{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2893", "width": "1797", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "Class -_\\nBook_-_.\u00c2\u00a3ilS", "height": "2802", "width": "1742", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2811", "width": "1677", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2812", "width": "1626", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2811", "width": "1612", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "iHr. iFifilic fi |)i6toncaI WioxU,\\nTHE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA, with some account of\\nAncifiit America and the Spanish Conquest. With Maps.\\n7S//t Thousand. 2 vols, crown Svo, $4.00.\\nOLD VIRGINIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS. qth\\nThousand. 2 vols, crown 8vo, 1^4.00.\\nTHE BEGINNINGS OF NE\\\\V ENGLAND, or the\\nI uritan Theocracy in its Relations to Civil and Religious\\nLiberty. 33th J hoiisand. Crown 8vo, 52.00.\\nIllustrated Edition. Containing Portraits, Maps, Facsimiles,\\nContemporary Views, Prints, and other Historic Materials.\\n8vo, ^4.00.\\nTHE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. i8th Tliojisand. 2\\nvols, crown 8vo, $4.00.\\nIllustrated Edition. 4th Thousand. Containing Portraits,\\nMaps, Facsimiles, Contemporary Views, Prints, and other\\nHistoric Materials. 2 vols. 8vo, $8.00.\\nTHE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY.\\n1783-1789. zoth Thousand. Crown 8vo, $2.00.\\nIllustrated Editioti. 4th Thousand. Containing Portraits,\\nMaps, Facsimiles, Contemporary Views, Prints, and other\\nHistoric Materials. Svo, $4.00.\\nTHE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. In Riverside Library\\n(or Young People. i6mo, 75 cents.\\nCIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.\\nCoNSIt)EriED WITH SOME REFERENCE TO ITS (JriGINS. 1 1 8th\\nThousand. Crown Svo, $1.00, ttct.\\nHISTORY 9F THE UNITED STATES FOR SCHOOLS.\\nWith Topical Analysis, Suggestive Questions, and Directions\\nfor Teachers, by Frank A. Hill. I4(jth Thousand. i2mo,\\n$1.00, tiet.\\nHOUGHTON, MIFFLIN CO.\\nBoston and New York.\\nAMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS, viewed f om the Stand-\\npoint of Universal History. Eifth Thousatid. i2mo, $1.00.\\nHari er Brothers, New York.", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF\\nAMERICAN HISTORY\\nI 783-1 789\\nBY\\nJOHN FISKE\\nA^7\\nI am uneasy and apprehensive, more so than during the war.\\nJay to Washington, ^une 27, 1786.\\nTHIRTIETH THOUSAND\\nBOSTON AND NEW YORK\\nHOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY\\n1899", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "Copyright, 1888,\\nBy JOHN FISKE.\\nAll riyhts reserved.\\nThe Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S A\\nElectrotyped and Printed by U. O. Houghton Co.", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "To\\nMY DEAR CLASSMATES,\\nFRANCIS LEE HIGGINSON\\nAND\\nCHARLES CABOT JACKSON,\\nDEDICATE THIS BOOK.", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "PBEFAOE.\\nThis book contains the substance of the course\\nof lectures given in the Old South Meeting-House\\nin Boston in December, 1884, at the Washington\\nUniversity in St. Louis in May, 1885, and in the\\ntheatre of the University Club in New York in\\nMarch, 1886. In its present shape it may serve\\nas a sketch of the political history of the United\\nStates from the end of the Revolutionary War to\\nthe adoption of the Federal Constitution. It makes\\nno pretensions to completeness, either as a summary\\nof the events of that period or as a discussion of\\nthe political questions involved in them. I have\\naimed especially at grouping facts in such a way as\\nto bring out and emphasize their causal sequence,\\nand it is accordingly hoped that the book may prove\\nuseful to the student of American history.\\nMy title was suggested by the fact of Thomas\\nPaine s stopping the publication of the Crisis,\\non hearing the news of the treaty of 1783, with the\\nremark, The times that tried men s souls are\\nover. Commenting upon this, on page 55 of the\\npresent work, I observed that so far from the crisis\\nbeing over in 1783, the next five years were to be", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "vi PREFACE.\\nthe most critical time of all. I had not then seen\\nMr. Trescot s Diplomatic History of the Admin-\\nistrations of Washington and Adams, on page 9\\nof which he uses almost the same words It must\\nnot be supposed that the treaty of peace secured\\nthe national life. Indeed, it would be more correct\\nto say that the most critical period of the country s\\nhistory embraced the time between 1783 and the\\nadoption of the Constitution in 1788.\\nThat period was preeminently the turning-point\\nin the development of political society in the west-\\nern hemisphere. Though small in their mere di-\\nmensions, the events here summarized were in a re-\\nmarkable degree germinal events, fraught with\\nmore tremendous alternatives of future welfare or\\nmisery for mankind than it is easy for the imagina-\\ntion to grasp. As we now stand upon the thresh-\\nold of that mighty future, in the light of which all\\nevents of the past are clearly destined to seem\\ndwindled in dimensions and significant only in the\\nratio of their potency as causes as we discern how\\nlarge a part of that future must be the outcome of\\nthe creative work, for good or ill, of men of Eng-\\nlish speech we are put into the proper mood for\\nestimating the significance of the causes which de-\\ntermined a century ago that the continent of Nortji\\nAmerica should be dominated by a single powerful\\nand pacific federal nation instead of being par-\\ncelled out among forty or fifty small communities,\\nwasting their strength and lowering their moral", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. vii\\ntone by perpetual warfare, like tlie states of an-\\ncient Greece, or by perpetual preparation for war-\\nfare, like the nations of modern Europe. In my\\nbook entitled American Political Ideas, viewed\\nfrom the Standpoint of Universal History, I have\\ntried to indicate the pacific influence likely to be\\nexerted upon the world by the creation and main-\\ntenance of such a political structure as our Fed-\\neral Union. The present narrative may serve as\\na commentary upon what I had in mind on page\\n133 of that book, in speaking of the work of our\\nFederal Convention as the finest specimen of\\nconstructive statesmanship that the world has ever\\nseen. On such a point it is pleasant to find one s\\nself in accord with a statesman so wise and noble\\nas Mr. Gladstone, whose opinion is here quoted on\\npage 223.\\nTo some persons it may seem as if the years\\n1861-65 were of more cardinal importance than\\nthe years 1783-89. Our civil war was indeed an\\nevent of prodigious magnitude, as measured by any\\nstandard that history affords and there can be\\nlittle doubt as to its decisiveness. The measure of\\nthat decisiveness is to be found in the completeness\\nof the reconciliation that has already, despite the\\nfeeble wails of unscrupulous place-hunters and un-\\nteachable bigots, cemented the Federal Union so\\npowerfully that all likelihood of its disruption\\nmay be said to have disappeared forever. When\\nwe consider this wonderful harmony which so soon", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "Viii PREFACE.\\nhas followed the deadly struggle, we may well be-\\nlieve it to be the index of such a stride toward the\\nultimate pacification of mankind as was never\\nmade before. But it was the work done in the\\nyears 1783-89 that created a federal nation capa-\\nble of enduring the storm and stress of the years\\n1861-65. It was in the earlier crisis that the pliant\\ntwig was bent and as it was bent, so has it grown\\nuntil it has become indeed a goodly and a sturdy\\ntree.\\nCambridge, October 10, 1888.", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "CONTEl^TS.\\nCHAPTER I.\\nRESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nFall of Lord North s ministry 1\\nSympathy between British Whigs and the revolutionary\\nparty in America 2\\ntt weakened the Wliig party in England 3\\nCharacter of Lord Shelburne 4\\nPolitical instability of the Rockingham ministry 5, 6\\nObstacles in the way of a treaty of peace 7, 8\\nOswald talks with Franklin 9-11\\nGrenville has an interview with Vergennes 12\\nEffects of Rodney s victory 13\\nMisunderstanding between Fox and Shelburne 14\\nFall of the Rockingham ministry 15\\nShelburne becomes prime minister 16\\nDefeat of the Spaniards and French at Gibraltar 17\\nFrench policy opposed to American interests 18\\nThe valley of the Mississippi Aranda s prophecy 19\\nThe Newfoundland fisheries 20\\nJay detects the schemes of Vergennes 21\\nAnd sends Dr. Vaughan to visit Shelburne 22\\nJohn Adams arrives in Paris and joins with Jay in insisting\\nupon a separate negotiation with England 23, 24\\nThe separate American treaty, as agreed upon:\\n1. Boundaries 25\\n2. Fisheries commercial intercourse 26\\n3. Private debts 27\\n4. Compensation of loyalists 28-32\\nSecret article relating to the Yazoo boundary 33\\nVergennes does not like the way in which it has been done 33\\nOn the part of the Americans it was a great diplomatic\\nvictory 34", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "X CONTENTS.\\nWhicli tlie commissioners won by disregarding the instruc-\\ntions of Congress and acting on their own responsibility 35\\nThe Spanish treaty 36\\nThe French treaty 37\\nCoalition of Fox with North 38-42\\nThey attack the American treaty in Parliament 43\\nAnd compel Shelbnrne to resign 44\\nWhich leaves England without a government, while for\\nseveral weeks the king is too angry to appoint ministers 44\\nUntil at length he succumbs to the coalition, which pres-\\nently adopts and ratifies the American treaty 45\\nThe coalition ministry is wrecked upon Fox s India Bill 46\\nConstitutional crisis ends in the overwhelming victory of\\nPitt in the elections of May, 1784 47\\nAnd this, although apparently a triumph for the king, was\\nreally a death-blow to his system of personal govern-\\nment 48,49\\nCHAPTER II.\\nTHE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nCessation of hostilities in Anaerica 50\\nDeparture of the British troops 51\\nWashington resigns his command 52\\nAnd goes home to Mount Vernon 53\\nHis legacy to the American people 54\\nThe next five years were the most critical years in Amer-\\nican history 55\\nAbsence of a sentiment of imion, and consequent danger of\\nanarchy 56, 57\\nEuropean statesmen, whether hostile or friendly, had little\\nfaith in the stability of the Union 58\\nFiilse historic analogies 59\\nInfluence of railroad and telegraph upon the perpetuity of\\nthe Union 60\\nDifficulty of travelling a hundred years ago 61\\nLocal jealousies and antip.atliies, an inheritance from prime-\\nval savagery 62, 63\\nConservative character of the American Revolution 64\\nState governments remodelled assemblies continued from\\ncolonial times 65\\nOrigin of the senates in the govenior s council of assistants 66\\nGovernors viewed with suspicion 67", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. XI\\nAnalogies with British institutions 68\\nThe judiciary 69\\nRestrictions upon suffrage 70\\nAbolition of primogeniture, entails, and manorial privileges 71\\nSteps toward the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade 72-75\\nProgress toward religious freedom 76, 77\\nChurch and state in Virginia 78, 79\\nPersecution of dissenters 80\\nMadison and the Religious Freedom Act o 81\\nTemporary overthrow of the church 82\\nDifficulties in regard to ordination; the case of Mason\\nWeems 83\\nOrdination of Samuel Seabury by non-jurors at Aberdeen 84\\nFrancis Asbury and the Methodists 85\\nPresbyterians and Congregationalists 86\\nRoman Catholics 87\\nExcept in the instance of slavery, all the changes described\\nin this chapter were favourable to the union of the\\nstates 88\\nBut while the state governments, in all these changes, are\\nseen working smoothly, we have next to observe, by\\ncontrast, the clumsiness and inefficiency of the federal\\ngovernment 89\\nCHAPTER ni.\\nTHE LEAGUE OP FRIENDSHIP.\\nThe several states have never enjoyed complete sovereignty 90\\nBut in the very act of severing their connection with Great\\nBritain, they entered into some sort of xmion 91\\nAnomalous character of the Continental Congress 92\\nThe articles of coirfederation they sought to establish a\\nleague of friendship between the states 93-97\\nBut failed to create a federal government endowed with\\nreal sovereignty 98-100\\nMUitary weakness of the government 101-103\\nExtreme difficulty of obtaining a revenue 104, 105\\nCongress, being unable to pay the army, was afraid of it 106\\nSupposed scheme for making Washington king 107\\nGreene s experience in South Carolina 108\\nGates s staff officers and the Newburgh address 109\\nThe danger averted by Washing-ton 110, 111\\nCongress driven from Philadelphia by mutinous soldiers 112 r", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "xii CONTENTS.\\nThe Commutation Act denounced in New England 113\\nOrder of the Cincinnati 114-117\\nReasons for the diead which it inspired 118\\nCongress finds itself unahlo to carry out the provisions of\\nthe treaty with Great Britain 119\\nPersecution of the loyalists 120, 121\\nIt was especially severe in New York l22\\nTrespass Act of 1784 directed against the loyalists 123\\nCharacter and early career of Alexander Hamilton 124-126\\nThe case of Rutgers v. Waddington 127, 128\\nWholesale emigration of Tories 129, 130\\nCongress unable to enforce payment of debts to British\\ncreditors 131\\nEngland retaliates by refusing to surrender the fortresses\\non the northwestern frontier 132, 133\\nCHAPTER IV.\\nDRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nThe barbarous superstitions of the Middle Ages concerning\\nti-ade were still rife in the eighteenth century 134\\nThe old theory of the uses of a colony 135\\nPitt s unsuccessful attempt to secure free trade between\\nGreat Britain and the United States 136\\nShip-building in New England 137\\nBritish navigation acts and orders in council directed against\\nAmerican commerce 138\\nJohn Adams tried in vain to negotiate a commercial treaty\\nwith Great Britain 139, 140\\nAnd could see no escape from the difficulties except in sys-\\ntematic reprisal 141\\nBut any^ such reprisal was impracticable, for the several\\nstates imposed conflicting duties 142\\nAttempts to give Congress the power of regulating com-\\nmerce were unsuccessful 143, 144\\n-j And the several states began to make commercial war upon\\none another 145\\n_^ Attempts of New York to oppress New Jersey and Con-\\nnecticut 146\\nRetaliatory measures of the two latter states 147\\nX The quarrel betrween Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the\\npossession of the valley of Wyoming 148-150", "height": "2847", "width": "1610", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. xin\\nThe quarrel between New York and New Hampshire oyer\\nthe possession of the Green Mountains 151-153\\nFailure of American diplomacy because European states\\ncould not tell whether they were dealing with one nation\\nor with thirteen 154, 155 f~\\nFailure of American credit John Adams begging in Hol-\\nland 156, 157\\nThe Barbary pirates 158\\nAmerican citizens kidnapped and sold into slavery 159\\nLord Sheffield s outrageous pamphlet 160\\nTripoli s demand for blackmail 161\\nCongress unable to protect American citizens 162\\nFinancial distress after the Revolutionary War 163, 164\\nState of the coinage 165\\nCost of the war in money 166\\nRobert Morris and his immense services 167\\nThe craze for paper money 168\\nAgitation in the southern and middle states 169-171\\nDistress in New England 172\\nImprisonment for debt 173\\nRag-money victorious in Rhode Island; the Know Ye\\nmeasures 174-176\\nRag-money defeated in Massachusetts the Shays insurrec-\\ntion 177-181\\nThe insurrection suppressed by state troops 182\\nConduct of the neighbouring states 183\\nThe rebels pardoned 184\\nTimidity of Congress 185, 186\\nCHAPTER V.\\nGERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nCreation of a national domain beyond the Alleghanies 187, 188\\nConflicting claims to the western territory 189\\nClaims of Massachusetts and Connecticut 189, 190\\nClaims of New York 190\\nVirginia s claims 191\\nMaryland s novel and beneficent suggestion 192 1\\nThe several states yield their claims in favour of the United\\nStates 193, 194\\nMagnanimity of Virginia 195\\nJefferson proposes a scheme of government for the north-\\nwestern territory 196", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "xiv CONTENTS.\\nNames of the proposed ten states 197\\nJeffei-son wishes to prohibit slavery in the national domain 198\\nNorth Carolina s cession of western lands 199\\nJohn Sevier and the state of Franklin 200, 201\\nThe nortliwestern territory 202\\nOrigin of the Ohio company 203\\nThe Ordinance of 1787 204-206\\nTlieory of folk-land upon which the ordinance was based 207\\nSjiain, hearing of the secret article in the treaty of 1783,\\nloses her temper and threatens to shut ujj the Missis-\\nsippi Eiver 208, 209\\nGardoqui and Jay 210\\nThreats of secession in Kentucky and New England 211\\nWashington s views on the political importance of canals\\nbetween east and west 212\\nHis far-sighted genius and self-devotion 213\\nMaryland confers with Virginia regarding the navigation of\\nthe Potomac 214\\nThe Madison-Tyler motion in the Virginia legislature 215\\n-Convention at Annapolis, Sept. 11, 1786 216-7x\\nHamilton s address calling for a convention at Philadelphia 217\\nThe impost amendment defeated by the action of New\\nYork last ounce upon the camel s back 218-220\\nSudden changes in popular sentiment 221\\nThe Federal Convention meets at Philadelphia, May, 1787 222\\nMr. Gladstone s opinion of the work of the convention 223\\nThe men who were assembled there 224, 225\\nCharacter of James Madison 226, 227\\nThe other leading members 228\\nWashington chosen president of the convention 229\\nCHAPTER VI.\\nTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nWhy the proceedings of the convention were kept secret for\\nso many years 230\\nDifficulty of the problem to be solved 231\\nSymptoms of cowardice repressed by Washington s impas-\\nsioned speech 232\\nThe root of all the difficulties the edicts of the federal\\ngovernment had operated only upon states, not upon\\nindividuals, and therefore could not be enforced with-\\nout danger of war 233-235", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. XV\\nTlie Virginia plan, of wliieh Madison was the chief author,\\noffered a radical cure 236\\nAnd was felt to be revolutionary in its character 237-239\\nFundamental features of the Virginia plan 240, 241\\nHow it was at first received 242\\nThe House of Representatives must be directly elected by\\nthe people 243\\nQuestion as to the representation of states brings out the\\nantagonism between large and small states 244\\nWilliam Paterson presents the New Jersey plan; not a\\nradical cure, but a feeble palliative 245\\nStruggle between the Virginia and New Jersey plans 246-249\\nThe Comiectieut compromise, according to which the na-\\ntional principle is to prevail in the House of Repre-\\nsentatives, and the federal principle in the Senate,\\nmeets at first with fierce opposition 250, 251\\nBut is at length adopted 252\\nAnd proves a decisive victory for Madison and his methods 253\\nA few irreconcilable members go home in dudgeon 254\\nBut the small states, having been propitiated, are suddenly\\nconverted to Federalism, and make the victory complete 255\\nVague dread of the future west 255\\nThe struggle between pro-slavery and anti-slavery parties\\nbegan in the convention, and was quieted by two com-\\npromises 256\\nShould representation be proportioned to wealth or to popu-\\nlation 257\\nWere slaves to be reckoned as persons or as chattels 258\\nAttitude of the Virginia statesmen 259\\nIt was absolutely necessary to satisfy South Carolina 260\\nThe three fifths compromise, suggested by Madison, was a\\ngenuine English solution, if ever there was one 261\\nThere was neither rhyme nor reason in it, but for all that,\\nit was the best solution attainable at the time 262\\nThe next compromise was between New England and South\\nCarolina as to the foreign slave-trade and the power of\\nthe federal government over commerce 263\\nGeorge Mason calls the slave-trade an infernal traffic 264\\nAnd the compromise offends and alarms Virginia 265\\nBelief in the moribund condition of slavery 266\\nThe foundations of the Constitution were laid in compromise 267\\nPowers granted to the federal government 268\\nUse of federal troops in suppressing insurrections 269", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "xvi CONTENTS.\\nVarious federal powers 270\\nProvision for a federal city under federal jurisdiction 271\\nThe Federal CongTess might compel the attendance of mem-\\nbers 272\\nPowers denied to the several states 272\\nShould the federal government be allowed to make its\\npromissory notes a legal tender in payment of debts\\npowerful speech of Gouverneur Morris 273\\nEmphatic and unmistakable condemnation of paper money\\nby all the leading delegates 274\\nThe convention refused to grant to the federal government\\nthe power of issuing inconvertible paper, but did not\\nthink an express prohibition necessary 275\\nIf they could have foreseen some recent judgments of the\\nsupreme court, they Avould doubtless have made the\\nprohibition explicit and absolute 276\\nDebates as to the federal executive 277\\nSherman s suggestion as to the true relation of the execu-\\ntive to the legislature 278\\nThere was to be a single chief magistrate, but how should\\nhe be chosen 279\\nObjections to an election by Congress 280\\nEllsworth and King suggest the device of an electoral col-\\nlege, which is at first rejected 281\\nBut afterwards adojjted 282\\nProvisions for an election by Congress in the case of a failure\\nof choice by the electoral college 283\\nProvisions for counting the electoral votes 284\\nIt was not intended to leave anything to be decided by the\\npresident of the Senate 285\\nThe convention foresaw imaginary dangers, but not the real\\nones 286\\nHamilton s opinion of the electoral scheme 287\\nHow it has actually worked 288\\nIn this part of its work the convention tried to copy from\\nthe British Constitution 289\\nIn which they supposed the legislative and executive de-\\npartments to be distinct and separate 290\\nHere they were misled by Montesquieu and Blackstone 291\\nWhat our government would be if it were really like that\\nof Great Britain 292-294\\nIn the British government the executive department is not\\nseparated from the legislative 295", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS. xvii\\nCirciimstances whieh obscured the true aspect of the case a\\ncentury ago 296-298\\nThe American cabinet is analogous, not to the British cabi-\\nnet, but to the privy council 299\\nThe federal judiciary, and its remarkable character 300-301\\nProvisions for amending the Constitution 302\\nThe document is signed by all but three of the delegates 303\\nAnd the convention breaks up 304\\nWith a pleasant remark from Franklin 305\\nCHAPTER VII.\\nCROWNING THE WORK.\\nFranklin lays the Constitution before the legislature of\\nPennsylvania 306\\nIt is submitted to Congress, which refers it to the legisla-\\ntures of the thirteen states, to be ratified or rejected by\\nthe people in conventions 307\\nFirst American parties, Federalists and Antifederalists 308, 309\\nThe contest in Pennsylvania 310\\nHow to make a quorum .311\\nA war of pamphlets and newspaper squibs 312, 313\\nEnding in the ratification of the Constitution by Delaware,\\nPennsylvania, and New Jersey 314\\nRejoicings and mutterings 315\\nGeorgia and Connecticut ratify 316\\nThe outlook in Massachusetts 317, 318\\nThe Massachusetts convention meets 319\\nAnd overhauls the Constitution clause by clause 320\\nOn the subject of an army Mr. Nason waxes eloquent 321\\nThe clergymen oppose a religious test 322\\nAnd Rev. Samuel West argues on the assumption that all\\nmen are not totally depraved 323\\nFeeling of distrust in the mountain districts 324\\nTimely speech of a Berkshire farmer 325, 326\\nAttitude of Samuel Adams 326, 327\\nMeeting of mechanics at the Green Dragon 327\\nCharges of bribery 328\\nWashington s fruitfid suggestion 329\\nMassachusetts ratifies, but proposes amendments 330\\nThe Long Lane has a turning and becomes Federal Street 331\\nNew Hampshire hesitates, but Maryland ratifies, and all\\neyes are turned upon South Carolina 332", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "xviii CONTENTS.\\nObjections of Rawlins Lowndes answered by Cotesworth\\nPiuckney 333\\nSouth Carolina ratifies the Constitution 334\\nImportant effect upon Virginia, where thoughts of a south-\\nern confederacy had been entertained 335, 336\\nMadison and Marshall prevail in the Virginia convention,\\nand it ratifies the Constitution 337\\nNew Hampshire had ratified four days before 338\\nRejoicings at Philadelphia riots at Providence and Albany 339\\nThe struggle in New York 340\\nOrigin of the Federalist 341-343\\nHamilton wins the victory, and New York ratifies 344\\nAll serious anxiety is now at an end the laggard states,\\nNorth Carolina and Rhode Island 345\\nFirst presidential election, January 7, 1789 Washington is\\nunanimously chosen 346\\nWhy Samuel Adams was not selected for vice-president 347\\nSelection of John Adams 348\\nWashington s journey to New York, April 16-23 349\\nHis inauguration 350", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERI-\\nCAN HISTORY.\\nCHAPTER I.\\nRESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nThe 20th of March, 1782, the day which wit-\\nnessed the \u00c2\u00a3aU of Lord North s ministry, was a\\nday of good o^ien for men of English race on both\\nsides of the Atlantic. Within two years from this\\ntime, the treaty which established the independence\\nof the United States was successfnlly negotiated at\\nParis and at the same time, as part of the series\\nof events which resulted in the treaty, there went\\non in England a rapid dissolution and reorganiza-\\ntion of parties, which ended in the overwhelming\\ndefeat of the king s attempt to make the forms of\\nthe constitution subservient to his selfish purposes,\\nand established the liberty of the people upon a\\nbroader and sounder basis than it had ever occu-\\npied before. Great indignation was expressed at\\nthe time, and has sometimes been echoed by Brit-\\nish historians, over the conduct of those Whigs\\nwho never lost an opportunity of expressing their\\napproval of the American revolt. The Duke of\\nRichmond, at the beginning of the contest, ex-", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "2 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\npressed a hope that the Americans might succeed,\\nSympathy be- ^Gcause they were in the right. Charles\\nwwkL and^lhe ^^x spokc of General Howe s first vic-\\nplrty Amer- ^o^T tlic terrible news from Long\\nIsland. Wraxall says that the cele-\\nbrated buff and blue colours of the Whig party\\nwere adopted by Fox in imitation of the Conti-\\nnental uniform but his unsupported statement is\\nopen to question. It is certain, however, that in\\nthe House of Commons the Whigs habitually al-\\nluded to Washington s army as our army, and\\nto the American cause as the cause of liberty\\nand Burke, with characteristic vehemence, declared\\nthat he would rather be a prisoner in the Tower\\nwith Mr. Laurens than enjoy the blessings of free-\\ndom in company with the men who were seeking\\nto enslave America. Still more, the Whigs did all\\nin their power to discourage enlistments, and in\\nvarious ways so thwarted and vexed the govern-\\nment that the success of the Americans was by\\nmany people ascribed to their assistance. A few\\ndays before Lord North s resignation, George On-\\nslow, in an able defence of tlie prime minister, ex-\\nclaimed, Why have we failed so miserably in this\\nwar against America, if not from the support and\\ncountenance given to rebellion in this very House\\nNow the violence of party leaders like Burke\\nand Fox owed much of its strength, no doubt, to\\nmere rancorousness of party spirit. But, after\\nmaking due allowance for this, we must admit that\\nit was essentially based upon the intensity of their\\nconviction that the cause of English liberty was\\ninseparably bound up with the defeat of the king s", "height": "2857", "width": "1691", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 3\\nattempt upon the liberties of America. Looking\\nbeyond the quarrels of the moment, they preferred\\nto have fx-eedom guaranteed, even at the cost of\\ntemporary defeat and partial loss of empire. Time\\nhas shown that they were right in this, but the ma-\\njority of the people could hardly be expected to\\ncomprehend their attitude. It seemed to many\\nthat the great Whig leaders were forgetting their\\ntrue character as English statesmen, and there is\\nno doubt that for many years this was\\nIt weakened\\nthe chief source of the weakness or the the wings in\\nEngland.\\nWhig party. Sir Gilbert Elliot said,\\nwith truth, that if the Whigs had not thus to a\\nconsiderable extent arrayed the national feeling\\nagainst themselves, Lord North s ministry would\\nhave fallen some years sooner than it did. The\\nking thoroughly understood the advantage which\\naccrued to him from this state of things and with\\nthat shortsighted shrewdness of the mere political\\nwire-puller, in which few modern politicians have\\nexcelled him, he had from the outset preferred to\\nfight his battle on constitutional questions in Amer-\\nica rather than in England, in order that the na-\\ntional feeling of Englishmen might be arrayed on\\nhis side. He was at length thoroughly beaten on\\nhis own ground, and as the fatal day approached he\\nraved and stormed as he had not stormed since the\\nspring of 1778, when he had been asked to entrust\\nthe o^overnment to Lord Chatham. Like the child\\nwho refuses to play when he sees the game going\\nagainst him, George threatened to abdicate the\\nthrone and go over to Hanover, leaving his son to\\nget along with the Whig statesmen. But presently", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "i RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nhe took heart again, and began to resort to the\\nsame kind of political management which had\\nserved him so well in the earlier years of his reign.\\nAmong the Whig statesmen, the Marquis of Rock-\\ningham had the largest political following. He\\nrepresented the old Whig aristocracy, his section\\nof the party had been first to urge the recognition\\nof American independence, and his principal fol-\\nlowers were Fox and Burke. For all these reasons\\nhe was esj)ecially obnoxious to the king. On the\\nother hand, the Earl of Shelburne was,\\nCharacter of\\nLord shei- in a ccrtam sense, the political heir of\\nburne.\\nLord Chatham, and represented princi-\\nples far more liberal than those of the Old Whigs.\\nShelburne was one of the most enlightened states-\\nmen of his time. He was an earnest advocate\\nof parliamentary reform and of free trade. He\\nhad paid especial attention to political economy,\\nand looked with disgust upon the whole barbaric\\nsystem of discriminative duties and commercial\\nmonopolies which had been so largely instrumental\\nin brincfino- about the American Revolution. But\\nbeing in these respects in advance of his age. Lord\\nShelburne had but few followers. Moreover, al-\\nthough a man of undoubted integrity, quite ex-\\nempt from sordid or selfish ambition, there was a\\ncynical harshness about him which made him gen-\\nerally disliked and distrusted. He was so suspi-\\ncious of other men that other men were suspicious\\nof him so that, in spite of many admirable qual-\\nities, he was extremely ill adapted for the work\\nof a party manager.\\nIt was doubtless for these reasons that the kinff,", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 5\\nwhen it became clear that a new government must\\nbe formed, made up his mind that Lord Shelburne\\nwould be the safest man to conduct it. In his\\nhands the Whig power would not be likely to grow\\ntoo strong, and dissensions wovild be sure to arise,\\nfrom which the king might hope to profit. The\\nfirst place in the treasury was accordingly offered\\nto Shelburne and when he refused it, and the king\\nfound himself forced to appeal to Lord Rocking-\\nham, the manner in which the bitter pill was taken\\nwas quite characteristic of George III. He re-\\nfused to meet Rockingham in person, but sent all\\nhis communications to him through Shelburne,\\nwho, thus conspicuously singled out as the object\\nof royal preference, was certain to incur the dis-\\ntrust of his fellow ministers.\\nThe structure of the new cabinet was unstable\\nenough, however, to have satisfied even such an\\nenemy as the king. Beside Rockingham himself,\\nLord John Cavendish, Charles Fox, Lord Keppel,\\nand the Duke of Richmond were all Old Whigs.\\nTo offset these five there were five New Whigs,\\nthe Duke of Grafton, Lords Shelburne, Camden,\\nand Ashburton, and General Conway; while the\\neleventh member was none other than the Tory\\nchancellor, Lord Thurlow, who was kept over from\\nLord North s ministry. Burke was made paymas-\\nter of the forces, but had no seat in the cabinet.\\nIn this curiously constructed cabinet, the prime\\nminister. Lord Rockingham, counted for ponticai insta\\nlittle. Though a good party leader, he RockinVlm\\nwas below mediocrity as a statesman,\\nand his health was failing, so that he could not at-", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "6 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\ntend to business. Tlie master spirits were the two\\nsecretaries of state, Fox and Shelburne, and they\\nwrangled perpetually, while Thurlow carried the\\nnews of all their quai rels to the king, and in cabi-\\nnet meetings usually voted with Shelburne. The\\nministry had not lasted five weeks when Fox began\\nto jjredict its downfall. On the great question of\\nparliamentary reform, which was brought up in\\nMay by the young William Pitt, the government\\nwas hopelessly divided. Shelburne s party was in\\nfavour of reform, and this time Fox was found upon\\nthe same side, as well as the Duke of Richmond,\\nwho went so far as to advocate universal suffrage.\\nOn the other hand, the Whig aristocracy, led by\\nRockingham, were as bitterly opposed as the king\\nhimself to any change in the method of electing\\nparliaments and, incredible as it may seem, even\\nsuch a man as Burke maintained that the old sys-\\ntem, rotten boroughs and all, was a sacred part of\\nthe British Constitution, which none could handle\\nrudely without endangering the country But in\\nthis moment of reaction against the evil influences\\nwhich had brought about the loss of the American\\ncolonies, there was a strong feeling in favour of re-\\nform, and Pitt s motion was only lost by a minority\\nof twenty in a total vote of three hundred. Half\\na century was to elapse before the reformers were\\nagain to come so near to victory.\\nBut Lord Rockingham s weak and short-lived\\nministry was nevertheless remarkable for the\\namount of good work it did in spite of the king s\\ndogged \u00c2\u00a9Imposition. It contained great adminis-\\ntrative talent, which made itself felt in the most", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 7\\nadverse circumstances. To add to the difficulty,\\nthe ministry came into office at the ci-itical moment\\nof a great agitation in Ireland. In less than three\\nmonths, not only was the trouble successfully re-\\nmoved, but the important bills for disfranchising\\nrevenue officers and excluding contractors from\\nthe House of Commons were carried, and a tre-\\nmendous blow was thus struck at the corrupt in-\\nfluence of the crown upon elections. Burke s great\\nscheme of economical reform was also put into op-\\neration, cutting down the pension list and dimin-\\nishing the secret service fund, and thus destroying\\nman}^ sources of corruption. At no time, perhaps,\\nsince the expulsion of the Stuarts, had so much\\nbeen done toward purifying English political life\\nas during the spring of 1782. But during the pro-\\ngress of these important measures, the jealousies\\nand bickerings in the cabinet became more and\\nmore painfully apparent, and as the question of\\npeace with America came into the foreground, these\\ndifficulties hastened to a crisis.\\nFrom the policy which George III. pursued with\\nregard to Lord Shelburne at this time, one would\\nsuppose that in his secret heart the king wished,\\nby foul means since all others had failed, to defeat\\nthe negotiations for peace and to prolong the war.\\nSeldom has there been a more oddly obstacles in\\ncomplicated situation. Peace was to be treat7^o\u00c2\u00a3\u00c2\u00b0^\\nmade with America, France, Spain, and\\nHolland. Of these powers, America and France\\nwere leagued together by one treaty of alliance,\\nand France and Spain by another, and these trea-\\nties in some respects conflicted with one another in", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "8 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nthe duties which they entailed upon the combat-\\nants. Spain, though at war with England for pur-\\nposes of her own, was bitterly hostile to the United\\nStates and France, thus leagued with two allies\\nwhich pulled in opposite directions, felt bound to\\nsatisfy both, while pursuing her own ends against\\nEngland. To deal with such a chaotic state of\\nthings, an orderly and harmonious government in\\nEngland should have seemed indispensably neces-\\nsary. Yet on the part of England the negotiation\\nof a treaty of peace was to be the work of two\\nsecretaries of state who were both jjolitically and\\npersonally hostile to each other. Fox, as secretary\\nof state for foreign affairs, had to superintend the\\nnegotiations with France, Spain, and Holland.\\nShelburne was secretary of state for home and\\ncolonial affairs and as the United States were\\nstill officially regarded as colonies, the American\\nnegotiations belonged to his department. With\\nsuch a complication of conflicting interests, George\\nIII. might well hope that no treaty could be made.\\nThe views of Fox and Shelburne as to the best\\nmethod of conceding American independence were\\nvery different. Fox understood that France was\\nreally in need of peace, and he believed that she\\nwould not make further demands upon England if\\nAmerican independence should once be recognized.\\nAccordingly, Fox would have made this concession\\nat once as a preliminary to the negotiation. On\\nthe other hand, Shelburne felt sure that France\\nwould insist upon further concessions, and he\\nthought it best to hold in reserve the recognition\\nof independence as a consideration to be bargained", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 9\\nfor. Informal negotiations began between Shel-\\nburne and Franklin, who for many years had been\\nwarm friends. In view of the impending change\\nof government, Franklin had in March sent a let-\\nter to Shelburne, expressing a hope that peace\\nmight soon be restored. When the letter reached\\nLondon the new ministry had already been formed,\\nand Shelburne, with the consent of the cabinet,\\nanswered it by sending over to Paris an agent, to\\ntalk with Franklin informally, and ascertain the\\nterms upon which the Americans would make\\npeace. The person chosen for this purpose was\\nRichard Oswald, a Scotch merchant, who owned\\nlarge estates in America, a man of very frank\\ndisposition and liberal views, and a friend of Adam\\nSmith. In April, Oswald had several conversa-\\ntions with Franklin. In one of these\\nOswald talks\\nconversations Franklin suggested that, Frantiin.\\nin order to make a durable peace, it was desirable\\nto remove all occasion for future quarrel that the\\nline of frontier between New York and Canada\\nwas inhabited by a lawless set of men, who in time\\nof peace would be likely to breed trouble between\\ntheir respective governments and that therefore\\nit would be well for England to cede Canada to\\nthe United States. A similar reasoning would\\napply to Nova Scotia. By ceding these countries\\nto the United States it would be possible, from\\nthe sale of unappropriated lands, to indemnify the\\nAmericans for all losses of private property during\\nthe war, and also to make reparation to the Tories,\\nwhose estates had been confiscated. By pursuing\\nsuch a policy, England, which had made war on", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "10 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nAmerica unjustly, and liad wantonly done it great\\ninjuries, would achieve not merely peace, but rec-\\nonciliation, with America and reconciliation, said\\nFranklin, is a sweet word. No doubt this was\\na bold tone for Fi anklin to take, and perhaps it\\nwas rather cool in him to ask for Canada and Nova\\nScotia but he knew that almost every member\\nof the Whig ministry had publicly exjjressed the\\nopinion that the war against America was an un-\\njust and wanton war and being, moreover, a\\nshrewd hand at a bargain, he began by setting his\\nterms high. Oswald doubtless looked at the mat-\\nter very much from Franklin s point of view, for\\non the suggestion of the cession of Canada he ex-\\npressed neither surprise nor reluctance. Franklin\\nhad written on a sheet of paper the main points\\nof his conversation, and, at Oswald s request, he\\nallowed him to take the paper to London to show\\nto Lord Shelburne, first writing upon it a note ex-\\npressly declaring its informal character. Franklin\\nalso sent a letter to Shelburne, describing Oswald\\nas a gentleman with whom he found it very pleas-\\nant to deal. On Oswald s arrival in London, Shel-\\nburne did not show the notes of the conversation to\\nany of his colleagues, except Lord Ashburton. He\\nkept the paper over one night, and then returned\\nit to Franklin without any formal answer. But\\nthe letter he showed to the cabinet, and on the 23d\\nof April it was decided to send Oswald back to\\nParis, to represent to Franklin that, on being re-\\nstored to the same situation in which she was left\\nby the treaty of 17G3, Great Britain would be will-\\ning to recognize the independence of the United", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 11\\nStates. Fox was authorized to make a similar\\nrepresentation to the French government, and the\\nperson whom he sent to Paris for this purpose was\\nThomas Grenville, son of the author of the Stamp\\nAct.\\nAs all British subjects were prohibited from en-\\ntering into negotiations with the revolted colonies,\\nit was impossible for Oswald to take any decisive\\nstep until an enabling act should be carried through\\nParliament. But while waiting for this he might\\nstill talk informally with Franklin. Fox thought\\nthat Oswald s presence in Paris indicated a desire\\non Shelburne s part to interfere with the negotia-\\ntions with the French government and indeed,\\nthe king, out of his hatred of Fox and his inborn\\nlove of intrigue, suggested to Shelburne that Os-\\nwald might be a useful check on that part of the\\nnegotiation which was in other hands. But Shel-\\nburne paid no heed to this crooked advice, and\\nthere is nothing to show that he had the least de-\\nsire to intrigue against Fox. If he had, he would\\ncertainly have selected some other agent than Os-\\nwald, who was the most straightforward of men,\\nand scarcely close-mouthed enough for a diploma-\\ntist. He told Oswald to impress it upon Franklin\\nthat if America was to be independent at all she\\nmust be independent of the whole world, and must\\nnot enter into any secret arrangement with France\\nwhich might limit her entire freedom of action in\\nthe future. To the private memorandum which\\ndesired the cession of Canada for three reasons,\\nhis answers were as follows: 1. By way of rep-\\naration. Answer. No reparation can be heard", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "12 RESULTS OF YORK TOWN.\\nof. 2. To jprevent future wars. Answer. It is\\nto be hoped that some more friendly method will\\nbe found. 3. As a fund of indem?iiJication to\\nloyalists. Answer. No independence to be ac-\\nknowledged without their being taken care of.\\nBesides, added Shelburne, the Americans would be\\nexpected to make some compensation for the sur-\\nrender of Charleston, Savannah, and the city of\\nNew York, still held by Bi-itish troops. From this\\nit appears that Shelburne, as well as Franklin,\\nknew how to begin by asking more than he was\\nlikely to get.\\nWhile Oswald submitted these answers to Frank-\\nlin, Grenville had his interview w^ith Vergennes,\\nGrenviiie has ^ud told him that, if England recognized\\nwith ver-* the independence of the United States,\\ngennes. ^j^^ should cxpcct Fraucc to restore the\\nislands of the West Indies which she had taken\\nfrom England. Why not, since the indepen-\\ndence of the United States was the sole avowed\\nobject for which France had gone to war Now\\nthis was on the 8th of May, and the news of\\nthe destruction of the French fleet in the West\\nIndies, nearl}^ four weeks ago, had not yet reached\\nEurope. Flushed with the victories of Grasse, and\\nexulting in the prowess of the moSt formidable\\nnaval force that France had ever sent out, Ver-\\ngennes not only expected to keep the islands which\\nhe had got, but was waiting eagerly for the news\\nthat he had acquired Jamaica into the bargain. In\\nthis mood he returned a haughty answer to Gren-\\nville. He reminded him that nations often went to\\nwar for a specified object, and yet seized twice as", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 13\\nmuch if favoured by fortune and, recurring to the\\ninstanco which rankled most deeply in the memories\\nof Frenchmen, he cited the events of the last war.\\nIn 1756 England went to war with France over the\\ndisputed right to some lands on the Ohio River\\nand the Maine frontier. After seven years of fight-\\ning she not only kept these lands, but all of Can-\\nada, Louisiana, and Florida, and ousted the French\\nfrom India into the bargain. No, said Vergennes,\\nhe would not rest content with the independence\\nof America. He would not even regard such an\\noffer as a concession to France in any way, or as a\\nprice in return for which France was to make a\\ntreaty favourable to England. As regards the rec-\\nognition of independence, England must treat di-\\nrectly with America.\\nGrenville was disappointed and chagrined by\\nthis answer, and the ministry made up their minds\\nthat there would be no use in trying to get an hon-\\nourable peace with France for the present. Accord-\\ningly, it seemed better to take Vergennes at his\\nword, though not in the sense in which he meant\\nit, and, by granting all that the Americans could\\nreasonably desire, to detach them from the French\\nalliance as soon as possible. On the 18th of May\\nthere came the news of the stupendous victory of\\nRodney over Grasse, and all Enoiand\\n1 1 -1 1 1 1 Effects of\\nrang with jubilee. Again it had been Rodney s vic-\\nshown that Britannia rules the wave\\nand it seemed that, if America could be separately\\npacified, the House of Bourbon might be success-\\nfully defied. Accordingly, on the 23d, five days\\nafter the news of victory, the ministry decided to", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "14 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\npropose the independence of America in tlie first\\ninstance, instead of making it the condition of a\\ngeneral treaty. Upon this Fox rather hastily\\nmaintained that the United States were put at once\\ninto the position of an independent and foreign\\npower, so that the business of negotiating with\\nthem passed from Shelburne s department into his\\nown. Shelburne, on the other hand, argued that,\\nas the recognition of independence could not take\\neffect until a treaty of peace should be concluded,\\nthe negotiation with America still belonged to him,\\nas secretary for the colonies. Following Fox s in-\\nstructions, Grenville now claimed the right of ne-\\ngotiating with Franklin as well as with Vergennes\\nbut as his written credentials only authorized him\\nto treat with France, the French minister suspected\\nfoul play, and turned a cold shoulder to Grenville.\\nFor the same reason, Grenville found Franklin\\nvery reserved and indisposed to talk on the subject\\nof the treaty. While Grenville was thus rebuffed\\nand irritated he had a talk with Oswald, in the\\ncourse of which he got from that simple and high-\\nrninded gentleman the story of the private paper\\nrelating to the cession of Canada, which Franklin\\nhad permitted Lord Shelburne to see. Grenville\\nimmediately took offence he made up his mind\\nthat something underhanded was going on, and that\\nthis was the reason for the coldness of Franklin\\nand Vergennes and he wrote an indignant letter\\nabout it to Fox. From the wording of this letter,\\nFox got the impression that Franldin s proposal\\nwas much more serious than it really was. It\\nnaturaUy puzzled him and made him angry, for the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 15\\nattitude of America implied in the request for a\\ncession of Canada was far different from the atti-\\ntude presumed by the theory that the mere offer of\\nindependence would be enough to detach her from\\nher alliance with France. The plan of the ministry\\nseemed imperilled. Fox showed Grenville s letter\\nto Rockingham, Richmond, and Cavendish and\\nthey all inferred that Shelburne was playing a\\nsecret part, for purposes of his own. This was\\ndoubtless unjust to Shelburne. Perhaps his keep-\\ning the matter to himself was simply one more\\nillustration of his want of confidence in Fox or,\\nperhaps he did not think it worth while to stir up\\nthe cabinet over a question which seemed too pre-\\nposterous ever to come to anything. Fox, however,\\ncried out against Shelburne s alleged duplicity, and\\nmade up his mind at all events to get the American\\nnegotiations transferred to his own department.\\nTo this end he moved in the cabinet, on the last\\nday of June, that the independence of the United\\nStates should be unconditionally acknowledged, so\\nthat England might treat as with a foreign power.\\nThe motion was lost, and Fox announced that he\\nshould resign his office. His resignation ^^11 of the\\nwould probably of itself have broken S\u00c2\u00b0 :^;tr|; Xiy\\nup the ministry, but, by a curious co-\\nincidence, on the next day Lord Rockingham died\\nand so the first British government begotten of\\nWashington s victory at Yorktown came prema-\\nturely to an end.\\nThe Old Whigs now found some difficulty in\\nchoosing a leader. Burke was the greatest states-\\nman in the party, but he had not the qualities of", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "16 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\na party leader, and his connections were not suffi-\\nciently aristocratic. Fox Avas distrusted by many\\npeople for his gross vices, and because of his way-\\nwardness in politics. In the dissipated gambler,\\nwho cast in his lot first with one party and then\\nwith the other, and who had shamefully used his\\nmatchless eloquence in defending some of the worst\\nabuses of the time, there seemed as yet but little\\npromise of the great reformer of later years, the\\nCharles Fox who came to be loved and idolized by\\nall enlightened Englishmen. Next to Fox, the\\nablest leader in the party was the Duke of Rich-\\nmond, but his advanced views on parliamentary re-\\nform put him out of sympathy with the majority of\\nthe party. Tn this embari assment, the choice fell\\nupon the Duke of Portland, a man of great wealth\\nand small talent, concerning whom Horace Wal-\\npole observed, It is very entertaining that two or\\nthree great families should persuade themselves\\nthat they have a hereditary and exclusive right of\\ngiving us a head without a tongue The choice\\nwas a weak one, and played directly into the hands\\nof the king. When urged to make the Duke of\\nPortland his prime minister, the king replied that\\nhe had already offered that position to Lord Shel-\\nburne. Hereupon Fox and Cavendish\\nShelburne i i -r i i i\\nprime minis- resigned, Dut Kichmoucl remained m\\noffice, thus virtually breaking his con-\\nnection with the Old Whigs. Lord Keppel also\\nremained. Many members of the party followed\\nRichmond and went over to Shelburne. William\\nPitt, now twenty-three years old, succeeded Cav-\\nendish as chancellor of the exchequer Thomas", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 17\\nTownshend became secretary of state for home and\\ncolonies, and Lord Grantham became foreign secre-\\ntary. The closing days of Parliament were marked\\nby altercations which showed how wide the breach\\nhad grown between the two sections of the Whig-\\nparty. Fox and Burke believed tha.t Shelburne\\nwas not only playing a false part, but was really as\\nsubservient to the king as Lord North had been.\\nIn a speech ridiculous for its furious invective,\\nBurke compared the new prime minister with Bor-\\ngia and Catiline. And so Parliament was ad-\\njourned on the 11th of July, and did not meet\\nagain until December.\\nThe task of making a treaty of peace was simpli-\\nfied both by this change of ministry and by th@\\ntotal defeat of the Spaniards and French at Gi-\\nbraltar in September. Six months before, Eng-\\nland had seemed worsted in every quarter. Now\\nEngland, though defeated in America, was victori-\\nous as regarded France and Spain. The avowed\\nobject for which France had entered into alliance\\nwith the Americans was to secure the independence\\nof the United States, and this point was now sub-\\nstantially gained. The chief object for which\\nSpain had entered into alliance with France was\\nto drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point\\nwas now decidedly lost. France had bound herself\\nnot to desist from the war until Spain should re-\\ncover Gibraltar but now there was little hope of\\naccomplishing this, except by some fortvmate bar-\\ngain in the treaty, and Vergennes tried to persuade\\nEngland to cede the great stronghold in exchange\\nfor West Florida, which Spain had lately con-", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "18 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nquered, or for Oran or Guadalouj^e. Failing in\\nthis, he adopted a plan for satisfying Spain at the\\nexpense of the United States and he did this the\\nmore willingly as he had no love for the Ameri-\\nFrench policy ^^^s, and did not wish to see them be-\\nAmerk!ii\u00c2\u00b0in- come too powcrf ul. France had strictly\\nterests. kept her pledges she had given us val-\\nuable and timely aid in gaining our independence\\nand the sympathies of the French people were en-\\ntirely with the American cause. But the object of\\nthe French government had been simply to humil-\\niate England, and this end was sufficiently accom-\\nplished by depriving her of her thirteen colonies.\\nThe immense territory extending from the Alle-\\nghany Mountains to the Mississippi River, and\\nfrom the border of West Florida to the Great\\nLakes, had passed from the hands of France into\\nthose of England at the peace of 1763 and by the\\nQuebec Act of 1774 England had declared the\\nsouthern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River.\\nAt present the whole territory, from Lake Supe-\\nrior down to the southern boundary of what is\\nnow Kentucky, belonged to the state of Virginia,\\nwhose backwoodsmen had conquered it from Eng-\\nland in 1779. In December, 1780, Virginia had\\nprovisionally ceded the portion north of the Ohio\\nto the United States, but the cession was not yet\\ncompleted. The region which is now Tennessee\\nbelonged to North Carolina, which had begun to\\nmake settlements there as long ago as 1758. The\\ntrackless forests included between Tennessee and\\nWest Florida were still in the hands of wild tribes\\nof Cherokees and Choctaws, Chickasaws and", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 19\\nCreeks. Several thousand pioneers from North\\nCarolina and Virginia had already set- ^he vaiiey of\\ntied beyond the mountains, and the sippt^ Tran-\\nwhite population was rapidly increasing. prophecy.\\nThis territory the French government was very un-\\nwilling to leave in American hands. The possibil=\\nity of enormous expansion which it would afford to\\nthe new nation was distinctly foreseen by sagacious\\nmen. Count Aranda, the representative of Spain\\nin these negotiations, wrote a letter to his king just\\nafter the treaty was concluded, in which he uttered\\nthis notable prophecy This federal republic is\\nborn a pygmy. A day will come when it will be a\\ngiant, even a colossus, formidable in these coun-\\ntries. Liberty of conscience, the facility for es-\\ntablishing a new population on immense lands, as\\nwell as the advantages of the new government,\\nwill draw thither farmers and artisans from all the\\nnations. In a few years we shall watch with grief\\nthe tyrannical existence of this same colossus.\\nThe letter went on to predict that the Americans\\nwould presently get possession of Florida and at-\\ntack Mexico. Similar arguments were doubtless\\nused by Aranda in his interviews with Vergennes,\\nand France, as well as Spain, sought to prevent\\nthe growth of the dreaded colossus. To this end\\nVergennes maintained that the Americans ought\\nto recognize the Quebec Act, and give up to Eng-\\nland all the territory north of the Ohio River\u00e2\u0080\u009e\\nThe region south of this limit should, he thought,\\nbe made an Indian territory, and placed under the\\nprotection of Spain and the United States. A\\nline was to be drawn from the mouth of the Cum-", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "20 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nberland River, following that stream about as far\\nas the site of Nashville, thence running southward\\nto the Tennessee, thence curving eastward nearly\\nto the AUeghanies, and descending through what\\nis now eastern Alabama to the Florida line. The\\nterritory to the east of this irregular line was to be\\nunder the protection of the United States the ter^\\nritory to the west of it was to be under the protec-\\ntion of Spain. In this division, the settlers beyond\\nthe mountains would retain their connection with\\nthe United States, which would not touch the Mis-\\nsissippi River at any point. Vergennes held that\\nthis was all the Americans could reasonably de-\\nmand, and he agreed with Aranda that they had\\nas yet gained no foothold upon the eastern bank\\nof the great river, unmindful of the fact that at\\nthat very moment the fortresses at Cahokia and\\nKaskaskia were occupied by American garrisons.\\nUpon another important point the views of the\\nFrench government were directly opposed to Amer-\\nTheNew- icau interests. The right to catch fish\\nfisheries. ou the bauks of Newfoundland had been\\nshared by treaty between France and England\\nand the New England fishermen, as subjects of the\\nking of Great Britain, had participated in this\\nprivilege. The matter was of very great impor-\\ntance, not only to New England, but to the United\\nStates in general. Not only were the fisheries a\\nsource of lucrative trade to the New England o-\\nple, but they were the training-school of a splendid\\nrace of seamen, the nursery of naval hei oes whose\\nexploits were by and by to astonish the world.\\nTo de^jrive the Americans of their share in these", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "MAP OF NORTH AMERICA,\\nShowing the Boundaries of the UNITED STATES, CANADA, and the SPANISH POSSES-\\nSIONS, according to the proposals of the Court of France in I 782.", "height": "2851", "width": "1652", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 21\\nfisheries was to strike a serious blow at the strength\\nand resources of the new nation. The British gov-\\nernment was not inclined to grant the privilege,\\nand on this point Vergennes took sides with Eng-\\nland, in order to establish a claim upon her for\\nconcessions advantageous to France in some other\\nquarter. With these views, Vergennes secretly\\naimed at delaying the negotiations for as long as\\nhostilities were kept up, he might hope to extort\\nfrom his American allies a recognition of the\\nSpanish claims and a renouncement of the fisher-\\nies, simply by threatening to send them no further\\nassistance in men or money. In order to retard\\nthe proceedings, he refused to take any steps what-\\never until the independence of the United States\\nshould first be irrevocably acknowledged by Great\\nBritain, without reference to the final settlement\\nof the rest of the treaty. In this Vergennes was\\nsupported by Franklin, as well as by Jay, who had\\nlately arrived in Pai-is to take part in the negotia-\\ntions. But the reasons of the American commis-\\nsioners were very different from those of Ver-\\ngennes. They feared that, if they began to treat\\nbefore independence was acknowledged, they would\\nbe unfairly dealt with by France and Spain, and\\nunable to gain from England the concessions upon\\nwhich they were determined.\\nJay soon began to suspect the designs of the\\nFrench minister. He found that he was sending\\nM. de Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord Shel-\\nburne under an assumed name he ascertained\\nthat the right of the United States to the Missis-\\nsippi valley was to be denied and he got hold of", "height": "2851", "width": "1632", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "22 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\na dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of\\nlescation at Philadelphia, to Vero;enues,\\nJaydetectsthe i\\nEciiemesof opposiDg the American claim to the\\nNewfoundland fisheries. As soon as\\nJay learned these facts, he sent his friend Dr.\\nBenjamin Vaughan to Lord Shelburne to put him\\non his guard, and while reminding him that it was\\ngreatly for the interest of England to dissolve the\\nalliance between America and France, he declared\\nhimself ready to begin the negotiations without\\nwaiting for the recognition of independence, pro-\\nvided that Oswald s commission should speak of\\nthe thirteen United States of America, instead of\\ncalling them colonies and naming them separately.\\nThis decisive step was taken by Jay on his own re-\\nsponsibility, and without the knowledge of Frank-\\nlin, who had been averse to anything like a sepa-\\nrate negotiation with England. It served to set\\nthe ball rolling at once. After meeting the mes-\\nsengers from Jay and Vergenues, Lord Shelburne\\nat once perceived the antagonism that had arisen\\nbetween the allies, and promptly took advantage of\\nit. A new commission was made out for Oswald,\\nin which the British government first described\\nour country as the United States and early in\\nOctober negotiations were begun and proceeded\\nrapidly. On the part of England, the affair\\nwas conducted by Oswald, assisted by Strachey\\nand Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville.\\nIn the course of the month John Adams arrived\\nin Paris, and a few weeks later Henry Laurens,\\nwho had been exchanged for Lord Cornwallis and\\nreleased from the Tower, was added to the com.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 23\\npany. Adams had a holy horror of Frenchmen\\nin general, and of Count Vergennes in particular.\\nHe shared that common but mistaken view of\\nFrenchmen which regards them as shallow, frivo-\\nlous, and insincere and he was indignant at the\\nposition taken by Vergennes on the question of the\\nfisheries. In this, John Adams felt as all New\\nEnglanders felt, and he realized the importance of\\nthe question from a national point of view, as be-\\ncame the man who in later years was to earn last-\\ning renown as one of the chief founders of the\\nAmerican navy. His behaviour on reaching Paris\\nwas characteristic. It is said that he left Count\\nVergennes to learn of his arrival through the\\nnewspapers. It was certainly some time before\\nhe called upon him, and he took occasion, besides,\\nto express his opinions about republics and monar-\\nchies in terms which courtly Frenchmen thought\\nvery rude.\\nThe arrival of Adams fully decided the matter\\nas to a separate negotiation with England. He\\nagreed with Jay that Vergennes should be kept as\\nfar Its possible in the dark until everything was\\ncut and dried, and Franklin was reluctantly\\nobliged to yield. The treaty of alliance between\\nFrance and the United States had expressly stip-\\nulated that neither power should ever\\n1 1 r Franklin over-\\nmake peace without the consent or the ruled by Jay\\nother, and in view of this Franklin was\\nloth to do anything which might seem like aban-\\ndoning the ally whose timely interposition had\\nalone enabled Washington to achieve the crown-\\ning triumph of Yorktown. In justice to Ver-", "height": "2851", "width": "1632", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "24 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\ngemies, it should be borne in mind that he had\\nkept strict faith with us in regard to every point\\nthat had been expressly stipulated and Frank-\\nlin, who felt that he understood Frenchmen bet-\\nter than his colleagues, was naturally unwilling to\\nseem behindhand in this respect. At the same\\ntime, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated,\\nVergennes was clearly playing a sharp game\\nagainst us and it is undeniable that, without de-\\nparting technically from the obligations of the alli-\\nance, Jay and Adams two men as honourable as\\never lived played a very sharp defensive game\\nagainst him. The traditional French subtlety was\\nno match for Yankee shrewdness. The treaty with\\nEngland was not concluded until the consent of\\nFrance had been obtained, and thus the express\\nstipulation was respected but a thorough and de-\\ntailed agreement was reached as to what the pur-\\nport of the treaty should be, while our not too\\nfriendly ally was kept in the dark. The annals of\\nmodern diplomacy have afforded few stranger\\nspectacles. With the indispensable aid of France\\nwe had just got the better of England in fight, and\\nnow we proceeded amicably to divide territory and\\ncommercial privileges with the enemy, and to make\\narrangements in which the ally was virtually ig-\\nnored. It ceases to be a paradox, however, when\\nwe remember that with the change of government\\nin England some essential conditions of the case\\nwere changed. The England against which we\\nhad fought was the hostile England of Lord North;\\nthe England with which we were now dealing was\\nthe friendly England of Shelburne and Pitt. For", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 25\\nthe moment, the English race, on both sides of the\\nAtlantic, was united in its main purpose and di-\\nvided only by questions of detail, while the rival\\ncolonizing power, which sought to work in a direc-\\ntion contrary to the general interests of English-\\nspeaking people, was in great measure disregarded.\\nAs soon as the problem was thus virtually re-\\nduced to a negotiation between the American com-\\nmissioners and Lord Shelburne s ministry, the air\\nwas cleared in a moment. The principal questions\\nhad ali-eady been discussed between Franldiu and\\nOswald. Independence being first acknowledged,\\nthe question of boundaries came up for settlement.\\nEngland had little interest in regaining the terri-\\ntory between the Alleglianies and the\\nThe separate\\nMississippi, the torts in which were al- American trea-\\nready held by American soldiers, and upon i.\\n1 1 n 1 m.1 Boundaries;\\nshe relinquished all claim upon it. llie\\nMississippi River thus became the dividing line\\nbetween the United States and the Spanish posses-\\nsions, and its navigation was made free alike to\\nBritish and American ships. Franklin s sugges-\\ntion of a cession of Canada and Nova Scotia was\\nabandoned without discussion. It was agreed that\\nthe boundary line should start at the mouth of the\\nriver St. Croix, and, running to a point near Lake\\nMadawaska in the highlands separating the Atlan-\\ntic watershed from that of the St. Lawrence,\\nshould follow these highlands to the head of the\\nConnecticut River, and then descend the middle of\\nthe river to the forty-fifth parallel, thence running\\nwestward and through the centre of the water com-\\nmunications of the Great Lakes to the Lake of the", "height": "2851", "width": "1632", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "26 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nWoods, thence to the source of the Mississippi,\\nwhich was supposed to be west of this Like. This\\nline was marked in red ink by Oswald on one of\\nMitchell s maps of North America, to serve as a\\nmemorandum establishing the precise meaning of\\nthe words used in the description. It ought to\\nhave been accurately fixed in its details by surveys\\nmade upon the spot but no commissioners were\\nappointed for this purpose. The language relat-\\ning to the northeastern portion of the boundary\\ncontained some inaccuracies which were revealed\\nby later surveys, and the map used by Oswald was\\nlost. Hence a further question arose between\\nGreat Britain and the United States, which was\\nfinally settled by the Ashburton treaty in 1842.\\nThe Americans retained the right of catching\\nfish on the banks of Newfoundland and in the Gidf\\nof St. Lawrence, but lost the right of drying their\\n2. Fisheries; fish ou the Newfoundland coast. On\\ncommercial i i i i\\nintercourse the otlicr hand, uo pcrmissiou was given\\nto British subjects to fish on the coasts of the\\nUnited States. As regarded commercial inter-\\ncourse. Jay sought to establish complete reciprocal\\nfreedom between the two countries, and a clause\\nwas proposed to the effect that all British mer-\\nchants and merchant ships, on the one hand, shall\\nenjoy in the United States, and in all places belong-\\ning to them, the same protection and commercial\\nprivileges, and be liable only to the same charges\\nand duties as their own merchants and merchant\\nships and, on the other hand, the merchants and\\nmerchant ships of the United States shall enjoy in\\nall places belonging to his Britannic Majesty the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 27\\nsame protection and commercial privileges, and be\\nliable only to the same charges and duties as Brit-\\nish merchants and merchant ships, saving always\\nto the chartered trading companies o\u00c2\u00a3 Great Britain\\nsuch exclusive use and trade, and the respective\\nports and establishments, as neither the other sub-\\njects of Great Britain nor any the most favoured\\nnation participate in. Unfortunately for both\\ncountries, this liberal provision was rejected on the\\nground that the ministry had no authority to inter-\\nfere with the Navigation Act.\\nOnly two questions were now left to be disposed\\nof, the question of paying private debts, and\\nthat of compensating the American loyalists for\\nthe loss of pi operty and general rough treatment\\nwhich they had suffered. There were many old\\ndebts outstanding from American to\\no 3. Pnvate\\nBritish merchants. These had been for\\nthe most part incurred before 1775, and while\\nmany honest debtors, impoverished during the war,\\nfelt unable to pay, there were doubtless many others\\nwho were ready to take advantage of circumstances\\nand refuse the payment which they were perfectly\\nable to make. It was scarcely creditable to us that\\nany such question should have arisen. Franklin,\\nindeed, argued that these debts were more than\\nfully offset by damages done to private property\\nby British soldiers as, for example, in the wanton\\nraids on the coasts of Connecticut and Virginia in\\n1779, or in Prevost s buccaneering march against\\nCharleston. To cite these atrocities, however, as\\na reason for the non-payment of debts legitimately\\nowed to innocent merchants in London and Glas-", "height": "2851", "width": "1632", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "28 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\ngow was to argue as if two wrongs could make a\\nright. The strong sense of John Adams struck at\\nonce to the root of the matter. He declared he\\nhad no notion of cheating anybody. The ques-\\ntions of paying debts and compensating Tories\\nwere two. This terse statement carried the day,\\nand it was finally decided that all private debts on\\neither side, whether incurred before or after 1775,\\nremained still binding, and must be discharged at\\ntheir full value in sterling money.\\nThe last question of all was the one most difficult\\nto settle. There were many loyalists in the United\\nStates who had sacrificed everything in the support\\nof the British cause, and it was unquestionably the\\nduty of the British government to make every pos-\\nsible effort to insure them against further injuiy,\\nand, if pi acticable, to make good their losses al-\\nready incurred. From Virginia and the New Eng-\\nland states, where they were few in number, they\\nhad mostly fled, and their estates had been confis-\\ncated. In New York and South Carolina, where\\nthey remained in great numbers, they were still\\nwaging a desultory war with the patriots, which\\nfar exceeded in cruelty and bitterness the struggle\\nbetween the regular armies. In many cases they\\nhad, at the solicitation of the British government,\\njoined the invading army, and been organized into\\ncompanies and regiments. The regular troops de-\\nfeated at King s Mountain, and those whom Arnold\\ntook witli him to Virginia, were nearly\\ntion of all American loyalists. Lord Shelburne\\nfelt that it would be wrong to abandon\\nthese unfortunate men to the vengeance of their", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 29\\nfellow countrymen, and he insisted that the treaty\\nshould contain an amnesty clause providing for the\\nrestoration of the Tories to their civil rights, with\\ncompensation for their confiscated property. How-\\never disagreeable such a course might seem to the\\nvictorious Americans, there were many precedents\\nfor it in European history. It had indeed come to\\nbe customary at the close of civil wars, and the\\neffect of such a policy had invariably been good.\\nCromwell, in his hour of triumph, inflicted no\\ndisabilities upon his political enemies and when\\nCharles II. was restored to the throne the healing\\neffect of the amnesty act then passed was so great\\nthat historians sometimes ask what in the world\\nhad become of that Puritan party which a moment\\nbefore had seemed supreme in the land. At the\\nclose of the war of the Spanish Succession, the\\nrebellious people of Catalonia were indemnified for\\ntheir losses, at the request of England, and with a\\nsimilar good effect. In view of such European\\nprecedents, Vergennes agreed with Shelburne as\\nto the propriety of securing compensation and fur-\\nther immunity for the Tories in America. John\\nAdams insinuated that the French minister took\\nthis course because he foresaw that the presence\\nof the Tories in the United States would keep the\\npeople perpetually divided into a French party\\nand an English party but such a suspicion was\\nquite uncalled for. There is no reason to suppose\\nthat in this instance Vergennes had anything at\\nheart but the interests of humanity and justice.\\nOn the other hand, the Americans brought for-\\nward very strong reasons why the Tories should", "height": "2851", "width": "1632", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "30 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nnot be indemnified by Congress. First, as Fi ank-\\nlin urged, many of them had, by their misrepre-\\nsentations to the British government, helped to stir\\nup the disputes which led to the war and as they\\nhad made their bed, so they must lie in it. Sec-\\nondly, such of them as had been concerned in burn-\\ning and plundering defenceless villages, and wield-\\ning the tomahawk in concert with bloodthirsty\\nIndians, deserved no compassion. It was rather\\nfor them to make compensation for the misery they\\nhad wrought. Thirdly, the confiscated Tory prop-\\nerty had passed into the hands of purchasers who\\nhad bought it in good faith and could not now be\\ndispossessed, and in many cases it had been dis-\\ntributed here and there and lost sight of. An\\nestimate of the gross amount might be made, and\\na corresponding sum appropriated for indemnifica-\\ntion. But, fourthly, the country was so impover-\\nished by the war that its own soldiers, the brave\\nmen whose heroic exertions had won the indepen-\\ndence of the United States, were at this moment\\nin sore distress for the want of the pay wliich Con-\\ngress could not give them, but to which its honour\\nwas sacredly pledged. The American government\\nwas clearly bound to pay its just debts to the friends\\nwho had suffei^ed so much in its behalf before it\\nshould proceed to entertain a chimerical scheme\\nfor satisfying its enemies. For, fifthly, any such\\nscheme was in the present instance clearly chimer-\\nical. The acts under which Tory property had\\nbeen confiscated were acts of state legislatures, and\\nCongress had no jurisdiction over such a matter.\\nIf restitution was to be made, it must be made by", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 81\\nthe separate states. The question could not for a\\nmoment be entertained by the general government\\nor its agents.\\nUpon these points the American commissioners\\nwere united and inexorable. Various suggestions\\nwere offered in vain by the British. Their troops\\nstill held the city o\u00c2\u00a3 New York, and it was doubt-\\nful whether the Americans could hope to capture it\\nin another campaign. It was urged that England\\nmight fairly claim in exchange for New York a\\nround sum of money wherewith the Tories might\\nbe indemnified. It was further urged that certain\\nunappropriated lands in the Mississippi valley\\nmight be sold for the same purpose. But the\\nAmericans would not hear of buying one of their\\nown cities, whose independence was already ac-\\nknowledged by the first article of the treaty which\\nrecognized the independence of the United States;\\nand as for the western lands, they were wanted as a\\nmeans of paying our own war debts and providing\\nfor our veteran soldiers. Several times Shelburne\\nsent word to Paris that he would break off the ne-\\ngotiation unless the loyalist claims were in some\\nway recognized. But the Americans were obdurate.\\nThey had one advantage, and knew it. Parlia-\\nment was soon to meet, and it was doubtful whether\\nLord Shelburne could command a sufficient ma-\\njority to remain long in office. He was, accord-\\ningly, very anxious to complete the treaty of peace,\\nor at least to detach America from the French\\nalliance, as soon as possible. The American com-\\nmissioners were also eager to conclude the treaty.\\nThey had secured very favourable terms, and were", "height": "2851", "width": "1632", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "32 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nloth to run any risk of spoiling what had been\\ndone. Accordingly, they made a proposal in the\\nform of a compromise, which nevertheless settled\\nthe point in their favour. The matter, they said,\\nwas beyond the jurisdiction of Congress, but they\\nagreed that Congress should recommend to the\\nseveral states to desist from further proceedings\\nagainst the Tories, and to reconsider tlieir laws on\\nthis subject it should further recommend that per-\\nsons with claims upon confiscated lands might be\\nauthorized to use legal means of recovering them,\\nand to this end might be allowed to pass to and fro\\nwithout personal risk for the term of one year.\\nThe British commissioners accejjted this comjjro-\\nmise, unsatisfactory as it was, because it was really\\nimpossible to obtain anything better without throw-\\ning the whole negotiation overboard. The consti-\\ntutional difficulty was a real one indeed. As\\nAdams told Oswald, if the point were further in-\\nsisted upon. Congress would be obliged to refer it\\nto the several states, and no one could tell how\\nlong it might be before any decisive result could be\\nreached in this way. Meanwhile, the state of war\\nwould continue, and it would be cheaper for Eng-\\nland to indemnify the loyalists herself than to pay\\nthe war bills for a single month. Franklin added\\nthat, if the loyalists were to be indemnified, it\\nwould be necessary also to reckon up the damage\\nthey had done in burning houses and kidnapping\\nslaves, and then strike a balance between the two\\naccounts and he gravely suggested that a special\\ncommission might be appointed for this purpose.\\nAt the prospect of endless discussion which this", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 33\\nsuggestion involved, tlie British commissioners gave\\nway and acceiDted the American terms, although\\nthey were frankly told that too much must not be\\nexpected from the recommendation of Congress.\\nThe articles were signed on the 80th of November,\\nsix days before the meeting of Parliament. Hos-\\ntilities in America were to cease at once, and upon\\nthe completion of the treaty the British fleets and\\nai mies were to be immediately withdrawn from\\nevery place which they held within the limits of\\nthe United States. A supplementary and secret\\narticle provided that if England, on making peace\\nwith Spain, should recover West Florida, the north-\\nern boundary of that province should be a line run-\\nning due east from the mouth of the Yazoo River\\nto the Chattahoochee.\\nThus by skilful diplomacy the Americans had\\ngained all that could reasonably be asked, while\\nthe work of making a general jDeace was greatly\\nsimplified. It was declared in the preamble that\\nthe articles here signed were provisional, and that\\nthe treaty was not to take effect until terms of\\npeace should be agreed on between England and\\nFrance. Without delay, Franklin laid the whole\\nmatter, except the secret article, before Vergennes,\\nwho forthwith accused the Americans of ingrati-\\ntude and bad faith. Franklin s reply,\\nVergennes\\nthat at the worst they could only be does not uko\\ncharged with want of diplomatic cour- wwoh it has\\n1 1 T been done.