{"1": {"fulltext": "E 713\\n.B86\\nCopy 1\\n?r\\n\\\\j\\nREMARKS\\nHON. J. H. BROMWELL.\\nOF OHIO,\\nHAWAIIAN ANNEXATION,\\nHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,\\nJUNE 14, 1898.\\nW A S M I N O TOM.\\n1898.", "height": "3714", "width": "2210", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "72949", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "B E M A K K S\\nOP\\nHON. J. H. BEOMWELL\\nThe House liaving under oousideration the joint resohition H. Res. 259) to\\nprovide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States-\\nMr. BROMWELL said:\\nMr, Speaker: After thirty years of peace at home and abroad\\nwe are to-day in the midst of war s alarm; the drumbeat and the\\nbugle call once more resound throughout the land; gathering\\nhosts are hurrying to the front; Old (llory waves over American\\nsoldiers marching in battle array; on our ships of war, more deadly\\nthan ever before, the crews stand ready for action; a naval victory,\\nunique in the history of warfare, has placed the name of Dewey\\nwith those of Farragut, Decatur, and Nelson, and those of Bagley\\nand Hobson fill the world with admiration.\\nAnother brilliant page is about to be added to the history of\\nAmerican triumph by land and sea over a hostile foe. Our arms\\nare turned no longer against American soldiers and brethren in\\nother States of the Union. The struggle is not maintained, as in\\nthe civil war, against the perpetuity of the American Govern-\\nment and the preservation of free institutions. We stand a united\\npeople in a united cause for a united purpose, to extend the priv-\\nileges of liberty to an oppressed people from the cruelty of a coun-\\ntry which has for hundreds of years been a disgrace to the civil-\\nization of the world, and to avenge an act of barbarism of which\\nno other nation on earth would have been guilty save Spain.\\nSide by side are the companies and regiments and brigades from\\nthe North and South. Northern soldiers will march under\\nWheeler and Lee, and Southern troops will fight with Miles and\\nMerritt. On the quarter deck and in the gun rooms of our cruisers\\nand battle ships will stand the men whose homes are on the Gulf\\nwith the men whose homes are on the Lakes. We have become a\\nhomogeneous people with one aim, one aspiration the honor and\\nglory of a common country.\\nThirty-five years ago the melodies of Dixie went up from one\\nside of the armed fortifications, while the miisic of the Star\\nSpangled Banner floated upward from the other. To-day the\\nstrains of both are heard in every camp and float across the water\\nfrom every seacoast city on the oceans and the Gulf. In the\\narmies which will ere long be marching through the Cuban Island\\nwill be found the children of Southern slaves, the children of\\ntheir masters and of those who set them free, guided by a com-\\nmon purpose, with a common motto, Cuba libre.\\n3iU 3", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "LESSONS TO UK Dlt.VWN I KO.M PKKSENT WAR.\\nFrom sncli a war we can not, if we are wise, but draw lessons\\nfor our future conduct as a nation. We have slept for thirty-\\nyears contented with onr internal resources, strong in our ma-\\nterial growth and development, self-contident to meet any strug-\\nj:le in which we should be called to engage. We have reasoned\\nthat our isolation from the great powers of the other hemisphere\\nwould continue to bo our protection and our strength. We have\\nforgotten the mighty progress which has been made in brmging\\nmore closely together the remotest corners of the earth.\\nWith no occasion to demand them, we have failed to keep\\nabreast of the progress of the rest of the world in offensive and\\ndefensive preparations for war. While the first little monitor,\\nthe product of American invention and genius, has revolution-\\nized naval warfare, wo have allowed ourselves to fall behind in\\nour naval equipment/ until we have ceased to rank among the\\nleaders in the matter of naval strength, and even the antagonism\\nof a .sixth-rate power has found us unprepared for immediate ac-\\ntion and filled with solicitude for immediate results.