{"1": {"fulltext": "Ditty\\nWs", "height": "4841", "width": "2790", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4361", "width": "2646", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "\u00e2\u0080\u00a2lA/5\\nANNEXATION OF HAWAII.\\nSPEECH\\nHON. STEPHEN M. WHITE,\\nOF CALIFORNIA,\\nSENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,\\nJune zi and 22, July 5 and 6, 1S9S.\\nWASHINGTON.\\nI898.", "height": "4361", "width": "2646", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "6868*", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "y\\nSPEECH\\nOF\\nHOK STEPHEN M. WHITE.\\nTuesday, June 21, 1S0S.\\nThe Senate having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) to\\nprovide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States-\\nMr. WHITE said:\\nMr. President: The correct determination of the issues now\\nbefore the Senate is not only of vital national importance, but in-\\nvolves questions more grave than any dealt with in this gener-\\nation. Heedless and thoughtless is the man who thinks otherwise.\\nSome outside of this Chamber, persons ordinarily considerate, are\\nin numerous instances carried away either by interest or by the\\nexcitement incident to the conditions surrounding us. They\\nmay clamor for immediate judgment, for no debate; but if this\\nbody is impotent to examine with care, with patience, and with\\nat least some ability a crisis of this grave import, it has failed to\\naccomplish the object for which it was called into existence and\\nit has responded not to the aspirations of the framers of the Con-\\nstitution.\\nOur differences, Senators, may be radical. There are a number\\nupon one side of this issue and upon the other who are taking\\ntheir positions honestly and with some degree, I trust, of intelli-\\ngence. It will not, I think, prevent proper deliberation, I know\\nit will not hasten consideration, to insist that there shall be no\\ndiscussion and that in this body there shall be assigned no reasons\\nfor our action. The duty demanding reasons for our conduct\\nwill be discharged regardless of the demonstrations of arrogance.\\nTHERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO ANNEX FOREIGN TERRITORY BY\\nRESOLUTION, CERTAINLY NOT OTHERWISE THAN AS A STATE.\\nWhatever may be said of the past history of this country or of\\nthe records to which Senators have adverted, there is one propo-\\nsition which can not be contested, namely, that there is no prece-\\ndent for this proposed action. States have been admitted into the\\nUnion, territory has been acquired and has been annexed by\\ntreaty stipulation, but there is no instance where by a joint reso-\\nlution it has been attempted not only to annex a foreign land far\\nremote from our shores, but also to annihilate a nation, to with-\\ndraw from the sovereign societies of the world a government\\nwhich, in the opinion of the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Mor-\\ngan] is the best government of which he has any cognizance\\nno instance where an act of such supreme importance has been\\nadvocated as mere legislation.\\nIt is well to reflect upon this subject and to do so not merely as\\nit affects our obligation to obey the Constitution, but also as it\\npertains to our destiny and refers to the reasons for our existence.\\nSenators may say that this, that, or the other should induce us to\\nrender ready acquiescence to an imperious and sudden demand,\\nbut I believe that every member of this bo:ly should record his\\n3-1 3", "height": "4329", "width": "2582", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "vote after patient and careful thought, and that the judgment\\nwhich he enters here should be one to meet the approval of his\\nconscience. We are building for time to come, as well as for the\\npresent. We can not shift responsibility. The advice of the un-\\ninformed or criminal will not mitigate our mistakes, even though\\ntheir views are momentarily indorsed.\\nUndoubtedly it is pleasant to be with the majority. The ac-\\nclaim of victory never falls upon an unsympathetic ear when it\\nreaches the person who has joined in bringing it about, but the\\nobligation which attaches to our position requires, it seems to me,\\nsomething beyond the reward of popularity. The Republic will\\nnever be safe if her people depend upon the mere guesses of Sena-\\ntors. The demands of honesty and the candid discharge of the\\nSenator s duty as he sees it are but expressions of the same idea.\\nMr. President, what are we asked to do? The resolution which\\nhas been presented comes from the House of Representatives, and\\nis but a repetition of the resolution prepared by the Committee on\\nForeign Relations of this body, and is to my mind upon its face,\\nirrespective of the constitutional questions involved, I was about to\\nsay absurd in its inaccuracy. Without for the time being debating\\nthe desirability of the annexation of the islands, gaze upon this\\nproposed resolution. I appeal to Senators who are opposed to me\\nupon the merits of this subject, and especially to those Senators,\\neminent at the bar, whose views have always been zealously\\nguarded by their respect for that law which they have sworn to\\nsupport and that Constitution to which they have here and else-\\nwhere given their unqualified and repeated adhesion.\\nThe joint resolution is entitled A joint resolution to provide\\nfor annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. It is as\\nfollows:\\nJoint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United\\nStates.\\nWhereas the Government of the Republic of Hawaii having, in due form,\\nsignified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede ab-\\nsolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of\\nsovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their\\ndependencies, and also to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute\\nfee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands, public build-\\nings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all other public\\nproperty of every kind and description belonging to the Government of the\\nHawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto\\nappertaining: Therefore,\\nResolved by ike Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of\\nAmerica in Congress assembled, That said cession is accepted, ratified, and\\nconfirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be,\\nand they are hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United States\\nand are subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular\\nthe property and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United\\nStates of America.\\nThe existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not\\napply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands; but the Congress of the United\\nStates shall enact special laws for their management and disposition: Pro-\\nvided, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such\\npart thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval pur-\\nposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local gov-\\nernment, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.\\nUntil Congress shall provide for the government of stich islands all the\\ncivil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing\\nGovernment in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons and shall\\nbe exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct\\nand the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill the vacan-\\ncies so occasioned.\\nThe existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall\\nforthwith cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist,\\nor as may bo hereafter concluded, between the United States and such for-\\neign nations. The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with\\nthis joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution, of the United States\\nnor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until\\nthe Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.\\nUntil legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs\\nlaws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands the existing customs relations\\nof the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall re-\\nmain unchanged.\\nThe public debt of the Republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of\\nthe passage of this joint resolution, including the amounts due to depositors\\nin the Hawaiian Postal Savings Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government\\nof the United States: but the liability of the Unitei States in this regard\\nshall in no case exceed \u00c2\u00a71,000,093. So long, however, as the existing Govern-\\nment and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are con-\\ntinued as hereinbefore provided said Government shall continue to pay the\\ninterest on said debt.\\nThere shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Is-\\nlands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed\\nby the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything\\nherein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands.\\nThe President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall\\nbe residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably prac-\\nticable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian\\nIslands as they shall deem necessary or proper.\\nSec. 2. That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall be ap-\\npointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.\\nSec. 3. That the sum of \u00c2\u00a7100,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary,\\nis hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasiiry not otherwise ap-\\npropriated, and to be immediately available, to be expended at the discre-\\ntion of the President of the United States of America, fur the purpose of\\ncarrying this joint resolution into effect.\\nI repeat, quoting from the resolution:\\nWhereas the Government of the Republic of Hawaii having, in due form,\\nsignified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede abso-\\nlutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sov-\\nereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their de-\\npendencies, and also to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute\\nfee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands, etc.\\nThe resolution thus refers truly to the grant contained in the\\nHawaiian constitution, but utterly disregards the facts when it\\nassumes that an unratified treaty means anything. I continue\\nthe quotation:\\nThat said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed.\\nWhat cession, Senators? Has any cession been made? Is there\\na lawyer upon either side of this Chamber who is willing to say\\nthat there has been a grant, a cession by Hawaii of Hawaii? Can\\na cession be made when a proposition emanates from one party\\nunaccepted by the other? Is there anyone who has regard for\\nthose attainments which he possesses who will claim that such\\ncontract has been made? Is there any ambiguity in the meaning\\nof the word cession? Is there any doubt about it? In Ander-\\nson s Dictionary of the Law, cession is defined a yielding up,\\na transfer, a grant, as of land, and so on.\\nHas there been any grant? Mr. President, the people of Hawaii\\nunder their constitution provided how the islands might be ceded\\nto the United States. They defined and limited in their organic\\ninstrument the method of conveyance by which they were to oper-\\nate the divestiture of empire. Has that method been followed?\\nDoes anyone pretend that it has been followed?\\nWill anyone speak to me of a treaty when we are confronted\\nwith a mere proposition negotiated between the plenipotentiaries\\nof two countries and unratified by a tribunal\u00e2\u0080\u0094 this Senate\u00e2\u0080\u0094 whose\\nconcurrence is necessary? There is no treaty; no one can reason-\\nably aver that there is a treaty. No treaty can exist unless it has\\nattached to it not merely the acquiescence of those from whom it\\nemanates as a proposal. It must be accepted joined in by the\\n8571", "height": "4329", "width": "2582", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "6\\nother party. This has not been done. There is, therefore, no\\ntreaty.\\nBlack defines a treaty thus:\\nIn international law an agreement between two or more independent\\nstates\u00e2\u0080\u0094 an agreement, league, or contract between two or more nations or\\nsovereigns formally signed by commissioners properly authorized and sol-\\nemnly, ratified, etc.\\nHence the declaration in the resolution that a treaty has been\\nmade is manifest falsehood.\\nWhence, then, do we derive the right to speak of a cession, of a\\nconcession of a grant? There is no grant, Senators. Whatever\\nmay be your views of the situation, that you can not deny. Yet\\nin this instrument which you put before us, and which you ask\\nus to support, you tell us that there is a cession, when 3 t ou know\\nthat a cession can not be made without the concurrence of both\\nparties to the agreement. That this resolution involves untruth\\nis palpable.\\nNot only Mr. Frelinghuysen, a former Secretary of State, but\\nother eminent publicists speak of a treaty as a contract and of\\nrights conferred as contractual. We know, however we may re-\\ngard a treaty, that it is absolutely ineffective, a veritable nothing,\\nuntil it has received the approval of all parties who are necessary\\nto it and who are named in it as such. Is a deed of any efficacy\\nsimply because I sign it, though I may have the title to property,\\nif it is not duly delivered? Is a contract which mentions A and B\\nas essential parties of any validity or any better than waste paper\\nunless A and B concur and join in it? And yet in this remarkable\\nresolution you treat this instrument as a concession, as an abso-\\nlute accomplished fact, when you concede that it has no effectu-\\nality unless the same is given it by one party.\\nMr. President, if this so-called treaty were executed by both\\nparties, if it received the indorsement of this Government and\\nwas ratified by the Senate, then you would treat it as a cession.\\nWould your treatment of it be any different from that which you\\nnow give it? Would you speak of it in any other way than you\\nnow speak of it when you say that the cession is accepted? And\\nwill you tell me, or can any one tell me, with any face or counte-\\nnance, that a treaty which has not been accepted by the United\\nStates or ratified by the Senate is upon exactly the same plane as\\na similar compact which has been made complete under our laws?\\nYet such is the tenor of this resolution\u00e2\u0080\u0094 such the ridiculous theory\\nupon which we are asked to pass it.\\nWhatever may become of this subject in the end, I should be\\nashamed of the Senate if it indorsed a proposition involving such\\na manifest contradiction as this resolution. I should be regretful\\nof the Senate and doubtful of the ability of its members if it\\nvoted for a resolution declaring that a cession had taken place by\\ntreaty, when upon our own records we find the indisputable evi-\\ndence that there has been no ratification of such a treaty, and that\\nthere has been no cession or grant whatever. Yet it is not even\\nproposed to change this phraseology\u00e2\u0080\u0094 so ardent, if I may be per-\\nmitted to use the expression, have some folk in this world become\\nthat they are willing to adopt anything if it involves the grant of\\nHawaii to this country, whatever may be the authority or what-\\never may be the language.\\nMr. President, some may be surprised that gentlemen of ability\\nand erudition, whose duty commands them to this Chamber, pay\\nbut little attention to this momentous subject. Many of them do\\nnot hesitate to announce elsewhere than in their seats that they\\n2571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "are not in sympathy with this resolution, but they have made up\\ntheir minds to swallow it, whatever it is or may be, and the less\\nthey know about it the less strain upon consciences already some-\\nwhat exerted.\\nBut there are many matters other than the mere form of this\\nresolution, there are numerous propositions besides those involved\\nin the power of Congress; yet I think that, before entering into\\ninquiries as to the merits of the case outside of the Constitution,\\nit may not be amiss to ascertain whether we contemplate tram-\\npling upon the organic law in which we all profess to believe. I\\nhave heard it said upon this floor by a Senator not now in the\\nChamber, but a very ardent annexationist, that the Constitution,\\nafter all, has nothing to do with annexation. Well, Mr. President,\\nif we may select from the many topics before us those which in\\nour opinion had better be regarded in the absence of the Consti-\\ntution, if that be a field for personal discretion and whim, we\\nmight as well eliminate that instrument from all thought and\\navoid its application to any controversy whatsoever.\\nThe Senator from Georgia [Mr. Bacon], in a very powerful ad-\\ndress delivered yesterday, pointed out, from the debates in this\\nbody, that there never was a time or a day when any lawyer here\\nclaimed that the Congress of the United States, by .-joint resolu-\\ntion, had a right to appropriate territory or to do anything save ad-\\nmit new States. It is a stock argument for those who are in favor\\nof Hawaiian annexation to declare that Texas is an example; that\\nthat State was admitted by joint resolution after a treaty had\\nbeen rejected, and that, therefore, we may admit Hawaii, not as\\na State, but as a dependency, a Territory, or what not, upon that\\nprecedent. I repudiate this so-called argument. I deem it my\\nduty to call attention to some of the decisions relied upon by the\\nCommittee on Foreign Relations in support of their contention\\non this point, and to certain precedents in the way of declarations\\nof statesmen in both Houses, which have not yet been cited.\\nI assume, to begin with, as I have said, that we are for the first\\ntime endeavoring to annex extraneous territory, not as a new\\nState, by joint resolution, and that there is no precedent for such\\nlegislation. What was the condition in Texas? The Congress of\\nthe United States did not adopt an y such monstrous piece of con-\\ntradiction and false statement as that reposing in the joint reso-\\nlution to which I have adverted. It did not declare that there\\nhad been a cession when there was no cession. On the contrary,\\nthe first resolution adopted was as follows:\\nNo. 8.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Joint resolution for annexing Texas to the United States.\\nResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of\\nAmerica in Congress assembled, That Congress doth consent that the terri-\\ntory properly included within and rightfully belonging to the Republic of\\nTexas may be erected into a new State, to be called the State of Texas, with\\na republican form of government, to be adopted by the people of said repub-\\nlic, by deputies in convention assembled, with the consent of the existing\\ngovernment, in order that the same mas be admitted as one of the States of\\nthis Union.\\n)l. And be it further resolved. That the foregoing consent of Congress is\\ngiven upon the following conditions, and with the following guaranties,\\nto wit: First, said State is to be formed subject to the adjustment by this\\nGovernment of all questions of boundary tnat may arise with other gov-\\nernments; and the constitution thereof, with the proper evidence of its\\nadoption by the people of said Republic of Texas, shall be transmitted to the\\nPresident of the United States, to be laid before Congress for its final action,\\non or before the 1st day of January, 18i0. Second, said State, when admitted\\ninto the Union, after ceding to the United States all public edifices, fortifi-\\ncations, barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy-yards, docks, maga-\\nzines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means pertaining to the\\npublic defense belonging to said Republic of Texa-,, shall retain all the public\\n3571", "height": "4329", "width": "2582", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "8\\nfunds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind which may belong to or may be\\ndue and owing said Republic, and shall also retain all the vacant and unap-\\npropriated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the\\ndebts and liabilities of said Republic of Texas, and the residue of said lands,\\nafter discharging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said State may\\ndirect; but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon\\nthe Government of the United States. Third, new States of convenient size,\\nnot exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having\\nsufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed\\nout of the territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the\\nprovisions of the Federal Constitution. And such States as may be formed\\nout of that portion of said territory lying south of 36\u00c2\u00b0 30 north latitude, com-\\nmonly known as the Missouri compromise line, shall be admitted into the\\nUnion with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission\\nmay desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said terri-\\ntory north of said Missouri compromise line slavery or involuntary servitude\\n(except for crime) shall be prohibited.\\n3. And be it further resolved, That if the President of the United States\\nshall, in his judgment and discretion, deem it most advisable, instead of pro-\\nceeding to submit the foregoing resolution to the Republic of Texas as an\\noverture on the part of the United States for admission, to negotiate with\\nthat Republic; then,\\nBe it resolved, That a State, to be formed out of the present Republic of\\nTexas, with suitable extent and boundaries, and with two Representatives in\\nCongress, until the next apportionment of representation, shall be admitted\\ninto the Union by virtue of this act. on an equal footing with the existing\\nStates, as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission and the cession\\nof the remaining Texan territory to the United States shall be agreed upon\\nby the Government of Texas and the United States: and that the sum of\\n\u00c2\u00a7100,000 be, and the same is hereby, appropriated to defray the expenses of\\nmissions and negotiations to agree upon the terms of said admission and ces-\\nsion, either by treaty to be submitted to the Senate or by articles to be sub-\\nmitted to the two Houses of Congress, as the President may direct.\\nApproved March 1, 1845 (5 Statutes at Large, page 798).\\nAfter this, such proceedings were had in Texas that the Con-\\ngress of the United States on the 29th day of December, 1845,\\nadopted another joint resolution, as follows:\\nNo. 1. Joint resolution for the admission of the State of Texas into the\\nUnion.\\nWhereas the Congress of the United States, by a joint resolution approved\\nMarch 1, 1845, did consent that the territory properly included within and\\nrightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas might be erected into a new\\nState, to be called the State of Texas, with a republican form of government,\\nto be adopted by the people of said Republic by deputies in convention as\\nsembled, with the consent of the existing Government, in order that the same\\nmight be admitted as one of the States of the Union, which consent of Con-\\ngress was given upon certain conditions specified in the first and second sec-\\ntions of said joint resolution; and\\nWhereas the people of the said Republic of Texas, by deputies in conven-\\ntion assembled, with the consent of the existing Government, did adopt a con-\\nstitution and erect a new State with a republican form of government, and\\nin the name of the people of Texas, and by their authority, did ordain and\\ndeclare that they assented to and accepted the proposals, conditions, and guar-\\nanties contained in said first and second sections of said resolution; and\\nWhereas the said constitution, with the proper evidence of its adoption by\\nthe people of the Republic of Texas, has been transmitted to the President\\nof the United States and laid before Congress, in conformity to the provisions\\nof said joint resolution: Therefore,\\nResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of\\nAmerica in Congress assembled, That the State of Texas shall be one, and is\\nhereby declared, to be one, of the United States of America, and admitted\\ninto the Union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects\\nwhatever.\\nSec. 2. And be it further resolved. That until the Representatives in Con-\\ngress shall be apportioned according to an actual emimeration of the inhabit-\\nants of the United States, the State of Texas shall be entitled to choose two\\nRepresentatives.\\nApproved, December 29, 1815. (9 Statutes at Large, page 10S.)\\nMr. President, it will be observed that in the Texas instance\\nthere was no unsustained reference to any cession, no pretense\\nthat the people of Texas had made any grant of their territory to\\nthe United States, and yet that statement might have been made\\no5Tl", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "9\\nin the face of the defeat of that treaty in the Senate with the same\\npropriety that it is asserted in the pending joint resolution, for\\nthe Hawaiian so-called treaty stands unratified by the Senate.\\nEqually impotent is it as a document of legal effect, equally value-\\nless as a grant, equally nugatory for any other purpose, standing\\nunratified as though it had been rejected.\\nPerhaps there may be this qualification, that it is subject to\\nratification, whereas a defeated treaty can not be made the basis\\nfor any affirmation; but so far as its legal potentiality is con-\\ncerned, it is just as worthless to-day in the hands of the Secretary\\nof this body unratified as though it had been rejected. It is not\\na treaty. The essential element of ratification here is wanting.\\nAnd yet the Committee on Foreign Relations and the advocates\\nof annexation, in the face of this obvious truth, speak of this\\nattempted and unconsummated act as a cession, and ask the Sen-\\nate to place itself upon record as holding that an unratified treaty\\ninvolves the cession or grant of a republic.\\nMr. President, there was no such contradiction in the Texas\\ncase. There was a proposition made by the Congress of the United\\nStates, and the conditions contained in the first joint resolution\\nalready read were accepted by Texas, and thereupon the Congress\\npassed another joint resolution making it of record that those\\nconditions have been complied with, and then everything was\\ncomplete. There was no cession of territory in the joint resolu-\\ntion. Texas was admitted as a State under the specific language\\nof the Constitution. That phraseology has already been men-\\ntioned, but perhaps it will do no harm to read it again. How-\\never futile, as far as its effect upon those who do not care to listen\\nmay be, it is well to register here that some one has some regard\\nfor the organic law and is not disposed to ignore it. Section 3 of\\nArticle IV of our Constitution is as follows:\\nNew States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but nonew\\nState shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State;\\nnor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or part of\\nStates, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concarned as\\nwell as of the Congress.\\nThe Senator from Georgia [Mr. Bacon] with that clearness\\nwhich is his characteristic, gave us the true reading and inter-\\npretation of that paragraph. I do not intend to fully traverse\\nthe field which he so ably considered except as it may be neces-\\nsary in an incidental way, but I wish to incorporate here the ap-\\npropriate language cited by the Senator from Georgia from Mr.\\nThurman. (Congressional Globe, part 1, third session Forty-first\\nCongress, page 193.)\\nMr. Thurman. I believe, sir, it is proper enough for me to say, for I think\\nthe President himself says it in his annual message, that a treaty was negoti-\\nated for the annexation of Dominica to the United States, and that that\\ntreaty failed to receive the requisite votes in favor of its ratification, thus\\ndisclosing the fact that between the President of the United States and the\\nSenate there is a direct opposition of opinion upon the subject of this acqui-\\nsition.\\nNow, not willing to defer to the opinion of the Senator\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and I do not say\\nthat in order to blame him; he has a right to his own opinion\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the President,\\nwith very great earnestness, urges upon Congress and upon the country the\\ndesirableness of this acquisition, and hegoas so far as to suggest the mode by\\nwhich Dominica may be annexed. Seeing that it is not likely to be annexed\\nunder the treaty-making power for want of the requisite support in the Sea-\\nate, he suggests that it may be annexed by joint resolution, as in the case of\\nTexas; and it is with a view to carry out, no doubt, the wishes or opinions of\\nthe President in this particular that the Senator from Indiana has introduced\\nthe joint resolution.\\nNow, the first thing that strikes me is this: Is the Senate ready to recede\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "10\\nfrom, its position? Is the Senate willing to ratify a treaty for the annexation\\nof Dominica, or is the Senate ready to annex Dominica by joint resolution?\\nAnd in that connection I beg leave to call the attention of the Senate to\\nthe fact that you can not by joint resolution annex Dominica as a Territory;\\nyou must annex her as a State if you annex her by joint resolution. There\\nis no clause in the Constitution of the United States that provides for the\\nacquisition of territory by joint resolution of Congress unless it be one single\\nprovision, and that is that the Congress may admit new States into the Union.\\nAnd it was upon the argument that there was no limitation upon that power\\nto admit new States into the Union, that it was not limited to territory be-\\nlonging to the United States, but that territory belonging to a foreign power\\nmight be admitted into the Union as a State.\\nIt was upon that doctrine that the resolution in the case of Texas was\\npassed. But no one has ever pretended that you could by joint resolution\\nannex territory as a Territory without admitting it as a State. Then, if a\\ntreaty is to be abandoned, the proposition which is before the Senate is, Is\\nthis Senate prepared to annex Dominica in its present condition?\\nNobody, I think, has the least idea that any treaty for its annexation can\\nbe ratified. This Senate is not so ignorant that it did not know every essen-\\ntial thing in this resolution when it voted on the treaty. It would be to stul-\\ntify ourselves to say that there is one single material inquiry in all this reso-\\nlution that was not known to the Senate when it voted on the treaty; and\\nunless the Senators who were opposed to that treaty are willing to recede\\nfrom their opposition and ratify a treaty that may be formed, it follows that\\nthis resolution can only be put forward with the view of annexing Dominica\\nby joint resolution, and that, as I said before, you can not do unless you are\\nwilling to take her in as a State.\\nThat is what Allen G. Thurman said in this Chamber in the\\nyear 1870.\\nI say again that no man on this floor, I think, has the least idea that a\\ntreaty of annexation can receive the requisite number of votes for its ratifi-\\ncation, and therefore\u00e2\u0080\u0094and I can not, perhaps, repeat it too often\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the only\\nquestion is, Will you annex Dominica as a State?\\nI will quote from several able men who were heard from in the\\nTexas debate, showing that in that remarkable discussion every\\nadvocate of annexation grounded his faith upon the specific grant\\ncontained in the Constitution to admit new States. Indeed, in\\nthat great controversy, notable not only for the learning which\\nwas evolved, but for the statesmanship which was manifested,\\nthere was no one who took the ground of a recent eminent states-\\nman who said that we can admit Hawaii under the general-wel-\\nfare clause of the Constitution.\\nThis novel extension of the general-welfare clause deserves to\\nbe classed with the somewhat more candid utterance of another,\\nwho asked, What is the Constitution between friends?\\nWithout taking time to read in full speeches which I have tried\\nto examine, I will quote very briefly from some of the addresses\\nmade during the Texas debate in enforcement of the statement\\nwhich I have just made. Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee, afterwards\\nPresident of the United States and then in the House of Repre-\\nsentatives, on the 21st of January, 1815, said:\\nThe admission of a sovereign State into the Union is not an acquisition of\\nterritory in the sense that territory is or can be acquired under the treaty-\\nmaking power. Tbey are wholly different.\\nMr. Johnson was talking of admission by joint resolution. He\\nrecognized the distinction upon which I insist.\\nI quote from page 222, Appendix, Congressional Globe.\\nMr. Douglas, of Illinois, also in the House of Representatives,\\non the 6th of January, 1845, page 67 of the Appendix to the Con-\\ngressional Globe, said, in alluding to the proceedings of the Con-\\nstitutional Convention:\\nAll of the propositions, after meeting with some favor at first, were finally\\nrejected, and the general clause as it now stands in the Constitution, provid-\\ning that new States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union, was\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "11\\nadopted in lion of them. Thus it will be perceived that instead of restricting\\nthe power as it existed in the articles of confederation, it was greatly en-\\nlarged in the Constitution so as to authorize Congress to admit new States\\nby a vote of a majority of each House, whether within the original limits\\nof the United States or not.\\nMr. Tibbatts, of Kentucky, on January 13, 1845. page 110 of the\\nsame Appendix, said:\\nMr. Madison, who was the author of that number (fourteenth nxrmber of\\nthe Federalist), says: The immediate object of the Federal Constitution is\\nto secure the union of the thirteen primitive States, which we know to be\\npracticable, and to add to them such other States as may arise in their bosoms\\nor in their neighborhood, which we can not doubt to be equally practicable.\\nThus, according to the interpretation given this power by Mr. Madison,\\nthe Constitution provides, first, for the union of the then existing thirteen\\nStates; secondly, for the admission of new States which arise out of the orig-\\ninal States; and thirdly, for the admission of such other States as might\\narise in the neighborhood of the thirteen primitive States.\\nMr. Bowlin, of Missouri, whose remarks are found on page 93\\nof the Appendix to the Congressional Globe, said:\\nNow, sir, what says the Constitution itself upon the subject of the admis-\\nsion of new States into the Confederacy? It says: New States may be ad-\\nmitted by the Congress into this Union. 1 This is the express language of the\\nConstitution, and without any restriction, except so far as it concerns the\\ndivision or amalgamation of existing States. Can language be more compre-\\nhensive than this? The power is here given in the very broadest terms.\\nMr. Colquitt, of Georgia, a Senator, on page 254 of the Appen-\\ndix to the Congressional Globe, said:\\nHonorable Senators seem to blend the idea of acquiring territory and ad-\\nmitting States and thereby produce confusion. It is insisted that we nrust\\nacquire territory by treaty! Let this be so, and it does not touch the argu-\\nment. For it is absolutely certain that you can not admit a State into the\\nUnion by treaty, that power being conferred alone upon Congress.\\nAnd here will be. found throughout all that discussion the state-\\nment by every advocate of Texas s annexation\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and I have only\\nread from them that the right and the authority of the United\\nStates to admit Texas were granted and delegated by the explicit\\nphraseology of the Constitution itself; that the power to admit\\nnew States was not limited to the original thirteen, nor even, as\\nMr. Madison had said, to those in their immediate neighborhood,\\nbut that it was a grant to Congress to bring into this sisterhood\\nanother member; a grant explicitly made, and one which could\\nnot be denied in the case of Texas without imposing a limitation\\nupon the constitutional phraseology not to be discovered in the\\ninstrument itself.\\nIt never struck any of those great statesmen who at that time\\ndiscussed this matter of momentous import that there was any\\nother authority than that to which they referred, and from that\\ntime to this I imagine the action of the Congress has been justi-\\nfied by reason of that power in the Constitution. There was a\\npowerful element holding that the power to admit new States\\nwas limited to the area described by Mr. Madison, but no one pre-\\ntended to seek refuge in or under the general- welfare clause.\\nAgain I quote from Senator Colquitt, page 254 of the same doc-\\nument:\\nThe argument I have just made is based upon the supposition that by ad-\\nmitting Texas as a State this Government acquires the territory of Texas.\\nI have thought proper to enforce this view because it seems impossible for\\nsome minds to conceive how Texas can become a member of the Union un-\\nless this Government does thereby acquire her territory. To my mind the\\ndistinction is manifest, and that by the resolutions from the House we ac-\\nquire no territory, but leave Texas as a State, possessed of her entire domain,\\nto dispose of as she pleases, under our Constitution, fixing only the terms by\\nwhich she may become a confederate. The acquisition of territory is one\\nthing; the admission of a State is another and totally different.\\n\u00c2\u00a3o71", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "12\\nMr. Yancey, of Alabama, on the 7th of January, 1845, page 86,\\nsame Appendix, said:\\nISTo man can doubt the constitutional power to admit Texas as a new\\nState. That being so, some such proposition must be united on.\\nSenator Woodbury, who was one of the ablest of the advocates\\nof the annexation of Texas, said, among other things, during the\\nsame debate:\\nAnd upon what grounds, then, did the honorable Senator from Virginia\\nsay that the House, in passing these resolutions, were assuming an executive\\npower? In adopting these resolutions, did it not leave the ratification of\\ntreaties to the Senate, as it was before? Gentlemen will say, How can this\\nbe when the Senate refused to ratify the treaty of Texas at the last session,\\nwhen the matter was referred to them? He would explain the difference.\\nIn that case the attempt, by treaty, was not to admit Texas into this Union.\\nNo such proposition was made. We might buy one acre or a million of acres\\nof territory by treaty, but that was not admitting her into the Union as a\\nState. There was no proposition in that treaty to admit her into the Union\\nas a State. He said then, when that treaty was pending, that if ever she was\\nadmitted as a State, it must be by Congress. That was what was now un-\\ndertaken to be done. Do we propose to admit her as a Territory, not as a\\nState? On the contrary, the treaty is repudiated, and we proceed to admit\\nher as a State by this resolution.\\nAt the last session of Congress we were acting under the grant in the\\nConstitution given to the treaty-making power. He need not talk of that.\\nWe were now acting upon the power conferred upon Congress and not upon\\nthe treaty- making power to admit new States. G-entlemen, therefore, made\\nnothing by saying that we refused to ratify the treaty presented to us at the\\nlast session of Congress. There was no treaty before us now. It was an en-\\ntirely different subject\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that of making Texas a State. It was different in\\nsubstance as well as in form. Now the attempt is made to deny to Congress\\nthis express grant.\\nMr. Woodbury, in continuation, remarked that the question dis-\\ncussed in those letters was the acquisition of territory; the question of tho\\nadmission of new States did not arise till nine years afterwards. Mr. Jeffer-\\nson was not, like Mr. Nicholas or Mr. Madison, a member of the convention,\\nand therefore not so well acquainted with the grounds of argument which\\nhad prevailed in it. But even if the inference drawn from Mr. Jefferson s\\nopinions were fairly deducible from them, the cases are not parallel ones.\\nThe propriety of admitting territory by treaty and new States by legislation\\ncan not be treated as the same issue. The treaty- making power and legisla-\\ntive power in those different cases are not in conflict.\\nThere are many similar enunciations occurring during that\\ndiscussion, and all of which tend, as far as those who took this\\nview, to the point that under the Constitution the power is given\\nto Congress to admit new States, and that such admission is au-\\nthorized regardless of locality, but that the right to act does not\\ninclude anything outside of the terms of the instrument, viz.,\\nnew States.\\nMr. President, how can a joint resolution such as this be opera-\\ntive? What is the legislative jurisdiction of Congress? Does it\\nextend over Hawaii? May we in this anticipatory manner reach\\nout beyond the sea and assert our authority under a resolution of\\nCongress within the confines of that independent nation? Where\\nis our right, our grant of power, to do this? Where do we\\nfind it? Some assume to discover it in the supposition that there\\nhas been a cession, which has in truth never been made. Hawaii\\nis foreign to us. We base our jurisdiction upon a falsehood de-\\nsired to be made conclusive in a resolution the verity of which it\\nis said can not be attacked, however groundless it may be. The\\ncommittee in this document assert that a cession has been accom-\\nplished, because they well know that we have otherwise no power\\nto act.\\nThe right of Congress to admit new territory by treaty has been\\noften considered. It puzzled Mr. Jefferson in the Louisiana case,\\nand notwithstanding the assurances of Mr. Gallatin, he always\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "13\\nappeared to have doubts as to the propriety of his course. But\\neminent statesmen who have succeeded him, jurists who have con-\\nstrued the Constitution have not found any considerable difficulty.\\nMr. Justice Story, in his great work upon the Constitution, has\\nadverted to the treaty-making power, and has sought, in so far as\\nit is pertinent to this matter, to some extent to define and explain\\nit. I may be pardoned perhaps if I refer to Justice Story. It is\\nbecoming in this new era an improper thing to rely upon the fathers\\nof the Republic and those who succeeded them. When one reads\\nfrom Washington a smile passes over the countenances of the\\nhopeful investors in the Philippines. Washington was of the old\\nand nonprogressive time!\\nThe man who to-day will pin his faith to the doctrines of those\\nmen who laid the foundations of this Republic and recorded in\\nconstitutional monuments their definitions of human rights and\\ntheir ideas of the true limitations of the powers of government\\nis becoming somewhat of a fogy. We are told that there is a\\nnew era dawning upon us; that a better time has come. Light\\nwhich did not shine upon earlier statesmen illumines the under-\\nstanding of to-day. No man who can pen a line and who aspires\\nto popularity and to the advocacy of what he calls progress ques-\\ntions the superiority of his own attainments as contrasted with\\nWashington, Hamilton, or Jefferson.\\nBut, Mr. President, enough as to that now. Judge Story (2\\nStory on Constitution, section 1324) says:\\nAs the General Government possesses the right to acquire territory either\\nby conquest or by treaty, it would seem to follow as an inevitable consequence\\nthat it possesses the power to govern what it has so acquired. The territory\\ndoes not when so acquired become entitled to self-government, and it is not\\nsubject to the .jurisdiction of any State. It must consequently be under the\\ndominion and jurisdiction of the Union, or it would be without any govern-\\nment at all. In cases of conquest the usage of the world is, if a nation is not\\nwholly subdued, to consider the conquered territory as merely held by mili-\\ntary occupation until its fate shall be determined by a treaty of peace; but\\nduring this intermediate period it is exclusively subject to the government of\\nthe conqueror. In cases of confirmation or cession by treaty the acquisition\\nbecomes firm and stable, and the ceded territory becomes apart of the nation\\nto which it is annexed, either on terms stipulated in the treaty or on such as\\nits new master shall impose, etc.