npable.\\nProfessor, You make some mental or bodily,\\nsome simple or complex, operation, the object of\\nevery volition: and by your definition would have it\\nunderstood, that no man ever has a volition to per-\\nform, or not perform, any action of which he judges\\nhimself absolutely incapable.\\nPupil. Such seems to me, to be a correct defini-\\ntion of an operation of the faculty of volition, which\\nwe use as synonymous with The Will.\\nProfessor. How do you know, that all men have\\nthis faculty of volition?\\nPupil, All men declare their coasciousness of\\nM", "height": "3323", "width": "1753", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0143.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "134 Objects of Volition,\\nwilling in certain cases; and there could be no act\\nof volition without the requisite faculty, unless there\\ncould be an effect without an adequate cause.\\nProfessor* Do we not choose external objects?\\nIf a pear and a peach are before me, may I not say,\\nthat I choose the peach, and that my volition ter-\\nminates upon a peach, rather than upon any con-\\ntemplated action?\\nPupil, Desire is a feeling which may have a\\npeach for its object; and many have confounded an\\noperation of the will, w^ith this emotion of the heart.\\nIf two things are presented to my contemplation, I\\nam said to prefer that which I most love^ desire^ or\\nesteem: but if I choose that which I prefer^ the\\nmeaning of this elliptical expression is, that I\\nchoose^ or will to take, or to receive, or to possess,\\nthat object which I prefer to something else. When\\napples, pears, and peaches, are all presented to your\\nview, and you choose peaches^ the meaning of the\\nexpression is, that you choose to take^ or receive^ or\\neat peaches. The question in the mind is, which\\nshall I take? and the volition is, I will take\\npeaches.\\nIf men accurately distinguish between their feel-\\nijjgs and volitions^ they will find in every instance,\\nthat a volition respects nothing but a contemplated\\naction.\\nProfessor, Does the faculty of volition in man\\never act independently of all his other mental facul-\\nties?\\nPupil. Never; if I may judge from my own con-\\nsciousness. I find, that I perceive without any pre-\\nvious operation of any other faculty than that of", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0144.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "The Will dependent. 135\\nPerception: I conceive too, independently of any-\\nother mental operation, in many instances; so that\\nPerception and Conception are independent facul-\\nties, that originate thought, or that may be said to\\nhave a sort of creative mental ability. It is not so\\nwith any other faculty, for if we are conscious or\\nremember^ we must be conscious of, or remember,\\nsome mental act: if we judge or reason^ or approve^\\nwe are dependent on conception or some other act,\\nfor the object about which we judge, or reason, or\\nexercise our conscience in approbation, li wt feel^\\nit is in consequence of, and in dependence on, some\\nantecedent mental operation; and if we exert our\\nfaculty of agency^ it is in obedience to volition. In\\nlike manner, if we will, it is to do, or not do, some-\\nthing of which we have conceived; so that some no-\\ntion of an action to be done, or not done, is essential\\nto the existence of a volition. Besides, if I will, it\\nis in consequence of some other mental act, than\\nthe mere conception of the action which is the ob-\\nject of volition; it is from some motive; so that the\\nWillis more dependent on previous mental opera-\\ntions than any other faculty of the mind. It re-\\nquires at least a conception of its object and a mo-\\ntive.\\nProfessor. The dependence of which you now\\nspeak, is not any thing extraneous to the mind; but\\na dependence of one faculty upon one or more fa-\\nculties of the same mind.\\nPupiL Yes, it is a constitutional dependence; that\\nhas its origin in the mental nature which the Creator\\nhas given, and the laws by which he governs human\\nminds, as certainlv as the material universe..", "height": "3291", "width": "1741", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0145.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "136 Volitions, Motmes^\\nProfessor, In what sense do you use the term\\nvolition?\\nPupil. It is a general term, that includes every\\noperation of the faculty of the will; whether that\\noperation be called a determination, a choice, a reso-\\nlution^ a purpose, an intention, an act of xvilling, a\\nwill, or any thing else.\\nProfessor* What is a motive to volition?\\nPupil. Any simple or complex mental operation,\\nor operations, which figuratively speaking, move,\\ninduce, excite, or occasion any volition, are the\\nmotive to that volition.\\nProfessor. Of course, every volition presupposes\\na motive, and there are as many motives as voli=\\ntions in existence, and no more. Do you distinguish\\nbetween a motive and an t72ducementP\\nPupil. Any simple mental operation, which of\\nitself does not constitute a motive, but which in\\nconnexion with one or more other mental opera-\\ntions, often does constitute a motive, we call an\\ninducement. Hence an inducement may be consider-\\ned as any constituent part of a motive. I will give\\nan example. I judge that a vexatious servant de-\\nserves to be flogged; but this judgment alone does\\nnot make me will to flog him. Immediately after,\\nI judge that the servant will be ruined if I do not\\ncorrect him. 1 judge also, that I am bound in duty\\nto flog him; and from these three judgments taken\\ntogether, I am induced to will that I will flog the\\nboy. Neither of these judgments alone moved me\\nto this volition; but each in conjunction with the\\nother, conspired to induce me to determine that I\\nwo\u00c2\u00abld flog him. Here the oction of fogging a boy,", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0146.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "and Inducements,, lo7\\nIS the object of my volition;- the motive for this vo-\\nlition consists of three distinct judgments; and each\\nof the jjLidgments is ati inducement,\\nA sufficient inducement^ and a motive to volition\\nare equivalent expressions; but by motive we always\\nmean, that which actually is the true reason of our\\nxvilling in any particular instance. Ask a man why\\nhe chose, willed, or determined, as he actually did,\\nin any case; and if he candidly and intelligently\\nanswers the question, he will present his motive for\\nthe volition. But if he states several things, no one\\nof which singly moved him to volition; but all of\\nwhich together did; each single thing is an induce-\\n7nent.\\nProfessor, Why do you define motives to be\\nthose mental operations that move us to volition f\\nMay not some external object, some creature of\\nsense, some written arguments, or some speech ut-\\ntered, be a motive?\\nPupil, An external object must be perceived, or\\nconceived of, by the mind, before It can have any\\ninfluence on the will: we say, therefore, that the\\nperception of external objects, and not the objects\\nthemselves, or some conception of them, is the mo-\\ntive^ or inducement to volition, presented by external\\nobjects. A speech never moves us to any volition\\nunless it be heard, or understood, or conceived of,\\nor in some way thought of, by the mind: and argu^\\nmenu are nothing to any man, before he forms some\\nnotion of them: so that, strictly speaking, nothing\\nbut mental operations can be motives to volition in\\nany human mind.\\nWhen a writer or speaker talks of presenting ^uq^\\nM2", "height": "3296", "width": "1744", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0147.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "5 38 Laws of Volition.\\nfives to his readers or hearers, he intends to make\\nsuch statements as being heard, read, or thought of\\nin some way, will by these mental operations move\\nihcm to some desired volition. It is the thought of\\nthe mind concerning a proposition, or its feelings\\nconsequent upon the thought, and not the proposi-\\ntion itself, that constitutes a motive.\\nProfessor, It is unquestionably one of the inva-\\nriable laws of the human mind, that the Will never\\noperates except in consequence of some motive* Can\\nyou now state any other laws of volition?\\nPupiU Any human feeling may be an immediate\\nmotive to volition.\\nAny operation of conscience may be an immediate\\nmotive to volition.\\nA simple operation of consciousness never proves\\na motive to volition. The same is true of a simple\\noperation of Perception, Conception, Volition and\\nAgency.\\nAny operation of the judgment concerning our\\nduty, interest, convenience, happiness, or unhappi-\\niiess, or concerning the fitness or unfitness, the pro-\\npriety or impropriety of any action, may be a\\nmotive to volition.\\nAny inferred judgment concerning the things\\njust mentioned, may be a motive to volition.\\nThe memory of any past volition to choose in any\\nparticular way, may be a motive to a future vo-\\nlition.\\nThe meraorij of any operation which we Judge we\\ncan perform if we will, and of any agreeable feeling\\nthat followed it, may be a motive for a volition to\\nperiorm a similar action.", "height": "3322", "width": "1841", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0148.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "Laws of Volition. 139\\nThe memory of any past motive may constitute a\\nfuture motive to volition.\\nThe memory of any promise may be a motive for\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2willing to perform the promised action.\\nProfessor. In laying down these rules, I presume\\nyou judge, that what commonly has taken place\\n7nay take place again: for we all remember that we\\nhave repeatedly chosen from such motives as you\\nhave described, and it is reasonable to conclude,\\nthat v/e, and other beings like us, may do it again.\\nPupil I can no more doubt, that men may in\\nfuture do, what they have commonly done in ages\\npast, than I can doubt whether the sun will arise\\nto-morrow; or whether fluids will continue to roll\\ndown an inclined plane.\\nProfessor, A motive consisting of a single men-\\ntal operation may be called a simple motive; and a\\nmotive consisting of two or more mental operations\\nmay be called a complex 7?iotive. Can you name any\\nsimple motives?\\nPupil. I sometimes have a volition immediately\\nconsequent upon some feelings and a conception of\\nthe action which is the object of volition.\\nProfessor, The conception of the action willed is\\nessential to every volition; and it is also essential,\\nthat we should not judge ourselves absolutely inca-\\npable of the action. These are pre-requisites to\\nevery volition. But these pre-requisites existing, a\\nsimple feeling may be a motive for willing immedi-\\nately to perform any contemplated action, that we\\nhave not judged ourselves incapable of performing.\\nThis simple feeling is consequent upon some intel-\\nlectual operation; but it is the feelings when it ex-\\nists, that constitutes the motive.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0149.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "140 Laws of Folitioii,\\nProfessor. In the same manner, any single feel-\\ning, operation of conscience, act of the judgment,\\nresult of reasoning, or act of memory, that moves\\nus to a volition, is a simple motive; but when we\\nwill in consequence of two or more inducements,\\nthe motive is complex.\\nProfessor. The greater part of our volitions, I\\nthink, are the result of complex motives. Ixvill to\\neat, we will suppose. If I thus will, because I now\\nhave a pleasant sensation from tasting food, and for\\nthis reason alone, my motive for willing to eat is\\nsimple: but if I not only feel present pleasure in\\ntasting, but judge that eating is necessary for my\\nsustenance; and from both these considerations, will\\nto eat another mouthful, the motive is complex.\\nAgain, if I would not eat another mouthful merely\\nbecause I now feel an agreeable sensation from the\\nlast, but if I will to eat it, from the present sensa-\\ntion in conjunction with remembrance or recollection\\nof past pleasure derived from eating, and a judg-\\nment that I shall feel the better for eating it, my\\nmotive is again complex, and is constituted of three\\ndistinct inducements; viz: a sensation, an act of me-\\nmory, and a judgment.\\nHave you any other rules of volition to give?\\nPupil. That which has been a motive to a particu-\\nlar volition in a man, at one time, and in one state of\\nbody and mind, may not prove a motive to a similar\\nvolition, at another time, and zvhen he is in a diffe-\\nrent state of body and of mind.\\nSimilar feelings^ however, in the sa7ne man, ge-\\nnerally occasion similar volitions, unless they are\\ncounteracted by some dictate of the Judgment err", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0150.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "Laws of Volition. 141\\nConsciences or by some memory of painful feelings^,\\nthat formerly resulted from an action similar to the\\ncontemplated one. For instance, a man who has for-\\nmerly chosen to eat, from the sensations of hunger,\\nwill, when hungry, generally determine to eat again,\\nunless his judgment informs him, that his health\\nrequires a temporary abstinence, or his Conscience\\napproves of his deferring the act of eating, until he\\nhas discharged some more immediately urgent duty.\\nLet a physician seat himself at table, and he will\\neat, if he is hungry, and does not judge that it is\\nbest for him to abstain; or if his Conscience does not\\nrequire him to visit a patient, before he gratifies his\\nappetite. The same is true of other men, with a\\nchange in the objects of duty, to which Conscience\\nmay call them.\\nIt is our knowledge of this rule, that enables us\\nto anticipate very accurately how men will act, when\\ncertain appetites crave indulgence, or when any\\ngiven emotion is excited in the heart.\\nEvery body knows, that men -will choose to act\\nas their sensations induce them^ unless Judgment^\\nReason^ Conscience^ or Memory^ or all of these^ pre-\\nsent stronger inducements^ and so furnish a motive\\nfor resisting^ denying^ and subduing their sensations.\\nHence, if men will to act at all from their sensations,\\nwithout giving the Judgment, Conscience, Reason,\\nand Memory time to be exercised about the action,\\nthey invariably will act according to their sensa-\\ntions.\\nThe same rule holds good in relation to our\\nem.otions. If men will and act hastily, they com-\\nmonly act out their feelings; or they will to act", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0151.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "f 42 Laws of Volition.\\nfrom the emotions of the moment. These are rasli\\nmen.\\nHence, every man knows, that anger will move\\nthat man, who feels the passion, and acts suddenly,\\nwithout consulting any other faculty than that of\\nfeeling, to purposes of retaliation and revenge.\\nProfessor. A little attention to human character\\nand conduct, will convince men of the truth of this\\nrule, that any man who has many ardent feelings\\nconsequent upon his perceptions; and comparatively\\nfew consequent upon his operations of Conscience,\\nReason, Judgment, and Memory, will generally be\\ngoverned in his volitions, by objects of sense.\\nPupil, Might you not have given another rule,\\nprior to this; that a man who more generally exer-\\ncises his perception^ than his Conscience, Reason,\\nJudgment and Memory, will have more sensations-\\nthan feelings of any other kind; and so will in his\\nVolitions be mainly a sensual man?\\nProfessor, The truth of your position cannot be\\ndenied. You might have added, that a man who\\nemploys his faculty of Conception in the work of\\nimagination, more than all his other intellectual fa-\\nculties, will have more feelings consequent on ima-\\nginations, than on the operations of Judgment,\\nReason, Conscience, Memory, and Perception; and\\nif he wills from his feelings mainly, as men gene-\\nrally do, his Imagination will control his Will.\\nThis man is styled a visionary^ or ro7nantic being.\\nPupil. A person such as you have now described,\\nwould be justly deemed insane^ I think.\\nProfessor. The most general rule, with which I\\nam acquainted concerning volitions is this, that a", "height": "3322", "width": "1841", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0152.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "LaTVS of Volition. 143\\nmarCs habitual volitions are as his habitual feelings:\\nfor there is scarcely any motive of which some feel-\\nings or a design to promote some feeling, is not a\\nconstituent part.\\nPupil, Of course, since a man s feelings are as\\nhis thoughts, and his volitions are as his feelings,\\nhis volitions must ultimately be as his thoughts.\\nAs a man thinketh so is he.\\nProfessor. And hence v^e infer, that it is a mat-\\nter of unspeakable importance, by education, reve-\\nlation, and every other practicable way, to regulate\\na man s thoughts.\\nCould we secure the right operation of the seven\\nfaculties of the understandings and employ them ex-\\nclusively about desirable objects, we should then\\ninfallibly secure the exercise of right feelings^ and\\nQf right volitions.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0153.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XIll\\nThe Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. An Operation of this Faculty\\ndistinguished. Proof of the Existence of this Faculty. Objects of\\nour Efficiency. Some Opet;ations of Man that are ordinarily per-\\nformed without Volition, ma^ be performed from Voluntary Exer-\\ntion. How the Mind exerts an Agency on the Botly is unknown\\nby us. The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental\\nFaculties considered. On the Consciousness, Perception, Concep-\\ntiftp, See.\\nProfessor. What is the faculty of Agency?\\nPupiL The faculty of agency in man, is that in-\\nherent part of the original constitution of his soul,\\nby which he performs from volition, or instinct, any\\naction.\\nProfessor* Agency and efficiency you will use as\\nsynonymous expressions. Any operation of the hu-\\nman mind, you will bear in mind, moreover, is\\ncalled an action; but a mental agency^ exertion^ ef-\\nfort^ or efficiency^ is only such an actio7i as we per-\\nform in consequence of a volition to do it, or of some\\nInstinct.\\nPupiL I think I have understood your distinc-\\ntion, ever since I read your NOTES to the first\\nAmerican Edition of Dr, Reid^s Works, You have\\nthere said, We think^ zve ruill^ we act. Here are\\nthree mental operations, which belong to three\\ndifferent faculties. The first belongs to the under-", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0154.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "Faculty of Efficiency, 145\\nstanding, the second to the will, and the third to a fa-\\nculty not the least important, which metaphysical wri-\\nters have not honoured with a distinct name and place\\nin their systems. It is the faculty of agency^ which\\nhas generally been confounded with The WilL There\\ncould be no agency without the Will, or some In-\\nstinct, any more than will without thought; but\\nthese things ought not to be confounded. The fa-\\nculty by which we will, is not the faculty by which\\nwe DO what we will. They are as distinct as the\\nvolition to walk, and the act of walking, which is\\nconsequent upon the volition; or as the perception\\nof an external object, and the judgment that it ex-\\nists. It is true, that where the power of doing any\\nthing exists, the performance of it immediately fol-\\nlows the will to do it immediately; because the\\nAuthor of our constitution has thus connected voli-\\ntion and agency; but the faculty of the will may ex-\\nist, and operate, after the power of agency is gone.