{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2968", "width": "1931", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "Library of Congress,\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA.\\nChap\\nShelf", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "I.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF\\nECONOMICS AND POLITICS.\\nEDITED BY\\nRICHARD T. ELY, Ph.D., LL.D.\\nNumber Eight.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "Croiweirs iltftrars\\nOF\\nlEconomicis antr politics;*\\nVol. I. The Independent Treasury System of the\\nUnited States $1.50\\nBy DAVID KINLEY, Ph.D., Professor of Political\\nEconomy in the University of Illinois.\\nVol. II. Repudiation of State Debts in the United\\nStates $1.50\\nBy WILLIAM A, SCOTT, Ph.D., Associate Professor of\\nPolitical Economy in the University of Wisconsin.\\nVol. III. Socialisnn and Social Reform $1.50\\nBy RICHARD T. ELY, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of\\nPolitical Economy, and Director of the School of\\nEconomics, Political Science, and History in the\\nUniversity of Wisconsin.\\nVol. IV. American Charities. A Study in Philanthro-\\npy and Economics $1.75\\nBy AMOS G. WARNER, Ph.D., Professor of Eco-\\nnomics and Social Science in the Leiand Stan-\\nford, Jr., University.\\nVol. V. Hull-House Maps and Papers.\\nBy RESIDENTS OF HULL-HOUSE, Chicago, III.\\nillustrated with Colored Maps. 8vo $2.50\\nSpecial Edition with Maps mounted on Cloth.\\n8vo $3.50\\nVol. VI. Punishment and Reformation. An Historical\\nSketch of the Rise of the Penitentiary\\nSystem $1.75\\nBy FREDERICK H. WINES, LL.D.\\nVol. VII. Social Theory. A grouping of Social Facts\\nand Principles $1.75\\nBy JOHN BASCOM, Professor of Political Economy\\nand Political Science, Williams College.\\nVol. Vili. Proportional Representation $1.75\\nBy JOHN R. COMMONS, Professor of Sociology\\nin Syracuse University.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL\\nREPRESENTATION\\nJOHN R. COMMONS\\nProfessor of Sociology in Syracuse University\\nNEW YORK: 46 East uth Street\\nTHOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY\\nBOSTON: 100 Purchase Street", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "5 VSoo.\\nCopyright, 1896,\\nThomas Y. Crowell Company.\\nC. J. PETERS SON, TYPOGRAPHERS.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "I\\nx\\nPREFACE.\\nIt is intended, in this book to show the his-\\ntorical significance of the recent movement for\\nProportional Representation, and a detailed appli-\\ncation of the reform to American politics. Spe-\\ncial consideration is given to city government,\\nwhere, at present, other reforms are being tried,\\nand where, it is believed, this one, if it were nn-\\nderstood, would also be heartily accepted.\\nI am grateful for expert criticism on the proof,\\nreceived from Professor J. W. Jenlis of Cornell\\nUniversity, and Mr. Stoughton Cooley, Secretary\\nof the American Proportional Representation\\nLeague and for helpful suggestions from Pro-\\nfessor Richard T. Ely, the editor of this series.\\nJOHN R. COMMONS.\\nSybacuse University, January, 1896.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nCHAPTER. PAGE.\\nI. The Failure of Legislative Assemblies 1\\nII. The Okioin and Develoi ment of Repre-\\nsentative Assemblies 10\\nIII. The District System at Work 36\\nIV. The General Ticket, the Limited Vote,\\nthe Cumulative Vote 86\\nV. Proportional Representation 99\\nVI. Application of the Remedy 132\\nVII. Party Responsibility 163\\nVIII. City Government 197\\nIX. Social Reform 223\\nX. The Progress of Proportional Repre-\\nsentation 236\\nAPPENDIX.\\nI. The Distribution of Seats 271\\nII. The Hare Preferential Plan 279\\nIII. The Gove Bill. Legislative Represen-\\ntation 285\\nIV. Books, Periodicals, and Societies 292", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nCHAPTER I.\\nTHE FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES.\\nThe American people are fairly content with\\ntheir executive and judicial departments of gov-\\nernment, but they feel that their law-making\\nbodies have painfully failed. This conviction per-\\ntains to all grades of legislatures, municipal. State,\\nand Federal. The newspapers speak what the peo-\\nple feel and, judging therefrom, it is popular to\\ndenounce aldermen, legislators, and congressmen.\\nWhen Congress is in session, the business interests\\nare reported to be in agony until it adjourns. The\\ncry that rises towards the end of a legislature s\\nsession is humiliating. The San Francisco Bulle-\\ntin is quoted as saying\\nIt is not possible to speak in measured terms of the\\nthing that goes by the name of legislature in this State.\\nIt has of late years been the vilest deliberative body in the\\nworld. The assemblage has become one of bandits instead\\nof law-makers. Everything within its grasp for years has\\nbeen for sale. The commissions to high office which it con-\\nfers are the outward and visible signs of felony rather than\\nof careful and wise selection.\\nJ", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "2 PROPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nEvery State in the Union can furnish examples\\nmore or less approaching to this. Statements\\nalmost as extreme are made regarding Congress.\\nGreat corporations and syndicates seeking legis-\\nlative favors are known to control the acts of both\\nbranches. The patriotic ability and even the per-\\nsonal character of members are widely distrusted\\nand denounced.\\nThese outcries are not made only in a spirit of\\npartisanship, but respectable party papers denounce\\nunsparingly legislatures and councils whose ma-\\njorities are of their own political complexion.\\nThe people at large join in the attack. When\\nstatements so extreme as that given above are\\nmade by reputable papers and citizens, it is not\\nsurprising that the people at large have come\\nthoroughly to distrust their law-makers. Charges\\nof corruption and bribery are so abundant as to\\nbe taken as a matter of course. The honored\\nhistorical name of alderman has frequently become\\na stigma of suspicion and disgrace.\\nAs might be expected, this distrust has shown\\nitself in far-reaching constitutional changes. The\\npowers of State and city legislatures have been\\nclipped and trimmed until they offer no induce-\\nments for ambition. The powers of governors,\\nmayors, judges, and administrative boards have\\nbeen correspondingly increased. The growing\\npopularity of the executive veto is one of the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "FAILURE OF LEGlSLATlVF ASSEMBLIES. S\\nstartling facts of the times. President Hayes\\nvetoed more congressional bills than any prede-\\ncessor, and his record has been excelled by Presi-\\ndent Cleveland. A city has been known to turn\\nout in mass-meetings, and to illuminate the heav-\\nens with bonfires, in honor of a mayor s veto which\\nrescued it from outrages and robberies perpetrated\\nby its own lawfully elected city fathers. The\\nprevailing reform in municipal government is the\\ntransfer of legislative functions, and even legis-\\nlative discretion, from the city council to the\\nmayor.\\nOur municipal institutions were transplanted\\nfrom England. As in the English system, the\\nmunicipal council was supreme. It engrossed all\\nthe legislative and administrative powers of local\\ngovernment. It elected the mayor and heads of\\ndepartments. It governed its appointees through\\nits own committees. New York was the first city\\nto break from this simplicity, as it has since gone\\nfarthest in stripping the council of power. Uni-\\nversal distrust led first to the mayor s appoint-\\nment by the governor, then to his popular election,\\nand later to popular election of heads of depart-\\nments. Again, the control of finances was taken\\nfrom the council and placed in an ex-officio Board\\nof Estimate and Apportionment. The council\\nstill retained the right to confirm or reject the\\nmayor s appointees. Thus the unity of govern-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "4 PROPOBTtONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nment was lost. Responsibility was ravelled out\\ninto scores of aimless threads. Mr. A. H. Green,\\na few years ago, found eighty different boards\\nor individuals who could create debt indepen-\\ndently of each other. i Here was the oppor-\\ntunity of the boss and the party machine.\\nUnity must somehow be secured. The boss,\\na mere private citizen, gathered into his hands\\nthese scattered threads, and centralized the gov-\\nernment of the city in himself. He controlled\\nnominations and elections. He appointed and re-\\nmoved officers. He pitted council against mayor,\\nboards against council, subordinates against chiefs,\\nmaking them all responsible to him. But he was\\nresponsible to no one. The latest movement in\\nmunicipal reform is to legalize the boss in the\\nperson of the mayor, to give him sole power to\\nappoint and remove all heads of departments, but\\nto elect him by popular vote and make him re-\\nsponsible to the people. The movement is not\\nyet completed. The council remains a shrivelled\\nand vicious relic. Logically, it should be abol-\\nished or reformed.\\nA similar movement, though later in time, is\\naffecting State legislatures. The governor has\\nbeen considerably exalted, but the movement is\\nas yet mainly in the stage of independent boards,\\nclothed with certain legislative and administrative\\n1 L. Williams, Arena, vol. ix., p. 644.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 5\\nauthority. Where the governor at first appointed\\nthese boards, as in the case of the Railway Com-\\nmissioners of Iowa, popular election is substituted.\\nThe Constitutions of the new States of North and\\nSouth Dakota, Montana, and Washington, may be\\nconsidered as stating the thought of the American\\npeople at the present time regarding their legisla-\\ntures.i Several administrative boards are created\\nin these new States, all filled by popular elec-\\ntion. Among these are commissions to supervise\\nand regulate insurance, railroads, agriculture and\\nlabor, prisons, and public lands. These commis-\\nsions absorb, in various degrees, the powers of\\nlegislatures, executives, and judges. They are the\\nnondescript, many-headed agents of the people\\ndistrusting the legislature, but not yet ready to\\nconfide everything to the governor s autocracy.\\nIf it be inferred that these commissions are\\ncreated not to belittle, but to enlighten, the\\nlegislature, and to act as its agents, we need\\nonly notice the maze of constitutional restrictions\\nthrown about all legislative acts. The articles\\nin the new State Constitutions on the legislative\\ndepartment are long and detailed. They seem\\nto be composed by the framers in order to declare\\nwhat the respective State legislatures cannot be\\npermitted to do. [They declare] by what\\n1 See article by F. N. Thorpe in Annals of the American\\nAcademy of Political and Social Science, September, 1891.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "6 PJROPOBTIONAL MEPit^SENTATtON.\\nprocedure the legislature shall act, on what it\\nshall not act, and to what extent it may act.\\nThe chief limitations on the legislature are with\\nrespect to special or private legislation, corpora-\\ntions, political corruption among members, taxa-\\ntion, and power to use the credit of the State.\\nThese constitutional restrictions, extending to\\nlegislatures and municipal councils, have forced\\nanother branch of government, the judiciary, to\\nthe front. Conscious of popular approval, judges\\nhave steadily encroached upon the field of legisla-\\ntive discretion, and reluctantly, it may be, have\\nmore and more assumed the right to set aside\\nlegislative statutes. This interference, however\\njustifiable the reasons, is fraught with danger to\\nthe judiciary. It is thereby, at the expense of its\\nintegrity in the field of administration and justice,\\nforced into the political arena, where are the\\nheated questions of political expediency. Popular\\nelection of judges, short terms, and partisanship\\nwill result. The executive, says Judge Horace\\nDavis,^ all-powerful at the beginning [of colonial\\nhistory], was reduced to a mere shadow of its\\nformer glory, and in these later days is regaining\\nsome of its lost power. The legislature, at first\\nweak, afterwards absorbed the powers of the other\\n1 Thorpe, as above, p. 17.\\n2 American Constitutions, Jolins Hopkins University\\nStudies in History and Politics, 3d series, pp. 55, 59.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 7\\ndepartments, but is now much reduced again.\\nThroughout all these changes the dignity and\\npower of the judges have steadily increased.\\nTheir greatest power, most amazing to Europeans,\\nis the authority to set aside a statute which they\\nhold to be in conflict with the written Constitu-\\ntion. No other courts in the world possess this\\nunique power. The scope of this power\\nis much broadened by the modern tendency to\\nlimit legislation. The early Constitutions were\\nvery brief, containing usually little more than a\\nbill of rights and a skeleton of the government,\\nleaving all details to the discretion of the legisla-\\nture. Now all this is changed the bounds of the\\ndifferent departments are carefully defined, and\\nthe power of the legislature is jealously curbed,\\nparticularly in the domain of special legislation.\\nIt will be seen at a glance that this enlarges the\\nrelative power of the courts. It limits the legisla-\\nture and widens the field of the judiciary at one\\nstroke.\\nNot only do the judges pretend to override\\nthe legislatures, but their exalted position renders\\nthem confidently autocratic in other directions.\\nThey are learning to dispense with juries, to dan-\\ngerously widen the scope of injunctions, and to\\npunish for contempt in cases not contemplated in\\nour Constitutions. The legislatures and Congress,\\nwhich are legally in a position to check these usur-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "8 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\npations, are practically helpless from their lack of\\nability and their loss of popular confidence.\\nThis demoralization of legislative bodies, these\\ntendencies to restrict legislation, must be viewed\\nas a profoundly alarming feature of American\\npolitics. Just as the duties of legislation are in-\\ncreasing as never before, in order to meet the vital\\nwants of a complex civilization, the essential or-\\ngans for performing those duties are felt to be in\\na state of collapse. The legislature controls the\\npurse, the very life-blood of the city, the State,\\nthe nation. It can block every other depart-\\nment. It ought to stand nearest to the lives, the\\nwishes, the wisdom, of the people. It is their\\nnecessary organ for creating, guiding, watching,\\nand supporting all the departments of govern-\\nment. Above them all, then, it ought to be\\neminently representative. But it is the least rep-\\nresentative of all. Surely, then, for the American\\npeople beyond all others, and in a high degree,\\ntoo, for all peoples who are developing popular\\ngovernment, it is pertinent to inquire carefully\\ninto the fundamental nature of these representa-\\ntive institutions, the causes of their failures, and\\nthe means, if any can be found, to adapt them to\\nthe exigencies of modern times.\\nWhy is it that a legislative assembly, which in\\nour country s infancy summoned to its halls a\\nMadison or a Hamilton to achieve the liberties", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 9\\nof the peoj)le, has now fallen so low that our\\npublic spirited men hesitate to approach it? The\\nmunicipal council in early times, as now in Eng-\\nland and Germany, comprised the stanchest men\\nof the community. The American Congress was\\nonce the arena for a Webster, a Clay, a Calhoun,\\nwhose debates a nation followed. If it can be\\nshown by what means representative assemblies\\nformerly enrolled the honored leaders of the peo-\\nple, and met precisely the problems of the day,\\nwe may be able to see how the social -and political\\nconditions of to-day, resulting from changes of the\\npast fifty years, have outgrown those early institu-\\ntions, and rendered their original fitness a dis-\\nastrous encumbrance.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "10 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\nCHAPTEE II.\\nTHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OP\\nREPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES.\\nA STEIKESTG feature of social evolution is the\\ndecay and obstruction of institutions which in\\ntheir day were essential to progress. The funda-\\nmental changes in society are unobtrusive. The\\nincrease of wealth and intelligence, the rise of cor-\\nporations, the combinations of labor, the spread of\\ndemocracy, the deepening of religion, the unfold-\\ning of new ideals and hopes, these are the fun-\\ndamental motives and objects of social growth.\\nLaws, legislatures, commissions, courts, are the\\nmachinery and devices whereby the people work\\nout their ideals. If the work to be done changes,\\nthe machinery becomes obsolete. It may be aban-\\ndoned altogether, as was slavery or it may be re-\\nvised and readapted, as when the king, an heredi-\\ntary executive, was displaced by the president, an\\nelected executive provided always that tha good\\nfruits of the past be not jeopardized.\\nRepresentative assemblies were devised to meet\\ncertain social ends; they sprang from historical\\nconditions. It is in the changing character of\\nthese ends and conditions that the modern prob-\\nlems of representation have arisen,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 11\\n1. The original object which pi-ocluced repre-\\nsentative assemblies was nationalization. Tliis is\\nshown in the twofold aspect of the union of local\\ngovernments into a nation, and the coalescence of\\nsocial classes in a single representative assembly.\\n(1.) The English nation, from which our repre-\\nsentative institutions were inherited, was formed\\nby welding together independent local communi-\\nties into a central organization, without destroy-\\ning the local governments. Previous experiments\\nin nationalization had resulted in the tyranny of\\nthe capital city and the slavery of the provinces.\\nThe reason is plain to every historical student,\\nand the same forces were working to the same\\noutcome in England. But the principle of rep-\\nresentation, almost unknown to the ancients, was\\ndiscovered and it permitted the unity of a nation,\\nwhile preserving the freedom of the localities.\\nThe primitive idea of a law-making body was\\nthe primary assembly of all the warriors. The\\nking and his chief adviser sagreed on resolutions,\\nand offered them to a simple yea and nay vote of\\nthe army. Every freeman had the right to appear\\nin his own person in the national assembly. After\\nthe Norman conquest this right was retained in\\ntheory, but abandoned in practice. Gradually\\nonly the wealthy land-owners, the tenants in chief,\\nand the higher clergy appeared. The distances\\nwere too great, the expense too heavy, and their", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "12 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\ninfluence too sliglit, for the small land-owners to\\ncontinue attendance. And as for tlie serfs and\\nthe town merchants and artisans, they never had\\nthe right. Thus the king and his council of\\nmagnates became the sole government of Eng-\\nland. They enacted the laws and controlled their\\nenforcement. The people had no voice, neither\\nwere they represented.\\nSlowly two forces were at work. The king\\ngave away his private estates, upon which he was\\nsupposed to support himself and his administra-\\ntion, and was therefore compelled to look else-\\nwhere for funds. During the same time the\\nunrepresented classes of small farmers and town\\nmerchants and workmen were acquiring wealth.\\nThe king was forced to ask them for contribu-\\ntions, or subsidies, to help him in his wars.\\nExperience showed that these aids could not be\\nsecured by compulsion. The king must obtain\\nthe consent of his subjects. Neither could their\\nhearty consent and co-operation be obtained when\\nthey were approached privately and individually.\\nThey must have the king s affairs laid before them\\nin assembly, and the state of his exchequer ex-\\nplained. But a national primary assembly of all\\nthe people was impossible. However, there was\\nin existence the more or less well-organized county\\ngovernment, with a history running far back into\\nAnglo-Saxon times. Here was a convenient pri-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "HEP RESENT ATIVE ASSEMBLIES. lo\\nmaiy assembly of all the landowners, twice a year\\nat the county seat, when the king s justices made\\ntheir circuit. Here the germs of representation\\nhad appeared in the practice of electing juries to\\npresent the criminal matters of the county before\\nthe king s judges, and of electing assessors to levy\\nthe king s taxes upon the county.^ Also there\\nwas a true legislative representation in the prac-\\ntice of the rural towns and the boroughs, which\\nsent delegates to the county courts. Very natu-\\nrally, it occurred to the king to ask this county\\nprimary to elect two good and discreet knights,\\nwho should represent the land-owners before him,\\nand hear and act upon his demands.^\\nIn the towns, also, had quietly grown up the\\nmerchant and craft guilds, compact organizations\\nof tradesmen and manufacturers, with mutual in-\\nterests mutually protected. When the king could\\nno longer wring from them money by coercion, he\\ninvited them to send their two accredited dele-\\ngates for a national gathering of guild represen-\\ntatives.\\nWhat is the significance of these devices? In\\nancient Rome the tax collectors swarmed from the\\nimperial city with proconsuls and armies at their\\nbacks, to exact arbitrary tribute from the prov-\\n1 Stubbs, Constitutional History, vol. i., p. 586.\\n2 These were first summoned in 1254, by Henry III., on occa-\\nsion of a military campaign into Gascony.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "14 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ninces. Provincial self-government, and with it\\nliberty and rights of property, were destroyed. In\\nEngland the provinces joined with the central\\ngovernment, through their elected representatives,\\nin determining the rate of taxation and in assess-\\ning it to individuals. Concessions in turn were\\nmade by the king, grievances were redressed, local\\nself-government, and with it liberty and rights of\\nproperty, were maintained.\\n(2) The union of localities alone does not\\nform a nation there must be added the union of\\nclasses. The first was the work of the thirteenth\\ncentury, the second of the fourteenth. At the\\nend of the thirteenth century there were at least\\nfour legislative assemblies, each representing a\\ndistinct class. They hardly deserved the name\\nof legislatures they were rather conventions of\\ndifferent social classes, negotiating with the king\\nat separate times and places, regarding their own\\nparticular class interests. They did not meet to-\\ngether. Each convention separately enacted laws\\nwith the consent of the king. In 1336 a council\\nof merchants from twenty-one cities agreed with\\nthe king to increase customs on wool, to extend\\nmonopolies, and enlarge the privileges of trade.\\nSuch matters were considered to affect only mer-\\nchants and townsmen. In the thirteenth century\\nmilitary tenants and land-owners, including the\\n1 Stubbs, Constitutional History, vol. ii., p. 379.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "BEPEESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 15\\nrepresentatives from the counties, enacted the great\\nstatutes, De Donis, Quia Umptores^ and others,\\nregulating the holding of real property, without\\nconsulting the burgesses and clergy. The clergy\\nalso managed their large estates and voted taxes\\nthereon without reference to other assemblies\\nand the laws of a political nature, such as those\\naffecting Ireland and Wales, or foreign relations,\\nwhich were not supposed to affect clergy, knights,\\nor burgesses, were enacted by the Great Council\\nwithout consulting these popular bodies.^\\nBy the end of the fourteenth century, these as-\\nsemblies were combined in the House of Lords\\nand the House of Commons. Here were the\\nsteps: The clergy were gradually deprived of\\ntheir power to legislate. The higher clergy then\\nsimply retained the place they had always held\\nin the Great Council, and this became the modern\\nHouse of Lords. The lower clergy were merged\\ninto the electorate of the counties and towns.\\nAgain, the representatives from the small land-\\nowners of the counties, and those from the guilds\\nof the towns, were drawn together by common\\ninterests against Idng and nobility. They elected\\na speaker to present their petitions to the king,\\nand thus, in time, became the House of Com-\\nmons.\\nTliis legislative assembly, therefore, was based\\n1 Hearn, Government of England, pp. 423-428.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "16 PBOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nupon two principles, the representation of local-\\nities and the representation of the two organized\\nsocial classes, town capitalists and conntrj farm-\\ners, which governed those localities.\\nThis was the original problem of representation.\\nHow different is it now Not only the kingdom\\nof England, but the United Kingdom of Eng-\\nland, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, has become a\\nnation. Localities have lost their significance\\nand their sanctity. Certain sections, like Ireland,\\nretain apparently local, but really class, griev-\\nances. On the whole, railways, telegraph, the\\npress, internal trade, and representation itself,\\nhave brought the people together. Foreign rela-\\ntions, a world-wide system of colonies, national\\narmies and navies, have exalted a national flag\\nand inspired a national patriotism. No longer\\nwould it be tolerable to leave the laws upon the\\ntariff to merchants and importers, land-laws to\\nreal-estate owners, foreign relations to the nobil-\\nity, or church taxation to the clergy. The repre-\\nsentative to-day is therefore not a mere agent of\\na close corporation or a social class. After five\\ncenturies, Edmund Burke could say, Parliament\\nis not a congress of ambassadors from different\\nand hostile interests, which interests each must\\nmaintain, as an agent and advocate, against other\\nagents and advocates but Parliament is a deliber-\\native assembly of our nation, with one interest,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "BEPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 17\\nthat of the whole, where not local purposes, not\\nlocal prejudices, ought to guide, but the general\\ngood, resulting from the general reason of the\\nwhole. You choose a member, indeed, but when\\nyou have chosen him, he is not a member of\\nBristol, but he is a member of Parliament.\\nIn America, too, the problem of representative\\ngovernment has been that of nationalization. It\\nhas passed three stages. First, counties and towns\\nwere united into colonies second, colonies united\\nin the Confederation third. States formed the na-\\ntion. By the first, the State legislatures arose\\nby the third, the national Congress.\\nJust as the physical child, according to the\\nbiologists, repeats in a brief time its ancestral\\nhistory of geological ages, so did the colonies,\\nthe children of English political institutions, re-\\npeat in a few years the slow and painful evolution\\nof centuries. The stages are best recorded in\\nMaryland.2 Originally the Constitution, as framed\\nby the proprietor, consisted of the governor, ap-\\npointed by the proprietor, a council, appointed by\\nthe governor, and a primary assembly of all the\\nfreemen. At first all could attend. But settle-\\nments expanded over a wide area. At the second\\nassembly, in 1638, those who could not attend\\n1 Address to the electors of Bristol, Collected Works,\\nLondon, 1854. Bonn, vol. i., p. 447.\\n2 See Doyle, English Colonies in America. Virginia, Mary-\\nland, and the Carolinas, p. 286 S,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "18 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\nin person were allowed to send proxies. But\\nproxies were apparently bought up by the governor\\nand his council in order to override the popular\\nwish. In 1639 the third assembly met. On this\\noccasion the various hundreds were instructed\\nto elect representatives. Yet, after the election,\\none person, at least, came forward and claimed the\\nright of appearing in person, on the ground that\\nhe had voted in the minority and so was not\\nrepresented. The claim was allowed. In 1642\\nthe assembly became typically representative by\\nexcluding the proxies and those appearing in\\ntheir own right, and limiting its membership to\\nthose elected by the localities. Thus the linger-\\ning hope of doing justice to the unrepresented\\nminority was abandoned. But the colony was\\nunited on the basis of local interests.\\nIn the colony of Massachusetts Bay we find\\nagain similar conditions and a similar outcome.\\nThe growth of fresh settlements brought with it\\nan expansion of the constitutional machinery of\\nthe colony. The Constitution of Massachusetts\\nwas older than the existence of the colony. The\\nlegislature of the colony was simply the general\\ncourt of the company transferred across the At-\\nlantic. At the same time the dispersal of the\\nsettlers at once unfitted that body for the work\\nof legislation. The remedy first applied to this\\ndifficulty was, not to substitute a representative", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 19\\nassembly for a primary one, but to limit the func-\\ntions of the court. It is clear that there was an\\noligarchical temper at work among the leading\\nmen in Massachusetts. The action of this Avas\\nplainly shown by the transfer of all legislative\\nrights from the court of freemen to the governor,\\ndeputy-governor, and assistants. At the same time\\nthe election of the governor was handed over from\\nthe freemen to the assistants.\\nTrue to English precedent, Massachusetts\\nfound the salvation of her constitutional liberties\\nin a question of taxation. When the governor\\nhad intended to change his abode to Newtown,\\nthe assembly resolved to fortify that settlement at\\npublic charge. To meet the cost a rate was\\nlevied on each town by order of the governor and\\nassistants. Against this the men of Watertown\\nprotested. Though the men of Watertown\\ngave way on the main issue, their protest seems\\nto have borne fruit. In the next year the powers\\nof the governor were formally defined by an act.\\nIt was also enacted by the General Court, in the\\nfollowing May, that the whole body of freemen\\nshould choose the governor, deputy-governor, and\\nassistants. A farther step towards self-govern-\\nment was taken in the resolution that every town\\nshould appoint two representatives to advise the\\ngovernor and assistants on the question of taxa-\\ntion. We can hardly err in supposing that this", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "20 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nwas the direct result of the protest made by the\\nmen of Watertown. i\\nIt was in Connecticut that the origin of repre-\\nsentative government first appears as a federation\\nof independent towns, rather than a local repre-\\nsentation to resist a central authority. The three\\ntowns which had been settled along the Connecti-\\ncut River united in 1638, and formally declared\\nthemselves a commonwealth with a Constitution\\nof their own. A system of representation\\nwas adopted at once, instead of being slowly\\nworked out through a series of expedients and\\ncompromises. The legislature was to consist of\\na governor, six assistants, and deputies. The gov-\\nernor and assistants were to be elected annually\\nby the whole body of freemen, met in a general\\nCQurt for that purpose. The deputies were to be\\nelected by the three existing towns, four from each.\\nAs fresh towns were formed, their number of repre-\\nsentatives was to be fixed by the government.\\nOther colonies passed through similar experi-\\nences. A common form of representation was\\ndeveloped in them all. It was exactly suited to\\nthe needs of an independent, but busy and scat-\\ntered farming and land-owning constituency, in\\ntheir efforts to combine and resist the royal and\\noligarchical tendencies of the times.\\n1 Doyle, The Puritan Colonies, vol. i., pp. 103-106.\\n2 Ibid., pp. 159, 160.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "ttEPRESENTATtVE ASSEMBLIES. 21\\nTlie Confederation was a temporary experiment\\nin nationalization which served the purposes of\\nrevolt against England, but failed in peace.\\nIn the Constitution of the United States two\\nprinciples are recognized, representation of States\\nin the Senate, representation of the people in the\\nHouse. But in both cases representation is based\\non residence. Pre-eminently, sections are repre-\\nsented.\\nThe problem of nationalization has been solved,\\nnot by Congress, however, which proved inade-\\nquate, but by civil war. The days of the bright-\\nest glory of Congress were those preceding the\\nwar, when the question of the Union was de-\\nbated. Sections have yet their claims in a nation\\nas wide as ours, but social and economic and class\\nquestions have overshadowed them. Foreign re-\\nlations, currency, customs duties, are national\\nquestions. The war amendments have brought\\ncitizenship and rights of property under Federal\\nprotection. Federal control has reached out for\\nthe two most important business interests, banking\\nand railways. Federal interference has grown into\\nmarvellous ramifications and, with the consolida-\\ntion of national trusts and syndicates, we may\\nexpect to see it still further extended. The sig-\\nnificance of these momentous changes will appear\\nwhen we proceed to the development of modern\\npolitical parties.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "22 PMOPOMTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nIt has appeared from the preceding pages that\\nthe origin of representative assemblies in State\\nand national governments depended upon the pre-\\nvious existence of organized local governments\\nseparated by wide territorial areas. This neces-\\nsitated the adoption of what has become the\\ndistrict system of electing single delegates to\\nrepresent semi-autonomous governments. Such\\na system has still its justification in many re-\\nspects, especially in a country as extended as the\\nUnited States, with its sectional differences of\\nclimate, resources, products, and people. But\\nwhy this system should survive to the present\\nday in the election of city legislatures is one of\\nthe enigmas of politics, to be solved by reference\\nto the traditions and inertia of mankind. In the\\nUnited States and new countries there are not\\neven historical reasons for the growth of this\\nsystem. Here the transition from primary assem-\\nblies was made simply by way of imitation. It\\nwas to England that the framers of our municipal\\nconstitutions turned when our cities had advanced\\nbeyond a size convenient for the ancient popular\\nassembly. It is, therefore, in the origin of Eng-\\nlish cities that we shall find the explanation of\\nthe origin of the district system.\\nThe earliest records seem to indicate that Eng-\\nlish cities were simply concentrated hundreds and\\ncounties. In Norman times, the larger cities were", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 23\\norganized like counties, with their sheriff, their\\ncounty court, composed of all the freeholders of\\nthe county, and the historical representatives from\\nthe townships. Here we have the origin of coun-\\ncilmen elected from the wards, the condensed\\ntownships. But the city was not at all an or-\\nganic body, with recognized common interests.\\nIt was a curious mixture of all the different in-\\nterests which happened to be thrown together in\\nthe neighborhood. In primitive London there\\nwere the original military tenants of the crown,\\nwith their independent manors and courts and\\ntheir agricultural serfs there were the parishes,\\ngoverned by the bishop and the chapter and the\\nmonasteries; and there were the guilds, admin-\\nistered by their own officers and administering\\ntheir own property. Over all these jarring inter-\\nests the sheriff presided as the representative of\\nthe king.\\nBut the circumstances of the times and the\\nneeds of defence drew the residents nearer to-\\ngether in common interests. This appears first\\nin the development of the guilds of merchants.\\nThrough commerce they gained wealth this\\nbrought political power and soon the merchant\\nguild absorbed the law-making power of the en-\\ntire city, its charter became the city charter, and\\nits maire the city mayor.\\n1 See Stubbs, vol. i., p. 407.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "24 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nIn still later times, when manufactures arose\\ninto prominence alongside merchandizing, new\\nguilds were organized, representing different\\ntrades. There were the weavers, the shoema-\\nkers, the goldsmiths, the butchers, and many\\nothers. Each of these craft-guilds had its own\\npresident, the alderman. They soon demanded\\na share in the city government, which was finally\\ngranted and their aldermen were given the right\\nto sit together as a law-making body, each rep-\\nresenting his own guild. In the reign of Ed-\\nward II., all the citizens were obliged to be\\nenrolled among the trade-guilds, and in the reign\\nof Edward III. the election of the city magis-\\ntrates was transferred from the representatives\\nof the ward-moots to the trading companies.\\nThus, to-day, London, and the municipal system\\ngenerally, has in the mayor a relic of the com-\\nmunal idea, in the alderman the representative\\nof the guild, and in the councillors of the wards\\nthe successors to the rights of the most ancient\\ntownship system.\\nThe question arises, How came it that so ra-\\ntional a system as the election of aldermen by the\\ndifferent organized interests of the cities should\\nhave been displaced by the arbitrary system of\\nelection by territorial districts or wards The\\n1 Stubbs, vol. i., p. 419.\\n2 Ihid., p. 424.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 25\\nanswer is Ijrief. The ancient system itself was\\npractically an election by wards, because the dif-\\nferent trades Avere grouped together, each in its\\nown district of the city. And when the federa-\\ntion of guilds was abolished and elections thrown\\nojjen to a widened suffrage, it seemed wholly nat-\\nural to continue that district system which was\\nseen to be in vogue in the covmties and in the\\nelection of councilmen.\\nWhen American cities adopted representative\\ngovernment, they adopted the English district\\nsystem. The transition is vividly portrayed in\\nthe history of Boston.^ Until the year 1822 the\\ngovernment of Boston had been a primary as-\\nsembly. On the 1st of May, 1822, the popula-\\ntion had grown to 45,000, the qualified voters to\\n7,000 or 8,000, too many for a primary assembly.\\nIn that year the General Court of Massachusetts\\ndrew up a charter entitled An Act establishing\\nthe City of Boston. It was presented to the\\nvoters of Boston, and accepted by a vote of 2,797\\nto 1,881. As authorizing the fii st depart-\\nure from the system of local government wliicli\\nhad been in operation nearly two centuries, it was\\nregarded as a measure of the very highest impor-\\ntance. Not a few of the old residents, who had\\n1 J. M. Bugbee, The City Government of Boston, in Jolms\\nHopldns University Studies in History and Political Science,\\n5tli series, j). 95.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "26 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nfouglit under tlie eyes of Washington in the field,\\nand under the eyes of Samuel Adams in the town\\nmeetings, looked upon the act which divided their\\ngreat folk-mote into twelve separate and silent\\ngatherings, where men delegated their rights to\\nothers, as the beginning of the end of democratic\\ngovernment.\\nLittle need be said about the differences be-\\ntween the original problems of representation in\\ncities, and those of their present development. The\\ncity is, above all political organizations, a unit\\nin itself. Aldermen and councillors should not\\nrepresent wards, they should represent the city.\\nThe ward has no place in city politics except,\\nperhaps, as an administrative division. It is well\\nrecognized that cities present the most aggravated\\nfailures of American politics and, so far as the\\nlegislative branch is concerned, the failure lies\\nmainly in this unnatural partition into petty dis-\\ntricts.\\n2. Proceeding from these historical conditions,\\nwe can j)erceive the impressive significance of the\\nmodern growth of national political parties. Be-\\nfore there were national questions there were no\\nnational parties, and even the early development\\nof party divisions was on territorial lines. The\\nWhigs were almost unknown in the counties, and\\nthe Tories unknown in the cities. Consequently,\\nthere was no important minority in either division", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 27\\nwhicli was unrepresented. Cities were unanimous\\non national questions, and so were the counties,\\nbecause the only important question they had to\\nmeet was the demand of the king for additional\\nsubsidies. More or less, the distinction between\\ncity and county continues in England to the\\npresent day. The original representatives of the\\nagricultural and the capitalist classes, whose co-\\nalescence formed the nation, have carried their\\ncUfferent interests into the House of Commons.\\nAnd now that the king is only a figurehead, and\\nthe House of Lords an occasional check, the\\nHouse of Commons has become almost supreme\\nSocial and economic questions divide its members\\nand they group themselves in national parties, to\\ncontend, not against Idng and lords, but among\\nthemselves.\\nIn the United States, on the other hand, the\\ncorporate, autonomous character of local govern-\\nments is scarcely recognized in the creation of\\nrepresentative districts. District lines are fre-\\nquently changed cities have grown up, and have\\nbeen grouped with rural areas the apportion-\\nment of representatives is wholly territorial. Con-\\nsequently, in the countiy at large the national\\nparties which have grown up are often evenly di-\\nvided in the territorial districts, and a representa-\\ntive of the majority, therefore, does not represent\\nthe opinions and wishes of the mass of his con-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "28 PEOPORTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nstituency. Tlie minority is simply discarded for\\ntlie time being.\\nIn tlie United States the power of political\\nparties lias readied a vigor unattained by those\\nof any other country. This power is the growth\\nof not more than fifty years. It has made its\\ngreatest advances since the period of the civil\\nwar. The peculiar feature of this development\\nhas been the supremacy of that new force in polit-\\nical parties, the machine. Party organization\\nis an essential element of party government but\\nthe extent, perfection, and detail of this organiza-\\ntion in the United States are bewildering. It con-\\ntrols both candidates and voters with an iron-like\\ngrip, and they glory in their subjection. These\\nparties are not divided on territorial lines. They\\nare divided mainly on national questions.\\nIn colonial times parties were unknown. Or\\nrather, we might say, there was a court party, or\\na party of prerogative, represented by the gov-\\nernor and his council, while the legislatures, the\\nrepresentative bodies, stood practically for a united\\npeople. The upper house being appointed by the\\ngovernor, the lower house was drawn together as\\na single unit, representing all the people. No\\nmatter from what county a representative was\\nreturned, he was the ablest man in the county,\\nfor the people were unanimous in their wishes to\\nwithstand the party of prerogative. Furthermore,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "BEPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 29\\nthe districts were all alike, being exclusively agri-\\ncultural, and the representative from one was in\\nharmony with the people of the others. There\\nwas no minority in any district to be unrepre-\\nsented by a delegate chosen by the majority.\\nBut to-day the legislature, whether in cit}\\nState, or nation, instead of being the organized\\nrepresentatives of those who protest against the\\ngovernment, is itself the government. Within its\\nwalls occur the struggles for the control of the\\nfortunes and destinies of the people. There is no\\noutside enemy whose constant presence enforces\\nharmony and mutual help. Two national parties\\nstand face to face in constant conflict, and which-\\never masters the legislature masters the people.\\n3. Furthermore, from the earliest times, the suf-\\nfrage, both in England and the United States, was\\nnarrowly limited. The masses of the people were\\nnot considered as citizens, or entitled to politi-\\ncal weight. In the counties, serfs, copyholders,\\nand the lesser freemen were excluded from the\\nsuffrage. Only the freehold knights were voters.\\nThe cities were close corporations, made up of\\nthe mayor and aldermen, and a few of the leading\\nmen of the guilds. Altogether, perhaps not one-\\nfifth of the adult male population was entitled to\\nvote for representatives to Parliament. As a re-\\nsult, on the few questions of national interest on\\nwhich they were required to select representatives,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "80 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nthe ruling classes in their respective districts were\\npractically unanimous. The trial of representa-\\ntive government in England on a democratic basis\\ndid not really begin until after the years 1867 and\\n1884, when the town and country laborers were\\nenfranchised. And if the failure of these institu-\\ntions is more complete in the United States than\\nin England, it is mainly because we have been\\nlonger trying to solve the problems of democracy\\nwith an aristocratic and capitalistic form of repre-\\nsentation. For it must be remembered, as already\\nshown, that the local government and liberty\\nwhich representation preserved to Englishmen\\nwas the government and Hberty of land-owners\\nand capitalists, and not primarily of serfs and\\nlaborers.\\nIn colonial times, also, the local governments\\nwere close corporations, and the representation by\\ndistricts suited their purposes. In the South a\\nfew aristocratic slave-holding families, united by\\nties of blood and marriage, controlled each county\\ngovernment. They could come together often\\nin social and business meetings, and, like the di-\\nrectors of a modern business corporation, could\\nchoose their agents and attorneys to conduct the\\ncounty government and to represent them in the\\nState and national legislatures. They selected\\nthe ablest men they could find. They wanted\\ntheir property and their independence well pro-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 31\\ntected. And in New England the church mem-\\nbers alone, that is, the wealthy and educated\\nclasses of the community, held the suffrage. In\\nMassachusetts, in 1780, only 4 per cent of the\\npopulation were voters in 1890, 29.7 per cent.^\\nIn the United States, to-day, not only the origi-\\nnal Anglo-Saxon is admitted to the suffrage, but\\nalso milhons from antagonistic races. Especially\\nis this true of the large cities, where 50 per cent\\nto 80 per cent of the voters are foreign-born and\\nchildren of foreigners.^ If England is tlu-eatened\\nby the widening of the suffrage, far more is the\\nRepublic of America. The great political ques-\\ntions of to-day are those which grow out of the\\ncitizenship of the manual laborers, the former\\nserfs. These questions have to do directly or re-\\nmotely with the profound problem of the owner-\\nship of wealth and the betterment of the social\\n1 See A. B. Hart, Practical Essays on American Govern-\\nment, pp. 35, 54.\\nA representative assembly may be seen to-day emerging in\\ntbe Empire of India, and the methods of election there to be\\nobserved illustrate precisely the advantages of limited suffrage\\nand viva voce voting in primitive English and colonial constitu-\\nencies. The natives are unrepresented in the British government\\nof the empire, but they have recently instituted representative\\nassemblies to consult and petition the India Council and the\\nCrown. The delegates to these assemblies are voted for in the\\nvarious localities by only the high-caste, educated, and wealthy\\nclasses, numbering, j^erhaps, 15 per cent of the population, and\\nthey are elected by acclamation. They are in all cases the most\\ndistinguished men of their constituencies.\\n2 Hart, as above, pp. 19G, 198.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "32 PBOPORTIONAL BEPEESENTATION.\\nconditions of tlie lowest classes. These classes are\\ndistributed tlirongliout all districts. They form\\nthe wide foundation structure of every community,\\nupon which the other classes are built. They\\ncompose the majority of the voters. They feel\\nthat they have not heretofore been represented in\\nthe councils of the city, the State, or the nation.\\nThey are unaccustomed to political control, and\\ntherefore they are the fertile soil for demagogues\\nand partisans. They hold the balance of power.\\nThey must be placated and pacified. The party\\nor candidate who presents to them the most spe-\\ncious appeals wins the day. They themselves are\\nnot allowed to combine according to their natural\\ndivisions, and elect their acknowledged leaders to\\nthe council, the legislature, and Congress. Could\\nthey combine throughout the nation, the labor\\nunions, scattered as they are through a hundred\\ndistricts, would unite, and the more intelligent of\\nthe laborers would have influence in selecting\\nthose who represent them as a body, just as they\\nselect their national presidents and secretaries. As\\nit is, they are forced into artificial territorial di-\\nvisions, and are compelled, along with the whole of\\nthe electorate, to submit to the candidates who\\nappeal to the more ignorant, thoughtless, preju-\\ndiced and easily influenced masses.^\\nIt is in the wide extension of suffrage that we\\n1 On this point see also below, Chapter VIII.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "EEPRE8ENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 33\\nfind the underlying cause of tlie machine and\\nthe boss. Close organization, with its minute\\nattention to details, and personal supervision of\\nthe rank and file, is the secret for wielding great\\narmies of unthinking men. The Catholic and\\nMethodist churches and the Salvation Army are\\nstriking triumphs of organizing ability dealing\\nwith the unprivileged and disorganized masses.\\nThe party machine does the same for the neg-\\nlected, isolated, ignorant voters.\\n4. Again, legislation in the olden times was\\nvery limited, both in the number of subjects dis-\\ncussed and the details of the regulations. The\\npeople were satisfied to live according to the cus-\\ntoms of their ancestors. Government was simply\\na matter of administration. The king, his council,\\nhis officers, and his judges were not called upon\\nto make new laws, but to learn what were the\\ncustoms of the land, and then to act accordingly.\\nBut to-day legislation is the most intricate of arts,\\ndepending upon the profoundest sciences, and dom-\\ninating the most vital of human interests. There\\nare hundreds of pressing problems, requiring legis-\\nlative direction, which the assemblies of Edward\\nI., or even the parliaments of George III., never\\ndreamed to be of social importance. Time was,\\nsays Woodrow Wilson,^ in the infancy of na-\\ntional representative bodies, when the representa-\\n1 The State, New York, 1890, page 583.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "34 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ntives of the people were called upon simply to\\ngive or to refuse their assent to laws prepared by\\na king or by a privileged class in the state but\\nthat time is far passed. The modern representa-\\ntive has to judge of the gravest affairs of govern-\\nment, and has to judge as an originator of policies.\\nIt is his duty to adjust every weighty plan, pre-\\nside over every important reform, provide for\\nevery passing need of the state. All the motive\\npower of government rests with him. His task,\\ntherefore, is as complex as the task of governing,\\nand the task of governing is as complex as is the\\nplay of economic and social forces over which it\\nhas to preside. Law-making now moves with a\\nfreedom, now sweeps through a field, unknown to\\nany ancient legislator; it no longer provides for\\nthe simple needs of small city-states, but for the\\nnecessities of vast nations, numbering their tens\\nof millions.\\nThe modern legislator must, therefore, be well\\nequipped. He must give the greater part of his\\ntime to parliamentary duties, and, above all, must\\nhave a long experience in his particular art. No\\nmore striking evidence of obsolescence can be cited\\nthan this, that, while the duties of legislation have\\nincreased as never before, the law-makers them-\\nselves have sunken into incompetence and obloquy.\\n5. There is one external influence on modern\\nlegislation so extremely important as to demand", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "BBPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 35\\nspecial notice. This is the private corporation,\\nwith its professional lobby. Corporations are as\\nrecent as party machines, and both have grown\\niTp together like Siamese twins. The professional\\nlobbyists are nearly always the managers of the\\npolitical machine. They carry in their pockets\\nthe political fortunes of the legislators. The\\nthird house is the modern legislature, at least\\nin the United States. Corporations, from their\\nvery inception and in their daily activities, are the\\ncreatures of government. Their life is legislation.\\nThey cannot, if they would, dispense with their\\nlobby.\\nThis is an entirely new feature in the constitu-\\ntion of representative assemblies. The first general\\ncorporation laws in the United States were enacted\\nin the 50 s, following the rapid extension of rail-\\nways and the organization of banks. A legislature\\nthat may have sufficed for simple duties in the\\ndays of isolated individual industries, is almost\\nsu^e to wither in an era of private corporations\\nw th public functions and fabulous resources.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "36 PROPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nCHAPTEE III.\\nTHE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK.\\nIn the preceding chapter the main differences\\nhave been shown between the ancient and the\\nmodern problems, constituencies, and conditions of\\nrepresentation. We have now to inquire into the\\nactual workings of this primitive institution in the\\nmidst of modern svirroundings.\\nThe position of the American voter who attempts\\nindependence is well known to be unenviable.