{"1": {"fulltext": "Q60\\nI", "height": "3630", "width": "2755", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "", "height": "2620", "width": "1747", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "6~\\nTHE NATION S RELATIONS TO ITS\\nISLAND POSSESSIONS.\\nSPEECH\\nOF\\nIIOK JON ATI-IAN BOSS,\\nor ^-ERMONT,\\nIN THE\\nSEE ATE OF THE UlN ITED STATES,\\nTUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1900.\\nT\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0w^A-smiTG-Tonsr.\\n1900.\\n418S", "height": "3723", "width": "2293", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "5\\n.\u00e2\u0096\u00a0R?", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "SPEECH\\nOF\\nHON. JONATHAN KOSS\\nOUTLYIXa DEPENDENCIES.\\nThat by tlio recent troatv with !?pain tho initea tetaros tak-e ine sovereignty over\\nanrl over the Philippine Islands under the duty to use and exercise it for the gen-\\nand highest interest of tho people of the United States and the inhabitants of th\u00c2\u00ab\\nestrained by tho provisions of the Constitution; and over Cuba, under the duty to\\nMr. ROSS. Mr. Prfsitlent, I ask leave to call up the resolution.s submitted bj\\nrue on the isth instant.\\nThe PRESIDINCt OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the resolutiona,\\nwhich will be read.\\nThe Secretary read the resolutions submitted by Mr. Ross on the 18th instant,\\nas follows:\\nRe.inlrecJ, That the provisions of the Constitution do notj unaided by act of Congress, extend\\nover Puerto Rico and the Philippine Isl.ands.\\nlirsolvcd. That by tho recent treaty with Spain the United Statestake^the sovereignty over\\nPuerto Kico _. _\\neral welfare\\nislands, unrestrained by tho provisions of\\nexercise it for the? pacification of the i.sland.\\nRvsoh-tJ. That the successful discbarue of this duty demands the establishment of a separata\\ndepartmc^nt of Government to take charge of ail outlying depondc-ncies of tho United States,\\nand the p.assago of a general law making appointments therein ucnipolitical.\\nMr, ROSS. Mr. President. I think it is entirely evident that all Senators do not\\ntake the same view of our relations to the Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico, and our\\nother dependencies. I shall present my own view.\\nI have always thought It wiser to give attention to present conditions, and to\\nthe discharge of present duties, than to dwell upon transactions passed and closed,\\nin an attempt to criticise or to find fault, or to point out how they might have\\nbeen more wisely conducted and have brought better supposed results. Early I\\nlearned that criticism and fault-finding could be set up on very limited capital,\\nand that the better supposed results are more imaginary than real. In fore-\\ncasting his supposed results the critic rarely foresees, or can foresee, the new and\\nimportant factors which would be brought into the problem if the changes de-\\nmanded bv his after-date criticism had been made. Allow me. therefore, to engage\\nthe attention of the Senate briefly in considering what I deem to be present con-\\nditions and duties.\\nFirst, then, let us inquire if the Constitution of the United States, r.r i^ropno\\nvigorc, unaid* d by treaty or act of Congress, extends to and covers the inhab-\\nitants of the territories acquired by the United States.\\nThis is an important question for consideration and determination, especially\\nby every Congressman, whose action may help determine tlie laws which shall\\ngovern the inhabitants of such territories.\\nTREATIES.\\nBy the recent treaty with Spain sovereignty is ceded to tho United States over\\nPuerto Rico and the Phili[ipine Islands with this provision:\\nTlie civil and politic.il stntim of the native Inh.abitants of tho territo.-ies hereby ceded to the\\nUnited States shall bo determined by Congress.\\nCuba, over which Spain relinquishes sovereignty and title, the tre.nty leaves\\nwithout any derlaration in regard to the stdfufi of her inliahitants, or the rights\\nof Congress further than to say that, upon its evacuation by Si)ain, the island is\\nto be occupied by the United States, and while such occupation shall continue the\\nUnited States\\nwill assume and discharge tho obligations that may. nndcr international law, result from th\u00c2\u00ab\\nfact of its occupation, for the protection of life and proiwrty.\\n4188 3", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "I do not propose in this connection to discnss what the relations of the United\\nStates to these islands are, further than to observe that the ceding power has\\niniposed no conditions nor reserved any rights defined and secured by the Consti-\\ntution to the inhabitants of those islands. This distinguishes this treaty from all\\nothers hitherto made by the United States by which she has acquired teiTitory\\noccupieu bv inhabitants. The treaty of IsOJ, for the cession of Louisiana, provides\\nin Article ill that\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nThe inlia!)itantsof tlie coJod torrltorvphall be incorporated in the Union of thcUnitfd States,\\nand aJmittocl as soon a possible, accorilins to the priiicipk-s of the Kotleral Constitution, t the\\nenjovnic-nt of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States;\\nund in the meantime they si. all bo maintained and protected in the free enjoymcut of their\\nlibertj-, property, and the relitpon which they profess.\\nThe treaty of 1S19, by wliich Florida was ceded to the United States, in Article\\nVII has a provision of similar legal import. So have the treaties by which New\\nMexico, Utah, California, etc.. were acquired in IS is and I^.jU, contained in Articles\\nVIII and IX of the treaty of 18 IS and brought forward into the treaty of l^i^i by\\nArticle V. The treaty of 1807, by which Alaska was acquired, has no provision\\nfor the inc rporation of the Territory into the Union as a State or States. It\\ndivides tht- inhabitants into two classes. It provides that they may return to Rus-\\nsia within three years, and of those who do not return says\\nBut if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory thov. with the nx ^-if v. r,f the\\ntincivilized native trilK. s, shall l o admitted to the enjoyment of all the riplr.\\nImnninities of citiz -usof the United Status .ind shall ho maintained and p; a\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2njoyment of their lilierty, proi frty, and religion. The uncivilized tribes ,o\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0uch regrulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to uV i.riginal\\ntribes of that country.\\nIt is thus manifest that in every treaty by which the United States has acquired\\nInhabited territory prior to the late treaty with Spain the ceding power has inserted\\na provi-sion that the inhabitants, except uncivilized tribes, j-hall be admitted to the\\nenjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United\\nStates, and all. except that by which Alaska was acquired, contain the further\\nprovision that they shall in due time, to be determined by Congress, bo admitted as\\na State or States into the Union.\\nSUPREME COURT DECISXOXS.\\nIt will be important to keep the pro\\\\nsions of these treaties in mind, especially\\nwhen we examine the decisions of the Supreme Court in regard to the constitu-\\ntional rights ot tlio inhabitants of these territories. In his opinion in The Ameri-\\ncan and Oceanic Insurance Cos. is. 356 Bales of Cotton. Canter, claimant. Chief\\nJustice Marshall quotes the sixth article of the treaty ceding Florida, which reads:\\nThe inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic Majesty codes to the United States by\\nthis treaty shall Ikj incorporated into the Union of the United States as soon as may be con-\\nsistent with tlie ])rincipli\u00c2\u00bbs of the Federal Constitution and adniitt\u00c2\u00bb d to thoen^ oymont of all the\\nprivilof^es. rights, and immunities of the citizens of the L nited Stiites. It is unuece sary to\\ninquire wheiher thus is not tljeir condition independent of stipulation. Tlioy do not, however,\\nparticii ate in political power; they do not share in government till Florida becomes a State.\\n(1 i cters, SU:.)\\nThe Northwest Territory and other territories ceded by separate States to the\\nUnited States, when under the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution, were\\nceded under a pledge from Congress in regard to their use and rights. Chief\\nJustice Taney says in his opinion in the Dred Scott case:\\nBy resolution paswiod October 10, IT. ^n, Conpre.ss pledpred Itself that, if the lands were ceded as\\nrecoinmeudixl. they should In? disposed of tor the common benefit of the United States, to be\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2ettU d and formed into distinct rejmblii an States, which ehall become members of the Federal\\nUniiin. uud have the same rights of sovereignty and freedom and iudepeudence as the other\\nStates.