\\nI judge that I can speak; I will to speak; but the\\npower of doing the thing which I will, was, without\\nmy knowledge, previously taken away. In this case\\nmy Creator has separated the power of agency from\\nthe power of volition. Should I continue, from any\\nderangement of intellect, to think that I coald speak,\\nI might continue to will, without producing the ac-\\ntion of speaking.\\nProf ssor. How do you know that you have any\\nfaculty of efficiency?\\nUpon the principle, that I may do what I will with my own prg-\\nperty, I have altered a few words in the foregoing extract.\\nN", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0155.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "146 Faculty of Efficiency,\\nPupil, I am conscious of exerting an agency in\\nconsequence of a volition. I am conscious of a vo-\\nluntary efficiency; and this efficiency I judge to be\\nan effect, which must have some cause. I judge too,\\nthat the mind which is conscious of a voluntary ef-\\nficiency must be the cause of this efficiency. But it\\ncould not be the cause of this efficiency, without\\nbeing adequate to it, for it is self-evident, that every\\neffect must have an adequate cause* Now this in\\nthe human mind, which renders it adequate, under\\ncertain circumstances, to voluntary efficiency, I call\\nthe faculty of efficiency in the human mind. That\\nother men have a similar faculty, I believe from their\\ntestimony, and mfer from the analogy between their\\nactions and my own.\\nProfessor. Have the operations of the facult) of\\nEfficiency any objects? If they have, what are they?\\nPupil, An operation of the faculty of efficiency\\nin man, has for its immediate object, either his\\nbody, or some of the faculties of his own mind.\\nAny bodily action which we judge we can per-\\nform, we exert ourselves to perform, whenever we\\nwill to do it and we find that most of our bodily\\norgans are excited by our mental efficiency. If I\\nwill to open my mouth, my faculty of efficiency so\\noperates upon the muscles of my mouth, through\\nthe nerves connected with those muscles, that I ac-\\ntually open ^my^outh. If I will to speak, my fa-\\nculty of doing what I will, so operates upon my\\nmouth, lungs, tongue, larynx, and other organs of\\nspeech, that they inhale, expire, and modulate the\\nair expired, in such a naanner as to produce all the", "height": "3319", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0156.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "Faculty of Efficiency, 147\\nvariety and combinations of articulate sounds, of\\nwhich vocal language is composed.\\nIf I will to walk, my faculty of agency operates\\nupon the nerves connected with the muscles of my\\nlegs, in such a manner that the action of walking is\\nproduced.\\nIn short, any voluntary animal operation which\\na man performs, is the result immediately of his\\nfaculty of agency, and only mediately of his faculty\\nof volition; for the will has the government of the\\nbody only through the faculty of agency.\\nProfessor, Many of our bodily operations are\\nperformed ordinarily without any volition to pro\u00c2\u00ab\\nduce them. The muscular distending and contract-\\ning of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the\\nwinking of our eyelids, the peristaltic motion of the\\nintestines, and breathing, are of this description;\\nhence they are called involuntary animal operations:\\nbut although they are generally involuntary, yet we\\nfind that the faculty of agency has some ability to\\nreach some of them; and that some of them may\\nbe voluntarily performed for a little time. Hence,\\nif I will to cease from breathing for a short time;\\nor to inhale more air than is natural, by breathing\\noftener than is usual; or ta inhale a greater quan-\\ntity at a time, by a longer inspiration than is com-\\nmon; or to wink at a certain time; I find that my fa-\\nculty of Agency executes my volition. By inhaling\\nmore air than is natural too, in any given time, I\\nmay voluntarily, if I know this will be the effect,\\nincrease the muscular action of the animal heart.\\nBy knowing the effect of certain medicines on\\nmy system, by experience, or judging of them from", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0157.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "148 Mental Agency on the Body,\\nanalogy, I may also, voluntarily, produce changes\\nin the state of my fluids, and even of the solid parts\\nof my body; and thus exert a physical agency upon\\nmy own animal frame.\\nThe principal concern of our faculties of volition\\nand agency, however, with our body, is to produce\\nsuch bodily operations as are never performed with-\\nout the exertion of either a voluntary, or an in-\\nstinctive efficiency upon the human frame. We\\nnever eat, drink, speak, read, walk, sit, ride, stand,\\nnor labour, in any of the mechanical or fine arts,\\nwithout the voluntary employment of our faculty\\nof efficiency, upon the requisite bodily organs.\\nPupil, Can you tell me, Sir, how the mind exerts\\nits efficiency upon the body?\\nProfessor, I frankly confess, that I cannot: and\\nmoreover I affirm, that no one has ever yet done it.\\nI do not proceed so far as to assert, that no one\\nwill ever be able to do it; for it becomes not me to\\nsay, to what extent the faculties of the human mind,\\nand the boundaries of human knowledge, may be\\nenlarged. The fact that mind operates on matter\\nwe know, but of the mode of operation we cannot\\nconceive. This is no more mysterious or incredible\\nthan another fact, that matter operates on matter,\\nin most instances in an inconceivable way. The\\nmodus operandi in every chemical process is a\\nmystery.\\nIn the animal frame, we have learned, by various\\nexperiments, that muscular motion is dependent on\\nthe action of the nerves upon the muscles; for if the\\nnerves that lead to any limb are divided, or tied,\\nthe muscular motion, that used to result from the", "height": "3315", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0158.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "Mental Agency on the Body* 149\\noperation of voluntary efEciency, will no longer take\\nplace. The spinal marrow is the great trunk of the\\ninverted tree of nerves, in the human body, of\\nwhich the brains are the root; and if the spinal mar-\\nrow be broken, the limbs of the body supplied with\\nbranches of nerves issuing beyond the broken place,\\nwill be as incapable of voluntary and instinctive\\nmotion, as the limbs of an oak of growth beyond\\nthe point of truncation. A dog with a broken back,\\nthat drags his hind legs after him, is an illustration\\nof this truth.\\nCut off the communication between the brains\\nand any part of the nerves growing out of them, and\\nthe muscles upon which the truncated nerves are\\nlaid, will no longer obey the will, and of course,\\nthe bones into which the muscles are inserted, will\\ncease to be moved at volition. Hence it is inferred,\\nthat the mind must first act upon the brain, and de-\\npendent nerves, before the muscles and bones can\\nmove according to the exertion of voluntary or in-\\nstinctive mental efficiency. These are facts; but how\\nthe nerves act upon the muscles, that is, how one\\nmaterial organ acts upon another; and how the fa-\\nculty of mental efficiency operates on the brain and\\nother nerves, no one has ever shown; nor are we,\\nat present, able to show. It remains one of the se-\\ncrets of nature. It is as difficult for us to conceive\\nhow the mind acts upon the brain and nerves, as to\\nconceive how it might operate directly on the mus-\\ncles, bones, and blood. It is as impossible for us,\\nat present, to conceive at all of the mode of mental\\nagency upon any part of the body, or of the mind,\\nas to conceive of the essence of the substance of\\nN2", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0159.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "150 Mental Efficiency.\\nmatter, of the operation of a chemical solvent, of\\nthe nature of the action of the gastric juice, or of\\nthe nature of the causation of attraction, cbhesion,\\nand gravitation.\\nLet us not, however, reject the knowledge which\\nwe do possess, because we do not know every\\nthing, which we conceive it would be desirable to\\nunderstand.\\nLet us now inquire concerning the operations of\\nthe faculty of Efficiency upon some of the other\\nfaculties of the human mind. What can you do in\\nand with your own mind, when you will it?\\nPupiL I find, when I will to be conscious^ and\\nendeavour to do what I will, that an act of con-\\nsciousness immediately follows both the volition and\\nthe exertion: but I find also, that if I exert myself\\nto refrain from being conscious, I cannot ej^ect my\\npurpose; so that my faculty of agency cannot stop\\nthe operations of consciousness. It has been -pre-\\nviously shown, that for a wise reason, this faculty\\nhas not been subjected to Volition, and its executor,\\nEfficiency.\\nProfessor, Well, proceed to review our faculties\\nin the order in which we have treated of them. Per-\\nception is the next.\\nPupih I often perceive, through my eyes, ears,\\nnose, and organs of tasting and touching, without\\nany voluntary exertion to produce my perceptions: I\\neven perceive frequently in direct opposition to my\\nvoluntary exertions,\\nI am conscious, however, that I frequently make\\nexertions to perceive, and that perceptions of such\\nobjects as are to be perceived, are immediately", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0160.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "3Iental Efficiency. 151\\nconsequent upon the voluntary employment of my\\nbodily organs. If I will to see my wife, that is in\\nthe room, and exert myself to do it, my eyes are\\nturned towards her, and I see her. If I will not to\\nsee her, my mental agency closes my eyelids, or\\nturns away my face, and I do not perceive her. I\\nhave a similar control over my other sensesj for I\\ncan feel, what is to h^felt^ and so on, by a voluntary\\nexertion to do it; and, to a certain extent, I can re-\\nfrain from hearing, by stopping my ears; from smell-\\ning, by holding my nose; from future tasting, by\\nkeeping my mouth shut, and free from the thing\\nto be tasted; and from touching many things, by\\nkeeping my body free from any contact with them.\\nWe are, therefore, in the present world, perci-\\npients, partly from voluntary exertion, partly with-\\nout it, and partly contrary to it: so that in percep-\\ntion we are subjected only in part to our own self-\\ngovernment.\\nThe most effectual way to prevent the perception\\nof any object, which we cannot remove from our\\nsenses, is to remove from it; and if we can do\\nneither of these, we may sometimes prevent per-\\nception by vigorously employing some of our other\\nmental faculties, about some interesting subject. If\\nI sit still, and make no exertion, I smell the offen-\\nsive effluvia of boiling cabbage from the kitchen^\\nbut if I closely apply myself to any object of con-\\nception, judgment, conscience, affection, or passion,\\nI do not perceive any thing fetid in the air which I\\nbreathe.\\nThe faculty of Conception^ or of Understanding,\\nis often acted upon by the faculty of Efficiency. If", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0161.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "152 Voluntary Efficiency,\\nI remember any conception, and will to have a\\nsimilar mental operation, I find that voluntary ex-\\nertion will put the faculty of conception in opera-\\ntion, so that I again conceive of the same thing.\\nWhen I will to employ this faculty in forming\\nimaginations^ without previously conceiving of the\\nmental images which I shall form, I find that vo-\\nluntary exertion vfiW^Mt the imagination to work. In\\nthis way all works of imagination are produced. If\\nthe faculty of agency did not affect the imagination\\nin this way, no voluntary work of the imagination,\\nsuch as a novel, or a face which a painter never\\nsaw, or a figure such as a statuary never perceived,\\ncould ever be the result of design, and intelligent\\nexertion.\\nAgain, when I will to employ my faculty of un-\\nderstanding upon any particular subject, and to\\nrender my faculty of perception and other faculties\\nsubservient to it, my faculty of agency will produce\\nreading, or some other kind of mental employment,\\nin which conception will be principally engaged.\\nHence, if I will to study a particular subject, my\\nexertion will produce repeated conceptions upon\\nthe subject, many of which will, and many will not,\\nassume the form of mental propositions: and thus\\nconception furnishes, as it were, raw materials to\\nthe Judgment, Reason, Conscience, and Feeling.\\nProfessor. You have spoken oi reading and of\\nstudy: we must have a definition of these terms be-\\nfore we proceed.\\nPupiU Reading is a complex operation of the\\nmind: and consists of a voluntary perception of cha-\\nracters and words, printed, written, or painted, to-", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0162.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "Studying and Revery, 153\\ngether with an effort to conceive of the meaning of\\nthem.\\nProfessor. This is a very good description of\\nreading to one s self, without any enunciation of\\nthe words; but reading aloud is a still more complex\\noperation; for it implies an agency which is partly\\nvoluntary, and partly instinctive, upon the organs\\nof speech, as well as of seeing, and conceiving; so\\nas to produce the actual seeing of characters, that\\ndenote things; the conception of the things denoted;\\nand the utterance of the sounds, for which, as well\\nas other things, the characters stand.\\nPupil. Well, study, I think is the employment\\nof any intellectual faculty upon any subject, in con-\\nsequence of some voluntary exertion to understand\\nthat subject.\\nProfessor. But what am I doing, if my mind is\\nbusily employed in thinking upon various subjects,\\nwithout any voluntary exertion to limit it to any\\nparticular subject?\\nPupil. You are engaged in a revery; you are\\nthinking, to be sure, but you are not studying.\\nProfessor. I fear there is much revery and little\\nstudying in the minds of most men. But not to in-\\ndulge ourselves in a revery, proceed in your dis-\\ncourse upon Efficiency,\\nPupil. The faculty of fudging, will not imme-\\ndiately yield to any mental agency upon it, so as\\nto form a particular judgment correspondent to our\\nwill and desires; but if I will to employ my judg-\\nment about any particular proposition, I can do it^\\nby a voluntary exertion, until I come to some de\u00c2\u00ab\\ncision upon that subject; or else will to suspend", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0163.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "1 S4f M en tal Efficiency\\nmy judgment upon it; or resolve on some other\\nmental pursuit. I may take a circuitous course of\\noperation on my faculty of judgment, so as to ren-\\nder its decisions conformable to my predominant\\nfeelings, by voluntarily considering such concep-\\ntions, arguments, and other judgments, and such\\nonly, as are most likely to produce any desired\\njudgment: and in this way, do men commonly per-\\nvert their judgment.\\nProfessor, We may exert an efficiency ijidirectly\\nand mediately on our judgment, you mean to say;\\nbut not immediately. This is true, especially of our.\\nacquired judgments; but our constitutional judg-\\nments generally, will not yield to any mental oppug-\\nnation. Hence, it is truly said, we cannot always\\njudge ^s we feel; we cannot always believe as we\\ndesire; but that men find no great difficulty in work-\\ning themselves into a ^^/z^ correspondent with their\\nfeelings, on many subjects.\\nIn relation to the Memory we may remark, that\\nif we will not to remember^ we cannot cease to re-\\nmember at will. Every act of recollection is depen-\\ndent on the operation of the faculty of Efficiency\\non the Memory. In many instances, however, we\\nexert ourselves to recollect some past mental acts,\\nwhich we judge we must have had; and are unable\\nto effect the thing which we have willed. Memory,\\ntherefore is only partially under the control of our\\nvoluntary agency.\\nPupiL The faculty of Reasoning never operates\\nexcept in consequence of some voluntary efficiency\\nupon it, but the nature of the inference depends on\\npur conception of the premises, and not at all upon", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0164.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "Mental Efficiencij, 15 5\\nvolition or efficiency. In paralogisms^ or instances\\nof false reasonings, a non sequitur as it is called, or\\na conclusion -which does not result from the pre-\\nmises, may be attached to them, that shall be any\\nthing, which we have previously determined to\\nmake it; but since this is not reasoning, but a pre-\\ntence of reasoning, our remark, that an inductive\\njudgment does not depend on any voluntary agency\\non the reasoning faculty, remains unimpeachable.\\nThe subjects of reasoning are determined on by\\nthe will, so that we always reason from voluntary\\nexertion, and on voluntarily selected subjects. In\\npreparing and presenting these subjects, by its\\nagency over other faculties, the efficiency has great\\ninfluence.\\nOur conscience can be acted on by our efficiency,\\nonly mediately^ through our Conceptions, Reason-\\ning, and Judgment. We must change our mental\\nviews of a law, of obligation, and of conduct, be-\\nfore we can alter our approbation or disapprobation;\\nand should we desire, and will, most earnestly to\\napprove immediately of what we disapprove, or the\\nreverse, our conscience would not obey our volun-\\ntary exertion. Hence conscience often reproves and\\ncondemns us, in spite of our desires and volitions\\nto the contrary. Could we change the dictates of\\nconscience at pleasure, conscience would not be a\\nbetter guide than feeling, to the path of duty. Con-\\nscience may be moulded by the hand of education,\\nand must always operate according to the know-\\nledge tvhich we have; so that we must exert our\\nagi-r,cy upon something anterior in operation to\\nconscience, before we can reach that moral faculty;", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0165.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "156 Me7ital Efficiency*\\nIt is happy for man, that his conscience is thus en-\\ntrenched against the will, armed with efficiency,\\nwhich is very generally subservient to Sensation,\\nAffection, and Passion.\\nWe may conceive of any particular Feelings and\\nshould we think ourselves capable of producing it,\\nby a voluntary exertion, might will to produce it;\\nbut we should find that no act of efficiency upon\\nthe heart could immediately produce it. The facul-\\nty of Feeling is operated upon by the Efficiency of\\nman, only mediately^ -through those mental opera-\\ntions which occasion feeling. Thus, should a man\\nexert himself to produce in himself a particular sen-\\nsation, he could effect his purpose only by his agen-\\ncy on the faculty of perception, to produce such a\\nperception as ordinarily is followed by that sensa-\\ntion. Would he make himself love, hate, hope, fear^\\nor experience any other emotion, he must, by his\\nagency on his intellectual faculties, excite those\\nthoughts which alone occasion those emotions.\\nWe cannot cease to feel, in consequence of any\\nvoluntary exertion to cease from feeling; so that\\nthe heart of a man is but partially, and that indi-\\nrectly, under the goverment of his will and agency.\\nProfessor. Now then, for The Will: what can a\\nman do with his will, if he will? Has he any power\\nof agency over his own volitions? This is the very\\npith of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy;\\nbut you must treat the subject without the least re-\\nference to any theological disputation.\\nPupil, You have taught me to treat this subject\\nphilosophically; that is, to exhibit a fair, simple\\npicture of my own consciousness and memory.", "height": "3322", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0166.