{"1": {"fulltext": "6\\n^2\\nHawaiian Annexation.\\nSPEECH\\nOF\\nHON. ROBERT R H I T T\\nOF ILLINOIS,\\nIn the House of Representatives,\\nSaturday, June 11, 1S9S.\\nThe House having under consideration the joint resolution (II. Res. 259) to\\nprovide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States-\\nMr. HLTT said:\\nMr. Speaker: The measure which is now before the House for\\nthe annexation of the Hawaiian Islands is substantially the same\\nas a treaty negotiated last year, which is here put into the form\\nof a joint resolution. The treaty was duly ratified by the Senate\\nof the Republic of Hawaii. We therefore know that we are act-\\ning with the cordial assent of the Government of the country\\nproposed to be annexed. That treaty was preceded by another,\\nnegotiated by President Harrison five years ago between the two\\ncountries, providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands\\nto the United States, which treaty was duly ratified by the Gov-\\nernment of Hawaii and would probably have been ratified by our\\nSenate had it not been withdrawn by reason of a change of th9\\noccupant of our Executive office.\\nThis is not a novel question at all. It is not an emergency propo-\\nsition sprung upon us suddenly. It is not a case of greed for ter-\\nritory and overweening influence brought to bear by a great and\\npowerful Government upon one of the smallest in the world to\\nconstrain it to give up its independent existence and be absorbed\\nby the other under the form of a legal proceeding. There is no\\noppression on our side, there is no unwillingness on the other side.\\nThe whole proceeding is with the cordial assent of the duly con-\\nstituted authorities of the Hawaiian Republic, and in accordance\\nwith the terms of the constitution of that Republic.\\nIt is in pursuance of a policy long discussed and well known\\nthere and to our people here and to all the world. It is a result\\noften contemplated by the successive governments of those islands\\nfor fifty years, because the circumstances surrounding the little\\nnation in all the changes in its history have plainly made this a\\nforegone conclusion. So slender, so tottering a political existence\\nin the midst of the mighty political powers of the world had a\\nprecarious tenure of life. It was a continual temptation to them\\nan all important possession of a weak power. It has often been\\nthreatened. Several times it has been seized and occupied by a\\npassing commander of a frigate by a French captain in 1829, by\\na British commander in 1843, again by the French in 1849.\\nConscious of its feeble ability to maintain independence among\\nthe nations, the subject of union with our country has been con-\\ntemplated long. One of the kings of Hawaii executed a deed of\\n3468 \u00e2\u0080\u00a2J-.r.-ur. i", "height": "4652", "width": "2832", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "V 2\\ncession to the United States in 1851. Another of the kings pre-\\npared a draft of a treaty of annexation to the United States in 1854,\\nbut before it was executed he died. As I have said, treaties of an-\\nnexation to the United States have twice been negotiated with this\\nGovernment within the last five years. It is the natural result of\\nevents and causes long operating and now concluding with mutual,\\ncordial consent.\\nThere is nothing that can impute to us, though this is so great\\nand mighty a nation, any purpose of exercising undue pressure,\\nas has ordinarily been the case in European history where a pow-\\nerful government has taken possession of, absorbed, and extin-\\nguished a smaller. The only question we have to consider, when\\nthis little commonwealth with open hands offers itself to us, is\\nwhether we would be better on by taking this step: whether it\\nwould be advantageous to us to accept these islands; whether they\\nare worth owning; whether their possession is of any value to us\\nor not.\\nARE THE ISLANDS WORTH ANNEXING?\\nThat is a simple question and ought to be easily answered.\\nOther nations have long since expressed their opinion of the\\nvalue of the islands in many ways. Though it is a very small\\nnationality, a very small extent of the earth s surface, not equal\\nin people to a Congressional district represented on this floor, yet\\nnineteen nations continually maintain representatives at Hono-\\nlulu to watch their interests. We keep there to-day an envoy\\nextraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. Why? Not because\\nthey are fertile and beautiful islands, not because there are a little\\nover a hundred thousand people there. No; it is because of the\\nsupreme importance and value of the islands on account of their\\nposition.\\nThey sit facing our western coast\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that long stretch confronting\\nthe great Pacific Ocean, the most extensive body of water in the\\nworld, stretching away for six, seven, eight thousand miles and\\nthey are the nearest point to our coast, and far, very far, removed\\nfrom any other point in that vast sea. They are 2,000 miles away\\nfrom us. That seems a very considerable distance, but the im-\\nmense stretch beyond them to the other portions of the earth is so\\nmuch greater that they seem comparatively near and are a part\\nof our own S3 7 stem.\\nWith the great change in the construction of fighting ships, all\\nof which are now moved by steam, coal has become an essential\\nof maritime war, as much so as powder or guns, and across that\\nwide ocean any vessel of war coming to attack the United States\\nmust stop for coal and supplies at the Hawaiian Islands before it\\ncan attack us. No ship can be constructed, no battle ship exists\\nin the world, which can make the trip from the other side of that\\nwide sea to our shores, conduct any operation of hostility against\\nus, and ever get back unless it has its supply of coal renewed.\\nMr. KELLEY. Will the gentleman permit an interruption? I\\nsimply want to call the gentleman s attention to the map.\\nMr. HITT. We are all pretty familiar with the map\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the re-\\nmarkable position of these islands and the routes that ships are\\naccustomed to follow. I do not suppose that my personal opin-\\nion is worth more than that of the average of mankind who are\\nnot specially qualified as commanders and mariners, nor that any\\nmember of the House is so presumptious as to consider his own\\npersonal opinion itself an important fact.\\n3168", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "But we have on this critical and central question, which is not\\none of common judgment, the opinions of the mi st distinguished,\\nspecially expert, and able men of the age, the greatest commanders\\nof our armies and our fleets who are living. It is an impressive\\nand convincing fact that all have given the same opinion. There\\nhas been no divergence. Everyone has stated that the possession\\nof those islands was to us of great importance, many of them say\\nindispensable; that it will diminish, not increase, the necessity for\\nnaval force, economize ships of war and not require more; that in\\nthe possession of an enemy, if we shall so foolishly and unwisely\\nact as to refuse annexation and permit them to pass into the hands\\nof an enemy, they will furnish a secure base for active operations\\nto harass and destroy the cities of our western coast; that in our\\npossession, duly fortified, those islands will paralyze any fleet,\\nhowever strong, however superior to our own naval force in the\\nPacific, before it can attack our coast.