{"1": {"fulltext": "Executive Jurisdiction in Diplomatic Affairs.\u00e2\u0080\u0094Constitutional\\nLimitations Protect the Presidential Office.\u00e2\u0080\u0094The Organic\\nlarv Inhibits Interference by the Legislative Department\\nwith the Exercise of Executive Functions.\u00e2\u0080\u0094The Case of Julio\\nSanguily.\\nIN THE\\nTHURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, AND FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1897.\\nWASHING-TOX.\\n1897.\\nJR i W", "height": "4658", "width": "2863", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "V\\n686T", "height": "4575", "width": "2836", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "ux. 1 j l \u00e2\u0080\u0099Ykv 2 /1\\nu\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2S\\nM. WHITE,\\nThe Senate having under consideration the joint resolution (S. R. 207) de\u00c2\u00ac\\nmanding the release of Julio Sanguily, an American citizen, imprisoned in\\nCuba\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nMr. WHITE said:\\nMr. President: Some time ago I determined to offer certain\\nsuggestions with relation to the Cuban question, and especially\\nconcerning the Presidential jurisdiction regarding recognition of\\nindependence. But as the session was drawing to a close, and as\\nthe chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and other\\nmembers of that committee specially charged with the consider\u00c2\u00ac\\nation of those very important measures warned us that there was\\nno time to be spared, I concluded that the Senate would devote\\nitself to the examination of the appropriation bills, and felt that it\\nwould be inopportune for me to interject remarks upon another\\nsubject. I therefore withheld my views, intending to offer them\\nlater on if they seemed relevant to anything that might hereafter\\noccur. But the proceedings this morning have demonstrated\\nthat it is not the intention of the Senate of the United States to\\nengage in the business of considering appropriation bills and that\\nwe are to spend valuable hours in sensational utterances. We are\\nto engage in fruitless argumentation upon a resolution which can\\nnot pass, and which, if passed, would not become effective or even\\nreceive Executive consideration; a resolution which could not aid\\nMr. Sanguily and would, on the contrary, interfere with the effort\\nnow being properly made to accomplish his release.\\nA resolution was offered several weeks past in this body with ref\u00c2\u00ac\\nerence to Cuban independence. That resolution was not pressed.\\nIt came in here with considerable flourish of trumpets, if I may\\nbe permitted to use such an expression, and was sidetracked.\\nSome reason, no doubt, existed for this. I have no complaint to\\nmake on this account, for I am now and have been opposed to its\\npassage.\\nWhen the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations [Mr.\\nAllison] last night informed the Senate that it was necessary to\\nsit until midnight in order to pass bills to appropriate money to\\nmaintain this Government, we were all made aware of the danger\\nof delay, and yet this morning the Senator deliberately displaced\\nthe appropriation bills, and practically declared to the people of\\nthe United States that the Senate will not, though it can, pass\\nmeasures of controlling importance, and will needlessly thus create\\nan absolute necessity for the calling of an extra session, while in\\nthe opinion of some of us such necessity would not exist if we\\nattended to our plain duty and ceased the making of disturbing\\nremarks.\\nIf we are to discuss Cuba, we shall go on and discuss it. Both\\nsides shall be heard. After a debate which can not be short we\\n2313 3\\nBPBEO\\nor\\nHON. STEPHEN", "height": "4658", "width": "2822", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "4\\nwill vote upon a resolution, the passage of which can not, as I\\nhave said, he followed by any desirable consequences.\\nMr. HALE. Will the Senator from California yield to me?\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER, Does the Senator from Califor\u00c2\u00ac\\nnia yield to the Senator from Maine?\\nMr. WHITE. Certainly.\\nMr. HALE. Allow me to suggest here that up to this moment\\nfrom the beginning of the session all the time on this great sub\u00c2\u00ac\\nject-matter has been taken up by those who are in favor of what\\nare called the Cuban resolutions. Senators who have not believed\\nit was wise to embark upon that subject or to pass declarations\\ninflammatory in their nature, which -would tend to complicate the\\nsituation, have contented themselves, as the Senator from Califor\u00c2\u00ac\\nnia has, as I have, and as have a dozen other Senators, with\\nsaying nothing, but depending upon the general conservative\\nspirit of the Senate to go on and do business. We are now within\\nseven or eight days of the end of the session, and Senators should\\nunderstand that, with this whole subject precipated, those Sena\u00c2\u00ac\\ntors who heretofore have declined to participate in the debate and\\nhave allowed it to go on by the advocates of the Cuban resolutions,\\ncan not consent that this matter shall be voted upon until it is\\nthoroughly debated, and it can not be said and urged that it is in\\nthe interest of delay, because up to this time hardly one Senator\\nhas lifted his voice against any of these resolutions. We have\\nbeen content to go on and do business, I repeat, and desire now to\\ndo that, but Senators may as well understand that here, within\\none -week of the end of the session, with all the appropriation bills\\nwhich have not been passed pending, to take up this question and\\nto begin to debate it and to follow its debate until the question is\\ntaken, substantially confiscates every hour of this session, and no\\nappropriation bill can be passed.\\nI trust the Senators who voted to displace an important appro\u00c2\u00ac\\npriation bill in order to take up this joint resolution will realize\\nthat we shall not be taunted because we choose to debate this sub\u00c2\u00ac\\nject, which the Senate has taken on against our votes, with the\\ncharge that we are delaying matters. We have a right to be heard,\\nMr. President, on this question as well as all of the Senators who\\nhave fulminated before the country ever since last December, and\\nwho will only be content now in dragging this discussion before\\nthe Senate. The matter will be discussed, and the other side will\\nbe presented.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, in connection with the remarks\\nof the senior Senator from Maine, I may be permitted to observe\\nthat I have taken much interest in the legal aspects of this ques\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion; but I have refrained from indulging in any lengthy debate,\\nor doing more than to ask a very occasional question of Senators\\noccupying the floor, because I did not wish to interfere with other\\nmeasures.\\nThe resolution now forced upon us presents so many grave ques\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions that those of us who differ from the majority of the Com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmittee on Foreign Relations should not remain silent, and I for ono\\ndo not propose to do so. I intend expressing my opinions. It can\\nnot be truly stated that I am so acting to consume time, because\\nmy course in the past has been demonstrative of my desire in the\\nother direction. If I can prevent the accomplishment of a mis\u00c2\u00ac\\ntaken plan, I will do so.\\nLet me ask, preliminarily, What is the object attempted to be\\n2613", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "5\\nbrought about by precipitating this discussion at this time, really\\nin violation of the agreement which was tacitly had last night, to\\ndevote this day s session to the consideration of appropriation bills?\\nFrom 11 o\u00e2\u0080\u0099clock this morning until this moment we have been en\u00c2\u00ac\\ngaged in discussing this resolution reported by the Committee on\\nForeign Relations only yesterday, accompanied by a report of 98\\npages, a large portion of it closely printed. Are we entitled to\\nexamine that report? Can this be done in a minute?\\nAssuming that there is reason for the passage of this resolution,\\nassuming that there is a result in sight, and a desire to benefit\\nthis unfortunate man\u00e2\u0080\u0094though the course adopted is most hurtful\\nto him\u00e2\u0080\u0094assuming all this, let me inquire by what authority and\\nin what manner do Senators who are so fervid expect to accom\u00c2\u00ac\\nplish anything by its passage in this body? .Let it be granted that\\nthe Senate of the United States shall adopt it; let it be granted\\nthat those of us who oppose the views of the majority of the Com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmittee on Foreign Relations shall remain silent and allow every\u00c2\u00ac\\nthing to be said by the other side and permit the resolution to go\\nthrough intact. Then the House of Representatives is reached;\\ngrant that it shall be accorded a favorable reception there\u00e2\u0080\u0094and\\nthis is purely a matter of assumption\u00e2\u0080\u0094then, as the resolution is\\njoint, it must be presented to the President of the United States.\\nIs it to be supposed that he will approve it? Manifestly not. I\\nspeak from the record, a record of which every Senator should bo\\nthoroughly cognizant. The executive department of this G-ov-\\nernment has had this affair under advisement. The President\\nhas been acting within the lines of his authority and has consid\u00c2\u00ac\\nered this very issue. He has done his duty as he understands it,\\nand if lie is to be consistent he will pocket this joint resolution.\\nDo the advocates of this resolution think that anything practical\\nis to be gained by pressing it here and now? It will not benefit\\nSanguily. It will avail no one.\\nMr. HILL. Will the Senator allow me a moment?\\nMr. WHITE. Certainly.\\nMr. HILL. The premier of the next Administration reported\\nthis joint resolution to the Senate yesterday.\\nMr. WHITE. Yes, sir.\\nMr. HILL. And while he would not ask it to be acted upon\\nthen, he expressed a hope that the Senate would take it up to-day\\nand pass it at once. It is whispered to me from the rear that he\\nvoted against its consideration to-day; but I was not going to\\nmake that statement. I simply suggest that even if the Senate\\nalone passes the resolution, it will at least have some moral effect\\nupon the next Administration, I should hope.\\nMr. WHITE. I differ from the Senator from New York. I\\nhope the Senator from New York will not make it incumbent on\\nthe chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations to carry\\ninto liis policy as Secretary of State the views which he has\\nannounced in this Chamber.\\nMr. HILL. Why should he not be consistent?\\nMr. WHITE. It is within his power and sole jurisdiction, Mr.\\nPresident, it appears to me, to be or not to be consistent [laughter],\\nand I submit that the Senator from New York should not seek to\\ntread within that sacred circle. [Laughter.]\\nIt is a fact that the Committee on Foreign Relations, having had\\nCuban affairs under their consideration, and having had an oppor\u00c2\u00ac\\ntunity to press them when a final vote might have been reached,\\n2613", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "G\\nhave nevertheless waited until the appropriation bills have come\\nhere, and then have sought a final decision. I for one, occupying\\na seat upon the minority side of this Chamber, do not wish it\\ntruthfully charged that I have been a participant in the defeat of\\nappropriation bills, but I do not propose to be foreclosed of my\\nright to discuss this subject which has been incontinently and\\nimproperly interjected into our business.\\nI think I have shown, Mr. President, that nothing of good can\\nfollow the adoption of this joint resolution even by the Senate\\nand the House. It has no place here. Sanguily does not need it.\\nCommon sense dictates that his case will not be furthered by its\\nadoption. Why not withdraw it?\\nMr. President, there are several resolutions on the Calendar\\ntouching the Cuban question. That part of our history which\\ncovers Cuban disturbances is rather a peculiar one. I will pre\u00c2\u00ac\\nsent the general resolution 1G3, which I ask may be read at the\\ndesk.\\nThe PRESIDING- OFFICER (Mr. Faulkner in the chair).\\nThe Secretary will read as requested.\\nThe Secretary read as follows:\\nThat it is hereby declared that a condition of public war exists between\\nthe Government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for some time\\nmaintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba, and that the United States\\nof America should maintain a strict neutrality between the contending pow\u00c2\u00ac\\ners, according to each all the 1 \u00e2\u0080\u0099ights of belligerents in the ports and territory\\nof the United States.\\nMr. WHITE. Then there was introduced the following reso\u00c2\u00ac\\nlution by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Bacon]\\nResolved by the, Senate (the House of Representatives concurring That the\\nquestion of the recognition by this Government of any people as a free and\\nindependent nation is one exclusively for the determination of Congress in\\nits capacity as the lawmaking power.\\nResolved f urther That this prerogative of sovereign power does not apper\u00c2\u00ac\\ntain to the executive department of the Government, except in so far as the\\nPresident is, under the Constitution, by the exercise of the veto, made a\\npart of the lawmaking power of the Government.\\nThen we have the joint resolution of this morning, which has\\nalready been read, but which I shall incorporate in my remarks,\\naccompanied, as I said before, by Report No. 1534, comprising 96\\npages of largely, closely printed matter.\\nThe joint resolution is as follows:\\nResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, etc.. That the Govern\u00c2\u00ac\\nment of the United States demands the immediate and unconditional release\\nof Julio Sanguily, a citizen of the United States, from imprisonment and\\narrest under the charges that are pending and are being prosecuted against\\nhim in the military and civil courts of Cuba, upon alleged grounds of rebel\u00c2\u00ac\\nlion and kidnaping, contrary to the treaty rights of each of said Govern\u00c2\u00ac\\nments and in violation of the laws of nations.\\nAnd the President of the United States is requested to communicate this\\nresolution to the Government of Spain, and to demand of that Government\\nsuch compensation as he shall deem just for the imprisonment and sufferings\\nof Julio Sanguily.\\nWe have not adopted the resolution regarding independence.\\nAt the last session we expressed an opinion favoring recognition\\nof belligerency. This was a mere expression of opinion, it was\\nin no way binding on the Executive. Our attitude is peculiar.\\nWe are not willing to recognize the independence of Cuba. In\\nmy judgment we are without power to do so. Then we are ex\u00c2\u00ac\\npected to demand the release of an alleged American citizen\\ncharged with the commission of crime abroad. We are required\\n2613", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "7\\nto find his citizenship, to declare him innocent, and to, by impli\u00c2\u00ac\\ncation, censure the Department of State. All this is to be done\\nwithout examination\u00e2\u0080\u0094proceeding upon faith entirely\u00e2\u0080\u0094in the last\\ndays of this Congress.\\nMr. President, the termination of this Administration will soon\\nbe witnessed. Everyone in this Chamber knows that upon the\\nmost important and radical issue before the American people I\\ndissent from the position of Mr. Cleveland as clearly and as fully\\nas I expect to dissent from the financial policy of the Administra\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion of Mr. McKinley, but I do not permit my views upon one or\\na dozen subjects to interfere at all with my defense of the conduct\\nof the Executive in the matters now under review. I deem it my\\nduty to see that something is presented in justification of the Presi\u00c2\u00ac\\ndent and the Secretary of State with reference to unfounded accu\u00c2\u00ac\\nsations of usurpation which have been repeated with wearying\\nfrequency here and elsewhere. Were the appropriation bills\\nallowed a right of way, I would postpone my observations; but I\\nmust deal with conditions as I find them.\\nThe joint resolution reported by the Senator from Alabama\\nwho sits in front of me [Mr. Morgan] with the indorsement of\\nthe Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman] who is to be the Secretary\\nof State, comes to us just as this Administration is going out.\\nThe Senator from Ohio, as the head of the diplomatic department\\nof the incoming Government, will soon attend to this matter him\u00c2\u00ac\\nself. Instead of coming here as chairman of his committee and\\nnow seeking to put the burden upon us, let him wait a few days\\nand take the responsibility himself. He will have to do so ulti\u00c2\u00ac\\nmately. Why does he not abstain rather than to join in an effort\\nto defeat the appropriation bills and precipitate a discussion which\\ncan have only that result, and which will not, I assure him, end\\nin the passage of the joint resolution here pending?\\nMr. SHERMAN. Will the Senator allow me?\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER Does the Senator from California\\nyield to the Senator from Ohio?\\nMr. WHITE. I yield to the Senator from Ohio gladly.\\nMr. SHERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from California\\nseems to desire to drag me into this debate when I certainly do\\nnot care to enter upon it.\\nAs to the joint resolution which is pending, I think it ought to\\ncommand the unanimous approval of the Senate. I believe in the\\ndeclaration that injustice, gross injustice, almost barbarous\\ninjustice, has been done to a naturalized citizen of the United\\nStates, and I say, therefore, that his rights, the rights of even a\\nsingle person, ought to be respected, guarded, and protected by\\nthe Senate of the United States.\\nI have not, however, been in favor, and am not now in favor,\\nof passing this joint resolution at this moment when it stands in\\nthe way of appropriation Dills. I have so voted and shall so vote\\nagain, and I trust that, after the debate has gone on for a while,\\nSenators here will see the necessity of taking up the appropria\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion bills and passing them.\\nI do not think there is any matter of criticism m the lact that\\nthis joint resolution was reported from the Committee on Foreign\\nRelations by the honorable Senator from Alabama [Mr. Morgan]\\nrather than by myself. That was done because he has taken\\na more active interest in the subject than I. He has prepared a\\nlong, full, and detailed report setting out every material fact\\n2613", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "8\\nwhich bears upon tlie case. Therefore at my request that Sena\u00c2\u00ac\\ntor properly reported the joint resolution, and I shall vote for it.\\nI hope that Senators will not be carried otf merely because they\\nhave been defeated upon a question of the order of business.\\nThey themselves stand in the way of a vote on this resolution. I\\nbelieve the friends of the joint resolution are willing to vote upon\\nit without delay, and thus the opinion of the Senate may be had\\nand the appropriation bills be taken up; but to say that, because\\nwe desire this joint resolution to be passed, we are opposed to the\\npassage of appropriation bills is a gross injustice to us. I intend\\nto support and stand by the Committee on Appropriations this day\\nand until the end of the session, in order that they may complete\\nall the appropriation bills which are necessary in order to carry\\non the operations of the Government; but that shall not prevent\\nme from doing what I think is right in behalf of any of the people\\nof the United States to protect our citizens against unlawful in\u00c2\u00ac\\nsolence, violence, and w T rong. I trust in God the time will never\\ncome when I shall see an American citizen wronged of his rights\\nand persecuted and prosecuted unjustly by any power, great or\\nsmall. That is the way I feel now.\\nI am in favor of protecting this particular American citizen,\\nalthough he is a naturalized citizen, in all the rights of man. I\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0would not see him destroyed or driven to the fate of another natu\u00c2\u00ac\\nralized citizen who was probably compelled to kill himself, or who\\nwas killed in custody. I am opposed to wrong and violence and\\ntyranny wherever it is exercised, and when it is inflicted upon a\\ncitizen of the United States I will stand by him if I am alone.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, we are all opposed to wu\u00e2\u0080\u0099ong. Of\\ncourse we are all in favor, I hope, of protecting American citi\u00c2\u00ac\\nzens. I am as resolute in this as the Senator from Ohio. Some\\nof us differ as to exactly how we should go about it; some of us\\nprefer that an American citizen should be actually protected,\\nwdiile some prefer to talk of protection without bringing it about.\\nThe American citizen who behaves himself will be protected.\\nWhether he acts lawfully or otherwise, he will be guarded in his\\nrights. But I must have a case reasonably proven before I can\\nact.