{"1": {"fulltext": "^^\\\\cr\\\\/\u00c2\u00a3A\\\\riar\\\\ |K^ Cub^r* l\\\\^u", "height": "2786", "width": "1887", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "INTERVENTION IN CUBAN AFFAIRS.\\nSPEECH\\nHon. DONELSON CAFFERY,\\nOF LOUISIANA,\\nIN THE\\nSENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,\\nSaturday, Aprii, i6, 1893.\\nW A S H I jM O T O X.\\n1898.", "height": "3692", "width": "2246", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0003.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "E7i~\\nv\\nC/l\\n68011\\n2^ SPEECH\\na\\nHON. DONELSON CAFFERY.\\nThe Senate having under consideration the joint resolution CS. R. 149) for\\nthe recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that\\nthe Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the\\nIsland of Cuba, and to withdraw it-i land and naval forces from Cuba and\\nCuban waters, and directing the I rcsident of the United States to use the\\nland and naval forces of the United States to carry thesa resolutions iuto\\neHect\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nMr. CAFFERY said:\\nMr. President: Differing so radically with the majority of my\\ncolleagues on tliis side of the Chamber as to the questions involved\\nin the pending resolution and amendments, I approach their dis-\\ncussion with a full sense of the fallibility of my own judgment and\\nwith deference to the contrary views of my colleagues. I have\\ntried to view this question in every light that I could, so as to\\nascertain what position the United States could take that would\\nhe sustained by international law while being just and beneficial\\nto both sides of the contestants now carrying on hostilities in the\\nIsland of Cuba. If my conclusions are wrong, it is my misfortune,\\nnot my fault.\\nMr. President, I have stood once before on the brink of war.\\nTliough quite young, I counseled moderation and delay. I coun-\\nseled due consideration of the disastrous consequences that might\\nflow from war precipitately waged. My counsels were swept to\\nthe winds, and I was swept along with the balance of my people\\ninto the most colossal war that was ever waged between civilized\\nnations. Sir, the hostile sections that engaged in that dreadful\\nconflict were each a unit. It was North against South. If we,\\nunhappily, must go to war with Spain, it will be waged on our\\npart by a solid Union. There will be no North nor South nor\\nEast nor West. It will be the war of a great Republic with one\\nof the oldest States of Christendom.\\nBut, Mr. President, in emergencies of this sort, where popular\\npassions become aroused, the motives of men not in entire accord\\nwith the enthusiastic populace seem to be questioned. Whoever\\ndares to utter an opinion or give expression to a thought not in\\nlino with the prevailing current of popular opinion is gibbeted by\\na libelous press. I will send up to the desk and have read a clip-\\nping from the Washington Times of to-day s issue in regard to\\nmyself.\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will read as re-\\nquested.\\nThe Secretary read as follows:\\n[Prom the Washington Times, April 10.]\\nA MARKEI MAN.\\nThe country has marked with surprise and indignation the extraordinary\\ncourse jnirsued in the Senate for the last two daVs by a Southern Senator\\nWho apijears anxious to constitute himself the head center of a small but\\n2 3358", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0004.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "compact body of persons whose effort is to help Spain as much as possible in\\n^o the present crisis.\\nTlie underlying motive of such a service is somewhat problematical. It\\nmay be a desire to earn glory or it might bo a political sin with a name not\\nto bo mentioned except upon the most damning evidence of its existence.\\nBut, be that as it may, the Senator in question needs careful watching.\\nHis gyrations yesterday suggest the propriety of observation if not of inves-\\ntigation. His former association with an institution of charity and learning\\nknown as the Louisiana State Lottery Company renders him all the more\\nworthy to have the critical eyes of his colleagues and of all American patriots\\nlii iuly fixed upon him.\\nMr. Ci^FFERY. It is rarely that I ever notice newspaper ar-\\nticles, nor wotild I have seen this one but for the fact that a friend\\nhas just sent it in to me. There is nothing in the article about\\nwliich I care to make any statement except the charge that I was\\never an agent of the Louisiana State Lottery Company. The gro-\\ntesqueness of the lie is the only thing that commends itself to my\\nespecial notice, for, Mr. President, if there is anything in my life\\nfor which I take pride it is in the efforts which I made to help\\nbreak down the infamous institution of the Louisiana State Lot-\\ntery Compau}\\nI say this editorial applies to me, though I am not named, be-\\ncause I am the only Senator from Louisiana who took any part in\\nthe debate on the Cuban question during the last two days.\\nI point to the balance of that editorial as a commentary on the\\ntimes. Sir, it is an epitome of the corruption of American jour-\\nnalism. It shows the extent and the depth to which libelous,\\ncorrupt newspapers will go in order to lash public men into fol-\\nlowing their arrogant dictation. Sir, when I can bring myself,\\nas humble as I am, to take one line of action or one inspiration of\\nthought from the libelous and slanderous journals that are now\\nattempting to hound this country on to war, I hope that moment\\nwill be my last.\\nMr. President, I differ, and I differ honestly, with the Committee\\non Foreign Kelations in the view which it has taken of this matter.\\nThe joint resolution which it has reported is a declaration of war.\\nWhatever action I favor, and I do favor intervention, is predicated\\nupon it as a humane movement which may result in war, but\\nwhich is justified under international law. If war comes of it,\\nour hands are clean. If war does not come of it. then, conjointly\\nwith Spain and the insurgents, we will relieve Cuba of the terri-\\nble suffering and destitution and misery and death which now\\nprevail there.\\nIntervention by a friendly power to put an end to hostilities that\\nhave culminated into barbarous cruelties, inhuman slaughter,\\nmore inhuman starvation, and universal ruin, waste, and destruc-\\ntion is justified by that code which prescribes the rule of conduct\\namong civilized nations. Nearness to the scene of conflict is a\\ncontrolling factor in prompting the intervention. Being justified\\nby principle and practice among the nations, it can not be con-\\nstrued, necessarily, into an act of war. While nonintervention\\nis the rule, intervention in sucli a case as that of Cuba forms a\\njust exception. Spain has not been able to pacify the island nor\\nsubdue the insurgents. The work of death and destruction goes\\non with a fearfully increasing progress. Humanity stands aghast\\nat the awful spectacle, and the President, following its noble dic-\\ntates and sustained by the law of nations, which is likewise God s,\\nasks of us the power to intervene to arrest carnage and death. 1\\nMr. President, stand ready to grant it.