\\nfcesy, has sometimes been condemned as\\ninsincere, but on inadequate grounds. He had\\nconsented with reluctance to the separate negotia-\\ntion, because he did not wish to give France any", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "34 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\npossible ground for complaint, whether real or os-\\ntensible. There does not seem, however, to have\\nbeen sufficient justification for so grave a charge\\nas was made by Vergennes. If the French nego-\\ntiations had failed until after the overthrow of the\\nShelburne ministry if Fox, on coming into power,\\nhad taken advantage of the American treaty to\\ncontinue the war against France and if under\\nsuch circumstances the Americans had abandoned\\ntheir ally, then undoubtedly they would have be-\\ncome guilty of ingratitude and treachery. There\\nis no reason for supposing that they would ever\\nhave done so, had the circumstances arisen. Their\\npreamble made it impossible for them honourably\\nto abandon France until a full peace should be\\nmade, and more than this France could not reason-\\nably demand. The Americans had kept to the strict\\nletter of their contract, as Vergennes had kept to\\nthe strict letter of his, and beyond this they meted\\nout exactly the same measure of frankness which\\nthey received. To say that our debt of gratitude\\nto France was such as to require us to acquiesce in\\nher scheme for enriching our enemy Spain at our\\nexpense is simply childish. Franklin was undoubt-\\nedly right. The commissioners may have been\\nguilty of a breach of diplomatic courtesy, but noth-\\ning more. Vergennes might be sarcastic about it\\nfor the moment, but the cordial relations between\\nFrance and America remained undisturbed.\\nOn the jjart of the Americans the treaty of Paris\\nA great dipio- most brilliant triumi:)hs\\nmatic victory, jj^ yfihole history of modern diplo-\\nmacy. Had the affair been managed by men of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 35\\nordinary ability, some of the greatest results of the\\nKevolutionary War would probably have been lost\\nthe new republic would have been cooped up be-\\ntween the Atlantic Ocean and the Alleghany Moun-\\ntains our westward expansion would have been\\nimpossible without further warfare in which Euro-\\npean powers would have been involved and the\\nformation of our Federal Union would doubtless\\nhave been effectively hindered, if not, indeed,\\naltogether prevented. To the grand triumph the\\nvaried talents of Franklin, Adams, and Jay alike\\ncontributed. To the latter is due the credit of de-\\ntecting and baffling the sinister designs of France\\nbut without the tact of Franklin this probably\\ncould not have been accomplished without offend-\\ning France in such wise as to spoil everything. It\\nis, however, to the rare discernment and boldness\\nof Jay, admirably seconded by the sturdy Adams,\\nthat the chief praise is due. The turning-point of\\nthe whole affair was the visit of Dr. Vaughan to\\nLord Shelburne. The foundation of success was\\nthe separate negotiation with England, and here\\nthere had stood in the way a more formidable ob\\netacle than the mere reluctance of Franklin. The\\nchevalier Luzerne and his secretary Marbois had\\nbeen busy with Congress, and that body had sent\\nwell-meant but silly and pusillanimous instructions\\nto its commissioners at Paris to be guided in all\\nthings by the wishes of the French court. To dis-\\nregard such instructions required all the lofty\\ncourage for which Jay and Adams were noted, and\\nfor the moment it brought upon them something\\nlike a rebuke from Congress, conveyed in a letter", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "36 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nfrom Robert Livingston. As Adams said, in his\\nvehement way, Congress surrendered their own\\nsovereignty into the hands of a Fi-ench minister.\\nBhish blush ye guilty records blush and perish\\nIt Js gloxy to have broken such infamous orders.\\nTrue enough the commissioners knew that in di=\\nplomacy, as in warfare, to the agent at a distance\\nfrom his principal some discretionary power must\\nbe allowed. They assumed great responsibility,\\nand won a victory of incalculable grandeur.\\nThe course of the Americans produced no effect\\nupon the terms obtained by Fi-ance, but it seriously\\nmodified the case with Spain. Unable to obtain\\nGibraltar by arms, that power hoped to get it by\\nThe Spanish diplomacy and with the sujoport of\\ntreaty. Fraucc slic sccmcd disposed to make the\\ncession of the great fortress an ultimatum, without\\nwhich the war must go on. Shelburne, on his part,\\nwas willing to exchange Gibraltar for an island\\nin the West Indies but it was difficult to get the\\ncabinet to agree on the matter, and the scheme was\\nviolently opposed by the people, for the heroic de-\\nfence of the stronghold had invested it with a halo\\nof romance and endeared it to every one. Never-\\ntheless, so persistent was Spain, and so great the\\ndesire for peace on the part of the ministry, that\\nthey had resolved to exchange Gibraltar for Guada-\\nloupe, when the news arrived of the treaty with\\nAmerica. The ministers now took a bold stand,\\nand refused to hear another word about giving up\\nGibraltar. Spain scolded, and threatened a re-\\nnewal of hostilities, but France was unwiJling to\\ngive further assistance, and the matter was settled", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 37\\nby England s surrendering East Florida, and al-\\nlowing the Spaniards to keep West Florida and\\nMinorca, which were already in their hands.\\nBy the treaty with France, the West India isl-\\nands of Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Christopher,\\nDominica, Nevis, and Montserrat were restored to\\nEngland, which in turn restored St. TUe French\\nLucia and ceded Tobago to France.\\nThe French were allowed to fortify Dunkirk, and\\nreceived some slight concessions in India and Af-\\nrica they retained their share in the Newfound-\\nland fisheries, and recovered the little neighbour-\\ning islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. For the\\nfourteen hundred million francs which France had\\nexpended in the war, she had the satisfaction of\\ndetaching the American colonies from England,\\nthus inflicting a blow which it was confidently\\nhoped would prove fatal to the maritime power of\\nher ^ncient rival but be^^ond this short-lived sat-\\nisfaction, the fallaciousness of which events were\\nsoon to show, she obtained very little. On the\\n20th of January, 1783, the preliminaries of peace\\nwere signed between England, on the one hand,\\nand France and Spain, on the other. A truce was\\nat the same time concluded with Holland, which\\nwas soon followed by a peace, in which most of the\\nconquests on either side were restored.\\nA second English ministry was now about to\\nbe wrecked on the rock of this group of treaties.\\nLord Shelburne s government had at no time been\\na strong one. He had made many enemies by his\\nliberal and reforming measures, and he had alien-\\nated most of his colleagues by his reserved de-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "38 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nmeanour and seeming want of confidence in them.\\nIn December several of tlie ministers resigned.\\nThe strength of parties in the House of Commons\\nwas thus quaintly reckoned by Gibbon Minis-\\nter 140 Eeynard 90 Boreas 120 the rest un-\\nknown or uncertain. But Reynard and Bo-\\nreas were now about to join forces in one of the\\nstrangest coalitions ever known in the history of\\npolitics. No statesman ever attacked\\nCoalition of p i i t- i i\\nFox with another more terociouslv than 1 ox had\\nNorth. 1 n TL.- 1 1-1\\nattacked JNorth durnig the past ten\\nyears. He had showered abuse upon him accused\\nhim of treachery and falsehood, of public per-\\nfidy, and breach of a solemn specific promise\\nand had even gone so far as to declare to his face\\na hope that he would be called upon to expiate his\\nabominable crimes upon the scaffold. Within a\\ntwelvemonth he had thus spoken of Lord North\\nand his colleagues From the moment when I\\nshall make any terms with one of them, I will rest\\nsatisfied to be called the most infamous of man-\\nkind. I would not for an instant think of a coali-\\ntion with men who, in every public and private\\ntransaction as ministers, have shown themselves\\nvoid of every principle of honour and honesty. In\\nthe hands of such men I would not trust my honour\\neven for a moment. Still more recently, when at\\na loss for words strong enough to express his belief\\nin the wickedness of Shelburne, he declared that\\nhe had no better opinion of that man than to deem\\nhim capable of forming an alliance with North.\\nWe may judge, then, of the general amazement\\nwhen, in the middle of February, it turned out", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 39\\nthat Fox had himself clone this very thing. An\\nill-omened marriage, William Pitt called it in\\nthe House of Commons. If this ill-omened mar-\\nriage is not already solemnized, I know a just and\\nlawful impediment, and in the name of the public\\nsafety I here forbid the banns. Throughout the\\ncountry the indignation was great. Many people\\nhad blamed Fox for not following up his charges\\nby actually bringing articles of impeachment\\nagainst Lord North. That the two enemies should\\nthus suddenly become leagued in friendship seemed\\nutterly monstrous. It injured Fox extremely in\\nthe opinion of the country, and it injured North\\nstill more, for it seemed like a betrayal of the king\\non his part, and his forgiveness of so many insults\\nlooked mean-spirited. It does not appear, how-\\never, that there was really any strong personal ani-\\nmosity between North and Fox. They were both\\nmen of very amiable character, and almost inca-\\npable of cherishing resentment. The language of\\nparliamentary orators was habitually violent, and\\nthe huge quantities of wine which gentlemen in\\nthose days used to drink may have helped to make\\nit extravagant. The excessive vehemence of po-\\nlitical invective often deprived it of half its effect.\\nOne day, after Fox had exhausted his vocabulary\\nof abuse upon Lord George Germaine, Lord North\\nsaid to him, You were in very high feather to-day,\\nCharles, and I am glad you did not fall upon me.\\nOn another occasion, it is said that while Fox was\\nthundering against North s unexampled turpitude,\\nthe object of his furious tirade cosily di-opped off\\nto sleep. Gibbon, who was the friend of both", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "40 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nstatesmen, expressly declares that they bore each\\nother no ill will. But while thus alike indi^jposed\\nto harbour bitter thoughts, there was one man for\\nwhom both Fox and North felt an abiding distrust\\nand dislike and that man was Lord Shelburne,\\nthe prime minister.\\nAs a political pupil of Burke, Fox shared that\\nstatesman s distrust of the whole school of Lord\\nChatham, to which Shelburne belonged. In many\\nrespects these statesmen were far more advanced\\nthan Burke, but they did not sufficiently realize\\nthe importance of checking the crown by means of\\na united and powerful ministry. Fox thoroughly\\nunderstood that much of the mischief of the past\\ntwenty years, including the loss of America, had\\ncome from the system of weak and divided minis-\\ntries, which gave the king such great opportunity\\nfor wreaking his evil will. He had himself been a\\nmember of such a ministry, which had fallen seven\\nmonths ago. When the king singled out Shel-\\nburne for his confidence. Fox naturally concluded\\nthat Shelburne was to be made to play the royal\\ngame, as North had been made to play it for so\\nmany years. This was very unjust to Shelburne,\\nbut there is no doubt that Fox was perfectly hon-\\nest in his belief. It seemed to him that the pres-\\nent state of things must be brought to an end, at\\nwhatever cost. A ministry strong enough to curb\\nthe king could be formed only by a coalescence of\\ntwo out of the three existing parties. A coales-\\ncence of Old and New Whigs had been tried last\\nspring, and failed. It only remained no\\\\v to try the\\neffect of a coalescence of Old Whigs and Tories.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 41\\nSuch was doubtless tlie chief motive of Fox in\\nthis extraordinary move. The conduct of North\\nseems harder to explain, but it was j^robably due\\nto a reaction of feeling on his part. He had done\\nviolence to his own convictions out of weak com-\\npassion for George III., and had carried on the\\nAmerican war for four years after he had been\\nthoroughly convinced that peace ought to be made.\\nRemorse for this is said to have haunted him to\\nthe end of his life. When in his old age he be-\\ncame blind, he bore this misfortune with his cus-\\ntomary lightness of heart and one day, meeting\\nthe veteran Barre, who had also lost his eyesight, he\\nexclaimed, with his unfailing wit, Well, colonel,\\nin spite of all our differences, I suppose there are\\nno two men in England who would be gladder to\\nsee each other than you and I. But while Lord\\nNorth could jest about his blindness, the memory\\nof his ill-judged subservience to the king was\\nsomething that he could not laugh away, and\\namong his nearest friends he was sometimes heard\\nto reproach himself bitterly. When, therefore, in\\n1783, he told Fox that he fully agreed with him\\nin thinking that the royal power ought to be\\ncurbed, he was doubtless speaking the truth. No\\nman had a better right to such an opinion than he\\nhad gained through sore experience. In his own\\nministry, as he said to Fox, he took the system as\\nhe found it, and had not vigour and resolution\\nenough to put an end to it but he was now quite\\nconvinced that in such a country as England,\\nwhile the king should be treated with all outward\\nshow of respect, he ought on no account to be al-\\nlowed to exercise any real power.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "42 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nNow this was in 1783 the paramount political\\nquestion in England, just as much as the question\\nof secession was paramount in the United States\\nin 1861. Other questions could be postponed\\nthe question of curbing the king could not. Upon\\nthis all-important point North had come to agree\\nwith Fox and as the principal motive of their\\ncoalition may be thus explained, the historian is\\nnot called upon to lay too much stress upon the\\nlower motives assigned in profusion by their polit-\\nical enemies. This explanation, however, does not\\nquite cover the case. The mass of the Tories\\nwould never follow North in an avowed attempt\\nto curb the king, but they agreed with the follow-\\ners of Fox, though not with Fox himself, in holy\\nhorror of parliamentary reform, and were alarmed\\nby a recent declaration of Shelbui-ne that the suf-\\nfrage must be extended so as to admit a hundred\\nnew county members. Thus while the two leaders\\nwere urged to coalescence by one motive, their\\nfollowers were largely swayed by another, and this\\nadded much to the mystery and general unintelli-\\ngibleness of the movement. In taking this step\\nFox made the mistake which was characteristic of\\nthe Old Whig party. He gave too little heed to\\nthe great jDublic outside the walls of the House of\\nCommons. The coalition, once made, was very\\nstrong in Parliament, but it mystified and scandal-\\nized the people, and this popular disapproval by\\nand by made it easy for the king to overthrow it.\\nIt was agreed to choose the treaty as the occasion\\nfor the combined attack upon the Shelburne min-\\nistry. North, as the minister wlio had conducted", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 43\\nthe unsuccessful war, was bound to oppose tlie\\ntreaty, in any case. It would not do for him to\\nadmit that better terms could not have\\nFall of Shel-\\nbeen made, i he treaty was also very bume s mmis-\\ntry.\\nunpopular with Fox s party, and with\\nthe nation at large. It was thought that too much\\nterritory had been conceded to the Americans, and\\nfault was found with the article on the fisheries.\\nBut the point which excited most indignation was\\nthe virtual abandonment of the loyalists, for here\\nthe honour of England was felt to be at stake. On\\nthis ground the treaty was emphatically condemned\\nby Burke, Sheridan, and Wilberforce, no less than\\nby North. It was ably defended in the Commons\\nby Pitt, and in the Lords by Shelburne himself,\\nwho argued that he had but the alternative of\\naccepting the terms as they stood, or continuing\\nthe war and since it had come to this, he said,\\nwithout spilling a drop of blood, or incurring one\\nfifth of the expense of a year s campaign, the com-\\nfort and happiness of the American loyalists could\\nbe easily secured. By this he meant that, should\\nAmerica fail to make good their losses, it was far\\nbetter for England to indemnify them herself than\\nto prolong indefinitely a bloody and ruinous strug-\\ngle. As we shall hereafter see, this liberal and\\nenlightened policy was the one which England\\nreally pursued, so far as practicable, and her honour\\nwas completely saved. That Shelburne and Pitt\\nwere quite right there can now be little doubt.\\nBut argument was of no avail against the resistless\\npower of the coalition. On the 17tli of February\\nLord John Cavendish moved an amendment to the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "44 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nministerial address on tlie treaty, refusing to ap-\\nprove it. On the 21st he moved a further amend-\\nment condemning the treaty. Both motions were\\ncarried, and on tlie 24th Lord Shelburne resigned.\\nlie did not dissolve Parliament and appeal to the\\ncountry, partly because he was aware of his per-\\nsonal unpopularity, and partly because, in spite of\\nthe general disgust at the coalition, there was little\\ndoubt that on the particular question of the treaty\\nthe public opinion agreed with the majority in Par-\\nliament, and not with the ministry. For this rea-\\nson, Pitt, though personally popular, saw that it\\nwas no time for him to take the first place in the\\ngovernment, and when the king proceeded to offer\\nit to him he declined.\\nFor more than five weeks, while the treasury\\nwas nearly empty, and the question of peace or war\\nstill hung in the balance, England was without a\\nregular government, while the angry king went\\nhuntino; for some one who would consent to be his\\nprime minister. He was determined not to submit\\nThe kin s coalitiou. He was naturally cu-\\nwrath. raged at Lord North for turning against\\nhim. Meeting one day North s father, Lord Guil-\\nford, he went up to him, tragically wringing his\\nhands, and exclaimed in accents of woe, Did I\\never think, my Lord Guilford, that your son would\\nthus have betrayed me into the hands of Mr.\\nFox He appealed in vain to Lord Gower, and\\nthen to Lord Temple, to form a ministry. Lord\\nGower suggested that perhaps Thomas Pitt, cousin\\nof William, might be willing to serve. I desired\\nhim, said the king, to apply to Mr. Thomas Pitt,", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 45\\nor Mr. Thomas anybody. It was of no use. By\\nthe 2d of April Parliament had become furious at\\nthe delay, and George was obliged to yield. The\\nDuke of Portland was brought in as nominal prime\\nminister, with Fox as foreign secretary. North as\\nsecretary for home and colonies. Cavendish as\\nchancellor of the exchequer, and Keppel as first\\nlord of the admiralty. The only Tory in the cab-\\ninet, excepting North, was Lord Stormont, who\\nbecame president of the council. The commission-\\ners, Fitzherbert and Oswald, were recalled from\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2Paris, and the Duke of Manchester and David\\nHartley, son of the great philosopher, were ap-\\npointed in their stead. Negotiations continued\\nthrough the spring and summer. Attempts were\\nmade to change some of the articles, especially the\\nobnoxious article concerning the loyalists, but all\\nto no purpose. Hartley s attempt to negotiate\\na mutually advantageous commercial treaty with\\nAmerica also came to nothinsr. The a,.\\no The treaty is\\ndefinitive treaty which was finally signed af^b^^thfcr\\non the 3d of September, 1783, was an tjj) whkh^\\nexact transcript of the treaty which presently faus.\\nSbelburne had made, and for making which the\\npresent ministers had succeeded in turning him out\\nof office. No more emphatic justification of Shel-\\nburne s conduct of this business could possibly have\\nbeen obtained.\\nThe coalition ministry did not long survive the\\nfinal signing of the treaty. The events of the next\\nfew months are curiously instructive as showing\\nthe quiet and stealthy way in which a political\\nrevolution may be consummated in a thoroughly", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "46 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nconservative and constitutional country. Early in\\nthe winter session of Parliament Fox brousrht in\\nhis famous bill for organizing the government of\\nthe great empire which Clive and Hastings had\\nbuilt up in India. Popular indignation at the\\nministry had been strengthened by its adopting\\nthe same treaty of peace fop the making of which\\nit had assaulted Shelburne and now, on the pas-\\nsage of the India Bill by the House of Commons,\\nthere was a great outcry. Many provisions of the\\nbill were exceedingly unpopular, and its chief object\\nwas alleged to be the concentration of the immense\\npatronage of India into the hands of the old Whig\\nfamilies. With the popular feeling thus warmly\\nenlisted against the ministry, George III. was now\\nemboldened to make war on it by violent means\\nand, accordingly, when the bill came up in the\\nHouse of Lords, he caused it to be announced, by\\nLord Temple, that any peer who should vote in its\\nfavour would be regarded as an enemy by the king.\\nFour days later the House of Commons, by a vote\\nof 153 to 80, resolved that to report any opinion,\\nor pretended opinion, of his majesty upon any bill\\nor other proceeding depending in either house of\\nParliament, with a view to influence the votes of\\nthe members, is a high crime and misdemeanour,\\nderogatory to the honour of the crown, a breach of\\nthe fundamental privileges of Parliament, and sub-\\nversive of the constitution of this country. A\\nmore explicit or emphatic defiance to the king\\nwould have been hard to frame. Two days after-\\nward the Lords rejected the India Bill, and on the\\nnext day, the 18th of December, George turned\\nthe ministers out of office.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 47\\nIn this grave constitutional crisis the king in-\\nvited William Pitt to form a government, and this\\nyoung statesman, who had consistently opposed the\\ncoalition, now saw that his hour was constitutional\\ncome. He was more than any one else ^j^^^ over^^\\nthe favourite of the people. Fox s polit- fo^y of^pltt?*\\nical reputation was eclipsed, and North s\\nwas destroyed, by their unseemly alliance. Peo-\\nple were sick of the whole state of things which\\nhad accompanied the American war. Pitt, who\\nhad only come into Parliament in 1780, was free\\nfrom these unpleasant associations. The unblem-\\nished purity of his life, his incorruptible integrity,\\nhis rare disinterestedness, and his transcendent\\nability in debate were known to every one. As the\\nworthy son of Lord Chatham, whose name was\\nassociated with the most glorious moment of Eng-\\nlish history, he was peculiarly dear to the people.\\nHis position, however, on taking supreme office at\\nthe instance of a king who had just committed\\nan outrageous breach of the constitution, was ex-\\ntremely critical, and only the most consummate\\nskill could have won from the chaos such a victory\\nas he was about to win. When he became first\\nlord of the treasury and chancellor of the ex-\\nchequer, in December, 1783, he had barely com-\\npleted his twenty-fifth year. All his colleagues in\\nthe new cabinet were peers, so that he had to fight\\nsingle-handed in the Commons against the united\\ntalents of Burke and Sheridan, Fox and North\\nand there was a heavy majority against him, be-\\nsides. In view of this adverse majority, it was\\nPitt s constitutioual duty to dissolve Parliament", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "48 RESULTS OF YORKTOWN.\\nand appeal to the country. But Fox, unwilling to\\nimperil his great majority by a new election, now\\nmade the fatal mistake of opposing a dissolution\\nthus showing his distrust of the people and his\\ndread of their verdict. With consummate tact,\\nPitt allowed the debates to go on till March, and\\nthen, when the popular feeling in his favour had\\ngrown into wild enthusiasm, he dissolved Parlia-\\nment. In the general election which followed, 160\\nmembers of the coalition lost their seats, and Pitt\\nobtained the greatest majority that has ever been\\ngiven to an English minister.\\nThus was completed the political revolution in\\nEngland which was set on foot by the American\\nvictory at Yorktown. Its full significance was only\\ngradually realized. For the moment it might seem\\nthat it was the king who had triumphed. He had\\nshattered the alliance which had been formed for\\nthe purpose of curbing him, and the result of the\\nelection had virtually condoned his breach of the\\nconstitution. This apparent victory, however, had\\nbeen won only by a direct appeal to the people,\\nand all its advantages accrued to the\\nOverthrow of ttt tt*\\nGeorge III. a pCOplc, and UOt tO (jrCOrgC ill. xllS lU-\\nsystera of per-\\nsonai govern- geuious systcm ot wcak and divided,\\nministries, with himself for balance-\\nwheel, was destroyed. For the next seventeen\\nyears the real ruler of England was not George\\nIII., but William Pitt, who, with his great popular\\nfollowing, wielded such a power as no English\\nsovereign had possessed since the days of Eliza-\\nbeth. The political atmosphere was cleared of\\nintrigue and Fox, in the legitimate attitude of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "RESULTS OF YORKTOWN. 49\\nleader of the new opposition, entered upon the\\nglorious part of his career. There was now set in\\nmotion that great work of reform which, hindered\\nfor a while by the reaction against the French revo-\\nlutionists, won its decisive victory in 1832. Down\\nto the very moment at which American and Brit-\\nish history begin to flow in distinct and separate\\nchannels, it is interesting to observe how closely\\nthey are implicated with each other. The victory\\nof the Americans not only set on foot the British\\nrevolution here described, but it figured most\\nprominently in each of the political changes that\\nwe have witnessed, down to the very eve of the\\noverthrow of the coalition. The system which\\nGeorge III. had sought to fasten upon America,\\nin order that he might fasten it upon England,\\nwas shaken off and shattered by the good people\\nof both countries at almost the same moment of\\ntime.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER II.\\nTHE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nThe times that tried men s souls are over,\\nsaid Thomas Paine in the last number of the\\nCrisis, which he published after hearing that the\\nnegotiations for a treaty of peace had been con-\\ncluded. The preliminary articles had been signed\\nat Paris on the 20th of January, 1783. The news\\narrived in America on the 23d of March, in a let-\\nter to the president of Congress from Lafayette,\\nwho had returned to France soon after the victory\\nat Yorktown. A few days later Sir Guy Carleton\\nreceived his orders from the ministry to proclaim a\\ncessation of hostilities by land and sea. A similar\\nproclamation made by Congress was formally com-\\nmunicated to the army by Washington on the 19th\\nof April, the eighth anniversar}^ of the first blood-\\nshed on Lexington green. Since Wayne had\\ndriven the British from Georgia, early in the pre-\\nceding year, there had been no military operations\\nbetween the regular armies. Guerrilla warfare\\nbetween Whig and Tory had been kept up in\\nparts of South Carolina and on the frontier of\\nNew York, where Thayendanegea was still alert\\nand defiant while beyond the mountains the tom-\\nahawk and scalping-knife had been busy, and\\nWashington s old friend and comrade, Colonel", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 51\\nCrawford, had been scorched to death by the fire-\\nbrands of the red demons but the armies had sat\\nstill, awaiting the peace which every one felt sure\\nmust speedily come. After Cornwallis s surrender,\\nWashington marched his army back to the Hud-\\nson, and established his headquarters at Newburgh.\\nRochambeau followed somewhat later, and in Sep-\\ntember joined the Americans on the Hudson but\\nin December the French array marched to Boston,\\nand there embarked for France. After the formal\\ncessation of hostilities on the 19th of April, 1783,\\nWashington granted furloughs to most of his sol-\\ndiers and these weather-beaten veterans trudged\\nhomeward in all directions, in little groups of four\\nor five, depending largely for their subsistence on\\nthe hospitality of the farm-houses along the road.\\nArrived ajkhome, their muskets were hung over\\nthe chimney-piece as trophies for grandchildren to\\nbe proud of, the stories of their exploits and their\\nsufferings became household legends, and they\\nturned the furrows and drove the cattle to pasture\\njust as in the old colony times. Their furloughs\\nwere equivalent to a fuU discharge, for on the 3d\\nof September the definitive treaty was departure of\\nsigned, and the country was at peace. troopsfNov.\\nOn the 3d of November the army was\\nformally disbanded, and on the 25th of that month\\nSir Guy Carleton s army embarked from New\\nYork. Small British garrisons still remained in\\nthe frontier posts of Ogdensburg, Oswego, Niag-\\nara, Erie, Sandusky, Detroit, and Mackinaw, but\\nby the terms of the treaty these places were to be\\npromptly surrendered to the United States. On", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "52 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nthe 4th of December a barge waited at the South\\nFerry in New York to carry General Washington\\nacross the river to Paulus Hook. He was going to\\nAnnapolis, where Congress was in session, in order\\nto resign his command. At Fraunces s Tavern,\\nnear the ferry, he took leave of the officers who so\\nlong had shared his labours. One after another\\nthey embraced their beloved commander, while\\nthere were few dry eyes in the company. They\\nfollowed him to the ferry, and watched the depart-\\ning boat with hearts too full for words, and then\\nin solemn silence returned up the street. At Phil-\\nadelphia he handed to the comptroller of the treas-\\nury a neatly written manuscript, containing an\\naccurate statement of his expenses in the public\\nservice since the day when he took command of\\nthe army. The sums which Washington had thus\\nspent out of his private fortune amounted to\\n$64,315. For his personal services he declined to\\ntake any pay. At noon of the 23d, in the pres-\\nence of Congress and of a throng of ladies and\\nWashington gentlemen at Annapolis, the great gen-\\nco^and f gavc up his comtuaud, and requested\\nas an indulgence to be allowed to\\nretire into private life. General Mifflin, who dur-\\ning the winter of Valley Forge had conspired with\\nGates to undermine the confidence of the people\\nin Washington, was now president of Congress,\\nand it was for him to make the reply. You re-\\ntire, said Mifflin, from the theatxe of action\\nwith the blessings of your fellow-citizens, but the\\nglory of your virtues will not terminate with your\\nmilitary command; it will continue to animate", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 53\\nremotest ages. The next morning Washington\\nhurried away to spend Christmas at his pleasant\\nhome at Mount Vernon, which, save for a few\\nhours in the autumn of 1781, he had not set eyes\\non for more than eight years. His estate had\\nsuffered from his long absence, and his highest\\nambition was to devote himself to its simple in\u00c2\u00bb\\nterests. To his friends he offered unpretentious\\nhospitality. My manner of living is plain, he\\nsaid, and I do not mean to be put out of it. A\\nglass of wine and a bit of mutton are always\\nready, and such as will be content to partake of\\nthem are always welcome. Those who expect\\nmore will be disappointed. To Lafayette he\\nwrote that he was now about to solace himself with\\nthose tranquil enjoyments of which the anxious\\nsoldier and the weary statesman know but little.\\nI have not only retired from all public employ-\\nments, but I am retiring within myself, and shall\\nbe able to view the solitary walk and tread the\\npaths of private life with heartfelt satisfaction.\\nEnvious of none, I am determined to be pleased\\nwith all and this, my dear friend, being the order\\nof my march, I will move gently down the stream\\nof life until I sleep with my fathers.\\nIn these hopes Washington was to be disap-\\npointed. All the world is touched by his repub-\\nlican virtues, wrote Luzerne to Vergennes, but\\nit will be useless for him to try to hide himself and\\nlive the life of a private man he will always be\\nthe first citizen of the United States. It indeed\\nrequired no prophet to foretell that the American\\npeople could not long dispense with the services of", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "54 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nthis greatest of citizens. Washington had already\\nput himself most explicitly on record as the leader\\nof the men who were urging the people of the\\nUnited States toward the formation of a more per-\\nfect union. The great lesson of the war had not\\nbeen lost on him. Bitter experience of the evils\\nattendant upon the weak government of the Conti-\\nnental Congress had impressed upon his mind the\\nurgent necessity of an immediate and thorough\\nreform. On the 8th of June, in view of the ap-\\nproaching disbandment of the army, he had ad-\\ndressed to the governors and presidents of the\\nseveral states a circular letter, which he wished\\nto have regarded as his legacy to the American\\npeople. In this letter he insisted upon four things\\nas essential to the very existence of the United\\nHis ie ac independent power. First,\\nto the Ameri- there must be an indissoluble union of\\ncan peoi)le,\\nJune s, 17S3. ^iM the states under a single federal\\ngovernment, which must possess the power of en-\\nforcing its decrees for without such authority it\\nwould be a government only in name. Secondly,\\nthe debts incurred by Congress for the purpose of\\ncarrying on the war and securing independence\\nmust be paid to the uttermost farthing. Thirdly,\\nthe militia system must be organized through-\\nout the thirteen states on uniform principles.\\nFourthly, the people must be willing to sacrifice, if\\nneed be, some of their local interests to the com-\\nmon weal they must discard their local prejudices,\\nand regard one another as fellow-citizens of a com-\\nmon country, with interests in the deepest and\\ntruest sense identical.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 55\\nThe unparalleled grandeur of Washington s char-\\nacter, his heroic services, and his utter disinterest-\\nedness had given him such a hold upon the people\\nas scarcely any other statesman known to history,\\nsave perhaps William the Silent, has ever pos-\\nsessed. The noble and sensible words of his cir-\\ncular letter were treasured up in the minds of all\\nthe best people in the country, and when the time\\nfor reforming the weak and disorderly government\\nhad come it was again to Washington that men\\nlooked as their leader and guide. But that time\\nhad not yet come. Only through the discipline\\nof perplexity and tribulation could the people be\\nbrought to realize the indispensable necessity of\\nthat indissoluble union of which Washington had\\nspoken. Thomas Paine was sadly mistaken when,\\nin the moment of exultation over the peace, he de-\\nclared that the trying time was ended. The most\\ntrying time of all was just beginning. It^is not\\ntoo much to say that the period of five years fol-\\nlowing the peace of 1783 was the most critical\\nmoment in all the history of the American people.\\nThe dangers from which we were saved in 1788\\nwere even greater than the dangers from which we\\nwere saved in 1865. In the War of Secession\\nthe love of union had come to be so strong that\\nthousands of men gave up their lives for it as cheer-\\nfully and triumphantly as the martyrs of older\\ntimes, who sang their hymns of praise Absence of a\\neven while their flesh was withering in u^o ^anV^\\nthe relentless flames. In 1783 the love dangToT*\\nof union, as a sentiment for which men ^^^^y-\\nwould fight, had scarcely come into existence", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "56 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\namong the people of these states. The souls of\\nthe men of that day had not been thrilled by the\\nimmortal eloquence of Webster, nor had they\\ngained the historic experience which gave to Web-\\nster s words their meaning and their charm. They\\nhad not gained control of all the fairest part of the\\ncontinent, with domains stretching more than three\\nthousand miles from ocean to ocean, and so situated\\nin geographical configuration and commercial rela-\\ntions as to make the very idea of disunion absurd,\\nsave for men in whose minds fanaticism for the\\nmoment usurped the place of sound judgment.\\nThe men of 1783 dwelt in a long, straggling series\\nof republics, fringing the Atlantic coast, bordered\\non the north and south and west by two European\\npowers whose hostility they had some reason to\\ndread. But nine years had elapsed since, in the\\nfirst Continental Congress, they had begun to act\\nconsistently and independently in common, under\\nthe sevei-e pressure of a common fear and an im-\\nmediate necessity of action. Even under such cir-\\ncumstances the war had languished and come nigh\\nto failure simply through the difficulty of insuring\\nconcerted action. Had there been such a govern-\\nment that the whole power of the thirteen states\\ncould have been swiftly and vigorously wielded as a\\nunit, the British, fighting at such disadvantage as\\nthey did, might have been driven to their ships in less\\nthan a year. The length of the war and its worst\\nhardships had been chiefly due to want of organiza^\\ntion. Congress had steadily declined in power and\\nin respectability it was much weaker at the end\\nof the war than at the beginning and there was", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS, hi\\nreason to fear that as soon as the common pressure\\nwas removed the need for concerted action would\\nquite cease to be felt, and the scarcely formed\\nUnion would break into pieces. There was the\\ngreater reason for such a fear in that, while no\\nstrong sentiment had as yet grown up in favour of\\nunion, there was an intensely powerful sentiment\\nin favour of local self-government. This feeling\\nwas scarcely less strong as between states like\\nConnecticut and Rhode Island, or Maryland and\\nVirginia, than it was between Athens and Megara,\\nArgos and Sparta, in the great days of Grecian\\nhistory. A most wholesome feeling it was, and one\\nwhich needed not so much to be curbed as to be\\nguided in the right direction. It was a feeling\\nwhich was shared by some of the foremost Revolu-\\ntionary leaders, such as Samuel Adams and Rich-\\nard Henry Lee. But unless the most profound\\nand delicate sta,tesmanship should be forthcoming,\\nto take this sentiment under its guidance, there\\nwas much reason to fear that the release from the\\ncommon adhesion to Great Britain would end in\\nsetting up thirteen little republics, ripe for endless\\nsquabbling, like the republics of ancient Greece\\nand mediaeval Italy, and ready to become the jsrey\\nof England and Spain, even as Greece became the\\nprey of Macedonia.\\nAs such a lamentable result was dreaded by\\nWashington, so by statesmen in Europe it was gen-\\nerally expected, and by our enemies it was eagerly\\nhoped for. Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester,\\nwas a far-sighted man in many things; but he\\nsaid, As to the future grandeur of America, and", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "58 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nits being* a rising empire under one head, whether\\nrepublican or monarchical, it is one of the idlest\\nand most visionary notions that ever was con-\\nceived even by writers of romance. The mutual\\nantipathies and clashing interests of the Americans,\\ntheir difference of governments, habitudes, and\\nmanners, indicate that they will have no centre of\\nunion and no common interest. They never can\\nbe united into one compact empire under any spe-\\ncies of government whatever a disunited people\\ntill the end of time, suspicious and distrustful of\\neach other, they will be divided and subdivided into\\nlittle commonwealths or principalities, according\\nto natural boundaries, by great bays of the sea,\\nand by vast rivers, lakes, and ridges of mountains.\\nSuch were the views of a liberal-minded philos-\\nopher who bore us no ill-will. George III. said\\nofficially that he hoped the Americans would not\\nsuffer from the evils which in history had always\\nfollowed the throwing off of monarchical govern-\\nment which meant, of course, that he hoped they\\nwould suffer from such evils. He believed we\\nshould get into such a snarl that the several states,\\none after another, would repent and beg on their\\nknees to be taken back into the British empire.\\nFrederick of Prussia, though friendly to the Amer-\\nicans, argued that the mere extent of country from\\nMaine to Georgia would suffice either to break up\\nthe Union, or to make a monarchy necessary. No\\nrepublic, he said, had ever long existed on so great\\nFalse iiistoric scale. The Roman republic had been\\nanalogies. transformed into a despotism mainly by\\ntlje excessive enlargement of its area. It was only", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 59\\nlittle states, like Venice, Switzerland, and Holland,\\nthat could maintain a republican government.\\nSuch arguments were common enough a century\\nago, but they overlooked three essential differences\\nbetween the Roman republic and the United States.\\nThe Roman republic in Caesar s time comprised\\npeoples differing widely in blood, in speech, and\\nin degree of civilization it was perpetually threat-\\nened on all its frontiers by powerful enemies and\\nrepresentative assemblies were unknown to it. The\\nonly free government of which the Roman knew\\nanything was that of the primary assembly or town\\nmeeting. On the other hand, the people of the\\nUnited States were all English in speech, and\\nmainly English in blood. The differences in de-\\nSCi-ee of civilization between such states as Massa-\\nchusetts and North Carolina were considerable,\\nbut in comparison with such differences as those\\nbetween Attika and Lusitania they might well be\\ncalled slight. The attacks of savages on the fron-\\ntier were cruel and annoying, but never since the\\ntime of King Philip had they seemed to threaten\\nthe existence of the white man. A very small\\nmilitary establishment was quite enough to deal\\nwith the Indians. And to crown all, the American\\npeople were thoroughly familiar with the principle\\nof representation, having practised it on a grand\\nscale for four centuries in England, and for more\\nthan a century in America. The governments of\\nthe thirteen states were all similar, and the polit-\\nical ideas of one were perfectly intelligible to all\\nthe others. It was essentially fallacious, therefore,\\nto liken the case of the United States to that of\\nancient Rome.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "60 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nBut there was another feature of the case which\\nwas quite hidden from the men of 1783. Just be-\\nfore the assembling- of the first Continental Con-\\ngress James Watt had completed his steam-engine\\nin the summer of 1787, while the Federal Con-\\nvention was sitting at Philadelphia, John Fitch\\nlaunched his first steamboat on the Delaware\\nRiver and Stephenson s invention of the locomo-\\ninfluenceof tivc was to follow in Icss than half a\\nrailroad and\\nteiegrapii ccnturv. Evcu witli all other conditions\\nupon perpetu-\\nity of the favourable, it is doubtful if the Ameri-\\nAmerican\\nUnion. can Uniou could have been preserved to\\nthe present time without the railroad. But for the\\nmilitary aid of railroads our government would\\nhardly have succeeded in putting down the rebel-\\nlion of the southern states. In the debates on the\\nOregon Bill in the United States Senate in 1843,\\nthe idea that we could ever have an interest in so\\nremote a country as Oregon was loudly ridiculed\\nby some of the members. It would take ten\\nmonths said George McDuffie, the very able\\nsenator from South Carolina for representa-\\ntives to get from that territory to the District of\\nColumbia and back again. Yet since the building:\\nof railroads to the Pacific coast, we can go from\\nBoston to the capital of Oregon in much less time\\nthan it took John Hancock to make the journey\\nfrom Boston to Philadelphia. Railroads and tele-\\ngraphs have made our vast country, both for polit-\\nical and for social purposes, more snug and com-\\npact than little Switzerland was in the Middle\\nAges or New England a century ago.\\nAt the time of our Revolution the difficulties of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 61\\ntravelling formed an important social obstacle to\\nthe union of the states. In our time the persons\\nwho pass in a single day between New York and\\nBoston by six or seven distinct lines of railroad\\nand steamboat are numbered by thousands. In\\n1783 two stage-coaches were enough for all the\\ntravellers, and nearly all the freight besides, that\\nwent between these two cities, except such large\\nfreight as went by sea around Cape Cod. The\\njourney began at three o clock in the morning.\\nHorses were changed every twenty miles, and if\\nthe roads were in good condition some forty miles\\nwould be made by ten o clock in the evening. In\\nbad weather, when the passengers had Difficulty of\\nto get down and lift the clumsy wheels hundred^yeara\\nout of deep ruts, the progress was much\\nslower. The loss of life from accidents, in propor-\\ntion to the number of travellers, was much greater\\nthan it has ever been on the railway. Broad riv-\\ners like the Connecticut and Housatonic had no\\nbridges. To drive across them in winter, when\\nthey were solidly frozen over, was easy and in\\npleasant summer weather to cross in a row-boat\\nwas not a dangerous undertaking. But squalls at\\nsome seasons and floating ice at others were things\\nto be feared. More than one instance is recorded\\nwhere boats were crushed and passengers drowned,\\nor saved only by scrambling upon ice-floes. After\\na week or ten days of discomfort and danger the\\njolted and jaded traveller reached New York.\\nSuch was a journey in the most highly civilized\\npart of the United States. The case was still\\nworse in the South, and it was not so very much", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "62 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nbetter in England and France. In one respect\\nthe traveller in the United States fared better than\\nthe traveller in Europe the danger from highway-\\nmen was but slight.\\nSuch being the difficulty of travelling, people\\nnever made long journeys save for very important\\nreasons. Except in the case of the soldiers, most\\npeople lived and died without ever having seen\\nany state but their own. And as the mails were\\nirregular and uncertain, and the rates of postage\\nvery high, people heard from one another but sel-\\ndom. Commercial dealings between the different\\nstates were inconsiderable. The occupation of the\\npeople was chiefly agriculture. Cities were few\\nand small, and each little district for the most\\npart supported itself. Under such circumstances\\nthe different parts of the country knew very lit-\\ntle about each other, and local prejudices were in-\\ntense. It was not simply free Massachusetts and\\nLocal jealous- slavc-holding South Carolina, or English\\nihie in inl Counccticut aud Dutch New York, that\\nprimevar^sa misuudcrstood and ridiculed each the\\nother but even between such neighbour-\\ning states as Connecticut and Massachusetts, both\\nof them thoroughly English and Puritan, and in\\nall their social conditions almost exactly alike, it\\nused often to be said that there was no love lost.\\nThese unspeakably stupid and contemptible local\\nantipathies are inherited by civilized men from\\nthat far-off time when the clan system prevailed\\nover the face of the earth, and the hand of every\\nclan was raised against its neighbours. They are\\npale and evanescent survivals from the universal", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 63\\nprimitive warfare, and the sooner they die out\\nfrom human society the better for every one.-\\nThey should be stigmatized and frowned down\\nupon every fit occasion, just as we frown upon\\nswearing- as a symbol of anger and contention.\\nBut the only thing which can finally destroy them\\nis the widespread and unrestrained intercourse of\\ndifferent groups of people in peaceful social and\\ncommercial relations. The rapidity with which\\nthis process is now going on is the most encourag-\\ning of all the symptoms of our modern civilization.\\nBut a century ago the progress made in this direc-\\ntion had been relatively small, and it was a very\\ncritical moment for the American people.\\nThe thirteen states, as already observed, had\\nworked in concert for only nine years, during\\nwhich their cooperation had been feeble and halt-\\ning. But the several state governments had been\\nin operation since the first settlement of the coun-\\ntry, and were regarded with intense loyalty by the\\npeople of the states. Under the royal governors\\nthe local political life of each state had been vig-\\norous and often stormy, as befitted communities of\\nthe sturdy descendants of English freemen. The\\nlegislative assembly of each state had stoutly de-\\nfended its liberties against the encroachments of\\nthe governor. In the eyes of the people it was the\\nonly power on earth competent to lay taxes upon\\nthem, it was as supreme in its own sphere as the\\nBritish Parliament itself, and in behalf of this\\nrooted conviction the people had gone to war and\\nwon their independence from England. During\\nthe war the people of all the states, except Con-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "64 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nnecticut and Rhode Island, had carefully remod-\\nelled their governments, and in the performance of\\nthis work had withdrawn many of their ablest\\nstatesmen from the Continental Congress but ex-\\ncept for the expulsion of the royal and\\nConservative i i i\\ncharacter of proprietary governors, the work had in\\nthe Revolution.\\nno instance been revolutionary in its\\ncharacter. It was not so much that the American\\npeople gained an increase of freedom by their sep-\\naration from England, as that they kept the free-\\ndom they had always enjoyed, that freedom which\\nwas the inalienable birthright of Englishmen, but\\nwhich George III. had foolishly sought to impair.\\nThe American Revolution was therefore in no re-\\nspect destructive. It was the most conservative\\nrevolution known to history, thoroughly English\\nin conception from beginning to end. It had no\\nlikeness whatever to the terrible popular convulsion\\nwhich soon after took place in France. The mis-\\nchievous doctrines of Rousseau had found few\\nreaders and fewer admirers among the Americans.\\nThe principles upon which their revolution was\\nconducted were those of Sidney, Harrington, and\\nLocke. In remodelling the state governments, as\\nin planning the union of the states, the precedents\\nfollowed and the principles applied were almost\\npurely English. We must now pass in review the\\nprincipal changes wrought in the several states,\\nand we shall then be ready to consider the general\\nstructure of the Confederation, and to describe the\\nremarkable series of events which led to the adop-\\ntion of our Federal Constitution.\\nIt will be remembered that at the time of the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 65\\nDeclaration of Independence there were three kinds\\nof government in the colonies. Connecticut and\\nRhode Island had always been true republics, with\\ngovernors and legislative assemblies elected by the\\npeople. Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland\\npresented the appearance of limited hereditary\\nmonarchies. Their assemblies were chosen by the\\npeople, but the lords projjrietary appointed their\\ngovernors, or in some instances acted as governors\\nthemselves. In Maryland the office of lord pro-\\nprietary was hereditary in the Calvert g^ate govern-\\nfamily in Delaware and Pennsylvania, ^i^d! asTemI\\nwhich, though distinct commonwealths from cSai*^\\nwith separate legislatures, had the same\\nexecutive head, it was hereditary in the Penn fam-\\nily. The other eight colonies were viceroyalties,\\nwith governors appointed by the king, while in all\\nalike the people elected the legislatures. Accord-\\ningly in Connecticut and Rhode Island no change\\nwas made necessary by the Revolution, beyond the\\nmere omission of the king- s name from lesral doc-\\numents and their charters, which dated from the\\nmiddle of the seventeenth century, continued to do\\nduty as state constitutions till far into the nine-\\nteenth. During the Revolutionary War all the\\nother states framed new constitutions, but in most\\nessential respects they took the old colonial char-\\nters for their model. The popular legislative body\\nremained unchanged even in its name. In North\\nCarolina its supreme dignity was vindicated in its\\ntitle of the House of Commons in Virginia it was\\ncalled the House of Burgesses in most of the\\nstates the House of Representatives. The mem-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "X\\n66 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nbers were chosen each yeai except in South Caro-\\nlina, where they served for two years. In the\\nNew England states they represented the town-\\nships, in other states the counties. In all the\\nstates excejjt Pennsylvania a property qualification\\nwas required of them.\\nIn addition to this House of Representatives all\\nthe legislatures excejJt__those of Pennsylvania and\\nGeorgia contained a second or ufjperTibuse known\\nOrigin of the the Senate. The origin of the senate\\nsenates. j^ fouud in the govcmor s council\\nof colonial times, just as the House of Lords is de-\\nscended from the Witenagemot or council of great\\nbarons summoned by the Old-English kings. The\\nAmericans had been used to having the acts of\\ntheir popular assemblies reviewed by a council,\\nand so they retained this revisory body as an upper\\nhouse. A higher property qualification was re-\\nquired than for membership of the lower house,\\nand, except in New Hampshire, Massachusetts,\\nand South Carolina, the term of service was longer.\\nIn Maryland senators sat for five years, in Vir-\\nginia and New York for four years, elsewhere for\\ntwo years. In some states they were chosen by\\nthe people, in others by the lower house. Idl\\nMaryland they were chosen by a college of electors,\\nthus affording a precedent for the method of elect-\\ning the chief magistrate of the union under the\\nFederal Constitution.\\nGovernors were unpopidar in those days. There\\nwas too much flavour of royalty and high preroga-\\ntive aboiat them. Except in the two republics of\\nRhode Island and Connecticut, American political", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 67\\nhistory during the eighteenth century was chiefly\\nthe record of interminable squabbles between gov-\\nernors and legislatures, down to the moment when\\nthe detested agents of royalty were clapped into\\njail, or took refuge behind the bulwarks of a Brit-\\nish seventy-four. Accordingly the new constitu-\\ntions were very chary of the powers to be exercised\\nby the governor. In Pennsylvania and\\nDelaware, in New Hampshire and Mas- viewed with\\nsuspicion.\\nsachusetts, the governor was at nrst re-\\nplaced by an executive council, and the president\\nof this council was first magistrate and titular ruler\\nof the state. His dignity was imposing enough,\\nbut his authority was merely that of a chairman.\\nThe other states had governors chosen by the leg-\\nislatures, except in New York where the governor\\nwas elected by the people. No one was eligible to\\nthe office of governor who did not possess a speci-\\nfied amount of property. In most of the states\\nthe governor could not be reelected, he had no veto\\nupon the acts of the legislature, nor any power of\\nappointing officers. In 1780, in a new constitution\\ndrawn up by James Bowdoin and the two Adamses,\\nMassachusetts led the way in the construction of a\\nmore efficient executive department. The presi-\\ndent was replaced by a governor elected annually\\nby the people, and endowed with the power of ap-\\npointment and a suspensory veto. The first gov-\\nernor elected under this constitution was John\\nHancock. In 1783 New Hampshire adopted a\\nsimilar constitution. In 1790 Pennsylvania added\\nan upper house to its legislature, and vested the\\nexecutive power in ii governor elected by the peo-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "68 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\npie for a term of three years, and twice reeligible.\\nHe was intrusted with the power of appointment\\nto offices, with a suspensory veto, and with the\\nroyal prerogative of reprieving or pardoning crim-\\ninals. In 1792 similar changes were made in Del-\\naware. In 1789 Georgia added the upper house\\nto its legislature, and about the same time in sev-\\neral states the governor s powers were enlarged.\\nThus the various state governments were repeti-\\ntions on a small scale of what was then supposed\\nto be the triplex government of England, with its\\nKing, Lords, and Commons. The governor an-\\nswered to the king with his dignity curtailed by\\nelection for a short period, and by narrowly limited\\nprerogatives. The senate answered to the House\\nof Lords, except in being a representative and not\\na hereditary body. It was supposed to represent\\nmore especially that part of the community which\\nwas possessed of most wealth and consideration\\nand in several states the senators were apportioned\\nwith some reference to the amovuit of taxes paid\\nby different parts of the state. The senate of\\nNew York, in direct imitation of the House of\\nLords, was made a supreme court of errors. On\\nthe other hand, the assembly answered to the\\nHouse of Commons, save that its power was really\\nlimited by the senate as the power of the House\\nof Commons is not really limited by the House of\\nLords. But this peculiarity of the British Consti-\\ntution was not well understood a century ago and\\nthe misunderstanding, as we shall hereafter see,\\nexerted a very serious influence upon the form of\\nour federal government, as well as upon the consti-\\ntutions of the several states.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 69\\nIn all the thirteen states the common law of\\nEngland remained in force, as it does to this day\\nsave where modified by statute. British and col-\\nonial statutes made prior to the Revolution contin-\\nued also in force unless expressly repealed. Tlie\\nsystem of civil and criminal courts, the remedies in\\ncommon law and equity, the forms of writs, the\\nfunctions of justices of the peace, the courts of\\nprobate, all remained substantially unchanged. In\\nPennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey, the\\njudges held office for a term of seven years in all\\nthe other states they held office for life or during\\ngood behaviour. In all the states save Georgia\\nthey were appointed either by the gov-\\n1 \\\\l 1 1 T^. judiciary.\\nei^nor or by the legislature, it was\\nGeorgia that in 1812 first set the pernicious ex-\\nample of electing judges for short terms by the\\npeople,^ a practice which is responsible for much\\nof the degradation that the courts have suffered in\\nmany of our states, and which will have to be aban-\\ndoned before a proper administration of justice can\\never be secured.\\nIn bestowing the suffrage, the new constitutions\\nwere as conservative as in all other respects. The\\ngeneral state of opinion in America at that time,\\nwith regard to universal suffrage, was far more ad-\\nvanced than the general state of opinion in Eng-\\nland, but it was less advanced than the opinions\\nof such statesmen as Pitt and Shelburne and the\\nDuke of Richmond. There was a truly English\\nirregularity in the provisions which were made on\\nIn recent years Georgia has been one of the first states to\\nabandon this bad practice.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "70 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nthis subject. In New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,\\nThe limited Delaware, and South Carolina, all resi-\\nBuflrage. dent freemen who paid taxes could vote.\\nIn North Carolina all such persons could vote for\\nmembers of the lower house, but in order to vote\\nfor senators a freehold of fifty acres was required.\\nIn Virginia none could vote save those who pos-\\nsessed such a freehold of fifty acres. To vote for\\ngovernor or for senators in New York, one must\\nj^ossess a freehold of $250, clear of mortgage, and\\nto vote for assemblymen one must either have a\\nfreehold of $50, or pay a yearly rent of $10. The\\npettiness of these sums was in keeping with the\\ntime when two daily coaches sufficed for the traffic\\nbetween our two greatest commercial cities. In\\nRhode Island an unincumbered freehold worth\\n$134 was required but in Rhode Island and Penn-\\nsylvania the eldest sons of qualified freemen could\\nvote without payment of taxes. In all the other\\nstates the possession of a small amount of property,\\neither real or personal, varying from $33 to $200,\\nwas the necessary qualification for voting. Thus\\nslowly and irregularly did the states drift toward\\nuniversal suffrage but although the impediments\\nin the way of voting were more serious than they\\nseem to us in these days when the community is\\nmore prosperous and money less scarce, they were\\nstill not very great, and in the opinion of conserva-\\ntive people they barely sufficed to exclude from the\\nsuffrage such shiftless persons as had no visible in-\\nterest in keeping down the taxes.\\ni-A/V^/^At the time of the Revolution the succession to\\nV( property was regulated in New York and the south-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 71\\nern states by the English rule of primogeniture.\\nThe eldest son took all. In New Jersey, Pennsyl-\\nvania, Delaware, and the four New England states,\\nthe eldest son took a double share. It\\n_^ Abolition of\\nwas Georgia that led the way in decree- primogeni-\\nture, entails,\\ning the equal distribution of intestate and manorial\\nproperty, both real and personal and\\nbetween 1784 and 1796 the example was followed\\nby all the other states. At the same time entails\\nwere either definitely abolished, or the obstacles to\\ncutting them off were removed. In New York the\\nmanorial privileges of the great patroons were\\nswept away. In Maryland the old manorial system\\nhad long been dying a natural death through the\\nencroachments of the patriarchal system of slavery.\\nThe ownership of all ungranted lands within the\\nlimits of the thirteen states passed from the crown\\nnot to the Confederacy, but to the several state\\ngovernments. In Pennsylvania and Maryland such\\nungranted lands had belonged to the lords proprie-\\ntary. They were now forfeited to the state. The\\nPenn family was indemnified by Pennsylvania to\\nthe amount of half a million dollars but Mary-\\nland made no compensation to the Calverts, inas-\\nmuch as their claim was presented by an illegiti-\\nmate descendant of the last Lord Baltimore.\\nThe success of the American Revolution made it\\npossible for the different states to take measures\\nfor the gradual abolition of slavery and the imme-\\ndiate abolition of the foreign slave-trade. On this\\ngreat question the state of public opinion in Amer-\\nica was more advanced than in England. So great\\na thinker as Edmund Burke, who devoted much", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "72 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nthought to the subject, came to the conclusion that\\nslavery was an incurable evil, and that\\nsteps toward\\nthe abolition there was not the slightest hope that\\nof slavery and o i\\nthesiave- the trade in slaves could be stopped.\\nThe most that he thought could be done\\nby judicious legislation was to mitigate the horrors\\nwhich the poor negroes endured on board ship, or\\nto prevent wives from being sold away from their\\nhusbands or children from their parents. Such\\nwas the outlook to one of the greatest political\\nphilosophers of modern times just eighty-two years\\nbefore the immortal proclamation of President\\nLincoln But how vast was the distance between\\nBurke and Bossuet, who had declared about eighty\\nyears earlier that to condemn slavery was to con-\\ndemn the Holy Ghost It was equally vast be-\\ntween Burke and his contemj)orary Thurlow, who in\\n1799 poured out the vials of his wrath upon the\\naltogether miserable and contemjitible proposal\\nto abolish the slave-trade. George III. agreed\\nwith his chancellor, and resisted the movement for\\nabolition with all the obstinacy of which his hard\\nand narrow nature was capable. In 1769 the Vir-\\nginia legislature had enacted that the further im-\\nportation of negroes, to be sold into slavery, should\\nbe prohibited. But George III. commanded the\\ngovernor to veto this act, and it was vetoed. In\\nJefferson s first draft of the Declaration of Inde-\\npendence, this action of the king was made the oc-\\ncasion of a fierce denunciation of slavery, but in\\ndeference to the prejudices of South Carolina and\\nGeorgia the clause was struck out by Congress.\\nWhen George III. and his vetoes had been eJimi", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 73\\nnated from the case, it became possible for the states\\nto legislate freely on the subject. In 1776 negro\\nslaves were held in all the thirteen states, but in\\nall except South Carolina and Georgia there was a\\nstrong sentrmeiTTin favour of emancipation. In\\nNorth Carolina, which contained a large Quaker\\npopulation, and in which estates w^ere small and\\nwere often cultivated by free labour, the pro-slavery\\nfeeling was never so strong as in the southernmost\\nstates. In Virginia all the foremost statesmen\\nWashington, Jefferson, Lee, Randolph, Henry,\\nMadison, and Mason were opposed to the continu-\\nance of slavery and their opinions were shared by\\nmany of the largest planters. For tobacco-culture\\nslavery did not seem so indispensable as for the\\nraising of rice and indigo and in Virginia the\\nnegroes, half-civilized by kindly treatment, were\\nnot regarded with horror by their masters, like the\\nill-treated and ferocious blacks of South Carolina\\nand Georgia. After 1808 the policy and the sen-\\ntiments of Virginia underwent a marked change.\\nThe invention of the cotton-gin, taken in connec-\\ntion with the sudden and prodigious development\\nof manufactures in England, greatly stimulated the\\ngrowth of cotton in the ever-enlai*ging area of the\\nGulf states, and created an immense demand for\\nslave-labour, just at the time when the importation\\nof negroes from Africa came to an end. The\\nbreeding of slaves, to be sold to the planters of the\\nGulf states, then became such a profitable occupa-\\ntion in Virginia as entirely to change the popular\\nfeeling about slavery. But until 1808 Virginia\\nsympathized with the anti-slavery sentiment which", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "74 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nwas growing up in the northern states and the\\nsame was true of Maryland. Emancipation was,\\nhowever, much more easy to accomplish in the\\nnorth, because the number of slaves was small, and\\neconomic circumstances distinctly favoured free\\nlabour. In the work of gradual emancipation the\\nlittle state of Delaware led the way. In its new con-\\nstitution of 1776 the further introduction of slaves\\nwas prohibited, all restraints upon emancipation\\nhaving already been removed. In the assembly of\\nVirginia in 1778 a bill prohibiting the further in-\\ntroduction of slaves was moved and carried by\\nThomas Jefferson, and the same measure was passed\\nin Maryland in 1783, while both these states re-\\nmoved all restraints upon emancipation. North\\nCarolina was not ready to go quite so far, but in\\n1786 she sought to discourage the slave-trade by\\nputting a duty of X5 per head on all negroes there-\\nafter imported. New Jersey followed the example\\nof Maryland and Virginia. Pennsylvania went\\nfarther. In 1780 its assembly enacted that no\\nmore slaves should be brought in, and that all\\nchildren of slaves born after that date should be\\nfree. The same provisions were made by New\\nHampshire in its new constitution of 1783, and by\\nthe assemblies of Connecticut and Rhode Island in\\n1784. New York went farther still, and in 1785\\nenacted that all children of slaves thereafter born\\nshould not only be free, but should be admitted to\\nvote on the same conditions as other freemen. In\\n1788 Virginia, which contained many free negroes,\\nenacted that any person convicted of kidnapj^ing\\nor selling into slavery any free person should suffer", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 75\\ndeath on the gallows. Summing up all these facts,\\nwe see that within two years after the independence\\nof the United States had been acknowledged by-\\nEngland, while the two southernmost states had\\ndone nothing to check the growth of slavery. North\\nCarolina had discouraged the importation of slaves\\nVirginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey\\nhad stopped such importation and removed all re-\\nstraint upon emancipation and all the remaining\\nstates, except Massachusetts, had made gradual\\nemancipation compulsory. Massachusetts had gone\\nstill farther. Before the Revolution the anti-\\nslavery feeling had been stronger there than in\\nany other state, and cases brought into court for\\nthe purpose of testing the legality of slavery had\\nbeen decided in favour of those who were opposed\\nto the continuance of that barbarous institution.\\nIn 1777 an American cruiser brought into the j)ort\\nof Salem a captured British ship with slaves on\\nboard, and these slaves were advertised for sale,\\nbut on complaint being made before the legislature\\nthey were set free. The nev/ constitution of 1780\\ncontained a declaration of rights which asserted\\nthat all men are born free and have an equal and\\ninalienable right to defend their lives and liberties,\\nto acquire property, and to seek and obtain safety\\nand happiness. The supreme court presently de-\\ncided that this clause worked the abolition of slav-\\nery, and accordingly Massachusetts was the first of\\nAmerican states, within the limits of the Union, to\\nbecome in the full sense of the words a free com-\\nmonwealth. Of the negro inhabitants, not more\\nthan six thousand in number, a large proportion", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "76 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nhad already for a long time enjoyed freedom and\\nall were now admitted to the suffrage on the same\\nterms as other citizens.\\nBy the revolutionary legislation of the states\\nsome progress was also effected in the direction of\\na more complete religious freedom. Pennsylvania\\nand Delaware were the only states in which all\\nChristian sects stood socially and politi-\\nProgress to- i t tit i\\nward freedom callv OU an CQUal lOOtUlg. lu Kliode\\nin religion. tiiiit-\u00c2\u00bb i i\\nIsland all Protestants enjoyed equal\\nprivileges, but Catholics were debarred from vot-\\ning. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and\\nConnecticut, the old Puritan Congregationalism\\nwas the established religion. The Congregational\\nchurch was supported by taxes, and the minister,\\nonce chosen, kept his place for life or during good\\nbehaviour. He could not be got rid of unless for-\\nmally investigated and dismissed by an ecclesiasti-\\ncal council. Laws against blasphemy, which were\\nvirtually laws against heres)^, were in force in these\\nthree states. In Massachusetts, Catholic priests\\nwere liable to imprisonment for life. Any one\\nwho should dare to speculate too freely about the\\nnature of Christ, or the philosophy of the plan of\\nsalvation, or to express a doubt as to the plenary\\ninspiration of every word between the two covers\\nof the Bible, was subject to fine and imprisonment.\\nThe tithing-man still arrested Sabbath-breakers\\nand shut them up in the town-cage in the market-\\nplace he stopped all unnecessary riding or driving\\non Sunday, and haled people off to the meeting-\\nhouse whether they would or not. Such restraints\\nupon liberty were still endured by people who had", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 77\\ndared and suffered so much for liberty s sake.\\nThe men of Boston strove hard to secure the repeal\\nof these barbarous laws and the disestablishment\\nof the Congregational church but they were out-\\nvoted by the delegates from the rural towns. The\\nmost that could be accomplished was the provision\\nthat dissenters might escape the church-rate by\\nsupporting a church of their own. The nineteenth\\ncentury was to arrive before church and state were\\nfinally separated in Massachusetts. The new con-\\nstitution of New Hampshire was similarly illiberal,\\nand in Connecticut no change was made. Rhode\\nIsland nobly distinguished herself by contrast\\nwhen in 1784 she extended the franchise to Cath-\\nolics.\\nIn the six states just mentioned the British gov-\\nernment had been hindered by charter, and by the\\noverwhelming opposition of the people, from seri-\\nously trying to establish the Episcopal church.\\nThe sure fate of any such mad experiment had\\nbeen well illustrated in the time of Andros. In\\nthe other seven states there were no such insupera-\\nble obstacles. The Church of England was main-\\ntained with languid acquiescence in New York.\\nBy the Quakers and Presbyterians of New Jersey\\nand North Carolina, as well as in half-Catholic,\\nhalf-Puritan Maryland, its supremacy was unwill-\\ningly endured in the turbulent frontier common-\\nwealth of Georgia it was accepted with easy con-\\ntempt. Only in South Carolina and Virginia had\\nthe Church of England ever possessed any real\\nhold upon the people. The Episcopal clergy of\\nSouth Carolina, men of learning and high charac-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "78 THE Til I RT KEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\ntor, olectcd by their own conj^rcgatioiis iustc^ud of\\nbein :i])pointocl to their livings by a patron, were\\nthoron^lily independent, and in the hite war tlielr\\npow(nl ul inlUienee had been mainly exerted in\\nbehalf of the patriot eause. Ilenco, while they\\nretained their inlhienec^ after tlie (^lose of the war,\\nthtu o was no dii lienlty in disestaldishing the elnireh.\\nIt felt itself able to stand withont goviu-nmont snp-\\nj)ort. As soon as tlu^ ])olitieal separation from\\nEngland was effeeted, the Ei)iseopal ehnreh was\\naeeordingly separated from the state, not oidy in\\nSonth Carolina, Imt in all the states in whieh it\\nhad hitherto been npheld by the anthoi-ity of the\\nBritish governm( nt and in the tH)nstitniions of\\nNew Jersey, Georgia, and the two Carolinas, no\\nless than in those of Delaware and Pennsylvania,\\nit was explieitly providinl that no man should be\\nobliged to pay any church rate or attend any reli-\\ngions service save according to his own free and\\nunhami)ered will.\\nThe case of Virginia was peculiar. At first the\\nChurch of England had talten dei^p root there\\nbecause of the consickn-able inuuigration of nnan-\\nbers of the Cavalier ])arty after the downfall of\\nCharles I. Most of the great statesmen of Vir-\\nginia in the Ivevolution such as Washington,\\nMadison, Mason, .Jefferson, I endleton, Henry, the\\nLees, and the lvandol])hs were de-\\nCliuroh and c i i i i n\\nstate in vir- scencuiuts ot I avaluM s and members oi\\ngiiiiu.\\nthe Church of England. l ut foi- a long\\ntime th(^ E])iscoj)al clergy had betui falling into\\ndiscredit. Many of them were a})})ointed by the\\nBritish government and ordained by the IJishoj)", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 79\\nof Loudon, and they were affected by the irreli-\\ngious listlessness and low moral tone of the English\\nchurch in the eighteenth century. The Virginia\\nlegislature thought it necessary to jiass special laws\\nprohibiting these clergymen from drunkenness and\\nriotous living. It was said that they spent more\\ntime in hunting foxes and betting on race-horses\\nthan in conducting religious services or visiting\\nthe sick and according to Bishop Meade, many\\ndissolute parsons, discarded from the church in\\nEngland as unworthy, were yet thought fit to be\\npresented with livings in Virginia. To this gen-\\neral character of the clergy there were many ex-\\nceptions. There were many excellent clergymen,\\nespecially among the native Virginians, whose ap-\\npointment depended to some extent upon the repute\\nin which they were held by their neighbours. J jut\\non the whole the system was such as to illustrate\\nall the worst vices of a church supported by the\\ntemporal power. The Revolution achieved the dis-\\ncomfiture of a clergy already thus deservedly dis-\\ncredited. The parsons mostly embraced the cause\\nof the crown, but failed to carry their congrega-\\ntions with them, and thus they found themselves\\narrayed in hopeless antagonism to popular senti-\\nment in a state which contained perhaps fewer\\nTories in proportion to its population than any\\nother of the thirteen.\\nAt the same time the Episcopal church itself\\nhad gradually come to ])e a minority in the com-\\nmonwealth. For more than half a century Scotch\\nand Welsh Presbyterians, German Lutherans,\\nEnglish Quakers, and Baptists, had been work-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "80 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\ning their way southward from Pennsylvania and\\nNew Jersey, and had settled in the fertile country\\nwest of the Blue Ridge. Daniel Morgan, who had\\nwon the most brilliant battle of the Revolution,\\nwas one of these men, and sturdiness was a chief\\ncharacteristic of most of them. So long as these\\nfrontier settlers served as a much-needed bulwark\\nagainst the Indians, the church saw fit to ignore\\nthem and let them build meeting-houses and carry\\non religious services as they pleased. But when\\nthe peril of Indian attack had been thrust west-\\nward into the Ohio valley, and these dissenting\\ncommunities had waxed strong and prosperous,\\nthe ecclesiastical party in the state undertook to\\nlay taxes on them for the support of the Church\\nof England, and to compel them to receive Epis-\\ncopal clergymen to preach for them, to bless them\\nin marriage, and to bury their dead. The imme-\\ndiate consequence was a revolt which not only\\noverthrew the established church in Virginia, but\\nnearly effected its ruin. The troubles began in\\n1768, when the Baptists had made their way into\\nthe centre of the state, and three of their preach-\\ners were arrested by the sheriff of Spottsylvania.\\nAs the indictment was read against these men for\\npreaching the gospel contrary to law, a deep\\nand solemn voice interrupted the proceedings.\\nPatrick Henry had come on horseback many a\\nmile over roughest roads to listen to the trial,\\nand this phrase, which savoured of the religious\\ndespotisms of old, was quite too much for him.\\nMay it please your worships, he exclaimed,\\nwhat did I hear read Did I hear an expression", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 81\\nthat these men, whom your worships are about to\\ntry for misdemeanour, are charged with preaching\\nthe gospel of the Son of God The shamefast\\nsilence and confusion which ensued was of ill omen\\nfor the success of an undertaking so unwelcome to\\nthe growing liberalism of the time. The zeal of\\nthe persecuted Baptists was presently reinforced\\nby the learning and the dialectic skill of the Pres-\\nbyterian ministers. Unlike the Puritans of New\\nEngland, the Presbyterians were in favour of the\\ntotal separation of church from state. It was one\\nof their cardinal principles that the civil magistrate\\nhad no right to interfere in any way with matters\\nof religion. By taking this broad ground they\\nsecured the powerful aid of Thomas Jefferson, and\\nafterwards of Madison and Mason. The contro-\\nversy went on through all the years of the Revo-\\nlutionary War, while all Virginia, from the sea to\\nthe mountains, rang with fulminations and argu-\\nments. In 1776 Jefferson and Mason succeeded\\nin carrying a bill which released all dissenters from\\nparish rates and legalized all forms of worship.\\nAt last in 1785 Madison won the crowning victory\\nin the Religious Freedom Act, by which the Church\\nof England was disestablished and all Madison and\\nparish rates abolished, and still more, Freedom Act,\\nall religious tests were done away with.\\nIn this last respect Virginia came to the front\\namong all the American states, as Massachusetts\\nhad come to the front in the abolition of neero\\nslavery. Nearly all the states still imposed reli-\\ngious tests upon civil office-holders, from simply\\ndeclaring a general belief in the infallibleness of", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "82 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nthe Bible to accepting the doctrine of the Trinity.\\nThe Virginia statute, which declared that opinion\\nin matters of religion shall in nowise diminish,\\nenlarge, or affect civil capacities, was translated\\ninto French and Italian, and was widely read and\\ncommented on in Europe.\\nIt is the historian s unpleasant duty to add that\\nthe victory thus happily won was ungenerously fol-\\nlowed up. Theological and political odium com-\\nbined to overwhelm the Episcopal church in Vir-\\nginia. The persecuted became persecutors. It\\nwas contended that the property of the church,\\nhaving been largely created by unjustifiable taxa-\\ntion, ought to be forfeited. In 1802 its parson-\\nages and glebe lands were sold, its parishes wiped\\nout, and its clergy left without a calling. A\\nreckless sensualist, said Dr. Hawks, adminis-\\ntered the morning dram to his guests from the\\nsilver cup used in the communion service. But\\nin all this there is a manifest historic lesson. That\\nit should have been possible thus to deal with the\\nEpiscopal church in Virginia shows forcibly the\\nmoribund condition into which it had been brought\\nthrough dependence upon the extraneous aid of a\\npolitical sovereignty from which the people of Vir-\\nginia were severing their allegiance. The lesson\\nis most vividly enhanced by the contrast with the\\nchurch of South Carolina which, rooted in its own\\nsoil, was quite able to stand alone when govern-\\nment aid was withdrawn. In Virginia the church\\nin which George Washington was reared had so\\nnearly vanished by the year 1830 that Chief Jus-\\ntice Marshall said it was folly to dream of reviv-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 83\\ning so dead a thing. Nevertheless, under the\\nnoble ministration of its great bishop, William\\nMeade, the Episcopal church in Virginia, no\\nlonger relying upon state aid, but trusting in the\\ndivine persuasive power o\u00c2\u00a3 spiritual truth, was even\\nthen entering upon a new life and beginning to\\nexercise a most wholesome influence.