{"1": {"fulltext": "/y\\nE 713\\n.C95\\nCopy 1\\nAiiiH Xuliuu ut llunuiiait I\\nSTEECll\\nHON. i:. 1). CKUMrACKE JJ,\\nof ixdiaxa.\\nIn TiiK House of ]?EPitESENTATi\\\\Ti:s,\\nTncsilaij, Jmie I ISOS.\\nTho IIi.u o haviiiR uiiilor considor.itinii tho joint resolution (H. Rc3. iu J) to\\nprovide for iinnexiuK tho Hawaiiiui Isliinds to the United States\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nMr. CRl MPACKKK said\\nMr. Spkakkk: I um opposod to Ibc annexation of tlio Hawaiian\\nIslands to this country beeansc, upon the whole, it appears to nie that\\nthe project \u00e2\u0096\u00a0would brin^ iiioro burdens Ih.in bonelits. It i)robably\\nwould bring sonio bonelits, for it is hard to conceive of a scheme so\\nAvild that has not some eonipeusatory features. Hut, sir, in a matter\\nof such grave importaneo as this, involving, as it does, a radical\\nchange of our historical policy, it ought not to receive our sanction\\nTinles s it is clear, considering its future as well as its present etlects,\\nthat there is a decided preponderance of advantage in it, and every\\ndoubt should be resolved against tho proposition.\\nWo should accept nothing by faith alone in a matter of such\\ntranscendent importance. It is claimed that the people of this\\ncountry, almost as a unit, are in favor of tho proposition. That\\nassertion I deuv; tho masses of the people have given the subject\\nvery little thought, but almost every expression from the farmers\\nand wage earners has been ajrainst it. It is true, there appears to\\nbo considerable sentiment in its favor, .judging from i)ublic prints\\nand utterances, but even that is largely sentiment, that has not\\nripened into conviction. It has been well said that one noisy man\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2will make more noise than forty (in iet ones; and that aphorism is\\npeculiarly tnio of tho situation respecting tho iiuostiou of\\nannexation.\\nTHE COSSTITCTIONAI. ASPF. T.\\nIn the liist jilace, the resolutions ought to be deleated lieeanse it\\nis an attempt to accomplish by tho legislative department of tho\\nGovernment that which tho organic law clearly requires to bo dono\\nbj the Exeei\\\\live. Without entering i\\\\])on an analysis of the Fed-\\neral Constitution. I desire to advert to tho fact that each depart-\\nment of the Government is and nni.- t bo independent of the others,\\nand it would be dangerous ami revolutionary for one department t\\narrogate functions and powirs vested by the Constitution in tho\\nothers. Under the division of powers the President has absolutely\\nno legislative authority except thoqualitied negative in the form of\\ntho veto. Kvorv member of this House will admit not only that\\nthe President has constitutional authority to negotiati for the annex-\\nation of territory, \u00e2\u0080\u00a2ubjoct to tho approval of the Senate, but that\\nhis is the only proper agency to accomplish that end, because it in-\\nvolves the exercise of the tfcaty-maUing power exclusively \\\\ested\\nin tho Presidint l y the (\u00e2\u0080\u00a2oustitutioii.\\n3m 1", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "4^\\nvy lJ -l\\nc,*\\nx The question is purely an executive one, witliout a single leglsla-\\niive feature. Tliere is no express authority in tlie Federal Constitu-\\ntion for the acquisition of territory, and in the early history of the\\nEepiibiic the existence of that authority was denied by many able\\nstatesmen. But the always convenieut doctrine of inherent power\\nwas conceived, and now no one questions the authority of the people\\nthrough their constitutional agencies to enlarge the public domain\\nby the annexation of additional territory. But every lawyer must\\nadmit that negotiations for the annexation of outlying territory are\\nexecutive in character, regardless of the form in which they are\\nplaced. The legislative formula, He it resolved, etc., can not\\nchange a proposition essentially executive in its character fo one of\\na legislative nature.\\nThis body has no executive powers whatever, excepting snch as\\nare incident to its own organization and government. Negotiations\\nfor the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands were lirst entered upon\\nby the President in the form of a treaty with those assuming to act\\nfor the islands, containing the same provisions as the pending reso-\\nlutions; but tlie treaty reqiiired the assent of two-thirds of tlie\\n(Senators, and it became apparent that it could not command that\\nassent, so it has been abandoned and this expedient invented to\\nevade the limitations of the Constitution. The simplest treaty\\nwith a foreign country must be ratified by two-thirds of the Sen-\\nators, but it is gravely claimed that a treaty of annexation aft ecting\\nthe destiny of the whole nation may be sanctioned by a bare majority\\nof the Senators.\\nAny measure that fails to receive the sanction of the people,\\nthrough their constitutional organism, ought to be defeated in an\\nattempt to subvert the Constitution, whatever may be its merits.\\nThe jireservation of the constitutional limitations and guarantya\\nis of infinitely greater importance than the acquisition of new ter-\\nritory, however desirable. No end will justify means of such a rev-\\nolutionary character. But it is claimed that a precedent exists for\\nthe proposed actimi in the acquisition of Texas. It is true that\\nTexas was admitted into the Union by a joint resolution of Con-\\ngress, after a treaty for its annexation had failed to bo ratified by\\nthe Senate, but it was admitted as a State and not as a Territory.\\nSection 3, Article IV, of the Constitution, confers upon Congress\\nthe iiower to admit new States into the Union, and it was insisted\\nthat as Texas was to be admitted into the Union as a State and not\\nannexed as a Territory it could be done by joint resolution. That\\ndoctrine w%a3 combated by the ablest lawyers and statesmen of the\\ntime, on the ground that the power to admit States into the Union\\nembraced only States created out of territory already a part of the\\nnational domain. Congress took the other view, however, and\\nTexas was admitted into the Union as a State by joint resolution,\\nand the action was acquiesced in by the people. But never in the\\nhistory of the country has territory been admitted as such by joint\\nresolution or by Congressional action.\\nFlorida, Louisiana, and Alaska were aunexed by treaty, and Cali-\\nfornia by conquest. The attempts to annex St. Thomas and the\\nDominican Hepublic were by treaty, and not by joint resolution.\\nUpon the failure of the treaty to annex San Domingo President\\nGrant suggested that it be done by Congressional action, but the\\njiower to so acquire it was quite generally denied. Senator Thur-\\nnian, of Ohio, one of the ablest lawyers of the country, in discussing\\nthe (question, said:\\nYou can not by joint resolntion .annex Snn Dominjro .is a Territory; you must\\nanuiix lier as .a Statu if you annex lier by joint resolution. Tliero is no clause in\\nthe Constitution that ^wovides for the acquisition of territory by joint resolution,\\n3441", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "uulcss it 1)0 that oiisrr\u00c2\u00bbs iiiiiv inhiiit now Stales in t\u00c2\u00ab llio I ninn. It wan upon lli\u00c2\u00ab\\nnfunient tlint tlioro was no limitiitioii tijion that i)o\\\\vor (o ndinlt n w Slati\u00c2\u00ab iiil-i\\n111 I uion; lliat it was not limited to tonitory bili.!ij;inj; to Iho InilPil State*,\\nb it that territory l\u00c2\u00bblonj;in;; to a loroipi i)owi-r niijlit bo admitted into tin. I nio:i\\naa a Slate. It was niion tliut ilodrino that tho ro.iolution in th(! iukooI Ti van wuh\\n))assrd. lint no ono has uv.r iirctvmlod that uu ould by joint loxoluliou aunix\\nterritory as a Territory without admiltiug it as a State.