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "Mental Efficiency, 157\\nWell then, I am not conscious that I will, neither\\ndo I remember that I ever did will, except in con-\\nsequence of some motive; and hence I conclude,\\nthat if my faculty of agency ever operates on my\\nwill, it must be indirectly and mediately, by opera-\\nting on those faculties which furnish and present\\nmotives for volition. A volition which I remember\\nthat I once had, to determine at a certain future\\ntime, in a particular case, in a particular manner, I\\nfind may be a motive to that determination, so that\\na volition remembered, may become a motive to a\\nfuture volition: but I do not find, from any thing\\nin my own memory, consciousness, or experience,\\nthat the recollection of any past, voluntary agency,\\nproduces immediately any volition; or that I have\\nany direct efficiency upon my own will.\\nProfessor, You may read, if you please, the fol-\\nlowing extracts from the notes on Dr. Reid. I have\\naltered a few words for my own satisfaction, and\\nmade some additions.\\nPupil, It remains for us to inquire if the power\\nof agency extends to the faculty of the will, so as\\nto regulate its volitions. We think; and when we\\nwill to think, the object of our power of agency is\\nan act of thinking. We perform the external uction\\nof writing, and then, the act of writing is the object\\nof agency. We think and write, when we Vv^ ill, be-\\ncause the Supreme Being has connected the power\\nof performing these operations, with the voluntary\\nexertion to perform them. But is volition ever the\\nobject of agency? Willing is a mental operation all\\nmust allow; and we ask, Is volition the object of\\nvoluntary exertionP Do I always, or at any time,\\nO", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0167.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "158 Of Mental Agemij\\n-will to have a certain volition^ and then voluntarily\\nexert myself to produce that volition, so as actually\\nto produce that certain volition? A certain volition\\nalways respects some action to be done. If I ivill^\\nthat Inoxv -will resolve to, perform it; I need exert\\nno agency upon my faculty of volition, for now\\nwill to perform it; and I could not will to will its\\npresent performance, without actually having alrea-\\ndy the certain volitition to perform the action in\\nquestion. If I will in future to resolve on the per*\\nformance of some action, when that future time ar-\\nrives, if I remember my previous determination, I\\nshall then will to perform it, from the memory of\\nmy former purpose; unless I then have some motive\\nfor refusing to determine, as I previously intended\\nto do. In regard to a future, intended volition,\\ntherefore, no voluntary exertion will produce it in\\nany other way, than by producing the recollection\\nof a past purpose, as an inducement; and even then\\nthe inducement will not prove a motive, if any\\nchange in our thoughts or feelings, moves us to the\\nchoice of not performing the action, the perform-\\nance of which we formerly intended to will.*\\nAn apple and an q^% lie before me. I have the\\nopportunity of making my election between them.\\nI have not yet determined which I will take, but I\\nwill to determine. Will a determination immediate-\\nly follow my will to determine, even as the motion\\nof my fingers follows my volition to write? Is\\nchoice so connected with an antecedent will to\\nchoose, as the voluntary motions of the body with\\nthe operations of the will, which relate to them?\\nWe apprehend that it is not; for every one, wh^", "height": "3353", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0168.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "upon the WilL i58\\nwill examine his own mental operations will find,\\nthat after his will to make a choice between the egg\\nand the apple, he must have some motive for his\\nchoice of taking one of them. If then he chooses to\\ntake one, say the apple, from some motive, and\\nthat motive is not the mere volition to deter-\\nmine which he will take, his determ/mation to take\\nthe apple is not immediately consequent on anj\\npower of agency exerted on the will, but the im-\\nmediate consequence of that simple or complex\\nmental operation, which constituted the motive.\\nNow that a mere volition to determine which of\\ntwo things I will take* never was to my mind a\\nmotive for the subsequent choice to take one of\\nthem in preference to the other, I am certain; for I\\nnever was conscious, so far as I remember, of ever\\nchoosing from such a motive; nor have I ever known\\na man who did choose from such a motive. We\\nare conscious of no operation of our efficiency upon\\nthe will, which according to a mental constitution\\nproduces volitions. We feel pei-suaded, therefore,\\nthat no act of the will, follows a determination to pro-\\nduce an act of the will, in the same manner, and for\\nthe same reason that bodily motions, or various in-\\ntellectual operations, follow volitions. We will to\\nspeak, and speak, because the faculties for doing\\nso, are rendered obedient to the faculties of volition\\nand agency: we will to think upon a particular sub-\\nject, and thought follows our voluntary effort to\\nthink; but if we will to have a choice, a determina-\\ntion, a purpose, or any kind of volition, the future\\nvolition which a man should imagine himself able\\nto produccj will not follow, without the intervention", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0169.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "160 Power of Agetiey,\\nof some other mental operation, which shall consti-\\ntute a motive for that particular volition.\\nProfessor, Well, to conclude, you have only to\\ndecide whether the faculty of Efficiency ever ope*\\nrates on itself\\nPupil, It never does directly: but indirectly it\\nmay,* for one volition may occasion an operation of\\nagency; a pleasant feeling may result from that exf**\\nertion; the feeling may be a motive for willing to\\nrepeat the exertion; and again, the operation of\\nagency may be consequent upon the new volition.\\nIn this way any exertion, consequent upon volition,\\nmay give rise to a great variety of feelings, and\\nconceptions, each of which, or any combination of\\nthem, may serve as a motive for willing some other\\nsimilar, or different, operation of agency.\\nProfessor, It appears, then, that this faculty of\\nagency, under the direction of the will, can operate\\ndirectly on every part of the body to which there is\\nan uninterrupted communication of nerves,* and\\neither directly or indirectly, upon every faculty of\\nthe human mind; even upon itself. How wonder-\\nful, how simple, and yet how complicated a being\\nis man! To a very great extent he can do what he\\nwills; even in the regulation of his own thoughts,\\nfeelings, volitions, and other mental actions. Let\\nhim know himself, and if he perseveringly deter-\\nmines it, he may govern himself.", "height": "3317", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0170.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XIV.\\nConsideration of several Attributes of the Soul -which ai-* not inhe-\\nrent.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Physical\\nLiberty and Necessity.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and\\nMetaphysical Necessities.\\nProfessor, Having taken a survey of the faculties\\nof the human mind, and spoken of its simple opera-\\ntions, it seems necessary that we should converse\\na little about the attributes of Liberty, Capacity,\\nPower, Necessity, Disposition, Inclination, Habit,\\nPrinciples of Action, several Complex Operations,\\nand the Improvement and Injury of the original\\nfaculties of the soul.\\nPupiU If you please, Sir, I should like to turn\\ninterrogator.\\nProfessor* It will, perhaps, conduce quite as\\nmuch to your edification in knowledge to ask ques-\\ntions as to answer them. You may proceed, without\\nbeing reproached as a Tankee,\\nPupil, What then is Liberty?\\nProfessor, Liberty and freedom are terms that\\ndenote the same thing. They express the relative\\nstate of the thing concerning which they are pr^^di-\\ncated. They express the state of any thing in rela-\\ntion to some contemplated effectual resistance^ ob-\\nstruction^ compulsion^ or necessity^ from some ex-\\n02", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0171.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "162 Liberty and Necessity.\\ntraneous cause. Had we never formed an idea of\\none of these things, we should never have conceived\\nof liberty^ or freedom; by which we mean a state of\\nexemption from resistance, obstruction, compulsion\\nor necessity. Liberty can with propriety be predi-\\ncated only of beings that are capable of some ope-\\nration; and of beings destitute of effectual compul-\\nsion, or restraint, from without themselves.\\nA mere animal, for instance, is capable of animal\\noperations, such as walking, running, flying, swim-\\nming, eatmg, drinking, and sleeping. Now an animal,\\nthat is capable of walking, has liberty to walk, when\\nhe is not physically obstructed in walking, so as to\\nbe absolutely prevented, by some other being. A\\nfish, that has fins, and is alive in the water, has\\nliberty to sxvim^ when it is not physically and effec-\\ntually restrained. A bird has liberty to fty^ so long\\nas it has wings capable of wafting it, and is not\\nphysically compelled to desist from using them. Cut\\noff the fins and tail of a fish, and the wings of a\\nfowl; and then the fish has no liberty to swim, the\\nbird no liberty to fly. Leave the fins on a fish, but\\ntake it out of the water, and it has no liberty to\\nswim. Leave the wings of a bird on his back, but\\nhold it under the water, in your hand, or thoroughly\\ndrench its plumage, and it will have, for the time,\\nno liberty of flying. An animal that is capable of\\nslumbering, and that is not prevetrted from sleeping,\\nby something that disturbs him, has the liberty of\\nsleeping. Man is at liberty to perform any action of\\nwhich he is capable, when he is not physically and\\neifectuaily restrained from doing it, by some being", "height": "3319", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0172.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "Power and Capacity* 163\\nmore powerful than himself. This is a physical\\nliberty of action.\\nTo ascertain, therefore, the extent of man s li-\\nberty of action, I must ascertain what actions he is\\ncapable of, and how far he is physically prevented\\nfrom doing them, by some extraneous cause. The\\nidea of restraint, implies some restraining cause or\\nagent.\\nMan is capable of performing those actions which\\nhe has power to do, when he has the liberty of\\ndoing them. For instance, when a man has all his\\nlimbs in a healthful state, wills to walk, and finds\\nthe faculty of agency on his muscles obedient to his\\nwill, he has the power of walking, if he is not phy-\\nsically prevented from walking, by some cause with-\\nout him .t If. We say, therefore, that he is capable\\nof walking, or has a capacity for walking, under\\nsuch circumstances, when nothing but liberty is\\nwanting to constitute the perfect /?0Tt;er of walking.\\nPupil, So that a man may have a capacity for\\nv/alking, when he has no power of walking, because\\nhe wants liberty to complete his power of walking.\\nProfessor, I hold my little son by the legs: my\\narms are more powerful than his legs: he wills to\\nwalk, but he has not the power of walking, because\\nI hold him fast. He has not the liberty of walking;\\nbut he has a capacity for walking. Had he liberty\\nhe would have the power, for nothing but liberty\\nis, by the supposition, wanting to constitute his\\npower of walking.\\nNow a man has liberty to perform all those ac-\\ntions, of which he is capable, when no physical re-\\nstraint is exerted upon him by some extraneous", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0173.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "164\\nPower and Liberty,\\ncause. If any physical restraint is exerted upon him\\nby any extraneous cause, to force him not to do, any\\naction for which he has a capacity, he is not at li-\\nberty to perform the contemplated action.\\nPupil, It seems to be requisite, I think, to as-\\ncertain wh dt poTJuei s a man has, in order to a correcft\\nunderstanding of the liberty with which he is en-\\ndowed. Pray, Sir, what constitutes the power and\\nthe liberty of perception?\\nProfessor. Each kind of perception requires dis-\\ntinct things to constitute the power of that parti-\\ncular perception. The general description, which I\\ngive of Power to perform any operation, is this,\\nthat it includes every thing essential to the actual\\nproduction of that operation. Of course, the exist-\\nence of a faculty or of faculties for doing any thing,\\nis always included in any particular power of action.\\nLiberty of action is another thing included, for\\nwhere there is no physical liberty to perform the\\naction, there is no power of performing it.\\nPupil, You speak, I perceive, exclusively of the\\nliberty of action. Would you distinguish it from\\nthe liberty of not acting?\\nProfessor. Liberty not to perform any particular\\naction is the exemption of any agent from compulsion\\nto do, or the physical necessity of doing, an action.\\nLiberty to perform an action may be called, for the\\nsake of distinction, positive liberty; and liberty not\\nto perform an action, negative liberty. Exemption\\nof an agent from compulsion to do, or not to do\\nan action, is the prominent idea included under the\\nterm of liberty^ whtther it be positive or negative.\\nPupil, That a n^an may have liberty to perform", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0174.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "Liberty and Power, 165\\nan action, is it necessary that he should have, at the\\nsame time, liberty not to perform it?\\nProfessor. Negative liberty is essential to positive\\nliberty. A man cannot be compelled not to do an\\naction, and yet have liberty at the same time to\\nperform it; nor can he be compelled to do it, and\\nyet have liberty not to perform it. He cannot, there-\\nfore, have physical liberty to do an action, and\\nyet be under the physical necessity of not doing it:\\nnor can he have the liberty of not doing it, and yet,\\nbe under the necessity of doing it; so that if he has\\npositive liberty to do an action, he must not be\\nunder the necessity of not doing it, which is the\\nsame thing as to say he must have the negative li-\\nberty of not doing it.\\nPupil. Well, Sir, is it essential to the power\\nof performing an action^ that we should have the\\npower of not performing it?\\nProfessor. It is not; for this would imply the ne-\\ncessity of the co-existence of two directly contrary\\npowers, to constitute a single power. In many in-\\nstances the power to perform a mental operation\\nimplies something which would render the exist-\\nence of a power of not performing the same opera-\\ntion, an impossibility. This will appear from the\\ndescription of different powers.\\nPupil. I am constrained to interrupt you again,\\nfor I wish to know whether the power and the\\nliberty respectively, of doing any action, implies the\\npower, and the liberty of performing a directly\\ncontrary action.\\nProfessor, Certainly not, for every distinct action\\nmust hjvye its proper power and liberty. To walk", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0175.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "166 Fower of Perception,\\none way, and to walk in a directly contrary way,\\nare two opposite actions. Now a power to walk one\\nWay, since it is a voluntary action, may imply,\\namong other things, a volition to walk in that par-\\nticular way; and the motive for willing to walk in\\nthat particular way, may be the very motive for\\nwilling not to walk in the opposite way; so that the\\nfower to walk in one way may exist, when I have\\nno power to walk in the opposite way. Again, one\\nway may be open to me, and the other may be ef-\\nfectually obstructed; so that I have liberty to walk\\nin one way, and not in the opposite. It is to be re-\\nmarked, that walking in one w^aj^, and not walking\\nin that one v/ay, are not opposite actions* Not doing\\nis the mere negation of action. The converse of a\\nproposition in which an action is predicated, is not\\na proposition in which a directly opposite action is\\npredicated, but one in which the non-entity of the\\naction is affirmed. For instance, I walk southxvard\\nis not the converse of I walk northward; but I walk\\nnot southward^ is the converse of the first statement;\\nand 1 walk not northward^ of the second. A nega-\\ntive particle introduced in any proposition, in the\\nright place, will make it the converse of what it\\nwas. I may have power and liberty to walk, when\\nI have not to sit; or to stand still, when I have not\\nto walk; or to will one action, when I have not the\\npower and liberty to luill a contrary action.\\nPupil. You was going to describe the power of\\nperception, before I interrupted you. What, Sir, is\\nthe power of seeing?\\nProfessor, The power of seeing includes the fa-\\nculty of perception, the existence of a sound eye in", "height": "3313", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0176.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "Power of Perception, 167\\nits proper place, and of light; the transmission of\\nrays of light from an object of vision to the eye,\\nand the exemption of the other faculties of the\\nmind from such intense employment, as prevents\\nperception, together with the liberty of seeing. If all\\nthtse things, but the last, should conspire to pro-\\nduce the power of seeing, and some one more pow-\\nerful than ourselves should exert a physical agency\\non our faculty of perception, so as to prevent our\\nseeing, we should not have the power of seeing.\\nThe liberty of seeing, however, when all the other\\nthings named conspire to produce the power of\\nvision, cannot be taken away, so far as we know,\\nby any other being than our Maker. By the eye in\\nits proper place I intend, in its due connexion with\\nthe optic nerve and brain. If light be absent, or\\nif no eye exist in its proper place, or if there be no\\nfaculty of perception, or no object of vision; or if\\nthe mind be wholly occupied with the mental ope-\\nrations, there is no power of seeing, in a sound\\nman, when awake, and under the ordinary opera-\\ntion of the laws of our mental nature.\\nTo constitute the poxvcr of hearings the faculty\\nof perception, a sound ear in its proper place, the\\nvibrations of air upon the tympanum of the ear, a\\nstate of mind in which other things do not intensely\\noccupy it, and the liberty of hearing, are essential.\\nThe power of tasting mcludes the existence of\\nliberty to taste, a faculty for tasting, the organs of\\ntasting in a proper state; and the contact of some-\\nthing vo be tasted with those organs.\\nThvi power of smelling is constituted by the ex-\\nistence of the faculty of perception, the nasal organs", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0177.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "168 Different Powers*\\nin a proper state, the liberty of smelling, and th\\ncontact of some effluvia of the object to be smelt\\nwith those organs.\\nThe power of touching includes the liberty, the\\nfaculty, and the organs of touching in a proper\\nstate; together with the contact of something with\\nthose organs, to be touched.\\nThe nerves spread over the whole body, in a\\nproper state, may be considered as the essential\\npart of the bodily organs by which we perceive in\\nthese five different ways.\\nPup iU I am impatient to hear your account of\\nthe power of performing the other simple mental\\noperations.\\nProfessor* The existence of the faculty of Con-\\nsciousness, and of some previous mental operation,\\nof which to be conscious, together with the liberty\\nof being conscious, constitute the power of con*\\nsciousness.