\\n3358", "height": "3562", "width": "2126", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0005.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "Sir, the conflict in Cuba is but the culmination of a series of\\nrcvohitions commencing fifty years ago. Last night the Senator\\nfrom Texas [Mr. hilton] alhided to the insurrection headed by\\nLopez, in which the gallant Kentuckian, Crittenden, lost his life.\\nThe recol ections of my earliest boyhood are associated with that\\ninsurrection, for from my native town went one of the most gal-\\nlant men that God ever created and was slaughtered on Cuban\\nsoil for what he thought was Cuban libert} From the expedi-\\ntion of Lopez till to-day there have been insurrections after insur-\\nrections to meet the same untimely fate, the same crushing dis-\\naster, as that of Lopez.\\nIn vain has autonomy been ofifered by Spain. It has been re-\\njected by the insurgents. In vain has an armistice been offered\\nby Spain. It has likewise been rejected by the insurgents.\\nThe fighting still goes on, and it must cease.\\nBut the present revolution assumes a proportion and a scope of\\ndestructive power greater than any of the preceding ones. Its\\ninevitable result is to make Cuba a charnel house of destruction\\nand death. From the topographical condition of that country,\\nfrom the character of the people who inhabit it, descended as they\\nare from the Spaniards, a guerrilla war is the only war they would\\nnaturally tight. From the time that the Saracens invaded Spain\\nand defeated the Spaniards at Gibraltar until the last Moor was\\ndriven out eight hundred years after there was a constant guerrilla\\nhand-to-hand fight between the Spaniard and tlie Moor.\\nThe guerrilla instinct has been inherited by all of Spanish\\nblood from centuries of strife, and we see it developed in Cuba to\\nthe most extensive proportions. A handful of insurgents occupy-\\ning the interior of the island bid defiance to the trained soldiery of\\nSpain. The island is about 750 miles long and about 50 miles\\nwide. It has a population of 1,000,000 people. The interior is\\noccui)ied by mountains. The habitations are mostly upon the\\nseaboard. The insurgents retire to the mountain fastnesses and\\nfrom there they swoop down upon the Spanish soldiery.\\nSir, it is manifest from the history of this revolution, the in-\\nability of 200,000 armed and equipped and disciplined Spanish\\ntroops to put down 30,000 insurgents, that the power of Spain is\\nslowly dying in that island. It is manifest that the loss of her\\nsovereignty is but a question of time. But it does not result, even\\nif that island is a desert, that the roving bands of insurgents with-\\nout a government of law, without the forces of a civilized gov-\\nernment, are therefore a state; and we are called upon in the\\namendment to the resolution to recognize a state. What is recog-\\nnition? It is merely certifying to the existence of a fact. It is\\nperceiving the identity of some status and so declaring. You can\\nnot make it by words. You can not recognize a state which has\\nno existence, and all the power of the great Congress of the\\nUnited States can not create the smallest state in Christendom\\nby statute or declaration.\\nIMr. President, how do civilized countries wage war or how do\\nthey recognize the existence of war? They wage war by state\\nagainst state. It is not every individual of every state who is at\\nwar with every other individual of the opposing hostile state.\\nNoncombatants are safe. Tliat is one of the blessings an unal-\\nloyed, a grand blessing that the international code has bestowed\\nupon civilizat on. In ancient times during war every man s hand\\nwas against his adversary. The Komaus butchered and murdered", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0006.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "and killed or enslaved every man whose state was hostile to Rome,\\nwhether with arms or whether without. The murder of prisoners\\nwas common. But modern civilization has erected another stand-\\nard. War is carried on by state against state and with regularly\\ndrilled and equipped armies. It has become a science. It is tha\\nscience of death, but still it is a science. It is not a pellmell,\\nhurly-burly fight. So, therefore, when you recognize belliger-\\nency you must recognize a war which is carried on under the codo\\nof civilized nations.\\nIt is immaterial to inquire, as to the existence of belligerency,\\nwhether the power of recognizing it belongs to the Executive or\\nto the legislative branch of Government, or to both conjoined;\\nbut when you recognize belligerency you must perceive, identify,\\npoint oi;t something which civilization calls, in the language of\\nPresident Grant, the terrible and awful dignity of war; not rov-\\ning, undisciplined bands, not men fighting here to-day and there\\nto-morrow over a vast expanse of territory, which they do not\\nhold permanently, or substantially so, but you must find an army.\\nIs there such an army in Cuba as comes iip to the requirements of\\nthe modern definition of war? Do you find such a government\\nas comes up to the modern definition of a government? Has it\\nexclusive power within any certain area of territory? Has it\\ncourts, and does it administer justice? All these qiTestious must\\nbe answered in the affirmative, and answered not upon inference,\\nnot upon loose, disjointed facts, not upon a paper constitution and\\npaper schoolhouses and levies of blackmail called taxes, but you\\nmust have your established government, your equipped institu-\\ntions capable of exercising all the functions of civil government,\\nand regular armies, carrying on war under civilized methods, and\\nthen you have belligerence.\\nBelligerence is nothing more, upon an investigation of the au-\\nthorities, which I do not care to read to any extent, than tempo-\\nrary statehood. When statehood becomes permanent, then you\\nrecognize the State. When it is only temporary and there is a\\ndoubt of its permanence, as in the case of Texas when General\\nJackson forbore to recognize the independence of that State until\\nsuch time as there would be no danger of Mexican subjugation,\\nyou recognize belligerence. The only marked essential distinction\\nis as between a permanent and temporary statehood. With\\nwhom will this great Government deal in the matter of belliger-\\nence? It must be wnth some political entity that has the muni-\\nments of a state, something that is covered by statehood indicia,\\nsomething that there can be no mistake about upon the part of the\\nrecognizing power. That is belligerence. It is not necessary that\\nthese requirements be of a permanent character. Temporary pos-\\nsession of them authorizes the recognition of belligerence.\\nMr. President, at the expense of thrashing over some of the old\\nstraw perhaps, I will quote certain definitions of statehood, in\\norder to see whether or not we can recognize the independence or\\nbelligerence of the insurgents under Maximo Gomez or anybody-\\nelse.\\nMr. Wheaton, page 33, in his definition of a state, sas s:\\nA state is also distinguishable from an unsettled horde of wandering sav-\\nages not yet formed into a civil society. The legal idea of a state necessarily\\nimplies that of the habitual obedience of its members to those persons in\\nwhom the superiority is vested and of a fixed abode and definite territory\\nbelonging to the people by whom it is occupied.