{"1": {"fulltext": "S4.\\n?2", "height": "5133", "width": "3354", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "2.\\n7\\nr", "height": "4613", "width": "2708", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "7r\\nA\\nAN IMPERIAL POLICY DANGEROUS\\nTO THE REPUBLIC.\\nSPEECH\\nOF\\nHON. JOHN F. SHAFROTH,\\nOF COLORADO,\\nIN THE\\nHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,\\nTuesday, June 14, 1803.\\nWASHINGTON.\\n1898.", "height": "4613", "width": "2708", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "611", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "of\\nSPEECn\\nOl\\nHON. JOHN F. SHA FROTH\\nThe House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 359) to\\nprovide for annexing: the Hawaiian Islands to the United States\\nMr. SHAFROTH said:\\nMr. Speaker: It is with feelings of the gravest apprehension\\nthat I find in this House a sentiment concerning the future foreign\\npolicy of this Government which has just found expression in the\\nspeech of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Sulzer]. He has\\nboldly declared that the United States should enter upon a policy\\nof acquiring colonial possessions; that it should not only annex\\nHawaii but should extend its power and dominion across the Pa-\\ncific and forever hold possession of the Philippine Islands.\\nSir., he but voices the sentiment of four-fifths of those Repre-\\nsentatives who believe in the annexation of Hawaii.\\nOn the day the vote was taken to consider this resolution, in\\norder to test the extent of this sentiment, I put the question to\\ntwelve Hawaiian annexationists of this House, whether they be-\\nlieved also in annexing the Philippine Islands. In every instance\\nI received an affirmative answer. I am satisfied that to-day such\\na policy for this Government would be carried by a large major-\\nity in this body. The question has gone beyond that of merely\\nannexing Hawaii and is now whether we will adopt an imperial\\npolicy for this Republic.\\nSir, if any person six weeks ago had suggested that the policy\\nwhich this Government has pursued with such magnificent re-\\nsults for the last one hundred years should be reversed and that\\nwe should extend our dominion to the Asiatic continent, he would\\nhave been regarded as a dreamer unfit to represent the people of\\nany State in the Union. And yet the excitement of war has pro-\\nduced such a desire for conquest that the Representatives set no\\nlimit or bound to the extent of our dominion.\\nMr. Speaker, I want to discuss this resolution from three stand-\\npoints:\\nFirst, from the political standpoint;\\nSecond, from the commercial standpoint and\\nThird, from the military standpoint.\\n3538 3\\nf", "height": "4613", "width": "2708", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "I.-FROM THE POLITICAL STANDPOINT.\\nWhat I mean by political standpoint is not as it affects one po-\\nlitical party or the other, but as it affects the general policy and\\nwelfare of the United States. Under a system of acquiring terri-\\ntory only on this continent, which in no manner involves us in\\nthe political controversies of the European powers, we have built\\nup the greatest nation on the face of the globe. No longer can\\neven the greatest European nation be compared to the United\\nStates. It is proper now to contrast this country only with groups\\nof nations, or with the balance of the world. In commerce, manu-\\nfacture, mining, and agriculture we are equal to between one-\\nthird and one-half of the balance of the world.\\nThe nations whose policy has been to acquire colonial posses-\\nsions have not made such rapid progress.\\nWHY THE UNITED STATES BECAME RICH AND POWERFUL.\\nWhy have we advanced so rapidly? At the time of the forma-\\ntion of our Government we possessed practically none of the\\naccumulated wealth that made the European nations important,\\nand yet without an equal start we have far surpassed them in\\nwealth and in all the industries that make a nation truly great.\\nThe reason of our immense achievement lies in the fact that the\\nposition of our territory naturally isolates us from the political\\nquarrels of the Eastern Continent,\\nWith no rival to the north or the south on this hemisphere, with\\nno contiguous foe we need fear, we have not been required to tax\\nourselves to death for the purpose of sustaining a large standing\\narmy and an immense navy. Mr. Speaker, I am in favor of an\\nample navy and have always so voted, but I am not in favor of\\nundertaking a policy that will necessitate two and three times as\\nlarge a navy as would be required for the most ample protection\\nof our territory as now constituted. A colonial policy means\\nenormously increased standing army and navy and millions to be\\nspent on fortifications of distant harbors.