{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3207", "width": "2111", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "Class\\nBook.\\nSMITHSONIAN DEPOSIT", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "THE\\nPRINCIPLE OF SYNTHETIC UNITY\\nIN BERKELEY AND KANT.\\nBy\\nSAMUEL mI^DICK, A.M., Ph.D.\\n^Z\\nLOWELL, MASS.:\\nMorning Mail Company Print.\\nCV)\\nJ-f", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "Jilt", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "PREFACE.\\nThis little volume was prepared as a thesis for the degree\\nof Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. By\\nthe advice of Dr. John Dewey I have undertaken to interpret\\nthe Metaphysical Notes of Berkeley s Commonplace Book,\\nand as far as possible discover the Principle of Unity which\\noccasionally manifests itself in Berkeley s works and which\\nformed a basis for a Treatise on the Will which Berkeley\\ncontemplated but never produced.\\nI wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. Dewey for his\\nassistance in the selection of collateral reading and for his\\nsuggestions in the development of the thesis. No literature\\ncould be secured bearing upon the interpretation of the Notes,\\nhence the Notes have been classified and such as bear upon\\nthe theme under discussion have been used. Often the\\nphraseology has been preserved but where that could not be\\ndone the thought has been expressed in phraseology as nearly\\nBerkeleian as the author could select so as to preserve the\\nunity that runs through the Notes.\\nThis principle of unity found in Berkely has been compared\\nand contrasted with the Unity of Kant.\\ns. M. D.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nPage\\nIntroduction i\\nI.\\nThe Will as Seen in Berkeley s Commonplace Book.\\nI. The Commonplace Book. 3\\na. Source of authority 3\\nb. Basis for a broader philosophy 4\\nc. The period in which Berkeley lived .5\\ni The new question. 6\\nd. Berkeley s hope in establishing the principle. 6\\ni Berkeley not satisfied with his philosophy. 7\\n2 The Will Defined.\\na. The abstract of the Will 7\\nb. The concrete of the Will. 8\\nc. The Will a pure activity 9\\ni Berkeley s approach to the modern idea. 9\\nd. The difficulties in treating the Will 10\\n3. The Will and the Understanding 11\\n4. What Wills and how? 11\\n5. Connection with the Divine Will 12\\nII.\\nWill, a Synthetic Element or Activity.\\nI. The Process of Knowledge.\\na. What Berkeley attempts 14\\nb. The source of knowledge 16\\ni Sensations. 16\\n2 Thoughts 17\\nc. Objects of conscious experience 18\\ni First element 18\\n2 Second element. 18", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "VI\\n3 Elements discussed\\na\\\\ Perception.\\ni Kant s schematism foreshadowed.\\n2 Imagination not a synthetic element\\n3 Substantiality in the Material World\\n4 Permanence necessary to perception.\\nF. Conception\\ni Berkeley s dualism.\\nThe Will s function in knowledge.\\na. Berkeley influenced by Descartes.\\nd. Will The source of the modes of knowledge\\nc. How Will becomes a synthetic activity.\\ni. Will in a disjunctive judgment.\\ne. Will the underlying unity.\\nBerkeley compared with Bowne.\\nBodies exist without the mind\\na. No experience without existing bodies.\\nExistence of bodies not a fancy.\\nc. Three theories for the existence of the Universe,\\nl Abstractly objective\\n2 Abstractly subjective.\\n3 Dynamic inter-relation.\\n4 To which does Berkeley belong\\nd. Berkeley s later philosophy.\\nKnowledge and Reason.\\na. Transition to Reason.\\nb. Reason Nature immersed in matter.\\nc. Morris on Berkeley.\\nd. Berkeley s Reason like that of Kant.\\nIII.\\nKant s Transcendental Ego.\\nPag-e\\n21\\n23\\n25\\n25\\n27\\n28\\n30\\n30\\n31\\n32\\n33\\n35\\n35\\n35\\n37\\n38\\n38\\n38\\n39\\n39\\n40\\n42\\n45\\n45\\n46\\nI. The Transcendental Ego defined 47\\na. Not a concept. 47\\nb. Terms applied to it 47\\nc. The starting place of metaphysics 48", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "vn\\nPage\\nd. Descartes cogtto ergo sum. 49\\ne. Kant s criticism 51\\nThe Transcendental and the Empirical Ego. 52\\ng. The relation of the Transcendental Ego to the Noumenon. 53\\n2. The function of the Transcendental Self in knowledge. 56\\na. Robert Adamson s conament. 56\\nd. Concreteness implied in Kant s analytic thought 57\\nc. The Ego not a power of theoretical cognition. 58\\nd. Necessity founded on transcendental conditions. 59\\nThought and the manifold united 60\\n3. Summary.\\na. Sources of confusion 62\\nl Categories as tools. 63\\nc. Something given to thought. 64\\nJ. Kant s treatment of thought and the manifold. 65\\nIV.\\nPoints of Resemblance and Difference Compared\\nAND Contrasted.\\n1. Defects Considered.\\na. Berkeley entitled to more credit than received. 67\\nd. Chief point of failure. 67\\nc. Berkeley failed to use the dialectic 68\\nd. Kant s advance on Berkeley. 69\\ne. Defects in Kant s system 70\\n2. Similarities pointed out 71\\na. Specific likenesses. 72\\n6. Synthetic activity in experience 74\\nc. Difference that of induction and deduction. 75\\n3. Differences pointed out. 77\\na. Their dualism 78\\nl Summary. 79\\n4. Conclusion. 79\\nBibliography. 81", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "THE PRINCIPLE OF SYNTHETIC UNITY\\nIN BERKELEY AND KANT.\\nEvery student of modern philosophy gives to Kant\\nthe credit of formulating and developing a synthetic\\nprinciple in knowledge, which prior to Kant had re-\\nceived little or no attention. There is no doubt the\\ncredit is properly placed the very nature of philosophy\\nis to have a system philosophy is a system but before\\nthere is a development there must be a movement of\\nthought through various stages. These stages, accor-\\nding to advanced modern logic, are three in number\\nand are represented by three forms of judgment, viz.,\\nthe categorical, the hypothetical and the disjunctive.\\nThe first of these judgments is the statement of a fact\\nthe second, the statement of a fact under certain limi-\\ntations and conditions the third, the statement of a\\nfact with all the conditions overcome and realized.\\nIt may be said that through the movement of thought\\nin modern philosophy, Berkeley s forecast of the Will\\nis the categorical judgment concerning the synthetic\\nprinciple or activity in knowledge, that Kant s Critique\\nof Pure Reason is the h^^pothetical judgment, and\\nHegel s Philosophy is the disjunctive judgment.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "The work of this paper is to discover, if possible,\\nwhether such a relation exists, i. e., to compare, as\\nsynthetic activities in knowledge, the active principle\\nof Will as seen in Berkeley s Commonplace Book with\\nthe Transcendental Ego of Kant s Critique of Pure\\nReason. The author will, therefore, in the develop-\\nment of Berkeley s principle of Will, reserve the right\\nto use Kantian phraseology where it seems best and\\nwhere it precisely expresses the Berkelean thought.\\nThe subject will be treated under the following heads\\nI. The Will as seen in Berkeley s Commonplace\\nBook.\\nII. The Will a Synthetic Activity in Knowledge.\\nIII. Kant s use of the Transcendental Unity of Apper-\\nception.\\nIV. Points of Resemblance and Difference Compared\\nand Contrasted.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "I.\\nTHE WILL AS SEEN IN BERKELEY S COMMONPLACE\\nBOOK.\\nIn developing the philosophy of the Commonplace\\nBook, a brief reference to the sources of material will\\nbe necessary to show the character of the philosophical\\nstudy of Berkeley in preparing for the production of the\\nworks he has left to us. The Commonplace Book was\\npublished for the first time in 187 1, edited by Alexander\\nCampbell Fraser, of the University of Edinburgh. It\\nconsists of an unclassified collection of metaphysical\\nthoughts expressed almost entirely in single sentences,\\nwhich represent the suggestions of the author s mind as\\nhe read many philosophical works and pondered over\\nthe subjects he contemplated developing. Some of\\nthese subjects he did develop, while others lie hidden in\\nthe thoughts of the Commonplace Book. It is the ob-\\nject of this investigation to trace out some of those\\nhidden lines of thought, and, if possible, to discover\\nBerkeley s theory of the human will and the part it\\nplays, as a unifying activity, in a system of knowledge.\\nThe references named in the Commonplace Book are\\nso numerous and comprehensive that it relieves the stu-\\ndent of much laborious effort to find the sources of study\\nwhich enabled Berkeley to form his conceptions. He", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "makes frequent reference to the leading mathematicians\\nof the day, and his frequent and specific references to\\nLocke show him to have been thoroughly master of\\nLocke s philosophical position on every phase of the\\nHuman Understanding. He also makes many and\\nfamiliar references to Descartes, Malebranche, Hobbes,\\nSpinoza, Newton, and others. He was also familiar\\nwith Aristotle and Plato.\\nA basis is laid in the Commonplace Book for a\\nbroader foundation of philosophical research and devel-\\nopment than is found in the Principles. The mere\\nmatter of solving the problem which arose from the\\nmisconception of the material universe was not all that\\nBerkeley meant to do. He anticipated the period of\\ncritical philosophy which was to follow and proposed to\\nlay a metaphysical basis for the purpose of robbing his\\ncritics of all opportunity of taking a deep hold on him.\\nHe meant to leave no weak place of attack from which\\nhis critics might succeed in dethroning him or in driving\\nhim from the position which he so manfully maintained.\\nIn order to accomplish this, he deemed A Treatise on\\nthe Human Will necessary and proceeded to lay the\\nfoundation for the same. This treatise of the will\\nwould have proved too narrow for his ontological inves-\\ntigation so he proposed to look into the mind and its\\nfaculties in a broader sense, and has laid the fundamen-\\ntal principles for this broader metaphysical development\\nin the Commonplace Book. It is my purpose in this\\ndiscussion to show what was Berkeley s conception of", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "the Will as proposed in the contemplated treatise and to\\nshow, as far as possible, how he meant to apply the\\nwill in his ultimate theory of knowledge. To reach the\\nconclusion desired in the premises laid down, a sum-\\nming up of the philosophical tendencies of Berkeley s\\ntime will be necessary to the introduction of this dis-\\ncussion.\\nBerkeley lived in a period when philosophers were\\nanalyzing Matter from every possible point of view,\\nand with varied success were attempting to explain its\\nexistence. The Abstractly Objective Theory was\\nprevalent. A thing must exist into which, as it were,\\nthe qualities, primary and secondary, were stuck but\\nwhen these qualities were pulled out of the thing\\nnothing was left, at least nothing that was knowable.\\nThis gave rise to material scepticism, and Berkeley\\nrealized that this scepticism of matter was leading to\\nscepticism of reality of every sort. The failure of\\nLocke, Malebranche, Descartes, and others to explain\\nand define matter gave rise to the idea that matter might\\nbe even a cause* of consciousness and one philoso-\\npher^ went so far as to explain the existence of the\\nmind by the body, or to show that the body was a suffi-\\ncient cause for the explanation of the existence of the\\nmind. Other philosophers^ advocated theories not less\\nobjectionable to Berkeley. These theories must be re-\\nfuted and something more rational and more satisfactory\\nsubstituted for them. The mere overthrowing of a\\nLocke. Hobbes. Spinoza and Leibnitz.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "6\\ntheory without substituting something more rational for\\nit, does not lessen the tendencies to scepticism it only\\nmakes them greater. Foreseeing this, Berkeley aimed\\nto introduce a new theory and then to defend his theory\\nagainst all assaults from either contemporaries or suc-\\ncessors. The first thing was to get the new question of\\nthe reality of matter before the minds of philosophers\\nto this end he struggled long and hard, and we may say\\nduring his life, almost in vain. It was with this lever\\nthat Berkeley moved modern thought. He changed\\nthe whole channel of inquiry about matter, as well as\\nthe current of thought concerning it. How was this\\nchange made and by what argument was the theory\\nsustained? The theory was that matter was a result of\\nmental operations that matter only existed in the\\nmind, or rather that matter could not exist without the\\nmind.\\nCould Berkeley but establish this important doctrine\\nand at the same time prove the existence of spiritual\\nsubstance, and thus with an unassumed premise explain\\ncause and effect, the mists of scepticism would vanish.\\nThere would no longer be left any room for doubt;\\nthere would no longer be any philosophical problem\\nfor the materialists and idealists to quibble over. The\\nconclusion would be final. To this end Berkeley pro-\\nduced his Principles of Human Knowledge. Nearly\\nall the fundamental thoughts of the Principles are found\\nin the Commonplace Book, but no argument. By\\ntracing the argument through the Principles and com-", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "paring it with the philosophical reasonings of the Siris,\\nwe notice a marked change in the psychology.^ There\\nare indications also that Berkeley was not thoroughly\\nsatisfied with the metaphysical aspect of his Principles.\\nThis may be the key to the explanation why he never\\ndeveloped the metaphysical principles laid down in his\\nCommonplace Book. Indeed, I think we shall discover\\nbefore we have finished that there were certain points\\nconcerning the will and other faculties of the mind that\\nhe could not define to his own satisfaction and at the\\nsame time defend the doctrines set forth in his philosophy\\nas handed down to us.\\nCould Berkeley have carried his point there would\\nhave been nothing left for him to do but to establish the\\ndoctrines of the divinity as he understood them and thus\\nhave utterly demolished the minute philosophers.\\nHaving said so much by way of explanation, let us ex-\\namine Berkeley s position with respect to the human will.\\nBerkeley s new idea of matter made it necessary for\\nhim to put a new interpretation upon the functions of\\nthe will. The soul, properly speaking, is the will, and\\nas such is distinct from idea that is, it cannot be classed\\nwith phenomena, and hence remains a mere abstrac-\\ntion, and as an abstraction is absolutely unknowable;\\nnot unknowable in the sense that it is an unthinkable\\nthing or essence, but unknowable in the sense that\\nthere can be no idea formed of it, it would at once\\nbecome an idea itself which from the very nature of\\nSiris Sec. 303.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "8\\nspirit or, of spirit-substance is absurd and a contradiction\\nof terms. We are imposed upon by the words will,\\ndetermine, agent, free, can, etc. To Berkeley words\\nmeant something, and the meaningless use to which\\nmany philosophers have put the above words has led us\\ninto many errors will is not an idea and indeed can-\\nnot be, and when it is made synonymous with words\\nwhich do represent ideas, it leads us into conflicting\\njudgments and inflicts upon us impositions which are in\\nno way excusable.\\nLet us, therefore, emphasize the fact that this un-\\nknown substratum, this abstract something, which un-\\nderlies all volition and all ideas, is something whereof\\nwe know not, neither indeed is there any other being\\nwhich has or can have an idea of it, for just as soon as\\nit becomes reducible to the mere possibility of being\\nknown in the sense of an idea it ceases to be a will at\\nall and we contradict ourselves by calling it so. Berke-\\nley, therefore, emphasizes the fact that The Spirit\\nthe active thing that which is Soul and God is the\\nWill alone. The ideas are effects impotent things.\\nThe concrete of the will and the understanding taken\\ntogether may be called the mind, not the person. The\\ndefinition of person is entirely omitted, but the idea\\nimplied that should we make the concrete of the will\\nand understanding equal to person we introduce a\\nsecond volitionating being or power into the world but\\nthis is contradictory to the acknowledged conception of\\nbut one volitionating being, viz. God.