\\nThe Senator from Ohio, as chairman of the Committee on For\u00c2\u00ac\\neign Relations, allowed this joint resolution to be brought in, when\\nhe knew that thereby he would precipitate a debate and that noth\u00c2\u00ac\\ning practical could come of it. Did he think that those of us who\\nhave refused heretofore to engage in discussions because we did\\nnot wish to interfere with legislation would be driven from the\\nassertion of our conscientious opinions by the pretext that we were\\nconsuming time, and this because we do not wish an obnoxious\\nresolution to be voted upon? The Sanguily matter has been be\u00c2\u00ac\\nfore his committee for months, and he selected the most inoppor\u00c2\u00ac\\ntune time for this display. The Senator from Alabama is an able\\nman and thoroughly conversant with these questions, but the\\nSenator from Ohio did not escape any responsibility for himself\\nwhen the Senator from Alabama reported the resolution. The\\nSenator from Ohio, knowing that this resolution could not be\\nadopted, knowing that within ten days he will be in charge of the\\nState Department, still risked the defeat of the appropriation bills.\\nHaving done that, he turns around and says he is in favor of taking\\nup the appropriation bills and regrets the disturbance which lie\\nhimself has inflicted upon us. This may appear to the Senator\\n2613", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "9\\nn\\nfrom Ohio to be consistent. It does not appear to me to be voz 7\\nconsistent.\\nMore than that, the Senator says that he ascertained that Julio\\nSanguily was being badly treated. When did he learn that?\\nWithin the last two or three days? As chairman of the Commit\u00c2\u00ac\\ntee on Foreign Relations, he ought to have known as much about\\nthis matter as those of us who are not upon that great committee.\\nThere was brought into the Senate many, many days ago, Senate\\nDocument 104, setting forth all the evidence contained in the re\u00c2\u00ac\\nport of the committee presented to us this morning. So this sub\u00c2\u00ac\\nject was before the Senator from Ohio, and before those who sym\u00c2\u00ac\\npathize and agree with him, weeks ago, and action was withheld\\nuntil this late hour, when, as I have stated, the able and conserva\u00c2\u00ac\\ntive Senator who is chairman of the Committee on Appropriations\\nhad announced the impossibility of legislation unless we devote\\nunremittingly each full day remaining to our proper work. Sen\u00c2\u00ac\\nate Document 104, containing all this evidence, was filed here on\\nFebruary 1 of this year, and its contents, it is safe to say, were\\nknown to the Senator from Ohio much earlier. If he has other\\ninformation, he has not disclosed it.\\nThe merits of Julio Sanguily\u00e2\u0080\u0099s complaint can be dealt with by\\nthe Senator from Ohio in ten days from this date in accordance\\nwith his views of the proprieties. That it can not be dealt with\\nearlier, except in accordance with the views of the present Ad\u00c2\u00ac\\nministration, is a fact which, whether he likes it or not, he must\\nconcede. Why, then, press the resolution? The first and most\\nimportant question, perhaps, calling for examination, is that\\ninvolving the power of Congress to pass a general resolution of\\nrecognition, either of belligerengy or independence. It is not jiro-\\nposed to rely upon legislation enacted upon any supposition or\\npresumption, but it is sought to directly recognize the independ\u00c2\u00ac\\nence of an alleged Cuban republic, not only without Executive\\nconcurrence, but in the face of the fact that the Executive has\\nsteadfastly declined to make such recognition. It is the deter\u00c2\u00ac\\nmination of the advocates of Congressional power to force recogni\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion in spite of the Executive. Can this be done? At the outset\\nit is proper to consider whether Congress has any such power,\\nand if it is ascertained that the authority exists, whether a proper\\ncase has arisen for its exercise.\\nWhen it was stated that the Secretary of State claimed that the\\nExecutive possessed the exclusive authority to recognizepndepend-\\nence, he was denounced in many quarters, not only in various\\nnewspapers, but also upon this floor; and it was even stated here\\nthat the doctrine which he advanced was absolutely novel, and\\nthat no similar pretension had ever been made. This groundless\\nassertion lias been so far modified that a distinguished Senator\\nwho ably advocated the so-called Cuban side of the controversy\\ndeclared that the claim was first made twenty-three years ago. It\\nwill be easy to show that not only is there nothing new in the re\u00c2\u00ac\\ncent announcement of the Secretary of State, but that the view\\nwhich he has taken seems to be supportable on principle, and is\\ncertainly in accord with the best precedents, diplomatic and judi\u00c2\u00ac\\ncial. There is nowhere in the Constitution a direct delegation, in\\nterms, of power to recognize belligerency. Nothing of the kind is\\ncontained in the legislative grant, nor does specific phraseology\\nconferring the authority manifest itself in that part of the organic\\nlaw which is devoted to the executive department. It was lately\\n2G13\\n%\\\\s", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "10\\nBaid by a most able and learned Senator, with regard to the con\u00c2\u00ac\\nstitutional provisions referring to the Congress, that\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nThere are more provisions devoted to that subject than to any other. Ic\\nprecedes the judicial department; it precedes the executive department; it\\nis first in time, first in right, power, and authority.\\nAnd the same learned Senator further remarked:\\nIf, then, the President perversely and lawlessly refuses or declines to ap\u00c2\u00ac\\npoint an ambassador when Congress desires one in the form of law, we could\\ndirect by law that he should appoint one to a particular country; and in case\\nof his further refusal, wo could name and designate a person as our political\\nagent to perform such duties as are usually performed by the Presidential\\nappointee, because such a power is necessary and proper to the execution of\\nthe paramount power of Congress to regulate our intercourse with foreign\\nnations. And we may well note here how close this construction is in har\u00c2\u00ac\\nmony with the Constitution, a harmony designed in all its parts, because such\\nan appointee by Congress, the person temporarily designated by Congress,\\nvested with ambassadorial, consular, or ministerial powers would receive a\\ntwo-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress, the Senate and the House of Rep\u00c2\u00ac\\nresentatives, a larger majority than if he had been appointed and commis\u00c2\u00ac\\nsioned by the President and the Senate to that office, for such law could only\\nbe passed over the veto of the President by a two-thirds vote of both the\\nSenate and the House.\\nNotwithstanding my high regard for the abilities and character\\nof the distinguished Senator from whom I have quoted, I find my\u00c2\u00ac\\nself unable to subscribe to this doctrine. While it is true that a\\nlaw which passes over the Presidential veto receives a larger ma\u00c2\u00ac\\njority than would an appointee of the President confirmed by the\\nSenate, yet it appears to me that this is not the point at all. The\\ntreaty-making power is vested in the Executive, subject to the\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, and while a treaty may be re\u00c2\u00ac\\npealed by a law, it can not be made in any other way than that\\ndesignated in the organic instrument. The President must pro\u00c2\u00ac\\npose the treaty. He may withdraw a treaty before ratification.\\nHe may decline to submit an amended treaty to the other contract\u00c2\u00ac\\ning power. If the Senate unanimously votes to make a treaty,\\nsuch vote is of no effect unless the Executive submits the conven\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion.\\nPresident Harrison, without consulting the Senate or either\\nbranch of Congress, recognized the Dole Government of the Ha\u00c2\u00ac\\nwaiian Islands, and the Secretary of State, on the loth of Febru\u00c2\u00ac\\nary, 1893, placed before Congress a treaty of annexation entered\\ninto by this Government with the representatives of the new estab\u00c2\u00ac\\nlishment of Hawaii. This treaty was being considered by the\\nSenate when it was withdrawn by President Cleveland, and\\nalthough it has been generally supposed that a majority of the\\nSenate favored the scheme outlined in that document, no oppor\u00c2\u00ac\\ntunity was given to vote upon it, and no one denied the authority\\nof the President to withdraw the proposition; and whether the\\nSenate relished Mr. Cleveland\u00e2\u0080\u0099s action or did not relish it was en\u00c2\u00ac\\ntirely immaterial. He had the constitutional power to act as he\\ndid, and although Senators might have considered that they were\\nbetter advised in the premises than the President, nevertheless\\nthis faith in themselves was not potential enough to overcome\\nconstitutional obstacles.\\nI can not bring myself to believe that the mere fact that Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngressional powers are enumerated earlier in the Constitution than\\nthose of the Executive adds anything to the authority expressly\\ngiven. The words used to confer power upon the Executive are\\njust as potential for the purposes named as those which demark\\nlegislative limits. While it is true, perhaps, that the more w T eiglity\\n2613", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "ii\\nobligations are assigned to the Congress, yet this does not affect\\nthe completeness and exclusiveness of the Presidential grant as\\nfar as made. If the Supreme Court, contumaciously or corruptly,\\nfails to decide cases submitted to it, Congress can not, for that\\nreason, do the work of the court. The argument that there is\\ndanger that the President may refuse to do his duty is not new.\\nIt was largely acted upon in the formulation of the Articles of Con\u00c2\u00ac\\nfederation, but the views of our early statesmen were considerably\\nmodified when the constitutional convention met. That power\\ngiven might be abused all knew. It was not expected that a sys\u00c2\u00ac\\ntem could be devised which would render usurpation or other mis\u00c2\u00ac\\nconduct impossible. Various duties were assigned to different\\nofficers in the hope that such distribution would result beneficially,\\nand that evil would less frequently prevail than under other dis\u00c2\u00ac\\npensations. The claim made that the President represents the one-\\nman power and Congress the people is mythical.\\nThe President and Congress and the judiciary each and all rep\u00c2\u00ac\\nresent the people, and the Government thus formed constitutes\\nthat system, composed of three independent departments which\\nthe people have ordained. The department which is the repos\u00c2\u00ac\\nitory of executive power is the creation of the people and repre\u00c2\u00ac\\nsents their behests, and he w T ho seeks to deprive the executive of\\nthose rights attacks the people and endeavors to avoid the popular\\nwill constitutionally expressed. Congress can not usurp execu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntive functions. If the President may not exercise power conferred\\nupon Congress, so also is it true that Congress can not trench upon\\nexecutive territory. The functions permitted to the executive and\\nthose committed to the judiciary and Congress in the aggregate\\nconstitute, as I have said, the governmental scheme outlined in\\nthe organic law. It appears to me peculiar to hold that the defined\\nand limited jurisdiction of the Congress possesses an absorbing\\nand accumulating nature adequate to draw to itself the nonas-\\nserted powers of the other departments, that Congress is the bene\u00c2\u00ac\\nficiary of executive nonaction.\\nIf it be true that we are governed under a system of delegated\\npowers, under what rule of construction can we hold that, al\u00c2\u00ac\\nthough the Constitution gives to the President and does not give\\nto Congress the power to appoint ambassadors, nevertheless, if\\nthe President refuses to do so, Congress may undertake his con\u00c2\u00ac\\nstitutional duty? It seems to be thought that the exigencies of\\nthe situation will justify this. Ido exigency can warrant the\\ndoing of any act by either department not permitted by the Con\u00c2\u00ac\\nstitution. The powers not conferred by the Constitution are\\nreserved. This reservation is not made in favor of Congress, It\\nwas not designed to give plenary authority to Congress. The\\npeople, it is true, jealously guarded their rights, hut the whole\\nplan was formed to protect their interests. The experiences of\\nthe confederation had not been lost. The ablest men of the time\\nbelieved that three departments, distinct, independent, each sepa\u00c2\u00ac\\nrated from the other by impassable lines, were essential to the\\nperpetuity of free institutions. Neither of these can lawfully\\ngrasp jurisdiction because of nonexertion by the department to\\nwhich it has been committed.\\nThe absolute separation of the executive from the other depart\u00c2\u00ac\\nments was early the subject of solicitude. In the convention Mr.\\nKing expressed his apprehension that an extreme caution in favor\\nof liberty might enervate the Government we were forming. Ho\\n2013", "height": "4575", "width": "2644", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "12\\nwished the House to recur to the primitive axiom that the three\\ngreat departments of government should he separate and inde\u00c2\u00ac\\npendent; that the executive and judiciary should he so as well as\\nthe legislative; that the executive should he so equally with the\\njudiciary. Those who desire to study this portion of the debates\\nwill find it in the Second Journal Constitutional Convention\\n(Madison), page 304.\\nDuring the debate upon the executive power, Mr. Madison said\\n(I Journal, page 387):\\nIf it be a fundamental principle of free government that the legislative,\\nexecutive, and judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is clear\\nalso that they be independently exercised. There is the same and perhaps\\ngreater reason why the executive should be independent of the legislative\\nthan why the judiciary should.\\nThis, Mr. President, is the language of Madison.\\nIt was well said by the Supreme Court of the United States in\\nMarbury vs. Madison (1 Cranch, 176):\\nThe powers of the legislature are defined and limited, and that those limits\\nmay not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To w hat pur\u00c2\u00ac\\nposes are powers limited and to what purpose is that limitation committed to\\nwriting if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be re\u00c2\u00ac\\nstrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlim\u00c2\u00ac\\nited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom\\nthey are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obli\u00c2\u00ac\\ngation.\\nAnd in the same case it was also said:\\nQuestions in their nature political, or which are by the constitu tional laws\\nsubmitted to the Executive, can never be made in this court.\\nIn Kendall vs. United States (12 Peters, 610) the court said:\\nThe executive power is vested in a President, and as far as his powers are\\nderived from the Constitution he is beyond the reach of any other depart\u00c2\u00ac\\nment, except in the mode prescribed by the Constitution through the im\u00c2\u00ac\\npeaching xiower.\\nThe very basis of our governmental plan is the distribution of\\nresponsibility among the several departments. Unquestionably\\nthe Executive may fail to do his duty, and great public interests\\nmay be sacrificed; but so, also, may it be said that Congress may\\nfail to act discreetly, and thereby sacrifice grave public interests.\\nCharges of that kind have been often made, and there has been\\nmuch evidence in support of the accusations.\\nIf Congress has the right to appoint an ambassador in the case\\nalready mentioned, who is to determine whether the refusal of\\nthe President to make an appointment has been perverse or law\u00c2\u00ac\\nless? The answer will probably be that Congress must determine\\nthe fact. Therefore, it necessarily results that whenever the legis\u00c2\u00ac\\nlative department may decide to harass the President, it can find\\nthis jurisdictional fact and can thereupon assert his prerogatives,\\nand practically exercise the functions, of government committed\\nto him.\\nBut I am unable to find a word in the Constitution directly or\\nby implication assigning Presidential functions to Congress when\\nthe Executive declines to act affirmatively. As well might it be\\nurged that a similar failure of Congress, with reference to some\\nconceded duty, such as appropriating money for necessary public\\npurposes, would vest authority in the President to meet the exi\u00c2\u00ac\\ngency. With equal reason it might be contended that because\\nthe Senate to-day declines to act upon appropriation bills, and\\ndevotes itself to issues upon other topics, that therefore the Presi\u00c2\u00ac\\ndent alone lias the power to appropriate money.\\n2613\\nI", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "13\\nPresidential obligation or Congressional duty are not enjoined\\nconditionally. The grant is in each instance absolute. Neither\\ndepartment has a contingent right to move. The location of juris\u00c2\u00ac\\ndiction is fixed by the instrument and not by the whim or caprice\\nof the official. It can always be found. It needs no expert to dis\u00c2\u00ac\\ncover it, nor is it located first here and then there. The plea that\\nsomebody could act the fool or the knave was no doubt a factor in\\nthe convention s deliberations. If it was believed that a man\\nselected to the highest national office could be trusted to obey the\\nConstitution, especially with the sword of impeachment hanging\\nover him, such assumption was probably based upon the idea that\\nthe people would most likely choose an honest and capable man,\\nand that the presence of such honesty and capability was neces\u00c2\u00ac\\nsarily involved in the faith of the fathers that a republican gov\u00c2\u00ac\\nernment was possible.\\nThe authors of the Federalist frequently had occasion to refer\\nto the division of power, and they strenuously contended that\\nproper lines of demarcation had been provided. There is not a\\nhint anywhere indicating that it was supposed that Congress had\\nthe right to exercise in any event or at all the duties assigned to\\nthe Executive.\\nThe President has power to grant reprieves and pardons, except\\nin cases of impeachment, and this authority is exclusive, as stated\\nin Klein s case. (13 Wall. U. S., 138.) He is also given jurisdic\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion, by and with the advice of the Senate, to make treaties, and\\nhe shall nominate and by and with the advice of the Senate shall\\nappoint ambassadors, etc. The exclusiveness of the grant is as\\nevident in the case of the executive as in the Congressional and\\njudicial instances. Mr. Justice Story says:\\nIn the government of this commonwealth the legislative department shall\\nnever exercise the executive or judicial powers, or either of them, etc. (1\\nStory, Cons., section 520.)\\nJames Wilson, who was an associate justice of the Supreme\\nCourt of the United States and professor of law in the College of\\nPhiladelphia, in the course of a lecture delivered by him on \u00e2\u0080\u009cGov\u00c2\u00ac\\nernment\u00e2\u0080\u009d (to be found in volume 1, Wilson\u00e2\u0080\u0099s Works, Andrews\u00e2\u0080\u0099s\\nedition, page 365) says:\\nThough the foregoing great powers, legislative, executive, and judicial,\\nare all necessary to a good government, yet it is of the last importance that\\neach of them he preserved distinct and unmingled in the exercise of its sepa\u00c2\u00ac\\nrate powers with either or with both of the others. Here every degree of\\nconfusion of the plan will produce a corresponding degree of interference,\\nopposition, combination, or perplexity in its execution. Liberty\\nand security in government depend not on the limits which the rulers may\\nplease to assign to the exercise of their own powers, but on the boundaries\\nwithin which their powers are circumscribed by the constitution.\\nHe further says (page 3G7) \u00e2\u0080\u0094and his language may be quoted with\\nappropriateness here:\\nEach of the great powers of government should be independent as well as\\ndistinct. The independency of each power consists in this, that its\\nproceedings, and the motives, views, and principles which produce those\\nproceedings, should be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of\\neither of the other two powers.\\nIn speaking of the power of the President to grant pardons, Mr.\\nRawle (Rawle on the Constitution, page 164) concludes that in\\nthe case of a vacancy in the office of President there is no power\\nto grant pardons, and remarks (page 166) that in the exercise of\\nthe benign prerogative of pardoning it has been justly said that\\nthe President stands alone.\\n2013", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "14\\nThe authors of the Federalist understood that they were giving\\nto the President considerable authority.