{"1": {"fulltext": "-nr4", "height": "3338", "width": "2095", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3338", "width": "2095", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "C^ L\\n7\\nF 1786\\n.K54\\nCopy 1\\nJ\\nTHE SITUATION IN CUBA.\\nSPEECH\\nHON. WILLIAM H. KING,\\nOF UTAH,\\nHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,\\nThursday, January ?o, 1898.\\nWASHING XONf.\\n1S9S.\\nJ\u00c2\u00bb.l..\u00c2\u00a3.", "height": "3338", "width": "2095", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "6S277\\nSPEECH\\nOF\\nHON. WILLIAM H. KING.\\nThe House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and\\niaving under consideration the bill (J3. R. (Ui9; making appropriations for\\nthe diplomatic and consular service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899\\nMr. KING said:\\nMr. Chairman: Yesterday the distinguished chairman of the\\nCommittee on Foreign Affairs [Mr. HittJ presented certain i^hases\\nof the Cuban question. It is laiown that during the entire period\\nof tlie extra session members upon this side of the House were\\nendeavoring to secure not only a discussion of this question, but\\nsome action which would be the contribution of at least moral\\naid to the Cuban insurgents struggling so heroically for freedom.\\nBut the rules of the House forbade discussion, and the other side\\nof the Chamber pursued a course of inexplicable silence. We\\nwere powerless. Though representatives of a free people, freedom\\nof speech was denied in this representative body. While we were\\nmeeting every third day, merely for the purpose of enabling the\\nmajority to compel an adjournment, it was known that starvation\\nand death and the most frightful devastation were decimating the\\nmost beautiful island of the sea. We knew that Weyler was\\nbutchering and destroying, that the greatest crime of the century\\nwas being committed, and yet we uttered no protest, we sent no\\nword of cheer to those who so bravely had withstood the assaults\\nof the greatest armies that had ever crossed the mighty deep.\\nImmediately after convening in December last, efforts were\\nagain made to secure consideration of this burning question.\\nSince last May a resolution, passed by the Senate and which ac-\\ncorded the Cuban insurgents the rights of belligerency, has been\\nlying upon the Speaker s table and in some quiet recess provided\\nby the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and the de-\\nmands of the Democrats of the House and of the people of the\\nUnited States had proven unavailing to bring it forth into the\\nlight.\\nWe were impotent to discharge a solemn obligation and perform\\na national duty. It is not my purpose to inveigh against the rules\\nof this House or indulge in denunciation of any persons or party,\\nbut to concisely and as plainly as possible state the facts relating to\\nthe Cuban question. After three years of sanguinary struggles,\\nduring all of which time the peace of our nation has been dis-\\nturbed and the interests of our citizens seriously affected, neither\\nthe Administration nor the party controlling legislation offers any\\nsolution of the question.\\nI listened in vain when the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hitt]\\nwas speaking, hoping that some proposition would be suggested\\nindicative of a determination upon the part of the party in power\\nto wisely and heroically deal with the situation which the Cuban\\nquestion presents. His speech was barren upon this matter; but\\n2 3223\\n/df?", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "it was an eloquent appeal for nonaction upon the part of this\\nCongress.\\nIt was a plea for further confidence in Spain and Spanish meth-\\nods, yet replete with confessions, more or less disguised, of Spain s\\nindefensible treatment of Cuba and Jaer inability to reassert her\\nauthority in her lost province. His appeal for all patriotic Amer-\\nicans to support the President in whatever steps were necessary\\nfor the vindication of the honor and the protection of the interests\\nof our country, found sympathetic auditors upon this side of the\\nChamber.\\nIt is unnecessary to assxire the gentleman that in every emer-\\ngency and in every hour of peril, our hands and hearts will as loy-\\nally uphold the integrity and honor of our nation, as the distin-\\nguished gentleman and his political associates. And any criticisms\\nwhich we offer, are predicated upon the statement that the Admin-\\nistration, and gentlemen on the other side of the Chamber, have\\nomitted to vindicate the rights of our Government and to patri-\\notically jiursue a national policy which has become a positive\\nnational duty.\\nWe sincerely invite our Republican friends to an immediate\\nperformance of long-neglected responsibilities, to bring from the\\ncommittee s table the resoliTtion according belligerent rights to\\nthe followers of the Cuban Republic, and to inaugurate a foreign\\npolicy that will establish peace in Cuba and terminate, to use the\\nwords of my eloquent friend from Illinois, the troubles, the con-\\nfusions, the destructions, and the hopeless condition of things in\\nthe island so adjacent to our shores.\\nHe will find every Democrat in this House supporting him, and\\nthe Administration in such a course, so in consonance with the\\ndesires of the American people and so essential to be pursued in\\norder to maintain the honor and dignity of the United States.\\nThe gentleman s words are not reassuring; they are not harbin-\\ngers of peace. Indeed, they are followed with lamentations and\\nportend impending dangers. Hopeful of peace, they are prophetic\\nof international complications which may result in war.\\nBut permeating his speech, through and through, is the anx-\\niously expressed, and unexpressed, desire that the threatening\\nclouds may be dissipated. If a wise and statesmanlike policy had\\nbeen pursued, there would have been no overhanging clouds to\\ndisquiet us, and the glorious sun of Cuban liberty would now be\\nradiating its brightness upon us. And even now, if the President\\nwill join us in immediately recognizing the Cuban insurgents as\\nentitled to all the rights of belligerents, our nation, without con-\\ntest with Spain or any departure from that high plane of moral,\\nnational, and international duty which it should pursue under all\\ncircumstances, will soon witness Cuba s emancipation from the\\nimperialism of Spain, and behold her clothed in all the splendor\\nof a free and independent nation.\\nWhy procrastinate? Why await the action of the Executive?\\nIn the language of the distinguished gentleman [Mr. Hitt] while\\nspeaking of the action of this body when passing a belligerency\\nresolution at the time Mr. Cleveland was President, this House\\nis impatient of the apathy of the Executive of the United States.\\nAny action upon the part of this Government that will give the\\ninsurgents the status of a nation requires the action of Congress.\\nI occupy, perhaps, different groiind from some of the gentlemen\\nupon this side of the House in believing that the hoiir has arrived\\nfor intervention upon the part of this Government to prevent the\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "coaiplete devastation of Cuba and the continuation of the inter-\\nnecine struggle whxh will only result in the further destruction\\nof thousands of innocent women and children and the ultimate\\nexpulsion of the armies and authority of Spain from the blood-\\nsoaked island. That course may mean war with Spain, but it\\nwill prevent Spain froiu starving 200,000 more helpless people\\nnow herded by her soldiers and in a decisive manner terminate\\nthe contest which, without such proceeding, may continue in-\\ndefinitely.\\nHowever, tliere can be no defense for refusing the course first\\nsuggested. Last May, when the Senate by resolution recognized\\nthe insurgents as belligerents, this House ought to have immedi-\\nately passed the resolution and the Executive ought to have con-\\ncurred therein. With the advantages wlr ch would have followed,\\nit must be apparent to all that Cuba s independence would long-\\nsince have been achieved. The refusal of this House to pass the\\nresolution was cowardly and indefensible. By so doing we have\\ncontributed to Spanish supremacy and have been Spain s potential\\nally in the unequal contest. We have aided her in making of\\nCuba a charnel house.\\nBy this crime of omission we have enabled her to kill by starva-\\ntion hundreds of thoiisands of reconcentrados. Instead of assum-\\ning the position of strict neutrality, we have acted as prochien\\nami to Spain. And now we are told to wait, and to hesitate, and\\nto let the work of starvation and death continue. The conduct\\nof Spain the distinguished gentleman characterizes as barbarous\\nand a war of extermination. If so, why condone and defend it?\\nWhy contribute to the barbarity and extermination by refusing\\nmoral aid to the insurgents? Do not stronger reasons now exist\\nfor declaring the contest between the Cubans and the Spanish a\\ncivil war than were found two j^ears ago, when, by resolution\\nearnestly supported by the gentleman from Illinois and his party,\\nit was stated that a condition of war existed in Cuba\\nThe revolution then had been in progress but a year. Now\\nthree years have e apsed. The civil government of the revolu-\\ntionists had not then fully demonstrated its undisputed control\\nover the military organization. Indubitable proof in rich abun-\\ndance is known now to us all, of the stability of the civil power, of\\nthe orderly conduct of all civil and administrative functions, of\\nthe Cuban Republic, and of the comj)lete dependency of the raili-\\ntary organization upon the civil power.\\nin 1896 the universality of the Cuban sentiment against Spain\\nwas not so conspicuous as now. It was then claimed that the sup-\\nporters of the revolutionary movement were few in number; that\\nthey lacked coherency and that patriotic impulse which would\\nbind them into homogeneous action. It is now conclusively dem-\\nonstrated that the Cuban people en masse are revolutionists; that\\nthey are possessed of a fixed determination to wrest their inde-\\npendence from the absolutism of Spain, and that whether in the\\nfield fighting under the Cuban flag, or pursuing as best they may,\\nin the cities and towns, the peaceful arts, they are all bound\\ntogether by purposes and designs stronger than links of steel, and\\ndo not hesitate to declare that they have consecrated their fortunes\\nand their lives upon freedom s altar.\\nTwo 5 ears ago there was room for doubt as to the ability of the\\nCubans to continue the contest. The unconquered courage of\\nthe mighty Canovas, whose words, The last dollar and the last\\nman, had aroused Spain to the most gigantic efforts, and had\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "laden the sea with ships and sails bearing the mightiest anny trcr\\nsent to the New World. Would the revolutionary forces, lacking\\ndiscipline, without arms or military equipments, he able to with-\\nstand the assaults of Spain s unnumbered hosts? That question\\nhad received no answer then. Now we know that the armies of\\nSpain have melted away, while the insurgents are better disci-\\nplined, armed, and equipped than ever before.\\nThe past two years have only strengthened the revolutionists.\\nSpain has grown weaker. Her resources are exhausted; her grasp\\nupon the island is relaxing; yet with a death-like struggle she\\nclings tenaciousl5^ preferring the destruction of the island, the\\ndeath of its people, her own impoverishment, and the blood of her\\nchildren, conscripted from the beautiful valleys of her empire, to\\nthe relinquishment of a claim founded upon discovery, and which\\nthe judgment of the world pronounces invalid because of oiDpres-\\nsion and tyranny.\\nThe eminent gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Adams] who\\nhas just addressed the committee, animadverted upon the conduct\\nof Mr. Cleveland while President, and seemed to deduce therefrom\\nthe idea that the Democrats of the House are not sincere in their\\nadvocacy of Cuba s cause. I desire to state that Mr. Cleveland did\\nnot, in dealing with the Cuban question, represent the wishes of\\nthe Democratic party.\\nMr. Cleveland at that time had ceased to be a Democrat. Nei-\\nther upon the financial question nor upon many others was he\\nin harmony with his party. He was repudiated at the national\\nconvention at Chicago. The only supporters of his financial policy\\nand the only sharers of many of his political views are to be found\\nin the ranks of those who supported the present Executive of the\\nUnited States in the last election. So my criticisms of the deal-\\nings of this Government with the Cuban question are not confined\\nto that, period covered by the Administration of Mr, McKinley.\\nDuring the incumbency of Mr. Cleveland, when Americans\\nwere incarcerated and when Spain was proceeding in a high-\\nhanded manner in dealing with American interests, both Mr.\\nCleveland and Mr. Olney were derelict in their duty and failed to\\ngive that support to Consul-General Lee which that brave official\\ndeserved and which the interests of American citizens demanded.\\nHowever, it seems from the message of President Cleveland, com-\\nniunicated December 7, 1896, that he had reached the conclusion\\nthat the policy of nonintervention could not much longer be fol-\\nlowed. These words are significant:\\nIt should be added that it can not be reasonably assiimed that the hitherto\\nexpectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained.\\nWhile we are anxious to accord all due respect to the sovereignty of Spain,\\nwe can not view the pending conflict in all its features and properly appre-\\nhend our inevitably close relations to it and its possible results without con-\\nsidering that by the course of events we may be drawn into such an unusiial\\nand unprecedented condition as will fix a limit to our patient waiting for\\nSijaiu to end the contest, either alone and in her own way, or with our\\nfriendly cooperation.\\nWhen the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has\\nbecome manifest and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in\\nCuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle\\nfor its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing\\nmore than the useless sacrifice of human life and the litter destruction of the\\nvery subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which\\nour obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher\\nobligations which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.\\nEven at that time the observance of the unequivocal meaning\\nof these robust words would have required immediate action upon", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "the part of tlie Government looking to a cessation of the fratri-\\ncidal struggle so horrifying to the American people and to the\\nentire world. It was then well understood that Spain s sovereignty\\nwas extinct in Cuba not only for all purposes of its rightful ex-\\nistence, but for any purpose whatever, and that the warfare\\nconducted had degenerated into a strife which was neither more\\nnor less than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter\\ndestruction of the island and its people, the very subject-matter\\nof the conflict.\\nBut the attitude of the Republicans in the House during the\\npast eight months becomes still more unfathomable when we con-\\nsider that portion of their platform adopted at St. Louis which\\nrefers to this subject. It is there declared that\\nThe Government of Spain having lost control of Cuha, and being unable to\\nprotect the property or lives of resident American citizens or to comply with\\nits treaty obligations, we believe that the Government of the United States\\nshould actively use its influence and good oflB.C3S to restore peace and give in-\\ndependence to the island.\\nThis declaration has been flagrantly and deliberately violated\\nby the party adopting it, and ignored, if not repudiated, by the\\nPresident whose nomination was based upon the platform con-\\ntaining it. If in June, 1896, when this platform was adopted, the\\nGovernment of Spain had lost control of Cuba, were not the\\nevidences more manifold in May, 1897, at which time Democrats,\\nwhile gagged and bound by the majority in the House, insisted\\nthat our voices should be lifted in behalf of the Cuban Republic?\\nHave not intervening events exemplified the wisdom of that\\nplatform utterance, and does not the hour now demand that that\\npromise should be fulfilled? Not a single word has been uttered\\nin the House by the party in power in harmony with the state-\\nment just referred to. If the Government of the United States in\\n1896 should have actively .used its influence to restore peace and\\ngive independence to Cuba, why not now? Or if our friends con-\\ntrolling the Government admit this course to be radical, why not\\ngrant belligerent rights?\\nDo they desire the independence of Cuba? If so, give to the in-\\nsurgents a national status, the right to float their flag upon the\\nhigh seas, to enter our ports and claim the rights of neutrals in\\na word, recognize them as belligerents. This ought not to be a\\nparty question. There should be no aisle between us when Cuba\\nlies prostrate. The cause of liberty and humanity should be as\\ndear to the gentlemen upon the other side of the House as to those\\nsitting near me.\\nThat policy which condemns our Government to isolation is not\\nto be commended. Nations are but individuals, and the law\\nwhich governs an individual in all its moral phases should control\\nthe nation. Sympathy for oppression, altruism working for a\\nbrighter and happier day, exemplified faith seeking in darkness\\nand uncertainty the dawn of freedom s day, wherein the highest\\nachievements and perfections of heart and brain are possible\\nthese are the seeds planted within us all to blossom and flower\\nand bring full fruition.\\nAnd so every effort to stand in that brighter day should be en-\\ncouraged and not disfavored. Moreover, this nation stands as the\\narchetype to the world. When despots tremble at threatened\\nrevolutions occasioned by their tyranny, and adopt repressive\\nmeasures to prevent the consummation of the people s will, we\\nrejoice at their discomfiture, and earnestly desire that the bless-\\nings we enjoy shall extend to the oppressed and downtrodden.", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "The people of the United States expect, and they have a right\\nto expect, that their servants in Congress will give expression, by\\nlegislation where needed, to the views and sentiments which they\\nso strongly entertain. Not for a moment during the present\\nstruggle in Cuba have the American people abated their interest\\nin this momentous controversy; nor have they doubted the course\\nwhich this Government ought to pursue. Tiiere has been no dis-\\ncordant note from them. They have declared over and over again\\nin favor of belligerency for the patriotic Cubans. The only harsh\\nvoice has come from the moneyed interests, the stock brokers, the\\ncoupon clippers, the representatives of capital, and the commercial\\ninterests. But thus it ever was.\\nCommercialism and the bloodless form of wealth never know\\ncountry or friend or liberty. They outlaw themselves from human-\\nity, and become forever the enemies to freedom s cause. When\\nGrant desired the freedom of Cuba during the ten years war, Wall\\nstreet, speaking through Hamilton Fish, prevented that great\\nman from carrying into effect the purpose born of his noble heart.\\nLiberty creates wealth, because it destroys discriminations, pro-\\nscriptions, and favored legislation (which crush the many to enrich\\nthe few), and opens the broad, wide avenues of human endeavor\\nequally to all the children of men.\\nBut wealth, much of which is the very child of liberty, becomes\\nher foe and compasses her destruction. The cruel, heartless\\npower of wealth controls nations and policies to-day. It declares\\nwar and compels peace. It fashions legislation, and dominates\\nkings and potentates, ministers and legislative bodies. It is a\\nsordid despotism, macadamizing the pathway of life with hu-\\nman bones cemented with human blood. It placed the armies of\\nEngland in the land of the pyramids as taskmasters and tax-\\ngatherers for the bondholders of Europe. It wrung by oppressive,\\nunjust taxation more than $26,000,000 annually from Cuba s im-\\npoverished children. It covers Cuba with its bonds and insolently\\ndemands that this nation shall take no step which may strengthen\\nthe purpose of the Cuban army to throw off the grinding tyranny\\nunder which the Cuban people have labored.\\nWhen we would lift our hand to do the right, it is palsied by\\nwealth; and when our tongues would speak for Cuba s liberty,\\nstock jobbers and bondholders bid them be silent, and our lips are\\nsealed. Let us invoke the spirit of liberty, and conjure from the\\npast those immortal forms that will enable us to break the spell\\nnow binding us, that we may do our duty, not only to our brothers\\nwho fight in freedom s holy cause, but to ourselves, our country,\\nand those who shall come after tis. Who gave man the right to\\nchain the human mind and to bond islands and nations and to\\noppress his brother? Governments rightly exist only when they\\nderive their just powers from the consent of the governed.\\nLet us reread the Declaration of Independence and have it inter-\\npreted, not by Wall street, not by French bondholders, but con-\\nstrued by the inspiration of freedom s undying spirit. We do not\\nwant war if it can be avoided consistent with duty and honor.\\nEven at this late hour all conflict may be escaped if belligerent rights\\nare given to the Cubans. Neither is it desired that we shall regard\\nlightly treaties and protocols and national obligations. A code of\\nhonor should prevail among nations as among individuals; but be-\\ncause of treaty stipulations with Spain, we are not to be constrained\\nfrom expressing disapproval of her barbarous, cruel, inhuman,", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "8\\nrapacious condiict. ciud the nameless atrocities committed by her\\nagainst her own cluldren as well as American citizens.\\nNeither national nor international law requires this; nor is it\\nviolative of treaty obligations, where there is a revolt against the\\ntitular government, to assume the attitude of neutrality between\\nth/- i:)arent and the contending child. Nay, it is a duty (where\\nexist wrongs so long endured as to compel revolution) to at least\\nrecognize a state of war and accord be ligerent rights. Because\\nof tlfe anxiety of the Democratic party to avert war, we de.sire that\\nbelligerent rights shall be granted the insurgents. And I have\\nno hesitation in stating that if this uncertain, halting, hopeless,\\npurposeless, objectiess policy now being pursued by the Adminis-\\ntration shall be continued, complications will arise and difficulties\\naccTimulate until war will be inevitable if the honor and dignity\\nof this Government shall be preserved. A few moments ago I\\ncalled attention to the fact that stronger reasons existed to-day for\\naction upon our part than prevailed when the House and Senate\\npassed a resolution in 1896 recognizing the belligerency of the\\nCuban people. I desire to quote from statements made by distin-\\nguished Republicans when the resolution was under considera-\\ntion.