\\nTho liistoiy of thi.s roimtry aftonl.s no proccdcnt for llio ;iniicxii-\\ntion of trnitoiy as siuh liy joint lesoliitiim of Congress, and any\\nsin-h attempt isClearlv repii^Miant to tlic (\u00e2\u0080\u00a2oii titntioii.\\nTho Federal ^iipreiiio t onit has ropcatctUy atriniictl the viows of\\nChief .Instieo Marshall in tho case of Insiiraiieo Coniiiany r. Canter\\n(I Teters, nil that tho constitutional nietlnnU of aciinirin;, aiUli-\\ntional territory are liy treaty aiulconciueal. Will anyone eon tend that\\nthis body has anv share in tho treaty-niakinj, jiowei I .issert, as\\na proposition of law, that tho lloii-so of Kejircsentatn e.s and tho\\nrrcsidont possess no concurrent powcr. i. I f the pendi ii^ jtroposi t ion\\nis legislative in its eliaraeter the rrosident bad no aiilhority to\\nnegotiate tho treaty in tho first place, and if it is executive this\\nbody has no constitutional authority over it -whatever. It is alto-\\ngether probable that if tho resolutions shall pass botii branebes ol\\nCongress and receive Executive approval no one will ever (|nestion\\nonrFitle to the island, but tho habit of inventing .subterfugo to\\novado the plain ])rovlsion3 of tho Constitution is dangerous and\\ndestructive in its tcinloncics.\\nSuppose tho President should disagree to tho resolutions and\\nshould veto llicni and tliey should subsequently pass l\u00c2\u00bboth branches\\nof Congress by a two-thirds vote, notwitliRtandiiig the veto, would\\nit be claimed that annexation so attemi tcd would have any eousti-\\ntntioual sanction? I apprehend not. The courts have no authority\\nto review tho exercise of political powers, and for this reason greater\\ncaution should eharaetcrizo the action of the (jovcrnmeut, because\\nof tho danger of overriding established limitations by insidious\\nencroachment.\\nCLIMATIC CO.VDITIO.V?.\\nI am oppose l to tho project bocanso it will incorporate iiilo our\\nl)olitical system territory over 2,000 miles from our coast, under a\\nblazing, tropical sun\u00e2\u0080\u0094 territory that can contribute but little to the\\ngreatness of the Ivopublic and will necessarily detract from the high\\nstandard of its citizenship. Tho dignity of labor i.s the glory ol\\nour civilization, and its standard can never bo lowered without\\nmaterial injury to the general welfare. AVhite labor never has gone\\ninto tropical countries and it never will go there. It is proposed to\\nannex tcrritorv capable of supporting a million people, in which all\\nlabor must bo performed by people of a very low order of civil and\\nindustrial life, and bring them into direct competition with the\\nhigh-class, intelligent labor of tho States.\\nThat policy, Hir, has been repeatedly repudiated by the poojjlc ot\\nthis countrvat tho polls. Tho protection of American lal)or from\\ncompetitioii with tho cheap labor of other countries has been a\\ncardinal doctrine of tho Itepuldiean party ever since its organiza-\\ntion. Tho ingenuity of our etatesmanship is now being taxed to\\ninvent methods of removing convict labor from competition with\\nfree labor, and vet it i.s asserted that it will not degrade the intelli-\\ngent labor of America to put it into direct competition with ill-i aid\\nBca-island, .Japanese, and Chinese workmen. That competition can\\nnot bo avoided if annexation shall be aee(uiii)rished. I mty ol\\ninterest, sentiment, and destiny, so far as it can bo attained, is\\nliighly necessary to the happiness of our people and the ))erpctnity\\nof ]{epubli an institutions, and we are already si) diversilied that\\n3141", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "perplexing and dangerous political and economical problems con-\\nIJront us, demanding solution.\\nThe difference in the degree of development in various parts of\\nthe country are so marked that ugly antagonisms exist and popular\\ndiscontent is fomented. Measures adapted to one section are un-\\nsuited to the demands of another, and legislation, general in its\\nscope, must be so compromised to secure something near equality\\nof operation, that its efficiency is in a large degree impaired. These\\ndiscordarrt elements constitute the gravest danger vrith which we\\nhave to contend, whether domestic or foreign. Gentlemen contend\\nthat laws may be made for the government of colonial acquisitions,\\nadapted to the degree of civil development, and that we need not ad-\\nmit the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands into full political part-\\nner.sliip with us until it is deemed expedient.\\nThe principle that all citizens are equal before the law is the bed-\\nrock of Kepiiblican institutions, and a policy that will discriminate\\nbetween citizens is repugnant to the genius of free government.\\nEquality is the soul of the Republic, and it is the beginning of the\\nend when this great country can tind excuses to make invidious\\ndistinctions between its own citizens. Besides this, there is no\\nplace in our political system for permanent colonial governments.\\nThe Constitution contemplates that every foot of territory within\\nour dominion, outside of the District of Columbia, shall ultimately\\nform part of a State with a citizenship equal to that of all the\\nStates. The Federal Supreme Court, in the famous Dred Scott de-\\ncisioUj declared that\\nThere is no power given by the Constitntion to the Federal Government to\\nestablish and maintain colonies bordering on the United States, nor .at a distance,\\nto be ruled and governed at its pleasure, nor to enlarge its territoiial limits,\\nexcept by the admission of new States The power to expand the terri-\\ntory of the United States by the admission of new St.ates is plainly given; and\\nin the construction of this power by all the Departments of the Government it\\nlias been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at\\nthe time, but to bo admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle\\nit to admission. It is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony\\nand governed by Congress with absolute authority.\\nWhat becomes of the policy advanced by annexationists that the\\nGovernment can permanently control the islands by a system fitted\\nto their situation, capacity, and develoi)ment? It is not the policy\\nof the Government to admit any class of people into the political\\nhousehold that can not intelligently ^and helpfully participate in\\nfree government and profit by its privileges. I confess that I have\\nsome sentiment upon the question of citizenship. I love to look\\nupon my fellow-citizen with the consciousness that, however hum-\\nble his station in life, he is the equal before the law of the greatest\\nin the land, and that from his loins may spiing a posterity that will\\nbless humanity and glorify republican institutions. A race that\\ndoes not possess these splendid possibilities must lower the dignity\\nof our citizenship.\\nTlie marvelous growth and uneven development of the country\\nare largely responsible for present conditions, and many of our most\\ntroublesome questions will be removed by time. Our interests will\\nbe more e(iuitably adjusted and grow into more harmonious rela-\\ntions with further development. The standard of life in all parts\\nof the country must be measured according to a common scale, and\\nwe have now as great a diversification of climate, resource, and\\ntendency as can be successfullj trained together under one political\\norganization. The Temperate Zone, bj inexorable law, has always\\ncontained, and always will contain, the highest intelligence of the\\nworld and all that is most helpful in civilized life. The tropical\\nclimate stifles growth and impedes progress in the individual, and,\\n3141", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "of roiirso, ill society, for tlio iiidividiiiil ia tlio Hoiial unit. (Inr\\nt xif^i ucifs slioiilil l c iircssiii;^ iiuU-od to .justify tho iiicoriioi.itiou\\ninto our social system of territory \\\\vhi li, iUnn its uii!iltcral)Iti con-\\nditions, can not keep ]tacc wit li us in our march to a iii^^lier iIo\u00c2\u00bbtiny.