\\nAnd Kent, who belongs to the same race of statesmen, not the\\nlater edition, says (1 Commentaries, thirteenth edition, page 166):\\nThe department of the Government that is intrusted by the Constitution\\nwith the treaty-making power is competent to bind the national faith in its\\ndiscretion, for the power to make treaties of peace must be coextensive with\\nthe exigencies of the nation, and necessarily involves in it that portion of the\\nnational sovereignty which has the exclusive direction of diplomatic nego-\\ntiations and contracts with foreign powers. All treaties made by that power\\nbecome of absolute efficacy because they are the supreme law of the land.\\nThere can be no doubt that the power competent to bind the nation by treaty\\nmay alienate the public domain and property by treaty. The power\\nthat is intrusted generally and largely with authority to make valid treaties\\nof peace can, of course, bind the nation by alienation of part of its territory.\\nThis authority, unless repudiated, ought to set at rest the con-\\ntention that territory can not be acquired by treaty.\\nMr. President, when we reflect as to the lines which demark\\nthe jurisdiction of the legislature, we must confine that depart-\\nment to our own nation. We can not, as I said before, extend\\nour legislative right to act without until there has been some\\nauthority by which that which is without is brought within.\\nWhence do acts of Congress go? Upon whom do they operate?\\nUpon the people of the United States. They have no efficacy be-\\nyond the United States except in so far as they influence the con-\\nduct of her people in certain excepted cases, and those exceptions\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "14\\nare more apparent than real. They are impotent to effect the\\ntitle or the status of the property of those who live upon alien\\nsoil. Where, then, do we obtain the authority to annex unless by\\nsome treaty provision? As Chancellor Kent has well said in\\nspeaking of treaties:\\nThe power to make treaties of peace\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nWhich he was then considering, and his remarks apply, of\\ncourse, to treaties in general\\nmust be coextensive with the exigencies of the nation, and necessarily in-\\nvolves in it that portion of the national sovereignty which has the exclusive\\ndirection of diplomatic negotiations and contracts with foreign powers.\\nAnd, indeed, we have acted upon that theory. We have sought\\nwherever we have attempted to bring foreign territory within\\nour confines to make a treaty of peace. Does it matter that in\\nthe case which resulted in the acquisition of California and adja-\\ncent territory domain still was left to the grantor, to Mexico? If\\nthe power to alienate a part requires a treaty, shall we say that\\nless consultation must be had when it is intended to convey all?\\nReflection for but a moment must convince, it seems to me, the\\nimpartial mind that prior to the extension of our legislative juris-\\ndiction something must happen bringing the foreign nation to us.\\nIn the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations there is a\\nbrief reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United\\nStates. In many instances jurists of not only ordinary repute\\nbut who stand in the front rank of their profession have used ex-\\npressions not pertinent to the actual issue under consideration,\\nwhich, when applied to other questions directly involving the mat-\\nter thus incidentally treated, may not be considered strictly ac-\\ncurate.\\nThese are called obiter dicta. They are to be encountered, I be-\\nlieve, in every line of authority in this country and elsewhere. Yet\\nupon the topic concerning which I am now addressing the Senate\\nthere is but little in this regard that requires explanation or com-\\nment from me. It will be found that about the only phrase which\\npervades any of the opinions cited and which can be relied upon at\\nall to justify the acquisition of foreign territory by legislative act\\nis the declaration of the competency of Congress to acquire by\\ntreaty or conquest; the treaty being the result of a negotiation of\\nthe Executive and the Senate, the other the assertion of the war\\npower.\\nLet us for a moment the task will not, I trust, be uninstruct-\\nive or tedious consider what has been said in some of these opin-\\nions. All, I believe, save two are adverted to in the report of the\\nCommittee on Foreign Relations.\\nIn American, etc., Company (1 Peters, 540), Chief Justice Mar-\\nshall said, in speaking of the cession of Florida, which, as we\\nknow, was acquired by treaty:\\nThe treaty is the law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to\\nthe enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the\\nUnited States. It is unnecessary to inquire whether this is not their condi-\\ntion independent of stipulation. They do not, however, participate in polit-\\nical power; they do not share in the Government till Florida shall become a\\nState. In the meantime Florida continues to be a Territory of the United\\nStates, governed by virtue of that clause in the Constitution which empowers\\nCongress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory\\nor other property belonging to the United States.\\nIn the same opinion he further said:\\nThe Constitution confers additionally on the Government of the United\\nStates the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently that\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "15\\nGovernment possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest\\nor by treaty.\\nMr. President, is there any pretense in this case that we are about\\nto acquire dominion over Hawaii by conquest? Arguments were\\nmade in this Chamber by many Senators some time ago having for\\ntheir object the maintenance of the proposition that we had really\\nsubdued or were responsible for the subjugation of Hawaii. But\\nthat hour is past. No such decision was rendered by the Senate, and\\nthe free and independent character of the Hawaiian Government\\nwas accepted not merely by a recognition by our Executive of its\\nministers, but by the explicit resolution of the Senate and its declara-\\ntion that no foreign government would be permitted to intervene.\\nIndeed, the resolution was broader than that, and is somewhat sig-\\nnificant as applicable here and as involving the then unanimous\\nopinion of this body.\\nOn the 31st of May, 1894, in the Journal of the Senate, page 218,\\nof that time, the following will be found:\\nResolved, That of right it belongs wholly to the people of the Hawaiian\\nIslands to establish and maintain their own form of government and domes-\\ntic policy; that the United States ought in no wise to interfere therewith:\\nand that any intervention in the political affairs of these islands by any other\\ngovernment will be regarded as an act unfriendly to the United States.\\nThere was a roll-call upon the passage of that resolution. The\\nyeas were 55, the nays none. There is, therefore, no question here\\nas to any right acquired by conquest. There can be no justifica-\\ntion for the pretense that this Government, in aid of its interests\\nin war, has seized upon hostile territory and occupied it, and holds\\nit by that force and by that right. There is no such case here.\\nHow then, taking the language of Chief Justice Marshall cited\\nin justification of the pending resolution, can that phraseology be\\ntortured into an indorsement of this anomalous, this unique pro-\\ncedure suggested for the first time in the history of this Govern-\\nment? Have we acquired Hawaii by treaty? No. Against the\\nassumption of this resolution every Senator here knows that there\\nhas been no acquisition.\\nContinuing the examination of the authorities relied upon and\\nothers noted elsewhere, we find in New Orleans vs. Armas\\n(9 Peters, 235) that Chief Justice Marshall construed the treaty\\nwith France by which Louisiana was acquired, referring to the\\nfact that she was admitted as a State by an act after the treaty of\\ncession had been ratified.\\nMr. President., a few moments ago I said, and it will do no harm\\nto repeat it now, that those who discussed the Texas case pointed\\nwith unerring accuracy to the fact that there was there no cession\\nof territory whatever, but that Congress by virtue of its power to\\nadmit new States brought in that Commonwealth as such. Here\\nwe are expected to reach out the legislative arm beyond the do-\\nmain of the United States, under whose laws this Senate exists,\\nand to assert dominion not only without our shores but beyond\\nthe confines of the Government with which we are concerned.\\n[At this point the PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gallinger)\\nannounced that the hour of 2 o clock had arrived; and, by unani-\\nmous consent, the consideration of House joint resolution 259 was\\nproceeded with.]\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, a case much relied upon is Flem-\\ning vs. Page (9 Howard, 611), where the Chief Justice refers to\\nthe fact that Mexico had been conquered, and he says:\\nThe United States, it U true, may extend its boundaries by conquest or\\ntreaty, and may demand the cession of territory as the condition of peace in.\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "16\\norder to indemnify its citizens for the injuries they have suffered, or to re-\\nimburse the Government for the expenses of the war; but this can be clone\\nonly by the treaty-making power or the legislative authority, and is not a\\npart of the power conferred upon the President by the declaration of war.\\nThe expression or the legislative authority has been fre-\\nquently cited as justifying the statement that Congress had the\\npower itself to annex foreign territory. It will be noticed, taking\\nthe phraseology all together and reading the opinion in toto, that\\nthe point under consideration was as to the war power of the Ex-\\necutive; and it is of some significance, in connection with recent\\nrumors as to a supposed stretch of authority that it was said the\\nPresident intended to exert, and which I have no idea he ever did\\nintend to exert, that he can not, as the Commander in Chief of the\\narmies of the United States, seize territory and appropriate it to\\nthe use of this nation, and therefore, a fortiori, he may not absorb\\nby his own will the soil the territory of a friendly power.\\nNo^loubt, in pursuit of the objects outlined in a declaration of\\nwar and as the leader of the armies of this Republic, its Com-\\nmander in Chief has a right to invade and to appropriate property\\nof the enemy coming within his reach and which he may have the\\npower to hold. He derives that authority under the war grants\\nof the Constitution. But he has no right to seize territory with-\\nout the enemy s lines. His taking of the enemy s territory is for\\nthe object and purposes of war to accomplish peace by removing\\nopposition. The Executive can not alone annex a State or a Ter-\\nritory. He can capture the foe and his property.\\nBut, Mr. President, it will be found by a perusal of this opinion\\nthat there is nothing more in it than a statement that by con-\\nquest or treaty this Government has the right to extend its limits.\\nIn neither event can the proposed resolution be justified, however\\nwe may construe this declaration of the Chief Justice, because\\nneither by treaty nor pursuant to conquest is the legislative au-\\nthority or the treaty-making authority now invoked.\\nThe following extract from the opinion of Justice Taney in the\\ncelebrated Dred Scott decision (19 Howard, 393) is relied upon as\\nsustaining the authority of Congress to annex a Territory:\\nWe do not mean, however, to (Question the power of Congress in this re-\\nspect. The power to expand the territory of the United States by the ad-\\nmission of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of this power\\nby all the departments of the Government, it has been held to authorize the-\\nacquisition of territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted\\nas soon ar, its population and situation would entitle it to admission. It is\\nacquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by\\nCongress with absolute authority; and a.3 the propriety of admitting a new\\nState is committed to sound discretion of Congress, the power to acquire ter-\\nritory for that purpose, to be held by the United States until it is in a suit-\\nable condition to become a State upon an equal footing with the other States,\\nmust rest upon the samp discretion. It is a question fur the political depart-\\nment of the Government, and not the judicial; and whatever the political\\ndepartment of the Government shall recognize as within the limits of the\\nUnited States, the judicial Department is also bound to recognize, and to ad-\\nminister in it the laws of the United States, so far as they apply.\\nIt must be remembered that the question involved in that case\\nwas not whether the territory could be annexed by joint reso-\\nlution or by treaty, and the phraseology of the court can only be\\ndeemed effective in so far as it holds that the political department\\nof the Government may take in outside possessions, intending to\\nhave in view their erection into a State or States. This opinion\\nappears to be considered of importance by many who have here-\\ntofore vigorously questioned it.\\nIn the same decision, Judge Taney said:\\nThere is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Gov-\\nernment to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or\\n\u00c2\u00a3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "17\\nat a distance to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to enlarge its\\nterritorial limits in any way except by the admission of new States, etc.\\nEvidently the author of this much controverted opinion did not\\nanticipate the bringing in of Hawaii or the Philippines.\\nIn Holden vs. Joy, in 17 Wallace, 211, Judge Clifford, in speak-\\ning for the court, said:\\nExpress power is given to the President, by and with the advice and con-\\nsent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators\\npresent concur, and inasmuch as the power is given in general terms, with-\\nout any description or ihe objects intended to be embraced within its scope,\\nit must l*e assumed that the framers of the Constitution intended that it\\nshould extend to all those objects which in the intercourse of nations had\\nusually been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation and treaty, if\\nnot inconsistent with the nature of our Government and the relation between\\nthe States and the United State.?.\\nHence it is that under the treaty-making power as thus defined\\nthe right to acquire territory exists. Hence it is that without\\nnegotiation between this Government and the other interested\\ngovernment culminating in a stipulation or a treaty, there can be\\nno accession of territory, no addition of soil.\\nIt is not germane to this discussion to say that we can admit\\nHawaii as a State, because no one proposes to do so. No enthu-\\nsiast here or elsewhere claims that Hawaii is ready for statehood.\\nEvery argument made upon this subject by annexationists carries\\nwith it a disclaimer that it is intended in our own time or for\\nyears and years to come to bring that region within the list of\\nAmerican States. Of course this claim must be made because\\nthe people of this country are not prepared, notwithstanding the\\ndeclarations of the able and distinguished Senator from Alabama\\n[Mr. Morgan] that this is the best Government the sun has ever\\nshone upon, to bring those many alien incompetents within our\\nconfines that heterogeneous compound of manifest inefficiency.\\nIn the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations attention\\nis called to the late case of the Mormon Church vs. The United\\nStates (13G U. S., 42). I claim that this is an authority directly\\nagainst the distinguished Senators who cite it, and that there is\\nnothing to be found in it warranting the pretense that this joint\\nresolution, if adopted, is constitutionally potential for the pur-\\nposes attributed to it. Said the Supreme Court in that case:\\nThe power to acquire territory other than the territory northwest of the\\nOhio River (which belonged to the United States at the adoption of the Con-\\nstitution is derived from the treaty-making power and the power to declare\\nand carry on war. The incidents of these powers are those of national sov-\\nereignty and belong to all independent governments. The power to make\\nacquisitions of territory by conquest, by treaty, and by cession is an incident\\nof national sovereignty.\\nSenators all recognize and admire the great abilities of Mr.\\nHamilton. His participancy not only in the formation of the\\nConstitution, but his advocacy of that great instrument and his\\ndefense of the principles upon which it wai based and the form in\\nwhich they were expressed have been transmitted to us and con-\\nstitute a part of the choicest literature of that remarkable time.\\nMr. Hamilton discussed the treaty-making power with his usual\\nforce and his accustomed clearness.\\nI call the attention of Senators to the remarks made by this law-\\nyer and statesman, hoping that, however little the argument then\\nmade may be reenforced by anything that I can say, his powerful\\nreasoning will not be disregarded by those who are examining this\\nresolution. I refer to page 508 of the seventh volume of the\\n\\\\7orks of Hamilton, from which I will very briefly quote.\\nThe power to make laws is th3 power of pronouncing authoritatively the\\nWill of the nation as to all persons and things over which it has jurisdiction;\\noo71\u00e2\u0080\u0094 2", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "18\\nor it may be defined to be the power of prescribing rules binding upon all\\npersons and things over which the nation has jurisdiction. It acts compul-\\nsively upon all persons, whether foreigners or citizens, and upon all things\\nwithin the territory of such nation, and also npon its own citizens and their\\nproperty without its territory in certain cases and under certain limitations.\\nBut it can have no obligatory action whatsoever upon a foreign nation, or\\nupon any person or thing within the jurisdiction of a foreign nation.\\nThe power of treaty, on the other hand, is the power by agreement, con-\\nvention, or compact to establish rules binding upon two or more nations,\\ntheir respective citizens and property. The rule established derives its re-\\nciprocal obligation from promise, from the faith which the contracting par-\\nties pledge to each other\u00e2\u0080\u0094 not from the power of either to prescribe a rule\\nfor the other. It is not here the will of a superior that commands. It is the\\nconsent of two independent parties that contract.\\nThe means which the power of legislation employs are laws which it enacts,\\nor rules which it enjoins. The subject upon which it acts is the nation of\\nwhom it is, the persons and property within the jurisdiction of the nation.\\nThe means which the power of treaty employs are contracts with other\\nnations, who may or may not enter into them. The subjects upon which it\\nacts are the nations contracting and those persons and things of each to\\nwhich the contract relates. Though a treaty may effect what a law can, yet\\na law can not effect what a treaty does. These discriminations are obvious\\nand decisive; and however the operation of a treaty may in some things\\nresemble that of a law, no two ideas are more distinct- than that of legislating\\nand that of contracting.\\nI have cited Mr. Hamilton s view for the purpose of showing to\\nthe Senate that the statement made by me as to the jurisdiction\\nof the legislative body over a foreign territory was not either a\\ncreation of my imagination nor in the slightest degree inaccurate.\\nCertainly it received this distinguished sanction, and it is enforced,\\nI think, by general reflection.\\nIn the same article from which this extract has been read we\\nfind the following, also from Mr. Hamilton:\\nLaws are the acts of legislation of a particular nation for itself. Treaties\\nare the acts of legislation of several nations for themselves jointly and recip-\\nrocally. The legislative powers of one State can not reach the cases which\\ndepend on the joint legislation of two or more States. For this resort must\\nbe had to the pactitious power, or the power of treaty. This is another atti-\\ntude of the subject, displaying the fallacy of the proposition that the legisla-\\ntive powers of Congress are exceptions to or limitations of the power of the\\nPresident, with the aid of the Senate, to make treaties.\\nWhenever it becomes necessary to enter into any sort of a com-\\npact or agreement with a foreign power, we can not proceed by\\nlegislation to make that contract. We can violate a treaty made\\nwith a foreign power by our own legislative act in defiance of\\nmorals. There have been cases in the history of this country where\\nthe abrogation and overthrow of treaties by legislative acts have\\ninvolved us in considerable diplomatic controversy; but as a legal\\nproposition there has never been any doubt of the power of the\\nlegislative department of the Government to destroy the effect of\\na previous treaty. While we may thus release ourselves by our\\nown power from its obligation in the form of law, we cannot force\\nanother nation to enter into an agreement with us merely by our\\nown act in the form of legislation. No such one-sided performance\\nis known to either international law or to any system of jurispru-\\ndence in the world.\\nA treaty, I have said, is defined by many to be a contract. So\\naccustomed have authors become to that expression that we find\\nin the ordinary and well-accredited law dictionaries of the day a\\nrecognition of this proposition. In Anderson s Dictionary of Law\\nthe word treaty is defined thus:\\nBy the general law of nations, is in the nature of a contract between two\\nnations; not a legislative act.\\nA contract between two or more independent nations.\\nContracts between States may be called conventions or treaties. Treaties\\nallowed by the law of nations are unconstrained acts of independent powers,\\nplacing them under an obligation to do something which is not wrong.\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "19\\nBouvier takes a similar view. He says:\\nTreaty. In international law. A treaty is a compact made between two\\nor more independent nations with a view to the public welfare. Treaties are\\nfor a perpetuity or for a considerable time. Those matters which are accom-\\nplished by a single act and are at once perfected in their execution are called\\nagreements, conventions, and pactions.\\nThe pending resolution does violence to basic and elementary\\nprinciples, and indicates to the outside world a wholesale dis-\\nregard or absolute ignorance of the most fundamental, common,\\nand usually known principles of jurisprudence.\\nMr. President, if it be true as stated in this decision that the\\nauthority to acquire territory is derived from the treaty-making\\npower, and the power to declare and carry on war, where do we\\nrind the right to annex these peaceful islands of the sea? Where\\nis the grant, where is the authority for which Senators contend?\\nWhen we speak of the power to do this, that, or the other thing\\nin pursuance of the right to declare war, we are alluding to a con-\\ndition of affairs which makes it necessary to strike down our foe.\\nWhen we talk about the jurisdiction of this Government in days\\nof peace when dealing with nations with whom it is friendly, a\\ndifferent condition surrounds us.\\nIt is not with the sword, it is not with weapons of destruction,\\nthat we are approaching the Hawaiian Republic, but it is the\\nsubtle negotiator of peace and ostensible good will who longs to\\nfasten Hawaii upon this Union. It is by diplomacy that we are\\nsolicited to bring her to us. It is by an instrument executed by\\nplenipotentiaries from both Governments and awaiting our rati-\\nfication that we are expected to bring that nation here, and it is\\nby that means alone that Hawaii herself contemplated annexa-\\ntion, for in her organic law and I refer to the thirty-second arti-\\ncle of her constitution, as follows:\\nArticle 32.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Treaties.\\nThe President, with the approval of the cabinet, shall have the power to\\nmake treaties with foreign governments, subject to the ratification of the\\nSenate.\\nThe President, with the approval of the cabinet, is hereby expressly au-\\nthorized and empowered to make a treaty of political or commercial union\\nbetween the Republic of Hawaii and the United States of America, subject\\nto the ratification of the Senate.\\nTHE HAWAIIAN CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PERMIT ANNEXATION BY JOINT\\nRESOLUTION.\\nMr. President, here in this so-called constitution of this so-called\\nRepublic, which by this so-called resolution of annexation is to be\\nmade a part of the American Union, as a Territory or a depend-\\nency, we find phraseology directly conferring the authority upon\\nPresident Dole and the Senate to make a treaty of political or\\ncommercial union with the United States.\\nUnder the expression political union the negotiation of the\\ntreaty which we had before us was sought to be justified. It was\\nwell known by the able and shrewd men who have had this an-\\nnexation scheme under control that the power of Mr. Dole and of\\nhis cabinet and his Senate to deed away their country would be\\ndenied. We, claiming to be a Government of limited powers and\\nto derive our authority from a Constitution granting either di-\\nrectly or by implication whatsoever authority we may have, were\\nnot expected to sanction or approve of a treaty destined to destroy\\na nationality unless in the instrument under which that nation-\\nality claimed to act there was plainly conferred authority to make\\nthat great cession. Therefore it was that in the Hawaiian con-\\nstitution there was inserted the thirty-second article, giving juris-\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "20\\ndiction to make treaties, as therein stated, of political as well as\\ncommercial union.\\nMr. President, it was thus recognized, not only here but in\\nHawaii, that by treaty alone could this deed be done. The neces-\\nsity of two parties, each sui juris, to concur in formulating a valid\\ncontract certainly is no less obvious in the case of two nations\\nthan in that of individuals, and in recognition of this commonly\\nknown truth the people of Hawaii, if they spoke at all, limited\\nthe method of alienation in their organic instrument. They lim-\\nited it in the terms and language to which I have adverted, and\\nwe accepted that limitation when our President negotiated a\\ntreaty, which is slumbering in the desk of the Secretary.\\nHence, from the outset it has been apparent not only to the peo-\\nple of the Hawaiian Islands, but to the people of the United States,\\nthat the circumstances are such as to require a treaty, not only\\nbecause of the difficulties of the situation so far as we are con-\\ncerned, but because there was no power in the Hawaiian Govern-\\nment to deal with the subject-matter otherwise than by treaty.\\nAre we to ignore not only the lessons of our own history, not only\\nthe precedents which have been written through years of study\\nand careful thought, but are we to take at this moment a nation\\nwithin our bosom which, by its own organic law, has declared\\nthat its alienation shall be accomplished in a certain definite, de-\\nfined, and restricted method, which method has been ignored.\\nDo we care, I ask again, Mr. President, anything not only for the\\nproprieties of the case, but for the rules prescribed in our own\\nlaws and in those of the country which we design to absorb? Are\\nwe disposed to play the role of the freebooter, or are we inclined\\nto act according to law?\\nHAWAII NOT THE ONLY ISSUE\u00e2\u0080\u0094 ACQUISITIONS BY CONQUEST DESIRED BY\\nANNEXATIONISTS\u00e2\u0080\u0094 THE AMERICAN FLAG.\\nMr. President, it is not merely the Hawaiian group which is in-\\nvolved in this disputation. Some suppose that the issue is thus\\nlimited. By no means. True, that object, and that alone, can be\\ndirectly and at once accomplished; but there are other issues\\ntied to this. I have heard it said here and elsewhere, and I have\\nread it in this and that newspaper, that Hawaiian annexation\\nmust be considered alone; that its effect upon other questions is\\nnot proper for debate. On the other hand, almost each hour of\\nthe day the advocates of this annexation make use of expressions\\nresembling this: When once the American flag is raised any-\\nwhere, there it must forever float.\\nMr. President, the American flag we revere and honor because\\nit is not only the flag of our country, but because we believe that\\nthe Government which it represents is based and acts upon prin-\\nciples of honor, upon maxims and policies which will stand the\\nscrutiny of ages and remain untarnished and unquestioned when\\nthe strongest of us shall be summoned hence, when tyranny shall\\nbe driven from the earth.\\nWhether that flag should float or should be taken down depends\\nupon whether it was raised in justice and maintained in righteous-\\nness. If miscreant schemer shall place it where it should not be\\nplaced; if the hand of the invader and spoliator shall seize it,\\nand under it conduct a campaign of disorder and rapine, of op-\\npression and robbery, it will not be for the honor of this Republic\\nor the glory of that flag that it shall continue to wave over such\\nan accomplishment. Nay, that man is a patriot who will take it\\nfrom the hand which held it for disgrace, who will return it to\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "21\\nits true home, where it may float as the representative of progress\\nand freedom: who will visit prompt and adequate penalty upon\\nhim who has insulted the emblem of a virtuous and Christian\\npeople.\\nWhen our banner rises over soil where it ought to wave, let it\\nbe maintained and defended if it requires all the strength, all the\\nmoney, and all the blood of our land. But it must not be used\\nfor evil. So to do is to desecrate it.\\nMr. President, do our friends who speak thus of the continued\\nsupport of our flag wherever and for whatsoever raised remember\\nthat when Mr. Foster communicated with Mr. Stevens, the, Ha-\\nwaiian minister, on the 14th of February, 1893\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and we know\\nthat Mr. Foster was an ardent annexationist; and we know that\\nMr. Stevens was an annexationist of annexationists; and we know\\nthat the Administration then in authority sympathized with the\\nidea of annexation do Senators remember that when Mr. Foster\\ncommunicated to Mr. Stevens, after the coup d etat which re-\\nsulted in the change of authority, he said:\\nSo far as your course accords to the de facto sovereign Government the\\nmaterial cooperation of the United States for the maintenance of good order\\nand protection of life and property from apprehended disorders, it is com-\\nmended: but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the\\nauthority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government in\\nthe capacity of protector, or to impair the independent sovereignty of that\\nGovernment by substituting the flag and power of the United States, it is\\ndisavowed.\\nHere, Senators, is a declaration, not of Mr. Cleveland or of Mr.\\nGresham. not of any of those who, succeeding the Harrison Ad-\\nministration, sought to overturn and negative the conduct of that\\nAdministration, but here was the declaration of Mr. Foster, in\\nwhich he disavowed the action of Mr. Stevens in the phraseology\\nwhich I have just read. Let us recollect that.\\nThis is not the place, it seems to me, wherein to allude to the\\nnecessity of maintaining the flag wherever it may be hoisted.\\nThis capital ought to be near the abode of justice. I trust we are\\nnot in barbarous days. If an officer of the United States plays\\nthe part of a usurper, does his illicit conduct bind this country?\\nThe United States ought to be the last of nations to sanction crimes\\ncommitted under assumed powers untruly alleged to have been\\nlawfully bestowed.\\nWhen Senators state that they will never favor the withdrawal\\nof our power from any locality where, in the midst of war or as\\nthe result of criminality or assumption, we may have taken pos-\\nsession and lifted our ensign, they make a broad assertion; and\\nwhen that statement is uttered in this Chamber, when it is made\\nin this presence, it suggests a situation that extends far beyond\\nHawaii and to which we had well give heed. The doctrine con-\\ntended for by some is almost piratical.\\nMr. President, it has been asserted by gentlemen who declare\\nthat they are opposed to the annexation of the Philippines or the\\nCarolines or any other lands that we need the Sandwich Islands.\\nIn the next breath we find either the same advocates or those\\nupon the same side of this issue declaring that the result of this\\nwar is to be the acquisition of a number of distant and remote\\ncountries an 3 the presentation of new questions for our considera-\\ntion. Then may we not wait in thought, not only because of the\\nintrinsic difficulties concerning which we must decide regarding\\nHawaii, but because of the bearing elsewhere? I shall discuss the\\nsubject, then, not only in connection with Hawaii and not merely\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "22\\nwith reference to the situation so far as that country is concerned,\\nbut also as to the bearing of her disposition upon other matters.\\nIs it not true, Senators, that intelligence and capability for wise\\ndiscernment and judicial decision are necessary for the perpetuity\\nof the Republic; that the greatest amount of intellectual devel-\\nopment that we can evolve means advanced and desirable results?\\nDo we not justly think that the interposition of alien and inferior\\nraces must work our injury? As we look upon the present situ-\\nation and observe not only this case, but its adjuncts, and those\\nthings which must follow it, we may well hesitate and give heed\\nto the admonitions of the past.\\nIt has often been asserted that our policy has always been in\\nfavor of Hawaiian annexation. We are told that our ablest men\\nhave ever looked upon that island community as virtually belong-\\ning to the United States, or occupying such a status, at least, that\\nwe must finally take possession. Mr. President, I can not read\\nhistory thus. It will be necessary for me to refer to several states-\\nmen, and in as brief and terse a way as I am capable of expressing\\nmy thoughts I will mention some of the utterances of historic\\ncharacters which seem to bear upon the subject. Mr. Madison\\nsaid:\\nA second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the Fed-\\neral Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States,\\nwhich we know to bo practicable; and to add to them sucii other States as\\nmay arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we can\\nnot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be neces-\\nsary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our north-\\nwestern frontier must be left to those whom further discoveries and experi-\\nence will render more equal to the task.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The Federalist, Hamilton s edition,\\npage 134.\\nWashington, to whom I trust I may be permitted to refer with-\\nout censure, said:\\nOur detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a dif-\\nferent course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the\\nperiod is not far off when we may defy material injury from external an-\\nnoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we\\nmay at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belliger-\\nent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not\\nlightly hazard the giving us provocation; when wo may choose peace or war,\\nas our interests, guided by our justice, shall counsel. Why forego the ad-\\nvantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon for-\\neign ground? Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable es-\\ntablishments on a respectably defensive posture, we may safely trust to\\ntemporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 13 Washing ton s Works,\\npages 317, 318.\\nIn the same document the Father of his Country referred to the\\ninterests of Europe as being a very remote relation.\\nMr. Jefferson said in a communication addressed to the Presi-\\ndent in 1823:\\nI have ever deemed it fundamental for the United States never to take\\nactive part in the quarrels of Europe. Their political interests are entirely\\ndistinct from ours; their mutual dealings, their balance of power, their com-\\nplicated alliances, their forms and principles of government are all foreign\\nto ours. They are nations of eternal war. All their energies are expended\\nin the destruction of the labor, property, and lives of their people. On our\\npart, never had a people so favorable a chance of trying the opposite system\\nof peace and fraternity with mankind and the direction of all our means and\\nfaculties to the purposes of improvement instead of destruction.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 7 Jefferson s\\nWorks, page 288.\\nApril 27, 1809, Mr. Jefferson, in writing to Mr. Madison in ref-\\nerence to the situation in Cuba, said in language already quoted:\\nIt will be objected to our receiving Cuba that no limit can then be drawn\\nto our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us without a navy, and\\nthis develops the principle which ought to limit our views. Nothing should\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "23\\never be accepted which would require a navy to defend it.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Jefferson s Worlzs,\\npage 44o; 1 Wharton s International Lair, page 557.\\nSecretary Frelinghuysen, in a note to Mr. Langston, dated June\\n20, 1883, says:\\nThe policy of this Government, as declared on many occasions in the past,\\nhas tended toward avoidance of possessions disconnected from the main con-\\ntinent. Had the tendency of the United States been to extend territorial\\ndomain beyond seas, opportunities have not been wanting to effect such a\\npurpose, whether on the coast of Africa, in the West Indies, or in the South\\nPacific.\\nHe also wrote to the same minister:\\nA conviction that a fixed policy, dating back to the origin of our constitu-\\ntional Government, was considered to make it inexpedient to attempt terri-\\ntorial aggrandizement which would require maintenance by a naval force in\\nexcess of any yet provided for our national uses, has led this Government to\\ndecline territorial acquisitions. Even as simple coaling stations, such terri-\\ntorial acquisitions would involve responsibility beyond their* utility. Tho\\nUnited States has never deemed it needful to their national life to maintain\\nimpregnable fortresses along the world s highways of commerce.\\nMr. Wharton, in referring to the purchase of Florida, states that\\nthe argument chiefly pressed by John Quincy Adams, then Secre-\\ntary of State, when advocating the treaty, was one of contiguity.\\nMr. Monroe stated the doctrine which bears his name, and to\\nwhich I shall later advert, and in the same message in which he\\nenunciated that remarkable proposition he said:\\nIt is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system\\nto any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and hap-\\npiness, nor can anyone believe that our Southern brethren, if left to them-\\nselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, there-\\nfore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.\\nIf we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new\\nGovernments and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she\\ncan never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to\\nleave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue\\nthe same course.\\nAnd if I may be allowed to state in the shortest possible words\\nthe Monroe doctrine, it is this:\\nIn the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we\\nhave- never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It\\nis only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that, wo resent in-\\njuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this\\nhemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected and by causes\\nwhich must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.\\nWe owe it. therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing be-\\ntween the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider\\nany attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this\\nhemispfiere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies\\nor dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not\\ninterfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence\\nand maintained it, and w r hose independence we have, on great consideration\\nand on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition\\nfor the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their\\ndestiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation\\nof an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 2 Richardson s Mes-\\nsages and Documents, etc., page 218; 1 Wharton s International Laic, page 273.\\nMr. President, in the mad race of conquest which appears to\\nbe upon us in the effort to acquire dominion, and this assertion of\\nwhat is called the new doctrine by lately developed statesment\\nthere is much involved. Let us halt a moment; let us reflect a\\nminute upon this doctrine of Monroe. It is idle for Senators to\\nsay that there is no issue involved regarding foreign acquisition,\\nespecially in the face of the contention urged here within the last\\ntwenty-four hours. It is idle in the face of the general argument\\nquite commonly urged by those who favor annexation that we\\nmust extend our dominion all over the world.\\nWhere is the strength and where is the power of the Monroe\\n35,1", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "24\\ndoctrine? We have declared that on this hemisphere we desired\\nno further interference by European powers, while we explicitly\\ndisclaimed any intention of interfering with those powers in their\\nthen possessions here. Plainly it was in the contemplation of Mr.\\nMonroe and those who acted with him that there was no inten-\\ntion, no design, to assault or question the possessions of other\\nnations outside of this hemisphere. Yet it is common knowledge\\nthis moment that the doctrine of Monroe, like the Farewell Ad-\\ndress of Washington, is, in the annexation view, ancient, effete,\\nout of date, can not meet the exigencies of the times, and does\\nnot supply the statesmanship of the nineteenth century.\\nMr. President, this is not a deliberate sentiment. Much of it\\nfollows from unfortunate conditions antagonistic to proper exam-\\nination. Not long ago, in the presence of a threatened war. a large\\nmajority of the Senate recorded their adhesion to resolutions\\nworded as follows:\\nWhereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three\\nyears in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral\\nsense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian\\ncivilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States\\nbattle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the\\nharbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has been set forth by\\nthe President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898,\\nupon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore,\\nResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of\\nAmerica in Congress assembled. First. That the people of the Island of Cuba\\nare, and of right ought to be, free and independent.\\nSecond. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Gov-\\nernment of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of\\nSpain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba\\nand withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.\\nThird. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed\\nand empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States,\\nand to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the sev-\\neral States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions\\ninto effect.\\nFourth\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nI call the attention of the Senate to this statement\\nThat the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to\\nexercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the\\npacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished,\\nto leave the government and control of the island to its people.\\nYet, Mr. President, men high in public station, and not strangers\\nto this presence, have not hesitated to aver that these war resolu-\\ntions are meaningless and that we must proceed to false possession\\nof the enemy s territory as conquerors.