{"1": {"fulltext": "1^,\\n.P35\\nCopy 1\\nANNEXATION OF HAWAII.\\nlF6 S n7i //t course of cmjjirc talcs its a-ayP\\nSPEECH\\nHON. CHARLES E. PEARCE,\\nOF MISSOURI,\\nHOUSE OF KEPKESENTATIVES,\\nJUNE 14, 1898.\\nWASHING X o^r.\\n1898.", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "68554\\nSPEECH\\n^THON. CHAELEB E. PEAECE.\\n_\\nThe House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) to\\nprovide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States-\\nMr. PEARCE of Missouri said:\\nMr. Speaker: 1 listened with deep and pleasnreable interest on\\nFriday last to the very eloquent argument of my learned friend\\nfrom Arkansas [Mr. DixsjiORii], because, however much I may\\ndisagree with him in his views, I have come to know that he is a\\nfair debater, and I sought to learn from the views which he pre-\\nsented on the subject the gist of the contention against the reso-\\nlutions which are before us for consideration. He gave us much\\ngenerality over the alleged unconstitutionality of this proceeding,\\nbut without soing into an extended discussion of the question, I\\nsincerelv hope that some gentleman who succeeds me in this de-\\nbate will take the trouble to point out one single sentence, or line,\\nor word of the Constitution of the United States that contravenes\\nthe adoption of these resolutions. It is a matter of history familiar\\nto everybody that every square mile of territory which has becjn\\nannexed to the United States since the foundation of the Govern-\\nment has been so annexed under the general welfare clause of\\nthe Constitution.\\nThe Louisiana Territory, embrac ng 1,179.931 square miles, was\\nannexed under that provision in ISO^J: Florida, embracing r)9.268\\nsquare mi es, was annexed under it in 1819; Te.^as, embracing\\n370,1:30 square miles, was annexed under it in 1845; New JMe.\\\\ico\\nand California, embracing 54. 78dsqiiare miles, were annexed under\\nit in 1848: the Gadsden purchase, embracing 45.5:;5 scjuare miles,\\nwas made in pursuance of it m 185l!; Alaska, embracing 577,o90\\ns;]Uare miles, was annexed under it in 18(57; and under it it is pro-\\nposed to annex the Territory of Hawaii, with its 7,000 square mi.es,\\nin this year of our Lord 1898.\\nThe constitutional questions connected with these various trans-\\nactions, by which the national area has been increased from first\\nto last nearly ;},000,0()0 square milt S. have been passed upun time\\nanil tiine again by the Supreme Court of the United States, and I\\nhad sui)i)osed until this hour that the right of annexing foreign\\nteiriiory was a settled question and not open to furtlier discus-\\nsion excepting for a filibuster against the propo -ed resoltitions.\\nMy learned friend has announced an apparently unique discov-\\nery, l)ttt which in point of fact is well known to everyone who\\nhas ever studied the map of the world or has traveled upon tlie\\n2 31)8", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "Pacific Ocean; he statos to us that the distance from San Fran-\\ncisco via Unahiska to Hon.u-kong, and of course to the Philippine\\nIshmds, is shorter as a sailing route than the distance from San\\nFrancisco to the same points via Honolulu, and therefore the ac-\\nquisition of the Hawaiian Islands is an unnecessary measure fov\\npurposes of publi defense.\\nIt is true that there is a port at Unalaska: it is also true that\\nthe nortliern route from San Francisco to Hongkong and to the\\nPhilippine Islands is shorter than the route via Honolulu; it is\\nalso true that the Empress Line of steamers, an English line\\nwhich sails Irom Vancouver to Yokohama and thence to Hong-\\nkong, crosses the Pacific Ocean within sight of the Aleutian\\nIslands. I mvself have been over thai route, and so has the gen-\\ntleman from Arkansas, and the statement which he makes in re-\\ngard to it is unquestionably true. But, Mr. Speaker, what does\\nthat prove? Does it establish the conlention that the annexation\\nof the Hawaiian Islands is an undesirable act upon the part of\\nthis Government? Does it establish the conteniion that those\\nislands are not necessary to the proper defense of the Pacific coast?\\nBy no means.\\nSuppose, for instance, that the Hawaiian Islands should pass\\nunder the control of the English Government, a contingency not\\naltogether improbable or remote if we do not take them in our-\\nselves. Now, draw a line from Vancouver or Esquimalt to the\\nHawaiian Islands, a distance of a little more than 2,000 miles;\\ndraw another line from the Havraiian Islands to the Isthmus of\\nPanama, a distance of a little more than 4,000 mi es; consider the\\nfact that the Hawaiian Islands extend from north to south a dis-\\ntance of 400 miles, and take into consideration the military aspects\\nof that situation, with the English Government fortified at Esqui-\\nmalt commanding the outlet of Puget Sound, fortified at Hou-\\nolulu and Pearl Harbor, and fortified at the western terminus of\\nthe isthmian canal, and is it not conclusive that under this pro-\\nposed condition of things the entire Pacific coast will be at the\\nmercy of the British Government in the contingency of war? Let\\nme inform you. gentlemen, that the English Government has\\nalready acquired an exclusive franchise upon Lake Nicaragua,\\nand has been seeking an isthmian route across the narrow neck\\nof land that separates North and South America. For this rea-\\nson, Mr. Speaker, if for no other, the acquisition of the Hawaiian\\nIslands at this time seems to me to be not only a desirable but a\\nnecessary measure on the part of the people of the United States.\\nBut, say my learned friend from Arkansas [Mr. Dinsmoke] and\\nalso my learned friend from Tennessee [Mr, RiciiardsonI, the\\nacquisition of the Hawaiian Islands will mark a new era in the\\nhistory of our country, and that by it we will enter upon a great\\nexpansive colonial policv, the end of which no man can measure.\\nMr. Speaker, not one intimation of a colonial policy has ever been\\nconnected with the acqirisition of the Hawaiian Islands. This\\nquestion has occupied the thought of our country for over fifty\\nyears. There never has been and is not now advanced any jtropo-\\nsition to annex Hawaii as a colonial possession of the United\\nStates, and there is no point whatsoever in the contention that\\nthis annexation, in any form, manner, or shape, commits either\\nCongress or any gentleman who votes for annexation to a colonial\\npolicy.\\nI am myself at the present time opposed to such a policy, not as\\na question of legal and constitutional right, but simply and solely\\nas a question of wisdom; and unless the exigencies of the future\\n31.58", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "shall lead lue to modify my judgment in that regard, I shall\\nremain in opposition to such a policy. What may become neces-\\nsary lor us to do in settling the details of a future treaty of peace\\nwth iSpain no man can tell. No one would be reckless enough\\nto commit himself upon that subject. Let me call your attention\\nto the treaty itself, made by the present Administration and the\\nGovernment of Hawaii in 18 J7. 