{"1": {"fulltext": "llftfo", "height": "3948", "width": "2367", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "015 825 3A1\\nConservation Resources\\nLis-F*e\u00c2\u00ab*TypeI", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "F 1786\\n.R245\\nCopy 1\\nINDEPENDENCE OF CUBA.\\n^REMARKS\\nOF\\nHON. JOSEPH L RAWLINS,\\nOF UTAH,\\nIN THE\\nSENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,\\nMONDAY, APRIL 18, 1898.\\nWASHINGTON.\\n1S98.", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "\\\\18^\\ns\\nDigitized by the Internet Archive\\nin 2011 with funding from\\nThe Library of Congress\\nhttp://www.archive.org/details/independenceofcuOOrawl", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "REMARKS\\nOF\\nHON. JOSEPH L. RAWLINS.\\nINDEPENDENCE OF CUBA.\\nMr. RAWLINS. Mr. President, the pivotal question in the ex-\\nisting situation in our relations with Spain and Cuba seems to be\\ninvolved in the claim made that the power and right to decide\\nthe question of national independence rest exclusively with the\\nPresident of the United States, and that no such power exists ill\\nthe conjoint action of the President, the Senate, and the House of\\nRepresentatives, or that, if by such joint action national inde-\\npendence may be recognized, it is a power which ought not now\\nto be exercised.\\nAs I may at this time without taxing the patience of the coun-\\ntry or delaying action which may be regarded as urgent, I desire\\nto discuss that question in the light of the provisions of the Con-\\nstitution of the United States.\\nMr. President, the power to recognize national independence is\\nnot conferred in express terms either upon the President or upon\\nany other department of the Government. It necessarily, there-\\nfore, exists as an incidental or implied authority. It is claimed to\\nexist iri the President as an incident to his power to make treaties.\\nThe power to make treaties is expressly vested by the Constitu-\\ntion in the Executive, to be exercised bj r and with the advice and\\nconsent of the Senate, two-thirds of the Senate concurring. The\\nSupreme Court of the United States has denned a treaty in the\\ncase of Edye vs. Robertson, reported in 112 United States Reports,\\nwhere this subject was under consideration and the opinion was\\nrendered by that eminent jurist, Mr. Justice Miller. On page 598\\nhe says:\\nA treaty is primaril y a compact between independent nations. It depends\\nfor the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the\\ngovernments which are parties to it.\\n32-19 3", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "As a treaty is a compact between independent nations, when-\\never it is proposed to enter into a treaty the question necessarily\\narises as to whether the party proposing to become bound by it\\nis an independent nation. The President, therefore, before he en-\\nters into the consideration of the subject-matter of a treaty nec-\\nessarily must make inquiries as to whether the other party is a\\nnational sovereignty and has an independent existence.\\nSo, whenever such question is presented to the President as in-\\ncidental to the exercise of the treaty-making power, the President\\nmust determine that question of national independence, which\\ninvolves the competency of the party proposing to enter into the\\ncontract; but when he has decided that question and enters into\\nthe treaty, it must be submitted to the Senate for its concurrence,\\nas provided in the Constitution. The Senate of the United States\\nmust necessarily pass in review all the elements which are pri-\\nmarily to be considered by the Executive whenever the making\\nof a treaty is involved, and among those elements is the question\\nas to the competency of one of the parties to the contract.\\nThe Senate must, therefore, make inquiry, in the exercise of its\\nundoubted authority as an incident to its power to advise the\\nPresident in respect to the making of a treaty, whether the oppo-\\nsite party is an independent nation competent to enter into the\\ncontract.\\nMr. President, the Senate may differ with the President in his\\ndetermination that the party proposing the treaty is an independ-\\nent nation. It may decide that it is not possessed of national\\nsovereignty, and upon that ground may refuse to concur in the\\ntreaty which has been sent to it by the President. Therefore, the\\nSenate, in the exercise of that incidental authority, may decide for\\nor may decide against national independence, notwithstanding the\\nPresident himself has previously passed upon that question, because\\nif the Senate decides that the party proposing the treaty is not an\\nindependent nation and not competent to make a contract, or to\\ncomply with its provisions if made, it is the end of controversy,\\nand the decision first made by the President is overruled in effect\\nby the power in whom the Constitution has vested the authority\\nto concur or -refuse to concur in a treaty.