\\nThe existence of the faculty of Understanding or\\nConception, together with liberty of operation, con-\\nstitute the power of understanding,\\nPupiL Is not the previous existence of an opera-\\ntion of consciousness, perception, memory, judgment,\\nreasoning, conscience, volition, feeling, and agency,\\nrequisite to constitute the power of conceiving of\\neach of these things?\\nProfessor, Why did you not add, and of con-\\nception?\\nPupil, Because I clearly understood, that it\\nwould be absurd to suppose, that an operation of\\nconception was essential to constitute the power of\\nconception, for that would be supposing an opera-", "height": "3319", "width": "1859", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0178.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "Different Powers, 169\\ntion of conception must have existed before there\\nwas any power to perform it.\\nProfessor. You are correct. It seems, then, that\\nwe may have power to conceive of an operation be-\\nfore we actually perform that operation. Conception\\nis an instance of this kind. Now then I ask, what\\nshould prevent me from conceiving of an act of me-\\nmory, had I the faculty of conception, without the\\nfaculty of memory?\\nPupil, I know not that you would be prevented\\nfrom doing it; and so you might do it, if you had\\npoxver. That you would not have the power, I can-\\nnot affirm; for I conceive of an angel, of Satan, of\\na mountain of salt, and of a man as tall as a steeple,\\nwithout ever having perceived, or ever before, per-\\nhaps, conceived of such things.\\nProfessor, It is true, that we more readily con-\\nceive of such mental operations as we have had,\\nthan of any which we have not performed; vet I\\ncannot ascertain, that the actual experiencing of anv\\noperation is essential to the power of conceiving of\\nthem. Conception, as we have already shown, is a\\nsort of creative, inventive, originating faculty of the\\nhuman mind.\\nPupil. V^ hat is the power of judging?\\nProfessor, A conception of the meaning of a pro-\\nposition, together with the faculty and the liberty\\nof judging, constitute the power of judging consti-\\ntutionally. Volition and attention are requisite in\\naddition, to constitute the power of forming ac-\\nquired judgm en ts.\\nThe power of reasoning comprehends the pre-\\nvious conception of at least two propositions, two\\nP", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0179.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "170 Dtffereyit Powers,\\njudgments, together with the liberty and faculty of\\ninferring from them a third, of which he conceives.\\nThe power of memory includes the faculty and\\nliberty of memory, together with the previous ex-\\nistence of some other mental act to be remembered.\\nThe power of recollection consists of the faculty\\nand liberty of memory, the previous existence of\\nsome act to be recollected, a volition to recollect,\\nand voluntary agency on the memory to produce\\nrecollection.\\nThe power of conscience includes the faculty of\\nconscience, liberty to exercise it, and some previous\\njudgment concerning a law, obligation, and the con-\\nformity or non-conformity of some action to that\\nlaw and obligation.\\nOf the seven powers appertaining to the ^even\\nfaculties of The Understandings it may be well\\nhere to remark, that God alone has the power of\\nabsolutely depriving us of the liherty of thinking.\\nWe may partially impair our own liberty of think-\\ning; and men may in some instances deprive others\\nof the liberty of employing some of their intellectual\\nfaculties for a little while; but him whom God has\\nmade free to think, not all the tyrants in the world\\nean compel not to think.\\nThe power of feeling includes the liberty and\\nfaculty of feelmg, together with some previous\\nthought which is the occasion of feeling.\\nI he power of volition includes the faculty and li-\\nberty of volition, together with the conception of\\nsome action deemed practicable to be resolved on,\\nand the apprehension of some motive for willing the\\nperformance of it.", "height": "3317", "width": "1869", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0180.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "Liberty and Necessity, 171\\nThe power of agency includes a volition to per-\\nform some action, together with the faculty and li-\\nberty of exertion in obedience to the will.\\nThese are the POWERS of man to perform\\nsimple operations of the mind. To describe the dif-\\nferent powers of complex operations, would re-\\nquire too much time. Only keep in mind, that\\npoxver always includes every thing essential to the\\nperformance of an operation, and you will generally\\nsatisfy yourself, so far as you have knowledge of\\ncauses and effects, what constitutes the power of\\nperforming any action.\\nFupil. Are there not many kinds of liberty and\\nnecessity of which you have said nothing?\\nProfessor. A law which does not forbid any ac-\\ntion is said to give liberty to perform it; because\\nthe law presents no legal obstruction to it. A person\\ntoo, is said to give liberty to do any action which\\nhe determines not to use any exertions to prevent\\nfrom being done. If a law authorizes any action, it\\nmay be said to give moral or legal liberty for its\\nperformance.\\nOi physical necessity nothing more need be said.\\nThere is a metaphysical necessity^ that two and two\\nshould amount to neither more nor less than four;\\nthat a square should not be a circle; that the same\\nthing should not exist and yet exist at the same time;\\nthat a proposition should be either true or false, and\\nnot both in the same sense; and that a being of in-\\nfinite knowledge and perfect truth should not lie.\\nMany similar things are metaphysically necessary;\\najjd to a metaphysical necessity, or a necessity re-", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0181.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "1 7% \u00e2\u0082\u00acertainty.\\nsuiting from the nature of the things which exist,\\nthere is no opposing liberty.\\nMoral certainty^ or any thing which is absolutely\\ncertain in moral operations^ has been called, some-\\ntimes moral and sometimes metaphysical necessity^\\nbut v/e think very improperly. When people mean\\nmoral certainty they should say so; and not con-\\nfound the certain futurition of a moral action with\\nnecessity.\\nSome things, moreover, which have been called\\nmoral necessities^ are absolutely physical necessities.\\nIt is said, for instance, to be morally necessary^ that\\nevery volition should be consequent upon some mo-\\ntive; whereas this is a physical necessity^ resulting\\nfrom the very nature of volition, and the natural\\nconstitution of the human mind. It is not only mo-\\nrally certain that there will be no volition without\\nsome motive; but it \\\\s physically impossible^ during\\nthe continuance of the present mental 7iature of\\nman, that there would be any act of the will with-\\nout some motive, in a sane mind.", "height": "3311", "width": "1861", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0182.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XV.\\nDisposition of Mind. Inclination. Habit. Imitation. Consideration\\nof sereral Principles of Human Actions. Principles of Substances,\\nSciences, Actions, and Moral Actions. Sentiments, Instinct. In-\\nstinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations.\\nPupil, What do you mean by Disposition of\\nmind?\\nProfessor. It is the name of any relative state of\\nthe mental faculties, I have a mental disposition to\\nlearn, if my mind is in such a state as is conducive\\nto the acquisition of knowledge. For instance if my\\nfaculties are in such a state relative to learning, that\\nI conceive of the importance of learning, desire to\\nlearn, judge it best to learn, and will to pay the re-\\nquisite attention, that I may learn, I have a dispo-\\nsition to learn.\\nPupil, You derive the word, I presume, from\\niispono^ or dispositum^ a placing in order and use\\nit always in the strict sense.\\nProfessor, I do: and I assure you, I never found\\na man who could tell me what he did mean by dis*-\\nposition^ that attempted to give any other definition\\nof the term. It surely is not the name of any one\\nfeeling, or of any other single operation of mind.\\nWe hear much of a disposition to believe. It is a\\nvery important one, if we mean by it such a state\\nV 2", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0183.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "174) Disposition* Inclination*\\nof the mental faculties relative to testimony, as is\\nlikely to ensure assent to the truth of credible and\\nvaluable testimony. If a man judges that a speaker\\nis a person of veracity, and has interesting truth to\\ncommunicate, and at the same time desires to hear\\nhis testimony, he has a disposition to believe. On\\nthe other hand, if a man doubts the veracity of a\\ntestifier, or hates his person, or judges that he has\\nnothing of importance to communicate, he is dis-\\nposed not to believe,\\nA right mental disposition in relation to any\\nm.ental operation to be performed, is as essential a\\nthe right disposition of the eye and of light in rela-\\ntion to the seeing of any object; or the right dis-\\nposition of a cannon, to carry a point blank shot\\nthrough a target.\\nPupzL What do you mean by a mental Inclina-\\niioni^\\nProfessor, Mental inclination is such a disposi-\\ntion of mind as presents many inducements to any\\nspecified voluntary action. It is figurative language,\\nderived from the inclination or bending forward of\\nthe body towards any object. If a man says he has\\nan inclination to go to the theatre to-night, his\\nmeaning is, that he has several inducements to will\\nthe operation of going, but has not quite determined\\nto go. If he has willed to go; he says, I have deter-\\nmined, resolved, purposed, intended or willed to go\\nto the theatre to-night; but if he has not actually\\nv/illed, yet thinks himself almost ready to do it,\\nfrom the inducements which he at present has, he\\nasserts that he is inclined, or has an iiiclitiation to\\ngo. A man is always inclined to do that, for willing", "height": "3297", "width": "1860", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0184.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "Mental Habits. 175\\nto do which he apprehends many powerful induce-\\nmentsj but he always wills to do that, for doing\\nwhich his inducements constitute a motive.\\nPupil. Hence I am inclined to do many things,\\nwhich I have not, upon the whole, motives for re-\\nsolving to do. I have been inclined to visit the\\ntheatre, but never willed to do it; and so was never\\nthere.\\nProfessor. Yes; and it is owing to your mental\\ndisposition that you apprehend any inducements^ and\\nthat you are not actually moved^ to mental deter-\\nmination^ and activity^ in relation to those actions.\\nPupil. What should I mean when I speak of\\nmental Habits?\\nProfessor. Mental habit is any such disposition\\nof mind in relation to any kind of action, which we\\nhave often rtrpeated, as renders the repetition of it\\neasy, and common. Habit is something acquired,\\nand when confirmed, more strongly resembles a\\nmental faculty than any other attribute of the soul.\\nHence it is frequently called a second nature. The\\nhabit of imitation is one of the earliest which we\\nform.\\nPupiL Are there any general laws concerning\\nhabit?\\nProfessor, It is a law of our nature, that the\\nfrequent repetition of any action, shall render the\\nperformance \u00c2\u00a9f that action easy; and commonly\\npresent a motive for future repetitions of it.\\nPupil, Of course, it is a law of our nature, that\\nthe frequent performance of a particular kind of ac-\\ntion, shall produce a habit of action.\\nProfessor* It is another law of our nature, that", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0185.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "176 Principles of Action.\\nnot very ardent, but moderately agreeable feelings\\nshall result from habitual actions: and another, that\\na habit, once formed, shall be difficult to resist and\\neradicate; but may be destroyed by the formation\\nof a contrary habit.\\nPupil. Can you classify the habits of man?\\nProfessor, Not easily; for any action of which\\nhe is capable, by being often repeated, may become\\nthe germ of a habit, lasting as life. Man forms\\nhabits of thinking, feeling, choice, and efficiency.\\nHe has habits of speaking, writing, dressing, eat-\\ning, drinking, sleeping, amusement, idleness, study,\\nand labour. But one thing I would have you re-\\nmember, that it is of unspeakable importance to\\nform amiable and healthful habits of body, and vir-\\ntuous, studious, systematic habits of soul: for so\\npowerful is habit, that it may enable the animal\\nframe to resist that poison which would have occa-\\nsioned death before the habit of using it was form-\\ned; and the mind, to take unceasing satisfaction in\\nunremitting, intellectual, and benevolent pursuits.\\nPupiL We have heard much about principles y\\nand principles of action. I would thank you to re-\\npeat to me, what you have formerly said on this\\nsubject, that your views may be more thoroughly\\nimpressed on my mind.\\nProfessor. A principle^ is the beginning, the ori-\\ngin, the foundation of any thing. It is derived from\\nthe Latin wprd principium. When you trace a science\\nto the axioms on which it is founded, you trace it\\nto its first principles. The first principles of any\\ncomplex substance, are those simple substances of\\nwhich it is compounded or constituted. Hence,", "height": "3315", "width": "1870", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0186.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "Principles of Action. 177\\nflour, yeast, water, and salt may be called the com-\\nponent principles of bread; and the ten mental fa-\\nculties which have been named, the component\\nprinciples of the human mind.\\nIf we inquire into the origin of human operation,\\nand ascertain what it is that occasions or produces\\nany operation, we ascertain the principle of that\\noperation. Hence the soul itself may be denomi-\\nnated 2L principle of thought, of feeling of volition,\\nand of agency. It is very frequently called an ac-\\ntive principle^ because it has the power of beginning\\nand continuing various kinds of operations.\\nThe principle of any particular action is that\\nwhich, figuratively speaking, lies at the foundation\\nof it, and supports it. Hence every faculty may be\\ncalled the first principle of its own operations. Be-\\nsides these first principles of action, those antece-\\ndent operations upon which any subsequent action\\ndepends, are called the principles of that action.\\nHence a motive is the principle of a volition. If you\\nask, upon what principle a man willed a certain\\naction, you inquire what motive induced him to\\nwill it.\\nAny thing that is very generally among mankind,\\na motive for willing any particular kind of opera-\\ntion, is called a general^ or common principle of\\naction. Hence huyiger^ because it moves all men to\\nseek and receive food, is called a common principle\\nof action. Each of the natural appetites has the\\nsame distinction. Habit is an acquired principle of\\naction, because it furnishes a standing motive to\\nevery one who forms it, for choosing to act in a\\nparticular way.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0187.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "1 78 Sentiments,\\nMankind are so universally influenced in their\\nvolitions, and voluntary exertions, by the desire of\\nwealth, power, society, health, life, happiness, and\\nthe approbation of those whom they esteem, that the\\ndesire and love of each of these things is styled si\\ne^mmon principle of action. These desires are na-\\ntural to all men in their present state. Hence we\\nsay, that a man is governed in his conduct by one,\\nor the other, or all of these principles of action, in\\nall the common concerns of life; unless he is ha-\\nbitually moved by a superior, acquired principle of\\naction, called the sense of duty\\nFeeling and Conscience, as we have already seen,\\nfrequently furnish motives for our conduct, and\\ntherefore may be called principles of action; and\\neven common principles.\\nThe common principle of voluntary efficiency^ is\\nvolition; for a man exerts himself upon this princi-\\nple, that he xvill to do it.\\nPupil. Is not sentiment a very general principle\\nof action?\\nProfessor, By sentiment I design to denote any\\nsuch judgment as ordinarily operates as a motive\\nto volition. I answer, therefore, that sentiment is a\\nvery common principle of human action.\\nPupil. Many of our constitutional judgments I\\nshould think, then, might be called sentiments; for\\nt\\\\it judgments^ that the things which we perceive,\\nreally exist, and that they are such as we perceive\\nthem, are principles of action to all men.\\nProfessor. You are undoubtedly correct. It is\\nanother comnum principle of action with men, that\\nevery operation of mind of which they are conscious^", "height": "3318", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0188.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "Moral Principles. 179\\n#r which they remember, has really been performed\\nby themselves. Our judgments, concerning our own\\nmental identity, the intelligence of the persons with\\nwhom we converse, the credibility of testimony;\\nand in short, all other permanent judgments, whether\\nconstitutional or acquired, which commonly move\\nmen to will a course of conduct conformable to\\nthose judgments, are principles of action.\\nOne of our most commonly operative sentiments\\nin relation to our voluntary agency upon material\\nobjects is this, That in the phenomena of nature,\\nwhat is to be, vv ill probably be like to what has been\\nin similar circumstances.\\nPupiL What is a moral principlef\\nProfessor, Any thing which lies at the foundation\\nof a moral law, obligation, or action.\\nPupil. I designed to inquire, particularly, about\\nthe principles of moral actions*\\nProfessor, When you have ascertained what is\\na moral action., you will then find no difficulty in\\nascertaming what is the principle of any particular\\nmoral action. For instance, if every volition is a\\nmoral operation, then every motive is a moral prin-\\nciple; and the faculty of volition is an inherent mO\\nral principle. If every operation of conscience is a\\nmoral action, then the faculty of conscience is a\\nmoral principle of action; and Q^ch. judgment in de-\\npendence on which conscience operates, is a moral\\nprmciple of conscience. If no operation of man is\\na moral action, but some operation of voluntary ef-\\nDr. Reid,", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0189.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "1 80 3Ioral Agency.\\nfidency^ then the faculty of agency is a moral prin-\\nciple, the volitions on which our operations of agen-\\ncy depend, are moral principles of agency; and the\\nmotives on which these volitions depend, are ulte-\\nrior moral principles of agency.\\nPupil. You speak hypothetically. I should be\\nobliged to you for a definition of a moral action.\\nProfessor, I will offer a few general remarks on\\nthis subject; but must refer you for full satisfaction\\nto the science of theology.\\nAny law given for the regulation of the actions\\nof an intellectual^ sensitive^ voluntary efficient^ or\\nagenty is a moral lazu. All other laws are called\\nphysical.\\nAny action -ivhtch is required or forbidden by a\\nmoral law, is a moral action., in contradistinction to\\na physical action, or operation.\\nPupil. Moral laws and moral actions, of course,\\nmay be either good or bad, right or wrong.