\\nThe separation of the English church in Amer-\\nica from the English crown was the occasion of a\\ncurious difficulty with regard to the ordination of\\nbishops. Until after the Revolution there were no\\nbishops of that church in America, and between\\n1783 and 1785 it was not clear how candidates for\\nholy orders could receive the necessary consecra-\\ntion. In 1784 a young divinity student\\nHI- Mason Weema\\nfrom Maryland, named Mason Weems, aufi samuei\\nSeabury.\\nwho had been studying for some time\\nin England, applied to the Bishop of London for\\nadmission to holy orders, but was rudely refused.\\nWeems then had recourse to Watson, Bishop of\\nLlandaff, author of the famous reply to Gibbon.\\nWatson treated him kindly and advised him to get\\na letter of recommendation from the governor of\\nMaryland, but after this had been obtained he re-\\nferred him to the Archbishop of Canterbury, who\\nsaid that nothing could be done without the con-\\nsent of Parliament. As the law stood, no one\\ncould be admitted into the ranks of the English\\nclergy without taking the oath of allegiance and\\nacknowledging the king of England as the head of\\nthe church. Weems then wrote to John Adams\\nat the Hague, and to Franklin at Paris, to see if\\nthere were any Protestant bishops on the Con-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "84 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\ntinent from whom he could obtain consecration.\\nA rather amusing diplomatic correspondence en-\\nsued, and finally the king of Denmark, after tak-\\ning theological advice, kindly offered the services\\nof a Danish bishop, who was to perform the cere-\\nmony in Latin. Weems does not seem to have\\navailed himself of this permission, probably because\\nthe question soon reached a more satisfactory solu-\\ntion.i About the same time the Episcopal church\\nin Connecticut sent one of its ministers, Samuel\\nSeabury of New London, to England, to be or-\\ndained as bishop. The oaths of allegiance and\\nsupremacy stood as much in the way of the learned\\nand famous minister as in that of the young and\\nobscure student. Seabury accordingly appealed to\\nNovember 14 uou-juriug Jacobite bishops of the\\n1784. Episcopal church of Scotland, and at\\nlength was duly ordained at Aberdeen as bishop\\nof the diocese of Connecticut. While Seabury\\nwas in England, the churches in the various states\\nI suppose it was this same Mason Weems that was afterward\\nknown in Virginia as Parson Weems, of Pohick parish, near\\nMount Vernon. See Magazine of American History, iii. 465-472\\nV. 85-90. At first an eccentric preacher, Parson Weems became\\nan itinerant violin-player and book-peddler, and author of that\\nedifying work, The Life of George Washington, with Curious An-\\necdotes equally Honourable to Himself and Exemplary to his Young\\nCountrymen. On the title-page the author describes himself as\\nformerly rector of Mount Vernon Parish, which Bishop\\nMeade calls preposterous. The book is a farrago of absurdities,\\nreminding one, alike in its text and its illustrations, of an over-\\ngrown English eliap-book of the olden time. It has had an enor-\\nmous sale, and lias very likely contributed more than any other\\nsingle book toward foi ming the popular notion of Washington.\\nIt seems to have been this fiddling parson that first gave currency\\nto the everlasting story of the cherry-tree and the little hatchet.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 85\\nchose delegates to a general convention, which\\nframed a constitution for the Protestant Epis-\\ncopal Church of the United States of America.\\nAdvowsons were abolished, some parts of the lit-\\nurgy were dropped, and the tenure of ministers,\\neven of bishops, was to be during good behaviour.\\nAt the same time a friendly letter was sent to the\\nbishops of England, urging them to secure, if pos-\\nsible, an act of Parliament whereby American\\nclergymen might be ordained without taking the\\noaths of allegiance and supremacy. Such an act\\nwas obtained without much difficulty, and three\\nAmerican bishops were accordingly consecrated in\\ndue form. The peculiar ordination of Seabury\\nwas also recognized as valid by the general con-\\nvention, and thus the Episcopal church in Amer-\\nica was fairly started on its independent career.\\nThis foundation of a separate episcopacy west\\nof the Atlantic was accompanied by the further\\nseparation of the Methodists as a distinct religious\\nsociety. Although John Wesley regarded the no-\\ntion of an apostolical succession as superstitious,\\nhe had made no attempt to separate his followers\\nfrom the national church. He translated the titles\\nof bishop and priest from Greek into Latin\\nand English, calling them superintendent and\\nelder, but he did not deny the king s headship.\\nMeanwhile during the long period of his preaching\\nthere had begun to grow up a Methodist church\\nin America. George Whitefield had come over\\nand preached in Georgia in 1737, and in Massa-\\nchusetts in 1744, where he encountered much op-\\nposition on the part of the Puritan clergy. But", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "86 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nthe first Methodist church in America was founded\\nin the city of New York in 1766. In 1772 Wesley\\nsent over Francis Asbury, a man of shrewd sense\\nand deep religious feelins to act as liis\\nFrancis As-\\nbury and the assistant and representative in this coun-\\nMethodists. i\\ntry. At that time tliere were not more\\nthan a thousand Methodists, with six preachers,\\nand all these were in the middle and southern col-\\nonies but within five years, largely owing to the\\nzeal and eloquence of Asbury, these numbers had\\nincreased sevenfold. At the end of the war, see-\\ning the American Methodists cut loose from the\\nEnglish establishment, Wesley in his own house at\\nBristol, with the aid of two presbyters, proceeded\\nto ordain ministers enough to make a presbytery,\\nand thereupon set apart Thomas Coke to be\\nsuperintendent or bishop for America. On the\\nsame day of November, 1784, on which Seabury\\nwas consecrated by the non-jurors at Aberdeen,\\nCoke began preaching and baptizing in Mary-\\nland, in rude chapels built of logs or under the\\nshade of forest trees. On Christmas Eve a con-\\nference assembled at Baltimore, at which Asbury\\nwas chosen bishop by some sixty ministers pres-\\nent, and ordained by Coke, and the constitution of\\nthe Methodist church in America was organized.\\nAmong the poor white people of the southern\\nstates, and among the negroes, the new church\\nrapidly obtained great sway and at a somewhat\\nlater date it began to assume considerable propor-\\ntions in the north.\\nFour 3^ears after this the Presbyterians, who\\nwere most numerous in the middle states, organ-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 87\\nized their government in a general assembly, which\\nwas also attended by Congregationalist delegates\\nfrom New England in the capacity of simple ad-\\nvisers. The theological difference between these\\ntwo sects was so slight that an alliance grew up\\nbetween them, and in Connecticut some fifty years\\nlater their names were often inaccurately used as\\nif synonymous. Such a difference seemed to vanish\\nwhen confronted with the newer differences that\\nbegan to sprino up soon after the close\\nof the Revolution. The revolt against Roman catuo-\\nlies.\\nthe doctrine of eternal punishment was\\nalready beginning in New England, and among\\nthe learned and thoughtful clergy of Massachusetts\\nthe seeds of Unitarianism were germinating. The\\ngloomy intolerance of an older time was beginning\\nto yield to more enlightened views. In 1789 the\\nfirst Roman Catholic church in New England was\\ndedicated in Boston. So great had been the preju-\\ndice against this sect that in 1784 there were only\\n600 Catholics in all New England. In the four\\nsouthernmost states, on the other hand, there were\\n2,500 in New York and New Jersey there were\\n1,700; in Delaware and Pennsylvania there were\\n7,700; in Maryland there were 20,000; while\\namong the French settlements along the eastern\\nbank of the Mississippi there were supposed to be\\nnearly 12,000. In 1786 John Carroll, a cousin of\\nCharles Carroll of Carrollton, was selected by the\\nPope as his apostolic vicar, and was afterward suc-\\ncessively made bishop of Baltimore and archbishop\\nof the United States. By 1789 all obstacles to the\\nCatholic worship had been done away with in all\\nthe states.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "88 THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS.\\nIn this brief survey of the principal changes\\nwrought in the several states by the separation\\nfrom England, one cannot fail to be struck with\\ntheir conservative character. Things proceeded\\njust as they had done from time immemorial with\\nthe English race. Forms of government were\\nmodified just far enough to adapt them to the new\\nsituation and no farther. The abolition of entails,\\nof primogeniture, and of such few manorial privi-\\nleges as existed, were useful reforms of far less\\nsweeping character than similar changes would\\nhave been in England and they were accordingly\\neffected with ease. Even the abolition of slavery\\nin the northern states, where negroes were few in\\nnumber and chiefly employed in domestic service,\\nwrought nothing in the remotest degree resembling\\na social revolution. But nowhere was this consti-\\ntutionally cautious and precedent-loving mode of\\nproceeding more thoroughly exemplified than in\\nthe measures just related, whereby the Episcopal\\nand Methodist churches were sejjarated from the\\nEnglish establishment and placed upon an inde-\\npendent footing in the new world. From another\\nExce t in the P^ vicw it may be observed that all\\ninstance of tlicsc chang^es, cxccpt in the instance of\\nslavery, all o x\\nwere^ favorable slavcry, tcudcd to assimilatc the states\\nto union. ^q q-^q anothcr in their political and\\nsocial condition. So far as they went, these changes\\nwere favourable to union, and this was perhaps\\nespecially true in the case of the ecclesiastical\\nbodies, which brought citizens of different states\\ninto cooperation in pursuit of specific ends in\\ncommon.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "THE THIRTEEN COMMONWEALTHS. 89\\nA.t the same time tliis survey most forcibly re-\\nminds us how completely the legislation which\\nimmediately affected the daily domestic life of the\\ncitizen was the legislation of the single state in\\nwhich he lived. In the various reforms just passed\\nin review the United States government took no\\npart, and could not from the nature of the case.\\nEven to-day our national government has no power\\nover such matters, and it is to be hoped it never\\nwill have. But at the present day our national\\ngovernment performs many important functions of\\ncommon concern, which a century ago were scarcely\\nperformed at all. The organization of the single\\nstate was old in principle and well understood by\\neverybody. It therefore worked easily, and such\\nchanges as those above described were brought\\nabout with little friction. On the other hand, the\\nprinciples upon which the various relations of the\\nstates to each other were to be adjusted were not\\nwell understood. There was wide disagreement\\nupon the subject, and the attempt to compromise\\nbetween opposing views was not at first successful.\\nHence, in the management of affairs which con-\\ncerned the United States as a nation, we shall not\\nfind the central machinery working smoothly or\\nquietly. We are about to traverse a period of\\nuncertainty and confusion, in which it required all\\nthe political sagacity and all the good temper of\\nthe people to save the half-built ship of state from\\ngoing to pieces on the rocks of civil contention.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III.\\nTHE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nThat some kind of union existed between the\\nstates was doubted by no one. Ever since the\\nassembling of the first Continental Congress in\\n1774 the thirteen commonwealths had acted in\\nconcert, and sometimes most generously, as when\\nMaryland and South Carolina had joined in the\\nDeclaration of Independence without any crying\\ngrievances of their own, from a feeling that the\\ncause of one should be the cause of all. It has\\nsometimes been said that the Union was in its ori-\\ngin a league of sovereign states, each of which sur-\\nrendered a specific portion of its sovereignty to\\nthe federal government for the sake of the common\\nwelfare. Grave political arguments have been\\nbased upon this alleged fact, but such an account\\nof the matter is not historically true. There never\\nwas a time when Massachusetts or Virginia w^as an\\nabsolutely sovereign state like Holland or France.\\nSovereign over their own internal affairs they are\\nto-day as they were at the time of the Revolution,\\nbut there was never a time when they presented\\nthemselves before other nations as sovereign, or\\nwere recognized as such. Under the government\\nof England before the Revolution the thirteen\\ncommonwealths were independent of one another,", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 91\\nand were held together, juxtaposed rather than\\nunited, only throuijh their alleg-iance to The several\\nstates have\\nthe British crown. Plad that allegiance ever enjoyed\\ncomplete sov-\\nbeen maintained there is no telling how ereignty.\\nlong they might have gone on thus disunited and\\nthis, it seems, should be one of our chief reasons\\nfor rejoicing that the political connection with\\nEngland was dissolved when it was. A permanent\\nredress of grievances, and even virtual indepen-\\ndence su.ch as Canada now enjoys, we might per-\\nhaps have gained had we listened to Lord North s\\nproposals after the surrender of Burgoyne but\\nthe formation of the Federal Union would cer-\\ntainly have been long postponed, and when we\\nrealize the grandeur of the work which we are now\\ndoing in the world through the simple fact of such\\na union, we cannot fail to see that such an issue\\nwould have been extremely unfortunate. How-\\never this may be, it is clear that until the connec-\\ntion with England was severed the thirteen com-\\nmonwealths were not united, nor were they\\nsovereign. It is also clear that in the very act of\\nsevering their connection with England these com-\\nmonwealths entered into some sort of union which\\nwas incompatible with their absolute sovereignty\\ntaken severally. It was not the people of New\\nHampshire, Massachusetts, and so on through the\\nlist, that declared their independence of Great\\nBritain, but it was the representatives of the\\nUnited States in Congress assembled, and speak-\\ning as a single body in the name of the whole.\\nThree weeks before this declaration was adopted,\\nCongress appointed a committee to draw up the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "92 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\narticles of confederation and perpetual union,\\nby which the sovereignty of the several states was\\nexpressly limited and curtailed in many important\\nparticulars. This committee had finished its work\\nby the 12th of July, but the articles were not\\nadopted by Congress until the autumn of 1777, and\\nthey were not finally put into operation until the\\nspring of 1781. During this inchoate period of\\nunion the action of the United States was that\\nof a confederation in which some portion of the\\nseveral sovereignties was understood to be sur-\\nrendered to the whole. It was the business of the\\narticles to define the precise nature and extent of\\nthis surrendered sovereignty which no state by it-\\nself ever exercised. In the mean time this sover-\\neignty, undefined in nature and extent, was exer-\\ncised, as well as circumstances permitted, by the\\nContinental Congress.\\nA most remarkable body was this Continental\\nThe Continen- Cougrcss. For the vicissitudcs through\\ntoe^iTraordl wliich it passcd, there is perhaps no\\nnary character. revolutionary body, savc the Long\\nParliament, which can be compared with it. For\\nits origin we must look back to the committees\\nof correspondence devised by Jonathan Mayhew,\\nSamuel Adams, and Dabney Carr. First assem-\\nbled in 1774 to meet an emergency which was gen-\\nerally believed to be only temporary, it continued\\nto sit for nearly seven years before its powers were\\never clearly defined and during those seven years\\nit exercised some of the highest functions of sover-\\neignty which are possible to any governing body.\\nIt declared the independence of the United States", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 93\\nit contracted an offensive and defensive alliance\\nwith France it raised and organized a Continental\\narmy it borrowed large sums of money, and\\npledged what the lenders understood to be the\\nnational credit for their repayment it issued an\\ninconvertible paper currency, granted letters of\\nmarque, and built a navy. All this it did in the\\nexercise of what in later times would have been\\ncalled implied war powers, and its authority\\nrested upon the general acquiescence in the pur-\\nposes for which it acted and in the measures which\\nit adopted. Under such circumstances its functions\\nwere very inefficiently performed. But the articles\\nof confederation, which in 1781 defined its powers,\\nserved at the same time to limit them so that for\\nthe remaining eight years of its existence the Con-\\ntinental Congress grew weaker and weaker, until it\\nwas swept away to make room for a more efficient\\ngovernment.\\nJohn Dickinson is supposed to have been the\\nprincipal author of the articles of con- r^^ articles of\\nfederation but as the work of the com- ^ederation.\\nmittee was done in secret and has never been\\nreported, the point cannot be determined. In\\nNovember, 1777, Congress sent the articles to the\\nseveral state legislatures, with a circular letter\\nrecommending them as containing the only plan of\\nunion at all likely to be adopted. In the course of\\nthe next fifteen months the articles were ratified by\\nall the states except Maryland, which refused to\\nsign until the states laying claim to the northwest-\\nern lands, and especially Virginia, should surrender\\ntheir claims to the confederation. We shall by", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "94 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nand by see, when we come to explain this point in\\ndetail, that from this action of Maryland there\\nflowed beneficent consequences that were little\\ndreamed of. It was first in the great chain of\\nevents which led directly to the formation of the\\nFederal Union. Having carried her point, Mary-\\nlaud ratified the articles on the first day of March,\\n1781 and thus in the last and most brilliant\\nperiod of the war, while Greene was leading Corn-\\nwallis on his fatal chase across North Carolina, the\\nconfederation proposed at the time of the Declara-\\ntion of Independence was finally consummated.\\nAccording to tL language of the articles, the\\nstates entered into a firm league of friendship with\\neach other and in order to secure and perpetuate\\nsuch friendship, the freemen of each state were en-\\ntitled to all the privileges and immunities of free-\\nmen in all the other states. Mutual extradition\\nof criminals was established, and in each state full\\nfaith and credit was to be given to the records,\\nacts, and judicial proceedings of every other state.\\nThis universal intercitizenship was what gave real-\\nity to the nascent and feeble Union. In all the\\ncommon business relations of life, the man of New\\nHampshire could deal with the man of Georgia on\\nan equal footing before the law. But this was al-\\nmost the only effectively cohesive provision in the\\nwhole instrument. Throughout the remainder of\\nthe articles its language was largely devoted to\\nreconciling the theory that the states were sever-\\nally sovereign with the visible fact that they were\\nalready merged to some extent in a larger political\\nbody. The sovereignty of this larger body was", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 95\\nvested in the Congress of delegates appointed\\nyearly by the states. No state was to be repre-\\nsented by less than two or more than seven mem-\\nbers no one could be a delegate for more than\\nthree years out of every six and no delegate could\\nhold any salaried office under the United States.\\nAs in colonial times the states had, to preserve\\ntheir self-government, insisted upon paying their\\ngovernors and judges, instead of allowing them to\\nbe paid out of the royal treasury, so now the dele-\\ngates in Congress were paid by their own states.\\nIn determining questions in Congi-ess, each state\\nhad one vote, without regard to population but a\\nbare majority was not enough to carry any impor-\\ntant measure. Not only for such extraordinary\\nmatters as wars and treaties, but even for the reg-\\nular and ordinary business of raising money to\\ncarry on the government, not a single step could\\nbe taken without the consent of at least nine of\\nthe thirteen states and this provision well-nigh\\nsufficed of itself to block the wheels of federal leg-\\nislation. The Congress assembled each year on\\nthe first Monday of November, and could not ad-\\njourn for a longer period than six months. Dur-\\ning its recess the continuity of government was\\npreserved by an executive committee, consisting of\\none delegate from each state, and known as the\\n^committee of the states. Saving such matters\\nof warfare or treaty as the public interest might\\nrequire to be kept secret, all the proceedings of\\nCongress were entered in a journal, to be published\\nmonthly and the yeas and nays must be entered\\nshould any delegate request it. The executive de-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "96 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\npartments of war, finance, and so forth were in-\\ntrusted at first to committees, until experience soon\\nshowed the necessity of single heads. There was\\na president of Congress, who, as representing the\\ndignity of the United States, was, in a certain\\nsense, the foremost person in the country, but he\\nhad no more power than any other delegate. Of\\nthe fourteen presidents between 1774 and 1789,\\nperhaps only Randolph, Hancock, and Laurens are\\npopularly remembered in that capacity Jay, St.\\nClair, Mifflin, and Lee are remembered for other\\nthings Hanson, Griffin, and Boudinot are scarcely\\nremembered at all, save by the student of Ameri-\\ncan history.\\nBetween the Congress thus constituted and the\\nseveral state governments the attributes of sov-\\nereignty were shared in such a way as to produce\\na minimum of result with a maximum of effort.\\nThe states were prohibited from keeping up any\\nnaval or military force, except militia, or from en-\\ntering into any treaty or alliapce, either with a\\nforeign power or between themselves, without the\\nconsent of Congress. No state could engage in\\nwar except by way of defence against a sudden In-\\ndian attack. Congress had the sole right of deter-\\nmining on peace and war, of sending and receiving\\nambassadors, of making treaties, of adjudicating all\\ndisputes between the states, of managing Indian\\naffairs, and of regulating the value of coin and fix-\\ning the standard of weights and measures. Con-\\ngress took control of the post-office on condition\\nthat no more revenue should be raised from postage\\nthan should suffice to discharge the expenses of the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 97\\nservice. Congress controlled the army, but was\\nprovided with no means of raising soldiers save\\nthrough requisitions upon the states, and it could\\nonly appoint officers above the rank of colonel the\\norganization of regiments was left entirely in the\\nhands of the states. The traditional and whole-\\nsome dread of a standing army was great, but there\\nwas no such deep-seated jealousy of a navy, and\\nCongress was accordingly allowed not only to aj)-\\npoint all naval officers, but also to establish courts\\nof admiralty.\\nSeveral essential attributes of sovereignty were\\nthus withheld from the states and by assuming\\nall debts contracted by Congress prior to the adop-\\ntion of the articles, and solemnly pledging the pub-\\nlic faith for their payment, it was implicitly declared\\nthat the sovereignty here accorded to Congress was\\nsubstantially the same as that which it had asserted\\nand exercised ever since the severing of the connec-\\ntion with England. The articles simply defined\\nthe relations of the states to the Confederation as\\nthey had already shaped themselves. Indeed, the\\narticles, though not finally ratified till 1781, had\\nbeen known to Congress and to the people ever\\nsince 1776 as their expected constitution, and\\npolitical action had been shaped in general accord-\\nance with the theory on which they had been drawn\\nup. They show that political action was at no\\ntime based on the view of the states as absolutely\\nsovereign, but they also show that the share of sov-\\nereignty accorded to Congress was very inadequate\\neven to the purposes of an effective confederation.\\nThe position in which they left Congress was hardly", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "98 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nmore than that o\u00c2\u00a3 the deliberative head of a league.\\nFor the most fundamental of all the at-\\nThe articles\\nfailed to create triDutes ot Sovereignty tlie power or\\na federal gov- i n\\\\\\nernment en- taxatiou was uot giveu to Cougress.\\nreaisover- It could neither raise taxes through^\\nan excise nor through custom house\\nduties it could only make requisitions upon the\\nthirteen members of the confederacy in proportion\\nto the assessed value of their real estate, and it was\\nnot provided with any means of enforcing these Req-\\nuisitions. On this point the articles contained\\nnothing beyond the vague promise of the states to\\nobey. The power of levying taxes was thus re-\\ntained entirely by the states. They not only im-\\nposed direct taxes, as they do to-day, but they laid\\nduties on exports and imports, each according to\\nits own narrow view of its local interests. The\\nonly restriction upon this was that such state-im-\\nposed duties must not interfere with the stipula-\\ntions of any foreign treaties such as Congress\\nmight make in pursuance of treaties already pro-\\nposed to the courts of France and Spain. Besides\\nall this, the states shared with Congress the powers\\nof coining money, of emitting bills of credit, and of\\nmaking their promissory notes a legal tender for\\ndebts.\\nSuch was the constitution under which the\\nUnited States had begun to drift toward anarchy\\neven before the close of the Revolutionary War,\\nbut which could only be amended by the unanimous\\nconsent of all the thirteen states. The historian\\ncannot but regard this difficulty of amendment as\\na fortunate circumstance for in the troubles which", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 99\\npresently arose it led the distressed people to seek\\nsome otlier method of relief, and thus prepared the\\nway for the Convention of 1787, which destroyed\\nthe whole vicious scheme, and gave us a form of\\ngovernment under which we have just completed\\na century unparalleled for peace and prosperity\u00e2\u0080\u009e\\nBesides this extreme difficulty of amendment, the\\nfatal defects of the Confederation were three in\\nnumber. The first defect was the two thirds vote\\nnecessary for any important legislation in Congress\\nunder this rule any five of the states as, for ex-\\nample, the four southernmost states with Mary-\\nland, or the four New England states with New\\nJersey could defeat the most sorely needed meas-\\nures. The second defect was the impossibility of\\npresenting a united front to foreign countries in re-\\nspect to commerce. The third and greatest defect\\nwas the lack of any means, on the part of Congress,\\nof enforcing obedience. Not only was there no\\nfederal executive or judiciary worthy of the name,\\nbut the central government operated only upon\\nstates, and not upon individuals. Congress could\\ntall for troojjs and for money in strict conformity\\nwith the articles but should any state prove de-\\nlinquent in furnishing its quota, there were no con-\\nstitutional means of compelling it to obey the call.\\nThis defect was seen and deplored at the outset\\nby such men as Washington and Madison, but the\\nonly remedy which at first occurred to them was\\none more likely to kill than to cure. Only six\\nweeks after the ratification of the articles, Madison\\nproposed an amendment to give to the United\\nStates full authority to employ their force, as well\\nL.ofC.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "100 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nby sea as by land, to compel any delinquent state\\nto fulfil its federal engagements. Washington\\napproved of this measure, hoping, as he said, that\\na knowledge that this j3ower was lodged in Con-\\ngress might be the means to prevent its ever being\\nexercised, and the more readily induce obedience.\\nIndeed, added Washington, if Congress were\\nunquestionably possessed of the power, nothing\\nshould induce the display of it but obstinate dis-\\nobedience and the urgency of the general welfare.\\nMadison argued that in the very nature of the\\nConfederation such a right of coercion was neces-\\nsarily implied, though not expressed in the ar-\\nticles, and much might have been said in behalf\\nof this opinion. The Confederation explicitly de-\\nclared itself to be perpetual, yet how could it per-\\npetuate itself for a dozen years without the right to\\ncoerce its refractory members Practically, how-\\never, the remedy was one which could never have\\nbeen applied without breaking the Confedera-\\ntion into fragments. To use the army or navy in\\ncoercing a state meant nothing less than civil war.\\nThe local yeomanry would have turned out against\\nthe Continental army with as high a spirit as that\\nwith which they swarmed about the British enemy\\nat Lexington or King s Mountain. A government\\nwhich could not collect the taxes for its yearly\\nbudget without firing upon citizens or blockading\\ntwo or three harbours would have been the absurdest\\npolitical anomaly imaginable. No such idea could\\nhave entered the mind of a statesman save from\\nthe hope that if one state should prove refractory,\\nall the others would immediately frown upon it and", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 101\\nuphold Congress in overawing it. In such case the\\nknowledge that Congress had the power would\\ndoubtless have been enough to make its exercise\\nunnecessary. But in fact this hope was disap-\\npointed, for the delinquency of each state simply\\nset an example of disobedience for all the others to\\nfollow and the amendment, had it been carried,\\nwould merely have armed Congress with a threat\\nwhich everybody would have laughed at. So mani-\\nfestly hopeless was the case to Pelatiah Webster\\nthat as early as May, 1781, he published an able\\npamphlet, vu ging the necessity for a federal con-\\nvention for overhauling the whole scheme of govern-\\nment from beginning to end.\\nThe military weakness due to this imperfect\\ngovernmental orijanization may be 11-\\n1 Military weak-\\nlustrated by comparing the number of uess of the\\nr^ t government.\\nregular troops which Congress was able\\nto keep in the field during the Revolutionary War\\nwith the number maintained by the United States\\ngovernment during the War of Secession. A\\nrough estimate, obtained from averages, will suf-\\nfice to show the broad contrast. In 1863, the mid-\\ndle year of the War of Secession, the total popu-\\nlation of the loyal states was about 23,491,600, of\\nwhom about one fifth, or 4,698,320, were adult\\nmales of military age. Supposing one adult male\\nout of every five to have been under arms at one\\ntime, the number would have been 939,664. Now\\nthe total number of troops enlisted in the northern\\narmy during the four years of the war, reduced to\\na uniform standard, was 2,320,272, or an average\\nof 580,068 under arms in any single year. In", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "102 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\npoint of fact, this average was reached before the\\nmidtlle of the war, and the numbers went on in-\\ncreasing, until at the end there were more than a\\nmillion men under arms, at least one out of every\\nfive adult males in the northern states. On the\\nother hand, in 1779, the middle year of the Revo-\\nlutionary War, the white population of the United\\nStates was about 2,175,000, of whom 435,000 were\\nadult males of military age. Supposing one out\\nof every five of these to have been under arms at\\nonce, the number would have been 87,000. Now\\nin the spring of 1777, when the Continental Con-\\ngress was at the highest point of authority which\\nit ever reached, when France was willing to lend it\\nmoney freely, when its paper currency was not yet\\ndiscredited and it coidd make liberal offers of\\nbounties, a demand was made upon the states for\\n80,000 men, or nearly one fifth of the adult male\\npopulation, to serve for three years or during the\\nwar. Only 34,820 were obtained. The total num-\\nber of men in the field in that most critical year,\\nincluding the swarms of militia who came to the\\nrescue at Ridgefield and Bennington and Oriskany,\\nand the Pennsylvania militia who turned out while\\ntheir state was invaded, was 68,720. In 1781,\\nwhen the credit of Congress was greatly impaired,\\nalthough military activity again rose to a maximum\\nand it was necessary for the people to strain every\\nnerve, the total number of men in the field, militia\\nand all, was only 29,340, of whom only 13,292\\nwere Continentals and it was left for the genius\\nof Washington and Greene, working with desper-\\nate energy and most pitiful resources, to save the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 103\\ncountry. A more impressive contrast to the readi-\\nness with which the demands of the government\\nwere met in the War of Secession can hardly be\\nimagined. Had the country put forth its strength\\nin 1781 as it did in 1864, an army of 90,000 men\\nmiffht have overwhelmed Clinton at the north and\\nCornwallis at the south, without asking any fa-\\nvours of the French fleet. Had it put forth its\\nfull strength in 1777, four years of active warfare\\nmight have been spared. Mr. Lecky explains\\nthis difference by his favourite hypothesis that the\\nAmerican Revolution was the work of a few ulti-a-\\nradical leaders, with whom the people were not\\ngenerally in sympathy; and he thinks we could\\nnot expect to see great heroism or self-sacrifice\\nmanifested by a people who went to war over what\\nhe calls a money dispute. But there is no rea-\\nson for supposing that the loyalists represented the\\ngeneral sentiment of the country in the Revolution-\\nary War any more than the peace party repre-\\nsented the oeneral sentiment of the northern states\\nin the War of Secession. There is no reason for\\nsupposing that the people were less at heart in 1781\\nin fighting for the priceless treasure of self-govern-\\nment than they were in 1864 when they fought for\\nthe maintenance of the pacific principles underlying\\nour Federal Union. The differences in the organi-\\nzation of the government, and in its power of oper-\\nating directly upon the people, are quite enough to\\nexplain the difference between the languid conduct\\nof the earlier war and the energetic conduct of the\\nlater.\\n1 History of England in the Eighteenth Century, iii. 447.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "104 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nImpossible as Congress found it to fill the quotas\\nof the army, the task of raising a revenue by req-\\nuisitions upon the states was even more discourag-\\ning. Every state had its own war-debt, and several\\nwere applicants for foreign loans not easy to ob-\\ntain, so that none could without the greatest diffi-\\nculty raise a surplus to hand over to\\nExtreme diffl- Tii /-i i\\ncuity of obtain- CongTess. llic Continental rag-money\\nhad ceased to circulate by the end of\\n1780, and our foreign credit was nearly ruined.\\nThe French government began to complain of the\\nheavy demands which the Americans made upon\\nits exchequer, and Vergennes, in sending over a\\nnew loan in the fall of 1782, warned Franklin that\\nno more must be expected. To save American\\ncredit from destruction, it was at least necessary\\nthat the interest on the public debt should be paid.\\nFor this purpose Congress in 1781 asked permis-\\nsion to levy a five per cent, duty on imports. The\\nmodest request was the signal for a year of angry\\ndiscussion. Again and again it was asked, If taxes\\ncould thus be levied by any power outside the\\nstate, why had we ever opposed the Stamp Act or\\nthe tea duties The question was indeed a serious\\none, and as an instance of reasoning from analogy\\nseemed plausible enough. After more than a year\\nMassachusetts consented, by a bare majority of two\\nin the House and one in the Senate, reserving to\\nherself the right of appointing the collectors. The\\nbill was then vetoed by Governor Hancock, though\\none day too late, and so it was saved. But Rhode\\nIsland flatly refused her consent, and so did Vir-\\nginia, though Madison earnestly pleaded the cause", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 105\\nof the public credit. For the current expenses of\\nthe government in that same year $9, 000, 000 were\\nneeded. It was calculated that -$4,000,000 might\\nbe raised by a loan, and the other f 5,000,000 were\\ndemanded of the states. At the end of the year\\nf 422,000 had been collected, not a cent of which\\ncame from Georgia, the Carolinas, or Delaware.\\nRhode Island, which paid $38,000, did the best of\\nall according to its resources. Of the Continental\\ntaxes assessed in 1783, only one fifth part had been\\npaid by the middle of 1785. And the worst of it\\nwas that no one could point to a remedy for this\\nstate of things, or assign any probable end to it.\\nUnder such circumstances the public credit sank\\nat home as well as abroad. Foreign creditors\\neven France, who had been nothing if not generous\\nwith her loans might be made to wait but there\\nwere creditors at home who, should they prove ugly,\\ncould not be so easily put off. The disbandment\\nof the army in the summer of 1783, before the\\nBritish troops had evacuated New York, was hast-\\nened by the impossibility of paying the soldiers\\nand the dread of what they might do under such\\nprovocation. Though peace had been officially\\nannounced, Hamilton and Livingston urged that,\\nfor the sake of appearances if for no other reason,\\nthe army should be kept together so long as the\\nBritish remained in New York, if not until they\\nshould have surrendered the western\\nDread of the\\nfrontier posts. But Congress could not =^\u00e2\u0084\u00a2^y-\\npay the army, and was afraid of it, and not with-\\nout some reason. Discouraged at the length of\\ntime which had passed since they had received any", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "106 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nmoney, the soldiers had begun to fear lest, now\\nthat their services were no longer needed, their\\nhonest claims would be set aside. Among the\\nofficers, too, there was grave discontent. In the\\nspring of 1778, after the dreadful winter at Valley\\nForge, several officers had thrown up their com-\\nmissions, and others threatened to do likewise.\\nTo avert the danger, Washington had urged Con-\\ngress to promise half-pay for life to such officers\\nas should serve to the end of the war. It was only\\nwith great difficulty that he succeeded in obtaining\\na promise of half-pay for seven years, and even\\nthis raised an outcry throughout the country, which\\nseemed to dread its natural defenders only less\\nthan its enemies. In the fall of 1780, however, in\\nthe general depression which followed upon the\\ndisasters at Charleston and Camden, the collapse\\nof the paper money, and the discovery of Arnold s\\ntreason, there was serious danger that the army\\nwould fall to pieces. At this critical moment\\nWashington had earnestly appealed to Congress,\\nand against the strenuous opposition of Samuel\\nAdams had at length extorted the promise of half-\\npay for life. In the spring of 1782, seeing the\\nutter inability of Congress to discharge its pecu-\\nniary obligations, many officers began to doubt\\nwhether the promise would ever be kept. It had\\nbeen made before the articles of confederation,\\nwhich required the assent of nine states to any\\nsuch measure, had been finally ratified. It was\\nwell known that nine states had never been found\\nto favour the measure, and it was now feared that\\nit might be repealed or repudiated, so loud was the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 107\\npopular clamour against it. All this comes of re-\\npublican government, said some of the officers\\ntoo many cooks spoil the broth a dozen heads are\\nas bad as no head you do not know whose prom-\\nises to trust a monarchy, with a good king whom\\nall men can trust, would extricate us from these\\ndifficulties. In this mood, Colonel Louis Nicola,\\nof the Pennsylvania line, a foreigner by birth, ad-\\ndressed a long and well-argued letter to Washing-\\nton, setting forth the troubles of the s\u00e2\u0080\u009eppoge^\\ntime, and urging him to come forward ^akh! wash-\\nas a saviour of society, and accept the igto^king.\\ncrown at the hands of his faithful soldiers. Nicola\\nwas an aged man, of excellent character, and in\\nmaking this suggestion he seemed to be acting as\\nspokesman of a certain clique or party among the\\nofficers, how numerous is not known. Wash-\\nington instantly replied that Nicola could not have\\nfound a person to whom such a scheme could be\\nmore odious, and he was at a loss to conceive what\\nhe had ever done to have it supposed that he could\\nfor one moment listen to a suggestion so fraught\\nwith mischief to his country. Lest the affair, be-\\ncoming known, should enhance the popular distrust\\nof the army, Washington said nothing about it.\\nBut as the year went by, and the outcry against\\nhalf-pay continued, and Congress showed symptoms\\nof a willingness to compromise the matter, the dis-\\ncontent of the army increased. Officers and sol-\\ndiers brooded alike over their wrongs. The army,\\nsaid General Macdougall, is verging to that state\\nwhich, we are told, will make a wise man mad.\\nThe peril of the situation was increased by the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "108 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nwell-meant but injudicious whisperings of other\\npublic creditors, who believed that if the army-\\nwould only take a firm stand and insist upon a\\ngrant of permanent funds to Congress for liquidat-\\ning all public debts, the states could probably be\\nprevailed upon to make such a grant. Robert\\nMorris, the able secretary of finance, held this\\nopinion, and did not believe that the states could\\nbe brought to terms in any other way. His name-\\nsake and assistant, Gouverneur Morris, held similar\\nviews, and gave expression to them in February,\\n1783, in a letter to General Greene, who was still\\ncommanding in South Carolina. TV hen Greene\\nreceived the letter, he urged upon the legislature\\nof that state, in most guarded and moderate lan-\\nguage, the paramount need of granting a revenue\\nto Congress, and hinted that the army would not\\nbe satisfied with anything less. The assembly\\nstraightway flew into a rage. No dictation by a\\nCromwell shouted the members. South Caro-\\nlina had consented to the five per cent, impost, but\\nnow she revoked it, to show her independence, and\\nGreene s eyes were opened at once to the danger\\nof the slightest appearance of military intervention\\nin civil affairs.\\nAt the same time a violent outbreak in the army\\nat Newburgh was barely prevented by the unfail-\\ning tact of Washington. A rumour went about\\nthe camp that it was generally expected the army\\nw^ould not disband until the question of pay should\\nbe settled, and that the public creditors looked to\\nthem to make some such demonstration as would\\noverawe the delinquent states. General Gates", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 109\\nhad lately emerged from the retirement in which\\nhe had been fain to hide himself after Camden,\\nand had rejoined the army where there was now\\nsnch a field for intrigue. An odious ax oma of im-\\npotent malice clings about his memory on this last\\noccasion on which the historian needs to notice him.\\nHe plotted in secret with officers of the staff and\\nothers. One of his staff, Major Armstrong, wrote\\nan anonymous aj^peal to the troops, and another,\\nColonel Barber, caused it to be circulated about\\nthe camp. It named the next day for a meeting\\nto consider grievances. Its language was inflam-\\nmatory. My friends it said, after\\nrf The danger-\\nseven long- years vour sutternie: cour- ousNewburgh\\naddress,\\nage has conducted the United States of March ii,\\n1783.\\nAmerica through a doubtful and bloody\\nwar and peace returns to bless whom A\\ncountry willing to redress your wrongs, cherish\\nyour worth, and reward your services Or is it\\nrather a country that tramples upon your rights,\\ndisdains your cries, and insults your distresses?\\nIf such be your treatment while the swords\\nyou wear are necessary for the defence of America,\\nwhat have you to expect when those very swords,\\nthe instruments and companions of your glory,\\nshall be taken from your sides, and no mark of\\nmilitary distinction left but your wants, infirmities,\\nand scars If you have sense enough to discover\\nand spirit to oppose tyranny, whatever garb it\\nmay assume, awake to your situation. If the pres-\\nent moment be lost, your threats hereafter will be\\nas empty as your entreaties now. Appeal from\\nthe justice to the fears of government, and sus-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "\\\\Hvt tho umu who WouUl u*l\\\\ l^o to lonx^oi 1\\\\m l i a\u00c2\u00bbv\\nut tlu hyat souUmum^ gx4 UolU of tho j\u00c2\u00bb^4 or uo\\\\(\\nUrtv, just uv t uu\u00c2\u00bb\\\\ ho !*nuh t\\\\ nri xvst tho toot\\nthut \u00c2\u00bbt\\\\ vHl wuvoviu^ii iV4\u00c2\u00bb i\\\\ jv\\\\voi|vuv, Tho uu^u\\\\ory\\nof tho \\\\tJV\\\\4t of tho IVunHvlvuu u V H\\\\u\\\\ whioh \\\\\\\\m\\\\\\nso t .\\\\avuusl tho jM^ jvlo iu 1781, wus v**till t lvjih lu\\nu\\\\ou\\\\h miwvls I u\u00c2\u00bbul hovt }U u\u00c2\u00bbv\\\\tHtiv\u00c2\u00bbu t\\\\\u00c2\u00bb ^uolt^\\n\\\\vh\\\\vlojijUo uuitiuv, whioh v^mKl hju\\\\Uv tuil tv\u00c2\u00bb oiul\\ni\u00c2\u00bb IvK^vnUhtHh M\\\\d uu^^ht ^MtH-^vUnto tho j orivh^\\\\ovl\\ntuul ouv\\\\v{U \u00c2\u00absH io\\\\l \\\\H\u00c2\u00bbu\u00c2\u00bbvtvY into olvil wur, ujJi-\\nwuH ^vf thti \\\\u\u00c2\u00ab\u00c2\u00abUWvv, Init ovt vruhu^if it so tW ns\\nto rtj \\\\Hviut tho \\\\uootiu^if t\\\\vv \\\\ntor da\\\\\\\\ with tho\\nsK^vvioi lui^jo^iivuoi ivl, who hnp^H^uo^l t\\\\\u00c2\u00bb K^ (inttvs\\nt\\\\\u00c2\u00bb |v\\\\tv^iUo, Thi* ^v\u00c2\u00bb\\\\lo\\\\\\\\ whioh ut^itht^^ ilisioijUiuo\\nUivi Hmvtt\\\\H\\\\ iHn\\\\hi vliswjiuwh iu h \\\\uoasmv titnl\\n(vnt^v i H hnvuls whiW it ^hyo us.lii\u00c2\u00bbv^^tvui tiiuo to\\na^\u00c2\u00bb^Hviutt^l Uhv h sAiuhlowlv o\u00c2\u00bbu\\\\o ii\\\\tv^ tho iwwtiujj,\\nHwU tuul\\\\l ^vv\\\\vt\\\\xu\u00c2\u00bbuloj*t ?i.ihnuH hvwko t ovrh in a\\n\u00c2\u00bbw\\\\\\\\a| ^Usju^ut iuui tvnu^Jiiii^^ sjvt^tnvh, Sviu^vnthiaix*^\\nK^ t^wly with tho jiwtYovixv^^s of his ht^uvvs, juul fviUv\\niuluuuiug thoiv ohiiius, ho u^ jhwUsI tv thoiv K ttov\\nfvH4i\u00c2\u00bbv^ \u00c2\u00bbAul wiwi^ultnl tht^iu \\\\vf tlu\u00c2\u00bb ttniiMo Uit l\u00c2\u00ab\\noultitv^ vvwvh ^i whioh l.\\\\n\u00c2\u00bb^iv.vs InKnutHh \u00c2\u00bbiul ivf tl\\\\o\\nfvvllv of ^nUtiuii thoiusolvovs i\u00c2\u00ab tho wixm^^, Uo still\\nKXHuxst^lUnl fvuUv^vmiuv \u00c2\u00bbs tho ^x\\\\ 4U^\\\\^t wf \\\\iotvxvit\\\\s\\na\u00c2\u00abvl with auisuuimnto skill ho ohi\u00c2\u00bbVs^ otoviAHl tho\\ntiuvuuiuous vH^^^Hwl s*s luulouht^Hllv tho wvuk of svmu", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "i.KAtjiiic ni i iiii :Nh!Hiii Jii\\n\\\\.\\\\tt: tiiiiiy y/)/i ;)j ilny \\\\i;oi iioi \\\\ft*an ti\\\\)U^ Uf v;tn/jui\u00c2\u00ab)\\nI l Sui-A A ;J) j ;iy, wj)jj t i lAnnny^ mom iUnn H.uy /Umi?\u00c2\u00ab\\nman iti Ui\u00c2\u00ab loom^ j/;ty fuhit A )v^i^ii;\\\\^i Utavmy word,\\nin j/roof of t)/ 5 f^oo l f;ti(,|j of Conp; Ij j Sn^/^an\\nii /.tAUipi; a Ji;U f/orii on 5 of tlu* i\u00c2\u00bb *nfy ^r\u00c2\u00ab, wiM^\u00c2\u00ab,\\nli/i Jinp5 l\u00c2\u00bbj\u00c2\u00ab sslj^ljt ii\u00c2\u00bb/\u00c2\u00bb, l)i j aij\u00c2\u00bb ^^J Hhd to k frow* i\u00c2\u00bb\\npoclii^t i\\\\ni /\u00c2\u00ab{W pair of ^n j X .wXoa wii mli iltf, asjtro/*.-\\no/jM^r Davi l iihU iili^mmi, U .ui just svi^nf/ im, \\\\U*,\\nJi;m1 tii;vt:r won* ii\\\\ii A XiU;U H \\\\n puMi an i aw la^ j;;\u00c2\u00bbjt\\ntlxjiu on h \u00c2\u00bbai i, itt \\\\th mu\\\\ U mmmt^i atui with\\njji\u00c2\u00ab j |j ,awant \u00c2\u00ab\u00c2\u00abnif ljav grown j^ray in youi\\niii ,i-\\\\ii ,i an l \u00c2\u00bb\u00c2\u00bbow (in J tny i M i/rnwhtp^ (;)in/J.\\nVVIiiJ/ al) ln Sii Ui s^i .vi mtfU JuA Un v^i .l^i on n /4/i\\\\uy^\\ntl\u00c2\u00ab; U XU i; an l Ux^n witl /lr ^w, U uvUr^ ih mi-MJttp;\\nUt iia tU t\\\\)i ,r.iiltfUii. lUiitu wa\u00c2\u00ab a, aiAii ^ti mn\\\\\\ntn t /liiy r iViilsiou of fm Mn^, A m /i]on was\\n[totU .ti J ,)arinj^ nn\u00c2\u00abhalw\u00c2\u00ab OAniMtttvA in tfj jus-\\nti ^5 of /ongr aiul it v/a\u00c2\u00bb haUUA that U\u00c2\u00ab^\\noifiU Aua of tlM^ Aumr u /^n su tny vU ,w with tA \\\\nn i iihi M\\na/i l ft /y A X with lisv lain tfj infanjou\u00c2\u00ab roj 04-;al\u00c2\u00ab //n-\\nUi moA in a Ja(/ ano/*yn\u00c2\u00bb//ii\u00c2\u00ab iuUi tf.i .a Ut iin-in. I ha\\ncr j\u00c2\u00bbtf allien (iiiUi\u00c2\u00bb, a\u00c2\u00bb ^Jiairnian, I/jkI nothinj^ to il/\\nhut put th |u -\u00c2\u00abtion an\u00c2\u00abJ r^^port it /.tt/nA unanl-\\njnofii jjy for if any i^tiJ) j ;njain l AAiniiU th -;y n/\\nUntiicj ihii t Ai in tilnfW it. Wa\u00c2\u00bbhi/iJ4t /n hfnittniiaUily\\nfA X fo/th th urj^ ^n/;y of th/ ?as^? in an niirnHai\\nhXiA j Ut yon ^i t MH, an J on i w ^-k kf^tr tit* timiU-:!\\nwas* ^tt)i; J hy an sKst I Anumni m^ \\\\t:Ai-\\\\M.y Uiv I tfa\\nittU) a j^roi^w \u00c2\u00abun i jua) fiy t y ^tr\u00c2\u00bb fuJJ pay, i/ *i\\ni t A:\\\\i:ii ii^ A\\\\ at on^ ^i hy fA-j-iMU /diA a h ,ari*jj/ lnU j *^t\\nat \u00c2\u00bbix p ir ^;nt. Hu ;h j o \\\\,:i\\\\H .f was* ail tJiat", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "112 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nCongress had to pay with, but it was all ultimately\\nredeemed and while the commutation was advan-\\ntageous to the government, it was at the same time\\ngreatly for the interest o\u00c2\u00a3 the officers, while they\\nwere looking out for new means of livelihood, to\\nhave their claims adjusted at once, and to receive\\nsomething which could do duty as a respectable\\nsum of money.\\nNothing, however, could prevent the story of the\\nNewburgh affair from being published all over the\\ncountry, and it greatly added to the distrust with\\nwhich the army was regarded on general principles.\\nWhat might have happened was forcibly suggested\\nby a miserable occurrence in June, about two\\nmonths after the disbanding of the army had\\nbegun. Some eighty soldiers of the Pennsylvania\\nline, mutinous from discomfort and want of paj^,\\nbroke from their camp at Lancaster and\\nCongress a\\n.irivenfrom marchcd dowu to Philadelphia, led by\\nby mutinous sersTeant or two. They drew up in\\nsoldiers, June o j i\\n21, 1783. \\\\\\\\y^Q before the state house, where Con-\\ngress was assembled, and after passing the grog\\nbegan throwing stones and pointing their muskets\\nat the windows. They demanded pay, and threat-\\nened, if it were not forthcoming, to seize the mem-\\nbers of Congress and hold them as hostages, or else\\nto break into the bank where the federal deposits\\nwere kept. The executive council of Pennsylvania\\n\u00c2\u00abat in the same building, and so the federal gov-\\nernment appealed to the state government for pro-\\ntection. The appeal was fruitless. President\\nDickinson bad a few state militia at his disposal,\\nbut did not dare to summon them, for fear they", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 113\\nshould side with the rioters. The city government\\nwas equally listless, and the townsfolk went their\\nways as if it were none of their business and so\\nCongress fled across the river and on to Princeton,\\nwhere the college afforded it shelter. Thus in a\\ncity of thirty-two thousand inhabitants, the largest\\ncity in the country, the government of the United\\nStates, the body which had just completed a treaty\\nbrowbeating- England and France, was ignomin-\\niously turned out-of-doors by a handful of drunken\\nmutineers. The affair was laughed at by many,\\nbut sensible men keenly felt the disgrace, and asked\\nwhat would be thought in Europe of a g ovei-nment\\nwhich could not even command the services of the\\npolice. The army became more unpopular than\\never, and during the summer and fall many town-\\nmeetings were held in New England, condemning\\nthe Commutation Act. Are we not poor enough\\nalready, cried the farmers, that we must be taxed\\nto support in idle luxury a riotous rabble of sol-\\ndiery, or create an aristocracy of men with gold\\nlace and epaulets, who will presently plot against\\nour liberties The Massachusetts legislature pro-\\ntested the people of Connecticut meditated resist-\\nance. A convention was held at Middletown in\\nDecember, at which two thirds of the towns in the\\nstate were represented, and the best method of\\noverruling Congress was discussed. Much high-\\nflown eloquence was wasted, but the convention\\nbroke up without deciding upon any course of\\naction. The matter had become so serious that\\nwise men changed their minds, and disapproved of\\nproceedings calculated to throw Congress into con-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "114 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\ntempt. Samuel Adams, who had almost violently\\nopposed the grant of half-pay and had been dissat-\\nisfied with the Commutation Act, now came com-\\npletely over to the other side. Whatever might\\nbe thought of the policy of the measures, he said,\\nCongress had an undoubted right to adopt them.\\nThe army had been necessary for the defence of\\nour liberties, and the public faith had been pledged\\nto the payment of the soldiers. States were as\\nmuch bound as individuals to fulfil their eno-ao-e-\\nments, and did not the sacred Scriptures say of an\\nhonest man that, though he sweareth to his own\\nhurt, he changefch not? Such plain truths j^re-\\nvailed in the Boston town-meeting, which voted\\nthat the commutation is wisely blended with the\\nnational debt. The agitation in New England\\npresently came to an end, and in this matter the\\ncourse of Congress was upheld.\\nIn order fully to understand this extravagant\\ndistrust of the army, we have to take into account\\nanother incident of the summer of 1783, which\\ngave rise to a discussion that sent its reverberation\\nall over the civilized world. Men of the present\\ngeneration who in childhood rummaged in their\\ngrandmothers cosy garrets cannot fail to have\\ncome across scores of musty and worm-eaten pam-\\nphlets, their yellow pages crowded with italics and\\nexclamation points, inveighing in j^assionate lan-\\nguage against the wicked and dangerous society\\nof the Cincinnati. Just before the army was dis^\\nbanded, the officers, at the suggestion of Genera]\\nKnox, formed themselves into a secret society, for\\nthe purpose of keeping up their friendly inter.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 115\\ncourse and cherishing the heroic memories of the\\nstruggle in which they had taken part. With the\\nfondness for classical analogies which characterized\\nthat time, they likened themselves to order of the\\nCincinnatus, who was taken from the c^\\nplough to lead an army, and returned to his quiet\\nfarm so soon as his warlike duties were over.\\nThey were modern Cincinnati. A constitution\\nand by-laws were established for the order, and\\nWashington was unanimously chosen to be its\\npresident. Its branches in the several states were\\nto hold meetings each Fourth of July, and there\\nwas to be a general meeting of the whole society\\nevery year in the month of May. French officers\\nwho had taken part in the war were admitted to\\nmembership, and the order was to be perpetuated\\nby descent through the eldest male representatives\\nof the families of the members. It was further\\nprovided that a limited membership should from\\ntime to time be granted, as a distinguished honour,\\nto able and worthy citizens, without regard to the\\nmemories of the war. A golden American eagle\\nattached to a blue ribbon edged with white was\\nthe sacred badge of the order and to this emblem\\nespecial favour was shown at the French court,\\nwhere the insignia of foreign states were generally,\\nit is said, regarded with jealousy. No political\\npurpose was to be subserved by this order of the\\nCincinnati, save in so far as the members pledged\\nto one another their determination to promote and\\ncherish the union between the states. In its main\\nintent the society was to be a kind of masonic\\nbrotherhood, charged with the duty of aiding the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "116 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nwidows and the orplian children of its members in\\ntime of need. Innocent as all this was, however,\\nthe news of the establishment of such a society-\\nwas greeted with a howl of indignation all over\\nthe country. It was thought that its founders\\nwere inspired by a deep-laid political scheme for\\ncentralizing the government and setting up a he-\\nreditary aristocracy. The press teemed with invec-\\ntive and ridicule, and the feeling thus expressed\\nby the penny-a-liners was shared by able men ac-\\ncustomed to weigh their words. Franklin dealt\\nwith it in a spirit of banter, and John Adams in a\\nspirit of abhorrence while Samuel Adams pointed\\nout the dangers inherent in the principle of hered-\\nitary transmission of honours, and in the admission\\nof foreigners into a secret association possessed of\\npolitical influence in America. What cried the\\nmen of Massachusetts. Have we thrown over-\\nboard the effete institutions of Europe, only to\\nhave them straightway introduced among us again,\\nafter this plausible and surreptitious fashion At\\nCambridge it was thought that the general senti-\\nment of the university was in favour of suppress-\\ning the order by act of legislature. One of the\\nmembers, who was a candidate for senator in the\\nspring of 1784, found it necessary to resign in or-\\nder to save his chances for election. Rhode Island\\nproposed to disfranchise such of her citizens as\\nbelonged to the order, albeit her most eminent citi-\\nzen, Nathanael Greene, was one of them, ^danus\\nBurke, a judge of the Supreme Court of South\\nCarolina, wrote a violent pamphlet against the\\nsociety of the Cincinnati under the pseudonym of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 117\\nCassius, the slayer of tyrants and this diatribe,\\ntranslated and amplified by Mirabeau, awakened\\ndull echoes among- readers of Rousseau and haters\\nof privilege in all parts of Europe. A swarm\\nof brochures in rejoinder and rebutter issued from\\nthe press, and the nineteenth century had come in\\nbefore the controversy was quite forgotten.\\nIt is easy for us now to smile at this outcry\\nagainst the Cincinnati as much ado about nothing,\\nseeing as we do that in the absence of territorial\\njurisdiction or especial political privileges an order\\nof nobility cannot be created by the mere inherit-\\nance of empty titles or badges. For example,\\nsince the great revolution which swept away the\\nlandlordship and fiscal exemptions of the French\\nnobility, a marquisate or a dukedom in France is\\nof scarcely more political importance than a doc-\\ntorate of laws in a New England university. Men\\nwere nevertheless not to be blamed in 1783 for\\ntheir hostility toward that ghost of the hereditary\\nprinciple which the Cincinnati sought to introduce.\\nIn a free industrial society like that of America\\nit had no proper place or meaning and the at-\\ntempt to set up such a form might well have been\\ncited in illustration of the partial reversion toward\\nmilitancy which eight years of warfare had effected.\\nThe absurdity of the situation was quickly realized\\nby Washington, and he prevailed upon the society,\\nin its first annual meeting of May, 1784, to aban-\\ndon the principle of hereditary membership. The\\nagitation was thus allayed, and in the presence of\\ngraver questions the much-dreaded brotherhood\\ngradually ceased to occupy popular attention.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "118 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nThe opposition to the Cincinnati is not fully ex-\\nplained unless we consider it in connection with\\nNicola s letter, the Newburgh address, and the\\nfliofht of Cougress to Princeton. The members of\\nthe Cincinnati were pledged to do whatever they\\ncould to promote the union between the states\\nthe object of the Newburgh address was to enlist the\\narmy in behalf of the public creditors, and in some\\nvaguely-imagined fashion to force a stronger govern-\\nment upon the country the letter of Nicola shows\\nthat at least some of the officers had harboured the\\nnotion of a monarchy and the weakness of Con-\\ngress had been revealed in the most startling man-\\nner by its flight before a squad of mutineers. It\\nis one of the lessons of history that, in the virtual\\nabsence of a central government for which a need\\nis felt, the want is apt to be supplied by the strong-\\nest organization in the country, whatever that may\\nhappen to be. It was in this way that the French\\narmy, a few years later, got control of the govern-\\nment of France and made its general emperor. In\\n1783, if the impotence of Congress were to be as\\nexplicitly acknowledged as it was implicitly felt,\\nthe only national organization left in the country\\nwas the army, and when this was disbanded it\\nseemed nevertheless to prolong its life under a new\\nand dangerous form in the secret brotherhood of\\nthe Cincinnati. The cession of western lands to\\nthe confederacy was, moreover, completed at about\\nthis time, and one of the uses to which the new\\nterritory was to be put was the payment of claims\\ndue to the soldiers. It was distinctly feared, as is\\nshown in a letter from Samuel Adams to Elbridge", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 119\\nGerry, that the members of the Cincinnati would\\nacquire large tracts of western land under this\\narrangement, and, importing peasants from Ger-\\nmany, would grant farms to them on terms of mili-\\ntary service and fealty, thus introducing into\\nAmerica the feudal system. In order to forestall\\nany such movement, it was provided by Congress\\nthat in any new states formed out of the western\\nterritory no person holding a hereditary title should\\nbe admitted to citizenship.\\nFrom the weakness of Congress as illustrated in\\nits inability to raise money to pay the public debt\\nand meet the current expenses of government, and\\nfrom the popular dread of military usurpation\\nwhich went along with the uneasy consciousness of\\nthat weakness, we have now to turn to another\\ngroup of affairs in which the same point is still\\nfurther illustrated and emphasized. We have seen\\nhow the commissioners of the United States in\\nParis had succeeded in making a treaty of peace\\nwith Great Britain on extremely favourable terms.\\nSo unpopular was the treaty in England, on ac-\\ncount of the great concessions made to the Ameri-\\ncans, that, as we have seen, the fall of Lord Shel-\\nburne s ministry was occasioned thereby.\\nCongress nnds\\nAs an offset to these liberal concessions, itseu unable to\\ncarry out the\\nof which the most considerable was the provisions of\\nthe treaty.\\nacknowledgment of the American claim\\nto the northwestern territory, our confederate gov-\\nernment was pledged to do all in its power to effect\\ncertain concessions which were demanded by Eng-\\nland. That the American loyalists, whose property\\nhad been confiscated by various state governments,", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "120 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nshould be indetunified for their losses was a claim\\nwhich, whatever Americans might think of it, Eng-\\nland felt bound in honour to urge. That private\\ndebts, due from American to British creditors,\\nshould be faithfully discharged was the plainest\\ndictate of common honesty. Congress, as we have\\nseen, was bound by the treaty to recommend to the\\nseveral states to desist from the persecution of\\nTories, and to give them an opportunity of recover-\\ning their estates and it had been further agreed\\nthat all private debts should be discharged at their\\nfull value in sterling money. It now turned out\\nthat Congress was powerless to carry out the joro-\\nvisions of the treaty upon either of these points.\\nThe recommendations concerning the Tories were\\ngreeted with a storm of popular indignation. Since\\nthe beginning of the war these unfortunate persons\\nPersecution of had bccu treated with severity both by\\nthe legislatures and by the people. Many\\nhad been banished others had fled the country,\\nand against these refugees various harsh laws had\\nbeen enacted. Their estates had been confiscated,\\nand their return prohibited under penalty of im-\\nprisonment or death. Many others, who had re-\\nmained in the country, were objects of suspicion\\nand dislike in states where they had not, as in New\\nYork and the Carolinas, openly aided the enemy or\\ntaken part in Indian atrocities. Now, on the con-\\nclusion of peace, in utter disregard of Congress,\\nfresh measures of vengeance were taken against\\nthese fawning spaniels, as they were called, these\\ntools and minions of Britain. An article in the\\nMassachusetts Chronicle expressed the common", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 121\\nfeeling As Hannibal swore never to be at peace\\nwith the Romans, so let every Whig swear, by\\nhis abhorrence of slavery, by liberty and religion,\\nby the shades of departed friends who have fallen\\nin battle, by the ghosts of those of our brethren\\nwho have been destroyed on board of prison-ships\\nand in loathsome dungeons, never to be at peace\\nwith those fiends the refugees, whose thefts, mur-\\nders, and treasons have filled the cup of woe.\\nTons of pamphlets, issued under the customary\\nLatin pseudonyms, were filled with this truculent\\nbombast and like sentiments were thundered from\\nthe pulpit by men who had quite forgotten for the\\nmoment their duty of preaching reconciliation and\\nforgiveness of injuries. Why should not these\\nwretches, it was sarcastically asked, be driven at\\nonce from the country Of course they could not\\ndesire to live under a free government which they\\nhad been at such pains to destroy. Let them go\\nforthwith to his majesty s dominions, and live under\\nthe government they preferred. It would never\\ndo to let them stay here, to plot treason at their\\nleisure in a few years they would get control of\\nall the states, and either hand them over to Great\\nBritain again, or set up a Tory despotism on Ameri-\\ncan soil. Such was the rubbish that passed current\\nas argument with the majority of the people. A\\nsmall party of moderate Whigs saw its absurdity,\\nand urged that the Tories had much better remain\\nat home, where they had lost all political influence,\\nthan go and found unfriendly colonies to the north-\\nward. The moderate Whigs were in favour of\\nheeding the recommendation of Congress, and act-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "122 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\ning in accordance with the spirit of the treaty and\\nthese humane and sensible views were shared by\\nGadsden and Marion in South Carolina, by Theo-\\ndore Sedgwick in Massachusetts, and by Greene,\\nHamilton, and Jay. But any man who held such\\nopinions, no matter how conspicuous his services\\nhad been, ran the risk of being accused of Tory\\nsympathies. Time-serving Whigs and trim-\\nmers were the strangely inappropriate epithets\\nhurled at men who, had they been in the slightest\\ndegree time-servers, would have shrunk from the\\nthankless task of upholding good sense and human-\\nity in the teeth of popular prejudice.\\nIn none of the states did the loyalists receive\\nseverer treatment than in New York, and for obvi-\\nous reasons. Throughout the war the fi-ontier had\\nbeen the scene of atrocities such as no other state,\\nsave perhaps South Carolina, had witnessed.\\nCherry Valley and Minisink were names of horror\\nnot easily forgotten, and the fate of Lieutenant\\nBoyd and countless other victims called loudly for\\nvengeance. The sins of the Butlers and their\\nbloodthirsty followers were visited in robbery and\\ninsult upon unoffending men, who were like them\\nin nothing but in being labelled with the epithet\\nTory. During the seven years that the city of\\nNew York had been occupied by the British army,\\nmany of these loyalists had found shelter there.\\nThe Whig citizens, on the other hand, had been\\ndriven off the island, to shift as best they might in\\nNew Jersey, while their comfortable homes wei e\\nseized and assigned by military orders to these\\nvery Tories. For seven years the refugee Whigs", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 123\\nfrom across the Hudson had looked upon New\\nYork with feelings like those with which the me-\\ndiaeval exile from Florence or Pisa was wont to\\nregard his native city. They saw in it the home of\\nenemies who had robbed them, the prison-house of\\ngallant friends penned up to die of wanton ill-usage\\nin foul ships holds in the harbour. When at last\\nthe king s troops left the city, it was felt that a\\ngreat day of reckoning had an-ived. In September,\\n1783, two months before the evacuation, more than\\ntwelve thousand men, women, and children em-\\nbarked for the Bahamas or for Nova Scotia, rather\\nthan stay and face the troubles that were coming.\\nMany of these were refined and cultivated per-\\nsons, and not all had been actively hostile to the\\nAmerican cause many had simply accepted British\\nprotection. Against those who remained in the\\ncity the returning Whigs now proceeded with great\\nseverit3% The violent party was dominant in the\\nlegislature, and George Clinton, the governor, put\\nhimself conspicuously at its head. A bill was\\npassed disfranchising all such persons as had vol-\\nuntarily stayed in neighbourhoods occupied by the\\nBritish troops their offence was called misprision\\nof treason. But the council vetoed this bill as too\\nwholesale in its operation, for it would have left\\nsome districts without voters enough to hold an\\nelection. An iron-clad oath was adopted in-\\nstead, and no one was allowed to vote unless he\\ncould swear that he had never in anywise\\nThe Trespass\\nabetted the enemy. It was voted that y ^^^j.^*^^\\nno Tory who had left the state should\\nbe permitted to return and a bill was passed", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "124 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nknown as the Trespass Act, whereby all persons\\nwho had quit their homes by reason of the enemy s\\npresence might recover damages in an action of\\ntrespass against such persons as had since taken\\npossession of the premises. Defendants in such\\ncases were expressly barred from pleading a mili-\\ntary order in justification of their possession. As\\nthere was scarcely a building on the island of New\\nYork that had not thus changed hands during the\\nBritish occupation, it was easy to foresee what con-\\nfusion must ensue. Everybody whose house had\\nonce been, for ever so few days, in the hands of a\\nTory now rushed into court with his action of tres-\\npass. Damages were rated at most exorbitant\\nfigures, and it became clear that the misdeeds of\\nthe enemy were about to be made the excuse for a\\ncarnival of spoliation, when all at once the test case\\nof Rutgers v. Waddington bi ought upon the scene\\na sturdy defender of order, an advocate who was\\nsoon to become one of the foremost personages in\\nAmerican history.\\nOf all the young men of that day, save perhaps\\nWilliam Pitt, the most precocious was Alexander\\nHamilton. He had already given promise of a\\ngreat career before the breaking out of the war.\\nAlexander bom on the island of Nevis, in\\nHamilton. ^hc Wcst ludics, iu 1757. His father\\nbelonged to that famous Scottish clan from which\\nhave come one of the most learned metaphysicians\\nand one of the most original mathematicians of\\nmodern times. His mother was a French lady, of\\nHuguenot descent, and biographers have been fond\\nof tracing in his character the various qualities of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 125\\nhis parents. To the shrewdness and persistence,\\nthe administrative ability, and the taste for ab-\\nstract reasoning which we are wont to find asso-\\nciated in the highest type of Scottish mind he\\njoined a truly French vivacity and grace. His\\nearnestness, sincerity, and moral courage were\\ncharacteristic alike of Puritan and of Huguenot.\\nIn the course of his short life he exhibited a re-\\nmarkable many-sidedness. So great was his genius\\nfor organization that in many essential respects\\nthe American government is moving to-day along\\nthe lines which he was the first to mark out.\\nAs an economist he shared to some extent in the\\nshortcomings of the age which preceded Adam\\nSmith, but in the special department of finance he\\nhas been equalled by no other American statesman\\nsave Albert Gallatin. He was a splendid orator\\nand brilliant writer, an excellent lawyer, and a\\nclear-headed and industrious student of political\\nhistory. He was also eminent as a political leader,\\nalthough he lacked faith in democratic government,\\nand a generous impatience of temperament some-\\ntimes led him to prefer short and arbitrary by-\\npaths toward desirable ends, which can never be\\nsecurely reached save along the broad but steep\\nand arduous road of popular conviction. But with\\nall Hamilton s splendid qualities, nothing about\\nhim is so remarkable as the early age at which\\nthese were developed. At the age of fifteen a bril-\\nliant newspaper article brought him into such re-\\npute in the little island of Nevis that he was sent\\nto New York to avail himself of the best advan-\\ntages afforded by the King s College, now known", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "126 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nas Columbia. He had at first no definite intention\\nof becoming- an American citizen, but the thrilling\\nevents of the time appealed strongly to the earnest\\nheart and powerful intelligence of this wonderful\\nboy. At a gathering of the people of New York\\nin July, 1774, his generous blood warmed, till a\\nresistless impulse brought him on his feet to speak\\nto the assembled multitude. It was no company\\nof half-drunken idlers that thronged about him, but\\nan assemblage of grave and responsible citizens,\\nwho looked with some astonishment upon this boy\\nof seventeen years, short and slight in stature, yet\\nerect and Caesar-like in bearing, with firm set\\nmouth and great, dark, earnest eyes. His eloquent\\nspeech, full of sense and without a syllable of bom-\\nbast, held his hearers entranced, and from that day\\nAlexander Hamilton was a marked man. He be-\\ngan publishing anonymous pamphlets, which at\\nfirst were attributed by some to Jay, and by others\\nto Livingston. When their authorship was dis-\\ncovered, the loyalist party tried in vain to buy off\\nthe formidable youth. He kept up the pamphlet-\\nwar, in the course of which he wofully defeated\\nDr. Cooper, the Tory president of the college but\\nshortly afterward he defended the doctor s house\\nagainst an angry mob, until that unpopular gentle-\\nman had succeeded in making his escape to a Brit-\\nish ship. Plamilton served in the army throughout\\nthe war, for the most part as aid and secretary to\\nWashington; but in 1781 he was a colonel in the\\nline, and stormed a redoubt at Yorktown with\\ndistinguished skill and bravery. He married a\\ndaughter of Philip Schuyler, began the practice of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 127\\nlaw, and in 1782, at the age of twenty-five, was\\nchosen a deleoate to Cono-ress.\\nIn 1784, when the Trespass Act threw New York\\ninto confusion, Hamilton had come to be regarded\\nas one of the most powerful advocates in the coun-\\ntry. In the test case which now came before the\\ncourts he played a part of consummate boldness\\nand heroism. Elizabeth Rutgers was a widow,\\nwho had fled from New York after its capture by\\nGeneral Howe. Her confiscated estate had passed\\ninto the hands of Joshua Waddington, a rich Tory\\nmerchant, and she now brought suit un-\\nder the Trespass Act for its recovery. Rutgers i).\\n-f WaUdiugton.\\nIt was a case ni which popular sympath}^\\nwas naturally and strongly enlisted in behalf of the\\npoor widow. That she should have been turned\\nout of house and home was one of the many gross\\ninstances of wickedness wrought by the war. On\\nthe other hand, the disturbance wrought by the\\nenforcement of the Trespass Act was already creat-\\ning fresh wrongs much faster than it was righting\\nold ones and it is for such reasons as this that\\nboth in the common law and in the law of nations\\nthe principle has been firmly established that the\\nfruits of immovables belong to the captor as long\\nas he remains in actual possession of them. The\\nTrespass Act contravened this principle, and it\\nalso contravened the treaty. It moreover placed\\nthe state of New York in an attitude of defiance\\ntoward Congress, which had made the treaty and\\nexpressly urged upon the states to suspend the\\nleo islation ajjainst the Tories. On larsfe grounds\\nof public policy, therefore, the Trespass Act de-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "128 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nserved to be set aside by the courts, and when\\nHamilton was asked to serve as counsel for the\\ndefendant he accepted the odious task without\\nhesitation. There can be no better proof of his\\nforensic ability than his winning a verdict, in such\\na case as this, from a hostile court that was largely\\ninfluenced by the popular excitement. The de-\\ncision nullified the Trespass Act, and forthwith\\nmass meetings of the people and an extra session\\nof the legislature condemned this action of the\\ncourt. Hamilton was roundly abused, and his\\nconduct was attributed to unworthy motives. But\\nhe faced the people as boldly as he had faced the\\ncourt, and published a letter, under the signature\\nof Phocion, setting forth in the clearest light the\\ninjustice and impolicy of extreme measures against\\nthe Tories. The popular wrath and disgust at\\nHamilton s course found expression in a letter\\nfrom one Isaac Ledyard, a hot-headed pot-house\\npolitician, who signed himself Mentor. A war of\\npamjihlets ensued between Mentor and Phocion. It\\nwas genius pitted against dulness, reason against\\npassion and reason wielded by genius won the\\nday. The more intelligent and respectable citizens\\nreluctantly admitted that Hamilton s arguments\\nwere unanswerable. A club of boon companions,\\nto which Ledyard belonged, made the same admis-\\nsion by the peculiar manner in which it proposed\\nto silence him. It was gravely proposed that the\\nmembers of the club should pledge themselves one\\nafter another to cliallenge Hamilton to mortal com-\\nbat, until some one of them should have the good\\nfortune to kill him The scheme met with general", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 129\\nfavour, but was defeated by the exertions of Ledyard\\nliiraself, whose zeal was not ardent enough to eon-\\ndone treachery and murder. The incident well\\nillustrates the intense bitterness of political pas-\\nsion at the time, as Hamilton s conduct shows him\\nin the light of a most courageous and powerful\\ndefender of the central government. For nothing\\nwas more significant in the verdict which he had\\nobtained than its implicit assertion of the rights of\\nthe United States as against the legislature of a\\nsingle state.\\nIn spite of the efforts of such men as Hamilton,\\nlife was made very uncomfortable for the Tories.\\nIn some states they were subjected to mob violence.\\nInstances of tarring and feathering were not un-\\ncommon. The legislature of South Carolina was\\nhonourably distinguished for the good faith with\\nwhich it endeavoured to enforce the recommenda-\\ntion of Congress but the people, unable to forget\\nthe smoking ruins of plundered homes, were less\\nlenient. Notices were posted ordering prominent\\nloyalists to leave the country the newspapers\\nteemed with savage warnings and finally, of those\\nwho tarried beyond a certain time, many were shot\\nor hanged to trees. This extremity of bitterness,\\nhowever, did not long continue. The instances of\\nphysical violence were mostly confined to the first\\ntwo or three years after the close of the war.\\nIn most of the states the confiscating acts were\\nafter a while repealed, and many of the loyalists\\nwere restored to their estates. But the\\nEmigration\\nemigration which took place between of Tories.