\\nOn the 5th day of February, 1896, the following resolution was\\nintroduced in the Senate:\\nResolved by the Senate {the House of Representatives concurring). That in\\nthe opinion of Congress a condition of public war exists between the Govern-\\nment of Spain and the governnient proclaimed and for some time maintained\\nby force of arms by the people of Cuba, and that the United States of Amer-\\nica should maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, ac-\\ncording to each all the lights of belUgerents in the ports and territory of ths\\nUnited States. To which was added, February 38, the following:\\nResolved further. That the friendly oflftces of the United States should be\\noffered by the President to the Spanish Government for the recognition of\\nthe independence of Cuba.\\nThis resolution was reported by the Committee on Foreign Re-\\nlations, of which the present Secretary of State, Mr. Sherman,\\nwas chairman. In advocating the adoption of the resolution, that\\ndistinguished gentleman said:\\nIn every aspect in which I can look at this matter it seems to me that this\\ncomparatively ignorant, comparatively inoffensive population, composed of\\nnative Cubans, emancipated blacks, and free mulattoes, have, in their vic-\\ntory over gi-eater numbers, acquired the position of belligerents.\\nThe gentleman went even further than the resolution called for.\\nHe stated:\\nMy convictions are strong, made stronger every day, that the condition of\\naffairs in Cuba is such that the intervention of the United States must sooner\\nor later be given to put an end to the crimes that are almost beyond descrip-\\ntion.\\nSpeaking of the conduct of Weyler and the course which that\\nSpanish general proposed to pursue, the eminent gentleman from\\nOhio said:\\nI wish to say, upon my own responsibility, that if this line of conduct is\\npursued by Spain in Cuba and the people of the United States are informed\\nof its conditions as they are narrated daily in the public papers, there is no\\nearthly power that will prevent the people of the United States from going\\nover to that island and running all over its length and breadth and driving\\nout from the little Island of Ciiba these barbarous robbers and imitators of\\nthe worst men who ever lived in the world.\\nConcluding his powerful speech, the gentleman said:\\nSir, whatever may be the result of the adoption of this measure, I desire to\\ntake my share of responsibility in connection with it, and with a confidence\\nin the .iudgment of the Almighty Ruler of the Universe, I believe it is wise if\\nwe can assist, and bid the other nations of the world concur, in securing for\\nthe people of Cuba the same liberties we now enjoy.\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": ".9\\nThese statements, when placed in contrast with the silence of the\\nSecretary of State during the past eight months, can not but pro-\\nvoke comment. As Senator he was willing to grant belligerency\\nas early as February 28, 1896. Now, after more battles have been\\nwon and the permanency of the Cuban Republic is assured, after\\nSpain s barbarity has been more clearly seen and Weyler s pro-\\nposed policy has become a realized fact, we hear nothing frors\\nthe distinguished gentleman from which it may be inferred that\\nthese views are still maintained by him. On February 11, 1870,\\nso fully imbued was the distinguished gentleman with the idea\\nthat a state of war existed in Cuba that he introduced a resolution\\nin the Senate of the United States which reads as follows:\\nWhereas the United States observe with deep interest the cruel war now\\nexisting in Cuba aud sympathize with its people, as with the people of all\\nAmerican nations or colonies in their efforts to secure independence of Eu-\\nropean power: Thei-ef ore,\\nBe it resolved, etc.. That the United States recognize the present existence\\nof a state of war between the Kingdom of Spain and the country of Cuba,\\nwaged upon the part of Cuba to establish its independence, and that the\\nUnited States will observe strict neutrality between the belligerent parties\\nas to their duty iinder the law of nations.\\nIf we remember the situation of the Cuban revolutionists in.\\n1870, it is incomprehensible that there should be opposition now\\nto the adoption of a similar resolution. In 1870 there were less\\nthan 10,000 insurgents in the field. Their operations were con-\\nfined exclusively to the eastern provinces of the island. There\\nwas scarcely a semblance of civil authority. Spain s possession\\nof the island was almost complete and her dominion but little\\nweakened; yet the then Senator from Ohio [Mr. ShermanJ dis-\\ntinguished for his ability and knowledge of international law, felt-\\nthat the revolutionists were entitled to belligerencj^\\nThe resolution first quoted passed the Senate February 28, 1896,\\n64 votes being in favor of it and only 6 against it. Among the\\neminent Republicans voting for the resolution were Senators CuL-\\nLOM, Elkins, Frye, Lodge, Proctok, Sherman, and Thurston.\\nOn March 2, 1896, the present chairman of the Committee on For-\\neign Affairs of the House [Mr. Hitt] reported the following reso-\\nlution and moved its adoption as a substitute for the one which\\nhad passed the Senate:\\nResolved, That in the opinion of Congress a state of public war exists in\\nCuba, the parties to which are entitled to belligerent rights, and the United\\nStates should observe a strict neutrality between the belligerents.\\nResolved, That Congress deplores the destruction of life and property\\ncaused by the war now waging in that island, and believing that the only per-\\nmanent solution of the contest equally in the interest of Spain, the people\\nof Cuba, and the other nations would be in the establishment of a government\\nby the choice of the people of Cuba, it is the sense of Congress that the Gov-\\nernment of the United States should use its good offices aud friendly influ-\\nences to that end.\\nResolved, That the United States has not intervened in struggles between\\nany European Governments and their colonies on this continent; butfromthe\\nvei-y close relations between the people of the United States and those of\\nCuba, in consequence of its proximity and the extent of the commerce be-\\ntween the two peoples, the present war is entailing stich losses upon the peo-\\nple of the United States that Congress is of the opinion that the Government\\nof the United States should be prepared to protect the legitimate interests of\\nour citizens by intervention, if necessary.\\nThe chairman of the committee, speaking to the substitute,\\nstated:\\nMr. Speaker, the resolutions presented to the House at this moment have\\nbeen considered with great care by the committee of the House specially\\ncharged with that duty. In many meetings, through several months, the\\nquestion involved has been discussed. These resolutions have been ripened\\nand matured after consultation with the most eminent jurists; and it is be-\\nlieved that in the interest of right, in the interest of peace, in the interest oi\\n3323", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "10\\noiir own country, and in the interest of those elsewhere who are making a\\nstruggle with which we sympathize, these resolutions present the most\\npractical, conservative, and effective mode of action and expression by Con-\\ngress.\\nFurther on in his speech he used the following language:\\nAll these resolutions, Mr. Speaker, that have been offered by the Commit-\\ntee on Foreign Affairs, and the terms in which they have been stated, have\\nbeen carefully considered, so that we believe they can not, and certainly\\nought not to, cause any trouble or rupture between us and any country\\nthat is not seeking trouble with us. First, as to the belligerency of\\nthe Cubans, if that is a fact and truth, we may recognize it; if it is not\u00e2\u0080\u0094 if it\\nis a falsehood\u00e2\u0080\u0094 we ought not to recognize it under any circumstances. Now,\\nlet us see what are the facts. That there is a state of war\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that there is\\nbelligerency\u00e2\u0080\u0094 can hardly be denied in view of the overwhelming evidence of\\na state of war.\\nThe distinguished gentleman then fortified this statement, as\\nwell as the resolution declaring the existence of a state of pulDlic\\nwar in Cuba, by referring not only to the newspaper reports, but\\nto the official consular reports lying before the members of the\\nHouse for weeks. Reference is further made to the statement of\\nAmerican consuls that the armed forces of the insurgents, con-\\ntending with desperate earnestness and unconquered will, were\\nthree times greater than those engaged in the rebellion between\\n18G8 and 1878. He conclusively demonstrated the existence of\\nwar in Cuba, and, as evidence, cited the tremendous efforts being-\\nput forth by Spain to overcome the insurrection.\\nOther gentlemen, who are now silent when we seek the passage\\nof a similar resolution, eloquently contended that a state of war\\nexisted in Cuba, and that it was the duty of this Government to\\naccord belligerent rights to the struggling patriots. In closing\\nthe debate on March 2, 1896, the distinguished chairman [Mr.\\nHitt] in reply to arguments which had been made against the\\nresolution, stated:\\nNearly six months ago the official reports that lie before me show that\\nthere were 35,(i00 men in arms defending that insurgent government organi-\\nzation, which is a power. Armed forces, not altogether a government ac-\\ncording to the notions of some nice lawyers, but a great armed political\\nmovement, as Wheaton says, has been formed, a powerful movement, which\\nis belligerent, which is war, and which is entitled to recognition. The gen-\\ntleman spoke of the apprehension that it would bring on speedy hostilities.\\nIf he reads the resolution with care he will see what is the opinion of men\\nwhose province it is to deal with this question that there is no ground to ap-\\nprehend that they will be received in such a spirit, for they plainly are not\\nmeant in such terms. They are a distinct vindication of our rights; they are\\nthe expression of our duties.\\nHow the position then taken hy the gentleman can be reconciled\\nwith the one he now occupies must be left for his determination.\\nAll that was then said in justification of the resolution can now\\nbe declared, and much more can be urged. If a state of i^ublic war\\nexisted in Cuba then, certainly after nearly two years have passed,\\nduring which time the revolutionary forces have won repeated\\nvictories and the armies of Spain have been decimated and reduced\\nto less than 60,000. the existence of war can not be denied.\\nThe resolution, as shown by the Congressional Record of\\nMarch 2. 1896, passed the House by a vote of 263 to 17. Owing to\\nthe disagreement of the two Houses upon the language of the\\nresolutions, the matter was referred to a conference committee.\\nThe distinguished gentleman from Illinois was one of the con-\\nferees upon The part of the House and the present Secretary of\\nState, Mr. Sherman, was one of the conferees upon the part of\\nthe Senate. After prolonged discus.sion the resolution which first\\npassed the Senate was agreed to by the House.", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "11\\nIn Tirging tlie House to accept the Senate resolution the gentle-\\nman made an elaboi^ate argument in favor of the belligerency of\\nthe insurgents, showing the forces which they had, the character\\nof civil government, and the advantages which would result to\\nthem from the passage of the resolution. He stated that\\nThe C4overnment of the insurgent niovement, the revohition in Cuba, is a\\nrepublican government with a president. They have an organi-\\nzation of civil officers. They have secured possession of province after prov-\\nince. In some cases they have almost all of the territory of a province in\\npeaceful occupation administered by their officers.\\nTiiey have shown all these high qualities and done all these great deeds\\nwithout the sordid hope of reward, bearing themselves more patiently\\nthrough this incessant struggle than our fathers did during the saddest\\nperiod of the Tlevolutionary war. It is our duty to pass these reso-\\nlution^. These people are imitating lis. All the traditions of Americans, all\\nour past, everything in our own history appeals to us to cheer and encourage\\nrather than aid to trample upon these men in Cuba who are struggling to be-\\ncome what we are. The House by an overwhelming vote passed the Senate\\nresolutions. And so far as the legislative department of the Government had\\nauthority, belligerent rights were accorded the insurgents.\\nThe action of President Cleveland in respect to the matter de-\\nserves the severest condemnation. If he had performed his duty,\\nthe Cuban question would have been a matter of history and\\nwould no longer have concerned us. In view of the record just\\nreferred to, I am at a loss to understand the quiescent attitude of\\nour Eepublican friends and their determination to prevent dis-\\ncussion of or action upon the resolution now before the Commit-\\ntee on Foreign Relations. It is true the recent message of the\\nPresident, as well as the statement of the distinguished gentle-\\nman from Illinois, attempts to supply a reason for the policy of\\nthe Administration.\\nIt is argued that such changes have recently occurred in the\\nadministration by Spain of Cuban affairs as to forbid the taking\\nof any step by this Government which might be construed as hos-\\ntile to the Spanish Government. The overthrow of the Conserva-\\ntive party in Spain, the accession of Sagasta to power, and the\\npromulgation of his autonomistic scheme for Cuba, are assigned as\\ngrounds for a reversal of the course of Congress two years ago, and\\nan adherence to the present policy of inaction and nonintervention.\\nIt is also urged that General Weyler has been recalled and that\\nGeneral Blanco, who has succeeded him, is pursuing such a\\nhumane policy that it would be an evidence of unfriendliness upon\\nour part to grant belligerent rights to the insurgents. None of\\nthe reasons assigned rests upon a substantial foundation. No\\nchange has occurred in Cuba and in the situation sufficient to\\nrestrain this Government from immediate action.\\nIt is charitable to siTppose that loyalty to the President impels\\nRepublicans to adhere to the policy now pursued, notwithstand-\\ning its variance from the plan heretofore advocated by them. The\\nmessage of the President, relating to the Cuban situation, as well\\nas the speech of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hitt] is erro-\\nneous, not only in its statement of facts, but its discussion of legal\\nprinciples as applied to the qiiestion of belligerency, and the con-\\nclusions derived therefrom. The President declares (1) that he\\nregards the recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insur-\\ngents as now unwise, and therefore inadmissible.\\nAs justification for tlrs view, he argues that the insurrection\\nlacks those essential qualifications and is devoid of those charac-\\nteristics, of that political organization, with the forms and func-\\ntions of an ordinary government, which are indispensable to the\\nrecognition of belligerency, (3) He further contends that Sagasta s\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "12\\nGovernment has entered upon the work of administrative and po-\\nlitical reforms which will give local self-government to the Cuban\\npeople; that it has not only recalled -the commander whose\\nbrutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civi-\\nlized world, but has accomplished such changes in the condition\\nthat time should be given to witness the evolution of peace and\\nthe pacification promised.\\nIt is my puri)ose now to consider the second objection or point\\nmade by the President, reserving the discussion of the first one to\\na later period in my remarks.\\nIt has been but a few daj S since my return from Cuba, and\\nmany members have requested me to ezplain the situation there,\\nthe condition of the people, the views of the Cubans, the progress\\nof the war, and especially the changes, if any, wrought by Blanco\\nand the autonomistic plan of the Spanish ministry.\\nIn obedience to these requests and in order that the House may\\nbecome cognizant of the facts that came to my knowledge while\\nthere, I will plainly state the result of my observations, averring\\npreliminarily that there has been no such improvement as sug-\\ngested by the President, and nothing whatever to occasion any\\ndelay upon the part of the United States in dealing with the ques-\\ntion, or to lead to a belief that a righteous peace is likely to be\\nattained.\\nMy visit to Cuba was entirely disinterested and for the sole pur-\\npose of learning something of a subject so transcendently impor-\\ntant to the American people. I traveled extensively in the island,\\nvisiting four of the provinces and making personal investigations in\\nscores of the cities and towns. Every opportunity was afforded me\\nby General Blanco and other officials to see the people and observe\\nthe conditions prevailing. Everywhere the greatest kindness was\\nmanifested, and the various governors, alcaldes, civil and military\\nauthorities were sedulous in their attentions.\\nGeneral Blanco and the general secretary, Dr. Congosto, stated\\nfully their views of the situation, expressing gra,tification at the\\nprospects of a speedy termination of all troubles and a success-\\nful implantation of autonomy in the affections of the people.\\nMarquis Montero, Seiior Galvez, and Dr. Zaj^as, members of the\\nautonomistic cabinet, were no less enthusiastic in proclaiming the\\nbeauties of autonomj and the beneficial results soon to be realized\\nfrom its establishment.\\nI met the leading autonomists from all parts of Cuba; promi-\\nnejit Spaniards and conservatives favored me with their views.\\nI met and mingled with representatives from all parties, and per-\\nsons from all vocations of life. The Spanish general, arrogant\\nand proud, explained what was necessary in order to crush the\\nrevolutionary forces. The Spanish soldier told of his privations\\nand regarded with unconcern the developments of the fiiture.\\nCuba to-day is almost indescribable. A reproduction of the\\nscenes and sorrows there observable, a true recital of what has\\noccurred and is daily transpiring, would, arouse to immediate\\naction the people of this great nation. This Congress would not\\ndare to trifle with them and this question as it has during the past\\nyear.\\nColumbus, in describing Cuba, said:\\nOf all the lands, this is the most beautiful ever beheld by human eyes.\\nSuch was Cuba, and such would Cuba be had the flag of Spain\\nnever floated over her soil. Spain s dominion has always corroded\\nand poisoned. She has been a curse and scourge to the peoples of", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "13\\ntwo continents. Boasting of her Christianity and civilization, her\\ntreatment of conquered peoples has been so barbarous as to shock\\nall nations. When her soldiers sacked a French colony and exe-\\ncuted the entire garrison, they placed above their heads the words,\\nNot as Frenchmen, but as heretics.\\nIn retaliation French soldiers captured a Spanish fort and\\nhanged its defenders. Above them were written the words, Not\\nas Spaniards, but as murderers. Such an exjitaph could justly be\\nplaced over the form of Spain s departed greatness and power in\\nCuba and in the New World. It Avill be remembered that upon\\nWeyler s recall Spain authoritatively announced that pacification\\nwas complete in the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Habana, Ma-\\ntanzas, and Santa Clara, and that so successfully had been the\\nmilitary operations in the two eastern provinces that withhi a\\nshort period the revolution would terminate in the establishment\\nof an honorable and perpetual peace.\\nBut it was then known, not only to Spain but to all inquirers,\\nthat in the Provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe\\nthe insurgents were supreme, and that in the remaining provinces\\nSpain s authority was limited to the fortified cities and towns. It\\nwas apparent that the policy of extermination pursued by Weyler\\nhad utterly failed to break the revolution and bring the Cuban\\npeople back to Spanish allegiance. To avert the impending tide\\nof American indignation and prevent the interposition by this\\nGovernment, Sagasta deftly offered the plan of aiitonomy.\\nThis was the last arrow in Spain s quiver. It has been shot and\\nhas fallen short of its mark. It has failed, as it deserved to fail,\\nbecause it was insincere and not designed to give the essentials of\\nlocal self-government to the i^eople of Cuba. It is a delusion and\\na sham. All shams sooner or later fail. The gentleman from\\nIllinois contends that it is liberal and possesses the same charac-\\nteristics found in Canada s organic law. The distinguished gen-\\ntleman is certainly in error. Autonomy, as Sagasta said in xjro-\\nclaiming it, affirms and strengthens the bond of sovereignty.\\nIn nothing is the central authority [Spain] diminished or weak-\\nened.\\nIt is merely a coupde theatre, and a fraudulent fabric suddenly\\nevolved and offered to cheat the insurgents into laying down\\ntheir arms, and to delude the American people into a policy of in-\\naction. It is one of Spain s frequent coup d etats and pronun-\\nciamentos. It is an exemplification of her past policies of vice\\nversa, of eternal promises to redress wrongs while secretly plot-\\nting to prevent the execution of reforms.\\nA careful examination of Sagasta s jpronunciamento reveals its\\nhyx)0crisy. The control of the subject of tarilf and customs is of\\nparamount importance to Cuba, and the imi^osition of unfriendly\\nlegislation in this direction disastrously affects the island; yet\\nthis subject, as provided in Sagasta s paper decree, he has so\\nguarded and protected as to subserve entirely the interests of\\nSpain, though grotesque attempts are made to conceal the unmis-\\ntakable designs and unerring results. The peninsular govern-\\nment is permitted a differential tariff rate or duty of 35 per cent.\\nThis means that Cuba is still to be exploited in the interest of\\nSpanish merchants, producers, and manufacturers.\\nTo illustrate this feature and its extreme advantage to Spain:\\nSuppose a rate of 10 per cent ad valorem were fixed as the duty\\non boots and shoes. Under the autonomistic plan Spain has the\\nright to augment this by 35 per cent, so that all boots and shoes\\n3323", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "14\\nimported into Ctiba from Spain would pay a 10 per cent duty only,\\nv/hile similar importations from all other countries would be re-\\nquired to pay a duty of 45 per cent. This discrimination is to\\ncompel Cuba to purchase from Spain to sell in a cheap market\\nand to buy in Spain s dear market.