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "The will, says Berkeley, is \u00e2\u0096\u00a0ftirus actus, or rather\\npure spirit, not imaginable, not sensible, not intelligi-\\nble, in nowise the object of the understanding, and\\nin nowise perceivable its properties are immortality and\\nincorruptibility, and its substance is to act, to cause,\\nto will, to operate. Its substance is not knowable.\\nIt is seen from what precedes that it is soul, is God,\\nand yet dependent upon God, i. e., that God is the\\nonly being in whom is vested the power of originat-\\ning volitions, but that there is a synthetic unity of\\nthe human and divine wills which renders them ab-\\nsolutely inseparable. The moment the human will\\nbecomes a unity in itself and entirely disconnected from\\nthe divine will, it becomes a thing of which an idea\\ncan be formed and therefore an idea, and thus ceases\\nto be a will at all yet as it is, it is a will, in as\\nmuch as it has the power of placing if not of abso-\\nlutely originating volitions.\\nBerkeley was not satisfied with the scholastique\\nterm, pure act for the will, but substituted pure\\nspirit, or active being from which I interpret him as\\napproaching nearer to the Leibnitzian idea that will\\nis not mere activity in general but that it is activity\\ntoward some definite end.^ He again approaches the\\nidea of modern philosophy in his attempt to give the\\nconcrete of the will. In his reasoning he approaches\\nthat point where his conclusions would lead him to\\nsay that the will psychologically speaking is the per-\\nLeibnitz s Essay on Human Understanding. By John Dewey.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "lO\\nson; this was Berkeley s thought yet he did not say\\nit, for the simple reason that he was not absolutely\\nsure of his premises, and he was careful to guard\\nhis statements lest a Hume should come after him.\\nMore recent philosophers have said it. The will is\\nthe man, psychologically speaking. It is interest-\\ning, however, to see how nearly Berkeley approached\\nthis idea and then shrank from expressing himself\\nlest he could not defend his doctrine.\\nThe difficulties in treating the will are not a few\\nsays Berkeley, and the great causes of perplexity and\\ndarkness arise from the fact that we imagine the\\nwill to be an object of thought we think we may\\nperceive it, contemplate it, turn it this way and that,\\nview it, and examine it as we would any object or\\nany of our ideas, whereas in truth it is no idea,\\nneither is there nor can there be any idea of it. If\\nyou say the will, or rather the volition, is a thing,\\nthere is an ambiguity arises in the use of the word\\nthing as applied to will and to idea. We may\\nconclude therefore that the will is an active force,\\nspiritual, forming in some way a union with the\\ndivine will, so that the volitionating of the divine will\\nis so imparted to the human will that we may be\\nsaid ourselves to volitionate. That the will is not\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0purus actus in the abstract sense, but that it is spirit\\nacting with some end in view, the realization of\\nwhich would have been an absolute self-consciousness,\\nPsychology, By John Dewey, P. 417.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "II\\nor such a consciousness of the ego within us, that\\nfrom that consciousness we should be able to estab-\\nlish beyond all doubt the existence of spirit substance.\\nThe Understanding and the Will The understand-\\ning taken as a faculty says Berkeley, is not really\\ndistinct from the will however, the will and the\\nunderstanding may very well be thought to be two\\ndistinct activities. There is but little doubt that the\\nseparation of will and understanding vv^as a matter of\\nwhich Berkeley was not sure, neither indeed was he\\nable to form a unity of the two which made no dis-\\ntinction between them. Every student of Berkeley is\\nthoroughly acquainted with his conception of the word\\nidea the difference between idea and volition is appar-\\nent the difference between will and understanding is\\nrelatively the difference between volition and idea, i. e.,\\nwhat the will is to volition, the understanding is to idea,\\nor on the other hand, as volition is the realization of\\nwill so idea is the realization of understanding it\\nfollows, therefore, that will and understanding are in-\\nseparable, both abstract ideas, the existence of one\\nnecessitating the existence of the other, and that will is\\nthe cause of idea, and idea the realization of under-\\nstanding.\\nWhat Wills and How?\\nIf you ask what thing it is that wills I must inquire\\nwhat you mean by thing, if you mean idea or any-\\nthing like an idea, then I answer it is no thing at all\\nthat wills however extravagant this may seem never-", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "12\\ntheless it is true, and it is that fundamental truth on\\nwhich the foregoing argument is based. Willing is co-\\nexistent with self-consciousness and we can no more\\nkeep from willing than we can keep from existing\\nwhile we exist we must therefore will the acquiescing\\nin the present state is a process of willing. That which\\nwills is an active power, spirit, and there is no other\\nactive power that can possibly be conceived of but the\\nwill. Here the conclusion to which Berkeley is tend-\\ning is already manifesting itself; he says there is no\\nactive power but the will, therefore if matter exists at\\nall it does not affect us whether or not Berkelej^ is able,\\nmetaphysically, to prove the doctrine of his Principles,\\nhe proposes to show that it forms no basis whatever\\nfor the prevalent scepticism with respect to those reali-\\nties which are of prime importance in attaining the\\nhighest end of man s existence.\\n(i) The connection of the human with the divine will.\\nTo show this connection is to answer the question\\nhow the will wills, and it is this connection which de-\\ntermines the difference between cause and occasion.\\nOccasion arises from a power that is without us, and\\nis acting independent of us and of those things which\\nhappen from without, we are not the cause, but there is\\nanother cause for them i. e., there is a being which\\nwills these perceptions in us. Therefore, there is a\\nduality existing, a human and a divine will, and the\\nhuman is not reducible to a mere machine to serve the\\npurpose of the divine.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "13\\nThe properties of all things are in God, i. e., there is\\nin the Deity understanding as well as will. He is no\\nblind agent in truth a blind agent is a contradiction.\\nIn this lies the substance of Berkeley s philosophy,\\nwhatever may be ascribed to the faculties of man be-\\nlong to the faculties of God or to the attributes of God\\non the other hand, and set over against this is man as a\\nvolitionating being separate man from the Deity and\\nhe becomes a blind agent make him a machine\\nthrough which the Deity operates and he ceases to be\\nan agent at all. The conclusion is then that the human\\nwill is an activity within itself capable of volitionating\\nand yet dependent upon and inseparable from the\\nDivine will. They are two things uniting and adher-\\ning, as it were, in one substratum, viz., spirit substance,\\n(pure reality) which is thinkable but not reducible to\\nan idea.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "II.\\nWILL, A SYNTHETIC ELEMENT OR ACTIVITY.\\nOur investigation thus far has been to detect, if\\npossible, Berkeley s conception of the Will, but he goes\\nfurther than the mere attempt to gain a notion of what\\nthe will is, he plans to bring the will into his philosophy\\nin the ultimate answer to his questions what are ex-\\nistence, reality, externality, causality and reason. As\\nKant s philosophy is an attempt to answer the ques-\\ntions, how are mathematics, physics and metaphysics\\npossible? and in his answers to establish a system of\\nmetaphysics, so Berkeley s proposed philosophy was an\\nattempt not only to define the meaning of the words\\nexistence, reality, externality, causality and reason but\\nto show that these things were possible and what was\\nthe essence of them. Could Berkeley succeed in this\\nthen he could or would have solved the whole philoso-\\nphic problem there would no longer be any excuse for\\nscepticism or dogmatism. To this end he produced his\\nphilosophical works which form the nucleus out of\\nwhich has grown the most of our modern philosophic\\nthought. The unity, however, which is necessary to a\\ncomplete knowledge of the physical and spiritual worlds\\nhe never realized the science of metaphysics he never\\nformulated. Of this fact Berkeley was fully conscious,", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "15\\nbut was no more satisfied to leave the problem there\\nthan modern philosophers have been to accept his doc-\\ntrines as conclusive. It was for the completion of a\\nscience of metaphysics, to reach a unity in knowledge,\\nthat Berkeley proposed to produce a treatise on the\\nwill, and the second part of this paper is to show that\\nBerkeley meant to make the will fundamental in know-\\nledge and metaphysics.\\nA complete answer to the above questions was to\\nBerkeley a complete unity in knowledge of all things\\nboth physical and metaphysical.\\nTo reach Berkeley s contemplated conclusion it will\\nbe necessary to examine the part played by experience\\nin this perfect knowledge, or to find out if possible what\\nexperience really is.\\nAll our knowledge, says Berkeley, is about ideas he\\nhere uses the word ideas^ as closely allied to, if not a\\nsynonym for experience. He says our simple ideas\\nare so many simple thoughts or perceptions. All\\nideas are either from without or from within. If from\\nwithout, they are sense ideas or sensations if from\\nwithin, they are operations of the mind, products of\\nthought. Kant would call them categories. Know-\\nledge is about ideas but knowledge is not ideas know-\\nledge is experience and has in it two factors, perception\\nand thought. So called ideas are not ideas unless they\\ncan be reduced to things perceivable, and not mere\\nBerkeley s Works Vol. i, P.\\nThe Commonplace Book (found in the Liie and Letters of George Berkeley\\nwith Writings Hitherto Unpublished) P. 489.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "i6\\nactivities neither can there be ideas without perception\\nactual or presupposed;^ neither can a perception be\\nperceived without a thing (an activity) to perceive\\nit. 2 It follows that knowledge about ideas when taken\\nfrom these two sources within and without, reduces\\npractically to experience at least knowledge cannot be\\nwithout the two factors perception and thought.\\nThere is no knowledge except from these sources, i.\\ne., except it be made up of the two elements perception\\nand thought. This is clear for Berkeley says, if it were\\nnot for the senses, that the mind could have no know-\\nledge no thought at all.^ And the whole tenor of his\\nphilosophy is to show that sensations alone are not\\nknowledge, but only things about which we have\\nknowledge. The two factors which enter into our\\nknowledge make it possible for us to have an experience\\nwithout which we could not have knowledge at all.\\nNeither sensations nor thought alone can give us ex-\\nperience,* for if we attempt to set off the operations of\\nthe mind to themselves and set them over against the\\nconditions of perception and, excluding the latter,\\nattempt to draw experience out of the former, we can\\nsucceed only by reducing the fundamental activities or\\nmodes of the understanding to ideas, but the moment\\nthey become ideas, they cease to be activities they are\\nmere things and we are found in a hopeless contra-\\nThe Cornmonplace Book, PP. 423 and 433.\\n498 438.\\nP. 434.\\nIntroduction to Selections, P. XXVII.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "17\\ndiction of terms. If we keep, within the operations of\\nthe mind s activity, in our search for the possibility of\\nexperience, we can have no ideas of this activity and\\nhence experience is impossible. On the other hand, if\\nwe attempt to draw experience out of sensations alone\\nwe rob ourselves of the power of self-identity. The\\nessence of mind, the ego which is substantial would at\\nonce be excluded. Sense-ideas or phenomena are at\\nonce dependent upon the mind and symbolical of the\\nintuitions of the mind.^ To draw experience from sen-\\nsations alone excludes this mind essence and leaves\\nexperience to the work of a blind agent which is no\\nless contradictory than our former proposition of draw-\\ning experience out of our mental operations. There\\nare then in all knowledge two elements and these are\\nthe same as Kant calls a priori and a posteriori.\\nMen are confused in their attempts to solve the\\nproblem of knowledge, because they look to other\\nsources than the understanding for knowledge, and\\nthere is no knowledge without the understanding. Still\\nanother source of confusion arises out of the fact that\\nwords which signify the operations of the mind are\\ntaken from sensible ideas. The remedy for this is in\\nstudying the understanding* and in finding out its rela-\\ntions to the problem of knowledge.\\nWe must pause for a moment to inquire, what are ob-\\nBerkeley s Works, Vol. i, PP. 32S-329.\\n2 I, P. 230 and The Principles, Sec. 142.\\nCommonplace Book, P. 432.\\nP. 435-", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "jects of knowledge and how do they exist? The objects\\nof conscious experience are alleged, in section one\\nof the Principles of Human Knowledge, to be (a\\nsense-given or external phenomena, (b internal phe-\\nnomena, (c) phenomena which may be representative\\nor misrepresentative of both these. These sense-given\\nor external phenomena which are necessary to a con-\\nscious experience are objects existing just as really as\\nany object exists to the most radical advocate of the\\nschool of realism for without their actual existence\\nneither experience nor knowledge could be possible.\\nSensible things, trees, houses, mountains, the whole\\nchoir of heaven and the furniture of earth to the indi-\\nvidual percipient consist at once of actually presented\\nand of merely represented sensations. The first ele-\\nment leaves the individual without choice and the object\\npresented without universality. The individual opens\\nhis eyes and beholds an object which he calls a tree\\nthe object is presented to him with sufficient coherence\\nto produce a sensation out of which he forms a percep-\\ntion, and a judgment, an idea, but the tree is particular-\\nized so far as the individual is concerned. However it\\nexists and has its coherence in the divine mind and the\\nmere experience arising from its observance or its\\npresentation is not a matter of choice with the observer.\\nThe second element involves contingency or arbitra-\\ntion on the part of the divine mind, and so far univer-\\nCf. Principles Sec. i, and Berkeley s Works Vol. i, PP. 131-22.\\n2 Life and Letters, P. 37S.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "19\\nsality or objectivity. If there is a particular tree there\\nmust be also the possibility of the representative univer-\\nsal tree. It is this universal that changes the object\\nfrom a mere ideal idealism to a real idealism, or from a\\nmere subjective phantasy to an objective reality. Sen-\\nsations are independent of the recipient and the cause\\nof sensations external to the recipient if this were not\\nso, sensations could not be fleeting and the Ego per-\\nmanent, but sensations are fleeting as the experience of\\nhumanity universally testifies but the Ego is perman-\\nent,^ otherwise there could be no experience to offer\\nsuch testimony, and whether there had ever been an\\nexperience or ever would be an experience other than\\nthe now would be impossible for us to know. On the\\nother hand, sensations are dependent upon the recipi-\\nent, for to conceive of them existing as I now have\\nthem is impossible unless there is an I to be sentient of\\nthem.^ Sensations are therefore at the same time de-\\npendent and independent of the sentient being. All\\nchanges of sensation are independent of the will of the\\nrecipient, but the realization of the objective cause of\\nthe sensation is dependent upon the will of the percipi-\\nent. We see that there is here set forth an apparent\\ncontradiction in Berkeley s philosophy of the process of\\nknowledge, and unless the problem is looked at strictly\\nfrom the metaphysical standpoint there is a real con-\\ntradiction. Prof. Bowne says, that metaphysically\\nBerkeley s Works, Vol. i, n. P. 230. Pr. Sec. 142.