\\nIn the advancement of modern militarj- science requiring months\\nof i)reparation f or the emplacement of modern batteries in ourse^T-\\ncoast fortifications and years for the construction of naval vessels\\nand their armament and the manufacture of high-pov/er explo-\\nsives, we can not afford, in time of peace, to neglect these great\\nworks until the call to war shall sound. When the Maine was\\nblown up by the Spanish assassins not enough powder and shells\\nwere in the hands of the Ordnance Department to fight a single\\nday s battle; not a fortification along the coast was in a condition\\nto sustain the bombardment of a hostile fleet; not a sufficient force\\nof troops, drilled and disciplined for active service, was at the dis-\\nposal of the General Commanding the Armies for an invasion of\\nCuba. It has taken more than a hundred days of constant, unre-\\nmitting, strenuous work to reach the point where we maj^ feel\\nthat we are at last prepared for offensive movements. I believe\\nthat this lesson will not have to be again repeated to the American\\npeople.\\nIn the history of England we read of one monarch, a Saxon\\nking, who, surrounded by foreign foes, by procrastination failed\\nto place his people in a proper condition to meet them, and his\\nreign was a prolonged series of disasters. So conspicuous was\\nthis neglect that he has come down to us under the name of Eth-\\nelred the Unready. We have within our own experience seen\\neven modem nations guilty of a similar blunder. France was\\noverrun by Germany, China defeated by Japan, because they had\\nnot in time of peace properly prepared for time of war. Pray\\nGod that never in our history shall we be found, in a contest with\\na foreign nation, so unworthyas to be called The United States\\nthe Unready. We have been daugerou.sly near it in the present\\ninstance.\\nTrue, it costs vast sums of money to provide and maintain a\\nnaval armament and a coast defense which will put us on a fair\\nfooting of etiuality with the European powers; but the cost of\\nhurried ])reparation, the expense of organizing and maintaining a\\npreat army called together for an emergency, is far in excess of\\nthe outlay which would be required to place ourselves in a state\\nof preparation in times of peace such as would make unnecessary\\nin most, if not all, cases a state of war.", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "NECESSITY OF COALING STATIONS.\\nAnother lesson which comes home to ns is the fact that it wonld\\nnot do for us as a nation to ignore the necessity of acquiring and\\nmaintaining in other parts of the world, even though remote from\\nour shores, places of rest and supply for the vessels of oar Navy.\\nIn the days of Nelson and Decatur, when the wind was the only\\nmotive power, cruises of months or years could be made Ly a\\nnaval fleet without the necessity of stopping at a port. But with\\nthe introduction of steam and the harnessing of the lightning to\\nperform so many of the functions of a ship of war the usefulness\\nof a fleet or vessel is limited by its capacity to carry its own sup-\\nply of coal.\\nHowever magnificent and almost invulnerable a modern battle\\nship may seem to be, it becomes a helpless derelict upon the face\\nof the waters when its bunkers are empty of coal and its supply\\nstation remote. Were the necessities of our naval service con-\\nfined to our own immediate waters this would be perhaps a mat-\\nter of little concern to us, for so long as our mines yield their\\nstored-up treasures and our great railroad systems carry their\\nblack but precious loads to our seaboard, our ships of war could\\nsupply their needs under the protection of skillfully equipped and\\nwell-manned coast defenses. [Applause.]\\nREVIVAL OF MERCHANT MARINE.\\nBut we should not forget that the hope is cherished that at no\\nremote time in the future the great merchant marine of the United\\nStates shall again be rebuilt; that our commerce will be found on\\nevery ocean and in every inlet floating on American bottoms; that\\nAmerican citizens will be found either in the pursuit of business\\nor pleasure in every city in every corner of the earth. It will be our\\nduty to spread the protection of this glorious banner of freedom\\nover every American, however humble; over every American ves-\\nsel, however remote.\\nTo do this will require an American Navy to enforce our just\\ndemands and command the respect of even the most powerful na-\\ntion. We shall build more ships, we shall train more men for\\nthis service, we shall make our coasts invulnerable, and we shall\\nrank among the most powerful instead of among the weakest in\\nour military and naval strength. Not for aggression, except in\\nthe cause of right; not for oppression or territorial aggrandize-\\nment, but for the enforcement of justice to our own people and\\nprotection of liberty and free government to the countries of this\\nWestern Hemisphere. With this necessity for the promotion of\\nour naval welfare are intimately associated two great subjects\\nwhich have demanded the attention of the American nation and\\nwhich the present war will no doubt bring to a fitting conclusion\\nthe annexation of Hawaii and the construction of the Nicaraguan\\nCanal.