\\nEven if autonomy were genuine in all other respects, such a\\npower as this with respect to its foreign commerce, placed in the\\nhands of unfriendly ministers in Spain, could be made the engine\\nof most fearful oppression, preventing Cuba s industrial and finan-\\ncial development and keeping her iDlundered for the enrichment\\nof Spain s producers. But this is not all. The preparation of all\\nschedules of duties is committed to a commission composed of in-\\nsular and peninsular members of the Cortes, but with the ultimate\\npower of control in the hands of the peninsular representatives.\\nThe provision is that the commission shall be constituted of\\nequal members selected from Spanish and Cuban representatives\\nin the Cortes. All disagreements upon schedules or rates are to\\nbe determined by the senior member of the commission. Inas-\\nmuch as the selection of the representatives is largely under\\nSpain s control, and remembering that from the members Cuba\\nmay have in the Cortes, some will belong to the Spanish part} it\\ndoes not require remarkable prescience to foretell what the result\\nwill be.\\nThe oldest member in the Cortes from Spain will be placed upon\\nthe commission. If all of the members of the commission from\\nCuba should be devoted to their country s interests and refuse\\nconsent to the tariff plan presented by Spain s commissioners,\\neven then, with the senior member having the casting vote, which\\nis tantamount to absolute control, the interests of the island\\nwould be sacrificed, and the original tariff schedule would be pre-\\npared in the interest of Spain.\\nEven if autonomy were to be successfully established, when it\\nis attempted to put into execution the sj stem of tariff taxation\\nprovided, such discords will arise as will inevitably produce civil\\nwar. Cuba s prosperity is dependent upon unrestricted com-\\nmerce. Impediments such as Spain would interpose would im-\\nmediately create stagnation, arrest industrial development, and\\nthe hardships thereby occasioned would be followed by mutter-\\nings and riots, which in turn would be succeeded by insurrec-\\ntions, and the grave of the past would be opened and the horrors\\nof another sanguinary struggle be upon us.\\nBut another feature more iniquitous than this is preserved in the\\nproposed plan. The governor-general, appointed by the Crown, is\\nmade supreme. He can declare martial law, suspend the local as-\\nsembly, veto its legislation, abrogate all civil guaranties, control\\nall officials, and without restraint dispose of all offices. He may\\ninitiate and impose colonial laws. He can conA oke or nrorogue\\nthe insular legislative body and can dissolve separately or simul-\\ntaneously either of its branches.\\nThe provision that if this shall be done the legislature must be\\nconvoked within three months does not remedy the evil, because\\nits convocation, if it were composed of members opposed to his\\npolicy, would be immediately followed by its prorogation. If\\nmeasures are presented for discussion in the local legislature, the\\ngovernor-general has the authority to prevent further discussion\\nwhenever he may consider that national interests are in any\\nmanner affected or in any wise prejudiced thereby.\\nThe result of this power can easily be understood. If a legisla-", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "15\\nture is selected not subservient to Spanish interests, and measures\\nare offered legitimate and proper, and discussion ensues displeas-\\ning to some tj rannous governor-general, he may sa} that it affects\\nnational interests, or that any criticism of Spain s policj is inimi-\\ncal to national prerogatives, and thereupon either prevent further\\ndiscussion and refer the question to the Spanish Government for\\ndetermination, or dissolve or adjourn the assembly.\\nIf the former course is pursued, the Spanish Government may\\nhold the matter under advisement for an indefinite period, thereby\\neffectually jDreventing legislation and so gagging and stifling the\\nCuban representatives that not only would freedom of speech\\nbe denied, but the assembly itself become a mere pretense and\\nmockery; Does any member suppose under this system that if\\npeace should now come it wo jM be of long duration?\\nIt must be evident to every person that disturbed conditions\\nvrould manifest themselves immediately and that with the arbi-\\ntrary power possessed by the Governor-General the local asserably\\nwould be adjourned; its representatives would appeal to the peo-\\nple, the latter would vindicate their course, and resort would be\\nhad to arms, and the power and authority of Spain again be chal-\\nlenged. This autonomy is a veritable Pandora s box. It is sur-\\ncharged with bristling problems and difficulties and filled with\\nso much subtlety and uncertainty, as well as unconcealed fraud\\nand deceit, that its permanent establishment is an impossibility.\\nAgain, it combiits to the Spanish Crown the appointment of the\\njudiciary. Possibly some of the subordinate tribunals may be\\norganized and filled by the Cubans, but the higher judicial tri-\\nbunals and appellate courts are created and controlled by Spain.\\nA governor of one of the provinces, a Cuban of eminence and in-\\ntegrity, who had been induced to supiaort the autonomist scheme,\\nstated to me that he insisted that the judges miist be selected by\\nthe people themselves; that if this were denied, he would fight au-\\ntonomy, because its acceptance would not mean a settlement of\\nthe questions at issue.\\nI called his attention to the fact that but a few days before the\\ntelegraphic dispatches announced the appointment of twelve judges\\nby the Spanish Government for Cuba and that that very day fur-\\nther dispatches showed the appointment by the Queen Regent of a\\nmember of the appellate court for the island. With Spanish\\njudges to construe the law there could be no peace. With the\\npower reserved to Spain to adjudicate through her tribunals every\\nlitigated controversy, not only those affecting property, but those\\naffecting personal liberty, the most optimistic can not hope for\\npeace and the settlement of the Cuban qiiestion.\\nAgain, article 36 provides:\\nTo the Spanish Cortes belongs the detei mination of what shall be consid-\\nered by their nature necessary expenses of the so\\\\ erei.;?nty, and the Spanish\\nCortes will determine every tliree years its amount and the necessary assets\\nto cover it, always reserving to itself the right to alter this provision.\\nThis, contrary to the view announced by President McKinley\\nin his message, is a limitation upon the Cuban parliament and\\nprevents them from fi aming the budget as to expenditures and\\nrevenues, thus committing to the Spanish Government the\\npower to apportion the expenses of war, of the army and navy, of\\ndiplomatic agents, and the meeting of all liabilities connected\\nwith the sovereignty of the Government.\\nWho can doubt but what, if peace were now established, with\\nCuba as a colonial dependency, the Spanish Government would\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "16\\nat once strengthen her navy, increase her army, and exert every\\neffort to place herself upon a war footing? She wotild claim, un-\\nquestionably, that Cuba would be the beneficiary of this course,\\nand would insist, therefore, that a large portion, perhaps one-\\nthird or one-half, of the expenses should be borne by the island.\\nThis position would of course be unacceptable to the insulars.\\nSpain would thereupon, by force if necessary, collect from Cuba\\nthe amount assigned, and the smoldering fires would at once\\nburst forth, to be quenched only by the blood of another revolution.\\nThere is no adjiistment of the public debt. No division is made,\\nand no suggestion as to the proportion which will be exacted of\\nCuba. This question is postponed until the termination of the\\nwar will allow its final total to be determined. Who determines\\nit? The Spanish Cortes. Who apportions it? The Spanish Gov-\\nernment. With the colossal debt of Spain, amounting to more\\nthan \u00c2\u00a71,000,000,000, who can doubt but what Spain will insist that\\nCuba shall bear a heavy portion of this sum?\\nWith the island impoverished, with property valueless, the sum\\nof two or three hundred million dollars a greater amount, un-\\nquestionably, Spain would insist should be paid by Cuba would\\nbe such a burden that the island cotild not survive under it.\\nThis, then, would provoke complications. A refusal to pay or a\\ndefault in the payment of the principal or interest would be em-\\nployed by Spain for enacting further repressive measures and ex-\\nercising absolute control over the fiscal and other affairs of the\\nisland. If the Cubans accept autonomy, they know this weapon\\nof confiscation is in the hands of Spain. Thelatter s impoverished\\ncondition will be too strong a temptation to restrain heavy repris-\\nals upon Cuba. Autonomy permits the Cuban people to control\\nmerely their roads and public improvements and matters relating\\nto public health.\\nIn every vital question, in all those matters affecting person and\\nproperty and liberty and freedom of thought and speech, in those\\nindividual, national, and sovereign powers, Spain s hand rests as\\nheavily upon Cuba as ever before. We may search no further than\\nthe paper granting autonomy for the reasons leading the Cuban\\npeople to its rejection.\\nThe upper branch, or council of administration of the insular\\ncortes, will be controlled by the Crown. Seventeen of its mem-\\nbers are appointed directly by the governor-general acting for\\nthe sovereign; and the influences of Spain will be so potent, espe-\\ncially when it is remembered that eligibility rests upon an annual\\nincome of at least \u00c2\u00a74,000, that under all circumstances a portion\\nof the remaining eighteen will be the creatures of the parent\\ngovernment.\\nGranting that this royal decree is bona fide and is designed as a\\nmeasure of administrative reform, it has not been vitalized by ap-\\nproval of the Cortes. It is inchoate, incomplete, merely a tem-\\nporary proclamation which may be withdrawn at the pleasure of\\ntheministry or nullified by the Spanish Cortes. To this criticism of\\nthe autonomistic decree Dr. Congosto and members of the cabinet\\nstated to me that Spain s honor was involved in its sacred main-\\ntenance, and that inasmuch as it was the result of evolution,\\nand that reforms once loromulgated can never be repealed, the\\nCubans were under obligation to accept, depending upon the honor\\nof the Spanish people to impress it with the seal of organic law\\nnnd honestly execute its provisions.\\nThis answer is imsatisfactory to the Cubans. They say that\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "17\\nSpain s unfulfilled promises of reform, made at the treaty of Zan-\\njon, caused the existing war. They also say that it is significant\\nthat no step has been taken to submit Sagasta s wooden horse\\nplan to the Cortes for approval. How can Spain, that knows\\nnothing of freedom, that lives in the medisevalism of the past,\\ngoverned by a bureaucratic system, with a shadowy legislative\\nbody to validate, when called upon, the decrees of nobles selected\\nby the Crown, design a system of honest, liberal, true colonial\\ngovernment?\\nHow can she give that which she does not possess and has no\\nconception of? Yet this is the offering which the President says\\nwill give local government to Cuba; and this deceptive decree has\\nprevented this Government from courageously dealing with a\\nquestion which, each day undisposed of, becomes more compli-\\ncated. This nation s high mission is not to aid in the enslave-\\nment of a people; yet our present policy is a glorification of\\nautonomy and a support of Spain s effort in chaining it upon\\nthe necks of the Cuban people.\\nAmong the hundreds of people with whom I spoke, including\\nthe rich and the poor, the Spaniard and the volunteer, the Cuban\\nplanter, the reconcentrado, the starving peasant, the insurgent\\nin arms, I found less than a dozen persons who sincerely and\\nearnestly believed in autonomy and zealously labored for its im-\\nplantation. The Spaniards (most of whom belong to the con-\\nservative party) bitterly assailed it.\\nWhen asked for the grounds of their opposition, they failed to\\ndisclose any, although it was apparent their opposition was largely\\nthe result of the failure of General Blanco to consult them or\\nselect from their numbers the various persons who were being\\nintrusted with office. The policy of Weyler they heartily indorsed.\\nThe atrocities and crimes committed during his regime seemed\\nrather to meet their approval; and this is paradoxical, becaiise\\nmany of them in their private life are compassionate and humane,\\nand in their business affairs are industrious, honest, frugal, and\\nmaterially aid in the advancement and development of the island.\\nAt this point, a matter suggests itself, which a student of soci-\\nology would regard with interest. Nearly all the Spaniards in\\nCuba are males. They came to Cuba in their youth, hoping by\\nindustry and frugality to amass a competency, and return in the\\nafternoon of life to enjoy its calm and quiet in the beautiful land\\nof their nativit3^ They faithfully devote themselves to labor,\\nand soon become merchants or traders or interested in some busi-\\nness venture. They form the shoppers and traders and brokers\\nof the island.\\nThough their patrons are Cubans and their wealth is made from\\nCubans, and though they owe their all to Cuba and her fertility,\\nthey are the implacable enemies of the Cuban people. Most of\\nthose who marry select their wives from Cuban families, but their\\nhostility to all other Cubans still continues. Their children,\\ncarefully guarded by the mothers, grow up as Cubans. They\\nlove their fathers, but are imbued with strong prejudices against\\nall other Spaniards.\\nWhile the father is thinking only of his business and dreaming\\nonly of the day when he may return to the scenes of his child-\\nhood, his son thinks only of Cuba and longs for the day when, as\\nan independent nation, her flag shall float on land and sea. So in\\nthe Spanish family there are the seeds of discord and revolution.\\nWhen Marti, Gomez, and Maceo raised the standard of revolt, the\\n322a-3", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "18,\\nsons of Spaniards were the first to support it, and during all the\\ndark hours of this struggle they have never faltered, and many-\\nhave -willingly and joyfully given their lives for the cause of\\nCuban independence.\\nA jjrominent Spanish merchant, whose son was with General\\nGarcia, sorrowfully, but with some anger, in speaking of the\\nSpaniards residing in Cuba, said to me:\\nWe are at fault for the revolution. We have heen so occupied in our busi-\\nness that we have let our wives rear our children and teach them treason.\\nI found no just reason for the professed optimism of General\\nBlanco, Congosto, Montero, and the supporters of the autonomis-\\ntic regime. The Marquis Montero assured me that in every town\\nI would find well-organized clubs of autonomists, composed of\\nCubans and Spaniards, and men who had formerly been sepa-\\nratists that is, those who desired independence\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and the most\\npronounced intransigentes that is, the most loyal Spaniards\\nand that with the support of these organizations the administra-\\ntion was confident the people would soon accept autonomy.\\nI was further told by Dr. Congosto, and my investigations veri-\\nfied the truth of the statement, that every alcalde and govenaor\\nin the island belonged to the autonomist party. But the conver-\\nsations which I had with leading autonomists convinced me that,\\nwith but few exceptions, they had no faith in the plan and would\\ngive a doubtful allegiance to it. To popularize the system, Blanco\\nhad taken persons who had been imprisoned by Weyler and\\nplaced them in responsible positions.\\nThe offices were being filled by Cubans, not Spaniards. The\\nreasons for this were manifest when Senor Galvez (president of\\nthe new ministry) said, that when this plan is put into oi^era-\\ntion, if the war continues, it will be Cubans fighting Cubans, and\\nno longer a contest between Cubans and Spaniards. The evident\\ndesign of Blanco is to win prominent Cubans to this delusiv^e\\nphantom by giving them high positions, hoping thereby to secure\\nthe support of the Cuban people. That inglorious, humiliating\\ndefeat will attend this effort must be patent even to the propo-\\nnents of the measure.\\nWithout discussing the ethical question involved in such conduct,\\nI state it to be a fact that many of those holding official positions\\nheartily sympathize with the insurgents and earnestly desire the\\nindependence of Cuba. Some frankly confess that they accepted\\nthe positions, fearful that if they refused, imprisonment would\\nfollow. Others stated that their acceptance resulted merely\\nfrom a desire to alleviate, if possible, the horrors and sufferings\\nof their fellow-countrymen, the reconcentrados. One high offi-\\ncial aided me in passing the Spanish lines to confer with the in-\\nsurgent forces, and another with fervid enthusiasm informed me of\\nthe purposes and plans of the insui-gents and the triumphant vic-\\ntory which would soon be theirs.\\nI visited autonomist clubs, and found the members not only\\nopenly expressing sympathy for the revolution, but secretly con-\\ntributing to its success. I talked with the poor reconcentrados,\\nand asked if they did not think it wise for all to renew their\\nallegiance to Spain. Many had suffered so terribly and were so\\nravenous for food that questions of governmental polity were as\\nuninviting as a proposition in calculus. But the hearts and\\nhopes of all were with their fathers and brothers and husbands\\nand countrymen in the tragic struggle which brought such un-\\nutterable woes, such desolation and death.\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "19\\nThe few Cubans who eotikl obtain employment, whether they\\nwere whites or blacks, were robbing themselves and their fam-\\nilies in order to contribute of their raite to their comrades in\\narms. I met a gentleman, once wealthy, now wanting for food\\nfor himself and family, who gave the insurgents his last cow the\\nday of my visit to him. The women and children, the Cuban\\nlawyer, the native doctor, the workman, the humblest farmer, the\\npoorest peasant, and the negro in the field, all are Cubans and all\\nare revolutionists. Whereveris found a Cuban home, there stands\\nan altar dedicated to Cuba libre, and each home is a fortress pro-\\ntecting freedom s cause, while within all earnestly, prayerfully\\nwatch for the coming of the day of liberation.\\nAll efforts to win the insurgents to the autonomist plan have\\nproven abortive. I met emissaries sent by Blanco to various prov-\\ninces, and they confessed that their missions had been fruitless.\\nOne of them, Mr. Laces, who had been in the Orient for the pur-\\npose of seeing the president and vice-president of the Cuban Re-\\npublic, stated to me that\\nThe Cuban forces in the eastern provinces are intensely hostile to anton-\\nomy. They are determined upon independence. It will be a long time be-\\nfore we can hope to win them to our cause.\\nI talked with insurgents, and they declared thej^ would never\\nabandon their striTggle until the Spanish armies were driven from\\nthe island and the independence of Cuba established. Blanco is\\nresorting to every possible means to win the insurgent leaders to\\nhis support. Offices, prominent positions, and great inducements,\\nincluding monetary bribes and considerations, are held out to\\nthem; btit thus far the insurgents have been unmoved.\\nA few who have been wounded or are suffering from serious\\nillness have become presentados, but when health returns they\\nrejoin their companies. A few malcontents have surrendered to\\nthe Spanish. armies. Governor G-arcia, of the province of Santa\\nClara, stated to me that a prominent Cuban officer would surren-\\nder, or present himself, upon the following day, together with\\n100 of his followers.\\nThe invitation was extended me to accompany the governor\\nupon a special train and witness the presentation. I accepted,\\nbut when the next day arrived, no insurgents appeared. The\\ngovernor promised to telegraph me as soon as the officer surren-\\ndered, but to this hour no telegram has been received.\\nI met a doctor who had charge of the insurgent hospitals in two\\nprovinces. He traveled constantly among the troops, having\\nvisited several thousand within the few days immediately pre-\\nceding my interview with him. He stated that there was no dis-\\nposition upon the part of either the officers or soldiers to accept\\nautonomy; that it was treated with derision and scorn, and re-\\ngarded as a subtle device to induce the Cuban patriots to lay down\\ntheir arms.\\nAn officer in the insurgent ranks told me that if genuine au-\\ntonomy had been offered before Weyler s cruelties and atrocities\\nhad been perpetrated, he thought the Cubans would have accepted\\nit; but that now, after hundreds of thousands of their country-\\nmen had been butchered and starved, and the island had been\\ndesolated by fire and sword, and the homes of the insurgents had\\nbeen destroyed and their wives and children either brutally killed\\nby Spanish troops or imprisoned until, by hunger and privation,\\ndeath had been a welcome release, they would never abandon the\\nconflict until Spain s sovereignty was extinct and the Republic of\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "20\\nCuba tirmly established. I met one insurgent soldier who had\\nsecretly entered a village in order to learn of his family. His\\nwife and sis children had been buried in the trench. Weyler had\\nkilled them. Starvation was his weapon. Could he accept au-\\ntonomy?\\nThe volunteers, of whom so much has been heard, niimber from\\n25,000 to 40,000. Resident Spaniards of Cuba compose the volun-\\nteer corps. They are the most uncompromising foes of Cubans,\\nthe friends of Weyler, the opponents of autonomy. They are the\\ncontrolling factor in Habana. They believe in the prosecution of\\nthe war, even to the extent of exterminating the Cubans.\\nWith the Spanish soldiers and the Spanish residents against\\nautonomy, with the insurgents in the field fighting for independ-\\nence and rejecting the proffers of peace predicated upon an accept-\\nance of autonomy, with all of the Cuban noncombatants secretly\\nopposmg it and clandestinely supporting the insurgents, it must be\\napparent that autonomy is already defeated and that any further\\ndelay upon the part of this Government in dealing definitely with\\nthe Cuban question, based upon the idea that autonomy will\\nprove the solution of the question, will be the height of fatuity\\nand a tribute to our credulity and ignorance.