\\nMr. President, suppose the President has decided in favor of\\n3219", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "national independence and the Senate has concurred in that deci-\\nsion by ratifying or confirming the treaty. Is that final? Is that a\\nconclusive determination of the question of national independence\\nwhich is thus exercised as an implied or incidental authority? I\\nv/ill endeavor to show that it is not conclusive; that there is an-\\nother authority provided by the Constitution competent to review\\nthis action and this determination both of the Executive and of tho\\nSenate, and which may overrule that determination decisively\\nand finally. That such is the case is no longer the subject of con-\\ntroversy or dispute if we are to follow the decisions of the highest\\ntribunal in this nation.\\nThe Supreme Court, in the case to which I have just referred,\\nafter setting forth that a treaty is primarily a compact between\\nindependent nations, decided that whenever this Government en-\\nters into such a compact, it necessarily recognizes the independent\\nexistence of the other party to the contract; but the Congress of\\nthe United States, by the conjoint action of the President, of the\\nSenate, and of the House of Representatives, may modify or repeal\\nthat treaty; may wipe it out of existence by revocation; and when\\nit is so repealed or revoked, it falls to the ground with all its im-\\nplications, including that of the recognition of the competence of\\none of the parties to the contract, namely, its national independ-\\nence.\\nThe Supreme Court of the United States has in a number of\\ncases decided that the treaty may be modified or may be revoked\\nby the action of Congress. This question directly arose in the\\ncase to which I have referred, where Mr. Justice Miller used this\\nlanguage:\\nWe are of the opinion that, so far as the provisions in that act may be found\\nto be in conflict with any treaty with a foreign nation, they must prevail in\\nall the judicial courts of this country. We had supposed that the question\\nhere raised was set at rest in this court by the decision in the case of The\\nCherokee Tobacco, 11 Wali. 616.\\nFurther on the court say:\\nThe precise question involved here, namely, a supposed conflict between\\nan act of Congress imposing a customs duty and a treaty with Russia on\\nthat subject, in force when the act was passed, came before the circuit court\\nfor the district of Massachusetts in 1885.\\nAfter referring to that decision, which held that the act of Con-\\ngress necessarily repealed pro tanto the treaty made by the Execu-\\n3349", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "6\\ntive with the concurrence of the Senate, the court proceeds to\\ndecide in this case that this power of Congress is unquestioned.\\nBut I read further as bearing upon this same question, and the\\nreasoning herein employed, it seems to me, is decisive of this en-\\ntire question:\\nA treaty is made by the President and the Senate. Statutes are made by\\nthe President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives. The addition\\nof the latter body to the other two in making a law certainly does not render\\nit less entitled to respect in the matter of its repeal or modification than a\\ntreaty made by the other two. If there be any difference in this regard, it\\nwould seem to be in favor of an act in which all three of the bodies partici-\\npate. And such is, in fact, the case in a declaration of war, which must be\\nmade by Congress, and which, when made, usually suspends or destroys ex-\\nisting treaties between the nations thus at war.\\nIn short, we are of the opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the United\\nStates with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance\\nin the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass\\nfor its enforcement, modification, or repeal.\\nIt must follow, therefore, that in so far as the President and\\nSenate have incidental authority to recognize national independ-\\nence in the exercise of the treaty-making power, which is ex-\\npressly conferred by the Constitution, such recognition may be\\nwiped out and obliterated by the conjoint action of the President\\nand the Senate and the House of Representatives in the exercise\\nof legislative authority. It must follow, then, clearly, that in\\nso far as the President is claimed to have authority to recog-\\nnize the independence of a nation in the exercise of this treaty-\\nmaking power his decision of that question is subject to review,\\nfirst, by the Senate, which may nonconcur, which renders inef-\\nfectual his recognition; but if the Senate concur, there is still\\nanother ultimate tribunal by whom the question may be decided,\\nnamely, the Congress of the United States; and the language of\\nthe Supreme Court is not inapt when it says:\\nIf there be any difference in this regard, it would seem to be in favor of\\nan act in which all three of the bodies participate.