\\nNICARAGUAN CANAL.\\nTheir necessity has come home to us as it never could had it\\nnot been for the experience of the last three months. The run\\nof our magnificent battle ship, the Oregon, through 13,000 miles\\nof water, amidst not only the perils of the sea, but of the danger\\nof attack by a hostile fleet, is a wonderful one in the history of\\nnaval warfare. But how many sighs have gone up, how many\\napprehensions have besn felt for her safety and that of her men,\\n3Ut", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "6\\nwhich might have been spared had the shorter route through the\\nNicaraguan Canal been given her. We are sending relief to the\\ngallant Dewey, adequate, I hope, even should a Spanish fleet be\\nsent to the Pliilippines to recover those islands.\\nWith the great canal across the isthmus it would be at least an\\neven race and a fair chance for our Atlantic fleet to succor Dewey\\nand iiis gallant men. We need it for the proper defense of our\\nwestern coast. We need it for the purpose of obviating the neces-\\nsity of maintaining at a groat expense a double line of naval vessels\\nwlion with it one alone would be sufficient. We need it to save\\nthe delay in sending our vessels from one coast to the other when\\nthe loss of a day might mean the destruction of lives and property\\nmore precious and valuable than any outlay we may make in its\\nconstruction. We need it, too, in times of peace as well as in times\\nof war. The great westei-n coast of South America should be the\\nmarket for the manufactures of the East and the agricultural\\nproductions of the South and the great Mississippi Valley.\\nWe need it for the opening trade with the countries of eastern\\nAsia, one day destined to eclipse all the other commerce of the\\nworld. We need it in times of war for our defense and in times\\nof peace for our commerce. Before the dawn of the twentieth\\ncentury I hope and I believe that it will be under way to its com-\\npletion.\\nBut important as this great enterprise is, we are confronted\\nwith the necessity of prompt action upon another far more im-\\nportant from every standpoint and more urgent upon our de-\\nmands for attention. That subject is the one now under discus-\\nsion in this House the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.\\nCOXSENSrS OF OPINION OF PUBLIC MEN.\\nI can hope to add nothing new to the discussion that has occu-\\npied the attention and best minds of the country for the last fifty\\nyears. The messages of our Presidents; the state papers of our\\nCabinet officers, our ministers, and our consuls; the professional\\nopinions of our best military and naval experts; the careful study\\nand expression of judgment of leading statesmen of both Houses\\nof Congress, and the editorial utterances of the great jiress of the\\ncountry, ever the faithful reflector as well as the molder of the\\nsentiments of the people at large, have united in one general,\\ngrand consensus of belief that it is a national duty which we owe\\nto ourselves to annex these islands.\\nWhile it is true perhajis that there is a certain amount of sen-\\ntimentality connected with this belief, arising from the fact that\\nthe progress of these islands from a state of paganism to the high-\\nest plane of Christian civilization has been due to the efforts of\\nAmerican missionaries: that the development of her magnificent\\nnatural resources and the upbuilding of her commei-ce have been\\nthe result of American immigration; that the overthrow of a cor-\\nrupt and dissolute monarchy and the establishment of a constitu-\\ntional republican government, modeled largely from the pattern\\nof our own, have been wrought by American sympathizers, there\\nis added to this a practical phase of the question which appeals\\nnot only to our self-interest but to considerations of the highest\\niijiportance affecting our future welfare and protection.\\nDivorcing, therefore, from our consideration of this subject all\\nquestions of mere sentiment, ignoring the fact that American in-\\nterests dominate and control its aft airs, shutting our eyes even to\\nthe sympathy which has heretofore existed between the two coun-\\nllt", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "tries, and which hcas made the Govcniinent of Hawaii during the\\npresent war assume the onerous duties and liabilities of an ally to\\nthis country instead of confining herself to the safe bounds of a\\nneutral position, let us look at the question from the hard, prac-\\ntical, selfish, if you will, standpoint of the benefits which will\\naccrue to the United States from this annexation when com-\\npleted.