\\nI accept the opinion of men like Admiral alker and Captain\\nMahan and General Schofield, Admiral Belknap, General Alexan-\\nder, and Admiral Dupont and Chief Engineer Melville. It is a\\nlong list of great sailors and soldiers, distinguished strategists\\nand authorities. The striking fact is that there is no dissent\\namong them. These men, who are authorities, have all concurred\\nas to the great importance of the islands. On one of the islands\\nis Pearl Harbor, now unimproved, a possible stronghold and a\\nrefuge for a fleet, which, fortified by the expenditure of half a\\nmillion dollars and garrisoned and aided by the militia of the\\nisland and its resources, can be made impregnable to any naval\\nforce, however large.\\nI speak of a naval force. To capture it there must be a land\\nforce also. The possession of all the islands was stated by these\\nable men, who were before the committee, to be essential, as they\\nwould furnish a valuable militia to promptly cooperate with a\\ngarrison of one or two regiments of artillery until, in the short\\ndistance from our shore, we could reenforce them with abundant\\nmilitary strength to repel the assault of the disembarking troops,\\nwho must come many thousands of miles farther than our own.\\nThis is not my mere assertion or opinion on so grave and tech-\\nnical a question. I am merely giving some of the leading points\\nmade by those whose names command the respect of the military\\nand naval professions throughout the world and w T ho have said\\nthat the possession not only of Pearl Harbor but of all that little\\ngroup of islands is to us a necessity. I will give some expressions\\nused by these distinguished authorities. I might give many more.\\nCaptain Mahan, the most distinguished writer and authority of\\nour time on the history of sea power, says:\\nIt is obvious that if we do not hold the islands ourselves, we can not ex-\\npect the neutrals in the war to prevent the other belligerent from occupy-\\ning them: nor can the inhabitants themselves prevent such occupation. The\\ncommercial valuo is not great enough to provoke neutral Interposition. In\\nshort, in war we should need a larger Navy to defend the Pacific coast, be-\\ncause we should have not only to defend our own coast, but to prevent, by\\nnaval force, an enemy from occupying the islands; whereas, if wo preoccu-\\npied them, fortifications could preserve them to us.\\nIn my opinion it is not practicable for any trans-Pacific country to invade\\n\u00c2\u00a9ur Pacific coast without occupying Hawaii as a base.\\nGeneral Schofield, who spent three months on the islands and\\nmade a careful survey of Pearl River Harbor, stated to our com-\\nmittee:\\nThe most important feature of all is that it economizes the naval force\\nrather than increases it. It is capable of absolute defense by shore batteries;\\no4C8", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "4\\nso that a naval fleet, after going there and replenishing its supplies and mak-\\ning what repairs are needed, can go away and leave the harbor perfectly\\nsaie under the protection of the army. Then arises at once the question why\\nthis harbor will be of consequence to the United States. It has not been\\neasy to make that perfectly clear to the minds of men who have not made\\nsuch subjects the study of a lifetime till now; but the conditions of the pres-\\nent war, it seems to me, ought to make it clear to everybody.\\nAt this moment the Government is fitting out quite a large fleet of steam-\\ners at San Francisco to carry large detachments of troops and military sup-\\nplies of all kinds to the Philippine Islands. Honolulu is almost in the direct\\nroute. That fleet, of course, will want very much to recoal at Honolulu, thus\\nsaving that amount of freight and tonnage for essential stores to be carried\\nwith it. Otherwise they would have to carry coal enough to carry them all\\nthe way from San Francisco to Manila and that would occupy a large amount\\nof the carrying capacity of the fleet, and if they recoal at Honolulu all that\\nwill be saved. More than that, a fleet is liable at any time to meet with stress\\nof weather, or perhaps a heavy storm, and there might be an accident to the\\nmachinery which will make it necessary to put into the nearest port possible\\nfor repairs and additional supplies. By the time it reaches there its coal sup-\\nply may be well-nigh exhausted; it then has to replenish its coal supply to\\ncarry it to whatever port it could reach.\\nIf I am not misinformed in regard to the laws of neutrality, the supply of\\ncoal that can be taken on board at neutral ports is only sufficient to bring it\\nback to the nearest home port, and not enough to carry it across the ocean,\\nso that if we had to regard Honolulu as a neutral port, we could only load up\\ncoal enough to bring us back to San Francisco. Now, let us suppose, on the\\nother hand, that the Spanish navy in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic,\\nor both, were a little stronger than ours instead of being somewhat weaker.\\nThe first thing they would do would be to go and take possession of the\\nSandwich Islands and make them the base of naval operations against the\\nPacific coast.\\nYou have only to consider the state of mind which exists all along the At-\\nantic coast under the erroneous apprehension that the Spanish fleet might\\npossibly assail our coast to see what would be the case if the Spanish fleet\\nwere a good deal stronger than ours and took possession of Honolulu and\\nmade it a base of operations in attacking the points on the Pacific coast. We\\nwould be absolutely powerless, because we would have no fleet there to dis-\\npute the possession of the Sandwich Islands, whereas, if we held that place\\nand fortified it so that a foreign navy could not take it, it could not operate\\nagainst the Pacific coast at all. for it could not bring coal enough across the\\nPacific Ocean to sustain an attack on the Pacific coast.\\nIt happens that in this war we have picked out the only nation in the world\\nthat is a little weaker than ourselves. The Spanish fleet on the Asiatic sta-\\ntion was the only one of all the fleets we could have overcome as we did. Of\\ncourse that can not again happen, for we will not be able to pick up so weak\\nan enemy next time. We are liable at any time to get into a war with a na-\\ntion which has a more powerful fleet than ours, and it is of vital importance,\\ntherefore, if we can, to hold the point from which they can conduct opera-\\ntions against our Pacific coast. Especially is that true until the Nicaragua\\nCanal is finished, because we can not send a fleet from the Atlantic to the Pa-\\ncific. We can not send them around Cape Horn and repel an attack there.\\nIf we had the canal finished, we would be much better off in that respect but\\neven then we would want the possession of a base very much.