\\nWhen he comes to the polls to cast his ballot, he\\nfinds but one candidate to be chosen for any given\\noffice. He finds that, through the machinery of\\nthe political party with which he has acted, there\\nis one candidate offered to him. There are practi-\\ncally but two candidates in the field, those of the\\ntwo great parties. If the voter is dissatisfied with\\nthe nominee of his own party, there are three\\ncourses open to him, to vote for the opposing can-\\ndidate, to vote for a third candidate, or to stay at\\nhome. It is likely that his dissatisfaction with the\\nopposing candidate is more intense than with his\\nown. Only in times of exceptional unrest, or as a\\nprotest against an exceptionally corrupt nomina-\\ntion, do large numbers of voters so radically revolt\\nas to go entirely over to the enemy. The majority", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 37\\nof the dissatisfied simply stay at home. This is\\ntheir only comfortable way to condemn their party s\\nnominee. But should they be intensely exasper-\\nated, or should they be of an uncompromising turn\\nof mind, they may go to the extreme of nominating\\nand voting for a third candidate. In this case\\ntheir offence is even woi se than if they vote for\\nthe principal opposing candidate. They indeed\\ngive him a half vote, just as they do when they\\nstay at home and they gain the opprobrium of\\ncrank, and the scorn of having thrown their\\nvotes away.\\nIn this way the party machine is the master of\\nthe situation. It alone can name the candidate\\nthe only check upon it is the fear of a bolt on\\nthe part of the voters. This fear is reduced to a\\nminimum. Though there may be loud protests\\nand a vigorous show of independence, it is well\\nknown that most of the protesters will fall into\\nline on election day, rather than see the other\\nside win.\\nAdd to the foregoing the fact that wards and\\nelection districts are bounded more or less arbi-\\ntrarily, that they include a heterogeneous and poly-\\nglot population, and that boundaries are frequently\\nchanged, and we have an additional reason for the\\nsupremacy of the party organization. The voters\\nhave very few interests in common. They Bee\\nlittle of each other; they have few of those so-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "88 PROPORTIONAL RBPRESENTATtON.\\ncial and business relations that would accustom\\nthem to join and work together. They do not\\nmeet in mass-meeting, as in the New England\\ntown-meeting, where individuals of all parties\\ncome together and discuss in public the affairs\\nof their district and the qualifications of candi-\\ndates, before the candidates are nominated. They\\nmust, therefore, look to their party organization\\nfor the dictation of a policy and the designation\\nof a candidate. It is in the party that they find\\ntheir common meeting-place. The strength of\\nTammany Hall, with its affiliated saloons, is in\\nthe social and fraternal life which it furnishes to\\nthe thousands of neglected voters who have no\\nhome, no church, no club.\\nThe party organization is a more or less close\\ncorporation, composed of a series of practically\\nself-perpetuating committees, the committees cor-\\nresponding to the different election areas. The\\nparty primary of the smallest division precinct,\\ntownship, or ward is the foundation of the sys-\\ntem but the primary is in the hands of its stand-\\ning committee. A very small percentage of the\\nparty voters, for one reason or another, attend the\\nprimaries. In cities the percentage ranges from\\ntwo to ten,^ in the townships from ten to forty.\\nA majority of the voters in these primaries elect\\n1 A. C. Bemheim, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. iii.,\\np. 99.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "THE BISTBICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 39\\ndelegates to the nominating conventions, or they\\nnominate ward or township candidates. This is\\nthe case with both the ruling parties. These\\ncandidates are the only ones between whom the\\nvoters can choose at the elections. The primaries\\nand the nominating conventions, controlled by the\\nparty managers, are therefore practically the elect-\\ning conventions.\\nI do not mean that the party managers who have\\nthis power can use it autocratically. They must\\nkeep before themselves always the qualities of their\\ncandidate which would promote or mar his popu-\\nlarity. They must nominate a man who, as they\\nsay, is available. But within this limit, unless\\nthe popular interest has been aroused by some\\nunusual emergency, they have a wide field of\\nautocracy.\\nSuch a system results in the selection of weak\\nand inefficient representatives. They are not\\nnecessarily corrupt, but they are tools and figure-\\nheads.\\nIn the first place, the area of choice is arbitrarily\\nlimited. It is a principle in elective constituencies\\nthat the larger the area over which a district ex-\\ntends, the more distinguished and capable are the\\ncandidates of all parties. In all districts repre-\\nsentatives can be elected only from the ranks of\\nthe party which happens to have the majority.\\nIt is wholly improbable that the able men of a", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "40 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nparty will be distributed about, one by one, in the\\nsmall districts wliere the party lias its majorities.\\nBut, even were tliey so benevolently scattered, the\\nconditions are against their nomination. The po-\\nlitical managers must have men who will do their\\nbidding. At the same time, with only one to\\nnominate and elect, the selection of candidates\\nis subject to the dictation of cliques. In wards\\nwhere the party has a safe or overwhelming ma-\\njority, the party managers often flagrantly override\\nthe honesty and decency of the community by\\nnominating the basest of men. And, in close\\ndistricts and wards, a compact faction, bent on\\nits own aggrandizement and threatening to help\\nthe other party, can often name a candidate, or, at\\nleast prevent the nomination of an outspoken and\\ncapable one. The influence of saloon-keepers in\\ncity and State politics is well known to depend on\\nthe power which close organization and unscrupu-\\nlous methods give them over party leaders in the\\nprimaries and conventions.\\nBesides operating within the party lines, these\\nsame factions, as well as other classes of voters,\\nhold the balance of power between parties. Hence\\ncandidates must placate them. Now, it is char-\\nacteristic of the greatest of party leaders that they\\nraise up about themselves a body of strong ad-\\nmirers, and a body of equally vigorous haters.\\nConsequently, we seldom find in American politics", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 41\\nthat a great party leader can be elected repeatedly\\nin a close district. This principle comes out dis-\\ntinctly in the election of the President of the\\nUnited States. Those men who have achieved the\\nhighest honors in the leadership of their party in\\nthe halls of Congress and in political battles, are\\nseldom elected to that high office. They are not\\noften even nominated and, if nominated, they are\\nalmost destined to be defeated. Unknown and\\nobscure men, or men whose record has been made\\nentirely apart from leadership in political debate,\\nare hunted out and given the place that in the\\naffection and admiration of the party voters be-\\nlonged to others. The true leaders must be con-\\ntent with appointive positions.\\nIn congressional and legislative elections, also,\\nit is well known that, when a party leader has\\nachieved prominence, the entire resources of the\\nopposite party throughout the nation or State are\\nthrown into his limited district to compass his\\ndefeat. And these extraordinary exertions are\\nusually successful, if the district be in any way\\na close one. Several leaders in Congress, after\\nserving a few terms and acquiring familiarity\\nwith the rules, and then becoming the recognized\\nleaders of their parties, have been defeated in their\\ndistricts. In this way the Democrats lost the\\nservices of their leader, William R. Morrison, and\\nthe Republicans lost also their tariff leader, William", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "42 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nMcKinley, Jr. Only in the case of a man like\\nBlaine or Garfield, who happened to live in over-\\nwhelming Republican districts, could the leaders\\nbe kept in the public stations where their services\\nwould redound to their party and their country.\\nIn the case of Mr. McKinley, a Democratic legis-\\nlature had used the gerrymander to create for him\\na strong Democratic district.\\nThe same forces operate still more inexorably\\nthe further clown we go to the lesser and lesser\\ndistricts until, when we come to ward politics, we\\nreach the very narrowest area of choice, with, con-\\nsequently, the lowest extreme of ability and the\\nhighest power of greedy factions and combines.\\nThis is the main reason why our legislative\\nbodies are composed of inexperienced men. A\\ncareful analysis of State legislatures will probably\\nshow that, in the average election, one-half the\\nrepresentatives are new men, with no legislative\\nexperience. An actual count of the Indiana legis-\\nlature of 1893 shows that, in a house of one\\nhundred representatives, there were 63 men who\\nwere there for the first time, 16 men who were\\nserving their second term, 12 men their third\\nterm, one man his fourth term, and one man\\nhis fifth term. And this was not the result of\\na landslide, bringing a new party into power;\\nbut the legislature was of the same political\\ncomplexion which it had borne for several years.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "TUE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 43\\nProfessor Hart asserts that in Connecticut, in the\\nyear 1790, 6-1 per cent of the members of the\\nlegisUxture had sat in it before, while in 1889\\nthe number was only 5 per cent. It is well known\\nthat the American House of Representatives is\\nbecoming more and more a body of one and two\\nterm men. In the Fifty-third Congress (not a\\nlandslide Congress), out of a membership of\\n353, there were 133 new men, 78 men serving\\ntlieir second term, and only 142 i.e., 40 per cent\\nwho were serving their third term and upwards.\\nAnd everywhere the aldermen have learned to be\\ncontent with one or two terms, but meanwhile to\\nmake a heavy strike, and then give way to\\nanother of the boys. Throughout the country it\\nmay be asserted, as a general rule, that the laws\\nof the people are enacted by a majority who have\\nhad no previous experience in law-making.\\nThis is the explanation of two significant facts\\nin American legislation, the power of the speaker\\nof the House, and the power of the lobby.\\nThe American speaker, unlike the English and\\nCanadian, is a man of dictatorial power. In the\\nnational government he is ranked next to the\\nPresident. He appoints the committees, lays\\ndown the rules, and controls legislation. He has\\na similar position in all State legislatures, and in\\nmany municipal councils. The reason for this\\n1 Practical Essays on American Government, p. 90.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "44 PBOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ndictatorship is the same as that which explains\\nthe power of a tribal chieftain or an imperial\\nCaesar the ignorance, incapacity, and faction of\\nhis subjects. Leadership is essential wherever a\\nbody of men are compelled to act in concert. But\\nthere are two kinds of leadership. One is that\\nof debate, argument, and statesmanship, depend-\\ning upon ability and enthusiasm, where the fol-\\nlowers have confidence in their chief, and accept\\nhis leadership, and act in concert with him volun-\\ntarily. This is the leadership of Gladstone in the\\nHouse of Commons. The other is that of coer-\\ncion, growing out of necessity and circumstance,\\nwhere followers distrust the ability of any leader\\nthey may choose, where they distrust their own\\nability to follow, and therefore they consent to the\\nabdication of self-government and the elevation of\\na tyrant. This is the leadership of the American\\nparty speaker. It proceeds from the lack of ac-\\nquaintance among the members of the legislative\\nbodies, and from their mutual incompetency.\\nThey serve short terms, they come together for\\nthe first time knowing little of the qualifications\\nof each. If they should keep the control of affairs\\nin their own hands, there would be wrangling and\\nwire-pulling over the appointments of committees,\\nand then factions and mutiny on account of their\\nfinal disposition. The only escape from this evil\\nis in the power of the speaker.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 45\\nIf our representative bodies were composed of\\nable men, if their terms of service were longer\\nand their legislative acquaintance wider, if the\\nnatural party leaders were not excluded from their\\nmidst by a petty district system of election, then\\nthe representatives would claim for themselves\\nthe power which they bestow upon their autocrat.\\nThey would appoint their own committees, as in\\nthe United States Senate, control their own rules,\\nmake their own laws, and the speaker would be\\nsimply a moderator instead of a dictator.\\nThough the speaker has a unique dominion,\\nthere is another power in American councils, legis-\\nlatures, and Congress, still more ominous the\\nlobby. It is the lobby which controls legislatures\\nto-day. If any law demanded by the people at\\nlarge, or even by a majority of the law-making\\nbody, is defeated or emasculated, its fate can be\\ntraced to the dominating influence of the lobby.\\nThe lobby is a new feature of representative\\ngovernment. It is coincident with the very re-\\ncent growth of large private corporations. It is\\norganized by them. They have such immense\\ninterests at stake on the turn of legislation, that\\ntheir lobby, with unlimited resources at its dis-\\nposal, is almost irresistible.\\nBut the lobby could not have acquired its pow-\\nerful influence were it not for certain qualities in\\nthe legislative bodies themselves which place them", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "46 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nat its mercy. Corruption is not the only explana-\\ntion. Legislators fall into the nets of lobbyists\\nlargely because of inexperience and incapacity.\\nThe lobbyists themselves are the shrewdest,\\nbrightest, and most influential men of the State\\nor nation. They often control the party spoils,\\nand an ambitious legislator cannot afford to antag-\\nonize them. The lobby is organized as well as\\nthe legislature itself. It has its chiefs, who band\\ntogether. All of the corporations and enterprises\\ninterested in legislation practically combine as a\\nunit. Then these able and honorable chiefs em-\\nploy their resources of argument and suggestion\\nwith individual legislators and before committees.\\nThey take the dimensions of every individual who\\ncomes in their way. But if their honorable\\nmethods are inadequate, they then turn the legis-\\nlator in question over to the petty lobbyist who\\ncarries the pocket-book. Their own hands are\\nclean.\\nThe power of the lobby is found mainly in the\\nfact of the party machine. The lobbyists are\\nusually the managers of the machine. They\\ncontrol State and national party spoils and offices.\\nThey have the political fate of individual law-\\nmakers in their hands. They are the actual\\nleaders in party politics. The wealth of a Tam-\\nmany boss comes from his employment as\\na corporation lobbyist. There must be leadership", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 47\\nsomewhere. The only question is, Shall the\\nleaders be elected to the legislature by the people,\\nor shall they control the legislature from outside\\nas mere irresponsible private citizens As long\\nas the people are prevented from electing their\\nleaders to positions of responsibility, there will\\nsurely arise these self-constituted leaders, whose\\nshrewdness gives them control over the weaklings\\nand hirelings who are actually elected.\\nThe absence of true leadership and the opportu-\\nnity of the lobby are shown in the fruitless bick-\\nerings and factious combinations which so often\\nprevent a legislature from accomplishing anything\\ngood. A party in the majority needs to be held\\ntogether through confidence in some leader or\\nleaders. But their forces are often scattered, and\\nlegislation is blocked. The opportunity of the\\nlobby is of most value in the election of a speaker,\\nwho, when once elected, becomes the instrument\\nof those who created him.\\nIt is not to be inferred that the lobby alone is\\nresponsible for corrupt legislatures and councils.\\nIt is equally true that corrupt legislatures are re-\\nsponsible for the lobby. Law-makers introduce\\nbills attacking corporations for the express pur-\\npose of forcing a bribe. This is called a strike,\\nand has become a recognized feature of American\\nlegislation, to meet which the corporations are\\ncompelled to organize their lobby.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "48 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nA very apparent weakness and injustice of the\\ndistrict system is the opportunity it gives a ma-\\njority party to crush out and disfranchise the\\nminority. This is seen flagrantly in the gerry-\\nmander. But, even where the system is not thus\\nabused, it is almost wholly a matter of chance\\nwhether the opinions of the people are justly\\nexpressed or not. This danger was not imminent\\nunder the earlier conditions of representation, as\\nhas already been shown, when electoral districts\\nwere natural units and the problem of represen-\\ntation was the federation of local communities.\\nBut now that party lines are drawn through the\\nmidst of every community, it nearly always hap-\\npens that one party gains in the elections an un-\\njust proportion of representatives at the expense of\\nothers. From the theory of the matter it is pos-\\nsible to exolude minority parties altogether, and\\nto give the entire legislative body to the majority.\\nSuppose a legislature to be composed of forty\\nmembers elected from forty districts, and that the\\npopular vote of the political parties stands respec-\\ntively 120,000 and 100,000. If the districts are\\nso arranged as to have 5,500 votes each, and the\\nparties happen to be divided in the districts in\\nthe same proportion as at large, we should have\\nin each district a vote respectively of 3,000 and\\n2,500. All of the forty candidates of the ma-\\njority would be elected, and the minority wholly", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "THE niiSTEICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 49\\nexcluded. An extreme result like this seems\\nimprobable, but it sometimes occurs.\\nAgain, it may happen, and often does, that a\\nminority of the popular vote obtains a majority\\nof the representatives. In the case assumed,\\nparties may have been divided in the several\\ndistricts as follows\\nPARTY A.\\nMajority of 100 in 25 districts, 2,800 X 25 70,000 votes.\\nMinority of 1,500 in 15 districts, 2,000 X 15 30,000 votes.\\nTotal, 100,000\\nPARTY B.\\nMinority of 100 in 25 districts, 2,700 X 25 67,500 votes.\\nMajority of 1,500 in 15 districts, 3,500 X 15 52.500 votes.\\nTotal, 120,000\\nIn this assumed case. Party A, with a total of\\n100,000 votes, obtains twenty-five representatives;\\nwhile Party B, with a total of 120,000 votes,\\nobtains only fifteen representatives.\\nWhere a system offers in theory such fruitful\\nopportunities, it is too much to expect party man-\\nagers to refrain from using them. Consequently,\\nthe district system, combined with party politics,\\nhas resulted in the universal spread of the gerry-\\nmander. It is difficult to express the opprobrium\\nrightly belonging to so iniquitous a practice as\\nthe gerrymander; but its enormity is not appre-\\nciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not repro-\\nbated, providing it be fought according to the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "60 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\nrules. Both political parties practise it, and\\nneither can condemn the other. They simply do\\nwhat is natural: make the most of their oppor-\\ntunities as far as permitted by the constitution\\nand system under which both are working. The\\ngerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of\\nparties, it is the outcome of the district system.\\nIf representatives are elected in this way, there\\nmust be some public authority for outlining the\\ndistricts. And who shall be the judge to say\\nwhere the line shall be drawn Exact equality is\\nimpossible, and who shall set the limits beyond\\nwhich inequality shall not be pressed? Every\\napportionment act that has been passed in this\\nor any other country has involved inequality and\\nit would be absurd to ask a political party to pass\\nsuch an act, and give the advantage of the ine-\\nquality to the opposite party. Consequently,\\nevery apportionment act involves more or less of\\nthe gerrymander. The gerrymander is simply\\nsuch a thoughtful construction of districts as will\\neconomize the votes of the party in power by\\ngiving it small majorities in a large number of\\ndistricts, and coop up the opposing party with\\noverwhelming majorities in a large number of\\ndistricts. This may involve a very distortionate\\nand uncomely scientific boundary, and the\\njoining together of distant and unrelated locali-\\nties into a single district such Avas the case in", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK:\\n51\\nthe famous original act of Governor Gerry of\\nMassachusetts, whence the practice obtained its\\namphibian name.^\\nBut it is not always necessary that districts l)e\\ncut into distorted shapes in order to accomplish\\nthese unjust results. A map of all the congres-\\n1 The term Gerrymander, though not the practice, origi-\\nnated with tlie Democratic party in Massachiisetts in 1811, when\\nElhridge Gerry was elected governor. Says Professor Ware, in\\nThe American Laio Review, January, 1872, from wliose article\\nthe accompanying ilki ^ration is taken\\nIn order to secure tLeniselves iu the possession of the government,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "52 PBOPOBTIONAL BJEPRESENTATION.\\nsional and legislative districts of tlie United States\\nwould by no means indicate the location of all the\\noutrageous gerrymanders. In fact, many of the\\nworst ones have been so well designed that they\\ncome close within all constitutional requirements.\\nThe truth is, the district system itself is so faulty\\nthat constitutional restrictions cannot correct it.\\nThe national Congress, has attempted to do so by\\nrequiring the districts for congressional elections\\nto be compact and of contiguous territory, and\\nof nearly equal population. But the law is every-\\nwhere disregarded. Parties are compelled to dis-\\nregard it, for a gerrymander in a Democratic State\\ncan be nullified only by a gerrymander in a Re-\\npublican State.\\nAs a result of the district system, the national\\nHouse of Representatives is scarcely a representa-\\ntive body. In the Fifty-first Congress, which\\nenacted the McKinley tariff law, a majority of the\\nrepresentatives were elected by a minority of the\\nvoters.\\nthe party in power passed the famous law of Feb. 11, 1812, providing for\\na new division of the State into senatorial districts, so contrived that\\nin as many districts as possible the Federalists should be outnumbered\\nby their opponents. To effect this all natural and cu.stomary lines were\\ndisregarded, and some parts of the State, particularly the counties of\\nWorcester and Essex, presented singular examples of political geogra-\\nphy, rt is said that Gilbert Stuart, seeing in the office of the Columbian\\nCentinel an outline of the Essex outer district, nearly encircling the\\nrest of the county, added with his pencil a beak to Salisbury, and\\nclaws to Salem and, Marblehead, as shown in the engraving, exclaim-\\ning, There, that will do for a salamander. Salamander, said Mr.\\nKu^sell, the editor, I call it a Gerry-mander.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "TUS DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK.\\n53", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "54\\nPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK.\\n55\\nFIFTY-FIRST CONGRESS ELECTION, 1888.\\nCONGRK.SSIONAL\\nTARTIES.\\nVUTK.\\nELECTED.\\nPROrOIlTI\\nRepublican\\n5,348,379\\n1G4\\n158\\nDemocrat\\n5,502,581\\nIGl\\n1G2\\nProhibition\\n184,937\\n5\\nScattering\\n56,889\\n325\\n11,092,78G\\n325\\nCONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1890.\\nLAUREN^J^jFAlRFlELDi\\nt^ jT^r^^ IKERSHA\\nVaBBEVillmBkwberr\\n^/^\\\\MARION^.\\nBARNWELL^S^i^N^ BERKELEY\\nAn illustration of compact and contiguous territory.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "5Q PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nThe Republicans, instead of having a majority of\\nthree, should have been in a minority of four, as\\nagainst the Democrats. The Republicans, with\\n48.2 per cent of the votes, elected 50.4 per cent\\nof the representatives; and the Democrats, with\\n49.6 per cent of the votes, elected 49.6 per cent\\nof the congressmen.\\nThat this Congress did not represent the people,\\nis emphasized by the avalanche of 1890.\\nFIFTY-SECOND CONGKESS ELECTION 1890.^\\nPER CENT PER CENT OF KEP-\\nPARTIES.\\nVOTE.\\nELECTED.\\nOF VOTE.\\nRESENTATIOSr.\\nRepublican\\n4,217,266\\n88\\n42.9\\n26.5\\nDemocrat\\n4,974,450\\n235\\n50.6\\n71.1\\nPoi^ulist\\n354,217\\n9\\n3.7\\n2.4\\nProhibition\\n207,814\\n2.1\\nIndependent\\n76,788\\n.7\\n9,830,535 332 100 100\\nThis election again displays the fortuitous results\\nof the system. The Democratic minority of 49.6\\nper cent of the congressmen in the Fifty-first Con-\\ngress was changed to a Democratic majority of 71.1\\nper cent in the Fifty-second Congress, while in\\nthe popular vote the Democratic proportion of 49.6\\nper cent of the total was increased only 1 per cent.\\nThe Republicans, with 42.9 per cent of the vote,\\nsecured only 26.5 per cent of the representatives.\\n1 Calculations for tlie Fifty-second, Fifty-third, and Fifty-\\nfourth Congresses are made by Mr. Stoughton Cooley in Propor-\\ntional liepresentation Review, March, 1894, based upon returns in\\nthe Chicago Daily News Almanac,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 67\\nThe Republican vote fell off 4.9 per cent of the\\ntotal; their representation decreased 24.1 per cent.\\nIt required 47,923 votes to elect a Republican,\\n44,276 votes to elect a Populist, and only 21,078\\nto elect a Democrat. The Democratic majority of\\n147 over the Republicans, and 138 over all, should\\nhave been a Democratic majority of 2.\\nFor the Fifty-third Congress, elected in 1892, the\\ntotal vote polled for congressmen was 12,032,203,\\nof which the Republicans polled 5,031,360; the\\nDemocrats, 5,670,148 the Populists, 1,046,392\\nthe Prohibitionists, 244,726; and 39,577 were scat-\\ntering. The result of this poll was that the Repub-\\nlicans elected 131, the Democrats 213, and the\\nPopulists 12 congressmen. This is to say, the\\nRepublicans, with 41.9 per cent of the total vote,\\n(a decrease of 1 per cent below that of the pre-\\nvious election), secured 36.8 per cent of the repre-\\nsentatives, an increase of 10,3 per cent; the\\nDemocrats, with 47.2 per cent of the vote (a de-\\ncrease of 3.4 per cent), got 59.8 per cent of the\\nrepresentatives the 8.7 per cent of the Populists\\nobtained 3.4 per cent of the representatives; the\\nProhibitionists 2 per cent secured nothing. In-\\nstead of a Democratic majority of 79 in Congress,\\nthere should have been a Democratic minority of\\n10, as against all other parties.\\nThe stupendous Republican victory of 1894 was\\nequally illusory. The total vote cast for congress-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "58 PEOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nmen was 11,288,135. Of this number tlie Repub-\\nlicans cast 5,461,202; the Democrats, 4,295,748;\\nthe Populists, 1,323,644; the Prohibitionists, 182,-\\n679; and 24,862 were scattering. The result was\\nthe election of 245 Republican, 104 Democrat, and\\n7 Populist congressmen. Or, in other words, the\\nRepublicans, with 48.4 per cent of the total vote\\n(an increase of 6.2 per cent), elected 68.8 per cent\\nof the congressmen the Democrats, with 38.1 per\\ncent of the vote (a decrease of 9.1 per cent), se-\\ncured 29.2 per cent of the representatives the\\n11.7 per cent of the Populists obtained 2 per cent\\nof the representatives and the 1.6 per cent of the\\nProhibitionists failed of recognition. The Repub-\\nlican majority of 134 in the present Congress\\nshould be a minority of 7, as against all other\\nparties.\\nThe injustice of the district system is extreme\\nin its effects on new parties. Such parties suffer\\nfor two reasons. In the case of the dominant par-\\nties there is a rough equality, because a Democratic\\ngerrymander in one State is likely to be balanced\\nin another by a Republican gerrymander. But a\\nnew party cannot establish a gerrymander to suit\\nitself until it gets control of a State government.\\nAlso, a new party is usually scattered throughout\\na large number of districts and States, and the dis-\\ntrict system prevents its members from combining\\nto elect their fair share of representatives. For", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 59\\nexample, in the Fifty-first Congress, the Prohibi-\\ntionists shoukl have had 5 representatives, they\\nreceived none; in the Fifty-third Congress the\\nPeople s party should have had 31 instead of 8,\\nand the Prohibitionists should have received 8\\ninstead of none and in the Fifty-fourth Congress\\nthe Popuhsts were entitled to 42 votes instead\\nof 7.\\nMany examples might be given from individual\\nStates to show the unrepresentative character of\\ncongressional representation. Those States which\\nare close in their majorities, and whose legislatures\\nalternate frequently, show an endless seesaw of\\ngerrymanders. Ohio has, perhaps, had more of\\nthese partisan displays than any other State. It\\nwas during the war that tlie first Republican legis-\\nlature overthrew a long-standing Democratic ap-\\nportionment act. The results were brought out\\nforcibly by Mr. Garfield in a speech in Congress\\nin 1870. He said:\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nAVlien I was first elected to Congress, in the fall of 1862,\\nthe State of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about\\n25,000 but, by the adjustment and distribution of political\\npower in the State, there were 14 Democratic representa-\\ntives upon this floor, and only 5 Republicans. The State\\nthat cast a majority of nearly 25,000 Republican votes was\\nrepresented in the proportion of one Republican and three\\nDemocrats. In the next Congress there was no great politi-\\ncal change in the popular vote of Ohio a change of only\\n20,000 but the result was that seventeen Republican mem-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "60\\nPEOPOETIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\nbers were sent here from Ohio, and only two Democrats. We\\nfind that only so small a change as 20,000 changed their\\nrepresentatives in Congress from fourteen Democrats and\\nfive Republicans, to seventeen Republicans and two Demo-\\ncrats.\\n[Now, no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a\\nsystem that may in theory, and frequently does in practice,\\nproduce such results as these.\\nThe Republicans retained power in the Ohio\\nlegislature from 1862 to 1876, with a consequent\\nunfair advantage in the distribution of congres-\\nsional seats. In the latter year a Democratic legis-\\nlature passed a new apportionment act. Since that\\ntime there have been eight such acts, the results of\\nwhich upon the fortunes of the two parties are de-\\npicted by the following statistical analysis\\nREPRESENTATION OF THE STATE OF OHIO IN\\nCONGRESS.\\nIB\\nz\\nCONGRESSION-\\nREPRESENTATIVES.\\nACCORDING TO\\nACTUAL\\nREPRESENTATION.\\nAL VOTE.\\nAOTUAI..\\nPropor-\\ntional.\\n3\\no\\nKep. 1 Dem.\\nKep.\\nDem.\\nRep.\\nDem.\\n45th,\\n1877-79\\n314,529\\n310,434\\n12\\n8\\n10\\n10\\nlEep. =lJDem.\\n46tli,\\n1879-81\\n277,875\\n264,737\\n9\\n11\\n10\\n10\\n1 Dem. =1^ Kep.\\n47tli,\\n1881-83\\n405,042\\n340,572\\n15\\n5\\n9\\n1 Kep. 2| Dem.\\n48th,\\n1883-85\\n306,674\\n268,785\\n8\\n13\\n10\\n1 Dem. 2 Rep.\\n49th,\\n1885-87\\n395,596\\n380,934\\n10\\n11\\n10\\n1 Dem. Kep.\\n50th,\\n1887-89\\n336,063\\n325,629\\n15\\n6\\n10\\n1 Kep. =2^ Dem.\\n51st,\\n1889-91\\n412,520\\n395,639\\n16\\n5\\n10\\n1 Rep. 3 Dem.\\n52d,\\n1891-93\\n362,624\\n350,528\\n7\\n14\\n101\\n1 Dem. 2J5 Rep.\\n53d,\\n1893-95\\n397,320\\n407,120\\n9\\n12\\n10\\n10\\nIDem. 1J-Kep.\\n54th,\\n1895-97\\n407,371\\n274,670\\n19\\n2\\n12\\n8^\\n1 Rep. 6 Dem.\\n1 One Prohibitionist. 2 One Populist.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "THE UISTIUCT SYSTEM AT WORK. Gl\\nIt will be seen that the Democrats in Ohio have\\nnever, since 1862, had a majority of the popular\\nvote on national questions, except in 1892 yet in\\nfour elections they have returned a majority of the\\ncongressmen. Neither are party calculations al-\\nways realized. In the Forty-fifth Congress the\\nDemocratic gerrymander returned a Republican\\nmajority of the congressmen, and in the Fifty-\\nthird Congress a Republican -gerrymander returned\\na Democratic majority, although in the Fifty-fourth\\nCongress the same gerrymander responded well to\\nthe Republican designs.\\nIn Indiana, in 1892, under a Democratic gerry-\\nmander, the Democrats cast for congressmen 259,-\\n190 votes, and elected eleven congressmen the\\nRepublicans cast only 5,522 less votes, namely,\\n253,668, but elected only two congressmen. It\\nrequired 126,83-1 Republican votes to elect one con-\\ngressman, against only 23,565 Democratic votes\\nin other words, one Democratic vote was worth 5.4\\nRepublican votes. The Democrats, casting 47.2\\nper cent of the total vote, secured 85 j)er cent of\\nthe representatives and the Republicans, with 46.2\\nper cent of the vote, secured only 15 per cent of\\nthe representatives. The smallest majority re-\\nceived by any Democratic candidate was 42, the\\nlargest was 3,081 whereas the smallest majority\\nreceived by a Republican candidate was 4,125, and\\nthe largest was 8,724. To see that the gerryman-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "62 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nder, though the apparent, is not the essential, evil\\nof the district system, it needs only to be noted\\nthat in the election of 1894, in Indiana, with the\\nsame gerrymandered districts as in 1892, the Re-\\npublicans elected the entire delegation of 13\\nmembers yet the total Republican vote for con-\\ngressmen in the State was only 50.5 per cent\\n(284,447) of the total vote, and the Democratic\\nvote was 42 per cent (238,371) of the total.i The\\nRepublicans are entitled to only 7, instead of 13\\nrepresentatives in the present Congress, and the\\nDemocrats of the State, who should have elected\\n6 congressmen, are wholly unrepresented.\\nThe inequalities of the district system are not\\nconfined to the United States. They appear in all\\nparliamentary countries. Some interesting results\\nfrom England are given by Sir John Lubbock in\\nhis tract on Representation. In the parliamen-\\ntary elections of 1886, there were contested 460\\nseats. The total number of votes given were\\n2,756,900, of which 1,423,500 were for Unionist,\\n1,333,400 for Home Rule candidates, or a major-\\nity of 90,000 votes for maintaining the Union.\\nAccording to the votes polled, the number of mem-\\nbers returned should have been 238 Unionists and\\n221 Home Rulers, which, adding the members re-\\nturned without a contest, viz.. Ill Unionists and\\n1 8.5 per cent going to Populists and Prohibitionists.\\n2 Tlie Imperial Parliament Series, London, Swan Sonnensch ein\\nCo., 1890.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 63\\n99 Home Rulers, would have given 349 Union-\\nists and 320 Home Rulers, or a majority of 29.\\nTlie actual numbers, however, were 394 Union-\\nists and 275 Home Rulers. The Unionists, there-\\nfore, obtained 45 seats more, and the Home Rulers\\n45 fewer seats, than they were entitled to from\\nthe votes polled, making, of course, 90 on a divis-\\nion. Thus, then, in 1874 the Conservatives ob-\\ntained 38 seats more than their votes entitled\\nthem to, counting 76 on a division. In 1880, on\\nthe contrary, the Liberals had 44 too many, count-\\ning 88 on a division. Thus, whatever side\\nhas the majority, we are confronted with a violent\\ncontrast between the voting strength in the con-\\nstituencies, and the voting strength in the House\\nof Commons.\\nIn my own county of Kent, continues Sir\\nJolui Lubbock, the Liberals polled in the three\\ndivisions, at the last election, over 13,000 votes,\\nagainst 16,000 given to their opponents, and yet\\nthe latter had all the six seats. Taking all the\\ncontested seats in the county, the Liberals polled\\n32,000 votes against 36,000, and yet the Conserva-\\ntives carried sixteen members and the Liberals\\nonly two. 1\\nAt the general election (in Ireland) in 1880,\\n86 seats were contested. Of these the Home\\nRulers secured 52, the Liberals and Conservatives\\ntogether only 34. Yet the Home Rule electors\\n1 Page 17.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "64 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\nwere only 48,000, while tlie Liberals and Conser-\\nvatives together were no less than 105,000.\\nIf the uncontested seats were estimated for, the\\nresults would remain substantially the same.\\nThe parliamentary election of 1895 brought an\\noverwhelming defeat to the Liberal party. There\\nwere 481 seats contested, of which the Liberals\\nobtained 202 and the Conservatives and Unionists\\n279, a majority of 77. Yet in the popular vote\\nthe Liberals stood 1,800,000 and the Conservative-\\nUnionists 1,775,000, a minority of 25,000. The\\ntrue representation would have been\\nConservative. Libekal,\\nContested seats 239 242\\nUncontested seats 132 57\\nTotal 371 299\\ngiving a Conservafive-Unionist majority of 72,\\ninstead of the actual majority of 152.\\nIn the Italian elections of 1884 the popular\\nvote stood in the proportion of 1.85 for the\\ngovernment to 1 for the opposition, but the rep-\\nresentation in the Chamber of Deputies was 5.19\\nfor the government to 1 for the opposition.\\nOther election figures might be given to show\\nthat in no country are the people accurately repre-\\nsented in their legislative assemblies. This is true\\n1 Pages 19 and 20.\\n2 See article by Sir John Lubbock, Analysis of English Elec-\\ntions, Proportional Representation Review, September, 1895.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 65\\nwhether the gerrymander is employed or not. Per-\\nhaps, taking a nation as a whole, the gerrymanders\\nof the United States in congressional elections\\ndo not affect the average result since, as already\\nshown, both parties enact them, and the work of a\\nDemocratic gerrymander in one State is offset by\\nthat of a Republican gerrpnander in another.\\nState legislatures, on the other hand, show\\ngreater inequalities, seeing that the party in\\npower outlines the districts for the entire constitu-\\nency, and there are no offsetting gerrymanders.\\nIn the Massachusetts State election of 1892,\\naccording to Mr. Berry,^ 116,708 Republican votes\\nelected twenty-five Republican senators, while\\n119,045 Democratic votes failed to elect the Demo-\\ncratic candidates for whom they were cast. The\\ntotal Democratic vote of 165,606, elected ten sena-\\ntors, thus requiring 16,560 Democratic votes to\\nelect one. The total Republican vote of 185,479\\nelected tliirty senatoi-s, requiring only 6,182 to\\nelect one. In State legislation, therefore, 1 Re-\\npublican was worth 2\u00c2\u00a7 Democrats.\\nIndiana in 1892, taking the presidential vote\\nas a basis, should have elected to the lower house\\n48 Democrats, 46 Republicans, 4 Populists, and 2\\nProhibitionists. There were actually elected 63\\nDemocrats and 37 Republicans. In 1894, on the\\n1 Proportional Represeiitatiou, Worcester, Mass., 1892,\\np. 32.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "66 PBOPOETIONAL BEPBESEJSfTATION.\\nbasis of tlie vote for Secretaiy of State, tlie Re-\\npublicans sliould have had 50 State representa-\\ntives, the Democrats 43, the Populists 5, and the\\nProhibitionists 2. Instead, the Republicans had\\n82, and the Democrats 18.\\nOhio elected 72 Republicans, 35 Democrats, to\\nthe lower house in 1892. Had the people been\\ntruly represented, there would have been 51 Re-\\npublicans, 51 Democrats, 3 Prohibitionists, and 2\\nPopulists.\\nMichigan in 1894, with a popular vote for\\ngovernor of 237,215 Republicans, 130,823 Demo-\\ncrats, 30,002 Populists, and 18,788 Prohibitionists,\\nelected to the lower house of the State legislature\\n99 Republicans and 1 Democrat. The repre-\\nsentation should have been 57 Republicans, 31\\nDemocrats, 7 Populists, and 5 Prohibitionists.\\nFor members of the lower house of the New\\nYork legislature in the last three elections, the\\nvote and actual elections, contrasted with what\\nwould have been the proportionate elections, were\\nas follows\\nNEW YORK ASSEMBLY, 128 MEMBERS. 1892.\\nPARTIES.\\nVOTE.\\nELECTED.\\nPEOPOETIOSTAL\\nRepublican\\n598,012\\n54\\n60\\nDemocrat\\n614,988\\n74\\n65\\nProhibition\\n33,012\\n3\\nSocialist Labor\\n8,472\\nScattering\\n16,463\\n1,301,947 128 128", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "rilE IJISTEICT SYSTEM AT WOIiK.\\n67\\nRepublican\\nDemocrat\\nProhibition\\nSocialist Labor\\nScattering\\n538,471\\n510,008\\n21,525\\n8,G31\\n32,357\\n1,111,592\\n74\\n54\\n128\\n65\\n60\\n2\\n1\\n128\\nRepublican\\nDemocrat\\nProhibition\\nSocialist Labor\\nPopulist\\nScatterina:\\n005,857\\n501,015\\n21,026\\n9,575\\n0,914\\n9,339\\n1,214,326\\n105\\n23\\n128\\n71\\n53\\n2\\n1\\n1\\n128\\nThe table on the following page is compiled by\\nMr. Geo. H. Haynes,^ in order to show the con-\\ntrast between the popular vote and the represen-\\ntation in the New England legislatures.\\nIn the four States, Maine, New Hampshire,\\nVermont, and Massachusetts, representation in the\\nSenate must, according to the Constitution, be pro-\\nportioned to population, and the partisan geny-\\nmander is therefore responsible for its distortion.\\nIn two of these states, IMaine and Vermont, it\\nwill be noticed that the theory of the gerrymander\\nhas been perfected in practice. In Rhode Island\\nand Connecticut, representation is fixed by the\\n1 An7ials of the American Academy of Political and Social\\nScience, September, 1895. Representation in New England\\nLegislatures.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "PBOPORTIONAL BEPBEBENTATION.\\nPER CT. OF\\nPER CT.\\nPER CT\\nSTATE.\\nPARTY.\\nYOTE FOR\\nIN\\nIN\\nGOVERKOR.\\nSENATE.\\nHOUSE.\\nRepublican\\nCi.3\\n100\\n96.7\\nMaine\\nDemocrat\\nProhibition\\n28.3\\n2.5\\n3.3\\nPeople s\\n4.9\\nr Republican\\n56.0\\n87.5\\n72.7\\nNew Hampshire\\nDemocrat\\n40.9\\n12.5\\n27.3\\nProhibition\\n2.1\\nRepublican\\n73.5\\n100\\n94.6\\nVermont\\nDemocrat\\nPeople s\\n24.4\\n1.3\\n4.6\\n0.4\\nProhibition\\n0.8\\n0.4\\nRepublican\\n56.6\\n90\\n81.3\\nDemocrat\\n36.9\\n10\\n18.7\\nMassachusetts\\nPeople s\\n2.7\\nProhibition\\n3.0\\nLabor\\n0.9\\nRepublican\\n53.1\\n94.6\\n95.8\\nRhode Island\\nDemocrat\\nProhibition\\n41.3\\n4.1\\n5.4\\n4.2\\nLabor\\n1.1\\nRepublican\\n53.5\\n91.7\\n81.3\\nOIVNT l?i^T T/^m^\\nDemocrat\\n43.3\\n8.3\\n18.3\\nVjlJXS JNiliC J.10U i.\\nProhibition\\n1.5\\nPeople s\\n1.3\\n0.4\\nConstitution for towns and cities, regardless of\\npopulation. In the lower houses of these States\\nboth towns and population are represented, and\\nthe gerrymander is not responsible for misrepre-\\nsentation as it is in the other States where popu-\\nlation alone is considered.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK.\\n69\\nLA CROSSE CO.\\nr\\nfD Q n-\\nS t\\nornpi\\nr of\\nm", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "70 PBOPOIITIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nMunicipal elections give results equally dispro-\\nportionate. Three alclermanic elections in Chicago\\nwere as follows\\nELECTION OF ALDERMEN. CHICAGO\\nTOTE. ELECTED.\\nPROPOR-\\nTIONAL.\\n1893.\\nRepublican 89,162 20 15\\nDemocrat 88,280 12 14\\nIndependent Democrat 17,118 1 3\\nIndependent 12,466 1 2\\nSocialist Labor 168\\n207,194 34 34\\ni894.\\nRepublican 100,647 22 18\\nDemocrat 83,008 12 14\\nPeople s 3,557 1\\nSocialist Labor 572\\nIndependent 6,452\\n194,236 34 34\\n1895.\\nRepublican 136,233 28 19\\nDemocrat 86,287 5 12\\nPeople s 17,199 2\\nProhibition 942\\nIndependent 10,649 1\\n251,310 34 34\\nIn St. Paul, a minorit}^ party elects a majority\\nof the board.\\nTOTE.\\nELECTED\\nRepublican\\n12,180\\n4\\nDemocrat\\n11,327\\n7\\nPeople s\\n1,117\\nProhibition\\n477\\nIndependent\\n444\\n25,545 11", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 71\\nIn this election, six aldermen, a majority of the\\nboard, received 4,879 votes, less than one-fifth of\\nthe votes polled.\\nThe Minneapolis election was as follows\\nELECTION OF ALDERMEN.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 MINNEAPOLIS. 1894\\nVOTE. ELECTED.\\nPROPOK-\\nTIONAL.\\nRepublican 17,705 9 6\\nDemocrat 13,378 3 4\\nPeople s 2,132 1\\nProhibition 1,484 1\\nScattering 4\\n34,703 12 12\\nThe most startling and seemingly impossible\\nresults are found in New York City, where, in\\n1892, Tammany Hall, Avith 59 per cent of the\\nvotes, elected every one of the thirty aldermen.\\nThis election is to be compared with the State\\nsenates in Maine and Vermont.\\nELECTION OF ALDERMEN. NEW YORK CITY, 1892.\\nVOTE. ELECTED\\nPKOPOR-\\nTIONAL.\\nTammany 166,093 30 19\\nCounty Democracy 4,384\\nRepublican 99,403 12\\nProhibition 2,105\\nPopulist and Socialist 7,359 1\\n280,007 30 30\\nIn the election of 1894, strangely enough, the\\nresults were nearly proportionate.\\n1 See p. 08,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "72 PROPORTIONAL BEPEESENTATION-\\nELECTION OF ALDERMEN. NEW YORK CITY, 1894.\\nTOTE.\\nELECTED.\\nPEOPOE-\\nTIONAL\\nRepuWican\\nTammany\\nState Democracy\\nSocialist Labor\\n112,316\\n106,238\\n33,900\\n5,296\\n14\\n14\\n2\\n13\\n13\\n4\\nScattering\\n7,861\\n265,611 30 30\\nIn the foregoing statistical exhibits, political\\nparties have been treated as corporate entities\\nand the revelations of inequality have been based\\nupon the total number of votes cast for each, re-\\ngardless of the variety of opinions and interests\\nwithin the party. This comparison does not re-\\nveal the extent of a still more serious evil, the\\nfact that nearly one-half the votes are cast for\\nunsuccessful candidates. The candidates who are\\nactually elected, while they may be said to repre-\\nsent their parties, do not represent all the voters\\nwithin the parties. They are elected only in the\\nstrongholds. Parties tend to become sectional-\\nized, and their antagonisms are thereby intensi-\\nfied. Of the 105 Democratic representatives in\\nthe Fifty-fourth Congress, only 14 are from the\\nNorthern States, while only 28 of the 241 Repub-\\nlicans come from the South. As the following\\ntable will show, there are 3,062,383 Democratic\\nvoters in the Union who are not represented by\\ncongressmen in whose nomination and election", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "TEE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 73\\nthey have had a voice. The large majority of\\nthem are from the Northern States and they must\\nbe content to have their views on national ques-\\ntions represented by men from an entirely dis-\\nsimilar section of country, with different interests\\nand prejudices. The same is true of Southern\\nRepublicans. The table on pp. 74 and 75 shows\\nthat 44 1 per cent of the voters are in this way\\nunrepresented in Congress.\\nThis table shows the percentage of unrepre-\\nsented voters in a landslide Congress, and\\nmiffht therefore be considered as an extreme case.\\nMr. Salem Dutcher, in his work on minority\\nrepresentation, published in 1872, made similar\\ncalculations for three congressional elections in\\nwhich there were only two political parties con-\\ncerned, and the representation was fairly propor-\\ntionate (see Table, p. 76).\\nIn the Assembly of New York State, as shown\\nby the table on p. 7G, the voters are misrepre-\\nsented, not only in the numerical proportion, but\\nalso in the personnel of assemblymen. Only 23\\nassemblymen represent 501,000 Democrats, and\\n13 of these, constituting a caucus majority, are\\nelected by 47,700 Tammany votes; 352,000\\nDemocrats in the State at large have no spokes-\\nmen whom they can truly acknowledge as their\\nown. Republican voters of the city, too, must\\ndepend upon rural Republicans for the protec-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "74\\nPBOPORTIONAL REPBJESENTATION.\\nScat-\\ntering\\nVote.\\nCO lO\\nO rtl 05 t- lO\\nO tH\\n.rH MCO\\n(M a:\\nCO \u00c2\u00bbo in\\nr-T\\nhi\\nw 2 R\\nAh S\\nCO t-\\nC3\\nt-\\n(MOCj3t-CO THOOO ?qcOrH\\nCO 02\\n-H\\nOO\\n-tlCDC30C2 .rHCOOOOOCOlO\\nrH\\nCO\\nlO\\nOCD10C2C0 COCOMOOO\\nt-\\nN\\nCDOiCOCOCq MCOCOlO00\\nrH rH\\nw\\nO\\nt- CO\\nCD\\nC2\\nCO\\nb-\\nrH[-C2rHt- COCDCOCOCDt^\\nH\\n(M CD (M\\nCO\\nCD\\nCOCOCiCOt- \u00e2\u0080\u00a20 OOOC2 10C7\\ncs\\nOi T-l (M\\nCD_^\\nC-\\niq\\n00^ (M_^ t-__ t-;^ ^__ C0__ O^ lO CO CI O\\n1\\nCD\\nCO lO\\nih\\nM\\nt-\\nco co (m co lo rn o o lo cf\\n(M\\nlO CO\\nt-\\nCOCvl^OOrH rHTHlOrH\\n!2;\\nC-1\\nt-\\nOl\\no\\ntH\\nTttiHOC-IOiaiOCOlOCDTH\\n1 u\\n2 S w\\nS y H\\nlO\\no\\nCO\\nlO\\nCO\\nG500C0t-t--*OCDt-t^t-\\nP\\nrH_ CO__\\nio_\\no\\nc\u00c2\u00bb\\nc-i_ c-1^ o_ ra lo^ c-]^ o_ o_ io\\nCO\\ni-T i-T\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0Hh\\nCO\\no\\no ocT cd r-T t-^ cT oT co~ o-i co\\nCO\\nCD\\nrH\\nOOOCO^t-rHC^^rHrHt-\\n(M 0-5 rH rt\\nM 5 H\\nt-\\n03 lO d\\nrH rH 00 t- rH M JO\\nC5\\nCO CO CD\\nO .OStHO .OCO .CD\\nt3 H\\nL-\\nO t- CO\\nrH CO lO OO b- rH\\nAh g O\\no\\nO 03 (M\\nCO CD O 01 O\\nh^ K-\\n(M\\nrH TjH\\nCO rH t- (M Ttl rH\\nP^\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2sa-jia\\n7\\n7\\n7\\n-KSEK\\nr-\\\\\\nrH 1 1\\n00\\nCO\\nlO\\nAh\\nH\\nCO\\no\\n.00\\nO\\nH\\naj\\nt^\\n\u00c2\u00bbo\\nH\\no\\nt-~\\nCD~\\nQ\\nm\\nH\\nPh\\nrH\\nd\\n00\\nCD 1-1\\ncq\\n;i|\\n-COCO -COrH -t-\\n:z5\\nw\\nK\\nt-\\nt- CO\\nC 1\\nc-1 o o in c:5 lo\\n-ti\\nt-\\no\\n(M\\nt- -rHCO CDIO -co\\no\\np4\\nCO\\niH t-\\nrH C0__ CD__ C0__ 00\\nH\\nO\\no\\nCO\\nT-t\\nt-^\\nCO~- \u00e2\u0080\u00a2C0 ~C0 -b-^rH~ -CD\\nCD\\nCO 1-1\\n(M\\nrH\\nCO 00 t- rH M\\n1\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2Sana\\nCO rH\\ntH\\nrH\\niH\\nOcorHCDio ^eocqcqt-\\n(M rH rH _ rH rH\\n1^\\nt- o\\n00\\n05\\n25\\nTtHt-(MOO t-COt^CJrH\\nt-. rH\\nt-\\ncn\\no\\nco-*a)(MTti CO o\\\\ cn CO CI\\nn\\nH\\nt- t-\\ntH\\nCD\\nCO\\nO^-^^CD^CD^Cq^ -idH^lOlOrHO\\nt3\\nAh\\ng\\no t-^\\n\u00c2\u00bbo~\\na^\\no\\nco~ -hT o co t-T oT T*r ocT cT\\no\\nCO\\nrH\\ntH\\nrHCOCOCOOO COlOt-COlO\\nP^\\nv*\\nrH\\ntM C rH u-:, rt _\\ncS\\nC3\\nc\u00c2\u00ab a o\\nS o g\\nc3\\nSo\\no\\nCD\\no\\nIllinois\\nIndiana\\nIowa\\nKansas\\nKentucky\\nLouisiana\\nMaine\\nMaryland\\nMassachuset\\nMichigan\\nMinnesota\\nMississippi\\n02\\nc\u00c2\u00ab\\nR fS o\\no\\n1\\n3\\n1 o 6\\no\\nQ fq b\\nM", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORE.\\n75\\nC5\\nCO\\nC5\\nin 00\\nC\u00c2\u00bb\\nCO\\nt-\\nCO\\n1^\\nCi -H\\no\\nt-\\nto\\nCO\\no\\nCO c\\\\\\nr-l\\no\\nr-l\\nt-\\no\\ng\\ni-H O\\nC3\\nO CI\\nC-J\\nO\\nC^\\nzo\\n\u00c2\u00bbo\\no\\nO tH\\no\\nKO\\nZC 1-1\\n-H lO\\nto\\nr~\\nO\\noo\\nC3\\nCO\\nlO .H\\no\\ni-H lO\\nl~\\no\\n(M to\\n-f\\nlO\\non\\ni^\\nIH\\nci;\\niCi\\nM\\nrtt\\nrH\\nt~ o\\na\\niH\\no\\n1-1\\niH\\ntH\\ni:j\\nrH\\niH\\nC-l\\nC2 O (M\\nra -H CI t-\\nL ^l\\ni-T lo cT cf\\nCO 00 C\\nt~ tH\\ni\u00c2\u00bb CO CI\\nIS\\nlO CO CO 05 iH CO\\nin t^ 00 lo r-T co cf\\nC^ tH \u00c2\u00bb0 Cq rH\\nO CO 00 C l o\\nCO in iH i^\\nCO iH \u00c2\u00ab5 00\\nc-^^ oo_ 00 ;o_ o_\\ni-T c\u00c2\u00a3 cT o co ih cd\\noo_ q^ co_ CT^ iH_\\nco co co oo -o\\nrH iH rl C-l t-\\nCO 00\\nC-100Oi *rHaj N Od\\nC-ItHt-INiHC^I-^Ot-I\\nTl [,-J T\u00e2\u0080\u0094 I ^J 1\u00e2\u0080\u0094 I U .J VJ l,U ^L^\\nrH^0q^C0G2^O_O_rH^C0CO\\no oo i-T i-T co r-T TtT (cT\\ntH O C-l CO CI t^ CI CI\\niH CO CO o\\nCOlOOOCOt^CllOOCO\\nOi-IK5000DrHOr-lCO\\nco_co_03_oo_cj_t-;^ *_cq_o_\\nr-r^dTr-Ti-r^oo orcrcr\\nOOCDr-iTjfTHCOOOOi-H\\nl 5\\nft\\ns\\nc3\\no\\nw\\no3\\nm\\na\\nc3\\nM\\no\\nP\\nr^\\ni^\\n/d\\na\\nO\\no\\n5\\nc3\\na g\\nS/3\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0B\\nS 5 g", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "76 PROPORTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nVOTES FOR CONGRESSMEN.\\nKEPRBSENTED.\\nUNEEPEE-\\nSENTED.\\nVOTES.\\nMEMBERS.\\nPEK\\nCENT.\\nVOTES.\\nPES\\nCENT.\\nFortieth Congress.\\nRepublican\\nDemocrat\\n1,751,804\\n583,813\\n142\\n49\\n427,841\\n1,242,115\\n42\\nTotal\\n2,335,617\\n191\\n58\\n1,669,956\\nForty-first Congress.\\nRepublican\\nDemocrat\\n2,356,421\\n1,167,914\\n159\\n83\\n820,824\\n1,731,254\\nTotal\\n3,524,335\\n242\\n58\\n2,552,078\\n42\\nForty-second Congress.\\nRepublican\\nDemocrat.\\n1,826,338\\n1,360,170\\n136\\n106\\n960,209\\n1,366,330\\nTotal\\n3,186,508\\n242\\n58\\n5,513,539\\n42\\ntion of their interests. Altogether, 44.4 per cent\\nof the voters who actually cast their ballots are\\nunrepresented.\\nVOTES FOR ASSEMBLYMEN, NEW YORK, 1894.\\nPARTY.\\nREPRESENTED.\\nUNREPRE-\\nSENTED.\\nVOTES.\\nMEMBEKB.\\nPER\\nCENT.\\nVOTES.\\nPEB\\nCENT.\\nRepublican\\nDemocrat\\nTammany\\nSocialist Labor\\nPopulist\\nProhibition\\nScattering\\n585,937\\n40,840\\n47,701\\n105\\n10\\n13\\n79,920\\n352,838\\n59,636\\n9,575\\n6,914\\n21,626\\n9,339\\nTotal\\n674,478\\n128\\n55.6\\n539,848\\n44.4", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WOEK.\\n77\\nIn the Board of Aldermen of New York City,\\nin 1894, although the parties are represented in\\nnearly numerical proportion, yet 52 per cent of\\nthe voters are actually unrepresented.\\nVOTES FOR ALDERMEN, NEW YORK CITY, 1894.\\nRepublican\\nTammany\\nState Democracy-\\nSocialist Labor\\nScattering\\nKEPEESENTED.\\n6G,683\\n62,679\\n8,702\\n14\\n14\\n2\\nUNREPRE-\\nSENTED.\\n45,633\\n53,559\\n25,198\\n5,296\\n7,861\\nTotal\\n128,064\\n30\\n48.1\\n137,547\\n51.9\\nThese exhibits for New York State and City\\nare, of course, typical for all assemblies elected by\\nsingle districts. Nearly one-half the voters are\\nwithout personal representation in the law-making\\nbodies. The significance of this fact is not readily\\nperceived. It is one phase of the conditions\\nwhich give the local machines their hold upon\\nthe parties. In the strongholds the machines are\\nsupreme because they have no fear of independent\\nmovements, and where the minority is hopeless\\nthe machines are left in control from sheer indif-\\nference of the voters. The party conventions,\\ntherefore, which nominate general officers for city.\\nState, and nation, are entirely controlled by the\\nlocal macliines. In the legislatures, however, the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "78 PBOPOETIONAL BEPItESENTATION.\\nmachines from the strongholds control the situa-\\ntion, and give character to the party as a whole.\\nIn either case, the rank and file of the voters have\\nbut little direct influence in politics.