\\nThis pledge acted upon is of equal force as the provision of a treaty, especially\\nunder the ordinance of 1787.\\nThese treaties and this resolution include all the territories of the United States,\\nexcept that of Oregon, which came by discovery and occupation\u00e2\u0080\u0094 in regard to\\nwhich I know of no decision of tlie United Stat ^s Supreme Court on the question\\nnndiT consideration\u00e2\u0080\u0094 and, excejit that acquired by the annexation of Texas and\\nHawaii, until we come to the recent treaty with Spain.\\nTHE SCOPE OF THE TREATY MAKING rOWER,\\nBy Article VI of the Constitution:\\nAll treaties made under the authority of the United States are made the supreme law of the\\nUnd.\\n41 S8", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "Of tlio tieaty-makiiiEr power the Suineine C uurt, in Geofiey jv. Riggs (133 U. S.,\\n258), speaking by Mr. Justice Field, says:\\nThe treaty power as expressed in the (V)nstitntion 1\u00c2\u00ab in terms unlimited except by thoaa\\nrestraints found in that instrument nKJiiiist tlieaotionof the (tovernment.orof its departments,\\nand thos( arisin^; from the nutni e of tlio Ho\\\\crnment itself and that of tlie States; it would not\\nbo contended tliat it extends so far as to autliuiize wliat th( Constitution forbids, ora chan^co u\\ntho charactei- of tlio Govorninent. or in tliat of tli States, or tlie ;ession of any i ortion ot tho\\nlatter without its consent. Fort Leavenworth U. K. Co. r.i Lowe (lit U. S. \u00e2\u0080\u00a2i). iM Hnt with\\nthose exceptions it is not perceived that there is any limit tothequestions whii-ii can b: adjudi;e;l\\ntouching any matter which is properly tho sub.ject of neirotiation witha foreitrn ctiiuitry. Ware\\nvs. Hvlton i ^V. S., IWi; Chirac iv. Chirac l. i V. S., NVheaton, -Vii; Ilau^nstine rs. Sanborn\\n(100 \\\\y. 8.. 4S3); Droit d Aubaino l Ops. Atty. Uon., 417); People r.i. (ierke Col., ;isi\\nIt will not he claimed that the provisions of these treaties driving the inhabitants\\nof the territories the rights. ]irivilegeg, and imuiiinities of citizons of the United\\nStates lie without the scope ot the treaty-making power. It is a generally admitted\\nproposition that the ceding power may properly reqnire such a provision in its\\ntreaty granting its sovereignty over a territory and that the power accepting the\\ngrant becomes solemnly bound thereby.\\nDTSTKKT Of cor.rMni.\\\\.\\nInasmuch as one or more of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court\\nis in regard to the constitutional rights of the inhabitants of the District of Co-\\nlumbia, it is proper to remark that the territory now included in the District\\nwhen the Constitution was ado])ted constituted parts of the States of Virginia and\\nMaryland, and before being ceded had become subject to the Constitution. By\\nthe cession the territory of the District was not taken from under the operation\\nof the Constitution. If so. the process by which it was accomplished is unknown\\nto me. Nor have I seen any suggestion by anyone that any change in its relation\\nin this respect was made by its cession by the States to the United States.\\nnow DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COUUT SHOULD BE CONSIDEUEI).\\nThese ob.?crvations are necessary for the proper understanding of the language\\nused by A arious .iudges of the United States Supreme Court in their opinions\\ntouching the constitutional rights of the inhabitants of the District of Columbia\\nand of tliese Territories; for. as aptly and pertinently said by Chief Justice Mar-\\nshall in Cohen vs. Virginia (G Wheaton, 204, o99):\\nIt is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken\\nin connection with tho case in which these oxi res.sioiis are used. If they co beyond the caso\\nthey may be respjcted. but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when tho\\nvery point is presented for judgment. The reason for this maxim is obvious. The question\\nactually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its full extent. Other\\nprinciples which may servo to illustrate it are considered in thoir relation to the case decided,\\nbut their pos.-iil le bearing upo .i all other cases is seldom completely investigated.\\nKeeping this caution by the eminent Chief Justice in mind, I fail to find any\\ndecision of the Supreme Court which fairly inilicates that the Constitution of the\\nUnited States, unaided by Congressional legislation or by treaty, vx jiroprio rujore\\nextends to the territories acquired bj the United States. There are expressions in\\nseveral of the opinions which would indicate that such might be the view of the\\nwriter. Such expressions were unnece-sary for the decision. In no case which I\\nhave been able to find is this point actually considered and decided. In every caso\\nin which the court has decided that the party was entitled to be accorded the\\nrights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution, such rights, jirivi-\\nleges, and immunities had been conferred by tho States from which the territori\\nwas ceded, as in the case of the District of Columbia, or by tlie treaty by which\\nthe territory was ceded to the United States; and frequently tho riglits thus\\nsecured had been confirmed hy the act of Congress conferring territonal govern-\\nment. The resolutions and proceedings by which several Slate-! ceded territory to\\nthe United Stales, including tlie Northwest Territory, were in legal effect treaties\\nand of like binding force.\\nThe decisions of the United States Supreme Court most generally relied upon to\\nsupport the view that the Constitution, unaided by act of Congress or treaty,\\nextends c.r propria vi /orc to all territories may, for convenient consideration, Oe\\ndivided into three clas.ses:\\n(1) The right of trial by .inry.\\n(2) Revenue, or the apportionment of direct taxes.\\n(3) Citizenship.\\nTHE laoHT or Tni.vr. bv juuy.\\nOf the first class are Callan vs. Wilson (1C7 U. S.. olOi; American Publishing\\nCompany vs. Fisher (IGG U. S., 4G4); Springville r.s-. Thomas (166 U. S.. TuT;;", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "Thompson vs. Utah (170 U. S., 343), and some others noted in these decisions.\\nCalliin rs Wilson clearly holds that a citizen of the District of Columbia has con-\\nstitutional right to trial bj- jurv when cliarged with a crime. Although not fully\\nSlated as a ground for the decision, the case was correctly decided if. as I think the\\nfact is, the Constitution was extended over the District while included in the States\\nof Marvland aud Virginia, and was never subsequently withdrawn. The decision\\nof the American Publishing Company r.s, Fisher was turned upon the point taken\\nthat the act of the Territory which authorized a verdict rendered on the concur-\\nrence of nine or more members of the jury contravened the act under which Utah\\nwas constituted a Territory. It leaves undecided whether the seventh amendment\\napplies. Mr. Justice Brewer summarizes the decisions on this point as follows:\\nthat\\nWhether the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, wliich provides\\nat -in suits at common Inw, where the value in controversy t bM exceed twf-nty d-jllars. tho\\nrieht of trial l.v jurv shall bo preserved, operates, ex propria ivV/or?, to invalidate this statute\\nmtvbo a matter of -dispute. In Webster to. Roid, 2 Howard. 4:!., an act of the lezr-lature of\\nIowa di.-^ponsinfr with a jury in a certain clas^of common-law actions was held void. W hileiu the\\nbe entitled to the benefit of the writ of habias corpus and of trial by jury\\nhave b -en adiudced bv reason of contlict with Conprrcssional lef^islation.\\nIn Revnolds rs. Uni ted States m U. S., 14.5. 154 1, it was said, m reference to a criminal caM\\ncouiiuK from tho Territory of Utah, that by the Constitution of the Lnited St.ates (Amend-\\nment i ontit-l. d to ft trial bv an iinD.irtial jury. Both of those c.iFes were\\nbv Mr Justice Bradley, speakiug for the court: Doubtless Congress, in legisiaunc lor lue ler-\\nritories would be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal nphts winch are\\nformulated in tho Constitution and its amendments; but these limitations would exist rather\\nby inference and the general spirit of the Constitution, from which Congress derives all its pow-\\ners than bv anv express and direct application of its provisions. And in McAllister i.