\\nMr. Madison\u00e2\u0080\u0099s remarks, to be found in the thirty-eighth number\\nof the Federalist, pages 291,292, Hamilton\u00e2\u0080\u0099s edition, clearly prove\\nthat he was not only cognizant of the fullness of executive power,\\nbut that he justified it.\\nIn discussing the objections made to the Constitution with ref\u00c2\u00ac\\nerence to the blending of powers, Mr. Madison declares (47 Fed\u00c2\u00ac\\neralist, 373):\\nNo political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped\\nwith the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that on\\nwhich the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, legislative,\\nexecutive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,\\nand whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pro\u00c2\u00ac\\nnounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the Federal Constitution,\\ntherefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of power, or with a mix\u00c2\u00ac\\nture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no\\nfurther arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of\\nthe system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to\\nevery one that tho charge can not be supported, and that the maxim on\\nwhich it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied.\\nI quote again from Mr. Madison:\\nIt is agreed on all sides that the powers properly belonging to one of the\\ndepartments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either\\nof the other departments. It is equally evident that neither of them ought\\nto possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in\\nthe administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied that\\npower is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually re\u00c2\u00ac\\nstrained from passing the limits assigned to it.\\nAfter discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as\\nthey may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judicial, the next,\\nand most difficult task, is to provide some practical security for each against\\nthe invasion of the others. What this security ought to be is the great prob\u00c2\u00ac\\nlem to be solved.\\nWill it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these de\u00c2\u00ac\\npartments, in the Constitution of the Government, and to trust to these\\nparchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power?\\nThis is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by\\nthe compilers of most of the American constitutions. But experience assures\\nns that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated, and that\\nsome more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble\\nagainst the more powerful members of the Government. The legislative\\ndepartment is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing\\nall power into its impetuous vortex.\\nSaid Mr. Justice Harlan, in Clougli vs. Curtis (134 U. S., 371):\\nOne branch of this Government, this court said in the Sinking Fund Cases\\n(99 U. S., 700), can not encroach on the domain of another without danger.\\nThe safety of our Constitution depends in no slight degree on the strict ob\u00c2\u00ac\\nservance of this salutary rule.\\nIt is undoubtedly true, as said by Chief Justice Fuller in Ex\\nparte Tyler (149 U. \u00c2\u00bbS., 104), that the maintenance of a system of\\nchecks and balances characteristic of republican institutions re\u00c2\u00ac\\nquires the coordinate departments of Government, whether Fed\u00c2\u00ac\\neral or State, to refrain from infringement on the independence\\nof each other.\\nIt might be added that the lodgment of concurrent authority in\\nthe executive and legislative departments could never have been\\nintended. The confusion sure to ensue from such a plan is man\u00c2\u00ac\\nifest. Nor is there any reason to suppose that any Presidential\\nprerogative is made dependent upon the nonaction of Congress.\\nIf there is a word in the Constitution justifying the assertion that\\nthe President has the right to recognize independence until Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngress sees fit to act, and that then his power ceases, it has not been\\npointed out. The Presidential power in this respect has been\\n2613\\nt", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "15\\nexercised during recess and when Congress was in session, and\\nhas never been successfully combated.\\nBy affixing his signature to an act or a treaty containing such phrase, tho\\nPresident does not effect any change in the Constitution. He can not take\\nconstitutional power in virtue of any clause of an act of Congress; nor can\\nho so surrender it. The constitutional power of each of tho three great de\u00c2\u00ac\\npartments of the Government, respectively, belongs to the offices, not the\\nofficers, and can not, by any act or words of theirs, he withdrawn from the\\npermanent and pervading authority of the Constitution. (7 Op. Atty. Gen.\\n(Cushing), 276.)\\nSaid Attorney-General Black (9 Op. Atty. Gen., 468-469):\\nAs Commander-in-Chief of the Army it is your (tho President\u00e2\u0080\u0099s) own judg\u00c2\u00ac\\nment what officer shall perform any particular duty, and as the supreme\\nexecutive magistrate you have the power of appointment. Congress could\\nnot, if it would, take away from the President, or in any wise diminish, the\\nauthority conferred upon him by the Constitution. If Congress had\\nreally intended to make him independent of you, that purpose could not be\\naccomplished in this indirect manner any more than if it was attempted di\u00c2\u00ac\\nrectly. Congress is vested with legislative power; the authority of the Presi\u00c2\u00ac\\ndent is executive. Neither has a right to interfere with the functions of the\\nother.\\nWhether the powers conferred upon Congress are more impor\u00c2\u00ac\\ntant than those devolving upon the President it is immaterial to\\ninquire. It may be assumed for the sake of argument that the\\ngreater responsibility rests upon the former. It is, nevertheless,\\ntrue that the failure on the part of the President to exercise those\\nfunctions which pertain to his office and which are not permitted\\nto Congress, can not result in an investiture of authority in the\\nlegislative department; nor is it correct to say that the framers of\\nthe Constitution intended to subordinate the Executive to the\\nCongressional will in cases other than those where such intention\\nis plainly announced.\\nIn considering the President, Hamilton said (The Federalist,\\nNo. 73, page 546):\\nThe propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights\\nand to absorb the powers of the other departments has been already more than\\nonce suggested; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the\\nboundaries of each has also been remarked; and the necessity of furnishing\\neach with constitutional arms for its own defense has been inferred and\\nproved.\\nIn further discussing the reasons for the conferring of authority\\nupon the President, Mr. Hamilton continues (page 547):\\nThe propriety of tho thing does not turn upon the supposition of special\\nwisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition that the legisla\u00c2\u00ac\\ntive will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it\\ninto a disposition to encroach upon the rights of the other members of the\\nGovernment; that the spirit of faction may sometimes prevent its delibera\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures\\nwhich its own mature reflection would condemn.\\nExamples of this kind are, as we all know, of frequent occur\u00c2\u00ac\\nrence. These expressions were used with reference to the veto\\npower, but demonstrate that the legislative department was not\\nregarded as constituting an errorless tribunal.\\nThe same view of the subject has been taken by constitutional\\nwriters since that time. Justice Miller, in his Lectures on Consti\u00c2\u00ac\\ntutional Law, page 94, mentions the fear which was entertained\\nwith reference to the powers of the executive, and in commenting\\nthereon he says:\\nThis belief, though natural enough at that time, was a very great mistake.\\nThe nearer we approach to individual responsibility in the executive, the\\nnearer will it come to perfection. It is my deliberate opinion that of all the\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "16\\nthree branches which have been discussed, the executive has been in time,\\nunder the construction given to the Federal Constitution and its practical\\nadministration, most shorn of the powers granted to it thereby. But\\nthe branch of the Government which has grown the most, and which a saga\u00c2\u00ac\\ncious man might, perhaps, have foreseen would so expand, is the legislative.\\nJustice Miller also says (Lectures, page 157):\\nThe experience of a century of the operations of the Government has\\nshown that while the growth of the country in territory, in population, in\\nwealth, and in power has added largely to the patronage of the Executive in\\nthe Avay of appointments to office and to the importance of those offices, and\\nwhile the frequent accession of successfril and popular military chiefs to the\\nPresidency, some of whom were men of arbitrary disposition, and well in\u00c2\u00ac\\nclined to the exercise of all the power which the Constitution gave them, and\\nwho have shown in every instance a disposition for a continuance in power\\nby seeking or accepting a reelection, there has never been the slightest dan\u00c2\u00ac\\nger to the liberties of the country, or of an overthrow of the existing institu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions, or of any material infraction of the general principles of constitutional\\ngovernment from this quarter. In fact, of all the three branches of the con\u00c2\u00ac\\nstitutional government of the United States, the executive has been the most\\ncrippled, confined, and limited in its practical use, during the period men\u00c2\u00ac\\ntioned, of the power really conferred on it.\\nSee also Story on the Constitution, section 1570.\\nThese comments, it is submitted, are sufficient to justify the\\nstatement that the powers delegated to the Executive by the or,\\nganic law are not, in the event of his neglect to exercise the same-\\nvested in any other department of the Government. It is true that\\nimpeachment can scarcely be called a remedy, but it is likewise\\ntrue that the power to impeach is a deterrent, and the responsi\u00c2\u00ac\\nbility of the President to the people and the authority vested in\\nCongress to impeach him constitute ample security against mal\u00c2\u00ac\\nadministration. To assume that it is necessary or that it would\\nbe proper to otherwise limit the authority of the Chief Magistrate\\nis to insinuate that the system under which we are operating is a\\nfailure, and that the people can not find within their midst a man\\nto whom the discharge of the obligations of the Chief Magistracy\\ncan be safely confided. I will hereafter discuss the relative fit\u00c2\u00ac\\nness of the Executive and Congress to deal with diplomatic ques\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions.\\nDuring the convention Mr. Morris remarked, in response to a\\nsuggestion by Mr. Madison, who favored the trial of the President\\non impeachment proceedings by the Supreme Court, that he\\nthought no other tribunal than the Senate could be trusted. The\\nSupreme Court were too few in number, and might be warped or\\ncorrupted. He was against a dependence of the Executive on the\\nLegislature, considering the legislative tyranny the great danger\\nto be apprehended; but there could be no danger that the Senate\\nwould say untruly, on their oaths, that the President was guilty\\nof crimes or facts, especially as in four years he can be turned out.\\nThose who are curious with reference to this interesting portion\\nof the discussion can find it in 5 Elliott s Debates, page 528.\\nIt is evident that these great men deduced from their impartial\\nstudy of the question the conclusion that it was necessary to guard\\nagainst legislative usurpation.\\nTHE RIGHT TO RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OR BELLIGERENCY OF A\\nFOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE EXECUTIVE.\\nI understand that it is generally conceded that the President\\nhas the power to recognize belligerency and independence, but it\\nis claimed that this power is not exclusive, and that it is subject\\nto the paramount authority of Congress. However, suggestions\\nhave been made to the effect that the Executive does not possess\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "17\\nthe power at all; that it is purely legislative. I will therefore first\\nconsider the subject in that aspect, and if I can show that the\\npower does exist in the Executive, its exclusive character must, I\\nthink, be admitted.\\nIt appears to me that if the President has the authority at all,\\nsuch authority must be exclusive. I can not conceive, as already\\nintimated, that there can be a concurrent delegation of the power\\nto recognize to both Congress and the Executive, and it seems to\\nme clearly untenable to assert that while the President may, if\\nCongress remains passive, recognize belligerency or independence,\\nnevertheless his action can be neutralized or reversed by act of\\nthe legislative department. But I will examine this branch of the\\nsubject as the argument progresses.\\nAmong Presidential duties is that which authorizes the reception\\nof ambassadors and other public ministers.\\nJudge Story, perhaps the ablest commentator upon the Constitu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion, treats this section as follows:\\nSec. 1565. The next power is to receive ambassadors and other public minis\u00c2\u00ac\\nters. This has been already incidentally touched. A similar power existed un\u00c2\u00ac\\nder the confederation; but it was confined to receiving \u00e2\u0080\u009cambassadors,\u00e2\u0080\u009d which\\nword, in a strict sense (as has been already stated), comprehends the highest\\ngrade only of ministers, and not those of an inferior character. The policy of\\nthe United States would ordinarily prefer the employment of the inferior\\ngrades; and therefore the description is properly enlarged, so as to include all\\nclasses of ministers. Why the receiving of consuls was not also expressly\\nmentioned, as the appointment of them is in the preceding clause, is not easily\\nto be accounted for, especially as the defect of the confederation on this head\\nwas fully understood. The power, however, may be fairly inferred from\\nother parts of the Constitution; and, indeed, seems a general incident to the\\nexecutive authority. It has constantly been exercised without objection; and\\nforeign consuls have never been allowed to discharge any functions of office\\nuntil they have received the exequatur of the President. Consuls, indeed, are\\nnot diplomatic functionaries or political representatives of a foreign nation,\\nbut are treated in the character of mere commercial agents.\\nSec. 1566. The power to receive ambassadors and ministers is always an\\nimportant and sometimes a very delicate function, since it constitutes the\\nonly accredited medium through which negotiations and friendly relations\\nare ordinarily carried on with foreign powers. A government may, in its\\ndiscretion, lawfully refuse to receive an ambassador or other minister with\u00c2\u00ac\\nout its affording any just cause of war. But it would generally be deemed\\nan unfriendly act, and might provoke hostilities unless accompanied by con\u00c2\u00ac\\nciliatory explanations. A refusal is sometimes made on the ground of the\\nbad character of the minister, or his former offensive conduct, or of the spe\u00c2\u00ac\\ncial subject of the embassy not being proper or convenient for discussion.\\nThis, however, is rarely done. But a much more delicate occasion is when a\\ncivil war breaks out in a nation, and two nations are formed, or two parties\\nin the same nation, each claiming the sovereignty of the whole, and the con\u00c2\u00ac\\ntest remains as yet undecided, flagrante bello. In such a case a neutral na\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion may very properly withhold its recognition of the supremacy of either\\nparty or of the existence of two independent nations, and on that account\\nrefuse to receive an ambassador from either. It is obvious that in such cases\\nthe simple acknowledgment of the minister of either party or nation might\\nbe deemed taking part against the other, and thus as affording a strong coun\u00c2\u00ac\\ntenance or opposition to rebellion and civil dismemberment. On this account,\\nnations placed in such a predicament have not hesitated sometimes to de\u00c2\u00ac\\nclare war against neutrals as interposing in the war, and have made them\\nthe victims of their vengeance when they have been anxious to assume a neu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntral position. The exercise of this prerogative of acknowledging new na\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions or ministers is therefore, under such circumstances, an executive\\nfunction of great delicacy, which requires the utmost caution and delibera\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion. If the Executive receives an ambassador or other minister as the repre\u00c2\u00ac\\nsentative of a new nation, or of a party in a civil war in an old nation, it is an\\nacknowledgment of the sovereign authority de facto of such new nation or\\nparty. If such recognition is made, it is conclusive upon the nation, unless,\\nindeed, it can be reversed by an act of Congress repudiating it. If, on the\\nother hand, such recognition has been refused by the Executive, it is said that\\nCongress may, notwithstanding, solemnly acknowledge the sovereignty of\\nthe nation or party. These, however, are propositions which have hitherto\\nremained as abstract statements under the Constitution, and therefore can\\n2613\u00e2\u0080\u00942", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "18\\nbe propounded, not as absolutely true, but as still open to discussion if they\\nshould ever arise in the course or our foreign diplomacy. The Constitution\\nhas expressly invested the Executive with power to receive ambassadors and\\nother ministers. It has not expressly invested Congress with the power\\neither to repudiate or acknowledge them. At all events, in the case of a\\nrevolution or dismemberment of a nation, the judiciary can not take notice\\nof any new government or sovereignty until it has been duly recognized by\\nsome other department of the Government to whom the power is constitu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntionally confided.\\nSec. 1567. That a power so extensive in its reach over our foreign relations\\ncould not be properly conferred on any other than the executive department\\nwill admit of little doubt. That it should be exclusively confided to that de\u00c2\u00ac\\npartment, without any participation of the Senate in the functions (that body\\nbeing conjointly intrusted with the treaty-making power), is not so obvious.\\nProbably the circumstance that in all foreign governments the power was\\nexclusively confided to the executive department, and the utter impractica\u00c2\u00ac\\nbility of keeping the Senate constantly in session, and the suddenness of the\\nemergencies which might require the action of the Government, conduced to\\nthe establishment of the authority in its present form.\\nPlainly indicating that it was the view of that distinguished\\njurist that the Constitution had vested this authority not tempo\u00c2\u00ac\\nrarily, not during a recess of Congress, but permanently and ex\u00c2\u00ac\\nclusively in the executive department. He continues:\\nIt is not, indeed, a power likely to be abused, though it is pregnant with\\nconsequences often involving the question of peace or war. And in our\\nown short experience the revolutions in France and the revolutions in South\\nAmerica have already placed us in situations to feel its critical character\\nand the necessity of having at the head of the Government an Executive of\\nsober judgment, enlightened views, and firm and exalted patriotism.\\nSec. 1568. As incidents to the power to receive ambassadors and foreign\\nministers, the President is understood to possess the power to refuse them,\\nand to dismiss those who, having been received, become obnoxious to censure,\\nor unfit to be allowed the privilege by their improper conduct, or by political\\nevents. While, however, they are permitted to remain as public function\u00c2\u00ac\\naries, they are entitled to all the immunities and rights which the law of na\\ntions has provided at once for their dignity, their independence, and their\\ninviolability.\\nIn a note to Judge Story\u00e2\u0080\u0099s work we find the following:\\nN ote 1.\u00e2\u0080\u0094It is surprising that The Federalist should have treated the power\\nof receiving ambassadors and other public ministers as an Executive function\\nof little intrinsic importance. Its language is, This, though it has been a\\nrich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It\\nis a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration\\nof the Government. And it was far more convenient that it should be ar\u00c2\u00ac\\nranged in this manner than that there should be a necessity of convening\\nthe Legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minis\u00c2\u00ac\\nter. thoiigh it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The\\nFederalist No. 69, page 421.