\\n1783 and 1785 was very large. It has been esti-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "130 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nmated that 100,000 persons, or nearly three per\\ncent, of the total white population, quit the coun-\\ntry. Those from the southern states went mostly\\nto the Bahamas and Florida while those from the\\nnorth laid the foundation of new British states in\\nNew Brunswick and Upper Canada. Many of\\nthese refugees appealed to the British government\\nfor indemnification for their losses, and their claims\\nreceived prompt attention. A parliamentary com-\\nmission was appointed to inquire into the matter,\\nand by the year 1790 some $16,000,000 had been\\ndistributed among about 4,000 sufferers, while\\nmany others received grants of crown-lands, or half-\\npay as military officers, or special annuities, or ap-\\npointments in the civil service. On the whole,\\nthe compensation which the refugees received from\\nParliament seems to have been much more ample\\nthan that which the ragged soldiers of our Revolu-\\ntionary army ever received from Congress.\\nWhile the political passions resulting in this\\nforced emigration of loyalists were such as naturally\\narise in the course of a civil war, the historian can-\\nnot but regret that the United States should have\\nbeen deprived of the services of so many excellent\\ncitizens. In nearly all such cases of wholesale\\npopular vengeance, it is the wrong individuals who\\nsuffer. We could well afford to dispense with the\\nborder-ruffians who abetted the Indians in their\\ncarnival of burning and scalping, but the refugees\\nof 1784 were for the most part peaceful and unof-\\nfending families, above the average in education\\nand refinement. The vicarious suffering inflicted\\nupon them set nothing right, but simply increased", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 131\\nthe mass of wrong, while to the general interests\\nof the country the loss of such people was in every\\nway damaging. The immediate political detriment\\nwrought at the time, though it is that which here\\nmost nearly concerns us, was perhaps the least im-\\nportant. Since Congress was manifestly unable\\nto carry out the treaty, an excuse was furnished to\\nEngland for declining to fulfil some of its pro-\\nvisions. In regard to the loyalists, indeed, the\\ntreaty had recognized that Congress possessed but\\nan advisory power but in the other provision con-\\ncerning the payment of private debts, which in the\\npopular mind was very much mixed up with the\\nquestion of justice to the loyalists, the faith of the\\nUnited States was distinctly pledged. ^^^.g\\nOn this point also Congress was power- o\u00c2\u00b0ce a\u00c2\u00b0ment\\nless to enforce the treaty. Massachu- BritL^ifcredit-\\nsetts. New York, Pennsylvania, Mary- retkiiatefby\\nland, Virginia, and South Carolina had sur ender the\\nall enacted laws obstructing the collec- western posts.\\ntion of British debts and in flat defiance of the\\ntreaty these statutes remained in force until after\\nthe downfall of the Confederation. The states\\nwere aware that such conduct needed an excuse,\\nand one was soon forthcoming. Many negroes\\nhad left the country with the British fleet some\\ndoubtless had sought their freedom others, per-\\nhaps, had been kidnapped as booty, and sold to\\nplanters in the West Indies. The number of these\\nblack men carried away by the fleet had been mag-\\nnified tenfold by popular rumour. Complaints had\\nbeen made to Sir Guy Carleton, but he had replied\\nthat any negro who came within his lines was pre-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "132 THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP.\\nsumably a freeman, and lie could not lend liis aid\\nin remanding such persons to slavery. Jay, as one\\nof the treaty commissioners, gave it as his opinion\\nthat Carleton was quite right in this, but he thought\\nthat where a loss of slaves could be proved, Great\\nBritain was bound to make pecuniary compensation\\nto the owners. The matter was wrangled over for\\nseveral years, in the state legislatures, in town and\\ncounty meetings, at dinner-tables, and in bar-rooms,\\nwith the general result that, until such compensa-\\ntion should be made, the statutes hindering the\\ncollection of debts would not be repealed. In re-\\ntaliation for this. Great Britain refused to withdraw\\nher garrisons from the western fortresses, which\\nthe treaty had surrendered to the United States.\\nThis measure was very keenly felt by the people.\\nAs an assertion of superior strength, it was pecul-\\niarly galling to our weak and divided confederacy,\\nand it also wrought us direct practical injury. It\\nencouraged the Indian tribes in their depredations\\non the frontier, and it deprived American mer-\\nchants of an immensely lucrative trade in furs. In\\nthe spring of 1787 there were advertised for sale\\nin London more than 360,000 skins, worth $1,200,-\\n000 at the lowest estimate and had the posts been\\nsurrendered according to the treaty, all this would\\nhave passed through the hands of American mer-\\nchants. The London fur-traders were naturally\\nloth to lose their control over this business, and in\\nthe language of modern politics they brought\\npressure to bear on the government to retain\\nthe fortresses as long as possible. The American\\nrefusal to pay British creditors furnished an excel-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "THE LEAGUE OF FRIENDSHIP. 133\\nlent excuse, while the weakness of Congress made\\nany kind o\u00c2\u00a3 reprisal impossible and it was not\\nuntil Washington s second term as president, after\\nour national credit had been restored and the\\nstrength of our new government made manifest,\\nthat England surrendered this chain of strongholds,\\ncommanding the woods and waters of our north-\\nwestern frontier.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IV.\\nDRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nAt the close of the eighteenth century the bar-\\nbarous superstitious of the Middle Ages concern-\\ning trade between nations still flourished with\\nscarcely diminished vitality. The epoch-making\\nwork of Adam Smith had been published in the\\nsame year in which the United States declared\\ntheir independence. The one was the great scien-\\ntific event, as the other was the great political\\nevent of the age but of neither the one nor the\\nother were the scope and purport fathomed at the\\ntime. Among the foremost statesmen, those who,\\nlike Shelburne and Gallatin, understood the prin-\\nciples of the Wealth of Nations were few indeed.\\nThe simple principle that when two par-\\nBarbarous SU- 1\\nperstitions tics trade both must be gamers, or one\\nabout trade.\\nwould soon stop tradnig, was generally\\nlost sight of and most commercial legislation pro-\\nceeded upon the theory that in trade, as in gam-\\nbling or betting, what the one party gains the other\\nmust lose. Hence towns, districts, and nations\\nsurrounded themselves with walls of legislative re-\\nstrictions intended to keep out the monster Trade,\\nor to admit him only on strictest proof that he\\ncould do no harm. On this barbarous theory, the\\nuse of a colony consisted in its being a customer", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 135\\nwhich you could compel to trade with yourself,\\nwhile you could prevent it from trading with any-\\nbody else and having secured this point, you\\ncould cunningly arrange things by legislation so as\\nto throw all the loss upon this enforced customer,\\nand keep all the gain to yourself. In the seven-\\nteenth and eighteenth centuries all the commercial\\nlegislation of the great colonizing states was based\\nupon this theory of the use of a colony. For ef-\\nfectiveness, it shared to some extent the character-\\nistic features of legislation for making water run\\nup hill. It retarded commercial development all\\nover the world, fostered monopolies, made the rich\\nricher and the poor poorer, hindered the inter-\\nchange of ideas and the refinement of manners,\\nand sacrificed millions of human lives in misdi-\\nrected warfare but what it was intended to do it\\ndid not do. The sturdy race of smugglers those\\ndespised pioneers of a higher civilization thrived\\nin defiance of kings and parliaments and as it\\nwas impossible to carry out such legislation thor-\\noughly without stopping trade altogether, colonies\\nand mother countries contrived to increase their\\nwealth in spite of it. The colonies, however, im-\\nderstood the animus of the theoiy in so far as it\\nwas directed against them, and the revolutionary\\nsentiment in America had gained much of its\\nstrength from the protest against this one-sided\\njustice. In one of its most important aspects, the\\nRevolution was a deadly blow aimed at the old\\nsystem of trade restrictions. It was to a certain\\nextent a step in realization of the noble doctrines\\nof Adam Smith. But where the scientific thinker", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "136 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\ngrasped the whole principle involved in the matter,\\nthe practical statesmen saw only the special appli-\\ncation which seemed to concern them for the mo-\\nment. They all understood that the Revolution\\nhad set them free to trade with other countries\\nthan England, but very few of them understood\\nthat, whatever countries trade together, the one\\ncannot hope to benefit by impoverishing the other.\\nThis point is much better understood in Eng-\\nland to-day than in the United States but a cen-\\ntury ago there was little to choose between the two\\ncountries in ignorance of political economy. Eng-\\nland had gained great wealth and power through\\ntrade with her rapidly growing American colonies.\\nOne of her chief fears, in the event of American\\nindependence, had been the possible loss of that\\ntrade. English merchants feared that American\\ncommerce, when no longer confined to its old paths\\nby legislation, would somehow find its way to\\nFrance and Holland and Spain and other countries,\\nuntil nothing would be left for England. The\\nRevolution worked no such change, however. The\\nprincipal trade of the United States was with Eng-\\nland, as before, because England could best supply\\nthe goods that Americans wanted and it is such\\nconsiderations, and not acts of Parliament, that de-\\ntermine trade in its natural and proper channels.\\nIn 1783 Pitt introduced into Parliament a bill\\nwhich would have secured mutual unconditional\\nfree trade between the two countries and this was\\nwhat such men as Franklin, Jefferson, and Madi-\\nson desired. Could this bill have passed, the hard\\nfeelings occasioned by the war would soon have", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 137\\ndied out, the commercial progress of both countries\\nwould have been promoted, and the stupid meas-\\nures which led to a second war within thirty years\\nmight have been prevented. But the wisdom o\u00c2\u00a3\\nPitt found less favour in Parliament than the dense\\nstupidity of Lord Sheffield, who thought that to\\nadmit Americans to the carrying trade would un-\\ndermine the naval power of Great Britain. Pitt s\\nmeasure was defeated, and the regulation of com-\\nmerce with America was left to the king in coun-\\ncil. Orders were forthwith passed as if upon the\\ntheory that America poor would be a better cus-\\ntomer than America rich.\\nThe carrying trade to the West Indies had been\\none of the most important branches of American\\nindustry. The men of New Enojland\\n11, Shipbuilding\\nwere famous lor seamanship, and bet- i New Eng-\\nland.\\nter and cheaper ships could be built in\\nthe seaports of Massachusetts than anywhere in\\nGreat Britain. An oak vessel could be built at\\nGloucester or Salem for twenty-four dollars per\\nton a ship of live-oak or American cedar cost not\\nmore than thirty-eight dollars per ton. On the\\nother hand, fir vessels built on the Baltic cost\\nthirty-five dollars per ton, and nowhere in Eng-\\nland, France, or Holland could a ship be made of\\noak for less than fifty dollars per ton. Often the\\ncost was as high as sixty dollars. It was not\\nstrange, therefore, that before the war more than\\none third of the tonnage afloat under the British\\nflag was launched from American dock-yards. The\\nwar had violently deprived England of this enor-\\nmous advantage, and now she sought to make the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "138 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nprivation perpetual, in the delusive hope of confin-\\nine: British trade to British keels, and in the belief\\nthat it was the height of wisdom to impoverish the\\nnation which she regarded as her best customer.\\nIn July, 1783, an order in council proclaimed that\\nhenceforth all trade between the United States and\\nthe Bi itish West Indies must be carried on in\\nBritish-built ships, owned and navigated by British\\nsubjects. A serious blow was thus dealt not only\\nat American shipping, but also at the interchange\\nof commodities between the states and the islands,\\nwhich was greatly hampered by this restriction.\\nDuring the whole of the eighteenth century the\\nBritish naviga- Wcst India sugar trade with the North\\nord rThi coun- American colonies and with Great Brit-\\nagainsTAmeii- ^iu had bceu of immense value to all\\ncan commerce, pg^j.^jgg^ g^jjjj r^\\\\\\\\ j^g^j bccu scriously dam-\\naged by the curtailment of it due to the war. Now\\nthat the artificial state of things created by the war\\nwas to be perpetuated by legislation, the prospect\\nof repairing the loss seemed indefinitely postponed.\\nMoreover, even in trading directly with Great\\nBritain, American ships were only allowed to bring\\nin articles produced in the particular states of\\nwhich their owners were citizens, an enactment\\nwhich seemed to add insult to injury, inasmuch as\\nit directed especial attention to the want of union\\namong the thirteen states. Great indignation was\\naroused in America, and reprisals were talked of,\\nbut eiTorts were first made to obtain a commercial\\ntreaty.\\nIn 1785 Franklin returned from France, and\\nJefferson was sent as minister in his stead, while", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY 139\\nJohn Adams became the first representative of the\\nUnited States at the British court. Adams was\\nat first very courteously received by George III.,\\nand presently set to work to convince Lord Car-\\nmarthen, the foreign secretary, of the desirableness\\nof unrestricted intercourse between the two coun-\\ntries. But popular opinion in England\\n-p, Jolin Adams\\nwas obstinately set against nun. ut tries in vain to\\nP 1 TVT A 11 1 negotiate a\\ntor the JNavigation Act and the orders commercial\\nin council, it was said, all ships would\\nby and by come to be built in America, and every\\ntime a frigate was wanted for the navy the Lords\\nof Admiralty would have to send over to Boston\\nor Philadelphia and order one. Rather than do\\nsuch a thing as this, it was thought that the British\\nnavy should content itself with vessels of inferior\\nworkmanship and higher cost, built in British dock-\\nyards. Thirty years after, England gathered an\\nunexpected fruit of this narrow policy, when, to\\nher intense bewilderment, she saw frigate after\\nfrigate outsailed and defeated in single combat\\nwith American antagonists. Owing to her exclu-\\nsive measures, the rapid improvement in American\\nshipbuilding had gone on quite beyond her ken,\\nuntil she was thus rudely awakened to it. With\\nsimilar short-sighted jealousy, it was argued that\\nthe American share in the whale-fishery and in the\\nNewfoundland fishery should be curtailed as much\\nas possible. Spermaceti oil was much needed in\\nEngland complaints were rife of robbery and\\nmurder in the dimly lighted streets of London and\\nother great cities. But it was thought that if\\nAmerican ships could carry oil to England and", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "140 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nsalt fish to Jamaica, the supply of seamen for the\\nBritish navy would be diminished and accord-\\ningly such privileges must not be granted the Amer-\\nicans unless valuable privileges could be granted\\nin return. But the government of the United\\nStates could grant no j^rivileges because it could\\nimpose no restrictions. British manufactured goods\\nwere needed in America, and Congress, which could\\nlevy no duties, had no power to keep them out.\\nBritish merchants and manufacturers, it was ar-\\ngued, already enjoyed all needful privileges in\\nAmerican ports, and accordingly they asked no\\nfavours and granted none.\\nSuch were the arguments to which Adams was\\nobliged to listen. The popular feeling was so\\nstrong that Pitt could not have stemmed it if he\\nwould. It was in vain that Adams threatened re-\\nprisals, and urged that the British measures would\\ndefeat their own purpose. The end of the Navi-\\ngation Act, said he, as expressed in its own pre-\\namble, is to confine the commerce of the colonies\\nto the mother country but now we are become in-\\ndependent states, instead of confining our trade to\\nGreat Britain, it will drive it to other countries\\nand he suggested that the Americans might make\\na navigation act in their turn, admitting to Amer-\\nican ports none but American-built ships, owned\\nand commanded by Americans. But under the\\narticles of confederation such a threat was Idle,\\nand the British government knew it to be so. Thir-\\nteen separate state governments could never be\\nmade to adopt any such measure in concert. The\\nweakness of Congress had been fatally revealed in", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 141\\nits inability to protect the loyalists or to enforce\\nthe payment of debts, and in its failure to raise a\\nrevenue for meeting its current expenses. A gov-\\nernment thus slighted at home was naturally de-\\nspised abroad. England neglected to send a minis-\\nter to Philadelphia, and while Adams was treated\\npolitely, his arguments were unheeded. Whether\\nin this behaviour Pitt s government was influenced\\nor not by political as well as economical reasons, it\\nwas certain that a political purpose was entertained\\nby the king and approved by many people. There\\nwas an intention of humiliating the Americans, and\\nit was commonly said that under a sufficient weight\\nof commercial distx-ess the states would break up\\ntheir feeble union, and come straggling back, one\\nafter another, to their old allegiance. The fiery\\nspirit of Adams could ill brook this contemptuous\\ntreatment of the nation which he represented.\\nThough he favoured very liberal commercial rela-\\ntions with the whole world, he could see no escape\\nfrom the present difficulties save in systematic re-\\ntaliation. I shou^ld be sorry, he said, to adopt\\na monopoly, but, driven to the necessity of it, I\\nwould not do things by halves. If monopolies\\nand exclusions are the only arms of defence against\\nmonopolies and exclusions, I would venture upon\\nthem without fear of offending Dean Tucker or the\\nghost of Dr. Quesnay. That is to say, certain\\ncommercial privileges must be withheld from Great\\nBritain, in order to be offered to her in return for\\nreciprocal privileges. It was a miserable policy to\\nbe forced to adopt, for such restrictions upon trade\\ninevitably cut both ways. Like the non-importa-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "142 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\ntion agreement of 1768 and the embargo of 1808,\\nsuch a policy was open to the objections familiarly\\nurged against biting off one s own nose. It was\\ninjuring one s self in the hope of injuring some-\\nbody else. It was perpetuating in time of peace\\nthe obstacles to commerce generated by a state of\\nwar. In a certain sense, it was keeping vip war-\\nfare by commercial instead of military methods,\\nand there was danger that it might lead to a re-\\nnewal of armed conflict. Nevei-theless, the con-\\nduct of the British government seemed to Adams\\nto leave no other course open. But such means\\nof preserving ourselves, he said, can never be\\nsecured imtil Congress shall be made supreme in\\nforeign commerce.\\nIt was obvious enough that the separate action\\nof the states upon such a question was only add-\\ning to the general uncertainty and confusion. In\\n1785 New Yoi-k laid a double duty on\\nReprisal im- t t-\u00c2\u00bb i\\npossible; the all goods wliatcvcr imported in British\\nstates impose i x i\\nconflicting sliips. In the samc year Pennsvlvania\\nduties. _\\npassed the first of the long series of\\nAmerican tariff acts, designed to tax the whole\\ncommunity for the alleged benefit of a few greedy\\nmanufacturers. Massachusetts sought to establish\\ncommittees of correspondence for the purpose of\\nentering into a new non-importation agreement,\\nand its legislature resolved that the present pow-\\ners of the Congress of the United States, as con-\\ntained in the articles of confederation, are not\\nfully adequate to the great purposes they were\\noriginally designed to effect. The Massachusetts\\ndelegates in Congress Gerry, Holton, and King", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 143\\nwere instructed to recommend a general conven-\\ntion of the states for the purpose of revising and\\namending the articles of confederation but the\\ndelegates refused to comply with their instructions,\\nand set forth their reasons in a paper which was\\napproved by Samuel Adams, and caused the legis-\\nlature to reconsider its action. It was feared that\\na call for a convention might seem too much like\\nan open expression of a want of confidence in Con-\\ngress, and might thereby weaken it still further\\nwithout accomplishing any good result. For the\\npresent, as a temporary expedient, Massachusetts\\ntook counsel with New Hampshire, and the two\\nstates passed navigation acts, prohibiting British\\nships from carrying goods out of their harbours,\\nand imposing a fourfold duty upon all such goods\\nas they should bring in. A discriminating tonnage\\nduty was also laid upon all foreign vessels, Rhode\\nIsland soon after adopted similar measures. In\\nCongress a scheme for a uniform navigation act,\\nto be concurred in and passed by all the thirteen\\nstates, was suggested by one of the Maryland dele-\\ngates but it was opposed by Richard Henry Lee\\nand most of the delegates from the far south.\\nThe southern states, having no ships or seamen\\nof their own, feared that the exclusion of British\\ncompetition might enable northern ship-owners to\\ncharge exorbitant rates for carrying their rice and\\ntobacco, thus subjecting them to a ruinous monop-\\noly; but the gallant Moultrie, then governor of\\nSouth Carolina, taking a broader view of the case,\\nwrote to Bowdoin, governor of Massachusetts, as-\\nserting the paramount need of harmonious and", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "Ill nini liNc lowAun ANAiicnv.\\nuiiilrtl iicrnin. Ill iJio Vii( ,iiiin. jiMHoiiiMy, ii liol-\\nliriiih il iiiImi-, iuiiikmI riiiiiHl.oll, \u00c2\u00ablcrliii( (l liiiiiKrir\\nill tlolllil. wlirllicr ill Wmild iml, lie lirllcr Id cil-\\n\u00c2\u00abMtiiiii|;(i I.Ih^ hriliiiii nil.lirr Miiiii l.ln i-jihIimii iiiii-\\nrliir; IhiI, I.Ik* rminiK vvmh {.nndtMl wilJi liinMrn jind\\nj^roiiiri, Miitl IIh- it|M iil*rr vv. i;i i(|Mc(|ily |iiil l \u00c2\u00bb\\\\\\\\ii\\nAmid Hiicli iiiiiliiiii! ir:il(HiHii H niid iiMM^i viiif;it, diir\\nill/; l.lir yonr ITHf* iicTh wnt^ piiHHcd l\u00c2\u00bby ten Ht. ilfM\\nIfninliili^ I/O loiifj;iTnii l.ln |io\\\\\\\\\u00c2\u00bb red iri^iilniiii/. imhii\\nliM r\u00c2\u00abio r\u00c2\u00abii iJio iiHiiin;; iJiiilcni yniirH. TImi Mii \u00c2\u00bbi\\nHinicH wliii li rrlrjiiiHMl I loin iu l.in|.j; wrrc ir(\u00c2\u00bbi| iii,\\nSoiil.li Miuliii. Mid I l!ivv!ii riiif :i*-tii ul iJio\\n(\u00e2\u0080\u00a2llicr It ll \\\\v\u00c2\u00bb r !iti ini/^dil. iiiivo JMirii (^x|MM l(\u00e2\u0080\u00a2(l, a\\njiinddr ul iiiroiii ;i uil,i H. Norlli iiroliiiii ;i!inliMl\\nnil llii |Hi\\\\M i lli.il. \\\\v:iu iimIu iI, ImiI. Mli|Md:il.( d lli. it,\\nvvlirii idl tlu^ HiiiitMi idioidd liiivr d(iii liKivviM*^ llirir\\nncTM slioidd Im HiiiiiiiitMJ ii|i in :i iitvv iilirh^ d coti-\\nIVdn. iiiuii. (iiiiircl.iciil, rciiii;iy I v;iiii;i, ;iiid Miiry-\\nl. iiid li;id li\\\\i d llii^ ln.r ill vvliirli |jii |.;i :iiir w:iH l.o\\ntuhr t lTrrl., wliilc IMkhIo Irthiiid |M-i vidrd tJi. ii ii\\nMliiMild iiiil, \\\\|iii(^ iiiilil mIIi I IIic I:i|);ic oI Iwriily-\\nlivo y(*iiiM. Tlio f;r;iiil. I\u00c2\u00bby New ll;iiii|\u00c2\u00bb;iiiii( Jillowrd\\nlilt* |M)\\\\v U to 1m* iiMi d (tidy ill one H|MMilicd way,\\nby n*Hlri iiiii!; Ilio dnlic:! iiii|M\u00c2\u00bbM!il\u00c2\u00bbl i l\u00c2\u00bby Ilic Hrvcrnl\\nHtiii\u00c2\u00ab H. Tlio fj^riiiilH ol MnHHjicliiiH\u00c2\u00ab l,l,H, N nv V \u00c2\u00bbih,\\nN(*\\\\v tl( rH( y, iiiid Virj^iiiin. \\\\vor iinl, lo l,;du rllci l,\\niinl/il nil I III uIJkth hIioiiM o iiilo o|M i-:il,i iii. Tlio\\nonly lliinj; wliicli tn/;r(\u00c2\u00abHH could do willi IJichc jicI.h\\nwww l( ri lVr llii in Icick to iJio Hrvcr. il K ^mmImIiiim S,\\nwilliii (tlili nM|ii( 4|, l,( Iry to rcdiicr llinii to Homo-\\ntliin;; liKr iiiiiloiniity.\\nMt imwliilr, Mir dilTdit iit ntjitcu, willi tlicir dif-\\nIt i ciil, tiirifl iiiid toiiMii|j; o JK^IiH, lirptii to mimUo -oni-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "hi .ll l i:ifi l(}WAI .h ANAH/JIY\\nHKjrrrial w; ,r m^iku ui; fuifft.hhr. So *)fifir ha/J t.Uh\\n(Ahtff iiircM Sew V^w^Vfiuii *tat virtuaJly :\\\\(At-A\\ni)tMr X}f/rt,n t/ i /rithh ahjj/jrtng than\\ni^(/rin(-/ ,iu^ni thr^^w h^rrs wuit: ot *;T\u00c2\u00bb, an i-,*!f,w* i5\u00c2\u00bb\\nw^, much ^hh Jol\\\\f wt-A up r/y Jaying\\n\u00c2\u00abylvarija imi \\\\unuii,U A agaln-it iMlawar*;, an/l New\\nJf-jM^y, pjllag*;/! at, ^/n/^; by V/th h^rr ^rCdXnr nfjigli-\\niM/arn^ was\u00c2\u00abt r^ wi|/ar*;/] f/; a cank tapjjf^l at ly/tli f^fl\u00c2\u00bb,\\nHx; cjmAiK^, (4 Saw Yf/rk Uyaroe t;9,\\\\}fj^ ^\\\\y ^-MVAi\\nan/1 tmhW(frthj. That rapi/J growth which wa\u00c2\u00bb\\n\u00c2\u00bbo \u00c2\u00ab/x/Ti to carry th/j r?ity and th/; \u00c2\u00bbtatfe to a p(mlum\\nr/f \\\\fr\\\\iu ij( ,y in th I ii kiti ha/l An-AiAy /rm, Afu^\\nth \\\\c\\\\f^riMrc of th*; i n hhh ihh rhv iv A (A hmtnhHfi\\nwfjnt on with leap* an l J^/un/ln. The fe^jlJng of\\nl/x al fifttnV/tiHTri waxe/1 ?,\\\\,r( it and in no one wan it\\nmore c/)in\\\\ \\\\(^/:]y rnanifent^;/! than in G*y/rge (y lin-\\nt^rti, the ilevolatiz/nary gen*?ral, wh//rn the j f50ple\\n(i]f-/!:i4-A governor for nine nuc/ /cmivh U-.tj/ih. From\\nahumhle origin, 1/y dint of nhrewflner-iH and nntir-\\nfng jxtish, Ci mi/m ha^l e^^we V; f/ 3 for the mornffnt\\nthe n/ /o-t [K/ z/erfuI ;rian in th Ht^te of \\\\ew York.\\nHe ha/J ///me t/j )/\u00c2\u00bb^/k njx^n the .Htat almost an if\\nit were hi\u00c2\u00bb own j/rirat*; manor, and hia life wa de-\\nvr;t ;^l t/; furthering it\u00c2\u00bb mU-Jc-iiA an he nnder-it/xxl\\nth rm. It wan hi.H firnt ai-tiele of faith that New\\nVof k mu.Ht he the greateJit \u00c2\u00bbtat^ in the Union,\\niiut }\u00c2\u00bbi:-t (umcAi\\\\f\\\\ unt i A Htat/;?iman\u00c2\u00bbhip we re eot-\\ntreniely narrow. Jn hi\u00c2\u00bb mind, the welfare of New\\nYork meant tl\u00c2\u00bbe prdling down and throating aaide\\nof all her n ;ighhonr -jand rivals. He wa\u00c2\u00bb the vigor-\\n/rj5\u00c2\u00bb and Htf /r AfH.9A. arl v^^/jat/j of every \\\\]h\\\\ *;ni] and\\nexchmva manmirn^ Atul the most uucj/inyroiuln tng", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "146 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nenemy to a closer union of the states. His great\\npopular strength and the commercial importance\\nof the community in which he held sway made him\\nat this time the most dangerous man in America.\\nThe political victories presently to be won by Ham-\\nilton, Schuyler, and Livingston, without which our\\ngrand and pacific federal union could not have\\nbeen brought into being, were victories won by\\nmost desperate fighting against the dogged opposi-\\ntion of Clinton. Under his guidance, the history\\nof New York, during the five years following the\\npeace of 1783, was a shameful story of greedy mo-\\nnopoly and sectional hate. Of all the thirteen\\nstates, none behaved worse except Rhode Island.\\nA single instance, which occurred early in 1787,\\nmay serve as an illustration. The city of New\\nYork, with its population of 30,000 souls, had long\\nbeen supplied with firewood from Connecticut, and\\nwith butter and cheese, chickens and garden vege-\\ntables, from the thrifty farms of New Jersey.\\nThis trade, it was observed, carried thousands of\\ndollars out of the city and into the pockets of de-\\ntested Yankees and despised Jerseymen. It was\\nruinous to domestic industry, said the men of New\\nYork. It must be stopped by those effective rem-\\nedies of the Sangrado school of economic doctors,\\na navigation act and a protective tariff. Acts\\nwere accordingly passed, obliging every Yankee\\nsloop which came down through Hell Gate, and\\nevery Jersey market boat which was rowed across\\nfrom Paulus Hook to Cortlandt Street, to pay en-\\ntrance fees and obtain clearances at the custom-\\nhouse, just as was done by shijJs from London or", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 147\\nHamburg and not a cart-load of Connecticut fire-\\nwood could be delivered at the back-door of a\\ncountry-house in Beekman Street until it should\\nhave paid a heavy duty. Great and just was the\\nwrath of the farmers and lumbermen. The New\\nJersey legislature made up its mind to retaliate.\\nThe city of New York had lately bought a small\\npatch of ground on Sandy Hook, and had built a\\nlight-house there. This light-house was the one\\nweak spot in the heel of Achilles where a hostile\\narrow could strike, and New Jersey gave vent to\\nher indignation by laying a tax of $1,800 a year on\\nit. Connecticut was equally prompt. At a great\\nmeeting of business men, held at New London, it\\nwas unanimously agreed to suspend all commercial\\nintercourse with New York. Every merchant\\nsigned an agreement, under penalty of $250 for\\nthe first offence, not to send any goods whatever\\ninto the hated state for a period of twelve months.\\nBy such retaliatory measures, it was hoped that\\nNew York might be compelled to rescind her odi-\\nous enactment. But such meetings and such re-\\nsolves bore an ominous likeness to the meetings\\nand resolves which in the years before 1775 had\\nheralded a state of war and but for the good work\\ndone by the federal convention another five years\\nwould scarcely have elapsed before shots would\\nhave been fired and seeds of perennial hatred sown\\non the shores that look toward Manhattan Island.\\nTo these commercial disputes there were added\\ndisputes about territory. The chronic quarrel be-\\ntween Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the valley\\nof Wyoming was decided in the autumn of 1782", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "148 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nby a special federal court, appointed in accord-\\nance with the articles of confederation,\\ntemt or^fdi^- The prize was adjudged to Pennsylva-\\nasters in the i p r^\\nvaueyofwyo- ma, and the government ot Connecti-\\ncut submitted as gracefully as possible.\\nBut new troubles were in store for the inhabitants\\nof that beautiful region. The traces of the massa-\\ncre of 1778 had disappeared, the houses had been\\nrebuilt, new settlers had come in, and the pretty\\nvillages had taken on their old look of content-\\nment and thrift, when in the spring of 1784 there\\ncame an accumulation of disasters. During a very\\ncold winter great quantities of snow had fallen,\\nand lay piled in huge masses on the mountain\\nsides, until in March a sudden thaw set in. The\\nSusquehanna rose, and overflowed the valley, and\\ngreat blocks of ice drifted here and there, carrying\\ndeath and destruction with them. Houses, barns,\\nand fences were swept away, the cattle were\\ndrowned, the fruit trees broken down, the stores\\nof food destroyed, and over the whole valley there\\nlay a stratum of gravel and pebbles. The people\\nwere starving with cold and hunger, and President\\nDickinson urged the legislature to send prompt re-\\nlief to the sufferers. But the hearts of the mem-\\nbers were as flint, and their talk was incredibly\\nwicked. Not a penny would they give to help the\\naccursed Yankees. It served them right. If they\\nhad stayed in Connecticut, where they belonged,\\nthey would have kept out of harm s way. And\\nwith a blasphemy thinly veiled in phrases of pious\\nunction, the desolation of the valley was said to\\nhave been contrived by the Deity with the express", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 149\\nobject of punishing these trespassers. But the\\ncruelty of the Pennsylvania legislature was not con-\\nfined to words. A scheme was devised for driving\\nout the settlers and partitioning their lands among\\na company of speculators. A force of militia was\\nsent to Wyoming, commanded by a truculent crea-\\nture named Patterson. The ostensible purpose was\\nto assist in restoring order in the valley, but the\\nbehaviour of the soldiers was such as would have\\ndisgraced a horde of barbarians. They stole what\\nthey could find, dealt out blows to the men and in-\\nsults to the women, until their violence was met\\nwith violence in return. Then Patterson sent a\\nletter to President Dickinson, accusing the farmers\\nof sedition, and hinting that extreme measures\\nwere necessary. Having thus, as he thought, pre-\\npared the way, he attacked the settlement, turned\\nsome five hundred people out-of-doors, and burned\\ntheir houses to the ground. The wretched victims,\\nmany of them tender women, or infirm old men, or\\nlittle children, were driven into the wilderness at\\nthe point of the bayonet, and told to find their way\\nto Connecticut without further delay. Heart-\\nrending scenes ensued. Many died of exhaustion,\\nor furnished food for wolves. But this was more\\nthan the Pennsylvania legislature had intended.\\nPatterson s zeal had carried him too far. He was\\nrecalled, and the sheriff of Northumberland County\\nwas sent, with a posse of men, to protect the\\nsettlers. Patterson disobeyed, however, and with-\\ndrawing his men to a fortified lair in the moun-\\ntains, kept up a guerilla warfare. All the Connect-\\nicut men in the neighbouring country flew to arms.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "150 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\n]\\\\Ien were killed on both sides, and presently Pat-\\nterson was besieged. A regiment of soldiers was\\nthen sent from Philadelphia, under Colonel Arm-\\nstrong, who had formerly been on Gates s staff, the\\nauthor of the incendiary Newburgh address. On\\narriving in the valley, Armstrong held a parley\\nwith the Connecticut men, and persuaded them to\\nlay down their arms assuring them on his honour\\nthat they should meet with no ill treatment, and\\nthat their enemy, Patterson, should be disarmed\\nalso. Having thus fallen into this soldier s clutches,\\nthey were forthwith treated as prisoners. Seventy-\\nsix of them were handcuifed and sent under guard,\\nsome to Easton and some to Northumberland,\\nwhere they were thrown into jaiL\\nGreat was the indignation in New England when\\nthese deeds were heard of. The matter had be-\\ncome very serious. A war between Connecticut\\nand Pennsylvania might easily grow out of it. But\\nthe danger was averted through a very singular\\nfeature in the Pennsylvania constitution. In order\\nto hold its legislature in check, Pennsylvania had\\na council of censors, which was assembled once in\\nseven years in order to inquire whether the state\\nhad been properly governed during the interval.\\nSoon after the troubles in Wyoming the regular\\nmeeting of the censors was held, and the conduct\\nof Armstrong and Patterson was unreservedly con-\\ndemned. A hot controversy ensued between the\\nlegislature and the censors, and as the people set\\ngreat store by the latter peculiar institution, public\\nsympathy was gradually awakened for the sufferers.\\nThe wickedness of the. affair began to dawn upon", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD AJVARCHY. 151\\npeople s minds, and they were ashamed of what had\\nbeen done. Patterson and Armstrong were frowned\\ndown, the legislature disavowed their acts, and it\\nwas ordered that full reparation should be made to\\nthe persecuted settlers of Wyoming.\\nIn the Green Mountains and on the upper waters\\nof the Connecticut there had been trouble for\\nmany years. In the course of the Revolutionary\\nWar, the fierce dispute between New York and\\nNew Hampshire for the possession of the Green\\nMountains came in from time to time to influence\\nmost curiously the course of events. It was closely\\nconnected with the intrigues against General\\nSchuyler, and thus more remotely with the Conway\\ncabal and the treason of Arnold. About the time\\nof Burgoyne s invasion the association of Green\\nMountain Boys endeavoured to cut the Gordian knot\\nby declaring Vermont an independent Troubles in\\nstate, and applying to the Continental fountains\\nCongress for admission into the Union.\\nThe New York delegates in Congress succeeded iu\\ndefeating this scheme, but the Vermont people went\\non and framed their constitution. Thomas Chitten-\\nden, a man of rough manners but very considerable\\nability, a farmer and innkeeper, like Israel Put-\\nnam, was chosen governor, and held that position\\nfor many years. New Hampshire thus far had not\\nactively opposed these measures, but fresh grounds\\nof quarrel were soon at hand. Several towns on\\nthe east bank of the Connecticut River wished to\\nA very interesting account of these troubles may be found in\\nthe first volume of Professor McMaster s History of the People of\\nthe United States.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "152 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nescape from the jurisdiction of New Hampshire.\\nThey preferred to belong to Vermont, because it\\nwas not within the Union, and accordingly not\\nliable to requisitions of taxes from the Continental\\nCongress. It was conveniently remembered that\\nby the original grant, in the reign of Charles II.\\nNew Hampshire extended only sixty miles from\\nthe coast. Vei-mont was at first inclined to assent,\\nbut finding the scheme unpopular in Congress, and\\nnot wishing to offend that body, she changed her\\nmind. The towns on both banks of the river then\\ntried to organize themselves into a middle state,\\na sort of Lotharingia on the banks of this New\\nWorld lihine, to be called New Connecticut.\\nBy this time New Hampshire was aroused, and she\\ncalled attention to the fact that she still believed\\nherself entitled to dominion over the whole of Ver-\\nmont. Massachusetts now began to suspect that\\nthe upshot of the matter would be the partition of\\nthe whole disputed territory between New Hamp-\\nshire and New York, and, ransacking her ancient\\ngrants and charters, she decided to set up a claim\\non her own part to the southernmost towns in Ver-\\nmont. Thus goaded on all sides, Vermont adopted\\nan aggressive policy. She not only annexed the\\ntowns east of the Connecticut River, but also as-\\nserted sovereignty over the towns in New York as\\nfar as the Hudson. New York sent troops to the\\nthreatened frontier. New Hampshire prepared to\\ndo likewise, and for a moment war seemed inevi-\\ntable. But here, as in so many other instances,\\nWashington appeared as peacemaker, and prevailed\\nupon Governor Chittenden to use his influence in", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING- TOWARD ANARCHY. 153\\ngetting the dangerous claims withdrawn. After\\nthe spring of 1784 the outlook was less stormy in\\nthe Green Mountains. The conflicting claims were\\nallowed to lie dormant, but the possibilities of mis-\\nchief remained, and the Vermont question was not\\nfinally settled until after the adoption of the Fed-\\neral Constitution. Meanwhile, on the debatable\\nfrontier between Vermont and New York the em-\\nbers of hatred smouldered. Barns and houses were\\nset on fire, and belated wayfarers were found mys-\\nteriously murdered in the depths of the forest.\\nIncidents like these of Wyoming and Vermont\\nseem trivial, perhaps, when contrasted with the\\nlurid tales of border warfare in older times between\\nhalf-civilized peoples of mediaeval Europe, as we\\nread them in the pages of Froissart and Sir Walter\\nScott. But their historic lesson is none the less\\nclear. Though they lift the curtain but a little\\nway, they show us a glimpse of the untold dangers\\nand horrors from which the adoption of our Fed-\\neral Constitution has so thoroughly freed us that\\nwe can only with some effort realize how narrowly\\nwe have escaped them. It is fit that they should\\nbe borne in mind, that we may duly appreciate the\\nsignificance of the reign of law and order which\\nhas been established on this continent during the\\ngreater part of a century. When reported in\\nEurope, such incidents were held to confirm the\\nopinion that the American confederacy was going\\nto pieces. With quarrels about trade and quarrels\\nabout boundaries, we seemed to be treading the\\nold-fashioned paths of anarchy, even as they had\\nbeen trodden in other ages and other parts of the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "154 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nworld. It was natural that people in Europe\\nshould think so, because there was no historic pre-\\ncedent to help them in forming a different opinion.\\nNo one could possibly foresee that within five years\\na number of gentlemen at Philadelphia, containing\\namong themselves a greater amount of political\\nsagacity than had ever before been brought to-\\ngether within the walls of a single room, would\\namicably discuss the situation and agree upon a\\nnew system of government whereby the dangers\\nmight be once for all averted. Still less could any\\none foresee that these gentlemen would not only\\nagree upon a scheme among themselves, but would\\nactually succeed, without serious civil dissension,\\nin making the people of thirteen states adopt, de-\\nfend, and cherish it. History afforded no example\\nof such a gigantic act of constructive statesman-\\nship. It was, moreover, a strange and apparently\\nfortuitous combination of circumstances that were\\nnow preparing the way for it and making its ac-\\ncomplishment possible. No one could forecast the\\nfuture. When our ministers and agents in Europe\\nOne nation or ^^^^^d the questiou as to making com-\\nthirteen? mercial treaties, they were disdainfully\\nasked whether European powers were expected to\\ndeal with thirteen governments or with one. If it\\nwas answered that the United States constituted a\\nsingle government so far as their relations with\\nforeign powers were concerned, then we were forth-\\nwith twitted with our failure to keep our engage-\\nments with England with regard to the loyalists\\nand the collection of private debts. Yes, we see,\\nsaid the European diplomats; the United States", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 155\\nare one nation to-day and thirteen to-morrow, ac-\\ncording as may seem to subserve their selfish inter-\\nests. Jefferson, at Paris, was told again and again\\nthat it was useless for the French government to\\nenter into any agreement with the United States,\\nas there was no certainty that it would be fulfilled\\non our part and the same things were said all\\nover Europe. Toward the close of the war most\\nof the European nations had seemed ready to enter\\ninto commercial arrangements with the United\\nStates, but all save Holland speedily lost interest\\nin the subject. John Adams had succeeded in\\nmaking a treaty with Holland in 1782. Frederick\\nthe Great treated us more civilly than other\\nsovereigns. One of the last acts of his life was to\\nconclude a treaty for ten years with the United\\nStates asserting the principle that free ships\\nmake free goods, taking arms and military stores\\nout of the class of contraband, agreeing to refrain\\nfrom privateering even in case of war between the\\ntwo countries, and in other respects showing a\\nliberal and enlightened spirit.\\nThis treaty was concluded in 1786. It scarcely\\ntouched the subject of international trade in time\\nof peace, but it was valuable as regarded the mat-\\nters it covered, and in the midst of the general\\nfailure of American diplomacy in Europe it fell\\npleasantly upon our ears. Our diplomacy had\\nfailed because our weakness had been proclaimed\\nto the world. We were bullied by England, in-\\nsulted by France and Spain, and looked askance\\nat in Holland. The humiliating position in which\\nour ministers were placed by the beggarly poverty", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "156 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nof Congress was something almost beyond credence.\\nIt was by no means unusual for the superintendent\\nof finance, when hard pushed for money, to draw\\nupon our foreign ministers, and then sell the drafts\\nfor cash. This was not only not unusual it was\\nan established custom. It was done again and\\nagain, when there was not the smallest ground for\\nsupposing that the minister upon whom the draft\\nwas made would have any funds wherewith to meet\\nit. He must go and beg the money. That was\\npart of his duty as envoy, to solicit loans without\\nsecurity for a government that could not raise\\nenough money by taxation to defray its current\\nFailure of cxpenscs. It was sickcuing work. Just\\nwTd^^Tohn before John Adams had been appointed\\nAdams beg- minister to Eng-land, and while he was\\ngmg m Hoi- o\\nland, 1784. visitiug in London, he suddenly learned\\nthat drafts upon him had been presented to his\\nbankers in Amsterdam to the amount of more than\\na million florins. Less than half a million florins\\nwere on hand to meet these demands, and unless\\nsomething were done at once the greater part of\\nthis paper would go back to America protested.\\nAdams lost not a moment in starting for Holland.\\nIn these modern days of precision In travel, when\\nwe can translate space into time, the distance be-\\ntween London and Amsterdam is eleven hours. It\\nwas accomplished by Adams, after innumerable\\ndelays and vexations and no little danger, in fifty-\\nfour days. The bankers had contrived, by ingen-\\nious excuses, to keep the drafts from going to\\nprotest until the minister s arrival, but the gazettes\\nwere full of the troubles of Congress and the bick-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 157\\nerings of the states, and everybody was suspicious.\\nAdams applied in vain to the regency of Amster-\\ndam. The promise of the American government\\nwas not regarded as valid security for a sum equiv-\\nalent to about thi ee hundred thousand dollars.\\nThe members of the regency were polite, but in-\\nexorable. They could not make a loan on such\\nterms it was unbusinesslike and contrary to pre-\\ncedent. Finding them immovable, Adams was\\nforced to apply to professional usurers and Jew\\nbrokers, from whom, after three weeks of per-\\nplexity and humiliation, he obtained a loan at ex-\\norbitant interest, and succeeded in meeting the\\ndrafts. It was only too plain, as he mournfully\\nconfessed, that American credit was dead. Such\\nwere the trials of our American ministers in Europe\\nin the dai^k days of the League of Friendship. It\\nwas not a solitary, but a typical, instance. John\\nJay s experience at the unfriendly court of Spain\\nwas perhaps even more trying.\\nEuropean governments might treat us with cold\\ndisdain, and European bankers might pronounce\\nour securities worthless, but there was one quarter\\nof the world from which even worse measure was\\nmeted out to us. Of all the barbarous communi-\\nties with which the civilized world has had to deal\\nin modern times, perhaps none have made so much\\ntrouble as the Mussulman states on the southern\\nshore of the Mediterranean. After the breaking\\nup of the great Moorish kingdoms of the Middle\\nAges, this region had fallen under the nominal\\ncontrol of the Turkish sultans as lords paramount\\nof the orthodox Mohammedan world. Its miser-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "158 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nable populations became the prey of banditti.\\nSwarms of half -savage chieftains settled down upon\\nthe land like locusts, and out of such\\nThe Barbary\\npirates. g^ pandcnionium of robbery and murder\\nas has scarcely been equalled in historic times the\\npirate states of Morocco and Algiers, Tunis afiid\\nTripoli, gradually emerged. Of these communities\\nhistory has not one good word to say. In these\\nfair lands, once illustrious for the genius and vir-\\ntues of a Hannibal and the profound philosophy of\\nSt. Augustine, there grew up some of the most ter-\\nrible despotisms ever known to the world. The\\nthings done daily by the robber sovereigns were\\nsuch as to make a civilized imagination recoil with\\nhorror. One of these cheerful creatures, who\\nreigned in the middle of the eighteenth century,\\nand was called Muley Abdallah, especially prided\\nhimself on his peculiar skill in mounting a horse.\\nResting his left hand vipon the horse s neck, as he\\nsprang into the saddle he simultaneously swung\\nthe sharp scimiter in his right hand so deftly as to\\ncut off the head of the groom who held the bridle.\\nFrom his behaviour in these sportive moods one\\nmay judge what he was capable of on serious occa-\\nsions. He was a fair sample of the Barbary mon-\\narchs. The foreign policy of these wretches was\\nsummed up in piracy and blackmail. Their cor-\\nsairs swept the Mediterranean and ventured far\\nout upon the ocean, capturing merchant vessels,\\nand murdering or enslaving their crews. Of the\\nrich booty, a fixed proportion was paid over to the\\nrobber sovereign, and the rest was divided among\\nthe gang. So lucrative was this business that it", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 159\\nattracted hardy ruffians from all parts of Europe,\\nand the misery they inflicted upon mankind during\\nfour centuries was beyond calculation. One of\\ntheir favourite practices was the kidnapping of\\neminent or wealthy persons, in the hope of extort-\\nin ransom. Cervantes and Vincent de Paul were\\namong the celebrated men who thus tasted the hor-\\nrors of Moorish slavery but it was a calamity that\\nmight fall to the lot of any man or woman, and it\\nwas but rarely that the victims ever regained their\\nfreedom.\\nAgainst these pirates the governments of Europe\\ncontended in vain. Swift cruisers frequently cap-\\ntured their ships, and from the days of Joan of Arc\\ndown to the days of Napoleon their skeletons\\nswung from long rows of gibbets on all the coasts\\nof Europe, as a terror and a warning. But their\\nlosses were easily repaired, and sometimes they\\ncruised in fleets of seventy or eighty sail, defying\\nthe navies of England and France. It was not un-\\ntil after England, in Nelson s time, had acquired\\nsupremacy in the Mediterranean that this dreadful\\nscourge was destroyed. Americans, however, have\\njust ground for pride in recollecting that their\\ngovernment was foremost in chastising these pirates\\nin their own harbours. The exploits of our little\\nnavy in the Mediterranean at the beginning of the\\npresent century form an interesting episode in\\nAmerican history, but in the weak days\\nT American citi-\\not the Coniederation our commerce was zens kid-\\nplundered with impunity, and American\\ncitizens were seized and sold into slavery in the\\nmarkets of Algiers and Tripoli. One reason for", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "IGO DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nthe long- survival of tliis villainy was the low state\\nof humanity among European nations. An Eng-\\nlishman s sympathy was but feebly aroused by the\\nplunder of Frenchmen, and the bigoted Spaniard\\nlooked on with approval so long as it was Protest-\\nants that were kidnapped and bastinadoed. In\\n1783 Lord Sheffield published a pamphlet on\\nthe commerce of the United States, in which he\\nshamelessly declared that the Barbary pirates were\\nreally useful to the great maritime powers, because\\nthey tended to keep the weaker nations out of their\\nshare in the carrying trade. This, he thought, was\\na valuable offset to the Empress Catherine s device\\nof the armed neutrality, whereby small nations\\nwere protected and on this wicked theory, as\\nFranklin tells us, London merchants had been\\nheard to say that if there were no Algiers, it\\nwould be worth England s while to build one. It\\nwas largely because of such feelings that the great\\nstates of Euroj3e so long persisted in the craven\\npolicy of paying blackmail to the robbers, instead\\nof joining in a crusade and destroying them.\\nIn 1786 Congress felt it necessary to take meas-\\nures for protecting the lives and liberties of Amer-\\nican citizens. The person who called himself Em-\\nperor of Morocco at that time was different from\\nmost of his kind. He had a taste for reading, and\\nhad thus caught a glimmering of the enlightened\\nliberalism which French philosophers were preach-\\ning. He wished to be thought a benevolent despot,\\nand with Morocco, accordingly. Congress succeeded\\nin making a treaty. But nothing could be done\\nwith the other pirate states without paying black.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 161\\nmail. Few scenes in our history are more amus-\\ning, or more irritating, than the interview of John\\nAdams with an envoy from Tripoli in London.\\nThe oily-tongued barbarian, with his soft voice and\\nhis bland smile, asseverating that his only interest\\nin life was to do good and make other people happy,\\nstands out in fine contrast with the blunt, straight-\\nforward, and truthful New Englander and their\\nconversation reminds one of the old story of Coeur-\\nde-Lion with his curtal-axe and Saladin with the\\nblade that cut the silken cushion. Adams felt sure\\nthat the fellow was either saint or devil, but could\\nnot quite tell which. The envoy s love Tripoli de-\\nf or mankind was so great that he could mali, Feb.\\nnot bear the thought of hostility between\\nthe Americans and the Barbary States, and he\\nsuggested that everything might be happily ar-\\nranged for a million dollars or so. Adams thought\\nit better to fight than to pay tribute. It would be\\ncheaper in the end, as well as more manly. At the\\nsame time, it was better economy to pay a million\\ndollars at once than waste many times that sum in\\nwar risks and loss of trade. But Congress could\\ndo neither one thing nor the other. It was too\\npoor to build a navy, and too poor to buy off the\\npirates and so for several years to come American\\nships were burned and American sailors enslaved\\nwith utter impunity. With the memory of such\\nwrongs deeply graven in his heart, it was natural\\nthat John Adams, on becoming president of the\\nUnited States, should bend his energies toward\\nfounding a strong American navy.\\nA government touches the lowest point of igno-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "162 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nminy when it confesses its inability to protect the\\nlives and property of its citizens. A government\\nCongress un- wliicli lias couic to this has failed in dis-\\nAnredcrrcfu- charging the primary function of govern-\\nment, and forthwith ceases to have any\\nreason for existing. In March, 178G, Grayson\\nwrote to Madison that several members of Congress\\nthought seriously of recommending a general con-\\nvention for remodelling the governmento I have\\nnot made up my mind, says Grayson, whether\\nit would not be better to bear the ills we have than\\nfly to those wc know not of. I am, however, in no\\ndoubt about the wealoiess of the federal government.\\nIf it remains much longer in its present state of\\nimbecility, we shall be one of the most contemptible\\nnations on the face of the earth. It is clear to\\nme as A, B, C, said Washington, that an exten-\\nsion of federal powers would make us one of the\\nmost happy, wealthy, resj^ectable, and powerful na-\\ntions that ever inhabited the terrestrial globe.\\nWithout them we shall soon be everything which is\\nthe direct reverse. I predict the worst consequences\\nfrom a half-starved, limping government, always\\nmoving upon crutches and tottering at every step.\\nThere is no telling how long the wretched state\\nof things which followed the Kevolution might\\nhave continued, had not the crisis been precipi-\\ntated by the wild attempts of the several states to\\nremedy the distress of the people by legislation.\\nFinancial dis- That financial distress was widespread\\ntatesturpoiit- ^^d deep-seated was not to be denied.\\nAt the beginning of the war the amount\\nof accumulated capital in the country had been", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 163\\nvery small. The great majority of the people did\\nlittle more than get from the annual yield of their\\nfarms or plantations enough to meet the current\\nexpenses of the year. Outside of agriculture the\\nchief resources were the carrying trade, the ex-\\nchange of commodities with England and the West\\nIndies, and the cod and whale fisheries and in\\nthese occupations many people had grown rich.\\nThe war had destroyed all these sources of revenue.\\nImports and exports had alike been stopped, so that\\nthere was a distressing scarcity of some of the com-\\nmonest household articles. The enemy s navy had\\nkept us from the fisheries. Before the war, the\\ndock-yards of Nantucket were ringing with the\\nbusy sound of adze and hammer, rope-walks cov-\\nered the island, and two hundred keels sailed\\nyearly in quest of spermaceti. At the return of\\npeace, the docks were silent and grass grew in the\\nstreets. The carrying trade and the fisheries began\\nsoon to revive, but it was some years before the\\nold prosperity was restored. The war had also\\nwrought serious damage to agriculture, and in some\\nparts of the country the direct destruction of prop-\\nerty by the enemy s troops had been very great.\\nTo all these causes of povei-ty there was added the\\nhopeless confusion due to an inconvertible paper\\ncurrency. The worst feature of this financial de-\\nvice is that it not only impoverishes people, but be-\\nmuddles their brains by creating a false and fleet-\\ning show of prosperity. By violently disturbing\\napparent values, it always brings on an era of wild\\nsiseculation and extravagance in living, followed by\\nsudden collaj)se and protracted suffering. In such", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "164 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\ncrises the poorest people, those who earn their\\nbread by the sweat of their brows and have no\\nmargin of accumulated capital, always suffer the\\nmost. Above all men, it is the labouring man who\\nneeds sound money and steady values. We have\\nseen all these points amply illustrated since the\\nWar of Secession. After the War of Indepen-\\ndence, when the margin of accumulated capital was\\nso much smaller, the misery was much greater.\\nWhile the paper money lasted there was marked\\nextravagance in living, and complaints were loud\\nagainst the speculators, especially those who oper-\\nated in bread-stuffs. Washington said he would\\nlike to hang them all on a gallows higher than that\\nof Haman but they were, after all, but the inevi-\\ntable products of this abnormal state of things, and\\nthe more guilty criminals were the demagogues who\\nwent about preaching the doctrine that the poor\\nman needs cheap money. After the collapse of\\nthis continental currency in 1780, it seemed as if\\nthere were no monej in the country, and at the\\npeace the renewal of trade with England seemed at\\nfirst to make matters worse. The brisk importa-\\ntion of sorely needed manufactured goods, which\\nthen began, would naturally have been paid for in\\nthe south by indigo, rice, and tobacco, in the mid-\\ndle states by exports of wheat and furs, and in\\nNew England by the profits of the fisheries, the\\nshipping, and the West India trade. But in the\\nsouthern and middle states the necessary revival\\nof agriculture could not be effected in a moment,\\nand British legislation against American shipping\\nand the West India trade fell with crippling force", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 165\\nupon New England. Consequently, we had little\\nelse but specie with which to pay for imports, and\\nthe country was soon drained of what little specie\\nthere was. In the absence of a circidating medium\\nthere was a reversion to the practice of barter, and\\nthe revival of business was thus further impeded.\\nWhiskey in North Carolina, tobacco in Virginia,\\ndid duty as measures of value and Isaiah Thomas,\\neditor of the Worcester Spy, announced that he\\nwould receive subscriptions for his paper in salt\\npork.\\nIt is worth while, in this connection, to observe\\nwhat this specie was, the scarcity of which created\\nso much embarrassment. Until 1785 no national\\ncoinage was established, and none was issued until\\n1793. English, French, Spanish, and German\\ncoins, of various and uncertain value, passed from\\nhand to hand. Beside the ninepences gtateofthe\\nand fourpence-ha -pennies, there were coinage.\\nbits and half-bits, pistareens, picayunes, and fips.\\nOf gold pieces there were the Johannes, or joe, the\\ndoubloon, the moidore, and pistole, with English\\nand French guineas, carolins, ducats, and chequins.\\nOf coppers there were English pence and half-\\npence and French sous and pennies were issued\\nat local mints in Vermont, Massachusetts, Connect-\\nicut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Eng-\\nlish shilling had everywhere degenerated in value,\\nbut differently in different localities and among\\nsilver pieces the Spanish dollar, from Louisiana\\nand Cuba, had begun to supersede it as a measure\\nof value. In New England the shilling had sunk\\nfrom nearly one fourth to one sixth of a dollar in", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "166 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nNew York to one eighth in North Carolina to one\\ntenth. It was partly for this reason that in devis-\\ning a national coinage the more uniform dollar was\\nadopted as the unit. At the same time the decimal\\nsystem of division was adopted instead of the cum-\\nbrous English system, and the result was ovir pres=\\nent admirably simple currency, which we owe to\\nGouverneur Morris, aided as to some points by\\nThomas Jefferson. During the period of the Con-\\nfederation, the chaotic state of the currency was a\\nserious obstacle to trade, and it afforded endless\\nopportunities for fraud and extortion. Clipping\\nand counterfeiting were carried to such lengths\\nthat every moderately cautious person, in taking\\npayment in hard cash, felt it necessary to keep a\\nsmall pair of scales beside him and carefully weigh\\neach coin, after narrowly scrutinizing its stamj) and\\ndeciphering its legend.\\nIn view of all these complicated impediments to\\nbusiness on the morrow of a long and costly war,\\nit was not strange that the whole country was in\\nsome measure pauperized. The cost of the war,\\nestimated in cash, had been about f 170,000,000\\na huge sum if we consider the circumstances of the\\ncountry at that time. To meet this crush-\\nCostofthe .111\\nwar; Robert ing indebtedness Mr. Hildreth reckons\\nMorris and liis\\ninimenseser- the total amouut raiscd by the states,\\nvices.\\nwhether by means of repudiated paper\\nor of taxes, down to 1784, as not more than |30,-\\n000,000. No wonder if the issue of such a strug-\\ngle seemed quite hopeless. In many parts of the\\ncountry, by the year 1786, the payment of taxes\\nhad come to be regarded as an amiable eccentri-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 167\\ncity. At one moment, early in 1782, there was not\\na single dollar in the treasury. That the gov-\\nernment had in any way been able to finish the\\nwar, after the downfall of its paper money, was due\\nto the gigantic efforts of one great man, Robert\\nMorris, of Pennsylvania. This statesman was\\nborn in England, but he had come to Philadelphia\\nin his boyhood, and had amassed an enormous for-\\ntune, which he devoted without stint to the service\\nof his adopted country. Though opposed to the\\nDeclaration of Independence as rash and prema-\\nture, he had, nevertheless, signed his name to that\\ndocument, and scarcely any one had contributed\\nmore to the success of the war. It was he who\\nsupplied the money which enabled Washington to\\ncomplete the great campaign of Trenton and\\nPrinceton. In 1781 he was made superintendent\\nof finance, and by dint of every imaginable device\\nof hard-pressed ingenuity he contrived to support\\nthe brilliant work wliich began at the Cowpens\\nand ended at Yorktown. He established the Bank\\nof North America as an instrument by which gov-\\nernment loans might be negotiated. Sometimes\\nhis methods were such as doctors call heroic, as\\nwhen he made sudden drafts upon our ministers in\\nEurope after the manner already described. In\\nevery dire emergency he was Washington s chief\\nreliance, and in his devotion to the common weal\\nhe drew upon his private resources until he became\\npoor and in later years for shame be it said\\nan ungrateful nation allowed one of its noblest and\\nmost disinterested champions to languish in a debt-\\nor s prison. It was of iU omen for the fortunes of", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "168 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nthe weak and disorderly Confederation that in 1784,\\nafter tlu-ee years of herculean struggle with unpos-\\nsibilities, this stont heart and sagacious head could\\nno longer weather the storm. The task of creating\\nwealth out of nothing had become too arduous and\\ntoo thanldess to be endured. Robert Morris re-\\nsigned his place, and it was taken by a congres-\\nsional committee of finance, under whose manage-\\nment the disorders only hurried to a crisis.\\nBy 1786, under the universal depression and\\nwant of confidence, all trade had well-nigh stopped,\\nand political quackery, with its cheap and dirty\\nremedies, had f idl control of the field. In the very\\nface of miseries so plaiidy traceable to the deadly\\npaper currency, it may seem strange that peojsle\\nshould now have begun to clamour for a renewal\\nof the experiment which had worked so much evil.\\nYet so it was. As starving men are said to dream\\nof dainty banquets, so now a craze for\\npaper-mouey, fictitious Wealth iu tlic sliapc of paper\\nmoney ran like an epidemic through the\\ncountry. There was a Barmecide feast of economic\\nvagaries only now it was the several states that\\nsought to apply the remedy, each in its own way.\\nAnd when we have threaded the maze of this rash\\nlegislation, we shall the better understand that\\nclause in our federal constitution which forbids the\\nmaking of laws impairing the obligation of con-\\ntracts. The events of 1786 impressed ujjon men s\\nminds more forcibly than ever the wretched and\\ndisorderly condition of the country, and went far\\ntoward calling into existence the needfid popidar\\nsentiment in favour of an overruling central govern-\\nment.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 169\\nThe disorders assumed very different forms in\\ntlie different states, and brought out a great diver-\\nsity of opinion as to the causes of the distress and\\nthe efficacy of the proposed remedies. Only two\\nstates out of the thirteen Connecticut and Dela-\\nware escaped the infection, but, on the other\\nhand, it was only in seven states that the paper\\nmoney party prevailed in the legislatures. North\\nCarolina issued a large amount of paper, and, in\\norder to get it into circulation as quickly as possi-\\nble, the state government proceeded to buy tobacco\\nwith it, paying double the specie value of the to-\\nbacco. As a natural consequence, the paper dollar\\ninstantly fell to seventy cents, and went on declin-\\ning. In South Carolina an issue was tried some-\\nwhat more cautiously, but the planters\\nAgitation in\\nsoon refused to take the ijaper at its southern and\\nmidcUe states.\\nface value. Coercive measures were\\nthen attempted. Planters and merchants were\\nurged to sign a pledge not to discriminate between\\npaper and gold, and if any one dared refuse the\\nfanatics forthwith attempted to make it hot for\\nhim. A kind of Kuklux society was organized\\nat Charleston, known as the Hint Club. Its\\npurpose was to hint to such people that they had\\nbetter look out. If they did not mend their ways,\\nit was unnecessary to inform them more explicitly\\nwhat they might expect. Houses were combustible\\nthen as now, and the use of firearms was well un-\\nderstood. In Georgia the legislature itself at-\\ntempted coercion. Paper money was made a legal\\ntender in spite of strong opposition, and a law was\\npassed prohibiting any planter or merchant from", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "170 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nexporting any produce without taking affidavit that\\nhe had never refused to receive this scrip at its full\\nface value. But somehow people found that the\\nmore it was sought to keep up the pajDcr by dint of\\nthreats and forcing acts, the faster its value fell.\\nVirginia had issued hills of credit during the cam-\\npaign of 1781, but it was enacted at the same time\\nthat they should not be a legal tender after the\\nnext January. The influence of Washington,\\nMadison, and Mason was effectively brought to\\nbear in favour of sound currency, and the people of\\nVirginia were but slightly affected by the craze of\\n1786. In the autumn of that year a proposition\\nfrom two counties for an issue of paper was de-\\nfeated in the legislature by a vote of eighty-five to\\nseventeen, and no more was heard of the matter.\\nIn Maryland, after a very obstinate fight, a rag\\nmoney biU was carried in the house of representa-\\ntives, but the senate threw it out and the meas-\\nure was thus postponed until the discussion over\\nthe federal constitution superseded it in 23oi3ular in-\\nterest. Pennsylvania had warily begun in May,\\n1785, to issue a million dollars in bills of credit,\\nwhich were not made a legal tender for the pay-\\nment of private debts. They were mainly loaned\\nto farmers on mortgage, and were received by the\\nstate as an equivalent for sj^ecie in the payment\\nof taxes. By August, 1786, even this carefully\\nguarded paper had fallen some twelve cents below\\npar, not a bad showing for such a year as that.\\nNew York moved somewhat less cautiously. A\\nmillion dollars were issued in bills of credit receiv-\\nable for the custom-house duties, which were then", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. l71\\npaid into the state treasury and these bills were\\nmade a legal tender for all money received in law-\\nsuits. At the same time the New Jersey legisla-\\nture j^assed a bill for issuing half a million paper\\ndollars, to be a legal tender in all business trans-\\nactions. The bill was vetoed by the governor in\\ncouncil. The aged Governor Livingston was\\ngreatly respected by the people and so the mob a.t\\nElizabethtown, which had duly planted a stake and\\ndragged his effigy up to it, refrained from inflict-\\ning the last indignities upon the image, and burned\\nthat of one of the members of the council instead.\\nAt the next session the governor yielded, and the\\nrag money was issued. But an unforeseen diffi-\\ncidty arose. Most of the dealings of New Jersey\\npeople were in the cities of New York and Phila-\\ndelphia, and in both cities the merchants refused\\ntheir paper, so that it speedily became worthless.\\nThe business of exchange was thus fast getting\\ninto hopeless confusion. It has been said of Brad-\\nshaw s Railway Guide, the indispensable compan-\\nion of the traveller in England, that no man can\\nstudy it for an hour without qualifying himseK for\\nan insane asylum. But Bradshaw is pellucid clear-\\nness compared with the American tables of ex-\\nchange in 1786, with their medley of dollars and\\nshillings, moidores and pistareens. The addition\\nof half a dozen different kinds of paper created\\nsuch a labyrinth as no human intellect could ex-\\nplore. No wonder that men were counted wise who\\npreferred to take whiskey and pork instead. No-\\nbody who had a yard of cloth to sell could tell how\\nmuch it was worth. But even worse than all this", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "172 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nwas the swift and certain renewal of bankruptcy\\nwhich so many states were prej)aring for them-\\nselves.\\nNowhere did the warning come so quickly or so\\nsharply as in New England. Connecticut, indeed,\\nas already obsei ved, came off scot-free. She had\\nissued a little paper money soon after the battle\\nof Lexington, but had stojjped it about the time\\nof the surrender of Burgoyne. In 780 she had\\nwisely and summarily adjusted all relations be-\\ntween debtor and creditor, and the crisis of 1786\\nfound her people poor enough, no doubt, but able\\nto wait for better times and indisposed to adopt\\nviolent remedies. It was far otherwise in Rhode\\nIsland and Massachusetts. These were preemi-\\nDistressinNew ncutly tlic maritime states of the Union,\\nEngland. ^j^^ \\\\Aow9^ ahucd by Eng-\\nland at American commerce had fallen most se-\\nverely. It was these two maritime states that suf-\\nfered most from the cutting down of the carrying\\ntrade and the restriction of intercourse with the\\nWest Indies. These things worked injury to ship-\\nbuilding, to the exports of lumber and oil and\\nsalted fish, even to the manufacture of Medford\\nrum. Nowhere had the normal machinery of busi-\\nness been thrown out of gear so extensively as in\\nthese two states, and in Rhode Island there was\\nthe added disturbance due to a prolonged occupa-\\ntion by the enemy s troops. Nowhere, jjerhaps,\\nwas there a larger proportion of the population in\\ndebt, and in these preeminently commercial com-\\nmunities private debts were a heavier burden and\\ninvolved more personal suffering than in the some-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 173\\nwhat patriarchal system of life in Virginia or\\nSouth Carolina. In the time of which we are now\\ntreating, imprisonment for debt was common.\\nHigh-minded but unfortunate men were carried to\\njail, and herded with thieves and ruffians in loath-\\nsome dungeons, for the crime of owing a hundred\\ndollars which they could not promptly pay. Under\\nsuch circumstances, a commercial disturbance, in-\\nvolving widespread debt, entailed an amount of\\npersonal suffering and humiliation of which, in\\nthese kinder days, we can form no adequate con-\\nception. It tended to make the debtor an outlaw,\\nready to entertain schemes for the subversion of\\nsociety. In the crisis of 178G, the agitation in\\nRhode Island and Massachusetts reached white\\nheat, and things were done which alarmed the\\nwhole country. But the course of events was dif-\\nferent in the two states. In Rhode Island the agi-\\ntators obtained control of the government, and the\\nresult was a paroxysm of tyranny. In Massachu-\\nsetts the agitators failed to secure control of the\\ngovernment, and the result was a paroxysm of re-\\nbellion.\\nThe debates over paper money in the Rhode Isl-\\nand legislature began in 1785, but the advocates\\nof a sound currency were victorious. These men\\nwere roundly abused in the newspapers, and in the\\nnext spring election most of them lost their seats.\\nThe legislature of 1786 showed an overwhelmins:\\nmajority in favor of paper money. The farmers\\nfrom the inland towns were unanimous in support-\\ning the measure. They could not see the difference\\nbetween the state making a dollar out of paper and", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "174 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\na dollar out of silver. The idea that the value did\\nnot lie in the government stamj) they dismissed as\\nan idle crotchet, a wire-drawn theory, worthy only\\nof literary fellows. What they could see was\\nthe glaring fact that they had no money, hard or\\nsoft and they wanted something that would sat-\\nisfy their creditors and buy new gowns for their\\nwives, whose raiment was unquestionably the worse\\nfor wear. On the other hand, the merchants from\\nseaports like Providence, Newport, and Bristol un-\\nderstood the difference between real money and the\\npromissory notes of a bankrupt government, but\\nthey were in a hopeless minority. Half a million\\ndollars were issued in scrip, to be loaned to the\\nfarmers on a mortgage of their real estate. No\\none could obtain the scrip without giving a mort-\\ngage for twice the amount, and it was thought\\nthat this security would make it as good as gold.\\nBut the depreciation began instantly. When the\\nworthy farmers went to the store for dry goods or\\nsugar, and found the prices rising with dreadful\\nrapidit} they were at first astonished, and then en-\\nraged. The trouble, as they truly said, was with\\nthe wicked merchants, who would not\\nRaff money in i c\\nvictorious in take tlic paiscr dollars at their face value.\\nRhode Island\\ntiie Know Tlicsc uicu wcrc tlius thwarting the 2:0 v-\\nTe measures.\\nernment, and must be punished. An\\nact was accordingly hurried through the legisla-\\nture, commanding every one to take paper as an\\nequivalent for gold, under penalty of five hundred\\ndollars fine and loss of the right of suffrage.\\nThe merchants in the cities thereupon shut up\\ntheir shops. During the summer of 1786 all", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 175\\nbusiness was at a standstill in Newport and Prov-\\nidence, except in tlie bar-rooms. There and about\\nthe market-places men spent their time angrily dis-\\ncussing politics, and scarcely a day passed without\\nstreet-fights, which at times grew into riots. In\\nthe country, too, no less than in the cities, the god-\\ndess of discord reigned. The farmers determined\\nto starve the city people into submission, and they\\nentered into an agreement not to send any produce\\ninto the cities until the merchants should open their\\nshops and begin selling their goods for paper at its\\nface value. Not wishing to lose their pigs and but-\\nter and grain, they tried to dispose of them in Bos-\\nton and New York, and in the coast towns of Con-\\nnecticut. But in all these places their proceedings\\nhad awakened such lively disgust that placards\\nwere posted in the taverns warning purchasers\\nagainst farm produce from Rhode Island. Disap-\\npointed in these quarters, the farmers threw away\\ntheir milk, used their corn for fuel, and let their\\napples rot on the ground, rather than supply the\\ndetested merchants. Food grew scarce in Provi-\\ndence and Newport, and in the latter city a mob of\\nsailors attempted unsuccessfully to storm the pro-\\nvision stores. The farmers were threatened with\\narmed violence. Town-meetings were held all over\\nthe state, to discuss the situation, and how long\\nthey might have talked to no purpose none can say,\\nwhen all at once the matter was brought into court.\\nA cabinet-maker in Newport named Trevett went\\ninto a meat-market kept by one John Weeden, and\\nselecting a joint of meat, offered paper in payment.\\nWeeden refused to take the paper except at a", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "176 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nheavy discount. Ti-evett ^yent to bed supperless,\\nand next morning informed against the obstinate\\nbutcher for disobedience to the forcing act. Should\\nthe court find him guilty, it would be a good spec-\\nulation for Trevett, for half of the five hundred\\ndollars fine was to go to the infonuer. Hard-\\nmoney men feared lest the court might prove sub-\\nservient to the legislature, since that body possessed\\nthe power of removing the five judges. The case\\nwas tried in September amid furious excitement.\\nHuge crowds gathered about the court-house and\\nfar down the street, screaming and cheering like a\\ncrowd on the night of a presidential election. The\\njudges were clear-headed men, not to be brow-\\nbeaten. They declared the forcing act unconstitu-\\ntional, and dismissed the complaint. Popular\\nwrath then turned upon them. A special session\\nof the legislature was convened, four of the judges\\nwere removed, and a new forcing-act was prepared.\\nThis act provided that no man could vote at elec-\\ntions or hold any office without taking a test oath\\npromising to receive paper money at par. But\\nthis was going too far. Many soft-money men\\nwere not wild enough to support such a measure\\namong the farmers there were some who had\\ngrown tired of seeing their produce spoiled on their\\nhands and many of the richest merchants had an-\\nnounced their intention of moving out of the state.\\nThe new forcing act accordingly failed to pass, and\\npresently the old one was repealed. The paper\\ndollar had been issued in May in November it\\npassed for sixteen cents.\\nThese outrageous proceedings awakened disgust", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 177\\nand alarm among sensible people in all the other\\nstates, and Rhode Island was everywhere reviled\\nand made fun of. One clause of the foreina: act\\nhad provided that if a debtor should offer paper to\\nhis creditor and the creditor should refuse to take\\nit at par, the debtor might carry his rag money to\\ncourt and deposit it with the judge and the judge\\nmust thereupon issue a certificate discharging the\\ndebt. The form of certificate began with the\\nwords Know Ye, and forthwith the unhappy lit-\\ntle state was nicknamed Rogues Island, the home\\nof Know Ye men and Know Ye measures.\\nWhile the scorn of the people was thus poured\\nout upon Rhode Island, much sympathy was felt\\nfor the government of Massachusetts, which was\\ncalled upon thus early to put down armed rebellion.\\nThe pressure of debt was keenly felt in the rural\\ndistricts of Massachusetts. It is esti-\\n1 1 ^^o money de-\\nmated that the private debts in the featedinMas-\\nsachusetts\\nstate amounted to some i7, 000,000, and theShaysmsur-\\nrection, Aug.\\nthe states arrears to the federal erov- nsc-Feb.\\n1787.