{"1": {"fulltext": "Mil m\\nHUH\\nHI\\nIts\\nI\\n\\\\\\\\\\\\m\\nii\\nBrm\\ntaw\\ni I i!l\\nEHroSIl\\nm\\nV I I I I I lii I\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0H\\nI tftlr\\niHliiWllH\\nHlmiUylNmUnUUlUtiHl IIHJIJ 111 11 2H", "height": "3952", "width": "2524", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0001.jp2"}, "2": {"fulltext": "Glass \u00e2\u0080\u009ex\\nBook", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0002.jp2"}, "3": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0003.jp2"}, "4": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0004.jp2"}, "5": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0005.jp2"}, "6": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0006.jp2"}, "7": {"fulltext": "ELEMENTS\\nLOGIC.\\nCOMPRISING\\nTHE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARTICLE\\nENCYCLOPAEDIA METROPOLITANA\\nWITH ADDITIONS, c.\\nBY\\nRICHARD WHAT ELY, D.D.\\nPRINCIPAL OF ST. ALBAN S HALL, AND LATE FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEG1\\nOXFORD.\\nFOURTH EDITION, REVISED.\\nLONDON:\\nPRINTED FOR\\nB. FELLOWES, LUDGATE STREET.\\niSSl,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0007.jp2"}, "8": {"fulltext": "JH5\\nLONDON\\nPRINTED BY R. CLAY, BREAD-STREET-HILL.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0008.jp2"}, "9": {"fulltext": "TO\\nTHE RIGHT REVEREND\\nEDWARD COPLESTON, D. D,\\nLORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF,\\n8fc. 8fc.\\nMy dear Lord,\\nTo enumerate the advantages I have\\nderived from your instructions, both in\\nregular lectures and in private conversation,\\nwould be needless to those acquainted with\\nthe parties, and to the Public, uninteresting.\\nMy object at present is simply to acknow-\\nledge how greatly I am indebted to you in\\nrespect of the present Work not merely as\\nhaving originally imparted to me the prin-\\nciples of the Science, but also as having\\na 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0009.jp2"}, "10": {"fulltext": "IV DEDICATION.\\ncontributed remarks, explanations, and illus-\\ntrations, relative to the most important points,\\nto so great an amount that I can hardly\\nconsider myself as the Author of more than\\nhalf of such portions of the treatise as are not\\nborrowed from former publications. I could\\nhave wished, indeed, to acknowledge this\\nmore explicitly, by marking with some note\\nof distinction those parts which are least my\\nown. But I found it could not be done. In\\nmost instances there is something belonging\\nto each of us and even in those parts where\\nyour share is the largest, it would not be fair\\nthat you should be made responsible for any\\nthing that is not entirely your own. Nor\\nis it possible, in the case of a Science, to\\nremember distinctly how far one has been, in\\neach instance, indebted to the suggestions of\\nanother. Information, as to matters of fact,\\nmay easily be referred in the mind to the\\nperson from whom we have derived it but\\nscientific truths, when thoroughly embraced,\\nbecome much more a part of the mind, as it", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0010.jp2"}, "11": {"fulltext": "DEDICATION.\\nwere since they rest, not on the authority\\nof the instructor, but on reasoning from data\\nwhich we ourselves furnish they are scions\\nengrafted on the stems previously rooted in\\nour own soil and we are apt to confound\\nthem with its indigenous productions.\\nYou yourself also, I have reason to be-\\nlieve, have forgotten the greater part of the\\nassistance you have afforded in the course\\nof conversations on the subject; as I have\\nfound, more than once, that ideas which I\\ndistinctly remembered to have received from\\nyou, have not been recognized by you when\\nread or repeated. As far, however, as I can\\nrecollect, though there is no part of the\\nfollowing pages in which I have not, more or\\nless, received valuable suggestions from you,\\nI believe you have contributed less to the\\nAnalytical Outline, and to the Treatise on\\nFallacies, and more, to the subjoined Dis-\\nsertation, than to the rest of the Work.\\nI take this opportunity of publicly de-\\nclaring, that as, on the one hand, you are", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0011.jp2"}, "12": {"fulltext": "vi DEDICATION.\\nnot responsible for any thing contained in\\nthis Work, so, on the other hand, should\\nyou ever favour the world with a publication\\nof your own on the subject, the coincidence\\nwhich will doubtless be found in it with many\\nthings here brought forward as my own, is\\nnot to be regarded as any indication of\\nplagiarism, at least on your side.\\nBelieve me to be,\\nMy dear Lord,\\nYour obliged and affectionate\\nPupil and Friend,\\nRICHARD WHATELY.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0012.jp2"}, "13": {"fulltext": "PREFACE.\\nThe following Treatise contains the sub-\\nstance of the Article Logic in the Ency-\\nclopaedia Metropolitana. It was suggested\\nto me that a separate publication of it might\\nprove acceptable, not only to some who are\\nnot subscribers to that work, but also to\\nseveral who are but who, for convenience\\nof reference, would prefer a more portable\\nvolume.\\nI have accordingly revised it, and made\\nsuch additions, chiefly in the form of Notes,\\nas I thought likely to increase its utility.\\nI have taken without scruple whatever\\nappeared most valuable from the works of\\nformer writers especially the concise, but in\\ngeneral accurate, treatise of Aldrich but\\nwhile I acknowledge my obligations to my\\npredecessors, of whose labours I have largely\\navailed myself, I do not profess to be alto-\\ngether satisfied with any of the treatises that\\nhave yet appeared nor have I accordingly\\njudged it any unreasonable presumption to", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0013.jp2"}, "14": {"fulltext": "Vll! PREFACE.\\npoint out what seem to me the errors they\\ncontain. Indeed, whatever deference an\\nAuthor may profess for the authority of those\\nwho have preceded him, the very circum-\\nstance of his publishing a work on the same\\nsubject, proves that he thinks theirs open to\\nimprovement. In censuring, however, as I\\nhave had occasion to do, several of the doc-\\ntrines and explanations of logical writers, and\\nof Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be\\nunderstood that this is not from my having\\nformed a low estimate of the merits of the\\nCompendium drawn up by the Author just\\nmentioned, but, on the contrary, from its\\ndeserved popularity, from the impossibility\\nof noticing particularly all the points in\\nwhich we agree, and from the consideration\\nthat errors are the more carefully to be\\npointed out in proportion to the authority\\nby which they are sanctioned.\\nIn the later editions I have introduced,, in\\nthe Appendix, under the word Person, an\\nextract from the theological works of my\\nillustrious predecessor in the teaching of\\nLogic, Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry in\\nthis University.\\nI have also to acknowledge assistance\\nreceived from several friends who have at\\nvarious times suggested remarks and alte-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0014.jp2"}, "15": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. ix\\nrations. But I cannot avoid particularizing\\nthe Rev. J.Newman, Fellow of Oriel College,\\nwho actually composed a considerable por-\\ntion of the work as it now stands, from\\nmanuscripts not designed for publication, and\\nwho is the original author of several pages.\\nSome valuable illustrations of the importance\\nof attending to the ambiguity of the terms\\nused in Political-Economy, were furnished\\nby the kindness of my friend and former\\npupil, Mr. Senior, of Magdalen College and\\nof Lincoln s Inn, late Professor of Political-\\nEconomy at Oxford, and now, at King s\\nCollege, London. They are printed in the\\nAppendix. But the friend to whom it is\\ninscribed has contributed far more, and that,\\nin the most important parts, than all others\\ntogether so much, indeed, that, though\\nthere is in the treatise nothing of his which\\nhas not undergone such expansion or modifi-\\ncation as leaves me solely responsible for the\\nwhole, there is not a little of which I cannot\\nfairly claim to be the Author.\\nThe present edition has been revised with\\nthe utmost care. But though the work has\\nundergone not only the close examination of\\nmyself and several friends, but the severer\\nscrutiny of determined opponents, I am\\nhappy to find that no material errors have", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0015.jp2"}, "16": {"fulltext": "x PREFACE.\\nbeen detected, nor any considerable altera-\\ntions found necessary. Some small additions\\nhave, however, been introduced into the\\nthird and fourth editions and also a change\\nin the arrangement, which I trust will some-\\nwhat lighten the student s labour. I have\\nremoved into an Appendix a considerable\\nportion of what was in the first two editions\\nplaced in Part I. (now Chap, i.) of the\\nCompendium as being (though highly im-\\nportant, not only from its connexion with\\nthe reasoning process, but for other purposes,\\nyet) not necessary, after the perusal of the\\nAnalytical Outline, for the understanding of\\nthe Second and Third Chapters. It may be\\nstudied, at the learner s choice, either before\\nor after the Compendium.\\nOn the utility of Logic many writers have\\nsaid much in which I cannot coincide, and\\nwhich has tended to bring the study into\\nunmerited disrepute. By representing Logic\\nas furnishing the sole instrument for the\\ndiscovery of truth in all subjects, and as\\nteaching the use of the intellectual faculties\\nin general, they raised expectations which\\ncould not be realized, and which naturally\\nled to a re-action. The whole system, whose\\nunfounded pretensions had been thus bla-\\nzoned forth, has come to be commonly", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0016.jp2"}, "17": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. XI\\nregarded as utterly futile and empty like\\nseveral of our most valuable medicines, which,\\nwhen first introduced, were proclaimed, each,\\nas a panacea, infallible in the most opposite\\ndisorders and which consequently, in many\\ninstances, fell for a time into total disuse\\nthough, after a long interval, they were\\nestablished in their just estimation, and em-\\nployed conformably to their real proper-\\nties.\\nTo explain fully the utility of Logic is what\\ncan be done only in the course of an expla-\\nnation of the system itself. One preliminary\\nobservation only (for the original suggestion\\nof which I am indebted to the same friend to\\nwhom this work is inscribed) it may be worth\\nwhile to offer in this place. If it were in-\\nquired what is to be regarded as the most\\nappropriate intellectual occupation of MAN,\\nas man, what would be the answer The\\nStatesman is engaged with political affairs\\nthe Soldier with military; the Mathemati-\\ncian, with the properties of numbers and\\nmagnitudes the Merchant, with commercial\\nconcerns, c. but in what are all and each\\nof these employed employed, I mean, as\\nmen; for there are many modes of exercise\\nof the faculties, mental as well as bodily,\\nwhich are in great measure common to us", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0017.jp2"}, "18": {"fulltext": "Xll PREFACE.\\nwith the lower animals. Evidently, in Rea-\\nsoning, They are all occupied in deducing,\\nwell or ill, Conclusions from Premises each,\\nconcerning the Subject of his own particular\\nbusiness. If, therefore, it be found that the\\nprocess going on daily, in each of so many\\ndifferent minds, is, in any respect, the same,\\nand if the principles on which it is conducted\\ncan be reduced to a regular system, and if\\nrules can be deduced from that system, for\\nthe better conducting of the process, then, it\\ncan hardly be denied that such a system and\\nsuch rules must be especially worthy the\\nattention, not of the members of this or that\\nprofession merely, but of every one who is\\ndesirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To\\nunderstand the theory of that which is the\\nappropriate intellectual occupation of Man\\nin general, and to learn to do that well, which\\nevery one will and must do, whether well or\\nill, may surely be considered as an essential\\npart of a liberal education.\\nEven supposing that no practical improve-\\nment in argumentation resulted from the\\nstudy of Logic, it would not by any means\\nfollow that it is unworthy of attention. The\\npursuit of knowledge on curious and interest-\\ning subjects, for its own sake, is usually\\nreckoned no misemployment of time and is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0018.jp2"}, "19": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. xiii\\nconsidered as, incidentally, if not directly,\\nuseful to the individual, by the exercise thus\\nafforded to the mental faculties. All who\\nstudy Mathematics are not training them-\\nselves to become Surveyors or Mechanics\\nsome knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry\\nis even expected in a man liberally educated,\\nthough without any view to his practising\\nSurgery or Medicine. The investigation of\\na process which is peculiarly and universally\\nthe occupation of Man, considered as Man,\\ncan hardly be reckoned a less philosophical\\npursuit than those just instanced.\\nIt has usually been assumed, however, in\\nthe case of the present subject, that a theory\\nwhich does not tend to the improvement of\\npractice is utterly unworthy of regard and\\nthen, it is contended that Logic has no such\\ntendency, on the plea that men may and do\\nreason correctly without it an objection\\nwhich would equally apply in the case of\\nGrammar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics, c,\\nin all of which systems the practice must\\nhave existed previously to the theory.\\nBut many who allow the use of systematic\\nprinciples in other things, are accustomed\\nto cry up Common-Sense as the sufficient\\nand only safe guide in Reasoning. Now by\\nCommon Sense is meant, I apprehend,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0019.jp2"}, "20": {"fulltext": "XIV PREFACE.\\n(when the term is used with any distinct\\nmeaning,) an exercise of the judgment un-\\naided by any Art or system of rules; such\\nan exercise as we must necessarily employ in\\nnumberless cases of daily occurrence in\\nwhich, having no established principles to\\nguide us, no line of procedure, as it were,\\ndistinctly chalked out, we must needs act\\non the best extemporaneous conjectures we\\ncan form. He who is eminently skilful in\\ndoing this, is said to possess a superior de-\\ngree of Common-Sense. But that Common-\\nSense is only our second-best guide that\\nthe rules of Art, if judiciously framed, are\\nalways desirable when they can be had, is\\nan assertion, for the truth of which I may\\nappeal to the testimony of mankind in gene-\\nral; which is so much the more valuable,\\ninasmuch as it may be accounted the testi-\\nmony of adversaries. For the generality\\nhave a strong predilection in favour of Com-\\nmon-Sense, except in those points in which\\nthey, respectively, possess the knowledge of\\na system of rules but in these points they\\nderide any one who trusts to unaided Com-\\nmon-Sense. A Sailor, e.g. will, perhaps,\\ndespise the pretensions of medical men, and\\nprefer treating a disease by Common-Sense\\nbut he would ridicule the proposal of navi-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0020.jp2"}, "21": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. \\\\v\\ngating a ship by Common-Sense, without\\nregard to the maxims of nautical art. A\\nPhysician, again, will perhaps contemn Sys-\\ntems of Political Economy,* of Logic, or\\nMetaphysics, and insist on the superior wis-\\ndom of trusting to Common -Sense in such\\nmatters but he would never approve of\\ntrusting to Common -Sense in the treatment\\nof diseases. Neither, again, would the Archi-\\ntect recommend a reliance on Common-Sense\\nalone in building, nor the Musician in music,\\nto the neglect of those systems of rules,\\nwhich, in their respective arts, have been\\ndeduced from scientific reasoning aided by\\nexperience. And the induction might be\\nextended to every department of practice.\\nSince, therefore, each gives the preference to\\nunassisted Common-Sense only in those cases\\nwhere he himself has nothing else to trust to,\\nand invariably resorts to the rules of art,\\nwherever he possesses the knowledge of them,\\nit is plain that mankind universally bear\\ntheir testimony, though unconsciously and\\noften unwillingly, to the preferableness of\\nsystematic knowledge to conjectural judg-\\nments.\\nThere is, however, abundant room for the\\nSee Senior s Introductory Lecture on Political-Economy,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0021.jp2"}, "22": {"fulltext": "XVI PREFACE.\\nemployment of Common -Sense in the appli-\\ncation of the system. To bring arguments,\\nout of the form in which they are expressed\\nin conversation and in books, into the\\nregular logical shape, must be, of course,\\nthe business of Common-Sense, aided by\\npractice for such arguments are, by sup-\\nposition, not as yet within the province of\\nScience else they would not be irregular,\\nbut would be already strict syllogisms. To\\nexercise the learner in this operation, I have\\nsubjoined, in the Appendix, some examples,\\nboth of insulated arguments, and (in the last\\ntwo editions) of the analysis of argumentative\\nworks. It should be added, however, that a\\nlarge portion of what is usually introduced\\ninto Logical treatises, relative to the finding\\nof Arguments, the different kinds of them,\\nc, I have referred to the head of Rheto-\\nric^ and treated of in a work on the Elements\\nof that Art.\\nIt was doubtless from a strong and deli-\\nberate conviction of the advantages, direct\\nand indirect, accruingjrom an acquaintance\\nwith Logic, that the University of Oxford,\\nwhen re-modelling their system, not only\\nretained that branch of study, regardless of\\nthe clamours of many of the half-learned,\\nbut even assigned a prominent place to it,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0022.jp2"}, "23": {"fulltext": "PREFACE xvii\\nby making it an indispensable part of the\\nExamination for the first Degree. This last\\ncircumstance, however, I am convinced, has,\\nin a great degree, produced an effect opposite\\nto what was designed. It has contributed to\\nlower instead of exalting, the estimation of\\nthe study and to withhold from it the earnest\\nattention of many who might have applied\\nto it with profit. I am not so weak as to\\nimagine that any System can ensure great\\nproficiency in any pursuit whatever, either\\nin all students, or in a very large proportion\\nof them u we sow many seeds to obtain a\\nfew flowers but it might have been ex-\\npected (and doubtless was expected) that a\\nmajority at least of successful candidates\\nwould derive some benefit worth mentioning\\nfrom their logical pursuits and that a\\nconsiderable proportion of the distinguished\\ncandidates would prove respectable, if not\\neminent logicians. Such expectations I do\\nnot censure as unreasonable, or such as 1\\nmight not have formed myself, had I been\\ncalled upon to judge ^t that period when our\\nexperience was all to come. But that ex-\\nperience has shown that those expectations\\nhave been very inadequately realized. The\\ntruth is, that a very small proportion,\\neven of distinguished students, ever become\\nh", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0023.jp2"}, "24": {"fulltext": "XV111 PREFACE.\\nproficients in Logic and that by far the\\ngreater part pass through the University\\nwithout knowing anything at all of the subject.\\nI do not mean that they have not learned by\\nrote a string of technical terms but that\\nthey understand absolutely nothing whatever\\nof the principles of the Science.\\nI am aware that some injudicious friends\\nof Oxford will censure the frankness of this\\navowal. I have only to reply that such is the\\ntruth and that I think too well of, and\\nknow far too well, the University in which I\\nhave been employed in various academical\\noccupations above a quarter of a century, to\\napprehend danger to her reputation from\\ndeclaring the exact truth. With all its de-\\nfects, and no human institution is perfect,\\nthe University would stand, I am convinced,\\nhigher in public estimation than it does, were\\nthe whole truth, and nothing but the truth,\\nin all points respecting it, more fully known.\\nBut the scanty and partial success of the mea-\\nsures employed to promote logical studies is\\nthe consequence, I apprehend, of the univer-\\nsality of the requisition. That which must he\\ndone by every one, will, of course, often be\\ndone but indifferently and when the belief\\nis once fully established, which it certainly\\nhas long been, that anything which is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0024.jp2"}, "25": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. xix\\nindispensable to a testimonial, has little or\\nnothing to do with the attainment of honors,*\\nthe lowest standard soon becomes the esta-\\nblished one in the minds of the greater num-\\nber and provided that standard be once\\nreached, so as to secure the candidate from\\nrejection, a greater or less proficiency in any\\nsuch branch of stud) 7 is regarded as a matter\\nof indifference, as far as any views of acade-\\nmical distinction are concerned.\\nDivinity is one of these branches and to\\nthis also most of what has been said con-\\ncerning Logic might be considered as equally\\napplicable but, in fact, there are several\\nimportant differences between the two cases.\\nIn the first place, most of the students who\\nare designed for the Church, and many who\\nare not, have a value for theological know-\\nledge, independently of the requisition of the\\nschools; and on that ground do not confine\\ntheir views to the lowest admissible degree of\\nproficiency whereas this can be said of very\\nfew in the case of Logic. And moreover,\\nsuch as design to become candidates for holy\\nOrders, know that another examination in\\nTheology awaits them. But a consideration,\\nIn the last-framed Examination-statute an express declara-\\ntion has been inserted, that proficiency in Logic is to have\\nweight in the assignment of honors.\\nh2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0025.jp2"}, "26": {"fulltext": "XX PREFACE.\\nwhich is still more to the present pur-\\npose, is, that Theology, not being a Science,\\nadmits of infinite degrees of proficiency, from\\nthat which is within the reach of a child, up\\nto the highest that is attainable by the most\\nexalted genius every one of which degrees\\nis inestimably valuable as far as it goes. If\\nany one understands tolerably the Church-\\ncatechism, or even the half of it, he knows\\nsomething of divinity and that something is\\nincalculably preferable to nothing. But it\\nis not so with a Science one who does\\nnot understand the principles of Euclid s\\ndemonstrations, whatever number of ques-\\ntions and answers he may have learnt by\\nrote, knows absolutely nothing of geometry\\nunless he attain this point, all his labour is\\nutterly lost worse than lost, perhaps, if he\\nis led to believe that he has learnt something\\nof a Science, when, in truth, he has not.\\nAnd the same is the case with Logic, or any\\nother Science. It does not admit of such\\nvarious degrees, as a knowledge of religion.\\nOf course I am far from supposing that all\\nwho understand anything at all of Logic\\nstand on the same level but I mean, what\\nis surely undeniable, that one who does not\\nembrace the fundamental principles, of that,\\nor any other Science, whatever he may have", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0026.jp2"}, "27": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. XXI\\ntaken on authority, and learned by rote,\\nknows, properly speaking, nothing of that\\nScience. And such, I have no hesitation\\nin saying, is the case with a considerable\\nproportion even of those candidates who ob-\\ntain testimonials, including many who gain\\ndistinction There are some persons, (pro-\\nbably not so many as one in ten, of such as\\nhave in other respects tolerable abilities,)\\nwho are physically incapable of the degree\\nof steady abstraction requisite for really\\nembracing the principles of Logic or of any\\nother Science, whatever pains may be taken\\nby themselves or their teachers. But there\\nis a much greater number to whom this is\\na great difficulty, though not an impossi-\\nbility and who having, of course, a strong\\ndisinclination to such a study, look naturally\\nto the very lowest admissible standard. And\\nthe example of such examinations in Logic\\nas must be expected in the case of men of\\nthese descriptions, tends, in combination\\nwith popular prejudice, to degrade the study\\naltogether in the minds of the generality.\\nIt was from these considerations, perhaps,\\nthat it was proposed, a few years ago, to\\nleave the study of Logic altogether to the\\noption of the candidates but the suggestion\\nwas rejected the majority appearing to", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0027.jp2"}, "28": {"fulltext": "XX11 PREFACE.\\nthink (in which opinion I most fully coin-\\ncide) that, so strongly as the tide of popular\\nopinion sets against the study, the result\\nwould have been, within a few years, an\\nalmost universal neglect of that Science.\\nMatters were accordingly left, at that time,\\nin respect of this point, on their former foot-\\ning which I am convinced was far prefer-\\nable to the proposed alteration.\\nBut a middle course between these two\\nwas suggested, which I was persuaded would\\nbe infinitely preferable to either a persua-\\nsion which I had long entertained, and\\nwhich is confirmed by every day s observa-\\ntions and reflections of which, few persons,\\nI believe, have bestowed more on this sub-\\nject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged,\\nbe made optional to those who are merely\\ncandidates for a degree, but indispensable to\\nthe attainment of academical honours and\\nthe consequence would be, that it would\\nspeedily begin, and progressively continue,\\nto rise in estimation and to be studied with\\nreal profit. The examination might then,\\nit was urged, without any hardship, be made\\na strict one since no one could complain\\nthat a certain moderate degree of scientific\\nability, and a resolution to apply to a certain\\nprescribed study, should be the conditions of", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0028.jp2"}, "29": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. xxiii\\nobtaining distinction. The far greater part\\nwould still study Logic since there would\\nbe (as before) but few who would be willing\\nto exclude themselves from the possibility of\\nobtaining distinction but it would be studied\\nwith a very different mind, when ennobled,\\nas it were, by being made part of the pass-\\nport to University honors, and when a pro-\\nficiency in it came to be regarded generally\\nas an honorable distinction. And in pro-\\nportion as the number increased of those\\nwho really understood the Science, the num-\\nber, it was contended, would increase of\\nsuch as would value it on higher and better\\ngrounds. It would in time come to be\\nbetter known and better appreciated by all\\nthe well-informed part of society and lec-\\ntures in Logic at the University would then,\\nperhaps, no longer consist exclusively of an\\nexplanation of the mere elements. This\\nwould be necessary indeed for beginners\\nbut to the more advanced students, the tutors\\nwould no more think of lecturing in the bare\\nrudiments, than of lecturing in the Latin or\\nGreek Grammar but, in the same manner\\nas they exercise their pupils in Grammar, by\\nreading with them Latin and Greek authors\\nwith continual reference to grammar-rules,\\nso, they would exercise them in Logic by", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0029.jp2"}, "30": {"fulltext": "XXIV PREFACE.\\nreading some argumentative work, requiring\\nan analysis of it on Logical principles.\\nThese effects could not indeed, it was\\nacknowledged, be expected to show them-\\nselves fully till after a considerable lapse of\\ntime but that the change would begin to\\nappear, (and that, very decidedly) within\\nthree or four years, was confidently antici-\\npated.\\nTo this it was replied, that it was most de-\\nsirable that no one should be allowed to\\nobtain the Degree of B. A. without a know-\\nledge of Logic. This answer carries a plau-\\nsible appearance to those unacquainted with\\nthe actual state of the University though in\\nfact it is totally irrelevant. For it goes on\\nthe supposition, that hitherto this object has\\nbeen accomplished that every one who\\npasses his examination does possess a know-\\nledge of Logic which is notoriously not the\\nfact, nor ever can be, without some impor-\\ntant change in some part of our system. The\\nquestion therefore is, not, as the above ob-\\njection would seem to imply, whether a real,\\nprofitable knowledge of Logic shall be strictly\\nrequired of every candidate for a Degree,\\n(for this in fact never has been done) but\\nwhether, in the attempt to accomplish this\\nby requiring the form of a logical examina-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0030.jp2"}, "31": {"fulltext": "PREFA B. XXV\\ntion from every candidate without exception,\\nwe shall continue to degrade the Science,\\nand to let this part of the examination be\\nregarded as a mere form, by many who might\\notherwise have studied Logic in earnest, and\\nwith advantage whether the great majority\\nof candidates, and those too of a more pro-\\nmising description, shall lose a real and im-\\nportant benefit, through the attempt, (which,\\nafter all, experience has proved to be a vain\\nattempt) to comprehend in this benefit a very\\nsmall number, and of the least promising.\\nSomething of an approach to the proposed\\nalteration, was introduced into the Examina-\\ntion-statute passed in 1830; in which, per-\\nmission is granted to such as are candidates\\nmerely for a testimonial, to substitute for\\nLogic a portion of Euclid. I fear, however,\\nthat little or nothing will be gained by this\\nunless indeed the Examiners resolve to make\\nthe examinations in Logic far stricter than\\nthose in Euclid. For since every one who\\nis capable of really understanding Euclid\\nmust be also capable of Logic, the alteration\\ndoes not meet the case of those whose in-\\naptitude for Science is invincible and these\\nare the very description of men whose (so\\ncalled) logical-examinations tend to depress\\nthe Science. Those few who really are", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0031.jp2"}, "32": {"fulltext": "XXVI PREFACE,\\nphysically incapable of scientific reasoning,\\nand the far greater number who fancy them-\\nselves so, or who at least will rather run a\\nrisk than surmount their aversion and set\\nthemselves to study in earnest, all these\\nwill be likely, when the alternative is pro-\\nposed, to prefer Logic to Euclid because\\nin the latter, it is hardly possible, at least not\\nnear so easy as in Logic, to present the sem-\\nblance of preparation by learning questions\\nand answers by rote in the cant phrase of\\nundergraduates, by getting crammed. Ex-\\nperience has proved this, in the case of the\\nResponsive-examinations, where the alterna-\\ntive of Logic or Euclid has always been pro-\\nposed to the candidates of whom those\\nmost averse to Science, or incapable of it,\\nare almost always found to prefer Logic*\\nThe determination may indeed be formed,\\nand acted on from henceforth, that all who\\ndo in reality know nothing, properly speak-\\ning, of any Science, shall be rejected all I\\nknow is, that this has never been the case\\nhitherto.\\nStill, it is a satisfaction to me, that atten-\\ntion has been called to the evil in question,\\nSince this was written, the experiment has been tried. In\\nthe Examination-list for the present Term (Easter, 1831) of\\n125 candidates who did not aspire to the higher classes, twenty-\\njive present Euclid for their examination, and one hundred Logic I", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0032.jp2"}, "33": {"fulltext": "PREFACE; wvii\\nand an experimental measure adopted for its\\nabatement. A confident hope is thus af-\\nforded, that in the event (which I much fear)\\nof the failure of the experiment, some other\\nmore effectual measure may be resorted to.\\nI am sensible that many may object, that\\nthis is not the proper place for such remarks\\nas the foregoing what has the public at\\nlarge, they may say, to do with the statutes\\nof the University of Oxford To this it\\nmight fairly be replied, that not only all who\\nthink of sending their sons or other near re-\\nlatives to Oxford, but all likewise who are\\nplaced under the ministry of such as have\\nbeen educated there, are indirectly con-\\ncerned, to a certain degree, in the system\\nthere pursued. But the consideration which\\nhad the chief share in inducing me to say\\nwhat I have, is, that the vindication of Logic\\nfrom the prevailing disregard and contempt\\nunder which it labours, would have been\\naltogether incomplete without it. For let it\\nbe remembered that the science is judged of\\nby the Public in this country, in a very great\\ndegree, from the specimens displayed, and\\nthe reports made, by those whom Oxford\\nsends forth. Every one, on looking into the\\nUniversity Calendar or Statute Book, feels\\nhimself justified in assuming, that whoever", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0033.jp2"}, "34": {"fulltext": "XXVlll PREFACE.\\nhas graduated at Oxford must be a Logician\\nnot, indeed, necessarily a first-rate Logician;\\nbut such as to satisfy the public examiners\\nthat he has a competent knowledge of the\\nScience. Now, if a very large proportion of\\nthese persons neither are, nor think them-\\nselves at all benefited by their (so called)\\nlogical education, and if many of them treat\\nthe study with contempt, and represent it as\\na mere tissue of obsolete and empty jargon,\\nwhich it is a mere waste of time to attend to,\\nlet any one judge what conclusions respect-\\ning the utility of the study, and the wisdom\\nof the University in upholding it, are likely\\nto be the result.\\nThat prejudices so deeply-rooted as those\\nI have alluded to, and supported by the au-\\nthority of such eminent names, especially\\nthat of Locke, and (as is commonly, though\\nnot very correctly supposed) Bacon, should\\nbe overthrown at once by the present trea-\\ntise, I am not so sanguine as to expect but\\nif I have been successful in refuting some of\\nthe most popular objections, and explaining\\nsome principles which are in general ill-\\nunderstood, it may be hoped that in time\\njust notions on the subject may gain ground\\nespecially if, as I have some reason to hope,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0034.jp2"}, "35": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. X\\\\i\\\\\\na more able advocate of the same cause\\nshould be induced to step forward.\\nIt may be permitted me to mention, that\\nas I have addressed myself to various classes\\nof students, from the most uninstructed tyro,\\nto the furthest-advanced Logician, and have\\ntouched accordingly both on the most ele-\\nmentary principles, and on some of the most\\nremote deductions from them, it must be\\nexpected that readers of each class will find\\nsome parts not well calculated for them.\\nSome explanations will appear to the one\\ntoo simple and puerile and for another\\nclass, some of the disquisitions will be at first\\ntoo abstruse. If to each description some\\nportions are found interesting, it is as much\\nas I can expect.\\nWith regard to the style, I have con-\\nsidered perspicuity not only, as it always\\nmust be, the first point, but as one of such\\nparamount importance in such a subject, as\\nto justify the neglect of all others. Prolixity\\nof explanation, homeliness in illustration,\\nand baldness of expression, I have regarded\\nas blemishes not worth thinking of, when any-\\nthing was to be gained in respect of clearness.\\nOf the correctness of the fundamental\\ndoctrines maintained in the work, I may be\\n.allowed to feel some confidence not so", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0035.jp2"}, "36": {"fulltext": "XXX PREFACE.\\nmuch from the length of time (about eigh-\\nteen years) that I have been more or less\\noccupied with it, enjoying at the same time\\nthe advantage of frequent suggestions and\\ncorrections from several judicious friends, as\\nfrom the nature of the subject. In works of\\ntaste, an author cannot be sure that the\\njudgment of the public will coincide with his\\nown and if he fail to give pleasure, he fails\\nof his sole or most appropriate object. But\\nin the case of truths which admit of Scientific\\ndemonstration, it is possible to arrive by\\nreasoning at as full an assurance of the just-\\nness of the conclusions established, as the\\nimperfection of the human faculties will\\nadmit; and experience, accompanied with\\nattentive observation, and with repeated\\ntrials of various methods, may enable one\\nlong accustomed to tuition, to ascertain with\\nconsiderable certainty what explanations are\\nthe best comprehended. Many parts of the\\ndetail, however, may probably be open to\\nobjections but if (as experience now autho-\\nrizes me the more confidently to hope) no\\nerrors are discovered, which materially affect\\nthe substantial utility of the work, but only\\nsuch as detract from the credit of the author,\\nthe object will have been attained which I\\nought to have had principally in view.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0036.jp2"}, "37": {"fulltext": "prefacl:. xx xi\\nNo credit, I am aware, is given to an\\nauthor s own disclaimer of personal motives,\\nand profession of exclusive regard for public-\\nutility since even sincerity cannot, on this\\npoint, secure him from deceiving himself;\\nbut it may be allowable to observe that one\\nwhose object was the increase of his repu-\\ntation as a writer, could hardly have chosen\\na subject less suitable for his purpose than\\nthe present. Though the interest in it has\\ngreatly exceeded what I had anticipated, it\\nstill can hardly be called a popular subject,\\nor one likely to become so, in any consi-\\nderable degree at least during the lifetime\\nof a writer of the present day. Ignorance,\\nfortified by prejudice, opposes its reception,\\neven in the minds of those who are consi-\\ndered as both candid and well-informed.\\nBesides that a great majority of readers not\\nonly know not what Logic is, but have no\\ncuriosity to learn, the greater part of those\\nwho imagine that they do know, are wedded\\nto erroneous notions of it. The multitude\\nnever think of paying any attention to the\\ncorrectness of their reasoning and those\\nwho do, are usually too confident that they\\nare already completely successful in this\\npoint, to endure the thought of seeking\\ninstruction upon it.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0037.jp2"}, "38": {"fulltext": "XXxii PREFACE.\\nAnd as, on the one hand, a large class\\nof modern philosophers may be expected to\\nraise a clamour against obsolete preju-\\ndices; bigoted devotion to the decrees of\\nAristotle confining the human mind in\\nthe trammels of the Schoolmen/ c, so on\\nthe other hand, all such as really are thus\\nbigoted to everything that has been long\\nestablished, merely because it has been long\\nestablished, will be ready to exclaim against\\nthe presumption of an author, who presumes\\nto depart in several points from the track of\\nhis predecessors.\\nThere is another circumstance, also, which\\ntends materially to diminish the credit of a\\nwriter on this and some other kindred sub-\\njects. We can make no discoveries of\\nstriking novelties: the senses of our readers\\nare not struck, as with the return of a Comet\\nwhich had been foretold, or the extinction of\\na taper in carbonic-acid gas the materials\\nwe work upon are common and familiar to\\nall, and, therefore, supposed to be well\\nunderstood by all. And not only is any\\none s deficiency in the use of these materials,\\nsuch as is generally unfelt by himself, but\\nwhen it is removed by satisfactory explana-\\ntions when the notions, which had been\\nperplexed and entangled, are cleared up by", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0038.jp2"}, "39": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. XXXM\\nthe introduction of a few simple and appa-\\nrently obvious principles, he will generally\\nforget that any explanation at all was needed,\\nand consider all that has been said as mere\\ntruisms, which even a child could supply to\\nhimself. Such is the nature of the funda-\\nmental principles of a Science they are so\\nfully implied in the most evident and well-\\nknown truths, that the moment they are\\nfully embraced, it becomes a difficulty to\\nconceive that we could ever have been not\\naware of them. And hence, the more simple,\\nclear, and obvious any principle is ren-\\ndered, the more likely is its exposition to\\nelicit those common remarks, of course of\\ncourse! no one could ever doubt that;\\nthis is all very true, but there is nothing\\nnew brought to light; nothing that was not\\nfamiliar to every one; there needs no\\nghost to tell us that. I am convinced that\\na verbose, mystical, and partially obscure\\nway of writing on such a subject, is the most\\nlikely to catch the attention of the multitude.\\nThe generality verify the observation of\\nTacitus, omne ignotum pro mirifico and\\nwhen anything is made very plain to them,\\nare apt to fancy that they knew it already\\nso that the explanations of scientific truths\\nare likely, for a considerable time at least,\\nc", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0039.jp2"}, "40": {"fulltext": "XXXiv PREFACE.\\nto be, by most men, underrated the more, the\\nmore perfectly they accomplish their object.\\nA very slow progress, therefore, towards\\npopularity is the utmost that can be expected\\nfor such a treatise as I have endeavoured to\\nmake the present. I have felt myself bound,\\nhowever, not only as a member of Society,\\nbut more especially as a minister of, the\\nGospel, to use my endeavours towards pro-\\nmoting an object which to me appears highly\\nimportant, and what is much more, whose\\nimportance is appreciated by very few be-\\nsides. The cause of Truth universally, and\\nnot least, of religious Truth, is benefited by\\nevery thing that tends to promote sound\\nreasoning and facilitate the detection of\\nfallacy. The adversaries of our Faith would,\\nI am convinced, have been on many occa-\\nsions more satisfactorily answered, and would\\nhave had fewer openings for cavil, had a\\nthorough acquaintance with Logic been a\\nmore common qualification than it is. In\\nlending my endeavours, therefore, whether\\nwith greater or less success, towards this ob-\\nject, I trust that I am neither uselessly nor\\nunsuitably employed.\\nI have seen in several writers, a sort of\\nsneering allusions to Logic and also to\\nTruth, (the latter, in reference, I presume,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0040.jp2"}, "41": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. XXXV\\nto an Essay on that subject) which I cannot\\nbut feel to be consolatory and even flattering.\\nIf such expressions had been accompanied by\\nan attempt to refute the fundamental prin-\\nciples I have endeavoured to maintain, it\\nwould have been understood that such im-\\nplied censure was meant to be directed\\nagainst false pretensions. But as it is, such\\nwriters seem to admit that it is Truth as\\nTruth, and Logical reasoning, as such, that\\nthey dislike. And certainly any who wish to\\npropagate errors, or to defend abuses, are\\nperfectly right in disliking the cultivation of\\nLogic, though they may not be prudent in\\navowing this feeling. The clear day-light\\ncould not be more unwelcome to the Chil-\\ndren of the Mist/ than the establishment\\nand diffusion of accurate principles of rea-\\nsoning, to the advocates of what they are\\naware is unsound.\\nMany indeed whose opinions on various\\npoints are opposed, are sincerely convinced\\nof the truth of what they maintain but all\\nof these ought to feel a full confidence that\\ntruth, wherever it may lie, will be best ascer-\\ntained and best supported, by a system of\\nsound reasoning.\\nThose who are engaged in, or designed for\\nthe Sacred Ministry, and all others who are", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0041.jp2"}, "42": {"fulltext": "XXXVI PREFACE.\\nsensible that the cause of true Religion is not\\na concern of the Ministry alone, should re-\\nmember that this is no time to forego any of\\nthe advantages which that cause may derive\\nfrom an active and judicious cultivation of\\nthe faculties. Among the enemies of Chris-\\ntianity in the present day, are included, if I\\nmistake not, a very different description of\\npersons from those who were chiefly to be\\nmet with a century, or even half a century\\nago what were called men of wit and\\npleasure about town ignorant, shallow,\\nflippant declaimers, or dull and powerless\\npretenders to Philosophy. Among the ene-\\nmies of the Gospel now, are to be found men\\nnot only of learning and ingenuity, but of\\ncultivated argumentative powers, and not\\nunversed in the principles of Logic. If the\\nadvocates of our Religion think proper to\\ndisregard this help, they will find, on careful\\ninquiry, that their opponents do not. And let\\nthem not trust too carelessly to the strength\\nof their cause Truth will, indeed, prevail,\\nwhere all other points are nearly equal but\\nit may suffer a temporary discomfiture, if\\nhasty assumptions, unsound arguments, and\\nvague and empty declamation, occupy the\\nplace of a train of close, accurate, and lumi-\\nnous reasoning.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0042.jp2"}, "43": {"fulltext": "PREFACE. XXXvil\\nIt is not, however, solely or chiefly for\\npolemical purposes that the cultivation of\\nthe reasoning faculty is desirable in per-\\nsuading, and investigating, in learning, or\\nteaching, in all the multitude of cases in\\nwhich it is our object to arrive at just con-\\nclusions, or to lead others to them, it is most\\nimportant. A knowledge of logical rules\\nwill not indeed supply the want of other\\nknowledge nor was it ever proposed, by\\nany one who really understood this Science,\\nto substitute it for any other; but it is no\\nless true that no other can be substituted for\\nthis that it is valuable in every branch of\\nstudy and that it enables us to use the\\nknowledge we possess to the greatest advan-\\ntage. It is to be hoped, therefore, that\\nthose academical bodies, who have been wise\\nenough to retain this Science, will, instead of\\nbeing persuaded to abandon it, give their\\nattention rather to its improvement and more\\neffectual cultivation.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0043.jp2"}, "44": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0044.jp2"}, "45": {"fulltext": "CONTENTS.\\nPACK\\nIntroduction 1\\nBOOK I.\\nAnalytical Outline of the Science 18\\nBOOK II.\\nSynthetical Compendium 54\\nChap. I. Of the Operations of the Mind, and of Terms ib.\\nChap. II.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Propositions 61\\nChap. III.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Arguments 73\\nChap. IV. Supplement to Chap. Ill 95\\nChap. V. Supplement to Chap. 1 122\\nBOOK III.\\nOf Fallacies 14(5\\nBOOK IV.\\nDissertation on the Province of Reasoning 226\\nChap. I.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Induction 228\\nChap. II. On the Discovery of Truth 235\\nChap. III.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Inference and Proof 266\\nChap. IV.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Verbal and Real Questions .275\\nChap. V.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Of Realism 282", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0045.jp2"}, "46": {"fulltext": "xl CONTENTS.\\nAppendix.\\npage\\nNo. I. On certain Terms which are peculiarly liable to\\nbe used ambiguously 298\\nNo. II. Miscellaneous Examples for the exercise of\\nLearners 358\\nNo. III. Example of Analysis 374\\nIndex 385", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0046.jp2"}, "47": {"fulltext": "ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nINTRODUCTION.\\nLOGIC, in the most extensive sense which Definition or\\nLogic.\\nthe name can with propriety be made to bear,\\nmay be considered as the Science, and also\\nas the Art, of Reasoning. It investigates the\\nprinciples on which argumentation is con-\\nducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind\\nfrom error in its deductions. Its most appro-\\npriate office, however, is that of instituting an\\nanalysis of the process of the mind in Reasoning;\\nand in this point of view it is, as has been\\nstated, strictly a Science while, considered in\\nreference to the practical rules above men-\\ntioned, it may be called the Art of Reasoning.\\nThis distinction, as will hereafter appear, has\\nbeen overlooked, or not clearly pointed out\\nby most writers on the subject Logic having\\nbeen in general regarded as merely an Art\\nand its claim to hold a place among the Sciences\\nhaving been expressly denied.\\nB", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0047.jp2"}, "48": {"fulltext": "2 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nPrevailing Considering how early Logic attracted the\\n52JJf. Ung attention of philosophers, it may appear sur-\\nprising that so little progress should have been\\nmade, as is confessedly the case, in developing\\nits principles, and perfecting the detail of the\\nsystem and this circumstance has been brought\\nforward as a proof of the barrenness and futility\\nof the study. But a similar argument might\\nhave been urged with no less plausibility, at\\na period not very remote, against the study of\\nNatural Philosophy; and, very recently, against\\nthat of Chemistry. No science can be expected\\nto make any considerable 1 progress, which is not\\ncultivated on right principles. Whatever may\\nbe the inherent vigour of the plant, it will nei-\\nther be flourishing nor fruitful till it meet with\\na suitable soil and culture and in no case is the\\nremark more applicable than in the present\\nthe greatest mistakes having always prevailed\\nrespecting the nature of Logic, and its pro-\\nvince having in consequence been extended by\\nmany writers to subjects with which it has no\\nproper connexion. Indeed, with the exception\\nof Aristotle, (who is himself not entirely ex-\\nempt from the errors in question,) hardly a\\nwriter on Logic can be mentioned who has\\nclearly perceived, and steadily kept in view\\nthroughout, its real nature and object. Before\\nhis time, no distinction was drawn between\\nthe science of which we are speaking, and that", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0048.jp2"}, "49": {"fulltext": "riters\\non Logic.\\nINTRODUCTION. 3\\nwhich is now usually called Metaphysics a\\ncircumstance which alone shows how small was\\nthe progress made in earlier times. Indeed,\\nthose who first turned their attention to the\\nsubject, hardly thought of inquiring into the\\nprocess of Reasoning itself, but confined them-\\nselves almost entirely to certain preliminary\\npoints, the discussion of which is (if logically\\nconsidered) subordinate to that of the main\\ninquiry.\\nZeno the Eleatic, whom most accounts re-Earjyw\\npresent as the earliest systematic writer on the\\nsubject of Logic, or, as it was then called,\\nDialectics, divided his work into three parts\\nthe first of which (upon consequences) is cen-\\nsured by Socrates [Plato, Parmen.~\\\\ for ob-\\nscurity and confusion. In his second part,\\nhowever, he furnished that interrogatory me-\\nthod of disputation [epdrrjais] which Socrates\\nadopted, and which has since borne his name.\\nThe third part of his work was devoted to\\nwhat may not be improperly termed the art of\\nwrangling [epummi], which supplied the dis-\\nputant with a collection of sophistical ques-\\ntions, so contrived, that the concession of some\\npoint which seemed unavoidable, immediately\\ninvolved some glaring absurdity. This, if it\\nis to be esteemed as at all falling within the\\nprovince of Logic, is certainly not to be re-\\ngarded (as some have ignorantly or heedlessly\\nb2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0049.jp2"}, "50": {"fulltext": "4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nrepresented it) as its principal or proper busi-\\nness. The Greek philosophers generally have\\nunfortunately devoted too much attention to\\nit; but we must beware of falling into the\\nvulgar error of supposing the ancients to have\\nregarded as a serious and intrinsically impor-\\ntant study, that which in fact they considered\\nas an ingenious recreation. The disputants\\ndiverted themselves in their leisure hours by\\nmaking trial of their own and their adversary s\\nacuteness, in the endeavour mutually to per-\\nplex each other with subtle fallacies; much in\\nthe same way as men amuse themselves with\\npropounding and guessing riddles, or with the\\ngame of chess to each of which diversions\\nthe sportive disputations of the ancients bore\\nmuch resemblance. They were closely analo-\\ngous to the wrestling and other exercises of the\\nGymnasium; these last being reckoned con-\\nducive to bodily vigour and activity, as the\\nformer were to habits of intellectual acuteness\\nbut the immediate object in each was a\\nsportive, not a serious contest; though doubt-\\nless fashion and emulation often occasioned\\nan undue importance to be attached to suc-\\ncess in each.\\nzeno. Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as any\\nfurther a logician than as to what respects his\\nerotetic method of disputation a course of\\nargument constructed on this principle being", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0050.jp2"}, "51": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION. 5\\nproperly an hypothetical Sorites, which may\\neasily be reduced into a series of syllogisms.\\nTo Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Eociid and\\nAntislhenes\\nAntisthenes both pupils of Socrates. The\\nformer of these prosecuted the subject of the\\nthird part of his predecessor s treatise, and is\\nsaid to have been the author of many of the\\nfallacies attributed to the Stoical school. Of\\nthe writings of the latter nothing certain is\\nknown; if, however, we suppose the above-\\nmentioned sect to be his disciples in this study,\\nand to have retained his principles, he cer-\\ntainly took a more correct view of the subject\\nthan Euclid. The Stoics divided all \\\\efcra,\\nevery thing that could be said, into three\\nclasses 1st, the simple Term 2d, the Pro-\\nposition 3d, the Syllogism viz. the hypo-\\nthetical for they seem to have had little\\nnotion of a more rigorous analysis of argu-\\nment than into that familiar form.\\nWe must not here omit to notice the merits\\nof Archytas, to whom we are indebted for the Archyt^.\\ndoctrine of the Categories. He, however, (as\\nwell as the other writers on the subject) appears\\nto have had no distinct view of the proper\\nobject and just limits of the science of Logic\\nbut to have blended with it metaphysical\\ndiscussions not strictly connected with it, and\\nto have dwelt on the investigation of the\\nnature of terms and propositions, without", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0051.jp2"}, "52": {"fulltext": "6 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nmaintaining a constant reference to the prin-\\nciples of Reasoning; to which all the rest\\nshould be made subservient.\\nArhtotie. The state, then, in which Aristotle found\\nthe science (if indeed it can properly be said\\nto have existed at all before his time) appears\\nto have been nearly this the division into\\nSimple Terms, Propositions, and Syllogisms,\\nhad been slightly sketched out the doctrine\\nof the Categories, and perhaps that of the\\nOpposition of propositions, had been laid\\ndown; and, as some believe, the analysis of\\nSpecies into Genus and Differentia, had been\\nintroduced by Socrates. These, at best, were\\nrather the materials of the system, than the\\nsystem itself; the foundation of which indeed\\nhe distinctly claims the merit of having laid,\\nand which remains fundamentally the same\\nas he left it.\\nIt has been remarked, that the logical system\\nis one of those few theories which have been\\nbegun and perfected by the same individual.\\nThe history of its discovery, as far as the main\\nprinciples of the science are concerned, pro-\\nperly commences and ends with Aristotle and\\nthis may perhaps in part account for the sub-\\nsequent perversions of it. The brevity and\\nsimplicity of its fundamental truths (to which\\npoint indeed all real science is perpetually\\ntending) has probably led many, to suppose", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0052.jp2"}, "53": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION. 7\\nthat something much more complex, abstruse,\\nand mysterious, remained to be discovered.\\nThe vanity, too, by which all men are prompted\\nunduly to magnify their own pursuits, has led\\nunphilosophical minds, not in this case alone,\\nbut in many others, to extend the boundaries\\nof their respective sciences, not by the patient\\ndevelopment and just application of the prin-\\nciples of those sciences, but by wandering into\\nirrelevant subjects. The mystical employment\\nof numbers by Pythagoras, in matters utterly\\nforeign to arithmetic, is perhaps the earliest\\ninstance of the kind. A more curious and\\nimportant one is the degeneracy of Astronomy\\ninto judicial Astrology but none is more\\nstriking than the misapplication of Logic, by\\nthose who have treated of it as the art of\\nrightly employing the rational faculties, or\\nwho have intruded it into the province of Na-\\ntural Philosophy, and regarded the Syllogism\\nas an engine for the investigation of nature\\nwhile they overlooked the boundless field that\\nwas before them within the legitimate limits of\\nthe science; and perceived not the importance\\nand difficulty of the task, of completing and\\nproperly filling up the masterly sketch before\\nthem.\\nThe writings of Aristotle were not only abso-\\nlutely lost to the world for about two centuries,\\nbut seem to have been but little studied for a", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0053.jp2"}, "54": {"fulltext": "8 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nlong time after their recovery. An art, how-\\never, of Logic, derived from the principles\\ntraditionally preserved by his disciples, seems\\nto have been generally known, and to have\\nbeen employed by Cicero in his philosophical\\nworks but the pursuit of the science seems to\\nhave been abandoned for a long time. Early\\nin the Christian era, the Peripatetic doctrines\\nexperienced a considerable revival and we\\nGaien, meet with the names of Galen and Porphyry\\nPorphyry. L J J\\nas logicians but it is not till the fifth century\\nthat Aristotle s logical works were translated\\nBoethius. into Latin by the celebrated Boethius. Not\\none of these seems to have made any consi-\\nderable advances in developing the theory of\\nreasoning. Of Galen s labours little is known\\nand Porphyry s principal work is merely on the\\npredicables. We have little of the science till\\nthe revival of learning among the Arabians, by\\nwhom Aristotle s treatises on this as well as on\\nother subjects were eagerly studied.\\nPassing by the names of some Byzantine\\nwriters of no great importance, we come to\\nschoolmen, the times of the Schoolmen, whose waste of\\ningenuity and frivolous subtilty of disputation\\nneed not be enlarged upon. It may be suf-\\nficient to observe, that their fault did not lie\\nin their diligent study of Logic, and the high\\nvalue they set upon it, but in their utterly\\nmistaking the true nature and object of the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0054.jp2"}, "55": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION.\\nscience and by the attempt to employ it for\\nthe purpose of physical discoveries, involving\\nevery subject in a mist of words, to the ex-\\nclusion of sound philosophical investigation.\\nTheir errors may serve to account for the\\nstrong terms in which Bacon sometimes ap- Bacon.\\npears to censure logical pursuits but that\\nthis censure was intended to bear against the\\nextravagant perversions, not the legitimate\\ncultivation of the science, may be proved from\\nhis own observations on the subject, in his\\nAdvancement of Learning.\\nHis moderation, however, was not imitated\\nin other quarters. Even Locke confounds in Locke.\\none sweeping censure the Aristotelic theory,\\nwith the absurd misapplications and perver-\\nsions of it in later years. His objection to the\\nscience, as unserviceable in the discovery of\\ntruth (which has of late been often repeated),\\nwhile it holds good in reference to many (mis-\\nnamed) logicians, indicates that, with regard\\nto the true nature of the science itself, he had\\nno clearer notions than they have, of the pro-\\nper province of Logic, viz. Reasoning and of\\nthe distinct character of that operation from\\nthe observations and experiments which are\\nessential to the study of nature.\\nAn error apparently different, but substan-\\ntially the same, pervades the treatises of Watts wmu.\\nand other modern writers on the subject.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0055.jp2"}, "56": {"fulltext": "10 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nPerceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic\\ntheory to the vast purposes to which others\\nhad attempted to apply it, he still craved after\\nthe attainment of some equally comprehensive\\nand all-powerful system which he accordingly\\nattempted to construct, under the title of The\\nRight Use of Reason, which was to be a\\nmethod of invigorating and properly directing\\nall the powers of the mind a most magni-\\nficent object indeed, but one which not only\\ndoes not fall under the province of Logic, but\\ncannot be accomplished by any one science or\\nsystem that can even be conceived to exist.\\nThe attempt to comprehend so wide a field, is\\nno extension of science, but a mere verbal\\ngeneralization, which leads only to vague and\\nbarren declamation. In every pursuit, the\\nmore precise and definite our object, the more\\nlikely we are to attain some valuable result\\nif, like the Platonists, who sought after the\\navrdyaOov, the abstract idea of good, we\\npursue some specious but ill-defined scheme\\nof universal knowledge, we shall lose the sub-\\nstance while grasping at a shadow, and be-\\nwilder ourselves in empty generalities.