{"1": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3511", "width": "2278", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n013 744 601 7", "height": "3530", "width": "2251", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "E 713\\n.D51\\nCopy 1\\nHawaiian A.nnexai ion.\\n8 r E BCH\\nOF\\n1! ON. M A K ION I) E V B I ES,\\nOF A l. I PO B N I A.\\nIn the House op Representatives,\\nl .v. June 14, 1898.\\nThe House having under consideration the joint resolution ll Bi\\nprovide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the Unite 1 S\\nMr. DE VRIES said:\\nMr. Speaker: The close of the nineteenth and the opening of\\nthe twentieth century witness a radical change in the theater of\\nthe chief commercial and naval operations of the world.\\nThe greater maritime commerce of the w rl l is upon the Pacific.\\nThat boundless water early promises to be the scene of the great\\nnaval conflicts of the future. International conflicts almost in-\\nvariably arc the results of the straggles and sharp contests between\\nnations in their endeavors to command the commerce of the world.\\nThe dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, the approaching com-\\npletion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the sudden appearance of\\nJapan as a factor in the world s commerce and controversies, the\\ndevelopment of Alaska and of the many islands of the Pacific and\\ncontiguous to the Orient have all attracted the genius, enter-\\nprise, and capital of the world.\\nHere is the world s mostexpansive field of commerce. Here arc\\nunlimited possibilities for capital, labor, and genius. Hero is a\\nboundless territory, inhabitedby over ioo.uii! i, not) people yet in com-\\nparative primitiveness. From the world s scramble for advan-\\ntages in the I Mient will come the conflicts of the next century.\\nHere in the Pacific will arise the complications: here will be con-\\ngregated the great navies, and here fought the great battles of\\nthe twentieth century. Already the European powers are divid-\\ning the advantages there obtainable. The part our country is\\ndestined to share in this development will be easily acquired and\\nsustained if we act promptly and properly.\\nWith the Key of the Pacific and the Nicaragua anal ours,\\ncontrolling and directing the com w of this commerce, at it-\\nern basis it will be controlled by the United States 1 one, while at,\\nus western basis it will be developed and divided by the combined\\nenergies and greed f Russia, England, Germany, France) Japan,\\nand China. For our defense and COmmercia] advantage it be-\\nhooves the Republic to marshal its forces, secure itself in its out-\\nposts, and post its commercial agents for the coming struggle for\\nthis magnificent commerce and the possible wars of the future.\\nRepresenting in part as I do the great State of California, with\\n800 miles of coast line lying adjacent to the scenes of these activ-\\nities, I believe I foresee correctly for that State immense commer-\\ncial advantages and a great future. The Pacific coast is destine.!\\nto outrival the Atlantic: Seattle. Portland. San Francisco, San\\nDiego, and Los Angeles will inevitably outrival Portland, Boston.\\n3582 1", "height": "3499", "width": "2074", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston. It was the\\ncommerce of the Atlantic that made great the latter; it will be the\\ngreater commerce of the Pacific that will make greater the former.\\nCalifornia, with its millions of acres of fertile soil, its many\\nrich mines, its infinite variety of productiveness, having every\\nvariety and character of land and climate, producing every variety\\nand kind of produce, all in the infancy of their development, is\\ndestined by its contiguity to these new marts of the world and its\\nrelative position as the gateway of the world s future commerce,\\nto become the richest country of the globe. The inevitable will\\nbring to her farmers, her laborers, her manufacturers, demands of\\nan infinite variety and quantity. Commerce is always reciprocal.\\nInternal natural wealth and productiveness always respond to\\nforeign trade, and the latter is essential to and develops the for-\\nmer.\\nAs a great factor in the development of these resources and this\\ncommerce, as an impregnable defense thereof when developed, as\\nwell as of California s 800 miles of coast line, l shall vote for the\\nannexation of the Hawaiian Islands.\\nBelieving as I do, and as I think can be conclusively demon-\\nstrated, that the ownership of these islands will render the Pacific\\ncoast perfectly impregnable from naval attack in case of war, I\\nwould consider the vote which failed to avail of their ownership\\ninexcusable. To leave our great coast trade, our great coast\\ncities, our many thousands of citizens subject to attack and de-\\nstruction by a hostile navy, to jeopardize its future by the possi-\\nbility of such, when for the acceptance only, without the asking\\nfor these islands, it is possible to render all of these free of the\\npossibility of such, would be little short of criminal. These con-\\nsiderations entail such grave consequences to the Pacific coast\\nthat they become national in importance. The debate upon this\\nquestion discloses these to be moving factors in support of the\\nlending resolution. My reasons, therefore, in supporting the\\nsame, Avhile primarily local, are essentially national.\\nPEART. HARBOR DEFENSELESS AND VALUELESS WITHOUT ANNEXATION\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nWITH ANNEXATION WE ABE IMPREGNABLE AGAINST NAVAL ATTACK ON\\nTHE W I I\\nPatient attention to this debate discloses that all the opponents\\nof annexation admit the necessity of our Government having a\\ncoaling and supply station at Pearl Harbor in these islands, and\\nthey assert as a part of their argument that having this already,\\nannexation adds nothing to our advantage or defense.\\nThere is no escape from the very patent fact that for military\\noperations on the Pacific this station is imperatively necessary.\\ni be admission of this undeniable fact by the opponents of annexa-\\ntion concedes the one point in the case fatal to their contention\\nand which demonstrates annexation of Hawaii necessary to our\\ndefense.\\nIt is not necessary to rest the case of annexation upon the ques-\\ntionable title we hold to that harbor. Our right thereto, as known\\nto all, whs acquired by a treaty of reciprocity, wherein we granted\\nHawaii the right to export to the United States certain articles\\nfree of duty, and in return therefor she granted us the right we\\nclaim in Pearl Harbor. Before this treaty was concluded the Ha-\\nwaiian minister addressed a letter to the then Secretary of State\\nBayard, inquiring if the interpretation of the treaty by our Gov-\\nernment was not that in case of revocation of the treaty we should\\nsurrender the harbor, to which the Secretary replied in the affirm-", "height": "3348", "width": "2241", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "ative. Thereupon the treaty was concluded. The treat; ter-\\nminable apon one year s nonce.\\nAt mi st then, admitting the stability of present conditions, we\\nhave bul a precarious title to that aarbor, not one thai would\\njustify its fortification, for certainly if the treaty is terminated\\nour Government can no1 in honor insist upon holding the con-\\nsideration therefor, especially as it was undoubtedly concluded\\nwith the contrary understanding. Waiving, however, this im-\\nportant inquiry and further waiving the important question of\\nwhether or not under the treaty we have a right to anything more\\nthan the water Burface constituting the harbor and norighl to\\nany adjacenl land for Bupply stores, shops, etc., weareconfi\\nwith an insurmountable objection winch, coupled with the ne-\\ncessity of an impregnable harbor here, demonstrates annexation\\nnecessary.\\nIt i- admitted by everyone and on all Bides that Pearl Barbor is\\nthe only harbor in the Sandwich Islands thai can be made a naval\\nstat Ion and base of supplies.\\nWe have heard much in the arguments by the opponents to an-\\nnexation about fortifying th s harbor as a t libra! tar. That is\\nall thai is necessary, tiny say. That Bhould l\u00c2\u00bb- done, they say;\\nand for this reason annexation, they claim, is unnecessary. But\\nthe weakness of this argument lies in the tact that demonstrates\\nannexation necessary, and that is thai Pearl Barbor can not be\\nmade a Gibraltar, can not be made impregnable, can not be in-\\nvulnerably fortified without occupying Bonoluln and the wh \u00c2\u00bble\\nof the Island of Oahu; and we can nol occupy these without an-\\nnexing all tho Hawaiian Islands. It would be idle to talk of\\nannexing the capital of Hawaii without annexing all the islands.\\nNo one would even suggest such an idea.\\nThe topography of the country is such and the situation such\\nthat to successfully fortify Pearl Harbor is a physical impossi-\\nbility without occupying Honolulu. Pearl Harbor is atypical\\nnaval harbor. It is said by naval experts that it would he with-\\nout a superior in the world if fortified from land attacks, which\\ncan b easily and cheaply done. A coral re i protects its entrance\\nwithout, so that no ship can enter save at a certain point upon\\nwhich cm easily be trained modern guns that could defy the\\nnavies of the world. Through this v the entrance of the har-\\nbor winds through a narrow and deep channel to a hep hay on\\nthe interior large enough to accommodate all the navies of the\\nearth. It is just seven miles from the channel entering Pearl\\nHarbor proper to Honolulu, To the west of a line between M\\nlulu and Pearl Harbor is a hill, Leitono, 185 feet high. This hill\\nis susceptible of being cheaply and impregnably fortifii d by mi d\\nern guns, which would at once command Pearl 1 1 irbor and Hono-\\nlulu and could destroy with impunity every ship or man-of-war\\nattempting to enter tiiis barb ir and demolish that city.\\nBaca of Honolulu, ami within three-quarters of a mile of Hono-\\nlulu Harbor, stands another hill called the Punch Howl.\\nfeet high, likewise buso ptible of being cheaply and impregnably\\nfortified, and from which modern guns could destroy any ship or\\nwar vessel entering or departing from Pearl Harbor. Northeast\\nfrom Honolulu. miles, m a thud h 11 Diamond 11 ad feet\\nhigh, likewise Busceptible of fortification and commanding the\\nharbor and city of Honolulu and adjacent coast. Each of these\\nhills is approachc l by almost perpendicular walls. Back of all\\nthese hills is a mountain range the only pa which is a nar-", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "row defile about 20 feet wide, of over 1,200 feet elevation, and this\\nis the only pass from the west by which Pearl Harbor or Honolulu\\ncan be approached. The sides of the mountain are almost perpen-\\ndicular for a thousand feet. A few men at this pass could hold it\\nagainst thousands. It is a veritable Thermopylae. Military experts\\nagree that for a nominal expense, less than the cost of one battle\\nship, all these points can be so fortified that the navies of the world\\ncould not enter Pearl or Honolulu harbor nor could the armies\\nof the world assault these by land. Here is the much-desired\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2Gibraltar, defended by an equally desirable Thermopylae.\\nIt will not be contended, however, that we acquired Honolulu by\\nthe reciprocity treaty, yet without it Pearl Harbor will afford\\nno refuge for our war ships, for they could be bombarded from\\nHonolulu or any of the points named. The Island of Oahu, upon\\nwhich is situated the capital of Hawaii, can for a comparatively\\nnominal sum be made a Gibraltar and a Thermopylae. Without\\nall of this island Pearl Harbor is defenseless and useless. But\\nOahu can only be acquired by annexing Hawaii.\\nThe inevitable induction, then, from the admission of the neces-\\nsity of a coaling and repairing station and harbor at Pearl Har-\\nbor is the annexation of all of these islands.\\nNo one has given more careful study to the strategic value and\\npossibilities of Hawaii and the detailed necessities to make it such\\nthan Lieut. Lucien Young. He was an attache of the Boston,\\nstationed at Honolulu at the time of the revolution. He com-\\nmanded the United States artillery landed at that time for the\\nprotection of American interests. During the long stay there he\\nmade a careful study of the country, distances, etc. His report,\\nforbidden publication by the Cleveland Administration, is now\\npublished by him in book form. It should be read by all students\\nof this great question. In part he says:\\nA SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION.\\nThe importance of Hawaii as a strategical position is no more a matter of\\nopinion than is a geometrical axiom. It is a primal, incontrovertible fact.\\nIt is second in importance to no other single point on the earth s surface.\\nEngland seized, and with luilldog tenacity has held, Gibraltar for its stra-\\ntegical value alone; but there is no country tho route to which lies past Gi-\\nbraltar which an not be reached by several other different ways. The dis-\\ntinctive feature of Hawaii, wherein it is unique among the strategical points\\nof the world, is that it lies at the center of an area so great that commercial\\nand military operations across it are practically impossible except by using\\nHawaii as a coal and supply station. Eliminate Hawaii from tho man. and\\nthere are BCarcely any battle ships in existence which can operate across the\\nPacifio, by reason of the fact that they can not carry coal enough, and the\\nproblem of coaling at sea has not yet been solved.\\nIt has been repeatedly and officially pointed out by the naval authorities,\\nnot only of the United States but of the world that the trans-Pacific coun-\\nt ries and islands, with the exception of Hawaii, are so far distant from the\\nAmerican continent that unless tin ships of such nations can recoal at\\nHawaii it is practically impossible for them to get to the Pacific coast for the\\npurpose of conducting military operations there. The most efficient ships\\ncould not get thereat all. and thoso which do carry sufficient coal to cross\\nwould have no coal with which to operate, much less to return to their base\\nrations, iii other words, it is impossible to maintain naval or military\\noperations at a distance of from 3,500 to 5,500 miles from a base of operations.\\nUnder these c editions it is elementary strategy and logic that there can be\\nno surer defense to the Pacific coast of the United States than to prevent\\nany other foreign country from getting possession or control of Hawaii.