\\nernment amounted to some $7,000,000\\nmore. Adding to these sums the arrears of boun-\\nties due to the soldiers, and the annual cost of the\\nstate, county, and town governments, there was\\nreached an aggregate equivalent to a tax of more\\nthan 150 on every man, woman, and child in this\\npopulation of 379,000 souls. Upon every head of a\\nfamily the average burden was some $200 at a time\\nwhen most farmers would have thought such a sum\\nyearly a princely income. In those days of scar-\\ncity most of them did not set eyes on so much as\\n$50 in the course of a year, and happy was he who", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "178 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nhad tucked away two or three golden guineas or\\nmoidores in an old stocking, and sewed up the\\ntreasure in his straw mattress or hidden it behind\\nthe bricks of the chimney-piece. Under such cir-\\ncumstances the payment of debts and taxes was\\nout of the question; and as the same state of\\nthings made creditors clamorous and ugly, the\\ncourts wei^e crowded with lawsuits. The lawyers\\nusually contrived to get their money by exacting\\nretainers in advance, and the practice of cham-\\nperty was common, whereby the lawyer did his\\nwork in consideration of a percentage on the sum\\nwhich was at last forcibly collected. Homesteads\\nwere sold for the payment of foreclosed mortgages,\\ncattle were seized in distrainer, and the farmer\\nhimself was sent to jail. The smouldering fires of\\nwrath thus kindled found expression in curses\\naimed at lawyers, judges, and merchants. The\\nwicked merchants bought foreign goods and\\ndrained the state of specie to pay for them, while\\nthey drank Madeira wine and di-essed their wives\\nin fine velvets and laces. So said the farmers\\nand city ladies, far kinder than these railers\\ndeemed them, formed clubs, of which the members\\npledged themselves to wear homespun, a poor\\npalliative for the deep-seated ills of the time. In\\nsuch mood were many of the villagers when in the\\nsummer of 1786 they were overtaken by the craze\\nfor paper money. At the meeting of the legisla-\\nture in May, a petition came in from Bristol\\nCounty, praying for an issue of paper. The j^eti-\\ntioners admitted that such money was sure to de-\\nteriorate in value, and they doubted the wisdom of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 179\\ntrying to keep it up by forcing acts. Instead of\\nthis they woukl have the rate of its deterioration\\nregulated by law, so that a dollar might be worth\\nninety cents to-day, and presently seventy cents,\\nand by and by fifty cents, and so on till it should\\ngo down to zero and be thrown overboard. People\\nwould thus know what to expect, and it would be\\nall right. The delicious naivete of this argument\\ndid not prevail with the legislature of Massachu-\\nsetts, and soft money was frowned down by a vote\\nof ninety-nine to nineteen. Then a bill was\\nbrought in seeking to reestablish in legislation the\\nancient practice of barter, and make horses and\\ncows legal tender for debts and this bill was\\ncrushed by eighty-nine votes against thirty-five.\\nAt the same time this legislature passed a bill to\\nstrengthen the federal government by a grant of\\nsupplementary funds to Congress, and thus laid a\\nfurther burden of taxes upon the people.\\nThere was an outburst of popular wrath. A con-\\nvention at Hatfield in August decided that the\\ncourt of common pleas ought to be abolished, that\\nno funds should be granted to Congress, and that\\npaper money should be issued at once. Another\\nconvention at Lenox denounced such incendiary\\nmeasures, approved of supporting the federal gov-\\nernment, and declared that no good could come\\nfrom the issue of paper money. But meanwhile\\nthe angry farmers had resorted to violence. The\\nlegislature, they said, had its sittings in Boston,\\nunder the influence of wicked lawyers and mer-\\nchants, and thus could not be expected to do the\\nwill of the people. A cry went up that henceforth", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "180 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nthe law-makers must sit in some small inland town,\\nwhere jealous eyes might watch their proceedings.\\nMeanwhile the lawyers must be dealt with and\\nat Northampton, Worcester, Great Barrington, and\\nConcord the courts were broken up by armed\\nmobs. At Concord one Job Shattuck brought sev-\\neral hundred armed men into the town and sur-\\nrounded the court-house, while in a fierce harangue\\nhe declared that the time had come for wiping out\\nall debts. Yes, squeaked a nasal voice from\\nthe crowd, yes, Job, we know all about them\\ntwo farms you can t never pay for But this\\nrepartee did not save the judges, who thought it\\nbest to flee from the town. At first the legislature\\ndeemed it wise to take a lenient view of these pro-\\nceedings, and it even went so far as to promise to\\nhold its next session out of Boston. But the aoi-\\ntation had reached a point where it could not be\\nstayed. In September the supreme court was to\\nsit at Springfield, and Governor Bowdoin sent a\\nforce of 600 militia under General Shepard to pro-\\ntect it. They were confronted by sx)me 600 insur-\\ngents, under the leadership of Daniel Shays. This\\nman had been a captain in the Continental army,\\nand in his force were many of the penniless veterans\\nwhom Gates would fain have incited to rebellion at\\nNewburgh. Shays seems to have done what he\\ncould to restrain his men from violence, but he was\\na poor creature, wanting alike in courage and good\\nfaith. On the other hand the militia were lacking\\nin spirit. After a disorderly parley, with much\\ncursing and swearing, they beat a retreat, and the\\ncourt was prevented from sitting. Fresh riots fol-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 181\\nlowed at Worcester and Concord. A regiment of\\ncavalry, sent out by the governor, scoured Middle-\\nsex County, and, after a short fight in the woods\\nnear Groton, captured Job Shattuck and dispersed\\nhis men. But this only exasperated the insvirgents.\\nThey assembled in Worcester to the number of\\n1,200 or more, where they lived for two months at\\nfree quarters, while Shays organized and drilled\\nthem.\\nMeanwhile the habeas corpus act was sus-\\npended for eight months, and Governor Bowdoin\\ncalled out an army of 4,400 men, who were placed\\nunder command of General Lincoln. As the state\\ntreasury was nearly empty, some wealthy gentle-\\nmen in Boston subscribed the money needed for\\nequipping these troops, and about the middle of\\nJanuary, 1787, they were collected at Worcester.\\nThe rebels had behaved shamefully, burning barns\\nand seizing all the plunder they could lay hands\\non. As their numbers increased they found their\\nmilitary stores inadequate, and accordingly they\\nmarched upon Springfield, with the intent to capture\\nthe federal arsenal there, and provide themselves\\nwith muskets and cannon. General Shepard held\\nSpringfield with 1,200 men, and on the 25th of Jan-\\nuaiy Shays attacked him with a force of somewhat\\nmore than 2,000, hoping to crush him and seize the\\narsenal before Lincoln could come to the rescue.\\nBut his plan of attack was faulty, and as soon as his\\nmen began falling under Shepard s fire a panic\\nseized them, and they retreated in disorder to Lud-\\nlow, and then to Amherst, setting fire to houses\\nand robbing the inhabitants. On the approach of", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "182 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nLincoln s army, three days later, Shays retreated\\nto Pelham, and planted his forces on\\ntion suppresTe d two stecp hiUs protccted at the bottom\\nby state troops. itj. T*ii i\\nby liu je snowdriits. liincoln advanced\\nto Hadley and sought to open negotiations with\\nthe rebels. They were reminded that a contest\\nwith the state government was hopeless, and that\\nthey had already incurred the penalty of death\\nbut if they would now lay down their arms and go\\nhome, a free pardon could be obtained for them.\\nShays seemed willing to yield, and Saturday, the\\n3d of February, was appointed for a conference\\nbetween some of the leading rebels and some of\\nthe ofticers. But this was only a stratagem. Dur-\\ning the conference Shays decamped and marched\\nhis men through Prescott and North Dana to Pe-\\ntersham. Toward nightfall the trick was discov-\\nered, and Lincoln set his whole force in motion\\nover the mountain ridges of Shutesbury and New\\nSalem. The day had been mild, but during the\\nnight the thermometer dropped below zero and an\\nicy, cutting snow began to fall. There was great\\nsuffering during the last ten miles, and indeed the\\nwhole march of thirty miles in thirteen hours over\\nsteep and snow-covered roads was a worthy exploit\\nfor these veterans of the Revolution. Shays and\\nhis men had not looked for such a display of en-\\nergy, and as they were getting their breakfast on\\nSunday morning at Petersham they were taken by\\nsurprise. A few minutes sufficed to scatter them\\nin flight. A hundred and fifty, including Shays\\nhimself, were taken prisoners. The rest fled in all\\ndirections, most of them to Athol and Northfield,", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 183\\nwhence they made their way into Vermont. Gen-\\neral Lincoln then marched his troops into the\\nmountains of Berkshire, where disturbances still\\ncontinued. On the 26th of February one Captain\\nHamlin, with several hundred insurgents, plun-\\ndered the town of Stockbri dge and carried off the\\nleading citizens as hostages. He was pursued as\\nfar as Sheffield, defeated there in a sharp skirmish,\\nwith a loss of some thirty in killed and wounded,\\nand his troops scattered. This put an end to the\\ninsurrection in Massachusetts.\\nDuring the autumn similar disturbances had oc-\\ncurred in the states to the northward. At Exeter\\nin New Hampshire and at Windsor and Rutland\\nin Vermont the courts had been broken up by\\narmed mobs, and at Rutland there had been blood-\\nshed. When the Shays rebellion was put down,\\nGovernor Bowdoin requested the neigh-\\nConduct of\\nbouring states to lend their aid m bring- neighbouring\\nIll states.\\ning the insurgents to justice, and all\\ncomplied with the request except Vermont and\\nRhode Island. The legislature of Rhode Island\\nsympathized with the rebels, and refused to allow\\nthe governor to issue a warrant for their arrest.\\nOn the other hand, the governor of Vermont issued\\na proclamation out of courtesy toward Massachu-\\nsetts, but he caused it to be understood that this\\nwas but an empty form, as the state of Vermont\\ncould not afford to discourage immigration A\\nfeeling of compassion for the insurgents was widely\\nspread in Massachusetts. In March the leaders\\nwere tried, and fourteen were convicted of treason\\nand sentenced to death but Governor Bowdoin,", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "184 DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nwhose term was about to expire, granted a rejirieve\\nfor a few weeks. At the annual election in Aj^ril\\nthe candidates for the governorship were Bowdoin\\nand Hancock, and it was generally believed that\\nthe latter would be more likely than the former to\\npardon the convicted men. So strong was this\\nfeeling that, although much gratitude was felt to=\\nward Bowdoin, to whose enei-getic measures the\\njjrompt suppression of the rebellion was due, Han-\\ncock obtained a large majority. When the ques-\\ntion of a pardon came up for discussion, Samuel\\nAdams, who was then president of the senate, was\\nstrongly opposed to it, and one of his arguments\\nwas very characteristic. In monarchies, he\\nsaid, the crime of treason and rebellion may ad-\\nmit of being pardoned or lightly punished but the\\nman who dares to rebel against the laws of a re-\\npublic ought to suffer death. This was Adams s\\nsensitive point. He wanted the whole world to\\nrealize that the rule of a republic is a rule of law\\nand order, and that liberty does not mean license.\\nBut in spite of this view, for which there was much\\nto be said, the clemency of the American tempera-\\nment prevailed, and Governor Hancock pardoned\\nall the prisoners.\\nNothing in the history of these disturbances is\\nmore instructive than the light incidentally thrown\\nupon the relations between Congress and the state\\ngovernment. Just before the news of the rout at\\nPetersham, Samuel Adams had proposed in the\\nsenate that the governor should be requested to\\nwrite to Congress and inform that body of what\\nwas going on in Massachusetts, stating that al", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "DRIFTING TOWARD ANARCHY. 185\\nthough the legislature are firmly persuaded that\\nin all probability they will be able speedily\\nand effectively to suppress the rebellion, yet, if any\\nunforeseen event should take place which may frus-\\ntrate the measures of government, they rely upon\\nsuch support from the United States as is expressly\\nand solemnly stipulated by the articles of confeder-\\nation. A resolution to this effect was carried in\\nthe senate, but defeated in the house through the\\ninfluence of western county members in sympathy\\nwith the insurgents and incredible as it may seem,\\nthe argument was freely used that it was incompat-\\nible with the dignity of Massachusetts to allow\\nUnited States troojjs to set foot upon her soil.\\nWhen we reflect that the arsenal at Springfield,\\nwhere the most considerable disturbance occurred,\\nwas itself federal property, the climax of absurdity\\nmight seem to have been reached.\\nIt was left for Congress itself, however, to cap\\nthat climax. The progress of the insurrection in\\nthe autumn in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Mas-\\nsachusetts, as well as the troubles in Rhode Island,\\nhad alarmed the whole country. It was feared\\nthat the insurgents in these states might join\\nforces, and in some way kindle a flame\\n1111 Congress\\nthat would run through the land. Ac- afraid to in-\\n11 1 terfere.\\ncordingly Congress m October called\\nupon the states for a continental force, but did not\\ndare to declare openly what it was to be used for.\\nIt was thought necessary to say that the troops\\nwere wanted for an expedition against the north-\\nwestern Indians National hiimiliation could go\\nno further than such a confession, on the part of", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "186 DRIFtiNG TOWARD ANARCHY.\\nour central government, that it dared not use force\\nin defence of those very articles of confederation to\\nwhich it owed its existence. Things had come to\\nsuch a pass that people of all shades of opinion\\nwere beginning to agree upon one thing, that\\nsomething must be done, and done quickly.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER V.\\nGEEMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nWhile tlie events we have heretofore contem-\\nplated seemed to prophesy the speedy dissolution\\nand downfall of the half-formed American Union,\\na series of causes, obscure enough at first, but\\nemerging gradually into distinctness and then into\\nprominence, were preparing the way for the founda-\\ntion of a national sovereignty. The growth of this\\nsovereignty proceeded stealthily along creation of a\\nI national do-\\nsucn ancient lines oi precedent as to main beyond\\ntake ready hold of people s minds, al- ies!\\nthough few, if any, understood the full purport of\\nwhat they were doing. Ever since the days when\\nour English forefathers dwelt in village communi-\\nties in the forests of northern Germany, the idea of\\na common land or f olkland a territory belonging\\nto the whole community, and upon which new com-\\nmunities might be organized by a process analogous\\nto what physiologists call cell-multiplication had\\nbeen perfectly familiar to everybody. Townships\\nbudded from village or parish folkland in Mary-\\nland and Massachusetts in the seventeenth century,\\njust as they had done in England before the time\\nof Alfred. The critical period of the Revolution\\nwitnessed the repetition of this process on a gigan-\\ntic scale. It witnessed the creation of a national", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "188 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nterritory beyond the AUeglianies, an enormous\\nfolkland in which all the thirteen old states had a\\ncommon interest, and upon which new and deriva-\\ntive communities were already beginning to organ-\\nize themselves. Questions about public lands are\\noften regarded as the driest of historical dead-\\nwood. Discussions about them in newspapers and\\nmagazines belong to the class of articles which the\\ngeneral reader usually skips. Yet there is a great\\ndeal of the philosophy of history wrapped up in\\nthis subject, and it now comes to confront us at\\na most interesting moment for without studying\\nthis creation of a national domain between the\\nAlleghanies and the Mississippi, we cannot under-\\nstand how our Federal Union came to be formed.\\nWhen England began to contend with France\\nand Spain for the possession of North America, she\\nmade royal grants of land upon this continent, in\\nroyal ignorance of its extent and configuration.\\nBut until the Seven Years War the eastward and\\nwestward partitioning of these grants was of little\\npractical consequence for English dominion was\\nbounded by the Alleghanies, and everything be-\\nyond was in the hands of the French. In that\\nmost momentous war the genius of the elder Pitt\\nwon the region east of the Mississippi for men of\\nEnglish race, while the vast territory of Louisiana,\\nbeyond, passed under the control of Spain. Dur-\\ning the lie volution ary War, in a series of romantic\\nexpeditions, the state of Virginia took military pos-\\nsession of a great part of the wilderness east of the\\nMississippi, founding towns in the Ohio and Cum-\\nberland valleys, and occupying with garrisons of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 189\\nher state militia the posts at Cahokia, Kaskaskia,\\nand Vincennes. We have seen how, through the\\nskill of our commissioners at Paris, this noble coun-\\ntry was secured for the Americans in the treaty of\\n1783, in spite of the reluctance of France conflicting\\nand the hostility of Spain. Throughout Smterru\\nthe Revolutionary War the Americans\\nclaimed the territory as part of the United States\\nbut when once it passed from under the control of\\nGreat Britain, into whose hands did it go To\\nwhom did it belong To this question there were\\nvarious and conflicting answers. North Carolina,\\nindeed, had already taken possession of what was\\nafterward called Tennessee, and at the beginning\\nof the war Virginia had annexed Kentucky. As\\nto these points there could be little or no dispute.\\nBut with the territory north of the Ohio River it\\nwas very different. Four states laid claim either\\nto the whole or to parts of this territory, and these\\nclaims were not simply conflicting, but irreconcila-\\nble.\\nThe charters of Massachusetts and Connecticut\\nwere framed at a time when people had not got over\\nthe notion that this part of the continent was not\\nmuch wider than Mexico, and accordingly these\\ncolonies had received the royal permission to ex-\\ntend from sea to sea. The existence of a foreign\\ncolony of Dutchmen in the neighbourhood was a\\ntrifle about which these documents did\\nClaims of Mas-\\nnot trouble themselves but when eachusetts and\\n-ff 1 1 1 1 Connecticut.\\nCharles 11. conquered this colony and\\nbestowed it upon his brother, the province of New\\nYork became a stubborn fact, which could not", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "190 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nbe disregarded. Massachusetts and Connecticut\\npeaceably settled their boundary line with New\\nYork, and laid no claims to land within the limits\\nof that state; but they still continued to claim\\nwhat lay beyond it, as far as the Mississippi River,\\nwhere the Spanish dominion now began. The re-\\ngions claimed by Massachusetts have since become\\nthe southern halves of the states of Michigan and\\nWisconsin. The region claimed by Connecticut\\nwas a narrow strip running over the northern por-\\ntions of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois\\nand we have seen how much trouble was occasioned\\nin Pennsylvania by this circumstance.\\nBut New York laughed to scorn these claims of\\nClaims of New Conuecticut. In the seventeenth cen-\\nYork.\\ntury all the Algonquin tribes between\\nLake Erie and the Cumberland Mountains had\\nbecome tributary to the Iroquois and during the\\nhundred years struggle between France and Eng-\\nland for the supremacy of this continent the Iro-\\nquois had put themselves under the protection of\\nEngland, which thenceforth always treated them\\nas an appurtenance to New York. For a hundred\\nyears before the Revolution, said New York, she\\nhad borne the expense of protecting the Iroquois\\nagainst the French, and by various treaties she had\\nbecome lawful suzerain over the Six Nations and\\ntheir lands and the lands of their Algonquin vas-\\nsals. On such grounds New York claimed j)i etty\\nmuch everything north of the Ohio and east of the\\nMiami.\\nBut according to Virginia, it made little differ-\\nence what Massachusetts and Connecticut and New", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 191\\nYork thought about the matter, for every acre of\\nland, from the Ohio River up to Lake Superior,\\nbelonged to her. Was not she the lordly Virginia s\\nOld Dominion, out of which every =iaims.\\none of the states had been carved Even Cape\\nCod and Cape Ann were said to be in North\\nVirginia, until, in 1614, Captain John Smith in-\\nvented the name New England. It was a fair\\npresumption that any uncarved territory belonged\\nto Virginia and it was further held that the orig-\\ninal charter of 1609 used language which impli-\\ncitly covered the northwestern territory, though,\\nas Thomas Paine showed, in a pamphlet entitled\\nPublic Good, this was very doubtful. But be-\\nsides all this, it was Virginia that had actually\\nconquered the disputed territory, and held every\\nmilitary post in it except those which the British\\nhad not surrendered and who could doubt that\\npossession was nine points in the law\\nOf these conflicting claims, those of New York\\nand Virginia were the most grasping and the most\\nformidable, because they concerned a region into\\nwhich immigration was beginning rapidly to pour.\\nThey were regarded with strong disfavour by the\\nsmall states, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware,\\nand Maryland, which were so situated that they\\nnever could expand in any direction. They looked\\nforward with dread to a future in which New York\\nand Virginia might wax powerful\\nenough to tyrannize over their smaller noveiandbe-\\nneighbours. But of these protesting gestion, oct.\\nstates it was only Mainland that fairly\\nrose to the occasion, and suggested an idea which", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "192 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nseemed startling at first, but from which mighty\\nand unforeseen consequences were soon to follow.^\\nIt was on the 15th of October, 1777, just two days\\nbefore Burgoyne s surrender, that this path-break-\\ning idea first found expression in Congress. The\\narticles of confedei-ation were then just about to be\\npresented to the several states to be ratified, and\\nthe question arose as to how the conflicting western\\nclaims should be settled. A motion was then made\\nthat the United States in Congress assembled\\nshall have the sole and exclusive right and power\\nto ascertain and fix the western boundary of such\\nstates as claim to the Mississippi, and lay out\\nthe land beyond the boundary so ascertained into\\nsej)arate and independent states, from time to time,\\nas the numbers and circumstances of the people\\nmay require. To carry OTit such a motion, it\\nwould be necessary for the four claimant states\\nto surrender their claims into the hands of the\\nUnited States, and thus create a domain which\\nshould be owned by the confederacy in common.\\nSo bold a step towards centralization found no fa-\\nvour at the time. No other state but Maryland\\nvoted for it.\\nBut Maryland s course was well considered she\\npursued it resolutely, and was rewarded with com-\\nplete success. By February, 1779, all the other\\nstates had ratified the articles of confederation. In\\nthe following May, Maryland declared that she\\nThis subject has been treated in a masterly manner by Mr.\\nH. B. Adams, in an essay on Maryland s Influence upon Land Ces-\\nsions to the United States, published in the Third Series of the\\nadmirable Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Pali-\\nttcs. I am indebted to Mr. Adams for many valuable suggestions", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 193\\nwould not ratify the articles until she should re-\\nceive some definite assurance that the northwestern\\nterritory should become the common property of\\nthe United States, subject to be parcelled out by\\nCongress into free, convenient, and independent\\ngovernments. The question, thus boldly brought\\ninto the foreground, was earnestly discussed in Con-\\ngress and in the state legislatures, until in Febru-\\nary, 1780, partly through the influence of General\\nSchuyler, New York decided to cede all her claims\\nto the western lands. This act of New York set\\nthings in motion, so that in September Congress\\nrecommended to all states having west-\\nO The several\\nern claims to cede them to the United states yield\\ntheir claims m\\nStates. In October, Congress, still pur- united states\\nsuing the Maryland idea, went farther, ^^o-ss.\\nand declared that all such lands as might be ceded\\nshould be sold in lots to immigrants and the money\\nused for federal purposes, and that in due season\\ndistinct states should be formed there, to be ad-\\nmitted into the Union, with the same rights of sov-\\nereignty as the original thirteen states. As an in-\\nducement to Virginia, it was further provided that\\nany state which had incurred expense during the\\nwar in defending its western possessions should\\nreceive compensation. To this general invitation\\nConnecticut immediately responded by offering to\\ncede everything to which she laid claim, except\\n3,250,000 acres on the southern shore of Lake\\nErie, which she wished to reserve for educational\\npurposes. Washington disapproved of this reser-\\nvation, but it was accepted by Congress, though\\nthe business was not completed until 1786. This", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "194 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\npart of the state of Ohio is still commonly spoken\\nof as the Connecticut Reserve. Half a million\\nacres were given to citizens of Connecticut whose\\nproperty had been destroyed in the British raids\\nupon her coast towns, and the rest were sold, in\\n1795, for 11,200,000, in aid of schools and colleges.\\nIn January, 1781, Vii ginia offered to surrender\\nall the territory northwest of the Ohio, provided\\nthat Congress would guarantee her in the possession\\nof Kentucky. This gave rise to a discussion which\\nlasted nearly three years, until Virginia withdrew\\nher proviso and made the cession absolute. It was\\naccepted by Congress on the 1st of March, 1784,\\nand on the 19th of April, in the following year,\\nthe tenth anniversary of Lexington, Massachu-\\nsetts surrendered her claims and the whole north-\\nwestern territory the area of the great states of\\nMichigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio\\n(excepting the Connecticut Reserve) thus be-\\ncame the common property of the half-formed\\nnation. Maryland, however, did not wait for this.\\nAs soon as New York and Vii-ginia had become\\nthoroughly committed to the movement, she ratified\\nthe articles of confederation, which thus went into\\noperation on the 1st of March, 1781.\\nThis acquisition of a common territory speedily\\nled to results not at all contemplated in the theory\\nof union upon which the articles of confederation\\nwere based. It led to the exercise of national\\nsovereignty in the sense of eminent domain, as\\nshown in the ordinances of 1784 and 1787, and\\npi-eparcd men s minds for the work of the Federal\\nConvention. Great credit is due to Maryland for", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 195\\nher resolute course in setting in motion this train\\nof events. It aroused fierce indignation at the\\ntime, as to many people it looked unfriendly to the\\nUnion. Some hot-heads were even heard to say\\nthat if Maryland should persist any longer in her\\nrefusal to join the confederation, she ought to be\\nsummarily divided up between the neighbouring\\nstates, and her name erased from the map. But\\nthe brave little state had earned a better fate than\\nthat of Poland. When we have come to trace out\\nthe results of her action, we shall see that just as\\nit was Massachusetts that took the decisive step\\nin bringing on the Revolutionary War when she\\nthrew the tea into Boston harbour, so it was Mary-\\nland that, by leading the way toward the creation\\nof a national domain, laid the corner-stone of our\\nFederal Union. Equal credit must be given to Vir-\\nginia for her magnanimity in making the desired\\nsurrender. It was New York, indeed, that set the\\npraiseworthy example but New York, after all,\\nsurrendered only a shadowy claim, whereas Vir-\\nginia gave up a magnificent and princely territory\\nof which she was actually in possession. She\\nmight have held back and made endless Ma^animity\\ntrouble, just as, at the beginning of the Virgima.\\nRevolution, she might have refused to make com-\\nmon cause with Massachusetts but in both in-\\nstances her leading statesmen showed a far-sighted\\nwisdom and a breadth of patriotism for which no\\nwords of praise can be too strong. In the later\\ninstance, as in the earlier, Thomas Jefferson played\\nan important part. He, who in after years, as\\npresident of the United States, was destined, by", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "196 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nthe purchase of Louisiana, to carry our western\\nfrontier beyond the Rocky Mountains, had, in 1779,\\ndone more than any one else to support the roman-\\ntic campaign in which General Clark had taken\\npossession of the country between the Alleghanies\\nand the Mississippi. He had much to do with the\\ngenerous policy which gave up the greater part of\\nthat country for a national domain, and-on the very\\nday on which the act of cession was completed he\\npresented to Congress a remarkable plan for the gov-\\nernment of the new territory, which was only par-\\ntially successful because it attempted too much, but\\nthe results of which were in many ways notable.\\nIn this plan, known as the Ordinance of 1784,\\nJefferson proposed to divide the northwestern terri-\\ntory into ten states, or just twice as many as have\\nactually grown out of it. In each of these states\\nthe settlers might establish a local government,\\nJefferson pro- undcr the authority of Congress and\\nof gTwrmnent wlicu in any one of them the population\\nwJst^rn terri- should comc to cqual that of the least\\ntory, 1 populous of the original states, it might\\nbe admitted into the Union by the consent of nine\\nstates in Congress. The new states were to have\\nuniversal suffrage they must have republican forms\\nof government they must pay their shares of the\\nfederal debt they must forever remain a part of\\nthe United States and after the year 1800 negro\\nslavery must be prohibited within their limits.\\nThe names of these ten states have afforded much\\namusement to Jefferson s biographers. In those\\ndays the schoolmaster was abroad in the land after\\na pecidiar fashion. Just as we are now in the full", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 197\\ntide of that Gothic revival which goes back for its\\nbeginnings to Sir Walter Scott as we admire me-\\ndiaeval things, and try to build our houses after old\\nEnglish models, and jjrefer words of what people\\ncall Saxon origin, and name our children Ro-\\nland and Herbert, or Edith and Winifred, so our\\ngreatgrandfathers lived in a time of classical re-\\nvival. They were always looking for precedents\\nin Greek and Roman history they were just be-\\nginning to try to make their wooden houses look\\nlike temples, with Doric columns they preferred\\nwords of Latin origin they signed their pamphlets\\nBrutus and Lycurgus, and in sober earnest\\nbaptized their children as Caesar, or Marcellus, or\\nDarius. The map of the United States was just\\nabout to bloom forth with towns named Ithaca and\\nSyracuse, Corinth and Sparta and on the Ohio\\nRiver, opposite the mouth of Licking Creek, a city\\nhad lately been founded, the name of which was\\ntruly portentous. Losantiville was this wonder-\\nful compound, in which the initial X stood for\\nLicking, while os signified mouth, anti op-\\nposite, and ville town and the whole read\\nbackwards as Town-opposite-mouth-of-Licking.\\nIn 1790 General St. Clair, then governor of the\\nnorthwest territory, changed this name to Cincin-\\nnati, in honor of the military order to which he be-\\nlonged. With such examples in mind, we may see\\nthat the names of the proposed ten states, from\\nwhich the failure of Jefferson s ordinance has de-\\nlivered us, illustrated the prevalent taste of the\\ntime rather than any idiosyncrasy of the man. The\\nproposed names were Sylvania, Michigania, Cher-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "198 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nsonesus, Assenisipia, Metropotamia, lUinoia, Sara-\\ntoga, Washington, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia.\\nIt was not the nomenclature that stood in the\\nway of Jefferson s scheme, but the wholesale way\\nin which he tried to deal with the slavery question.\\nHe wished to hem in the probable extension of\\nslavery by an impassable barrier, and accordingly\\nhe not only provided that it should be extinguished\\nin the northwestern territory after the\\nHe wishes to\\nprohibit siav- year 1800, but at the same time his anti-\\nery in tlie na-\\ntionai do- slavcry ardour led him to try to extend\\nmain.\\nthe national dominion southward. He\\ndid his best to persuade the legislature of Virginia\\nto crown its work by giving up Kentucky to the\\nUnited States, and he urged that North Carolina\\nand Georgia should also cede their western terri-\\ntories. As for South Carolina, she was shut in be-\\ntween the two neighbouring states in such wise that\\nher western claims were vague and barren. Jeffer-\\nson would thus have drawn a north-and-south line\\nfrom Lake Erie down to the Spanish border of the\\nFloridas, and west of this line he would have had\\nall negro slavery end with the eighteenth century.\\nThe policy of restricting slavery, so as to let it die\\na natural death within a narrowly confined area,\\nthe policy to sustain which Mr. Lincoln was elected\\npresident in 1860, was thus first definitely out-\\nlined by Jefferson in 1784. It was the policy of\\nforbidding slavery in the national territory. Had\\nthis policy succeeded then, it would have been an\\nounce of prevention worth many a pound of cure.\\nBut it failed because of its largeness, because it\\nhad too many elements to deal with. For the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 199\\nmoment, the proposal to exclude slavery from the\\nuorthwestern territory was defeated, because of\\nthe two thirds vote required in Congress for any\\nimportant measure. It got only seven states in\\nits favour, where it needed nine. This defeat, how-\\never, was retrieved three years later, when the fa-\\nmous Ordinance of 1787 prohibited slavery for-\\never from the national territory north of the Ohio\\nRiver. But Jefferson s scheme had not only to\\ndeal with the national domain as it was, but also to\\nextend that domain southward to Florida and in\\nthis it failed. Virginia could not be persuaded to\\ngive up Kentucky until too late. When Kentucky\\ncame into the Union, after the adoption of the\\nFederal Constitution, she came as a sovereign state,\\nwith all her domestic institutions in her own hands.\\nWith the western districts of North Carolina the\\ncase was somewhat different, and the story of this\\nregion throws a curious light upon the affairs of\\nthat disorderly time.\\nIn surrendering her western territory. North\\nCarolina showed praiseworthy generosity. But the\\nfrontier settlers were too numerous to be handed\\nabout from one dominion to another, without say-\\ning something about it themselves and their ac-\\ntion complicated the matter, until it was too late\\nfor Jefferson s scheme to operate upon them. In\\nJune, 1784, North Carolina ceded the region since\\nknown as Tennessee, and allowed Congress two\\nyears in which to accept the grant. Meanwhile,\\nher own authority was to remain supreme there.\\nBut the settlers grumbled and protested. Some\\nof them were sturdy pioneers of the finest type, but", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "200 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nalong with these there was a lawless population of\\nwhite trash, ancestors of the peculiar race of\\nmen we find to-day in rural districts of Missouri\\nand Arkansas. They were the refuse of North\\nCarolina, gradually pushed westward by the ad-\\nvance of an orderly civilization. Crime was rife\\nin the settlements, and, in the absence of courts, a\\nrough-and-ready justice was administered by vigi-\\nlance committees. The Cherokees, moreover, were\\ntroublesome neighbours, and people lived in dread\\nof their tomahawks. Petitions had again and\\nagain gone up to the legislature, urging the estab-\\nlishment of courts and a militia, but had passed un-\\nheeded, and now it seemed that the state had with-\\ndrawn her protection entirely. The settlers did\\nnot wish to have their country made a national do-\\nmain. If their own state could not protect them,\\nit was quite clear to them that Congress could not.\\nWhat was Congress, any way, but a roomful of\\nmen whom nobody heeded So these backwoods-\\nmen held a convention in a log-cabin at Jonesbor-\\nough, and seceded from North Carolina. They\\ndeclared that the three counties between the Bald\\nMountains and the Holston River constituted an\\nindependent state, to which they gave the name of\\nJohn Sevier, Franklin and they went on to frame\\nofFrankto,^ constitutiou and elect a legislature\\nwith two chambers. For governor they\\nchose John Sevier, one of the heroes of King s\\nMountain, a man of Huguenot ancestry, and such\\ndauntless nature that he was generally known as\\nthe lion of the border. Having done all this,\\nthe seceders, in spite of their small respect for", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 201\\nCongress, sent a delegate to that body, requesting\\nthat the new state of Franklin might be admitted\\ninto the Union. Before this business had been\\ncompleted, North Carolina repealed her act of\\ncession, and warned the backwoodsmen to return\\nto their allegiance. This at once split the new\\nstate into two factions one party wished to keep\\non as they had now started, the other wished for\\nreunion with North Carolina. In 1786 the one\\nparty in each county elected members to represent\\nthem in the North Carolina legislature, while the\\nother party elected members of the legislature of\\nFranklin. Everywhere two sets of officers claimed\\nauthority, civil dudgeon grew very high, and pis-\\ntols were freely used. The agitation extended into\\nthe neighbouring counties of Virginia, where some\\ndiscontented people wished to secede and join the\\nstate of Franklin. For the next two years there\\nwas something very like civil war, until the North\\nCarolina party grew so strong that Sevier fled, and\\nthe state of Franklin ceased to exist. Sevier was\\narrested on a warrant for high treason, but he ef-\\nfected an escape, and after men s passions had\\ncooled down his great services and strong charac-\\nter brought him again to the front. He sat in the\\nsenate of North Carolina, and in 1796, when Ten-\\nnessee became a state in the Union, Sevier was her\\nfirst governor.\\nThese troubles show how impracticable was the\\nattempt to create a national domain in any part of\\nthe country which contained a considerable popu-\\nlation. The instinct of self-government was too\\nstrong to allow it. Any such population would", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "202 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nhave refused to submit to ordinances of Congress.\\nTo obey the j)arent state or to set up for one s self,\\nthese were the only alternatives which ordinary\\nmen at that time could understand. Experience\\nhad not yet ripened their minds for comprehend-\\ning a temporary condition of semi-independence,\\nsuch as exists to-day under our territorial govern-\\nments. The behaviour of these Tennessee back-\\nwoodsmen was just what might have been exj^ected.\\nThe land on which they were living was not com-\\nmon land it had been appropriated it belonged\\nto them, and it was for them to make laws for it.\\nSuch is the lesson of the short-lived state of Frank-\\nlin. It was because she perceived that similar\\nfeelings were at work in Kentucky that Virginia\\ndid not venture to loosen her grasp upon that state\\nuntil it was fully organized and ready for admis-\\nsion into the Union. It was in no such partly set-\\ntled country that Congress could do such a thing\\nas carve out boundaries and prohibit slavery by an\\nact of national sovereignty. There remained the\\nmagnificent territory north of the Ohio, an em-\\npire in itself, as large as the German Empire, with\\nthe Netherlands thrown in, in which the collec-\\ntive wisdom of the American people, as represented\\nin Congress, might autocratically shape the future\\nfor it was still a wilderness, watched by frontier\\ngarrisons, and save for the Indians and the trap-\\npers and a few sleepy old French towns on the\\neastern bank of the Mississippi, there were no\\nsigns of human life in all its vast solitude. Here,\\nwhere there was nobody to grumble or secede. Con-\\ngress, in 1787, proceeded to carry out the work\\nwhich Jefferson had outlined three years before.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 203\\nIt is interesting to trace the immediate origin of\\nthe famous Ordinance of 1787. At the close of\\nthe war General Rnfus Putnam, from the moun-\\ntain village of Rutland in Massachusetts, sent to\\nCongress an outline of a plan for colonizing the re=\\ngion between Lake Erie and the Ohio origin of the\\nwith veterans of the army, who were o company.\\nwell fitted to protect the border against Indian at-\\ntacks. The land was to be laid out in townships\\nsix miles square, with large reservations for the\\nministry and schools and by selling it to the\\nsoldiers at a merely nominal price, the penniless\\nCongress might obtain an income, and at the same\\ntime recognize their services in the only substan-\\ntial way that seemed practicable. Washington\\nstrongly favoured the scheme, but, in order to carry\\nit out, it was necessary to wait until the cession of\\nthe territory by the various claimant states should\\nbe completed. After this had been done, a series\\nof treaties were made with the Six Nations, as over-\\nlords, and their vassal tribes, the Wyandots, Chip-\\npewas, Ottawas, Delawares, and Shawnees, whereby\\nall Indian claims to the lands in question were for-\\never renounced. The matter was then formally\\ntaken up by Holden Parsons of Connecticut, and\\nEufus Putnam, Manasseh Cutler, Winthrop Sar-\\ngent, and others, of Massachusetts, and a joint-\\nstock company was formed for the purchase of\\nlands on the Ohio River. A large number of set-\\ntlers old soldiers of excellent character, whom\\nthe war had impoverished were ready to go and\\ntake possession at once and in its petition the\\nOhio company asked for nothing better than that\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0\u00e2\u0080\u00a2fvA", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "204 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nits settlei s should be under the immediate gov\u00c2\u00ab\\nernment of Congress in such mode and for such\\ntime as Congress shall judge proper. Such a\\nproposal, affording a means at once of replenishing\\nthe treasury and satisfying the soldiers, could not\\nbut be accepted and thus were laid the founda-\\ntions of a state destined within a centur} to equal\\nin population and far surpass in wealth the whole\\nUnion as it was at that time. It became necessary\\nat once to lay down certain general principles of\\ngovernment applicable to the northwestern terri-\\ntory and the result was the Ordinance of 1787,\\nwhich was chiefly the work of Edward Carrington\\nand Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, and Nathan\\nDane of Massachusetts, in committee, following\\nthe outlines of a draft which is supposed to have\\nbeen made by Manasseh Cutler. Jefferson was no\\nlonger on the ground, having gone on his mission\\nto Paris, but some of the principles of his proposed\\nOrdinance of 1784 were adopted.\\nIt was provided that the northwestern territory\\nshould ultimately be carved into states, not exceed-\\ning five in number, and any one of these might be\\nadmitted into the Union as soon as its population\\nshould reach 60,000. In the mean time, the whole\\nTheordinance territory was to be governed by officers\\nof 1787. appointed by Congress, and required to\\ntake an oath of allegiance to the United States.\\nUnder this government there was to be unqualified\\nfreedom of religious worship, and no religious tests\\nshould be required of any public official. Intestate\\nproperty should descend in (;qual shares to children\\nof both sexes. Public schools were to be estab-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 205\\nlished. Suffrage was not yet made universal, as a\\nfreehold in fifty acres was required. No law was\\never to be made which should impair the obligation\\nof contracts, and it was thoroughly agreed that this\\nprovision especially covered and prohibited the\\nissue of paper money. The future states to be\\nformed from this territory must make their laws\\nconform to these fundamental principles, and under\\nno circumstances could any one of them ever be\\nseparated from the Union. In such wise, the\\ntheory of peaceful secession was condemned in\\nadvance, so far as it was possible for the federal\\ngovernment to do so. Jefferson s principle, that\\nslavery should not be permitted in the national\\ndomain, was also adopted so far as the northwest\\nwas concerned and it is interesting to observe the\\nnames of the states which were present in Congress\\nwhen this clause was added to the ordinance. They\\nwere Georgia, the two Carolinas, Virginia, Dela-\\nware, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts\\nand the vote was unanimous. No one was more\\nactive in bringing about this result than William\\nGrayson of Virginia, who was earnestly supported\\nby Lee. The action of Virginia and North Caro-\\nlina at that time need not surprise us. But the\\nmovements in favour of emancipation in these two\\nstates, and the emancipation actually effected or\\ngoing on at the north, had already made Georgia\\nand South Carolina extremely sensitive about slav-\\nery and their action on this occasion can be ex-\\nplained only by supposing that they were willing\\nto yield a point in this remote territory, in order\\nby and by to be able to insist upon an equivalent", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "206 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nin the case of the territory lying west of Georgia.\\nNor would they have yielded at all had not a fugi-\\ntive slave law been enacted, providing that slaves\\nescaping beyond the Ohio should be arrested and\\nreturned to their owners. These arrangements\\nhaving been made, General St. Clair was appointed\\ngovernor of the territory surveys were made land\\nwas put up for sale at sixty cents per acre, pay-\\nable in certificates of the public debt and settlers\\nrapidly came in. The westward exodus from New\\nEngland and Pennsylvania now began, and only\\nfourteen years elapsed before Ohio, the first of the\\nfive states, was admitted into the Union.\\nI doubt, says Daniel Webster, whether one\\nsingle law of any law-giver, ancient or modern, has\\nproduced effects of more distinct, marked, and last-\\nins: character than the Ordinance of 1787. Noth-\\ning could have been more emphatically an exercise\\nof national sovereignty; yet, as Madison said, while\\nwarmly commending the act. Congress did it with-\\nout the least colour of constitutional authority.\\nThe ordinance was never submitted to the states\\nfor ratification. The articles of confederation had\\nnever contemplated an occasion for such a pecul-\\niar assertion of sovereignty. A great and inde-\\npendent fund of revenue, said Madison, is pass-\\ning into the hands of a single body of men, who\\ncan raise troops to an indefinite number, and ap-\\npropriate money to their support for an indefinite\\nperiod of time. Yet no blame has been whis-\\npered, no alarm has been sounded, even by men\\nmost zealous for state rights and most suspicious\\nof Congress. Within a few months this argument", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 207\\nwas to be cited with telling effect against those\\nwho hesitated to accept the Federal Constitution\\nbecause of the great powers which it conferred upon\\nthe general government. Unless you give a gov-\\nernment specific powers, commensurate with its\\nobjects, it is liable on occasions of public necessity\\nto exercise powers which have not been granted.\\nAvoid the dreadful dilemma between dissolution\\nand usurpation, urged Madison, by clothing the\\ngovernment with powers that are ample but clearly\\ndefined. In a certain sense, the action of Congress\\nin 1787 was a usurpation of authority to meet an\\nemergency which no one had foreseen, as in the\\ncases of Jefferson s purchase of Louisiana and Lin-\\ncoln s emancipation of the slaves. Each of these\\ninstances marked, in one way or another,\\na brilliant epoch in American history, land upon\\n1 1 T 1 which the Gr-\\nand in each case the pubhc interest was dmaucewas\\nso unmistakable that the people con-\\nsented and applauded. The theory upon which\\nthe Ordinance of 1787 was based was one which\\nnobody could fail to understand, though perhaps\\nno one would then have known just how to put it\\ninto words. It was simply the thirteen states,\\nthrough their delegates in Congress, dealing with\\nthe unoccupied national domain as if it were the\\ncommon land or folkland of a stupendous town-\\nship.\\nThe vast importance of the lands between the\\nAUeghanies and the Mississippi was becoming\\nmore apparent every year, as the westward move-\\nment of population went on. But at this time\\ntheir value was much more clearly seen by the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "208 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nsouthern than by the northern states. In the\\nnorth the westward emigration was only just be-\\nginning to pass the AUeghanies in the south, as\\nwe have seen, it had gone be^^ond them several\\nyears ago. The southern states, accordingly, took\\na much sounder view than the northern states of\\nthe importance to the Union of the free navigation\\nof the Mississippi River. The difference was for-\\ncibly illustrated in the dispute with Spain, which\\ncame to a crisis in the summer of 1786. It will\\nbe remembered that by the treaties which closed\\nthe Revolutionary War the provinces of\\nSpain, hearing !L,\\nof the secret iLast and VV cst t lorida were ceded by\\narticle in the _^ o -itt- t-\\ntreaty of 1783, Ji,ngland to fepaiu. West Florida was\\nloses her tern-\\nper and threat- tllC TCglOU lying bctwceu tllC Appalach-\\nenstoshutup -JO JTl\\ntiie Anssissippi icola aiid the MississijjjDi rivers, includ-\\ning the southernmost portions of the\\npresent states of Alabama and Mississippi. By\\nthe treaty between Great Britain and the United\\nStates, the northern boundary of this province was\\ndescribed by the thirty-first parallel of latitude\\nbut Spain denied the right of these powers to place\\nthe boundary so low. Her troops still held Natchez,\\nand she maintained that the boundary must be\\nplaced a hundred miles farther north, starting\\nfrom the Mississippi at the mouth of the Yazoo\\nRiver, near the present site of Vicksburg. Now\\nthe treaty between Great Britain and the United\\nStates contained a secret article, wherein it was\\nprovided that if England could contrive to keep\\nWest Florida, instead of surrendering it to Spain,\\nthen the boundary should start at the Yazoo. This\\nshowed that both England and the United States", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 209\\nwere willing to yield the one to tlie other a strip of\\nterritory which both agreed in withholding from\\nSpain. Presently the Spanish court got hold of\\nthe secret article, and there was great indignation.\\nHere was England giving to the Americans a piece\\nof land which she knew, and the Americans knew,\\nwas recently a part of West Florida, and therefore\\nbelonged to Spain Castilian grandees went to\\nbed and dreamed of invincible armadas. Congress\\nwas promptly informed that, until this affair should\\nbe set right, the Americans need not expect the\\nSpanish government to make any treaty of com-\\nmerce with them and furthermore, let no Amer-\\nican sloop or barge dare to show itself on the\\nMississippi below the Yazoo, under penalty of\\nconfiscation. When these threats were heaixl in\\nAmerica, there was great excitement everywhere,\\nbut it assumed opposite phases in the north and\\nin the south. The merchants of New York and\\nBoston cared little more about the Mississippi\\nRiver than about Timbuctoo, but they were ex-\\ntremely anxious to see a commercial treaty con-\\ncluded with Spain. On the other hand, the back-\\nwoodsmen of Kentucky and the state of Franklin\\ncared nothing for the trade on the ocean, but they\\nwould not sit still while their corn and their pork\\nwere confiscated on the way to New Orleans. The\\npeople of Virginia sympathized with the backwoods-\\nmen, but her great statesmen realized the impor-\\ntance of both interests and the danger of a conflict\\nbetween them.\\nThe Spanish envoy, Gardoqui, ai^rived in the\\nsummer of 1784, and had many interviews with", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "210 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nJay, who was then secretary for foreign affairs.\\nGardoqui set forth that his royal master was gra-\\nciously pleased to deal leniently with the Ameri-\\nGardoquiand cans, and would confcr one favour u23on\\nthem, but could not confer two. He\\nwas ready to enter into a treaty of commerce with\\nus, but not until we should have renounced all\\nclaim to the navigation of the Mississippi River\\nbelow the Yazoo. Here the Spaniard was inexora-\\nble. A year of weary argument passed by, and he\\nhad not budged an inch. At last, in despair. Jay\\nadvised Congress, for the sake of the commercial\\ntreaty, to consent to the closing of the Mississippi,\\nbut only for twenty-five years. As the rumour of\\nthis went abroad among the settlements south of the\\nOhio, there was an outburst of wrath, to which an\\nincident that now occurred gave added virulence. A\\nNorth Carolinian trader, named Amis, sailed down\\nthe Mississippi with a cargo of pots and kettles\\nand barrels of flour. At Natchez his boat and his\\ngoods were seized by the Spanish officers, and he\\nwas left to make his way home afoot through sev-\\neral hundred miles of wilderness. The story of his\\nwrongs flew from one log-cabin to another, until it\\nreached the distant northwestern territory. In the\\nneighbourhood of Viucennes there were Spanish\\ntraders, and one of them kept a shop in the town.\\nThe shop was sacked by a band of American sol-\\ndiers, and an attempt was made to incite the In-\\ndians to attack the Spaniards. Indignation meet-\\nings were held in Kentucky. The people threat-\\nened to send a force of militia down the river and\\ncapture Natchez and New Orleans and a more", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 211\\ndangerous threat was made. Should the north-\\neastern states desert them and. adopt Jay s sugges-\\ntion, they vowed they would, secede, and throw\\nthemselves upon Great Britain for protection. On\\nthe other hand, there was g-i^eat aoitation\\nTlireats of\\nin the seaboard towns of Massachusetts, secession in\\nrm T T \u00e2\u0080\u00a21111 Kentucky and\\nihey were disgusted with the back- inNewEng-\\nwoodsmen for making such a fuss about\\nnothing, and with the people of the southern states\\nfor aiding and abetting them and during this tur-\\nbulent summer of 1786, many persons were heard\\nto declare that, in case Jay s suggestion should not\\nbe adopted, it would be high time for the New\\nEngland states to secede from the Union, and form\\na confederation by themselves. The situation was\\ndangerous in the extreme. Had the question been\\nforced to an issue, the southern states would never\\nhave seen their western territories go and offer\\nthemselves to Great Britain. Sooner than that,\\nthey would have broken away from the northern\\nstates. But New Jersey and Pennsylvania now\\ncame over to the southern side, and Rhode Island,\\nmoving in her eccentric orbit, presently joined\\nthem and thus the treaty was postponed for the\\npresent, and the danger averted.\\nThis lamentable dispute was watched by Wash-\\nington with feelings of gravest concern. From an\\nearly age he had indulged in prophetic dreams of\\nthe grandeur of the coming civilization in America,\\nand had looked to the country beyond the moun-\\ntains as the field in which the next generation was\\nto find room for expansion. Few had been more\\nefficient than he in aiding the great scheme of Pitt", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "212 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nfor overtlii owing the French power in America, and\\nhe understood better than most men of his time how\\nmuch that scheme implied. In his early journeys\\nin the wilderness he had given especial attention to\\nthe possibilities of water connection between the\\neast and west, and he had bought for himself and\\nsurveyed many extensive tracts of land beyond the\\nmountains. The subject was a favourite one with\\nhim, and he looked at it from both a commercial\\nand a political point of view. What we most\\nneeded, he said in 1770, were easy transit lines be-\\nwashington s twccu cast and wcst, as the .channel\\nhnporrance^of of convcyancc of the extensive and val-\\ntweeli east and uable trade of a rising empire. Just\\nbefore resigning his commission in 1783\\nWashington had explored the route through the\\nMohawk Valley, afterward taken first by the Erie\\nCanal, and then by the New York Central Rail-\\nroad, and had prophesied its commercial impor-\\ntance in the present century. Soon after reaching\\nhis home at Mount Vernon, he turned his attention\\nto the improvement of intercourse with the west\\nthrough the valley of the Potomac. The east and\\nwest, he said, must be cemented together by in-\\nterests in common; otherwise they will break\\nasunder. Without commercial intercourse they\\nwill cease to understand each other, and will thus\\nbe ripe for disagreement. It is easy for ^mental\\nhabits, as well as merchandise, to glide down\\nstream, and the connections of the settlers beyond\\nthe mountains all centre in New Orleans, which is\\nin the hands of a foreign and hostile power. No\\none can teU what complications may arise from this,", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 213\\nargued Washington let us bind these people to\\nus by a chain that can never be broken and with\\ncharacteristic energy he set to work at once to es-\\ntablish that line of communication that has since\\ngrown into the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and\\ninto the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. During\\nthe three years preceding the meeting of the Fed-\\neral Convention he was largely occupied with this\\nwork. In 1785 he became president of a company\\nfor extending the navigation of the Potomac and\\nJames rivers, and the legislature of Virginia passed\\nan act vesting him with one hundred and fifty shares\\nin the stock of the company, in order to testify\\ntheir sense of his unexampled merits. But\\nWashington refused the testimonial, and his far-\\ndeclined to take any pay for his services, alfd^sen^devch\\nbecause he wished to arouse the people\\nto the political importance of the undertaking,\\nand felt that his words would have more weight\\nif he were known to have no selfish interest in it.\\nHis sole purpose, as he repeatedly said, was to\\nstrengthen the spirit of union by cementing the\\neastern and western regions together. At this\\ntime he could ill afford to give his services without\\npay, for his long absence in war-time had sadly\\nimpaired his estate. But such was Washington.\\nIn order to carry out the enterprise of extend-\\ning the navigation of the Potomac, it became nec-\\nessary for the two states Virginia and Maryland con-\\nMaryland to act in concert and early gi^^aregardTng\\nin 1785 a joint commission of the two ofX poto\\nstates met for consultation at Washing-\\nton s house at Mount Vernon. A compact insur-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "214 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\ning harmonious cooperation was prepared by the\\ncommissioners and then, as Washington s scheme\\ninvolved the connection of the head waters of the\\nPotomac with those of the Ohio, it was fonnd nec-\\nessary to invite Pennsylvania to become a party to\\nthe compact. Then Washington took the occasion\\nto suggest that Maryland and Virginia, while they\\nwere about it, should agree upon a uniform system\\nof duties and other commercial regulations, and\\nupon a uniform currency and these suggestions\\nwere sent, together with the compact, to the legis-\\nlatures of the two states. Great things were des-\\ntined to come from these modest beginnings.\\nJust as in the Yorktown campaign, there had come\\ninto existence a multifarious assemblage of events,\\napparently unconnected with one another, and all\\nthat was needed was the impulse given by Wash-\\nington s far-sighted genius to set them all at work,\\nsurging, swelling, and hurrying straight forward\\nto a decisive result.\\nLate in 1785, when the Virginia legislature had\\nwrangled itself into imbecility over the question of\\nclothing Congress with power over trade, Madison\\nhit upon an expedient. He prepared a\\nMadison s mo-\\ntion a step in motiou to the effect that commissioners\\nadvance, 1785.\\nfrom all the states should hold a meet-\\ning, and discuss the best method of securing a uni-\\nform treatment of commercial questions but as\\nhe was most conspicuous among the advocates of a\\nmore perfect union, he was careful not to present\\nthe motion himself. Keeping in the background,\\nhe persuaded another member John Tyler,\\nfather of the president of that name, a fierce", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 215\\nzealot for state rights to make the motion. The\\nplan, however, was so little acceptable that it\\nwas not then persisted in, and the motion was laid\\non the table. But Madison knew what was com-\\ning from Maryland, and bided his time. After\\nsome weeks it was announced that Maryland had\\nadopted the compact made at Mount Vernon con-\\ncerning jurisdiction over the Potomac. Virginia\\ninstantly replied by adopting it also. Then it was\\nsuggested, in the report from Maryland, that Del-\\naware, as well as Pennsylvania, ought to be con-\\nsulted, since the scheme should rightly include a\\ncanal between the Delaware River and the Chesa-\\npeake Bay. And why not also consult with these\\nstates about a uniform system of duties If two\\nstates can agree upon these matters, why not four\\nAnd still furthei*, said the Maryland message,\\ndropping the weightiest part of the proposal into a\\nsubordinate clause, just as women are said to put\\nthe quintessence of their letters into the postscript,\\nmight it not be well enough, if we are going to\\nhave such a conference, to invite commissioners\\nfrom all the thirteen states to attend it An in-\\nformal discussion can hurt nobody. The confer-\\nence of itself can settle nothing and if four states\\ncan take part in it, why not thirteen Here was\\nthe golden opportunity. The Madison-Tyler mo-\\ntion was taken up from the table and carried.\\nCommissioners from all the states were invited to\\nmeet on the first Monday of September, 1786, at\\nAnnapolis, a safe place, far removed from the\\ninfluence of that dread tyrant, the Congress, and\\nfrom wicked centres of trade, such as New York", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "216 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nand Boston. It was the governor of Virginia who\\nsent the invitations. It may not amount to much,\\nwrote Madison to Monroe, but the expedient is\\nbetter than nothing and, as the recommendation\\nof additional powers to Congress is within the pur-\\nview of the commission, it may possibly lead to bet=\\nter consequences than at first occur.\\nThe seed dropped by Washington had fallen on\\nfruitful soil. At first it was to be just a little\\nmeetins: of two or three states to talk about the\\nPotomac River and some projected canals, and al-\\nready it had come to be a meeting of all the states\\nto discuss some uniform system of legislation on\\nthe subject of trade. This looked like progress,\\nyet wlien the convention was gathered\\nConvention at* ^^^^rr1\\nAnnapolis, at Aunapolis, ou tlic 11th of oeptember,\\nSept. 11, 17SG. j T\\nthe outlook was most discouraoinof.\\nCommissioners were there from Virginia, Dela-\\nware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York.\\nMassachusetts and New Hampshire, Rhode Island\\nand North Carolina, had duly appointed commis-\\nsioners, but they were not there. It is curious to\\nobserve that Maryland, which had been so earnest\\nin the matter, had nevertheless now neglected to\\nappoint commissioners and no action had been\\ntaken by Georgia, South Carolina, or Connecticut.\\nWith only five states represented, the commission-\\ners did not think it worth while to go on with their\\nwork. But before adjourning they adopted an ad-\\ndress, written by Alexander Hamilton, and sent it\\nto all the states. All the commissioners present\\nhad been empowered to consider how far a uniform\\ncommercial system might be essential to the per-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 217\\nmanent harmony of the states. But New Jersey-\\nhad taken a step in advance, and instructed her\\ndelegates to consider how far a uniform system\\nin their commercial regulations and other impor-\\ntant matters might be necessary to the common\\ninterest and permanent harmony of the several\\nstates. And other important matters^ thus\\nagain was the weightiest part of the business rele-\\ngated to a subordinate clause. So gingerly was\\nthe great question so dreaded, yet so inevitable\\napproached This ref ei-ence to other mat-\\nters was pronounced by the commissioners to be\\na vast improvement on the original plan and\\nHamilton s address now urged that com- Hamuton s ad-\\nmissioners be appointed by all the therstepln ad.\\nstates, to meet in convention at Phila-\\ndelphia on the second Monday of the following\\nMay, to devise such further provisions as shall\\nappear to them necessary to render the constitution\\nof the federal government adequate to the exigen-\\ncies of the Union, and to report to Congress such\\nan act as, when agreed to by them, and confirmed\\nby the legislatures of every state, would effectually\\nprovide for the same. The report of the commis-\\nsioners was brought before Congress in October, in\\nthe hope that Congress would earnestly recommend\\nto the several states the course of action therein\\nsuggested. But Nathan Dane and Rufus King of\\nMassachusetts, intent upon technicalities, suc-\\nceeded in preventing this. According to King, a\\nconvention was an irregular body, which had no\\nright to propose changes in the organic law of the\\nland, and the state legislatures could not properly", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "218 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nconfirm the acts of such a body, or take notice of\\nthem. Congress was the only source from which\\nsuch proposals could properly emanate. These ar-\\nguments were pleasing to the self-love of Congress,\\nand it refused to sanction the plan of the Annapo-\\nlis commissioners.\\nIn an ordinary season this would perhaps have\\nended the matter, but the winter of 1786-87 was\\nnot an ordinary season. All the troubles above de-\\nscribed seemed to culminate just at this moment.\\nThe paper-money craze in so many of the states,\\nthe shameful deeds of Rhode Island, the riots in\\nVermont and New Hampshire, the Shays rebel-\\nlion in Massachusetts, the dispute with Spain, and\\nthe consequent imminent danger of separation be-\\ntween north and south had all come together and\\nthe feeling of thoughtful men and women through-\\nout the country was one of real consternation. The\\nlast ounce was now to be put upon the camel s back\\nin the failure of the impost amendment. In 1783,\\nwhen the cessions of western lands were creating a\\nNew York de- ^i^-tional domaiu, a promising jslan had\\npostVmend^ bccu dcvised for relieving the country\\nment. of j^jg \\\\on.(\\\\. of debt, and furnishing Con-\\ngress with money for its current expenses. All\\nthe money coming from sales of the western folk-\\nland was to be applied to reducing and wiping out\\nthe principal of the public debt. Then the interest\\nof this debt must be provided for and to that end\\nCongress had recommended an impost, or system\\nof custom-house duties, upon liquors, sugars, teas,\\ncoffees, cocoa, molasses, and pepper. This impost\\nwas to be kept up for twenty-five years only, and", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 219\\nthe collectors were to be appointed by the several\\nstates, each for its own ports. Then for the cur-\\nrent expenses of the government, supplementary\\nfunds were needed and these were to be assessed\\nupon the several states, each of wliich might raise\\nits quota as it saw fit. Such was the original plan\\nbut it soon turned out that the only available source\\nof revenue was the national domain, which had\\nthus been nothing less than the principal thread\\nwhich had held the Union together. As for the\\nimpost, it had never been possible to get a suffi-\\ncient number of states to agree upon it, and of the\\nquotas for current expenses, as we have seen, very\\nlittle had found its way to the federal treasury.\\nUnder these difficulties, it had been proposed that\\nan amendment to the articles of confederation\\nshould endow Congress with the power of levying\\ncustoms-duties and appointing the collectors and\\nby the summer of 1786, after endless wrangling,\\ntwelve states had consented to the amendment.\\nBut, in order that an amendment should be\\nadopted, unanimous consent was necessary. The\\none delinquent state, which thus blocked the wheels\\nof the confederacy, was New York. She had her\\nlittle system of duties all nicely arranged for what\\nseemed to be her own interests, and she would not\\nsurrender this system to Congress. Upon the\\nneighbouring states her tariff system bore hard,\\nand especially upon New Jersey. In 1786 this lit-\\ntle state flatly refused to pay her quota until New\\nYork should stop discriminating against her trade.\\nNothing which occurred in that troubled year\\ncaused more alarm than this, for it could not be", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "220 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\ndenied that such a declaration seemed little less\\nthan an act of secession on the part of New Jersey.\\nThe arguments of a congressional committee at last\\nprevailed upon the state to rescind her declaration.\\nAt the same time there came the final struggle in\\nNew York over the impost amendment, against\\nwhich Governor Clinton had firmly set his face.\\nThere was a fierce fight, in which Hamilton s most\\nstrenuous efforts succeeded in carrying the amend-\\nment in part, but not until it had been clogged\\nwith a condition that made it useless. Congress,\\nit was declared, might have the revenue, but New\\nYork must appoint the collectors she was not\\ngoing to have federal officials rummaging about\\nher docks. The legislature well knew that to grant\\nthe amendment in such wise was not to grant it at\\nall, but simply to reopen the whole question. Such\\nwas the result. Congress expostulated in vain. Ou\\nthe 15th of Februar} 1787, the matter was recon-\\nsidered in the New York legislature, and the im-\\npost amendment was defeated.\\nThus, only three months before the Federal\\nConvention was to meet, if indeed it was ever to\\nmeet. Congress was decisively informed that it\\nwould not be allowed to take any effectual meas-\\nures for raising a revenue. There now seemed noth-\\ning left for Congress to do but adopt the recom-\\nmendation of the Annapolis commissioners, and\\ngive its sanction to the proposed convention. Mad-\\nison, however, had not waited for this, but had\\nprevailed upon the Virginia legislature to go on\\nand appoint its delegates to the convention. The\\nevents of the year had worked a change in the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 221\\npopular sentiment in Virginia people were more\\nafraid of anarchy, and not qnite so much afraid\\nof centralization and now, under Madison s lead,\\nVirginia played her trump card and chose George\\nWashington as one of her delegates, g^^jg^\\nAs soon as this was known, there was popXr senti-\\nan outburst of joy throughout the land.\\nAll at once the people began everywhere to feel\\nan interest in the proposed convention, and pres-\\nently Massachusetts changed her attitude. Up to\\nthis time Massachusetts had been as obstinate in\\nher assertion of local independence, and as unwill-\\ning to strengthen the hands of Congress, as any of\\nthe thirteen states, except New York and Rhode\\nIsland. But the Shays rebellion had served as a\\nuseful object-lesson. Part of the distress in Massa-\\nchusetts could be traced to the inability of Con-\\ngress to pay debts which it owed to her citizens.\\nIt was felt that the time had come when the ques-\\ntion of a national revenue must be seriously con-\\nsidered. Every week saw fresh converts to the\\nparty which called for a stronger government.\\nThen came the news that Virginia had chosen dele-\\ngates, and that Washington was one of them then\\nthat New Jersey had followed the example then\\nthat Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Delaware, had\\nchosen delegates. It was time for Massachusetts\\nto act, and liufus King now brought the matter up\\nin Congress. His scruples as to the legality of the\\nproceeding had not changed, and accordingly he\\nmoved that Congress should of itself projDose a\\nconvention at Philadelphia, identical with the one\\nwhich the Annapolis commissioners had already", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "^^\u00e2\u0096\u00a02 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nrecommended. The motion was carried, and in\\nthis way Congress formally approved and adopted\\nwhat was going on. Massachusetts immediately\\nchose delegates, and was followed by New York.\\nIn April, Georgia and South Carolina followed\\nsuit. Connecticut and Maryland came on in May,\\nand New Hampshire, somewhat tardily, in June.\\nOf the thirteen states, Rhode Island alone refused\\nto take any part in the proceedings.\\nThe convention held its meetings in that plain\\nbrick building in Philadelphia already immortal-\\nized as the place from which the Declaration of In-\\ndependence was published to the world.\\nConvention Tlic work wliicli tliesc mcu were under-\\ndeiphia, May taking was to determine whether that\\n14-25 1787.\\nDeclaration had been for the blessing\\nor the injury of America and of mankind. That\\nthey had succeeded in assembling here at all was\\nsomewhat remarkable, when we think of the curi-\\nous medley of incidents that led to it. At no time\\nin this distressed period would a frank and abrupt\\nproposal for a convention to remodel the govern-\\nment have found favour. Such projDosals, indeed,\\nhad been made, beginning with that of Pelatiah\\nWebster in 1781, and they had all failed to break\\nthrough the crust of a truly English conservatism\\nand dread of centralized power. Now, through\\nwhat some might have called a strange chajiter of\\naccidents, before the element of causal sequence in\\nit all had become so manifest as it is to us to-day,\\nthis remarkable group of men had been brought\\ntogether in a single room, while even yet but few\\nof them realized how thoroughly and exhaustively", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 223\\nreconstructive their work was to be. To most of\\nthem it was not clear whether they were going\\nmerely to patch up the articles of confederation,\\nor to strike out into a new and very different path.\\nThere were a few who entertained far-reaching\\npurposes the rest were intelligent critics rather\\nthan constructive thinkers the result was surpris=\\ning to all. It is worth our while to pause for a\\nmoment, and observe the character and composition\\nof one of the most memorable assemblies the world\\nhas ever seen. Mr. Gladstone says that just as\\nthe British Constitution is the most subtle organ-\\nism which has proceeded from progressive history,\\nso the American Constitution is the most wonder-\\nful work ever struck off at a given time by the\\nbrain and purpose of man. Let us now see who\\nthe men were who did this wonderful work, this\\nIliad, or Parthenon, or Fifth Symphony, of states-\\nmanship. We shall not find that they were all\\ngreat geniuses. Such is never the case in such an\\nassembly. There are not enough great geniuses to\\ngo around and if there were, it is questionable if\\nthe result would be satisfactory. In such discus-\\nsions the points which impress the more ordinary\\nand less far-sighted members are sure to have great\\nvalue especially when we bear in mind that the\\nobject of such an assembly is not merely to elabo-\\nrate a plan, but to get the great mass of people,\\nincluding the brick-layers and hod-carriers, to un-\\nIt -would be in the hig-liest degree erroneous, however, to\\nsuppose that the Constitution of the United States is not, as\\nmuch as any other, an instance of evohition from precedents.\\nSee, in this connection, the very able article by Prof. Alexander\\nJohnston, New Princeton Review, Sept., 1887, pp. 175-190.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "224 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nderstand it well enough to vote for it. An ideally\\nperfect assembly of law-makers will therefore con-\\ntain two or three men of original constructive\\ngenius, two or three leading spirits eminent for\\nshrewdness and tact, a dozen or more excellent\\ncritics representing various conflicting interests,\\nand a rank and file of thoroughly respectable, com-\\nmonplace men, unfitted for shining in the work of\\nthe meeting, but admirably competent to proclaim\\nits results and get their friends and neighbours to\\nadopt them. And in such an assembly, even if it be\\nsuch as we call ideally perfect, we must allow some-\\nthing for the presence of a few hot-headed and\\nirreconcilable members, men of inflexible mind,\\nwho cannot adapt themselves to cii-cumstances, and\\nwill refuse to play when they see the game going\\nagainst them.\\nAll these points are well illustrated in the as-\\nsemblage of men that framed our Federal Consti-\\ntution. In its composition, tliis group of men left\\nnothing to be desired. In its strength and in its\\nweakness, it was an ideally perfect assembly.\\nThere were fifty-five men, all of them\\nThe men wlio i i c p -i i i? i\\nwereassem- respcctablc lor lamily and tor personal\\nqualities, men who had been well ed-\\nucated, and had done something whereby to earn\\nrecognition in these troubled times. Twenty-nine\\nwere university men, graduates of Harvard, Yale,\\nColumbia, Princeton, William and Mary, Oxford,\\nGlasgow, and Edinburgh. Twenty-six were not\\nuniversity men, and among these were Washington\\nand Franklin. Of the illustrious citizens who, for\\ntheir public services, would naturally have been", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 225\\nhere, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were in\\nEurope Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and Rich-\\nard Henry Lee disapproved of the convention, and\\nremained at home and the greatest man of Rhode\\nIsland, Nathanael Greene, who one likes to think\\nmight have succeeded in bringing his state into\\nthe convention, had lately died of a sun-stroke, at\\nthe early age of forty-four.\\nOf the two most famous men present little need\\nbe said. The names of Washington and Franklin\\nstood for supreme intelligence and consummate\\ntact. Franklin had returned to this country two\\nyears before, and was now president of Pennsyl-\\nvania. He was eighty-one years of age, the oldest\\nman in the convention, as Jonathan Dayton of New\\nJersey, aged twenty-six, was the youngest. The\\ntwo most profound and original thinkers in the\\ncompany were but little older than Dayton. Alex-\\nander Hamilton was thii^ty, James Madison thirty-\\nsix. Among political writers, these two men must\\nbe ranked in the same order with Aristotle, Mon-\\ntesquieu, and Locke and the Federalist, their\\njoint production, is the greatest treatise on govern-\\nment that has ever been written. Jolin Jay, who\\ncontributed a few pages to this immortal volume,\\nhad not been sent to the convention, because New\\nYork did not wish to have it succeed. Along^ with\\nHamilton, New York sent two commonplace men,\\nRobert Yates and John Lansing, who were ex-\\ntreme and obstinate Antifederalists and the ac-\\ntion of Hamilton, who was thus prevented from\\ncarrying the vote of his own state for any measure\\nwhich he might propose, was in this way sadly em-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "226 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nbarrassed. For another reason, Hamilton failed\\nto exert as much influence in the convention as one\\nwould have expected from his profound thought\\nand his brilliant eloquence. Scarcely any of these\\nmen entertained what we should now call extreme\\ndemocratic views. Scarcely any, j^erhaps, had\\nthat intense faith in the ultimate good sense of the\\npeople which was the most powerful characteristic\\nof Jefferson. But Hamilton went to the other ex-\\ntreme, and expressed his distrust of popular gov-\\nernment too plainly. His views were too aristo-\\ncratic and his preference for centralization was too\\npronounced to carry conviction to his hearei S.