*. L iiited\\nStates (141 U. 8., 174) it is held that the constitutional provision in respect to the tenor of oudi-\\ncial oflices did not apply to Territorial judges.\\nIf what has been said in regard to the force of the treaties by which these ter-\\nritories? were ceded is sound, the cases were all correctly decided, and .iustified, as\\nis done in some of them, classifying the District of Columbia and Territories with\\nStates as protected by this provision of the Constitution.\\nThere can be no doubt that the treaty with Mexico secured to the inhabitants of\\nthe territory ceded the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Consti-\\ntution. By its terms Mexicans who should prefer to remain in the territory could\\nretain the title and rights of Mexican citizens or acquire those of citizens of the\\nUnited States. If they remained without election for a year after the cession of\\nthe cession of the territory, they\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nshould bo considered to have elected to become citizens of the United States, shall bo\\nincorporated into tho Union of the United States, and be admitted at the proper time to the\\nenjovniont of all tlio rights of citizens of tho United States, according to the principles of the\\nConstitution, aud shaU bo protected in the free cnjojTnont of their liberty and property.\\nThese terms of the treaty were accepted Viy the United States, and secured to\\nthe inhabitants of tho torritorv the rights secured to citiy.eus of the United States\\nby the Constitution. Trial by common-law jury was one of these rights. The\\nfact that such terrilorv was secured the rights, immunities, and privileges of the\\nConstitution, and was in preparation, under the treaty, for becoming a State,\\njustified tho remark of Mr. Justice Bradley in Mormon Church vs. United States:\\nDoubtles. i Congres-s. In legi-laf ing for the Territories, would bo subject to those fundamental\\nlimitati .ns in favor of personal ri-lits which are formnl.ited in tho Constitution and its amend-\\nments: but these liniitations would exist r.ither by inference aud the general spirit of the Con-\\nBtitntion, from which Couiiresd derives all its jiowers, than by any express or direct application\\nof its provisions.\\nThese rights were secured by the treaty. Unquestionably these principles\\ninipliedlv should govern the legislation of Congress regarding the inhabitants of a\\nTerritory which was being prepared to take its place among the States of the I nion.\\nTho ca.se of Spving^-illo r.s-. Thomas is made to rest upon the ground stated in\\nAmerican Publishing Conqianv v. Fisher. Thompson vs. Utah was properly\\ndecided ui)on the ground that the act upon which the plaintiff in error was tried\\nwas passed after tho crime hargt d was committed, and unconstitutional as an\\ner pDsl fartit law, an iinmunitv secured to him by the Constitution. None of these\\ndecisions read in the light of the treaties or the law of the land extending over\\nthe District of Columbia and the Territories, uphold the claim that the Constitu-\\ntion. \u00c2\u00abj- rt./)ri o i-u/o;.. jirevailed over ihoin. 1 T\\nIt is (luito evident that this must be the principle which controls when in re\\n4188", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "Ross (110 U. S.. 4 is considered. Ho was a seaman on an AniPiican vessel. H\u00c2\u00ab\\nclaimed to be a British subject. While {h vessel was in harbrn- in Japan lie com-\\nmitted thereon a mnvdcr. By an act of oiifjvess, ])assed agreeably to a treaty\\nbetween the United St.ites and Japan he could be tried by a consular court in\\nJapan, consisting of the\u00c2\u00bbAmerican consul and four associates. The court and ita\\nproceedings were regul.ir if the act of Congress was constitutional. Ho was tried,\\nconvicted, and sentencinl to be executed. On the trial he properly rai.-ed the\\npoints that he was entitled by the onstitutiou to be indicted by a grand jury and\\ntried by a common law jury and that the consular court, as constituted, had no\\njurisdiction to try him.\\nIf the act establishing the consular court was unconstitutional when challenged by\\na citizen of the United States it was so when challenged by him, though a British\\nsubject. By shipping as a seaman on an Anu rican vessel ho liecame entitbd to\\nbe tried by valid laws applicable to the trial of an American citizen, Jlis sentence\\nwas commuted by the President to imprisonment for life in the penitentiary\\nat Albany, N. Y. After remaming incarcerated for a time he brought halx-aa\\ncorpus, claiming that his incarceration was unlawful on the gi-ounds claimed by\\nhim on the trial. It was held that the American vessel, though on the high seas,\\ncommon to all nations, was American territory, and under the treaty the consular\\ncourt had jurisdiction to try him and his conviction was lawful. 1 can see no\\nescape from the conclusion that this decision establishes that Cougi-ess has plenary\\npower, unrestricted by the Constitution, in legislating for outside territories.\\nREVENUE OR THE APPORTIONMENT OF DIRECT TAXES.\\nOf the second class I have found but one decision which is claimed to hold that\\nthe Constitution, of its own unaided vigor, extends itself over the District of\\nColumbia and Territories located outside the States, and that is Loughborough\\nrs. Blake (5 Wheaton, 317). It was decided in 1820, Chief Justice Jlarshall deliv-\\nering the opinion. The question for decision was whether an act of Congress\\nincluding the District of Columbia in an apportiomnent of a direct tax, according\\nto the census of the States and District, was constitutional. It was held consti-\\ntutional. It could not be otherwise held if the District was then under the Con-\\nstitution.\\nThe reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall, as I understand it, is that it was imma-\\nterial whether tlie District was under the provisions of the Constitution. In sub-\\nstance he reasons that if in levj ing a direct tax Congress should omit a State or\\nnot apportion the tax among the States according to the census, as prescribed\\nin the Constitution, the tax would be unlawfullj levied and void; that the same\\neffect would not result if a Territory was omitted, because the Constitution does\\nnot require direct taxes in the Territories to be so apportioned; that in the Terri-\\ntories Congress exercises plenary power in levying direct taxes, and in the exer-\\ncise of this power could apportion the tax as retjuired by the Constitution among\\nthe States. I think the decision and reasoning of the eminent Chief Justice, prop-\\nerly understood, does not support the doctrine, but the reverse.\\nCITIZENSniI*.\\nIn considering citizenship I shall not discuss the Slaughterhouse cases and some\\nothers which are upheld, because the acts of the States complained of as infring-\\ning upon the rights of citizens secured by the Constitution were held to be valid\\nwithin the police power of the State, althougii some expressions in the opinions\\nmay give the carele.^3 reader the impression tliat the Constitution extends over\\nthe District of Columbia and the Territories, unaided by act of Congress or by\\ntreaty, for if any such expressions can fairly be held to have such force, they\\nwere cleaidy outside the points considered and decided, and are no more than\\ndicta.\\nIn United States w. Wang Kim Ark (ir.D V. S.. G19) it is held that the defend-\\nant in error, born of Chinese parents in California while his parents were resid-\\ning there, but were not and could not, under the laws of the United States, be\\nnaturalized, became a citizen of the United States under the fourteenth amend-\\nment. The case was decid- d by a divided court, after very full consideration.\\nThe majority of the judges hold that the common-law doctrine in regard to birth\\nin a country, from foreign parents residing there, entitles the child to the pro-\\ntection of the country, and for that reason he owes to such country allegiance and\\nbecomes a citizen under th terms of the amendment.\\nThere is force in the dissenting views of Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice\\nBEarlan, holding that the birth must be from parents who, by the hiws of the\\n4188", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "8\\ncountry, could have become citizens by naturalization to give the child such a\\nstatus. In the discussion in the opinion representing the views of the coxirt some\\nexpressions are used which carry the impression that such a birth in the Terri-\\ntoi-ies. or wherever the United States has jurisdiction, renders the child a citizen.