\\nIt is not perhaps much to be wondered\\nat, that in still later times several ingenious\\nwriters, forming their notions of the science\\nitself from professed masters in it, such as have\\njust been alluded to, and judging of its value", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0056.jp2"}, "57": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION. 1 1\\nfrom their failures, should have treated the\\nAristotelic system with so much reprobation\\nand scorn. Too much prejudiced to bestow\\non it the requisite attention for enabling them\\nclearly to understand its real character and\\nobject, or even to judge correctly from the\\nlittle they did understand, they have assailed\\nthe study with a host of objections, so totally\\nirrelevant, and consequently impotent, that,\\nconsidering the talents and general information\\nof those from whom they proceed, they might\\nexcite astonishment in any one who did not\\nfully estimate the force of very early prejudice.\\nLogic has usually been considered by these incorrect\\nviews of the\\nobjectors as professing to furnish a peculiar nati,re of the\\nJ Jl o l science.\\nmethod of reasoning, instead of a method of\\nanalyzing that mental process which must\\ninvariably take place in all correct reasoning\\nand accordingly they have contrasted the ordi-\\nnary mode of resoning with the syllogistic, and\\nhave brought forward with an air of triumph\\nthe argumentative skill of many who never\\nlearned the system a mistake no less gross\\nthan if any one should regard Grammar as a\\npeculiar Language, and should contend against\\nits utility, on the ground that many speak\\ncorrectly who never studied the principles of\\ngrammar. For Logic, which is, as it were, the\\nGrammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward\\nthe regular Syllogism as a distinct mode of", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0057.jp2"}, "58": {"fulltext": "12 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nargumentation, designed to be substituted for\\nany other mode but as the form to which all\\ncorrect reasoning may be ultimately reduced\\nand which, consequently, serves the purpose\\n(when we are employing Logic as an art) of\\na test to try the validity of any argument in\\nthe same manner as by chemical analysis we\\ndevelop and submit to a distinct examination\\nthe elements of which any compound body is\\ncomposed, and are thus enabled to detect any\\nlatent sophistication and impurity.\\nComplaints have also been made that Logic\\nleaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and\\nthose which are the sources of the chief errors\\nin reasoning viz. the ambiguity or indistinct-\\nness of Terms, and the doubts respecting the\\ndegrees of evidence in various Propositions an\\nobjection which is not to be removed by any\\nsuch attempt as that of Watts to lay down\\nrules for forming clear ideas, and for guiding\\nthe judgment; but by replying that no art\\nis to be censured for not teaching more than\\nfalls within its province, and indeed more than\\ncan be taught by any conceivable art. Such\\na system of universal knowledge as should in-\\nstruct us in the full meaning or meanings of\\nevery term, and the truth or falsity, certainty\\nor uncertainty, of every proposition, thus\\nsuperseding all other studies, it is most unphi-\\nlosophical to expect, or even to imagine. And", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0058.jp2"}, "59": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION. 13\\nto find fault with Logic for not performing\\nthis, is as if one should object to the science of\\nOptics for not giving sight to the blind or as\\nif (like the man of whom Warburton tells a\\nstory in his Div. Leg.) one should complain of\\na reading-glass for being of no service to a\\nperson who had never learned to read.\\nIn fact, the difficulties and errors above\\nalluded to are not in the process of Reasoning\\nitself (which alone is the appropriate province\\nof Logic) but in the subject-matter about which\\nit is employed. This process will have been\\ncorrectly conducted if it have conformed to the\\nlogical rules, which preclude the possibility of\\nany error creeping in between the principles\\nfrom which we are arguing, and the conclusions\\nwe deduce from them. But still that conclu-\\nsion may be false, if the principles we start\\nfrom are so. In like manner, no arithmetical\\nskill will secure a correct result to a calcula-\\ntion, unless the data are correct from which we\\ncalculate nor does any one on that account\\nundervalue Arithmetic and yet the objection\\nagainst Logic rests on no better foundation.\\nThere is in fact a striking analogy in this\\nrespect between the two sciences. All Num-\\nbers (which are the subject of Arithmetic) must\\nbe numbers of some things, whether coins, per-\\nsons, measures, or any thing else but to intro-\\nduce into the science any notice of the things", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0059.jp2"}, "60": {"fulltext": "14 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\nrespecting which calculations are made, would\\nbe evidently irrelevant, and would destroy its\\nscientific character we proceed therefore with\\narbitrary signs representing numbers in the\\nabstract. So also does Logic pronounce on\\nthe validity of a regularly-constructed argu-\\nment, equally well, though arbitrary symbols\\nmay have been substituted for the terms; and,\\nconsequently, without any regard to the things\\nsignified by those terms. And the possibility\\nof doing this (though the employment of such\\narbitrary symbols has been absurdly objected\\nto, even by writers who understood not duly\\nArithmetic but Algebra) is a proof of the\\nstrictly scientific character of the system. But\\nmany professed logical writers, not attending\\nto the circumstances which have been just\\nmentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on\\nvarious branches of knowledge disquisitions\\nwhich must evidently be as boundless as human\\nknowledge itself, since there is no subject on\\nwhich Reasoning is not employed, and to\\nwhich, consequently, Logic may not be applied.\\nThe error lies in regarding every thing as the\\npropei* province of Logic to which it is appli-\\ncable. A similar error is complained of by\\nAristotle, as having taken place with respect\\nto Rhetoric of which, indeed, we find speci-\\nmens in the arguments of several of the inter-\\nlocutors in Cic. de Oratore.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0060.jp2"}, "61": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION. 15\\nFrom what has been said, it will be evident\\nthat there is hardly any subject to which it is\\nso difficult to introduce the student in a clear\\nand satisfactory manner, as the one we are now\\nengaged in. In any other branch of know-\\nledge, the reader, if he have any previous\\nacquaintance with the subject, will usually be\\nso far the better prepared for comprehending\\nthe exposition of the principles; or if he be\\nentirely a stranger to it, will at least come to\\nthe study with a mind unbiassed, and free from\\nprejudices and misconceptions: whereas, in the\\npresent case, it cannot but happen, that many\\nwho have given some attention to logical pur-\\nsuits (or what are usually considered as such)\\nwill have rather been bewildered by funda-\\nmentally erroneous views, than prepared, by\\nthe acquisition of just principles, for ulterior\\nprogress and that not a few who pretend not\\nto any acquaintance whatever with the science,\\nwill yet have imbibed either such prejudices\\nagainst it, or such false notions respecting its\\nnature, as cannot but prove obstacles in their\\nstudy of it.\\nThere is, however, a difficulty which exists\\nmore or less in all abstract pursuits; though\\nit is perhaps more felt in this, and often oc-\\ncasions it to be rejected by beginners as dry\\nand tedious viz. the difficulty of perceiving\\nto what ultimate end, to what practical or", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0061.jp2"}, "62": {"fulltext": "16 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\ninteresting application the abstract principles\\nlead, which are first laid before the student;\\nso that he will often have to work his way\\npatiently through the most laborious part of\\nthe system before he can gain any clear idea\\nof the drift and intention of it.\\nThis complaint has often been made by che-\\nmical students, who are wearied with descrip-\\ntions of oxygen, hydrogen, and other invisible\\nelements, before they have any knowledge\\nrespecting such bodies as commonly present\\nthemselves to the senses. And accordingly\\nsome teachers of chemistry obviate in a great\\ndegree this objection, by adopting the ana-\\nlytical instead of the synthetical mode of pro-\\ncedure, when they are first introducing the\\nsubject to beginners L e. instead of syntheti-\\ncally enumerating the elementary substances,\\nproceeding next to the simplest combinations\\nof these, and concluding with those more\\ncomplex substances which are of the most\\ncommon occurrence, they begin by analyzing\\nthese last, and resolving them step by step\\ninto their simple elements thus at once pre-\\nsenting the subject in an interesting point of\\nview, and clearly setting forth the object of\\nit. The synthetical form of teaching is in-\\ndeed sufficiently interesting to one who has\\nma^e considerable progress in any study and\\nbeing more concise, regular, and systematic,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0062.jp2"}, "63": {"fulltext": "INTRODUCTION. 17\\nis the form in which our knowledge naturally\\narranges itself in the mind, and is retained by\\nthe memory but the analytical is the more\\ninteresting, easy, and natural kind of intro-\\nduction as being the form in which the first\\ninvention or discovery of any kind of system\\nmust originally have taken place.\\nIt may be advisable, therefore, to begin by\\ngiving a slight sketch, in this form, of the\\nlogical system, before we enter regularly upon\\nthe details of it. The reader will thus be pre-\\nsented with a kind of imaginary history of the\\ncourse of inquiry by which that system may be\\nconceived to have occurred to a philosophical\\nmind.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0063.jp2"}, "64": {"fulltext": "18 [Book I.\\nBOOK I.\\nANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE.\\nI-\\nIn every instance in which we reason, in\\nthe strict sense of the word, i. e. make use of\\narguments, whether for the sake of refuting\\nan adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of\\nsatisfying our own minds on any point, what-\\never may be the subject we are engaged on, a\\ncertain process takes place in the mind, which\\nis one and the same in all cases, provided it\\nbe correctly conducted.\\nOf course it cannot be supposed that every\\none is even conscious of this process in his own\\nmind much less, is competent to explain the\\nprinciples on which it proceeds. This indeed\\nis, and cannot but be, the case with every\\nother process respecting which any system has\\nbeen formed the practice not only may exist\\nindependently of the theory, but must have\\npreceded the theory. There must have been\\nLanguage before a system of Grammar could\\nbe devised and musical compositions, previous\\nto the science of Music. This, by the way,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0064.jp2"}, "65": {"fulltext": "1.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 19\\nwill serve to expose the futility of the popular\\nobjection against Logic, that men may reason\\nvery well who know nothing of it.* The\\nLocke has a great deal to this purpose e. g. in chap,\\nxvii. on Reason, (which, by the way, he perpetually\\nconfounds with Reasoning.) He says, in 4, If syllo-\\ngisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of\\nreason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that before\\nAristotle there was not one man that did or could know\\nany thing by reason and that since the invention of syl-\\nlogisms there is not one in ten thousand that doth. But\\nGod has not been so sparing to men to make them barely\\ntwo-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them\\nrational, i. e. those few of them that he could get so to\\nexamine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above\\nthreescore ways that three propositions may be laid toge-\\nther, there are but fourteen wherein one may be sure that\\nthe conclusion is right, fyc. tyc. God has been more\\nbountiful to mankind than so He has given them a mind\\nthat can reason without being instructed in methods of\\nsyllogizing, fyc. fyc. All this is not at all less absurd than\\nif any one, on being told of the discoveries of modern\\nchemists respecting caloric, and on hearing described the\\nprocess by which it is conducted through a boiler into the\\nwater, which it converts into a gas of sufficient elasticity\\nto overcome the pressure of the atmosphere, $c 9 should\\nreply, If all this were so, it would follow that before the\\ntime of these chemists no one ever did or could make any\\nliquor boil.\\nIn an ordinary, obscure, and trifling writer, all this con-\\nfusion of thought and common-place declamation might\\nas well have been left unnoticed but it is due to the\\ngeneral ability and to the celebrity of such an author as\\nLocke, that errors of this kind should be exposed.\\nHe presently after inserts an encomium upon Aristotle,\\nin which he is equally unfortunate he praises him for the\\ninvention of syllogisms to which he certainly had no\\nc 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0065.jp2"}, "66": {"fulltext": "20 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nparallel instances adduced, show that such an\\nobjection might be applied in many other cases,\\nwhere its absurdity would be obvious and that\\nthere is no ground for deciding thence, either\\nthat the system has no tendency to improve\\npractice, or that even if it had not, it might\\nnot still be a dignified and interesting pursuit.\\nOne of the chief impediments to the attain-\\nment of a just view of the nature and object of\\nLogic, is the not fully understanding, or not\\nsufficiently keeping in mind, the sameness of\\nthe reasoning process in all cases. If, as the\\nordinary mode of speaking would seem to in-\\ndicate, mathematical reasoning, and theologi-\\ncal, and metaphysical, and political, 8?c. were\\nessentially different from each other, i. e. dif-\\nferent kinds of reasoning, it would follow, that\\nsupposing there could be at all any such science\\nas we have described Logic, there must be so\\nmany different species, or at least different\\nbranches of Logic. And such is perhaps the\\nmore claim than Linnaeus to the creation of plants and\\nanimals or Hervey, to the praise of having made the blood\\ncirculate; or Lavoisier, to that of having formed the atmo-\\nsphere we breathe. And the utility of this invention con-\\nsists, according to him, in the great service done against\\nthose who were not ashamed to deny anything; a service\\nwhich never could have been performed, had syllogisms\\nbeen an invention of Aristotle s for what sophist could\\never have consented to restrict himself to one particular\\nkind of arguments, dictated by his opponent", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0066.jp2"}, "67": {"fulltext": "process simi-\\nlar in all sub-\\nI.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 21\\nmost prevailing notion. Nor is this much to\\nbe wondered at since it is evident to all, that\\nsome men converse and write, in an argumen-\\ntative way, very justly on one subject, and very\\nerroneously on another, in which again others\\nexcel, who fail in the former. This error may Reasoning\\nbe at once illustrated and removed, by consi- ec{\\ndering the parallel instance of Arithmetic in\\nwhich every one is aware that the process of a\\ncalculation is not affected by the nature of the\\nobjects whose numbers are before us but that\\n(e.g.) the multiplication of a number is the\\nvery same operation, whether it be a number of\\nmen, of miles, or of pounds though neverthe-\\nless persons may perhaps be found who are\\naccurate in calculations relative to natural\\nphilosophy, and incorrect in those of political-\\neconomy, from their different degrees of skill in\\nthe subjects of these two sciences not surely\\nbecause there are different arts of Arithmetic\\napplicable to each of these respectively.\\nOthers again, who are aware that the simple\\nsystem of Logic may be applied to all subjects\\nwhatever, are yet disposed to view it as a\\npeculiar method of reasoning, and not, as it is,\\na method of unfolding and analyzing our rea-\\nsoning whence many have been led (e. g. the\\nauthor of the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk\\nof comparing Syllogistic reasoning with Moral\\nreasoning taking it for granted that it is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0067.jp2"}, "68": {"fulltext": "22 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boqk I.\\npossible to reason correctly without reasoning\\nlogically which is, in fact, as great a blunder\\nas if any one were to mistake grammar for a\\npeculiar language, and to suppose it possible to\\nspeak correctly without speaking grammatically.\\nThey have in short considered Logic as an art\\nof reasoning whereas (so far as it is an art) it\\nis the art of reasoning the logician s object\\nbeing, not to lay down principles by w T hich one\\nmay reason, but, by which all must reason, even\\nthough they are not distinctly aware of them:\\nto lay down rules, not which may be followed\\nwith advantage, but which cannot possibly be\\ndeparted from in sound reasoning. These mis-\\napprehensions and objections being such as lie\\non the very threshold of the subject, it would\\nhave been hardly possible, without noticing\\nthem, to convey any just notion of the nature\\nand design of the logical system.\\n2.\\nSupposing it then to have been perceived\\nthat the operation of reasoning is in all cases\\nthe same, the analysis of that operation could\\nnot fail to strike the mind as an interesting\\nmatter of inquiry. And moreover, since (appa-\\nrent) arguments which are unsound and incon-\\nclusive, are so often employed, either from error\\nor design and since even those who are not\\nmisled by these fallacies, are so often at a loss", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0068.jp2"}, "69": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a72.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 23\\nto detect and expose them in a manner satisfac-\\ntory to others, or even to themselves it could\\nnot but appear desirable to lay down some\\ngeneral rules of reasoning, applicable to all\\ncases by which a person might be enabled the\\nmore readily and clearly to state the grounds\\nof his own conviction, or of his objection to the\\narguments of an opponent instead of arguing\\nat random, without any fixed and acknowledged\\nprinciples to guide his procedure. Such rules\\nwould be analogous to those of Arithmetic,\\nwhich obviate the tediousness and uncertainty\\nof calculations in the head wherein, after\\nmuch labour, different persons might arrive at\\ndifferent results, without any of them being\\nable distinctly to point out the error of the rest.\\nA system of such rules, it is obvious, must, in-\\nstead of deserving to be called the art of wrang-\\nling, be more justly characterised as the art\\nof cutting short wrangling, by bringing the\\nparties to issue at once, if not to agreement;\\nand thus saving a waste of ingenuity.\\nIn pursuing the supposed investigation, ifc Anaiysu\\nwill be found that every conclusion is deduced,\\nin reality, from two other propositions (thence\\ncalled Premises;) for though one of these may\\nbe, and commonly is, suppressed, it must never-\\ntheless be understood as admitted as may\\neasily be made evident by supposing the denial\\nof the suppressed premiss, which will at once", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0069.jp2"}, "70": {"fulltext": "24 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\ninvalidate the argument: e.g. if any one, from\\nperceiving that the world exhibits marks of\\ndesign/ infers that it must have had an in-\\ntelligent author/ though he may not be aware\\nin his own mind of the existence of anv other\\npremiss, he will readily understand, if it be\\ndenied that whatever exhibits marks of design\\nmust have had an intelligent author/ that the\\naffirmative of that proposition is necessary to\\nthe validity of the argument. An argument\\nthus stated regularly and at full length, is\\ncalled a Syllogism which therefore is evidently\\nnot a peculiar kind of argument, but only a\\npeculiar form of expression, in which every\\nargument may be stated.\\nWhen one of the premises is suppressed\\n(which for brevity s sake it usually is) the\\nargument is called an Enthymeme. And it\\nmay be worth while to remark, that when the\\nargument is in this state, the objections of an\\nopponent are (or rather appear to be) of two\\nkinds viz. either objections to the assertion\\nitself, or objections to its force as an argument.\\nE. G. In the above instance, an atheist may be\\nconceived either denying that the world does\\nexhibit marks of design, or denying that it\\nfollows from thence that it had an intelligent\\nauthor. Now it is important to keep in mind\\nthat the only difference in the two cases is, that\\nin the one the expressed premiss is denied, in the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0070.jp2"}, "71": {"fulltext": "J 2.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 25\\nother the suppressed; for the force as an argument\\nof either premiss depends on the other premiss\\nif both be admitted, the conclusion legitimately\\nconnected with them cannot be denied.\\nIt is evidently immaterial to the argument\\nwhether the conclusion be placed first or last;\\nbut it may be proper to remark, that a premiss\\nplaced after its conclusion is called the Reason*\\nof it, and is introduced by one of those con-\\njunctions which are called causal viz. since,\\nbecause, fyc. which may indeed be employed\\nto designate a premiss, whether it came first\\nor last. The illative conjunctions, therefore,\\nfyc. designate the conclusion.\\nIt is a circumstance which often occasions\\nerror and perplexity, that both these classes\\nof conjunctions have also another signification,\\nbeing employed to denote, respectively, Cause\\nand Effect, as well as Premiss and Conclusion\\ne. g. If I say, this ground is rich, because the\\ntrees on it are flourishing, or the trees are\\nflourishing, and therefore the soil must be rich,\\nI employ these conjunctions to denote the con-\\nnexion of Premiss and Conclusion for it is\\nplain that the luxuriance of the trees is not\\nthe cause of the soil s fertility, but only the\\ncause of my knowing it. If again I say, the\\ntrees flourish, because the ground is rich,\\nThe Major-premiss is often called the Principle; and\\nthe word Reason is then confined to the Minor, j", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0071.jp2"}, "72": {"fulltext": "26 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nor the ground is rich, and therefore the trees\\nflourish/ I am using the very same conjunctions\\nfau\u00c2\u00b0 S e! and denote the connexion of cause and effect; for\\nin this case, the luxuriance of the trees, being\\nevident to the eye, would hardly need to be\\nproved, but might need to be accounted for.\\nThere are, however, many cases, in which the\\ncause is employed to prove the existence of its\\neffect especially in arguments relating to\\nfuture events as e. g. when from favourable\\nweather any one argues that the crops are\\nlikely to be abundant the cause and the\\nreason, in that case, coincide. And this con-\\ntributes to their being so often confounded\\ntogether in other cases.\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nIn an argument, such as the example above\\ngiven, it is, as has been said, impossible for any\\none, who admits both premises, to avoid ad-\\nmitting the conclusion. But there will be fre-\\n\u00c2\u00a3E tar quently an apparent connection of premises with\\na conclusion which does not in reality follow\\nfrom them, though to the inattentive or un-\\nskilful the argument may appear to be valid\\nand there are many other cases in which a doubt\\nmay exist whether the argument be valid or not;\\ni. e. whether it be possible or not to admit the\\nSee Appendix, No. I. art. Reason, See also Bhetoric,\\nPart I. ch. ii.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0072.jp2"}, "73": {"fulltext": "3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 27\\npremises, and yet deny the conclusion. It is of\\nthe highest importance, therefore, to lay down\\nsome regular form to which every valid argu-\\nment may be reduced, and to devise a rule\\nwhich shall show the validity of every argument\\nin that form, and consequently the unsoundness\\nof any apparent argument which cannot be\\nreduced to it e. g. if such an argument as this\\nbe proposed, every rational agent is account-\\nable; brutes are not rational agents; therefore\\nthey are not accountable or again, all wise\\nlegislators suit their laws to the genius of their\\nnation Solon did this therefore he was a wise\\nlegislator there are some, perhaps, who would\\nnot perceive any fallacy in such arguments,\\nespecially if enveloped in a cloud of words\\nand still more, when the conclusion is true, or\\n(which comes to the same point) if they are dis-\\nposed to believe it and others might perceive\\nindeed, but might be at a loss to explain, the\\nfallacy. Now these (apparent) arguments ex-\\nactly correspond, respectively, with the follow-\\ning, the absurdity of the conclusions from which\\nis manifest every horse is an animal sheep\\nare not horses therefore they are not animals\\nand, all vegetables grow; an animal grows;\\ntherefore it is a vegetable. These last exam-\\nples, I have said, correspond exactly (considered\\nas arguments) with the former the question\\nrespecting the validity of an argument being,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0073.jp2"}, "74": {"fulltext": "28 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nnot whether the conclusion be true, but whether\\nit follozvs from the premises adduced. This\\nmode of exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward\\na similar one whose conclusion is obviously\\nabsurd, is often, and very advantageously, re-\\nsorted to in addressing those who are ignorant\\nof Logical rules;* but to lay down such rules,\\nand employ them as a test, is evidently a safer\\nand more compendious, as well as a more\\nphilosophical mode of proceeding. To attain\\nthese, it would plainly be necessary to analyze\\nsome clear and valid arguments, and to observe\\nin what their conclusiveness consists.\\nLet us suppose, then, such an examination\\nto be made of the syllogism above mentioned\\nwhatever exhibits marks of design had an\\nintelligent author the world exhibits marks of\\ndesign therefore the world had an intelligent\\nauthor. In the first of these premises we find\\nAn exposure of some of Hume s fallacies in his\\nEssay on Miracles and elsewhere, was attempted, on\\nthis plan, a few years ago, in a pamphlet (published ano-\\nnymously, as the nature of the argument required, but\\nwhich I see no reason against acknowledging) entitled\\nHistoric Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte in\\nwhich it was shown that the existence of that extraordi-\\nnary person could not, on Hume s principles, be received\\nas a well-authenticated fact since it rests on evidence less\\nstrong than that which supports the Scripture-histories.\\nFor a clear development of the mode in which this last\\nevidence operates on most minds, see Hints on Inspira-\\ntion, p. 30 46.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0074.jp2"}, "75": {"fulltext": "3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 29\\nit assumed universally of the class of things\\nwhich exhibit marks of design/ that they had\\nan intelligent author and in the other premiss,\\nthe world is referred to that class as com-\\nprehended in it now it is evident, that what- i\\never is said of the whole of a class, may be said\\nof any thing comprehended in that class so\\nthat we are thus authorized to say of the\\nworld, that it had an intelligent author.\\nAgain, if we examine a syllogism with a nega-\\ntive conclusion, as, e. g. nothing which exhi-\\nbits marks of design could have been produced\\nby chance the world exhibits, fyc. therefore\\nthe world could not have been produced by\\nchance the process of Reasoning will be\\nfound to be the same since it is evident, that\\nwhatever is denied universally of any class may\\nbe denied of any thing that is comprehended\\nin that class.\\nOn further examination it will be found, that\\nall valid arguments whatever may be easily\\nreduced to such a form as that of the fore-\\ngoing syllogisms and that consequently the\\nprinciple on which they are constructed is the\\nUNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning.\\nSo elliptical, indeed, is the ordinary mode of\\nexpression, even of those who are considered\\nas prolix writers, i. e. so much is implied and\\nleft to be understood in the course of argu-\\nment, in comparison of what is actually stated,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0075.jp2"}, "76": {"fulltext": "30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\n(most men being impatient, even to excess, of\\nany appearance of unnecessary and tedious\\nformality of statement) that a single sentence\\nwill often be found, though perhaps considered\\nas a single argument, to contain, compressed\\ninto a short compass, a chain of several distinct\\narguments. But if each of these be fully deve-\\nloped, and the whole of what the author in-\\ntended to imply be stated expressly, it will be\\nfound that all the steps even of the longest and\\nmost complex train of reasoning, may be re-\\nduced into the above form.\\nIt is a mistake (which might appear scarcely\\nworthy of notice, had not so many, even\\nesteemed writers, fallen into it) to imagine that\\nAristotle and other logicians meant to propose\\nthat this prolix form of unfolding arguments\\nshould universally supersede, in argumentative\\ndiscourses, the common forms of expression\\nand that, to reason logically, means, to state\\nall arguments at full length in the syllogistic\\nform and Aristotle has even been charged with\\ninconsistency for not doing so. It has been said,\\nthat in his Treatises of Ethics, Politics, fyc,\\nhe argues like a rational creature, and never\\nattempts to bring his own system into prac-\\ntice. As well might a chemist be charged\\nwith inconsistency for making use of any of\\nthe compound substances that are commonly\\nLord Karnes.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0076.jp2"}, "77": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a74.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 31\\nemployed, without previously analyzing and\\nresolving them into their simple elements as\\nwell might it be imagined that, to speak gram-\\nmatically, means, to parse every sentence we\\nutter. The chemist (to pursue the illustration)\\nkeeps by him his tests and his method of\\nanalysis, to be employed when any substance is\\noffered to his notice, the composition of which\\nhas not been ascertained, or in which adultera-\\ntion is suspected. Now a fallacy may aptly be\\ncompared to some adulterated compound it\\nconsists of an ingenious mixture of truth and\\nfalsehood, so entangled, so intimately blend-\\ned,\u00e2\u0080\u0094 that the falsehood is (in the chemical\\nphrase) held in solution one drop of sound\\nlogic is that test which immediately disunites\\nthem, makes the foreign substance visible,\\nu and precipitates it to the bottom.\\n4.\\nBut to resume the investigation of the prin-\\nciples of reasoning the maxim resulting from\\nthe examination of a syllogism in the foregoing\\nform, and of the application of which, every\\nvalid argument is in reality an instance, is,\\nthat whatever is predicated (i. e. affirmed or\\nThis excellent illustration is cited from a passage in an\\nanonymous pamphlet, An Examination of Rett s Logic.\\nThe author displays, though in a hasty production, great\\nreach of thought, as well as knowledge of his subject.\\nAristotle\\ndictum.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0077.jp2"}, "78": {"fulltext": "32 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\ndenied) universally, of any class of things, may\\nbe predicated, in like manner, (viz. affirmed\\nor denied) of any thing comprehended in that\\nclass. This is the principle, commonly called\\nthe dictum de omni et nullo, for the establish-\\nment of which we are indebted to Aristotle,\\nand which is the keystone of his whole logical\\nsystem. It is not a little remarkable that\\nsome, otherwise judicious writers, should have\\nbeen so carried away by their zeal against that\\nphilosopher, as to speak with scorn and ridicule\\nof this principle, on account of its obviousness\\nand simplicity though they would probably\\nperceive at once, in any other case, that it is\\nthe greatest triumph of philosophy to refer\\nmany, and seemingly very various, phenomena\\nto one, or a very few, simple principles and\\nthat the more simple and evident such a prin-\\nciple is, provided it be truly applicable to all\\nthe cases in question, the greater is its value\\nand scientific beauty. If, indeed, any prin-\\nciple be regarded as not thus applicable, that\\nis an objection to it of a different kind. Such\\nan objection against Aristotle s dictum, no one\\nhas ever attempted to establish by any kind\\nof proof; but it has often been taken for\\ngranted; it being (as has been stated) very\\ncommonly supposed, without examination, that\\nthe syllogism is a distinct kind of argument,\\nand that the rules of it accordingly do not", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0078.jp2"}, "79": {"fulltext": "4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 33\\napply, nor were intended to apply, to all\\nreasoning whatever. Under this misappre-\\nhension, Dr. Campbell labours with some in-\\ngenuity, and not without an air of plausibility,\\nto show that every syllogism must be futile\\nand worthless, because the premises virtually\\nassert the conclusion little dreaming, of\\ncourse, that his objections, however specious,\\nlie against the process of reasoning itself,\\nuniversally and will therefore, of course,\\napply to those very arguments which he is\\nhimself adducing.\\nIt is much more extraordinary to find ano-\\nther eminent authorf adopting, expressly, the\\nvery same objections, and yet distinctly admit-\\nting (within a few pages) the possibility of\\nreducing every course of argument to a series\\nof syllogisms.\\nThe same writer brings an objection against\\nthe Dictum of Aristotle, which it may be worth\\nwhile to notice briefly, for the sake of setting\\nin a clearer light the real character and object\\nof that principle. Its application being, as\\nhas been seen, to a regular and conclusive\\nsyllogism, he supposes it intended to prove\\nand make evident the conclusiveness of such\\na syllogism and remarks how unphilosophical\\nit is to attempt giving a demonstration of a\\nPhilosophy of Rhetoric.\\nf Dugald Stewart Philosophy, vol. ii.\\nD", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0079.jp2"}, "80": {"fulltext": "34 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\ndemonstration. And certainly the charge\\nwould be just, if we could imagine the logi-\\ncian s object to be, to increase the certainty\\nof a conclusion which we are supposed to have\\nalready arrived at by the clearest possible mode\\nof proof. But it is very strange that such an\\nidea should ever have occurred to one who had\\neven the slightest tincture of natural philoso-\\nphy for it might as well be imagined that\\na natural philosopher s or a chemist s design is\\nto strengthen the testimony of our senses by\\na priori reasoning, and to convince us that a\\nstone when thrown will fall to the ground, and\\nthat gunpowder will explode when fired be-\\ncause they show that according to their prin-\\nciples those phenomena must take place as\\nthey do. But it would be reckoned a mark\\nof the grossest ignorance and stupidity not to\\nbe aware that their object is not to prove the\\nexistence of an individual phenomenon, which\\nour eyes have witnessed, but (as the phrase is)\\nto account for it i. e. to show according to\\nwhat principle it takes place to refer, in\\nshort, the individual case to a general law of\\nnature. The object of Aristotle s dictum is\\nprecisely analogous he had, doubtless, no\\nthought of adding to the force of any indi-\\nvidual syllogism his design was to point out\\nthe general principle on which that process is\\nconducted which takes place in each syllogism.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0080.jp2"}, "81": {"fulltext": "ctum.a\\nstatement of\\n\u00c2\u00a74.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 35\\nAnd as the Laws of nature (as they are called)\\nare in reality merely generalized facts, of\\nwhich all the phenomena coming under them\\nare particular instances so, the proof drawn\\nfrom Aristotle s dictum is not a distinct\\ndemonstration brought to confirm another\\ndemonstration, but is merely a generalized\\nand abstract statement of all demonstration\\nwhatever and is, therefore, in fact, the very\\ndemonstration which, (mutatis mutandis) ac-\\ncommodated to the various subject-matters, is\\nactually employed in each particular case.\\nIn order to trace more distinctly the different The d\\nstaten\\nsteps of the abstracting process, by which any Jf\u00e2\u0084\u00a2J a j\\nparticular argument may be brought into the\\nmost general form, we may first take a syllogism\\nstated accurately and at full length, such as the\\nexample formerly given, whatever exhibits\\nmarks of design, $fc. and then somewhat-\\ngeneralize the expression, by substituting (as\\nin Algebra) arbitrary unmeaning symbols for\\nthe significant terms that were originally used\\nthe syllogism will then stand thus every\\nB is A C is B therefore C is A. The rea-\\nsoning is no less evidently valid when thus\\nstated, whatever terms A, B, and C, respectively\\nmay be supposed to stand for such terms may\\nindeed be inserted as to make all or some of\\nAppendix, No. I. art. Law.,\\nD 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0081.jp2"}, "82": {"fulltext": "36 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nthe assertions false but it will still be no less\\nimpossible for any one who admits the truth of\\nthe premises, in an argument thus constructed,\\nto deny the conclusion and this it is that\\nconstitutes the conclusiveness of an argument.\\nViewing then the syllogism thus expressed,\\nit appears clearly, that A stands for any thing\\nwhatever that is affirmed of a whole class,\\n(viz, of every B) which class comprehends or\\ncontains in it something else viz, C (of which\\nB is, in the second premiss, affirmed) and\\nthat, consequently, the first term (A) is, in the\\nconclusion, predicated of the third C.\\nNow to assert the validity of this process,\\nnow before us, is to state the very dictum\\nwe are treating of, with hardly even a verbal\\nalteration viz.\\n1. Anything whatever, predicated of a whole\\nclass,\\n2. Under which class something else is con-\\ntained,\\n3. May be predicated of that which is so\\ncontained.\\nThe three members into which the maxim\\nis here distributed, correspond to the three\\npropositions of the syllogism to which they are\\nintended respectively to apply.\\nThe advantage of substituting for the terms,\\nin a regular syllogism, arbitrary unmeaning\\nsymbols, such as letters of the alphabet, is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0082.jp2"}, "83": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a74.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 37\\nmuch the same as in geometry the reasoning\\nitself is then considered, by itself, clearly, and\\nwithout any risk of our being misled by the\\ntruth or falsity of the conclusion which is, in\\nfact, accidental and variable the essential point\\nbeing, as far as the argument is concerned, the\\nconnexion between the premises and the con-\\nclusion. We are thus enabled to embrace the\\ngeneral principle of all reasoning, and to per-\\nceive its applicability to an indefinite number\\nof individual cases. That Aristotle, therefore,\\nshould have been accused of making use of\\nthese symbols for the purpose of darkening his\\ndemonstrations, and that too by persons not\\nunacquainted with geometry and algebra, is\\ntruly astonishing. If a geometer, instead of\\ndesignating the four angles of a square by four\\nletters, were to call them north, south, east, and\\nwest, he would not render the demonstration of\\na theorem the easier and the learner would\\nbe much more likely to be perplexed in the\\napplication of it.\\nIt belongs then exclusively to a syllogism,\\nproperly so called e. a valid argument, so\\nstated that its conclusiveness is evident from\\nthe mere form of the expression), that if letters,\\nor any other unmeaning symbols, be substi-\\ntuted for the several terms, the validity of the\\nargument shall still be evident. Whenever\\nthis is not the case, the supposed argument is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0083.jp2"}, "84": {"fulltext": "Detection of\\nunsound ai-\\n88 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\neither unsound and sophistical, or else may be\\nreduced (without any alteration of its meaning)\\ninto the syllogistic form in which form, the\\ntest just mentioned may be applied to it.\\nWhat is called an unsound or fallacious\\nargument, L e. an apparent argument, which is,\\nin reality, none, cannot, of course, be reduced\\ninto this form but when stated in the form\\nmost nearly approaching to this that is possible,\\nits fallaciousness becomes more evident, from\\nits nonconformity to the foregoing rule e. g.\\nwhoever is capable of deliberate crime is re-\\nsponsible an infant is not capable of deliberate\\ncrime therefore, an infant is not responsible,\\n(see 3) here the term responsible is\\naffirmed universally of those capable of deli-\\nberate crime it might, therefore, according\\nto Aristotle s dictum, have been affirmed of\\nanything contained under that class but, in\\nthe instance before us, nothing is mentioned\\nas contained under that class only, the term\\ninfant is excluded from that class and\\nthough what is affirmed of a whole class may\\nbe affirmed of anything that is contained under\\nit, there is no ground for supposing that it may\\nbe denied of whatever is not so contained for\\nit is evidently possible that it may be applicable\\nto a whole class and to something else besides\\nto say, e. g. that all trees are vegetables, does\\nnot imply that nothing else is a vegetable.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0084.jp2"}, "85": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a75.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 39\\nNor, when it is said, that all who are capable\\nof deliberate crime are responsible, does this\\nimply, that no others are responsible for\\nthough this may be very true, it has not been\\nasserted in the premiss before us and in the\\nanalysis of an argument, we are to discard all\\nconsideration of what might be asserted con-\\ntemplating only what actually is laid down in\\nthe premises. It is evident, therefore, that such\\nan apparent argument as the above does not\\ncomply with the rule laid down, nor can be so\\nstated as to comply with it, and is consequently\\ninvalid.\\nAgain, in this instance, food is necessary to\\nlife corn is food therefore, corn is necessary\\nto life the term necessary to life is affirmed\\nof food, but not universally; for it is not said of\\nevery kind of food the meaning of the assertion\\nbeing manifestly that some food is necessary to\\nlife here again, therefore, the rule has not\\nbeen complied with, since that which has been\\npredicated, (i. e. affirmed or denied) not of the\\nwhole, but of a part only of a certain class,\\ncannot be, on that ground, predicated of any\\nthing whatever which is contained under that\\nclass.\\n\u00c2\u00a75.\\nThe fallacy in this last case is, what is usually\\ndescribed in logical language as consisting in", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0085.jp2"}, "86": {"fulltext": "40 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nthe non-distribution of the middle term i. e.\\nits not being employed to denote all the objects\\nto which it is applicable. In order to under-\\nstand this phrase, it is necessary to observe, that\\na proposition being an expression in which one\\nthing is affirmed or denied of another e.g. A\\nis B, both that of which something is said, and\\nthat which, is said of it (i. e. both A and B),\\nare called fi terms, from their being (in their\\nnature) the extremes or boundaries of the pro-\\nposition and there are, of course, two, and but\\ntwo, terms in a proposition (though it may so\\nhappen that either of them may consist either of\\none word, or of several) and a term is said to\\nDistribution be distributed, when it is taken universally,\\nso as to stand for every thing it is capable of\\nbeing applied to and consequently undis-\\ntributed, when it stands for a portion only of\\nthe things signified by it thus, all food, or\\nevery kind of food, are expressions which imply\\nthe distribution of the term food some\\nfood would imply its non-distribution and it\\nis also to be observed, that the term of which,\\nin one premiss, something is affirmed or denied,\\nand to which, in the other premiss, something\\nelse is referred as contained in it, is called the\\nmiddle term in the syllogism, as standing\\nbetween the other two (viz. the two terms of\\nthe conclusion), and being the medium of proof.\\nNow it is plain, that if in each premiss a part\\nof terms.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0086.jp2"}, "87": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a75.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 41\\nonly of this middle term is employed, i.e. if it\\nbe not at all distributed, no conclusion can be\\ndrawn. Hence, if, in the example formerly\\nadduced, it had been merely stated that\\nsomething (not whatever or everything\\nwhich exhibits marks of design, is the work\\nof an intelligent author, it would not have\\nfollowed, from the world s exhibiting marks of\\ndesign, that that is the work of an intelligent\\nauthor.\\nIt is to be observed, also, that the words\\nall and every, which mark the distri-\\nbution of a term, and some, which marks\\nits non-distribution, are not always expressed\\nthey are frequently understood, and left to be\\nsupplied by the context; e.g. food is neces-\\nsary viz. some food man is mortal viz.\\nevery man. Propositions thus expressed are\\ncalled by logicians indefinite because it is\\nleft undetermined by the form of the expres-\\nsion whether the subject (the term of which\\nsomething is affirmed or denied being called\\nthe subject of the proposition, and that which\\nis said of it, the predicate be distributed\\nor not. Nevertheless it is plain that in every\\nproposition the subject either is, or is not,\\ndistributed, though it be not declared whether\\nit is or not; consequently, every proposition,\\nwhether expressed indefinitely or not, must\\nbe either universal or particular; those", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0087.jp2"}, "88": {"fulltext": "42 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nbeing called universal, in which the predicate\\nis said of the whole of the subject (or, in\\nother words, where the subject is distributed)\\nand those particular, in which it is said only\\nof a part of the subject: e.g. All men are\\nsinful, is universal some men are sinful,\\nparticular and this division of propositions is,\\nin logical language, said to be according to\\ntheir u quantity.\\nQuantity and But the distribution or non-distribution of the\\nquality of\\nproportions. p re( n ca e s entirely independent of the quantity\\nof the proposition nor are the signs all and\\nsome ever affixed to the predicate; because\\nits distribution depends upon, and is indicated\\nby, the quality of the proposition i. e. its\\nbeing affirmative or negative; it being a uni-\\nversal rule, that the predicate of a negative\\nproposition is distributed, and of an affirmative,\\nundistributed.* The reason of this may easily\\nbe understood, by considering that a term which\\nstands for a whole class may be applied to (i. e.\\nThe learner may perhaps be startled at being told\\nthat the predicate of an affirmative is never distributed\\nespecially as Aldrich has admitted that accidentally this\\nmay take place; as in such a proposition as all equilateral\\ntriangles are equiangular but this is not accurate he\\nmight have said that in such a proposition as the above\\nthe predicate is distributable, but not that it is actually dis-\\ntributed i. e. it so happens that all equiangular triangles\\nare equilateral but this is not implied in the previous\\nassertion and the point to be considered is, not what\\nmight be said with truth, but what actually has been said.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0088.jp2"}, "89": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a75.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 43\\naffirmed of) anything that is comprehended\\nunder that class, though the term of which it is\\nthus affirmed may be of much narrower extent\\nthan that other, and may, therefore, be far from\\ncoinciding with the whole of it thus it may be\\nsaid with truth, that the Negroes are uncivi-\\nlized, though the term uncivilized be of much\\nwider extent than Negroes, comprehending,\\nbesides them, Hottentots, Sfc; so that it would\\nnot be allowable to assert, that all who are\\nuncivilized are Negroes it is evident, there-\\nfore, that it is a part only of the term uncivi-\\nlized that has been affirmed of Negroes\\nand the same reasoning applies to every af-\\nfirmative proposition for though it may so\\nhappen that the subject and predicate coincide,\\ni. e. are of equal extent, as, e. g. all men are\\nrational animals all equilateral triangles\\nare equiangular (it being equally true, that\\nall rational animals are men, and that all\\nequiangular triangles are equilateral; yet this\\nis not implied by the form of the expression\\nsince it would be no less true, that all men\\nare rational animals, even if there were other\\nrational animals besides man.\\nIt is plain, therefore, that if any part of the\\npredicate is applicable to the subject, it may\\nbe affirmed, and, of course, cannot be denied,\\nof that subject and consequently, when the\\npredicate is denied of the subject, it is implied", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0089.jp2"}, "90": {"fulltext": "44 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nthat no part of that predicate is applicable to\\nthat subject; i. e. that the whole of the predicate\\nis denied of the subject for to say, e. g. that\\nff no beasts of prey ruminate/ implies that\\nbeasts of prey are excluded from the whole\\nclass of ruminant animals, and consequently\\nthat no ruminant animals are beasts of prey.\\nAnd hence results the above-mentioned rule,\\nthat the distribution of the predicate is implied\\nin negative propositions, and its non-distribu-\\ntion in affirmatives.\\nDisuit^tfon It is to be remembered, therefore, that it is\\nof middle\\nterms. nQ su ffi c i en t f or the middle term to occur in a\\nuniversal proposition since if that proposition\\nbe an affirmative, and the middle term be the\\npredicate of it, it will not be distributed e. g.\\nif in the example formerly given, it had been\\nmerely asserted, that all the works of an\\nintelligent author show marks of design, and\\nthat the universe shows marks of design,\\nnothing could have been proved since, though\\nboth these propositions are universal, the\\nmiddle term is made the predicate in each,\\nand both are affirmative and accordingly, the\\nrule of Aristotle is not here complied with,\\nsince the term work of an intelligent author,\\nwhich is to be proved applicable to the\\nuniverse, would not have been affirmed of the\\nmiddle term what shows marks of design\\nunder which universe is contained but the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0090.jp2"}, "91": {"fulltext": "5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 45\\nmiddle term, on the contrary, would have been\\naffirmed of it.\\nIf, however, one of the premises be nega-\\ntive, the middle term may then be made the\\npredicate of that, and will thus, according to\\nthe above remark, be distributed e. g. no\\nruminant animals are predacious the lion is\\npredacious therefore the lion is not rumi-\\nnant this is a valid syllogism and the middle\\nterm (predacious) is distributed by being made\\nthe predicate of a negative proposition. The\\nform, indeed, of the syllogism is not that pre-\\nscribed by the dictum of Aristotle, but it may\\neasily be reduced to that form, by stating the\\nfirst proposition thus no predacious animals\\nare ruminant which is manifestly implied (as\\nwas above remarked) in the assertion that no\\nruminant animals are predacious. The syllo-\\ngism will thus appear in the form to which the\\ndictum applies.\\nIt is not every argument, indeed, that can be\\nreduced to this form by so short and simple an\\nalteration as in the case before us a longer and\\nmore complex process will often be required\\nand rules will hereafter be laid down to faci-\\nlitate this process in certain cases but there is\\nno sound argument but what can be reduced\\ninto this form, without at all departing from\\nthe real meaning and drift of it; and the form\\nwill be found (though more prolix than is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0091.jp2"}, "92": {"fulltext": "46 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nneeded for ordinary use) the most perspicuous\\nin which an argument can be exhibited.\\nAll reasoning whatever, then, rests on the\\none simple principle laid down by Aristotle,\\nthat what is predicated, either affirmatively\\nor negatively, of a term distributed, may be\\npredicated in like manner (i. e. affirmatively or\\nnegatively) of any thing contained under that\\nterm. So that when our object is to prove any\\nproposition, L e. to show that one term may\\nrightly be affirmed or denied of another, the\\nprocess which really takes place in our minds\\nis, that we refer that term (of which the other\\nis to be thus predicated) to some class (i. e.\\nmiddle term) of which that other may be\\naffirmed, or denied, as the case may be. What-\\never the subject matter of an argument may\\nbe, the reasoning itself, considered by itself, is\\nin every case the same process and if the\\nwriters against Logic had kept this in mind,\\nthey would have been cautious of expressing\\ntheir contempt of what they call syllogistic\\nreasoning, which is in truth all reasoning;\\nand instead of ridiculing Aristotle s principle\\nfor its obviousness and simplicity, would have\\nperceived that these are, in fact, its highest\\npraise the easiest, shortest, and most evident\\ntheory, provided it answer the purpose of ex-\\nplanation, being ever the best.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0092.jp2"}, "93": {"fulltext": "G.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 47\\n\u00c2\u00a76.\\nIf we conceive an inquirer to have reached,\\nin his investigation of the theory of reasoning,\\nthe point to which we have now arrived, a\\nquestion which would be likely next to engage\\nhis attention, is that of Predication i. e. since\\nin reasoning we are to find a middle term, which\\nmay be predicated affirmatively of the subject in\\nquestion, we are led to inquire what terms may\\nbe affirmed, and what denied, of what others.\\nIt is evident that proper names, or any other common an i\\nterms, which denote each but a single indivi- terms\\ndual, as Caesar, the Thames, the Con-\\nqueror of Pompey, this river (hence called\\nin Logic singular terms cannot be affirmed\\nof anything besides themselves, and are there-\\nfore to be denied of any thing else we may say,\\nthis river is the Thames, or Caesar was the\\nconqueror of Pompey but we cannot say of\\nanything else that it is the Thames, fyc.\\nOn the other hand, those terms which are\\ncalled common, as denoting any one indivi-\\ndual of a whole class, as river, u conqueror,\\nmay of course be affirmed of any, or all that\\nbelong to that class as, the Thames is a\\nriver the Rhine and the Danube are rivers.\\nCommon terms, therefore, are called pre-\\ndicates (viz. affirmatively predicable), from\\ntheir capability of being affirmed of others a\\nsingular term, on the contrary, may be the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0093.jp2"}, "94": {"fulltext": "48 .ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nSubject of a proposition,, but never the Predi-\\ncate, unless it be of a negative proposition (as,\\ne. g. the first-born of Isaac was not Jacob or,\\nunless the subject and predicate be only two\\nexpressions for the same individual object as\\nin some of the above instances.\\nAbstraction The process by which the mind arrives at the\\nand generali*\\nzaiion. notions expressed by these common (or in\\npopular language, general terms, is properly\\ncalled Generalization though it is usually (and\\ntruly) said to be the business of abstraction for\\nGeneralization is one of the purposes to which\\nAbstraction is applied when we draw off, and\\ncontemplate separately, any part of an object\\npresented to the mind, disregarding the rest of\\nit, we are said to abstract that part. Thus, a\\nperson might, when a rose was before his eyes\\nor mind, make the scent a distinct object of\\nattention, laying aside all thought of the colour,\\nform, Spc. and thus, even though it were the\\nonly rose he had ever met with, he would be\\nemploying the faculty of Abstraction but if, in\\ncontemplating several objects, and finding that\\nthey agree in certain points, we abstract the\\ncircumstances of agreement, disregarding the\\ndifferences, and give to all and each of these\\nobjects a name applicable to them in respect\\nof this agreement, i. e. a common name, as\\nrose, we are then said to generalize. Ab-\\nstraction, therefore, does not necessarily imply", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0094.jp2"}, "95": {"fulltext": "6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 49\\nGeneralization, though Generalization implies\\nAbstraction.\\nMuch needless difficulty has been raised\\nrespecting the results of this process many\\nhaving contended, and perhaps more having\\ntaken for granted, that there must be some\\nreally existing thing* corresponding to each of\\nthose general or common terms, and of which\\nsuch term is the name, standing for and repre-\\nsenting it e. g. that as there is a really exist-\\ning Being corresponding to the proper name,\\nyEtna, and signified by it, so the common\\nterm mountain, must have some one really\\nexisting thing corresponding to it, and of course\\ndistinct from each individual mountain (since\\nthe term is not singular but common), yet\\nexisting in each, since the term is applicable to\\neach of them. When many different men,\\nit is said, are at the same time thinking or\\nspeaking about a mountain, i. e. not any par-\\nticular one, but a mountain generally, their\\nminds must be all employed on something;\\nwhich must also be one thing, and not several,\\nand yet cannot be any one individual and\\nhence a vast train of mystical disquisitions\\nabout Ideas, fyc. has arisen, which are at best\\nnugatory, and tend to obscure our view of the\\nprocess which actually takes place in the mind.\\nSee the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v.\\nE", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0095.jp2"}, "96": {"fulltext": "Notions ex-\\npressed by\\ncommon\\nterms.\\n50 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nThe fact is, the notion expressed by a com-\\nmon term is merely an inadequate (or incom-\\nplete) notion of an individual and from the\\nvery circumstance of its inadequacy, it will\\napply equally well to any one of several in-\\ndividuals e. g. if I omit the mention and the\\nconsideration of every circumstance which dis-\\ntinguishes JEtna from any other mountain, I\\nthen form a notion (expressed by the common\\nterm mountain) which inadequately designates\\niEtna e. which does not imply any of its\\npeculiarities), and is equally applicable to any\\none of several other individuals.\\nGeneralization, it is plain, may be indefinite-\\nly extended by a further abstraction applied to\\ncommon terms e. g. as by abstraction from\\nthe term Socrates we obtain the common term\\nPhilosopher so, from philosopher, by a\\nsimilar process, we arrive at the more general\\nterm man from man we advance to\\nanimal, tyc.\\nThe employment of this faculty at pleasure\\nhas been regarded, and perhaps with good\\nreason, as the characteristic distinction of the\\nhuman mind from that of the Brutes. We are\\nthus enabled not only to separate, and consider\\nsingly one part of an object presented to the\\nmind, but also to fix arbitrarily upon whatever\\npart we please, according as may suit the pur-\\npose we happen to have in view e. g. any", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0096.jp2"}, "97": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a76.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 51\\nindividual person to whom we may direct our\\nattention, may be considered either in a politi-\\ncal point of view, and accordingly referred to\\nthe class of Merchant, Farmer, Lawyer, fyc. as\\nthe case may be or physiologically, as Negro,\\nor White-man or theologically, as Pagan or\\nChristian, Papist or Protestant; or geographi-\\ncally, as European, American, fyc. fyc. And\\nso, in respect of anything else that may be\\nthe subject of our reasoning: we arbitrarily fix\\nupon and abstract that point which is essential\\nto the purpose in hand; so that the same object Different \u00c2\u00bbb-\\nstractions\\nmay be referred to various different classes, Jjj^\\naccording to the occasion. Not, of course,\\nthat we are allowed to refer anything to a\\nclass to which it does not really belong; which\\nwould be pretending to abstract from it some-\\nthing that was no part of it but that we arbi-\\ntrarily fix on any part of it which we choose\\nto abstract from the rest.\\nIt is important to notice this, because men\\nare often disposed to consider each object as\\nreally and properly belonging to some one class\\nalone,* from their having been accustomed, in\\nthe course of their own pursuits, to consider,\\nin one point of view only, things which may\\nwith equal propriety be considered in other\\npoints of view also L e. referred to various\\nSee the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v.\\ne2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0097.jp2"}, "98": {"fulltext": "modes of clas-\\nsification\\n52 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I.