{"1": {"fulltext": "T)U6r}\\n*JZ", "height": "5152", "width": "3460", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4597", "width": "2966", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "^2^2 Z_\\n\u00c2\u00a3*L Y/y-z ~-z?\\n1/\\n)UW\\nHAWAIIAN QUESTION.\\n1\\nSPEECH\\nHON. FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS,\\nOF NEVADA,\\nIN THE\\nHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,\\njune: 3, 1 89\\nWASHINGTON.\\nI898.", "height": "4597", "width": "2966", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "J\\nv\\n23", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "f\\nHawaiian Annexation\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Territorial Expansion,\\nSPEECH\\nOF\\nHON. FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS.\\nThe House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) t\u00c2\u00a9\\nprovide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States-\\nMr. NEWLANDS said:\\nMr. Speaker: I shall not enter into the question of the consti-\\ntutional power invoked by the opponents of Hawaiian annexation.\\nI shall assume that the United States has all the powers of sover-\\neignty; that it is not to-day prepared to deny the legality or the\\nconstitutionality of the processes by which its territory has grown\\nfrom 800,000 square miles to 3,600,000 square miles; that it is not\\nprepared to-day to contest the validity of the acquisition of\\nFlorida, the acquisition of Louisiana, involving the control of the\\nMississippi and the Missouri valleys, the acquisition of Texas, the\\nacquisition of New Mexico and Upper California, the acquisition\\nof the great intermountain region between the Rockies and the\\nSierra Nevadas, or the acquisition of Alaska.\\nI shall assume that if it can acquire continental territory it can\\nacquire insular territory. I shall assume that if it can acquire the\\nisland of Key West, off the coast of Florida, it can acquire Hawaii,\\noff the coast of California. I shall assume that if it can acquire\\nAlaska, 1,500 miles away by land, it can acquire Hawaii, 2,200\\nmiles away by sea; that if it can acquire the Aleutian Islands,\\nstretching 500 miles west of the Hawaiian, it can acquire the\\nHawaiian Islands, 500 miles east of the Aleutian; that if it can\\nacquire territory by the accident of war, it can acquire it by the\\ndeliberation of peace; that if it can acquire territory by dis-\\ncovery, by violence, by conquest, and by treaty, it can acquire\\nterritory by gift, accepted by solemn enactment of law in which\\nboth branches of Congress and the President concur.\\nI take it that the question of constitutional power is foreclosed\\nby the action of one hundred years, and that the only question to\\nbe determined is one of policy, expediency, and good judgment.\\nDANGERS Or TERRITORIAL EXPANSION.\\nWe are told that avarice is the besetting sin of nations as well\\nas of individuals; that the pathway of history is strewn with the\\ngraves of nations driven by lust of power and avarice of territory\\ninto a ruinous expansion, destructive of liberty, destructive of\\nsimplicity, destructive of morals, and destructive of virility.\\nWe are told that to grow means danger, and that to dwarf one s\\ngrowth means safety. We are told that the Hawaiian Islands mean\\nempire, colonial expansion, centralization of power, to be followed\\nby decentralization and destruction; that their acquisition means\\nthe beginning of the end. The accidental occupation of Manila,\\n3132 3", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "involving possibly the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, ac-\\ncentuates alarm and creates the fear that a proposition intended\\nonly to secure territorial defense and commercial security is the\\nstepping-stone to a policy of imperial aggrandizement.\\nHOW OUR COUNTRY HAS GROWN.\\nI shall not attempt to follow the historic parallels which the\\ngentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clark] has so eloquently drawn.\\nI know nothing more deceptive than historic parallels. It is\\ntrue, Mr. Speaker, that nations, like individuals, have their in-\\nfancy, their manhood, their old age, and death. It is true that\\nnations must grow and must decline. It is true that governments\\nthat have grown into empires have become extinct. It is also\\ntrue that governments that have not grown into empires have be-\\ncome extinct.\\nWas expansion the cause of the death of the one and non-\\nexpansion the cause of the death of the other? If phenomenal\\ngrowth is a sure sign of early decay, then the seeds of dissolution\\nare already planted in this Government, for we have grown in one\\ncentury from 800,000 to 3,600,000 square miles. Our present area\\nis nearly five times as great as that occupied by the Republic in\\nits infancy.\\nWas it desire for empire and lust of territory, or was it accident,\\nor was it a high and benficent purpose that led to this enlarge-\\nment of our territory? There was no need of additional territory\\nto meet the requirements of our population. The entire popu-\\nlation of to-day could be put into the thirteen original States\\nwithout overcrowding them. Part of this territory was acquired\\nby war, part by negotiation and purchase, but it must be con-\\nceded that the central idea was to rectify our boundaries, to ex-\\ntend our western frontier and remove European powers from\\npossession of contiguous territory, and to separate us by oceans,\\ngulfs, lakes, and rivers from possible enemies whose proximity\\nwould necessitate the maintenance of large military establish-\\nments as a means of defense.\\nAnd so we expanded under the conviction that our boundary\\non the south should be the Gulf of Mexico and the Rio Grande, on\\nthe east the Atlantic, on the west the Pacific, and on the north\\nthe St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes; and later on, foreseeing\\nthat, by the process of peaceful evolution, Canada might become\\na part of our Union, Alaska was acquired as the only other foreign\\npossession between our territory and the Polar Sea.\\nOur country was to be a great commercial union of States,\\nbound together in such a way as to secure them from external\\nfoes and from external conditions of adversity. There were to be\\nno custom-houses at boundary lines to restrain interstate trade;\\nno standing armies for offense or defense against neighboring\\nStates. Relief was to be given from militarism, and the produc-\\ntive power of the Union was to be increased by pursuing the arts\\nof peace.\\nBut whilst the States were thus to be free from military con-\\ntention as amongst themselves, the nation was to be made strong\\nfor defense. This involved the establishment of a scientific bound-\\nary and a territorial grant based not on lust of empire, but on\\npatriotic determination to strengthen our defensive line and to\\nsecure the prosperity and happiness, the peace, safety, and welfare\\nof a great people.", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "INSULAR EXPANSION.\\nWhilst these acquisitions were mainly continental and, with the\\nexv?ption of Alaska, contiguous, the very purpose of territorial\\ndefense necessarily involved the peaceful acquisition of islands\\nadjacent to our coast which could be made the basis of naval or\\nmilitary attack, and which, in the possession of strong European\\npowers, would constitute a constant menace to our coast.\\nHad our forefathers contemplated the vast territorial expan-\\nsion since achieved they would doubtless have regarded the ac-\\nquisition of the Bahamas and the West Indies as important.\\nThey would have realized that those islands would control access\\nto the Gulf of Mexico and would bar the way to the Nicaragua\\nCanal sometime to be built and owned by this country, and they\\nwould have felt that the possession of those islands by the great\\npowers of England, Spain, and France might be as hazardous to\\nour peaceful isolation and our commercial supremacy as the occu-\\npation of contiguous continental territory.\\nCould they have foreseen the growth of naval power they would\\nhave realized that foreign aggression would take the form, not so\\nmuch of invasion by military force, but of naval attack on our\\nmerchant-marine engaged in the coast trade and upon our coast\\ncities, and that such an attack could not be successfully made\\nwithout convenient coaling stations such as these islands afforded.\\nThe very policy which embraced the acquisition of contiguous con-\\ntinental territory ought also to have embraced the acquisition of\\nthe adjacent islands, whose annexation would increase the dis-\\ntances between us and possible foes.