\\nNext, it is claimed, as I understand the argument of those op-\\nposed to the view of the question which has been entertained by\\nthe majority of the Senate, that the President has the authority\\nto recognize national independence as an incident to his authority\\nto receive foreign ambassadors or diplomatic representatives.\\nMr. President, the power to receive ambassadors, as already\\npointed out, is not conferred upon the President in express terms\\n3249", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "anywhere in the Constitution. The Constitution in defining the\\njurisdiction of the courts makes reference to ambassadors. la\\nthe controversies relating to ambassadors, the Supreme Court or\\nthe United States is vested with original jurisdiction; and when a\\ncase comes up, and any question of ambassadorship arises in the\\ncourt, the question as to whether the party claiming any privi-\\nlege or right in virtue of that character which must be decided\\nIs the individual a foreign ambassador? The determination or\\nthat question is necessary in order to decide, first, whether the\\nSupreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction of\\nthe controversy. It may be necessary to decide it in order to de-\\ntermine whether the person is entitled to the privilege which pes\\ntains only to a foreign ambassador.\\nHow is the court to decide that question? The Constitution has\\nmade no provision as to how it shall be determined. We can,\\ntherefore, not look to any express provision in order to determine\\nthat question. Who is to decide that fact? Mutuality and reci-\\nprocity are essential to the exercise of the power both to send and\\nreceive ambassadors. If some foreign government should send a\\ndiplomatic representative to the United States, and he should ad-\\ndress himself to the President, undoubtedly the power of the\\nPresident informally to receive him would be unquestioned, as he\\nmay receive any individual, irrespective of the official character of\\nthat individual.\\nNaturally, as has been frequently suggested, the President will,\\nin the first instance, pass upon the question as to whether any par-\\nticular individual presenting credentials from an alleged independ-\\nent nation is entitled to be received; and in passing upon the ques-\\ntion as to whether he shall be extended that official courtesy the\\nPresident would undoubtedly be called upon to pass upon the ques-\\ntion as to whether the authority undertaking to accredit him was\\njiossessed of national independence or sovereignty.\\nI readily concede, Mr. President, that here incidentally the Pres-\\nident is called upon to determine whether or not national independ-\\nence exists in respect of the power undertaking to accredit an\\nambassador to the United States, but the important question is\\nwhether his determination in such a case as that is final and con-\\nclusive and binding upon all the other departments of the Gov-\\n3240", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "ernzxxent, or binding upon him in his future action in respect to\\nthat G overnment.\\nA few considerations, it seems to me, will make it perfectly\\nclear and conclusive that where the President thus incidentally\\npasses upon the question as to whether a given power is an inde-\\npendent nation is not conclusive, because, before we can have\\ncomplete relations with any foreign government, we must not\\nonly receive, but we must undertake to send diplomatic represent-\\natives from this Government to represent it in the matters per-\\ntaining to the power which it is proposed to recognize. It is a\\nreciprocal duty. To receive the representative of a foreign govern-\\nment and to refuse to send one is an anomaly in the affairs of\\nnations. The President undoubtedly, in the first instance, may\\nreceive, but he has no power to send a representative. He can\\nnot create the office of ambassador, he can not provide his salary,\\nhe can not determine his grade, unless some express authority be\\nconferred upon him to that effect by the Congress of the United\\nStates.