\\nTHE QUESTION OF DEFENSE.\\nNotwithstanding the certainty of the defense which would be afforded to\\ndflc coast by excluding a possible enemy from Hawaii, it would not\\nicy for the United States to attempt this method of defense by herself\\ntaking possession of Hawaii, unless that possession could be made effective\\na1 reasonable exp\\nWhether this can be done is nota new question to American naval author-\\nities or statesmen.", "height": "3348", "width": "2241", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "As longago as 1861 Congress, by f omul resolution ftvry\\nana War Departn port upon the conditions and requirei\\nthe coas dcfensesol the L l By Instr\\npartment Admiral Dupont drew up report in reply to thin i\\nwinch be said, In connection with thodefense of the Pa\\nls [mppssJl to,, highly the vain,, an. I Importance of the\\n(sandwich islands, whether in a commercial or military point of view Hbould\\ncireni r pla them in our hands, they would prove the n\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0t acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific ccan nn acquisition\\nintimately connected w th our commercial and naval supremacy n those\\nThis opinion basbeen fullyapproved by tji\\nthat day to this, I hat I nltei ontrolof Bawail can\\neffective and economical is demonstrated by a oriel\\nI i w BECUR] P(\\nAlthough th, Hawaiian Islands are eight in number and extei i\\ntanceof about i dies, with the exceptions ol Honolulu and Pearl harbors\\nit- porta are a 1 i i roadsteads, in which vessels are comi it .lis\\ntances pi approximately half a mile from shore, obliged at all times to land\\n.\u00e2\u0080\u00a2mil Bhipall freight In small boats, hampered by the restless Bwell of the\\n1 anandexposed to constant interruptions The port ol n\\ncould partially protected by building a breakwater several miles Ions n:\\nan .\u00e2\u0096\u00a0xj\u00e2\u0080\u009eMis,. ,.t an auestimated number of millions ol dollars, l.ut even then it\\nwould not be protected from northerly storms With the exception there\\nl! In and Pearl harbors, all other points in th. islands may bo\\neliminated from consideration as possible naval stations.\\nPearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor are both located upon the -.nth -,,1,.\\nisland ol Oahmand are only! miles apart. Any effective military\\ncontrol of ti ne nm-t necessarily include th.- control of ti ther f..r they\\ntogether that heavy artillery located either point w\\nwithm easy range and have mil oontrol of the other.\\nFprtiflcations for the defense ol the two need be\\nKind. Both Honolulu and Pearl harbors are prot 1 by natural fortiflcn\\ntions, which l nothing but th.. placing of the guns to become impregna-\\nrnree miles east ol Honolnl i fout int.) the deep wni\\nsummit only aboui a quarter of a mil., from th.. water mond\\nHead.a lull ..i -.lid rock, with an almost perpendicular face, read\\nition f 750 I\\nNATfl! W. Ki HI 11 I. I los-\\nIn th.- very heart ..f Honolulu, with three-quarters of a mile of deep\\nios a second hill of solid rock, with almost perpendicular face. ri.Mii\\nelevation ol \u00c2\u00abi feet. Four miles weal of Honolulu p oa rl\\nHarbor, lies a thu-.l lull th.- -am. rocky, perpendicular character, reaching\\nan elevation oM ittery of modern guns can be mounted\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2I these three hills at so little expense as to practically eliminate the amount\\na- a factor i..r consideration a- an estimate of cost To th. rear ol Honolulu\\nth. only pass through th. mountain i- a narrow cnt.SU feet wide tonpi\\nwhich an invading army would have to climb an aim dicnlar LlufT\\nnearly 1,000 i .-t high, which would preclude any attack from tb\\nHonolulu w an absolut ndlocked harbor, but i- unsuitable for\\na naval station lor tw.. reasons: Fii It is s.. small that it will not\\nmodate more than 100 vessels at the outside, and the rapidly gr\\ncommercial use ..f the port will very soon tax its limit to t 1 iu the\\n8 l l place, th. shores of th barb r are distant only from a l\\nquarters ol a mil.- fr deep water. Th. dry docks, machim\\nes a naval station should 1 to\\nwater as to practically put them beyond th. reach of an rdinary bombard\\nin. in. while Honolulu can be so fortified as to absolute!?\\nlive landing being made, it lit it a heavy\\nship might easily, before boingdrivi\\nstation by a few well dir\\nPearl Harbor is an arm of tl onected with thi\\nlong, narrow, river like entrance, Boni9 miles in length, the h\\npandmg and dividing into three lochs, having interior froi\\nof some 80 miles, witn an average depth of from HO to 60 feet II\\nformed ol coral and sandstone, with a top layer of soil. In ma:.-.\\nbanks are so perpendicular that a full rigged ship could lie alongside\\nexcavation or flock building. 1 harbor is surrounded by abui\\nsprings ol pure, fresh water, and artesian wells reach fresh w\\npoint at a depth of approximately t to us f,.,.f. which ri-. s to an el\\npiabout i level. Th i well wooded with algi\\nforests and the country on the land -id. is a rich, fertile disti I\\nwith rice, banana, and sugar plantations,\\namount of fresh supplies tion.\\n3537", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "6\\nA CONVENIENT REEF.\\nA barrier reef extends parallel with and distant About a mile from the\\nshore, and the water beyond does not reach a depth of over 100 feet for a dis-\\ntance of about another mile, being well suited, therefore, for marine mining.\\nThese, with the assistance of the fortifications already spoken of and inex-\\npensive fortifications at the month of the harbor, would be absolutely pro-\\nhibitive of any successful attack upon the station from the sea. The Navy\\nand War Departments have already executed most minute surveys of the\\nharbor and its entrance, and caused expert reports to be made thereon. As\\nearly as 1872 Generals Schofield and Alexander, of the United States Army,\\nreported unequivocally in favor of the military value of this harbor to the\\nUnited States.\\nThe survevs of the Navy Department have been made under the direction\\nof Admirals Irwin, Walker, and Miller. They disclose that there is a sand\\nbar across the extreme outer entrance of the harbor, consisting almost ex-\\nclusively of soft, disintegrated coral sand, which can be disposed of by a suc-\\ntion dredge at an estimated expense of not to exceed $150,000. The rise and\\nfall of the tide is less than 3 feet, and there are no currents which need bo\\nfeared to reform the bar. A bar similar in character, somewhat smaller in\\nextent, was pumped out from the entrance to Honolulu Harbor in 1891. a depth\\nof over 30 feet being secured, which has not since changed a particle. The\\nexpense of clearing the Honolulu Harbor bar, exclusive of the cost of the\\ndredge, was only about $40,000. This dredge is the propertyof the Hawaiian\\nGovernment, and is available at any time for use by the United States Gov-\\nernment at Pearl Harbor if desired.\\nTREATY RIGHTS.\\nThe United States now has by the treaty the right to the exclusive use of\\nPearl Harbor, but has as yet taken no step other than making the surveys\\nmentioned to avail itself of this privilege. A popular view has been that\\nt ue rights which the United States possesses in Pearl Harbor are all that the\\nUnited States needs in a military way. This is an erroneous view. In the\\niirst place, there are doubts as to the permanency of the title of the United\\nStates to the harbor. The Hawaiian Government, both the monarchy and\\nthe republic, maintains that the United States title to the harbor is co-\\nterminus with the existing reciprocity treaty, and that if such treaty is ter-\\nminated the American rights to Pearl Harbor terminate also.\\nBe that as it may, there is no grant of territory by that treaty, and as a\\nprotective measure it would be necessary for the United States to own not\\nonly the hind on which its naval station is located, but it should be able to\\ncontrol the territory for a sufficient distance away therefrom to insure the\\nnonoccupation of a hostile power. The report of Generals Schofield and Alex-\\nander in ls^ laid especial stress upon this point. At that time, basing their\\nopinion upon the then efficient range of cannon, they reported that the united\\nStates should secure territory for a distance of not less than i miles in every\\ndirection from the harbor. Since then the efficient range of heavy artillery\\nhas greatly increased. Honolulu lies only 7 miles from Pearl Harbor, well\\nwithin range.\\nThero certainly can be no claim advanced that by the reciprocity treaty,\\nwhich gives the United States the authority to establish a naval station at\\nPearl Harbor, it was intended to cede to the United States the jurisdiction\\ni ver the territory occupied by Honolulu, the capital city of the country, and\\nyet without possession or control of Honolulu thero is no safety in locating a\\nnaval station at Pearl Harbor. The necessary corollary of this situation is\\nthat in order to make use of Pearl Harbor the control of Honolulu must also\\nraired.\\nA DEFINITE ALTERNATIVE.\\nIt is not within the bounds of consideration that the people of Hawaii\\nwould consent 1 1 1 segregate the city of Honolulu from the country and trans-\\nfer it to the United States. The proposition which the United States must\\nthen face is to take the islands as a whole, or Pearl Harbor is of no value to it.\\nIn other words, the question is reduced down to the single issue of annexing\\n.up as a whole or letting it go as a whole. Another matter of vital\\nimportance in arriving at a decision of this issue is the certainty that it will\\nbe almost impossible to eject any strong maritime power which once in-\\ntreni hes itself in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.\\nOn the other hand, if the United States first occupies this stronghold of\\nD World, it will give it the dominant power over the entire North\\nPacific, both from a naval and a commercial standpoint, ami afford a military\\nprotection to its Pacific coast and a control over the trans-Pacific commerce\\nwhich can be attained in no other way.\\nIf any or the leading maritimo nations obtain that control, they can be\\nevicted therefrom only by such expenditure of blood and treasure as will\\nmake the effort one of the great naval and military feats of history; and,\\nuntil such eviction, it will be the ouo focus in the northern Pacific from", "height": "3348", "width": "2241", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "whicu hostile 1 1 1 i I i\\ncommerce, now greater in the Pacific than iu ai\\n1 rom nit t he face i J i he\\nThat 1 should make no mi-take In distances, which\\nvi i niB argument, l have verified the same from the \u00c2\u00abn i\\nrial l [awaiian map in tli archives ol th\\nveyand Found them absolutelj elf shows L i\\ntenant Young to have been a close student of this questio\\nothers speaking of the question and in this debate vary in their\\nstatements on the points of these distances. There is no wu\\nbetwe ii Lieutenant Youngs statement and the official sm\\nWith these islands a part of our dominion, im] i\\ntied, as they are capable of being, the Pacific coast would\\ncomplete immunity from Bea attack.\\nNo warcrafl existing r known to the world can airy sufficient\\ncoal to cross tii Pacific and operate against our coast and n\\nindeed, none such can ever cross and return by reason of ti\\nthat sufficient coal can nol be carried for that purpose. There\\nare i ther islands in the Pacific that will fulfill such pui\\nAcquiring I lands, therefore, means a complete natural\\ndefense of the Pacific coast Nothing ihort of annexation will,\\nhowever, make this defense compli\\nThe converse is equally true, as Btated by Lieutenant Young.\\nShould an enemy acquire them and operate therefrom\\nof supplies, no power on earth could dislodge this enemy, who,\\noperating therefrom as a base of supplies and opei \u00c2\u00bbn tii\\ngreat commerce and cities of the Pacific coast, would\\nmediable disaster. We could possibly, by appropriating thou-\\nBandsof millions of dollars therefor, fortify every point on that\\ncoast, but we could not with Unit fully protect our\\nfrom Buch attack even with a mighty navy added; for the attack-\\ning party always gathers its force t a known point, wb\\npart v attacked ii iver knows where tin- blow is to -ti nek.\\nWith Bawaii fortified, therefore, we have an outpost inipn\\nMe to all attack and from Which our Navy can Bweep the Pai ific.\\nog iii the rear any fleet attempting an assault tip\\ncoast, attacking at a distance any Buch, and rendering helph\\ndenial of coal supplies any enemy approachio\\nWith Hawaii, th refore, we will ma Pacific\\nmanding and protecting at once Alaska, the P ad the\\neastern terminus of the Nicaragua anal.\\nntlemen have suggested a coaling Btation at [Jnalaska.\\nBide of the incontrovertible argument that this i\\nlor sufficient reasons by navigators, the necessit) wh\\nthe acquisition of the Qnalaska \u00c2\u00bbn equallj\\nargues the necessity tor the acquisition of the nly ot\\ncable coaling station in the Pacific, Hawaii, whicl\\nof defense of incalculable value.\\nIt Bhould he borne in mind t! thechief\\nof Hawaii will be th I of the western entra\\nragua Canal when c I. To this point Hawaii is almost\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2j. I miles nearer than Ohalaska. Promacommei dpoint\\nall vessels bound from the Orient ild bo\\ncompelled to call at Hawaii for BUpplies. Certainly n\\nwould go 3,016 miles farther north for Buch to Dhalaska.\\nNo words can so forcibly illustrate th sb andcomm\\nvalue of Hawaii to the United the map. showing in miles\\nthe relative position there f in the Pacific, which I wdl hi i\\nas a part of my consideration of this question.", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "9\\nANN] 1 1 N ID UTS A UCALLBB A!tM V AM s vvv\\nWith this impregnable barb r commanding our w e st e rn coast,\\ncapable of accommodating our entire Navy, and which an l\\ndefended against the navies and armies of the world without tip-\\nuse of a single battle Bhip by the manning of fortifications on\\nland, we have minimized the cost of future Pacific coasl defense.\\nInstead of annexation requiring an additional navy t defend\\nthese islands, these islands will, when necessary, defend the Navy.\\nOur possession of them, properly fortified and need as a b\\nsupplies for our ships, while rendering the Pacific i from\\nattack, will at the same time decrease the requirements of a strong\\nnavy to defend every point of that coast. Especially i- this true\\nshould the islands come into p issession of a hostile country. The\\ntopograph) of the country will enable us by modern fortifications,\\nwith the service of local militia and volunl sers, to hold it against\\nall hostile corners.