\\n3358", "height": "3562", "width": "2126", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0007.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "6\\nI will read another one of them, and ask that the other defini-\\ntions which I have maybe inserted in my remarks in tlie Record.\\nWoolsey, section 36, says:\\nA state is a commniiity of persons living within certain limits of territory\\nTindor a permanent orfjauization, which aims to secure the prevalence of jus-\\ntice Ly self-imposed law.\\nThen I refer to Hall, section 1:\\nThe marks of an independent state arc tliat the commnnity constitutinp;\\nit is permanently established for a political end, that it possesses a deflned\\nterritorj-, and that it is independent of external control.\\nNow, in regard to the proposition which I have advanced, that\\nbelligerence is temporary statehood, I cite Hall, section 5, page 34:\\nIt is no doubt incumbent upon a state to treat subjects who may have\\nBuccecded in establishing a temporary independence as belligerents and not\\nas criminals, and if it is incumbent upon the state itself, it is still more so\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0upon foreign governments, who deal only with external facts and who have\\nno right to pass judgment upon the value, from a moral or a municipally\\nlegal point of view, of political occurrences taking place within other coun\\ntries.\\nThere is the recognition of the proposition as to belligerence\\nwhich 1 advanced, as drawn from the definition of statehood itself.\\nI think it needs no further corroboration. It is self-evident to my\\nmind.\\nWe are called upon to vote for that which will stultify us. We\\nare called iipon to acknowledge in our legislative capacity and as\\nhaving jurisdiction over the matter that which does not exist;\\nand, sir, if it exists at all, where is the scope of its influence;\\nwhere is the extent of its existence? It is said that Havana is\\nheld by the Spaniards. There are 250,000 inhabitants of that island\\nin the one city of Havana. A majority of the population of the\\nisland is in the cities on the seaboard, not a single one of which is\\nheld by the insurgents. Now, if independence is recognized, how\\ncan the recognition cover any other than the territory occupied\\nexclusively by the insurgents? Who has informed tis where that\\nterritory is? Who could possibly define its limits and give it a\\nlocal habitation? What skillful guide could conduct an American\\nminister to the mountain capital of Gomez? It has been admitted\\nthat twice that fancied capital has been changed, but that would\\namount to little if there had ever been one.\\nEvery President from Grant to McKinley, having cognizance of\\nall the facts surrounding the case, has refused to recognize the in-\\ndependence of Cuba or its belligerence; and, sir, they had sympa-\\nthy not mock sympathj but real American sympathy for real\\npatriots struggling for real liberty. Were they unsympathetic\\nwith the struggle for human liberty? No, sir: and if there is one\\nargument of a practical character stronger than another to con-\\nvince me of the absolute inutility of the power of recognition be-\\nlonging to the legislative branch, it is oiir inability to get the\\ninformation upon which that decision must be founded. With\\nall the evidence upon which belligerency can be based in the pos-\\nsession of tlie President, wdio but him can ascertain its existence?\\nMr. MASON. Mr. President\\nThe PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jones of Arkansas in the\\nchair). Does the Senator from Louisiana yield to the Senator\\nfrom Illinois?\\nMr. CAFFERY. I decline to bo interrupted now.\\nMr. MASON. Very well.\\nMr. CAFFERY. Here we are, sir, meditating now this ques-\\ntion of war between Spain and the United States. Here is the\\na;a8", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0008.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, a vohnne of GOO\\npages, purporting to be the evidence and papers concerning the\\nexisting relations between Spain and the United States, and we\\nhave had three days to examine it in the midst of this exciting\\nand absorbing debate, when we sit from 10 a. in. to late in the\\nevening. I have not read that book. I have not had the time;\\nand 1 am called on here, in this acute spasm of public indignation\\nand wrath against the atrocities committed in Cuba, to decide\\nupon this gi eat question of war.\\nThe Executive is charged, and charged solely, and charged ex-\\nclusively, with the power of recognition. I have heard Senators\\nsay that because the Senate could make a commercial treaty or\\ncould make any other treaty, therefore there was a concurrent\\npower and jurisdiction between the legislative branch and the\\nexecutive branch in regard to recognition. It is not so, sir. Be-\\nfore you negotiate your treaty you must recognize the credentials\\nof the representatives of powers with whom you deal, and who\\ndoes that but the President? His recognition is all-sufticient and\\nall-conclusive as to the existence of states when he recognizes\\ntheir ministry as clothed with power to transact the treaty. It\\nspi ings from the power to appoint and receive ministers and am-\\nbassadors. That gives a wide and exclusive operation for the ex-\\necutive exercise of authority in the premises.\\nThe Executive is clothed with entire jurisdiction over our ex-\\nternal affairs so far as diplomacy goes. Is there a man in the Sen-\\nate who does not know that it largely rests within the discretion\\nof a President whether to precipitate a war or not by acts or cor-\\nrespondence entirely under his control? He has charge of all the\\ndiplomatic negotiations looking to laying the foundation, both in\\ndeed and in word, for a state of affairs that may necessarily lead\\nto war: and when we declare war, we do nothing more than act\\nupon the findings of the Executive.\\nMr. President, there can be no recognition of belligerency or in-\\ndependence in Cuba that will hold water under the canons of\\ninternational law. We will stultify ourselves, we will violate the\\ninternational law, if we do so. That law appears to be scoffed at,\\nsneered at, as nonexistent. No civilized nation on the globe can\\ndare fly in the face of the enlightened conscience of mankind.\\nThat law has for its sanction the rebuke of the nations of the\\nworld, and unless we want to be outlawed, unless we want to be\\noutside of the pale of the family of nations, we can not knowingly\\nand flagrantly violate any of the articles of the code that governs\\nthe conduct of nations toward each other.\\nThe question of belligerency and the question of recognition\\nhave been so full} argued that I will simply content myself with\\nthe statement I have made of the general principles that I think\\nbear upon the question.\\nI desire to take up the proposition advanced by the Senator from\\nOhio [Mr. Foraker] in this connection. He stated that if we did\\nrecognize the independence of Cuba, and if there were anything\\nlacking, if there were a missing link, we could make that up after-\\nwards. In other words, that we could make independence and\\nthen recognize it.