\\nClasses, (or predicates.) And this is that which\\nchiefly constitutes what is called narrowness-of-\\nmind e.g. a mere hotanist might be astonished\\nat hearing such plants as Clover and Lucerne\\nincluded, in the language of a farmer, under\\nthe term grasses, which he has been accus-\\ntomed to limit to a tribe of plants widely,\\ndifferent in all botanical characteristics and\\nthe mere farmer might be no less surprised to\\nDifferent find the troublesome weed, (as he has been\\naccustomed to call it,) known by the name of\\nCouch-grass, and which he has been used to\\nclass with nettles and thistles, to which it has\\nno botanical affinity, ranked by the botanist as\\na species of Wheat, {Triticum Repens.) And\\nyet neither of these classifications is in itself\\nerroneous or irrational though it would be\\nabsurd, in a botanical treatise, to class plants\\naccording to their agricultural use or, in an\\nagricultural treatise, according to the structure\\nof their flowers.\\nThe utility of these considerations, with a\\nview to the present subject, will be readily\\nestimated, by recurring to the account which\\nhas been already given of the process of rea-\\nsoning the analysis of which shows, that it\\nconsists in referring the term we are speaking\\nof to some class, viz. a middle term; which term\\nagain is referred to or excluded from (as the\\ncase may be) another class, viz. the term which", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0098.jp2"}, "99": {"fulltext": "6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 53\\nwe wish to affirm or deny of the subject of the\\nconclusion. So that the quality of our reason-\\ning in any case must depend on our being\\nable correctly, clearly and promptly, to ab-\\nstract from the subject in question that which\\nmay furnish a Middle-term suitable to the\\noccasion.\\nThe imperfect and irregular sketch which\\nhas here been attempted, of the logical system,\\nmay suffice (even though some parts of it should\\nnot be at once fully understood by those who\\nare entirely strangers to the study) to point out\\nthe general drift and purpose of the science,\\nand to render the details of it both more inte-\\nresting and more intelligible. The analytical\\nform, which has here been adopted, is, gene-\\nrally speaking, better suited for introducing\\nany science in the plainest and most interesting\\nform though the synthetical, which will hence-\\nforth be employed, is the more regular, and\\nthe more compendious form for storing it up\\nin the memory.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0099.jp2"}, "100": {"fulltext": "54 [Book II.\\nBOOK II.\\nSYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.\\nChap. I. Of the Operations of the Mind and\\nof Terms.\\noperations of There are three operations of the mind\\nthe mind. L\\nwhich are immediately concerned in argument\\n1st. Simple Apprehension; 2d. Judgment;\\n3d. Discourse or Reasoning.*\\ns.mpie-ap. 1st. Simple-apprehension is the notion (or\\nprehension, x\\nconception) of any object m the mmd, analo-\\ngous to the perception of the senses. It is\\neither Incomplex or Complex Incomplex\\nApprehension is of one object, or of several\\nwithout any relation being perceived between\\nLogical writers have in general begun by laying down\\nthat there are, in all, three operations of the mind (in\\nuniversum tres) an assertion by no means incontrovertible,\\nand which, if admitted, is nothing to the present purpose\\nour business is with argumentation, and the operations of\\nthe mind implied in that what others there may be, or\\nwhether any, are irrelevant questions.\\nThe opening of a treatise with a statement respecting\\nthe operations of the mind universally, tends to foster the\\nprevailing error (from which probably the minds of the\\nwriters were not exempt) of supposing that Logic pro-\\nfesses to teach the use of the mental faculties in general\\nthe right use of reason, according to Watts.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0100.jp2"}, "101": {"fulltext": "Chap. I. \u00c2\u00a72.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 55\\nthem, as of e( a man/ a horse/ cards com-\\nplex is of several with such a relation, as of\\na man on horseback/ a pack of cards.\\n2d. Judgment is the comparing together in judgment.\\nthe mind two of the notions (or ideas) which\\nare the objects of Apprehension, whether com-\\nplex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they\\nagree or disagree with each other (or that\\none of them belongs or does not belong, to the\\nother.) Judgment, therefore, is either affirma-\\ntive or negative.\\n3d. Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of Discos\\nproceeding from one judgment, to another\\nfounded upon that one, (or the result of it.)\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\nLanguage affords the signs by which these Language.\\noperations of the mind are expressed and com-\\nmunicated. An act of apprehension expressed\\nin language, is called a term; an act of judg-\\nment, a proposition an act of reasoning, an\\nargument; (which, when regularly expressed\\nis a syllogism as e. g.\\nEvery dispensation of Providence is beneficial\\nAfflictions are dispensations of Providence,\\nTherefore they are beneficial\\nis a Syllogism (the act of reasoning being\\nindicated by the word therefore it consists\\nof three propositions, each of which has", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0101.jp2"}, "102": {"fulltext": "56 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. II.\\n(necessarily) two terms, as beneficial, dis-\\npensations of Providence, fyc*\\nT er m3 Language is employed for various purposes\\nPropositions. _ 1\\nsyllogisms, e.g. the province ot an historian is to convey\\ninformation; of an orator, to persuade, Spc.\\nLogic is concerned with it only when employed\\nfor the purpose of reasoning, (i. e. in order to\\nconvince and whereas, in reasoning, terms are\\nliable to be indistinct, (i. e. without any clear,\\ndeterminate meaning,) propositions to he false,\\nand arguments inconclusive, Logic undertakes\\ndirectly and completely to guard against this\\nlast defect, and, incidentally and in a certain\\ndegree against the others, as far as can be done\\nby the proper use of language it is, therefore,\\n(when regarded as an artj- the Art of\\nIn introducing the mention of language previously to\\nthe definition of Logic, I have departed from established\\npractice, in order that it may be clearly understood, that\\nLogic is entirely conversant about language a truth which\\nmost writers on the subject, if indeed they were fully\\naware of it themselves, have certainly not taken due care\\nto impress on their readers. Aldrich s definition of Logic,\\nfor instance, does not give any hint of this.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2f It is to be observed, however, that as a science is con-\\nversant about knowledge only, an art is the application of\\nknowledge to practice hence Logic (as well as any other\\nsystem of knowledge) becomes, when applied to practice,\\nan art while confined to the theory of reasoning, it is\\nstrictly a science and it is as such that it occupies the\\nhigher place in point of dignity, since it professes to de-\\nvelop some of the most interesting and curious intellectual\\nphenomena. It is surely strange, therefore, to find in a", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0102.jp2"}, "103": {"fulltext": "Chap. I. \u00c2\u00a72.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 57\\nemploying language properly for the purpose\\nof Reasoning. Its importance no one can\\nrightly estimate who has not long and atten-\\ntively considered how much our thoughts are\\ninfluenced by expressions, and how much error,\\nperplexity, and labour, are occasioned by a\\nfaulty use of language.\\nA syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable\\ninto three propositions, and each proposition\\ncontaining two terms of these terms, that\\nwhich is spoken of is called the subject that\\nwhich is said of it, the predicate; and these two\\nare called the terms (or extremes) because,\\nlogically, the Subject is placed first, and the\\nPredicate last: and, in the middle, the Copula,\\nwhich indicates the act of judgment, as by it\\nthe Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Sub-\\nject. The Copula must be either is or is not,\\nthe substantive verb being the only verb recog-\\nnised by Logic all others are resolvable, by\\nmeans of the verb, to be, and a participle or\\nadjective e.g. the Romans conquered the\\nword conquered is both copula and predicate,\\nbeing equivalent to were (Cop.) victorious 9\\n(Pred.)*\\ntreatise on Logic, a distinct dissertation to prove that it is\\nan Art, and not a Science\\nIt is proper to observe, that the copula, as such, lias\\nno relation to time; but expresses merely the agreement\\nor disagreement of two given terms hence, if any other\\ntense of the substantive verb, besides the present, is used,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0103.jp2"}, "104": {"fulltext": "58 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nIt is evident, that a Term may consist either\\nof one Word or of several and that it is not\\ncategore- every word that is categorematic, i. e. capable\\nof being employed by itself as a Term. Ad-\\nverbs, Prepositions, Sfc. and also Nouns in any\\nsyncategore- other case besides the nominative, are syncate-\\nmatic. u\\ngorematic, i. e. can only form part of a term.\\nA nominative Noun may be by itself a term.\\nA Verb (all except the substantive verb used\\nMixed. as the copula) is a mixed word, being resolvable\\ninto the Copula and Predicate, to which it is\\nequivalent; and, indeed, is often so resolved in\\nthe mere rendering out of one language into\\nanother as ipse adest he is present. It\\nis to be observed, however, that under verb,\\nwe do not include the Infinitive, which is pro-\\nperly a Noun-substantive, nor the Participle,\\nwhich is a Noun-adjective. They are verbals\\nbeing related to their respective verbs in re-\\nspect of the things they signify but not verbs,\\ninasmuch as they differ entirely in their mode\\nit is either to be understood as the same in sense, (the dif-\\nference of tense being regarded as a matter of grammatical\\nconvenience only or else, if the circumstance of time\\nreally do modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as\\nto make the use of that tense an essential, then, this\\ncircumstance is to be regarded as a part of one of the\\nterms at that time or some such expression, being\\nunderstood. Sometimes the substantive verb is both\\ncopula and predicate i. e. where existence only is predi-\\ncated e. g. Deus est.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0104.jp2"}, "105": {"fulltext": "Chap. I. \u00c2\u00a73.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 59\\nof signification. It is worth observing, that an\\nInfinitive (though it often comes last in the\\nsentence) is never the predicate, except when\\nanother Infinitive is the Subject: e.g.\\nsubj. pred.\\nf\\nI hope to succeed i. e. to succeed is what I hope.\\nIt is to be observed, also, that in English\\nthere are two infinitives; one in i?ig the\\nsame in sound and spelling as the participle\\npresent, from which, however, it should be\\ncarefully distinguished; e.g. rising early is\\nhealthful, and it is healthful to rise early,\\nare equivalent. In this, and in many other\\ncases, the English word IT serves as a represen-\\ntative of the subject when that is put last e.g.\\npred. subj.\\nIt is to be hoped that we shall succeed.\\nAn adjective (including participles) cannot,\\nby itself, be made the subject of a proposition\\nbut is often employed as a predicate as\\nCrassus was rich though some choose to\\nGrammarians have produced much needless perplexity\\nby speaking of the participle in ing, being employed so\\nand so when it is manifest that that very employment\\nof the word constitutes it, to all intents and purposes, an\\ninfinitive and not a participle. The advantage of the\\ninfinitive in ing, is, that it may be used either in the\\nnominative or in any oblique case not, as some suppose\\nthat it necessarily implies a habit e. g. Seeing is\\nbelieving there is glory in dying for one s country\\na habit of observing, fyc.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0105.jp2"}, "106": {"fulltext": "60 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nconsider some substantive as understood in\\nevery such case, {e.g. rich man) and conse-\\nquently do not reckon adjectives among Simple\\nterms (i. e. words which are capable, singly,\\nof being employed as terms.) This, however,\\nis a question of no practical consequence but\\nI have thought it best to adhere to Aristotle s\\nmode of statement. See his Categ.)\\nsimple- Of Simple-terms, then, (which are what the\\nterms.\\nfirst part of Logic treats of) there are many\\ndivisions of which, however, one will be suffi-\\ncient for the present purpose viz. into singular\\nand common; because, though any term what-\\never may be a subject, none but a common term\\ncan be affirmatively predicated of several others.\\nsi\u00e2\u0080\u009egniar A singular term stands for one individual, as\\nand common\\nterms. Caesar, the Thames (these, it is plain,\\ncannot be said [or predicated] affirmatively, of\\nany thing but themselves.) A common term\\nstands for several individuals, (which are called\\nits significates) i. e. can be applied to any of\\nthem, as comprehending them in its single\\nsignification; as man, river, great.\\nThe learner who has gone through the\\nAnalytical Outline, will now be enabled to pro-\\nceed to the Second and Third Chapters either\\nwith or without the study of the remainder of\\nwhat is usually placed in the First Chapter,\\nand which is subjoined as a Supplement. See\\nChap. v.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0106.jp2"}, "107": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. \u00c2\u00a71.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 61\\nChap. II. Of Propositions.\\ni-\\nThe second part of Logic treats of the pro-\\nposition which is, Judgment expressed in\\nwords\\nA Proposition is defined logically* a sentence Definition of\\nproposition.\\nindicative, i. e. affirming or denying (this ex-\\ncludes commands and questions.) Sentence\\nbeing the genus, and Indicative the difference,\\nthis definition expresses the whole essence\\nand it relates entirely to the words of a propo-\\nsition. With regard to the matter, its property\\nis, to be true or false. Hence it must not be\\nambiguous (for that which has more than one\\nmeaning is in reality several propositions), nor\\nimperfect, nor ungrammatical, for such an ex-\\npression has no meaning at all.\\nSince the substance, (i. e. genus,*f or material\\npart) of a Proposition is, that it is a sentence\\nand since every sentence (whether it be a pro- Divisions of\\nx propositions.\\nposition or not) may be expressed either abso-\\nlutely, or under an hypothesis, on this we\\nSee Chap. v. 6. f Ibid 3\\nAs, Caesar deserved death; did Caesar deserve\\ndeath\\nAs, if Caesar was a tyrant, what did he deserve\\nWas Caesar a hero or a villain If Caesar was a\\ntyrant, he deserved death He was either a hero or\\na vijlain.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0107.jp2"}, "108": {"fulltext": "62 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book II.\\nfound the division* of propositions according\\nsubstance, to their substance viz. into categorical and\\nhypothetical. And as genus is said to be pre-\\ndicated in quid (what), it is by the members of\\nthis division that we answer the question, what\\nis this proposition (qua? est propositio.) An-\\nswer, Categorical or Hypothetical.\\nCategorical propositions are subdivided into\\npure, which asserts simply or purely, that the\\nsubject does or does not agree with the predi-\\ncate, and modal, which expresses in what mode\\n(or manner) it agrees e. g. an intemperate\\nman will be sickly Brutus killed Caesar 5*\\nare pure. An intemperate man will probably\\nbe sickly Brutus killed Caesar justly are\\nmodal. At present we speak only oipure cate-\\ngorical propositions.\\nIt being the differentia^ of a proposition that\\nit affirms or denies, and its property to be true\\nor false; and Differentia being predicated in\\nquale quid, Property in quale, we hence form\\nanother division of propositions, viz. according\\nQuality. to their quality, into Affirmative and Negative,\\n(which is the quality of the expression, and\\ntherefore, in Logic, essential) and into True\\nand False (which is the quality of the matter,\\nand therefore accidental.} An Affirmative pro-\\nposition is one whose copula is affirmative, as\\nbirds fly not to advance is to go back\\na Negative proposition is one whose copula is\\nSee Chap. v. 5. f Ibid 3", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0108.jp2"}, "109": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. \u00c2\u00a72.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. G3\\nnegative, as man is not perfect no miser\\nis happy/\\nAnother division* of propositions is accord- Quantity.\\ning to their quantity (or extent :)if the predi-\\ncate is said of the whole of the subject, the\\nproposition is Universal: if of a part of it\\nonly, the proposition is Particular (or partial\\ne. g. England is an island all tyrants\\nare miserable no miser is rich are Uni-\\nversal propositions, and their subjects are\\ntherefore said to be distributed, being under-\\nstood to stand, each, for the whole of its Signi-\\nficates but, some islands are fertile all\\ntyrants are not assassinated; are Particular,\\nand their subjects, consequently, not distri-\\nbuted, being taken to stand for a part only of\\ntheir Significates.\\nAs every proposition must be either Affirma-\\ntive or Negative, and must also be either uni-\\nversal or particular, we reckon, in all, four\\nkinds of pure categorical propositions, (i. e.\\nconsidered as to their quantity and quality\\nboth;) viz. Universal Affirmative, whose symbol\\n(used for brevity) is A Universal Negative, E;\\nParticular Affirmative, Particular Nega-\\ntive, 0.\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\nWhen the subject of a proposition is a Com-\\nmon-term, the universal signs all, no, every\\nSee Chap. v. 5.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0109.jp2"}, "110": {"fulltext": "64 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nare used to indicate that it is distributed, (and\\nthe proposition consequently is universal the\\nparticular signs some, fyc the contrary;\\nshould there be no sign at all to the common\\nterm, the quantity of the proposition (which is\\ncalled an Indefinite proposition) is ascertained\\nby the matter i.e. the nature of the connexion\\nbetween the extremes which is either Neces-\\nsary, Impossible, or Contingent. In necessary\\nindefinites, and in impossible matter, an Indefinite is un-\\nderstood as a universal e. g. birds have\\nwings i. e. all: birds are not quadrupeds;\\ni. e. none in contingent matter, (i. e. where\\nthe terms partly (i. e. sometimes) agree, and\\npartly not) an Indefinite is understood as a\\nparticular e. g. food is necessary to life\\ni. e. some food birds sing i. e. some do\\nbirds are not carnivorous i. e. some are not,\\nor, all are not.*\\nsingular pro- As for singular propositions, (viz. those whose\\npositions. s\\nsubject is either a proper name, or a common\\nterm with a singular sign) they are reckoned as\\nUniversals, (see Book IV. Ch. iv. 2.) because\\nin them we speak of the whole of the subject\\ne. g. when we say, Brutus was a Roman, we\\nIt is very perplexing to the learner, and needlessly so,\\nto reckon indefinites as one class of propositions in respect\\nof quantity. They must be either universal or particular,\\nthough it is not declared which. Such a mode of classifi-\\ncation resembles that of some grammarians, who, among\\nthe Genders, enumerate the doubtful gender", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0110.jp2"}, "111": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. 2.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 65\\nmean, the zvhole of Brutus this is the general\\nrule but some singular propositions may\\nfairly be reckoned particular i. e. when some\\nqualifying word is inserted, which indicates\\nthat you are not speaking of the whole of the\\nsubject e. g. Caesar was not wholly a\\ntyrant this man is occasionally intem-\\nperate non omnis moriar.\\nIt is evident, that the subject is distributed\\nin every universal proposition, and never in a\\nparticular; (that being the very difference be-\\ntween universal and particular propositions\\nbut the distribution or non-distribution of the\\npredicate, depends (not on the quantity, but)\\non the quality, of the proposition for, if any\\npart of the predicate agrees with the subject,\\nit must be affirmed and not denied of the sub-\\nject therefore, for an affirmative proposition\\nto be true, it is sufficient that some part of the\\npredicate agree with the subject and (for the\\nsame reason) for a negative to be true, it is\\nnecessary that the whole of the predicate\\nshould disagree with the subject e. g. it is\\nIt is not meant that these may not be, and that, the\\nmost naturally, accounted Universals but it is only by\\nviewing them in the other light, that we can regularly\\nstate the Contradictory to a Singular proposition. Strictly\\nspeaking, when we regard such propositions as admitting\\nof a variation in Quantity, they are not properly considered\\nas Singular the subject being, e. g. not Ccesar, but the\\nparts of his character.\\nF", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0111.jp2"}, "112": {"fulltext": "GG ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\ntrue that learning is useful, though the\\nwhole of the term useful does not agree\\nwith the term learning, (for many things\\nare useful besides learning,) but no vice is\\nuseful, would be false, if any part of the term\\nuseful agreed with the term vice; (i.e.\\nif you could find any one useful thing which\\nwas a vice.) The two practical rules then to\\nbe observed respecting distribution, are,\\n1st. All universal propositions (and no par-\\nticular) distribute the subject.\\n2d. All negative (and no affirmative) the\\npredicate.*\\nHence, it is matter of common remark, that it is\\ndifficult to prove a Negative. At first sight this appears\\nvery obvious, from the circumstance that a Negative has\\none more Term distributed than the corresponding Affir-\\nmative. But then, again, a difficulty may be felt in\\naccounting for this, inasmuch as any Negative may be\\nexpressed (as we shall see presently) as an Affirmative,\\nand vice versa. The proposition, e.g. that such a one is\\nnot in the Town, might be expressed by the use of an\\nequivalent term, he is absent from the Town.\\nThe fact is, however, that in every case where the ob-\\nservation as to the difficulty of proving a Negative holds\\ngood, it will be found that the proposition in question\\nis contrasted with one which has really a terra the less,\\ndistributed, or a term of less extensive sense. E. G. It\\nis easier to prove that a man has proposed wise measures,\\nthan that he has never proposed an unwise measure. In\\nfact, the one would be, to prove that Some of his mea-\\nsures are wise; the other, that All his measures are\\nwise. And numberless such examples are to be found.\\nBut it will very often happen that there shall be Nega-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0112.jp2"}, "113": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 67\\nIt may happen indeed, that the whole of the\\npredicate in an affirmative may agree with the\\nsubject e. g. it is equally true, that all men\\nare rational animals and all rational ani-\\nmals are men but this is merely accidental,\\nand is not at all implied in the form of ex-\\npression, which alone is regarded in Logic*\\nOf Opposition,\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nTwo propositions are said to be opposed to\\neach other, when, having the same subject\\nand predicate, they differ, in quantity, or\\nquality, or both.f It is evident, that with any\\ngiven subject and predicate, you may state\\nfour distinct propositions, viz. A, E, I, and\\nO any two of which are said to be opposed;\\nhence there are four different kinds of opposi-\\ntion, viz. 1st. the two universals (A and E)\\ntive propositions much more easily established than\\ncertain Affirmative ones on the same subject. E. G. That\\nThe cause of animal-heat is not respiration, has been\\nestablished by experiments but what the cause is,\\nremains doubtful. See Note to Chap. III. 5.\\nWhen, however, a Singular Term is the Predicate, it\\nmust, of course, be co-extensive with the subject; as\\nRomulus was the founder of Rome.\\nf For Opposition of Terms, see Chap. V.\\np 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0113.jp2"}, "114": {"fulltext": "68 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\ncontraries, are called contraries to each other 2d. the\\nfies. contra two particular, (I and O) subcontraries 3d. A\\nsubalterns, and I, or E and O, subalterns 4th. A and O,\\ncontradicto- or E and I, contradictories.\\nnes.\\nAs it is evident, that the truth or falsity of\\nany proposition (its quantity and quality being\\nknown) must depend on the matter of it, we\\nmust bear in mind, that, in necessary matter\\nall affirmatives are true, and negatives false\\nin impossible matter, vice versa; in contingent\\nmatter, all universale false, and particulars\\ntrue (e. g. all islands (or some islands)\\nare surrounded by water, must be true, be-\\ncause the matter is necessary to say, no\\nislands, or some not, fyc would have been\\nfalse again, some islands are fertile; some\\nare not fertile, are both true, because it is\\nContingent Matter: put all or no, in-\\nstead of some, 9 and the propositions will be\\nfalse.) Hence it will be evident, that Con-\\ntraries will be both false in Contingent matter,\\nbut never both true Subcontraries, both true\\nin Contingent matter, but never both false\\nContradictories, always one true and the other\\nfalse, Sfc. with other observations, which will\\nbe immediately made on viewing the scheme\\nin which the four propositions are denoted by\\ntheir symbols, the different kinds of matter by\\nthe initials, n, i, c, and the truth or falsity\\nof each proposition in each matter, by the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0114.jp2"}, "115": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.\\n69\\nletter v. for (verum) true, f. for (falsum)\\nfalse.\\nn. v.\\ni. f.\\nc. f.\\nn. v.\\ni. f.\\nC. V.\\nBy a careful study of this scheme, bearing\\nin mind, and applying the above rule con-\\ncerning matter, the learner will easily elicit all\\nthe maxims relating to opposition as that,\\nin the Subalterns, the truth of the particular\\n(which is called the subaltemate) follows from\\nthe truth of the universal (subaltemans), and\\nthe falsity of the universal from the falsity of\\nthe particular that Subalterns differ in quan-\\ntity alone; Contraries, and also Subcontraries,\\nin quality alone Contradictories, in both\\nand hence, that if any proposition is known\\nto be true, we infer that its Contradictory is\\nfalse if false, its Contradictory true, fyc.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0115.jp2"}, "116": {"fulltext": "70 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nOf Conversion.\\n\u00c2\u00a74.\\nA proposition is said to be converted when\\nits tefrms are transposed i. e. when the sub-\\nject is made the, predicate, and the predicate\\nthe subject when nothing more is done, this\\nis called simple conversion. No conversion is\\nemployed for any logical purpose, unless it be\\nillative;* i. e. when the truth of the Converse is\\nimplied by the truth of the Exposita, (or pro-\\nposition given e. g.\\nNo virtuous man is a rebel, therefore\\nNo rebel is a virtuous man.\\nSome boasters are cowards, therefore\\nSome cowards are boasters.\\nmauve con- Conversion can then only be illative when\\nno term is distributed in the Converse, which\\nwas not distributed in the Exposita (for if that\\nbe done, you will employ a term universally in\\nthe Converse, which was only used partially\\nin the Exposita.) Hence, as E distributes\\nboth terms, and I, neither, these propositions\\nmay be illatively converted in the simple\\nThe reader must not suppose from the use of the word\\nillative, that this conversion is a process of reasoning\\nit is in fact only stating the same Judgment in another\\nform.\\nversion.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0116.jp2"}, "117": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 71\\nmanner (vide 2. But as A does not dis-\\ntribute the predicate, its simple conversion\\nwould not be illative (e. g. from all birds\\nare animals, you cannot infer that all ani-\\nmals are birds/ as there would be a term\\ndistributed in the converse, which was not,\\nbefore. We must therefore limit its quantity\\nfrom universal to particular, and the Conver-\\nsion will be illative e. g. some animals\\nare birds; this might be fairly named con-\\nversion by limitation; but is commonly called\\nConversion per accidens E may thus be con- c on\\nverted also. But in O, whether the quantity\\nbe changed or not, there will still be a term\\n(the predicate of the converse) distributed,\\nwhich was not before you can therefore only\\nconvert it illatively, by changing the quality\\ni. e. considering the negative as attached to\\nthe predicate instead of to the copida, and thus\\nregarding it as I. One of the terms will then\\nnot be the same as before but the proposition\\nwill be equipollent (i. e. convey the same\\nmeaning) e. g. some members of the uni-\\nversity are not learned you may consider\\nnot-learned as the predicate, instead of\\nlearned the proposition will then be I, and\\nof course may be simply converted, some\\nwho are not learned are members of the uni-\\nversity. This may be named conversion by\\nnegation or as it is commonly called, by\\nversion\\nper acokicns", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0117.jp2"}, "118": {"fulltext": "72 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\ncontra-posu contra-position.* A may also be fairly con-\\nverted in this way, e. g.\\nEvery poet is a man of genius therefore\\nHe who is not a man of genius is not a poet\\n(or, None but a man of genius can be a poet\\nor, a man of genius alone can be a poet.\\nFor (since it is the same thing to affirm some\\nattribute of the subject, or to deny the absence\\nof that attribute) the original proposition is\\nprecisely equipollent to this,\\nsubj. pred.\\nNo poet is not-a-man-of-genius\\nwhich, being E, may of course be simply\\nconverted. Thus, in one of these three ways,\\nevery proposition may be illatively converted\\nviz. E, I, simply A, O, by negation; A, E,\\nby limitation.\\nNote, that as it was remarked that, in some\\naffirmatives, the whole of the predicate does\\nactually agree with the subject, so, when this\\nis the case, and is granted to be so, A may\\nbe illatively converted, simply but this is an\\naccidental circumstance. In a just Definition,\\nthis is always the case for there the terms\\nbeing exactly equivalent (or, as they are called,\\nNo mention is made by Aldrich of this kind of con-\\nversion but it has been thought advisable to insert it, as\\nbeing in frequent use, and also as being employed in this\\ntreatise for the direct reduction of Baroko and Bokardo.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0118.jp2"}, "119": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 73\\nconvertible terms) it is no matter which is\\nmade the subject, and which the predicate,\\ne. g. a good government is that which has\\nthe happiness of the governed for its object\\nif this be a right definition, it will follow that\\nu a government which has the happiness of\\nthe governed for its object is a good one.\\nMost propositions in mathematics are of this\\ndescription e. g.\\nAll equilateral triangles are equiangular and\\n11 All equiangular triangles are equilateral.\\nChap. III. Of Arguments.\\ni.\\nThe third operation of the mind, viz. rea-\\nsoning, (or discourse) expressed in words, is\\nargument; and an argument stated at full\\nlength, and in its regular form, is called a\\nsyllogism the third part of Logic therefore\\ntreats of the syllogism. Every Argument* s y iio g ist\\nI mean, in the strict technical sense for in popular\\nuse the word Argument is often employed to denote the\\nlatter of these two parts alone: e.g. This is an Argument\\nto prove so and so; this conclusion is established by\\nthe Argument: i.e. Premises. See Appendix, No. I.\\nart. Argument.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0119.jp2"}, "120": {"fulltext": "74 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nconsists of two parts; that which is proved;\\nand that by means of which it is proved the\\nformer is called, before it is proved, the ques-\\ntion; when proved, the conclusion (or infer-\\nence that which is used to prove it, if stated\\nlast (as is often done in common discourse,) is\\ncalled the reason, and is introduced by be-\\ncause or some other causal conjunction\\n(e. g. Caesar deserved death, because he was a\\ntyrant, and all tyrants deserve death. If the\\nconclusion be stated last (which is the strict\\nlogical form, to which all Reasoning may be\\nreduced) then that which is employed to\\nprove it is called the premises,* and the Con-\\nclusion is then introduced by some illative\\nconjunction, as therefore, e. g.\\nAll tyrants deserve death\\nCaesar was a tyrant\\ntherefore he deserved death. -j-\\nBoth the premises together are sometimes called the\\nantecedent.\\nf It may be observed that the definition here given of\\nan argument is in the common treatises of logic laid down\\nas the definition of a syllogism a word which I have\\nconfined to a more restricted sense. There cannot evi-\\ndently be any argument, whether regularly or irregularly\\nexpressed, to which the definition given by Aldrich, for\\ninstance, would not apply so that he appears to employ\\nsyllogism as synonymous with argument. But be-\\nsides that it is clearer and more convenient, when we\\nhave these two words at hand, to employ them in the two\\nsenses respectively which we want to express, the truth", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0120.jp2"}, "121": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 75\\nSince, then, an argument is an expression Definition of\\nin which from something laid down and\\ngranted as true (i. e. the Premises) something\\nelse (i. e. the Conclusion) beyond this must be\\nadmitted to be true, as follozving necessarily (or\\nresulting) from the other and since Logic is\\nwholly concerned in the use of language, it\\nfollows that a Syllogism (which is an argument\\nstated in a regular logical form) must be\\nu an argument so expressed, that the con- Definition of\\nSyllogism.\\nclusiveness of it is manifest from the mere\\nforce of the expression i. e. without consider-\\ning the meaning of the terms e. g. in this\\nsyllogism, Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X\\nthe conclusion is inevitable, whatever terms\\nX, Y, and Z, respectively are understood to\\nstand for. And to this form all legitimate\\narguments may ultimately be brought.\\nis, that in so doing I have actually conformed to Aldrich s\\npractice for he generally, if not always, employs the\\nterm syllogism in the very sense to which I have confined\\nit viz. to denote an argument stated in regular logical\\nform as, e. g. in a part of his work (omitted in the late\\neditions) in which he is objecting to a certain pretended\\nsyllogism in the work of another writer, he says, valet\\ncerte argumentum sijllogismus tamen est falsissimus, c.\\nNow (waiving the exception that might be taken at this\\nuse of falsissimus nothing being, strictly, true or false,\\nbut a proposition) it is plain that he limits the word\\nsyllogism to the sense in which it is here defined, and\\nis consequently inconsistent with his own definition of it.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0121.jp2"}, "122": {"fulltext": "(Y-)\\n76 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\nAristotle s The rule or axiom (commonly called die-\\ndictum. v\\nturn de omni et nullo by which Aristotle\\nexplains the validity of this argument, is this\\nwhatever is predicated of a term distributed,\\nwhether affirmatively or negatively, may be pre-\\ndicated in like manner of every thing contained\\nunder it. Thus, in the examples above, X is\\npredicated of Y distributed, and Z is contained\\nunder Y (i. e. is its subject therefore X is\\npredicated of Z so all tyrants, Sfc. (p. 74.)\\nThis rule may be ultimately applied to all\\narguments (and their validity ultimately rests\\non their conformity thereto) but it cannot be\\ndirectly and immediately applied to all even of\\npure categorical syllogisms for the sake of\\nbrevity, therefore, some other axioms are\\ncommonly applied in practice, to avoid the\\noccasional tediousness of reducing all syllo-\\ngisms to that form in which Aristotle s dictum\\nis applicable.*\\nInstead of following Aldrich s arrangement, in laying\\ndown first the canons which apply to all the figures of\\ncategorical syllogisms, and then going back to the dic-\\ntum of Aristotle which applies to only one of them, I\\nhave pursued what appears a simpler and more philo-\\nsophical arrangement, and more likely to impress on the\\nlearner s mind a just view of the science viz. 1st. to\\ngive the rule (Aristotle s dictum) which applies to the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0122.jp2"}, "123": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 77\\nWe will speak first of pure categorical\\nsyllogisms and the axioms or canons by\\nwhich their validity is to be explained viz.\\nfirst, if two terms agree with one and the same\\nthird, they agree with each other: secondly,\\nif one term agrees and another disagrees with\\none and the same third, these two disagree with\\neach other. On the former of these canons\\nrests the validity of affirmative conclusions\\non the latter, of negative: for no categorical\\nsyllogism can be faulty which does not violate\\nthese canons; none correct which does: hence\\non these two canons are built the rules or\\ncautions which are to be observed with respect\\nto syllogisms, for the purpose of ascertaining\\nwhether those canons have been strictly ob-\\nserved or not.\\n1st. Every syllogism has three, and only\\nthree terms: viz. the middle term, and the\\ntwo terms (or extremes, as they are commonly\\ncalled) of the Conclusion or Question. Of\\nmost clearly and regularly-constructed argument, the\\nSyllogism in the first figure, to which all reasoning may\\nbe reduced; then the canons applicable to all categoricals\\nthen, those belonging to the hypothetical and lastly, to\\ntreat of the Sorites which is improperly placed by\\nAldrich before the hypothetical. By this plan the pro-\\nvince of strict Logic is extended as far it can be every\\nkind of argument which is of a syllogistic character, and\\naccordingly directly cognizable by the rules of logic,\\nbeing enumerated in natural order.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0123.jp2"}, "124": {"fulltext": "78 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nthese, 1st, the subject of the conclusion is\\ncalled the minor term; 2d, its predicate, the\\nmajor term and 3d, the middle term,, is that\\nwith which each of them is separately com-\\npared, in order to judge of their agreement\\nor disagreement with each other. If there-\\nfore there were two middle terms, the ex-\\ntremes, (or terms of the conclusion) not being\\nboth compared to the same, could not be\\nconclusively compared to each other.\\n2d. Every syllogism has three, and only\\nthree propositions viz. 1st, the major premiss\\n(in which the major term is compared with the\\nmiddle:) 2d, the minor premiss (in which the\\nminor term is compared with the middle and\\n3d, the Conclusion, in which the Minor term\\nis compared with the Major.\\n3d. Note, that if the middle term is ambi-\\nguous, there are in reality two middle terms, in\\nsense, though but one in sound. An am-\\nbiguous middle term is either an equivocal\\nterm used in different senses in the two pre-\\nmises (e. g.\\nLight is contrary to darkness\\nFeathers are light therefore\\nFeathers are contrary to darkness\\nor a term not distributed: for as it is then\\nused to stand for a part only of its signijicates\\nit may happen that one of the extremes may", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0124.jp2"}, "125": {"fulltext": "Chap.III.\u00c2\u00a72.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.\\nhave been compared with one part of it, and\\nthe other with another part of it e. g.\\nWhite is a colour,\\nBlack is a colour therefore\\nBlack is white. Again,\\nSome animals are beasts,\\nSome animals are birds therefore\\nSome birds are beasts.\\nThe middle term therefore must be distri-\\nbuted once, at least, in the premises (i. e. by\\nbeing the subject of an universal, or predicate\\nof a negative, Chap. ii. 2. p. 63,) and once is\\nsufficient since if one extreme has been\\ncompared to a part of the middle term, and\\nanother to the whole of it, they must have\\nbeen both compared to the same.\\n4th. No term must be distributed in the con-\\nclusion which was not distributed in one of the\\npremises; for that (which is called an illicit\\nprocess, either of the Major or the Minor\\nterm) would be to employ the whole of a\\nterm in the Conclusion, when you had em-\\nployed only a part of it in the Premiss and\\nthus, in reality, to introduce a fourth term\\ne.g.\\nAll quadrupeds are animals,\\nA bird is not a quadruped therefore\\nIt is not an animal. Illicit process of the major.\\n5th. From negative premises you can infer\\nnothing. For in them the Middle is pro-\\nnounced to disagree with both extremes; not,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0125.jp2"}, "126": {"fulltext": "80 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nto agree with both or, to agree with one, and\\ndisagree with the other; therefore they can-\\nnot be compared together e. g.\\nA fish is not a quadruped;\\nA bird is not a quadruped, proves nothing.\\n6th. If one premiss be negative, the conclu-\\nsion must be negative for in that premiss the\\nmiddle term is pronounced to disagree with\\none of the extremes, and in the other premiss\\n(which of course is affirmative by the pre-\\nceding rule) to agree with the other extreme\\ntherefore the extremes disagreeing with each\\nother, the conclusion is negative. In the\\nsame manner it may be shown, that to prove\\na negative conclusion one of the Premises must\\nbe a negative.\\nBy these six rules all Syllogisms are to be\\ntried; and from them it will be evident; 1st,\\nthat nothing can be proved from two particular\\nPremises; (for you will then have either the\\nmiddle Term undistributed, or an illicit pro-\\ncess e. g.\\nAldrich has given twelve rules, which I found might\\nmore conveniently be reduced to six. No syllogism can\\nbe faulty which violates none of these six rules. It is\\nmuch less perplexing to a learner not to lay down as a\\ndistinct rule, that, e. g. against particular premises which\\nis properly a result of the foregoing since a syllogism\\nwith two particular premises would offend against either\\nR. 3. or R. 4.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0126.jp2"}, "127": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 81\\nSome animals are sagacious\\nSome beasts are not sagacious\\nSome beasts are not animals.\\nAnd, for the same reason, 2dly, that if one\\nof the Premises be particular, the Conclusion\\nmust be particular e. g.\\nAll who fight bravely deserve reward\\nSome soldiers fight bravely you can only infer that\\nSome soldiers deserve reward\\nfor to infer a universal Conclusion would be\\nan illicit process of the minor. But from two\\nuniversal Premises you cannot always infer a\\nuniversal Conclusion e. g.\\nAll gold is precious,\\nAll gold is a mineral therefore\\nSome mineral is precious.\\nAnd even when we can infer a universal,\\nwe are always at liberty to infer a particular\\nsince what is predicated of all may of course be\\npredicated of some.\\nOf Moods.\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nWhen we designate the three propositions\\nof a syllogism in their order, according to\\nAldrich, by a strange oversight, has so expressed\\nhimself as to imply (though he could hardly mean it) that\\nwe always may, if we will, infer a universal conclusion\\nfrom two universal premises.\\nG", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0127.jp2"}, "128": {"fulltext": "82 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\ntheir respective quantity and quality (i. e. their\\nsymbols) we are said to determine the mood\\nof the syllogism e. g. the example just above,\\nall gold, fyc is in the mood A, A, I. As\\nthere are four kinds of propositions, and three\\npropositions in each syllogism, all the possible\\nways of combining these four, (A, E, I, O,) by\\nthrees, are sixty-four. For any one of these\\nfour may be the major premiss, each of these\\nfour majors may have four different minors,\\nand of these sixteen pairs of premises, each\\nmay have four different conclusions. 4x4\\n(=16) x 4 64. This is a mere arithmetical\\ncalculation of the moods, without any regard\\nto the logical rules for many of these moods\\nare inadmissible in practice, from violating\\nsome of those rules e. g. the mood E, E, E,\\nmust be rejected as having negative premises\\nI, O, O, for particular premises; and many\\nothers for the same faults to which must be\\nadded I, E, O, for an illicit process of the\\nmajor, in every figure. By examination then\\nof all, it will be found that, of the sixty-four,\\nthere remain but eleven moods which can be\\nused in a legitimate syllogism, viz. A, A, A,\\nA, A, I, A, E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O, O,\\nE, A, E, E, A, O, E, I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0128.jp2"}, "129": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 83\\nOf Figure,\\n\u00c2\u00a74.\\nThe Figure of a syllogism consists in the\\nsituation of the Middle term with respect to\\nthe Extremes of the Conclusion, (i. e. the major\\nand minor term,) When the Middle term is\\nmade the subject of the major premiss, and the\\npredicate of the minor, that is called the first\\nFigure (which is far the most natural and\\nclear of all, as to this alone Aristotle s Dictum\\nmay be at once applied.) In the second Figure\\nthe Middle term is the predicate of both pre-\\nmises in the third, the subject of both in the\\nfourth the predicate of the Major premiss, and\\nthe subject of the Minor, (This is the most\\nawkward and unnatural of all, being the very\\nreverse of the first.) Note, that the proper\\norder is to place the Major premiss ^r^, and\\nthe Minor second but this does not constitute\\nthe Major and Minor premises for that pre-\\nmiss (wherever placed) is the Major, which\\ncontains the major term, and the Minor, the\\nminor (v. R. 2. p. 78.) Each of the allowable\\nmoods mentioned above will not be allowable\\nin every Figure since it may violate some of\\nthe foregoing rules, in one Figure, though not\\nin another e. g. I, A, I, is an allowable mood\\nin the third Figure but in the first it would\\no2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0129.jp2"}, "130": {"fulltext": "84 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nhave an undistributed middle.* So A, E, E,\\nwould in the first Figure have an illicit process\\nof the major, but is allowable in the second\\nand A, A, A, which in the first Figure is allow-\\nable, would in the third have an illicit process\\nof the minor all which may be ascertained by\\ntrying the different Moods in each figure, as\\nper scheme.\\nLet X represent the major term, Z the\\nminor, Y the middle.\\nst Fig.\\n2d Fig.\\n3d Fig.\\n4th Fig.\\nY,X,\\nX,Y,\\nY, X,\\nX, Y,\\nZ, Y,\\nZ, Y,\\nY, Z,\\nY, Z,\\nZ,X,\\nz, X,\\nZ, X,\\nZ, X.\\nThe Terms alone being here stated, the\\nquantity and quality of each Proposition (and\\nconsequently the Mood of the whole Syllo-\\ngism) is left to be filled up (L e. between\\nY and X, we may place either a negative or\\naffirmative Copula and we may prefix either\\na universal or particular sign to Y.) By apply-\\ning the Moods then to each Figure, it will be\\nfound that each Figure will admit six Moods\\nI A\\ne. g. Some restraint is salutary all restraint is un-\\ni i\\npleasant something unpleasant is salutary. Again Some\\nI A\\nherbs are fit for food nightshade is an herb some\\nI\\nnightshade is fit for food.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0130.jp2"}, "131": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. \u00c2\u00a74.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 85\\nonly, as not violating the rules against undis-\\ntributed middle, and against illicit process and\\nof the Moods so admitted, several (though\\nvalid) are useless, as having a particular Con-\\nclusion, when a universal might have been\\ndrawn e. g. A, A, I, in the first Figure,\\nAll human creatures are entitled to liberty;\\nAll slaves are human creatures therefore\\nSome slaves are entitled to liberty.\\nOf the twenty-four Moods, then, (six in\\neach Figure) five are for this reason neg-\\nlected ,for the remaining nineteen, logicians\\nhave devised names to distinguish both the\\nMood itself, and the Figure in which it is\\nfound since when one Mood (i. e. one in\\nitself, without regard to Figure) occurs in\\ntwo different Figures, (as E, A, E, in the\\nfirst and second) the mere letters denoting\\nthe mood would not inform us concerning\\nthe figure. In these names, then, the three\\nvowels denote the propositions of which the\\nSyllogism is composed the consonants (be-\\nsides their other uses, of which hereafter)\\nserve to keep in mind the Figure of the\\nSyllogism.\\nFig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, fErlOque prio-\\nn s.\\nFig. 2. cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstlnO, bArOkO,*\\nsecundse.\\nOr, Fakoro, see 7.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0131.jp2"}, "132": {"fulltext": "86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nC tertia, dArAptl, dlsAmls, dAtlsI, f ElAptOn,\\nFig. 3. bOkArdO,* f ErlsO, habet quarta insuper\\naddit.\\nFig. 4. brAmAntlp, cAmEnEs, dlmArls, f EsAp\\nfrEsIsOn.\\nBy a careful study of these mnemonic lines\\n(which must be committed to memory) you\\nwill perceive that A can only be proved in\\nthe first Figure, in which also every other\\nProposition may be proved; that the second\\nproves only negatives; the third only parti-\\nculars; that the first Figure requires the\\nmajor premiss to be universal, and the minor,\\naffirmative, fyc; with many other such ob-\\nservations, which will readily be made, (on\\ntrial of several Syllogisms, in different Moods)\\nand the reasons for which will be found in\\nthe foregoing rules e. g. to show why the\\nsecond figure has only negative Conclusions,\\nwe have only to consider, that in it the mid-\\ndle term being the predicate in both premises,\\nwould not be distributed unless one premiss\\nwere negative; (Chap. ii. 2.) therefore the\\nConclusion must be negative also, by Chap,\\nin. 2, Rule 6. One Mood in each figure\\nmay suffice in this place by way of example\\nFirst, Barbara, viz. (bAr.) Every Y is X\\n(bA) every Z is Y; therefore (rA) every Z\\nis X e. g. let the major term (which is\\nOr, Dokamo, see 7.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0132.jp2"}, "133": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 87\\nrepresented by X) be one who possesses all\\nvirtue the minor term (Z) every man who\\npossesses one virtue and the middle term\\n(Y) every one who possesses prudence\\nand you will have the celebrated argument of\\nAristotle, Eth. sixth book, to prove that the\\nvirtues are inseparable viz.\\nHe who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue\\nHe who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence\\ntherefore\\nHe who possesses one, possesses all.\\nSecond, Camestres, (cAm) every X is Y\\n(Es) no Z is Y (trES) no Z is X. Let the\\nmajor term (X) be true philosophers, the\\nminor (Z) the Epicureans the middle (Y)\\nreckoning virtue a good in itself; and this\\nwill be part of the reasoning of Cicero, Off.\\nbook first and third, against the Epicureans.\\nThird, Darapti, viz. {dA) every Y is X\\n(rAp) every Y is Z therefore (tl) Some Z is\\nX g.\\nPrudence has for its object the benefit of individuals\\nbut prudence is a virtue therefore some virtue has for\\nits object the benefit of the individual,\\nis part of Adam Smith s reasoning {Moral\\nSentiments) against Hutcheson and others,\\nwho placed all virtue in benevolence.\\nFourth, Camenes, viz. (cAm) every X is Y;\\n(En) no Y is Z therefore (Es) no Z is X\\ne. g.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0133.jp2"}, "134": {"fulltext": "88 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nWhatever is expedient, is conformable to nature\\nWhatever is conformable to nature, is not hurtful to\\nsociety therefore\\nWhat is hurtful to society is never expedient.\\nis part of Cicero s argument in Off. Lib. hi.\\nbut it is an inverted and clumsy way of\\nstating what would much more naturally fall\\ninto the first Figure for if you examine the\\nPropositions of a Syllogism in the fourth\\nFigure, beginning at the Conclusion, you will\\nsee that as the major term is predicated of the\\nminor, so is the minor of the middle, and that\\nagain of the major so that the major appears\\nto be merely predicated of itself. Hence the\\nfive Moods in this Figure are seldom or never\\nused some one of the fourteen (moods with\\nnames) in the first three Figures, being the\\nforms into which all arguments may most\\nreadily be thrown but of these, the four in\\nthe first Figure are the clearest and most\\nnatural as to them Aristotle s dictum will\\nimmediately apply.* And as it is on this dictum\\nWith respect to the use of the first three Figures\\n(for the fourth is never employed but by an accidental\\nawkwardness of expression) it may be remarked, that the\\nFirst is that into which an argument will be found to fall\\nthe most naturally, except in the following cases First,\\nWhen we have to disprove something that has been main-\\ntained, or is likely to be believed, our arguments will\\nusually be found to take most conveniently the form of\\nthe Second Figure viz. we prove that the thing we are", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0134.jp2"}, "135": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 89\\nthat all Reasoning ultimately depends, so all\\narguments may be in one way or other\\nbrought into some one of these four Moods\\nand a Syllogism is, in that case, said to be\\nreduced: (i. e. to the first figure.) These four\\nare called the perfect moods, and all the rest\\nimperfect.\\nspeaking of cannot belong to such a Class, either because\\nit wants what belongs to the whole of that Class, (Cesare)\\nor because it has something of which that Class is desti-\\ntute; (Camestres) e.g. No impostor would have warned\\nhis followers, as Jesus did, of the persecutions they would\\nhave to submit to and again, An enthusiast would\\nhave expatiated, which Jesus and his followers did not,\\non the particulars of a future state.\\nThe same observations will apply, mutatis mutandis,\\nwhen a Particular conclusion is sought, as in Festino and\\nBaroko.\\nThe arguments used in the process called the Ab-\\nscissio Infiniti, will in general be the most easily referred\\nto this Figure. See Chap. v. 1. subsection 6.\\nThe Third Figure is, of course, the one employed when\\nthe Middle term is Singular, since a Singular term can\\nonly be a Subject. This is also the form into which most\\narguments will naturally fall that are used to establish\\nan objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an opponent s Pre-\\nmiss, when his argument is such as to require that premiss\\nto be Universal. It might be called, therefore, the\\nEnstatic Figure. E. G. If any one contends that this\\nor that doctrine ought not to be admitted, because it\\ncannot be explained or comprehended, his suppressed\\nmajor premiss may be refuted by the argument that the\\nconnexion of the Body and Soul cannot be explained or\\ncomprehended, Sec.\\nA great part of the reasoning of Butler s Analogy may\\nbe exhibited in this form.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0135.jp2"}, "136": {"fulltext": "90 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nOstensive Reduction.\\nIn reducing a Syllogism, we are not, of\\ncourse, allowed to introduce any new Term\\nor Proposition, having nothing granted but\\nthe truth of the Premises but these Pre-\\nmises are allowed to be illatively converted\\n(because the truth of any Proposition implies\\nthat of its illative converse) or transposed: by\\ntaking advantage of this liberty, where there\\nis need, we deduce (in Figure 1st,) from the\\nPremises originally given, either the very same\\nConclusion as the original one, or another\\nfrom which the original Conclusion follows by\\nillative conversion e. g. Darapti,\\nAll wits are dreaded\\nAll wits are admired\\nSome who are admired are dreaded,\\ninto Darii, by converting by limitation (per\\naccidens) the minor Premiss.\\nAll wits are dreaded;\\nSome who are admired are wits therefore\\nSome who are admired are dreaded.\\nCamestres,\\nAll true philosophers account virtue a good in itself;\\nThe advocates of pleasure do not account, \u00c2\u00a7c.\\nTherefore they are not true philosophers,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0136.jp2"}, "137": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.\\nreduced to Celarent, by simply converting the\\nminor, and then transposing the Premises.\\n11 Those who account virtue a good in itself, are not\\nadvocates of pleasure\\nAll true philosophers account virtue, \u00c2\u00a7c. therefore\\nNo true philosophers are advocates of pleasure.\\nThis Conclusion may be illative ly converted\\ninto the original one.\\nBaroko e. g. Reduction by\\nmeans of\\nconversion\\nEvery true patriot is a friend to religion by negation.\\nSome great statesmen are not friends to religion\\nSome great statesmen are not true patriots,\\nto Ferio, by converting the major by negation,\\n(contraposition), vide Chap. ii. 4.\\nHe who is not a friend to religion, is not a true patriot\\nSome great statesmen, #c.\\nand the rest of the Syllogism remains the\\nsame only that the minor Premiss must be\\nconsidered as affirmative, because you take\\nnot-a-friend-to-religion, as the middle term.\\nIn the same manner Bokardo f to Darii e. g.\\nSome slaves are not discontented\\nAll slaves are wronged therefore\\nSome who are wronged are not discontented.\\nConvert the major by negation (contrapo-\\nsition) and then transpose them the Con-\\nclusion will be the converse by negation of the\\nOr Fakoro, considered i. c. as Festino.\\nt Or Dokamo, considered r. as Disarms.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0137.jp2"}, "138": {"fulltext": "92 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\noriginal one, which therefore may be inferred\\nfrom it e. g.\\n11 All slaves are wronged\\nSome who are not discontented are slaves\\nSome who are not discontented are wronged.\\nIn these ways (by what is called Ostensive\\nReduction, because you prove, in the first\\nfigure, either the very same Conclusion as be-\\nfore, or one which implies it) all the imperfect\\nMoods may be reduced to the four perfect\\nones. But there is also another way, called\\nReductio ad impossibile.\\n\u00c2\u00a76.\\nBy which we prove (in the first figure) not\\ndirectly that the original Conclusion is true,\\nbut that it cannot be false i. e, that an ab-\\nsurdity would follow from the supposition of\\nits being false e. g,\\nAll true patriots are friends to religion\\nSome great statesmen are not friends to religion\\nSome great statesmen are not true patriots.\\nIf this Conclusion be not true, its contra-\\ndictory must be true viz.\\nAll great statesmen are true patriots.\\nLet this then be assumed, in the place of the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0138.jp2"}, "139": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. \u00c2\u00a77.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 93\\nminor Premiss of the original Syllogism, and\\na false conclusion will be proved e. g. bAr.\\nAll true patriots are friends to religion;\\nbA All great statesmen are true patriots\\nrA, All great statesmen are friends to religion\\nfor as this Conclusion is the Contradictory of\\nthe original minor Premiss, it must be false,\\nsince the Premises are always supposed to be\\ngranted therefore one of the Premises (by\\nwhich it has been correctly proved) must be\\nfalse also but the major Premiss (being one\\nof those originally granted) is true therefore\\nthe falsity must be in the minor Premiss\\nwhich is the contradictory of the original con-\\nclusion therefore the original Conclusion\\nmust be true. This is the indirect mode of\\nReasoning. (See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. 1.)\\nThis kind of Reduction is seldom employed\\nbut for Baroko and Bokardo, which are thus\\nreduced by those who confine themselves to\\nsimple Conversion, and Conversion by limita-\\ntion, (per accidens and they framed the\\nnames of their Moods, with a view to point\\nout the manner in which each is to be re-\\nduced viz. B, C, D, F, which are the initial\\nletters of all the Moods, indicate to which\\nMood of the first figure (Barbara, Celarent,\\nDarii, and Ferio) each of the others is to be\\nreduced m indicates that the Premises are to", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0139.jp2"}, "140": {"fulltext": "94 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nbe transposed s and p, that the Proposition\\ndenoted by the vowel immediately preceding,\\nis to be converted; s, simply, p, per accidens,\\n(by limitation thus, in Camestres, (see ex-\\nample, p. 87,) the C indicates that it must be\\nreduced to Celarent the two ss, that the\\nminor Premiss and Conclusion must be con-\\nverted simply the m, that the Premises must\\nbe transposed. The P, in the mood Bramantip,\\ndenotes that the premises warrant a univer-\\nsal conclusion in place of a particular. The\\nI, though of course it cannot be illatively\\nconverted per accidens, viz: so as to become\\nA, yet is thus converted in the Conclusion,\\nbecause as soon as the premises are trans-\\nposed (as denoted by the m,) it appears that a\\nuniversal conclusion follows from them.\\nK (which indicates the reduction ad im-\\npossibile) is a sign that the Proposition,\\ndenoted by the vowel immediately before it\\nmust be left out, and the contradictory of the\\nConclusion substituted viz. for the minor\\nPremiss in Baroko and the major in Bokardo.\\nBut it has been already shown, that the\\nConversion by contraposition (by negation)\\nwill enable us to reduce these two Moods,\\nostensively.*\\nIf any one should choose that the names of these\\nmoods should indicate this, he might make K the index\\nof conversion by negation; and then the names would be,\\nby a slight change, FaJcoro and Dokamo.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0140.jp2"}, "141": {"fulltext": "C hap. IV. 5 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 95\\nChap. IV.\\nSUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. III.\\nOf Modal Syllogisms, and of all Arguments\\nbesides regular and Pure-Categorical Syl-\\nlogisms,\\nOfModals.\\n\u00c2\u00a71.