\\nI lie situation ccrtaini.v docs iiotjustifN tiiat radical ileiiartiiio at\\ntliis time, and 1 sincerely hope it invi r will. I lm islands are as\\nAvidely separated from us socially and industrially as they arc phys-\\nically. There is not a siu;;lo tciidoiicy or interc.st in common\\nbetween us, and our destinies are uualteraldy diver^joiit. The peo-\\nple of the islands are iiicajjablo of sclf-j^ovcinment, and al\\\\\\\\a_\\\\H\\nwill be. Xo itro;;rcssi\\\\ e rcimldic can e\\\\er endure in the torrid\\nzone, llio infusion of that exotic into our national currents will\\ntend to corrui)t tuir whole system; it will be a fcsti ring sore in the\\nbody politic, to irritate and annoy for all time. A pressing neces-\\nsity is recogni/ed for the oxclusion from our domain of immigrants\\nwhoso inlluciiee upon our institutions would lie deleterious, and\\nyet it is pro]ioscd to introduce at one coup n whole race of jieople\\n80 stolid and uuresponsi\\\\e iu tlnir very natures that they can not\\nbe assimilated by our ci\\\\ili/.iiig forces.\\nThe suggestion that the Mongolians shall be excluded from the\\nislands when they shall have passed under our control is no remedy,\\nfor the natives aio C(iually objectionable, and no desirable jteoplo\\ncan become inured to that environment. The climate and soil i)rc-\\ncliulo the hope of a high civilization, and if the islands should bo\\nstocUetl with the best Anglo-Saxon blood they would degenerate\\ninto a race of indolents in a few generations, under the inlluenceof\\nthe enervating surrouudiugs. Ho who declares to the contrary dis-\\nputes an immutable law of individual development and. goes into\\nthe face of all history and experience.\\nDo Ave want a country incapable of keeping step with us to tho\\ninspiring music of jirogress, a country that will oi)erate as a check,\\na drawback, to our forward niovoment! Insular possessions so far\\naway from the continent would add to the causes for international\\ncomplic.itions and embarrassments and become a luxuriant soil for\\nthe growth of pt)litical peculation and scandal.\\nTHE COMMERCE Of THE ISLANDS.\\nMuch h;is been said about the importance to us of the trade of\\nthe islands. Those who have given the matter careful considera-\\ntion for years past must know that thoir trade h.as been an expen-\\nsivo luxury. It is unquestionably true that tho islands iiroduco\\nstaple articles of commerce similar to those produced by other\\ntropical countries, but they do not contribute as ugle article to tho\\nworld s trade tho like of which can not begotten elsewhere. Tho\\nBurronudiiigs and habits of living of the inhabitants are such that\\nthey reiiuire comjiaratively few of tho jnoducts of this country.\\nTheir tra(b iiaturall.\\\\- belongs to us to the extent that it is mutu-\\nally benelicial, and their geographical situation guarantees us al-\\nmost abstiluto control of it without annexation or treaty concessions.\\nIt is not necessary to admit them to our jxilitical liresido in order\\nto obtain that which wo can have without. It would be dearly\\njturchased, indeed, if we were compelled to do that. Their com-\\nmerce was insignilit ant jirior to the treaty with this country, in\\n187.5, admitting their jtroducts intoour porta free of tlnty. Their\\nrhief article of export is sugar, and tho oncessions exteiuled by tho\\ntreaty gave a powert ul impnlbc to sugar growing on the islands.\\nTho attention of American iinestors liad been attracted to the situ-\\nation and private corporations were orgaiii/ed to c\u00c2\u00ab ntrol the sugar\\nplantations. Jsubstantially all the Hugar plantations if the island", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "are now in tlic hands of those corporations and over 75 per cent of\\ntlie stock is owned by American investors.\\nIt was the influence of those stockholders that procured the\\ntreaty. With the enormous advantage secured by the treaty over\\nother sugar-producing countries, the corporate influences induced.\\nthe Hawaiian Government to negotiate treaties with Japan, China,\\nand other countries to enable the planters to import laborers under\\nthe contract system, that they might have cheap labor to cultivate\\nthe plantations. Thousands of Japanese and Chinese laborers were\\nbrought to the islands under those treaties, and they now consti-\\ntute the chief industrial force of the country.\\nWith the coolie system of labor and a rebate of duties by this\\ncountry, the i)roflt8of the sugar baroiis were enormous. The plant-\\ners have sold substantially the entire product to the sugar refiners\\ntrust in this country, delivered at San Francisco, at a price one-\\nfourth of a cent a pound below the current New York price. The\\nrebate of duty did not cheapen sugar to the consumers in this\\ncountry, but it was a clear bonus to the sugar planters trust of\\nHawaii and the refiners trust in America. Our trade with the\\nislands last year amounted to $18,377,000. We purchased from\\nthem $13,687,000 of products, mostly sugar, and sold them goods to\\nthe amount of $4,690,000. We paid them about $9,000,000 more\\nthan we received from them, and in addition, the rebate of duties\\nwe gave them for the privilege of purchasing their sugar at the\\nsame rate we could have gotten it from other countries amounted\\nto $5,354,512.80.\\nWhat did the people of this country receive for this enormous\\nconcession? Not a farthing, outside of the sugar trust. We gave\\nmore in the way of rebate by over $600,000 than our entire sales to\\nthem amounted to. In other words, we paid the people of those\\nislands full market price for their sugar, the same as if no rebate\\nhad been granted. We gave them $4,690,000 of our products and\\n$600,000 in cash in addition That is called a commercial reciprocity\\ntreaty! The reciprocity feature is a fiction. If the sugar planters\\nand refiners had sufficient influence to bring about that treaty and\\nthe treaties between Hawaii and Japan and China respecting con-\\ntract labor in 1875, if they had the two Governments by the throat\\nthen, why have they not power enough to accomplish political\\nunion between them in 18981\\nIS THS SUGAE TECST AGAINST ANNEXATION?\\nWhy, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen tell us that the American sugar\\ntrust is opposing annexation, and therefore we ought to establish\\nit. Questions of this magnitude ought to be settled by reason, and\\nnot by prejudice. It is not very complimentary to the statesman-\\nship of this body to attempt to influence its action by considera-\\ntions of that kind. But what is the truth respecting the attitude of\\nthe sugar trust toward the scheme? Agents of that institution are\\nmen of adroitness, and they know well enough that if they openly\\nespoused a measure it would have to be exceptionally meritorious\\nto muster votes enough to prevail. They fully appreciate the inten-\\nsity of the prejudice against that organization, and if they desire\\na proposition to succeed they can nothelp it more than by ostensi-\\nbly opposing it.\\nBut where do the interests of that organization lie? For where its\\ntreasures are, there will its heart be also. The sugar refiners trust\\nreceives directly about one fourth of the bonus granted by the Gov-\\nernment to the Hawaiian sugar, and it is known that officers of the\\ntrust are large stockholders in the sugar-producing corporations on\\nthe islands. The bonus has averaged over $3,000;000 a year since\\n3141", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "tlio date of the tieatv, and lias ajxurc^iatcil llu; ciiorinoii.s snni of\\n$tir ,(HH),0()t A sum iiioio fliaii sullificiit to Imy oveiy foot of laud\\nin the islands taken from tl)e pockets of tlio ])eopI of this coiinlrv\\nwitliont any compensatory return! Tho treaty is lialde to ho ahro-\\nj;ated ;it any time and this immense, soureeof rV-venm- rut off. It is\\nthe umliilieal lurd tliiou^ h wliicli the sui^ar-jirowinj^ harcuisand th(^\\nrelimrs trust have heeu ahsorhiug nourishment, and they can not\\nalford to havo it severed.