\\nYou can not make a status of independence for another. You\\ncan only make your own. You may be an ally of another, but if\\nyou go outside of the confines of your own territory and dip into\\nthe affairs of another stale and recognize that which does not\\nexist, and set to work to make what you want to recognize, you", "height": "3562", "width": "2126", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0009.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "8\\nhave violated the international compact that binds states and\\nciv.lized government. It does not make any difference in the\\ncase of Cuba whether the quotations that the Senator makes from\\nPresident McKinley s message apply or not. If the sovereignty\\nof Spain has ceased, it does not necessarily follow that the sover-\\neignty of the insurgents rises and comes into existence.\\nWe can only deal with the present state of facts. We can not\\npredicate action on a contingent condition which, though likely,\\nis not certain to happen. It would unsettle the relations of the\\nworld were the doctrine to obtain that, because a state may and\\nof right ought to become independent, therefore we will proceed\\nto recognize something nonexistent, and proceed by our aid to\\ncreate the future existence of what we presently do not know to\\nexist, or know not to exist.\\nIndependence can not be made any other way by the people of\\nCuba than by clothing themselves with the muniments of state-\\nhood, and if they have not got them it makes no difference\\nwhether there is a Spaniard there or not. It may be that after\\nthe Spaniards leave the island the Cubans will proceed to get to-\\ngether after a while, with aid from the United States, and build up\\nsomething that we can call a state, but before that happens we\\ncan not recognize it.\\nMr. President, my deliberate opinion is that we stultify our-\\nselves in voting for independence, and that the President of the\\nUnited States would be bound to veto the resolution if we\\nadopted it.\\nTo show that the insurgents are as much to blame for the con-\\ndition of affairs as the Spaniards, I will read some reports of our\\nconsuls laid before us on the 11th instant. I will turn over and\\nread some of their reports and we will see the condition of affairs\\nthere. I have not time to read many of them. Here is a commu-\\nnication from Mr. Hyatt to Mr. Day of the 31st of January last.\\nI will read only the last part of it, and ask that the whole of it be\\nincorporated in my remarks.\\nMr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.\\nNo. 427.] Consulate of the United State.s\\nSantiago de Cuba, January 31, 1S93.\\nSiic I desire to inform the honorable Department of State that Captain-\\nGeneral Blanco arrived at this port on Friday night, the SSth instant, but\\nremained on shipboard until the next mornins:.\\nThe consular corps called soon after his arrival. Most of General Blanco s\\nremarks were directed to the French and American consuls.\\nColonel Marsh, of General Blanco s staff, called upon and dined with me\\nthe same evening. He speaks fairly good English, and is a gentleman of rare\\nsocial qualities. On leaving he said, I shall be at all times most happy to\\nuse whatever influence 1 may have with General Blanco in securing a favor-\\nable resolution of any matters that yoti may desire to present to him.\\nI told him I was i)repared to take advantage of his offer at once, as there\\nhad iust arrived at the custom-house in this place a quantity of quinine\\nwhich the collector of customs said he could not deliver duty i ree without\\ninstructions from Havana. The colonel promised to lay the inatter at onca\\nbefore the Captain-General, and the quinine is released, and, as I understand,\\nit is ordered that all future shipments are to be promptly delivered to me, if\\nany shall come.\\nOn Sunday morning the regular passenger train on the Sabanilla and\\nMaroto Hailroad, when 5 miles out of Santiago, was blown up bv dvnamite\\nbombs, exploded by electric wires; two cars were shivered in atoms. Five\\npassengers were killed outright and twenty-two badly wounded, some of\\nT -hom have since died. It is thought by some that the insurgents believed\\nthat Captain-General Blauco was on the train; by others that they merely\\nwanted to notify the general that they were around and attending to busi-\\nness.\\nI am, etc., PULASKI F. HYATT,\\nUnited States Consul.\\n3258", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0010.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "9\\nHere is another extract showing how war is carried on in that\\nisland, the sort of highly civilized soldiers that we are to recog-\\nnize, and the highly civilized conduct by which warfare is carried\\non. It is a letter from Mr. Hyatt again, and no one who reads\\nthese reports can accuse Mr. Hj^att of any partiality to the Span-\\niards. All his sympathies are with the insurgents. I read this\\nto show how they treat autonomy:\\nMr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.\\nNo. 438.] Consulate of the United States.\\nSantiago de Cuba, Febrxiary i, 1S93.\\nSir: The military conditions here upon the surface are not materially\\nchanged, but to one who watches the signs of the times and linows the char-\\nacter of the men who act the drama the situation is not without portent.\\nThe era of good feeling is passing away, while bitter words and cruel acts\\nare again coming to the front. Those engaged in works of mercy are de-\\nnounced for keeping alive a tribe that ought to be dead. But it can not be\\nsaid there is no excuse for harsh judgment. The stoppage of all agricultural\\npursuits and the blowing up of cars containing innocent people can not be\\njustified even under the guise of war. Extremists of both sides seem able to\\ndominate the sentiments of their respective parties, while a deep feeling of\\npersonal hatred pervades their breasts.\\nGeneral Blanco s mild and humane policy meets with but a feeble response\\nfrom his own followers, while the insurgents laugh at the old man who\\nthrows sods and grass instead of stones.\\nAiitonomy is already a dead issue, while buying insurgent leaders thus far\\nis not a marked success, the insurgent generals having already imprisoned sev-\\neral officers suspected of venality.\\nColonel Marsh, of General Blanco s staff, said recently:\\nSpain fails to comprehend that Cuba has, as it were, two mothei s\u00e2\u0080\u0094 a po-\\nlitical one, which is Spain; a commercial one, which is the United States; and\\nthe political mother fails to see that the commercial mother has any rights,\\nwhile the commercial mother can not shako off her responsibility, for God\\nhas made them next-door neighbors.\\nI do not believe that the Westera Continent has ever witnessed death by\\nstarvation equal to that which now exists in eastern Cuba.\\nVery respectfully, etc.,\\nPULASKI F. HYATT,\\nUnited States Consul.\\nThere is where the insurgents are blowing up passenger trains\\nand killing passengers, private individuals, and where the consul\\nstates that autonomy is dead. I will read another extract from\\nMr. Hyatt to Mr. Day. Let us see how they treat Americans\\nover there. I read from No. 421, and ask that the whole letter be\\nincorporated in my remarks:\\nMr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.