\\nThe same eminent and experienced soldier, when asked whether\\nit would be sufficient to have Pearl Harbor without the islands,\\nsaid we ought to have the islands to hold the harbor; that if left\\nfree and neutral complications would arise with foreign nations,\\nwho would take advantage of a weak little Republic with claims\\nfor damages enforced by war ships, as is frequently seen. If an-\\nnexed, we would settle any dispute with a foreign nation; that we\\nwould be much stronger if we owned the islands as part of our\\nterritory, and would then also have the resources of the islands,\\nwhich are so fertile, for military supplies; that if we do not have\\nthe political control they may become Japanese; and we would be\\nsurrounded by a hostile people.\\nAdmiral Walker, who has had long experience in the waters of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands, emphatically confirmed the views of Gen-\\neral Schofield, especially that it would cost far less to protect the\\nPacific coast with the Hawaiian Islands than without them; that\\n34\u00e2\u0082\u00ac8", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "5\\nit would be taking a point of advantage instead of giving it to\\nyour enemy.\\nAdmiral Dupont, in a report made as long ago as 1851, expressed\\nhis view in these words:\\nIt is impossible to estimate too highly the value and importance of the\\nSandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point of view. Should\\ncircumstances ever place them in our hands, they would prove the most im-\\nportant acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific Ocean\u00e2\u0080\u0094 an acquisition\\nintimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in those seas.\\nTHE TEACHING OP RECENT EVENTS.\\nFor a war of defense the Hawaiian Islands are to us inestimably\\nimportant, most essential, and in this light they have been most\\noften discussed. The discussion in past years has attracted Utile\\npublic attention, because our people, until they were lately\\nawakened by the war and the movement to reenf orce Dewey, have\\nnot thought much about the exposed situation of our western\\ncoast in case of war with a really great power or the necessity of\\npossessing these islands confronting our Pacific coast.\\nWe learn fast in war time. Not long ago, when the air was\\nfilled with rumors of Spanish war ships coming to our eastern and\\nnortheastern coast, many members here, and I was one of them,\\nreceived telegrams from the coast cities to use their influence to\\nhave an adequate naval force sent to the threatened coast on the\\nnortheast. Now we have fleets and strong land forces and coast\\ndefenses on the east. We have comparatively slender prepara-\\ntions on the west coast. There is not anywhere on the east a\\ngroup of islands of such cardinal and unique importance as the\\nSandwich Islands not even the Bermudas.\\nNot only in defensive war but in war of any kind they are nec-\\nessary to us. In the events of the hour we have an illustration of\\nthe importance and the military necessity of possessing those\\nislands. The present war was begun for the declared purpose of\\nexpelling Spain from Cuba and liberating the struggling people\\nof that island; but once involved in war, it is the duty of the\\nPresident, who is Commanrler of the Army and Navy, to strike at\\nSpain wherever he can effectively; and a great and successful\\nblow was struck in Manila by gallant Admiral Dewey and hi3\\nfleet. [Applause.]\\nThere is no one in our country so recreant to his duty as an\\nAmerican that he would refuse to support the President in suc-\\ncoring Dewey after his magnificent victory, lying in Manila Bay,\\nholding in control the Spanish power there, but unable to land\\nfor want of reenf orcements and surrounded by millions of Spanish\\nsubjects. Yet it is not possible to send support to Dewey to-day\\nwithout taking on coal and supplies at Honolulu in the Hawaiian\\nIslands a neutral power.\\nBy the law of nations, that power is bound to refuse to allow\\nships engaged in war to take on supplies or stay in port over\\ntwenty-four hours and is liable for all damages to Spanish inter-\\nests caused by allowing the rules of neutrality in war to be vio-\\nlated by us. We are strong; Hawaii is weak. We absolutely\\nmust use that port, and do use it.\\nIf the rights and duties of neutrality were enforced by the Ha-\\nwaiian G-overnment, and the Monadnock and the Monterey, which\\nareleaving San Francisco for Manila, were compelled to go through\\nwith such coal as they could carry, they could not get half way\\nbefore their fires would go out and they would lie weltering, help-\\n3168", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "6\\nless, dead, like derelicts, in the Pacific. In order to reach the\\nPhilippine Islands it is a necessity that the transports, battle ships,\\nand other vessels of the fleet shall take on supplies at Honolulu,\\nand they are doing it.\\nIS OUR PRESENT POSITION HONORABLE?\\nThere is a feature connected with this that is humiliating to an\\nAmerican who loves the consistent dignity and honor of his coun-\\ntry and desires to have it command the respect of the world.\\nWithin the last two weeks 1 have heard, in conversation among\\nmembers of this House, expressions of great impatience at the\\nconduct of European powers, upon newspaper rumor that Span-\\nish ships of war had been permitted to recoal in one French\\nisland, that a Spanish ship of war had been aliowed to stay thir-\\nty-six hours in a port of another island belonging to France, that\\nsupplies had been derived by Spain from Germany, even in this\\ntime of war. The discontent expressed throughout our country\\nin the press was so wide, the criticism so sharp, that M. Hano-\\ntaux, the French minister of foreign affairs, in order to preserve\\nand promote amicable relations and kindly sentiments, made a\\npublic statement disposing of all these disquieting rumors, and\\ndeclaring that France loyally and faithfully observes and will\\nobserve her obligations as a neutral toward both belligerents\\neverywhere.\\nWhile we have been giving notice to France, Germany, and\\nGreat Britain that war was existing and calling their attention\\nto their duty as neutral powers, in order that they might issue\\nneutrality proclamations, while on the east we respectfully ap-\\nproached German William, who commands a hundred legions,\\nwith long formal notices of our belligerency, trusting that he\\nwould adhere to the rules of neutrality, we came on the west to\\nthe little Republic of Hawaii, and without a word of courtesy or\\nrequest took possession of all we cared to take, in utter contempt\\nof her neutrality, of our duties as a belligerent nation dealing\\nwith a neutral country, and in disregard of the heavy liabilities\\nwe forced upon Hawaii.\\nWe had even piled up 10,000 tons of coal in Honolulu Harbor\\nfor our Navy, a considerable part of it before the declaration of\\nwar. Yesterday came the news that the Charleston, one of our\\nbattle ships, entered the harbor of Honolulu without so much as\\nsaying by your leave, to stay there as long as she will. All the\\nother ships in the fleet going over to our Asiatic squadron do the\\nsame thing. We have the superior physical force to do this, but\\nwe are not in a position to do it with impunity in the face of the\\npublic opinion of the world, if we desire to command the respect\\nof mankind and our own self-respect.\\nTHE THREE RULES GOVERNING NEUTRALITY.