1 quote the language of the\\ntreaty: And it is a2;reed that all the territory of and appertaining\\nto the Republic ot Hawaii is hereby annexed to the United States\\nof America under the name of the Territory of Hawaii. So that\\nu]ion the consummation of this transac ion the relation of the\\nUnited States Government to Hawaii will become exactly the\\nsame as the relation of the United States Government to Alasi^a\\nat the prespnt time.\\nMr. DINSMORE. Will it interrupt my friend if I ask him a\\nquestion in this connection?\\nMr. PEARi:E of Missouri. By no means; not at all.\\nMr. DlNSMOlxE. I should like my friend to state to the House\\nwhether he can trace any relation between that detuuct treaty\\nand these resolutions.\\nMr. PEARC E of Missouri, It has not yet transpired that the\\ntreaty referred to by my friend is in any sense defunct. It stands\\nbefore the Senate to-day as an open question. But irrespective of\\nwhether it is or not defunct, these resolutions if adopted by Con-\\ngress will be carried out upon the lines of that treaty, and the\\nhonor and good faith of the people of the United Slates require\\nand will demand that they shall be carried out upon those lines.\\nWhen the Hawaiian Islands are taken in under the sovereignty of\\nthe United States Government, they will come to us as the Terri-\\ntory of Hawaii, and in no other form, and there are ample provi-\\nsions in these resolutions for such a consummation.\\nThis leads me, Mr. Speaker, to answer another qaestion pro-\\npounded during this debate by nearly every gentieman who has\\noccupied a position of antagonism to the pending measiire, and\\nthat is, What are you going to do with these islands? How\\nare you going to govern them? This question seems to be a great\\nobstacle in the way of very many of my friends who have taken\\npart m this discussion. Of course I can not tell, nor can any\\nother man tell, what the Congress of the United States will do in\\nreference to this question, or what provision of government it will\\nlegislate into existence. I can only express my own opinion upon\\nthat subject, and whether it be worth much or little, if 1 should\\nhappen to be in Congress when the subject comes to be dealt with,\\n1 can tell you without any hesitation what I will do. I will vote\\nfor a Territorial government in Hawaii. In my opiiiion it will\\nhave a Territorial governor, it will have a Territorial legislature\\nand judicial officers, a government, in short, of the same or s:milar\\ncharacter as that which exists in Arizona, in New Mexico, in\\nOklahoma, and in Alaska, with such modifications, of course, as\\nmay be suitable to the present or future condition of things.\\nPeop O who imagine that the constitutional electors of Hawaii are\\nincap able of self-government, or are lacking in intelligence, or\\nare unlettered or illiterate are very much mistaken. I have my-\\nself no trouble upon that subject, and it does not constitute the\\nslightest obstacle in my judgment. I greatly wonder why any\\ngentleman on this floor shoiilJ have any trouble upon this subject.\\nBut, says my good friend from Arkansas [Mr. Dinsmore], the\\npeople of Hawaii were not consulted, and therefore we should not\\n3458", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "take them into our system of government. Let my honorablo\\nfriend from Arkansas, or any otlier gentleman on this floor, tell\\nme when in the history of our country, during all the proceedings\\nby which we annexed and incorporated nearly ;j,UU0,00l square\\nmiles of additional territory, the question of annexation was ever\\nsubmitted to the people of either the territory annexed or of the\\nUnited States to be acted upon by a direct vote?\\nMr. DINSMORE, I will suggest to the gentleman the case of\\nTexas.\\nMr. PEAROE of Missouri. My friend says Texas. I expected\\nthat suggestion. Of course we all know the details of the history\\nof the annexation of Texas, and it is needless to relate them here.\\nBut perhaps you all do not know one fact in connection with that\\ntransaction. The annexation of Texas was first sought by a treaty\\nwhich failed of passage through the United States Senate, but it\\nwas the basis of another and subsequent treaty, and the endeavor\\nto secure the result finally terminated in resolutions which passed\\nthe House of Representatives and afterwards the Senate and be-\\ncame a law by the approval of the Executive. After those reso-\\nlutions were passed the legislature of Texas was convened, and a\\nconvention of the people was summoned to consider the then\\npending propositions.\\nA constitution was drafted and was adopted by both the legis-\\nlature and the convention, and later the people were called upon\\nto vote upon the ratification of the acts which had been done by\\nthose bodies. The main (luestiou at this time was the adoption of\\nthe constitution, and the question of annexation was merely inci-\\ndental. Yet, Mr. Speaker, although the population of Texas at\\nthat time, exclusive of Indians, was over 130,U00, only about 4,100\\nvotes were cast for ratification. Only 4,000 votes out of a popu-\\nlation of more than 100,000. Now, I invite you to compare that\\nvote with the present case. The people of the Hawaiian Islands\\nfor more than fifty years have been living under a constitution\\ngranted to them by the third Kamehameha, and that constitii-\\ntion from the outset has prescribed the qualifications of electors.\\nThe provisions of this instrument, although changed at various\\ntimes by the Hawaiian Legislatiire, has never taken away the right\\nof suffrage from the people. It existed in the time of Kalakaua,\\nand it was one of the prominent reasons which led the late Queen\\nLiliuokalani to attempt the overthrow of the constitutional rights\\nof the people and to bring about a return to the absolutism of the\\nearly kings. The present constitution also prescribes the qualifi-\\ncations of electors, and the qualified electors of Hawaii who have\\nspoken upon this subject, directly or indirectly, constitute as large\\na percentage of the population of Hawaii as did the votes cast\\nupon the ratification oi: the annexation of Texas taken in compar-\\nison with the population of that State.\\nI was exceedingly glad to learn from the speech of my good\\nfriend from Arkansas [Mr. Dinsmore] that amid all the reasons\\nwhy the Hawaiian Islands should not be annexed to the United\\nStates he freely and frankly admitted that there was one po-wer-\\nfal consideration in favor of these resolutions. He says that the\\npossession of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States would\\ngreatly increase the power of the American Government to keep\\nforeign nations off our shores. In (iod s name, what else do we\\nwant them for, looking at the subject from a military point of\\nview? We are not seeking the ac(iuisition of the Hawaiian\\nIslands to make aggressive war upon the rest of mankind.