\\nNaturally a question of this kind divides itself into a consider-\\nation of the positive arguments in favor of the plan and an an-\\nswer to the objections which are urged against it, but these are so\\ninseparably connected that I shall not attempt to enumerate them\\nas distinct from each other, for the answer to each objection that\\nis raised forms of itself a link in the chain of the argument in\\nbehalf of annexation.\\nSTKATEGIC IMPORTANCE.\\nThe first argument in favor of the annexation of these islands\\nis based upon their strategic value for the defense of our Pacific\\ncoast growing out of their unique and isolated position in the\\nmidst of the great Pacific Ocean and the limitations upon the ef-\\nfectiveness of the modern vessels of war by reason of the absolute\\nnecessity of either carrying immense sux^plies of fuel or of having\\ncoaling stations at convenient intervals.\\nMahan, in his article in the Forum of March, 1893, says:\\nThe military or sti-ategic value of a naval position depends upon its situa-\\ntion, iipon its strengtli, and upon its resources. Of the three, the first is of\\nmost consequence, because it results from tlie nature of things, whereas the\\ntwo latter, wlien deficient, can be artificially supplied in whole or in part.\\nFortifications remedy the weakness of a position, foresight accumulates be-\\nforehand the resources which nature does not yield on the spot; but it is not\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2within the power of man to change the geographical situation of a point\\nwhich lies outside the limit of strategic effect.\\nLet US examine from this standpoint the unique position of these\\nislands. They stand at the center of a circle within a few hun-\\ndred miles of whose circumference may be found the most im-\\nportant points on the western coast of the United States, the\\nsouthern shores of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the eastern\\ncoast of Japan and the Polynesian Archipelago. Within easy\\nsteaming distance of the coaling stations of European powers in\\nthese eastern waters, no other nation on earth would hesitate to\\nacquire i^ossession of them were the opportunity given as it is to\\nthe United States. The following table will show their distance\\nfrom these most important points:\\nHawaii to\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Miles.\\nSan Francisco 2, 080\\nNicaragua Canal 4, 210\\nTahiti 2,389\\nPagopago, Samoa 2, 26:5\\nAuckland, New Zealand 3,850\\nFiji :3,736\\nMarshall Islands 2,09S\\nCaroline Islands 2,60\\nHongkong 4.917\\nYokohama, Japan 3, 390\\nUnalaska, Aleutian Islands 2,010\\nSitka 3,39.5\\nVancouver 2,305\\nThe location of these islands with resp?ct to the nearest coaling\\nstations of other nations is very concisely but comprehensively\\nstated in the remarks of Mr. Draper, of Massachusetts, in this.\\n3444", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "House in February, 1894, from which I make the following qi:ota-\\ntion:\\nI litil l^SC Hawaii was nearer to the territory of the United States than to\\nthat of anv other power, the distance to San Francisco l)eing but ;J,1(X) miles,\\nrrliilo the liritish I ortified jiort of Victoria, with its neighboring dockj-ard of\\nEsquiinalt and coal mines of Nanainii- was :i.otJO miles distant. The next\\nnearest British jwrt was Leonka, in Fiji group, 3,700 miles distant in an op-\\nposite direction.\\nFrench territory was 3,380 miles distant at Tahiti; Germany held the Ad-\\nmiralty Islands, distant ;J,UK) miles; and Spain the Caroline Islands, 2,000\\nmiles distant, and the I..adrones, about 2,!t00 miles distant.\\nSince that time Germany has moved up to a distance of 2,098 miles by an-\\nnexing the Marsliall Islands and placing herself in a tiaukiug position on both\\nthe South Pacilic and trans-Pacitic trade routes.\\nFranco, by the acquisition of the Low Archipelago and the Marquesas\\nIslands, is 2,0. 0 miles distant from Hawaii, on the South Pacific route. Great\\nBritain has advanced from Fiji toward the intersecting point on clearly de-\\nfined lines, annexing group after group and detached islands when they were\\nin the lino of approach, even though uninhabited or without harbors or com-\\nmercial value, until in 1891 her flag was planted on Johnston Island, 600 miles\\nfrom Hawaii and the nearest point she can approach to her American terri-\\ntory, unless the next move be the occupation of Hawaii itself.