\\nWhat is the law that governs the conduct of a neutral nation\\nand its liability? When the treaty of Washington was nego-\\ntiated in this city in 1871, the United States presented and pro-\\nposed three general rules which should be observed by a neu-\\ntral nation and determine its liability. The English refused to\\nassent to them in the language first proposed, and after long de-\\nbate and modification at last those rules were put in due form,\\naccepted, and solemnly placed in that famous treaty. Both na-\\ntions agreed to observe and be bound by them in future, and to\\ninvite the adherence and cooperation of all other nations.\\nYou have recently seen the spirit and substance of those rules\\n3168", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "7\\nreflected in the proclamations of neutrality issued by many nations.\\nThose famous rules sprang from our suggestion. Let me read\\ntheir words, and then see the liability to which we put a neutral\\nnation which, willingly or unwillingly, must submit to what we\\nare doing to-day at Honolulu, and notice especially the second\\nrule which we then pressed and now disregard, and under which\\nHawaii is liable to Spain. By the sixth article of the treaty of\\nWashington of 1871 a neutral is bound\\nFirst, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe\\nis intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which it is at\\npeace, and a,lso to use like diligence to prevent the departure f rom its juris-\\ndiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel\\nhaving been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction\\nto warlike use.\\nSecondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its porta\\nor waters as the base of naval operations against the other or for the pur-\\npose of renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms or the recruit-\\nment of men.\\nThirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and as to\\nall persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing\\nobligation and duty.\\nThat is the law of nations as we pressed it unsparingly, and un-\\nder which we collected $15,500,000 from Great Britain for depre-\\ndations committed on our interests by ships that had been coaled\\nor harbored in British ports in violation of that law. So for every\\ndamage done to Spanish interests by an American war ship which\\nhas been supplied, repaired, or coaled in the Sandwich Islands\\nthat Go?ernment, the property of the people of those islands, is\\nliable to pay to Spain the full amount of loss.\\nWhen this war is over and peace is declared, if the gentlemen\\nopposed to this resolution prevail and prevent annexation and\\ncontinue Hawaii s independent existence, if the liabilities of the\\nislands for the claims of Spain against the Republic of Hawaii\\nshould be referred to arbitration, and the President of the United\\nStates should be one of the arbitrators, he would have to vote to\\ncompel them to pay the last cent, no matter how vast might be\\nthe burden of taxation it would impose on that little people.\\nPRESSURE NOW BY FOREIGN POWERS.\\nNow, this is not a vague speculation. It is not merely hypo-\\nthetical. The property owners in the island are alarmed. The\\nforeign powers represented there are active. I hold in my hand a\\ndispatch from our minister at Honolulu of May 10. a part of which\\nI can not with propriety read, and have not authority to do so;\\nbut I will read this part:\\nThe strongest influence has been brought to bear upon the Government\\nurging it to proclaim neutrality, give notice to the Bennington to leave port,\\nand invite the cooperation of other powers to protect the neutrality ot the\\ngroup.\\nHe proceeds to state that this is the opinion of the diplomatic\\ncorps here, and not only them, but the foreign merchants also,\\nand I regret to say many who heretofore have been classed as\\nAmerican sympathizers and urgent annexationists. Do you won-\\nder at them? With the prospect of such trouble and taxation\\namounting to confiscation, fearing that the United States, with\\nthe powerful influences at work in Washington hostile to Hawaii,\\nmay not come to their rescue, when we have not given a hint, much\\nless a pledge, to stand between the little Republic and danger, do\\nyou wonder that merchants and all property owners are disquieted?\\nBat without any words from us or any assurance from our Gov-\\nernment, notwithstanding the pressure to which it has been sub-\\n34:8", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "8\\njected, the brave little Hawaiian Government, loving America\\nbetter than Spain and confident in the justice of the great Ameri-\\ncan people as a child trnsts its father, remains unchanged in its\\npurpose. [Applause.]\\nAre you not as Americans proud of that little colony, the\\nonly true American colony, the only spot on earth beyond our\\nboundaries in the wide world where our country is preferred\\nabove all others? [Renewed applause.] That steadfast body of\\nmen, pressed and menaced by the influence of so many empires\\nand kingdoms, threatening them with the danger that would fol-\\nlow if they permitted the American flag to stay in their harbor,\\nremained constant in their devotion to the colors they loved and\\nthe people they always trusted. They are the same men who,\\nwhen threatened with an unscrupulous, corrupt, and arbitrary\\nmonarchy, which had violated the constitution, besieged the King\\nin his palace and shook his throne, overcame his army, and com-\\npelled him to swear observance of the constitution which he had\\nviolated.\\nThe same resolute men drove a worthless Queen from the throne\\nwhen she again attempted to overthrow the constitution and de-\\nstroy the guaranties of property the woman who, when she\\ntalked with Minister Willis of restoration, wished one condition,\\nthat she might behead the Americans. I have no apology to make\\nfor men sprung from our blood who have borne themselves with\\nsuch enlightenment, courage, and energy as these men have done\\n[applause] whose only fault is that they love our flag more than\\ntheir own. They love the flag under which many of them once\\nfought. Some of them fought under another, the bonnie blue\\nflag, during our great war; but at heart brave Americans all, they\\nhave united there to sustain the cause of the United States in this\\nwar with Spain, animated by a love of American institutions and\\nlove of liberty. They are men who can not be intimidated or\\nturned aside from their purpose, men who have successfully re-\\nsisted every influence to bring them under the control of other\\nforeign governments or any domestic tyranny.\\nOITR NATIONAL HONOR IN QUESTION.\\nThis is a very practical and important question with them, and\\nit is important to us. I said we had only the question of interest\\nto consider here to-day, whether it would be advantageous to ua\\nto annex. Have we not also a high question of national honor?\\nWhile we are demanding the observance of neutrality by other\\nnations, we disregard it ourselves. We are compelled to it by\\nmilitary necessity. That is the fact. What is the honorable so-\\nlution? Annex them and end it all. In a war of defense, as I\\nhave stated, these islands are to us indispensable. We find, too,\\nthat in this contest with Spain, which has taken the form of of-\\nfensive war, as we are attacking them in the Orient, we are com-\\npelled to use them in order to support Dewey.\\nDANGER OF DELAY.