\\nIn enlarging our boundaries, one of the legitimate objects to be\\nobtained was to secure the outposts beyond our defensive line,\\nthe possession of which by a hostile power would make its attack\\nmore effective.\\nThe recent operations of the Spanish fleet from the Cape Verde\\nand Canary Islands as bases, a movement which created alarm\\nand apprehension along our entire coast, demonstrated the value\\nin war of a naval station even so distant. It demonstrated that\\nan attacking fleet can be more effective than a defensive fleet with\\na long coast line to protect, for the attacking fleet knows the point\\nit intends to attack whilst the defensive fleet must scatter its\\nenergies along an entire coast.\\nIt has been fortunate that our first modern experience of war-\\nfare with European powers has been with the weakest of the sec-\\nond-class powers a country bankrupt in resources, corrupt in\\ngovernment, and inefficient in action. No pen could picture the\\nresult had Spain been a first-class naval power, with the Canary\\nIslands, Puerto Rico, and Cuba as bases of supplies and attack.\\nGeographically the Bahamas and the West Indies belong to this\\ncountry as a part of its defensive line, but owned, as they are, by\\ngreat powers, the task of acquisition will be difficult and, with\\ntheir large population of half-breed and inferior races, may be un-\\ndesirable. But if these islands had only the limited population\\nof Hawaii to-day and should be freely offered to this country as a\\ngift, the statesman who would successfully oppose their acquisi-\\ntion would be execrated by posterity.\\nI contend, then, that the vast acquisitions made by this country\\nhave strengthened rather than weakened it; have diminished the\\nchances and opportunities for militarism, have minimized the\\n3132", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "6\\nchances of continental wars, have increased our capacity for de-\\nfense, and have secured the development of an empire dedicated\\nto civilization, good order, good government, and peace. I con-\\ntend that the reasoning which led to these acquisitions applies to\\nthe islands near our Atlantic coast, though I admit that present\\nconditions render their acquisition impossible and, perhaps, unde-\\nsirable, and that their number makes the task of complete defen-\\nsive isolation difficult.\\nPACIFIC COAST.\\nBut how is it with our Pacific coast? Can we secure there ad-\\nvantages regarding the possession of adjacent islands which we\\nhave failed to secure on the Atlantic coast? We have there a coast\\nline, including Alaska, twice as great as that of our Atlantic coast.\\nBetween Alaska and our States lie the British possessions. The\\nPacific Ocean is nearly three times as wide as the Atlantic Ocean.\\nWe already bound it on the west and north. What confronts us on\\nthe Asiatic coast? Japan, a rising military and naval power, pos-\\nsessing to-day a navy superior to our own, spirited, self-assertive,\\nand aggressive.\\nWhat other powers? Russia, reaching out for the ocean, deter-\\nmined to obtain an outlet to increase its maritime power, Eng-\\nland, France, and Germany all contending over the division of\\nthe Chinese Empire. On the Asiatic coast the great navies of the\\nworld will be concentrated. The contest of the future will be\\nover the commerce of the Pacific Ocean. Are there any islands\\noff our Pacific coast like the West Indies or the Bahamas in the\\npossession of foreign naval powers? No; the islands of the North-\\nern Pacific are few, not many. From San Francisco to Hong-\\nkong, a distance of 7,000 miles; from the Aleutian Islands to the\\nTropics, a distance of about 5,000 miles, lie the scarcely populated\\nHawaiian Islands 2,200 miles from San Francisco and 4,900 miles\\nfrom Hongkong\u00e2\u0080\u0094 possessing a limited soil of great fertility, unsur-\\npassed climate, and an incomparable harbor.\\nThese are the only islands that it would be necessary for us to\\nacquire, for whilst they are not so near to our Pacific coast as the\\nBahamas and West Indies to our Atlantic coast, they are near\\nenough to form the base of attack by a hostile power, and they are\\nthe only islands adjacent to California from which such an attack\\ncould be made. Distance is relative. Recollect that the Atlantic\\nis much narrower than, the Pacific. We might well hesitate to\\nattempt to secure all the islands in the Atlantic Ocean near our\\ncoast because of the hopelessness of the task. We might be de-\\nterred from it by reason of the fact that the European coast itself\\nis not so far distant as to make a successful naval attack by a\\nEuropean power impossible.\\nBut recollect that the Pacific Ocean is so wide as to make a\\nnaval attack from the Asiatic coast impossible without recoaling,\\nand the Hawaiian Islands offer the only facilities for that purpose.\\nThe Hawaiian Islands are eight in number, with a population of\\n109,000 people. The two existing harbors of Honolulu and Oahu\\nare incapable of economical defense, but Pearl Harbor, 9 miles from\\nHonolulu, is capable of being so fortified at small expense as to\\ndefy the navies of the world without the aid of a supporting navy.\\nIt is a large lagoon, landlocked, except on the ocean side, to which\\naccess is barred by a coral reef through which a drift can be\\neasily made.\\n3432", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "When made, the harbor could float the navies of the world, and\\nyet the narrow approach to it could he so protected by mines and\\nfortifications as to enable it to defy the navies of the world. In\\nits defensive capacity it resembles the harbor of Santiago de Cuba,\\nwhich to-day, though protected by inferior fortifications, holds at\\nbay our entire Navy. It could only be taken by a land attack,\\nand the troops necessary to attack it would have to be brought\\nnearly 5,000 miles from the Asiatic coast.\\nIt is estimated that the expenditure of half a million dollars\\nwould adequately fortify and protect this harbor, and that a reg-\\niment of men would be a sufficient defensive force, except, perhaps,\\nin times of war. It would be invulnerable from the sea. A land\\nattack would be almost impossible because of the long distance\\nby ocean to be traversed by an attacking army.\\nOne regiment of the Regular Army, aided by a militia composed\\nof the resident population of whites and Kanakas, could success-\\nfully resist any attacking force without other aid. General Scho-\\nfield states that during our late war many Kanakas served in the\\nUnion Army and that they made excellent soldiers.\\nWhat elements of weakness, then, attach to these islands as a\\ndefensive outpost of our coast? Will Pearl Harbor require a\\nlarge defensive navy? No; it can protect itself. Will a large\\noccupying army be required? No the resident militia, aided by\\na regiment of regulars will meet every requirement.\\nIn case of attack aimed by some great power from the Asiatic\\ncoast we would send soldiers and ships to Hawaii for additional\\ndefense, but how much better to concentrate a small force there\\nthan to scatter a large force along our entire Pacific coast, to\\nincrease fortifications, to increase warships, and to prepare for\\nthe general defense of a long line of many thousand miles, leav-\\ning defenseless Hawaii to be captured by the attacking power,\\nand used as an effective means of raiding our entire coast from\\nthe Aleutian Islands to San Diego. Admiral Walker says that\\nwe could fortify the Hawaiian Islands for less money that it would\\ntake to build one battle ship.\\nWith Hawaii as a base, Spain, if in possession of a sufficient\\nnaval power, could destroy our merchant marine on the Pacific\\ncoast, capture our ships returning from Alaska with gold, and\\nkeep the entire coast in an agony of apprehension. Without Ha-\\nwaii no naval power could aim an attack on us from the Asiatic\\ncoast, as recoaling would be difficult, if not impracticable. What\\nnavy would be guilty of the folly of starting from Hongkong for\\nan attack upon our Pacific coast, 7,000 miles away, relying only\\nupon colliers for additional supply? A storm might scatter them:\\nan attacking force might sink them. Numerous contingencies\\nmight occur creating disadvantage for the attacking navy and\\nadvantage for the defensive navy. With these islands in our pos-\\nsession no hostile attacking force could reach our Pacific coast\\nfrom the Asiatic coast, and costly military and naval protection\\nwould be unnecessary. Without these islands costly coast forti-\\nfications and a large navy would be required for coast defense.\\nDANGER OF OCCUPATION.