\\nAre we prepared to overturn the precedents written in our\\ncountry s history up to the date of the passage of the resolution\\nApril 20, 189S? It can not be successfully disputed that the annex-\\nation of Hawaii will constitute the entering wedge for an impe-\\nrialistic policy as foreign to the purposes and views entertained\\nwhen this Government was organized as are the objects and\\ntheories of the most despotic government upon the earth strangers\\nto our system.\\nI have called attention not only to the radical nature of this\\nchange, but to its suddenness. How, then, can it be considered\\ninappropriate to dwell with care upon this threatened change?\\nDo we know so much more than those who have gone before us?\\nWe have electric lights, perhaps, where earlier Americans used\\ntallow candles, and many of those productions and conveniences\\nwhich we are wont to call the blessings of life are around us in\\nrich profusion; but in all that involves deep reflection upon the\\nrights of humanity, upon the theories of free government with\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "reference to all of the temptations, the passions of life, the fail-\\nings and shortcomings of men. concerning the propriety of con-\\nstitutional limitations and a clear demarking of power there is\\nlittle to be gained. Our so-called wisdom has come to us from\\nthe past.\\nThe philosophers of antiquity wrote lessons which we read to-day\\nwith profit, and to which succeeding ages and students have con-\\ntributed but little. The men who fashioned our system did not\\ndo so in moments of passion, in an insane race for wealth, for terri-\\ntory, for acquisition. They were not forming any corporations\\nor syndicates to control franchises or to usurp popular rights; they\\nwere not planning to introduce an alien race that they might\\nbring down the price of labor, or to interject new theories into a\\nsocial system evolved from patient toil. They moved forward\\nwithout doubt, convinced of their personal rectitude and careless\\nof punishment for the doing of duty.\\nThey knew their grievances. Their knowledge was accurate;\\ntheir information thorough. Modern juveniles in statecraft are\\nbabies at their shrines. They risked their all to rid themselves\\nof encroachment; they knew evils from which their efforts have\\nabsolved us. The perils into which we are in danger of plunging\\nwere sought to be avoided in their governmental plan. They had\\nstudied the problems of self-control, and brought to bear upon\\nthis intricacy intellects as reliable surely as any here; and if they\\nwere not disinterested, their interest was for the people, with\\nwhom they stood, of whoin they were, and for the Republic with\\nwhose destinies their lives, their properties, and their sacred hon-\\nors were inseparably linked.\\nBefore we divorce ourselves from these alliances and enter upon\\nnew, and for us untried, fields let us reflect. Untried fields for\\nus, I have said, but not untried fields elsewhere. The story of\\nman is polluted with the stains of the arrogance of those who rose\\nto power by virtue and frugality and descended to vice from that\\nweakness which has existed from Adam to this instant and is\\nblended with humanity. The rewards of patient honesty are many,\\nand after they have been reaped how often in every generation has\\nman s folly compassed his fall. The brilliant, the remorseless ty-\\nrant was once perhaps solicitous for moderate competency. The\\nprosperous have often yielded to temptation. The Fourth of July\\napproaches. Are we to speak of love of man, of the rights of man,\\nor of title derived from the sword? These are old subjects. From\\ngeneration to generation they throng history.\\nI will resume the citation of authority.\\nMr. Webster has been often cited as favoring the annexation of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands. The authority of Mr. Webs er is directly\\nthe other way. In the sixth volume of his works, pages 4G3-464,\\nwe find the following:\\nIt can not but be in conformity with the interest and wishes of the Govern-\\nment and the people of the United States that this community, thus existing\\nin the midst of a vast expanse of ocean, should be respected and all its\\nrights strictly and conscientiously regarded, and this must also be the true\\ninterest of all other commercial states.\\nFar remote from the dominions of European powers, its growth and pros-\\nperity as an independent State may yet be in a high degree useful to all whose\\ntrade is extended to those regions, while its near approach to this continent\\nand the intercourse which American vessels have with it, such vessels con-\\nstituting five-sixths of all which annually visit it, could not but create dis-\\nsatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another\\npower, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of\\nthe islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government. Consider-\\ning, therefore, that the United States possesses so large a share of the inter-\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "26\\ncourse with those islands, it is deemed not unfit to mate the declaration that\\ntheir Government seeks, nevertheless, no peculiar advantages, no exclusive\\ncontrol, over the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its independent\\nexistence and anxiously wishes for its security and prosperity.\\nAgain referring to Mr. Webster, I wish to cite from a letter\\nwritten by him on the 19th of December, 1842. to be found 6 Web-\\nster s Works, 478, in which he says:\\nThe United States therefore are more interested in the fate of the islands\\nand of their Government than any other nation can be; and this considera-\\ntion induces the President to be quite willing to declare as the sense of the\\nGovernment of the United States that the Government of the Sandwich\\nIslands ought to be respected, that no power ought either to take possession\\nof the islands as a conquest or for purpose of colonization, and that no power\\nought to seek therein undue control over the existing Government or any ex-\\nclusive privileges or preferences with it in matters of commerce.\\nThere can be no stronger language than that which I have read\\nfrom this distinguished statesman. He remarked that we desired\\nno peculiar advantages, no exclusive dominancy. He said that we\\nwere content with Hawaii s independent existence, and further\\nasseverated that no power ought to seek undue control in island\\naffairs. He went so far as to say that there should not be any\\nexclusive privileges or preferences as to matters of commerce.\\nNever did Mr. Webster write a word to indicate that he had\\nchanged his mind. Taking this doctrine, which has often been\\nreferred to by annexationists, is there any difference in the posi-\\ntion assumed by Mr. Webster and that which is taken here by\\nthose who antagonize annexation? In 1894 we warned the world\\nthat no one should interfere. Mr. President, before I close this\\ndiscussion I trust I may be able to show that all of the talk about\\nthe intervention of other powers is a mere creation of the imagina-\\ntions of some who entertain the notion in good faith and many\\nwho circulate the canard for the purpose of influencing the minds\\nof Senators and leading them to suppose that foreigners are about\\nto absorb the entire Hawaiian group.\\nTHE COALING BUGABOO.\\nHere I wish to give expression to a thought that may deserve\\nsome amplification? If there be any question as to the character of\\nour relations with the prospective Hawaiian coaling station called\\nPearl Harbor, or if there be any doubt as to our title, is there any\\ndifficulty in amending and changing the present compact, if it\\nneeds any alteration, so as to remove all doubt?\\nHas there been any effort to do that? Has there been any at-\\ntempt to cure any defect in the grant, if there is such defect?\\nHas there been any effort to do aught else than to put the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands in such a situation as to make it as nearly neces-\\nsary as possible to annex them? Have not the struggles of those\\nin authority in this Administration been to bring about annexa-\\ntion regardless of coaling necessities, and have not our present\\ndiplomats utterly failed to enter into any negotiations to remove\\nthe supposed difficulties of which they themselves complain re-\\ngarding coal? The coal proposition, like the Presidential-seizure\\nproposition, is a mere bugaboo jointly created by the Dole and the\\npresent American administrations.\\nFURTHER PRECEDENTS.\\nAttention is sometimes directed to Mr. Webster s letter to Mr.\\nRives, which, it is stated, shows a change in his opinion.- It is\\nfound in 1 Wharton s International Law, page 419. He says:\\nThe United States, true to its treaty obligations, has in no case interfered\\nwith the Hawaiian Government for the purpose of opposing the course of\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "27\\nits own independent conduct or of dictating to it any particular line of\\npolicy. In acknowledging the independence of the islands and of the Gov-\\nernment established over them it was not seeking to promote any peculiar\\nobject of its own. This Government still desires to see the nation-\\nality of the Hawaiian Government maintained, its independent administra-\\ntion of public affairs respected, and its prosperity and reputation increased.\\nAfterwards, in a letter forwarded by Mr. Webster, as Secretary\\nof State, to Mr. Severance, July 14, 1851 (1 Wharton s Interna-\\ntional Law, page 420), he said:\\nThe annunciation of this policy will not surprise the governments of\\nEurope, nor be thought to bo unreasonable by the nations of the civilized\\nworld; and that policy is that while the Government of the United States\\nitself, faithful to its original assurance, scrupulously regards the independ-\\nence of the Hawaiian Islands, it can never consent to see those islands taken\\npossession of by either of the great commercial powers of Europe, nor can it\\nconsent that demands, manifestly unjust and derogatory and inconsistent with\\na bona fide intention, shall be enforced against that Government.\\nMr. Legare, who was Secretary of State in 1843, wrote to Mr.\\nEverett (1 Wharton s International Law, page 418):\\nThe Hawaiian Islands bear such a peculiar relation to ourselves that we\\nmight even feel justified, consistently with our own principles, in interfer-\\ning by force to prevent their falling by conquest into the hands of one of the\\ngreat powers of Europe.\\nThis reference ii also frequently cited, as is also that of Mr.\\nClayton, as Secretary of State, to Mr. Rives, dated July 5, 1850,\\nwhere he declared:\\nWe do not ourselves covet sovereignty over them [the Hawaiian Islands].\\nWe would be content that they should remain under their present rulers,\\nwho, we believe, are disposed to be just and impartial in their dealings with\\nall nations.\\nAnd in writing to the same minister, Mr. Webster said (June\\n19,1851):\\nIf, therefore, it should not be too late, it is hoped that you will make such\\nrepresentations upon the subject to the minister of foreign affairs of France\\nas will induce that Government to desist from measures incompatible with\\ntne sovereignty and. independence of the Hawaiian Islands, etc.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 1 Whar-\\nton s International Laze, page 419.\\nPresident Tyler, in speaking of the Texas case, said:\\nThe Government and people of the United States have never evinced, nor\\ndo they feel, any desire to interfere in public questions not affecting the rela-\\ntions existing between the States of the American Continent. If\\nannexation in any form occur, it will arise from the free and unfettered action\\nof the people of the two countries.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 k Richardson s Messages, etc., page 320.\\nMr. Fillmore, in his second annual message, December 1, 1851\\n(5 Richardson s Messages, etc., page 120), says:\\nIt is earnestly to be hoped that the differences which have for some time\\npast been pending between the Government of the French Republic and that\\nof the Sandwich Islands may be peaceably and durably adjusted so as to se-\\ncure the independence of those islands.\\nMr. Fillmore continues, in explanation of the interest which this\\nGovernment has in the Hawaiian group, and proceeds:\\nWe were also influenced by a desiro that those islands should not pass\\nunder the control of any other great maritime state, but should remain in aE\\nindependent condition, and so be accessible and useful to the commerce ol\\nall nations.\\nHere again it is manifest that our policy was not annexation;\\nthat the only end and main object we had in view was absolute\\nindependence, not only for our own benefit, but because we deemed\\nthat the commerce of all nations was entitled to look upon the\\nGovernment of Hawaii as absolutely free, unfettered, and inde-\\npendent.\\nPresident Taylor took up the same question in his first annual\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "28\\nmessage, December 4, 1849 (5 Richardson s Messages, etc. page 17).\\nHe said:\\nWe desire that the islands may maintain their independence and that\\nother nations should concur with us in this sentiment. We could in no event\\nbe indifferent to their passing under the dominion of any other power.\\nThe principal commercial states have in this a common interest, and it is to\\nhe hoped that no one of them will attempt to interpose obstacles to the entire\\nindependence of the islands.\\nHere again it is plain that the Executives of whom I have made\\nmention and the Secretaries of State whom I have quoted and\\nthe other statesmen upon whose words I have sought to comment\\nclaimed, asserted, and demanded that there should be no interpo-\\nsition by any other power, and that the Hawaiian Islands must\\nremain free and independent, enjoying their liberties not only for\\ntheir own benefit, but for the advantage of commerce. Our wishes\\nin this regard have ever been conclusive on the world.\\nWe announced through President Fillmore that we were not\\nseeking to augment our territory, but merely demanded that others\\nlike ourselves should keep their hands off. The idea of the acqui-\\nsition of territory by conquest and the forcible introduction into\\nthis Republic of other races was a stranger to the state papers of\\nthe United States and to the proceedings of Congress until within\\na very few days. Yet those of us who object to the committal of\\nthe United States to the monstrous fallacy now enthusiastically\\nadvocated here are denounced in unmeasured terms not however\\nby persons familiar with their country or her system, but by those\\nwho are happy because of ignorance of their own peculiarities.\\nNO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE\u00e2\u0080\u0094 ENGLAND, FRANCE, JAPAN.\\nIt is of interest in this connection to note that although there\\nhas been unauthorized interference with Hawaii on the part of\\nEnglish and French officers, both of those nations disavowed the\\nmisconduct, and this disavowal was couched in the most positive\\nand satisfactory terms.\\nMr. President, without perhaps intending that it should be so,\\nthe Committee on Foreign Relations in their report have referred\\nto the attempt of other nations to obtain possession of the Hawaiian\\nIslands, and we have had more than one statement not only of\\npresent perils but of dangers which in times bygone encompassed\\nthose islands. A consultation of the record is conclusive that\\nwhile there was, as I have said, momentary trouble, and while\\nthere was intrusion, there was never any justification by the\\nparent government either in the case of England or in the case\\nof France, and both of these great nations, in the solemn form of\\na treaty, absolved themselves from such intention.\\nMr. Fox, in a letter to Mr. Upshur, dated June 25, 1843, said:\\nI am directed by the Earl of Aberdeen to state to you, for the information\\nof the Government of the United States, that the occupation of the Sandwich\\nIslands was an act entirely unauthorized by Her Majesty s Government, and\\nthat with the least practicable delay due inquiry will be made into the pro-\\nceedings which led to it.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix 2,\\nAffairs in Hawaii, page 115.\\nMr. Upshur, in another communication to Mr. Fox, of date July\\n5, 1843, says:\\nSeeking to establish no undue advantages in the Sandwich Islands for citi-\\nzens of the United States at the expense of other powers, the President re-\\nceives with much pleasure the assurance contained in Mr. Fox s note that\\nnone such are sought for Great Britain, etc. (Page 117.)\\nHere, Mr. President, observe the peculiarity of this phraseology.\\nOur Government, in noting with pleasure the disclaimer of the\\n3371", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "29\\nEarl of Aberdeen, proceeded to avow that we did not seek to as-\\nsert any undue advantage in the Hawaiian Islands. Is this an\\nannexation claim?\\nMr. Rives, in writing to Mr. Webster, October 30, 1851. from\\nParis, referred to a call made by him upon the representative of\\nthe French Government, in which the latter stated\\nThat tlio French Government had never had the slightest intention of\\npursuing any measures toward the Sandwich Islands inconsistent with a,\\njust respect of their independence; that, after the receipt of the letter I had\\naddressed to the minister of foreign affairs in July last, Monsieur de Sartiges\\nhad been instructed to give you the fullest and most formal assurances to\\nthat effect. Ho alluded also to the circumstance that the United\\nStates had been invited to become a party to the convention concluded be-\\ntween France and England in 18-13 for mutually respecting the independence\\nof the Sandwich Islands, but the invitation had been declined, a circumstance\\nwhich, he thought, should protect France from the suspicion of having im-\\nproper designs upon the independence of the islands.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Idem, page 105.\\nAs further evidencing the disposition of France and England to\\nlet Hawaii alone, those Governments, upon the refusal of the\\nUnited States to enter into any joint declaration regarding the\\nmatter, concluded an agreement between themselves on the 28th\\nof November, 1843, whereby it was announced that\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nHer Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-\\nland, and His Majesty, the King of the French, taking into consideration the\\nexistence in the Sandwich Islands of a Government capable of providing for\\nthe regularity of its relations with foreign nations, have thought it right to\\nengage reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State\\nand never to take possession, either directly or under a title of protectorate,\\nor under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are com-\\nposed.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Fore ign Relations, Appendix 2, page 61, 1891.\\nNow, Mr. President, here is an explicit and never disavowed\\ncompact, entered into in the broad light of civilization by these\\ntwo great nations, whereby they explicitly and in direct terms\\ndeclare that they will not interfere with Hawaii, and here are the\\ncommunications, which I have repeated, by which the proper repre-\\nsentatives most satisfactorily denied any responsibility for the acts\\nof those who attempted to meddle with Hawaii.\\nThe views of Mr. Marcyupon annexation have been often relied\\non by those who favor that consummation, and it may not be\\namiss to quote briefly from them. In a letter written by him to\\nMr. Gregg December 22, 1853, he says:\\nWhile we do not intend to attempt the exercise of any exclusive control\\nover them [the Hawaiian Islands], we are resolved that no other power or\\nstate will exact any political or commercial privileges from them which we\\nare not permitted to enjoy, far less to establish any protectorate over them.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\n1 Whar. Int. Laic, L.\\nOn the 16th day of December, 1853, he wrote to Mr. Mason thus:\\nIt seems to be inevitable that they [the Hawaiian Islands] must come under\\nthe control of this Government, and it would be but reasonable and fair that\\nthese powers [England and France] should acquiesce in such a disposition of\\nthem, provided the transference was effected by fair means.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 1 Whar. Int.\\nLair, 422; Appendix 2, page 106.\\nLater on, April 4, 1854, he says, in a letter to Mr. Gregg:\\nIt was foreseen that at some period not far distant such a change would\\ntake place and the Hawaiian Islands would come under the protectorate of\\nor be transferred to some foreign power. You were informed that it was\\nnot the policy of the United States to accelerate such a change: but if in the\\ncourse of events it became unavoidable, this Government would much prefer\\nto acquire the sovereignty of these islands for the United States rather than\\nto see it transferred to any other power.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations United States\\nAppendix 2, page 121.\\nAt the date referred to it was feared that foreign intervention\\nwould certainly occur, and the situation was regarded as ex-\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "stated that-\\nA flood of emigration -would pour in from California the moment our flag\\nwas raised, sufficient to put a check upon all fixture British and French pre-\\ntensions.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations United States, Appendix 2, page 125.\\nMr. President, there is nothing to prevent a flood of emigra-\\ntion going to the islands now if they are really so desirable.\\nThey have a Government, we are told (I confess I doubt the state-\\nment), which is an admirable one, which is administered upon all\\nthe broad lines of freedom and right, and yet there is no remark-\\nable emigration, for reasons which can be very readily surmised.\\nIn the first place, -it will not be difficult to show that the pop-\\nulation now contained in the Hawaiian Islands subsist not in con-\\nsequence of any of that sort of employment, either agricultural or\\notherwise, which is inviting to the labor interests of the United\\nStates; that sugar and coffee and other productions are raised\\nbecause of the character of labor, the cheapness of the labor, and\\nthe necessity for the employment of low-priced people.\\nMr. Gregg, on September 15, 1854, in writing to Mr. Marcy,\\nstates that he insisted upon the immediate signature of the\\ntreaty/ (Republished in Foreign Relations United States, Ap-\\npendix 2, page 126, 1894.)\\nOn the same page Mr. Gregg, who seems to have in some re-\\nspects resembled the late Mr. Stevens, remarked:\\nThe moment our flag was raised a flood of immigration from California\\nwould pour in, sufficient, at least, to make the islands thoroughly American\\nand to secure an equitable and fair arrangement if the terms of the present\\ntreaty are deemed unsatisfactory.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Idem.\\nThe proposed treaty with the King of the Sandwich Islands\\ncommenced with the recital:\\nHis Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, being convinced that plans\\nhave been and still are on foot hostile to his sovereignty and to the peace of\\nhis kingdom, which His Majesty is without power to resist, etc. Foreign\\nRelations United States, Appendix 2, page 127.\\nArticle 2 of this proposed treaty declares that the kingdom shall\\nbe incorporated into the American Union as a State, etc. (Idem.\\nThe proposed treaty was never ratified. Kamehameha III died\\non December 15, 1854.\\nMr. Gregg, on the 29th of December, 1854, in a letter to Mr.\\nMarcy, stated:\\nFrom information which has recently come to my knowledge, I am in-\\nclined to entertain the opinion that the present head of the Government will\\nbe disposed to preserve, if possible, the separate independence of the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Idem, page 132.\\nAt this point it may be well to reflect that Kamehameha III\\nwas obviously induced to make the proposition to resign his\\ncrown because of his fear of foreign attack. His son and successor\\ndid not seem disposed to do so.\\nAll of these years, Mr. President, have come and gone, and no\\nattack has been made. There has never been a moment from that\\nday to this when there has been any intrusion which has had be-\\nhind it the sanction of any government on earth. There has\\nnever been a time in the history of the Hawaiian Islands when\\nthey were as absolutely safe from the interference of any power\\nas they are at this moment. No one wants them; no one threat-\\nens them. They are free from all dangers\u00e2\u0080\u0094 more secure than\\never.\\nIn this connection I call the attention of the Senate to a state-\\nment contained in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations,\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "31\\nwith which I have no doubt Senators are familiar. Referring\\nto the condition of our relations with Japan, I have never thought\\nthat the views of the distinguished members of that committee\\nupon this subject have had any support in reason, and the publi-\\ncation before the world of that report, with its ill-founded refer-\\nence to Japan, brought out a protest, of which, I think, I have a\\ncopy, which I believe to be accurate, and as I deem it exceedingly\\nimportant in this connection, I will ask that it be read at the desk.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gallinger in the chair).\\nWithout objection, the Secretary will read it.\\nThe Secretary read as follows:\\nOn the 16th of last March Hon. C. K. Davis introduced a joint resolution,\\nfrom the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, providing for the\\nannexation of Hawaii to the United States, and submitted in support of the\\nresolution a report signed by seven members of the committee. This report\\ndisclosed the fact that the gentlemen who signed it have conceived certain\\nserious misapprehensions regarding Japan s attitude toward Hawaii. The\\nfollowing extracts will serve as illustrations of this statement:\\nJapan, says the report, has openly protested against the annexation\\nof Hawaii to the United States upon grounds which indicate an unjust sus-\\npicion of our national honor in cur future dealing with her subjects in those\\nislands. The blunt refusal of the President to consider this protest caused\\nJapan to make a formal withdrawal of it, etc.\\nThe members of the Committee on Foreign Relations must, as a matter of\\ncourse, be familiar with all the details of the correspondence which passed\\nbetween the United States and Japan in regard to tlie annexation of Hawaii.\\nBearing this in mind, it is surprising to find in their report such a statement\\nas that above quoted. The reasons underlying Japan s protest were fully\\nand frankly stated in the correspondence, but nothing was said in that con-\\nnection which bore even the faintest semblance of suspicion of the good faith\\nor the good will of the United States. On the contrary, all the representa-\\ntions made on behalf of Japan were carefully guarded by assurances of com-\\nplete confidence in the friendly intentions ot the United States, and those\\nassurances were cordially reciprocated.\\nBut from the Japanese standpoint the friendship of the two countries,\\nhowever close and cordial, could not be regarded as the factor which would\\ndecide the effects of annexation upon the interests of Japan. The question\\nwas one of fact and not of sentiment; and the result was notably dependent\\nupon the circumstance that the situation which had been created in Hawaii\\nby the treaties between that country and Japan, and by the laws in force,\\nmust necessarily be changed by the application of United States laws. Of\\nthose laws in themselves, Japan had no complaint to make; her relations\\nwith the United States are harmoniously conducted under them. Her ob-\\njection was based upon the injurious effects which her Government believed\\nthe sudden and in some measure unexpected change in existing conditions\\nin Hawaii would have upon her interests and the interests of her people in\\nthe islands.\\nThe United States did not agree with this view, but the discussion was con-\\ndncted in a spirit of frank friendliness which gave no cause for offense and\\nleft no semblance of bad feeling on either side. Therefore the statement that\\nJapan was actuated by an unjust suspicion of American national honor\\nfinds no warrant in what actually occurred, and does grave injustice, more-\\nover, to a nation which has always maintained unusually cordial relations with\\nthe United States. To add also that the President s refusal to consider the\\nrespectful protest of a friendly Government was blunt implies a lack of\\nordinary courtesy which happily the facts of the case do not confirm.\\nThe cause assigned by the report for Japan s protest is, in effect, the hope\\nascribed to the Government of Japan that the Japanese in Hawaii will gain\\ncontrol of affairs there by means of an indiscriminate use of the electoral\\nfranchise. Alluding to the protest, the report proceeds to state that this\\ndiplomatic intervention can not be dissociated from its real predicate, which\\nis the demand made by Japan upon the Republic of Hawaii, which has not\\nbeen withdrawn, that her subjects in Hawaii shall have equal privileges\\nwith the natives in voting at elections and in holding offices. And, in an-\\nother place, The immigrants from Japan retain their allegiance to that Em-\\npire, and yet they claim full political rights in Hawaii, notwithstanding their\\nalienage. In this* demand they have the undisguised encouragement of the\\nJapanese Government. These privileges are demanded as rights.\\nThese statements are based upon a complete misapprehension of the facts.\\nSeveral years ago there was some discussion between the Japanese and the\\nHawaiian Governments concerning the exercise of the electoral franchise by\\nJapanese in Hawaii, but no demand was ever made on behalf of Japan that\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2550", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "32\\nher people should enjoy any other or greater privileges in this regard than\\nwere accorded to aliens in general under the constitution and laws of Hawaii.\\nThe Japanese Government never hesitated to admit that everything which\\nthat constitution and those laws established as a condition precedent to the\\nassumption of Hawaiian citizenship by other aliens was of necessity binding\\nupon Japanese subjects. All that it asked was equality before the law; ail\\nthat it protested against was discrimination.\\nThe correspondence on the subject clearly shows that from Japan s point\\nof view the matter was important only in so far as it involved a question of\\nprinciple. In no manner did it imply the hope or expectation that Japanese\\nsubjects would gain control of Hawaiian political affairs. That charge has\\nbeen made before and has been proved to be baseless. At best it rests upon\\na mere surmise, which finds no support either in the actions of Japan or in\\nthe course of affairs in Hawaii. So far from having been the pivotal motive\\nof the protest against annexation, as the report of the committee woiild seem\\nto indicate, the official explanation of that protest shows that it had no place\\namong the considerations urged by Japan.\\nThe report further states that of these subjects of Japan in Hawaii the\\nlarger number were soldiers in the war with China, and are still subject to\\nthe military orders of the Emperor. This is a mistake. Possibly some of\\nthese Japanese served as soldiers in the war with China, but the majority of\\nthem could not have done so. Even if the statement were correct, however,\\nit is difficult to see what bearing it can have upon the Hawaiian situation.\\nIn Japan, as in some European countries, there is a general conscription law\\nunder which every able-bodied male, not exempt for causes defined by the\\nlaw, must serve at some time or another in the army.\\nBut after such service the conscript ceases to be a soldier and returns to\\nthe pursuits of civil life. Some of the advocates of annexation, without tak-\\ning this fact into consideration, have gone so far as to allege that the Japan-\\nese Government was flooding the islands with soldiers in the peaceful guise\\nof laborers. The absurdity of this statement has been demonstrated, among\\nothers, by no less a person than President Dole. In two interviews published\\nby authority during his recent visit to this country he stated that the Japan-\\nese immigrants were not soldiers; that some of them had doubtless served in\\nthe army under the conscription law of Japan, but that this circumstance\\ndid not occasion any anxiety in Hawaii.\\nCommenting upon the pending controversy between Japan and Hawaii\\nconcerning immigration, the report makes the following statement:\\nAlmost the entire number of Japanese in Hawaii are coolies, who were\\nbrought there under the authority of the two Governments, and were to\\nreturn to Japan at the end of their term of service. They claim the right to\\nremain in Hawaii under a general treaty which applied only to such persons\\nas came for temporary or permanent residence as voluntary immigrants.\\nThis claim is disputed by Hawaii and there is still trouble over it. Under\\nsuch circumstances the presence and constant inflow of Japanese in great\\nnumber is an evil which threatens the native people with the less of their\\nmeans of living and the whole country with the overflow of paganism. It\\nalso threatens the overthrow of the Republic and the destruction of the lives\\nand property of the Republicans through an insurrection or combination of\\nthe lower classes of natives, who are for the most part adherents of royalty\\nand are under the control of the kahunas, who are sorcerers, with the Jap-\\nanese.\\nThe Japanese immigrants, to whom reference is made in this paragraph,\\nare those who emigrate to Hawaii under the stipulations of the convention\\nof 1886. The Hon. tlenry E. Cooper, Hawaiian minister for foreign affairs,\\nin his report to President Dole for the biennial period ending December 31,\\n1897, describes the negotiations which led to the conclusion of that conven-\\ntion. As he correctly states, their inception was due to the efforts of the\\nHawaiian Government to secure labor from Japan. The experience of\\nthose who had to deal with the labor problem at that time (1883), he says,\\nwas to the effect that the large preponderance of Chinese on the planta-\\ntions would likely prove a disturbing element. In order to offset this, it was\\nthought wise to secure laborers from Japan. Negotiations were accordingly\\nopened, which resulted in the signing of the convention in 1SS6.\\nThe negotiations, it will be perceived, extended over three years. This\\nwas due to the fact that the Japanese Government was reluctant to permit\\nanything like collie emigration. The convention was especially framed\\nto overcome this difficulty, care being taken to safeguard the welfare of the\\nemigrants and to remove from the whole project the odium which justly at-\\ntaches to that form of semiservile labor. The emigrants were, as a rule,\\nsmall farmers and agricul tural laborers, selected from among those who freely\\nvolunteered to go to Hawaii. After arriving in that country they were iii\\nsome sense the wards of the Government, their status being distinctly differ-\\nent from that of contract laborers brought to the islands under private aus-\\npices. Nor did their residence in the islands necessarily terminate with the\\nfulfillment of their contracts. They were free to renew those contracts, to\\nreturn home, or to remain, as some have done, without contracts.\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "33\\nThere has never been any dispute between the two Governments on any\\nof these points, and there is at present no trouble concerning them. On\\nthe contrary, the Hawaiian planters are anxious to have these people remain\\nwhen their contracts expire, and the Hawaiian Government has never of-\\nfered any objection to their doing so. The pending controversy between the\\ntwo Governments regarding immigration involves an entirely different ques-\\ntion. As far back as 1893, when the question o\u00c2\u00a3 annexation was first mooted,\\nthe Hawaiian Government began casting about for means of obtaining\\nlabor for the sugar plantations under a system not involving labor con-\\ntracts, which, it was thought, were prejudicial to the success of annexation.\\nVarious plans were proposed, and some experiments were tried, among\\nothers the importation of Portuguese. But none of these quite met the de-\\nmands of the situation, and consequently, with the apparent approval of the\\nGovernment, voluntary immigration from Japan was instituted. Immigra-\\ntion under the convention of 1886 practically ceased thereafter, although the\\nconvention still remained in force. The voluntary immigrants supplied the\\ndemand for labor and continued freely to come, until suddenly in the spring\\nof 1887, without previous notice of any kind, several shiploads of these peo-\\nple, 1,174 persons in all, were denied the right of landing in Hawaii and were\\ncompelled to return to Japan under circumstances which subjected them to\\ngrave hardship.\\nIt was to this action that the Japanese Government tGok exception, and\\nthis alone caused the claim for indemnification which is still pending. In this\\nconnection it is interesting to note that although one of the reasons for the\\nexpulsion of these voluntary immigrants was the openly expressed appre-\\nhension that the islands would be flooded with Japanese, for whose labor\\nthere was no demand and whose presence was deemed detrimental to the\\nbest interests of Hawaii, since then more than 2,000 laborers have been\\nbrought there under the convention, with the express sanction of the Ha-\\nvraiian Government.\\nWhile on this branch of the subject it is in place to note that the commit-\\ntee asserts in another part of the report that the United States owes to\\nAmericans in Hawaii and to the native population the duty of rescuing\\nthem from the silent but rapid invasion of the pagan races from Asia, which\\nis concerted and is far more dangerous to Hawaii than if it came on ships of\\nwar for the avowed purpose of subjugating the Hawaiin Islands. being\\nk the stealthy approach of a destruction that wasteth at noonday.\\nAside from rhetorical purpose, it is difficult to determine precisely what\\nmeaning these statements are intended to convey. Surely not that the Jap-\\nanese Government is craftily plotting the overthrow of the Hawaiian Gov-\\nernment by a concerted movement of its people upon the islands. Aside\\nfrom the inherent improbability of such a proposition, the facts of the case\\nwarrant a very different and a much more reasonable conclusion. The great\\nmajority of the Japanese in Hawaii have gone there solely in response to the\\ndemand for their service They have gone because Hawaiian employers\\nneeded them and because the Hawaiian Government recognized the neces-\\nsity of their presence.\\nIf the native population of Hawaii had sufficed for the purposes of the\\nplanters and other employers, there would be very few Japanese in the\\nislands. It can not be successfully maintained, therefore, that their pres-\\nence has interfered with the prosperity or the welfare of the natives. On\\nthe other hand, it can easily be demonstrated that their labor in the past has\\naided materially in the development of Hawaiian resources and has added\\nlargely to American wealth in the islands. In like manner it can be proved\\nthat without that labor in the future, or some substitute which has not yoi\\nbeen discovered, the continued prosperity of the agricultural interests of\\nHawaii is problematical.\\nIt can also be safely asserted that the Japanese people in Hawaii are indus-\\ntrious and law abiding, and that they will compare favorably with persons\\nfrom the like condition of life in other countries. President Dole stated this\\nto be the fact in the interviews already alluded to, and other intelligent and\\ninfluential residents of the islands have expressed the same opinion, and yet\\nthe committee alleges that they are not trustworthy as laborers nor honest\\nin their dealings with merchants. Mr. Thurston, on the other hand, in the\\ndocument which the cormhittee appends to its report, asserts that individ-\\nually the Chinese and Japanese in Hawaii are industrious, peaceable citi-\\nzens. This latter, it may be said without fear of successful contradiction,\\nwill be found to be the consensus of authoritative, well-informed opinion on\\nthe subject.\\nThroughout the report under review the thought, already noticed, appears\\nfirst in one form and then in another, that there is danger to Hawaii from\\nan uprising among the Japanese, through concerted design, instigated and\\nsupported, it is openly hinted, by Japanese authority. Without pausing to\\ncomment upon the undeserved stigma thus cast upon the honor and good\\nfaith of the Japanese Government, it may be asserted most emphatically\\nthat there is nothing either in past or in current events in Hawaii to justify\\n3571-3", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "34\\nsuch a belief. During all the troubles which occurred when the monarchy\\nwas overthrown, and during all the vicissitudes which beset the new Gov-\\nernment, the Japanese in Hawaii made no hostile demonstration and gave\\nno trouble of any kind whatever.\\nSubsequently they pursued the same course, even at a time when the Ha-\\nwaiian Government appeared to be treating a number of their countrymen\\nwith unmerited harshness. At no time has there been anything like a sign\\nof union between them and the lower order of Hawaiian natives, such as the\\nCommittee on Foreign Relations refer to, and at no time have they given the\\nslightest pretext for apprehension. They have shown no wish, as the com-\\nmittee states, to participate in government, nor are they in any wise un-\\nder the control or direction of managers set over them in authority by the\\nGovernment agents in Japan. There are no such managers, unless over-\\nseers are meant, and these are appointed by the employers.\\nThe committee makes another grave error when it asserts that the pol-\\nicy of Japan toward Hawaii will become aggressive and determined so soon\\nas the United States refuses to annex the islands, and makes the return to\\nmonarchy possible. This statement embodies a charge which the Japanese\\nGovernment some time ago took occasion to refute in the most authoritative\\nmanner. In the correspondence concerning annexation the Japanese minis-\\nter made the following statement regarding a similar assertion:\\nWith reference to the mischievous suggestion or report, which has\\nbeen so industriously circulated in this country and elsewhere, that Japan\\nhas designs against the integrity or sovereignty of Hawaii, I am further\\ninstructed by the Imperial Government to state most emphatically and un-\\nequivocally that Japan has not now and never had such designs or designs of\\nany kind whatever against Hawaii.\\nIn response to this declaration the Secretary of State made the following\\nreply:\\nSo far as you [the Japanese minister] take occasion to deny what you\\naptly call the mischievous suggestion or report that Japan has designs\\nagainst the integrity or sovereignty of Hawaii, I am glad to assure you that\\nsuch denial was entirely unnecessary, inasmuch as this Government has not\\ndoubted and can nut for an instant doubt the sincerity and friendliness of\\nJapan in all that concerns her relation to the United States and the Hawaiian\\nIslands.\\nThese extracts form only a part of the assurances which were exchanged\\nbetween the two Governments on this point. They utterly preclude the idea\\nthat Japan will ever adopt anything like an aggressive policy toward\\nHawaii, since the adoption of such a policy would be tantamount to a species of\\nbad faith of which Japan has never been guilty. The statement of the Com-\\nmittee on Foreign Relations is, therefore, wholly conjectural, and finds no\\njustification in the past or present relations of Japan and Hawaii. As was\\nstated in the correspondence already referred to, Japan has absolutely no\\ndesigns of any kind whatever inimical to Hawaii, and no motive in her deal-\\ning with that country except to secure by legitimate means the due observ-\\nance of just obligations.\\nBefore the reading was concluded,\\nMr. MORGAN. I should like to interpolate just there in that\\nreport my protest that no foreign minister has the right to send\\nto this Senate in any form whatever a criticism upon a report of\\na committee of this body.\\nMr. WHITE. He has not sent it here. I have brought it here\\nand make the criticism as my own.\\nMr. MORGAN. How does the paper appear here? Is it of-\\nficial?\\nMr. WHITE. I have presented the paper here. It has been\\nnearly read, and I ask that the reading be continued as part of\\nmy remarks. I think that it is apposite and relevant to the state-\\nments made by the Committee on Foreign Relations, which I am\\nchallenging and criticising, as I have a right to do, and which. I\\nshall continue to do for a while.