\\nAnnexation, therefore, means economy, means a smaller navy,\\nmeans a smaller army to render impregnable our\\nTins vn.w BTTPPORTKD nv ALL naval am mii\\nNot only is the strategic value of Hawaii asserted and the a\\nability of annexation supported by the facts and opinions cited,\\nbut also by an unbroken Line and unanimity of opinion of ur\\nnaval and military experts. We educate many of these gentlemen\\nat public expense in order to avail our country of their technical\\nknowledge; we commit to their knowledge and judgment in tlm\\nof war the lives of our citizens, our property, and our country.\\nFrom their ranks spring such men as Dewey and Hobson, whose\\ngenius and bravery excite the applause of the world and command\\nthe expressed admiration of the enemy. Their opinions, there-\\nfore, in matters environed by conditions calling for such should\\nbe accepted by us as conclusive. At least this must be true when\\nthese opinions are rcen forced by the criterion of pi mmon\\nsense,\\nThe following are a few of the many of this ord IT of merit.\\nAn English authority, the London Tim\\nThe narrow, land-locked Inlet or lagoon named Pearl River Harbor la In\\nitself small m extent, lmt it is f inestimable valo\\npossessing it and nsm^ it for naval purposes. In the deep w\\nsheltered lake not only the armed lui of the conn-\\ntries may tiii 1 peace and perfect security. The maritime power which holds\\nPearl Ettver Harbor and moors her fleet there b N ortH\\nPacific.\\nGeorge W. Melville, Chief Engineer of the Navy,\\none of we recognized leading naval engineers of the a\\ncently written upon this question as f llows:\\nICODKRH WAII I IKi: A Tllll .l IN\\nIt is true that we are whOIl]\\nthe United States desires no rritory. but j In the\\nfull matnten rights with Eastern peoples, there\\nto I ii probable cause clash N\\nthief In the night .viftly and without warning. Jomlni.a\\nof strategy, has said, No enemy is so in\\nlooted i v any power, however Cormidal\\nA wis,- state should apply the same re i he\\nBays, Iron weighs at least as much as g ld i I\\nan answer wholly apt t the argument of th who, calm in the coi\\npresent peace, would rely up n the ansi tlth of the\\nStates and our limitless imeetthest idden war. l\\nbering the gold only, and forgetting the vital iron of militai\\nHAWAII BBIDOBS A BS v 0THBBWI8S DfPASSABLB.\\nAnil so while at this time we are wholly at peace on tl\\nbreadth of that wide ocean lies between us aud the at I", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "10\\nmay si ime time be hostile to us, yet it must be remembered that in a moment\\npeace may fade and that Hawaii bridges the stretch of sea which without the\\nisland group would be at this stage in the development of marine propulsion\\nimpassable to an enemy s fleet.\\nPEARL HARBOR THE KEY TO WESTERN DEFENSE.\\nPearl Harbor is the sole key to the full defense of our western shore, and\\nthat key should lie in our grasp only.\\nWHY HAWAII ISA STRATEGIC POINT AND MADEIRA NOT.\\nHawaii s unique advantages as a strategic point of prime importance have\\nbeen set forth so ably and so often as to forbid their citation here. One or\\ntwo objections raised by not a few nontechnical critics may, however, be\\nconsidered.\\nPearl Harbor is 2,100 miles from our western coast, and Madeira is about\\nthe same distance from our eastern shore. The latter has little, if any. mili-\\ntary value. Why. then, should Hawaii, parted by the same stretch of sea,\\nexceed it in importance?\\nPACIFIC SO BROAD WAR SHIPS MUST RECOAL AT HAWAII.\\nThe critics forget that the paramount worth of the Hawaiian group in war\\nwill lie, first, in the fact that the Pacific is so broad that its passage will\\nexhaust the coal supply of a war vessel, making necessary a renewal at Hon-\\nolulu; and, second, in the isolation of the group, with the absence of other\\nla ml between it and our coast. If the Pacific were as narrow as the Atlantic,\\nor if other islands intervened\u00e2\u0080\u0094 as with Madeira\u00e2\u0080\u0094 between our western shore\\nand Hawaii, the strategic value of the latter would be largely reduced.\\nPEARL HARBOR IMPREGNABLE.\\nAgain, it has been urged that if we shall take the group we shall but\\nacquire territory to defend\u00e2\u0080\u0094 an element not of strength, but of weakness, in\\nwar. and one which will make necessary large additions to our fleet. Pearl\\nHarbor can be made an impregnable ocean fortress. It is true that one does\\nnot wage war with fortresses. It is also true, however, that they form vant-\\nage points from which a force may sally and under whose wing that force\\nmay supply and recruit for fresh attack. If Hawaii in naval conflict shall\\nhave no useful function in this, then it would seem that, through the wars of\\nall time, the eager strife for the possession of for tresses, of guarded ports, of\\nfrontier outposts, has been false strategy, an error militarily.\\nENEMY ATTACKING WESTERN COAST MUST FIRST CONTROL HAWAII.\\nAs to the dread of the economist or of the altrurian, that annexation will\\nrequire largely augmented naval strength, it may be said that if an adequate\\nforce of the united States be stationed at Hawaii and its coast communica\\ntions be properly guarded, an enemy from over sea would violate some of\\ntin- cardinal principles of naval strategy and invite sure disaster in attacking\\nour western Bhores without first blockading or defeating the Hawaiian\\nsquadron. The force of Pearl Harbor should then form simply but the first\\nline of defense. Then the seagoing ships fit to lie in a line, with their tor-\\npedo auxiliaries should be gathered to meet first the assault, leaving the coast\\nguard to the reserve of torpedo craft and monitors stationed at fortified\\nports. The strength of the squadron a* this mid-Pacific outpost should be,\\ndoubtless, sufficient to meet the enemy, but the force on the coast could bo\\nreduced.\\nCaptain Mahan, whose writings upon naval science are of such\\nmerit as to have been translated into many foreign languages, has\\nwritten as follows upon this subject:\\nIt is one of the most important strategic points in the world. It stands\\nalone, having no rival and admitting no rival. It istheone spot in the Pacific\\nIn, ni tin- equator on the south to Alaska on the north, and between America\\non the cast and Asia on the west, where water, food, or coal can be obtained.\\nIt is also on or near the principal trade routes across the Pacific. Its unique\\nposition is what has given it the name of the crossroads of the Pacific,\\nthe key of the Pacific, the Gibraltar of the Pacific.\\nTill: POSSESSION OF HAWAII WILL STRENGTHEN THE UNITED STATES.\\n1. From a military point of view the possession of Hawaii will strengthen\\nthe United States. Of course, as is constantly argued, every addition of ter-\\nritory is an additional exposed point; but Hawaii is now exposed to pass\\nunder foreign domination\u00e2\u0080\u0094 notably Japan\u00e2\u0080\u0094 by a peaceful process of over-\\nrunning and assimilation. This will inevitably involve its possession by a\\nforeign power a grave military danger to us\u00e2\u0080\u0094 against which preoccupation\\nby the United States is, in my judgment, the only security.\\nA LARGER NAVY Mi. BSSABY WITHOUT THAN WITH HAWAII.\\nIn replying to the second question I must guard myself from being\\nunderstood to think our present Pacific fleet great enough for probable con-\\n3537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "11\\ntingencies, Willi Luis imoi istlwi n greater amy would not be n led for\\nthe defense of the P khan would be required with the Islands un-\\nannexed. If wo have the Islands, and in the Pacific a Heel of proper force,\\ntho presence of the latter, r of an adequate detachment from it. at the\\nHawaiian Islands will materially woaken if not wholly cripple an] attempted\\nInvasion of the Pacific ooast (except from British Columbia), and\\nquently will proportionately strengthen us.\\nWith a 11. -ft .r the same si/.o. and Hawaii unoccupied by either party, tho\\nenemy would at. least be hi a better position to attach us; while if he suc-\\nceeded In establishing himself In any of our ooast anchorages, he would l o\\nfar better off. For In the latter case the Islands would n..i menace his com-\\nmunications with home, which they would If In our poaa ohm, because Ha\\nwail Hanks the communications.\\nIt Ls obvious also that Ifwedonot hold the islands ourselves we cannot\\nexped the nentrals In the war to prevent the other belligerent from occupy\\n.11. nor can t be Inhabitants themselves prevent Bucta i. Tho\\ncommercial value Is not great enough to provoke neutral Interposition. In\\nshort, in war we should need a larger navy t.. defend the Pacific coast, be-\\ncause we should have not only to defend our own coast, but to prevent, by\\nnaval force, an enemy from occupying the islands: whereas, if we had pre-\\noccupied them, fortifications could preserve them to us.\\nCOAi.tN.; A I BBA IMi ii v. tii IAB1 i:.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2i. Coal can be transported hi colliers, but as yet it can not be transsl\\nAith either rapidity or certainty. Even If it be occasionally pra. tlca-\\niii.. t :ii at sea, the process is si. .wand uncertain. Reliance upon such\\nmeans only is. In my Judgment, Impassible. A base must i had. and. .-x.-.-pt,\\nthe ports of our own coast, there is none to be nam. 1 alongside Of Hawaii.\\nAdmiral Porter, in an official report with reference to Hawaii,\\nstates:\\nEuropean commerce, customs, enterprise, and ideas of government are\\nmaking rapid strid.-s all over that vast an l .i iiflc a t neater on which\\nnal lire Beems to have intended the United States should exereise the princi-\\npal a infcroL\\nAnd ho deprecates the occupancy of those islands by any other\\npower as follows:\\nThey could launch forth their ships of war upon us with perfect impunity,\\nandin the event of war we should be driven from the Pacific.\\nEvery consideration points to the absolute nee Ity of obtaining for the\\nUnited states a paramount Influence thoi-e.\\nAdmiral Du Pont has also officially reported in language similar\\nupon tho necessity of these islands as a natural Pacific coast de-\\nfense:\\nIn tho Pacific we already have outposts on our flanks In the hands of first-\\nowera It is Imp esible to estimate too highly the value and Impor-\\ni ince it t tie Sandwich Islands, whether In a commercial or military point of\\nview, should circumstances ever place them In our hands, they would pn ve\\nthe most Important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific I\\nacquisition intimately connected with our commercial and naval Bupi\\nin those seas.\\nAnd Admiral Belknap Btates:\\nan.M .xation 01 KOXXRTOUfl DTTXBB8T am VITAL IHPOBTAJ\\nTo the people of the United Stat\\ninterest and of vital imp rta:ve. fad I. it would seem that i\\ntablished that group to be ultimately occupied as an outpost,aa it v\\nthe great Republic on Its western border and that the tune had no..\\nfor the fulfillment ofsuch de\\nA glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual oh\\nthe great Importance and Inestimable value of those Islands as a strategic\\npoint and commercial center. Bituated in mid North Pacific, the group looks\\nout on every hand toward grand opportunities of trade, political aggrandize-\\nment, and polyglot intei\\nThe group now seeks annexation to the United States; the consummation\\nof such wish would inure to the benefit of both peoples, commercially and\\npolitically. Annex the islands, constitute them a Territory, ai\\ntrade will double within ten yean. Let the islanders feel that they are once\\nand forever under the folds of the American Bag, as part and parcel of tlej\\ngreat Republic, and a development will take place in the group that will at\\noucesurprise its people and the world.", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "12\\nFAILURE TO ANNEX WOULD BE FOLLY.\\nNot to take the fruit within our grasp and annex the group now begging\\nns to take it in would be folly, indeed\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a mistake of the gravest character.\\nLoth for the statesmen of the day and for the men among us of high com-\\nmercial aims and great enterprises.\\nOur statesmen should act in this matter in the spirit and resolve that\\nsecured to us the vast Louisiana purchase, the annexation of Texas, and the\\nacquisition of California. The Administration that secures to the United\\nStales the coign of vantage in the possession of those beautiful islands\\nwill score a great measure of beneficent achievement to the credit side of its\\naccount.\\nTo which may he added contributions from the pen of that in-\\nvaluable contributor to military science, General Schofield:\\nFrom the time, twenty-five years ago, when I made a personal examination\\nfor the purpose of ascertaining the value of those islands to this country for\\nmilitary and naval purposes, I have always regarded ultimate annexation of\\nthe islands to this country as a public necessity. But the time when this\\nshould lie accomplished had to depend on natural political development. In\\nt In- 1 1 leantime our national interests should be secured by the exclusive right\\nto occupy, improve, and fortify Pearl River Harbor, so as to insure our pos-\\nsession of that harbor in time of war.\\nPEARL HARBOR MUST BE HELD AT ANY COST.\\nTo illustrate my views on this subject, I have likened that harbor to a\\ncommanding position in front of a defensive line which an army in the field\\nis compelled to occupy. The army must occupy that advanced position and\\nhold it, at whatever cost, or else the enemy will occupy it with his artillery,\\nand thus dominate the main line. If we do not occupy and fortify Pearl\\nRiver Harbor, our enemy will occupy it as a base from which to conduct op-\\nerations against our Pacific coast and the isthmian canal, which must, of\\ncourse, in due time, be constructed and controlled by this country. The\\npossession of such a base at a convenient distance from our Pacific coast\\nwould be a great temptation to an unfriendly nation to undertake hostile op-\\nerations against us.\\nPEARL HARBOR CAN BE DEFENDED WITHOUT A NAVY.\\nOne of the greatest advantages of Pearl River Harbor to us consists in the\\nfact that no navy would be required to defend it. It is a deep, landlocked\\narm of the sea, easily defended by fortifications placed near its mouth, with\\nits anchorage beyond the reach of guns from the ocean.