\\nIn this connection reference should be made to the condition of\\nthe troops and the prospect of Spanish victories. When the rev-\\nolution began, February 14, 1895, there were 20,320 Spanish soldiers\\nand GO, 000 volunteers in Cuba. In March 7,000 additional soldiers\\narrived. Weyler asked for 200,000, and at least 125,000 were sent\\nin response to his call. To-day less than 60,000 Spanish troops are\\nin the island. Disease, superinduced by privation and hunger,\\ndestroyed most of the Spanish troops. The hospitals contain\\n15,000, and from 1,200 to 1,800 are returned to Spain each month.\\nThe Spanish soldiers now upon the island are young boys, poorly\\nfed and imperfectly clothed. Many of them stated to me, thoiigh,\\nthat their condition was very much improved since the advent of\\nGeneral Blanco. From all that I could learn, General Weyler\\ntreated his troops in a most inhuman manner. He suffered his\\nofiicers and contractors to rob them of their small stiiDend and\\ndeprive them of the necessary food and clothing. They were sta-\\ntioned in small forts and left to die of starvation and fever.\\nNotwithstanding all these sufferings and privations, and though\\nthe Government is in arrears in its payment of the troops, from\\neight to twelve months, I found the soldiers uncomplaining, faith-\\nful, apparently unconcerned as to the progress of the war or the\\ndisposition to be made of them. I believe thej are brave and\\ncourageous and obedient in executing any order given them.\\nOf the Spanish officers but little commendable can be said.\\nThey are indolent, idle, selfish, unpatriotic, absolutely indifferent\\nto the situation and the perils of the country which they serve.\\nThey are found in the cafes, promenades, theaters, and every-\\nwhere but in the barracks or in the field or engaged in active serv-\\nice. More officers than soldiers are to be seen in the cities. I\\ncounted nearly 150 in a small theater in Habana during an oper-\\natic performance.\\nAn intelligent campaign with the resources and soldiers at\\nWeyler s command must necessarily have resulted in the subju-\\ngation of the revolutionists. But Spain s opportunity has passed.\\nThere have been no campaigns, no military operations, upon the\\npart of the Spaniards worthy the name. I saw no drilling and\\nfound but few persons who had ever seen the Spanish troops drill.\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "21\\nThe soldiers sent from Spain are, in tlie main, raw recruits,\\nboys without military training, from the mountains and valleys\\nand farms and shops. Immediately upon their arrival they are\\nsent into the interior, placed in small forts, many of which are\\nlocated in swamps and lowlands, and there left to the ravages of\\nhunger and fevers. At present most of the Spanish troops are\\nemployed in protecting towns and cities and guarding a few plan-\\ntations and the railroad trains and tracks.\\nGeneral Pando is operating in the Orient, but is utterly unable\\nto dislodge the insui gents. The armies under Gomez are stronger\\nto-day, better equipped and disciplined than ever before. I learned\\nthis not only from conversations with insurgents, but from state-\\nments made by Spanish officers and of cials. One of the commis-\\nsioners sent by Blanco into the Oriente told me that in the provinces\\nof Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba there were at least 35,000\\nwell armed and equipped insurgents.\\nIn the Province of Santa Clara the insurgent forces number\\n2,000; in Matanzas, 1,800; in Habana, 1,500, and in Pinar del Rio,\\n2,500, A letter which I hold in my hand, from General Rodri-\\nguez, the insurgent commander of the three provinces last named,\\nstates that the condition of the troops was never better; that in\\nhealth and spirits they are superb, and that they have all the arms\\nrequired, but are somewhat deficient in clothing.\\nIf Spain was unable, with the magnificent army under Weyler s\\ngeneralship, to reconquer Cuba, it is difficult to understand how\\nsuccess upon the battlefields can now crown her efforts. With\\n$12,000,000 required each month for the army, with her treasury\\nexhausted, and her forces so limited that only police duty is done,\\nthe contest can only end in Cuban success. One of the Spanish\\nofficials, with rather an air of pride, called my attention to a dis-\\npatch stating that Spain was negotiating for a loan of 200,000,000\\npesetas, offering as security a second mortgage upon custom-house\\nreceipts to be collected in Cuba and the cedula tax thereafter to be\\nlevied and collected in the island.\\nWhen it is remembered that already mortgages have been given\\nupon the prospective revenues of the island for years, and also\\nthat the cedula tax is based upon the income of the insulars, it is\\nevident the security offered would not be accepted by any money\\nlender.\\nWhen I asked General Uberto, who commanded the Spanish\\ntroops in Santa Clara Province, how he expected Spanish success\\nwhen the insurgents were now stronger than ever and the Span-\\nish armies weaker, his reply was evasive, being an appeal to the\\nchivalry and pride of Spain, which, under every danger, would\\nnever submit to defeat. He bitterly complained of the United\\nStates, charging that the revolution was attributable to this Gov-\\nernment and its continued violation of treaty obligations as well as\\nomission to prevent fillibustering expeditions.\\nWhen attention was called to the fact that Spain s ships and\\nvessels had intercepted no craft, but that so rigorously had police\\nduty been performed by this Government that numerous expedi-\\ntions had been prevented and vessels captured, he was compelled\\nto confess that no breach of duty could be charged against the\\nUnited States. He then complained that our sympathies for the\\ninsurgents inspired them to resistance, and that the United States\\nwas the real enemy of Spain, masquerading behind the armies of\\nGomez.\\n\u00c2\u00a3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "22\\nThis spirit of animosity I found to be prevalent with the Span-\\nish officers and many of the Spanish residents. No military expe-\\nditions were being conducted and no campaigns carried on by the\\nSpanish generals. They contented themselves with guarding the\\ncities and towns, and attempting to protect a few plantations and\\nthe railroad trains and tracks. There were no tents or A^ehicles,\\nand no commissarj^ department connected with the army. The\\nidea of leaving the towns and railroads and purstiing the insur-\\ngents into the interior seemed not to te a part of the programme.\\nIn the four provinces last named the Spanish troops hold by a\\nmore or less precarious tenure the cities, towns, and railroads,\\nbut the rest of the country is occupied by the insurgents. The\\nlatter go at pleasure, occasionally approaching the little block-\\nhouses, frequently intercepting trains and destroying bridges,\\nand often breaking through the fortifications, in the darkness of\\nnight, and plundering some store or warehouse in the smaller\\nvillages.\\nUpon each train soldiers are placed to protect it, and armored\\ncars filled with soldiers precede it. Each railroad station is a for-\\ntress, and upon each side of the railroad track, every few hun-\\ndred yards, is a small fort or blockhouse filled with Spanish sol-\\ndiers to protect the track. A few plantations are operated, but\\nthese are protected by forts constructed at the esi^ense of the\\nowners and garrisoned by Spanish soldiers, for each of which $30\\nper month is paid to the Spanish commanders.\\nBeyond the range of the forts, as stated, the country is in the\\nhands of the insurgents. Within the range of the forts there is\\nsome agricultural activity. I met insurgents within a few miles\\nof Spanish forts and within 2 miles of important cities. The day\\nafter reaching Habana Aranguren and his forces approached\\nwithin a few miles of the city and destroyed a costly bridge. The\\ncamp of one of the insurgent leaders was within 18 miles of Ha-\\nbana, and when I was in the city of Matanzas General Betencourt\\nwas hovering upon its outskirts.\\nIn each of the so-called pacified provinces, civil officers of the\\nCuban Republic are engaged in superintending extensive fields,\\nwithin which are raised sweet potatoes and various fruits and\\nvegetables for the sustenance of the insurgent armies. The Span-\\niards, the Cuban noncombatants, and the Spanish troops are locked\\nup in the cities and fortifications, while the insurgents, with but\\nslight resistance, freely roam over these four provinces.\\nThis is the extent of the pacification. An insurgent captain in-\\nformed me that the policy of Gomez was to wear Spain out; to\\ncompel the troops to garrison the cities and towns, thus prevent-\\ning their mobilization and any attempt to enter upon an aggres-\\nsive military campaign. Occasionally a Spanish general with a\\nfew thousand troops will make a hurried dash into the country\\nand a brief encounter with the Cubans may result.\\nIn the two eastern provinces some spirited engagements are oc-\\ncurring. The efforts of Pando to penetrate the interior have been\\nrepulsed and he has been compelled to return to Habana. It is\\nevident that under this state of warfare, if Spain is able to main-\\ntain her troops in the island, the contest may be prolonged indefi-\\nnitely. It has been charged that the insurgents are barbarous\\nnegToes, and that the contest has degenerated into a mere guerrilla\\nwarfare.\\nThere is some little foundation for the latter criticism. But it\\nIs impossible to prescribe any definite rules for conducting war.\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "The plan of Gomez has certainly been successful in weakening his\\nadversaries, in destroying the Spanish armies, and in wresting\\nprovinces from Spanish control; and this has been done, too, in the\\nmain, with due regard to the rights of Spanish prisoners.\\nThat the insurgents do not risk their cause upon a single battle,\\nis true; that they avoid meeting a well-armed superior force, must\\nalso be conceded; but that their iDolicy depletes the ranks of the\\nenemy and exhausts the treasury of Spain, and daily weakens the\\nmilitary strength of their enemy, all must admit. If the results\\nare the same as might be achieved by two or three victorious bat-\\ntles, who shall say that it is not war? But, as stated, occasionally\\nthere are fierce engagements between large contending forces.\\nThe Cuban armies are composed of about 80 per cent negroes\\nand mulattoes; the remainder are white Cubans. The negroes\\nare brave, courageous, intelligent, and patriotic. When the war\\nbegan, thousands of the brightest young white Cubans in the\\nisland, flocked to the standard of Gomez, and hundreds who were\\nbeing educated in the colleges of France and the United States\\nhastened to give their support to the revolution.\\nWithin its ranks are found thousands of brave, heroic men of\\nedtication and refinement, men who have in our schools and col-\\nleges, imbibed the spirit of liberty and the love of republican in-\\nstitutions. There are so many professional men in the Cuban\\narmy that it is sometimes called the doctors and lawyers war.\\nThe insurgents are not wild bandits or guerrillas, but are men\\nworthy of the blessings of freedom, capable of appreciating lib-\\nerty, and with capacity to maintain a stable, enlightened, liberal\\ngovernment. By appointment I met one of these young leaders.\\nHe had been educated in the United States and Paris.\\nThe revolution found him the possessor of the luxuries and com-\\nforts of wealth, and yet he gladly left all to cast his fortunes with\\nthose who .entered upon the struggle for Cuban independence.\\nFor nearly three years he had been wandering throiigh the prov-\\ninces, hunted and pursued by the Spanish troops, suffering expo-\\nsure and disease, but he is still inflexible in his purpose and happy\\nin his undertaking. He assured me that there would be no com-\\npromise, no surrender, but that the revolution would continue\\nuntil Cuba was free.\\nIn the four western provinces the insurgents operate in small\\ncompanies, but there is such discipline and system that mobiliza-\\ntion can be effected very quickly. An organization which per-\\nmits an army to almost disintegrate, and yet has such control as\\nto mass the troops and concentrate its full strength within a few\\ndays, is not only marvelous, but indicates a high order of general-\\nship, upon the part of the military leaders as well as great devo-\\ntion upon the part of both officers and men. To keep Spain s forces\\ndispersed is a strong reason for this mode of warfare. In addi-\\ntion, the impoverished condition of the island and the difficulty in\\nsecuring food render it hazardous to move in large bodies.\\nThe two eastern provinces comprise about one-half the area of\\nthe island. These provinces, with the exception of a few cities,\\nare absolutely dominated by the insurgents. Spain s authority\\nhas been completely overthrown, and the Cuban Republic is exer-\\ncising, with but little niolestation or opposition, undisputed con-\\ntrol. The civil officers perform their functions, and the civ l\\nmachinery is in constant operation. President Masso and his\\ncabinet remain at the capital Cubitas during most of the time\\nand perform the constitutional duties enjoined upon them.\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "24\\nWeyler, with nearly 200,000 troops and volunteers, found it\\nimpossible to successfully invade these provinces. His troops\\nwere hurled back like the vs^aves of the ocean, whenever any ad-\\nvance was made. In the four western provinces, in which the\\nSpanish claim the fruits of their success are apparent and the evi-\\ndences of peace and pacification appear, there is nothing but des-\\nolation, ruin, starvation, and death. In the hundreds of miles\\nthat I traveled there was no sign of life outside of the forts and\\nthe fortified cities, towns, and plantations.\\nThe island for 400 miles in length is a wilderness. The fertility\\nof the island, however, is so great that though flame and sword\\nmay desolate it, the grass and verdure soon cover it and render\\nless hideous the work of destruction. Every farm in these four\\nprovinces has been destroyed, every house except in the cities and\\ntowns and upon a few fortified plantations has been burned, all\\nfarm implements and property of a personal character have either\\nbeen carried away or fed to the flames which swept over the island.\\nThe horses and cattle have been driven from the fields and long\\nsince confiscated either by the Spanish troops or the insurgent\\nforces.\\nThat General Blanco has made some reform and abated some-\\nwhat the severities of Weyler s administration can not be doubted;\\nyet he rigorously enforces the rule which prevents the people who\\nare herded in the fortified cities and towns from going beyond the\\nlines of the fortifications and attempting the rebuilding of their\\nhomes or the effort to procure fi om the soil enough for their sub-\\nsistence.\\nWeyler s order of reconcentration drove into the cities and\\ntoviTos at least 600,000 people. Their homes and property were de-\\nstroyed and many of the people ruthlessly butchered. The Span-\\nish ti oops and guerrillas, without, in many instances, giving them\\nany opportunity to understand the order or make any preparation,\\nenforced their departure from their homes and brutally drove\\nthem like cattle into the adjacent cities and towns. Around the\\nlatter, deep ti enches had been constructed and upon the ramparts\\nthrown up, posts and palisades were planted and bound and\\nstrengthened by barbed wire.\\nThese suffering, wretched people found themselves in these cities\\nwithout clothing or food or roof or shelter. Any attempt to cross\\nthe trocha to return to their blackened homes or to search in the\\ndesolate fields for roots or sweet potatoes for themselves or their\\nsuffering, starving wives and children, subjected them to being\\nshot by the soldiers guarding; or if they were successful in escap-\\ning their \\\\dgilant eye, they encountered the Spanish guerrillas, by\\nwhom they were cruelly dispatched and brought into the city,\\nthrown into the streets as a warning to others, and their death\\nmade the foundation for a dispatch of a Spanish victory over in-\\nsurgent forces. Thus imprisoned, they became first desperate,\\nthen sullen, and at last, in pathetic despair, sat down in the streets\\nand highways listlessly awaiting the approach of death.\\nThose who have property, behold it gradually wasting, and those\\nwho have none are daily meeting death from exposure and star-\\nvation. I met hundreds of people who had been wealthy, but\\nwhose property was valueless. American citizens who owned\\nhundreds and thousands of acres were homeless and offering ex-\\ntensive tracts of lands for a small pittance with which to purchase\\nbread.\\nWithin the range of the rifle s ball, around the cities and towns\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "25\\nand upon the few fortified plantations, a few persons are at work\\nin the fields. To leave the cities or jiass beyond the line of forts\\nis impossible without a passpoit, unless under cover of the dark-\\nness of the night. The surviving reconcentrados are prevented\\nfrom returning to their desolate lands, and even if permission\\nwere accorded them, the difficulties before them are great.\\nEmaciated by long privations, without homes or utensils or imple-\\nments of any kind, without horses or cattle, their return would\\nbe like a visit to a wilderness, and their subsistence dependent\\nupon its subjugation.\\nInadequate efforts are being made for their support. General\\nBlanco stated that he had been authorized to use $100,000 to feed\\nthe reconcentrados; but this amount, when nearly 200.000 people\\nare wanting food and clothes, and many of them medicines and\\nshelter, would but slightly mitigate their sufferings.\\nAnd so, while they are confined by Spanish forts and rifles, and\\nprevented from tilling the soil or seeking subsistence, the chari-\\ntable of this nation are being called upon to contribute to relieve\\ntheir extremities. While Spain is attempting to exterminate them\\nby this hopeless war, we are only prolonging their sufferings by\\nthe meager contributions expended in their behalf.\\nFrom personal investigations and figures furnished me by\\nSpaniards,governorsof provinces, mayors of cities, priests, doctors,\\nand various officials, it is my firm conviction that not less than\\n300,000 people have died from starvation and diseases superin-\\nduced by these privations during the year 1897 in the four prov-\\ninces in which the order of reconcentration was enforced. An3\\nif the war shall be prolonged, or this Government shall cot inter-\\nvene either for the preservation of the people or to restore peace\\nand secure the independence of the island, more than 100,000 peo-\\nple will meet death from starvation within the next few months.\\nIn the city of Habana from 25,000 to 30,000 people are in abso-\\nlute want. Many are dying daily from starvation and the depri-\\nvations they have endured. Thousands haunt your footsteps in\\nthe streets, their only resting place being the cold pavements. In\\nGuines more than one-half of the population, made up of the resi-\\ndents and those driven in by Weyler s troops, died during the\\nyear of 1897. In Artimesa, in the Province of Pinar del Rio, from\\n40 to 60 per cent of the poxjulation perished from the same causes\\nduring the same period.\\nThe governor of Matanzas Province stated to me that official\\nreports showed that nearly 40,000 persons in the reconcentrado\\ntowns and cities within that province had died from May, 1897, to\\nthe 31st of December of the same year. Investigation proved that\\nthese reports did not cover those who had not been buried under\\nthe auspices of the church. One of the alcaldes in the same prov-\\nince and several reputable physicians, as well as a very prominent\\nSpaniard who had been an alcalde, stated that the deaths were\\nvery much in excess of the figure furnished by the governor.\\nGovernor Armas seemed a very humane man and claimed to be\\ndoing what he could to alleviate the sufferings; but it was appar-\\nent that very little was being accomplished in that direction.\\nUpon the steps of his palace, as I was returning to the hotel late\\nin the evening, I saw fourteen starving, half-naked creatures\\nlying upon the stone steps. The next morning I learned that sev-\\neral had died during the night.\\nIn the streets of the city of Matanzas, in which he resided, the\\nscenes of distress and suffering were almost unendurable. Starv-\\nS323", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "26\\ning mothers with their starving children were encountered at\\nevery corner. I saw several men who had once been strong lying\\ndead in the streets. In improvised hospitals in the suburbs of ;1\\nthe city were hundreds of these unfortunate reconcentrados.\\nThe young boy in control of one informed me that 1 in 20 who\\nentered the hospital passed out alive.\\nI accompanied him while administering the food furnished for\\nthe day. It consisted of 4 quarts of milk and about 25 pounds of\\nrice for about 300 persons. Many were so emaciated and had suf-\\nfered so long for the lack of food that they were unable to take\\nthe few spoonsful offered them. None were suffering from dis-\\nease, except such as resulted from starvation. In passing the\\nnext morning I learned that thirteen had died during the night.\\nIn other places visited the same distressing, horrible sights were\\npresented.\\nIn Colon, Jucaro, Cruzes, Manzanillo, Santa Clara, Sagua la\\nGrande, San Domingo, Guanabacoa, and indeed in every town\\nand city visited, these awful, harrowing scenes could not be es-\\ncaped. From all that I could learn no efforts whatever had been\\nmade during Weyler s administration for the relief of the people.\\nIndeed, I met persons who had been in the Cabanas fortress for\\nfurnishing medicines and food to the dying and starving. I met\\nnoble, heroic women who had been thrust into dungeons for at-\\ntempting to supply quinine to the djnng reconcentrados.\\nEven now there is lack of organization, and what little is being\\naccomplished for the people results from the efforts of the Cubans,\\nwith occasional help from some humane Spaniard. It seems as\\nthough the people are so inured to the sufferings that they have\\ngrown somewhat apathetic. The alcalde of Sagua la Grande\\nstated that 10,000 in that city needed immediate help. He had\\norganized committees and was doing everything within his power\\nto ameliorate the fearful condition. He had gathered sufficient\\nmeans to furnish for five or six days a few ounces of beans and\\nrice to 1,600 of the most distressed.\\nThis deplorable condition, so briefly and imperfectly sketched,\\ndemonstrates that the reason assigned by the President for inac-\\ntion does not exist, and that Sagasta has not wrought such changes\\nor reforms as to restrain this Government from altering its do-\\nnothing xDolicy.