\\nMr. MORGAN. I wish to ask the Senator from California if\\nthis is an official paper?\\nMr. WHITE. All I have to say about it I have said about it.\\nMr. MORGAN. I do not know whether it is an official paper\\nor not. I only inquire for information.\\nMr. WHITE. I have nothing to add to what I have already\\nsaid, except that I wish to have the reading completed.\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "35\\nMr. MORGAN. I wish to say that if it is an official paper from\\na foreign minister\\nMr. WHITE. It is not. I never spoke to the minister or had\\nany communication with him.\\nMr. MORGAN. If it is an official paper, it is a very serious and\\nvery outrageous assault upon this Senate and a committee of the\\nSeuate to have him send a paper here or to have it brought here in\\nany way criticising the action of the Senate. It is clearly to deny\\nto us the right of free speech and holding us accountable in another\\nplace for words uttered in debate or uttered in the progress of\\nproceedings in this body. I have just noticed it, and I enter my\\nprotest against it and I wish the Senate to understand it.\\nThe VICE-PRESIDENT. The Secretary will read the remain-\\nder of the paper. There are only four lines left.\\nThe Secretary resumed and concluded the reading of the paper\\nas above given.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, there is nothing astonishing about\\nthis paper, nor is it any infringement upon the rights of a Senator,\\nnor calling a Senator in question, as the technical expression is\\nused, for anything that he may have said. I am calling the mem-\\nbers of the Foreign Relations Committee in question in so far as\\nthe logic of their report is concerned. There is nothing personal\\nabout it. I am discussing them, as I have a right to do.\\nNobody has a higher regard for the attainments of every mem-\\nber of that great committee than have I, but I have the privilege,\\nI presume, to differ from them in this or upon any matter. This\\nprotest is no novelty; it has been advertised all over the country\\nfor weeks, and I have availed myself of a privilege, common not\\nonly to a citizen of the United States but of the world, to present\\nand employ it. If it is not a copy of an authentic document, the\\nargument is good, very good; I will adopt it. I can not certify to\\nit, and I do not propose to do so. Still I will use it.\\nMr. MORGAN. If the Senator will allowme to interrupt him,\\nI do not object to the Senator using or adopting any argument\\nwhich he thinks is pertinent or relevant, or to make use of any\\nmaterial which he sees proper under any circumstances in debate\\non this floor. What I was objecting to, Mr. President, was what\\nI consider to be the wrong of the Department of State in receiving\\nsuch a paper as that from the minister of Japan, if it is an offi-\\ncial paper, and I rose to inquire whether it was or not. I have\\nnever seen or heard of the paper before.\\nMr. WHITE. I can not state to the Senator whether it was\\never certified by anybody. I have been told that such a docu-\\nment has been presented and filed, but I do not know that it has\\nbeen.\\nMr. MORGAN. Filed with the Secretary of State?\\nMr. WHITE. I have heard so, but I do not know; I have not\\nseen it on file, and I have not my information from the Secretary\\nof State. I have availed myself of public channels and utilized\\nan argument which I think shows a great deal of sound sense.\\nMr. MORGAN. I am not complaining of the Senator from Cal-\\nifornia using anything he pleases in argument. What I complain\\nof\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and it is a just complaint\u00e2\u0080\u0094 is that the Secretary of State should\\npermit such a paper as that to be filed in his office as a state paper,\\na paper in which an open criticism is made upon the Senate of the\\nUnited States and one of its committees, and in which there is\\nimputed to them, as I caught the reading of it, ignorance, and per-\\nhaps worse\u00e2\u0080\u0094 prevarication, as I understood it.", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "36\\nWe have had here recently, within the last three or four years,\\nseveral instances of very flagrant outrage upon the Senate of the\\nUnited States in just such a way as this. The Senate will re-\\nmember that at one time, when we were discussing here the Nic-\\naraguan Canal bill, a foreign minister injected into this body,\\nthrough the Assistant Secretary of State, a diatribe against the\\nmembers of the Senate who were conducting that legislation upon\\na bill which had been pending before the Senate\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a long argu-\\nment of a very incisive, not to say unjust and outrageous, charac-\\nter against the bill and against the action the Senate had taken, or\\nwas proposing to take, and I had to put in then a protest against it.\\nPrior to that time, in a session of the Senate, there was brought\\ninto this body, through diplomatic action, the opinions of the\\nBritish minister upon the question of the Bering Sea matter, in\\nwhich there was an arraignment not only of the Senate and the\\nHouse of Representatives but of political parties in this country,\\nand a direct appeal from the Congress of the United States to the\\npeople of the United States, made in this state paper brought into\\nthe Senate.\\nI only mention, Mr. President, that we have come upon times\\nwhen the other departments of this G-overnment seem to have no\\nregard at all for the rights of the Senate or of the House of Rep-\\nresentatives in matters of this kind. The time was, in the days\\nof Mr. Webster and General Jackson, and Mr. Jefferson also, that\\nwhen foreign ministers undertook to make criticisms upon mes-\\nsages of Presidents of the United States, and also upon the pro-\\nceedings in Congress, they were not only silenced for it, but they\\nwere dismissed from this court on that account.\\nThe Senator from California is perfectly at liberty, so far as I\\nam concerned, to use this or any other paper. My inquiry was\\nnot addressed to his right or the propriety of the Senator doing\\nit not in the slightest degree but it was addressed only to the\\npoint that the Secretary of State ought not to allow a paper of\\nthat kind to find its way into the archives of the State Depart-\\nment as an official document.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, I have no right to speak for the\\nSecretary of State. I have had no communication with the Sec-\\nretary of State or any Assistant Secretary of State or any official\\nof the State Department regarding this matter. I have not\\nMr. SPOONER. I suspect, if the Senator will permit me, that\\nthere is no very good foundation for the statement that the Sec-\\nretary of State has been guilty of any indiscretion in this matter.\\nMr. WHITE. I was about to say that.\\nMr. SPOONER. I doubt -very much the propriety although I\\nmake the suggestion with very great reluctance and deference\\nof the sort of comment which the Senator from Alabama has in-\\ndulged in in open session.\\nMr. MORGAN. What particular part of my comment does\\nthe Senator object to? I shall be pleased to have him quote it.\\nMr. SPOONER. Oh, let it go.\\nMr. MORGAN. No; I will not let it go at all. I want the\\nSenator to quote the particular part of my comment that he ob-\\njects to.\\nMr. SPOONER. I will have it written out.\\nMr. MORGAN. No, sir; the Senator will not find it in the\\nRecord.\\nMr. SPOONER. I thought the Senator was commenting upon\\nthe propriety of such a criticism by a foreign minister upon the\\nreport of a committee of this body.\\n\u00c2\u00a3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "37\\nMr. MORGAN, That is exactly what I was commenting upon.\\nMr. SPOONER. I am entitled to my opinion\u00e2\u0080\u0094 which is very\\nlikely wrong\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that such a comment perhaps had better be made\\nin executive session.\\nMr. MORGAN. No, Mr. President, not when the paper itself\\nis brought out in open session of the Senate. The first time I\\nheard it was when it was read here just now.\\nMr. SPOONER. I did not know that it was read.\\nMr. MORGAN. It was read here.\\nMr. SPOONER. I understand it was published in a newspaper.\\nMr. MORGAN. 1 do not know about a newspaper, whether\\nthis came from a newspaper or from the archives of the State De-\\npartment, or from the Japanese legation, or where it is from; and\\nthe Senator from California [Mr. White] does not inform us, and\\nI have no right to ask him, and do not ask him. The paper is\\nhere purporting to be a statement made by a foreign minister;\\nand being such a paper as that, I have the right to say that, how-\\never it may have gotten here, that minister has no right to make\\nany such comment as he has made upon the proceedings in this\\nSenate, and if he made it through the public prints or made it in\\na communication to the State Department, or if he made it to\\nthe Senator from California with a view of its being brought here\\nas a criticism upon the conduct of a committee of this body, he is\\nentirely outside of the privileges and outside of the ordinary de-\\ncorum of a foreign minister, and he deserves a rebuke for it.\\nI for one, sir, will not let this matter rest just where it is, not\\nbecause of its effect upon this case at all not at all\u00e2\u0080\u0094 but because\\nI have the right as a Senator and a member of that committee to\\nbring in question this abuse, as I conceive it to be a very gros3\\none, of the privileges of a committee of this body.\\nMr. SPOONER. Mr. President, I would not for a moment\\nquarrel with the attitude of the Senator from Alabama if it i3\\ndefinitely determined and ascertained that this is a document\\nwhich is official and has been filed with the Department of State.\\nI do not know that that is true, and the Senator does not know\\nthat that is true. That was the entire point of my suggestion. I\\nquite agree with the Senator that no representative of a foreign\\ngovernment should be permitted in open, in this way, in disregard\\nof the conventionalities of intercourse between this Government\\nand other governments, to criticise either of the bodies or the\\ncommittees of either of the bodies. I have no question or dispute\\nwith the Senator about that.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, it appears that the document is\\nnot certified to\u00e2\u0080\u0094 I am not in a position to say that it was ever cer-\\ntified to by the Japanese minister. I stated once but in view\\nof the last statement of the Senator from Alabama I may be in-\\ndulged in a repetition of the statement\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that I am not acquainted\\nwith the minister from Japan and am not, as I should be, to any\\nextent familiar with the legation or its members; but if I were a\\nminister from Japan and had seen this report of the Committee.\\non Foreign Relations I would have thought very much as that\\ndocument or paper expresses itself. At all events, it is a criticism\\nwhich I adopt.\\nMr. President, in this same connection it is not unimportant to\\nconsider the attitude of Japan: it is entirely germane to this dis-\\ncussion; and, with due deference, it is my judgment that the\\nCommittee on Foreign Relations ought not to attack foreign gov-\\nernments unless there is some absolutely plain reason justifying\\nsuch assault.\\no571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "38\\nI have in my hand an article which, like the unsigned paper, I\\ndid not obtain from the office of the Secretary of State or from\\nany other official. There is in Harper s Magazine for November,\\n1897. an interesting article signed by Mr. Hoshi, who I understand\\nto be the Japanese minister. There is much of it which refers to\\nsubjects that are not pertinent to this discussion, though very en-\\ntertaining from various standpoints, but there is a part of the pub-\\nlication which applies to the issue before us, and I wish to have\\nthe same read and made a part of my remarks.\\nThe Secretary read as follows:\\nJapan is so new as a factor in the world s calculations, so little studied,\\nand so little understood, that her motives and her actions are sometimes\\nseriously misconstrued. This is a topic upon which I must speak with due\\ncaution, but even at the risk of seeming impropriety I can not allow the op-\\nportunity to pass of saying a word upon subjects which have lately been at-\\ntracting widespread attention.\\nNo citizen of this country should be ignorant of the fact that among the\\npeople of Japan there is a genuine and deeply rooted attachment to the\\nUnited States. It is not a merely sentimental liking, but a feeling founded\\nupon the memory of many kindnesses received. The United States has\\nbeen a friend to Japan, helpful in the hour of need, considerate at all times.\\nIf there was a nation upon whose sympathy they could rely in the effort to\\nimprove their condition, and of whose appreciation they were certain in\\nwhatever successes they might gain, that nation, the Japanese people have\\nthought, was the United States. Such being the case, the tone of many re-\\ncent utterances in the American press will be to them like an angry blow\\nfrom a friend.\\nThat the American, people should regard Japan as an aggressor, lustful of\\naggrandizement, eager to quarrel, and ready, if need be, for war, will seem\\nto them incomprehensible. And that this clamor should have arisen because\\ntheir Government, in pursuance of clear and legitimate duty, has chosen to\\npresent, in a respectful, calm, and moderate way, certain reasons why a cer-\\ntain thing should not be done will add to the mystery. There are jingoes in\\nJapan, as a distinguished countryman of mine said the other day, but I have\\nheard of none so forgetful of right, of friendship, and of interest as to make\\nthe declaration recently attributed to Japan by a prominent American jour-\\nnal, kt Let us send a few war ships to the United States.\\nThis is a delicate subject, I know, but I can not refrain from saying that\\nAmericans especially should appreciate the solicitude which Japan feels in\\nthe welfare of her subjects in foreign countries. The Japanese Government\\nhas never permitted the establishment of anything like a cooly system\\namong her people. If they go abroad, it desires that they shall go as men,\\nand not as numbers, and it asks and expects for them the same treatment\\nand the same protection as are accorded to other strangers. Whatever may\\nbe said to the contrary, the Japanese are not an emigrating people; but, to pro-\\nvide for all contingencies, an emigration law has been enacted, carefully\\nframed, to protect the emigrant and to prevent him from going to countries\\nwhere he would not be welcome.\\nJapanese emigration to Hawaii involves this, among other questions.\\nThat emigration was instituted upon the solicitation of Hawaii under the\\nstrictly guarded stipulations of a special treaty. The welfare, much less the\\nindependence, of Hawaii has never been endangered by the operations of\\nthat treaty. On the contrary, Japanese immigration was zealously promoted\\nand encouraged in the islands until political contingencies rendered another\\nnolicy advisable. Japan did not seek the treaty, but her people have been\\ninduced to resort to Hawaii under the guaranties it provides, and certainly\\nno one with any sense of justice can now blame her for endeavoring to con-\\nserve their rights.\\nTouching upon another, yet a cognate subject, it may be said most emphat-\\nically that the Japanese nation has no tendency toward territorial aggran-\\ndizement. Neither in the past history of the empire nor in its modern annals\\ncan there be found any trace of such a spirit. Formosa was taken from\\nChina, but that was in lieu of indemnity which it was inconvenient for China\\nto pay; besides, the status of Formosa as an appendage of China has not\\nalways been strictly maintained. At one time the Japanese, Chinese, and\\nDutch simultaneously occupied different parts of the island. More recently\\nJapan sent an expedition thither, with the consent of China, as was supposedt\\nto punish the savages for their cruelty to shipwrecked seamen.\\nHistorically, therefore, there were close relations between Japan and\\nFormosa. The most conclusive reason, however, in favor of the cession of\\nthe island is that by geographical position it is a natural addition to the Em-\\npire. The cession of the Liao-tung peninsula is the only other instance of\\nthe forcible acquisition of territory by Japan. The peninsula was returned\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "39\\nto China, and although the return excited some popular disapproval, it was\\nnot so much on account of the loss of territory as because of the manner of\\nretrocession. I repeat, therefore, that history affords no example of greed\\nof territorial aggrandizement on the part of Japan. It is as foreign to the\\ngenius of her people as it is to the designs of her Government. The charge\\nthat she intends, either by forcible seizure or by peaceful occupation, to ac-\\nquire possession of a country thousands of miles distant and totally without\\nthe sphere of her territorial influence can therefore only be accounted for\\nin one of two ways. It is cither prompted by ignorance or by interested\\nmotives.\\nJapan s real ambition lies in quite another direction. In her geographical\\nposition, her natural resources, as well as in the capacity and adaptability of\\nher people, she perceives the surest means of attaining national greatness.\\nThe watchwords of the Japan of to-day are enterprise and industry. The\\npeople have turned their attention to commerce, to manufactures, and to the\\narts. They realize the advantages their country possesses, and are doing\\nwhat they can to utilize them. They may not yet have reached the full\\nmeasure of their ambition, but they loolc forward hopefully to the time when\\nJapan will be the emporium of tiie Orient, firmly bound to her neighbors,\\neast and west, by the strong ties of mutual interest.\\nMr. WHITE. I have called attention to these declarations for\\nthe purpose of showing the attitude taken by leading Japanese\\nwith relation to Hawaii and as containing a fair and clear expres-\\nsion entirel} T at variance with the assumed hostility which it is\\nsought to charge upon the Japanese nation with reference to our\\ncourse in the Pacific. I shall have occasion, no doubt, to call the\\nattention of the Senate to several happenings in Hawaii bearing\\nupon this topic and to the fact that the presence of a labor ele-\\nment not considered either homogeneous or desirable by our peo-\\nple is occasioned not by any means solely because of the will of\\nJapan, nor because of legislation antedating the establishment of\\nthe Republic, but since then contract laborers have not only been\\nimported, but their number has been materially augmented.\\nIt may not be out of place to say that although when some 800\\nordinary immigrants from Japan were about to be landed a dis-\\npute arose and they were excluded, nevertheless since then more\\nthan 2,000 contract laborers have been admitted by the Hawaiian\\nboard of immigration. These recent importations are far less de-\\nsirable than those who have been denied entrance. Hence the\\nHawaiian Government the best on earth, as we are told by an-\\nnexationists\u00e2\u0080\u0094 has permitted and is permitting the importation of\\na class against which they and their friends are ostensibly pro-\\ntesting.\\nBut, Mr. President, we see that the theory upon which the great\\nmen whose views I have attempted to cite was based regarding\\nHawaii is not infringed upon or interfered with by anything that\\nis happening to-day. Their constant and unalterable, continued\\nand universal, statement was that we would not suffer the islands\\nto pass into hostile hands, but that we were anxious for their\\nfreedom and the maintenance there of an independent govern-\\nment.\\nSenators may say that the sentiments of the Japanese Govern-\\nment as mentioned by me are of late date, and that that nation\\ndid formerly entertain different views. I do not think so. But,\\noccupying her vantage ground, the American Republic contem-\\nplates all the world, and at this hour finds no people willing to\\ndispute her oft-expressed edict that Hawaii must be free.\\nThose who are attempting to grant Hawaii to us find it to their\\ninterest to insist that there is danger of foreign interference. But\\nthis is not true. No proof has been adduced. Mere assertion in\\nsuch a case must be unavailing to warrant important action.\\nMr. President, there is scarcely a break in the line of authority\\nan", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "40\\nupon this subject, and the occasional expression in favor of annex-\\nation is uniformly predicated upon the fear that some other power\\nmay intervene. Never did any statesmen assert that if the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands were capable of maintaining their own govern-\\nment, whether a republic or such other form of rule as they might\\nelect, we should interfere.\\nMr. Marcy, on January 31, 1855, made this most positive declara-\\ntion. In writing to Mr. Gregg he said that the policy of the\\nUnited States was\\nNot to accelerate or urge on any important change in the government of that\\ncountry, but if it has or should become so far enfeebled that it can not be\\ncontinued, and the sovereignty of the islands must be transferred to another\\npower, then a state of things will exist in which it will be proper for the\\nUnited States to have a regard to the future condition of that country.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nIdem, page 133.\\nIn the same letter Mr. Marcy declares that the draft of the\\ntreaty was not satisfactory, that the President believed that strong\\nobjections to the immediate incorporation of the islands as a State\\nexisted, and that there were other objections; that the amounts\\nto be paid as annuities, etc., were too large, and that the treaty,\\ndeviating in many particulars from the terms suggested by thV\\nUnited States, was not acceptable.\\nThis about concluded the incident as far as Mr. Marcy was con-\\ncerned, and while he did attempt to bring about annexation, it will\\nbe observed, whatever the fact may have been, that he professed\\nthroughout the entire negotiations that we should accept Hawaii\\nin order to escape European domination. But the experience of\\nforty-odd years shows conclusively that there never was any dan-\\nger of foreign interference that could not be promptly checked by\\nthe declaration Of the intention of the United States.\\nHeretofore the mere announcement of its policy through the\\nExecutive has been adequate, even though the situation looked\\nserious. Now it is proposed to add to the warnings heretofore\\ngiven a joint resolution which will manifest the views of all de-\\npartments of the Government, and which will plainly notify the\\nworld that the United States does not wish this independent Gov-\\nernment interfered with. Such a resolution is pending, having\\nbeen introduced by myself.\\nWhy such warning will not be effective now, when we are much\\nstronger than formerly and far better able to cope with important\\nquestions, is more than I can conceive.\\nMr. McBride, the representative of this Government at Hono-\\nlulu in 1863, was an ardent annexationist, and the main purpose\\nwhich seemed to animate him was the protection of the Americans\\non the islands by annexation. He represented, in addition to the\\nother attractions which might be found on the islands, that a\\ndeputation which had been sent by the British Government to\\nreport upon the cotton-growing industry made a report which was\\nsaid to be favorable; and he continues:\\nThe cotton-growing capacity of these islands has been sufficiently tested\\nto demonstrate it as a fact that it is not at all inferior to Alabama, Georgia,\\nor Mississippi, either as to quality or quantity per acre.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations\\nUnited Stages, Appendix 2, pages 135-13t\\nHe also refers to the coffee industry, which he says is propitious.\\nOn the 5th of February, 1864, the Secretary of State reported\\nthat an application had been made for the revival of a treaty which\\nhad been negotiated during the Administration of President Pierce,\\nbut which was not approved by the Senate. Says the Secretary:\\nAfter due consideration, however, especially in connection with the prob-\\nable effect of such a measure on the public revenue at this juncture, it is not\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "41\\nSeemed advisable further to entertain the subject. Foreign Relations\\nUnited States, Appendix 2, page 136.\\nIn acknowledging the receipt of Mr. McBride s note Secretary\\nSeward made no definite statement as to the policy of the Govern-\\nment. The fears of Mr. McBride regarding the British invasion\\nturned out to be purely visionary.\\nMr. McCook, under date of September 3, I860, refers to the fact\\nthat many of the American residents have rendered themselves\\nobnoxious to the King and his cabinet by unwarranted interfer-\\nence, etc., in the political affairs of the Kingdom. He also says:\\nAnother class of Americans, the missionaries, have controlled the political\\naffairs of the country since 1820. They are dissatisfied because within the\\nlast few years they have lost their hold upon the Government and its offices.\\nThe first class of Americans are generally disappointed adventurers; the\\nsecond class are religionists, who, having once exercised supreme power in\\nchurch and state, feel all the bitterness of disappointment at seeing their po-\\nlitical power pass into other hands, and knowing that the native population\\nis beginning to listen to a religion preached from other pulpits than their\\nown, etc.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations United States, Appendix 2, page 138.\\nMr. McCook expressed the opinion that a test would find the\\npeople of the islands demanding, by votes freely expressed, an-\\nnexation to the United States.\\nIn a letter from Secretary Seward to Mr. McCook, dated Sep-\\ntember 12, 1867 (Foreign Relations, United States, Appendix 2,\\npage 143) there are expressions showing that Secretary Seward\\npreferred a lawful and peaceable annexation of the islands to\\nthe United States with the consent of the people of the Sandwich\\nIslands. Those are the terms in which the Secretary framed his\\nsentiments.\\nAfterwards, July 5, 1868, Mr. Seward, in communicating with\\nMr. Spalding, said, and his letter is quite interesting:\\nSir: Your letter of the 14th of April has been received and carefully read.\\nThe information which you give of the excitement which is prevailing in\\nHonolulu in regard to the annexation of the Sandwich Islands is very inter-\\nesting. You suggest a system of proceeding here with reference to that ob-\\nject which could not possibly, at the present time, obtain the sanction of any\\nDepartment of this Government.\\nWithout going into an explanation of the causes for the condition of na-\\ntional sentiment which temporarily exists, it is enough to say that the public\\nattention sensibly continues to be fastened upon the domestic questions\\nwhich have grown out of the late civil war. The public mind refuses to dis-\\nmiss these questions, even so far as to entertain the higher but more remote\\nquestions of national extension and aggrandizement. The periodical Presi-\\ndential and Congressional elections are approaching. Each of the political\\nparties seems to suppose that economy and retrenchment will be prevailing\\nconsiderations in that election, and the leaders of each party, therefore, seem\\nto shrink from every suggestion which may involve any new national enter-\\nprise, and especially any foreign one.\\nHow long sentiments of this sort may control the proceedings of the Gov-\\nernment is uncertain, but in the meantime it will be well for you not to allow\\nextravagant expectations of sympathy between the United States and the\\nfriends of annexation in the islands to influence your own conduct. You\\nwill continue, however, to write me upon the subject freely, as you have\\nhitherto done.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations United States, Appendix 2, page 144.\\nFrom this it appears that Mr. Spalding was probably engaged\\nin a revolutionary scheme which Secretary Seward promptly dis-\\nposed of. Whatever ideas Seward may have entertained favoring\\nannexation in 1867, he changed his mind later on, as this corre-\\nspondence witnesses.\\nMuch has been said with reference to the message of President\\nJohnson of December 9, 1868, in which he said:\\nA reciprocity treaty, while it could not materially diminish the revenues\\nof the United States, would be a guaranty of the good will and forbearance\\nof all nations until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no dis-\\ntant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations\\nUnited States, Appendix 2, page 146.\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "42\\nCare was always taken by the officials until very recently to\\nnote that the acquiescence of the people was necessary. And\\nwhile perhaps this matter may be further on elaborated, we must\\nnot forget the distinction attempted to be drawn by the Commit-\\ntee on Foreign Relations when they say that we can only deal\\nwith a government; that every people act through and by a gov-\\nernment, and that we can not otherwise hold official intercourse.\\nMr. President, in the case of the annexation of Texas there was\\nregistered a free and untrammeled vote favoring annexation; and\\nin every word that was written or spoken upon that issue there\\nwas evinced a determination to act in accordance with the will of\\nthe people of Texas. I grant, as a legal proposition conclusive,\\nthat in dealing with a foreign power we must treat with the organ-\\nized government; but when we propose to annex a nation, to sweep\\nfrom the family of sovereignties one of its members, we, a gov-\\nernment organized by the people and claiming to exercise our\\nfunctions pursuant to the will of the people, can not afford to\\nbring within this communion masses of men unwilling to come.\\nGrant that the technical right of alienation exists in a government\\nwhich pro hac vice may be lawfully empowered so to act, still we\\nhave the authority to go behind the mere form. The question\\nwithin our discretion is, Shall we annex a people not desirous of\\nthe affiliation?\\nNever should this Republic, based upon universal suffrage and\\ndependent for its life and for its existence upon the common\\nacquiescence and support of all its citizens, compel to its mem-\\nbership men who are alien to it in sympathy and feeling, or who\\nwish to remain without it. They are foreign and hope to so\\nremain.\\nPresident Johnson also Remarked in the same document that\\nthe\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nattitude of the United States toward these islands is not very different from\\nthat in which they stand toward the West Indies\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Idem., page 146.\\nMr. Spalding, in a letter which appears in the document and on\\nthe page last above cited, says:\\nI feel that the desire for annexation is stronger to-day than it has been at\\nany time since my arrival on the islands, simply because the prospects of the\\ntreaty are felt to be almost hopeless and the planters must have relief by\\nannexation. Idem, page 147.\\nFor such relief did these planters then work: for that relief they\\nhave since toiled. The relief mentioned took the form some years\\nago of a virtual bonus or bounty on sugar\u00e2\u0080\u0094 or, more correctly,\\ntariff exemptions equivalent to a bounty indirectly paid to them\\nby the Government of the United States under an existing treaty.\\nAsses?ments, as I understand, are being levied to-day upon every\\nton of sugar produced in the island to forward the interests of an-\\nnexation. The planters are strong; millions are involved. The\\ntreaty may any day be stricken dead either by the hand of legis-\\nlation or by failure to continue it. Annexation means continued\\nabsence of tariff taxation. Hence this struggle.\\nThe situation referred to by Mr. Spalding years ago was evi-\\ndently similar to that now prevailing. The planters needed re-\\nlief, viz, exemption from tariff taxation. They were practically\\nlooking out for a bounty. The scheme was then, as it is now,\\nutterly selfish.\\nIn another place in the same letter Mr. Spalding says:\\nThe truth is that so long as there was a chance for receiving the benefits\\nof free trade with the United States and escaping taxation men who had\\ncapital invested here were generally opposed to annexation. Idem.\\n8571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "43\\nTims it comes about that there is very little patriotism con-\\nnected with this matter, so far as leading annexationists upon the\\nisland are concerned. They are looking out for themselves. They\\nare not to he blamed for doing so. They are struggling as many\\nstruggle, and as we all struggle more or less in the private walks\\nof life to augment our fortunes and better oar conditions. While\\nnot censuring them for these interested efforts, while not wonder-\\ning that they thus exert themselves for their own advantage, yet\\nit behooves us, under the circumstances in which we are placed,\\nto judge of this matter from a wholly different and, I may be\\npermitted to say, a loftier standpoint.\\nThe letters of Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish (Foreign Relations United\\nStates, Appendix 2, pages 152-153) show that annexation was\\nsimply considered as an alternative in the event that reciprocity\\ncould not be accomplished. And it is to be noted that in the first\\nof these communications (February 10, 1873) Mr. Pierce states\\nthat it is expected to succeed in procuring reciprocity\\nBy offering to the United States a quid pro quo. the cession of the sover-\\neignty and proprietorship of the spacious, landlocked, easily defended harbor\\nor estuary known as Ewa or Pearl River, in this island, 10 miles distaut from\\nHonolulu, and also to include the territory surrounding it, say 10 miles\\nsquare in all.\\nThis was before the treaty was negotiated, and perhaps the\\nstatement may be more or less of value in construing the grant in\\nthe treaty, which we will do later on.\\nAfter this General Schofield was sent to the islands with Colonel\\nAlexander for the purpose of investigating Pearl Harbor.\\nThe opinions of Mr. Blaine were undoubtedly favorable to an-\\nnexation. His views as to the extension of the domain of the\\nUnited States are quite well understood, and the theories which\\nwere carried out in the Samoan folly failed to prevail as to Hawaii.\\nMr. Blaine, in his letter to Mr. Comly of December 1, 1881, de-\\nclares, in speaking of the islands, that\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nTheir fertile resources for the growth of rice and sugar would not only be\\ncontrolled by American capital, but so profitable a field of labor would attract\\nintelligent workers thither from the United States.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Foreign Relations of\\nUnited States, Appendix 2, page 170.\\nA statement without anything to support it; and there never\\nwill be a day when the coffee planters of the Hawaiian group or\\nthe sugar raisers there located will furnish any field for intelli-\\ngent American labor. It is somewhat singular that Mr. Blaine\\nshould have been so ill informed as to American labor. Although\\nthe sugar plantations have been under American control for a\\nlong time, and while the same may be said of the coffee planta-\\ntions, American labor has not been attracted thither, and the\\nAmerican laboring man will never work in rice or cane fields.\\nThis may be said to be generally the history of our policy as far\\nas Hawaii is specifically concerned, and from it we glean that the\\nidea of annexation has, as a rule, emanated from the sugar peo-\\nple, and that because American planters needed protection our\\nconsular officers have assumed that the whole country must be\\ncaptured.\\nThe earlier statesmen, and those whose views are most entitled\\nto respect, have not concurred in this theory.\\n[At this point, without having concluded his speech, Mr. White\\nyielded the floor for the day.]\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "SPEECH\\nOF\\nHON. STEPHEN M. WHITE,\\nof california,\\nIn the Senate of the United States,\\nWednesday, June 22 Tuesday, July 5, and Wednesday, July 6, 180S\u00c2\u00bb\\nThe Senate having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259)\\nto provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States-\\nMr. WHITE said:\\nMr. President: I am aware that a full consideration of this\\ninteresting subject can not be had if we are to regard those only\\nwho are prepared to subject the important to the frivolous\\naffairs of international moment and permanent domestic policy\\nto local interest and selfish view. Did I not firmly believe that\\nthe issues now before us are far-reaching I would not detain the\\nSeriate longer.\\nI attempted yesterday to criticise the pending resolution, not\\nmerely as to the merits of the case, but in view of its inherent\\ncontradictions and manifest absurdities. I have faith the com-\\nmittee will either withdraw the resolution or certainly alter its\\nform fundamentally.\\nMr. President, I endeavored yesterday to enlist the attention of\\nthose charged with the duty of knowing something about this\\nsubject to the opinion expressed by eminent statesmen who have\\npassed away, and I quoted from them quite liberally. Looking\\nover the reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations here and\\nelsewhere\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and the reports made in both bodies of Congress are\\npractically identical, and may, therefore, I suppose, be referred to\\nwith indifference I find it is said that the late Secretary of State,\\nMr. Sherman, favored annexation.\\nIt is true that he signed a document connected with and accom-\\npanying the message of the President of the United States in 1897\\nwhich contained the proposed treaty which we were expected to\\nratify. I do not know whether the Secretary of State examined\\nthat message with care, but various circumstances have occurred\\nto indicate that he did not.\\nHowever that may be, when he was compiling the work which\\nis called The Recollections of John Sherman, he not only used, at\\nthe close of that book, the phraseology which has been quoted\\n3571 45", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "46\\nhere already in this debate, but he made another declaration,\\nwhich has not been cited, and which I shall venture to read in a\\nmoment.\\nThe following is in Mr. Sherman s works, volume 2, page 121G:\\nThe events of the future are beyond the vision of mankind, but I hope that\\nour people will be content with internal growth and avoid the complications\\nof foreign acquisitions. Our family of States is already large enough to cre-\\nate embarrassment in the Senate, and a republic should not hold dependent\\nprovinces or possessions. Every new acquisition will create embarrass-\\nments. Canada and Mexico as independent republics will be more valuable\\nto the United States than if carved into additional States. The Union al-\\nready embraces discordant elements enough, vnthoiit adding others. If my\\nlife is prolonged, I will do all I can to add to the strength and prosperity of\\nthe United States, but nothing to extend its limits or to add new dangers by\\nacquisition of foreign territory.\\nBut this is not all, Mr. President. The same distinguished\\nstatesman, selected by the present Administration for its Secre-\\ntary of State, and who entered into the public service on the same\\nday, I believe, that signalized the acceptance of office by the dis-\\ntinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. Morrill], this man of\\nwide knowledge, acquired not only in both Houses of the National\\nLegislature but in two Cabinets, again declared, on page 1039 of\\nhis book already cited, as follows:\\nIt is not worth while to follow the line of events that resulted in making\\nGreat Britain. Germany, and the United States the guardians of these far-\\ndistant, half-civilized, mercurial, and combative orientals.\\nHe refers to the Samoan tribes, in which we have a third inter-\\nest.\\nThe only interest the United States had in these islands was the possession\\nand ownership of the Bay of Pago Pago, acquired by a treaty in 1878 between\\nthe United States and the King of Samoa. The repeated wars on a small\\nscale that have occurred since that time and the complications and expense\\ncaused by the tripartite protectorate of the islands furnish another example\\nof the folly of the United States in extending its property rights to lands in a\\nfar-distant sea. Our continental position ought to dissuade us from acquiring\\noutside possessions which, in case of war, would cost the United States more\\nto defend than their value.\\nThis, Mr. President, was written by Mr. Sherman when he was\\na member of this body\u00e2\u0080\u0094 written by him deliberately\u00e2\u0080\u0094 penned in a\\nwork through which he desired to give to posterity not only a\\nstatement of his career but an elucidation of his opinions. Since\\nhe ceased to be Secretary of State there was published\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and I think\\nthere has been no denial of the accuracy of the statement\u00e2\u0080\u0094 in a\\nprominent newspaper of the United States, on May 16, 189S, the\\nfollowing interview:\\nNOT A AVAR FOR CONQUEST.\\nThis is not a war for the acquisition of territory. We do not want to in-\\ncrease our territorial lines. It is a war in the interest of humanity and\\nChristianity. We could not blindfold ourselves to the fact that cruelty and\\noppression existed under our very eyes. The sentiment of Congress\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and\\nCongress voices the sentiment of the country\u00e2\u0080\u0094 was clearly in favor of war,\\nif need be, to free Cuba from Spanish rule. The President and his Cabinet\\ndid all they could to stem the tide, but they failed. Congress was of one\\nmind, and a war with Spain was the result.\\nWhen we demanded of Spain that she relinquish her control and domi-\\nnation of her possessions in the Western Hemisphere, we made a demand\\nwhich was unusual. It is not the custom at this end of the century to formu-\\nlate a demand upon a foreign power such a3 we made upon Spain, but we\\nwere forced to it. Misrule in Cuba became unbearable, and there was only\\ncue thing to do, and that was to demand the freedom of Cuba from Spanish\\npule. This Congress did.\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "47\\nWar having been declared, it becomes the duty of every good citizen to\\nsupport the Government that it may be able to carry the struggle to a suc-\\ncessful conclusion.\\nAs I said before, this is not to be a war of conquest. We do not want terri-\\ntory- We do not want the spoils of war, but we want justice- to humanity.\\nIf I were in public life, I should oppose to the fullest extent of my ability the\\nretention of any of the Spanish possessions. As I oppose the annexation of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands, I would fight against the annexation of Cuba, the Phil-\\nippines, or Puerto Rico. If these islands were to become a part of the terri-\\ntory of the United States, we would have everything to lose and nothing to\\ngain. We might easily have secured a coaling station in the islands without\\nassuming sovereignty over them. The same would apply with equal force\\nand effect if we were to take in Cuba and the other Spanish possessions.\\nTHEY WOULD BE A SOUECE OE WEAKNESS.\\nTo my mind there is no reason why we should annex either Cuba, the\\nPhilippines, or Hawaii. They would be a source of weakness rather than of\\nstrength. Our Navy would have to be largely increased, an increased stand-\\ning Army would have to be maintained, and we would have under our care\\na mongrel population, partly uncivilized. There is no reason why we should\\nestablish a protectorate over any of these islands.\\nMr. President, it will be observed that I have referred to the\\ndistinguished statesman from Ohio and have given his estimate\\nof annexation made some time ago in his work and also his ideas\\ndisclosed last month. It would appear that the judgment which\\nhe gave to the world in the first instance has been approved by his\\nmore mature and latest expression.\\nThe Committee on Foreign Relations tells us by citing from the\\nPresidential message that Mr. Sherman favors annexation. We\\nhave, as I have observed, his early protest against it, and the later\\ninterview, when he stood unfettered by the courtesies and embar-\\nrassments of the office of Secretary of State. His sole motive was\\nthen to give to the country the same candid sentiments which are\\nembodied in his Recollections. Certainly the citation made by\\nthe Committee on Foreign Relations is not worthy of very serious\\nconsideration.