\\nWe are told that there is no danger of the occupancy of these\\nislands by any strong power. Our answer is that they have been\\noccupied three times in the last century by stronger powers. The\\nHawaiian Republic is incapable of resisting aggression. It lacks\\n3433", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "8\\nthe population and the wealth necessary to defend itself against\\na strong naval or military power. These islands must fall into\\nthe hands of some strong power, or else, with an increasing Jap-\\nanese population, internal revolution and Japanese control are\\nimminent.\\nThe process of assimilation caused by an influx of Japanese\\nmight result in peaceful Japanese control. Can we afford to let\\nthese islands drift into the possession of any strong European\\npower? Can we permit. them, through the action of existing\\ninternal forces, to drift under the control of Japan, that rising\\npower of the Orient, possessing to-day a navy superior to our\\nown\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a nation strong, self-assertive, aggressive, reaching out\\nfor power? In case Hawaii, discarded by us, is willing to seek\\nthe support of some stronger power, could we object? Such\\nobjection would be insufferable arrogance on our part after\\nhaving refused their annexation.\\nPROTECTORATE.\\nWe are told that a protectorate is the thing. Will any reason-\\nable man contend that we can protect unless the people of Hawaii\\nask for protection? And suppose they signify their desire to be\\nincorporated into the system of some stronger power, what becomes\\nof our protectorate? How can we guarantee their independence\\nif they do not wish to be independent? How can we protect them\\nif they do not wish to be protected?\\nAssuming, however, that they desire to be protected, how can\\nwe incur the obligation of protecting them without the right to\\ncontrol their action? If we control their action, that means gov-\\nernment equivalent to annexation. If we do not control their\\naction, can anyone conjecture what international complications\\nmay result from their arrogance, their indiscretion, or their ag-\\ngressiveness produced by a sense of security?\\nSIMPLY A TERMINABLE RIGHT TO PEARL HARBOR.\\nBut we are told that we already own Pearl Harbor and it would\\nbe better for us to fortify it and improve it as a coaling station\\nWithout incurring the obligation of governing the Hawaiian Is-\\nlands. Would it be wise to run the risk of having a hostile popu-\\nlation immediately surrounding the harbor with its fortifications?\\nThe island would without doubt drift under Mongolian con-\\ntrol. Could we rely upon their friendliness in case of war? For\\npurely strategic purposes it would doubtless be better if Pearl\\nHarbor were bounded by rocks without population. But are the\\ndisadvantages of acquiring the existing population of Hawaii suf-\\nficient to counterbalance the advantages gained from having a\\npatriotic and friendly population surrounding the key to the\\nPacific? The disadvantages are much exaggerated. The popu-\\nlation consists of about 20,000 whites, 30,000 Kanakas, 20,000 Chi-\\nnese, 40,000 Japanese. The whites consist of Americans, English,\\nand Portuguese, ail of whom can be easily assimilated.\\nThe Kanakas are a very kindly, intelligent race, gradually be-\\ncoming extinct. The Chinese and Japanese are there, as a rule,\\nwithout families, under contract. They are devoted to their own\\ncountry, and intend some time returning there. The existing\\nMongolian population, therefore, will necessarily be withdrawn,\\nand under wise exclusion laws there will be none to take its place.\\nThe population of Hawaii will necessarily, therefore, be increased\\n1432", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "9\\nby emigration from our own country to islands possessing a lim-\\nited but fertile soil and an incomparable climate, and thus by the\\npeaceful processes of emigration from our own country the entire\\ncharacter of the population will be changed. The present popula-\\ntion is friendly to America.\\nThis movement had its source in the establishment of American\\nmissions in the early part of the century. It involves no wrench,\\nno violence. As the President states it, it is a consummation, not\\na change. The Government is to-day practically American; the\\npeople will easily glide into our governmental system. They are\\nnow practically a part of our industrial system.\\nBut is it true that we have any perpetual rights in Pearl Har-\\nbor? Our rights there are secured by a reciprocity treaty termi-\\nnable at the will of either party. There is nothing in the language\\nto indicate that a perpetual right is granted, and the history of\\nthe transaction shows that there was no such intention.\\nWhen the reciprocity treaty was renewed, the Senate of the\\nUnited States inserted, in addition to the existing provisions for\\nthe admission of certain American products free of duty into Ha-\\nwaii and the admission of certain Hawaiian products free of duty\\ninto America, a clause giving to American vessels the exclusive\\nright to enter Pearl Harbor, and giving the United States the\\nright to improve the harbor for such purposes.\\nNothing was said as to the time or duration of the privilege,\\nand inferentially the term of the privilege was coincident with the\\nterm of the other reciprocal privileges in the treaty, and when the\\nHawaiian minister, before signing it as amended wrote a letter to\\nSecretary Bayard stating that such was his construction of the\\nclause, that the privilege as to Pearl Harbor was terminable at the\\nwill of either party, Mr. Bayard, our Secretary of State, acqui-\\nesced in his construction.\\nWith this history would it not be brutal in us to terminate the\\ntreaty, as is insisted by the opponents of annexation (for their real\\npurpose is to exclude Hawaiian sugar from our country) and at\\nthe same time to claim the permanent right to the harbor? How\\ncould we justify such an act of aggression? Is any power given\\nto us to fortify this harbor? No. Do we own a foot of territory\\nthere? No. Have we any jurisdiction over the harbor itself?\\nNo. To fortify this harbor and to land our forces there would be\\nan invasion of Hawaiian soil. To attempt to administer our laws\\nwithin the boundaries of Pearl Harbor would be practically gov-\\nerning a part of the islands instead of governing the whole.\\nIt can not be taken for granted that Hawaii will give to this\\ncountry her most valuable possession when we discard all the rest.\\nThe purpose of Hawaii is to obtain security, protection, peace,\\nand good government. Can we deny all this and at the same\\ntime seize her only effective harbor of defense and hold it as our\\nown?\\nALEUTIAN ISLANDS.\\nNow we are met by the statement that it is unnecessary to\\nacquire Hawaii because we have already acquired the Aleutian\\nIslands farther to the west, as there is in these islands an admir-\\nable harbor, the name of which, I believe, is Kiska. I am not\\ninformed as to the character, importance, or value of that harbor,\\nnor am I informed as to the feasibility of the tortuous route\\nsuggested, nor as to the condition of the currents and other", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "10\\nmatters that oftentimes make the shortest route in distance the\\nlongest in time; bnt admitting all the gentleman from Arkansas\\n[Mr. Dinsmore] claims regarding it, admitting that it is nearer\\nto go from San Francisco to the north and then to the south in\\norder to reach Hongkong and the Philippine Islands, admitting\\nthat Kiska is an admirable harbor, I ask, Does that fact minimize\\nthe importance of securing the only other harbor in that vast\\nexpanse of ocean which can be utilized either for the purposes of\\nwar or of commerce?\\nAnd while we attach so much importance to the defensive as-\\npect of this station, are we lightly to consider the commercial ad-\\nvantages involved in having the halfway station from our Pacific\\ncoast to the Orient, the halfway station from China to the future\\nNicaragua Canal? So I contend that as a matter of defense to our\\ncoast, as a matter of pursuing legitimately the lines which the\\ncountry has so steadily pursued, of rectifying its boundaries, of se-\\ncuring scientific boundaries that will protect from foreign aggres-\\nsion and minimize the necessity of militarism, we should acquire\\nthese islands which lie adjacent to California, and that the dis-\\ntance makes no difference. The question is whether they are at\\nsuch a distance as effectively to be used by a hostile power; and\\nit makes no difference whether they are 100 miles from San Fran-\\ncisco or 2,200 miles, provided they can be so used.