\\nProfessor, Yes; for every law which a ruler gives\\nhis subjects; a master, his servant; a parent, his\\nchild; a teacher, his pupil; or the Creator, his intel-\\nlectual, voluntary, efficient creature, is a moral law;\\nand every act of disobedience, as well as of obe-\\ndience, is a moral action.\\nPupil, In some sense, it appe irs to me, that a\\nmoral action may be a very immoral one; and a\\nmora/ law, an im7noralUw, Am I right?\\nProfessor, Perfectly: for one mor d law of one\\nbeing, may be contrary to the moral law of another\\nbeing. A parent, for example, may require his\\nchild to steal; and God requires the same child not\\nto steal. Now conformity to any moral law is", "height": "3317", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0190.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "Moral Agency, 181\\n3\u00c2\u00aemetimes cdled moral, in contradistinction to non-\\nconformity, which is popularly denoted humoral, or\\nvicious. Moral, therefore, has two senses; one of\\nwhich is opposed to physical, and the other to im-\\nmoral. That moral lazu of any being which is con-\\ntrary to the moral, law of th6 Creator, is an immo-\\nral or vicious law: and that moral conduct which\\nis required by a moral law of man, but which is\\ncontrary to the moral law of God, is immoral con-\\nduct. When we enquire, what is a moral action?\\nwe use the word moral in opposition to physical.\\nIt is in this sense, that I have said, that any action\\nrequired or forbidden by a moral law, is a moral\\naction.\\nPupil, From what you have already said, I\\nshould infer, that a 7noral sentiment^ is any such\\njudgment on any moral subject, as is commonly a\\nmotive to a particular kind of moral actions.\\nProfessor, We accord in judgment; and let me\\nadd, it is happy for mankind that all of their diZ-\\nquired Judgme7its are not senti?nents; for then, every\\nman s moral actions would be as unreasonable as\\nhis opinions are erroneous.\\nPupil. What do you call Instinct?^\\nProfessor. An a7ii?nal principle of action; and so\\ncalled, because it appertains to all animals; and ex-\\ncites them to many actions.\\nInstinctive actions, says Lord Karnes, cannot be said to have\\na motive, because they are not (?one with any view to consequeuces.\\nElem nts of Criticism j vol. i. p. 46.\\nQ", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0191.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "182 Human Instinct,\\nPupil, What is this Instinct? Is it a faculty, or\\na disposition?\\nProfessor, Instinct in man is such a disposition\\nof the faculties of perception and agency in relation\\nto each other^ as produces instantly certain actions,\\nwithout any conception of them, or volition concern-\\ning them.\\nPupil. Will you h^ve the kindness to illustrate\\nyour definition?\\nProfessor. In a child, the perception which it\\nhas through the stomach and organs of tasting, in\\nconsequence of the operation of the gastric juice\\non the coats of the stomach, in the absence of food,\\nis immediately followed by an operation of the fa-\\nculty of agency on the lips, tongue, and throat,\\nwhich produces the act ot sucking. The child has\\nno conception of the action, nor of the utility of\\nit; nor of its ability to perform it; neither does it\\nwill to perform it, from any motive whatever. It\\nsucks, instinctively. The author of our nature has\\ndisposed the faculties of perception and agency in\\nsuch a manner, that the child exerts its power of\\nagency in sucking, immediately in consequence of\\ncertam perceptions, so that if the child had no other\\nfaculties of mind than these two, it would be able\\nto suck. The perception which is followed by suck-\\ning, is commonly called the sense of hunger.\\nPupil, Sucking then is an operation performed\\nby instinct. What other operations, do mankind\\nperform from this disposition?\\nProfessor. It is to be remarked, that men fre-\\nquently perform those actions from volition, which\\nare ordinarily performed from instinct. With this", "height": "3319", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0192.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "Instinctive Operations, 183\\nunderstanding, I denominate sw.allowtng^ wiriking^\\nsucking^ shrinking^ laughing^ crying^ weepings sigh-\\ning^ starting^ and all those actions performed by\\nour bodily members for self defence^ or self-preser-\\nvation^ when they are performed without volition\\nto perform them, instinctive operations. None of\\nthese are performed, except in consequence of some\\nperception; and they are frequently performed with-\\nout any intention. Hence instinct is the principle of\\nthese operations.\\nPupiL I think Dr. Reid represents breathings and\\nthe contraction and relaxation of the muscles^ in all\\nVOLUNTARY, bodHy actions^ to be instinctive ac-\\ntions.\\nProfessor* I think him incorrect in this; for\\nbreathings when involuntary, as it generally is, re-\\nsults not from perception of any kind; but from the\\nmechanical construction of the chest, lungs, and\\nwindpipe of the human frame; and the chemical\\naffinity of the blood in the living animal, for a por-\\ntion of the atmospheric air, called oxygen gas, to-\\ngether with its want of affinity for the other portion,\\ncalled azotic gas. Hence I have known the dead\\nbody of a man to breathe, from pulling down the\\ndiaphragm, so as to produce a vacuum favourable\\nto the distension of the lungs. This case of unnatu-\\nral breathing was purely a mechanical operation,\\nwithout any chemical influence.\\nThe action of the muscles in voluntary opera-\\ntions is the effect of our mental efficiency upon\\nthem; and although we know not the mode in which\\nour mental effi Jen :y affects our nerves and muscles,\\nyet we know the fact, that upon volition, the mind", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0193.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "184 Muscular Motion.\\ndoes exert an agency upon every moveable part of\\nthe body. This is something widely different from\\ninstinct. The muscles are so connected with the\\nmechanical structure of our bones, and with one\\nanother, arranged like loops and puUies, that the\\ncontraction or distention of certain muscles being\\neffected, through the agency of the mind, by the\\nmedium of the nerves, the bones are moved me-\\nchanically. Muscular 7notion, therefore, when the\\nresult of volition, is no more instinctive, than ner-\\nvous influence, whatever that may be; and breathing\\nis no more instinctive than the circulation of the\\nblood, or the muscular distention and contraction\\nof the material heart. Some of our involuntart/ mus-\\ncular 7notions^ however, are instinctive; as in the\\ncase of sucking.\\nBreathing is partly a mechanical operation, and\\npartly the result of what is usually called the vi-\\ntality of the blood. The principles of breathing are\\nthe mechanical structure of the organs employed\\nin it, and animal life: and the principles of muscular\\nmotions are the mechanical structure of the mus-\\ncles, the influence of the nerves, and the action of\\nour mental efficiency upon them.\\nSleeping, involuntary natural breathing, the cir-\\nculation of the blood, and the motions of the heart,\\nare all dependent on animal life. The motions of\\nthe bones, are dependent on mechanical structures\\nand muscular operation: and the growth of the\\nbones, nails, hair, and indeed of every nerve, mus-\\ncle, sinew, and portion of the human frame, upon\\nvegetable life. As the plants of the earth grow\\nfrom food supplied to them by the earth, air, light.", "height": "3319", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0194.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "Growth of the Body, 185\\nand heatj so the parts of the human body are fed\\nby the blood; and the blood by the aliments suited\\nto the nature of the vital fluid. We thrive and\\ngrow, not from volition, not from instinct, not from\\nmechanical principles, but from the principles of\\nvegetation. As so many capillary tubes in plants\\nconvey the sap to every vegetating portion, so the\\nlacteal vessels take up the chyle prepared for them,\\nand convey it to the thoracic duct, which pours the\\nnew stream of life into the aorta and heart. From\\nthis great reservoir, the arteries take it to every in-\\ncreasing particle of the human frame.\\nQ", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0195.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XVI.\\nSeveral Complex Operations of Man considered. Attention, Obser-\\nvation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contem-\\nplation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nCompounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name givea to\\nseveral successive Conceptions.\\nPupil. Will you describe some of the principal\\ncomplex operations of man?\\nProfessor, Of several actions which are partly\\nmechanical, partly animal, and partly mental, such\\nas voluntary walking, eating, drinking, writing,\\nreading aloud, speaking and the like, we have al-\\nready said enough. Dancing, playing on instruments\\nof music, riding, fighting, and the practice of every\\ndomestic, ornamental, mechanical, or other art, is a\\ncomplex operation,\\nPupih I desire particularly a knowledge of com-\\nplex mental operations.\\nProfessor. Some of the most important complex\\nmental operations, which are described by a single\\nterm in our language, are the following, viz:\\nI. Attention. This is a voluntary effort to con-\\nfine some one or more of our intellectual faculties\\nto some particular object, or objects, for the pur-\\npose of knowing or perceiving something, which\\nwe judge may be known or perceived. Attention", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0196.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "Complex Mental Operations. I8i^\\nalways implies a judgment tiiat by attention some-\\nthing may be perceived or known; together with a\\nvolition^ and a consequent exertion of the faculty of\\nagency upon some other faculty; to keep it in a\\nstate favourable to its appropriate operation; so that\\nat least three simple operations are always denoted\\nby the term attention*\\nLet perception be the object of attention^ for an\\nexample. Attention will then include a judgment,\\nthat something may be either seen, touched, heard,\\nsmelt, or tasted; a volition to exert our faculties to\\nperceive what may present itself to our perception;\\nand an actual agency upon that faculty, so as to\\nhear any sound that may reach the ear, or to see\\nany object exhibited to the eye, or to smell, taste,\\nor touch such things as may come in contact with\\nthe organs of these senses.\\nLet me speak to a man who appears not to hear\\nwhat I say; or if he hears, not to be employing his\\nConception, Judgment, Reasoning, Conscience, or\\nMemory, about my statements; and I will say, at-\\ntend to me. If he then judges, that I have some-\\nthing to utter, and voluntarily exerts himself to\\nhear me, and apprehend my meaning, he performs\\nthe complex mental operation of attention,\\nIL Observation. Attention to any object of\\nperception, is the complex mental operation called\\nobservation. Of course it includes as many simple\\noperations as attention. Hence, a statement of any\\nthing which we have attentively perceived, is an\\nobservation,\\nIII. Reflection, is another complex mental\\nact, which consists in a man s attention to his own", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0197.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "188 Complex Operations,\\nmental operations. If he judges that he may know\\nwhat is transacted in his own mind, and voluntarily\\nexerts himself to remember, be conscious or con-\\nceive of; or judge, reason, or exercise his conscience\\nabout any of his own thoughts, feelings, volitions,\\nor exertions, he is the subject of oriental reflection.\\nIt most commonly denotes the turning again of the\\nattention of the mind to itself, and its own conscious\\noperations.\\nIV. Inquirt, is a voluntary exertion of the mind\\nupon its faculties of conception and judgment, for\\nthe purpose of framing propositions in the form of\\nquestions. You exemplify this complex operation\\nwhenever your mind creates any interrogation which\\nyou put to me.\\nV. Investigation, is the institution of an in-\\nquiry into any subjeci, from the desire or the de-\\ntermination to form some judgment concerning it.\\nVI. Consideration, is a voluntary, and for some\\ntime continued thinking of some operation, or con-\\nduct, in regard to its consequences, or other rela-\\ntions. Of course, consideration implies attention to\\nat least two things; namely, some operation and its\\nconsequences, or other relations.\\nVII. Contemplation, is a voluntary, general,\\nand serious consideration, of a number of objects\\nin their various relations to one another.\\nVIII. Meditation, is the consideration of any\\nobject with a design to form some plan of future\\nconduct, or to be prepared for some future event.\\nIX. Comparison, implies the conception of at\\nleast two things, and of some relative judgment\\nconcerning them. Hence if I compare one apple", "height": "3302", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0198.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "Complex Operations* 189\\nwith another, I conceive of each, and of the mean-\\ning of the thing which I predicate, at least in my\\nwn mind, in relation to them. I say, for instance,\\nthis apple, of which I conceive, is like or unlzke\\nthat, or is larger, or smaller, or better, or worse,\\nthan that, of which I also conceive. Something of\\nthis nature enters into every mental operation of\\ncomparing; so that there is no comparison without\\na conception of each of the things compared, a con-\\nception of the thing mentally predicated in relation\\nto them, and a relative judgment.\\nX. Association or Classification, is a com-\\nplex mental operation, which includes the compa-\\nrison of a plurality of objects, and a determination\\nto arrange, and label them, according to our judg-\\nment of their resemblance, or dissimilitude.^\\nCast into my lap twenty things, and bid me asso-\\nciate, or classify them. I will perform the operation\\nthus. First, I perceive each one of them, in one or\\nmore ways, for I see them all; I handle them all.\\nTo form a class of certain objects, is nothing else but to give the\\nsame name to all those which we judge to be similar; and when out\\nof this class we form two or more, we still do nothing else but choose\\nnew names to distinguish objects which we judge to be different. It\\nis by this artifice alone we reduce our ideas to order, and this artifice\\naccomplishes nothing more; we must add, that it can do nothing but\\nthis. Indeed we should be grossly mistaken, if we imagined that there\\nare in nature species and genera, because there are species and ge-\\nnera in our manner of conceiving. General names are properly the\\nnames of no existing [[external] thing; they only express the views of\\nthe mind, when we consider things under relations of resemblance or\\ndifference. There is no tree in general, no apple-tree in general, no\\npear-tree in general; there are only individuals; therefore there are\\nneither species nor genera in nature. Condillac.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0199.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "190 Association,\\nThen I compare each one of the twenty with every\\nother one of the remaining number. I perceive that\\nfive of them have one colour, which I call red; and,\\nin the operation of comparing, judge that they are\\nlike each other, and unlike the other fifteen in this\\nrespect. I call them, therefore, red things; because\\nthing denotes any object of knowledge, and is the\\nnoDst general term in our language. On comparison^\\nin like manner, Ijudge^ that five others out of these\\ntwenty are blacky five white, and five green, I have\\nof course, by comparing these twenty things to-\\ngether, in relation to their colour, and forming\\njudgments concerning them, in consequence of per-\\nceptions through the eye, divided them into four\\ncompanies, or classes, which I distinguish as classes\\nof red, black, white, and green things. Now I have\\nperformed one work of association: but I attend to\\nthe things still, and make another classification. I\\ngrasp each thing of the twenty in the palm of my\\nhand; and from the perception of touch, compare\\neach, in order, with every other thing, and judge,\\nthat ten of them are in shape like each other, and\\nthe other ten like each other, but unlike the first ten.\\nI give a particular name to each shape, for the sake\\nof distinction, and so call the one round, and the\\nother cubic. Hence I have two classes of things;\\nnamely, cubic and round things. On further com-\\nparison, I judge them all alike in several of their\\nattributes, of a different nature from their colour and\\nshape. They are all elastic, of similar consistency,\\nand I saw them all cut out of the tusk of an ele-\\nphant. I give a name, therefore, to denote this si-\\nmilarity of the things in several attributes, and call", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0200.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "Association. 191\\ntliem all ivory. Hence, should I compare them with\\nother objects around me, that want elasticity, and\\nother attributes which belong to these twenty things,\\nI should say, these are ivory things^ ten of which\\nare round^ and the other ten^ cubic in shape,* and\\nfive of them are in colour red^ five blacky five zdhite^\\nand ^ve g-reen.\\nIn this way we classify or associate all objects\\nof our conception. By this complex operation men\\nhave divided all things into uncreated and created\\nthings; into substances and attributes; and all sub-\\nstances into mind and matter,\\nPupiL And is this that association of ideas of\\nwhich we hear and read much that is unintelligible?*\\nProfessor* An idea you know is nothing but a\\nconception; and all the things of which we conceive\\nwe class in various ways, in consequence of compar-\\nmg them. An association of ideas^ is nothing more\\nthan an association or classification of conceptions.\\nNow our conceptions will admit of as many classes\\nas there are kinds of things of which we conceive.\\nWe have of course conceptions of substances, attri-\\nThe object which we name a tree, a child will call a tree after\\nBs, the very first tree which we shall show it; and this name will be\\nfor it the name of an individual. However, if it be shown another tree\\nit will not wait to ask its name: it will call it a tree, and render this\\nname common to two individuals. It will in the same way render it\\ncommon to three, to four, and at last to all the plants which will ap-\\npear to it 4.0 bear some resemblance of the first trees it had seen. It\\nis naturally induced to generalize, because it is more convenieut t\u00c2\u00bb\\nuse a name which it knows, that to learn a new one. It generalizes,\\ntherefore, without having formed a design of generalizing; nay, without\\nremarking that it generalizes. Co7ic/?Ytoc.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0201.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "192 A Train of Thought.\\nbutes, mind, matter, operations, faculties, relations^\\ndispositions, and the like.\\nPvpiL Are all our classifications acquired?\\nProfessor. Every one of them. Classification is a\\nvoluntary operation.\\nPup iL Of what great use is association of things?\\nProfessor* Should men never classify objects of\\nthought, they could speak of individual things only.\\nBesides, association greatly assists our memory. It\\nis a law of mental operation, that the memory of any\\nthought of a single object should greatly facilitate\\nour recollection of other things, which we have at\\nany former time classed with it.\\nIt is even a law of our mental nature, that mental\\noperations which have been classified merely by a\\nconception of, and judgment concerning, the time of\\ntheir existence, should be easily remembered. Hence,\\nif we can only recollect one mental operation, per-\\nformed at a certain time, we can often readily recol-\\nlect many operations, that very speedily followed\\nit. This is recalling what is called a train of thought.