\\nThus we have practically a uniform expression upon this sub-\\nject, extending to this day and debate.\\nTHE HAWAIIAN GROUP\u00e2\u0080\u0094 ITS SITUATION.\\nAt this point I will venture to allude to the location of the\\nislands and the possibility of their value to us.\\nFirst, I wish to call the attention of the Senate to the situation\\nof the Hawaiian Islands. It is common talk that everyone under-\\nstands this branch of the controversy thoroughly, and yet I read\\nnot long ago a statement made by a prominent judicial officer of\\nCalifornia to the effect that the argument urged in this Chamber\\nby the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Pettigrew] that Manila\\nwas not as far from San Francisco via Unalaska as via Honolulu\\nwas unfounded, and even observed that an inspection of any map\\nwould sustain his criticism.\\nMr. President, this gentleman and others adopting the same\\nargument forget that they reside upon a globe. It is to be sup-\\nposed that such critics at some time were aware of this fact and\\nare merely suffering from want of memory.\\nI requested the Superintendent of the Coast and Geodetic Sur-\\nvey to give me a statement of the sailing distance from San Fran-\\ncisco via Honolulu to Manila, and the sailing distance from San\\nFrancisco via Unalaska, touching at Yokohama, to the same\\npoint, and taking into consideration the deviations necessary to\\ntouch at both points. As a result of that inquiry the Superin-\\ntendent forwarded me the note which I ask may be read.\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "48\\nThe Secretary read as follows:\\nTreasury Department,\\nOffice of the Coast and Geodetic Survey,\\nWashington, D. C, June 15, 1808.\\nSir: In reply to your letter received yesterday I beg leave to forward the\\nfollowing data.\\nComputed distances of steamer routes (on great circles and allowance for\\nrounding of capes or islands)\\nNautical miles.\\nSan Francisco (Point Bonita) to Unalaska 2,035\\nTJnalaska to Yokohama (via Cape Mela) 2,550\\nYokohama to Manila 1,790\\nFan Francisco to Honolulu.-. 2,083\\nHonolulu to Manila (via S. Bernadino passage) 4,710\\nRespectfully, yours, HENRY S. PRITCHETT,\\nSuperintendent.\\nHon. Stephen M. White,\\nUnited States Senate, V/ashington, D. C.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, it will be observed, taking these\\ncourses as indicated by the Superintendent of the Coast and Geo-\\ndetic Survey and which are most favorable to the Honolulu route,\\nthat the aggregate distances from San Francisco to Manila are\\nmore than 400 miles less with all these deviations via Unalaska\\nand via Yokohama than via Honolulu, and if those who are in-\\nterested in the matter examine the Philippine group it will be\\nnoticed that the route referred to by the Superintendent of the\\nCoast and Geodetic Survey is by the south end of the Island\\nof Luzon, which is not always the course adopted. It is the\\nshorter. So that if we touch at the two points which I have\\nnamed and make the necessary allowances mentioned in this let-\\nter, we still have a difference of about 418 miles in favor of the\\nUnalaska route: and if we make none of these allowances and\\ntake the ordinary sailing route, the saving is much more.\\nMr. President, there are other things which perhaps are not\\nalways thought of by those who consider this subject in a cursory\\nway. I refer to the matter of distances. We often hear it said,\\nand we have heard it remarked here during the last few weeks,\\nthat we need the Hawaiian Islands in order to defend the Nica-\\nragua Canal. I am in favor of the construction of the Nicaragua\\nCanal. I need not say that here, for I have publicly and privately,\\nand in every way possible, advocated its building, and am anxious\\nto-day to forward the intention of the Senator from Alabama [Mr.\\nMorgan] who presented a measure to the Senate yesterday which\\nI know will meet the support of many of us regarding that very\\nimportant and most material enterprise.\\nBut if we are anxious to learn anything about this matter, if\\nwe really wish to know anything about it, if it is not our purpose\\nto remain in the fog and to avoid knowledge that we may not do\\ntoo much violence to our prejudices, let us look at the facts.\\nHonolulu is distant from Brito, the western terminus of the pro-\\nposed canal, 4,210 miles. I have heard it said in debate in this\\nChamber that Honolulu looks into the mouth of the Nicaragua\\nCanal.\\nIf there were any canal, and if there was any mouth to be looked\\ninto, it would be very difficult to make the observation from a\\npoint 4,210 miles distant, not only because that distance is some-\\nwhat beyond the ordinary capacity of human observation, but\\nalso because it is somewhat difficult to gaze through that much of\\nthe earth or the ocean (our friends must still remember the form\\nof the earth). But do we need Honolulu to defend the mouth of\\nthe canal, 4,210 miles away?\\nf.571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "49\\nHow far is San Francisco from Brito, the western terminus of\\nthe Nicaragua Canal? San Francisco is 2,700 miles from Brito. I\\nimagine that no nation will be justified in assuming a difference to\\nbe immaterial which consists of 1,510 miles; and if we are to de-\\nfend the western mouth of the Nicaragua Canal when that canal\\nis constructed, it would be well for us to do so from San Francisco\\nand not from Honolulu, unless indeed we wish to give the enemy\\nan immense advantage.\\nAgain, San Diego is about 500 miles nearer the intended western\\nterminus of the Nicaragua Canal than San Francisco, and thus if\\nwe go to San Diego and make that the headquarters of our army\\nof defense, we will have about 2,200 miles to sail as against 4,200 in\\ncase of Honolulu. Is that immaterial? Are 2,000 miles of any\\nimportance? Still, Mr. President, there are not a few, many of\\nwhom conceive themselves peculiarly qualified to seats in this\\nChamber, who may not know of these distances.\\nMr. President, in connection with what I have already said\\nwith regard to distances, I wish here to give the figures regarding\\nthe distances from Brito via Honolulu to Yokohama:\\nMiles.\\nBrito to Honolulu 4,210\\nHonolulu to Yokohama 3,445\\nDistance from Brito to Yokohama 7,655\\nFrom Brito to Yokohama via San Francisco the distances are:\\nMiles.\\nBrito to San Francisco 2,700\\nSan Francisco to Yokohama 4,536\\nTotal 7,233\\nor 419 miles shorter calling at San Francisco on the voyage from\\nBrito to Yokohama than when calling at Honolulu.\\nMr. President, if we take into consideration the rotundity of the\\nearth and take the shortest route possible from Brito to Y~oko-\\nhama, that route will be found to be within about 100 miles of\\nthe harbor of San Francisco. Now, these are facts which no\\namount of oratorical effort and no confused statements in confus-\\ning reports of any kind and no declaration of Army or Navy offi-\\ncers or other estimable people can change or alter. I am not an\\nexpert in military matters, and probably not otherwise, but I have\\nlearned in my brief career that experts are not very valuable wit-\\nnesses.\\nI have learned that whenever a man becomes a partisan I care\\nnot to what vocation he belongs or whence he comes his testi-\\nmony must always be considered in the light of his interests. In-\\ndeed, no writer upon the law of evidence, no man who has thought\\nabout the effect of testimony or the credibility of mankind, has\\nfailed to recognize that the interest and prejudice and the bias of\\nwitnesses must affect their testimony. These observations are\\ndaily made by the careful court and acted upon by the competent\\njury.\\nWhen an expert, whether a naval or an army expert, whether\\nhe belongs to one department or the other, asserts that we need the\\nHawaiian Islands in order to defend the Nicaragua Canal, such\\nassertion is unwarranted, for the simple reason that it is much bet-\\nter and easier to defend from San Diego or San Francisco. We\\nhave large fortresses at those points. The harbor of San Francisco\\nis quite well defended to-day, and powerful batteries have recently\\nbeen put in place at San Diego. Hence, unless we are to erect an\\n\u00c2\u00a3571\u00e2\u0080\u0094 4", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "50\\nisland in the sea\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and that has not yet been proposed\u00e2\u0080\u0094 there is no\\nplace in the Pacific Ocean from which we can defend the Nicaragua\\nCanal, but there are places in the Stats of California from which\\nit may be adequately and thoroughly protected.\\nMr. President, we are told that we need the Hawaiian Islands in\\norder to defend the Pacific coast. Perhaps I ought not to venture\\nto take issue with the naval experts who have so announced; but\\nwhen they contradict each other, when gentlemen occupying high\\npositions in the Army and Navy of the United States vary in con-\\nclusions, we are warranted, perhaps, in examining the subject,\\nfor we know that somebody has made a mistake. I have a very\\nhigh regard for Admiral Belknap and General Schofield; they are\\nable, patriotic, and true. I wish they would not contradict each\\nother so much, for my task would then be much easier. General\\nSchofield paid a visit, as we have already been told, to Honolulu for\\nthe purpose of examining into the defenses proposed or suggested\\nat that point. He made his report May 8, 1873, and in referring to\\nthe subject of Honolulu Harbor he said:\\nThere are many other so-called harbors or places for anchorage, hut they\\nare mostly open roadsteads, affording shelter only from certain winds, and\\nthey are all entirely incapable of being defended by shore batteries. Even\\nthe harbor of Honolulu itself can not be defended from the shore. It is a\\nsmall harbor lying seaward from the land and only protected from the sea\\nby outlying coral reefs.\\nAn enemy could take up his position outside of the entrance to the harbor\\nand command the entire anchorage, as well as the town of Honolulu itself.\\nThis harbor would therefore be of no use to us as a harbor of refuge in a war\\nwith a powerful maritime nation.\\nAdmiral Belknap was a witness before the Committee on For-\\neign Relations, and he took up this subject. On page 711 of the\\nreport of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations we find the\\nfollowing:\\nThe Chairman. And you also have a general acquaintance with the Bay\\nof Honolulu?\\nMr. Belknap. Yes; in my judgment Honolulu is one of the easiest de-\\nfended ports in the world. They talk about ships attacking that harbor. The\\nfact is, they can not do it successfully. A few heavy guns properly located\\nwould keep them away.\\nHere are two distinguished officers, one of the Navy and the\\nother of the Army. One of them tells us that Honolulu Harbor\\ncan not be fortified and the other says that it is the easiest place\\nin the world to fortify. Are we to consider these gentlemen\\nexperts? No doubt they are experts, but they are like other\\nexperts their testimony must be taken in view of the circum-\\nstances surrounding them and their liability to make mistakes.\\nHere are declarations the one directly in the teeth of the other.\\nCan I be blamed if I throw down this testimony and with wearied\\nvoice ask for more light? Can we be censured if after this want\\nof harmony we examine the matter for ourselves? When one\\nadvises us that the harbor of Honolulu can not be fortified at all\\nso as to repel an enemy, and the other declares it is the easiest\\nplace in the world to fortify, we may be pardoned if we cast\\naside the entire testimony and look at the facts that we may draw\\nour own conclusions.\\nWhile there are no more splendid specimens of brave and intel-\\nligent manhood in the world than can be found in our Army and\\nour Navy, we can not be dead to the fact that their business is\\nthat of war, and we can not be dead to the fact that the greater our\\nNavy, the more bellicose our policy; the more frequently we are\\ninvolved in just war, the better our soldiers and sailors are\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "51\\npleased. It is not to their discredit. We have educated them to\\nthe pursuit of arms that they may defend their Government and\\nconquer her foes. They are well qualified for this work. They\\nare not of peace, and often not for peace. War brings promo-\\ntion and offers magnificent triumphs.\\nNow, Mr. President, let us analyze some of the statements\\nmade by those who are seeking to expert us into an untried policy.\\nDO WE REQUIRE HAWAII?\u00e2\u0080\u0094 A COALING STATION.\\nWe are informed that we need the Hawaiian Islands, among\\nother reasons, because a coaling station is necessary. Keeping in\\nmind that we already have a coaling station at Pearl Harbor, let\\nus take up the value of the Hawaiian Islands as a matter of defense\\nto our western coast. Against whom are we to protect ourselves?\\nAre we to fight the British? Some time ago\u00e2\u0080\u0094 not very long ago\\nmost belligerent declarations were made every three or four days\\nby some of our friends in this Chamber with reference to the\\nBritish lion, who was then supposed to be seeking to devour us.\\nNow we are more friendly, but we can not tell when our minds\\nwill change. We not only have the right to alter our opinions\\noften, but we do so with great frequency, and now and then\\nunder conditions not wholly sustainable.\\nIS HAWAII IN DANGER?\\nThe English Government does not need the Hawaiian Islands.\\nAt Esquimault, close by the State of Washington, Great Britain\\nis possessed of one of the finest fortresses in the world. Her de-\\nfenses there are almost equal to Gibraltar. There she is right in\\nsight of the smoke of our civilization. She is not compelled to go\\n2,100 miles from anywhere and be dependent upon a precarious\\nsupply of coal and provisions, but she has her coal and her sup-\\nplies and everything right at our door. Surely she does not wish\\nthe Hawaiian group for the purpose of attacking the Pacific coast.\\nWho needs it? Hawaii is 3,500 miles from Japan. Does anyone\\nreally and sincerely think that Japan intends to engage in war or\\nhas the remotest notion of ever engaging in war with this Re-\\npublic? Her interests are to a great extent ours. She has devel-\\noped marvelously within the last few years. She has joined in\\nthe great procession of progress and has enlisted the sympathies\\nand admiration of all true citizens of the American Republic.\\nTo-day in our great Eastern shipyard of Philadelphia and in the\\ngreat Western shipyard of San Francisco there are vessels build-\\ning by our mechanics for her navy. She has solicited trade with\\nus. Day by day and hour by hour we are advancing our material\\ninterests with Japan.\\nOur cotton, our wheat, and our flour are there finding a ready\\nmarket. She solicits our assistance. Shall we warn her off when\\nshe approaches us with the legitimate profits of traffic? She does\\nnot oppose us. Shall we challenge the world and seek to discover\\nan opponent? Are we striving to create hostility and opposition\\nso as to formulate a basis to ostensibly justify us in aggressive\\nconduct?\\nJapan is and must be our friend. Her development means en-\\nlarged opportunity for us. Why drive her away? Why doubt\\nher sincerity? Why question her honor? If her actions toward\\nHawaii excite doubt, negotiation\u00e2\u0080\u0094 friendly, manly negotiation-\\nwill solve all. If we are hunting for a quarrel, let us select some\\nnation less anxious for our good will.\\nDoes Germany seek Hawaii? Does France covet Hawaii?\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "52\\nFrance and England have declared in a treaty, as I stated yes-\\nterday, made years and years ago, that they did not advise or\\nencourage Hawaiian discord. That treaty constitutes a solemn\\npromise of abstention from conquest. There is no nation on the\\nface Cc the earth challenging the integrity of Hawaii, It is but\\nnatural that this should be true. Does any power care to engage\\nin warfare with us in order to possess Hawaii? When we have\\ndeclared that we will not permit any interference with her free-\\ndom, have we grounds for the insinuation that any nation will\\nquestion our authority or meet us in deadly combat as to a propo-\\nsition which has received the acquiescence of all men for fifty\\nyears?\\nMr. President, I would not spend a minute in considering this\\naspect of the subject were it not that 1 have heard it asserted here\\nand in other places that there is danger that some one will gobble\\nour coveted islanders? For what purpose can any nation desire\\nthe Sandwich Islands? To attack us? Some of our military ex-\\nperts have been lately described by Admiral Belknap at a dinner\\nin Boston, which has probably been noted by Senators here, in a\\nfashion that I might not have ventured to picture them. He de-\\nscribed Captain Mahan as a mere writer of books, and yet Ma-\\nhan is the leading authority relied upon by annexationists.\\nBut do our military experts really mean what they say when\\nthey speak about an enemy attacking us from Hawaii? Some\\ntime ago I procured a statement from Chief Engineer Melville\\nwith reference to the speed and capacity of the Oregon and San\\nFrancisco, which were selected as types of our vessels, cruisers\\nand battle ships. From that statement, which I have not here in\\ndetail, this fact appears:\\nThe battle ship Oregon, which, as we know, is one of our best\\nwar vessels, can run at forced draft, if there is no accident and\\nwithout recoaling, 2,400 knots; at ordinary cruising rates she\\ncould travel 5,040 knots. Under forced draft, 16. 79 knots per hour,\\nshe consumes 253 tons of coal per day, and she can keep this up\\nsix days. Under ordinary cruising rates, 10 knots per hour, she\\nconsumes 73 tons per day and can maintain this for twenty-one\\ndays. According to a statement made to me later from the De-\\npartment, at the most economical speed her consumption per day\\nwould be 69^ tons, at a speed of 10\u00c2\u00a3 knots per hour.\\nLet us take into consideration the case of a vessel running at\\nforced draft. Suppose that Honolulu were in the possession of\\nan enemy having a battle ship as good as the Oregon. War ordi-\\nnarily means haste. Such a ship making the journey at full speed\\nwould have one day s sailing left when she reached our coast. If\\nshe proceeded at ordinary cruising rates, she would be able to turn\\naround and get home, and that would be about all. But would\\nany vessel or would any sane individual send a ship abroad to en-\\ngage in a mortal conflict, and as a matter of choice, unless that\\nship had the capacity to turn about and come home? No base of\\nsupplies 2,109 miles distant is adequate to meet the demands of\\nthe modern battle ship or the modern cruiser, and no nation de-\\npending upon a base of supplies 2,100 miles away can wage naval\\nwarfare in this day and generation.\\nMr. HAWLEY. Will the Senator permit me a moment? Have\\nwe not just dispatched a fine fleet and large transports a much\\ngreater distance than that to Manila?\\nMr. WHITE. Undoubtedly; but does the Senator deny the\\nfigures that I am giving? We provide for recoaling these ships;", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "53\\nwe send transports with them. It is but a little while since it\\nwas denied on this floor by annexationists that there could be\\ncoaling from transports. Coaling from transports is a subject\\nnot depending upon the acquisition of Honolulu or any other\\nplace. My proposition is that no base of supplies 2,100 miles away\\ncan be utilized by the modern battle ship or the modern cruiser\\nin the warfare of to-day, and I say it because of the mathemati-\\ncal propositions which I have enunciated here, based upon data\\nderived from the office of the Chief of Engineers of the United\\nStates Navy. The argument of annexationists is that Hawaii is\\nso near that it can be used as a base of operations. This I de-\\nnounce as absurd. If coaling can be done by transports, we can\\nbe invaded regardless of our occupancy of Honolulu.\\nMr. HAW LEY. Will the Senator pardon me again for a mo-\\nment? I should like to know how, under his theories, Great\\nBritain gets on with possessions all over the world which she de-\\nfends with her steamships?\\nMr. WHITE. Great Britain, I suppose, has coal near enough\\nto supply the vessels to which the distinguished Senator alludes,\\nwherever she has any contest; but the fact is certain that a vessel\\ndesigned for cruising by steam power can not be operated without\\ncoal, and that if she can not get coal within 2,100 miles she can\\nnot afford the risk of combat.\\nMr. LINDSAY. I will ask the Senator if Great Britain in any\\npart of the world relies upon a coaling station as far distant from\\nthe territories over which she holds control as Honolulu is from\\nthe United States?\\nMr. WHITE. I think not. But, Mr. President, whatever may\\nbe done by Great Britain or by any other power, there are certain\\nfacts which no amount of statement or eloquent utterance can\\nelide from this record or destroy as to their effective, conclusive\\nnature. One of them is that if it takes 253 tons of coal a day to\\noperate a battle ship under forced draft, and that battle ship con-\\ntains only 100 tons of coal, it can not maintain a struggle; and a\\nbattle ship sent from Honolulu to our coast and cruising for any\\nconsiderable time after arriving would become practically a use-\\nless hulk tossed about by wind and wave, as noncombatant as a\\ndead whale.\\nBut, Mr. President, this branch of the discussion is really not\\nvery material because of the obvious fact, to which I have already\\nadverted, that no enemy intends to take the island. We are con-\\njuring up a knight-errant panoplied for battle and are calling for\\naid to strike him down. We are hunting dream-created enemies.\\nVisions of serried columns, of ships lined for action, flit in our fer-\\nvid brains. Mighty empires active in preparing to destroy us are\\nborn and die in fancy s moments. These are chimeras. No real-\\nity threatens us. No nation is hunting for a fight with us on this\\naccount, and no nation ever will.\\nBut, Mr. President, we are told that Hawaii would be very valu-\\nable for self-defense; that we need the country to defend our Pa-\\ncific coast. I am anxious for the welfare and happiness and safetj\\nof the entire Union. I am certainly not less so for that great State\\nwherein I reside, where are to be found the closest and most\\ncherished of my associations. But will we make a weak defense\\nstronger by acquiring that which must also be defended? If our\\ncoast is not well protected now, will we make its protection easier\\nby obtaining an addition that also must be fortified? Is it any\\nanswer to say to me, as the experts already referred to declare.\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "54\\nthat if we had these distant ocean specks no enemy could reach us?\\nWill this claim stand examination? First, we must have the enemy;\\nand secondly, it will be well to consider the value as a defense of a\\nremote point, days away, as a substitute for domestic fortifications.\\nConsider our position on the Pacific coast. Harbors, roadsteads,\\nplaces of embarkation comparatively easy of approach, and hence\\nneeding defense. But, Mr. President, if an enemy were about to\\nstrike th e city of Washington would we rush to the city of New York\\nin order to get ready to repel him? If the Pacific coast were threat-\\nened by any power (and the only power capable of hurting us is\\nGreat Britain), would we not depend upon our domestic and con-\\ntinental fortifications and upon the vessels located near our shores?\\nWould we not have by our side and within easy calling distance\\nmeans adequate to guard us, all duly armed and prepared for ac-\\ntion, with supplies and equipments at hand? With no remote\\npossession to protect, with everything needed and required for\\nour own defense at our door, we can well consider ourselves im-\\npregnable if we care for our interests with ordinary solicitude.\\nMr. President, will it be easier to defend our Pacific coast if\\nwe have these islands than if we allow them to remain under their\\npresent control? In the first place, for many years we have got-\\nten along very well without Honolulu; but if we take possession,\\nwe will find ourselves the proprietors of islands extending over\\nmore than 400 miles. What must we defend? Are we to defend\\nHonolulu, which we are told by Admiral Belknap is the easiest\\nplace in the world to defend, or are we to defend Pearl Harbor,\\nwhich G eneral Schofield certifies to us is a place very easy to guard?\\nThese two harbors are located on the island of Oahu. Is it enough\\nto fortify them only? Admiral Belknap suggests \u00c2\u00a75,000,000 as an\\nadequate appropriation to make a good defense for Honolulu.\\nCaring not for the time being as to what it costs, let us suppose\\nthat any amount of money necessary is expended to fortify both\\nof those harbors, and that they are impregnable, are there any\\nother places where a hostile force can be landed? Undoubtedly\\nmany places. The large island of Oahu, the largest of the group,\\nhas several landing places, at two of which, and notably at Hilo,\\nthere is adequate facility for the discharging of a cargo. A re-\\ncently constructed wharf at Hilo, as I am informed, has proved\\nsuccessful. But we must protect the whole group, not only be-\\ncause they are productive, but also because we can not afford to\\nallow our enemy to land anywhere.\\nHawaii is the largest island and can not be left to the mercy of\\nthe invader.\\nIt follows that if we are to possess Hawaii for defensive pur-\\nposes, we must make immense investments both for fortifications\\nand navj^. If no such outlay is essential, it is only because there is\\nno ground to apprehend foreign interference. But that very cir-\\ncumstance demonstrates the inadequacy and folly of the argument\\nmade here that the islands are absolutely vital to our defense.\\n[At this point the Presiding Officer (Mr. Jones of Arkansas)\\nannounced that the hour of 2 o clock had arrived, and by unani-\\nmous consent the consideration of House joint resolution 259 was\\ncontinued.]\\nMr. President, when we consider the remoteness of this group,\\nwhen we consider the absence of any danger either to the Repub-\\nlic of Hawaii from external causes in the way of foreign inter-\\nference, when we reflect on the strength of our own location and\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "55\\nthe facilities that we there may enjoy for local defense, how\\nabsurd doss it seem to speak of annexation as a part of our\\npolicy.\\nn.VWATI AND THE PHILIPPINES.\\nBut we are told that if we are to hold the Philippines we must\\nhave Hawaii. In the next breath the same speaker will tell us\\nthat he is not in favor of holding the Philippine Islands, but that\\nhe is in favor of annexing Hawaii.\\nI think there are very few Senators who doubt that if we are to\\nengage in the business of foreign acquisition and are to seek dom-\\nination over the islands of the Pacific and Indian oceans, we might\\nas well start in and take Hawaii. If such is to be our polic} r if\\nwe are to follow that plan and extend our flag in signification of\\npermanent occupation. I am strenuously opposed to a colonial or\\nimperial policy. Before we take such a step let us definitely un-\\nderstand whither we are drifting. If we are to become filibus-\\nters, let it be with our eyes open and in full view of the startling\\nchange in our national scheme.\\nBut we are advised that as Admiral Dewey has destroyed the\\nSpanish fleet at Manila, we must have Honolulu in order to send\\nhim supplies, and especially coal. Senators declare that the Ha-\\nwaiian Government has violated the neutrality laws and that\\nthey may be disturbed. By whom? Again do we conjure up im-\\naginary dangers. Who is to object?\\nA few days ago a prominent newspaper enthusiastically advo-\\ncating annexation declared that Spain would object. I will not\\nspeak of our right to procure coal or other contraband. It is un-\\nnecessary to dwell upon that proposition. Spain is now engaged\\nin objecting to all our warlike procedure. A protest on the part\\nof Spain we would, perhaps, expect to meet as we met her opposi-\\ntion at Manila. Who else objects? Do any of the supposed hos-\\ntile nations of the earth who are\u00e2\u0080\u0094 in the minds of certain Sena-\\ntors\u00e2\u0080\u0094threatening our possessions object? Have we anyone, any\\nnation, any diplomat, any power, protesting against our conduct?\\nBut. assuming for the time being that we are not embarking upon\\na career of conquest and that we do not intend, except for purposes\\nof indemnity, to hold the Philippine group, assuming for the mo-,\\nment that that is the case, is there any justification for annexingN\\nthe Hawaiian Islands merely because, for the instant, they may be\\nof assistance to us?\\nMr. President, surely we do not intend to absorb a nation or to\\nadopt a new policy merely for the purpose of meeting the exigency\\nof a moment. No, Mr. President, the object and purpose is deeper;\\nthe motive is deeper, and it is but illy concealed. It is well known\\nby those who are most earnestly in favor of the plan now out-\\nlined that this acquisition will furnish a powerful argument for\\nthe continuation of the territorial-expansion idea.\\nI remarked some time ago, before the present war was declared,\\nand before, perhaps, it was contemplated, that if we took Hawaii,\\nthe next thing to happen would be the annexation of other islands\\nnearer the Orient, and when I made that statement someone arose\\nand said that there were no islands that could be annexed, and\\nthat there was nothing therefore in my declaration. And yet,\\nearlier than I supposed^ do I find myself confronted with the con-\\ndition which I then so truly feared. If we consummate this\\nscheme, it will be urged that we must have the Philippines because\\nHawaii is not of great value unless in connection with other po3-\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "56\\nsessions. We have an interest in the Samoan Islands, and when\\nwe have grabbed the Philippines something else will be required;\\nand thus we will finally extend our empire heaven knows where,\\nand will sanction a policy essentially imperialistic.\\nMr. President, no one can deny that the possession of remote\\ncountries inhabited by numerous barbarians necessitates the ex-\\nercise of much power and the expenditure of vast money. We\\nare all prepared to and are expending millions in maintenance of\\nthe war with Spain. But when peace shall spread her lovely\\nwings over the land and contention shall have ceased the efforts\\nof diplomacy will impose a heavy burden in the way of indemnity\\nupon our adversary, probably requiring the possession, at least\\nfor a time and by way of security, of oriental lands. Then the\\nPolynesians, Malays, Chinese, Negritas, and semi-orang-outang3\\nwill demand our care. A large army and adequate naval force\\nwill be requisite. Our soldiers will operate in unhealthful climes\\nand the American people will be compelled to determine whether\\nthe objects for which this Union was established can be conserved\\nor maintained if we bring to and within it such peculiar elements.\\nIn a recent article written by the distinguished Senator from\\nAlabama [Mr. Morgan] and to be found in the North American\\nKeview under the caption What shall we do with the con-\\nquered islands? I find the following:\\nThe question of greatest difficulty that will be presented for solution by\\nthe United States at the close of the war with Spain will be the disposal of\\nthe Philippine and the Caroline islands. In respect of all the islands from\\nwhich Spanish power is expelled by our arms, there is a proper and necessary\\nreservation, to be made at the proper time, of limited areas that will include\\ncertain bays and hai bors that are best adapted to the purposes of military\\noutposts, and for coaling stations and places of refuge for our war ships and\\nother national vessels.\\nIt is clear enough that the programme of expansion is behind\\nthis resolution. But do we want the Hawaiian Islands for any\\npurpose except as a coaling station? No military expert or naval\\nexpert has intimated that they are essential otherwise than for\\nmilitary uses. No one pretends, or assumes to pretend, that we\\nmust defend the entire Hawaiian coast, though I believe that that\\nwill be necessary if there is any force in the military argument.\\nBut it is urged with great vehemence that we need a coaling sta-\\ntion at this point. If so, let us proceed to get a coaling station.\\nSome .of us think we have one now.\\nLet us for a moment examine the provisions of our treaty with\\nHawaii in reference to that subject. If there is in the existing\\ntreaty, as I said yesterday, any defect which can be remedied in\\nany way, why do we not try to remedy it? If we need a coaling\\nstation near Honolulu or at Pearl Harbor or anywhere else in the\\nworld, why do we not attempt to obtain one? If we require a\\nrefuge for our ships in Pearl Harbor, and if there is a technical\\ndefect in the grant of that harbor, why do we not by diplomatic\\neffort attempt to remedy that defect? No; we will not remedy it.\\nWe will not provide for a coaling station, but we will take the\\nentire group upon the pretext that we need a coaling station at\\nthis single point.\\nMr. President, would it be difficult to negotiate an alteration of\\nthe treaty? With whom would we be compelled to negotiate? We\\nwould be compelled to negotiate with the Government over which\\nMr. Dole presides. Would he be willing to provide for a coaling\\nstation at Pearl Harbor with the necessary rights of property for", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "57\\nits proper use? Undoubtedly so. Has he been asked? Has there\\nbeen any effort to negotiate a treaty? When Mr. Dole came to\\nthese hospitable shores, and was elaborately entertained by our\\nGovernment here, did we ever suggest to him that it would be a\\ngood thing to arrange for a coaling station?\\nMr. President, there has been no movement, we have been ad-\\nvised, looking to the acquisition of any rights with reference to\\ncoaling in Pearl Harbor or elsewhere, except the making of the\\ntreaty to which I have already adverted, the second article of\\nwhich is to be found on page 171 of Appendix 2, to which I have\\nalready referred, and is as follows:\\nHis Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government\\nof the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River,\\nin the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and re-\\npair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the\\nUnited States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other\\nthings needful to the purpose aforesaid.\\nMr. President, this appears to be a very clear grant, but it is\\nurged that because of certain declarations made by Mr. Bayard\\nthis explicit and plain phraseology must be construed as limited in\\nits effect to the time during which the other clauses of the treaty\\nare in operation. Some time ago this subject was elaborately de-\\nbated in this body, and the distinguished Senator from Alabama\\n[Mr. Morgan] and the then distinguished Senator from Oregon,\\nMr. Dolph, argued with great force, it seemed to me, and conclu-\\nsively, I thought and think, that this was an absolute grant and\\ndid not depend for its efficacy on the existence of the treaty as a\\nwhole. Itcontains unlimited authority. The expression grant,\\nwithout other clause to modify it, appears to me to involve an\\nalienation which it is not possible for the grantor to impair.\\nBut, Mr. President, is it for a coaling station that we intend to\\nchange the precedents of our history and for the first time to go\\nout into the midst of the deep and seize territory? Is it a coaling\\nstation only that you desire? If so, let us acquire, if we have not\\nalready acquired, our coaling station, and let the Government of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands proceed to work out its destiny, whatever\\nthat may be.\\nWill you tell me, Mr. President, can anyone say to me, that no\\ncompact can be made with that so-called Republic? Perhaps so,\\nif the cunning annexation diplomat shall step around the back door\\nand whisper into President Dole s ear, Do not agree to it; but\\ndoes anyone doubt, if we in good faith enter into a negotiation\\nlooking to the perfection of our title, if our title is not good, that\\nwe can succeed? Why not? Is it for the interest of the Dole gov-\\nernment to refuse it? No, Mr. President.\\nOf what does the management of this distant Republic com-\\nplain? Where is their peril? They claim to fear invasion. Will\\nthey therefore refuse to permit us to place at their very doors our\\narmies and our navies, to be utilized in carrying out that policy\\nof freedom from foreign interference upon which we have always\\nsuccessfully insisted?\\nMr. FAULKNER. I wish to ask the Senator from California a\\nquestion for information, if he will permit me.\\nMr. WHITE. Certainly.\\nMr. FAULKNER. I ask whether the Government of the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands have ever made a claim that that grant of Pearl\\nHarbor was limited to the existence of the treaty under which it\\nwas made?\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "58\\nMr. WHITE. I do not know that they have. I can not say.\\nMr. FR YE. Mr. President, in answer to the Senator from West\\nVirginia [Mr. Faulkner], I will say that the minister from the\\nHawaiian Islands at the time the treaty was entered into wrote\\nan inquiry to our Secretary of State, Mr. Bayard, as to whether\\nor not this was a cession. Mr. Bayard s reply was that it was\\npari passu with the treaty, and that if the treaty was abrogated\\nthe cession would be abrogated too.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, as a matter of law I believe the\\ncession of Pearl Harbor was complete. In the Congressional\\nRecord, volume 26, part 7, Fifty-third Congress, second session,\\nJuly 2, 189-1, page 7030, I find the following remarks of Mr. Sher-\\nman:\\nMr. Sherman. Mr. President, I wish to place before the Senate the exact\\nhistorical facts with regard to our acquisition of a coaling station in the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands and the treaty relations we have with those islands. By a\\nconvention concluded on the 30th of Janruuw, 1875, we stipulated:\\nFor and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by His\\nMajesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands in the next succeeding article of\\nthis convention, and as an equivalent therefor, the United States of America\\nhereby agree to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the\\nsame being the growth and manufacture or produce of the Hawaiian Islands,\\ninto all the ports of the United States free of duty.\\nAmong those articles was sugar, then produced in a comparatively small\\nquantity in the Hawaiian Islands. That treaty, containing reciprocal pro-\\nvisions, was to expire at the end of seven years, at any time on the demand\\nof either Government. At the end of the seven years, when the treaty had\\nexpired, an effort was made to extend it seven years longer. That was con-\\ntested severely in the Senate Chamber, and there was much opposition to\\nthe extension of the treaty, because the statistics, showed that we had then\\nlost $23,000,000 more than we had gained during the seven years by the free\\nadmission into our country of sugar and other articles. Then a new treaty-\\nwas made, entirely separate and distinct from the old treaty, and that treaty\\ncontains this stipulation\\nMr. Dolpii. When was that made?\\nMr. Sherman. In 1834. It provides:\\nWhereas a convention was concluded between the United States of Amer-\\nica and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands on the 30th day of Jan-\\nuary, 1875, concerning commercial reciprocity.\\nThen follow the recitals about the provisions of the treaty. Then it pro-\\nceeds:\\nThe high contracting parties agree that the time fixed for the duration\\nof the said convention shall be definitely extended for a term of seven years\\nfrom the date of the exchange of ratifications hereof, and further, until the\\nexpiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall\\ngive notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the high\\ncontracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the\\nend of the said term of seven years or at any time thereafter.\\nWhen this treaty was before the Senate there was great opposition to it for\\nthe reasons I have stated. Therefore, in order to find a consideration to be\\npaid by the Hawaiian Islands to the United States for this enormous bounty,\\nthe Senator from Vermont, if I remember correctly, offered this additional\\nconsideration; and, in my judgment, the second treaty would have been\\nbaaten at the time it was pending but for the provision he offered. Here is\\nthe provision, and here is the absolute grant in perpetuity, according to the\\nlegal language of the grant, which gives us these islands for these purposes\\nas one of the considerations for extending the treaty seven years more:\\nHis Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government\\nof the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River,\\nin the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and re-\\npair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the\\nUnited States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other\\nthings needful to the purpose aforesaid.\\nHere is an absolute, unconditional, unqualified grant that has been paid\\nfor by $23,000,000 already, and we agreed to extend the term seven years\\nlonger. Thus we have given a double consideration for this right. I have\\nno doubt the Senator from Maine [Mr. Frye] will estimate the value of that\\nprivilege far more than I, but certainly we have already paid a large sum,\\nand we have agreed to pay another sum equivalent to twenty-five or twenty-\\nsix million dollars, and we now possess by virtue of this treaty an exclusive\\nright to enter upon and improve that harbor.\\n8571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "59\\nThe provisions of the treaty as to the seven years applied only to the ad-\\nmission of articles entered into the several countries named therein, but this\\nspecial provision was, standing by itself, an absolute and conclusive convey-\\nance, so far as one government can convey to another the absolute and ex-\\nclusive right in perpetuity to occupy that place for a coaling station and for\\nother naval purposes.\\nSo it seems to me there is nothing in the argument of the honorable Sena-\\ntor from Maine. We have paid, and doubly paid, for that, harbor. We own\\nit now; it is now in our possession, and we have the right to improve it.\\nMr. President, it will thus be observed that the distinguished\\nSenator, who at that time was chairman of the Committee on For-\\neign Relations, construed article 2 of this treaty as containing an\\nabsolute grant, and his view as to the legal effect of that compact\\nwas not dissented from by the distinguished Senator from Ala-\\nbama [Mr. Morgan] for that Senator said:\\nNow, I will suppose that this bill is passed and the treaty is abrogated.\\nHawaii is released from all of it that is not obligatory upon her. I believe\\nthat Hawaii is not released from that fee-simple title, as I understand it and\\nread it, which is contained in the treaty extension to Pearl Harbor, and which\\nwas said here to be the consideration of that extension. Nevertheless, at the\\ntime the ratifications of that treaty were exchanged and contemporaneously\\nwith it, as a part of the question of the exchange of ratifications, Mr. Carter,\\nwho was then minister to the United States from Hawaii, insisted that if the\\ntreaty of reciprocity was determined according to its terms, upon giving a\\nyear s notice thereupon the Pearl Harbor would revert to Hawaii.\\nThen, Mr. President, the discussion proceeded, elucidating the\\nstatements made Ly Mr. Bayard, and upon which the contention\\nof the revocability of the treaty depends. Mr. Dolph, then a\\nSenator from Oregon, discussed the issue at considerable length,\\npointing out, it seems to me conclusively, the impossibility of the\\nclaim that Mr. Bayard had any authority by his mere opinion to\\ndisturb or modify a contract entered into x ursuant to the Consti-\\ntution. It must, of course, be conceded that there are moral con-\\nditions connected with this affair and that the statements of Mr.\\nCarter and Mr. Bayard might have induced the home Government\\nto take affirmative action in the premises; but whether there be\\nany such difficulty about the matter or not, trhere is nothing to\\nhinder the making of a supplemental agreement or convention or\\nan alliance giving us all the rights which we desire in Pearl\\nHarbor, and all desirable coaling privileges.