\\nCommonplace Book, P. 481", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "20\\nBerkeley s theory of the externality of matter cannot be\\ndisproved, for without the will of God nothing can\\nexist. It is only necessary then to understand that the\\nobjective cause of a sensation is not absolute, but is\\ndependent upon the activity, yea even upon the con-\\nstant activity of the will of God in this existence there\\nis a sufficient coherency permanently to contain all the\\nelements necessary to the production of a sensation.\\nThe time of a sensation depends upon attendant circum-\\nstances not necessary to be explained here. This co-\\nherency of matter which makes it capable of perman-\\nently producing sensations, and by which sensations\\nare thrust upon us whether we will or not, explains to\\nus the sense in which a sensation is independent of the\\nMe, of the sentient creature. This material object\\nwhich causes the sensation is not a something created\\nby a fiat of the Divine Will or power and cast out into\\nspace as an absolute and independent existence, as a\\nthing-in-itself, but it is the manifestation of the Divine\\nWill in a state of constant activity. This manifestation\\nproduces sensations in the percipient these sensations\\nare caught up by the activity of the mind and made\\nover into conceptions, the whole process resulting in\\nknowledge. These two elements are the same two\\nelements which Kant calls perception and conception.\\nThe chief difference is in the form of the dualism\\narising from these two elements and the manner or\\nprocess of their synthesis. Let us pause here for a\\nBowne s Metaphysics, P. 461.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "21\\nmoment and examine Berkeley s conception of those\\ntwo elements in their separate relations to our know-\\nledge or experience. This apparent digression is\\nnecessary that we may understand the importance of\\nBerkeley s attempt to do away with the schools of\\nrationalism and empiricism and yet preserve their\\nprinciples as fundamental elements in knowledge.\\nFirst, let us inquire into Berkeley s notion of percep-\\ntion. Perception is used now generally, in a somewhat\\ndifferent way than it was in the philosophy of Locke\\nand Berkeley. The latter however develops perception\\nthrough his term suggestion into an acquired per-\\nception of things, objects in space. Berkeley in his\\nlater philosophy made perception as necessary to ex-\\nperience as experience was necessary to knowledge,\\nand varied his psychological view until he may be in-\\nterpreted as using the term perception much more in\\nthe Kantian sense than any of his predecessors had\\ndone.\\nHe foreshadows sometimes Kant s schematism in the\\nsuccession of events and in the filling of a moment of\\ntime he says extension, motion, time, each include the\\nidea of succession. Number which consists of distinct\\nperception, consists also of succession, for things which\\nare at once perceived are jumbled together and mixed\\nin the mind. Time and motion cannot be conceived\\nwithout succession.^ It is clearly implied that here in\\nSelections from Berkeley, P. 158.\\nCommonplace Book, n. P. 471.\\nP. 42s.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "22\\nthe notion of perception, there can be no empty time\\nand from what follows, that there can be no moment of\\ntime, at least of which we can have any knowledge,\\nthat is empty of sense perception, or external percep-\\ntion. He continues by saying if it were not for sense\\n(perception) the mind could ^have no knowledge, no\\nthought at all.^ This statement of Berkeley is emphatic,\\nand when interpreted simply means that thought cannot\\nbe merely analytic. Had Berkeley developed this prin-\\nciple he would have shown that the manifold, or things\\njumbled in the mind as he says, were not given to the\\nmind as things ready made for the mind to act upon,\\nbut that they are the external manifestation of the Divine\\nWill and are given to the mind as a whole, a mere im-\\npression, and that the activity of the mind made them\\nas we know them i. e., there can be no absolute thing-\\nin-itself given to the mind for it to work upon, but none\\nthe less a real and permanent manifestation of divine\\nintelligence and activity which must be acted upon by\\nour intelligence or understanding in order to become\\nobjectified. Without such a given manifold, thought\\neither analytic or synthetic would be impossible all\\nknowledge must then have two elements in it and must\\nbe synthetic, the process of this synthesis was to be de-\\nveloped in the activity of the will and to be set forth in\\nthe contemplated treatise on the will.\\nBerkeley makes no use of the imagination as a syn-\\nthetic element of any kind, but very clearly distin-\\nCommonplace Book, P. 434.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "23\\nguishes between sense perception and the imagination.\\nThe perceptions have a steadiness, order, and coherence\\nwhich are not found in the imagination, and to reduce\\nBerkeley to a philosophy which gives no more perma-\\nnence to the objective world of his idealism, than to the\\nimaginary world is simply to advertise an ignorance of\\nhis whole system. I can do no better here to establish\\nthe permanence of Berkeley s phenomenal world than\\nto quote two or three paragraphs from Prof. Fraser,\\ntaken from the Life and Letters of Berkeley.\\nOne actual sensation or group of sensations is the\\nuniversal work of other sensations or groups of sensa-\\ntions that are not at the time actual. This relation of\\nsensible sign and its correlative, Berkeley would say,\\nis only imaginable, meaning of substantiality or caus-\\nality, when they are attributed to essentially dependent\\nand passive phenomena like those of sense.\\nFurther still these practically all important relations\\nof coexistence and succession among perceived sensa-\\ntions are, a priori, at this point of view, arbitrary.\\nThat is to say, there is no uncreated or Divine necessity\\nfor their being what we find it to be, any sensation or\\ngroup of sensations may be the constant or universal\\nsign of any other. A priori, anything might be the\\nphysical co-constituent, and physical cause of any-\\nthing for physical substance and causality are only\\nthe arbitrarily constituted signification of actual sen-\\nsations.\\nThus the only conceivable and practical, and for", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "H\\nus the only possible, substantiality in the material\\nworld is permanence of coexistence or aggregation\\namong sensations and the only conceivable and prac-\\ntical, and for us the only possible, causality among\\nphenomena is permanence or invariableness among\\ntheir successions.\\nThese two are almost (but not quite) one. The\\nactual or conscious coexistence of all the sensations\\nwhich constitute a particular tree, or a particular moun-\\ntain, cannot be simultaneously realized, a few coexistent\\nvisible signs, for instance, lead us to expect that the\\nmany other sensations of which the tree is the virtual\\nco-constituent would gradually be perceived by us, if\\nthe conditions for our having actual sensations of all\\nthe other qualities were fulfilled. The substantiality\\nand causality of matter thus resolve into a Universal\\nSense-Symbolism, the interpretation of which is the\\noffice of phj sical science. The physical world is a\\nsystem of interpretable signs, dependent for its actual\\nexistence in sense upon the sentient mind of the inter-\\npreter but significant of guaranteed pains and pleas-\\nures, and the guaranteed means of avoiding and at-\\ntaining pains and pleasures significant too of other\\nminds, and their thoughts, feelings and volitions and\\nsignificant above all of Supreme mind through whose\\nActivity, the signs are sustained, and whose Archetypal\\nIdeas are the source of those universal or invariable\\nrelations of theirs which make them both practically\\nand scientifically significant or objective. The per-", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "25\\nmanence and efficiency attributed to matter is in God\\nin the constitutive Universals of Supreme Mind sen-\\nsations or sense-given phenomena themselves and sen-\\nsible things, so far as they consist of sensations, can be\\nneither permanent nor efficient they are in constant\\nflux. This constant flux is not the miraculous creat-\\ning and destroying of things, but the constant phe-\\nnomenal change of the permanent in nature and fore-\\nshadows the Kantian doctrine of the change in the\\npermanent. The material world its substance or\\npermanence, its powers, and its space resolve them-\\nselves into a flux of beautifully significant sensations,\\nsense-ideas or sense-phenomena, which are perpetually\\nsustained in existence by a Divine Reason and Will.\\nIt is so that the Berkelean Conception reconciles Plato\\nwith Protagoras.\\nPermanence is therefore a necessary factor in the\\nconditions of perception, but actual perception is not\\nitself necessary to the external existence of bodies.\\nThe existence of bodies unperceived may be said to be\\nonly a potential existence, but it is an existence depend-\\ning upon the active powers of an intelligent being.\\nThis necessary activity is no less important in the phi-\\nlosophy of later thought than with Berkeley, the chief\\ndifference being the way the different schools of philoso-\\nphy account for the principle of activity.\\nConception is a no less important factor in knowledge\\nthan perception, according to Berkeley. Concepts as\\nLife and Letters of Berkeley, PP. 374-376.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "36\\nsuch are not given to us intuitively a concept is not\\nsomething given from the external world, it is thought.\\nAll things conceived by us, according to Berkeley,\\nare (a thoughts, (b powers to receive thoughts,\\nand (c) powers to cause thoughts. External things\\nare perceived but by perception alone cannot be known\\nthe active power of thought must form an element in\\nthe knowledge of any thing. This activity is necessary\\nto the formation of a judgment, and the judgment must\\ninvolve both a percept and a concept;^ the former is\\ngiven through the senses, the latter is made out of the\\nmind s activity it is a process of thought activity.\\nThe problem which has been so vexing to philosophers\\nof all ages, viz., the distinction between perception and\\nconception, did not greatly disturb Berkele} in his\\nproblem of knowledge Berkeley had but one thing-\\nin-itself, if you look at this one thing-in-itself from the\\nstandpoint of its outward manifestation you have per-\\nception, if you look at it from the side of its inward\\nactivity you have conception. Hence Berkeley did not\\nhave to contend with that kind of dualism which has\\nbeen so annoying to man} philosophers both before\\nand since his time. He had a dualism^ of a different\\nnature, but the very principle of his synthesis removed\\nfrom him the annoying problems of separating percep-\\ntion and conception, and the unifying of two things-in-\\nthemselves.\\nCommonplace Book, P. 484.\\nP. 4S4. And Selections, n. P. 71.\\nLife and Letters, P. 29. And Commonplace Book, 422.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "27\\nThe dualism of Berkeley was the dualism arising\\nfrom setting the self over against the outer world, but\\nin a very different way from that of Descartes, for the\\nCartesian idea or conception of the world was to Berke-\\nley a mere abstraction. Berkeley s dualism was not\\nso much a dualism between percept and concept, as it\\nwas a dualism between concepts, between his own con-\\nception of the impossibility of anything existing in the\\nuniverse unperceived or unwilled, and the common\\nidea of the independent existence of matter.^ The\\nsynthesis of these concepts however would destroy the\\nCartesian dualism between mind and matter. Matter\\nwould no longer stand over against self, but it would\\nbe a manifestion of a self-conscious intelligence and\\nwould therefore be in self-consciousness. A synthetic\\nactivity by which such a dualism could be made into\\na unity was just as necessary in Berkeley s system as\\nit was in Descartes or in Kant s. Upon the synthetic\\nactivity which made this dualism into a unity depended\\nthe coherence and permanence of the external world\\nwhich made experience a possibility. That unifying\\nelement is the Will. There is not one big Will, viz.,\\nthe Divine Will which creates all these things of the\\nobjective world, and then a lot of little wills, one for\\neach person, by which there is a realization of this\\ncreation there is but one Will and the manifestation of\\nthat Will objectively is the objective world, and the\\nhuman will is the subjective manifestation of the Divine\\nLife and Letters. P. 29. And Commonplace Book, P. 422.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "28\\nWill, or is a differentiation of the one universal Will\\nworking through us, the development and realization\\nof which tends toward a perfect intelligence which if\\never attained to would mean a full realization of the\\nDivine Will. This would be a complete knowledge of\\nthe objective world which would be the ultimate phil-\\nosophical unity. Kant sought this unity by setting\\nforth two things-in-themselves, one objective and one\\nsubjective, and then sought a process of knowledge by\\nwhich he might synthesize the dualism thus made.\\nBerkeley sought, by maintaining that there was but\\none thing-in-itself, viz., the subjective, to establish .a\\nphilosophy which would explain the external world\\nand self-consciousness by showing that there was no\\nexternal world outside of self-consciousness.\\nThe question now presents itself to us What was\\nthe synthetic activity by means of which Berkeley\\nmeant to reach his ultimate unity The question can\\nbe answered in a single word, it was the Will. What\\nhas already been said is to show that the process of\\nknowledge does include the elements attributed to\\nknowledge both by the empiricists and by the rational-\\nists, and by the idealists and the realists. The process\\nby which the elements were to be synthesized and\\nknowledge brought to an ideal unity was to be a pro-\\ncess of the Will conteni-plated but not developed.\\nBerkeley was not able to free himself from the notion\\nof the Will as given to him from his study of Descartes.\\nIn the psychology of Descartes there are two funda-", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "29\\nmental modes of thought, viz., perception and volition\\nin receiving ideas the mind is passive, its ideas are put\\ninto it partly by the objects which effect the senses,\\npartly by the impressions in the brain and partly by the\\ndisposition or habits of the mind itself previously form-\\ned, and by the movements of the Will. The mind is\\nactive only in volitions. The Will therefore being\\nmore originative has more to do with true or false\\njudgments than the understanding. In the perfection\\nof man as well as in the nature of God, Will and in-\\ntellect must be united. For thought, will is as neces-\\nsary as understanding.^\\nA judgment is the work of the understanding the\\naffirming or denying of it is the work of the will. The\\nwill goes further than the understanding and may turn\\nthe understanding from the path of knowledge. There\\nis nothing which the will cannot affirm or deny, accept\\nor reject, or toward which it cannot occupy an attitude\\nof indifference the will extends to the unknown as\\nwell as to the known, and can affirm or deny the one\\nas well as the other; the will is therefore greater than\\nthe understanding. The understanding is limited to a\\ndefinite sphere, the will is unlimited. Descartes says,\\nThe will or the freedom of the will is of all my facul-\\nties the only one which, according to my experience,\\nis so great that I cannot conceive a greater. It is this\\nfaculty pre-eminently by reason of which I believe I\\nam created in the image of God.\\nBncyclopedia Britannica, Art. Descartes.\\n2 History of Modern Philosophy. By Kuno Fischer, PP. 361-62.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "30\\nBerkeley was a close student of Descartes and was\\ninfluenced by his doctrine to regard the will as the\\nunifying element in knowledge.