\\nHitherto we have treated of pure categorical\\nPropositions, and the Syllogisms composed of\\nsuch. A pure categorical proposition is styled\\nby some logicians a proposition de inesse\\nfrom its asserting simply that the Predicate is\\nor is not (in our conception) contained in the\\nSubject as John killed Thomas. A modal\\nproposition asserts that the Predicate is or is\\nnot contained in the Subject in a certain\\nmode or manner as, accidentally, wil-\\nfully, $c.\\nA Modal proposition may be stated as a\\npure one, by attaching the Mode to one of\\nthe Terms: and the Proposition will in all\\nrespects fall under the foregoing rules e. g.\\nJohn killed Thomas wilfully and maliciously\\nhere the Mode is to be regarded as part of the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0141.jp2"}, "142": {"fulltext": "96 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nPredicate. It is probable that all knowledge\\nis useful probably useful is here the Pre-\\ndicate. But when the Mode is only used to\\nexpress the necessary, contingent, or impos-\\nsible connexion of the Terms, it may as well\\nbe attached to the Subject e. g. man is\\nnecessarily mortal is the same as all men\\nare mortal: injustice is in no case expe-\\ndient, corresponds to no injustice is ex-\\npedient and this man is occasionally\\nintemperate, has the force of a particular:\\n(vide Chap. ii. 2. note.) It is thus, and thus\\nonly, that two singular Propositions may be\\ncontradictories e, g. this man is never in-\\ntemperate, will be the contradictory of the\\nforegoing. Indeed every sign (of universality\\nor particularity) may be considered as a\\nMode.\\nSince, however, in all Modal Propositions,\\nyou assert that the dictum (L e. the assertion\\nitself) and the Mode, agree together, or dis-\\nagree, so, in some cases, this may be the most\\nconvenient way of stating a Modal, purely\\nsubj.cop. pred. subject.\\nr-i i i n\\ne. g. It is impossible that all all men should\\nsubject.\\nbe virtuous. Such is a proposition of the\\nsubj. cop. pred.\\nApostle Paul s This is a faithful saying, fyc.\\nsubject\\nthat Jesus Christ came into the world to save", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0142.jp2"}, "143": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 97\\n81) bj.\\nsinners. In these cases one of your Terms\\n(the subject) is itself an entire Proposition.\\nIn English, the word In is often used in\\nexpressing one proposition combined with\\nanother, in such a manner as to make the\\ntwo, one proposition e. g. You will have a\\nformidable opponent to encounter in the Em-\\nperor this involves two propositions; 1st,\\nYou will have to encounter the Emperor\\n2d, u He will prove a formidable opponent\\nthis last is implied by the word in, which de-\\nnotes (agreeably to the expression of Logicians\\nmentioned above, when they speak of a pro-\\nposition de messe that that Predicate is\\ncontained in that Subject.\\nIt may be proper to remark in this place,\\nthat we may often meet with a Proposition\\nwhose drift and force will be very different,\\naccording as we regard this or that as its Pre-\\ndicate. Indeed, properly speaking, it may be\\nconsidered as several different Propositions,\\neach indeed implying the truth of all the rest,\\nbut each having a distinct Predicate the\\ndivision of the sentence being varied in each\\ncase and the variations marked, either by\\nthe collocation of the words, the intonation\\nof the voice, or by the designation of the em-\\nphatic words, viz. the Predicate, as scored\\nunder, or printed in italics. E. G. The\\nii", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0143.jp2"}, "144": {"fulltext": "98 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\n1 2 3\\nOrganon of Bacon was not designed to\\n4 5 6\\nsupersede the Organon of Aristotle: this\\nmight be regarded as, at least, six different\\npropositions if the word numbered (1) were\\nin italics, it would leave us at liberty to\\nsuppose that Bacon might have designed to\\nsupersede by some work of his, the Organon\\nof Aristotle but not by his own Organon\\nif No. 2 were in italics, we should understand\\nthe author to be contending, that whether or\\nno .any other author had composed an Or-\\nganon with such a design, Bacon at least did\\nnot if No. 3, then we should understand\\nhim to maintain that whether Bacon s Or-\\nganon does or does not supersede Aristotle s,\\nno such design at least was entertained and\\nso with the rest. Each of these is a distinct\\nProposition; and though each of them im-\\nplies the truth of all the rest, (as may easily be\\nseen by examining the example given) one of\\nthem may be, in one case, and another, in an-\\nother, the one which it is important to insist on.\\nWe should consider in each case what\\nQuestion it is that is proposed, and what an-\\nswer to it would, in the instance before us,\\nbe the most opposite or contrasted to the one\\nto be examined. E. G. You will find this\\ndoctrine in Bacon, may be contrasted, either\\nwith, You will find in Bacon a different", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0144.jp2"}, "145": {"fulltext": "Chap IV. l.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 99\\ndoctrine/ or with, You will find this doctrine\\nin a different author.\\nAnd observe, that when a proposition is\\ncontrasted with one which has a different pre-\\ndicate, the Predicate is the emphatic word\\nas this man is a murderer; i.e. not one\\nwho has slain another accidentally, or in self-\\ndefence this man is sl murderer, with the\\nCopula for the emphatic word, stands opposed\\nto he is not a murderer a proposition with\\nthe same terms, but a different Copula.*\\nIt will often happen that several of the Pro-\\npositions which are thus stated in a single sen-\\ntence, may require, each, to be distinctly stated\\nand proved e. g. the Advocate may have to\\nprove, first the fact, that John killed Tho-\\nmas and then, the character of the act, that\\nthe killing was wilful and malicious. See\\nPraxis, at the end of the vol. See also Ele-\\nments of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. iii. 5.\\nThus if any one reads (as many are apt to do) Thou\\nshalt not steal, Thou shalt not commit adultery, he\\nimplies the question to be, whether we are commanded to\\nsteal or to forbear but the question really is, what things\\nare forbidden; and the answer is, Thou shalt not steal;\\nThou shalt not commit adultery, c.\\nThe connexion between Logic and correct Delivery is\\nfurther pointed out in Rhet. App. I.\\nStrictly speaking, the two cases I have mentioned coin-\\ncide for when the is or the not is emphatic, it\\nbecomes properly the Predicate viz. the statement of\\nthis man s being a murderer, is true or, is not true.\\nH 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0145.jp2"}, "146": {"fulltext": "100 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nOf Hypotheticals.\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\nA hypothetical Proposition is denned to be,\\ntwo or more categoricals united by a Copula\\n(or conjunction), and the different kinds of\\nhypothetical Propositions are named from\\ntheir respective conjunctions viz. conditional,\\ndisjunctive, causal, Sfc.\\nWhen a hypothetical Conclusion is inferred\\nfrom a hypothetical Premiss, so that the force\\nof the Reasoning does not turn on the hypo-\\nthesis, then the hypothesis (as in Modals)\\nmust be considered as part of one of the\\nTerms; so that the Reasoning will be, in\\neffect, categorical e. g.\\npredicate.\\nEvery conqueror is either a hero or a villain\\nCaesar was a conqueror therefore\\npredicate.\\nHe was either a hero or a villain.\\nWhatever comes from God is entitled to reverence\\nsubject.\\nIf the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come\\nfrom God\\nIf they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reve-\\nrence.\\nBut when the Reasoning itself rests on the\\nhypothesis (in which way a categorical Con-\\nclusion may be drawn from a hypothetical\\nPremiss,) this is what is called a hypothetical", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0146.jp2"}, "147": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 101\\nSyllogism and rules have been devised for\\nascertaining the validity of such Arguments\\nat once, without bringing them into the\\ncategorical form. (And note, that in these\\nSyllogisms the hypothetical Premiss is called\\nthe major, and the categorical one the minor.)\\nThey are of two kinds, conditional and dis-\\njunctive.\\nOf Conditionals.\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nA Conditional Proposition has in it an illa-\\ntive force i. e. it contains two, and only two\\ncategorical Propositions, whereof one results\\nfrom the other (or follows from it,) e. g.\\nantecedent.\\nIf the Scriptures are not wholly false,\\nconsequent.\\nthey are entitled to respect.\\nThat from which the other results is called the\\nantecedent that which results from it, the con-\\nsequent (consequens and the connexion be-\\ntween the two (expressed by the word if\\nthe consequence (consequential) The natural\\norder is, that the antecedent should come\\nbefore the consequent; but this is frequently\\nreversed e. g. the husbandman is well off if\\nhe knows his own advantages Virg. Geor,\\nAnd note, that the truth or falsity of a con-\\nditional Proposition depends entirely on the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0147.jp2"}, "148": {"fulltext": "1 02 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nconsequence e. g. if Logic is useless, it\\ndeserves to be neglected; here both Ante-\\ncedent and Consequent are false: yet the\\nwhole Proposition is true i. e. it is true that\\nthe Consequent follows from the Antecedent.\\nIf Cromwell was an Englishman, he was an\\nusurper, is just the reverse case for though\\nit is true that Cromwell was an English-\\nman, and also that he was an usurper, yet\\nit is not true that the latter of these Pro-\\npositions depends on the former the whole\\nProposition, therefore, is false, though both\\nAntecedent and Consequent are true. A Con-\\nditional Proposition, in short, may be con-\\nsidered as an assertion of the validity of a\\ncertain Argument since to assert that an\\nargument is valid, is to assert that the Con-\\nclusion necessarily results from the Premises,\\nwhether those Premises be true or not.\\nThe meaning, then, of a Conditional Propo-\\nsition is this that the antecedent being granted,\\nthe consequent is granted which may be con-\\nsidered in two points of view first, if the\\nAntecedent be true, the Consequent must be\\ntrue hence the first rule the antecedent being\\ngranted, the consequent may be inferred; se-\\ncondly, if the Antecedent were true, the Con-\\nsequent would be true hence the second rule\\nthe consequent being denied, the antecedent may\\nbe denied for the Antecedent must in that", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0148.jp2"}, "149": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 03\\ncase be false since if it were true, the Con-\\nsequent (which is granted to be false) would\\nbe true also e. g. if this man has a fever,\\nhe is sick here, if you grant the antecedent,\\nthe first rule applies, and you infer the truth\\nof the Consequent he has a fever, there-\\nfore he is sick if A is B, C is D but A is B,\\ntherefore C is D (and this is called a construc-\\ntive Conditional Syllogism but if you deny\\nthe consequent (i. e. grant its contradictory)\\nthe second rule applies, and you infer the\\ncontradictory of the antecedent; he is not\\nsick, therefore he has not a fever this is the constructive\\ndestructive Conditional Syllogism if A is B, tive.\\nC is D C is not D, therefore A is not B.\\nAgain, if the crops are not bad, corn must\\nbe cheap, for a major then, but the crops\\nare not bad, therefore corn must be cheap, is\\nConstructive. Corn is not cheap, therefore\\nthe crops are bad, is Destructive. If every\\nincrease of population is desirable, some mi-\\nsery is desirable but no misery is desirable\\ntherefore some increase of population is not\\ndesirable, is Destructive. But if you affirm\\nthe consequent, or deny the antecedent, you can\\ninfer nothing for the same Consequent may\\nfollow from other Antecedents e. g. in the\\nexample above, a man may be sick from other\\ndisorders besides a fever therefore it does\\nnot follow, from his being sick, that he has a", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0149.jp2"}, "150": {"fulltext": "of Condi\\ntionals\\n104 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book H..\\nfever; or (for the same reason) from his not\\nhaving a fever, that he is not sick. There\\nare, therefore, two, and only two, kinds\\nof Conditional Syllogisms the constructive,\\nfounded on the first rule, and answering to\\ndirect Reasoning and the destructive, on the\\nsecond, answering to indirect being in fact a\\nmode of throwing the indirect form of reason-\\ning into the direct e. g. If C be not the\\ncentre of the circle, some other point must be\\nwhich is impossible therefore C is the centre.\\n(Euclid, B. III. Pr, 1.)\\nconversion And note, that a Conditional Proposition\\nmay (like the categorical A) be converted by\\nnegation i. e. you may take the contradictory\\nof the consequent, as an antecedent, and the\\ncontradictory of the antecedent, as a consequent\\ne.g. if this man is not sick he has not a\\nfever. By this conversion of the major Pre-\\nmiss, a Constructive Syllogism may be reduced\\nto a Destructive, and vice versa. (See 6.\\np. 92.)\\nOf Disjunctives.\\n4.\\nA Disjunctive Proposition may consist of\\nany number of categoricals and of these,\\nsome one, at least, must be true, or the whole\\nProposition will be false if, therefore, one or", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0150.jp2"}, "151": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. t.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 105\\nmore of these categoricals be denied e.\\ngranted to be false) you may infer that the\\nremaining one, or (if several) some one of the\\nremaining ones, is true e. g. either the\\nearth is eternal, or the work of chance, or the\\nwork of an intelligent Being it is not eternal,\\nnor the work of chance therefore it is the\\nwork of an intelligent Being. It is either\\nspring, summer, autumn, or winter but it is\\nneither spring nor summer; therefore it is\\neither autumn or winter. Either A is B, or\\nC is D but A is not B, therefore C is D.\\nNote, that in these examples (as well as in\\nvery many others) it is implied not only that\\none of the members (the categorical Proposi-\\ntions) must be true, but that only one can be\\ntrue so that, in such cases, if one or more\\nmembers be affirmed, the rest may be denied;\\n[the members may then be called exclusive\\ne. g. it is summer, therefore it is neither\\nspring, autumn, nor winter either A is B,\\nor C is D but A is B, therefore C is not D.\\nBut this is by no means universally the case\\ne. g. virtue tends to procure us either the\\nesteem of mankind, or the favour of God\\nhere both members are true, and consequently\\nfrom one being affirmed we are not authorized\\nto deny the other.\\nIt is evident that a disjunctive Syllogism\\nmay easily be reduced to a conditional; e, g.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0151.jp2"}, "152": {"fulltext": "106 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nif it is not spring or summer, it is either\\nautumn or winter, Sfc.\\nThe Dilemma*,\\nis a complex kind of Conditional Syllogism.\\n1st. If you have in the major Premiss se-\\nveral antecedents all with the same consequent,\\nthen these Antecedents, being (in the minor)\\ndisjunctively granted (i. e. it being granted\\nthat some one of them is true), the one common\\nconsequent may be inferred (as in the case of a\\nsimple Constructive Syllogism e. g. if A is B,\\nC is D and if X is Y, C is D but either\\nA is B, or X is Y therefore C is D. If the\\nblest in heaven have no desires, they will be\\nperfectly content so they will, if their desires\\nThe account usually given of the Dilemma in Logical\\ntreatises is singularly perplexed and unscientific. Aldrich,\\nin speaking of it, abstains from all use of Logical terms,\\nand speaks in a loose, vague, and rhetorical manner. And\\nit is remarkable that all the rules he gives respecting it,\\nand the faults against which he cautions us, relate exclu-\\nsively to the Subject-matter as if one were to lay down\\nas rules respecting a Syllogism in Barbara, 1st. Care\\nmust be taken that the major Premiss be true 2dly.\\nthat the minor Premiss be true!\\nMost, if not all, writers on this point either omit to tell\\nus whether the Dilemma is a kind of conditional, or of\\ndisjunctive argument or else refer it to the latter class, on\\naccount of its having one disjunctive Premiss though it\\nclearly belongs to the class of conditionals.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0152.jp2"}, "153": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. \u00c2\u00a75.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 107\\nare fully gratified but either they will have\\nno desires, or have them fully gratified; there- simple eon-\\netrnctive Di-\\nfore they will be perfectly content. Note, in lemma\\nthis case, the two conditionals which make up\\nthe major Premiss may be united in one Pro-\\nposition by means of the word whether: e.g.\\nwhether the blest, Sfc. have no desires, or\\nhave their desires gratified, they will be con-\\ntent.\\n2d. But if the several antecedents have each complex con-\\nstrnctive Di-\\na different consequent, then the Antecedents, lemma\\nbeing, as before, disjunctively granted, you\\ncan only disjunctively infer the consequents\\ne. g. if A is B, C is D and if X is Y, E is F\\nbut either A is B, or X is Y therefore either\\nC is D, or E is F. If ^Eschines joined in\\nthe public rejoicings, he is inconsistent if he\\ndid not, he is unpatriotic but he either\\njoined, or not, therefore he is either incon-\\nsistent, or unpatriotic. (Demost. For the\\nCrown.) This case, as well as the foregoing,\\nis evidently constructive.\\nIn the Destructive form, whether you have\\none Antecedent with several Consequents, or\\nseveral Antecedents either with one, or with\\nseveral Consequents in all these cases, if you\\ndeny the whole of the Consequent, or Conse-\\nquents, you may in the conclusion deny the\\nwhole of the Antecedent or Antecedents e.g.\\nif the world were eternal, the most useful", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0153.jp2"}, "154": {"fulltext": "108 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\narts, such as printing, fyc. would be of un-\\nknown antiquity: and on the same supposi-\\ntion, there would be records long prior to the\\nMosaic and likewise the sea and land, in all\\nparts of the globe, might be expected to\\nmaintain the same relative situations now as\\nformerly but none of these is the fact\\ntherefore the world is not eternal. Again,\\nif the world existed from eternity, there\\nwould be records prior to the Mosaic and\\nif it were produced by chance, it would not\\nbear marks of design there are no records\\nprior to the Mosaic and the world does bear\\nmarks of design therefore it neither existed\\nfrom eternity, nor is the work of chance.\\nThese are commonly called Dilemmas, but\\nhardly differ from simple conditional Syllo-\\ngisms, two or more being expressed together.\\nNor is the case different if you have one\\nantecedent with several consequents, which\\nconsequents you disjunctively deny; for that\\ncomes to the same thing as wholly denying\\nthem since if they be not all true, the one\\nantecedent must equally fall to the ground;\\nand the Syllogism will be equally simple e. g.*\\nif we are at peace with France by virtue of\\nthe treaty of Paris, we must acknowledge the\\nsovereignty of Buonaparte and also we must\\nA.D. 1815.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0154.jp2"}, "155": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. \u00c2\u00a75.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1()9\\nacknowledge that of Louis hut we cannot do\\nboth of these therefore we are not at peace,\\nfyc; which is evidently a simple Destructive.\\nThe true Dilemma is, a conditional Syllogism\\nxvith several* antecedents in the major, and a\\ndisjunctive minor; hence,\\n3d. That is most properly called a destructive Destructive\\ni i i Sim n Dilemma.\\nDilemma, which has (like the constructive ones)\\na disjunctive minor Premiss i. e, when you\\nhave several Antecedents with each a different\\nConsequent; which Consequents (instead of\\nwholly denying them, as in the case lately\\nmentioned) you disjunctively deny and thence,\\nin the Conclusion, deny disjunctively the An-\\ntecedents e. g. if A is B, C is D and if X is\\nY, E is F but either C is not D, or E is not\\nF therefore, either A is not B, or X is not Y.\\nIf this man were wise, he would not speak\\nirreverently of Scripture in jest; and if he\\nwere good he would not do so in earnest\\nbut he does it, either in jest, or earnest; there-\\nfore he is either not wise or not good.\\nEvery Dilemma may be reduced into two or Resolution of\\na Dilemma.\\nmore simple Conditional Syllogisms e. g. If\\niEschines joined, fyc. he is inconsistent he\\ndid join, fyc. therefore he is inconsistent and\\nThe name Dilemma implies precisely two antecedents\\nand hence it is common to speak of the horns of a di-\\nlemma; but it is evident there may be either two or\\nmore.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0155.jp2"}, "156": {"fulltext": "110 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nagain, if iEschines did not join, fyc. he is\\nunpatriotic; he did not, fyc. therefore he is\\nunpatriotic. Now an opponent might deny\\neither of the minor Premises in the above\\nSyllogisms, but he could not deny both; and\\ntherefore he must admit one or the other of\\nthe Conclusions for, when a Dilemma is\\nemployed, it is supposed that some one of the\\nAntecedents must be true (or, in the destruc-\\ntive kind, some one of the Consequents false),\\nbut that we cannot tell which of them is so\\nand this is the reason why the argument is\\nstated in the form of a Dilemma.\\nSometimes it may happen that both ante-\\ncedents may be true, and that we may be\\naware of this and yet there may be an ad-\\nvantage in stating (either separately or con-\\njointly) both arguments, even when each\\nproves the same conclusion, so as not to\\nderive any additional confirmation from the\\nother still, I say, it may sometimes be\\nadvisable to state both, because, of two pro-\\npositions equally true, one man may deny\\nor be ignorant of the one, while he admits\\nthe other, and another man, vice versa.\\nFrom what has been said, it may easily be\\nseen that all Dilemmas are in fact conditional\\nsyllogisms; and that Disjunctive Syllogisms\\nmay also be reduced to the form of Condi-\\ntionals but as it has been remarked, that", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0156.jp2"}, "157": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 6.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 1 1\\nall Reasoning whatever may ultimately be\\nbrought to the one test of Aristotle s Dic-\\ntum/ it remains to show how a Conditional\\nSyllogism may be thrown into such a form,\\nthat that test will at once apply to it and\\nthis is called the\\nReduction of Hi/pot heticals*\\n\u00c2\u00a76.\\nFor this purpose we must consider every\\nConditional Proposition as a universal affir-\\nmative categorical Proposition, of which the\\nAldrich has stated, through a mistake, that Aristotle\\nutterly despised Hypothetical Syllogisms, and thence made\\nno mention of them but he did indicate his intention to\\ntreat of them in some part of his work, which either was\\nnot completed by him according to his design, or else (in\\ncommon with many of his writings) has not come down\\nto us.\\nAldrich observes, that no hypothetical argument is valid\\nwhich cannot be reduced to a categorical form and this\\nis evidently agreeable to what has been said at the begin-\\nning of Chap. iii. but then he has unfortunately omitted\\nto teach us how to reduce Hypothetical to this form\\nexcept in the case where the Antecedent and Consequent\\nchance to have each the same subject in which case, he\\ntells us to take the minor Premiss and Conclusion as an\\nEnthymeme, and fill that up categorically e.g. If Caesar\\nwas a tyrant, he deserved death he was a tyrant there-\\nfore he deserved death; which may easily be reduced to\\na categorical form, by taking as a major Premiss, all\\ntyrants deserve death. But when (as is often the case)\\nthe Antecedent and Consequent have not each the same", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0157.jp2"}, "158": {"fulltext": "112 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nTerms are entire Propositions, viz. the ante-\\ncedent answering to the Subject, and the con-\\nsequent to the Predicate e. g. to say, if\\nLouis is a good king, France is likely to\\nprosper, is equivalent to saying, the case\\nof Louis being a good king, is a case of\\nFrance being likely to prosper: and if it be\\ngranted, as a minor Premiss to the Condi-\\ntional Syllogism, that Louis is a good king,\\nthat is equivalent to saying, the present case\\nis the case of Louis being a good king;\\nfrom which you will draw a conclusion in\\nBarbara, (viz. the present case is a case of\\nFrance being likely to prosper, exactly\\nsubject, (as in the very example he gives, if A is B, C is\\nD, he gives no rule for reducing such a Syllogism as\\nhas a Premiss of this kind and indeed leads us to sup-\\npose that it is to be rejected as invalid, though he has just\\nbefore demonstrated its validity. And this is likely to\\nhave been one among the various causes which occasion\\nmany learners to regard the whole system of Logic as a\\nstring of idle reveries, having nothing true, substantial, or\\npractically useful in it but of the same character with the\\ndreams of Alchymy, Demonology, and judicial Astrology.\\nSuch a mistake is surely the less inexcusable in a learner,\\nwhen his master first demonstrates the validity of a certain\\nargument, and then tells him that after all it is good for\\nnothing (prorsus repudiandum.) In the late editions of\\nAldrich s Logic, all that he says of the reduction of\\nHypothetical is omitted; which certainly would have\\nbeen an improvement, if a more correct one had been\\nsubstituted but as it is, there is a complete hiatus in the\\nsystem.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0158.jp2"}, "159": {"fulltext": "Chap.IV.\u00c2\u00a76.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 113\\nequivalent to the original Conclusion of the\\nConditional Syllogism viz. France is likely to\\nprosper. As the Constructive Condition may\\nthus be reduced to Barbara, so may the De-\\nstructive, in like manner, to Celarent e. g.\\nif the Stoics are right, pain is no evil but\\npain is an evil therefore the Stoics are not\\nright is equivalent to the case of the\\nStoics being right, is the case of pain being\\nno evil the present case is not the case of\\npain being no evil therefore the present case\\nis not the case of the Stoics being right. This\\nis Camestres, which, of course, is easily re-\\nduced to Celarent. Or, if you will, all Condi-\\ntional Syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara,\\nby considering them all as constructive which\\nmay be done, as mentioned above, by con-\\nverting by negation the major Premiss. (See\\np. 104.)\\nThe reduction of Hypotheticals may always\\nbe effected in the manner above stated; but\\nas it produces a circuitous awkwardness of\\nexpression, a more convenient form may in\\nsome cases be substituted e. g. in the ex-\\nample above, it may be convenient to take\\ntrue for one of the Terms: that pain is\\nno evil is not true that pain is no evil is\\nasserted by the Stoics; therefore something\\nasserted by the Stoics is not true. Some-\\ntimes again it may be better to unfold the\\ni", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0159.jp2"}, "160": {"fulltext": "114 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nargument into two Syllogisms: e.g. in a for-\\nmer example first, Louis is a good king\\nthe governor of France is Louis; therefore\\nthe governor of France is a good king. And\\nthen, second, every country governed by a\\ngood king is likely to prosper/ Sfc. [A Di-\\nlemma is generally to be reduced into two or\\nmore categorical Syllogisms.] And when the\\nantecedent and consequent have each the\\nsame Subject, you may sometimes reduce the\\nConditional by merely substituting a categori-\\ncal major Premiss for the conditional one\\ne. g. instead of if Caesar was a tyrant, he\\ndeserved death; he was a tyrant, therefore he\\ndeserved death you may put for a major,\\nall tyrants deserve death fyc. But it is of\\nno great consequence, whether Hypotheticals\\nare reduced in the most neat and concise man-\\nner or not since it is not intended that they\\nshould be reduced to categoricals, in ordinary\\npractice, as the readiest way of trying their\\nvalidity, (their own rules being quite sufficient\\nfor that purpose but only that we should be\\nable, if required, to subject any argument\\nwhatever to the test of Aristotle s Dictum, in\\norder to show that all Reasoning turns upon\\none simple principle.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0160.jp2"}, "161": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 1 5\\nOf Enthymeme, Sorites, fyc.\\n\u00c2\u00a77.\\nThere are various abridged forms of Argu-\\nment which may be easily expanded into\\nregular Syllogisms such as,\\n1st. The Enthymeme, which is a Syllogism Emi.ymemc.\\nwith one Premiss suppressed. As all the\\nTerms will be found in the remaining Premiss\\nand Conclusion, it will be easy to fill up the\\nSyllogism by supplying the Premiss that is\\nwanting, whether major or minor e. g.\\nCaesar was a tyrant therefore he deserved\\ndeath. A free nation must be happy\\ntherefore the English are happy.\\nThis is the ordinary form of speaking and\\nwriting. It is evident that Enthymemes may\\nbe filled up hypothetically.*\\n2d. When you have a string of Syllogisms,\\nin the first figure, in which the Conclusion of\\nIt is to be observed, that the Enthymeme is not strictly\\nsyllogistic i. e. its conclusiveness is not apparent from\\nthe mere form of expression, without regard to the mean-\\ning of the Terms because it is from that we form our\\njudgment as to the truth of the suppressed Premiss.\\nThe expressed Premiss may be true, and yet the Con-\\nclusion false. The Sorites, on the other hand, is strictly\\nsyllogistic; as may be seen by the examples. If the\\nPremises stated be true, the conclusion must be true.\\ni 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0161.jp2"}, "162": {"fulltext": "116 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\neach is made the Premiss of the next, till you\\narrive at the main or ultimate Conclusion of\\nall, you may sometimes state these briefly, in\\nsorites. a form called Sorites in which the Predicate\\nof the first proposition is made the Subject of\\nthe next and so on, to any length, till finally\\nthe Predicate of the last of the Premises is\\npredicated (in the Conclusion) of the Subject\\nof the first e. g. A is B, B is C, C is D, D is\\nE therefore A is E. The English are a\\nbrave people a brave people are free a free\\npeople are happy therefore the English are\\nhappy. A Sorites then, has as many middle\\nTerms as there are intermediate Propositions\\nbetween the first and the last; and conse-\\nquently, it may be drawn out into as many\\nseparate Syllogisms; of which the first will\\nhave, for its major Premiss, the second, and\\nfor its minor, the first of the Propositions of\\nthe Sorites as may be seen by the example.\\nThe reader will perceive also by examination\\nof that example, and by framing others, that\\nthe first proposition in the Sorites is the only\\nminor premiss that is expressed when the\\nwhole is resolved into distinct syllogisms, each\\nconclusion becomes the minor premiss of the\\nsucceeding syllogism. Hence, in a Sorites,\\nthe first proposition, and that alone, of all the\\npremises, may be particular; because in the\\nfirst figure the minor may be particular, but", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0162.jp2"}, "163": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 117\\nnot the major (see Chap. iii. 4) and all\\nthe other propositions, prior to the conclusion,\\nare major premises. It is also evident that\\nthere may be, in a Sorites, one, and only one,\\nnegative premiss, viz. the last for if any of\\nthe others were negative, the result would be\\nthat one of the syllogisms of the Sorites would\\nhave a negative minor premiss which is (in\\nthe 1st Fig.) incompatible with correctness.\\nSee Chap. iii. 4.\\nA string of Conditional Syllogisms may gjg\u00c2\u00a3 tlletle\\nin like manner be abridged into a Sorites\\ne. g. if A is B, C is D if C is D, E\\nis F if E is F, G is H but A is B, there-\\nfore G is H. If the Scriptures are the word\\nof God, it is important that they should be\\nwell explained if it is important, fyc. they\\ndeserve to be diligently studied if they de-\\nserve, Sfc. an order of men should be set\\naside for that purpose but the Scriptures are\\nthe word, fyc; therefore an order of men\\nshould be set aside for the purpose, fyc.: in\\na destructive Sorites, you, of course, go back\\nfrom the denial of the last consequent to the\\ndenial of the first antecedent G is not H\\ntherefore A is not B.\\nHence it is evident how injudicious an arrangement\\nhas been adopted by former writers on Logic, who have\\ntreated of the Sorites and Enthymcme before they en-\\ntered on the subject of Hypothetical.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0163.jp2"}, "164": {"fulltext": "118 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book II.\\ninduction. Those who have spoken of Induction or of\\nExample. Example, as a distinct kind of Argument in a\\nLogical point of view, have fallen into the\\ncommon error of confounding Logical with\\nRhetorical distinctions, and have wandered\\nfrom their subject as much as a writer on the\\norders of Architecture would do who should\\nintroduce the distinction between buildings of\\nbrick and of marble. Logic takes no cogni-\\nzance of Induction, for instance, or of a priori\\nreasoning, fyc, as distinct Forms of argument\\nfor when thrown into the syllogistic form, and\\nwhen letters of the alphabet are substituted\\nfor the Terms (and it is thus that an Argu-\\nment is properly to be brought under the cog-\\nnizance of Logic), there is no distinction\\nbetween them e. g. a Property which\\nbelongs to the ox, sheep, deer, goat, and\\nantelope, belongs to all horned animals; ru-\\nmination belongs to these therefore to all.\\nThis, which is an inductive argument, is evi-\\ndently a Syllogism in Barbara. The essence\\nof an inductive argument (and so of the other\\nkinds which are distinguished from it) consists\\nnot in the form of the Argument, but in the\\nrelation which the Subject-matter of the Pre-\\nmises bears to that of the Conclusion.*\\nSee Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. 6. Nothing probably\\nhas tended more to foster the prevailing error of consi-\\ndering Syllogism as a particular kind of argument, than", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0164.jp2"}, "165": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 9\\nrevia-\\ntioni.\\n3d. There are various other abbreviations Abb\\nUOII:\\ncommonly used, which are so obvious as\\nhardly to call for explanation as where one\\nof the Premises of a Syllogism is itself the\\nConclusion of an Enthymeme which is ex-\\npressed at the same time e. g. all useful\\nstudies deserve encouragement; Logic is\\nsuch (since it helps us to reason accurately\\ntherefore it deserves encouragement here\\nthe minor Premiss is what is called an En-\\nthymematic sentence. The antecedent in that\\nminor Premiss (i. e. that which makes it\\nEnthymematic) is called by Aristotle the Pro-\\nsyllogism.\\nIt is evident that you may, for brevity,\\nsubstitute for any term an equivalent as in Eq^ienti\\nthe last example, it, for Logic such\\nfor a useful study, fyc. The doctrine of\\nConversion, laid down in the Second Chapter,\\nfurnishes many equivalent propositions, since\\neach is equivalent to its illative converse.\\nThe division of nouns also (for which see\\nChap, v.) supplies many equivalents e. g. if\\nA is the genus of B, B must be a species\\nof A if A is the cause of B, B must be the\\neffect of A.\\n4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first Sjiiogismi\\nsight appear faulty, will often be found, n i,lc ncct\\nthe inaccuracy just noticed, which appears in all or most\\nof the logical works extant. Sec DisscrtdUon on the\\nProvince of Reasoning. Ch. i. S*e b\u00c2\u00abloW, ^3US-J3q)", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0165.jp2"}, "166": {"fulltext": "120 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nexamination, to contain correct reasoning,\\nand, consequently, to be reducible to a re-\\ngular form e. g. when you have, apparently,\\nnegative Premises, it may happen, that by\\nconsidering one of them as affirmative, (see\\nChap. ii. 4. p. 72), the Syllogism will be\\nregular e. g. no man is happy who is not\\nsecure no tyrant is secure therefore no\\ntyrant is happy, is a Syllogism in Celarent*\\nSometimes there will appear to be too many\\nterms and yet there will be no fault in the\\nReasoning, only an irregularity in the ex-\\npression e. g. no irrational agent could\\nproduce a work which manifests design the\\nuniverse is a work which manifests design\\ntherefore no irrational agent could have pro-\\nduced the universe. Strictly speaking, this\\nSyllogism has five terms but if you look to\\nthe meaning, you will see, that in the first\\nPremiss (considering it as a part of this Argu-\\nment) it is not, properly, an irrational agent\\nthat you are speaking of, and of which you\\nIf this experiment be tried on a Syllogism which has\\nreally negative Premises, the only effect will he to change\\nthat fault into another viz. an excess of Terms, or\\n(which is substantially the same) an undistributed middle\\ne. g. an enslaved people is not happy the English are\\nnot enslaved therefore they are happy if enslaved\\nbe regarded as one of the Terms, and not enslaved as\\nanother, there will manifestly be four. Hence you may\\nsee how very little difference there is in reality between\\nthe different faults which are enumerated.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0166.jp2"}, "167": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 121\\npredicate that it could not produce a work\\nmanifesting design but rather it is this\\nu work/ fyc. of which you are speaking, and\\nof which it is predicated that it could not be\\nproduced by an irrational agent; if, then,\\nyou state the Propositions in that form, the\\nSyllogism will be perfectly regular. (See 1.\\nof this Supplement.)\\nThus, such a Syllogism as this, every true\\npatriot is disinterested few men are disin-\\nterested; therefore few men are true patriots;\\nmight appear at first sight to be in the second\\nFigure, and faulty whereas it is Barbara,\\nwith the Premises transposed: for you do not\\nreally predicate of few men, that they are\\ndisinterested, but of disinterested persons,\\nthat they are few. Again, none but\\ncandid men are good reasoners few infidels\\nare candid few infidels are good reasoners.\\nIn this it will be most convenient to consider\\nthe major Premiss as being, all good rea-\\nsoners are candid, (which of course is pre-\\ncisely equipollent to its illative converse by\\nnegation;) and the minor Premiss and Con-\\nclusion may in like manner be fairly expressed\\nthus most infidels are not candid there-\\nfore most infidels are not good reasoners\\nwhich is a regular Syllogism in Camestres*\\nThe reader is to observe that the term employed as\\nthe Subject of the minor premiss, and of the conclusion,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0167.jp2"}, "168": {"fulltext": "122 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nOr, if you would state it in the first Figure,\\nthus those who are not candid (or un-\\ncandid) are not good reasoners most infidels\\nare not candid; most infidels are not good\\nreasoners.\\nChap. V.\\nSUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.\\n[This Supplement may be studied either before or after the\\nCompendium.\\n\u00c2\u00a71-\\nThe usual divisions of nouns into univocal,\\nequivocal, and analogous, and into nouns of\\nthe first and second intention, are not, strictly-\\nspeaking, divisions of words, but divisions of\\nthe manner of employing them the same word\\nmay be employed either univocally, equivo-\\ncally, or analogously either in the first inten-\\ntion or in the second. The ordinary logical\\ntreatises often occasion great perplexity to the\\nlearner, by not noticing this circumstance, but\\nrather leading him to suppose the contrary.\\nis most-infidels he is not to suppose that most is a\\nsign of distribution it is merely a compendious expres-\\nsion for the greater part of.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0168.jp2"}, "169": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 123\\n(See Book III. 8.) Some of those other\\ndivisions of nouns, which are the most com-\\nmonly in use, though not appropriately and\\nexclusively belonging to the Logical system,\\ni. e. to the theory of reasoning, it may be\\nworth while briefly to notice in this place.\\nLet it be observed then, that a noun ex-\\npresses the view we take of an object. And\\nits being viewed as an object, i. e. as one, or\\nagain as several, depends on our arbitrary\\nchoice e. g. we may consider a troop of\\ncavalry as one object or we may make any\\nsingle horse with its rider, or any separate\\nman or horse, or any limb of either, the sub-\\nject of our thoughts.\\n1. When then any one object is considered singer ami\\nCommon\\naccording to its actual existence, as numerically ter,iis\\none, the noun denoting it is called Singular\\nas, u this tree, the city of London, Sfc.\\nWhen it is considered as to its nature and\\ncharacter only, as being of such a description\\nas will equally apply to other single objects,\\nthe inadequate or incomplete view (see Ana-\\nlytical Outline, 6.) thus taken of an indi-\\nvidual is expressed by a Common noun as\\ntree, city.\\n2. When any object is considered as a part Absointc ami\\nJ l Relative.\\nof a whole, viewed in reference to the whole\\nor to another part, of a more complex object\\nof thought, the noun expressing this view", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0169.jp2"}, "170": {"fulltext": "124 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nis called Relative: and to Relative noun is\\nopposed Absolute as denoting an object con-\\nsidered as a whole,, and without reference to\\nanything of which it is a part, or to any other\\npart distinguished from it. Thus, Father/\\nand Son/ Rider, Commander, fyc,\\nare Relatives, being regarded, each as a part\\nof the complex objects, Father-and-Son, fyc.\\nthe same object designated absolutely would\\nbe termed a Man, Living-Being, fyc.\\ncorrelative. Nouns are Correlative to each other, which\\ndenote objects related to each other, and\\nviewed as to that relation. Thus, though a\\nKing is a ruler of men, King and Man\\nare not correlative, but King and Subject, are.\\ncompatible 3. When there are two views which cannot\\nand Opposite.\\nbe taken of one single object at the same\\ntime, the terms expressing these views are\\nsaid to be Opposite, or Inconsistent (repug-\\nnantia) as, black and white when both\\nmay be taken of the same object at the same\\ntime, they are called Consistent, or Compatible\\n(convenientia) as, white and cold. Rela-\\ntive terms are Opposite, only when applied\\nwith reference to the same subject as one\\nmay be both Master and Servant, but not at\\nthe same time to the same person.\\nconcrete and 4. When the notion derived from the view\\ntaken of any object, is expressed with a refe-\\nrence to, or as in conjunction with, the object", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0170.jp2"}, "171": {"fulltext": "(hap. V. 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 125\\nthat furnished the notion, it is expressed by a\\nConcrete term; as, foolish, or fool; when\\nwithout any such reference, by an Abstract\\nterm as, folly.\\n5. A term which denotes a certain view Positive,\\nPrivative,\\nof an object as being actually taken of it, is a (,Ne s iUive\\ncalled Positive as, speech a man speak-\\ning: a term denoting that this view might\\nconceivably be taken of the object, but is not,\\nis Privative as, u dumbness, a man silent\\nfyc* That which denotes that such a notion\\nis not and could not be formed of the object,\\nis called Negative as, a u dumb statue, a\\nlifeless carcase, Sfc.\\nIt is to be observed that the same term\\nmay be regarded either as Positive, or as Pri-\\nvative or Negative, according to the quality\\nor character which we are referring to in our\\nminds thus, of happy and miserable,\\nwe may regard the former as Positive, and\\nthe latter chappy) as Privative or vice\\nMany Privative epithets are such that by a little\\ningenuity the application of them may be represented as\\nan absurdity. Thus, Wallis s remark (introduced in this\\ntreatise) that a jest is generally a mock-fallacy, i. e. a\\nfallacy not designed to deceive, but so palpable as only to\\nfurnish amusement, might be speciously condemned as\\ninvolving a contradiction for the design to deceive, it\\nmight be said, is essential to a fallacy. In the same\\nway it might be argued that it is absurd to speak of a\\ndead man; e.g. every man is a living creature; nothing\\ndead is a living creature therefore no man is dead", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0171.jp2"}, "172": {"fulltext": "126 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nversa according as we are thinking of enjoy-\\nment or of suffering.\\nDefinite and 6. A Privative or Negative term is also\\nIndefinite.\\ncalled Indefinite (infinitum) in respect of its\\nnot defining and marking out an object in\\ncontradistinction to this, the Positive term is\\ncalled Definite (finitum) because it does thus\\ndefine or mark out. Thus, organized being,\\nor Caesar, are called Definite, as marking\\nout, and limiting our view to, one particular\\nclass of Beings, or one single person unor-\\nganized, or not-Caesar, are called Indefi-\\nnite, as not restricting our view to any class,\\nor individual, but only excluding one, and\\nleaving it undetermined, what other individual\\nthe thing so spoken of may be, or what other\\nclass it may belong to.\\ncontradic It is to be observed, that the most perfect\\ntory opposi-\\nuonof terms. pp OS ition between nouns exists between any\\ntwo which differ only in respectively wanting\\nand having the particle not (either expressly, or\\nin sense) attached to them as, organized,\\nand not-organized, corporeal, and in-\\ncorporeal; for not only is it impossible for\\nboth these views to be taken at once of the\\nsame thing, but also, it is impossible but that\\none or other should be applicable to every\\nobject; as there is nothing that can be both,\\nso there is nothing that can be neither. Every\\nthing that can be even conceived must be", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0172.jp2"}, "173": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 127\\neither Caesar/ or not-Caesar; either cor-\\nporeal/ or incorporeal. And in this way a\\ncomplete twofold division may be made of any\\nsubject, being certain (as the expression is) to\\nexhaust it. And the repetition of this process,\\nso as to carry on a subdivision as far as there\\nis occasion, is thence called by Logicians\\nu abscissio infiniti i. e. the repeated cutting\\noff of that which the object to be examined is\\nnot e.g. 1. This disorder either is, or is not,\\na dropsy and for this or that reason, it is\\nnot 2. Any other disease either is, or is not,\\ngout this is not then, 3. It either is, or is\\nnot, consumption, S?c. fyc? This procedure is\\nvery common in Aristotle s works.\\nSuch terms may be said to be in contra-\\ndictory opposition to each other.\\nOn the other hand, Contrary terms, i. e. contrary\\nthose which, coming under some one class,\\nare the most different of all that belong to that\\nclass, as wise and foolish, both denoting\\nmental habits, are opposed, but in a different\\nmanner for though both cannot be applied to\\nthe same object, there may be other objects\\nto which neither can be applied nothing can\\nbe at once both wise and foolish but a\\nstone cannot be either.\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\nThe notions expressed by Common terms,\\nwe are enabled (as has been remarked in the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0173.jp2"}, "174": {"fulltext": "128 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nAnalytical Outline) to form by the faculty of\\nabstraction: for by it, in contemplating any\\nobject (or objects,) we can attend exclusively\\nto some particular circumstances belonging to\\nit, [some certain parts of its nature as it\\nwere,] and quite withhold our attention from\\nthe rest. When, therefore, we are thus con-\\ntemplating several individuals which resemble\\neach other in some part of their nature, we\\ncan (by attending to that part alone, and not\\nto those points in which they differ) assign\\nthem one common name, which will express or\\nstand for them merely as far as they all agree;\\nand which, of course, will be applicable to all\\nor any of them (which process is called\\nGeueraiiza- generalization) and each of these names is\\ncalled a common term, from its belonging to\\nPredicabies. them all alike or a predicable, because it\\nmay be predicated affirmatively of them, or of\\nany one of them.\\nGeneralization (as has been remarked) im-\\nplies abstraction, but it is not the same thing\\nfor there may be abstraction without generali-\\nzation: when we are speaking of an Indi-\\nvidual, it is usually an abstract notion that we\\nform e. g. suppose we are speaking of the\\npresent King of France he must actually be\\neither at Paris or elsewhere sitting, standing,\\nor in some other posture and in such and\\nsuch a dress, fyc. Yet many of these circum-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0174.jp2"}, "175": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 29\\nstances, (which are separable Accidents [vide\\n6] and consequently) which are regarded as\\nnon-essential to the individual, are quite dis-\\nregarded by us and we abstract from them\\nwhat we consider as essential thus forming\\nan abstract notion of the Individual. Yet\\nthere is here no generalization.\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nWhatever term can be affirmed of several Spedes\\nthings, must express either their whole essence,\\nwhich is called the Species or a part of their\\nessence {viz. either the material part, which is\\ncalled the Genus, or the formal and distin- GenuB\\nguishing part, which is called Differentia, or Differen ti a\\nin common discourse, characteristic) or some-\\nthing joined to the essence whether necessarily\\n(i. e. to the whole species, or, in other words,\\nuniversally, to every individual of it), which is\\ncalled a Property or contingently e. to Pro rt\\nsome individuals only of the species), which is\\nan Accident. Acc i (le)lt", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0175.jp2"}, "176": {"fulltext": "1 30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nEvery predicable expresses either\\ns\\nThe whole essence or part of its or something\\nof its subject: essence joined to its\\nviz. Species J essence\\nGenus \u00e2\u0080\u0094Difference\\nProperty Accident\\nuniversal [peculiar universal\\nbut not but not and pe-\\npeculiar universal]* culiar\\ninseparable separable.\\nIt is evident, from what has been said, that\\nthe Genus and Difference put together make\\nAnd, consequently, not correctly called a Property,\\nas is remarked below but inserted here as having been\\nusually reckoned such by logical writers. They have\\nalso added a fourth kind of Property viz. that which is\\npeculiar to a Species, and belongs to every Individual of\\nit, but not at every time. But this is, in fact, a contradic-\\ntion since whatever does not always belong to a Species,\\ndoes not belong to it universally. It is through the\\nambiguity of words that they have fallen into this con-\\nfusion of thought e. g. the example commonly given is,\\nhomini canescere to become grey being, they say,\\n(though it is not) peculiar to man, and belonging to every\\nindividual, though not always, but only in old age, fyc.\\nNow, if by canescere be meant the very circumstance\\nof becoming grey, this manifestly does not belong to\\nevery man if again it be meant to signify the liability to\\nbecome grey hereafter, this does belong always to man.\\nAnd the same in other instances. Indeed the very Pro-\\nprium fixed on by Aldrich, risibility, is nearly parallel\\nto the above. Man is always capable of laughing but\\nhe is not capable of laughing always.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0176.jp2"}, "177": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. \u00c2\u00a73.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 131\\nup the Species e.g. rational and animal\\nconstitute man so that, in reality, the\\nSpecies contains the Genus (i. e. implies it\\nand when the Genus is called a whole, and is\\nsaid to contain the Species, this is only a meta-\\nphorical expression, signifying that it compre-\\nhends the Species, in its own more extensive\\nsignification e. g. if I predicate of Caesar that\\nhe is an animal, I say the truth indeed, but\\nnot the whole truth for he is not only an\\nanimal, but a man so that man, is a more\\nfull and complete expression than animal\\nwhich for the same reason is more extensive,\\nas it contains, (or rather comprehends) and\\nmay be predicated of, several other species,\\nviz. beast, u bird, Sfc. In the same man-\\nner the name of a species is a more extensive,\\nbut less full and complete term than that of\\nan individual {viz. a singular term; since the\\nspecies may be predicated of each of these.*\\nThe impression produced on the mind by a Singu-\\nlar Term, may be compared to the distinct view taken in\\nby the eye, of any object (suppose some particular man)\\nnear at hand, in a clear light, which enables us to distin-\\nguish the features of the individual in a fainter light, or\\nrather farther off, we merely perceive that the object is a\\nman this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the\\nname of the Species yet farther off, or in a still feebler\\nlight, we can distinguish merely some living object and at\\nlength, merely some object these views corresponding\\nrespectively with the terms denoting the Genera, less or\\nmore remote. Rhet. Part III. Chap. ii. 1.\\nk2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0177.jp2"}, "178": {"fulltext": "132 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\n[Note, that genus and species are commonly\\nsaid to be predicated hi quid (jl) {i.e. to answer\\nto the question, what as, what is Caesar?\\nAnswer, a man what is a man Answer,\\nan animal. Difference, in quale quid;\\n(ttoIop tl) Property and Accident in quale\\n(irolov.y\\\\\\n\u00c2\u00a74-\\nsubaltern A genus, which is also a species, is called a\\ngenus and\\nspecies. subaltern genus or species as bird, which is\\nthe genus of pigeon (i. e. of which pigeon\\nis a species) is itself a species of animal. A\\ngenus, which is not considered as a species of\\nanything, is called summum (the highest) ge-\\nnus a species which is not considered as a\\ngenus of any thing, i. e. is regarded as con-\\ntaining under it only individuals, is called\\ninjima (the lowest) species.\\nWhen I say of a Magnet, that it is a kind\\nof iron-ore, that is called its proximum genus,\\nbecause it is the closest (or lowest) genus\\nthat is predicated of it: mineral is its more\\nremote genus.\\nWhen I say that the Differentia of a magnet\\nis its attracting iron, and that its Property\\nis polarity, these are called respectively a\\nSpecific Difference and Property because\\nmagnet is an injima species (i. e. only a species.)\\nWhen I say that the Differentia of iron ore", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0178.jp2"}, "179": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 4.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 133\\nis its containing iron* and its property be-\\ning attracted by the magnet, these are called\\nrespectively, a generic Difference and Pro-\\nperty, because iron ore is a subaltern species\\nor genus, being both the genus of magnet, and\\na species of mineral.\\nThat is the most strictly called a Property,\\nwhich belongs to the whole of a Species, and\\nto that Species alone as polarity to the mag-\\nnet. [And such a property it is often hard to\\ndistinguish from the differentia but whatever\\nyou consider as the most essential to the nature\\nof a Species, with respect to the matter you\\nare engaged in, you must call the differentia\\nas rationality to man; and whatever\\nyou consider as rather an accompaniment (or\\nresult) of that difference, you must call the\\nproperty as the use of speech seems to be\\na result of rationality.] But very many pro-\\nperties which belong to the whole of a species\\nare not peculiar to it; as, to breathe air\\nbelongs to every man but not to man alone\\nand it is, therefore, strictly speaking, not so\\nmuch a property of the Species man, as of\\nthe higher, e. more comprehensive, Species,\\nwhich is the genus of that, viz. of land-\\nanimal. Other Properties, as some logicians\\ncall them, are peculiar to a species, but do not\\nbelong to the whole of it e. g. man alone can\\nbe a poet, but it is not every man that is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0179.jp2"}, "180": {"fulltext": "134 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nso. These, however, are more commonly and\\nmore properly reckoned as accidents.\\nAccidents se- For that is most properly called an Acci-\\nFnse a parabi\u00c2\u00ab. dent, which may be absent or present, the\\nessence of the Species continuing the same\\nas, for a man to be walking, or a native\\nof Paris of these two examples, the former\\nis what logicians call a separable Accident,\\nbecause it may be separated from the indi-\\nvidual: (e.g. he may sit down;) the latter\\nis an inseparable Accident, being not separable\\nfrom the individual, (i. e. he who is a native\\nof Paris can never be otherwise;) from the\\nindividual, I say, because every accident must\\nbe separable from the species, else it would be\\na property.*\\nLet it here be observed, that both the\\ngeneral name Predicable, and each of the\\nThis seems to me a clearer and more correct descrip-\\ntion of the two kinds of accident than the one given by\\nAldrich viz. that a Separable Accident may be actually\\nseparated, and an Inseparable, only in thought, ut Man-\\ntuanum esse, a Virgilio. For surely to be the author\\nof the iEneid was another Inseparable Accident of the\\nsame individual; to be a Roman citizen another; and\\nto live in the days of Augustus another now can we\\nin thought separate all these things from the essence of\\nthat individual To do so would be to form the idea of\\na different individual. We can indeed conceive a man,\\nand one who might chance to bear the name of Virgil,\\nwithout any of these Accidents but then it would plainly\\nnot be the same man.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0180.jp2"}, "181": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 135\\nclasses of Predicables, (viz. Genus, Species,\\nfyc.) are relative i. e. we cannot say what\\npredicable any term is, or whether it is any\\nat all, unless it be specified of what it is to\\nbe predicated: e.g. the term red would\\nbe considered a genus, in relation to the terms\\npink, scarlet, 8?c. it might be regarded\\nas the differentia, in relation to red rose\\nas a property of blood, as an accident of\\na house, fyc.\\nAnd universally, it is to be steadily kept\\nin mind, that no common terms have, as\\nthe names of individuals have, any real thing\\nexisting in nature corresponding to them {rohe\\nTt, as Aristotle expresses it, though he has\\nbeen represented as the champion of the op-\\nposite opinion vide Cat eg. c. 3.), but that\\neach of them is merely a name denoting a\\ncertain inadequate notion which our minds\\nhave formed of an Individual, and which,\\nconsequently, not including anything wherein\\nthat individual differs from certain others, is\\napplicable equally well to all or any of them\\nthus man denotes no real thing (as the\\nsect of the Realists maintained) distinct from\\neach individual, but merely any man, viewed\\ninadequately, i. e. so as to omit, and abstract\\nfrom, all that is peculiar to each individual\\nby which means the term becomes applicable\\nalike to any one of several individuals, or", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0181.jp2"}, "182": {"fulltext": "136 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\n(in the plural) to several together and we\\narbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we\\nthus choose to abstract and consider sepa-\\nrately, disregarding all the rest so that the\\nsame individual may thus be referred to any\\nof several different Species, and the same\\nSpecies to several Genera, as suits our pur-\\nDiiferent pose. Thus it suits the Farmer s purpose to\\nI-iassScation. class his cattle with his ploughs, carts, and\\nother possessions, under the name of stack\\nthe Naturalist, suitably to his purpose, classes\\nthem as quadrupeds which term would\\ninclude wolves, deer, fyc, which to the farmer\\nwould be a most improper classification the\\nCommissary, again, would class them with\\ncorn, cheese, fish, 8pc, as provision; that\\nwhich is most essential in one view, being\\nsubordinate in another.\\n\u00c2\u00a75.\\nDivision, An individual is so called because it is in-\\ncapable of logical division which is a meta-\\nphorical expression to signify the distinct\\nL e, separate) enumeration of several things\\nsignified by one common name. This ope-\\nration is directly opposite to generalization,\\n(which is performed by means of abstrac-\\ntion for as, in that, you lay aside the\\ndifferences by which several things are dis-\\ntinguished, so as to call them all by one", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0182.jp2"}, "183": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 137\\ncommon name, so, in Division, you add on\\nthe Differences, so as to enumerate them\\nby their several particular names. Thus,\\nmineral is said to be divided into stones,\\nmetals, fyc. and metals again into gold,\\niron, Sfc. and these are called the Parts\\n(or Members) of the division.\\nThe rules for Division are three 1st. each\\nof the Parts, or any of them short of all,\\nmust contain less (u e. have a narrower sig-\\nnification) than the thing divided. 