\\nUnquestionably the power is vested in Congress to determine\\nwhether or not we will send any representatives and what the\\ngrade and pay of its representatives shall be, and when Congress\\nhas so acted, the President, under his oath, in the execution of the\\npower vested in him by the Constitution, must recognize that\\naction of Congress as his exclusive guide in such matters. Then,\\nalthough the President may incidentally determine that the nation\\nis in existence to the extent necessary to enable him to extend the\\nofficial courtesy of receiving its representatives, he has no power\\nto determine as to whether the foreign relations with that govern-\\nment shall be made complete by the sending of a representative\\nfrom this country.\\nHence we find in this case that, while the President may be\\ncalled upon to act, and may properly act, his action is subject to\\nreview by the Congress of the United States, by the conjoint\\naction of the President, the representatives of the States, and the\\nrepresentatives of the people in the two branches of Congress,\\nand the united action, the conjoint consent and direction, of these\\nthree departments of our Government, so to speak, are of far more\\nefficacy and power than the determination of the President inci-\\n8349", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "9\\ndentally in undertaking to receive a diplomatic representative\\nfrom abroad.\\nThe Congress may overrule the action of the President and wipo\\nit out, and not only that, but I nest call attention to a power vested\\nin Congress whose exercise may be destructive absolutely of\\ndiplomatic relations with foreign governments, and which can\\nnot by any possibility be questioned. The power to declare war\\nis vested exclusively in the Congress of the United States, and\\nthe moment such a declaration is made by Congress the Presi-\\ndent has no authority to receive any diplomatic representative\\nfrom the power or nation against whom the declaration of war is\\nmade. The language which is employed by the Supreme Court\\nof the United States in direct application to the power of Congress\\nin respect to treaties is equally applicable to the question of the\\nexercise of the power of the President to receive ambassadors from\\nforeign governments. This language is used:\\nSuch is, in fact, the case in a declaration of war, which must be made by\\nCongress and which, when made, usually suspends or destroys existing trea-\\nties between the nations thus at war.\\nUsually, I believe universally, the diplomatic relations existing\\nbetween the nations thus at war are destroyed by a declaration of\\nwar, and though the President may have decided to receive an\\nambassador from some foreign country, that power is wiped\\naway. Although the President in the first instance has that\\npower, Congress can take away that power by a simple declara-\\ntion of war. It can wipe it out absolutely and eternally, and what\\nit can do thus completely it can do in part if it see proper to do it.\\nTherefore the two grounds upon which it is claimed that the\\nPresident of the United States alone can recognize the national\\nindependence of another power, government, or people and that\\nsuch determination is finally conclusive, as it is claimed to relate\\nto the power to make treaties, are destroyed, because the Supreme\\nCourt of the nation has decided that Congress may revoke, repeal,\\nor wipe out treaties as it sees proper; and as to the power claimed\\nto exist in the President by virtue of his right to receive foreign\\nambassadors, Congress can take away effectually that power.\\nThere is no ground, no foundation anywhere to be found in the\\nConstitution, either in express authority or implied authority, by\\n3249", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "10\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0which it can be successfully maintained that the President has the\\nexclusive authority finally to determine the question of national\\nexistence.\\nMr. President, it would seem to follow that, while the President\\nhas incidental authority in certain cases to recognize the inde-\\npendence of foreign governments, in the case of treaties his de-\\ntermination of it may be reviewed and overruled by the Senate of\\nthe United States. Where it is determined both by the President\\nand the Senate, it may be overruled by the action of the Congress\\nof the United States, composed of the President, Senate, and House.