\\nIn an interview of a few weeks ago Senor Sagasta, the Spanish\\npremier, said:\\nOur colonies have cost us dear. Within the last twenty-five years we have\\nspent in thern 3,000,0*30 009 francs in defensive works. Only the most impor-\\ntant cities and points have been fortified, as we could not erect works every-\\nwhere. The cost would have been 7,000,000,000 or 8,000,000,000 francs.\\nGermany also finds colonies to be expensive. Her experience in\\nthis respect was recently stated in the Boertsen Courier, of Berlin,\\nas follows:\\nA heavy burden has been laid upon Germany by her colonial policy. About\\n11,000,000 marks are spent annually in this connection, and a further expendi-\\n3536", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "tare may be looked for in the future. The revenue derived from the colonies\\nin no v/ay offsets this expenditure.\\nGreat armies and navies appeal to the national pride when com-\\nparing the prowess of nations, yet it must be remembered that\\nthe chief end of government is the happiness of the subject, and\\nsubjects can not be happy when burdened with taxation for main-\\ntaining unnecessarily large armies and navies. Such a course\\naffects not only the happiness of the citizen, but prevents great\\ndevelopment and cripples the industries of a nation. It strips\\nthe productive forces of a country in order to supply men for the\\narmy. In order to maintain this warlike array the taxes of Eng-\\nland are 10 per cent of the earnings of her people; of France, 13 per\\ncent; of Germany, 10.V per cent, while those of the United States,\\nunder our policy, are only 5 per cent. The wars of Europe in the\\npast century have directly or indirectly cost more than $100,000,-\\n000,000. That is the reason Europe has not prospered as wehave.\\nDo we want to change that natural advantage which our position\\ngives and enter upon a policy that will involve us in controver-\\nsies with foreign powers and necessitate the placing of the same\\nburdens upon our people as are now borne by the nations of Europe?\\nFor a time the glittering sight of marshaled men may stimu-\\nlate our pride and make us enthusiastic for such an array, but\\nwhen we realize that the cost of indulging that national pride\\nmust be paid by the sweat of labor, with its inevitable result of\\npreventing development and crippling industries, the wise course\\nof maintaining our natural advantage becomes apparent.\\nNo better advice was ever given than that of Washington in his\\nFarewell Address, when he said:\\nThe great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extend-\\ning our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection\\nas possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fill-\\ntilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.\\nEurope has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very re-\\nmote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the\\nauses of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it\\nmust be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary\\nvicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her\\nfriendships or enmities.\\nOur detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a dif-\\nferent course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the\\nperiod is not far off when we may defy material injury from external an-\\nnoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality wo\\nmay at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belliger-\\nant nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not\\nlegally hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war\\nas our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.\\nWhy forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own\\nto stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweavingour destiny with that\\nof any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of Euro-\\npean ambition, rivalahip, interest, humor, or caprice?", "height": "4613", "width": "2708", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "6\\nMr. Jefferson, in his inaugural address of 1801, announced the\\nfollowing rule:\\nPeace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alli-\\nances with none.\\nSHALL WE ABANDON THE MONROE DOCTRINE?\\nThis annexation policy which sseins to so thoroughly pervade\\nthis House means the abandonment of the Monroe doctrine. That\\ndoctrine is simply that European governments should not extend\\ntheir territory on this hemisphere, and reciprocally that we should\\nnot extend our dominion beyond the same.\\nMr. Speaker, in this Hall two years ago, I witnessed a scene\\nwhich I shall never forget. It was at the time of the dispute be-\\ntween this country and Great Britain over the Venezuelan bound-\\nary. The President sent a message to Congress, which with ring-\\ning words declared that the Monroe doctrine should be maintained;\\nthat no European power should be permitted to acquire territory\\non this side of the Atlantic. There was universal applause fol-\\nlowing the reading of that message. The feeling of Congress\\npartook of the same character as that which manifested itself at\\nthe time of the passage of the bill appropriating $50,000,000 for\\nthe defense of the nation. With no dissenting voice it was said\\nthat the Monroe doctrine was most essential to our Government\\nand must be upheld.