\\nThe significant feature of the district system is\\nnot only the fact that voters have a choice only\\nbetween the candidates of the dominant political\\nparties it is also significant that a very small\\nproportion of voters hold the balance of power\\nbetween these two parties. In the congressional\\nelection of 1890, which substituted a Democratic\\nmajority of 127 for a Republican majority of 3,\\nthis result was brought about by a change of only\\n5 per cent of the total vote,i the Republicans losing\\nthat proportion, and the Democrats gaining only\\n2 per cent. On the other hand, the election of\\n1894, which turned a Democratic majority of\\n7 9 into a Republican majority of 134, was the\\nwork of 9.1 per cent of the voters, who aban-\\ndoned the Democratic party.\\nIn Indiana the remarkable overthrow, in 1894,\\nof a Democratic delegation of eleven members,\\nand two Republicans, by a solid delegation of thir-\\nteen Republicans, was effected by only 5.2 per\\ncent of the voters who left the Democrats, while\\nthe Republican vote was increased by only 4.3\\nper cent of the total\\nIn the Massachusetts Senate, elected in 1891,\\n1 See pp. 56, 57. 2 gee p. 62.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 79\\na change of less than 5 per cent from the vote\\nof those elected to the candidates m their respect-\\nive districts who received the next highest vote\\nwould have defeated every member of the senate,\\nand a change of less than li per cent of the vote\\nin twenty-one districts would have made the State\\nSenate Democratic instead of Republican.^\\nProfessor Giddings^ asserts that the total\\npossible gain or loss to a political party through\\nstrictly independent voting does not exceed, under\\nthe most favorable circumstances, 5 per cent of\\nthe maximum total vote of a presidential year.\\nThis statement is sustained by even the unprece-\\ndented landslides of the past six years.\\nIt is in the exaggerated weight of small factions\\nholding the balance of power between the two\\nparties that is to be found the secret of the cor-\\nrupt influences already described. The great\\nmajority of the voters are conservative, and do\\nnot readily change their party. Especially in\\nclose districts, therefore, interested elements can\\ndictate terms to both parties. This, too, gives\\nthe bribable vote an influence far in excess of its\\nproportions. Professor J. J. McCook finds in\\ntwenty-one towns of Connecticut that 15.9 per\\n1 J. M. Berry, Proportional Representation, Worcester, 1892.\\n2 Political Science Quarterly, vol. viii., p. 117 ff., The Na-\\nture and Conduct of Political Majorities.\\n3 Forum, September, 1892. The Alarming Proportion of\\nVenal Voters.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "80 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\ncent of the voters are venal. The proportion\\nranges from 3 per cent to 50 per cent. The aver-\\nage for the city and county is about 12i per cent.\\nThe proportion in other States is doubtless much\\nless but even then it is plain that the bribable\\nvoters themselves are adequate to hold the balance\\nof power between the parties. The single-mem-\\nbered district, therefore, places a magnificent pre-\\nmium upon bribery.\\nWe have seen how unequally parties are rep-\\nresented in the city. State, and nation. Our repre-\\nsentative system was contrived to represent not\\nparties, but sections. The efforts toward its im-\\nprovement have been directed not toward equality\\nof party representation, but equality of district\\nrepresentation. Congressional statutes and State\\nconstitutions require the districts to be of equal\\npopulation. But this is not enforced. South\\nCarolina has a white district as low as 134,369\\n(Census, 1890) but the sole black and Repub-\\nlican district, the seventh,^ contains 216,512 popu-\\nlation. In Texas the districts range from 102,000\\nto 210,000; in Kansas from 167,000 to 278,000;\\nand in Pennsylvania from 131,000 to 310,000\\n(both extremes in the city of Philadelphia). In\\nIllinois in 1892 the four Chicago districts had an\\naverage population of 297,980, while the sixteen\\ncountry districts averaged only 164,914.\\n1 See Diagram, p. 55.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "TUB DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WOBK. 81\\nState and municipal representation is still more\\nunequal. In New York City the State assembly\\ndistricts are identical with the aldermanic dis-\\ntricts. Says the Report of the New York Senate\\nCommittee on cities In the common council, as\\nwell as in the legislature, a voting constituency\\nof 7,000 has the same representation as a like\\nconstituency of 24,000. The principle of numer-\\nical equality, therefore, finds no application what-\\never in the common council of New York City.\\nThe same may be said of the principle of locality\\nrepresentation. The interests of the first and sec-\\nond districts are in all things practically alike the\\ntotal vote of the two districts is 14,498. The\\ninterests of the twenty-third district are in many\\nregards distinct from those of the first and second.\\nThe territorial area of the first and second com-\\nbined is 634 acres, that of the twenty-third is\\n1,881 acres and yet the twenty-third, with almost\\ntwice the population of the first and second, and\\nthree times the area as well, has but one vote as\\nagainst the two accorded to both the smaller area\\nand the smaller constituency.\\nThese statistics prove the excessive inequality\\nand minority domination of the present system\\nwherever applied. But we have not yet reached\\nthe end of the story. We must enter the legis-\\nlative halls in order to see the final chapter. To\\n1 P. 92.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "82 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nsay nothing furtlier of the rule by the speaker\\nof the House and by the legislative committees,\\nthrough which power is taken out of the hands\\nof the assembly itself, there is on all party ques-\\ntions the imperium in imperio of the party caucus.\\nIf one party in a legislature has 60 representa-\\ntives out of 100, the policy of the legislature is\\nnot dictated by an open conference of the 60 with\\nthe 40 but the majority party withdraws, and in\\nsecret conclave determines by a majority vote what\\nshall be its united action. Thus 31 members a\\nmajority of the 60, but a minority of the whole\\nmay determine the policy of the legislature, and\\nenact the laws of the people. This is no fanciful\\nsketch. The power of the party caucus is well\\nknown. A man who bolts the caucus can have\\nno influence whatever in legislation. He has meas-\\nures of his own, which he wishes to see enacted\\ninto laws. These may be appropriations of money\\nfor improvements, or for State or national institu-\\ntions in his own district. They may be good\\nmeasures, or they may be bad. But he knows\\nthat, in order to carry them, he cannot afford to\\nstand against the wishes of his fellow-partisans\\non other measures. Thus every representative is\\nin the power of his party caucus. He cannot stay\\nout of the caucus, and when he enters he must\\nabide by its decisions. To say that legislatures are\\ndeliberative assemblies, under such circumstances,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 83\\nis ironical. They are rather war-camps. Delib-\\neration involves consultation between opposing in-\\nterests and opinions, and the development of a\\ncompromise policy, which will be modified more\\nor less by all who have a voice. But the caucus\\nrule, dominated in the interests of the party rather\\nthan of the people, based on an electoral system\\nwhich usually gives a political party a clear ma-\\njority, begets intolerance and the overriding of\\nminorities. The party emerges from its caucus\\nlike an army from its fortress, runs upon the\\nenemy, listens to no cry for quarter or compro-\\nmise, beheads its own deserters, and then carouses\\nover its victory.\\nWe have now been able to follow the various\\nevil phases of recent American political life di-\\nrectly or remotely to their root in the system of\\nelecting single representatives from limited dis-\\ntricts, a system which we have inherited un-\\nchanged through six centuries of political and\\nsocial evolution. At the present time, when\\npolitical parties based on social questions divide\\nthe people and seek representation, we are using\\na system of representation based on locality. The\\npolitical parties inevitably seize upon this machin-\\nery and use it for party ends. Thus violently\\ndistorted, it represents neither sections nor parties.\\nInstead, it has divided the people in every district", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "84 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ninto two camps, each dictated by its own party\\nmachine and spoilsmen.\\nTliese two machines are often leagued together.\\nProfessor Bryce has pointed out the community of\\ninterests which exists between them on occasion\\nof independent reform movements, when they\\nactually combine against the reformers.^ They\\nare also in a more or less permanent coalition.\\nMen who are jointly interested in corporations\\nwhich seek legislation and franchises are osten-\\nsibly opposed to each other as prominent managers\\nof the different political organizations. Though\\ndiffering in politics, they unite the two machines\\nin the promotion of their own corporate interests.\\nThe j)erfection of this unity of interests seems to\\nhave been reached in various cities where, as in\\nCincinnati, the same man is reported to be the\\nboss of both political organizations.^ This\\ncoalition extends to Federal politics. Recently a\\nleading national manager has been publicly ac-\\ncused, by a reputable member of his own party, of\\naffording campaign assistance to the manager of\\nthe opposing party in return for congressional aid\\nto a corporation client. Both machines in nation,\\nState, and city are the tools of the corporations\\nand speculators who plunder the public. Conse-\\n1 See Bryce, American Common wealth, vol. ii., p. 111.\\n2 See Proceedings of the Cleveland Conference for Good City\\nGovernment, p. 318, Philadelphia, National Municipal League,\\n1895.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 85\\nquently, those voters who would he independent,\\nand would gladly revolt against ring rule, have no\\nplace. They cannot elect an independent candi-\\ndate unless they carry a majority of their petty\\nward or district. This is almost impossible in the\\nface of the party organizations. They can do\\nnothing but combine with one machine against\\nanother. Hence come hopelessness and apathy of\\nthe better classes of citizens. Hence also come\\nthose violent explosions and hysterics of reform,\\nthose popular uprisings, which occasionally break\\ndown the barriers of machine rule, but relapse\\nagain, like a mob in contest with troops. The\\ngerrymander and inequality in the representation\\nof parties are bad enough but the deadly evil of\\nthe system is the expulsion of ability and public\\nspirit from politics, and the consequent dictator-\\nship of bosses and private corporations.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nCHAPTEE IV.\\nTHE GENERAL TICKET, THE LIMITED VOTE,\\nTHE CUMULATIVE VOTE.\\nEnough has been said to show the array of evils\\nwhich spring from the single-membered district\\nsystem. These evils have not escaped observation,\\nand various attempts have been made to remedy\\nthem. Especially in France have interesting ex-\\nperiments been made by the substitution of scru-\\ntin de liste,^^ or the general ticket. Under this\\nmethod each constituency elects several members,\\neach elector has as many votes as there are mem-\\nbers to be elected, and those candidates are de-\\nclared successful whose votes stand at the head of\\nthe list. In this way the majority party gets the en-\\ntire list and the minority is wholly unrepresented.\\nThere are two applications of this system which\\nlead to important differences in the final results.\\nThe first is that adopted in several instances in\\nthe United States in the election of boards of\\ncounty commissioners and boards of education,\\nwhere the entire assembly is elected on a single\\nticket. With such a system, the question of equal\\nrepresentation plays no part whatever. The mi-\\nnority parties are without a single representative.\\nBut the system usually results in the election of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "THE GENERAL TWEET.\\n87\\nabler men than the district system. This would\\nnaturally be expected from the fact that a party,\\nin making nominations for a large area, cannot\\nafford to nominate obscure men. For example,\\nthe city of Cleveland, Ohio, recently introduced,\\nwith the sanction of the State legislature, a far-\\nreaching reform in its system of public schools, one\\nfeature of which is the election of a school-board of\\nseven members on a general ticket. In the first elec-\\ntion under this plan the vote stood as follows\\nEEPtJBLICAN.\\nDEMOC\\nRAT.\\nBuss\\n15,714\\nDodge\\n13,661\\nBoutell\\n15,595\\nG Gulden\\n13,551\\nBackus\\n15,385\\nPollner\\n13,306\\nHouse.\\n15,8G0\\nRyan\\n12,851\\nDaykin\\n1G,198\\nBurke\\n12,814\\nMcMillan\\n15,690\\nHoffman\\n12,777\\nFord\\n16,036\\nPlent\\n12,804\\nTotal\\n110,518\\nTOTA\\nL\\n91,764\\nIt will be seen that the Republicans obtained\\nthe entire board but had there been a change of\\nonly 1,000 to 2,000 votes from Republicans to\\nDemocrats, the Democrats would have carried\\ntheir entire list.\\nThe Cook County (Illinois) commissioners are\\nelected on a general ticket, with the result that\\nin 1892 the Democrats, with a vote of 133,000,\\nelected their entire list of 10 candidates, and the\\nRepublicans, with 100,000 voters, were unrepre-\\nsented. In 1893 the Republicans, with votes\\nranging from 70,926 to 72,554, elected 9, and the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "88 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPEE8ENTATI0N.\\nDemocrats, witli votes ranging from 69,305 to\\n70,980, elected, one. This was the first election\\nin many years when both parties had representa-\\ntion on the board.\\nThe second application of the general ticket\\nis a compromise between the single-membered\\ndistrict and the general ticket. Districts are\\nretained, but they are enlarged, the number is\\nlessened, and a solid delegation to the legislature\\nof from five to twenty representatives is elected\\non a general ticket for each district, by a majority\\nor plurality vote. For example, the county of\\nCuyahoga (including the city of Cleveland) sends\\nrepeatedly a solid delegation of six Republican\\nrepresentatives to the Ohio State legislature, and\\nnot one Democrat. The county of Hamilton (in-\\ncluding the city of Cincinnati) sends a solid dele-\\ngation of nine Democrats.\\nRepresentatives to Congress in the first half\\ncentury of our constitutional history were elected\\nby this system. Each State sent to Congress a\\nsolid delegation of one party or another, elected\\neither by the State legislature or by popular vote.\\nSo unjust did the method prove to be that gradu-\\nally the single-member district was substituted by\\nindividual State action, and finally Congress, in\\n1842, made the latter obligatory in all States.\\nPresidential electors are still chosen by this\\nsystem, though the State of Michigan made, in the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "THE LIMITED VOTE. 89\\nelection of 1892, a notable departure, by substitut-\\ning the district system. The legislature of 1893,\\nhowever, controlled by an opposing party, repealed\\nthe law, and returned to the general ticket.\\nIt will, of course, be observed that a legislative\\nbody elected upon this basis will not wholly ex-\\nclude a minority party. Indeed, the experience\\nof France seems to show that as far as equality of\\nrepresentation is concerned, the general ticket\\nscrutin de Uste is as equitable as the single district\\nticket scrutin d arrondissement. In the election\\nof members to the Chamber of Deputies in 1885,\\nconducted according to scrutin de Uste., the Repub-\\nlicans, with 4,300,000 votes, obtained 366 seats,\\nwhereas their numbers entitled them to only 311;\\nwhile the Conservative-Monarchists, with 3,550,-\\n000 votes, obtained 202 seats against their rightful\\nproportion of 257, a result not materially differ-\\nent from that of the district system in the United\\nStates. The general ticket was abandoned in\\n1889, after the trial at this one election; and the\\nFrench method at present is the same as that of\\nother countries.\\nThe general ticket presents exactly the same\\nfault as the single-membered district it divides\\nthe voters into two camps with no representation\\nof the minority, and commits the control of elec-\\ntions to the party machines. Its only difference is\\nthat it makes the area of election larger.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "90\\nPROPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nA modification of the general ticket, intended\\nto give tlie minority party a limited, though not\\nnecessarily proportional, representation, is the\\nso-called Limited Vote. This was nsed for nine\\nyears in the election of aldermen in New York\\nby three-cornered constituencies, where, with\\nthree to be elected, each voter had but two votes\\ninstead of three. The majority party therefore\\ncould usually elect only two candidates. In Bos-\\nton since 1893 there have been elected annually\\ntwelve aldermen at large, but each voter has only\\nseven votes. The majority party therefore elects\\nseven, and the minority five. Following is the\\nelection return for 1894. The two principal par-\\nties nominated but seven candidates each, while\\nminor parties nominated a smaller number. The\\ncandidates elected are those twelve who receive\\nthe highest number of votes, as indicated below.\\nVOTES CAST FOR ALDERMEN, BOSTON, 1894.\\nREPUBLICAN.\\nDEMOCRAT.\\nINDEPENDENT\\nREPUBLICAN.\\nAllen,\\n31,276\\nBarry,\\n28,592\\nFottler, 10,894\\nBryant,\\n28,630\\nDever,\\n27,642\\nHallstrom, 12,976\\nDyar,\\n24,945\\nFlood,\\n30,718\\nFolsom,\\n29,534\\nLee,\\n26,115\\nPresho,\\n26,479\\nLomasney,\\n26,657\\nSanford,\\n26,062\\nMcClellan,\\n24,069\\nWitt,\\n25,836\\nO Brien,\\n24,587\\n192,762 188,380 23,870\\nIndependent Democrat, Dolan, 10,234 scattering, 19,667.\\nTotal vote for all parties, 434,913. Republicans elect seven;\\nDemocrats elect five.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 91\\nIt will be seen from the above return that the\\nlimited vote creates an artificial representation of\\nthe two dominant parties, and permits no repre-\\nsentation whatever of minor parties and indepen-\\ndent movements. Parties are not represented in\\nproportion to this popular vote, else the above\\nelection would have returned but six Republicans,\\none independent Republican, and five Democrats.\\nThe fact that the dominant parties nominate only\\nseven candidates makes a nomination almost equiv-\\nalent to an election, the voters of the majority\\nparty having no choice whatever, and the voters\\nof the minority having only a possible choice of\\ntwo out of the seven.\\nThe limited vote is an interesting example of\\nthe way in which the very classes against whom\\na reform movement is aimed may divert it to\\ntheir profit. This method of election does not\\npermit independence it rather tightens the hold\\nof the party organizations, and is in harmony with\\nthose well-known developments of municipal poli-\\ntics where the two party machines agree to divide\\nthe spoils. It is paralleled by the bi-partisan\\ncommissions, which, instead of being non-partisan,\\nare all-partisan. And it is a long step in the di-\\nrection of that highest development of machine\\npolitics referred to in the preceding chapter,\\nwhere one man is the boss of both political\\norganizations. The limited vote in Boston has", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "92 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nnot appreciably improved the type of aldermen,\\nand cannot be said to have accomplished any\\nresult except a permanent alliance of the two\\nmachines. In New York the law was repealed\\nafter a trial of nine years.\\nThe general ticket has been shown to be crude,\\neven barbarous, in its destruction of minorities.\\nThe limited vote is less barbarous, but it does not\\nwiden the field for independence. The Cumu-\\nlative Vote is a further modification of the gen-\\neral ticket in the direction, apparently, of freedom\\nfor the voter. According to this plan, the elector\\nhas as many votes as there are representatives\\nto be elected, but he may dispose of them as he\\npleases. Not only may he distribute them one\\nby one among the candidates of one or all parties,\\nas in the general ticket or limited vote, but he\\nmay cumulate them upon one or more candi-\\ndates. In this way a small minority, which would\\nhave no opportunity in the limited vote, may elect\\na small number of candidates by cumulating all\\nits votes on one or more. For example, in the\\nelection of Boston alderm-en, given above, if the\\nIndependent Republicans could have cumulated\\ntheir 23,870 votes upon one of their candidates,\\ninstead of dividing them singly between two, and\\nbeing compelled to vote presumably for five regu-\\nlar Republicans in order to use all their lawful", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 93\\nnumber of votes, they could have elected that one\\nby a vote as large as that received by any other\\ncandidate.\\nWith the cumulative vote, very much depends\\nupon the size of the districts. If they are small,\\nas in the election of representatives to the lower\\nbranch of the Illinois legislature, the result differs\\nbut little from the limited vote. In Illinois each\\ndistrict elects on a general ticket three members of\\nthe State House of Representatives but the voter\\nmay cumulate or divide his votes, giving one vote\\nto each candidate, or one and a half votes to each\\nof two candidates, or three votes to one candidate\\n(called plumping This system was adopted\\nin 1870, and has therefore had a trial of twenty-\\nfive years. Testimony as to its practical workings\\nwill throw light upon the problem before us. Mr.\\nM. N. Forney has published answers from Illinois\\neditors to inquiries which he submitted to them.^\\nFrom these replies and other sources, the follow-\\ning conclusions are drawn.\\n1. It appears that representatives of third parties\\nin Illinois do not, as a rule, secure election. In\\n1892 the Prohibitionists in the State mustered for\\nrepresentatives 24,684 voters (not votes) the Peo-\\nple s Party, 20,108, out of a total of 872,948. If\\nthese parties could have concentrated their votes,\\n1 See Political Reform by the Representation of Minorities,\\nNew York, 1894.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "94\\nPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ntliey would have elected four and three members\\nrespectively, out of a total of 153. In the elec-\\ntion of 1894, the results were as follows:\\nILLINOIS LEGISLATURE, 1894.\\nRepublicans\\nDemocrats\\nProhibitionists\\nPeople s Party\\nIndependent\\nInd. Democrats\\nInd. Republicans\\nAmer. Citizen\\nScattering\\nTotal\\nVOTE FOE\\nREPKESEN-\\nTATIVES.\\n1,332,488\\n14,735\\n43,402\\n174,465\\n6,323\\n1,407\\n8,867\\n2,585\\n2,575\\n2,486,847\\nPER CENT\\nOF TOTAL.\\n53.4\\n37.2\\n1.7\\n7.1\\n.2\\n.3\\n.1\\n.1\\n100\\nREPRESEN-\\nTATIVES\\nELECTED.\\n92\\n61\\nPROPOR-\\nTIONAL.\\n82\\n57\\n3\\n11\\n153\\n153\\nThe elections are therefore confined, as in the\\nlimited vote, to the candidates of the two domi-\\nnant parties. Unlike the single-membered district\\nsystem, however, both parties have representatives\\nfrom every part of the State instead of from the\\nstrongholds only, and there are no hopeless minori-\\nties of the two main parties. Every citizen who\\nhas business before the legislature has some mem-\\nber of his own party to transact that business.\\nThe vote in the legislature is close, requiring the\\nconstant attendance of all members. By the elec-\\ntion of 1892 it stood 75 to 78.\\n2. Votes are wasted whenever a popular candi-\\ndate receives plumpers beyond the number", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 95\\nnecessary to elect him. A candidate who runs\\ntoo far ahead is just as dangerous to his party as\\nthe man who runs far behind. Under tlie old\\nsystem, the man who runs ahead does so at the\\nexpense of his adversary, but under the cumula-\\ntive system it is at the expense of his col-\\nleagues. For example, in the election of 1894\\nthe vote of the forty-fifth district was as follows:\\nCallahan Republican\\nBlack Democrat\\nTiptit Democrat\\nLathrop Republican\\nPalmer People s Party\\nSmith Prohibition\\n11,140\\n0,793J\\n9,699^\\n9,G28\\n2,921^\\n960\\nThe total Republican votes were 20,768, repre-\\nsenting approximately 6,923 voters the Demo-\\ncratic votes were 19,493, representing 6,498\\nvoters. Yet the Democratic minority elected two\\nrepresentatives, and the Republican plurality only\\none, because Callahan, Republican, received at\\nleast 1,400 votes more than he needed but his\\ncolleague, Lathrop, lacked at least 75. This re-\\nsult occurred in one district in 1892, and in three\\ndistricts in 1894.\\n3. In order to obviate this waste, all the re-\\nsources of the party managers are enlisted, and\\nthe party machine becomes even more indispensa-\\nble than under the old system. In the first place,\\nthe managers determine how many candidates\\n1 See Forney, above.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "96 PBOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nshall be nominated. Only where the parties are\\nclose, as in the forty-fifth district above cited, do\\nboth parties nominate two candidates. In other\\ncases, the minority nominates but one, and a nomi-\\nnation is equivalent to an election. For example,\\nthe vote in the thirty-sixth district was\\nKitzmiller\\nRepublican\\n16,525\\nMounts\\nDemocrat\\n9,013^\\nJones\\nDemocrat\\n9,059\\nWinters\\nPeople s Party\\n2,360\\nKelly.\\nProhibition\\n1,117\\nThe Republicans, though lacking but 1,500 of the\\nDemocratic vote, nominated but one candidate.\\nAgain, in close districts, the managers must exer-\\ncise great care in selecting good running mates,\\nas did the Democrats in the forty-fifth and thirty-\\nsixth districts. For these reasons the party or-\\nganization is greatly strengthened, there is a\\nstrong opposition to plumjDing, and voters are\\ncareful not to disobey the party instructions.\\n4. The quality and ability of representatives\\nare no better than under the old system. In close\\ndistricts, where four candidates are nominated,\\nthere may be a slight improvement; but, in other\\ndistricts, where a nomination is equivalent to elec-\\ntion, the worst elements get control, and bid de-\\nfiance to the people. There are frequent deals\\nbetween parties, the minority agreeing to put up\\none man, and the gang in both parties control-\\nling the primaries.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 97\\nIf districts are larger, electing five to fifteen\\nmembers, the cumulative vote gives a decided\\nadvantage to very small parties, both from the\\nsmaller quota necessary to elect a single candi-\\ndate, and from the increased waste of the larger\\nparties. In England the school boards are elected\\non the cumulative plan by districts returning four\\nor more members.\\nA correspondent of the Neiv York Worlds report-\\ning the first election held in Manchester under\\nthis system, wrote\\nIn INIanchester there were fifteen members of the school\\nboard to be elected, and each voter had fifteen votes at his\\ndisposal. Forty-four candidates went to the polls, and over\\n390,000 votes were given by 20,513 voters. Manchester\\nis famous for two things, first, the fervor of its Protes-\\ntantism second, the number, organization, and strength of\\nits working-classes. But at tliis election the two Roman\\nCatholics were brought in at the head of the poll, one of\\nthem receiving nearly 20,000 more votes than any Protes-\\ntant candidate, and no working-class candidate, of whom\\nthere were seven, being elected at all, the highest vote any\\nof them received being 3,854, while one of them got only\\n166. Here is the list of the successful candidates, with the\\nvotes given to each\\nRev. Canon Toole, Roman Catholic\\nGeorge Richardson, Roman Catholic 3(3,308\\nVVm. Birch, Philanthroiust 35,415\\nHerbert Birle.y, Episcopalian 34,02G\\nWm. B. Callencler, Episcopalian 31,824\\n1 Quoted by Dutcher, Minority or Proportional Representa-\\ntion, New York, 1872, p. 72.\\n54,560", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "98 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nRobert Gladstone, Episcopalian 24,237\\nThos. Dale, Episcopalian 20,688\\nJoseph Lamb, Episcopalian 22,987\\nLydia Becker, No Religion 15,249\\nRichard Haworth, Wesleyan 13,137\\nRev. W. McKerrow, Presbyterian 9,919\\nRobert Rumney, Presbyterian 9,510\\nDr. John Watts, Uusectarian 8,861\\nJohn Cooper, Wesleyan 8,020\\nOliver Heywood, Secularist 7,902\\nThe 90,868 votes given to the Roman Catholic can-\\ndidates were polled by about 7,000 voters, who either\\nplumped for the reverend gentleman who heads the\\nlist, or split their votes between him and the lawyer who\\nfollows him. The 133,762 votes given to the five Church\\nof England candidates were polled by about 9,000 voters\\nso that it seems that in Manchester the relative strength of\\nthe Church of England and the Church of Rome is as nine\\nto seven. It is quite clear that under the old system the\\nformer could have elected all the candidates, while the lat-\\nter would have been unrepresented but it is equally clear\\nthat these two i^arties underestimated their own strength,\\nand that between them they might have elected all the can-\\ndidates but one. The Catholics might have had six in-\\nstead of two candidates, and given each of them 15,144\\nvotes the Episcopalians might have had eight candidates,\\nand given each of them 16,720 votes while all that the\\nother i)arties could have done would have been to elect the\\nremaining candidate.\\nThe cumulative vote, therefore, whether in\\nsmall or large constituencies, must involve either\\nwaste and guesswork, or extreme dictatorship of\\nparty machinery.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 99\\nCHAPTER V.\\nPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nThe cumulative vote makes it possible for the\\nelector, entitled to vote for a number of candi-\\ndates, to concentrate his entire voting strength\\nupon a single candidate. This is the advantage to\\nminority parties which it gives, as compared with\\nthe general ticket. It compels all parties, there-\\nfore, to cumulate in order to prevent a waste of\\nvotes. Now, suppose every elector were required\\nto plump all of his votes on a single candidate.\\nEvery one would then be equally well provided\\nfor, if he had but one vote on a general ticket,\\ninstead of as many votes as there are candidates.\\nTen votes given to one candidate count no more\\nthan one vote given to that candidate, provided\\nevery other elector has but one vote. It has, in-\\ndeed, been proposed that representatives should\\nbe elected on general ticket, but that each elector\\nshould be entitled to vote for but one candidate,\\nthe candidates who stand highest on the poll up to\\nthe required number being declared elected. This\\nwould be in effect a compulsory plumping. The\\n1 L. C. F. Garvin, How to effect Municipal Reform, Arena,\\nSeptember, 1894.\\nLofC.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "100 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nsame objections would apply as against the cumu-\\nlative vote. It would waste the elector s voting\\nstrength by giving surplus votes to popular candi-\\ndates, which the electors, could they know before-\\nhand, would wish to give to others representing\\nthe same views. The party organization would\\ntherefore decide for the electors exactly how their\\nvotes should be cast.\\nBut this dictation could be avoided and the\\nvoter s freedom guaranteed, if he were ^permitted\\nto indicate on his ballot his second and third\\nchoices, for whom his single vote should be\\ncounted, if it were not needed to elect his first\\nchoice, or if it were given for a candidate who\\ncould not be elected. This is the single trans-\\nferable vote, which, as its name would indicate,\\nallows each elector to vote for but one candidate,\\ninstead of the entire number to be elected, but\\npermits him to indicate second and tliird choices.\\nThe total number of votes cast is therefore the\\nsame as the number of valid ballots, which,\\ndivided by the number of members to be elected\\n(or number of members plus one), gives the unit\\nor quota of representation necessary to elect a\\nsingle representative. Each voter marks his ballot\\nwith the figures, 1, 2, 3, etc., opposite the names\\nof candidates in the order of his preference. In\\ncounting the ballots, at first only the first choices\\nare counted, and as soon as a candidate has", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 101\\nreceived a number of first choices equal to the\\nquota, he is declared elected. After that no more\\nvotes are counted for him, but remaining ballots\\nwhich give him first choice are counted for the\\ncandidates marked second choice, or if the second\\nchoice bo declared elected, then for the third\\nchoice, and so on. After the ballots have been\\ngone over once in this way, and it is found that\\nthe full number of members is not elected, as\\nwould usually be the case, then candidates whose\\ntotal vote, either by way of first or secondary\\nchoices is less than a quota, are declared out\\nin the inverse order of their vote, and their ballots\\nare transferred to the successive choices indicated\\nthereon, until the complete number of members\\nis declared elected.\\nThis method of election has been exhibited by\\nMiss C. H. Spence of South Australia, in some\\nfifty public meetings. By massing together the\\nresults of these several elections, she has presented\\nthe following scrutiny of 3,824 votes for the elec-\\ntion of six parliamentary representatives. There\\nwere twelve names of candidates on her voting-\\npapers, arranged in alphabetical order.^\\nThe instructions to voters were that they should mark\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0with figures, in the order of their preference, the candidates\\n1 Report of meeting on Proportional Representation, or\\neffective voting, held at River House, Clielsea, London. John\\nBale Sons, 18tU, p. 3(5.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "102 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nSUR-\\nPLUS.\\nELIMINATED.\\nO\\nW\\n637\\n517\\n637\\n615\\n637\\n637\\n144\\n3,834\\nCANDIDATES.\\nd\\nO\\n1\\nrH\\n1\\n11\\n2\\n1\\n3\\n18\\n1\\n4\\n4\\n2\\n2\\n1\\n13\\nd\\no\\nO\\n4\\n1\\n4\\n11\\n1\\n6\\n30\\n1\\n17\\n1\\n6\\ng\\nW\\n10\\n10\\n2\\n2\\n37\\n11\\n2\\n21\\n6\\nS\\nO\\nid\\n7\\n6\\n31\\n72\\n9\\n32\\n22\\no\\n44\\n47\\n17\\n11\\n28\\n63\\n6\\nh\\nS\\nS\\nPQ\\ni\\n12\\n15\\n64\\n88\\n31\\n80\\nw\\n00\\n139\\n27\\n127\\n49\\nAngas (Capital)\\nBaker (Do.)\\n419\\n2G2\\n361\\n190\\n682\\n107\\n320\\n136\\n93\\n656\\n72\\n466\\nBirks (Single Tax)\\nButtery (Labor)\\nCharlston (Do.)\\nFowler (Capital)\\nGlynn (Irish Catholic)\\nGuthrie (Labor)\\nHarrold (Capital)\\nMagarey (Prohibition)\\nRobinson (Labor)\\nStirling (Wom. s Suffraj\\nNull\\n;e),\\n6)3,824\\n637-\\n45\\n19\\niota\\n76\\n92\\n187\\n216\\n290\\n342\\nas far as six or fewer. This is all the voter has to do. His\\nvote is to be counted for one, and that one the first on his\\nlist who needs his vote and can use it. If his first choice\\nhas ah-eady reached tlie quota, or has too few votes even\\nwith his aid to do so, the vote is transferred to his next,\\nas shown by his number, and used and not loasted.\\nThe quota is found by Mr. Hare s original method, by\\ndividing the whole number of votes by the number of rep-\\nresentatives needed, in this instance six. The votes should\\nbe first mixed thoroughly together, and then taken out\\none by one and numbered, and allotted according to first\\nchoice, as shown in the first vertical column of the table\\nappended. The votes are found to be 3,824, which, divided\\nby six, gives as a quotient or quota 637, leaving out the\\nfraction.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 103\\nThis sliows that only Charlston and IMagarey had any\\nsurplus and, after cutting the pile of votes once, like a\\npack of cards, so that there might be no arrangement of\\npreferred second choices, the 45 and the 19 unneeded votes\\nwere taken from the top, and allotted according to second\\nchoice, as seen by columns two and three.\\nNext, the returning officer declares Robinson, the lowest\\non the poll, not elected, and proceeds to distribute his\\noriginal and transferred votes by second choice, or third,\\nif second is already elected. (See column 3.) Next, Har-\\nrold is declared 7iot elected, and his votes dealt with sim-\\nilarly. Thus, step by step,, six of the twelve candidates are\\neliminated from the contest, leaving six elected.\\nOf these, two have quotas of first choice votes, two have\\nquotas of first and transferred votes, and two have what\\nMr. Hare calls approximate quotas sufficient for returning\\nthem. The appropriation of transferred votes may\\nbe followed in the horizontal lines. At the foot we see\\na line marked Null these were ineffective apparently\\nmore than in reality. These 144 voting papers could not\\nbe used because the voters had marked the names of men\\nwho had already obtained the full quota of 637 votes, or\\nwho had been eliminated as hopeless.\\nBut I believe that there were only two unrepresented\\none who had marked one name, and that one of the unsuc-\\ncessful candidates, while the other voter had ingeniously\\npicked out the six who failed to make a quota.\\nThe single transferable vote has become the\\nclassical form of proportional representation,\\nfrom the great ability with which it was presented\\nby its author, Mr. Thomas Hare, and advocated\\nby John Stuart Mill.^ It was also devised inde-\\n1 See Chapter X. and Appendix IV.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "104 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\npeiidently by the Danish statesman, M. Andrae,\\nand introduced by him into the election of a\\nportion of the members of the Rigsraad in 1855,\\nand for the Landsthing in 1867. It is advo-\\ncated by the English Proportional Representation\\nSociety, of which Sir John Lubbock is president.\\nThere is a practical difficulty, almost insur-\\nmountable, in the application of this system to\\nlarge constituencies, in the fact that all the votes\\nof the entire constituency must be brought to-\\ngether to the central bureau for counting. They\\ncannot be counted by the various precinct officials,\\nleaving only the totals to be handled by the cen-\\ntral board. The Hare system doubtless Avorks well\\nin a constituency of a thousand voters, as in the\\nMechanics Institute of San Francisco, where it\\nhas been successfully employed in three elections,\\nor in constituencies electing only three to seven\\ncandidates by a restricted suffrage, as in the\\nDanish law of M. Andrae but Avhen ten thousand,\\nor a hundred thousand, or a half million votes are\\nto be counted, and a large number of the ballots\\nmust be recounted to make the proper transfers,\\nthe task is too heavy.\\nThe Hare system is advocated by those who, in\\na too doctrinaire fashion, Avish to abolish political\\nparties. They apparently do not realize the im-\\npossibility of acting in politics Avithout large\\ngroupings of individuals, nor do they perceive that", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "riiOrOimONA L UErUKSENTATION. 10\\nthe Hare systt in itself, though apparently a system\\nof personal representation, would, nevertheless,\\nresult in party representation. And this from the\\nfact that voters who act rationally, and wish to\\nsee their own views most strongly represented in\\nlegislation, would always transfer their secondary\\nchoices to candidates of the same party as the ones\\nwho receive their iirst choices. The only way in\\nwhich the system could lessen party cohesion\\nwould he to require the names of candidates to\\nhe printed in alphabetical order, as in the present\\nJMassachusotts and California ballot laws, and not\\nby party tickets, so that the voters would be com-\\npelled to search through the entire ballot for the\\ncandidates of their own party. This would doubt-\\nless encourage independent voting, but would by\\nno means abolish parties. A study of the scru-\\ntiny of votes taken by Miss Spence, as given above,\\nshows that the surplus votes, and votes of\\neliminated candidates, have been transferred\\nas far as possible within party lines. In an actual\\ninstead of a trial election the adherence to party\\nwould be closer.\\nWith the present organization of parties in tlie\\nUnited States, and with the customary method of\\nprinting party tickets on the so-called Australian\\nballot, there is reason to believe that the Hare\\nsystem would be forced into the service of par-\\nties. There is a general agreement among the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "106 PEOPOETIONAL BEPRE8ENTATI0N.\\nleading advocates of proportional representation\\nthat a system of election is needed which will do\\nas little violence as possible to existing prejudices\\nand habits, a system which will fit in with the\\nmethods of voting and the political traditions of\\nthe people, and yet will utilize these traditions\\nand methods in such a way as to free the voter\\nfrom the tyranny of the single-membered district\\nsystem. It must also be a system in which the\\nballots can be counted at the precincts where\\nthey are cast.\\nVOTE FOE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS,\\nINDIANA, 1892.\\nDEMOCEAT.\\nREPUBLICAN.\\nPEOPLE S.\\nPKOHIB.\\nI.\\n262,270\\n255,615*\\n22,208*\\n13,050\\nII.\\n260,661\\n253,878*\\n21,861\\n12,830\\nIII.\\n260,600\\n253,836*\\n21,883\\n12,827\\nIV.\\n260,586\\n253,815*\\n21,876\\n12,824\\nV.\\n260,580\\n253,799*\\n21,873\\n12,823\\nVI.\\n260,560\\n253,807*\\n21,873\\n12,821\\nVII.\\n260,588\\n253,793\\n21,873\\n12,821\\nVIII.\\n260,547\\n253,808\\n21,865\\n12,820\\nIX.\\n260,575\\n253,787\\n21,873\\n12,819\\nX.\\n260,600\\n253,792\\n21,873\\n12,813\\nXI.\\n260,591\\n253,777\\n21,871\\n12,820\\nXII.\\n260,590*\\n253,767\\n21,867\\n12,819\\nXIII.\\n260,581\\n253,767\\n21,867\\n12,815\\nXIV.\\n260,538\\n253,770\\n21,865\\n12,816\\nXV.\\n260,533\\n3,910,390\\n253,770\\n21,864\\n328,392\\n12,815\\n3,808,791\\n192,533\\nIn order to approach the solution of our prob-\\nlem from a standpoint familiar to Americans, we\\nmay examine the principles involved in a vote for", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 107\\npresidential electors, and the possible modifica-\\ntions necessary to make such an election propor-\\ntional. Take, for example, the vote in the State\\nof Indiana in 1892, as shown on p. 106. The\\nparticular candidates are indicated by Roman nu-\\nmerals, in the order in which they stood on the\\nrespective tickets.\\nOf course, under the existing system of majority\\n(or rather plurality) rule, the fifteen Democratic\\nnominees are declared the successful candidates,\\nseeing that individually each one receives more\\nvotes than any Republican candidate. But with\\nproportional representation, parties, rather than in-\\ndividuals, must receive their just deserts. There-\\nfore the following calculation is made\\nDemocrats 3,910,390\\nEepublicans 3,808,791\\nPeople s Party 328,392\\nProhibitionists 192,533\\n8,240,106\\n8,240,106 -r 15 549,340 unit of representation.\\nSince there are fifteen representatives to be\\nelected, it would appear that every party should\\nbe entitled to one representative for every fif-\\nteenth part which it receives of the total vote\\nfor all parties. This quotient would be 549,340,\\nwhich would be the unit of representation. Di-\\nviding, now, the several party votes by the unit\\nof representation, we have,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "108 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nREMAINDER. ELECTING.\\nDemocrats, 3,910,390 -f 549,340 7 165,010 7\\nEepublicans, 3,808,791 -f 549,340 7 63,411 7\\nPeople s Party, 328,392 -f 549,340 328,392 1\\nProhibitionists, 192,533 -f- 549,340 192,533\\nTotal, 14 15\\nThe People s party, having the largest remainder\\nabove a full quotient, would be entitled to the odd\\ndelegate, making the complete representation con-\\nsist of seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and\\none Populist.\\nIt now remains to select the individual candi-\\ndates on the several tickets. This is done by\\ntaking the seven Democrats, seven Republicans,\\nand one Populist, who show the highest number\\nof individual votes. I have indicated the success-\\nful candidates by an asterisk.\\nHere we have the simplest modification possible\\nof the existing general ticket with which Ameri-\\ncans are familiar. It secures justice between\\nparties, obviates the waste of cumulative voting,\\nbreafe the monopoly of the dominant parties, and\\nelects the most popular and representative men in\\neach party.\\nBut as a practical instrument for a scheme of\\nproportional representation, it presents serious dif-\\nficulties. Like all of the plans for minority rep-\\nresentation that have been examined, as well as\\nthe existing single-membered district, it is based,\\nprimarily, upon the theory that the voter casts", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 109\\nliis ballot for individual candidates and not for\\na political party. This is the primitive theory of\\nrepresentation, which, as we have seen, emerged\\nfrom the primary assembly through the instru-\\nmentality of proxies. Based, however, upon this\\nearlier theory, the modern voter approaches the\\nelection with the idea of his jjolitical party upper-\\nmost in his mind. He votes for persons because\\nthey are the nominees of his party. The person-\\nality of the candidates is a secondary considera-\\ntion. This is seen in an extreme case in the\\ngeneral ticket of a presidential election. Each\\npolitical party nominates a list of candidates equal\\nto the total number to be elected and the voters\\nof the majority party, by voting individually for\\neach candidate on their party ticket, elect the en-\\ntire ticket. For this reason the plan is not suited\\nto proportional representation, under which the\\npolitical parties could not hope to elect an entire\\ndelegation, and would naturally not wish to nomi-\\nnate a larger number of candidates than they could\\nexpect to elect.\\nAt the same time there is a very prevalent\\nmodification in the method of voting the general\\nticket in the United States, which will suR-o-est a\\nway out of this difficulty. The voter is usually\\ngiven -the privilege of voting a straight ticket by\\nplacing a single mark opposite the title of the\\nparty of his choice. In this way he gives a vote", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "110 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nindividually for each candidate on the ticket,\\nalthough not required to check the individual\\nnames. Plainly, if all the votes are cast in this\\nway, the final result as between parties is the\\nsame as though each voter cast but one vote for\\na party instead of his ten or fifteen or more votes\\nfor the individual candidates of that party. Con-\\ncsiderations of this kind influenced Mr. Thomas\\nGilpin of Philadelphia, who in the year 1844\\npublished his pamphlet On the Representation\\nof Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority\\nin Elected Assemblies. This was probably the\\nearliest attempt to find a philosophical solution\\nfor the problem of presentation. 2 Mr. Gilpin\\nproposed that voters should have but one vote,\\nwhich they should cast, not for a candidate, but\\nfor a party. The constituencies were to be en-\\nlarged, and each party committee or convention\\nwas to present one list of candidates. The voter\\nwas to hand in to the election officers his party\\nticket which might contain as candidates the\\nwhole number of representatives to be voted for\\nin the district; and these should be placed in\\npreferences highest on the list, in order that those\\nset first on it may be chosen according as the\\nnumber of votes given may entitle the ticket to\\none or more of its candidates. The total number\\n1 Philadelphia, John C. Clark, printer, 1844.\\n2 Professor Wm. R. Ware, in American Laiv Review, Jan-\\nuary, 1872.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Ill\\nof tickets voted divided by the number of persons\\nto be elected, gives the electoral quota., which, in\\nturn, used as a divisor, determines the number of\\ncandidates who are elected on each list. No pro-\\nvision was made whereby the elector could indi-\\ncate his preferences among the candidates on his\\nparty ticket, the rule being that, as already quoted\\nfrom Gilpin, if a given list was entitled to, say,\\nthree quotas of votes, the first three candidates\\nwere to be the elected deputies.\\nIn 18-16 M. Victor Considerant published at\\nGeneva, Switzerland, a plan similar to that of\\nGilpin, but independently originated.^ He did\\nnot contemplate a full list of candidates on all\\nparty tickets, but only partial lists, as the nomi-\\nnating agencies might choose. Each list was to\\nbe published before election and given an official\\nnumber. Each elector was to vote for a ticket by\\nwriting on his ballot the number, No. 1, No.\\n2, etc., and then also to name the candidates of\\nhis own ticket whom he wished.^\\nIn 1870 M. Borely of Nmies, France, proposed\\nthat each elector should himself indicate his pref-\\nerences by numbering the candidates 1, 2, 3, etc.\\n1 De la Sincerite du goiivemement representatif, ou Exposi-\\ntion de I Electioii Veridique. Eei^rinted by Karl Biirkli, Zurich,\\n1892.\\n2 D c crire sur son bulletin le numero de sa section, et au-des-\\nsous, la liste des noms qu il aura choisis paruii les caudidats de\\nsa section, p. 12,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "112 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nIn this form the plan was adopted m 1871 by the\\nAssociation Reformiste of Geneva, Switzerland,\\nand became known as the lists lihre, or free\\nticket.\\nWhile recognizing political parties as primarily\\nentitled to representation, it was again soon per-\\nceived that the restriction of the elector to one\\nvote for a single party did not permit him to vote\\nfor individual candidates on other party tickets\\nwhom he may have preferred; and his freedom\\nof choice within his own party would not be\\ngreat, seeing that his party managers would nom-\\ninate no more candidates than they hoped to\\nelect. In 1875 the Swiss Association, therefore,\\nabandoned the double vote for party and for can-\\ndidates within the party, and advocated a combi-\\nnation of the cumulative vote and the free ticket.\\nThe voter was to have as many votes as there\\nwere deputies to elect, and he might cumulate\\nthem as he saw fit. However, to avoid the\\nwasted votes of the crude cumulation, the free list\\nfeature was added; and it was provided that the\\ntotal number of votes given to individual candi-\\ndates on the respective tickets were to be added\\ntogether to determine the share of representation\\nwhich the parties as such should have.\\nMuch can be said in favor of this plan, espe-\\ncially in connection with the Australian system of\\nvoting, where all the party tickets appear upon", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 113\\nthe same blanket ballot. It is also Avell adapted\\nto the Massachusetts and California ballots, where\\ncandidates are named alphabetically, and not ac-\\ncording to parties. By it the voters may plump\\ntheir votes without resrard to the instructions of\\nthe party managers, yet with the assurance that\\nno votes are wasted. For example, in the election\\nin the forty-fifth Illinois district, as given on page\\n95, where the Republican Callahan ran so far\\nahead of his ticket that his colleague was de-\\nfeated and two Democrats were elected, the free\\nticket amendment would have given the follow-\\ning result\\nREPUBLICAN. DEMOCRAT. PEOPLE S AND\\nPROHIBITION.\\nCallahan, 11,140 Tiptit, 9,79.3J\\nLathrop, 9,628 Black, 9,699^\\nTotal, 20,768 19,493 3,881^\\nRepublican, 20,768\\nDemocrat, 19,493\\nPeople s, 2,921^\\nProhibition,, 960\\nTotal, 44,142.^ -j- 3 14,714 unit of representation.\\nRepublican, 20,768 14,714 1 6,054, electing 2\\nDemocrat, 19,493 14,714 1 4,779, electing 1\\nPeople s, 2,921 14,714 2,921;^, electing\\nProhibition, 960 14,714 960, electing\\n2 3\\nIn the crude cumulation, where candidates and\\nnot parties are considered, as in the Illinois method,\\nthe Republicans with a majority of the votes", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "114 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nelected only one candidate, wlio received 1,400\\nvotes more tlian he needed. But with the free\\nticket modification, these 1,400 wasted votes are\\ncounted for the party to which this leading candi-\\ndate belongs and are in effect transferred to his\\ncolleague. Thus that party secures its rightful\\nproportion of two representatives instead of one,\\nand the candidate running ahead of his ticket\\nbecomes a help instead of a danger.\\nA bill based upon this combination was intro-\\nduced by Hon. Tom Johnson in the Fifty-second\\nCongress, and is given herewith\\n52d CoNGKESs, 1st Session,\\nH. E. 9222.\\nIN THE HOUSE OF EEPRESENTATIVES.\\nJune 15, 1892.\\nReferred to the Committee on Election of President and\\nVice-President, and ordered to be printed.\\nMr. Johnson of Ohio introduced the following bill\\nA BILL\\nPROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES\\nBY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Eepresentatives\\nof the United States of America in Congress assembled,\\nThat members of the House of Representatives shall be\\nvoted for at large in their respective States.\\nSec. 2. That any body of electors in any State may, in\\nconvention, nominate any number of candidates not to ex-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 115\\nceed the number of seats to which such State is entitled in\\nthe House, and cause their names to be printed on its ballot.\\nSec. 3. That every elector shall be entitled on his\\nballot to one vote each for as many persons as the State\\nwhereof he is a resident is entitled to seats in the House,\\nand he may cumulate his votes on a less number of persons\\nin such manner as he may choose.\\nSec. 4. That the sum of all the votes cast for all the\\ncandidates in any State shall be divided by the number of\\nseats to which such State is entitled, and the quotient to the\\nnearest unit shall be known as the unit of representation.\\nSec. 5. That the sum of all the votes cast for all the\\ncandidates of each body of electors nominating candidates\\nshall be severally divided by the quota of representation,\\nand the units of the quotients thus obtained will show the\\nnumber of representatives to which each such body of\\nelectors is entitled and if the sum of such quotients be\\nless than the number of seats to be filled, the body of elec-\\ntors having the largest remainder after division of the sum\\nof all the votes cast for all its candidates by the quota of\\nrepresentation, as herein specified, shall be entitled to the\\nfirst vacancy, and so on until all the vacancies are filled.