2d. All\\nthe Parts together must be exactly equal to\\nthe thing divided (therefore we must be\\ncareful to ascertain that the summum genus\\nmay be predicated of every term placed under\\nit, and of nothing else.) 3d. The Parts or\\nMembers must be opposed i. e. must not be\\ncontained in one another: e.g. if you were\\nto divide book into poetical, historical,\\nfolio, quarto, french, latin, fyc. the members\\nwould be contained in each other for a\\nfrench book may be a quarto, and a quarto,\\nfrench, fyc. You must be careful, therefore,\\nto keep in mind the principle of division with\\nwhich you set out e. g. whether you begin\\ndividing books according to their matter, their\\nlanguage, or their size, Sfc. all these being so\\nmany c?*oss divisions. And when anything is\\ncapable (as in the above instance) of being\\ndivided in several different ways, we are not", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0183.jp2"}, "184": {"fulltext": "138 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nto reckon one of these as the true, or real,\\nor right one, without specifying what the\\nobject is which we have in view for one\\nmode of dividing may be the most suitable\\nfor one purpose, and another for another\\nas e. g. one of the above modes of dividing\\nbooks would be the most suitable to a book-\\nbinder another in a philosophical, and the\\nother in a philological view.\\nIt must be carefully remembered, that the\\nword Division, as employed in Logic, is, as\\nhas been observed already, metaphorical; for\\nto divide, means, originally and properly, to\\nseparate the component parts of anything;\\neach of which is of course absolutely less than\\nthe whole e. g. a tree e. any individual tree)\\nmight be divided physically, as it is called\\ninto root, trunk, branches, leaves, tyc. -Now\\nit cannot be said that a root or a leaf is a\\ntree whereas in a Logical Division each of\\nthe Members is, in reality, more than the\\nwhole e. g, if you divide tree (i. e. the genus,\\ntree) into oak, elm, ash, fyc. we may say of\\nthe oak, or of any individual oak, that it is\\na tree for by the very word oak, we ex-\\npress not only the general notion of a tree,\\nbut more, viz. the peculiar Characteristic (L e.\\nDifference) of that kind of tree.\\nIt is plain, then, that it is logically only,\\ni. e. in our mode of speaking, that a Genus", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0184.jp2"}, "185": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. C] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 139\\nis said to contain (or rather comprehend its\\nSpecies while metaphysically, (i. e. in our\\nconceptions) a Species contains, i. e, implies,\\nits Genus.\\nCare must be taken not to confound a phy-\\nsical Division with a logical which beginners\\nare apt to do, by introducing, in the course of\\na Division, the mention of the real Parts of\\nwhich an Individual consists, and of each\\nwhich accordingly the whole cannot be af-\\nfirmed.\\n\u00c2\u00a76.\\nDefinition is another metaphorical word, Dcfim.it\\nwhich literally signifies, laying down a boun-\\ndary and is used in Logic to signify an\\nexpression which explains any term, so as\\nto separate it from everything else, as a\\nboundary separates fields. A Nominal Defi-\\nnition (such as are those usually found in a\\ndictionary of one s own language) explains\\nonly the meaning of the term, by giving some\\nequivalent expression, which may happen to\\nbe better known. Thus you might define a\\nTerm, that which forms one of the ex-\\ntremes or boundaries of a proposition; and\\na Predicable, that which may be predi-\\ncated decalogue, ten commandments\\ntelescope, an instrument for viewing distant\\nobjects, fyc. A Real Definition is one which", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0185.jp2"}, "186": {"fulltext": "140 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nexplains and unfolds the nature of the thing\\nand each of these kinds of definition is either\\naccidental or essential. An essential Definition\\nassigns (or lays down) the constituent parts of\\nthe essence (or nature). An accidental Defi-\\nnition (which is commonly called a description)\\nassigns the circumstances belonging to the\\nessence, viz. Properties and Accidents (e. g,\\ncauses, effects, fyc): thus, man may be\\ndescribed as an animal that uses fire to\\ntwo divi- dress his food, Sfc. [And here note, that in\\nsions of de-\\nfinition- describing a species, you cannot mention any-\\nthing which is strictly an accident, because,\\nif it does not belong to the whole of the\\nSpecies, it cannot define it in describing an\\nindividual, on the contrary, you enumerate\\nthe accidents, because by them it is that one\\nindividual differs from another, and in this\\ncase you add the species e. g. Philip was\\na man, of Macedon, who subdued Greece, fyc.\\nIndividuals, it is evident, can be defined (i, e.\\ndescribed) in this way alone.]\\nLastly, the Essential Definition is divided\\ninto physical (i, e. natural) and logical or\\nmetaphysical the physical Definition lays\\ndown the real parts of the essence which are\\nactually separable the logical, lays down the\\nideal parts of it, which cannot be separated\\nexcept in the mind: thus, a plant would be\\ndefined physically, by enumerating the leaves,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0186.jp2"}, "187": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 141\\nstalks, roots, fyc. of which it is composed\\nlogically, it would be defined an organized\\nBeing, destitute of sensation the former of\\nthese expressions denoting the Genus, the\\nlatter the Difference for a logical definition\\nmust always consist of the genus and differen-\\ntia, which are the parts of which Logic con-\\nsiders every species as consisting, and which\\nevidently are separable in the mind alone.\\nThus man is defined c a rational animal,\\nfyc. So also a Proposition might be de-\\nfined, physically, a subject and predicate\\ncombined by a copula the parts here enu-\\nmerated being actually separable but logically\\nit would be defined a sentence which affirms\\nor denies and these two parts of the essence\\nof a Proposition (which are the genus and\\ndifferentia of it) can be separated in the mind\\nonly. And note, that the Difference is not\\nalways one quality, but is frequently com-\\npounded of several together, no one of which\\nwould alone suffice.\\nDefinitions are divided into Nominal and\\nReal, according to the object accomplished by\\nthem whether to explain, merely, the mean-\\ning of the word, or the nature of the thing\\non the other hand, they are divided into Ac-\\ncidental, Physical, and Logical, according to\\nthe means employed by each for accomplishing\\ntheir respective objects whether it be the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0187.jp2"}, "188": {"fulltext": "1 42 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nenumeration of attributes, or of the physical,\\nor the metaphysical parts of the essence.\\nThese, therefore, are evidently two cross di-\\nvisions. In this place we are concerned with\\nnominal definitions only (except, indeed, of\\nlogical terms) because all that is requisite\\nfor the purposes of reasoning (which is the\\nproper province of Logic) is, that a term\\nshall not be used in different senses: a real\\ndefinition of anything belongs to the science\\nor system which is employed about that thing.\\nIt is to be noted, that in mathematics (and\\nindeed in all strict Sciences) the Nominal,\\nand the Real Definition exactly coincide; the\\nmeaning of the word, and the nature of the\\nthing, being exactly the same. This holds\\ngood also with respect to Logical terms,\\nmost Legal, and many Ethical terms.\\nIt is scarcely credible how much confusion\\nhas arisen from the ignorance of these dis-\\ntinctions which has prevailed among logical\\nwriters.*\\nIn Chap. ii. 3 of Book IV. the doctrine here laid\\ndown will be more fully developed.\\nAldrich, having given as an instance of a Nominal Defi-\\nnition the absurd one of homo, qui ex humo, has led\\nsome to conclude that the Nominal Definition must be\\nfounded on the etymology or at least that such was his\\nmeaning. But that it was not, is sufficiently plain from\\nthe circumstance that Wallis (from whose work his is\\nalmost entirely abridged) expressly says the contrary. Be", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0188.jp2"}, "189": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 143\\nThe principal rules for definition are three\\nviz. 1st. The definition must be adequate i. c.\\nneither too extensive nor too narrow for the\\nthing defined e. g. to define u fish, an\\nanimal that lives in the water, would be too\\nextensive, because many insects, fyc. live in\\nthe water to define it, an animal that\\nhas an air-bladder, would be too narrow\\nbecause many fish are without any.\\n2d. The definition must be in itself plainer\\nthan the thing defined, else it would not ex-\\nplain it I say, in itself, {i. e. generally)\\nbecause, to some particular person, the term\\ndefined may happen to be even more familiar\\nand better understood, than the language of\\nthe definition.\\n3d. The Third Rule usually given by Logi-\\ncians for a definition, is, that it should be\\ncouched in a convenient number of appropriate\\nwords (if such can be found suitable for the\\npurpose) since figurative words (which are\\nopposed to appropriate) are apt to produce am-\\nbiguity or indistinctness too great brevity may\\noccasion obscurity; and too great prolixity, con-\\nfusion. But this perhaps is rather an admonition\\nwith respect to Style, than a strictly logical\\nrule nor can we accordingly determine with\\nthis as it may, however, it is plain that the etymology of\\na term has nothing to do with any logical consideration of\\nit. See note to S, of Book III.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0189.jp2"}, "190": {"fulltext": "144 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II.\\nprecision, in each case, whether it has been\\ncomplied with or not there is no drawing the\\nline between too long and too concise/\\nfyc. Nor would a definition unnecessarily\\nprolix be censured as incorrect, but as inele-\\ngant, inconvenient, fyc. If, however, a defini-\\ntion be chargeable with Tautology, (which is\\na distinct fault from prolixity or verbosity) it\\nis properly incorrect, though without offend-\\ning against the first two rules. Tautology\\nconsists in inserting too much, not in mere\\nwords, but in sense yet not so as too much to\\nnarrow the definition (in opposition to Rule 1.)\\nby excluding some things which belong to the\\nclass of the thing defined but only, so as to\\nstate something which has been already im-\\nplied. Thus, to define a Parallelogram ts a\\nfour-sided figure whose opposite sides are\\nparallel and equal, would be tautological be-\\ncause, though it is true that such a figure, and\\nsuch alone, is a parallelogram, the equality of\\nthe sides is implied in their being parallel, and\\nmay be proved from it. Now the insertion of\\nthe words and equal, leaves, and indeed\\nleads, a reader to suppose that there may be\\na four-sided figure whose opposite sides are\\nparallel but not equal.* Though therefore\\nThis would be inferred according to the principle of\\nexceptio probat regulum, an exception proves a rule.\\nThe force of the maxim is this; (for it is not properly", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0190.jp2"}, "191": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. C.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 145\\nsuch a definition asserts nothing false, it\\nleads to a supposition of what is false and\\nconsequently is to be regarded as an incor-\\nrect definition.\\nconfined to the case where an exception, strictly so called,\\nis mentioned) that the mention of any circumstance intro-\\nduced into the statement of a precept, law, remark, fyc. (for\\nthe application of the maxim is not confined to the case\\nof Definitions) is to be presumed necessary to be inserted\\nso that the precept, tyc. would not hold good if this cir-\\ncumstance were absent. If e. g. it be laid down that he\\nwho breaks into an empty house shall receive a certain\\npunishment, it would be inferred that this punishment\\nwould not be incurred by breaking into an occupied house\\nif it were told us that some celestial phenomenon could\\nnot be seen by the naked eye, it would be inferred that it\\nwould be visible through a telescope fyc.\\nAnd much is often inferred in this manner, which was\\nby no means in the Author s mind; from his having in-\\naccurately inserted what chanced to be present to his\\nthoughts. Thus, he who says that it is a crime for people\\nto violate the property of a humane Landlord who lives\\namong them, may perhaps not mean to imply that it is no\\ncrime to violate the property of an absentee-landlord, or\\nof one who is not humane but he leaves an opening for\\nbeing so understood. Thus again (to recur to the case\\nof definitions) in saying that an animal which breathes\\nthrough gills and is scaly, is a fish, though nothing false\\nis asserted, a presumption is afforded that you mean to\\ngive too narrow a definition in violation of Rule I.\\nAnd Tautology, as above described, is sure to mislead\\nany one who interprets what is said, conformably to the\\nmaxim that the exception proves a rule.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0191.jp2"}, "192": {"fulltext": "146 [Book III.\\nBOOK III.\\nOF FALLACIES.\\nIntroduction.\\nDefinition of By a Fallacy is commonly understood, any\\nunsound mode of arguing, which appears to\\ndemand our conviction, and to be decisive of\\nthe question in hand, when in fairness it is\\nnot. Considering the ready detection and\\nclear exposure of Fallacies to be both more\\nextensively important, and also more difficult,\\nthan many are aware of, I propose to take\\na Logical view of the subject referring the\\ndifferent Fallacies to the most convenient\\nheads, and giving a scientific analysis of the\\nprocedure which takes place in each.\\nAfter all, indeed, in the practical detection\\nof each individual Fallacy, much must depend\\non natural and acquired acuteness nor can\\nany rules be given, the mere learning of\\nwhich will enable us to apply them with me-\\nchanical certainty and readiness but still we\\nshall find that to take correct general views\\nof the subject, and to be familiarized with", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0192.jp2"}, "193": {"fulltext": "Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 147\\nscientific discussions of it, will tend, above all\\nthings, to engender such a habit of mind, as\\nwill best fit us for practice.\\nIndeed the case is the same with respect to\\nLogic in general scarcely any one would, in\\nordinary practice, state to himself either his\\nown or another s reasoning, in Syllogisms in\\nBarbara at full length yet a familiarity with\\nLogical principles tends very much (as all\\nfeel, who are really well acquainted with\\nthem) to beget a habit of clear and sound\\nreasoning. The truth is, in this, as in many\\nother things, there are processes going on in\\nthe mind (when we are practising anything\\nquite familiar to us) with such rapidity as to\\nleave no trace in the memory and we often\\napply principles which did not, as far as\\nwe are conscious, even occur to us at the\\ntime.\\nIt would be foreign, however, to the pre- inaccurate\\nlanguage of\\nsent purpose, to investigate fully the manner t f er wri\\nin which certain studies operate in remotely\\nproducing certain effects on the mind it is\\nsufficient to establish the fact, that habits of\\nscientific analysis (besides the intrinsic beauty\\nand dignity of such studies) lead to practical\\nadvantage. It is on Logical principles there-\\nfore that I propose to discuss the subject of\\nFallacies; and it may, indeed, seem to have\\nbeen unnecessary to make any apology for\\nl 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0193.jp2"}, "194": {"fulltext": "148 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nso doing, after what has been formerly said,\\ngenerally, in defence of Logic but that the\\ngenerality of Logical writers have usually fol-\\nlowed so opposite a plan whenever they have\\nto treat of anything that is beyond the mere\\nelements of Logic, they totally lay aside all\\nreference to the principles they have been\\noccupied in establishing and explaining, and\\nhave recourse to a loose, vague, and popular\\nkind of language such as would be the best\\nsuited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but\\nseems strangely incongruous in a professed\\nLogical treatise. What should we think of\\na Geometrical writer, who, after having gone\\nthrough the elements with strict definitions\\nand demonstrations, should, on proceeding\\nto Mechanics, totally lay aside all reference\\nto scientific principles, all use of technical\\nterms, and treat of the subject in undefined\\nterms, and with probable and popular argu-\\nments It would be thought strange, if even\\na Botanist, when addressing those whom he\\nhad been instructing in the principles and the\\nterms of his system, should totally lay these\\naside when he came to describe plants, and\\nadopt the language of the vulgar. Surely it\\naffords but too much plausibility to the cavils\\nof those who scoff at Logic altogether, that\\nthe very writers who profess to teach it should\\nnever themselves make any application of, or", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0194.jp2"}, "195": {"fulltext": "Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 149\\nreference to, its principles, on those very occa-\\nsions, when, and xvhen only, such application\\nand reference are to be expected. If the\\nprinciples of any system are well laid down,\\nif its technical language is judiciously framed,\\nthen, surely, those principles and that lan-\\nguage will afford (for those who have once\\nthoroughly learned them) the best, the most\\nclear, simple, and concise method of treating\\nany subject connected with that system. Yet\\neven the accurate Aldrich, in treating of the\\nDilemma and of the Fallacies, has very much\\nforgotten the Logician, and assumed a loose\\nand rhetorical style of writing, without making\\nany application of the principles he had for-\\nmerly laid down, but, on the contrary, some-\\ntimes departing widely from them.*\\nThe most experienced teachers, when ad-\\ndressing those who are familiar with the\\nelementary principles of Logic, think it re-\\nquisite, not indeed to lead them, on each\\noccasion, through the xvhole detail of those\\nHe is far more confused in his discussion of Fallacies\\nthan in any other part of his treatise of which this one\\ninstance may serve after having distinguished Fallacies\\ninto those in the expression, and those in the matter in\\ndictione, and extra dictionem, he observes of one or\\ntwo of these last, that they are not properly called Falla-\\ncies, as not being Syllogisms faulty in form Syllogismi\\nforma peccantcs, as if any one, which was such, could\\nbe Fallacia extra dictionem", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0195.jp2"}, "196": {"fulltext": "150 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nprinciples, when the process is quite obvious,\\nbut always to put them on the road, as it were,\\nto those principles, that they may plainly see\\ntheir own way to the end, and take a scientific\\nview of the subject in the same manner as\\nmathematical writers avoid indeed the occa-\\nsional tediousness of going all through a very\\nsimple demonstration, which the learner, if he\\nwill, may easily supply but yet always speak\\nin strict mathematical language, and with re-\\nference to mathematical principles, though\\nthey do not always state them at full length.\\nI would not profess, therefore, any more than\\nthey do, to write (on subjects connected with\\nthe science) in a language intelligible to those\\nwho are ignorant of its first rudiments to do\\nso, indeed, would imply that one was not\\ntaking a scientific view of the subject, nor\\navailing one s-self of the principles that had\\nbeen established, and the accurate and con-\\ncise technical language that had been framed.\\nMistakes as The rules already given enable us to de-\\nto the office\\nof Logic, velop the principles on which all reasoning\\nis conducted, whatever be the Subject-matter\\nof it, and to ascertain the validity or fal-\\nlaciousness of any apparent argument, as far\\nas the form of expression is concerned; that\\nbeing alone the proper province of Logic.\\nBut it is evident that we may nevertheless\\nremain liable to be deceived or perplexed in", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0196.jp2"}, "197": {"fulltext": "Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 151\\nArgument by the assumption of false or doubt-\\nful Premises, or by the employment of in-\\ndistinct or ambiguous Terms; and, accordingly,\\nmany Logical writers, wishing to make then-\\nsystems appear as perfect as possible, have\\nundertaken to give rules for attaining clear\\nideas, and for guiding the judgment and\\nfancying or professing themselves successful in\\nthis, have consistently enough denominated\\nLogic, the Art of using the Reason which\\nin truth it would be, and would nearly super-\\nsede all other studies, if it could of itself\\nascertain the meaning of every Term, and the\\ntruth or falsity of every Proposition, in the\\nsame manner as it actually can the validity of\\nevery Argument. And they have been led\\ninto this, partly by the consideration that\\nLogic is concerned about the three operations\\nof the mind simple Apprehension, Judgment,\\nand Reasoning not observing that it is not\\nequally concerned about all the last opera-\\ntion being alone its appropriate province\\nand the rest being treated of only in reference\\nto that.\\nThe contempt justly due to such preten-\\nsions has most unjustly fallen on the Science\\nitself; much in the same manner as Chemistry\\nwas brought into disrepute among the un-\\nthinking, by the extravagant pretensions of\\nthe Alchy mists. And those Logical writers", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0197.jp2"}, "198": {"fulltext": "152 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book III.\\nhave been censured, not (as they should have\\nbeen) for making such professions, but for not\\nfulfilling them. It has been objected, espe-\\ncially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at\\na loss as to the most important and difficult\\npoint in Reasoning viz, the ascertaining the\\nsense of the terms employed, and removing\\ntheir ambiguity. A complaint resembling that\\nmade (according to a story told by Warbur-\\nton,* and before alluded to) by a man who\\nfound fault with all the reading-glasses pre-\\nsented to him by the shopkeeper the fact\\nbeing that he never learnt to read. In the\\npresent case, the complaint is the more un-\\nreasonable, inasmuch as there neither is, nor\\never can possibly be, any such system devised\\nas will effect the proposed object of clearing\\nup the ambiguity of Terms. It is, however,\\nno small advantage, that the rules of Logic,\\nthough they cannot, alone, ascertain and clear\\nup ambiguity in any Term, yet do point out\\nin which Term of an Argument it is to be\\nsought for directing our attention to the\\nmiddle Term, as the one on the ambiguity of\\nwhich a Fallacy is likely to be built.\\nIt will be useful, however, to class and\\ndescribe the different kinds of ambiguity\\nwhich are to be met with; and also the\\nvarious ways in which the insertion of false,\\nIn his Div. Leg.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0198.jp2"}, "199": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a71.J OF FALLACIES. 153\\nor, at least, unduly assumed, Premises, is\\nmost likely to elude observation. And though\\nthe remarks which will be offered on these\\npoints may not be considered as strictly form-\\ning a part of Logic, they cannot be thought\\nout of place, when it is considered how essen-\\ntially they are connected with the application\\nof it.\\n1-\\nThe division of Fallacies into those in the Division of\\nFallacies.\\nwords (IN DICTIONE,) and those in the\\nmatter (EXTRA DICTIONEM) has not\\nbeen, by any writers hitherto, grounded on\\nany distinct principle at least, not on any\\nthat they have themselves adhered to. The\\nconfounding together, however, of these two\\nclasses is highly detrimental to all clear no-\\ntions concerning Logic being obviously allied\\nto the prevailing erroneous views which make\\nLogic the art of emploijing the intellectual\\nfaculties in general, having the discovery of\\ntruth for its object, and all kinds of know-\\nledge for its proper subject-matter with all\\nthat train of vague and groundless specu-\\nlations which have led to such interminable\\nconfusion and mistakes, and afforded a pre-\\ntext for such clamorous censures.\\nIt is important, therefore, that rules should\\nbe given for a division of Fallacies into", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0199.jp2"}, "200": {"fulltext": "154 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nLogical and Non-logical, on such a principle\\nas shall keep clear of all this indistinctness\\nand perplexity.\\nIf any one should object, that the division\\nabout to be adopted is in some degree arbi-\\ntrary, placing under the one head Fallacies,\\nwhich many might be disposed to place under\\nthe other, let him consider not only the in-\\ndistinctness of all former divisions, but the\\nutter impossibility of framing any that shall\\nbe completely secure from the objection urged,\\nin a case where men have formed such various\\nand vague notions, from the very want of\\nsome clear principle of division. Nay, from\\nthe elliptical form in which all reasoning is\\nusually expressed, and the peculiarly involved\\nand oblique form in which Fallacy is for the\\nmost part conveyed, it must of course be\\noften a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbi-\\ntrary choice, not only to which genus each\\nhind of Fallacy should be referred, but even\\nto which kind to refer any one individual Fal-\\nlacy for since, in any course of Argument,\\none Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently\\nhappens, in the case of a Fallacy, that the\\nhearers are left to the alternative of supplying\\neither a Premiss which is not true, or else, one\\nindetermi- which does not prove the Conclusion e. g. if a\\nnate charac-\\n;^j\u00c2\u00b0 s fFal man expatiates on the distress of the country,\\nand thence argues that the government is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0200.jp2"}, "201": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a72.] OF FALLACIES. 155\\ntyrannical, we must suppose him to assume\\neither that every distressed country is under\\na tyranny, which is a manifest falsehood, or,\\nmerely that every country under a tyranny\\nis distressed, which, however true, proves\\nnothing, the Middle Term being undistributed.\\nNow, in the former case, the Fallacy would\\nbe referred to the head of extra dictionem\\nin the latter to that of in dictione which\\nare we to suppose the speaker meant us to\\nunderstand? Surely just whichever each of\\nhis hearers might happen to prefer some\\nmight assent to the false Premiss others,\\nallow the unsound Syllogism to the Sophist\\nhimself it is indifferent, as long as they can\\nbut be brought to admit the Conclusion.\\nWithout pretending, then, to conform to\\nevery one s mode of speaking on the subject,\\nor~to lay down rules which shall be in them-\\nselves (without any call for labour or skill in\\nthe person who employs them) readily appli-\\ncable to, and decisive on each individual case,\\nI propose a division which is at least perfectly\\nclear in its main principle, and coincides, per-\\nhaps, as nearly as possible with the established\\nnotions of Logicians on the subject.\\n2\\nt\\\\\\ndoes, or does not follow from the Premises.\\nIn every Fallacy, the Conclusion either l\\nJ J Fallacies.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0201.jp2"}, "202": {"fulltext": "156 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nWhere the Conclusion does not follow from\\nthe Premises, it is manifest that the fault is\\nin the Reasoning, and in that alone these,\\ntherefore, we call Logical Fallacies,* as being,\\nproperly, violations of those rules of Reason-\\ning which it is the province of Logic to lay\\ndown.\\nOf these, however, one kind are more purely\\nLogical, as exhibiting their fallaciousness by\\nthe bare form of the expression, without any\\nregard to the meaning of the Terms to\\nwhich class belong 1 st. Undistributed Middle\\n2d. Illicit Process 3d. Negative Premises, or\\nAffirmative Conclusion from a negative Pre-\\nmiss, and vice versa to which may be added,\\n4th. those which have palpably (i.e. expressed)\\nmore than three Terms.\\nThe other kind may be most properly called\\nsemi-logical viz. all the cases of ambiguous\\nmiddle Term except its non-distribution for\\nthough in such cases the conclusion does not\\nfollow, and though the rules of Logic show\\nthat it does not, as soon as the ambiguity of the\\nmiddle Term is ascertained, yet the discovery\\nand ascertainment of this ambiguity requires\\nattention to the sense of the term, and know-\\nledge of the Subject-matter; so that here,\\nIn the same manner as we call that a criminal court\\nin which crimes are judged.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0202.jp2"}, "203": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a72.] OF FALLACIES. 157\\nLogic teaches us not how to find the Fallacy,\\nbut only where to search for it, and on what\\nprinciples to condemn it.\\nAccordingly it has been made a subject of\\nbitter complaint against Logic, that it presup-\\nposes the most difficult point to be already\\naccomplished, viz the sense of the Terms to\\nbe ascertained. A similar objection might be\\nurged against every other art in existence\\ne. g. against Agriculture, that all the precepts\\nfor the cultivation of land presuppose the\\npossession of a farm or against Perspective,\\nthat its rules are useless to a blind man. The\\nobjection is indeed peculiarly absurd when\\nurged against Logic, because the object which\\nit is blamed for not accomplishing cannot j os-\\nsibly be within the province of any one art\\nwhatever. Is it indeed possible or conceiv-\\nable that there should be any method, science,\\nor system, that should enable one to know\\nthe full and exact meaning of every term in\\nexistence The utmost that can be done is\\nto give some general rules that may assist us\\nin this work which is done in the first two\\nchapters of Book II.\\nThe very author of the objection says,\\nThis (the comprehension of the meaning of\\ngeneral Terms) is a study which every in-\\ndividual must carry on for himself; and of\\nwhich no rules of Logic (how useful soever", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0203.jp2"}, "204": {"fulltext": "158 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nthey may be in directing our labours) can\\nsupersede the necessity. D. Stewart, Phil.\\nVol. II. chap. ii. s. 2.\\nNothing perhaps tends more to conceal\\nfrom men their imperfect conception of the\\nmeaning of a term, than the circumstance of\\ntheir being able fully to comprehend a process\\nof reasoning in which it is involved, without\\nattaching any distinct meaning at all to\\nthat Term; as is evident when X Y Z are\\nused to stand for Terms, in a regular Syllo-\\ngism thus a man may be familiarized with a\\nTerm, and never find himself at a loss from\\nnot comprehending it from which he will be\\nvery likely to infer that he does comprehend\\nit, when perhaps he does not, but employs it\\nvaguely and incorrectly; which leads to fal-\\nlacious Reasoning and. confusion. It must be\\nowned, however, that many Logical writers\\nhave, in great measure, brought on themselves\\nthe reproach in question, by calling Logic\\nthe right use of Reason, laying down\\nrules for gaining clear ideas, and such-like\\nakafavela, as Aristotle calls it. (Rhet. Book I.\\nChap, ii.)\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nMaterial Fai- The remaining class (viz. where the Conclu-\\nsion does follow from the Premises) may be\\ncalled the Material, or Non-logical Fallacies", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0204.jp2"}, "205": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a73.] OF FALLACIES. 159\\nof these there are two kinds 1st. when\\nthe Premises are such as ought not to have\\nbeen assumed 2d. when the Conclusion is\\nnot the one required, but irrelevant which\\nFallacy is called ignoratio elenchi because\\nyour Argument is not the elenchus (i, e.\\nproof of the contradictor?/) of your opponent s\\nassertion, which it should be but proves, in-\\nstead of that, some other proposition resem-\\nbling it. Hence, since Logic defines what\\nContradiction is, some may choose rather to\\nrange this with the Logical Fallacies, as it\\nseems, so far, to come under the jurisdiction\\nof that art nevertheless, it is perhaps better\\nto adhere to the original division, both on\\naccount of its clearness, and also because few\\nwould be inclined to apply to the Fallacy in\\nquestion the accusation of being inconclusive,\\nand consequently illogical reasoning besides\\nwhich, it seems an artificial and circuitous\\nway of speaking, to suppose in all cases an\\nopponent and a contradiction the simple state-\\nment of the matter being this, I am required,\\nby the circumstances of the case, (no matter\\nwhy) to prove a certain Conclusion I prove,\\nnot that, but one which is likely to be mis-\\ntaken for it; in this lies the Fallacy.\\nFor it is manifest that the fault, if there be any, must\\nbe either 1st. in the Premises, or 2dly. in the Conclusion,\\nor 3dly. in the Connexion between them.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0205.jp2"}, "206": {"fulltext": "160 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nIt might be desirable therefore to lay aside\\nthe name of ignoratio elenchi, but that it\\nis so generally adopted as absolutely to re-\\nquire some mention to be made of it. The\\nother kind of Fallacies in the Matter will\\ncomprehend (as far as the vague and ob-\\nscure language of Logical writers will allow\\nus to conjecture) the fallacy of non causa\\npro causa and that of petitio principii: of\\nthese, the former is by them distinguished into\\na non vera pro vera and a non tali pro\\ntali; this last would appear to be arguing\\nfrom a case not parallel as if it were so\\nwhich, in Logical language, is, having the\\nsuppressed Premiss false for it is in that the\\nparallelism is affirmed and the non vera\\npro vera will in like manner signify the ex-\\npressed Premiss being false so that this Fal-\\nlacy will turn out to be, in plain terms, neither\\nmore nor less than falsity (or unfair assump-\\ntion) of a Premiss.\\nThe remaining kind, petitio principii\\n(begging the question takes place when a\\nPremiss, whether true or false, is either\\nplainly equivalent to the Conclusion, or de-\\npends on it for its own reception. It is to\\nbe observed, however, that in all correct\\nReasoning the Premises must, virtually, im-\\nply the Conclusion so that it is not possi-\\nble to mark precisely the distinction between", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0206.jp2"}, "207": {"fulltext": "4.] OF FALLACIES. l(jl\\nthe Fallacy in question and fair Argument;\\nsince that may be correct and fair Rea-\\nsoning to one person, which would be, to\\nanother, begging the question inasmuch\\nas to one, the Conclusion might be more\\nevident than the Premiss, and to the other,\\nthe reverse. The most plausible form of this\\nFallacy is arguing in a circle; and the greater\\nthe circle, the harder to detect.\\n\u00c2\u00a74-\\nThere is no Fallacy that may not properly\\nbe included under some of the foregoing\\nheads those which in. the Logical treatises\\nare separately enumerated, and contradistin-\\nguished from these, being in reality instances\\nof them, and therefore more properly enume-\\nrated inlthe subdivision thereof; as in the\\nscheme annexed\\nM", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0207.jp2"}, "208": {"fulltext": "162\\nELEMENTS OF LOGIC.\\n[Book III.\\ns\\nS3\\n9?\\n2 2.0I\\n3.5\\na.SS\\nJ 3 co\\nGO\\nJL E^\\no EL\\ntr 1 o\\n3^\\nH0CO\\no\\nCD -ts\\ns i\\n3 a", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0208.jp2"}, "209": {"fulltext": "|5.J OF FALLACIES. 163\\n\u00c2\u00a75.\\nOn each of the Fallacies which have been\\nthus enumerated and distinguished, I propose\\nto offer some more particular remarks but\\nbefore I proceed to this, it will be proper to\\npremise two general observations, 1st. on the\\nimportance, and 2d. the difficulty, of detect-\\ning and describing Fallacies both have been\\nalready slightly alluded to but it is requisite\\nthat they should here be somewhat more fully\\nand distinctly set forth.\\n1st. It seems by most persons to be taken\\nfor granted that a Fallacy is to be dreaded importance\\nof detecting\\nmerely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by Faiude..\\na skilful sophist or if they allow that a man\\nmay with honest intentions slide into one un-\\nconsciously, in the heat of argument, still they\\nseem to suppose that where there is no dispute,\\nthere is no cause to dread Fallacy whereas\\nthere is much danger, even in what may be\\ncalled solitary reasoning, of sliding unawares\\ninto some Fallacy, by which one may be so far\\ndeceived as even to act upon the conclusion\\nthus obtained. By solitary reasoning I mean\\nthe case in which one is not seeking for argu-\\nments to prove a given question, but labouring\\nto elicit from one s previous stock of know-\\nledge some useful inference.* To select one\\nSee the chapter on inferring and proving, (Book IV.\\nCh. iii.) in the Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning.\\nM 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0209.jp2"}, "210": {"fulltext": "164 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nfrom innumerable examples that might be\\ncited, and of which some more will occur in\\nthe subsequent part of this essay; it is not\\nimprobable that many indifferent sermons\\nhave been produced by the ambiguity of the\\nword plain: a young divine perceives the\\ntruth of the maxim, that for the lower\\norders one s language cannot be too plain:\\n(i. e. clear and perspicuous, so as to require\\nno learning nor ingenuity to understand it,)\\nand when he proceeds to practise, the word\\nplain indistinctly flits before him, as it\\nwere, and often checks him in the use of\\nornaments of style, such as metaphor, epithet,\\nantithesis, fyc, which are opposed to plain-\\nness in a totally different sense of the word\\nbeing by no means necessarily adverse to\\nperspicuity, but rather, in many cases, con-\\nducive to it as may be seen in several of\\nthe clearest of our Lord s discourses, which\\nare the very ones that are the most richly\\nadorned with figurative language. So far in-\\ndeed is an ornamented style from being unfit\\nfor the vulgar, that they are pleased with it even\\nin excess. Yet the desire to be plain, com-\\nbined with that dim and confused notion which\\nthe ambiguity of the word produces in such\\nas do not separate in their minds, and set\\nbefore themselves, the two meanings, often\\ncauses them to write in a dry and bald style,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0210.jp2"}, "211": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a75.] OF FALLACIES. 165\\nwhich has no advantage in point of perspicuity,\\nand is least of all suited to the taste of the\\nvulgar. The above instance is not drawn\\nfrom- mere conjecture, but from actual expe-\\nrience of the fact.\\nAnother instance of the strong influence of innueucc of\\nwords ou\\nwords on our ideas may be adduced from a th0p s bt\\nwidely different subject most persons feel a\\ncertain degree of surprise on first hearing of\\nthe result of some late experiments of the\\nAgricultural Chemists, by which they have\\nascertained that universally what are called\\nheavy soils are specifically the lightest and\\nvice versa. Whence this surprise for no one\\never distinctly believed the established names\\nto be used in the literal and primary sense, in\\nconsequence of the respective soils having\\nbeen xveighed together indeed it is obvious\\non a moment s reflection that tenacious clay-\\nsoils (as well as muddy roads) are figuratively\\ncalled heavy, from the difficulty of ploughing,\\nor passing over them, which produces an effect\\nlike that of bearing or dragging a heavy\\nweight yet still the terms u light and\\nheavy, though used figuratively, have most\\nundoubtedly introduced into men s minds\\nsomething of the ideas expressed by them in\\ntheir primitive sense. The same words, when\\napplied to articles of diet, have produced im-\\nportant errors many supposing some article", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0211.jp2"}, "212": {"fulltext": "166 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nof food to be light of digestion from its being\\nspecifically light. So true is the ingenious ob-\\nservation of Hobbes, that words are the\\ncounters of wise men, and the money of\\nfools.\\nMen imagine, says Bacon, that their minds have\\nthe command of Language but it often happens that\\nLanguage bears rule over their mind. Some of the\\nweak and absurd arguments which are often urged against\\nSuicide may be traced to the influence of words on\\nthoughts. When a Christian moralist is called on for a\\ndirect Scriptural precept against suicide, instead of reply-\\ning that the Bible is not meant for a complete code of\\nlaws, but for a system of motives and principles, the answer\\nfrequently given is thou shalt do no murder and it is\\nassumed in the arguments drawn from Reason, as well as\\nin those from Revelation, that Suicide is a species of\\nMurder; viz. because it is called se\\\\\u00c2\u00a3-murder; and thus,\\ndeluded by a name, many are led to rest on an unsound\\nargument, which, like all other fallacies, does more harm\\nthan good, in the end, to the cause of truth. Suicide, if\\nany one considers the nature and not the name of it,\\nevidently wants the most essential characteristic of mur-\\nder, viz. the hurt and injury done to one s neighbour, in\\ndepriving him of life, as well as to others by the insecurity\\nthey are in consequence liable to feel. And since no one\\ncan, strictly speaking, do injustice to himself, he cannot,\\nin the literal and primary acceptation of the words, be said\\neither to rob or to murder himself. He who deserts the\\npost to which he is appointed by his great Master, and\\npresumptuously cuts short the state of probation graciously\\nallowed him for working out his salvation, (whether by\\naction or by patient endurance,) is guilty indeed of a\\ngrievous sin, but of one not the least analogous in its\\ncharacter to murder. It implies no inhumanity. It is\\nmuch more closely allied to the sin of wasting life in", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0212.jp2"}, "213": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a75.] OF FALLACIES. 167\\nMore especially deserving of attention is\\nthe influence of Analogical Terms in leading\\nmen into erroneous notions in Theology\\nwhere the most important terms are analogi-\\ncal and yet they are continually employed\\nin Reasoning, without due attention (oftener\\nthrough want of caution than by unfair de-\\nsign) to their analogical nature and most of\\nthe errors into which theologians have fallen\\nmay be traced, in part, to this cause.*\\nIn speaking of the importance of refuting\\nFallacies, (under which name I include, as\\nwill be seen, any false assumption employed as\\na premiss) this consideration ought not to be\\noverlooked that an unsound Principle, which\\nhas been employed to establish some mis-\\nindolence, or in trifling pursuits, that life which is be-\\nstowed as a seed-time for the harvest of immortality. What\\nis called in familiar phrase killing time, is, in truth, an\\napproach, as far as it goes, to the destruction of one s own\\nlife for Time is the stuff life is made of.\\nIt is surely wiser and safer to confine ourselves to such\\narguments as will bear the test of a close examination,\\nthan to resort to such as may indeed at the first glance\\nbe more specious and appear stronger, but which, when\\nexposed, will too often leave a man a dupe to the fallacies\\non the opposite side. But it is especially the error of\\ncontroversialists to urge every thing that can be urged\\nto snatch up the first weapon that comes to hand\\nfuror arma ministrat without waiting to consider\\nwhat is TRUE.\\nSec the notes to Ch. v. 1. of the Dissertation sub-\\njoined.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0213.jp2"}, "214": {"fulltext": "168 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IIL\\nchievously false Conclusion, does not at once\\nbecome harmless, and too insignificant to be\\nworth refuting, as soon as that conclusion is\\ngiven up, and the false Principle is no longer\\nemployed for that particular use. It may\\nequally well lead to some other no less mis-\\nchievous result. A false premiss, according\\nas it is combined with this, or with that, true\\none, will lead to two different false conclu-\\nsions. Thus, if the principle be admitted,\\nthat any important religious errors ought to\\nbe forcibly suppressed, this may lead either\\nto persecution on the one side, or to latitudi-\\nnarian indifference on the other. Some may\\nbe led to justify the suppression of heresies by\\nthe civil sword and others, whose feelings\\nrevolt at such a procedure, and who see per-\\nsecution reprobated and discountenanced by\\nthose around them, may be led by the same\\nprinciple to regard religious errors as of little\\nor no importance, and all religious persuasions\\nas equally acceptable in the sight of God.\\nThus much, as to the extensive practical in-\\nfluence of Fallacies, and the consequent high\\nimportance of detecting and exposing them.\\n\u00c2\u00a76.\\nDifficulty of 2dly. The second remark is, that while\\ndetecting\\nFallacies, sound reasoning is ever the more readily\\nThe Errors of Romanism, Ch. v. 2. p. 228.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0214.jp2"}, "215": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a7C] OF FALLACIES. 169\\nadmitted, the more clearly it is perceived to be\\nsuch, Fallacy, on the contrary, being rejected\\nas soon as perceived, will, of course, be the\\nmore likely to obtain reception, the more it is\\nobscured and disguised by obliquity and com-\\nplexity of expression it is thus that it is the\\nmost likely. either to slip accidentally from the\\ncareless reasoner, or to be brought forward\\ndeliberately by the Sophist. Not that he\\never wishes this obscurity and complexity to\\nbe perceived on the contrary, it is for his\\npurpose that the expression should appear as\\nclear and simple as possible, while in reality it\\nis the most tangled net he can contrive.\\nThus, whereas it is usual to express our rea-\\nsoning, elliptically, so that a Premiss (or even\\ntwo or three entire steps in a course of argu-\\nment) which may be readily supplied, as being\\nperfectly obvious, shall be left to be under-\\nstood, the Sophist in like manner suppresses\\nwhat is not obvious, but is in reality the weakest\\npart of the argument and uses every other\\ncontrivance to withdraw our attention (his\\nart closely resembling the juggler s) from the\\nquarter where the Fallacy lies. Hence the\\nuncertainty before mentioned, to which class\\nany individual Fallacy is to be referred and\\nhence it is that the difficulty of detecting and\\nexposing Fallacy, is so much greater than that\\nof comprehending and developing a process of", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0215.jp2"}, "216": {"fulltext": "170 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book III.\\nsound argument. It is like the detection and\\napprehension of a criminal in spite of all his\\narts of concealment and disguise when this is\\naccomplished, and he is brought to trial with\\nall the evidence of his guilt produced, his con-\\nviction and punishment are easy and this is\\nprecisely the case with those Fallacies which\\nare given as examples in Logical treatises\\nthey are in fact already detected, by being\\nstated in a plain and regular form, and are, as\\nit were, only brought up to receive sentence.\\nOr again, fallacious reasoning may be com-\\npared to a perplexed and entangled mass of\\naccounts, which it requires much sagacity and\\nclose attention to clear up, and display in a\\nregular and intelligible form though when this\\nis once accomplished, the whole appears so per-\\nfectly simple, that the unthinking are apt to\\nundervalue the skill and pains which have\\nbeen employed upon it.\\nMoreover, it should be remembered that a\\nvery long discussion is one of the most effec-\\ntual veils of Fallacy. Sophistry, like poison,\\nis at once detected, and nauseated, when\\npresented to us in a concentrated form but\\na Fallacy which when stated barely, in a few\\nsentences, would not deceive a child, may\\ndeceive half the world, if diluted in a quarto\\nvolume. For, as in a calculation, one single\\nfigure incorrectly stated will enable us to", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0216.jp2"}, "217": {"fulltext": "(J.J OF FALLACIES. 1 7 i\\narrive at any result whatever, though every\\nother figure, and the whole of the operations,\\nbe correct, so, a single false assumption in any\\nprocess of reasoning, though every other be\\ntrue, will enable us to draw what conclusion\\nwe please and the greater the number of\\ntrue assumptions, the more likely it is that\\nthe false one will pass unnoticed.* But\\nwhen you single out one step in the course of\\nthe reasoning, and exhibit it as a Syllogism\\nwith one Premiss true and the other false, the\\nsophistry is easily perceived. To use another\\nillustration, it is true in a course of argument,\\nas in Mechanics, that nothing is stronger\\nthan its weakest part and consequently a\\nI have seen a long argument to prove that the potato\\nis not a cheap article of food in which there was an ela-\\nborate, and perhaps correct, calculation of the produce per\\nacre of potatoes, and of wheat, the quantity lost in bran\\nexpense of grinding, dressing, $c. and an assumption\\nslipped in, as it were incidentally, that a given quantity of\\npotatoes contains but one-tenth part of nutritive matter equal\\nto bread from all which (and there is probably but one\\ngroundless assertion in the whole) a most triumphant\\nresult was deduced. This, however, gained the undoubt-\\ning assent of a Review by no means friendly to the author,\\nand usually noted more for scepticism than for ready\\nassent u All things, says an apocryphal writer, are\\ndouble, one against another, and nothing is made in vain\\nunblushing assertors of falsehood seem to have a race of\\neasy believers provided on purpose for their use men\\nwho will not indeed believe the best-established truths\\nof religion, but are ready to believe any thing else.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0217.jp2"}, "218": {"fulltext": "172 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nchain which has one faulty link will break\\nbut though the number of the sound links\\nadds nothing to the strength of the chain, it\\nadds much to the chance of the faulty one s\\nescaping observation.\\nTo speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies\\nthat have ever been enumerated as too glaring\\nand obvious to need even being mentioned,\\nbecause the simple instances given in logical\\ntreatises, and there stated in the plainest\\nand consequently most easily detected form,\\nare such as would (in that form) deceive no\\none; this, surely, shows extreme weakness,\\nor else unfairness. It may readily be allowed,\\nindeed, that to detect individual Fallacies, and\\nbring them under the general rules, is a harder\\ntask than to lay down those general rules\\nbut this does not prove that the latter office\\nis trifling or useless, or that it does not essen-\\ntially conduce to the performance of the\\nother there may be more ingenuity shown\\nin detecting and arresting a malefactor, and\\nconvicting him of the fact, than in laying\\ndown a law for the trial and punishment of\\nsuch persons but the latter office, L e, that\\nof a legislator, is surely neither unnecessary\\nnor trifling.\\nIt should be added that a close observation\\nand Logical analysis of Fallacious arguments,\\nas it tends (according to what has been already", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0218.jp2"}, "219": {"fulltext": "7.] OF FALLACIES. 173\\nsaid) to form a habit of mind well suited for\\nthe practical detection of Fallacies so, for\\nthat very reason, it will make us the more\\ncareful in making allowance for them i. e. to\\nbear in mind how much men in general are\\nliable to be influenced by them. E. G. a re-\\nfuted argument ought to go for nothing but in\\nfact it will generally prove detrimental to the\\ncause, from the Fallacy which will be pre-\\nsently explained. Now, no one is more likely\\nto be practically aware of this, and to take\\nprecautions accordingly, than he who is most\\nversed in the whole theory of Fallacies for\\nthe best Logician is the least likely to calcu-\\nlate on men in general being such.\\n\u00c2\u00a77.\\nOf Fallacies in form,\\nenough has already been said in the pre-\\nceding Compendium and it has been re-\\nmarked above, that it is often left to our\\nchoice to refer an individual Fallacy to this\\nhead or to another.\\nTo the present class we may the most con-\\nveniently refer those Fallacies, so common in\\npractice, of supposing the conclusion false,\\nbecause the Premiss is false, or because the\\nargument is unsound and inferring the truth\\nof the Premiss from that of the Conclusion", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0219.jp2"}, "220": {"fulltext": "174 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. k [Book III.\\ne.g. if any one argues for the existence of a\\nGod, from its being universally believed, a\\nman might perhaps be able to refute the argu-\\nment by producing an instance of some nation\\ndestitute of such belief; the argument ought\\nthen (as has been observed above) to go for\\nnothing but many would go further, and\\nthink that this refutation had disproved the\\nexistence of a God in which they would be\\nguilty of an illicit process of the major term\\nviz. whatever is universally believed must\\nbe true the existence of a God is not uni-\\nversally believed; therefore it is not true.\\nOthers again from being convinced of the\\ntruth of the conclusion would infer that of the\\nPremises; which would amount to the Fal-\\nlacy of an undistributed middle viz. what\\nis universally believed, is true the existence\\nof a God is true therefore it is universally\\nbelieved. Or, these Fallacies might be stated\\nin the hypothetical form; since the one evi-\\ndently proceeds from the denial of the antece-\\ndent to the denial of the consequent and the\\nother from the establishing of the consequent\\nto the inferring of the antecedent which two\\nFallacies will often be found to correspond\\nrespectively with those of Illicit process of the\\nmajor, and Undistributed middle.\\nFallacies of this class are very much kept\\nout of sight, being seldom perceived even by", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0220.jp2"}, "221": {"fulltext": "7.] OF FALLACIES. 175\\nthose who employ them but of their prac-\\ntical importance there can be no doubt, since\\nit is notorious that a weak argument is always,\\nin practice, detrimental and that there is no\\nabsurdity so gross which men will not readily\\nadmit, if it appears to lead to a conclusion of\\nwhich they are already convinced. Even a\\ncandid and sensible writer is not unlikely to\\nbe, by this means, misled, when he is seeking\\nfor arguments to support a conclusion which\\nhe has long been fully convinced of himself\\nL e. he will often use such arguments as\\nwould never have convinced himself, and are\\nnot likely to convince others, but rather (by\\nthe operation of the converse Fallacy) to\\nconfirm in their dissent those who before dis-\\nagreed with him.\\nIt is best therefore to endeavour to put\\nyourself in the place of an opponent to your\\nown arguments, and consider whether you\\ncould not find some objection to them. The\\napplause of one s own party is a very unsafe\\nground for judging of the real force of an\\nargumentative work, and consequently of its\\nreal utility. To satisfy those who were doubt-\\ning, and to convince those who were opposed,\\nare the only sure tests but these persons are\\nseldom very loud in their applause, or very\\nforward in bearing their testimony.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0221.jp2"}, "222": {"fulltext": "176 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nOf Ambiguous middle.\\n\u00c2\u00a78.\\nThat case in which the middle is undistri-\\nbuted belongs of course to the preceding head,\\nthe fault being perfectly manifest from the\\nmere form of the expression in that case the\\nextremes are compared with two parts of the\\nsame term but in the Fallacy which has been\\ncalled semi-logical, (which we are now to\\nspeak of) the extremes are compared with\\ntwo different terms, the middle being used in\\ntwo different senses in the two Premises.*\\nAnd here it may be remarked, that when\\nthe argument is brought into the form of a\\nregular Syllogism, the contrast between these\\ntwo senses will usually appear very striking,\\nfrom the two Premises being placed together\\nand hence the scorn with which many have\\ntreated the very mention of the Fallacy of\\nEquivocation, deriving their only notion of it\\nfrom the exposure of it in Logical treatises\\nwhereas, in practice it is common for the two\\nPremises to be placed very far apart, and dis-\\ncussed in different parts of the discourse by\\nwhich means the inattentive hearer overlooks\\nany ambiguity that may exist in the middle\\nFor some instances of important ambiguities, see\\nAppendix.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0222.jp2"}, "223": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a78.J OF FALLACIES. 177\\nterm. Hence the advantage of Logical ha-\\nbits, to fix our attention strongly and steadily\\non the important terms of an argument.\\nOne case, which may be regarded as com- paronymous\\nword?.\\ning under the head of Ambiguous middle, is,\\nwhat is called, Fallacia Figures Dictionis\\nthe Fallacy built on the grammatical structure\\nof language, from men s usually taking for\\ngranted that paronymous words i. e. those\\nbelonging to each other, as the substantive,\\nadjective, verb, fyc. of the same root) have a\\nprecisely correspondent meaning which is by\\nno means universally the case. Such a fallacy\\ncould not indeed be even exhibited in strict\\nLogical form, which would preclude even the\\nattempt at it, since it has two middle terms in\\nsound as well as sense but nothing is more\\ncommon in practice than to vary continually\\nthe terms employed, with a view to grammati-\\ncal convenience nor is there anything unfair\\nin such a practice, as long as the meaning is\\npreserved unaltered e. g. murder should be\\npunished with death this man is a murderer\\ntherefore he deserves to die, fyc. Spc. Here\\nwe proceed on the assumption (in this case\\njust) that to commit murder and to be a mur-\\nderer, to deserve death and to be one who\\nought to die, are, respectively, equivalent\\nexpressions and it would frequently prove a\\nheavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind\\nN", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0223.jp2"}, "224": {"fulltext": "178 ELEMENTS OF LOGrC. [Book III.\\nof liberty but the abuse of it gives rise to\\nthe Fallacy in question e. g. projectors are\\nunfit to be trusted; this man has formed a\\nproject, therefore he is unfit to be trusted\\nhere the Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis\\nthat he who forms a project must be a projec-\\ntor whereas the bad sense that commonly\\nattaches to the latter word, is not at all im-\\nplied in the former.\\nThis Fallacy may often be considered as\\nlying not in the middle, but in one of the\\nterms of the conclusion so that the conclu-\\nsion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all\\nwarranted by the Premises, though it will\\nappear to be so, by means of the grammatical\\naffinity of the words e. g. to be acquainted\\nwith the guilty is a presumption of guilt this\\nman is so acquainted therefore we may\\npresume that he is guilty this argument\\nproceeds on the supposition of an exact cor-\\nrespondence between presume and pre-\\nsumption? which, however, does not really\\nexist for presumption is commonly used\\nto express a kind of slight suspicion whereas\\nto presume amounts to absolute belief.\\nThe above remark will apply to some other\\ncases of ambiguity of term viz. the conclu-\\nsion will often contain a term, which (though\\nnot, as here, different in expression from the\\nAdam Smith s Wealth of Nations Usury.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0224.jp2"}, "225": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a78.] OF FALLACIES. 179\\ncorresponding one in the Premiss, yet) is\\nliable to be understood in a sense different\\nfrom what it bears to the Premiss though, of\\ncourse, such a Fallacy is less common, be-\\ncause less likely to deceive, in those cases than\\nin this; where the term used in the conclu-\\nsion, though professing to correspond with\\none in the Premiss, is not the very same in\\nexpression, and therefore is more certain to\\nconvey a different sense which is what the\\nSophist wishes.\\nThere are innumerable instances of a non-\\ncorrespondence in paronymous words, similar\\nto that above instanced as between art and\\nartful, design and designing, faith and faith-\\nful, Sfc. and the more slight the variation of\\nmeaning, the more likely is the Fallacy to be\\nsuccessful for when the words have become\\nso widely removed in sense as pity and\\npitiful, every one would perceive such a\\nFallacy, nor could it be employed but in jest.\\nThis Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted,\\nby stating merely the impossibility of reducing\\nsuch an argument to the strict Logical form\\n(unless indeed you are addressing regular\\nLogicians) you must find some way of point-\\ning out the non-correspondence of the terms\\nin question e. g. with respect to the example\\nabove, it might be remarked, that we speak\\nof strong or faint presumption, but we use\\n2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0225.jp2"}, "226": {"fulltext": "180 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nno such expression in conjunction with the\\nverb presume/ because the word itself im-\\nplies strength.\\nNo fallacy is more common in controversy\\nthan the present, since in this way the Sophist\\nwill often be able to misinterpret the proposi-\\ntions which his opponent admits or maintains,\\nand so employ them against him. Thus in the\\nexamples just given, it is natural to conceive\\none of the Sophist s Premises to have been\\nborrowed from his opponent.*\\nEtymology. The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or\\nrather perhaps may be regarded as a branch\\nof that founded on etymology; viz. when a\\nTerm is used at one time, in its customary,\\nand at another, in its etymological sense.