\\nHon. Lorin Thurston says:\\nIn the Pacific Ocean from the Equator to Alaska, from the coasts of China\\nand Japan to the American Continent, there is but one spot where a ton of\\ncoal, a pound of bread, or a gallon of water can be obtained by a passing yes-\\nBel, and that spot is Hawaii.\\nIn the necessities of modern naval warfare, the architect is con-\\nfronted by the three serious problems of formidable armament,\\ninvulnerable armor, and coal-caiTying capacity, and the nice ad-\\njustment of these three elements in such a way as to procure, at\\nthe same time, the greatest speed is the one problem which is\\nengaging the attention of naval experts throughout the world.\\nAny one of these three features abnormally developed at the ex-\\npense of the others impairs the efficiency of the fighting machine.\\nA battle ship or cruiser with large storage capacity for coal can\\ncarry proportionately fewer guns of lighter caliber and with arma-\\nment more liable to penetration by the modern projectile. So\\nthat while she might obtain the advantage of remaining long at\\neea without recoaling, she would at the same time be at a serious\\ndisadvantage in conflict with a vessel carrying heavier armor and\\nthrowing a greater weight of projectile to a greater distance. On\\nthe other hand, it matters not how impervious her armor or deadly\\nher armament, if she can not carry within herself her means of\\nlocomotion, she becomes worthless except for purposes of coast\\ndefense.\\nA modern battle ship without coal is like a caged lion\u00e2\u0080\u0094 mag-\\nnificent, but harmless.\\nSo unanimous are modern strategists upon the importance of\\nHawaii as a strategic point tliat it has been aptly named and uni-\\nversally referred to as the key of the Pacific. Its importance\\nto the United States as a means of protection to our western coast\\nhas attracted the attention of this Government for many years.\\nGeneral Schofield, who visited the islands under the instructions\\nOf the Secretary of War in 1872, said:\\nq) __\\nour commerce on the Pacific Ocean, they would afford the means of incal-\\nculable injury to the United States. If the absolute neutrality of the islands\\ncould always bo insured, that would suffice; but they have not and never\\ncould liave the power to maintain their own neutrality, and now their neces-\\nyiti", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "9\\nBitioi? force them to seek alliance with some nation which can relieve their\\nembarrassment. The British Empire stands ready to enter into such an alli-\\nance, and thus complete its chain of naval stations from Australia to British\\nColumbia. We can not refuse the islands the little aid they need and at tho\\nsame time deny their right to seek it elsewhere. The time has come when\\nwe must secure forever the desired control over those islands or let it pass\\ninto other hands. The financial interest to the United States involved in\\nthis treaty is very small, and if it were much greater it would still be insipr-\\nniflcant when compared to the importance of such a military and naval sta-\\ntion to the national security and welfare.\\nQuoting again from Captain Malian:\\nShut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown\\nback for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles\u00e2\u0080\u0094 or between 7,000\\nand 8,000 going and coming\u00e2\u0080\u0094 an impediment to sustained maritime operations\\nwell-nigh prohibitive. The coal mines of British Columbia constitute, of\\ncourse, a qualification to this statement; but upon them, if need arose, we\\nmight at least hope to impose some trammels by action from the land side.\\nIt is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defense of a coast line\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nof a sea frontier\u00e2\u0080\u0094 is concentrated in a single position, and the circumstance\\nrenders doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can.\\nAdmiral Eelknap reenforces these opinions in tlie following\\nlanguage:\\nA glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual observer\\nthe great importance and inestimable value of those islands as a strategic\\npoint and commercial center. Not to take the fruit witliin our\\ngrasp and annex the group now begging us to take it in would he folly\\nindeed\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a mistake of a gravest character, both for tho statesmen of the day\\nand for the men among us of high commercial aims and great enterprises.\\nOUR PRESENT NEED OF THE ISLANDS.