\\nOur doubtful, hesitating course has added to our embarrass-\\nments. And it is clear that stronger reasons exist for granting\\nbelligerency to the Cubans than were found two years ago. I\\nshall contend, before concluding my remarks, that immediate in-\\ntervention by the United States is not only now justifiable but\\nimperatively required. Before proceeding with a discussion of\\nthis question I desire to consider the first point made by President\\nMcKinley, to which I called attention a few minutes ago, namely,\\nthat under the principles of international law the Cuban insur-\\ngents were not entitled to belligerent rights.\\nThe President quotes at length from the message of President\\nGrant delivered to Congress December 7, 1875, in which the latter\\nargued that unless justified by necessity the granting of belliger-\\nency had always been, and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act\\nand a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion;\\nand fiirther, that there was no such substantial political organi-\\nzation, real, palpable, and manifest to the world, among the\\nCubans as to take the contest out of the category of a mere re-\\nbellious insurrection and place it on the footing of war.\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "27\\nPresident McKinley approves of the views expressed by General\\nGrant, and contends that the possession of the essential qualifica-\\ntions of sovereignty and the adoption in the conduct of the war of\\nrules approved by the received code of war are lacking in the\\nCuban revolution, and that without the attributes of statehood,\\nthe existence of which he considers doubtful, the recognition of\\nbelligerency would be inadmissible and indefensible.\\nI have shown that in lb 96 the present Secretary of State and the\\ngentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hitt] as well as other distinguished\\nRepublicans, not only contended that the revolution in Cuba,\\nmeasured by the rules of international law, had reached such posi-\\ntion that it was justly entitled to belligerent rights, but that with\\ngreat unanimity the Repiiblicans in both branches of Congress\\nvoted for such a resolution.\\nI have also shown that time has only added strength to the revo-\\nlution and subtracted from the power of the titular government.\\nBelligerency is merely a state of war, and war is that state in\\nwhich a nation prosecutes its right by force. Whether war ex-\\nists is a question of fact, and that fact is to be determined by each\\nneutral nation for itself.\\nIn a letter from Canovas to the New York World, March 6,\\n1896, Spain s great minister admits that the struggle is a civil\\nwar, and declares it is impossible to attempt reforms during a\\ncivil war or under any foreign pressure in the present condition\\nof the island. Minister De Lome, in a letter to Clara Barton,\\ndated February 12, 1897, unwittingly confessed that the insurrec-\\ntion in Cuba reached the dignity of public war. As early as\\nJanuary 7, 1896, La Pais, a leading Spanish newspaper, contained\\nthese words:\\nWe hold in front of oiir troops 53,000 insurgents. Thirty thousand of them\\nare well mounted and perfectly armed.\\nIt seems absurd for the President and gentlemen upon the other\\nside of the Chamber to argue that a condition of jjublic war does\\nnot exist in Cuba. Neither a de .jure nor a de facto government is\\nindispensable to belligerency. It is not imperative that the revo-\\nlutionary forces should occupy seaports or whiten the ocean with\\ntheir sails. Yet this is the contention in the President s message\\nand of our Republican friends.\\nIt is not the location of the civil government, nor its capacity to\\ncomraand the allegiance, the support, or the obedience of the people\\noutside of the domain of its military command, but inside that\\nterritory, that fixes its right to recognition as a belligerent power.\\nA de facto civil government having power to enforce obedience\\nto its decrees within its military command, whether that power\\nis civil or military, is a government that can conduct lawful war-\\nfare under the laws of nations. It needs no capital, or seaports,\\nor garrisoned fortresses to prove its right to fight for the liberties\\nof its supporters.\\nThe present premier of Spain, Senor Sagasta, in his speech before\\na meeting of the Liberal senators and deputies on the 19th of May,\\n1897, substantially admits that the insurgents were a belligerent\\npower, and if not a de facto government, were sufficiently organ-\\nized to enforce obedience to decrees within its military command.\\nThese are his words:\\nWe have 200,COO troops in Cuba, but we are not even masters of the terri-\\ntory trodden by our soldiers. The picture could not be gloomier. We have\\nwar in Cuba and in the Pnilippines.\\nS233", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "2.8\\nToussaint had no treasury or navy or harbor, France possessed\\neach; yet Toussaint and his supporters were belligerents, and San\\nDomingo becaiue an independent republic.\\nIn our own revolutionary struggles we had a floating capital,\\nour Treasury was empty, and our harbors were possessed by Eng-\\nland; yet under every rule of international law our fathers were\\nbelligerents.\\nIt must not be forgotten that many of the principles of inter-\\nnational law are an unwelcome legacy from the past. They were\\nevolved by despotic governments in the interests of power and to\\npreserve kingly prerogatives. The rights of man, the questions\\nof liberty and free government, the duties which a high civiliza-\\ntion and a true Christianity impose, were of less concern than\\nIdngly power and the perpetuity of oppressive government.\\nOur nation has made great contributions to international law,\\nand the grow^th of personal liberty has found reflex action in inter-\\nnational codes. International law is not an exact science and\\nmust expand to meet the currents that rush on to wider and\\nnobler spheres. The view of the President, as well as that of\\nGeneral Grant, seems to be founded uxDon the position taken by\\nMr. Dana in his notes to Wheaton s International Law.\\nThe question of necessity is not involved, in according bel-\\nligerent rights. Where any considerable part of a nation seeks\\nwithdrawal therefrom and in good faith takes up arms and com-\\nbats the titular government for the purpose of obtaining political\\nends; wlien, as the Cubans have done, it maintains the conflict\\nfor years and supports a military organization capable of execut-\\ning such degrees as are essential not only for its organization but\\nfor the elective discomfiture of its opponent, and where there is\\na civil power operating within constitutional limits, feeble though\\nits authority may be, the movement assumes such proportions as to\\nremove its supporters from the category of criminals, and stamps\\nas barbarous their treatment as pirates. Therefore they are bellig-\\nerents, and nations friendly to the parent government should so\\nregard them and maintain a strict neutrality between the contend-\\ning xiowers. And it is the exclusive province of the neutral gov-\\nernment to determine when the revolution ceases to be a piratical\\nexpedition or a criminal insurrection, and its promoters entitled\\nto neutrality. I desire to present some authorities in support of\\nthe views just announced.\\nJudge Grier, in the prize cases (2 Black), says:\\nA civil vrar is never solemnly declared. It becomes sucli by accident. The\\npower and organizations of the persons who originate and carry it on, when\\nthe party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion\\nof territory, have declared their independence and cast off their allegiance,\\nhave organized armies, commenced hostilities against their former sovereign,\\nthe world acknowledges them as belligerents and the contest as war.\\nMr. Manning, in his valuable work (page 98) announces this\\nto be the rule:\\nThe concession of such rights may at a certain epoch of the strife b3\\nclaimed both in the interests of humanity and of neutral states; there always,\\nindeed, arrives a moment at which such a concession is made fas in the case\\nof the late Southei n insurrection in the United States) by the government\\nfrom which the revolt takes place.\\nSpeaking of the time when the recognition of belligerency may\\nbe accorded, he says:\\nIt must be neither so premature as to embarrass a friendly government in\\nsuppressing what may prove to be only a transient or partial display of dis-\\norder or treachery, nor, on the other hand, so dilatory as to protract the in-\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "29\\nconvenience and cruelty incident to a contest conducted on a large scale,\\napart from all the humane alleviations which the laws of civilized war have\\nintroduced.\\nEarl Russell,, replying to Mr. Seward s criticisms of England in\\nrecognizing the belligerency of the Confederacy, referred in jns-\\ntification to the number of troops employed by the United States\\nand its vast preparations for war. It is now conceded by all that\\nEngland s action was conformable to the law of nations, espe-\\ncially in view of the fact that President Lincoln by his proclama-\\ntion relating to the blockade treated the Confederates as belliger-\\nents.\\nVattel (page 299) declares that\\nWhen a party is formed in a state who no longer obeys the sovereign, and\\nare possessed of sufficient strength to oppose him, this is called civil war.\\nAnd Hall, in his great work on international law, announces\\nthe principle that clearly brings the Cubans within its terms. He\\nstates:\\nAs soon as a considerable population is arrayed in arms with the professed\\nobject of obtaining political ends, it resembles a state too nearly for it to be\\npossible to treat individuals belonging to such population as criminals. It\\nwould be inhuman for the enemy to execute its prisoners. It would be still\\nmore inhiiman for foreign nations to capture and hang the crews of the war\\nships as pirates. Humanity requires that the members of such a community\\nbe treated as belligerents.\\nBluntschli, the German writer, clearly proves that the Cuban\\ninsurgents are not mere lav/less banditti, conducting, as the Presi-\\ndent s position implies, a mere criminal resistance against the\\nGovernment, but are a people engaged in a political revolution,\\nand are therefore entitled to be regarded, not only by Spain, but\\nother nations, as belligerents. The rule is announced by him as\\nfollows:\\nEvery struggle with the armed band, even when it may be organized in a\\nmilitary manner, is not war. When in southern Italy brigands form tL*.m-\\nselves into armed troops regularly commanded and give battle to the Gov-\\nernment troops, they do not for that reason constitute a belligerent party,\\nbut only bands of malefactors. The distinction rests upon this: That war is\\na political struggle, engaged in for political ends. Brigands neither aspire to\\ndefend the existing political system nor to create a new one. They only obey\\nthe guilty desire by obtaining by violence control of the persons and posses-\\nsions of their neighbors. They properly fall, therefore, within the jurisdic-\\ntion of criminal tribunals, and the law of nations is not concerned with them.\\nIt is a different matter when, in a State, a large party of citizens, or sub-\\njects, convinced of the necessity of a revolution or the justice of their claim,\\ntake up arms, organize themselves in a military manner and oppose regular\\ntroops to the troops of the Government. It can not be maintained that such\\nan organized body of citizens, animated by political purpose, does not possess\\na possible aptitude for the creation of a new state.\\nIt will be seen from this statement that a civil government is\\nnot a requisite to a state of belligerency. To contend that Gomez\\nand the heroic men who are following him, that Masso and the\\ncivil officials who are subordinate to him are mere brigands, and\\nare to be treated as traitors and malefactors, is shocking to the\\nsensibilities of every person; and yet a refusal to accord them\\nbelligerent rights ignores their political aspirations and the tyran-\\nnous exactions imposed by Spain, which have led to the revolu-\\ntion and the desire for the creation of a new state, and, by every\\nrule of logic, necessarily requires us to regard them as traitors\\nand pirates.\\nThe Cubans as belligerents, so far as international law is con-\\ncerned, would have a status merely for the purpose of fighting\\nand (by the arbitrament of the sword; determining whether f ur th er\\n32.23", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "30\\nrecognition shall be given them as a distinct and independent na-\\ntion. The author last mentioned further states:\\nThe quality of belligerency is accorded to armed parties who, without\\nhaving received from an already existing state the right to combat with\\narmed forces, have militarily organized themselves and struggle in good\\nfaith within their own state for a political right.\\nProfessor Snow, late of Harvard University, states the interna-\\ntional rule as follows:\\nA mixed war is a war between members of the same political society. It\\nis a civil war, though it may not reach beyond the proportions of an insur-\\nrection or a local rebellion. The movements in Spain in 1866 and 1867 were of\\nthis nature. Such a war may attain sufficient strength and magnitude to en-\\ntitle both contending parties to all the rights of war with respect to each\\nother and to neutral states. Again, according to the manner and degree of\\nthe hostile operation, wars are .said to be perfect or imperfect.\\nWith the Cuban forces occupying the eastern half of the island\\nand possessing the residue, with the exception of the fortified cities\\nand towns, can it truthfully be said that it is not a civil war?\\nDr. Lorimer, in his Institutes of the Law of Nations, announces\\nthe rule relative to belligerency as follows:\\nThere is the recognition of the inchoate state as a jural claimant for sepa-\\nrate recognition; that is to say, the acknowledgment of its right to contend\\nfor its recognition, or, to borrow a phrase from municipal law, of its title\\nto sue. The form Avhich recognition usually assumes at this stage is that of\\na concession of belligerent rights.\\nProfessor Pomeroy, in his excellent work on International Law,\\nwith great clearness presents the legal principles involved in this\\nsubject. He contends that the de facto existence of the insur-\\ngents as a state is not an essential prerequisite to the granting of\\nbelligerency, and that the government according belligerent rights\\ndoes not ally itself with the revolutionists, but\\nSimply accords to this community the international right to carry on\\nproper war with the usual immunities and duties as to other nations which\\nbelong to war. it does not assume to decide upon the justice of the\\nquarrel. Without this recognition all other powers would be under\\nthe necessity of treating the insurgents under certain circumstances as out-\\nlaws and ijirates, for as the community has no standing as a state, it could\\nnot without the species of recognition in question perform any hostile act or\\nhave recourse to any military measure that might interfere with the rights\\nof other nations, although such acts and measures are permitted to the states\\nby international law.\\nHe contends that to refuse recognition under some circum-\\nstances might\\nHave the direct effect of causing the states so refusing to take the part of\\nthe mother country against the rebels. As a consequence, if another power\\nshould remain strictly neutral to the contest, that very attitude must involve\\nthe recognition of the insurgents as belligerents. Unless another power de-\\nsires to take an active part in the hostilities and throw the weight of its influ-\\nence and, under some circumstances, the positive aid of its executive power\\nin favor of the motlier country, it must treat the rebels as belligerents.\\nThe propositions, therefore, which I lay down and maintain are, first, that\\nas, in general, every nation has a right to remain neutral in every such con-\\ntest, every nation has a right to recognize both parties as belligerents, the\\ncontest as proper war, and the mother country would have no legal ground\\nof complaint of such act and attitude; secondly, that in general it is the duty\\nof every other nation to take this position of neutrality.\\nThe position of Mr. Dana (which has become the fortress be-\\nhind which the present Executive protects himself) that there\\nmust be a de facto political organization, sufficient in character,\\npopulation, and resources to constitute, if left to itself, a state\\namong the nations, and the employment of military forces on each\\nside acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war, and\\nthe treatment of captured insurgents by the parent state, as pris-\\no2a3", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "31\\noners of war, before belligerency can be granted, is not supported\\nby authority. As Professor Poaieroy states:\\nThe error which lies at the bottom of all Mr. Dana s argument, and which\\nvitiates the whole of it, is the assumption that necessity alone would jus-\\ntify the foreign state in recognizing the belligerency of the insurgent com-\\nmunity.\\nThe United States in refusing belligerency to the insurgents\\nhave been the supporters of Spam, and such refusal is an act of\\nhostility to the Cubans. Civil war exists. This is an incontest-\\nable fact. Whether our support of Spain by denying belligerency\\nhas been material, actual, and effective may be questioned by\\nsome, but that it has been moral, is too palpable to need argument.\\nSpain had no right to reqjiire this -moral aid from us. The in-\\nsurgents would be justified in complaining because of its bestowal.\\nSpain demands the right to determine whether the contest is war.\\nThe same right of determination belongs to this Government.\\nOur action in granting belligerency might not influence Spain.\\nShe might still regard the insurgents as pirates and treat them as\\nsuch. But no law, national or international, ought to require this\\nnation to treat them as criminals. In the controversy we should\\nhave been neutral. If neutrality had been observed, belligerency\\nwould have been accorded the supporters of the Cuban Republic.\\nEven under one phase of Mr. Dana s view, neutrality should have\\nbeen declared, because the killing of American citizens, the\\nimprisonment of others, the destruction of millions of dollars\\nworth of their property, and also the extensive commerce betweea\\nCuba and this nation, created such a necessity as not only de-\\nmanded neutrality but justified intervention.\\nSpain s efforts to repress the rebellion are not the mere ordinary\\ngovernmental agencies for the arrest and punishment of infractors\\nof the law and which are supplemented by the posse comitatus they\\nare not the mere disi^ersal of a mob or the overthow of a multitude\\nengaged in riotous demonstrations in which Spain is engaged;\\nbut a superhuman, death-like struggle of the military forces of\\nthe nation to prevent the complete extinguishment of the civil\\npower within her chief province.\\nThis, then, is war in fact. And this position becomes im-\\npregnable when fortified by facts showing that the Cuban forces\\nare not mere nomadic bands of unorganized malcontents, but are a\\npowerful military organization, based upon organic law and sub-\\nject to civil jurisdiction, occupying extensive territory and op-\\nposing successfully the vast military forces of the parent govern-\\nment. And, in addition, they are supported morally, financially,\\nand otherwise by four-fifths of the inhabitants of their country.\\nThe insurgents more than answer the requirements of Mr. Can-\\nning, the great English statesman, who said, when considering\\nthe case of the Greek revolutionists, that the character of bellig-\\nerency is not so much a princijjle as a fact, and\\nThat a certain degree of force and consistency acquired by a mas=i of pop-\\nulation engaged in war entitled that population to be treated as belligerents.\\nEven if their right was questionable, it was the interest of nations,\\nweU understood, to so treat them.\\nIn the struggle between conflicting forces in Mexico we recog-\\nnized the government of Juarez as the rightful one, but treated\\nboth parties to the struggle as belligerents.\\nOrtolan contends that it is the general practice of nations to\\nregard it a civil war when a considerable part of the citizens are\\nproceeding with and against force to change or modify the gov-\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "32\\nernment or to accomplish some other political design. (Volume\\n2, page 10, Dip. de la Mur.)\\nAnd Martens and Kluber declare it to be the duty of nations to\\nassume neutrality, except when bound by treaties of alliance\\neither offensive or defensive, with one of the belligerents.\\nBecause the Spanish generals refuse flags of truce, or the ex-\\nchange of prisoners, and ruthlessly butcher captured insurgents,\\nis not a persuasive argument against affirmative action by us;\\nand yet this savagery is assigned by the President, quoting from\\nGrant, as one of the reasons why belligerency should not be\\ngranted. The history of the war proves that the insurgents treated\\nprisoners in that humane manner required by international rules,\\nand sought to conform to recognized usages of war.\\nIn order to deprive them of the advantages of belligerency,\\nwhich would result if Spain conducted the contest according to\\napproved methods of warfare, she, both by civil and military au-\\nthorities, insists that the Cubans are traitors and criminals (instead\\nof political offenders) and treats them as such. But even applying\\nthe tests suggested by the President, belligerency long since should\\nhave been granted. There is a civil government, a de facto polit-\\nical organization. It has won to its support sufiScient numerical\\nstrength to arm and equip and maintain in the field for nearly\\nthree years more than 30,000 soldiers.\\nA constitution has been adopted, liberal in its terms. Civil and\\nmilitary operations are conducted pursuant to its provisions. Offi-\\ncers are elected, laws are enacted, revenue is collected, a postal\\nsystem is maintained, diplomatic agents appointed, a capital estab-\\nlished, and the military forces have acted, so far as the parent gov-\\nernment would permit, in harmony with the established rules of\\nwar. If Spain refused an exchange of prisoners, or to recognize\\nflags of truce, the wrong, if it be one, must be visited upon the\\noffender, not the innocent one. What more in justice and reason\\ncan be required by this Government before assuming neutrality?\\nIt is a matter of history that many adventuresome sons of our\\nRepublic have supported in this contest the flag of Cuba. If\\ncaptured by Spain, they are to be treated as traitors and malefac-\\ntors. We accord them the same treatment because we deny them\\nbelligerency. The officials of this nation, Congress and the Presi-\\ndent, are indicted for conspiring with Spain to exterminate the\\nnoncombatants by starvation and hang the insurgents in arms as\\ntraitors. In the court of public conscience an impartial jury have\\npronounced the defendants guilty. What shall be the sentence?