\\nThe leading part in the convention fell, therefore,\\nto James Madison, a young man somewhat less\\nbrilliant than Hamilton, but superior to him in so-\\njamesMadi- bricty and balance of powcrs. Madison\\nused to be called the Father of the\\nConstitution, and it is true that the government\\nvmder which we live is more his work than that\\nof any other one man. From early youth his life\\nhad been devoted to the study of history and the\\npractice of statesmanship. He was a graduate of\\nPrinceton College, an earnest student, familiar\\nwith all the best literature of political science from\\nAristotle down to his own time, and he had given\\nespecial attention to the history of federal govern=\\njient in ancient Greece, and in Switzerland and\\nHolland. At the age of twenty-five he had taken\\npart in the Virginia convention which instructed\\nthe delegates from that state in Congress to bring\\nforward the Declaration of Independence. Dur-\\ning the last part of the war he was an active and", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 221\\ninfluential member of Congress, where no one\\nequalled or approached him for knowledge of Eng-\\nlish histoi-y and constitutional law. In 1784 he\\nhad returned to the Virginia legislature, and been\\nforemost in securing the passage of the great act\\nwhich gave complete religious freedom to the peo-\\npie of that state. No man understood better than\\nhe the causes of the alarming weakness of the fed-\\neral government, and of the commercial disturb-\\nances and popular discontent of the time nor\\nhad any one worked more zealously or more\\nadroitly in bringing about the meeting of this con-\\nvention. As he stood here now, a leader in the\\ndebate^ there was nothing grand or imposing in his\\nappearance. He was small of stature and slight\\nin frame, like Hamilton, but he had none of Ham-\\nilton s personal magnetism. His manner was shy\\nand prim, and blushes came often to his cheeks.\\nAt the same time, he had that rare dignity of un-\\nconscious simplicity which characterizes the earnest\\nand disinterested scholar. He was exceedingly\\nsweet-tempered, generous, and kind, but very hard\\nto move from a path which, after long reflection,\\nhe had decided to be the right one. He looked at\\npolitics judicially, and was so little of a party man\\nthat on several occasions he was accused (quite\\nwrongfully, as I hope hereafter to prove) of gross\\ninconsistency. The position of leadership, which\\nhe won so early and kept so long, he held by sheer\\nforce of giant intelligence, sleepless industry, and\\nan integrity which no man ever doubted. But he\\nwas above all things a man of peace. When in\\nafter years, as president of the United States, he", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "228 GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.\\nwas called upon to manage a great war, he was out\\nof place, and his reputation for supreme ability\\nwas temporarily lowered. Here in the Federal\\nConvention we are introduced to him at the noblest\\nand most useful moment of his life.\\nOf the fifty-five men here assembled, Washington,\\nFranklin, Hamilton, and Madison were of the first\\norder of ability. Many others in the room were\\ngentlemen of more than ordinary talent and culture.\\nOther leading Tlicrc was Jolm Diclvinson, who had\\nmem ers. movcd f rom Pennsylvania into Delaware,\\nand now came to defend the equal rights of the\\nsmaller states. There was James Wilson of Penn-\\nsylvania, born and educated in Scotland, one of the\\nmost learned jurists this country has ever seen.\\nBeside him sat the financier, Robert Morris, and his\\nnamesake Gouverneur Morris of Morrisania, near\\nthe city of New York, the originator of our decimal\\ncurrency, and one of the far-sighted projectors of\\nthe Erie Canal. Then there was John Putledge\\nof South Carolina, who ever since the Stamp Act\\nCongress had been the mainstay of his state and\\nwith him were the two able and gallant Pinckneys.\\nCaleb Strong, afterward ten times governor of\\nMassachusetts, was a tyjjical Puritan, hard-headed\\nand supremely sensible his colleague, Rufus\\nKing, ah eady distinguished for his opposition to\\nnegro slavery, was a man of brilliant attainments.\\nAnd there were George Wythe, the chancellor of\\nVirginia, and Daniel Carroll of Maryland, who had\\nplayed a prominent part in the events which led to\\nthe creation of a national domain. Oliver Ells-\\nworth of Connecticut, afterward chief justice of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "GERMS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. 229\\nthe United States, was one of the ablest lawyers\\nof his time with him were Roger Sherman and\\nWilliam Johnson, the latter a Fellow of the Koyal\\nSociety, and afterward president of Columbia Col-\\nlege. The New Jersey delegation, consisting of\\nWilliam Livingston, David Brearley, William Pat-\\nerson, and Jonathan Dayton, was a very strong\\none and as to New Hampshire, it is enough to\\nmention the name of John Langdon. Besides all\\nthese there were some twenty of less mark, men\\nwho said little, but listened and voted. And then\\nthere were the irreconcilables, Yates and Lan-\\nsing, the two Antifederalists from New York and\\nfour men of much greater ability, who took an im-\\nportant part in the proceedings, but could not be\\ninduced to accept the result. These four were\\nLuther Martin of Maryland George Mason and\\nEdmund Randolph of Virginia and Elbridge\\nGerry of Massachusetts.\\nWhen these men had assembled in Independence\\nHall, they chose George Washington president of\\nthe convention. The doors were locked, and an\\ninjunction of strict secrecy was put upon every one.\\nThe results of their work were known in the fol-\\nlowing September, when the draft of the Federal\\nConstitution was published. But just what was\\nsaid and done in this secret conclave was not re-\\nvealed until fifty years had passed, and the aged\\nJames Madison, the last survivor of those who sat\\nthere, had been gathered to his fathers. He kept\\na journal of the proceedings, which was published\\nafter his death, and upon the interesting story told\\nin that journal we have now to enter.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VI.\\nTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nThe Federal Convention did wisely in withhold-\\ning its debates from the knowledge of the people.\\nIt was felt that discussion would be more untram-\\nmelled, and that its result ought to go before the\\ncountry as the collective and unanimous voice of\\nthe convention. There was likely to be wrangling\\nenough among themselves but should their scheme\\nbe unfolded, bit by bit, before its parts could be\\nviewed in their mutual relations, popular excite-\\nment would become intense, there might be riots,\\nand an end would be put to that attitude of mental\\nrepose so necessary for the constructive work that\\nwas to be done. It was thought best that the\\nscheme should be put forth as a completed whole,\\nand that for several years, even, until the new sys-\\ntem of government should have had a fair trial,\\nthe traces of the individual theories and preferences\\nconcerned in its formation should not be revealed.\\nFor it was generallv assumed that a sys-\\nDifflcult prob-\\nlem before the tem of government new in some nnpor-\\nconvention. i i i\\ntant respects would be j)roposed by the\\nconvention, and while the people awaited the result\\nthe wildest speculations and rumours were current.\\nA few hoped, and many feared, that some scheme\\nof monarchy would be established. Such surmises", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 231\\nfound their way across the ocean, and hopes were\\nexpressed in England that, should a king be chosen,\\nit might be a younger son of George III. It was\\neven hinted, with alarm, that, through gratitude to\\nour recent allies, we might be persuaded to offer\\nthe crown to some member of the royal family of\\nFrance. No such thoughts were entertained, how=\\never, by any person present in the convention.\\nSome of the delegates came with the design of\\nsimply amending the articles of confederation by\\ntaking away from the states the power of regulat-\\ning commerce, and intrusting this power to Con-\\ngress. Others felt that if the work were not done\\nthorouglily now another chance might never be of-\\nfered and these men thought it necessary to abol-\\nish the confederation, and establish a federal re-\\npublic, in which the general government should act\\ndirectly upon the people. The difficult problem was\\nhow to frame a plan of this sort which people could\\nbe made to understand and adopt. At the very\\noutset some of the delegates began to exhibit symp-\\ntoms of that peculiar kind of moral cowardice\\nwhich is wont to afflict free governments, and of\\nwhich American history furnishes so many instruc-\\ntive examples. It was suggested that palliatives\\nand half measures would be far more likely to find\\nfavour with the people than any thorough-going re-\\nform, when Washington suddenly interposed with\\na brief but immortal speech, which ought to be\\nblazoned in letters of gold, and posted on the wall\\nof every American assembly that shall meet to\\nnominate a candidate, or declare a policy, or pass\\na law, so long as the weakness of human nature", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "232 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nshall endure. Rising from his president s chair, his\\nWashington s tall figure drawu up to its full height, he\\nsolemn appeal, exclaimed in tones unwontedly solemn\\nI with suppressed emotion, It is too probable that\\nno plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps an-\\nother dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to\\nplease the people, we offer what we ourselves disap-\\nprove, how can we afterward defend our work?\\nLet us raise a standard to which the wise and the\\nhonest can repair; the event is in the hand of\\nGod.\\nThis outburst of noble eloquence carried con-\\nviction to every one, and henceforth we do not hear\\nthat any attempt was avowedly made to avoid the\\nissues as they came up. It was a most wholesome\\ntonic. It braced up the convention to high resolves,\\nand impressed upon all the delegates that they were\\nin a situation where faltering or trifling was both\\nwicked and dangerous. From that moment the\\nmood in which they worked caught something from\\nthe glorious spirit of Washington. There was\\nneed of such high purpose, for two plans were pres-\\nently laid before the meeting, which, for a moment,\\nbrought out one of the chief elements of antago-\\nnism existing between the states, and which at first\\nseemed irreconcilable. It was the happy compro-\\nmise which united and harmonized these two plans\\nthat smoothed the further work of the convention,\\nand made it possible for a stable and powerful\\ngovernment to be constructed.\\nThe first of these plans was known as the Vir-\\nginia plan. It was agreed upon in a committee of\\nthe delegates of that state, and was btought for-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 233\\nward by Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia,\\nin the name of the state, but its chief author was\\nMadison. It struck instantly at the root of the\\ndifficulties under which the country had been stag-\\ngering ever since the Declaration of Independence.\\nThe federal government had possessed no means\\nof enforcing obedience to its laws. Its The root of aii\\nedicts were without a sanction and this\\nwas because they operated upon states, and not\\nupon individuals. When an individual defies the\\nlaw, you can lock him up in jail, or levy an execu-\\ntion upon his pi operty. The immense force of the\\ncommunity is arrayed against him, and he is as\\nhelpless as a straw on the billows of the ocean.\\nHe cannot raise a militia to protect himself. But\\nwhen the law is defied by a state, it is quite other-\\nwise. You cannot put a state into jail, nor seize\\nits goods you can only make war on it, and if you\\ntry that expedient you find that the state is not\\nhelpless. Its local pride and prejudices are aroused\\nagainst you, and its militia will turn out in full\\nforce to uphold the infraction of law. Against\\nthis obstinate and exasperated military force what\\ns^uperior force can you bring? Under some rare\\ncombination of circumstances you might get the\\nmilitary force of several of the other states but\\nordinarily, when what you are trying to do is simply\\nto enforce e very-day laws, and when you simply\\nrepresent a distrusted general government in con-\\nflict with a local government, you cannot do this.\\nThe other states will sympathize with the delinquent\\nstate they will feel that the very same condition\\nof things which leads you to attack that state to-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "234 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nday will lead you to attack some other state to-\\nmorrow. Hence you cannot get any military help,\\nand you are jDowerless.\\nSuch was the case with the Continental Congress.\\nA novel and distrusted institution, it was called\\nupon to enforce its laws upon long-established com-\\nmunities, full of sturdy independence and obstinate\\nlocal prejudices. It was able to act, though with\\nclumsy slowness, as long as there was an enemy in\\nthe field who was even more dreaded. But as soon\\nas this enemy had been beaten out of sight it could\\nnot act at all. This had been because it did not\\nrepresent the American people, but only the Amer-\\nican states. The vital force which moved it was\\nnot the resistless force of a whole people, but only\\na shadowy semblance of force, derived from a theo-\\nretical consent of thirteen corporate bodies, which\\nin their corporate capacity could never be compelled\\nto agree about anything under the sun and unless\\ncompelled they would not agree. Four years of\\ndisturbance in every part of the country, in the\\ncourse of which troops had been called out in sev-\\neral states, and civil war had been narrowly averted\\nat least half a dozen times, had proved this beyond\\nall cavil. With almost any other people than the\\nAmericans civil war would have come already.\\nWith all the vast future interests that were in-\\nvolved in these quarrels looming up before their\\nkeen, sagacious minds, it was a wonder that they\\nhad been kept from coming to blows. Such self-\\nrestraint had been greatly to their credit. It was\\nthe blessed fruit of more than a century of govern-\\nment by free discussion, while yet these states were", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0260.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 235\\ncolonies, peopled by the very cream of English free-\\nmen who had fought the decisive battle of civil and\\nreligious freedom for mankind in that long crisis\\nwhen the Invincible Armada was overv/helmed and\\nthe Long Parliament won its triumphs. Such self-\\nrestraint had this people shown in days of trial,\\nunder a vicious government adopted in a time of\\nhurry and sore distress. But late events had gone\\nfar to show that it could not endure.\\nThe words of Randolph s opening speech are\\nworth quoting in this connection. The confed-\\neration, he said, was made in the infancy of the\\nscience of constitutions, when the inefficiency of\\nrequisitions was unknown when no commercial\\ndiscord had arisen among states when no rebel-\\nlion like that in Massachusetts had broken out\\nwhen foreign debts were not urgent when the\\nhavoc of paper money had not been foreseen\\nwhen treaties had not been violated and when\\nnothing better could have been conceded by states\\njealous of their sovereignty. Rut it offered no\\nsecurity against foreign invasion, for Congress\\ncould neither prevent nor conduct a war, nor pun-\\nish infractions of treaties or of the law of nations,\\nnor control particular states from provoking war.\\nThe federal government has no constitutional\\npower to check a quarrel between separate states\\nnor to suppress a rebellion in any one of them\\nnor to establish a productive impost nor to coun-\\nteract the commercial regulations of other nations\\nnor to defend itself against the encroachments of\\nthe states. From the manner in which it has been\\nratified in many of the states, it cannot be claimed", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0261.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "236 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nto be paramount to the state constitutions so that\\nthere is a prospect of anarchy from the inherent\\nlaxity of the government. As the remedy, the\\ngovernment to be established must have for its\\nbasis the republican principle.\\nHaving thus tersely stated the whole problem,\\nRandolph went on to present the Vii-giuia plan.\\nTo make the federal government operate directly\\nupon individuals, one provision was absolutely\\nnecessary. It did not solve the whole\\nThe Virginia t\\npiau; a proolem, but it was an indispensable be-\\nradical cure.\\nginning. This was the proposal that\\nthere should be a national legislature, in which the\\nAmerican jyeojile instead of the American states\\nshould be represented. For the purposes of fed-\\neral legislation, there must be an assembly elected\\ndirectly by the people, and with its members appor-\\ntioned according to population. There must be\\nsuch an assembly as our present House of Repre-\\nsentatives, standing in the same immediate relation\\nto the people of the whole country as was sustained\\nby the assembly of each separate state to the peo-\\nple of that state. Without such direct representa-\\ntion of the whole people in the Federal Congress,\\nit would be impossible to achieve one secure step\\ntoward the radical reform of the weaknesses and\\nvices of the confederation. It was the only way in\\nwhich the vexed question of one nation or thirteen\\ncould be made to yield a satisfactory answer. At\\nthe same time it could not be denied that such a\\nproposal was revolutionary in character. It paved\\nthe way for a national consolidation which might\\ngo further than any one could foresee, and much", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0262.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 237\\nfurther than was desirable. The moi ibund Con-\\ngress of the Confederation, with its delegates chosen\\nby the state assemblies, and casting its vote simply\\nby states, had utterly failed to serve as a national\\nlegislature. There was a good deal of truth in\\nwhat John Adams once said of it, that it was more\\na diplomatic than a legislative body. It was, in-\\ndeed, because of this consciously felt diplomatic\\ncharacter that it was called a Congress, and not a\\nParliament. In its lack of coercive power it re-\\nsembled the international congresses of Europe\\nrather than the supreme legislature of any country.\\nTo substitute abruptly for such a body a truly\\nnational legislature, based not upon states but\\nupon population, was quietly to inaugurate a revo-\\nlution of no less magnitude than that which had\\nlately severed us from Great Britain. So bold a\\nstep, while all-essential in order to complete that\\nrevolution, and make its victorious issue fortunate\\ninstead of disastrous to the American people, was\\nsufficiently revolutionary to awaken the fears of\\nmany members of the Federal Convention. To\\nthe familiar state governments which had so long\\npossessed their love and allegiance, it was super-\\nadding a new and untried govei-nment, which it\\nwas feared would swallow up the states and every-\\nwhere extinguish local independence. Nor can it\\nbe said that such fears were unreasonable. Our\\nfederal government has indeed shown a strong ten-\\ndency to encroach upon the province of the state\\ngovernments, especially since our late Civil War.\\nToo much centralization is our danger to-day, as\\nthe weakness of the federal tie was our danger a", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0263.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "238 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\ncentury ago. The rule of tlie Federalist party was\\nneeded in 1789 as the rule of the Republican party\\nwas needed in 1861, to put a curb upon the centrif-\\nugal tendencies. But after Federalism had fairly\\ndone its great work, at the beginning of the nine-\\nteenth century, it was well that the administration\\nof our national affairs should pass into the hands\\nof the party to which Thomas Jefferson and Samuel\\nAdams belonged, and which Madison, in his calm\\nstatesmanlike wisdom, had come to join. And now\\nthat, in our own day, the disruptive forces have\\nbeen even more thoroughly and effectually over-\\ncome, it is time for the principles of that party to\\nbe reasserted with fresh emphasis. If the day\\nshould ever arrive (which God forbid when the\\npeople of the different parts of our country shall\\nallow their local affairs to be administered by pre-\\nfects sent from Washington, and when the self-\\ngovernment of the states shall have been so far\\nlost as that of the departments of France, or even\\nso far as that of the counties of England, on\\nthat day the progressive political career of the\\nAmerican people will have come to an end, and\\nthe hopes that have been built upon it for the fu-\\nture happiness and prosperity of mankind will be\\nwrecked forever.\\nI do not think that the historian writing at the\\npresent day need fear any such direful calamity,\\nfor the past century has shown most instructively\\nhow, in such a society as ours, the sense of political\\ndangers slowly makes its way through the whole\\nmass of the people, until movements at length are\\nmade to avert them, and the pendulum swings in", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0264.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 239\\nthe opposite direction. The history of political\\nparties in the United States is especially rich in\\nlessons of this sort. Compared with the statesmen\\nof the Federal Convention, we are at a great ad-\\nvantage in stndying this question of national con*\\nsolidation and we have no excuse for failing to\\ncomprehend the attitude of the men who dreaded\\nthe creation of a national legislature as the enter-\\ning wedge which would by and by rend asunder\\nthe structure of our liberties. The great mind of\\nMadison was one of the first to entertain distinctly\\nthe noble conception of two kinds of government\\noperating at one and the same time upon the same\\nindividuals, harmonious with each other, but each\\nsupreme in its own sphere. Such is the funda-\\nmental conception of our partly federal, partly\\nnational, government, which appears throughout\\nthe Virginia plan as well as in the Constitution\\nwhich grew out of it. It was a political concep-\\ntion of a higher order than had ever before been\\nentertained it took a great deal of discussion to\\nmake it clear to the minds of the delegates gen-\\nerally and the struggle over this initial measure\\nof a national legislature was so bitter as to come\\nnear breaking up the convention.\\nIn its original shape the Virginia plan went\\nmuch further toward national consolidation than\\nthe Constitution as adopted. The reaction against\\nthe evils of the loose-jointed confederation, which\\nKandolph so ably summed up, was extreme. Ac-\\ncording to the Virginia plan, the national legisla-\\nture was to be composed of two houses, like the\\nleo^islatures of the several states. The members of", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0265.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "240 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nthe lower house should be chosen directly by the\\npeople members o\u00c2\u00a3 the upper house, or Senate,\\nshould be elected by the lower house out of per-\\nsons nominated by the state legislatures. In both\\nthe lower and the upper branches of this national\\nlegislature the votes were to be the votes of indi-\\nviduals, and no longer the votes of states, as in the\\nContinental Congress. Under the articles of con-\\nfederation each state had an equal vote, and two\\nthirds were required for every important measure.\\nUnder the proposed Constitution each state was to\\nhave a number of representatives proportionate\\neither to its wealth or to the number of its free\\ninhabitants, and a bare majority of votes was to\\nsuffice to pass all measures in the ordinary course\\nof business and these rules were to apply both to\\nthe lower house and to the Senate. To adopt such\\na plan would overthrow the equality of the states\\naltogether. It would give Virginia, the greatest\\nstate, sixteen representatives, where Georgia, the\\nsmallest state, had but one and besides, as the\\nvotes were no longer to be taken by states, indi-\\nvidual members could combine in any way they\\npleased, quite irrespective of state lines. It was\\nnot strange that to many delegates in the conven-\\ntion such a beginning should have seemed revolu-\\ntionary. This impression was deepened when it\\nwas further proposed not only to clothe this na-\\ntional legislature with original powers of legislation\\nin all cases to which the several states are incom-\\npetent, but also to allow it to set aside at discretion\\nsuch state laws as it might deem unconstitutional.\\nIt is interesting to find Madison, whose Federalism", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0266.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 241\\nafterward came to be so moderate, now appearing\\nas the earnest defender of this extreme provision,\\nso incompatible with state rights. But in Madi-\\nson s mind at this moment, in the actual presence\\nof the anarchy of the confederation, the only alter-\\nnative which seemed to present itself was that of\\narmed coercion. A negative on state laws, he\\nsaid, is the mildest exj)edient that can be devised\\nfor enforcing a national decree. Should no such\\nprecaution be engrafted, the only remedy would be\\ncoercion. The negative would render the use of\\nforce unnecessary. This prerogative of the general\\ngovernment is the great pervading principle that\\nmust control the centrifugal tendency of the states,\\nwhich, without it, will continually fly out of their\\nproper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony\\nof the political system. But these views were not\\ndestined to find favour with the convention, which\\nfinally left the matter to be much more satisfacto-\\nrily adjusted through the medium of the federal ju-\\ndiciary.\\nSuch were the fundamental provisions of the\\nVirginia plan with regard to the national legisla-\\nture. To carry out the laws, it was proposed that\\nthere should be a national executive, to be chosen\\nby the national legislature for a short term, and\\nineligible a second time. Whether the executive\\npower should be invested in a single person or in\\nseveral was not specified. As will be seen here-\\nafter, this was regarded as an extremely delicate\\npoint, with which it was thought best not to em-\\nbarrass the Virginia plan at the outset. Passing\\nlightly over this, it was urged that, in order to com-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0267.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "242 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,\\nplete the action of the government upon individu-\\nals, there must be a national judiciary to determine\\ncases arising under the Constitution, cases in ad-\\nmiralty, and cases in which different states or their\\ncitizens appear as parties. The judges were to be\\nchosen by the national legislature, to hold office\\nduring good behaviour.\\nSuch, in its main outlines, was the plan which\\nRandolph laid before the convention,\\nFirst reception\\nof the Virginia m the name 01 the VirOTnia dele\u00c2\u00abfation.\\nplan.\\nAn audacious scheme exclaimed some\\nof the delegates it was enough to take your breath\\naway. If they were going to begin like this, they\\nmight as well go home, for all discussion would be\\ntime wasted. They were not sent there to set on\\nfoot a revolution, but to amend and strengthen the\\narticles of confederation. But this audacious plan\\nsimply abolished the Confederation in order to sub-\\nstitute for it a consolidated national government.\\nForemost in uroring; this obiection were Yates and\\nLansing of New York, with Luther Martin of\\nMaryland. Dickinson said it was pushing things\\naltogether too far, and his colleague, George Read,\\nhinted that the delegation from Delaware might\\nfeel obliged to withdraw from the convention if the\\nelection of representatives according to population\\nshould be adopted. By the tact of Madison and\\nGouverneur Morris this question was postponed for\\na few days. After some animated discussion, the\\nissues became so narrowed and defined that they\\ncould be taken up one by one. It was first decided\\nthat the national legislature should consist of two\\nbranches. Then came a warm discussion as to", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0268.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 243\\nwhether the members of the lower house should he\\nelected directly by the people. Curiously enough,\\nin a country where the principle of popular elec-\\ntion had long since taken such deep root, where\\nthe assemblies of the several states had been chosen\\nby the people from the very beginning, there was\\nsome doubt as to whether the same principle could\\nsafely be applied to the national House of Repre-\\nsentatives. Gerry, with his head full of the Shays\\nrebellion and the Know Ye measures of the\\nneighbouring state, thought the people could not\\nbe trusted. The people do not want virtue,\\nsaid he, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.\\nRoger Sherman took a similar view, and was sup-\\nported by Martin, Rutledge, and both the Pinck-\\nneys but the sounder opinion prevailed. On this\\npoint Hamilton was at one witli Mason, Wilson,\\nand Dickinson. The proposed assembly, said Ma-\\nson, was to be, so to speak, our House of Commons,\\nand ought to know and sympathize with every part\\nof the community. It ought to have at heart the\\nrights and interests of every class of the people,\\nand in no other way could this end be so com-\\npletely attained as by popular election. Yes,\\nadded Wilson, without the confidence of the peo-\\nple no government, least of all a republican gov-\\nernment, can long subsist. The election of the\\nfirst branch by the people is not the corner-stone\\nonly, but the foundation of the fabric. It is es-\\nsential to the democratic rights of the community,\\nsaid Hamilton, that the first branch be directly\\nelected by the people. Madison argued power-\\nfully on the same side, and the question was finally\\ndecided in favour of popular election.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0269.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "244 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nIt was now the 4*k^ of June, when the great\\nquestion came up which nearly wrecked the con-\\nvention before it was settled, after a whole month\\nof stormy debate. This was the question as to\\nhow the states should be represented in the new\\nArtagouism Cougrcss. On the Virginia plan, the\\nstet ^fand smaller states would be virtually\\nemau states. swampcd. Unlcss they could have\\nequal votes, without regard to wealth or popula-\\ntion, they would be at the mercy of the great\\nstates. In the division which ensued, the four\\nmost populous states Virginia, Massachusetts,\\nPennsylvania, and North Carolina favoured the\\nVirginia plan and they succeeded in carrying\\nSouth Carolina with them. Georgia, too, which,\\nthough weak at that moment, possessed considera-\\nble room for expansion, voted upon the same side.\\nOn the other hand, the states of Connecticut, New\\nJersey, Delaware, and Maryland which were not\\nonly small in area, but were cut off from further\\nexpansion by their geographical situation were\\nnot inclined to give up their equal vote in either\\nbranch of the national legislature. At this stage\\nof the proceedings the delegation from New Hamp-\\nshire had not yet arrived upon the scene. On sev-\\neral occasions the majority of the Maryland dele-\\ngation went with the larger states, but Luther\\nMartin, always opposed to the Virginia plan, usu-\\nally succeeded in dividing the vote of the delegation.\\nOf the New York members, Yates and Lansing,\\nhere as always, thwarted Hamilton by voting with\\nthe smaller states. Their policy throughout was\\none of obstruction. The members from Connect!-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0270.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 245\\ncut were disposed to be conciliatory but New Jer-\\nsey was obstinate and implacable. She knew what\\nit was to be tyrannized over by powerful neighbours.\\nThe wrongs she had suffered from New York and\\nPennsylvania rankled in the minds of her dele-\\ngates. Accordingly, in the name of the smaller\\nstates, William Paterson laid before the conven-\\ntion the so-called New Jersey plan TheNewJer-\\nfor the amendment of the articles of feebie^paiiTa-\\nconfederation. This scheme admitted\\na federal legislature, consisting of a single house,\\nan executive in the form of a council to be chosen\\nby Congress, and likewise a federal judiciary, with\\npowers less extensive than those contemplated by\\nthe Virginia plan. It gave to Congress the power\\nto regulate foreign and domestic commerce, to levy\\nduties on imports, and even to raise internal rev-\\nenue by means of a Stamp Act. But with all this\\napparent liberality on the surface, the New Jersey\\nplan was vicious at bottom. It did not really give\\nCongress the power to act immediately upon indi-\\nviduals. The federal legislature which it proposed\\nwas to rej)resent states, and not individuals, and\\nthe states were to vote equally, without regard to\\nwealth or population. If things were to be left\\nin this shape, there was no security that the pow-\\ners granted to Congress could ever be really exer-\\ncised. Nay, it was almost certain that they could\\nnot be put into operation. It was easy enough on\\npaper to give Congress the permission to levy du-\\nties and regulate comlnorce, but such a permission\\nwould amount to nothing unless Congress were\\narmed with the power of enforcing its decrees upon", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0271.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "246 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nindividuals. And it could in no wise acquire such\\npower unless as the creature of the people, and not\\nof the states. The New Jersey plan, therefore,\\nfurnished no real remedy for the evils which af-\\nflicted the country. It was vigorously opposed by\\nHamilton, Madison, Wilson, and King. Hamil-\\nton, indeed, took this occasion to offer a plan of\\nhis o\\\\vn, which, in addition to Madison s scheme of\\na purely national legislature, contained the fea-\\ntures of a tenure for life or good behaviour, for the\\nexecutive and the members of the upper house.\\nBut to most of the delegates this scheme seemed\\ntoo little removed from a monarchy, and Hamil-\\nton s brilliant speech in its favour, while applauded\\nby many, was supported by none. The weighty\\narguments of Wilson, King, and jMadison pre-\\nvailed, and the New Jersey plan lost its original\\nshape when it was decided that Congress should\\nconsist of two houses. The principle of equal\\nstate representation, however, remained as a stum-\\nbling-block. Paterson, supported by his able col-\\nleague Brearley, as well as by IMartin and the two\\nirreconcilablos from New York, stoutly maintained\\nthat to depart from this principle would be to ex-\\nceed the powers of the convention, which assuredly\\nwas not intended to remodel the government from\\nbeginning to end. But Randolph answered,\\nWhen the salvation of the republic is at stake, it\\nwoidd be treason to our trust not to propose what\\nwe find necessary and Hamilton pithily re-\\nminded the delegates that as they were there only\\nfor the purpose of recommending a scheme which\\nwould have to be submitted to the states for accept-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0272.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 247\\nance, they need not be deterred by any false serUf\\npies from using their wits to the best possible ad-\\nvantage. The debate on the merits of the question\\nwas an angry one. According to the Virginia\\nplan, said Brearly, the three states of Virginia,\\nMassachusetts, and Pennsylvania will carry every-\\nthing before them. It was known to him, from\\nfacts within New Jersey, that where large and\\nsmall counties were united into a district for elect-\\ning representatives for the district, the large coun-\\nties always carried their point, and consequently\\nthe large states would do so. Was it fair,\\non the other hand, that Georgia should have an\\nequal vote with Virginia He would not say it\\nwas. What remedy, then One only that a\\nmap of the United States be spread out, that all\\nthe existing boundaries be erased, and that a new\\npartition of the whole be made into thirteen equal\\nparts. Yes, said Paterson, a confederacy\\nsupposes sovereignty in the members composing it,\\nand sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to\\nbe considered as a nation, all state distinctions\\nmust be abolished, the whole must be thrown into\\nhotchpot, and when an equal division is made then\\nthere may be fairly an equality of representation.\\nThis argument was repeated with a triumphant\\nair, as seeming to reduce the Virginia plan to ab-\\nsurdity. Paterson went on to say that there\\nwas no more reason that a great individual state,\\ncontributing much, should have more votes than a\\nsmall one, contributing little, than that a rich indi-\\nvidual citizen should have more votes than an in-\\ndigent one. If the ratable property of A was to", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0273.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "248 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nthat of B as forty to one, ought A, for that reason,\\nto have forty times as many votes as B Give\\nthe large states an influence in proportion to their\\nmagnitude, and what will be the consequence\\nTheir ambition will be proportionally increased,\\nand the small states will have everything to fear.\\nIt was once proposed by Galloway [in the first\\nContinental Congress] that America should be rep-\\nresented in the British Parliament, and then be\\nbound by its laws. America could not have been en-\\ntitled to more than one third of the representatives\\nwhich would fall to the share of Great Britain\\nwould American rights and interests have been\\nsafe under an authority thus constituted Then,\\nwarming with the subject, he exclaimed, If the\\ngreat states wish to unite on such a plan, let\\nthem unite if they please, but let them remember\\nthat they have no authority to compel the others\\nto unite. Shall I submit the welfare of New\\nJersey with five votes in a council where Virginia\\nhas sixteen I will never consent to the pro-\\nposed plan. I will not only oppose it here, but on\\nmy return home will do everything in my power to\\ndefeat it there. Neither my state nor myself will\\never submit to tyranny.\\nPaterson was ably answered by James Wilson,\\nof Pennsylvania, who pointed out the absurdity of\\ngiving 180,000 men in one part of the country as\\nmuch weight in the national legislature as 750,000\\nin another part. It is unjust, he said. The\\ngentleman from New Jersey is candid. He de-\\nclares his opinions boldly. I commend him for it.\\nI will be equally candid. I never will con-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0274.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 249\\nfederate on his principles. The convention grew\\nnervous and excited over this seemingly irreconcil-\\nable antagonism. The discussion was kept up with\\nmuch learning and acuteness by Madison, Ells-\\nworth, and Martin, and history was ransacked for\\ntestimony from the Aniphiktyonic Council to Old\\nSarum, and back again to the Lykian League.\\nMadison, rightly reading the future, declared that\\nif once the proposed union should be formed, the\\nreal danger would come not from the rivalry be-\\ntween large and small states, but from the antago-\\nnistic interests of the slaveholding and non-slave-\\nholding states. Hamilton pointed out that in the\\nstate of New York five counties had a majority of\\nthe representatives, and yet the citizens of the other\\ncounties wei e in no danger of tyranny, as the laws\\nhave an equal operation upon all. Rufus King\\ncalled attention to the fact that the rights of Scot-\\nland were secure from encroachments, although\\nher representation in Parliament was necessarily\\nsmaller than that of England. But New Jersey and\\nDelaware, mindful of i-ecent grievances, were not\\nto be argued down or soothed. Gunning Bedford\\nof Delaware was especially violent. Pretences\\nto support ambition, said he, are never wanting.\\nThe cry is. Where is the danger and it is insisted\\nthat although the powers of the general government\\nwill be increased, yet it will be for the good of the\\nwhole and although the three great states form\\nnearly a majority of the people of America, they\\nnever will injure the lesser states. Gentlemen, I\\ndo not trust you. If you possess the power, the\\nabuse of it could not be checked and what then", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0275.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "250 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nwould prevent you from exercising it to our de-\\nstruction Sooner than be ruined, there are\\nforeignpormrs ivho will take us hy the hand. I\\nsay this not to threaten or intimidate, but that we\\nshould reflect seriously before we act. This lan-\\nguage called forth a rebuke from Ruf us King. I\\nam concerned, said he, for what fell from the\\ngentleman from Delaware, take a foreign power\\nhy the hand I am sorry he mentioned it, and I\\nhope he is able to excuse it to himself on the score\\nof passion.\\nThe situation had become dangerous. The\\nconvention, said Martin, was on the verge of dis-\\nsolution, scarce held together by the strength of a\\nhair. When things were looking darkest, Oliver\\nEllsworth and Roger Sherman suggested a com-\\npromise. Yes, said Franklin, when a joiner\\nwishes to fit two boards, he sometimes pares off a bit\\nfrom both. The famous Connecticut compromise\\nled the way to the arrangement which\\nTheConnecti-\\ncutcompro- was ultimately adopted, accordmg to\\nwhich the national principle was to pre-\\nvail in the House of Representatives, and the federal\\nprinciple in the Senate. But at first the compromise\\nmet with little favour. Neither party was willing\\nto give way. No compromise for us, said Lu-\\nther Martin. You must give each state an equal\\nsuffrage, or our business is at an end. Then we\\nare come to a full stop, said Roger Sherman. I\\nsuppose it was never meant that we should break\\nup without doing something. When the question\\nas to allowing equality of suffrage to the states in\\nthe Federal Senate was put to vote, the result was", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0276.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 251\\na tie. Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela-\\nware, and Maryland five states voted in the\\naffirmative Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vir-\\nginia, Noi th Carolina, and South Carolina five\\nstates voted in the negative the vote of Georgia\\nwas divided and lost. It was Abraham Baldwin, a\\nnative of Connecticut and lately a tutor in Yale\\nCollege, a recent emigrant to Georgia, who thus\\ndivided the vote of that state, and prevented a de-\\ncision which would in all probability have broken\\nUJ5 the convention. His state was the last to vote,\\nand the house was hushed in anxious expectation,\\nwhen this brave and wise young man yielded his\\nprivate conviction to what he saw to be the para-\\nmount necessity of keeping the convention together.\\n\\\\A.ll honour to his memory\\njThe moral effect of the tie vote was in favour of\\nthe Connecticut compromise for no one could doubt\\nthat the little states, New Hampshire and Rhode\\nIsland, had they been represented in the division,\\nwould have voted upon that side. The matter was\\nreferred to a committee as impartially constituted\\nas possible, with Elbridge Gerry as chairman and\\non the 5th of July, after a recess of three days, the\\ncommittee reported in favour of the compromise*\\nFresh objections on the part of the large states\\nwere now offered by Wilson and Gouverneur Mor-\\nris, and gloom again overhung the convention.\\nGerry said that, while he did not fully approve of\\nthe compromise, he had nevertheless supported it,\\nbecause he felt sure that if nothing were done war\\nand confusion must ensue, the old confederation\\nbeing already virtually at an end. George Mason", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0277.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "252 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nobserved that it could not be more inconvenient\\nfor any gentleman to remain absent from his pri-\\nvate affairs than it was for him but he would bury\\nhis bones in that city rather than expose his country\\nto the consequences of a dissolution of the conven-\\ntion. Mason s subsequent behaviour was haixUy\\nin keeping with the promise of this brave speech,\\nand in Gerry w^ shall observe like inconsistency.\\nAt present a timely speech from Madison soothed\\nthe troubled waters but it was only after eleven\\ndays of somewhat more tranquil debate that the\\ncompromise was adopted on the 16th of July. Even\\nthen it was but narrowly secured. The ayes were\\nConnecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,\\nand North Carolina, five states the noes were\\nPennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Geor-\\ngia, four states Gerry and Strong against King\\nand Gorham divided the vote of Massachusetts,\\nwhich was thus lost. New York, for reasons pres-\\nently to be stated, was absent. It is accordingly to\\nElbridge Gerry and Caleb Strong that posterity\\nare indebted for here preventing a tie, and thus\\nbringing the vexed question to a happy issue.\\nAccording to the compromise secured with so\\nmuch difficulty, it was arranged that in the lower\\nhouse population was to be represented, and in the\\nupper house the states, each of which, without re-\\ngard to size, was forever to be entitled to two sena-\\ntors. In the lower house there was to be one rep-\\nresentative for every 40,000 inhabitants, but at\\nWashington s suggestion the number was changed\\nto 30,000, so as to increase the house, which then\\nseemed likely to be too small in numbers. Some", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0278.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 253\\none suggested that with the growth of population\\nthat rate would make an unwieldy house within a\\nhundred and fifty years from that time, whereat\\nGorham of Massachusetts laughed to scorn the\\nidea that any system of government they coidd\\ndevise in that room could possibly last a hun-\\ndred and fifty years. The difficulty has been sur-\\nmounted by enlarging from time to time the basis\\nof representation. It now seemed inadvisable that\\nthe senators should be chosen by the lower house\\nout of persons nominated by the state legislatures\\nand it was accordingly decided that they should\\nbe not merely nominated, but elected, by the state\\nlegislatures. Thus the Senate was made quite in-\\ndependent of the lower house. At the same time,\\nthe senators were to vote as individuals, and thus\\nthe old practice of voting by states, except in cer-\\ntain peculiar emergencies, was finally done away\\nwith.\\nIt is seldom, if ever, that a political compromise\\nleaves things evenly balanced. Almost every such\\narrangement, when once set working, weighs down\\nthe scales decidedly to the one side or the other.\\nThe Connecticut compromise was really a decisive\\nvictory for Madison and his party, although it\\nmodified the Virginia plan so considerably. They\\ncould well afford to defer to the fears and preju-\\ndices of the smaller states in the struc-\\nIt was a deci-\\nture of the Senate, for by securing a MldlsonT\\nlower house, which represented the scheme.\\nAmerican people, and not the American states,\\nthey won the whole battle in so far as the question\\nof radically reforming the government was con-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0279.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "254 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\ncernecl. As soon as the foundation was thus laid\\nfor a government which should act directly upon\\nindividuals, it obviously became necessary to aban-\\ndon the articles of confederation, and work out a\\nnew constitution in all its details. The plan, as\\nnow reported, omitted the obnoxious adjective\\nnational, and spoke of the federal legislature\\n2bndi federal courts. But to the men who were still\\nblindly wedded to the old confederation this sooth-\\ning change of phraseology did not conceal their\\ndefeat. On the very day that the compromise was\\nfavourably reported by the committee, Yates and\\nLansing quit the convention in disgust, and went\\nhome to New York. After the departure of these\\nuncongenial colleagues, Hamilton might have acted\\nwith power, had he not known too well that the\\nsentiment of his state did not support him. As a\\nmere individual he could do but little, and accord-\\ningly he went home for a while to attend to press-\\ning business, returning just in time to take part in\\nthe closing scenes. His share in the work of fram-\\nirreconciiabies i\u00c2\u00bbg Federal Constitution was very\\ngo home. s,m?i\\\\\\\\. About the time that Hamilton\\nreturned, Luther Martin, whose wrath had waxed\\nhotter every day, as he saw power after power ex-\\ntended to the federal government, at length gave\\nway and went back to Maryland, vowing that he\\nwould have nothing more to do with such high-\\nhanded proceedings.\\nWhile the Connecticut compromise thus scat-\\ntered a few scintillations of discontent, and re-\\nlieved the convention of some of its most discordant\\nelements, its general effect was wonderfully har-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0280.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 255\\nmoniziiig. The men who had opposed the Virginia\\nplan only through their dread of the larger states\\nwere now more than conciliated. The concession\\nof equal representation in the Senate turned out\\nto have been a master stroke of diplomacy. As\\nsoon as the little states were assured of an equal\\nshare in the control of one of the two central legis-\\nlative bodies, they suddenly forgot their scruples\\nabout thoroughly overhauling the government, and\\nnone were readier than they to intrust extensive\\npowers to the new Congress. Paterson of New\\nJersey, the fiercest opponent of the Virginia plan,\\nbecame from that time forth to the end of his life\\nthe most devoted of Federalists.\\nThat first step which proverbially gives the most\\ntrouble had now been fairly taken. But other\\ncompromises were needed before the work of con-\\nstruction could properly be carried out. As the\\nantagonism between great and small states disap-\\npeared from the scene, other antagonisms appeared.\\nIt is worth noting that just for a moment there was\\nrevealed a glimmering of jealousy and dread on\\nthe part of the eastern states toward antago-\\nthose of which the foundations were laid ^j,^\u00e2\u0084\u00a2^ ouh^^\\nin the northwestern territory. Many\\npeople in New England feared that their children\\nwould be drawn westward in such numbers as to\\ncreate immense states beyond the Ohio and thus\\nit was foreseen that the relative political weight of\\nNew England in the future would be diminished.\\nTo a certain extent this prediction has been justi-\\nfied by events, but Koger Sherman rightly main-\\ntained that it afforded no just grounds for dread.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0281.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "256 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nKing and Gerry introduced a most illiberal and\\nmischievous motion, that the total number of rep-\\nresentatives from nevr states must never be allowed\\nto exceed the total number from the original thir-\\nteen. Such an arrangement, which would surely\\nhave been enough to create that antagonism be-\\ntween east and west which it sought to forestall\\nand avoid, was supported by Massachusetts and\\nConnecticut, with Delaware and Maryland but it\\nwas defeated by the combination of New Jersey\\nwith the four states south of Maryland. The\\nground was thus cleared for a very different kind\\nof sectional antagonism, that which, as Madison\\ntruly said, would prove the most deep-seated and\\nenduring of all, the antagonism between north\\nand south. The first great struggle between the\\nAntagonism pi O-slavcry and anti-slavery parties be-\\nstotesandfree Federal Convcution, and it\\nstates. resulted in the first two of the long series\\nof compromises by which the irrepressible conflict\\nwas postponed until the north had waxed strong\\nenough to confront the dreaded spectre of secession,\\nand, summoning all its energies in one stupendous\\neffort, exorcise it forever. From this moment down\\nto 1865 we shall continually be made to realize\\nhow the American people had entered into the\\nshadow of the coming Civil War before they had\\nfairly emerged from that of the Revolution and\\nas we pass from scene to scene of the solemn story,\\nwe shall learn how to be forever grateful for the\\nsudden and final clearing of the air wrought by\\nthat frightful storm which men not yet old can still\\nso well remember.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0282.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 257\\nThe first compromise related to the distribution\\nof representatives between north and south. Was\\nrepresentation in the lower house of Congress to\\nbe proportioned to wealth, or to population and\\nif the latter, were all the inhabitants, or only all\\nthe free inhabitants, to be counted It was soon\\nagreed that wealth was difficult to reckon and pop-\\nulation easy to count and to an extent sufficient\\nfor all ordinary purposes, population might serve\\nas an index of wealth. A state with 500,000 in-\\nhabitants would be in most cases richer than one\\nwith 400,000. In those days, when cities were\\nfew and small, this was approximately true. In\\nour day it is not at all true. A state with large\\ncommercial and manufacturing cities is sure to be\\nmuch richer than a state in which the population\\nis chiefly rural. The population of Massachusetts\\nis somewhat smaller than that of Indiana but her\\naorwreo-ate wealth is more than double that of In-\\ndiana. Disparities like this, which do not trouble\\nus to-day, would have troubled the Federal Con-\\nvention. We no longer think it desirable to give\\npolitical representation to wealth, or to anything\\nbut persons. We have become thoroughly demo-\\ncratic, but our great-grandfathers had not. To\\nthem it seemed quite essential that wealth should\\nbe represented as well as persons; but they got\\nover the main difficulty easily, because under the\\neconomic conditions of that time population could\\nserve roughly as an index to wealth, and it was\\nmuch easier to count noses than to assess the value\\nof farms and stock.\\nBut now there was in aU the southern states,", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0283.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "258 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nand in most of the northern, a peculiar species of\\ncollective existence, which might be described\\neither as wealth or as population. As\\nwere slaves to a i\\nbe reckoned humau bein :s the slaves mioht be de-\\nas persona or o o\\nas chattels? scribcd as population, but in the eye of\\nthe law they were chattels. In the northern states\\nslavery was rapidly disappearing, and the property\\nin negroes was so small as to be hardly worth con-\\nsidering while south of Mason and Dixon s line\\nthis peculiar kind of property was the chief wealth\\nof the states. But clearly, in apportioning repre-\\nsentation, in sharing political power in the federal\\nassembly, the same rule should have been applied\\nimpartially to all the states. At this point. Pierce\\nButler and Cotesworth Pinckney of South Caro-\\nlina insisted that slaves were part of the popula-\\ntion, and as such must be counted in ascertaining\\nthe basis of representation. A fierce and compli-\\ncated dispute ensued. The South Carolina pro-\\nposal suggested a uniform rule, but it was one that\\nwould scarcely alter the political weight of the\\nnorth, while it would vastly increase the weight of\\nthe south and it would increase it most in just\\nthe quarter where slavery was most deeply rooted.\\nThe power of South Carolina, as a member of the\\nUnion, would be doubled by such a measure.\\nHence the northern delegates maintained that\\nslaves, as chattels, ought no more to be reckoned\\nas part of the population than houses or ships.\\nHas a man in Virginia, exclaimed Paterson,\\na number of votes in proportion to the number\\nof his slaves And if negroes are not represented\\nin the states to which they belong, why should they", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0284.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 259\\nbe represented In the general government?\\nIf a meeting o\u00c2\u00a3 the people were to take place in a\\nslave state, would the slaves vote? They would\\nnot. Why then should they be represented in a\\nfederal government? I can never agree, said\\nGouverneur Morris, to give such encouragement\\nto the slave-trade as would be given by allowing\\nthe southern states a representation for their ne-\\ngroes. I would sooner submit myself to a tax\\nfor paying for all the negroes in the United States\\nthan saddle posterity with such a constitution.\\nThe attitude taken by Vii ginia was that of\\npeace-maker. On the one hand, such men as\\nWashington, Madison, and Mason, who were ear-\\nnestly hoping to see their own state soon freed\\nfrom the curse of slavery, could not fail to perceive\\nthat if Virginia were to gain an increase of politi-\\ncal weight from the existence of that institution,\\nthe difficulty of getting the state legislature to\\nabolish it would be enhanced. But on the other\\nhand, they saw that South Carolina was inexorable,\\nand that her refusal to adopt the Constitution for\\nthis reason would certainly carry Georgia with\\nher, and probably North Carolina, also. Even\\nhad South Carolina alone been involved, it was not\\nsimply a question of forming a Union which should\\neither include her or leave her ovit in the cold.\\nThe case was much more complicated than that.\\nIt was really doubtful if, without the cordial as-\\nsistance of South Carolina, a Union could be\\nformed at all. A Federal Constitution had not\\nonly to be framed, but it had to be presented to\\nthe thirteen states for adoption. It was by no", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0285.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "260 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nmeans clear that enough states would ratify it to\\nenable the experiment of the new government to go\\ninto operation. New York and Rhode Island were\\nknown to be bitterly opposed to it Massachusetts\\ncould not be counted on as sure to add South\\nCarolina to this list would be to endanger every-\\nthing. The event justified this caution. We shall\\nhereafter see that it was absolutely necessary to\\nsatisfy South Carolina, and that but for her ratifi-\\ncation, coming just at the moment when it did, the\\nwork of the Federal Convention would probably\\nhave been done in vain. It was a clear perception\\nof the wonderful complication of interests involved\\nin the final appeal to the people that induced the\\nVirginia statesmen to take the lead in a compro-\\nmise. Four years before, in 1783, when Congress\\nwas endeavouring to apportion the quotas of rev-\\nenue to be required of the several states, a similar\\ndispute had arisen. If taxation were to be distri-\\nbuted according to population, it made a great dif-\\nference whether slaves were to be counted as popu-\\nlation or not. If slaves were to be counted, the\\nsouthern states would have to pay more than their\\nequitable share into the federal treasury if slaves\\nwere not to be counted, it was argued at the north\\nthat they would be paying less than their equitable\\nshare. Consequently, at that time the north had\\nbeen inclined to maintain that the slaves were pop-\\nulation, while the south had preferred to regard\\nthem as chattels. Thus we see that in politics, as\\nwell as in algebra, it makes all the difference in\\nthe world whether you start with ^^Z^/s or with\\nminus. On that occasion Madison had offered a", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0286.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 261\\nsuccessful compromise, in which a slave figured as\\nthree fifths of a freeman and Rut-\\nledge of South Carolina, who was now tilths compro-\\npresent in the convention, had supported ume English\\nthe measure. Madison now proposed ever there was\\nthe same method of getting over the diffi-\\nculty about representation, and his compromise\\nwas adopted. It was agreed that in counting pop-\\nulation, whether for direct taxation or for repre-\\nsentation in the lower house of Congress, five slaves\\nshould be reckoned as three individuals.\\nAll this was thoroughly illogical, of course it\\nleft the question whether slaves are population or\\nchattels for theorizers to wrangle over, and for\\nfuture events to decide. It was easy for James\\nWilson to show that there was neither rhyme nor\\nreason in it but he subscribed to it, nevertheless,\\njust as the northern abolitionists, Rufus King and\\nGouverneur Morris, joined with Washington and\\nMadison, and with the pro-slavery Pinckneys, in\\nsubscribing to it, because they all believed that\\nwithout such a compromise the Constitution would\\nnot be adopted and in this there can be little\\ndoubt that they were right. The evil consequences\\nwere unquestionably very serious indeed. Hence-\\nforth, so long as slavery lasted, the vote of a south-\\nerner counted for more than the vote of a north-\\nerner and just where negroes were most numerous\\nthe power of their masters became greatest. In\\nSouth Carolina there soon came to be more blacks\\nthan whites, and the application of the rule there-\\nfore went far toward doubling the vote of South\\nCarolina in the House of Representatives and in", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0287.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "262 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nthe electoral college. Every five slaveholders\\ndown there were equal in political weight to not\\nless than eight farmers or merchants in the north\\nand thus this troublesome state acquired a power\\nof working mischief out of all proportion to her\\nreal size. At a later date the operation of the rule\\nin Mississippi was similar and in general it was\\njust the most backward and barbarous parts of the\\nUnion that were thus favoured at the expense of\\nthe most civilized parts. Admitting all this, how-\\nin other words, \u00c2\u00a9vcr, it rcmaius undeniable that the Con-\\nioi^tfon ^a^t-^^^* stitution saved us from anarch}^ and\\nthSuT- there can be little doubt that slavery\\nstances. evcry other remnant of barbarism\\nin American society would have thriven far more\\nlustily under a state of chronic anarchy than was\\npossible under the Constitution. Four years of\\nconcentrated warfare, animated by an intense and\\nlofty moral purpose, could not hurt the character\\nor mar the fortunes of the people, like a century of\\naimless and miscellaneous squabbling over a host\\nof petty local interests. The War of Secession was\\na terrible ordeal to pass through but when one\\ntries to picture what might have happened in this\\nfair land without the work of the Federal Conven-\\ntion, the imagination stands aghast.\\nThe second great compromise between north-\\nComproniise ^^^1 southcm iutcrcsts related to\\nEngland and t^c aboHtiou of the forcigu slave-trade\\nastoth^forer^ ^-iid the powcr of the federal govern-\\nsiave-trade. commercG. All the states\\nexcept South Carolina and Georgia wished to stop\\nthe importation of slaves but the physical condi-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0288.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 263\\ntions of rice and indio-o culture exhausted the\\nnegroes so fast that these two states felt that their\\nindustries would be dried up at the very source\\nif the importation of fresh negroes were to be\\nstopped. Cotesworth Pinckney accordingly de-\\nclared that South Carolina would consider a vote\\nto abolish the slave-trade as simply a polite way of\\ntelling her that she was not wanted in the Union.\\nOn the other hand, the three New England states\\npresent in the convention had made up their minds\\nthat it would not do to allow the several states any\\nlonger to regulate commerce each according to its\\nown whim. It was of vital importance that this\\npower should be taken from the states and lodged\\nin Congress otherwise, the Union would soon be\\nrent in pieces by commercial disputes. The policy\\nof New York had thoroughly impressed this lesson\\nupon all the neighbouring states. But none of the\\nsouthern states were in favour of granting this power\\nunreservedly to Congress. If a navigation act\\ncould be passed by a simple majority in Congress,\\nit was feared that the New Engianders would get\\nall the carrying trade into their own hands, and\\nthen chai ge ruinous freights for carrying rice, in-\\ndigo, and tobacco to the north and to Europe. On\\nthis point, accordingly, the southern delegates acted\\nas a unit in insisting that Congress should not be\\nempowered to pass navigation acts, except by a two\\nthirds vote of both houses. This would have tied\\nthe hands of the federal government most unfortu-\\nnately and the New Engianders, enlightened by\\ntheir own interests, saw it to be so. Here were the\\nmaterials ready for a compromise, or, as the stout", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0289.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "264 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nabolitionist, Gouverneur Morris, truly called it, a\\nbargain between New England and the far\\nsouth. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Con-\\nnecticut consented to the prolonging of the foreign\\nslave-trade for twenty years, or until 1808 and in\\nreturn South Carolina and Georgia consented to\\nthe clause emjjowering Congress to pass navigation\\nacts and otherwise regulate commerce by a simple\\nmajority of votes. At the same time, as a conces-\\nsion to rice and indigo, the New Englanders agreed\\nthat Congress should be forever prohibited from\\ntaxing exports and thus one remnant of mediaeval\\npolitical economy was neatly swept away.\\nThis compromise was carried against the sturdy\\nopposition of Virginia. The language of George\\nMason of Virginia is worth quoting, for it was\\nsuch as Theodore Parker might have used. He\\ncalled the slave-trade this infernal traffic. Slav-\\nThis last com- Giy/ Said lie, discouragcs arts and\\nto\u00c2\u00b0m!ake the manufactures. The poor despise la-\\nadhesion of i i e 111 rpi\\nVirginia doubt- bour whcu periomied by slaves. Ihey\\nprevent the immigration of whites, who\\nreally strengthen and enrich a country. They pro-\\nduce the most pernicious effect on manners. Every\\nmaster of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They\\nbring the judgment of Heaven on a country. As\\nnations cannot be rewarded or punished in the next\\nworld, they must be in this. By an inevitable\\nchain of causes and effects. Providence punishes\\nnational sins by national calamities. But these\\nprophetic words were powerless against the combi-\\nnation of New England with the far south. One\\nthing was now made certain, that the vast in-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0290.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 265\\nfluence of Rutledge and the Pinckneys would be\\nthrown unreservedly in behalf of the new Consti-\\ntution. I will confess, said Coteswortli Pinck-\\nney, that I had prejudices against the eastern\\nstates before I came here, but I have found them\\nas liberal and candid as any men whatever. But\\nthis compromise, which finally secured South Caro-\\nlina and Georgia, made Virginia for the moment\\ndoubtful for Mason and Randolph were so dis-\\ngusted at the absolute power over commerce con-\\nceded to Congress that, when the Constitution was\\nfinished and engrossed on paper, they refused to\\nsign it.\\nIt is difficult to read this or any other episode in\\nour history whereby negro slavery was extended\\nand fostered without burning indignation. But\\nthis is not the proper mood for the historian, whose\\naim is to interpret men s actions by the circum-\\nstances of their time, in order to judge their mo-\\ntives correctly. In 1787 slavery was the cloud like\\nunto a man s hand which portended a deluge, but\\nthose who could truly read the signs were few.\\nFrom north to south, slavery had been slowly\\ndying out for nearly fifty years. It had become\\nextinct in Massachusetts, it was nearly so in all the\\nother northern states, and it had just been forever\\nprohibited in the national domain. In Maryland\\nand Virginia there was a strong and growing party\\nin favour of abolition. The movement had even\\ngathered strength in North Carolina. Only the\\nrice-swamps of the far south remained wedded to\\ntheir idols. It was quite generally believed that\\nslavery was destined speedily to expire, to give", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0291.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "266\\nTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nplace to a better system of labour, without any\\ngreat clanger or disturbance and this opinion was\\ndistinctly set forth by many delegates in the con-\\nvention.^ Even Charles Pinckney went so far as\\nto express a hope that South Carolina, if not too\\nmuch meddled with, would by and h\\\\ voluntarily\\nrank herself among the emancipating states but\\nhis older cousin declared himself bound in candour\\nto acknowledge that there was very little likelihood\\nindeed of so desirable an event. Not even these\\nSouth Carolinians ventured to defend slavery on\\nprinciple. This belief in the moribund condition\\nof slavery prevented the convention from realizing\\nthe actual effect of the concessions which were\\nmade. Scarcely any cotton was grown at that time,\\nand none was sent to England. The industrial\\nrevolution about to be \\\\vrought by the inventions\\nof Arkwright and Hargreaves, Cartwright and\\nWatt and AVhitney, could not be foreseen. Nor\\ncould it be foreseen that presently, when there\\nshould thus arise a great demand for slaves from\\nVirginia as a breeding-ground, the abolitionist\\nTlie slave-population of the United States, according to the\\ncensus of 1T90, was thus distributed among- the states\\nNorth.\\nSouth.\\nNew Hampshire\\n158\\nDelaware\\n8,887\\nVermont\\n17\\nMaryland\\n103.036\\nMassaehnsetts\\nVii-ginia\\n293,427\\nRhode Island\\n952\\nNorth Carolina\\n100.572\\nConnecticut\\n2.750\\nSouth Carolina\\n107,094\\nNew York\\n21,324\\nGeorgia\\n29,264\\nNew Jersey\\n11.423\\nKentucky\\n11.830\\nPemisylvania\\n3.737\\nTennessee\\n3.417\\n40,370\\n657,527\\nTotal\\n697\\n.897.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0292.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 2C7\\nparty in that state would disappear, leaving lier to\\njoin in tlic odious struggle for introducing slavery\\ninto the national domain. Though these things\\nwere so soon to happen, the wisest man in 1787\\ncould not foresee them. The convention hoped\\nthat twenty years would see not only the end of the\\nforeign slave-trade, but the restriction and diminu-\\ntion of slavery itself. It was in such a mood that\\nthey completed the compromise by recommending\\na tariff of ten dollars a head upon all negroes im-\\nported, while at the same time a clause was added\\nfor insuring the recovery of fugitive slaves, quite\\nsimilar to the clause in the ordinance for the gov-\\nernment of the northwestern territory.\\nIt was the three great compromises here de-\\nscribed that laid the foundations of our Federal\\nConstitution. The first compromise, by conceding\\nequal representation to the states in the Senate,\\nenlisted the small states in favour of the The founda-\\nnew scheme, and by establishing a na- coustitution\\ntional system of representation in the il ^compro-\\nlower house, prepared the way for a gov-\\nernment that could endure. This was Madison s\\ngreat victory, secured by the aid of Sherman and\\nEllsworth, without which nothing could have been\\neffected. The second compromise, at the cost of\\ngiving disproportionate weight to the slave states,\\ngained their support for the more perfect union\\nthat was about to be formed. The third compro-\\nmise, at the cost of postponing for twenty years\\nthe abolition of the foreign slave-trade, secured ab-\\nsolute free-trade between the states, with the sur-\\nrender of all control over commerce into the hands", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0293.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "268 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nof the federal government. After these steps had\\nbeen taken, the most difficult and dangerous part\\nof the road had been travelled; the remainder,\\nthough extremely important, was accomplished far\\nmore easily. It was mainly the task of building on\\nthe foundations already laid.\\nIn the grants to the federal government of\\npowers hitherto reserved to the several states, the\\ndiversity of opinion among the members of the\\nconvention was but slight compared to the pro-\\nfound antagonism which had been allayed by the\\nthree initial compromises. It was admitted, as a\\nmatter of course, that the federal government alone\\nPowers grant- ?ould coiu moucy, fix the standard of\\nerai Koveru-^ wciglits and mcasurcs, establish post-\\nmeut. offices and post-roads, and grant patents\\nand copyrights. To it alone was naturally in-\\ntrusted the whole business of war and of interna-\\ntional relations. It could define and punish felonies\\ncommitted on the high seas it could maintain a\\nnavy and issue letters of marque and reprisal it\\ncould support an army and provide for calling\\nforth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,\\nto suppress insurrections, and to rejiel invasions.\\nBut in relation to this question of the army and\\nthe militia there was some characteristic discussion.\\nIt was at first proposed that Congress should have\\nthe power to subdue a rebellion in any state on\\nthe application of its legislature. The Shays re-\\nbellion was then fresh in the memory of all the\\ndelegates, and their arguments simply reflected\\nthe impression which that unpleasant affair had\\nleft upon them. Charles Pinckney, Gouverneur", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0294.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 269\\nMorris, and John Langdon wished to have the\\npower given to Congress unconditionally, without\\nwaiting for an application from the legislature.\\nBut Gerry, who had been on the ground, spoke\\nsturdily against such a needless infraction of state\\nrights. He was utterly opposed, he said, to let-\\nting loose the myrmidons of the United States on\\na state without its own consent. The states will be\\nthe best judges in such cases. More blood would\\nhave been spilt in Massachusetts in the late insur-\\nrection if the general authority had intermeddled.\\nEllsworth suggested that Congress should use its\\ndiscretion only in cases where the legislature of the\\nstate could not meet but Randolph forcibly re-\\nplied that if Congress is to judge whether a state\\nlegislature can or cannot meet, the difficulty is in\\nno wise surmounted. Gerry s view at last pre-\\nvailed, and in accordance therewith it was decided\\nthat the federal power should guarantee to every\\nstate a republican form of government, and should\\nprotect each of them against invasion and on ap-\\nplication of the legislature, or of the executive (if\\nthe legislature could not be convened), it should\\nprotect them against domestic violence. This ar-\\nrangement did not fully provide against such an\\nemergency as that of rival and hostile executives\\nin the same state, as under the so-called carpet-\\nbag governments which followed after the AV^ar\\nof Secession, but it was doubtless as sound a provi-\\nsion as any general constitution could make.\\nThe federal government was further empowered\\nto borrow money on the credit of the United States\\nand it was declared that all debts contracted and", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0295.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "270 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nengagements entered into before tlie adoption of\\nthis constitution should be as valid against the\\nUnited States under this constitution as under the\\nconfederation. There was to be no repudiation or\\nreadjustment of debts on the ground of inability to\\npay. Congress was further empowered to establish\\na uniform rule of naturalization and a uniform law\\nof bankruptcy. But it was prohibited from passing\\nbills of attainder or ex post facto laws, or suspend-\\ning the writ of habeas corpus, except under the\\nstress of rebellion or invasion. It was provided\\nthat all duties, imposts, or excises should be uni-\\nform throughout the United States. The federal\\ngovernment could not give preference to one state\\nover another in its commercial regulations. It\\ncould not tax exports. It could not draw money\\nfrom the treasury save by due process of appro-\\npriation, and all bills relating to the raising of\\nrevenue must originate in the lower house, which\\ndirectly represented the people. Congress was\\nempowered to admit new states into the Union,\\nbut it was not allowed to interfere with the terri-\\ntorial areas of states already existing without the\\nexpress consent of the local legislatures. To insure\\nthe independence of the federal government, it was\\nprovided that senators and representatives should\\nbe paid out of the federal treasury, and not by\\ntheir respective states, as had been the case under\\nthe confederation. Except for such offences as\\ntreason, felony; or breach of the peace, they should\\nbe privileged from arrest during their attendance\\nat the session of their respective houses, and in\\ngoing to or returning from the same and for any", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0296.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 271\\nspeech or debate in either house they were not to\\nbe questioned in any other place. It was fur-\\nther provided that a territory not exceeding ten\\nmiles square should be ceded to the United States,\\nand set apart as the site of a federal city, in which\\nthe general government should ever after hold its\\nmeetings, erect its buildings, and exercise exclusive\\njurisdiction. During the past four years the Con-\\ntinental Congress had skipped about from Phila-\\ndelphia to Princeton, to Annapolis, to Trenton, tO\\nNew York, until it had become a laughing-stock,\\\\\\nand the newspapers were full of squibs about it.\\nVerily, said one facetious editor, the Lord shall\\nmake this government like unto a wheel, and keep\\nit rolling back and forth betwixt Dan and Beer-\\nsheba, and grant it no rest this side of Jordan.\\nThis inconvenience was now to be remedied. Con-\\ngress was hereafter to have a federal police force\\nat its disposal, and was never more to be reduced\\nto the humiliation of a fruitless appeal to the pro-\\ntecting arm of a state government, as at Philadel-\\nphia in the summer of 1783. Furthermore, the\\nContinental Congress had of late years commanded\\nso little respect, and had offered so few tempta-\\ntions to able men in quest of political distinction,\\nthat its meetings were often attended by no more\\nthan eight or ten members. It was actually on the\\npoint of dying a natural death through sheer lack\\nof public interest in it. To prevent any possible\\ncontinuance of such a disgraceful state of things,\\nit was agreed that the Federal Congress should be\\nauthorized to compel the attendance of absent\\nmembers, in such manner and under such penalties", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0297.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "272 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nas each house may provide. Had the political\\nlife of the country continued to go on as under the\\nconfederation, it is very doubtful whether such a\\nprovision as this would have remedied the evil.\\nBut the new Federal Congress, drawing its life\\ndirectly from the people, was destined to afford far\\ngreater opportunities for a political career than\\nwere afforded by the feeble body of delegates which\\npreceded it and a penal clause, compelling mem-\\nbers to attend its meetings, was hardly needed\\nunder the new circumstances which arose.\\nWhile the powers of the federal government\\nwere thus carefully defined, at the same time sev-\\neral powers were expressly denied to the states. No\\nstate was allowed, without explicit authority from\\nCongress, to lay any tonnage or custom-\\nnied to the housc dutics, kecj) troops or ships of\\nwar in time of peace, enter into any\\nagreement or compact with another state or with\\na foreign power, or engage in war unless actually\\ninvaded, or in such imminent danger as will not\\nadmit of delays. The following clause provided\\nagainst a recurrence of some of the worst evils\\nwhich had been felt under the league of friend-\\nship No state shall enter into any treaty,\\nalliance, or confederation grant letters of marque\\nand reprisal coin money emit bills of credit\\nmake anything but gold and silver coin a tender in\\npayment of debts pass any bill of attainder, ex\\npost facto law, or law impairing the obligation of\\ncontracts or grant any title of nobility. Hence-\\nforth there was to be no repetition of such dis-\\ngraceful scenes as had lately been witnessed in", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0298.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 273\\nRhode Island. So far as the state legislatures\\nwere concerned, paper money was to be ruled out\\nforever. But how was it with the federal govern-\\nment By the articles of confederation the United\\nStates were allowed to issue bills of credit, and\\nmake them a tender in payment of debts. In the\\nFederal Convention the committee of detail sug-\\ngested that this permission might remain under\\nthe new constitution but the suggestion was al-\\nmost unanimously condemned. All the ablest men\\nin the convention spoke emphatically against it.\\nGouverneur Morris urged that the federal govern-\\nment, no less than the state governments,\\n111 1 1 p Emphatic con-\\nshould be expressly prohibited from demnation of\\n1-11 f i-i paper money.