\\nBut we need not depend upon the theoretical considerations\\nwhich evolve the opinions of these distinguished experts. We are\\nhaving to-day a practical illustration of the absolute necessity of\\nthese islands to the United States in the conduct of the war we\\nare waging against Spain. Not a vessel that we are sending to\\nDewey s relief could reach him, not a battalion of the troops which\\nare being carried on transports to complete the subjugation of\\nManila could be landed at that port, if we were deprived of the\\nprivilege of obtaining fresh supplies at this great halfway port in\\nthe long journey cross the broad expanse of the Pacific. It is not\\nsufficient to say that when the war with Spain is ended there will\\nbe little occasion for offensive operations by American fleets and\\narmies in the waters of eastern Asia.\\nLittle did we imagine before the present war that we should find\\nit necessary to carry offensive operations to so remote a point aa\\nthe Philippines, and it will not do for us to blindly shut our eyes\\nto the possibility of just such future contingencies again arising.\\nWe have learned the Issson that in a war with a foreign power\\nwe must be prepared for offensive as well as defensive action, and\\nwith every European nation stretching out for bases of supply\\nfrom which their fleets may operate, and already forming a cordoa\\nof advanced posts drawing nearer year by year to our Pacific\\ncoast, we shall soon be hemmed in on the west as we are now upon\\nthe east and south. With Hawaii in our possession we shall be\\nreasonably secure. Without it, and especially in the hands of an\\nunfriendly nation, we have a menace continually threatening us.\\nI shall not comment upon the importance of these islands to us\\nfrom a commercial standpoint, although their accession to our\\ncontrol would mean a vast increase in profitable commerce by ths\\ninvestment of American capital and a rapid growth of our mer-\\nchant marine for handling the trade of these islands. These mere", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "10\\npecuniary and commercial considerations are so far overshadowed\\nby their im])ortance to us for offensive and defensive inarposes\\nthat they may bo left out of consideration.\\nPOME OIIJELTIONS CONSIDEUED.\\nAnd now lot us see what are some of the objections to and ar-\\nguments aj^ainst the union that is proposed.\\nThe first, and what would be the most serious one if it were ten-\\nable, is the claim that such action would be contrary to our own\\nConstitution.\\nThis claim of unconstitutionality proceeds upon the theory that\\nbecause there is not a distinct grant of power to annex territorj-,\\nor because tlie territory is not contiguous, or because the character\\nof its people is not similar to those of the territory now occupied\\nby the United States, we have not the power to act.\\nANNEXATION OF TERRITORY ALREADY MADE.\\nFortunately these questions are not new and have all been set-\\ntled by the highest authorities known to our system of govern-\\nment. While it may be true that the Constitution does not, in so\\nmany words, refer to our right to annex additional territory, as a,\\nmatter of fact we commenced such annexation in the very infancy\\nof our Republic and have continued in that policy down to the\\npresent time. We have annexed by purchase, we have annexed\\nby treaty, and we have annexed practically by conquest, or by\\ntreaty as a result of conquest. We purchased Louisiana in 1803;\\nFlorida in 1819; California, New Mexico, and Arizona, in 1849,\\ncame to us as a result of the Mexican war; we annexed Texas by\\njoint resolution of Congress in 1844, and bought Alaska from Rus-\\neia in 18G7. We have occupied and practically annexed the Mid-\\nway Island in the North Pacific, even farther from our coast than\\nthe Hawaiian Islands, and the right to make these annexations\\nhas been pas.sed upon by the highest constitutional authority in\\nexistence, the Supreme Court of the United States.\\nCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANNEXATION.\\nChief Justice Marshall, in 1 Peters, 542, said:\\nThe Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union the\\npower of ni;iking wars and making treaties. Consequently that Government\\npossesses the power of acquiring tei ritory, either by conquest or treaty.\\nAnd this doctrine has been even more recently reaffirmed by the\\nsame court in the following words:\\nThe power to acquire territory is derived from the treaty-making power,\\nand the power to declare and carry on war.\\nThe incidents of these powers are those of national sovereignty, and be-\\nlong to all independent governments.