\\nKant made self-consciousness the source of all the\\ncategories but could not know self-consciousness be-\\ncause the categories could not be applied to it, yet he\\nwas absolutely certain that such an activity as self-\\nconsciousness existed. Berkeley made use of the will\\nin the same relation, it was the activity of will that\\nmade self-consciousness possible, it contained all the\\ncategories, or rather it was the source of all the pro-\\ncesses of knowledge, yet it could not be known because\\nno idea could be formed of it, Kant would say no cate-\\ngory could be applied to it. Berkeley had but one\\nthing-in-itself viz., spirit, a living and conscious indi-\\nvidual spirit, and his self identity arose by God working\\nthrough thi^ individuality of spirit, and experience was\\nmade by placing this spirit as a unifier of experiences.\\nThis spirit was the active principle of mind, an activity\\nwhich transcended Hume s idea of knowledge, which\\ngave us as many states of consciousness as we had ex-\\nperiences. Berkeley s self-identity could not arise out\\nof mere self-consciousness taken on the side of thought,\\nfor we cannot be conscious of self except as we set the\\nself over against the outer external world self identity\\ncannot be the result of mere consciousness, for if so\\nthen I could not possibly be the same person to-day I\\nwas twelve months ago.^ The transcendental unity of\\nCommonplace Book. P. 4S1.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "31\\napperception was not seen by Berkeley, but some\\nidentifying principle is necessary to self-consciousness,\\nBerkeley therefore makes the active principle of will\\nrun through these states of consciousness and bind\\nthem into one unified identity.^ The objective essence\\nof matter or the sense given non-ego was with Berkeley\\npurely phenomenal or ideal, the essence of mind, the\\nego is substantial and causal. According to Berkeley s\\ndoctrine the identity of finite substance must consist in\\nsomething more than mere continued existence, or\\nrelation to determined time and place of beginning to\\nexist; the existence of our thoughts (which being com-\\nbined make all substances) being frequently interrupt-\\ned they have divers beginnings and endings.^ The\\nactive principle of will is not only necessary to person-\\nal identity, but is necessary to insure identity of any\\nobject.\\nThe will as a synthetic activity grows out of the fact\\nthat there is but one Intelligence, in which the will\\nconstitutes the fundamental active principle in other\\nwords, will is a homogeneous activity, if we can think\\nof activity being homogeneous as we think of space\\nbeing made up of homogeneous parts this being true\\nour wills are to God s Will as a small portion of space\\nis to the whole of space the difference being, that will\\nas an activity may comprehend, or approach compre-\\nhension of the parent will, while space in itself being\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2Commonplace Book, P. 4S1.\\nBerkeley s Works, Vol. 1, P. 230. Principles Sec. 142.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2Commonplace Book, P. 4S1.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "32\\nnothing but a mere abstraction remains to all space just\\nas we place it. This being true whatever exists in\\nGod s Will must exist in our wills so far as our wills are\\nmade to comprehend God s Will, or in other words the\\ncomplete comprehension or realization of God s Will\\nwould be the ultimate unity of the universe in our self-\\nconsciousness, which is the end of all philosophy and\\nthe banishment of all scepticism.\\nTo illustrate, a man begins with the colonization of\\nAmerica to manufacture woolen goods, the whole in-\\ndustry of woolen goods is under his control if he has\\na disjunctive judgment, i. e., if he has an unconditioned\\nand unlimited knowledge of the wants and demands of\\nthe people so far as the market for woolen goods is\\nconcerned and that knowledge develops with the trade\\nand remains perfect and complete all the time he will\\nhave just enough factories, just enough machinery, just\\nenough working men, and will make just enough goods\\nto the yard of just the right kind to supply the demand.\\nIf the manufacturer could live through the whole devel-\\nopment or evolution of trade and his judgment remain\\ndisjunctive all the time his knowledge would be a per-\\nfect knowledge, a perfect unity of the totality or logical\\nindividual of the whole but if the manufacturer ceases\\nto exercise his will in the running of his machinery no\\nweb will be produced, no factory will exist. The will\\nconstitutes the fundamental element in the disjunctive\\njudgment of the manufacturer, and his subjects have a\\nperfect knowledge of the whole trade in proportion to", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "33\\nthe extent in which they comprehend the will of the\\nmanufacturer.\\nSuch is God s relation to the universe. He has a\\ndisjunctive judgment of the universe, the activity of will\\nunderlying it all there can therefore be no dualism\\nwhatever, there can be no two things-in-themselves\\nthere can be but one thing-in-itself, self-conscious spirit,\\nand that spirit is active and its activity is the Will. The\\nexternal world is not outside and foreign to that self-\\nconsciousness, but is a part of it and a method of its\\nmanifestation. There is not a separate will for each\\nperson, and a separate intelligence for each person,\\nthere is but one Will and that will workincr through us\\nmakes our wills, and produces in us a self activity by\\nwhich we are capable of development. This process\\nof development is bringing the external world into our\\nself-consciousness and thus comprehending more or less\\nof the Divine Will. We approach the unity of knowl-\\nedge, the disjunctive judgment of the universe, in pro-\\nportion to the complete comprehension of the parent\\nwill.\\nKant makes two things of perception and conception,\\nbut is not able to separate one from the other and define\\neach separately so Berkeley gives a special volition-\\nating power and freedom to the human will, but does\\nnot separate it from the Divine Will. There is no\\nnecessary element of synthesis between the human and\\nthe divine wills, because from the very nature of the\\nactivity of will there is, to start with, no duality.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "34\\nThere must be a unity which underlies man s separa-\\ntion from nature and it is by virtue of this unity that\\nman can have a higher ideal of nature and may be able\\nto realize the ideal thus formed. This brings us back\\nto the origin of man and nature, both of which must be\\nexpressions of an intelligence and if there were no\\nconnecting link man would be entirely isolated from\\nnature and could form no conception of it whatever,\\nthere could be no common principle. The unifying\\nlink is Will, in which is found two elements, first the\\npower of forming conceptions of ends not already exist-\\ning, and second, the power of transforming the existing\\nstate of things so that these conceived ends become\\nactual. This power of the will to frame ideals is due\\nto the presence in it of a perfect intelligence the end\\nman always has before him is the realization of this\\nperfect intelligence, and the various particular ends are\\nsimply so many aspects of the realization of this perfect\\nintelligence. Nature is only a partial manifestation and\\nmust be refashioned and worked over until it becomes a\\nmore adequate expression of the perfect intelligence,\\nand that is the realization of the ideal in the develop-\\nment of will. Nature becomes a tool, an instrument of\\nthe will when we talk of subjugating the forces of\\nnature we simply mean the bringing of them under the\\nfull control of the will this can only be explained by\\nthe unity of a higher intelligence.^\\nThis modern conception of the will is precisely the\\nDewey s Lectures, Introduction to Philosophy.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "35\\noutgrowth of the principles postulated by Berkeley and\\nshows that Berkeley saw behind the veil what philoso-\\nphers now see more clearly. Two hundred years of\\nphilosophic thought has removed partially the veil\\nthrough which Berkeley saw but which he was not\\nable to remove. This synthetic activity of the Will\\nunites the dualism of concepts already referred to,\\ngives coherence to the objective world, and changes\\nour former conception of Berkeley s objective Idealism\\ninto an objective Realism differing not widely from the\\nEmpirical Realism of Kant s Critique of Pure Reason.^\\nDr. Bowne of our own time does not widely differ\\nfrom this conception of Berkeley. He says, Matter\\nand material things have no ontological existence, but\\nonly a phenomenal existence. Their necessary de-\\npendence and lack of all subjectivity makes it impossi-\\nble to view them as capable of other than phenomenal\\nexistence. This world-view then contains the following\\nfactors (i) The Infinite energizes under the forms of\\nspace and time; (2) the system of energizing according\\nto certain laws and principles, which system appears\\nin thought as the external universe; and (3) finite\\nspirits, who are in relation to this system, and in whose\\nintuition the system takes on the forms of perception.\\nThis view is not well described as idealism, because it\\nmakes the world more than an idea.\\nThat experience may be possible bodies must and do\\nexist without the mind, as the word mind is commonly\\nKant s Doctrine of the Thing-in-itself, P. 67.\\nBowne s Metaphysics, P. 466.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "36\\nused, and Berkeley sets forth very clearly how it is\\npossible to have a body exist without the mind, or the\\ndifference between a body existing within the mind and\\none existing without the mind. His explanation would\\nbe about on this wise; every idea has a cause i. e., is\\nproduced by a will. Every phenomenon is sustained\\nby a free intelligent agent. Without the activity of the\\nmind, without the exercise of the Will of the Deity\\nnothing could exist, and no longer can anything exist\\nthan the Divine Will continues to act the moment the\\nactivity of the Divine Will ceases, that moment the\\nobject of reality must become a nonentity. The Divine\\nWill is an activity and things do actually exist, and\\nsince our wills are part of the Divine Will we are re-\\nquired only to fulfill the necessary conditions and we\\nhave perception the conditions of the perception of a\\nthing remain unchanged whether willed directly by the\\nDivine Will, as a mountain, a tree, etc., or worked out\\nindirectly through human agency, as a library. So far\\nas our self-consciousness is concerned they exist or\\nnon-exist according to the potential or actual fulfillment\\nor non-fulfillment of the conditions of perception. The\\nperception once having been formed the existence is\\nmade real and. legitimate by means of the imagination\\nwithout the re-fulfillment of the conditions of per-\\nception. What is the difference between the reality\\nof the library which I have perceived and left\\nand now recall by the faculty of imagination,\\nand the fanciful library which I may call up and", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "37\\narrange in the adjoining room, which in reality is\\nnothing but fancy In the former the Divine Will and\\nintelligence has worked it out through human agency\\nand hence it has sufficient coherence to fulfill all the\\nconditions of sense perception. In the second case the\\nDivine Will has not acted upon the fanciful library, and\\nthe conditions of perception have not been provided.\\nHence in the latter the library is merely ideal, while in\\nthe former it is really ideal, or if you please, objectively\\nideal as well as subjectively ideal. This existence\\nwhen not perceived however is but a potential existence\\nin the Divine Will and Thought. Bodies do exist\\nwhen not perceived they being powers in the active\\nbeing.\\nThe existence of bodies with Berkeley is not a mere\\nfancy of the mind, neither is it a continual miracle\\nwrought by divine power, yet both these positions have\\nbeen charged upon him in spite of his persistent denial\\nof any such belief, or of any such doctrine with respect\\nto the existence of reality in the objective world. The\\nexistence of the phenomenal world is just as necessary\\nto experience in the philosophy of Berkeley as it is in\\nthe philosophy of Kant further, the mere existence is\\nnot sufficient to produce an experience, there must be a\\nsynthesis, a necessary connection in this phenomenal\\nworld, otherwise neither world nor experience would\\nbe possible.^ It is true that Berkeley did not system-\\natize his theory of synthesis and necessary connection\\nCommonplace Book, P. 471.\\nBerkeley-Blackwood s Classics, P. 194", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "38\\nas did later philosophers. He took more for granted,\\nbut his place in the philosophic world should not be\\nunderestimated on that account since philosophers\\nhave been trying for two hundred years to complete a\\nsystem of synthesis and have not succeeded to the\\nsatisfaction of all, it would hardly be expected that the\\nman who originated the idea would culminate the doc-\\ntrine. It was as creditable for him to postulate such a\\nphilosophy even in isolated thoughts as it was for his\\nfollowers to take those thoughts and make a system\\nof them.\\nThere have been three leading theories for the ex-\\nistence of the material universe maintained and develop-\\ned, viz., the Abstractly Objective theory in which there\\nis a static something that contains the idea of unity\\nwhen it is separated from the qualities or from the\\nmultiplicity of the external world; it is simply the idea\\nof the identity separated and abstracted from the differ-\\nences. Instead of getting a unity of the differences\\nand qualities, we get a unity separated from the quali-\\nties and underlying not one thing alone but all things.\\nThe second of these theories is the Abstractly Sub-\\njective theory, in which the idea of a real unity is a\\nfiction of the mind. It denies the existence of sub-\\nstance and somehow places a lot of attributes in the\\nmind in such a way as to make the phenomenal world\\nappear as it does. It takes the side of multiplicity or\\ndifference and holds it apart from unity.\\nThe third of these theories is the more modern and", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "39\\nconcerns itself with the fact that matter is the unity of\\nand in things. It holds that a thing is a dynamic inter-\\nrelation of qualities, the unity being ideal. There is\\nthen no unity of substance apart from the qualities, the\\nunity is simply the fact that the qualities after all have\\none end or function to which they are all subordinate.\\nTo understand this theory is to understand philoso-\\nphy.\\nTo which of these theories does Berkeley adhere\\nCertainly not to the first, for such a conception of the\\nexternal world was to him a contradiction, and lacked\\nall the elements of true philosophy. Neither can he be\\nclassed with the second, for unity would then be a mere\\nfiction of the mind made up for the purpose of explain-\\ning permanence in the external world it would rob\\nhim of his unity and by so doing destroy the possibility\\nof experience or of an external world at all. He could\\nnot be classed with the third for his source of unity was\\npostulated, and consisted of an unrealized system,\\nrather than a formulated and realized or philosophic\\nsystem of synthesis by which a unity is made rather\\ntlian given. He is a cross between the second, the\\nAbstractly Subjective theory, and the third which we\\nmay call the theory of Dynamic Inter-relation, with the\\nconstant tendency of his philosophy, as set forth in his\\nCommonplace Book toward the latter. The more he\\nstudied the great problem of philosophy the more he\\ngave up the Abstractly Subjective theory and swung\\nround toward the theory of Dynamic inter-relation, and", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "40\\neven approached it so far as to express in an isolated\\nway nearly all its underlying principles.