\\nissuing bills or credit, or in any wise\\nmaking its promissory notes a legal tender. He\\nwent over the history of the past ten years he\\ncalled attention to the obstinacy with which the\\nwretched device had been resorted to again and\\nagain, after its evils had been thrust before every-\\nbody s eyes and he proved himself a true prophet\\nwhen he said that if the United States should ever\\nagain have a great war to conduct, people would\\nhave forgotten all about these things, and would\\ncall for fresh issues of inconvertible paper, with\\nsimilar disastrous results. Now was the time to\\nstop it once for all. Yes, echoed Roger Sher-\\nman, this is the favourable crisis for crushing\\npaper money. This is the time, said his col-\\nleague, Ellsworth, to shut and bar the door against\\npaper money, which can in no case be necessary.\\nGive the government credit, and other resources\\nwill offer. The power may do harm, never good.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0299.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "274 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nThere was no way, he added, in which powerful\\nfriends could so soon be gained for the new constl\\ntution as by withholding this power from the gov-\\nernment. James Wilson took the same view. It\\nwill have the most salutary influence on the credit\\nof the United States, said he, to remove the pos-\\nsibility of paper money. Rather than grant the\\npower to Congress, said John Langdon, I would\\nreject the whole plan. The words which grant\\nthis power, said George Read of Delaware, if\\nnot struck out, will be as alarming as the mark of\\nthe Beast, in the Apocalypse. On none of the\\nsubjects that came up for discussion during that\\nsummer was the convention more nearly unanimous\\nthan in its condemnation of paper money. The\\nonly delegate who ventured to speak in its favour\\nwas Mercer of Maryland. What Hamilton would\\nhave said, if he had been present that day, we may\\njudge from his vigorous words published some time\\nbefore. The power to emit an inconvertible paper\\nas a sign of value ought never hereafter to be used\\nfor in its very nature, said he, it is pregnant with\\nabuses, and liable to be made the engine of impo-\\nsition and fraud, holding out temptations equally\\npernicious to the integrity of government and to\\nthe morals of the people. Paterson called it\\nsanctifying iniquity by law. The same views\\nwere entertained by Washington and Madison.\\nThere were a few delegates, however, who thought\\nit unsafe to fetter Congress absolutely. To use\\nLuther Martin s expression, they did not set them-\\nselves up to be wise beyond every event. George\\nMason said he had a mortal hatred to paper", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0300.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 275\\nmoney, yet, as he could not foresee all emergencies,\\nhe was unwilling to tie the hands of the legislature.\\nThe late war, he thought, could not have been\\ncarried on had such a prohibition existed. Ran-\\ndolph spoke to the same effect. It was finally de-\\ncided, by the vote of nine states against New Jersey\\nand Maryland, that the power to issue inconvertible\\npaper should not be granted to the federal govern-\\nment. An express prohibition, such as had been\\nadopted for the separate states, was thought unnec-\\nessary. It was supposed, that it was enough to\\nwithhold the power, since the federal government\\nwould not venture to exercise it unless expressly\\npermitted in the Constitution. Thus, says Madi-\\nson, in his narrative of the proceedings, the pre-\\ntext for a paper currency, and particularly for\\nmaking the bills a tender, either for public or pri-\\nvate debts, was cut off. Nothing could be more\\nclearly expressed than this. As Mr. Justice Field\\nobserves, in his able dissenting opinion in the re-\\ncent case of Juilliard. vs. Greenman, if there be\\nanything in the history of the Constitution which\\ncan be established with moral certainty, it is that\\nthe f ramers of that instrument intended to prohibit\\nthe issue of legal-tender notes both by the general\\ngovernment and by the states, and thus prevent\\ninterference with the contracts of private parties.\\nSuch has been the opinion of our ablest constitu-\\ntional jurists, Marshall, Webster, Story, Curtis,\\nand Nelson. There can be little doubt that, ac-\\ncording to all sound principles of interpretation,\\nthe Legal Tender Act of 1862 was passed in fla-\\ngrant violation of the Constitution. Could Ells-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0301.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "276 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nworth and Morris, Langdon and Madison, have\\nforeseen the possibility of such extraordinary judg-\\nments as have lately emanated from the Supreme\\nCourt of the United States, they would doubtless\\nhave insisted upon the express prohibition, instead\\nof leaving it to posterity to root out the plague,\\nas it will apparently some time have to do, by the\\ncumbrous process of an amendment to the Consti-\\ntution.\\nThe work of the convention; as thus far con-\\nsidered, related to the legislative department of the\\nnew government. While these discussions were\\ngoing on, much attention had been paid, from time\\nto time, to the characteristics of the proposed fed-\\neral executive. The debates on this question,\\nthough long kept up, were far less acrimonious than\\nthe debates on representation and the power of\\nCongress over trade, because here there was no\\nobvious clashing of local interests. But for this\\nvery reason the convention had no longer so clear\\na chart to steer by. On the question of the slave-\\ntrade, the Pinckneys knew accurately just what\\nSouth Carolina wanted, how much it would do to\\nclaim, and how far it would be necessary to yield.\\nAs to the regulation of commerce by a bare ma-\\njority of votes in Congress, King and Sherman on\\nthe one hand, Mason and Randolph on the other,\\nwere able to pursue a thoroughly definite course of\\naction in behalf of what were supposed to be the\\nspecial interests of New England or of Virginia.\\nConsequently, the debates kept close to the point\\nthe controversy was keen, and sometimes, as we\\nhave seen, angry.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0302.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 211\\nIt was very different with the question as to the\\nfederal executive. Upon this point the discussions\\nwere guided rather by general speculations as to\\nwhat would be most likely to work well, and accord-\\ningly they wandered far and wide. Some of the\\ndelegates seemed to think we should sooner or later\\ncome to adopt a hereditary monarchy, and that the\\nchief thing to be done was to postpone the event as\\nlong as possible. Many wild ideas were broached\\nsuch, for example, as a triple-headed executive, to\\nrepresent the eastern, middle, and southern states,\\nsomewhat as associated Roman emperors\\nDebates as to\\nat times administered affairs in the dif- t^e federal\\nT executive.\\nferent portions of an undivided empire.\\nThe Virginia plan had not stated whether its pro-\\nposed executive was to be single or plural, because\\nthe Virginia delegates could not agree. Madison\\nwished it to be single, to insure greater efficiency,\\nbut to Randolph and Mason a tyranny seemed to\\nlurk in such an arrangement. When James Wil-\\nson and Charles Pinckney suggested that the execu-\\ntive power should be intrusted into the hands of\\none man, a profound silence fell upon the conven-\\ntion. No one spoke for several minutes, until\\nWashington, from the chair, asked if he should put\\nthe question. Franklin then got up, and said it\\nwas an interesting subject, and he should like to\\nhear what the members had to say and so the ball\\nwas set rolling. Rutledge said there was no need\\nof their being so shy. A man might frankly ex-\\npress his opinions, and afterwards change them if\\nhe saw good reason for so doing. For his part, he\\nwas in favour of vesting the executive power in a", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0303.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "278 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nsingle person, to secure efficiency of administration\\nand concentration of responsibility but he would\\nnot give hiin the power to declare war and make\\npeace. Sherman then made the far-reaching sug-\\ngestion, that the executive magistracy was really\\nnothing more than an institution for carrying the\\nwill of the legislature into effect that the person\\nor persons ought to be appointed by and account-\\nable to the legislature only, which was the deposi-\\ntory of the supreme will of the society. As they\\nwere the best judges of the business which ought\\nto be done by the executive department, he\\nwished the number might not be fixed, but that\\nthe legislature should be at liberty to appoint one\\nor more, as experience might dictate. It would\\ngreatly have astonished the convention had they\\nbeen told that this suggestion of Sherman s was a\\nmove in the very same line of development which\\nthe British government had been following for\\nmore than half a century yet such, as we shall\\npresently see, was the case. Had this point been\\nunderstood then as we understand it now, the pro-\\nceedings of the convention could not have failed to\\nbe profoundly affected by it. As it was, the sug-\\ngestion did not receive due attention, and the\\nstream of discussion was turned into a very differ-\\nent channel. Wilson ai gued powerfully in favour\\nof a single chief magistrate, and this view finally\\nprevailed.\\nAfter it had been decided that there should be\\none man set in so high a position, there was end-\\nless discussion as to whether he should be elected\\nby the people or by Congress, and whether he", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0304.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 279\\nshould serve for one, or two, or three, or four, or\\nten, or fifteen years.^^ Better call it ^here should\\ntwenty, said Ruf us King, sarcastically {^\u00e2\u0080\u009eu,owlhouid\\nit is the Average reign of princes. iie be elected.\\nHamilton and Gouverneur Morris would have had\\nhim chosen for life, subject to removal for misbe-\\nhaviour; but the preference for a short term of\\nservice was soon manifest. As to the method of\\nelection, opinions oscillated back and forth for sev-\\neral weeks. Wilson said he was almost unwilling\\nto declare the mode which he wished to take place,\\nbeing apprehensive that it might appear chimer-\\nical. He would say, however, at least, that in\\ntheory he was for an election by the people. Ex-\\nperience, particularly in New York and Massachu-\\nsetts, showed that an election of the first magis-\\ntrate by the people at large was both a convenient\\nand a successful mode. The objects of choice in\\nsuch cases must be persons whose merits have gen-\\neral notoriety. Mason, Rutledge, and Strong\\nagreed with Sherman that the executive should\\nbe chosen by the legislature but Washington,\\nMadison, Gerry, and Gouverneur Morris strongly\\ndisapproved of this. Morris argued that an elec-\\ntion by the national legislature would be the work\\nof intrigue and corruption, like the election of the\\nking of Poland by a diet of nobles but Mason\\ndeclared, on the other hand, that to refer the\\nchoice of a proper character for a chief magistrate\\nto the people would be as unnatural as to refer a\\ntrial of colours to a blind man. A decision was\\nfirst reached against an election by Congress, be-\\ncause it was thought that if the chief magistrate", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0305.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "280 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nshould prove himself thoroughly competent he\\nought to be reeligible but if reeligible he would\\nbe exposed to the temptation of truckling to the\\nmost powerful party or cabal in Congress, in order\\nto secure his reelection. It did not occur to any\\none to suggest that under ordinary circumstances\\nthe executive ought to follow the policy of the most\\npowerful party in Congress, and that he might at\\nthe same time preserve all needful independence\\nby being clothed with the power of dissolving Con-\\ngress and making an ajjpeal to the people in a new\\nelection. It is interesting to consider what might\\nhave come of such a suggestion, following upon the\\nheels of that made by Roger Sherman. As we\\nshall presently see, it would have immeasurably\\nsimplified the machinery of our government, be-\\nsides making the executive what it ought to be, the\\narm of the legislature, instead of a separate and\\ncoordinate 230wer. Upon this point the minds of\\nnearly all the members were so far under the sway\\nof an incorrect theory that such an idea occurred\\nto none of them. It was decided that the chief\\nmagistrate ought to be reeligible, and therefore\\nshould not be elected by Congress.\\nAn immediate choice by the people, however,\\nSuggestion of did uot mcct witli general favour. To\\nan electoral\\ncoUege. obviate the difficulty, Ellsworth and\\nKing suggested the device of an electoral col-\\nlege, in which the electors should be chosen by\\nthe state legislatures, and should hold a meeting\\nat the federal city for the sole purpose of deciding\\nupon a chief magistrate. It was then objected\\nthat it would be difficult to find competent men", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0306.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 281\\nwho would be willing to undertake a long journey\\nsimply for such a purpose. The objection was felt\\nto be a very grave one, and so the convention re-\\nturned to the plan of an election by Congress, and\\nagain confronted the difficulty of the chief magis-\\ntrate s intriguing to secure his reelection. Wilson\\nthought to do away with this difficulty by introdu-\\ncing the element of blind chance, as in some of the\\nstates of ancient Greece, and choosing the execu-\\ntive by a board of electors taken from Congress\\nby lot but the suggestion found little support.\\nDickinson thought it would be well if the peoj)le of\\neach state were to choose its best citizen, in\\nmodern parlance, its favourite son then out of\\nthese thirteen names a chief magistrate might be\\nchosen, either by Congress or by a special board\\nof electors. At length, on the 26th of July, at\\nthe motion of Mason, the convention resolved\\nthat there should be a national executive, to con-\\nsist of a single person, to be chosen by the na-\\ntional legislature for the term of seven years,\\nand to be ineligible for a second term. He was\\nto be styled President of the United States of\\nAmerica.\\nThis decision remained until the very end of Au-\\ngust, when the whole question was reopened by a\\nmotion of Rutledge that the two houses of Congress,\\nin electing the president, should proceed by joint\\nballot. The object of this motion was to prevent\\neither house from exerting a negative on the choice\\nof the other. It was carried in spite of the oppo-\\nsition of some of the smaller states, which might\\nhope to exercise a greater relative influence upon", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0307.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "282 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nthe choice of })residents, if the Senate were to vote\\nseparately. At this point the fears of Gouverneur\\nMorris, that an election by Congress would result\\nin boundless intrigue, were revived and in a pow-\\nerful speech he persuaded the convention to return\\nto the device of the electoral college, which might\\nbe made equal in number and similar in composi-\\ntion to the two houses of Congress sitting together.\\nIt need not be required of the electors, after all,\\nthat they should make a loug journey to the seat\\nof the federal government. They might meet in\\ntheir respective states, and vote by ballot for two\\npersons, one bf whom must be an inhabitant of a\\ndifferent state. By this provision it was hoped to\\ndiminish the chances for extreme sectional partial-\\nity. A list of these votes might be sent under\\nseal to the presiding officer of the Senate, to be\\ncounted. Should no candidate turn out to have a\\nmajority of the votes, the Senate might choose a\\npresident from the five highest candidates on the\\nlist. The candidate having the next highest num-\\nber of votes might be declared vice-president, and\\npreserve the visible continuity of the government\\nin case of the death of the president during his\\nterm of office. By these changes the method of\\nelecting the president, as finally decided ujDon, was\\nnearly completed. But Mason, Randolph, Gerry,\\nKing, and Wilson were not satisfied with the pro-\\nvision that the Senate might choose the president\\nin case of a failure of choice on the part of the\\nelectoral college they preferred to give this power\\nto the House of Representatives. It was thought\\nthat the Senate would be likely to prove an aristo-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0308.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 283\\ncratic body, somewhat removed from the people in\\nits sympathies, and there was a dread of intrust-\\ning to it too many important functions. Mason\\nthought that the sway of an aristocracy would be\\nworse than an absolute monarchy and if the Sen-\\nate might every now and then elect the president,\\nthere would be a risk that the dignity of his office\\nmight degenerate, until he should become a mere\\ncreature of the Senate. On the other hand, the\\nsmall states, in order to have an equal voice with\\nthe large ones, in such an emergency as the failure\\nof choice by the electoral college, wished to keep\\nthe eventual choice in the hands of the Senate.\\nAmong the delegates from the small states, only\\nLangdon and Dickinson at first supported the\\nchange, and only New Hampshire voted for it. At\\nlength Sherman proposed a compromise, which was\\ncarried. It was agreed that the eventual choice\\nshould be given to the House of Representatives,\\nand not to the Senate, but that in exercising this\\nfunction the vote in the House 6f Representatives\\nshould be taken by states. Thus the humours of\\nthe delegates from the small states, and of those\\nwho dreaded the accumulation of powers into the\\nhands of an oligarchy, were alike gratified. This\\narrangement was finally adopted by the votes of\\nten states against Delaware.\\nBut in spite of all the minute and anxious care\\nthat was taken in guarding this point, the contin-\\ngency of an election being thus thrown into the\\nhands of the national legislature was not regarded\\nas likely often to occur. In point of fact, it has\\nhitherto happened only twice in the century, in the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0309.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "284 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nelections of 1800 and of 1824. It was recognized\\nthat the work would ordinarily be done through\\nthe machinery of the electoral college, and that\\nthus the fear of intrigue between the president and\\nCongTCSs, as it had originally been felt by the con-\\nvention, might be set aside. To make assurance\\ndoubly sure, it was provided that no person shall\\nbe appointed an elector who is a member of the\\nlegislature of the United States, or who holds any\\noffice of profit or trust under the United States.\\nIt then appeared that the arguments which had\\nbeen alleged against the eligibility of the president\\nfor a second term had lost their force and he was\\naccordingly made reeligible, while his term of ser-\\nvice was reduced from seven years to four.\\nThe scheme had thus arrived substantially at its\\npresent shape, except that the counting of the\\nelectoral vote still remained in the hands of the\\nSenate. On the 6th of September this provision\\nwas altered, and it was decided that the president\\nof the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate\\nHow to count House of Representatives, open\\nthe votes. j^]j ^]jg certificates, and the votes shall\\nthen be counted. The object of this provision\\nwas to take the office of counting away from the\\nSenate alone, and give it to Congress as a whole\\nand while doing so, to guard against the failure of\\nan election throuo-h the disaijreement of the two\\nhouses. The method of counting was not pre-\\nscribed, for it was thought that it might safely be\\nleft to joint rules established by the two houses of\\nCongress themselves, after analogies supplied by\\nthe experience of the several state legislatures.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0310.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 285\\nThe case of double returns, sent in by rival gov-\\nernments in tlie same state, was not contemplated\\nby the convention and thus the door was left open\\nfor a danger considerably greater than many of\\nthose over which the delegates were agitated. It\\nmay safely be said, however, that not even the\\nwildest license of interpretation can find any sup-\\nport for the ridiculous doctrine suggested by some\\npersons blinded by political passion in 1877, that\\nthe business of counting the votes and deciding\\nupon the validity of returns belongs to the pi-esi-\\ndent of the Senate. No such idea was for a mo-\\nment entertained by the convention. Any such\\nidea is completely negatived by their action of the\\n6th of September. The express purpose of the\\nfinal arrangement made on that day was to admit\\nthe House of Representatives to active participation\\nin the office of determining who should have been\\nelected president. It was expressly declared that\\nthis work was too important to be left to the Sen-\\nate alone. What, then, would the convention have\\nsaid to the preposterous notion that this work\\nmight safely be left to the presiding officer of the\\nSenate The convention were keenly alive to any\\nimaginable grant of authority that might enable\\nthe Senate to grow into an oligarchy. What would\\nthey have said to the proposal to create a monocrat\\nad hoc, an official permanently endowed by virtue\\nof his office with the function of king-maker\\nIn this connection it is worth our while to ob-\\nserve that in no respect has the actual working of\\nthe Constitution departed so far from the inten-\\ntions of its framers as in the case of their provi-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0311.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "286 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nsions concerning the executive. Against a host of\\npossible dangers they guarded most elab-\\ntion foresaw oratelv, tut the dangers and inconven-\\nimaginary dan- i i i\\ngers, but not icuccs agaiust whicu wc havc actually\\nthe real ones.\\nhad to contend they did not loresee.\\nIt will be observed that Wilson s proposal for a di-\\nrect election of the president by the people found\\nlittle favour in the convention. The schemes that\\nwere seriously considered oscillated back and forth\\nbetween an election by the national legislature and\\nan election by a special college of electors. The\\nelectors might be chosen by a popular vote, or by\\nthe state legislatures, or in any such wise as each\\nstate might see fit to determine for itself. In\\nj)oint of fact, electors were chosen by the legisla-\\nture in New Jersey till 1816 in Connecticut till\\n1820 in New York, Delaware, and Vermont, and\\nwith one exception in Georgia, till 1824 in South\\nCarolina till 1868. Massachusetts adopted vari-\\nous plans, and did not finally settle down to an\\nelection by the people until 1828. Now there\\nwere several reasons why the Federal Convention\\nwas afraid to trust the choice of the president di-\\nrectly to the people. One was that very old objec-\\ntion, the fear of the machinations of demagogues,\\nsince people were supposed to be so easily fooled.\\nAs already observed, the democratic sentiment in\\nthe convention was such as we should now call\\nweak. Another reason shows vividly how wide the\\nworld seemed in those days of slow coaches and\\nmail-bags carried on horseback. It was feared\\nthat people would not have sufficient data where-\\nwith to judge of the merits of public men in states", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0312.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 287\\nremote from their own. The electors, as eminent\\nmen exceptionally well informed, and screened\\nfrom the sophisms of demagogues, might hold little\\nconventions and select the best possible candidates,\\nusing in every case their own unfettered judgment.\\nIn this connection the words of Hamilton are\\nworth quoting. In the sixty-eighth number of the\\nFederalist he says The mode of appointment\\nof the chief magistrate of the United States is al-\\nmost the only part of the system which has escaped\\nwithout severe censure, or which has received the\\nslightest mark of approbation from its opponents.\\nThe most plausible of these who has appeared in\\nprint has even deigned to admit that the election\\nof the president is well guarded. It was de-\\nsirable that the sense of the people should operate\\nin the choice of the person to whom so important\\na trust was to be confided. It was equally\\ndesirable that the immediate election should be\\nmade by men capable of analyzing the qualities\\nadapted to the station, and acting under circum-\\nstances favourable to deliberation and to a judi-\\ncious combination of all the reasons and induce-\\nments that were proper to govern their choice. A\\nsmall number of persons, selected by their fellow-\\ncitizens from the general mass, will be most likely\\nto possess the information and discernment requi-\\nsite to so complicated an investigation. It\\nwas also peculiarly desirable to afford as little op-\\nportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This\\nevil was not least to be dreaded in the election of\\na magistrate who was to have so important an\\nagency in the administration of the government.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0313.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "288 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nSuch was the theory as set forth by a thinker\\nendowed with rare ability to follow out in imagina-\\ntion the results of any course of political action.\\nIt is needless to say that the actual working of the\\nscheme has been very different from what was ex=\\npected. In our very first great struggle of parties,\\nActual work- 1800, tlic clectors divided upon party\\neifctora r t\u00c2\u00ae the compli-\\nscheme. catcd investigation for which they were\\nsupposed to be chosen. Quite naturally, for the\\nwork of electing a candidate presupposes a state of\\nmind very different from that of serene delibera-\\ntion. In 1800 the electors acted simply as autom-\\nata recording the victory of their party, and so it\\nhas been ever since. In our own time presidents\\nand vice-presidents are nominated, not without\\nelaborate intrigue, by special conventions quite\\nunknown to the Constitution the people cast their\\nvotes for the two or three pairs of candidates thus\\npresented, and the electoral college simply registers\\nthe results. The system is thus fully exposed to\\nall the dangers which our forefathers dreaded from\\nthe frequent election of a chief magistrate by the\\npeople. Owing to the great good-sense and good-\\nnature of the American people, the system does\\nnot work so badly as might be expected. It has,\\nindeed, worked immeasurably better than any one\\nwould have ventured to predict. It is nevertheless\\nopen to grave objections. It compels a change\\nof administration at stated astronomical periods,\\nwhether any change of policy is called for or not;\\nit stirs up the whole country every fourth year with\\na furious excitement that is often largely factitious;", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0314.jp2"}, "315": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 289\\nand twice within the century, in 1801 and again in\\n1877, it has brought us to the verge of the most\\nfoolish and hopeless species of civil war, in view\\nof that thoroughly monarchical kind of accident, a\\ndisputed succession.^\\nThe most curious and instructive point concern-\\ning the peculiar executive devised for the United\\nStates by the Federal Convention is the fact that\\nthe delegates jDroceeded upon a thoroughly false\\ntheory of what they were doing. As already ob-\\nserved, in this part of its discussions the convention\\nhad not the clearly outlined chart of local interests\\nto steer by. It indulged in general speculations\\nand looked about for precedents and there was\\none precedent which American statesmen then\\nalways had before their eyes, whether they were\\ndistinctly aware of it or not. In creating an exec-\\nutive department, the members of the convention\\nwere really trying to copy the only constitution of\\nwhich they had any direct experience, xhe convent-\\nand which most of them agreed in think- supposed itself\\nto be copying\\nmg the most efficient workino- constitu- froni the Brit-\\nish Constitu-\\ntion in existence, as indeed it was.\\nThey were trying to copy the British Constitution,\\nmodifying it to suit their republican ideas: but\\ncuriously enough, what tliey copied in creating the\\noffice of president was not the real English exec-\\nutive or prime minister, but the fictitious English\\nexecutive, the sovereign. And this was associated\\nSince this was written, this last and most serious danger\\nwould seem to have been removed by the acts of 1886 and 1887\\nregulating the presidential succession and the counting of elec\\ntoral votes.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0315.jp2"}, "316": {"fulltext": "290 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nin their minds with another profound misconcep-\\ntion, which influenced all this part of their work.\\nThey thought that to keep the legislative and exec-\\nutive offices distinct and separate was the very pal-\\nladium of liberty and they all took it for granted,\\nwithout a moment s question, that the British Con-\\nstitution did this thing. England, they thought,\\nis governed by King, Lords, and Commons, and\\nthe supreme power is nicely divided between the\\nthree, so that neither one can get the whole of it,\\nand that is the safeguard of English liberty. So\\nthey arranged President, Senate, and Representa-\\ntives to correspond, and sedulously sought to divide\\nsupreme power between the three, so that they\\nmight operate as checks upon each other. If either\\none should ever succeed in acquiring the whole\\nsovereignty, then they thought there would be an\\nend of American liberty.\\nNow in the earlier part of the work of the Fed-\\neral Convention, in dealing with the legislative\\ndej)artment, the delegates were on firm ground,\\nbecause they were dealing with things of which\\nthey knew something by experience but in all\\nthis careful separation of the executive power from\\nthe legislative they went wide of the mark, because\\nthey were following a theory which did not truly\\ndescribe things as they really existed. And that\\nwas because the English Constitution was, and still\\nis, covered \\\\x^ with a thick husk of legal fictions\\nwhich long ago ceased to have any vitality. Black-\\nstone, the great authority of the eighteenth cen-\\ntury, set forth this theory of the division of power\\nbetween King, Lords, and Commons with clear-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0316.jp2"}, "317": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 291\\nness and force, and nobody then understood Eng-\\nlish history minutely or thoroughly enough to see\\nits fallaciousness. Montesquieu also, the ablest\\nand most elegant political writer of the influence of\\nage, with whose works most of the states- ^d^Biact-^\\nmen in the Federal Convention were\\nfamiliar, gave a similar description of the English\\nConstitution, and generalized from it as the ideal\\nconstitution for a free people. But Montesquieu\\nand Blackstoue, in their treatment of this point,\\nhad their eyes upon the legal fictions, and were\\nblind to the real machinery which was working\\nunder them. They gave elegant expression to what\\nthe late Mr. Bagehot called the literary theory\\nof the Euglisli Constitution. But the real thing\\ndiffered essentially from the literary theory\\neven in their day. In our own time the divergence\\nhas become so conspicuous that it would not now\\nbe possible for well-informed writers to make the\\nmistake of Montesquieu and Blackstone. In our\\ntime it has come to be perfectly obvious that so\\nfar from the English Constitution separating the\\nexecutive power from the legislative, this is pre-\\ncisely what it does not do. In Great Britain the\\nsupreme power is all lodged in a single body, the\\nHouse of Commons. The sovereign has come to\\nbe purely a legal fiction, and the House of Lords\\nmaintains itself only by submitting to the Com-\\nmons. The House of Commons is absolutely\\nsupreme, and, as we shall presently see, it really\\nboth appoints and dismisses the executive. The\\nEnglish executive, or chief magistrate, is ordinarily\\nthe first lord of the treasury, and is commonly", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0317.jp2"}, "318": {"fulltext": "292 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nstyled the prime minister. He is chairman of the\\nmost important committee of the House of Com-\\nmons, and his cabinet consists of the chairmen of\\nother committees.\\nTo make this perfectly clear, let us see what our\\nmachinery of government would be, if it were\\nreally like the English. The presence or absence\\nof the crowned head makes no essential difference\\nit is only a kind of ornamental cupola. Suppose\\nfor a moment the presidency abolished, or reduced\\nWhat our gov- ^o the political nullity of the crown in\\nbeTfwIre England and postpone for a moment\\nof c reat^Brit-* the Consideration of the Senate. Sup-\\npose that in our House of Representa-\\ntives the committee of ways and means had two\\nchairmen, an upper chairman who looks after\\nall sorts of business, and a lower chairman who at-\\ntends especially to the finances. This upjier chair-\\nman, we will say, corresponds to the first lord of\\nthe treasury, while the lower one corresponds to\\nthe chancellor of the exchequer. Sometimes, when\\nthe upper chairman is a great financier, and capa-\\nble of enormous labour, he will fill both places at\\nonce, as Mr. Gladstone was lately first lord of the\\ntreasury and chancellor of the exchequer. The\\nchairmen of the other committees on foreign, mili-\\ntary, and naval affairs will answer to the English\\nsecretaries of state for foreign affairs and for war,\\nthe first lord of the admiralty, and so on. This\\ngroup of chairmen, headed by the upper chairman\\nof the ways and means, will then answer to the\\nEnglish cabinet, with its prime minister. To\\ncomplete the parallel, let us suppose that, after", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0318.jp2"}, "319": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 293\\na new House of Representatives is elected, it\\nchooses this prime minister, and he appoints the\\nother chairmen who are to make up his cabinet.\\nSuppose, too, that he initiates all legislation, and\\nexecutes all laws, and stays in office three weeks\\nor thirty years, or as long as he can get a major-\\nity of the house to vote for his measures. If he\\nloses his majority, he can either resign or dis-\\nsolve the house, and order a new election, thus\\nappealing directly to the people. If the new\\nhouse gives him a majority, he stays in office if\\nit shows a majority against him, he steps down\\ninto the house, and becomes, perhaps, the leader\\nof the opposition.\\nNow if this were the form of our government, it\\nwould correspond in all essential features to that\\nof England. The likeness is liable to be obscured\\nby the fact that in England it is the queen who is\\nsujjposed to appoint the prime minister but that\\nis simply a part of the antiquated literary the-\\nory of the English Constitution. In reality the\\nqueen only acts as mistress of the ceremonies.\\nWhatever she may wish, the prime minister must\\nbe the man who can command the best working\\nmajority in the house. This is not only tested by\\nthe first vote that is taken, but it is almost invari-\\nably known beforehand so well that if the queen\\nofPers the place to the wrong man he refuses to\\ntake it. Should he be so foolish as to take it, he\\nis sure to be overthrown at the first test vote, and\\nthen the right man comes in. Thus in 1880 the\\nqueen s manifest preference for Lord Granville or\\nLord Hartington made no sort of difference. Mr.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0319.jp2"}, "320": {"fulltext": "294 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nGladstone was as much chosen by the House of\\nCommons as if the members had sat in their seats\\nand balloted for him. If the crown were to be\\nabolished to-morrow, and the house were hence-\\nforth, on the resignation of a prime minister, to\\nelect a new one to serve as long as he could com-\\nmand a majority, it would not be doing essentially\\notherwise than it does now. The house then dis-\\nmisses its minister when it rejects one of his im-\\nportant measures. But while thus appointed and\\ndismissed by the house, he is in no wise its slave\\nfor by the power of dissolution he has the right to\\nappeal to the country, and let the general election\\ndecide the issue. The obvious advantages of this\\nsystem are that it makes anything like a deadlock\\nbetween the legislature and the executive impossi-\\nble and it insures a concentration of responsibil-\\nity. The prime minister s bills cannot be disre-\\ngarded, like the president s messages and thus,\\ntoo, the house is kept in hand, and cannot degen-\\nerate into a debating club.^\\nA system so delicate and subtle, yet so strong\\nand efficient, as this could no more have been in-\\nvented by the wisest of statesmen than a chemist\\ncould make albumen by taking its elements and\\nmixing them together. In its practical working it\\nis a much simpler system than ours, and still its\\nprincipal features are not such as would be likely\\nto occur to men who had not had some actual ex-\\nThe history of President Cleveland s tarifE message of 1887,\\nhowever, shows that, where a wise and courageous president calls\\nattention to a living issue, his party, alike in Congress and in the\\ncountry, is in a measure compelled to follow his lead.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0320.jp2"}, "321": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 295\\nperience of them. It is the peculiar outgrowth of\\nEnglish history. As we can now see, its\\n1 1 In the British\\nchiei characteristic is its not separating government,\\np l^ 1 the executive\\nthe executive powerirom the legislative, department is\\nA, T-\u00c2\u00bb T J 1 ii t separated\\ns a mem ber oi r arliament, the prime from the legis.\\nminister introduces the legislation which\\nhe is himself expected to carry into effect. Nor\\ndoes the English system even keep the judiciary\\nentirely separate, for the lord chancellor not only\\npresides over the House of Lords, but sits in the\\ncabinet as the prime minister s legal adviser. It\\nis somewhat as if the chief justice of the United\\nStates were ex officio president of the Senate and\\nattorney-general though here the resemblance is\\nsomewhat superficial. Our Senate, although it\\ndoes not represent landed aristocracy or the church,\\nbut the federal character of our government, has\\nstill a superficial resemblance to the House of\\nLords. It passes on all bills that come up from\\nthe lower house, and can originate bills on most\\nmatters, but not for raising revenue. Its func-\\ntion as a high court of impeachment, with the chief\\njustice for its presiding officer, was directly copied\\nfrom the House of Lords. But here the resem-\\nblance ends. The House of Lords has no such\\nveto upon the House of Commons as our Senate\\nhas upon the House of Representatives. Between\\nour upper and lower houses a serious deadlock is\\npossible but the House of Lords can only reject\\na bill until it sees that the House of Commons is\\ndetermined to have it carried. It can only enter\\na protest. If it is obstinate and tries to do more,\\nthe House of Commons, through its prime minis-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0321.jp2"}, "322": {"fulltext": "296 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nter, can create enough new peers to change the\\nvote, a power so formidable in its effects upon\\nthe social position of the peerage that it does not\\nneed to be used. The knowledge that it exists is\\nenough to bring the House of Lords to terms.\\nThese features of the English Constitution are\\nso prominent since the reform of Parliament in\\n1832 as to be generally recognized. They have\\nbeen gradually becoming its essential features ever\\nCircumstances siuCC tllC Rcvolutiou of 1688. BcforG\\nscure^ the true that time the crown had really been the\\ncasracentMy cxecutivc, and there had really been a\\nseparation between the executive and\\nlegislative branches of the government, which on\\nseveral occasions, and notably in the middle of the\\nseventeenth century, had led to armed strife.\\nWhat the Revolution of 1688 really decided was\\nthat henceforth in England the executive was to be\\nthe mighty arm of the legislature, and not a sepa-\\nrate and rival power. It ended whatever of real-\\nity there was in the old system of King, Lords,\\nand Commons, and by the time of Sir Robert Wal-\\npole the system of cabinet government had become\\nfairly established but men still continued to use\\nthe phrases and formulas bequeathed from former\\nages, so that the meaning of the changes going on\\nunder their very eyes was obscured. There was\\nalso a great historical incident, after Walpole s\\ntime, which served further to obscure the meaning\\nof these changes, especially to Americans. From\\n1760 to 1784, by means of the rotten borough sys-\\ntem of elections and the peculiar attitude of politi-\\ncal parties, the king contrived to make his will felt", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0322.jp2"}, "323": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 297\\nin the House of Commons to such an extent that\\nit became possible to speak of tbe personal govern-\\nment of George III. The work of the Revolution\\nof 1688 was not really completed till the election\\nof 1784 which made Pitt the ruler of England, and\\nits fruits cannot be said to have been fully secured\\ntill 1832. Now as our Revolutionary War was\\nbrought on by the attempts of George III. to es-\\ntablish his personal government, and as it was ac-\\ntually he rather than Lord North who ruled Eng-\\nland during that war, it was not strange that\\nAmericans, even of the highest education, should\\nhave failed to discover the transformation which\\nthe past century had wrought in the framework of\\nthe English government. Nay, more, during this\\ncentury the king had seemed even more of a real\\ninstitution to the Americans than to the Brit-\\nish. He had seemed to them the only link which\\nbound the different parts of the empire together.\\nThroughout the struggles which culminated in the\\nWar of Independence, it had been the favourite\\nAmerican theory that while the colonial assemblies\\nand the British Parliament were sovereign each in\\nits own sphere, all alike owed allegiance to the\\nking as visible head of the empire. To people who\\nhad been in the habit of setting forth and defend-\\ning such a theory, it was impossible that the crown\\nshould seem so much a legal fiction as it had really\\ncome to be in England. It is very instructive to\\nnote that while the members of the Federal Conven-\\ntion thoroughly understood the antiquated theory\\nof the English Constitution as set forth by Black-\\nstone, they drew very few illustrations from the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0323.jp2"}, "324": {"fulltext": "298 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nmodern working of Parliament, with which they\\nhad not had sufficient opportunities of becoming\\nfamiliar. In particular they seemed quite uncon-\\nscious of the vast significance of a dissolution of\\nParliament, although a dissolution had occurred\\nonly three years before under such circumstances\\nas to work a revolution in British politics without\\na breath of disturbance. The only sort of dissolu-\\ntion with which they were familiar was that in\\nwhich Dun more or Bernard used to send the colo-\\nnial assemblies home about their business when-\\never they grew too refractory. Had the signifi-\\ncance of a dissolution, in the British sense, been\\nunderstood by the convention, the pregnant sug-\\ngestion of Roger Sherman, above mentioned, could\\nnot have failed to give a different turn to the whole\\nseries of debates on the executive branch of the\\ngovernment. Had our Constitution been framed a\\nfew years later, this point would have had a better\\nchance of being understood. As it was, in trying\\nto modify the English system so as to adapt it to\\nour own uses, it was the archaic monarchical fea-\\nture, and not the modern ministerial feature, upon\\nwhich we seized. The president, in our system,\\nirremovable by the national legislature, does not\\nanswer to the modern prime minister, but to the\\nold-fashioned king, with powers for mischief cur-\\ntailed by election for short terms.\\nThe close parallelism between the office of presi-\\ndent and that of king in the minds of the framers\\nof the Constitution was instructively shown in the\\ndebates on the advisableness of restraining the\\npresident s action by a privy council. Gerry and", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0324.jp2"}, "325": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 299\\nSherman urged that there was need of such a coun-\\ncil, in order to keep watch over the presi-\\nThe American\\ndent. It was sug-o-ested that the privy cabinet is auai-\\nogous not to\\ncouncil should consist of the president tiie British\\ncabinet, but to\\nof the Senate, the speaker of the House p^i /y\\ncouncil.\\nof Representatives, the chief justice of\\nthe supreme court, and the principal officer in each\\nof five departments as they shall from time to time\\nbe established their duty shall be to advise hira in\\nmatters which he shall lay before them, but their\\nadvice shall not conclude him, or affect his respon-\\nsibility. The plan for such a council found favour\\nwith Franklin, Madison, Wilson, Dickinson, and\\nMason, but did not satisfy the convention. When\\nit was voted down Mason used strong language.\\nIn rejecting a council to the president, said he,\\nwe are about to try an experiment on which the\\nmost despotic government has never ventured the\\nGrand Seignior himself has his Divan. It was\\nthis failure to provide a council which led the con-\\nvention to give to the Senate a share in some of the\\nexecutive functions of the president, such as the\\nmaking of treaties, the appointment of ambassa-\\ndors, consuls, judges of the supreme court, and other\\nofficers of the United States whose ajDpointment\\nwas not otherwise provided for. As it was objected\\nto the office of vice-president that he seemed to have\\nnothing provided for him to do, he was disposed of\\nby making him president of the Senate. No cabi-\\nnet was created by the Constitution, but since then\\nthe heads of various executive departments, ap-\\npointed by the president, have come to constitute\\nwhat is called his cabinet. Since, however, the", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0325.jp2"}, "326": {"fulltext": "300 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nmembers of it do not belong to Congress, and can\\nneither initiate nor guide legislation, they really\\nconstitute a privy council rather than a cabinet in\\nthe modern sense, thus furnishing another illustra-\\ntion of the analogy between the president and the\\narchaic sovereign.\\nConcerning the structure of the federal judiciary\\nlittle need be said here. It was framed with very\\nThe federal little disagreement among the delegates,\\nju ciary. rpj^^ work was cliicfly done in committee\\nby Ellsworth, Wilson, Randolph, and Rutledge,\\nand the result did not differ essentially from the\\nscheme laid down in the Virginia plan. It was\\nindeed the indispensable completion of the work\\nwhich was begun by the creation of a national\\nHouse of Representatives. To make a federal\\ngovernment immediately operative upon individual\\ncitizens, it must of course be armed with federal\\ncourts to try and federal officers to execute judg-\\nment in all cases in which individual citizens were\\namenable to the national law. But for this system\\nof United States courts extended throughout the\\nstates and supreme within its own sphere, the fed-\\neral constitution could never have been put into\\npractical working order. In another respect the\\nfederal judiciary was the most remarkable and\\noriginal of all the creations of that wonderful con-\\nvention. It was charged with the duty of inter-\\npreting, in accordance with the general principles\\nof common law, the Federal Constitution itself.\\nThis is the most noble as it is the most distinctive\\nfeature in the government of the United States.\\nIt constitutes a difference between the American", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0326.jp2"}, "327": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 301\\nand British systems more fundamental than the\\nseparation of the executive from the legislative de-\\npartment. In Great Britain the unwritten consti-\\ntution is administered by the omnipotent House of\\nCommons whatever statute is enacted by Parlia-\\nment must stand until some future Parliament may\\nsee fit to repeal it. But an act passed by both\\nhouses of Congress, and signed by the president,\\nmay still be set aside as unconstitutional by the su-\\npreme court of the United States in its judgments\\nupon individual cases brought before it. It was\\nthus that the practical working of our Federal Con-\\nstitution during the first thirty years of the nine-\\nteenth century was swayed to so great an extent\\nby the profound and luminous decisions of Chief\\nJustice Marshall, that he must be assigned a fore-\\nmost place among the founders of our Federal\\nUnion. This intrusting to the judiciary the whole\\ninterpretation of the fundamental instrument of\\ngovernment is the most peculiarly American feature\\nof the work done by the convention, and to the\\nstability of such a federation as ours, covering as\\nit does the greater part of a huge continent, it was\\nabsolutely indispensable.\\nThus, at length, was realized the sublime concep-\\ntion of a nation in which every citizen lives under\\ntwo complete and well-rounded systems of laws,\\nthe state law and the federal law, each with its\\nlegislature, its executive, and its judiciary moving\\none within the other, noiselessly and without fric-\\ntion. It was one of the longest reaches of construc-\\ntive statesmanship ever known in the world. There\\nnever was anything quite like it before, and in Eu-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0327.jp2"}, "328": {"fulltext": "302 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nrope it needs much explanation to-day even for\\neducated statesmen who have never seen its work-\\ninsfs. Yet to Americans it has become so much a\\nmatter of course that they, too, sometimes need to\\nbe told how much it signifies. In 1787 it was the\\nsubstitution of law for violence between states that\\nwere partly sovereign. In some future still grander\\nconvention we trust the same thing will be done\\nbetween states that have been wholly sovereign,\\nwhereby peace may gain and violence be diminished\\nover other lands than this which has set the example.\\nGreat as was the work which the Federal Con-\\nvention had now accomplished, none of the members\\nsupposed it to be complete. After some discussion,\\nit was decided that Congress might at any time, by\\na two thirds vote in both houses, propose amend-\\nments to the constitution, or on the application of\\nthe legislatures of two thirds of the states might\\ncall a convention for proposing amendments and\\nsuch amendments should become part of the consti-\\ntution as soon as ratified by three fourths of the\\nstates, either through their legislatures or through\\nspecial conventions summoned for the purpose.\\nThe design of this elaborate arrangement was to\\nguard against hasty or ill-considered changes in the\\nfundamental instrument of government and its\\neffectiveness has been such that an amendment has\\ncome to be impossible save as the result of intense\\nconviction on the part of a vast majority of the\\nwhole American people.\\nFinally it was decided that the Federal Consti-\\ntution, as now completed, should be presented to\\ntlie Continental Congress, and then referred to", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0328.jp2"}, "329": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 303\\nspecial conventions in all the states for ratification\\nand that when nine states, or two thirds of the\\nwhole number, should have ratified, it should at\\nonce go into operation as between such ratifying\\nstates.\\nWhen the great document was at last drafted\\nby Gouverneur Morris, and was all ready for the\\nsignatures, the aged Franklin produced a paper,\\nwhich was read for him, as his voice was weak.\\nSome parts of this Constitution, he said, signing the\\nhe did not approve, but he was aston- constitution,\\nished to find it so nearly perfect. Whatever opin-\\nion he had of its errors he would sacrifice to the\\npublic good, and he hoped that every member of the\\nconvention who still had objections would on this\\noccasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and\\nfor the sake of unanimity put his name to this in-\\nstrument. Hamilton added his plea. A few mem-\\nbers, he said, by refusing to sign, might do infinite\\nmischief. No man s ideas could be more remote\\nfrom the plan tiian his were known to be but was\\nit possible for a true patriot to deliberate between\\nanarchy and convulsion, on the one side, and the\\nchance of good to be expected from this plan, on\\nthe other? From these appeals, as well as from\\nWashington s solemn warning at the outset, we see\\nhow distinctly it was realized that the country was\\non the verge of civil war. Most of the members\\nfelt so, but to some the new government seemed\\nfar too strong, and there were three who dreaded\\ndespotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Ran-\\ndolph, and Gerry refused to sign, though Randolph\\nsought to qualify his refusal by explaining that he", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0329.jp2"}, "330": {"fulltext": "304 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\ncould not yet make up his mind whether to oppose\\nor defend the Constitution, when it should be laid\\nbefore the people of Virginia. He wished to re-\\nserve to himself full liberty of action in the matter.\\nThat Mason and Gerry, valuable as their services\\nhad been in the making of the Constitution, would\\nnow go home and vigorously oppose it, there was\\nno doubt. Of the delegates who were present on\\nthe last day of the convention, all but these three\\nsigned the Constitution. In the signatures the\\ntwelve states which had taken part in the work\\nwere all represented, Hamilton signing alone for\\nNew York.\\nThus after four months of anxious toil, through\\nthe whole of a scorching Philadelphia summer,\\nafter earnest but sometimes bitter discussion, in\\nwhich more than once the meeting had seemed on\\nthe point of breaking up, a colossal work had at\\nlast been accomplished, the results of which were\\nmost powerfully to affect the whole future career\\nof the human race so long as it shall dwell upon\\nthe earth. In spite of the high-wrought intensity\\nof feeling which had been now and then displayed,\\ngrave decorum had ruled the proceedings and\\nnow, though few were really satisfied, the approach\\nto unanimity was remarkable. When all was over,\\nit is said that many of the members seemed awe\\nstruck. Washino-ton sat with head bowed in sol\\nemn meditation. The scene was ended by a char-\\nacteristic bit of homely pleasantry from Franklin\\nThirty -three years ago, in the days of George II\\nbefore the first mutterings of the Revolution had\\nbeen heard, and when the French dominion in", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0330.jp2"}, "331": {"fulltext": "THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 305\\nAmerica was still untouched, before the banish-\\nment of the Acadians or the rout of Braddock,\\nwhile Washington was still surveying lands in the\\nwilderness, while Madison was playing in the\\nnursery and Hamilton was not yet born, Franklin\\nhad endeavoured to bring together the thirteen\\ncolonies in a federal union. Of the famous Al-\\nbany plan of 1754, the first comj)lete outline of a\\nfederal constitution for America that ever was\\nmade, he was the principal if not the sole author.\\nWhen he signed his name to the Declaration of\\nIndependence in this very room, his years had\\nrounded the full period of threescore and ten.\\nEleven years more had j)assed, and he had been\\nspared to see the noble aim of his life accom-\\nplished. There was still, no doubt, a chance of\\nfailure, but hope now reigned in the old man s\\nbreast. On the back of the president s quaint\\nblack armchair there was emblazoned a haK-sun,\\nbrilliant with its gilded rays. As the meeting\\nwas breaking up and Washington arose, Franklin\\npointed to the chair, and made it the text for\\nprophecy. As I have been sitting here all these\\nweeks, said he, I have often wondered whether\\nyonder sun is rising or setting. But now I know\\nthat it is a rising sun", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0331.jp2"}, "332": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER VII.\\nCROWNING THE WORK.\\nIt was on the 17tli of September, 1787, that the\\nFederal Convention broke up. For most of the\\ndelegates there was a long and tedious journey\\nhome before they could meet their fellow-citizens\\nand explain what had been done at Philadelphia\\nduring this anxious smnmer. Not so, however,\\nwith Benjamin Franklin and the Pennsylvania\\ndelegation. At eleven o clock on the next morn-\\ning, radiant with delight at seeing one of the most\\ncherished purposes of his life so nearly accom-\\nplished, the venerable philosopher, attended by his\\nseven colleagues, presented to the legislature of\\nPennsylvania a copy of the Federal Constitution,\\nand in a brief but pithy speech, characterized by\\nhis usual homely wisdom, begged for it their most\\nfavourable consideration. His words fell upon\\nwilling ears, for nowhere was the disgust at the\\nprevaihng anarchy greater than in Philadelphia.\\nBut still it was not quite in order for the assembly\\nto act upon the matter until word should come\\nfrom the Continental Congress. Since its igno-\\nminious flight to Princeton, four years ago, that\\nmigratory body had not honoured Philadelphia with\\nits presence. It had once flitted as far south as\\nAnnapolis, but at length had chosen for its abiding-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0332.jp2"}, "333": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 307\\nplace the city of New York, where it was now in\\nsession. To Congress the new Constitution must\\nbe submitted before it was in order for the several\\nstates to take action upon it. On the 20th of\\nSeptember the draft of the Constitution\\nThe new Con-\\nwas laid before Congress, accompanied stitutionia\\nm before\\nby a letter from Washington. The congress and\\n_ submitted\\nforces of the opposition were promptly forthwith to\\nJ. i (;j,g several\\nmustered. At their head was Richard ^}^^f? ^.ti-\\nncation.\\nHenry Lee, who eleven years ago had\\nmoved in Congress the Declaration of Indepen-\\ndence. He was ably supported by Nathan Dane\\nof Massachusetts, and the delegation from New\\nYork were unanimous in their determination to\\nobstruct any movement toward a closer union of\\nthe states. Their tactics were vigorous, but the\\nmajority in Congress were against them, especially\\nafter the return of Madison from Philadelphia.\\nMadison, aided by Edward Carrington and young\\nHenry Lee, the famous leader of light horse, suc-\\nceeded in every division in carrying the vote of\\nVirginia in favour of the Constitution and against\\nthe obstructive measures of the elder Lee. The\\nobjection was first raised that the new Constitution\\nwould put an end to the Continental Congress, and\\nthat in recommending it to the states for consid-\\neration Congress would be virtually asking them\\nto terminate its own existence. Was it right or\\nproper for Congress thus to have a hand in signing\\nits own death-warrant? But this flimsy argument\\nwas quickly overturned. Seven months before\\nCongress had recognized the necessity for calling\\nthe convention together whatever need for its", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0333.jp2"}, "334": {"fulltext": "308 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nwork existed then, there was the same need now\\nand by refusing to take due cognizance of it Con-\\ngress would simply stultify itself. The opposition\\nthen tried to clog the measure by proposing amend-\\nments, but they were outgeneralled, and after eight\\ndays discussion it was voted that the new Consti-\\ntution, together with Washington s letter, be\\ntransmitted to the several legislatures, in order to\\nbe submitted to a convention of delegates in each\\nstate by the people thereof, in conformity to the\\nresolves of the convention.\\nThe submission of the Constitution to the people\\nof the states was the signal for the first formation\\nof political parties on a truly national issue. Dur-\\ning the war there had indeed been Whigs and\\nTories, but their strife had not been like the ordi-\\nnary strife of political parties it was actual war-\\nfare. Irredeemably discredited from the outset,\\nthe Tories had been overridden and outlawed from\\none end of the Union to the other. They had\\nnever been able to hold up their heads as a party\\nin opj)osition. Since the close of the war there\\nhad been local parties in the various states, divided\\non issues of hard and soft money, or the impost,\\nor state rights, and these issues had coincided in\\nmany of the states. Dviring the autumn of 1787\\nall these elements were segregated into two great\\npolitical parties, whose character and\\nFirst Amer- m i i i\\nlean parties, vicws are Sufficiently described bv their\\nFederalists\\nand Antifed- namcs. Thosc who Supported the new\\neralists. _\\nConstitution were henceforth known as\\nFederalists those who were opposed to strength-\\nening the bond between the states were called", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0334.jp2"}, "335": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 309\\nAntifederalists. It was fit that their name should\\nhave this merely negative significance, for their\\npolicy at this time was purely a policy of negation\\nand obstruction. Care must be taken not to con-\\nfound them with the Democratic-Republicans, or\\nstrict constrvictionists, who appear in opposition to\\nthe Federalists soon after the adojation of the Con-\\nstitution. The earlier short-lived party furnished\\na great part of its material to the later one, but\\nthe attitude of the strict constructionists under the\\nConstitution was very different from that of the\\nAntifederalists. Madison, the second Republican\\npresident, was now the most energetic of Feder-\\nalists and Jefferson, soon to become the founder\\nof the Democratic-Republican party, wrote from\\nParis, saying, The Constitution is a good canvas,\\non which some strokes only want retouching.\\nHe found the same fault with it that was found\\nby many of the ablest and most patriotic men in\\nthe country, that it failed to include a bill of\\nrights but at the same time he declared that\\nwhile he was not of the party of Federalists, he\\nwas much further from that of the Antifederalists.\\nThe Federal Convention he characterized as an\\nassembly of demi-gods.\\nThe first contest over the new Constitution came\\nin Pennsylvania. The Federalists in that state\\nwere numerous, but their opponents had one point\\nin their favour which they did not fail to make the\\nmost of. The constitution of Pennsylvania was\\npeculiar. Its legislature consisted of Thecontestm\\na single house, and its president was Pennsylvania.\\nchosen by that house. Therefore, said the Anti-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0335.jp2"}, "336": {"fulltext": "310 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nfederalists, if we approve of a federal constitution\\nwhich provides for a legislature of two houses and\\nchooses a president by the device of an electoral\\ncollege, we virtually condemn the state constitution\\nunder which we live. This cry was raised with no\\nlittle effect. But some of the strongest immediate\\ncauses of opposition to the new Constitution were\\nwanting in Pennsylvania. The friends of paper\\nmoney were few there, and the objections to the\\ncontrol of the central government over commerce\\nwere weaker than in many of the other states.\\nThe Antifederalists were strongest in the moun-\\ntain districts west of the Susquehanna, where the\\nsomewhat lawless population looked askance at\\nany plan that savoured of a stronger government\\nand a more regular collection of revenue. In\\nthe eastern counties, and especially in Philadel-\\nphia, the Federalists could count upon a heavy\\nmajority.\\nThe contest began in the legislature on the 28tli\\nof September, the very day on which Congress de-\\ncided to submit the Constitution to the states, and\\nbefore the news of the action had reached Phila-\\ndelphia. The zeal of the Federalists was so in-\\ntense that they could wait no longer, and they\\nhurried the event with a high-handed vigour that\\nwas not altogether seemly. The assembly was on\\nthe eve of breaking up, and a new election was to\\nbe held on the first Tuesday of November. The\\nAntifederalists hoped to make a stirring campaign,\\nand secure such a majority in the new legislature\\nas to prevent the Constitution from being laid be-\\nfore the people. But their game was frustrated", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0336.jp2"}, "337": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 311\\nby George Clymer, who had sat in the Federal\\nConvention, and now most nnexpectedly moved\\nthat a state convention be called to consider the\\nproposed form of government. Great was the\\nwrath of the Antifederalists. Mr. Clymer was\\nquite out of order, they said. Congress had not\\nyet sent them the Constitution and besides, no\\nsuch motion could be made without notice given\\nbeforehand, nor could it be voted on till it had\\npassed three readings. Parliamentary usage was\\ndoubtless on the side of the Antifederalists, but the\\nmajority were clamorous, and overwhelmed them\\nwith cries of Question, question! The question\\nwas then put, and carried by 43 votes against 19,\\nand the house adjourned till four o clock. Before\\ngoing to their dinners the 19 held an indignation\\nmeeting, at which it was decided that they would\\nfoil these outrageous proceedings by staying away.\\nIt took 47 to make a quorum, and without these\\nmalcontents the assembly numbered but 45. When\\nthe house was called to order after dinner, it was\\nfound there were but 45 members present. The\\nsergeant-at-arms was sent to summon the delin-\\nquents, but they defied him, and so it became nec-\\nessary to adjourn till next morning. It was now\\nthe turn of the Federalists to uncork the vials of\\nwrath. The affair was discussed in the\\ntaverns till after midnight, the 19 were quorum.\\nabused without stint, and soon after breakfast,\\nnext morning, two of them were visited by a crowd\\nof men, who broke into their lodgings and dragged\\nthem off to the state house, where they were for-\\ncibly held down in their seats, growling and mut-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0337.jp2"}, "338": {"fulltext": "312 CROWNING THE WORK.\\ntering curses. This made a quorum, and a state\\nconvention was immediately appointed for tlie 20th\\nof November. Before these proceedings were con-\\nchided, an ex25ress-rider brought the news from\\nNew York that Congress had submitted the Con-\\nstitution to the judgment of the states.\\nAnd now there ensued such a war of pamphlets,\\nbroadsides, caricatures, squibs, and stumj)-speeches,\\nas had never yet been seen in America. Cato and\\nAristides, Cincinnatus and Plain Truth, were out\\nin full force. What was the matter with the old\\nconfederation asked the Antif ederalists. Had it\\nnot conducted a glorious and triumphant war?\\nHad it not set us free from the oppression of Eng-\\nland? That there was some trouble now in the\\ncountry could not be denied, but all would be right\\nif people would only curb their extravagance, wear\\nhomespun clothes, and obey the laws. There was\\ngovernment enough in the country already. This\\nPhiladelphia convention ought to be distrusted.\\nSome of its members, such as John Dickinson and\\nRobert Morris, had opposed the Declaration of In-\\ndependence. Pretty men these, to be offering us\\na new government You might be sure there was\\na British cloven foot in it somewhere. Their con-\\nvention had sat four months with closed doors, as\\nif they were afraid to let people know what they\\nwere about. Nobody could tell what secret con-\\nspiracies against American liberty might not have\\nbeen hatched in all that time. One thing was\\nsure the convention had squabbled. Some mem-\\nbers had gone home in a huff others had refused\\nto sign a document fraught with untold evils to the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0338.jp2"}, "339": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 313\\ncountry. And now came James Wilson, making\\nspeeches in behalf of this precious Constitution,\\nand trying to pull the wool over people s eyes and\\npersuade them to adopt it. Who was James Wil-\\nson, any way? A Scotchman, a countryman of\\nLord Bute, a born aristocrat, a snob, a patrician,\\nJimmy, James de Caledonia. Beware of any form\\nof government defended by such a man. And as\\nto the other members of the convention, there was\\nRoger Sherman, who had signed the articles of\\nconfederation, and was now trying to undo his\\nown work. What confidence could be placed in a\\nman who did not know his own mind any better\\nthan that Then there were Hamilton and Madi-\\nson, mere boys and Franklin, an old dotard, a\\nman in his second childhood. And as to Washing-\\nton, he was doubtless a good soldier, but what did\\nhe know about politics So said the more mod-\\nerate of the malcontents, hesitating for the moment\\nto speak disrespectfully of such a man but pres-\\nently their zeal got the better of them, and in a\\npaper signed Centinel it was boldly declared\\nthat Washington was a born fool\\nFrom the style and temper of these arguments\\none clearly sees that the Antifederalists in Pennsyl-\\nvania felt from the beginning that the day was\\ngoing against them. Sixteen of the men who had\\nseceded from the assembly, headed by Robert\\n.Whitehill of Carlisle, issued a manifesto setting\\nforth the ill-treatment they had received, and sound-\\ning an alarm against the dangers of tyranny to which\\nthe new Constitution was already exposing them.\\nThey were assisted by Richard Henry Lee, who", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0339.jp2"}, "340": {"fulltext": "314 CROWNING THE WORK.\\npublished a series of papers entitled Letters from\\nthe Federal Farmer, and scattered thousands of\\ncopies through the state of Pennsylvania. He did\\nnot deny that the government needed reforming,\\nbut in the proposed plan he saw the seeds of aris-\\ntocracy and of centralization. The chief objections\\nto the Constitution were that it created a national\\nlegislature in which the vote was to be by individ-\\nuals, and not by states that it granted to this\\nbody an unlimited power of taxation that it gave\\ntoo much power to the federal judiciary that it\\nprovided for paying the salaries of members of\\nCongress out of the federal treasury, and would\\nthus make them independent of their own states\\nthat it required an oath of allegiance to the federal\\ngovernment and finally, that it did not include a\\nbill of rights. These objections were very elabo-\\nrately set forth by the leading Antifederalists in\\nthe state convention but the logic and eloquence\\nof James Wilson bore down all opposition. The\\nAntifederalists resorted to filibustering. Five days,\\nit is said, were used up in settling the meanings of\\nthe two words annihilation and consolidation.\\nIn this way the convention was kept sitting for\\nnearly three weeks, when news came from the\\nDelaware state, as it used then to be called in\\nPennsylvania. The concession of an equal repre-\\nT, sentation in the federal Senate had re-\\nDelaware rati-\\nstltutioif Dec ii^ovsd the only ground of opposition\\nPenMyivania Dclawarc, and the Federalists had\\njeTsey^b^c! everything their own way there. In a\\nconvention assembled at Dover, on the\\n6th of December, the Constitution was ratified with-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0340.jp2"}, "341": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 315\\nout a single dissenting voice. Thus did this little\\nstate lead the way in the good work. The news\\nwas received with exultation by the Fedei alists at\\nPhiladelphia, and on the 12th Pennsylvania rati-\\nfied the Constitution by a two thirds vote of 46 to\\n23. The next day all business was quite at a\\nstandstill, while the tovni gave itself up to proces-\\nsions and merry-making. The convention of New\\nJersey had assembled at Trenton on the 11th, and\\none week later, on the 18th, it ratified the Consti-\\ntution unanimously.\\nA most auspicious beginning had thus been\\nmade. Three states, one third of the whole number\\nrequired, had ratified almost at the same moment.\\nTwo of these, moreover, were small states, which\\nat the beginning of the Federal Convention had\\nbeen obstinately opposed to any fundamental change\\nin the government. It was just here that the Fed-\\neralists were now strongest. The Connecticut com-\\npromise had wrought with telling effect, not only\\nin the convention, but upon the people of the states.\\nWhen the news from Trenton was received in\\nPennsylvania, there was great rejoicing in the east-\\nern counties, while beyond the Susquehanna there\\nwere threats of armed rebellion. On the day after\\nChristmas, as the Federalists of Carlisle were about\\nto light a bonfire on the common and fire a salute,\\nthey were driven off the field by a mob armed with\\nbludgeons, their rickety old cannon was spiked,\\nand an almanac for the new year, containing a\\ncopy of the Constitution, was duly cursed, and then\\nburned. Next day the Federalists, armed with\\nmuskets, came back, and went through their cere-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0341.jp2"}, "342": {"fulltext": "316 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nmonies. Their opponents did not venture to molest\\nthem but after they had dispersed, an Antifed-\\neralist demonstration was made, and effigies of\\nJames Wilson and Thomas McKean, another prom-\\ninent Federalist, were dragged to the common,\\nand there burned at the stake.\\nThe action of Delaware and New Jersey had\\nshown that the Antifederalists could not build any\\nhopes upon the antagonism between large and small\\nstates. It was thought, however, that the southern\\nstates would unite in opposing the Constitution\\nfrom their dread of becoming commercially sub-\\njected to New England. But the compromise on\\nthe slave-trade had broken through this opposition.\\nOn the 2d of January, 1788, the Constitution was\\nratified in Georgia without a word of dissent. One\\nweek later Connecticut ratified by a vote of 128 to\\n40, after a session of only five days.\\nGeorgia rati- c i a c i t\\nlies, Jan. 2, The hoDCS of the Antiiederalists now\\n1788; Con- i ht i i\\nnecticut, Jan. rcstcd uDOU Massachusctts, wlicrc the\\n9. The out-\\nlook in Massa- state convcutiou asscmblcd on the 9th\\nchusetts. I ll\\nof January, the same day on which that\\nof Connecticut broke up. Should Massachusetts\\nrefuse to ratify, there would be no hope for the\\nConstitution. Even should nine states adopt it\\nwithout her, no one supposed a Federal Union\\nfeasible from which so great a state should be\\nexcluded. Her action, too, would have a marked\\neffect upon other states. It could not be denied\\nthat the outlook in Massachusetts was far from\\nencouraging. The embers of the Shays rebellion\\nstill smouldered there, and in the mountain coun-\\nties of Worcester and Berkshire were heard loud", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0342.jp2"}, "343": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 317\\nmurmurs of discontent. Laws impairing tlie ob-\\nligation of contracts were just what these hard-\\npressed farmers desired, and by the proposed Con-\\nstitution all such laws were forever prohibited.\\nThe people of the district of Maine, which had\\nformed part of Massachusetts for nearly a century,\\nwere anxious to set up an independent government\\nfor themselves and they feared that if they were\\nto enter into the new and closer Federal Union\\nas part of that state, they might hereafter find it\\nimpossible to detach themselves. For this reason\\nhalf of the Maine delegates were opposed to the\\nConstitution. In none of the thirteen states, more-\\nover, was there a more intense devotion to state\\nrights than in Massachusetts. Nowhere had local\\nself-government reached a higher degree of effi-\\nciency nowhere had the town meeting flourished\\nwith such vigour. It was especially characteristic\\nof men trained in the town meeting to look with\\nsuspicion upon all delegated power, upon all author-\\nity that was to be exercised from a distance. They\\nbelieved it to be all important that people should\\nmanage their own affairs, instead of having them\\nmanaged by other people and so far had this\\nprinciple been carried that the towns of Massachu-\\nsetts were like little semi-independent republics,\\nand the state was like a league of such republics,\\nwhose representatives, sitting in the state legisla-\\nture, were like delegates strictly bound by instruc-\\ntions rather than untrammelled members of a delib-\\nerative body. To men trained in such a school, it\\nwould naturally seem that the new Constitution\\ndelegated altogether too much power to a govern-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0343.jp2"}, "344": {"fulltext": "318 CROWNING THE WORK.\\ning body which must necessarily be remote from\\nmost of its constituents. It was feared that some\\nsort of tyranny might grow out of this, and such\\nfears were entertained by men who were not in the\\nslightest degree infected with Shaysism, as the polit-\\nical disease of the inland counties was then called.\\nSuch fears were entertained by one of the greatest\\ncitizens that Massachusetts has ever produced, the\\nman who has been well described as preeminently\\nthe man of the town meeting, Samuel Adams.\\nThe limitations of this great man, as well as his\\npowers, were those which belonged to him as chief\\namong the men of English race who have swayed\\nsociety through the medium of the ancient folk\\nmote. At this time he was believed by many to be\\nhostile to the new Constitution, and his influence in\\nMassachusetts was still greater than that of any\\nother man. Besides this, it was thought that the\\ngovernor, John Hancock, was half-hearted in his\\nsupport of the Constitution, and it was in every-\\nbody s mouth that Elbridge Gerry had refused to\\nset his name to that document because he felt sure\\nit would create a tyranny.\\nSuch symptoms encouraged the Antifederalists\\nin the hope that Massachusetts would reject the\\nConstitution and ruin the plans of the visionary\\nyoung men as Richard Henry Lee called them\\nwho had swayed the Federal Convention. But\\nthere were strong forces at work in the opposite\\ndirection. In Boston and all the large coast towns,\\neven those of the Maine district, the dominant feel-\\ning was Federalist. All well-to-do people had been\\nalarmed by the Shays insurrection, and merchants,", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0344.jp2"}, "345": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 319\\nshipwrights, and artisans of every sort were con-\\nvinced that there was no prosperity in store for\\nthem until the federal government should have\\ncontrol over commerce, and be enabled to make its\\nstrength felt on the seas and in Europe. In these\\nviews Samuel Adams shared so thoroughly that his\\nattitude toward the Constitution at this moment\\nwas really that of a waverer rather than an oppo-\\nnent. Amid balancing considerations he found it\\nfor some time hard to make up his mind.\\nIn the convention which met on the 9th of Jan-\\nuary there sat Gorham, Strong, and King, who\\nhad taken part in the Federal Convention. There\\nwere also Samuel Adams and James Bowdoin the\\nrevolutionary generals. Heath and Lincoln and\\nthe rising statesmen, Sedgwick, Parsons, and Fisher\\nAmes, whose eloquence was soon to become so\\nfamous. There were twenty-four clergymen, of\\nvarious denominations, men of sound scholar-\\nship, and several of them eminent for worldly wis-\\ndom and liberality of temper. Governor Hancock\\npresided, gorgeous in crimson velvet and finest\\nlaces, while about the room sat many browned and\\nweatherbeaten fai mers, among whom were at least\\neighteen who hardly a year ago had marched over\\nthe pine-clad mountain ridges of Petersham, under\\nthe banner of the rebel Shays. It was a whole-\\nsome no less than a genei ous policy that let these\\nmen come in and freely speak their minds. The\\nair was thus the sooner cleared of discontent the\\ndisease was thus the more likely to heal itself. In\\nall there were three hundred and fifty-five dele-\\ngates present, a much larger number than took", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0345.jp2"}, "346": {"fulltext": "320 CROWNING THE WORK.\\npart in any of the other state conventions. The\\npeople of all parts of Massachusetts were very\\nthoroughly represented, as befitted the state which\\nwas preeminent in the active political life of its\\ntown meetings, and the work done here was in\\nsome respects decisive in its effect upon the adop-\\ntion of the Constitution.\\nThe convention began by overhauling that docu-\\nment from beginning to end, discussing it clause\\nby clause with somewhat wearisome minuteness.