\\nIt is perhaps fair, let me observe, to assume that the attack made\\nupon this provision did not arrest great attention. The avowed\\npurpose of The Federalist was to discuss only objections made by\\nthe opponents of the proposed plan, which seemed to be serious.\\nThe failure to regard this provision as of vital import was not as\u00c2\u00ac\\ntonishing because of the absence of circumstances which eventu\u00c2\u00ac\\nated in later years. That The Federalist was not always conclu\u00c2\u00ac\\nsive, appears by reference to No. 77, where it is expressly stated\\nthat the President possesses the power to remove officers only by\\nor with the advice and consent of the Senate\u00e2\u0080\u0094a misconception\\nlong indulged in. (See 5 Op. Atty. Gen. (Crittenden), 290, 291.)\\nJudge Story, in that portion of the commentaries to which I\\nhave alluded, says:\\non the other hand, such recognition has been refused by the Executive,\\nit is raid that Congress may, notwithstanding, solemnly acknowledge the\\nsovereignty of a nation or party.\\nIt will be noted that the learned commentator does not adopt\\nthis opinion, but the authority to which he refers is Rawle on the\\n\u00e2\u0080\u0098--613\\ni", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "19\\nConstitution, chapter 20, pages 195,19G. Mr. Rawle published his\\ncommentaries in 1825. Although his work was exceedingly valu\u00c2\u00ac\\nable, yet some of his conclusions were found to be untenable, and\\nthe book has practically passed out of print. It is not easy to dis\u00c2\u00ac\\ncover where Mr. Rawle found the authority for his statement,\\nand his contention is successfully combated by Judge Story, not\\nonly in the comments which I have read, but in a decision by that\\ngreat jurist to which I will in a moment allude. Judge Story\u00e2\u0080\u0099s\\nwork was published in 1833, and afterwards, and while lie was an\\nassociate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he\\nrendered the decision in Williams vs. The Suffolk Insurance Com\u00c2\u00ac\\npany (3 Sumner, 272 et seq.). He there said:\\nThe Government of Buenos Ayres insists that the Falkland Islands consti\u00c2\u00ac\\ntute a part of the dominions within its sovereignty, and, consequently, that\\nit has the sole jurisdiction to regulate and prohibit the seal fishery at those\\nislands, and to punish any violation of its laws by a confiscation of the vessels\\nand property engaged thei ein. On the other hand, the American Govern\u00c2\u00ac\\nment insists that the Falkland Islands do not constitute any part of the\\ndominions within the sovereignty of Buenos Ayres; and that the seal fishery\\nat those islands is a trade free and lawful to the citizens of the United States,\\nand beyond the competency of the Buenos Ayres Government to regulate,\\nprohibit, or punish. The controversy is still undisposed of by the two Gov\u00c2\u00ac\\nernments, each maintaining its own claims and pretensions, and neither ad\u00c2\u00ac\\nmitting the claims or pretensions of the other. In this state of the diplomacy\\nbetween the two countries, while the whole matter is in contestation between\\nthem, or, as we may say, flagrante lite, the question is whether it is compe\u00c2\u00ac\\ntent for this court to reexamine and decide, in its judicial capacity, upon the\\nclaims and pretensions of the two Governments, and thus to interpose its\\npositive umpirage to settle the matters in dispute, at least to the extent re\u00c2\u00ac\\nquired for the proper adjudication of the cases now before it.\\nIt will be noted the issue was clearly presented. The material,\\nthe vital, the relevant issue was whether the islands named be\u00c2\u00ac\\nlonged or did not belong within a certain jurisdiction, and therein\\nwas involved the other question as to whether a determination had!\\nbeen legally reached upon that subject. He continues:\\nMy judgment is that this court possesses no such authority, and that it is\\nbound up by the doctrines and claims insisted on by its own government, and\\nthat it must take them to be rightful until the contrary is established by\\nsome formal and authorized action of that government.\\nNow, let us see how the government alluded to manifested\\nits decision.\\nI wish to direct the attention of the Senate particularly to this\\njudicial announcement:\\nIt is very clear, that it belongs exclusively to the executive department of\\nour Government to recognize, from time to time, any new governments which\\n\u00e2\u0080\u009cmay arise in the political revolutions of the world; and until such new gov\u00c2\u00ac\\nernments are so recognized, they can not be admitted by our courts of justice\\nto have or to exercise the common rights and prerogatives of sovereignty.\u00e2\u0080\u009d\\nMr. President, here is a decision handed down in 1838, which\\nclearly announces the doctrine for which the present Secretary of\\nState, Mr. Olney, contends, and which has been lately condemned\\nas revolutionary. Here it is announced from the bench by one\\nof the ablest jurists who ever presided over a court, clearly and\\npositively, that the power to recognize is not only vested in the\\nExecutive, but that such an investiture is exclusive.\\nThe Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment\\nin Williams vs. The Suffolk Insurance Company (13 Peters, 420),\\nusing this language:\\nAnd can there be any doubt that when the executive branch of the Gov\u00c2\u00ac\\nernment, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall in its corre\u00c2\u00ac\\nspondence with a foreign nation assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of\\nany island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department? And m\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "20\\nthis view it is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the court to\\ndetermine, whether the Executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know\\nthat in the exercise of his constitutional functions he has decided the ques\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion. Having done this under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is\\nobligatory on the people and Government of the Union.\\nIf this were not the rule, cases might often arise in which, on the most\\nimportant questions of foreign Jurisdiction, there would be an irreconcilable\\ndifference between the executive and judicial departments. By one of these\\ndepartments a foreign island or country might be considered as at peace\\nwith the United States, whilst the other would consider it in a state of war.\\nNo well-regulated government has ever sanctioned a principle so unwise and\\nso destructive of national character.\\nAnd yet, Mr. President, we have heard it asserted again and\\nagain that this doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United\\nStates\u00e2\u0080\u0094the declared judgment of the highest judicial tribunal\\nknown to our law, promulgated many years ago\u00e2\u0080\u0094is unprece\u00c2\u00ac\\ndented. It has been even intimated that the Secretary of State\\nw T ho proclaimed it risked impeachment. Perhaps it may be a\\ncrime to declare the law. It is clear that the Supreme Court be\u00c2\u00ac\\nlieved that the President in recognizing independence on his\\nown responsibility did so \u00e2\u0080\u009cin the exercise of his constitutional\\nfunctions.\u00e2\u0080\u009d\\nI know that it was said by the distinguished Senator from Geor\u00c2\u00ac\\ngia [Mr. Bacon] that those portions of these decisions which\\nrelate to Executive jurisdiction are obiter dicta. It may be that it\\nwas unnecessary to decide whether or not the Executive authority\\nwas exclusive; but it is plain that the jurisdiction of the Execu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntive to effectively recognize independence was a material issue\\nabsolutely necessary to the decision of the case. These authori\u00c2\u00ac\\nties are conclusive of the existence of Executive control if\\nthe Supreme Court has any jurisdiction to settle such questions.\\nIf the Executive, without Congress, can not recognize, then the\\nbasis of the court\u00e2\u0080\u0099s decision drops out.\\nMy object in citing this case is to disclose the views entertained\\nby Judge Story and his associates. That jurist had considered\\nthe subject in his commentaries, as I have shown, and hence his\\nattention had been specially directed to the matter, and he had\\nalso in mind Mr. Rawle\u00e2\u0080\u0099s view already referred to, and upon\\nwhich he had commented, and, taking the expressions contained\\nin the commentaries and those found in the decision in 3 Sumner\\nabove mentioned, it is obvious that it was the carefully thought-\\nout opinion of J udge Story that the authority to recognize was\\nexclusively in the Executive.\\nI have had occasion to consider this topic to some extent when\\nresolutions advising a recognition of belligerency were before the\\nSenate, and I then referred to several adjudications, and I shall\\ntake the liberty of again citing some of them in brief.\\nIn 2 Black, 670, I find the following:\\nWhether the President, in fulfilling his duties as commander-in-chief in\\nsuppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance and\\na civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them\\nthe character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this court\\nmust be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the\\nGovernment, to which this power was intrusted. He must determine what\\ndegree of force the crisis demands.\\nIt is plain that it was the opinion of the Supreme Court that the\\nPresident was authorized and was the proper party to find the\\nfacts as to belligerency. It is true that the conflict involved was\\ndomestic, but the citation is nevertheless relevant. It will be\\nnoted that \u00e2\u0080\u009cpolitical department\u00e2\u0080\u009d is used as synonymous with\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "21\\nexecutive department. Judge Story evidently thought that the\\nword \u00e2\u0080\u009cgovernment\u00e2\u0080\u009d was used as equivalent to \u00e2\u0080\u009cexecutive de\u00c2\u00ac\\npartment inG-elston vs. Hoyt (3 Wheat., 324), because that case\\nis referred to by him in Williams vs. Suffolk Insurance Company\\nas upholding the jurisdiction in the President to proclaim bellig\u00c2\u00ac\\nerency.\\nIn Kennett vs. Chambers (14 How., 50,51), Chief Justice Taney\\nsaid:\\nIt is not necessary in the case before us to decide how far the judicial tri\u00c2\u00ac\\nbunals of the United States would enforce a contract like this, when two\\nStates, acknowledged to be independent, were at war and this country neu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntral. It is a sufficient answer to the argument to say that the question\\nwhether Texas had or had not at that time become an independent State\\nwas a question for that department of our Government exclusively which is\\ncharged with our foreign relations, and until the period when that depart\u00c2\u00ac\\nment recognized it as an independent State, the judicial tribunals of the\\ncountry were bound to consider the old order of things as having continued\\nand to regard Texas as a part of the Mexican territory.\\nIn alluding to the constitutional power, or rather to the power\\nof the President derived from the Constitution with reference to\\nour foreign relations, I beg leave to quote from Chancellor Kent.\\nSaid that very able man:\\nThe President is the constitutional organ of communication with foreign\\npowers.\\nIt was evidently the view of that able jurist that the Presidential\\nduty in this respect was not derived from any statute and did not\\ndepend upon the will of Congress.\\nAgain he says:\\nThe power of receiving foreign ministers includes in it the power to dismiss\\nthem, since he (the President) alone is the organ of communication with them,\\nthe representative of the people\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nNot the representative of Congress, but the representative of\\nthe people\\nin all diplomatic negotiations, and accountable to the community not only for\\nthe execution of the law, but for competent qualifications and conduct of\\nforeign agents.\\nIt is to be noted that according to this statement the President\\nis the representative of the people in all diplomatic negotiations,\\nand he is said to be accountable to the community. There is\\nno intimation that he is accountable to Congress in this regard.\\nHe derives the authority from a higher source, from the people.\\nHe rests upon the consent of the governed, as evidenced by the\\nConstitution.\\nDuring the recent Chilean difficulty it was held by the district\\ncourt of the United States for the southern district of California\\nas follows:\\nIt is beyond question that the status of the people composing the Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngressional party at the time of the commission of the alleged offense is to be\\nregarded by the court as it was then regarded by the political or executive\\ndepartment of the United States. This doctrine is firmly established. (U. S.\\nvs. Trumbull, 49 Fed., 99,104.)\\nAnd in the Itata case (56 Fed., 510) Judge Hawley, speaking for\\nthe circuit court of appeals, said:\\nThe law is well settled that it is the duty of the courts to regard the status\\nof the Congressional party in the same light as they were regarded by the\\nexecutive department of the United States at the time the alleged offenses\\nwere committed.\\nIt thus appears that whenever our courts have been called on to\\nsolve an issue which depends upon the existence or nonexistence\\nof a nation they have turned uniformly to the executive, and havo\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "22\\naccepted the determination of that department as conclusive and\\nbinding upon them. Can it be, Mr. President, that this jurisdic\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion thus affirmed by our judiciary and announced for years and\\nyears by all the departments of our G-overnment rests pro hac vice\\nonly in the Executive, and that his authority is of such flimsy\\ntenure that it is subject to Congress; that he is possessed of the\\npower to recognize onty when Congress does not see fit to with\u00c2\u00ac\\ndraw it from him? Is there any scheme in the organic law for an\\nappeal from Executive action in this matter? Either the power to\\nrecognize is vested in the Executive or it is not. If the right is\\nconceded, then, in the absence of any constitutional limitation, it\\nmust, I assert, be exclusive. That he does not derive it from any\\nact of Congress is obvious, for no one has pointed to an act of\\nCongress presuming or pretending to give him any such right.\\nI have said, Mr. President, in line, as I take it, with the au\u00c2\u00ac\\nthorities on which I have been commenting and to which I have\\nattempted to attract the attention of the Senate, that if it be\\nconceded that the Executive has the power to recognize inde\u00c2\u00ac\\npendence, then, unless there can be pointed out in the Consti\u00c2\u00ac\\ntution some limitation of that power, some appellate jurisdiction\\nin Congress, some restriction upon it, something justifying the\\nconclusion that in the absence of Presidential exercise of that\\nauthority it may be assumed by Congress, the conclusion inevi\u00c2\u00ac\\ntably follows that the Presidential prerogative is attached to that\\noffice only, and that the President either derives his authority\\nfrom the Constitution or he does not possess it at all. It further\\nappears evident that if the Executive may recognize independence,\\nthe debate is at an end as to the point now considered, and the\\nposition of the Secretary of State is justified.\\nMr. Wharton, whose abilities as a lawyer and as an author and\\nwhose researches into matters pertaining to international affairs\\nearned for him high reputation throughout the civilized ^w T orld,\\ncompiled a digest on the international law of the United States,\\npursuant to authority given by Congress and under the Congres\u00c2\u00ac\\nsional eye, and this work comes nearer constituting an accepted\\nAmerican text-book upon this subject than any other treatise. In\\ndiscussing this subject, he heads the section with reference to bel\u00c2\u00ac\\nligerency as follows: Such recognition (i. e.), belligerency deter\u00c2\u00ac\\nminable by Executive,\u00e2\u0080\u009d and he cites with apparent approval a\\nstatement of Secretary Seward in his letter to Mr. Dayton, wherein\\nit is said:\\nIt is, however, another and distinct question whether the United States\\nwould think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form adopted\\nby the House of Representatives. This is a practically and purely executive\\nquestion, and the decision of it constitutionally belongs not to the House of\\nRepresentatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the United\\nStates.\\nHe was discussing at that time a proceeding in the House of\\nRepresentatives touching the recognition of the alleged newly\\nformed Government of Mexico, pertaining to a protest made by the\\nHouse of Representatives, wherein they affirmed their hostility to\\nthe encroachments of monarchic powers within the confines of a\\nsister republic. Mr. Seward thus asserted jurisdiction\u00e2\u0080\u0094exclusive\\njurisdiction\u00e2\u0080\u0094in the Executive, and in so doing he followed the\\nline of precedents heretofore mentioned, and from which the State\\nDepartment has deduced a uniform rule of conduct, and has\\nregarded the claim of exclusive right in the Executive as based\\nupon the correct interpretation of the Constitution.\\n2d 13", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "23\\nWhile the Executive lias rarely, as in the case of President Jack-\\nson in the Texas matter, sought the advice of Congress as to such\\nissues, this advice has never been asked as signifying a doubt of\\nthe executive claim, or an assertion that the jurisdiction rested\\nelsewhere than in the Executive. The opinion of Congress has\\nbeen solicited merely in an advisory way. Congress often seeks\\nto advise without being requested so to do, and may, I presume,\\nwhen solicited, contribute the notions of its members. The value\\nof such advice is quite another thing. No legal force can be\\naffirmed of it.\\nA question touching this topic was passed on by Chief Justice\\nMarshall in United States vs. Hutchings (2 Wheeler Crim. Cases,\\n516). The opinion of that able jurist is thus given by the reporter:\\nThe court decided that the commissions shall go to the jury merely as\\npapers found on board the vessel; but on the main question the court was of\\nopinion that a nation became independent from its declaration of independ\u00c2\u00ac\\nence only as respects its own government and the various departments\\nthereof; that before it could be considered independent by the judiciary of\\nforeign nations it was necessary that its independence should be recognized\\nby the executive authority of those nations; that as our Executive had\\nnever recognized the independence of Buenos Ayres, it was not competent\\nto the court to pronounce its independence.\\nIt may be argued that here again the court\u00e2\u0080\u0099s conclusion is obiter\\ndictum, but it was material whether the country in question had\\nbeen acknowledged to be independent, and the judgment of the\\nChief Justice that that acknowledgment should be by the Execu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntive contains his opinion as to the character of recognition which\\nmust take place before the fact can be judicially assumed. The\\nconcurrence of opinion between Marshall, Story, and Taney, and\\nother able jurists quoted, ought certainly be sufficient to relieve\\nthe Secretary of State from the charge of advancing a new and\\nabsurd claim\u00e2\u0080\u0094an accusation, it may be noted, which has been\\nflippantly urged by some of the most widely circulated newspapers\\nin the country and by persons in official position who ought to\\nknow better. It sometimes happens that an unfriendly feeling\\ntoward an individual or an officer begets ill-advised comment.\\nIn The Ambrose Light (25 Fed., 443), Judge Brown says:\\nThe additional facts proved show, however, such a subsequent implied\\nrecognition by our Government of the insurgent forces as a government da\\nfacto in a state of war with Colombia and entitled to belligerent rights as\\nshould prevent the condemnation of the vessel as prize. A communication\\nfrom the Department of State to the Colombian minister, bearing date the\\nday of the seizure, seems to me to constitute such a recognition by necessary\\nimplication.\\nHere, therefore, the court not only conceded the right of the\\nPresident to recognize belligerency, but even held that such rec\u00c2\u00ac\\nognition was accomplished unintentionally by an executive com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmunication. The action of the Executive, so taken and not\\ndesigned to recognize belligerency, nevertheless fixed the legal\\nstatus of this vessel, and justified a judgment against the Gov\u00c2\u00ac\\nernment and relieved the vessel from condemnation as prize.\\nThe point determined was obviously material. I am aware\\nthat it has been said here, I believe without too much consid\u00c2\u00ac\\neration, that w T e are not bound by the decisions of the courts.