\\nSec 6. That the candidates of each body of electors\\nnominating candidates and found entitled to representation\\nunder the foregoing rules, shall receive certificates of elec-\\ntion in the order of the vote received, the candidate receiv-\\ning the highest number of votes the first certificate, and so\\non but in case of a tie, with but one vacancy to be filled,\\nthe matter shall be determined by lot between the candi-\\ndates so tied.\\nThis combination of the cumulative vote and\\nthe free ticket answers in most respects the\\nideal of electoral reform. It gives to the voter", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "116 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nthe widest freedom of choice between all the indi-\\nvidual candidates on all the tickets, avoids the\\nwaste and the consequent machine supremacy\\nof the simple cumulative vote, and opens the way\\nfor independent movements within and without\\nthe dominant parties. There are, however, two\\nminor objections. If voters are allowed to write\\non their ballots the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., against\\nindividual candidates, it becomes easy to make\\nthose distinguishing marks which the laws\\nagainst bribery seek to prohibit.. This objection\\nwould not hold against a plan by which the voter\\ngives but one vote to a candidate or one to a\\nticket. Again, the cumulation involves a waste of\\nvotes between the groups or factions within the\\nparty corresponding to the waste which the sim-\\nple cumulation permits between parties. Voters\\nof a given faction who cumulate on their own first\\nchoices of their party candidates, and who fail to\\ndistribute their votes so as to aid the secondary\\ncandidates of the same faction, would be at a dis-\\nadvantage, and minor but shrewder factions would\\nsecure disproportionate influence in the party repre-\\nsentation. This objection, however, is not a serious\\none, provided the several factions nominate sepa-\\nrate tickets, as they could easily do.\\nThe cumulative vote, with the free ticket\\namendment, has been adopted by the Canton Zug\\nin Switzerland, and is favored by Professor Ernest", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 117\\nNaville, tlie leading advocate of proportional rep-\\nresentation in that country. It is simpler than\\nthe plan finally agreed upon by the Swiss and\\nAmerican advocates of the reform, and would per-\\nhaps secure all the advantages of the latter. It\\ncould be adopted in Illinois by a slight amend-\\nment to the cumulative vote, though the small\\nsize of the constituencies would prevent the best\\nresults. It is the only form, too, which could\\nconveniently be adopted in States like Massachu-\\nsetts and California, whose ballot laws require\\nthat candidates names be printed in alphabetical\\norder, and not by party groupings. In these\\nStates the voter could cumulate his votes on in-\\ndividual candidates, and it would be the duty of\\nthe returning officei-s to separate out the candi-\\ndates by parties and add up the individual votes\\nin order to find the several party votes. The\\nsimple rule of three would then determine the\\nparty representation, and the individual candi-\\ndates who stood highest on the party lists would\\nbe declared elected.\\nIt is evident, however, that the advantages of\\ncumulation will be secured to the party, though\\nnot to favored candidates, if voters, being allowed\\nto cast but one vote for individual candidates on\\nany of the party tickets, are permitted to cast all\\nthe unused votes to which they are entitled for a\\nsingle party, by merely making the legal mark", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "118 PBOPORTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nagainst the title of tlie party. Thus if a voter in\\na constituency electing twenty candidates chooses\\nto give single votes to five candidates on one or\\nmore tickets, he may, instead of cumulating the\\nremaining fifteen on a single candidate, by writing\\nthe figures 15 against the candidate s name, be\\npermitted to bunch them directly for the party\\nticket to which his favorite candidate belongs by\\nmaking the simple cross against the party emblem.\\nHis fifteen votes would go for the party thus indi-\\ncated and his remaining five would count both as\\npreferences for individual candidates within the\\nparties, and as votes for the parties to which those\\ncandidates belong.\\nThis is the plan finally agreed upon by the\\nSwiss Association, and recently incorporated into\\nthe electoral laws of Neuchatel and Geneva. It\\nwas also adopted b}^ the American Proportional\\nRepresentation League at Saratoga in 1895, as\\nmost nearly suited to American habits. A bill\\ndrawn up by a committee of the League appointed\\nfor the purpose is given herewith, together with\\nan introductory statement by the committee\\nThe accompanying bill is provided with especial refer-\\nence to the election of boards of aldermen in cities but\\n1 Professor J. E. Commons, Syracuse University; Mr. Stougli-\\nton Cooley, Secretary American Proportional Representation\\nLeague; Professor J. W. Jenks, Cornell University. This bill\\nlias not been officially adopted by the League. It is simply the\\nrecommendation of the committee.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "PBOPOBTIONAL EEPRESENTATION. 119\\nthe same provisions may be adapted, with simple verbal\\nchanges, to the election of members of a legislature, or\\ncongressmen, or any board consisting of a number of\\nrepresentatives with equal powers. The number of candi-\\ndates on any ticket ought ordinarily not to exceed fifteen,\\nand may well be as small as five. In case of large bodies,\\ntherefore, the city or State can be divided into large terri-\\ntorial districts, and the proportional system applied to each.\\nIt has been presumed that the general laws of the State\\nprovide for the nominations by parties and by petition\\nfollow the general plan of the Australian system of voting\\nprovide for election inspectors, canvassei S, etc.; lay down\\nprinciples determining the validity of votes and in gene-\\nral provide for the carrying out of elections, so that this\\nbill provides only the specific requirements needed for the\\nproportional system.\\nBILL\\nTO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA-\\nTION IN CITIES.\\nSec. I. The members of the board of aldermen to be\\nchosen at any election shall be chosen by all the voters of\\nthe city on a general ticket, and not by separate districts.\\nSec. II. Any party or body of voters which polled at\\nthe last preceding city election one per centum of the total\\nvote cast for the principal office filled at said election, or\\nwhich shall present a nomination paper signed by voters\\nequal in number to such percentage [or by the number\\nspecified in the law of the State concerned], naay nominate\\na ticket or list of any number of candidates for said board\\nof aldermen not to exceed the total number of persons to be\\nelected to said board and the names of the persons thus\\nnominated shall be printed on the official ballot, but so that", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "120 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nthe list of candidates nominated by each party or body of\\nvoters shall be printed separately.\\nSec. III. A candidate may be placed upon several party\\ntickets, but he may choose in favor of one of them. All\\nthe votes cast for him are then counted for the ticket\\nchosen. In default of a choice by him, the ticket to which\\nhe shall be assigned is determined five days before the\\nelection by lot, by the proper officer, in the presence of the\\nofficial representatives of the parties or petitioners con-\\ncerned, if they wish to appear.\\nA candidate s name cannot be placed on any ticket if he\\nmakes objection in writing to the proper officer five days\\nbefore the election.\\nSec. IV. Each voter shall have as many votes as there\\nare persons to be elected, which he may distribute as he\\nchooses among the candidates, giving not more than one\\nvote to any one candidate, votes thus specifically given to\\nbe known as individual votes and each such vote shall\\ncount individually for the candidate receiving the same and\\nfor the ticket to which the candidate belongs. In case a\\nvoter does not use the total number of votes to which he is\\nentitled by specifying that number of candidates, the re-\\nmainder of his votes, to be known as ticket votes, shall\\nbe counted for any ticket as a whole, provided that he\\ndesignate such ticket by title otherwise only the indi-\\nvidual votes shall be counted. His entire ballot will be\\nvoid if more than one ticket is designated by title.\\nThe voter casts his individual votes by marking in\\nthe space provided by law opposite the names of the sepa-\\nrate candidates he casts his ticket votes by marking\\nin the space provided at the head of the ticket.\\nSec. Y. Judges and inspectors of election shall deter-\\nmine for each precinct, and the central canvassing board\\nfor the city, the following", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 121\\n1. The number of votes invalidated for any cause.\\n2. The number of valid individual votes cast for\\neach candidate.\\n3. The number of valid individual votes cast for\\neach party or ticket.\\n4. The number of ticket votes cast for each ticket.\\n5. The total number of valid votes cast for each ticket,\\nincluding individual votes and ticket votes.\\n6. The total number of all valid votes cast.\\nSec. VI. In determining the results of the election,\\n1. The total number of valid votes cast for all tickets\\nshall be divided by the number of candidates to be\\nelected; the quotient, ignoring fractions, to be\\nknown as the unit of representation.\\n2. The total number of valid votes cast for each ticket\\nshall be severally divided by the unit of represen-\\ntation, and each such ticket shall be entitled to\\na number of aldermen equal to the quotient thus\\nobtained, ignoring fractions.\\n3. If the sum of such quotients be less than the number\\nof persons to be elected, the ticket having the\\nlargest remainder after the division aforesaid shall\\nbe entitled to an additional alderman thereafter,\\nthe ticket having the second largest remainder;\\nand so on, until the whole number is chosen.\\nSec. VII. When the number of representatives to which\\neach ticket is entitled shall have been determined as pro-\\nvided in Section VI., the candidates upon such tickets who\\nshall have received the highest number of votes (not exceed-\\ning the number of representatives to which such ticket is\\nentitled) shall receive certificates of election. In case of a\\ntie between tickets or candidates, the lot decides.\\nSec. VIII. If a ticket obtains more representatives than\\nit has presented candidates, the number of seats remaining", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "122 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nto be filled is distributed among the other tickets in pro-\\nportion to the votes cast for each.\\nSec. IX. When there is a vacancy in any seat, the candi-\\ndate who has received in the general election the greatest\\nnumber of votes after the last one elected, in the party or\\ngroup within which the vacancy has occurred, is chosen to\\nfill it.\\nIn order to illustrate the practical operation of\\ntliis measure if enacted into law, I give herewith\\nan abstract of the report of a special commission\\nto the Belgian Parliament appointed for the pur-\\npose of holding a trial ballot in Brussels, Nov. 19,\\n1893. The report is published in full in La\\nRepresentation Proportio7ieUe, Brussels, Decem-\\nber, 1893. It gives a detailed and careful ex-\\nhibit of all the steps in proportional voting. To\\nAm ericans it is especially useful since, although\\nthe Belgian bill differs in some points from the\\nAmerican, yet it is an application of the Swiss\\nplan to the Australian ballot a ballot not used\\nin Switzerland.\\nThe Belgian parliament, having in hand the re-\\nvision of the constitution, determined to test the\\nclaims of the advocates of proportional representa-\\ntion by a trial election of the eighteen represen-\\ntatives from Brussels in parliament and although\\nparliament finally rejected the reform, yet the\\nobject lesson has attracted international attention.\\nThe commission having the matter in charge", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 123\\nplaced in nomination six different tickets, a\\nlarger number than would usually have been pre-\\nsented, since the Catholics and Independents, and\\nthe Socialists and Progressists, would usually\\nnominate fusion tickets.\\nAlthough there were eighteen seats to be filled\\nfrom the Brussels district, the committee did not\\nplace full tickets in nomination, the largest being\\nthat of the Socialists, containing ten names. As\\nno party could hope to secure all the seats, no\\nparty would nominate a full list of candidates\\nunless required by law to do so. Each party\\nwould nominate one or two more than it hoped to\\nelect. On page 124 is given the form of ballot\\nused in this election, with initials for the names of\\nthe candidates. These candidates were men who\\nhad retired from active politics, but whose polit-\\nical reputation made them well known in the city.\\nThe instructions given to voters were as fol-\\nlows\\nINSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTORS.\\nA. The elector may stamp the white spot in the square\\nplaced at the head of a list of candidates. By voting in\\nthis way he gives eighteen votes to the ticket, no matter how\\nmanij candidates there are upon it. Ticket votes.\\nB. He can, after having stamped the square at the\\nhead of the ticket, also stamp the white spot in one or\\nmore squares placed at the right of the names of those can-\\ndidates ^oho Jigure on the same ticket. By doing this he", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "124\\nPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nCO\\nm\\ng\\nm\\nB\\nm\\nH\\nn\\ng\\nn\\nUJ\\n3\\n^^^B\\n^H^l\\n^^^^1\\nIBJ^I\\n^^^^1\\n^^^^1\\n^^^^1\\n^^1^1\\n^Hbh\\n_l\\no\\nQ\\nX\\n_j\\n1-\\no\\nc\\nUJ\\nLU\\n(D\\nUJ\\n0)\\nt\\nX\\nX\\n1-\\nT3\\nQ\\nQ\\nQ\\na\\nQ\\ns\\nh-\\no\\ni-H\\n(M\\nCO\\nim\\nCO\\n00\\nC5\\nCO\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0HB\\n^^H\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0\u00e2\u0096\u00a0H|\\nH^H\\nBan\\n^^H\\n^\u00e2\u0096\u00a0M\\n^VV||\\n^^^n\\n^^^^1\\n^B^H\\n^r^H\\n^V^9\\n^piH\\n2\\n^^^9\\n^^^B\\nB^BI\\nIbhI\\n^^fll\\nH^^B\\n^mn\\n^^^^1\\n^^^n\\nHHH\\n^^^^H\\nj^BBB\\nmm\\n^HlH\\nQ\\nZ\\nLLl\\n0)\\nO.\\nO\\nLU\\nLU\\n1-\\nNUl\\nX\\ni\u00c2\u00ab:\\nCd\\noS\\nU5\\na\\nz\\niH\\n(M\\nec\\nlO\\nCO\\nI-\\nM\\nB\\nB\\nB\\nB\\nB\\nB\\nn\\nB\\nOS 5\\no\\nH\\nH\\nH\\nli\\nH\\nu\\nu\\nH\\nO\\nDC\\nLU\\nLU\\no\\n5\\nQ\\nc\\nS J\\no\\no\\nO\\n_l\\nen\\n%5\\na\\nr-l\\nIN\\nCO\\nlO\\nCO\\nl\\n00\\nCO\\nD\\nB\\nB\\ng\\ng\\ng\\ng\\ng\\n^^H\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0^H\\nICH\\nD\\n\u00c2\u00a32\\nH\\nH\\nM\\nBh\\nM\\nCO\\nQl\\nu\\nor\\nCD\\no\\n0)\\nQ\\nD\\no\\nLU\\no\\nc\\no\\nCO\\niH\\n(M\\nCO\\nU5\\nCO\\ni\\n00\\n05\\nO\\ni-l\\nCO\\nH\\nB\\nB\\njj^H\\nB\\nH\\nB\\nB\\nU\\n^^^^1\\ni2f\\n^Hi\\nH\\n^m\\nH\\ngf\\ngg\\nM\\nC5\\n2\\nz\\nDO\\nLU\\nLU\\nt\\nj\\na.\\nt.\\nQ\\nQ\\nO\\n_l\\n_j\\nCO\\niD\\no\\n-1 O\\nOC\\niH\\nN\\nCO\\nlO\\nCO\\n1\\n00\\nm^gg^|[gg\\nX\\nCO o\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0z.\\nCQ\\nLU\\nQ\\nX\\ncc\\no\\nc\\niH\\nN\\nCO\\nlO\\nCO\\nr:-\\n00\\nOi\\nnH", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 125\\ngives eighteen votes to that ticket and one vote of prefer-\\nence individual votes to each of the candidates whom\\nhe has thus designated.\\nC. Tlie elector ivho has not voted at the head of any ticket\\ncan stamp the white spot of one or more squares placed at\\nthe right of tlie names of candidates on whatever ticket the\\ncandidate may appear. In this way he gives for each\\nsquare stamped 07ie vote of preference to the candidate des-\\nignated, and one vote to the ticket to ivhich this candidate\\nbelongs. (Mixed ballots.) (This differs from the American\\nbill and from the Swiss laws, in which the elector gives\\nindividual votes on as many tickets as he pleases, and\\nthen gives the remainder of the number to which he is\\nentitled to any ticket, even though his individual votes\\nare on both tickets.)\\nD. The following ballots are void\\n1. Ballots having more than one vote at the head of\\ntickets.\\n2. Ballots upon which the elector has stamped the white\\nspot placed at the head of a ticket, and has voted at the\\nsame time for candidates on the other tickets. (Not void\\nin American bill and Swiss laws.)\\n3. Ballots in which the elector has voted for more than\\neighteen candidates.\\nThe people of Brussels took a lively interest in\\nthe experiment. Meetings were held in various\\nparts of the city, and the method of voting was\\nexplained. About 12,000 electors cast their bal-\\nlots. The voting-booths were open from 9 A.M.\\nto 4 P. M. The counting of ballots was begun at\\nonce, and completed in all the precincts in three-\\nquarters of an hour to four hours time for from", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "126 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\n300 to 1,940 ballots each. This work was found\\nto be not at all complicated, and was done as\\neasily and rapidly as in the ordinary elections.\\nThe work of the central bureau began at 5.30\\nP.M. and the returns from the several precincts\\nwere added up as rapidly as they came in. The\\nfirst results were as follows\\nNumber of votes 12,192\\nBlank or void ballots 333\\nValid ballots 11,859\\nA large number of the void ballots had been\\npurposely annulled by the voters, who had cov-\\nered them with fantastic inscriptions. The party\\nvotes were the following:\\nPARTY. TICKET TICKET MIXED TOTAL\\nBAS.LOTS. VOTES. VOTES. VOTES.\\nModerates 546x18= 9,828+ 1,865= 11,693\\nProgressists 2,013 X 18 36,234 3,278 39,512\\nSocialists 5,748X18= 103,464+ 3,217= 106,681\\nFlemish\\nDemocrats 1,127X18= 20,286+ 1,427= 21,713\\nIndependents 411X18= 7,398+ 1,027= 8,425\\nCatholics 972x18^ 17,496+ 1,909= 19,405\\nTotal 10,817 X 18 194,706 12,723 207,429\\nA very small number of the ballots contained\\nmixed votes, only 1,042 out of 11,859, the\\ngreat majority, 10,817, being cast for tickets.\\nWith th-e American law there would doubtless be\\na larger proportion of mixed or scattering votes,\\nsince the voter who has marked the head of his", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "riiOI OIiTIONAL llEPRESENTATION. 127\\nticket is not prohibited from scattering a portion\\nof his votes for candidates on other tickets. In\\nthe Belgian hiw, of course, each ticket vote\\ncounts eighteen votes for the party in the Amer-\\nican bill it counts only the surplus remaining after\\nthe individual votes have been counted for\\nthose several tickets in which the individually\\ndesignated candidates appear.\\nThe 1,042 mixed ballots contained 12,723 votes,\\nan average of twelve to the ballot, whereas the\\nvoter was entitled to eighteen. This may be ex-\\nplained. The elector who scatters his votes is\\nembarrassed in finding eighteen individuals who\\nsatisfy him, and on the average, therefore, loses\\none-third of his party-voting strength. He finds\\nit easier to vote for tickets than for candidates.\\nThe modified ticket vote of the American bill,\\ntherefore, again assists those who wish to vote\\nmixed tickets, and in so far promotes the inde-\\npendence of the voter. It allows him to use all\\nthe votes to which he is entitled after he has scat-\\ntered his individual votes among various tickets\\nby merely bunching the remaining votes on a\\nsingle ticket.\\nFor the distribution of seats among the political\\nparties the Belgian reformers have indorsed a plan\\ndrawn up by Professor D Hondt, and explained in\\nAppendix I. to this book. It is a complicated\\nplan, and does not secure better results than the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "128 PBOPOBTIONAL HEPliESENTATION.\\nsimple rule of three adojjted in Geneva and Neu-\\nchatel and by the American League. Accord-\\ning to this latter simple division, the distribution\\nwould be the following: The total number of\\nvotes, 207,429, divided by eighteen, gives 11,523\\nas the unit of representation. Dividing the party\\nvotes by this unit provides for fifteen representar\\ntives; the remaining three are assigned to the\\nparties having the largest remainders.\\nPARTY TOTAL TTNIT OF REMAIN-\\nVOTE. EEPEESKNTATION. UEll. \u00c2\u00bbKA1\u00c2\u00bb.\\nModerates. 1 1,003^ 11,523 1+ 170= 1\\nProgressists 39,512\\n11,523 3+ 4,043\\nSocialists 100,081+ 11,523 9+ 2,974= 9\\nFlemish Democrats 21,713\\nIriflcpenderits 8,425\\nCatliolics 19,405\\n11,523 1+ 10,UJO= 2\\n11, .523 0+ 8,425= 1\\n11,523==!+ 7,882= 2\\nTotal 15 18\\nIt is impossible under any plan yet devised to\\nto find an exactly proportionate representation\\nRepresentatives are living units, and cannot be\\nj)arcelled into fractions for the accommodation of\\nunfortunate remainders. But taking the above\\ndistribution, we find that the\\nModerates get one representative for 11 ,093 votes.\\nProgressists got ojie representative for 13,170 votes.\\nSocialists get one representative for 1 1 ,853 votes.\\nFlemish Democrats get one representative for 10,850 votes.\\nIndependents get one representative for 8,425 votes.\\nCatholics got one representative for 9,702 votes.\\n1 In Appendix T. will ho found a comparison of different plans\\nproposed for the distrihution of seats,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "PBOPOUTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 129\\nAfter determining the number of representatives\\nto which each party is entitled, the next step is\\nto designate the individual candidates actually\\nelected. The vote for candidates on the Progress-\\nist ticket is here given, the others being similar.\\nThis ticket is entitled to three seats, and the indi-\\nviduals chosen are those having the three highest\\nvotes, as indicated below.\\nINDIVIDUAL VOTES ON PROGRESSIST TICKET.\\nVOTES OF PllEF- VOTKS OF I REF-\\nEREX E 0 EltENCE OX TOTAL.\\nTICKET BALLOTS. MIXED BALLOTS.\\nDA 738 459 1,197*\\nDEM 1,012 495 1,507*\\nGEN .394 442 8.36\\nLAB 228 349 577\\nLAV 282 365 647\\nSCA 616 428 1,044*\\nSP 388 367 755\\nCA 393 373 766\\nThe report of the commission states that the\\nmost important men of each jmrty lead the tickets\\nin the number of their votes. In this connection\\nshould be noted the small number of preferences\\ngiven on ticket ballots. Of the 10,817 ticket bal-\\nlots only 6,317 indicated preferences for candi-\\ndates, the remaining 4,500 voting straight tickets\\nwith only the single mark against the title. The\\n6,317 ticket votes, which contained also indi-\\nvidual votes of preference on the same ticket, in-\\ndicated only 21,105 such preferences, an average", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "130 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nslightly exceeding three, as against the average of\\ntwelve individual votes on the 1,042 mixed bal-\\nlots. It would seem, therefore, that the mixed\\nballots, which do not throw their entire weight\\nfor one party against others, and so have little\\ninfluence upon the share of party representation,\\nhave, nevertheless, a disproportionately large in-\\nfluence in designating the candidates upon each\\nticket who shall be elected. This might occur;\\nbut in the above election, as a matter of fact, the\\ncandidates who received the largest number of\\nvotes of preference on ticket ballots generally re-\\nceived a similar advantage on the mixed ballots.\\nIn this connection the objection is made against\\nthe Swiss system that a strong jparty with surplus\\nvotes might defeat the leader of another party by\\ngiving preference votes to a weak candidate on\\nthe ticket of the latter. That this objection has\\nbut little weight can be seen by examining the\\nabove table of individual votes on the Progressist\\nticket. Not often would a party be so strong as\\nwillingly to transfer votes to an opposing party\\nwhich would be liable to swell the latter s repre-\\nsentation at the expense of its own. It could\\njeopardize only one of the candidates on the lat-\\nter s ticket, and this would not affect the leader\\nunless the j)arty were so small as to be entitled to\\nonly one representative. In the Progressist ticket,\\nit will be seen, 209 votes would have been needed", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "PROPORTIONAL PEPRESENTATION. 131\\nto displace S.C.A., the lowest successful candidate\\non the ticket, by G. E. N., the next in order, while\\nthe leader of the party, D. E. ]\\\\I., exceeds S. C. A.\\nby nearly 500 votes. The principal leader of a\\nparty may always be expected to run considerably\\nahead of his ticket. As between the larger par-\\nties, therefore, which are entitled to more than\\none representative, the objection has no weight,\\nwhile wath a party barely entitled to but one\\nrepresentative it assumes an improbable waste of\\nvotes by the larger parties. It might be added,\\nhowever, that in the cumulative variety of the\\nfree ticket as proposed in the Johnson bill and\\nadopted in Canton Zug, the principal leaders of a\\nparty would be further removed from such risk\\nthan in the single-vote variety.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "132 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBEBENTATION.\\nCHAPTEE yi.\\nAPPLICATION OF THE REMEDY.\\nIn stating the advantages of proportional repre-\\nsentation there are two lines of discussion, a theo-\\nretical and a practical. The theoretical principle\\ninvolves the goal towards which electoral reform\\nshould be directed. But to reach this goal a plan\\nof action must be devised. In the latter case the\\ndiscussion is practical, dealing with the various\\nmethods which have been proposed.\\nIn a Democratic form of government, unlike an\\nabsolute monarchy, methods are as important as\\nmeasures. If a practicable and effective method\\nof proportional representation cannot be discov-\\nered, the theoretical principle is a mere dream.\\nWe shall therefore best perceive the general prin-\\nciple and the practical method by examining them\\ntogether.\\nIn the first place, proportional representation\\nrecognizes the nature of modern political parties\\nas based, not altogether on sectional divisions, but\\non social and economic problems of national scope.\\nThere is in various quarters a disposition to decry\\nand resist any recognition of parties. It is pointed\\nout, for example, that the very essence of civil", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 133\\nservice reform lies in taking the offices out of\\npolitics, and that the evils of municipal govern-\\nment proceed from political parties.\\nThe contention is mainly one of definition.\\nPossibly a new definition is needed of party,\\nas well as politics. The latter has come to\\nmean a base, underhanded manipulation and diplo-\\nmacy. But there is also an honorable and neces-\\nsary politics. All action by government, whether\\ncity, State, or nation, is political action. And all\\naction by individuals towards incorporating their\\nviews in laws and public policy must be through\\nassociations or groupings of individuals under\\ntheir chosen leadership. These groups are politi-\\ncal parties, and this action is the genuine,\\neducational, vital function of parties in popular\\ngovernment.\\nBut where there is freedom and intelligence,\\nsuch groupings are not rigidly permanent. They\\nturn on political questions, and as questions\\nchange there come new alignments of individuals.\\nIf the electoral machinery prevents this, and forti-\\nfies the dominant parties against inroads, compel-\\nling alignment on new questions the same as on\\nold, and forcing the same alignment on municipal\\nand State questions which exists on national ques-\\ntions, the party becomes a machine, sustained by\\nspoils and plunder, and there is no freedom for\\nthe voter. If, however, the electoral machinery", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "134 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nbe modified so as to permit tlie representation of\\nnew elements witliin tlie old parties, or to facili-\\ntate the representation of new parties, then we\\nshould have, not rigidity and corruption, but\\nnatural and wholesome political growth, whether\\nin city. State, or nation.\\nProportional representation, therefore, is based\\nupon a frank recognition of parties as indispensable\\nin free government. This very recognition, in-\\nstead of making partisan government all-powerful,\\nis the necessary condition for subordinating parties\\nto the public good. To control social forces, as\\nwell as physical forces, we must acknowledge their\\nexistence and strength, must understand them,\\nand then must shape our machinery in accordance\\nwith their laws. We conquer nature by obeying\\nher.\\nAt the same time, though recognizing political\\nparties based on social questions, yet, in a nation\\nof such vast territory as the United States, sec-\\ntional differences also demand recognition. These\\nare amply provided for in our Federal Constitution.\\nThe Senate of the United States represents the\\nStates, without regard to population or parties.\\nIt is not proposed to criticise this practice. It\\nis an important feature of our Federal system.\\nYet it does not seem that the Senate should have\\nthe same weight in legislation as the House of\\nRepresentatives. It ought to sink to the level", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 13o\\nof a revisory board like tlie House of Lords, or the\\nupper chambers of the Canadian and Provincial\\nparliaments. Such would become its status, if the\\nHouse truly represented the people, and furnished\\na lifelong arena for their political leaders. As\\nit is, the Senate shines, not by ability, but by\\ncomparison.\\nThe House is supposed to represent the people.\\nA combination of sectional and party representa-\\ntion would be secured in this branch by elect-\\ning State delegations on the proportional basis.\\nCongress has power to provide without Constitu-\\ntional amendment for this plan of election. The\\ngerrymander has destroyed whatever unity of local\\nrepresentation the present system may retain in\\ntheory. Districts are frequently changed agri-\\ncultural, manufacturing, mining areas are thrown\\ntogether. The State, however, is a truly organic\\nunit, accustomed to act as such and State election\\nof national representatives would harmonize with\\nthis unity, and would permit the free play of sec-\\ntional as well as national interests.\\nIn State legislatures a similar distinction might\\nbe made. In the lower house the county, or a\\nsmall group of counties, electing ten or twelve\\nrepresentatives, could be made the unit. In a\\nHouse of one hundred members, there would be\\neight or ten districts, each sending its delegation\\nelected on the proportional basis.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "136 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nThe State senate should be elected on a general\\nticket for the State at large, one-half perhaps at\\neach election. It is difficult to describe the prin-\\nciple upon which senates at present are chosen.\\nTheir membership is small, ranging from thirty-\\nfive to fifty. Hence senators cannot stand for\\ncounties. Only nine of the fifty-two Indiana\\nsenators represent single counties, and two of\\nthese are from one county. The others represent\\nthe most arbitrary combinations of two, three, and\\nfour counties each, arranged only for partisan pur-\\nposes. May not the senate be given a distinctive\\nplace and character, elected on the broad basis of\\nthe State, representing the whole people, thereby\\nattracting to its halls the recognized leaders of\\nthought and action throughout the common-\\nwealth\\nAt the same time local interests would have\\ntheir influence. A political party with only\\nmeagre sagacity would distribute its nominees\\neither for Congress or for a State senate as widely\\nas possible over the State. Only in this way\\ncould it appeal to the voters of all classes and in-\\nterests. Even now we see this distribution in the\\nnomination of tickets of State candidates, from\\nthe governor to the chief of statistics. If sec-\\ntional differences are decisive, political parties\\nmay be trusted to provide for them.\\nThe canton of Geneva, with a single legislative", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 137\\nassembly of one hundred members, elects them\\non the proportional plan, in three nearly equal\\ngroups one group of thirty-four from the city of\\nGeneva, one group from the right and another\\nfrom the left bank of the river.\\nIn municipal elections the unity of the city\\nwould be recognized by abolishing the wards alto-\\ngether, and by electing only one legislative assem-\\nbly instead of two. With a single chamber also,\\nas in foreign cities, responsibility will be central-\\nized, and the honor of the position enhanced.\\nThe board of aldermen or common council might\\nconsist of thirty members, ten of them to be\\nelected each year. There might, indeed, be cities\\nof extensive area, or with sections of opposing\\ninterests, where two or three general tickets could\\nbe elected. But as a rule this would not be neces-\\nsary, for the parties would be careful to distribute\\ncandidates among the sections.\\nThe significance of proportional representation,\\nas far as it affects popular elections, consists in\\nthe fact that it prohibits the exaggerated influ-\\nence of small factions holding the balance of\\npower between two parties. For this reason it\\nwill remove the incentives to bribery and extrava-\\ngant use of money in elections. The secret bal-\\nlot has made bribery difficult and dangerous, but\\nit has not touched the inducements to bribery.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "I\\n138 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nThe number of close districts is so large that ma-\\njorities in the legislatures and Congress, as well\\nas popular majorities for executive and judicial\\nofficers, turn on narrow margins. The bribable\\nvote is as large as, or even larger than, the shifting\\nvote,^ and is therefore adequate to decide elec-\\ntions, and to turn the control of legislative bodies\\nwith large majorities from one party to the other.\\nBut with proportional representation there is no\\nfaction or group which holds the balance of power.\\nA change of the entire venal vote, should it equal\\nthe Connecticut average of 12^ per cent, would\\naffect only 12^ per cent of the result. But as\\nthe changes of this kind are more or less offset\\nby both parties, they could not disturb more than\\none per cent to three per cent of the total vote. It\\ncan therefore be seen how diminutive would be\\nthe briber s influence. Successful bribery would\\nendanger only one candidate out of a party s\\nrepresentation. And this, unless the legislature\\nwere minutely close, would not be worth the\\nbriber s expense. A legislature elected by bribery\\ncould be of no service unless it contained a ma-\\njority for the bribers. The only cases in which\\nbribery might be expected to give a political party\\nsuch a clear majority, would be in those States\\nwhere the party vote is very close, as in New\\nYork and Indiana, where the two parties often\\n1 See pp. 79, 80.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 139\\ndiffer by less than 1 per cent of the total vote.\\nBut even in such cases, it must he remembered.,\\nthere are third and fourth parties, which, if repre-\\nsented, would hold the balance, and would prevent\\na clear majority for either of the great parties.\\nThe same is true of the Federal Congress. In\\nother States, where one party has a heavy major-\\nity, the bribable vote is not large enough to over-\\ncome it. The secret ballot makes bribery difficult;\\nproportional representation makes it fruitless.\\nProportional representation based upon political\\nopinions, rather than territorial areas, is a specif-\\nic for the gerrymander. As already shown, the\\ngerrymander is an inevitable result of the district\\nsystem. It is merely a phase of the attempt to\\noutline the districts or the wards. If there are\\nno districts, there can be no gerrymander. Other\\nremedies must fail. The courts in various States\\nhave recently taken upon themselves the right to\\noverrule certain redistricting acts contrived for the\\nelection of State legislators. This policy is dan-\\ngerous to the integrity of the courts, as well as\\nfruitless. The courts are not empowered to sub-\\nstitute an apportionment of their own creation\\nand therefore, by declaring an existing gerry-\\nmander unconstitutional, they merely call back a\\nprevious one of another party, usually their own,\\nand equally vicious with the one condemned. But", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "140 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nproportional representation, by abolishing districts\\naltogether, wipes out the very substance of the\\ngerrymander. It relieves the courts and the le-\\ngislatures of an onerous burden and a dangerous\\npower. So inevitable and self-evident is this\\nremedy for the troublesome gerrymander that to\\nadd more words in explanation of it could only\\nweaken the force of the simple statement.\\nNot only are parties primarily represented, they\\nare represented with mathematical accuracy in\\nproportion to their strength. Justice and equal-\\nity become realities. Instead of the flagrantly\\ndistorted assemblies, which by way of rhetoric we\\ncall representative, we should have a true reflec-\\ntion of the people. And this equal representation\\nis elastic. It conforms to all the movements of\\npopulation. If cities increase in size, their repre-\\nsentation increases in legislatures and Congress.\\nEven more significant than unequal representa-\\ntion as between parties, is the large number of\\nvoters who under the district system are wholly\\nunrepresented. The tables given in Chapter III.i\\nshow for certain elections of congressmen, of mem-\\nbers of the New York Assembly, and of aldermen\\nof New York City, the number of electors who\\nvoted for successful candidates, and are therefore\\nrepresented by men of their choice, and the num-\\n1 See pp. 74-77.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 141\\nber who voted for uiisuccessfiil candidates, and\\nare therefore unrepresented. By reference to\\nthose tallies it will be seen that, by the congres-\\nsional election of 1894, 44.5 per cent of the voters\\nare unrepresented in Congress by men of their\\nown choosing. That this is the usual proportion\\nis shown by the fact that for the Fortieth, Forty-\\nfirst, and Forty-second Congresses, elected more\\nthan twenty years earlier, the proportion of unrep-\\nresented voters was 42 per cent. In the New\\nYork Assembly elected in 1894, 44.4 i^er cent of\\nthe voters are unrepresented and in the Board of\\nAldermen of New York City 51.9 per cent are\\nunrepresented.\\nThe theory by which it is sought to justify the\\npresent system in its denial of representation to\\nnearly half the voters, is based on the assertion\\nthat a minority party in one district will be a\\nmajority party in another and that, therefore, the\\nminority voters whose particular candidates are\\nnot ^ccessful will, nevertheless, be represented,\\nbecause legislators in other districts will be\\nelected by voters of the same political faith.\\nThat such an argument should be generally ac-\\ncepted as adequate is striking evidence of the hold\\nwhich political parties as corporate entities have\\ngained upon the popular imagination. So unques-\\ntioned is the notion of the solidarity and the com-\\nmunity of interests of men of the same party, no", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "142 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nmatter how far apart they may live in different\\nsections of the nation, the State, or the city, that\\none-half the people are willing to forego the right\\nof personal representation, and to permit distant\\nand often antagonistic interests to choose for them\\ntheir own. representatives. It is assumed that the\\nNegroes and Republicans of the Southern States\\nare represented by Republicans chosen in the\\nNorth, and that Northern Democrats can find their\\nspokesmen in the Democrats from the South. In\\nthe present New York Assembly, 13 of the 23\\nDemocratic assemblymen were elected by 47,700\\nTammany voters of New York City. Can it be\\nsaid that the 350,000 Democrats of the remainder\\nof the State will find their views expressed by\\nthese Tammany assemblymen from the city?\\nAre the Republican merchants of the city repre-\\nsented by the farmers from the country? These\\nvoters for defeated candidates have no voice in the\\nselection of the standard-bearers of their own party.\\nIn this important sense they are unrepresented.\\nUnable to affect elections Avithin their own party,\\nthey leave the machine in control. The present\\ninfluence of Tammany Hall would be much lessened\\nin State and Federal politics, did not the district\\nsystem make its leaders spokesmen, not only for its\\nown following, but also for the unrepresented\\nDemocracy of the State at large. Proportional\\nrepresentation would increase the representation", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 143\\nof the latter while reducing the representation of\\nTammany, and so lessen its autocratic power.\\nCandidates, too, are not nominated on one issue\\nalone, but on several. It is this tempering and\\nmodulation of the representative body so as to\\ncorrespond with all phases of opinion and policy\\nthroughout the country or the State that propor-\\ntional representation guarantees.\\nIt is to be noted that, in this discussion, we are\\nnot concerned directly with the basis of suffrage.\\nWe are not inquiring whether it shall be wide or\\nlimited, plural or singular, male or female, old or\\nyoung, white or black, intimidated or free. We\\ntake the suffrage for granted, and inquire only\\nwhether, such as it is, it is effective whether, with\\nthe show of representation, there is essential dis-\\nfranchisement, and what are the remedies therefor.\\nProportional representation promises, above all,\\nthe independence of the voter, and freedom from\\nthe rule of the party machine. It will not abolish\\nparties, it recognizes them. But it permits new\\nalignments and groupings of individuals within\\nand without existing parties at the expense of the\\niron-bound classification imposed by the modern\\nhighly developed party machine.\\nThe secret of machine rule lies in the control\\nof nominations, and the rigid alignment of voters\\nin two camps. Freedom from the machine, then,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "144 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nmeans, first, power on tlie part of the voters to con-\\ntrol the nominations of their party; and second,\\npower to defeat obnoxious candidates without en-\\ndangering the success of the party. Both of these\\nadvantages are provided for in the proposed bilL\\nFirst, as to influencing nominations. In many\\nof the cities of this country, where representative\\ninstitutions have most signally failed, the public\\nalarm is showing itself in spirited independent\\nmovements of the best classes of citizens from all\\npolitical parties. But these municipal leagues and\\ncivic federations can act only indirectly upon the\\ncity authorities. They have very little influence\\nupon the nominations of the two parties for mu-\\nnicipal officers. They do not attempt independent\\npolitical action, their only resource being to enter\\ninto combination with one of the machines in order\\nto defeat the other. But suppose, in such a situa-\\ntion, proportional representation were adopted.\\nThe Municipal League could then nominate an\\nindependent ticket by petition signed by one per\\ncent of the voters at the last general election.\\nLet this ticket be nominated in advance of the\\nnominations by the dominant parties. Let it con-\\ntain names of the best citizens of both parties, men\\nwhose ability, public spirit, and integrity are every-\\nwhere acknowledged. The two dominant parties\\nwould be almost forced to indorse these candi-\\ndates. In that case the candidates would select", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 145\\nthe party for which their individual votes should\\nbe counted. If it should happen that the entire\\nticket of the Municipal League were indorsed by\\nthe various parties, the League s ticket would\\nwholly disappear but the members and friends of\\nthe League would scatter their votes among the\\nother tickets, voting individually for tlieir own\\noriginal candidates. The following will illustrate\\nthe process.\\nSuppose there are ten aldermen to elect, and\\nthat the League can muster 300 voters, the Re-\\npublicans 500, the Democrats 400, and the Labor\\nparty 100. Each voter being entitled to ten\\nvotes, there would be 13,000 votes in all, requir-\\ning 1,300 to elect a single candidate. Suppose\\nthe League to place in nomination the following\\nticket, consisting of three Republicans, three Dem-\\nocrats, and one Labor candidate.\\nTICKET OF MUNICIPAL LEAGUE.\\nRepublicans B\\n(c\\nDemocrats\\nLabor G\\nIf, now, the character of their nominees is so\\ndistinguished that the existing parties would be\\nconstrained to indorse them all, and, being thus", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "146 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPEESENTATION.\\nindorsed, the candidates should indicate the ex-\\nisting parties as the beneficiaries of tlieir votes (in\\naccordance with section 3 of tire bill), the tickets\\nto be voted at the election would be as follows\\nMUKICIPAL\\nLEAGUE.\\nEEPUBLICAKS.\\nDEMOCRATS.\\nLABOE.\\nA\\n*A\\n*D\\n*G\\nB\\n*B\\n*E\\nN\\nC\\n*C\\n*F\\nD\\nH\\nL\\nE\\nI\\nM\\nF\\nK\\nG\\nEach party, unless required by law, would nom-\\ninate, not a complete list, but only about as many\\nas each expected to elect. If, now, the 300 voters\\nof the League should distribute their votes indi-\\nvidually for the seven League candidates, as indi-\\ncated above, while all others should vote straight\\ntickets for their respective parties, the result\\nwould be\\nRepublicans, 6,000 900 5,900 votes, electing 5 aldermen.\\nDemocrats, 4,000 900 4,900 votes, electing 4 aldermen.\\nLabor, 1,000 -J- 300 1,300 votes, electing 1 alderman.\\nTotal, 12,100 10\\nIn this extreme case the League has seen its\\nown ticket disappear, but has dictated the nomina-\\ntions of the other parties, and, by adding its votes\\nto theirs, has elected its own nominees. The five\\nRepublicans elected would include A, B, C, who", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE liEMEBY. 14T\\nreceive 800 individual votes each, against 500\\neach for II, I, and K. The four Democrats would\\ninclude D, E, F, who receive 700 individual votes\\neach, against 400 each for L and M. The Labor\\ncandidate, G, receives 400, against 100 for N and\\nO. Of course it is not expected that in actual\\npractice the 500 Republicans, for example, would\\nall vote straight tickets. IMan}^ of them might give\\npreferences for H, I, and K, but many more would\\ngive their preferences for A, B, and C, while the\\nentire weight of the League would be thrown for\\nA, B, and C. And so for the other parties.\\nWhat reason have we to suppose that other\\nparties would swallow the League ticket, as above\\nindicated? Simply the fact that their voters are\\nperfectly free to abandon their party nominees,\\nand to vote for the League candidates of their\\nown political stripe, yet not nominated by their\\nown machine. For example, if the other parties\\ndeclined to indorse the League candidates, the\\ntickets now to be voted would be\\nMUNICIPAL LEAGUE. REPUBLICANS. X DEMOCRATS. LABOR.\\n/\u00e2\u0080\u00a2A X\\nH\\nL\\nN\\nRepublican-^ B x\\nI\\nM\\nO\\nic X\\nK\\nR\\n(-D\\nP\\nS\\nDemocrat E\\nQ\\nT\\nIf\\nU\\nLabor G", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "148 PBOPOBTIOKAL REPRESENTATION.\\nI have indicated the vote of a supposed Repub-\\nlican who gives one vote each to the Republicans\\non the League ticket, and his other seven votes to\\nhis own ticket straight. Supposing all the Repub-\\nlicans, Democrats, and Laborites to do the same (of\\ncourse an extreme case), we should have the fol-\\nlowing result\\nMUNICIPAL LEAGUE. KEPUBLICANS. DEMOCBATS. LABOR.\\n3,000 Straight 5,000 4,000 1,000\\n1,500 Repub. \u00e2\u0080\u00941,500 \u00e2\u0080\u00941,200 100\\n1,200 Demo.\\n100 Labor\\n5,800 3,500 2,800 900\\nElecting 4 3 2 1\\nThe extent to which the Municipal League\\ncould go in electing its candidates would, of course,\\ndepend upon the ripeness of voters for revolt from\\ntheir parties. Li a case like that above, where the\\nparties declined to indorse any of the League can-\\ndidates, we might expect a much larger disaffec-\\ntion than above supposed, and the election of a\\nlarger number of League candidates. It will be\\nnoticed that the Republicans, by bolting their\\nparty, have succeeded in electing six Republicans\\ninstead of the five to which their proportions origi-\\nnally entitled them. But three of these six are\\nnominees of the League, A, B, and C, who get\\n800 votes each (300 from the League and 500\\nfrom the Republicans). One of the League Dem-\\nocrats is elected with 700 votes.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE llEMKUY. 149\\nI have given two extreme variations out of the\\nseveral combinations possible. Many others might\\nbe suggested and worked out. I will conclude\\nwith one more.\\nSuppose the Republicans and Democrats each\\nnominate one of the League candidates. The tick-\\nets would be\\nMUNICIPAL LEAGUE\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0X\\nREPUBLICANS.\\nDEMOCKATS.\\nLABOR,\\nA\\nAx\\nDx\\nN\\nB\\nH\\nL\\nC\\nI\\nM\\nD\\nK\\nR\\nE\\nP\\nS\\nF\\nQ\\nT\\nG\\nI have indicated the vote of a Leaguer who\\ngives one vote to each of his nominees on the\\nRepublican and Democratic tickets, and eight to\\nhis League ticket. Supposing the others to vote\\nlikewise, and the other parties to vote straight, we\\nshould have\\nLeague, 2,400 votes, electing 2 aldermen.\\nRepublicans, 5,300 votes, electing 4 aldermen.\\nDemocrats, 4,300 votes, electing 3 aldermen.\\nLabor, 1,000 votes, electing J_ alderman.\\n13,000 votes, electing 10 aldermen.\\nIn this case the League has elected two men on\\nits owai ticket, and two of its own nominees on\\nother tickets.\\nSo much for the influence of voters upon the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "150 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nnominations of candidates. The second element\\nof strength in proportional representation is the\\npower it gives to voters to defeat obnoxious can-\\ndidates of their own party without endangering\\nthe success of the party as a whole. This may be\\nillustrated by another example, such as may often\\nbe found in a State at large, where there is no in-\\ndependent organization like the Municipal League,\\nready to anticipate the party nominations. Sup-\\npose in such a case that the parties with the rela-\\ntive strength of 500 Republicans, 400 Democrats,\\n100 Laborites, place the following tickets in\\nnomination\\nO\\nBLICANS.\\nDBMOCEATS.\\nA\\nD\\nB\\nE\\nF\\nH\\nL\\nI\\nM\\nK\\nE\\nIf the voting were as usual, the Republicans\\nwould have 5,000 votes, electing five candidates\\nthe Democrats 4,000, electing four and the La-\\nborites 1,000 votes, electing one. But suppose\\nthe party organization of the Republicans has fla-\\ngrantly disregarded the wishes of 200 Republicans,\\nand nominated no candidate representing them.\\nUnder the present system of plurality election,\\nthese 200 Republicans know that to put up an in-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 151\\ndependent ticket means Loth their own defeat and\\nthat of the Republican party as a whole, with the\\nelection of the Democrat. But with proportional\\nrepresentation they could safely nominate an inde-\\npendent ticket. The tickets would be as fol-\\nlows\\nKEPUBLICANS. DEMOCRATS.\\nINDEPENDENT\\nREPUBLICANS.\\nA D N AA\\nB E O BB\\nC F CC\\nH L\\nI M\\nK K\\nThe result of the election would be\\nIndependent Repub., 2,000 votes, electing 2 representatives.\\nRepublicans, 3,000 votes, electing 3 representatives.\\nDemocrats, 4,000 votes, electing 4 representatives.\\nLabor, 1,000 votes, electing 1 representative.\\nWe see here a striking advantage of proportional\\nrepresentation. An independent movement takes\\nplace in the ranks of a plurality party, and does\\nnot in the least endanger the success of the party\\nas a whole. The Republicans elect as many repre-\\nsentatives as before the division, so that on party\\nquestions they retain their original strength in the\\nlegislature but the individuals elected are by no\\nmeans the same. Two of the five are wholly inde-\\npendent of the machine organization. Of course,\\nif the independent movement increased, as it could", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "152 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nreadily do, if tlie candidates of the regular organiza-\\ntion were objectionable, the number of independent\\nrepresentatives would be increased proportionally\\nat the expense of the regular nominees.\\nIt is easily seen that this increased power to\\nreject the nominees of a party must react strongly\\nupon the character of the nominees. The latter\\nare nominated to be elected. Under the present\\nsystem very inferior men may be elected, because\\nthe voters have no other choice. Let them have,\\nhowever, the wide freedom of choice which pro-\\nportional representation gives, and the party mana-\\ngers will be forced to place before them a much\\nhigher grade of candidates, who will be suited to\\ntheir wishes. Thus proportional representation\\ngives the voters power against the influence of\\nthe machine to control nominations, not only di-\\nrectly, by nominating early their own candidates\\nfor a later indorsement by the regular organiza-\\ntion, but also indirectly, by their increased power\\nto bolt, and defeat obnoxious candidates who\\nhave been regularly nominated.\\nThe secret of these combinations and recombi-\\nnations, of this unparalleled freedom of the voter,\\nsprings from two facts: first, instead of requiring\\na majority or plurality to elect a candidate, a much\\nsmaller fraction can do so and second, a wide\\nterritorial area is given for combinations of voters\\nof the same opinions. Instead of a ward we have", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 153\\na city; instead of a district we have a State.\\nUnder the present sj stem, independent voters who\\nactually place a ticket in the field are usually in\\nthe minority. If, however, we count those who\\nstay at home, as we should do to a large extent,\\nthe number of independents is very great. But\\nthey have only a choice between two machines.\\nThey are penned up in narrow districts under\\nthe whip of the party bosses. But proportional\\nrepresentation breaks down the fences, and en-\\nables them to combine throughout the city or\\nState. And, furthermore, it allows them to com-\\nbine within their own party organization without\\npromoting the success of the opposing party s\\nmachine.\\nThat this feature of proportional representation\\nstrikes at the radical evil of present-day politics, is\\nshown abundantly by current literature. We may\\nnotice absenteeism and the primaries.