\\nThe result of that message made the Monroe doctrine inter-\\nnational law. After that firm message England discovered that\\nthe Monroe doctrine was the same principle applied to this conti-\\nnent that she had exercised repeatedly as to the Eastern Hemi-\\nsphere, namely, the doctrine of the balance of power. She con-\\nceded that if she had the right to enforce that doctrine as to\\nthe Eastern Continent, we had the right to enforce it as to the\\nWestern.\\nFor one hundred years we have been trying to get the nations\\nof the world to recognize this principle, and at last it is an ac-\\ncomplished fact. Yet, the minute we get this cherished principle\\nfirmly established and recognized, we by our own volition de-\\nstroy it.\\nSir, we have no right to invoke that doctrine against the acqui-\\nsition of territory on this continent by European nations, and at\\nthe same time violate the doctrine by the acquisition of territory\\non the eastern continent. We must either keep hands off the\\nEastern Hemisphere, or permit European nations to acquire ter-\\nritory in this continent. One is the correlative of the other.\\nTo my mind there is no comparison as to which is the better\\npolicy for this Government. The one continues the policy of\\npeace, of making this the greatest of all commercial nations, and\\nof developing all the varied industries of the same.\\n3536", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "The other is a policy of military aggrandizement, which is not\\nsuited to the principles of a republic, and not consonant with the\\nliberty of the individual.\\nThere are weaknesses in republics that disqualify them from\\nbecoming warlike nations. The discipline of an army is the exer-\\ncise of the powers of monarchy. The conduct of a campaign is\\nabsolute monarchy.\\nTo gain advantages in preparing for and declaring war, secrets\\nmust be made of important facts, which can never be done under\\nrepublican institutions. Good government in a republic is the\\nresult of the greatest latitude of investigation by the public. To\\ndepart from that course would open the Pandora box of evils\\nwhich would jeopardize the very existence of the republic.\\nMr. Speaker, others maybe willing under an impulse generated\\nby war to declare that they will abandon the doctrine that has\\nbeen recognized not only by one, but by all political parties as\\nthe true and wise policy for this Government; but I for one can\\nnot. I can not persuade myself that such a course is for the best\\ninterest of my country.\\nOTHER POLITICAL PROBLEMS.\\nIii the annexation of the Hawaiian or Philippine islands other\\npolitical questions arise that are almost as momentous and as\\nfatal to our institutions as the doctrine of military aggrandize-\\nment. The Hawaiian and Philippine islands are located in a\\nlatitude south of the Tropic of Cancer. Sir, there is something\\nin the climate of the torrid zone that saps the energies of man and\\nprevents that development so essential to good and enlightened\\ncitizenship of a republic. The civilization of a people is largely\\nthe result of climatic influences, and hence it is almost impossible,\\nif not an impossibility, to change the civilization of the countries\\nsituated near the equator. The Sandwich Islands have a popula-\\ntion of 109.000, of which 24,407 are Japanese; 21,616, Chinese;\\n15,191, Portuguese; 39,504, native Hawaiians; 4,116, other foreign-\\ners, and 3,036, Americans. The Philippine Islands have a greater\\npercentage of Asiatic population.\\nWhy, sir, what are we going to do with these or the Philippine\\nIslands if they are annexed to the United States? Are we going\\nto admit them as States? You must remember they belong to an\\nentirely different civilization, to an entirely different race. They\\nknow nothing of republican institutions.\\nAre we going to give these people the right of local self-govern-\\nment? The answer is no; and it is not contended that they are\\ncapable of self-government. Yet are we going to violate the very\\nprinciple for which our fathers fought the Revolutionary war?\\nAre we now going to deny the principle that taxation without\\nrepresentation is tyranny?\\n3530", "height": "4613", "width": "2653", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "8\\nThe Constitution of the United States declares that no person\\nehall be deprived of the right of citizenship on account of race,\\ncolor, or previous condition of servitude.\\nMr. Speaker, when territory is added to this nation, we are\\nbound to give the inhabitants thereof the right of citizenship, or\\nto overturn the guaranty of the Constitution. What does local\\nself-government or admission to statehood mean as to these islands?