\\nNo. 421.] Consulate of the United States,\\nSantiago de Cuba, January 1?, 1S9S.\\nSir: I deem it a duty to lay before the honorable Department of State the\\nsituation here as affecting American interests, and to inclose herewith an\\norder issued by command of Gen. Maximo Gomez, and a translation of the\\nsame, forbidding the grinding of the sugar crop for the years 1897 and 1898.\\nIn this part of Cuba, so far as 1 can learn, all idea of making a sugar crop\\nis entirely abandoned.\\nI regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances,\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall\\nunder the same ban.\\nI had hoped that after the reconcentration order was revoked, through\\nthe energetic action of the present administration, we would find no trouble\\nin reinstating American industries; but it appears that all of the benefits\\nthat should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the action of the\\ninsurgents, who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee, and\\nother estates. The Pompo manganese mines, owned by Americans, would at-\\nthe present time be a very iirofltable investment if allowed to operate, are\\nalso being held up by the same power.\\nThe three Revery brothers, who I informed you recently I was about to\\nassist in returning to their coffee and fruit estates, got there only to find the\\ncould not go to work until permission was obtained from the insurgent com-\\nmander, which permission seems doubtful, I myself, as I understand my duty,\\nbeing inhibited from rendering them any assistance at this point.\\n3358", "height": "3562", "width": "2126", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0011.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "10\\nThese, \u00e2\u0096\u00a0with several sugai- estates within my consular district, are held up\\nand becoming more worthless than before.\\nIt is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in eastern Cuba.\\nSqualidity, starvation, sickness, and death meets one in all places. Beggars\\nthrong our doors and stop us on the streets. The dead in large numbers re-\\nmain over from day to day in the cemeteries unburied.\\n.1:\\nVery respectfully, PULASKI F. HYATT,\\nUnited States Consul.\\nI have one or two more here. Here is one on page 33 that I will\\nincorporate, the order of Calixto Garcia, who appears to be the\\ninsurgents commander, ordering that any one who offered auton-\\nomy should be shot.\\n[Inclosurein No. 405.]\\nMilitary Departaient of the Ea.st,\\nGeneral Headquarters,\\nBaire, November 6, 1807. (Third of Independence.)\\nTo the commanding generals of the first, second, and third army corps of\\neastern Cuba:\\nDuly informed through the press that the Spanish Government is offering\\nautonomy with the intention by these means to subdue the revolution, or at\\nleast to bring about disturbances in our ranks and weaken our cause, this\\ngeneral headquarters reminds you that the spirit and letter of our co7istitu-\\ntion does not admit with Spain any treaty whatever that is not based upon\\nthe absolute independence of Cuba.\\nIn accordance with this I will bo inexorable, submitting to a summary\\ntrial and will consider as traitors all civil or military officers of whatever\\nrank who receive me.ssages, commissions, or have any intercourse with the\\nenemy, as the supreme government of the republic is the only one author-\\nized, and listen to any overtures that may be made, and even the govern-\\nment will only listen to proposals acknowledging the absolute independence\\nof Cuba by the Spanish Government. All persons who come within our\\nlines commissioned by the enemy with proposals to submit to Spain will bo\\ntried and punished as spies.\\nIn order to avoid any ignorance being professed on this subject, you will\\ncirculate this communication among your subordinates, posting this order\\nduring eight days at your headquarters and have it read in the presence of\\nthe troops.\\nCountry and liberty.\\nCALIXTO GARCIA.\\nCommander in Chief of the Department of the East.\\n(Baire is a small village lying about 54 miles from the city of Santiago.)\\nThen, again, on page 34, I will read the letter of Mr. Hvatt to\\nMr. Day, No. 410:\\nMr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.\\nNo. 410.] Consulate of the United States,\\nSantiago de Cuba, December 5, 1S07.\\nSir: The situation in this part of Cuba is not destitute of activity; never-\\ntheless, it seems to be one of expectancy, both sides posing and waiting to\\nsee what will happen in the United States.\\nThere is a more secure feeling since the arrival of Governor-General Blanco;\\notherwise no perceptible change. The reconcentration order is relaxed, but\\nnot removed; but many people have reached a point where it is a matter of\\nentire indifference to them whether it is I emoved or not, for they have lost\\nall interest in the problem of existence.\\nA census of the island taken to-day, as compared with one taken three\\nyears ago, I feel confident would show that two-thirds of the residents are\\nmissing; and the Spanish army would make no better showing.\\nTlio rainy season is practically over, and cooler weather is^ apparent, the\\nthermometer ranging from 7U\u00c2\u00b0 to 88\u00c2\u00b0 F. through the twenty-four hours, in\\nthe shade.\\nHis Excellency Enrique Capriles, a former governor of this province, has\\nreturned to this post of duty. His former record is a sufficient guaranty of\\nof an honorable administration.\\nMr. Rigney. an American sugar planter near Manzanillo, was preparingto\\ngrind during the coming sea.son. A few nights since the insurgents fired\\nseven cannon shots among his buildings, one ball passing through tlie roof of\\nhis house. Americans were liopef ul that thev would be allowed to make their\\ncrop, and several arc making ready to do so; but the action of the insurgents\\n;;258", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0012.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "11\\ntoward Mr. Eigney gives the prnbletn a doubtful aspect. It may bave bcon\\na personal matter against Mr. I^igney.\\nThe number of destitute Amei-icans fed by this consulate decreased from\\n89 to tit, but is again on the increase. Since being fed, sickness among them\\nhas materially decreased and their appearance has greatly impi oved-\\nVery respectfully, PULASKI F. HYATT,\\nUnitfd States Consul.\\nI will not read any more, but I will aslc that the next one, No.\\n413, on page 35, be incorporated to show that the order of recon-\\ncentration was practically wiped out at the date of this letter,\\nDecember 14, 1S97.\\nThe letter is as follows\\nMr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.\\nNo. 413.J Consulate ov the United States,\\nSantiago dc Cuba, December lU, 1S07.\\nSir: Since my last dispatch on the situation in Cuba several military\\nengagements of more or less importance have occurred, and the insurgents\\nare claiming to have liad the best in the fight; but until an engagement shall\\ntake place of sufficient importance to have a controlling influence, 1 can\\nsafely leave the press to report on such matter.s.