\\nAnnexation wouhl secure free markets in this country and all tho\\nhenelits mjoyid under tho treaty. an l in addition it would seruro\\nstahility of .i;overnment on the islands. ANithout ^oin;j into tho\\nethieal questions involved in tho proposition to annex, it must ho\\nadmitted that tho existinj^ jrovornmeiit is not deejily rooted in the\\natVeetions of the, peoi)le antl a revolt is liahlo to oeeur at any time.\\nBy annexation they would secure open markets and a stahle govern-\\nment, two factors hii;hly essential to tho sujjar interests, i ho\\neonuneree of tho islands has heen larj^ely developed under the\\nimpetus of tho treaty and dei)euds for its m;iinteuauec ujjon the ex-\\ntension of tho treaty or annexation. Uur trade with any foreign\\ncountry mijilit be vastly increased by similar cnc-sided concessions,\\nbut wo would soon grow ])oor under that kind of trafhe.\\nJiut, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen assure us that annexation would\\n]mt an end to tho contract-labor system on tho islands. Would it f\\nJ.et us examiuo that question briefly. In the first place, if it did,\\nthe planters could atVord to ]):iy twice as high a rate of wages as\\nthey are paying under the jirescnt system, anil then have an annual\\nbonus over legitimate prolits of $2,000,000. Hut American labor\\nnever will cultivate the sugar plantations ou those islands, and\\nunless Mongolians and South Sea Islanders are employed they will\\ngo uncultivated. White labor Avill never contest with tlio half-\\neivili/cd hordes of the Orient and the Pacilic islands for industrial\\nsupremacy in that lield, and natives and coolies must do the; work.\\nThey are immunes; it is their element; and tho cheap-labor system\\ncan never be terminated without materially impairing jiroduction,\\nI he sugar barons and refiners know this, and they kimw that juo-\\nduction will not be stopped.\\nThis is foreshadowed in I resideut McKiuley s message submitting\\nthe annexation treaty to the Senate in these words:\\nWhat t lie conditions of sncli a union bIi.iII be, tlio politicnl rcl.ition tlirrcof to\\ntlio Unili d SLatci, tlio cli.Tr.icter of the local :idiniiii\u00c2\u00bbtrati\u00c2\u00abn, tli (|iiality and\\n\u00c2\u00ablcpreo of the eleclivo IVanchiso of tlio inbabitantn, llio oxtensioii of the Todcral\\nlaw3 to the territory, or the ciiartnieiit of gpocial laws to (it the i ciiliar ouditiou\\ntlioroof, the ie;;iilatlon, if nrod be, of tin, labor systi-ni tberuiu, an- all uiatteiH\\nwhich the treaty baa wisely reb jjated to Coiiiiies^.\\nThe labor system will be regulated to meet the peculiar conditions\\non the islands. That is, the coolie system will bo permitted, beeauso\\nof the inability to rocuro other labor. The sugar barons know\\nwhat that means. J licy know what regulation of the labor system\\nand laws of the United States is required by the peculiar comli-\\ntion. Hy aum-xation they would secure everything to be desired,\\nand with their monopoly of the interest they would go on accumu-\\nlating millions upon millions at the exi)ense of the citi/eiis of this\\ncmintry. I firmly believe that niiicb of the annexation sentiment\\nis inspired by the sugar barcms on the islands and the sugar relincrs\\nof this country. I am convinced that if tho treaty had to run for\\na quarter of a century yet tho Hawaiian authorities would not have\\njuoposed annexation.\\nI^ast year there were 2S.782 laborers employed on the sugar ]ilan-\\ntations, and only l.lUT of them were natives, jhere wire 12.823\\nJapanese, (!,2Mt t liiiusc, 2,2t! Portuguese. andTl of fhei natiouaii-\\n34tl", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "1\\n8\\nties, nearly all under the contract system, and not an American\\namongst tliem. Great solicitude is expressed by gentlemen for the\\nLii^h minded Americans who are said to have gone to the Islands to\\ncarry with them the beauties of American civilization. We are told\\nthat they have rescued the islands from heathenism and educated\\nand Christianized the natives. There doubtless have gone to that\\nbenighted people many worthy representatives of our Christian\\ncivilization; but of those who are there actively urging the scheme\\nof annexation we know they have gotten substantially all the pro-\\nductive resources in their clutches they have monopolized the Gov-\\nernment; they have overrun the natives with sun- worshipers from\\nthe South Sea Islands and pagan coolies from China and Japan,\\nthat they might grow rich from their cheap sweat and toil.\\nThose high-minded gentlemen have overturned established insti-\\ntutions and fixed upon the people an industrial system hardly a\\ndegree above absolute slavery. They are entitled to sympathy and\\nencouragement indeed! The Saviour stigmatized better men as\\nthieves and robbers and scourged them out of the Temple. Are we,\\nMr. Speaker, to be made the tools of these designing mercenaries\\nand loan the great forces of our Government to enable them to fur-\\nther prey upon helplessness?\\nWhat possible interest has the American Sugar Trust in defeating\\nthe scheme of annexation? Hawaiian sugar has come to our mar-\\nkets free of duty for twenty five years, and annexation would only\\nmake the arrangement permanent. That sugar comes hero in a\\nraw state, and the trust does all the refining. The Hawaiian Sugar\\nTrust is behind the whole scheme, and it is prolific of resources.\\nUnder the tarilF law of 1890 duties were removed from sugar, and\\nHawaii had no advantage in our markets over other sugar-growing\\ncountries. A bounty was paid to American sugar growers, and the\\nHawaiian barons had the audacity to set forces in motion with the\\nview of effecting annexation so they could share in the bounty.\\nLocal disturbances were created, and the revolution of 1893 occurred\\nand was made the pretext for immediate tender of dominion to this\\ncountry. There is scarcely a doubt that that revolution was en-\\ncouraged by the sugar planters for the purpose of eflecting politi-\\ncal union with this country and securing a bounty on their sugar\\nproduct. In 1889 Mr. Merrill, who was our minister to the Hawaiian\\nGovernment, wrote\\nIt is noticeable that .imong tlie American residenta in Hawaii lliere are several\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0srlio, from personal motives, contemplate with satisfaction iieriodical ilisqnietnde\\nin the Kingdom, hoping th.at frequent revolationary epoclis will force the United\\nStates Government to ni.ake these islands a part of its territory. In\\norder to keep affairs in as much turmoil as possible, baseless rumors are constantly-\\nput in circulation, many of which find publication in other countriea.\\nUnder the terms of the treaty of annexation negotiated by Presi-\\ndent Harrison the Hawaiian planters were assured the benefits of\\nour bounty law. Minister Stevens, under date of February 1, 1893,\\nwrote Secretary of State Foster:\\nAs to terms of annexation, I still adhere firmly to the opinion that the\\nBugar bounty to be paid to the Hawaiian planters should bo Limited to 6 mills\\nper pound\u00e2\u0080\u0094 $12 per ton.