\\nIt means a race problem. We have had one race problem, which\\nalmost destroyed republican institutions in some of the States of\\nthis Union. That was one in which the races were nearly equally\\ndivided in such States. How much more serious must be the\\nproblem where the proportion against our own race is more than\\n15 to 1?\\nConsequently, the admission of Hawaii or the Philippine Islands\\nwill bring to us nothing but discord, discontent, and a large ex-\\npenditure of money. In my judgment it will result in no good to\\nthe nation.\\nIs it possible that it is wise policy to add to our country the\\nsame Asiatic inhabitants against whom the people of the Pa-\\ncific coast once rose in their wrath and compelled the enact-\\nment of laws excluding them from our shores?\\nThe song of Come along, John Chinaman, we ve room enough\\nto welcome all, was once sung with a degree of enthusiasm that\\nindicated a unanimity of sentiment favorable to such immigra-\\ntion. And yet, sir, when the practicable application of the senti-\\nment was felt, it produced such a revulsion in the public mind\\nthat had not speedy restrictive legislation followed it would have\\nproduced domestic disturbances that might have culminated even\\nin revolution. Is it possible that it is wise to again put repub-\\nlican institutions to such a severe test?\\nThe foundation upon which republics are founded is the edu-\\ncation of its citizens. It is in recognition of this principle that\\nwe have established the public-school system and spent millions\\nand millions of dollars in educating our children. It is said that\\nanarchy can never prevail among educated people, and it is true.\\nAre we now to ignore that principle and run the hazards of revolt\\nwhich all history shows must surely follow from ignorant citi-\\nzenship?\\nBesides, sir, by annexation of the Hawaiian Islands we are\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2violating another fundamental principle of our Government.\\nGovernments derive their just powers from the consent of the\\ngoverned. The Dole administration does not even pretend to\\nrepresent the wishes of the people of Hawaii on this question.\\nA monster petition against annexation, signed by more than a\\nmajority of the Hawaiians, has been presented to the Senate. No\\none has contended in this debate that a majority of the inhabitants\\nc533", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "9\\ndesire annexation. The annexationists dare not adopt an amend-\\nment to this resolution providing for annexation upon a vote of\\nthe people of those islands. Is it possible that our Government\\nthat pretends to derive its jurisdiction over people from the con-\\nsent of the governed are, as against a frieDdly people, going ttf\\nannex them without their consent? We may have the power, but\\nit is not wise to exercise it.\\nI therefore contend that from a political standpoint it will be\\nan egregious blunder for this Government to enter upon an im-\\nperial policy, or to make a start therein by annexing the Hawaiian\\nIslands.\\nII.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 FROM THE COMMERCIAL STANDPOINT.\\nI wish now to examine this question from the commercial stand-\\npoint. In doing this, I will consider it only from the standpoint\\nof benefit to our country, not as it affects the people of the\\nHawaiian or Philippine islands. Do we get the best of the bar-\\ngain?\\nThis is the first time I have ever heard that it is to our com-\\nmercial advantage to annex islands when the balance of trada\\nwith them is against us to the extent of ten millions a year\u00e2\u0080\u0094 when\\nthey sell us three times as much as we sell them.\\nWe imported from Hawaii in 1898 products of the value of\\n$15,460,098 and exported products of the value of $5,404,208, leav-\\ning the balance of trade against us to the extent of $9,995,890.\\nThe balance of trade against us is not the worst feature of our\\ncommerce with those islands. Ninety-nine per cent of those im-\\nports is sugar, every pound of which should be raised on Ameri-\\ncan soil and by American labor. The Hawaiian Islands in 1897\\nimported into this country the enormous amount of 502.000,000\\npounds of sugar. Sir, that is sufficient to supply with that com-\\nmodity all the people in the United States residing west of the\\nMissouri River. When these islands are once annexed, the sugar\\nindustry there will increase even more rapidly than it has in the\\npast, and in the last twenty-five years the imports of sugar have\\nincreased almost in a geometrical ratio, being 25,080,182 pounds\\nin 1875 and 443,569,282 pounds in 1893.\\nMr. Speaker, is it possible that we want to put those people in\\nactive competition with the people who are native-born Ameri-\\ncans?\\nMr. BRUCKER. Have we not done that by the reciprocity\\ntreaty?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. I concede that that has been done by the\\nreciprocity treaty, and it has been done at a cost of $65,000,000 to\\nyour constituents and mine. [Applause.]