\\nI take it to be a matter of far greater importanca that I shall watch the\\ntrend of public opinion and its eflects on the political situation, for thus far\\nbattles have not been the most important factors in the Cuban problem.\\nUp to the present we have only garbled accounts as to the contents of the\\nPresident s message, so it is too early to say what its effects will be. I shall,\\nhowever, watch such results with much concera, as all parties have looked\\nforward to it with deepest solicitation.\\nThe order of reconcentratiou is now practically wiped out, and so far as\\nthe Spanish Government is concerned, men go about nearly as they please.\\nThe insurgents and their sympathizers will unqnestiouably take advantage\\nof the revocation to get from the towns and cit.es what they need, and other-\\nwise strengthen their cause.\\nThe effect on agricultural pursuits will be disappointing, because the great\\nmajority of those who would or should take up the work joined the insur-\\ngent forces when compelled to leave their homos, and the portion which came\\nwithin the lines of reconcentratiou are women, children, old and sickly pe\\npie, most of whom seem to have little interest in the problem of life.\\nThere is no one to take these people back to the fields and utilize their re-\\nmaining strength. Their houses are destroved, their fields are overgrown\\nwith weeds, they have no seed to plant, and if they had, they can not live\\nsixty or eightv days until the crop matures, which, when grown, would more\\nthan likely be taken by one or the other of the contending parties.\\nMany of those who are attached to their families have them within the m-\\nsiu geut lines.\\nFinally, I give it as my opinion, an opinion that I am sure is not biased in\\nfavor of Cuba, that Spain will be compelled to prosecute a far more vigorous\\nwar than has yet been done if she conquers peace in Cuba. I think I speak\\nadvisedly when I .say that in this end of the island, at least, there are many\\nthousand square miles where the foot of the Si anish soldier has never trod.\\nWithin this zone the insurgents have their families, corral their horses and\\ncattle, and raise their crops. They reach the outside world by methods of\\ntheir own.\\nWhy Spain, with a large body of as obedient and Ijrave soldiers as ever\\nshouldered a gun, has not penetrated these grounds and scattered to the four\\nwinds the comparatively small body of men who are there is a question I\\nwill not attempt to answer. x-i\\nAs I write a man is dying on the street in front of my door, the third m a\\ncomparatively short time.\\nVery respectfully, PULASKI F. HYATT,\\nUnited States Consul.\\nMr. CAFFERY. Mr. President, not only from these consular\\nreports, but from the statements in General Grant s first message\\nand the statements of every President who has w^ritteu of Cuba\\nsince, have the wars between the insurgents and the Spanish Gov-\\nernment been characterized, on either side. as of excessive atrocity,\\nof unexampled fierceness, and of complete devastation and ruin\\nto the country. It has been shown that the combatants on either\\nside are guilty of excesses. The war first started with the firing of\\n3253", "height": "3562", "width": "2126", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0013.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "the cane fields in eastern Cuba. When Weyler, for whom I have no\\nwords biit those of condemnation, saw that the insurgents were\\ndestroying the power of the sugar planters and others to make a\\nliving and pay taxes to the Spanish Government, he ordered the\\nreconcentration of the pacificos, thought to he friendly to the in-\\nsurgents. So between these two atrocious policies of destruction\\nthat island is a desert and a waste.\\nBoth sides are responsible for it; the insurgents as well as the\\nSpaniards. They are the same sort of people. There is no differ-\\nence between them in respect to crueltj and a talent for destruc-\\ntion. They are mostly all of Spanish blood. They inherit all the\\nvirtues and all the vices of their parentage. They have shown as\\nmuch cruelty in warfare, as much wanton waste and destruction\\nof i:)roperty. as the Spaniards themselves.\\nGeneral Grant mentions in one of his messages the fearful\\ntragedy of the murder by the insurgents of COO Spanish prisoners\\nat one swoop. It may or may not have been retaliation but there\\nwas and is a war of absolute extermination going on there. That\\nis the reason, and the only reason, why we can intervene. The\\nonly basis xipon which you can put intervention, outside of the\\nright of self-defense, is on the humane basis. That is a real, legal\\nbasis. It is a basis that is acknowledged by the humane code\\nthat governs the conduct of nations. It is a fearful responsibility\\nfor a state to undertake to judge of the circumstances that author-\\nize an intervention for humane purposes.\\nThe ground must be clear of doiibt; the facts must be known\\nwith certainty. No mere sympathy for a people struggling for\\nfreedom is a proper or legal basis.\\nWe seek no gain; we seek no conquest. If, to gain ends of peace,\\nwe must use the agency of war, the responsibility does not rest\\nwith us. We must discharge, in the face of difficulties both pres-\\nent and others looming ui) in the future, a solemn duty to human-\\nity and to civilization.\\nThe probability of some reconcentrados dying by reason of our\\nintervention may come to pass, but it is better that some should\\ndie than all. It is better to save some than that all should perish.\\nBut, sir, the exigency is on us. Impelled by the highest mo-\\ntive that can animate a nation, we are compelled to intervene;\\nand for what? To stop a war of extermination and devastation;\\nnothing more. If in order to restore peace, and permanently se-\\ncure it. we may have to go farther and establish a government,\\nwe do that as incidental to the power to intervene in order to\\ncarry out the beneficent purposes of the intervention.\\nSir, that embarrassments and difficulties may grow out of this\\nnone will deny, but we can not foresee what the future may bring\\nforth in the incidental duties that may devolve iipon us. I re-\\ngret that the hand of the President has been forced by the clamor\\nfor war. He and his predecessor have declared that affairs might\\nget so bad as to compel the United States to intervene, and the\\ntime is at hand now to do so.\\nThat is the basis iipon which we can rest and defy civilization\\nto point out one single flaw in our procedure. It is not only a\\nright, but in our case it is a duty, a high Christian, civilized duty.\\nIt is useless to talk as to whether or not autonomy has been of-\\nfered. It has been offered, but it has been rejected. The bearer\\nof a flag of truce was murdered in cold blood who tendered on\\nbehalf of Spain the offer of autonomy and self-government to the\\nislanders. There is an order in the consular reports from which\\nC358", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0014.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "13\\nI have read showing that it is death to speak of autonomy to an\\ninsurgent.