\\nIt also follows that, while the President incidentally may decide\\nthat a given government is a national sovereignty, in order that\\nhe may receive its accredited representatives, that may be re-\\nviewed and overthrown by the action of the Congress of the\\nUnited States, and no provision of the Constitution and no other\\nauthority has been pointed out to which the authority of the\\nPresident to recognize national independence can be claimed as an\\nincident. It must follow that no such exclusive power exists in\\nthe President, and that in every case it is subject to be reviewed\\nand overthrown by the conjoint action of the President, the Sen-\\nate, and the House of Representatives.\\nHaving come to the conclusion, therefore, that this is a power\\nwhich rests finally for the determination of the Congress of the\\nUnited States whose action must receive the concurrence of the\\nPresident in the method provided in the Constitution, so that\\nin that case we have the conjoint action of the three depart-\\nments passing upon the question, the next question which arises\\nis whether under the existing circumstances in the present situ-\\nation the Congress of the United States ought to recognize the\\nindependence of the Republic of Cuba.\\nIn this connection, before proceeding to the discussion of the\\nquestion of expediency, I desire to allude for a moment to a claim\\nmade by the distinguished and learned Senator from Alabama\\n[Mr. Morgan] It had been asserted that France recognized the\\nindependence of the colonies when the situation in regard to actual\\nindependence, national sovereignty, and ability to carry into\\neffect provisions of treaties and perform international duties and\\nobligations was less tenable than that which pertains to the Re-\\na;M9", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "11\\npublic of Cuba. I understood the Senator from Alabama to deny\\nthat any such recognition had taken place, and he read from a\\ntreaty entered into between France and the colonies, whereby it\\nwas provided that neither should enter into any agreement for\\na cessation of hostilities with Great Britain without the consent\\nof the other. When the Senator, as it seems to me, read from\\nthat treaty, he overthrew the very proposition which I understood\\nhim to seek to maintain; because when that treaty was made with\\nFrance, France necessarily determined and decided that the other\\nparty to the treaty or contract was an independent nation. I read\\nfrom the definitions as given by Mr. Justice Miller as to what a\\ntreaty is. He says:\\nA treaty is a contract between independent nations.\\nAnd that is necessarily true. Hence, when France entered into\\na treaty with the colonies she entered into a compact or contract\\nwith an independent nation. When she entered into a contract\\nwith that independent nation, she recognized the existence of the\\ncolonies as an independent nation, a people occupying an equal\\nstation, possessed of sovereignty among the nations of the world.\\nIt is a shining example and an apt illustration of the duty of the\\npeople of the United States in relation to the Republic of Cuba.\\nIs it wise or is it expedient for Congress to recognize the inde-\\npendence of the Republic of Cuba? In the course of the very ablg\\ndiscussion of the different phases of this question during the last\\nweek some Senator deprecated with great earnestness that any-\\none in this body, that any member of either branch of Congress,\\nshould lack confidence in the President of the United States. If\\nwe had good reason to believe at this time that the President of\\nthe United States was in fact favorable to the independence of tha\\nRepublic of Cuba, I for one would be disposed to leave the ques-\\ntion of recognition of that independence to his determination,\\nhaving full confidence that such recognition would take place\\nwithin such time as would prevent any evil consequences arising\\nwhich have been depicted as likely to result from a failure to rec-\\nognize the independence of the island or its emancipation from\\nthe authority of Spain.\\nThe President of the United States in all his representations to\\nthe Kingdom of Spain has never caused any suggestion to be made\\n32i9", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "12\\nto that Government in favor of the absolute and complete inde-\\npendence of the Island of Cuba. In the two communications\\nwhich he has made to the Congress of the United States relating to\\nthat subject we do not find any suggestion, any recommendation, to\\nthe Congress of the United States that the ultimate end in this\\ncase is the establishment of the independence of the Island of Cuba\\nand its emancipation from Spanish authority. It is not a question\\nof lack of confidence in the Executive.