\\nIf we really need a coaling station in the Hawaiian Islands, it\\ndoes not follow that we need the Hawaiian Islands. If we need\\na coaling station in China, it dees not follow that we need China.\\nMr. Dole, as the careful conservator of the interests of his people,\\nand the whole Hawaiian people will be glad to have us on hand\\nwith our naval and military establishment. They will be pleased\\nto have our guns and other protection to enforce the declaration\\nto which I have already referred, whereby we inhibit interference\\nfrom without.\\nLet us have the evidence of any honest effort by anybody to\\nenter into a negotiation to perfect the Pearl Harbor grant, and\\nthen I will consider with you whether we must engage in the\\nbusiness of appropriating the entire Hawaiian Republic. I regard\\nit, for reasons already pointed out and for others that might\\nreadily be given, as immaterial; but my point is that, granted,\\nfor the sake of the argument, that we must have a coaling station,\\nyou do for that reason insist upon appropriating the Hawaiian\\nRepublic.\\nMr. President, we have a coaling station in the Samoan Islands,\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "GO\\nwhich we obtained by virtue of the tripartite agreement into\\nwhich we entered with two monarchic powers, a treaty whereby\\nwe agreed to dethrone a king and to place another upon the\\nthrone. This Republic entered into that compact, and we are\\nsow maintaining and carrying it out. By this peculiar arrange-\\nment we obtained a coaling station 4,000 miles from San Francisco.\\nI do not believe that there has ever been anyone in our Depart-\\nment of State so inefficient that he could not negotiate a proper\\ncontract with reference to a coaling station either at Honolulu or\\nat Pearl Harbor the place to be selected by Admiral Belknap and\\nGeneral Schofield.\\nif I am right in this regard, the whole annexation job is ended.\\nPersonally, I consider that there is no necessity for a coaling sta-\\ntion at Hawaii. My belief is that Unalaska^and Kiska, in the\\nAleutian group, furnish more eligible sites. I assume, however,\\nfor the time being, that we have use for such a station in the\\nSandwich Islands, and even upon that basis it is obvious we are\\nnot required to assume the duty of governing such a population\\nat such a point.\\nI have already referred -to the coal capacity of modern vessels\\nfor the purpose of demonstrating that the Hawaiian Islands can\\nnever be made a base of operations against the United States, and\\nalso to prove how ridiculous is the assertion that Honolulu and\\nManila are near enough for naval-aggression purposes.\\nFor this purpose I in-ert a table furnished by Chief Engineer\\nMelville to the senior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Petti-\\ngrew]:\\nWashington, D v C, January 11, 1898.\\nSir: Your letter of January 5, 1893, addressed to the Secretary of the\\nNavy, requesting certain information as to the coal capacity and steaming\\nradius of first-class battle ships and cruisers of the first rate, has been re-\\nferred to this Bureau.\\nIn reply the Bureau transmits the following table, which contains the in-\\nformation desired:\\nName.\\nType.\\nCoal-\\nbunker\\ncapacity.\\nSteaming\\nradius on\\nthis coal at\\nmost eco-\\nnomic rate.\\nSteaming\\nradius on this\\ncoal at maxi-\\nmum speed\\nwith forced\\ndraft.\\nIowa ---l\\nFirst-class battle ship\\ndo\\nTons.\\n1,790\\n1,550\\n1,560\\n1,510\\n1,300\\n1,200\\n1,600\\n1,520\\n1,100\\nKnots.\\n*6,000\\n4.805\\n4,797\\n5,205\\n4.342\\n4,486\\n*7,000\\n6,824\\n6,105\\nKnots.\\nt2,355\\n12,671\\n...do.\\nt2,265\\nOregon\\nBrooklyn\\ndo\\nArmored cruiser\\ndo\\n\u00c2\u00a32,448\\n1 1,404\\n1 1,344\\nColumbia\\nProtected cruiser\\ndo\\n11,840\\nt 1,565\\nOlympia\\ndo\\nt 1,403\\nEstimated.\\ntFrom official trial on basis of 2.4 pounds of coal per 1 horsepower.\\nJFrom official trial, actual figures.\\nVery respectfully,\\nGEO. MELVILLE,\\nEngineer in Chief, United States Navy, Chief of Bureau.\\nHon. R. F. Pettigrew,\\nUnited States Senate, Washington, V. C.\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "61\\nAS TO THE CLAIM THAT IF WE DO NOT TAKE HAWAII THAT REPUBLIC WILL\\nBE TAKEN BI ANOTHER.\\nMr. President, if we should refuse to adopt this resolution then\\nit is threatened Hawaii will go elsewhere. Hawaii is located in\\nthe Pacific Ocean, 2,100 miles from the California coast. She can\\nnot move her foundations by any process of oratorical legerde-\\nmain, and her interests can not be altered in so far as they depend\\nupon her location. As before stated, those interests are with us.\\nWhen the McKinley Act was in force, and when we paid a bounty\\nto our domestic sugar producers and abolished all sugar tariff,\\nthere was no discrimination in favor of Hawaii.\\nThe sugar industries in Hawaii languished. She pined for a\\nresuscitation of the advantages of the past, and yet she did not\\nleave us; she did not go to England or to France or to Germany\\nand negotiate a treaty with them. The pretense that a refusal of\\nannexation will induce her to trade elsewhere is, in common par-\\nlance, a mere bluff.\\nNature, Mr. President, not the disposition of Mr. Dole and his\\ncabinet or anybody else, incited the Hawaiian people to trade\\nwith the United States, and no action that we take here upon this\\nproposition, no action that we may take regarding annexation,\\ncan in any way prevent them from continuing to trade with us.\\nTrade is unfeeling. Men deal in sugar, rice, coffee, and other\\narticles because they make or think they make money by such\\ndealing. The people of Hawaii do not send their goods, wares,\\nand merchandise to California, or to any other part of the United\\nStates, merely because they are fond of our people, but they send\\nthem to us and trade with us because they find, it is to their in-\\nterest to do so. We have the market, and they will continue to\\ndeal with us regardless of the fate of this resolution, just as they\\ndealt with us when the McKinley law was in force and notwith-\\nstanding its provisions and regardless of our tariff, which yielded\\nthem no advantage. Clearly there is nothing in this contention.\\nTHE PRETENSE THAT WE CAN NOT WARN OTHER NATIONS AWAY IF WE\\nREFUSE TO ACCEPT HAWAII.\\nWe are informed that we can not consistently announce to\\nother nations You shall not interfere with Hawaii when we\\ndecline annexation. Why not? Did we not often make such a\\ndeclaration, when at the same time our Presidents and our Sec-\\nretaries of State declared that we did not intend to assert control;\\nthat all we desired was that Hawaii should be preserved to the\\nimpartial trade of the world?\\nWhen we told Great Britain at the time of unauthorized inter-\\nference by one of her officers, when we told France when a simi-\\nlar transaction was happening, that we would not brook their in-\\nterference and that was many years ago we did not threaten or\\nintimate annexation. Nevertheless we dictated foreign absten-\\ntion, and our wishes have been ever respected. And we to-day\\nassume and have a right to assume the power to repeat this same\\nthing. Have we no right to warn away other nations unless we\\nsee fit to take the islands ourselves? Are the islands upon the\\nblock offered to the highest bidder for cash? Must we bid or sub-\\nmit to foreign ownership?\\nI repeat that in my judgment no nation wants Hawaii; but at\\nall events there is no country which will demur to our positive\\nannouncement that there shall be no foreign aggression. There\\nis no inconsistency, no impropriety in warning away other na-\\ntions, although we do not take the country ourselves. The\\n3571", "height": "4313", "width": "2494", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "62\\nstrength of our position consists in our avoidance of conquest.\\nMust we obliterate the Hawaiian Republic? Must we annex and\\ntake to ourselves that territory in order to justify our claim of\\nnoninterference from abroad? If so, the history that we have\\nmade for fifty years has been ill made; and, if so, we have had no\\nright to do that which the world has admitted and conceded for\\nhalf a century was our right to do. Surely there is absolutely\\nnothing in this part of the argument of the other side.\\nTHE LABOR QUESTION.\\nMr. President, all sorts of statements have been made to induce\\nthe public to favor this acquisition. Among other suggestions is\\nthe assertion that there will be a great field for labor in the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands. I stated upon another occasion that if such a mag-\\nnificent chance for the laboring man existed it was somewhat sin-\\ngular that he had never discovered that hisMeccawas therelocated.\\nThe truth of it is that there is no opportunity for the white man,\\nthe intelligent American laboring man, or the negro in the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands. Of course there may be an occasional carpenter\\nemployed, a few mechanics, a limited number of superintendents\\nof coffee plantations and sugar industries, but speaking of the\\nlabor of the islands, as referring to a large and material class of\\nmen, there is nothing for those of our toilers who wish for better\\nthings.\\nMr. President, I wish to call the attention of some of my Repub-\\nlican friends to the remarkable effect of the policies which they\\nseem to some extent to be outlining. They have asserted and\\nclaimed in many a forum and have received credit in many a place\\nfor the declaration that they have guarded and cared for the labor-\\ning interests of the United States. They have referred to the\\nhigh wages paid in our factories, the large salaries which skilled\\nmechanics have obtained, and have designated this elevation of\\nthe working class as their greatest achievement.\\nThe policy, Senators, which you are now initiating and the\\nchannel into which you seek to compel us to drift will lead us\\ninevitably to this result, that the pauper labor, the servile labor,\\nthe cooly labor of the Orient will be brought into competition\\nwith that which you have often declared it to be your policy to\\ndefend. This first step, whereby you introduce within the bound-\\naries of our Government some 50,000 orientals, is but a premoni-\\ntion of that other and more disastrous movement which will\\nswell the aggregate of ignorance to millions and millions. When\\nyou obtain all the land upon which you look with covetous eye,\\nyou will likewise add a population destructive of wages and inimi-\\ncal to civilization.\\nMr. President, some years ago in the State of California and\\nthroughout the entire West there was a movement against Chi-\\nnese labor, and it had behind it the greatest merit. We saw our\\npeople threatened by an oriental invasion. We knew that the\\nChinese possessed sufficient ability and sufficient knowledge of\\nour conditions to find it profitable to engage in competition here.\\nWe learned that there could be no intelligence or competent\\nAmerican citizenship in an element struggling for 10 cents per\\nday. We legislated in the most drastic manner, and have, to a\\nlarge extent, kept them from our shores.\\nWe passed acts of Congress having that object in view and were\\nclwrged with violating treaty rights. We finally reduced the\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "63\\nnumber of Mongolians in the United States to about 100,000. Now\\nwe are to bring in between twenty and thirty thousand Chinamen\\nby this measure. True, the joint resolution reciting the language\\nof the treaty attempts to keep the Chinamen in Hawaii. I doubt\\nwhether under a treaty we can enter into a compact of that sort,\\nbut I am clear that we can not by a joint resolution admitting a\\nterritory, if it be assumed for the time being that we have the\\npower to admit the islands at all, curtail or restrict the movements\\nof the residents of that territory\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a part of this country. How-\\never this may be, the abandonment of the former claimis manifest.\\nMr. President, our consul at Honolulu, Mr. Haywood, has made\\na report with reference to the coffee industry to which our atten-\\ntion has been lately directed. He points out with great elabora-\\ntion and detail that the men who do the actual work are Japanese\\nand Chinese, and that they labor for $15 a month and board them-\\nselves. In a few instances they are paid $16, but the wages are\\nusually $15 a month, and it is certain there is no opportunity in\\nthis business for American citizens. It is clear that we will not\\nenter into active competition with a person who is working upon\\ncoffee and sugar plantations for from ten to fifteen dollars per\\nmonth.\\nHence the statement that annexation will afford a splendid\\nopening for labor has nothing whatever to maintain it. Never\\nin any part of the world has the raising of cane sugar and the\\nproduction of coffee teen considered important to enlightened\\nwhite labor, and to-day the coffee production of the world is fully\\nequal to the demand and somewhat ahead of it, and a careful\\nreading of the elaborate report which I have cited will show the\\nimpartial man that the assertion that there is anything for labor\\nin .the Hawaiian Islands is a mere pretense. We have heard much\\nabout the present Hawaiian Government and its friendship to this\\ncountry and to those who toil.\\nIn this connection I refer to the following Hawaiian legislation:\\nAct 66.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 An act relating to the landing of aliens in the Hawaiian Islands.\\nBe it enacted by the executive and advisory councils of the provisioned gov-\\nernment of the Hawaiian Islands, It shall be unlawful for aliens of the fol-\\nlowing classes to land in the Hawaiian Islands, to wit: Idiots, insane persons,\\npaupers, vagabonds, criminals, fugitives from justice, persons suffering from\\na loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, stowaways, vagrants, and per-\\nsons without visible means of support, which means of support may be shown\\nby the bona fide possession of not less than $50 in money or a bona fide writ-\\nten contract of employment with a reliable and responsible resident of the\\nHawaiian Islands.\\nSec. 2. The master or other officer of any vessel or any person who shall\\nbring within the Hawaiian Islands and land, or attempt to land, or permit to\\nbe landed, any alien not lawfully entitled to enter the Hawaiian Islands, shall\\nbe deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be pun-\\nished by a fine of not more than 8500 nor less than $100 for each and every such\\nalien not entitled to enter the Hawaiian Islands, so brought and landed, or\\nattempted or permitted to be lauded, and may be imprisoned for a term not\\nexceeding one year; and any such vessel shall not have clearance from any\\nport of the Hawaiian Islands until such fine is paid.\\nSec 8. Upon the arrival of any vessel from any foreign land at any port\\nof the Hawaiian Islands with passengers on board it shall be the duty of the\\nmaster of such vessel to report the name, nationality, last residence, desti-\\nnation, occupation, and object of coming to the Hawaiian Islands of every\\nsuch passenger, before any of them are landed, to the collector-general of\\ncustoms or his deputy, or the collector of customs of the port at which such\\nvessel has arrived, who shall thereupon inspect all of siich passengers who\\nmay be aliens, either on board of such vessel or at a designated place on\\nshore. But such removal of such passengers from the said vessel for the\\npurposes of such inspection shall not be considered to be a landing. The\\ninspecting officers shall have the power to administer oaths and to take and\\nconsider testimony touching the right of any such alien passengers to land\\n8571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "64\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2within the Hawaiian Islands, all of which shall be entered of record. All de-\\ncisions made by the inspection officers touching the right of any alien to land\\nshall be final: Provided, That the collector-general of customs may reverse the\\ndecisions of his deputy and the several collectors of customs in case appeal\\nshall betaken to him from their decisions. It shall be the duty of the master\\nand officers and agents of such vessel to adopt due precautions to prevent the\\nlanding of any alien at any place or time other than that designated by the\\ninspection officers, and any master, officer, or agent of such vessel who shall,\\neither knowingly or negligently, land or permit to land any alien at any place\\nor time other than that designated by the inspection officers, or other than\\nthose who may have received a permit to land by the inspection officers, shall\\nbe deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be liable to the penalties above men-\\ntioned. Any such vessel shall not have clearance from any port of the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands until such fine is paid.\\nSec. 4. All aliens who may unlawfully come to the Hawaiian Islands shall,\\nif practicable, be immediately sent out of the country on the vessel by which\\nthey were brought in. The cost of their maintenance while here, as well as\\nthe expense of removing such aliens out of the country, shall be borne by\\nthe owner or owners of the vessel on which such aliens came; and if any\\nmaster, agent, consignee, or owner of such vessel shall refuse to receive\\nback on board such aliens, or shall neglect to detain them thereon, or shall\\nrefuse or neglect to carry them out of the country or pay the cost of their\\nmaintenance whilo here, such master, agent, consignee, or owner shall be\\ndeemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be liable to the above-mentioned penal-\\nties for each and every offense, and any such vessel shall not have clearance\\nfrom any port of the Hawaiian Islands until such fine is paid.\\nSec. 5. Any alien who shall come into the Hawaiian Islands in violation of\\nlaw may be returned, as by law provided, at any time within one year there-\\nafter at the expense of the person or persons, vessel or corporation bringing\\nsuch alien into the Hawaiian Islands; and, if that can not be done, then at\\nthe expense of the Government; and any alien who becomes a public charge\\nwithin one year after his arrival in the Hawaiian Islands, from causes exist-\\ning prior to his arrival, shall be deemed to have come in violation of law, and\\nmay be returned as aforesaid. And any alien who shall come into the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands in violation of law shall be detained by the marshal or hia\\ndeputy or any sheriff or police officer until there if an opportunity for his\\ndeportation.\\nSec. 6. The circuit judges and district magistrates are hereby vested with\\nfull and concurrent jurisdiction of all misdemeanors arising under the provi-\\nsions of this act; and the collector-general of customs, his deputy, and the\\nseveral collectors of customs are invested with full jurisdiction in matters\\ntouching the right of any alien to land or the question whether any alien who\\nhas landed has done so in violation of law, subject, however, as to said deputy\\nand collectors, to the review of the collector-general of customs in case of\\nappeal.\\nSec. 7. This act shall take effect upon publication.\\nApproved this 1st day of March, A. D. 1S91.\\nSANFORD B. DOLE,\\nPresident of the Provisioned Government of the Hawaiian Islands.\\nJ. A. KING,\\nMinister of the Interior.\\nAct III.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 An act to amend act No. 66 of the laws of the provisional gov-\\nernment, entitled An act relating to the landing of aliens in the Hawaiian\\nIslands, approved March 1, 1894.\\nBe it enacted by the Executive and Advisory Coxmcils of the Republic of Ha-\\nwaii, Section 1 of act No. 66 of the laws of the provisional government, enti-\\ntled An act relating to the landing of aliens in the Hawaiian Islands, ap-\\nproved March 1, 1894, is hereby amended by adding at the end of said section\\nfollowing words, viz, binding such aliens to work as an agricultural laborer\\nfor a term of less than two years.\\nSec. 2. This act shall take effect from the date of its approval, this 9th day\\nof August, A. D. 1891.\\nSANFORD B. DOLE.\\nAct XVII. \u00e2\u0080\u0094An act relating to the immigration of aliens and foreigners\\nunder contract of service.\\nBe it enacted by the executive and advisory councils of the Republic of Ha-\\nwaii, From and after the passage of this act, it shall be unlawful for any\\nperson, company, partnership, or corporation in any manner whatsoever to\\nprepay the transportation, migration, or introduction of any alien or aliens,\\nany foreigner or foreigners, into the Hawaiian Islands, under contract or\\nagreement, made previous to the importation, migration, or introduction of\\n6o7L", "height": "4305", "width": "2542", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "65\\nsuch alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform agricultural or do-\\nmestic labor or for service in mills or factories in the Hawaiian Islands: Pro-\\nvided, liowever, That any person, company, partnership, or corporation may\\nbring aliens or foreigners into the Hawaiian Islands as aforesaid upon re-\\nceiving from the board of immigration its written approval of the contracts\\nunder which it is proposed to introduce such aliens or foreigners.\\nFor the purpose of this act all aliens and foreigners arriving within the\\njurisdiction of the Republic of Hawaii in any vessel or who, having so arrived,\\nmay be performing quarantine on shore shall be deemed to be without the\\nHawaiian Islands and the provisions of this act regarding the importation,\\nmigration, or introduction of aliens and foreigners so arriving or in quar-\\nantine.\\nSec. 2. All contracts or agreements which may hereafter be made by and\\nbetween any person, company, partnership, or corporation and any aliens,\\nforeigner, or foreigners to perform agricultural or domestic labor or for\\nservice in mills and factories in the Hawaiian Islands previous to the migra-\\ntion, importation, introduction, or arrival of the person or persons whose\\nlabor or service is contracted for into the Hawaiian Islands shall be void, ex-\\ncept such contracts and agreements as shall have been approved by the board\\nof immigration as aforesaid.\\nSec. 3. For every violation of any of the provisions of section 1 of this act\\nthe person, company, partnership, or corporation violating the same shall\\nforfeit pay for th3 benefit of the treasury for every such offense the sum of\\n$300 for each alien or foreigner introduced or landed in the Hawaiian Islands,\\nor whose passage has been paid, encouraged, or arranged for contrary to the\\nprovisions of section 1 of this act, upon conviction thereof before a district\\nmagistrate.\\nSec. 4. The master of any vessel who shall knowingly bring within the\\nHawaiian Islands on such vessel, and land or permit to be landed from any\\nforeign port or place any alien or foreigner who. previous to embarkation on\\nsuch vessel, had entered into contract or agreement to perform agricultural\\nor domestic labor or service in mills or factories in the Hawaiian Islands,\\nwhich contract or agreement had not been approved by the board of immi-\\ngration as aforesaid, shall forfeit and pay for benefit of the treasury the sum\\nof 8100 for each alien or foreigner so introduced or landed upon conviction\\nthereof by the district magistrate.\\nSec. 5. This act shall not apply to immigration of laborers under contract\\nunder the provisions of the convention between this country and Japan of\\nJanuary 28, A. D. 1886.\\nSec. 6. This act shall take effect from the date of its publication.\\nApproved this 1st day of February, A. D. 1895.\\nSAN FORD B. DOLE.\\nIt has been for some time asserted that the new organization in\\nthe Sandwich Islands favored American labor, and that because\\nthe missionary element had become dominant the high-priced\\nwhite laborers of the United States could confidently rely upon\\nsplendid remuneration if the Hawaiian Islands were annexed. It\\nis therefore important to examine the treaties prevailing between\\nHawaii and Japan, from which latter country it is supposed dan-\\nger is to be anticipated. These treaties, so far as they relate to\\nthis subject, have already been printed, at my suggestion, as a\\nSenate document. They are as follows:\\nTREATIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND HAWAII.\\nWhereas a treaty of amity and commerce between His Majesty the King,\\nand His imperial Majesty the Teuno of Japan, was concluded at Yeddo, on\\nthe lUth day of August, 1871, which has been ratified by His Majesty the\\nKing, and His Imperial Majesty the Tenno of Japan, and the ratifications\\nduly exchanged\u00e2\u0080\u0094 which treaty is, word for word, as follows:\\nHis Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and His Imperial Japanese\\nMajesty the Tenno, being equally animated by the desire to establish rela-\\ntions of friendship between the two countries, have resolved to conclude a\\nTreaty, reciprocally advantageous, and for that purpose have named their\\nplenipotentiaries, that is to say, His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian\\nIslands, His Excellency C. E. De Long, appointed and commissioned by His\\nMajesty envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Kingdom\\nof Hawaii near the Government of His Majesty the Tenno of Japan, and\\nHis Imperial Majesty the Tenno, His Excellency Sawa Iusanme Kiyowara\\nNoluyoshe. minister for foreign affairs, and His Excellency Terachima Jusee\\nFugiwara Munemori, first assistant minister for foreign affairs, who, having\\n3571-5", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "66\\ncommunicated to each other their respective full powers, which are found in\\ngood order and in proper form, have agreed upon the following articles:\\nArticle I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His\\nMajesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and His Imperiarjapanese Maj-\\nesty the Tenno, their heirs and successors, and between their respective\\nsubjects.\\nArticle II. The subjects of each of the two high contracting parties, re-\\nspectively, shall have the liberty freely and securely to come with their ships\\nand cargoes to all places, ports, and rivers in the territories of the other\\nwhere trade with other nations is permitted; they may remain and reside in\\nany such ports and places, respectively, and hire and occupy houses and\\nwarehouses, and may trade in all kinds of produce, manufactures, and mer-\\nchandise of lawful commerce, enjoying at all times the same privileges as\\nmay have been or may hereafter be granted to the citizens or subjects of\\nany other nation, paying at all times such duties and taxes as may be exacted\\nfrom the citizens or subjects of other nations doing business or residing\\nwithin the territories of each of the high contracting parties.\\nArticle III. Each of the high contracting parties shall have the right to\\nappoint, if it shall seem good to them, a diplomatic agent, who shall reside\\nat the seat of the Government of the respective countries, and consuls and\\nconsular agents, who shall reside in the ports or places within the territories\\nof the other where trade with other nations is permitted. The diplomatic\\nagents and consuls of each of the high contracting parties shall exercise ail\\nthe authority and jurisdiction, and shall enjoy within the territories of the\\nother all the rights and privileges, exemptions, and immunities which now\\nappertain or may hereafter appertain to agents of the same rank of the\\nmost favored nations.\\nArticle IV. It is here stipulated that the Hawaiian Government and its\\nsubjects, upon like terms and conditions, will be allowed free and equal par-\\nticipation in all privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been\\nor may hereafter be granted by His Majesty the Tenno of Japan to the Gov-\\nernment, citizens, or subjects of any other nation.\\nArticle V. The Japanese Government will place no restrictions whatever\\nupon the employment by Hawaiian subjects of Japanese in any lawful capac-\\nity. Japanese in the employ of foreigners may obtain Government passports\\nto go abroad, on application to the governor of any open port.\\nArticle VI. It is hereby agreed that such revision of this treaty, on giv-\\ning six months previous notice to either of the high contracting parties, may\\nbe made by mutual agreement, as experience shall prove necessary.\\nArticle VII. The present; treaty shall be ratified by His Majesty the King\\nof the Hawaiian Islands, and by His Imperial Majesty the Tenno, and the\\nratifications exchanged at Yeddo, the same day as the date of this treaty,\\nand shall go into effect immediately after the date of such exchange of rati-\\nfications.\\nIn token whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.\\nDone at the city of Yeddo, this 19th day of August, A. D. 1871, correspond-\\ning in Japanese date to the fourth day of the seventh month of the fourth\\nyear of Meiji.\\n(Signed) C. E. DE LONG. [SEAL.\\nS^WA IUSANME KIYOWAEA NOLUYOSHE. Tseal.\\nTERACHIMA JUSEE FUGIWARRA MUNEMORI. [seal.;\\nNow, all persons are hereby notified that the said treaty is a part of tho\\nlaw of this Kingdom, and is to be regarded as stich.\\n[L. s.] CHAS. C. HARRIS,\\nFor Minister of Foreign Affairs.\\nForeign Office, September 27, 1S71.\\nconvention between the empire of japan and the kingdom OF TnB\\nHAWAIIAN ISLANDS.\\nWhereas a large number of the subjects of His Majesty the Emperor of\\nJapan have emigrated to the Hawaiian Islands; and whereas it is not un-\\nlikely that others of His Imperial Majesty s subjects may desire to take ad-\\nvantage of the system of free and voluntary emigration which has been\\nestablished, and which it is intended by this convention to confirm; and\\nwhereas it is equally the desire of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian\\nIslands and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to afford the emigrants the\\nmost ample and effectual protection compatible with the constitution and\\nlaws of Hawaii, His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and His\\nMajesty the Emperor of Japan, being resolved to treat upon these impor-\\ntant subjects, have, for that purpose, appointed their respective plenipo-\\ntentiaries to negotiate and conclude an emigration convention, that is to\\nsay: His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, Robert Walker Irwin,\\nknight commander of the Royal Order of Kalakaua, His Majesty s charge\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2526", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "67\\nd affaires and consul-general at Tokio, and His Majesty the Emperor of Ja-\\npan, Count Inouye Kaoru, Jusarnmi, His Imperial Majesty s ministet of\\nstate for foreign affairs, first class of the Order of the Rising Sun, etc., who,\\nafter a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers, found in\\ngood and due form, have agreed-upon and concluded the following articles:\\nArticle I. It is mutually agreed between the contracting parties that\\nthe several stipulations contained in this convention shall, so far as the same\\nare applicable, embrace as well the subjects of His Majesty the Emperor of\\nJapan, who have already emigrated to the Hawaiian Islands, as those who\\nmay hereafter emigrate thither.\\nArticle II. The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan agree\\nthat in pursuance of the provisions of this convention, and so long as tho\\nsame shall remain in force, Japanese subjects may freely emigrate to the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands. But nothing herein contained shall be held to deprive His\\nImperial Japanese Majesty s Government of the right, in individual cases, to\\nprohibit such emigration, or at their pleasure generally to limit, suspend, or\\nprohibit such emigration, if in their judgment the exigencies of the Stats,\\nor the welfare of the Japanese subjects, justify such action. It is, however,\\nunderstood that this right shall not be arbitrarily exercised, neither shall it\\nbe enforced against intending emigrants, in respect to whom the Japanese\\nGovernment shall have given the permission provided for in Article III\\nhereof.\\nArticle III. All emigration under this convention shall be carried on be-\\ntween tiie ports of Yokohama and Honolulu. The kenrei (governor) of\\nKanagawa shall, in all matters connected therewith, represent and act on be-\\nhalf of the Japanese Government. His Hawaiian Majesty s Government\\nengage to appoint a special agent of the Hawaiian board of immigration to\\nreside at Yokohama. The appointment of such agent shall be subject to the\\napproval of the Japanese Government.\\nIt shall be the duty of said agent to correspond and consult with said\\nkenrei upon all matters connected with the subject of Japaneso emigration,\\nto Hawaii, and he shall moreover be charged with the duty of making ali\\nnecessary arrangements with reference to the embarkation and transporta-\\ntion of intending emigrants. Whenever emigrants aro desired, the said\\nagent shall give the said kenrei at least one month s xjrevious notice, setting\\nforth the number and class of persons desired, to which notice the said\\nkenrei shall without unnecessary delay reply, giving the determination of\\nHis Imperial Majesty s Government in that behalf. In default of such notice,\\nor in default of a favorable reply thereto from the said kenrei, the conclud-\\ning paragraph of the last preceding article hereof shall not apply.\\nArticle IV. All emigration under this convention shall be by contract.\\nThe contracts shall be for the period not exceeding three years, and shall be\\nin accordance with a form to be approved by both Governments. The con-\\ntracts shall be concluded at Yokohama, by and between the special agent of\\nthe Hawaiian board of immigration, in the name and on behalf of the Ha-\\nwaiian Government and the intending emigrants, and shall be approved by\\nthe kenrei of Kanagawa. During the continuance of any such contracts the\\nHawaiian Government shall assume all the responsibilities of employer to-\\nward the emigrants, and shall consequently be responsible for the due and\\nfaithful performance of all the conditions of such contracts. And, at the\\nsame time, the said Government of Hawaii guarantees to each and every\\nJapanese emigrant the full and perfect protection of the laws of the King-\\ndom, and will endeavor at all times and under all circumstances to promote\\nthe welfare and comfort of such emigrants.\\nArticle V. His Hawaiian Majesty s Government agrees, moreover, to\\nfurnish all emigrants, under this convention, free steerage passage, including\\nproper food, from Yokohama to Honolulu, in first-class passenger steamers.\\nThe steamers selected for the purpose of transporting such emigrants shall\\nbe approved by the Kenrei of Kanagawa.\\nArticle VI. In order to insure the proper fulfillment of tho terms of the\\ncontracts entered into between the board of immigration of the Hawaiian\\nKingdom and any Japanese emigrants, and to afford full protection to such\\nemigrants in the enjoyment of their rights under the laws of the Hawaiian\\nKingdom, His Hawaiian Majesty s Government will provide and employ\\nduring the continuance of any of the contracts aforesaid, a sufficient number\\nof inspectors and interpreters, who shall be able to speak and interpret the\\nJapaneso and English languages, and the services of such interpreters shall\\nat all times be rendered without charge to such emigrants, in the courts of the\\nHawaiian Kingdom, in any suits arising out of or concerning any such con-\\ntracts, in which such emigrants may be plaintiffs, defendants, complainants,\\nor accused.\\nArticle VII. The Government of His Hawaiian Majesty will, during the\\ncontinuance of any of the contracts provided for by this convention, employ\\na sufficient number of Japanese physicians to attend the emigrants, and will\\ngive to the said physicians the status of Government physicians, and will\\n5571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "68\\nstation them in sv ch localities as may from time to time appear to be desira-\\nble in order to afford the emigrants all necessary medical aid.\\nArticle VIII. His Hawaiian Majesty s Government further agree that\\nthe diplomatic and consular agents of Japan in Hawaii shall at all times have\\nfree and unrestricted access to all Japanese emigrants; they shall be afforded\\nevery facility to satisfy themselves that the contracts are being fulfilled in\\ngood faith; and they shall also have the right, in case of violation thereof, to\\nask and obtain the protection of the laws and the local authorities of Hawaii.\\nArticle IX. The well-being, happiness, and prosperity of Japanese sub-\\njects emigrating to Hawaii, being equally objects of solicitude to both the\\ncontracting parties, His Imperial Japanese Majesty s Government consent\\nthat His Hawaiian Majesty s Government shall have the right to send back\\nto Japan all evil-disposed, vicious, or vagrant Japanese subjects in Hawaii,\\nwho may create trouble or disturbance or encourage dissipation of any kind\\namong the emigrants, or who may become a charge upon the State.\\nArticle X. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications\\nshall be exchanged at Honolulu as soon as possible.\\nArticle XI. The present convention shall take effect immediately upon\\nthe exchange of the ratification thereof, and shall remain in force for the pe-\\nriod of five years; and thereafter until six months previous notice shall have\\nbeen given by one of the contracting parties to the other of its intention to\\nabrogate it.\\nIn testimony whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the\\npresent convention in the English language, and have hereunto affixed their\\nDone at the city of Tokyo this 28th day of the first month of the nineteenth\\nyear of Meiji, corresponding to the 28th day of January, in the eighteen hun-\\ndred and eighty-sixth year of the Christian era.\\nR. W. IRWIN. [l. s.]\\nINOUYE KAORU. [l. s.]\\nISTow be it known that the above convention has been duly ratified by His\\nMajesty the King and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the\\nsaid ratifications have been duly exchanged.\\nTherefore the said convention has become a part of the law of this King-\\ndom, and all the provisions thereof are to be observed accordingly.\\n[L. s.3 WALTER M. GIBSON,\\nMinister of Foreign Affairs.\\nForeign Office, Honolulu, March 5, 1SSG.\\nAre these treaties inimical to Japanese interests as those inter-\\nests are interpreted by the present philanthropic possessors of the\\ncountry? Is the prevailing Hawaiian dynasty struggling to aid\\nthe laboring man? The Dole Government is not by any means\\nsolicitous for the welfare of the laboring man. A large number\\nof contract laborers from Japan have been provided ever since the\\ndisturbance which resulted in the exclusion of some 800 Japanese\\nin 1897. Two thousand contract laborers had been given per-\\nmission to land by the board of immigration of Hawaii several\\nmonths ago. The penal laws of Hawaii, published by authority in\\n1897, are in some respects interesting reading. I have compiled\\nvery briefly portions of these laws which I think bear upon the\\nsubject, covering a couple of pages nearly.\\nSection 1566 inhibits the importation of contract labor unless\\nupon permission of the board of immigration, but section 1570 of\\nthe same code is in these words:\\nSections 1566 to 1569 shall not apply to immigration of laborers under con-\\ntract under the provisions of the convention between this country and Japan\\non January 28, A. D. 1886.\\nThis treaty contains a clause allowing either party to abrogate\\nit upon six months notice; but the Dole Government makes no\\nattempt to do so, and not only continues contract labor in the is-\\nlands, but such labor is subject to regulations savoring of slavery.\\nThe following sections of the Hawaiian penal laws disclose the\\nsituation quite correctly:\\nSec. 1383. All engagements of service contracted in a foreign country, to be\\nexecuted in this, unless the same bo in contravention of the laws of this, shall\\nbe binding here: Provided, however, That all such engagements made for a\\n\u00c2\u00a3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2526", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "69\\nlonger period than ten years shall be reduced to that limit, to count from the\\nday of the arrival of the person bound in this Republic.\\nSec. 138-1. If any person lawfully bound to service shall willfully absent him-\\nself from such service without the leave of his master, any district magistrate\\nof the Republic, upon complaint made under oath by the master, or by any-\\none on his behalf, may issue a warrant to apprehend such person and bring\\nhim before the said magistrate; and if the complaint shall be maintained, the\\nmagistrate shall order such offender to be restored to his master, and he shall\\nbe compelled to serve the remainder of the time for which he originally con-\\ntracted.\\nSec. 1385. If any such person shall refuse to serve according to the provi-\\nsions of the last section or the terms of his contract, his master may apply to\\nany district magistrate where he may reside, who shall be authorized, by\\nwarrant or otherwise, to send for the person so refusing and, if such refusal\\nbe persisted in, to commit such person to prison, there to remain at hard\\nlabor until he will consent to serve according to law. And in case such per-\\nson so bound as aforesaid shall have returned to the service of such master\\nin obedience to such order of such magistrate, and shall again willfully ab-\\nsent himself from such service without the leave of his master, such district\\nmagistrate may fine such offender for the first offense not exceeding So and\\nfor the second offense not exceeding $10; and in default of payment thereof\\nsuch offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor until such fine is paid; and\\nfor every subsequent offense thereafter the offender shall be imprisoned at\\nhard labor not exceeding three months, and at the expiration of any such\\nimprisonment such magistrate shall order such offender to be restored to his\\nmaster to serve for the remainder of such original term of service.\\nMr. President, these provisions are the law, and those who are\\nopposed to slavery will note that these resolutions do not repeal\\nthese infamous statutes, which are no doubt valid under the de-\\ncision of our Supreme Court in Robertson vs. Baldwin (165 United\\nStates, 275) wherein it was determined that compulsory service of\\ndeserting seamen in fulfillment of their contracts is not in viola-\\ntion of the thirteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution,\\nwhich prohibits involuntary servitude; that no service which be-\\ncomes involuntary during its continuance is antagonistic to that\\namendment.\\nMr. President, it is asserted that the Dole Government has\\nchanged its views and that the coffee and sugar planters would\\nprefer to pay high wages to white labor rather than lower wages\\nto the Mongolians. I doubt this statement. The San Francisco\\nChronicle, a very prominent California paper favoring annexa-\\ntion, published a brief and significant article under date of April\\n2 of the present year, which I will read:\\nCONTRACT LAW THEIR SALVATION\u00e2\u0080\u0094 PLANTERS SAY ITS ABOLISHMENT\\nWOULD MEAN THEIR RUIN.\\nHonolulu, March 24, 1898.\\nThe sugar planters are up in arms against a bill now pending in the Legis-\\nlature providing for the abolishment of the labor-contract system now in\\nvogue, by which a laborer who deserts from a plantation can be arrested and\\nthrown into jail until he is willing to return to his work and have all costs\\nof his capture and detention assessed against him. The planters say that\\nunder the present condition the abolishment of the penal-contract law would\\nmean th\u00c2\u00ab utter ruin of every plantation on the islands. At a meeting of a\\ncommittee representing the Planters Association and the House committee,\\nto which the bill was referred, such men as John H. Hackfeld, W. Gr. Irwin,\\nP. M. Swansey, C. Bolte, and H. Renjes were present, and all expressed the\\nopinion that the passage of the bill would deal a death blow to the sugar in-\\ndustry.\\nThe planters explained that the laborers brought to Hawaii are picked\\nfrom the lowest classes in Japan. It is necessary to advance from $130 to\\n$150 to each laborer to get him here. If, when he arrives, he can not be held\\nto his contract, the plantation not only loses the man but the money invested\\nin him.\\nMr. President, our annexation friends do not intend to repeal\\nthese odious enactments.\\nMr. President, I have already mentioned the fact that there were\\na certain number of Chinese laborers excluded by order of the\\n3C71", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "70\\nDole Government and that afterwards a larger number were per-\\nmitted to land. It must be remembered that the 800 whose advent\\nwas inhibited were not of the lowest class. They were ordinary-\\npersons, seeking the rights of ordinary immigrants; but the 2,000\\nwho were afterwards permitted to come in were contract laborers\\nand were allowed to appear in the islands because they were\\nneeded for servile purposes at a maximum rate of $15 per month.