\\nIn one sense this may be true. As far as voting is concerned,\\nwe are scarcely bound by anything. When our names are\\ncalled, we may vote as we please. But if we can not accept\\nthe construction placed upon the organic law for many, many\\nyears, for three or four generations, by our ablest judges, we are\\ncertainly inconsistent with the attitude which some of us assume\\n2813", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "24\\nin criticising the Supreme Court because it lias lately changed its\\nopinion as to certain propositions.\\nMr. Blaine, May 9,1881, in a letter to Minister Christiancy, said:\\nIf the Calderon Government is supported by the character and intelli\u00c2\u00ac\\ngence of Peru, and is really endeavoring to restore constitutional govern\u00c2\u00ac\\nment, with a view both to order within and negotiation with Chile for peace,\\nyou may recognize it as the existing provisional government and render what\\naid you can by advice and good offices to that end. Mr. Elmore has been re\u00c2\u00ac\\nceived by me as the confidential agent of such provisional government.\\nAs has already been remarked, it is well settled in diplomacy\\nthat the reception of a minister or agent vested with diplomatic\\nfunctions is a recognition of the existence of the government\\nwhich has sent the envoy here. Mr. Blaine did not consider it\\nnecessary to consult Congress upon this subject. He acted upon\\nthe theory that Congress had no authority in the premises.\\nPresident Arthur, in his third annual message (1883), in speak\u00c2\u00ac\\ning of the difficulties between Chile and Peru, and especially with\\nreference to the uncertain nature of the government of the last-\\nnamed country, said:\\nMeanwhile the provisional government of General Iglesias has applied for\\nrecognition to the principal powers of America aiid Europe. If the will of\\nthe Peruvian people would be manifested, I shall not hesitate to recognize\\nthe government approved by them.\\nIn the message thus sent by President Arthur to the Congress of\\nthe United States, and regarding which no unfavorable comment\\nhas ever been made here or elsewhere, he wrote, \u00e2\u0080\u009cI shall not hesitate\\nto recognize,\u00e2\u0080\u009d etc. President Arthur used the personal pronoun,\\nand seemed to have no doubt of his right to completely recognize\\nindependence when, in his official judgment, the occasion might\\narise.\\nCan there be such a thing as incomplete recognition of the inde\u00c2\u00ac\\npendence of a government resulting from the declaration of the\\nPresident seeking to directly recognize it? If the President of the\\nUnited States to-day receives a minister from the alleged Republic\\nof Cuba, would there be any doubt that that formal reception of\\nthe minister would be conclusive of the fact that the new govern\u00c2\u00ac\\nment had been recognized as an independent state?\\nWhen Dom Pedro relinquished his claim to the Brazilian throne,\\nPresident Harrison acted promptly, and in his message to Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngress (Foreign Relations 1890, page 4) he says:\\nToward the end of the past year the only independent monarchical govern\u00c2\u00ac\\nment on the Western Continent, that of Brazil, ceased to exist, and was suc\u00c2\u00ac\\nceeded by a republic. Diplomatic relations were at once established with the\\nnow government, but it was not completely recognized\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nMark the phrase\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nuntil an opportunity had been afforded to ascertain that it had popular ap\u00c2\u00ac\\nproval and support. When the course of events had yielded assurance of\\nthis fact, no time was lost in extending to the now government a full and cor\u00c2\u00ac\\ndial welcome into the family of American commonwealths.\\nMark the phrases \u00e2\u0080\u009ccompletelyrecognized,\u00e2\u0080\u009d \u00e2\u0080\u009cfull wel\u00c2\u00ac\\ncome into the family of American commonwealths.\u00e2\u0080\u009d Is a \u00e2\u0080\u009ccom\u00c2\u00ac\\nplete\u00e2\u0080\u009d or full recognition subject to Congressional reversal?\\nHere, therefore, is another Presidential communication to Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngress, directly stating that the Executive not only recognized the\\nBrazilian Government, but that he has left nothing to be done to\\ncomplete the acknowledgement. Ho one has challenged the effi\u00c2\u00ac\\ncacy of that recognition, and I again ask, Will anyone say that\\nCongress might have risen in its constitutional might and, by the", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "25\\npassage of a resolution, made void tliat which the President made\\ncomplete?\\nOn December 9, 1891, President Harrison, in a message to Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngress, stated that which I shall read. These communications were\\nnot confidential; they were notoriously made. The country knew\\nall about them. They were printed as Congressional documents,\\nand placed upon the desks of Senators and Representatives, and\\nconstitute a portion of the history of this Union. President Har\u00c2\u00ac\\nrison said:\\nThe civil war in Chile, which began in January last, was continued, but\\nfortunately with infrequent and not important armed collisions, until August\\n28, when the Congressional forces landed near Valparaiso and, after a bloody\\nengagement, captured that city. President Balmaceda at once recognized\\nthat his cause was lost, and a provisional government was speedily estab\u00c2\u00ac\\nlished by the victorious party. Our minister was promptly directed to rec\u00c2\u00ac\\nognize and put himself in communication with this government so soon as it\\nshould have established its de facto character, which was done.\\nHence the President, without consulting Congress, without ask\u00c2\u00ac\\ning for the approval of Congress, without seeking the ratification\\nof liis act, without submitting to any further scrutiny than every\\ncommunication upon the state of the Union must have in this and\\nthe other body, sent instructions to Chile, to the American minis\u00c2\u00ac\\nter, directing him, in virtue of the Executive authority, to recog\u00c2\u00ac\\nnize the changed condition.\\nHe also recognized the new Government of the Hawaiian Islands\\nunder circumstances which were, to say the least, novel. His\\nability to do this was never doubted, though the wisdom of its\\nexercise was questioned.\\nThe references which I have thus made evince the uniform\\nand unchallenged assertion of Executive jurisdiction, and what\u00c2\u00ac\\never may be the true construction of the Constitution, the power\\nasserted was complete, absolute, and effective. No action of Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngress was needed to ratify or approve. If there is any Congres\u00c2\u00ac\\nsional power to repudiate such recognition, it can be found nowhere\\nin the Constitution, but is based upon the notion that Congress\\nhas powers not granted, and has the right to draw to itself all func\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions not accorded to or exercised by the other Departments, a con\u00c2\u00ac\\ntention absolutely in conflict with that organic provision which\\nreserves to the people the powers not granted.\\nThe exclusive right of the Executive has been maintained in\\nalmost every instance, the exceptions being where the Executive\\nthought it well to consult Congress, as did President Jackson in\\nthe Texas case. But even there he did not relinquish or doubt\\nhis authority.\\nMr. President, we are apt to confuse the true interpretation of\\nour duty with the result toward which our inclinations point.\\nWhen we seek to reach a desirable end, or when we find an inde\u00c2\u00ac\\npendent officer exercising his authority in a manner differing from\\nour ideas of propriety, we are too apt to seek to extend the limits of\\nour domain and to interfere with subjects intrusted by law to\\nother hands. Hence it is that legislators differing from the Execu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntive endeavor to defend their criticisms by assuming unwarranted\\njurisdiction.\\nThe exclusive right of the Executive has been maintained, as I\\nhave said, in almost every instance. President Jackson did not\\nrecognize the jurisdiction of Congress to do anything more than\\nto advise. He was willing to act upon such advice, not because it\\nwas necessary for him to do so, but because in the discharge of\\n2513", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "26\\nliis Executive power he thought it better to clo so. Nor is there\\nanything in the resolution which was passed by Congress at that\\ntime assuming any greater authority or power than the giving of\\nadvice. There are expressions to be found, notably in remarks\\nby Mr. Clay, not altogether consistent, I may say, upon this sub\u00c2\u00ac\\nject. indicating to some extent that he believed Congress had au\u00c2\u00ac\\nthority in the premises. We have had such claims of power here,\\nbut we have no case where Congress has ousted Executive juris\u00c2\u00ac\\ndiction. or where the proclamation of the Executive upon this\\nsubject has ever been repudiated. It seems tome a most peculiar\\nview to assert that there is jurisdiction here not only to upset that\\nwhich has been done, but to perform acts which it is thought\\nought to have been performed, but which the Executive has de\u00c2\u00ac\\nclined to do, and which the Constitution provides, if done at all,\\nshall be done by the President.\\nIn the memorandum upon the power to recognize the independ\u00c2\u00ac\\nence of a new foreign state (Senate Document No. 5G, Fifty-fourth\\nCongress, second session) a large number of authorities are collated\\nwhich it is unnecessary to review here. The references to the\\ndebates concerning the South American revolutions are quite\\ninteresting as demonstrating that at that very early date it was\\ngenerally conceded that the jurisdiction was with the Executive.\\nVolume 4, page 71, Memoirs, John Quincy Adams, we find that\\nthat statesman lias made the following entry with reference to a\\nconversation with Mr. Monroe:\\nThe President told me that last evening a member of the Senate came to\\nhim and asked him if at the Cabinet meetings before the commencement of\\nthe session of Congress the determination was taken not to acknowledge the\\nGovernment of Buenos Ayres, professedly to the end that Congress might\\ntake the lead in this measure. And this was now inquired obviously with a\\nview to justify the present conduct of Mr. Clay. The President answered\\nthat at that time the questions were proposed whether the Executive was\\ncompetent to acknowledge the independence of Buenos Ayres, and, if so,\\nwhether it was expedient; that it had been concluded the Executive was\\ncompetent; but that it was not expedient to take the step without the cer\u00c2\u00ac\\ntainty of being supported in it by the public opinion, which, if decidedly favor\u00c2\u00ac\\nable to the measure, would be manifested by measures of Congress. Mr. Mon\u00c2\u00ac\\nroe added, if Mr. Clay had taken the ground that the Executive had gone as\\nfar as he could go with propriety toward the acknowledgment of the South\\nAmericans, that he was well disposed to go further, if such were the feeling\\nof the nation and of Congress, and had made his motion with that view, to\\nascertain the real sentiments of Congress, it might have been in perfect har\u00c2\u00ac\\nmony with the Executive. But between that and the angry, acrimonious\\ncourse pursued by Mr. Clay there was a wide difference.\\nThis plainly shows that Mr. Monroe himself believed that the\\npower to recognize is in the President, but he was not averse to\\nconsulting those whose right to nullify his acts he denied. But\\nhe made no intimation that there was any question as to the ex\u00c2\u00ac\\nclusiveness of Presidential jurisdiction.\\nHe spoke also, as shown by these quoted remarks, of public\\nopinion. He was naturally anxious to discover the sentiments of\\nthe people, though he did not design sacrificing his constitutional\\npower or abdicating any of his constitutional privileges, whatever\\nmight be the opinion either of Congress or of the peox le. He rec\u00c2\u00ac\\nognized unquestionably that as the servant of the people it was\\nhis duty to maintain the laws which had been provided for his\\nguidance, and which lie must follow until the people in their sov\u00c2\u00ac\\nereign cajiacity established a different system.\\nOn page 204 of the same memoirs we find the following:\\nMy draft of a dispatch to B. Bush was read. They were all startled at the\\nparagraph announcing it as the President\u00e2\u0080\u0099s intention at no remote period to\\nrecognize the Government of Buenos Ayres.\\n2313", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "27\\nThe whole conversation, everything that was said\u00e2\u0080\u0094and the re\u00c2\u00ac\\nmarks are set forth at some length in his memoirs\u00e2\u0080\u0094goes to show\\nthat the people, that the Congress, all interested, were anticipating\\nthe decision of the Executive upon the matter then pending. That\\nMr. Monroe asserted the jurisdiction in himself, and that he in\u00c2\u00ac\\ntended to see that it remained where the Constitution had placed\\nit, no one can deny.\\nThe following significant expressions appear in the same diary,\\non page 205:\\nMr. Crawford now said that if the acknowledgment was to take place, he\\nshoxild prefer making it in another form, not by granting an exequatur\u00e2\u0080\u009d to\\na consul, but by sending a minister there; because the Senate must then act\\nupon the nomination, which would give their sanction to the measure. Mr.\\nWirt added that the House of Representatives must also concur by assenting\\nto an act of appropriation. And the President, laughing, said that as those\\nbodies had the power of impeachment over us, it would be quite convenient\\nto have them thus pledged beforehand.\\nI said my impressions were altogether different. I would make the ac\u00c2\u00ac\\nknowledgment as simple and unostentatious as possible, with as little change\\nin the actual state of things as could be. I thought it not consistent with our\\nnational dignity to be the first in sending a minister to a new power. It had\\nnot been done by any European power to ourselves. If an exchange of min\u00c2\u00ac\\nisters was to take place, the first should come from them. As to impeach\u00c2\u00ac\\nment, I was willing to take my share of risk of it for this measure whenever\\nthe Executive should deem it proper. And instead of admitting the Senate\\nor House of Representatives to any share in the act of recognition, I would\\nexpressly avoid that form of doing it which would require the concurrence\\nof those bodies. It was, I had no doubt, by our Constitution an act of the\\nExecutive authority. General Washington had exercised it in recognizing\\nthe French Republic by the reception of Mr. Genet. Mr. Madison had exer\u00c2\u00ac\\ncised it by declining for several years to receive, and by finally receiving, Mr.\\nOnis; and in this instance I thought the Executive ought carefully to pre\u00c2\u00ac\\nserve entire the authority given him by the Constitution, and not weaken it\\nby setting the precedent of making either House of Congress a party to an\\nact which it was his exclusive right and duty to perform.\\nCrawford said ho did not think there was anything in the objection to\\nsending a minister on the score of national dignity, and that there was a dif\u00c2\u00ac\\nference between the recognition of a change of government in a nation al\u00c2\u00ac\\nready acknowledged as sovereign and the recognition of a new nation itself.\\nHe did not however deny, but admitted, that the recognition was strictly\\nwithin the powers of the Executive alone, and I did not press the discussion\\nfurther.\\nTherefore not only did the Secretary of State in that discussion,\\nand not only did other members of the Cabinet concede and hold\\nthe existence of this exclusive power in the President, but the\\nPresident himself, while believing it to be wise to obtain the ap\u00c2\u00ac\\nproval of Congress, so believed only because of the Congressional\\npower to appropriate and for the reason that he wished that mat\u00c2\u00ac\\nters should proceed without friction. No intimation is contained\\nat any place in this discussion or in the detailed report of what\\noccurred at that time to warrant any doubt that Mr. Monroe him\u00c2\u00ac\\nself held the same views now entertained by Mr. Cleveland and\\nMr. Olney.\\nMr. HOAR. Will the Senator from California allow me?\\nMr. WHITE. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.\\nMr. HOAR. I should like to ask the Senator from California\\nif he does not agree that a declaration of war against a foreign\\ndistrict or country is a recognition of it as a sovereign power?\\nMr. WHITE. Such a declaration is undoubtedly an assumption\\nof the existence of a power against which war could be declared.\\nThis i3 certainly true.\\nMr. HOAR. Suppose, for instance, Cuba had practically main\u00c2\u00ac\\ntained her independence of Spain, Spain being utterly unable to\\nhelp herself, and Cuba had committed hostile acts upon our corn-\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "28\\nmerce, is not the power in Congress to declare war with Cuba, as\\nthe power is in Congress to regulate commerce with Cuba, under\\nsuch circumstances, with all the incidents that follow?\\nMr. WHITE. Congress may declare war against a nation or it\\ncan regulate commerce with a nation. An act of Congress declar\u00c2\u00ac\\ning war does not by its terms create independence or declare that\\nstatus. The declaration assumes the status, however.\\nMr. HOAR. So we could not have a treaty of peace?\\nMr. WHITE. Well, we could have a treaty; I concede that.\\nA treaty is initiated by the Executive, and the Senate advises and\\nconsents.\\nMr. HOAR. The Senator will pardon me a moment. I do not\\nwant to interfere with his argument. I put this question in sup\u00c2\u00ac\\nport of the conclusion to which I had myself arrived, which is, I\\nthink, the one which was in the thought of President Jackson,\\nand perhaps would reconcile every expression which is to be\\nfound in our history.\\nIt is very clear that this is an incident, however great or im\u00c2\u00ac\\nportant it is. The power in the Executive is clearly incident to\\nthe power not merely to send ambassadors, but to invite the send\u00c2\u00ac\\ning of ambassadors from abroad, as the Senator has so well shown,\\nand I agree with the Senator that it is a power which necessarily\\nmust continue all the year round, and may be exercised on an\\nhour\u00e2\u0080\u0099s notice sometimes, and it can not be exercised by Congress\\nfor that reason. But it seems to me, with great respect, that while\\nit is incident to the treaty-making power of which the President\\nis a part, as the Senator said, it is also an incident of certain con\u00c2\u00ac\\nstitutional powers of Congress. Yet these powers never will be\\nbrought into conflict, although they may reside to a limited ex\u00c2\u00ac\\ntent in both. But the question we are dealing with is not whether\\nCongress may have it as incident to the power to regulate com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmerce. not whether Congress may have it as incident to the power\\nto declare war, not whether Congress may have it as incident to\\nits power of legislation over the conduct of American citizens, not\\nas an incident or consequence; our question now is, Does it rest\\nin Congress primarily and originally before any of these other con\u00c2\u00ac\\nstitutional things are done?\\nNow, I agree with the Senator that the very necessity of the\\ncase makes it an executive power, and an executive power alone,\\nwhere nothing is to be done but recognition. So this is a very\\ngrave matter that we should not concede unless the Constitution\\nrequires it, that the power of recognizing a foreign country may\\nsometimes be a necessary incident to some constitutional legisla\u00c2\u00ac\\ntive power of Congress; and I hope that nothing will occur in\\nthis discussion on either side which will amount to a limitation\\nor abridgment of that power. The Senator will pardon me for\\nthe interruption.\\nMr. WHITE. It is true that the question to which I am imme\u00c2\u00ac\\ndiately addressing myself is the attempt absolutely and directly\\nby a joint resolution to recognize the independence of another\\ngovernment.\\nMr. HOAR. As incident to nothing?\\nMr. WHITE. Yes, sir; predicated upon nothing incidentally.\\nThe resolution directly deals with the subject. It is confined to\\nthat specific topic alone. I am not here to enter into a discussion\\nas to the effect of indirect legislation which Congress may per\u00c2\u00ac\\nhaps at some time see fit to enact in conflict with Executive view.\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "29\\nIt is always dangerous to seek the discussion of irrelevant sub\u00c2\u00ac\\njects, or to attempt the adoption of rules to govern cases not yet\\npresented.