\\nAs I have already said, we have seen the effectiveness of a\\nmovement inaugurated by a hostile and bankrupt country, from\\na base of operations 2,500 miles from our coast. How effective\\nwould Hawaii be as the base of operations of the great power of\\nGermany or Russia in dominating our entire coast, raiding it from\\nthe Aleutian Islands to San Diego, intercepting our ships as they\\ncome down with the gold from Alaska, destroying our entire\\nmerchant marine, darting in here and there with an effectiveness\\nthat would necessitate ample military and naval defense all along\\nthe line. And here we have a long coast on the Pacific, twice as\\nlong as that on the Atlantic, and we hesitate to avail ourselves of\\nthe only harbor which, in hostile hands, would constitute a menace\\nto our safety.\\nCOLONIAL EXPANSION.\\nBut we are confronted by the statement that the acquisition of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands means colonial expansion, territorial ex-\\npansion, empire. I regard it as an unfortunate thing that this\\nquestion is to be considered in the public mind in connection with\\nthe Philippine question. None of us know how that question\\nis to be determined. For one I trust that it will not be so de-\\ntermined as to involve colonial expansion.\\nI do not believe in owning islands all over the globe; I do not\\nbelieve in a system of colonial extension like that of England.\\nDifferent nations must pursue different lines of expansion and\\ngrowth. A country that is built up and overpopulated as Eng-\\nland is must, in order to maintain its prosperity, its growth and\\nits strength, acquire additional territory. The policy of an island\\nlimited in area like that of England, and having a population of\\nvigorous and aggressive people should be entirely different from\\nthe policy of a country that has more territory than population,\\nand which should be absorbed in internal problems, not external\\nproblems.\\nThe relation which such a population as the Philippines will", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "11\\nhave to our own, both as to individual liberty, individual repre-\\nsentation, and industrial and commercial laws will be so perplex-\\ning as to distract us from the consideration of the grave internal\\nproblems that confront us. The acquisition of such a population\\nmay entirely break down and destroy our industrial system, based\\nupon protection and intended to protect the American laborer\\nfrom the disastrous competition of the cheap labor of other coun-\\ntries. Whether this is desirable or not may be a matter of con-\\ntention, but that the immediate effects of it might be a most\\nserious readjustment of industrial and economic conditions, in-\\nvolving distress and suffering to our existing population, must be\\nconsidered.\\nI am therefore against colonial expansion for this country. I\\nam for territorial defense. I should have regarded our position\\nas stronger to-day had Dewey met the Spanish fleet in the open\\nsea and destroyed it and then sailed to Cuba, there to unite his\\nforces with Sampson s and Schley s. I believe in concentration\\nof action, not diffusion of action. I believe in steadily keeping in\\nmind the purpose with which we started, which was to drive the\\nSpaniards from Cuba. Involved in that was the destruction of\\nthe Spanish navy wherever found, for through the Spanish navy\\nalone could an effective defense of Cuba be made.\\nDewey s brilliant victory placed Manila at his feet. He was\\ntrue to the military instinct in holding his ground and taking\\npossession of the islands as a pledge of security and peace.\\nBut the problems with reference to those islands are to be settled\\nhereafter by wise statesmanship. It may be that we have so com-\\nplicated ourselves with the insurgent chief there, with the insur-\\ngent forces that are now arrayed against Spain and are wresting\\nfrom her by land the possession of her fortifications, that honor\\nand a proper regard for the respect of mankind will demand from\\nus the task of pacifying the islands and organizing a stable and\\ncivilized government there.\\nI would not have the United States unresponsive to any hon-\\norable obligation. I would even run the risk of mistakes in our\\nforeign policy rather than do that. But these are questions for\\nthe future, serious questions, involving possible acquisition of\\n9,000,000 people of inferior races, not suited for our civilization,\\nnot suited for assimilation with us. Their acquisition involves\\nnot territorial defense, not peace, but aggression, conquest, war,\\ninternational complications. It puts us in the theater of action\\nof the great nations of the world and may force us to participate\\nwith them in all the diplomatic controversies that may arise.\\nBut no such disadvantages attach to the Hawaiian Islands. The\\npopulation which we add is inconsiderable. The country has\\nalready, by the peaceful process of evolution, assimilated itself\\nwith us. For years it has been practically American. American\\nideas, American liberty, American civilization, prevail there. No\\nviolent wrench is involved in their acquisition. No difficult prob-\\nlem of colonial expansion is involved in adding a population of\\n109,000 people, 50,000 of whom will retire to their old homes\\nwithin the next five or ten years, leaving the island for the pos-\\nsession of the Caucasian race. No difficult problems of agricul-\\ntural competition present themselves, for the soil, though rich, is\\nlimited and has probably reached its largest development.\\nI admit that the Philippine question is one of great difficulty.\\nIt may involve a readjustment of our entire industrial system.\\n3432", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "12\\nWe have thus far promoted commercial union between the States,\\ndone away with custom-houses between them, done away with all\\nrestraints upon friendship and commerce. We have built up\\naround our country, by the action of both parties, the defensive\\nwall of the tariff to protect our industries and the wage earners\\nemployed in them against the cheap labor of other countries and\\nadverse conditions elsewhere.\\nIf it were proposed to-day to add Japan and the Chinese Empire\\nto the United States and to place our protective wall around them\\nall, would New England assent? It would mean the injury and\\nperhaps destruction of every manufacturing enterprise in that\\nsection, for the tendency, of course, is for every such enterprise\\nto drift to the point of cheapest production.\\nWe, in a measure, protect our laboring people against the cheap\\nlabor of Europe and also against the cheaper labor of the Mongo-\\nlian races by our tariff laws; but there is not an intelligent man\\nwho does not realize to-day that the great industrial nations of\\nthe future are likely to be Japan and China, and if they were in-\\ncorporated within our domain and surrounded by this tariff wall\\nwe would find our industries transplanted from our own soil to\\ntheirs.\\nAs it is, the energies of hundreds of millions of people in China\\nof great industrial aptness are to be loosened, and those energies\\nare to be directed by the great powers of Europe\u00e2\u0080\u0094 England,\\nFrance, Germany, and Russia. We shall feel the force of their\\ncompetition.\\nBear in mind the change that is now going on in the cotton in-\\ndustry. That industry is being gradually transferred from New\\nEngland to the South. Why? Because labor is cheaper in the\\nSouth, because the hours of labor are longer, because there are\\nnot the same restrictions as to child labor.\\nWe have numerous problems to meet within this tariff wall of\\nours, problems that involve social questions, the consolidation of\\ncapital, the consolidation of labor, the condition of the laboring\\nclasses. The time will probably come when, by a constitutional\\namendment, the hours of labor will be regulated in all the States\\nby the Congress of the United States, when the question of child\\nlal o: will be regulated by the laws of the United States, for the\\ncontention will be made by the laboring classes in those States\\nsubject to wise, just, and reasonable restraint as to the hours of\\nlabor that other States not subject to such restraint are absorb-\\ning their industries.\\nHow would it be with reference to Japan and China, if those\\nEmpires were attached to us? How will it be with the Philip-\\npine Islands if they are attached to us and our industrial system\\nis applied to them? It will be hard for us to apply the rule of\\njustice and equality to those possessions without inflicting a serious\\ninjury on our own people.\\nBut recollect that Hawaii has already come within the scope of\\nour industrial system by the reciprocity treaty. Already she is a\\npart of our industrial system. There is no wrench, no violence.