\\nA bounty of $12 a ton on an output of 250,000 tons a year, paid\\nby the people of this country to the Hawaiian sugar baroiis Three\\nmillions of dollars a year from American sweat and toil Is it auy\\nwonder the oligarchy was keen to surrender tlie sovereignty of the\\nislands to this country? They were willing to sell the birthright\\nof the inoitensive natives, which they had gotten by artifice, for\\nthree millions a year of American gold. As far back as 1873 the\\nsame schemers were at work attempting to secure free markets in\\nBill", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "tliiH country. J lioy were williu^j to Hiirrcn\u00c2\u00abl M- tho moat nacrcd\\nrights of llio pcoplo for Kixin. (icMicral ydiolielil, wlio is ro fro-\\nqiioiitly (inoted l y tho fiieiula of aiiiiuxatiou, wrote from the isliinds\\nill l^To these wonls:\\nT!ii j;rp:il (il)Jo(t of tlio Ilnwniinn Clovpriinioiit in Rocking n rociprorify treaty\\nWith tlio l?iiiloJ Stall s lias bcoii, ami will prolialily roiiliniic to be, to r\u00c2\u00ab. Ili ve llie\\neugar plaiitcra from llio oi)craliiin (if our tariir on lluMrHtiKar. IniK-i d,\\ntlio sujjar planters arosoaniioiis I ora rciiproiil y trcntj-, or ho anxious, rather, lor\\nfree tnulo in sn-iar with Iho United .Slati S, that many ortln-m ojwnly proclaim\\nthemselves in favor of auueiatiou of tlieso islands to tho United Slates.\\nThat, Mr. Speaker, clearly exposes tho motives and nutliods of\\nthe Hawaiian oligarchy iu seeking annexation. (Jrced is their\\nmotive, and disingenuonsness tlicir method. I deplore tho existence\\nof the American Sugar Trust, but as between it and tho llawaiiau\\ntrust my sympathies aro with tho Americati, for it does employ\\nintelligent labor and contriljutes somewhat to tlio su| port of free\\ninstitutions, while, on tho other hand, tho Hawaiian trust enii)!oy8\\nnone but cheap Asiatic labor and contributes to the maiutenanco\\nof the coolio industrial system.\\nHawaii is tlio paradise of commercial jobbers; it is tho worst\\ntrust-ridden country of tho hemisphere; its commerce, its produc-\\ntion, its politics, and its conscience aro all controlled by corpora-\\ntions. Do wo need it t Is there a necessity for any more trusts ia\\nour country T Wo are asked to assumo tho Hawaiian public debt,\\namounting to $1,000,000, and remit taxes amounting to over $G,00O,00O\\na year for all time. Can wo aftord to pay that immense price for\\ntho slight benefit wa would derive from control of tho ialandsT\\nAnd that is only tho beginning, for there will bo forts, fortilica-\\ntions, ocean cables, mail contracts, warship.s, enlarged armies and\\nnavies, and tho Lord only knows what all\\nTUE SUGAn-BEET INDCSTRT.\\nA new impulse lia.5 been given to beet-sugar production in this\\ncountry by tho existing taritf law, and it is conlidently hoped that\\nin tho near future American farmers will grow all of tho sugar\\nrequired for our consumption. Our farmers can never compete witli\\nHawaiian sugar growers, with their advantages of climate and coolie\\nlabor, and tho effect will be either to retard beet-sugar productioa\\nhere or continue to put enormous profits in the coffers of the Hawai-\\nian sugar barons at the expense of American consumers. We can\\nallbrd neither. Those islands produce annually about 1. 0,0(X) tons\\nof sugar over one-sixth of our entire importation. Tho farmers\\nand wage earnei-s of this country, who constitute the power and\\nglory of our civilization, stand as a unit against annexation.\\nTho question for us to decide is, Will we legislate iu favor of the\\nmillions of farmers and laborers of America, who support onr insti-\\ntutions, or in favor of tho sugar barons of tho Hawaiian Islands,\\nwho have been jireying upon our substanro like commercial cormo-\\nrants for the last quarter of a century f I am for the fanners and\\nlaborers of this country.\\nTUE STUATEtaCAL QCE^TION.\\nThe principal argument in support of annexation is fliat the\\nislands aro so located that they would constitute a valuable naval\\noutpost and would be especially dangerous to onr Pacific coast in\\nthe hands of a hostile power.\\nTliey are de hired to be the key to the Pacific Ocean, and we are\\ntold that if wo do not annex them, since thoy are so generously\\ntendered to us, that wo will have no right to object to their occu-\\npancy by some of her country. It is tlie same old story that was\\ntold when we liad under consiileration the proposition to purehaso\\ntho Island of St. Thomas of Denmark during President .lohnson a\\nJul", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "10\\nAdmiuistratiou and the proposition to annex Santo Domingo during\\nPresident Grant s Administration. They were a key to eometbiug\\nor some place, and we needed them for strategical reasons and to\\ndevelop commerce.\\nPresident Grant, the greatest military genius of the ccntnry,\\nthrew all the weight of his personal, professional, and political\\ninfluence in favor of acquiring Santo Domingo, and failed. He dem-\\nonstrated its necessity from a military standpoint, and the danger\\nof allowing it to go into the hands of a foreign power. He expati-\\nated upon its peculiar advantages in developing South American\\ntrade, and solemnly warned the country that if we failed to annex\\nit a European power stood ready to pay $2,000,000 for Samana Bay\\nalone, and that it would be sold. The Senate refused to ratify tho\\ntreaty, and the subject was dropped altogether out of politics.\\nSamana Bay is still there under the same control, and our sense of\\nsecurity has not been disturbed a particle by our failure to acquire\\nit. Our trade with South America has continued to develop, and\\nno one now thinks the country made a mistake iu refusing to adopt\\nthe recommendations of President Grant.\\nThe same old arguiueut has been resurrected, galvanized over,\\nand made to do service iu support of the inoposition to annex tho\\nHawaiian Islands. It is supported by the opinions of a number of\\nAcrj respectable naval experts, who are fertile iu theory and barren\\niu experience, but they fail to make a better case for the pending-\\nproject than that greater military expert. President Grant, made iu\\nfavor of Santo Domingo twenty-live years ago. It is not an expert\\nquestion, and must be settled by the application of common-sense\\nrules and principles. Tho i oiitical, industrial, and economical\\njihases of the proposition should receive attention as well as the\\nstrategical. AVhile I have a high regard for the opinions of naval\\nexperts on expert propositions, they are more than human if their\\njudgments are not highly colored by professional training. A long\\ncourse of study of one branch of government is apt to lead to an\\nexaggerated estimation of its relative importance.\\nMr. TAWNEY. Will the gentleman allow a question?\\nMr. CKUMPACKEK. I prefer not to yield.\\nMr. TAWNEY. I only wanted to ask the gentleman whether\\nthere is any relation whatever between the policy which tho Gov-\\nernment of the United States has pursued iu the past with respect\\nto the islands of Hawaii and our policy with regard to San Do-\\nmingo, of which the gentleman has iust been speaking.\\nMr. CRUMPACKER. Yes; I think they are all within the range\\nof thft Monroe doctrine. And I will take occasion to say right\\nhere\\nMr. TAWNEY. Just one word further. Have we ever maintained\\nthe policy of not allowing other nations to interfere with San Do-\\nmingo as we have done wath respect to the islands of Hawaii for tho\\nlast half a century?\\nMr. CRUMPACKER. We have, most assuredly. Those islands\\nare Avithiu the range of the Monroe doctrine and if now wo should\\npermit the Sandwich Islands to go into the hands of a foreign power\\nwe should still be infinitely safer on the Pacific coast, according to the\\nopinion of all naval and military experts, than we are on the Atlan-\\ntic; and everybody in the country knows that we are in no danger\\nwhatever on tho Atlantic coast. [Applause.]\\nMr. GIBSON. Wait till we get into war with a country that has\\na navy, and you will find out whether our Atlantic coast is iu\\ndanger.