\\nPupil But why should the thought of one object\\nin a class, or of one idea in a train, bring up a multi-\\ntude of other objects, in the same class, or ideas\\nthat were in the mind at, or near, the same. time?\\nProfessor. I can assign no other reason, why these\\nthings should be, than this, that God has so con-\\nstituted our minds that these things are actually ex-\\nperienced by mankind in general. We find these to\\nbe laws of our mental nature; that a train of thought,\\nwhich has once passed through our minds, if volun-\\ntarily or involuntarily commenced again, is easily re-\\ntraced; that we perform any mental operation, and", "height": "3322", "width": "1704", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0202.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "Abstraction, 193\\ntrain of operations, more and more easily, and\\nrapidly, in proportion to the number of times, in\\nwhich we have repeated them; and that the memory\\nof one thing shall frequently occasion the memory\\nof a number of other things, with which it was as-\\nsociated by some work of our own minds, or to\\nwhich it was related by some apprehended circum-\\nstances. These are laws of memory as well as of as-\\nsociation.\\nPupil. There is another very important complex\\nmental operation of man which you have not\\nnamed.\\nProfessor* Abstraction, is the Xlth complex\\nmental operation, of which I designed to speak.\\nIt is intimately connected with classification; and\\nwithout it we should never have any abstract terms,\\nor general zvords^ so that language would consist of\\nnouns, exclusively; and of such nouns only as de-\\nnote individual things.\\nPupil, Well, Sir, what is abstraction?^\\nProfessor, It is a mental process, which includes\\nthe comparison and classification of individual things,\\ntogether with a judgment, that all the things of each\\nclass are alike, at least in some respect; and a de-\\ntermination to employ one name to denote any one,\\nand every one, of the individuals of that class, so\\nfar as we judge it to be like the rest, without re-\\nThere is no man in general. Abstract ideas are therefore no-\\nthing bal- 1enominatiofiS. if we really imaginff! any thitigel.se in ihf^m,\\nwe should reseoable a painter who should obstinately be beiit ou ^t\u00e2\u0080\u00a2\\ning man in general, and who, it is obvious, can never paint but indivi-\\nduals. CondUlac.\\nR", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0203.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "194 Abstracti07u\\ngarding the things in which it may differ from\\nthem.* I will refer to an example just given. Hav-\\ning classified the twenty things cast into my lap, by\\ncomparing them, and judging them, I will to use\\na name that shall designate any one of the ten, that is\\njudged to be of a similar shape, without any present\\nregard to colour, elasticity, or any thing else but\\nshape; and I invent, or adopt, the word ball. Of\\neach and every one of the round things thus classi-\\nfied, I say, this is a ball. Subsequently, if I com-\\npare any other object with any one of these ten\\nballs, and resolve not to attend for the present to\\nany thing appertaining to them but their shape, I\\nshall judge, that the other object is like, or unlike,\\neach of the balls in shape. If I judge it, upon com-\\nparison, to be like them, in this one respect of\\nshape, I shall say, this is a ball too.\\nThe ten things that from similarity of shape\\namong themselves, but dissimilarity to the balls,\\nhave been put into a distinct class, I wish to speak\\nAn abstract ferm is such a name of an individual thing of which we\\nconceive, as we judge equally applicable to any one of many similar indi-\\nviduals. Such a term we could neither form, nor use, did we not volun-\\ntarilj take away, that is, abstract, from our conceptions concerning an\\nindividual, several things which are peculiar to it as an individual. J}\u00c2\u00a3an\\nis an abstract term. In forming it, we abstract from our conceptions of\\nan individual man those which are peculiar to any one, and not com-\\nmon to every other individual being, that we designate by this name.\\nWe abstract, for instance, the colour of the complexion, the size of the\\nlimbs, and th*? expression of the features, as well as the distinction of\\nsex, when we say, God made man upright. Of the meaning of this\\ntertrif man, we conceive, or have an idea. We conceive that it denotes\\nany one individual, in whom certain attributes meet, without regarding\\ncertain other attributes that may be peculiar to some one, and not com-\\nmon to other individuals called meit.", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0204.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "Abstractmi, 195\\nof in relation to their shape, to the exclusion of\\nevery thing else perceived in them, and so I invent,\\nor adopt, the name of cube. By subsequent compari-\\nsons, I am induced to call every other object, which\\nin shape resembles one of these things, a cube;\\nwhatever may be its other attributes. Hence any\\nthing that is judged to be like another thing in\\nshape which we have previously called a ball, we\\ndenominate, when considered in relation to shape\\nalone, a ball.\\nNow put, for the first time, five balls of wood,\\nfive of ivory, five of marble and five of lead into a\\nchild s hat, v/ho by comparing and judging has\\nlearned to call them balls in distinction from all ob-\\njects of a different figure. Let him now be taught\\nto compare these balls in some other respect than\\nthat of figure. Let them be all of the same size,\\nand he will soon judge, that while alike in shape\\nand size, they are not all alike in weight. By\\nhandling them, he will have such perceptions as\\nwill induce the judgment, that five may be put\\ninto one class, from being like each other, and un-\\nlike the other fifteen in weight. In this way, con-\\ntemplating them for somcvtime, he will make four\\nclasses, each of which will consist of five indivi-\\nduals. Now he will want a name to designate each,\\nand every one of the five, as belonging to one of\\nthese four classes. There is, however, no name in\\nour language to designate each of a class of objects,\\nmerely from regard to their specific gravity. We\\nmust therefore turn the attention of the child to\\nother things in which each ball of the five in each\\nclass is like all in its own class, and unlike all in", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0205.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "1 96 Abstraction,\\nthe other classes. The five in one class look\\nalike, and differ m appearance from those of\\neach other class. The five in one class are alike\\nelastic, and the five in each of two other classes\\nare also elastic; but the five in one class are less\\nelastic than the five in the other class. The five\\nin the last class are not elastic. Besides, one\\nclass o\u00c2\u00a3 the balls were cut out of a tree, another\\nout of an elephant s tusk, another out of a gritty\\nblock of a certain kind of stone, and the fourth\\nwere run out of a substance rendered liquid by-\\nheat. The child still wants a name for each thing\\nof each class, that shall serve for every one of five\\nin its own peculiar class. He is taught therefore, to\\ncall the five balls, that have a peculiar appearance,\\ntexture, and degree of elasticity, that were cut out\\nof a tree, wooden balls; and any one of the five is\\na wooden ball. In proceeding thus far, there has\\nbeen no attention paid to the kind of a tree from\\nwhich each wooden ball was cut, nor to its colour,\\nnor to many other of its attributes. When, therefore,\\nthe child sees any other object, that is a ball, and\\nthat has the attributes of wood, he calls it a wooden\\nbalU abstracting, or taking away voluntarily, from\\nhis contemplation of the thing, its size, colour, and\\nall other things, which are not common to every\\nthing in the class of things called wooden balls.\\nThe five balls that have the highest degree of\\nelasticity, with a peculiar texture, appearance, and\\norigin, the child calls ivory balls; and each and every\\none of them an ivory ball. In like manner he ob-\\ntains a notion oi a marble^ and of a leaden ball.\\nPupil, In abstracting, it appears to roe, that we", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0206.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "Abstraction, 197\\nvoluntarily conceive of a part of a complex object,\\nof uhich as a whole we have previously conceived,\\nwith a design to classify that complex object, ac-\\ncording to the part of which we voluntarily con-\\nceive, to the exclusion of its other parts, with ob-\\njects that resemble it in this selected feature, while\\nthey differ from it in others.*\\nProfessor, Every class of things is a complex\\nwhole, constituted by constituent parts which have\\nmore or less resemblance to each other. Mankind\\nfor example, is an abstract term, designed to de-\\nnote all beings collectively which would indivi-\\ndually be called a man^ without any regard had to\\nthose attributes in which one man may differ from\\nWe must here beware of the ambiguity of the word conception^\\nwhich sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, some-\\ntimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. If the word\\nbe taken in the first sense, [as it always should be,] I acknowledge\\nthat every act of the mind is an individual act; the universality there-\\nfore is not in the mind, but in the object, or thing conceived.\\nDfi. Reid.\\nWhat Dr. Reid calls a general conception, is nothing but a complex\\nobject, of whose distinct attributes we have so many distinct concep-\\ntions. We adduce a passage from this author which perfectly expresses\\nour opinion. **I apprehend that we cannot, with propriety, be said to\\nhave abstract and general ideas, either in the popidar or in the philo-\\nsophical sense of that word. In the popular sense an idea is a thought;\\nit is the act of the mind in thinking, or in conceiving any object This\\nact of the mind is always an individual act, and therefore there can be\\nno general idea in this sense. In the philosophical sense, an idea is an\\nimage in the mind, or in the brain, which, in Mr. Locke s system is\\nthe immediate object of thought; in the system of Berkeley and Hume\\nthe only object of thought. I believe there are no ideas of this kind,\\nand therefore no abstract general ideas. Indeed, if there were really-\\nsuch images m the mind, or in the brain, they could not be general,\\nbecause every thing that really exists is an individual. ReiiTs Works,\\nvol. iii. p. 57.\\nR2", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0207.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "198 Abstraction.\\nanother. Ma?i also is an abstract term, formed by\\nvoluntarily conceiving of some things which we have\\nfound in every individual included under the term,\\nwhile we voluntarily exclude from our conception\\nall those minor differences which we discern. One\\nman has a white skin; another, a black skin; one\\nman is tall and another short; one man crooked and\\nanother straight; but voluntarily declining to think\\nof these things, I conceive of a part of each of\\nthese individuals, of the intellectual and bodily fa-\\nculties of each, for instance, and then judging, that\\nthe colour of the skin, the length, crookedness,\\nshortness and straightness of each individual being\\ndisregarded, these are essentially alike in their fa-\\nculties, I resolve to give each of them the name of\\n?nan^ that I may thereby class and distinguish them,\\nfrom beings that do not possess similar attributes.\\nFupiL Is abstraction necessary to classificationf\\nProfessor, Conceive of five objects as perfectly\\nalike in all respects as possible. You still find, that\\nthey are numerically different. If, then, you put\\nthese five things together into one class, and call\\neach apea^ you conceive of each without regard to\\nits numerical difference and individuality. You cannot\\ntherefore classify any two things without abstract-\\ning from the consideration of each its numerical\\ndifference, if you class them from regard to their\\nsimilarity.\\nPupiL Is classif cation essential to abstraction^ so\\nthat we could not abstract without it?\\nProfessor, We might abstract had we never be-\\nfore classified; but the first abstraction would lay\\na foundation for a classification. Should we consi-", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0208.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "Compounding, 199\\nder, for instance, the attribute of a thing without\\nregard to the substance of which it is an attribute,\\nwe should prepare the way for a division of a thing\\ninto its substance and its attributes.\\nPupil. Mr. Locke speaks of compounding or\\ncomposing as a mental operation. Do you call this\\na simple or a complex operation?\\nProfessor, The apothecary compounds^ when he\\nconceives of, and selects different substances, and\\namalgamates them, or grinds or mixes them together;\\nbut of any mental operation of compounding I know\\nnothing, by my own consciousness or memory, or\\nby the intelligible testimony of others; unless it\\nconsists in conceiving of one external thing, and\\nthen of another external thing, and then of the two\\nas being so connected or physically compounded,\\nas to constitute one complex thing; which is nothing\\ndifferent from a simple act of conception, for the\\nobject of an act of conception may be either simple\\nor complex. If it is the union of two things of which\\nwe conceive, this union is a simple object; but if\\nthe thing made by union or composition be the thing\\nconceived of, it is a complex object of conception.\\nFor example, I conceive of the word thought^ then\\nof the word /w//, then of the U7iiting of the two,\\nand then of the compound word thoughtful. Here\\nis no mental operation of compounding distinct\\nfrom four successive, simple acts of conception.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0209.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XVII.\\nImprovement and Injury of the Original Faculties of the Mind.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nThey have their Infantile state. Exercise and Discipline the chief\\nmeans of their Improvement. Insanity, a state of mind resulting\\nfrom some Injury. Dreaming.\\nPupil, Are the original faculties of the mind in\\nman capable of any improvement?\\nProfessor. Every one of them is capable of im-\\nprovement by exercise and discipline. We may vo-\\nluntarily employ one faculty, so as to render many\\nof its important operations easy from habit; or we\\nmay so neglect to employ it, that its operations will\\nbe comparatively feeble and difficult^ In infancy\\nand youth the mental faculties are commonly in a\\nfeeble, infantile state; and they acquire strength\\nwith years.\\nPupil. We have a striking example in the facul-\\nty of memory, of the possibility of the improvement\\nof our original faculties. I have observed, that per-\\nsons who exercise the memory a good deal, commit\\nany thing to memory, so as to be able to recollect\\nit at pleasure, much more easily and rapidly than\\nothers who have exercised it less, and than they\\nthemselves did at first. A child who has learned to\\nrecite one stanza, will subsequently commit two", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0210.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "Mental Improvement, 201\\nstaiizas with more ease, and in less time than it did\\none.\\nProfessor. Many persons complain of the weak-\\nness and treachery of their memory. They are for-\\ngetful, and often cannot recollect, because they have\\nsuffered the faculty to become feeble for the want\\nof exercise.\\nPupil Do we not find that some men whose\\nother faculties are very energetic, have bad me-\\nmories?\\nProfessor, We do; and we attribute it to the\\nfact, that they have exercised their other faculties\\ngreatly to the neglect of this. These very men,\\nhowever, will generally remember those operations\\nof mind which delight them. Hence a philosophical\\nand argumentative man, will remember a chain of\\nreasoning, when he cannot recollect the precise\\nwords in which he heard it delivered. He is ac-\\ncustomed to remember reasonings; while others\\nwho have employed themselves in remembering\\nand reciting fine speeches, will be able to reiterate\\nan elegant paragraph which they have heard but\\nonce, without the variation of a word.\\nPupil, Dr. Johnson, I think, remarked, concern-\\ning those who complain of the want of memory,\\nthat no man forgets the person xvho kicked his\\nshins^\\nProfessor, It is no less true of the other faculties\\nthan of memory, that they are improved by exer-\\ncise. In this respect, there is a strong analo: be-\\ntween the members of the body, and ihe constitu-\\nenics of the mind. If any one limb is kept in a state\\nof inactivity, it becomes feeble and rigid; but those", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0211.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "202 Mental Improvement,\\nparts of the human frame that are exercised most\\nregularly, become most powerful. If men would\\nreason more, they would be more capable of reason-\\ning: if they would exercise their judgment more,\\nthey would be better judges. Even the faculty of\\nperception, and the bodily organs of it, are render-\\ned more accurate and capable, by being judiciously\\nexercised.\\nPupiL Is it the part of wisdom to improve one\\nor two faculties exclusively, or even pre-eminently?\\nProfessor* No better general rule can be given,\\nthan to employ and improve all mental faculties,\\nhabits, and dispositions, with due regard to their\\nrelative importance. A mere man of memory is a\\ncontemptible being; but the man who has all his\\nfaculties improved by use, is more likely to obtain\\nthat happiness which may result from all the con-\\nstituent parts of his nature.\\nWe are in danger of exercising none of our fa-\\nculties, except those of conception and feelings too\\nmuch; unless it be from a wrong educatione From\\neducation some almost exclusively employ the me-\\nmory; but if destitute of any injurious, extraneous\\ninfluence, men will commonly indulge themselves\\ninordinately in that work of the conception, which\\nwe call imagination, and in feeling alone. Con-\\nscience and judgment are most commonly exercised\\ntoo unfrequently.\\nPupiL Are our feelings capable of much im-\\nprovement?\\nProfessor, It is the business of a physician, par-\\nticularly, to prescribe for the regulation and im-\\nprovement of our SENSATIONS, becausc they depend", "height": "3322", "width": "1726", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0212.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "Mental ImprovemefiU 203\\n\u00c2\u00a9n the state of our bodily health and organs, our\\nfood, our drink, the state of the weather, the quali-\\nty and temperature of the atmosphere, the stimulus\\nwhich we take, and all the various things which\\nare used as medicines. The deaf, dumb, and blind\\nfrequently evince how delicate our perceptions and\\nconsequent sensations may be rendered by use and\\nconstant attention. T^e senses which any of these\\npersons retain, are generally more acute than the\\nsame are in those who enjoy the five.\\nOur emotions are dependent on previous mental\\noperations; and by improving the quality and the\\nenergy of them, our emotions may be improved.\\nWe find by experience, that certain thoughts are fol-\\nlowed by certain affections; and if we would cherish\\nthe affections, and frequently enjoy them, we must\\nvoluntarily exert ourselves to reiterate the thoughts.