\\nPerhaps no example of this can be found\\nthat is more extensively and mischievously\\nemployed than in the case of the word repre-\\nsentative assuming that its right meaning\\nmust correspond exactly with the strict and\\noriginal sense of the verb, represent, the\\nSophist persuades the multitude, that a mem-\\nber of the House of Commons is bound to be\\nguided in all points by the opinion of his\\n-constituents and, in short, to be merely their\\nPerhaps a dictionary of such paronymous words as\\ndo not regularly correspond in meaning, would be nearly\\nas useful as one of synonyms i. e. properly speaking, of\\npseudo-synonyms.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0226.jp2"}, "227": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a79.] OF FALLACIES. 181\\nspokesman: whereas law and custom, which\\nin this case may be considered as fixing the\\nmeaning of the Term, require no such thing,\\nbut enjoin the representative to act according\\nto the best of his own judgment, and on his\\nown responsibility.*\\n\u00c2\u00a79.\\nIt is to be observed, that to the head of Fallacy of\\nIcterroga-\\nAmbiguous middle should be referred what tions\\nis called Fallacia plurium Interrogationum\\nwhich may be named, simply, the Fallacy\\nof Interrogation viz. the Fallacy of asking\\nseveral questions which appear to be but one\\nso that whatever one answer is given, being of\\ncourse applicable to one only of the implied\\nquestions, may be interpreted as applied to\\nthe other; the refutation is, of course, to\\nreply separately to each question, L e. to\\ndetect the ambiguity.\\nI have said, several questions which ap-\\nHome Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such\\nweapons for any Sophist who may need them and has\\nfurnished some specimens of the employment of them.\\nHe contends, that it is idle to speak of eternal or im-\\nmutable Truth, because the word is derived from to\\n11 trow, i. e. believe. He might on as good grounds\\nhave censured the absurdity of speaking of sending a\\nletter by the post because a post, in its primary\\nsense, is a pillar or have insisted that Sycophant\\ncan never mean anything but Fig-shower.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0227.jp2"}, "228": {"fulltext": "182 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\npear to be but one for else there is no Fal-\\nlacy such an example, therefore, as estne\\nhomo animal et lapis? which Aldrich gives,\\nis foreign to the matter in hand; for there\\nis nothing unfair in asking two distinct ques-\\ntions (any more than in asserting two dis-\\ntinct propositions) distinctly and avowedly.\\nThis Fallacy may be referred, as has been\\nsaid, to the head of Ambiguous middle. In all\\nReasoning it is very common to state one of\\nthe Premises in form of a question, and when\\nthat is admitted, or supposed to be admitted,\\nthen to fill up the rest; if then one of the\\nTerms of that question be ambiguous, which-\\never sense the opponent replies to, the Sophist\\nassumes the other sense of the Term in the\\nremaining Premiss. It is therefore very com-\\nmon to state an equivocal argument, in form\\nof a question so worded, that there shall be\\nlittle doubt which reply will be given but if\\nthere be such doubt, the Sophist must have\\ntwo Fallacies of equivocation ready e. g. the\\nquestion whether anything vicious is expe-\\ndient, discussed in Cic. Off. Book III. (where,\\nby the bye, he seems not a little perplexed\\nwith it himself) is of the character in ques-\\ntion, from the ambiguity of the word expe-\\ndient which means sometimes, conducive\\nto temporal prosperity, sometimes con-\\nducive to the greatest good whichever", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0228.jp2"}, "229": {"fulltext": "10.J OF FALLACIES. 1 S3\\nanswer therefore was given, the Sophist might\\nhave a Fallacy of equivocation founded on this\\nterm viz. if the answer be in the negative,\\nhis argument, Logically developed, will stand\\nthus, u what is vicious is not expedient\\nwhatever conduces to the acquisition of wealth\\nand aggrandizement is expedient therefore it\\ncannot be vicious if in the affirmative, then\\nthus, u whatever is expedient is desirable\\nsomething vicious is expedient, therefore de-\\nsirable.\\nThis kind of Fallacy is frequently employed Distribution\\nand non-dis-\\nin such a manner, that the uncertainty shall trib tio\\nbe, not about the meaning, but the extent of a\\nTerm, i. e. whether it is distributed or not\\ne. g. did A B in this case act from such and\\nsuch a motive which may imply either,\\nwas it his sole motive? or was it one of\\nhis motives? in the former case the term\\nthat-which-actuated-A B is distributed in\\nthe latter, not now if he acted from a mixture\\nof motives, whichever answer you give, may\\nbe misrepresented, and thus disproved.\\n\u00c2\u00a710.\\nIn some cases of ambiguous middle, the intriuic and\\nrr\\\\ l ill incidoiit.il\\nTerm in question may be considered as hav- eq\u00c2\u00bb\u00c2\u00abw\u00c2\u00abtioM.\\ning in itself, from its own equivocal nature,\\ntwo significations (which apparently consti-\\ntutes the Fallacia equivocations of Logical", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0229.jp2"}, "230": {"fulltext": "1 84 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nwriters others again have a middle Term\\nwhich is ambiguous from the context, i. e.\\nfrom what is understood in conjunction with it.\\nThis division will be found useful, though it\\nis impossible to draw the line accurately in it.\\nThe elliptical character of ordinary discourse\\ncauses many Terms to become practically\\nambiguous, which yet are not themselves em-\\nployed in different senses, but with different\\napplications, which are understood. Thus,\\nThe Faith would be used by a Christian\\nwriter to denote the Christian Faith, and by\\na Mussulman, the Mahometan yet the word\\nFaith, has not in these cases, of itself, two\\ndifferent significations. So eKXetcrol, elect,\\nor chosen, is sometimes applied to such as\\nare chosen, to certain privileges and advan-\\ntages (as the Israelites were, though they\\nwere overthrown in the wilderness for their\\ndisobedience and as all Christians are fre-\\nquently called in the New Testament) some-\\ntimes again to those who are chosen, as fit\\nto receive a final reward, having made a right\\nuse of those advantages as when our Lord\\nsays, many are called, but few chosen.\\nWhat Logicians have mentioned under the title of\\nFallacia amphibolise is referable to this last class\\nthough in real practice it is not very likely to occur. An\\namphibolous sentence is one that is capable of two mean-\\nings, not from the double sense of any of the words, but", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0230.jp2"}, "231": {"fulltext": "10.J OF FALLACIES. 185\\nThere are various ways in which words Aedd\u00c2\u00bbt\u00c2\u00abi\\nJ equivocation.\\ncome to have two meanings 1 st. by accident\\n(i. e. when there is no perceptible connection\\nbetween the two meanings) as light sig-\\nnifies both the contrary to heavy, and the\\ncontrary to dark. Thus, such proper\\nnames as John or Thomas, fyc. which happen\\nto belong to several different persons, are\\nambiguous, because they have a different sig-\\nnification in each case where they are applied.\\nWords which fall under this first head are\\nwhat are the most strictly called equivocal.\\n2dly There are several terms in the use of First and\\nseco 1\\nwhich it is necessary to notice the distinction lion\\nsecond mlen-\\nfrom its admitting of a double construction as in the\\ninstance Aldrich gives, which is untranslatable quod\\ntangitur a Socrate, illud sentit where illud may be\\ntaken either as the nominative or accusative. So also the\\ncelebrated response of the oracle Aio te, iEacida, Ro-\\nmanos vincere posse which closely resembles (as Shak-\\nspeare remarks) the witch-prophecy, The Duke yet lives\\nthat Henry shall depose. A similar effect is produced\\nby what the French call construction louche, a squint-\\ning construction i. e. where some word or words may be\\nreferred either to the former or latter clause of the sen-\\ntence of which an instance occurs in the rubric prefixed\\nto the service of the 30th January. If this day shall\\nhappen to be Sunday [this form of prayer shall be used]\\nand the fast kept the next day following the clause in\\nbrackets may belong either to the former or the latter\\npart of the sentence. In the Nicene Creed, the words\\nu by whom all tilings were made, are grammatically re-\\nferable either to the Father or the Son.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0231.jp2"}, "232": {"fulltext": "1 86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nbetween first and second intention.* The\\nfirst-intention of a Term, (according to\\nthe usual acceptation of this phrase) is a\\ncertain vague and general signification of it, as\\nopposed to one more precise and limited, which\\nit bears in some particular art, science, or\\nsystem, and which is called its second-inten-\\ntion. Thus, among farmers, in some parts,\\nthe word beast is applied particularly and\\nespecially to the ox kind and bird, in the\\nlanguage of many sportsmen, is in like manner\\nappropriated to the partridge the common\\nand general acceptation (which every one is\\nwell acquainted with) of each of those two\\nwords, is the First-intention of each the\\nother, its Second-intention.\\nI am aware that there exists another opinion as to\\nthe meaning of the phrase second-intention; and that\\nAldrich is understood by some persons to mean (as indeed\\nhis expression may very well be understood to imply)\\nthat every predicable must necessarily be employed in the\\nSecond-intention. I do not undertake to combat the\\ndoctrine alluded to, because I must confess that, after\\nthe most patient attention devoted to the explanations\\ngiven of it, I have never been able to comprehend what\\nit is that is meant by it. It is one, however, which,\\nwhether sound or unsound, appears not to be connected\\nwith any Logical processes, and therefore may be safely\\npassed by on the present occasion.\\nFor some remarks on the Second-intention of the word\\nSpecies, when applied to organized beings (viz. as de-\\nnoting those plants or animals, which it is conceived may\\nhave descended from a common stock), see the subjoined\\nDissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 1.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0232.jp2"}, "233": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a710.] OF FALLACIES. 187\\nIt is evident that a Term may have several\\nSecond-intentions, according to the several\\nsystems into which it is introduced, and of\\nwhich it is one of the technical Terms thus\\nline signifies, in the Art-military, a certain\\nform of drawing up ships or troops in Geo-\\ngraphy, a certain division of the earth to\\nthe fisherman, a string to catch fish, fyc. Sfc.\\nall which are so many distinct Second-inten-\\ntions, in each of which there is a certain\\nsignification of extension in length which\\nconstitutes the First-intention, and which cor-\\nresponds pretty nearly with the employment\\nof the Term in Mathematics.*\\nIt will sometimes happen, that a Term shall\\nbe employed always in some one or other of\\nits second intentions and never, strictly in\\nthe first, though that first intention is a part\\nof its signification in each case. It is evident,\\nthat the utmost care is requisite to avoid con-\\nfounding together, either the first and second\\nintentions, or the different second intentions\\nwith each other.\\n3rdly. When two or more things are con- Resemblance\\nand analogy.\\nnected by resemblance or analogy, they will\\nIn a few instances the Second-intention, or philoso-\\nphical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the\\nFirst-intention, or popular use thus affection is\\nlimited in popular use to love; charity, to alms-\\ngiving flower, to those which have conspicuous\\npetals; and fruit, to such as are eatable.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0233.jp2"}, "234": {"fulltext": "188 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nfrequently have the same name. Thus a\\nblade of grass/ and the contrivance in\\nbuilding called a dove-tail are so called\\nfrom their resemblance to the blade of a\\nswords and the tail of a real dove. But two\\nthings may be connected by analogy, though\\nthey have in themselves no resemblance: for\\nanalogy is the resemblance of ratios (or rela-\\ntions:) thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the\\npalate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear\\nand hence the same word, sweet is applied\\nto both, though no flavour can resemble a\\nsound in itself: so, the leg of a table does not\\nresemble that of an animal nor the foot of a\\nmountain that of an animal; but the leg\\nanswers the same purpose to the table, as the\\nleg of an animal to that animal the foot of a\\nmountain has the same situation relatively to\\nthe mountain, as the foot of an animal to the\\nanimal; this analogy therefore may be ex-\\npressed like a mathematical analogy (or pro-\\nportion) leg animal supporting stick\\ntable.\\nIn all these cases (of this 3rd head) one of\\nthe meanings of the word is called by Logi-\\ncians proper, L e. original or primary the\\nUnless, indeed, the primary application of the Term\\nbe to the leaf of grass, and the secondary to cutting\\ninstruments, which is perhaps more probable but the\\nquestion is unimportant in the present case.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0234.jp2"}, "235": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a710.] OF FALLACIES. 189\\nother improper, secondary, or transferred\\nthus, sweet is originally and properly applied\\nto tastes secondarily and improperly (i. e. by\\nanalogy) to sounds thus also, dove-tail is\\napplied secondarily (though not by analogy,\\nbut by direct resemblance) to the contrivance\\nin building so called. When the secondaiy\\nmeaning of a word is founded on some fan-\\nciful analogy, and especially when it is intro-\\nduced for ornament sake, we call this a\\nmetaphor as when we speak of a ship s\\nploughing the deep. The turning up of the\\nsurface being essential indeed to the plough,\\nbut accidental only to the ship but if the\\nanalogy be a more important and essential\\none, and especially if we have no other word\\nto express our meaning but this transferred\\none, we then call it merely an analogous\\nword (though the metaphor is analogous also)\\ne.g. one would hardly call it metaphorical\\nor figurative language to speak of the leg of a\\ntable, or mouth of a river,*\\n4thly. Several things may be called by the comeetion\\nsame name (though they have no connection place\\nof resemblance or analogy) from being con-\\nnected by vicinity of time or place; under\\nwhich head will come the connection of cause\\nand effect, or of part and zvhole, fyc. Thus a\\nSee Dr. Copleston s account of Analogy in the notes\\nto his Four Discourses.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0235.jp2"}, "236": {"fulltext": "190 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\ndoor signifies both an opening in the wall\\n(more strictly called the door-way) and a\\nboard which closes it; which are things nei-\\nther similar nor analogous. When I say,\\nthe rose smells sweet and I smell the\\nrose the word smell has two meanings\\nin the latter sentence, I am speaking of a\\ncertain sensation in my own mind in the\\nformer of a certain quality in the flower,\\nwhich produces that sensation, but which of\\ncourse cannot in the least resemble it; and\\nhere the word smell is applied with equal\\npropriety to both.* Thus we speak of\\nHomer, for the works of Homer and\\nthis is a secondary or transferred meaning:\\nand so it is when we say, a good shot, for\\na good marksman but the word shot has\\ntwo other meanings, which are both equally\\nproper viz. the thing put into a gun in order\\nto be discharged from it, and the act of dis-\\ncharging it.\\nThus, learning signifies either the act of\\nacquiring knowledge, or the knowledge itself;\\ne.g. he neglects his learning; Johnson\\nwas a man of learning. Possession is am-\\nbiguous in the same manner, and a multitude\\nof others.\\nOn this ambiguity have been founded the striking\\nparodoxes of those who have maintained that there is no\\nheat in fire, no cold in ice, tyc. The sensations of heat,\\ncold, Sj c. can of course only belong to a Sentient Being.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0236.jp2"}, "237": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a710.] OF FALLACIES. 191\\nMuch confusion often arises from ambiguity\\nof this kind, when unperceived nor is there\\nany point in which the copiousness and con-\\nsequent precision of the Greek language, is\\nmore to be admired than in its distinct terms\\nfor expressing an act, and the result of that\\nact e. g. irpa^ts, the doing of anything\\n7rpay/jLa, the thing done so, Boats and\\nBco pov, Xipfrts and X^/xa, Sfc.\\nIt will very often happen, that two of the\\nmeanings of a word will have no connection\\nwith one another, but will each have some\\nconnection with a third. Thus martyr\\noriginally signified a witness; thence it was\\napplied to those who suffered in bearing testi-\\nmony to Christianity; and thence again it is\\noften applied to u sufferers in general the\\nfirst and third significations are not the least\\nconnected. Thus w post signifies originally\\na pillar, (postum, from pono) then a distance\\nmarked out by posts and then the carriages,\\nmessengers, Sfc. that travelled over this dis-\\ntance. It would puzzle any one, proceeding\\non mere conjecture, to make out how the\\nword premises should have come to signify\\na building.\\nAmbiguities of this kind belong practically\\nto the first head: there being no perceived\\nconnection between the different senses.\\nThe remedy for ambiguity is a Definition of", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0237.jp2"}, "238": {"fulltext": "192 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nthe Term which is suspected of being used in\\ntwo senses viz, a Nominal, not necessarily a\\nReal Definition as was remarked in Book IT.\\nChap. v.\\nBut here it may be proper to remark, that\\nfor the avoiding of Fallacy or of verbal con-\\ntroversy, it is only requisite that the term\\nshould be employed uniformly in the same\\nsense as far as the existing question is con-\\ncerned; thus, two persons might, in discussing\\nthe question, whether Caesar was a great\\nman, have some such difference in their ac-\\nceptation of the epithet great, as would be\\nnon-essential to that question e. g. one of\\nthem might understand by it nothing more\\nthan eminent intellectual and moral qualities\\nwhile the other might conceive it to imply the\\nperformance of splendid actions this abstract\\ndifference of meaning would not produce any\\ndisagreement in the existing question, because\\nboth those circumstances are united in the\\ncase of Caesar but if one (and not the other)\\nof the parties understood the epithet great\\nto imply pure patriotism, generosity of cha-\\nracter, fyc then there would be a disagree-\\nment as to the application of the Term, even\\nbetween those who might think alike of\\nCaesar s character. Definition, the specific for\\nambiguity, is to be employed, and demanded\\nwith a view to this principle it is sufficient", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0238.jp2"}, "239": {"fulltext": "11] OF FALLACIES. 193\\non each occasion to define a Term as far as\\nregards the question in hand.\\n\u00c2\u00a711.\\nOf those cases where the ambiguity arises\\nfrom the context, there are several species\\nsome of which Logicians have enumerated,\\nbut have neglected to refer them, in the first\\nplace, to one common class (viz. the one\\nunder which they are here placed;) and have\\neven arranged some under the head of Fal-\\nlacies in dictione and others under that of\\nextra dictionem\\nWe may consider, as the first of these Fallacy of\\nDivision and\\nspecies, the Fallacy of Division and that of Com P\u00c2\u00b0 8ition\\nComposition, taken together, since in each\\nof these the middle Term is used in one\\nPremiss collectively, in the other, distribu-\\ntive ly if the former of these is the major\\nPremiss, and the latter, the minor, this is\\ncalled the Fallacy of Division the Term\\nwhich is first taken collectively being after-\\nwards divided and vice versa. The ordinary\\nexamples are such as these All the angles\\nof a triangle are equal to two right angles\\nA B C is an angle of a triangle therefore\\nA B C is equal to two right angles. Five\\nis one number three and two are five\\ntherefore three and two are one number or,\\nthree and two are two numbers, five is", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0239.jp2"}, "240": {"fulltext": "194 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nthree and two, therefore five is two numbers\\nit is manifest that the middle Term, three and\\ntwo (in this last example) is ambiguous, signi-\\nfying, in the major Premiss, taken dis-\\ntinctly, in the minor, taken together and\\nso of the rest.\\nTo this head may be referred the Fallacy\\nby which men have sometimes been led to\\nadmit, or pretend to admit, the doctrine of\\nNecessity e. g. he who necessarily goes\\nor stays (L e. in reality, who necessarily goes,\\nor who necessarily stays is not a free agent\\nyou must necessarily go or stay i. e. you\\nmust necessarily take the alternative there-\\nfore you are not a free agent. Such also is\\nthe Fallacy which probably operates on most\\nadventurers in lotteries e. g. the gaming of\\na high prize is no uncommon occurrence and\\nwhat is no uncommon occurrence may rea-\\nsonably be expected therefore the gaining of\\na high prize may reasonably be expected;\\nthe Conclusion, when applied to the indi-\\nvidual (as in practice it is), must be under-\\nstood in the sense of reasonably expected\\nby a certain individual; therefore for the\\nmajor Premiss to be true, the middle Term\\nmust be understood to mean, no uncom-\\nmon occurrence to some one particular per-\\nson whereas for the minor (which has been\\nplaced first) to be true, you must understand", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0240.jp2"}, "241": {"fulltext": "\u00c2\u00a711.] OF FALLACIES. 195\\nit of no uncommon occurrence to some one\\nor other and thus you will have the Fallacy\\nof Composition.\\nThere is no Fallacy more common, or more\\nlikely to deceive, than the one now before us\\nthe form in which it is most usually employed,\\nis, to establish some truth, separately, con-\\ncerning each single member of a certain class,\\nand thence to infer the same of the xohole col-\\nlectively thus some infidels have laboured to\\nprove concerning some one of our Lord s\\nmiracles, that it might have been the result\\nof an accidental conjuncture of natural circum-\\nstances next, they endeavour to prove the\\nsame concerning another and so on and\\nthence infer that all of them might have been\\nso. They might argue in like manner, that\\nbecause it is not very improbable one may\\nthrow sixes in any one out of a hundred\\nthrows, therefore it is no more improbable that\\none may throw sixes a hundred times running.\\nThis Fallacy may often be considered as\\nturning on the ambiguity of the word all\\nwhich may easily be dispelled by substituting\\nfor it the word each or every, where that\\nis its signification e. g. all these trees make\\na thick shade, is ambiguous, meaning, either,\\nevery one of them, or u all together.\\nThis is a Fallacy with which men are ex-\\ntremely apt to deceive themselves for when a\\no 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0241.jp2"}, "242": {"fulltext": "196 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nmultitude of particulars are presented to the\\nmind, many are too weak or too indolent to\\ntake a comprehensive view of them hut con-\\nfine their attention to each single point, by\\nturns and then decide, infer, and act, accord-\\ningly e, g. the imprudent spendthrift, finding\\nthat he is able to afford this, or that, or the\\nother expense, forgets that all of them together\\nwill ruin him.\\nTo the same head may be reduced that\\nfallacious reasoning by which men vindicate\\nthemselves to their own conscience and to\\nothers, for the neglect of those undefined du-\\nties, which though indispensable, and there-\\nfore not left to our choice whether we will\\npractise them or not, are left to our discre-\\ntion as to the mode, and the particular\\noccasions, of practising them e. g. I am\\nnot bound to contribute to this charity in\\nparticular nor to that nor to the other\\nthe practical conclusion which they draw, is,\\nthat all charity may be dispensed with.\\nAs men are apt to forget that any two cir-\\ncumstances (not naturally connected) are\\nmore rarely to be met with combined than\\nseparate, though they be not at all incom-\\npatible so also they are apt to imagine,\\nfrom finding that they are rarely combined,\\nthat there is an incompatibility e. g. if the\\nchances are ten to one against a man s", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0242.jp2"}, "243": {"fulltext": "12.] OF FALLACIES. ]97\\npossessing strong reasoning powers, and ten\\nto one against exquisite taste, the chances\\nagainst the combination of the two (suppos-\\ning them neither connected or opposed) will\\nbe a hundred to one. Many, therefore, from\\nfinding them so rarely united, will infer that\\nthey are in some measure incompatible\\nwhich Fallacy may easily be exposed in the\\nform of Undistributed middle qualities un-\\nfriendly to each other are rarely combined\\nexcellence in the reasoning powers, and in\\ntaste, are rarely combined therefore they are\\nqualities unfriendly to each other.\\n12.\\nThe other kind of ambiguity arising fromFaiiacia\\nthe context, and which is the last case of\\nAmbiguous middle that I shall notice, is the\\nfallacia accidentis, together with its con-\\nverse, fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad\\ndictum simpliciter in each of which the mid-\\ndle Term is used, in one Premiss to signify\\nsomething considered simply, in itself, and as\\nto its essence and in the other Premiss, so\\nas to imply that its Accidents are taken into\\naccount with it as in the well-known ex-\\nample, what is bought in the market is\\neaten raw meat is bought in the market\\ntherefore raw meat is eaten. Here the\\nmiddle has understood in conjunction with", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0243.jp2"}, "244": {"fulltext": "198 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nit, in the major Premiss, as to its substance\\nmerely in the minor, u as to its condition and\\ncircumstances\\nTo this head, perhaps, as well as to any,\\nmay be referred the Fallacies which are fre-\\nquently founded on the occasional, partial,\\nand temporary variations in the acceptation\\nof some Term, arising from circumstances of\\nperson, time, and place, which will occasion\\nsomething to be understood in conjunction\\nwith it beyond its strict literal signification\\ne. g. the phrase Protestant -ascendancy,\\nhaving become a kind of watch-word or ga-\\nthering-cry of a party, the expression of good\\nwishes for it would commonly imply an ad-\\nherence to certain measures not literally ex-\\npressed by the words to assume therefore\\nthat one is unfriendly to Protestant-ascend-\\nancy in the literal sense, because he has\\ndeclared himself unfriendly to it when imply-\\ning and connected with such and such other\\nsentiments, is a gross Fallacy and such an\\none as perhaps the authors of the above would\\nmuch object to, if it were assumed of them\\nthat they were adverse to the cause of\\nliberty throughout the world, and to a fair\\nrepresentation of the people, from their\\nobjecting to join with the members of a\\nfactious party in the expression of such sen-\\ntiments.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0244.jp2"}, "245": {"fulltext": "13.] OF FALLACIES. 199\\nSuch Fallacies may fairly be referred to the\\npresent head.\\n\u00c2\u00a713.\\nOf the Non-logical (or material) Fallacies\\nand first, of begging the question Petitio\\nPrincipii.\\nThe indistinct and unphilosophical account Begging the\\na A quest jou.\\nwhich has been given by Logical writers of\\nthe Fallacy of non causa and that of pe-\\ntitio principii makes it very difficult to\\nascertain wherein they conceived them to\\ndiffer, and what, according to them, is the\\nnature of each without therefore professing\\nto conform exactly to their meaning, and\\nwith a view to distinctness only, which is the\\nmain point, let us confine the name petitio\\nprincipii to those cases in which the Premiss\\neither appears manifestly to be the same as\\nthe Conclusion, or is actually proved from the\\nConclusion, or is such as would naturally\\nand properly so be proved (as if one should\\nattempt to prove the being of a God from the\\nauthority of Holy- writ and to the other\\nclass be referred all other cases, in which\\nthe Premiss (whether the expressed or the\\nsuppressed one) is either proved false, or has\\nno sufficient claim to be received as true.\\nLet it however be observed, that in such", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0245.jp2"}, "246": {"fulltext": "200 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\ncases (apparently) as this, we must not too\\nhastily pronounce the argument fallacious\\nfor it may be perfectly fair at the commence-\\nment of an argument to assume a Premiss that\\nis not more evident than the Conclusion, or is\\neven ever so paradoxical, provided you pro-\\nceed to prove fairly that Premiss and in like\\nmanner it is both usual and fair to begin by\\ndeducing your Conclusion from a Premiss\\nexactly equivalent to it which is merely\\nthrowing the proposition in question into the\\nform in which it will be most conveniently\\nproved. Arguing in a Circle, however, must\\nnecessarily be unfair; though it frequently is\\npractised undesignedly e. g. some Mechani-\\ncians attempt to prove, (what they ought to\\nlay down as a probable but doubtful hypo-\\nthesis,) that every particle of matter gravitates\\nequally why because those bodies which\\ncontain more particles ever gravitate more\\nstrongly, i. e. are heavier but (it may be\\nurged) those which are heaviest are not always\\nmore bulky no, but still they contain\\nmore particles, though more closely con-\\ndensed; how do you know that? because\\nthey are heavier how does that prove it\\nbecause all particles of matter gravitating\\nequally, that mass which is specifically the\\nheavier must needs have the more of them in\\nthe same space.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0246.jp2"}, "247": {"fulltext": "13.] OF FALLACIES. 201\\nObliquity and disguise being of course most obu qB uj\\nimportant to the success of the petitio pruicipu\\nas well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will\\nin general either have recourse to the circle,\\nor else not venture to state distinctly his as-\\nsumption of the point in question, but will\\nrather assert some other proposition which\\nimplies it;* thus keeping out of sight (as a\\ndexterous thief does stolen goods) the point\\nin question, at the very moment when he is\\ntaking it for granted. Hence the frequent\\nunion of this Fallacy with ignoratio elenchi\\n[vide 15.] The English language is per-\\nhaps the more suitable for the Fallacy of\\npetitio principii, from its being formed from\\ntwo distinct languages, and thus abounding in\\nsynonymous expressions which have no re-\\nsemblance in sound, and no connection in\\netymology so that a Sophist may bring\\nforward a proposition expressed in words of\\nSaxon origin, and give as a reason for it, the\\nvery same proposition stated in words of Nor-\\nman origin e. g. to allow every man an\\nunbounded freedom of speech must always\\nbe, on the whole, advantageous to the State\\nGibbon affords the most remarkable instances of tin s\\nkind of style. That which he really means to speak of,\\nis hardly ever made the subject of his proposition. His\\nway of writing reminds one of those persons who never\\ndare look you full in the face.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0247.jp2"}, "248": {"fulltext": "202 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nfor it is highly conducive to the interests of\\nthe Community, that each individual should\\nenjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of ex-\\npressing his sentiments.\\nH.\\nundue as- The next head is, the falsity, or, at least,\\nsumption.\\nundue assumption, of a Premiss, when it is\\nnot equivalent to, or dependent on, the Con-\\nclusion which, as has been before said,\\nseems to correspond nearly with the meaning\\nof Logicians, when they speak of non causa\\npro causa. This name indeed would seem to\\nimply a much narrower class there being\\none species of arguments which are from cause\\nto effect in which, of course, two things are\\nnecessary; 1st, the sufficiency of the cause;\\n2d, its establishment; these are the two\\nPremises if therefore the former be unduly\\nassumed, we are arguing from that which is\\nnot a sufficient cause as if it were so e. g. as\\nif one should contend from such a man s\\nhaving been unjust or cruel, that he will\\ncertainly be visited with some heavy temporal\\njudgment, and come to an untimely end. In\\nthis instance the Sophist, from having as-\\nsumed, in the Premiss, the (granted) existence\\nof a pretended cause, infers in the conclusion\\nthe existence of the pretended effect, which\\nwe have supposed to be the Question. Or", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0248.jp2"}, "249": {"fulltext": "14.] OF FALLACIES. 203\\nvice versd, the pretended effect may be em-\\nployed to establish the cause e. g. inferring\\nsinfulness from temporal calamity. But when\\nboth the pretended cause and effect are\\ngranted, L e. granted to exist, then the So-\\nphist will infer something from their pre-\\ntended connection L e. he will assume as a\\nPremiss, that of these two admitted facts,\\nthe one is the cause of the other as the\\nopponents of the Reformation assumed that it\\nwas the cause of the troubles which took\\nplace at that period, and thence inferred that\\nit was an evil.* In like manner, nothing\\nis more common than to hear a person state\\nIn many cases, a Sign (see Rhet. Part I.) from which\\none might fairly infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken\\nfor the Cause of it: as if one should suppose the falling\\nof the mercury to be a cause of rain, of which it certainly\\nis an indication. Whereas the fact will often be the very\\nreverse e. g. a great deal of money in a country is a\\npretty sure proof of its wealth, and thence has been often\\nregarded as the cause of it whereas in truth it is an\\neffect. The same, with a numerous and increasing popu-\\nlation. So also exposure to want and hardship in youth,\\nhas been regarded as a cause of the hardy constitution of\\nthose men and brutes which have been brought up in\\nbarren countries of ungenial climate. Yet the most ex-\\nperienced cattle-breeders know that animals are, cceteris\\nparibus, the more hardy for having been well fed and\\nsheltered in youth but early hardships, by destroying\\nall the tender, ensure the hardiness of the survivors. So,\\nloading a gun-barrel to the muzzle, and firing it, docs\\nnot give it strength but proves, if it escape, that it was\\nstrong.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0249.jp2"}, "250": {"fulltext": "204 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nconfidently, as from his own experience, that\\nsuch and such a patient xvas cured by this or\\nthat medicine whereas all that he absolutely\\nknows, is that he took the medicine, and that\\nhe recovered. Such an argument as either of\\nthese might strictly be called non causa pro\\ncausa but it is not probable that the Logical\\nwriters intended any such limitation (which\\nindeed would be wholly unnecessary and im-\\npertinent,) but rather that they were con-\\nfounding together cause and reason; the\\nsequence of Conclusion from Premises being\\nperpetually mistaken for that of effect from\\nphysical cause.* It may be better, therefore,\\nto drop the name which tends to perpetuate\\nthis confusion, and simply to state (when\\nsuch is the case) that the Premiss is unduly\\nassumed i. e. without being either self-evi-\\ndent, or satisfactorily proved.\\nThe contrivances by which men may deceive\\nthemselves or others, in assuming Premises\\nunduly, so that that undue assumption shall\\nnot be perceived, (for it is in this the Fallacy\\nconsists) are of course infinite. Sometimes\\n(as was before observed) the doubtful Premiss\\nis suppressed, as if it were too evident to need\\nbeing proved, or even stated, and as if the\\nwhole question turned on the establishment of\\nthe other Premiss. Thus Home Tooke proves,\\nSee Appendix, No. I. article Reason.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0250.jp2"}, "251": {"fulltext": "14.] OF FALLACIES. 205\\nby an immense induction, that all particles\\nwere originally nouns or verbs and thence\\nconcludes, that in reality they are so still, and\\nthat the ordinary division of the parts of\\nspeech is absurd keeping out of sight, as\\nself-evident, the other Premiss, which is ab-\\nsolutely false; viz. that the meaning and force\\nof a word, now, and for ever, must be that\\nwhich it, or its root, originally bore.\\nSometimes men are shamed into admitting\\nan unfounded assertion, by being confidently\\ntold, that it is so evident, that it would argue\\ngreat weakness to doubt it. In general, how-\\never, the more skilful Sophist will avoid a\\ndirect assertion of what he means unduly to\\nassume because that might direct the reader s\\nattention to the consideration of the question\\nwhether it be true or not; since that which\\nis indisputable does not so often need to be\\nasserted it succeeds better, therefore, to allude\\nto the proposition, as something curious and\\nremarkable; just as the Royal Society were\\nimposed on by being asked to account for the\\nfact that a vessel of water received no addition\\nto its weight by a live fish put into it; while\\nthey were seeking for the cause, they forgot\\nto ascertain the fact, and thus admitted with-\\nout suspicion a mere fiction. Thus an eminent\\nScotch writer, instead of asserting that the\\nadvocates of Logic have been worsted and", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0251.jp2"}, "252": {"fulltext": "references.\\n206 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\ndriven from the field in every controversy,\\n(an assertion which, if made, would have been\\nthe more readily ascertained to be perfectly\\ngroundless,) merely observes, that it is a cir-\\ncumstance not a little remarkable\\nFaiucy of One of the many contrivances employed\\nfor this purpose, is what may be called the\\nFallacy of references; which is particularly\\ncommon in popular theological works. It is\\nof course a circumstance which adds great\\nweight to any assertion, that it shall seem to\\nbe supported by many passages of Scripture\\nnow when a writer can find few or none of\\nthese, that distinctly and decidedly favour his\\nopinion, he may at least find many which may\\nbe conceived capable of being so understood,\\nor which, in some way or other, remotely\\nrelate to the subject but if these texts were\\ninserted at length, it would be at once per-\\nceived how little they bear on the question\\nthe usual artifice therefore is, to give merely\\nreferences to them trusting that nineteen out\\nof twenty readers will never take the trouble\\nof turning to the passages, but, taking for\\ngranted that they afford, each, some degree\\nof confirmation to what is maintained, will\\nbe overawed by seeing every assertion sup-\\nported, as they suppose, by five or six Scrip-\\nture-texts.\\nFrequently the Fallacy of ignoratio elenchi", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0252.jp2"}, "253": {"fulltext": "14.] OF FALLACIES. 207\\nis called in to the aid of this i. e. the Premiss c\u00c2\u00a9mMMtion\\nof tliis l- al-\\nis assumed on the ground of another proposi- fetS^.**\\ntion, somewhat like it, having been proved.\\nThus, in arguing by example, fyc. the pa-\\nrallelism of two cases is often assumed from\\ntheir being in some respects alike, though per-\\nhaps they differ in the very point which is\\nessential to the argument. E. G. From the\\ncircumstance that some men of humble sta-\\ntion, who have been well educated, are apt\\nto think themselves above low drudgery, it\\nis argued, that universal education of the\\nlower orders would beget general idleness\\nthis argument rests, of course, on the assump-\\ntion of parallelism in the two cases, viz. the\\npast, and the future; whereas there is a cir-\\ncumstance that is absolutely essential, in which\\nthey differ for when education is universal it\\nmust cease to be a distinction which is pro-\\nbably the very circumstance that renders men\\ntoo proud for their work.\\nThis very same Fallacy is often resorted to\\non the opposite side an attempt is made to\\ninvalidate some argument from Example, by\\npointing out a difference between the two\\ncases though they agree in every thing that\\nis essential to the question.\\nIt should be added that we may often be calculation of\\nprobabilities.\\ndeceived, not only by admitting a premiss\\nwhich is absolutely unsupported, but also, by", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0253.jp2"}, "254": {"fulltext": "208 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nattributing to one which really is probable,\\na greater degree of probability than rightly\\nbelongs to it. And this effect will often be\\nproduced by our omitting to calculate the\\nprobability in each successive step of a long\\nchain of argument. Each link may have an\\nexcess of chances in its favour, and yet the\\nultimate conclusion may have a great pre-\\nponderance against it e. g. All Y is (pro-\\nbably) X all Z is (probably) Y therefore Z\\nis (probably) X now suppose the truth of\\nthe major premiss to be more probable than\\nnot; in other words, that the chances for it\\nare more than say and for the truth of\\nthe minor, let the chances be greater still;\\nsay then by multiplying together the nu-\\nmerators, and also the denominators of these\\ntwo fractions, x we obtain as indicating\\nthe degree of probability of the conclusion\\nwhich is less than i. e. the conclusion is\\nless likely to be true than not. E. G. The\\nreports this author heard are (probably) true\\nthis (something which he records) is a report\\nwhich (probably) he heard; therefore it is\\ntrue: suppose, first, The majority of the re-\\nports he heard, as 4 out of 7, (or 12 of 21,)\\nto be true and, next, That he generally, as\\ntwice in three times, (or 8 in 12,) reports\\nfaithfully what he heard; it follows that of\\n21 of his reports, only 8 are true. Of course,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0254.jp2"}, "255": {"fulltext": "16.] OF FALLACIES. 209\\nthe results are proportionally striking when\\nthere is a long series of arguments of this\\ndescription. And yet weak and thoughtless\\nreasoners are often influenced by hearing a\\ngreat deal urged, a great number of proba-\\nbilities brought forward, in support of some\\nconclusion i. e, a long chain, of which each\\nsuccessive link is weaker than the foregoing\\ninstead of (what they mistake it for) a cumu-\\nlation of arguments, each, separately proving\\nthe probability of the conclusion.\\nLastly, it may be here remarked, conform-\\nably with what has been formerly said, that\\nit will often be left to your choice whether to\\nrefer this or that fallacious argument to the\\npresent head, or that of Ambiguous middle\\nif the middle term is here used in this sense,\\nthere is an ambiguity if in that sense, the\\nproposition is false\\n15.\\nThe last kind of Fallacy to be discussed irrei\\nis that of Irrelevant Conclusion, commonly\\ncalled ignoratio elenchi. Various kinds of\\npropositions are, according to the occasion,\\nsubstituted for the one of which proof is re-\\nquired.\\nSometimes the Particular for the Universal\\nsometimes a proposition with different Terms\\nand various are the contrivances employed to\\nr\\nevant\\nConclusion.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0255.jp2"}, "256": {"fulltext": "210 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\neffect and to conceal this substitution, and to\\nmake the Conclusion which the Sophist has\\ndrawn, answer, practically, the same purpose\\nas the one he ought to have established. I\\nsay, practically the same purpose, because\\nit will very often happen that some emotion\\nwill be excited some sentiment impressed on\\nthe mind (by a dexterous employment of this\\nFallacy) such as shall bring men into the dispo-\\nsition requisite for your purpose, though they\\nmay not have assented to, or even stated dis-\\ntinctly in their own minds, the proposition which\\nit was your business to establish. Thus if a\\nSophist has to defend one who has been guilty\\nof some serious offence, which he wishes to ex-\\ntenuate, though he is unable distinctly to prove\\nthat it is not such, yet if he can succeed in\\nmaking the audience laugh at some casual mat-\\nter, he has gained practically the same point.\\nSo also if any one has pointed out the extenu-\\nating circumstances in some particular case of\\noffence, so as to show that it differs widely\\nfrom the generality of the same class, the\\nSophist, if he find himself unable to disprove\\nthese circumstances, may do away the force\\nof them, by simply referring the action to that\\nvery class, which no one can deny that it\\nbelongs to, and the very name of which will\\nexcite a feeling of disgust sufficient to coun-\\nteract the extenuation e. g. let it be a case", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0256.jp2"}, "257": {"fulltext": "15.J OF FALLACIES. 211\\nof peculation, and that many mitigating cir-\\ncumstances have been brought forward which\\ncannot be denied; the sophistical opponent\\nwill reply, well, but after all, the man is a\\nrogue, and there is an end of it now in\\nreality this was (by hypothesis) never the\\nquestion and the mere assertion of what was\\nnever denied, ought not, in fairness, to be\\nregarded as decisive but practically, the odi-\\nousness of the word, arising in great measure\\nfrom the association of those very circumstances\\nwhich belong to most of the class, but which\\nwe have supposed to be absent in this parti-\\ncular instance, excites precisely that feeling of\\ndisgust, which in effect destroys the force of\\nthe defence. In like manner we may refer to\\nthis head, all cases of improper appeals to\\nthe passions, and every thing else which is\\nmentioned by Aristotle as extraneous to the\\nmatter in hand (e\u00c2\u00a3 w rov irpdyfiaros.)\\nIn all these cases, as has been before ob-\\nserved, if the fallacy we are now treating of\\nbe employed for the apparent establishment,\\nnot of the ultimate Conclusion, but (as it very\\ncommonly happens) of a Premiss, e. if the\\nPremiss required be assumed on the ground\\nthat some proposition resembling it has been\\nproved) then there will be a combination of\\nthis Fallacy with the last mentioned.\\nA good instance of the employment and\\np2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0257.jp2"}, "258": {"fulltext": "tation.\\n212 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nexposure of this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides,\\nin the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus concern-\\ning the Mitylenaeans the former (over and\\nabove his appeal to the angry passions of\\nhis audience) urges the justice of putting the\\nrevolters to death which, as the latter\\nremarked, was nothing to the purpose, since\\nthe Athenians were not silting in judgment,\\nbut in deliberation, of which the proper end\\nis expediency.\\nThis fallacy It is evident, that ignoratio elenchi may be\\nused in refu-\\nemployed as well for the apparent refutation\\nof your opponent s proposition, as for the ap-\\nparent establishment of your own for it is\\nsubstantially the same thing, to prove what\\nwas not denied, or to disprove what was not\\nasserted the latter practice is not less com-\\nmon, and it is more offensive, because it\\nfrequently amounts to a personal affront in\\nattributing to a person opinions, fyc. which he\\nperhaps holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a\\ndiscussion one party vindicates, on the ground\\nof general expediency, a particular instance of\\nresistance to Government in a case of intole-\\nrable oppression, the opponent may gravely\\nmaintain, that we ought not to do evil that\\ngood may come a proposition which of\\ncourse had never been denied the point in\\ndispute being whether resistance in this par-\\nticular case mere doing evil or not. In this", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0258.jp2"}, "259": {"fulltext": "15.] OF FALLACIES. 213\\nexample it is to be remarked (and the remark\\nwill apply very generally) that the Fallacy of\\npetitio principii is combined with that of igno-\\nratio elenchi, which is a very common and\\nsuccessful practice viz. the Sophist proves,\\nor disproves, not the proposition which is\\nreally in question, but one which so implies it\\nas to proceed on the supposition that it is\\nalready decided, and can admit of no doubt\\nby this means his assumption of the point in\\nquestion is so indirect and oblique, that it\\nmay easily escape notice and he thus esta-\\nblishes, practically, his Conclusion, at the very\\nmoment he is withdrawing your attention\\nfrom it to another question.\\nThere are certain kinds of argument re-\\ncounted and named by Logical writers, which\\nwe should by no means universally call Fal-\\nlacies but which when unfairly used, and so\\nfar as they are fallacious, may very well be\\nreferred to the present head such as the ar-\\ngumentum ad hominem or personal argument, ^[j\u00e2\u0084\u00a2?;^\\nargumentum ad verecundiam argumentum\\nad populum fyc. all of them regarded as con-\\ntradistinguished from argumentum ad rem\\nor according to others (meaning probably the\\nvery same thing) ad judicium. These have\\nall been descibed in the lax and popular lan-\\nguage before alluded to, but not scientifically\\nthe argumentum ad hominem they say, is\\nad hominem,\\nc.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0259.jp2"}, "260": {"fulltext": "214 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\naddressed to the peculiar circumstances, cha-\\nracter, avowed opinions, or past conduct of\\nthe individual, and therefore has a reference\\nto him only, and does not bear directly and\\nabsolutely on the real question, as the s argu-\\nmentum ad rem does in like manner, the\\nargumentum ad verecundiam is described as\\nan appeal to our reverence for some respected\\nauthority, some venerable institution, fyc. and\\nthe argumentum ad populum as an appeal\\nto the prejudices, passions, fyc. of the multi-\\ntude and so of the rest. Along with these is\\nusually enumerated argumentum ad ignoran-\\ntiam which is here omitted, as being evi-\\ndently nothing more than the employment of\\nsome kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of\\nthat word, towards such as are likely to be\\ndeceived by it. It appears then (to speak\\nrather more technically) that in the argu-\\nmentum ad hominem the conclusion which\\nactually is established, is not the absolute and\\ngeneral one in question, but relative and par-\\nticular viz. not that such and such is the\\nfact, but that this man is bound to admit it,\\nin conformity to his principles of Reasoning,\\nor in consistency with his own conduct, situa-\\ntion, $*c* Such a Conclusion it is often\\nThe argumentum ad hominem will often have the\\neffect of shifting the burden of proof, not unjustly, to\\nthe adversary. (See Rhet.) A common instance is the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0260.jp2"}, "261": {"fulltext": "i 15.] OF FALLACIES. 215\\nboth allowable and necessary to establish, in\\norder to silence those who will not yield to\\nfair general argument or to convince those\\nwhose weakness and prejudices would not\\nallow them to assign to it its due weight it is\\nthus that our Lord on many occasions silences\\nthe cavils of the Jews as in the vindication\\nof healing on the Sabbath, which is paralleled\\nby the authorized practice of drawing out a\\nbeast that has fallen into a pit. All this, as\\nwe have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be\\ndefence, certainly the readiest and most concise, fre-\\nquently urged by the Sportsman, when accused of bar-\\nbarity in sacrificing unoffending hares or trout to his\\namusement he replies, as he may safely do, to most of\\nhis assailants, why do you feed on the flesh of animals\\nand that this answer presses hard, is manifested by its\\nbeing usually opposed by a palpable falsehood viz, that\\nthe animals which are killed for food are sacrificed to our\\nnecessities though not only men can, but a large propor-\\ntion (probably a great majority) of the human race\\nactually do, subsist in health and vigour without flesh\\ndiet and the earth would support a much greater human\\npopulation were such a practice universal. When shamed\\nout of this argument they sometimes urge that the brute\\ncreation would overrun the earth, if we did not kill them\\nfor food an argument, which, if it were valid at all,\\nwould not justify their feeding on fish though, if fairly\\nfollowed up, it ivould justify Swift s proposal for keeping\\ndown the excessive population of Ireland. The true\\nreason, viz, that they eat flesh for the gratification of the\\npalate, and have a taste for the pleasures of the table,\\nthough not for the sports of the field, is one which they\\ndo not like to assign.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0261.jp2"}, "262": {"fulltext": "216 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\ndone plainly, and avozvedly but if you at-\\ntempt to substitute this partial and relative\\nConclusion for a more general one if you tri-\\numph as having established your proposition\\nabsolutely and universally, from having esta-\\nblished it, in reality, only as far as it relates\\nto your opponent, then you are guilty of a\\nFallacy of the kind which we are now treating\\nof: your Conclusion is not in reality that which\\nwas, by your own account, proposed to be\\nproved the fallaciousness depends upon the\\ndeceit or attempt to deceive. The same ob-\\nservations will apply to argumentum ad\\nverecundiam, and the rest.\\nIt is very common to employ an ambiguous\\nTerm for the purpose of introducing the\\nFallacy of irrelevant Conclusion L e. when\\nyou cannot prove your proposition in the\\nsense in which it was maintained, to prove it\\nin some other sense e. g. these who contend\\nagainst the efficacy of faith, usually employ\\nthat word in their arguments in the sense of\\nmere belief, unaccompanied with any moral or\\npractical result, but considered as a mere\\nintellectual process and when they have thus\\nproved their Conclusion, they oppose it to\\none in which the word is used in a widely\\ndifferent sense.*\\nWhen the occasion or object in question is not such\\nas calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0262.jp2"}, "263": {"fulltext": "1C] OF FALLACIES. 217\\n\u00c2\u00a716.\\nThe Fallacy of tgnoratio elenchi is nowhere\\nmore common than in protracted controversy,\\nwhen one of the parties, after having at-\\ntempted in vain to maintain his position, shifts\\nhis ground as covertly as possible to another,\\ninstead of honestly giving up the point. An\\ninstance occurs in an attack made on the\\nreaders or hearers, the emotions required, it is a common\\nRhetorical artifice to turn their attention to some object\\nwhich will call forth these feelings and when they are\\ntoo much excited to be capable of judging calmly, it will\\nnot be difficult to turn their Passions, once roused, in the\\ndirection required, and to make them view the case before\\nthem in a very different light. When the metal is heated\\nit may easily be moulded into the desired form. Thus\\nvehement indignation against some crime, may be directed\\nagainst a person who has not been proved guilty of it\\nand vague declamations against corruption, oppression,\\n^c. or against the mischiefs of anarchy with high-flown\\npanegyrics on liberty, rights of man, ^c. or on social\\norder, justice, the constitution, law, religion, $c. will\\ngradually lead the hearers to take for granted, without\\nproof, that the measure proposed will lead to these evils\\nor these advantages and it will in consequence become\\nthe object of groundless abhorrence or admiration. For\\nthe very utterance of such words as have a multitude of\\nwhat may be called stimulating ideas associated with\\nthem, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially\\nof the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of\\nfeeling, as will effectually blind their judgment so that\\na string of vague abuse or panegyric will often have the\\neffect of a train of sound Argument. Rhetoric, Part II.\\nChap. ii. 6.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0263.jp2"}, "264": {"fulltext": "mises alter-\\nnately.\\n218 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nsystem pursued at one of our Universities.\\nThe objectors, rinding themselves unable to\\nmaintain their charge of the present neglect of\\nMathematics in that place, (to which neglect\\nthey attributed the late general decline in those\\nstudies) shifted their ground, and contended\\nthat that University was never famous for Ma-\\nthematicians which not only does not establish,\\nbut absolutely overthrows, their own original\\nassertion for if it never succeeded in those pur-\\nsuits, it could not have caused their late decline.\\nFallacy of A practice of this nature is common in oral\\ncombating L\\ne controversy especially viz. that of combating\\nboth your opponent s Premises alternately, and\\nshifting the attack from the one to the other,\\nwithout waiting to have either of them de-\\ncided upon before you quit it.\\nIt has been remarked above, that one class\\nof the propositions that may be, in this Fal-\\nlacy, substituted for the one required, is the\\nparticular for the universal: similar to this, is\\nthe substitution of a conditional with a uni-\\nversal antecedent, for one with a particular\\nantecedent, which will usually be the harder\\nto prove e. g. you are called on, suppose, to\\nprove that if any private interests are hurt by\\na proposed measure, it is inexpedient; and\\nyou pretend to have done so by showing that\\nif all private interests are hurt by it, it must\\nbe inexpedient. Nearly akin to this is the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0264.jp2"}, "265": {"fulltext": "17.] OF FALLACIES. 2 If)\\nvery common case of proving something to be\\npossible when it ought to have been proved\\nhighly probable; or probable, when it ought\\nto have been proved necessary or, which\\ncomes to the very same, proving it to be not\\nnecessary, when it should have been proved not\\nprobable or improbable, when it should have\\nbeen proved impossible. Aristotle (in Rhet.\\nBook II.) complains of this last branch of the\\nFallacy, as giving an undue advantage to the\\nrespondent many a guilty person owes his\\nacquittal to this the jury considering that\\nthe evidence brought does not demonstrate\\nthe absolute impossibility of his being inno-\\ncent, though perhaps the chances are innu-\\nmerable against it.\\n\u00c2\u00a717.\\nSimilar to this case is that which may be JJJ of\\nJ Objections.\\ncalled the Fallacy of objections L e. showing\\nthat there are objections against some plan,\\ntheory, or system, and thence inferring that it\\nshould be rejected; when that which ought\\nto have been proved is, that there are more,\\nor stronger objections, against the receiving\\nthan the rejecting of it. This is the main,\\nand almost universal Fallacy of infidels, and\\nis that of which men should be first and prin-\\ncipally warned. This is also the strong hold\\nof bigoted anti-innovators, who oppose all", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0265.jp2"}, "266": {"fulltext": "220 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nreforms and alterations indiscriminately; for\\nthere never was, nor will be, any plan executed\\nor proposed, against which strong and even\\nunanswerable objections may not be urged\\nso that unless the opposite objections be set\\nin the balance on the other side, we can never\\nadvance a step. There are objections,\\nsaid Dr. Johnson, against a plenum, and\\nobjections against a vacuum but one of them\\nmust be true.\\nThis is, as has been said, the principal engine em-\\nployed by the adversaries of our Faith they find nume-\\nrous objections against various parts of Scripture; to\\nsome of which no satisfactory answer can be given and\\nthe incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on\\nthese, to forget that there are infinitely more, and stronger\\nobjections against the supposition that the Christian Re-\\nligion is of human origin and that where we cannot\\nanswer all objections, we are bound in reason and in can-\\ndour to adopt the hypothesis which labours under the\\nleast. That the case is as I have stated, I am authorized\\nto assume, from this circumstance that no complete and\\nconsistent account has ever been given of the manner in\\nwhich the Christian Religion, supposing it a human contri-\\nvance, could have arisen and prevailed as it did. And yet\\nthis may obviously be demanded with the utmost fairness,\\nof those who deny its divine origin. The Religion exists:\\nthat is the phenomenon those who will not allow it to\\nhave come from God, are bound to solve the phenomenon\\non some other hypothesis less open to objections they\\nare not indeed called on to prove that it actually did arise\\nin this or that way but to suggest (consistently with\\nacknowledged facts) some probable way in which it may\\nhave arisen, reconcileable with all the circumstances of\\nthe case. That infidels have never done this, though they", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0266.jp2"}, "267": {"fulltext": "18. J OF FALLACIES. 221\\nThe very same Fallacy indeed is employed\\non the other side, by those who are for over-\\nthrowing whatever is established as soon as\\nthey can prove an objection against it, with-\\nout considering whether more and weightier\\nobjections may not lie against their own\\nschemes but their opponents have this de-\\ncided advantage over them, that they can\\nurge with great plausibility, we do not call\\nupon you to reject at once whatever is ob-\\njected to, but merely to suspend your* judgment,\\nand not come to a decision as long as there\\nare reasons on both sides: now since there\\nalways will be reasons on both sides, this non-\\ndecision is practically the very same thing as\\na decision in favour of the existing state of\\nthings the delay of trial becomes equivalent\\nto an acquittal*\\n18.\\nAnother form of ignoratio elenchi, which is F ll c y f\\no proving a\\nalso rather the more serviceable on the side qletdon*\\nhave had near 2000 years to try, amounts to a confession\\nthat no such hypothesis can be devised, which will not be\\nopen to greater objections than lie against Christianity.