{"1": {"fulltext": "49\\nT7\\n1", "height": "4812", "width": "2808", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4568", "width": "2764", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "e Relation of Berkeley s Later\\nto His Earlier Idealism\\nBY\\nCARL V. TOWER, A.M., Ph.D.,\\nINSTRUCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.\\nPRESENTED TO THE\\nFACULTY OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE\\nOF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.\\nANN ARBOR:\\n1899.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4568", "width": "2732", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "The Relation of Berkeley s Later\\nto His Earlier Idealism\\njP BY\\nCARL V. TOWER, A.M., Ph.D.,\\nm\\nINSTRUCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.\\nPRESENTED TO THE\\nFACULTY OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE\\nOF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.\\nANN ARBOR:\\n1899.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "429744\\nTHE INLAND PRESS, ANN ARBOR, MICH.", "height": "4512", "width": "2772", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "ERRATA.\\nPage 7. Note 1, read p. 176.\\nPage 12. Note 5, read note 3, p. 47.\\nPage 13. Note 1, read note 3, page 47.\\nPage 20. Line 10, read muscle instead of muscular.\\nPage 55- Line 29, read mists instead of midst.\\nPage 66. Line 24, read Humian instead of human.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4584", "width": "2752", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nCHAPTER I.\\n1. Introduction.\\n2. Abstract Ideas.\\n(a) Abstract Images.\\n(b) Universals.\\nCHAPTER II.\\nIdeas and Things.\\n1. Idea as Mere Sensation.\\n2. Idea as Percept.\\n3. Spirit, Phenomenon and Idea\\nCHAPTER III. Constitution of Experience.\\n1. Relations.\\n(a) Arbitrary Connection.\\n(b) Necessary Connection.\\n2. Notions and Their Objects.\\n(a) Notion of Relations.\\n(b) Notion of Spirit.\\nCHAPTER IV. Conclusion.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4592", "width": "2768", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER I.\\nI. INTRODUCTION.\\nOn one of the pages of Berkeley s Commonplace Book, the\\nauthor notes that nothing can be a proof against one side of a\\ncontradiction that bears equally hard upon the other. One might\\nbe inclined to admit that a just estimate of the Berkeleian philos-\\nophy resolves itself into this reflection, if it were not that historical\\nevidence decidedly favors a more positive interpretation. Unfor-\\ntunately, the true appreciation of the attitude adopted toward\\nReality by a philosopher who, like Berkeley, is not a system-maker\\nscarcely a systematizer of philosophic conceptions is often\\npartially obscured by the fact that the positive construction placed\\nupon his work by subsequent thinking sometimes emphasizes the\\nnegative element of his philosophy, and so isolates it from the\\ncourse of later philosophical development. This is a truism,\\nbut its explanation simply is that the spirit of philosophy respects\\nthe system by which its course of development is for a time\\napparently arrested. When theory succeeds theory in rapid suc-\\ncession, the progress of thought is in single file. A feature, an\\naspect, is sufficient to constitute a farther step in advance. The\\nvalue of the theory is merely extensive, while that of the system is.\\nalso intensive. The system serves always to recall the personality\\nof the system maker, the theory is merged in its later outgrowths,\\napart from which it is abstract and featureless.\\nBerkeley was not the creator of a system. Rather was he a\\nman with a theory of life, of morals, of Reality. Thus it is not\\nsurprising if, in his philosophy, the many definite tendencies in the\\ndirection of Empiricism have come to be regarded as almost the\\nonly positive elements in his conception of the world. 1 The his-\\ntory of philosophy makes evident the value of Berkeley as a link\\nin the empirical succession from Locke to Mill, though with\\nregard to his philosophy as a whole, it may likewise be said that\\nEmpiricism forms a negative rather than a positive element. The\\nlines of thought followed by him in his earlier metaphysical under-\\ntaking are undoubtedly those which make most clearly and defi-\\nnitely toward the empirical views adopted by his successors. It\\n1 In its best known form, as a factor in the history of philosophy, only an\\nempirical idealism. Burt: A History of Modern Philosophy T (1892).", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "6\\nwas, perhaps, unfortunate for the later acceptance of the Berke-\\nleian theory of immaterialism, in a form more acceptable to its\\noriginator, that the new doctrine found so ready an acceptance\\nas to what have since been regarded as its essential features: The\\nCartesian dualism of thought and existence, so haltingly maintained\\nby Locke 1 in his doctrine of substance, added to Berkeley s own\\nnominalistic tendency and further sustained by his religious re-\\npugnance to an atheistical, unthinking matter were the forces\\nat work in the life of Berkeley, which early culminated in his view\\nthat, upon the existence or non-existence of abstract matter, there\\nlay at stake the consistency of human reason with itself, and our\\nonly warrant for the objectivity of the ideals which human reason\\nsets for itself. It may indeed be objected that these ideals, being\\nso apparently of a theological cast, were the rocks and stubble\\nwhich prevented the successful spading up of false notions und pre-\\njudices so vigorously begun. But as Berkeley does not lay claim\\nto a philosophy without presuppositions, so neither does he regard\\nthe prepossessions of his opponents as in themselves obstacles to\\ntruth, provided only the motives underlying them be not inherently\\nself-contradictory.\\nWhatever may have been the motive which determined Berke-\\nley to become the promulgator of immaterialism, the discoverer\\nhimself seemed scarcely aware that the world was already ripe for\\nhis views. In the enthusiasm which formed the necessary accom-\\npaniment of the awakening consciousness of his mission in the\\nworld of philosophy, Berkeley was in part led to misconstrue\\nthe task which he had set for himself. Aware that he was to inau-\\ngurate a revolution in the current modes of metaphysical thinking,\\nand mindful of the mighty sect of men which was to oppose\\nhim, the single problem of the existence or non-existence of mat-\\nter assumed for him a size disproportionate to its true significance,\\nin view of the other questions which an idealistic philosophy is\\ncalled upon to solve. Immaterialism 2 is far removed from idealism\\nin any positive and definite sense, though the former meant for\\nBerkeley the latter, and accordingly upon the doctrine of the im-\\nmateriality of matter the first step in the idealistic progression\\nwhich ensued, his early efforts are chiefly directed. The success\\nwhich he attained in the clear and forcible series of arguments em-\\nbodied in the Principles of Human Knowledge, was at the time\\ngrudgingly attested in comments, which, however, may best be ex-\\npressed in the words of the more favorably disposed critic, Hume:\\ni Cf. T. H. Webb: Veil of Isis, p. 12.\\n2 It is the negative side of his philosophy to which\u00e2\u0080\u0094 unfortunately, but\\nnaturally he was led in his early works to give the greatest relative considera-\\ntion. Morris: British Thought and Thinkers p. 221.", "height": "4592", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "Berkeley s arguments says he, admit of no answer and produce\\nno conviction. 1\\nBut the lessons in scepticism which Hume drew from them\\nwere foreign, not only to the spirit and intention of Berkeley, but\\nin not a few instances, even in his earlier philosophy seemed directly\\nopposed to the mould in which it was cast. Berkeley certainly over-\\nshot his mark in his too vigorous insistence upon the sensuous\\ncharacter of all that we know; and in consequence the objectivity\\nof thought relations, which any idealism of value must in some\\nsense lay claim to discover, appear, indeed, in his philosophy as\\na background, but highly colored with theological notions. His\\nidealism, being a theory rather than a system, the various aspects\\nwhich it assumes are external to one another; yet one form of ideal-\\nism drops out of sight, rather than is premeditatedly abandoned\\nfor another. He runs the whole gamut of idealisms from phe-\\nnomenalism to what is in the end very like Platonic Realism.\\nThere is something kaleidescopic about this progression, one can-\\nnot say that there is any true line of demarcation between the\\nearlier and the later, although the fundamental difference is appa-\\nrent. Berkeley never deepens his conceptions to the extent of\\nfully ascertaining if they are in agreement or non-agreement with\\nthe propositions which form the starting point of his early posi-\\ntion. 2 Thus there results a number of seemingly heterogeneous\\nlines of thought which are, in great part, rather suggestions and\\nbeginnings in thought than steps in a course of logical development.\\nIf, then, our interpretation shall endeavor to determine the resultant\\nof these lines of thought it ought to effect this, not by a process of\\nsubjectively balancing the evidence fo-r or against the earlier or the\\nlater theory as representative of Berkeley, but by taking such ex-\\nplicit utterances as he offers us in his general attitude toward phil-\\nosophy other than his own. Berkeley has most frequently been\\nregarded as an extreme Nominalist, and upon this basis largely\\nrests the claim of Empiricism upon him as its representative. This\\nNominalism, whether of an extreme or, as some would have it, of\\na modified type, is best set forth in his discussion of Abstract\\n1 Works; Hume IV, p. 181.\\n2 We may be inclined to wonder, says Balfour in his biographical introduc-\\ntion to Berkeley s works, that a man who had done so much before he was thirty, had\\nnot done much more by the time he was sixty. That he produced so\\nlittle in his maturer years is doubtless due in part to temperament, and to the dis-\\ntraction of an unsettled and wandering life, but it must also be largely attributed\\nto the almost total absence of intelligent criticism, either from friends or foes, under\\nwhich Berkeley suffered throughout the whole period during which criticism might\\nhave aroused him to make some serious effort to develop or to defend the work of\\nhis youth. The Works of George Berkeley, edited by George Sampson,", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "Ideas, which constitutes his Introduction to the Principles of Hu-\\nman Knowledge, and it is accordingly with this work as a basis\\nthat we shall introduce the first of the topics in this discussion.\\n2. ABSTRACT IDEAS.\\nz) Abstract Images.\\nThe philosophical discussions and dialogues of Berkeley every-\\nwhere abound in figures, and the effect of his metaphors is sometimes\\nto make one think that the Platonism of his later years was indeed the\\nundercurrent of his life, for a time obscured by the new discovery\\nwhich attracted him in his youth. The predominating figure which,\\nin his early philosophy, serves to clothe his conception of the\\nworld is that of the analogy of human language to a divine lan-\\nguage, which forms the interpretable system of nature. Our fail-\\nure to interpret correctly this divine nature-language is in a large\\nmeasure owing to our lack of appreciation of the true function of\\nhuman language.\\nNow Philosophers have generally regarded the paradoxes and\\ninconsistencies that reason is wont to encounter in its search for\\nmetaphysical truth as due to the inherent weakness of our faculties\\nwhich, being finite, are unable to penetrate into the inward\\nessence and constitution of things 1 in themselves infinite. But\\nit is a hard thing to suppose right deductions from true princi-\\nples should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained\\nor made consistent. 2 Human reason, we should think, ought, if\\nunhindered, to yield more satisfactory conclusions to the problems\\nwhich it has it self raised, and we should believe that God has\\ndealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a\\nstrong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of\\ntheir reach. 3\\nThe errors to which the untrammelled exercise of reason has\\ngiven rise have been attributed solely to the finitude of reason as\\nsuch, and it has not yet been sufficiently pointed out that the most\\nfruitful source of them is language. The flexibility of language,\\nwhich adapts it to ordinary intercourse and the common business\\nof life, becomes its chief difficulty when it is of necessity em-\\nployed in the nicer discriminations of metaphysics. Here as\\neverywhere the word is our master, or is likely to become so, if the\\nrelations which it bears to our reasoning be not definitely under-\\nstood.\\n1 Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, 2.\\n2 Ibid. 3.\\n3 Ibid.", "height": "4564", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "9\\nUsually the word may be said to signify a conscious process;\\nfrequently, also, it does not. In the former case a conscious con-\\ntent is the equivalent of the word, in the latter merely a cerebral\\nprocess. Fear, love, hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the\\nlike, arise immediately in the mind upon the perception of certain\\nwords, without any ideas coming between x or, on the other hand\\nthe word may arouse as its equivalent a more or less definite idea.\\nLanguage has thus other uses than that of arousing conscious pro-\\ncesses by coupling a word with a particular definitely recognized\\nconscious content or idea, since tne word may arouse to action or\\npassion without the intervention of the idea. Thus we see that a\\nword may stand for no idea at all, or it may stand for other par-\\nticular ideas than that of which it serves as the sign in any particu-\\nlar instance.\\nBut the adaptability of language to the demands made upon it\\nby ordinary life render it impossible for a word, by means of a fixed\\ndefinition, to correspond in every case to the same definite con-\\nscious content. The definition indeed serves to govern and\\nrestrict the corresponding idea to relation^ among other ideas to\\nwhich the definition is also applicable; but it is not true that the\\nword stands always for the same idea. The mistaken notion that\\nevery name has one only precise and settled signification 2 has\\noccasioned the belief in abstract ideas or abstract notions from\\nwhich has sprung much confusion in metaphysical thinking.\\nThus men have come to regard the concepts of qualities, or of\\nbeings, which include several coexistent qualities, as abstract ideas.\\nWe are now in a position to see a little way into the difficulty\\nwhich Berkeley finds with the abstract idea of his opponents.\\nWithout attempiing in this place to establish a rigid definition of\\nthe Berkeleyian idea, it may be noted that is is oftenest synonymous\\nwith the above acceptation of a particular, definite, recognizable\\ncontent of consciousness. The freedom which Locke allowed\\nhimself in the definition of idea as, whatever is the object of the\\nunderstanding when a man thinks 3 is a liberty which Berkeley\\ndoes nothing to restrict. The two conditions which it seems are\\neverywhere necessary to the idea are that it shall be (a) a content\\nof consciousness, (b) recognized as a definite content of conscious-\\nness, i. e., perceived.\\nNow the abstract idea appears in Berkeley s eyes to be in the\\nfollowing anomalous position. As idea, it must be recognizable as\\na definite content of consciousness, but, as abstract, it must so\\nit is claimed be different in kind from the particulars, out of which,\\n1 Principles of Human Knowledge; 20 of Introduction.\\n2 Ibid, g 18.\\n3 Essay concerning Human Understanding. Introduction, 8", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "10\\nby observation of their common likenesses, the abstract idea has\\nbeen formed. What Berkeley seems to say to his opponents in his\\npolemic against abstract ideas is in effect this: You tell me that\\nthere are such things as abstract ideas that besides the ideas of\\nsense, the ideas of imagination, the ideas perceived by attending\\nto the passions and operations of the mind, 1 the ideas of mem-\\nory, ete., etc., you have also ideas from which all particulars are\\nexcluded, and which, though relating to the particular ideas that\\nmay be subsumed under them, are not themselves particular. But\\nif these ideas for which you contend are anything at all, they are\\nrecognizable by you as definite conscious contents, and are thus\\nparticular, and, in so far, like the other particular ideas which you\\nhave. You can accordingly describe them, and, having recourse\\nto introspection, you must surely discover that all you have are\\nparticular ideas. By some of these ideas you may indeed denote\\nnumbers of other particular ideas but nowhere will you find the\\nthing you call abstract idea.\\nIf the foregoing is a correct interpretation of Berkeley s\\nthought about abstract ideas, it is easy to see that his difficulty\\nwith them lay in the unimaginableness of such things. An abstract\\nimage is, as Fraser says, manifestly absurd. 2 Taken in this sense\\nit is doubtful if Locke whom Berkeley seems to have chiefly in\\nmind ever seriously contended for such a thing. 3 On the other\\nhand, if Berkeley be not understood to have thus misconceived the\\ndoctrine of his opponent as grossly as ever Locke misconstrued\\nDescartes innate ideas, the distinction between his own view\\nand that of the upholder of abstract ideas is far less than is often\\nsupposed. For Berkeley by no means denies the possibility of\\nthere being general ideas. All he denies is that there are general\\nideas or general notions taken in the above sense of abstract\\nimages. Let us see if Locke s own description of abstract ideas\\nmay serve further to explain Berkeley s difficulties.\\nLocke says: The use of words then being to stand as out-\\nward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken\\nfrom particular things, if every particular idea that we take in\\nshould have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent\\nthis, the mind makes particular ideas received from particular\\nobjects to become general; which is done by considering them as\\nthey are in the mind such appearances separate from other exist-\\nences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or\\n1 Principles, i.\\n2 Selections, p 19, note.\\n3 Like Berkeley, Locke has everywhere a sober dread of abstraction, and\\nclings to the particular and concrete with a sense of the risk of losing the real in\\nthe emptiness of the universal. Locke s Essay Fraser s ed., vol. II, p. 101,\\nnote 2.", "height": "4596", "width": "2868", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "11\\nany other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction, whereby\\nideas taken from particular beings become general representatives\\nof all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable\\nto whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such pre-\\ncise naked appearances in the mind which Beckeley takes to mean\\nimages without considering how, whence, or with what others\\nthey come there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly\\nannexed to them) as the standards to rank real existences into sorts,\\nas they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accord-\\ningly. 1 r\\nNow this passage in which the doctrine of abstraction is ex-\\nplicitly set forth, does not of itself particularly favor Berkeley s\\ninterpretation of Locke, but the subsequent use which the latter\\nmakes of abstractions in which e. g. the idea of extension is treated\\nas something which we possess apart from the idea of that which\\nis extended, and the idea of hardness apart from that which is felt\\nthese, coupled with the passage immediately following the one\\nwe have just quoted, in which it is said that the having of gen-\\neral ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and\\nbrute, induce Berkeley to think that the having of abstract ideas\\nmeans the possession of a faculty the existence of which man is\\nnot able to verify by direct introspection of himself or by observa-\\ntion of the way in which objects come to be recognized in consci-\\nousness of a lower order than his own. In one of the dialogues\\nthere is to be found this passage: I understand that the several\\nparts of the world became gradually preceivable to finite spirits,\\nendowed with proper faculties. 2 If this maybe accepted as a\\nhint toward an indeal evolution or spiritual unfolding of nature, 3\\nit may be seen that Berkley would naturally rebel against the claim\\nthat man possesses a faculty so different in kind 4 from that belong-\\ning to animals of a lower order than himself, and so undesirable as\\nan element of his own consciousness. The abstract idea, in the\\nsense of abstract image that indescribable something which is\\nneither this nor that definite and particular thing, but which is set\\nover against the other definite and imaginable contents of consci-\\nousness an idea of this sort Berkeley claims it is impossible to\\nframe.\\n(b) Universals.\\nIt would be in a great measure to anticipate a discussion of\\nthe notion and its objects if we were at this point to dwell at length\\nupon Berkeley s positive conception of universals. Yet a few\\nLocke s Essay, Bk. II, Ch. XI, 9.\\n1 Ci Philonous 3d dialogue.\\n3 Cf. also, Siris, note 2 of Fraser s Selection s, p. 343.\\n4 Intro, to Principles, 11.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "12\\nwords may be sufficient to show that with the abstract idea, in any\\nother sense than that of abstract image, he finds no very great\\ndifficulty. He regards the abstract image as an absurdity because,\\nalthough a content of consciousness different in kind from particu\\nlars, it, however, always reduces itself to particulars which it pro-\\nfesses not to be. But, says he, it is to be noted that I do not\\ndeny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any\\nabstract general ideas; for, in the passage we have quoted wherein\\nthere is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they\\nare formed by abstraction after the manner set forth in sections 8\\nand 9, 1 which last I do not think a whit more needful for the\\nenlargement of knowledge than for communication. 2 It is, I\\nknow, a point much insisted on that all knowledge and demonstrtt-\\ntion are about universal notions, to which I fully agree; but then it\\ndoes not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstrac-\\ntion in the manner premised universality, so far as I can com-\\nprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive 8 nature or concep-\\ntion of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars\\nsignified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things,\\nnames, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are ren-\\ndered universal.\\nThus it is not the claim that we are able to generalize experi-\\nence by means of universal notions to which Berkeley takes\\nexception, but rather the claim, which rightly or wrongly he reads\\ninto Locke, that those notions are formed by abstraction in the\\nmanner premised. And it is not so much the process of abstrac-\\ntion that he objects to as the hypostatization of the abstraction\\nthus formed; for, thus hypostatized, it is the abstract image to\\nwhich every element of particularity is denied. The abstract\\nuniversal, in fulfilling its claim to be idea in consciousness, must\\nhave its sensuous aspect, and so must submit itself to the condition\\nof being particular, 5 though a particular with a universal reference;\\nbut this necessary element of particularity is denied it by its\\nclaimants; hence the falsity and uselessness of such an idea. But\\nit might be objected to Berkeley, this abstract universal has indeed\\na sensuous side, though the particularity of the idea does not neces-\\nsarily follow from this, and consequently it is not what you claim\\nit to be an abstract image. Thus it is surely possible to form the\\nidea of man in general which, in the meaning that it has for me, is\\n1 Introduction to Principles of Human Knowledge, 12.\\n2 Ibid. 15\\ni. e. As an inflexible quasi-entity in the form of abstract image, having no\\nrelation to the particular to which it is presumably applicable.