\\nMr. BRUCKER. And yet at the same time the gentleman will\\nnot say that he is in favor of the repeal of that treaty?", "height": "4613", "width": "2653", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "10\\nMr, SHAFROTH. I must say that I do not believe that treaty\\nought to exist. [Applause on the Democratic side.]\\nThe annexation of these islands means the absolute destruction\\nof the sugar industry in the Western States. It means depriving\\nthe already overburdened farmer of the privilege of raising a prod-\\nuct which promises to yield him some return for his labor.\\nWhy he can not compete with Hawaiian sugar is because it is\\nthere raised by contract Chinese and Japanese labor that is paid\\n$3 a month and board, or 30 cents a day without board. In the\\nPhilippine Islands the labor conditions are still worse. Is it any\\nwonder that Mr. Gompers, the president of the Federation of\\nLabor of the United States, is fighting with all his might the an-\\nnexation of the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands.\\nTherefore I maintain that from a commercial standpoint an-\\nnexation would be to the detriment of our trade balance, to the\\ndestruction of our sugar industry, and to the injury of our la-\\nborers.\\nIII.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT.\\nMr. Speaker, I desire now to discuss the proposition from a mili-\\ntary standpoint.\\nI take it as a general proposition that the consensus of opinions\\nof statesmen is that solidarity of territory presents the most in-\\nvulnerable form of possessions. No better demonstration of this\\ncan be found than in the present war with Spain. We have\\nmade the attack upon Spain, where? Not on her home territory.\\nIf this war were waged upon her home territory it would take ten\\ntimes the number of men and ten times the amount of money to\\nproduce the same result we are now accomplishing.\\nWe have attacked Spain at her weakest points, namely, in her\\noutlying possessions. If we acquire colonies, the first attack upon\\nus will be through them. As long as you have a compact territory\\nno nation will dare invade it, because nothing can be made\\nthereby. There is no way of holding a slice of territory cut from\\na nation located such as ours. Sooner or later it would be retaken.\\nWhen nations find that nothing can be gained by war with such\\na country the idea of conquest vanishes even if they covet our\\npossessions. We should not exchange concentration for dif-\\nfusion.\\nWe have heard much in this debate of England s greatness.\\nEngland is great, but not to be compared to the United States.\\nOn account of her small home territory, England could not have\\na large population without colonial possessions, but we have a ter-\\nritory so large in area that it can easily accommodate ten times\\nits present inhabitants without overcrowding. But even British", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "11\\nstatesmen have doubted the wisdom of that country having colo-\\nnial possessions. Mr. Gladstone once said:\\nThe United States have a national base for the greatest continuous empire\\never established by man. The distinction between a continuous em-\\npire and one severed and dispersed over the seas is vital.\\nEven India has been a source of depleting the British treasury,\\nand it is said in England that, more than any other part of the\\nBritish Empire, India gives their statesmen sleepless nights. Be-\\nsides, England is continually at war with her provinces in sup-\\npressing uprisings and revolts, at the expense of her treasury.\\nThe United States need have no fear of the outcome of a con-\\ntest with any foreign power. Great Britain is the only dangerous\\npower, and her outlying dominions make her so vulnerable that\\nshe dare not attack us. Even if her navy is larger than ours, she\\nrealizes that the minute war is declared the armies of the United\\nStates would cross the Canadian borders and wrest from her grasp\\nthe gem of her colonial possessions. Canada is our hostage and\\nis a sure preventive of war.\\nWhen the Hawai an Islands are annexed, the point of attack by\\nany foreign power will be there, because it is so far from our\\nstrength and power. There they can meet us on equal terms, and\\nit will make our wars of the future contests upon the high seas\\ninstead of upon the land, where our great natural strength lies.\\nWhy should we throw away our natural strength land power\\nin order to grasp that which is expensive and not necessary to\\nus sea power?\\nThe Hawaiian Islands have a coast line of over S00 miles\u00e2\u0080\u0094 as large\\nas that of New England. If we annex them, they must be forti-\\nfied and defended. It puts the outposts of our defense 2,100 miles\\ninto the Pacific. As we know it will be the point of attack in case\\nof war with foreign powers, it must be fortified more strongly\\nthan the other portions of our country. It means, therefore, the\\nexpenditure of millions in fortifications and an unnecessarily large\\nnavy.