\\nThe question between the materialist and me, says\\nBerkeley, is not whether things have a real existence\\nout of the mind of this or that person, but, whether\\nthey have an absolute existence distinct from being per-\\nceived by God, and external to all mind. There is no\\ndifference between this doctrine of existence and that of\\nthe third theory above referred to except the mere fact\\nthat Berkeley uses the word God instead of Intelligence\\nor Self-consciousness, which the school of the dynamic\\ntheory would have used, in order that they might not\\nbe charged with dogmatism. The metaphysical princi-\\nple is just the same, and the ultimate end sought by\\nBerkeley and the advocates of the dynamic theory was\\nthe same. They differed only in their methods of\\nattaining the end. When the latter attempt to explain\\nthe origin of self-consciousness-in-itself, or the origin of\\nthe thing-in-itself, or if they deny the existence of these\\nfactors in themselves and attempt to explain the origin\\nof the unity of which these factors are component parts\\nthey are driven back to Berkeley s God or landed in\\nhopeless chaotic agnosticism.\\nSense and Experience acquaint us with the course\\nand analogy of appearances or natural effects.\\nThought, Reason, Intellect introduce us into the\\nknowledge of their causes. Sensible appearances,\\nthough of a flowing, unstable, and uncertain nature,\\nyet having first occupied the mind, they do by an early", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "41\\nprevention render the aftertask of thought more diffi-\\ncult; and, as they amuse the eyes and ears, and are\\nmore suited to vulgar uses and the mechanic arts of\\nlife, they early obtain a preference, in the opinion of\\nmost men, to those superior principles, which are the\\nlater growth of the human mind, arrived to maturity\\nand perfection, but, Jiot affecting the corporeal sense,\\nare thought to be so far deficient in point of solidity and\\nreality sensible and real, to common apprehensions,\\nbeing the same thing. Although it be certain that the\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0principles of science are neither objects of Sense nor\\nImagination and that Intellect and Reason are alone\\nthe sure guides to truth.\\nIn this expression of Berkeley s later philosophy he\\nshows the importance of the faculty of Reason, in our\\nknowledge. The universal laws which make mathe-\\nmatics and physics reducible to a science are not ob-\\njects of sense, nor of imagination. However he does\\nnot drop out the element of sense, for if he did he\\nwould destroy experience, without which there could\\nbe no such thing as knowledge. Prof. Fraser in com-\\nmenting on the section here referred to, observes that\\nBerkeley speaks lightly of the reality of sensible things.\\nProf. Fraser for the most part shows a very comprehen-\\nsive and accurate knowledge of Berkeley s philosophy\\nbut certainly has not grasped the meaning of the sec-\\ntion under discussion. Berkeley has shown, prior to\\nthe production of this later work, by his New Theory\\nSiris. Sec. 264.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "42\\nof Vision, and by his Theory of Visual Language, that\\nthe organs of sense are not always accurate interpreters\\nof things presented to us under the laws and conditions\\nof perception, and that furthermore the same organ of\\nsense under different circumstances and under varied\\nconditions will interpret a thing one way at one time\\nand in a different way at another time, the apparent in-\\nstability and uncertainty of such reality is therefore the\\nresult of the way you modify the conditions of percep-\\ntion and not, as Prof. Fraser observes, a depreciation of\\nthe reality of the thing itself; the view is then in per-\\nfect harmony with his former view of reality and needs\\nno reconciliation. If Berkeley had changed his view\\nof reality as Prof. Fraser suggests, he must have\\nchanged his view of the unchangeableness of God, for\\nsuch a change could only come about by the oscillation\\nof the Will of God such a charge would be an insult\\nto the memory of the Philosopher, and Prof. Fraser did\\nnot mean to make such a charge, he simple missed the\\nmeaning that Berkeley meant to convey in the passage\\nunder consideration.\\nIn the process of knowledge thus developed and the\\nUnity arrived at by making Will a synthetic activity,\\nBerkeley has not attempted to separate the Will from\\nthe Reason, but has given Reason its legitimate place\\nin knowledge which when taken in connection with\\nwhat precedes shows Berkeley to have been much less\\ndogmatical than his critics would have us believe him\\nto have been. Let us then examine Reason and see", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "43\\nwhether we can find in it that gradation of faculties or\\nactivities by which the Deity is postulated as the high-\\nest category in knowledge, or in which the Deity must\\nultimately become the highest category in knowledge.\\nIt is necessary to pass through reason, to reach the\\nhighest category, but it must be remembered that the\\nWill from its very nature as a synthetic activity, and\\nfrom its connection with the Divine Will underlies\\nReason and renders it efficient in knowledge just the\\nsame as it underlies other activities of the mind. What\\nfollows therefore in respect to Reason must not be taken\\nas isolated from Will but only as one movement in the\\nactivity of Will.\\nSense perceptions^ introduce us to the fact that we\\nhave an external world around us, and that out of that\\nexternal existence or rather by observation of it, we dis-\\ncover certain unalterable laws, but this is not a satis-\\nfactory knowledge of things, we are not sure that the\\nlaws are unalterable, our observation may not be suffi-\\ncient to justify us in saying that what we have observ-\\ned will always under all conditions be the same or even\\nunder the same conditions will never change. We are\\nnot sure we can universalize with certainty what we\\nhave postulated. 2 There must be another element viz.,\\nReason. Reason is the judge on the bench in Berke-\\nley s intellectual world. Reason introduces us to the\\npossibility of the universal laws which we think we\\nSiris, Sec. J64, Selections a., P. 330.\\nIntroduction to Selections, P. XXIII.\\nSiris, Sec. 303.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "44\\nhave discovered from mere observation;^ through the\\nfaculty of reason we are able to look into the causes of\\nall empirical knowledge. Reason forms the perman-\\nent in knowledge, while sensations or perceptions are\\nin themselves fluctuating and unstable. Reason also\\nsits in judgment on the imaginations, and enables us to\\ndetermine what is a mere imaginary fancy and to\\nseparate it from what is permanent in the objective\\nworld. The former is nothing more than a dream and\\nhas not sufficient coherence to fulfill the conditions of\\nperception even when it appears in the imagination for\\nthe first time and under no conditions can a fanciful\\nimage be reproduced in the mind as it was first given.\\nThe latter constitutes the objective world in its reality\\nand has sufficient coherence to fulfill the conditions of\\nperception. It is ideally real and permanent. The\\nacts of Reason by which knowledge is made permanent\\nbecome new objects to the understanding in them we\\nfind the graduation of the faculties leading us from a\\nlower to a higher plane of knowledge until we reach\\nthe highest which is the Deity. This process which is\\nimplied and partly developed in the Siris and practi-\\ncally outlined in the Commonplace Book is a process\\nof knowledge not widely different in its application to\\nthe understanding from the categories of Kant, and\\neven going far beyond Kant in reaching the highest\\ncategory. Kant stops with the category of reciprocity\\nand leaves himself in a contradiction with respect to the\\nSiris, Sec. 264.\\nSiris, Sec. 303. Selections, n., P. 345.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "45\\nknowledge of self-consciousness later philosophers\\nhave carried Kant s principles much further and have\\nmade purpose, self-consciousness, etc., categories and\\ncontinuing in the same process must find the highest\\ncategory in the Deity. Berkeley did this long before\\nbut did not formulate it.\\nWith Berkeley, nature is reason immersed in mat-\\nter. Philosophy is the endeavor fully to disengage\\nthe immanent reason.^ Philosophy does not attempt to\\ndisengage reason, and set it over against matter thus\\nmaking two abstractions and forming a dualism with\\nsuch a chasm between the two elements as to render\\nthe possibility of unity hopeless, but to disengage the\\nimmanent reason for the purpose of giving it a greater\\nleverage and to enable it to transform matter and mind\\ninto one comprehensive ideal unity which may contain\\ntwo elements one involved in the other with such a\\ncomplete synthesis that absolutely no dualism will\\nappear.\\nProf. Morris said of Berkeley, He saw perfectly\\nwell that it makes a world-wide difference whether, as\\na so-called idealist, you find the absolute radical and\\nessence of universal being in living, knowable spirit, or\\nin an unliving and intrinsically unknowable something,\\nconventionally termed Matter. In the former is given\\na vital principle, possessed of a faculty, to wit. Reason,\\ncapable of accounting for the visible order and invari-\\nable law of concrete phenomena, and of a power,\\nBerkeley-Blackwood s Classics, P. 206.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "46\\nnamely, Will competent to be the source of the incess-\\nant motive of phenomena, or of their miscalled forces.\\nBerkeley s Reason like that of Kant leads us to the\\nhighest possible unity in knowledge, viz., the Deity.\\nHe says, there may be demonstrations used even in\\nDivinity. I mean revealed Theology, as contradisting-\\nuished from natural for though the principles may be\\nfounded in faith yet this hinders not but that legitimate\\ndemonstrations might be built thereon. Provided still\\nthat we define the words we use, and never go beyond\\nour ideas. But to pretend to reason or demon-\\nstrate any thing about the Trinity is absurd. Here an\\nimplicit faith becomes us.\\nHaving thus briefly pointed out the process by which\\nBerkeley would lead us through the various stages in\\nthe process of knowledge, let us turn for a few moments\\nto the active principle of knowledge as found in the\\nCritique of Pure Reason by Kant.\\nBritish Thoughts and Thinkers, P, 216.\\nCommonplace Book, PP. 438-439.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "III.\\nkant s transcendental ego.\\nIn attempting to examine the Transcendental Ego of\\nKant as a factor in knowledge it is necessary for us to\\nfree our minds if possible of the concept of the Ego as\\nan object. Indeed we must free our minds of any con-\\ncept at all, for a concept is just the thing it is not. It is\\na thinking activity. Through this I or He or It (the\\nthing) which thinks, Kant says, nothing is set before\\nour consciousness except a transcendental subject^x.\\nIn order to define to some extent this thingless thing\\nor activity let us examine some of the phrases or terms\\nwhich represent it. It has been called the I, the\\nI Think, the Absolute Unity of Thinking Subject,\\nthe Unity of Pure Self-consciousness, the Self\\nOriginative and Self Illuminative Act or Activity, the\\nOriginal Synthetic Unity of Apperception, the\\nTranscendental Unity of Apperception, the Orig-\\ninal Primary Apperception, Pure Apperception,\\nTranscendental Self, etc. The various shades of\\nmeaning which these predicates present to our minds\\nshow us something of the difficulty arising out of an\\nattempt to define a thing which is no-thing.\\nThe transcendental self is the functional unity back\\nCritical Philosophy of Kant. By Caird. Vol. II. P. 26.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "48\\nof all knowledge and works through the individual. It\\nis a synthetic activity which makes experience by mak-\\ning a complete unity.\\nThe fact that we speak of a synthetic unity implies,\\nat least, something to unite this something when de-\\nfined will be found to be the I and the external world.\\nThis gives us the starting point of Metaphysics. We\\ncannot say I am I until we reach this stage, neither can\\nwe have metaphysics until we can say I am I for until\\nwe are able to separate the I from the world we are\\ncompletely overwhelmed by the world. We can neither\\ncriticize the world nor judge of it until we are able to\\nget outside of it, i. e., until we are able to separate our-\\nselves from the world and set ourselves over against\\nthe world. But having made such a separation we\\nhave not reached the ultimatum in knowledge. We\\nhave only begun the freedom of thought if we were\\nto stop herg we should be in slavery so far as intelli-\\ngence is concerned. That is if thought found here a\\nresting place where it could stand still, it would-be in\\nabject slavery, there would be no further movement\\npossible for thought but such is not the case, it is\\nnecessary for us to get outside the world in order that\\nwe may be able to lift the world up to our own standard.\\nIt does not follow from this that there is a dualism and\\nthat the I set over against the external world is entirely\\nforeign to the external world. It does not of necessity\\nimply a dualism fundamentally, but it does imply that\\nwe can have no metaphysical starting place until the", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "49\\nmovement of thought has reached that stage in which\\nby process of analysis of the original reality it is able\\nto make such division and set the one over against the\\nother. When the analysis of the original reality has\\nbeen made and we have set thought over against matter,\\nhave we entirely separated thought from the material\\nworld and made it capable of acting within itself? This\\ngives rise to the question, is thought analytic? Descar-\\ntes said cogito ergo sum and in the statement made\\nthought purely analytic he did more than that, he\\nrendered the Self knowable in the sense that the\\nKantian categories could be applied to it, for without\\nsome empirical representation, which presents to the\\nmind material for thought, the judgment I think could\\nnot be formed. Descartes proposition reduces to the\\nform I am thinking or that I exist thinking, he\\nwas wrong in inferring the I exist from the I think,\\nfor his major premise must be every thinking being\\nexists, which would not be true, as it would assert that\\nthe property thought constitutes all beings possessing it\\nnecessary beings. The criticism Kant offers on Des-\\ncartes proposition is not a criticism against the fact that\\nthought was and is analytic, but against the proposition\\nas being one which objectifies the transcendental self;\\nthis could not be true in the system of Kant as he pro-\\nceeds to prove. That Descartes proposition made the\\nself determinable by the categories follows from the fact\\nKant s Critical Philosophy. By Mahaffy. P. 272.\\na p, 273.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "50\\nthat to say I exist thinking expresses more than the\\nspontaneity of pure thought; it expresses, in fact,\\na determination of the subject as present to itself in per-\\nception. If on the other hand, I concentrate my\\nattention upon the mere logical function of thought\\nthe pure spontaneity of the combination of the mani-\\nfold of a merely possible perception, either as I am or\\nas I appear to myself, but I am thinking of myself only\\nas I might think of any object from the manner of the\\nperception of which I abstract. If, then, I represent\\nmyself in this point of view as a subject of thought, or\\neven as a ground of thinking, this does not mean that I\\napply to myself the categories of substance and causal-\\nity for these categories are not the bare conceptions\\nof subject and ground, but these functions of thought\\nas already applied to our sensuous perception. Now,\\nsuch application of the categories would, indeed, be\\nnecessary if I wished to know myself as an object\\nthrough them. But, exhypothesi, I wish to be con-\\nscious of myself only as a thinking subject, I, therefore,\\nset aside the consideration of how I am given to myself\\nin perception (which may, indeed, present me to my-\\nself, though only as phenomenon.) And thus, in the\\nconsciousness of myself in mere thought, I come back\\nupon the being which for me underlies all being {bm\\nich das Wesen selbst), but which is not thereby given\\nin such a way that thought can determine it. The\\n1 Critical Philosophy of Kant. By Caird. Vol. II, P. 29.\\n2 Vol. II, PP. 29-30.