\\nIf we find that certain thoughts are productive of\\ncertain inordinate passions, which are not ultimate-\\nly productive of happiness to us, we should exert\\nourselves to avoid the reiteration of the thoughts\\nwhich occasioned them: and the best way to expel\\none class of thoughts, is voluntarily to attend to\\nsome other subject.\\nWe may acquire such self-command over our\\nown thoughts, as to attend to any one particular\\nsubject, to the exclusion of all others, for a consi-\\nderable time.\\nOur feelings frequently need suppression; and\\nthe habitual indulgence of them renders us habitu-\\nally sensitive in an unreasonable degree. We may\\navoid the force of many feelings, and the existence", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0213.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "204 Mental Injuries.\\nof others, by immediately recurring to subjects\\nwhich ordinarily excite a different class of feelings.\\nThose mental operations which require the most\\nexertion, lazy people are the least inclined to per-\\nform, and those who would attain to eminence\\nshould determine by all means to render the per-\\nformance of them habitual.\\nMen are naturally averse to close attention to any\\nsubject, and extremely reluctant to study, but habits\\nmay be formed, that will render idleness, or fre-\\nquent revery, burthensome, and regular application\\nto business, a source of moderate, but continued\\ngratification.\\nPupil May not the mental faculties be injured\\nor improved by physical means?\\nProfessor. Every faculty of the mind, while re-\\nsident in the body, is in a greater or less degree\\naffected by the state of the body. Excessive eating\\nand drinking will for a time benumb all the facul-\\nties; and any one of them, by excessive application\\nmay be impaired. Insane persons exhibit numerous\\ninstances of injury done to the mental facul6es, by\\nthe imprudent and excessive use of one or more of\\nthem.\\nPup iU What is insanity?\\nProfessor. It is a state of mind in which the\\nment ril faculties do not operate in a natural manner.\\nPupiL What are the most common mental causes\\nof insanity?\\nProfessor. An excessive indulgence of some af-\\nfection or passion, is the most common cause of\\npermanent madness. Inebriation is a very common\\ncause of temporary madness, that not unfrequently", "height": "3311", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0214.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "Breaming, 2\u00c2\u00a95\\nterminates in idiocy; which when superinduced may\\nbe called the paralysis of all the faculties but that\\nof perception.\\nPupil. But what do you say of a perfect natural\\nidiot?\\nProfessor, In my opinion, for I have no certainty\\non the subject, a natural fool never had a human\\nimmortal soul, any more than the brutes have.\\nPupil What sort of a soul has a brute?\\nProfessor, I will endeavour to answer that ques-\\ntion, in a future conversation on comparative men-\\ntal science.\\nPupil. Well, Sir, is not dreaming a species of\\ninsanity?\\nProfessor, Any mental operation performed while\\none is asleep, is called dreaming. There is some\\nresemblance between the state of an insane person\\nand that of a sleeping person who dreams: still\\ndreaming is not raving. When one dreams, he does\\nnot generally think himself asleep; and w^hen one\\nis insane, he is very prone to think all other men\\nare more mad than himself. In a state of insanity,\\nsome of the faculties seem to be dormant, while\\nothers perform strange operations: and in sleep the\\nfaculties of the dreamer are not all equally active,\\nnor equally consistent in their activity.\\nPupil. Do we always dream, when asleep?\\nProfessor. We do not always remember what\\nour minds have been doing, when we were asleep;\\nnor can we recollect any considerable portions of\\nour mental actions done while we are awake. That\\nwe do not remember to have been at all times con-\\nscious of thinking, feeling, willing, and mentally\\nS", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0215.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "206 Dreaming.\\nexerting ourselves, when asleep, is therefore no\\nproof that we have not been. That our minds are\\nalways active, when we are asleep, or in a swoon,\\nI cannot affirm; and must therefore leave you to\\nform your own opinion, from such facts as may\\noccur to you.\\nPupil. In what respects, particularly, do the\\nmental operations of a man sleeping, differ from\\nthose performed by him when awake?\\nProfessor. A sleeper generally perceives nothing\\nthrough his eyes, ears, nose, or organs of taste,*\\nwhile he has various. perceptions through the organs\\nof touching, and many sensations in consequence of\\nthem. A sleeper is more prone to exercise his fa-\\nculty of conception in matters of imagination, than\\nwhen he is awake, and often experiences very lively\\nemotions in consequence of them. A dreamer per-\\nforms many operations, which he judges, at the\\ntime, to be acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tast-\\ning, and touching; but when he awakes, he is in-\\nduced to judge, that the objects which he perceived\\nhad no real existence, or else were perceived with-\\nout the intervention of bodily organs.\\nSometimes a sleeper judges his conceptions to be\\nperceptions; and this mistake no wakeful person\\nmakes, unless he is insane. The insane often make\\nit. Memory, Judgment, Reasoning, Consciousness,\\nConscience, Feeling, the Will, and the faculty of\\nAgencv are also frequently operative during sleep;\\nbut this peculiarly distinguishes dreaming from\\nour waking operations; that our voluntary agency\\nupon our bodies is in a great measure interrupted.\\nDreamers commonly cannot speak, and perform", "height": "3308", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0216.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "Dr earning. 2\u00e2\u0082\u00ac)7\\nother corporal actions which they will, and exert\\nthemselves, to perform.\\nThere are some exceptions to this general rule\\nconcerning the inefficiency of our agency upon our\\nbodily members while asleep; for one who walks in\\nhis sleep, called a somnambulist^ has power over his\\nambulatory members, and sometimes over his arms\\nand hands, while his eyes and ears are locked up in\\nsleep.\\nPupil, In sound sleep, then, the agency of man\\nover his bodily organs and members is in a great\\nmeasure suspended; so that his thinking and wil-\\nling and efficiency do not produce their ordinary\\nexternal effects.\\nThe judgment, moreover, is given to error, in\\nsupposing that we perceive, and by our bodily\\nmembers perform, what we neither actually per-\\nceive, nor do, through our bodily members. These\\nseem to be the principal differences between a\\ndreamer, and a wakeful moral agent.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0217.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XVIlf.\\nComparative Mental Science.\\nProfessor, The professor of anatomy frequently\\ninstructs his pupils in the structure of the human\\nframe by comparing it with the frames of different\\nanimals. I have pursued something of a similar\\ncourse with you, in teaching the science of the hu-\\nman mind. I have exhibited to you something of\\nthe peculiarities of minds not human, that you\\nmight better understand the operations of the hu-\\nman soul. Now let me ascertain what you remem-\\nber of comparative mental science.\\nPupil, Any systematic arrangement of what we\\nknow concerning different kinds of minds, when com-\\npared with each other, is comparative mental science.\\nOf the minds, or souls, of any other beings than\\nmen we know but little, because we have very few\\nmeans of becoming acquainted with them. Of our\\nown mental acts we are conscious, and have me-\\nmory, but these faculties afford us no aid in the\\ninvestigation upon M hich we are entering.\\nProfessor, What then are our sources .f know-\\nledge concerning souls superior or inferior to that\\nof man?\\nPupil, Reasoning from external indications of\\nmental operations, and Kevelation, are our only", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0218.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "Comparative Mental Science* 209\\nsources of knowledge, concerning the souls of brutes\\nand angels; and concerning the Uncreated Mind.\\nProfessor. What is a spirit?\\nPupil, Any thinking, sensitive, voluntary agent,\\nthat is destitute of a material body, is a spirit. The\\nname however is sometimes used as synonymous\\nwith mind and soul Besides, tnind and spirit are\\nused by some writers to denote Consciousness, Con-\\nsience, Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, and Me-\\nmory collectively, to the exclusion of Perception\\nby the senses. Feeling, Volition and Agency, which\\nthey denote by the word 50m/. Hence some would\\nsay, that men have both souls and spirits^ but that\\nbrutes have only souls.\\nWe use, however, mind and soul as synonymous,\\naccording to the general custom of mankind, and as\\ncomprehensive of the whole substance in any indi\u00c2\u00b0\\nvidual that thinks, feels, wills, and voluntarily or\\ninstinctively acts; while we use spirit to denote this\\nsame substance in a state of separation from a ma-\\nterial body. God is a spirit^ without any bodily\\nform.\\nProfessor. What faculties has the Divine Mind?\\nPupil, All the faculties of the human mind, with\\nthe addition of a faculty of Prescience. His faculty\\nof Perception, however, does not operate through\\nany bodily organs; nor have we any reason to judge\\nthat his faculty of Feeling ever is the subject of\\nany sensations.\\nProfessor. Man, it seems then was formed after\\nthe divine mental image; and although he wants\\nprescience^ yet he is able to acquire such judgment\\nand prudence as supply its place^ so far as it is de-\\nS2", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0219.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "210 The Divme Mind.\\nsirable for creatures, to possess any attribute of\\ncharacter resembling it.\\nWhat are some of the principal differences be-\\ntween the Divine, and a human, Mind?\\nPupil, The first is uncreated, and self-existent;\\nthe last is created, and dependent on the first, for\\nthe commencement and continuance of its exist-\\nence. The Divine Mind is infinite and immutable;\\nbut the human is finite and mutable. God is eternal^\\nor without beginning and without end; but man is\\nonly everlastings or without a termination to his\\nmental duration. The Agency of God can produce\\nsubstances where nothing before existed; but the\\nagency of man has only a very limited power over\\na few things which already exist.\\nThe Divine Mind is perfectly and immutably\\ngood in all its operations; but the human is sus-\\nceptible of both good and evil.\\nProfessor, You cannot proceed much further,\\nin this direction, without entering upon the science\\nof theology; which would be contrary to our present\\ndesign.\\nLet us leave the doctrine of spirits, and attend to\\nsouls inferior to those denominated human. What\\ndo you know concerning the souls of brutes?\\nPupiL Divine Revelation says little of them.\\nIt incidentally remarks, however, that the soul of a\\nbrute goeth downward, at death; by which it is ge-\\nnerally understood, that at death the soul of a brute\\nis annihilated.\\nOur knowledge concerning the souls of animals\\ninferior to man is derived from induction and ana-\\nlogy. We observe the external motions of animals,", "height": "3311", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0220.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "Of the Souls of Brutes. 211\\nand attribute them to such mental faculties in them,\\nas we know are in ourselves the efficient causes of\\nsimilar external motions.\\nProfessor, Do all animals possess the ten mental\\nfaculties which are common to men?\\nPupil. No animal inferior to man possesses them\\nall.\\nProfessor. Is any one of our faculties possessed\\nby every animal?\\nPupiL The faculty of Feeling is; and every\\ncreature destitute of this, is denominated a vegeta-\\nble, a mineral, or something besides an animal^ and\\nis destitute of a soul.\\nProfessor. You will find also, I think, that one\\nother faculty is common to all. What do you\\nunderstand by a brute?\\nPupiL Any animal inferior to the human animal.\\nProfessor. Have brutes all the various y^^/j/z^* of\\nmankind?\\nPupiL In general, brutes have no other feelings\\nthan those denominated sensations. That many of\\nthem have emotions I am not confident.\\nProfessor, Have all hr nits- perception?\\nPupiL The greater part of them have; and their\\nsensations seem to be consequent upon them as in\\nmen. It is however, very questionable whether some\\nbrutes have not sensations immediately in conse-\\nquence of some impression on their bodies. The\\nsnail, the oyster, the clam, and several similar ani-\\nmals, appear to feel^ but give only faint indications\\noi perception.\\nProfessor. Let me state to you a fact. Oysters,\\nif placed with the concave part of their shells", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0221.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "212 Of the Souls of Brutes.\\ndownwards, on your cellar floor, and sprinkled\\nwith salt water, will, at the time of tide when they\\nusually feed, open their pearly lips and drink in\\ntheir accustomed beverage. If you enter the cellar\\nwhen they are feeding and make a noise, or if you\\nenter with a lighted candle, they will close their\\nmouths in a moment. Do they not hear, then; or\\nperhaps hear and see both?\\nPupil, It would be, perhaps, rash to affirm that\\nthey do not hear; but to me it seems most probable,\\nthat light and sound acting upon them, produce cer-\\ntain sensations, whereupon they instinctively exert\\ntheir faculty of agency in closing their wide mouths.\\nHence we attribute to instinct all their operations.\\nTheyy^^/, and act from sensation without any con-\\nception or volition. Instinct in some few animals\\ninferior to man, I would say therefore, consists in\\nsuch a relative disposition of the faculties of sensa-\\ntion and agency that certain actions immediately\\nfollow certain sensations.\\nProfessor. Well, I shall not oppose your theory,\\nuntil 1 have some positive proof to offer in favour\\nof the notion that they see and hear. That they do\\nsomething like it, I have already shown. As for\\nconception or volition, none ever saw any indica-\\ntions of either in them. We may remark, that the\\nsoul of an oyster, which is destitute of the power\\nof leaving its native place, is the most diminutive\\nsoul of which we have any knowledge. The snail^\\nthe clam, and other similar creatures, besides the\\npower of sensation are capable of IochI motion. The\\nclam, upon a perception or as you think a sensation\\nfrom the noise of a foot approaching it on the sand", "height": "3322", "width": "1707", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0222.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "Of the Souh of Brutes. 213\\nbeach, will settle iisclf to the bottom of its hole.\\nSensation and agency if not perception and agency-\\nare so connected in its soul, that certain actions in-\\nstinctively follow certain sensations.\\nPupil Sensation and instinctive agency^ to a cer-\\ntain extent, it seems then, that all animals, even\\nclams and oysters, have in common xvith man.\\nProfessor. Which of our five senses are enjoyed\\nby most animalsf\\nPupiL All animals I believe are capable of taste\\nand touch; so that even oysters have some per-\\nceptions. Many animals are able to smell in addition\\nto the two former. The greater number of animals\\nhave all the five modes of perceiving which men\\nhave.\\nProfessor. Have brutes any faculty of under-\\nstanding?\\nPupil. Some brutes appear to conceive of objects\\nof sense, and of these things alone. A horse which\\nhas been accustomed to company and then is se-\\nparated, will, for a day or two, whinny after his\\ncompanion. If he did not conceive of him, when he\\ndoes not perceive him, it seems incredible that he\\nshould manifest uneasiness at his absence. A horse,\\na dog, an elephant, and most of the larger tribes of\\nanimals, discover frequently design. There can be\\nno design without some degree of understanding.\\nThe objects of conception to brutes are, however,\\nfew, when compared with those presented to the\\nhuman mmd. We have no evidence that they ever\\nconceive of any of the things denoted by abstract\\nterms.\\nProfessor. Have brutes judgment?", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0223.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "214 Of the Souls of Brutes,\\nPupil, I think they never conceive of a proposi-\\ntion, and consequently never have any operations\\nthat may be properly denominated judgments. None\\nof them I believe reason. None of them have con-\\nscience.\\nProfessor. Are any of them conscious of their\\nown mental operations?\\nPupil. If they are, I have no proof of it.\\nProfessor. Do brutes possess a faculty of me-\\nmory?\\nPupil. Some of them appear to, in an inferior\\ndegree. They have what may be called recognitioUy\\nor an act of memory resulting from the repetition\\nof any particular perception or conception, but not\\nrecollection. Recognition is a species of remem-\\nbrance, that probably is never exercised but in con-\\nsequence of perceiving again what has been before\\nperceived; or conceiving again that of which the\\nbrute has before conceived.\\nIf the horse does not remember any former per-\\nceptions of a companion, why should he whinny\\nfor him: if a cow does not remember some of her\\nnotions of an absent calf, why should she bellow\\nafter it, as she will for two or three days after it\\nhas been concealed from her? The memory of\\nbrutes may be co-extensive with their perceptions,\\nand their conceptions of perceptible objects.\\nProfessor. Have any of the brutes a faculty of\\nvolition?\\nPupil. Some of them appear to conceive of a\\nfew external actions, and to will the performance of\\nthem. My horse when weary of confinement in the\\nstable, would unhook the door and get out, so that", "height": "3311", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0224.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "Of the Souls of Brutes. ^15\\nI was obliged to substitute a padlock instead of a\\nhook. He then gnawed the padlock until he found\\nit useless. Now unless he conceived of getting out,\\nand willed to get out, I cannot assign any reason\\nfor his ingenious exertions to do it.\\nA fox, one should think, must conceive and will\\nthe performance of his actions, when he takes wool\\ninto his mouth, and gradually immerses his body,\\nbeginning with the hinder part, until he has driven\\nthe vermin on him to the wool, when he abandons\\nthe wool to the stream.\\nIf dogs and elephants have conception, and they\\ncertainly indicate design, then they may conceive\\nof something to be done, and will to perform it.\\nMost animals, however, appear to act exclusively\\nfrom instinct, instead of conceptions, motives, and\\nvolitions.\\nProfessor, You have already said, that brutes\\npossess the faculty of feeling, which is the subject\\nof sensa\u00c2\u00ab^ions. They have in many instances sym-\\npathetic sensations^ which very nearly resemble\\nthe affection of pity. A few animals discover feel-\\nings, which if they do not deserve the name of emo-\\ntions, are sensations of the highest order. The dog\\nand horse, frequently manifest something like love\\nand gratitude. An elephant discovers long cherished\\nresentment; and most animals in some circumstances\\nevince /ear.\\nPupil, To what extent have brutes the power of\\nagency?\\nProfessor, Their faculty of agency operates, I\\nbelieve, exclusively upon their bodily organs, so as\\nto produce their accustomed instinctive or voluntary", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0225.