\\n4 Introduction to Principles of Human Knowledge, 15.\\nv. note 2, p. 131 of this essay.", "height": "4592", "width": "2868", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "13\\ndifferent from the particular fleeting images which accompany this\\nabstract idea; and, as the latter has for me this universal meaning,\\nit is in consciousness a something distinct from the particular. To\\nthis we might, in behalf of Berkeley, ask in reply: Why then is it\\nnot the case that, granted the same premises, we march straight to\\nthe same conclusions? If we differ in our reasonings, is it not\\nbecause we differ in our experiences, and because, in consequence,\\nthe sensuous images, which are only the obverse of the universals\\nwe employ, necessarily have something to do with our conclusions?\\nIn the Commonplace Book, Berkeley instructs an imaginary reader\\nas follows: Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as\\noccasions of bringing into his mind determined significations\\nI desire and warn him not to expect to find truth in any book or\\nanywhere but in his own mind. Our assurance of truth, he seems\\nto imply, is in the correspondence of the experiences of finite\\nbeings; and hence, if we would have truth we must not neglect the\\nparticular sensuous aspect of our experience, nor yet regard it as a\\nhinderance to the universal which it bears within it. Not that we\\ncould ever attain truth by means of particulars which have no uni-\\nversal aspect, though every idea is indeed particular. If we will\\nannex a meaning to our words and speak only of what we can con-\\nceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which, consid-\\nered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to\\nrepresent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.\\nThe idea, then, which is in itself definite and particular, the\\nimage, and the conglomerate of particular experiences, has never-\\ntheless a representative character in which may be seen the\\nevaluation by the rational consciousness of the particulars which\\nthe image is taken to represent. That is, we are confined to par-\\nticulars, Berkeley says; but particulars, at least some of them, have\\na universal reference, this universal reference consisting in simply\\nrecognizing that the general idea has no peculiarity which marks it\\noff as the special property of any particular idea. 1 Thus the idea\\nof a triangle is a general idea or notion, not as if I could frame\\nthe idea of a triangle which is neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor\\nequicrural; but only that the particular triangle which I consider,\\nwhether of this or of that sort it matters not, doth equally stand\\nfor and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that\\nsense universal. 2\\nAs a conclusion of the matter we may, I think, fairly interpret\\nBerkeley as follows: In our thinking we are confined to particu-\\ntars i. e., there are not in our consciousness universals existing as\\nquasi-entities over against a number of particulars different from\\n1 Cf. later discussions of the notion; also note 2, p. of this essay.\\n2 Introduction to the Principles, 15.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "14\\nthem in kind. The human mind is of the nature of a republic\\nrather than of a monarchical system. On the other hand, the par-\\nticularity of the idea is not its only aspect; for the universality of\\ncertain of our ideas at least is as true and immediately recogniz-\\nable as the particularity which belongs to them all. If this is a\\nfair interpretation of Berkeley, as we read this doctrine in the\\nIntroduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, I see noth-\\ning that can justify the belief that he assigns a prior right to the\\nparticular as against the universal. Rather does it seem to be a\\nplea for the equal rights of the universal and the particular, as dis-\\ntinguishable features of the idea.\\nBut the importance of Berkeley s defense of the particular, as\\nagainst the asserted existence of a featureless abstraction, must\\nnot, on that account, be minimized. He is here as elsewhere more\\noften the champion of the particular than of the universal; and the\\nimpetuosity of his attack upon the territory usurped by his oppon-\\nent doubtless prevented him from seeing that his own defenses\\nwere hastily constructed, sufficient for the occasion only, but not\\nof a character to withstand the carefully planned attacks of later\\nthought. Thus it comes about that his defective views on this\\nsubject perplex his whole philosophy. Dr. James McCosh, no\\nvery friendly critic, says: he rejects, as I believe he ought,\\nabstract ideas, in the sense of Locke, that is, in the sense of im-\\nages of qualities; and he claims it is his merit that he gets rid of\\ngrand abstractions but, while he has exposed the errors\\nof Locke, he has not established the positive truth Had\\nhe taken as much pains in unfolding what is contained in consid-\\nering a figure as triangular, and Peter as man, without consider-\\ning other qualities, and what is involved in forming general propo-\\nsitions and reasoning about qualities, as he has taken to expel\\nabstract ideas in the sense of phantasms, he would have saved his\\nown philosophy, and philosophy generally from his day to this,\\nfrom an immense conglomeration of confusion. 1 This is no\\ndoubt true; but it is not impossible that where, as in the case of\\nBerkeley s philosophy, it is admitted on all sides that an immense\\nconglomeration of confusion exists, a part of the confusion may\\nbe due to the neglect of certain strongly marked lines of thought\\nin favor of others less prominent in his philosophy as a whole, but\\nmore clearly developed at certain stages of its progress. As Profes-\\nsor Wenley says: Like Kant, Berkeley is not to be regarded in one\\naspect of his work only, and the same materials which viewed in a\\ncertain aspect, constitute in a large measure his value for philos-\\nophy should perhaps be viewed in another light, if we are to be\\ntrue to the thought of the founder of idealism himself. 2\\n1 McCosh: Locke s Theory of Knowledge with a notice of Berkeley in\\nCriteria of Truth, p. 57.\\n2 British Thought and Modern Speculation, in Scottish Review, Vol. 19.", "height": "4604", "width": "2848", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER II.\\nTHINGS AND IDEAS.\\nIn the beginning which we have thus made in our attempted\\ndetermination of the general Berkeleian conception of the world,\\nhis view of abstract ideas has been given the first place as the\\nepistemological motif of that idealistic attitude toward Reality\\nwhich Berkeley inaugurated. Partly on account of the natural\\nlimitations attaching to human language, partly because of the\\nnegligence of metaphysicians, who do not always verify the cor-\\nrespondence between the terms which they employ, and definite\\nconcrete thoughts, without which words are mere stumbling blocks\\nin the way of logical thinking it has come about that a kind of\\nspurious currency was brought into circulation, which has not\\nbeen without its effect upon the metaphysics of the past. It is\\nBerkeley s professed task to recall men to a more adequate appre-\\nciation of the meanings that underlie the terms by which they\\ndesignate supposed existences. Nothing, says he, seems of\\nmore importance toward erecting a firm system of sound and real\\nknowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of scepticism\\nthan to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant\\nby thing, reality, existence, for in vain shall we dispute concern-\\ning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge\\nthereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. 1\\nIn this enquiry with which Berkeley sets out there may be\\nfound at least some feeble anticipation of that later voyage of\\ndiscovery which was to tax the energies of a mightier intellect\\nthan his own. Tis on the meaning and import of existence that\\nI chiefly insist. The metaphysical question: what is Reality?\\nBerkeley is the first to raise explicitly in the form, what is the\\nmeaning of Reality or rather, we may say, what assignable mean-\\ning can we give to that which we call Reality, i. e. by what ideas\\ncan we designate the Real The solution of this problem is partly\\nforeshadowed in the very manner of stating the question itself.\\nThe Real must at least fulfill the negative condition of not being\\nthat which cannot be expressed or in some way verified in ideas.\\nBut then what are ideas\\nFor answer Berkeley unquestioningly sets out from the Car-\\ntesian separation of thought and existence, idea and thing. Re-\\nality was virtually comprehended under these two categories, and\\n1 Principles of Human Knowledge 89.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "16\\nas the Lockian psychological theory of knowledge progressed it\\nbecame more and more evident that these two heterogeneous quid-\\ndities would never fulfill the requirement of explaining one another,\\nwhich had been implied in the assertion of their mutual relation.\\nThere was needed a bold stroke which would at once destroy the\\nindependence of thought or substance. The violent disruption of\\nthese two existents effected by Decartes must be succeeded by the\\nsummary relegation of one or the other to the rank of dependent\\nexistence. And there was no question as to which should ulti-\\nmately yield precedence to the other. The unknown must ever\\nderive its explanation from the known. Knowledge had been de-\\nfined by Locke as the preception of the connexion and agreement\\nor disagreement and repugnancy between our ideas. It only\\nremained to discover whether or not ideas alone, and the knowl-\\nedge we have by means of them, are in harmony with the ordinary\\npreceptions of life and that partially organized system of truth of\\nwhich we are made aware in the knowledge of the several sciences.\\nAn affirmative answer to this question would mean that ideas,\\nhitherto conceived as subjective merely, and thus in separation\\nfrom an unknown substance, must declare their adequacy to fulfill\\nall the conditions of objectivity required by the scientific and\\nordinary naive consciousness. The objectivity of the idea once\\nestablished, as idea it would yet retain its essential relatedness t\\nthe percipient and cognitive consciousness, and thus maintain its\\nposition as an element in a system of conscious experiences. Carte-\\nsian substance could thus be banished to the limbo of useless\\nmetaphysical abstractions.\\nThe obstacles in the way of the desired consummation which\\npresented themselves to Berkeley were, in the first place, the preju-\\ndices of mankind, and second, the semblance of agreement between\\nsubstance and ideas, which still remained in the Lockian epistem-\\nology as the formal assertion of a correspondence between ideas\\nand the primary qualities of things.\\nWith regard to the first difficulty, the long established prepos-\\nsessions of men in favor of unthinking substance would naturally\\nrender them unfavorably disposed toward an abrupt reversal of\\ntheir customary ways of thinking. Thus, until they could be\\nbrought to see that true objectivity does not necessarily imply the\\nexistence of an unknown or unknowable substance, and that ideas\\ndo not of necessity mean floating fancies and mere subjective crea-\\ntions of the mind, prejudice must be overcome by a review of the\\npractical benefits conferred upon mankind by the Berkeleian new\\ndiscovery. Now, the extreme materialism of Hobbes and Gas-\\nsendi, and the tendency towards the complete mechanical inter-\\npretation of everything, prevalent at the time of Berkeley, which,\\nas he declares, is foreign to his nature, together with his own pious", "height": "4596", "width": "2800", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "17\\ninclinations, brought it about that practical benefits were for him,\\nin large part, synonymous with theological benefits. The result was\\nthat Berkeley fought the battle of Immaterialism with the Essay of\\nLocke in one hand and the weapons of a deistic theology in the other.\\nBut, in the second place, as we have said, Locke s emphasis\\nupon the ideal character of existence ill served to maintain a union\\nbetween the primary qualities of substance and their ideal counter-\\nparts in the mind. The secondary qualities had already taken\\ntheir places in the ideal, which was also the knowable, system of\\nexperiences. Color, sound, heat, etc., many of the ideas\\nwhich go to make up the world of which we have actual experience,\\nhad already been declared subjective. The primary qualities,\\nfive in number, extension, motion or rest, figure and number,\\ntogether with impenetrability or solidity, were also ideas;\\nalthough supposedly the conscious effects of unknown coexistent\\ncauses. The only inlets into the dark chamber of the under-\\nstanding were the senses; yet so far as concerned real knowledge\\nof the world beyond consciousness, the senses were closed doors.\\nThe charge of subjective idealism would have been preferred\\nagainst Locke had not Berkeley s own doctrine been at hand. 1\\nThe only egress from subjectivity lay in the recognition that\\nall ideas of sense may, in one aspect, be viewed as subjective;\\nwhile, in another aspect, it is equally true that they may be\\nregarded as objective; and it is only in this way that objectivity of\\nsystem, that is, rational knowledge, can declare itself. Thus we\\nmay, I think, understand Berkeley to say: If you have regard to\\nan unthinking matter or substance, unknown or unknowable,\\nindependent of mind, I maintain that, in such a reference, ideas\\nare subjective, mind-related things beyond which you cannot pass\\nto supposed existences different from conscious facts. But if by\\nobjective you mean the system of factual experience which we\\nterm the objective world, it is in that case the objectivity of the\\nidea for which I contend; and furthermore, I make extension,\\ncolor, etc., to exist really in bodies independent of our mind.\\nYou mistake me, he says in his third dialogue between Hylas\\nand Philonous, I am not for changing things into ideas, but\\nrather ideas into things.\\nPrimary qualities are then to be deposed from the position of\\nindependent existences and are to rank now with secondary quali-\\nties. But how effect this? They are useless assumptions, for,\\njust as sound and color (subjective appearances) seem to be essen-\\n1 For Locke s own approach to an idealistic position, Cf. e. g. T. II. Webb;\\nVeil of Isis, passage above quoted, pp. 12-13. Also Locke s Essay: Bk. IV., Ch.\\nII., 14: Bk. IV., Ch. XI., 1; Bk. IV., Ch. XL, 3; IV., XI.,8(Cit. in Veil of Isis", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "18\\ntially coexistent with the other objective aspects of our world of\\nexperience, so do the ideal counterparts of the primary qualities\\nequally well fill up the manifold of objective experiences. Only\\nthe bare assertion remains that, corresponding to these ideal quali-\\nties, are their originals, presumably more real than they; the\\nformer being, as it were, photographs of the latter, shot into the\\nmind, and preserving in some miraculous fashion the pristine\\nbeauty and truth belonging to the originals. But wherein lies the\\ndifference between these and the secondary; and why are not these\\nlatter also supposed to inhere in an unknown something beyond\\nconsciousness?\\nNow the primary qualities in their ideational character are\\nreferred to powers, secondary qualities to combinations of powers\\nin an unknown substance. Accordingly the latter, although\\ndenominated by Locke simple ideas/ or simple elements of\\nknowledge, are nevertheless, with reference to their origin in\\nunknown combinations of powers, complex; and it is because\\nof their complexity that this class of ideas possess that distinctively\\nideal character which seems to belong to them and not to the\\nprimary qualities. But how do we attain a knowledge of their\\ncomplexity? By the introspection of conscious contents, of course,\\ntogether with observation of the conditions under which we intro-\\nspect; from which it appears e. g. that what is hot to one hand is\\ncold to the other, or what is sweet to one palate may be bitter to\\nanother requisite conditions being given. Thus you may refer\\nsecondary qualities to unknown combinations of powers, resident\\nin one unknown substance if you will; but the real complexity of\\nso-called mental elements is your test, and the condition under\\nwhich your judgment is made, is relativity of the idea to the per-\\ncipient organism. The complexity of the experienced mental contents\\nis then the equivalent of their condemnation to rank also as inde-\\npendent entities by means of objective counterparts; and conversely,\\nsimplicity means the guarantee of their right so to exist. We have\\nthus a sufficient criterion by which to judge of the validity of\\nLocke s claim in behalf of primary qualities; and it is this task\\nwhich Berkeley sets for himself in the Theory of Vision, though by\\nno means attempting an exhaustive analysis of this class of ideas.\\nI. IDEA AS MERE SENSATION.\\nBerkeley now proposes to turn the tables, and subject primary\\nqualities also to the test of experience which, as we shall see,\\ninvolves a reference of primary to secondary qualities. He wishes\\nto test the less definitely known by the more completely known,\\nrather than, with Locke, to refer the more definitely known to the\\nmore hypothetical. In the Theory of Vision the analysis of that\\nclass of ideas which have hitherto been regarded as simple elements", "height": "4608", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "19\\nof consciousness is undertaken with reference to Sight and Touch\\nonly, although the essay undoubtedly implies far more than that\\nwhich is explicitly set forth as the design of the author, which isi\\nto show the manner wherein we perceive by sight the Distance,\\nMagnitude and Situation of objects; also to consider the difference\\nthere is betwixt the ideas of Sight and Touch and whether there be\\nany idea common to both senses. 1\\nIn the second book of the essay, Locke had shown that we\\nget the idea of space, both by our sight and touch, which, says\\nhe, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that\\nmen perceive, by their sight, a distance between bodies of different\\ncolors, or between the parts of the same body, as that they see\\ncolors themselves. 2 This space, considered barely in length\\nbetween any two beings, without considering anything else between\\nthem is called distance. 3 Now it was the current theory, to which\\nLocke gave countenance, that the spatial determination, distance\\nis perceivable by the sense or sight regardless of the way in which\\nit is perceived by touch, against which the first argument in the\\nTheory of Vision was raised. The initial assumption underlying\\nthe series of arguments with respect to distance, is the common\\nagreement that Distance of itself, and immediately, cannot be\\nseen. Distance not being immediately perceivable by sight and\\nyet being perceived, it follows that it is brought into view by\\nmeans of some other idea, that is itself immediately perceived in\\nthe act of vision. 4 These other ideas are then merely signs or\\nsuggestions by which distance is introduced into the mind as a\\nconscious percept or idea. Against the view that the mind by a\\nkind of natural geometry immediately perceives distance by the\\nmathematical judgment of lines and angles; and also against\\nanother opinion held by writers on optics to the effect that the eye\\njudges distance by the greater or less divergence of the rays trans-\\nmitted from the object, Berkeley urges objections which may be\\nbriefly stated as follows: (i) There are no such mathematical per-\\nceptions, for introspection does not reveal a process of computa-\\ntion or comparison of lines and angles. (2) Lines and angles,\\nbeing merely mathematical hypotheses, are not objectively existent.\\n(3) If the foregoing mathematical judgments were involved in our\\npreception of distance, they would yet be insufficient of themselves\\nto explain the phenomena we are considering. For the idea of\\ndistance being mediated by other ideas we must necessarily have\\nTheoiy of Vision, 31.\\n2 Locke s Essay; Bk. II, Ch. xiii, 2.\\nIbid. 3.\\n4 Theory of Vision 2.\\n5 Ibid. 8 11.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "20\\nsome regard to the latter in determining the composition of our\\nperception of distance. Thus introspection will show us that ideas,\\nor sensations as we might now call them, produced by the muscu-\\nlar movement of the eyeball, accompany the accommodation of\\nthe eye for nearer or more remote vision.\\nAgain with regard to the phenomena of accommodation^\\nBerkeley tells us that the perception of distance is aided by the\\nstrain sensations with which we correct the confused appear-\\n.ance of objects brought too near the eye. But besides these mus-\\ncl sensations or visual ideas or signs accompanying the\\nemployment of the visive faculty, there are also visible signs,\\nsuch as the particular number, size, kind, etc of the things seen;\\nand all these are of use to us in the determination of distance.\\nFrom the foregoing we may conclude, that a man born blind would,\\nif he were subsequently enabled to see, receive an entirely new set\\nof sensations, which would be mere mind-related symbols, but\\nmeaningless, until their significance was learned by means of asso\\ndating them with those sensations earlier formed in his experience.\\nNow color, Berkeley is ready to assume, is the proper and imme-\\ndiate object of sight, and this, being a secondary quality, is not\\nwithout the mind; whereas outness or independence of the\\nmind is ascribed to extension, figure, and motion. But extension is\\ninseparable from color, and where extension is there too is figure\\nand also motion. In proof of this, we have the experience that\\nthe appearance of an object alters with its proximity to or distance\\nfrom the observer, this difference displaying itself in the degree of\\nfaintness of color and outline.\\nThe conclusion now is that the strictly visual sensations, col-\\nors, refer us to tactual sensations, sensations of muscular effort\\nexperienced in the resistance which bodies offer to us, sensations\\nof bodily movement and of the movement of bodily organs, and\\nlastly, sensations of muscular effort experienced in going to the\\ndistant object. Ideas of space, outness, and things placed at a\\ndistance are not, strictly speaking, the objects of the sight; they are\\nno otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear. 1 But it has\\ncome about in our experience that ideas of hearing are more easily\\nseparable from ideas of touch than are those of sight. We hear\\nthe footfall of a man walking upon the street and we readily recog-\\nnize the ideal character of the experienced sound; but it is a more\\ndifficult matter to realize that the man whom we see arouses a\\ntotally different class of sensations from the man whom we touch.\\nYet it is nevertheless true that, just as familiar words immediately\\narouse in our minds meanings far different from the sounds which\\nare also conveyed, but of which we are scarcely aware, so like-\\n1 Theory of Vision 46.", "height": "4604", "width": "2800", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "21\\nwise the secondary objects, or those which are only suggested by\\nsight, do often more strongly affect us, and are more regarded,\\nthan the proper objects of that sense. 1\\nAs in the case of Distance, we find that Magnitude also is not\\nimmediate but suggested. The lines and angles argument is\\nreasserted to prove the immediacy of our preception of magnitude\\nby Sight independently of the sense of Touch; but, again, recourse\\nto introspection declares the experiential nature of judgments of\\nthis kind. The magnitude of the visible object constantly changes\\nwith change of distance between the real object and the observer;\\ntherefore, when we speak of the magnitude or size of a thing, it\\nmust be that we have reference to a more stable, tangible, magni-\\ntude. 