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "51\\nself Descartes set forth was the empirical self and was\\nan object among so many other objects and not the self\\nthat knows. The self that knows is transcendental and\\nis itself unknowable but is thinkable.\\nKant s criticism as has been said was not made on\\nDescartes because the latter held that thought was\\nanalytic and therefore independent of the material\\nworld, but because Descartes made the self one object\\namong other objects, and made it possible to apply the\\ncategories to it. That the criticism was on this basis is\\nclear for Kant himself held, erroneously as we shall\\nsee, that thought was analytic, and that it was set over\\nagainst the manifold and that the manifold was an\\nentirely foreign element which must in some way be\\nbrought in contract with the self or with thought, and\\nthat thought and the manifold were to be exploded and\\nin the explosion they would be united into a new and\\nthird thing viz., knowledge or experience, just as\\nOxygen and Hydrogen exploded together make a new\\nand third substance water. But in order that oxygen\\nand hydrogen be exploded and we get a third sub-\\nstance, water, there must be applied the active energy,\\nheat. So with the former in order that thought and the\\nmanifold may be exploded into knowledge there must\\nbe present the energy or activity which Kant calls the\\nTranscendental Self or Unity of Apperception.\\nWe shall understand more fully the nature of this\\nactivity if we compare it with the noumenon and dis-\\ntinguish it from the Empirical self. The empirical self", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "52\\nis the self we know and not the self that knows, it is\\nsimply one object among so many other objects with\\nthis scientific inferiority that it is an object of inner\\nsense only and we cannot therefore apply to it those\\nmathematical appliances which can be applied to exter-\\nnal objects. The fact that there is not a suflHcient uni-\\nversal or thread of unity in the empirical self to make\\nit a sure basis for a pure science, renders a pure science\\nof Empirical Psychology impossible. The empirical\\nself is a unity, but it is only a unity in any one experi-\\nence and not a unity which makes experiences into an\\nexperience. It is a ready made unity at any given time,\\nit is the self Hume had constantly in mind in the devel-\\nopment of his philosophy. But the transcendental self\\nis the unity of thought involved in knowledge, it is a\\nsubject of thought but not an object of knowledge it\\nis not an object at all, if it were it would be subject to\\nthe forms of time and space. Every object is subject to\\nthe forms of time and space and must have a sensuous\\ncontent and be determinable by the categories. This is\\njust what the transcendental ego is not it is not subject\\nto the forms of time and space, it does not have a sen-\\nsuous content, it is not determinable by the categories,\\nbut it is on the other hand the source of the categories, it\\nis logically the basis of the possibility of experience and\\ncannot be thought of as an object among other objects.\\nIt was just this fact, this reducing the transcendental\\nself to an object and then calling that object a soul that\\nled to the fallacies of Rational Psychology which Kant", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "53\\nsets forth in his Paralogisms. Again the transcendental\\nself cannot be thought an object among other objects\\nfor of itself and in itself it is a mere abstraction, it is\\nempty of all content, and so long as we stay in this\\nmere empty abstraction we cannot get a conception of\\nan object at all neither can we merge from this mere\\nabstraction without the manifold of sense being given\\nfor thought to work upon, to move out upon. It is this\\nelement or activity presupposed that renders a judgment\\npossible, even the simplest judgment I am I would not\\nbe possible if there were not this presupposed content\\ngiven for thought to act upon. The self, then, is\\nanother way of saying that thinking thinks some-\\nthing.\\nIt now remains for us to examine the relation of the\\nTranscendental Ego to the Noumenon. The chapter\\nin the Critique of Pure Reason which leads us from the\\nphenomena to the noumena is the chapter that leads\\nfrom the categories of the understanding to the Ideas\\nof reason. This passing from the phenomena to the\\nnoumena is of the same nature but of a higher order\\nthan the passing from the Mathematical categories to\\nthe Dynamical categories. In the latter Kant does not\\ngive us any thing new, he simply gives us a deeper and\\ntruer view of the object under consideration. The\\nmathematical categories constitute individual phenom-\\nena, the dynamical categories regulate this same indi-\\nvidual phenomena and the two taken together constitute\\nexperience. Now when we pass from the categories", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "54\\nof the understanding to the Ideas of Reason, we find\\nthe Ideas of Reason do not constitute experience but\\nthey do regulate experience, hence they bear the same\\nrelation to the categories of the understanding that the\\ndynamical categories bear to the mathematical cate-\\ngories. The Ideas are necessary postulates, they are,\\nif you please, the categories of Reason. Now, Reason\\nas a unifying power must of necessity have on the sub-\\njective side the unifying element of self-consciousness,\\nand on the objective side the unifying element or sub-\\nstratum of phenomena. The former Kant calls the\\nTranscendental Ego, the latter the Noumenon. The\\nformer we have to some extent already defined, the\\nlatter will now be briefly considered. The Noume-\\nnon, says Kant, is a bounding concept (Crenzbegriff),\\nrepressing the pretensions of sensibility, not invented\\nat random, but necessarily and unavoidably connected\\nwith the limitation of sensibility. The noumenon is a\\npurely negative boundary, a kind of warning that there\\nis something existing behind mere phenomenon it is\\nnot one thing bounding another thing, it is simply a\\nbounding concept. We cannot know the noumenon\\nany more than we can know the transcendental self.\\nIt is not a somewhat to which categories can be applied.\\nThe noumenon is the mental attitude, the mental stand-\\npoint from which we look at an object in this it differs\\nfrom the A-bsolute of Spencer. The existence of the\\nAbsolute of Spencer is a matter of knowledge. He\\nKant s Critical Philosophy. By Mahaffy. P. 227.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "55\\nshows, or attempts to show, that all we know is relative\\nthis relativity itself necessitates the showing that the\\nAbsolute exists but is unknowable, he could not admit\\nthat the Absolute could not be a conception in the mind.\\nKant goes further than Spencer, he has a bounding\\nconcept, which is outside of the phenomenon it is the\\nstandpoint from which we look at the phenomenon. In\\nKant s treatment of the thing-in-itself and the noumenon\\nthey are not necessarily the same, but if we carry the\\nsystem to its logical conclusion, i. e., if we go on\\nbeyond Kant to what would be the logical outcome of\\nhis s3^stem if fully developed, they become identical.\\nThe thing-in-itself holds the same relation to the cate-\\ngories of the understanding that the noumenon does to\\nthe Ideas of Reason. The transcendental self is the\\nunity of apperception, the source of all synthesis, the\\nsource of the categories. In nearly the same sense\\nthe noumenon is the source of the Ideas of Reason, or\\nto speak more accurately, perhaps, the noumena are\\nthe Ideas of Reason, the ideals which can never be\\nrealized but which must be postulated. In other words,\\nthe noumenon bears the same relation to the Ideas of\\nReason that self-consciousness does to the categories of\\nthe understanding. The transcendental self as has\\nbeen said, is the functional unity back of ail knowledge\\nand works through the individual so far as it carries\\nout its unifying activity and realizes itself we have the\\nnoumenon. Noumenon is not therefore an idea of faith,\\nas Kant makes it, but it is an actual existence, it must", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "5^\\nexist in phenomenon. The Ideas are not therefore\\nmere fancies, they are higher categories and in ap-\\nproaching them we find no break in the logical thought.\\nWe have observed in thus briefly defining the Trans-\\ncendental Ego and comparing it with the Empirical\\nEgo and the Noumenon, that Kant gives us an imper-\\nfect and somewhat defective knowledge of it, and in\\norder to get a knowledge of it which is at all satisfactory\\nwe must go beyond Kant. The same thing is true\\nwhen we turn from the discussion of what it is to the\\ndiscussion of its function in knowledge which is the\\nnext step in this investigation.\\nIts function in knowledge, as has been indicated in\\nits definition is that of a synthesizing activity. Robert\\nAdamson says, No connection or representation of\\nideas is possible, unless all of them can be accompanied\\nby the pure logical form of self-consciousness, I think.\\nConsciousness of the unity and identity of Self is nec-\\nessary for all representations, as otherwise they could\\nnot he ybr me, could not form parts of my experience.\\nBut just as unity is not apart from difference, so con-\\nsciousness of unity itself is only possible if difference,\\nplurality or manifold be given. This is simply\\nanother way of saying that if we remove from knowl-\\nedge the synthesizing activity of the Self we destroy\\nthe possibility of experience. The self is that synthetic\\nactivity which makes it possible for us to have a repre-\\nsentation remove the activity of self and the would\\n1 On the Philosophy of Kant. By Robert Adamson.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "57\\nbecome rigidly empirical and would be set over against\\nthe external world, but we should never be conscious\\nof it. It would become impossible for me to say I am\\nI for I could have no such consciousness, but Kant held\\notherwise he thought it possible to make the simple\\njudgment I am I but thought it impossible to ever move\\nout of the narrow circle thus formed in that primary\\nsimple judgment. Kant speaks of the self as if it had\\na sort of independent reality of its own, apart from all\\nrelations to the other elements of knowledge. 1=1 is,\\nhe says, a purely analytic proposition. This is one\\nof the causes of confusion in Kant s critique, but we\\nmust not be led astray by it. It arises with the idea\\nthat thought is analytic, but if we take Kant in his true\\nmeaning we shall not take such statements as the above\\nto mean that the Transcendental Ego can be objectified,\\nneither can we think of it as having a content indepen-\\ndent of the manifold which is given as it were for\\nthought to work upon.\\nIf thought were purely analytic and we could make\\nthe simple judgment I am I, without the aid of the\\nmanifold, metaphysics would be rendered impossible.\\nIt is just at this point that many students of Kant be-\\ncame confused, and declare him contradictory and\\nunintelligible if, indeed, we were to accept Kant s\\nbare statement of the proposition I am I as an evidence\\nthat thought is purely analytic, and take the statement\\nas isolated from the body of the Critique he would be\\nKant and his English Critics. By John Watson. P. 140.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "58\\ncontradictory and his whole system on that basis would\\ngo to show that metaphysics is impossible. But to\\nunderstand the meaning of Kant we must modify the\\nstatement that thought is purely analytic by the teach-\\ning of the Critique as a whole which clearly implies\\nthat synthesis is implicit at least in the analytic propo-\\nsition, if not clearly presupposed in it. In the most\\ncritical and literal interpretation of Kant s analytic\\nproposition I am I, it must still contain implicit synthe-\\nsis just as certainly and just as effectually as the abstract\\nBeing of Hegel contains implicit concreteness, yet no\\ncareful student of Hegel will deny that his abstract\\nBeing does contain an implicit concreteness.\\nThe transcendental unity of apperception was implicit\\nto Kant even in the analytic proposition, and it was\\nbecause of this implicitness that Kant thought the I\\ncould set itself over against the world as being indepen-\\ndent of the world and at the same time be conscious of\\nthe judgment, of the fact that it had set itself off and\\nhad not objectified itself, or made it possible to apply\\nthe categories to it.\\nThe Ego is not merely a power of theoretical cog-\\nnition, which power alone is treated of in the Critique\\nof Pure Reason, it is also a power of practical acting\\nor willing, and finally a power of relating its cognitions\\nto its willing, or a power of judgment. But before\\nwe have a relating power we must have something to\\nrelate, something to unite, i. e., we must have a condi-\\n1 Journal, Speculative Philosophy, Vol. Ill, P. 134.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "59\\ntion we can not have a condition without a conditioned,\\nand the uUimate end of our science must be to find out\\nwhat would be the outgrowth of the union of the\\ncondition and conditioned. The origin of the sen-\\nsations in the Ego was not the problem of the Critique\\nof Pure Reason so far as Kant was concerned with that\\nproblem that we had a manifold which gave us sensa-\\ntions was granted by all, just what that manifold was\\ndid not yet concern Kant. The problem is, how is it\\npossible for us to get an experience out of this manifold\\nor how is it possible to get thought and the manifold\\ninto a unity?\\nThis unity can only be accomplished by the synthetic\\nunity of apperception, it is the synthetic unity of apper-\\nception, and without the consciousness of such a\\nsynthesis we could have nothing more than the frag-\\nmentary unity which is the empirical consciousness or\\nself.\\nNecessity is always founded on transcendental con-\\nditions. There must, therefore, be a transcendental\\nground of the unity of our consciousness in the syn-\\nthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, therefore of\\nall Concepts of objects in general for the object\\nis no more than that something of which the concept\\npredicates such a necessity of synthesis.\\nThat original and transcendental condition is noth-\\ning else but what I call transcendental a-p^erce^tion.\\nThe consciousness of oneself, according to the deter-\\nminations of our state, is, with all our internal percep-", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "6o\\ntion, empirical only, and always transient. There can\\nbe no fixed or permanent self in that stream of internal\\nphenomena. It is generally called the internal sense,\\nor empirical apperception. No knowledge can\\ntake place in us, no conjunction or unity of one kind of\\nknowledge with another, without that unity of con-\\nsciousness which precedes all data of intuition and\\nwithout reference to which no representation of objects\\nis possible. This pure, original, and unchangeable\\nconsciousness I shall call Transcendental A-pfercej^-\\ntion. The complete unity of thought and the manifold\\nin and of itself is not sufficient to give us knowledge or\\nexperience but we must of necessity be conscious of the\\nunity. The origin of the manifold must be left out of\\nsight in order to fully understand Kant. If Kant were\\ndriven to give an account of the origin of the manifold\\nin so far he would be crowded back to the so-called\\nBerkeleyan dogmatism but Kant is not concerned with\\nthat problem. Kant s problem is Given a universe\\nhow shall we know it? Where he goes beyond those\\nwho preceded him is in the use and application of the\\nprinciple of apperception.\\nThe synthetic activity or active principle of unity\\nwhich is so prominent in Kant s philosophy, requires\\nsomething to be united, on one hand the manifold of\\nsense and on the other various functions of unity, the\\ncategories, it is only because of these functions of unity\\nacting upon the manifold as a background that the most\\nCritique of Pure Reason. Tr. by Miiller. PP. 94-95.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "6i\\nsimple judgment 1=1 is possible. Now in so far as\\nthese functions of unity by acting upon the manifold of\\nsense make it into one complete whole we have self-\\nconsciousness, and in so far as we thus reach self-con-\\nsciousness experience becomes thought manifested.