\\nNo hallway measures will suffice. We must accept the islands and hold\\nand govern them or else let some other great nation do it. To fail now to\\ncarry intoeffect oar own great national policy upon the first occasion offered\\nto us W( iuld, in my judgment, be one of those blunders which are worse than\\ncrimes.\\nIt would be idle to multiply opinions upon this subject or to at-\\ntempt to add to the value, weight, or conviction borne by those\\nalready cited.\\nIt seems to me, therefore, that the advisability of annexation\\nfrom a strategic standpoint is not only established by the logic of\\nthe situation and the opinions of those entitled to be given weight,\\nbut is a geometrical axiom capable of absolute demonstration.\\nTHE II II id. POLITICAL STATUS OF HAWAII. A PROTECTORATE, AND THE\\nMINORITY REPORT.\\nWisdom in legislation, particularly in matters of great national\\nconcern, involving the possibility of the national defense, requires\\nthat every apparent possible contingency be provided against.\\nThe occasion having arisen when this Government is called upon\\nto finally adopt a course with reference to this question, at this\\nla^t opportunity this Congress should not leave the country ex-\\nposed to any subsequent embarrassment.\\nIt will be conceded by all that Hawaii is incapable of independ-\\nent existence. Of small area and population, of limited wealth\\nand revenues, without any navy or army, she is incapable, in\\ntimes of foreign or domestic complications, which confront every\\ngovernment from time to time, of maintaining an independent\\nsovereignty. More particularly is this true as her strategic posi-", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "13\\ntion in tho Pacific makes her the object of the jealousies of other\\nnations and consequent subject of controver\\nit has. therefore, been tho history of these islands thai they\\nhave been tossed about from one domination to another, foreign\\nand domestic. All of its governments have Bought the strong\\narm Mt some foreignpower npon which to lean their precarious\\npolitical existence. Four times in the past eighty-four years had\\nshe been taken possession of once by Russia, twice by Franco,\\nand once by England. In the past Ihu- quasi-political identity\\nhas b ten preserved solely by the moral .support given thai\\nence by this Government.\\nIt is idle to multiply arguments upon this proposition, however,\\nfor the argument is foreclosed by the minority report upon this\\nresolution, which asserts the necessity of a quasi protectorate over\\nthese islands by this Government.\\nFor my part I am unable to appreciate either the cogency of tho\\nlogic or the consistency of the opposition here that asserts at once\\nthat the people of these islands are a Bavage, ignorant, leprous,\\nand undesirable population and at the same time demands that\\nwe become by a protectorate responsible for their conduct with all\\nnations without having the right to control their actions. If their\\nC mdition is as stated, nothing short of annexation can justify any\\nassumption of responsibility for that people bv us.\\nWhile the moral support of this country has Bufficed in the\\npremises in the past, wo are now confronted by new conditions\\ndemanding different treatment.\\nIn the progress of the century these islands have increased in\\nimportance. The lethargy of the Pacific is disturbed by a rapidly\\nincreasing commerce, lis quiet is viewing the gradual assembling\\nhereof the great navies of the world. To the west with gigantic\\nstrides Japan is suddenly thrust into the horizon, ambitious, p \u00c2\u00bbw-\\nerful, grasping. Activity will supplant the quietude of the Pa-\\ncific.\\nLocal conditions in Hawaii have changed. A Republic has sup-\\nplanted a monarchy, a Republic whose principles and govern-\\nment are similar to ours and whoso creation and perpetuity were\\nand are manifestly contingent upon absorption within and annexa-\\ntion to our Government. A silent but dreadful enemy is pi\\nin a majority population, under any general franchise, of Japan-\\nese who demand and whose country demands for them political\\nliberty in Hawaii, tho right to participate in the law and treaty-\\nmaking power, without renouncing their allegianc 1 to their native\\nJapan. Japan has covel tus eyes upon Hawaii and will take her\\nat the first opportunity, by peace it possible, by force if necessary.\\nThe repeated declarations of our Presidents and Congress cer-\\ntainly assure Hawaii that she has and would alw \\\\vs ha\\nmoral support. But in the presence of and under this protection\\nnew conditions bring home to her the truth that this will no\\nlonger avail. By peaceful evolution or by war, if Hawaii is not\\nannexed to the United States by the pending resolution, she will\\npass into tho possession of some foreign ower, leaving as the\\nalternative to us her loss or recovery at the cosl of an expensive\\nwar.\\nThe student of existing condition- can no) escape this conclu-\\nsion.\\nIf we reject this resolution and the treaty pending, how can wo\\nlonger expect to maintain a protectorate over Hawaii? The pres-\\nent Government derives its force largely because it is\\n3537", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "14\\nregarded as a step to annexation. Their present constitution is\\nbased upon annexation. If we reject annexation, the present\\nauthorities, to preserve their existence, their properties, consti-\\ntuting three-fourths of that on the islands, nay, their very lives,\\nwill offer the Republic to some other country on the condition of\\nthe preservation of themselves, their properties, and political\\nrights. What, then, becomes of our protectorate? Whom can\\nwe protect when no one asks our protection? Grant our inter-\\nference; does anyone dream that if the present Hawaiian Gov-\\nernment offered to annex Hawaii to Japan, we could prevent that\\nconsummation except by an expensive, prolonged, and possibly\\ndreadful war?\\nOr suppose no such offer is made, and we reject this treaty and\\nresolution, and in due course of time Japan asserts the franchise\\nright for her citizens in Hawaii, or that the natives qualify and\\nvote; does anyone doubt that the then established Government, to\\nsecure its permanency, would turn to Japan or some other nation\\nfor support?\\nOr grant that the Government remains the same in Hawaii and\\nour moral support the same, and Spain demands indemnity against\\nHawaii for not remaining neutral in the present war, and presents\\nclaim for permitting us to coal and supply in her ports on the way\\nto the Philippines, does anyone doubt that this would be a valid\\nclaim under the laws of nations and in amount would be so great\\nas to extend Spanish suzerainty over Hawaii? Is not here a moral\\nconsideration on our part to annex in order to save that little Re-\\npublic the disaster her loyalty to our cause has imposed upon her?\\nOr grant that no one of these occurrences comes to pass, but\\nthat, present conditions prevailing, we become involved in a war\\nwith Japan or some other nation of first-class power possessing a\\nnavy equal or superior to ours, unless we shall have previously\\nannexed and fortified Hawaii, how long before Hawaii would be\\ninvested by the enemy, fortified, and made a base of supplies to\\nharass our western coast and destroy our commerce? What\\nwould the moral force of a protectorate avail then? And how\\nlong would it require for us to dislodge an enemy here? Our re-\\ncent experiences at Santiago and Havana should be instructive.\\nThe terror of citizens, abandonment of resorts and business upon\\nour seaboards, the frantic clamor from the coasts, even the Pa-\\ncific, should bear fresh witness of the disasters occasioned even\\nby the remotest possibilities of coast attack.\\nIf a possibly rotten Spanish fleet at Cadiz terrorizes the Atlantic\\ncoast, what would be the condition of the public mind on the\\nPacific coast with a hostile Japanese fleet of first-class war ships,\\nsuperior to ours, as she possesses, intrenched at Hawaii? I well\\nremember that with the inferior Spanish fleet at Manila, guarded\\nby the superior force of Dewey, when it was proposed to remove\\nthe Oregon and Mon lercy from the Pacific coast, a storm of pro-\\ntests from these good citizens was showered upon the Navy De-\\npartment and the delegation in Congress. The amount of damage\\nto the Pacific coast and commerce consequent upon the occupancy\\nof Hawaii by an enemy in time of war would be incalculable.\\nThis is not a speculative consideration. It is a reasonable prob-\\nability, and as such, while we are determining this matter, should\\nbe avoided absolutely, completely, and forever by the annexation\\nof these islands. The fact that under an existing protectorate the\\nPresident and Government of this Republic wish to surrender thei r\\nhigh offices and are imploring us to receive their independent sov-\\n3537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "15\\nereignty as a dependency outfit to demonstrate tho incompetency\\nof Sat protectorate tomeel Inevitable conditions, and ought at\\nthe sain.- time to convince Congress thai animminenl danger con-\\nfronts as wherenpon. it we do not act, there may bo lost to tins\\ncountry an opportunity of defense rarely offered in tho life and\\nsituation of a nation.\\nIf wo fail to act in this emergency and upon this opportunity,\\nwhere no other nati d is protesting or will protest, at a tun.- when\\nHawaii is I Ing to be annexed, at a lime when the absolute\\nnecessity for these islands is demonstrated by their use by us in\\ncoaling and supplying our ships en route to tho Philippines ana in\\nresting and refreshing our gallant soldiers thence bound, ii wo\\nwait until the progressof time and the development oj conditi\\npresent obstacles to annexation, in myjudgmenl oneof thegrai\\nblunders of the century will have been committed by the wisest\\nnation of the century.\\nThe political status of the Hawaiian Government is unstable,\\nA protectorate will not suffice: annexation alone is necessary to\\nand will provide against all menacing contingencies upon our\\nwestern coast. Therefore I conceive tho imperative duty of the\\nhour to be annexation.\\nThe manifest duty of tho hour to insure our defense in future\\nwars to remove a source of complications in future i\\nis to annex these islands. So long as they remain under their\\npresent and similar governments they will ever be a menace b. the\\npeace of this country by involving us in controversies over them.\\nThe solution and safety of the situation demand immediate an-\\nnexation,\\nANNEXATION WILL lsr.NI .l IT I. VnOR.\\nIt is charged by the opponents of annexation that such will in-\\niure the condition of the laborers of this country. 1 he meresug-\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2restionof this statement is sufficient to warrant consideration,\\nfor if found true it should under ordinary circumstances control\\nin the matter.\\n,rrect understanding of the elements and forces involved\\nargues the converse, that annexation will benefit the labor Of this\\ncountry. This phase of the question has been much befogged by\\na want of a clear understanding thereupon. Even so well in-\\nformed a gentleman as Mr. Gompers. president oi the Ami r\\nFederation of Labor, whom I deem and know personally to bean\\nintelligent, honorable, and capable gentleman.has fallen into this\\ncrror.\u00c2\u00b0 In a letter addressed toSpeaker Rki Dafewdays since ho\\nsaid:\\nThe laborers are corralled In gangs of from twelv. i each can*\\nluivnVganoTOr armed a whip with which diligtt\\nU ^eoTerw tognumoerofc mtrae1 Z^\u00c2\u00a3Eft\u00c2\u00a33ES 3S\u00c2\u00a3\\nin the suttar Industry, an I r employers have ahva ii.it\\nthe sn- ir in.l iVtrv can a I oily o .nducted\\n^sssssssssssa snaa\\nthe United l ,c V ,in\\nKmiUvieh islands permitted to coi\\ns^cieToflab^ repugnant to the fi\\nM^ardawtost the extension of the same s]\\nr indu.trv of Louisianaand thecotton flel\\nIt n V.irl d more than twenty 3 Ution,\\nand education ^legislatively close I he nese.\\nThe wisdom of that legislation ha i b den intil there are few\\nif any. who now The annexati. w. mid. with\\none stroke of the pen,\\nour gates, which would threaten an inundation of Hong liana to overwhelm\\ntho free laborers of our country.\\n3 37", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "16\\nThe undesirable classes of inhabitants of these islands against\\nwhom criticism is leveled are the Chinese, Japanese, and Ha-\\nwaiians.\\nSo far as the Japanese residents are concerned, annexation will\\nnot change their status or rights. They can now enter these\\nislands or the United States at will.\\nSo far as the Hawaiians are concerned, the same considerations\\napply. Annexation will not permit a single additional native or\\nJapanese to enter this country.\\nSo far as the Chinese are concerned, the resolution contains a\\ncondition of annexation which not only prohibits the Chinese in\\nHawaii entering this country after annexation, but expressly\\nprohibits any more Chinese entering Hawaii. The provision\\nthereupon is:\\nThere shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Is-\\nlands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed\\nby the laws of the United States: and no Chinese, by reason of anything\\nherein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Ha-\\nwaiian Islands.\\nSo that, inasmuch as the Chinese can and do go to Hawaii from\\nChina and establish factories there, sending much of their prod-\\nucts into this country free of duty under the existing reciprocity\\ntreaty, and as further emigration from China to Hawaii for that\\npurpose will by annexation be prohibited, to that extent future\\ncompetition by Chinese labor with our laborers will be stopped by\\nannexation.\\nAnd inasmuch as much, or in fact the vast bulk, of the products\\nand manufactures of the Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, and na-\\ntives in Hawaii are now admitted into this country by treaty free\\nof duty, and thus thrown into competition with our laborers\\nproducts, annexation can not injure our laborers.\\nBut, as Mr. Gompers says, the vast majority of these are con-\\ntract laborers and the sugar industry is run by them. Then, since\\nthis is true and this product of contract labor competes with a\\nsimilar product of our laborers, coming in free of duty to our mar-\\nkets, that is the very best reason for annexation, because, when\\nwe annex these islands, instead of the United States being gov-\\nerned by their laws they will be governed by ours, one of which\\nis that contract labor is unlawful. While this might not invali-\\ndate existing labor contracts, it would and certainly will prohibit\\nnew ones and mean the early extinction of contract labor in\\nI lawaii.