\\nThe possession of the islands lor purposes of public defens? is\\n3i58", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "the exact point, and the only point, for which I am arguing and\\ncontending. One of the great reasons why we want and must\\nhave those islands is to make it aiisolii ely impossible forafot-eign\\ngoveiTiment to assail us, and especially to render it impossible for\\nan Asiatic power, with an Asiatic religion, to seat iiseif w.thin\\n2,000 mle^ of our Pacific coast. In my judgment no admiss.on\\ncould be made that would constitute a stronger argument for the\\nalopt on or these resolutions tlian the fair and honest statement\\nof my honorable fr;end from Arkansas (Mr. D^xsmore].\\nAnother pomt of difficulty which troubles my friends who op-\\npose this measure is t-.ie question of tne cost o: maintenance.\\nUpon that queition the records of the Hawaiian (J-A-eram- nt\\nfm n sh us valuable information. Aggregating the pnhlic reve-\\nnues from 1878 to I49i. and decucting from the aggregate the ex-\\npenditures during the same period of time, we find that for a\\nperiod of fourteen years the expenditure over revenue is only\\n\u00c2\u00a7;0. )34. notwithstanding the fact that during that period the\\nislands suifered two revolutions, with all the extraordinary ex-\\npenses incident thereto. In ]8 J6 thepublic revenues were \u00c2\u00a71,997,\\n818 and the aggregate expenditures were $1,901,190, leaving a bal-\\nance to the credit of the Government on December ol, i80o, of\\n$9o.G27. Under any reasonable administration of affairs by an\\nintelligent territorial government tne Hawaiian Islands can be\\nmade fully self-supporting.\\nNow, Mr. Speaker, whatever views people may have heretofore\\nhad upon th^s subject, whether those views have been upon general\\npolitical lines or whether they have proc;eeded upon commercial\\nlines, we are to-day confronted with the condition of war. and we\\nare compe led to consider this question from a standpoint which\\nthe oi^ponents of annexation have always heretofore scouted as a\\npossibility too remote to constitute a reasonable argument.\\nWhether we will or no, we are compelled to look at this subject\\nfrom that standpoint and legislate with reference to it.\\nWith a voice almost unanimous the people of the United States\\nhave declared at the polls and through us, their representatives,\\nthat the island of Cuba shall be hereafter free from the sovei--\\neignty of Spain. To make that declaration good and to compel\\na recognition of that independence by Spain we have declared\\nwar up m that Government. By our unanimous voice we have\\nauthorized and directed the President of the United St ites to em-\\nploy the entire military and naval power of the country, and also\\nits matoriiil resources, and have charged him with the tremendous\\nresponsibility of conducting that war to a successful issue. Hav-\\ning done that, having charged him with this great and solemn\\nres])onsibiiity. we can not, wiihout stultifjing ourselve-, with-\\nhold from him any measure which he thinks is necessary to bring\\nthat consummation about.\\nIn the performance of the duties laid upon him by the people\\nand by Congress, he has aright to ask for any provision, no matter\\nwhat it may be. that will either contribute to the power of attack\\nor w.ll fortify our own country against every contingency that\\ncan p )ssibly arise out of a state of war. We are not playing a\\ngame of politics or diplomacy to-day. It is war. and in it is bound\\nup not only the freedom of Cuba but the national honor of our\\nown counti-y. That which a few months ago was thought to be\\ntoo remote for serious consideration is to-day a stern and una ter-\\nablo fact. I care not what your views or my views upon this sub-\\njoft might be under ordinary circnmstances. It is today a meas-\\nure of war, and as such it stands before this Congress, and I envy\\n.\u00e2\u0080\u00a2U;Vl", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "not the man who, after havhig laid upon the Presitlent the duty of\\naggressive attack and also of providing a complete system of har-\\nbor and coast-line defense, stops now to split hairs over historical\\nprecedents or judicial interpretations of constitutional law.\\n1 envy not the man who in these days of armed conflict wnll\\nwithhold from the President any measure of legislation which in\\nhis judgment or in the judgment of his war council is deemed\\nnecessary to make his efforts effective. No amount of caviling\\nas to whether the recommendations of the President or the action\\nof Congress were right or wrong, justifiable or unjustiiiai)le; no\\nphilanthropic feelings over the sacrifices already made or which\\nshall be made in the future; no protest over the expenditure of\\nmoney which has been or shall become necessary; no measuring\\nof cause or effect: no predictions as to whether this conflict shall\\nbe fought out by Spain and the United States, or whether all the\\nnations of Europe will be involved before the end shall be reached,\\ncan avail one jot or tittle to change the grim unalterable fact that\\nwe are in a state of war.\\nAlready the field of operations embraces one-third of the water\\narea of the world. Where its limitations will be three months\\nhence no man can tell. Ninety days ago not a man in this House\\nwould have ventured the prediction that the first scene of the great\\ndrama would open upon the coast of Asia. We thought we were\\ngoing straightway to Cuba. We never dreamed that the first\\nvictory of American arms would be in the far-oijf archipelago of\\nthe Philippines.\\nWho will venture to predict what the next scene of this swift-\\nmoving drama will reveal? Will it be the intervention of the\\npowers to compel Spain to surrender Cuba Will it be a protest\\nby France against the impairment of her bonded security in\\nSpanish domains, or will it be a German demand for joint occu-\\npancy or division of the conquered territory? Will the United\\nStates settle this business by force of arms, as she has started to\\nsettle it, with Spain alone, or will the next shifting of the scenes\\nreveal an European alliance to protect Spain from destruction, or\\nto play the role of Russia in the late war between China and\\nJapan? No man can tell what lies in the future, and in the early\\nfuture.\\nWhile the purposes of the United States m this conflict are di-\\nrected to freeing the Western Hemisphere from a despotism which\\nfor four centuries has been a blight upon civilization and a curse\\nto downtrodden millions of the human race, no man in this pres-\\nence will dare to say that the American flag, once planted in a just\\nand holy w^ar. at home or abroad, shall ever be removed except by\\nthe free act of the American Government.