\\nBut no such question was before the court, nor does tl\\\\e opinion proftss to con-\\nsider such a (jncstion. Tlie question involved may be correctly decided, and yet\\ndoes not touch the doctrine tliat the Constitution extends to the District of Colum-\\nbia and TeiTitories of its own unaided vigor. These are the strongest representa-\\ntive cases claimed to indicate that the Constitution has such unaided power.\\nTHE CONSTITUTION.\\nOpposed to its having such power are the nature and language of the Constitu-\\ntion and many decisions of the Supreme Court. The Constitntion is that of a\\nrepresentative government of the people. It was formulated and adopted by rep-\\nresentatives selected by and from the people of the different States to form a com-\\nmon government for themselves under the name of the United States. This name\\nis used throughout the instrument to mean the States united, or their combined\\npower. The Constitution comuiences with\\nWo, the peonle of the United States, in order to form ft more perfect union, and\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0\u00c2\u00a9curt! the bleisinKs of liberty to ourselves aud our posterity, do ordain and establish this Con-\\nstitution for tho Uuited Statoa of America.\\nUnited States as here used evidently is a synonym for the union of the States\\nwhich should adopt it. The people of the States announced in advanr e that,\\nthrough their representatives, they form the Constitation, among other things to\\nsecure the blessings of liherty to themselves and their posterity, and announced no\\nother jrarpose. It is almost invariably held that the acts and laws enacted b.v the\\nlegal representatives of any municipality bind only the inhabitants of that munici-\\npality. Such acts and laws have, and are intended to have, no extraterritorial\\neffector jurisdiction. If any extraterritorial jurisdiction for such laws is intended,\\nit must be clearly expressed, or tlio contrary will be ]/resumed.\\nThe several articles of the Constitntion, and the first ten amendments, adopted\\nnearly contemporarily, establish the three departments of the Government, pro-\\nvide for the manner of their establishment, define their respective powers, some\\nboth affirmatively and negatively deline what jjower the States yield to the Gen-\\neral Government, and what they reserve, including its powers over the citizens of\\nthe several States, the relation of the States, and of the citizens of the several\\nStates, to each other, and to the General Government; liow and by whom the Con-\\nstitution can be amended; provide for the adiuissiun of new States; and specify\\nthe power of the Government over the Territory and other property of the United\\nStates.\\nNot a sentence contained in the original articles, nor the first ten amendments,\\nadopted nearly contemporaneously, more clearly to specify the scope and limita-\\ntion of the powers named in the original articles, indicates that these provisions\\nareapi)lied to or bind anyone except the citizens of the several States, who, through\\ntheir chosen representatives, framed and adopted lliera and are given power to\\nannul and amend them. Nor is there any such sentence in the eleventh and\\ntwelfth anu-ndments. When the thirteenth amendment was framed and adopted\\nit was therein clearly expressed that its provisions should extend not onlj- to tho\\nStates then included in the Union, or tliroughuut the Uuited States, but to any\\nplace subject to their jurisdiction.\\nIt is significant that this chiuse should be inserted into this amendment, and be\\nnowhere found in the original articles, nor in the preceding nor succeeding amend-\\nments, if of their own vigor they extend wherever the L nited States exercises\\njurisdiction. Especially significant is tlie insertion of this provision into this\\namendment, and its omission from the fonrtcenth and fiiteenth amendments fol-\\nlowing so soon thereafter and formuhited by some of the same eminent constitu-\\nticmallawyers. It clearly shows that the men who formulated it did not think\\nthat tho other provisions of the Constitution, as then amended, extended of their\\nown vigor into the Territories.\\nJn confirmation of this view is the fact, that up to that time all treaties ceding\\nterritories to tho Inited ^tates contain carefully expressed provisions giving\\nimmediately its citizens the rights, jirivileges. and immunities of citizens of the\\nUnited States, or providing that such riglits, privileges, aud immunities should\\nspeedily be conferred and the Territories formed into States. The commissioners\\nwho formulated those tre.ities, the Presidents who submitted them to the Senate,\\nthe Senators, or some ot them at least, who ratified tliem, were eminent constitu-\\ntional lawyers, and some of them engaged in formulating and discu:-sing the orig-\\n41 S8", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "inal Constitution. It can hardly be conceived as possible thnt this line of action\\nbIiouM havo been pursued for so many years, if tlie Constitution, of its own\\nnuaided force, extends to every territory aciiuired by the United States.\\nTERIUTORIES AND TERniTOniAIi COUnTS.\\nSuch -was not the view of Daniel Webster in 1828 when arguing American\\nInsurance Company vs. Canter (1 Peters, oil). He then said:\\nWhat is Florida? It is no part of tho United States. How can it be? How is it reprcsentedf\\nDo tho laws of tlio United St!it ;3 roach Flori.la? Not unloss by particular provisions. The ter-\\nritory and all within it are to bo govcrnod by tlio acriuiriiit: i)ovver. oxwpt wlitiro there are\\nreservations by treaty. By tl;o law of Eu^, lnnd, when possession is takrn of territories, tlie\\nKiug. Jure connuv. htxs tho i)ower of legislation until Parliament shall interfere. Coiiffross boB\\nthe (.s- roroiuv in this case, r.ud Florida was to ho governed by Contfresa as she thonglit prop: r.\\n\\\\Vhat has Congress done? .Slie might havo done anything; she might have refused tho right\\nof trial by .iury, and refused a logislutaro. bhe h:vs given a logislatnro to be exorci.sod at her\\nwill: and a government of a mixed nature, in which she has endeavored to distinguish between\\nStale and United States inrisdiction, anticipating tho future erection of tho territory into a\\nState Does the law establishing the court at Key West come within the restrictions of the\\nConstitution of tho United States? If tho Constitution does not extend over this territory, the\\nthe law can not be inconsistent with tho national Constitution.\\nSuch -was not the \\\\iow of Chief Justice Marshall, who delivered the opinion in\\nthat case and therein said:\\nThese courts, then, are not constitutional conrts, In which the judicial power conferred by\\nthe Coi stitntion on the General Government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving\\nit. They are legislative courts, created in virtuo of tho general right of sovereignty which\\nexists iii the Government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all need-\\nful rules and regulations respecting tho territory belonging to tho United States. Tho juris-\\ndiction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the\\nThird Article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in tho execution of those gen-\\neral powers which that body possesses over tho Territories of the United States. Although\\nadmiralty jurisdiction can bo exercised in the States in thoso courts only which are established\\nin pursuance of the third article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to\\ntho Territories. In legislating for them Congress exercises the combined powers of the general\\nand of the State government.\\nNor was such the view of Chief Justice Chase, as shown by an extract from his\\nopinion in Clinton vs. Englebrecht (13 Wallace, 4o4), as follows:\\nThere is no snpreme conrt of the United States, nor is there any district conrt of the United\\nStates in the sense of tho Constitution, in the Territory of Utah. The judges are not appointed\\nfor the same terms, nor is the .iurisdiction which they exercise part of tho judicial power con-\\nferred by the Constitution of the General Government. Tho courts are tho legisLative courts\\nof tho Territories, created in virtue of that clause which anthorizes ongi-ess to make all need-\\nful rules and regulations respecting the Territories Ijclonging to the United States.