\\nTin; advantage of annexation to our laborers then will be the\\nultimate extinction of contract labor in Hawaii, which now com-\\npetes in open market with our laborers. (The effect of this upon\\nour beet-sugar industry I will speak of later.) To contend, as\\ndo( !fl Mr. iompers, that annexation will extend these local Hawaiian\\ncontract-labor laws to the United States is to contend that instead\\nof annexing Hawaii, coming in under our laws, we are annexing\\nthe United States to Hawaii, going in under their laws. This is\\nreductio ad absurdum.\\nThe experiences of mankind demonstrate that all inferior races\\ndecimate and become extinguished before the march of Anglo-\\nSa son civilization and laws. The annexation of Hawaii, with the\\nChinese exclusion condition quoted, means the extirpation from\\nHawaii of the Chinese, Japanese, and Hawaiians now competing\\nin open market with our laborers. The invasion by Anglo-Saxons\\nfollowing annexation of these islands so guarantees. Since the\\nenactment of the United States Chinese exclusion laws the num-", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "17\\nber of !hinese in this country has b en rapidly decreasing;.\\nwill be when cur exclusion laws are extended to Hawaii.\\npressly provided by these resolutions. Indeed, the resolutions\\nare stronger, Cor under them no Chinese whatever can go to Ha-\\nwaii. The native! [awaiians have, in obedience to history, In past\\nyears been reduct d from half a million to 80,000.\\nThe following table shows the relative population of thi\\nin 1890 and 1898:\\ntfati ompared.\\ni ality.\\nBawaiians\\nPari Bawaiians\\nihinese\\nAmericana\\nBawaiian born, for-\\neign parent\\nJapanese\\nNorwegian\\n31,436\\n6, 186\\n15,30]\\n1 828\\nr. (96\\n12 380\\n31,019\\n8,485\\n21,616\\nNationality.\\nBritoi\\nPorl oguese\\nins\\nb\\nt ther foreigners\\naian\\nl 944\\n419\\n15,191\\n101\\n000\\n89,990\\nDivided into nationality of parents.\\nThis table is instructive. It shows Japan s desire and attempl\\nto populate these islands by a majority of her people, BO as to ac-\\nquire th- in: it shows annexation will limit the number of th\\nelimination of tho possibility of accomplishing this purp\\nshows that a great influx of Chinese will be Btopped; il shows\\nthat the natives are gradually becoming extinct. Increased Anglo-\\nSaxon habitation will increase this, it shows, in short, that an-\\nnexation will naturally diminish this alien competitive force of\\nlaborers\u00e2\u0080\u0094 drive them out of these islam l where they hover under\\ncover of the reciprocity treaty as competitors with our laborers.\\nThe impetus jjiven business by the insurance of a stable govern-\\nment by annexation will immediately populate these islands wi li\\nsuch an influx of Americans that all other races musl go before\\nthem. The Japanese and the Chinese, as soon or before their three\\nor five years labor contract expires, by necessity of law, will le\\npart the native in due course of his destiny wilV become extinct\\nso that annexation means the annihilation in these islands of con-\\ntract labor now competing with our laborers inopenmai\\nbenefit rather than an injury to our laborers.\\nWe should, if for no other reason, annex Hawaii so that by\\nextending our contract-labor inhibiting laws thereto we can blol\\nand drive from its Bhores the contract labor i \u00c2\u00bbW competing with\\nour laborers in open market. This alone, other, things being I QUal,\\nwould justify annexation. The- organized labor of the country\\nrealizes and appreciates this, as will be Been from the following:\\nWA8HIKOT09 I 1 I\\nDear Sir: In reply to yonr Inquiry of even date i eelingof or-\\nganized labor on the question ot the annexation of Bawail, I\\nstate that my Individual opinion, base 1 on thirty-three years ei\\nwage-earner and twenty years among organized men, con to take\\n;th Mr. t tempers, who was quoted as opposed to annexation\\nh wii- 1 i irk, t Missouri, In the House of B\\nSaturday last.\\nin this opinion Mr. Gkmipen should have l n in..to,i as an Individual and\\nDot as a representative of organized labor, and do man has authority\\nthai organized labor is for r against annexation, foi Ion has never\\nbeen placed before organized labor,\\nMr. Qompere himself, I am reliably informed, is a man of limited\\nence as a wage-earner, ant does not correctly cihil tl\\namong American worktngmen, who desire to aphold in time of war Che Aa-\\n;i )7-2", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "18\\nministration, regardless of their own political opinions, and he seems to ig-\\niK re their oft-expressed desire to extend commerce and multiply the oppor-\\ntunities to labor. My belief is that Mr. Gornpers, on this question, stands\\nalmost alone, as I am informed he did at the last convention of his own or-\\nganization on the anti-Cuban war resolution.\\nI have the honor to be, very respectfully,\\nA. M. LAWSON,\\nMaster Workman District Assembly 60, Washington, D. ft\\nHon. Charles H. Grosvenor,\\nHouse of Re2 resen tatives.\\nThe Hotel Raleigh, Washington, D. ft, June 13, 1803.\\nDear Sir: In reply to your communication of the 11th instant concern-\\ning the position of organized labor on the annexation of Hawaii, permit me\\nto state that I know of no labor organization, or any branch of it, which has\\ntaken any action on the matter. No doubt some members prominently\\nidentified with labor have expressed themselves on the subject one way or\\nanother as their individual opinions had led them, but the question has not\\nreceived that consideration, to my knowledge, which the American work-\\nman does and should give to matters bearing on his interests.\\nOrganized labor, in my opinion, should never be identified with partisan\\npolitics. We should at all times be free to strike an enemy or to assist a\\nfriend. In either case our memory should be good, irrespective of whatever\\nhis political party affiliations may be, for I hold that to advance the interests\\nof organized labor is to advance the best interests of the state, and that is\\nthe first duty of every citizen worthy of the name. This is the school and\\nthe teaching which dominate the organizations which I have the honor to\\nrepresent.\\nAs to tho annexation of Hawaii, which in no sense is a party issue, while it\\nis true that we have not in any council or convention taken any position on\\nthe matter, it is also true that the sentiment of tho great mass of the mem-\\nbership favor the proposition, as do many of their chief executive officers, as\\nshown by the inclosed telegrams. This expression has become more pro-\\nnounced as the apparent necessity grows since the brilliant victory of Manila.\\nSuch feelings are inspired by the same motives which prompted so many of\\nour members to enter the volunteer service.\\nIt is not at all probable that in the event of annexation tho condition of\\nlabor in Hawaii would or could bo transplanted to this country, no more\\nthan the quasi serfdom of Mexico would find lodgment under our Constitu-\\ntion, but, on the contrary, I submit there is every reason to believe that the\\nadvanced intelligence, conservatism, and patriotism of the organized Ameri-\\ncan workman would meet such conditions and vastly improve them. There\\nare so many illustrations that it would bo idle to enumerate them.\\nYoUI S trUly W.F.HYNES.\\nRepresenting Brotherhood Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood\\nLocomotive Firemen, Order of Railway Conductors, Brother-\\nhood of Raihvay Trainmen, Order of Railway Telegrapher*.\\nHon. C. n. Grosvexor,\\nHouse of Representatives, Washington, D. C.\\nMontreal, Quebec, June v,, 1893.\\nW. F. Htnes, Raleigh Hotel, Washington, D. ft:\\nAs an American citizen, I am heartily in favor of the annexation of Hawaii.\\nF. P. SAKGENT,\\nChief of Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,\\nPeoria, III., June Ht, 13Q3-\\nW. F. HTNES, care ft Grosi-enor:\\nAnswering vour telegram, in my opinion tho United States should annex\\nthe Hawaiian islands. Tho necessity of our control over tho islands in time\\nit war is now apparent to everyone. Commercially, too, they are of great\\nimportance to us. \u00e2\u0080\u009e,._,,,,.\\nP. H. MOEBISSET,\\nGrand Master Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen.\\nCedar Rapids, Iowa, June U, 1898.\\nV. P Hvm;s. The Raleigh, Washington, D. ft:\\n[n the position which it seems the United States must hereafter occupy, I\\ndeem Hawaii a very valuable, if not indispensable, acquisition.\\nE. E. CLARK.\\nChief Order of Railway Conductors.\\n3537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "LS\\nit was observable and was of nole thai practically every one f\\nthose members of this House who are to day opposing the annexe\\nHon of Hawaii recently voted againsl the consideration in this\\nHonse of the Lodge immigration bill. If it is tins alleged incor-\\nporating into our population of abonl 100,000 of 1 1 1 inhal\\nof Hawaii claimed to be undesirable which actuates their oppo-\\nsition, I conn ni nd to them the Lodge immigration bill, for almost\\nevery sixty or ninety days there comes to this country a great r\\nnumber of foreign immigrants than the whole population of\\nHawaii, all of whom compete more actively with our wage-earn-\\ners when heir than will the population Of Hawaii when an:\\nThis immigranl influx brings as no point of defense, no territory,\\nno advantage as does annexation.\\nIf Congress wishes to serve the laborers of this country, let it\\nannex I fawaii, thereby inhibiting run tract labor on the west, and\\nshut down the gates of Jastle Garden, thereby shutting out com-\\npetition on the east.\\ni i 1 IND THE SUGAR-BEET 1NDU8TR1 IS M I i c I\\nAs the representative upon this floor of a distrid the soil and\\nclimate of large areas of which are admirably adapted to the de-\\nvelopment of the Bugar beet, which infant industry is rapidly\\nbeing undertaken by many of my constituents, l have cone\\nlong and thoroughly this phase of the question. At first sugges-\\ntion l was impressed with a danger to the interests of our Bugar-\\nbeet growers from annexation, but more mature consideration\\nand study demonstrate to my mind thai we have nothing to fear\\nin this direction. On the contrary, annexation will place the\\nAmerican farmer in a better position to compi te with the sugar\\nproducer of Hawaii.\\nWe are to bear in mind continuously that for years past and\\nunder present conditions the Bugar product of the Hawaiian is-\\nlands has come and now comes into this country duty free. T. is\\ncondition would not, of course, be changed by annexation, yet\\nunder this condition the BUgar-beel industry of this country con-\\ntinues to thrive and develop and has grown to what it is to-day.\\nThe only way these respective producers would be affected in a\\nlethal wav would be that at an early day the Hawaiian producer\\nwould be deprived of the use of cheap contract labor,\\nthe cost of production to him would lie enhanced and he propor-\\ntionally injured so far as his ability to compete with our pro-\\nducer is concerned.\\nMher conditions and facts bear upon their -elative situati\\nit i^ a fundamental economic proposition pa ently bo true a- *,i\\ni e idle to demonstrate, that where the demand is far in ex\\nBupply tie -re is no competition between produ\\nThere is not at present any competition between the Hawaiian\\nand American producers of Bugar, though they both sell in the\\nsame open market without any discriminating duty againsl the\\nHawaiian.\\nThis country annually Bends abroad $100, ,000 in pun fa\\nBUgar consumed in this country in addition to that produ\\nboth this country and Hawaii. We annually consume over 2,1\\n000 tons of 2. 24(1 pounds each of sugar in this country, while the\\nentire home and Hawaiian product for is:*:, the largest cv-r pro-\\nduced, was but 528,000 tons. We. therefore, only prodn\\nforth m both Hawaii and the United States of the BUgar we con-\\nsume, and. therefore, there can be and is no present competition", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "20\\nbetween the home and Hawaiian sugar producer. Hence the in-\\ncreased and increasing production of beet sugar in this country.\\nThe possibility that conditions will ever be otherwise is very\\nremote, if not improbable.\\nThe American people are great sugar consumers. The records\\nshow that for the last twenty- three years the amount of sugar\\nconsumed each year in this country annually increased 12 per\\ncent, and that by a most conservative estimate in fifteen years\\nhence the American people will consume annually at least 4,000,-\\n000 tons of sugar.\\nWith 84 per cent of our present consumption of sugar purchased\\nabroad\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that is, outside of Hawaii and thjs country\u00e2\u0080\u0094 with the\\nsugar demand increasing 12 per cent annually, it is absolutely\\nimpossible for this country and Hawaii for many years to come to\\nsupply this demand and thereby become competitors in our mar-\\nkets.\\nSome idea of the remoteness of this improbability may be had\\nby the knowledge of the fact, as stated by Mr. Studniczka, whose\\nwords I will print, that an average-sized sugar factory producing\\n3,500 tons of sugar per annum costs $350,000; that the number\\nof such factories required to produce the quantity of sugar im-\\nported into this country in 1896 would be 506, costing $177,000,000.\\nThere are now only 7 of such factories in this country, where 506\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0would be required if we manufacture all the sugar we consume.\\nMoreover, the annual increasing demand of 12 per cent per an-\\nnum of sugar consumed would require the additional construction\\nannually of 42 sugar factories costing $14,700,000, or in ten years\\nrequiring 420 additional factories, at a cost of $147,000,000, to\\nmanufacture and supply the increased demand alone. In other\\nwords, for this country in 1903 to meet the domestic demand for\\nsugar it must construct 92G sugar factories of an annual product of\\n3,500 tons each, at a cost of $325,000,000, whereas at present, with\\nthe development of that industry, we have only 7.\\nTo contend that this will or can be done is to invade the bounds\\nof absurdity; but unless it is and until it is done there will be no\\ncompetition by Hawaiian beet-sugar growers with our beet-sugar\\ngrowers.