\\nAnother matter worthy of consideration is this:\\nIt is confidently stated that if we do not anne\u00c2\u00a3 the islands,\\nJapan will flood them with immigrants. It is therefore impor*\\ntant to look over the history of the past. The immigration for\\nthe period 1889-1893 was 1 to 15, as contrasted with 1893-1897.\\nIn other words, there were nearly seven times more immigrants\\nlanded during the former period than during the latter.\\nIt has been asserted that laborers would appear from ill-paid\\nEuropean regions. This is answered conclusively and briefly:\\nBetween 1875 and 1880 a few natives were brought from Norway\\nto Hawaii. The experiment was never repeated. Had it been\\nsuccessful the hardy, frugal, industrious, money-saving toilers of\\nNorway would have gladly sought the benefits of Hawaiian set-\\ntlement. Germany, or rather a few German immigrants, made\\nthe same effort shortly afterwards, and were even less successful,\\nand no similar expedition was afterwards attempted.\\nTHE STATUS OF HAWAII WHEN ANNEXED.\\nTo the objection that Hawaii is too remote for a State, and should not have\\nprivileges of statehood for various reasons, it is replied that nothing of the\\nkind is contemplated, or wil] in any event happen. If not, why not?\\nThe joint resolution declares: The Hawaiian Islands and their dependen-\\ncies be, and they are hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United\\nStates, and arc subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, etc.\\nThe resolution also provides that the President shall appoint five commis-\\nsioners, two of whom shall be residents of the islands, and who shall recom-\\nmend to Congress proper legislation.\\nSenator Morgan, in the San Francisco Examiner of October 20, 1897, in\\nspeaking of an address which he made to the Hawaiian people, says:\\nThey were always in fear of a negro invasion from this country to crowd\\nthem out of their work. These fears have been removed. I tried, success-\\nfully I think, to show them that once the islands were annexed all of its\\ncitizens would become citizens of the United States, with the same rights\\nbefore the law as myself or any other American. All the natives are Ha-\\nwaiian citizens, and their status as citizens will not be disputed; on the con-\\ntrary, it becomes a part of the United States. Supposing annexation\\nis accomplished, Congress, through a commission of two Hawaiians and three\\nAmericans, will decide whether it shall be a Territory or an independent\\nState. If a Territory, the United States could do nothing wiser than to retain\\nPresident Dole, etc.\\nWhile the distinguished Senator from Alabama was in the islands recently\\nhe at several times asserted that citizenship would be conferred upon the\\nnatives as soon as annexation was accomplished, and, as reported by the Ha-\\nwaiian press, he was very positive in these utterances.\\nAnd from the nature of things it is manifest that statehood is in prospect.\\nSenator Morgan, in a letter addressed to Mr. James K. Kaulia and pub-\\nlished in the Honolulu Independent of October 19, says: Nor could we in\\nany event accept Hawaii as a dependency or colony. We have no such pow-\\ners under our Constitution.\\nThose who believe that it is impolitic to annex any territory as remote as\\nHawaii, with the prospect of statehood in front of us, can not afford, without\\ndoing violence to their convictions, to support the present scheme. Annex-\\nation means possible statehood. This can not be denied. When political\\nexigencies require it, some party, not more anxious for power than such\\norganizations have heretofore been, will bring about the election of two\\nSenators from this mid-ocean State.\\nMr. President, I have referred to these statements made by the\\ndistinguished Senator from Alabama not in any spirit of criti-\\ncism, but merely to disclose the view of a very eminent man, one\\nwho has been a leader in this matter, at least one of the leaders,\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2526", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "71\\nindicating what we have a right to expect, showing that a strong,\\npowerful, and well-considered sentiment already favors the incor-\\nporation of Hawaii, with its 109,000 miscellaneous people, into the\\nfraternity of States. This indicates in the plainest and clearest\\nway the danger that is impending,\\nANNEXATION SHOULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT CONSULTING THS\\nPEOPLE.\\nMr. President, I said in commencing this discussion that one\\nobjection entertained in the best of faith by those of us who op-\\npose annexation is the fact that we do not believe the people of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands\\nagainst their consent.\\nTHE TEXAS CASE.\\nWe have been several times referred to the conduct of other\\ngovernments, and the. Texas case, so often cited by the opposition,\\nis here referred to again. But the Texas incident confirms my\\nstatement:\\nThe constitution of Texas provided (Schedule, section 5, House Executive\\nDocument 16, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session) that immediately after\\nthe adjournment of the convention by which it was prepared il the President\\nof the Republic shall issue his proclamation directing the chief justices in\\nthe several counties of this Republic, and the chief justices and their asso-\\nciates are hereby required, to cause polls to be opened in the respective\\ncounties, etc., for the purpose of taking the sense of the people of\\nTexas in regard to the adoption or rejection of this constitution, and the\\nvotes of all persons entitled to vote under the existing laws or this constitu-\\ntion shall be received, etc.\\nThe constitution contained an explicit acceptance of the provisions of the\\njoint resolution for annexing Texas to the United States. (Id., page 2.)\\nThe Texas constitutional provisions with relation to voting were as fol-\\nlows (Id., page 4):\\nSec 1. Every free male person who shall have attained the age of 21 years,\\nand who shall be a citizen of the United States, or who is, at the time of the\\nadoption of this constitution by the Congress of the United States, a citizen\\nof the Republic of Texas, and shall have resided in this State one year next\\npreceding an election, and the last six months within the district, county,\\ncity, or town in which he offers to vote (Indians not taxed, Africans, and de-\\nscendants of Africans excepted), shall be deemed a qualified elector; and\\nshould such qualified elector happen to be in any other county situated in\\nthe district in which he resides at the time of an election, he shall be per-\\nmitted to vote for any district officer: Provided, That the qualified electors\\nshall be permitted to vote anywhere in the State for State officers: And pro-\\nvided further, That no soldier, seaman, or marine in the Army or Navy of the\\nUnited States shall be entitled to vote at any election created by this consti-\\ntution.\\nSec. 2. All free male persons over the age of 21 years (Indians not taxed,\\nAfricans, and descendants of Africans excepted) who shall have resided six\\nmonths in Texas immediately preceding the acceptance of this constitution\\nby the Congress of the United States shall be deemed qualified electors.\\nThe joint resolution of Congress for annexing Texas was adopted March 1,\\n1815, and in the preamble it is provided that Texas may be erected into a\\nState with a republican form of government to be adopted by the people of\\nthat Republic.\\nAfter this resolution went into effect and on the 13th day of October, 1845,\\nan election was held in the several counties of Texas in which the subject of\\nratification or rejection of annexation, in accordance with the joint resolu-\\ntion, was directly voted upon, and the result was 4,245 votes in favor of an-\\nnexation and 267 against, and at the same time there were cast in favor of\\nthe adoption of the constitution 4,172 votes and for its rejection 312 votes.\\n(Idem, page 26.)\\nAnd on the 10th day of November Anson Jones, the President of Texa=,\\nissued his proclamation reciting that the polls were opened on the 13th of\\nOctober for the purpose of taking the sense of the people of Texas. On\\nDecember 10, 1845, Mr. Douglas, from the Committee on Territories, re-\\nported a resolution for the admission of Texas, as follows:\\nWhereas the Congress of the United States, by a joint resolution approved\\nMarch 1, 1845, did consent that the territory properly included within and\\nrightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas might be erected into a new\\nState, to be called the State of Texas, with a republican form of government\\n3571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "72\\nto be adopted by the people of the said Republic by deputies in convention\\nassembled, with the consent of the existing Government, in order that the\\nsame might be admitted as one of the States of the union; which consent of\\nCongress was given upon certain conditions specified in the first and second\\nsections of said joint resolution; and\\nWhereas the people of the said Republic of Texas, by deputies in conven-\\ntion assembled, with the consent of the existing Government, did adopt a\\nconstitution and erect a new State with a republican form of government\\nand in the name of the people of Texas, and by their authority did ordain\\nand declare that they assented to and accepted the proposals, conditions, and\\nguaranties contained in the said first and second sections of said resolution;\\nand\\nWhereas the said constitution, with the proper evidence of its adoption\\nby the people of the Republic of Texas, has been transmitted to the President\\nof the United States and laid before Congress, in conformity to the provi-\\nsions of said joint resolution: Therefore,\\nBe it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United\\nStates of America in Congress assembled, That the State of Texas shall be\\none, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United States of America and\\nadmitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States in all\\nrespects whatever.\\nBe it further resolved, That until the Representatives in Congress shall be\\nappointed according to an actual enumeration of the inhabitants of the\\nUnited States, the State of Texas shall be entitled to choose two Representa-\\ntives.\\nThere are two features connected with the Texas case which deserve\\nparticular consideration. The first of these are the reasons actuating Con-\\ngress, and the second the care that was taken by both Governments to act in\\naccordance with the will of the people of the territory proposed to be annexed.\\nPresident Tyler, in his message of June 30, 1841 (4 Richardson s Mess., etc.,\\npage 323), alludes to Texas as a Republic coterminous in territory with our\\nown, and he also uses the expression ll a territory settled mostly by emi-\\ngrants from the United States, who would bring back with them in the act\\nof reassociation an unconquerable love of freedom and an ardent attach-\\nment to our free institutions.\\nAgain he says (page 326): If annexation in any form occur, it will arise\\nfrom the free and unfettered action of the people of the two countries.\\nThus it will be observed that President Tyler deemed it of importance to\\ndirect the attention of Congress to the contiguity of the territory in question\\nand to the fact that the same was mostly settled by emigrants from the\\nUnited States; not, as in the present case, a mere handful of Americans; not\\na small minority of the people, but, on the contrary, the most of the people;\\nand he was careful to qualify all his statements by the assurance that no an-\\nnexation would be tolerated which was not in consonance with the free and\\nunfettered action of the people of the two countries.\\nThe proposed Texas treaty of annexation commences with this recital:\\nThe people of Texas having, at the time of the adoption of their consti-\\ntution, expressed, by an almost unanimous vote, their desire to be incor-\\nporated into the Union of the United States, etc.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 House Executive Docu-\\nment 271, Twenty -eighth Congress, first session, page 5.\\nIn this connection I refer to the following extract from the letter of\\nMessrs. Van Zandt and Henderson to Mr. Calhoun, (idem, page 13):\\nIn 1836, after the declaration of the independence of Texas, in pursuance\\nof the orders of the convention and the expression of the popular will, the\\npresident ad interim, by his proclamation, ordered an election to be held\\nthroughout the Republic for the ratification or rejection of the constitution\\nwhich had been adopted by the convention and for the expression by the\\npeople of their wishes in regard to the annexation of Texas to the United\\nStates. The result was that upon a full poll but 93 votes were given against\\nannexation\\nIt will be noted that there was no limitation to the exercise of the right of\\nsuffrage, as far as the free people of Texas were concerned. In fact, the\\nproclamation mentions no limitation.\\nSee also message of President Tyler, of date April 22, 1841. (-4 Richardson s\\nMessages, etc., page 309.)\\nThe general distinction to be observed as to our acquired terri-\\ntory and Hawaii is thus pointed out by Judge Cooley (15 Forum,\\npage 399)\\nThe acquisition of Louisiana was made memorable in a constitutional\\npoint of view by the fact that the President who managed the negotiation\\nand brought it to a successful conclusion did not believe that any power ex-\\nisted under the Constitution for making the purchase.\\nMr. Jefferson saw very clearly the vast importance of whart he undertook\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2526", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "73\\nto do. It would add to the United States a great extent of territory which\\nwas already becoming important in order to provide for the emigration going\\non from the existing States into the interior. It would rid us of an undesir-\\nable neighbor at the west. It would give us the Mississippi as a highway\\nfor the commerce of the interior with the outer world. It would secure its\\noutlet as the entrepot of the trade of the world with our Western people;\\nand it would relieve us forever from the danger that by and by the inhab-\\nitants of the Western Territories would sever their connection with the Union\\nand unite in forming a great republic upon the rivers which would constitute\\ntheir chief international highways.\\nThis was the prize to be attained; but the Constitution, in his view, had\\nmade li no provision for our holding foreign territory and still less for incor-\\nporating foreign nations into our Union. Under the circumstances, he\\nthought the emergency should be met by first making the purchase and then\\nappealing to the nation for an additional article in the Constitution ap-\\nproving and confirming an act which the nation had not previously author-\\nized. He would have had this done as quietly as possible, avoiding public\\ndiscussion, but shutting up the Constitution for some time until the pur-\\nchase was made. The Federal politicians of the day took what advantage\\nthey might of his scruples and made all the opposition they could; but states-\\nmen like Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris refused to make this a mere par-\\ntisan question, and, while they made light of Mr. Jefferson s scruples, did all\\nthey could to favor the purchase. That it was an act of the highest wisdom\\nno one at this day has the slightest doubt, and we think we may fairly as-\\nsume that Mr. Jefferson, after it had once been accomplished, felt but lightly\\nthe scruples he had felt at the outset, for when he found that his party did\\nnot share in them, he ceased to insist upon the necessity for amendment to\\nthe Constitution.\\nEvery foot of the territory acquired in the Louisiana purchase was not\\nonly needed to provide for the natural and inevitable expansion of the set-\\ntlement then going on in the territory of the United States, but it also fitted\\nperfectly into the American system, and the purchase brought nothing of a\\ndiscordant nature into the existing Union. The domain purchased would be\\nformed into Territories with suitable governments as the needs of its grow-\\ning population should require, and these Territories would in time become\\nStates. There was at the mouth of the Mississippi a considerable settiement\\nof people of another race from those who had colonized the existing States,\\nbut they were Europeans, and there was no question that in time they would\\nbecome, as American citizens, an element by no means incongruous or unde-\\nsirable. There is no ground whatever for question that had the condition of\\nthings which confronted Mr. Jefferson at the time of the Louisiana -purchase\\nbeen foreseen when the Constitution was formed, the wisdom of leaving it to\\nbe dealt with by the Government as it was in fact dealt with would have\\nbeen doubted by no one.\\nWhat has been said regarding the acquisition of Louisiana is equally ap-\\nplicable to the treaty for the annexation of Florida. Here, again, was a case\\nof territory bordering upon that of the Union, in the hands of a foreign na-\\ntion, but needed to provide for the gradual expansion of the population of\\nthe Union, and certain in time to become the property of the Union, either\\npeaceably or by the lawless action of those who would covet it and who\\nwould seem to the people of the United States to be its natural a,nd proper\\nproprietor. It was purchased for incorporation into the Union in the reg-\\nular and ordinary way, and the opportunity was also taken advantage of to\\nextinguish claims on the Pacific coast which were likely in time to become\\ntroublesome. Everything that was done in these two cases tended to perfect\\nthe work of the founders of our institutions instead of bringing in any ele-\\nment of discord or incongruity.\\nIn regard to the country itself, we may repeat here what has already been\\nsaid in respect to Louisiana and Florida. Its acquisition brought no incon-\\ngruous element into the Federal Union. A State was brought in, being ad-\\nmitted to the Union on an equal footing with the other States. The popula-\\ntion was homogeneous with our own: its institutions were similar to those\\nwhich prevailed in the other States of the Union. Nothing was done; noth-\\ning was promised; nothing was contemplated in the annexation that was not\\nerfectly harmonious with our existing system. The treaty as formed\\nooked to the acquisition of territory that already constituted an established\\nState, and it was upon this basis that the negotiations completed by the ac-\\ntion of the two legislatures proceeded. The State, it was agreed, might be\\ndivided into other States, but there wasnothing here that looked to anything\\nbut the final incorporation of States into the Union on precisely the same\\nterms with those already constituting members of the Union. The State\\nannexed bordered upon States already admitted to the Union, and if it could\\nhave been acquired honorably and without taking upon ourselves a war with\\na country with which we had ourselves no quarrel, it would doubtless be\\n3571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "74\\nagreed without dissent by our people that annexation ought to have been as-\\nsented to.\\nIn the year 1867 our Government, under the exercise of the treaty- making\\npower, acquired the country known as Alaska. This country bordered upon\\nterritory which upon plausible reasons we had claimed to own, but which in\\nthe settlement of our northwestern boundary with Great Britain had been\\nassigned to that power. It was therefore not at the time of its acqusition\\nstrictly contiguous to any territory of the United States. It was neverthe-\\nless upon the continent; it was not very far away; it was unoccupied except\\nby a race of savages; it would be open to occupation by the American peo-\\nple, and in due time, if sufficient population should be found there, would be\\nprovided with a territorial government and might become a State of the\\nAmerican Union without seeming to conflict especially with what we herein-\\nbefore have claimed to be the true rule of constitutional construction on the\\nsubject. Had it been annexed previous to the settlement of the Oregon\\nboundary no one could have raised any question of constitutional propriety.\\nMr. President, the statement thus made is sufficient to demon-\\nstrate that in the case of Texas the greatest care was exercised\\nto ascertain the will of the people, and, as I before remarked, the\\nmere fact that the Dole Government may have the technical au-\\nthority to annex should not be of particular importance to- us,\\nfor the act which we are seeking to do is not merely a legal act,\\nbut should be a highly moral act, and we can not afford to\\ncompel these people to come into this Republic. They must not\\nbe unwilling colaborers. We have the physical power to do it,\\nbut the right which is based upon conscience is of a different na-\\nture.\\nAlthough I have already considered the constitutional aspects\\nof annexation, 1 wish to call attention to the thirty-second article\\nof the Hawaiian constitution wherein the power is given to effect\\nwhat? Not annexation, but a political or commercial union.\\nWhat is a political union? Is it necessarily annexation? The\\nviews of international law writers upon the power to accomplish\\nannexation are to some extent thus expressed by Mr. Woolsey:\\nIf the power of a sovereign or of a government is limited by a ground law,\\nwritten or unwritten, a treaty can not override the constitution. No one\\ncan lawfully exercise power which does not of right belong to him. Thus,\\nunder constitutional forms, where the treaty-making power is placed in par-\\nticular hands, no others can exercise it, and where it is limited in extent it\\ncan not be lawfully exercised beyond that limitation. Where, however, an\\nunlimited power of making treaties is given to a government, or to some\\ndepartment of it, the public domain and property may be alienated or indi-\\nvidual rights may be sacrificed for public purposes. And yet even the most\\nabsolute despot may make treaties which neither his subjects nor third pow-\\ners ought to regard as binding. Could the house of Romanoff, for instance,\\nresign the throne of Russia to whom it pleased? The true view here is that\\nthe province of absolutism is not to dispose of the national life, but to main-\\ntain it without those checks on the exercise of power which exist elsewhere.\\nNo power, however uncontrolled, was given to destroy a nation or can law-\\nfully do so.\\nAn interesting inquiry here arises, whether the treaty -making power in a\\nfederative union like the United States can alienate the domain of one of the\\nStates without its consent. Our Government, when the northeastern boitnd-\\nary was in dispute, declared that it had no power to dispose of territory\\nclaimed by the State of Maine. The better opinion would seem to be, says\\nChancellor Kent, that such a power of cession does reside exclusively in the\\ntreaty -making power uuder the Constitution of the United States, although,\\na sound discretion would forbid the exercise of it without the consent of the\\ninterested State. But it might be asked whether the treaty-making power\\nis not necessarily limited by the existence of States, parties to the confedera-\\ntion, having control for most purposes over their own territory? Could the\\ntreaty-making power blot out the existence of a State which helped to create\\nthe Union by ceding away all its domain? Such fearful power was never\\nlodged in the General Government by the Constitution and could never be\\nlawfully exercised in the ordinary contingencies of the confederation. Only\\nin extreme cases, where the treaty-making power is called upon to accept the\\nfact of conquest or to save the whole body from ruin by surrendering a part,\\ncould such an exercise of power bo justified. (Comp., sections 53, 161.)\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2526", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "75\\nMr. President, we have been in the habit of alluding to our\\nGovernment as one of delegated powers, and we have claimed\\nheretofore that the Congress has no authority except that con-\\nfided to it either directly or by necessary implication by the Con-\\nstitution. I suppose that any lawyer in this Chamber would, if\\nhe were not called upon by the political exigencies of the moment\\nto vote in favor of the joint resolution, admit that under the Ha-\\nwaiian system the power to alienate that nation does not repose\\nin the legislature or the treaty-making authority unless it is so\\nordained in her organic law, and yet the constitution of Hawaii, as\\nI have pointed out. only gives authority in respect to political and\\ncommercial union to be exercised by treaty, and there is not one\\nword anywhere, unless it is found in the treaty-making provis-\\nion, which I gravely doubt, authorizing denationalization.\\nIt will not be presumed that a people under republican forms\\never organize a government for the purpose of granting the entire\\ncountry to another. The agency created through the constitu-\\ntion and laws must be regulated and controlled by them. No\\nnation ever made a constitution or passed an act through its leg-\\nislature or elected a legislature with the intention that that legis-\\nlature should destroy the nationality. For the first time we are\\nto accept the unauthorized act of the Congress as binding not only\\non ourselves but also upon Hawaii.\\nWe are confidently informed that if the President of that Re-\\npublic and his Legislature make no objection, that the country is\\nours, regardless of their constitution. Mr. President, if Senators\\nwould calmly reflect upon this situation the pending resolution\\nwould be consigned to the waste basket, where it belongs.\\nMr. President, passing from this to another subject, 1 wish to\\ncall the attention of the Senate to the argument made to some ex-\\ntent here to-day, that as Hawaii is small its annexation will not\\namount to a very great deal. It is no doubt true that the Repub-\\nlic of Hawaii is comparatively insignificant, but its absorption\\nwill nevertheless as completely establish our repudiation of the\\nMonroe doctrine and of other theories of government heretofore\\nadopted as though it covered a much greater area and was ten-\\nanted by a much more numerous and powerful population. Every\\nvast change has had a small beginning. Our independence was a\\nmatter of growth, and no one doubts that because of our success\\nnumerous monarchical establishments were destroyed and upon\\ntheir ashes free governments arose. If we can annex these islands,\\nwe can take in any spot in the world under the same claim of\\nright.\\nIn illustrating this phase of the question. Senator Morehead, of\\nKentucky, during the Texas discussion, said:\\nHg might be told that these were extreme cases. So they were; and he\\nshould not have introduced them hut for the sake of illustration, and tbey\\ndid illustrate the principle contended for and showed plainly the extremity\\nof the proposition contained in the resolution from the House. If Cuba and\\nHaiti and Liberia were received, we might soon have an application from\\nChina. We had had lately a brilliant mission to China and had become\\nacquainted with many things before unknown touching the Celestial Em-\\nEire\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the land of flowers. Very possibly we might become captivated by the\\neauty of their long tails and slanting eyes and wish to have among us their\\nladies with little feet.\\nThe annexation of an empire so large as China would, perhaps, go pretty\\nfar toward gratifying our appetite for acquisition of foreign territory. W\u00c2\u00ab\\nmight then go south on our own continent, annex Mexico [this was already\\nthreatened] and annex Bogota, and Bolivia, and Peru, and Chile, till at length\\nwe took in Patagonia. We were told by the geographers that the people of\\n\u00c2\u00a3571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "7G\\nPatagonia were cannibals, or, in other words, man-eaters. Very well; if\\nthey were, it might probably exert a conservative influence on the public\\ncouncils, and the annunciation from the Chair of the Senator from Pata-\\ngonia might well cause gentlemen to be extremely orderly. China\u00e2\u0080\u0094 only\\nthink of it!\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the Ultima Thule of the East! What a temptation to have her\\n*2i this Union What a privilege The glorious privilege of our Constitution,\\nthat we could take in the world! Congressional Globe and Appendix, Twenty-\\neighth Congress, second session, 1844-45, page 281.\\nTHE DANGER OF THE EXAMPLE.\\nMr. President, the point of this reference is that if we commence\\nthis work of expansion and accretion there will he no limit. The\\ntaste of conquest is dangerous. It may be well enough for any\\nSenator to say that, after all, the annexation of so small a\\ncountry is immaterial; that we would not seize a larger country\\nsimilarly situated. But experience shows that this argument is\\nvalueless, and that the very vote which is given by the distin-\\nguished Senator from Massachusetts who has so eloquently ad-\\ndressed the Senate to-day in favor of the resolution will be re-\\nferred to as authority and be declared to be worthy of the greatest\\nconsideration in maintaining the theory that the Philippine Islands\\nand other parts of the world are to be permanently acquired.\\nMr. President, in this body, among the most eloquent and able\\nSenators who favor annexation are to be found those who have\\nurged, as I said the other day, that wherever the American flag\\nis raised it must forever remain. They will be sure to take ad-\\nvantage of this precedent. When a treaty of peace with Spain is\\nbeing negotiated the consequences of Hawaiian annexation will\\nbe manifested.\\nThis is the first step\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the dangerous step\u00e2\u0080\u0094 in the direction of\\nterritorial expansion. If there ever was a time when we should\\nproceed slowly in such matters, that time is now. To-day, in the\\nmidst of the great triumphs of our arms; to-day, when everywhere\\nin our land rise voices of praise and thanksgiving for the wonder-\\nful battles we have won, we must not be deaf to the circumstance\\nthat intense enthusiasm is not productive of the wisest conclu-\\nsions, and that in the midst of the excitement incident to military\\nsuccess there is but little opportunity or ability to solve those\\nnumerous problems of free government which encompass the vic-\\ntorious Republic.\\nMr. President, in times when nations are struggling for life,\\nwhen they are being emancipated from oppression, when they are\\nadmitted to the broad light of freedom and breathe again that in-\\nvigorating air of liberty of which they were so long deprived in\\nthose moments they understand the meaning of tyranny, and they\\nknow full well the distinction between civil government exercised\\nand based upon the people s will and that which springs from\\nmilitary power.\\nHowever virtuous men may be or may have been, however\\ngreat their intellectuality, however superior their education, when\\nthey are suddenly invested with plenary jurisdiction and have\\nthe authority to dominate their fellow-men, the temptation is\\never too great and they yield to its seductions. Hence the danger\\nof vast military establishments and the necessity for thorough\\nseparation between the civil and military departments. When\\nthis Government was first organized and had around it and\\nwithin it nothing save that which told of human rights vindicated\\nand oppression subverted, it was far differently situated. But\\ntwo or three years ago, but four or five months ago, we did not\\ni.571", "height": "4305", "width": "2526", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "77\\nhear Senators clamoring for extension and expansion and for im-\\nmense navies and armies.\\nOUR HOMOGENEITY IMPORTANT.\\nMr. President, is the homogeneity of the American people\\nworth) of consideration? What is it we most need in solving the\\nproblems of domestic government? We require not only that co-\\nhesion which draws together the whole in an effort to preserve\\nits every part, but we must have that moral sympathy and that\\nmoral strength which can only emanate from a people sufficiently\\neducated to appreciate the basic principles of their government,\\nsufficiently courageous to defend them, and sufficiently impartial\\nto deal out to each other and to all men that justice upon which\\nalone human institutions can permanently rest.\\nMr. President, see the problems which constantly confront\\nAmerican people. From the Atlantic shore to the Pacific Ocean\\nwe have a common people. We are used to regard ourselves as\\nsuch. We speak of a common interest, of a common heart, and\\nof a universal aspiration. We speak of these as the result of that\\neducated development of just minds which has eventuated in the\\nformation of a character and a capacity adequate to meet the\\ngrave necessities of self-rule.\\nYet, while that is true, do we not find wide diversity of opinion\\nin this Republic? Do we not find in Massachusetts, for instance,\\na great difference of opinion as to financial matters as contrasted\\nwith the sentiment on the same topic that prevails in the State of\\nColorado? Do we not find certain parts of this country striving\\nfor the prevalence of theories in which they honestly believe, and\\nwhich they enforce with great intellectual vigor? And do we not\\nfind in another part of this same land violently antagonistic no-\\ntions upon that identical topic?\\nAnd yet, sir, if this be true in this country of education, in this\\nland where the schoolhouse and the church rise, where we are\\ntaught together and breathe the same atmosphere, where from\\nocean to ocean the railroads and other means of transportation\\ncarry us day by day. and where the constant intermingling of\\nevery class tends to dissociate from all anything in the nature of\\nprejudice or sectionalism\u00e2\u0080\u0094 if this be true here in our well-beloved\\nRepublic, what is to be the condition of things if we summon\\namong us millions not merely hundreds of thousands, but mil-\\nlions who not only are not masters of the theories of civil gov-\\nernment, but who, Mr. President, know less of it than the child\\nwho toddles at your knee?\\nI wonder that anyone who feels a deep and abiding interest in\\nhis country will decline to pause a moment over this consider-\\nation. Is it contemplated that we are to educate newly imported\\nraces and that after years of trouble and difficulty they may be\\nraised to our level? Have we attained perfection in government?\\nHave we solved all its grave and momentous difficulties? Are we\\nprepared to say that we possess not only the government par ex-\\ncellence, which we do assert, but that there is no more for us to\\ndo, that the superlative has been reached, that there is no other\\nquestion now important enough for us to solve, and that we must\\ngo forward as republican missionaries throughout all the nations\\nto instill lessons of freedom and that reverence for law which\\nwe inculcate and in which we believe? Are we prepared to assert\\nthis? Surely not.\\nThere is scarcely a Senator here who does not look forward to\\n3571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "78\\nthe near future as pregnant with grave contentions among our\\nown people, not battles with the sword, but battles of intellect,\\nbattles of mind, battles where men earnestly and honestly con-\\ntend for mastery as to principles affecting even our governmental\\nstructure. Shall we, thus confronted by these domestic problems,\\nthus meeting day by day these grave issues, demanding our best\\nthought and our most patriotic effort, affiliate with the ignorant,\\nvenal, and savage, living far removed and alien to us in language\\nand ideas?\\nWill the Malay make a good citizen? I do rot think so, not-\\nwithstanding encomiums passed upon him. Obliteration will\\ncome finding him not qualified to be of us. He should never be\\nelevated to the position of American citizenship, and no country\\ntenanted by incompetents should ever be acquired for permanent\\noccupancy. The Negrito must share the same fate. Not every\\nclime, not under every sun, not in the home of every race can\\nthe American citizen be found.\\nHe dwells where natural gifts and the advantages of education\\nand free exercise of his best faculties lead him to see the best and\\nto do it. He belongs to a dominating type. It must be through\\nthe processes of evolution, not born in legislative halls and that\\ndo not sx3ring from the sudden thirst of power on the part of an\\narmed people, that men may be disciplined for freedom. In this\\nday and generation, when we hear the approach of momentous\\nquestions, we are told that we must depart from tried paths and\\nproceed into an undiscovered country.\\nMr. President, the following may be considered to some extent\\na summary of the positions which I have taken here. First, as to\\nthe statement that our policy has always tended toward annexa-\\ntion. This is untrue. Jefferson declared that we should never\\naccept any territory requiring a navy to defend it. Webster,\\nwhile asserting that we had peculiar interests in the islands, ex-\\npressly disclaimed any intention of annexation. Presidents Tyler,\\nTaylor, Fillmore, etc., held the same views. Marcy at one time\\nfavored annexation, but the scheme was not carried out, and his\\nlatest expression on the subject favored maintaining their inde-\\npendence. When Mr. Frelinghuysen was Secretary of State he\\nadopted Jefferson s view against extracontinental acquisitions.\\nSecond, that we need Hawaii for military purposes. It is diffi-\\ncult to see how such an addition to our country could otherwise\\nthan weaken us. We are now but moderately defended, both as\\nto fortifications and naval development. Admiral Walker testi-\\nfied before the Senate Committee on Coast Defenses that in case\\nof war with a great maritime power our Navy would be inadequate.\\nIts splendid achievements at Manila and Santiago in nowise de-\\ntract from the correctness of that assertion, nor can we question\\nthat if we are to proceed to develop ourselves as an all-conquering\\npower our Navy must be many, many times augmented. While\\nvast improvement has been made, our Navy is not perfect. Every-\\nbody admits that Hawaii would require naval defense. We are\\nnot protected as it is. Will it help us to take in something new\\nalso demanding defensive expenditures?\\nIt would cost not less than $100,000,000 to properly protect\\nHawaii. The town of Honolulu is located on the Island of Oahu\\nand Pearl Harbor is also on that island. Admiral Belknap says\\nthat Honolulu can be well defended by fortifications costing\\n\u00c2\u00a75,000, 0C0. General Schofield reported officially to the Depart-\\n3571", "height": "4305", "width": "2526", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "ment that it could not be defended from the land and would be\\nuseless as a naval station for that reason. Schofield reported in\\nfavor of Pearl Harbor. It will, in any event, take much money\\nto fcrtify these two places, to say nothing of naval repair shops\\nand sites for same, docks, etc. (We have no adequate docks any-\\nwhere.) But when these two harbors are fortified, what have we\\ngot? A partial protection of one island containing only about\\n600 square miles. There are six other inhabited islands, some of\\nwhich are much larger than Oahu, viz, Hawaii contains about\\n4,000 square miles, and Maui and Lanui are much more extensive\\nthan Oahu. Moreover, the islands are not closely grouped.\\nThe distance between their extremes is some 400 miles. While\\nthere are no extensive harbors outside of Honolulu and Pearl,\\nthere are yet landing places on each island. Especially is this true\\nof Hawaii, At Hilo there is a wharf in process of construction.\\nUnless a navy capable of successfully meeting any hostile force\\nthat may be sent is maintained and retained at the islands they\\ncan not be held, even if Pearl and Honolulu harbors are fortified.\\nThese ports would be blockaded and a naval station established\\nby the enemy at some other port. The defending navy must pro-\\ntect the very long coast lines of the group, and must patrol 400\\nmiles of water, without taking into consideration the deflections\\nnecessary in managing vessels sent from one coast to the other.\\nThe extent of the navy rendered thus essential is problematical.\\nIt would depend upon the resources of our enemy. Something\\nover one year ago the English budget showed $100,000,000 appro-\\npriated for naval purposes for a single year. The vessels to be\\nconstructed with this will form but a small part of the British\\nnavy; and if we assume that $100, 000,000 worth of hostile fleet is\\nsent to Hawaii, we must be able to prevent a landing and must,\\nconsequently, have at least enough there to defeat an establish-\\nment by the enemy at any point of a naval station or the placing\\nof any considerable body of men on shore. If w T e were contesting\\nwith England, $100,000*000 would not be enough with which to\\nstart our island defenses. That sum might do were we contesting\\nwith Germany, France, Japan, or Russia. Then, have we the\\nsupplies necessary to maintain an army and navy?\\nIn the testimony given by General Schofield before the House\\ncommittee he referred to the possibility of employing natives of\\nHawaii to defend the island, but when those natives permitted\\nthe few individuals who took possession of the island and over-\\nturned the former Government to take that remarkable step,\\nwhen they have permitted that Government to be maintained in\\nspite of their own numerical strength, it is absolutely useless to\\ntalk to me or I think to anyone, with effect, as to the ability of\\nthe natives to defend anything.\\nMr. President, I have heard a great deal about the value of allies\\nin the prosecution of war. I heard a great deal of it in this Cham-\\nber for a couple of years when I was unable to vote for the alleged\\npatriotic resolutions, which I did not think patriotic, regarding\\nother people who were in insurgency, and 1 then said that whenever\\nthe American soldier planted his foot upon foreign soil, contesting\\nfor dominion, he, under the Stars and Stripes, must win his triumph\\nand that his auxiliaries would be of comparatively little account.\\nUpon a broken reed would this Government rest if she depended\\nupon the natives of Hawaii to defend Hawaii in case of foreign\\ninvasion. She must rely upon her own gallant sons, and their\\n3571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "80\\nblood and their sacrifice alone can maintain her dominion in that\\ndistant sea.\\nHere, as illustrating what I said a moment ago\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and I mention\\nit now lest it may escape my observation no one has a higher re-\\ngard\u00e2\u0080\u0094and I repeat it\u00e2\u0080\u0094 for our soldiers and sailors than have I,\\nbut they are not the men to whom our Constitution has intrusted\\nthe maintenance or carrying on of civil government. They are\\nnot the men who in any age or in anytime have been safely given\\nthe investigation of those questions which involve the perpetuity\\nof republican institutions. Wise and strong and able and brave\\nthough they are, brilliant and magnificent their victories, glori-\\nous the pages upon which their deeds are written, yet not to them\\nhas been conferred by our wise organic law the duties of the\\nstatesman.\\nMr. President, when Admiral Belknap was testifying some time\\nago before the Committee on Foreign Relations of this body, he\\nsaid:\\nGreat Britain now lias Puget Sound, which she ought not ba permitted to\\nhold a single day, in my judgment.\\nI refer to the report of -the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-\\ntions, February 26, 1894, page 687. If it be true that the testi-\\nmony was given, and I presume there is no one who will deny\\nit, for it is an official report, we find a very brave and distinguished\\nofficer, for whom all of us have the highest regard, asserting that\\nEngland ought not to be permitted to hold Puget Sound for one\\nminute.\\nI mention this as showing the different theories upon which the\\ndifferent officials of this Government proceeds Civil matters can\\nnot be safely intrusted to the military any more than military\\naffairs can be assigned to civilians. What a peculiar declaration.\\nAs the result of an arbitration, which many of us and perhaps all\\nof us here think did not reach a correct judgment, England ac-\\nquired dominion on Puget Sound; and the Admiral s theory is\\nthat because it would be of great advantage to us to possess this\\nregion, we ought not to permit England to hold it for a moment.