\\nNot to resolve, is to resolve. Bacon.\\nHow happy it is for mankind that in the most momen-\\ntous concerns of life their decision is generally formed for\\nthem by external circumstances which thus saves them\\nnot only from the perplexity of doubt and the danger of\\ndelay, but also from the pain of regret since we acquiesce\\nmuch more cheerfully in that which is unavoidable.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0267.jp2"}, "268": {"fulltext": "222 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III\\nof the respondent, is, to prove or disprove\\nsome part of that which is required, and dwell\\non that, suppressing all the rest.\\nThus, if a University is charged with culti-\\nvating only the mere elements of Mathematics,\\nand in reply a list of the books studied there\\nis produced, should even any one of those\\nbooks be not elementary, the charge is in\\nfairness refuted but the Sophist may then\\nearnestly contend that some of those books\\nare elementary and thus keep out of sight\\nthe real question, mk. whether they are all\\nso. This is the great art of the answerer of a\\nbook suppose the main positions in any\\nwork to be irrefragable, it will be strange if\\nsome illustration of them, or some subordinate\\npart in short, will not admit of a plausible\\nobjection the opponent then joins issue on\\none of these incidental questions, and comes\\nforward with a Reply to such and such\\na work.\\nHence the danger of ever advancing more\\nthan can be well maintained since the refu-\\ntation of that will often quash the whole a\\nguilty person may often escape by having too\\nThe Quakers would perhaps before now have suc-\\nceeded in doing away our superfluous and irreverent\\noaths, if they had not, besides many valid and strong\\narguments, adduced so many that are weak and easily\\nrefuted.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0268.jp2"}, "269": {"fulltext": "19.J OF FALLACIES. 223\\nmuch laid to his charge so he may also by\\nhaving too much evidence against him, i. e.\\nsome that is not in itself satisfactory thus, a\\nprisoner may sometimes obtain acquittal by\\nshowing that one of the witnesses against him\\nis an infamous informer and spy though\\nperhaps if that part of the evidence had been\\nomitted, the rest would have been sufficient\\nfor conviction.\\nCases of this nature might very well be re-\\nferred also to the Fallacy formerly mentioned,\\nof inferring the Falsity of the Conclusion from\\nthe Falsity of a Premiss which indeed is very\\nclosely allied to the present Fallacy the real\\nquestion is, whether or not this Conclusion\\nought to be admitted; the Sophist confines\\nhimself to the question, whether or not it\\nis established by this particular argument\\nleaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he\\nhas carried his point as to the latter question,\\nthat the former is thereby decided.\\n\u00c2\u00a719.\\nIt will readily be perceived that nothing is suppre^i\\nConclusion.\\nless conducive to the success of the Fallacy in\\nquestion than to state clearly, in the outset,\\neither the proposition you are about to prove,\\nor that which you ought to prove it answers\\nbest to begin with the Premises, and to in-\\ntroduce a pretty long chain of argument before", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0269.jp2"}, "270": {"fulltext": "224 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.\\nyou arrive at the Conclusion. The careless\\nhearer takes for granted, at the beginning,\\nthat this chain will lead to the Conclusion\\nrequired; and by the time you are come to\\nthe end, he is ready to take for granted that\\nthe Conclusion which you draw is the one\\nrequired his idea of the question having\\ngradually become indistinct. This Fallacy\\nis greatly aided by the common practice of\\nsuppressing the Conclusion and leaving it to\\nbe supplied by the hearer, who is of course\\nless likely to perceive whether it be really that\\nwhich was to be proved, than if it were\\ndistinctly stated. The practice therefore is at\\nbest suspicious and it is better in general to\\navoid it, and to give and require a distinct\\nstatement of the Conclusion intended.\\n\u00c2\u00a720.\\njests. Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it\\nmay not be improper to mention the just and\\ningenious remark, that Jests are Fallacies\\ni. e. Fallacies so palpable as not to be likely\\nto deceive any one, but yet bearing just that\\nresemblance of argument which is calculated\\nto amuse by the contrast; in the same\\nmanner that a parody does, by the contrast\\nof its levity with the serious production which\\nit imitates. There is indeed something\\nSee Wallis s Logic.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0270.jp2"}, "271": {"fulltext": "20.] OF FALLACIES. 225\\nlaughable even in Fallacies which are in-\\ntended for serious conviction, when they are\\nthoroughly exposed. There are several dif-\\nferent kinds of joke and raillery, which will be\\nfound to correspond with the different kinds\\nof Fallacy the pun (to take the simplest and\\nmost obvious case) is evidently, in most in-\\nstances, a mock argument founded on a pal-\\npable equivocation of the middle Term and\\nthe rest in like manner will be found to\\ncorrespond to the respective Fallacies, and to\\nbe imitations of serious argument.\\nIt is probable indeed that all jests, sports,\\nor games, (jraihiaX) properly so called, will be\\nfound, on examination, to be imitative of serious\\ntransactions as of War, or Commerce.* But\\nto enter fully into this subject would be un-\\nsuitable to the present occasion.\\nI shall subjoin some general remarks on the\\nlegitimate province of Reasoning, and on its\\nconnection with Inductive philosophy, and\\nwith Rhetoric on which points much misap-\\nprehension has prevailed, tending to throw\\nobscurity over the design and use of the\\nScience under consideration.\\nSee some excellent remarks on Imitation, in Dr.\\nA. Smith s posthumous Essays.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0271.jp2"}, "272": {"fulltext": "226 [Book IV.\\nBOOK IV.\\nDISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF\\nREASONING.\\nLogic being concerned with the theory of\\nReasoning, it is evidently necessary, in order\\nto take a correct view of this Science, that all\\nmisapprehensions should be removed relative\\nto the occasions on which the Reasoning-\\nprocess is employed, the purposes it has\\nin view, and the limits within which it is\\nconfined.\\nSimple and obvious as such questions may\\nappear to those who have not thought much\\non the subject, they will appear on further\\nconsideration to be involved in much per-\\nplexity and obscurity, from the vague and\\ninaccurate language of many popular writers.\\nTo the confused and incorrect notions that\\nprevail respecting the Reasoning-process may\\nbe traced most of the common mistakes re-\\nspecting the Science of Logic, and much of\\nthe unsound and unphilosophical argumen-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0272.jp2"}, "273": {"fulltext": "ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 227\\ntation which is so often to be met with in the\\nworks of ingenious writers.\\nThese errors have been incidentally ad-\\nverted to in the foregoing part of this work\\nbut it may be desirable, before we dismiss the\\nsubject, to offer on these points some further\\nremarks, which could not have been there\\nintroduced without too great an interruption\\nto the development of the system. Little\\nor nothing indeed remains to be said that is\\nnot implied in the principles which have been\\nalready laid down but the results and appli-\\ncations of those principles are liable in many\\ninstances to be overlooked, if not distinctly\\npointed out. These supplementary observa-\\ntions will neither require, nor admit of, so\\nsystematic an arrangement as has hitherto\\nbeen aimed at since they will be such as\\nare suggested principally by the objections\\nand mistakes of those who have misunder-\\nstood, partially or entirely, the nature of the\\nLogical system.\\nq2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0273.jp2"}, "274": {"fulltext": "228 Book IV.\\nChap. I.\\nOf Induction.\\n\u00c2\u00a71.\\nMistake of Much has been said by some writers of the\\nopposing\\n\u00c2\u00a3yiio g ism. to superiority of the Inductive to the Syllogistic\\nmethod of seeking truth, as if the two stood\\nopposed to each other and of the advantage\\nof substituting the Organon of Bacon for that\\nof Aristotle, fyc. fyc. which indicates a total\\nmisconception of the nature of both. There\\nis, however, the more excuse for the confu-\\nsion of thought which prevails on this subject,\\nbecause eminent Logical writers have treated,\\nor at least have appeared to treat, of Induc-\\ntion as a distinct kind of argument from the\\nSyllogism which if it were, it certainly might\\nbe contrasted with the Syllogism or rather\\nthe whole Syllogistic theory would fall to the\\nground, since one of the very first principles\\nit establishes, is that all Reasoning, on what-\\never subject, is one and the same process,\\nwhich may be clearly exhibited in the form\\nof Syllogisms. It is hardly to be supposed,\\ntherefore, that this was the deliberate mean-\\ning of those writers though it must be", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0274.jp2"}, "275": {"fulltext": "Chap. I. 1.] OF INDUCTION. 229\\nadmitted that they have countenanced the\\nerror in question, by their inaccurate expres-\\nsions. This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have\\narisen from a vagueness in the use of the\\nword Induction, which is sometimes employed\\nto designate the process of investigation and\\nof collecting facts sometimes, the deducing\\nof an inference from those facts. The former\\nof these processes (viz. that of observation\\nand experiment) is undoubtedly distinct from\\nthat which takes place in the Syllogism\\nbut then it is not a process of argument the\\nlatter again is an argumentative process but\\nthen it is, like all other arguments, capable of\\nbeing Syllogistically expressed. And hence\\nInduction has come to be regarded as a distinct\\nkind of argument from the Syllogism. This\\nFallacy cannot be more concisely or clearly\\nstated, than in the technical form with which\\nwe may now presume our readers to be\\nfamiliar.\\nInduction is distinct from Syllogism\\nInduction is a process of Reasoning therefore\\nThere is a process of Reasoning distinct from\\nSyllogism.\\nHere, Induction, which is the middle\\nTerm, is used in different senses in the two\\nPremises.\\nIn the process of Reasoning by which we Analysis\\ndeduce, from our observation of certain known", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0275.jp2"}, "276": {"fulltext": "230 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\ncases, an inference with respect to unknown\\nones, we* are employing a Syllogism in Bar-\\nbara with the major Premiss suppressed\\nthat being always substantially the same, as it\\nasserts, that what belongs to the individual\\nor individuals we have examined, belongs to\\nthe whole class under which they come e.g.\\nfrom an examination of the history of several\\ntyrannies, and finding that each of them was\\nof short duration, we conclude, that the same\\nis likely to be the case with all tyrannies the\\nsuppressed major Premiss being easily supplied\\nby the hearer viz. that what belongs to the\\ntyrannies in question is likely to belong to all.\\nTwo senses Induction, therefore, so far forth as it is an\\nof the word _\\ninduction, argument, may, ot course, be stated Syllo-\\ngistically but so far forth as it is a process of\\ninquiry with a view to obtain the Premises of\\nthat argument, it is, of course, out of the\\nprovince of Logic.f Whether the Induction\\nNot the minor, as Aldricli represents it. The instance\\nhe gives will sufficiently prove this This and that, and\\nthe other magnet attract iron therefore so do all. If\\nthis were, as he asserts, an Enthymeme whose minor is\\nsuppressed, the only Premiss which we could supply, to\\nfill it up, would be, All magnets are this, that, and the\\nother which is manifestly false.\\nf And this is the original and strict sense of the word.\\nInduction means properly, not the deducing of the con-\\nclusion, but the bringing in, one by one, of instances,\\nbearing on the point in question, till a sufficient number\\nhas been collected.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0276.jp2"}, "277": {"fulltext": "Chap. I. \u00c2\u00a72.] OF INDUCTION. 231\\n(in this last sense) has been sufficiently ample,\\ni. e. takes in a sufficient number of individual\\ncases, whether the character of those cases\\nhas been correctly ascertained and how far\\nthe individuals we have examined are likely to\\nresemble, in this or that circumstance, the rest\\nof the class, tipc. fyc., are points that require\\nindeed great judgment and caution but this\\njudgment and caution are not to be aided by\\nLogic, because they are, in reality, employed\\nin deciding whether or not it is fair and\\nallowable to lay down your Premises L e.\\nwhether you are authorized or not, to assert,\\nthat what is true of the individuals you\\nhave examined, is true of the whole class:\\nand that this or that is true of those indivi-\\nduals. Now, the rules of Logic have nothing\\nto do with the truth or falsity of the Premises,\\nexcept of course when they are the conclu-\\nsions of former arguments but merely teach\\nus to decide, not whether the Premises are\\nfairly laid down, but whether the Conclusion\\nfollows fairly from the Premises or not.\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\nWhether the Premiss may fairly be assumed, Assumption\\nor not, is a point which cannot be decided induction,\\nwithout a competent knowledge of the nature\\nof the subject e. g. in Natural Philosophy, in\\nwhich the circumstances that in any case affect", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0277.jp2"}, "278": {"fulltext": "232 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nthe result, are usually far more clearly ascer-\\ntained, a single instance is often accounted a\\nsufficient Induction e. g. having once ascer-\\ntained that an individual magnet will attract\\niron, we are authorized to conclude that this\\nproperty is universal in the affairs of human\\nlife, on the other hand, a much fuller Induc-\\ntion is required, as in the former example.\\nIn short, the degree of evidence for any propo-\\nsition we originally assume as a Premiss\\n(whether the expressed or the suppressed\\none) is not to be learned from Logic, nor\\nindeed from any one distinct Science but\\nis the province of whatever Science furnishes\\nthe subject-matter of your argument. None\\nbut a Politician can judge rightly of the de-\\ngree of evidence of a proposition in Politics\\na Naturalist, in Natural History, fyc. fyc.\\ninvest- E. G. from examination of many horned\\nanimals, as sheep, cows, fyc, a Naturalist finds\\nthat they have cloven feet now his skill as\\na Naturalist is to be shown in judging whether\\nthese animals are likely to resemble in the\\nform of their feet all other horned animals\\nand it is the exercise of this judgment, toge-\\nther with the examination of individuals, that\\nconstitutes what is usually meant by the In-\\nductive process; which is that by which we\\ngain, properly, new truths, and which is not\\nconnected with Logic being not what is\\ntion.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0278.jp2"}, "279": {"fulltext": "Chap. I.\u00c2\u00a72.] OF INDUCTION. 233\\nstrictly called Reasoning, but Invest] gat) on.\\nBut when this major Premiss is granted him,\\nand is combined with the minor, viz. that the\\nanimals he has examined have cloven feet,\\nthen he draws the Conclusion Logically: viz.\\nthat the feet of all horned animals are clo-\\nven. Again, if from several times meeting\\nwith ill-luck on a Friday, any one concluded\\nthat Friday, universally, is an unlucky day,\\none would object to his Induction and yet\\nit would not be, as an argument, illogical;\\nsince the Conclusion follows fairly, if you\\ngrant his implied Premiss, that the events\\nwhich happened on those particular Fridays\\nare such as must hapen on all Fridays but\\nwe should object to his laying down this Pre-\\nmiss and therefore should justly say that\\nhis Induction was faulty, though his argument\\nwere correct.\\nAnd here it may be remarked, that the The more\\ndoubttui in-\\nordinary rule for fair argument, viz. that ^f 1\\nin an Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss\\nshould be always the one of whose truth\\nleast doubt can exist, is not observed in In-\\nduction for the Premiss which is usually\\nthe more doubtful of the two, is, in that, the\\nI have selected an instance in which Induction is tlie\\nonly ground we have to rest on no reason, that I know\\nof, .having ever been assigned that could have led us to\\nconjecture this curious fact a priori.\\nu\\niulucti jii.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0279.jp2"}, "280": {"fulltext": "234 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nmajor; it being in few cases quite certain that\\nthe individuals, respecting which some point\\nhas been ascertained, are to be fairly regarded\\nas a sample of the whole class the major\\nPremiss, nevertheless, is seldom expressed,\\nfor the reason just given, that it is easily\\nunderstood, as being, mutatis mutandis, the\\nsame in every Induction.\\nWhat has been said of Induction will\\nequally apply to Example which differs from\\nit only in having a singular instead of a\\ngeneral Conclusion e. g. in the instance\\nabove, if the Conclusion had been drawn,\\nnot respecting tyrannies in general, but re-\\nspecting this or that tyranny, that it was not\\nlikely to be lasting, each of the cases adduced\\nto prove this would have been called an\\nExample.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0280.jp2"}, "281": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. \u00c2\u00a71.] 235\\nChap. II.\\nOn the Discovery of Truth.\\n\u00c2\u00a71.\\nWhether it is by a process of Reasoning\\nthat New Truths are brought to light, is a\\nquestion which seems to be decided in the ne-\\ngative by what has been already said though\\nmany eminent writers seem to have taken for\\ngranted the affirmative. It is, perhaps, in a\\ngreat measure, a dispute concerning the use of\\nwords; but it is not, for that reason, either\\nuninteresting or unimportant, since an inaccu-\\nrate use of language may often, in matters of\\nScience, lead to confusion of thought, and to\\nerroneous conclusions. And, in the present\\ninstance, much of the undeserved contempt\\nwhich has been bestowed on the Logical sys-\\ntem may be traced to this source for when\\nany one has laid down, that Reasoning is\\nimportant in the discovery of Truth, and that\\nLogic is of no service in the discovery of\\nTruth, (each of which propositions is true\\nin a certain sense of the terms employed,\\nbut not in the same sense) he is naturally", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0281.jp2"}, "282": {"fulltext": "236 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nled to conclude, that there are processes of\\nReasoning to which the Syllogistic theory does\\nnot apply, and, of course, to misconceive alto-\\ngether the nature of the Science.\\nIn maintaining the negative side of the\\nabove question, three things are to be pre-\\nmised first, that it is not contended that\\ndiscoveries of any kind of Truth can be made\\n(or at least are usually made) without Reason-\\ning only, that Reasoning is not the whole of\\nthe process, nor the whole of that which is\\nimportant therein secondly, that Reasoning\\nshall be taken in the sense, not of every exer-\\ncise of the Reason, but of Argumentation, in\\nwhich we have all along used it, and in\\nwhich it has been defined by all the Logical\\nwriters, viz. from certain granted propo-\\nsitions to infer another proposition as the\\nconsequence of them thirdly, that by a\\nNew Truth, be understood something nei-\\nther expressly nor virtually asserted before,\\nnot implied and involved in anything already\\nknown.\\nTo prove, then, this point demonstratively\\nbecomes in this manner perfectly easy for\\nsince all Reasoning (in the sense above de-\\nfined) may be resolved into Syllogisms and\\nsince even the objectors to Logic make it a\\nsubject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the\\nPremises do virtually assert the Conclusion,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0282.jp2"}, "283": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. l.J DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 237\\nit follows at once that no New Truth (as\\nabove defined) can be elicited by any process\\nof Reasoning.\\nIt is on this ground, indeed, that the justly-\\ncelebrated author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric\\nobjects to the Syllogism altogether, as necessa-\\nrily involving a petit 10 principii an objection\\nwhich, of course, he would not have been dis-\\nposed to bring forward, had he perceived that,\\nwhether well or ill-founded, it lies against all\\narguments whatever. Had he been aware that\\na Syllogism is no distinct kind of argument\\notherwise than in form, but is, in fact, any\\nargument whatever, stated regularly and at\\nfull length, he would have obtained a more\\ncorrect view of the object of all Reasoning\\nwhich is, merely to expand and unfold the\\nassertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied\\nin those with which we set out, and to bring\\na person to perceive and acknowledge the full\\nforce of that which he has admitted to con-\\ntemplate it in various points of view; to admit\\nin one shape what he has already admitted in\\nanother, and to give up and disallow whatever\\nis inconsistent with it.\\nNor is it always a very easy task even to\\nbring before the mind the several bearings,\\nthe various applications, of any one proposi-\\ntion. A common Term comprehends several,\\noften numberless individuals; and these often,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0283.jp2"}, "284": {"fulltext": "238 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nin some respects, widely differing from each\\nother; and no one can be, on each occasion of\\nhis employing such a Term, attending to and\\nfixing his mind on each of the individuals, or\\neven of the species so comprehended. It is to\\nbe remembered, too, that both Division and\\nGeneralization are in a great degree arbi-\\ntrary i. e. that we may both divide the same\\ngenus on several different principles, and may\\nrefer the same species to several different\\nclasses, according to the nature of the dis-\\ncourse and drift of the argument each of\\nwhich classes will furnish a distinct middle\\nTerm for an argument, according to the\\nquestion. E. G. If we wished to prove that\\na horse feels, (to adopt an ill-chosen ex-\\nample from the above writer,) we might refer\\nit to the genus animal to prove that it\\nhas only a single stomach, to the genus of\\nnon-ruminants to prove that it is likely\\nto degenerate in a very cold climate, we\\nshould class it with original productions of\\na hot climate, fyc. fyc. Now, each of these,\\nand numberless others to which the same\\nthing might be referred, are implied by the\\nvery term, horse; yet it cannot be ex-\\npected that they can all be at once pre-\\nsent to the mind whenever that term is\\nuttered. Much less, when, instead of such\\na Term as that, we are employing Terms", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0284.jp2"}, "285": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 23.9\\nof a very abstract and, perhaps, complex\\nsignification,* as government, justice, $r.\\nThe ten Categories f or Predicaments, categories.\\nwhich Aristotle and other Logical writers\\nhave treated of, being certain general heads\\nor summa genera, to one or more of which\\nevery Term may be referred, serve the pur-\\npose of marking out certain tracks, as it were,\\nwhich are to be pursued in searching for\\nmiddle Terms, in each argument respectively\\nit being essential that we should generalize\\non a right principle, with a view to the ques-\\ntion before us or, in other words, that we\\nshould abstract that portion of any object\\npresented to the mind, which is important\\nto the argument in hand. There are ex-\\npressions in common use which have a re-\\nference to this caution such as, this is a\\nquestion, not as to the nature of the object,\\nOn this point there are some valuable remarks in the\\nPhilosophy of Rhetoric itself, Book IV. Chap. vii.\\n-f- The Categories enumerated l)y Aristotle, are obffla,\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0KOOOV, 7TO~lOV, irpUffTl, TTOU 7TOTe, ke iadcu, t\\\\\u00c2\u00a3iy f TTOul)\\n7raor)(\u00c2\u00a3ij which are usually rendered, as adequately as,\\nperhaps, they can be in our language, Substance, Quan-\\ntity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Posses-\\nsion, Action, Suffering. The Catalogue has been by\\nsome writers enlarged, as it is evident may easily be\\ndone by subdividing some of the heads and by others\\ncurtailed, as it is no less evident that all may ultimately\\nbe referred to the two heads of Substance and Attribute,\\nor (in the language of some Logicians) Accident.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0285.jp2"}, "286": {"fulltext": "240 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nbut the magnitude of it: this is a question\\nof time, or of place Spc., i. e. the subject\\nmust be referred to this or to that Category.\\nWith respect to the meaning of the Terms\\nin question, Discovery, and New Truth;\\nit matters not whether we confine ourselves to\\nthe narrowest sense, or admit the widest, pro-\\nvided we do but distinguish: there certainly\\nare two kinds of New Truth and of\\nDiscovery, if we take those words in the\\nDiscovery. 1 i i i i\\nwidest sense in which they are ever used.\\nFirst, such Truths as were, before they were\\ndiscovered, absolutely unknown, being not im-\\nplied by anything we previously knew, though\\nwe might perhaps suspect them as probable\\nsuch are all matters of fact strictly so called,\\nwhen first made known to one who had not\\nany such previous knowledge, as would enable\\nhim to ascertain them a priori L e. by Rea-\\nsoning as, if we inform a man that we have\\na colony at Botany Bay or that the earth\\nis at such a distance from the sun or that\\nplatina is heavier than gold. The commu-\\nnication of this kind of knowledge is most\\ninformation, usually, and most strictly, called information\\nwe gain it from observation, and from testi-\\nmony no mere internal workings of our own\\nminds (except when the mind itself is the\\nvery object to be observed), or mere discus-\\nsions in words, will make these known to us", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0286.jp2"}, "287": {"fulltext": "(i.w.IUl.j DISCOVER? OF TRUTH. 211\\nthough there is great room for sagacity in\\njudging what testimony to admit, and forming\\nconjectures that may lead to profitable obser-\\nvation, and to experiments with a view to it.\\nThe other class of Discoveries is of a very\\ndifferent nature. That which may be elicited\\nby Reasoning, and consequently is implied in\\nthat which we already know, we assent to on\\nthat ground, and not from observation or tes-\\ntimony to take a Geometrical truth upon\\ntrust, or to attempt to ascertain it by obser-\\nvation, would betray a total ignorance of the\\nnature of the Science. In the longest de-\\nmonstration, the Mathematical teacher seems\\nonly to lead us to make use of our own stores,\\nand point out to us how much we had already\\nadmitted and, in the case of many Ethical\\npropositions, we assent at first hearing, though\\nperhaps we had never heard or thought of the\\nproposition before so also do we readily as-\\nsent to the testimony of a respectable man,\\nwho tells us that our troops have gained a\\nvictory but how different is the nature of\\nthe assent in the two cases. In the latter\\nwe are ready to thank the man for his infor-\\nmation, as being such as no wisdom or learn-\\ning would have enabled us to ascertain in\\nthe former, we usually exclaim very true!\\nthat is a valuable and just remark that\\nnever struck me before! implying at once\\nR", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0287.jp2"}, "288": {"fulltext": "242 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nour practical ignorance of it, and also our\\nconsciousness that we possess, in what we\\nalready know, the means to ascertain the\\ntruth of it that we have a right, in short,\\nto bear our testimony to its truth.\\nTo all practical purposes, indeed, a Truth\\nof this description may be as completely un-\\nknown to a man as the other but as soon\\nas it is set before him, and the argument by\\nwhich it is connected with his previous no-\\ntions is made clear to him, he recognises it as\\nsomething conformable to, and contained in,\\nhis former belief.\\nIt is not improbable that Plato s doctrine of\\nReminiscence arose from a, hasty extension of\\nwhat he had observed in this class, to all ac-\\nquisition of knowledge whatever. His Theory\\nof ideas served to confound together matters\\nof fact respecting the nature of things, (which\\nmay be perfectly new to us) with propositions\\nrelating to our own notions, and modes of\\nthought (or to speak, perhaps, more cor-\\nrectly, bur own arbitrary signs) which propo-\\nsitions must be contained and implied in those\\nvery complex notions themselves and whose\\ntruth is a conformity, not to the nature of\\nthings, but to our own hypothesis. Such\\nare all propositions in pure Mathematics, and\\nmany in Ethics, viz. those which involve no\\nassertion as to real matters of fact. It has", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0288.jp2"}, "289": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. \u00c2\u00a71.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 243\\nbeen rightly remarked,* that Mathematical\\npropositions are not properly true or false,\\nin the same sense as any proposition respect-\\ning real fact is so called and hence the truth\\n(such as it is) of such propositions is necessary\\nand eternal since it amounts only to this,\\nthat any complex notion which you have ar-\\nbitrarily framed, must be exactly conformable\\nto itself. The proposition, that the belief\\nin a future state, combined with a complete\\ndevotion to the present life, is not consistent\\nwith the character of prudence, would be\\nnot at all the less true if a future state were\\na chimera, and prudence a quality which was\\nno-where met with nor would the truth of\\nthe Mathematician s conclusion be shaken,\\nthat circles are to each other as the squares\\nof their diameters, should it be found that\\nthere never had been a circle, or a square, con-\\nformable to the definition in rcrum natura. f\\nDugakl Stewart s Philosophy, Vol. II.\\n\u00e2\u0080\u00a2j Hence the futility of the attempt of Clarke, and\\nothers, to demonstrate (in the mathematical sense) the\\nexistence of a Deity. This can only be done by covertly\\nassuming in the Premises the very point to be proved.\\nNo matter of fact can be mathematically demonstrated;\\nthough it may be proved in such a manner as to leave no\\ndoubt on the mind. E. G. I have no more doubt that I\\nmet such and such a man, in this or that place, yesterday,\\nthan that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right\\nangles: but the kind of certainty I have of these two\\ntruths is widely different; to say, that I did not meet the\\nR 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0289.jp2"}, "290": {"fulltext": "244 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nThe Ethical proposition, just instanced, is\\none of those which Locke calls trifling, be-\\ncause the Predicate is merely a part of the\\ncomplex idea implied by the subject; and he\\nis right, if by trifling he means that it gives\\nnot, strictly speaking, any information but he\\nshould consider, that to remind a man of what\\nhe had not, and what he would not have\\nthought of, may be, practically, as valuable\\nas giving him information and that most\\npropositions in the best sermons, and all, in\\npure Mathematics, are of the description\\nwhich he censures.\\nIt is, indeed, rather remarkable that he\\nshould speak so often of building Morals into\\na demonstrative Science, and yet speak so\\nslightingly of those very propositions to which\\nwe must absolutely confine ourselves, in order\\nto give to Ethics even the appearance of such\\na Science for the instant you come to an\\nassertion respecting a matter of fact, as that\\nmen L e, actually existing men) are bound\\nto practise virtue, or are liable to many\\ntemptations, you have stepped off the ground\\nof strict demonstration, just as when you\\nproceed to practical Geometry.\\nman, would be false indeed, but it would not be anything\\ninconceivable, self-contradictory, and absurd but it would\\nbe so, to deny the equality of the angles of a triangle to\\ntwo right angles.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0290.jp2"}, "291": {"fulltext": "Ch,u II. I.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 215\\nBut to return it is of the utmost import- information\\ni i rv and Instruc-\\nance to distinguish these two kinds ot Dis- tio\\ncovery of Truth. In relation to the former,\\nas I have said, the word information is\\nmost strictly applied the communication of\\nthe latter is more properly called instruc-\\ntion. I speak of the usual practice for it\\nwould be going too far to pretend that writers\\nare uniform and consistent in the use of these,\\nor of any other term. We say that the His-\\ntorian gives us information respecting past\\ntimes the Traveller, respecting foreign coun-\\ntries on the other hand, the Mathematician\\ngives instruction in the principles of his Sci-\\nence the Moralist instructs us in our duties\\nand we generally use the expressions u a well-\\ninformed man, and a well-instructed man,\\nin a sense conformable to that which has been\\nhere laid down. However, let the words be\\nused as they may, the things are evidently\\ndifferent, and ought to be distinguished. It\\nis a question comparatively unimportant, whe-\\nther the term Discovery shall or shall not\\nbe extended to the eliciting of those Truths,\\nwhich, being implied in our previous know-\\nledge, may be established by mere strict\\nReasoning. Similar verbal questions, indeed,\\nmight be raised respecting many other cases\\ne. g. one has forgotten (i. e. cannot recollect)\\nthe name of some person or place perhaps", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0291.jp2"}, "292": {"fulltext": "246 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nwe even try to think of it, but in vain at\\nlast some one reminds us, and we instantly\\nrecognise it as the one we wanted to recollect\\nit may be asked, was this in our mind or not\\nThe answer is, that in one sense it was, and\\nin another sense, it was not. Or, again, sup-\\npose there is a vein of metal on a man s estate,\\nwhich he does not know of; is it part of\\nhis possessions or not and when he finds it\\nout and works it, does he then acquire a new\\npossession or not Certainly not, in the same\\nsense as if he has a fresh estate bequeathed\\nto him, which he had formerly no right to\\nbut to all practical purposes it is a new pos-\\nsession. This case, indeed, may serve as an\\nillustration of the one we have been consider-\\ning and in all these cases, if the real distinc-\\ntion be understood, the verbal question will\\nnot be of much consequence. To use one\\nmore illustration. Reasoning has been aptly\\ncompared to the piling together blocks of\\nstone on each of which, as on a pedestal, a\\nman can raise himself a small, and but a\\nsmall, height above the plain but which,\\nwhen skilfully built up, will form a flight of\\nsteps, which will raise him to a great eleva-\\ntion. Now (to pursue this analogy) when the\\nmaterials are all ready to the builder s hand,\\nthe blocks ready dug and brought, his work\\nresembles one of the two kinds of Discovery", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0292.jp2"}, "293": {"fulltext": "Hap. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 247\\njust mentioned, viz. that to which we have\\nassigned the name of instruction but if his\\nmaterials are to be entirely, or in part, pro-\\nvided by himself, if he himself is forced to\\ndig fresh blocks from the quarry, this cor-\\nresponds to the other kind of Discovery.\\n2.\\nI have hitherto spoken of the employment Physical du\\ncovcries.\\nof argument in the establishment of those\\nhypothetical Truths (as they may be called)\\nwhich relate only to our own abstract no-\\ntions it is not, however, meant to be in-\\nsinuated that there is no room for Reasoning\\nin the establishment of a matter of fact\\nbut the other class of Truths have first been\\ntreated of, because, in discussing subjects of\\nthat kind, the process of Reasoning is always\\nthe principal, and often the only thing to be\\nattended to, if we are but certain and clear\\nas to the meaning of the terms; whereas,\\nwhen assertions respecting real existence are\\nintroduced, we have the additional and more\\nimportant business of ascertaining and keeping\\nin mind the degree of evidence for those facts\\nsince, otherwise, our Conclusions could not\\nbe relied on, however accurate our Reason-\\ning but, undoubtedly, we may by Reasoning\\narrive at matters of fact, if we have matters\\nof fact to set out with as data; only that it", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0293.jp2"}, "294": {"fulltext": "248 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nwill very often happen that, from certain\\nfacts/ as Campbell remarks, we draw only\\nprobable Conclusions; because the other\\nPremiss introduced (which he overlooked) is\\nonly probable. He observed that in such an\\ninstance, for example, as the one lately given,\\nwe infer from the certainty that such and such\\ntyrannies have been short-lived, the probability\\nthat others will be so and he did not con-\\nsider that there is an understood Premiss\\nwhich is essential to the argument (viz. that\\nall tyrannies will resemble those we have\\nalready observed) which being only of a pro-\\nbable character, must attach the same degree\\nof uncertainty to the Conclusion.* An indi-\\nvidual fact is not unfrequently elicited by\\nskilfully combining, and Reasoning from, those\\nalready known of which many curious cases\\noccur in the detection of criminals by officers\\nof justice, and Barristers, who acquire by\\npractice such dexterity in that particular de-\\npartment, as to draw sometimes the right\\nConclusion from data, which might be in the\\npossession of others, without being applied to\\nAnd the doubtfulness is multiplied, if both Premises\\nare uncertain. For since it is only on the supposition of\\nboth Premises being true, that we can calculate on the\\ntruth of the Conclusion, we must state in numbers the\\nchances against each Premiss being true, and then mul-\\ntiply these together, to judge of the degree of evidence of\\nthe Conclusion.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Book III. 14.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0294.jp2"}, "295": {"fulltext": "Cha*. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 2 19\\nthe same use. In all cases of the establish-\\nment of a general fact from Induction, that\\ngeneral fact (as has been formerly remarked)\\nis ultimately established by Reasoning e. g.\\nBakewell, the celebrated cattle-breeder, ob-\\nserved, in a great number of individual\\nbeasts, a tendency to fatten readily, and\\nin a great number of others the absence\\nof this constitution in every individual of\\nthe former description, he observed a certain\\npeculiar make, though they differed widely in\\nsize, colour, fyc. Those of the latter descrip-\\ntion differed no less in various points, but\\nagreed in being of a different make from the\\nothers these facts were his data from\\nwhich combining them with the general prin-\\nciple, that Nature is steady and uniform in\\nher proceedings, he logically drew the conclu-\\nsion that beasts of the specified make have\\nuniversally a peculiar tendency to fattening\\nbut then his principal merit consisted in making\\nthe observations, and in so combining them\\nas to abstract from each of a multitude of\\ncases, differing widely in many respects, the\\ncircumstances in which they all agreed and\\nalso in conjecturing skilfully how far those\\ncircumstances were likely to be found in the\\nwhole class the making of such observations,\\nand still more the combination, abstraction,\\nand judgment employed, are what men com-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0295.jp2"}, "296": {"fulltext": "250 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nmonly mean (as was above observed) when\\nthey speak of Induction and these operations\\nare certainly distinct from Reasoning.* The\\nsame observations will apply to numberless\\nother cases as, for instance, to the Discovery\\nof the law of vis inertia? and the other\\nprinciples of Natural Philosophy.\\nBut to what class, it may be asked, should\\nbe referred the Discoveries thus made All\\nwould agree in calling them, when first ascer-\\ntained, New Truths, in the strictest sense\\nof the word; which would seem to imply\\ntheir belonging to the class which may be\\ncalled by way of distinction, Physical Disco-\\nveries: and yet their being ultimately esta-\\nblished by Reasoning, would seem, according\\nto the foregoing rule, to refer them- to the\\nother class, viz. what may be called Logical\\nLogical Di S Discoveries since whatever is established by\\nReasoning must have been contained and\\nvirtually asserted in the Premises. In answer\\nto this, it is to be observed, that they cer-\\ntainly do belong to the latter class, relatively\\nto a person who is in possession of the\\ndata: but to him who is not, they are\\nNew Truths of the other class for it is to be\\nremembered, that the words Discovery\\nand New Truths are necessarily relative:\\nthere may be a proposition which is to one\\nSee Book I. 1. Note.\\ncovenes.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0296.jp2"}, "297": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 251\\nperson absolutely known; to another (viz, one\\nto whom it has never occurred, though he is in\\npossession of all the data from which it may\\nbe proved) it will be (when he comes to\\nperceive it, by a process of instruction) what\\nwe have called a Logical Discovery: to a third\\nviz. one who is ignorant of these data) it will\\nbe absolutely unknown, and will have been,\\nwhen made known to him, a perfectly and\\nproperly New Truth, a piece of information,\\na Physical Discovery, as we have called it.*\\nTo the Philosopher, therefore, who arrives at\\nthe Discovery by Reasoning from his observa-\\ntions, and from established principles com-\\nbined with them, the Discovery is of the\\nformer class to the multitude, probably, of\\nthe latter, as they will have been most likely\\nnot possessed of all his data.\\nIt follows from what has been said, that in character of\\nMathematics, and in such Ethical propositions\\nIt may be worth while in this place to define what is\\nproperly to be called Knowledge it implies three things;\\n1st, firm belief, 2dly, of what is true, 3dly, on sufficient\\ngrounds. If any one c. g. is in doubt respecting one of\\nEuclid s demonstrations, he cannot be said to know the\\nproposition proved by it if, again, he is fully convinced\\nof anything that is not true, he is mistaken in supposing\\nhimself to know it lastly, if two persons are each folly\\nconfident, one that the moon is inhabited, and the other\\nthat it is not, (though one of these opinions must be true J\\nneither of them could properly be said to hum the truth,\\nsince he cannot have sufficient proof of it.\\nscientific\\ntruths.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0297.jp2"}, "298": {"fulltext": "252 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nas we were lately speaking of, we do not allow\\nthe possibility of any but a Logical Discovery\\ni. e. no proposition of that class can be true,\\nwhich was not implied in the definitions and\\naxioms we set out with, which are the first\\nprinciples for since these propositions do not\\nprofess to state any matter of fact, the only\\nTruth they can possess, consists in conformity\\nto the original principles to one, therefore,\\nwho knows these principles, such propositions\\nare Truths already implied, since they may be\\ndeveloped to him by Reasoning, if he is not\\ndefective in the discursive faculty and again,\\nto one who does not understand those princi-\\nples (i. e. is not master of the definitions)\\nsuch propositions are in great measure, if not\\nwholly, unmeaning. On the other hand, pro-\\npositions relating to matters of fact, may he,\\nindeed, implied in what he already knew (as\\nhe who knows the climate of the Alps, the\\nAndes, Sfc. tipc. has virtually admitted the\\ngeneral fact, that the tops of mountains are\\ncomparatively cold but as these possess an\\nabsolute and physical Truth, they may also be\\nabsolutely new, their Truth not being im-\\nplied by the mere terms of the propositions.\\nThe truth or falsity of any proposition con-\\ncerning a triangle, is implied by the meaning\\nof that and of the other Geometrical terms\\nwhereas, though one may understand (in the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0298.jp2"}, "299": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. \u00c2\u00a73.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 253\\nordinary sense of that word) the full meaning\\nof the terms planet, and inhabited, and\\nof all the other terms in the language, he\\ncannot thence be certain that the planets\\nare, or are not, inhabited.\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nIt has probably been the source of much\\nperplexity, that the term true has been\\napplied indiscriminately to two such different\\nclasses of propositions. The term definition is Dean\\nused with the same laxity and much confu-\\nsion has thence resulted. Such Definitions as\\nthe Mathematical, must imply every attribute\\nthat belongs to the thing defined because\\nthat thing is merely our meaning; which\\nmeaning the Definition lays down whereas,\\nreal substances, having an independent exist-\\nence, may possess innumerable qualities (as\\nLocke observes) not implied in the meaning\\nwe attach to their names, or, as Locke ex-\\npresses it, in our ideas of them. Their eu\u00c2\u00abi u\\nnominal essence (to use his language) is not\\nthe same as their real essence whereas the\\nnominal essence, and the real essence, of a\\nCircle, fyc. are the same. A Mathematical\\nDefinition, therefore, cannot properly be called\\ntrue, since it is not properly a proposition\\nI mean in this place, that expression of a Definition\\nin which the name is conjoined with that which is, pro-\\ni\\nNominal de-\\nitions.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0299.jp2"}, "300": {"fulltext": "254 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\n(any more than an article in a Dictionary,)\\nbut merely an explanation of the meaning of\\na Term. Perhaps in Definitions of this class,\\nit might be better to substitute (as Aristotle\\nusually does) the imperative mood for the\\nindicative: thus bringing them. into the form\\nof postulates; for the Definitions and the\\nPostulates in Mathematics differ in little or\\nnothing but the form of expression e. g. let\\na four-sided figure, of equal sides and right\\nangles, be called a square, would clearly\\nimply that such a figure is conceivable, and\\nthat the writer intended to employ that term to\\nsignify such a figure which is precisely all\\nthat is meant to be asserted. If, indeed, a\\nMathematical writer mean to assert that the\\nordinary sense of the term is that which he\\nhas given, that, certainly, is a proposition,\\nwhich must be either true or false but in\\ndefining a neiv term, though the term indeed\\nmay be ill chosen and improper, or the Defi-\\nnition may be self-contradictory, and conse-\\nquently unintelligible, the words true, and\\nfalse, do not apply. The same may be\\nsaid of what are called nominal Definitions of\\nperly speaking, the definition of it, in the form of a pro-\\nposition as e. g. a Triangle is a plane superficial\\nfigure bounded by three straight lines: the words in\\nitalics are what, strictly speaking, constitute the Defini-\\ntion but what I am here speaking of is the whole sen-\\ntence.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0300.jp2"}, "301": {"fulltext": "Chaf. II. 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 255\\nother things, i. e. those which merely explain\\nthe meaning of the word viz. they can be\\ntrue or false only when they profess (and so\\nfar as they profess) to give the ordinary and\\nestablished meaning of the term. But those\\nwhich are called real Definitions, viz. which\\nunfold the nature of the thing, (which they\\nmay do in various degrees,) to these the\\nepithet true may be applied and to make\\nout such a Definition will often be the very\\nend (not as in Mathematics the beginning) of\\nour study.*\\nIn Mathematics there is no such distinction\\nbetween nominal and real Definition the\\nmeaning of the term, and the nature of the\\nthing, being one and the same so that no\\ncorrect Definition whatever of any Mathema-\\ntical term can be devised, which shall not\\nimply every thing which belongs to the term.\\n\u00c2\u00a74.\\nWhen it is asked, then, whether such great Ambiguity or\\nthe wont\\nDiscoveries, as have been made in Natural RMMttl\\nPhilosophy, were accomplished, or can be\\naccomplished, by Reasoning? the inquirer\\nshould be reminded, that the question is am-\\nbiguous it may be answered in the affir-\\nmative, if by Reasoning is meant to be\\nBurke on Taste, in the Introduction to his Essay\\non the Sublime and Beautiful.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0301.jp2"}, "302": {"fulltext": "256 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nincluded the assumption of Premises. To the\\nright performance of that work, is requi-\\nsite, not only, in many cases, the ascertain-\\nment of facts, and of the degree of evidence\\nfor doubtful propositions, (in which observation\\nand experiment will often be indispensable,)\\nbut also a skilful selection and combination of\\nknown facts and principles such as implies,\\namongst other things, the exercise of that\\npowerful abstraction which seizes the com-\\nmon circumstances the point of agreement\\nin a number of, otherwise, dissimilar indi-\\nviduals; and it is in this that the greatest\\ngenius is shown. But if Reasoning be\\nunderstood in the limited sense in which it\\nis usually denned, then we must answer in\\nthe negative and reply that such Discoveries\\nare made by means of Reasoning combined\\nwith other operations.\\nIn the process I have been speaking of, there\\nis much Reasoning throughout and thence\\nthe whole has been carelessly called a pro-\\ncess of Reasoning.\\nIt is not, indeed, any just ground of com-\\nplaint that the word Reasoning is used in two\\nsenses; but that the two senses are perpe-\\ntually confounded together and hence it is\\nthat some Logical writers fancied that Rea-\\nsoning (viz. that which Logic treats of) was\\nthe method of discovering Truth and that", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0302.jp2"}, "303": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. \u00c2\u00a74.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 257\\nso many other writers have accordingly com-\\nplained of Logic for not accomplishing that\\nend; urging that Syllogism (i.e. Reason-\\ning though they overlooked the coincidence)\\nnever established any thing that is, strictly\\nspeaking, unknown to him who has granted\\nthe Premises and proposing the introduction\\nof a certain rational Logic to accomplish\\nthis purpose i. e. to direct the mind in the\\nprocess of investigation. Supposing that\\nsome such system could be devised that it\\ncould even be brought into a scientific form,\\n(which he must be more sanguine than scien-\\ntific who expects,) that it were of the great-\\nest conceivable utility, and that it should be\\nallowed to bear the name of u Logic, (since\\nit would not be worth while to contend about\\na name) still it would not, as these writers\\nseem to suppose, have the same object pro-\\nposed with the Aristotelian Logic or be in\\nany respect a rival to that system. A plough\\nmay be a much more ingenious and valuable\\ninstrument than a flail but it never can be\\nsubstituted for it.\\nThose Discoveries of general laws of Na-\\nture, fyc. of which we have been speaking,\\nbeing of that character which we have de-\\nscribed by the name of Logical Discoveries,\\nto him who is in possession of all the Premises\\nfrom which they are deduced; but being, to the\\nS", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0303.jp2"}, "304": {"fulltext": "258 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nmultitude (who are unacquainted with many\\nof those Premises) strictly New Truths/\\nhence it is, that men in general give to the\\ngeneral facts, and to them, most peculiarly,\\nthe name of Discoveries for to themselves they\\nare such, in the strictest sense the Premises\\nfrom which they were inferred being not only\\noriginally unknown to them, but frequently\\nremaining unknown to the very last; e.g. the\\ngeneral conclusion concerning cattle, which\\nBake well made known, is what most Agri-\\nculturists (and many others also) are ac-\\nquainted with but the Premises he set out\\nwith, viz. the facts respecting this, that, and\\nthe other, individual ox, (the ascertainment of\\nwhich facts was his first Discovery,) these are\\nwhat few know, or care to know, with any\\nexact particularity.\\nobservation And it may be added, that these disCO-\\namI experi- m i\\nveries of particular facts, which are the\\nimmediate result of observation, are, in them-\\nselves, uninteresting and insignificant, till they\\nare combined so as to lead to a grand general\\nresult those who on each occasion watched\\nthe motions, and registered the times of oc-\\ncupation of Jupiter s satellites, little thought,-\\nperhaps, themselves, what magnificent results\\nthey were preparing the way for.* So that\\nHence, Bacon urges us to pursue Truth, without\\nalways requiring to perceive its practical application.\\nmeat.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0304.jp2"}, "305": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. HJ DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 259\\nthere is an additional cause which has con-\\nfined the term Discovery to these grand ge-\\nneral conclusions and, as was just observed,\\nthey are, to the generality of men, perfectly\\nNew Truths in the strictest sense of the word,\\nnot being implied in any previous knowledge\\nthey possessed. Very often it will happen,\\nindeed, that the conclusion thus drawn will\\namount only to a probable conjecture; which\\nconjecture will dictate to the inquirer such an\\nexperiment, or course of experiments, as will\\nfully establish the fact thus Sir H. Davy,\\nfrom finding that the flame of hydrogen gas\\nwas not communicated through a long slender\\ntube, conjectured that a shorter but still slen-\\nderer tube would answer the same purpose\\nthis led him to try the experiments, in which,\\nby continually shortening the tube, and at the\\nsame time lessening its bore, he arrived at\\nlast at the wire-gauze of his safety-lamp.\\nIt is to be observed also, that whatever\\ncredit is conveyed by the word Discovery,\\nto him who is regarded as the author of it,\\nis well deserved by those who skilfully select\\nand combine known Truths {especially such\\nas have been long and generally known) so\\nas to elicit important, and hitherto unthought-\\nof, conclusions; their s is the master-mind:\\ndpxtreKToviKi) (frpovrjcns. Whereas men of very\\ninferior powers may sometimes, by immediate\\ns 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0305.jp2"}, "306": {"fulltext": "260 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nobservation, discover perfectly new facts, em-\\npirically and thus be of service in furnishing\\nmaterials to the others to whom they stand\\nin the same relation (to recur to a former\\nillustration) as the brickmaker or stone-\\nquarrier to the architect. It is peculiarly\\ncreditable to Adam Smith, and to Mr. Mal-\\nthus, that the data from which they drew\\nsuch important Conclusions had been in every\\none s hands for centuries.\\nAs for Mathematical Discoveries, they (as\\nwe have before said) must alzvays be of the\\ndescription to which we have given the name\\nof Logical Discoveries since to him who\\nproperly comprehends the meaning of the\\nMathematical terms, (and to no other are the\\nTruths themselves, properly speaking, intel-\\nligible) those results are implied in his pre-\\nvious knowledge, since they are Logically\\ndeducible therefrom. It is not, however,\\nmeant to be implied, that Mathematical Dis-\\ncoveries are effected by pure Reasoning, and\\nby that singly. For though there is not here,\\nas in Physics, any exercise of judgment as to\\nthe degree of evidence of the Premises, nor any\\nexperiments and observations, yet there is the\\nsame call for skill in the selection and combina-\\ntion of the Premises in such a manner as shall\\nbe best calculated to lead to a new, that is,\\nmiperceived and unthought-of Conclusion.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0306.jp2"}, "307": {"fulltext": "-\u00e2\u0080\u00a2radons\\nconnected\\nChap.II.\u00c2\u00a75.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 20 1\\nIn folloxving, indeed, and taking in a de-\\nmonstration, nothing is called for but pure\\nReasoning but the assumption of Premises is\\nnot a part of Reasoning, in the strict and tech-\\nnical sense of that term. Accordingly, there\\nare many who can follozv a Mathematical\\ndemonstration, or any other train of argu-\\nment, who would not succeed well in framing\\none of their own.*\\n\u00c2\u00a75.\\nFor both kinds of Discovery then, the Lo- o pe\\ncom\\ngical, as well as the Physical, certain opera- ReMon\\ntions are requisite, beyond those which can\\nfairly be comprehended under the strict sense\\nof the word Reasoning in the Logical, is\\nrequired a skilful selection and combination of\\nknown Truths: in the Physical, we must em-\\nploy, in addition (generally speaking) to that\\nprocess, observation and experiment. It will\\ngenerally happen, that in the study of nature,\\nand, universally, in all that relates to matters\\nof fact, both kinds of investigation will be\\nunited i. e. some of the facts or principles\\nyou reason from as Premises, must be ascer-\\ntained by observation; or, as in the case of\\nthe safety-lamp, the ultimate Conclusion will\\nHence, the Student must not confine himself to this\\npassive kind of employment, if he would truly become a\\nMathematician.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0307.jp2"}, "308": {"fulltext": "262 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nneed confirmation from experience so that\\nboth Physical and Logical Discovery will\\ntake place in the course of the same process\\nwe need not, therefore, wonder, that the two\\nare so perpetually confounded. In Mathe-\\nmatics, on the other hand, and in great part\\nof the discussions relating to Ethics and Ju-\\nrisprudence, there being no room for any\\nPhysical Discovery whatever, we have only\\nto make a skilful use of the propositions in our\\npossession, to arrive at every attainable result.\\nThe investigation, however, of the latter\\nclass of subjects differs in other points also\\nfrom that of the former. For, setting aside\\nthe circumstance of our having, in these, no\\nquestion as to facts, no room for observa-\\ntion, there is also a considerable difference\\nin what may be called, in both instances, the\\nprocess of Logical investigation the Premises\\non which we proceed being of so different a\\nnature in the two cases.\\nMatbemati- To take the example of Mathematics, the\\ncal and other A\\nReasoning. Definitions, which are the principles of our\\nReasoning, are very few, and the Axioms still\\nfewer; and both are, for the most part, laid\\ndown and placed before the student in the\\noutset; the introduction of a new Definition\\nor Axiom, being of comparatively rare occur-\\nrence, at wide intervals, and with a formal\\nstatement besides which, there is no room", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0308.jp2"}, "309": {"fulltext": "Chap. II. \u00c2\u00a75.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 263\\nfor doubt concerning either. On the other\\nhand, in all Reasonings which regard matters\\nof fact, we introduce, almost at every step,\\nfresh and fresh propositions (to a very great\\nnumber) which had not been elicited in the\\ncourse of our Reasoning, but are taken for\\ngranted viz, facts and laws of Nature, which\\nare here the principles of our Reasoning, and\\nmaxims, or elements of belief, which answer\\nto the axioms in Mathematics. If, at the\\nopening of a Treatise, for example, on Che-\\nmistry, on Agriculture, on Political Economy,\\nSfc. the author should make, as in Mathe-\\nmatics, a formal statement of all the propo-\\nsitions he intended to assume, as granted\\nthroughout the whole work, both he and his\\nreaders would be astonished at the number;\\nand, of these, many would be only probable,\\nand there would be much room for doubt as\\nto the degree of probability, and for judg-\\nment, in ascertaining that degree.\\nMoreover, Mathematical axioms are always\\nemployed precisely in the same simple form\\ne. g. the axiom that u things equal to the\\nsame are equal to one another, is cited,\\nwhenever there is need, in those very words\\nwhereas the maxims employed in the other\\nclass of subjects, admit of, and require, con-\\ntinual modifications in the application of\\nthem e. g. the stability of the laws of", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0309.jp2"}, "310": {"fulltext": "264 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nNature/ which is our constant assumption in\\ninquiries relating to Natural Philosophy, as-\\nsumes many different shapes, and in some of\\nthem does not possess the same absolute cer-\\ntainty as in others e. g. when, from having\\nalways observed a certain sheep ruminating,\\nwe infer, that this individual sheep will con-\\ntinue to ruminate, we assume that i( the pro-\\nperty which has hitherto belonged to this\\nsheep will remain unchanged when we infer\\nthe same property of all sheep, we assume\\nthat the property which belongs to this\\nindividual belongs to the whole species if,\\non comparing sheep with some other kinds of\\nhorned animals, and finding that all agree in\\nruminating, we infer that all horned animals\\nruminate, we assume that the whole of a\\ngenus or class are likely to agree in any point\\nwherein many species of that genus agree\\nor in other words, that if one of two pro-\\nperties, fyc. has often been found accompanied\\nby another, and never without it, the former\\nwill be universally accompanied by the latter\\nnow all these are merely different forms of\\nthe maxim, that nature is uniform in her\\noperations, which, it is evident, varies in ex-\\npression in almost every different case where\\nit is applied, and admits of every degree of\\nevidence, from absolute moral certainty, to\\nmere conjecture.