\\nBut while time is seeking to accomplish this miracle another\\nfactor enters for consideration. As each year rolls by the ability\\nof the Hawaiian sugar producer to compete with us is being weak-\\nened if not destroyed. We have already attempted to show that\\nthe accomplishment of annexation will be a severe blow to both\\nthe Hawaiian sugar grower and manufacturer, for by this he w^ill\\nbe denied cheap contract labor. As these contracts only run for\\nthree and five years, in that time he will sustain a severe and, ac-\\ncording to many, an irreparable blow, for his ability to produce\\nsugar cheaply will be greatly diminished. He will be compelled\\nas a competitor in our market to pay cost of transportation across\\nthe Pacific, which our farmer will not have to pay.\\nBy reason of the facts that the Hawaiian lands will not produce\\nin alternate seasons other profitable products they are compelled to\\ncrop each year, thereby sooner exhausting their soils and requiring\\nthe additional cost item of high-priced fertilizers, estimated to\\naggregate in 1896 at least $700,000.\\nThe extreme acreage of Hawaiian sugar lands is already tilled\\nfor that purpose. These do not exceed 100,000 acres and coxild\\nnot be made to exceed 20,000 acres more except by very expensive\\ncultivation.\\n3537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "Jl\\nThough hitherto no( developed, the Hawaiian lands are much\\nbetter adapted to and can l\u00c2\u00bb more profitably farmed fori\\nami subtropical fruits, products which we consume, but do not\\nproduce. American enti rprise and capital in possession of these\\nislands, under a Btable government as a guaranty of in\\nwill soon substitute these for the less profitable ragar products.\\nif this Secretary Wilson Bays:\\nHawaii, then, w mpete with sugar producers in the SI\\nWhen he p fth *cientil\\nthe possibilities of coffee pro Inction that can t\u00c2\u00bb- extended over mnch of the\\nlimited Bngar I 1 r :t will be found that In that inda ionop\\noly with which no State In the Union can interfere,\\nno scientific Improvement the coffee tree w I\\nthe berry and Increased yield of the tree through Intelligent\\never been made. I t limateof these Islands Isadmirablj adapted t.i th\u00c2\u00ab\\nproduction ..i many fine fruits that can not be grown in any -t our\\nThey can grow many choice subtropical and tropical fruits that have\\nthe improvement ol which would lead I\\nprofitable production. In these directions the farmers ol tb Stab\\nqi i| a impete with Hawaii.\\nTo show thai the facte and figures offered are based up\\nliable authority I here insert the opinions of the Secretary of\\nculture, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. II. s. Studniczka s aator\\nMorgan, tin former being one of the best exj ts of the day upon\\nthie subject. Secretary Wilson say-:\\nIMPORTATIONS Ol -i\\nThe average amount ol sugar im) ..rt -ii Into the Uniti Dually\\nfrom 1890 to 1897, inclusive,\\n(101,575,383. The importation during the fiscal year ending June 10, IHS7, was\\nthan the average 1 1 four pn h was\\n1 ,752 617 tons, owing to the desire of importers t of the\\ntariff act pending in n^i-.--i during the last months t that j\\nThe a v. \u00e2\u0096\u00a0raj, 1 importation of sugar from the Hawaiian I slum is from\\n1897, inclusive, was 1 19,456 tons, valued at Pho importation for the\\nfiscal year of 1895 was 192.608 tons being 43.053 ton above the average of the\\npr iding four years Durum 1897 the Hawaiian sugar was 9. 1 i\u00c2\u00bb-r\\nthe amount consumed in the United 8 ta tea Prom l t 1807 il\\ncent of our isumptton.\\ni.\\\\-i kipnoa ot in ii bcoah\\nThe beet sugar consumed In the United States In 1808 v\\n1891 it was 81 per cent, of the total consumption The disturbed eondit\\nCuba doubtle caused much of this marked\\nfrom countries In i ontinental Europe are those from whli ti we\\nthe mosi active competition. The production ol beet suimr In the I\\nn was 41,341 tons if 2,340 pounds each: o( rane augni\\nol maple sugar, 5,000 tons, and of sorghum sng i\\nThe total domestic product was\\nThe total refined product of imported sugai ogthe\\ntotal annua! consumption 2,006.383 tons\\nProm the foregoing it appears that W percent I\\nthe United Btatea was Imported.\\nii v\u00c2\u00ab mi vn sua vb i ii i us\\nA prominent question Is, Can this Hawaiian prodm tionb\\nin competition with the American farmer 1 Free entrv int.. the United\\nfrom these islands has given great encouragemi duction ol\\nand the industry has been developed very rapidly We must take int n\\nBideration methods of cultivation In Hawaii tx I Delude\\nwhat the future of the industry will be In that\\nSugarcane is grown continuously on the same land in Hawaii, ami f..r\\nthis reason the soil is being exhausted. The lied t..\\nbuy commercial fertilizers. The three elements of plant food\\nsary to vegetation are nitrogen, potassium, and phosphoric a I Ha\\nwill find saJtpeterin Chile, potash at the Stassfurl mine In Qermai\\nphosphates in Florida. Guano on the islands ol I\\nand quite expensive. When it becomes necessary t i fertilize the soil in\\norder to grow a crop, the expense becomes a considerable item and must In\\nconsidered in determining what th eff\\nAmerican sugar growers\\n537", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "22\\nHAWAII CAN NOT COMPETE.\\nThese considerations lead me to conclude that the system of agriculture\\npursued in Hawaii, which is certainly reducing the fertility of the soil, can\\nnot compete with a system of farm management in the United States, where\\nthe fertility of the soil is not at all reduced. Weconsume in the United States\\nabout 2,000,000 tons of sugar. Something like a million acres devoted to this\\npurpose would produce all the sugar we import into our country at the pres-\\nent time, or 10 acres grown on each one of 100,000 farms, in rotation with other\\ncrops, would meet home demands and do no injury to the soils.\\nThe American farmer will use this crop to diversify the farm system.\\nThe Hawaiian sugar grower is a ono-crop man, and whenever one crop is\\nperpetually grown, be it wheat or maize, oeets or cane, cotton or tobacco,\\nthe available plant food in the soil is certain to be reduced below the point of\\nprofitable production and fertilizers are required.\\nMr. Studniczka in a recent letter states:\\nAs one of your fellow-citizens and a resident of the city of St. Louis since\\n1ST-, I desire to address you these few lines on behalf of the annexation of\\nthe Hawaiian Islands.\\nPrior to coming to St. Louis I had been engaged in the beet-sugar indus-\\ntry of Austria. Then I superintended large sugar refineries here, and for\\nthe past twenty years my business has been that of manufacturing and sell-\\ning sugar-cane fertilizers and dealing in all kinds of sugar machinery, in ad-\\ndition to the construction of sugar and glucose manufactories.\\nAll of my business interests are directly with the sugar and glucose pro-\\nducers of this country. I have no business relations with Hawaii or tho Ha-\\nwaiian sugar plantations and expect to have none. I am most intensely\\ninterested in the success of the beet-sugar industry of the United States,\\nfirst, because I believe that it will be beneficial to my own business interests,\\nand, second, because I believe it will be beneficial to this country as a whole,\\nespecially to the laboring interests. As evidence of my interest in this sub-\\nject, I have written much and often concerning the beet-sugar industry, urg-\\ning that measures be adopted to promote its establishment in this country.\\nAs a delegate to the last trans-Mississippi congress, held in July, 1887, at Salt\\nLake City, Utah, I presented to the congress an address upon the beet-sugar\\nindustry of this country, which is printed in their proceedings.\\nI make this preliminary statement in order that it may demonstrate to you\\nthat all of my personal interests aro to aid and support the beet-sugar indus-\\ntry and the promotion of the domestic production of sugar in general.\\nI have noted with surprise that one of tho principal reasons which appear\\nto l e urged against annexation is that it will injure the beet-sugar industry\\nin the United States, and have therefore made investigation as to the facts\\nand conditions in and concerning Hawaii, with a view to deciding in my own\\nmind whether this objection were valid. As a result of my investigations, I\\nwas unhesitatingly convinced that the annexation of Hawaii will not be in\\nany way injurious to either the domestic cane or beet sugar of this country.\\nSUGAR CONSUMPTION OF THE UNITED STATES.\\nThe United States Government records show that the United States con-\\nsumed during 1898 2,263,000 tons of sugar of 2,000 pounds each. Of this amount\\n269,000 tons were produced from cane grown in tho United States and 44,500\\ntons from beets produced in the United States, and 170.000 tons were produced\\nin Hawaii. Hawaii and ttie United States together therefore produced only\\n(89,000 tuns, requiring 1,773,000 tons to be imported from other countries.\\nThe official statistics of tho United States Government show that for\\ntwenty-three years the average annual increase of sugar consumed in the\\nUnited Statesnas been 12 per cent over that of the previous year. Even in\\ntmparatively dull times the increased consumption for 1897 over that\\nof 1896 was 136,000 tons. It is estimated by Mr. Willett, of Willett Gray,\\nsugar brokers of Now York, one of the best-informed and most conservative\\nsugar authorities of tho world, that tho consumption of sugar in the United\\nStates within fifteen years from now will not be less than 4,000,000 tons per\\nannum. I considor this an entirely safe and conservative estimate.\\nLIMIT OF HAWAIIAN SUGAR PRODUCTION.\\nI ha ve made myself familiar with the facts and figures concerning Hawaiian\\nproduction of sugar. For twenty three years Hawaii has had a free and pro-\\ntected market in the United States for its raw sugar. Under this stimulat-\\ning influence practically all of its lands available for cane culture have been\\nbrought into cultivation. The total area so in cultivation is less than 100,000\\nacres. A few thousand more acres can possibly be brought under cultivation\\nl v pumping water to an elevation of from 150 to SIX) feet.\\nEven the area which this very expensive; cultivation can bring into use is\\nlimited, not to exceed from 15,000 to 20,000 acres. Tho largest amount of\\n8537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "sugar ever produced In Hawaii In one year was a boa I 2-KUioi) tons. Th\\nest amount thai M ever can produce will probably i\\ntons. The area available for cane culture In Hawa\\nquires almost continuous cultivation, which is extremelj oxbaustini\\nsoil.\\nThe present pri duction of Hawaii is possible only by reason of th\\nenormous amounts i f high-grade and expeni\\nHawaii imported during 1896 fertilizers to the amount o( neurlj\\nBides which there were used of domestic fertilizers about the same n\\nAs they nave rop which they can rotate with cane, the exhaustion of the\\nsoil steadily continues, and can only be kept up bj Increasing\\nIzation we can, therefore, be certain th:it the Hawaiian\\ntion wiU be about 800,000 tons of sugar per annum.\\nFUTURE 01 BEET SUGAR IN THIS COUNTRY\\nThe beei sugar Industry can. l firmly believe, be developed until\\nfurnish all the sugar which this country requires; but it will\\nyears to accomplish this. Some idea ol what will have 1 i be done before do-\\nmestic beet Bugar can supply this country with all thesugar II consumes\\ncan be derived From the following figures: An average sized l*\\ntory, producing 3,500 tons of Bugar per annum, will cosi It\\nwould have required 506 1 1 sugar factories, costing\\nthe sugar imported into this country in 1896 from countries other than li\\nIi the annual increase In consumption of the United States Isoi\\n150,000 tons per annum, in --trail of I2per cent, as it has been (or twentj\\nyearopast. It would require each year IS additional factories, stii\\nyear $14,700,000, or within ten years from now it would require I\\nfactories, costing $147,000,000, to supply the Increase In consumption alone.\\nThat i\u00c2\u00ab to say. by 1908 it will require, In round numbei\\nfactories, each capable of an annual product of 3,500 tons, cost! ui\\nto supply the Bugar, which will otherwise be imported from some othci\\ntry to supply the needs of the United States. There are now onlj\\nsugar factories in operation in the United States.\\nEven though the nigheet expectations of the friends of l t sugar are re\\nalized, do they believe that 1,000 beei sugar factories will Ixj\\nthis country within the next ten years) Until thedoi sugar indus-\\ntry is able to Bupply the market of the United States the sugar from Haw ail\\ncan not injure the beet sugar producers of the United Stal there\\nwill be an ansupplied market, with the price fixed by the pri\\nthroughout the world. The only way In which the domestic beet sugar pro\\nducercan be injured by Hawaiian sugar is that the Hawaiian producer\\nundersell him. But the Hawaiian planter will not sell his sugar below tic\\nmarket price unless there is some reason for so d ling, and thei\\nreason so long as there is a market in which both he ana the American]\\nwill be protected by the American tariff.\\nTherefore neither Hawaiian nor domestic United Stal n ill\\nobliged to lower their prices in order to obtain market.\\nso l iikmt.h IN HAWAII THAN B\\nThe beet-sugar producers of this country do no! consider II\\nplanters of Louisiana a menace to their Industry why should th\\nthe Bugar raised in Hawaii a menace to them If Hawaii lerlcan\\nterritory, the cane Bugarof Louisiana and ti ane Bugarof Hawaii will both\\nstand in the same relation to the beet-sugar product\\nto produce a limited amount, while the great field f-r. cpansion will i\\n1 i.-d by the b \u00c2\u00bbt sugar industry, with opportunity to.