2 Again with regard to the Measurement of Magnitudes, the\\nessentially relative and inconstant nature of visible Magnitude at\\nonce declares its utility as a standard. It is not the merely visible\\nfoot or visible yard that we adopt as the unit of linear measure-\\nment for these appear of different lengths according to their dis-\\ntance from the eye; but it is rather a constant and invariable, tan-\\ngible, magnitude to which we appeal. In further support of Berke-\\nley s contention that Magnitude is perceived in the same manner\\nas Distance, we are reminded that what we immediately and\\nproperly see are only lights and colors in sundry situations and\\nshades, and degrees of faintness and clearness, confusion and dis-\\ntinctness. 3\\nThe heterogeniety of the ideas of Sight and Touch is further\\nshown by an analysis of what is contained in the ideas of Position\\nor Situation. Experience teaches us that certain ideas of touch\\ngo with certain other ideas of visible things, and that, on the\\noccasion of the latter, an instantaneous and true estimate of the\\nsituation of outward tangible objects is made. These two classes\\nof ideas are two entirely different kinds of experience. That\\nwhich I see is only variety of light and colors. That which I feel\\nis hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What similitude,\\nwhat connexion, have those ideas with these But some have\\nnevertheless asserted the imposibility of thus divorcing visible and\\ntangible ideas, urging as a reason the numerical identity of the\\nobjects of these senses and the equality of the number as given\\nimmediately in the visual idea. To this Berkeley replies that\\nilbid,\u00c2\u00a7 5 i.\\n2 Noti;: Throughout the essay, tangible magnitude, tangible idea, tangible\\nobject, etc.. mean for Berkeley real magnitude, real idea, real object. At this\\njuncture Berkeley enlightens us somewhat with regard to his apparent use of\\ntangible ideas as the ultimate sense data. The reason here given is the evi-\\ndent utility of such sensations for the perservati n of the bodily organism, they\\nare adapted to benefit or injure our bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the\\nsensations of pleasure or pain. Cf. on Suggestion,\\n3 Theory of Vision, 77.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "22\\nnumber also is a creature of the mind 1 nothing fixed and set-\\ntled, really existing in things themselves; whatever the mind\\nchooses to regard as one is a unit, and the same thing from another\\npoint of view may be a manifold. We must learn the applicability\\nof number to visible as well as to tangible ideas. The confusion\\nbetween these two kinds of ideas has led to the above mentioned\\ndifficulty about objects being painted inverted upon the retina yet\\nseen upright; for, relatively to the visible earth, the position of\\nthe retinal object is correctly depicted, and relatively to the tan-\\ngible earth, that with which we are concerned is only the outward\\ntangible object.\\nThe conclusion with regard to Distance, Magnitude and Situ-\\nation, warrants us in affirming the following proposition: The\\nextension, figures, and motions perceived by sight are specifically\\ndistinct from the idea of touch, called by the same name; nor is\\nthere any such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common to both\\nsenses. 2 There is no idea common to both these senses, because\\nideas of light and color, being the only immediate objects of sight,\\nare specifically distinct from ideas of touch, and in consequence,\\nSpace, Distance, Magnitude, Extension and Motion 3 are suggested\\nmediate ideas.\\nBut if Sight and Touch yield us two entirely different sets of\\nideas, why do we denote by the same name these groupings of dif-\\nferent ideas Furthermore, why are these ideas so mingled to-\\ngether in our experience as to seem inseparable The answer to\\nboth these questions is: In the course of our experience it has\\ncome about that Visible and Tangible ideas have been constantly\\nassociated together so that one has become the mark or sign of\\nthe other. Thus a visible square suggests a tangible square\\nbecause, having learned the applicability of number to both sets of\\nideas, we see that one resembles the other in having a correspond-\\ning number of parts or marks. But this sign language whereby\\nvisible ideas suggest tangible ideas, has been learned early in our\\nexperience; and there has thus resulted the constant confusion\\nbetween them. The perception of an external world is apparently\\nimmediate, experience having brought about such facility in the\\ninterpretation of signs; but because of this, we are led to the\\nwrong inference that this immediateness is due to the sense of\\nsight alone, whereas by that sense we are made aware of colors\\nonly, in varying degrees of light and shade.\\nIt is now time to enquire more particularly into the nature of\\n1 Principles, 12.\\n2 Theory of Vision, 127.\\n3 T OTE: That visible and tangible motion have nothing in common follows\\nas a corollary from the difference between visible and tangible extension vide\\n137. Theory of Vision.", "height": "4600", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "23\\nthe Berkelian idea as set forth in the preceding sections of the\\nTheory of Vision. On the way to this we may note the definition\\nthat occurs in 45 of the Essay in which it is said: I take the\\nword idea for any immediate object of sense or understanding\\nin which large signification it is commonly used by the mod-\\nerns. This statement, however, is made with reference to tang-\\nible ideas only. In its scope it is equivalent to the Lockian idea\\nand also to Berkeley s ordinary use of the term. As so extended,\\nit has not properly been the object of our consideration. It is\\ntrue that the above definition is inclusive of the narrower meaning,\\nin which the word idea has been used throughout the Theory of\\nVision, but it is with this restricted use that we are here concerned.\\nAnd I think it cannot fail to be readily understood from the\\nforegoing brief consideration of the essay that idea is throughout\\nused in the narrower meaning of mere sensation. The proper\\nobjects of sight are colors, just as the proper objects of hearing\\nare sounds, but in the perception of any external object there is\\nmore involved than the mere sense-presentation of color. The\\nobject presented in perception possesses outness, extension and\\nfigure, is, in short, externalized in space in a way that cannot be\\naccounted for by reference to the mere data of sight alone. The\\ntrue object of perception is therefore mediately constituted by-\\nmeans of these visual data, which serve as signs or suggestions of\\ntactual and muscular sensations, to which the last appeal is made.\\nOn the other hand, the true object of sight is a mere mind-depend-\\nent sensation, colors our sole visual data- -being admittedly only\\nin the mind. Extension, figure and motion, three of Locke s pri-\\nmary qualities, are so far as concerns their reference to the visual\\nfaculty, reduced to a condition of mind-dependency a result\\nwhich Berkeley practically achieves here in the Theory of Vision.\\nNumber, another of Locke s primary qualities, has also been de-\\nclared a creature of the mind. With the disposal of figure, exten-\\nsion and distance in space, the perception of solidity, by means of\\nthe visual faculty alone, is declared impossible. But the primary\\nqualities nevertheless reappear in another form, for tangible exten-\\nsion, magnitude, figure, etc., yet remain. It is true they are de-\\nnominated tangible ideas and are regarded as subjective, sen-\\nsations, as in the case of visual ideas but for all that they are\\nlooked upon as ultimate data, beyond which we cannot pass. The\\nexternality of the world remains for us an irreducible fact, as far\\nas the Theory of Vision is concerned; and visual ideas are related\\nto tangible ideas as signs to the thing signified.\\nBut though we may as yet determine nothing further with\\nregard to tangible ideas, it is possible that additional light may be\\nthrown upon the Berkelian conception of visual ideas. We have\\nseen that, throughout the essay, idea is synonymous with sensa-", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "24\\ntion; but in what acceptation shall we take this equivalent term\\nsensation? Is it a recognized conscious content; or is it an unre-\\ncognized and subconscious datum Although here as elsewhere\\nBerkeley s theory of knowledge is undeveloped and fragmentary,\\nwe may, I think, find a justification for holding to the latter of the\\ntwo constructions indicated as possible. For, in the first place,\\nidea, we have been told, may have another function than that of\\narousing its precise equivalent in consciousness. Thus, the sen-\\nsation of color may suggest other sensations; though color may\\nnot be consciously recognized as present in the percept. Again,\\nour visual sensations have, in the upbuilding of our conscious ex-\\nperience, become so inextrically interwoven with their suggested\\ntangible sensations, that it is only by attention to the physiologi-\\ncal processes underlying the phenomena of vision that we can ob-\\ntain a just estimate of what may be attributed to the functioning\\nof that faculty alone. But we never perceive mere colors, i. e.,\\nmere visual sensations; or ideas for what in our perception we\\nare actually conscious of are colors extended, figured, etc. Visual\\nsensations, then, although necessary to the explanation of the\\ngrowth of our experience by means of their association with other\\nsensations, are strictly not perceived. This is the conclusion\\nreached in the Vindication of Theory of Vision 1 in which we are\\ntold that the colored point projected in the fund of the eye is\\nunperceived. It is tangible and apprehended only by imagina-\\ntion i. e., it is a sign or suggestion of other ideas with which\\nour knowledge of the outer world seems more intimately con-\\ncerned.\\nII IDEA AS PERCEPT.\\nThe Theory of Vision to which we have referred in order to\\nobtain Berkeley s earliest acceptation of idea was, as Fraser\\nsays, the opening wedge which served to introduce the doc-\\ntrine of Immaterialism as set forth in the Principles of Human\\nKnowledge. Little fault has been found with Berkeley for having\\nleft so much of the work of associational psychology to be per-\\nformed by his successors; yet during the year which elapsed be-\\ntween the publication of the Theory of Vision and the appearance\\nof the Principles, we must assume that the work of associational\\npsychology had considerably, advanced. So far as concerned the\\nEssay, we were left with the literal fact of tangible sensations, as\\nultimate sense criteria of objectivity. But the notion that tangi-\\nble sensations are really more ultimate than any other we must now\\nsuppose to be a vulgar error, which it was not Berkeley s pur-\\n1 Theory of Vision Further Indicated and Explained, 50; Fraser s note\\nto 3, Theory of Vision, p. 168 of Selections.", "height": "4596", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "25\\npose to examine and refute in a discourse concerning Vision. The\\nlatter is merely an experiment, pursued a little way for the purpose\\nof satisfying himself with his new conception of objective exist-\\nence, and further investigation along that line is no longer of para-\\nmount interest to him.\\nWe are accordingly invited to take a fresh start with sensa-\\ntions, as it were, all on the same level. Analysis of the meaning\\nof supposed objective, mind-independent qualities (so far as we\\nwere concerned with them in the Theory of Vision) has every-\\nwhere revealed their essentially composite character, and each one\\nof those units into which they resolve themselves declares itself in\\nconsciousness as mind-dependent, a sensation. In short, when we\\nlook to the meaning of objective existence in any of its particular\\nqualities, a sensation, in conjunction with some other sensation,\\noffers itself to us as the readiest and most complete explanation of\\nthe quality. It seems we must conclude that all we have are these\\nideas or sensations. In sensation, we have apparently come in\\ntouch with Reality. We have now a fairly complete psychological\\ntheory of knowledge; and we wish to discover the extent of its use-\\nfulness in metaphysic. We are no longer concerned with the\\nquestion of whether qualities of the object may be explained in\\nterms of sensation, but whether the object itself, in all the ways in\\nwhich it appeals to our sense-perception and cognitive conscious-\\nness, may be accounted for by means of the same sensations.\\nNow, with regard to the object, there is the commonly ac-\\ncepted opinion that by it we denote an existent which has a pecu-\\nliar reality of its own, distinct from its being perceived. But if we\\nattempt to describe any natural object apart from its relation to\\nothers, we can only describe it as it affects us; i. e., each special\\ndetermination of the object is seen to be some one or other of\\nthe special revelations of sense. The table I write on I say\\nexists, that is, I see and feel it; furthermore if I were out of my\\nstudy I should say it existed meaning thereby that if I was in my\\nstudy I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does\\nperceive it. What more can be said of the existence of an object\\nthan this The object is a mere plexus of sensations, and as\\nseveral of these are observed to accompany each other, they come\\nto be marked by one name and so to be reputed as one Thing.\\nThese clusters of sensations give to us all the meaning that is con-\\ntained in the existence of the Thing. Beyond the Thing, as so\\nconstituted, there is nothing. Some indeed, on the basis of a\\ndistinction between the above mentioned primary and secondary\\nqualities, assert the existence of an object independent of sense\\nperceptions; but this can be no longer maintained, if, as will be\\nseen by reference to the Theory of Vision, primary may be equated\\nwith secondary qualities. And af*ter all, it is but looking into", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "26\\nyour own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it pos-\\nsible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or color, to exist without\\nthe mind or unperceived. 1 Ideas cannot then be taken in any\\nsense as copies of external things, for the external thing and the\\nidea would of necessity be identical. If the orginals are perceived\\nthey are ideas; if unperceived, then that which is perceived is identi-\\ncal with that which is unperceived a manifest contradiction.\\nThus far with regard to the ordinary common sense distinc-\\ntion between thing and idea, as also the further distinction between\\nobject and percipient consciousness by means of supposed quali-\\nties inherent in the former. But in addition to the foregoing ways\\nof conceiving the object, philosophers have asserted the existence\\nof matter variously regarded as substratum, occasion/\\nsubstance, to which the knowledge of our ideas and their rela-\\ntions to them, admittedly ideal, is ultimately to be referred. Now,\\naside from the uselessness of such a conception for purposes of\\nexplaining our experience, matter in this sense is in itself contra-\\ndictory; for either it is something out of all relation to ideas, in\\nwhich case it is unknowable and even its existence cannot be\\nasserted, or else it is the things which we see and touch and handle,\\nand thus a complex of sensations. If we are careful always to use\\nwords in their proper significations, that is, if we admit no term\\nfor which we cannot discover a definite mental equivalent, it is\\nplain that we must reject the materialistic hypothesis of an inert,\\nsenseless, unthinking substance, as self-contradictory because\\nlending itself to no idea that we can frame of its existence. But,\\nif on the other hand, by matter is meant merely the things present\\nto us in external preception, Berkeley says that he finds no great\\ndifficulty with the term. I do not argue against the existence of\\nany one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection.\\nThat the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do\\nexist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose exist-\\nence we deny is that which Philosophers call Matter or corporeal\\nsubstance. 2\\nOur knowledge seems then only in a sense to be confined to\\nexistences which are merely subjective. We are, indeed, Berkeley\\ntells us, confined to ideas or phenomena, and to explain the\\nphenomena, is all one as to show why, upon such and such occa-\\nsions, we are affected with such and such ideas. 3 But, on the\\nother hand, the distinction between ideas as things, and ideas as\\nmere creations of the mind, appears for Berkeley to keep its full\\n1 Principles of Human Knowledge \u00c2\u00a35 22.\\n2 Principles 35; repeated frequently in the dialogues between Hylas and\\nPhilonous.\\n3 Principles of Human Knowledge 50.", "height": "4592", "width": "2828", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "-27\\nsignificance. There is a rermn natura and the distinction be-\\ntween realities and chimeras retains its full force. 1 For after all\\nwe have been considering the object in one of its aspects merely.\\nThe object has been shown to be resolvable into a complex of sen-\\nsations, and is thus a percept or idea. But these sensations are\\nfor Berkeley only the hypothetical conscious elements into which\\nthe percept is ideally resolvable, and its existential nature is by no\\nmeans exhausted. The object of perception has been called idea\\nbecause, as Berkeley tells us in the third dialogue between Hylas\\nand Philonous a necessary relation to the mind is understood to\\nbe implied by that term. But this does not of necessity mean\\nthat it is not likewise dependent for its existence upon something\\nbeyond the individual consciousness in which it is held.\\nNow Locke has found that in order to determine the nature\\nof certain of our ideas, viz., those complexes of sensation, or per-\\ncepts which we have been considering, we must take into account\\nthe causal origin or source of these simple ideas of which the per-\\ncept (as we shall now call it) is made up. The percept in other\\nwords has a reference beyond itself, it can only be defined by\\nsomething that is in a certain sense not itself; to understand its\\ncomplete nature, we must recognize that its being is not wholly\\nsubjective, but dependent also upon something objective. We\\nhave seen that powers residing in an unknown corporeal sub-\\nstance were supposed by Locke to fulfil, the condition of supply-\\ning this need for something objective by reference to which ideas\\nof sense could be explained. But these powers being conceived\\nas objective counterparts of ideas, no distinction remained between\\nideas and their counterparts. This Berkley has pointed out with\\nthe conclusion that, as an idea can be like nothing but an idea, 2\\na mind dependent thing like nothing but a mind-dependent thing;\\nso all things that we know involve a reference to percipient con-\\nsciousness. Thus, that objective something has been wrongly con-\\nceived, for true objectivity means, not objectivity of mind to some-\\nthing which is ex hypotliesi different from it, but objectivity of\\nmind, by means of the double reference of the percept, to mind and\\nto objective Being as also Mind.\\nNor is it apparent to dwell somewhat at length upon this\\npoint that the Berkelian percept or thing is, in its total character,\\nentirely comprehended in the psychological description of the\\nbundle of sensations which compose it; and that the causal refer-\\nence of the percept to objective existence is a mere artifice by\\nwhich to escape solipsism. It is not as though, by defining the\\nPrinciples of Human Knowledge 34.\\n2 Vid. Ueberweg s discussion of this point (Annotations to Berkeley s Prin-\\ncipien, trans, in Krauth s Principles of Human Knowledge, p. 343.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "28\\nobject in terms of sensation, one were thereby precluded from the\\nrecognition that objects involve a reference beyond the individual\\nconsciousness, any more than, in regarding the object as through-\\nout constituted by thought-relations, one would be taken to imply\\nthe categories which he as an individual finds it convenient to em-\\nploy in thinking of the object. What Berkley means is rather the\\nuniversal character which attaches to the percipient as well as to\\nthe cognitive consciousness the universality of sense-perception\\nas an element not to be neglected in our explanation of experience.\\nAgain, it is not as though a mass of sensations were thrust into the\\nmind, and the door closed upon all objective existence; but we\\nfirst define the object as having a necessary reference to percipi-\\nency, and then, from the dual character of mind-related existents,\\nas objects of sense and objects of imagination or memory, etc.,\\narrive at the distinction of mind and mind. The objective char-\\nacter which necessarily belongs to the peculiar nature of the thing\\nor percept cannot consistently be conceived as matter; it must\\nthen be conceived in analogy with that to which the percept has\\nbeen shown to have a necessary reference, i. e. mind. How well\\nBerkeley succeeds in thus substituting objective mind for objective\\nmatter is another question. All that we are here concerned to set\\nforth is his insistence upon a fundamental distinction between\\nideas; and that the understanding of idea as percept involves a con-\\nsideration of its reference to other than the individual percepient\\nmind. Accordingly we shall now briefly discuss the Berkelian\\nidea in connection with a second class of Things which he denom-\\ninates mind or spirit.\\n3 SPIRIT, PHENOMENA AND IDEA.\\nIn section 89 of the Principles we are told that our knowledge\\nis not entirely confined to ideas, that the term idea would be im-\\nproperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion\\nof. For, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of\\nknowledge there is likewise something that knows or perceives\\nthem. 1 This perceiving, active being is what I call Mind, Spirit,\\nSoul or Myself that which I denote by the term I which is\\nneither an idea, nor like an idea, but that which perceives and\\nwills, and reasons about them. 2 It is to this active perceiving\\nprinciple that all the objects of sense must ultimately be referred\\nfor their explanation since, as Berkeley has told us, the reason for\\nusing the term idea rather than object is that there is thereby im-\\nplied a necessary relation to the mind. Accordingly, if there are\\nrecognizable differences in the ideas which the mind possesses, it\\n1 Principles of Human Knowledge 2.\\n2 Principles of Human Knowledge 139,", "height": "4592", "width": "2840", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "29\\nmay be possible to discover wherein this consists, not by the refer-\\nence of ideas to a material substance, but by the relation which\\nseems to subsist between them and the active, perceiving mind.\\nNow all ideas are divided into three classes: ideas actually\\nimprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attend-\\ning to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas\\nformed by help of memory and imagination either compounding,\\ndividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the\\naforesaid ways. 1 All ideas, however, regarded as mere objects of\\nconsciousness, are in themselves passive there is nothing of\\nPower or Agency included in them. 2 With regard to certain of\\nthese there seems to be involved the creative or combining activ-\\nity of mind; for I find that I can excite ideas in my mind at\\npleasure and vary and shift the scene as often as I think fit 3 and\\nthis making and unmaking of ideas doth properly denominate\\nthe mind active. 4 But over another class of ideas, viz., those of\\nsense, I find that 1 have no control. These have a strength, a live-\\nliness and distinctness which do not belong to the ideas of the\\nimagination: They are chiefly to be distinguished from ideas that\\nare purely subjective by the fact of their appearing in an orderly\\nand coherent series, and also because of their entire independence\\nof the will. However, these ideas like all others are passive and\\nmind-dependent, they have no being apart from percipient mind.