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "216 Of the Souls of Brutes,\\nactions. If they have conception, I have no proof\\nthat they exert any instinctive or voluntary agency\\nin conceiving of any thing. They give no evidence\\nof voluntary exertions of memory. They have no\\nconscience, judgment, or reason, upon which their\\nefficiency could be exerted. Have they many m-\\nstinctive operations?\\nPupil, I know of no brute that laughs. Several\\nof them cry, and moan; two species of them hiss;\\nand the greater part of them have all the other in-\\nstinctive operations which are common to the hu-\\nman family, besides many that are peculiar to them-\\nselves.\\nProfessor, Do brutes form habits of acting?\\nPupil, They are generally as expert in this bu-\\nsiness as the human species of animals. They seem\\nnaturally disposed to imitation; and some of them\\nvery soon learn to imitate every thing which they\\nperceive, so far as they have faculties for perform-\\ning similar actions. The horse forms habits of tra-\\nvelling, and the parrot of imitating the human\\nvoice; while every tribe of brutes form other habits\\nadapted to their nature and state.\\nA disposition to imitate is a natural attribute of\\nall animals that have perception.\\nA disposition to consort with its own species, is\\nalso common to most animals; and most animals\\nare gregarious, or have a disposition not only for\\na companion, but for considerable company.\\nProfessor, No aninal, however, finds society so\\nessential to its happiness as man; and none is capa-\\nble of deriving such benefit or injury from it.\\nHave brutes any complex mental operations?", "height": "3322", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0226.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "Of the Souls of Brutes. 2ir\\nPupih None.\\nProfessor. Are the mental faculties of brutes ca-\\npable of improvement or deterioration?\\nPupil. Their mental faculties may be injured by-\\nabuse received from man; but their original facul-\\nties are capable of little improvement; and that chief-\\nly by physical agency on their bodies. Their habits\\nmay be strengthened or eradicated in some in-\\nstances; and their dispositions may be somewhat\\naffected by the manner of their treatment.\\nProfessor. Man appears to hold a middle rank\\nbetween superior and inferior souls. When we con-\\nsider the faculties, instincts, habits, and powers of\\nbrutes, in all their variety, we must exclaim, Horn\\nmanifold are thy works Lord^ God^ Ahnig-htyJ but\\nwhen we turn to man, A single human mind ex-\\ncels them all!", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0227.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "CONVERSATION XIX.\\nlt\u00c2\u00a3capitulation of the Principal Doctrines taught in the preceding\\nConversations.\\nProfessor. Anyone who would have his pupil\\nmaster of any science, must repeatedly question\\nhim, and require a summary of the knowledge\\nwhich he has acquired. I wish you thoroughly to\\nimderstand the science of which we have treated;\\nI therefore will patiently hear from you a recapitu-\\nlation. Begin, if you please.\\nPupil. Science signifies any such mental opera-\\ntion as is denominated knowledge. The word is de-\\nrived from scio^ to know.\\nAny act of consciousness^ or of memory^ and any\\nact of constitutional^ intuitive^ or inductive judgment^\\nis called knowledge.\\nA particular science is any systematic arrangement\\nof knowledge about any particular subject.\\nMental Science is our knowledge of mind sys-\\ntematically arranged.\\nThe Science of the Human Mind is our know-\\nledge of the mind of man systematically arranged.\\nThe consciousness which mankind have of their\\nown mental operations, is the foundation upon which\\nthis science is erected.", "height": "3322", "width": "1716", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0228.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "Recapitulation^ 219\\nAny thing which subsists as the subject of inhe-\\nrent attributes, is a substance.\\nA substance is an object not of perception^ but of\\nconception.\\nThe nature of a substance is known only by its\\ninherent attributes.\\nAll the substances with which we are acquainted,\\nmay be divided into two classes; the first of which\\nincludes all material^ and the second, all immaterial\\nor mental substances.\\nAny portion of a material substance is called\\nmatter; and any immaterial substance, A mind.\\nAny number of organized particles of matter is\\ncalled A BODY.\\nA mind connected with a body is called a soul.\\nA mi72^ subsisting without a body, or considered\\nas separated from it, is called a spirit.\\nSome of the inherent attributes of matter, by\\nwhich it is distinguished from mind, are solidity,\\nextension, inertness, .mobility, divisibility, and in*\\nsensibility.\\nThe inherent attributes of a mind are its faculties\\nof thinking, feeling, volition and efficiency.\\nMan, in- his present stkte, is a complex being,\\nconstituted by two kinds of substances, matter and\\nmind.\\nThe material part of man is so organized as to\\nconstitute the human body.\\nThe human mind, and the human body of the\\ncomplex being man, are, to a certain extent, mu-\\ntually dependent; and in other respects, severally\\nindependent, on each other.\\nAny thing done by the miri is called a mental", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0229.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "220 Recapitulatioiu\\noperation; any thing done by the body, a bodily ope-\\nration; and any operation performed by the co-ope-\\nration of a man s mind and body, is ascribed to the\\ncomplex being, or person, having two constituent\\nsubstances in his nature.\\nProfessor* Give an example.\\nPupiL Reasoning is a purely mental operation;\\ninvoluntary breathings a purely bodily operation:\\nand reading aloud^ an operation neither of the mind\\nnor of the body, but of the man, performed through\\nthe co-operation of his two constituent substances.\\nProfessor* Well: proceed in your didactic man-\\nner.\\nPupiL Any operation performed by any single\\nfaculty of man, is called a simple operation: and any\\nwork of man, however it may be designated, by a\\nsingle term^ that requires the co-operation of two or\\nmore faculties, is denominated a complex operation.\\nSimple and complex mental operations, are such\\nas are performed by one, or more of the mental fa-\\nculties.\\nAny thing done by the mind, or body, or both,\\nis an action; and any action performed in conse-\\nquence of a volition to do it, is called an exertion^\\nor an exercise^ or an act of efficiency indiscrimi-\\nnately.\\nAn attribute is any thing attributed tOy or predi-\\ncated of, an other.\\nAll attributes of substances may be divided into\\nsuch as are inker ent^ or such as are extraneous and\\nmcidentaU\\nInherent attributes are those which we conceive", "height": "3306", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0230.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "Recapitulation* 221\\nof as inhering in the substance to which they belong,\\nand which are essential to its existence.\\nAll other attributes are extraneous and incidental^\\nfor the substance to which they appertain may be\\nconceived of as existing without them.\\nMankind are conscious of performing ten distinct\\nkinds of mental operations.\\nWe constitutionally judge, that every effect must\\nhave an adequate cause.\\nMan is the efficient cause of all his own mental\\noperations.\\nThat in the original constitution of the human\\nmind, whereby it performs any simple operation, is\\na mental faculty, for performing that operation.\\nWithout the requisite faculty for performing each\\nof its own mental operations, the human mind would\\nnot be an adequate cause of the effects which it\\nactually produces.\\nAn inherent faculty^ is that, in the original con-\\nstitution of any substance, whereby it is capable of\\nany operation.\\nThe human mind has ten inherent faculties^ which\\nare called The Perception; The Consciousness; The\\nConception^ or Faculty of Understanding; The\\nJudgment; The Memory; The Faculty of Reason-\\nings or Induction; The Conscience; The Hearty or\\nThe Faculty of Feeling; The Will, or the Faculty\\nof Volition; and The Efficiency^ or The Faculty of\\nAgency,\\nMen when awake and sane, perceive external\\nobjects through the instrumentality of their bodily\\norgans of sense.\\nOm perceptions may be divided mKofve classes;\\nT2", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0231.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "2^ Recapitulation.\\nviz. those of seeing, those of hearing, those of\\nsmelling, those of tasting, and those of touching.\\nMen are conscious of nothing but their own pre-\\nsent mental operations.\\nMen conceive of everv object of knowledge. Our\\nperceptions and the things perceived, our concep-\\ntions and the objects of which we conceive, are all\\nof them objects of conception.\\nAny ideay or notion of a thing, is a conception of\\nit.\\nAll ideas, or conceptions, are simple operations of\\nthe mind, so that there are neither complex nor ab-\\nstract ideas in any mind.\\nAbstract terms are names invented to designate\\nany one thing in a genus, species, order, province,\\nor class of any description, which contains many\\nthings similar to it, in its distinguishing characteris-\\ntics, but dissimilar in some other attributes.\\nThese terms are called abstract, because we con-\\nceive of each and every thing denoted by them, as\\nif they were abstracted from some of the attributes\\nwhich belong to them as individuals, but not to all\\nof the same class, that are respectively designated\\nby the same general name.\\nProfessor, Give an example.\\nPupil. I conceive of the meaning of the term\\nquadruped. I take away from each and every indi-\\nvidual, when I consider it as a quadruped, every\\nother attribute than this, that it has four legs* Qua-\\ndruped is an abstract term. When I call a horse, a\\ncow, an ox, a hare, a tiger, a leopard, severally, a\\nquadruped, I abstract voluntarily, from my concep-\\ntion of each of these animals, their colour, size,", "height": "3302", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0232.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "Recapitulation, 223\\nsex, covering, propensities, and all other things in\\nwhich they differ from each other; while I conceive\\nof each as an animal having four legs, in which they\\nall agree. Instead of having an abstract idea, I con-\\nceive of a name, that is capable of being applied to\\nmany individual animals, and of describing each in\\nrespect to one of its most distinguishing charac-\\nteristics.\\nProfessor* I shall divide your discourse into\\nseveral lessons by asking you a question now and\\nthen. Proceed in your summary of mental science.\\nPupil, The conception of images of things, es-\\npecially of things that we judge to have no real\\nexistence, is called imagination; and the faculty of\\nconception when thus employed, is called the ima-\\ngination.\\nDiscernment^ Comprehension^ Apprehension^ and\\nIntuition are other principal acts oi conception.\\nThe object of every act of Judgment^ is some\\nproposition expressed or understood.\\nAll acts of judgment are such as result either\\nfrom our constitution, or from reflection and expe-\\nrience. The former are called constitutional^ the lat-\\nter ttc^wfr^^ judgments.\\nFor our constitutional judgments we can give no\\nother reason than this, that God has so formed the\\nminds of men that they naturally form such judg-\\nments.\\nSome constitutional judgments are called intuitive^\\nbecause they immediately result from intuition. If\\nwe judge a proposition to be true so soon as we\\nunderstand the meaning of it, it is an intuitive\\njudgment.", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0233.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "224 Recapitulation,\\nEvery proposition, which from bare intuition is\\njudged to be true, is called a self-evident propo-\\nsition.\\nAny proposition which men constitutionally judge\\nto be true, is denominated an axiom.\\nOur acquired judgments are those which we learn\\nto form from reflection, experience, reasoning, and\\nattention to testimony.\\nBelieving^ or an act offaith^ is an acquired judg-\\nment; which has some proposition, which is the\\nsubject of testimony, for its object.\\nMemory h2is ioY its object in every mind, some\\nof the past mental operations of that mind.\\nAn act of memory consequent on a volition to\\nemploy the memory upon the subject, is called re-\\ncollection or reminiscence. Any act of memory not\\nimmediately resulting from voluntary exertion, is\\ncalled remembrance.\\nLogic is the science of reasoning. Reasoning is\\nthe act of inferring a conclusion from some con-\\ntemplated premises.\\nAxioms, or self-evident propositions, lie at the\\nfoundation of every system of reasoning.\\nWe must argue from things known to things un-\\nknown.\\nEvery act of perfect reasoning includes three\\npropositions; the two first of which are called pre-\\nmises^ and the last the conclusion^ or inference.\\nThese three propositions, so connected as to frame\\nan argument, are called a syllogism.\\nWhen one of the premises is generally admitted,\\nand so well known, that it is not stated, the argu-", "height": "3310", "width": "1785", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0234.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "Recapitulation. 225\\nmerit, consisting of two propositions, is called an\\nenthymeme.\\nAny act of reasoning in which the premises are\\nunquestionably true, and the conclusion necessarily\\nfollows from them, is called a demonstration.\\nIn probable reasonings^ the premises are proba-\\nbly^ but not certainly true.\\nAll our reasonings may be considered as either\\nanalogical or synthetical^ according as we reason\\nfrom effects to causes, or from causes to effects.\\nOur inferred judgments we often reverse, from\\ndiscovering some defect in the premises whence\\nthey were deduced; but our constitutional judg-\\nments are never changed.\\nProfessor. Your next lesson is concerning Con-\\nscience, which is often called the Moral Sense,\\nPupil. Conscience always has for its object some\\nmoral laxv^ moral agent^ or moral action.\\nA moral law is any rule of conduct laid down for\\nthe governnjent of an intelligent, sensitive, volun-\\ntary agent, or efficient.\\nA physical law is any general observation con-\\ncerning any uniform physical operations, descriptive\\nof those operations.\\nA physical action is any operation of an involun-\\ntary agent upon mind or matter.\\nA m.oral action^ as distinguished from a physical\\naction, is any action of an intelligent, sensitive, vo-\\nluntary agent, that is either required or forbidden,\\nand so to he judged of, by some moral law.\\nIn the judgment of the moral law, which God\\nhas given man, those actions of man, and those", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0235.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "226 Recapitulation.\\nalone, which God has either required or forbidden,\\narc moral actions.\\nBreathing, and the circulation of the blood, for\\ninstance, are neither required nor forbidden by the\\nlaw of our Maker, because they are natural opera-\\ntions; and they are neither morally good nor mo-\\nrally evil. Nevertheless, they are operations predi-\\ncable of man; and of man too, consisting of body\\nand mind, for so soon as the mind is separated\\nfrom the body, breathing and the circulatioii of the\\nblood cease.\\nConscience either approves or -disapproves of some-\\nthing of a moral character.\\nNo operation of conscience can be opposed to a\\nman s present judgment: but many are the instances\\nin which the dictates of conscience are hostile to\\nour present feelings.\\nWe have now treated of seven kinds of mental\\noperations, any one of which is called a thought.\\nWe have spoken of seven mental faculties, that\\nperform these seven kinds of thinkings which are\\ndenominated together The Understanding,\\nThe Understanding therefore, besides a faculty\\nof understandings includes six other intellectual ia--\\nculties.\\nProfessor* Very good: now pass to the Faculty\\nof Feeling,\\nPupil, The operations of The Heart are always\\nconsequent upon some previous thought.\\nOur feelings may be divided into two great\\nclasses; the first of which contains all our sensa-\\ntions; and the second, all our emotio7is.", "height": "3322", "width": "1704", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0236.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "Recapttulatio7u 227\\nOur three most powerful sensations are called\\nappetites.\\nEvery sensation is consequent upon some opera-\\ntion of the faculty oi perception*\\nOur emotions are either affections or passions;\\nand are consequent upon some other kind of thinking\\nthan that called perception*\\nThe Will is that mental faculty by which a man\\nchooses, resolves, or determines.\\nAny act of the will is called a volition*\\nEvery volition has for its object some contem-\\nplated action^ which a man conceives himself to be\\ncapable of performing.\\nAny thought or feelings or complication of\\nthoughts or feelings, or of both, that is the true\\nreason why any volition is performed, is the motive\\nto that volition.\\nNo rational man ever had a volition without\\nsome motive to that volition.\\nAny one who has a volition without some motive\\nof which he himself conceives, is either a fool or a\\nmadman*\\nThe immediate consequcQce of volition is the\\nexertion of our faculty of agency, so far as we have\\nthe power of doing what we will.\\nThe mental faculty of effciency operates directly\\nupon some of the mental faculties, and indirectly\\nupon others.\\nIt is the province of man s effciency to perform\\nwhat he wills.\\nSo far as any one can do this, he has the power\\nof voluntary agency.\\nMan s power of voluntary efficiency is finite, and", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0237.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "228 Conclusioti*\\ncircumscribed by such laws as his Creator has been\\npleased to establish.\\nThus we have briefly surveyed the operations of\\nman s ten mental faculties, which are the inherent,\\nand essential attributes of his mind.\\nProfessor. The incidental attributes of the human\\nmind have been treated of in such a concise manner\\nin the preceding conversations, that a recapitulation\\nis needless. Permit me to express a hope, that you\\nwill frequently re-consider the doctrines you have\\nlearned, and grow in knowledge through eternity.\\nTHE ENB.", "height": "3311", "width": "1688", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0238.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0239.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0240.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0241.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0242.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0243.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "^v. O. if\\ns t-\\ni --1\\ne^\\n^V f\\n0\\no5 \u00e2\u0080\u00a2^i\\n.0 K\\n.0\\n.A\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^c.\\nK%-\\n0(\\nDeacidified using the Bookkeeper process\\nNeutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide\\nTreatment Date: Oct. 2004\\nPreservationTechnologies\\nA WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION\\n1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive\\nCranberry Township. PA 16066\\n(724)779-2111", "height": "3316", "width": "1631", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0244.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "m\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0c\\ni\\n.A^\\n^^^/T^^\\nJ\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2ft I j^ ^A?.\\nA 1\\noo\\nr^. \\\\g rr\\nxx^\\ncP^.^!r^.%\\nr^X iV.,\\na\\ns\\n^0\\nR\\nv^^\\nOo.\\no c\\nC", "height": "3328", "width": "1767", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0245.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3525", "width": "2023", "jp2-path": "conversationsons00elye_0246.jp2"}}