\\nThere are Senators upon this floor with whom I differ in respect\\nto questions of public policy in whom I have the utmost confi-\\ndence, but for the reason that I am compelled to differ with those\\nSenators in respect to some matter of public policy I must, so far\\nas I am able, bring their purposes to naught. Every man who be-\\nlieves that the people of Cuba, who have during the past three\\nyears struggled to establish their independence and emancipate\\nthemselves from the tyranny of Spain, have established it, will\\ndo and must do, if he is true to his convictions, do legitimately,\\nwhatever he thinks is necessary in order to bring about that re-\\nsult.\\nIf we find ourselves upon that question in opposition to the ex-\\npressed desires of the President of the United States, and if we\\nseek to bring to naught the purpose which he seems to have in\\nview, which does not mean the complete independence of that\\nisland, it is not because we lack confidence in the personal integ-\\nrity and honesty of the President, but it is because we believe in\\na policy and a purpose which essentially, and maybe radically,\\ndiffers from that which he maintains and if we would be true to\\nour convictions, we must seek to defeat the purposes and policy of\\nthe President.\\nIt is not necessary that we distrust the President. If I have\\nread the purpose of the President as expressed in his message, if I\\nmay judge of it by his previous conduct in relation to this ques-\\ntion, if we are to judge as to what may take place in the future\\nby what has taken place in the past, we necessarily come to the\\nconclusion that the end which the President seeks is peace in the\\nIsland of Cuba and some kind of stable government there, per-\\nhaps an autonomous government in which the sovereignty of\\nSpain over the island remains, but in which there is tranquillity,\\n32i9", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "13\\nin which we may proceed in peace to carry on our international\\ncommerce and perform our international relations and duties\\nwithout the incidental disturbance and outrages which the con-\\nduct in respect to that island has entailed in the times which have\\npassed. But that does not reach the end which, in my judgment,\\nis desired by the American people. It is not the purpose enter-\\ntained by a vast majority of the members of the Senate, and I do\\nnot believe it is entertained elsewhere. Our duty, then, in this\\nemergency is, if we can, to carry into effect the purposes which a\\nmajority of the Senate entertains upon this question.\\nMr. President, suppose we content ourselves with the direction\\nto the President to intervene in the affairs of Cuba. Suppose we\\ndeclare in connection with that that the people of Cuba ought to\\nbe a free and independent nation. Suppose we authorize and\\ndirect the President of the United States to employ the Army and\\nNavy for the purpose of bringing about some result which we do\\nnot plainly and unequivocally declare in the resolution which we\\nenact. We turn over to the Executive the Army and the Navy of\\nthe United States to be employed at his discretion.\\nWe have confidence in the President. Judging by the past, we\\nhave reason to believe what his action is likely to be in the future.\\nWhat will he do? It is not a question of personal integrity. It\\nis not a question of Americanism. It is not a question of the\\nrespect which every citizen of the United States owes to the Chief\\nMagistrate of the nation. What will he do with the Army and\\nthe Navy? To what end will he employ it? is the question which\\nconcerns the American people and the American Congress.\\nWe should all be delighted if we had an explicit and direct as-\\nsurance of the President that he would employ the Army and\\nNavy decisively for the purpose of giving complete independence\\nto the people of Cuba, but the misfortune of the situation is that\\nthe President has in no way intimated, either in terms or by act\\nor conduct, that he would drive the Spaniards away from Cuba\\nand leave the people of that island in a complete state of emanci-\\npation.\\nThe Senator from Delaware [Mr. Gray] held up his hand and\\nwith great earnestness and eloquence declared that he was not a\\npartisan in respect to this question, but was an American, and I\\n3219", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "14\\ndoubt not that the sentiment which he thus expressed is enter-\\ntained perhaps by every member of the Senate. I agree with him\\nfully when he declares that the question of national honor, the\\nquestion of safety, the question of freedom, the question of public\\npolicy as it relates to that moral control which this Government\\nhas sought to maintain of affairs upon this continent rises far\\nabove partisan consideration. The sentiment which he thus ex-\\npressed, while advocating the view that Congress ought to yield\\nto the suggestions of the President on this occasion, is entertained,\\nI believe, by everyone who entertains the opposite view and thinks\\nthat in order that the purpose which the majority of the Senate has\\nin view may be carried into effect we are unable to conform to the\\nsuggestions of the President.