\\nThe same doctrine has been adhered to by the Supreme Conrt, as shown by the\\nopinion in McAllister r.s. United States (141 U. S., 174), where the cases on the\\nsubject are reviewed. The courts brought under consideration in this line of cases\\nare denominated legislative courts, courts established by Congress in the exercise\\nof its plenary power over tho Territories, or the combined power of the General\\nGrovernment and of the States, as it is sometimes e.xpressed: courts which do not\\nderive their authority from the judicial power of the Cnited State.s, vested in the\\nSupreme Court and inferior courts ordained agreeably to Article III of the Consti-\\ntution, but derive their power from an act of Congress, even when it embraces tho\\nidentical oubject-matter\u00e2\u0080\u0094 maritime\u00e2\u0080\u0094 over which the Supreme Court is given juris-\\ndiction by Article III of the Constitution. These cases are distinguishable from\\nthose that hold that the citizen of the District of olumbia. and of tho Territories,\\nis entitled to be tried by a common-law jury. No person has the constitutional\\nright to be tried by a particular court, if t!ie court which tries him accords all the\\nrights, privileges, and immunities secured to him by tho Constitution.\\nCITIZENS OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND OF TERRITOniES.\\nOf like tendencv and force are the decisions of the Supreme Conrt holding that\\na citizen of the District of Columbia or of a Territory can not sue in the United\\nStates courts a citizen of a State, nor be sne l in such courts by such citizen of a\\nState, because the Constitution gives such courts jurisdiction only of suits between\\ncitizens of different States; that the District of Columbia or a Territory is not a\\nState within the terms of the Constitution, whatever it may be internationally.\\n(Hepburn EUezy, 2 Cranch. 44. New Orleans vs. Winter, 1 Whcaton, 91; Bar-\\nney r.s. Baltimore, G Wallace. 2S0.) These cases establish, if they establish any-\\nthing, that the term State in the Constitution means one of the States of the Union\\nand no other municipality. Bv parity of rea.sonmg. Unite.l States, when n.sed in\\nthat instrument, should mean the States united, and nothing more, unless clearly\\nasserted, as in tho thirteenth amendment.\\n41S8", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "10\\nDRED SCOTT DECISION\\nTho Dretl Scott decision is not opposecl to these views. Chief Justice Taney, as\\nfurnishing the foundation for holding that the phiiutiff in error was not entitled\\nto sue in the United States courts, deliucs who are included as citizens of the\\nUnited States within the terms of the Constitution. He bays:\\nThe words penple of the I liited States nnd citizens are synonymous terms, and mean\\ntho same thinp. They both de. iril e tho political body wlm. arcordinK to our rei)ubiican insti-\\ntutions, form the soverei^ Uty and hold tho power and conduct the Government throuRh their\\nreprcsenaitivos. Tliov are what we taniiliarly call the sovereitrn people, and every citizen is\\none of this people, and a constituent meuiLcr of this eovereipnty. Ihe question before us is\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0whether tho class of persons (negroes) described in the plea of abatement compose a portion of\\nthis people and are constituent nii mbers of tliis sovereignty. Wo think they are not and are\\nnot inc-luded.and were not intended to be included, under the word citizens of the United States.\\nThis portion of the decision has not been criticised nor overruled to my knowl-\\nedge. Under this definition of citizen he must have a part in the exercise of the\\nsovereignty. Other portions of the opinion, if not overruled, have been ignored,\\nespecially that portion which holds that the chiu.se in the Constitution in regard\\nto the power of Congress over territories ajiplies only to the territories belong-\\ning to the Ciiited States when the Constitution was adopted, or such as might\\nbe acquired to be developed into States. The case clearly holds that nntil the\\nadoption of the fourteenth amendment there might be persons born and residing\\nwithin the United States, subject to its powers and having a right to demand its\\nprotection, who are not citizens because not entitled to participate in the sover-\\neignty. That amendment enlarges this definition only to the extent of all persons\\nborn in the United States and sub.iect to its jurisdiction. The term United States\\nhere must mean the territory of the States united to form the National Govern-\\nment. The words and suliject to its jurisdiction are not words of enlargement,\\nas in the thirteenth amendment, but words of limitations of the class born in the\\nUnited States, and were inserted to exclude children born of parents who wore\\nresiding in the United States as the representatives of other nations.\\nDUCISIOXS IX IlEGARD TO THE HIOIITS OF INDIANS.\\nOf like legal tendency and effect are the decisions of the Supreme Court in regard\\nto the rights of Indians, as .shown in I nited States cs-. Rogers. 4 Howard. 5(37;\\nUnited States vs. Kagama. 11^ U. S.. :37.j: Elk vs. Wilkius. 112 U. S.. IM. and other\\ncases relating to the relations of the United States to the Indians. In tho last case\\nnamed tho plaintiff was an Indian, born among the tribe to whieh ho belonged.\\nHe sued the defendant for refusing to enroll him as a voter in the city of Omaha.\\nHe alleged that he was an Indian, born within the United States; that for more\\nthan a year prior to tiie grievances complained of he had severed his tribal rela-\\ntions to the Indian tribes, and fully and completely surrendered himself to tho\\njurisdiction of the United States: that he was a c-tizen of the United States by\\nvirtue of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, entitled to all the rights\\nand privileges f the citizens of the United States, and had been a Immi jiilc resi-\\ndent of the State and city for a period of time more than long enough to entitle\\nhim to vote.\\nThese allegations were admitted by demurrer. It was held that he was not a\\ncitizen of the Uniteil States bj* virtue of the fourteenth amendment, because bom\\nwith his tribe, and therefore owed suliordinate allegiam-e to it. The peculiar\\nrelations of the United States to Indians were discussed, and statutes shown which\\nallowed them to le naturalizeil. On this branch of the case, and resjiecting the\\nallegation that he was a citizen, it was held that this allegation and the allegation\\nthat hi had severed his tribal relaticms and completely surrendered himself to the\\njurisdiction of the United States and of the State, were not suflicient to enable\\niiim to recover, unless accompanied, as they were not, by tlio furtlu r allegation\\nthat the Unite 1 Sates or State had accepted his surrender, had naturalized him,\\nor recognized him as a citizen.\\nUnited States vs. Kagama establi.shes the right of this nation to govern the\\nIndians liy acts of Congress instead of by treaties while they maintain their tribal\\nrelations on an Indian reservation within tho limits of a State: that, because\\nwithin tlic geographical limits of the Unit d States, they are neces.sarily sultject\\nto the laws which Congress may enact for their i rote(tion and for the protection\\nof people with whom they conio in contact: that tho States have no such power as\\nlong as tii-y maintain tlieir tribal relations; that they owe no ;dl(\\\\i, ianco to the\\nState, and the State gives them no i rotection. Tlio opinion recognizes and dis-\\ncusses the J), eiiliar relations of tlio (lovornment to tlie Indians; tliat Indians,\\nwhile maintaining trilal relations, owe a subordinate allegiance to the tribe and\\na paramount allegiance to this Qoverumeut.\\n4164", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "11\\nIt would seem that in regard to citizenship paramount allegiance ought to con-\\ntrol. Sovereignty and allegiaiico are interdependent. Sovereignty is the para-\\nmount power which governs and protects. From protection arises subjection, or\\nduty to obey, or allegiance. It is dilVicult to discover any satisfactory reason dis-\\ntinguishing this case from In re Wang Ark Kim, except that the latter was born\\nwithin a State, and therefore within the operation of the fourteenth aniendiiu-nt\\nof the Constitution, and Kagama. on an Indian reservation, over wiiith the .Stato\\nwithin whoso limits the reservation was had no .iurisdiction. and therefore was\\noutside the operation of that amendment. Bc^th were bom under the sovereignty\\nof the United States. The protection furni.^hed by the exercise of that sovereignty\\nraised the duty of obedience to the lav.