\\nIf, then, the nature of these ideas, in distinction from those of\\nmemory and imagination, is such as to warrant us in affirming\\ntheir objective reference since they are not wholly dependent\\nupon individual mind we are led to conclude their dependence\\nupon other mind. They are not generated from within by the\\nmind itself 5 and are therefore imprinted upon it by a spirit\\ndistinct from that which perceives them 6 or there is some other\\nWill or Spirit that produces them. 7\\nWe may now summarize Berkeley s finding with regard to\\nidea, so far as it has been considered in the present and preced-\\ning sections. It is (i) the mere atomic element of conscious-\\nness or sensation; (2) the object of external perception, or\\nbundle of sensations, or percept, as we have chosen to call it,\\nof whose being relation to percipient mind is a necessary\\ncondition; (3) this same object of external perception or\\npercept in the being of which there is also involved a necessary\\n1 Principles,* 1.\\n2 Ibid 25.\\n3 Ibid 2S.\\n4 Ibid.\\n5 Ibid 90.\\n6 Ibid.\\n7 Ibid 29.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "30\\ndependence upon objective mind. Gradually as the philosophy of\\nBerkeley progresses, the term phenomenon is substituted for idea,\\nbut if, in our interpretation, we discard the latter and adopt the new\\nterm, the two-fold meaning which may be given to the phenom-\\nenon must be borne in mind. On the one hand phenomenon\\nimplies for Berkeley a reference backward to the elemental con-\\nscious facts which make up its being, on the other hand there is in\\nit implied a reference forward to objective consciousness.\\nIn truth, the object and the sensation are the same and can-\\nnot therefore be abstracted from each other. 2 This was Berke-\\nley s answer to the Cartesian dualistic hypothesis. As the object\\nand sensation can only be ideally separated, we must interpret one\\nin terms of the other. Thus, upon the direct evidence of consci-\\nous experience, we have partially carried out this programme as\\nwitnessed in the fact that the object is resolvable into sensation.\\nBut it would be a misinterpretation of his principle if we were to\\nstop at this single and one-sided application; for if the object and\\nsensation are only ideally separable, it seems not an illegitimate\\nmethod of procedure to insist that, as sensational character is\\nalways necessary to the being of an object, so also sensation pos-\\nsesses a true objective character which cannot rightfully be\\ndenied it.\\nIn order to exhibit these two equally necessary views of the phe-\\nnomenon, their mutual relation would have to be shown; but this\\nwould involve a discussion of the Berkelian relations between\\nideas, the third of the objects of our knowledge, and this we have re-\\nserved for the succeeding chapter, as also the more complete deter-\\nmination of his view of the self and objective mind, for upon this\\ndepends in large part the adequacy or inadequacy of the hypo-\\nthesis which he substitutes for Cartesian corporeal substance.\\nAll that we are concerned with here is the determination of the\\nvarious meanings in which Berkeley uses idea. This we have seen,\\nin one of its aspects, viz., from the point of view of its objectivity,\\ninvolves a reference to Things to which in the present chapter we\\n1 One of Ueberweg s objections to Collyn s use of phenomenon rather\\nthan idea, in his interpretation of Berkeley, is that the term phenomenon\\ndenotes a complex of sensations. (Annotations; Krauth s Principles, p. 331). I\\ncannot avoid thinking, however, that idea is more often used in the later works\\nfor the composite, the phenomenon, rather than for the object of the special senses.\\nAnother of Ueberweg s objections is that the word Erscheinung presupposes a\\nthing-in-itself of which it is the phenomenon. Now with all Berkeley s zeal in\\ndisclosing to us the new doctrine that the senses report truly an external world,\\nwith all his eagerness in demonstrating the non-existence of unknown substance\\nthis insistence upon the esse-is-percepi should not conceal the fact that for Berke-\\nley the being of the phenomenon is grounded upon something other than the indi-\\nvidual consciousness. The thing-in-itself is, in short, the content of the divine con-\\nsciousness, an unknown but not an unknowable.\\n2 Principles, 5.", "height": "4592", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "31\\nshall attempt to assign no precise signification. For the present\\nwe shall content ourselves with the simple recognition that the\\nbeing of the phenomenon is in part dependent upon the Will of a\\nmore powerful Spirit than the finite, viz., God, who is able to pro-\\nduce in the latter the regular and orderly series of phenomena\\nwhich constitute the objective system of Nature.\\nIn the Theory of Vision, we saw that ideas as sensations were\\nmerely the signs which enabled us to become aware of other sen-\\nsations; and, further, we saw that sensations always come to us in\\ngroups. It is the extended, colored, tangible thing that we actu-\\nally meet with in our experience, rather than the mere sensation.\\nThe latter, as it were, receives its being merely from the fact of its\\nbeing one of a manifold. This truth was expressed, in the case of\\nvisual signs, by instituting an analogy of visual signs with those of\\nhuman language, colors i. e. mere visual sensations, together with\\ntheir variations of light and shade, make up for us a sort of visual\\nsign-language or Universal Language of Nature. In the Prin-\\nciples, however, in which, it is true, the sensationalistic or empiri-\\ncal view is brought to a completion and throughout emphasized, it\\nis also apparent that this Universal Language of Nature is of\\nsupersensous* or extra human origin. The phenomenal object or\\nintuited manifold of sensations in turn receives its complete expla-\\nnation not only in the sensations of which it is made up but by its\\nobjective reference to something other than itself. As sensations\\nare significant of the object, as by them we are taught to expect\\nthe possible future sensations in the groups constituting the object\\nof external perception, so on the other hand is the phenomonal\\nobject itself representative of a Divine order of Nature with regard\\nto which the phenomenon is merely the significant sign. It is this\\nsecond meaning of ideas that occasions the frequent use of the\\nword phenomenon in the dialogues of Berkeley and particularly in\\nSiris.\\nViewed from the standpoint of the Berkelian idea, the altered\\nmeaning which it receives by being regarded as phenomenon is\\none of the chief features which distinguish the later philosophy of\\nSiris from the earlier standpoint of the Theory of Vision and the\\nPrinciples. In the latter work phenomenon and Idea, rather than\\nsensation and percept claim our attention.\\nIn the Principles of Human Knowledge. Idea and\\narchetype receive only a brief treatment at Berkeley s hands.\\nIn this work, as we know, his chief insistence was upon the im-\\npossibility of the existence of abstract matter in any of the signi-\\nfications in which it had hitherto been maintained by the philoso-\\nphers. Accordingly, at this point, 1 having considered various\\n1 Principles of Human Knowledge, 71.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "32\\nother meanings of matter, he briefly dismisses the notion of arche-\\ntypal ideas, understood as quasi-material forms, independent of the\\nDivine mind, and in accordance with which the latter creates the\\nworld. 1 The constitution of the world must throughout conform\\nto that type of reality which, as it enters into our experience, we\\nvariously denote by the terms mind, or self or spirit; and arche-\\ntypes of our own ideas, if such be admitted, can exist only \\\\n*some\\nother mind?\\nBut that there are certain unknown Ideas in the Mind of God\\narchetypal forms not independent of his will Berkley does not\\ndeny. Indeed his later philosophy moves almost exclusively in\\nthe region of these Platonic existences. This does not mean how-\\never that the earlier empirical standpoint is now abandoned, but\\nonly that there is a greater insistence upon the objectivity of the\\nidea which we have before noticed. In this latter aspect, the re-\\nality of the thing or phenomenal object is seen to depend not only\\nupon its relation to percipient mind; its complete reality can only\\nbe understood by reference to universal, creative mind. Accord-\\ningly Berkeley is brought to the fuller recognition of an archetypal\\nsystem of forms, Ideas, or Divine meanings, of which the phenom-\\nenal object is merely the significent sign. For do I not acknowl-\\nedge says he in the third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous\\na two-fold state of things the one ectypal or natural, the other\\narchetypal and eternal? The former was created in time, the lat-\\nter existed from everlasting in the mind of God. In Siris the\\ndiscovery of this archetypal system by means of interpretable\\nsense-given phenomena, is regarded as the true end of all human\\nendeavor.\\nBut the archetypal form or Idea, although certainly indicat-\\ning a much closer affiliation to the Platonic philosophy than is dis-\\ncoverable in any of Berkeley s earlier works, cannot be identified\\nwith Idea in the strictly Platonic sense of the word. For it is\\nwith Berkeley equivalent to the notion, which in our discussion\\nof the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge we\\ntook to be his recognition of the conceptual character that attaches\\nto ideas. If we read this later doctrine in the light of his earlier\\nwork, idea does not appear to us as the vague and shadowy rem-\\niniscence of an intangible universe of pure forms, from which we\\nare cut off, save by the negation of sense-reality and the indulgence\\nof the contemplative and speculative mood. Rather is it the case\\nthat the Berkelian world appears here and now, with the noticeable\\ndifference between the earlier and later construction of it, that the\\nconceptual is at last accorded the just recognition which was ever\\n1 Fraser; Philosophy of Berkeley, Blackwood series pp. 350-353.\\n2 Principles, 99.", "height": "4592", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "33\\nimplied in Berkeley s insistence upon the objective nature of the\\nidea, as of equal importance with its subjective reference. Objec-\\ntive and subjective are alike aspects of the phenomenon, the thing\\npresent to perception. In this objectivity of the idea we have one\\nof the elements by which the antithetical poles of Berkeley s phil-\\nosophy, his earlier empiricism and later Rationalism, are united in\\nthe thought of a spiritual unfolding of Nature in which we pass by\\ngradual steps from the mere sense-given phenomena to the Ideas\\nof imminent law and order, goodness and moral government, in\\nthe absence of which imminent Ideas of Reason there would be for\\nus no world, but chaos.\\nTo treat otherwise than in this brief fashion these objects of\\nhuman knowledge which, because of their changed notation, appear\\nin Siris as new elements foreign to the earlier thought of Berkeley,\\nwould be to run too far afield upon ground which should more\\nproperly be covered in our subsequent enquiries. We have so far\\nattempted to show, not without the cost of some tedious but neces-\\nsary repetition, the various meanings which Berkeley assigns to the\\nword idea. In the interest of clearness, I subjoin the following\\nsummary at the close of this chapter:\\ni. Idea is used as object of the special senses, sound, color,\\ntouch, etc. but color is never perceived except as something col-\\nored and extended; touch is always the feeling of something resist-\\ning and possessing form. Consequently single objects of the special\\nsenses are never true objects for us, i. e. perceived. Idea in this\\nfirst sense is then mere sensation\\n2. Idea as the immediate object or phenomenon of percep-\\ntion, resolvable into particular sensations and consequently depen-\\ndent for its being upon percipient mind. Idea as such is the\\ncomplex of sensations, marked by one name, and so regarded as a\\nthing.\\n3. Idea in the foregoing sense, but distinguished from the\\nsubjective contents of the individual consciousness, and thus\\nregarded as dependent upon objective mind.\\n4. Idea as archetype, Platonic idea or Notion. Or we may\\nexpress it thus:\\n1. idea mere sensation\\na. as complex of sensations.\\n2. idea phenomenon j b. as conceptual, and in this latter\\nsense the equivalent of:\\n3. Idea as Notion.\\nA concluding word with regard to these three classes in order\\nto free from ambiguity these various meanings of the word idea, may\\nbe necessary, and may serve to acquaint us in advance with some\\nof the difficulties we are likely to encounter in our farther review\\nof Berkeley s interpretation of experience. In the first place, idea", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "34\\nas mere sensation seems grossly at variance with his frequently\\nrepeated assertions that ideas are particular, definite, discoverable\\nmental contents. I am also of the opinion that idea is most fre-\\nquently used by Berkeley in the sense of phenomenon, i. e. it implies\\nmore than the sensations which constitute it actually reveal in per-\\nception. In fact it is never the -mere sensation when the idea is\\nconsciously perceived. But the phenomenon, it was in part Berke-\\nley s mission to tell us, is in every case resolvable into those units;\\nand, as it is only the complex that is perceived, it seems that in his\\nearlier philosophy Berkeley does have reference to these atomic\\nelements of consciousness or hypothetical sensations. The phen-\\nomenon, as a complex of sensations, needs no further notice here;\\nbut to the phenomenon in its objective reference, attach, in one\\nform or another, most of the difficulties we are likely to encounter\\nin the following chapters. And, as a tentative step, we take the\\nphilosopher s word for it that in doing away with Locke s abstract\\nmaterial substance he has merely denied the causal reference of\\nsense objects to such substance, while, in doing this, by showing\\nthe necessary relation to percipient consciousness of all such ob-\\njects, he has not thereby affected the object, or denied to it all\\ncausal reference to objective existence, but has merely substituted\\nmind for matter.\\nThe question which is thus raised for us is: What is the nature of\\nthe Divine Being which Berkeley thus substitutes for substance\\nIs it a deistically conceived contrivance, artificially introduced to\\nescape subjectivity and support theistic belief, or is his view of the\\npersonality of God and man the rationally grounded consequence\\nof a new meaning which he gives to idea Again, is the order,\\nsteadiness and regularity which he ascribes to the ideas of sense,\\nthereby distinguishing them from subjective fancies, consistently\\nmaintained in a philosophy which seems to destroy the ground on\\nwhich it stands by the acknowledgment that all ideas are particular?\\nAnd, finally, in the archetypes or Ideas of Reason which occupy\\nso bold a position in Siris, do we encounter importations foreign\\nto the life current of Berkeley s thought, or are we here only\\nbrought to a better understanding of less familiar but none the less\\nimportant elements in his early theory of knowledge? If the\\nphilosophy of Siris merely represents a platonizing mood into which\\nBerkeley fell in his declining years, there is no discoverable rela-\\ntion between his earlier negative and his later positive idealism.\\nBut if the Idea, which seems in Siris the instrument and motive by\\nwhich he reaches his final conclusions is affiliated, as we have sug-\\ngested, to other elements of his earlier works, we may not be forced\\nto a decision between Empiricism and Rationalism which will be\\naltogether without evidence in support of the latter and less fre-\\nquently accepted view.", "height": "4592", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER III.\\nCONSTITUTION OF EXPERIENCE.\\ni Relations,\\na. Arbitrary Connection\\nA third of the objects of human knowledge are relations. We\\nhave thus far instanced the various meanings in which Berkeley\\nused the word idea in the earlier and later phases of his idealism,\\nand we have now to consider the manner of their connection. In\\nthe first place, we may again note that the point d appui which\\nserved to introduce Berkeley into his new idealistic universe was\\nthe reduction of Locke s primary qualities to the secondary, there-\\nby equating all the sensations derived from the special senses.\\nThis constituted his negative disproof of matter. So far as con-\\ncerned the existence of abstract matter the testimony of the\\nsenses at any rate could not be alleged in its behalf. But matter\\nhad been regarded as the cause, if not primary, at least the causal\\nagent, and idea the effect. Accordingly in the absence of matter and\\nthe consequent denial of a material cause it results that any phen-\\nomenal object or any object of the special senses is, in itself, re-\\ngarded as particular, inactive, destitute of power or causal agency.\\nNow the principle of cause and effect may be for us an orig-\\ninal, underivative revelation of the rational consciousness 1 and\\nthis is by no means denied, for in the second dialogue between\\nHylas and Philonous the latter is made to say: I do by no means\\nfind fault with your reasoning in that you collect a cause from the\\nphenomenon, but I deny the cause deducible by reason can prop-\\nerly be termed matter. But, on the other hand, if causal agency\\ncan no longer be attributed to the objects of sense, since they are\\nnow phenomena; and since the combining and relating activity, in\\nso far as that may be attributed to the mere individual conscious-\\nness, does not extend to these ideas of sense; we must discover\\nsome other connection, by means of which the presence of the\\nphenomenon may be accounted for and the nature of the cause\\nrevealed to us.\\nNow, in the process of introspectively analysing the contents\\nof consciousness, we found that the ideas obtained by one sense\\nare translatable into terms of another sense. But we further dis-\\n1 Fraser; Berkeley, Blackwood Philos. Classics, p. ig8.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "36\\ncovered that the objects of one sense are, so far as we can see,\\ntotally unlike those of another. True, the very process which\\nserves to display their heterogeneity exhibits also because of the\\nparallel discovery of their interpretability in terms of each other-\\ntrie mind-dependence of all objects of consciousness. Yet, intro-\\nspection stops short of telling us why the objects should be inter-\\npretable in terms of others unlike them. There is then, for us, no\\ndiscoverable necessary connection between ideas. 1 But we can no\\nlonger explain the phenomenal object in terms of matter; and\\nmind, if it cannot discover to us the why, may at least serve to\\nexhibit the how of the connection.\\nThis Berkeley proceeds to show by instituting the parallelism\\nbetween sense symbols and words, the significant signs of human\\nspeech. In the latter case, words have no similarity to the mean-\\nings which they serve to convey, to the sound waves or the\\nnerve processes by which the result is brought about. That sounds\\nshould signify meanings at all does not seem necessary; and the\\nfact that an articulate word is understood to have a definite meaning\\nshows the arbitrariness of human speech. Thus also the written\\nword distance is wholly unlike the uttered sound or the visual\\ncolors which also serve to suggest distance, or finally the tactual\\nor muscular data which likewise introduce the idea of distance into\\nthe mind. Neither is there any necessary connection between col-\\nors and tangible magnitude. Confusion [in the outlines of the\\nobject] or faintness [of color] have no more a necessary connec-\\ntion with little or great magnitude than they have with little or great\\ndistance. 2 Farther, when one has by experience learned the con-\\nnection there is between the several ideas of sight and touch, he\\nwill be able, by the perception he has of the situation of visible\\nthings in respect of one another, to. make a sudden and true esti-\\nmate of the situation of outward, tangible things corresponding to\\nthem. And thus he shall perceive by sight the situation of external\\nobjects, which do not properly fall under that sensed\\nWith regard to the nature of this connection, when, upon\\nperception of an idea, I range it under this or that sort it is\\nbecause it is perceived after the same manner, or because it has a\\nlikeness or conformity with or affects me in the same way as the\\nideas of the sort I rank it under 4 Thus the experience of a\\ncustomary connection between ideas is sufficient to account for\\nthe presence of the phenomenal object, and the manner in which\\nthis connection is brought about is by our perceiving the likeness\\n1 Philosophy of Berkeley in Life, Letters, etc., pp. 374-375. Fraser;\\nBerkeley, Blackwood Series P- 198.\\n2 Theory of Vision, 58.\\n3 Ibid\u00c2\u00a7 9 9.\\n*Ibid 128.", "height": "4596", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "37\\nor conformity of one idea with another or recognizing that we are\\naffected by one idea as we are affected by another. The arbi-\\ntrariness of human language is paralleled by this arbitrariness of\\nthe sense symbolism, and in both cases it is experience that\\ninstructs us in the use of these symbols. The externalization of\\nobjects in space Berkeley takes to be accounted for by his sensa-\\ntionalistic machinery; and Space, in any other sense than as an\\nempirical product, here falls under the general condemnation of\\nabstract ideas. 1 So likewise Time is the empirical succession of\\nsensations, not, as with Locke, a succession taken to denote time,\\nbut a succession constitutive of time.\\nIn 147 of the Theory of Vision the empirical theory as it\\nappears to Berkeley is fairly summed up. It is as follows:\\nUpon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper\\nobjects of vision constitute the Universal Language of Nature,\\nwhereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions, in order\\nto attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and\\nwell being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful\\nand destructive of them. It is by this information that we are\\nprincipally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life.\\nAnd the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the\\nobjects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages\\nand signs of human appointment; which do not suggest the things\\nsignified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an\\nhabitual connection that experience has made us to observe\\nbetween them. 2 This constitutes Berkely s empiricism, a posi-\\ntion which was never lost sight of in spite of later rationalistic\\ndevelopments; for, twenty-three years after the Theory of Vision\\nwas published, its vindication appeared, in which is maintained the\\ngoverning principle of that former work, viz. the passivity of\\nall ideas in so far as they are received as mere particulars, regard-\\nless of the combining and relating activity of mind.\\nBut we may ask: does this perceived likeness between ideas\\nmean merely a way that sensations have of forming themselves\\ninto groups, and so constituting a product utterly unlike the\\nsensations of which it is composed; or, since sensations are in\\nthemselves heterogeneous, is there implied in the perceived like-\\nness a reference to the combining activity of mind? Now Berkeley\\nmakes no enquiry into the presuppositions which render experience\\npossible; he does not search out principles or categories which\\nfunction in a manifold of sense foreign to them by nature.\\nUnitary mind, as active, synthetic, is the presupposition from\\nwhich he starts. His dualism is not between sense and under-\\nJ Fraser; Berkeley, Blackwood Philos. Classics, p. 136.\\n2 Theory of Vision, 147.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "38\\nstanding; it is between mind and mind. By reference to mind as\\nthe conscious unity of a manifold, Locke s primary qualities had\\nbeen reduced to their condition of mind-dependence, and in Berke-\\nley s empirical explanation of the constitution of the object, sensa-\\ntions are regarded as significant signs only because of their relation\\nto mind. This is apparent even in the Theory of Vision, and, if\\none reads his earlier philosophy in the light of his later work, it\\nseems less necessary to read Berkeley through Hume. That mind\\nor self was at first conceived by means of crude categories, and\\nthus justly merited the censure of Hume, it would be idle to dispute;\\nbut the spirit-substance was only a feeble echo of Locke s tabula\\nrasa and foreign to Berkeley s active mind and to the Reason\\nof Siris.