-. an.l foi\\nto conic far more rapidly than capital ms 1 1 k 1 to be I\\nWith every pern inal reast \u00c2\u00bbn to op p os e Hawaiian annexation. II\\nfad be Injurious to the domestic sugar business of the Unlt\\nim, at the question from a purely selfish aspect, I can seen\\ni ng that the annexation ol Hawaii will In any manner whatsoever Injun\\nthe beet or the cane BUgar Industry of the Un I while then\\nevery reason to believe that it will be beneficial to every b\\ncountry. As a broad measure of national policy, and a- an American\\nI sincerely hope that your honorable body wl dl claims tl\\nBona! Interests may bring before you against the annexation\\nkeep in mind only the ureal strategic advantage to our nation and\\nand that the annexation of Hawaii may be Consummated at an I any date\\nSo that a critical examination of all the facts discloses that the\\nHawaiian sugar producer is nol to-day a competitor with the\\nAmerican sugar producer; that it will require years, if ever, for\\nhim to become such; that when this would become p\\ntance to markets, the increased cost of his labor, the d I\\n3637", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "24\\nof his soils, and the limits of his acreage would, if he continued\\nin business, practically eliminate him as a competitor; while\\nevery reason indicates that long before then these disadvantages\\nand coexistent advantages will have diverted his efforts into an-\\nother field of production, not, possibly, competitive with us, and\\nhe will have entirely surrendered the sugar-producing field to our\\nfarmers. Inasmuch as, therefore, annexation will not possibly\\ndisadvantage our sugar producers now selling in open market\\ntheir sugar products with the Hawaiians, but will be a great\\nfactor in reducing the competitive strength of the Hawaiian pro-\\nducer in this respect and turn his efforts to another field of pro-\\nduction, I say annexation will be a benefit and not an injury to\\nthe American beet-sugar industry.\\nTHE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.\\nThe Congressional records of a hundred years past, covering\\nall the glorious epochs marking the expansion of the confines of\\nthis Republic from the thirteen original States to the present\\nbroad expanse, witnesses the same learned disquisitions upon con-\\nstitutional law, the same declamations upon imperialism having\\nbeen expounded in Congress in opposition to each of the steps of\\nour nation to the present territorial limits. Yet no member here\\nto-day would undo any of these acts. It is a poor commentary\\nupon the wisdom of the fathers to assert that there was denied\\nthis sovereignty in its charter of creation, the power to adjust itself\\nto inevitable growth, population, and welfare.\\nFrom my limited point of view this question seems foreclosed\\nnot only by the express words of the Constitution, but by the de-\\ncisions of the Supreme Court thereupon and the recognized policy\\nof over a century.\\nSection 8, Article I of the Constitution of the United States\\nsays:\\nThe Congress shall have power to provide for tho common de-\\nfense and general welfare of the United States.\\nThat the annexation of these islands is necessary both for the\\ncommon defense and to promote the general welfare, I have\\nalready endeavored to show.\\nSo the powers granted Congress to make treaties and to\\ndeclare war have likewise been held sufficient to warrant the\\nacquisition of territory whenever the same was incident to the\\nsubject-matter thereof.\\nThe Constitution nowhere expressly authorizes or prohibits\\nCongress acquiring territory, but since the full and complete exer-\\ncise of the powers expressly granted Congress above cited at\\ntimes necessarily require the acquisition of territory, these neces-\\nsary powers must by all rules of construction be deemed included\\nin the grants named.\\nNor is Congress limited to any particular procedure, as by treaty\\nor joint resolution, in its exercise of the power providing for the\\ngeneral defense. This is so vital a power to the existence of the\\nsovereignty itself that the framers of the Constitution evidently\\ndid not appreciate the high national importance of marking this\\ndistinction.\\nThat with the express grant of power in the Constitution is\\nincluded the incidental power of acquiring territory when neces-\\nsary has been often decided by the Supreme Court of the United\\nStates.\\n3o37", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "25\\nIn one of these opinions Chief Justice Marshall, sp\\nthe court, says:\\nThe Constitution confers absolutely on the Government o( theUi\\npower of making wars and making treaties; consequently the Qovernment\\n-sc6 the power t acquiring territory her bj treaty.\\nThat opinion was rendered in the great case of the American\\nInsurance Company vs. Canter.\\nAnd again, in the celebrated case of Mormon Church ra. The\\nUnited States, the same court B\\nThe power to acquire territory is derived From the treaty TaMng power\\nand. the power to declare and carry oo war. The incidents ol these\\npowers are those of national sovereignty ;ni l belong to M Independent nov\\nernments.\\nThere can be no question, then, that when the acquisition of\\nterritory is necessary to the common defense or to promote\\nthe general welfare* that the incidental power is granted.\\nTo deny this power now is to reopen tho settled debah\\npolicy of this Government for over one hundred years. The Jon-\\nstitution confers plenary powers for this purpose, and whether\\ntheir exercise shall he by treaty or resolution affects and is af-\\nfected by the exigencies of the occasion only and in nowise\\ntives the existence of this power fundamental to sovereign exist\\nence.\\nThe exercise of this power at intervals for over a hundred years\\nhas grown up with the nation and developed one of\\npolicies and prerogatives as sacred as the written Constitution\\nitself. Through it the area of the country has expanded from\\n800,000 to 3,000,000 square miles. Through it we have extended\\nour confines from Ohio to and including Alaska, 1,500 mill\\ntant overland to the north, and tho Aleutian Island-. 500 miles\\nWest of Hawaii. Through it, step by step, we acquired Louisiana\\nin 1803, Florida in 1819, California, New Mexico, and Arizona in\\n1840, and Alaska in 1867. Sometimes by treaty, suuietimee by\\nresolution, always for the general welfare and fox the common\\ndefense; and no one here will deny, though it was then denied,\\nthat each of these steps did add to the coma a and\\npromote the general welfare.\\nSo as the confines of our country have b en gradually extends 1\\nwestward, occupying step by step every vantage an enemy might\\noccupy, we are now not inaugurating a new policy or exer\\na new* power in annexing Hawaii, but exercising i written,\\ndicated, often exercised constitutiona] powi r in tl ruina-\\ntion of a policy of our country pursued for over a century\\nwhich no man will deny has each case added to tb\\ndefense and promoted the general welfare, and which no man will\\nin the future deny was so and well done in this c\\nI take it that the broad powers of providing for the common\\ndefense and promoting the general welfai\\nby our Constitution were intended to embrace in a\\nthose inherent powers of every independei pity to do\\nevery act necessary to preserve the independent existence of that\\nsovereignty or which will promote the weal, development, and\\nwell-being of it and its peopla So reading our Constitution, I\\nbelieve that in voting for the annexation of Hawaii ai\\nthe oath taken upon assuming a seat in this House to support that\\nConstitution of the United States of America.\\n3537", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "2t\\nEDUCATION IN II AAV All.\\nOne of the frequent objections urged to annexation is the state-\\nment that the Hawaiians are a mixed, mongrel, ignorant race.*\\nThis is not only inconsistent, but without foundation in fact.\\nWe are 75,000,000, they 109,000. If all of them were ignorant,\\ntheir precipitation in our midst would only result in their enlight-\\nenment and not our retrogression. I have already stated that often\\nat intervals of sixty or ninety days an equal number of ignorant\\nare thrust upon us from European ports, and have not lowered\\nour standard of intelligence or morality, though they do injure\\nour laborers by competing with them in our labor markets.\\nIf it is true that the Hawaiians are so ignorant, we should annex\\nat once, upon the reasoning of the minority\u00e2\u0080\u0094 for they here con-\\ntend for a protectorate over these people, and it is admitted our\\nGovernment is committed to and now maintains that quasi re-\\nsponsibility for their conduct, and I insist that if we are to be re-\\nsponsible for their national conduct in the probable complications\\nof the twentieth century we should have a right to control their\\nacts. This would be necessary that we prevent being led into\\ninternational controversies by them. Here annexation would\\nprevent such rather than complicate us with other nations.\\nBut the intelligence of a people has never been so recklessly\\nmistaken or misstated as that of the Hawaiians. It seems we are\\naccustomed to assume their ignorance, when, in fact, man for\\nman, they are as well educated as almost any people on the globe.\\nIndeed, their standard of education compares well with that of\\nany State of the Union. Almost every adult Hawaiian can read,\\nwrite, and speak the English language. That is the language\\ntaught in their schools. About one-half of the Portuguese on these\\nislands are equally as well educated. The remarkable showing\\nis made that their laws require compulsory education, and that\\nof 14,286 eligibles, 14,023 children actually attended school in 1896.\\nTheir school system compares favorably with any of the world,\\nas shown by the following table:\\nNumber o\\nf schools\\nteachers, and pupils fot\\nthe yea\\n1896.\\nSchools.\\nTeachers.\\nPupils.\\nMale.\\nFemale.\\nTotal.\\nMale.\\nFemale. Tutal.\\nGovernment\\nIndependent\\n132\\n03\\nIll\\n72\\n169\\n130\\n280\\n202\\n5, 754\\n1,994\\n4.435 10,189\\n1,840 3,834\\nTotal\\n195\\n183\\n299\\n482 1 7,748\\n6,275 I 14,023\\nAnnexation, therefore, would not bring us a mongrel, ignorant\\nrace, but a race whose standard of education is good, and among\\nwhom is already established schoolhouses and a school system\\nrarely excelled.\\nIf. however, these islands are necessary to our defense and wel-\\nfare, why should this great nation shrink from its duty on account\\nof 109,000 ignorant people, be it granted? I am one who has more\\nconfidence in the moral and educational forces of my country.\\nAnnex, provide for our defense and welfare, and if elevation is\\nthere needed this great nation is equipped with the necessary\\nforces to educate and moralize the acquired.\\nIndeed, we are fortunate to be able to acquire so valuable an\\noutpost for the national defense by having to assimilate so few of\\n3537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "objectionable population. We find here government\\nupon ours, a pcoplo whoso language and institution*\\nwhoso laws are ours, whoso schools teach nr language, whose\\nsentiments and patriotism respect and hold holy the holidays of\\nour country\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a more assimilative country could rarely be found.\\nOOSTXOtn i\\nTwo thousand miles away is a phrase which seems always\\nto delight the opponent of annexation, lie loves to roll these\\nwords about his tongue and his tongue aboul them. Bui nal\\ncontiguity is measured by hours and not by miles. In considering\\nthe ad vantages and movements of the commerce, of the militia,\\nand of the great navies of the world, miles are no Ion\\nered, but the hours measuring these movements are tb\\nsideration. The presence of c ur re n ts, of winds, oj .\u00e2\u0080\u00a2_.\u00e2\u0096\u00a0 rail,\\nof relative motive powers, compel this.\\nWithin this rule Hawaii is far within the precedents. She is\\nnearer Washington than was the Dearest borders of Louisiana in\\n1803, than was Florida in 1810, California in 1849, or Alaska in\\n1867 or to-day. she is nearer Washington in miles to-day than\\nportions of Alaska, than the Aleutian Islands, and the Btudway\\nIslands, hundreds of miles west of Hawaii, owned by us and at-\\ntempted to be made a naval station by OS with the loss of $o\\nexpended and a war ship wrecked.\\n-on -i.n i OJ i ii UfinLCJBD I mi v in w r-\\nIt is insisted that we have no moral right to annex, and that it\\nis not in conformity with the high prin ciples of this Government\\nto extend its dominion without consenl of those al\\nThe absurdity of this proposition as an abstraet one is shown\\nby history. This has never been the practice excepting in tie\\nof Texas. We did not consult the Indians of Florida; we con-\\nsuited only the g o ver n ing power, Spain. We .lid not consult the\\nIndians of Louisiana; we consulted only the governing power,\\nFrance. Wo did not consult the half-breeds of California; we\\nconsulted only the governing power, Mexico. We did not consult\\nthe Eskimos of Alaska; we consulted only the governing\\nRussia.\\nSo with Hawaii it is sufficient to consult the Republic authori-\\nties, the recognized governing power, and not th- Chinese and\\nJapanese, the latter having been sent there to pr nible,\\nannexation. That this is the desire of the Bawaiians outst li\\nfew interested royalists is attested by the fact that resolntii i\\nvoring annexation were unanimously adopted bt their\\nRepresentatives, a large majority 0$ whom and the\\nwhich were and are fufi-blooded Hawaiian--.\\nThus it appears that while our friends insist this\\nbe first submitted to s popular vote of those whom tl\\nto be mongrels and ignorant, [submit this is neither the\\nlished practice, nor is it necessary in the present easel\\nthe popular will of those entitle.) to be COttse\\nGranting that we are farcing upon these i called igm rai\\nGovernment, can anyone conceive of a gn\\nforced upon any nation? When ti\\nernment those liberty-preserving principles for which mankind\\nhas fought since creation and which are tie- envy of all en\\nnations, to force upon these so called mongrels these benign prin-\\nciples and this magnificent Government, insuring th-m our lib-\\no337", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "28\\nerty, protecting them with our powers, is certainly a spectacle and\\na crime which must strike dumb with awe the whole world.\\nIt can only be compared with that inhuman cruelty which\\nprompts a good mother to punish her babe with a dose of castor\\noil, seemingly useless, cruel, barbarous at the time, but possibly\\nthe child will be spared long enough to learn that it was that\\nwhich spared his life and preserved his health and to appreciate\\nthat after all there is no one like a mother.\\nANNEXATION IS THE DEMOCRATIC TOLICY.\\nThe nineteenth century opened with Thomas Jefferson, the\\nfounder of Democracy, founding the areal basis of this great Re-\\npublic by the annexation of Louisiana in 1803. Following in his\\nillustrious footsteps and blazing the forests in the same direction\\nin pursuit of the policy of annexation were James Monroe, a Dem-\\nocrat, who in 181!) annexed Florida; James K. Polk, a Democrat,\\nwho in 1845 annexed Texas and in 1819 annexed California; Frank-\\nlin Pierce, a Democrat, who in 1853 made the Gadsden purchase.