\\nSurely it is an alarming condition when the in-\\ntelligent and business classes everywhere leave the\\nprimaries and the elections to the heelers, the\\nloafers, and the ignorant. The extent of this evil\\nis in recent years well understood, but its causes\\nare unexplained. Says a writer in an article favor-\\ning compulsory voting :i In the State of New\\nYork 300,375 persons who voted in 1888 remained\\n1 F. W. Holls, in Annals of American Academy of Political\\nand Social Science, Ain-il, 1891, pp. 589, 590.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "154 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\naway from the polls in 1889; and 286,278 did so\\nin 1890. In the last mayoralty election in New\\nYork City (1890), over 35,000 men who had even\\nregistered abstained from voting, with the result\\nthat the city was once more turned over to an\\norganized band of plunderers. A more deliberate\\nand extensive betrayal of trust would be difficult\\nto find. In Massachusetts the total vote of 328,-\\n588 in 1888 fell to 260,798 in 1890, a difference\\nof 67,790. In Chicago the figures are even more\\nstartling. In the spring election of 1887 less than\\n72,000 out of a possible 138,000 were cast,\\n66,000 citizens failing in their duty, while in\\nJune of the same year, at the judiciary election\\nfor the choice of judges for a city of almost a mil-\\nlion of souls, the total vote was 44,074, less than\\none-third of the number of qualified voters. Pro-\\nfessor A. B. Hart^ affirms that the voting popula-\\ntion is one-fourth of the total population, and that\\nin the presidential elections five-sixths of this vote\\nis cast. In New York, in 1880, the vote Avas\\n1,104,605, being 23 per cent of the population, and\\n95 per cent of the legal voters; but in 1891 it was\\nonly 259,425. In New York City in 1888, the\\nvote was 18 per cent of the population; in 1890 it\\nwas 11 per cent, and in 1891 it was 13i per cent.\\nIn Massachusetts the census of 1885 showed\\n1 Practical Essays on American Government, pp. 24, 30.\\nNew York, 1893,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF TUB REMEDY. 155\\n442,616 voters; but the vote for governor in that\\nyear was only 209,668, and in 1894 it was 13 per\\ncent of the population. For j) resident in 1888 in\\nthat State it was 344,243. In Boston, says Mr.\\nS. B. Capen, President of the jNIunicipal League,\\nthe assessed polls in January, 1895, were 143,435.\\nOf these but 88,214 were registered, and only\\n70,191 less than one-half of the eligibles took\\nthe trouble to vote. Ward 11, the home of the\\nrich, shows the lowest proportion of actual votes,\\nas compared with registered citizens. The full\\nfigures are: assessed polls, 7,809; registered,\\n4,807: votes cast, 3,533. Ward 9, the Beacon\\nHill ward, shows assessed polls, 3,838 registered,\\n2,260; votes cast, 1,687. And at a party primary\\nheld in Ward 11, there were but 81 votes cast in\\nfour precincts out of 800 entitled to vote.\\nUp to the present time the greater part of the\\nagitation for better government consists in bitterly\\ncriticising the intelligent voters who stay at home,\\nand beseeching them to meet their political duties.\\nIt is assumed that their only reasons are bad\\nweather, dirty politics, business engagements, and\\nlack of public spirit. Indeed, such reasons come\\nto the surface but even when these classes are\\naroused, as at the present time, and ready to do\\ntheir share of work, no one can fail to see that\\nthey are cowed and silenced by their utter help-\\nlessness and the hopelessness of their cause. Sep-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "156 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPEESENTATION.\\naratecl by arbitrary ward lines in narrow districts,\\nthey cannot get together throughout the city. If\\nthey have a record of independence, the party pri-\\nmary excludes them; and, if admitted, they are\\nnot a match against the party organization. Poli-\\ntics is a business. It requires time and strength.\\nThe politician does the least of his work in the\\nprimary. The real work is done beforehand, and\\nthe primary registers the cut-an5.-dried decrees.\\nAmerica has no leisured citizens who can afford\\nto give themselves to this work. They must\\nleave, it to the professionals.\\nWith proportional representation the party pri-\\nmary loses much of its significance. Nominations\\ncan be made by petition. Municipal leagues,\\ncivic federations, business men s associations,\\nchambers of commerce, labor unions, have their\\ncompleted organizations. These can nominate\\ntheir tickets by petition, or can indorse those\\nalready nominated. As in English cities, where\\nit requires but eight signatures to nominate a\\ncandidate for the municipal council, the matter\\nwould adjust itself, and there would be no danger\\nfrom a multiplicity of candidates and tickets.\\nWith such facility in the nomination of indepen-\\ndent tickets, and with independent parties holding\\nthe balance of power, the party primaries would\\nfall into disuse. Politicians would not struggle to\\ncontrol them, seeing that even if successful, yet their", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 157\\nparty could not elect a majority of tlie assembly,\\nand so make it wortli Avliile for them to control the\\nprimaries. They Avould learn also to nominate by\\npetition, as is the practice in other countries.\\nAt the same time the primaries and conventions\\nmust be recognized at present as the sources of\\npower. The most serious evil connected with\\nthem, and the one which gives the machine its\\ncontrol, is the practice of exclusive majority rule.\\nCommittees and delegates are elected by a major-\\nity vote on the principle of the general ticket, or\\nelse the chairman is authorized to appoint them,\\nand he is the product of a majority vote. The\\ntrue purpose of a primary or convention, as repre-\\nsenting all sections of a party, is defeated. It is\\nproper that the majority should elect the chairman,\\nor nominate single candidates but why should the\\nmajority be alone represented on committees, dele-\\ngations, and general tickets Plainly, here is need\\nfor a further application of the proportional rule.\\nMr. D. S. Remsen of the New York bar, in\\nhis essay on Primary Elections, has made a\\ncareful study of the rules governing party organ-\\nizations, and the management of primaries and\\nconventions in the United States. He advocates\\na plan of primary election similar to Mr. Hare s\\nsingle transferable vote already described in these\\npages. It is probable that the complexity in-\\nvolved in counting the votes according to that", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "158 p HOP our ION AL representation.\\nplan would cause it to break down in tlie confu-\\nsion of a mass-meeting and in the hands of\\ntellers who are inexpert. A plan is required\\nwhich will be simple and quickly worked. Such\\na one has been proposed by Dr. L. B. Tucker-\\nman of Cleveland, Ohio, and is described by its\\nauthor under the title, Election by Preponder-\\nance of Choice. 1\\n1. Each voter writes on his ballot as many\\nnames as there are persons to be chosen, writing\\nthe names in the order of his choice, first choice\\nfirst, second choice second, and so on. When\\nnominations are made before balloting, it is more\\nconvenient to write them on a board where all can\\nread them.\\n2. In tallying the vote, the tellers read the last\\nname on each ballot first, crediting the name with\\none tally the name next to the last, second,\\ncrediting the same with two tallies and so on,\\nalways crediting the name written first on each\\nballot with as many tallies as there are names\\nwritten on that ballot. Thus a ballot written\\nSMITH\\nBROWN\\nJONES\\nFETZER\\nCOLEMAN\\n1 Proportional Representation Review, September, 1893.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 159\\nwould be read, Coleman 1, Fetzer 2, Jones 3,\\nBrown 4, Smith 5.\\n3. The person receiving the highest number\\nof tallies is first declared elected the person re-\\nceiving the next highest, next; and so on, until all\\nthe vacancies are filled. In case of a tie mth but\\none vacancy to be filled, the incumbent is deter-\\nmined by lot.\\nThe practical working of this rule is that\\nevery element in the electing body large enough\\nto have a quota, finds itself proportionately repre-\\nsented, and by its own first choice or choices.\\nSuppose, for instance, a caucus in a ward contain-\\ning one hundred voters. They are to choose\\ndelegates to a convention. Suppose there are\\ntwo factions, one counting on fifty-five voters,\\nthe other on forty-five, and the contest so lively\\nthat a full vote is polled. Suppose, further, that\\nthe first faction decides to supjDort A, B, C, D,\\nand E, in the order named, and the second F,\\nG, H, I, and K, the resulting ballot will tally as\\nfollows\\nA 55 X 5 275 F 45 x 5 225\\nB 55 X 4 220 G 45 X 4 180\\nC 55 X 3 165 H 45 X 3 135\\nD 55 X 2 110 I 45 X 2 90\\nE 55 X 1 55 K 45 X 1 45\\nThe five highest are A, F, B, G, and C, three\\nof the majority faction and two of the minority", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "160 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESUNTATION.\\nthe first choices, the representative men of both\\nparties. The advantage of this method in a\\ncaucus or convention is that it reaches the result\\ncertainly, directly, and quickly; there is no count-\\ning the number of ballots cast, and dividing by\\nthe number of persons to be chosen, to find what\\nthe quota is.\\nThis plan is simple and effective, and can be\\napplied to primaries and conventions. It could\\nbe introduced into the bill proposed in these pages,\\nby providing that conventions maldng nominations\\nof congressmen or aldermen should be required to\\nadopt the plan, and that the presidents and secre-\\ntaries of such conventions, in presenting their\\ntickets to election commissioners, should certify\\nthat the nominations have been made in accord-\\nance with the law. They should certify, too, that\\nprimaries and other conventions sending delegates\\nto the nominating convention had also complied\\nwith the law.\\nWith a rule of this kind governing primaries\\nand conventions, we should accomplish within\\nparty lines results similar to those to be ac-\\ncomplished by the proposed bill between parties.\\nAll classes within a party would be represented,\\npacked conventions would be unknown, the\\nparty machine would be shorn of much of its\\nundeserved power, tickets would be nominated\\nwith candidates acceptable to all ranks of the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. IGl\\nparty, the necessity for independent tickets would\\nbe largely obviated, and citizens would be more\\ninclined to attend tlieir party primaries, knowing\\nthat their wishes would find expression.\\nWhen finally we come to the elections, propor-\\ntional representation would go far towards bring-\\ning out a full vote. There would be none of the\\npresent hopelessness. It is only the fear of\\nwasting their votes on good men who have no\\nchance of winning which deters the people from-\\nvoting against the bad candidates who are forced\\nupon them by the regular machine.\\nSo crude a measure as compulsory voting could\\nnot change the results of the present system. In\\ntwo recent elections in the Swiss canton of Zu-\\nrich, with a compulsory voting law applying to\\ntwo communes, 21 per cent to 24 per cent of the\\nballots were blanks, while in the communes with-\\nout the compulsory law, 17 per cent and 20 per\\ncent were blanks.^ Compulsory voting does not\\nfurnish an outlet for independence. It would\\nrather tighten the control of the party managers\\nWe have seen that the margin of mobile voters\\nwho change from one party to another is seldom\\nmore than 5 per cent of the maximum total vote\\nin a presidential year. Compulsory voting might\\n1 Chas. Richardson in Annals of American Academy of Politi-\\ncal and Social Science, ISIarch, 1892, p. 86.\\n2 See Direct Legislation Record, September, 1894, p. 63.\\n8 See Hart, Practical Essays, p. 51.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "162 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\npossibly change this proportion slightly, but it\\ncould do no more than substitute one machine for\\nanother. The real problem is not how to compel\\nunwilling electors to vote, but how to give effect\\nto the votes of those who are wilhng.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "PAETY BESPONSIBILlTy. 1G3\\nCHAPTER VII.\\nPARTY RESPONSIBILITY.\\nThe ideal of democratic government in the\\nUnited States has centred about the principle of\\nrule by the majority of the people. Its aim is\\nBentham s aphorism, the greatest good of the\\ngreatest number. The means whereby in practi-\\ncal politics this greatest good is to be secured is to\\ndivide the people into two political parties based\\non numbers alone, and to give to one of these\\nparties entire control of government in at least its\\nlegislative and executive departments. If the\\npeople happen not to be divided in such a way as\\nto gather a majority into a single party, then a\\nplurality is to be permitted to choose the govern-\\ning officials. By this process it is maintained\\nthat the rule of the majority is secured through\\nthe device of what is known as party respon-\\nsibility.\\nIt must be noticed that the word party in\\nthis connection has a double meaning. The argu-\\nment begins with the conception of a popular\\nparty composed of a mass of voters it ends witli\\na party of office-holders and law-makers who are\\nelected by the voters. These officials are commis-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "164 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nsionecl as a kind of extra-legal corporation to con-\\nduct the government, and are required to appeal\\noften to the voters for continuance in power.\\nOne thing overlooked in this form of govern-\\nment is the quality of the individual men who\\nconstitute the governing corporation. Individual\\nstatesmen do not stand out as leaders of the party\\nor the people. They all are merged in a corporate\\nmediocrity. The bosses who actually control the\\ncorporation by no means represent the popular\\nparty, much less can they command a majority of\\nthe popular vote. They are irresponsible. A\\nparty and not a man becomes responsible.\\nProportional representation is advocated as a\\nmeans for supplementing party responsibility with\\nthe individual responsibility of law-makers to the\\npeople. It will do this, first, by bringing into\\nlegislative assemblies able and experienced men,\\nthe true leaders of their parties and the people.\\nThe assertion is often made that our public of-\\nficers and representatives are as good as the people\\nwho elect them that they are representative in\\nthe sense of possessing the average ability, intelli-\\ngence, and integrity, of the community and there-\\nfore the failures of our governments are to be\\nfound, not in the machinery, but in the voters.\\nIt is questionable whether this assertion is true.\\nVery often the legislative body is below the aver-\\nage citizenship of the community. But the ques-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "PARTT RESPONSIBILITY. 165\\ntion comes, Do we want only average men to\\ngovern us and make our laws We do not select\\naverage physicians to save our lives, average law-\\nyers to 2)rotect our rights, average ministers to\\ninterpret the gospel, nor average tailors. Lakers,\\nand carpenters to clothe, feed, and shelter us.\\nWe select men of exceptional native ability, who\\nthrough training have become experts and profes-\\nsionals, men versed in their callings. So in this\\nmost important of our delegated services, this re-\\nvising and framing our laws which regulate the\\nvery structure of society, and make our lives, our\\nrights, our religion, and our enjoyments possible, in\\nthis supreme service, why should we not select men\\nfar above the average Should they not be men\\nwho are grounded in jurisprudence, sociology, politi-\\ncal economy, comparative legislation, besides pos-\\nsessing that infinite tact known as statesmanship\\nIndeed, the American people do desire such\\nmen. They have long been dissatisfied with their\\nlaw-making bodies. They have been persistently\\ndepriving them of power because they are both\\nunrepresentative and inefficient. The people sin-\\ncerely wish to have capable legislators, but have\\nnot been able to enforce their wishes. The reason\\nis that social and legal institutions of themselves\\npossess a certain capacity of natural selection.\\nThey are the framework, the environment, within\\nwhich individuals and classes co-operate. As in", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "166 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ntlie biological world, those individuals survive and\\nprosper who are best able to utilize the passions,\\ncustoms, and legal regulations of their fellow-men.\\nBut society, unlike the animals, can change\\nits customs and laws within certain limits, and\\nthereby can change the environment of individ-\\nuals. New and different qualities are now neces-\\nsary for survival and power. Such a change\\nis the secret ballot, which handicaps bribery; or\\ncivil service reform, which evicts spoilsmen; or\\nhundreds of those political devices whereby gov-\\nernment has been for centuries slowly perfected.\\nThe same will hold for legislatures. If the people\\nwish to bring to their legislatures intelligence, ex-\\nperience, ability, probity, and sympathy with pop-\\nular aims, they should first develop those forms of\\ngovernment and that political machinery which\\nwill insure adequate security, support, and dignity\\nto such qualities.\\nProportional representation would be an im-\\nprovement of this kind. In the first place, it\\nwould secure all the advantages of the English\\nand Canadian practice of non-residency. Five-\\nsixths of the members of parliament do not live in\\nthe districts they represent. This enables a polit-\\nical party to keep its leaders always in power, by\\nselecting for them a sure district in which to make\\ntheir canvass. With proportional representation,\\nas with a general ticket, representatives could be", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 167\\nselected from an entire State or city without refer-\\nence to their residence in a limited district or ward.\\nThe area of choice is widened. A party leader,\\nlike McKinley or Morrison, need no longer be ex-\\ncluded from Congress because he happens to live\\nin a district where his party is a minority. Gerry-\\nmanders could not be constructed to exclude liim.\\nAll the money and influence of a wealthy opposing\\nparty could effect nothing. His party might be\\na minority in the State, yet, if it could poll only\\na single quota of the votes, he would be sure of\\nelection. Nothing could exclude him except the\\ndisaffection of his own followers.\\nNeither could factions and interests holding the\\nbalance of power dictate nominations, and thus put\\nunknown and opinionless men before the voters.\\nEvery faction, every party, every interest, could\\nplace its own strongest men in the legislature and\\ncom23romise candidates, dark horses, would be\\nunknown.\\nMr. Albert Stickney has found in frequent elec-\\ntions and short terms the root of corrupt politics\\nand machine rule.^ There is truth in his conten-\\ntion. A representative must indeed give his time\\nto carrying elections. He must placate and har-\\nmonize factions. He must properly distribute the\\nspoils, and must not break with the machine. Little\\ntime is left to study legislation.\\n1 See A True Republic, New York, 1879.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "168 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\nBut with proportional representation, frequent\\nelections would be combined with life-long service,\\nprovided the representative retained the confidence\\nof a single quota of the voters. The manipulation\\nof elections would not engross him. His only-\\nthought would be to know that in his legislative\\nduties he truly represented his quota of supporters.\\nFrequent elections, on the other hand, would give\\nthe people power quietly to drop him if he ceased\\nto represent them. They would simply give their\\npreferences to others on their party ticket, or would\\nnominate a new ticket which would draw from him.\\nFrequent elections under the district system are\\ndangerous to both the good and the bad. Under\\nproportional representation they would endanger\\nonly the bad.\\nThe representatives therefore will not only be\\ncapable they will be responsible directly to the\\npeople. The objection against proportional repre-\\nsentation on the ground that it abandons what is\\ncalled party responsibility, proceeds from the\\nassertion that it gives no party a clear majority\\nin the legislature that ours is a government by\\npolitical parties, and parties must therefore be\\npermitted to make a record in the legislature or\\nCongress, upon which they can go before the people\\nfor approval or rejection.\\nThis objection will be considered later when\\nspeaking of minority parties. In this place let", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "PARTY EESPONSIBILITY. 169\\nUS notice the nature of party responsibility.\\nIt is multiple and corporate. The people can\\nselect no individual upon whom to centre respon-\\nsibility. A party, like a corporation, can be held\\naccountable only through its individual agents.\\nFor this reason, cities in the United States are\\ntransferring legislative and administrative func-\\ntions from boards and councils to the mayor.\\nThus responsibility is fixed. But when a national\\nparty of four hundred representatives and sena-\\ntors, besides hundreds of State and local officers,\\nis defeated at the polls, both the good and the bad\\nare defeated together. Why shoidd a representa-\\ntive rise above party expediency when he knows\\nthat the deeds of his colleagues will drag him\\ndown with them?\\nThere are two features of proportional repre-\\nsentation which permit the voters to hold individual\\nrepresentatives, instead of parties, responsible. The\\nfirst is the fact that parties, if defeated, would lose\\nbut a small proportion of their representatives. No\\nmatter how close the votes of parties in any State,\\na popular rebuke would usually lessen its vote\\nnot more than five per cent, except in cases where\\ndisaffection within the party has brought out an\\nindependent ticket. A party having eight repre-\\nsentatives in a delegation of fifteen would thereby\\nlose not more than one. Under the district system,\\nas has been shown, a reversal of five per cent is", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "170 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ncatastrophic and an entire party, good and bad, go\\ndown together. Tlius the idea is unduly promi-\\nnent that the people reject the party as a whole,\\nand the fiction is fostered of party responsibility.\\nBut with proportional representation only a very\\nfew of the party candidates would be defeated.\\nNow, if the voters have the power to select\\nthose candidates who are to be dcieated, and to\\ncontinue the others, shall we not have the essence\\nof individual responsibility? The second feature\\nof proportional representation gives them this\\npower. Not only may electors vote for tick-\\nets, they may also indicate their preferences for\\nindividual candidates upon their party ticket.\\nThus, in the case of a party expecting to elect\\neight representatives, and therefore nominating\\nnine, but in the final count electing only seven,\\nthe voters by their preferences will have dropped\\nat least two who have not met their responsibility.\\nAnd, again, in the provisions for nominating inde-\\npendent tickets, and thus drawing off from a polit-\\nical party all those voters who are dissatisfied with\\nthe candidates it has nominated, and in the pro-\\nvisions for scattering individual votes among can-\\ndidates of several tickets, the electors have the\\nwidest freedom for distinguishing between can-\\ndidates, and holding each one personally respon-\\nsible. Consequently, bad candidates cannot ride\\ninto power on a wave of party prosperity, nor can", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 171\\ngood candidates be swamped in the ebb of party\\nadversity. Each candidate stands upon his f)wn\\nmerits and record, and by these is he judged,\\napart from the judgment upon his party as a\\nwhole.\\nWith all parties fairly represented by their\\nablest leaders, legislatures would become delibera-\\ntive assemblies, instead of arenas for party strife.\\nThe objection against proportional representation\\nhas just been cited, that it would nullify party\\nresponsibility. It is said that it would do this\\nl)y giving a small minority the balance of power\\nand enabling it to dictate legislation. This would\\nweaken the government and prevent a consistent\\npolicy. We have frequently noticed the very\\nclose popular vote as between the two great par-\\nties, neither of them receiving a majority. Third\\nand fourth parties, therefore, if given their propor-\\ntionate weight in legislation, would often hold the\\nbalance. Of course, with the existing system they\\nalready often have this advantage, but with pro-\\nportional representation the same would more\\nfrequently happen.\\nThe weight of this objection, the most serious\\nyet presented against proportional representation,\\nvaries in different grades of government. Polit-\\nical parties are divided on national questions.\\nCity and State politics do not (or should not)\\nfollow the same alignment. Leaving the consid-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "172 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPEESENTATION.\\neration of city politics to another chapter, we may\\nat this point examine tlie objection as applied to\\nCongress (and incidentally to the State legisla-\\ntures), where it has its greatest force, and where\\npre-eminently party responsibility may be ex-\\npected to be decisive.\\nIn the first place, the objection overlooks the\\nprinciple of equality and justice in representation.\\nIt may prove here, as elsewhere, that justice is\\nthe wisest expediency. It is a curious anomaly,\\nshowing confusion of thought regarding democ-\\nracy, that a people who insist on universal suf-\\nfrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in granting\\nit, should deny the right of representation to those\\nminor political parties whose existence is the nat-\\nural fruit of this suffrage. The argument against\\nproportional representation is made that it would\\nenable the degraded and corrupt elements of the\\ncommunity to keep a bad man in the legislature\\nagainst the wishes of all the honest and patriotic\\nclasses; that it would give saloon-keepers and\\ngamblers representation that it would give too\\ngreat influence to the socialists and other dan-\\ngerous elements.\\nPossibly universal suffrage is unwise, and the\\nfranchise should be restricted but, having granted\\nit, the dangerous elements become more danger-\\nous if they are denied that hearing which the\\nsuffrage promises. Vice and corruption thrive by", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "PA RTF liESPONSIBILITF/ 173\\nsecrecy. Nothing is so mortal to them as expo-\\nsure. It is suicidal to come out in the open, and\\ndefend themselves in their nakedness. The seri-\\nous fault with the present system is its rich oppor-\\ntunities for under-handed work on the part of the\\ncorrupt classes. They alone have no political\\nprinciples, and can therefore take sharp advantage\\nof the party divisions of the people. By their\\nvery corruption they have far more than their pro-\\nportionate representation. It is a serious evil of\\nthe existing system that the two industries most\\nlargely represented in municipal councils are those\\nof the saloon-keepers and the gamblers. Far bet-\\nter would be a system which reduces their rep-\\nresentation to the same jjroportions which their\\nnumbers bear to the whole community. The\\ncorrupt and dangerous classes are a A^ery small\\nminority of the people, but by their well-chosen\\nmethods they get majorities in our legislative\\nbodies. Proportional representation would give\\nthem a hearing, for they are entitled to it, but it\\nwould deny them supremacy.\\nThe argument, however, of those who fear that\\nthird parties will hold the balance of power is not\\nbased solely on a dread of the corrupt classes, but\\nrather of the idealists, the reformers, faddists\\nand cranks so-called. They would retain ex-\\nclusive majority rule and party responsibility in\\norder to prevent the disproportionate influence of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "174 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nthese petty groups. They overlook, of course,\\nthe weight of the argument already made, that\\nindividual responsibility is more important for the\\npeople than the corporate responsibility of parties.\\nThey overlook also other considerations.\\nA significant fact in American national politics\\nis the actual break-down of this presumed party\\nresponsibility. In our system of co-ordinate pow-\\ners, there can be no party responsibility for legis-\\nlation unless the Senate, the House, and the Pres-\\nident agree in politics. Yet since the election\\nof 1876 there have been but six years of such\\nagreement, namely, in the Forty-seventh, Fifty-\\nfirst, and Fifty-third Congresses. And in the\\nForty-seventh Congress the Senate was tied, and\\nin the Fifty-third the Senate, with a Democratic\\nmajority, was constantly opposed to the Demo-\\ncratic House and President. For less than one-\\nthird of the time, therefore, can we be said to\\nenjoy party responsibility. Only where a single\\nparty for a long series of years has possession of\\ngovernment, as was the case during and follow-\\ning the Civil War, is it likely to get control of\\nall branches, so that party responsibility can be\\nlocated. And even in such a period internal dis-\\nsensions between the President and Congress con-\\nfuse the public.\\nAgain, a strong government, so-called, is needed\\nmainly in the administration of foreign affairs.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "PARTY BESPONSIBILITY. 175\\nIn the American and German systems, as distin-\\nguished from the English and French, in which\\nthe executive is independent of the legislature,\\nsuch a government is secured regardless of party\\nrevolutions. If this were not so, the deadlocks of\\nthe past twenty years would have rendered our\\nsystem intolerable. At the same time there is no\\npublic question which so thoroughly extinguishes\\nparty lines as a serious foreign complication.\\nBut there are deeper reasons than these for\\nbelieving that a just representation of the people\\nby their recognized leaders would guarantee an\\nefficient and stable government, freed from the\\ndictation of extremists who hold the balance of\\npower.\\nThere are but two classes of questions in\\nAmerican politics which are characteristically\\nparty questions, these are questions of the suf-\\nfrage, such as force bills and gerrymanders, which\\nthreaten to deprive one party of its votes and\\nquestions of legislative election or civil service\\nappointment to office. It must be admitted that\\non these two classes of questions a clear party\\nmajority is necessary. But other questions can\\nbe compromised. The legislature of Nebraska\\nof 1893 adjourned with probably the best record\\nachieved by any State legislature in several years.\\nYet it was composed of three parties about equally\\ndivided. The legislature spent six weelcs out of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "176 PROPORTIONAL REPBESENTATION.\\nthe legal twelve in a deadlock over the election\\nof United States senator. Such a matter cannot\\nbe compromised except by electing an unknown\\nman. This the legislature did, and then pro-\\nceeded to law-making. It enacted good laws on\\nimportant matters, such as railways and indebted-\\nness, which were exciting popular feeling at the\\ntime but these laws were neither confiscatory nor\\nreactionary. They were just to all concerned.\\nThere were no deadlocks. Every measure was a\\nfair compromise.\\nProportional representation could not exist with\\na spoils system, and probably not with the elec-\\ntion of United States senators by legislatures. It\\nwould end in deadlocks and incapacity. But this\\nsurely cannot be a serious objection to the reform.\\nOn other grounds the country would gain if merit\\nwere substituted for spoils, and senators elected\\nby the people.\\nWith these two occasions of difference removed\\nfrom legislative halls, the possibilities of comjoro-\\nmise would soon appear. They proceed from the\\nfact that the majority of the people are not ex-\\ntremists. They will not consent to radical depar-\\ntures from existing institutions. The points of\\nagreement between political parties on principles\\nand measures are therefore far more numerous\\nthan those of divergence. Parties differ only on\\nthe fringe of policies. Their battles are usually", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "TAiiTY responsibility: 111\\nmock battles inspired by spoils instead of policies.\\nWhen the outs come m, they do not radically re-\\nverse the policy of their predecessors. Even the\\ntariff, on which they fight their battles, resolves\\niself into a matter of a very high tariff, or one not\\nquite so high. The country will not permit a\\nreturn to no-tariff. Other questions, such as free\\nsilver and anti-options, are settled by divisions\\nwhich run across party lines. Upon pensions both\\nparties bring out emulous majorities. River and\\nharbor bills are bargained through by individual\\nlog-rolling, and exchange of favors. On so\\nmany of the vital questions do representatives in\\nCongress disregard party lines, that one is led to\\nsuspect that the tariff is merely a war scare\\nto keep the voters in line.\\nThe fundamental nature of legislation is not\\nparty victory, but compromise. Compromise is\\nexpediency. Expediency is nothing more nor less\\nthan ideal principles and institutions in process\\nof realization. Compromise rests on the fact of\\ngrowth. Society is developing out of a primitive\\nbarbaric state, where human rights were unknown,\\ntowards an era wdien the ideal rights of man shall\\nbe recognized and obtained for every individual.\\nOne by one the burdens of the past are being\\ndiscarded in the march towards the goal. And\\nthis is expediency compromise. Enthusiasts\\nappeal to the higher law, and demand that all", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "178 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nobstructions be overthrown at once. This is im-\\npossible. These obstructions are not mere coats of\\nmail and trunks and luggage. They are human\\nbeliefs, habits, passions, prejudices, necessities.\\nThey exist in the very souls of men. It requires\\ntime and death to remove them. No more can\\nthe physical body separate itself suddenly from\\nimmature childhood, and, omitting the period\\nof youth, suddenly leap into ripened manhood,\\nthan can the social body abruptly break from its\\npast.\\nBut the social body grows through modifi-\\ncations of social institutions. The family, the\\nchurch, the State, private property, are all being\\nchanged in the direction of social ideals. These\\nchanges are made unconsciously, as in primitive\\ntimes, also consciously, as in modern times by\\nlegislation. Here arise the two primary divisions\\nof society, which, shifting slightly, according to\\nthe issues in hand, appear in general as the con-\\nservative and liberal parties, the former holding\\nto the things already achieved, the latter urging\\nchange.\\nThese different classes and interests come to-\\ngether in the legislative halls. The circumstances\\nof the time compel change. The radicals demand\\nextreme measures. The conservatives resist. If,\\nnow, the system of representation is such that\\nneither has a majority in the legislature, but the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 179\\noverwhelming majority of the people who hold\\nmoderate views is adequately represented and holds\\nthe balance of power, compromises will result.\\nMeasures will be examined, debated, amended,\\nuntil they reach the shape which will command a\\nmajority of the votes.\\nThere is no measure in politics which cannot\\nbe thus modified. Even the question of slavery\\ncould have been compounded. There are a hun-\\ndred intermediate positions between immediate\\nemancipation and permanent slavery. Had a law\\nbeen enacted in the 40 s or 50 s providing for\\ngradual emancipation, even upon the basis pro-\\nposed by Abraham Lincoln, of a hundred years,\\nthe Civil War might have been averted. But the\\ndistrict system had excluded from Congress Demo-\\ncrats from the North, and Whigs from the South,\\nmen who occupied a middle ground, and the antag-\\nonism between the sections was thereby exagger-\\nated. Especially was it affirmed by a committee\\nof the United States Senate in 1869, and it is well\\nknown to students of history that the South was\\nnot fairly represented in Congress. A large mi-\\nnority of the whites were in favor of the Union,\\nand doubtless they could have been brought to\\ngradual emancipation. But they were excluded\\nfrom the State legislatures and from the halls of\\nCongress. The slave-holding oligarchy precipi-\\ntated the South into rebellion and when the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "180 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\ndie was cast, the people were forced to follow.^\\nWould not compromise have been better than war?\\nWould not the Negroes to-day be in a better con-\\ndition\\nCompromise seems to compound with evil. No\\nquestion is settled until it is settled right. True\\nindeed. There is a base compromise born of pusil-\\nlanimity. It fortifies and strengthens the evil.\\nBut true expediency plans for the ultimate extinc-\\ntion of hoary wrong. It recognizes, however, that\\nright is not all on one side. Historical conditions,\\ninherited privileges, legal enactments, of them-\\nselves create rights. Slave-owners should have\\nbeen compensated, as in the West Indies, or else\\nbeen granted time to prepare for emancipation, as\\nin Brazil. The district system prevents this kind\\nof compromise. It keeps new parties out of rep-\\nresentation. Their leaders have no influence on\\nlegislation, whereby they might force a compro-\\nmise looking to the future. Thus the anti-slavery\\nmovement had no strength in Congress commen-\\nsurate with its strength among the people. It was\\nchoked and suppressed until it became irrepres-\\nsible. It ended in civil war, immediate emancipa-\\ntion, and no compensation.\\nIt must not be supposed, therefore, that pro-\\n1 See Report of the Select Committee of the United States\\nSenate, on Representative Reform, Senate Document Fortieth\\nCongress, Third Session, No. 271, March, 1869.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "PAirrr hesponsibilitt. 181\\nportional representation, by increasing compromise,\\nwould prevent reform. Indeed, it would bring for-\\nward the day of genuine reform. And tins not by\\nerratic jumps or civil war, but like the steady pro-\\ncesses of nature. Reform movements would have\\na hearing in their beginnings. Legislation would\\nprepare for them. The minds of men would ripen\\nfor them. Only in this way could they prevent\\nreactions. Those anti-slavery agitators who saw\\nin Lincoln s proclamation the final triumph of their\\nwork, and those extremists who gave the new-\\nfledged freeman the ballot, may well to-day look\\nback with chagrin on those exultant measures.\\nThe slave is not yet free. He was not ready for\\nthe ballot. He has even been openly disfran-\\nchised. And the South is a land of smothered\\nanarchy. Surely gradual emancipation and pro-\\ngressive enfranchisement would not have been\\nslower in fuial results than were those uncom-\\npromising reforms.\\nSo it is with present-day reforms. By means\\nof proportional representation they would show\\nthemselves inside party organizations. At present\\nour parties are grown over with a crust of tradi-\\ntion. They do not respond to the growing body\\nwithin. There is a false feeling of security on\\nthe part of managers. New movements being un-\\nrepresented, the leaders run to extremes. These\\nhave not the advantages of responsibility, of con-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "182 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION\\nference and. friction with the representatives of\\nexisting conditions. Hence they become visiona-\\nries instead of practical reformers, and the public\\nlearns to distrust them.\\nMr. Wm. Dudley Foulke, president of the Pro-\\nportional Representation League, has said\\nThe result of nearly all political action is compromise.\\nIn the present system this compromise is made when the\\ngreat parties are organized. It is made amid the excite-\\nment of a political convention. When proportional repre-\\nsentation is adopted those compromises will be made in the\\nlegislative body, where all can see more clearly the strong\\nand the weak points of every claim. Suppose you are in\\nfavor of some particular reform civil service reform, for\\ninstance will you have a better chance of success when\\nyou urge your claims upon one of the two great parties in\\nthe turmoil of a political contest, or where these claims can\\nbe freely presented by your own representatives in the\\nlegislative body Let us suppose, for instance, that we\\nhave a number of prohibitionists in a legislative body, suf-\\nficient perhaps to control the balance of power, what will\\nbe the probable result of legislation A prohibitory law\\nwill hardly be adopted for this would be in opposition to\\nthe great majority but stronger temperance legislation\\nwill be enacted local option, for instance, or more strin-\\ngent excise laws. It is by such compromises as these that\\ncivilization makes its safest and most effective strides.\\nSmall factions which control the balance of power may\\noccasionally get more than they are entitled to, but this\\nwill only be the case where there is some greater issue\\nbetween the larger parties which compels the relinquish-\\n1 Proportional Representation Revieiv, December, 1895.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 183\\nment of something for the sake of obtaining something of\\ngreater importance. Compromise is of the essence of pop-\\nular government, and the fairest compromises are most\\nlikely to be inade when all phases of popular thought are\\nproportionally represented.\\nThe first effects of every innovation are always\\nviewed with alarm. So accustomed are we to\\nthe workings of existing institutions, that, though\\nwe acknowledge their imperfections and injustice,\\nwe rather cling to them than risk the imagined\\nincidental results that may flow from the triumph\\nof justice and fairness. Our principal difficulty\\nis our failure to perceive that a far-reaching re-\\nform, which strikes at the root of existing evils,\\nbrings with it a series of changes which harmonize\\nwith it. We assume that under the new system\\nall conditions, except the mere mechanical im-\\nprovement, will remain the same as they are\\nbefore. At first, indeed, the people might not\\nfully understand the innovation, and shi^ewd\\nschemers might take advantage of their ignorance\\nbut soon they will comprehend it, and will adjust\\ntheir actions to it. It does not follow that, with\\nproportional representation, third parties, composed\\nof so-called cranks, faddists, impracticables,\\nanti-vaccinationists, repudiationists, or what\\nnot, would increase in size, and continuously hold\\nthe balance of power. A few able men of noble\\nhumanitarian, though visionary, ideas, in every", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "184 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nassembly, would be an actual gain. But if their\\nviews are truly impracticable and unjust, nothing\\nwill so demonstrate the fact to them and their\\nfollowers as the responsibility for practicable legis-\\nlation, and the hard contact with other views\\nupheld by men of ability in legislative halls.\\nIdealist reformers would send their ablest spokes-\\nmen. Other parties in self-defence would be\\ncompelled to do the same. The representative\\nassembly would become the great forum of the\\npeople. Its debates would command attention.\\nIt would educate the nation. Reformers would\\nsee that their cause is strengthened, not by send-\\ning eccentrics to Congress, but by sending ca-\\npable, all-round men. At present, having no\\nrepresentation whatever, only their extremists can\\nattract attention. The very nature of reform\\nmovements would change. There are many sen-\\nsible citizens who to-day would gladly see politi-\\ncal and industrial conditions improved, but who\\nfind no place in the dominant party organizations,\\nand are distrustful of the extreme reform organ-\\nizations, and are therefore enrolled in that army\\nof often nearly half the voters who stay at home.\\nThese men would take an active interest in poli-\\ntics, and would modify by their new-found influ-\\nence the personnel of both the new parties and\\nthe old. In these ways the balance of power\\nwould be held, not by faddists, but by the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "PAliTY RESPONSIBILITY. 185\\nsolid, patriotic, disinterested citizenship of the\\ncountry.\\nProportional representation was advocated thirty\\nyears ago in the interests of the minoritj^ It was\\nthought to be a promising corrective of the newly\\nwidened suffrage. The franchise in England was\\nextended in 1867 to the artisans, and in 1884 to\\nthe agricultural laborers. In the United States it\\nwas granted in 1869 to the Negroes. Conserva-\\ntives thought minority representation was neces-\\nsary to protect the rich against the confiscation of\\nthese mobs. This was partly the thought of Jolui\\nStuart Mill, in his classical work, On Represen-\\ntative Government. But to-day it is advocated\\nin the interests of the masses. John Stuart Mill\\nknew nothing of the power of the lobby as against\\nan extended franchise. One man of wealth has\\nthe influence of a thousand farmers, storekeepers,\\nand laborers. But the lobby is a dangerous ma-\\nchine in legislation. It protects the unscrupulous\\nfor a while, but stirs those vindictive passions\\nwhich finally lead to indiscriminate spoliation.\\nFar better for one and all would be fair and open\\ncompromise If legislatures were deliberative\\nassemblies, bringing together the leaders of all\\nclasses and interests, this would be secured and\\nthe progress of enduring social and industrial\\nreform would be quickened.\\nThese considerations have a bearing upon the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "186 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nargument J for the so-called Direct Legislation\\nby the peopb. Direct legislation exists at present\\nin various forms in every canton of Switzerland.\\nThree of them, have no legislature, retaining the\\nprimitive primary assembly of all the voters. Di-\\nrect legislation applies to cantonal and municipal\\nquestions, and has been extended to federal legis-\\nlation. It exists in two principal forms, the Initi-\\native and Referendum.\\nThe Referendum is the right of the people to\\nvote upon a law which originates in the legisla-\\nture. This exists in two forms, the optional and\\nthe obligatory. In the optional referendum the\\nproposed law is referred to the people only when\\na certain proportion of the citizens, usually one-\\nsixth to one-fourth, demand it by formal petition.\\nIt exists in eight cantons, and in the federal legis-\\nlature. The obligatory referendum permits no\\nlaw to be passed, or expenditures beyond a stip-\\nulated sum to be made, by the legislature, without\\na vote of the peo^^le. It exists in eight cantons,\\nincluding the two most populous Zurich and\\nBerne. The tendency in Switzerland has been to\\nj)ass to the initiative and the obligatory referen-\\ndum as the com^Dlete and only satisfactory form of\\nlegislation by the people.\\nAs applied in America, the referendum prom-\\nises decided advantages over delegated legislation.\\nIt would take important questions out of party", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "PARTY liESPONSIBILITY. 187\\npolitics. Legislatures already use it for tins pur-\\npose, especially in liquor and local-option legis-\\nlation. It would educate the people on public\\nquestions. The press in Switzerland to-day has\\na rdle more preponderant than formerly. But\\nits principal advantage is as a check upon corrupt,\\nincapable, and unrepresentative legislatures. It\\nutterly deprives them of power. It has banished\\nthe lobby from Swiss legislation. Representatives\\ncannot sell out, simply because they cannot de-\\nliver the goods. The people alone decide. The\\nreferendum is a club of Hercules in the hands of\\nthe people. But it does not create it destroys.\\nThis is shown in various ways. The people can\\nvote only on certain, large, simple, well-defined\\nmeasures, such as loans, public improvements,\\nsaloon license, etc. The details of legislation in\\nthese days are far more important than ever be-\\nfore. This gives abundant opportunity in the\\nlegislatures to introduce ambiguous phraseology\\nor provisions which would neutralize the j)urpose\\nof the bill, or make it unconstitutional or obnox-\\nious. 1 Consequently the people are better able\\nto vote for men than for measures. Tliis is shown\\nby the following examples\\nIn New York, in 1894, the vote on the revised\\nConstitution was only 57 per cent of the vote cast\\nfor governor at the same election the vote on\\n1 Alfred Cridge, in Hope and Home.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "188 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\napportionment (gerrymander) was 59 per cent and\\nthe vote on canal improvement was 60 per cent.\\nIn California, in 1892, tlie vote on five amend-\\nments to the Constitution and four propositions\\nranged from 53 per cent to 80 per cent of the\\nvotes cast at the same election for members of the\\nassembly. (Popular election of senators 80 per\\ncent; educational voting qualification 77 per cent.)\\nIn Ohio a Constitutional amendment to tax fran-\\nchises of corporations was lost three times, although\\nthe majorities in its favor were large, simply be-\\ncause the total vote on the question was less than\\n75 per cent of the total vote cast at the same\\nelections for state officers, as required by the Con-\\nstitution.\\nIn Switzerland, of the twenty federal referenda\\nduring 1879-1891, the average vote was 58.5 per\\ncent of the total number of voters, ranging from\\n40 per cent to 67 per cent. Upon the Right\\nto Employment it was 56 per cent.^\\nIn Zurich a larger percentage of votes is cast,\\nowing to the compulsory voting law; the average\\non 133 cantonal propositions of all kinds being\\n74 per cent of the eligible voters. 26 per cent of\\nthe votes were blanlts, while in two recent elec-\\ntions of candidates 21 per cent and 24 per cent\\nwere blanks.^\\n1 A. B. Hart, The Eeferendum in Switzerland, in The\\nNation, September 14, 1894.\\n2 J. W. Sullivan, Direct Legislation Record, September, 1894.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "PAIiTY RESPONSIBILITY. 189\\nIn Switzerland it turns out that many bills are\\nai^proved or rejected in the referendum not on\\ntheir merits, but on the questions Confidence\\nor No Confidence in the legislature which sub-\\nmitted them. In federal legislation, twenty-seven\\nlaws and constitutional amendments were sub-\\nmitted to the referendum (optional) during the\\nyears 1874 to 1894; and of these fifteen were re-\\njected and twelve approved. In Zurich, with the\\ncompulsory referendum, there were 128 legislative\\nacts voted upon between 1869 and 1893. The\\npeople ratified ninety-seven, and rejected thirty-\\none.i A few laws at first rejected by the people\\nwere later adopted; and although Zurich is en-\\ngaged in manufacturing and has a large working-\\nclass vote, it has rejected laws reducing the period\\nof work in factories to twelve hours a day, pro-\\ntecting female operatives, making employers liable\\nfor accidents to employees, increasing the amount\\nof education in the public schools, and providing\\nfree text-books. These votes do not mean always\\nthat the people are more conservative than their\\nrepresentatives, but that the particular form in\\nAvhich the legislature drew up the measures and\\nthe personnel of the legislature itself were not\\nsatisfactory to the people. These adverse votes\\n1 See A. Lawrence Lowell, The Referendum and Initia-\\ntive, International Journal of Ethics, October, 1895.\\n2 Sec Lowell as above.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "190 FBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\non advanced measures should be compared with\\nthe votes when the referendum was first estab-\\nlished in 1869. Says Herr BurMi, The Father\\nof the Referendum The plutocratic govern-\\nment and the Grand Council of Zurich, which had\\nconnived with the private banks and railroads,\\nwere pulled down in one great voting swoop. The\\npeople had grown tired of being beheaded by the\\noffice-holders after every election.\\nThe unrepresentative character of the legisla-\\ntures has led to the Initiative, whereby the people\\npurpose to draw up their own measures, and have\\nthem voted upon without the interference of the\\nlegislature. A petition signed by six to eight per\\ncent of the voting constituency submits the bill\\nto the legislature, which must in turn promptly\\nsubmit it unchanged to the people, though it may\\nexpress an opinion or submit also an alternative\\nproposition, if it wishes. The cantonal initiative\\nexists in fourteen of the twenty-two cantons, and\\nwas introduced into federal legislation in 1891.\\nBut the initiative is almost valueless as a means\\nof legislation. It, indeed, educates the people and\\nshows the weakness of extremists, as when the in-\\nitiative federal bill, guaranteeing right of em-\\nployment to every citizen, was rejected by a vote\\nof four to one; but it does not enact good laws.\\nIn Zurich, from 1869 to 1893, nineteen initiatives\\n1 Quoted by Sullivan, Direct Legislation, New York, 1893.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "PABTY RESPONSIBILITY/ 191\\nwere voted upon. Four of them the legislature\\nadvised the people to adopt, and of these two were\\nratified at the popular vote, and two were rejected\\nbut of the other fifteen proposals which were dis-\\napproved by the legislature, only three were en-\\nacted by the people. One of these set up houses\\nof correction for tramps, a measure the wisdom of\\nwhich Avas much doubted a second re-established\\nthe death penalty, but this came to nothing, for\\nthe people rejected, at the referendum, the law\\nwhich was prepared to carry it into effect; the\\nthird abolished compulsory vaccination.\\nThe initiative is weak for the reasons already\\ngiven as to the true nature of legislation. It pre-\\nvents compromise and mutual concession. IMeas-\\nures are drawn up, not by a body representing all\\ninterests, which would therefore be fair to all, Imt\\nby a faction or group of extremists. It by no\\nmeans embodies the joint wisdom and sense of jus-\\ntice of the community. It therefore cannot often\\ncommand a majority of the votes and if it does,\\nthe animus is likely to be not a generous spirit\\nof tolerance, but a petty hatred of a small minor-\\nity. This is shown by the recent federal refer-\\nendum forbidding the slaughter of animals by\\nbleeding, which was adopted mainly to persecute\\nthe Jews.