\\nSome of the objections seem odd to us at this time,\\nwith our larger experience. It was sev-\\nDebates in the \u00e2\u0080\u00a2if,\\nMassachusetts era! days beiore the minds oi the coun-\\ntry members could be reconciled to the\\nelection of representatives for so long a period as\\ntwo years. They had not been wont to delegate\\npower to anybody for so long a time, not even to\\ntheir selectmen, whom they had always under their\\neyes. How much more dangerous was it likely to\\nprove if delegated authority were to be exercised\\nfor so long a j^eriod at some distant federal city,\\nsuch as the Constitution contemplated There\\nwas a vague dread that in some indescribable way\\nthe new Congress might contrive to make its sit-\\ntings perpetual, and thus become a tyrannical oli-\\ngarchy, which might tax the people without their\\nconsent. And then as to this federal city, there\\nwere some who did not like the idea. A district\\nten miles square Was not that a great space to\\ngive up to the uncontrolled discretion of the federal\\ngovernment, wherein it could wreak its tyrannical\\nwill without let or hindrance One of the dele-\\ngates thought he could be reconciled to the new", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0346.jp2"}, "347": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 321\\nConstitution i\u00c2\u00a3 this district could only be narrowed\\ndown to one mile square. And then there was the\\npower granted to Congress to maintain a standing\\narmy, of which the president was to be ex officio\\ncommander-in-chief. Did not this open the door\\nfor a Cromwell It was to be a standing army\\nfor at least two years, since this was the shortest\\nperiod between elections. Why, even the British\\nParliament, since 1688, did not keep up a stand-\\ning army for more than one year at a time, but\\nrenewed its existence annually under what was\\ntermed the Mutiny Act. But what need of a\\nstanding army at all? Would it not be sure to\\nprovoke needless disorders? Had they already\\nforgotten the Boston Massacre, in spite of all the\\norations that had been delivered in the Old South\\nMeeting-House A militia, organized under the\\ntown -meeting system, was surely all-sufficient.\\nSuch a militia had won glorious triumphs at Lex-\\nington and Bennington and at King s Mountain,\\nhad not an army of militia surrounded and cap-\\ntured an army of regulars led by one of England s\\nmost skilful officers What more could you ask\\nClearly this plan for a standing army foreboded\\ntyranny. Upon this point Mr. Nason, from the\\nMaine district, had his say, in tones of inimitable\\nbombast. Had I the voice of Jove, said he, I\\nwould proclaim it throughout the world and had\\nI an arm like Jove, I would hurl from the globe\\nthose villains that would dare attempt to establish\\nin our country a standing army\\nNext came the complaint that the Constitution\\ndid not recognize the existence of God, and pro-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0347.jp2"}, "348": {"fulltext": "322 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nvided no religious tests for candidates for federal\\noffices. But, strange to say, this objection did not\\ncome from the clergy. It was urged by some of\\nthe country members, but the ministers in the con-\\nvention were nearly unanimous in opjDos-\\nLiberal atti- _, i i i\\ntudeoftiie ing it. llicrc had been a remarkable\\nchange of sentiment among the clergy\\nof this state, which had begun its existence as a\\ntheocracy, in which none but church members could\\nvote or hold office. The seeds of modern liberal-\\nism had been planted in their minds. When Amos\\nSingletary of Sutton declared it to be scandalous\\nthat a Papist or an infidel should be as eligible to\\noffice as a Christian, a remark which naively as-\\nsumed that Roman Catholics were not Christians,\\nthe Rev. Daniel Shute of Hingham replied\\nthat no conceivable advantage could result from a\\nreligious test. Yes, said the Rev. Philip Payson\\nof Chelsea, human tribunals for the consciences\\nof men are impious encroachments upon the pre-\\nrogatives of God. A religious test, as a qualifica-\\ntion for office, would have been a great blemish.\\nIn reason and in the Holy Scripture, said the\\nRev. Isaac Backus of Middleborough, religion is\\never a matter between God and the individual the\\nimposing of religious tests hath been the greatest\\nengine of tyranny in the world. With this lib-\\neral stand firmly taken by the ministers, the re-\\nligious objection was speedily overruled.\\nThen the clause which allows Congress to regu-\\nlate the times, places, and manner of holding fed-\\neral elections was severely criticised. It was feared\\nthat Congress would take advantage of this pro-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0348.jp2"}, "349": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 323\\nvision to destroy the freedom of elections. It was\\nfurther objected that members of Congress, being\\npaid their salaries from the federal treasury, would\\nbecome too independent of their constituents. Fed-\\neral collectors of revenue, moreover, would not be\\nso likely to act with moderation and justice as col-\\nlectors appointed by the state. Then it was very\\ndoubtful whether the people could support the ex-\\npense of an elaborate federal government. They\\nwere already scarcely able to pay their town, county,\\nand state taxes was it to be supposed they could\\nbear the additional burden with which federal tax-\\nation would load them Then the compromise on\\nthe slave-trade was fiercely attacked. They did\\nnot wish to have a hand in licensing this nefarious\\ntraffic for twenty years. But it was urged, on the\\nother hand, that by prohibiting the foreign slave-\\ntrade after 1808 the Constitution was really deal-\\ning a death-blow to slavery and this opinion pre-\\nvailed.\\nDuring the whole course of the discussion, ob-\\nserved the Rev. Samuel West of New Bedford, it\\nseemed to be taken for granted that the federal\\ngovernment was going to be put into the hands of\\ncrafty knaves. I wish, said he, that the gen-\\ntlemen who have started so many possible objec-\\ntions would try to show us that what they so much\\ndeprecate is jwohahle. Because power may be\\nabused, shall we be reduced to anarchy? What\\nhinders our state legislatures from abusing their\\npowers May we not rationally suppose that\\nthe persons we shall choose to administer the gov-\\nernment will be, in general, good men General", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0349.jp2"}, "350": {"fulltext": "324 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nThompson said lie was surprised to hear such an\\nargument from a clergyman, who was profession-\\nally bound to maintain that all men were totally\\ndejsraved. For his part he believed they were so,\\nand he could prove it from the Old Testament.\\nI would not trust them, echoed Abraham White\\nof Bristol, though every one of them should be a\\nMoses.\\nThe feeling of distrust was strongest among the\\nfarmers from the mountain districts. As Rufus\\nKing said, they objected, not so much to the Con-\\nstitution as to the men who made it and the men\\nwho sang its praises. They hated lawyers, and\\nwere jealous of wealthy merchants. These law-\\nyers, said Amos Singletary, and men of learn-\\ning, and moneyed men that talk so finely and gloss\\nover matters so smoothly, to make us poor illiterate\\npeople swallow the pill, expect to get into Congress\\nthemselves. They mean to be managers of the\\nConstitution. They mean to get all the money\\ninto their hands, and then they, will swallow up us\\nlittle folk, like the great Leviathan, Mr. President\\nyes, just as the whale swallowed up Jonah. Here\\na more liberal-minded farmer, Jonathan Smith of\\nLanesborough, rose to reply with references to the\\nShays rebellion, which presently called forth cries\\nof Order! from some of the members. Samuel\\nAdams said the gentleman was quite in order,\\nlet him go on in his own way. I am a plain\\nman, said Mr. Smith, and am not\\nSpeech of a itix\\nBerkshire uscd to spcak lu public, Dut i am sroins:\\nfarmer.\\nto show the ertects of anarchy, that\\nyou may see why I wish for good government.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0350.jp2"}, "351": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 325\\nLast winter people took up arms, and then, if you\\nwent to speak to them, you had the musket of death\\npresented to your breast. They would rob you of\\nyour property, threaten to burn your houses, oblige\\nyou to be on your guard night and day. Alarms\\nspread from town to town, families were broken\\nup the tender mother would cry, Oh, my son is\\namong them What shall I do for my child\\nSome were taken captive; children taken out of\\ntheir schools and carried away. How dread-\\nful was this Our distress was so great that we\\nshould have been glad to snatch at anything that\\nlooked like a government. Now, Mr. Presi-\\ndent, when I saw this Constitution, I found that it\\nwas a cure for these disorders. I got a copy of it,\\nand read it over and over. I did not go to\\nany lawyer, to ask his opinion we have no lawyer\\nin our town, and we do well enough without. My\\nhonourable old daddy there [pointing to Mr. Single-\\ntaryj won t think that I expect to be a Congress-\\nman, and swallow up the liberties of the people. I\\nnever had any post, nor do I want one. But I\\ndon t think the worse of the Constitution because\\nlawyers, and men of learning, and moneyed men\\nare fond of it. I am not of such a jealous make.\\nThey that are honest men themselves are not apt\\nto suspect other people. Brother farmers, let\\nus suppose a case, now. Suppose you had a farm\\nof 50 acres, and your title was disputed, and there\\nwas a farm of 5,000 acres joined to you that be-\\nlonged to a man of learning, and his title was in-\\nvolved in the same difficulty would you not be\\nglad to have him for your friend, rather than to", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0351.jp2"}, "352": {"fulltext": "326 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nstand alone in the dispute Well, the case is the\\nsame. These lawyers, these moneyed men, these\\nmen of learning, are all embarked in the same\\ncause with us, and we must all sink or swim to-\\ngether. Shall we throw the Constitution over-\\nboard because it does not please us all alike?\\nSuppose two or three of you had been at the pains\\nto break up a piece of rough land and sow it with\\nwheat would you let it lie waste because you\\ncould not agree what sort of a fence to make\\nWould it not be better to put up a fence that did\\nnot please every one s fancy, rather than keep dis-\\nputing about it until the wild beasts came in and\\ndevoured the crop? Some gentlemen say. Don t\\nbe in a hurry take time to consider. I say. There\\nis a time to sow and a time to reap. We sowed our\\nseed when we sent men to the Federal Convention,\\nnow is the time to reap the fruit of our labour\\nand if we do not do it now, I am afraid we shall\\nnever have another opportunity.\\nIt may be doubted whether all the eloquence of\\nFisher Ames could have stated the case more for-\\ncibly than it was put by this plain farmer from the\\nBerkshire hills. Upon Ames, with King, Parsons,\\nBowdoin, and Strong, fell the principal work in\\ndefending the Constitution. For the first two\\nweeks, Samuel Adams scarcely opened\\nAttitude of T 1\\nSamuel his moutli, but listened with anxious care\\nAdams.\\nto everything that was said on either\\nside. The convention was so evenly divided that\\nthere could be no doubt that his single voice would\\ndecide the result. Every one eagerly awaited his\\nopinion. In the debate on the two years term of", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0352.jp2"}, "353": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 327\\nmembers of Congress, he had asked Caleb Strong\\nthe reason why the Federal Convention had decided\\nupon so long a term and when it was explained\\nas a necessary compromise between the views of so\\nmany delegates, he replied, I am satisfied. Will\\nMr. Adams kindly say that again asked one of\\nthe members. I am satisfied, he repeated and\\nnot another word was said on the subject in all\\nthose weeks. So profound was the faith of this\\nintelligent and skeptical and independent people\\nin the sound judgment and unswerving integrity of\\nthe Father of the Revolution As the weeks went\\nby, and the issue seemed still dubious, the work-\\ningmen of Boston, shipwrights and brass-founders\\nand other mechanics, decided to express their opin-\\nion in a way that they knew Samuel Adams would\\nheed. They held a meeting at the Green Dragon\\ntavern, passed resolutions in favour of the Con-\\nstitution, and appointed a committee, with Paul\\nRevere at its head, to make known these resolu-\\ntions to the great popular leader. When Adams\\nhad read the paper, he asked of Paul Revere,\\nHow many mechanics were at the Green Dragon\\nwhen these resolutions passed? More, sir, than\\nthe Green Dragon could hold. And where were\\nthe rest, Mr. Revere In the streets, sir.\\nAnd how many were in the streets More,\\nsir, than there are stars in the sky.\\nBetween Samuel Adams and Thomas Jefferson\\nthere were several points of resemblance, the chief\\nof which was an intense faith in the sound com-\\nmon sense of the mass of the people. This faith\\nwas one of the strongest attributes of both these", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0353.jp2"}, "354": {"fulltext": "328 CROWNING THE WORK.\\ngreat men. It has usually been supposed that it\\nwas this incident of the meeting at the Green\\nDragon that determined Adams s final attitude in\\nthe state convention. Unquestionably, such a dem-\\nonstration must have had great weight with him.\\nBut at the same time the affair was taking such a\\nturn as would have decided him, even without the\\naid of this famous mass-meeting. The long delay\\nin the decision of the Massachusetts convention\\nhad carried the excitement to fever heat through-\\nout the country. Not only were people from New\\nHampshire and New York and naughty Rhode\\nIsland waiting anxiously about Boston to catch\\nevery crumb of news they could get, but intrigues\\nwere going on, as far south as Virginia, to influence\\nthe result. On the 21st of January the Boston\\nGazette came out with a warning, headed by\\nenormous capitals with three exclamation-points\\nBribery and Corruption 1 The most diabol-\\nical plan is on foot to corrupt the members of tlie\\nconvention who oppose the adoption of the new\\nConstitution. Large sums of money have been\\nbrought from a neighbouring state for that pur-\\npose, contributed by the wealthy. If so, is it not\\nprobable there may be collections for the same\\naccursed purpose nearer home No adequate\\ninvestigation ever determined whether this charge\\nwas true or not. We may hope that it was ill-\\nfounded but our general knowledge of human\\nnature must compel us to admit that there was\\nprobably a grain of truth in it. But what was un-\\ndeniable was that Richard Henry Lee wrote a let-\\nter to Gerry, urging that Massachusetts should not", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0354.jp2"}, "355": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 329\\nadopt the Constitution without insisting upon sun-\\ndry amendments and in order to consider these\\namendments, it was suggested that there should\\nbe another Federal Convention. At this anxious\\ncrisis, Washington suddenly threw him-\\nself into the breach with that infallible fmitfui kug-\\njudgiuent of his which always saw the\\nway to victory. If another Federal Convention\\nis attempted, said Washington, its members will\\nbe more discordant, and will agree upon no general\\nplan. The Constitution is the best that can be\\nobtained at this time. The Constitution or\\ndisunion are before us to choose from. If the\\nConstitution is our choice, a constitutional door is\\nopen for amendments, and they may be adopted in\\na peaceable manner, without tumult or disorder.\\nWhen this advice of Washington s reached Bos-\\nton, it set in motion a train of events which soon\\nsolved the difficulty, both for Massachusetts and\\nfor the other states which had not yet made up\\ntheir mind. Chief among the objections to the\\nConstitution had been the fact that it did not con-\\ntain a bill of rights. It did not guarantee religious\\nliberty, freedom of speech and of the press, or the\\nright of the people peacefully to assemble and\\npetition the government for a redress of grievances.\\nIt did not provide against the quartering of sol-\\ndiers upon the people in time of peace. It did not\\nprovide against general search-warrants, nor did it\\nsecurely prescribe the methods by which individ-\\nuals should be held to answer for criminal offences.\\nIt did not even provide that nobody should be\\nburned at the stake or stretched on the rack, for", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0355.jp2"}, "356": {"fulltext": "330 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nholding peculiar opinions about the nature of God\\nor the origin of evil. That such objections to the\\nConstitution seem strange to us to-day is partly\\ndue to the determined attitude of the men who,\\namid all the troubles of the time, would not con-\\nsent to any arrangement from which such safe-\\nguards to free thinking and free living should be\\nomitted. The friends of the Constitution in Bos-\\nton now proposed that the convention, while adopt-\\ning it, should suggest sundry amendments contain-\\ning the essential provisions of a bill of rights. It\\nwas not intended that the ratification should be\\nconditional. Under the circumstances, a condi-\\ntional ratification might prove as disastrous as\\nrejection. It might lead to a second Federal Con-\\nvention, in which the good work already accom-\\nplished might be undone. The ratification was to\\nbe absolute, and the amendments were offered in\\nthe hope that action would be taken upon them as\\nsoon as the new government should go into opera-\\ntion. There could be little doubt that the sugges-\\ntion would be heeded, not only from the importance\\nof Massachusetts in the Union, but also from the\\nfact that Virg-inia and other states would be sure\\nto follow her example in suggesting such amend-\\nments. This forecast proved quite correct, and it\\nwas in this way that the first ten amendments\\noriginated, which were acted on by Congress in\\n1790, and became part of the Constitution in 1791.\\nAs soon as this plan had been matured, Hancock\\nproposed it to the convention the hearty support\\nof Adams was immediately insured, and within a\\nweek from that time, on the 6th of February, the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0356.jp2"}, "357": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. B31\\nConstitution was ratified by the narrow majority of\\n187 votes ao-ainst 168. On that same\\n_ _ _ Massachusetts\\nday Jefferson, in Paris, wrote to Madi- ratifies,- pro-\\nposing amend-\\nson I wish with all my soul that the j^ents, Feb. 6,\\nnine first conventions may accept the\\nnew Constitution, to secure to us the good it con-\\ntains but I equally wish that the four latest, which-\\never they may be, may refuse to accede to it till a\\ndeclaration of rights be annexed but no objection\\nto the new form must produce a schism in our\\nUnion. But as soon as he heard of the action of\\nMassachusetts, he approved it as preferable to his\\nown idea, and he wrote home urging Virginia to\\nfollow the example.\\nMassachusetts was thus the sixth state to ratify\\nthe Constitution. On that day the name of the\\nLong Lane by the meeting-house where the con-\\nvention had sat was changed to Federal Street.\\nThe Boston people, said Henry Knox, had quite\\nlost their senses with joy. The two counties of\\nWorcester and Berkshire had given but 14 yeas\\nagainst 59 nays, but the farmers went home de-\\nclaring that they should cheerfully abide by the de-\\ncision of the majority. Not a murmur was heard\\nfrom any one.\\nAbout the time that the Massachusetts conven-\\ntion broke up, that of New Hampshire assembled\\nat Exeter but after a brief discussion it was de-\\ncided to adjourn until June, in order to see how\\nthe other states wovdd act. On the 21st of April\\nthe Maryland convention assembled at Annapolis.\\nAll the winter Patrick Henry had been busily at\\nwork, with the hope of inducing the southern states", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0357.jp2"}, "358": {"fulltext": "332 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nto establish a separate confederacy; but lie had\\nmade little headway anywhere, and none at all in\\nMaryland, where his Influence was completely coun-\\nteracted by that of Washington. Above all things,\\nsaid Washington, do not let the convention adjourn\\ntill the matter is decided, for the Antif ederalists\\nare taking no end of comfort from the postpone-\\nment in New Hampshire. Their glee was short-\\nlived, however. Some of Maryland s strongest\\nmen, such as Luther Martin and Samuel Chase,\\nwere Antifederalists but their efforts were of no\\nMaryland rati- ^^^r a scssiou of fivc days the\\nfles, April 28. Coustitutiou was ratified by a vote of 63\\nto 11. Whatever damage New Hampshire might\\nhave done was thus more than made good. The\\neyes of the whole country were now turned upon\\nthe eighth state. South Carolina. Her convention\\nwas to meet at Charleston on the 12th of May, the\\nanniversary of the day on which General Lincoln\\nhad surrendered that city to Sir Henry Clinton\\nbut there had been a decisive preliminary struggle\\nin the legislature in January. The most active\\nof the Antifederalists was Rawlins Lowndes, who\\nhad opposed the Declaration of Independence.\\nLowndes was betrayed into silliness. We are\\nnow, said he, under a most excellent constitu-\\ntion, a blessing from Heaven, that has stood the\\ntest of time !J, and given us liberty and inde-\\npendence yet we are impatient to pull down that\\nfabric which we raised at the expense of our blood.\\nThis was not very convincing to the assembly, most\\nof the members knowing full well that the fabric\\nhad not stood the test of time, but had already", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0358.jp2"}, "359": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 333\\ntumbled in by reason of its vicious construction.\\nA more effective plea was that which referred\\nto the slave-trade. What cause is there, said\\nLowndes, for jealousy of our importing negroes\\nWhy confine us to twenty years Why limit us\\nat all? This trade can be justified on the prin-\\nciples of religion and humanity. They debates in the\\ndo not like our having slaves because aua*^} eJi s^ia\u00c2\u00b0\\nthey have none themselves, and there-\\nfore want to exclude us from this great advantage.\\nCotes worth Pinckney replied By this settlement\\nwe have secured an unlimited importation of ne-\\ngroes for twenty years. The general government\\ncan never emancipate them, for no such authority\\nis granted, and it is admitted on all hands that the\\ngeneral government has no powers but what are\\nexpressly granted by the Constitution. We have\\nobtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever\\npart of the countiy they may take refuge, which is\\na right we had not before. In short, considering\\nall circumstances, we have made the best terms in\\nour power for the security of this species of prop-\\nerty. We would have made better if we could\\nbut, on the whole, I do not think them bad. Per-\\nhaps Pinckney would not have assumed exactly\\nthis tone at Philadelphia, but at Charleston the\\nargument was convincing. Lowndes then sounded\\nthe alarm that the New England states would\\nmonopolize the carrying-trade and charge ruinous\\nfreights, and he drew a harrowing picture of ware-\\nhouses packed to bursting with rice and indigo\\nspoiling because the owners could not afford to pay\\nthe Yankee skippers prices for carrying their", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0359.jp2"}, "360": {"fulltext": "334 CROWNING THE WORK.\\ngoods to market. But Pinckney rejoined that a\\nYankee shipmaster in quest of cargoes woukl not\\nbe likely to ruin his own chances for getting them,\\nand he called attention to the great usefulness of\\nthe eastern merchant marine as affording material\\nfor a navy, and thus contributing to the defence of\\nthe country. Finally Lowndes put in a plea for\\npaper money, but with little success. The result\\nof the debate set the matter so clearly before the\\npeople that a great majority of Federalists were\\nelected to the convention. Among them were\\nGadsden, the Rutledges and the Pinckneys, Moul-\\ntrie, and William Washington, who had become a\\ncitizen of the state from which he had helped to\\nexpel the British invader. The Antifederalists\\nwere largely represented by men from the upland\\ncounties, belonging to a population in which there\\nwas considerable likeness all along the Apjsalachian\\nchain of mountains, from Pennsylvania to the south-\\nern extremity of the range. There were among\\nthem many moonshiners, as they were called,\\ndistillers of illicit whiskey, and they did not\\nrelish the idea of a federal excise. At their head\\nwas Thomas Sumter, a convert to Patrick\\nSouth Caro- tt i i-\\nlina ratifies, Hcnrv s schcmc f or a southern conf ed-\\nMay23.\\neracy. Their policy was one of delay\\nand obstruction, but it availed them little, for on\\nthe 23d of May, after a session of eleven days,\\nSouth Carolina ratified the Constitution by a vote\\nof 149 against 73.\\nThe sound policy of the Federal Convention in\\nadopting the odious compromise .over the slave-trade\\nwas now about to bear fruit. In Virginia there", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0360.jp2"}, "361": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 335\\nhad grown up a party wliicli favoured the establish-\\nment of a separate southern confederacy. By the\\naction of South Carolina all such schemes were now\\nnipped in the bud. Of the states south of Mason\\nand Dixon s line, three had now ratified the Con-\\nstitution, so that any separate confederacy could\\nnow consist only of Viro-inia and North\\nr T mi c 1-1 Important\\nCarolma. ihe reason for this short- eflfectupon\\nlived separatist feeling in Virginia was\\nto be found in the complications which had grown\\nout of the attempt of Spain to close the Mississippi\\nRiver. It will be remembered that only two years\\nbefore Jay had actually recommended to Con-\\ngress that the right to navigate the lower Mis-\\nsissippi be surrendered for twenty-five years, in\\nexchange for a favourable commercial treaty with\\nSpain. The New England states, caring nothing\\nfor the distant Mississippi, supported this measure\\nin Congress and this narrow and selfish policy\\nnaturally created alarm in Virginia, which, in her\\ndistrict of Kentucky, touched upon the great river.\\nThus to the vague dread of the southern states in\\ngeneral, in the event of New England s controlling\\nthe commercial policy of the government, there was\\nadded, in Virginia s case, a specific fear. If the\\nNew England people were thus ready to barter\\naway the vital interests of a remote part of the\\ncountry, what might they not do Would they\\never stop at anything so long as they could go on\\nbuilding up their commerce This feeling strongly\\ninfluenced Patrick Henry in his desire for a sepa-\\nrate confederacy and we have seen how Randolph\\nand Mason, in the Federal Convention, were so", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0361.jp2"}, "362": {"fulltext": "336 CROWNING THE WORK.\\ndisturbed at the power given to Congress to regu-\\nlate commerce by a simple majority of votes that\\nthey refused to set their names to the Constitution.\\nThey alleged further reasons for their refusal, but\\nthis was the chief one. They wanted a two thirds\\nvote to be required, in order that the south might\\nretain the means of protecting itself. Under\\nthese circumstances the opposition to the Constitu-\\ntion was very strong, and but for the action of\\nSouth Carolina the party in favour of a separate\\nconfederacy might have been capable of doing much\\nmischief. As it was, since that party had actively\\nintrigued both in South Carolina and Maryland,\\nthe ratification of the Constitution by both these\\nstates was a direct rebuff. It quite demoralized\\nthe advocates of secession. The paper-money men,\\nmoreover, were handicapped by the fact that two\\nof the most powerful Antifederalists, Mason and\\nLee, were determined opponents of a paper cur-\\nrency, so that this subject had to be dropped or\\nvery gingerly dealt with. The strength of the\\nAntifederalists, though impaired by these causes,\\nwas still very great. The contest was waged with\\nall the more intensity of feeling because, since\\neight states had now adopted the Constitution, the\\nverdict of Virginia would be decisive. The con-\\nvention met at Richmond on the 2d of June, and\\nEdmund Pendleton was chosen president. Fore-\\nmost among the Antifederalists was Patrick Henry,\\nwhose eloquence was now as zealously\\nDebates in the i i i\\nVirginia Con- emplovcd affainst the new gfovernment\\nvention. .it,., n\\nas it had been in bygone days against\\nthe usurpations of Great Britain. He was sup-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0362.jp2"}, "363": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 337\\nported by Mason, Lee, and Grayson, as well as by\\nBenjamin Harrison and John Tyler, the fathers of\\ntwo future presidents and he could count on the\\nvotes of most of the delegates from the midland\\ncounties, from the south bank of the James River,\\nand from Kentucky. But the united talents of the\\nopposition had no chance of success in a conflict\\nwith the genius and tact of Madison, who at one\\nmoment crushed, at another conciliated, his oppo-\\nnent, but always won the day. To Madison, more\\nthan any other man, the Federalist victory was due.\\nBut he was ably seconded by Governor Randolph,\\nwhom he began by winning over from the opposite\\nparty, and by the favourite general and eloquent\\nspeaker, Light-Horse Harry. Conspicuous in\\nthe ranks of Federalists, and unsurpassed in debate,\\nwas a tall and gaunt young man, with beaming\\ncountenance, eyes of piercing brilliancy, and an in-\\ndescribable kingiiness of bearing, who was by and\\nby to become chief justice of the United States, and\\nby his masterly and far-reaching decisions to win\\na place side by side with Madison and Hamilton\\namong the founders of our national government.\\nJohn Marshall, second to none among all the illus-\\ntrious jurists of the English race, was then, at the\\nage of thirty-three, the foremost lawyer in Virginia.\\nHe had already served for several terms in the state\\nlegislature, but his national career began in this\\nconvention, where his arguments with\\n\u00e2\u0080\u009e__ Madison and\\nthose ot Madison, reinforcing each other, Marshall pre-\\n1 1 1^ mi 1\\nbore down all opposition. Ihe details ginia ratifies,\\n1 June 25.\\nof the controversy were much the same\\nas in the states already passed in review, save", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0363.jp2"}, "364": {"fulltext": "338 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nin so far as coloured by the peculiar circumstances\\nof Virginia. After more than three weeks of de-\\nbate, on the 25th of June, the question was put to\\nvote, and the Constitution was ratified by the nar-\\nrow majority of 89 against 79. Amendments were\\noffered, after the example of Massachusetts, which\\nhad already been followed by South Carolina and\\nthe minority in Maryland and, as in Massachu-\\nsetts, the defeated Antifederalists announced their\\nintention to abide loyally by the result.\\nThe discussion had lasted so long that Virginia\\nlost the distinction of being the ninth state to ratify\\nthe Constitution. That honour had been reserved\\nNewHamp- fo^ Ncw Hampshire, whose convention\\nreldy^^aUfied, bad met ou tlic anniversary of Bunker\\nJune 21. YiMI, and after a four days session, on\\nthe 21st of June, had given its consent to the new\\ngovernment by a vote of 57 against 46. The\\ncouriers from Virginia and those from New Hamp-\\nshire, as they spurred their horses over long miles\\nof dusty road, could shout to each other the joyous\\nnews in passing. Though the ratification of New\\nHampshire had secured the necessary ninth state,\\nyet the action of Virginia was not the less signifi-\\ncant and decisive. Virginia was at that time, and\\nfor a quarter of a century afterward, the most popu-\\nlous state in the Union, and one of the greatest in\\ninfluence. Even with the needed nine states all in\\nhand, it is clear that the new government could not\\nhave gone into successful operation with the lead-\\ning state, the home of Washington himself, left out\\nin the cold. The New Roof, as men were then\\nfond of calling the Federal Constitution, must", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0364.jp2"}, "365": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 339\\nspeedily have fallen in without this indispensable\\nprop. When it was known that Virginia had rati-\\nfied, it was felt that the victory was won, and the\\nsuccess of the new scheme assured. The 4th of\\nJuly, 1788, witnessed such loud rejoicings as have\\nperhaps never been seen before or since on Ameri-\\ncan soil. In Philadelphia there was a procession\\nmiles in length, in which every trade was rejjre-\\nsented, and wagons laden with implements of in-\\ndustry or emblematic devices alternated with bands\\nof music and gorgeous banners. There figured\\nthe New Roof, supported by thirteen columns, and\\nthere was to be seen the Ship of State, the good\\nship Constitution, made out of the barge which\\nPaul Jones had taken from the shattered and\\nblood-stained Serapis, after his terrible fight. As\\nfor the old scow Confedei acy, Imbecility master,\\nit was proclaimed she had foixndered at sea, and\\nthe sloop Anarchy, when last heard from, was\\nashore on Union Rocks. All over the country\\nthere were processions and bonfires, and in some\\ntowns there were riots. In Providence the Feder-\\nalists prepared a barbecue of oxen roasted whole,\\nbut a mob of farmers, led by three members of the\\nstate legislature, attempted to disperse them, and\\nwere with some difficulty pacified. In Albany the\\nAntifederalists publicly burned the Constitution,\\nwhereupon a party of Federalists brought out an-\\nother copy of it, and nailed it to the top of a pole,\\nwhich they planted defiantly amid the ashes of the\\nfire their opponents had made. Out of these pro-\\nceedings there grew a riot, in which knives were\\ndrawn, stones wei-e thrown, and blood was shed.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0365.jp2"}, "366": {"fulltext": "340 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nSuch incidents might have served to remind one\\nthat the end had not yet come. The difficulties\\nwere not yet surmounted, and the rejoicing was in\\nsome respects premature. It was now settled that\\nthe new government was to go into operation, but\\nhow it was going to be able to get along without\\nthe adhesion of New York it was not easy to see.\\nThe stru le ^ow York then ranked\\nin New York, ^j^jy j^g f^f ^j^ among the statcs in popula-\\ntion, but commercially and militarily she was the\\ncentre of the Union. She not only touched at once\\non the ocean and the lakes, but she separated New\\nEngland from the rest of the country. It was\\nrightly felt that the Union could never be cemented\\nwithout this central state. So strongly were peo-\\nple impressed with this feeling that some went so\\nfar as to threaten violence. It was said that if\\nNew York did not come into the Union jDeacefuUy\\nand of her own accord, she should be conquered\\nand dragged in. That she would come in peace-\\nfully seemed at first very improbable. When the\\nstate convention assembled at Poughkeepsie, on\\nthe 17th of June, more than two thirds of its\\nmembers were avowed Antifederalists. At their\\nhead was the governor, George Clinton, hard-headed\\nand resolute, the bitterest hater of the Constitution\\nthat could be found anywhere in the thirteen states.\\nForemost among his supporters were Yates and\\nLansing, with Melanchthon Smith, a man familiar\\nwith political history, and one of the ablest de-\\nbaters in the country. On the Federalist side\\nwere such eminent men as Livingston and Jay,\\nbut the herculean task of vanquishing this great", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0366.jp2"}, "367": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 341\\nhostile majority, and converting it by sheer dint of\\nargument into a majority on the right side, fell\\nchiefly upon the shoulders of one man. But for\\nAlexander Hamilton the decision of New York\\nwould unquestionably have been adverse to the\\nConstitution. Nay, more, it is very improbable\\nthat, but for him, the good work would have made\\nsuch progress as it had in the other states. To get\\nthe people to adopt the Constitution, it was above\\nall things needful that its practical working should\\nbe expounded, in language such as every one could\\nunderstand, by some writer endowed in the highest\\ndegree with political intelligence and foresight.\\nUpon their return from the Federal Convention,\\nYates and Lansing had done all in their power to\\nbring its proceedings into ill-repute. Pamphlets\\nand broadsides were scattered right and left. The\\nConstitution was called the triple-headed mon-\\nster, and declared to be as deep and wicked a\\nconspiracy as ever was invented in the darkest ages\\nagainst the liberties of a free people. It soon oc-\\ncurred to Hamilton that it would be well worth\\nwhile to explain the meaning of all parts of the\\nConstitution in a series of short, incisive essays.\\nHe communicated his plan to Madison and Jay,\\nwho joined him in the work, and the result was\\nthe Federalist, perhaps the most famous of\\nAmerican books, and undoubtedly the most pro-\\nfound and suggestive treatise on government that\\nhas ever been written. Of the eighty-five numbers\\noriginally published in the Indepen- The Fed-\\ndent Gazetteer, under the common sig- eraiist.\\nnature of Publius, Jay wrote five, Madison", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0367.jp2"}, "368": {"fulltext": "342 CROWNING THE WORK.\\ntwenty-nine, and Hamilton fifty-one. Jay s papers\\nrelated chiefly to diplomatic points, with which his\\nexperience abroad had fitted him to deal. The\\nfirst number was written by Hamilton in the cabin\\nof a sloop on the Hudson, in October, 1787 and\\nthey continued to appear, sometimes as often as\\nthree or four in a week, through the winter and\\nspring. Madison would have contributed a larger\\nshare than he did had he not been called early in\\nMarch to Virginia to fight the battle of the Con-\\nstitution in that state. The essays were widely\\nand eagerly read, and probably accomplished more\\ntoward insuring the adoption of the Constitution\\nthan anything else that was said or done in that\\neventful year. They were hastily written, struck\\nout at white heat by men full of their subject.\\nDoubtless the authors did not realize the grandeur\\nof the literary work they were doing, and among\\nthe men of the time there were few who foresaw\\nthe immortal fame which these essays were to earn.\\nIt is said of one of the senators in the first Con-\\ngress that he made the memorandum, Get the\\nFederalist, if I can, without buying it. It is n t\\nworth it. But for all posterity the Federalist\\nmust remain the most authoritative commentary\\nupon the Constitution that can be found for it is\\nthe joint work of the principal author of that Con-\\nstitution and of its most brilliant advocate.\\nIn nothins: could the flexibleness of Hamilton s\\nintellect, or the genuineness of his patriotism, have\\nbeen more finely shown than in the hearty zeal and\\ntranscendent ability with which he now wrote in\\ndefence of a plan of government so different from", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0368.jp2"}, "369": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 343\\nwhat he would himself have proposed. He made\\nMadison s thoughts his own, until he set them\\nforth with even greater force than Madison him-\\nself could command. Yet no arguments could\\npossibly be less chargeable with partisanship than\\nthe arguments of the Federalist, The judgment\\nis as dispassionate as could be shown in a philo-\\nsophical treatise. The tone is one of grave and lofty\\neloquence, apt to move even to tears the reader\\nwho is fully alive to the stupendous issues that\\nwere involved in the discussion. Hamilton was\\nsupremely endowed with the faculty of imagining,\\nwith all the circumstantial minuteness of concrete\\nreality, political situations different from those\\ndirectly before him and he put this rare power to\\nnoble use in tracing out the natural and legitimate\\nworkins: of such a Constitution as that which the\\nFederal Convention had framed.\\nWhen it came to defending the Constitution\\nbefore the hostile convention at Poughkeepsie, he\\nhad before him as arduous a task as ever fell to\\nthe lot of a parliamentary debater. It was a case\\nwhere political management was out of the ques-\\ntion. The opposition were too numerous to be\\nsilenced, or cajoled, or bargained with. They\\nmust be converted. With an eloquence scarcely\\nequalled before or since in America until Webster s\\nvoice was heard, Hamilton argued week after week,\\ntill at last Melanchthon Smith, the foremost debater\\nof Clinton s party, broke away, and came to the\\nFederalist side. It was like crushing the centre\\nof a hostile army. After this the Antifederalist\\nforces were confused and easily routed. The de-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0369.jp2"}, "370": {"fulltext": "344 CROWNING THE WORK.\\ncisive struggle was over the question whether New\\nYork could ratify the Constitution conditionally,\\nreserving to herself the right to withdraw from the\\nUnion in case the amendments upon which she\\nhad set her heart should not be adopted. Upon\\nthis point Hamilton reinforced himself with the\\nadvice of Madison, who had just returned to New\\nYork. Could a state once adopt the Constitution,\\nand then withdraw from the Union if not satisfied\\nMadison s reply was prompt and decisive. No,\\nsuch a thing could never be done. A state which\\nhad once ratified was in the federal bond\\nHamilton wins\\nthe victory, torcvcr. ihc Coustitutiou could uot pro-\\nand New York n i\\nratifies, July vidc for uor coutcmplatc its own over-\\n26.\\nthrow. There could be no such thing\\nas a constitutional right of secession. When Me-\\nlanchthon Smith deserted the Antifederalists on\\nthis point, the victory was won, and on the 2Gth of\\nJuly New York ratified the Constitution by the\\nbare majority of 30 votes against 27. Rejoicings\\nwere now renewed throughout the country. In the\\ncity of New York there was an immense parade,\\nand as the emblematic federal ship was drawn\\nthrough the streets, with Hamilton s name embla-\\nzoned on her side, it was doubtless the proudest\\nmoment of the young statesman s life.\\nNew York, however, clogged her acceptance by\\nproposing, a few days afterward, that a second\\nFederal Convention be called for considering the\\namendments suggested by the various states. The\\nproposal was supported by the Virginia legisla-\\nture, but Massachusetts and Pennsylvania opposed\\nit, as having a dangerous tendency to reopen the", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0370.jp2"}, "371": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK, 345\\nwhole discussion and unsettle everything. The\\nproposal fell to the ground. People were weary\\nof the long dispute, and turned their attention to\\nelecting representatives to the first Congress.\\nWith the adhesion of New York all serious anxi-\\nety came to an end. The new government could\\nbe i3ut in operation without waiting for North\\nCarolina and Rhode Island to make up their\\nminds. The North Carolina convention\\nThe laggard\\nmet on the 21st of July, and adjourned caroLa and\\non the Ist of August without coming to island.\\nany decision. The same objections were raised as\\nin Virginia; and besides, the paper-money party\\nwas here much stronger than in the neighbouring\\nstate. In Rhode Island paper money was the chief\\ndifficulty that state did not even take the trouble\\nto call a convention. It was not until the 21st of\\nNovember, 1789, after Washington s government\\nhad been several months in operation, that North\\nCarolina joined the Federal Union. Rhode Island\\ndid not join till the 29th of May, 1790. If she\\nhad waited but a few months longer, Vermont, the\\nfirst state not of the original thirteen, would have\\ncome in before her.\\nThe autumn of 1788 was a season of busy but\\npeaceful electioneering. That remarkable body, the\\nContinental Congress, in putting an end to its\\ntroubled existence, decreed that presidential elec-\\ntors should be chosen on the first Wednesday of\\nJanuary, 1789, that the electors should meet and\\ncast their votes for president on the first Wednes-\\nday in February, and that the Senate and House\\nof Representatives should assemble on the first", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0371.jp2"}, "372": {"fulltext": "346 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nWednesday in March. This latter day fell, in 1789,\\non the 4th of the month, and accordingly, three\\nyears afterward, Congress took it for a precedent,\\nand decreed that thereafter each new administra-\\ntion should begin on the 4th of March. It was\\nfurther decided, after some warm debate, that until\\nthe site for the proposed federal city could be\\nselected and built upon, the seat of the new gov-\\nernment should be the city of New York.\\nIn accordance with these decrees, presidential\\nelections were held on the first Wednesday in Jan-\\nuary. The Antifederalists were still potent for\\nFirst presi- miscliicf iu Ncw York, with the result\\nwcm jan.^r that, just as that state had not joined in\\nthe Declaration of Independence until\\nafter it had been proclaimed to the world, and just\\nas she refused to adopt the Federal Constitution\\nuntil after more than the requisite number of states\\nhad ratified it, so now she failed to choose electors,\\nand had nothing to do with the vote that made\\nWashington our first president. The other ten\\nstates that had ratified the Constitution all chose\\nelectors. But things moved slowly and cumbrously\\nat this first assembling of the new government.\\nThe House of Representatives did not succeed in\\ngetting a quorum together until the 1st of April.\\nOn the 6th, the Senate chose John Langdon for its\\npresident, and the two houses in concert counted\\nthe electoral votes. There were 69 in all, and\\nevery one of the 69 was found to be for George\\nWashington of Virginia. For the second name\\non the list there was nothing like such unanimity.\\nIt was to be expected that the other name would", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0372.jp2"}, "373": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 347\\nbe that of a citizen of Massachusetts, as the other\\nleading state in the Union. The two foremost\\ncitizens of Massachusetts bore the same name, and\\nwere cousins. There would have been most strik-\\ning poetic justice in coupling with the name of\\nWashington that of Samuel Adams, since these\\ntwo men had been indisputably foremost in the\\nwork of achieving the independence of the United\\nStates. But for the hesitancy of Samuel Adams\\nin indorsing the Federal Constitution, he would\\nvery likely have been our first vice-president and\\nour second president. But the wave of federalism\\nhad now begun to sweep strongly over Massachu-\\nsetts, carrying everything before it, and none but\\nthe most ardent Federalists had a chance to meet\\nin the electoral college. Voices were raised in\\nbehalf of Samuel Adams. While we honour the\\nAmerican Fabius, it was said, let us not forget the\\nAmerican Cato. It was urged by some, with much\\ntruth, that but for his wise and cautious action in\\nthe Massachusetts convention, the good ship Con-\\nstitution would have been fatally wrecked upon\\nthe reefs of Shaysism. His course had not been\\nthat of an obstructionist, like that of his old friends\\nHenry and Lee and Gerry; but at the critical\\nmoment one of the most critical in all that won-\\nderful crisis he had thrown his vast influence,\\nwith decisive effect, upon the right side. All this\\nis plain enough to the historian of to-day. But in\\nthe political fervour of the election of 1789, the\\nfact most clearly visible to men was that Samuel\\nAdams had hesitated, and perhaps made things\\nwait. These points came out most distinctly on", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0373.jp2"}, "374": {"fulltext": "348 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nthe issue of his election to the Federal Conaress,\\nin which he was defeated hy the youthful Fisher\\nAmes, whose eloquence in the state convention had\\nbeen so conspicuous and useful but they serve to\\nexplain thoroughly why he was not put upon the\\npresidential list along with Washington. His\\ncousin, John Adams, had just returned from his\\nmission to England, weary and disgusted with the\\nscanty respect which he had been able to secure\\nfor a feeble league of states that could not make\\ngood its own promises. His services during the\\nRevolution had been of the most splendid sort\\nand after Washington, he was the second choice\\nof the electoral college, receiving 34 votes, while\\nJohn Jay of New York, his nearest competitor,\\nreceived only 9. John Adams was accordingly\\ndeclared vice-president.\\nOn the 14th of April Washington was informed\\nof his election, and on the next day but one he bid\\nadieu again to his beloved home at Mount Vernon,\\nwhere he had hoped to pass the remainder of his\\ndays in that rural peace and quiet for which no\\none yearns like the man who is burdened with\\ngreatness and fame unsought for. The position to\\nwhich he was summoned was one of unparalleled\\nsplendour, how splendid we can now realize\\nmuch better than he, and our grandchildren will\\nrealize it better than we, the position of first\\nruler of what was soon to become at once the\\nstrongest and the most peace-loving people upon\\nthe face of the earth. As he journeyed toward\\nNew York, his thoughts must have been busy with\\nthe arduous problems of the time. Already, doubt-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0374.jp2"}, "375": {"fulltext": "CROWNING THE WORK. 349\\nless, he liad marked out the two great men, Jeffer-\\nson and Hamilton, for his chief advisers the one\\nto place us in a proper attitude before the mocking\\nnations of Europe the other to restore our shat-\\ntered credit, and enlist the moneyed interests of\\nall the states in the success of the Federal Union.\\nWashington s temperament was a hopeful one, as\\nbefitted a man of his strength and dash. But in\\nhis most hopeful mood he could hardly have dared\\nto count upon such a sudden and wonderful demon-\\nstration of national strength as was about to ensue\\nupon the heroic finaneial measures of Hamilton.\\nHis meditations on this journey we may well be-\\nlieve to have been solemn and anxious enough.\\nBut if he could gather added courage from the\\noften-declared trust of his fellow-countrymen, there\\nwas no lack of such comfort for him. At every\\ntown through which he passed, fresh evidences of\\nit were gathered, but at one point on the route his\\nstrong nature was especially wrought upon. At\\nTrenton, as he crossed the bridge over the Assun-\\npink Creek, where twelve years ago, at the darkest\\nmoment of the Revolution, he had outwitted Corn-\\nwallis in the most skilful of stratagems, and turned\\nthreatening defeat into glorious victory, at this\\nspot, so fraught with thrilling associations, he was\\nmet by a party of maidens dressed in white, who\\nstrewed his path with sweet spring flowers, while\\ntriumphal arches in softest green bore inscriptions\\ndeclaring that he who had watched over the safety\\nof the mothers could well be trusted to protect the\\nilaughters. On the 23d he arrived in New York,\\nand was entertained at dinner by Governor Clin-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0375.jp2"}, "376": {"fulltext": "350 CROWNING THE WORK.\\nton. One week later, on the 30tli, came the inau-\\nguration. It was one of those magnificent days of\\nclearest sunshine that sometimes make\\nInauguration r- 1 A 1 1 i\\nof Washing- ouc icel in April as it summer had come.\\nton, April 30. i ttt i\\nAt noon or that day Washington went\\nfrom his lodgings, attended by a military es-\\ncort, to Federal Hall, at the corner of Wall and\\nNassau streets, where his statue has lately been\\nerected. The city was ablaze with excitement. A\\nsea of upturned eager faces surrounded the spot,\\nand as the hero appeared thousands of cocked hats\\nwere waved, while ladies fluttered their white hand-\\nkerchiefs. Washington came forth clad in a suit\\nof dark brown cloth of American make, with white\\nsilk hose and shoes decorated with silver buckles,\\nwhile at his side hung a dress-sword. For a mo-\\nment all were hushed in deepest silence, while the\\nsecretary of the Senate held forth the Bible upon\\na velvet cushion, and Chancellor Livingston ad-\\nministered the oath of office. Then, before Wash-\\nington had as yet raised his head, Livingston\\nshouted, and from all the vast company came\\nanswering shouts, Long live George Washing-\\nton, President of the United States I", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0376.jp2"}, "377": {"fulltext": "BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.\\nThe bibliography of the period covered in this book is\\nmost copiously and thoroughly treated in the seventh volume\\nof Winsor s Narrative and Critical History of America, Boston,\\n1888. For the benefit of the reader who may not have ready\\naccess to that vast storehouse of information, the following\\nbrief notes may be of service.\\nThe best account of the peace negotiations is to be found\\nin chapter ii. of Winsor s volume just cited, written by Hon.\\nJohn Jay, who had already discussed the subject quite thor-\\noughly in his Address before the New York Historical Society\\non its Seventy-Ninth Anniversary, Nov. 27, 1883. Of the\\nhighest value are Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice s Life of Lord\\nShelburne, 3 vols., London, 1875-76, and Adolphe de Cir-\\ncourt, Histoire de l action commune de la France et de I Ame-\\nrique, etc., tome iii., Docuynents originaux inedits, Paris, 1876.\\nSee also Sparks, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American\\nRevolution, 12 vols., Boston, 1829-30 Trescot s Diplomacy\\nof the American Revolution, N. Y., 1852 Lyman s Diplomacy\\nof the United States, Boston, 1826 Elliot s American Diplo-\\nmatic Code, 2 vols., Washington, 1834 Chalmers s Collection\\nof Treaties, 2 vols., London, 1790 Lord Stanhope s History\\nof England, vol. vii., London, 1853 Lecky s History of Eng-\\nland, vol. iv., London, 1882 Lord John Russell s Memorials\\nof Fox, 4 vols., London, 1853-57 Albemarle s Rockingham\\nand his Contemporaries, 2 vols., London, 1852 Walpole s\\nLast Journals, 2 vols., London, 1859 Force s American\\nArchives, 4th series, 6 vols., Wasliington, 1839-46 John\\nAdams s Works, 10 vols., Boston, 1850-56 Rives s Life of\\nMadison, 3 vols., Boston, 1859-68 Madison s Letters and\\nother Writings, 4 vols., Phila., 1865 tlie lives of Franklin,", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0377.jp2"}, "378": {"fulltext": "352 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.\\nby Bigelow and Partou the lives of Jay, by Jay, Flanders,\\nand Whitelocke Morse s John Adams, Boston, 1885 Cor-\\nrespondence of George III. with Lord North, 2 vols., London,\\n1867 Wharton s Digest of International Law, Washington,\\n1887, Appendix to vol. iii. Hale s Franklin in France, 2\\nvols., Boston, 1888. The view of the treaty set forth in\\n1830 by Sparks, according to which Jay and Adams were\\nquite mistaken in their suspicious of the French court, we\\nmay now regard as disposed of by the evidence presented\\nby Circourt and Fitzmaurice. It has led many writers\\nastray, and even with all the lights which Mr. Bancroft has\\nhad, the account in the last revision of liis History of the\\nUnited States, vol. v., N. Y., 1886, though in some respects\\none of the best to be found in the general histories, still\\nleaves much to be desired.\\nThe general condition of the United States under the\\narticles of confederation is well sketched in the sixth volume\\nof Bancroft s final revision, and in Curtis s History of the\\nConstitution, 2 vols., N. Y., 1861. An excellent summary is\\ngiven in the first volume of Schouler s History of the United\\nStates under the Constitution, of which vols, i.-iii. (Washing-\\nton, 1882-85) have appeared. Mr. Schouler s book is sug-\\ngestive and stimulating. The work most rich in details is\\nProfessor McMaster s History of the People of the United\\nStates, of which the first volume rather more than covers\\nthe period 1783-89. The author is especially deserving\\nof praise for the diligence with which he has searched the\\nnewspapers and obscure pamphlets of the period. He has\\nthus given much fresh life to the narrative, besides throwing\\nvaluable light upon the thoughts and feelings of the men\\nwho lived under the league of friendship. I take plea-\\nsure in acknowledging my indebtedness to Professor Mc-\\nMaster for several interesting illustrative details, chiefly in\\nmy third, fourth, and seventh chapters. At the same time\\none is sorely puzzled at some of his omissions, as in the\\naccount of the Federal Convention, in which one finds no\\nallusion whatever to the all-important question of the rep-\\nresentation of slaves, or to the compromise by which New\\nEngland secured to Congress full power to regulate com-", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0378.jp2"}, "379": {"fulltext": "BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. 353\\ninerce by yielding to Georgia and South Carolina in the\\nmatter of the African slave-trade. So the discussion as to\\nthe national executive is carried on till July 2Gth, when\\nit was decided that the president should be chosen by Con-\\ngress for a single term of seven years then the subject\\nis dropped, and the reader is left to suppose that such\\nwas the final arrangement. Instances of what seems like\\ncarelessness are sufficiently numerous to make the book\\nin some places an unsafe guide to the general reader, but\\nin spite of such defects, which a careful revision might\\nremedy, its value is great. Further general information\\nas to the period of the Confederation may be found in\\nMorse s admirable Life of Alexander Hamilton, 3d ed., 2 vols.,\\nBoston, 1882 J. C. Hamilton s Republic of the United States,\\n7 vols., Boston, 1879 Frothingham s Rise of the Republic,\\nBoston, 1872, chapter xii. Von Hoist s Constitutional History,\\n5 vols., Chicago, 1877-85, chapter i. Pitkin s History of the\\nUnited States, 2 vols., New Haven, 1828, vol. ii. Marshall s\\nLife of Washington, 5 vols., Phila., 1805-07 Journals of\\nCongress, 13 vols., Phila., 1800 Secret Journals of Congress,\\n4 vols., Boston, 1820-21.\\nOn the loyalists and their treatment, the able essay by\\nRev. G. E. Ellis, in Wiusor s seventh volume, is especially\\nrich in bibliographical references. See also Sabine s Loyal-\\nists of the American Revolution, 2 vols., Boston, 1864 Ryer-\\nson s Loyalists of America, 2 vols., Toronto, 1880 Jones s\\nNew York during the Revolution, 2 vols., N. Y., 1879. Al-\\nthough chiefly concerned with events earlier than 1780, the\\nJournal and Letters of Samuel Curwen, 4th ed., Boston, 1864,\\nand especially the Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson,\\n2 vols., Boston, 1884-86, are valuable in this connection.\\nFor the financial troubles the most convenient general\\nsurvey is to be found in A. S. Bolles s Financial History of\\nthe United States, 1774-1789, N. Y., 1879 Sparks s Life of\\nGouverneur Morris, 3 vols., Boston, 1832 Pelatiah Webster s\\nPolitical Essays, Phila., 1791 Phillips s Colonial and Con-\\ntinental Paper Currency, 2 vols., Roxbury, 1865-66 Var-\\nnum s Case of Trevett v. Weeden, Providence, 1787; Arnold s\\nHistory of Rhode Island, 2 vols.^ y. Y,, 1859-60. The best", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0379.jp2"}, "380": {"fulltext": "354 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.\\naccount of the Shays rebellion is G. R. Minot s History of\\nthe Insurrections in Massachusetts, Worcester, 1788 see also\\nBarry s History of Massachusetts, 3 vols., Boston, 1855-57\\nAustin s Life of Gerry, 2 vols., Boston, 1828-29. A new\\nand interesting account of the northwestern cessions and the\\nOrdinance of 1787 is B. A. Hinsdale s Old Northwest, N. Y.,\\n1888 see also Dunn s Indiana, Boston, 1888 Cutler s Life,\\nJournal, and Correspondence of Manasseh Cutler, 2 vols.,\\nCincinnati, 1887.\\nIn the Johns Hophins Unioersity Studies in Historical and\\nPolitical Science, the following articles bear especially upon\\nsubjects here treated and are worthy of careful study II.,\\nv., vi., H. C. Adams, Taxation in the United States, 1789-\\n1816 III., i., H. B. Adams, Maryland s Influence upon Land\\nCessio7is to the United States j III., ix., x., Davis, American\\nConstitutions IV., v. Jameson s Introduction to the Consti-\\ntutional and Political History of the Individual States IV.,\\nvii.-ix., Shoshuke Sato s History of the Land Question in the\\nUnited States.\\nFor the proceedings of the Federal Convention in framing\\nthe Constitution, and of the several state conventions in rati-\\nfying it, the great treasure-house of authoritative infonna-\\ntion is Elliot s Debates in the Conventions, 5 vols., originally\\npublished under the sanction of Congress in 1830-45 new\\nreprint, Phila., 1888. The contents of the volumes are as\\nfollows\\nI. Sundry preliminary papers, relating to the ante-revo-\\nlutionary period, and the period of the Confederation\\njournal of the Federal Convention Yates s minutes\\nof the proceedings the official letters of Martin,\\nYates, Lansing, Randolph, Mason, and Gerry, in ex-\\nplanation of their several courses Jay s address to the\\npeople of New York and other illustrative papers.\\nII., III., IV. Proceedings of the several state conven-\\ntions with other documents, including the Virginia\\nand Kentucky resolutions of 1798, and data relating\\nthereto.\\nV. Madison s journal of debates in the Congress of the\\nConfederation, Nov. 4, 1782 -June 21, 1783, and", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0380.jp2"}, "381": {"fulltext": "BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. 355\\nFeb. 19 -April 25, 1787; Madison s journal of the\\nFederal Convention letters from Madison to Wash-\\nington, Jefferson, and Randolph, Sept. 1787 -Nov.\\n1788 and other papers.\\nThe best edition of the Federalist is by H. C. Lodge,\\nN. Y., 1888. See also Story s Commentaries on the ConstitU\\ntion, 4th ed., 3 vols., Boston, 1873 the works of Daniel\\nWebster, 6 vols., Boston, 1851 Hurd s Theory of our Na-\\ntional Existence, Boston, 1881. The above works expound\\nthe Constitution as not a league between sovereign states\\nbut a fundamental law ordained by the people of the United\\nStates. The opposite view is presented in The Republic of\\nRepublics, by P. C. Centz [Plain Common Sense, pseudonym\\nof B. J. Sage of New Orleans], Boston, 1881 the works of\\nCalhoun, 6 vols., N. Y., 1853-55 A. H. Stephens s War be-\\ntween the States, 2 vols., Phila., 1868 Jefferson Davis s Rise\\nand Fall of the Confederate Government, 2 vols., N. Y., 1881.\\nSeveral volumes of the American Statesmen contain\\ninteresting accounts of discussions in the various conventions,\\nas Tyler s Patrick Henry, Hosmer s Samuel Adams, Lodge s\\nHamilton, Magruder s Marshall, Roosevelt s Morris. Gay s\\nMadison falls far below the general standard of this excel-\\nlent and popular series. No satisfactory biography of Madi-\\nson has yet been written, though the voluminous work of\\nW. C. Rives contains much good material. For judicial\\ninterpretations of the Constitution one may consult B. R.\\nCurtis s Digest of Decisions, 1790-1854 Flanders s Lives of\\nthe Chief Justices, Phila., 1858 Marshall s Writings on the\\nFederal Constitution, ed. Perkins, Boston, 1839 see also\\nPomeroy s Constitutional Law, N. Y., 1868 Wharton s Co7n-\\nmentaries, Phila., 1884 Von Hoist s Calhoim, Boston, 1882;\\nTyler s Letters and Times of the Tylers, 2 vols., Richmond,\\n1884-85. Among critical and theoretical works, Fisher s\\nTrial of the Constitution, Phila., 1862, and Lock wood s Abo-\\nlition of the Presidency, N. Y., 1884, are variously suggestive;\\nWoodrow Wilson s Congressional Government, Boston, 1885,\\nis a work of rare ability, pointing out the divergence which\\nhas arisen between the literary theory of our government\\nand its practical working. Walter Bagehot s English Consti-", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0381.jp2"}, "382": {"fulltext": "356 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.\\ntution, revised eel., Boston, 1873, had already, in a most pro-\\nfound and masterly fashion, exhibited the divergence be-\\ntween the literary theory and the actual working of the\\nBritish government. Some points of weakness in the British\\nsystem are touched in Albert Stickney s True Republic,\\nN. Y., 1879 see also his Democratic Government, N. Y., 1885.\\nThe constitutional history of England is presented, in its\\nearlier stages, with prodigious learning, by Dr. Stubbs, 3\\nvols., London, 1873-78, and in its later stages by Hallam,\\n2 vols., London, 1842, and Sir Erskine May, 2 vols., Bos-\\nton, 1862-63 see also Freeman s Growth of the English\\nConstitution, London, 1872 Comparative Politics, London,\\n1873 Some Impressions of the United States, London,\\n1883 Rudolph Gneist, History of the English Constitution, 2\\nvols., London, 1886 J. S. Mill, Representative Government,\\nN. Y., 1862 Sir H. Maine, Popular Government, N. Y., 1886\\nS. R. Gardiner s Introduction to the Study of English History,\\nLondon, 1881. Li this connection I may refer to my own\\nbook, American Political Ideas, N. Y., 1885 and my articles,\\nGreat Britain, House of Lords, and House of Com-\\nmons, in Lalor s Cyclopcedia of Political Science, 3 vols.,\\nChicago, 1882-84. It is always pleasant to refer to that\\ncyclopjedia, because it contains the numerous articles on\\nAmerican history by Prof. Alexander Johnston. One must\\nstop somewhere, and I will conclude by saying that I do not\\nknow where one can find anything more richly suggestive\\nthan Professor Johnston s articles.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0382.jp2"}, "383": {"fulltext": "MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nThe names of those who for various reasons were absent\\nwhen the Constitution was signed are given in italics the\\nnames of those who were present, but refused to sign, are\\ngiven in small capitals.\\nNew Hampshire John Langdon.\\nNicholas Gilman.\\nMassachusetts Elbridge Gerry.\\nNathaniel Gorham.\\nRufus King.\\nCaleh Strong.\\nConnecticut William Samuel Johnson.\\nRoger Sherman.\\nOliver Ellsworth.\\nNew York Robert Yates.\\nAlexander Hamilton.\\nJohn Lansing.\\nNew Jersey William Livuigston.\\nDavid Brearley.\\nWilliam Churchill Houston.\\nWilliam Paterson.\\nJonathan Dayton.\\nPennsylvania Benjamin Franklin.\\nThomas Mifain.\\nRobert Morris.\\nGeorge Clymer.\\nThomas Fitzsimmons.\\nJared IngersoU.\\nJames Wilson.\\nGouverneur Morris.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0383.jp2"}, "384": {"fulltext": "358 MEMBERS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION.\\nDelaware George Read.\\nGunning Bedford.\\nJohn Dickinson.\\nRichard Bassett.\\nJacob Broom.\\nMaryland James McHenry.\\nDaniel of St. Thomas Jenifer.\\nDaniel Carroll.\\nJohn Francis Mercer.\\nLuther Martin.\\nVirginia George Washington.\\nEdmund Randolph.\\nJohn Blair.\\nJames Madison.\\nGeorge Mason.\\nGeorge Wythe.\\nJames McClurg.\\nNorth Carolina Alexander Martin.\\nWilliam Richardson Davie,\\nWilliam Blount.\\nRichard Dobbs Spaight.\\nHugh Williamson.\\nSouth Carolina John Rutledge.\\nCharles Cotesworth Pinckney.\\nCharles Pinckney.\\nPierce Butler.\\nGeorgia William Few.\\nAbraham Baldwin.\\nWilliam Pierce.\\nWilliam Houstoun.\\nOf those who signed their names to the Federal Constitu-\\ntion, the six following were signers of the Declaration of\\nIndependence\\nRoger Sherman,\\nBenjamin Franklin,\\nRobert Morris,\\nGeorge Clymer,\\nJames Wilson,\\nGeorge Read.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0384.jp2"}, "385": {"fulltext": "MEMBERS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION. 359\\nThe ten following were appointed as delegates to the Fed-\\neral Convention, but never took their seats\\nNew Hampshire John Pickering.\\nBenjamin West.\\nMassachusetts Francis Dana.\\nNew Jersey John Nelson.\\nAbraham Clark.\\nVirginia Patrick Henry (declined).\\nNorth Carolina Richard Caswell (resigned).\\nWillie Jones (declined).\\nGeorgia George Walton.\\nNathaniel Pendleton.\\nNo delegates were appointed by Rhode Island. In a letter\\naddressed to the Honourable the Chairman of the General\\nConvention, and dated Providence, May 11, 1787, sev-\\neral leading citizens of Rhode Island expressed their regret\\nthat their state should not be represented on so momentous\\nan occasion. At the same time, says the letter, the result\\nof your deliberations we still hope may finally be ap-\\nproved and adopted by this state, for which we pledge our\\ninfluence and best exertions. The letter was signed by\\nJohn Brown, Joseph Nightingale, Levi Hall, Philip Allen,\\nPaul Allen, Jabez Bowen, Nicholas Brown, John Jinkes,\\nWelcome Arnold, William Russell, Jeremiah Olney, William\\nBarton, and Thomas Lloyd Halsey. The letter was pre-\\nsented to the Convention on May 28th by Gouverneur Mor-\\nris, and, being read, was ordered to lie on the table for\\nfurther consideration. See Elliot s Debates, v. 125.\\nThe Constitution was ratified by the thirteen states, as\\nfollows\\n1. Delaware Dec. 6, 1787.\\n2. Pennsylvania Dec. 12, 1787.\\n3. New Jersey Dec. 18, 1787.\\n4. Georgia Jan. 2, 1788.\\n5. Connecticut Jan. 9, 1788.\\n6. Massachusetts Feb. 6, 1788.\\n7. Maryland April 28, 1788.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0385.jp2"}, "386": {"fulltext": "360 PRESIDENTS OF THE CONGRESS.\\n8. South Carolina May 23, 1788.\\n9. New Hampshire June 21, 1788.\\n10. Virginia June 25, 1788.\\n11. New York July 26, 1788.\\n12. North Carolina Nov. 21, 1789.\\n13. Rhode Island May 29, 1790.\\nPRESIDENTS OF THE CONTINENTAL\\nCONGRESS.\\n1. Peyton Randolph of Virginia Sept. 5, 1774.\\n2. Henry Middleton of South Carolina Oct. 22, 1774.\\nPeyton Randolph May 10, 1775.\\n3. John Hancock of Massachusetts May 24, 1775.\\n4. Henry Laurens of South Carolina Nov. 1, 1777.\\n5. John Jay of New York Dec. 10, 1778.\\n6. Samuel Huntington of Connecticut Sept. 28, 1779.\\n7. Thomas McKean of Delaware July 10, 1781.\\n8. John Hanson of Maryland Nov. 5, 1781.\\n9. Elias Boudinot of New Jersey Nov. 4, 1782.\\n10. Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania Nov. 3, 1783.\\n11. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia Nov. 30, 1784.\\n12. Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts June 6, 1786.\\n13. Arthur St. Clair of Pennsylvania Feb. 2, 1787.\\n14. Cyrus Grifflu of Virginia Jan. 22, 1788.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0386.jp2"}, "387": {"fulltext": "INDEX.\\nACADIANS, 205.\\nAdams, Herbert B., 192.\\nAdams, John, arrives in Paris, 22\\nhis indignation at the pusillanimous\\ninstructions from Congress, 3(\\ncondemns the Cincinnati, 110; tries\\nin vain to negotiate commercial\\ntreaty with Great Britain, 139-141\\nnegotiates a treaty with Holland,\\n155 obtains a loan there, 150, 157\\nhis interview with the envoy from\\nTripoli, 161 absent from the United\\nStates at the time of tlie Federal\\nConvention, 223 elected vice-presi-\\ndent of the United States, 348.\\nAdams, Samuel, his devotion to local\\nself-government, 57, 318 his com-\\nmittees of correspondence, 92 op-\\nposes Washington s proposal for\\npensioning officers, 100; but at\\nlength supports the Commutation\\nAct, 114; condenms the Cincimiati,\\n116, 118; approves the conduct of\\nthe Massachusetts delegates, 143\\nopposes pardoning the ringleaders\\nin the Shays insurrection, 184 not\\na delegate to the Federal Conven-\\ntion, 225 the man of the town\\nmeeting, 318 in the Massachu-\\nsetts convention, 324, 32G-328 why\\nnot selected for the vice-presidency,\\n347.\\nAlbany, riot in, 339.\\nAmendments to Constitution, 302, 330,\\n338\\n4mes Fisher, 319, 326, 348.\\nAmis, North Carolinian trader, 210.\\nAmphiktyonic council, 249.\\nAnnapolis convention, 216.\\nAntagonisms between large and small\\nstates, 244-252; between east and\\nwest, 255 between north and south,\\n256-267.\\nAntifederalist party, 309 in Pennsyl-\\nvania, 310; in Massachusetts, 317,\\n324 in Soutli Carolina, 334 in\\nVirguiia, 335-337 in New York, 340,\\n341, 346.\\nAntipathies between states, 62.\\nAranda, Count, his prophecy, 19.\\nAristides, pseudonym, 312.\\nAristocracy, 283.\\nAristotle, 225.\\nArkwright, Sir Richard, 267.\\nArmada, the Invincible, 235.\\nArmstrong, Jolm, 109, 150.\\nArmy, dread of, 105, 321.\\nArnold, Benedict, 28, 100, 151.\\nAsbury, Francis, 85.\\nAshburton, Lord, 5.\\nAshburton treaty, 20.\\nAssemblies, 65.\\nAssunpink Creek, 349.\\nAugustine, 158.\\nBackus, Rev. Isaac, 322.\\nBagehot, Walter, 291._^\\nBaldwin, Abraham, 251.\\nBaltimore and Ohio Railroad, 213.\\nBaptists persecuted in Virginia, 80.\\nBarbary pirates, 157-161.\\nBarrt5, Isaac, 41.\\nBedford, Gunning, 249.\\nBennington, 321.\\nBernard, Sir Francis, 298.\\nBiemiial elections, 327.\\nBill of rights demanded, 329.\\nBlackstone, Sir William, 290, 291,\\n297.\\nBossuet on slavery, 72.\\nBoston Gazette, quoted, 328.\\nBoundaries of United States as set-\\ntied by the treaty, 25.\\nBowdom, James, 143, 180-184, 319,\\n324.\\nBoyd, Lieutenant, 122.\\nBraddock, Edward, 305.\\nBradsliaw s Railway Guide, 171.\\nBrearley, David, 229, 246.\\nBribery, charges of, 328.\\nBritish army departs, 51.\\nBritish Constitution compared witU\\nAmerican, 290-298.\\nBuff and blue colours, 2.\\nBurgesses, House of, in Virgima, b5.\\nBurke, yEdanus, 110.\\nBurke, Edmund, his sympathy with\\nthe Americans, 2 could not see the\\nneed for parliamentgiry reform, 6\\nhis invective against Shelburne, 17 j\\non the slave-trade, 72.\\nButler, Pierce, 258.", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0387.jp2"}, "388": {"fulltext": "362\\nEngland, 296 srowtii of, m\\nCamden, Lord, 5.\\nCanada, Fra?!!?!;.,\\nshould be ced^dtnH^ff^^ at it\\n9, U. tlie United States,\\nCarleton, Sir Guv nc\\nJ^air, JJabney, 92 w.\\nt^arrington, Edward 04 ^07\\nCarroU, Daniel, 2^\\nCarrying trade, 1G3, 263\\nCartwnght, Edmund 267\\nCato,XdoS^^?:l^^\u00c2\u00ab*=^ -.87\\nCavendish, Lord John 5 ifi\\nCensors, council Of, ^liy,,^^,^\\nCeutmel, pseudonym, 313\\ncraStir^^:!^^:\\nChase, Samuel, 322\\nt^hatham. Lord, 188\\nCherry Valley, 129\\n197. ^\u00e2\u0080\u00a25^ 0 ginal name of\\nINDEX.\\nvidu system, 62\\nSn 3S*^L?J?--Y-tts eon-\\nCleveland GroVer h s S^^\\n294. ^nfl message,\\nS Torifs t persecution\\nnion of the sUteT?!\\nimpost amendment oon\\nthe Constitution 340 lnf\u00c2\u00b0Pr?\\nPresident Wa^hiw^ I entertams\\nClinton, SirS^^.\u00c2\u00b0?^*d:nner,350.\\nZ^r 311-\\nSagtl6r ^61.\\nCoke, Thomas, 86.\\nColumbia College, 125\\ng\u00e2\u0084\u00a2263 ^-entoCon-\\n^o^TJr^Zl^^^,^^^ States, CO.\\n290-298 In Nort/ r\u00c2\u00b0 England, 68;\\ns:s^r^^^^^^c^titu.\\nCoSrCo^ t- 92-98.\\nIll ^eakness, 56, 98, 102-113 J4\\nSsiTer \u00c2\u00ab^f-ter, 9l ,.^t\\ndelphia by dnrnkir f^? ^^a-\\nnt^rt54TS:l*^--ty,\\n185; PasseVordnance%\\nment of nortW=f ?^overn\\n203-206; refuses t^ territory,\\nconvention for rpfn. =ommend a\\nerument, 218 ^^I ^^Pg the gov-\\nfusal, 221 in somp rl\\nmatic rati er than a 7 Pf* P^o-\\n237; its mlgSnsT i- \u00c2\u00b0V\\nDates on tho n\u00e2\u0080\u009e o; de-\\nsubmits ft tolhe^tatf ir\\nto an end, 345 ^es, 308 comes\\nCongress, Fede nl\\nto. 270; choice nr ited\\nma, 146-151 kpe^\u00c2\u00ab ^eunsylva-\\nclearof paper mre; ^7\u00c2\u00b0o^* f^ T\\nclauns of, 189 laf. i.^ estern\\nConstitutiOT, 316 \u00c2\u00bbe\\nC-^ecticut comp;omise, the, 250-\\nrearKtStir^6r\u00c2\u00ab^*heAmeri-\\nConstitu^ion,embIematicfederalship.\\nCo-ention, the Federal, 154, 222-\\nConway, Gen. Henrv 5\\nCooper, Dr. Myles, W\\nCornwallis, Lord, 22, 51 340\\nCouncil, privy, 999\\nC-ardice of Inierican politicians,\\nCrawford, William, 51\\nCurtis, B. R., 276\\nCutler, Maaasseh, 203.\\nJ ane, Nathan, 204, 217 307\\nDajton, Jonathan, 225 999^-\\n^.243 28i;2S3,299,|i9 2 ^28, 242,\\nr theS\u00c2\u00b0 lV ^t.298.\\nE,ection^bylot,281;flrstpresidentiaI,\\nte adSfd tn-^^-\\npresident, T81-287 1?^\\nworkin r 988 Practical\\nElliot, Sir Gilbert, 3.\\n3 S;s:sbra.\\niimbargo acts, 142.", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0388.jp2"}, "389": {"fulltext": "INDEX.\\n367\\nnumbers of, in the several states,\\n266.\\nSmall states converted to federalism\\nby the Connecticut compromise,\\n55, 315.\\nSmith, Adam, 125, 154, 135.\\nSmith, Capt. John, 191.\\nSmith, Jonathan, 324-326.\\nSmith, Melanchthon, 340, 343, 344.\\nSmugglers, 135.\\nSouth Carolina, Episcopal church in,\\n78, 82 revokes five per cent, im-\\npost, 108 issues paper money, 109\\nabsolute need of conciliating her,\\n259, 200 makes bargain vpith New\\nEngland states, 2G2-2G7 debates\\non the Constitution, 332-334 rati-\\nfies it, 334.\\nSovereignty never belonged to sepa-\\nrate st.ites, 90.\\nSpain, treaty of 1783 with Great\\nBritain, 36 attempts to close Mis-\\nsissippi River, 208-211, 218, 335.\\nSpanish doUar, why it superseded\\nEnglish pound as unit of value in\\nAmerica, 166.\\nSpermaceti oil, 139, 163.\\nSpringfield arsenal, 181 185.\\nStates, powers denied to, 272.\\nStormont, Lord, 45.\\nStory, Joseph, 270.\\nStrachey, Sir Henry, 22.\\nStrong, Caleb, 228, 252, 279, 324,\\n327.\\nSuccession disputed, 289.\\nSuffrage, limitations upon, 70.\\nSugar trade, 138.\\nTemple, Lord, 44, 46.\\nTennessee, IS, 189, 199.\\nThayendanegea, 50.\\nThomas, Isaiah, 165.\\nTliompson, Gen., in Massacliusetts con-\\nvention, 324.\\nThurlow, Lord, 5.\\nTtuirstou, member of Virginia legisla-\\nture, 144.\\nTithing-men in New England, 76.\\nTobacco as currency in Virginia, 165.\\nTories, American see Loyalists.\\nTories, British, 42.\\nTownshend, Tliomas, 17.\\nTrade, barbarous superstitions about,\\n134.\\nTravelling, diflBculties of, a century\\nago, 61.\\nTreaty of 1783, difficulties in the way\\nof, 8 strange character of, 24 pro-\\nvisions of, 25-33 a great diplomatic\\nvictory for the Americans, 34, 189\\nsecret article relating to Florida\\nboundary, 33, 208; adopted, 45;\\nnews arrives in America, 50 Con-\\ngress unable to carry out its pro-\\nvisions, 119-132, 154.\\nTrespass Act in New York, 123-128-\\nTrevett vs. Weeden, 176.\\nTucker, Josiah, 58, 141.\\nTyler, John, the elder, 214, 337.\\nUnion, sentiment of, 55.\\nUnitariauism, 86.\\nUniversity men in Federal Conventionj\\n224.\\nVaughan, Benjamin, 22, 35.\\nVergemies, Count de, 12 wishes to\\nsatisfy Spain at the expense of the\\nUnited States, 18-21 thwarted by\\nJay, 22 accuses the Americans of\\nbad faith, 33 tired of sending loans,\\n104.\\nVermont, troubles in, 151-153 riots\\nin connection with the Shays rebel-\\nlion, 183.\\nVice-presidency, 282.\\nVictoria, Queen, 293.\\nViuceunes, riot m, 210.\\nViolence of political invective, 39.\\nVirginia, church and state in, 78-85\\non five per cent, impost, 104 paper\\nmoney in, 170 takes possession of\\nnorthwestern territory, 188-191\\ncedes it to tlie United States, 194\\nplan for new federal government,\\n233-242 its reception by the con-\\nvention, 242 compromise as to\\nrepresentation of slaves, 259-262;\\nresents the compromise between\\nSouth Carolina and the New Eng-\\nland states, 265 debates on tlie\\nConstitution, 335-337 ratifies it,\\n337.\\nVisionary young men, i. e., Hamil-\\nton, Madison, Gouverueur Morris,\\netc., 318.\\nWaddington, Joslma, 127.\\nWalpole, Horace, 16.\\nWalpole, Sir Robert, 296.\\nWar, the Civil, 55, 256, 262 contrast\\nwith Revolutionary, 101-103; cost\\nof Revolutionary, 106.\\nWashington, George, marches from\\nYorktowu to the Hudson River, 51\\ndisbands the army, 51 resigns his\\ncommand, 52 goes home to Mount\\nVernon, 53 his legacy to tlie\\nAmerican people, 54 on the riglit\\nof coercion, 100 urges half-pay for\\nretired officers, 106; supposed\\nscheme for making him king, 107\\nhis masterly speech at Newburgli,\\n110 president of the Cincinnati,\\n115 on the weakness of the con-\\nfederation, 162 wislies to hang\\nspeculators in breadstuffs, 164\\ndisapproves of Connecticut s reser-\\nvation of a tract of western land,\\n193 approves of Ohio Company,\\n203; his views on the need for\\ncanals between east and west, 212", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0389.jp2"}, "390": {"fulltext": "368\\nINDEX.\\nimportant meeting held at his\\nhouse, 214 is chosen delegate to\\nthe Federal Convention, 221 presi-\\ndent of the convention, 229 his\\nsolemn warning, 231, 303 his sug-\\ngestion as to the basis of represen-\\ntation, 252 asks if he shall put the\\n(luestion on the motion of WUson\\nand Pinokney, 277 disapproves of\\nelectuig executive by the legisla-\\nture, 279 sends draft of the Con-\\nstitution to Congress, 307 called a\\nfool by the Antifederalists, 313\\napproves of amendments, but op-\\nposes a second convention, 329\\nunanimously chosen president of\\nthe United States, 346 his journey\\nto New York, 349 his inaugura-\\ntion, 350.\\nWashington, William, 334.\\nWatson, Bishop of Llandaff, 83.\\nWatt, James, 60, 267.\\nWayne, Anthony, 50.\\nWealth as a basis of representation,\\n2.57.\\nWebster, Daniel, 56, 206, 276.\\nWebster, Pelatiah, 101, 228.\\nWeems, Mason, 83.\\nWesley, John, 85.\\nWest, Rev. Samuel, 322.\\nWest India trade, 138, 164.\\nWhigs, British, sympathize with revo-\\nlutionary party in America, 2.\\nWhiskey as currency in North Caro-\\nlina, 165.\\nWhite, Abraham, 324.\\nWhitefield, George, 85.\\nWhiteliill, Robert, 313.\\nWhitney, Eli, 267.\\nWilliam the Silent, 55.\\nWilson, James, 228, 243, 246, 248,251,\\n261, 274, 277, 279, 281, 282, 299, 300,\\n312, 313, 316.\\nWitenagemot, 66.\\nWorcester Spy, 165.\\nWraxall s Memoirs, 2.\\nWyoming, troubles in, 148-150.\\nWythe, George, 228.\\nYates, Robert, 225, 242, 244, 240, 254,\\n340, 341.\\nYazoo boundary, 33, 208.\\nLRBFelS", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0390.jp2"}, "391": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0391.jp2"}, "392": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2847", "width": "1620", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0392.jp2"}, "393": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2851", "width": "1591", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0393.jp2"}, "394": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2918", "width": "1773", "jp2-path": "criticalperiodof01fisk_0394.jp2"}}