\\nWOULD THE POSSESSION OV HAWAII BY ANY OTHER NATION LE\\nDANGEROUS TO US?\\nBut gentlemen say it is no longer a question as to whether we\\nshall own the islands, but whether we can permit any other nation\\nto own them, and that if we do not take them some other nation\\nwill.\\nMr. Speaker, I have no apprehension that any other nation will\\never own them or that even if they should they could be a menace\\nto us.\\nSome gentlemen talk as if it would mean annihilation to the\\nUnited States if a foreign power should get possession of the\\nislands. So greatly have they magnified this feature of the de-", "height": "4613", "width": "2653", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "12\\nbate that one might imagine that the very existence of our nation\\nwas threatened if some other nation should have a coaling station\\nthere.\\nWhy, Mr. Speaker, the greatest naval power on earth to-day\\nhas a naval and coaling station within 100 miles of the two leading\\ncities of Seattle and Tacoma. On Vancouver Island Great Brit-\\nain has not only a coaling station, but a great naval establish-\\nment. Our naval and military men have not spent any sleepless\\nnights in anticipation of total annihilation from such a source.\\nGreat Britain has a number of coaling stations on islands in the\\nAtlantic close to our shore, and yet we do not have any night-\\nmares over that fact.\\nDo you suppose that Great Britain, even if she owned the Sand-\\nwich Islands, would go out into the middle of the Pacific Ocean\\nand from there attempt to send her battle ships against our shore?\\nShe, like all other nations, would find that the Hawaiian Islands\\nare too far from our shore to act as a base of supplies or naval\\nestablishment for repairs. Very little more coal can be stored in\\na battle ship than that which is necessary to carry it to our shores.\\nBy the time a hostile battle ship reached our shores from Honolulu\\nshe would be almost out of coal, and hence not in condition to enter\\nan engagement. If there were delay, her ships would be as help-\\nless as sail vessels to resist or escape from our armament.\\nHAWAII NOT A NATURAL, COALTNG STATION.\\nMr. Speaker, a great deal has been said about Hawaii being a\\ncoaling station. It is not naturally a coaling station, because no\\ncoal is found on the island. For through commerce it is not a\\ncoaling station. I was told by Senator Pettigrew, who came\\nback from China by that route, that merchant ships do not coal\\nat Honolulu, He said that at the ports of China you can buy\\ncoal for $7 a ton, but when you reach Honolulu it costs $14 per\\nton. Consequently it pays to take a sufficient quantity of coal to\\nlast to San Francisco, so as not to coal at Honolulu. The very\\nstatement of the reason must cany conviction. There may be\\nsome coaling at Honolulu, but it must be very small.\\nWhy should we desire even a coaling station at Hawaii when\\nit is 800 miles out of the way in going from San Francisco to\\nYokohama, or the Chinese ports? In measuring distance on the\\nglobe it must be remembered that the earth rounds to the north.\\nWe already own the Aleutian Islands, which are within 75\\nmiles of the direct line of travel to Japan and China. Those\\nislands contain coal and hence are natural coaling stations. The\\nisland of Kiska, in that group, contains a magnificent harbor and\\nin my judgment has a far greater strategic position than any har-\\nbor in Hawaii. We are apt to think of our Aleutian Islands as", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "13\\nbeing frigid and unfit for harbor purposes, but when we are\\nassured that the thermometer never gets below 7\u00c2\u00b0 above zero, and\\nalso realize that Kiska is situated south of the latitude of the\\ngreatest port in the world, Liverpool, we can realize that there is\\nno danger of ice obstructing navigation for a single day in the\\nyear.\\nThe route from San Francisco to Yokohama is three days shorter\\nby our own islands than by Honolulu, and from the ports of Se-\\nattle and Tacoma the time is still shorter. I am informed that\\nships do not go by Honolulu, unless they have sufficient local\\nbusiness at that port to justify the loss of three days in the voyage.\\nWhy should we be grasping for that which is out of the way\\nwhen we should be developing the islands and shore line we\\nalready possess?\\nMr. SULZER. Will the gentleman allow me a question?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. Yes, sir.\\nMr. SULZER. You are opposed to the annexation of the\\nHawaiian Islands?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. Yes, sir.\\nMr. SULZER. But you have not said what you would do with\\nthose islands.\\nMr. SHAFROTH. I will state in response to the gentleman\\nwhat I think is the best thing to do with the Hawaiian Islands.