\\nThis process of acquiring Hawaii is simply the peaceful process of\\nevolution.\\nI think, then, with all due deference to the opinions of my friends\\non this side, that they should draw the distinction between an im-\\nperial policy and this question, between colonial extension and\\nterritorial defense. It will not do to oppose a just measure on the\\n3132", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "13\\nscore that it may hereafter lead to an indefensible measure. Yoke\\na just measure with an indefensible measure, and they may both\\ngo through. Settle the just measure now and leave the indefensi-\\nble measure to be settled by time, and then you can meet it with\\nargument alone, without its receiving the support of a just and\\nproper measure.\\nI will not take up time further with reference to the impor-\\ntance of Hawaii as a matter of defense, of our coast, nor shall I\\nenter at any length upon the commercial advantages of the\\nHawaiian Islands. All that has been ably covered by the chair-\\nman of the committee and by other speakers. I simply wish to\\nurge that the question of Hawaiian annexation and Philippine\\nannexation should not be yoked together. I wish to urge the\\nview that growth does not necessarily lead to decline.\\nWe are told that the insular possessions of England are to-day\\nher greatest weakness; that her colonies are sources of weakness\\nrather than of strength. Imagine the history of that country had\\nit remained content within its narrow insular boundaries. The\\nonly career that such a nation can follow is one of colonial expan-\\nsion. You may say to her, Cut off the Indies; cutoff Canada;\\ncut off your African possessions. Imagine how quickly she\\nwould die. Historians hereafter may declare that England died\\nas a result of undue growth, of phenomenal growth, of territorial\\nexpansion; but history will also record that she lived nobly.\\nWe wish that this country should live nobly, that it should pur-\\nsue the high purposes with which it started out, the purpose of\\nestablishing within our domain as far as possible a homogeneous,\\nindependent, self-respecting people, capable of war, but inclined\\nto peace; pursuing all the methods that will secure peace; remov-\\ning from our continent by peaceful negotiations European nations\\nwhose proximity threatened continued complications; removing\\nall restraints upon trade between these great States, and securing\\nalso such insular territory as is necessary to protect its defensive\\nline, securing the outposts against foreign occupation, placing be-\\ntween this country and the great military countries vast expanses\\nof ocean, controlling the insular outposts, and thus securing scien-\\ntific boundaries, which in themselves will secure lasting peace.\\n[Loud applause.]\\n[See map, next page, and appendix.]\\n3432", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX.\\n[Extracts from statements of General Schofield and Admiral Walker.]\\nCommittee on Foreign Affairs,\\nTuesday, May 10, 1898.\\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs this day met, Hon. R. R,\\nHitt in the chair.\\nGen. J. M. Schofield and Admiral John G. Walker appeared be-\\nfore the committee.\\nThe Chairman. The committee will bear in mind that they\\ngave informal instrnctions to the chairman to request the presence\\nof General Schofield and Admiral Walker at this meeting of the\\ncommittee, when resolution 259 will be before them for considera-\\ntion by an order already made. Those gentlemen are present, and\\nI will ask General Schofield if he will be kind enough, to give the\\ncommittee such views and information as he can as will enlighten\\nthem in the consideration of this joint resolution providing for\\nannexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States; and the\\nreason we have sent for you was on account of the personal ex-\\nperience you have had on your part to some extent, and also your\\ncharacter as a soldier and commander of the Army for a long\\ntime.\\nstatement of gen. j. m. schofield, united states army.\\nGeneral Schofield. Mr. Chairman, I presume that members\\nof the committee are familiar with the general ideas which have\\nbeen advanced for many years by military and naval men in re-\\ngard to the value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.\\nI will therefore be as brief as possible, so as not to repeat what\\nhas been so often said before; but first, to show the interest that\\nwe have always taken in the subject, I wish simply to recall the\\ntfact that I, in company with General Alexander, one of the most\\ndistinguished engineer officers of the Army at that time, went to\\nthe islands twenty-five years ago at our own instance, or rather\\nwe got confidential orders at our requestto go there and investi-\\ngate the subject, so we might be thoroughly convinced in our\\nown minds, and so far as practical convince the Government, of\\nthe importance of the matter.\\nWe spent three months on the island and made a careful survey\\nof Pearl River Harbor and visited the other islands, and obtained\\nthe knowledge that that was the only harbor in the islands to be\\nconsidered in respect to military and naval matters, and we found\\nit to be of exceedingly great value. Its natural adaptability to\\nnaval purposes is perhaps not surpassed by any harbor in the world.\\nIn regard to its secure anchorage for large fleets, its distance from\\nthe sea makes it beyond the reach of the guns of war ships, and\\nthe great ease with which the entrance to the harbor could be\\ndefended by mounting batteries so as to make it a perfectly safe\\nrefuge for marine shipping or naval cruisers, or even a fleet which\\nmight find it necessary under any circumstances to take refuge\\n3132 15", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "16\\nthere; for coaling grounds, for navy-yard repair shops, storehouses\\nand everything of that kind.\\nThe most important feature of all is that it economizes the naval\\nforce rather than increases it. It is capable of absolute defense\\nby shore batteries; so a naval fleet, after going there and replen-\\nishing its supplies and making what repairs are needed, can go\\naway and leave the harbor perfectly safe to the protection of the\\nArmy. Then arises at once the question why this harbor will be\\nof consequence to the United States. It has not been easy to make\\nthat perfectly clear to the minds of men who have not made such\\nsubjects the study of a lifetime till now; but the conditons of the\\npresent war, it seems to me, ought to make it clear to everybody.\\nLet us take\\nMr. Clark. Would you rather proceed and say all you have to\\nsay and then be questioned, or do you prefer that we should put\\nthe questions as you proceed?\\nGeneral Schofield. I have no objections to questions being\\nasked as I go along.\\nMr. Clark. Does not the very fact\\nMr. Newlands. Do you not think that it would make the re-\\nmarks of the General more consecutive if he should be allowed to\\nproceed without interruption?\\nMr. Clark. I asked his preference in regard to the matter.\\nGeneral Schofield. It is entirely immaterial to me.\\nMr. Newlands. My observation is that it has always exnedited\\na hearing of this kind.\\nGeneral Schofield. It is entirely as you please. At this mo-\\nment the Government is fitting out quite a large fleet of steamers\\nat San Francisco to carry large detachments of troops and mili-\\ntary supplies of all kinds to the Philippine Islands. Honolulu is\\nalmost in the direct route. That fleet, of course, will want very\\nmuch to recoal at Honolulu, thus saving that amount of freight\\nand tonnage for essential stores to be carried with it. Otherwise\\nthey would have to carry coal enough to carry them all the way\\nfrom San Francisco to Manila and that would occupy a large\\namount of the carrying capacity of the fleet, and if they recoal at\\nHonolulu all that will be saved. More than that, a fleet is liable\\nat any time to meet with stress of weather, or perhaps a heavy\\nstorm, and there might be an accident to the machinery which\\nwill make it necessary to put into the nearest port possible for\\nrepairs and additional supplies. By the time it reaches there its\\ncoal supply might be well-nigh exhausted; it then has to replen-\\nish its coal supply to carry it to whatever port it could reach.