\\nMr. CRUMPACKER. The countries that have great navies are\\nBO weakened in their domestic situation that they do not dare to go\\n3411", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "11\\nto war. Thoy have jcalousios at lioiuu. Siiaiu h.i.s umic, Lecuiise\\nshe i8 too small and iii( nso ]ticuti:iI.\\nThtTo aro niiiiuToii.s islaiida iu much rlnsor proxiiiiitv to our oast-\\neru coast than thu llawaiiaii.s aro to tlm we.st -rn, and wo do not\\nown a 8in;^lo ouo of tlioni; tlioy aro ownt d lar;;cly by Kuropcan\\npowers, and yet we appn-heud no danp(ir from that source. In fact,\\ntlio Hawaiian Ishunls aro Bulistantiallj as far from our western\\nshores as Ihirojio is from our eastern, and with all of our years of\\noxperienco and intercourse 1 doubt if wo would liavo l.unipo moved\\nfarther away if wo could. Aro islands in the hands of a forei^ju\\ni lower a greater menace to ua ou the west side than ou tho ea^itf\\nf so, for what reasiui?\\nWould the Hawaiian Islands, under tho control of Great Hritain,\\nLe a source of greater danger to the racilic coast than tho 15cr-\\nmndas, only a few hundred mih^s away, are to tiie Atlantic coast f\\nContingencies niaj arise that would make tho islands of some im-\\nportance to us as a base of naval operations; conditions might exist\\nunder which their occui)ancy l y a foreign power would be u matter\\nof some concern to us. Hut the question is. Are those coniingeneiea\\nand conditions so likely to exist as to Justify us in departing from\\nour historical policy and entering upon tho dangerous experiment\\nof territorial exjiausionf Would they not bring ua more evil than\\ngood! Six months ago no one would have dreamed of the highly\\nBcnsational uaval conllict that recently occurred at the Philippine\\nIslands.\\nIf that brilliant event could have Leon foreseen, naval expert*\\nwould have been profuse in theories favoring tho aciiuisition of\\nterritory for strategical purposes iu tho Orient. Warfare is a suc-\\ncession of surprises, and no wisdom has foresight enough to know-\\nwhere the next battle will bo fonght. Naval warfare must make\\nits own facilities; it is not within tho range of reason that wo\\nCf should acquire possessious all over the globe for naval depots,\\ni There aro stronger reasons for the acquisition of territory on the\\ncontinent of Asia for naval purpasos than inthecenter of the PaciUo\\nOcean. If wo owned those islands wo would bo compelled to\\nprotect them; they are within 2,000 miles of other islands in\\nthe South \u00c2\u00a3ea that could bo made the base of formidable uaval\\noperations. They can not protect themselves, and Pearl Harbor,\\nhowever well fortified, could only protect tho entrance to Oahu.\\nThere are six or seven other inhabited islands iu tho group, witii\\nmoans of ingress and egress more or less adequate, and they could\\nbe appro.achedand devastated by a naval force. They must be pro-\\ntected and the maintenance of a squadron of warshipa there would\\nbe necessary.\\nMr. TAWNEY. Will tho gentleman name one of those harbors?\\nMr. CIUJMl AClvKK I suggested that thcro were live or six\\nislands with means of ingress and egress moro or less adequate.\\nThoy are approached by commercial agencies; thoy cau be ap-\\nproached by soldiers as well.\\nMr. Hli M\\\\VELL. Will tho gentleman allow mo to ask\\nMr. CHU.MPACKKR. I prefer not to be interrupted. In war we\\nwould tJieube compelled to light in mid ocean, 2,000 miles from our\\nnatural stronghold, where our invincible force could not be avail-\\nable. As we aro now situated we can select tho theater of art ion;\\nwo can withdraw to our coasts or attack an enemy wherever ho is\\nexposed. Wo have no insular territory to defend and consequently\\ncan select tho battle grouml. Do we desire to surrender tli.it imjiort-\\naiit ailvantagef i^pain had a fortified harbor in Manila as strong as\\nPearl Harbor, and yet there was a Dewey. Are wo to learn nothing\\nfrom Spain s oxpericncet Her naval outpost at the Philippines id\\n3441", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "12\\na soui L e of weakness\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a cause of her ovcrtbiow. Sbe liiis, in addi-\\ntion, Porto Kico, Cuba, and the Canaries to defend, all far removed\\nfrom her continental stronghold, and she is helpless.\\nIn the present conflict we can choose the battlefield. We can\\nattack her most vulnerable point. If she had no insular posses-\\nsions she could withdraw to the continent and be almost invincible\\nagainst our arms, and yet gentlemen insist that such possessions\\nare a source of military strength. If it had not been for her islands\\nSpain would not have been involved in the war. That is a point of\\nno mean significance. England, with her mighty navy, is com-\\npelled to distribute it around over the world so that it can hardly\\nbe said to be formidable. The more naval outposts and sujiply\\ndepots a country has scattered over the seas in time of war the\\nmore its naval power must be divided. Outlying possessions give\\nrise to complications in ways that can not l)e foreseen, and that\\ncountry is safest from disturbance that has the fewest of them, and\\nit is strongest in time of war. They excite jealousies and distrust\\nand breed misunderstandings; they aiford a pretext for burdening\\nthe productive energies of a country with a large army and navy,\\nand handicap it in the conquest of trade.\\nBut friends of the proposition express the fear that if we con-\\ntinue to maintain the jjolicy of excluding foreign control of the\\nislands we will be involved in dangerous complications with other\\npowers which would be averted by annexation. What has been\\nour experience in that lino? During all our relations with the\\nislands we have had infinitely less trouble with them and on their\\naccount than we have had with Alaska since our purchase of that\\nTerritory. There is now a judgment of half a million dollars stand-\\ning against us growing out of complications brought with the\\nAlaskan possessions more than Hawaii has cost us in all her his-\\ntory. It is conclusively demonstrated that annexation multiplies\\nperplexities from which we could otherwise be free.\\nBut, Mr. Speaker, we are told that if wo control the Hawaiian\\nIslands our Pacific coast will bo secure from attack, because no\\nwar ship can carry coal enough to steam from any other port on the\\nPacific Ocean, do any fighting, and return. Naval engagements arc\\nusually of short duration a few hours are sufficient to destroy a\\nmighty fleet, so destructive are the implements of warfare. We\\nhave existed with safety for a hundred years without control of the\\nHawaiian Islands, and they grow of less imi^ortance to us with\\nevery improvement of war ships.\\nEussia just contracted for a number of war ships and cruisers, some\\nof which are to bo constructed by American contractors, and they\\nare to have capacity enough to carry coal to steam from St. Peters-\\nburg to Port Arthur, a distance of 17,000 miles. A ship of that\\ncapacity could leave Hongkong and run to the Pacilic coast,\\nbombard the coast cities for a week, andreturn without any incon-\\nvenience. It could demolish every city on the coast outside of\\nAlaska and have time to spare. With continued improvement and\\nthe prospect of revolution in motive power by electricity, warships\\nare likely to be constructed within the next decade that will carry\\nsupplies enough to circumnavigate the globe. Our strength is in\\nour isolation and a patriotic citizenship, and our shield is in an atti-\\ntude of dignity and justice toward all mankind.