\\nCan we put this question off indefinitely? Can we play with\\nour duty under the law of nations, or shall we try to turn about\\nand treat them sincerely as neutral? We know that the actual\\nreal neutrality of the islands would to-day work us a great injury.\\nThe minority propose that we should guarantee the independence\\nof the islands, which, of course, perpetuates their neutrality and\\nputs us in a position that we can not endure.\\nMr. JOHNSON of Indiana. I hope the gentleman will not turn\\n8468", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "9\\ntoo much to one side. If he turns too short to the right, gentle-\\nmen can not hear him on that side, and if he turns too sharp to\\nthe left we can not hear him on this; and we all want to hear the\\ngentleman.\\nMr. H1TT. I appreciate the gentleman s suggestion, as it implies\\nthat my remarks have his attention.\\nWe can not afford to let them alone. We must possess and\\nfortify and hold and use them or leave them to their fate. The\\nother side of the House propose to guarantee their independence\\nby a declaration of Congress. That is a mere matter of words,\\nand when war arises words are brushed aside and armies and navies\\ndecide; and we should prepare not by declarations, but by taking\\nthe islands. Besides, independence implies all the duties and\\nrights of neutrality. The gentlemen would put our Government in\\nthe dishonorable position of declaring and guaranteeing Hawaiian\\nindependence as a neutral nation at the very moment when we are\\ndisregarding their neutrality and independence.\\nTHEIR FUTURE THREATENED.\\nThey can not remain as they are. The future is threatening.\\nSagacious statesmen have long f oreseen it.\\nMr. Willis, whom so many old members will recollect as a valu-\\nable member of this House, was sent to these islands by Mr. Cleve-\\nland to demand the overthrow of the republican government.\\nWe all recollect his dispatches. Many of us had the advantage\\nof conversation with him when he returned to this country.\\nRISING POWER OF JAPAN IN HAWAII.\\nIn one of those dispatches he mentioned, incidentally, what he\\nalso said here in conversation, that far the most threatening fact\\nin the condition of the islands was the rapid growth of the Japanese\\nelement, and the purpose for which it was being sent there. There\\nare over 24,000 Japanese on the island. They are mostly men,\\ngrown men; 19,000 of them are men.\\nIf they voted, it would be converted into a Japanese common-\\nwealth immediately. This is not a light thing.\\nA BIT OF HISTORY.\\nOver twelve years ago the planters, desirous of having other\\nlabor to diversify their Chinese and Portuguese labor, tried to have\\nan additional supply from Japan. An arrangement was made,\\nwhich was put into a convention in 1886, permitting the Japanese\\nImmigration Company to send over Japanese laborers upon due\\nauthorization from the Hawaiian Government. These Japanese\\ncame at first in small numbers; but pretty soon they began to come\\nfaster, and the Japanese Government, which is directed by able\\nstatesmen, anxious to take advantage of all opportunities, made a\\ndemand that these Japanese subjects going there should have the\\nsame rights as the natives.\\nA JAPANESE FUTURE NOW PLAINLY THREATENED THEM.\\nThat startled the Hawaiian Government. That was what Mr.\\nWillis referred to when we met him here in conversation. The\\ndemand was ingeniously presented and energetically sustained.\\nIt might seem surprising that such a demand should be made. It\\nwas based upon an old treaty made by Japan in 1873 with one of\\nthe kings, which it was claimed granted to all Japanese forever\\nthe rights of the most favored nation. In truth, that treaty re-\\nlated only to traders and their privileges in the ports, and was so\\nmeant. It gave to Japanese liberty to come with ships and car-\\ngoes to ports where trade with other nations was permitted, where\\n3468", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "10\\ntliey might hire houses and warehouses and trade, enjoying the\\nsame privileges as were granted to other nations.\\nHowever, it did not amount to anything without rinding a\\nfavored nation. They found an old treaty, made way back in\\n1863, by one of the native kings with Spain, drawn apparently in\\nvery liberal terms, and meant to enabie the traders to come and\\ntrade in the ports, which provided that they should enjoy the\\nsame rights and privileges which are granted to natives.\\nSo, by carrying over these privileges given to Spanish traders\\nas such by a Kanaka king thirty-five years ago, and under which\\nSpain had never thought of claiming the voting franchise, by dis-\\ntributing them to the Japanese traders in 1873 they spread them\\nout in their demand over the whole Japanese population, laborers\\nand all. That population was being poured in at a tremendous\\npace, sometimes 1,000 a week, and they would have soon over-\\nwhelmed everything on the island by sheer numbers. The Ha-\\nwaiian Republic made its utmost endeavors to struggle against\\nthis flood. They protested, they denied any such interpretation\\nof a treaty which concerned not laborers, but merely traders, such\\nas came on trading voyages in that old time.\\nThey demanded that only those should land who had permits by\\nthe convention of 1886. They adopted a police restriction against\\npaupers, such as all governments have a right to make. The po-\\nlice regulation required every one who came to have $50. The\\nimmigration company in Japan was up to the exigency. They\\nsent them still without permits and met the pauper restriction by\\na curious device. As the coolie left the vessel to go off, he was\\nhanded $50. which he took in one hand, and after he passed the\\ninspector he handed it back to the Japanese agent; and so they\\npretended to comply with the literal terms of the restriction.\\nThe Hawaiian Government would not submit to such proceed-\\nings. They arrested those without permits or bona fide money\\nand turned back hundreds of them\u00e2\u0080\u0094 over 1,100. The Japanese\\nGovernment were in dead earnest by this time. The game was in\\nsight. If they could once get these men in sufficient numbers\\nthere with the voting power, they would soon turn the whole Gov-\\nernment into a Japanese commonwealth, and then they would\\nquickly end the reciprocity treaty with the United States and\\nall our special rights to Pearl Harbor or anything else. Japan sent\\na ship of war, which might well alarm them, and a high official\\nwith it, who demanded that the permit should not be required, and\\nthat they should be free to come in as voluntary immigrants\\nwithout stint; that Hawaii had no right to inquire into the bona\\nfide character of the fifty-dollar transaction, and presented a great\\nclaim for indemnity to those turned back.\\nThe little Republic held out stoutly and asked for arbitration.\\nJapan said, We will arbitrate; we will soon let you know ex-\\nactly what we will do; and the next month they said they would\\narbitrate all questions between the two countries except as to the\\nbona fide character of the fifty-dollar transaction and the permit\\nfor immigration, nor would they arbitrate the treaty-construction\\nquestion. In short, they were willing to refer to arbitration\\neverything except the questions to be arbitrated. The horizon\\nlooked dark for Hawaii.