-s of the United States in both, the duty of\\nprotection and duty of obedience being intcrd(]icndeut. The subordinate control\\nof the tribe over him did not amount to sovereignty \\\\s ithin its meaning in inter-\\nnational luv\\nINTF.KNATIOXAL LAW RESPECTIXG CEDED TERarrOIUES.\\nAgain, it is international law, ever}-where admitted and recognized, that the\\ncession of sovereignty over a country bj* one nation to another aflects only the\\npolitical relations of the inhabitants of the ceded country, and makes them sub-\\njects thereafter of the nation receiving the cession: that v.-hile the inhabitants of\\nthe ceded country change their allegiance, their relation to each other and their\\nrights of property remain undisturbed. The cession of a country does not affect\\nthe rights of property. (Yattel, book 3, chap, lo, sec. SOU; United States vs.\\nPerchman. 7 Peters, 51; Mitchell vs. United States, 9 Peters, 711; Strather vs.\\nLucas, 12 Peters, 410; American and Ocean Insurance Co. vs. Confer. 1 Peters, .111.)\\nLaws, u ^ages. and municipal regulations in force at the time of cession remain\\nin force imiil changed by the new sovereignty. The new sovereignty may deal\\nwith the inhabitants and give them what law it pleases unless restrauied by the\\ntreaty of cession, but until alteration be made the former law continues. (Cal-\\nvin s Case, 7 Co., 17; Campbell r.s. Hall, Cowi.er. 20d; Mitchell vs. United States,\\n9 Peters, 711; Cross et ai. vs. Harrison, IG Howard, 1G4.) Ci oss vs. Harrison holds\\nthat this international law prevails in this country. The Constitution, therefore,\\ncan not of its own inherent force extend itself over such territory. It might be\\nwidvly at variance with the law of the ceded territory. Hence it follows that the\\nConstitution, with the exception of the thirteenth amendment, does not extend,\\nexjyvoprio viqorc, into the newly ceded dependencies, and the contracting nations\\ncould properly except uncivilized tribes from the rights, privi eges, and inmiuni-\\nties of citizens in the treaty by which Alaska was acquired. Hence, the Sui^rfine\\nCourt properly has held that Congress has plenary power in legislating for terri-\\ntories, unless restrained by the stipulation of the treaty, whether that powdr is\\nderived impliedly from the treaty-making power\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that the nation must have power\\nto govern what it may lawfully acquire\u00e2\u0080\u0094 or from section J of Article IV of the\\nConstitution.\\nTlie cases hold that it is immaterial from which source the power comes. It is\\nplenary or unlimited, from whichever source it springs. The cases following the\\nDred Scott decision refer to this section as an expression of this power. By it\\nterritory is treated, not as a part or portion of the United States, but as property\\nbelonging to the United States, and Cotigre^s is given plenary power to disiK)se of\\nit, which it has no power to do if it constitutes a portion of the United States\\ncovered by the Constitution. If it were a part of the United States within the\\nmeaning of those words as used in the Constitution, on the fundamental princi-\\nples on which the Government is founded, the inliabitants of such territory bhould\\nbe clothed with the power of legislation under the Constitution, be represented in\\nCongress, and have a voice in altering and amending the Cocstitution. In what-\\never light it is viewed it is maniiVst that the Constitution, with the exception\\nnamed, unaided does not extend to Puerto Rico and the Philijipme Islands, and\\nthat Congress, with this exception, is clothed with plenary power to legislate in\\nregard to them; to make such rules and regulations respecting them as it regards\\nneedful, considering their situation and circumstances, untrammeled by the other\\nprovisions of the Constitution which secure particular rights, privileges, and immu-\\nnities to citizens of the United States whoso property these ishmds are.\\nIf the Constittition, with the exception named, does not iu\\\\ade these islands of\\nits own force, it is manifest that its other provisions will not become operative\\nthere without an act of Longress. The treaty did not put them in operation there.\\nIt has been claimed that Congress by some indefinalle process impliedly puts them\\nin operation as soon as it enters upon lepislat on lor the islands.fVtn without hav-\\ning passed any act to that eti ect. In (juite a number of instant es the Supreme\\nCourt has said that in legislating lor the Territories Congress has plenary power,\\nllss", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "12\\nor the coral lined power of the National Government and of the States. Such com-\\nbined power must be absolute and unlimited, the power of any nation over such\\nterritories\u00e2\u0080\u0094 except in regard to allowing slavery or, in the language of section 3,\\nArticle IV, of the Constitution:\\nPower to disijoso of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and\\nother projierty b.-loiiping to the United States.\\nThe power of the States in enacting laws is not confined within the limits pre-\\nscribed for the National Government by the Constitution. It is absolute except\\nin the particulars surrendered to the National Government. There are number-\\nless decisions of the Supreme Court to this effect on the subject of due process\\nof law or the law of the land. In Missouri vs. Lewis (101 U. S., 22, 31) Mr.\\nJustice Bradley says:\\nWe might go still further and say, with nndoubted truth, that there is nothing in the Consti-\\ntution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or\\nany part of its ti-rritory. If tlie State of Kew York, for example, should tee fit to ado])t the civil\\nlaw and its methods of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counti s. and the\\ncommon law and its method:! of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing iu the Con-\\nstitution of the United States to prevent its so doing.\\nAnd Mr. Justice Brown, in Holden vs. Hardy (169 U. S., 866}, after quoting the\\nforegoing, says:\\nWe have seen no reason to donbt the soundness of these views. In the future growth of the\\nnation, as lieretofore, it is not impossible that Congress may see fit to annex territories whose\\njurisprudence is that of the civil law. One of tlie considerations moving to such annexation\\nmight hs tho very fact that the territory so annexed should enter the Union with its tniditions,\\nlaws, and systems of administration unchanged. It wt.uld lio a narrow construction of tho C o i-\\nstitution to require tlieni to abandon these, or to substitute for a system which rejiresented the\\ngrowtliof generations of inhabitants a jurisprudence with which they had no previous acqualnt-\\nuuco or sympathy.\\nThese decisions are forcibly to the point that Congress, in the exercise of the\\ncombined powers of the National Government and of the States, has unlimited\\npower in legi!^lating for the.-e islands, with the exception of allowing slavery, and\\ndoes not thereby impliedly confer upon their inhabitants the other rights,\\nprivileges, and immunities secured to the citizens of the United States by the\\nConstitution. Doubtless the citizens of the United States, fully imbued with the\\nprinciples of the Constitution, will see to it that no Congress will ever exist which\\nwill not confer upon the inhabitants of these islands all the rights, privileges, and\\nimmunities secured by the Constitution, so far as they are applicable to their\\ncondition and circumstances.\\nlir.I.-VTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THESE DEPENDENCIES.\\nWhile, under these views. Congress enters upon the government of these depend-\\nencies unrestrained by the provisions of the Constitution, nevertheless it will\\nexercise this power tmder the obligation of a general duty, to be discharged faith-\\nfully and honestly for the highest welfare of their inhabitants, and of the inhabit-\\nants of the nation. Every function of government is a duty so to be discharged.\\nAs applied to Puerto Rico and the Pliilippine Islands the duty is general. It is so\\nleft by the treaty.\\nnEi.ATioNs TO rrn.\\\\.