\\nBut, Mr. Speaker and gentlemen, while this is unquestionably the\\nhigh resolve of the American people, it is yoixr duty and the duty of\\nns all as legislators, as citizens, as patriotic lovers of our country, to\\ndiscard all our preconceived notions about the desirability or non-\\ndesirability of the Hawaiian Islands, and to do that which will\\nstrengthen our Army and our Navy, and to see to it that every pre-\\nparation which statesmanship and human ingenuity can devise\\nshall be made, to meet not only the exigencies of the war with Spain\\nbut also every possibleexigency that may folio waEuropean alliance\\ncreated to take from the hands of the United States Government the\\nsettlement of the questions which may logically arise out of this\\nconflict.\\nI do not know that such an alliance will come to iiass. It is\\nenough for me to Imow that it is or.e of the possibilities of tin\\n3458", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "8\\nfuture, a possibility which has some threatening: aspects at the\\npresent time. Notwithstanding the bold and remarkable state-\\nment of Mr, Chamberlain, I do not beiieve in re.ymg upon the\\nsympathetic interference of Great Britain, or of Japan, or of any\\nother co .intxy. I woual rather rely upon the physical stren.ufth\\nand resourceful power of our own 7 o.OJL ,U0a liberty-loving people\\nthan upon the sympathy of any foreign nation, however friendly,\\nor upon all Europe combined. God helps those who help them-\\nselves.\\nMr. Sp^a ker, we have had a rude awakening since this crisis\\nbegan. Fortunately for us. and perhaps fortuuate for the world,\\nwe have had to deal with a nation intinitely weaker than ourselves\\nin material resources, and as illy prepared to meet the exigencies\\nof a great war. Less than five years ago nearly 1,000 cities and\\ntowns located upon open ports and upon tributary streams along\\nand contigu: ms to our 5,00J miles of coast were absolutely de ense-\\nless against foreign attack. Five years ago the Navy of the United\\nStates was the weakest of the first-class powers and. for lack of mu-\\nnitions and crews practiced m the service of modern ordnance, was\\ncomparatively useless for offensive or defensive war; and yet, Mr.\\nSpeaker, we were asserting against every nation in Europe a doc-\\ntrine of exclusion from the Western Hemisphere, never recognized\\nas a tenet of mternat .onal law. and depending alone for its main-\\ntenance upon the moral influence of this Republic. However just\\nand nec ^sary the Monroe doctrine may be from our standpoint of\\nview, and however deep-rooted it may be in the conscience of the\\nAmerican people, it is unquestionably an affront to every nation\\nin Europe, and is to-day acknowledged with illy concealed reluc-\\ntance by Japan in her relations with the Hawaiian Islands.\\nI warn gentlemen on this floor that we have seen enough in the\\nlast twelve mouths to satisfy any reflecting man, that the perpetu-\\nation of the Monroe doctrme can only be made possible by the\\nspeedy development of the naval power of the United States up\\nto a degree of efficiency that will enable us at all times to suc-\\ncessfully resist the encroachments of any government on earth.\\nWhat does this involve, Mr. Speaker? Shall we rely upon the in-\\ntegrity of foreign alliances? Why, sir, no such convention was\\never made anywhere or at any time but it was torn into shreds at\\nthe dictation of sell-interest or by the shitting demands of on-\\ncoming exigencies.\\nI venture the assertion that if Congress had given heed twenty\\nyears ago to the warnings which have been iterated and reter-\\nated over and over again on this floor, every American port would\\nto-day be impregnable against assault, our Navy won d be peer-\\nless upon the seas, no war with Spaia would ever have occurred,\\nthree hundred millions of money would have been saved, Cuba\\nwould l e free, her people, wasted by starvation and savagery,\\nwould be on the high road of progress, and the Maine, instead of\\nrotting i encath the loathsome waters of Havana Harbor with her\\nmurdered crew, would be riding the waves.\\n1 ask auain. Mr. Speaker, what does the maintenance of the\\nMonroe doctrine involve? We are not so wise, our rights and\\nresponsibilities are not so small, our statesmanship is not so far-\\nseeing, but that we can learn a lesson of wisdom from our com-\\npetitors in the race for nalionil development. Witn the advent\\nof steam as a motive power Great Britain, without halting for the\\nevolution of the future, began iunnediately to reconstruct her\\nnavy. New armaments and dry docks followed hard after, and\\nai58", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "9\\nthen began the establishment of that wonderful system of supply\\nstations which to-day belt the world. While continental Europe\\nand America remained wrapped up in the conservatism of the\\nfathers. Great Britain pushed forward into the new order of\\nthings until at every coigne of militp.ry and commercial vantage,\\nat Gibraltar, at Malta, at Port Said, at Aden, at Bombay, at\\nCalcutta, at Madras, at Colombo, at Singapore, at Sydney, at\\nMelbourne, at New Zealand, at Hongkong, at Victoria,- and at\\nVancouver, she sits intrenched with hmitiess stores to reenforce\\nher naval power. For the purposes of th s consideration it mat-\\nters not whether we pra se or condemn her foreign and colonial\\npolicy. She sits complacent behind her naval ramparts, mistress\\nof the seas, with incalcuhible powers of defense and olfense,\\nable and ready to vindicate her sovereignty everywhere, and to\\nguarantee at all times safety to every advance agent of her com-\\nmercial enterprise.\\nAges before Columbus lifted the veil from the Western Hemi-\\nsphere Asiatic commerce was the pursuit of empires. Along its\\nshifting routes, from the Phoenicians down to the present day,\\ngreat cities have risen and passed away, their aggran^lizement and\\ndecay inexorably measured by tbeir ability to adapt themselves to\\nnew developments or by their disposition to hold on to obsolete\\nand worn-out systems. Constantinople, Genoa, Venice. Lisbon,\\nand Amsterdam have each in its day gathered wealth and splendor\\nfrom the inexhaustible stores of the Orient, and each has fallen\\nfrom leadership in proportion as it has kept its eye on the past\\nrather than upon the future. England, looking behind, saw the\\ncities of the Mediterranean rise and fall with the shifting of con-\\ntrol over the great thoroughfares to Asia. Looking into the\\nfuture, she saw a great productive population gathering upon the\\neastern coast of America, spreading in great waves over a conti-\\nnent, subduing mountains and harnessing rivers to its uses,\\nwhile it reached out across the Pacific for a share in that won-\\nderful commerce. Foreseeing the magnitude of this new com-\\npetition, she bought the control of the Suez Canal, deepened and\\nwidened its channel, enlarged her ship capacity from 3,500 to\\n7,000 tons, and reduced her freight charges from $7 to $3 per long\\nton. Not content with that provision of security, she built a\\ntranscontinental railway through Canada and established a steam-\\nship hne from Vancouver to China and Australia. Not content\\nwith that provision, she undertook to gain a lodgment at the\\nmouth of the Orinoco, in defiance of the Monroe doctrine, and ia\\nto-day reaching for an isthmian route to the Indies, to fortify\\nand still further facilitate her monopoly of oriental commerce.