\\nSo much, then, for the objection that because the Constitution\\ndoes not contain a specific grant of power we have no authority;\\nfor we see that this power to annex is a necessary consequence of\\nour existence as a sovereign and independent nation. These de-\\ncisions would seem to be broad enough to cover equally the other\\ntwo constitutional objections, even it they were strictly new ques-\\ntions. But here again -we have precedents, upon which no ques-\\ntions have been raised, to establish our rights. The objection\\nthat Hawaii is not contiguous becomes of little importance when\\nwo recall that the greater portion of the magnificent domain of\\nAlaska is more remote from the nearest point of the rest of our", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "11\\nUnited States territory than is Hawaii and that we are separated\\nfrom the former by the domain of a foreign government as well\\nas by an equal stretch of ocean, and that the Midway Island and\\nthe Aleutian Islands are absolutely detached from contiguous\\nterritory. This objection, therefore, fails.\\nCHARACTER OF INHABITANTS.\\nThat the inhabitants of Hawaii, or at least a majority of them,\\nare of different race and civilization from those of the United\\nStates is undoubtedly true; but did not the same objection lie to\\nthe inhabitant of all the territory wliich we have annexed from\\nthe beginning? At the time of the Louisiana purchase the Indians\\nfar exceeded in number the white inhabitants, and the latter were\\nlargely made up of men alien to our civilization, laws, and cus-\\ntoms. Alaska contained nothing but a few Indian tribes, Esqui-\\nmos, and Russian traders. In comparison with these the popula-\\ntion of Hawaii would be far more desirable, for they have had the\\nbenefit of Christian education and the enlightening influences of\\ncommercial intercourse with civilized nations.\\nThe fear that we would not assimilate this population deserves\\nbut little consideration in the face of our experience with the im-\\nmigration from foreign countries and the rapidity with which\\nwithin one or two generations at the most they become homoge-\\nneous with our other citizens. Once in our possession, too, suit-\\nable restrictions can be thrown around the further settlement of\\nthese islands by the undesirable class of Asiatics who have within\\nthe last few years threatened to overwhelm with their numbers\\n_j the white population.\\nAll other objections to the annexation of these islands seem to\\nbe based rather upon the question of the wisdom of the policy\\nthan upon the power to annex. One of the most frequently urged\\nobjections on this score is that its remoteness from the continental\\nportion of the United States would render it an object of special\\nattack by hostile nations and would entail upon us the necessity\\nof keeping up a much greater navy and of entailing much heavier\\nexpenditures in order to protect it in time of war. Neither of\\nthese positions is, in the judgment of those best qualified to speak,\\ntenable.\\nWILL SAVE EXPENSE OF KEEPING UP LARGE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC.\\nWith Pearl Harbor, the only inlet upon any of the islands\\ncapable of receiving and protecting a fleet of large war vessels,\\nwell defended, and Honohilu, a few miles distant, properly forti-\\nfied by American soldiers drawn from the Hawaiian residents, a\\nmere handful of men and one or two battle ships or monitors could\\nprotect the island against any hostile fleet that might be sent\\nagainst it. An attack, if made and unsuccessful, would almost\\nnecessarily mean the loss of the attacking fleet, for no vessels that\\ncould be sent from any other coal-supply station could run to\\nHawaii, remain any considerable time to make an attack, and then\\nreturn to the station which it had left. Its coal bunkers would,\\nlong before its arrival, be exhausted, and it would be helpless and\\ndefenseless against not only a hostile fleet but even the elements\\nthemselves.\\nAs to the fear that it would require a greater Navy and entail\\ngreater expense to this Government, it would seem to be reason-\\nable that if by maintaining two or three modern vessels of war at\\n3il4", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "the Hawaiian Islands we can absolutely prevent the approach of\\nhostile fleets from eastern Asia, it would be far less expensive than\\nmaintaining a large number of vessels at each of our unprotected\\npoints upon the Pacific coast. An ounce of prevention would, in\\nthis case, be far better than a pound of cure. Especially does this\\nargument become convincing should the Nicaraguan Canal be\\nconstructed and controlled by the United States, for then our ves-\\nsels in the Atlantic Heet could reenforce our squadron in the Pa-\\ncific before the vessels of a hostile power covild reach Hawaii from\\nany except the nearest outlying station.