\\nKant s categories are nowhere given to us as organic\\nunities, but through their functional activity upon the\\nmanifold of sense we get a unity which is organic. The\\nseeming conflict here is removed when we realize that\\nwe actually start with an organic unity and arrive at an\\norganic unity. If Kant had not taught better than he\\nknew this would have been a serious difficulty. Kant\\npresupposes a synthesis, an organic unity to start with,\\nbut not intentionally on his part, nevertheless true for\\nif he had not so done he could not have deduced the\\ncategories the categories would have been impossible\\nfrom Kant s standpoint, neither could we be conscious\\nof the simplest judgment, but with Kant s conception of\\nthe process of knowledge he makes a long and some-\\nwhat circuitous effort to unite what he regards as two\\nforeign (to each other) elements in knowledge. Kant s\\nerror arises out of the thought of two things-in-them-\\nselves, an objective and a subjective the former gives\\nus perception, the latter conception. Perception and\\nconception therefore, are absolutely separated one from\\nthe other and must be united. The synthesis of imagi-\\nnation must be brought into play before the unity of\\napperception can complete the ultimate unity desired.\\nBy this process Kant succeeded in doing away with the", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "62\\ndualism of perception and conception as such but not with\\nthe dualism of the perceptive and conceptive elements in\\nknowledge. This process unifies the external world and\\nbrings it into self-consciousness, and thus enables us to\\nknow it, but no more. The categories are here brought\\nto a stand-still, they can go as high as the category of\\nreciprocity and no higher the moment we go beyond\\nthat, that moment we leave the domain of the knowable\\nfor the domain of the unknowable. We know that\\nthere is a self-consciousness, without which there can\\nbe no knowledge, but we cannot know the self-con-\\nsciousness. We must think self-consciousness, freedom,\\nimmortality, and God, but we can know nothing of\\nthem.\\nThe chief sources of confusion in the study of the\\nCritique of Pure Reason are (a) Kant held that thought\\nwas purely analytic, (b) that the manifold was foreign\\nto thought and (c) he treated the subject as if thought\\nwere synthetic and the manifold a part of thought.\\nThe difficulties immediately become apparent when we\\ntake these conflicting premises under consideration.\\nKant proceeds from the first of these premises to deduce\\ncategories out of that from which no category can be\\nhad. To hold that thought is purely analytic, and from\\nthat purely analytic element to deduce categories which\\nare themselves functional activities of synthesis is itself\\na contradiction. The question naturally arises why is\\nit impossible for us to deduce the categories of the un-\\nderstanding if thought be analytic. It is impossible", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "63\\nbecause the source of the categories is the transcen-\\ndental ego or self-consciousness, and self-consciousness\\nitself is impossible on the basis of purely analytic\\nthought.\\nThe categories are simply the tools with which the\\nself-consciousness works in overcoming the external\\nworld, but if there were no consciousness there could\\nbe, of course, no methods of its manifestation. How-\\never this does not still free us from the difficult} the\\nquestion, why is self-consciousness impossible if thought\\nbe purely analytic, is not answered, and is just as per-\\nplexing as to say the categories are impossible if\\nthought be analytic. Let us therefore see why self-\\nconsciousness would be impossible if thought were\\npurely analytic. We cannot be conscious unless we\\nare conscious of something. We have a thought, it\\nmay be true or false that is of no consequence, the\\nquestion is, how is the thought determined? does it\\ndetermine itself by working in itself or must it have a\\nforeign element to work upon or to work through in\\norder to determine itself? Kant would evidently say the\\nlatter, for if it did not need the foreign element there could\\nbe a judgment formed from the movement of thought per\\nse and out of that judgment must come knowledge and\\nexperience, and by the movement of thought in its own\\ndetermination we have arrived at knowledge without a\\nperception or even the form of a perception, which is\\ncontradictory to Kanfs whole philosophic doctrine.\\nSuch could not be the movement of thought within", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "64\\nitself without objectifying the transcendental ego and\\nmaking it subject to the limitations of the categories\\nthis would reduce us again to the Cartesian cogito ergo\\nsum, which leaves us precisely where we were when\\nKant took us and began to lead us through this laby-\\nrinthian process of knowledge.\\nKant was never able to free himself from the common\\nconception that the actual was somehow given and\\nthought worked itself into this real somewhat.\\nJ Thought by working on the sensibility gave us both\\nperception and conception, the one coming from the\\nobjective side and the other coming from the subjective\\nside these two elements must be brought into a unity\\nand we must be conscious of the unity or we cannot\\npossibly have an experience at all. The transcendental\\nself was and is the activity which produces this unity,\\nbut this transcendental ego is as it were a mere focal\\npoint between the Ego and the world, or it is rather the\\npoint of Egoity outside the world looking at the world,\\na mere thought activity. We are conscious of the Ego\\nas separated from the world and yet the world is due to\\nthe synthetic unity of the self. There is no world\\n.except through the activity of the Ego and no con-\\nsciousness of the Ego except through the synthetic\\nrelations which the world holds to the Ego. Kant was\\nnever able to get the Transcendental Ego out of itself\\nand get the world into it. It was because of this fact\\nthat Kant s doctrine of the Transcendental Ego was not\\nsatisfactory to philosophers who followed him.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "^5\\nThe fact that Kant treated thought as a necessary\\nelement in knowledge and yet made it purely analytic\\nconfuses us from the fact that we cannot conceive of it\\nas being purely analytic without the impossibility of\\nbeing able to make the simple judgment I am I, yet\\nKant says that judgment is purely analytic. But to\\nKant this judgment could not be made without in some\\nway the manifold, the world of sense, becoming a sort\\nof background from which the I was distinguished but\\nwhich of itself did not enter into the judgment. On\\nthe other hand, Kant treated the external world as a\\nthing-in-itself which as such was entirely foreign to the\\nI yet must be thought, but until brought into a unity\\nwith the I could not be known. This was the dualism\\nwhich Kant never overcame the external world must\\nbe thought as something external to the I, and the I\\nmust be thought as something independent of the world\\nyet we could not know that either existed without the\\nother, neither could we have an experience without the\\nunion of the two and at the same time have a con-\\nsciousness of the union. By the function assigned to\\nthe Transcendental Ego Kant succeeded in doing away\\nwith the dualism of the elements of perception and con-\\nception arising respectively from the manifold and from\\nthought, but he never succeeded in doing away with\\nthe dualism of the elements of perception and concep-\\ntion in knowledge. While Kant s philosophy was a\\ngreat advance on anything that had preceded him, in\\nthe solution of the problems of knowledge, he did not", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "66\\nreach the ultimate principle. He left a great question\\nunsolved the relation of the Transcendental Ego to the\\nEmpirical Ego. The Transcendental Ego was to Kant\\nthe ultimate principle and he attempted to show its\\nrelation to experience it existed only as it connected\\nelements of experience, and where it connected them it\\nwas a mere thought point, or activity, a kind of focus\\nand can be nothing more so far as our knowledge of it\\nis concerned. It can never reflect the self to us it can\\nnever give the self back to us in any knowable way.\\nFrom its very nature it hampers itself, reduces itself to\\na mere point which is necessary and thinkable, yet\\nwhich cannot be reflected or given back to us and which\\nmust forever remain unknowable. It is because of this\\nview that Kant s highest category must be that of\\nreciprocity.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "IV.\\nPOINTS OF RESEMBLANCE AND DIFFERENCE COMPARED\\nAND CONTRASTED.\\nBerkeley has not received the credit due him for his\\nphilosophic thought, simply because of his dogmatical\\nstatements. He did not systematize the great principles\\nhe postulated. Mere analytic knowledge was impossible\\nwith Berkeley but he did not stop to prove that such\\nwas the case. His acceptation of the Will practically\\nmakes such a proof unnecessary. He regards the proof\\nof the existence of God as set forth in his Divine Visual\\nLanguage, as conclusive, and this supplemented by the\\nScriptural revelation seemed to Berkeley to be sufficient\\neven to convince a sceptic that God existed and in Him\\nwere all the attributes or factors of a perfect intelli-\\ngence. Even accepting that God is all that Berkeley\\nclaims Him to be, Berkeley still fails from a philosophic\\nstandpoint in so far as he does not systematize the\\nprocess of knowledge even as given to us through the\\npostulated principles. He would have approached a\\nsystem of knowledge had he succeeded in developing\\nthe Will as he anticipated doing, but even then he was\\nassuming certain Divine principles which were dog-\\nmatic rather than philosophic.\\nThe chief point of failure in Berkeley s system was", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "68\\nthat he started with one thing-in-itself, subjective spirit,\\nand made the activity of God s Will the efficient cause\\nof the same, and not only the mere cause but the active\\nprinciple through which this subjective thing-in-itself\\nhad activity and through which it was possible to obtain\\na knowledge of the universe. He made the same active\\nprinciple of Divine Will the efficient cause of the real\\nobjective world but at the same time denied that there\\nwas an objective thing-in-itself. Now how the same\\nefficient cause or Divine activity produced a subjective\\nthing-in-itself, and gave it activity, and produced an\\nobjective reality which was not a thing-in-itself, and\\nhad no activity was what Berkeley did not express or\\nattempt to explain. He took it for granted, with his\\nconception of the Will, that such an explanation was\\nnot necessary. The acceptation of God s existence was\\nall that was necessary to him and for this very reason\\nhe has been classed, and justly too, with the dogmatists.\\nBerkeley meant to show that the Will was the essence\\nof spirit substance and also of material substance but\\nbecause he never reached a clear vision of the process\\nby which he could make Will play this specific part in\\nthe unity of the universe, and the unity of the perfect\\nintelligence of the same, he never gave to the world his\\ndeepest and most critical philosophic work, viz., A\\nTreatise on the Human Will.\\nThe reason of Berkeley s failure may be given in a\\nsingle sentence. He failed to grasp the idea and to\\napply the Dialectic in philosophical reasoning. His", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "69\\nPhilosophy was hidden behind his Theology, and he i\\nfeared to cut himself loose from his Theology and to\\nenter into a process of purely philosophical reasoning\\nlest the result would be in discord with the revealed\\nidea of God he chose therefore to hold tenaciously to\\nthe notion he had of God from the Biblical revelation\\nand by process of formal rather than real Logic to make\\nmen accept his premises. He therefore postulated his\\npremises rather than logically made them, and by so\\ndoing laid himself liable to the charge of dogmatism.\\nKant s advance on Berkeley was in bringing Philoso-\\nphy out from behind the veil of Theology, and in\\napplying the Dialectic to it. Kant sought the truth for\\nits own sake whether or not it came in harmony with\\npreconceived theological notions. If one was true and\\nthe other was not the process of real Logic and the\\nDialectic must drive the false one to the wall. Whether\\nKant s philosophy is true or not, it is p/iz loso^/iy. He\\nmade his premises and put the dialectic into his system.\\nPhilosophy is a system and that is what Kant had that\\nBerkeley did not have, and just so far as that system\\nwent Kant as a philosopher was in advance of Berkeley.\\nKant s failure to grasp the full movement of thought lay\\nin the fact that he took thought to be purely analytic,\\nand yet deals with it as though he had all the while\\npresupposed a synthesis. This brings him before his\\ncritics as teaching a contradictory philosophy which he\\ncould not harmonize. It led him into an artificial de-\\nduction ot the categories which made them rigid and", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "70\\ntied them up in their application to only one-half the\\ntruth, beyond which Kant could only think and not\\nknow. Kant s movement through the dialectic has\\npractically freed him from the charge of dogmatism-\\nYet ultimately, on the basis of thought being purely\\nanalytic, he must have fallen into precisely the same\\ndogmatism that constantly hampered Berkeley. Kant\\nwas making his way between two philosophical poles,\\nDogmatism on the one hand and Scepticism on the\\nother, and freed himself from stranding on either by his\\nprocess of synthesizing perception and conception. He\\ncould never have been wholly free from the former had\\nhe not taught better than he knew by presupposing a\\nsynthesis while he treated thought as analytic. Another\\nfundamental error lies in the fact that Kant made his\\nmethod regressive and not progressive. This logical\\nerror can be best expressed by quoting from Caird.\\nNow, I have attempted to show that in all this there is\\nonly one logical error, to wit, the confusion of the\\nregressive process of thought, by which the unity of self\\nis found to underlie the categories and the forms of\\nsense, with a process of mere abstraction. This error\\nnecessarily carries with it the conception of the unity of\\nself-consciousness as purely analytic, and as, therefore,\\nstanding in irreconcilable opposition to the unity of the\\nconsciousness of objects as purely synthetic, i. e., as\\nexternally synthetic of the matter given under the forms\\nof sense. From this, again, follows the impossibility of\\nreaching a Icnowledge which is adequate to the Ideas of", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "71\\nreason, and the equal impossibility of conceiving the\\nmoral law as realized in the phenomenal world. Hence,\\nalso, the moral law itself shrinks into the conception of\\nlaw in general, and this into the tautology of self-con-\\nsistency, i. e., of consistency with that which has in\\nitself no determination. And if a partial escape is\\nfound from this emptiness of abstraction by typifying\\nthe moral law as a law of nature yet the conception of\\nthe law of freedom as if it were a law of necessity seems\\nto be too hopelessly self-contradictory to bring with it\\nany real solution of the dificulty.\\nOur investigation so far has been to find the active\\nprinciple in knowledge as. held by each of the philoso-\\nphers under consideration and to some extent to define\\nits application in the philosophical works which they\\nhave left to posterity. We have also briefly pointed out\\nsome of the fundamental defects in each system. It\\nnow remains for us to call attention to some of the points\\nof similarity and dissimilarity. Let us first then take up\\nthe points of likeness.