\\nBut at this point the little Republic made a treaty of annexa-\\ntion with the United States, and Japan learned that they could\\nnot discuss the matter further with them, because they had made\\na treaty of annexation with the United States, which, by its very\\nnature, would extinguish all other treaties. Even that did not stop\\n34G8", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "11\\nJapan, and she made an earnest protest to the United States\\nagainst the treaty of annexation. Our Government answered\\npromptly that Japan was not concerned in it; that we could deal\\nonly with the Hawaiian Republic, and refused to consider the pro-\\ntest, and this in such terms that Japan formally withdrew it.\\nBut she has not withdrawn these claims, she has not withdrawn\\nthe demand against the Hawaiian Government of the right to\\npour in Japanese without permit, or the right to demand for all\\nJapanese any privileges or rights of the natives, which would\\ninclude the right to vote and hold office.\\nNow, suppose we reject this offer of the Hawaiian Republic to\\njoin our country and become part of us. They are then left an\\nindependent government, with no hope of joining us, and become\\nresponsible for their own international relations and must answer\\nto Japan. If Japan should succeed in her contention as to the\\nold treaty rights, her people will vote and soon change the ad-\\nministration of affairs there. They would elect their own officials\\nand government in Hawaii.\\nRECIPROCITY AND PEARL HARBOR RIGHTS THREATENED.\\nThey could at once attack the reciprocity treaty with the United\\nStates. By the terms of that treaty either party may terminate\\nit on twelve months notice. Pearl Harbor is therein granted to\\nus; that is, we have a right to enter the harbor to improve it and\\nuse it as a coaling and naval station.\\nWe have never done any of these things. The entrance has not\\neven been opened. No ship of ours has gone in there. Nothing\\nwhatever has been done in that direction. I tried vainly to have\\nan appropriation made by Congress over a year ago to have the\\nharbor opened and improved and our flag raised, in order to\\nstrengthen our title by possession, so that when the question of\\nour tenure should come up we might have that point in our\\nfavor\u00e2\u0080\u0094 an important point in any contention which might arise\\nunder international law. But since we have done nothing the\\ncase stands thus: The Pearl Harbor grant to us in the reciprocity\\ntreaty was in a new article, Article II, added when the treaty\\nwas renewed in 1887. After that amendment had been put on in\\nthe Senate, and before exchange of ratifications of the renewed\\nreciprocity treaty thus modified, there was an exchange of official\\nnotes between Minister Carter, of the Hawaiian Islands, and Mr.\\nBayard, Secretary of State of the United States.\\nMr. Carter stated that they wanted it distinctly understood\\nthat in assenting to the Senate provision in a reciprocity treaty\\ngranting to the United States the use of Pearl Harbor as a coaling\\nstation they did not propose any derogation of the sovereignty or\\njurisdiction of the Hawaiian Islands or any cession of territory\\nwhatever; that it was to be regarded as a privilege granted as com-\\npensation for the advantages they obtained by reciprocity, and\\nthat with the cessation of reciprocity the Pearl Harbor grant\\nwould cease.\\nMr. Bayard s words in reply, are conclusive. He said:\\nNo ambiguity or obscurity in that amendment is observable: and I can\\ndiscern therein no subtraction from Hawaiian sovereignity over the harbor\\nto which it relates, nor any language importing a longer duration for the\\ninterpolated Article II than is provided for in Article I of the supplementary\\nconvention.\\nArticle I provides that this arrangement may be abrogated on\\n\u00c2\u00a9ne year s notice. There is our tenure of Pearl River.\\nMr. TAWNEY. Is it not a fact that under that grant the Gov-\\n3168", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "12\\neminent of the United States obtains absolutely nothing except\\nthe use of the water that we obtain no land at all for the pur-\\npose of utilizing the harbor as a coaling station?\\nMr. H1TT. I will read the language of Article II:\\nHis Maiesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government\\nof the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River,\\nin the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair\\nstation for the use of the vessels of the United States, and to that end the\\nUnited States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things\\nneedful to the purpose aforesaid.\\nAs the honorable gentleman says, we get nothing in that grant\\nbut the use of the water.\\nMr. Speaker, I have held the floor so much longer than I in-\\ntended that I will hasten to conclude.\\nCOMMERCIAL INTERESTS.\\nThe commercial value of the islands, the great interests that\\nare to be promoted or are to languish, dependent upon our pos-\\nsession of the islands, which are the crossing place of almost all\\nthe lines of steamers in that sea, have been often discussed. We\\nhave a very large trade there, over $18,000,000 annually of late years,\\nand increasing. Not only do we admit their unrefined sugar free\\nto our country, but, under the reciprocity treaty, they admit our\\nproducts free of duty, and last year we sold to them \u00c2\u00a76,800,000\\nworth of goods.\\nOf course, if the islands are diverted to other control if that\\ntreaty terminates we will rapidly lose their trade. At present\\nthey purchase from us three-fourths of all their imports. We\\nhave a great shipping trade there, American ships carrying nearly\\nall the trade of the island. Honolulu is the only port in the world\\nwhere American shipping is so greatly in the ascendant as to out-\\nnumber that of all other countries put together. Of the seven\\ntrans-Pacific steamship lines, six make Honolulu a way station.\\nShall we let it pass into rival or hostile control?\\nMr. GAINES. I understand from reliable sources that the pop-\\nulation of that island is more or less afflicted with leprosy. Will\\nthe gentleman please let us know what are the facts on that point?\\nCHARACTER Off THE POPULATION\u00e2\u0080\u0094 LEPROSY.\\nMr. H1TT. The population of the island. 109,000, is a mixed\\npopulation. About half, or nearly half, are Asiatic Chinese and\\nJapanese. About twenty to twenty-five thousand are people of Eu-\\nropean or American origin a good many Americans, a good many\\nGermans, British, and a large number Portuguese and other na-\\ntionalities. This Caucasian element is the strong intellectual and\\nindustrial force of the island. The Portuguese are people who\\nhave been there for some time. More than half of them were born\\non the island; were educated in the schools there, which are simi-\\nlar to the schools here, and those children speak English as an\\nordinary American child. There is little or no leprosy among\\nthem or any cleanly, highly civilized people anywhere. After\\nannexation the Asiatics would rapidly disappear in numbers\\nunder the operation of our laws and under the penal code of the\\nislands, which would send back Chinese laborers very soon.