\\nThe gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hitt] contended, and that\\nview is taken by the President in his message, that belligerency\\nwould be disadvantageous to the insurgents. This is so fallacious,\\nif not preposterous, that its advocacy is amazing. Why do the in-\\nsurgents desire belligerent rights? Why is Spain unwilling that\\nthey shall be accorded if no benefits will result to the revolution-\\nists? The present vice-president of the Cuban Republic, Salva-\\ndor Cisneros, on the 1st of February, 1896, when he was president,\\naddressed an eloquent appeal to the American people. He asked\\nthat international standing be given the insurgents and that\\nThe American people grant to us, through their President and Congress,\\nthose rights of belligerency to which, according to the laws of war and of\\nnations, we are entitled. Must we capture Habana and drive Spain s\\nhirelings across the sea before we are even given the right of men to fight\\nfor that priceless gift which God destined should be universally divided\\namong His children? Must we gain our independence before we are accorded\\nthe sanction of the world to labor for it? Here in Cubitas are the\\nhead offices and chief departments of the republic; here we are able and\\n3233", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "33\\nmost willing to receive representatives of the United States or other na-\\ntions. All we wish now is to be looked upon by the Government of\\nthe United States as men and soldiers battling for their birthright. We do\\nnot wish to appear in the eyes of the world like bandits and rabble.\\nAnd from that time until the present, able and distinguished\\nrepresentatives of the Republic of Cuba have been pleading with\\nthis nation to grant the prayer so eloquently offered by the first\\npresident of the republic. Some of the advantages accruing from\\na grant of belligerency, were pointed out by the able gentleman\\nfrom Illinois when he was championing the cause of Cuba.\\nOn April 3, 1896, when urging the House to pass the Senate reso-\\nlution, he said:\\nNow, to answer the gentleman from Iowa, the effect of recognizing the\\nbelligerency of the Cubans will be, first, to give them a flag and status. If a\\nship should enter New York Harbor this afternoon belonging to Caban insur-\\ngents flying the lone star flag, she would be liable to be treated as a pirate\\nand all on board might be treated as criminals, as violators of law, as enemies\\nof mankind. With recognition, the belligerents will have a flag with the\\nsame status as that of any other country, and a vessel flying that flag can go\\ninto New York Harbor right alongside a Spanish frigate. But as we stand\\nnow, if they should go in this afternoon, the Spanish minister would be at\\nthe State Department immediately asking to have them seized and treated\\nas pirates.\\nAfter we have recognized the belligerent rights of the Cubans,\\nm.en can openly leave our shores and aid the Cubans. The Cubans can go\\nupon the stock boards in this city or anywhere else and publicly offer a loan\\noffer to negotiate their bonds as our fathers did during the Revolution at\\nAmsterdam. They can negotiate loans either with other governments or\\nwith private citizens.\\nHe then qiTOtes the words of Minister Canovas, who said:\\nFrom the moment of their recognition they can send out vessels upon the\\nocean under the flag of the lone star, raise funds in foreign countries, move\\nabout with a freedom which was otherwise never enjoyed, and they could\\neven carry on privateering.\\nAnd then the gentleman from Illinois proceeds:\\nThat does not state all that the recognition of belligei-ency would accom-\\nplish; but it states the great and important advantages that such an act\\nwould give to the Cubans. Why, sir, the United States is at this\\nhotir a base of operations of the Spanish Government in crushing the Cubans\\nwho are struggling for their freedom. Under the pretense of neutrality, we\\nare, every time the Spanish minister gives information to the State Depart-\\nment, running to capture men who are about to start to Cuba or to seize sup-\\nplies of arms intended for the Cubans. We have not even conflne d\\nour assistance to our own ports. In the case of the Hawkins we have pursued\\nthe Cubans out upon the high seas at the behest of Spain. Is that real neu-\\ntrality? Is that fairness? Is it justice? Are we not in spirit and in fact the\\neflicient oppressors of the Cubans ourselves?\\nThose strong, fearless words came from the gentleman when he\\nwas sympathizing with the Cubans, and contending that their in-\\ndependence would result by granting belligerency. Now he seeks\\nto darken our councils; the spell of the President s message has\\nfallen upon him. We have been insisting that this Government\\nshould neither in spirit nor in fact be the efficient oppressors of\\nthe Cubans, but that its heavy hand should be taken from them,\\nthat they might be permitted in their own way to fight their bat-\\ntles for freedom, receiving at our hands only the same treatment\\nwhich we accord to their oppressors.\\nWhen the Spanish minister demanded of President Madison\\nthat our ports be closed against the flags of revolting colonies in\\nSouth America, the President, through Monroe, stated in effect\\nthat the demand could not be complied with; that each party\\nwas permitted to enter our ports with its public and private ships\\nand take from them every article which was the subject of com-\\nmerce with other nations.\\n3323\u00e2\u0080\u00943", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "34\\nIn Mr, Dana s edition of Wheaton (page 34 and a^le) the follow-\\ning language was used:\\nThey [insurgents] gain a great advantage of recjognized status and the op-\\nportunity to employ commissioned cruisers at sea and to exert all the power\\nknown to maritime warfare with the sanction of foreign nations. They can\\nobtain abroad loans, military and naval materials, and enlist men as against\\neverything but neutrality laws. Their flag and commissions are acknowl-\\nedged, their revenue laws respected, and they acquire a quasi-political recog-\\nnition.\\nJustice Brown, in the Abrose-Light Case (25 Fed, Rep., 418),\\nsays that\\nThe recognition by at least some established government of a state of war,\\nor of the belligerent rights of insurgents, is necessary to prevent their cruis-\\ners from being held legally piratical by the courts of other nations injuriously\\naffected, is either directly confirmed or necessarily implied from many ad-\\njudged cases.\\nFrom these and many other authorities to which reference\\nmight be made it is patent that great advantages to the Cuban\\ninsurgents would have been derived from such recognition. Loans\\nwould have been negotiated, privateering conducted munitions of\\nwar purchased from us, thousands of our chivalrous and gallant\\nsons recruited into the Cuban armies, and to-day Cuba would not\\nbe in desolation and ruin; but, with the bright flag of a virile,\\nyoung nation, she would have entered upon the great highway\\ntrodden by progressive nations, acknowledging the beneficence of\\nrepublican institutions and the glorious example established by\\nour nation, the firstborn of the continent.\\nThis duty unperformed, has pressed upon us other and important\\nones. The Cubans will achieve their independence whether we\\nrecognize them as belligerents or not, or whether there is any in-\\ntervention by us in their behalf. What Chatham said of our\\nfathers is true of the Cubans:\\nYou can not conquer America. You may raise armies, you may make cam-\\npaigns, you may even win battles, but you will never subdue the spirit of\\nliberty in that people.\\nIf there is no recognition of independence, there should be bel-\\nligerency.\\nBy granting belligerency it would hasten Cuban independence;\\nbut the cruelties and sorrows and horrors of the situation would\\ncontinue, our commerce still further suffer, our peace as a nation\\nwould be disturbed, and the interests of our people and Govern-\\nment rendered still more insecure. To prevent the continuation\\nof this great crime against humanity, this desolation, ruin, aud\\ndeath, the United States should immediately recognize the inde-\\npendence of the Cuban Republic, enter into diplomatic relations\\nwith it, compel a suspension of hostilities so that the murder of\\nthe reconcentrados might cease, then mediate to secure Spain s\\nabandonment of the contest and the relinquishment of her author-\\nity therein.\\nIf the Cuban people were willing to pay to Spain a monetary\\nconsideration for the complete extinguishment of her sovereignty^,\\nit would be a matter in which our voice would be silent. If\\nSpain perversely refused such mediation, and continued the work\\nof devastation and death, by force, cooperating with the Cuban\\narmies, this nation should drive her flag from Cuban soil, and\\njoin in the coronation of a new government this isle of the free,\\nthis home of the brave.\\nInternational law supports this position, and our peculiar rela-\\ntions to Cuba, together with the occurrences of the century which\\nS233", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "35\\naffect Spain, Cuba, and the United States, multiply the reasons\\njustifying it. Before discussing the legal aspect of the ques-\\ntion involved in the proposition of intervention, I desire to invite\\nattention to some historic facts demonstrating that SiDain has for-\\nfeited all right to the possession or control of Cuba.\\nWe have passed from the gloom and darkness of medisevalism,\\nbut Spain has refused to accept the inspiration prophetic of a truer\\ncivilization and a glorified era. Her conquests have been by the\\nsword and the power of might; justice and mercy have been un-\\nknown quantities in her foreign administration. The New World\\nwas prostrate at her feet. Instead of seeking the enlightenment\\nof its inoffensive children and the establishment of colonial gov-\\nernments intrenched in the affections of the people, she sought\\ntheir destruction, and, with the utmost ferocity, despoiled them\\nof place and nation. Cupidity and avarice intensified their bru-\\ntality.\\nTwo purposes only guided Spain in dealing with her colonies in\\nthe New World. First, to enrich the parent Government by their\\nexploitation and the enforced sale of Spanish products to the\\nCuban people. Second, their political control by an oligarchy, in\\norder to furnish places and offices for hordes of Spanish courtiers\\nand satellites. There was no attempt to advance the material\\ninterests of the colonies and their people or to bring aboiTt indus-\\ntrial development. The most repressive measures were adopted\\nto prevent political independence or financial growth, which might\\nlead to discontent toward parent State.\\nThe same policy which Tacitus informs us Rome applied to\\nGreat Britain, that of plundering and of enslaving the people,\\nwas regarded as the proper one to control the colonial dependen-\\ncies. To the colonies no form of local self-government was given.\\nOfficials were sent by the Crown armed with despotic power.\\nThey ruled without law, except their own tyrannous will. Civil\\nlaw was a figment, personal rights and liberty were unknown.\\nThere could only be in time one result of this imperialism. Re-\\nvolts and revolutions succeeded each other. Made desperate by\\nthe outrages and wrongs perpetrated upon succeeding generations,\\nthe spirit of determined resistance seized the people, and the yoke\\nof Spain was thrown off.\\nTlie South American colonies under Boliver, Ban Martin, O Hig-\\ngins, and other valorous leaders, won their independence. Mexico\\nand the Central American States followed their example, until at\\nlast in the empires possessed by Spain in the New World, only\\nthe ever-faithful isle and Puerto Rico remained. Her misfor-\\ntunes in the government of her colonies and the humiliating defeats\\nsustained at their hands have wrought no change in her system\\nof administering Cuban affairs.\\nDuring the century her anger has been kindled against Cuba,\\nand she has enforced her paternalistic policy and more fully devel-\\noped the commercial sj stem which makes Cuba a tributary to\\nSpaiai. She destroyed the vast population inhabiting the island at\\nthe time of its discovery, and then planted the system of slavery.\\nWhen, through the force of revolution, she was compelled to\\nabandon slavery, slie sought Asiatic importations to found another\\ncondition of servitude. She has sent Governors-General who were\\nso corrupt and despotic that almost all had to be deposed and\\ndispelled. Some, such as Gaspar de Torres, were real highway-\\nmen. (Die. Enc. Hisp., page 1467.)", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "36\\nThese men by decree of May 28, 1S25, liai\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nThe fullest authority, the same powers being bestowed which by the\\nroyal ordinances are granted to the governors of besieged cities. In conse-\\nquence of this His Majesty gives the most ample and unbounded\\npower, not only to send away from the island any persons in office, what-\\never their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein\\nmay be deemed injurious (by the Governor-General) or whose Gon-\\ndii .t, public or private, may alarm you, but also to suspend the\\nexecution of any order whatsoever or any general provision made concerning\\nany branch of the administration as may be thought most suitable to the\\nroyal service.\\nBecause Spain has denied Cubans a participation in the govern-\\nment of their own affairs and condemned them to political in-\\nferiority in the land of their birth, because she confiscates the\\nproduct of their labor, impoverishes the people, deprives them of\\nsacred and dear rights, maintains a despotic militarism, and com-\\nnels the acceptance of a Spanish bureaucracy, the Cubans have\\nagain and again appealed for redress. Entreaties have been un-\\navailing. Insurrections and revolutions have then followed. So\\nthat the century presents a pathetic picture Cuba despoiled and\\nplundered; Spain profiting by her misfortunes; the oppressed\\npleading for liberty and a mitigation of their sorrow; Spain co-\\nquetting with their demands, promising relief only to find pretexts\\nfor denying righteous demands; revolutions, carnage, and blood-\\nshed; and the chapter is not yet closed.\\nThe revolutions of 1850 and 1851 were speedily overthrown, but\\nin 1855 the Cubans conspired again for independence. In 1868\\nthe conflict began and raged for ten years. On the 24th of Feb-\\nruary. 1895, men who accepted peace in 1878 again joined the\\nstandard of revolt and, with their sons, fight on for liberty, home,\\nand country.\\nDuring the ten years war the property of many of the Cubans\\nwas confiscated and the country laid waste; yet upon the estab-\\nlishment of peace, Spain s exactions reached the enormous figure\\nof $46,000,000 for the fiscal year 1879. It was slightly reduced in\\n1883, and since 1886 the annual budget has been fixed at about\\n$26,000,000.\\nWith this enormous drain upon the island, and with repressive\\nand restrictive legislation, in the interests of Catalonia and impor-\\ntant manufacturing and producing cities of Spain, (which were\\nbarriers to the commercial nations with which Cuba desired to\\ndeal and by natural laws were her proper and natural markets of\\ntrade); it becomes a matter of wonder that the people could meet\\nthese demands and still give to the island a value of nearly\\n$1,000,000,000 before the present war overwhelmed it.\\nThe capacity of the people to bear these great burdens testifies\\neloquently to their industry, and is strong evidence of their ability\\nfor self-government. And it is conceded by Spanish authority\\nthat there must be added to this large sum annually taken to re-\\nplenish the coffers of Spain, millions of dollars which, by pecula-\\ntion and malversation in office, were diverted from the revenue\\nchannels by the Spanish bureaucracy.\\nSeiior Roblado, the present leader of the Conservatives in Spain,\\nstated in the Cortes May 28, 1890, speaking of the the defalcation\\nof the Spanish officials in Cuba:\\nThey amount to the following sum: 22,811,516 pesetas. Did not the Gov-\\nernment know this? What has been done?", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "37\\nAnd Sonor Castaneda stated in the Spanish Cortes June 24\\n1891:\\nHow can any one doubt that corraptioti exists in the Island of Ciiba?\\nGeneral Prendergast has furnished a list of ;350 persons employed in the cns-\\ntom-houses against whom proceedings have been taken for fraud, and not\\none of them has been punished,\\nSenor Dolz, a Spanish deputy, published in the Atenebo de\\nMadrid, in the spring of 1895, a statement that the custom-house\\nfrauds in Cuba since the year 1877 amounted to $100,000,000.\\nCaptain-General Dulce, writing to the minister for the colonies\\nin 1867, said:\\nThe cause of trouble and of the inquietude which appears in the island of\\nCuba should be sought for to a great extent in the tariff laws, which, undei\\nthe pretext of protection, make impossible a commerce carried on in good\\nfaith. pjje custom-house system is very expensive, overloaded with\\nformalities, which do not prevent fraud, but which embarrass and annoy\\nhonest trade. The ordinance of matriculas, instead of protecting industry\\nupon the seas, has well-nigh destro5 ed it.\\nThe debate in the Spanish Cortes in June. 1890, revealed that a\\nperfect saturnalia of larceny and corruption existed in the cus-\\ntom-houses and various other departments provided for the col-\\nlection of revenues in Cuba. The minister of the colonies, resid-\\ning at Madrid, has nearly $100,000 annually assigned to him; the\\ngovernor-general, $50,000 annually, in addition to palaces and ex-\\npenses of maintaining his household; the director-general of the\\ntreasury, $18,000 per annum; the archbishop of Santiago and the\\nbishop of Habana, $18,000 each; and so on ad infinitum. General\\nPando, in March, 1890, affirmed that the board of public debt had\\ncommitted robberies exceeding the sum of $12,000,000.\\nBy the venal methods employed by these swarms of Spanish\\nofficeholders controlling Cuba, it has been said that from one-\\nfourth to one-half of all revenues collected are embezzled. The\\ndebt of Cuba in 1868 was $25,000,000. By the scandalous, im-\\nmoral fiscal system imposed by Spain since that time, this in-\\ndebtedness in 1895 had reached_ the fabulous sum of nearly $300,-\\n000,000. This debt was created by Spain, not Cuba. The Cubans\\nhad no voice in obtaining the money, nor were thej consulted in\\nthe expenditure of it.\\nMore than five hundred millions in addition to this sum, be-\\ntween the close of the ten-years war and the commencement of\\nhostilities, have been wrung from the island. This amount went\\nto replenish Spain s exhausted treasury and to meet advances\\nmade in the Car list wars and her controversies in Santo Domingo\\nand Peru. None of it went for the upbuilding of Cuba. No\\nschools were established, no highways built, no public improve-\\nments made.\\nIn the budget of 1895, which appropriated and distributed over\\n$26,000,000, only $746,925 was ostensibly appropriated for local\\nimprovements. I sought in vain when in Cuba for any evidences\\nof a just or beneficent administration by the Peninsula. It is a\\nfact beyond question that Spain has exploited the Cubans and de-\\nlivered them over to be plundered by corrupt, venal, impecunioug\\ncamp followers of the Spanish Crown and its satellites. I found\\nno schools, no highways, no improved harbors, no asylums none\\nof those evidences which mark a judicious application of public\\nrevenues. Spain was warned of this unnatural and despotic\\ncourse. In the Cortes in 1866 a deputy said:\\nI foresee a catastrophe near at hand in case Spain persists in remaining\\ndeaf to the just reclamations of the Cubans. Look at the old colonics of the", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "38\\nAmerican continent. All have ended in conquering tlieir independence.\\nLet Spain not forget the lesson; let the Government be just to the colonies\\nthat remain. Thus she vsrill consolidate her dominion over people v7ho only\\naspire to be good sons of a worthy mother, but who are not willing to live as\\nslaves under the scepter of a tyrant.\\nThese evils becoming unbearable, a declaration of independence\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0was issued October 10, 1868, at Yara, and Cespedes, with. 128\\nill-armed men, raised the standard of revolution. Some of the\\ngrievances alluded to are stated in the declaration as follows:\\nAnd as Spain has many a time promised us Cubans to respect our rights\\nwithout having hitherto fulfilled her promises; as she continues to tax us\\nheavily, and by so doing is likely to destroy our wealth; as we are in danger\\nof losing our property, our lives, and our honor, under further Spanish do-\\nlainion, etc.\\nIt is not my purpose to detail the sorrowful, sickening proceed-\\nings of this conflict, of the cruelties and barbarities perpetrated\\nby Valmaceda, Weyler, and other Spanish commanders and offi-\\ncials, or to dwell on the long, sanguinary struggle which resulted\\nin the loss, of over 100,000 Spanish troops through sickness, dis-\\nease, and war, and the destruction of thousands of Cubans and\\nthe desolation of a large portion of the island.\\nAt last General Campos, commanding the Spanish armies, nego-\\ntiated with the Cuban leaders for the establishment of peace, and\\nin Febriiary, 1878, articles of peace were agreed upon. Indubita-\\nble proofs exist that Spain has flagrantly violated the terms of\\nthat treaty, and that the present revolution is directly caused by\\nher perfidy and the continuous oppression of her Cuban subjects.\\nSenor Maura, who was minister for the colonies in 1893, offered\\na measure of colonial reform containing many admirable, liberal\\nfeatures. It partially met the requirements of the peace of Zanjon.\\nIt was quickly defeated in the Cortes, and Senor Barbazuza pre-\\npared a colonial scheme of government which was approved by\\nthe Cortes in February, 1895. It was not real or genuine, and\\ngave neither administrative decentralization nor political or in-\\ndustrial relief to the Cubans. It maintained the same paternal-\\nism, perpetuated the same monopoly of trade in favor of Spain,\\nby means of differential duties and obstructions to commercial\\nrelations with the United States and other nations.\\nIt still converted the island into a prey for the Spanish vam-\\npires and officeholders, and condemned the Cubans to the same\\nslavery and inequality so long endured. The news of this mock-\\nery quickly reached the island, and on the 34th of February the\\nfires of revolution were lighted.\\nVattel announces that promises and conventions must be re-\\nspected by rulers and governments, and when broken revolution\\nis justifiable.\\nPromises of genuine autonomy and the abolition of the obnox-\\nious colonial system prevailing, brought the peace of Zanjon; but\\nno effort was made, except as above stated, to effect the promised\\nreforms.