\\nThe policy of territorial expansion will necessarily involve ub in\\ncomplications in foreign politics, with which we should have no\\nconcern. Wo need no additional territory for any of the purposes\\nof peace, and war is justified only when there is no other honorable\\nrecourse. If we intend to annex the islands at all, it would be most\\nunwise to consummate the act in the face of the present situation.\\n3U1", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "13\\nStateBnianship will not bo inisled l)y (ho pioviiiliim oxcitPtnent to\\n(Id tbat wlik li ini;^lit niutfriully cripplo iis in tln |iro-\u00c2\u00abrulion of tlio\\njirosont war. We liavn :i Cootliolil on tlio I liilipiiint? IsIiukIm, ami in-\\nilisiTeet (leclaralionH aio he;uil on all hands, that it nhall ho our\\npolicy to piTMiancnlly occupy thoni. l- oreign coimtries aro apt to\\nniiHJndfjo our puii)o.so8. rrecii itato anucxation wonld ho looked\\nupon as a niovonicnt prolitninary to the coniploto suhjiij^ation of\\ntho I hilippines, and would bo construed as thi^ inau;iMratioii of au\\na^r^rcssivo policy of territorial expansion. It \\\\V(Mild cxcito tho\\nai)i)rehcnsion of lluropem powers and lose us their moral supjiort,\\nand perhaps invito intervention aijainst us; our preteu.sioii of\\nhumanity would bo justly rej^arded as liypocritical cant.\\no have our Monroo doctrine, tho oxistemo of which is recog-\\nnized tho worlil over, and by force of an analogous law controlliuj^\\ntho ])olitic3 of tho Old World the jjowcrs would find abundant\\njustitication to intervene and rebuke what they wouhl reyard as\\naudacity on tho part of this Goverumcnt.\\nTHE WAR NECESSITY.\\nThere is nothina: iu the oxigenciea of the present war that re-\\nquires tho annexation of the islands. Our occupation of tho Phil-\\nil)pines, if our protestations and professions aro to bo regarded,\\nwill bo only temporary. Unless wo permit the war to degenerate\\nfrom a righteous movement for the relief of oppressed humanity\\ninto a greedy conquest for colouial spoils, our military foothold in\\nthe Orient will soon terraiuate. Tho only need we have for Hawaii\\nnow is for a supply station on the line of communication between\\ntho continent au(l the Philippines, and that we have already in\\nour unqualified right to Pearl Harbor for tliat purpose. Our right\\nto that harbor is complete and exclusive, and our uso of it, under\\nthe terms of the grant, can not possibly involve the Hawaiian Gov-\\nernment in complications, because it has no control over the harbor\\nas against this country.\\nThe graut is in these terms:\\nHis m.-ye^tr, th\u00c2\u00ab King of the Il. twaiian Islands, pr.mts to Iho GovemnieTit of\\ntlie L niteil States tho oxrhisivo right to enter the harbor of ro.irl Kiver, in tho\\nIsland of Oahu, and tu establish and maintain thi ro n coalin and rejiair station\\nfor tho uso of vessels of tho United States, and to tlmt end the I nitcd States may\\nimprove tho cntranco to said harbor and do all other things ucedi ul to tho x urpose\\naforesaid.\\nIf the grant should ho terminable with tho treaty, which is a do-\\nhatablo question, it could not bo terminated by either party under\\na year, and that, in all probability, will bo as long as wo will be re-\\nquired to maintain our force in tho Philipy)incs, unless it shall be\\ntho intention to continue to occupy those islands for the puqioso of\\ncoercing annexation. The possibility of tho Hawaiian Government\\nterminating the treaty is too remote to bo worthy of consideration\\nunless tho oligarchy should conclude to take the preliminary step iu\\ntho existing crisis in tho hope that it would compel annexation.\\nTho stream of gold, at tho rate of fG,(XX ,000 a year, (lowing from\\nthis country into tho pockets of tho sugar barons iu Hawaii is au\\nadequate guaranty that tho treaty will continue.\\nI have no doubt there aro inlluential citizens of those islands\\nwho would glaiily involve their Government in tho existing com-\\nplications with tho view of promoting tho scheme of annexation.\\nLet that Government decl.ire neutrality between tho belligerents\\nand its declaration, if honestly kept, will be respected. Let this\\ncountry depenil upon its grant for the uso of Pearl Harbor for .1\\n8npi)ly station and the question will be solved. We will have all\\nthat we require and Hawaii will be entirely free from the controversy.\\n3111", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "14\\nAnd, besides this, it is au uudeniable fact that there is a feasible\\nroute from San Francisco to the Philippines by way of our Aleutian\\npossessions which is over 800 miles shorter tha,n the Hawaiian route.\\nIt is always open and practicable, and possesses as safe, convenient,\\nand adequate a harbor and supply station as Pearl Harbor. The\\ntemperature in the coldest weather is never lower than 7 Fahreu-\\nlieit, and it very rarely reaches that point. 15ut there have been no\\nsugar kings on the Aleutians to advertise their advantages; con-\\nBequently that important line has been almost overlooked by the\\ncountry. It answers every purjiose of a supply station in support-\\ning our forces in the Philippines, and we already own it.\\nMr. TAWNEY. I suppose the gentleman knows that Pearl Har-\\nbor can not be entered by a single vessel at the X)reseut time, owing\\nto the bar.\\nMr. CRUMPACKER. I know that the Hawaiian Government\\nLas permitted us to store 12,000 or more tons of coal in an accessi-\\nble harbor, and will subject herself to no liability whatever under\\nthe laws of nations in permitting us to go and take that coal.\\nMr. TAWNEY. That is in the harbor of Honolulu. The gentle-\\nman was talking of Pearl Harbor.\\nMr. CRUMPACKER. It can make no difference; whenweplaced\\nour coal there we acquired the right to go after it.\\nTHE ISLANDS WILL NOT GO TO AXOTHEE COUNTRY.\\nBut if we don t take the islands some other country will, is the\\nalternative that is submitted to us by the advocates of the propo-\\nsition. Suppose Mexico should propose political union with this\\ncountry and notify us that if the jiroposition were not accepted she\\nwould tender a surrender of her sovereignty to France or Germany;\\ndo gentlemen confess that we would be remediless? Are they will-\\ning to have the Monroe doctrine so construed and limited? I\\nimagine not. Wo do not want Mexico in our political household,\\nand would resist any proposition that placed her under the control\\nof any European power. The same is true in relation to the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands. If we do not choose to accept them we will not be\\nestopped to prevent their passing under the dominion of any for-\\neign power. ut there is no danger of such a contingency. The\\nspecter of foreign control is conjured up for the purjiose of exciting\\nour cupidity and apprehension.\\nHave we forgotten San Domingo so quickly? The sugar barons\\nof the islands, who constitute the governing power, realize full well\\nthat uuiou with any foreign country would mean the abrogation of\\nthe commercial treaty and the loss of their gieat advantage in the\\nAmerican markets. It would cost them over $5,000,000 a year,\\nand that they will never submit to willingly. There is no lia-\\nbility of their proposing annexation to anj other country, and if\\nany power should attempt to take them by conquest this country\\nwould immediately prevent it. That fact is a guaranty of their\\nsafety from foreign molestation, as no government will take the\\nhazard of a war with this country to possess those islands. There\\nis absolutely no force in the suggestion that they are becoming-\\norientalized and will ultimately go to Japan by absorption.