\\nNow, what is all this to us? In the first pbice, Mr. Speaker,\\nit emphasizes the fact that while the development of the American\\nNavy is absolutely essential to the maintenance of the Monroe\\ndoctrine, and to the development of our commerce with foreign\\nnations, and to the protection of our own coast against foreign\\nattack, a navy without practicable and defensible coaling stations\\nis as useless as an army withoiit food.\\nNo man can foresee the potentiality of the forces which are gath-\\nering on the Asiatic coast. With Great Britain in India, in Poly-\\nnesia, in the Malachian Straits, and in Hongkong, with France\\nin Cambodia, with Russia in Manchuria, with Germany in her\\nnewly acquired Chinese ports, and with Japan pushi7ig forward\\nwith prodigious strides, it is apparent on the face of the situation\\nthat the United States must either surrender the commerce which\\n345S", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "10\\nslie has already acquired or she must fortify herself by all the\\nmeans known to the establishment of commercial power, and\\nwhich have been advantageous agencies in the experience of com-\\npeting nations.\\nIt is for these reasons, looking at the subject from a stand-\\npoint ot national defense and national progress, that I have ior\\nmany years advocated the peaceful acquisition of the Hawaiian\\nIslands. I happen to have been twice in the Hawaiian Islands.\\nI was there lirst in 18j1, and as a result of that visit I became\\nand have ever since remained an ardent advocate of annexation,\\nbelieving that action to be not onl} desirable but necessary, and\\nboth not only from a military but from a commercial pomt of\\nview. I am not guided by any party or political declarations\\nui on this subject. I was thoroughly convinced years ago that\\nthe acquisition of these islands, with the facilities afforded in\\nPearl Harbor, was absolutely necessary in order to a successful\\ndefense of our Pacific coast.\\nFrom a militai-y point of view the most interesting feature in\\nthese islands is the harbor which I have already mentioned. It\\nis situated in the island of Oahu, about 7 miles from the city\\nof Honolulu. The distance from the harbor to the open sea is\\nabout 4 miles, and they are connected by a naiTOw passage not\\nmore than a third of a mile in width. At the outer end of this\\npassage there is a sand lar, easily removable at a cost of about\\n$100, 000. In this harbor there are 3 square miles of water which\\nis from 5 to 10 fathoms deep, and an area of smaller size from 2\\nto 4 fathoms in depth. The locality is free from storms of suffi-\\ncient severity to endanger shipping, and in the neighborhood aro\\nabundant supplies of fresh and healthful water.\\nThe harbor approaches are easily defensible, and it is calciilated\\nby military experts that \u00c2\u00a7500,000 will make it substantially im-\\npregnable against naval attacks. Here the entire American Navy\\ncan ride in absolute security. There are no other inclosed har-\\nbors in the entire group, and none other exists for thousands of\\nmiles west or south. Throughout the eastern two-thirds of the\\nNorth Pacific Ocean it is the only place available as a naval and\\ncoaling station outside the American coast. The control of Pearl\\nHarbor, therefore, gives to the nation which holds it the mastery\\nof the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator, and it is, therefore, of\\nincalculable strategic value to the United States. A foreign\\npower possessing Pearl Harbor would be within easy striking dis-\\ntance of the Pacific coast, and in case of war would have the\\nability to speedily annihilate, not only American commerce on the\\nopen Pacific Ocean, but also our coastwise trade, from Alaska to\\nits southernmost point.\\nWhat stronger argument for the possession of the Hawaiian Is-\\nlands can be conceived of than the fact that our Philippine fleet,\\nif compelled by the exigencies of war or by stress of weather to\\nabandon its preFent vantage ground, has no place of safety or\\nsupply short of the harbor of San Francisco, and is subject, while\\nperhaps in a crippled condition, to pursuit and attack throughout\\nthat entire distance until within the sheltering embrace of the\\nGolden Gate?\\nCaptain Mahan, whose splendid essay upon sea power has ex-\\ncited the applause of the world, says in a recent paper:\\nIt is not praf:tieat)lo for any transpacific country to invade oiir Pacific\\ncoast witlioiit occupying Hawaii as a base.\\n3 5", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "11\\nAnd further:\\nIt Ls obvious that if wc do not hold tlioso islands oiirsolves wo can not expect\\ntho nontralM in t ho war to prevent tho other Ix-lli^erents from oecnpyiiig\\nthem, nor can the iuliahitants themselves pri^veut it. In sliort. wo Hhould\\nneed a larger navy to defend tho Pacific coast, because wo should have to not\\nonly defend our own coast but to prevent bj- naval force an enemy from oc-\\ncupying the islan Is, whereas if wo preoccupied them fortifications would\\npreserve them to us.\\nAnother eminent anthority, George Melville, Chief Engineer of\\nthe United States Navj saj s:\\nHawaii bridges the stretch of seas, which, without the island group, would\\nbe. at this stage in the development of marine propulsion, impassalile to aa\\neneiiiy .s Heet. Pearl Harbor is tho sole key to the full delenso of our west-\\nern coast, and that key should lie in our grasp only.\\nIt does not make a particle of difference what the condition of\\nChina is to-day. In the philosophy of that mysterious people,\\nwaiting is the nio^t God-like of human virtues all things\\ncome to him who waits. It matters not how friendly Japan is\\nunder present circumstances. It is of no importance that Eng-\\nland and Russia are engrossed in a contest lor commercial su-\\npremacy in the far East. There is not an exigency in the great\\ndraraa of the world s politics to-day that may not be shifted into\\nnew rf^lations and unexpected contests to-morrow.\\nWhile Pearl Harhor can be made a veritable Gibraltar in point\\nof impregnability, it forma an unxiaralleled vantage ground from\\nwhich a naval force can sail with a full equipment of coal and\\nmunitions for attack in any quarter. Again says this eminent\\nauthority:\\nPearl Harbor would form a first lino of defense, and an enemy from the\\nopen sea would violate some of the cardinal principles of naval strategy and\\ninvite sure disaster in attacking our western coast without first blockading\\nor defeating tho Hawaiian squadron.\\nSays Admiral Belknap:\\nA glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual observer\\nthe great importance and inestimable value of this island as a strategic point.