\\nGeneral Campos wrote a year thereafter, a letter which shows\\nthe duplicity of Spain. It was read in the Spanish Senate by\\nCanovas July 21, 1879:\\nPromises never fulfilled, abuses of all kinds, no provision made for agri-\\nculture and public works, the exclusion of the natives from all branches of the\\nadministration, and other faults implanted gave rise to the insurrection of\\nYara. The conviction of successive governments, that no other means can\\nbe used here but terror, and that it is a matter of dignity not to begin re-\\nform as long as a shot is fired, may be continued. If we do not wish to ruin\\nSpain, we must take up frankly the question of liberty.\\n3323", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "39\\nThe Madrid Liga Heraria of July 27, 1879, in publishing this,\\nthen asks:\\nWhat have we clone from the peace of Zanjon to this day to prevent a\\nrepetition of what happened at Yara?\\nThe eminent Spanish statesman, Pei y Margall, said, as quoted\\nin the Madrid Don Qui Jote, July 13, 1879:\\nWe must endeavor to reestablish the principles of justice. No nation has\\nthe right to occupy other territory inhabited by other men imless with their\\nconsent. No prescription is possible in this matter. Prescription\\ndoes not apply and never does apply to the right of liberty and independ-\\nence. Let us make them masters and arbiters of their own desti-\\nnies. Let us leave them to rule themselves in all matters pertaining to their\\ninternal life, political, administrative, and economic.\\nAgainst such conduct the sentiment of patriotism is invoked. But\\nabove the idea of country arises that of humanity, and above both that of\\njustice. Cuba is the grave of our youth in these deplorable wars. Our sol-\\ndiers perish there by thousands. The greater part is dragged there\\nby force and must fight for a cause that is distasteful to them. Must\\nthe nation to be sovereign drain the life of the groups composing it? Does\\nits sovereignty necessarily carry with it the slavery of colonies?\\nThe statement of one of our own consuls, as reported by the\\nState Department in 1885, proves the intolerable condition of\\nthe Spanish dominion:\\nThe entire population with the exception of the official class are living\\nunder a tyranny unparalleled at this day on the globe. There is a system of\\noppression and torture which enters into every phase of life, eats into the\\nsoul of every Cuban, mortifies, injures, and insults him every hour, impover-\\nishes him and his family from day to day, threatens the rich man with bank-\\nruptcy and the poor man with beggary. The exactions of the Spanish Gov-\\nernment and the illegal outrages of its oflicers are in fact intolerable. They\\nhave reduced the islands to despondency and ruin. The Government\\nat Madrid is directly answerable for the misery of Cuba and for the rapacity\\nand venality of its subordinates. A war tax of the most exaggerated\\ncharacter was laid. Every business, trade, art, or profession is taxed in the\\nproportionof 35 to 33|- per cent of its net income. All the petty trades\\nand employments in the country are separately suffering. All participate in\\nthe common distress.\\nBetween the peace of Zanjon and the breaking out of the pres-\\nent war it was apparent to the Cubans no amelioration of their\\ncondition was possible except such as was gained by the sword.\\nTaxes had been levied anew on everything, the offices were still\\nfilled by Spaniards, the professed, extension of suffrage to the\\nCubans was rendered inoperative by Spanish administration, mal-\\nversation and the most flagrant frauds were still perpetrated in\\nthe revenue and other departments, representation was denied, the\\npublic revenues applied exclusively to pay Spanish debts and to\\nmaintain the army and navy, and the industrial depression, by\\nthese vicious means and discriminatory legislation, had become sq\\nacute that stagnation in business and an economic and monetary\\ncrisis resulted. A revolution was the only fruit possible upon this\\nupas tree of Spain s planting.\\nJose Marti established a provisional, independent government,\\nwhich has successfully maintained itself against the power of\\nSpain until the present hour. So vigorous were its military opera-\\ntions, that the magnanimous Campos was hurriedly recalled to\\nSpain, and the unmentionable Weyler sent to succeed him. Then\\nfollowed a reign of terror and bloodshed so horrible as to defy\\ndescription.\\nNone in Cuba deny these inhuman acts attributed to him.\\nThe Spanish people admit them, and the evidences of their perpe-\\ntration are incontestable. The proclamations of Valmaceda iu\\nthe ten years war, that\\nall persons captured in Spanish waters or on the high seas near Cuba, no\\nmatter their derivation or destination, having arms or munitions aboard,\\n333-:j", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "40\\naTe to be treated as pirates and immediately exeoutad, and every habita-\\ntion unoccupied will be burned by tlie troops, and tbose from which a white\\nflag does not float reduced to ashes, and every man over 15 years of age found\\naway from his habitation failmg to prove a justifiable motive shall be shot\\nwere not more cruel. Against that mode of warfare Mr. Fish, at\\nthe direction of President Grant, protested:\\nThe order to indiscriminately slaughter all persons captui ed in siich vessel,\\nwithout regard to their uum.ber, could not Uut shock the sensibilities of all\\nhumane persons.\\nMr. Fish further stated:\\nIn the interest of Christian civilization and common humanity, I hope this\\ndocument is a forgery. If it be indeed genuine, the President instructs me in\\nthe most forcible manner to protest against such a mode of warfare and to\\nask you to request the Spanish authorities in Cuba to take such steps as no\\nperson having the right to proclaim the protection of the Government of the\\nUnited States shall be sacrificed or injured in the conduct of hostilities upon\\nthis basis.\\nUnder Weyler s orders pacificos and noncombatants were\\nslaughtered, Cahanas fortress and other prisons filled with inno-\\ncent men and women, many of whom were never heard of again,\\nthe homes and property of the Cubans in the four western prov-\\ninces of the island destroyed by the torch in the hands of the\\nSpanish soldiers and guerrillas, and the helpless, homeless people,\\nmore than half a million in number, forced into fortified cities\\nand towns, there to become victims of starvation and the ravages\\nof diseases produced by their privations and suffering.\\nThis is a brief recital of Spain s record in Cuba. Are her crimes\\nand savagery to be endured forever? In the words of Margall,\\nAbove coujatry is humanity, and above both is justice. Justice\\nhas pronounced judgment. Spain has forfeited all right to further\\ninterest in Cuba.\\nWhile this record was being made, how has her conduct affected\\nthis Grovernment and its interests?\\nOur commerce with Cuba, aggregating nearly $100,000,003\\nper annuna, has been practically destroyed; American citizens\\nhave been ruthlessly biTtchered, and property belonging to Amer-\\nican citizens which exceeded |50,000,000 in value has been ren-\\ndered worthless; hundreds of American citizens have been made\\nbeggars and are now wandering in the streets of Cuban cities,\\nhomeless and dependent upon the charity of this Government; be-\\ntween three and four hundred thousand people have met wretched\\ndeaths as reconcentrados and noncombatants; 200.000 still more\\nwretched Cubans are now unprovided for, and v/ill, in the event\\nof the prolongation of the struggle in its present form, soon meet\\nthe same fate; 25,000 Cubans, fearing imprisonment or death for\\nalleged political offenses, are refugees within our ownborders. Our\\nears and eyes have been witnesses for nearly three years of this\\nmost horrible condition; we have constantly been importuned\\nfrom all quarters to interpose, to prevent the continuation of this\\nawful carnival; the peace of our nation has been during this long\\nperiod disturbed and the interests of our nation menaced; the sen-\\nsibilities of the people have been shocljed, and all have joined in\\nsolemnly protesting against this great crime against humanity.\\nAll these things have profoundly impressed the American peo-\\nple, and they believe that, measured by any moral or ethical code\\nor any divine or human law, national or international, a period\\nhas been reached when we ought not to be required to suffer longer\\nor endure further this awful spectacle. And the additional rea-\\nsons must not be forgotten. We are employing an arm of our\\n32;;3", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "41\\nnaval power in gnardiiig the high seas in tlio interest of Spain.\\nThis tax is becoming bnrdensome.\\nIt is not only during this revolution that we have been compelled\\nto siiifer from the conditions in Cuba. The numerous insurrec-\\ntions and wars extending over the century have been an unceasing\\nsource of trouble, irritation, expense, anxiety, and sorrow to our\\nluation and people. And: during much of this period our relations\\nwith Spain have been delicate and strained.\\nShe has impressed our seamen, disregarded treaty obligations,\\nand, in the case of the Virginius, executed American citizens.\\nThe State Department contains voluminous reports containing\\nprotests, demands, explanations, negotiations, and all of the petty\\nwretched circumlocution incident to diplomatic conduct. This na-\\ntion has been patient, but the hour has now arrived when a firm,\\nvigorous American policy should be pursued. France, it is sug-\\ngested, may interfere in this matter. Spanish bonds have pro-\\ncured French money, and French influences are operating to\\nbring to a close this contest with victory to Spain.\\nIf for any consideration we are restrained from now acting,\\nand if the insurgents are vanquished, what assurances are thera\\nthat within less than a decade a reenactment of the same scenes\\nand crimes would not occur? Spain of to-morrow will be the\\nSpain of to-day and yesterday, applying the same methods, exer-\\ncising the same despotism; and the Cubans of the future will be\\nas the Cubans of the past, with this difference, that each year and\\neach day the glory of our nation s freedom will give added strength\\nto their purpose to gain that which we enjoy.\\nThe Cuban question never can be and never will be settled, and\\nour peace ever will be disturbed, until the scepter of Spain s\\npower passes forever from Cuba s shore. When Amelia Island\\nwas the rendezvous of buccaneers and those whose predatory in-\\ncursions injured our commerce and disturbed our peace, our ships\\nwere sent to drive them from the island, though it was a Spanish\\npossession. The condition amounted in law to a nuisance, and we\\nabated it.\\nIf a strong man is constantly and cruelly wounding his child,\\nand a person is so situate as to be the enforced witness of the\\ncrime, human law, receiving moral sanction, approves the effort\\nto arrest the parent s misconduct.\\nIn addition to our material and commercial interests in the\\nisland, there is an abiding one founded upon affinity if not con-\\nsanguinity. Washington when President said:\\nBorn, sir, in a land of liberty; having early learned its value; having en-\\ngaged in a perilous conflict to defend it; having, in a word, devoted the best\\nyears of my life to secure its permanent establishment in my own country,\\nmy anxious recollections, my sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes are\\nirresistibly excited whensoever in any country 1 see an oppressed nation\\nunfurl the banners of freedom.\\nThe words of Webster are a command to us in this hour of vacil-\\nlation and neglected duty. When pleading for the recognition\\nof Grecian independence in the House of Representatives in 1823,\\nhe used these words:\\nWhat part it becomes this country to take on a question of this sort, so far\\nas it is called upon to take any part, can not be doubtful. Our side of this\\nquestion is settled for us even without our own volition. Our history, our\\nsituation, our character, necessarily decide our position and our course be-\\nfore we have even time to ask whether we have an option. Our place is on\\nthe side of free institutions.\\nAnd in his masterly letter to Mr. Hulsemann, in answer to the\\nlatter s communication remonstrating, in behalf of the Austriaii\\nS2;J3", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "42\\nGovernment, against the action of the President (in sending Mr.\\nClayton to ascertain the progress of the Hungarian revolution) and\\ncertain expressions used by the President, Mr, Webster states:\\nAnd if the United S^^ ates wish success to countries contending for popular\\ninstitutions and natiouij. independence, it is only because they regard such\\nconstitutions and such -national independence not as imaginary, but real\\njustice. When th3 United States behold the people of foreign coun-\\ntries without any such in^;^^rf erence spontaneously moving forward for the\\nadoption of institutions like their own, it surely can not be expected of them\\nto remain wholly indifferent spectators.\\nMr. Fish, in his memorable letter to Mr. Gushing, under date of\\nNovember 5, 1875, said:\\nWhile remembering and observing the duties which this Government as\\none of the family of nations owe s to another member by public law, treaties,\\nor the particular statutes of the United States, it would be idle to attempt to\\nconceal the interest and sympathy with which Americans in the United\\nStates regard any attempt of a nufperous people on this continent to be re-\\nlieved of ties which hold them in t.^iS position of colonial subjection to a dis-\\ntant power, and to assume the independence and the right of self-control\\nwhich natural rights and the spirii of the age accord them.\\nCuba has engaged the attention of American statesmen, and has\\nbeen a matter of grave concern to our Presidents, for nearly a hun-\\ndred years. The uncertain tenure of Spain s holding, and the\\noppressive colonial system maintained, as well as the disquietude\\nconstantly prevailing there, of necessity brought the subject prom-\\ninently into view. And after the promulgation of the Monroe doc-\\ntrine, and European nations sought an alliance vv^ith Monroe, by\\nwhicla Cuba was to be guaranteed as a possession of Spain, our\\nconcern in her welfare was increased.\\nThe Important position which it holds in commanding the Gulf,\\nand its proximity to our shores, made the question of its owner-\\nship transceudently important. Monroe, taking counsel from\\nJefferson and other great statesmen, announced that no European\\npower should be permitted to interfere with Cuba; that while\\nSpain s claim woiild not be controverted, the acquisition by any\\nother nation would not be tolerated. At the same time it was\\neither directly or indirectly understood by American statesmen\\nthat ultimately Spain s supremacy would be lost.\\nEuropean nations acquiesced in Monroe s position, so that our\\nnation has been the voluntary, self-appointed guardian of Cuba.\\nIt is a national policy which forbids Cuba, no matter what her\\nwrongs and oppressions may be at the hands of Spain, from se-\\ncuring European aid or contracting an alliance, offensive or de-\\nfensive, with a European power. We prevent other nations from\\ngiving moral or material suiDport to Cuba in revolutions provoked\\nby Spanish oppression. Does it comport with decency or dignity\\nor right for this nation, under such circumstances, to be an indif-\\nferent spectator to her woes and afflictions?\\nAs early as 1823 the unrest in Cuba occasioned us solicitude.\\nJefferson, in writing to President Monroe, June 11, 1823, said:\\nCuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us.\\nAnd the letter of Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, to Minister\\nNelson, in the same year, evidenced the grave apprehension which\\nCuba, as a European dependency, created.\\nIn 1825 Cuba again became a,n object of international negotia-\\ntion. England desired a joint declaration by the Governments of\\nthe United States, France, and Great Britain to protect Spain s\\ntitle to the island. It was hoped, if this step were taken, that an\\nimmediate acknowledgment would be made by Spain of the South\\n3:23", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "43\\nAmerican Republics. During the incumbency of Mr. Van Buren\\nas Secretary of State, Cuba s relations with Spain and the United\\nStates were constantly discussed.\\nAnd in 1827 Mr. Everett complained of the connivance of the\\nSpanish Crown with the British ministry and Spanish refugees\\nwho were inaugurating movements for the revolutionizing of the\\nisland. In 1830 additional complications arose, and shortly after\\nwe find the State Department again concerned in Cuba s peace,\\nand prospective European combinations which it was considered\\nwould imperil our nation. In 1851, Mr. Webster, then Secretary\\nof State, in a communication to Mr. Barringer, shows the interest\\nof the United States in Cuba and the troubles occasiont d the former\\nin suppressing invasions calculated to overthrow Spain s power in\\nthe island. In 1852, when Mr. Everett was Secretary of State, we\\nfind him occu]pied in dealing with the Cuban question. He states:\\nThe United States, on the other hand, would by the proposed convention\\ndisable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place with-\\nout any disturbance of existing foreign relations and in the natural order of\\nthings. The Island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to\\nthe Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the\\nentrance of that great river which drains half the North American continent\\nand with its tributaries forms the largest system of internal water communi-\\ncation in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with\\nCalifornia by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the\\nSpanish Crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the\\nUnited States should propose a convention like this to Prance and England,\\nthose powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves\\nwas far less serioiis than that which we ask them to assume. The opinions of\\nAmerican statesmen at different times and under varying circumstances\\nhave differed as to the desirableness of the acquisition of Cuba by the United\\nStates. Territorially and commercially it would in our hands be an ex-\\ntremely valuable possession. Under certain contingencies it might be almost\\nessential to our safety.\\nAnd on the 3d of December of the same year he wrote to Mr.\\nCrampton as follows:\\nTo enter into a compact with European powers to the effect that tha\\nUnited States as well as the other contracting powers,\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nReferring to England and France\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nwould disclaim all intentions now or hereafter to obtain possession of Cuba\\nwould be inconsistent with the principle, the policy, and the tradition of the\\nUnited States.\\nPresident Fillmore in his message of 1852 referred to the uneasy-\\ncondition and feeling of alarm on the part of the Cuban authori-\\nties. He complained of the interference by the Spanish officials\\nwith our commercial intercourse with the island. Cuba continued\\nto be a source of irritation to the United States, and was the pro-\\nlific cause of many state papers by Mr. Marcy and other officials\\nof our Government.\\nPresident Buchanan in his message (1858) states:\\nThe truth is that Cuba, in its existing colonial condition, is a constant sourca\\nof annoyance to the American people. With that iilaud under tha\\ndominion of a distant foreign power, this trade\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nFrom the Mississippi River in the United States\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nof vital importance to these States, is exposed to the danger of being destroyed\\nin time of war, and it has hitherto been subjected to perpetual injury and an-\\nnoyance in time of peace. Our relations with Spain, which ought to be of the\\nmost friendly character, must always be placed in jeopardy while the exist-\\ning colonial government over the island shall remain in its present condition.\\nIn 1869 President Grant s first annual message discusses at some\\nlength the Cuban question, and calls attention to the fact that for\\nmore than a year a revolution has been waged in the island for\\nindependence and freedom. Ho refers to the effort of the United\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "44\\nStates to bring the contest to a termination and stop the blood-\\nBhed occasioned by the revolution.\\nIn his special message of June 13, 1870, reference is made to the\\ndestruction of property belonging to American citizens and the\\nimprisonment of some and the sacrifice of the lives of others. In\\nhis message the following year he complains of the distiirbed con-\\ndition of the island and the great concern, annoyance, and anxiety\\nresulting therefrom.\\nThe able Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, on October 29, 1873, in\\nwriting to Mr. Sickles, our minister at Madrid, referred to the\\nineffectual efforts of Spain to suppress the insurrection, the de-\\nstruction of life and property, and the great commercial and other\\nconnections existing between the United States and the island.\\nHe also complained of the great strain imposed upon the United\\nStates in enforcing the neutrality laws, and intimated that if\\nSpain s inability to establish peace should long continue the com-\\nmercial interests of the people of the United States, as well as the\\nGovernment s diity to itself, might require the adoption of a dif-\\nferent policy.\\nIn writing to Mr. Gushing, February 6, 1874, he states:\\nCivil dissensions in Cuba and especially sanguinary hostilities, such as are\\nnow raging there, produce effects in the United States second in gravity only\\nto those which they produce in Spain. 1= Meanwhile this condition of\\nthings grows day by day more and more insupportable to the United States.\\nThe Government is compelled to exert constantly the utmost vigilance to\\nprevent infringement of our law on the part of Cubans purchasing munitions\\nor materials of war or laboring to fit out military expeditions in our ports;\\nwe are constrained to maintain a large naval force to prevent violations of\\nour sovereignty either by the Cubans or by the Spaniards; our people are\\nhorrified and agitated at the spectacle at our very doors of war not only with\\nall its ordinary attendance of devastation and carnage, but with the ac^^\\ncompaniments of barbarous shooting of prisoners of war, or their summary\\nexecution by military commission, to the scandal and disgrace of the age?!_\\nwe are under the necessity of interposing continually for the protection of-\\nour citizens against wrongful acts of local authorities of Spain in Cuba; and\\nthe public peace is every moment subject to be interrupted by some unfore-\\nseen eventiike that which recently occui red to drive us at once to the brink\\nof war with Spain. In short, the state of Cuba is the one great cause of per-\\npetual solicitude in the foreign relations of the United States.