\\nIf I am not misinformed in regard to the laws of neutrality, the\\nsupply of coal that can be taken on board at neutral ports is only\\nsufficient to bring it back to the nearest home port, and not enough\\nto carry it across the ocean, so that if we had to regard Honolulu\\nas a neutral port we could only load up coal enough to bring us\\nback to San Francisco; and if I am misinformed in regard to that\\npoint, why, Admiral Walker will correct me. Now, let us sup-\\npose, on the other hand, that the Spanish navy in the Pacific, as\\nwell as in the Atlantic, or both, were a little stronger than ours,\\ninstead of being somewhat weaker. The first thing they would\\ndo would be to go and take possession of the Sandwich Islands\\nand make them the basis of naval operations against the Pacific\\ncoast.\\nYou have only to consider the state of mind which exists all along", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "17\\nthe Atlantic coast under the erroneous apprehension that the Span-\\nish fleet might possibly assail our coast to see what will be the case\\nif the Spanish fleet were a good deal stronger than ours and took\\npossession of Honolulu and made it a basis of operation in attack-\\ning the points on the Pacific coast. We would be absolutely pow-\\nerless, because we would have no fleet there to dispute the posses-\\nsion of the Sandwich Islands, whereas, if we held that place and\\nfortified it so that a foreign navy could not take it, it could not\\noperate against the Pacific coast at all, for it can not bring coal\\nenough across the Pacific Ocean to sustain an attack on the Pacific\\ncoast. Then the Sandwich Islands would be a base for naval op-\\nerations, just as Puerto Rico is against the Atlantic coast. If Spain\\nis strong enough to hold Puerto Rico, so that a squadron can\\nreplenish with supplies, coal, ammunition, and provisions there,\\nthe whole Spanish fleet can raid our Atlantic coast at will.\\nIt happens that in this war we have picked out the only nation\\nin the world that is a little weaker than ourselves. The Spanish\\nfleet on the Asiatic station was the only one of all the fleets we\\ncould have overcome as we did. Of course, that can not again\\nhappen, for we will not be able to pick up so weak a fellow next\\ntime. We are liable at any time to get into a war with a nation\\nwhich has a more powerful fleet than ours, and it is of vital im-\\nportance, therefore if we can, to hold the point from which they\\ncan conduct operations against our Pacific coast. Especially is\\nthat true until the Nicaragua Canal is finished, because we can\\nnot send a fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Wc can not send\\nthem around Cape Horn and repel an attack there. If we had the\\ncanal finished, we would be very much better off than now in\\nthat respect, but even then we would want the possession of a\\nbase very much from which no power on earth except England\\ncan carry on a war against us.\\nThey have Esquiniault and other places which would be a base\\nof operations against us if it were possible that there could be a\\nwar between us. Still, the islands would be of very great value\\nto them, being on a direct line of communication between Van-\\ncouver and their possessions in the southwest, but they do not need\\nit in the sense that other nations do. Germany, France, and any\\nof those nations would jump at the chance to get the Sandwich\\nIslands, while they all recognize our preemption. We got a pre-\\nemption title to those islands through the volunteer action of our\\nAmerican missionaries who went there and civilized and Chris-\\ntianized those people and established a Government that has no\\nparallel in the history of the world considering its age, and we\\nmade a preemption which nobody in the world thinks of disput-\\ning, provided we perfect our title. If we do not perfect it in due\\ntime we have lost those islands. Anybody else can come in and\\nundertake to get them.\\nSo it seems to me the time is now ripe when this Government\\nshould do that which has been in contemplation from the begin-\\nning as a necessary consequence of the first action of our people\\nin going there and settling those islands and establishing a good\\ngovernment and education and the action of our Government\\nfrom that time forward on every suitable occasion in claiming the\\nright of American influence over those islands, absolutely exclud-\\ning any other foreign power from any interference, and especially\\nas the result of the unanimous report from General Alexander\\nand myself that steps ought to be taken in due time to secure this\\n3432\u00e2\u0080\u00942", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "18\\nharbor. We found annexation could not be talked of on account\\nof the then existing government. We thought it wise to advise\\nthe government to take such steps as would secure for us the bene-\\nfit of the use of that harbor, because that is the thing that is val-\\nuable to us; we do not care about the rest. All the rest is merely\\nincidental to the necessity on the part of this Government to pos-\\nsess that harbor and to fortify it for military and naval purposes.\\nOf course this subject may be extended indefinitely\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the value\\nof that harbor as a place of refuge in time of war for merchant\\nships which might be pursued by cruisers, or a place of refuge to\\nreplenish the supplies of our own cruisers. They are of infinite\\nvalue to the United States, or to any country which may oppose\\nthem in these islands for such purposes, but the great military\\npoint is the one I made twenty-five years ago, and I have not\\nceased to insist upon it at all proper times from that time to this,\\nthat to guard our Pacific coast against the possibility of a naval\\npower taking possession of those islands, making them a base of\\noperations against our Pacific coast, the one thing necessary to be\\ndone is for the United States to acquire them, improve that har-\\nbor, fortify it, and make it perfectly secure and hold it forever.\\nThe Chairman. To acquire the whole islands?\\nGeneral Schofield. To acquire so much as may be necessary\\nfor the purpose. That is a political question which I have not\\nthought necessary to dwell upon. I do not see how you can own\\nand command that harbor without having some claim over the\\nislands.\\nMr. Newlands. You have spoken thus far of the importance of\\nthis harbor; would it be sufficient to have the harbor without the\\nislands themselves?\\nGeneral Schofield. That is the point we are just raising. That\\nis a political question which perhaps I ought not to discuss. My\\nown impression is we ought to have the islands for the purpose of\\nholding the harbor; otherwise if these islands were left free and\\nneutral to conduct their own political relations with foreign na-\\ntions, we would necessarily, soOner or later, come into complica-\\ntions. We must either allow foreign nations to exact from them\\nthe damages which such nations are in the habit of exacting from\\neverybody who does not regard their interests and rights you\\nhear every day of Great Britain and Germany sending war ships\\nto compel people to comply with their demands. We can not\\nguard the islands against that sort of trouble unless they belong\\nto us. If they belong to us, we conduct the foreign relations for\\nthe islands and settle any dispute which exists with a foreign na-\\ntion instead of leaving a weak little Republic to do it.\\n-jf-\\nMr. Williams. Let us go back a moment. Suppose we owned\\nthe harbor and fortified it, with the right of sovereignty over the\\nharbor\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that is the supposition I made\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and sufficient surround-\\ning land to protect the fortifications of the harbor, which I under-\\nstand we do have. Now, how could any foreign power land at the\\nmain island of Hawaii or any of the Hawaiian Islands and threaten\\nour possession of the harbor? Where would they land?\\nGeneral Schofield. They could land troops anywhere at Hono-\\nlulu Harbor, especially if the population were friendly to them.\\nSuppose the Japanese, for instance, succeeded in getting that for\\nwhich they are working so hard now, the political possession of\\nthe islands and physical possession\u00e2\u0080\u0094 because all the emigrants\\n3133", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "19\\nfrom Japan there are soldiers in a very few years Japan can get\\nphysical and political control of the islands\\nMr. Williams. But my supposition was, if we had announced\\nto the world our guaranty of the independence of the islands\\nGeneral Schofield. We can not do that\\nMr. Williams (continuing). And our firm determination to\\nmaintain that. If that announcement were made, do you, as a\\nmilitary man, think that the Japanese Empire would undertake to\\ndefy that announcement and make an attack upon those islands?