\\nThe contract system would be terminated. The immigration\\nfrom this country would no doubt increase. I have seen little\\nreason to believe that there would be any difficulty whatever in\\nregard to any maladies save among those Asiatic elements and\\nthe Kanakas. There is leprosy, brought to the islands, it is said,\\nby the Chinese. I am not familiar with the facts, personally,\\nnever having visited the islands. There is a vague impression,", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "13\\nespecially among Bible readers, who are very prevalent in this\\nHouse [laughter J, as to that word leprosy in descriptions of the\\nislands, which is not correct as to the form of disease called lep-\\nrosy as it exists in Hawaii, and which I have myself often seen in\\nthe Orient.\\nIt is a malady that rarely affects people of the Caucasian race\\nof the better class, who use an abundance of soap and water. It\\nis not contagious in the ordinary sense. Why, I have seen chil-\\ndren in the huts of lepers in Turkey, sons and daughters of lepers,\\n8 and 10 years of age, who were beautiful children, and who had\\nnever been away from the leper village. That is a common sight\\nin the Orient. It is not the loathsome, running disease mentioned\\nso often in the Bible. It seems to be a paralysis and withering of\\nthe ears, fingers, etc., and they drop away painlessly.\\nIt is communicated by long association and intercourse, but it\\nis not communicated like the smallpox, or yellow fever, or any of\\nthose rapidly contagious maladies. The present vigorous, well-\\norganized, well arranged government of the islands has segregated\\nit at Mo .okai; and though the elements there for the spread of\\nsuch maladies are very favorable, in that oriental population, and\\namong those weak and diseased natives, yet it is a comparatively\\nsmall detraction from the condition of the general population of\\nthe island, and it would probably never be found to affect us in\\nthis country. We have had it in a sporadic way in our country for\\na long time and it is controlled. There is a leper colony in Louisi-\\nana and one in Canada. I will leave that question to experts.\\nMr. LOVE. I should like to ask the gentleman what number\\nof American citizens there are in the island?\\nMr. HITT. I do not think there are any American citizens ex-\\ncept some travelers and sojourners. There are many people there\\nof American origin, but they are Hawaiians, some of them sons\\nand grandsons of men who went from the United States. But\\nthey are not American citizens, except partially, by a peculiar\\nprovision of their law. which allows men to retain a title to for-\\neign citizenship. I think there are a good many of them; but\\nwhat is ordinarily meant by strictly American citizens relates to\\npeople who travel or sojourn there from this country and go away.\\nThere are several thousands there of American origin, and who\\nare very strongly American at heart.\\nMr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I have listened with a great\\ndeal of interest to what the gentleman has said about this; but\\nthere is one phase of the question that I think the House would\\nhear with a great deal of interest, and that is the result and effect\\nof annexation, not upon the commercial or military welfare of\\nthis country, but as a departure from the established customs of\\nour country. I should like to hear the gentleman upon that phase\\nof the question.\\nNO NEW POLICY.\\nMr. HITT. This measure does not launch us upon any new\\npolicy, as I tried to explain, but the importance of the question\\nlies, first of all, in the necessity of possessing these islands for the\\ndefense of our western shore, the pro tec tion and promotion of our\\ncommercial interests, and the welfare and security of our own coun-\\ntry generally. Mr. Blaine stated it very well in a dispatch where\\nhe said the Panama Canal connecting our two shores, facilitating\\ntheir defense and communication, was a purely American ques-\\ntion, and that the possession of the Sandwich or Hawaiian Islands,\\ngiving them strategic control of the North Pacific, was one of\\npurely American policy.", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "14\\nIn the whole of what I have said I have discussed this question\\nsolely as it affected our own country. The population there is so\\nsmall that it can not be considered an element of much compara-\\ntive importance. It is not one seven-hundredth part of our pop-\\nulation at home. It is the importance of the group as a point,\\nwhat military and naval men call a strategic point, that makes it\\nof extreme importance and should make us prompt to seize upon\\nthe first opportunity to have rightful possession of the islands.\\nSUGAR COMPETITION.\\nSomething is said about the danger to our beet-sugar interests\\nin this country from the competition of Hawaiian cane sugar\\nafter annexation coming in free of duty. There may well be\\nsome persons connected with the sugar-refining i merest who are\\nhostile to annexation; but the producers of beet sugar or unre-\\nfined sugar have nothing to apprehend. The total available\\nnatural cane lands in the islands do not amount to four townships\\nof our land. They could not supply a tenth of what we consume.\\nBesides, annexation will make no difference to the farmer here,\\nas the raw or unrefined sugar of the Hawaiian Islands now comes\\nin as free of duty under the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty as it\\nwould after annexation, and the only man who is affected is the\\nrefiner, who is protected now by the tariff against refined Ha-\\nwaiian sugar. Benned sugar does not come in free under the\\ntreaty, and if annexation comes the refined sugar will come in\\nfree, and of course the refiners are hostile to it.\\nMr. RIDGELY. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign\\nAffairs stated what is a very important matter in regard to the\\ntreaty existing between the Sandwich Islands and Japan. Under\\nthat treaty the Japanese Government claimed the right of citizen-\\nship for Japanese subjects who are now on the island, or who\\nmay hereafter go there under this treaty. Now, my question is,\\nif we accept the islands under the present bill, will we have to ac-\\ncept those Japanese subjects under that treaty?\\nMr. HITT. Not at all\u00e2\u0080\u0094 not as citizens.\\nMr. RIDGELY. And involve ourselves in that affair.\\nMr. HITT. This action extinguishing the sovereignty of Ha-\\nwaii and incorporating the islands in the United States would\\nabrogate all her treaties. The only part that would survive would\\nbe claims arising or accruing prior to this time under former\\ntreaties. All treaties fall with the extinction of the existence of\\na nation. Their foreign affairs pass under our control.\\nPOSSIBLE STATEHOOD.\\nMr. CL ARDY. The gentleman has very interestingly and very\\ninstructively explained various features of this question, but there\\nis one point that 1 should like to know still further about, and that\\nis this: Suppose these islands are received into the United States\\nunder this resolution, what does this Administration intend, or\\nwhat do the people of the United States intend, to do with them?\\nWill they be admitted as a State? It seems to me that is a very\\nimportant question.\\nMr. HITT. 1 am not a mind reader, and the Almighty alone\\ncan answer what is in men s minds.\\nMr. CLARDY. The gentleman ought to have some idea of\\nwhat the Government intends to do.\\nMr. HITT. You will have to find that out from other sources.