\\nAs far as a declaration of war or a treaty of commerce are con\u00c2\u00ac\\ncerned, both presuppose the existence of nationality upon which\\nthe declaration or legislation may be operative, but whether in\\nthe exercise of our constitutional power of passing a bill regulat\u00c2\u00ac\\ning commerce., concurred in by the Executive, a peculiar collateral\\nconsequence may result, I do not propose at this hour to elabo\u00c2\u00ac\\nrately consider. Such a course would be foreign to the purpose I\\nhave at hand. I am endeavoring to show that, as far as the at\u00c2\u00ac\\ntempt to directly recognize a revolutionary organization goes, it\\nis not within our sphere. Whether indirect action of Congress\\nmight result in the assumption of another national existence, it is\\nnot certain that such assumption could absolutely create a nation.\\nBut this is speculative. I do not believe that any such conflict of\\nauthority or peculiar combination of circumstances will ever be\\nmanifested. I could add that we might readily hold commercial\\nrelations with communities not constituting a nation. This Gov\u00c2\u00ac\\nernment has continued moving in the present channel for many\\nyears without, I think, any substantial deviation in practice from\\nthe course to which I have alluded.\\nI do not feel prepared to change our procedure now. The cita\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions which I made from Mr. Adams\u00e2\u0080\u0099s account of Mr. Monroe\u00e2\u0080\u0099s\\nstatement are interesting, and are certainly sufficient to acquit\\nthe Executive or the Secretary of State from the charge of assert\u00c2\u00ac\\ning anything new. The specific proposition contended for by the\\npresent Administration is that in the case of Cuba Congress has\\nnot the power directly to declare independence, or even belliger\u00c2\u00ac\\nency. I have stated that I believe that contention to be well\\nfounded, and I have sought to fortify my opinion by referring to\\nprecedent and to principle.\\nMr. President, it is clear that the Constitution does not make\\nit the duty of Congress, nor does it give to either House, the au\u00c2\u00ac\\nthority to receive ambassadors or ministers. This function is\\nconferred upon the President only. It has been suggested that\\nthis delegation of authority amounts to nothing more than the\\nenjoining of a duty to extend proper courtesies to diplomatic offi\u00c2\u00ac\\ncers coming from abroad. With due respect, it appears to me\\nthat this argument has nothing in reason to sustain it. Can we\\nafford to urge that as important an instrument as the Constitu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion, upon which our governmental framework absolutely rests,\\nis devoted to any extent or at all to a mere matter of etiquette?\\nThe duty which the President must perform under the organic\\nlaw with relation to ambassadors and ministers is not merely to\\ngrasp their hands or to otherwise salute them in the most approved\\nmethod of the day; nor is it exhausted or even exercised by giving\\ninvitations to receptions or dinners. It means more than this.\\nAs the Executive is granted the power to receive, so he is accorded\\nthe right to determine to whom such reception should be vouch\u00c2\u00ac\\nsafed. He receives officially if he believes that the party present\u00c2\u00ac\\ning himself is not only individually the sort of a man who ought\\nto be received, but he also is bound to determine whether he in\\nfact represents a foreign power.\\nNecessarily this authority to determine is involved in the dis\u00c2\u00ac\\ncharge of the duty to receive. When a person offering himself at\\nthe Executive Mansion claims that he is entitled to be received as\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "30\\na minister, the President, from the very nature of the case, ia\\ncompelled to decide whether liis pretensions are well founded,\\nand in doing this he is hound to find on the issue as to whether\\nthe applicant represents a foreign power. Thus the alleged min\u00c2\u00ac\\nister of the Cuban Republic seeks to meet the Executive; Mr.\\nCleveland refuses to receive him, because he declares that the\\nminister does not represent a foreign power. Congress can not\\ndictate to the President as to who he shall receive, for the simple\\nreason that the duty to receive being constitutionally delegated\\nto him, he must determine for himself whether a case has arisen\\ncalling for the exercise of that power. It is the duty of Congress\\nto pass laws to govern the country, but it is within its sole discre\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion to enact or not to enact. If we refuse to appropriate a dollar\\nfor public purposes we might be and would be derelict, but no\\ncourt could mandamus us, because Congress judges for itself as\\nto whether a case has arisen calling for the exercise of its func\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions.\\nThe President may act badly; indeed, his conduct may justify\\nimpeachment. So Congress may behave in an outrageous man\u00c2\u00ac\\nner, and the people may be without any further remedy than that\\nwhich is expressed at the polls. No scheme of government ever\\ndevised can insure ability and honesty upon the part of those in\u00c2\u00ac\\ntrusted with power, and there is no individual or officer to whom\\nauthority has been delegated w T ho may not violate his obligations\\nand work evil. But the accomplishment of such regrettable results\\nis no argument against jurisdiction. It must be remembered that\\nthe existence of jurisdiction may well mean the power to do not\\nonly that which is right, but also that which is wrong.\\nWhere is there a word in the organic law indicating preference\\nfor Congressional jurisdiction? The legislative limitations therein\\nprescribed were suggested by ages of experience. Danger lurks\\nin excited multitudes and appears in the consequences of uprisings\\nand insurrections as well as in the remorseless mandates of kingly\\npower. The fathers sought to guard against extremes. The dele\u00c2\u00ac\\ngation of authority to the Executive was designed to confer exclu\u00c2\u00ac\\nsive jurisdiction to the extent indicated. Concurrent jurisdiction\\nin such a matter as this would be confusing and lead to perilous\\ndisputation. The power thus accorded is not and never will be\\nsubject to appeal. Congress must pass a bill over the Presidential\\nveto, because the Constitution so declares; but Congress can not,\\nby bill, modify or abrogate the Executive authority with reference\\nto foreign relations, and especially with regard to receiving am\u00c2\u00ac\\nbassadors and ministers. So also of the legislative and executive\\njurisdictions. Were it otherwise, the whole scheme would be a\\nfailure. If the legislative department is preferred, this means\\nthat the executive and judicial departments exist only in subordi\u00c2\u00ac\\nnation to Congress, whose edicts are in fact supreme. This posi\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion is not only violative of the words of the Constitution, but in\\nconflict with the often expressed intentions of the fathers. It has\\nno support in our history. It is revolutionary, and destructive of\\nthat independence without which the Presidential office can never\\nbe properly exercised.\\nSOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONTRARY POSITION.\\nIt is intimated that the President has the power to recognize,\\nbut it is said that this is only a conditional grant. It is limited in\\nsome mode. It exists now, and it may not exist to-morrow. This\\n2G13", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "31\\nposition I repudiate, for I find no direct grant to Congress justify\u00c2\u00ac\\ning such a conclusion; nor does it appear to me that such author\u00c2\u00ac\\nity is granted anywhere by implication, or is the necessary attend\u00c2\u00ac\\nant of any authority specifically delegated. If the President\\nrecognizes the belligerency or independence of the Cuban Republic,\\ncan Congress repudiate such recognition? I take it that this is\\nnot possible. If the Presidential recognition of belligerency is\\nvalid in any case, in what case is it invalid? And. if the President\\nhas authority to absolutely recognize independence in any case, is\\nnot that authority the result of discretion conferred upon him by\\nthe Constitution? And such discretion involves the ability to re\u00c2\u00ac\\nfuse as well as to grant, and if it is not competent for Congress to\\nnullify Presidential recognition of belligerency or independence,\\ncan Congress render nugatory the decision of the President deny\u00c2\u00ac\\ning such recognition? I think that I have already shown that the\\nframers of the Constitution were not engaged in the business of\\nguarding Congress against the President, but that they felt the\\nnecessity of so organizing the Houses that they could not subor\u00c2\u00ac\\ndinate Presidential jurisdiction within allotted lines save in one\\nmode, to wit, impeachment.\\nThe plenary authority exercised by the President in foreign\\naffairs is exemplified to some extent not only in receiving minis\u00c2\u00ac\\nters, but even in providing for the exercise by foreign consuls\\nof authority within the United States.\\nWhen the British consul at Charleston, at the beginning of the\\nlate civil war, acted in a manner contrary to the wishes of Mr.\\nLincoln and his Cabinet, the exequatur was revoked and Mr.\\nBunch s powers terminated. No consultation was had with Con\u00c2\u00ac\\ngress upon this subject. It is discretionary with the President\\nto refuse an exequatur, although, as Mr. Blaine declared in his\\nletter to Mr. Morgan, May 31,1881 (1 Whar. Int. Law, page 765),\\nthe exercise of that undoubted right is an extreme one, rarely\\nresorted to here.\\nInstances of the dismissal of ministers are numerous. We re\u00c2\u00ac\\nmember very clearly the action of Mr. Cleveland in demanding\\nthe recall of Minister West, owing to his correspondence with an\\nalleged British subject called, for the time being, Murchison. No\\npower was conferred by Congress upon the President, but he,\\nhaving the right to control the matter, exercised his prerogative\\nat his discretion.\\nIn Schuyler\u00e2\u0080\u0099s American Diplomacy, page 136,1 find the following:\\nIt may be mentioned here that our Government has never been slow to use\\nits right in asking for the recall of, or of sending away, a foreign minister who\\nbecomes obnoxious. The recall of Mr. Genet, the French minister, was asked\\nin 1793; that of Mr. Jackson, the British minister, in 1809; that of Mr. Poussin,\\nthe French minister, in 1849; Mr. Crampton, the British minister, was given\\nhis passports in 1856; and intercourse ceased with Mr. Catacazy, the Russian\\nminister, in 1871.\\nIn all those cases the act was the act of the Executive; it was\\nthe result of Executive discretion; there was no participancy by\\nthe legislative department, and none claimed.\\nIf Congress possesses the pow T er to settle the question of bel\u00c2\u00ac\\nligerency or independence, it is clear that all sources of material\\ninformation ought to be open to investigation and examination.\\nI beg leave to refer to remarks made by me on a former occa\u00c2\u00ac\\nsion touching this question:\\nThere is another ground which appears to me very strong in support of\\nthe contention that the recognition power is lodged in the Executive. Thera\\n2313", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "32\\nis before the Senate a document which was read by the Senator from Ala\u00c2\u00ac\\nbama, and which I deem quite important. I refer to House Document 224 of\\nthe present session. I read a few lines for purposes of illustration:\\n\u00e2\u0080\u009cNo. 2699.] Consulate-General or the United States,\\nHabana January 7, 1896.\\nSir: With reference to the proclamation of the Captain-General of the\\n2d instant declaring a state of war to exist in the provinces of Habana and\\nPinar del Rio, copy and translation of which accompanied my dispatch No.\\n2695 of the 4th instant\\nAt this point I find a note stating that the proclamation mentioned is not\\nprinted. From this I conclude that the omitted paper has not been revealed\\nto Congress. No one appears to controvert this supposition. When the\\nHouse adopted the resolution calling for this correspondence it did so in the\\nfollowing phraseology:\\nResolved That the Secretary of State be directed to communicate to the\\nHouse of Representatives, if not inconsistent with the public interests, copies\\nof all correspondence relating to affairs in Cuba since February last.\u00e2\u0080\u009d\\nThe House passed the usual resolution in the regular form which custom\\nauthorizes. Manifestly information has been withheld\u00e2\u0080\u0094no doubt properly.\\nTime out of mind, if I may use that expression with reference to this verjr\\nmodern Government, it has been the custom to withhold information, the\\ndisclosure of which the Executive deems incompatible with public interest.\\nThe document thus legitimately withheld may contain essential and con\u00c2\u00ac\\ntrolling facts upon this subject. That it is important would seem to follow\\nto some extent from the very circumstance that it is retained. Has the\\nExecutive the right to thus deny information? Our Chief Magistrates have\\nalways done so, pursuant to unchallenged custom and in compliance with\\nrecognized usage, evidenced by many hundred resolutions calling upon the\\nExecutive for diplomatic information. The President is not directed; he is\\nmerely requested, and always with the qualification which I have noted.\\nThe Executive right to withhold delicate diplomatic correspondence is inci\u00c2\u00ac\\ndental to the Presidential office. Can it be that the Constitution has placed\\nupon Congress the burden of deciding and the duty to determine issues con\u00c2\u00ac\\ncerning belligerent or other relations to foreign powers and has not at the\\nsame time compelled the President to give us everything within his knowl\u00c2\u00ac\\nedge? Can it be that we are to pass upon a part of the case and not upon\\nthe whole? Can it be that under the law we are deprived of material evi\u00c2\u00ac\\ndence and yet are expected to render final and determinative judgment upon\\nan imperfect record\u00e2\u0080\u0094a fraction of the aggregate proof? I say not. The\\nPresident has before him all information. Ho reviews a complete history.\\nPlainly, he is in a better condition to judge of the true state of affairs than\\nare we. He has the means to secure ail relevant information.\\nHaving in charge the diplomatic relations of the Government, he is, or\\nshould be, better advised than the Senate or the House of Representatives,\\nor both.\\nIt was early settled that the Executive could not he compelled\\nto surrender up to both Houses of Congress information which\\nthat officer deemed to be of such a character as to render it inad\u00c2\u00ac\\nvisable to make a disclosure.\\nWhen President Washington sent in the proposed treaty with\\nGreat Britain, a question arose as to whether the President had\\nany right to negotiate a treaty of commerce (2 Marshall\u00e2\u0080\u0099s Wash\u00c2\u00ac\\nington, page 377). Mr. Livingstone offered a resolution in the\\nHouse requesting the President to furnish a copy of the instruc\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions to the minister of the United States who negotiated the treaty\\nwith Great Britain. Mr. Madison proposed to amend so as to\\nexcept such papers as, in the judgment of the President, it might\\nbe inconsistent with the interests of the United States at this time\\nto disclose (id., page 378). This proposition was rejected, and the\\nresolution offered by Mr. Livingstone was passed by a vote of 62\\nto 37. Afterwards the President communicated to the House his\\nrefusal, and in concluding it he said:\\nAs it is essential to the due administration of the Government that the\\nboundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments\\nshould be preserved, a just regard to the Constitution and to the duty of my\\noffice under all the circumstances of this case forbid a compliance with your\\nrecmest. (Id., 381.)\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "33\\nI can not find that the power of the President to retain infor\u00c2\u00ac\\nmation the disclosure of which he deems incompatible with the\\npublic interest lias ever been doubted, and the uniform practice\\nof Congress admits this power. We do not direct the President\\nnor do we seek to compel him to make disclosures against his own\\njudgment. On the contrary, the Presidential discretion is in\\nterms conceded in every resolution seeking information from the\\nState Department which Congress sees fit to pass.\\nThe question of the recognition of belligerency or independence\\nshould be determined upon a full view of the entire situation.\\nEvery fact bearing upon it ought to be before that department\\ncharged with the responsibility of acting. It is manifest that the\\nmost important documents, the most direct and convincing cir\u00c2\u00ac\\ncumstances, may be contained in official communications contain\u00c2\u00ac\\ning matter which ought not to be made public. Indeed, it is safe\\nto say that the most important information is doubtless encoun\u00c2\u00ac\\ntered in such documents. The very gravity of the disclosures\\ntherein contained makes it inadvisable to surrender them. So\\nthat we who claim the right to pass upon this issue must concede\\nthat all avenues of information are not open to us\u00e2\u0080\u0094many are open\\nto us, no doubt, but all are not open to us\u00e2\u0080\u0094and that the most\\nmaterial part of the case is withheld in harmony with the Consti\u00c2\u00ac\\ntution, which, it is claimed, gives us the power to overrule the\\nExecutive, notwithstanding his superior facilities for knowing the\\nfacts, and his power to withhold information officially received\\nby him, and which appears to him (perhaps correctly) properly\\ndeterminative of the entire matter. If it be true that the Consti\u00c2\u00ac\\ntution has made it our duty to pass upon the diplomatic questions\\ninvolved and has given to the President means of obtaining infor\u00c2\u00ac\\nmation not granted to any other department, and has likewise left\\nthe disclosure of such knowledge wholly discretionary with him,\\nthe system is radically defective. It is not likely that the Presi\u00c2\u00ac\\ndent requires more data than the Senate or the Congress, and to\\nrequire us to act without all the evidence is to compel a judgment\\nin the absence of the most material evidence.\\nI have already referred to the opinion of Mr. Monroe on this\\nsubject regarding Executive power. I wish to attract attention to\\nthe circumstance that Mr. Monroe deemed it advisable to send\\ncommissioners to the South American states for the purpose of\\nenabling him to determine whether he should recognize the inde\u00c2\u00ac\\npendence of the new governments. These commissioners he, as\\nChief Executive, sent to the South American republics that he\\nmight obtain information to justify him in reaching a conclusion\\nas to whether he ought to accord a declaration of independence or\\nnot. In many instances subsequent Administrations found it de\u00c2\u00ac\\nsirable to send emissaries abroad for the purpose of determining\\nsimilar issues without consulting Congress.\\nAgents or messengers have been sent not as diplomats or min\u00c2\u00ac\\nisters, and therefore without consultation with the Senate, the\\nbranch of Congress solely authorized to confirm envoys and plen\u00c2\u00ac\\nipotentiaries; but these appointments have been justified, not only\\nin many of the cases cited but in many others, because of the fact\\nthat they were the mere agents of the Executive, his messengers\\nsent abroad to bring him word as to affairs concerning which he\\nneeded information in order to duly execute a constitutional\\npower, to wit, the recognition of a new government.\\nThe case of Mr. Trist, who was sent as a confidential agent to\\n2613\u00e2\u0080\u00943", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "34\\nMexico (and the object and purpose of his mission appears, 2 Whar\u00c2\u00ac\\nton on International Law, section 154), is an exemplification of the\\nauthority of the President in this regard. The appointment of\\nArchbishop Hughes and Bishop Mclllraine, Mr. Everett, Mr. Win-\\nthrop, and Mr. j. B. Kennedy as confidential agents with refer\u00c2\u00ac\\nence to matters connected with the recognition of belligerency\\nduring our domestic strife contributes an interesting chapter to\\nthe exercise of authority by the President without consulting the\\nSenate and all within the recognized diplomatic limits.\\nThe case often referred to here\u00e2\u0080\u0094so frequently that it is not nec\u00c2\u00ac\\nessary for me to discuss it\u00e2\u0080\u0094of Mr. Mann and the Hungarian con\u00c2\u00ac\\ntroversy is in point. Mr. Webster s elaborate presentation of the\\nsubject and the treatment it received at the hands of Mr. Everett\\nare all in the same line. I will not go over them, for they have\\nbeen dwelt upon often and are familiar to the Senate and to the\\ncountry.\\nWhen we speak of the advisability of reposing power in one de\u00c2\u00ac\\npartment of the Government in preference to another, our argu\u00c2\u00ac\\nment is only of value in so far as it tends to illustrate the motives\\nand objects and ends sought to be accomplished by the framers of\\nthe Constitution, and in an ambiguous case, if it is found that\\nthe lodgment of power in one particular department would be\\nmanifestly inadvisable, and if the language is obscure or the con\u00c2\u00ac\\nstruction in doubt, perhaps we may be aided to some extent when\\nwe consider it on principle and in the light of the practical inter\u00c2\u00ac\\npretation of experience.