\\nGeneral Schofield. I do not doubt it for a moment. They\\nwould first populate the island with Japanese and get control of\\nthe Government. They would have two or three hundred thou-\\nsand Japanese there thoroughly loyal to Japan as much so as\\nAmericans are to the United States. What good would our guar-\\nanty of independence be against such a population?\\nMr. Williams. You do not understand me. They might have\\nthe local government of Japanese people; I grant that.\\nGeneral Schofield. Suppose those people there, in accordance\\nwith the doctrines of the American Government, were to organ-\\nize a government and ask admission into the Japanese Empire.\\nCould we resist it?\\nMr. Williams. If we announced for military and naval reasons\\nthat we would guarantee the independence of those people, we\\nwould resist it to-day.\\nGeneral Schofield. Our announcement would be laughed at\\nby the governments of the world, because we have not done the\\nthings necessary to maintain that guaranty.\\nMr. Newlands. You have spoken of the importance of our\\nholding these islands with a view of preventing any other nation\\nfrom taking them and making them a basis of attack upon our\\nPacific coast. Let me ask you whether there would be any disad-\\nvantages to our country arising from the Sandwich Islands being\\nabsolutely neutral in any war?\\nGeneral Schofield. Oh, unquestionably; we would lose all the\\nprivileges we are enjoying now, the right to use them as a hos-\\npitable harbor for our own purposes. If they were to become ab-\\nsolutely neutral, we would not be at liberty to coal or get supplies\\nthere. The advantage to-day of the friendly attitude instead of a\\nneutral attitude existing in the Sandwich Islands is going to be\\nvery great to us.\\nMr. Newlands. You think simply a neutral attitude in the\\nSandwich Islands would be disadvantageous to our country?\\nGeneral Schofield. Yes, because other nations would enjoy\\njust the same privileges we do.\\nMr. Newlands. Do you think a greater international embar-\\nrassment would arise from a protectorate of those islands than\\nan ownership?\\nGeneral Schofield. I would not look at a protectorate. I think\\nwe should have absolute control of the foreign policy of thoso\\nislands.\\nMr. Newlands. But with reference to international complica-\\nt ons or embarrassments, would you regard our strongest position\\nas one of a protectorate or annexation?\\nGeneral Schofield. Annexation, by all means. I would not\\nlisten to a proposition for a protectorate at all, for the reason that\\nyou would not be able to control their foreign policy. They will\\n3132", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "20\\ncommit acts that will be regarded as objectionable by other\\nnations, and we will have to say to a great naval power which\\nwants to go in and enforce its terms, No, you shall not do it.\\ni t\\nMr. Newlands. There is just one further question I would\\nlike to ask you. You have dwelt at great length on the advan-\\ntage which the Sandwich Islands would be to a foreign country at\\nwar with us, in attacking us upon the Pacific coast. Will you\\nstate what embarrassment would arise to us from a neutral posi-\\ntion of the Sandwich Islands in such a war?\\nGeneral Schofield. They would simply deprive us of the use of\\nthose islands for military or naval purposes, and we could not\\nhave a place of refuge, for instance, for our fleet or merchant\\nships. A neutral port there would be of no advantage to us, and\\nwe would have great deprivation if we could control the com-\\nmerce of the Pacific Ocean by our cruisers, as I presume we can.\\nWe ought to be able in any foreign war to control those islands\\nand control the commerce of the Pacific Ocean, provided we have\\na depot for our cruisers to refit and resupply themselves, etc. In\\nother words, for the purpose of military control of commerce we\\nwant very much that depot.\\nMr. Newlands. An objection urged to the acquisition of these\\nislands is that it would very largely increase the Navy?\\nGeneral Schofield. That is absolutely untrue. It is the re-\\nverse of the fact, as it would have the tendency to diminish the\\nNavy in the Pacific because of the control of these islands.\\nMr. Newlands. Would the military expense be large in forti-\\nfying those islands?\\nGeneral Schofield. No, sir; compared with the general ex-\\npenses of the Army and Navy of the United States.\\nMr. Newlands. From an economical point of view, in a war,\\nwould you regard the holding of these islands as an advantage?\\nGeneral Schofield. Oh, very great, very great. It would cost\\nus very much less to carry on war in the Pacific Ocean if we hold\\nthese islands than if we did not have them. The difference would\\nbe far greater than any possible cost of holding and fortifying\\nthem.\\nMr. Adams. Has any estimate been made of the probable ex-\\npense of fortifying Pearl Harbor?\\nGeneral Schofield. No. I would rather leave that to the en-\\ngineers; but it is not very great, a few hundred thousand dollars,\\nperhaps. It is peculiarly easy to fortify. You only have to have\\nfortifications on each side of this comparatively narrow channel.\\nMr. Williams. If we were strong enough to hold the islands\\nand prevent a successful attack by any power, would not we be\\nstrong enough to defend our Government from the same power?\\nGeneral Schofield. I think that does not follow at all. The\\nholding of the islands so that a foreign navy can not get posses-\\nsion of them absolutely paralyzes that navy as against the Pacific\\ncoast, so that the problem of war would be reduced to holding the\\nislands instead of defending the whole line of the Pacific coast.\\nMr. Williams. I will put the question in another shape. If we\\nowned those islands our holding them for any great length of time\\nwould depend upon our sea power?\\nGeneral Schofield. Yes; we can not hold anything without\\nsea power.\\n3432", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "21\\nMr. Williams. It would necessarily come down to the question\\nof sea power after all. If our sea power was sufficient to hold\\nthem, then our sea power would be sufficient to protect ourselves\\nfrom the naval attacks of an enemy?\\nGeneral Schopield. I beg your pardon. The difference is this:\\nThe holding of the islands\u00e2\u0080\u0094 if we have possession and fortify them,\\nour sea power would be reenf orced by enormous land power there.\\nIn other words, an enemy, in order to get a basis from which to\\nattack us at all, either on sea or shore, would have to come to\\nthose islands there\u00e2\u0080\u0094 they would have to attack the perfected mod-\\nern fortifications.\\nMr., Williams. Do you presuppose the population of the islands\\nfriendly to us or unfriendly?\\nGeneral Schofield. I suppose them to be friendly, and that\\nthey would therefore assist us in their defense.\\nMr. Williams. That, I say, is predicated largely upon the as-\\nsumption that they will be friendly?\\nGeneral Schofield. Yes; and that is the great value of annexa-\\ntion as compared with neutrality or something worse.\\nSTATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN G. WALKER, UNITED STATES NAVY.\\nThe Chairman. Admiral Walker, the gentlemen of the com-\\nmittee have requested you to be present that they may have the\\naid of your views and information as a seaman touching the ques-\\ntion involved in the resolution before them providing for the an-\\nnexation of the Hawaiian Islands, and we will be glad to have\\nyou state your views in such manner as may suit you.\\nAdmiral Walker. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the com-\\nmittee, it seems to me that General Schofield has covered the gen-\\neral ground very well, and perhaps it would be better for mem-\\nbers of the committee to ask me any questions they please at once.\\nI agree with General Schofield entirely in his general statement\\nof the value of the islands to the United States.\\nMr. Dinsmore. Then, if I may be permitted, I would like to\\nask the Admiral especially to explain to the committee\u00e2\u0080\u0094 it may\\nbe others understand it, but I would like to have him explain to\\nus the situation there from a military standpoint, and what would\\nhave to be done in case we take possession of the islands; what\\nfortifications and what works we would have to construct, and\\nwhat force he thinks would be sufficient to be placed there.