\\nIn regard to Cuba tho duty is particular. It is so constituted by the re.solutions\\nantedating tlio war and l)y the provisions of the treaty. The prtaiuiileof the .ioint\\nrei^olution of Conu ress appvo\\\\ed April JO. is .iS. counts upon the abhorrent condi-\\ntions which have existed in that island for more than three years, shocking to the\\niiK ral sense (.f the penplu of the United States, a di.sgrace to Christian civilization,\\nculminating in th( destrnciion of tiie Mttiin with JbG of its oflicers and crew, and\\nthereupon it is solemnly resolved, (1) That the people of the island are, and of\\nright ought to be, free and indejiendent. (2) That it is the duty of this Cioveru-\\nmeiit to demand, and it does demand, that Spain at once relin(iuisi) its authority\\nan i government of the island. (li) Authorizes the President to use the entire land\\nami naval forces, and to call out tlie militia to enforce the demand. (4) The\\nUnited States disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise .sovenignty, .iuris-\\ndiction, or control over the island excejit for the iiacitication thereof, ami then\\nasserts its delerminaliou to leave the government and control of the island to its\\npeople.\\nThe.se were followed by the act approved April 2. declaring that a state of war\\nhad existed between the United States and Spain since April 21. and directing and\\nempowering tho Pn^sident to use the entire land and naval forces and to call into\\nthe service the militia of tho I nited States in tlie prosecution of the war. The\\nPresidi iit exercised tlie power conferred, obeyed the direction, jirosecuted the war\\nto a successful termination, resulting first in the protocol and then in the treaty\\nratified by the Senate, by which Spain relinquishes her sovereignty over Cuba,\\n4183", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "13\\nantl tlio United States annoniicos to tho world that sbo is about to occupy anfl,\\nwhile the occupation continues, she\\nwill assTimo and disoharpo the oljlijrat ions tlint may. nntlpr International law, result from th\u00c2\u00ab\\nfact of its occupatioD for tlio jirotoctiou of lito and i)roi)erty.\\nThe United States is now in the exorcise of such occupation. It has been claimed\\nthat she did not take sovonijj;nty over the island; that ou tlie reliniiuislimeiit by\\nSpain it vanished into thin air to some place unknown, or, as one eminent writer\\non international law has said, was in abeyance until the inhabitai)t.s of tho island\\nshould bo in condition to receive and exercise it. Sovereignly is supremo or para-\\nmount control in the {government of a country. The United States is now, and\\nhas been since the sipnin;, of the protocol, in the exercise of this control in the\\ngovernment of tho island. It has not been a divided control, as sometimes happens\\nin the conflict of arms. Her control has been unquestioned and undi-puted. I\\nthink the United States, upon the surrender of sovereignty over tho island by\\nSpain, immediately following tho signing of the protocol, took sovereignty over\\ntho island, not as her own. nor tor her benefit, nor for the people of tho United\\nStates, but for the inhabitants of the island, for the specitied and partieular pur-\\npose of pacitication of the island. What ismeant by the pacification of the island?\\nIt may be diilicuit to determine.\\nPersons and nations may differ in regard to the state of things which must exist\\nto have this accomplished. The Cubans may say that they are pacified, in a state\\nof peace now. and therefore it is our duty to withdraw and allow them to set up\\nsuch a government as they may choose. We may .say that pacification means\\nmore than absenee of a state of war: that, considering the state of things that had\\nexisted for three or more years, it means until the inhalntants shall have acquired\\na reliable, stable government. Are the Cubans capable of e.^tablishing and main-\\ntaining i stable government? Who shall decide? If that be the meaning, what\\nkind of a governm^mt? A monarchy, a desi Otism abhorrent to tho fundamental\\nprinciples that have ruled and inspired this nation from its origin? Who can tell?\\nThen the announcement makes no provision for any return by such government,\\nwhen established, for the expenditures and obligations incurred in prosecuting\\nthe war and administering the sovi reignty.\\nIs the United States to receive such compensation? She became a volunteer in\\nthe war. and anntninced herself such volunteer in taking tho sovereignty until\\npacification is accomplished. As such the United States stands to-day before the\\ncivilized nations of the world. The inhabitants of Cuba are the beneficiariei of\\nthis volimtarily assumed duty, and when a difference arises between this Gov-\\nernment and tliem, whether the duty has been performed and whether this nation\\nis to be compensated for the expense of its administration, have a right to arraign\\nthis nation at the b.ar of nations and demand that it give account of the steward-\\nship wliich it voluntarily as.-umed. The determination of the rights of this nation\\nand of tho Cubans under this assumed duty may involve many nice (luestions and\\nmany diOieulties.\\nSHOVLD THE UXITKD STATES EXTEND THESE REI-ATIOXS TO rUERTO RICO AND THE PHILIP-\\nPINE ISLANDS?\\nYet thore are those wh 5 earaestly urged that Congress should make a declara-\\ntion that the nation holds Puerto iiico and tlie rhilii)piue Islands under the same\\nundefined, yet in a sense partictilar, duty. In my judgment, such a course is beset\\nwith complications and diflicullios. By adopting it the nation Vvould court these\\nand invite the inhabitants of the islands to engender perplexing qnestiona and\\nentanglements. I nder the treaty the nation takes the sovereignty of Puerto Rico\\nand of the Philippine Islands, under the general duty to use it in such a manner\\nas Congress may judge will best subserve the highest interests of their inhabitants\\nand the inhabitants of this nation. I would announce no othf r duty in regard to\\nthem. Many more complications and entanglements may arise in the discharge\\nof thep;irticular duty to Cuba than are likely to arise in the aischarge of the gen-\\neral duty to Puerto Rico and the Philii)piue Islands.\\nCONGRESS SHOULD ANNOUNCE NO POLICY EXCEPT THE FLAG.\\nIt is urged that this nation should annonnce the policy of its purpose in the\\nadministration of the sovereignty. The flag of tho nation h.as been jdanted on\\nthose islands. Tbat is the emblem of its policy, and ever hiia been, even when at\\nhalf-mast, mourning the loss of her sons slain in its defense. The flag never did,\\nand I hope never may. represent but one policy. Thar policy is individual man-\\nhood; the right to enjoy religious and civil liberty; the right of every man to\\nbelieve in and worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience; the\\n4188", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "14\\nright to stand protected equally with every other man liefuro the law in the enjoy-\\nment of freedom, of personal rights, and of property.\\nLet the flag, as thu representative of these principles, be planted and become\\ndominant on and over every island and every inhabitant. No other, no better,\\npolicy can be proclaimed. In no other way can this Congi-ossand nation discharge\\nIts duty to the peojde of the United States and to the poople of the islands. Con-\\ngress should jtroflaim this policy by its acts and make no attempt to do what it\\nhas no power to do\u00e2\u0080\u0094 to pledu;e or limit the acticn of future Congresses. What\\nfuture Congresses shall do is for theni to determine and proclaim. It can not be\\nassumed that wisdom will die with the present Congress, nor that it is any part\\nof its duty to proclaim v/hat future Congresses shall do. Sufficient unto the day\\nis the duty thereof.\\nCOXSEXT OF THE IXnAHITAXTS OF ISLAXDS XOT Itr.QUinni).\\nIf these principles are enforced as far as applicable to the government of these\\nIslands, the inhabitants will be blessed, whether they consent thereto in advance\\nor not. In a rei)resentative government the right to govern is not derived from\\nthe consent of the governed until they arrive at a stage of advancement which\\nwill render them capable of giving an intelligent consent. Four-fifths of the\\ninluihitants of this country have given no consent except representatively. The\\nconsent of women, as a rule, and of minors is never required, nor allowed to be\\ntaken. Wives and children are assumed to be represented by husbands and\\nfathers. Bovs are to be educated, trained, and ripened into manhood belore they\\nare capable of giving consent. Doubtless the boys of fifteen in this country are\\nbetter prepared to give an intelligent consent than are the inhabitants of those\\nislands. This is not their fault. After having lived for more than three hundred\\nyears under a government of oppression and practical denial of all rights, it is not\\nwonderful that they are not capable of .iudgmg how they should be governed.