\\nI believe that a policy recognizing their independence is all that\\nis necessary; they will not attempt to annex their country to any\\nother, and no other government will ever seek to acquire those\\nislands. Now, let me go into detail a little on the subject.\\nMr. SULZER. Then you are in favor of this Government pur-\\nsuing with regard to the Hawaiian Islands a dog-in-the-manger\\npolicy, saying, We do not want them, and we will not let any-\\nbody else have them.\\nMr. SHAFROTH. They do not want to go to any other country.\\nMr. SULZER. How do you know that?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. Every test shows that it is true. Senator\\nPettigrew was at a meeting in the Hawaiian Islands, and un-\\ndertook to find out whether those who attended that meeting had\\nsigned a remonstrance against annexation even to this country;\\nand every man rose and said he was opposed to annexation.\\nMr. SULZER. Suppose those islands should desire to maintain\\ntheir independence, but at some future time should be seized by\\nGreat Britain or France, as they have been in the past, what\\nwould this country do?\\nHAWAIIAN* INDEPENDENCE GUARANTEED.\\nMr. SHAFROTH. I will attempt to answer that. There was\\na treaty made between England and France at the instance of\\nDaniel Webster, when he was Secretary of State, which pro-\\n3o36", "height": "4613", "width": "2653", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "14\\nvides that they shall never acquire an inch of territory of the\\nHawaiian Islands. That treaty stands in the way. There has\\nbeen no effort on the part of either of them to acquire these islands,\\nand with that treaty standing there it seems to me that there is\\nno possibility that the islands will ever be acquired by either of\\nthose nations.\\nMr. SULZER. Right there. In case of war do treaties stand?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. I apprehend, Mr. Speaker, that when there\\nis an interest of the United States that backs up the provisions of\\na treaty, there is no country on the face of the globe that will dis-\\nregard it. No, Mr. Speaker, there is no danger of these islands\\ngoing to any other nation.\\nI hold in my hand a copy of the treaty referred to, which I ask\\nto incorporate as a part of my remarks:\\nHer Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and His\\nMajesty the King of the French, taking into consideration the existence in\\nthe Sandwich Islands of a Government capable of providing for the regularity\\nof its relations with foreign nations, have thought it right to engage recip-\\nrocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State and never\\ntaken possession, either directly or under the title of a protectorate, or under\\nany other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed.\\nThe undersigned, her Britannic Majesty s principal secretary of state for\\nforeign affairs, and the ambassador extraordinary of His Majesty the King\\nof the French at the court of London, being furnished with the necessary\\npower, hereby declare in consecpience that their said majesties take recipro-\\ncally that engagement.\\nIn witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present declaration\\nand have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.\\nDone in duplicate at London the 23th day of November, in the year of our\\nLord 1843.\\nABERDEEN. [l. s.]\\nST. AULAIRE. [l. s.J\\nWhy, Mr. Speaker, European nations are continually asserting\\nthat independence shall be accorded to such and such a republic.\\nYou remember the little Republic of San Marino, in the Pyrenees,\\nbetween France and Spain, which has a standing army of, I think,\\neleven men It has been protected for hundreds of years by treaty\\nprovisions of the European powers. It is sanctioned by the doc-\\ntrine of the balance of power, concerning which every European\\nnation has a right to make treaty stipulations, and that is the\\nreason they have recognized in our Government the right to dic-\\ntate as to territorial possessions in the Western Hemisphere.\\nMr. BRUCKER. Your judgment is that the Hawaiian Gov-\\nernment gets the best end of things under the present reciprocity\\ntreaty with Hawaii?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. Decidedly.\\nMr. BRUCKER. Is it your judgment that that treaty should\\ncontinue?\\n3536", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "15\\nMr. SHAFROTH. That is a question which depends entirely\\nupon how much importance we attach to the military station.\\nMr. BRUCKER. Pearl Harbor?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. Pearl Harbor. I do not believe as a matter\\nof fact that the right to Pearl Harbor depends upon this treaty.\\nIt may be wise to continue it or it may not. Reciprocity was a\\npolicy of this Government for awhile and seemed to go to the ex-\\ntent of taking this in. I doubt very much\\nMr. BRUCKER. Supposing our right to use Pearl Harbor to\\ndepend upon reciprocity, would you still be in favor of the repeal\\nof the treaty?