\\nAdmiral Walker. Pearl Harbor is now a large lagoon, prac-\\ntically surrounded by land. There is a narrow entrance, and\\noutside of this entrance a coral reef extends around the island out-\\nside of this lagoon and makes a bar, preventing a vessel entering\\nthe harbor which draws over 10 or 12 feet of water, I can not say\\nexactly. I was out there in 1894, and I took up the idea that\\nthere must be a break in that coral reef somewhere, which, if\\nfound, probably an entrance could b3 easily made, and I was led\\nto that belief from the fact that they had deepened the entrance\\nto Honolulu Harbor quite easily. I put a party of officers and\\nmen at work, and they were seven weeks on that bar. They ex-\\namined the oar very carefully and found exactly what I expected\\nthey would find, a fissure in the reef, which was filled with fine\\ncoral sand\u00e2\u0080\u0094 disintegrated coral. They bored it out, inside and\\noutside, to determine its width.\\nWe found we could come down without the slightest trouble as\\ndeep as we wanted to go; but this is fine sand, which can be\\n3432", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "22\\nsucked off with a suction dredge with the greatest ease. That en-\\ntrance through the reef was in its narrowest part about 500 feet,\\nas I recollect. When that should be opened, which could be done\\nat small expense, it would leave an entrance varying, say, from\\n800 or 1,000 feet to 500, every inch -of which would be covered by\\nthe guns placed in the fortifications on the beach; and it would\\nnot be a straight channel: it would be a curved channel, and by\\nmeans of mines and a few guns on the beach all the navies in the\\nworld could be stopped from entering in there.\\nMr. Newlands. How large is that lagoon inside the coral reef?\\nAdmiral Walker. It is very large, and cut up by points and\\nislands so it is very smooth water, always as smooth as the water\\nof the Potomac here, and it is entirely secure as an anchorage.\\nThere is plenty of depth of water.\\nMr. Williams. How deep is it?\\nAdmiral Walker. You could always get 6, 7, or 8 fathoms of\\nwater; all the water a ship wants.\\nThe Chairman. Will you state the comparative value of the\\nSandwich Islands as a point compared to any other islands which\\nlie in the Pacific Ocean near to or far from our Pacific coast?\\nAdmiral Walker. I consider the Sandwich Islands worth far\\nmore than all the others put together. The Sandwich Islands, if\\noccupied by an enemy with a fleet, would be a thorn in our side.\\nThe Chairman. It is the isolation of the Sandwich Islands\\nfrom any near neighbor which contributes to its importance?\\nAdmiral Walker. That contributes to its importance, of course.\\nThere is no other in the North Pacific that would be of use. When\\nI speak of the North Pacific, I speak of the American side. There\\nis nothing of any use except the Sandwich Islands.\\nMr. Cousins. How much would it cost to make the Sandwich\\nIslands impregnable to a fleet such as composes a first-class power\\nnow?\\nAdmiral Walker. It is not at all probable that any power\\nwould send a very heavy fleet out there, as it is a long way from\\nEurope.\\nMr. Cousins. It is presumed that would be their business to\\nBend one there. How much would it cost to fortify this harbor?\\nAdmiral Walker. That is a question I could not answer. It\\nwould not be very heavy of making fortifications for Pearl Har-\\nbor so it could not be taken at all, and the only other secure land-\\ning place would be at Honolulu, which is from 7 to 10 miles away,\\nand it is perfectly easy to fortify that sufficient!} 7 to prevent any-\\nbody from landing there.\\nMr. Berry. It would cost less than to build a battle ship now?\\nAdmiral Walker. Yes.\\nMr. Pearson. I suppose half a million to deepen it and half a\\nmillion more to build fortifications?\\nAdmiral Walker. I can not speak as an engineer as to the\\nfortifications. I should think a half millicn would put up all the\\nfortifications we would want there.\\nMr. Newlands. Suppose in this war the Spanish Government\\nhad a navy equal to or perhaps superior to ours and should take\\npossession of the Hawaiian Islands and menace us from that point\\nby offensive warfare against the Pacific coast. How would they\\nmake that warfare effective as against our commerce on that\\ncoast, and what precautions would we have to adopt to meet it?", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "23\\nAdmiral Walker. Without the Sandwich Islands ^hey could\\nnot operate successfully against our coast at all, because the ques-\\ntion of neutrality would cut them off from both the British do-\\nminions north of us and Mexico south of us; but with the Sandwich\\nIslands in their possession they could establish a depot of coal\\nand supplies at the Sandwich Islands, and ships would pass back-\\nward and forward as they pleased.\\nMr. Newlands. Would it prove very destructive to our com-\\nmercial marine in that case?\\nAdmiral Walker. If they had force enough. If they were\\nsuperior to us in force, why they would wipe out the merchant\\nmarine from the Pacific coast entirely.\\nMr. Newlands. What precautions would we have to adopt in\\norder to meet that?\\nAdmiral Walker. We would need a very much larger navy\\nthan we would otherwise need on that coast.\\nMr. Newlands. We would need a navy to protect our coast;\\nthat would be required along the entire line of our coast, as well\\nas Alaska?\\nAdmiral Walker. Yes; we would need a greater number of\\nfortifications; we would need fortified places that perhaps would\\nnot be fortified otherwise.\\nMr. Newlands. But I am putting a supposed case that their\\nnavy was equal or perhaps superior to ours, and I want to ask\\nwhat precautions we would have to take in order to meet an of-\\nfensive warfare waged upon that coast. Now, for instance, we\\nhave these vessels leaving Alaska just about this time with gold\\nfor San Francisco.\\nAdmiral Walker. They would have to be convoyed in force\\nsufficient to secure safety.\\nMr. Newlands. By United States vessels?\\nAdmiral Walker. By vessels of war.\\nMr. Newlands. And you say additional fortifications would be\\nrequired on the Pacific coast?\\nAdmiral Walker. Otherwise the Spaniards could land where\\nthey pleased out of the range of fortifications. Of course, the\\ncoast of California is a long coast, and it could be raided like any\\nother coast.\\nMr. Newlands. So we would have to increase not only the\\nmilitary expense, but the naval expense, in order to protect that\\ncoast?\\nAdmiral Walker. Yes.\\nMr. Newlands. You say they could not operate far\\nj;: t?\\nAdmiral Walker. Not unless they had a base.\\nMr. Newlands. Is there any island on the Atlantic Ocean so\\nimportant 011 the Atlantic coast as those islands are on the Pacific\\ncoast?\\nAdmiral Walker. No; I do not think so.\\nMr. Adams. In your judgment it would cost less and take fewer\\ntroops to protect the Pacific coast with the possession of the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands than without them?\\nAdmiral Walker. Yes.\\nMr. Adams. Because, to my mind, that is the great economic\\npoint of the whole question.\\n3433", "height": "4547", "width": "2637", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n019 944 342 2\\n24\\nAdmiral Walker. I suppose we could take the Hawaiian Is-\\nlands and fortify them for less money than it would take to build\\none battle ship.\\nMr. Cousins. Suppose you have the Hawaiian Islands thor-\\noughly fortified so they are impregnable so far as any fleet is con-\\ncerned owned by any other power, and the inhabitants thereof\\nshould become suddenly dissatisfied with the government that\\nthen existed and they should take charge of these fortifications,\\nhow would you get them?\\nAdmiral Walker. I take it for granted that we should have\\ngarrisons in those fortifications\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a small garrison and, knowing\\nthe people of the Hawaiian Islands as well as I do, I have not the\\nslightest idea they would ever become dissatisfied to any such ex-\\ntent as that.\\nMr. Cousins. Are you pretty well acquainted with the inhabit-\\nants of Hawaii?\\nAdmiral Walker. I have been out there at different periods.\\nI was out there lorty-five years ago, and I was out there four\\nyears ago.\\nMr. Newlands. You do not think the people of those islands\\nwould regard this as an oppressive Government?\\nAdmiral Walker. No.\\nMr. Williams. I understood you to say in your opinion we\\nwould require a less navy for the defense of the Pacific coast or\\non the Pacific seas if we owned Hawaii than if we did not. If we\\nowned Hawaii, would not we bring ourselves nearer the point of\\nattack instead of removing ourselves farther from one?\\nAdmiral Walker. I do not think so.\\n3432", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4564", "width": "2756", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n019 944 342 2\\nHollinger Corp.\\npH8.5", "height": "5083", "width": "3453", "jp2-path": "hawaiianquestion00newl_0028.jp2"}}