\\nSir, what kind of a cause is that? Even a whisper of peace is\\nmet by the murderous machete. Is that the sort of a republic that\\nwe want to unduly launch upon the civilized world, created by\\nour breath, where the bearer of a flag of truce and the conveyor\\nof a message of peace has to be murdered?\\nSir, we are justified imder the international law and in the\\nChristian conscience of civilization for intervention. It is said\\nwe have to recognize what does not exist in order to make that\\nintervention good. Sir, we will then start with a fraud. We\\nwill start by passing a spurious counterfeit statehood upon the\\nworld. That is a start that the United States deliberately pro-\\nposes to make in this contemplated proceeding. We can not do\\nit and maintain our self-respect as one of the self-respecting na-\\ntions of the globe. You can not make states like you make paper\\nmoney. You can not make states like you enact a statute. They\\nare something to be made by and on behalf of the people who re-\\nside in them, and no outsider can by statute make them. Any\\ndemand, therefore, for us to acknowledge the existence of a fraud,\\nthe existence of a counterfeit, ought to be spurned out of this Cham-\\nber. N.\\nSir, the war feeling must be strong that would carry our people J\\nto the length of recognizing a falsehood and perpetrating a wrong\\nand launching upon international life a counterfeit state, vv hich\\nwould inevitably lead to war.\\nAnd whose war would it be, Mr. President? Ours? Is there a\\nfoot of American soil that has been invaded by the hostile tread of\\nthe invader? Is there a single citizen of the United States deprived\\nof his life or liberty anywhere in the civilized world for which we\\nought to take up arms? Whose fight is it that we are plunging\\ninto? Not our tight. It is a fight between certain insurrectionary\\npersons in the Island of Cuba and the Spanish Crown, and under\\nordinary circumstances we have nothing to do with it.\\nSir, if there was one single legitimate cause of war to unite this\\npeople, 1 ,000,000 swords would leap from their scabbards to de-\\nfend the honor and the power and the reputation of the United\\nStates without debating the question an instant. Vv^hy do we talk\\nhere? Because this resolution involves the consideration of a\\nmomentous question affecting the good name and the reputation\\nof the United States. It affects us very nearly, very closely. It\\naffects us in our judgment and in our conscience.\\nSir, this is not a question to be decided by passionate appeal.\\nThis is not a question to be submitted to the arts of rhetoric. This\\nquestion can not be decided by vilification of Spain; nor, sir,\\nought it to be decided with any reference to any small, political,\\ncontemptible, partisan advantage.\\nSir, this country appears to be swept from its feet by a perfect\\ncyclone of passion. Men of ordinary judgment appear to be lost\\nin amazement when they contemplate the extent to which juised\\nsympathy and passion are driving us.\\nSir, men get up here in this Chamber and tell ua it is no time to\\ntalk, but to act. Act how? Are we going to act foolishly? Are\\nwe going to act without cause? Are we going to plunge these\\n70,000,000 people into the horrors of war? We are told to act,\\nto turn loose the dogs of war and let them dip their bloody tongues\\nin human gore. That is the cry heard everywhere. Any temper-\\nate counsel is spurned, and a man of moderation is talked of as\\nL258", "height": "3562", "width": "2126", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0015.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "14\\nI have been talked of in the editorial that I have placed upon the\\nrecords this morning.\\nMr. President, I will lay down my position thus: The United\\nStates of America, moved and inspired by the highest considera-\\ntions of humanity and duty, do hereby declare that the war be-\\ntween Spain and her insurgent colony shall cease. This is the\\nlanguage, the noble language, of President McKinley. And that\\nin order to make that declaration good he shall intervene there\\nwith all the power of this great Republic, and then and there, if\\nnecessary, establish such a government as will secure permanent\\npeace. Whether Spain likes it or whether Spain does not, we\\nhave gone too far to consider.\\nIt is idle, sir, to refer to all the concomitant and conspiring cir-\\nciTmstances and incidents that tend to the terrible conclusion of\\nwar. This ground of pure, unalloyed humanity is sufficient for\\nany Senator in this Chamber to stand on. It is an aggravation of\\nit to bring in the finding in regard to the Maine. That is an ag-\\ngravating cause, but no man can say that it is a controlling cause.\\nWhy, sir, have we gone insane? Here is a board of inquiry con-\\nstituted oiit of our own oificers. Their finding is thrown to the\\nwinds. Another hearing is taken by a body of civilians and they\\nfind suspicion of foul play by Spain, which an able court of in-\\nquiry did not entertain or did not put down in their report.\\nAh, sir, I commend that report of the naval court of inquiry\\nand Captain Sigsbce s telegram preceding that report. It ought\\nto have given the tone to the American conduct and to the Amer-\\nican action in regard to this whole question between the United\\nStates and Spain. Suspend your judgment, says that most ad-\\nmirable officer, suspend your judgment: do not go oft too quick; do\\nnot lose your heads; we will investigate; we will try to find out how\\nthis occurred, and when it is found out, we will say so. In the\\nmeantime suspend your judgment.\\nAn admirable, excellent, noble telegram, and at the time that\\nit Avas written calculated to allay what he must have known\\nwere the high-wrought feelings of a great-hearted people struck\\nalmost dumb at the news of tiie terrible catastrophe. Instead of\\nfollowing that example, every art of rhetoric, every device of the\\ndemagogue, is resorted to to help plunge this country into a pre-\\ncipitate war.\\nSir, I do not contemplate an honorable war, a just war, with\\nany other feeling than one of sorrow, but I do contemplate a war\\nwaged between the United States and another power without a\\njust ground as the most fearful curse that could fall upon the de-\\nvoted heads of our good, honest, patriotic citizens.\\nSir. as showing the rash and ill-considered war clamor, the find-\\ning of the Navy board of inquiry and the action and stand of the\\nPresident are set aside, and the incident of the Maine is taken as\\nthe fii-m ground of battle.\\nOur own court has found no casus belli. Our own President\\nhas foimded no case on that incident.\\nNo impartial man can find a case on what, though terrible and\\nshocking, sending a thrill of horror throughout the globe, has not\\nbeen traced to Spain or Spain s act. Until Spain s complicity is\\nestablished her liability to war does not arise.\\nMr. President, I had intended to elaborate the questions in this\\ncase at Tiiuch greater length. I will only now state some conclu-\\ntaions that I think may flow from intervention.\\nI have no hesitancy in saying that the condition of affairs in\\na258", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0016.