\\nThe referendmn, on the other hand, exhibits\\n1 Sco Lowell, as above.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "192 PEOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nstrikingly tlie unrepresentative character of tlie\\nlegislatures. Tlie people reject both measures\\npatently vicious and others whose details they sus-\\npect, merely on the question of confidence in the\\nlegislature.\\nUnquestionably direct legislation in the form\\nof the referendum would serve an important pur-\\npose in the present condition of American politics.\\nIt would promptly bring all legislative assemblies\\nto a standstill. But, as in Switzerland, it would\\nmake them no more attractive than now to the\\nability and statesmanship of the country. They\\nwould be simply advisory committees on legisla-\\ntion, with no responsibility, attracting neither the\\npolitical leaders, nor enlisting the popular vote at\\nelections. But the political atmosphere would be\\ncleared. The people would have relief from the\\nsurfeit of partisanship and corrupt influences.\\nThey could calmly contemplate the obstacles to\\npopular government. In Switzerland, direct legis-\\nlation is being followed by proportional represen-\\ntation. Five cantons have adopted it since 1891,\\nthrough the referendum. Four have rejected it\\nby referendum, in some cases because it was con-\\nfused by partisan legislatures with other issues.^\\nBut in two cases an initiative is demanding a new\\nvote. The opinion is expressed that in less than\\n1 See Bulletin cles Schweiz. Wahlreforyn-Vereinsfiir Propor-\\ntionale Volksvertretung, No, 8 and 9, Mai, 1894,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 193\\nten years the whole of Switzerland will have pro-\\nportional representation carried out peaceably, with-\\nout revolution and bloodshed. Thus direct\\nlegislation proves to be an efficient instrument,\\nnot so much for legislation, as for reforming the\\nlegislatures. If the arguments presented in the\\nforegoing pages are valid, and proportional repre-\\nsentation brings into the legislatures the political\\nleaders of the people, transforming them from par-\\ntisan organs into deliberative bodies accurately\\nrepresenting the public, we may expect that the\\nreferendum and the initiative in Switzerland will\\nbe gradually discontinued, but not until they have\\nmade possible a genuinely representative democ-\\nracy.\\nThe preceding discussion is concerned only with\\nthe legislative department of government. How-\\never the executive may be chosen, he is properly\\nonly the agent of the legislature. As such he is\\nnot called upon to exercise discretion, which is\\nthe prerogative of legislators, but to execute laws\\nexactly as their framers contemplated. He is\\ntherefore, strictly speaking, not a party official,\\nbut a non-partisan agent. As a matter of effi-\\nciency, he should be in sympathy with the ruling\\npolicy of the legislature. There is therefore no\\nreason why minority representation should be\\n1 Chr.rles Burkli, iu Proportional Eepresentaiioii Eeview, Sep-\\ntember, 1895.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "194 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nintroduced in the executive department. Where\\nit has been attempted, as in the executive boards\\nof Switzerland, the results are unsatisfactory.\\nPractical efficiency also requires that the execu-\\ntive head be a single officer, and this excludes\\nthe principle of minority representation.\\nThe case is somewhat different with the judi-\\nciary. This branch of government interprets the\\nlaws, and applies them to particular cases. To a\\nconsiderable extent it creates new laws through\\nits application of recognized principles to new\\nconditions. In the United States it has also an\\nimportant political function through its control\\nover the legislature. Whether, therefore, judges\\nshould be appointed or elected is a debatable\\nquestion. Undoubtedly, if the courts further\\nextend their powers over legislation, they must,\\nlike the legislatures, be made elective. Any other\\npolicy would be destructive to democratic ten-\\ndencies. But if the courts are to come under\\nthe control of machine politics through popular\\nelections on party tickets, they, too, must sooner\\nor later become degraded. Already supreme court\\nand inferior judges in various States are known\\nto be nominated and elected by saloon and cor-\\nporate interests with a view to their action on the\\nconstitutionality of important statutes.\\nPossibly proportional representation will solve\\nthe enigma of an elective judiciary. Police magis-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "PARTY RESPONSIBILITY/ 195\\ntrates in Philadelphia and snpreme court judges\\nin Pennsylvania are elected by the limited vote,\\na form of minority representation, which, as al-\\nready explained, makes them directly the agents\\nof party politics. The principle, however, miglit\\nbe employed with a better form of proportional\\nrepresentation, which would tend to remove the\\nbench from partisan control.\\nThe problems of the executive and judiciary\\nare subsidiary ones. They have appeared im-\\nportant only because the failure of legislatures\\nhas imposed heavy obligations on the co-ordinate\\nbranches of government. The legislatures have\\nbeen unrepresentative in character because the\\ntheory of party responsibility has prevented re-\\nform of electoral machinery. More important\\nthan party responsibility is such a perfection of\\nmethods as will maintain individual responsibility\\nof all officials directly to the people. By propor-\\ntional representation this would be secured, and\\nwith it would appear in legislative assemblies the\\nleading men of the city. State, and nation men\\nwho would possess that spirit and capacity of\\njust compromise which proceed only from wide\\nexperience, distinguished ability, and patriotism.\\nWith such men in power it would no longer be\\nnecessary to hold a majority of the legislature\\ntogether by the party machine, but new majori-\\nties could be trusted to be formed on every ques-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "196 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\ntion in harmony witli the wishes and interests\\nof all the people. And instead of idealizing the\\nrule of a mere numerical majority on the plea of\\nthe greatest good of the greatest number, we\\nshould promote mutual concession for the sake\\nof a Lroacler ideal, the greatest good of all the\\npeople.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 197\\nCHAPTER VIII.\\nCITY GOVERNMENT,\\nIt is admitted that a portion of the arguments\\nin the preceding chapter is in advance of what\\nthe public is ready to accept. Jeremy Bentham\\nis quoted as saying that a reform may be so en-\\ntirely just that all classes will forthwith join\\ntogether to defeat it. Not only must it be just,\\nit must be practicable and it must not run\\ncounter to public prejudice. We as a people are\\nnot yet ready to abandon the notion that party\\nresponsibility in Federal affairs is essential for\\nsafety and even in our State governments the\\nelection of senators by State legislatures, and the\\ncongressional gerrymanders, force us to decide\\nState questions by Federal parties.\\nBut in city affairs it is different. The think-\\ning and practical public is consenting, even in-\\nsisting, that city politics must be separated from\\nState and Federal politics that a man s views on\\nthe tariff have nothing to do with his views on\\nspecial assessments, health administration, fran-\\nchise-stealing, or police. It is also agreed that\\nthird parties in cities are not composed of vision-\\naries and irresponsibles, but of the intelligent and", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "198 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\nwell-to-do classes. Consequently, reformers are\\nappealing to citizens to abandon tlieir political\\nparties in city elections, and to vote for the best\\nman on business principles. Independence in city\\npolitics is coming to be dignified and respected.\\nPublic prejudice may soon permit the necessary\\npolitical machinery for promoting this indepen-\\ndence. But up to the present time what has been\\ndone\\nThe city is looked upon as a business corpora-\\ntion, instead of a political corporation, to be man-\\naged in a business manner. It must therefore\\nhave its general manager, who shall appoint all\\nheads of departments, and become clearly responsi-\\nble for its administration. Power must be taken\\nfrom the council and from boards, and be concen-\\ntrated in the mayor. The mayor must be elected\\nby popular vote.\\nMr. James Bryce calls this a cure or kill\\nmethod of government.^ It places tremendous\\ninterests at stake in every election upon the turn\\nof a few votes. When the people are thoroughly\\naroused they may elect a good mayor. But how\\nUsually, as recently in New York City, one of the\\ntwo political party machines must be recognized\\nin the nomination. A compromise candidate must\\nbe agreed upon, and the other elective officials\\nmust be properly distributed so that this machine,\\n1 American Commonwealth, vol. i., p. 617.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 199\\nusually in the iiiinoritj, may get a share of the\\nspoils. ]3ut in case such a patchwork ticket can-\\nnot be arranged, the independents are forced to\\nnominate a ticket of their own. Here the result\\nis familiar. Three candidates are in the field for\\none office. The great majority of the voters ad-\\nhere to their party. The independents cannot\\nelect their man; they can only draw from one\\nmachine to the success of the other. And it is\\nusually found that the two machines have an\\nagreement both to keep the field as a lesson to the\\nreformers, and afterwards to share the offices.\\nThus the one-man system compels the very\\nthing which the reformers deprecate, the intro-\\nduction of Federal politics. It does not permit\\nthe introduction of a third element wholly disen-\\ntangled from any alliances with the two dominant\\nparties. To ascribe the failure of mayoralty des-\\npotism to the indifference of the intelligent and\\nbusiness classes is to overlook the fact that the\\nsystem of majority election, all the way from\\nprimaries and conventions up to the mayor,\\nrigidly excludes those classes. They may be\\naroused for a time, may abandon their Federal\\npolitics, and may join in a popular uprising. In\\nthat case the independent movement may show\\nconsiderable strength, and in isolated cases may\\ncontrol the election. But popular uprising is not\\nthe normal condition. It is rebellion, it requires", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "200 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nunusual exertions and great expenditures of time\\nand money by the few who take the lead. It\\ndepends upon impromptu organization, and soon\\nexhausts itself. One or two mayors may be\\nelected through its influence but the politicians\\nknow that, by quietly waiting, their turn will\\ncome again. This explains why the advocates of\\none-man power, in looking about for the failure of\\ntheir remedy, are beginning to ascribe it to the\\nshort term of the mayor, which prevents him from\\ndeveloping a policy.\\nThis last explanation of failure shows us a fault\\nnot only in the practice, but also in the theory, of\\none-man rule. The city is not merely a voluntary\\nbusiness corporation organized to economize the\\ntaxes of the stockholders it is a compulsory\\ncorporation, into which men are born. It is a\\nbranch of the State, and exercises the sovereign\\nfunctions of eminent domain, taxation, ordinance-\\nmaking, based on compulsion rather than on free\\ncontract. In a private corporation the interests\\nof the stockholders are all in one direction the\\nincrease of dividends. In a political corporation\\ndifferent classes of citizens have often different\\ninterests. Therefore all interests and classes\\nshould be represented in its administration. In\\nwhat direction its sovereign powers shall be em-\\nployed is a political question, involving justice\\nand expediency as well as business. Shall taxes", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 201\\nbe levied to protect health, to extend free schools,\\nto cleanse the slums, to buy water-works or street-\\ncar lines these are a few of the political ques-\\ntions which cities must consider. Upon these\\nquestions there is room for an alignment of politi-\\ncal parties, of conservatives, and progressists, as\\nmuch as in Federal politics, but not corresponding\\nto the Federal alignment. The mayor represents\\nonly the majority. If he has a policy, it should\\naffect nothing more nor less than the execution of\\nthe laws and ordinances and these a representa-\\ntive body must determine if not the municipal\\ncouncil, then the State legislature. They are not\\nmatters of free contract to be agreed upon Ijy pri-\\nvate individuals they are coercive enactments to\\nbe executed by the mayor and the police. They\\ncannot be determined except to a hmited extent\\nby the initiative and referendum, for reasons\\nalready given and if municipal home rule is to be\\nextended or even retained, they must be deter-\\nmined by local legislation.\\nBut the council, says Mr. Seth Low, is the\\ngreat unsolved organic problem in connection with\\ncity government in the United States. Origi-\\nnally given complete control of city affairs, it has\\nbeen forced to share its power with other branches.\\nTo its incapacity and gradual subsidence are to be\\nascribed the miserable plight of our cities.\\nGerman and English cities retain the council as", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "202 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nthe all-important and only elective body of city\\nofficials. But it is doubtful whether American\\ncities can learn from them. European cities do\\nnot have a heterogeneous population of foreigners\\nand foreign extraction furnishing one-half the\\nvotes or more. Neither do they have universal\\nsuffrage. In New York one person in six is a\\nvoter; in Glasgow, one in nine; in Berlin, one in\\neleven. In Berlin the voting age is twenty-five;\\nand non-taxpayers, numbering 10 to 15 per cent\\nof the men of voting age, have no vote whatever.\\nThe council is elected by an ingenious three-\\nclass system, in such a way that 10 to 15 per\\ncent of those who vote including only the very\\nwealthiest citizens, numbering not more than 7\\nor 8 per cent of the total male population above\\ntwenty-one years elect two-thirds of the coun-\\ncil.^ In Glasgow, 25,000 adult males equal to\\none-fourth of the population are disfranchised;\\nwhile the influence of property is still further\\nemphasized by the provisions that women may\\nvote provided they are taxpayers, and also sub-\\nurban merchants and property owners who live\\nwithin seven miles of the city.\\nThe restrictions in all British cities on regis-\\ntration, the requirements of two years residence\\nin the same precinct, and the exclusion of those\\n1 See Albert Shaw, Municipal Government in Continental\\nEurope, p. 307^ ff.^", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 203\\nwho receive public relief, disfranchises many\\nthousands of the poorest classes who freely vote\\nin America.^\\nFrance, with a wider municipal suffrage than\\nGermany or England, nevertheless disfranchises\\nhabitual drunkards, recipients of public poor relief,\\nand those convicted of crime. It is significant\\nthat France, with her comparatively wide muni-\\ncipal suffrage, elects municipal councilmen below\\nthe ability of those in England and Germany, and\\nthat city government in that country has been\\ncentralized in the hands of the mayor who appoints\\nall subordinates. He is elected by the council,\\nbut can be removed by the prefect of the depart-\\nment. In Paris there is almost no home rule;\\nthe two prefects who govern the city being ap-\\npointed by the president of the Republic.^\\nIt is generally agreed that the government of\\nEnglish and German cities is superior to that of\\nAmerican cities. Public officials are renowned\\nfor their honesty, efficiency, and the economy of\\ntheir administration. The municipal councils in-\\nclude the best and most intelligent citizens, who\\nserve without salary. And yet they who thus\\nrepresent the wealth of the community have pro-\\nmoted much further than American cities many\\npublic services for the wants of the unrepresented\\n1 See Albert Shaw, Municipal Government in Great Britain.\\n2 Ibid., p. 23 ff.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "204 PBOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nmasses, sucli as parks, baths, gas and water supply,\\nclieap car-fares, and many others. The reason for\\nthis is probably to be found in the very purity\\nand efficiency of their administration, which en-\\ncourages the citizens to intrust to their munici-\\npalities many functions which the corruption of\\nAmerican cities forces them to remand to private\\ncorporations. In German cities, also, the com-\\npulsory enlistment of private citizens of wealth\\nand influence in unpaid co-operation with city\\nauthorities in the details of administration, ac-\\nquaints them thoroughly with the needs of the\\npeople and stimulates a public spirit. In Berlin\\n10,000 taxpayers are thus enrolled, nearly 2,500\\nbeing in the department of charities. That a\\nrestricted suffrage would bring similar results in\\nAmerican cities is not to be expected. In the\\nwords of Mr. Seth Low, In a country where\\nwealth has no hereditary sense of obligation to its\\nneighbors, it is hard to conceive what would be\\nthe condition of society if universal suffrage did\\nnot compel every one having property to con-\\nsider, to some extent at least, the well-being of\\nthe whole community.\\nYet it must be acknowledged that the failure\\nof American cities is in some way connected with\\nuniversal suffrage. The fault, however, lies, not\\nwith the extension of the suffrage, but with an\\nobsolete system of election devised for aristo-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 205\\ncratic and capitalistic representation. The wealthy\\nclasses of Berlin, wlio elect two-thirds of the coun-\\ncil, are more amenable to business considerations\\nthan are the masses of the voters. Just as little\\nas railway stockholders would consider the Fed-\\neral politics or the religious belief or any other\\nquality of their directors, attorneys, and managers,\\nexcept their business capacity, so little would a\\ncapitalistic suffrage allow these qualities to in-\\nfluence the selection of councilmen. Were the\\nsuffrage restricted to any other single class in the\\ncommunity, little difficulty would be met by such\\nclass in selecting its ablest and typical represen-\\ntatives for important positions. School-teachers\\nand professors, if they alone held the franchise,\\nwould select the leading men of their calling.\\nMinisters of the gospel would select the leading\\nminister, physicians the leading physician, mer-\\nchants the most successful merchant, manufac-\\nturers the best organizer of industry, and so on.\\nBut when the suffrage is extended to all these\\nclasses, and they are thrown together in a mis-\\ncellaneous grouping, and instructed to elect a sin-\\ngle representative who stands for them all, they\\ncannot do it. The tj^ical physician does not\\nrepresent the merchants, nor the most successful\\nmerchant the ministers. Compromise candidates\\nmust be selected who do not stand out typically\\nas the leaders of any class. Far more difficult is", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "206 PBOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION:\\nthe problem when the manual working classes,\\nwith new and opposing interests, receive the fran-\\nchise. Not only are the business classes them-\\nselves, under such conditions, unable to elect their\\nown typical representatives and councilmen, but\\nthe propertyless laborers and the small home-own-\\ners are likewise handicapped. The ward Hnes\\nseparate them all into artificial groupings, and pre-\\nvent those natural combinations based on business\\nand social interests which they would readily adopt\\ncould they join together throughout the city, ir-\\nrespective of residence. Neighborhood, though\\nmore compacted, is less united in the city than\\nin the country. Friendship, business alliances,\\nreligious co-operation, social enjoyments, bind to-\\ngether people of different wards instead of those\\nof the same ward. The ward system, separating\\npolitically those whom interest would join, and so\\npreventing their natural representation, ends in-\\nevitably in the party machine, with its military\\nand fraternal organization of the voters who are\\notherwise separated. It is useful, therefore, only\\nto the astute schemer and wire-puller, the repre-\\nsentative and boss of the machine, who bal-\\nances sldlfuUy interest against interest, faction\\nagainst faction, party against party. He repre-\\nsents nothing but his own shrewd manipulation of\\nthe separated fragments of the body politic. His\\nsuccess is that of Napoleon, divide and conquer.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 207\\nIt is adiuitted tliat government by tlie mayor in\\nAmerican cities is better than government by the\\ncommon council elected by wards. It centralizes\\nthe administration in one head, which is more easily\\ndecapitated by a popular uprising than the hydra-\\nheaded council. But its limitations and dangerous\\ntendencies have been indicated. The council, how-\\never, elected upon the proportional basis, promises\\nmore for municipal reform than the mayor. In\\nthe first place it would soon remove the govern-\\nment from Federal politics, simply because it would\\nintroduce representation of business interests, good\\ncitizenship interests, labor interests, and various\\ninterests other than partisan, which would hold\\nthe balance of power, and prevent every partisan\\naction.\\nThe appeal to voters to abandon their Federal\\npolitics in city elections must in the long run be\\nfruitless under a system of majority or plurality\\nrule, where one party by the election of a mayor\\ncan capture the entire city government. The\\nprize is too great to be neglected by partisan inter-\\nests. Party machinery must be constantly active,\\nor else be weakened. To exert influence on na-\\ntional issues, the local organization must find co-\\nhesion in local issues. Local victory strengthens\\nits hold on the State and national organizations.\\nThe only way to prevent national parties from\\nstruggling to control city politics is to introduce a", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "208 PEOPOBTIONAL BEPEUSENTATION.\\nsystem wliicli prevents any one party from securing\\nmajority control of tlie city government. If tliird\\nor fourth parties liolcl the balance of power, they\\ncan check the domination of either national party\\nin city affairs, and so reduce them both to a mini-\\nmum. And here again, since the public looks on\\nthird parties in city affairs with a favor which it\\ndoes not vouchsafe to third parties in Federal affairs,\\nthe time is ripe for a system of city government\\nwith proportional representation which will frankly\\ngive these third parties the balance of power, and,\\nindeed, encourage them to increase in numbers,\\nvariety, and vigor. At the same time, by electing\\na council of, say, thirty, in annual groups of ten,\\nthe quota of representation would be large enough\\nto exclude petty and factious interests, but small\\nenough to represent all interests of municipal sig-\\nnificance.\\nProportional representation would bring able\\nand public-spirited men into the service of the city.\\nAs a legislative body meeting once a week or\\nfortnight, and supervising through their commit-\\ntees, but not administering the city departments,\\nthe councilmen would receive no salaries, as in\\nGerman and English cities but they would be\\nglad to serve. It is a mistake to assume that the\\nbest business men are so engrossed with their pri-\\nvate affairs that they would not act as councilmen.\\nSuch men already give their unpaid services as", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 209\\ntrustees of institutions, as members of State boards\\nof charities, as school, park, and sinking-fund com-\\nmissioners, and in many public positions where\\nthey are not compelled to seek appointment by\\nquestionable means. So would they serve in the\\ncity council if chosen on the proportional plan in\\nsuch a way as to be free from humiliating bar-\\ngains. Elected in this way, says Charles Fran-\\ncis Adams,^ who could refuse to serve Consider\\nthe prestige, the weight of authority and influence,\\nwith which any man could walk into a council\\nchamber, who entered it at the head of the poll\\nunder such a system as this. No citizen, whether\\nin New York or Boston, so elected, could or would\\nrefuse to obey the mandate of his fellow-citizens.\\nAnd so it would be in the power of any consider-\\nable body of voters to lay a hand on the shoulder\\nof any man, no matter how eminent or how busy\\nhe might be, and call upon him to perform his\\ntour of municipal duty.\\nSuch citizens, too, would be elected from the\\ndifferent sections of the city. Proportional repre-\\nsentation in cities would not abolish local repre-\\nsentation. In some cases where a river or a\\nrailway system divides the city into two widely\\ndifferent sections, it might be well to provide for\\ntwo tickets, one for each section. But even with-\\nout such provision, the parties nominating candi-\\n1 Proijortional Representation Review, March, 1891,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "210 PBOPOETIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\ndates could bring out a full vote for their tickets\\nonly on condition tliat they distributed the candi-\\ndates among the sections. And if the voters as a\\nmatter of fact attach weight to sectional repre-\\nsentation, they can readily cast that weight in their\\nballots by voting for such candidates as repre-\\nsent their sections. Thus sectional interest must\\ncome forward under such a system in its true\\nproportions along with other interests, though\\nit is prevented from becoming the exclusive in-\\nterest.\\nWith a reformed city council removed from\\nFederal politics, the city administration would as-\\nsume a new efficiency. The council is not only a\\nlegislative body if it truly represents the people,\\nit must be also an administrative body. Therein\\nit differs from the State and Federal legislatures\\nin that the latter are sovereign in every regard\\nover their respective fields. But the city govern-\\nment is only a branch of the State government, its\\npowers are delegated, and it possesses only those\\ngranted by the legislature or the Constitution of\\nthe State. Matters of general legislation, such as\\nhealth, administration of justice, property, and\\npersonal rights, in all their manifold forms, are\\nwithheld from it. The council, representing the\\ndelegated sovereignty of the city, has but limited\\nlegislative duties, even under the most generous\\ngrant of home rule. It remains, therefore, to in-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 211\\nquire how far it should be intrusted with adminis-\\ntrative duties.\\nAt the present time, civil service reform in the\\nUnited States has advanced no farther than the\\ncontrol of subordinate positions. It is not even\\nproposed by the ardent advocates of this reform\\nthat either in city, State, or nation, it should in-\\nclude the heads of departments. The conse-\\nquence is that, in the cities where civil service\\nrules apply, there is a double head to each depart-\\nment a ])oUtical head, appointed by the mayor for\\nhis own term of office, and a professional or expert\\nhead, holding under civil service rules during\\nefficiency. The latter has the entire administra-\\ntion of the details of the service, and the super-\\nvision of subordinates he is an expert who has\\nusually come up from the ranks, and is thoroughly\\nacquainted with every feature of his department.\\nThe political head comes and goes with the mayor,\\nand is supposed to represent his policy. The\\nactual administration, however, he is compelled\\nfrom very inefficiency to leave to the expert head.\\nNow, civil service reform comes in as a mechan-\\nical arrangement to j^revent the political heads of\\ndepartments from applying to subordinates the\\nsame rules of appointment and removal as those\\nwhich are applied to themselves. So far it has\\nbest accomplished its aim when administered by a\\ncommission appointed independently of the city", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "212 PBOPORTIONAL nEPBESENTATIOW.\\nauthorities, as in Massacliusetts by the governor.\\nThis commission, after competitive and non-com-\\npetitive examinations, can alone certify candi-\\ndates for subordinate appointments to the heads\\nof departments, upon requisitions from the latter.\\nUsually, when one appointment is to be made, the\\nthree candidates who stand highest on examina-\\ntion are certified, and the head of the department\\nmust select one of these. Promotions, too, must\\nbe made according to fixed rules of precedence.\\nThe object here is to restrict the freedom of the\\npolitical heads of departments, so that they will\\nnot dismiss subordinates in order to appoint their\\nown political adherents.\\nUndoubtedly, with the existing methods of se-\\nlecting heads, these rules are indispensable. They\\ngive employees security of tenure, they promote\\nefBciency and economy, but above all they prevent\\nthe demoralization of the voters, a surprisingly\\nlarge number of whom are controlled by the hope\\nof office for themselves or their friends.\\nBut civil service reform as thus administered is\\nstrikingly inadequate in municipal government.\\nThe general testimony is that it succeeds well\\nwhen the heads of departments are in sympathy\\nwith it; but if they are not, they can defeat its\\naims. On the other hand, if the heads are perma-\\nnent expert officials, as is often the case in the fire\\ndepartment, they do not need the services of an", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 213\\noutside commission, and are awkwardly hampered\\nby it. The appointment and promotion of subor-\\ndinates is not a mere mechanical matter of ex-\\naminations, measurements and averages, which\\ncan be done by a commission having no profes-\\nsional and expert knowledge of the services re-\\nquired. Rather is it a work of tact and insight\\ninto character, a work requiring that sound judg-\\nment, that thorough experience in the service, and\\nthat full knowledge of those subtle qualities which\\nbring success in the particular duties required,\\na judgment, an experience, and a knowledge\\nwhich can be found only in the resourceful head\\nof a department, who has served in subordinate\\npositions, and who has at heart the success and\\nhonor of his department. The weakness of civil\\nservice reform is that it does not reach the foun-\\ntain and source of efificient civil service, the heads\\nof departments.\\nA thorough reform of the civil service in city\\naffairs cannot be expected until the political heads\\nof departments are abolished altogether, and the\\nentire administration intrusted to the expert pro-\\nfessional heads. In German and English cities\\nthe civil service commission as an independent\\norganization is unknown. Heads of departments\\nare selected by the council, sometimes from the\\nsubordinates by promotion, but usually from the\\nlists of those who have achieved success and", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "214 PliOPOBTlONAL BMPBESENTATION.\\nreputation as heads in smaller cities, having be-\\ngun their careers as subordinates in both large\\nand small ones. Upon these heads is laid the\\ncomplete responsibility for the administration of\\ntheir departments, and, as an indispensable con-\\ndition of such responsibility, the unrestricted ap-\\npointment and removal of all subordinates. The\\ncouncil, of course, legally and formally ratifies\\nthe action of its heads of departments through its\\nown committees, though not interfering in the\\nelection of subordinates.\\nIn the United States an essential feature of\\ngovernment by the mayor, both as practised and\\nadvocated, is his unchecked freedom in appoint-\\ning his so-called cabinet, the heads of depart-\\nments. They are his personal representatives in\\nthe city administration. But the mayor, as al-\\nready shown, must necessarily be elected, except\\nin sporadic cases, on the basis of Federal politics.\\nHis personal representatives, therefore, must re-\\nflect his political complexion. They must come\\nand go with him. They are appointed and\\nremoved, not on account of their intimate knowl-\\nedge of the departments and their eminently suc-\\ncessful administration therein, but solely for those\\npolitical reasons which may, for the time being,\\n1 Illustrations of this and other statements regarding foreign\\ncities are found in Albert Shaw s Municipal Government in\\nGreat Britain and Municipal Government in Continental\\nEurope, New York, 1895.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 215\\nstrengthen the popular hokl of the mayor. As\\nlong as the mayor, elected by popular vote, ap-\\npoints them, such must be their character. They\\nare at the best a useless encumbrance, and in all\\ncases a serious danger to the administration of\\ncity affairs.\\nOn the other hand, if a reformed and strictly\\nnon-partisan council of the foremost citizens,\\nwherein no single political party held the major-\\nity, should appoint the heads of departments,\\nthese would not be chosen for political reasons,\\nbut simply to carry out the wishes of the council.\\nThe latter would determine its own policy, as\\nfar as the city government is empowered to do\\nso; and the heads of departments would be its\\nprofessional, expert administrators for developing\\nthat policy. The civil service commission could\\nbe abolished as a wasteful obstruction; and the\\ndepartment chiefs, whose only claim to perma-\\nnency would be the efficiency of their administra-\\ntion, could be intrusted with entire responsibility\\nin all the details of appointments, promotions,\\nand removals.\\nThus it will be seen that proportional represen-\\ntation in American cities will achieve its marked\\nsuccess not merely in the legislative field, but in\\nthe more important administrative field. There\\nis, in fact, no half-way position between rule by\\nmayor and rule by council. If Americans accept", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "216 PROPOBTIONAL REPBESENTATION.\\nthe present tendency, they cannot stop short of\\nthe abolition of the counciL Following that must\\ncome longer terms for the mayor; next, removal\\nfrom office by the governor, not only for mal-\\nfeasance, but for political reasons, as in France.\\nHome rule, democratic self-government, civic\\npride, municipal patriotism, must gradually dis-\\nappear in the face of advancing centralization.\\nOn the other hand, a council elected from the\\nbest citizens by the free choice of the voters, as\\nguaranteed by proportional representation, would\\ngradually absorb into its hands the control of city\\nadministration. Beginning with the control of\\ntaxation, the legislature would remove from it\\nthose restrictions against granting franchises and\\nmaking loans, and those financial limitations im-\\nposed by independent boards of estimate and\\napportionment, which now render even the legis-\\nlative functions of the council in our large cities\\na mere formality. Then the council would be\\nable to control the mayor, and to state the terms\\nof financial support. And finally, j)roceeding\\nfrom one success to another, the mayor would\\nagain be reduced to the position of chairman\\nand dignitary, while the grand committee of the\\npeople, representing them wholly and in part,\\nfreed from machines, bosses, and spoilsmen, would\\nrestore to our cities a genuine representative\\ndemocracy.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 217\\nPractical illustrations of the line of reasoning\\npursued in the foregoing pages might be found\\nin any American city. I will select the campaign\\nof 1895 for the election of mayor and council-\\nmen in the city of Syracuse. The Republican or-\\nganization had been in control of the city for\\nseveral years. After both the Republican and\\nDemocratic parties had made their nominations\\nfor mayor, there was considerable dissatisfaction.\\nA Citizens Reform party was organized, com-\\nposed mainly of Republicans. This party offered\\nthe mayoralty nomination successively to three\\nwell-known and capable citizens, two of whom\\ndeclined, and the third accepted. Thus three\\ncandidates were in the field. As a result, the\\nDemocrats elected their nominee on the follow-\\ning vote Democrats, 9,184 Citizens, 6,018\\nRepublicans, 5,831. At the same election 19\\ncouncilmen were elected by wards. Had the\\ncouncilmanic election been based on proportional\\nrepresentation, according to the vote for mayor,\\nthe council would have stood, 8 Democrats, 6\\nCitizens, 5 Republicans. Neither party would\\nhave secured a majority. At the same time the\\nCitizens party would have met no difficulty in\\nfinding eminent candidates. The two men who\\nrefused to run for mayor would willingly have\\naccepted a place on a proportional ticket, be-\\ncause a nomination would have been equivalent", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "218 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nto an election. Tliey would not have been\\nforced to undergo the bitter personal attacks\\nwhich, spring from the supreme importance of a\\nsingle candidate, upon whom depend all the ap-\\npointments and the distribution of patronage.\\nThere would have been no fight whatever over\\nthe four or five principal candidates nominated\\nby the Citizens party. Then, when elected, such\\nmen would not have been compelled to drop their\\nprivate business, at great loss to themselves, their\\npartners, and their families, only to return to it\\nafter two years of harassing struggle with spoils-\\nmen. Serving without salaries, meeting once a\\nweek, supervising through committees the heads\\nof departments, to whom the actual administration\\nis intrusted, they would have time for their pri-\\nvate affairs. Under such conditions, there is no\\nreason why the best men of American cities, as of\\nEuropean cities, should not find the honor and\\nopportunities of an aldermanic seat greatly to be\\ndesired. When once elected, and their records\\nmade, they would be returned again and again\\nto the council, with no effort, no political wire-\\npulling, simply through nomination by petition\\nand the untrammelled suffrage of their fellow-\\ncitizens. In the council they would hold the\\nbalance of power between the two dominant\\nparties. They would prevent all partisan legis-\\nlation and appointments, would be the spokes-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 219\\nmen for the public opinion of the community, and\\na rallying-point against corruption in the city\\naffairs.\\nHere the objection naturally arises, granting\\nthat the Citizens Reform party would be able\\nto guarantee election to its principal candidates,\\nwould not the same be true for the regular parties\\nand their nominees Therefore, would not the\\nproportional plan strengthen instead of weaken\\nthe hold of the machines Could they not elect\\nthe very worst candidates whom they might\\nchoose? And when elected, could not these rep-\\nresentatives of both party organizations combine\\nto defeat the Citizens party and then divide the\\nappointments and share the corruption funds be-\\ntween themselves After all, does not muni-\\ncipal reform depend solely upon the renewed\\ninterest and independence of citizens in municipal\\naffairs rather than in any mere revision of political\\nmachinery\\nUnquestionably, the first requisite of any reform\\nis the public spirit, intelligence, and independence\\nof the voters. A corrupt and ignorant electorate\\ncan never produce good government. At the same\\ntime, the history of the secret ballot legislation\\nin the United States the past five years demon-\\nstrates beyond doubt the importance of reform\\nin political machinery. The ballot laws did not\\ncreate patriotism, public spirit, intelligence, inde-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "220 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\npendence but they have given these qualities an\\nadvantage which they never before possessed in\\nthe electoral contest with bribers. Proportional\\nrepresentation goes farther in the same direction.\\nIt offers to would-be independent voters the guar-\\nanty that they will not throw their votes away if\\nthey cast them for third-party candidates. In the\\nSyracuse election hundreds of voters were influ-\\nenced by this consideration. A bolt from the\\nRepublican ticket to the Citizens ticket on the\\nmayoralty election was quite generally understood\\nto be simply a vote for the Democratic candidate.\\nBut with proportional representation every 1,100\\nvotes turned over to the Citizens ticket carries\\nthe assurance of electing one candidate on that\\nticket whereas in the election of mayor it would\\nhave required nearly 10,000 votes. So easy and\\nsafe is the bolting from the regular nominees\\nunder the proportional plan that the political or-\\nganizations would see the necessity of nominating\\nat least prominent men instead of mere tools and\\nfigure-heads. Otherwise the Citizens ticket could\\neasily increase its share of representation from a\\nthird to a half or more of the aldermen. In either\\ncase there would be a decided gain. If only the\\nmen who engineer the political machines, but\\nwho usually hold no offices, could be placed\\nin the municipal council, they would be in a\\nposition where the people could condemn them.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "CITY GOVERNMENT. 221\\nAnd succeeding elections, with the habit of in-\\ndependence encouraged among the voters, would\\ngradually weed out even the least corrupt of\\naldermen. The voters in American cities are\\nalready independent enough to bring about these\\nresults. Our cities are not now in need of\\ngreater independence among the citizens, but\\nof better machinery for expressing their actual\\nindependence.\\nCity government in the United States is at once\\nthe direst failure and the brightest hope of our\\npolitics. It is based upon the ward, the pettiest\\nextreme of the district system of representation,\\nand ward politics is recognized as the worst pol-\\nitics. This is the hopeful feature, that the people\\nacknowledge the failure, and are looking for rem-\\nedies. What these remedies shall be is not yet\\nclear nor agreed. A great many must be tried\\nand tested, and their defects noted, and finally\\nby experimental selection the fittest will survive.\\nWith three thousand cities and villages, America\\nhas the widest variety of municipal experiments\\nin the world. Small governments can be reformed\\nmore readily than large ones. To experiment\\nupon Congress jeopardizes the nation; to exper-\\niment upon cities risks but a fraction. And no\\nexperiment scarcely can aggravate the actual sit-\\nuation. From one city to another the successful\\nreform Avill extend, and finally, like other reforms", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "222 PBOPOETIONAL BEFRESENTATION.\\nin America, proceed to State and national adop-\\ntion. If proportional representation can be fairly\\nintroduced and tested, it is believed that the fore-\\ngoing pages have indicated the hope of its uni-\\nversal success.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "SOCIAL EEFOEM. 223\\nCHAPTER IX.\\nSOCIAL REFORM.\\nThe motive of political reform is not a mere\\nacademic deliglit in symmetrical and clean govern-\\nment. It goes mncli farther. Political reform is\\nonly the preliminary to social reform. The most\\nserious objections urged against the interference\\nof the State or the city in promoting social welfare\\nare grounded on the incapacity of administrative\\nofficials. The experience of foreign cities has\\ndemonstrated the value of municipal ownership\\nand operation of all public services, such as water,\\ngas, electric lighting, and street railways. The\\nefficient municipal governments of Europe have\\ndone much more. They have erected municipal\\ndwellings with the best equipments, to be leased\\nat moderate rentals to working people. They\\nhave conducted municipal farms, slaughter-houses,\\nsavings banks, pawnshops, baths, laundries, ball-\\ngrounds, technical schools, with the purpose to\\nimprove the condition of the poorest working pop-\\nulation, and to elevate the life of every class.\\nIn American cities it would seem absurd to in-\\ntrust such important enterprises to the authorities\\nas at present constituted. Generally, where water-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "224 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nworl^, gas, or electric ligliting is taken up by a\\nmunicipality, it is placed in the hands, not of the\\ncouncil, but of a board or commission newly cre-\\nated for the purpose, and elected by the people or\\nappointed by the mayor. This does not bring\\nsatisfactory results. It unnecessarily splits the\\ngovernment, divides responsibility, involves waste-\\nful administration. Yet, where the council cannot\\nbe trusted, it is the only practicable plan. At the\\nsame time, it is so objectionable that it affords\\nlittle encouragement to those who desire the exten-\\nsion of municipal functions. With a reformed\\ncouncil, however, the way would be open to a\\nbusiness-like administration of all new enterprises\\nwhich the public might wish the municipality to\\nundertake. The reform of the government of\\nLondon, through the County Government Act of\\n1888, which created a council of able and repre-\\nsentative citizens, was followed immediately by\\nenergetic work in the direction of municipal dwell-\\nings, street and dock improvements, abolition of\\ncontract work, and purchase of street-railway lines.\\nThe latter, throughout the whole area of London,\\nwill be owned and operated by the council, and\\nconsolidated into a single system within fifteen\\nyears.\\nThe people who suffer most from inefficient and\\ncorrupt government in the United States are the\\nwage-earning classes. Their streets are ill kept;", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "SOCIAL BEFOBM. 225\\nsanitary and building regulations are unenforced\\nheavy charges are imposed for car-fares and gas;\\nparks, playgrounds, and schools are inadequate.\\nSo little does the city do for the classes who have\\nno property, that they lose their interest in muni-\\ncipal government, and readily follow the politician\\nwho appeals to their prejudices. This becomes a\\nserious matter as these classes grow in self-con-\\nsciousness, as they begin to learn their political\\npower, and to feel that the motive of municipal\\ngovernment is not to promote their welfare, but to\\nrestrict their liberty. They have a majority of the\\nvotes, and they tend to combine under machine\\nleadership for what they consider their class inter-\\nests. Municipal reform must consider the welfare\\nof the masses of the working classes. But it is a\\nmistake to suppose that their welfare will be pro-\\nmoted by giving them exclusive majority rule, as\\nwith the present system. Tammany Hall secures\\ntheir votes, but neglects their homes and schools.\\nA corrupt government, with weak officials, managed\\nby private bosses, can never introduce social re-\\nforms. It must first have a share of the business\\nintegrity and leadership of the community. There\\nare many men of this type in every city who would\\ngladly enter upon reforms for the people could\\nthey be placed in power. If the working classes\\nwere free to vote as they pleased, they would soon\\nlearn to stand by such men and to keep them in", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "226 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nthe municipal council against all tlie influences of\\nmacliines and corporations. At present these men\\nare excluded by the very qualities which would\\nmake them of service. Proportional representa-\\ntion is the only political reform yet proposed\\nwhich will guarantee them continued election, and\\nthereby bring about that interest of the working\\nclasses in good city government and that harmony\\nof all classes which is becoming indispensable.\\nThoughtful persons who contemplate the social\\nconditions of to-day are oppressed by anxiety. So\\nsuddenly have a multitude of strange evils sprung\\ninto sight that the observer is bewildered, on\\none side, an unprecedented concentration of wealth\\nin the control of a few syndicates on the other, a\\ngrowing restlessness and frantic attempts at organ-\\nization on the part of the wage-earning classes. As\\nphases of these changes, there are also the rapid\\nrise of cities where capital and labor meet face to\\nface in secret and open battle the mobilization\\nof the army near these cities, and the equipment\\nof armories the increase of the unemployed, of\\ncrime, intemperance, and vice the purchase of\\nlegislation and the degradation of politics. But\\nmore serious than all is the cynical recognition of\\nthese facts in the club-room, the bitter emphasis\\nof them in the back alley and the tenement and\\namong the small farmers, and the hopelessness of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "SOCIAL REFORM. 227\\nmillions of workers. Forty years ago the farmer\\nand his sons worked early and late, opening np the\\nwilderness, but they went and came with songs.\\nTo-da}^ they cannot endure it; sons abandon the\\nfarms for the cities, work is irksome and a curse\\nthey hurry through it to reach the saloon. Have\\nthe people become individually and severally de-\\ngenerate, or are they distorted by social condi-\\ntions\\nWhatever the causes, the problems are here.\\nAnd the array of solutions is more bewildering\\nthan the multitude of problems. Here are iso-\\nlated groups of visionaries and enthusiasts, ready\\nto sacrifice themselves for their several panaceas.\\nHere are timid souls anxious to smooth the ele-\\nments by charity, and beseeching competitors to\\nshow brotherly kindness. Here are hard intellects,\\ndemanding the police.\\nThe situation cannot remain. It rests on a pro-\\nfound contradiction. On one side is a relieion\\nquoted and invoked at school, in the pulpit, by\\nthe press, by socialists, even by atheists, which ex-\\nalts an ideal of human brotherhood and equality;\\non the other side, an industrial condition fast so-\\nlidifying class distinctions, and a political philoso-\\nphy teaching the infallibility of the majority.\\nThe conviction is growing that in some way the\\ngovernment, as city, State, or nation, is to have an\\nimportant place in solving these contradictions. It", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "228 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nis seen that the church has lost its liolcl in the\\nMiddle Ages it might have sufficed. Education\\nis not enough it, with religion, intensifies the\\nunrest. Public opinion grows and accomplishes\\nmuch, but it is limited. Feelings of brotherhood\\nand a spirit of concession soften antagonism in\\nindividual cases, but they are not comprehensive.\\nThe state alone includes all the other elements\\nit alone is coterminous with society. Without it\\neducation is not universal. Religion and brother-\\nhood do not reach criminals, degenerates, nor\\ntyrants, but the state lays its hand u]3on them.\\nSociety acts through the state it is society s\\norgan. Public opinion, as modified by religion,\\neducation, and brotherhood, effects its main pur-\\nposes through legislation.\\nBut the state is too much considered as merely\\ncoercive. It is primarily co-operative. Coercion\\nis needed only for anti-social individuals and emer-\\ngencies. The state seems to be coercive because it\\ndoes not represent all the people it is not yet a\\nperfect organ for expressing their wishes. Many\\nwho are not truly anti-social are crushed by it.\\nWere its laws and administration accurately just to\\nall classes, and did it promote the general rather\\nthan influential private welfare, public opinion\\nwould exact such close obedience that coercion\\nwould almost disappear.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "SOCIAL REFORM. 229\\nNo social doctrine can long be held by a consid-\\nerable body of people if it does not include a side\\nof truth. It may not be intelligently held, nor be\\nintelligible to others, and may be grounded mainly\\non feelings but it is the expression of feelings\\nAvliich are themselves products of social conditions,\\nand so has a place in social organization. Such\\nare the profound conservative instincts which sus-\\ntain private property, the family, political parties,\\nand the state. Less so, and modified more or less\\nby intelligence, are the instincts which demand\\nchange, such as abolition of slavery and the sa-\\nloon, or which seek socialism, anarchism, single\\ntax, co-operation, or other innovations. Out of\\nthe proper and just balancing of all these interests\\nand doctrines, and their proportionate realization\\nin social structure, proceeds that moving equilib-\\nrium which is the life of society.\\nIt is the province of the science of sociology to\\ndiscover what is this just balancing of social forces\\nwhich will harmonize antagonisms and make for\\nprogress. Science should indicate those lines of\\ndevelopment and social experiment which will\\neconomize the life of society, and secure the good\\nof every individual.\\nBut science alone is inadequate. It is merely\\nacademic and preliminary. Its honor is that it\\nleads to invention, and invention in society is\\nlegislation. Legislation, comprehending the en-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "^30 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\ntixe range of human social existence, lays the\\nfoundation for individual development and pri-\\nvate co-operation. Law-makers, then, are socio-\\nlogical inventors, and require the aid of sociology\\nas electricians require the aid of physics.^\\nSocial invention, however, differs from mechan-\\nical invention in one most important character.\\nSociety is not dead matter to be ruthlessly ad-\\njusted. It is a vital, historical growth, composed\\nof human lives, feelings, and interests. These\\ninterests must be consulted. Monarchy was abol-\\nished because royal inventors did not consult\\nsocial classes. Likewise every system of govern-\\nment which is partial and unrepresentative will be\\nleft behind, whether it be conducted by aristoc-\\nracy, plutocracy, or political machines.