\\nIt is the opinion of those best qualified to judge that its annex-\\nation will obviate the necessity for large expenditures rather than\\ncause them. We have to take care of Hawaii in the sense of not\\nallowing any other nation to occupy it. This doctrine we have\\naffirmed and reaffirmed on many occasions, and it is now recog-\\nnized and conceded by every nation on earth that we have that\\nright. It is sufficiently within the sphere of the American influ-\\nence to bring it strictly within the provisions of the Monroe doc-\\ntrine, and on more than one occasion that doctrine has been\\ninvoked to prevent the occupation of those islands by other powers.\\nIf, therefore, we have this responsibility cast upon us, and re-\\nmembering that in carrying it out we may become involved at\\nalmost any time with another nation who finds it necessary to\\ntake military possession of them, how much wiser, easier, and\\nless expensive it would be to us were we to exercise this control\\nnot as a mere protectorate over a little helpless nation, but as a\\npart of our own independent and sovereign territory.\\nlilGHT OF ItAWAIIAX GOVERNMENT TO ACT.\\nAs to arguments which are raised against the project for rea-\\nsons growing out of the fact that the governing element of the\\nisland constitutes but a mere minority of the entire population,\\nthat a large number of its people are denied the right of suffrage,\\nand tliat any proposition to annex should be submitted to a vote\\nof the entire people instead of the Government now in existence,\\nit is sufficient to say that none of these things have been regarded\\nas of any importance in other cases in which we have acquired\\nterritory. With the exception of Texas, the consent of these peo-\\nple was neither asked nor received.\\nThe negotiations were conducted with the sovereign authorities\\ncontrolling the territory. Even in the case of Texas the people\\nthemselves did not pass upon the question directly. It is sufficient\\nfor us to know, therefore, that there is a stable Government in\\nthese islands, which, acting under constitutional provision spe-\\ncifically set forth, has the right to propose and consummate this\\nannexation. This Government has been recognized by every civ-\\nilized nation not only as de facto but de jure. It has all the\\npowers of sovereignty, including tliat of joining the island by\\ncession to a foreign power. This has been universally recognized\\nas a result of con(iuest and as i)reliminary to the sale or cession of\\nterritory by ijeaceful means. We are not hampered, therefore,\\nby any (juestion of the power of the Government with which we\\nwill deal.\\nSl MMAItV.\\nThe whole situation, therefore, seems to resolve it elf into this:\\nThere is no constitutional prohibition, but, on the contrary, ample\\npower; as to the policy which should control the Government,", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "13\\nthere is no division of sentiment among those who have consiileved\\nit from the standpoint of strategic necessity; as to its value for\\ncommercial purposes, the whole course of our official action, in-\\ncluding the negotiation of treaties of commerce and reciprocity,\\nbears evidence. We would need it at the present time as a mili-\\ntary necessity, but even in times of peace we shall need it as a\\nresting place for the fleet we shall have to keep in eastern waters\\nand the relief and assistance which our peacelul commerce will\\nneed in its long passage across the Pacific.\\nIt comes to us without war, without bloodshed, without a for-\\neign complication, a voluntary donation of its own Government,\\nits own freewill offering. It is asked for by the Administration\\nas a necessity, and I am ready to grant the request.\\n_ For my part, I do not fear that we shall depart from the tradi-\\ntional ijolicy of our country of noninterference in the affairs of\\nforeign nations, but I do believe that the surest safeguard against\\nthe interference of foreign governments in our affairs will be the\\nenlargement of our naval armament, the procurement of stations\\nscattered at suitable intervals as harbors of refuge and supply,\\nthe building of the Nicaraguan Canal, the retention of Puerto\\nRico as a guard to its entrance, and the annexation of Hawaii as\\nthe Key of the Pacific. [Applause.]\\n3141", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "L i BKHKYUFCUNGKtbS\\n013 744 692 3", "height": "3517", "width": "2179", "jp2-path": "remarksofhonjhbr02brom_0016.jp2"}}