\\nb. Necessary Connection.\\nWe have already noticed that the ideas of sense are distin-\\ntinguished from those of imagination, first, because of their greater\\nliveliness and distinctness; second, because of their independence\\nof the individual mind; finally, from the observed fact of their\\nappearing in a regular, orderly and coherent series. It was reserved\\nfor Hume to give exclusive prominence to the first of these distinc-\\ntions; but for Berkeley this liveliness and distinctness of the ideas\\nof sense is merely a characteristic mark observed to accompany\\nideas whose special designating feature is the orderliness and regu-\\nlarity of their production.\\nThe phenomenal object having been resolved into its sensa-\\ntional constituents, no likeness or affinity between these sensations\\nor objects of the special senses can be discovered. No value at-\\ntaches to them except as they are understood to be signs and so\\nrecognized by the mind by reference to which their meanings are\\nexhibited in the gradual unfolding of experience. Experience\\nteaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and\\nsuch other ideas x herein consists the arbitrariness of the connec-\\ntion but the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind\\nwe depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws\\nof nature; and these we learn by experience. 2 And all this we\\nknow, not by discovering any necessary connection between our\\nideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature. 3\\nThe law of cause and effect does not subsist between ideas, for\\nthese, as mere passive particulars, serve only as signs by which the\\nmind is enabled to gather rational meanings and understand the\\nlaws imposed upon the finite by a Supreme Mind; for ideas of\\nsense, being impressed in accordance with Rules or Laws of\\n1 Principles 30.\\n2 Ibid.\\n3 Ibid \u00c2\u00a731.", "height": "4596", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "39\\nNature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and\\nwise than human spirits. 1 Thus no phenomenal object can be a\\ncause, phenomena are merely effects, and, in the case of an apparent\\naffinity of one substance for another or the observed attraction of\\none body to another, nothing is signified besides the effect itself.\\nTo the objection that for purposes of scientific enquiry secon-\\ndary causes, at least, must be admitted, Berkeley replies that the\\nhypothesis of the uniformity and invariability of nature is in no\\nwise affected upon his principles. There are certain general\\nlaws that run through the whole chain of natural effects; these are\\nlearned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men\\napplied to the explaining of the various phenomena which\\nexplanation consists only in showing the conformity any particular\\nphenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the\\nsame thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production\\nof natural effects. 2 Complete knowledge of the phenomenon we\\ncannot have, not because it is in its nature alien to mind, but be-\\ncause the efficient cause which produces it is the will of a\\nspirit yet we can obtain a greater largeness of Comprehension,\\nwhereby analogies, harmonies and agreements are discovered in\\nthe works of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is,\\nreduced to general rules 3 or categories.\\nIn the Principles of Human Knowledge the objectivity of the\\nlaws, by means of which a world in space and time is made possible,\\nis seemingly accepted as a fact based upon simple observation of\\nphenomena, than which there are no more ultimate facts for us.\\nIn the unitariness of the phenomenon we have not only a thing as\\na cluster of sensations marked by one name, but a thing which in\\nits unity is itself an object of consciousness, an idea. Accordingly,\\nas we have elsewhere said, the character of the phenomenon is not\\ncompletely exhausted in the mere discovery of its sensational con-\\nstituents, for simple observation of it, as it is intuitively appre-\\nhended in consciousness, reveals it a thing, distinguished from other\\nthings, in spite of psychological analysis and the mere description\\nof how it has come to be. But not being independent of mind, the\\nfurther explication of phenomena must again take place only with\\nreference to mind; i. e., I must simply observe the relation between\\nmind and phenomena in this second character. This reveals that\\nphenomena, as also the relations which apparently subsist between\\nthem, are independent of my mind, i. e., mind in so far as I have\\na knowledge of its acts and operations; and this constitutes, in\\nBerkeley s earlier philosophy, the objectivity of natural phenomena\\nand the laws by which they are governed.\\n1 Principles j$ 36.\\n2 Ibid 62.\\n3 Ibid 105.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u009440\\nThus, (i) the Principles endeavors to establish the objec-\\ntivity of laws upon the the observation of ideas as ultimate facts\\nof consciousness, which presumably reveals the fact that these\\nphenomena and their relations are independent of the indiviual\\nwill. (2) Accordingly they are to be referred to a Supreme Mind\\nhere conceived under the catagory of Will. From this there results\\na subordination of Reason to Will and the apparent liability of\\nthese objective laws of nature (even granting their objectivity to\\nhave been established by so simple a process) to be subverted by\\na capricious Will; we may discover the general laws of nature,\\nand from them deduce the other phenomena; I do not say demon-\\nstate, for all deduction of that kind depends on a supposition that\\nthe Author of Nature always operates uniformily, and in constant\\nobservance of those rules we take for principles which we cannot\\nevidently know. 1\\nIt is in the Principles that the sufficiency of the Berkeleian sign\\nlanguage for the explanation of experience seems most apparently\\nto depend upon the support of a deistic theology, while, in Siris,\\nReason rather than Will is looked upon as the supreme category;\\nand the discovery of the objectivity of law is based upon a deeper\\ninsight into the implications of the phenomenal objects, and a\\nrecognition of the inadequacy of the early empirical position as an\\nultimate explanation of the phenomenal universe. The inner bonds\\nwhich weld the perceived universe into a rational whole are now\\nmade subjects of reflection, 2 and the issue is the discovery that the\\nuniversals of Reasons are immanent in sense. In accordance with\\nthe established connections, no longer referred to the arbitrary\\nimposition of Divine Will, it is seen that the mind of man acts\\nby an instrument necessarily. The to yyefiovt%o\\\\ f or mind presiding\\nin the world acts by an instrument freely. 3 Secondary causes are\\nnow admitted; for without instrumental and secondary causes, there\\ncould be no regular course of nature. And without a regular course\\nnature could never be understood. 4 Berkeley never dreams of\\ndeparting from his early belief that mechanical causes cannot be\\nreceived as ultimate explanations; but there is a much stronger in-\\nsistence upon their usefulness and necessity, as mechanical hypoth-\\neses. There is an analogy, constancy and uniformity in the phenom-\\nena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general\\nrules; and these are a Grammar for the understanding of Nature 5\\nand so far as men have studied and remarked its rules, and can\\nVlbid \u00c2\u00a7107. Works Yol. I.\\n2 Wenley; British Thought and Modern Speculation in Scottish Review,\\nJan., 1892, vol. 19, p. 150.\\n3 Siris 160.\\nSiris 160.\\n5 Siris 252.", "height": "4592", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "41\\ninterpret right, so far they may be said to be knowing in nature. 1\\nWe must now clearly recognize that sense is of itself insufficient to\\nconstitute the phenomenal world of objects as we find it. The phe-\\nnomena of nature strike on the senses and are understood by the\\nmind 2 i.e., Thought, Reason, Intellect, introduce us into the\\nknowledge of their causes. 3 Again, it is certain that the princi-\\nples of science are neither objects of Sense or imagination; 4 Sci-\\nence consists not in the passive perceptions but in the reasoning\\nupon them. 5\\nThus we are brought in Siris to the knowledge of a new world\\nin which such is the mutual relation, connection, motion and\\nsympathy of the parts that they seem, as it were, animated and\\nheld together by one soul; and such is their harmony, order, and\\nregular course, as sheweth the soul to be governed and directed by\\na Mind. 6\\nAs we are now constrained to interpret Berkeley s Language of\\nNature, we find that we must no longer read it as a system of signs,\\narbitrarily instituted by capricious Will, but as signs whose sole\\nvalue is in their rational significence. In the new universe, with\\nwhich we are now made acquainted, the continuity remains unbro-\\nken. From the lowest sense given phenomena we ascend in a series\\nof gradations to the highest products of Reason by means of which\\nare discovered the inviolable laws immanent in an objective system\\nof nature. True, the various steps by which this unfolding of\\nnature is accomplished are frequently dominated by the hylo-\\nzoistic and animistic conceptions of the past. Accordingly no\\nphilosophy of nature, worthy the name, is offered us, nor indeed\\nis such seriously intended by Berkeley in his review of the anti-\\nquated categories of past philosophies; but the central feature which\\nserves to differentiate his later from his earlier idealism nevertheless\\nremains. The world is now to be viewed as an organic whole, whose\\nseveral parts are throughout concatenated and sustained by one\\nMind. Exeept for the important fact that Mind is now conceived\\nas Reason immanent in the world rather than as dominant Will,\\nthe new conceptions do not seem so foreign to his former idealism;\\nyet by this there is apparently introduced a world-wide distinction\\nbetween his later and earlier doctrines.\\nIf we attempt to discover the source of these new conceptions\\nwe come upon a nowise unfamiliar assertion that the Mind, her\\nacts and faculties, furnish a new and distinct class of objects/ 7 and\\n1 Siris, 254.\\n2 Ibid.\\n3 Ibid 268.\\n*Ibid.\\n5lbid \u00c2\u00a7305.\\n6 Ibid 273.\\n7 Ibid 297.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "42\\nthese objects are what Berkeley variously denominates Ideas/ in-\\ntellectual ideas, intellectual notions, and notions. Now the\\nthorough recognition of the immanence of Reason in the Berkelian\\nworld of phenomena forbids our believing that he has espoused the\\ncause of Platonism with the ardor of a complete devotee. Siris,\\nindeed, is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Plato; but to Plato,\\nBerkeley has never been a complete stranger, either to his spirit, or\\nin the knowledge of his works. The passages suggestive of Plato,\\nand in some instances quoted from him, Berkeley turns to account\\nin showing a closer correlation of sense and intellect than the\\nformer achieves, while at the same time the passivity of the idea\\nthrough which Berkeley reached his early empiricism is not aban-\\ndoned. 1 The following indicate his more explicit recognition in\\nSiris of the several functions that maybe assigned to mind it its\\ndiverse operations.\\nIn the first place Sense implies an impression from some\\nother being, and denotes a dependence in the soul which hath\\nit, 12 a statement clearly recalling the influence of Locke and in-\\ndeed not unsuggestive of Kant, if one bears in mind that the ding-\\nan-sich must somehow be conceptualized, or else an alternative of\\ncourse adopted by Fichte and the Hegelians it declares itself to\\nbe nothing. Again: By experiments of sense we become ac-\\nquainted with the lower faculties of the soul; from them, whether\\nby a gradual evolution or ascent, we arrive at the highest. Sense\\nsupplies images to memory. These become subjects for fancy to\\nwork upon. Reason considers and judges of the imaginations.\\nAnd these acts of reason become new objects of the understand-\\ning. 3 Further to illustrate the small part that is played by mere\\nsense, apart from the active functioning of Reason: as under-\\nstanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear, or see, or feel [as\\ndo the special senses], so sense knoweth not sense or\\nsoul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing. 4 And now if we\\nwould know what this has to do with the phenomenal object, we\\nmay note that we know a thing when we understand it; and we\\nunderstand it when we can interpret or tell what it signifies\\nWe perceive, indeed, sounds by hearing, and characters by sight.\\nBut we are not therefore said to understand them. 5 They are\\n1 Berkeley s notions are Locke s ideas of relation and by them he pro-\\nposes to effect a compromise between the tabula rasa of Aristotle and the innate\\nideas of Plato and suggests that though there are properly no ideas or passive\\nobjects but what were derived from Sense, yet there are also, besides these, her\\nown acts and operations [acts of the mind], such as notions, which must be\\nreferable to the understanding, here Berkeley clearly approximates\\nto Kant. T. H. Webb; Veil of Isis, p. 27.\\n2 Siris, 286.\\n3 Ibid \u00c2\u00a7303.\\n*Ibid \u00c2\u00a7305.\\n5 Ibid 253.", "height": "4600", "width": "2800", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "43\\nunintelligible save as they are subjected to the unifying acts of\\nReason. In the uncategorized sense impressions there is only\\nunintelligible sound, unintelligible color, perceived 7 or rather\\npresent to sense, but not understood, not truly perceived or apper-\\nceived. Only the correlate of sensations into which unity is intro-\\nduced by the mind is truly regarded as an object distinguished from\\nother objects and related to them. The former individualized per-\\ncept is now looked at from the point of view of its other implica-\\ntions, and there is seen to be involved in its being the informing\\nprinciple of active, unitary mind. 1\\nWe may now ask whether this later Rationalism is at variance-\\nwith Berkeley s early idealism, or whether it merely represents the\\ngreater elaboration of elements already contained in the philosophy\\nof the Principles of Human Knowledge. Accordingly, let us\\nretrace our steps, delaying for a moment at the fourth of the seven\\ndialogues entitled Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher. The\\nseries of arguments here put forth are in the nature of rational infer-\\nences from the various sensations with which we are affected, pur-\\nporting to discover to us that the Optic Language we before con-\\nsidered solely from the point of view of the arbitrariness of signs\\nregarded in themselves hath a necessary connexion with knowledge\\nwisdom and goodness. By rational inferences from the acts, ges-\\ntures, and speech of our fellowmen we are enabled to conclude the\\nexistence of other selves conceived in analogy with our own. By\\nparity of reasoning the sign language of Nature viewed in its total-\\nity is significant of a Mind upon whom Nature is constantly de-\\npendent for its existence, a design argument being supported in\\nmaintenance of a theistic view. Here we are told, in anticipation\\nof Siris, that every perception of an object involves the work of\\nrational inference. The mere signs or sensations which, like the\\nprinted words of a page, are, in their own Nature of small\\nmoment, carry the attention onward to the very things signified\\nwhich in truth and strictness are not seen, but only sug-\\ngested and apprehended by means of the proper pbjects of sight.\\nWe have, again, the doctrine of the Theory of Vision, with a\\ngreater insistance, not only upon the insignificance of sensations\\nregarded in themselves, but also a more explicit recognition of the\\nfunction of mind in apprehending the object. Likewise the cus-\\n1 No sooner does intellect dawn upon the shadowy scene, than we perceive\\nthe true principle of unity, identity and existence. Those things which before\\nseemed to constitute the whole of being, upon taking an intellectual view of things\\n[i. e., viewing them as conceptions] prove to be but fleeing phantoms.\\nIn presence of such declarations, Professor Fraser declares that Berkeley not\\nonly was not a sensualist of the school of Condillac, not only not an empiricist of\\nthe school of Hume, but he was a transcendentalist of the highest and purest\\nschool of Kant Cf. also Lewis: The History of Philosophy from,\\nThales to Comte, vol. II, pp. 304, 305.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "44\\ntom-induced association between sensations takes on a different\\ncoloring now from that observable in the Theory of Vision, and\\nwe are told that there must be time and experience, by repeated\\nacts, to acquire a habit of knowing the connexion between the signs\\nand the things signified. This seems in essential agreement with\\na passage in Siris 2 which states that mind, knowledge and notions,\\neither in habit or in act, always go together. That habit which\\nis unconsciously rational is the basis of our immediate perceptions\\nor the phenomenal object, is the view which Berkeley adopts in\\nAlciphron and later urges in his doctrine of the immanence of\\nReason in the world of sense.\\nHere we must pause for the moment, since it is plain that the\\nnegative theory of the Principles and the dialogues between Hylas\\nand Philonous, repeating with slight variations the former doctrine,\\ncan offer but feeble suggestion of the rationalism which creeps into\\nSiris through the dialogue we have briefly noticed. There thus\\narises the question of whether Alciphron and Siris should not be,\\ntogether,regarded as representative of Berkeley s later thought, while\\nthe Theory of Vision, the Principles and the earlier dialogues\\nremain to vindicate a view of the world between which and the\\nlater idealism there is little or no connection. The lines upon\\nwhich we must seek an answer to this question are suggested by\\nthe further inquiry that naturally arises from the preceeding, viz.\\nhow, in a Philosophy which preached Nominalism at the outset,\\nhave we any right to speak of rational connections and the domi-\\nnance of mind in a universe in which by hypothesis our knowledge\\nis confined to particulars. Accordingly we can expect to find\\nessential agreement between these two seemingly opposed types of\\nphilosophy only in the discovery that the conceptual processes\\nimplied in Berkeley s later theory of the constitution of experience\\nare not at variance with the earlier. That the mind and its acts\\nmake us aware of an entirely different class of objects from the mere\\nsense ideas, we are told in Siris and this is but a repetition of\\n89 3 of the Principles in which we learn that we have a notion of\\nrelations between things or ideas\u00e2\u0080\u0094 which relations are distinct from\\nthe ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived\\nby us without our perceiving the former. In other words, the\\nmind by its acts conceives the relations between things, while these\\nlatter may be viewed as mere particulars apart from the rational\\nimplications that are throughout contained in the constitution of\\nthe object. Thus from the consideration of relations between\\nideas, which has so far in this chapter occupied our attention, we\\n1 Fraser; Selections from Berkeley, p. 269.\\nSiris, \u00c2\u00a7309,\\n3 Cf., p. 13 note.", "height": "4604", "width": "2856", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "45\\nmust now turn to the notion by means of which we obtain our\\nknowledge of relations.\\n2. THE NOTION AND ITS OBJECTS.\\n(a). Meani?ig of l Notion.\\nIn the section on abstract ideas we endeavored to set forth\\nBerkeley s distinction between ideas in the sense of abstract images,\\nand in that of representative notions. All ideas, which are, in one\\naspect, particular, herein consists his Nominalism are in another\\naspect representative of other particulars, and in this consists his\\nRationalism. They are alike abstractions from the phenomenal\\nobject. In one aspect we see that they are translatable into terms of\\nmind as percipient, in the other into terms of mind as cognitive.\\nIn any case, the existence of the object involves a reference to\\nmind, not only as merely percipient, but as cognitive.\\nIn Berkeley s early idealism we have seen that it is the relation\\nof the phenomenal object X.o percipient consciousness that is chiefly\\ninsisted upon. The percept is individualized, resolved into its\\nconstituent factors by means of its discoverable relation to con\\nsciousness in so far as the latter denotes a passive experience\\npercipience. At this stage we note the arbitrariness of the relation\\nbetween phenomena thus particularized. Why this particular\\natomic element of consciousness should be connected with that\\nother particular, passive experience, does not appear. 1 The reason\\nof the connection, if any there be, has been lost in the past expe-\\nrience of the individual or the race, in the course of which such\\nfacility has been gained in interpretation of this Universal Sign\\nLanguage that the necessity of its origin and maintenance in Uni-\\nversal Mind is neglected. 1 he sensations, which have no bond in\\nthemselves, since they serve only as signs, must have a causal\\nsource or ground in which the reason of their connection can be\\nfound, a source that is independent; of the individual will, and in\\nwhich, as we finally learn in Siris, we can only participate by\\nmeans of the universals of Reason.\\nIn the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley recognized\\nthe existence of these universals; for, as Mr. Bradley 2 has said, he\\nknew that Relation constitutes the universality of ideas. Hence\\nhis third kind of existence, the knowledge of which is given us by\\na notion. But, as the same author further says, Berkeley does not\\nfollow up the notion because blinded by the ambiguity of the\\nidea derived from Locke. Abstract ideas Berkeley indeed denies,\\nthough only, as we have said, in the sense of abstract images\\nBerkeley Fraser (Blackwood Series), p. 198.\\nl C. W. Bradley; Berkeley s Idealism, in Journal of Speculative Philos.\\n1881-83.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "46\\nfor every idea has its particular aspect; but the phenomenal object\\nlikewise retains its conceptual character; it is related to other\\nthings, and is one of an organic whole whose several parts are\\ninterdependent and ultimately imply a rational nexus. That the\\nunifying bond between phenomena, implied in the recognition of\\ntheir causal source, is not suggested in the Principles otherwise\\nthan in his brief acknowledgement of relations, is true; but it\\nwould be false to assert that Berkeley had no basis for his future\\nrationalizing, and that he reached his later philosophy by means\\nof the abstractions which he had at first denied. Nor is this so\\ninconsistent with a statement occurring early in the Principles\\nand which seems to curtail our knowledge: my conceivingor imag-\\nining power he there tells us, does not extend beyond the possi-\\nbility of real existence. For, as we have endeavored to show, by\\nreal existence Berkeley never means the mere object of the special\\nsenses, but the percept and the doctrine of Alciphron, that\\nevery perception implies more than it preceptively intimates, 2 is\\nbut the development of a view for which he was already prepared\\nin the recognition of the representative character belonging to all\\nperception.\\nTo repeat in brief Berkeley s theory respecting universals, the\\npercept, or phenomenal object, immediately present to conscious-\\nness is, in so far as it can be referred to individual conscious ex-\\nperience, resolvable into particulars. Accordingly, the percept is\\nitself particular, and likewise all general notions or concepts are\\nparticular, since by reference to the immediate perceptual charac-\\nter of the individual consciousness their composite nature is dis-\\ncovered. But two things which God has joined together cannot\\nbe put asunder without loss to both, and if we cannot, from the\\nforegoing, abstract the object from sensation and ascribe to it an\\nexistence independent of conscious experience, neither can we\\nhypostatize mere sensations and give to them an ultimate reality\\nwhich we deny to the objective consciousness involved in the im-\\nmediate perception of things.