\\nTHE NECESSITY OE SECItECY IN DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS.\\nIt is notorious that it is practically impossible to preserve secrecy\\nas to matters occurring in the Senate. It frequently happens that\\ndebates taking place in supposed executive session are publicly\\nreported; and while it is usually true that the reports made and\\nthe deductions drawn are not altogether correct, and there are\\nmany omissions of vital and essential features, yet it is also a well-\\nknown fact that whenever a sensational proposition or anything\\ncalculated to excite public curiosity or interest is announced in\\nexecutive session it finds its way to the public. The delicacy of\\nforeign negotiations, the ease with which controversies nearly\\nsettled may be impeded by ill-advised expressions or premature\\ndisclosure, is too plain to need comment.\\nNor is this all. We know that the Senate is not now and never\\nhas been and never can bo os reliable a place for the carrying on\\nof those negotiations which are frequently necessary in the man\u00c2\u00ac\\nagement of international disputes, and the same may be said with\\nmore emphasis with reference to Congress. Thus, within a year\\nperhaps, we have heard remarks made with reference to foreign\\ngovernments with which we were at peace. We have heard a\\nfriendly nation called \u00e2\u0080\u009ca toothless wolf,\u00e2\u0080\u0099 5 \u00e2\u0080\u009ca Gila monster, 55 \u00e2\u0080\u009ca\\nnation whose symbol of power is a monkey and an organ grinder,\u00e2\u0080\u009d\\nand kindred phrases in a body several of whose members now\\nclaim almost exclusive diplomatic authority. Our ability to\\nexcite a foreign government, our ability to involve the Govern\u00c2\u00ac\\nment of the United States in difficulty, certainly will not be seri\u00c2\u00ac\\nously challenged. Wo are not as successful in procuring the\\nspreading of the wings of peace over the earth. Mr. Sanguily\\nmay well doubt the propriety of our interference with his case,\\nwhich is now being energetically pressed by our State Department.\\n\u00c2\u00a3613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "While intemperate remarks are delivered here, persons in whom\\nwe have an interest are being tried and sentenced for violations\\nof municipal law, and our State Department is endeavoring to\\nextricate, by diplomacy, many in whom we are concerned who\\nhave, by reason of their desire to liberate another people, placed\\nthemselves within the reach of the criminal processes of a friendly\\npower. It is believed that utterances made upon this floor, which\\ncould not have any effect for good, have made it more difficult for\\nthe Executive to procure liberation of individuals in Cuba who\\nhave been in the greatest peril.\\nThe Constitution conferred upon the Senate and the House juris\u00c2\u00ac\\ndiction as to treaties, and also in the matter of certain appoint\u00c2\u00ac\\nments, and that it was the part of wisdom so to do is, I believe,\\nobvious. Whether we consider a treaty as a contract, in accord\u00c2\u00ac\\nance with the views of Mr. Frelinghuy sen and others, or whether\\nwe regard it as in the nature of legislation (and the Constitution\\ndeclares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land), it is proper\\nfor the lawmaking power to be consulted as to subjects which\\nnot only affect foreign relations but often directly interfere with\\nthe acts of Congress and the exercise of municipal powers by the\\nseveral States. In the making of a contract the ability and char\u00c2\u00ac\\nacter of the Senate has always been of great assistance, and I doubt\\nwhether there has ever been a topic of international concern sub\u00c2\u00ac\\nmitted in the form of a treaty where much light and many wise\\nsuggestions have not emanated from this body. Legislation can\\nnot be conducted by the Executive alone, and upon the same prin\u00c2\u00ac\\nciple it may be said that no treaty ought to be made without the\\ncooperation of the Senate, and the framers of the Constitution, in\\nmaking it impossible to perfect such an instrument in the absence\\nof two-thirds ratification here, undoubtedly considered that such\\na strong indorsement would atone for the absence of the other\\nbranch of Congress. Were the concurrence of the House neces\u00c2\u00ac\\nsary, there would be much friction, many misunderstandings, and\\nnumerous contentions with nations with whom we had been pre\u00c2\u00ac\\nviously on terms of amity. But the justification of the policy to\\nbe met with in the matter of ratifying treaties is found in the fact\\nthat we there deal not only with foreign governments regarding\\npurely international matters, but with propositions affecting legis\u00c2\u00ac\\nlation, and which must, as I have already remarked, have more or\\nless effect upon the domestic concerns of the several States.\\nThe difficulties unavoidable in treating diplomatic questions in\\nthe Senate must be evident to all. Not only are imprudent re\u00c2\u00ac\\nmarks indulged in because of impulses natural to momentary\\nexcitement, induced occasionally by ill-founded newspaper utter\u00c2\u00ac\\nances, mistaken reports\u00e2\u0080\u0094the result of journalistic enterprise and\\ncompetition\u00e2\u0080\u0094but Senators are in the habit of giving their opin\u00c2\u00ac\\nions through resolutions of various kinds, often accompanied by\\nspeeches exceedingly demonstrative and very seldom involving\\nthe actual opinion of a majority of the Chamber or even of a com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmittee.\\nSuch resolutions, after being discussed at the time of their pres\u00c2\u00ac\\nentation, are sent to committee and are perhaps never reported\\nback, or if reported are in a modified form; and when the matter\\nis investigated it is perhaps discovered that the circumstances are\\nnot such as to warrant the belligerent remarks which had been\\nmade at the time of introduction.\\nWhen Mr. Cleveland sent in his Venezuelan message there was\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "considerable excitement. Senators for the first time during my\\nbrief incumbency here expressed their appreciation by applause\\nupon the floor. A bill was speedily passed placing the necessary\\nfunds in the hands of the Executive to enable him to proceed\\nwith the work outlined in the message. Resolutions of varied\\nform were introduced, and finally the Committee on Foreign Re\u00c2\u00ac\\nlations, through the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr.\\nDavis] who sits near me, presented a concurrent resolution of\\nconsiderable length, purporting to define the Monroe doctrine\\nand to extend its application much beyond the lines laid down by\\nMr. Cleveland.\\nAfterwards the same distinguished Senator delivered an address\\nin support of his report. He took very advanced ground. The\\nresolution is still upon our Calendar, and no vote will ever be had\\nupon it. I intend to refer to several other reports of the Commit\u00c2\u00ac\\ntee on Foreign Relations preceding the remarkable Sanguily resolu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion now before us, and shall endeavor to show that the Secretarv of\\nState has done his duty under the law ably and effectively. But 1\\nwill now yield to the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations\\n[Mr. Allison] and if the appropriation bills are again displaced I\\nwill continue my argument. At all events, I will not, under pre\u00c2\u00ac\\nvailing circumstances, proceed further at this late hour.\\nFriday February 26, 1807.\\nJULIO SANGUILY.\\nIt having been ascertained that Julio Sanguily had been par\u00c2\u00ac\\ndoned prior to the consideration of the resolution on that subject\\nreferred to in the foregoing remarks, the following proceedings\\nwere had in the Senate:\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 1 o clock having\\narrived, it is the duty of the Chair to lay before the Senate the\\nunfinished business, which will be suited.\\nThe Secretary. A joint resolution (S. R. 207) demanding the\\nrelease of Julio Sanguily, an American citizen imprisoned in\\nCuba.\\nMr. PETTIGREW. I ask that the unfinished business be laid\\naside, and that we proceed with the consideration of the Indian\\nappropriation bill.\\nMr. BERRY. Temporarily, -without prejudice.\\nMr. PETTIGREW. Temporarily, without prejudice, if it is\\ndesired.\\nMr. MORGAN. It was the understanding, by unanimous con\u00c2\u00ac\\nsent yesterday, that the joint resolution was to come up at 1\\no\u00e2\u0080\u0099clock to-day.\\nMr. PETTIGREW. Then I move that it be laid aside.\\nMr. MORGAN. The Senator can not do that without violating\\nthe unanimous-consent agreement.\\nMr. WHITE. I am entitled to the floor on the joint resolution,\\nI believe.\\nMr. PETTIGREW. I am not aware of any such unanimous-\\nconsent agreement. I should like to have it read.\\nMr. WHITE. I do not object to the request of the Senator\\nfrom South Dakota.\\nMr. PETTIGREW. I do not intend to violate a consent agree\u00c2\u00ac\\nment.\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "37\\nMr. LINDSAY. There was no consent agreement about it that\\nI understand.\\nMr. BERRY. Is the joint resolution to he temporarily laid\\naside? The Senator from California who has the floor has no ob\u00c2\u00ac\\njection to that until we can get through with the bill that is now\\nbefore the Senate. I appeal to the Senator from Alabama not to\\nurge the joint resolution at this time.\\nMr. FRYE. I hope the Senator from Alabama will consent to\\nallow the joint resolution to go to the Calendar. The telegraphic\\ncommunications received to-day, undoubtedly reliable, show that\\nSanguily, by advice of his attorney, has, under duress of a two-\\nyears\u00e2\u0080\u0099 imprisonment, consented to the judgment and the sentence\\nby withdrawing the appeal; that the Queen Regent has signed the\\npardon, and that Sanguily is free.\\nNow, while I regard that as unfortunate in many respects, it\\nseems to me it leaves the joint resolution without any necessity of\\nfurther consideration. I do not believe, and never did, in wasting\\npowder simply for the purpose of making a noise.\\nI shall vote, under these circumstances, to proceed wfltli the ap\u00c2\u00ac\\npropriation bill. I do not believe anyone doubts my friendliness\\nto Cuba. Every pulsation of my heart is with the patriots who\\nare fighting for liberty, and I have an utter detestation of the\\nbrutalities of Spain; but I do not believe there is any further\\nnecessity of considering the joint resolution. I hope it will be\\npermitted to go to the Calendar.\\nMr. MORGAN. I am acting here-\\nMr. CALL. I ask the Senator from Alabama to allow me to\\nsay-\\nMr. MORG AN. Who has the floor?\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California\\n[Mr. White] has the floor. Does he yield to the Senator from\\nAlabama?\\nMr. PETTIGREW. I move to take up the Indian appropriation\\nbill.\\nMr. WHITE. I am entitled to the floor; but I have stated that\\nI have no objection to yielding the floor; but I should like to say\\na word. However, I will yield temporarily to the Senator from\\nAlabama. I do not wish to incommode the Senator in charge of\\nthe appropriation bill, and will not do it; but, having the floor, I\\nthink I am entitled to the courtesy of a request before I yield it.\\nI may be mistaken.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California\\nyields to the Senator from Alabama.\\nGEORGE WASHINGTON AGUIRRE.\\nMr. MORGAN. I am very thankful to the Senator from Cali\u00c2\u00ac\\nfornia for his courtesy. He has the floor on the joint resolution\\nwhich is before the Senate, and it can be disposed of if Senators\\nwill only contain themselves a little while in a legitimate and in\\na decent way. I rose under the privilege which -was accorded to\\nme by the Senator from California to ask unanimous consent for\\nthe adoption of a resolution which I will read:\\nResolved That the President is requested, if it is not, in his opinion, incom\u00c2\u00ac\\npatible with the public interests, to communicate to the Senate such infor\u00c2\u00ac\\nmation as has been furnished to or obtained by the Executive or the Depart\u00c2\u00ac\\nment of State relating to the arrest and imprisonment of and any proceed\u00c2\u00ac\\nings against George Washington Aguirre, a youth of 19 years of age, and a\\n2G13", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "38\\ncitizen of the United States, who, to obtain the benefit of a general amnesty\\nproclaimed by the Captain-General of Cuba, surrendered to the Spanish au\u00c2\u00ac\\nthorities in Cuba on the 4th day of July, 1896.\\nYou will observe, Mr. President, that there is quite an associa\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion of dates there that have a great hold upon the affections of\\nthe American people. He seems to have surrendered on the 4th\\nday of July, 1896, and his name his George Washington Aguirre.\\nPie is 19 years of age, and he surrendered under a proclamation of\\namnesty which invited him to come in and surrender. Doubtless\\nhe is one of our American boys, of Cuban origin, who has gone\\ndown there to take a hand in that scrimmage, as I am afraid a\\ngood many of them are inclined to do. For the benefit of the Sen\u00c2\u00ac\\nator from Massachusetts [Mr. Hoar] if he doubts the citizenship\\nof this man (he seems to turn his head in this way as if he wanted\\nto make a point of citizenship,as he made yesterday), I will call\\nhis attention to another name toy reading the following letter:\\nNew York City, February 2 U 1 S 97\\nMy Dear Sir: I desire to call your attention to the case of George Wash\u00c2\u00ac\\nington Aguirre, an American citizen, 19 years of age, and a prisoner in the\\nCubana fortress in Habana since the 4th day of July last. He surrendered\\nunder the amnesty proclamation of General Weyler promising freedom to\\nthose who gave themselves up. He was promptly ordered to be court-\\nmartialed, but by the interference of General Lee this was changed to an\\norder for a civil trial. This civil trial has not come yet and likely never will,\\nwithout the aid of our Government. The tortures of this boy threaten his\\nlife. I make this statement to you upon respectable authority, who have\\nrequested this letter. I have no personal knowledge of the facts. The\\nauthority of this nation should correct such wrongs, and speedily. His\\nrelease should be demanded at once.\\nI am, very truly, yours, ETHAN ALLEN.\\nHon. John T. Morgan.\\nNow, there is another name connected historically with the\\nUnited States, and I suppose I can venture to assume here in pre\u00c2\u00ac\\nsenting this resolution that this boy, whose name is George\\nWashington Aguirre, and who is only 19 years of age, is a citizen\\nof the United States, because Ethan Allen has said so. That is\\nas far as I can go upon it. Now, acting upon that predicate, I\\nwant to ask the unanimous consent of the Senate for the adoption\\nof this resolution for information from the President.\\nMr. HOAR. What was it the Senator called my attention to?\\nI came into the Chamber as he finished the reading.\\nMr. MORGAN. I called attention to the fact that this man\\nwas evidently of Cuban birth, born of a Cuban family, because\\nhis name is Aguirre. I supposed the Senator would be ready to\\nraise the question of naturalization on him, and I wanted to say\\nthat I had no further testimony to offer on the subject than the\\ntestimony of Ethan Allen.\\nMr. HOAR. The Ethan Allen of the Revolution?\\nMr. MORGAN. His grandson.\\nMr. PLATT. He is president of the Cuban junta of New York.\\nMr. MORGAN. He is a grandson of Ethan Allen of the Revolu\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion and is very apt to be president of a revolutionary junta, or\\nwhatever you may call it.\\nMr. HOAR. I thought the Senator said something about the\\ncase that was up yesterday as I came in.\\nMr. MORGAN. No; I was going to get to that after a little.\\nI ask for the adoption of the resolution, Mr. President.\\nMr. FRYE. It is only a resolution of inquiry.\\nMr. WHITE. If there be no objection and no discussion, I will\\n2613\\nI", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "39\\nyield for that purpose only. I wish to make a very limited number\\nof observations, which will not consume five minutes.\\nMr. MORGAN. Of course one objection will carry it over.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be read at\\nthe desk for information.\\nThe Secretary read the resolution, as follows:\\nResolved That the President is requested, if it is not in his opinion incom\u00c2\u00ac\\npatible with the public interests, to communicate to the Senate such informa\u00c2\u00ac\\ntion as has been furnished to or obtained by the Executive or the Department\\nof State relating to the arrest and imprisonment of and any proceedings\\nagainst George Washington Aguirre, a youth of 19 years of age, and a citizen\\nof the United States, who, to obtain the benefit of a general amnesty pro\u00c2\u00ac\\nclaimed by the Captain-General of Cuba, surrendered to the Spanish authori\u00c2\u00ac\\nties in Cuba on the 4th day of July, 1898.\\nMr. HOAR. It alleges certain facts.\\nMr. GRAY. I rise to say a word and to ask a question.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Cali\u00c2\u00ac\\nfornia yield for the purpose?\\nMr. WHITE. I can not yield for a debate.\\nMr. GRAY. It is not debate. I want to ask a question.\\nMr. WHITE. I will yield to the Senator from Delaware.\\nMr. GRAY. I want to appeal to the Senator from Alabama\\nthat he allow the resolution to be so amended as not to make the\\nSenate of the United States responsible for allegation of fact of\\nwhich they can know nothing. It may be all true, but if he\\nwill put in the word \u00e2\u0080\u009calleged\u00e2\u0080\u009d before \u00e2\u0080\u009ccitizen\u00e2\u0080\u009d and \u00e2\u0080\u009calleged\u00e2\u0080\u009d\\nbefore \u00e2\u0080\u009csurrendered,\u00e2\u0080\u009d I have no objection to the resolution.\\nOtherwise 1 have.\\nMr. MORGAN. I will do that with great cheerfulness, because\\nthe Senate of the United States has got so far that it is not willing\\nto take any responsibility for-\\nMr. Lindsay and Mr. White addressed the Chair.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be amended\\naccordingly. Does the Senator from California yield to the Sena\u00c2\u00ac\\ntor from Kentucky?\\nMr. WHITE. For a question.\\nMr. LINDSAY. I desire to know whether this able-bodied\\nyoung man, who abandoned the Cuban cause and took advantage\\nof the amnesty proclamation, ought not to change his name before\\nhe asks the Senate of the United States to intervene in his behalf.\\nThat was a very un-George Washington like act, and I do not\\nthink he comes here in a position to demand any extraordinary\\nconsideration at the hands of the Senate.\\nMr. MORGAN. How could he change his name?\\nMr. CALL. Will the Senator allow me to say a word?\\nMr. LINDSAY. I refer to the George Washington part of his\\nname.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Cali\u00c2\u00ac\\nfornia yield to the Senator from Florida?\\nMr. WHITE. I do not want to discriminate, and therefore I\\nyield to the Senator from Florida.\\nMr. CALL. Mr. President, I happen to know this young man,\\nGeorge Washington Aguirre. He is a native American, born of\\nCuban parents, who became naturalized and lived in this country\\nand abroad. He is a young man, animated by a noble, virtuous,\\nhonorable sentiment of devotion to the country of his forefathers.\\nHe went to Cuba for the purpose of rendering patriotic aid to the\\ncause which he believed in common with all the Cuban people to be\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "40\\na true and honorable effort to obtain independence. lie is quite a\\nyouth, not yet being 21 years of age. He was here in Washing-\\nton just before his departure for Cuba. I have no doubt from\\nthese facts, which are within my knowledge, that the statements\\nof the letter read by the Senator from Alabama are true.\\nMr. LINDSAY. He did not desert the Cuban cause? _\\nMr. CALL. I suppose that, like many others, he might have\\nbeen exhausted by the severe privations, to which he was unac\u00c2\u00ac\\ncustomed. I know nothing about that; but a youth, compara\u00c2\u00ac\\ntively of tender years, and not accustomed to great exposure,\\nmight quite naturally be unable to continue in the service.\\nMr. WHITE. As 4 understand, the resolution in its present\\nform is objected to, and therefore I presume it will go over.\\nMr. FRYE. The Senator from Alabama accepted the amend\u00c2\u00ac\\nment proposed.\\nMr. WHITE. Then, if it may be voted upon without further\\ndiscussion, I will yield for that purpose.\\nThe PRESIDING- OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama ac\u00c2\u00ac\\ncepted the amendment of the Senator from Delaware. Is there\\nobjection to the present consideration of the resolution?\\nMr. HOAR. Let us hear the amended resolution.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be read as\\namended.\\nThe Secretary read the resolution as modified, as follows:\\nResolved That the President is requested, if not in his opinion incompatible\\nwith the public interests, to communicate to the Senate such information as\\nhas been furnished to or obtained by the Executive of the Department of\\nState relating to the arrest and imprisonment of and any proceedings\\nagainst George Washington Aguirre, a youth of 19 years of age, and an\\nalleged citizen of the United States, who, to obtain the benefit of a general\\namnesty proclaimed by the Captain-General of Cuba, surrendered to tho\\nSpanish authorities in Cuba on the 4th day of July, 1896.