\\nThey are to be trained in these principles: tirst. by being allowed, under experi-\\nenced leaders, to put them in practice in the simpler forms of government, and\\nthen be graduallv advanced in their exercise, as their knowledge increases.\\nAll accounts agree that the administration of justice in the islands through the\\ncourts has bet-n a farce; that no native could establish his rights or gain his cause,\\nhowever righteous, against the Spaniards and priests: that therein bribery and\\nevery form of favoritism and oppression prevailed. Under such training and\\nabuse falsehood and deceit have become prevalent. These most discouraging\\ntraits of character can not be changed in a generation, and never except by pure,\\nimpartial administration of justice througli the courts, regardless of who may be\\nthe parties to the controversies. In my judgment, the people of this nation obtain\\nmore and clearer knowledge of their personal and property rights through the\\nadministration of justice in the courts than from all other sources\\nWHAT EXl EUIEXCE TEACUES.\\nAll experience teaches that the requirements and impartial practice of the prin-\\nciples of civil and religious liberty can not speedily l e ac luired by the inhabitants,\\nleft to their own way. under a protectorate by this nation. The experience of\\nthis nation in governing and endeavoring to civilize the Indiana teaches this. For\\nabout a centurv this nation exercisi-d. in fact, a prolei-t orate over the tribes, and\\nallowed the natives of the country to maiiagc their tribal and other relations in\\ntiieir own wav. The advancement in civilization was very slow and hardly per-\\nceptible. During the comparatively few years that C ongress lias, by direct legis-\\nlation, controlleil tlieir relation to each other and to the reservations tiie advance-,\\nment in civilization has been ten-fold more rapid. This is in accord with all\\nexperience. The untaught can not become ac(iuainted with the ditlicult prob-\\nlems of government and of individual rights, and their due enforcement, without\\nskillful gui lea.\\nNo practical educator would think of creating a body of skilled mechanics by\\nturning the unskilhd loose in a machine shoj). He would jdaco there trained super-\\nintendents and guides to impart information to their untaught brains and to guide\\ntheir unskilled hands. It is equally true that they would never become skilled\\nwithout using th-ir brains and h.iu Is in oi)eratiiig the machines. So, too, if this\\nnation would sm-cessfuUy bring llie inliabitants of these islands into the practice\\nof the principles of religious ami civil liberty, it must both give them the opjior-\\ntunity to bo taught in, and to i)r.ictice them, lirst in their simpler forms and then\\nin their higher jipiilic.iiion. but under competent and trained teachers and guides\\nplaced over tiiem bv tiiis nation.\\nIt is equally true that the laws and customs now prevailing must neither be\\npushed one side nor chang( d too suddenly. They must be permeated gradually\\nby the leaven of civil ai.d religious liberty until the entire population is leavened.\\nass", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "15\\nTo accomplish this without mistake, in the intcrost of the people of tliis nation\\nand of the inhahitants of tlio islaiuls, is a most Oillicult task, dcuiandini; honesty,\\nintelligence, and the greatest c;iro and good judgnu nt. The task is rendered much\\nmore dilhcult hecause the people of the islands have hitherto heen governed by\\nthe application of the direct opposite of these principles, and are comi)osc d of great\\nnnmliers of tribes, speaking ditlorcut dialects and languages, and governed by\\ndifferent customs and laws.\\nSEPARATE DErAKTM?:NT OF GOVKUNMENT DEMANDED.\\nThe successful solution of this problem demands accurate knowledge of the\\npresent conditions of the entire population, and of the different cla.sscs. of their\\nrespective habits, customs, and laws. As the principles of civil and religious lib-\\nerty are gradnaily intermingled with their juescnt customs, habits, and laws,\\nchanges will be constantly going forward. An intimate knowledge of these ciianges\\nwill also be necessary for then- successful government. Hence, as a rirst step to\\na successful discharge of this duty. Congress should create a department of gov-\\nernment, cliarged with the sole duty to bt-como accurately acfiuainted with and to\\ntake charge of their affairs, and place exact knowledge of them before Congi-ess\\nfor its guidance. They should nut, as now, be left in charge of departments over-\\nloaded and overworked.\\nAPrOlNTMEN TS Ml ST BE MADE XONPOI.lTTCAt,.\\nTlie second step to be taken is to remove all civil appointments in the islands\\nfrom the realm of politics. The nation will utterly fail in the discharge of its\\nduty if the ishnids are made political footballs, subject to change in gor\\\\-evnment\\nwith every jtolitical change in the Administi ation. The administration of the\\nsoveignty must be intelligent, honest, and uninterrupted. A faithful, inteUigent\\nman.with a lull knowledge of the situation, must not be displaced to give place\\nto one ignorant of the conditions, however capable otherwise. The duty rests\\nupon the entire nation. It must be discharged for the interest of whole nation.\\nThere are honest, capable men in every political party. These should be sought\\nout and given place in the administration of this sovereignty, as nearly as maybe\\nin pro; ortion to the strength of the several political parties in the nation. Then,\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0when there is a political change in the Administration, there will be no induce-\\nment to make extensive changes in the administrative appointees of the sovereignty.\\nCONCLUSION.\\nDifficult as is the administration of this sovereignty, if honestly and intelli-\\ngently imdertaken such administration, I believe, will be beneficial both to the\\npeople of this nation and to the inhabitants of the islands. Difficulties which\\nhave come as these have come\u00e2\u0080\u0094 unsought\u00e2\u0080\u0094 honestly and faithfully encountered,\\nbring wisdom and strength. The stvug-^le for nearly a century in this nation over\\nshivery gave wonderful wisdom, strength, and clearness of insight into the great\\nprinciples which the nation is now called upon to apply to these oppressed islands.\\nStagnation is decay and ultim:ite death. Honest struggle, endeavor, and discus-\\nsion bring light. grov -th, development, and strength. The primary object to be\\nattained by the discharge of this duty is the elevation of the inhabitants of the\\nislands physically, meiitally, and morally; to make them industrious, honest,\\nintelligent, liberfy-loving, and law-abiding. This end attained, the secondary\\nobject\u00e2\u0080\u0094 commercial and material growth among them and among the surround-\\ning millions\u00e2\u0080\u0094 will surely follow. The first unattained. the second at Lest will be\\nspasmodic and of little worth.\\nThe intelligent, thoughtful observer sees more in nature and in the ordering of\\nthe affairs of this world than the ungiiided plans and devices of men and nations.\\nFor him the wisdom of the Eternal shapes the affairs of men and of nations, .some-\\ntimes even against their selfish plans and desire.s. For such His hand planted the\\nseed of individual manhood and for centuries watched over and cared tor it in its\\nslow growth amidst infinite sufferings, struggles, and conflicts, until, at length,\\nplanted on these shores, not entirely in its i)urity. bat at last brmight to full\\nfruit.ige in the terrible struggles nnd conlliets which ended with the civil war.\\nUnder Him no man, no nation, lives to itself alone. If it has received much,\\nmuch must it give to the less favored. Under His guidance. I believe, the dis-\\ncharge of this greatand difhcult duty has fallen, unsought, tothe lot ot this nation.\\nThen let the nation take up the duty which the Ruler of men and nations h.as\\nplaced upon it: go forward in an honest, unselfish, intelligent, earnest end-avor\\nto discharge it for the highest interest of the nation and of the islands, in the fear\\nand underthe direction of the Supreme Uuler who guided the fathers and founders;\\nand the nation will not, can not, encounter failure.\\n4188\\no", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3661", "width": "2247", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n010 457 372 1\\nHoUinger Corp.\\npH8.5", "height": "3733", "width": "2418", "jp2-path": "nationsrelations00ross_0020.jp2"}}