\\nFrom the third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous it may\\nbe seen that a possible Humian hypostatization of sensations was\\npresent to Berkeley s mind; and he seems there struggling to free\\nhis conception of the self from the crude categories in which it\\nappears clothed in the Principles, a task which he better achieved\\nin Siris. But it never appeared to him that he would himself be\\nregarded as a representative of sensationalism, and that, in exhib-\\niting the necessary relation of all objects to the percipient con-\\n1 Philosophy of Berkeley in The Life, Letters and Unpublished Writings of\\nBerkeley, p. 371-372.\\n2 Wer.ley; British Thought and Modern Speculation, jn Scottish Rev.,\\nVol. 19, p. 140.", "height": "4604", "width": "2792", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "47\\nsciousness, he had debarred himself from any further consideration\\nof those universals of Reason, upon the assumed existence of which\\nthe whole of his later theory reposes. To hypostatize universals or\\nnotions, in other words, to conceive an abstract idea that cannot\\nbe shown to bear the marks which signify its origination in indi-\\nvidual experience, is an impossibility. While on the other hand,\\nto hypostatize sensations, to regard them as having an existence\\nindependent of the relating activity of mind, is again to commit\\nthat fallacy of abstractly conceiving existence to which it was\\nBerkeley s purpose to call attention. That particular sensations\\nare of themselves insufficient for the ultimate explanation of our\\nexperience of an objective world, Berkeley acknowledges in the\\nadmission that all knowledge and demonstration are about uni-\\nversal notions. Things which, regarded in themselves, and as\\nmere passive objects of mind, are particular, become universal by\\nbeing regarded in their relation to mind from which they cannot\\nultimately be separated.\\nIn the second edition of the Principles 1 we are told that there\\nsubsist relations between things and that these relations are discov-\\nerable by means of the notion. The notion, we are also told in\\nthe first edition, is the particular in its representative character, not\\nas representative of anything beyond and distinct from conscious-\\nness, but representative of other particulars whose sole significance\\nis their relation to conscious mind. Accordingly, the Berkelian no-\\ntion is a representative image, 2 the obverse of the particular whose\\nconstituent elements are discoverable by psychological analysis;\\nbul this representative or conceptual 3 character is as much a given\\niThe fact that this statement occurs only in the second edition of the\\nPrinciples has been cited as proof positive, not only that in the earliest phase of\\nhis idealism Berkeley had but imperfectly conceived the function of the intellec-\\ntual notion, a fact readily to be conceded; but it has also been held to denote a\\nmore fundamental difference, such that the earlier and later theories could not have\\nbeen held together in solution by Berkeley. Such objections do not however suf-\\nficiently explain the fact that in the second edition of the Principles, published in\\n1732, so shortly before the appearance of Siris, the empiricism of the first edition\\nreappears in substantially the same form that it assumes in the earlier. Cf. McCosh;\\nLocke s Theory of Knowledge with a notice of Berkeley in Criteria of\\nTruth.\\n2 Representative of conscious experience, not of a reality independent of all\\nconsciousness tor, as Lewes says: Nothing can be more inaccurate than to class\\nBerkeley among those who maintain ideas to be representative of things: ideas he\\nsays are things. Yet Hamilton commits this inaccuacy. History of Philo., Vol.\\nII, p. 313, note.\\n3 i. e., The concept must be individualized. Yet this rule, says Manse 1,\\nProleg. Logica, pp. 23, 33, quoted by Fraser in Selections, page 21, note 2),\\nindividualize your conceps does not mean sensationalize them. With Berkeley,\\nhowever, as we have seen, it does mean sensationalize them, although this does not\\nexclnde the representative character of the concept. For: a blurred picture is\\njust as much a single mental fact as a sharp picture is; and the use t either picture", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "48\\nfact of consciousness as the particular image which in one aspect\\nit is seen to be. The particular only exists with reference to the\\nuniversal, while, on the other hand, the universal has no abstract\\nexistence apart from the particular. For this reason Professor\\nFraser s contention that Berkeley makes ideas objective, rather than\\nthings subjective, seems to be borne out even in the earlier theory.\\nIam not for changing things into ideas, bat rather ideas into\\nthings, says Berkeley; since those immediate objects of percep-\\ntion, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I\\ntake to be the real things themselves\\nJudging from his early statements with regard to the notion,\\nand from the subsequent part which they play in his later idealism,\\nit does not seem that such statements of the realistic position he\\nwished to defend should be taken merely as an attempt to square a\\nsubjective idealism with the common sense conviction that there is\\nan external world which is for its existence independent of the in-\\ndividual consciousness. For Berkeley, the objectivity of ideas\\nand relations between ideas was guaranteed, i by throughout\\nmaintaining that, in showing the subjective reference which any\\nphenomenon has, he is not thereby destroying the independent\\nby the mind to symbolize a whole class of individuals is a new mental function.\\n(James: Psych., vol. II, p. 49). In other words: the Mind, her acts and fac-\\nulties, furnish a new and distinct class of objects, (cited above, Siris, 247) or\\nnotions, and the notion is just this blurred picture, not in its character as re\\nsolvable into its constituents in the individual consciousness, but in the use which\\nthe mind makes of it. To quote from an article of recent date, (Dr. A.\\nK. Rogers Epistemology and Experience: Philos. Rev., Sept., 1898). The\\nconcept has existence only as a tool, a method. It is not any element of expe-\\nrience as an existence, but simply the way we use that particular element which we\\ncall the image. Accordingly, the concept, the universal as such does not enter\\ninto reality at all except in its functional use. It is quite impossible that anything\\nshould exist in general.\\nNow I think Berkeley would say, this functional use of the concept in expe-\\nrience must be justified, and we find its justification in the representative image; for,\\nin the latter, this functional use of the concept, this reference beyond the mere\\nparticulars of which the representative image is composed is a given fact of expe-\\nrience. The dynamic representative character of the concept or notion, the ref-\\nerence forward to other reality than itself, is as much a fact, seized and transfixed,\\nand thus justified in experience, as its static character which is its natural history\\nand the description of its particular, constituent, psychic factors\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and experience\\ncannot be other than it takes itself to be.\\nThe representative image or notion is thus a go-between in two phases of\\nour attitude toward reality. As representative it is functionally active as the con-\\ncept; as static, passive, translatable into terms of the individual consciousness, it is\\ncomposite and thus resolvable into particulars. As concept it is ideally predicable\\nin the judgment but this predication, though ideal, finds its justification in the fact\\nthat the sense datum which forms the subject of judgment is also ideal and in the\\nunitariness of the representative image are the two made one.\\nThus, beneath the surface contradiction which appears in many parts of\\nBerkeley s philosophy the divergent lines of Siris and the Principles meet in a com-\\nmon focus\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the doctrine of the notion.", "height": "4592", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "49\\ncharacter of the object, since objectivity is a given fudamental\\nfact of consciousness; (2) by the presence in consciousness of\\nuniversals or notions. In denying the existence of abstract no-\\ntions, i. e., in the discovery that the notion always involves a re-\\nlation to sense perception Berkeley had vindicated the reality of\\nthe notion and thus the objectivity of the relations which form its\\ncontent by the direct evidence of the perceptual consciousness.\\nFor the content of the notion is, he tell us, relations, relations\\nwhich at any rate appear objective, and since the notion is, in its\\nindividual character, as the image, experiential, the objectivity of\\nrelations is directly evinced by consciousness; for to use Professor\\nRoyce s language experience cannot be other than it takes itself\\nto be. In other words, Berkeley asserts a common sense realism, 2\\nresting the existence of universals upon the direct testimony of\\nconsciousness. His realism is not, however, a copy theory, for\\nthere is nothing foreign to consciousness of which the idea can be\\nthe copy, and in this respect it is idealism.\\nIn the third dialogue between Hylas and Phylonous, the notion\\nin the guise of the archetype plays a more prominent part than in\\nthe Principles, and likewise the objectivity of ideas is further in-\\nsisted upon. While in the later work we find Berkeley denying the\\nexistence of abstract matter, for the reason that the existence of a\\nthing cannot be abstracted from the perception of it, we here find\\nhim using the same argument in support of the objectivity of\\nthings or ideas to mind, for that a thing should be really perceived\\nby my consciousness and at the same time not. really exist is to me\\na plain contradiction, since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in\\nthought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being per-\\nceived.\\nIn Siris we receive further insight into the doctrine of the\\nobjectivity of ideas, which, from his now complete recognition of\\nthe immanence of reason, one would expect to find him regard as\\nactive in their objective aspect. And so it is, for he there says\\nthat sensible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in the cause,\\nand as passions in us. In Siris also 3 Berkeley favors a doctrine of\\ninnate notions, although, as he tells us, it is different from that\\nwhich is favored by the moderns, doubtless meaning the abstract\\nidea of Locke as well as the innate idea of Descartes. For the\\ninnate notion Berkeley describes as having a potential existence:\\n1 It is the emptiness of the abstract universal as well as its unimaginableness\\nagainst which Berkeley declaims the unschematized category. But Berkeley had\\nno dualism as had Kant no violent severing of sense-given impressions from the\\nactivity of thought.\\n2 Cf. Wenley British Thought and Modern Speculation, p. 148 of Scottish\\nRev., vol. 19.\\n3 Siris 308-309-315.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "50\\nit is connate rather than innate. The finite mind or self, by par-\\nticipation in the Divine Mind, possesses the power of reflection\\nand of originating its own products, the notions; but since this\\nreflection is employed upon sense phenomena, which are not by\\nnature foreign to Mind, the notion amounts to an active synthesis\\nof this given material, and is thus for Berkeley constitutive, or to\\nexpress it more nearly in Berkeley s Platonic language, by means\\nof the notion we rediscover the universal creative form of -the\\nDivine Reason immanent in sense.\\n(b) Notion of Self and God.\\nParallel to Berkeley s theory of a notion of relations there also\\ndevelops his notion of the Self and God. With regard to our\\nknowledge of Self it is again Locke who furnishes a point of\\ndeparture for Berkeley s theory. The former, in close imitation of\\nDescartes, had said 1 that as for our own existence we perceive it\\nso plainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For\\nnothing can be more evident to us than our own existence\\nExperience convinces us that we can have an intuitive knowledge\\nof our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we\\nare. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking we are con-\\nscious to ourselves of our own being; and in this matter come not\\nshort of the highest degree of certainty.\\nApparently in entire agreement with this, Berkeley sets out\\nwith a intuitional view of the self. Such passages as the following\\nappear in considerable profusion throughout his earlier philosophi-\\ncal works, and demonstrate his inability to free himself from an\\napparent necessity of giving to his conception of the self an empir-\\nical setting. In the Principles he says that we comprehend\\nour own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other\\nspirits by reason. 2 Likewise, in the third dialogue between\\nHylas and-Philonous: I do nevertheless know that I who am a\\nspirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas\\nexist. Further, I know what I mean by the terms I and myself,\\nand I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive\\nit as I perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound. By such state-\\nments Berkeley not only laid himself open to the charge of having\\nattempted to ground his metaphysic upon a psychological theory\\nof the self a view which a consistent application of his own empir-\\nical principles would destroy; for, as Hume afterward showed, the\\npermanence of the I, as given in perception, is not a real perma-\\nnence but he apparently sought to reinstate, notwithstanding his\\n1 Locke s Essay, Book IV, ch. ix-3.\\n2 Principles, 89.", "height": "4596", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "51\\nNominalism, a substance theory fully as unacceptable as that\\nof Locke.\\nEarly in the Principles this category of substance appears; yet it\\noccurs rather as a foil to the Cartesian substance than as a principle\\nof explanation to which the author attached any positive significance\\na category nearest at hand to envisage the active principle which,\\nby the extension of its activity, was to supplant passive matter. We\\nhave no mediaeval discussion of faculties, no question is raised as\\nto the relation of a soul substance to a divine spirit substance, nor\\nare we told anything about the attributes of this substance. On the\\ncontrary in speaking of the perception of the qualities of bodies\\nhe says that these qualities are in the mind only as they are per-\\nceived by it that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by\\nway of idea. Following the passage just quoted, Berkeley pro-\\nceeds to draw the conclusion that the soul does not possess quali-\\nties. Subject, mode, and attribute, of the philosophers are discarded\\nas unintelligible terms; and this he illustrates in the case of a\\nmaterial object. 1\\nThe paralogism involved in the attempt to explain the self by\\nmeans of the materialistic category of substance certainly appeared\\nto Berkeley. In the first place they would, of necessity, occur to\\nhim in the distinction which he set up between spirits and ideas.\\nThe latter, as merely passive existences, have nothing in common\\nwith spirit but the general name Being. This distinction is intro-\\nduced among the reflections of the Commonplace Book: Things\\nare two fold, he tells us active or inactive. The existence of\\nactive things is to act, of inactive to be perceived. There being\\nnothing in common between these two heterogeneous kinds of exis-\\ntences, the former, the active relational principle, mind or spirit, can-\\nnot be adequately expressed in terms of passive ideas. Accordingly,\\nin spite of a seemingly bold assertion that we assuredly have an\\nidea of substance, we read its qualification in the statements which\\nfollow: The substance of body we know. The substance of Spirit\\nwe do not know it not being knowable, it being a purus actus. 1\\nNow by the substance of body, Berkeley, as we have seen,\\nmeans nothing else than the sensible object, involving indeed\\nthought-relations if we read him aright, but never abstract sub-\\nstance. Likewise any knowledge of spirit as substance is here,\\ndenied.\\nIn the Principles and in the earlier dialogues, the category of\\nsubstance occurs in connection with his various other characteri-\\nzations of mind or spirit. In the third of these dialogues, after\\nspeaking of the I as a spirit or thinking substance, he goes on\\n1 Principles, 49.\\n1 Philonous 3d dialogue, \u00c2\u00a75.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "52\\nto say: The Mind, Spirit or Soul, is that indivisible, unextended\\nthing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I say indivisable, because\\nunextended; and unextended because extended, figured, moveable\\nthings are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and\\nwills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea I- do not\\ntherefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. These state-\\nments do not seem to be a return to scholastic discussions as to\\nthe possible existence of a spirit substance, stripped of all the rela-\\ntions by which substance or matter is perceptively known- to us.\\nThey appear rather to indicate the predominant thought in Berke-\\nley s mind, that neither the sense qualities nor substance which\\nexists only in presence of these qualities can be adduced in sup-\\nport of a kind of existence which is, in itself, unknowable. Only\\na negative signification is assigned to substance; 1 and Berkeley,\\nwhenever he is driven to an explanation of the self or the objective\\nSpirit which for him takes the place of matter, has recourse to the\\nactive, thinking principle, a knowledge of which is had by means\\nof the notion.\\nAfter denying the possibility of our having an idea either of\\nthe self or of God, he proceeds to give a reason for his insistence\\nthat we have, if not an idea, at least some knowledge, of Spirit.\\nIn reply to Hylas objection that even if abstract matter be disal-\\nlowed, there may yet be some third nature distinct from Matter\\nand Spirit for what reason is there why you should call it\\nSpirit Berkeley in effect says that there can be no via mediabe-\\ntween matter and spirit, no unica substantia 2 for as I have a mind\\nto have some notion of meaning in what I say when I speak\\nof an active being, I am obliged to mean spirit. Activity can be\\nascribed only to that which has ideas and possesses the power of\\ncombining and relating those ideas, or to that which creates ideas.\\nIf L may be allowed to quote farther, at considerable length,\\nfrom the dialogue we have been considering, the following may be\\ntaken as illustrative of the position at which Berkeley has thus far\\narrived with regard to a knowledge of the self and God. Though\\nwe have no idea of spirit, yet taking the word idea in a large\\nsense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea [notion],\\nthat is, an i?nage or likeness of God\u00e2\u0080\u0094 though indeed extremely in-\\nadequate. For all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflect-\\ning on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its im-\\nperfection. 3 In this we seem to obtain some hint of Berkeley s\\n1 Lewis, in his History of Philosophy (Berkeley) holds to the extreme of\\nthis substance-interpretation ot Berkeley. He tells us that his idealism is at\\nbottom the much decried system of Spinoza, who taught that there was but one\\nessence in the universe, and that one Substance.\\n2 cf. Fraser; Berkeley, Blackwood Philos. Classics, p. 201.\\n3 Third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. Wales Vol.", "height": "4612", "width": "2792", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "53\\nlater doctrine of Personality, God appearing to be for him the\\ncompletion of the finite self. He further describes this sort of\\nknowledge in the following terms: I have, therefore, though not\\nan inactive idea, yet in myself some sort of an active thinking\\nimage of the Deity. And though I perceive Him not by sense,\\nyet I have a notion of him, or know him by reflection and reason-\\ning. 1\\nTo this statement of Philonous, Hylas, the materialist, objects.\\nYou say, he remarks, your own soul supplies you with some sort\\nof an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowl-\\nedge you have, properly speaking, no idea of your own soul.\\nTo act consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit.\\nPhilonous thus replies, I say, in the first place, that I do not\\ndeny the existence of material substance, merely because I have\\nno notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in\\nother words, because it is repugnant that there should be a notion\\nof it. Many things, for ought I know, may exist, whereof neither\\nI nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatso-\\never. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing in-\\nconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly,\\nthat although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive,\\nyet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without\\nsome reason for such belief; but I have no reason for believing the\\nexistence of matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither\\ncan I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or\\npassions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance\\neither by probable deduction or necessary consequence. Whereas\\nthe being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking prin-\\nciple, I evidently know #_ reflection It is granted we have\\nneither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of\\nthe existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow\\nthat such spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to sup-\\npose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose\\nthe other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there is\\na probability for the other. I say, lastly, that I have a notion\\nof Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it. I do\\nnot perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by\\nreflection.\\nIn the above we have not only Berkeley s second and positive\\ndisproof of abstract matter the first and negative disproof being\\ngrounded on the fact that its existence is not supported by the evi-\\ndence of immediate perception but, what is here to our purpose,\\nhis reasons for substituting spirit for abstract matter.\\nWe may put the case briefly thus: We can have no idea of\\n1 Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "54\\n-spirit, but only a notion or conception of it. We have neither an\\nidea of abstract matter nor can we conceive its existence. The\\nnotion of matter is self-contradictory because, being conceived as\\npassive, we may demand that the notion of it shall be realized in\\nthe form of passive existence, or ideas, and this demand it cannot\\nfulfill or if it does, it at once becomes idea, and then Berkeley\\nasks: why reduplicate existence and attempt to think matter other-\\nwise than as it is revealed to us in the percipient consciousness\\nThe notion of matter is thus inadequate to its objective existence.\\nIf it be replied that matter is active, produces, brings about effects,\\nBerkeley would say that the notion of activity is indentical with\\nthe notion of spirit; for as soon as you attempt to conceive it as\\nmatter, you make it passive, i. e., idea, and thus destroy activity.\\nIf then you attempt to conceive matter in itself, as an absolute ex-\\nistence apart from spirit, you must admit that it must stand on its\\nown merit, i. e., as passivity, and thus, again, it is idea.