\\nIndeed, it would seem that nature had established that gi oup to be ultimately\\noccupied as an outpost, as it were, of the great Repul)lic on its western bor-\\nder, and that the time had now come for the fulfillment of said design.\\nLieutenant-General Schofield, after a personal examination of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands, expressed the following cogent views:\\nI have ahvays regarded the ultimate annexation of the islands as a public\\nnecessity. I hp^vo likened that harbor to a commanding pusition in front of\\na defensive line which the army in the field is compelled to occupy. The\\narmy must occupy that advance position and hold it at whatever cost or else\\nthe enemy will occupy it with his artillery and dominate the main line. If\\nwe do not occupy and fortify Pearl Harbor, our enemy will occupy it as a\\nbase from which tj conduct operations against our Pacific cnast and the\\nIsthmian Canal. One of tho great advantages of Pearl Harbor to us con.sista\\nin the fact that no navy would bo required to defend it. It is a deep land-\\nlocked arm of tho sea, easily defended by fortifications placed near its mouth,\\nwith its anchorage beyond the reacli of guns from tho ocean. Cruisers and\\nother war ships which might be overpowered at sea. as well as merchant ves-\\nsels, would find there beyond the land defenses absolute security against\\nnaval attack.\\nThe following is the opinion of Admiral Dupont on this phase\\nof tho subject:\\nIt is imjKjssible to estimate too highly tho value and importance of the\\nSandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point of view. Should\\ncircumstances place them in our hands, they would prove a most important\\nacquisition intimately connected with our commercial supremacy in those\\nseas.\\nThe unqualified and concurring judgment of these distinguished\\nscientists do not by any means stand alone. Everybody who has\\nexamined thestibject from the standpoint of nat onai defense, and\\nwhose opinion is entitled to consideration, is equally emphatic,\\n3158", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "12\\nwhereas not a strategist of experience and recognized ability has\\never presented an opinion contrary to the expressions which I\\nhave taken the liberty to quote. Whatever views members may\\nhave upon other phases of the subject, unquestionably from a\\nmilitary standpoint the acquisition of the Havraiian Islands\\nstands b3fore Congress as a measure equal, if not superior, in im-\\nportance and urgency to the construction of the Nicaraguau\\nCanal.\\nMr. Speaker, I have a prof ound respect and an instinctive feeling\\nof deference for the opinions of the distinguished ex-Secretary of\\nState who has just retired to private life after a career unsur-\\npassed by that of any American statesman for usefulness and wis-\\ndom; but I can not agree with his contention that the Government\\nof the United States has an indefeasible title to Pearl Harbor, ir-\\nrespective of the maintenance or abrogation of the reciprocity\\ntreaty now existing. The grant of an usufructory interest in\\nthat harbor was made in consideration of the provisions of that\\ntreaty, not in perpetuity, but constructively during the life of the\\ntreaty. It is a part of the treaty, and in my judgment is insep-\\narable from it. Its abrogation fprminates all of its subsisting pro-\\nvisions, and it would be a violent assumption to hold that the\\nrights vested thereby would continue to exist after the basis upon\\nwhich they stand had been destroyed by the action of the Ameri-\\ncan Government.\\nI can not see any validity in the proposition that the American\\nGovernment can exercise its right to terminate the treaty in\\ntwelve months after notice, and notwithstanding that termina-\\ntion hold on to one of the chief considerations of the grant. To\\ndo so, even if we had the power to do it, would be a manifest\\nfraud on the Hawaiian Government, and could never find sup-\\nport and countenance in the moral sense of the American people.\\nNo such proposition ever entered into the negotiations which cul-\\nminated in that convention, or in its renewal, nor has it ever ex-\\nisted, nor does it exist to-day in the understanding of the Ha-\\nwaiian Government. Such is the statement not only of the pre-\\nmier of the Hawaiian Government, but also of Mr. Bayard, late\\nSecretary of State.\\nIf that group of islands shoitld pass by voluntary cession into\\nthe sovereignty of a European state, or, through the operations of\\nthe peaceful invasion of the Japanese, which during the last ten\\nyears has increased that population from 2,700 to nearly if not\\nquite 32,000, should become directly or indirectly absorbed into\\nthe Japanese system, I can not for one moment believe that any\\nsuch pretension of the United States to the ownership of Pearl\\nHarbor would be admitted by any court of international arbitra-\\ntion. In the face of such conditions, either the one or the other of\\nwhich is more than a prol^ability, the assertion of the Menroe doc-\\ntrine or of an exclusive proprietary interest in Pearl Harbor would\\ninevitably precipitate another foreign war. Irrespective of any\\nother consideration, the avoidance of such a risk is, in my judg-\\nment, of transcendent importance.\\nMr. Speaker, the splendid domain of the Hawaiian Islands, sitn-\\nailed within the arc of our existing possessions, is to-day offered\\nwith all rights of sovereignty to the United States as the free gift\\nof the existing and established Government, together with all pub-\\nlic lands and property, and with no condition whatsoever beyond\\nthe assumption of the public debt to the maximum amount of\\n$4,000,000. If ac-cepted by the passage of this measiire, that great\\nentrepot, lying in the highway of the future commerce of the\\na-158", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "13\\nEast and the West, will psaccfully pass into the possession of tho\\nAmerican people, assuring to them perpetual immunity from hos-\\ntile attack, a stratej^ ic position of incalculable valne in time of\\nwar. a harbor of refuse in storm or cahmiity, and a magniticent\\nsupply station for our Navy and merchant marine through all the\\nexigencies of onr country s future.\\nIf. on the contrary. Congress shuts the door upon this tender,\\nthe Hawaiian Islands must of necessity pass under foreign domin-\\nion. Not one of the constituent elements of the Hawaiian popu-\\nlation is suffici ntly strong to maintain for any prolonged per.od\\nof time an independent form of government against internecine\\ncontiict or foreign au gress.on. If we re. me to extend our own\\nsovere gnty and protection, the Un ted States can not. with any\\nshowot .iustice or sanction of right recognizable by other nations,\\ninvoke the principles of the Monroe doctrine against a voluntary\\ntreaty of cession to Great Britain or to Germany or to France,\\nwhich may become necessary to the preservation of the rights and\\nthe protect on ot the lives of the Hawaiian people against domestic\\nor foreign violence.