\\nBut if a system of government can be perfected\\nwhere all classes and interests shall be represented\\nby their leading spokesmen, social invention will\\nproceed, not by the coercive arm of the state, but\\nby mutual concession. Labor and capital to-day\\nhave no recognized common ground or meeting-\\nplace, neither in shop, factory, church, college, nor\\nstate. It is left for demagogues, the representa-\\ntives of neither, to bring them together. But a\\ncity council, having the responsibility of the city\\nin its hands, and containing in its membership the\\nacknowledged leaders of capital and labor, would\\nSee Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 2 vols. New York, 1886.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "SOCIAL ItEFOEM 231\\nbe, within its jurisdiction, the most efficient in-\\nstrnment yet discovered for harmonizing the two.\\nIt would be a perpetual board of arbitration, pos-\\nsessing many powers of sovereignty, but not com-\\npelled to use them. Strikes sind boycotts would\\nbe settled by mutual agreement between author-\\nized negotiators. And for the wider interests of\\nStates and nation the legislatures and Congress\\nwould fill the same office.\\nSuch a representative assembly would be com-\\nposed of moderate, sensible, earnest men, because\\nthe people are moderate and earnest. There\\nwould be extremists and idealists, but their vis-\\nions would be controlled by hard contact with the\\npractical difhculties of ideal legislation and with\\nthe overwhelming majority of moderates. And\\nthe latter, too, would be forced to sge that ideal\\nconditions must have consideration as well as the\\nrude facts of the present.\\nFrom such assemblies of leaders in all the cities\\nand States and the Congress of the Union would\\nproceed such well-considered, straightforward, and\\nsimple laws, without the coercion of partisan ma-\\njorities or the injustice of partial representation,\\nthat the people would learn to respect their gov-\\nernment, and to fall in line heartily with its laws\\nand ordinances. Such assemblies, instead of shoot-\\ning back and forth between revolution and re-\\naction, would march steadily forward in the line", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "232 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nof social reform. They would call science and\\ncomparative legislation and history to their aid.\\nThey would establish by mutual concession the\\nessential conditions for the brotherhood of capital\\nand labor, and with these conditions would lay\\nthe foundations for the gradual solution of the\\nmain problems of social organization. And the\\nstate, instead of being a coercive policeman to\\nforce degenerates into line, would become the\\nhonored instrument of social co-operation.\\nIt might then be expected that the legislature\\nwould resume its rightful place as the sovereign\\nbranch of government. Unquestionably, its posi-\\ntion is such that, no matter how degraded its\\ncharacter, unless restricted by the Constitution, it\\ngradually absorbs supreme control of the other\\ndepartments. It alone can grant and withliold\\nfinancial support; and sooner or later this power\\nsubordinates the executive, the judicial, and the\\nadministrative branches. The national Congress,\\nnotwithstanding presidential vetoes and popular\\ndistrust, has drawn to itself the management of the\\ndetails of administration. State legislatures and\\nmunicipal councils would have done the same but\\nfor the increasing constitutional restrictions which\\nhave subordinated their financial powers to the\\njudiciary and the executive. Could the Federal\\nConstitution be readily amended, doubtless similar\\nrestrictions would be imposed upon Congress.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "SOCIAL REFORM. 233\\nIf government is to be an agent for social re-\\nform, it must Lave first the conficlence of the peo-\\nple. This can come only as it commands the best\\nability of the community, and is representative\\nin character. The executives and judges do not\\nanswer these requisites. They cannot represent\\nall the people. They are single officers elected\\nby a majority, or appointed by the agent of the\\nmajority, and they do not inspire universal confi-\\ndence. Generally, indeed, they do not represent\\neven a majority of the people, but only a plu-\\nrality and even in that plurality a small faction\\nof astute politicians and influential capitalists in-\\nterested in legislation or contracts and franchises,\\nhas dictated the nominations and the appoint-\\nments. It cannot be expected that the people,\\nwho are only awaiting a new election to bring in\\na new executive hostile to the incumbent one,\\nwill trust such a government with the delicate\\nand portentous problems of social reform. In the\\nlegislature, however, elected upon the propor-\\ntional basis, by the free choice of all classes of\\nvoters, and uncontrolled by a partisan majority,\\nthe people would find that ability, that extended\\nexperience, that representative character, and that\\ncontinuous policy, which would command their\\nconfidence.\\nAVith the confidence of the people assured, the\\nlegislature must become solely responsible for the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "234 PEOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\npolicy and administration of government. It is\\nbecoming plain that, in times of urgency, the\\nAmerican idea of checks and balances is falla-\\ncious. A government in which departments are\\npitted against each other cannot be consistent and\\nharmonious, much less efficient. The idea is al-\\nready nearly abandoned in municipal government,\\nwhere the mayor is made alone responsible for the\\nadministration. There must, indeed, be checks\\nand balances in government, else one class will\\noverride the others. But these checks should not\\nbe founded upon the antagonism of independent\\ndepartments rather should they be provided for\\nwithin a single sovereign department. By a pro-\\nportional election of law-makers this is secured.\\nWithin the legislative body itself, controlling all\\nother departments, Avould be found such a bal-\\nancing of interests and classes that, on the one\\nhand, the despotism which our constitution-makers\\nfeared would be obviated, and,, on the other, the\\nindispensable harmony and unity of government\\nwould be guaranteed.\\nThe legislature could then safely be made the\\nsovereign organ of the government and the promo-\\nter of social reform. The executive would sink to\\nits true position, that of an agent for carrying out\\nthe policy of legislation and the judiciary, instead\\nof annulling the laws, would simply apply them to\\nconcrete cases.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "SOCIAL EEFOBM. 235\\nAll this, of course, involves a cliange in the\\ncharacter of our representative assemblies difficult\\nfor the American citizen to comprehend. It im-\\nplies not merely a constitutional supremacy of the\\nlaw-making body over the other departments, but\\nprimarily a popular supremacy in the hearts of the\\npeople. Proportional representation is not ad-\\nvocated only to give the minority a hearing, but\\nmainly to give all the j^eople confidence in their\\nrulers and in one another. And unless the rising\\ndemand for social reform now urging forward all\\nclasses can bring them all together into harmoni-\\nous, progressive, and just legal relations through\\nthe law-making agencies, the outlook for these\\nmovements is indeed ominous.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "236 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nCHAPTER X.\\nTHE PROGRESS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA-\\nTION.\\nIn its Englisli and colonial origins, representa-\\ntive government was an almost nnconscious\\ngrowth. No pMlosopliical dissertations preceded\\nit. The masses of the people, with slavery and\\nserfdom their lot, were ignorant and without voice\\nin the government. Representation at that time\\nwas an instrument in the contest between mon-\\narchy on the one hand, and aristocracy and wealth\\non the other. The first outcome was the success\\nof representation and the limitation of monarchy.\\nThe problems of government which attracted at-\\ntention down to the middle of the nineteenth cen-\\ntury turned upon the relative weight of the\\nmonarchical as against the representative principle.\\nConsequently, the philosophical works of the\\neighteenth century, and the written constitutions\\nfrom 1787 to 1848, were concerned with the dis-\\ntribution of powers, and the balancing of execu-\\ntive, legislative, and judicial branches. In all of\\nthese discussions, the unpropertied classes had no\\nimmediate interest, and were not consulted. The\\nfinal result of this constitution-making has been\\nthe destruction or the constitutional limitation of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "ITS PROGRESS. 237\\nmonarchy and aristocracy based on birth, and the\\nincreased influence of plutocracy based upon prop-\\nerty.\\nIn the third and fourth decades of the present\\ncentury, a remarkable wave of democracy culmi-\\nnated in our Western civilization. In the United\\nStates, property and educational qualifications\\nwere very generally removed from the suffrage.\\nIn France, and more especially in Switzerland, the\\nfranchise was made nearly universal. In England\\nand Germany, while the suffrage was not extended\\nto the wage-receiving classes, yet the spirit of\\nthe times liberalized the constitutions through the\\nReform Bills of 1832 and 1854 in England, and\\nthe representative parliaments of 181:8 in Ger-\\nmany.\\nThe modern political parties date from those\\ndecades. Popular suffrage introduced a radical\\nchange in the nature of the representative system.\\nPoliticians began to bid for the labor vote. A\\nfew pioneering minds saw the inevitable outcome,\\nand set about a philosophical study of the founda-\\ntions of representation. It was not accidental\\nthat the years 1844 in America and 1846 in\\nSwitzerland mark the first attempts of individual\\nminds to inquire into the true basis of representa-\\ntion. Mr. Thomas Gilpin published at Philadel-\\nphia, in the former year, his prophetic M ork,\\nof which little notice was then taken, On the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "238 PBOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION\\nRepresentation of Minorities of Electors to act\\nwith the Majority in Elected Assemblies. In\\n1846 Victor Considerant, the distinguished leader\\nof the socialist school of Fourier, addressed an\\nopen letter to the Grand Council of Geneva, en-\\ntitled, De la Sincerite du Gouvernement Re-\\npresentatif, ou Exposition de I Election Veridique.\\nIn this brochure M. Considerant proposed inde-\\npendently a plan of election almost identical with\\nthat of Thomas Gilpin. Each voter was to cast\\none vote for a party, and then to indicate the\\nnames of the candidates of his party whom he\\npreferred. The proportion of representatives to\\nwhich each party should be entitled was to be\\ndetermined by the rule of three, and the success-\\nful candidates by the order of their preferences.\\nSomething akin to this plan had been suggested\\nsome twelve years before by Considerant s master,\\nCharles Fourier; and its publication in 1846 pre-\\nceded by one year the wide extension of the suf-\\nfrage in Geneva. There was as yet no feeling of\\nserious need for it, and it therefore lay dormant\\nfor fifteen years. In 1861 it was revived by M.\\nAntoin Morin in two pamphlets\\nIn 1864, at the August election, the city of Gen-\\neva was the scene of violent outbreaks and blood-\\nshed, resulting from the political strife of the\\n1 Un Noiiveau Systfeme Electoral. Geneve, 1861. De la Repre\\nsentatiou des Minorites. Geneve, 1862.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "ITS PEOGliESS. 239\\nConservative and Radical parties. The following\\nSeptember, Professor Ernest Naville pulj islied liis\\nfirst brochure addressed to the federal council\\nand the Swiss people, showing that the violence\\nof the elections which threatened the stability of\\nSwiss institutions, and inspired throughout Europe\\na dread of the new democracy of 1848, was but\\nthe natural outcome of the general ticket and ex-\\nclusive majority rule. Professor Naville from that\\ndate has been the recognized leader of the re-\\nform in Switzerland; and his numerous publica-\\ntions, besides presenting cogent arguments, afford\\na complete history of proportional representation\\nto the present time.\\nIn 1867 was formed 1 Association reformiste de\\nGeneve, composed of Professor Naville and six\\nassociates. But the time was not yet ripe for a\\npopular appreciation of the principles of propor-\\ntional representation nor, indeed, had a plan been\\nperfected which would appeal to the public. The\\nmovement for the referendum and initiative as a\\ndecidedly practical and thorough-going deadlock\\nupon their unrepresentative assemblies absorbed\\nthe thought of the people. Another twenty-live\\nyears passed without appreciable advance in popu-\\nlar approval. A small group of students contin-\\nued at work improving the plan of reform which\\n1 Les Elections de Geneve, Memoire pre sente au Conseil fe de ral\\net au Peviple Sixisse, par Ernest Naville; Lavisanne et Geneve,\\n1864, p. 59.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "240 PBOPOBTIONAL REPBE8ENTATI0N.\\nthey would present to tlie people. In the year\\n1876 the national Association Suisse pour la Re-\\npresentation Proportionelle was organized, with\\nbranches at Berne and Geneva. Hearings were\\nobtained from time to time before legislative and\\nconstitutional assemblies. But it required a crisis\\nto force public attention upon the reform.\\nThe crisis came in 1890 in the Italian canton of\\nTicino. The Conservative party in 1889, with\\n12,653 votes, elected 77 of the 112 members of\\nthe Grand Council, while the Liberals, with 12,008\\n(a handful less), elected only 35. Out of a total\\nvote of 24,671, it was calculated that 9,157 were\\nunrepresented.! Finally, in 1890, an insurrec-\\ntion broke out. The Liberals seized upon the arse-\\nnal, and overthrew the Conservative government.\\nFederal troops were despatched to put down the\\nrevolt. Then it was that the federal government\\nrecommended to the canton the adoption of pro-\\nportional representation. The suggestion was\\nacted upon, a commission was created, and in 1891\\nthe Free List was adopted in the form approved\\nby the Swiss Association. Says Professor Louis\\nWuarin of the University of Geneva r^\\nHad not the system of proportional representation been\\ncarefully worked out by men who, believing in the correct-\\nW. D. McCracken, Proportional Representation Review,\\nSeptember, 1893, p. 12.\\n2 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social\\nScience, November, 1895,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "ITS PROGRESS 241\\nness of the principle, were desirous of changing tlip basis\\nof the electoral law, the great achievement in the cause of\\njustice and peace we now rejoice at, in Switzerland, would\\nnot have been effected. Is not this an eloquent encourage-\\nment to every man to look for the truth and prepare its\\nadvent, no matter if the feeling of the people should even\\nbe strongly adverse or sceptical at the beginning? The\\nreformers, a small handful of workers, met with but little\\nencouragement at first they were opposed by almost all\\nthe men playing some part in politics, and who enjoyed the\\nreputation of being practical. But an hour came when\\nthe stone intended to be put at the corner of the edifice of\\ndemocracy was found useful, and was used. In the organ-\\nization of free government, there is something which is\\nleft to the brain and the spirit of research. The power of\\nthought is a living force, and no department of the world\\ncan prosper where it is stagnant.\\nFrom Ticino the reform lias spread rapidly to\\nother cantons. The initiative and referendum have\\nhelped it very much. The French Protestant can-\\nton Neuchatel adopted it in 1891 the large canton\\nof Geneva in 1892; the Catholic Fribourg, for mu-\\nnicipal elections, in 1894; the German Catholic Zug\\nin 1894, which combined the free ticket with\\ncumulative voting finally the German Catholic\\nSoluthurn in March, 1895, the first to introduce\\nthe Droop quota (the votes divided by the number\\nof representatives increased hy one In a few\\ncantons and cities the reform has been rejected by\\nreferendum. The city of Basle rejected it a few\\nyears ago, but the people are now demanding it", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "242 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nanew by initiative. The German Catholic Lucerne\\nand St. Gall rejected it, though large minorities\\nwere for it. It is expected that they will soon\\nfollow, and take it up like Basle; so that in less\\nthan ten years the whole of Switzerland will have\\nproportional representation carried out without\\nrevolution and bloodshed.\\nIn a small decentralized country, like Switzer-\\nland, a political reform is more readily accomplished\\nthan in a large one. England and America, how-\\never, have actually preceded Switzerland by twenty\\nto twenty-five years in the adoption of certain\\nforms of minority representation. Doubtless the\\ncrudity and comparative failure of those primitive\\nforms were important factors in blocking their pro-\\ngress and prejudicing the public against mere doc-\\ntrinaire tinkering without a practicable basis.\\nSimilar conditions, however, and similar problems,\\nsuggest similar solutions. In 1854, in the discus-\\nsion of the second Reform Bill, Lord John Russell\\nmoved in Parliament, on the suggestion of Profes-\\nsor Fawcett, that, in the newly created electoral\\ndistricts returning three members, no elector should\\nvote for more than two candidates. He said\\nNow it appears to me that many advantages would\\nattend the enabling the minority to have a part in these re-\\nturns. In the first place, there is apt to be a feeling of sore-\\n1 See article by Charles Burkli, Free List vs. the Hare Sys-\\ntem, in Proportional Representation Review, September, 1895.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "ITS PROGRESS. 243\\nuess when a considerable number of electors, such as I have\\nmentioned, are completely shut out from a share in the\\nrepresentation of one place. But, in the next place, I\\nthink that the more you have your representation confined to\\nlarge populations, the more ought you to take care that there\\nshould be some kind of balance, and that the large places\\nsending members to this House should send those who rep-\\nresent the community at large. But when there is a very\\nlarge body excluded, it cannot be said that the community\\nis fairly represented.\\nIn 1854 Mr. James Garth Marshall published\\nat London his Majorities and Minorities Their\\nRelative Rights, wherein he proposed for the first\\ntime the cumulative vote which has been so popu-\\nlar in English and American reforms. The limited\\nvote of Lord Russell, however, did not find legis-\\nlative enactment until twenty-three years after its\\nfirst proposal; and the cumulative vote was first\\nemployed in 1870. Two events prepared the way\\nfor this adoption. The first was the discussion\\ninaugurated by Mr. Thomas Hare in 1859, when\\nhe published his volume entitled The Election\\nof Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal,\\nwhich was followed in 1862 by John Stuart Mill s\\nprofoundly philosophical Considerations on Rep-\\nresentative Government. Mr. Mill speaks of\\nThomas Hare as a man of great capacity, fitted\\nalike for large general views and for the contri-\\n1 Quoted by Salem Dutcher, Minority or Proportional Rep-\\nresentation, New York, 1872, p. 38.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "244 PBOPORTION^AL REPBESENTATION.\\nvance of practical details and of his plan as\\namong the very greatest imjDrovements yet made\\nin the theory and practice of government.\\nCertainly no discussions have equalled these\\ntreatises of Mill and Hare in placing before the\\nthinking people of all countries the true nature of\\nrepresentation under universal suffrage and politi-\\ncal parties. The very extreme to which Mr. Hare\\ncarried his plan, proposing as he did to abolish all\\ndistricts, and to make one great constituency, en-\\nabled him and Mr. Mill to develop fully the philo-\\nsophical principles underlying personal rather than\\nparty or sectional representation. The unit of\\nrepresentation was to be determined by dividing\\nthe whole number of votes in the entire kingdom\\nby the number of seats in the House. Every can-\\ndidate who obtained a quota would be returned,\\nfrom however great a number of local constitu-\\nencies his votes might be gathered. The elector\\nwould indicate his first and second choices, and so\\non so that his single vote might be transferred\\nfrom elected or defeated candidates to some one\\nwhom it might assist in electing.^ The mechanical\\ndetails for counting, calculating the quota, and\\n1 Considerations on Eepresentative Government, American\\nedition, New York, 1875, pp. 153, 156.\\n2 In Appendix II. will be found a bill drawn up according to\\nMr. Hare s plan for municipal councils, and in Appendix III. a\\nmodification of the Hare plan devised by Mr. W. H. Gove, of\\nSalem, Mass.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "ITS PltOGRESS. 245\\ntransferring the votes, are given by Mr. Hare in\\ngreat detail. So complicated did the plan appear\\nwhen presented on a national scale, yet so power-\\nful were the considerations urged in favor of its\\nunderlying principle, that for ten years in England\\nand America the simpler forms of the limited and\\nthe cumulative votes received earnest attention\\nand occasional enactment into law.\\nAt the same time the suffrage w^as again being\\nwidely extended in both countries. In 1867, when\\nthe Reform Bill which granted the ballot to the\\nartisans in towns was being adopted by Parliament,\\nMr. jNIill, as member for Westminster, moved an\\namendment embodying the essential features of\\nMr. Hare s scheme. The motion did not prevail\\nbut at a later session the limited vote of Lord John\\nRussell was adopted for all parliamentary constitu-\\nencies returning three members, known as three-\\ncornered constituencies. It will not be surprising\\nto the reader who has followed the description of\\nthe limited and cumulative votes in the foreffoingf\\npages to learn that it was the manipulation of this\\nlimited vote which first introduced into England\\nthe American political machine. IMr. Joseph\\nChamberlain and the Liberals of Birmingham pro-\\nceeded to organize thoroughly their following, in\\norder to secure not merely two but the three can-\\ndidates of their constituency.\\nIn 1870, when the English government began", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "246 PBOFOBTIONAL UEPBESENTATION.\\nits wide extension of free schools, the cumulative\\nvote was introduced in the election of the new\\nlocal boards of education. This was by way of\\nconcession to the supporters of private and secta-\\nrian schools, who wished to retain their hold in\\nthe distribution of public funds, and in the admin-\\nistration of their schools.\\nWith this Act the progress of proportional\\nrepresentation in England ceased. When the\\nsuffrage was extended in 1884 to agricultural\\nlaborers, an attempt was again made to introduce\\nthe reform, but after considerable discussion the\\namendment was defeated. The next year was\\norganized the English Proportional Representa-\\ntion Society, of which Sir John Lubbock is presi-\\ndent, and several of the members of Parliament\\nare members. The society advocates the Hare\\nsystem in constituencies electing five to fifteen\\nrepresentatives\\nIn the United States, the work of Thomas Gil-\\npin followed close upon the Act of Congress of\\n1842, which for the first time took the control\\nof elections for congressmen from the several\\nStates, and provided, among other .things, that\\nthe single-membered district should be universal.\\nThis was an attempt to give representation in\\nCongress to the minority, who were practically dis-\\nfranchised by the laws of certain States wherein\\ncongressmen were elected on a general ticket.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "ITS PROGRESS. 247\\nGiipm s essay grew out of the discussion upon\\nthis measure.^\\nNot until the period following the Civil War\\nwas public opinion ready to discuss the principles\\nof representation, nor, indeed, was there any press-\\ning occasion. The writings of Mr. Hare and\\nMr. ]\\\\Iill were widely read in the United States\\nand the pending reconstruction of the States lately\\nin rebellion, and the agitation for the enfranchise-\\nment of the freedmen, brought the problems of rep-\\nresentation suddenly to a focus. There were only\\ntwo plans which reached practical adoption, the\\nlimited vote and the cumulative vote. The legis-\\nlature of New York, in 1867, in providing for a\\nconstitutional convention, required that thirty-two\\nof the delegates to be chosen should be from the\\nState at large no voter to vote for more than six-\\nteen candidates. In this way, though the political\\nbias of the delegates elected to the convention\\nfrom single districts stood 81 Republicans to 47\\nDemocrats, the delegates from the State at large\\nstood 16 to 16.2\\nIn the same year the Congress of the United\\nStates considered a supplementary reconstruction\\nbill, to which Hon. C. R. Buckalew, the Democratic\\nsenator from Pennsylvania, offered an amendment\\nproviding for the cumulative vote. A sub-com-\\nmittee, of which Senator Buckalew was chairman,\\nDutcher, p. 41. 2 ji^ui^ p. 42.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "248 PBOPORTIONAL BEPRESENTATION.\\nreported to tlie Senate in 1869 a bill providing\\nfor tlie cumulative vote. Senator Buckalew sup-\\nported his amendment with great ability. Two\\nextended debates occurred in the House in 1870\\nand 1871, on the motion of Mr. Marshall of Illi-\\nnois to apply the cumulative vote to the new\\nmembers of Congress, provided for in the new\\napportionment Act of those years. But both in\\nthe Senate and in the House the amendments\\nwere defeated. Congress was in no mood to grant\\nthis concession to the minority.\\nThe significance of proportional representation\\nin the event of Negro enfranchisement, and the\\nreasons why it did not at that time appeal to the\\nparty in control of Congress, are strikingly por-\\ntrayed by the proceedings of a convention of tax-\\npayers of South Carolina, assembled at Columbia\\nin May, 1871. The convention adopted the re-\\nport of a committee favoring the cumulative vote\\nfor the State legislature. Among the speakers\\nwas Mr. D. H. Chamberlain, attorney-general of\\nthe State, who said\\nIn the first place, gentlemeii, it is necessary to modify\\nthe absolute control which a mere numerical majority has\\nobtained over the State, and to secure for intelligence and\\nproperty a proper representation in the affairs of the gov-\\nernment. And looking about for some device which, with-\\nout violence to the fundamental principle on which our\\ngovernment rests, will bring relief from the grievances", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0260.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "ITS PROGRESS. 249\\nwhich afflict our people, I have fixed upon this system of\\ncumulative voting, because it is not only just in its theory,\\nbut it will prove itself right in its results. It takes noth-\\ning from the rights of the majority. It gives them a pre-\\ndominating control, but not an absolute disposition of the\\nentire fortunes of the State. Do you believe for a moment,\\nthen, when you put into an ignorant assembly, many of\\nwhom can neither read nor w^ite, forty-seven gentlemen\\nwhom I might select in this body, that you would not shame\\nthem into decency, or frighten them from crime? Who\\ndoes not know that the presence of one honest man puts to\\nflight a band of robbers Now, according to this system,\\nyou deny nothing which belongs to the majority, but from\\nthe moment you place in the lower house forty-seven of\\nyour ablest citizens, bad legislation will cease, and good\\nlegislation will begin.\\nAlthough rejected by Congress, the cumulative\\nor limited vote was adopted, to a greater or less\\nextent, in various States. The most important\\naction was that taken by the constitutional con-\\nvention of the State of Illinois, which met Decem-\\nber, 1869. The convention adopted the report\\nof a committee of which Mr. James Medill was\\nchairman, dividing the State into 51 senatorial\\ndistricts, each electing a single senator, but creat-\\ning a lower house of 153 members, to be elected\\nin the senatorial districts by tlu-ees by the cumu-\\nlative vote. This section was voted upon sepa-\\nrately by the people, July 2, 1870, and carried\\nby a vote 99,022 in favor, and 70,080 against.\\n1 Dutcher, p. 62.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0261.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "250 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nHigh expectations were entertained of the re-\\nform. Mr. Medill in convention said\\nPerhaps no proposition has come before this conven-\\ntion that has more fully taken possession of my mind, be-\\ncause I believe it is one of the greatest and most valuable\\nimprovements in a free government ever devised by the\\nwisdom of man since representative government has been\\nestablished. I believe it is only a question of time when\\nthe principle of minority representation will be applied to\\nall legislative elections in Europe and America, from Par-\\nliament or Congress down to village aldermen, and in all\\nother cases when two or more officers are to be voted upon\\nat the same time, for the same office. By this plan, and\\nthis only, can the democratic equality of the citizen be\\nasserted, and carried into practice in public life. The\\nwhole people, instead of a plurality or majority, will be\\nrepresented by this plan and it is as much superior to the\\nold method of representation as the whole is greater than\\nthe half. It does not attempt to take away any of the\\nrights of the majority. The majority, under this system,\\nwill still rule, having full and ample control, and still being\\nresponsible for the laws made. But this gives the dis-\\nfranchised minority, who may amount to almost one-half\\nthe commimity, some voice, some representation in govern-\\nment, some chance to be heard. It secures rejpresentation\\nwith taxation, which the existing one-sided system does\\nnot. It gives the minority some opportunity to present\\ntheir views, and defend their principles and interests, in the\\nhalls of legislation. What can be more just than that, or\\nmore correct in principle i\\nHow these bright hopes have been disappointed\\nis shown by tlie previous discussions of this book.\\n1 Putclier, p. 55.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0262.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "ITS PROGBESS. 251\\nThe action of the New York legislature and\\nthe veto by Governor Hoffman in April, 1872,\\nof the bill providing for the cumulative vote in\\nthe election of aldermen in New York City,\\nmark the highest point attained in America in\\nthe discussion of minority representation. The\\nPersonal Representation Society of New York\\nhad appeared before the constitutional conven-\\ntion of 1867, to urge the adoption of the Hare\\nplan. Mr. Horace Greeley, as a member of that\\nconvention, had moved an amendment requiring\\nthe cumulative vote in the election of senators\\nand representatives. After considerable discussion\\nit was defeated by a vote of 93 to 20. Later an\\namendment requiring minority representation in\\nthe election of directors of private corporations\\nwas defeated by 71 to 32. It remained for a\\nRepublican legislature, desirous of breaking the\\nhitherto impregnable Tammany majority in New\\nYork City, in 1872 to provide, in an Act creating\\na new charter for that city, that the board of al-\\ndermen should be elected by the cumulative vote\\nin five districts of nine aldermen each. The dis-\\ncussion in the legislature and in the press attracted\\nnational attention. Without previous experience,\\nit was impossible to foresee all its consequences.\\nYet with districts as large as the bill provided for,\\nthere would have been opportunity for the rep-\\nresentation of minor parties, though the waste of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0263.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "252 PBOPORTIONAL EEPRESENTATION.\\nvotes would have prevented their greatest influ-\\nence. The arguments of Governor Hoffman in\\nhis veto message present such a mixture of spe-\\ncious falsity and shrewd knowledge of the situa-\\ntion, and the document is of so great historic\\nimportance in the movement for true representa-\\ntion, that it is here given in full\\nExecutive Chamber, Albany, April 30, 1872.\\nTo the Assembly, I return, withoiit approval, Assembly\\nBill No. 118, entitled, An Act to reorganize the Local\\nGovernment of the City of New York.\\nThe bill provides a new charter for the City of New\\nYork, the main features of which are these One board of\\nforty-five aldermen, elected nine in each senate district,\\nby a novel method called the cumulative vote, under which\\none man may vote nine times for one candidate, and\\nwhereby a minority can elect its candidate or candidates,\\nagainst the will of the majority in the district this board\\nof aldermen to appoint (by the same vote) four out of the\\nfive heads which are given to each of the administrative\\ndepartments.\\nThe remedy which is relied on against the evils of mis-\\ngovernment under this charter is the cumulative system of\\nvoting, which it introduces in order to secure fuller repre-\\nsentation of the minority. It is claimed that this will re-\\nsult, not only in a better class of representatives, but in\\ngreater power on the part of the minority to restrain the\\nmajority. Nine aldermen are to be elected in each district\\nand every elector is authorized, instead of voting once for\\neach of nine candidates, to cast, if he chooses so to do, nine\\nvotes for any one candidate, or to cast three votes each for\\n1 Quoted by Dutclier, pp. 158-161.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0264.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "ITS PROGRESS. 253\\nany three candidates, and so on. This plan seeks to let the\\nparty which is in a minority in any political subdivision\\nput into office its candidate, in spite of the opposition of\\nthe political majority. Experiments are now being tried in\\none or two of the other States, of this cumulative method\\nof voting as to some of their local elections but these have\\nbeen inaugurated so recently that they afford us no guide\\nto sound judgment derived from actual practice and expe-\\nrience. It is proposed by this bill that we shall try the ex-\\nperiment in the chief city of the continent, with its vast\\nand complicated interests exposed to great injury if this\\nnew theory prove to be a failure. A city of a million in-\\nhabitants is not the place for trying experiments in govern-\\nment, especially an experiment which many of the most\\nthoughtfiil of our people believe to be visionary, impracti-\\ncable, and unconstitutional. It would be much wiser for\\nus to await the result of the trials now going on elsewhere.\\nThis would not be the first time that a scheme to allow the\\nminority to put men into office, in sj)ite of the opposition\\nof the majority, has been tried in this State. For many\\nyears the Board of Supervisors in New York was elected\\nupon this principle. In that instance the minority were\\nallowed, practically, to choose just half the Board. This\\nexperiment, warmly and earnestly advocated at its intro-\\nduction as a valuable improvement, resulted, as all admit\\nnow, in a disastrous failure, and was abandoned with gen-\\neral consent. There is this difference between that instance\\nand the method now proposed that there the minority\\nwere secured an equal share of power, while here it is ex-\\npected that they will obtain only a share proportioned to\\ntheir actual numbei s.\\nA very serious question arises whether this method of\\nvoting is in conformity with the provisions of the Con-\\nstitution. Many of the ablest lawyers of the State have", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0265.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "254 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.\\nnot hesitated to express their convictions that it must be\\nheld to be unconstitutional. It is said, and with great\\nforce, that the election, as regulated by this charter, is not\\nan election in the sense in which that word was understood\\nat the time the Constitution was made, and in the sense in\\nwhich it has always been understood among us. An elec-\\ntion is the choice of a public officer by his receiving a\\nlarger number of votes than any other candidate in the\\ndistrict entitled to fill the office, all the electors being en-\\ntitled to vote once at such election for a candidate for\\nthe place to be filled. It is suggested also that the Con-\\nstitution guarantees that all electors shall be entitled to\\nvote for all officers who are to be elected by the people,\\nand that if any elector exercises his right to vote once\\nfor each of the nine aldermen to be chosen for his dis-\\ntrict, his single vote as to any one of the candidates can-\\nnot be overridden by one of his neighbors voting nine\\ntimes for some one man for the same place without an in-\\nfraction of his equal right of suffrage as an elector under\\nthe Constitution.\\nThe fundamental piinciple of our government, familiar\\nto the people, is that elective officers shall be chosen by a\\nmajority of the votes of the people entitled to take part in\\nthe choice. In all cases submitted to the people, the major-\\nity decides. When any other principle is sought to be in-\\ntroduced, a revolutionary change of great magnitude is\\nproposed, which ought not to be tried under the sanction\\nof an Act of the legislature only; if so great a change is to\\nbe made at all, it should be done only with the careful de-\\nliberation which pertains to revisions of the Constitution.\\nIndependent of the constitutional question is that of the\\nexpediency of this change in the method of choosing repre-\\nsentatives. I am not disposed to take the ground that\\nsome form of minority representation may not prove to be", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0266.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "ITS PBOGBESS. 255\\nan improvement. This has nowhere been tried long enough\\nto prove anything.\\nIn all free government the people divide themselves into\\ntwo great parties. This tendency is so universal that it is\\nnot statesmanship to ignore it. Enactments will not over-\\ncome it. It is a natural, useful, and wholesome division\\nit insures a large body of men among the people interested\\nin and intent upon fault finding with the party in power,\\nand struggling by means of exposure of their errors to\\nbring over to the side of the minority enough of the elec-\\ntors to convert it into a majority, and so to take over the\\ngovernment. In politics, as in other things, it is agitation\\nwhich purifies. Under this proposed new system of voting,\\nthe minority carry in their candidates without effort. The\\nmajority do the same. In a district where it is known that\\nthe political majority usually casts about two-thirds of the\\nwhole vote, there being nine aldermen to be elected, the\\ncaucus or nominating convention of the political majority\\nwill naturally concentrate all their votes upon six can-\\ndidates the caucus of the minority will concentrate on\\nthree. There will be no actual contest before the people.\\nThe decrees of the pai ty caucus will be absolute. Neither\\nside will be in fear, lest, by putting forward unfit candi-\\ndates, it may lose the election. For the two parties will be\\nacting at the polls, not against each other, but independent\\neach of the other. This condition of things, where the de-\\ncrees of the party caucuses on both sides are final, naturally\\ngives rise to secret combinations between the leaders on\\nboth sides for an agreed-upon division of power, against\\nwhich combinations the mass of the voters might, under\\nthis system, struggle in vain. It is true that there is an\\nopportunity for a combination in favor of one or two candi-\\ndates of independent voters, who may be regardless of party\\nassociations. But when the power of the regular party oi", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0267.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "256 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION, j\\nganization is considered, will not this influence of combina-\\ntions of independent voters make itself felt to a very limited\\nextent, and very rarely? Will it be equal to the power\\nwhich voters, disposed to disregard their party associations\\non any occasion, can now exert, by temporarily voting\\nwith the opposing party, by way of rebuke to their own\\nIt may be a fatal mistake for us to be overconfident that\\nthe effect of this method of voting will be merely to add\\nto the influence and power in politics of the more unselfish\\nand more virtuous among the electors. The professional\\npoliticians may use it more skilfully and effectually than\\nothers, and it may intrench them in power beyond the\\nreach of the popular majority or of popular condemnation.\\nThis system must tend to increase very largely the power\\nin politics of men who have a personal following, in the\\nshape of clubs and associations, formed to promote the suc-\\ncess of one man in local politics. The weight of a club of\\nthis kind will be increased ninefold, a club of 1,000 wield-\\ning 9,000 votes. ISTor is it to be overlooked that this cumu-\\nlative method of voting confers a higher money value on\\nthe ballot of any man who is corrupt enough to sell it. He\\ncan make his vote worth to any one candidate nine times\\nas much as it is now. The inducement to pay and the\\ninducement to take bribes will both be greater than now.\\nThe legislature must itseK have looked upon this method\\nof voting as nothing better than an experiment. If it had\\nbeen satisfied of its merits, and had had confidence in its\\nworking well, it would have applied the principle generally,\\nwherever it could be applied, to local elections at least,\\nthroughout the State.\\nIt is right that the minority should be represented in all\\npublic deliberative bodies and the American system of gov-\\nernment makes provision for its representation. Every", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0268.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "ITS PBOGRESS. 257\\npolitical subdivision sends a representative of its own choice\\nto the general representative body, congressional districts\\nto Congress, assembly districts to the Assembly, towns to\\nthe boards of supervisors, wards to village and city coun-\\ncils and thus the minority in the State at large, being\\nnevertheless the majority in many of the political subdi-\\nvisions of the State, is able to secure its approximate share\\nin the public councils.\\nI have dwelt at so much length upon this question of\\nminority representation, because it is the distinguishing\\nfeature of the charter, both in the election of the legisla-\\ntive branch of the city government and in the choice by\\nit of heads of executive departments and this feature its\\nadvocates claim as its chief merit.\\nThe bill does not limit itself in applying the minority\\ndoctrine, so-called, to the election of representatives of the\\npeople in the public councils. It proposes to give the mi-\\nnority of the members of the common council the same\\npower of selecting, independent of the majority in that\\nbody, a portion of the men who are to administer the gov-\\nernment of the city in its various departments.\\nTHE EIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY.\\nThe minority ought to be represented as fully as pos-\\nsible, in proportion to its numbers, in the public councils.\\nBut the minority has not the right to govern. It is not\\nwise that it should share in any degree in the actual ad-\\nministration of affairs. The majority must govern. The\\nuseful sphere of duty for the minority is to watch the gov-\\nerning party, to expose its vrrong-doing, if any, to restrain\\nit by this vigilance and exposure. Just so far as the mi-\\nnority is admitted to a share in the actual administration\\nof government, to a share in executive duties, just so far", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0269.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "258 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N. J\\nis it weakened for the performance of its proper duty,\\nthat of vigilance over those in authority, just so far is its\\ninclination to be vigilant lessened. It is only a minority\\nout of power that will be faithful to the duties of a minor-\\nity. Every m.ember of the minority who is admitted to\\ntake part in the actual administration of public affairs, and\\nall of his party whom he can influence, naturally acquire a\\ntendency to defend the administration of which he forms\\na part and where they ought to be exercising a restrain-\\ning power by their vigilance, they are often found helping\\nto cover up things that need exposure. An adniinistration\\nthat has its corps of defenders in both political parties will\\nbe much more likely to continue improper practices than\\nif it relies for its defence only on its own party friends,\\nand feels that the opposite party is ready, in solid ranks,\\npromptly to assail it if guilty of wrong-doing. I believe\\nthe clear, complete, and undivided responsibility of one ol\\nother of the political parties into which people in all free\\ncommunities divide themselves, is essential to good govern\\nment. For vigilance on the part of the people themselves,\\nthis bill proposes to substitute the services of a few indi-\\nviduals put into partial power by the minority as watchers,\\nwhich will tend to make the people rely on these few, and\\nindifferent to their own duty of vigilance in their own\\naffairs. These few hired watchers may become screens for\\nerrors and neglect of duty on the part of their associates\\nand themselves.\\nThe government of the majority is the only govern-\\nment recognized by the Constitution of the United States\\nand of the State. The majority controls, and must con-\\ntrol, in legislation, and ought to be solely res]ponsible for\\nadministration. When its representatives prove recreant\\nto the trusts committed to them, a vigilant minority is\\nquick to take advantage of the fact, and in turn it becomes", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0270.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "ITS moGBESS. 259\\nthe majority. The existence of a strong, vigilant minor-\\nity, which, not being a sharer of power, has no motive to\\ndefend those in power, but every motive to expose them\\nwhen doing wrong, is quite as essential to honest and faith-\\nful administration of the affairs of the republic, as is the\\nexistence of the majority in whose hands the actual manage-\\nment of public affairs is placed. This cumulative method\\nfor appointing heads of departments may have the effect\\nof fatally lessening at once the sense of responsibility on\\nthe part of the majority and the vigilance of the minority.\\nThere are three features of the foregoing mes-\\nsage which will be noticed here, tlie others having\\nbeen mainly anticipated in the preceding chapters.\\nIt is a patent fallacy to assert that, by giving to\\nevery voter nine votes instead of one, thereby the\\ninfluence of venal voters and bad politicians with\\na personal following is increased ninefold. If the\\nvotes of the corrupt are multiplied by nine, so also\\nare the votes of the good, and relatively they all\\nretain the same influence.\\nAgain, the provision for constituencies electing\\nnine aldermen makes possible the representation\\nof third and fourth parties of independents and\\ngood citizens, though with a great waste of their\\nvotes. They could not be entirely excluded as in\\nthe Illinois three-cornered constituencies.\\nThe arguments of Governor Hoffman against\\nminority representation in the board of aldermen\\nare not altogether invalid, and his objections to\\na similar representation in the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0271.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "260 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBEBENTATION.\\ndepartments are well considered. Later experi-\\nence lias shown that administrative boards are\\nincompetent as compared with single heads of de-\\npartments, and that bi-partisan boards are not\\nsuperior to those composed of members of a single\\nparty. Minority representation in an executive\\ndepartment dissipates the energy and responsibil-\\nity of administration but minority representation\\nin the legislative branch is necessary to enable the\\nminority to watch the governing body, to expose\\nits wrong-doing, if any, to restrain it by this vigi-\\nlance and exposure.\\nThe crude cumulation in constituencies elect-\\ning as many as nine members might possibly have\\nbeen of some advantage to good government in\\nNew York City; but the limited vote, which was\\nsuccessfully adopted a year later, was no better\\nthan the single district. This law, enacted in\\n1873, provided for the election of aldermen in\\nnine distriets of three members each, no voter\\nto cast more than two votes. The limited vote\\nis apparently in contradiction to the State Consti-\\ntution, by which every elector is entitled to vote\\nfor all officers that now are or hereafter may be\\nelective by the people. At any rate, it of course\\nproved unsatisfactory, and was repealed in 1882.\\nThe State of Pennsylvania has experimented\\nwith the cumulative and limited votes in various\\ndirections.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0272.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "ITS FliOGBESS. 261\\nOn March 4, 1870, the legislature provided by-\\nspecial act for the cumulative vote in tho town of\\nBloomsburg, the home of Senator Buckalew, for\\nall offices of two or more incumbents. In June,\\n1871, the act was extended to all elections of\\nmembers of town councils throughout the State.\\nThis was repealed in 1873.\\nBy a provision of the Constitution of 1874, the\\nlimited vote is applied in the city of Pliiladelphia\\nto the election of police magistrates. The legis-\\nlature in 1875 created twenty-four courts with the\\nsame number of magistrates, who are elected on a\\ngeneral ticket but no voter can vote for more\\nthan two-thirds of the number to be chosen at a\\nsingle election. The same Constitution requires\\nthe limited vote in the election of judges of the\\nsupreme court of the State. There are seven\\njudges elected, and the elector votes for six.\\nThese various experiments with crude forms of\\nminority representation furnish in part an expla-\\nnation of the entire subsidence of the movement\\nsince 1874. To have extended the cumulative or\\nlimited vote after the exhibitions of their short-\\ncomings in three States was not to be expected.\\nIndeed, the only places where minority representa-\\ntion now remains are in the States of Illinois and\\nPennsylvania, where it is incorporated in the Con-\\nstitutions. Doubtless at the first general revision\\nof these Constitutions it will be dropped.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0273.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "262 PBOFOBTIOJSfAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nThere are also other reasons why the speculative\\npolitical thought of the country has not turned\\nto the problems of representation. Other pressing\\nsubjects, growing out of the war, such as the tariff,\\nthe greenback, specie payments, have engrossed the\\npublic mind. The attention of speculative reform-\\ners has been occupied with the civil service, and\\nthe protection of those subordinate offices which\\nare the spoils of party victory and the demoraliza-\\ntion of the people. It is probable, indeed, that,\\nin the practical sequence, civil service reform was\\nnecessary to prepare the way for proportional rep-\\nresentation. The American people needed educa-\\ntion upon the matter of rotation in office, and,\\nindeed, upon the very nature of government.\\nThey did not want a system of bureaucracy, with\\nofficials holding for life. They felt that public\\noffices Avere common property that the right to\\nhold them, like the right to pre-empt government\\nland, is a natural incident of citizenship, and that\\ngovernment service is an asylum for the unfortu-\\nnate. They lacked confidence in expert knowl-\\nedge of every kind.\\nCorrect views on these points could practically\\nbe first impressed upon the public only in con-\\nnection with those minor civil service offices of\\na routine character which do not carry political\\n1 A. B. Hart, Practical Essays on American Government,\\np. 91.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0274.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "ITS mOGBESS. 2G3\\nresponsibility. With tlie ground cleared in this\\nway, the nature of other higher offices can more\\nplainly come to view, and thus the way be pre-\\npared for substituting appointive heads nf depart-\\nments for elective heads. Finally, with the\\nadministrative branches of government accurately\\ncomprehended, the people are beginning to concen-\\ntrate thought upon the legislative branch, to in-\\nquire into the principles of representation, and to\\nperceive the need of abler and more experienced\\nmen with life-long service in legislative halls.\\nEven now the weightiest popular objection to pro-\\nportional representation springs from that partisan\\nsympathy with the spoils system which denies the\\nright of representation to minor groups of voters\\nnot included in the two dominant parties.\\nAnother political reform which has cleared the\\nway for proportional representation is the secret\\nballot, with all the party tickets printed on a\\nsingle large sheet. This encourages independence,\\nand facilitates that choice of individual candidates\\non various tickets which is an important feature of\\nthe bill recommended by the American committee.\\nAfter these important preliminary reforms are\\naccomplished, it can be more clearly seen that the\\nvery citadel of political power, the legislative as-\\nsembly, is the source of the degradation of Ameri-\\ncan politics, and that with a reformed legislature\\nall other reforms can be perfected. A revival of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0275.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "264 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\ninterest in proportional representation has begun\\nwithin the past five years. The civil service\\nreformers of the country with unanimity have\\nespoused it. This interest took definite shape in\\n1893, through the organization at Chicago of the\\nAmerican Proportional Representation League, and\\nthe launching of the Proportional Representation\\nReview. Magazine articles have appeared, two or\\nthree books have been published, bills have been\\nintroduced into legislatures and Congress, and an\\nenthusiastic and capable agitation has been inaug-\\nurated.\\nIn 1891 the people of South Dakota voted upon\\na minority representation clause to their Constitu-\\ntion, copied after the Illinois system, which they\\nrejected by a vote of 46,200 against 24,161.