\\nThe notion of spirit, however, though inadequate in so far\\nas we attempt to characterize it by conceptions borrowed from\\npassive ideas, is not inconsistent; for the conception of spirit does\\nnot demand that it shall be, in its absolute nature, expressed in\\nterms of ideas, but that these shall only signify or represent spirit-\\nual activity, which is by hypothesis different from ideas. Thus we\\nmust, from the very notion of matter, demand a complete knowl-\\nedge of what it is, and it is thus inadequate to the form of repre-\\nsentation which its conception requires; while, on the other hand,\\nthe notion of spirit is less inadequate inasmuch as it only requires\\na medium for the expression of itself, viz, notions or representa-\\ntions. We may accordingly be forced to content ourselves with a\\nrelative knowledge of mind or spirit, a probability, as Berkeley\\nexpresses it, but of matter we can have no knowledge, except as a\\nmind-dependent existence.\\nThe passages which I have transcribed from Berkeley s dia-\\nlogue do not seem to me to indicate a sole reliance upon the em-\\npirical self in support of his idealistic hypothesis. In the self or\\nthinking principle which I evidently know by reflection there\\nis implied the thought of an activity of relation of which we are\\nmade aware not only by its empirical manifestations but, also by\\nthe universals of reason or notions. Berkeley, as we have before\\nsaid, does not think of instituting a Kantian inquiry into the prin-\\nciples which must be presupposed in the constitution of experience\\nin order to render it possible. Before Kant s question could arise\\nthere was needed Hume s misinterpretation of Berkeley s spirit\\nsubstance and the subsequent disintegration of the self into ab-\\nstract sensations. By Kant the self was to be rediscovered,\\nalthough the foreign Somewhat against which Berkeley so vigor-\\nously contended reappeared in the guise of a ding-an-sich, thus oc-", "height": "4600", "width": "2844", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "55\\ncasioning the transformation of the self from an ontological into\\nan epistemological unity. Berkeley, on the other hand, who by\\nhis less critical and easier method,, had seized upon Locke s com-\\nbining activity of mind, by extending the scope of its activity\\nfrom the small sphere to which the latter had confined it, viz., ideas\\nof reflection, gradually transforms it into the self, which, by par-\\nticipation in the Infinite Self, or God, is constitutive of the rela-\\ntions that are througout implied in all phenomenal objects.\\nAt the first thought it seems altogether incongruous and un-\\nseemly to connect Kant or his speculation with Berkeley and his\\nphilosophy and yet the two are more nearly con-\\nnected than at first sight would seem to be possible, not merely by\\ntheir historic connection through Hume under the law of action\\nand reaction, but by the problem with which both grappled so\\nearnestly, although their solutions vary so widely. We find them\\nin certain particulars nearer than we should at first have suspected.\\nThe matter which Berkeley so passionately rejects while he retains\\nthe sensations which are all we know, is, as he conceives it, not\\ngreatly unlike the Ding-an-sich which Kant so pertinaciously\\nignores, while he accepts the phenomena, which somehow he holds\\nto be its representation. The time and space which Kant acknowl-\\nedges as the forms and only as the forms of our direct knowledge\\naffirmed or presumed of sense experiences by an a priori neces-\\nsity, are accepted by Berkeley as a priori relations, because neces-\\nsarily involved in the continued activity of God. Kant s catego-\\nries of our generalized chinking are matched by Berkeley s original\\nnotions of relations between ideas which are discerned and\\naffirmed directly by the mind. The ideas, however, which Kant\\nbeheld as shivering ghosts through the midst of his timid scepti-\\ncism, and which he was forced to recognize as real by a faith which\\nhe could only say was a make-believe of God, the soul, and the\\ncosmos, these were to Berkeley the pillars and foundation of his\\nphilosophic faith. While Kant finds in conscience the command\\nto believe in God, because God is needed as a chief of police for\\nthe moral universe, Berkeley finds in God the personal foundation\\nand enforcer of duty, because duty is the voice of reason and\\ngoodness, which are but other names for the thoughts and actings\\nof God.\\nWe have endeavored to show that the self of Berkeley is but\\npoorly understood if one fastens upon the category of substance\\nas indicative of his deeper thought or last word about the matter.\\nHis unwillingness to apply the category of substance, and his\\nrecognition that being is an inadequate concept by which to ex-\\npress the self, appear in a few passages in his Commonplace Book.\\nThere he says, with regard to the objective source of ideas of\\nsense: there is a being which wills these perceptions in us, to", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "56\\nwhich he adds: It should be said, nothing but a Will a being\\nwhich wills being unintelligible. 1 Likewise he seems to disallow\\nthe hypostalization of Will or Understanding, either as modes of\\na substance, or as faculties in abstraction from the self of which\\nthey are different forms of manifestation: I must not say that\\nwill or understanding is all one, but that they are both abstract-\\nideas, i. e., none at all they not being even ratione different from\\nthe spirit, qua faculties, or active. 2 Again: Thought itself, or\\nthinking, is no idea. Tis an act, i. e., volition, as contradistin-\\nguished to effects the Will. 3 Further in his account of the per-\\nception of objects, Berkeley says, in a passage already noted in\\nanother connection: when I speak of objects as existing in the\\nmind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in\\nthe gross literal sense as when bodies are said to exist in a place,\\nor a seal to make an impression on wax. My meaning is only that\\nthe minds comprehends or perceives them. 4\\nOn the whole it does not seem that he has much thought of\\npressing the analogy of material substance upon his active prin-\\nciple. Although ideas, in so far as they are regarded apart from\\nthe relating mind, are passive, and although as coming from a\\nsource foreign to the finite mind, the latter is receptive with regard\\nto them; yet ideas in themselves, having no connexion or identity\\nwith one another, have a meaning for the finite mind only in so far\\nas the latter possesses the relating activity which is necessary for\\nthe interpretation of these significant signs into a rational lan-\\nguage. Thus the mind is not a mere tabula rasa, a substance-vehi-\\ncle for conveying into the empirical consciousness a world of\\nready made perceptions; on the contrary, in so far as empirical\\nperception is present, there is implied the work of rational activ-\\nity, without which experience would be impossible. The finite\\nmind can interpret the language of the Author of Nature only so\\nfar as it possesses the capability of interpretation, i. e., as it shares\\nthe rational activity which is at the heart of experience.\\nWith respect to the identity of the finite mind or self, Berke-\\nley is eminently unsuccessful, at least in his early philosophy.\\nThe question thus appears to him in the Commonplace Book\\nWherein consists the identity of persons? Not in actual con-\\nsciousness, for then I m not the same person I was this day twelve-\\nmonths but while I think of what I did then. Not in potential,\\nfor then all persons may be the same for aught I know. 5 Here\\n1 Life Letters and Unpublished Writings of Berkeley, p. 430.\\n2 Fraser; Commonplace Book in Life, letters, etc., p. 466.\\n3 Ibid, p. 460.\\nThird Dialogue between Hylas and Philonious.\\n5 Fraser; Commonplace Book, in Life, letters, etc., p. 481.", "height": "4608", "width": "2836", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "57\\nhe seems to rely solely upon memory as the bond of connection\\nbetween past and present states of consciousness; and its inade-\\nquacy as an explanation of any other than empirical identity he\\ncould have seen if he had but applied the principles of associa-\\ntional psychology which he himself set afoot.\\nIn the third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous he seems\\nto foresee Hume s subsequent procedure with regard to the self.\\nHylas says in reply to the long speech of Philonous which we have\\nquoted: Notwithstanding all you have said and in conse-\\nquence of your own principles, it should follow that you are only\\na system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them.\\nWords are not to be used without a meaning in spii-itual substance\\nmore than in material substance; the one is to be exploded as well\\nas the other, for the murder of matter is the suicide of the mind.\\nThis objection, suggestive of his Commonplace Book, in which\\nBerkeley says that the very existence of idea constitutes the\\nSoul 2 which is a mere congeries of perceptions, is answered as\\nfollows: I know or am conscious of my own being, and that I\\nmyself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active\\nprinciple which perceives, knows, wills and operates about ideas.\\nI know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colors and\\nsounds: that a color cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a color:\\nthat I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from color\\nand sound; and for the same reason, from all other sensible things\\nand inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious of the\\nexistence or essence of Matter. 3 Now from this statement that\\nthe self is an individual principle, distinct from ideas, and the pre-\\nceding assertion that Mind is a congeries of perceptions, it\\nseems that Blakeley contemplated a distinction between an empiri-\\ncal and a rational self, although the distinction is far from being\\nexplicitly pointed out.\\nIn the Commonplace book he regards the person as immortal,\\nwhile he denies immortality to the soul, by which he evidently\\nmeans the self in its individual or empirical aspect. Berkeley s\\ntheory of personality is a later development of his philosophy, in\\nthe progress of which he has come to place increasing reliance\\nupon the notion, rather than upon mere intuition. But if, in his\\nearly theory, he fails to distinguish clearly between the empirical\\nself as a mere congeries of perceptions, and the rational activity\\nwhich renders possible an interpretation of the sign langua.\\nNature, in the later philosophy of Siris there is a tendency to lose\\nthe identity of the self in Universal Mind. He now verges upon\\n1 Third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.\\nlrascr; Commonplace Book, Life, letters, etc., p. 438.\\n3 Third dialogue between Hi I as and Philonous.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "58\\nmysticism, and draws largely from Neo-Platonic sources for his\\nconceptions. Jamblichus, he says, furnishes a doctrine that there\\nis a principle of the soul higher than nature, whereby we may be\\nraised to a union with the gods, and exempt ourselves from fate. 1\\nAccording to the Platonic philosophy, ens and unum are the\\nsame. And consequently our minds participate so far of existence\\nas they do of unity. But it should seem that personality is the\\nindivisible center of the soul or mind, which is a monad so far\\nforth as she is a person. Therefore Person is really that which\\nexists, inasmuch as it participates in the Divine unity: 2 Again, he\\nsays: Upon mature reflection, the person or mind, of all created\\nbeing, seemeth alone indivisible and to partake most of unity. But\\nsensible things are rather considered as one than truly so, they\\nbeing in a perpetual flux or succession ever differing and various.\\nNevertheless, all things together must be considered as one uni-\\nverse, one by the connexion and order of its parts, which is the\\nwork of mind, whose unit is, by Platonics, supposed a participa-\\ntion of the first rusV. 3 Aristotle himself, in his third book\\nof the Soul, saith it is the mind that maketh each thing to be one.\\nHow this is done Themistius is more particular, observing\\nthat as being conferreth essence, the mind, by virtue of her sim-\\nplicity, conferreth simplicity upon compound beings. And, indeed,\\nit seemeth that the mind, so far forth as person, is individual.\\nTherein resembling the divine one by participation, and imparting\\nto other things what itself participates from above. This is agree-\\nable to the doctrine -of the ancients; however the contrary opinion\\nof supposing number to be an original primary quality in things,\\nindependent of the mind, may obtain among the moderns. 4\\nHere Berkeley in his theory of personality relies upon the\\nconcept of unity not only to exhibit the necessary dependence of\\nthe finite upon the infinite mind, but also to differentiate the former\\nfrom the latter. Number, he now says, in entire agreement\\nwith his earlier philosophy, is no object of sense it is an act\\nof the mind. The same thing in a different conception is one or\\nmany. 5 Unity he still regards as a creature of the mind, and\\nnot something existing in things independent of the mind; yet it\\nis no longer as formerly an abstract idea, but a notion. And the\\nnotions, as we have seen, are in Siris identified with the archetpyes\\nor ideas of Reason, immanent in the phenomena of sense. The\\nlatter, as Berkeley insists, are not to be regarded in one aspect\\n1 s Siris, 272.\\n2 Ibid, 346.\\n3 Ibid, 350.\\n4 Idid, 356 and 357.\\n5 Ibid, 8 288.", "height": "4612", "width": "2812", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "59--\\nalone, for the phenomenon is not merely the complex of sensations\\nwhich has been marked by one name, and so reputed as a Thing.\\nThe Thing is, in another aspect, as the presented object of con-\\nsciousness, an irreducible fact; it must finally be referred to its\\ncausal source and receive its ultimate explanation in objective\\nUniversal Mind. The identity of the thing is not a mere ficti-\\ntious identity, for the unity which the mind introduces into sensa-\\ntions has its counterpart in an objective unity whose source is\\nUniversal Mind. As the finite mind, in its explanation of phe-\\nnomena, procedes from synthesis to higher synthesis, by the redis-\\ncovery in Time of the archetypal ideas or notions, it becomes\\naware of the Divine unity in which it participates.\\nBut while pci son is really that which exists, inasmuch as it\\nparticipates in the Divine Unity, difference is not lost; for it is\\nalso true that the mind so far forth as person is individual.\\nPersonality is for Berkeley the most adequate category for the\\ncomplete explanation of experience, since the self not only ex-\\npresses the highest synthesis but, true to the empirical aspect of\\nthings, it also expresses difference, as self distinguished from self.\\nMy experiences, he seems to say, must be referred to a higher\\nsource than myself, and there is a cosmical order independent of\\nirre; yet, in a very real sense also, these experiences are mine, and\\nI am not the mere theatre for the play of passing phenomena,\\nsince in my ability to discern the unphenomenal character which\\nattaches to my experiences, in the significance which the arche-\\ntypal ideas have for me, my empirical self becomes, like my other\\nphenomenal experiences, the symbol of a higher personality.\\nBut there is another reason why Berkeley, in his final account\\nof the relation of the self to God, rejects a complete identifica-\\ntion of the self with God. We have seen that in his early philos-\\nophy, Berkeley s conception of God seems unmistakably to be of\\nthe deistic cast. The arbitrariness of the divime nature language\\nis chiefly put forward; God is seemingly regarded as an extraneous\\npower working effects in us. But the interpretability of this lan-\\nguage rests fur us upon the presupposition of a necessary unity of\\nthe finite with the Absolute Mind or Reason. Siris is the explica-\\ntion of this, and the universals of Reason which formerly received\\nsuch brief recognition are the means whereby we arrive at the\\nknowledge of an objective order of things, which as the deeper\\nmeaning, is the completion as well as the ground of Berkeley s ear-\\nlier idealism. With his increasing gnosticism, his growing confi-\\ndence in the universals of Reason, Berkeley is apparently more\\ntolerant of views which in strictness cannot be called theistic.\\nWhether the woo? be abstracted from the sensible world, and con-\\nsidered by itself as distinct from and presiding over the created\\nsystem; or whether the whole Universe, including mind, together", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "60\\nwith the mundane body, is conceived to be God, and the creatures\\nto be partial manifestations of the Divine essence there is no\\nAtheism in either case, whatever misconception there may be; so\\nlong as Mind or Intellect is understood to preside over, govern\\nand conduct the whole frame of things.\\nAs we have elsewhere seen, the immanence of the divine Rea-\\nson in the world of sense is the view which is now favored by\\nBerkeley; but it is not maintained to the exclusion of the theistic\\nview which dominated his early idealism: and in this he avoids\\nthe pantheism towards which he seems tending and the complete\\nresolution of the self into an Absolute Reason. 3 It is true that\\nhis theistic utterances are no longer dogmatic assertions as for-\\nmerly. The limitation of that finite knowledge which would grasp\\nthe infinite is now more clearly recognized. The theistic concep-\\ntion of God comes as the deeper insight into the ever present cre-\\native Reason which informs and maintains the world. It comes as\\na conviction that as man in his rational activity is made aware of\\na higher rational self which is the completion of the finite and the\\npresupposition of our knowledge of a world, so may this higher\\nself be more completely known by conceiving it in analogy with\\nthe total nature of man. As in Berkeley s idealism, and more\\nexpressly in the later form which it takes in Siris, Reason is not\\nto be absolutely divorced from sense, so neither is Will a faculty\\ndistinct from Reason. Not Reason alone, but Reason and Will,\\nas different expressions of man s spiritual activity, constitute his\\ninner self.\\nIn the third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous we have\\nalready seen Berkeley s statement that God is to be known only by\\nreflecting upon the self, by heightening its powers and removing\\nits imperfections. In Alciphron, the Minute Philosopher, the\\nquestion of the legitimacy of this process comes up. The inade-\\nquacy of finite categories is recognized, while predication by\\nmeans of them is nevertheless defended by reverting to the schol-\\nastic argument that they are applied by way of eminence and\\nnot by way of defect.\\nThe theistic view, which he thus but poorly maintains as\\nagainst pantheism, is perhaps furnished with a more rational basis\\nif one reads it in connection with his later utterances with respect\\nto the notion, and the function which we found must be assigned\\ni Siris, 326.\\n2 Cf. Siris, \u00c2\u00a7276, 287.\\n3 La large tolerance de Berkeley n excommunie pas le pantheism, bien\\nqu elle affirme que le funds de l etre, en Dieu coniine en nous, est l i ncli visible\\nunite de la personne. L. Carrau: La philosophie religicuse en Angleterre;\\nParis, iSSS, p, 27.\\n\u00c2\u00a719-", "height": "4584", "width": "2864", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "61\\nto it in the constitution of experience. Viewed in this light, man s\\nknowledge of God is but the farther extension of his knowledge\\nof the phenomenal order. In the phenomenal world of Berkeley\\nwe are not cut off from a world of noumenal existence, for in the\\nsense-material which is subjected to the unifying work of finite\\nconceptions there is nothing foreign to Reason. In the generali-\\nzations of science, by means of which is made possible for us an\\norderly and connected world of experience, nay even in perception\\nitself, we are already transcending the merely phenomenal. Finally,\\nin the highest completed synthesis, the Divine Reason, we have\\nmerely the last step which gives meaning to the whole. Man shares\\nin the Universal Reason, and it is only by his participation in this\\nReason that he is enabled to take cognizance of this Unity, which\\nis the truest explanation of himself and of the world in which he\\nlives. But in man Reason and Will are equally fundamental, alike\\nuniversal expressions of his experience of himself, and together\\nthey constitute his personality. In his conception of God Berke-\\nley refuses to be be content with mere Reason as the final explana-\\ntion of things. Reason, as so conceived, is scarcely differentiated\\nfrom Fate, while the Reason it is Berkeley s purpose to discover is\\na purposeful activity, directed toward the Supreme Good; it is, as\\nhe tells us, Will which is conducted and applied by intellect.\\nThe Divine arbitrariness is still retained; God is Divine Will di-\\nrected by Divine Reason. Although in that Reason the finite is\\nnow seen to participate, the key to the knowledge of God is not\\nonly the rational, but the moral implication contained in man s\\nknowledge of himself.\\n1 Siris, 254.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "CHAPTER IV.\\nThe relations which obtain either by way of agreement or\\ncontrast between the earlier and later phases of Berkeley s ideal-\\nism, and which have been exhibited somewhat in detail with respect\\nto the three objects of human knowledge, ideas, relations, and\\nthat third class of existences, denominated by Berkeley, spirits,\\nmay now be briefly summarized.\\nWith respect to ideas we distinguished between three classes:\\n(i) the sensation; (2) the phenomenal object, which is in one\\naspect a mere complex of sensations, and which in another aspect\\nremains an objective datum of consciousness, ultimately explained\\nonly by reference to the objective mind of God; (3) the archetype\\nor Idea of Reason. The early philosophy of Berkeley exhibits\\nhis insistance upon the subjective character of phenomena, while\\nin the later philosophy of Siris, their objective character is\\nbrought to light by means of the immanent universals, ideas, whose\\nexistence had in the Principles a tacit recognition in the ad-\\nmission that there are universal notions.\\nTurning to the connection of ideas, we found that in the ear-\\nlier philosophy the principle of Causality is declared to be inope-\\nrative between ideas, as they are here regarded, in their particular\\nand subjective aspect. A custom or habit of relating passively\\nexperienced sensations is apparently sufficient to account for the\\npresence of the external phenomenal object. The theory is in the\\nfirst instance differentiated from the subsequent huirijan traduction\\nof it only in the implicit recognition of the fundamental unity which\\nsubsists between the finite and the Divine Mind, in the fact that the\\nformer possesses the capability of rationally interpreting the sensa-\\ntion symbols which ultimately depend upon the causal activity of\\nDivine Will. Again, in the Principles of Human Knowledge and\\nin the Dialogues, Berkeley furnished ample acknowledgment of\\nthe fact that the phenomenal object, for which he prefers the term\\nidea rather than thing, has not a merely subjective existence,\\nalthough, he declares it is meaningless if we attempt to conceive it\\nout of all relation to percipient consciousness. His sufficient ac-\\nknowledgment of this is, however, in this early phase of his ideal-\\nism, unsupported otherwise than by citing the fact that ideas of\\nsense are apparently independent of human volition, being pro-\\nduced in a regular, orderly and coherent series.\\nBut, as we approach Berkeley s later realistic position, we find\\nhim evidently aware that the objectivity of phenomena cannot be", "height": "4604", "width": "2852", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u009463\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nestablished in so simple a way. Accordingly, in Alciphron/ the\\nobjective implications of the phenomenal object are made more\\nexpressly the subject of study, which results in the discovery that\\nany perception is not merely the sum of particular sensations, but\\nthat, on the contrary, in order to the recognition of any perceived\\nobject, there is involved the work of unconscious rational infer-\\nence. 1 A few sensations serve as signs by which we are led to expect\\nother unperceived sensations, provided certain conditions be ful-\\nfilled. These present sensations are nothing of themselves, but\\nonly as they are signs of relations whose permanence and objectivity\\nare due to the constitutive universals of Supreme Mind. 2 Imme-\\ndiate perception is thus seen to imply mediation; and faith in\\nan established, objective order of association between the two kinds\\nof sense phenomena (visual and tactual) is the basis of the con-\\nstructive activity of intellect in all inductive interpretation of sensi-\\nble things. 