\\nBoth inquired into the Principles of Human Knowl-\\nedge, and both inquiries included the same factors of\\nknowledge, viz.. Self, the World and God. Self and\\nthe World constituted the two elements or factors of\\nspecial inquiry in both cases. As neither of the phil-\\nosophers regarded Self and the World as one and the\\nsame thing, a dualism arose in each system. The\\nnature of the dualism constituting one of the differences\\nCritical Philosophy of Kant. By Caird. Vol. II. P. 640,", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "72\\nmay be omitted for the present. This dualism consti-\\ntuted a fundamental defect in the process of knowledge,\\nhence, both attempted to free themselves from this\\ndualism and to develop a process of knowledge which\\nwould ultimately give us a complete unity. The nature\\nof the elements of synthesis constitutes the foregoing\\nportion of this discussion. That element is in Berkeley s\\nsystem the Will, and in Kant s the Transcendental Ego\\nor Synthetic Unity of Apperception. To arrive at this\\nunity both began with experience and both made a\\nsynthetic activity necessary to experience. That both\\nbegan with experience is clear for Berkeley says, If it\\nwere not for sense the mind could have no knowledge,\\nno thought at all. All of introversion, meditation, con-\\ntemplation, and spiritual acts as if these could be\\nexerted before we had ideas from without by the senses\\nare manifestly absurd. Kant s whole philosophy\\nis based on the fact that knowledge begins with experi-\\nence, and that the manifold of sense is an indispensable\\nfactor.\\nBerkeley holds that all knowledge is about ideas but\\nideas are impossible without experience. Kant holds\\nthat all knowledge begins with experience. Berkeley\\nsays, all ideas are from without or from within.\\nKant holds that we have external sense and internal\\nsense, and these express themselves in the form of\\nspace and time. Berkeley holds that if these ideas\\nare from without, they are sensations, Kant, that they\\n1 Commonplace Book, P. 434.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "73\\nare perceptions, the manifold. Berkeley says, if they\\nare from within they are operations of the mind,\\nthoughts Kant that they are conceptions, thoughts.\\nBerkeley, all our ideas (experiences) are either sen-\\nsations or thoughts. Kant, all our experiences are\\nsensations and thoughts.^ Berkeley, the bare pas-\\nsive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.\\nKant, the vague whole given by the manifold unana-\\nlyzed is perception, Berkeley, whatever has in it an\\nidea (experience) though it be never so passive,\\nthough it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must\\nperceive (think). Kant, whatever has experience\\nmust have perception (sensations) and thought com-\\nbined. Berkeley, two things cannot be said to be alike\\nor unlike till they have been compared. Comparing is\\nthe viewing two ideas together and marking in what they\\nagree and what they disagree. The mind can compare\\nnothing but its own ideas. Kant, the world of experi-\\nence can only be known by classification and by placing\\neach object under the category in which it belongs.\\nIn the above classification the language of Berkeley\\nhas been closely followed and it shows a decided paral-\\nlelism in the fundamental principles with which both\\nsystems began.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2This comparison must be taken with some license both on the part of Berkeley\\nand of Kant. It we take Berkeley s phraseology sensations or thoughts as isolated\\nfrom his principle of synthesis it indicates sources of knowledge and is in perfect\\nharmony with Locke s doctrine of knowledge. To get the full force of the state-\\nment it must be looked at in the light of the present discussion. On the other\\nhand, Kant must be regarded as using sensations and thoughts as /actors in\\nexperience.\\nFor above statements of Berkeley see Commonplace Book, PP. 49S-499.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "74\\nIt is equally true that both made a synthetic activity\\nnecessary to experience. With Berkeley, experience\\nis impossible without in some way the whole phenome-\\nnon is connected without a connection there would be\\nneither world nor experience. The true source is\\nwithin the veil. It is in the super-sensible or trans-\\ncendent, not among phenomena or in the world of\\nphenomenal experience. Can we follow it within the\\nveil? That depends upon the possibility of our having\\neither a sort of knowledge that is unphenomenal, or\\nelse a faith that transcends both the data of the senses\\nand faith in merely physical law.\\nThis synthetic activity which makes the necessary\\nconnection and which lies behind the veil is the Will.\\nIt cannot be known, but, on account of a faith which\\ntranscends the data of sense, must be thought. The\\nWill cannot be known, and yet it leads us on in our\\nprocess of knowledge until we are as sure of it as we\\nare of our own existence, we have to think it; if we\\nsay we know, the knowledge must be of a kind unphe-\\nnomenal, it is rather a transcendent faith. With Kant,\\nexperience is impossible without the synthesis of per-\\nception and conception and the consciousness of the\\nsynthetic act this involves the law of necessary con-\\nnection. This synthetic activity is the Transcendental\\nUnity of Apperception. By attempting to know this\\nsynthetic activity we are led from the phenomenal to\\nthe noumenal world, in which we are unable to apply\\n^Berkeley, Blackwood s Classics, PP. 194-195.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "75\\ntheoretical reason, because theoretical reason is bound\\ndown to the world of sense but we can approach it by\\npractical reason which is not limited by sense. We\\ncannot know it, however, but for practical reason it is\\nenough that we think it, and determine ourselves\\naccording to the Ideas of it. In so far as we are forced\\nto think it and it is forced upon us by a law which is\\none with the consciousness of ourselves, we may say\\nwe are as sure of its truth as of our own existence. It\\nis in this point with Kant as it is with Berkeley, we\\nwalk by faith and not by sight this is one of the most\\nimportant and interesting similarities existing in the\\ntwo systems. The name by which the activity is desig-\\nnated is of but little importance in this discussion, the\\nreal truth of the matter is what we are seeking. The\\ndifference between Berkeley and Kant in the use of this\\nactive principle is just the difference between induction\\nand deduction and nothing more, i. e., there is no strict\\nline of demarkation. Induction is the process of\\nthought when we have in mind the getting of a hypoth-\\nesis, and this was Berkeley s position. What he\\nattempted was done, he modestly says, with a view to\\ngiving hints to thinking men who have leisure and\\ncuriosity to go to the bottom of things, and pursue them\\nin their own minds. That is, Berkeley concerned\\nhimself with the production of hypotheses rather than\\nthe defining of them. Deduction is defining or devel-\\n1 Critical Philosophy of Kant. By Caird. Vol. II, P. 634.\\n^Introduction to Selections, P. XXXIII.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "76\\noping a hypothesis, and represents Kant s position in\\nthe movement of thought; he explained hypotheses,\\ndefined them and in his definitions transformed them..\\nThe true difference in induction and deduction is then\\nsimply different cross-sections in the same movement of\\nthought, or they are the same thing in different stages\\nof development. Berkeley and Kant are related in the\\nsame way, Berkeley representing the inductive cross-\\nsection and Kant the deductive cross-section of the\\nmovement of thought.\\nIn summing up the points of similarity we may say,\\nthe inquiries of both involve the relation of Self and the\\nWorld both began with experience both had a dual-\\nism both sought a unity both saw the necessity of a\\nsynthetic activity both made this activity necessary to\\nexperience both made the active principle thinkable\\nbut unknowable both led us through Reason by means\\nof a transcendent faith, into an undoubted assurance of\\nImmortality, Freedom and God.\\nWe are not to assume from what has been said, that\\nthere are no differences between Berkeley and Kant as\\nto their philosophical systems. The differences in\\nmany respects are more fundamental than their like-\\nnesses, as will readily be suggested to the mind of the\\nstudent of Berkeley and Kant. I believe it necessary\\nonly to call attention to these differences, when they\\nbecome sufficiently apparent. The first difference,\\nwhich is a fundamental one, is found in the bases upon\\nwhich these two systems of philosophy are founded.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "11\\nBerkeley makes metaphysics the key-stone in the arch\\nof his system and makes all things in the phenomenal\\nworld conform to that theory. Kant makes science the\\nbasis of his system and reasons from the possibility of\\nscience to the possibility of metaphysics. In other\\nwords Berkeley practically says, metaphysics given,\\nhow is the world of science possible? Kant, the world\\nof science given, how is metaphysics possible? Berke-\\nley was more sure of the existence of God than he was\\nof the external world. Kant more sure of the existence\\nof the external world than he was of the existence of\\nGod.\\nAnother difference is in Kant s use of the dialectic of\\nthought. This is of great importance in a system of\\nphilosophy. The dialectic falls back on the pure unity\\nof thought itself pre-supposed in conceptual synthesis.\\nIt suggests noumena and not objects of experience, and\\ngives rise to questions which experience cannot settle.\\nIt is the process by which we are enabled to go beyond\\nthe sphere of the understanding and the phenomenal\\nworld into the sphere of reason and the noumenal\\nworld. The movement of thought by which such a\\ntransition can be made is almost indispensable in the\\nformation and carrying out of a system of philosophy.\\nThis movement Berkeley never succeeded in embodying\\nin his philosophy, but Kant did. This marks one of\\nthe wide differences. Berkeley never succeeded in\\ngetting outside of his subject, but from within he looked\\nat it from this way and from that, and each time got", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "78\\nsome practically new view of the question at issue\\nhence, his system is largely defective in method. Kant\\ngot outside of his subject and looked at it as a whole,\\nand each variation in the movement shows us the same\\ntheme looked at from a new standpoint, hence, Kant s\\nsystem is methodic.\\nThey differed in the dualism that arose out of their\\ntreatment of the Self and the external World. Kant s\\ndualism was a dualism of perception and conception, a\\ndualism between self-consciousness and the manifold.\\nBerkeley s dualism, as has already been explained,\\nwas practically a dualism of concepts. Kant s dualism\\narose from getting outside of his subject and recogniz-\\ning two elements separate and distinct, without the\\nunion of which there could be no knowledge. Berke-\\nley s dualism arose by staying inside of his subject and\\nrecognizing two diametrically opposite conditions, spir-\\nitual and so-called material, which, in order to have\\nknowledge, must be harmonized. Kant s unity is the\\nTranscendental Ego. Berkeley s unity is the Will.\\nFinally, they differed in what constituted identity.\\nBerkeley s identity is in reality only a superficial iden-\\ntity, there is no essential reality in the relation of\\nthings relations are ideal, and that which constitutes\\nidentity is without the thing and independent of it. The\\nidentity of Berkeley is like a thread running through\\nthings which holds them together yet leaves them inde-\\npendent. So far as the relation of these things, one to\\nanother, is concerned it is ideal. Kant s identity is\\nvery different, it is an underlying identity, an identity", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "79\\nof differences in which the relation is real instead of\\nideal. A quotation from Caird wil\\\\ serve better than\\nmy own language to show Kant s position with respect\\nto identity. Since, however, the relations of the\\nsubstances are represented by Kant as real and not\\nmerely ideal, and since the substances can manifest\\ntheir nature only in those relations, the opposition of\\ntheir individuality to their relativity is on the point of\\ndisappearing, and with it of course must disappear the\\nexternality of the principle that unites them. For, if\\nthe difference of the substances be merely a relative\\ndifference, i. e., a difference of elements which are\\nnothing apart from their relations to each other, the\\nbinding principle cannot be regarded as an external\\nlink of connection, but must be taken simply as the\\nunity which underlies the differences of the substances,\\nand which manifests itself in their action and reaction\\nupon each other.\\nTo sum up their chief differences lie in the bases\\non which the systems are founded, in the standpoints\\nfrom which they looked at the subject under considera-\\ntion, in their dualism, and in what constitutes identity.\\nIn conclusion, let us rise above the mere method and\\nlook at the truth as each of those great philosophers\\nsought to find it. We see Berkeley approach it from\\nthe side of metaphysics and write Empirically Ideal and\\nTranscendentally Real. From the side of science Kant\\napproaches and writes Empirically Real and Transcen-\\ndentally Ideal.\\n1 Critical Philosophy of Kant. By Caird. Vol. I, P. 113.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "BIBLIOGRAPHY.\\nThe Works of George Berkeley. By Alexander Campbell Fraser. Ox-\\nford, 1 87 1.\\nLife and Letters of George Berkeley with Writings Hitherto Unpublished.\\nBy A. C. Fraser. Oxford, 1871.\\nBerkeley. By A. C. Fraser. Edinburgh, 1871.\\nWorks of John Locke in ten vols. London, 1823.\\nPhilosophical Works of David Hume in four vols. Boston and Edin-\\nburgh, 1854.\\nSelections from Berkeley with An Introduction and Notes. By A. C.\\nFraser. Oxford, 1S84.\\nA Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. By L. A. Selby-Bigge.\\nOxford, 1 888.\\nThe Methods, Meditations, and Selections from Descartes. By John\\nVeitch. Edinburgh and London, i88r.\\nHistory of Philosophy. By Kuno Fischer, Eng. Tr. by J. P. Gordy.\\nNew York, 1887.\\nLeviathan. By Thomas Hobbes. London, 1839.\\nMetaphysics, A Study in First Principles. By Borden P. Bowne. New\\nYork, 1882.\\nLeibnitz s New Essay Concerning the Human Understanding. By John\\nDewey. Chicago, 1S88.\\nA History of Philosophy. By Johann Eduard Erdman, Eng. Tr. by\\nW. S. Hough. London, 1890.\\nPsychology. By John Dewey. New York, 1889.\\nHistory of Philosophy. By Friedrich Ueberweg, Eng. Tr. by Geo. S.\\nMorris, with additions by Noah Porter. New York, 18S8.\\nBritish Thoughts and Thinkers. By Geo. S. Morris. Chicago, 1880.\\nKritik der reinen Vernimst, von. Immanuel Kant. Leipzig, 1781.\\nCritique of Pure Reason, Eng. Tr. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. London,\\n1884.\\nCritique of Pure Reason. Eng. Tr. by J. Max Miiller. London, 1881.\\nKant s Critical Philosophy for English Readers. By J. P. Mahaffy.\\nLondon, 1889.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "82\\nThe Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. By Edward Caird. 2 vols.\\nNew York, 1889.\\nShaw Fellowship Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant. By Robert\\nAdamson. Edinburgh, 1879.\\nAn Analysis of Kant s Critique of Pure Reason. By Francis Haywood.\\nLondon, 1844.\\nKant s Doctrine of the Thingin-Itself. By Rikizo Nakashina. New\\nHaven, 1889.\\nKant s Critique of Pure Reason. By Geo. S. Morris. Chicago, 1882.\\nA Critique of Kant. By Kuno Fischer. Eng. Tr. by W. S. Hough.\\nLondon, 1888.\\nKant and His English Critics. By John Watson. Glasgow, 1881.\\nJournal of Speculative Philosophy. Vols. HI and XIV, articles, Kant s\\nTranscendentalism and Professor Caird on Kant.\\nCritical Account of the Philosophy of Kant. By Edward Caird. Glas-\\ngow, 1877.\\nCritick of Pure Reason. Tr. from the original by William Pickering.\\nLondon, 1838.\\nThe Development from Kant to Hegel. By Andrew Seth. London, 1882.\\nFirst Principles. By Herbert Spencer. London, 1862.\\nEncyclopedia Britannica. Art., Descartes.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "THE\\nPRINCIPLE OF SYNTHETIC UNITY\\nIN BERKELEY AND KANT.\\nBy\\nSAMUEL 2*1. DICK, A.M., Ph.D.\\nLOWELL, MASS.\\nMorning Mail Company Pkint.\\n1S9S.", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "NDERY\\n1903", "height": "3067", "width": "1844", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3235", "width": "2104", "jp2-path": "principleofsynth00dick_0104.jp2"}}