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "15\\nCuba may be such after intervention as to retinire other than a\\ncast-iron line of procedure. We are but little acquainted with\\nthat people and their conditions. Tlae honorable Senator from\\nVermont [Mr. Proctor] has given the clearest, the most succinct,\\nand the most comprehensive statement that I have heard on the\\nsubject, and he does not satisfy me entirely. He could not have\\nknown the insurgents, the body of whom are to constitute the\\nelectorate. He did not see them; he was in the city of Havana\\nmostly, and necessarily got his information secondhand.\\nMr. HOAR and Mr. GRAY. Nor did he speak Spanish.\\nMr. CAFFERY. Well, that is another drawback; but whether\\nhe spoke Spanish or not. he was not in the field, where he could\\ndiscover precisely what kind of a government that people require.\\nThat ultimately some kind of a government of the people will be\\nestablished there is without question; but, Mr. President, tliat is\\na most delicate operation, involving a practical acquaintance with\\nthe local conditions, involving a knowledge of who ought and who\\nought not to belong to the electorate, involving, in short, a com-\\nplt te inquiry as to the social and political conditions of that\\nisland.\\nDoes not everybody know that after tliis war\u00e2\u0080\u0094 you may say it\\nis the culmination of the war of 1863\u00e2\u0080\u0094 has lasted now thirteen\\nyears, with a break of seventeen years, the feelings of bitterness and\\nhatred that have been engendered between the contestants must\\nrequire of whoever goes in there to establish a government most\\ncaiitious, most wise action?\\nThe honorable Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Moxey] in a\\nspeech delivered in this body said that the insurgents had four\\ncenturies of wrongs to resent and injuries to avenge, and that the\\nlex talionis would be applied. If that be so, Mr. President, is it\\nnot incumbent upon us to give the President of the United States\\nthe widest latitude of operation, the widest discretion? It seems\\nto me so. It seems to me that the House resolution must be modi-\\nfied in some particulars so as to give him a full and plenary juris-\\ndiction on the lines that he asks for in his message.\\nI must say. sir, that that message commends itself to me, to the\\nworld, to civilization, as one of the most sagacious, wise, htirnane,\\nand. statesmanlike documents that ever came from a civilized\\nruler. It will be a memorial hereafter to the wisdom and patience\\nand patriotism of President McKinley. It will show, when the\\nproper occasion arises, the man whom the American electorate\\nselects for the Presidency will always rise up to its height, how-\\never high it may be, and the greater the occasion the greater his\\npatriotism.\\nMr. President, one thought more, and I will take my seat. I\\nhave no doubt in my own mind that in the future the Island of\\nCuba will be ours. I do not say that we ought, in a spirit of ag-\\ngression or greed for additional territory, to take any steps to\\nbring about that result; biit I do say that the finger of destiny\\nitseK points to it. It is not in the condition of the Hawaiian Islands\\nor some insignificant point in the Pacific or the Atlantic. It is\\nnecessary to round up, as Mr. Jefferson said in an early day, the\\nfull possessions of the American Republic. No man can sail past\\nthe Florida Keys into the Gulf of Mexico who does not see the\\nvast importance of that island to the American Republic. It is a\\npart, and an essential part, of the Monroe doctrine that that island\\nshall belong to no other foreign country than Spain.\\nWhat is the significance of that doctrine, Mr. President? Some\\n\u00c2\u00a3258", "height": "3562", "width": "2126", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0017.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "LIBKHKY Ul- CUNOKtbb\\n013 785 883 S\\n16\\ntime in the course of events Spain will have to let go that island.\\nSpain is poor. She is vexed with dynastic trouble. Her resotirce.5\\ncan not much longer stand the drain of keeping up a struggle in\\nwhich the chances of success are desperate. There will be an\\nindependent government in Cuba, even if we, the United States\\nkeep hands oft now. Then Americans will flock there. They will\\nfinally get control of the government. Revolutions will, no doubt,\\nbreak out at intervals, as they have in every Spanish- American\\ncountry, but constant accessions of Americans will gradually ce-\\nment their strength and importance. Loyalty to the Stars and\\nStripes will comijel the erection of our national ensign as the gov-\\nerning flag in Cuba. I do not say, Mr. President, that I desire to\\nsee Cuba a State in the American Union. Certainly not until after\\na long tutelage of the population under Federal guardianship.\\nThat tutelage will be found necessary to tit the mass of the inhab-\\nitants there for the duties of citizenship as we understand them.\\nBut the destiny of Cuba is to be a part of a Republic to which, by\\nsituation and interests, she is and will be so closely bound.\\nWith its nearness to this great Republic, right under the shadow\\nof our institutions and influence, with the commercial intercourse\\nbetween us and Cuba so large and constantly increasing, it is the\\npart of wisdom to forecast the time when the lone star of the\\nCuban banner will glitter in the constellation on the bhxe field of\\nour own star-spangled banner. But, ah, sir, that is not what the\\ninsurgents want now. They want independence. They have had\\nthe United States fighting their battles all the way along. The\\nCuban junta has directed operations from the city of New York.\\nIt does not stand them in hand to say that they have not sold or\\nissued over a hundred thousand dollars of bonds. It is manifest\\nthat nobody will take them until the independence of that island\\nis recognized; and to this end, they have bent every energy to force\\nrecognition by the United States.\\nNow, sir, when they get their independence, what then? Their\\nbonds will, I am told, go to 40 cents in the dollar. They want,\\nperhaps, to take the plantations that belong to the Spaniards as\\nsecurity for them. The Spaniards own nearly all the property.\\nThat appears to be the fact from the representations of the con-\\nsuls. There are in Cuba about 300,000 Spaniards: there are about\\n800,000 Cubans; there are about 500,000 colored. That 800,000\\n\\\\vill probably dominate the balance of the population, possibly\\ntolerating the colored, until such time as they can be set aside.\\nSuch a heterogeneous population, animated by the hatreds of war,\\nliable to clash from racial differences, naturally leads to revolu-\\ntion. A government recognized to-day may be extinct to-morrow,\\nuntil finally the result of which I have spoken will come to pass\\nthe incorporation of the island into the territory of this Republic.\\nMr. President, I will leave the subject at this point. I have\\nendeavored to look at this question as calmly and as dispassion-\\nately as I could. Whether or not I have strvick the right line is\\nfor others to say. liut whatever conclusion I have arrived at has\\nat least been one attained after much reflection and after the best\\njudgment 1 could give to the question.", "height": "3561", "width": "2100", "jp2-path": "interventionincu00caff_0018.jp2"}}