\\nBut whether as a matter of principle the Monroe doctrine could\\nbe applied or whether it could not be, yet, nevertheless, in the ab-\\nsence of a voluntary cession to a European power, the gravitation\\nto Japan and finally absorption by that country will be the inevi-\\ntable destiny of the Hawaiian people. Under the constitution of\\nthat Republic it is easy to be seen that it is only a matter of time\\nwhen the Japanese population may lawfully acquire control of all\\nthe legislative and administrative functions of the Government,\\nin which event the transition to a colonial system, autonomous\\nin Its character, but yielding allegiance to the Emperor, would be\\naltogether too imperceptible to justify interference at any par-\\nticular period of time, or even to render interference possible\\nwithout a war with that Empire. Thus, by a movement similar to\\nthose which have hei-etofore characterized the migration of na-\\ntions, there would be eventually precipitated that greatest of all\\nconceivable calamities, the planting of an Asiatic population and\\nthe founding of an Asiatic cult two-thirds of the stretch across\\nMr. Speaker, another point of contention against this measure\\nis that by the acquisition of these islands we will largely increase\\nour coast line necessary to be defended, and therelore the acqui-\\nsition would be a source of weakness rather than of strength.\\nThere is no force in this contention. Pearl Harbor is the only\\nlandlocked harbor in the entire Hawaiian group, and the only\\nplace that could be made available as a naval base. In the pos-\\nsession of the United States, no foreign enemy could maintain a\\nlodgment anvwhere on the entire coast line for any purpose what-\\nsoever. Susceptible of being made as impregnab.e as Gibraltar,\\nit has the superior advantage of being a refuge agamst storm as\\nwell as against superior forces, while it is a coign of vantage\\nfrom which every trade route in the Southern Pacific can be\\nflanked, giving unparalleled facilities for the assailing or detend-\\ning commerce, and absolutely dominating not only the island\\ncoast line, but also every ocean highway from Alaska to the\\nEquator.\\nAfter traversing all the waters of the globe. I know of no posi-\\ntion which can be so cheaply fortifii d or maintained, which will\\ngive to the Government so great an influence in maritime com-\\nmerce, and which can be made so tremendously effective in the\\npossible conflicts of the future.\\nuM58", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "14\\nAside from strategic considerations, common justice to a weak\\nand defenseless neighbor demands ttaat the United States shall\\neither recognize the neuti-ality obligations of a noncombatant or\\nelse shall eliminate those obligations from the forum ot future con-\\ntentions by an incorporation into our own system. We are to-day\\nusing the Island of Oahu as a base of supplies and a naval station\\nin open detiauce of the well-recognized laws governing neutral\\npowers and in absolute contradiction of our own demand upon all\\nother nations in the world.\\nCan anyone doubt that the principles of the Alabama case would\\ndetermine the judgment of any court of international arbitration\\nif a call for damages should be herearter made upon Hawaii by\\nthe Government of Spain? Can anyone doubt that the collection\\nof a judgment by seizure of Hawaiian revenues, or the occu-\\npation of Hawaiian territory until satisfaction was rendered,\\nwould be upheld by European nations in spite of the Monroe dec-\\ntrine unless the United States paid the award? Our action al-\\nready taken is absolutely indefensible upon any other theory than\\nthat the treaty already concluded gives quasi jurisdictional rights\\npending ratification.\\nThe annexation of Hawaii is wholly disconnected from and in-\\ndependent of any questions growing out of our contest with Spain.\\nRepeating what I have heretofore said, this subject in one form\\nor another has been before the American people and before Con-\\ngress for over fifty years, and it would have been accomplished\\nlong ago had it not been for the contentions of political parties\\nand the overshadowing exigencies of the civil war. No proposi-\\ntion of colonial establishment has ever entered into the negotia-\\ntions of the two Governments. The treaty of 1893 and also that of\\n1897 both provided that the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated\\ninto the territory of the United States as an integral part thereof,\\nand shall be known as the Territory of Hawaii, and as such shall\\nbe governed by such laws as Congress shall enact.\\nThe undertaking to connect this subject with the fate of the\\nPhilippine Islands, of Puerto Rico, is simply and solely a makeshift\\nof the opposition to defeat this measure by the sinuous arts of par-\\nliamentar} tactics, notwithstanding the fact thata vast majority of\\nthe American people have already substantially voted for annex-\\nation and that a majority of both Houses of this Congress are\\nwaiting to vote for it at the earliest possible opportunity.\\nSpeaking for myself, Mr. Speaker, although for twenty years I\\nhave been convinced of the wisdom of this proceeding from every\\nstandpoint of view, present and future, yet, laying aside all other\\nconsiderations which relate to commercial development and the\\nprogress of civilization, it is enough for me to know that the\\nPresident of the United States, charged with the responsibility of\\nprosecuting this war to a successful issue, regards the annexation\\nof the Hawaiian Islands as a military necessity. With that knowl-\\nedge I will give him my loyal support, and I will never consent\\nthat this session of Congress shall adjourn until these resolutions\\nhave been fully acted upon.\\nMr. Speaker, there is no novelty in the objections which are\\nurged against this measure. They were urged against the pur-\\nchase of Louisiana in 1803. The Federalists of that day chal-\\nlenged the constitutionality of the acquisition, and even Mr. Jef-\\nferson (luestioned it. But Congress and the Supreme Court de-\\ncided otherwise. They were urged against the annexation of\\nTexas by the Abolitionists of the North and by many statesmen\\nof the South. Whole tomes of statistics were summoned to prove\\n24,58", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "15\\nthat the heterogeneous population gathered within those districts\\ncoiild never be ampiiorated, and would prove to bo an eternal\\nmenace to our republican institutions. But they were annexed\\nnevertheless, and to-day thoy are teeming with wealth, inte.li-\\ngence, and industrial energy. They were urged against the ac-\\nqui-^ition of New Mexico and California, and one of the greatest\\nSi eeches Webster ever made was an invective against that terra\\nincognita. Nevertheless, nearly S JO.OOO.OOO was given as the price\\nof that territorv.aud it has ja-oven to bo an inexhaustible store-\\nhouse of miner; il and agricultural wealth. Thi^y were urged still\\nmore vehemently a-ainst the {lurchase of Alaska, and Mr. Seward\\nwas charged with political lunacy lor paying eight millions of good\\nmoney for a region of eternal icebergs. But. Mr. iSpea er. in all\\nthese so-called uneonstitutional, irrational, and unstatesniaiilike\\nperformances we builded wiser than we knew, and out of tliose\\nvast regions of tropical jungle and arctic waste a great nation\\nhas grown up to subdue the sterile places of the earth and to bless\\nhumanity. Who to-chiy would turn backward this wonderful\\nmarch of progress? W ho would not rather carry it forward, re-\\nlying upon the insjiirations and the strength of American intelli-\\ngence and upon the providence of Almighty God?