\\nAlaska alone of all the great annexed domain of this country\\ncame in under other than Democratic administration, a policy\\nwhich has increased the area of the Republic from 815,615 square\\nmiles to over 3,600,000 square miles, and now we are told that the\\nfurther annexation of 6,000 square miles in Hawaii is not a Demo-\\ncratic policy and that this means national destruction. The\\nDemocratic party has made mistakes and accomplished good, has\\nsuffered defeats and gained successes, but the grandest of all its\\nachievements and greatest glory of that party is that it has founded\\nthe areal basis of the greatest of republics. History has insepara-\\nbly linked with Democracy the laying of the structural founda-\\ntion of this great country.\\nThe past century has dedicated to the cause of mankind through\\nthe Democratic policy this broad and expansive area. Its incep-\\ntion was marked and the policy founded at the commencement of\\nthe century by Jefferson. God forbid that this policy shall be\\nimpeded at the close of this century by the party founded by Jef-\\nferson. The annexation of Hawaii means the consummation of\\nthat policy, and it is fitting that it should be completed at the\\nclose of the century at the commencement of which it was inaugu-\\nrated. Let the nineteenth century witness the consummation of\\nthis great work by the acquisition of the last necessary piece of\\nterritory which makes a boundless ocean the natural defender\\nof the great work of a century of glorious Democratic policy.\\nCOMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF HAWAII.\\nWhile the United States generally is benefited by the trade\\nwith Hawaii, California is particularly so. The following is a\\nstatement of San Francisco\\\\s commerce alone, showing Hawaii\\nher second best customer, for the year ending November 30, 1896:\\nTabh showing comparative importance of San Francisco export^ to Haivaii,\\nmid to sonu other countries, for the year ending November SO, 1896.\\nAustralia... P 9S9\\nBawaii 3,588,000\\nAll of Central America :i,44o.(KKl\\nChina .!Wi,(kK)\\nJapan 2,270,000\\nMexico 1,469,000\\nAll Europe, except Great Britain 1 4 ir (MHt\\nAll of Asia ami Oceanica, except China and Japan 1,298,000\\nNew Zealand. Samoa, Marquesas, Cook, Fiji, Friendly, Marshall,\\ni laroline, and all other Polynesian islands combined i,8I.(hH)\\nBritish Columbia iSl rJS\\nAll of South America jmaum\\n3537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "29\\nHawaii ia San Francisco s second host foreign wine customer,\\nher third best purchaser of salmon, her third largest consumer\\nof barley, and her sixth best consumer of Hour. In 1896 Hawaii\\nimported 76 per oent of her imports, aggregating f5, 164,808, from\\nthe United States.\\nUnder existing conditions Hawaii lias here a free market for\\nbut practically three of her products\u00e2\u0080\u0094 su urar, rice, and bananas.\\nHer general tariff of 10 per cent lias allowed about 85 per cent of\\nher imports to come from other countries than the United States.\\nIf we annex, this restriction will be removed as to us and we will\\nsurround her with our tariff Of over 50 per cent against the world,\\nwhich will give us all her trade.\\nIf we do not annex and some other country does, our trade will\\nbe cut off entirely by a similar tariff to ours thrown around\\nHawaii by the annexing country. Our merchants, manufactur-\\ners, and producers of California, walled off from the East by\\nmountain ranges and exorbitant railroad rates, have found in\\nHawaii a good customer. We sell her our wines, flour, hay, liar-\\nley, and many other products. This with only 109,000 population.\\nAnnex. and our trade will be multiplied many fold, besides selling\\nher the 25 percent now purchased by her from other countries.\\nThis means an increased demand for the products of our Cali-\\nfornia farmer and merchant. It means the employment of more\\nlabor by them to meet thi- increased demand ana higher wages\\nfor the laborer.\\nRefuse to annex and permit some other country to do so, and\\nwe lose the greater part, if not all, of our existing trad with\\nHawaii. Hawaiian trade brings many millions of dollars to the\\nSan Francisco merchants each year. Locally speaking, my con-\\nstituents whose markets are in San Prancisco profit much by this,\\nfor the more demand there is of the San Francisco merchant, the\\nmore money paid to him. the more demand be has for my con-\\nstituents 1 produce and the more money to pay for it. Annexa-\\ntion, therefore, means f r my constituents moro demand for their\\nproducts, more money to pay for them, .and a consequent greater\\ndemand by them for more labor and higher prices for the Bame.\\nThe foreign trade of Hawaii is already phenomenal. In l s .\u00c2\u00bbr, it\\namounted to $308 per capita for each man, woman, and child in\\nthat country, a record unparallele I in history. The total number\\nof American vessels entering American ports in theyear ending\\ndune 30, 1898, were l v and of these t91 were from Hawaii: that\\nis, Hawaii furnished cargoes for 191 American ships, while all the\\nworld besidet furnished cargoes for only 298 such. fter ai\\ntion all Hawaiian trade must under the law be carried in Ameri-\\ncan bottoms, for this then coast trad As our tariff will\\nbar out trade between other countries and Hawaii and turn the\\nHawaiian trade to this country, alter annexation all Hav\\ncommerce will be carried In American ships, the number of which\\nwill soon be doubled, all to the immense advantage of this coun-\\ntry, and California in particular.\\nBe the population of Hawaii what it may, it is today ti\\ncommercial country for its size and the number of its population\\non the globe, and is in the customer ol tl\\ncific coast. Why should we of the coast, then, fling aside the\\ngolden opportunity to secure more firmly this customer, if not\\nprevent its absolute loss to our country.- We need not speculate\\nupon future possibilities, but I rest my case up n the proposition", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "30\\nthat annexation of Hawaii is vital to the prosperity of the Stateof\\nCalifornia.\\nTHE NICARAGUA CANAL.\\nInseparably connected with the annexation of Hawaii as a mili-\\ntary and commercial outpost is the construction of the Nicaragua\\nCanal. This should he done and owned by the United States\\nGovernment, and no other party or power. No enterprise of\\nmodern times will work the results which will be accomplished\\nby the construction of this canal. High freight rates between\\nEast and West will be matters of the past. The Atlantic and\\nPacific States will be 10,000 miles nearer. European markets will\\nbe 7,000 miles nearer California, and the Orient will be 6,000\\nmiles nearer New York. It doubles the effectiveness of our Navy\\nby enabling the Atlantic squadron to defend the Pacific, and that\\nof the Pacific to defend the Atlantic.\\nWith the Nicaragua Canal and the Keyof the Pacific, Hawaii,\\nas naval and commercial agencies of the United States, the do-\\nminion, commerce, and safety of our Government are secured.\\nWith these we can marshal our armies and exploit our navies\\nfrom Occident to Orient far more rapidly than any other power\\non the face of the globe. With these we can control and direct\\nthe commerce of the two hemispheres; we can successfully pro-\\nject our commerce into the great regions of Siberia, China, and\\nthe Oceanic isles as well vend it at the doors of Europe.\\nNOT IMPERIALISM.\\nIt is unfortunate that the consideration of this question is made\\nnecessary at the present time. The glorious victory of the gallant\\nDewey at the Philippines and his occupation there have led the\\nopponents of the annexation of Hawaii to level against the latter\\narguments entirely addressed to the question of annexing the\\nformer. We have introduced here frequently the words im-\\nperialism, national aggrandizement, land grabbers, and\\nother similar terms. It is only one more evidence of the weak-\\nness of the case of the opponents of annexation of Hawaii when\\nthey inveigh here such entirely superfluous and irrelevant consid-\\nerations. The absence of a capacity to discriminate is always\\nunfortunate.\\nThe annexation of Hawaii involves not the first elements of im-\\nperialism. On the contrary, if it is anything, it is the consum-\\nmation of consolidation and concentration. It involves only and\\nis for the national defense and welfare, the preservation intact of\\nexisting compact territory, and the promotion of the welfare\\nthereof alone. It is for consolidation, not extension. It is but the\\nconsummation of a century s great work and policy marked out\\nby Jefferson, pursued by Pierce, Polk, and other eminent Demo-\\ncrats, in rendering impregnable by natural fortifications this great\\nRepublic and promoting the welfare thereof.\\nOne of the essential elements of colonization and imperialism is\\nthe gathering in as dependencies countries of different tongues,\\nhabits, laws, and institutions. That is wanting here, for, as I have\\nalready said, the Hawaiians speak our tongue, teach our language\\nin their schools, imitate our laws, copy our institutions, celebrate\\nour holidays. They are already Americanized and assimilated.\\nIndependent of the existence of the present war and the exigen-\\ncies thereof, I find cogent reasons confirming the conviction of the\\nnecessity for annexing Hawaii.\\n35:)7*", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "31\\nThe war has served only to emphasize and confirm this conclu-\\nsion. It has unexpectedly and incomparably in ;i moment Mashed\\nbefore the world a situation in the Philippines where the proper\\nconduct of the war. the proper succor of onr Navy and Army, and\\nthe comfort and health of many of onr soldier neighbors en route\\nto serve our country imperatively require that we control Hawaii.\\nI have voted to declare this war, I have voted to bring on the\\nconditions at the Philippines, I have voted to intrust our nation s\\nhonor and vindication in the hands of our present President, and\\nhaving so done, and he having declared annexation necessary\\nthereto, I shall vote therefor to uphold his hands in this crisis, be-\\ning convinced as I am that it is entirely necessary and fur the\\nbest interests of the Republic.\\nI do not consider any question of foreign policy is here involved,\\nbut solely a question of the nation s defense, welfare, and present\\nmilitary necessity.\\nEven were a question of foreign policy here involved, I would\\ndeem it unwise tor any Representative or party to adopt at this\\ntime a fixed policy with reference thereto. War is an extraordi-\\nnary occasion which brings to nations extraordinary duties and\\nthe necessity of the exercise of varied functions and acts. Partic-\\nularly is this trne of a nation s foreign policv in time of war with\\na foreign power. It can not with reference to snch war and the\\nopposing nation Bafely adopt any fixed territorial policy, and all\\nfixed policies should be excepted in case of war.\\nThe great means to success in war are by destroying the enemy s\\narmy and navy, demolishing her cities, exhausting hex revenues.\\nand conquering and occupying her territory.\\nIf the enemy be a foreign power and we announce in advanc\\nthat we will not acquire foreign territory, we waive in advance\\nand deny ourselves one of the most successful means to a success-\\nful conclusion of the war. Theenemv should know that we mean\\nnot only to invade her territory, but hold it if n cessity demands,\\nthat tear of this loss may induce peace.\\nWar always carries the successful belligerent beyond original\\ndemands. At the inception of this war our I tovernnient, in the\\ninterest of peace and in harmony with its definite purpose 1\\ntablish liberty in Cuba peacefully, if possible, but by war it\\nessary, announced in its declaration of war which was mad. and\\nsent to Spain as an ultimatum that luban independence was all\\nwe desired, and expressly negatived the idea of desiring to acquire\\nany of Spain s territory.\\nThis was contemptuously refused; was nor even received, much\\nless considered, by that country. That being the case, our atti-\\ntude now and Spain s expectations must be that we shall pursue\\nthrough war. vigilantly availing ourselves of all the r\\nnized means thereto, including the acquisition of Spanish I\\ntoiyand possessions. This accords with every war by civilized\\nnations. ur forefathers in the war of the Revolution demanded\\nonly certain concessions as to taxes, etc.; but. war being i\\nsary thereto, they demanded and secured the legitimate rose\\nthe situation eventuated by that war\u00e2\u0080\u0094 indep\\nIn this war and at this tiin territorial policies of this (Govern-\\nment should not be mooted. Spain should know that to sue\\nfully prosecute this war we will conquer and hold, if\\nnot only the Philippines. Cuba. Puerto Rico, nay, even Spain her-\\nself. That we will invade these and .-trip her of every vestige of", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "LltJKHKY Ul- LUNUKti i\\n013 744 601 7\\n32\\nterritory. Any other policy denies us the most potent means to\\nsuccessful war.\\nIt will be early enough for us to discuss whether we will Imld\\nany or all of these after the great and paramount object of the\\nhour is accomplished\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the suit for peace by Spain\u00e2\u0080\u0094 until which no\\navenue of success should be abandoned or its abandonment, dis-\\ncussed. When the treaty of peace is to be signed and indemnity\\npaid us, these possessions\u00e2\u0080\u0094 commercial outposts and naval stations\\ntherein, always desirable\u00e2\u0080\u0094 can be mooted and determined. Until\\nthen let us, as a united people, demand of the President, as Com-\\nmander in Chief of the Army and Navy, aggressive war, and up-\\nhold his hands in all he requires to that end.\\nLet us remember that the supreme duty of the hour is the\\nvindication of American honor stained by the great insult of a\\ncontemptible power and the upholding the cause of liberty to which\\nthis Republic is dedicated; let us pray that we will come forth a\\nunited, peaceful, happy, and God-fearing people; let us hope that\\nout of the ranks of war, out of the smoke and din of battle, out\\nof the rejoicings over victories by land and by sea our nation will\\nemerge and then wisely meet all questions of future policy, do-\\nmestic and foreign, and solve them wisely and properly as becomes\\nthe stability and future of a Republic founded upon the intelli-\\ngence of its citizens and dedicated to the cause of freedom.\\n3537", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3359", "width": "2038", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n013 744 601 7", "height": "3431", "width": "2272", "jp2-path": "hawaiianannexati00devr_0036.jp2"}}