\\nMr. GRAY. Let it read 4 is alleged to have surrendered. We\\ndo not know anything about that.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be so modified.\\nMr. ALLEN. I rise to a parliamentary inquiry. If this reso\u00c2\u00ac\\nlution is passed, does it displace the Sanguily resolution?\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER, it does not, the Chair will state.\\nMr. BERRY and Mr. MILLS. Question.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair hears no objection to\\nthe present consideration of the resolution. Is the Senate ready\\nfor the question? The question is on agreeing to the resolution of\\nthe Senator from Alabama as modified.\\nThe resolution as modified was agreed to.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, I trust that we will find George\\nWashington Aguirre to be a duly qualified citizen of some coun\u00c2\u00ac\\ntry. I am not altogether convinced of his innocence, of his impec\u00c2\u00ac\\ncability, or his statesmanship. I do not consider these proposi\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions established merely because he bears the name of George\\nWashington. I remember some time ago prosecuting a person,\\nwho was sent to the penitentiary of my State, whose name was\\nJuan de Dios (John of God). He never by word or deed justified\\na claim of honesty.\\nI do not intend to discuss questions relating to Julio Sanguily at\\nany length to-day for the reasons stated by the Senator from Maine\\n[Mr. Frye] I understand that a resolution will be offered later\\nby Mr. Sanguily\u00e2\u0080\u0099s friends in this Chamber protesting against his\\npardon. They seem to be disturbed because he is at liberty.\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "41\\nObjections have already been registered to the action of San-\\nguily and his counsel in admitting guilt and seeking pardon. It\\nis unfortunate that we have not been able to control Mr. Sanguily\\nin this respect, and his absence from prison will deprive the world\\nof a vast amount of very effective and charming eloquence, accom\u00c2\u00ac\\npanied, no doubt, by applause of an intelligent and discriminating\\ncharacter. It is indeed too bad that Sanguily has been pardoned,\\neven though our resolution has not passed and has not been trans\u00c2\u00ac\\nmitted to the Government of Spain. It is to be hoped, Mr. Presi\u00c2\u00ac\\ndent. that when the Committee on Foreign Relations brings us a\\ncase for discussion hereafter it will be a live case, and it is to be\\nhoped when a resolution is produced here demanding somebody\u00e2\u0080\u0099s\\nsurrender that we may not discover in the midst of patriotic\\ndeclamation that the gentleman whose liberty we are seeking to\\nobtain has already successfully petitioned for a pardon and ad\u00c2\u00ac\\nmitted his guilt without consulting us. We can hardly retrieve\\nour position by substituting George Washington Aguirre for Don\\nJulio Sanguily. [Laughter.]\\nI regret that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions is not in this Chamber. Possibly he may have heard of the\\npardon of Don Julio Sanguily. Were the chairman of the com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmittee here, I should ask him whether it is true that he had in his\\npocket, or that his committee had in its custody yesterday, when\\nthis question was being considered, a document showing that Mr.\\nSanguily had petitioned for pardon. Such an assertion has been\\nmade, but I should like to know whether it is true. I have no\\ninformation upon the subject. If the report be true, the Commit\u00c2\u00ac\\ntee on Foreign Relations should not have kept the information\\nfrom the Senate. If it was not proper information to be given\\npublicly, we might have placed ourselves \u00e2\u0080\u009cin comunicado,\u00e2\u0080\u009d and\\nshould have closed the doors; in that way we might perhaps have\\nconstituted ourselves a body of \u00e2\u0080\u009cpacificos.\u00e2\u0080\u009d\\nI do not wish to interfere with the appropriation bills which were\\nset aside to-day in order that Don Julio Sanguily might be released.\\nI will yield to the Senator from South Dakota to make the motion\\nof wdiicli he has already given notice.\\nMr. LODGE. Mr. President, I had no intention of saving a\\nword on this resolution, which I think was properly laid aside and\\nthe appropriation bill taken up. But, in the absence of the chair\u00c2\u00ac\\nman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. Sherman] the\\nSenator from California [Mr. White] saw fit to attack that com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmittee and revive the debate, and say one or two things which I\\ndo not propose to leave unanswered, as the chairman of the com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmittee is not present to say anything in regard to it.\\nI am very sorry that the Senator from California should be so\\ndisturbed about the flow of eloquence in the Senate on the San\u00c2\u00ac\\nguily resolution, and about the applause in the galleries. I think\\nhe was unreasonably disturbed. He spoke for four hours himself,\\nand no galleries interrupted him. [Laughter.] Also, Mr. Presi\u00c2\u00ac\\ndent, I want to say that this matter is not to be settled by sneers,\\nnor is an answer made in this case by mispronouncing the name\\n\u00e2\u0080\u009cJulio,\u00e2\u0080\u009d nor is this case answered by making fun of some man\\nwhose name happens to be that of the great general and statesman\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2whose birthday we celebrated here a few days ago. This matter\\ncan not be disposed of by sneers.\\n2013", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "42\\nThe case in which a pardon has just been granted is hut one\\ncase. There is information which has been withheld from the\\nSenate and from the American people in a great many other cases\\nnot in relation to Cubans, but in relation to American citizens.\\nThose will all come to the surface. We shall all see it some day;\\nthe Senate will have the opportunity of seeing it; the American\\npeople will have the opportunity of seeing it.\\nAs to this specific case and the charge made against the Foreign\\nRelations Committee, I desire simply to say a single word. That\\ncommittee had received no information that this man had been\\npardoned. The Committee on Foreign Relations began to consider\\nthis case about one month ago. The report they made is dated the\\n1st day of February. We put the matter over from week to week at\\nthe request of the State Department, because we were told that the\\ndiplomatic negotiations which had been going on for about twenty-\\nthree months were about approaching a close, and the Depart\u00c2\u00ac\\nment hoped in a few days to have this man pardoned. We put it\\nover; and finally we reported the resolution, and we got the man\u00e2\u0080\u0099s\\npardon the next morning. In other words, twenty-three months\\nwere consumed in diplomatic negotiations; but after the matter\\nwas taken up and it was discussed by the committee and pre\u00c2\u00ac\\nsented at the bar of American public opinion, the news of the\\nman\u00e2\u0080\u0099s pardon came by cable this morning, and we are sneered at\\nbecause we are told he was going to be pardoned any way.\\nMr. GRAY. May I ask the Senator a question as to a matter of\\nMr. LODGE. Certainly.\\nMr. GRAY. The Senator from Massachusetts says that twenty-\\nthree months have been consumed by the State Dei artment in\\nnegotiations in regard to the case of Sanguily.\\nMr. LODGE. I think I have stated the fact correctly.\\nMr. GRAY. Is it not a fact that the larger part of those nego\u00c2\u00ac\\ntiations, and the greater part of the time occupied in pursuing\\nthem, was consumed in discussing the treaty between the United\\nStates and Spain in regard to citizens of the United States who\\nwere arrested for participating in rebellion, without arms in their\\nhands, and demanding for them a trial by a civil court under the\\ntreaty; and whether, at last, those negotiations were not success\u00c2\u00ac\\nful in procuring that trial, and that the necessary delay was by\\nreason of the procedure of the courts, which, of course, takes time?\\nMr. LODGE. I did not enter into what the diplomatic nego\u00c2\u00ac\\ntiations were about.\\nMr. GRAY. The Senator from Massachusetts gave that impres\u00c2\u00ac\\nsion; at least, I so understood him.\\nMr. LODGE. I stated that diplomatic negotiations had been\\ngoing on in regard to this man\u00e2\u0080\u0099s case for twenty-three months,\\nand that is absolutely true.\\nMr. GRAY. But the Senator gave the impression that futile\\nnegotiations were going on for twenty-three months, whereas at\\ndifferent stages the demands made by the State Department were\\nacceded to by the Government of Spain, and the trial demanded\\nbefore a civil court for Sanguily was granted after necessary de\u00c2\u00ac\\nlay owing to their form of procedure.\\nMr. LODGE. I did not say the negotiations were futile. That\\nword was not used by me, but used by the Senator from Delaware.\\nMr. GRAY. I say that is the impression I got from what the\\nSenator stated.\\nMr. LODGE. I did not so state, but I shall not quarrel with\\n\u00c2\u00a3G13", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "43\\nthe Senator about that. All I said was that for twenty-three months\\ndiplomatic negotiations had been going on in regard to this man; that\\nthe question has been considered in the committee for one month;\\nthat the resolution was reported to the Senate yesterday, and this\\nmorning we have cable news that Sanguily is pardoned. Those\\nare the simple facts, and I am perfectly willing to leave them.\\nMr. GRAY. Those are not the simple facts.\\nMr. LODGE. I beg the Senator\u00e2\u0080\u0099s pardon. Had not diplomatic\\nnegotiations been going on for twenty-three months?\\nMr. GRAY. There it is again, Mr. President. The simple\\nstatement is made that negotiations of a diplomatic character\\nhave been going on for twenty-three months, and the impression\\nis made\u00e2\u0080\u0094I do not know whether it is sought to be made by the\\nSenator from Massachusetts or not\u00e2\u0080\u0094that negotiations, which were\\nfutile in their character, have been going on all that time in regard\\nto the release of Sanguily, whereas a greater part of the time was\\noccupied in demanding the rights of Sanguily under the treaty\\nwith Spain.\\nMr. CHANDLER. Where was Sanguily all the time?\\nMr. LODGE. I did not say that the negotiations were futile.\\nThe Senator from Delaware keeps saying that.\\nMr. GRAY. I intended that the Senator should state or that I\\nshould state for him what the real facts were.\\nMr. LODGE. I omitted i^o facts. I say diplomatic negotiations\\nwere going on for twenty-three months, and during that time this\\nman was in prison. There is no question about it. I do not say\\nthe negotiations have not been successful. We know they have\\nbeen successful, because he was released this morning or yester\u00c2\u00ac\\nday.\\ni say it was twenty-three months that the State Department was\\nengaged in negotiations before the Senate did anything, so that\\nthey did not seem unreasonably impatient about- it.\\nMr. TELLER. Will the Senator allow me to state that this\\nman was tried and condemned on December 8, 1895, and sen\u00c2\u00ac\\ntenced on December 3, 1895, more than a year ago.\\nMr. LODGE. He was sentenced more than a year ago, Mr.\\nPresident.\\nMr. GRAY. The trial from which the appeal was made was\\nhad on the 3d of December, 1896. That was the trial against\\nwhich the State Department protested.\\nMr. LODGE. He has been tried, and an appeal has been taken,\\nand all that. But. Mr. President, I do not care to go into the\\ndetails of it. The facts are perfectly well known.\\nI only desire to say, in reply to what the Senator from California\\n[Mr. White] has said, that the Committee on Foreign Relations\\nhad put this matter over two or three times at the request of the\\nSecretary of State, because Sanguily was about to be released and\\naction was about to be taken as the result of diplomatic negotia\u00c2\u00ac\\ntions. We had no information yesterday that he was pardoned,\\nso far as I am aware.\\nMr. MORGAN. We have none now.\\nMr. LODGE. We had no information that he had been par\u00c2\u00ac\\ndoned.\\nMr. WHITE. Nobody said you had.\\nMr. LODGE. I understood the Senator from California\u00e2\u0080\u0094if I\\nmisunderstood him, I am very sorry\u00e2\u0080\u0094to say that the committee\\nyesterday had information that Sanguily had been pardoned.\\nMr. WHITE. I stated that the committee, as I understood it,\\n2313", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "44\\nhad the information in their pockets, or the chairman had in his\\npocket a petition filed by this gentleman\u00e2\u0080\u0099s counsel and himself,\\nasking for pardon, and that they knew of the processes which had\\nbeen had in connection with the affair.\\nMr. LODGE. What counsel does the Senator refer to?\\nMr. WHITE. The counsel, if I may be permitted to pronounce\\nhis name\u00e2\u0080\u0094although 1 have heretofore supposed that I had a little\\nknowledge of the Spanish language\u00e2\u0080\u0094I may be permitted to say\\nJulio Sanguily, notwithstanding a correction by the infallible\\nauthority at present upon the floor. [Laughter.]\\nMr. LODGE. The Senator is welcome to pronounce that name\\nany way he likes. I thought from his knowledge of Spanish that\\nhe was mispronouncing the name humorously, as that is the com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmon form that is employed against Cubans.\\nAll I want to know is who the counsel is who has made this\\nstatement. I received no information and the committee received\\nnone.\\nMr. WHITE. I had no reference to the Senator, and was not\\nthinking of him in connection with the matter.\\nMr. LODGE. I can only answer for the committee. The com\u00c2\u00ac\\nmittee received no statement. There was a dispatch read here by\\nthe Senator from Maine [Mr. Hale] from Mr. Dominiguez, I\\nthink, who said an appeal had been taken. That was read here in\\nopen Senate by the Senator from Maine. But there was nothing\\nsent to the committee except a single communication from the\\nState Department, and not from the counsel. That did not say\\nthat the pardon had been granted. It said what had been said\\nbefore, that efforts were being made to obtain a pardon.\\nMr. GRAY. Let me ask the Senator whether the information\\nhe got in committee\u00e2\u0080\u0094as long as he has spoken of what occurred in\\nthe committee\u00e2\u0080\u0094was not to the effect that a pardon had been deter\u00c2\u00ac\\nmined upon just as soon as the condition precedent, which is requi\u00c2\u00ac\\nsite under Spanish law, had been complied with?\\nMr. LODGE. I understood that they were trying to get a par\u00c2\u00ac\\ndon.\\nMr. GRAY. I tried to get out the information that it had been\\ndetermined upon by the Spanish executive.\\nMr. LODGE. Then the Senator said that a pardon had been\\ngranted.\\nMr. GRAY. That it had been determined to be granted as soon\\nas the condition precedent, necessary under under Spanish law,\\nhad been complied with.\\nMr. LODGE. That is exactly what I said. I said that we\\nreceived information that a pardon was shortly expected.\\nMr. GRAY. Yes.\\nMr. LODGE. And that it had not been granted.\\nMr. GRAY. Your previous statement was, unless I misunder\u00c2\u00ac\\nstood you\u00e2\u0080\u0094of course I have no altercation, and wall have no alter\u00c2\u00ac\\ncation, with the Senator\u00e2\u0080\u0094that the information was merefy that\\nefforts were being made to obtain a pardon.\\nMr. LODGE. No; I mean that the process was going on for\\ntwenty-three months, or any period you please.\\nMr. GRAY. You said it was approaching a conclusion.\\nMr. LODGE. That was what we were told at the beginning of\\nFebruary, when we took the matter up\u00e2\u0080\u0094that it was approaching\\na conclusion. As the Senator well knows, we postponed the mat\u00c2\u00ac\\nter from week to week on that account.\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "45\\nI did not mean to be drawn into this discussion. What I de\u00c2\u00ac\\nsired to say was that the committee did not have the information\\nwhich the Senator from California attributed to it. I know noth\u00c2\u00ac\\nin about the counsel except from the dispatch read by the Sena\u00c2\u00ac\\ntor from Maine. I did not then know that the Mr. Dominguez\\nwho is named in the dispatch was the counsel for Sanguily.\\nMr. WHITE. Mr. President, I do not wish to incommode tho\\nSenators who have charge of the appropriation bills, and I do not\\nintend to do so, and I will say but a very few words.\\nThe Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Lodge] seems to think\\nthere has been a personal onslaught of some kind upon himself,\\nand he was led to call my attention to the lack of enthusiasm created\\nby my remarks made to the Senate yesterday. I presume his ob\u00c2\u00ac\\nject in thus informing us was designed to excite my envy when\\ncontrasting my position with the enthusiastic demonstrations\\nwhich ever attend his eloquent and relevant statements.\\nHowever, I have lived long enough to know that there are many\\ngreat men in this world and that I have no claim to greatness,\\nand it is enough for me even temporarily to rest in the shadow of\\nthe mighty intellectual power whose instruction has been so\\ngenerously given. I, perhaps, might survive some of the com\u00c2\u00ac\\nments of the Senator, but I do not know how I can exist in view\\nof his criticism upon my pronunciation of the name of the party\\nmentioned in the joint resolution. I ventured to call him Julio\\nSanguily, and the Senate has been informed that I mispronounced\\nhis name, and this I did in a disrespectful manner. If it were\\nnot for my faith in the abilities of the Senator from Massachusetts\\nand my consequent belief that all of the Spanish scholars I have\\never met have been mistaken as to the pronunciation of such\\nnames, I would, perhaps, hesitatingly venture to adhere to my own\\nview. 1 will, however, study the lesson proffered by the Senator\\nfrom Massachusetts and shall endeavor to absorb some of that\\nlearning which must be useful to the Senate, pertinent to this\\ndebate, and natural to the Senator from Massachusetts.\\nI regret that my friend the Senator from Florida [Mr. Call]\\nalso accuses me of having taken up too much time. It is seldom\\nthat I take the floor save for an inquiry, whereas the Senator from\\nFlorida is a chronic speaker upon the subject of Cuba. He is not in\\na position to rebuke me for my single infraction. Now, that Julio\\nSanguily (I hope I may be permitted to continue to so pronounce his\\nname) is free, we are treated to the case of Ruiz, and are told upon\\nthe authority of a newspaper, infallible, of course, before all tribu\u00c2\u00ac\\nnals, that Ruiz was badly treated, murdered in a dungeon. Com\u00c2\u00ac\\nments on this topic are directed at me, and, as far as I am able to\\nappreciate the Senator\u00e2\u0080\u0099s meaning, the insinuation is conveyed that\\nI and other Senators who do not favor declaring war without\\nascertaining what we are to right about are guilty of the murder\\nof Ruiz, and this because Sanguily has been pardoned. This\\nconclusion might be considered slightly illogical by some, but not\\nby the Senator from Florida.\\nMr. HALE. Let me ask the Senator whether any motion has\\nbeen made to substitute any other island for Cuba?\\nMr. WHITE. I will say to the Senator from Maine that no\\nmotion has been made, but there are insinuations that something\\nof the kind is coming; that if it be true that Sanguily has con-\\n2613", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "46\\nfessed his guilt, nevertheless there is suffering elsewhere, and it\\nwill be urged that while we were mistaken in the case of Sanguily,\\na valid cause of complaint must exist as to some one. There must\\nbe an oppressed innocent somewhere, and we will be fully informed\\nregarding the outrage by illustrations in the newspapers and\\nmagnificent orations in the \u00e2\u0096\u00baSenate.\\nMr. HALE. But no motion has been made to substitute any\\nother island for Cuba?\\nMr. WHITE. Not yet.\\nMr. GALLINGER. We are going to put in the State of Maine\\nnext instead of Cuba.\\nMr. WHITE. The Senator from Florida, after commenting\\nupon the immense amount of time that I took in discussing the\\nCuban question yesterday, in order to be truly consistent, pro\u00c2\u00ac\\nceeded to make a speech upon the subject himself.\\nI yielded to the appropriation bills, and I will do so again in the\\nhope that these important measures may be passed, and that we\\nmay establish a field day for the discussion of Cuba, and give\\nnotice to all alleged suffering patriots, wherever found, that their\\ncases will be taken up as soon as the Calendar will permit, and our\\nNavy increased correspondingly to the necessities of our bellig\u00c2\u00ac\\nerency.", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "", "height": "4562", "width": "2384", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "o 028 001 805 3", "height": "4603", "width": "2452", "jp2-path": "executivejurisdi00whit_0048.jp2"}}