\\nThe difference between the Executive and the people and the\\nSenate is not one of inexpediency. It is not a mere question of\\nadministration.\\nThe President in his communication to the Senate has claimed\\nnot only that the Republic of Cuba ought not to be recognized,\\nbut the supporters of the President here have informed us that\\nhis contention is that he alone may exercise the power to deter-\\nmine whether any nation is independent or otherwise, and that\\nhis determination is final and exclusive\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that there is no authority\\nin this Government to pass in review and modify or repeal the\\ndetermination which he thus makes.\\nIn connection with that claim on his part it is also claimed that\\nthe conditions in Cuba are not such as to warrant any recognition\\nof the organized government existing there and which has had\\ncontrol of the operations against Spain. If those conditions do\\nnot now exist there, I ask is there any reasonable probability that\\nin the future any change in the condition is likely to take place\\nwhich will convince the President, in the exercise of what he\\nclaims is his exclusive province and authority, that there should\\nbe a recognition of the independence of the people upon that\\nisland?\\nI will never consent by any vote which I shall cast to concede\\nto the President of the United States that he can determine finally\\nand without review by Congress whether any nation is free or\\n3249", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "15\\nindependent or otherwise. See what that involves. The Presi-\\ndent of the United States might decide that Japan is not an inde-\\npendent nation; he might refuse to receive diplomatic representa-\\ntives from that Government; he might undertake to intercept\\nsupplies sought to be delivered to that Government on the ground\\nthat it was under subjection to some other foreign government,\\nsuch as Russia or Great Britain or some other power, as a mero\\ndependency and not as an independent sovereignty.\\nThe rights and duties of neutrality necessarily depend upon na-\\ntional sovereignty and national existence. It is only necessary to\\nproceed further in order to see that the question of national inde-\\npendence may mean peace or war.\\nTo abdicate the power which thus belongs to Congress to rec-\\nognize the independence of a nation, to declare war, to prescribe\\nthe conditions upon which war may be carried on, to do those\\nthings which may be necessary to wage that war to success\u00e2\u0080\u0094 to\\nabdicate all this power to the President is too much for the Presi-\\ndent to ask and too much for any friend of the President to seek\\nupon the mere pretense that every Senator owes it as a duty as a\\npatriot to support every recommendation which the President may\\nmake.\\nI think the Senate ought to adhere to the position which it has\\ntaken and only concur in any action whereby the Republic of Cuba\\nmay be recognized as a separate and independent nation, that its\\nforces may be utilized in conjunction with those of the United\\nStates, in order that the war which seems now to be impending\\nagainst Spain may be waged to a successful conclusion, in order\\nthat by the precedent which we now establish in this great and\\ncritical emergency the question maybe finally and forever settled.\\nWhile the President has incidental authority, primarily, to recog-\\nnize national independence in connection with the power to make\\ntreaties and receive ambassadors, the exercise of that power is\\nalways subject to revision, modification or review by the Congress\\nof the United States.\\nI be .ieve there never has arisen any duty more important than\\nthe one which now devolves upon both branches of Congress upon\\nthis great question. For myself, I am unwilling to surrender it.\\n3849", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "Ifilill\\n015 825 971\\n16\\nI am unwilling to make any concession which implies its surren-\\nder. I am unwilling for a moment to concede to the present Exec-\\nutive or any other Executive that power which belongs, in my\\njudgment, finally to the representatives of the States and of the\\npeople in the two branches of Congress. It is the power of peace\\nor war, that power which is clearly and unequivocally vested\\nhere and not anywhere else.\\n3249\\nO", "height": "3540", "width": "2122", "jp2-path": "independenceofcu00rawl_0018.jp2"}}