\\nAgain do I say that men, however brave and however able, who\\nare engaged in vocations that tempt to conquest, are not good ad-\\nvisers in civil affairs.\\nWhen we have paid out enormous sums we have not strength-\\nened our continental possessions at all. The Pacific coast is in as\\nmuch danger as ever. We must have an Hawaiian squadron. The\\nenemy will not move his ships to suit us. We can not leave the\\nislands unguarded, because the foe may appear at any time. Cali-\\nfornia is a long distance away, and the modern cruiser and battle\\nship can not go too far from a coaling station. We must defend\\nCalifornia by a navy other than that employed at the islands.\\nEngineer in Chief Melville writes that the battle ship Oregon,\\nwhich is one of our best war vessels, can run at forced draft, if\\nthere is no accident, and without recoaling, 2,400 knots. At ordi-\\nnary cruising rates she could travel 5,040 knots. Under forced\\ndraft (16.79 knots per hour) she consumes 253 tons of coal per\\nday, and she can keep this up six days. Under ordinary cruising\\nrates (10 knots per hour) she consumes 73 tons per day, and can\\nmaintain this for twenty-one days.\\nThe San Francisco, one of our best cruisers, can steam only\\n1,500 knots forced draft without recoaling, or 3.2 days, and at or-\\n3571", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "81\\ndinary cruising rate she can travel 4,104 knots without recoaling.\\nIt is therefore evident that if the islands were in the possession of\\nan enemy, that enemy would not send his cruisers or battle ships\\nto California, for if he tarried to fight he would not have coal\\nenough to get home and would float around helpless and useless.\\nThe sample cruiser and battle ship which I have named are about\\nas good as any\u00e2\u0080\u0094 at all events, above the average. I have made\\nthese estimates upon the most favorable showing the vessels have\\never made. I have no doubt, however, that practically my calcu-\\nlations are too high, as the average ship seldom comes up to the\\nspecifications after the actual trial has been made.\\nSome one said in the House of Representatives that a battle ship\\nof the first class could not be sent safely across the ocean. We\\nhave negatived that in the case of the Oregon, but because of\\nnumerous places at which she was able to coal. As a rule, this is\\nno doubt true. No one would care to encounter a typhoon in a\\nbattle ship if she did not have an ample supply of coal.\\nThe above proves that a naval warfare can not be carried on\\nwith a base of supplies as distant as Hawaii.\\nWe are told that Honolulu looks right into the proposed\\nNicaragua Canal, and will be necessary for the defense of Brito,\\nthe western terminus of the canal. That this is all moonshine\\nwill appear when it is shown that Honolulu is 4,210 miles from\\nBrito, while San Diego, where we are now erecting a fortifica-\\ntion, is only 2,200 miles, and San Francisco only 2,700. Therefore\\nit is palpable that, as San Diego is over 2,000 miles and San Fran-\\ncisco about 1,500 miles nearer Brito than Honolulu, the California\\npoints, not Honolulu, must be relied upon. If Hawaii were in\\npossession of an enemy, he could never send a modern battle ship\\nor cruiser to Brito and stay in a fight, even to say nothing of\\ngetting back. His coal would give out and we would tow him\\ninto port.\\nI repeat in shorter form the figures which I have already laid\\nbefore the Senate in this connection, epitomizing merely what I\\nhave said.\\nWe are informed that Honolulu is on the track of oriental\\ncommerce and that all vessels from Europe or Atlantic ports, after\\ngoing through the canal, will make direct for Honolulu, and from\\nthere to Yokohama, and that therefore we need the islands to pro-\\ntect canal commerce.\\nThe exact distance from Brito via Honolulu to Yokohama is\\nshown on the official charts to be\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nMiles.\\nBrito to Honolulu 4,210\\nHonolulu to Yokohama 3,415\\nDistance from Brito to Yokohama via Honolulu 7. 655\\nFrom Brito to Yokohama via San Francisco the distances are:\\nBrito to San Francisco 2.70.)\\nSan Francisco to Yokohama 4,530\\nDistance from Brito to Yokohama via San Francisco 7,2=30\\nHence distance via the San Francisco route is shorter by 419\\nmiles.\\nObviously this fact and the other consideration that San Fran-\\ncisco is a most important port will force practically all the canal\\nAsiatic trade that way. This proposition is relied upon, and with\\n3571-0", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "82\\nreason, by those who think that the canal will help California com-\\nmerce. The shortest route from Brito to Yokohama passes within\\n176 miles from San Francisco and more than 1,800 miles from\\nHonolulu. The shortest route from San Francisco to Yokohama\\npasses near the Aleutian Islands and about 1,900 miles from Hon-\\nolulu. Unless the mariner who uses the canal wants to kill time\\nhe will save 419 miles and go to San Francisco. He may save\\nsomething more by passing within 176 miles of that city.\\n3. It is said that unless we take the islands some other govern-\\nment will capture them. In the first place, there is absolutely no\\nevidence to justify this assertion. About half a century ago Eng-\\nlish and French officers, without authority of their Governments,\\nmade demonstrations against the islands. We protested, and Eng-\\nland and France at once disavowed the unauthorized behavior\\nof their agents and even offered to join us in securing their per-\\nmanent independence.\\nWe declined, no doubt, because of Washington s warning\\nagainst entangling alliances; but England and France, to show\\ntheir earnestness, made a mutual official declaration on Novem-\\nber 28, 1843, by which they engaged reciprocally never to take\\npossession, either directly or under the title of protectorate, or\\nunder any other form, of any part of the territory, etc. Ger-\\nmany has not evinced the slightest desire to interfere, and the\\nsame is true of Russia. As to Japan, there is no danger. A dis-\\npute as to damages for refusal to permit certain Japanese immi-\\ngrants to land has arisen, but will be arbitrated. Japan is nearly\\n3,500 miles from Hawaii, and to defend Hawaii would require an\\nenormous outlay, even more than would be required in our case.\\nAn interesting review of this part of the situation will be found in\\nan article by Minister Hoshi in the last November Harper, to which\\nI have already referred and which is now in the Record at length.\\nJapan has every reason to be friendly with us and we with that\\nEmpire. The enormous increase in the consumption by that\\ncountry of our manufactures of steel and iron and of American\\nflour and cotton and the large importation into the United States\\nof Japanese tea, raw silk, etc., are sufficient to establish the ab-\\nsurdity of any talk of war by Japan for the control of Hawaii.\\nIf England, Germany, or France waged war against us, their\\nfinancial institutions, which control to a great extent their poli-\\ncies, would be driven to the wall. The first gun fired at New\\nYork by either of these powers would shake Europe to its center\\nand render it necessary to make a new map of that part of the\\nworld. If England were silly enough to fight us, she would oper-\\nate, as far as the Pacific coast is concerned, from Esquimalt,\\nwhich is on our borders and where she has one of the finest forts\\nin existence.\\nFor fifty years we have warned European powers away from\\nthe Hawaiian Islands. That warning has always been heeded.\\nWe are better able to take care of ourselves now than we were\\nthen. Where is there any new danger?\\nIf it is necessary to build fortifications and guard the islands,\\nwhy not improve Pearl Harbor, which was ceded to us by Article\\nII of the treaty of December 6, 1884, by which we were given the\\nexclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River in the island of\\nOahu and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair\\nstation for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end\\n3371", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "83\\nthe United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and\\ndo all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid?\\n4. It is said that the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty will\\nannul the Pearl Harbor cession. This I have already considered.\\no. It is said that if we refuse to take the islands our position wiH\\nbe morally weakened. The contrary is true. Under the Monroe\\ndoctrine we do not claim or take nor would we have the South\\nAmerican republics or any of them. The same doctrine has al-\\nwa} T s been applied to Hawaii and its application recognized by all\\npowers. The strength of the Monroe doctrine consists in our ab-\\nstention from conquest or absorption. We merely warn other\\ngovernments not to oppress our sister republics. If Europe said\\nto us, Take Mexico, or we will take it, we would reply, We\\nwill not do so, and you must keep your hands off. This long-\\ndefined and carefully regarded policy we apply to Hawaii. If, on\\nthe other hand, we shall begin the plan of absorption, we must\\nget ready to take the consequences. Army and Navy must be\\nindefinitely increased. Onerous taxation and centralization will\\nfollow. The Monroe doctrine becomes a thing of the past, a myth,\\na memory, a mistake.\\nMr. President, in this connection let us reflect upon the conse-\\nquences of our attitude upon those whom we have assumed to\\ndefend under the Monroe doctrine. In this Chamber we ap-\\nplauded a most uncommon circumstance when Mr. Cleveland\\nsent in his remarkable message, in which, in maintenance of that\\ndoctrine, he threw down the gantlet to a mighty empire, and,\\nthough we were unprepared to face any first-class power, we did\\nnot flinch. England, taking a correct view of the situation, agreed\\nfinally to arbitration, and the incident was, so far as concerned\\nthe strained relations, happily closed, and we congratulated our-\\nselves upon this acquiescence in that time-honored declaration.\\nMr. President, does it not seem passing strange that at this day,\\nso close to that hour when we were thus demonstrative in favor\\nof that doctrine and declared in this Chamber that it was written\\nso deeply and so firmly in our law that it had almost become\\ncrystallized in the Constitution itself when we made that an-\\nnouncement just a few months ago, did anyone here suppose that\\nwe would soon threaten an opposite policy?\\nWe said we would not even interfere with the possessions of\\nforeign governments upon this continent, but that the Western\\nHemisphere must be consecrated to freedom, and that wherever\\nliberty won in the battle she should remain intrenched and unas-\\nsailed, and the armies and navies of the Republic would defend\\nher against foreign aggression. But this day we are stretching\\nforth for dominion elsewhere; we are abandoning this theory, be-\\ncause we can not with any face or conscience assert that no other\\nnation has the right to invade the sacred precincts of this hemi-\\nsphere, when we claim the right to go abroad and with the sword\\nbring within our control alien races.\\nMr. President, what will be the effect, I repeat, upon our sister re-\\npublics on this hemisphere of this manifest-destiny talk? They\\nhave looked upon us as their powerful guardian, adequate with\\nour giant resources to shield them. They now see us breaking\\nthe moorings to which the ship of state was long since attached\\nby patriotic hands and witness us about to engage in spoliation.\\nMr. President, is it wonderful that we already hear inurmur-\\n3571", "height": "4273", "width": "2486", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "84\\nfogs, not perhaps very loud, against this policy which we are\\nadvocating, murmurings emanating from this continent, from the\\nvery peoples with whom we have attempted to form alliances,\\nwith whom our statesmen have attempted to make closer rela-\\ntions, from our own hemisphere, from our sister Republics?\\n^Taturally the extension of empire will excite jealousy and fear\\nhere. If we are to abandon our preconceived and announced the-\\nories and go abroad in pursuit of conquests, well may our neigh-\\nbors say that we are not their defender, and that perhaps they,\\ntoo, are in danger.\\nMr. President, this programme, which according to some we\\nare about to outline and in the pursuit of which this is the initia-\\ntive step, must infallibly bring upon us the condemnation or cer-\\ntainly the warm regret of every other American Republic. Let us\\npause a minute if we are to throw away the lessons of generations.\\nIf this doctrine has been builded up through so many years and\\nhas stood every test to which the truth can be subjected and has\\nbean found to be correct, let us not throw it aside in a moment.\\nNeither in the storm of passion nor in the enthusiasm of victory\\nlet us discard it.\\nRemember that it was not conceived in haste and indiscretion,\\nbut that it was born of reflection by those who thought and\\nworked for the benefit and advancement of their country. Not\\nin the clash of arms or the sound of martial tread or the acclaim\\nof contesting or victorious armies was this statesmanlike declara-\\ntion announced. Mr. President, it will be long before I forget it.\\n1 do not arrogate any such knowledge as that which is professed\\nby many, leading me to repudiate it as old and worn out. The\\ntruth, Mr. President, as well in matters pertaining to statesman-\\nship and civil government as elsewhere, will last longer than one\\nage. Senseless is he who ignores it.\\nCan we be indifferent, Mr. President, to the voice of those who\\nlive upon our continent? We may have power to do so, but the\\nconsequences of that indifference may be that instead of being\\nthe advocate and, defender of free institutions we will become\\nthe marauder of nations.\\n6. It is claimed that annexation will be most beneficial to our\\nlaboring interests. This is untrue, and happily the absurdity of\\nthe claim is thoroughly appreciated by the laboring people of the\\nUnited States, whohave not hesitated, from their national assem-\\nblage to local meetings, to denounce the entire project. If Hono-\\nlulu is a good place for white labor, why has not such labor gone\\nthere? In what direction is the new enterprise to be guided?\\nEverybody concedes that our intelligent white people will not\\nwork in the cane fields.\\nNotwithstanding the talk with reference to the genial character\\nof the climate, it is certain that a cane field is a real furnace.\\nWhile the temperature runs from 50\u00c2\u00b0 to 90\u00c2\u00b0, the very absence of\\nextreme cold and intense heat results in a warm sameness enervat-\\ning in the extreme. No climate that can produce coffee can be\\notherwise than unpleasantly warm. The absence of white labor\\nestablishes that there is no field for it. Sugar is the great indus-\\ntry. In the year 1897 over 500,000,000 pounds were produced.\\nThis is about enough to supply the whole population west of the\\nMissouri River. We hear the claim often that the limit of pro-\\nduction has been reached. The same assertion was confidently\\nmade when the output was only one-fourth of that of 1897. Sugar\\n3571", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "is the mainstay of the islands; without it there would be no con-\\nsiderable commerce and no talk of annexation.\\nMuch is said as to coffee raising. Our consul at Honolulu has\\nrecently made a very full report as to the status of this industry.\\nHe shows that the labor is wholly Asiatic; that the Chinese re-\\nceive $16 per month and the Japanese $15, without board; that\\nthe industry is not yet firmly established; that capital is neces-\\nsary. He ventures the opinion that German labor could be profit-\\nably employed in planting, but does not pretend that picking,\\nthe most expensive part of the transaction, can be done by any\\nbut inferior labor. The coffee supply of the world now fully\\nequals the consumption. There is no tariff in this country upon\\ncoffee. The Hawaiian must compete with the low-priced labor of\\nBrazil and Central America. Manifestly there is nothing in this\\noutlook for either the American farmer or workingman. A few\\nmechanics can get work now and then in Hawaii, but the market\\nin this respect is quite limited.\\nMuch has been said of the intention of the Dole Government to\\nprevent Japanese immigration. That there has been no such in-\\ntention is evidenced by the documents and facts which I placed\\nbefore the Senate on yesterday. Not long since 800 Japanese im-\\nmigrants were refused landing, and this was the basis for the\\ncontroversy with Japan, that Government claiming that under\\nexisting treaties the interference was unjust. There is in force a\\nconvention between the two countries authorizing contract labor\\nto go to Hawaii. This is, of course, the worst sort of immigra-\\ntion. The 800 excluded were not, except perhaps in a few isolated\\ncases, of this class.\\nThe treaty which provides for contract labor can be terminated\\non six months notice by either power. Dole has never attempted\\nto end it, but on the contrary, since the exclusion of the 800 non-\\ncontract Japanese, the Dole people, through their board of immi-\\ngration, have agreed to the landing of 2,000 contract laborers\\nfrom Japan. The sugar and coffee planters want cheap labor.\\nThey run the islands and will continue to do so, and they will\\nhave just the labor they wish\u00e2\u0080\u0094 cheap labor\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the only labor used\\nanywhere in the world by coffee and sugar growers.\\nIf Dole wishes the treaties with Japan modified, why does he\\nnot endeavor to procure such modification? If he can not do so\\nunaided, why does he not invoke the friendly offices of the United\\nStates?\\n7. It is said that if we do not annex, Dole arid others will divert\\ntheir trade elsewhere. There is nothing in this. The main sup-\\nporters and instigators of this treaty are not philanthropists.\\nThey are after profits. They trade with us because they make\\nmoney by so doing. Without any remission of duty they would\\nsend their sugar and coffee to us because here is their market.\\nWhen the McKinley bill interfered with their sugar, they still\\ncame here. With the reciprocity treaty in force, they would be\\ninsane to go elsewhere. Were it necessary to discriminate to hold\\ntheir trade, we could do so by a reasonable treaty. As a matter of\\nfact, however, they will, as has been said, continue to deal with\\nthe people of the United States for their own financial benefit.\\nIt is said, Mr. President, that there are issues here involving\\nthe happiness and prosperity of the sugar trust of the United\\nStates. 1 suppose that upon a matter of international concern\\nregarding a question which involves the alteration of our policy,\\n3571", "height": "4241", "width": "2438", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "86\\nsuch a charge will not amount to a great deal; but yesterday the\\ndistinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Lindsay] very thor-\\noughly answered the entire pretense. Certain it is that whenever\\nwe have brought within our confines all the great sugar produc-\\ning regions of the earth\u00e2\u0080\u0094 cane sugar, I mean the sugar trust, so\\ncalled, will be in clover. It to-day realizes more from the sugar\\nproduced by the planters of Louisiana than from any sugar which\\nit imports, for it does not give those planters, as the Senators\\nfrom Louisiana well know, the benefit of all the tariff, I suppose,\\nnot by at least half a cent per pound.\\nWhenever the cane-sngar production of the world, oriental and\\nall, is within the United States, it is said we may have competi-\\ntion. Mr. President, the competition possible against great trusts\\nis a mere theory. No more could a man with five or ten millions\\nof money engage in a contest against the Standard Oil Company\\nor the sugar trust or any of the other vast combinations in this\\ncountry than could I, with my microscopic means, engage in a\\nwar of the sort with a millionaire.\\nTherefore this annexation in the end, and pressed to its legiti-\\nmate results, will have but one outcome, and that directly an-\\ntagonistic and contradictory to that which is asserted by the ad-\\nvocates of annexation. The sugar trust naturally favors and\\nmust favor annexation. But this is a collateral issue, designed\\nmerely to divert attention and to att9inpt by misstatement to\\nlead people through prejudice or passion to vote contrary to their\\njudgment. Those in this section of the country who have always\\nsupported the trust are for annexation.\\n8. The sugar planters, who are not numerous but enormously-\\nrich, have reaped their benefits for the most part from the reci-\\nprocity treaty with the United States, by means of which we have\\ndonated to them $75,000,000 the extent of their exemption from\\nduty.\\nThey fear that this treaty may be changed and made more truly\\nreciprocal. They therefore are spending time and money to secure\\nannexation, and when this is accomplished their ample income\\nwill be made permanent without any benefit accruing to the peo-\\nple of the United States. This accounts for the position of vari-\\nous newspapers and individuals who are interesting themselves\\nvigorously in advocacy of annexation.\\n9. The character of population we will bring in by annexation,\\nas shown by the last census, is as follows:\\nNationality.\\nMales.\\nFemales.\\nTotaL\\n16,399\\n4,249\\n1,975\\n1,406\\n866\\n56\\n216\\n8,202\\n19,212\\n19, 167\\n321\\n448\\n11.620\\n4; 236\\n1,111\\n844\\n566\\n45\\n162\\n6,989\\n5, 195\\n2,449\\n134\\n152\\n31,019\\n8,485\\n3,086\\n2,250\\n1,432\\n101\\n378\\n15,191\\n24,407\\n21,616\\n455\\n600\\nTotal\\n72,517\\n36,503\\n109,020\\n3571", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "87\\nWe do not exclude Japanese and will not do so if Hawaii is an-\\nnexed. We exclude Chinese laborers, but we do not drive away\\nthose already here. Therefore, the Asiatics now in the islands\\nwill remain, and Chinese and Japanese cheap labor will be in-\\ncorporated.\\nMr. President, not very long ago the people of this country\\nagitated the question of the restriction of immigration. It is bu\\na few weeks since it was the subject of discussion in this Cham-\\nber. It is but a few years ago when it was almost provocative of\\na revolution upon the western coast of this country. We then ob-\\njected to importing Mongolians by the shipload, and now, as re-\\nmarked to me by a distinguished Senator, we propose to bring\\nthem in by the continent load.\\nWe assume to be fond of our laborers, and yet we design im-\\nporting or forcing into this country, by extending our boundary,\\nan element of competition with which our kindred can not possibly\\nhope to compete. When our friends who argue for a protective\\ntariff point to its benefits, they invariably advance or seek to ad-\\nvance the argument that labor should receive munificent reward.\\nIn the prospective presence of 7,000,000 of an alien race, able to live\\nupon a few cents a day, willing to work at starvation wages in\\ncotton or woolen mills, we are still told that we pursue a mani-\\nfest destiny, that for which political organizations were called\\ninto existence. The Democratic party and the Republican party\\nand the Populist party declare they are in favor of further edu-\\ncating and further enlightening our own people. I do not think\\nany great organization in the United States has ever heretofore\\nsaid that it believed in diluting our intelligence and morality with\\nthe ignorance and crime of other lands.\\n10. We are advised that most of the Hawaiian sugar land is\\nheld under lease and that there is plenty of fine land for the\\npeople. Is anyone fool enough to think that the Hawaiian sugar\\nbarons will let an outsider in? If our land laws are extended\\nover the islands, will the American farmer get in first? If\\nthere is a general grab, will he be considered? The truth is that\\nit takes a fortune to develop and operate a plantation in Hawaii\\nto get a start, and the poor man will be even less in it there\\nthan he is here.\\n11. If there is anything the matter with the Japanese and Ha-\\nwaiian treaties; if there are troubles with Japan in contempla-\\ntion; if there is difficulty regarding our improvement of Pearl\\nHarbor, why not tender our good offices and we can fix these mafa\\nters to the satisfaction of all? If our ability to do this is ques-\\ntioned, I answer, why not try? The advocates of annexation will\\nnot permit the making of any such negotiations, because they\\nknow that the same would be successful.\\nIt is said that the Japanese and natives will unite and overthrow\\nthe Government.\\nJapan openly disclaims any such intention. If our interest re-\\nquired it, we would intervene to prevent any such effort.\\nThe answer, however, to this pretense is that it is an annexation\\nbugaboo. It is suggested by the very men who are importing\\ncontract laborers now. The Dole Government is doing this\\nthrough its board of immigration.\\n12. The present Hawaiian Government was formed as the result\\n3571", "height": "4241", "width": "2438", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "88\\nof a conspiracy headed by our minister. Its organization is\\nutterly unfair; its constitution is so framed that the masses of the\\npeople have nothing to do with the election of a president, and\\nthe natives are and always have been, in fact, disfranchised.\\nThey had nothing to do with the organization of the constitution;\\nand yet we are informed that annexation can be accomplished\\nwithout their cooperation.\\n13. The proposed legislation is unconstitutional. Foreign ter-\\nritory can only be acquired through the treaty-making power.\\nOur right to so acquire dominion has been maintained since the\\nLouisiana case. It has been recognized by Story, Miller, and all\\nwriters upon constitutional law who have given their views upon\\nthe subject. This construction of the organic law found direct\\nsanction in the opinion of Justice Clifford in Holden vs. Joy (17\\nWall., 211).\\n14. The Texas case does not constitute a precedent, for Texas\\nwas admitted under section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution,\\nwhich declares that new States maybe admitted by the Con-\\ngress into this Union. The Constitution having thus designated\\nthe cases wherein the Congress might exercise jurisdiction to\\nadmit, and confined such exercise to new States, excluded the\\ngranting of authority to admit any territory not constituting\\nnew States. The provision of section 3 supra, giving the Con- r\\ngress power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regula-\\ntions respecting the territory of the United States, refers to terri- 3.\\ntory acquired not by the authority conferred in that section, but p\\npursuant to the treaty -making power.\\n15. The jurisdiction of the Congress as to legislation is circum-\\nscribed by the limits of the United States. Without those limits\\nCongress can not go, unless some explicit power can be shown.\\nHawaii can be annexed only pursuant to a valid international con-\\ntract, i. e., a treaty.\\n16. The cession of nationality is neither an executive nor a legis-\\nlative function. The Hawaiian Executive cr Legislature or both\\nhave no general authority to alienate their functions and to deed\\naway the nationality which they have been chosen to govern. If\\nsuch authority exists, it must be discovered in the Hawaiian con-\\nstitution.\\n17. The only provision found in the Hawaiian constitution\\nwhich anyone pretends conveys the right upon Dole and his asso-\\nciates to deed away the Government is found in section 32 of the\\nHawaiian constitution. That provision is to the effect that the\\nPresident, with the approval of the cabinet, is empowered to make\\na treaty of political and commercial union between Hawaii and\\nthis country, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.\\nThe power to make a political union does not involve annexa-\\ntion. No one will pretend that authority to make a commercial\\nunion affects nationality. Political union does not necessarily in-\\nvolve the extinguishment of either nation. The conferring of\\nthis authority upon Hawaii gives no right to sacrifice her entity\\nor to merge the same into the American Republic.\\nGranting the existence of the power to deed away sovereignty\\nunder the thirty-second article of the Hawaiian constitution, such\\ngrant has not been made, although a treaty was proposed by\\nHawaii and agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries of both nations\\n3571", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "89\\nand transmitted by the President approvingly to the Senate,\\nNevertheless, a treaty being a contract, mutual in all respects,\\nand dependent for its efficacy and validity upon the acquiescence\\nof all parties thereto, and Article II, section 2, paragraph 2, of\\nour Constitution subjecting the Presidential treaty-making pre-\\nrogative to the advice and consent of the Senate, and such advice\\nand consent not having been given, it follows that the Hawaiian\\nso-called treaty is yet a mere unexecuted proposition, invalid, un-\\nenforceable, and without the slightest potentiality. It is binding\\nupon neither party, and is inadmissible in evidence for or against\\nany party named within it.\\nThe resolution recites that which is absolutely false, for it de-\\nclares that the cession has been made. No cession or grant is\\nof the slightest validity or entitled to be called such until it is ef-\\nfective, binding, and not requiring any acquiescence to make it\\ncomplete.\\nThe assertion in the general resolution, the Republic of Hawaii\\nhaving, in due form, signified its consent in the manner provided\\nby its constitution, to cede absolutely to the United\\nStates all rights of sovereignty, etc., is misleading. The consent\\nof Hawaii can not be shown otherwise than by treaty, and a treaty\\nnot accepted by the United States, pursuant to her Constitution,\\nis a mere proposition, susceptible of withdrawal by the party pro-\\nposing it and ignored by the second and material party.\\nGranting that Hawaii has formally proposed to cede by treaty\\nand that the power of cession is conferred in her constitution,-\\nsuch cession can only become complete when the United States\\nhas ratified the treaty and thus made it effective and for the first\\ntime assented to the acquisition.\\n18. The present acquisition threatens our dominancy on this\\nhemisphere, because Mexico and Central and South America have\\nheretofore believed us sincere in advocating the Monroe doctrine.\\nOur abandonment of that doctrine must generate suspicion, im-\\npair confidence in our sincerity, and warn our neighbors that we\\nintend to embark upon those marauding schemes which we have\\nalways hitherto condemned.\\n19. The determination of Hawaiian annexation affirmatively is\\nbad enough in so far as the result must be the acquiring of a\\ncountry for the benefit of a few sugar growers and speculators,\\nyet the serious evil is found in the example set. The Philippines,\\nthe Carolines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Ladrones tempt the\\ncovetous eye of the modern expansionist.\\n20. Heretofore we have sought to defend our laboring interests\\nby excluding shiploads of Chinamen. We will soon import con-\\ntinent-loads of Malays, Negritos, id omne genus.\\n21. The protectionists of the United States have heretofore de-\\nclared themselves in favor of advanced wages. Tfee new policy\\nwill break down all restraint, for those who are brought within\\nour confines must have equal rights. Slave labor\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and all enforced\\ncontract toil is slave labor is tolerated under our Constitution;\\nbecause it has been held by our Supreme Court that contracts for\\nservices may be penally maintained. The labor contracts of Ha-\\nwaii are therefore legally defensible, and it is the policy of an-\\nnexationists to maintain these contracts. They will vote against\\nthe amendment annulling the same.\\n3571", "height": "4241", "width": "2438", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "90\\n23. The policy *n which we are about to enter will lead to enor-\\nmous expenditure. The present Congress will be considered most\\neconomical in the light of that which is to come. Millions upon\\nmillions for the maintenance of an enormous army and an enor-\\nmous navy are indispensable adjuncts to the expansion theory.\\n23. The expansion theory will lead us into complications with\\nforeign nations. We will be brought in contact with all sorts of\\nproblems which do not now receive any consideration at our\\nhands. We will be warlike and aggressive instead of peaceful,\\nhappy, and prosperous.\\nThere are several amendments before the Senate touching this\\nmatter, and there probably will be other amendments offered. I\\ndo not know that any advocate of annexation will be willing to\\ntake the position that any of these amendments ought to be\\nadopted. I suppose that even the amendment which prevents\\nslave labor in Hawaii may be voted down. I presume that the\\njoint resolution in its present untruthful form, stating that there\\nhas been a cession when there is no cession, is also to receive the\\napproval of those who are in favor of annexation.\\nBut at least we ought to be willing to submit to the Senate,\\nwith confidence in its adoption, an amendment authorizing the\\npeople of those islands to vote. I will not go into the character\\nof the organization of that Government. I will not speak of the\\nmethods which were employed. The Senator from South Dakota\\n[Mr. Pettigrew] will more fully and completely cover that sub-\\nject than I would be able to do, as he is, I believe, more familiar\\nwith it, though I have given it some study. But if ever there\\nwas a time when the American people should be careful not to\\nincorporate within their confines any of those who do not wish\\nto come in, it is now. Why not, then, adopt the amendment per-\\nmitting a vote?\\nMr. President, I sympathize with the views expressed by the\\ndistinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Hoar], as every\\none, I presume, here knows, with reference to the extension of\\ndominion; but he must remember, when he asserts that the an-\\nnexation of the Hawaiian Islands does not mean such extension,\\nand can not be quoted in advocacy of that extension, that that\\nargument is not recognized as valid by the advocates of a broader\\npolicy. They hail him as a powerful colaborer in the cause.\\nCaptain Mahan, from whom the advocates of annexation have\\noften quoted, has said in an article published by him and called\\nHawaii and our future sea power:\\nThe United States finds itself compelled to answer a question\u00e2\u0080\u0094 to make a\\ndecision\u00e2\u0080\u0094 not unlike and not less momentous than that required of the Ro-\\nman senate when the Mamertine garrison invited it to occupy Messina, and\\nso to abandon the hitherto traditional policy which had confined the expan-\\nsion of Rome to the Italian peninsula.\\nAgain he says:\\nThis is no mere question of a particular act. but of a principle, a policy,\\nfruitful of many future acts, to enter upon which, in the fullness of our na-\\ntional progress, the time has now arrived. The principle accepted, the an-\\nnexation of Hawaii would be no mere sporadic effort, irrational because\\ndisconnected from an adequate motive, but a first fruit and a token that the\\nnation in its evolution has aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nthat has been the happiness of those under its influence\u00e2\u0080\u0094 beyond the borders\\nthat have heretofore sufficed for its activities.\\n3G71", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "91\\nThere is a very brief comment taken from the Nation upon this\\narticle, which I will read:\\nThat is precisely the way to put it. This is no mere question of a partic-\\nular act, but of a principle, a policy, fruitful of many future acts. As such it\\nis as important as anything which has occurred in the United States since\\nthe adoption of the Federal Constitution, and as such it ought to be debated.\\nConsidering this, the way in which the subject has been for four years left\\nin the hands of sugar and other speculators, and bandied about as a means of\\nmaking money for a few sons of missionaries, of keeping England out of an\\nisland, of curing lewdness and heathenism, and of securing a lockless key, 1\\nis certainly very odd.\\nCongress is becoming more and more aware of the gravity of the scheme.\\nCaptain Mahan has laid it perfectly bare. His illustration from the history\\nof Rome is most apposite. When the senate directed the consul to occivpy\\nMessina, it launched Rome on a new career, which was to build up the Roman\\nEmpire, but it sealed the fate of Roman republicanism. The age of Cato and\\nScipio and Gracchus, the ago of liberty and law, had come to an end. The\\nage of Marius and Sylla and Pompey and Coesar and Augustus and Caligula\\nhad been entered on. The empire bad begun. As soon as provinces began\\nto be acquired by conquest or fraud the rule of the people ceased and the\\noligarchical senate took charge.\\nThe senate had not been long in charge before the princeps or boss\\nmade his appearance and told it what laws to pass and how the sham offices\\nshould be filled. And 1 he princeps had not been long in command before the\\nsoldiers who won and h-ild the provinces made their appearance and put his\\noffice up at auction. And then, in another brief period, the whole fabric\\nbuilt-up by so much valor and ambition and love of expansion fell into\\nhideous ruin. If it cU-es not point a moral as well as adorn a tale, no event\\nof human history is Ltted to do so.\\nMr. President, it is unfair and wrong to charge those of us who\\noppose annexation with want of patriotism. I can understand\\nthat somebody who may have a financial interest in the result of\\nthis contest, who may, for instance, hold stock in some Hawaiian\\nsugar companies, may do this, but those of us who are here in op-\\nposition to this scheme earnestly believe that its accomplishment\\nwill bring great disaster upon the Republic.\\nWe glory in the triumph of our arms, in all that the American\\ncitizen should deem worthy of praise, and we resent as infamously\\nuntrue any imputation to the contrary. Upon the deck of every\\nbattle ship where American blood has been poured, upon every\\nfield where American valor has transmitted to posterity in imper-\\nishable message the grandeur and splendor of her name\u00e2\u0080\u0094 we have\\nan interest in all that we have a share\u00e2\u0080\u0094 it is the common heritage\\nof American citizenship. Therefore, sir, when we contest for\\nwhat we conceive to be the truth and the right we but exercise a\\nright and perform a duty.\\nThe expressions of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Hoar]\\nin the early part of his remarks this morning regarding the duty\\nof a Senator were very appropriate.\\nI have noticed, so far as I am personally concerned, that I have\\nbeen attacked because in the legislature of my State in 1893 a res-\\nolution favoring annexation was passed. To show the absolute\\nimpossibility of following any rule, if it can be called a rule, of\\nthat kind I will place in the Record as a part of my remarks the\\nvote in the very next California legislature two years afterwards,\\nin which in the State senate the Hawaiian resolution was de-\\nfeated, the vote being 9 to 22, the negative being composed of all\\nthe Democratic members and a majority of the Republican mem-\\nS571", "height": "4241", "width": "2438", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "92\\nbers. Of course if we are to be guided by an inspiration of this\\nkind, I presume the last expression must be deemed more binding\\nthan the first.\\nAssembly joint resolution No. 8, relative to the annexation of Hawaii, was\\nintroduced January 24, 1895, by Assemblyman Bremster C. Kenyon, of the\\nseventy-second district (Los Angeles), and. referred to committee on federal\\nrelations. Assembly Journal, page 156.\\nThe resolution was favorably reported from committee on January 31,\\n1895. Assembly Journal, page 206.\\nThe resolution was read and adopted February IS, 1895.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Assembly Journal,\\npage 458.\\nThe resolution reached the Senate in message February 18, 1895, and was\\nreferred to the committee on federal relations and immigration.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Senate\\nJournal, page 552.\\nThe resolution was reported favorably to the Senate from committee and\\nmade special order for same day at 3.30 p. m. February 27, 1895. \u00e2\u0080\u0094Senate Jour-\\nnal, page 701.\\nThe resolution was not reached at 3.30 p. m. February 27, 1895, and was\\nmade special order for March 1, 1895.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Senate Journal, page 708.\\nThe resolution was refused adoption, upon the roll being called, by a vote\\nof 22 against and 9 for, on March 1, 1895.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Senate Journal, page 750.\\nThe resolution was defeated by the following vote: Ayes, Senators Beard,\\nFranck, Henderson, Orr, Pedlar, Shine, Simpson, Voorhees, and Withing-\\nton\u00e2\u0080\u0094 9. Noes, Senators Arms, Androus, Bert, Burke, Denison, Dunn, Fay,\\nFlint, Gesford, Gleaves, Hart, Hollaway, Mahoney, Martin. Mathews, Mc-\\nAllister, McGowan, Seawell, Seymour, Shippee, Toner, and Whitehurst- 22.\\nI take it that those of us who have come here, representing as we\\nall do able and strong constituencies, are expected to exercise our\\njudgments in accordance with the dictates of our consciences and\\nthe theories of government as we understand them. We are here\\nwith some independence of character, I trust, and sworn to follow\\na Constitution which we can not afford to violate as we inter-\\npret it, even though we are instructed to do it by the combined\\nvote of the American people. We strive to do our duty. In this\\nway only can we expect or do we deserve respect.\\nI have the greatest confidence in the wisdom, the candor, the\\nabsolute ability of the American people, but it is impossible for\\nme as an individual to know as much of a given question as an-\\nother who has contributed toward it more thought, who has ex-\\namined it with more care, who has studied it with more painstak-\\ning deliberation, and who has had the weight of its decision directly\\nupon his shoulders. So it takes time for these matters to be un-\\nderstood. They are not to be solved in an instant. Hence that\\nlegislator who follows what he concedes to be his duty in a mat-\\nter involving principle and affecting, as he understands it, the\\nbasic principles of government is right. The legislator who does\\nnot thus act is wrong and proceeds contrary to his obligations,\\nwhether he be in this Chamber or elsewhere.\\nThe exciting incidents surrounding us may influence some, but\\nno action we may take regarding this resolution can have the\\nslightest effect upon the pending conflict. We will proceed until\\nvictory perches upon our standard and until conquest after con-\\nquest shall attest our superiority. The difficulty will come later\\non. Stirring scenes may be in store for us. Battles may be fiercely\\nwaged. This will be so no matter what may be done regarding\\nHawaii.\\nThe influence of our action here is in another direction, and\\nbears upon final settlement. I fear the effect of the example. I\\nregard with deep solicitude the possible changes of our tried and\\n3571", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "93\\ntrue policies. If annexation must come, it will be the hope of\\nthose who have opposed its consummation, with all the power at\\nour command, that our views may have been mistaken. It will\\nbe our prayer that this great nation will not proceed upon a ca-\\nreer of conquest; that she will not teach her sons and daughters\\nthat in the glory of martial triumph is to be found the supreme\\nhappiness of freemen. When the battle tide has passed and the\\ncalmness of reflection is about us, may we wisely consider those\\nimportant teachings handed down from the great and gone, and\\nmay we never forget that not within our little circle or in our\\nlittle day has been discovered all the wisdom of mankind, and that\\nwe are perhaps becoming heedless of the lessons that philosophy\\nand patriotism have inculcated since the morning of time.\\n3571", "height": "4241", "width": "2438", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4241", "width": "2438", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRFCc\\nn iiiiiiiiii\\n019 944 354 9", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "9\\nWs", "height": "4241", "width": "2438", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\nJijf viflJ Hill Kill rllll lllll IIIH fllil llflf lllrl fl ll4\\n019 944 354 9\\nHollinger Corp.", "height": "4297", "width": "2502", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00whit_0100.jp2"}}