\\nBy the terms of this resolution all such questions will be deter-\\nmined by Congress, and Congress will and should do what the", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "15\\nAmerican people want done. The President will have no power\\nover the subject.\\nMr. RIDGELY. Do the Japanese in Hawaii vote?\\nMr. H1TT. They do not vote now, and the disposition and\\nmode of government of those islands and everything connected\\nwith them is, under the terms of the joint resolution, lei t in the\\ncontrol of Congress.\\nMr. FLEMING. I should like to ask this question, which I\\nthink is a legitimate one: What is the personal opinion of the gen-\\ntleman himself as to the status that the Hawaiian Islands ought\\nto occupy in future developments of the country? I should like\\nto know if the gentleman has any information on the subject.\\nMr. HITT. It is nothing but the private opinion of one indi-\\nvidual, and is of little value.\\nMr. FLEMING. It would carry a great deal of weight, and it\\nis a question that is troubling some of us as to the development\\nthat is to come in the future.\\nMr. HITT. It is a development that relates to the future.\\nChief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott decision, speaking of the\\nconstitutionality of the acquisition of territory, said that there was\\nno power granted in the Constitution of the United States to ac-\\nquire any territory in any way; that there was only a grant to\\nCongress to admit States. A State is a civil political organization\\nof people occupying territory or land previously possessed by the\\nUnited States. That has been the fact as to all States admitted\\nexcept Texas, which was acquired as a Territory or possession,\\nand admitted as a State at the same time.\\nJudge Taney added that in the construction of the power to\\nadmit States it authorizes the acquisition of territory not fit for\\nadmission at the time, and the power to acquire territory for that\\npurpose rests upon the same discretion, and is a question for the\\npolitical department of the Government.\\nIn truth, it is impossible to imagine a sovereign state without\\nthe power of increasing its boundaries. It enters into the very\\nidea of sovereignty, and Chief Justice Fuller said in the Mormon\\nChurch case that the power to make acquisitions of territory by\\nconquest, by treaty, or by cession is an incident of national sov-\\nereignty. Chief Justice Taney said in his supplemental remark,\\nafter his comments on the restricted grant in the Constitution to\\nadmit States, that territory that was acquired was always ac-\\nquired with a theoretical view to ultimately being a State or a\\npart of a State, a condition of statehood in some form at some time.\\nMr. FLEMING. That is what I meant.\\nMr. HITT. When we admitted those vast stretches of ice and\\nrock in Alaska that border upon the Arctic Ocean it was with the\\ntheoretical view that some day, under some conditions, they might\\nbe a part of the United States as States, not merely as a landed\\npossession or territory; but we have waited a generation, and we\\nmay wait a thousand years. There are gentlemen sitting all\\naround me who represent districts in States made out of territory\\nwhich we kept waiting the greater part of a century. How long\\nwas the region which is Montana a territorial possession? I do\\nnot know what will be the ultimate destiny of this little group of\\nislands and their population, but we may imagine that, with the\\nassent of California or Oregon or Washington, they may become\\na county or counties and a part of one of those States, and thus\\nassume the quality of statehood. But this I give merely as a sug-\\ngestion, and representing the opinion of nobody else, and 1 did\\nnot intend to bring it into the debate.\\n3468", "height": "4336", "width": "2617", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\niiiiiiiiiiiiii mil\\n019 944 337 9\\n16\\nMr. SIMS. I want to ask about the expense that it will be to\\nthis Government to maintain this territory.\\nMr. HITT. That is a question no man can answer with pre-\\ncision. It is a well-managed little republic on a sound financial\\nbasis. There is a balance to credit now in the budget of the\\nislands. They are not running in debt, but have a margin of sur-\\nplus. I trust we can administer them as economically as that Gov-\\nernment does. With the gentleman who has asked me the question\\nand other gentlemen who will be here in Congress, I have confi-\\ndence enough in their wisdom to feel sure that the affairs of a little\\nadded population, numbering but one seven-hundredth part of our\\nown people, will be successfully cared for in our future legislation.\\nI have detained the House very long, and I hope that I have not\\nfailed to answer any question.\\nMr. HENRY of Mississippi. If we take these islands and annex\\nthem, have we to pay anything in the way of debts?\\nMr. HITT. Weil,* they have assets and liabilities, the assets\\nbeing twice as great as the liabilities. We take both when we\\ntake the Government. There is a provision in the resolution that\\nthe debt shall not in any case exceed $4,000,000. The assets of the\\nislands are given in the statement of the financial officer showing\\nthat they are nearly twice that.\\nMr. HENRY of Mississippi. Do we assume the indebtedness?\\nMr. HITT. With their assets we take their liabilities. The\\nassets are $7,938,000, and the liabilities about 83,900.000.\\nMr. BARTLETT. Is there anything in the shape of paper\\nmoney or bills which this Government becomes responsible to re-\\ndeem; and if so. how much?\\nMr. HITT. There are liabilities; but they are all easily ascer-\\ntainable by the official reports before us. There are three series\\nof bonds, in all $3,330,200. There are deposits in postal savings\\nbank of $882.345. 29, making $4,212,545.29. less bond proceeds cash in\\nthetreasury of $221,565.90 and postal bank^eposits of $111. 371.04. in\\nall $332,936.94, leaving total net debt $3,879,608.35. I think there\\nare no other bills or paper money. It does not appear in the re-\\nport.\\nMr. BARTLETT. I understand that there are several hundred\\nthousand\u00e2\u0080\u0094 probably $280,000.\\nMr. HITT. It is a pretty sound Government financially; the\\npublic credit there is good.\\nI have consumed so much time I should ask the pardon of the\\nHouse. The consideration of this measure has been long deferred.\\nThere has been so much discussion throughout the country, such\\nmanifest impatience for its consideration here, that at last there\\nis a pretty clear perception by almost everyone that the annexa-\\ntion resolution before us is in response and obedience to the de-\\nmands of the whole country. I think the constituency of nine-\\ntenths of the gentlemen here, if they could utter their wiil by\\nvotes, would command us to promptly pass this resolution. Our\\nvotes in passing it will voice the earnest purpose of the American\\npeople; the conservative sentiment of the country is expressed by\\nit. as a measure for the welfare, for the security and prosperity\\nof the whole nation. Let us pass it and carry out the will of the\\nAmerican people. I thank the House for such patient attention.\\n[Loud applause.]\\n[Wednesday June 15, the question was taken and there were\\nyeas 209, nays 91 So the joint resolution was passed by the House. J\\n3168", "height": "4652", "width": "2832", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00hitt_0016.jp2"}}