\\nIn President Granfs seventh annual message attention is directed\\nto the protracted strife in Cuba, to the extent of seriously crippling\\ncommercial nations, especially the United States, and to the loss\\nof property by the citizens of the United States. Almost the first\\nact of President Hayes was to direct the attention of Congress to\\nthe baneful effects upon the United States of the hostilities in\\nCuba, and the unlawful proceedings of Spain in interfering with\\nAmerican vessels and commerce in making illegal arrests and levy-\\ning oppressive taxes upon American residents.\\nPresident Arthur did not escape a question which had chal-\\nlenged most of his predecessors, and we find him in 1884, in his\\nmessage to Congress, alluding to the neutrality laws and the vigi-\\nlance required upon the part of the United States to prevent infrac-\\ntions by persons who were endeavoring to bring about a revolt in\\nCuba against Spanish authoritj\\nMr. Cleveland was compelled to deal with the unpleasant heri-\\ntage. On December 7, 1896, in addressing Congress, he referred\\nto the interests of the United States in Cuba, the commercial rela-\\ntions between them, the capital invested in railroads, mines, and\\nother enterprises, and argued that the United States are inex-\\ntricably involved in the controversy in other ways, both vexatious\\nand costly, and that the struggle which was ruining the Island\\nE233", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "45\\nwas of serious concern to our people, and that our interests were\\nnot wholly sentimental or philanthropic.\\nThe present Executive is confronted with the same question,\\nbut a crisis has now been reached. All the currents of the past\\nare converged and there must be a solution of the question.\\nIt is a litigated question which has been in the court of public\\nconscience for nearly a hundred years and international forums\\nfor three-quarters of a century. The court of final resort has\\nnow been reached.\\nPresident McKinley denominates the issues as the\\nmost important problem with which this Government is how called upon to\\ndeal pertaining to its foreign relations.\\nFor no enduring period since the enfranchisement of the continental pos-\\nsessions of Spain in the Western Continent has the condition of Cuba or the\\npolicy of Spain toward Cuba not caused concern to the United States.\\nThe existing conditions can not but fill this Government and the American\\npeople with the gravest apprehension.\\nSuch a record as this is conclusive proof that the safety and wel-\\nfare of this nation, its peace and honor, its commercial interests,\\nand the protection of its citizens having property interests in\\nCuba can only be preserved and secured by the termination of\\nSpanish supremacy in Cuba. We can no longer be required to\\nmaintain an expectant attitude, waiting for Spain to adopt a\\nproper colonial policy, to deal righteously with the Cuban people,\\nand to reestablish an honorable, just, and lasting peace with her\\nrevolted subjects. What, then, is the remedy? In my opinion, it\\nlies in intervention by the United States. Spain has been repeat-\\nedly warned for seventy-five years that the United States could\\nnot forever behold the lamentable conditions prevailing in Cuba\\nand the prospect of continued revolutions so distracting to our\\npeace and injurious to this nation.\\nExamples are numerous in history of intervention by govern-\\nments in the affairs of others. Whatever high and worthy reasons\\nhave existed as authority for interfering in the political concerns\\nof nations, whatever sanction such interference may have found\\nin international law, all can now be invoked in justification of\\ndirect, immediate, and, if necessary, armed intervention by this\\nnation to free the lamb from the vulture s clutches, to release the\\ninnocent, struggling child from the grasp of the inhuman, debased,\\nand barbarous parent.\\nThe grounds assigned for intervention have been various. The\\nfoUowinghave been regarded as sufficient to warrant it: Impedi-\\nments to commerce, Burdensome measures of protection and\\nrepression, Effusion of blood, Humanit5% and Thereposeof\\nEurope. England and other powers intervened in the case of\\nBelgium in 1830 because of a warm desire to arrest, with the\\nshortest possible delay, the disorder and the effusion of blood.\\nUnder the treaty of Berlin in 1878, intervention in behalf of\\nServia, Roumania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria was predicated\\nupon the ground of a desire to regulate. Humanitarian feel-\\nings prompted intervention in 1837 by Great Britain, France, and\\nRussia in behalf of the Greek revolutionists. The religious pei*-\\nsecutions inflicted by the Sultan of Turkey and the policy of ex-\\ntermination pursued by the Ottoman Government aroused the\\nGreeks to heroic and desperate resistance. Owing to the timely\\naid afforded by the great powers they achieved independence.\\nSpeaking of this contest, Dr. Wheat on states that\\nThe rights of human nature wantonly outraged by this cruel warfare were\\nbut tardily and imperfectly vindicated by this measure, but its principl;\\nB323", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "4G\\nwasfully justified by the gi eat, pai-amotint law of self-preservation. What-\\never a nation may lawfully defend for itself, it may defend for another if\\ncalled on to interpose. This interference of the Christian powers to put an end\\nto this bloody contest might safely, therefore, have been rested on this ground\\nalone, without appealing to the interests of commerce and of the rejjose of\\nEurope, which, as well as the interests of humanity, are alluded to in the\\ntreaty as the determining motives of the high contracting parties.\\nThere is great contrariety of opinion expressed by publicists\\nand international writers as to wliat grounds forcible interven-\\ntion may rigbtfully be predicated upon, but all concede that as\\nan -act of self-defense, or for self -protection, it is permissible and\\nfully authorized. While there is not complete harmony upon the\\npart of the writers referred to as to the classification of the rea-\\nsons assigned as justification, under the names of order,\\npeace, and commercial relations, as well as property rights\\nof citizens, still there is a substantial concurrence of expres-\\nsion that the protection of these interests rests upon the right of\\nself-defense; and that for continued invasion of such interests,\\nand the disturbance of such peace, order, and rights, forci-\\nble intervention is justifiable.\\nWhether forcible intervention is authorized upon humanitarian\\ngrounds alone is not free from doubt if determination rests upon\\nthe weight of authority \u00e2\u0080\u0094that is, of standard authors on inter-\\nnational law. Slight consideration has been devoted to this im-\\nportant subject, and no established rules are deducible from the\\nbooks. But certain it is there is a growing sentiment which will\\nultimately be crystallized into positive international rule that\\nbrutal massacres, long-continued oppression, resulting in slavery,\\npoverty, and destruction of property and life, wars of extermi-\\nnation and barbarous and despotic treatment without signs of\\ncessation, which brutalize and degrade, will be sufficient warrant\\nfor intervention to prevent their continiiance, at least when, by\\nsuch crimes and oppressions by one government against a portion\\nof its subjects, the moral sentiments of nations are shocked and\\ntheir peace and quiet rendered insecure.\\nVattel recognizes succor to people oppressed by their sovereign\\nas proper. Logically, if the sovereign refuses the j)roffered succor,\\nthe interposing nation would have a right to compel acceptance.\\nHeffter denies the right of intervention for the repression of\\ntyranny, but insists that if civil war results (because of oppres-\\nsion) between the sovereign and a portion of its subjects, then\\nassistance by intervention or otherwise may be rendered in be-\\nhalf of either party.\\nCalvo and Fiore contend for the right of intervention to put an\\nend to crimes and slaughter.\\nWoolsey, in his most excellent treatise on International Law,\\njustifies interference in the affairs of other states when it is de-\\nmanded by self-preservation, and when some extraordinary state\\nof things is brought about by the crime of a government against\\nits subjects.\\nUnder Dr. Wheaton s broad statement, quoted from Mcintosh,\\nthat whatever a nation may defend for itself it may defend for\\nanother, interference in Cuba is clearly warranted. Cuba s right\\nof revolution is as sacred and as well grounded in the principles of\\nright and justice as the Greeks and if the revolution rests upon\\nthe ground that a great crime was being committed, we have the\\nright to recognize the government of the revolutionists and aid in\\nthe eff ortiJ to prevent the continuance of such crime. Even Gr otitis\\nadmits that occasions T^y sj:53 justifying resistance to the sover-\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "47\\neign. The doctrine tanght by Hobbes of patrimonial kingdoms\\nhas passed away, like many of the exploded theories of the past.\\nManning, in Ms Law of Nations, page 97, states as grounds on\\nwhich interference with the affairs of foreign states would now\\nbe held capable of justification:\\n(2) The continuance of a revolutionary state of affairs in a foreign state\\nnnder circnmstances in which, it seems ihighly probable that without such\\ninterference either public order can never be restored at all or can only be\\nrestored after such sufferings to humanity and such injuries to surrounding\\nstates as obviously overbalance the general evil of all interference from\\nwithout.\\nThe other forros which interference may take are:\\n(3) Actual support of a revolutionary party in a foreign state, or of the\\ngovei nment of a state in its efforts to suppress a revolution; and (i) public\\nrecognition for the purpose of general intercourse on equal terms of a newly\\nformed though perhaps not yet iirmly established government.\\nPhillimore announces the following rule with respect to this\\nquestion:\\nThe right of self-defense may, in certain cases, carry with it the necessity\\nof intervening in the relations and, to a certain extent, of controlling the\\nconduct of another state, and this when the interest of the intervenor is not\\nimmediately and directly biit mediately and indirectly aft ected.\\nHe further states that in self-defense interference is justifi-\\nable when the domestic institutions of a state are inconsistent\\nwith the peace and safety of other states; and also upon invita-\\ntion of belligerent parties in a civil war.\\nHall states the doctrine of intervention as follows:\\nThe grounds upon which intervention has taken place or upon which it is\\nsaid with more or less of authority that it is permitted may be referred to\\nthe right of self-preservation, to the right of opposing wrongdoing, to the\\nduty of fulfilling engagement, and to the friendship for one of two parties in\\na state. (Hall Int. Law, page 261.)\\nProfessor Pomeroy contends that it is impossible to place limita-\\ntions uiDon the question as to when intervention may or may not\\nbe authorized. He insists that it is a branch of politics rather\\nthan a subdivision of international law.\\nHenry Clay, while Secretary of State, wrote, May 10, 1825:\\nWhen the epoch of separation between a parent state and its colony, from\\nwhatever cause, arises, the struggle for self-government on the one hand and\\nthe preservation of power on the other produces mutual exasperation and\\nleads to a most embittered and ferocious war. It is then that it becomes the\\nduty of thii d powers to interpose theii humane ofl ces and calm the passions\\nand enlighten the councils of the parties.\\nThe present Secretary of State, speaking in the Senate on the\\n28th of Februarj 1896, stated that if Spain continued Weyler s\\npolicy the people of the United States would\\ngo over to that island and drive out these barbarous robbers and imitators\\nof the worst men who ever lived in the world. We will not shield\\nourselves behind the position taten by the British Government in the case\\nof Armenia, that Annenia was so far away and beyond her power that Great\\nBritain could not help those people when they were being murdered.\\nBut Cuba lies right at our door.\\nThe words of Fish to Mr. Gushing, November 5, 1875, show that\\nthe conditions then existing were deemed almost of sufiScient\\ngravity to warrant intervention. He refers to the inhumanity\\ncharacterizing Spain s conduct in Cuba and the omission of the\\nSpanish Government to perform its treaty obligations to the\\nUnited States, and then states that\\nIt becomes a serious question how long such a condition of things can or\\nshould be allowed to exist, and compels us to inquire whether the point has\\nnot iDeen reached where longer endurance ceas-; s to be possible. In\\nthe absence of any prospects of a termination of the war or of any change in\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "48\\nthe manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he (the Pi-esident)\\nfeels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments\\nto intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end a disastrous and de-\\nstructive conflict and restoring peace in the Island of Cuba.\\nThe London Times, in an editorial January 26, 1876, discnsses\\nSpain s relations to Cuba and the letter of Secretary Fish just re-\\nferred to, arraigning the Spanish-Cuban policy. In the editorial\\nthese words are used:\\nThe purists of international law may at once be warned off the field of dis-\\nctission. They may say that the United States has no more right to dictate\\nhow Spain shall govern than Spain has to order the reorganization of the\\nSouth. But these arguments are fit merely for lecture rooms. The\\npractical answer is that the general rule of international usage conveniently\\ncalled international law can be applied only to the ordinary cases of warfare.\\nSince there is no international parliament, each nation is .iustifled in defend-\\ning its interest by exceptional measures when they are attacked in an excep-\\ntional manner. We find, then, that Spain has driven one of the finest\\nislands in the world into revolt; that she is trying to suppress the revolt by\\nsystematic savagery, and that the restoration of peace by mere force is all\\nbut hopeless. Nor can we blame him (Mr. Fish) for insisting that if\\nSpain shall not set Cuba free she is bound to make it orderly.\\nMessrs. Biichanan, Mason, and Soule, in their joint dispatch to\\nthe Secretary of State October 18, 1854, declared that whenever\\nSpain s possession of Cuba\\nseriously endangered our internal peace, or the existence of the Union, the\\nUnited States would be justified by human and divine law in wresting it\\nfrom Spain.\\nPresident Grant contemplated intervention, as is evidenced by\\nhis message of 1874, wherein he says\\nthat the inability of Spain to suppress the insurrection may make some posi-\\ntive steps on the part of other powers a matter of self-necessity.\\nA similar statement occurs in his message the following year.\\nMr. Cleveland recognized that our obligations to Spain would not\\nprevent us from intervening when it was manifest that Spain s\\nsovereignty was extinct in the island. Mr. McKinley recognizes\\nthat intervention with force is pennissible in the discharge of\\nobligations to ourselves, to civilization, and humanity.\\nI have shown that Spain s savage and inhuman course, persist-\\nently pursued with respect to Cuba, justified the revolution, and\\nthat by every proper standard Spain s right to control Cuba has\\nbeen forfeited. It has been shown that her desire to retain the\\nisland is purely mercenary; and that for three-quarters of a cen-\\ntury the island has been the arena of insurrections, revolutions,\\nand carnage, the direct and certain results of Spain s misconduct.\\nThat during all of this time, by reason of the geographical situ-\\nation of Cuba and the menace which her possession by an un-\\nfriendly power would be to our security and peace, and also be-\\ncause of our commercial relations with her, and the property\\nrights which our citizens have acquired therein, as well as the\\ndesire which we entertain for the spread of republican institu-\\ntions and the dedication of this continent to political freedom,\\nwe have regarded her with the utmost solicitude.\\nAttention has also been called to the Monroe doctrine, which\\ndevolves upon this nation the duty of preventing the acquisition\\nof Cuba by any other nation and the great trouble, complications,\\nand expense occasioned this nation because of Spain s inability to\\npreserve peace in the island; the irritation and trouble to the\\nAmerican people so great as to disturb their peace as a nation,\\nand. in self-defense, to compel a change in the hitherto expect-\\nant attitude of our Government.\\n3223", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "49\\nAttention has been directed to the views of jurists and the views\\nof distinguished American statesmen in support of the proposition\\nthat forcible intervention in the affairs of another nation may be\\njustified. With the facts before us, in the light of the century s\\nevents and the i)resent tragic condition of the island, I ask can it\\nbe possible that there is any member of this House who denies the\\njustification or the duty of the United States to immediately rec-\\nognize the independence of the Cuban Republic and aid its armies,\\nas the forces of England, France, and Russia supported the armies\\nof G-reece, in putting an end to the slaughter of innocents, the\\ndevastation of a country, and the commission of a crime against\\nhumanity?\\nIn so doing we would also be defending American citizens now\\nin Cuba, protecting their property, preserving our commerce, re-\\nstoring peace to the nation, and performing such acts as the laws\\nof self-defense and self-preservation impose upon every govern-\\nment. If Spain refuses to relinquish control of Cuba, it would\\nmean war. In this programme territorial acquisition should not\\nbe considered. It is true that great statesmen like Jefferson,\\nAdams, and Polk desired the annexation of Cuba, and unques-\\ntionably many of the inhabitants of Cuba desire to plant them-\\nselves under the flag of this great Republic.\\nBut the forcible deprivation of a nation of any portion of its\\nterritory, with a design to make it a part of our national domain,\\nis unwise, if not criminal. After Cuba s independence shall have\\nbeen fully recognized, after the billows of war shall have lost\\nthemselves in the calm of peace and rest, after the shock of this ter-\\nrible conflict shall have been forgotten and the cool, dispassionate\\njudgment of the Ctiban people shall have been consulted, after\\nthe people of this broad land have evidences of the fruits of inde-\\npendence in Cuba, after all of the mists and clouds and lurid flames\\nthat now encircle us have been cleared away, then if the people\\nof Cuba earnestly desire to merge their future into ours it will\\nbe ample time to consider the question of annexation.\\nWill the Cuban people be capable of self-government? I have\\nmet many who entertain gTave doubts. The stormy scenes in the\\nSpanish- American Republics are referred to as examples of Cuban\\nindependence. It is true that Cuba will embark upon the career\\nof free government under unauspicious circumstances; but I am\\npersuaded that there is enough intelligence, virtue, integrity, and\\nstability to be found among her people to give reasonable assur-\\nance of the permanency of the government agreed upon. Though\\nthe island is desolate, it is productive and fertile.\\nIn 1887 there was a population of over 1,700,000. Perhaps when\\nthe present war began it had reached 3, 000,000. Undoubtedly more\\nthan 500,000 have perished within the past three years, but there\\nare brave and courageous men and women who will bring to the\\nnew and difficult problems high patriotism, singleness of purpose,\\nand an unalterable determination that the fruits obtained by long\\nyears of suffering, of sorrow and tears and bloodshed shall not\\nbe lost. The negroes, numbering from 27 to 30 per cent of the\\npopulation, are industrious, intelligent, and law abiding.\\nThe Cuban people are different from those inhabiting the South\\nAmerican Republics. In the latter they are factional, emotional,\\nthe followers of men rather than the devotees of principle. Resi-\\ndents of the same State are not homogeneous. High mountains,\\nwide rivers, and impenetrable forests separate communities, pro-\\n3223-4", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "015 999 922 1\\n50\\nduce provincialism, breed isolation, and subtract from national\\npride and prevent a love of national institutions.\\nIn Cuba there is the utmost fraternity between Cubans and\\namity between races. There is no sectionalism. The railroads\\nand the rapid ocean transportation bring the people together and\\nproduce harmonious thought and action. They are more con-\\nservative, more enlightened, more in harmony with the spirit and\\nhigh impulses of the age than the people of South America. For\\nyears many of the young men and women have been receiving\\neducation in the United States.\\nMany have intermarried with Americans. Those who have re-\\nturned have carried with them love of republican institutions\\nand much of the genius of 6ur institutions. At least 25,000 Cu-\\nbans are now in the United States. With the advent of peace\\nthey would return and contribute materially in establishing order\\nand founding a stable, liberal government.\\nThe English language is not a stranger there. American interests\\nare extensive, and with peace and stability assured, American\\ncapital would seek investment and thousands of our citizens, en-\\nticed by the beauty of the island, the fertility of the soil, and its\\nincomparable cliraate, would there seek homes and add strength\\nto its political, social, and economic superstructure. It has been\\ncharged that the insurgents will control the situation and organ-\\nize a powerful military government, or produce a state of anarchy.\\nThe personnel of the Cuban army disproves this statement.\\nPatriots are its ofl cers and they show no vaulting ambition.\\nThey long for peace and will gladly welcome the hour when they\\nmay return to the rebuilding of the devastated island.\\nOur duty is plain. The past and present, the martyred dead\\nand sorrowful living, the voice of our country and the spirit of\\nnever-dying justice, command us to perform it.\\nIs true freedom but to break\\nFetters for our own dear sake,\\nAnd with leathern hearts forget\\nThat we owe mankind a debt?\\nNo; true freedom is to share\\nAll the chains our brothers wear.\\nAnd with heart and hand to be\\nEarnest to make others free.\\nThey are slaves who dare not speak\\nFor the fallen and the weak;\\nThey are slaves who will not choose\\nHatred, scoffing, and abuse,\\nRather than in silence shrink\\nFrom the truths they needs must think.\\nThey are slaves who dare not be\\nIn the right with two or three.", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3376", "width": "1981", "jp2-path": "situationincuba00king_0054.jp2"}}