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. That would depend entirely upon whether\\nor not complications were likely to arise as to annexation to any\\nother country. I do not regard that naval station there as of the\\nimportance that some gentlemen here do.\\nMr. LOVE. Do you regard it as of absolute importance as a\\ncoaling station?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. I do not regard it as a necessity to this Gov-\\nernment. I believe that those who think that ships are going to\\ncome from the Hawaiian Islands, a distance of 2,100 miles, to at-\\ntack our shores are mistaken in the mode of warfare of modern\\ntimes.\\nMr. Speaker, they would never have a strpply of coal that far\\noff. They would get it somewhere else. They would go to Mex-\\nico and buy a coaling station on the peninsula of Lower Califor-\\nnia, if they could not get it in any other way. If they could not\\nbuy, they would seize it as a military necessity; at least, they\\nwould never resort to the Hawaiian Islands, because, when they\\ncoaled there, they would not have more than enough coal to last\\nthem until they got to our western coast; and when they met our\\nships, if they were engaged in battle for any considerable length\\nof time, they would be out of coal, perfectly helpless, and at the\\nmercy of our fleet.\\nMr. FLEMING. Is it not also true that the possession of the\\nHawaiian Islands by the United States would really be a point of\\nmilitary weakness to our Government until we had spent money\\nenough on them to fortify them and make them impregnable\\nagainst outside attack?\\nMr. SHAFROTH. I am satisfied, Mr. Speaker, that they would\\nbe nothing but a source of weakness to us, unless we are willing\\nto undertake the policy of building a navy twice or three times as\\nlarge as that which we naturally should have.\\nOUR TITLE TO PEARL HARBOR.\\nButeven if Hawaii possessed all the strategical advantage claimed,\\nthere would be no reason for annexation. We already own the\\nonly easily defended harbor to be found on those islands. Pearl\\n3536", "height": "4613", "width": "2653", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n019 961 076 4\\n1G\\nHarbor is ours by grant, and no nation can take it from us. The\\nwording of the treaty is so plain that it seems to me no one can\\ndoubt our title. It reads as follows:\\nHis Majesty, the King of the Hawaiian Islands, grants to the Government\\nof the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River in\\nthe Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair\\nstation for the use of vessels of the United States; and to that end the United\\nStates may improve the entrance to said hai bor and do all other things need-\\nful to the purpose aforesaid.\\nSenator Sherman has contended that the grant was drawn by\\nSenator Edmunds and that its author had stated over and over\\nagain that it was as absolute a conveyance as any language could\\nmake it. Inasmuch as Senator Edmunds is one of the most dis-\\ntinguished lawyers in this country., his word ought to be given\\ngreat consideration in the construction of this contract.\\nIs it possible that for remittance of duties on sugar to the\\namount of $65,000,000 we have obtained nothing?\\nWould any sane man agree to establish a coaling station and\\nrepair establishment, with the permanent improvements and build-\\nings necessary and with all the durable fortifications essential to\\nmaintain the same, and be subject to notice to quit? Would we\\nagree to improve the entrance to Pearl Harbor, which would take\\nthousands and thousands of dollars, for the purpose of surren-\\ndering it on one year s notice? The word grant is used, and there\\nis no provision limiting the time of the same.\\nPearl Harbor is ours, and hence we have all the strategical ad-\\nvantage it affords. That is the only easily defended harbor in\\nthose islands. With that harbor in our possession, what induce-\\nment would there be for any foreign nation to annex those islands?\\nNone whatever.\\nI therefore contend that there is no strategical advantage to\\nthis country in the Hawaiian Islands: but even if there were, we\\nalready own the only strategical point of the islands.\\nMr. Speaker, there are few questions that so vitally affect the\\nwelfare and happiness of the American people as that of reversing\\nthe policy under which our nation has prospered to a degree\\nhitherto unknown in the history of the world and adopting one\\nof colonial acquisitions, withits attendantimperial policy. Impar-\\ntial history records the downfall of every nation that ever under-\\ntook to realize the dream of universal empire. Let us profit by\\nthe example.\\nO", "height": "4606", "width": "2614", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "VUttp", "height": "4613", "width": "2653", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "LIBRARY OF CONGRESS\\n019 961 076 4 9\\nHollinger Corp.\\npH8.5", "height": "5119", "width": "3228", "jp2-path": "imperialpolicyda00shaf_0020.jp2"}}