\\nMr. Speaker, it is urged that the people of the Hawaiian Islands\\nare incapable of self-government, and therefore annexation must\\nnecessarily be hostile to the best interests of the American people.\\nOf the present constituent elements of Hawaiian population, the\\nChinese, numbering nearly 23,000, can safely be regarded as only\\ntemporary sojourners in the islands. With the application of\\nAmerican laws aga nst further immigration, the immediate outgo\\n01 this element wdl begin; and in a comparatively short period of\\ntime they will become greatly reduced in point of numbers, if\\nthey do not entirely disappear. The Japanese are fairly good ma-\\nterial for future citizenship. They are acqu sitive of knowledge,\\nindustrious and economical, and easily molded in the forms and\\nusages of the society in which they locate.\\nTaking the native Hawaiians, Portuguese, the British, the Ger-\\nmans, and the Americans into consideration, the percentage of\\nintelligence existing at the present time among these elements is\\nas large as that which exists in any of the new sections of our\\nown country. Out of 15,191 Portuguese residents, 48.8 per cent\\nwere born on the islands. The percentage of industrials is over\\n91 per cent of the entire working population, fully up to the show-\\ning of the most advanced nations of the world. Of 9;i,l0 people\\nover G years of age. Go.O per cent are able to read and write. Ex-\\ncluding the Portuguese, the Japanese, and the Chmese, the per-\\ncentage of those able to read and write rises to nearly 86 per cent.\\nThe percentage of children attending school is still more re-\\nmarkable. The total number of children within the school age-\\nviz. 6 to 15\u00e2\u0080\u0094 was reported in isy\u00c2\u00bb to be 14,280, out of which the\\nschool attendants were 18,744, or 9(5.2 per cent, an increase of\\nnearly 15 per cent over 1890and over 25 per cent over 1884. While\\nthe natives of full Hawaiian blood appear to be decreasing, the\\nnative born of mixed Hawaiian stock is very largely on the in-\\ncrease, such births rising from 1,568 in 18 i0 to 2.-590 m 1896, a\\ngain of 65 per cent. The children born in the islands of parents\\nboth foreign have increased from 5,018 in 1890 to 8,839 in 1890, a\\ngain of Go per cent.\\nThese increases are mostly among Hawaiians, Europeans, and\\nAmericans, showing the rise of a new stock thoroughly amena-\\nble to the influences of Anglican civilization, into which it is rap-\\n3458", "height": "3234", "width": "2069", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "mt!^!^ V ^UNbKtb^\\n013 717 904\\n16\\nidly mersing year by year. The contention, therefoi e, that there\\nis anj antagonism, physical, moral, intellectual, or social, between\\nthe people who can be regarded as permanent residents of the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands and the people of the United States is no more\\nvalid than the early contention that the people of Lomsiai a,\\nTexas. New Mexico, and California would never coalesce with\\nthe Anglo-Saxon popiilation of the original States.\\nCOMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.\\nMr. Speaker, I have been considering this measure more par-\\nticularly from the standpoint of the proposition that the acquisi-\\ntion of the Hawaiian Islands at this time is necessary for the\\n].roi)er protection of the Pacific coast. A word or two upon the\\ncommercial side of this question as it relates to the future pros-\\nperity of the United States. For a quarter of a century the de-\\nmaud has come from every quarter of our country for the enlarge-\\nment of our foreign commerce, and yet during all that time not a\\nsingle measure of substantial importance has ever been enacted\\nby Congress or by any commercial body of the United States which\\nconstit utes a basis upon which that enlargement can proceed.\\nOutside of Honolulu and the cities of Mexico and (iaudalajara\\nthere is not an American office of exchange m any foreign port of\\nthe Western Hemispliere or in the oriental world where an Ameri-\\ncan negotiation can be carried on. Every commercial bill, every\\nloan of money, every mercantile and affreightment contract, has\\nto be negotiated in an English office and pay tribute in one form\\nor another to English enterprise. Everywhere, in Mexico, in\\nCentral and South America, in Polynesia, in India, in Ceylon, in\\nthe Straits Settlements, in China, in Japan, and even in Hawaii,\\nEnglish institutions exist, founded under the broad, far-reaching\\npolicy of the British Government to increase and monopolize\\nevery branch of foreign trade, and not until the people of this\\ncountry outgrow the swaddling clothes bequeathed to them by\\nthe narrow policy of insular isolation will they ever have a\\npermanent share in the mighty commerce which beats its v/ings\\nin the waves of the broad Pacific.\\nIn the face of the universally recognized need of the Nicaragua\\nCanal we have been wasting precious time haggling and splitting\\nhairs over the difference between minimum and maximum esti-\\nmates of cost when the gain to American commerce in every year\\nafter its construction will be more than the entire expenditure.\\nThe progressive enterprise of the United States, the manufactur-\\ners of the North, the cotton growers of the South, the farmers of\\nOregon and California, all demand a short route between the\\noceans, and the peerless voyage of the Oregon to join the front\\nbattle line in our war with Spain emphasizes that demand with\\nan eloquence beyond the power of human speech.\\nThe construction of this great waterway connecting the two\\noceans, following upon the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands-,\\nand the independence of Cuba, will I each a consummation not\\nless magnificent than those splendid transactions which in the\\nearly history of our country laid the foundations of national\\nwealth, national power, and national glory, all which have been\\nthe wonder of the world and the honorable pride of every Ameri-\\ncan citizen. Powerful to resist attack from without, loving peace\\nat home and abroad, this great country will then have reached-\\nthe acme of its destiny, and its beneficent influence upon the na-\\ntions and the peoples of the earth will be the glory of the twentieth\\ncentury.\\n3458\\nO", "height": "3420", "width": "1961", "jp2-path": "annexationofhawa00pear_0016.jp2"}}