3 Berkeley s association of ideas is, as Fraser points\\nout, 4 not merely subjective but objective, although his position of\\nobjective association is not reached critically; it is, says Fraser, his\\nreligious faith in the constancy of the divine constitution of the\\ncosmos. Objective association originates the notions of sensa-\\ntions as significant signs, and belief in the invariableness of the\\nrelations of which they are significant. Subjective association, on\\nthe other hand, helps us to recollect the meaning of each partic-\\nular sensation and connect the signs with their significance in our\\njination. 5\\nIn the latest phase of his idealism, represented by Siris, we\\nhave seen that the judgment of suggestion ripens into the explicit\\nrecognition of universals of Reason, or the constitutive notions,\\nimminent in sense. The legitimacy of Berkeley s final resort to\\nthe notion, of which he makes such important use in establishing a\\nmore consistent foundation for his early jdealism, was found in the\\nfact that his early nominalism was directed merely against the\\nhypostatization of conceptions in abstract separation from mind as\\npercipient, while a more concrete universal was admitted by him\\neven in his early theory, although its function in the constitution\\nof experience was but imperfectly conceived.\\nFinally, our consideration of Berkeley s third class of exist-\\nences, viz: Spirits, revealed that, corresponding to Berkeley s\\ngrowing insight into the nature of the phenomenal object, there\\n1 Cf Wenley; British Thought and Modern Speculation, p. 149 of Scol\\ntish Rev., vol. 19.\\n8 Fraser; Philosophy of Berkeley.\\n3 Ibid, p. 395.\\nFraser; Philosophy of Berkeley in Life, Letters and Unpublished\\nWriting*, p. 304.\\n5 Ibid, p. 404.\\nI", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u009464\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nalso emerges a theory of the self and God which is more consistent\\nwith the rationalism that is implicitly the basis of his theory of the\\nworld. That the world is to be regarded as my individual repre-\\nsentation, had never been maintained by Berkeley, as some would\\nhave us believe. Its ultimate dependence upon. Divine, rational\\nwill had been affirmed at the outset, the guarantee for its indepen-\\ndence of me consisting in the very fact of Berkeley s insistence\\nthat perception and conception should not be thought to exist in\\nabsolute separation from one another. The particular is indeed\\nthe conscious datum to which introspective analysis of the pheno-\\nmenal object conducts us; but the conceptual existence of the\\nlatter is as much a basal fact of consciousness as the particulars by\\nmeans of which it translates itself into the concrete perceptual ex-\\nperience of individual minds. Accordingly the early theory, which\\ntells us that particular sensations are merely the signs by which we\\nare enabled to interpret the rational language of a supreme Author\\nof Nature, becomes, by means of the later development of the\\nnotion, the obverse of Berkeley s rationalistic philosophy, in which\\nwe are led to see that the relations which subsist between pheno\\nmena, in the organic system of human experience, are not mere\\nsubjective fictions, but objective relations, discoverable by us, be-\\ncause of the essential unity which obtains between the finite and\\nthe Universal Mind, upon which these relations ultimately depend.\\nYet, as we have seen, in this unity of the self with God, to\\nwhich he finally conducts us in Siris, difference is not merged in\\nmere identity. The world is also in a sense the representation of\\nthe finite self, not because of the mere fact that man is a percipient\\norganism, but rather because of that very unity which obtains be-\\ntween the finite and the infinite in virtue of which man possesses\\nan imperishable personality all his own 1 sharing, as he does, in\\nthe universal constitutive ideas. Through man, by means of these\\nuniversals, the world is constituted, and is representative alike of\\nan eternal or timeless order of things subsisting in the mind of\\nGod, though also of the subjective interpretation which man puts\\nupon his experience. From this subjectivity, man, by voluntary\\nwillingness of insight into the eternal order, seeks to free himself,\\nand thus reconstitute the world in the likeness of God. Thus the\\nearly doctrine that nature is in its totality an interpretable system,\\ndependent upon a Power that is not ourselves, seems borne out in\\nSiris by his theory of the personality or spiritual individuality 2\\nof man.\\nIt must, however, be kept in mind that the separate strands of\\nBerkeley s philosophy were never united in an organic whole. The\\n1 Wenley; British Thought and Modern Speculation; Scottish Rev., Vol.\\n19, p. 154.\\n2 Fraser; ll Berkeley, p. 207.", "height": "4600", "width": "2856", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u009465\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nmanifold implications of the new point of view, consequent upon\\nhis disposal of the fiction of abstract matter, were but imperfectly-\\nconceived. The work of establishing an idealistic philosophy\\nwhich should take the place of previous materialistic theories was\\nonly partially sketched, never definitely executed. Furthermore,\\nhis philosophy was always in a state of transition, and accordingly\\none cannot regard any particular phase of its development as an\\nadequate expression of Berkeley s complete thought about reality.\\nEmpiricism, which is by far the dominant principle of his early\\ntheorizing, long ago yielded up to more consistent systematizers\\nmaterial valuable not alone for psychological method but for gen-\\neral scientific enquiry. On the other hand, the final idealistic\\nposition which he reached in Siris was presented in too fragmentary\\na form to be of abiding service to subsequent philosophy.\\nElle n etait pas fausse, mais incomplete la Sii-is n est qu un\\ndeveloppement plein de grandeur de ce que nous ont revele les premieres oeuvres.\\nBerkeley est arrive au seuil de la vieillesse, il a lutle jusqu ici contre ce qu il croit\\nle mal et 1 erreur; nul polemiste via ete plus ardent, plus soupple, plus infatigahle;\\nil a poursuivi dans tous ses retrenchments successifs la matiere en soi; il a refute\\nCollins, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, combattu 1 elendue-substance de Descartes, la\\nmonade de Leibniz, 1 attraction newtonienne et jusqu un principe du calcul\\ninfinitesimal; c est encore un soldat de la verite qu il est parti pour les Bermudas.\\nLe voila dans sa retraite de Cloyne; sa philosophic, comme sa vie, a cesse d etre\\nmilitante, il lit et medite, laisse sa pensee poursuivre son ascension de principe en\\nprincipe, jusqu a 1 Un supreme; peu soucieux des objections et des pteuves,\\ns enchantant, sans trop s interroger sur 1 authenticite des texies, des echos de la\\nsagesse antique, ou il croit surprmdre comme le souffle affaibli d une inspiration\\nsacree. C est ainsi que Platon, parvenu au bout de ses jours et au sommet de son\\ngenie, laisse a de plus jeunes les procedes de refutation, les amies de la dispute,\\net, ressuscitant les vieilles doctrines pour leur dormer un plus beau sen-, expose\\nplus qu il ne demontre dans ses oeuvres mngistrales et sereines, le Time, les Lois.\\nUne critique exigeante peut les traiterde romans philosophiques, comme la Siiis;\\nnous croyons qu elle aurait tort. Quand une grande intelligence a pense toute sa\\nvie ce qu elle a pense a le fin, en pleine possession d elle-meme, et ce qui doit\\nnous interesser le plus, et qui dans la mesure que les productions humaines en sont\\ncapables, doit contenir le plus de verite. 1\\nIf, however, Berkeley cannot be regarded as a thorough-going\\nempiricist, nor yet as a consistent rationalist, the suggestiveness of\\nhis theory as a whole should not on that account be minimized.\\nHis early theory, in which it is claimed that the existence of sen-\\nsible objects always involves a reference to percipient conscious-\\nness, denotes a faithfulness to experience a that is not without\\nits value, when corrected by the subsequent view that mere com-\\nplexes of sensations, actually present in the individual mind, do not\\nof themselves constitute the substantiality of the object, which is\\nalso a conceptual unity.\\nBut Berkeley s close identification of perception and concep-\\ntion has, because of the imperfect manner in which he explicates\\n1 L. Carrau; La philosophic religieuse, pp. 18, 20.\\n2 Green; Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Intro. 173.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "6G\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nthe rationalistic elements of his philosophy, been the occasion of\\nnot a little misunderstanding with regard to his true attitude toward\\nthe phenomenal object, which he substitutes for the thing, inde-\\npendent of consciousness. Thus Green, while admitting that\\nBerkeley knew that pure theism (which he wished to establish)\\nhas no foundation unless it can be shown that there is nothing real\\napart from thought, says that he failed to distinguish this true\\nproposition there is nothing real apart from thought from this\\nfalse one, its virtual contradictory there is nothing other than\\nfeeling; and in substituting simply idea for Locke s idea of a\\nthing, Berkeley failed, Green further tells us, to take the truer\\nview of thought and its object, as together in essential correlation\\nconstituting the real, and merged both thing and idea in the\\nindifference of simple feeling. 1\\nOf course upon this view that Berkeley has reduced thought\\nand its world to simple feeling, objectivity is done away with; and\\nbodies and things, suggested by feeling, are not real, since present\\nsensations are the only reality. But thus to isolate the phrase,\\nesse is per dpi, more particularly if the percipi be held to imply ex-\\nclusively the perception of a single individual through the medium\\nof his senses only [as Green in the above passages seems to insist]\\nis to eviscerate Berkeley. 2 For he does not declare\\nthat we can possess a knowledge only of states of our own conscious-\\nness, 3 since mere feeling present in any individual subjective con-\\nsciousness, apart from the objective conditions which render feeling\\ninterpretable is, on Berkeley s theory, an abstraction-no less absurd\\nthan abstract matter. 4 The esse of things indeed implies perripi, yet\\nnot alone this but concipi or intelligi. Therefore to isolate the\\nformer phrase is not only to neglect the later realistic development\\nof Berkeley s theory, but to substitute an imagined abstraction in\\nplace of Berkeley s concrete particular. The substantiality of the\\nworld of external existence, as distinct from the images and fancies\\nof the subjective consciousness, is for Berkeley a fact not to be\\ndoubted. The mere Being 5 and substantiality of things is the least\\nthat can be said about them, and the true question of idealism is\\nnot, does matter exist? since the materiality of the world cannot\\nbe doubted; but rather what do we mean by saying that there is a\\nmaterial world, i. e., what is the truth about matter?\\nThe answer is, that from our thought of the existence of the\\n1 Green; Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Intro.\\n2 Wenley; British Thought and Modern Speculation, p. 145.\\n3 Ibid, p. 154.\\n*Fraser; Philosophy of Berkeley, in Life, Letters, etc., of Berkeley,\\nP- 37i-\\n5 Tt is not uninteresting at this point to compare Berkeley s idea of being with\\nthat of Hegel. The former says: The general idea of Being appeareth to me\\nthe most abstract and incomprehensible of all other. cf. Principles of Human\\nKnowledge, 17.", "height": "4604", "width": "2848", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "67\\nmaterial object we cannot abstract that very condition which\\nseems necessary to its being, viz., the condition that it shall be an\\nobject for perceptual consciousness. But this does not mean that\\nits existence is entirely comprehended in my perception of the\\nobject; that it is nothing apart from me; but only that perception\\nis a universal and necessary condition of the being of an object.\\nThe two have, as it were, a kind of organic relation, and cannot\\nbe separated. What is not for consciousness, for the passive ex-\\nperience of perception, no less than what is not constituted by\\nthought, is a mere abstraction.\\nThe view that the Berkelian idea is equivalent to mere feeling\\ninvolves a most ludicrous construction of Berkeley s theory of the\\nobject not immediately present in perception. Does Berkeley\\nmean that, in turning my back upon the object, I thereby anni-\\nhilate it? In this respect at least, as Mr. Wenley has said, he\\nwas not the fool his critics would have had him. For, in the\\nfirst place, even if the object has an existence only under the con-\\ndition of sense-perception; if that condition be not fulfilled, we\\nhave yet no right to speak of the object being annihilated, for that\\nwould mean that we first take the object apart from perceptual\\nconsciousness, and then conceive its destruction. If the object\\nhas an existence only in relation to some perceptual consciousness,\\nif it gets its meaning only as it is for a percipient subject, then in\\nthe absence of its being perceived, we cannot say that the object\\nis destroyed and again flashed back into existence when the condi-\\ntion of sense-perception is fulfilled; object would simply be mean-\\ni?igless apart from sense-perception.\\nHowever, this is to lay exclusive emphasis upon the percipi.\\nUpon Berkeley s principles, Fraser says, 1 the thing may be taken\\nto exist, when we are absent from it, in percisely the same way\\nthat the thing present to sense exists, i. e., in the one case as in\\nthe other, actual sensations signify a conceivable object. The\\nimmediate object being rationally constituted, Berkeley does not\\nmean that, in merely thinking of the object not present in my per-\\nception, I by this means recreate it, but that, in my thought of the\\nobject, I again recognize the universal conditions which now, as\\nat the time when the object was present to my perception, consti-\\ntute its independence of me. Does he not mean this in the fol-\\nlowing? The trees are in the park, i. e., whether I will or no.\\nLet me but go thither and open my eyes by day, and I shall not\\navoid seeing them. 2 Or again, bodies do exist whether we\\nthink of them or no, they being taken in a two-fold sense; (i) Col-\\nlections of thoughts, (2) Collections of powers to cause these\\nthoughts. These latter exist, though perhaps a parti rei it may be\\n1 Fraser; Philosophy of Berkeley in Life Letters and Unpublished Writings,\\np. 382.\\nCommonplace Book, p. 474.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "68\\none simple perfect power 1 which, as we afterward learn, is\\nSupreme Mind.\\nGreen, however, in considering the philosophical idealism of\\nBerkeley in its bearing upon science, says that if physical truths\\nimply permanent relations Berkeley s theory properly excludes\\nthem. 2 Quoting section 58 of the Principles, he explains that\\nthis passage meant for Berkeley that the motion of the earth would\\nbegin as soon as wc were there to see it; while for us it means that\\nit is now going on as an established law of nature which may be\\ncollected from the phenomena. This seems, however, to lay too\\nexclusive emphasis upon the accident of sense-perception. What\\nBerkeley means appears rather to be that the established rules of\\nnature are certain permanent conditions of existence which the\\nmind in its conceptual activity is enabled to discover. Our belief\\nin these primary conditions is ultimately grounded upon our belief\\nin Supreme Rational Will, of which these laws or conditions are\\nthe expression. Once discovered, I know that the phenomena,\\nwhich may be subsumed under these laws, actually occur in ac-\\ncordance with them. The earth moves whether I perceive it or\\nnot, for in my thought of the motion of the earth, I recognize that\\nthe accident of my individual perception is not involved in the ob-\\njective conditions underlying my presumption that the earth moves.\\nStill the universal condition, under which the mind arrives at\\na knowledge of the laws which subsist between phenomena, is that\\nof sense-perception. Conception is only an abstraction from the\\nconcrete life of mind or spirit; we have only a relative universal as\\nlikewise a relative particular; therefore mere relations or abstract\\nconditions of existence are not to be hypostatized and taken in\\nabsolute separation from perceptual consciousness. This is the\\nlogic of Berkeley s polemic against abstract ideas. Accordingly\\nthe motion of the earth, as also any phenomenal object not present\\nto my perception, must be regarded as being in a certain sense per-\\nceived. Nor does this imply for Berkeley the idea of God as a\\npercipient being in a human and anthropomorphic sense, for\\nGod, it is said in Siris, has no sensory. 3 Perception is finally\\ntranslated into a system of rational relations which are intuited\\nrather than perceived. The world is ultimately a rationally con-\\nstituted cosmos, whose intelligible relations are at once the crea-\\ntion and the object of Supreme Rational Will or Person. What-\\never difficulties attach to this view, and they are doubtless many,\\nit at least avoids the extreme of the rationalistic view by refusing\\nto regard the ultimate unity, to which experience must be sub-\\njected, as a mere systejn of relations apart from the concrete life of\\nconscious personality.\\n1 Commonplace Book in Life, Letters, etc., p. 486.\\nGreen; Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Introduction,\\n3 Siris; 289.", "height": "4604", "width": "2888", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "BIBLIOGRAPHY.\\nBerkeley, Geo.: A New TJieory of Vision (1709), Principles o-\\nHuman Knowledge (17 10), Dialogues between Hylas and Phil,\\nonous (17 13), The Theory of Vision further Vindicated and\\nExplained (1730), Alcephron or the Minute PJiilosopJier (1 732 )f\\nSir is (1744), The Analyst (1733\u00e2\u0080\u009434), Concerning Motion\\n(1721).\\nPreiser: Berkeley s Works (4 vols. Clarendon Press, London).\\nSampson, Geo.: Berkeley s Works (3 vols., Geo. Bell and Sons,\\nLondon; vols. L and LI, 1898).\\nBailey: A Review of Berkeley s Theory of Vision, designed to\\nshow the Unsoundness of that Celebrated Speculaiien (West min-\\nsler Review, Oct. 1842).\\nBaumann, J. J. Die Lehre von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik,\\n1869.\\nBaxter, Andrew: Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (2d\\ned., S C. entitled Dean Berkeley s Scheme against the existence\\nof Matter and a Material World examined and shown incon-\\nclusive), pp. 256-344, v. Kraut Ji, Princ. of Human Knowledge.\\nBeaslcy: A Search of Truth, v. Krauth, Princ. of Human Knowl-\\nedge.\\nBeat lie, James: Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth\\n77\u00c2\u00b0)-\\nBowen, Panels: Berkeley and his Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.,\\n1838).\\nBradley, W. Berkeley s Idealism (Journal of Spec. Philos. vols.\\nXV-XVI, 1SS1-1882).\\nBrockhaus: Real Encyclop., Elfte. Aufl. Vol. II, 1864.\\nBrown, Thos.: Lectures 011 the Philos. of the Human Mind (4 vols.\\nEdinh., 1820, Lectures XXVI and XXVI 1).\\nBukle: Geschichte iter neuern Philosophic, 1803 v. Krauth Princ.\\nof Human Knowledge.\\nButlicrogge Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits (po.\\nKrauth: Princ).\\nButt, J. Afternoon Lectures on English Literature (1866).\\nCarrau, Ludovic: La philosophic rcligicuse en Augletcrre (1888,\\nJ\\\\i)is, Art., Berkeley).\\nColly ns, Simon: Berkeley s Doctrine on the Nature of Matter,\\n(Journal of Spec. Philos., 3-4, 1869-70), Berkeley, the New\\nMaterialism, and the Diminution of Light by Distance (Jour.\\nSpec. Philos., vol. 15, 1881).", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "70\\nSimon- Collyns: On the Nature and Eleme7its of the Material\\nWorld Hamilton versus Mile, Edinburgh, 1866), Is Thought\\nthe Hunker (Jour. Spec. Philos., Dec., 1869).\\nCountry 1 IV. L.: Studies in Philosophy (1882).\\nErdmann: Leibnitz und d. Entwickel d. Idealismus vor Kant (1842\\nin Gcs chic hie d. Philos\\nEe trier: Lectures and Philosophic Remains.\\nEahkenberg: History of Philosophy (trans, by A. C. Armstrong,\\nJr., 1893).\\nErederichs, Eriedrich: Der Phaenomenale Idealismus Berkeley s\\nund Kant s, ein kritisch-philosophische Abhandlung (Berlin,\\n1 8 7 1 Ueben Berkeley V Idealisms, Berlin, 1870).\\nEraser, Alex. Campbell: Selections from Berkeley (Oxford, 1891),\\nBerkciey a Subjectivist (North British Rev., vol. XXXIV,\\ni86r).\\nHuxley, T. ff: Collected Essays VI, 1894.\\nEaweett, Edward Douglas: Berkeley to Hegel, Monist, Oct. 1896,\\nvol. VI I, pp. 41-81.\\nHegel. Gesch. d. Philosophic (Michelit, Berlin, 1844).\\nHildebrand: Propaedeutic der Philosophic {Heidelberg, 1819).\\nHome, Henry: Elements of Criticism (ch. XXV), 1762.\\nHume, David: Essays, etc., 1748.\\nKrug, Wilt. Traug If andworterbuch der philos. Wissenschaften.\\nLoewg, I h.: Der Idealismus Berkeley s (Sitsungberich der konig-\\nliche Akadanin der Wiss., Win/).\\nMcCosh, J.; Criteria of Truth (Locke s Theojy of Knowledge\\nwith a notice of Berkeley).\\nMeyer,. En gen: J/ time s and Berkeley s Philosophic der Mat he-\\nrn at ik (Halle, 1894).\\nMill, J. S Dissertations and Discussions (vol. If, 1882).\\nMorris, G. S. British Thought and Thinkers (1880).\\nOrange, II. W. Berkeley as a Moral Philosopher.\\nPorter, Noah: The Two Hundredth Birthday of Bishop Berkeley\\n(March 12, 1885).\\nReid, Thos.: Works (Hamilton, Edinb., 1827), Intellectual Pow-\\ners of Alan.\\nRitter: Geschichte der neuem Philosophic, 1853, vol. IV.\\nRobertson, Geo. Croom: Eraser s Berkeley, a criticism by Robert-\\nson ed. of Mind in vol. VI, 1 88 1, p. 421.\\nHazard, Rowland G. Will, 1864, Causation, 1869.\\nGreen, T. H. Philos Works, vol. I.\\nKraut h, Chas. P.: A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human\\nKnowledge, with Prolegomena and collected opinio?is (1874).\\nSimion: Principles of Human Knowledge, (1878).\\nSchwegler: History of Philosophy.", "height": "4608", "width": "2896", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "71\\nStephen, Leslie: History of English Tlionght in the Eighteenth\\nCentury.\\nSpieker, Gideon: Kant, Hume und Berkeley, cine Kritik der Er-\\nkcntniss theorie [Berlin, 1875).\\nStirling, J. H. Professor Eraser s Berkeley [Jour. Spec. Philos.\\nvol. VII, Jan. 1873).\\nStewart, Dugald: Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind\\n(1792-1827, ch. I), Works {Hamilton V, 90; II, 18, 19) v.\\nKraut li, Princ. of Hum. Know.\\nTiedmann: Geist el. speculation Pliilosopliie (1797 vol. VI, v.\\nKraut h, ibid.)\\nTyler: Three Men of Letters (1895).\\nUcberweg: Philosophische Bibliothck, 12, (Abhandlunge?i uber dit\\nPrincipie?i dcr menschlichen erkentniss; ins Deutsche ubersetze\\nund mit Amierkungen versehen von E. Ueberwcg s 2 Aufl.,\\nLeipzig 1879). Trans, of Ucberweg s notes into Eng. by Chas.\\nP. Kraut h (Princ. of Human Knowledge), Gcsch d Philosoph-\\nien d Neuzeit Dritte A tifl. 1872.\\nVogel: Philos ph. Repetitorium, 1873.\\nWebb, T E.: VeilofIsis(i88s).\\nWindelband: History of Philosophy.\\nZimmermann: Ueber Hume s St filing zu Berkeley und Ka?it (1883).\\nStirling, J. H. Philosophy and Theology.\\nMills, Jr., E. Memoir of Geo. Berkeley The Irish Nation).\\nMills, J.: Lives of Illustrious Irishmen {vol. V, pt. I, pp. 1-2 7).\\nWenley, R. M. British Thought and Modern Speculation, Scot-\\ntish Rev. San. 1892.\\nNote. For detailed reference to Berkeley s commentators v.\\nKrauth s Principles of Human Knowledge, through which\\nmuch of the above bibliography has been obtained.", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4588", "width": "2860", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n028 986 839 2", "height": "4592", "width": "2892", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4667", "width": "2850", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n028 986 839 2", "height": "4600", "width": "2876", "jp2-path": "relationofberkel00tow_0082.jp2"}}