\\nThe cumulative vote has been applied by the\\nConstitutions of the eleven States of Illinois, Ne-\\nbraska, California, Pennsylvania, West Virginia,\\nMissouri, Mississippi, Idaho, Kentucky, North Da-\\nkota, and Montana, to the election of directors of\\nprivate corporations. I shall not enter at length\\ninto this and other minor phases of its application,\\nbut shall only observe that, among the evils at-\\ntending the rise of corporations in the United\\nStates, has been prominent the practice known as\\nfreezing out the minority stockholders. Says\\na well-informed writer :i\\n1 Isaac F. Kice, Forum, vol. xiv., p. 206.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0276.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "ITS PBOGBESS. 265\\nAll our pul)lic affairs having become permeated with\\nthe poison of dishonesty, it necessarily has affected our\\nquasi-public relations as well. Indeed, our great public cor-\\nporations, such as railroads, are in themselves species of\\ncommunities, of which the security holders are the citizens,\\nand in these communities the right to steal under certain\\nlegal forms and sanctions has in certain directions become\\nfully recognized.\\nWhatever frauds are perpetrated under advice of counsel,\\nor by resolutions duly passed by a majority vote, at a regu-\\nlarly constituted meeting, security holders have long since\\ncome to regard as unobjectionable, or at least beyond the\\nreach of successful attack. Lideed, quite frequently, as\\nsoon as a board of directors is elected, it considers itself the\\nabsolute owners of the property, to manage or mismanage,\\nas its private interests may dictate. These private interests\\nare sometimes in such dkect conflict with the interests of\\nthe corporation as to involve it iu bankruptcy.\\nProportional representation in private corpora-\\ntions would partially meet the evils above described,\\nthough of course many other factors are involved\\nin the problem.\\nThere remains to be noticed the constitutional\\naspects of proportional representation. Of course,\\njust as in Switzerland, the American people can\\nadopt the reform by a referendum vote, hj way of\\namendment to their Constitutions and possibly in\\nmany States a constitutional amendment would\\nbe required; but the machinery of amendment\\nis so very cumbersome and dilatory that direct", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0277.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "266 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPEESENTATION.\\naction of tlie legislature is preferable whenever\\nlegal. Congress unquestionably lias power, with-\\nout constitutional amendment, to adopt the system\\nfor congressional elections. Indeed, it is only the\\nAct of Congress of 1842, prescribing the present\\ndistrict system, which legally prevents individual\\nStates from adopting it.\\nIn the election of State legislatures, there are\\nserious difficulties in the interpretation of Con-\\nstitutions. So strict are the courts in holding\\nlegislatures to the terms of the Constitution, that\\namendments would be required, probably, in nearly\\nevery State. Yet the following considerations are\\noffered.\\nThe first condition for proportional representa-\\ntion is a consolidation of the present single-\\nmembered districts into a smaller number, each\\nelecting several members. The Constitutions of\\nall the States require that State senators shall be\\nelected by districts. In only nineteen States,^\\nhowever, is it specifically asserted in one way or\\nanother, that but one senator shall be elected in\\neach district. In each of these States a Consti-\\ntutional Amendment would be required for the\\nSenate. In the other twenty-five States, so far\\nas a fair interpretation is concerned, counties can\\n1 Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,\\nMinnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North\\nDakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylyania, Rhode Island, South Caro-\\nlina, South Dakota, Vermont, Texas, Wisconsin.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0278.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "n\\\\^ PROGRESS. 2(J7\\nbe grouped together, and two or more senators\\nelected from each district. Furthermore, there\\nwoukl seem to be no constitutional inhibition\\nagainst enlarging these groupings, even to the\\nextent of dividing the State into only two districts.\\nThese could then either elect their senators at the\\nsame election or in alternate elections, as the larger\\nnumber of Constitutions require.\\nAs regards the lower house, seven State Consti-\\ntutions require that members shall be elected by\\nsingle districts. Counties which are entitled to\\nmore than one representative are to be divided\\ninto districts by either the legislature or the county\\nsupervisors.^ Thirty Constitutions guarantee at\\nleast one representative to each county or town, but\\npermit counties entitled to more than one to elect\\nthem on a general ticket. In these States, the\\nproportional plan could be adopted without consti-\\ntutional amendment only in the counties electing\\nmore than one member.\\nThere remain six States, not counting Illinois,\\nin which the system could probably be adopted\\nover the entire State without amendment. Dela-\\nware allots seven representatives to each county,\\nand the legislature is free to prescribe either the\\ngeneral ticket or the single district. Indiana,\\n1 California, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New\\nYork, Wisconsin.\\n2 New York and Michigan.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0279.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "268 PBOPOBTIOJSrAL BaPBESENTATION.\\nMinnesota, Nevada, and Washington permit tlieir\\nlegislatures to create districts as tliey may see fit,\\nonly requiring that representatives shall be pro-\\nportional to the population.! Iowa permits four\\ncounties to be combined into a single district.\\nWhenever, as in the above cases, a general\\nticket is permitted, proportional representation\\nmay be adopted by the legislature. There is a\\nsecond condition, namely, that each voter may be\\npermitted to cast as many votes as there are candi-\\ndates to be elected, which he may also distribute\\nas he pleases. Five Constitutions actually require\\nthis condition in the provision that every elector\\nshall be entitled to vote for all the officers that\\nare now or hereafter may be elective by the\\npeople. 2 It would seem that this provision ex-\\ncludes the Hare system and the limited vote, but\\ndoes not stand in the way of the Swiss free list\\nor the cumulative vote. Other Constitutions\\nmerely provide that persons of the proper age,\\netc., shall be entitled to vote at all elections.\\nThe third condition is that the legislature must\\nbe free to provide rules for the canvass of the\\nvotes and the apportionment between political\\nparties. Nearly all the States have adopted in\\ntheir Constitutions the plurality rule, by which\\n1 In the apportionment Act of 1895, Indiana has actually com-\\nbined various counties into districts electing two representatives\\non a general ticket.\\n2 New York, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0280.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "ITS PEOOHESiS. 269\\ncandidates having the highest number of votes\\nare declared elected. Applied to a general ticket,\\nthis rule would exclude minority representation,\\nexcept in the case of the simple cumulative vote.\\nIn twenty-seven States, however, the Constitutions\\ndo not apply this rule to the election of memljers\\nof the legislature.^ The legislatures of these\\nStates are, therefore, free to change their jDlurality\\nrule, and to adopt the proportional plan of the\\naddition and transference of votes within party\\nlines, and the selection of candidates according to\\ntheir standing on their respective party tickets.\\nIn the matter of local government, all of the\\nConstitutions give the legislature almost complete\\npower to provide for the organization of counties,\\ncities, incorporated villages. The only restrictions\\nare of a general nature, imposed either by the\\nprohibition of special legislation, or by the collat-\\neral articles of the Constitution. This sovereign\\npower of the legislature carries the right to create,\\ndefine, and abolish offices, and to determine the\\nmethod of selection, either by a^Dpointment or elec-\\ntion, at large or by wards. Where election is\\ndetermined upon, the collateral provisions of the\\n1 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illi-\\nnois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Maryland,\\nDelaware, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky,\\nTennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, California, Nevada, Colo-\\nrado, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia. See Stimson, American\\nStatue Law, vol. i., p. 56.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0281.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "270 PBOPOBTIOJSfAL EEPBESENTATION.\\nConstitution liold, which set forth the qualifica-\\ntions and riglits of voters, and the manner of\\nconducting elections and canvassing the returns.\\nThese provisions liave just been referred to. As\\nthey apply in the same manner to city and county\\nas to legislative elections, they leave all the legis-\\nlatures fi-ee to apply the Swiss system or the cumu-\\nlative vote to the municipal council.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0282.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX I. 271\\nAPPENDIX I,\\nTHE DISTRIBUTION OP SEATS.\\nThe significance of proportional representation in\\nthe United States consists not so much in a mathe-\\nmatically accurate assignment of representatives to\\nthe several parties, as in the freedom of the voter\\nfrom machine rule, and the introduction of leader-\\nship into legislative assemblies. Yet the mathe-\\nmatical calculations are important. Several plans\\nhave been suggested for a just distribution of seats,\\nbut fault can be found in every one.\\nThe difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that,\\nwhen the several party votes are divided by the\\nunit of representation, the sum of the quotients\\ndoes not equal the number of representatives to be\\nelected, and consequently the remaining representa-\\ntives must be assigned to parties on the basis of\\nremainders. Now, these remainders may be scat-\\ntered about in such a way as to destroy the sym-\\nmetry of the result, especially where they fall to\\nminor parties. For example, in the Belgian election,\\ndescribed on page 127, the unit of representation,\\nfound by dividing the number of votes by the num-\\nber of representatives, is 11,523. This unit pro-\\nvides for but fifteen seats, and the other three are\\nassigned to the Flemish Democrats, the Indepen-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0283.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "272 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\ndents, and the Catholics, on remainders. The result\\nis an advantage to the smaller parties, and a disad-\\nvantage to the larger. The Independents, for ex-\\nample, who did not have even a single unit, secured\\ntheir only seat on a remainder, giving one represen-\\ntative for 8,425 votes, whereas the Socialists, who\\nreceive no seat on a remainder, have but one repre-\\nsentative for 13,170 votes.^\\nIt will be seen that, the smaller the unit of repre-\\nsentation, the less probability will there be of re-\\nmainders. If, instead of dividing the total vote by\\nthe exact number of representatives to be elected,\\nwe divide by that number p^^ts one, our proceeding\\nwould be more accurately mathematical, and would\\nproduce a smaller unit. In the Belgian election,\\ninstead of 11,523, it would be 10,917. The princi-\\nple here involved is the evident one that, if one can-\\ndidate is to be elected, he will require only one-half\\nthe votes plus one; if two are to be elected, each\\none will require but one-third plus one, and so on.\\nThat is to say, the denominator of the fraction\\nwhich elects is a unit larger than the number to be\\nelected.\\nThis was the rule adopted by the Swiss canton of\\nSolothurn in 1895, and is known as the Droop\\n1 Socialists 106,687\\nProgressists 39,512\\nFlemish Democrats 21,713\\nCatholics 19,405\\nModerates 11,693\\nIndependents 8,425\\n207,429 -M8 11,523", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0284.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX I. 273\\nquota, having been proposed by Mr. H. K. Droop of\\nLondon, in 1869. In the Belgian election it happens\\nthat the result would be the same as in the division\\nby the exact number of representatives, although but\\ntwo candidates are assigned on remainders instead\\nof three. The chances, however, would be in favor\\nof a fairer representation for the larger parties.\\nStill another plan of distribution, which finds a unit\\nof representation so small that it does away with\\nremainders entirely, is that of Professor V. D Hondt\\nof Brussels. This is the plan actually employed in\\nthe Belgian election, and is explained by the Commis-\\nsion as follows\\nWe write, in the order of their importance from left to\\nright, the electoral vote of the six tickets. Socialists, Progress-\\nists, Flemish Democrats, Catholics, Moderates, and Indepen-\\ndents, and then proceed to reduce the unit of representation by-\\nsuccessive divisions, until a unit is found small enough to be\\ncontained eighteen times into the party votes.\\nSOCIAL-\\nIST.\\nPRO-\\nGRESSIST.\\nFLEMISH\\nDEM.\\nCATHO-\\nLIC.\\nMODER-\\nATE.\\nINDE-\\nPENDENT,\\n1.\\n2.\\n3.\\n4.\\n5.\\n106,681\\n53,000\\n35,000\\n26,000\\n21,000\\n39,512\\n19,000\\n13,000\\n9,878\\n21,713\\n10,000\\n7,000\\n19,405\\n9,700\\n11,693\\n5,000\\n8,425\\n6.\\n7.\\n8.\\n17,000\\n15,000\\n13,000\\n9.\\n11,000\\n10.\\n11.\\n10,000\\n9,600\\n1 On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods\\nof Electing Peiiresentatives, Loudon, 1869,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0285.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "274 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\nWe then reason as follows If there had been only one seat\\nto fill, it would have fallen to the largest party, the Socialists\\nwe therefore write down the figure 106,681, which assigns the\\nfirst seat. For the second we find what would be the number\\nof votes required of the Socialists if the two seats were distrib-\\nuted equally. This would require 53,000 votes for each seat,\\nmore than that obtained by any other party. We write down\\nthe 53,000, which assigns the second seat. Next, 106,681\\ndivided by three gives only 35,000, a figure less than that of\\nthe Progressists, 39,512, and the latter figure is therefore en-\\ntitled to the third seat. We write down this figure, and then\\ndetermine that if the Progressists had a second seat they would\\nhave had only 19,000 votes to each seat. The fourth and\\nfifth, therefore, go to the Socialists, M ho have 26,000 votes for\\neach of four candidates elected. The sixth and seventh seats\\ngo to the Flemish Democrats and Socialists, the unit of rep-\\nresentation now descending to 21,000 votes for each seat. The\\neighth and ninth go to the Progressists and Catholics, who\\nwould still have 19,000 votes for each candidate to be elected.\\nThe tenth and eleventh go to the Socialists; the twelfth\\nand thirteenth to the Socialists and Progressists (13,000\\nvotes to the seat) the fourteenth and fifteenth to the\\nModerate Liberals and Socialists (11,000 votes per seat);\\nthe sixteenth and seventeenth to the Flemish Democrats\\nand Socialists (10,000 votes per seat); and, lastly, the eigh-\\nteenth to the Progressists, who thereby secure one seat for\\n9,878 votes.\\nThe Socialists have now obtained ten representatives, the\\nProgressists four, Flemish Democrats two, Catholics one, and\\nModerate Liberals one, total eighteen and 9,878 is the unit of\\nrepresentation, which obviates the assignment of representa-\\ntives to any party on the basis of a remainder. This number\\nis contained ten times in the vote of the Socialists, four times\\nin that of the Progressists, two times in that of the Flemish\\nDemocrats, and one time in that of the Catholics and Moderate\\nLiberals, and it is not contained in the vote of the Indepen-\\ndents,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0286.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX I 275\\nThe main difficulty in the distribution of seats, it\\nwill be noticed, springs from the fact that a small\\nparty, whose vote is not equal to a single unit of repre-\\nsentation, may, nevertheless, secure a representative\\non the score of having a remainder larger than the re-\\nmainders in other parties. To meet this difficulty, 1\\nproposed, in the Proportional Rejjresentatioii Revleia,\\nMarch, 1894, that every party whose total vote is less\\nthan, say, 85 per cent of the unit of representation, be\\nexcluded altogether from the apportionment, and that\\na new unit be found on the basis of the remaining\\nvotes. In the Belgian election the Independent vote\\nis only 73 per cent of the unit 11,523 and if it be\\nexcluded, the total number of votes of other parties\\nwould be 199,004 (207,429 minus 8,425). Dividing\\nthis by eighteen, we have a second, or effective unit of\\nrepresentation, 11,055, which provides for sixteen\\nfull quotients, and gives the Catholics and Flemish\\nDemocrats each one additional on remainders.\\nThe same result could be reached in a simpler way.\\nThe legislature could fix specifically the fraction or\\npercentum of the aggregate vote, falling below which,\\nno party should be granted a representative. For ex-\\nample, in the above election, one-eighteenth would be\\n5.55 per cent of the aggregate vote. Let all parties\\nbe excluded (where eighteen are to be elected) whose\\ntotal vote is less than one-twentieth, 5 per cent, of the\\naggregate vote (in this case 10,371). If ten are to\\nbe elected, the parties to be excluded would be those\\ncasting less than 9 per cent of the aggregate vote.\\nAnd, supposing ten to be elected, Sec. A l. of the law.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0287.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "276 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPttESENTATlON\\nas given on p. 121, could be amended so as to read\\nSec. VI. In determining tlie results of the election, 1.\\nFrom the aggregate number of valid votes cast for all\\ntickets, shall be deducted the votes of all parties\\nwhose total vote is less than 9 per cent of the aggre-\\ngate, such parties to be excluded altogether from\\nrepresentation. The remainder shall be divided by\\nthe number of candidates to be elected the quotient,\\nignoring fractions, to be known as the unit of repre\\nsentation, etc.\\nIf fifteen representatives are to be elected, the\\nparties excluded would be those receiving less than,\\nsay, 6 per cent of the aggregate vote. With such\\na distribution the election returns given on page 107,\\nwhere fifteen presidential electors are chosen,^ would\\nhave excluded the People s party, whose total vote,\\n328,392, was less than 494,406 (6 per cent of the aggre-\\ngate, 8,240,106), and the result would have been eight\\nDemocrats and seven Eepublicans, instead of seven\\nDemocrats, seven Eepublicans, and one Populist.\\nEeturning to the application of these four plans to\\nthe Belgian election, we should have the following\\nunits of representation in the order of size\\nUNITS OF KEPEESENTATIOlSr.\\n1. Dividing by number of candidates 11,523\\n2. Droop (number of candidates plus one) 10,917\\n3. Excluding parties less than 5 per cent 11,055\\n4. D Hondt 9,878\\n1 Republican 3,910,390 People s 328,392\\nDemocrat 3,808,791 Prohibition 192,533\\n8,2i0,106\\nSimple unit 549,340. Effective unit 514,612.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0288.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX 1.\\n277\\nThe comparative distribution among the several\\nparties would be as follows\\nEXCLUDING PARTIES\\nLESS THAN\\nDROOP.\\n1\\n3\\n9\\nAs exhibiting the difficulty m securing accurate\\nproportional representation, the following table shows\\nthe number of votes in each party required to secure\\none representative, under the various plans\\nSIMPLE\\nDIVISION\\nModerates\\n1\\nProgressists\\n3\\nSocialists\\n9\\nFlemish Democrats 2\\nIndependents\\n1\\nCatholics\\n2\\nD HONDT.\\nPER C]\\n1\\n1\\n4\\n3\\n10\\n10\\n2\\n2\\n1\\n2\\nSIMPLE DIVISION\\nAND DROOP.\\nD nONDT.\\nEXCLUDING\\nPARTIES\\nLESS THAN\\n5 PER CENT.\\nModerates\\nProgressists\\nSocialist\\nFlemish Dem.,\\nIndependent\\nCatholics\\n1 seat for 11,693 votes\\n1 13,170\\n1 11,853\\n1 10,856\\n1 8,425\\n1 9,702\\n1 for 11,693\\n1 9,878\\n1 10,668\\n1 10,856\\n8,425\\n1 19,405\\n1 for 11,693\\n1 13,170\\n1 10,668\\n1 10,856\\n8,425\\n1 9,702\\nIt will be seen that, in this particular election,\\nM. D Hondt s highly complicated plan, though dis-\\npensing with remainders, is yet the most unequal of\\nall, seeing that the Progressists get one representa-\\ntive for 9,878 votes, while the Catholics get only one\\nfor nearly twice as many (19,405).\\nConsidering the complexity of all plans except the\\nsimple division, and the practical objections against\\noverloading the reform with too many explanations,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0289.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "278 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPHESENTATION:\\nbesides tlie impossibility in any case of an absolutely\\nperfect result, it is probable that the bill as ^tq-\\nsented by the American committee will appeal most\\nstrongly to the public. However, it seems that a\\nfeasible plan, which would obviate too great influ-\\nence of such parties as are too insignificant to com-\\nmand a single unit of representation, would be just\\nand expedient.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0290.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX IL 279\\nAPPENDIX II.\\nTHE HARE PREFERENTIAL PLAN.\\nA Form of Law for the Election of Municipal Boards in California.\\nBy Alfred Cridge.\\nAll county, municipal, and school district boards,\\nincluding school trustees, supervisors of counties and\\nof cities and counties, city and town councils, or other\\nmunicipal or county body, board, or commission, shall\\nhereafter be elected by the proportional and preferen-\\ntial plan, in the manner following Every qualified\\nvoter shall be entitled to vote for as many members\\nof such bodies, boards, or commissions as are to be\\nelected in the whole of the city, town, county, or school\\ndistrict, without regard to district or ward lines and\\nno members of such boards or bodies shall hold over,\\nbut all the members shall be elected at every election\\nhereafter held for such officers.\\nThe elector shall prepare his ballot by marking the\\nfigure 1 (one) opposite the name of the candidate who\\nis his first choice for such board. He shall, in like\\nmanner, mark the figure 2 (two) opposite the name of\\nthe candidate who is second choice for such board,\\nand the figure 3 (three) opposite the name of the can-\\ndidate who is his third choice, and so on in regular\\nnumerical order. All marking of the names of candi-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0291.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "280 PBOPOBTIONAL EEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\ndates beyond the number required by law to be elected\\nshall be void and of no effect.\\nThe number of votes required to elect a member of\\nsuch board shall be called the Quota. The quota for\\neach membership shall be ascertained by dividing the\\nwhole number of votes cast at a given election by the\\nnumber of candidates to be elected at such election\\nfor such board, omitting the fraction in the quotient,\\nif there be any. All the ballots cast for such boards\\nshall be taken to the place provided by law for can-\\nvassing election returns for the purpose of counting.\\nEvery candidate for such boards, whose name is\\nprinted on the official ballot, shall have a separate\\nfile prepared for the reception of the ballots cast in\\nhis favor. As each ballot is opened the words Fig-\\nure One shall be announced, followed by the name\\nof the candidate opposite to which the figure 1 (one)\\nis marked. The ballot shall then be placed on the\\nfile belonging to such candidate, without calling off\\nany other names on the ballot. This process of dis-\\ntribution shall be continued till all the ballots are\\ndistributed.\\nWhen all the ballots have thus been distributed to\\nthe files of those candidates designated thereon as\\nfirst choice, any candidate or candidates having a full\\nquota shall be declared elected. If any candidate has\\nmore than a quota, the surplus shall be taken from\\nthe top of the file, and transferred to the files of those\\nnot having a quota, as follows\\nCommencing with the file having the highest sur-\\nplus, the ballots shall be severally distributed to the", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0292.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX 11. 281\\nfiles of the other candidates designated thereon as\\nsecond choice but if the candidate designated as\\nsecond choice has been elected, then the ballot shall\\nbe transferred to the file of the candidate designated\\nthereon as third choice and so on, until a candidate\\nhas been reached who has not received a quota, or\\nuntil the legally marked names on the ballot are ex-\\nhausted. Whenever during the distribution of surplus\\nballots any candidate obtains a quota, he shall be de-\\nclared elected, and no more ballots shall be counted\\nfor him.\\nWhen the distribution of the surplus ballots has\\nbeen completed, if the number of candidates having\\nvotes recorded in their favor is greater than the num-\\nber of members to be elected, then the candidate\\nhaving the least number of votes shall be declared\\nout of the count, and the ballots belonging to, or filed\\nfor, such candidate, shall be redistributed among the\\nremaining candidates. In redistributing the ballots\\nof a candidate who has been declared out of the count,\\nthe figure marked opposite the name of such candi-\\ndate on each ballot shall be first announced, followed\\nby the name of the candidate, followed by the word\\nOut. Then the next higher figure in numerical\\norder shall be announced, followed by the name of\\nthe candidate to which such higher figure stands oppo-\\nsite, and the ballot shall be placed on the file belong-\\ning to such candidate, unless such candidate shall have\\nbeen declared elected, or declared out of the count, in\\nwhich case the second higher figure shall be announced,\\ntogether with the name of the candidate opposite", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0293.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "282 FBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\nthereto. This process shall continue in regular nu-\\nmerical order until the ballot is placed on the file of\\nsome candidate who has not been declared elected, or\\nnot been declared out of the count, or until the list\\nof legally marked names on the ballot is exhausted.\\nWhen the ballots belonging to the candidate having\\nthe lowest number of votes shall have been redistrib-\\nuted, then, if necessary, the candidate having the\\nnext lowest number of votes shall also be declared\\nout of the count, and the ballots belonging to such\\ncandidate shall be redistributed in like manner.\\nWhenever, during the redistribution of the ballots, it\\nshall be found that a candidate has received his quota\\nof votes, he shall immediately be declared elected, and\\nno further ballots shall be placed on his file or counted\\nin his favor. Candidates having the lowest number\\nof votes shall be successively declared out of the\\ncount, and their ballots redistributed until the number\\nof remaining candidates shall be so reduced that the\\nnumber of candidates already declared, added to the\\nnumber of remaining candidates who have not been\\ndeclared out of the count, shall be equal to the number\\nof members to be elected. Then all remaining candi-\\ndates who have not been declared out of the count\\nshall also be declared elected. If, in the process of\\ndeclaring candidates out of the count, it shall be\\nfound that two or more of the candidates having the\\nlowest number of votes have a tie vote, or an equal\\nnumber of votes, then, if each of such candidates\\nshall have less than one per cent of the total vote\\ncast at the election, they shall all be declared out of", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0294.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX IL 283\\nthe count at the same time but if each of such can-\\ndidates has more than one per cent of the total vote\\ncast at the election, then that one of such candidates\\nshall be declared out of the count against whose\\nname on his ballots the figure 1 is marked the least\\nnumber of times and if the figure 1 (one) is marked\\nan equal number of times on the ballots of two or\\nmore such candidates, then that candidate shall be\\ndeclared out of the count against whose name the fig-\\nure 2 (two) is marked the least number of times, and\\nso on in regular numerical order.\\nIf the position of any member of such board shall\\nbecome vacant, the candidate who was last declared\\nout of the count shall succeed to the vacant position.\\nThis form of law was prepared as a constitutional\\namendment to enable the eighteen assemblymen and\\nnine senators from the city and county of San Eran-\\ncisco to be so elected, and the modification is adapted\\nto States where the legislature has power to make\\ngeneral laws (as it has in this State) for the govern-\\nment of counties and municipalities. It has no power\\nto make special laws or to permit local option, other-\\nwise than in connection with a vote for or against a\\ncity or town charter as a whole. The provision for\\nSan Francisco specially had, therefore, to be made as\\na constitutional amendment. In some State or States\\nthe legislature might have such power.\\nThe phraseology used in the Mechanics Institute\\namendment, under which a third election has just\\nbeen held, of its trustees, is much shorter j but for a", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0295.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "284 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nState law it was deemed advisable to make it petti-\\nfogger tight, even at the cost of a few hundred more\\nwords. If once in use as regards any organization in\\na State, all subsequent legislation to extend it could\\nbe comprised in a very few words, by reference to it\\nas the proportional and preferential vote in the\\nmanner now in force and used for the election of\\n(adding the requisite designations).\\nPerhaps a better expression could be devised than\\nthe words our board or such boards, which I\\nhave substituted for the words senators and as-\\nsemblymen in the constitutional amendment. It\\nmight be advisable in some parts to designate in de-\\ntail the class of officials to be elected, such as alder-\\nmen, councilmen, school trustees, etc. That is a\\nmatter to be considered according to time and place.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0296.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX III. 28^\\nAPPENDIX III.\\nTHE GOVE BILL. -LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION.\\nCOMMONWBALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,\\nIn the Year One Thousaud Eight Hundred\\nand Ninety-one.\\nRESOLVE.\\nTo amend the Constitution relative to tlie Election\\nof Senators and Eepresentatives.\\nResolved, by both houses, that it is expedient to\\nalter the Constitution of this Commonwealth by the\\nadoption of the subjoined article of amendment and\\nthat the said article, being agreed to by a majority of\\nthe senators and two-thirds of the members of the\\nHouse of Eepresentatives present and voting thereon,\\nbe entered on the journals of both houses, with the\\nyeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the\\nGeneral Court next to be chosen and that the said\\narticle be published, to the end that, if agreed to in\\nthe manner provided by the Constitution by the Gene-\\neral Court next to be chosen, it may be submitted to\\nthe people for their approval and ratification, in order\\nthat it may become a part of the Constitution of the\\nCommonwealth.\\nARTICLE OF AMENDMENT.\\nSec. I. In order to provide for a representation\\nof the citizens of this Commonwealth, founded upon", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0297.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "286 FliOPOSTlONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nthe principle of equality, any resident of this Com-\\nmonwealth, eligible under the Constitution to the\\noffice of senator, may be nominated as a candidate\\nfor said office by any person.\\nNo such nomination shall be valid unless the fol-\\nlowing conditions are complied with\\n1. The nomination shall be in writing, signed\\nby the person making it, and shall contain the name\\nand place of residence of the candidate.\\n2. An acceptance of the nomination signed by\\nthe candidate shall be indorsed thereon.\\n3. It shall be deposited in the office of the\\nsecretary of the Commonwealth not more than three\\nmonths nor less than five weeks before the day of\\nelection.\\n4. There shall be deposited with the nomina-\\ntion the sum of fifty dollars, or such other sum not\\nexceeding one hundred dollars, as the legislature\\nmay hereafter by law direct.\\nSec. II. Not less than four weeks before the day\\nof election, the secretary of the Commonwealth shall\\nfurnish to each candidate and to every voter who\\nshall request it, a printed list containing the names\\nof all the candidates in alphabetical order with the\\nplace of residence of each, and the name of the\\nperson by whom each was nominated.\\nSec. III. At any time after his nomination and\\nnot less than three weeks before the day of election,\\nany of said candidates may furnish to the secretary\\nof the Commonwealth a statement in writing, signed\\nby himself and acknowledged before any magistrate", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0298.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX III. 287\\nauthorized to take acknowledgment of deeas, which\\nstatement shall contain the names of one or more\\nothers of said candidates with whom he believes him-\\nself to be in accord upon the most important public\\nquestions, and to one or more of whom he wishes to\\ntransfer any ineffective votes cast for himself.\\nSec. IV. The secretary shall prepare a new list\\nof candidates similar to that named in Sec. II. of this\\narticle, but containing also against the name of each\\ncandidate the names in alphabetical order of all can-\\ndidates named in the list, if any, furnished by that\\ncandidate, as provided in Sec. III. and he shall, not\\nless than two weeks before the day of election, furnish\\nto the clerk of every city or town a sufficient number\\nof copies of said new list. Every such clerk shall, im-\\nmediately upon the receipt thereof, post conspicu-\\nously, and open to the inspection of the public, one\\ncopy of said list at each and every place in his city\\nor town where votes are to be received at said elec-\\ntion, and shall also immediately furnish one copy to\\nevery legal voter resident in said city or town who\\nshall demand the same.\\nSec. V. Every legal voter, wherever resident, shall\\nbe entitled to cast his vote for senator in favor of any\\nperson whose name appears in the aforesaid list of\\ncandidates but no person shall vote for more than\\none candidate, nor for any person whose name does\\nnot appear upon the aforesaid list of candidates.\\nBut whenever a candidate duly nominated is\\nomitted from the list published by the secretary\\nof the Commonwealth, votes may be cast for him", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0299.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "288 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\nwith the same effect as if his name appeared on said\\nlist.\\nIf the secretary shall make such omission inten-\\ntionally or through wilful neglect of duty, he shall,\\nupon conviction thereof, be ever after incapable of\\nholding any office of trust or profit under the Com-\\nmonwealth.\\nSec. VI. The returns of votes having been trans-\\nmitted to the secretary of the Commonwealth as pro-\\nvided by the Constitution, the secretary shall make a\\nlist of all candidates voted for, with the vote received\\nby each candidate in each precinct or voting place,\\nand his total vote, and said list shall be transmitted,\\npublished, and distributed in the same manner pro-\\nvided in Sec. IV., concerning the list therein named\\nand after the secretary shall have ascertained who are\\nthe persons who appear to be elected, he shall make\\na list of the successful candidates, with the computa-\\ntion by which their election has been ascertained, and\\nshall forthwith furnish a copy of the same to each\\ncandidate and also to every voter who shall request it.\\nShc. VII. Ineffective votes shall be transferred\\naccording to the request of the candidate for whom\\nthey were originally cast, to a person named in the\\nlist furnished by said candidate as provided by\\nSec. III.\\nThe forty candidates then having the highest num-\\nber of votes shall be declared elected, and the secre-\\ntary shall issue certificates of election to them.\\nIn case two or more candidates have the same\\nnumber of votes, the candidates residing at the great-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0300.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX III. 289\\nest distance from the state-house shall be deemed, for\\nthe purpose of election, to have the highest number.\\nSec. VIII. The following shall be deemed ineffec-\\ntive votes, and shall be transferred in the order\\nnamed\\n1. Any votes cast for a candidate in excess of\\none-fortieth of the entire vote cast, beginning with\\nthe candidate receiving the largest vote, and proceed-\\ning to the one next highest, and so on.\\nIn the case of two or more receiving the same\\nvote, the transfer shall be from each alternately, in\\nalphabetical order.\\n2. Votes cast for candidates who have since\\ntheir nomination died or become ineligible in the\\nsame order.\\n3. Original votes cast for candidates who fail of\\nelection, beginning with the candidate receiving the\\nsmallest total vote, and proceeding to the one next\\nlowest, and so on in case of two or more receiving\\nthe same vote the transfer to be made from each\\nalternately in alphabetical order.\\nNo votes shall be transferred from any candidate\\nwho has not furnished the statement named in Sec.\\nIII.\\nSec. IX. Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall\\nbe transferred to the candidate named in his said list,\\nliving and eligible at the time of counting the vote,\\nfor whom the largest number of votes were originally\\ncast, and whose vote by transfer or otherwise does not\\nequal one-fortieth of the whole vote cast, until all are\\ntransferred as far as possible.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0301.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "290 PBOFOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\nIf the same number of votes were originally cast\\nfor two or more candidates named in said list, tlie\\ncandidate residing nearest the one from whom the\\nvotes are to be transferred shall be preferred.\\nSec. X. The secretary shall at once transmit to\\nthe treasurer and receiver-general all sums of money\\nreceived as provided in Sec. I.\\nImmediately after declaring the names of the\\npersons elected senators, he shall draw on the treas-\\nurer and receiver-general a warrant for the payment\\nof the sum received with one nomination, and issue\\nthe same to the person nominating each candidate\\nwho shall appear by the returns to have received one\\nthousand or more original votes, and all such war-\\nrants shall be paid by the treasurer and receiver-gen-\\neral on presentation. The remainder of the sum\\npaid under Sec. I. shall be and remain the property\\nof the Commonwealth.\\nSec. XI. In case a vacancy shall occur in the sen-\\nate after the declaration of election provided in Sec.\\nVII., the votes cast for the member whose seat shall\\nhave become vacant, together with any ineffective\\nvotes assigned to him, shall be redistributed in the\\nsame manner as if he had died or become ineligible\\nbefore the canvassing of the votes, and the candidate\\nnot before elected, who, after returning to him any\\nvotes originally cast for him, shall then appear to\\nhave the largest number of votes shall be declared\\nelected.\\nSec. XII. The supreme judicial court, upon the\\npetition of twenty-five legal voters, shall have jurisdic-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0302.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX III. 291\\ntion to enforce by mandamus the correction of any\\nerroneous or improper issue of such certificate of elec-\\ntion, when such error can be made to appear from the\\nface of the returns issued by the secretary as provided\\nin Sec. VI., upon canvassing said returns in the man-\\nner provided in Sections VII., VIIL, and IX.\\nBut the senate shall continue to be the final judge\\nof the election of its members.\\nSec. XIII. The legislature may at any time provide\\nby law that representatives be elected in substantially\\nthe same manner as is herein provided for senators,\\nand by such law may, if it so decides, divide the Com-\\nmonwealth into not exceeding six electoral districts,\\nfrom each of which the candidates voted for in that\\ndistrict must be taken, and by voters within which\\nsuch candidates must be nominated. The number of\\nvoters in each of these districts to be as nearly equal\\nas possible.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0303.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "292 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION.\\nAPPENDIX IV.\\nBOOKS, PERIODICALS, AND SOCIETIES.\\nFollowing is a list of the more important books\\nand periodicals devoted to proportional representa-\\ntion. The reader is referred, for more complete\\nlists, to the FropoTtional Representation Revieiu, De-\\ncember, 1893 to Mr. M. I^. Forney s Political Ee-\\nform by the Eepresentation of Minorities, 47 Cedar\\nStreet, New York, 1894, where magazine references\\nare also given and to Poole s Index.\\nGilpin, Thomas. The Eepresentation of Minorities of\\nElectors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies,\\nPhiladelphia, 1844. This is believed to be the first publi-\\ncation on the subject of proportional representation in any\\nlanguage. It is to be reprinted in the Annals of the Ameri-\\ncan Academy of Political and Social Science.\\nCoKSiDEKANT, VICTOR. De la Sincerite du Gouvernement\\nKepresentatif, ou Exposition de I Election v^ridique,\\nGeneve, 1846. The first brochure on the subject published\\nin Switzerland. Reprinted in 1892 by Charles Burkli,\\nZurich. Fifteen centimes.\\nHare, Thomas. The Machinery of Eepresentation, Lon-\\ndon, 1857. Mr. Hare s first publication. The Election of\\nEepresentatives, Parliamentary and Municipal. Third edi-\\ntion. Philadelphia, 1867, 350 pages. The classical treatise.\\nMux, John Stuart. Considerations on Eepresentative\\nGovernment, New York, 1882, 365 pages. Chapter vii. is\\nan enthusiastic argument for the Hare system.\\nBucKALEW, C. E. Proportional Eepresentation, Philadel-", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0304.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX IV. 293\\nphia, 1872. Senatoi Buckalew was a member of the Senate\\ncommittee which reported in favor of the cumulative\\nvote in the reconstruction of the Southern States. The\\ncommittee s report is given in this book. The original\\nis, Keport of the Select Committee of the United States\\nSenate on Eepresentative Keform, Senate document, 40th\\nCongress, 3d session, No. 271, March 2, 1869.\\nSterne, Simon. Representative Reform and Personal Rep-\\nresentation, Philadelphia, 1871. An able presentation of\\nthe Hare system, simplified and adapted to American insti-\\ntutions. Mr. Sterne at present advocates the Swiss system.\\nLubbock, Sir John. Representation, sixth edition, Lon-\\ndon, 1890, 88 pages. Favors the single transferable vote.\\nAuthor is president of the English Proportional Represen-\\ntation Society.\\nCbidge, Alfred. Proportional Representation: includ-\\ning its Relations to the Initiative and Referendum, San\\nFrancisco, 1893. Published by the author, 429 Montgom-\\nery Street. Ten cents. Favors the Hare system.\\nRemsen, D. S. Primary Elections: a Study of Methods\\nfor Improving the Basis of Party Representation, New\\nYork, 1894. Application of proportional representation\\nto primaries.\\nForney, M. N. Political Reform by the Representation of\\nMinorities. Published by the author, 47 Cedar Street,\\nNew York, 1894. Favors Burnitz system, similar to pre-\\nponderance of choice. Contains extensive bibliography,\\nand references to magazine articles.\\nSullivan, J. W. Direct Legislation through the Initiative\\nand Referendum, New York, 1893. Paper, tweny-five\\ncents. The best presentation of direct legislation, with\\noccasional references to proportional representation.\\nLa Representation Proportionelle, Paris, F. Pichon, 1888, 524\\npages. Ten francs. Published by the Societe pour I lEtude\\nde la Representation Proportionelle. Contains the most\\ncomplete account of the reform in all countries.\\nLa Representation Proportionelle, Revue Mensuelle, Bruxelles,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0305.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "294 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N.\\nBelgium. Publislied by L Association Eeformiste beige\\npour la Representation Proportionelle, since 1883. Five\\nfrancs yearly. Favors D Hondt system. The volume for\\n1885 contains a full account of the international congress\\nat Anvers.\\nBulletin de la Societe Suisse pour la Bepresentation Propor-\\ntionelle. Geneve et Bale since 1885. Prix du numero,\\n50 centimes. Printed in French and German. A complete\\nrecord of progress in Switzerland.\\nHope and Home, Alfred Cridge, editor, San Francisco.\\nTwenty-five cents a year. Devoted to direct legislation\\nand proportional representation. Favors Hare system.\\nProportional Bepresentation Beview, published quarterly by\\nthe American Proportional Representation League, Stough-\\nton Cooley, secretary, Chicago. Fifty cents a year. The\\nAmerican League was organized at Chicago in 1893; The\\nfiles of the Beview (2 vols., fifty cents each) contain dis-\\ncussions by European and American advocates.\\nDirect Legislation Becord, Newark, New Jersey, Eltweed\\nPomerey, editor. Monthly, twenty-five cents a year.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0306.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "INDEX.\\nAbility of representatives, 39-43,\\n152-1C2, lftl-167, 183-lS-l, 195, 208-\\n209, 217-218, 231, 233.\\nAbsenteeism, 153-162.\\nAdams, Charles Francis, quoted,\\n209.\\nAdministration, boards, 5 muni-\\ncipal council, 210 \u00c2\u00a3E.\\nAldermen, origin, 24; elections,\\n70-72, 77 single board, 137.\\nAmerican Proportional Represen-\\ntation League bill, 119-122.\\nAndrae, M., Danish statesman, 104.\\nArbitration, 231.\\nBalance of power, 40.\\nBallot laws, 112, 219, 230.\\nBasle, city, 241.\\nBelgium, trial election, 122-130.\\nBerlin, 202.\\nBerne, Swiss canton, 186.\\nBerry, J. M., cited, 65.\\nBibliography, 293 ff.\\nBor^ly, M., cited. 111.\\nBoston, original government, 5 ff\\nlimited vote, 90 absenteeism,\\n155.\\nBribery, 79-80, 138 ff., 166.\\nBryce, James, cited, 84, 198.\\nBuck.alew, Senator, C. B., 217.\\nBurke, Edmund, quoted, 16, 17.\\nBurkli, Charles, cited, 193.\\nBurkli, Father of the Referen-\\ndum, 190.\\nCalifornia ballot law, 117 refer-\\nendum vote, 187.\\nCanada, parliament, 133 non-resi-\\ndency, 166.\\nCapen, S. B., cited, 155.\\nCapitalist, representation of, 13 ff.\\nCaucus, legislative, 81-82.\\nChamberlain, D. H., quoted, 247.\\nChamberlain, Joseph, 245.\\nChecks and balances, 234.\\nChicago, aldermanic elections, 70\\nabsenteeism, 153.\\nCities, origin of council, 3, 4, 22-\\n26 government of, 197 ff. con-\\nstitutionality of proportional\\nrepresentation, 268-270.\\nCivil Service Reform, 166, 175-176,\\n211-216, 262.\\nConfederation, 21.\\nCongress, origin, 21 elections,\\n55 ff. constitutionality of pro-\\nportional representation, 266.\\nConnecticut, bribery, 138 colonial\\nlegislature, 20.\\nConsiderant, Victor, cited. 111, 238.\\nConstitutional restrictions on le-\\ngislatures, 5 ff.\\nConstitutionality of proportional\\nrepresentation, 265-270.\\nCorporations and lobby, 34, 35 and\\nmachine, 84 proportional elec-\\ntion of directors, 264, 265.\\nCorruption, 47.\\nCounty Commissioners, election of,\\n87.\\nCridge, Alfred, bill for Hare sys-\\ntem, 279 ff.\\nCumulative vote, 92-98 and free\\nlist, 113 ff.\\n295", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0307.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "296\\nINDEX.\\nDenmark, parliament, 104.\\nD Hondt, Professor V., distribu-\\ntion of seats, 127, 273 ff.\\nDistribution of seats, 128, 271 ff.\\nDirect legislation, 186 ff.\\nDroop, H. E., quota, 241, 272.\\nDutcher, Salem, cited, 73.\\nElections, Congress, 16, 55 ff. Le-\\ngislatures, 65 ff. British Parlia-\\nment, 62, 64 Italian Parliament,\\n64 aldermen, 70 ff.\\nEngland, elections, 62, 64; school\\nboards, 97; non-residency, 166;\\nparty responsibility, 174; cities,\\n202, 213 suffrage, 237.\\nExecutive department, 193 ff.\\nFawcett, Professor, cited, 242.\\nForney, M. N., cited, 93.\\nFoulke, Wm. D., quoted, 182.\\nFourier, Chas., cited, 238.\\nFrance, Chamber of Deputies, 89\\nparty responsibility, 174; muni-\\ncipal suffrage, 203, 237.\\nFribourg, Swiss canton, 241,\\nGeneva, Swiss canton, 118, 136.\\nGeneral ticket, 86-89.\\nGermany, party responsibility, 174;\\ncities, 201, 213 suflErage, 237.\\nGerrymander, 48-81, 135, 139, 140,\\n167, 175 original, 51.\\nGiddings, Professor F. H., cited, 79.\\nGilpin, Thomas, 110, 237.\\nGladstone, party leader, 44.\\nGlasgow, suffrage, 202.\\nGove, W. H., bill for legislative\\nrepresentation, 285 ff.\\nGreeley, Horace, cited, 251.\\nGuilds, representation of, 13, 14,\\n24,25.\\nHare system, 100-105, 243 bill pro-\\nposed by Alfred Cridge, 279 ff.\\nHart, Professor A. B., cited, 43,\\n154, 262.\\nHoffman, Governor, veto, 252 ff.\\nHolls, F. W., quoted, 153, 154.\\nHouse of Lords, 135.\\nIllinois, gerrymander, 80 cumula-\\ntive vote, 93-96, 113, 249, 259.\\nIndependence of voters, 143-153.\\nIndiana, congressional elections,\\n78 legislature, 42, 65, 66 presi-\\ndential electors, 106, 276; close\\nstate, 138.\\nInitiative, 185 ff.\\nItalian election, 64.\\nJohnson, Hon. Tom, bill for con-\\ngressional elections, 114, 115.\\nJudiciary, increased power, 17, 194,\\n261.\\nKansas gerrymander, 80.\\nLabor and capital, 230.\\nLabor unions, representation of,\\n32.\\nLegislatures, failure, 4 ff., 135, 232,\\n266.\\nLegislation formerly limited, 33,34.\\nLimited vote, 90-92.\\nLincoln, Abraham, cited, 179.\\nLobby and corporations, 34, 35;\\nand the machine, 45-47.\\nLondon, original government, 24;\\nreformed council, 224.\\nLow, President Seth, cited, 201, 203.\\nLowell, A. Lawrence, cited, 189 ff.\\nLubbock, Sir John, 62-64, 104, 245.\\nLucerne, Swiss canton, 242.\\nMachine, 4, 28 based on universal\\nsuffrage, 33 its power, 37 de-\\nscribed, 38, 142, 173, 198 coalition\\nof both parties, 84.\\nMarshall, James Garth, cited, 243.\\nMaryland, colonial legislature, 17.\\nMassachusetts, colonial legisla-\\nture, 18-20 senate, 78, 79 ballot\\nlaw, 117; absenteeism, 153-164;\\ncivil service, 212,", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0308.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "INDEX.\\n297\\nMayor, origin, 23-24; goverument\\nby, 198 If., 207, 234.\\nMcCook, Professor J. J., cited, 79,\\n80.\\nMcKinley, Win., 42, 167.\\nMeclill, Joseph, quoted, 250.\\nMill, John Stuart, cited, 103, 185,\\n243.\\nMichigan legislature, 66.\\nMinneapolis aldermen, 71.\\nMorin, Antoin, cited, 237.\\nMorrison, Wm., 41, 167.\\nMunicipal elections, 137, 144-149\\nenterprises, 223 government,\\n197 ff.\\nNationalization, original problem\\nof representation, 11-21.\\nNaville, Professor Ernest, cited,\\n117, 239.\\nNebraska legislature, 175.\\nNeuchatel, Swiss canton, 118, 241.\\nNew York City, 3, 4, 198 alder-\\nmen, 71, 72 gerrymander, 80\\nlimited vote, 90 absenteeism,\\n153 suffrage, 202.\\nNew York, State Assembly, 66, 67,\\n76 close State, 138 referendum\\nvote, 186.\\nNominations, 144, 156.\\nNon-residency, 166.\\nOhio, Congressional election, 59-61.\\nlegislature, 66 referendum vote,\\n187.\\nParis, suffrage, 203.\\nParliament, British, 16, 17, 27\\nelections, 62-64 Italian, 64.\\nParties, rise of, 26-28 defined, 133\\nresponsibility of, 163 ff.; third\\nana minor, 173 ff., 183, 184, 271 ff.\\nPennsylvania gerrymander, 80\\nlimited vote, 260, 261.\\nPhiladelphia, limited vote, 261.\\nPolitics, defined, 133.\\nPreponderance of choice, 158, 159.\\nPresident, veto, 3 not a party\\nleader, 41.\\nPresidential electors, 88.\\nPrimaries, 38, 39, 153-162.\\nReferendum, 186 ff.\\nRemsen, S. D., cited, 157.\\nRepresentation of social classes,\\n14-lC.\\nRepresentative assemblies in col-\\nonies, 30, 31 in India, 31 note.\\nRepresented and unrepresented\\nvoters, 72-78; 140-143, 179.\\nResponsibility of respresentatives,\\n168-171.\\nRice, Isaac F., cited, 264.\\nRichardson, Chas., cited, 161.\\nRussell, Lord John, quoted, 242.\\nSaloons, 38, 40.\\nSchool board elections, 87, 97, 98.\\nSections represented, 209, 210.\\nSenate, United States, 134-135\\nState, 136.\\nShaw, Albert, cited, 202, 214.\\nSilver question, 177.\\nSingle transferable vote, 100-105.\\nSlavery qviestion, 179, 181.\\nSocial classes, representation of,\\n14-16.\\nSocial reform, 223 ff.\\nSocieties for Proportional Repre-\\nsentation, 293, 294.\\nSoluthurn, Swiss canton, 240.\\nSouth unrepresented in Congress,\\n179.\\nSouth Carolina, 80, 248 map of\\ngerrymander, 55.\\nSouth Dakota, 264.\\nSpeaker of the House, 15, 43-45.\\nSpence, Miss C. H., cited, 101-103.\\nStickney, Albert, cited, 167.\\nSt. Gall, Swiss canton, 242.\\nSt. Paul, aldermanic election, 70.\\nSuffrage, 29-33, 143, 172, 185, 202 ff.,\\n224, 236, 237, 246.\\nSullivan, J. W., cited, 190.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0309.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "298\\nINDEX.\\nSwitzerland, Association R6for-\\nmiste, 112 referendum, 185 tf.\\nsuffrage, 237.\\nSyracuse, municipal election,\\n217 ff.\\nTammany Hall, 38, 46, 71, 72, 141,\\n225, 251.\\nTariff, 177.\\nTaxation and representation, 12.\\nTexas gerrymander, 80.\\nTicino, Swiss canton, 240.\\nTuckerman, L. B., quoted, 158, 159.\\nUnrepresented voters, 72-78, 140-\\n143, 179.\\nVeto, executive, 3.\\nWage-earning classes, 224.\\nWard, Lester F., cited, 230 note.\\nWard system, 24, 25, 42.\\nWilson, Woodrow, cited, 33, 34.\\nZug, Swiss canton, 116, 131,\\n241.\\nZurich, 161, 186-190.", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0310.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0311.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "DEC 7", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0312.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2816", "width": "1682", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0313.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2984", "width": "1927", "jp2-path": "proportionalrepr00comm_0314.jp2"}}