\\nThe Jai anese and Chinese laborers on the islands were brought\\nthere by the sugar barons under the contract system. Thousands of\\n1 hem weve imported by the Dole oligarchy. They are there for fixed\\nlorms, and are required to return to their own country when the\\nterm of service expires. The treaties require the Hawaiian Govern-\\nment to guarantee the performance of the contracts, and to furnish\\nthem transportation back to their homes at the tormiuation of the\\nperiod of employment. They are not naturalized, and have no polit-\\nG4tl", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "15\\nical lights. Tlioy do not have their faiuilioa, and aro only sojoiirn-\\nors. This accounts lor Iho largo discropaucy bi tweon the sexes on\\nthe islands. Tho sui^ar f^rowcrs need their labor, and iluxe is no\\nBontiniciit lor their exclusion.\\nJapan has evinced no disposition to seize the islands. It is true\\nfiho protested ajjainst annexation to tiiis country, becanso it would\\ndissolvi the llawaiiansovoreiRiityandilestroy tho guaranty under 111\\nJai)anes(\u00c2\u00bb treaty. Japan quite likely li.is some concern on aceoiint\\nof tlio well known hostility of tliis country toward Mongolian im-\\nmigration. There need be no fear whatever of anncx.ition to or\\nabsorption by any other country as long as we ]irotest. Our protest\\nalone, of which the world already has notice, isasuflicieut guaranty\\nof their safety and neutrality.\\nThe operations of Kuropcan powers in China is a cause for no\\napi)reheusion on the part of this country. Kuro])e is no more dangerous\\nin .\\\\sia than it is in Europe. It is in easy across to our e.-vstern coast,\\nand has given us no disturbance, and it will bo equally as harmless\\nin Asia.\\nIIAWAU AND THi; PACIFIC COMMEHCK.\\nMr. Speaker, much importance is attached to the islands because\\nof their relation to the commerce of tho Pacific Ocean. There is no\\nreason why we can not fully enjoy their beuelits from a commercial\\nstandpoint without annexation. Wo can not hope to profitably\\nextend our foreign trade by tho policy of territorial exjiausiou.\\nCommerce has no sentiment or aH eetion the ethics of international\\ntrade are those of tho bargain counter and tho country that has\\nthe greatest advantages in production will control tho greatest\\nshare of tho world s trade. We already have Pearl Harbor for a\\ncoaling station. All civilized countries are engaged in trade, and\\nthey gladly welcomo cargoes of commerce into their ports and\\nreadily extend hospitalities to tho carrying vessels.\\nIt is not necessary that we have a coaling station in our own right\\nwherever we send a trading vessel. iShips are provided with coal\\nin tho various parts of tho world with as much alacrity as their\\ncrews are provided with entertainment at the hotels. What would\\nbo thought of tho proposition to maintain a United States shoo\\nstore in London, so Americans traveling abroad could procure foot-\\nwear? How many foreign countries bavo coaling stations ujion our\\ncoasts? Where have our ships gone on comiuercial missions that\\nthey have had any dilliculty in procuring coal if any was to bo hadf\\nho is ready to conless, in tho face of our marvelous growth, th.xt\\nour eouimereial policy has been a failure? Sir, with high-priced\\nlabor anil high rate of interest in this country our imnlucers have\\nmade wonderful cominests in the world s markets in the last few\\nyears. Our fonimi trade is increasing at an unparalleled rate, not-\\nwithstanding tlu^ many disadvantages wo labor under and the\\nproverbial wastefulness of tlie Aiiu*riean people. Tho manufaetur-\\niug uatii ii3 of tho Old World, by force of haidt and surroundings,\\naro comjiolled to maintain enormously expeiibivo standing armies\\nand navies. It has been s.iid that ovcry toiler in Germany has to\\ncarry a soldier or .1 sailor on bis back.\\nThose countries ;iro badly handic.ipjjed by that condition, from\\nwhieh we are now coiu]\u00c2\u00bbarativoly Irce. t.)ur isidatiou is our jirinci-\\npal safeguard, and the advantages it contains has enabled us to\\nachieve remarkablo tiium|dis in jiroduction and trailo. We lo not\\nrealize tho ennrmous adv.intage our siiii)u gives us, or th ro\\nwould bo no sentiment in favor of siirrenilenng it. Tiio burden is\\nso great on foreign countries that they are now contcmjilating a\\ntreaty for tho purpose of limiting, by mutual covenant, the size of\\n3H1", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "Lfil?!! NUKt:.^\\n013 744 617\\n16\\ntheir armies and uavies. It is sbortsiglited and suicidal for us to\\nenter upon a policy that will take from us the important advan-\\ntage wo now eujoy.\\nOur trade can never be extended by cannon or warships, but it\\nwill continue to increase until wo have achieved commercial su-\\npremacy, if we do not surrender the immense advantage we now\\npossess. Our strength is not, and will never be, in our Army and\\nNavy, but in the contentment and intelligence of our citizenship.\\nOur greatest danger is not from external force, but from internal\\ndiscontent and disintegration. As long as our people are united\\nin sentiment and prosperous we are invincible against the whole\\nworld, but if we are torn by discord and shattered by discontent\\nour strength will depart though we have the mightiest navy that\\never rode the seas. We are strongest when the burdens of Govern-\\nment are lightest.\\nI deprecate the policy that would cause this country to take\\nfrom the multitude their hard-earned substance, so much needed in\\nindustrial development, to build a navy equal to those maintained\\nby the European powers. The policy of territorial expansion will\\ncompel us to do that. It would be immeasurably better in an emer-\\ngency to go into the markets of the world to buy war ships and\\ncruisers than to invest millions upon millions of money in times of\\npeace, needed in developing production, to the construction of float-\\ning palaces of steel and have them rust and rot on the sea.\\nA large navy does not, in my judgment, tend to secure peace.\\nNations, like individuals, often act upon impulse, and if there be\\ntime for reflection difliculties may be settled amicably and war obvi-\\nated. Does any gentleman on this floor contend that it would pro-\\nmote domestic peace for all of our citizens to carry firearms and dirk\\nknives in their daily intercourse? That which is true of individu-\\nals is likewise true of nations.\\nI am in favor of a navy reasonably commensurate with onr neces-\\nBities, considering our isolated situation. I would have war ships\\nsufficient for coast police and defensive purposes and a reasonable\\nnucleus, in addition, for oftensive operations but I would not unnec-\\nessarily burden the people of the country for the support of a great\\nnavy just for its glory.\\nIf we take the proposed step in this crisis, it will surely launch\\nus upon a policy of territorial aggression and colonial imperialism,\\ncarrying complications in all parts of the earth, and our national\\npeace will bo constantly threatened. I warn gentlemen that thirst\\nlor power is a dangerous passion and hard to satisfy, for it will not\\nbe controlled by reason. The appeal to national pride always has\\na fascination hard to resist, and it is doubly powerful when the\\npublic mind is in an abnormal state of excitement, as it is to-day.\\nThe wisdom of statesmanship would defer action upon matters of\\nsuch high importance until the passions of war subside and condi-\\ntions will permit calm consideration.\\nThis is a Government of the people, by the people, and for the\\npeople, and I have faith in its splendid destiny and am jealous of\\nits great powers, fearful always that they maj through excessive\\nzeal or mistaken judgment, be perverted. Let us try no dangerous\\nor uncertain experiment; let us hesitate to change a policy the suc-\\ncess of which is the acknowledged envy of the world; let ns profit\\nby the wrecks of nations and individuals who were not satisfied to\\nlet well enough alone. [Applause.]\\nai4i", "height": "3494", "width": "2200", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00crum_0016.jp2"}}