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0310.jp2"}, "311": {"fulltext": "Ohap. II. 5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 265\\nThe same may be said of an infinite num-\\nber of principles and maxims appropriated to,\\nand employed in, each particular branch of\\nstudy. Hence, all such Reasonings are, in\\ncomparison of Mathematics, very complex\\nrequiring so much more than that does, be-\\nyond the process of merely deducing the con-\\nclusion Logically from the Premises so that\\nit is no wonder that the longest Mathematical\\ndemonstration should be so much more easily\\nconstructed and understood, than a much\\nshorter train of just Reasoning concerning\\nreal facts. The former has been aptly com-\\npared to a long and steep, but even and\\nregular flight of steps, which tries the breath,\\nand the strength, and the perseverance only;\\nwhile the latter resembles a short, but rugged\\nand uneven, ascent up a precipice, which\\nrequires a quick eye, agile limbs, and a firm\\nstep and in which we have to tread now on\\nthis side, now on that ever considering, as\\nwe proceed, whether this or that projection\\nwill afford room for our foot, or whether\\nsome loose stone may not slide from under\\nus. There are probably as many steps of\\npure Reasoning in one of the longer of Eu-\\nclid s demonstrations, as in the whole of an\\nargumentative treatise on some other subject,\\noccupying perhaps a considerable volume.\\nAs for those Ethical and Legal Reasonings", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0311.jp2"}, "312": {"fulltext": "266 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nwhich were lately mentioned as in some re-\\nspects resembling those of Mathematics, (viz.\\nsuch as keep clear of all assertions respecting\\nfacts) they have this difference that not only\\nmen are not so completely agreed respecting\\nthe maxims and principles of Ethics and Law,\\nbut the meaning also of each term cannot be\\nabsolutely, and for ever, fixed by an arbitrary\\ndefinition on the contrary, a great part of\\nour labour consists in distinguishing accurately\\nthe various senses in which men employ each\\nterm, ascertaining which is the most pro-\\nper, and taking care to avoid confounding\\nthem together.\\nChap. III.\\nOf Inference and Proof.\\n\u00c2\u00a7i-\\nSince it appears, from what has been said,\\nthat universally a man must possess some-\\nthing else besides the Reasoning-faculty, in\\norder to apply that faculty properly to his\\nown purpose, whatever that purpose may be\\nit may be inquired whether some theory could", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0312.jp2"}, "313": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. \u00c2\u00a71.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 267\\nnot be made out, respecting those other\\noperations and intellectual processes, dis-\\ntinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary\\nfor us sometimes to employ in the investiga-\\ntion of truth; and whether rules could\\nnot be laid down for conducting them.\\nSomething has, indeed, been done in this Different ao.\\nplications of\\nway by more than one writer; and more might\\nprobably be accomplished by one who should\\nfully comprehend and carefully bear in mind\\nthe principles of Logic, properly so called\\nbut it would hardly be possible to build up\\nanything like a regular Science respecting\\nthese matters, such as Logic is, with respect\\nto the theory of Reasoning. It may be use-\\nful, however, to observe, that these other\\noperations of which we have been speaking,\\nand which are preparatory to the exercise\\nof Reasoning, are of two kinds, according to\\nthe nature of the end proposed; for Rea-\\nsoning comprehends Inferring and Proving;\\nwhich are not two different things, but the\\nsame thing regarded in two different points\\nof view like the road from London to York,\\nand the road from York to London. He\\nwho infers,f proves and he who proves,\\ninfers; but the word infer fixes the mind\\nD. Stewart.\\nf I mean, of course, when the word is understood to\\nimply correct Inference.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0313.jp2"}, "314": {"fulltext": "268 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV,\\nfirst on the Premiss, and then on the Con-\\nclusion the word prove/ on the contrary,\\nleads the mind from the conclusion to the\\nPremiss. Hence, the substantives derived\\nfrom these words respectively, are often used\\nto express that which, on each occasion, is\\nlast in the mind Inference being often used\\nto signify the Conclusion (i. e. Proposition\\ninferred) and Proof, the Premiss. We say,\\nalso, How do you prove that and What\\ndo you infer from that? which sentences\\nwould not be so properly expressed if we\\nwere to transpose those verbs. One might,\\ntherefore, define Proving, the assigning of\\na reason or argument for the support of a\\ngiven proposition and Inferring, the de-\\nduction of a Conclusion from given Premises.\\nIn the one case our Conclusion is given, (i. e.\\nset before us) and we have to seek for argu-\\nments in the other, our Premises are given,\\nand we have to seek for a Conclusion i. e.\\nto put together our own propositions, and\\ntry what will follow from them or, to speak\\nmore Logically, in the one case, we seek to\\nrefer the Subject of which we would predi-\\ncate something, to a class to which that Pre-\\ndicate will (affirmatively or negatively) apply\\nin the other, we seek to find comprehended,\\nin the Subject of which we have predicated\\nsomething, some other term to which that", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0314.jp2"}, "315": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. \u00c2\u00a72.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 269\\nPredicate had not been before applied.* Each\\nof these is a definition of Reasoning.\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\nTo infer, then, is the business of the Philo- invest^u.\\nand A l\\\\o-\\nsopher; to prove, of the Advocate; the former, catc\\nfrom the great mass of known and admitted\\ntruths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional\\ntruth whatever, that has been hitherto unper-\\nceived and perhaps, without knowing, with\\ncertainty, what will be the terms of his Con-\\nclusion. Thus the Mathematician, e. g. seeks\\nto ascertain what is the ratio of circles to each\\nother, or what is the line whose square will be\\nequal to a given circle the Advocate, on the\\nother hand, has a Proposition put before him,\\nwhich he is to maintain as well as he can his\\nbusiness, therefore, is to find middle terms\\n(which is the inventio of Cicero) the Philo-\\nsopher s, to combine and select known facts,\\nor principles, suitably, for gaining from them\\nConclusions which, though implied in the\\nPremises, were before unperceived in other\\nwords, for making Logical Discoveries.\\nTo put the same thing in another point of\\nview, we may consider all questions as falling\\nProving may be compared to the act of putting\\naway any article into the proper receptacle of goods o\u00c2\u00a3\\nthat description; inferring, to that of bringing out the\\narticle when needed.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0315.jp2"}, "316": {"fulltext": "270 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nunder two classes viz. What shall be pre-\\ndicated of a certain Subject and which\\nCopula, affirmative or negative, shall connect\\na certain Subject and Predicate we inquire,\\nin short, either, 1st, What is A? or, 2d,\\nIs A, B, or is it not? The former class\\nof questions belongs to the Philosopher the\\nlatter to the Advocate.* (See Rhet. Appen-\\ndix G. p. 387.)\\nThe distinction between these two classes of questions\\nis perhaps best illustrated by reference to some case in\\nwhich our decision of each of the questions involved in\\nsome assertion is controverted, by different parties. E. G.\\nPaul says, that the apostles preached Christ crucified\\nto the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks, foolish-\\nness that Jesus, who had suffered an ignominious death,\\nwas the Messiah, the Saviour of the World, was a doctrine\\nopposed both by Jews and Gentiles though on different\\ngrounds, according to their respective prejudices: the\\nJews, who sought after a Sign (i. e. the coming of the\\nMessiah in the clouds to establish a splendid temporal\\nkingdom) were offended scandalized at the\\ndoctrine of a suffering Messiah: the Greeks who sought\\nafter Wisdom (i.e. the mode of themselves exalting their\\nown nature, without any divine aid) ridiculed the idea of a\\nHeavenly Saviour altogether which the Jews admitted.\\nIn logical language, the Gentiles could not comprehend\\nthe Predicate the Jews, denied the Copula.\\nIt may be added, that in modern phraseology, the\\noperations of corresponding prejudices are denoted,\\nrespectively by the words paradox (a stumbling-\\nblock and nonsense foolishness which are\\noften used, the one, by him who has been accustomed to\\nhold an opposite opinion to what is asserted, the other, by\\nhim who has formed no opinion on the subject.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0316.jp2"}, "317": {"fulltext": "Chap. III. 2. j INFERENCE AND PROOF. 271\\nSuch are the respective preparatory pro-\\ncesses in these two branches of study. They\\nare widely different they arise from, and\\ngenerate, very different habits of mind and\\nrequire a very different kind of training and\\nprecept.* The Pleader, or Controversialist,\\nor, in short, the Rhetorician in general, who\\nis, in his own province, the most skilful, may\\nbe but ill-fitted for Philosophical investigation,\\neven where there is no observation wanted\\nwhen the facts are all ready ascertained for\\nhim. And again, the ablest Philosopher may\\nmake an indifferent disputant especially,\\nsince the arguments which have led him to\\nthe conclusion, and have, with him, the most\\nweight, may not, perhaps, be the most pow-\\nerful in controversy. The commonest fault,\\nhowever, by far, is to forget the Philosopher\\nor Theologian, and to assume the Advocate,\\nimproperly. It is therefore of great use to\\ndwell on the distinction between these two\\nbranches. As for the bare process of Rea-\\nsoning, that is the same in both cases but\\nIt is evident that the business of the Advocate and\\nthat of the Judge are in this manner opposed the one\\nbeing to find arguments for the support of his client s\\ncause the other, to ascertain the truth. And hence it\\nis, that those who have excelled the most in the former\\ndepartment, sometimes manifest a deficiency in the latter,\\nthough the subject-matter^ in which they arc conversant,\\nremains the same.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0317.jp2"}, "318": {"fulltext": "272 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book- IV.\\nthe preparatory processes which are requisite,\\nin order to employ Reasoning profitably, these,\\nwe see, branch off into two distinct channels.\\nIn each of these, undoubtedly, useful rules\\nmay be laid down but they should not be\\nconfounded together. Bacon has chosen the\\nphilosophical department of Philosophy giving rules in his\\nOrganon, not only for the conduct of experi-\\nments to ascertain new facts, but also for the\\nselection and combination of known facts and\\nprinciples, with a view of obtaining valuable\\nInferences and it is probable that a system of\\nsuch rules is what some writers mean (if they\\nhave any distinct meaning) by their proposed\\nLogic.\\nRhetorical In the other department, precepts have\\ninquiry.\\nbeen given by Aristotle and other Rhetorical\\nwriters, as a part of their plan. How far\\nthese precepts are to be considered as\\nbelonging to the present system, whether\\nmethod is to be regarded as a part of\\nLogic, whether the matter of Logic is to be\\nincluded in the system, whether Bacon s is\\nproperly to be reckoned a kind of Logic all\\nthese are merely verbal questions, relating to\\nthe extension, not of the Science, but of the\\nname. The bare process of Reasoning, i. e.\\ndeducing a Conclusion from Premises, must\\never remain a distinct operation from the\\nassumption of Premises, however useful the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0318.jp2"}, "319": {"fulltext": "Chap.III. \u00c2\u00a73.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 273\\nrules may be that have been given, or may\\nbe given, for conducting this latter process,\\nand others connected with it; and however\\nproperly such rules may be subjoined to the\\nprecepts of that system to which the name\\nof Logic is applied in the narrowest sense.\\nSuch rules as I now allude to may be of\\neminent service but they must always be,\\nas I have before observed, comparatively\\nvague and general, and incapable of being\\nbuilt up into a regular demonstrative theory\\nlike that of the Syllogism to which theory\\nthey bear much the same relation as the\\nprinciples and rules of Poetical and Rhetorical\\ncriticism to those of Grammar; or those of\\npractical Mechanics, to strict Geometry. I\\nfind no fault with the extension of a term\\nbut I would suggest a caution against con-\\nfounding together, by means of a common\\nname, things essentially different and above\\nall I would deprecate the sophistry of striving\\nto depreciate what is called the school-\\nLogic, by perpetually contrasting it with\\nsystems with which it has nothing in com-\\nmon but the name, and whose object is\\nessentially different.\\n\u00c2\u00a73.\\nIt is not a little remarkable that writers; h,\\nnon ami\\nwhose expressions tend to confound together,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0319.jp2"}, "320": {"fulltext": "274 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nby means of a common name, two branches\\nof study which have nothing else in com-\\nmon (as if they were two different plans for\\nattaining one and the same object), have them-\\nselves complained of one of the effects of\\nthis confusion, viz. the introduction, early in\\nthe career of Academical Education, of a\\ncourse of Logic under which name, they\\nobserve, men now universally compre-\\nhend the works of Locke, Bacon, $*c. which,\\nas is justly remarked, are unfit for beginners.\\nNow this would not have happened, if men\\nhad always kept in mind the meaning or\\nmeanings of each name they used. And it\\nmay be added, that, however justly the word\\nLogic may be thus extended, we have no\\nground for applying to the Aristotelian Logic\\nthe remarks above quoted respecting the Ba-\\nconian which the ambiguity of the word,\\nif not carefully kept in view, might lead us\\nto do. Grant that Bacon s work is a part of\\nLogic it no more follows, from the unfitness\\nof that for learners, that the Elements of the\\nTheory of Reasoning should be withheld from\\nthem, than it follows that the elements of\\nEuclid, and common Arithmetic, are unfit\\nfor boys, because Newton s Principia, which\\nalso bears the title of Mathematical, is above\\ntheir grasp. Of two branches of study which\\ni. e. in the Scotch universities.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0320.jp2"}, "321": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 1.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS 275\\nbear the same name, or even of two parts of\\nthe same branch, the one may be suitable to\\nthe commencement, the other to the close\\nof the Academical career.\\nAt whatever period of that career it may-\\nbe proper to introduce the study of such as\\nare usually called Metaphysical writers, it\\nmay be safely asserted, that those who have\\nhad the most experience in the business of\\ngiving instruction in Logic, properly so called,\\nas well as in other branches of knowledge,\\nprefer and generally pursue the plan of letting\\ntheir pupils enter on that study, next in order\\nafter the elements of Mathematics.\\nChap. IV.\\nOf Verbal and Real Questions.\\n\u00c2\u00a71.\\nThe ingenious author of the Philosophy of\\nRhetoric having maintained, or rather as-\\nsumed, that Logic is applicable to Verbal\\ncontroversy alone, there may be an advantage\\n(though it has been my aim throughout to\\nshow the application of it to all Reasoning)\\nin pointing out the difference between Verbal\\nt 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0321.jp2"}, "322": {"fulltext": "276 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV\\nand Real Questions, and the probable origin\\nof Campbell s mistake for to trace any error\\nto its source, will often throw more light on\\nthe subject in hand than can be obtained if\\nwe rest satisfied with merely detecting and\\nrefuting it.\\nEvery Question that can arise, is in fact a\\nQuestion whether a certain Predicate is or is\\nnot applicable to a certain subject, or what\\nPredicate is applicable and whatever other\\naccount may be given by any writer, of the\\nnature of any matter of doubt or debate,\\nwill be found ultimately to resolve itself into\\nDifference this. But sometimes the Question turns on\\nbetween a\\nverbal and a the meaning and extent of the terms em-\\n:stion. o\\nployed sometimes, on the things signified by\\nthem. If it be made to appear, therefore,\\nthat the opposite sides of a certain Question\\nmay be held by persons not differing in their\\nopinion of the matter in hand, then that Ques-\\ntion may be pronounced Verbal as depend-\\ning on the different senses in which they\\nrespectively employ the terms. If, on the\\ncontrary, it appears that they employ the\\nterms in the same sense, but still differ as to\\nthe application of one of them to the other,\\nthen it may be pronounced that the Question\\nis Real, that they differ as to the opinions\\nthey hold of the things in Question.\\nSee Chap. iii. 2.\\nbetween a\\nverbal am\\nreal quest", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0322.jp2"}, "323": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. I.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 277\\nIf, for instance, two persons contend whe-\\nther Augustus deserved to be called a great\\nman, then, if it appeared that the one in-\\ncluded, under the term great, disinterested\\npatriotism, and on that ground excluded Au-\\ngustus from the class, as wanting in that\\nquality and that the other also gave him no\\ncredit for that quality, but understood no more\\nby the term u great, than high intellectual\\nqualities, energy of character, and brilliant\\nactions, it would follow that the parties did\\nnot differ in opinion except as to the use of\\na term, and that the Question was Verbal.\\nIf, again, it appeared that the one did give\\nAugustus credit for such patriotism, as the\\nother denied him, both of them including\\nthat idea in the term great, then the Ques-\\ntion would be Real. Either kind of Question,\\nit is plain, is to be argued according to Logical\\nprinciples but the middle terms emj)loyed\\nwould be different; and for this reason, among\\nothers, it is important to distinguish Verbal\\nfrom Real controversy. In the former case,\\ne. g. it might be urged with truth, that the\\ncommon use of the expression great and\\ngood proves that the idea of good is not\\nimplied in the ordinary sense of the word\\ngreat an argument which could have, of\\ncourse, no place in deciding the other Ques-\\ntion.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0323.jp2"}, "324": {"fulltext": "tions mis\\ntaken for\\nKeal.\\n278 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV\\n2.\\nverbal Ques- It is by no means to be supposed that all\\nVerbal Questions are trifling and frivolous. It\\nis often of the highest importance to settle cor-\\nrectly the meaning of a word, either according\\nto ordinary use, or according to the meaning\\nof any particular writer or class of men but\\nwhen Verbal Questions are 7nistaken for Real,\\nmuch confusion of thought and unprofitable\\nwrangling will be generally the result. Nor is\\nit always so easy and simple a task, as might\\nat first sight appear, to distinguish them from\\neach other for several objects to which one\\ncommon name is applied will often have many\\npoints of difference, and yet that name may\\nperhaps be applied to them all in the same\\nsense, and may be fairly regarded as the\\ngenus they come under, if it appear that they\\nall agree in what is designated by that name,\\nand that the differences between them are in\\npoints not essential to the character of the\\ngenus. A cow and a horse differ in many\\nrespects, but agree in all that is implied by\\nthe term quadruped, which is therefore\\napplicable to both in the same sense.* So\\nYet the charge of equivocation is sometimes unjustly-\\nbrought against a writer, in consequence of a gratuitous\\nassumption of our own. An Eastern writer, e.g. may be\\nspeaking of beasts of burden and the reader may", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0324.jp2"}, "325": {"fulltext": "Chap. IV. 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 27!)\\nalso the houses of the ancients differed in\\nmany respects from ours, and their ships still\\nmore; yet no one would contend that the\\nterms house and ship, as applied to\\nboth, are ambiguous, or that oIkos might not\\nfairly be rendered house, and vavs ship; be-\\ncause the essential characteristic of a house\\nis, not its being of this or that form or\\nmaterials, but its being a dwelling for men\\nthese therefore would be called two different\\nkinds of houses and consequently the term\\nhouse would be applied to each, without\\nany equivocation, in the same sense and so\\nin the other instances. On the other hand,\\ntwo or more things may bear the same name,\\nand may also have a resemblance in many\\npoints, and may from that resemblance have\\ncome to bear the same name, and yet if the\\ncircumstance which is essential to each be\\nwanting in the other, the term may be pro-\\nnounced ambiguous. E. G. The word Plan-\\ntain is the name of a common herb in\\nchance to have the idea occur to his mind of Horses and\\nMules lie thence takes for granted that these were\\nmeant and if it afterwards come out that it was Camels.\\nhe perhaps complains of the writer for misleading him by\\nnot expressly mentioning the species saying, I could\\nnot know that he meant Camels. lie did not mean Camels,\\nin particular he meant, as he said, beasts of burden\\nand Camels are such, as well as Horses and Mules. He\\nis not accountable for your suppositions.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0325.jp2"}, "326": {"fulltext": "280 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nEurope, and of an Indian fruit-tree both\\nare vegetables; yet the term is ambiguous,\\nbecause it does not denote them so far forth\\nas they agree. Again, the word Priest is\\napplied to the Ministers of the Jewish and\\nof the Pagan religions, and also to those\\nof the Christian and doubtless the term\\nis so used in consequence of their being both\\nministers (in some sort) of religion. Nor\\nwould every difference that might be found\\nbetween the Priests of different religions con-\\nstitute the term ambiguous, provided such\\ndifferences were non-essential to the idea\\nsuggested by the word Priest as e. g. the\\nJewish Priest served the true God, and the\\nPagan, false Gods this is a most important\\ndifference, but does not constitute the term\\nambiguous, because neither of these circum-\\nstances is implied and suggested by the term\\nlepevs; which accordingly was applied both\\nto Jewish and Pagan Priests. But the term\\nlepevs does seem to have implied the office\\nof offering sacrifice, atoning for the sins of\\nthe people, and acting as mediator between\\nman and the object of his worship and ac-\\ncordingly that term is never applied to any\\none under the Christian system, except to\\nthe ONE great Mediator. The Christian\\nministers not having that office which was\\nimplied as essential in the term Upevs, were", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0326.jp2"}, "327": {"fulltext": "C.i.u IV. 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 281\\nnever called by that name, but by that of\\nTrpeo-Purepos* It may be concluded, there-\\nfore, that the term Priest is ambiguous, as cor-\\nresponding to the terms [epev? and irpeafiv-repos\\nrespectively, notwithstanding that there are\\npoints in which these two agree. These\\ntherefore should be reckoned, not two different\\nkinds of Priests, but Priests in two different\\nsenses since (to adopt the phraseology of\\nAristotle) the definition of them, so far forth\\nas they are Priests, would be different.\\nIt is evidently of much importance to keep\\nin mind the above distinctions, in order to\\navoid, on the one hand, stigmatizing as Verbal\\ncontroversies, what in reality are not such,\\nmerely because the Question turns on the\\napplicability of a certain Predicate to a certain\\nsubject; or, on the other hand, falling into the\\nopposite error of mistaking words for things,\\nand judging of men s agreement or disagree-\\nment in opinion in every case, merely from\\ntheir agreement or disagreement in the terms\\nemployed.\\nFrom which our word Priest is derived, but which\\n(it is remarkable) is never translated Priest in our\\nversion of the Scriptures, but Elder.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0327.jp2"}, "328": {"fulltext": "282 [Book IV.\\nChap. V.\\nOf Realism.\\n\u00c2\u00a71.\\nNothing has a greater tendency to lead to\\nthe mistake just noticed, and thus to produce\\nundetected Verbal Questions and fruitless Lo-\\ngomachy, than the prevalence of the notion\\nof the Realists,* that genus and species are\\nsome real Things, existing independently of\\nour conceptions and expressions and that,\\nas in the case of singular terms there is some\\nreal individual corresponding to each, so in\\ncommon terms, also, there is something cor-\\nresponding to each, which is the object of our\\nthoughts when we employ any such term.f\\nIt is well known what a long and furious controversy\\nlong existed in all the universities of Europe between the\\nsects of the Realists and the Nominalists the heat of\\nwhich was allayed by the Reformation, which withdrew\\nmen s attention to a more important question.\\nf A doctrine commonly, but falsely attributed to\\nAristotle, who expressly contradicts it. He calls in-\\ndividuals primary Substances (irp^rai ovaiai), Genus\\nand Species secondary, as not denoting (rode ti) a\\nreally-existing thing, Ildo-a de ovaia Soke! rofa ti\\nGtiixaiveiv. E7ri fiev ovv tmv 7rpu)TU)v ovaiuiv ara^Kbtar-\\nf3r]Tr)TOP icai aXr)deg e(ttiv, otl rode ti ai^aivtC cirofiov yap\\nteal tv aptdfiu) to hrfkov^evov eotiv. E7rt \u00c2\u00a3e tmv devTpcov\\novaiojv, I AINETAI jizv 6fJioi(x)c rw ir^fiaTi tyjq 7rpo 7)]yopiac", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0328.jp2"}, "329": {"fulltext": "Cbaf. V. I.] REALISM. 283\\nThere is one circumstance which ought to\\nbe noticed, as having probably contributed not\\na little to foster this error: I mean the peculiar\\ntechnical sense of the word Species when Technics\\napplied to organized Beings. It has been laid li 1\\ndown in the course of this work, that when b!\\nseveral individuals are observed to resemble\\neach other in some point, a common name\\nmay be assigned to them denoting that\\npoint, applying to all or any of them so far\\nforth as respects that common attribute,\\nand distinguishing them from all others as,\\ne. g. the several individual buildings, which,\\nhowever different in other respects, agree in\\nbeing constructed for men s dwelling, are\\ncalled by the common name of House:\\nand it was added, that as we select at pleasure\\nthe circumstance that we choose to abstract,\\nwe may thus refer the same individual to\\nseveral different species, according as it suits\\nour purpose and the same in respect of the\\nreference of Species to Genus whence it\\nseems plainly to follow that Genus and Spe-\\ncies are no real things existing independent\\nof our thoughts, but are creatures of our\\nown minds. Yet in the case of Species of\\norganized Beings, it seems at first sight as\\nrace tl at]f.iciiveiv, oral enrtj, avOpiowoc, f/ %iaoy MI IN\\nTE AAH6E2 XXa fiaKkov xoiov r\u00c2\u00ab trrjfialyti k. r.\\nAristotle, Categ. 3.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0329.jp2"}, "330": {"fulltext": "284 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nif this rule did not hold good; but that the\\nSpecies to which each individual belongs, could\\nnot be in any degree arbitrarily fixed by us,\\nbut must be something real, unalterable, and\\nindependent of our thoughts. Caesar or\\nSocrates, for instance, it may be said, must\\nbelong to the Species Man, and can belong\\nto no other and the like, with any individual\\nBrute, or Plant. On the other hand, if any\\none utters such a proposition as Argus was\\na mastiff, to what head of Predicables would\\nthis Predicate be referred Surely our logi-\\ncal principles would lead us to answer, that\\nit is the Species; since it could hardly be\\ncalled an Accident, and is manifestly no other\\nPredicable. And yet every Naturalist would\\nat once pronounce that Mastiff is no distinct\\nSpecies, but only a variety of the Species Dog.\\nThis however does not satisfy our inquiry as\\nto the head of Predicables to which it is to\\nbe referred.\\nThe solution of the difficulty is to be found\\nin the consideration of the peculiar technical\\nsense of the word Species when applied to\\nspecies dis- organized Beings in which case it is always\\nlinguished by _ _ _\\nNaturals applied (when we are speaking strictly, as\\nnaturalists) to such individuals as are sup-\\nposed to be descended from a common stock,\\nor which might have so descended; viz. which\\nresemble one another (to use M. Cuvier s", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0330.jp2"}, "331": {"fulltext": "Chap. V.\u00c2\u00a71.] REALISM. 285\\nexpression) as much as those of the same stock\\ndo. Now this being a point on which all\\n(not merely Naturalists) are agreed, and since\\nit is a matter of fact, that such and such in- of\\nfact mimI\\ndividuals are, or are not, thus connected, it f\\nJ arrangement.\\nfollows, that every question whether a cer-\\ntain individual Animal or Plant belongs to a\\ncertain Species or not, is a question not of\\nmere arrangement, but of fact. But in the\\ncase of questions respecting Genus it is other-\\nwise. If, e. g. two Naturalists differed, in the\\none placing (as Linnaeus) all the Species of\\nBee under one Genus, which the other sub-\\ndivided (as later writers have done) into se-\\nveral genera, it would be evident that there\\nwas no question of fact debated between\\nthem, and that it was only to be considered\\nwhich was the more convenient arrangement\\nif, on the other hand, it were disputed whether\\nthe African and the Asiatic Elephant are\\ndistinct Species, or merely Varieties, it would\\nbe equally manifest that the question is one\\nof fact; since both would allow that if they\\nwere descended (or might have descended)\\nfrom the same stock, they were of the same\\nSpecies, and if otherwise, of two this is the\\nfact, which they endeavour to ascertain, by\\nsuch indications as are to be found.\\nFor it is to be further observed, that this\\nfact being one which cannot be directly", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0331.jp2"}, "332": {"fulltext": "286 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nknown, the consequence is, that the marks\\nby which any Species of Animal or Plant is\\nknown, are not the very Differentia which\\nconstitutes that Species. Now, in the case of\\nunorganized beings, these two coincide the\\nMark by marks by which a diamond, e. is distin-\\nwhich a J\\nkSownnot guished from other minerals, being the very\\nDirtvmuSa. Differentia that constitutes the Species Dia-\\nmond. And the same is the case in the\\nGenera of organized beings likewise the\\nLinnaean Genus felis, e. g. (when consi-\\ndered as a Species, i. e. as falling under some\\nmore comprehensive class) is distinguished\\nfrom others under the same Order, by those\\nvery marks which constitute its Differentia.\\nBut in the Infimae Species (according to the\\nview of a Naturalist) of plants and animals,\\nthis, as has been said, is not the case since\\nhere the Differentia which constitutes each\\nSpecies includes in it a circumstance which\\ncannot be directly ascertained (viz. the being\\nsprung from the same stock), but which we\\nconjecture from circumstances of resemblance;\\nso that the marks by which a Species is known,\\nare not in truth the whole of the Differentia\\nitself, but indications of the existence of that\\nDifferentia; viz. indications of descent from\\na common stock.*\\nThere are few, and but a few, other Species to which\\nthe same observations will in a great degree apply I mean", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0332.jp2"}, "333": {"fulltext": "Cbaf.V. 1.] fcfeALISM. 287\\nHence it is that Species, in tlie case of or-\\nganized beings, appears to be something real,\\nand independent of our thoughts and lan-\\nguage and hence, naturally enough, the same\\nnotions have been often extended to the Ge-\\nnera also, and to Species of other things: so\\nthat men have an idea of each individual of\\nevery description truly belonging to some one\\nSpecies and no other; and each Species in\\nlike manner to some one Genus whether\\nwe happen to be right or not in the ones\\nto which we refer them.\\nFew, if any indeed, in the present day avow\\nand maintain this doctrine but those who are\\nnot especially on their guard, are perpetually\\nsliding into it unawares.\\nNothing so much conduces to this as the\\ntransferred and secondary use of the words\\nsame, one and the same, identical, Ambiguity\\nfyc. when it is not clearly perceived and care-\\nfully borne in mind, that they are employed\\nin which the Differentia which constitutes the Species, and\\nthe mark by which the Species is known, are not the same:\\ne. s. Murder: the Differentia of which is that it be\\ncommitted with malice aforethought this cannot be\\ndirectly ascertained and therefore we distinguish murder\\nfrom any other homicide by circumstances of preparation,\\nJc, which are not in reality the Differentia, but indica-\\ntions of the Differentia; i. e. grounds for concluding that\\nthe malice did exist.\\nSee Appendix, No. I. art. Same.\\none, kc", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0333.jp2"}, "334": {"fulltext": "288 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV,\\nin a secondary sense, and that more frequently\\neven than in the primary.\\nSuppose, e. g. a thousand persons are\\nthinking of the Sun, it is evident it is one\\nand the same individual object on which all\\nthese minds are employed so far all is clear\\nbut suppose all these persons are thinking of\\na Triangle not any individual triangle, but\\nTriangle in general and considering, per-\\nhaps, the equality of its angles to two right\\nangles it would seem as if, in this case also,\\ntheir minds were all employed on one and\\nthe same object: and this object of their\\nthoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere\\nword triangle, but that which is meant by it nor\\nagain, can it be everything that the word will\\napply to, for they are not thinking of tri-\\nangles, but of one thing. Those who do not\\nacknowledge that this u one thing has an ex-\\nistence independent of the human mind, are\\nin general content to tell us, by way of ex-\\nplanation, that the object of their thoughts\\nis the abstract idea of a triangle an\\nexplanation which satisfies, or at least silences\\nmany; though it may be doubted whether\\nthey very clearly understand what sort of a\\nthing an idea is, which may thus exist in a\\nConceplualists is a name sometimes applied to those\\nwho adopt this explanation to which class Locke is\\nreferred.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0334.jp2"}, "335": {"fulltext": "Chap.V. \u00c2\u00a71.] REALISM, 289\\nthousand different minds at once, and yet be\\none and the same.\\nThe fact is, that unity and sameness\\nare in such cases employed, not in the pri-\\nmary sense, but to denote perfect similarity.\\nWhen we say that ten thousand different\\npersons have all one and the same Idea\\nin their minds, or are all of one and the\\nsame Opinion, we mean no more than that\\nthey are all thinking exactly alike when we\\nsay that they are all in the same posture,\\nwe mean that they are all placed alike and\\nso also they are said all to have the u same\\ndisease, when they are all diseased alike.\\nOne instance of the confusion of thought\\nand endless logomachy which may spring\\nfrom inattention to this ambiguity of the\\nwords same, fyc, is afforded by the con-\\ntroversy arising out of a sermon of Dr. King\\n(Archbishop of Dublin), published about a\\ncentury ago. He remarked (without express-\\ning himself perhaps with so much guarded\\nprecision as the vehemence of his opponents\\nrendered needful) that the attributes of the\\nDeity (viz. Wisdom, Justice, $r.) are not to be\\nregarded as the same with those human (nul-\\nlities which bear the same names, but are\\ncalled so by resemblance and analogy only.\\nFor this he was decried by Bishop Berkeley\\nand a host of other objectors, down to the\\nu", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0335.jp2"}, "336": {"fulltext": "290 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\npresent time, as an Atheist, or little better.\\nIf the divine attributes, they urged, are not\\nprecisely the same in kind (though superior\\nin degree) with the human qualities which\\nbear the same name, we cannot imitate the\\nDeity as the Scriptures require we cannot\\nknow on what principles we shall be judged\\nwe cannot be sure that God exists at all;\\nwith a great deal more to the same purpose\\nall of which would have been perceived to be\\nentirely needless, had the authors but recol-\\nlected to ascertain the meaning of the prin-\\ncipal word employed. For, 1st, When any\\ntwo persons (or other objects) are said to\\nhave the same quality, accident, Sfc, what\\nwe predicate of them is evidently a certain\\nresemblance, and nothing else. One man,\\ne. g. does not feel another s sickness but\\nthey are said to have the same disease, if\\nthey are precisely similar in respect of their\\nailments and so also they are said to have\\nthe same complexion, if the hue and texture\\nof their skins be alike. 2dly, Such qualities\\nas are entirely relative, which consist in the\\nrelation borne by the subject to certain other\\nthings, in these, it is manifest, the only re-\\nsemblance that can exist, is, resemblance of\\nrelations, i. e. ANALOGY. Courage, e. g.\\nconsists in the relation in which one stands\\n(ev r 6%\u00e2\u0082\u00actp irfaq irpoQ, Arist.) towards dangers", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0336.jp2"}, "337": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. \u00c2\u00a71.] REALISM. 2\\nTemperance or Intemperance, towards bodily\\npleasures, fyc. When it is said, therefore, of\\ntwo courageous men, that they have both the\\nsame quality, the only meaning this expression\\ncan have, is, that they are, so far, completely\\nanalogous in their characters having similar\\nratios to certain similar objects. In short, as,\\nin all qualities, sameness can mean only strict\\nresemblance, so, in those which are of a rela-\\ntive nature, resemblance can mean only ana-\\nlogy. Thus it appears, that what Dr. King\\nhas been so vehemently censured for asserting\\nrespecting the Deity, is literally true even\\nwith respect to men themselves viz. that it\\nis only by Analogy that two persons can be\\nsaid to possess the same virtue, or other such\\nquality. 3dly, But what he means is plainly,\\nthat this analogy is far less exact and complete\\nin the case of a comparison between the\\nDeity and his creatures, than between one\\nman and another; which surely no one\\nwould venture to deny. But the doctrine\\nagainst which the attacks have been directed,\\nis self-evident, the moment we consider the\\nmeaning of the term employed.*\\nIn the Introduction and Notes to the last\\nedition of Archbishop King s Discourse, I\\nSee Dr. Copleston s excellent Analysis and Defence\\nof Archbishop King s principles, in the Notes to his\\nFour Discourses.\\n2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0337.jp2"}, "338": {"fulltext": "292 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nhave considered the matters in debate more\\nfully but this slight notice of them has been\\nintroduced in this place, as closely connected\\nwith the present subject.\\n\u00c2\u00a72.\\norigin of the The origin of this secondary sense of the\\nambiguity of\\nsan,e c words, same/ one/ identical/ Sfc. (an\\nattention to which would clear away an in-\\ncalculable mass of confused Reasoning and\\nLogomachy,) is easily to be traced to the use\\nof Language and of other signs, for the pur-\\npose of mutual communication. If any one\\nutters the one single word triangle, and\\ngives one single definition of it; each of\\nthe persons who hear him forms a certain\\nnotion in his own mind, not differing in any\\nrespect from that of each of the rest; they\\nare said therefore to have all one and the\\nsame notion, because, resulting from, and\\ncorresponding with, (that which is, in the\\nprimary sense) one and the same expres-\\nsion and there is said to be one single\\nidea of every triangle (considered merely as a\\ntriangle) because one single name or defini-\\ntion is equally applicable to each. In like\\nmanner, all the coins struck by the same sin-\\ngle die, are said to have one and the same\\nimpression, merely because the (numerically)\\none description which suits one of these coins,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0338.jp2"}, "339": {"fulltext": "Chap. V. \u00c2\u00a72.] REALISM. 293\\nwill equally suit any other that is exactly\\nlike it.\\nIt is not intended to recommend the disuse\\nof the words same, identical, $c. in this\\ntransferred sense which, if it were desirable\\nwould be utterly impracticable but merely\\na steady attention to the ambiguity thus\\nintroduced, and watchfulness against the\\nerrors thence arising.* The difficulties and\\nperplexities which have involved the ques-\\ntions respecting personal identity, among\\nothers, may be traced principally to the neg-\\nlect of this caution.f But a full consideration\\nIt is with words as with money. Those who know the\\nvalue of it best, are not therefore the least liberal. We\\nmay lend readily and largely; and though this be done\\nquietly and without ostentation, there is no harm in keep-\\ning an exact account in our private memorandum-book\\nof the sums, the persons, and the occasions on which they\\nwere lent. It may be, we shall want them again for our\\nown use or they may be employed by the borrower for\\na wrong purpose; or they may have been so long in his\\npossession that he begins to look upon them as his own.\\nIn either of which cases it is allowable, and even right, to\\ncall them in. Logic Vindicated. Oxford, 1809.\\nf I mean that many writers have sought an explanation\\nof the primary sense of identity (viz. personal) by looking\\nto the secondary. Any grown man, e.g. is, in the primary\\nsense, the same person he was when a child: this sameness\\nis, I conceive, a simple notion, which it is vain to attempt\\nexplaining by any other more simple; but when philo-\\nsophers seek to gain a clearer notion of it by looking t\\nthe cases in which sameness is predicated in another scum\\nviz. similarity, such as exists between several individuals", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0339.jp2"}, "340": {"fulltext": "294 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.\\nof that question would be unsuitable to the\\nsubject of this work.\\ndenoted by a common name, (as when we say that there\\nare growing on Lebanon some of the same trees with which\\nthe Temple was built, meaning cedars of that species) this\\nis surely as idle as if we were to attempt explaining the\\nprimary sense, e.g. of rage, as it exists in the human\\nmind, by directing our attention to the rage of the sea.\\nWhatever personal identity does consist in, it is plain that\\nit has nothing to do with similarity; since every one would\\nbe ready to say, When I WAS a child, I thought as a\\nchild, I spake as a child, I understood as a child; but\\nwhen I became a man, I put away childish things.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0340.jp2"}, "341": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0341.jp2"}, "342": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0342.jp2"}, "343": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX.\\nLIS! OF WORDS EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING APPEND1\\nArgument.\\nHence. See Reason,\\nSame.\\nAuthority.\\nWhy.\\nSin.\\nCan. See May.\\nIdentical. See One,\\nTherefore. See Wh)\\nCapable. See Possi-\\nSame.\\nTruth.\\nble, Impossible, Ne-\\nImpossibility.\\nWhy.\\ncessary.\\nIndifference.\\nWhence.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Why.\\nCase.\\nLaw.\\nCause. See Reason,\\nMay. See Must.\\nWhy.\\nNecessary.\\nCertain.\\nOld.\\nValue.\\nChurch.\\nOne.\\nWealth.\\nElection.\\nPerson.\\nLabour.\\nExpect.\\nPossible.\\nCapital.\\nExperience.\\nPriest.\\nRent.\\nFalsehood. See Truth\\nReason.\\nWages.\\nGospel.\\nRegeneration.\\nProfits.\\nNo. I.\\nON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO\\nBE USED AMBIGUOUSLY.\\nIt has appeared to me desirable to illustrate the import-\\nance of attending to the ambiguity of terms, by a greater\\nnumber of instances than could have been conveniently\\neither inserted in the context or introduced in a note,\\nwithout too much interrupting the course of the discussion\\nof Fallacies.\\nI have purposely selected instances from various Bubjects,\\nand some from the most important; being convinced thai\\nthe disregard and contempt with which logical Btudiei arc", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0343.jp2"}, "344": {"fulltext": "298 APPENDIX.\\nusually treated, may be traced, in part, to a notion, that\\nthe science is incapable of useful application to any matters\\nof real importance, and is merely calculated to afford an\\nexercise of ingenuity on insignificant truisms syllogisms\\nto prove that a horse is an animal, and distinctions of\\nthe different senses of canis or gallus a mistake\\nwhich is likely to derive some countenance (however\\nunfairly) from the exclusive employment of such trifling\\nexemplifications.\\nThe words and phrases which may be employed as\\nambiguous middle terms are of course innumerable but\\nit may be in several respects of service to the learner, to\\nexplain the ambiguity of a few of those most frequently\\noccurring in the most important discussions, and whose\\ndouble meaning has been the most frequently overlooked;\\nand this, not by entering into an examination of all the\\nsenses in which each term is ever employed, but of those\\nonly which are the most liable to be confounded together.\\nIt is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is\\nthe most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the\\ngreatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are\\namong the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the\\ngenerality consider there is the least room to doubt. It\\nis indeed from those very circumstances that the danger\\narises words in very common use are both the most liable,\\nfrom the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one\\nsense into another, and also the least likely to have that\\nambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetually\\nmistaken for accurate knowledge.\\nIt may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not\\nunfrequently occurs in the employment of the very phrase,\\nsuch an author uses such a word in this, or that sense,\\nor means so and so, by this word. We should not use\\nthese expressions, (as some have inadvertently done) in", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0344.jp2"}, "345": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 299\\nreference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, m\\nthe authors mind, of the object in question; of which the\\nnotions conveyed to others by the word may often fall short\\nnor again should we regard the sense in which they under-\\nstand him, as necessarily his sense (though it is theirs) of\\nthe word employed, since they may mistake his meaning;\\nbut we must consider what sense it is likely he expected\\nand intended to convey, to those to whom he addressed\\nhimself. And a judicious writer will always expect each\\nword to be understood, as nearly as the context will allow,\\nin the sense, or in one of the senses, which use has esta-\\nblished, except so far as he may have given some different\\nexplanation. But there are many who, from various causes,\\nfrequently fail of conveying the sense they design.\\nIt is but fair perhaps to add this warning to my readers\\nthat one who takes pains to ascertain and explain the sense\\nof the words employed in any discussion, whatever care he\\nmay use to show that what he is inquiring after, is, the\\nreceived sense, is yet almost sure to be charged, by the\\ninaccurate, and the sophistical, with attempting to introduce\\nsome new sense of the words in question, in order to serve\\na purpose.\\nARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has been de-\\nfined in the foregoing treatise (Compendium, Book II. Ch. hi.\\n1) in that sense it includes (as is there remarked) tin-\\nConclusion as well as the Premises: and thus it is, that\\nwe say a Syllogism consists of three propositions; PMf. the\\nConclusion which is proved, as well as those by which it\\nis proved.\\nBut in ordinary discourse, Argument is very often used\\nfor the Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Con-\\nclusion; e. g. the Conclusion which this Argument i-\\nintended to establish is so and so.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0345.jp2"}, "346": {"fulltext": "300 APPENDIX.\\nIt is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly\\nspeaking, a course or series of such Arguments when a\\ncertain Conclusion is established by Premises, which are\\nthemselves, in the same dissertation, proved by other pro-\\npositions, and perhaps those again, by others the whole\\nof this dissertation is often called an Argument to prove\\nthe ultimate conclusion designed to be established though\\nin fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, e. g.\\nthat we speak of Warburton s Argument to prove the\\ndivine legation of Moses, Sfc.\\nSometimes also the word is used to denote what may be\\nproperly called a Disputation; i. e. two trains of argument,\\nopposed to each other as when we say that A and B had\\na long Argument on such and such a subject and that A\\nhad the best of the Argument. Doubtless the use of the\\nword in this sense has contributed to foster the notion\\nentertained by many, that Logic is the art of wrangling,\\nthat it makes men contentious, Sfc: they have heard that\\nit is employed about Arguments and hastily conclude that\\nit is confined to cases where there is opposition and contest.\\nIt may be worth mentioning in this place, that the various\\nforms of stating an Argument are sometimes spoken of\\nas different kinds of Argument as when we speak of a\\nCategorical or Hypothetical Argument, or of one in the first\\nor some other figure though every logician knows that the\\nsame individual Argument may be stated in various figures, \u00c2\u00a7c.\\nThis, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those\\nwho speak of the Syllogism as a peculiar kind of Argu-\\nment and of Syllogistic Reasoning, as a distinct mode\\nof Reasoning, instead of being only a certain form of\\nexpressing any argument.\\nAUTHORITY. This word is sometimes employed in\\nits primary sense when we refer to any one s example,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0346.jp2"}, "347": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 301\\ntestimony, or judgment as when, e.g. we speak of cor-\\nrecting a reading in some book, on the Authority of an\\nancient MS. giving a statement of some tact, on the\\nAuthority of such and such historians, c $c\\nIn this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the\\nLatin Auctoritas.\\nSometimes again it is employed as equivalent to Po-\\ntestas, Power: as when we speak of the Authority of a\\nMagistrate, \u00c2\u00a7-c.\\nMany instances may be found in which writers have\\nunconsciously slid from one sense of the word to another,\\nso as to blend confusedly in their minds the two ideas.\\nIn no case perhaps has this more frequently happened than\\nwhen we are speaking of the Authority of the Church in\\nwhich the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article\\nChurch) comes in aid of that of the former. The Authority\\n(in the primary sense) of the Catholic, i. e. Universal\\nChurch, at any particular period, is often appealed to, in\\nsupport of this or that doctrine or practice: and it is,\\njustly, supposed that the opinion of the great body of the\\nChristian World affords a presumption (though only a pre-\\nsumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpretation\\nof Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any cere-\\nmony, regulation, 8fc.\\nOn the other hand, each particular Church has Authority\\nin the other sense, viz. Power, over its own members, t\\nenforce anything not contrary to God s Word. But the\\nCatholic or Universal Church, not being one religious com-\\nmunity on earth, can have no Authority in the Bense of\\nPower since, whatever the Romanists may pretend, there\\nnever was a time when the power of the Pope, of a Coun-\\ncil, or of any other human Governors, over all Christians,\\nwas admitted, or could be proved to have any JU8 claim to\\nhe admitted.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0347.jp2"}, "348": {"fulltext": "302 APPENDIX.\\nAuthority again in the sense of Auctoritas may have\\nevery degree of weight, from absolute infallibility, (such\\nas, in religious matters, Christians attribute to the Scrip-\\ntures) down to the faintest presumption. See Hawkins on\\nTradition. Hinds s History of the Early Progress of\\nChristianity, Vol. II. p. 99. Hinds on Inspiration. Errors\\nof Romanism, Chap. iv. And Essay on the Omission of\\nCreeds, fyc. in the New Testament.\\nCAN. \u00e2\u0080\u0094See May.\\nCAPABLE. See Possible, Impossible, and\\nNecessary.\\nCASE. Sometimes Grammarians use this word to\\nsignify (which is its strict sense) a certain variation in\\nthe writing and utterance of a Noun, denoting the relation\\nin which it stands to some other part of the sentence;\\nsometimes to denote that relation itself: whether indicated\\nby the termination, or by a preposition, or by its colloca-\\ntion; and there is hardly any writer on the subject who\\ndoes not occasionally employ the term in each sense, with-\\nout explaining the ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous\\ndebate has hence resulted. Whoever would see a specimen\\nof this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek Grammar in\\nwhich the Authors insist on giving the Greek language an\\nAblative case, with the same termination, however, as the\\nDative (though, by the way, they had better have fixed\\non the Genitive, which oftener answers to the Latin Abla-\\ntive) urging, and with great truth, that if a distinct termi-\\nnation be necessary to constitute a case, many Latin Nouns\\nwill be without an Ablative, some without a Genitive or\\nwithout a Dative, and all Neuters without an Accusative.\\nAnd they add, that since it is possible, in every instance,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0348.jp2"}, "349": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 303\\nto render into Greek the Latin Ablative, consequently there\\nmust be an Ablative in Greek. If they had known and\\nrecollected that in the language of Lapland there are, as\\nwe are told, thirteen Cases, they would have hesitated to\\nuse an argument which would prove that there must\\ntherefore be thirteen Cases in Greek and Latin also All\\nthis confusion might have been avoided, if it had but been\\nobserved that the word Case is used in two senses.\\nCAUSE.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Reason, and Why.\\nCERTAIN. This is a word whose ambiguity, together\\nwith that of many others of kindred signification (as may,\\ncan, must, possible, \u00c2\u00a7c.) has occasioned infinite\\nperplexity in discussions on some of the most important\\nsubjects such as the freedom of human actions, the divine\\nforeknowledge, \u00c2\u00a7c.\\nIn its primary sense, it is applied (according to its\\netymology from cerno) to the state of a person s mind\\ndenoting any one s full and complete conviction and,\\ngenerally, though not always, implying that there is suf-\\nficient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily\\ntransferred to the truths or events, respecting which this\\nconviction is rationally entertained. And Uncertain (as w r ell\\nas the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjec-\\ntives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, it is certain\\nthat a battle has been fought: it is certain that the moon\\nwill be full on such a day: it is uncertain whether such\\na one is alive or dead: it is uncertain whether it will\\nrain to-morrow meaning, in these and in all other cases,\\nthat we are certain or uncertain respectively; not indica t ing\\nany difference in the character of the events themselves,\\nexcept in reference to our knowledge respecting them; far\\nthe same thing may be, at the same time, both certain and", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0349.jp2"}, "350": {"fulltext": "304 APPENDIX.\\nuncertain, to different individuals; e.g. the life or death\\nat a particular time, of any one, is certain, to his friends\\non the spot uncertain or contingent, to those at a distance.\\nFrom not attending to this circumstance, the words un-\\ncertain and contingent (which is employed nearly in\\nthe same sense as uncertain in its secondary meaning) have\\nbeen considered by many writers* as denoting some quality\\nin the things themselves and have thus become involved\\nin endless confusion. Contingent is indeed applied to\\nevents only, not to persons but it denotes no quality in\\nthe events themselves only, as has been said, the relation\\nin which they stand to a person who has no complete\\nknowledge respecting them. It is from overlooking this\\nprinciple, obvious as it is when once distinctly stated, that\\nChance or Fortune has come to be regarded as a real\\nagent, and to have been, by the ancients, personified as a\\nGoddess, and represented by statues.\\nCHURCH is sometimes employed to signify the Church,\\ni. e. the Universal or Catholic Church, the Society com-\\nprehending in it all Christians, who are Members one\\nof another, and who compose the Body, of which Christ\\nis the Head; Jwhich, collectively taken, has no visible\\nsupreme Head or earthly governor, either individual, or\\ncouncil and which is one, only in reference to its One\\ninvisible Governor and Paraclete, the Spirit of Christ,\\ndwelling in it. See Hinds s History of the Rise of\\nAmong others, Archbishop King, in his discourse on Predestination,\\nhas fallen into this error as is explained in the Notes and the Appendix\\nto my edition of that work.\\nIt may be allowable to mention in this place, that I have been repre-\\nsented as coinciding with him as to the point in question, in a note to\\nMr. Davison s work on Prophecy through a mistake, which the author\\ncandidly acknowledged, and promised to rectify.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0350.jp2"}, "351": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 305\\nChristianity, and Blanco White s Preservative against\\nPopery.\\nSometimes again it is employed to signify a Church I. e.\\nany one branch of that general Society having governors\\non earth, and existing as a community possessing authority\\nover its own members in which sense we read of the\\nSeven Churches in Asia; of Paul s having the care\\nof all the Churches, Sfc. This ambiguity has often greatly\\nfavoured the cause of the Church of Rome; which being\\nadmitted by her opponents to be a Church, i. e. a branch,\\nthough an unsound and corrupt one, of the universal Church\\nof Christ, is thence assumed to be the Church, the Society\\nin which all men are called upon to enrol themselves. See\\nthe article Truth.\\nThe Church is also not unfrequently used to denote the\\nClergy, in contradistinction to the Laity as, when we speak\\nof any one s being educated for the Church, meaning, for\\nthe Ministry. Some would perhaps add that it is in this\\nsense we speak of the endowments of the Church since\\nthe immediate emolument of these is received by clergy-\\nmen. But if it be considered that they receive it in the\\ncapacity of public instructors and spiritual pastors, these\\nendowments may fairly be regarded as belonging, in a cer-\\ntain sense, to the whole body, for whose benefit they are,\\nin this way, calculated in the same manner as we consider,\\ne. g. the endowment of a professorship in a university, as\\na benefaction, not to the professors alone, but to the uni-\\nversity at large.\\nELECTION. This is one of the terms which is often\\nto all practical purposes ambiguous, when not employed,\\nstrictly speaking, in two different senses, but with dif-\\nferent applications, according to that which is understood\\nin conjunction with it. See Book III. 10. See also", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0351.jp2"}, "352": {"fulltext": "306 APPENDIX.\\nEssays on some of the Difficulties) \u00c2\u00a7c. Essay III. On\\nElection.\\nEXPECT. This word is liable to an ambiguity,\\nwhich may sometimes lead, in conjunction with other\\ncauses, to a practical bad effect. It is sometimes used\\nin the sense of anticipate calculate on, \u00c2\u00a7c.\\n(eXmZb)) in short, consider as probable sometimes for\\nrequire, or demand as reasonable, consider as\\nright (a\u00c2\u00a3uo.)\\nThus, I may fairly expect (a^iio) that one who has\\nreceived kindness from me, should protect me in distress\\nyet I may have reason to expect (kXiriZ^iv) that he will not\\nEngland expects every man to do his duty; but it would\\nbe chimerical to expect, i. e. anticipate, a universal perfor-\\nmance of duty. Hence, when men of great revenues,\\nwhether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendor and\\nsensuality of Sardanapalus, they are apt to plead that this\\nis expected of them which is true, in the sense that such\\nconduct is anticipated as probable; not true, as implying\\nthat it is required or approved. Thus also, because it\\nwould be romantic to expect (i. e. calculate upon) in public\\nmen a primary attention to the public good, or in men in\\ngeneral an adherence to the rule of doing as you would be\\ndone by, many are apt to flatter themselves that they cannot\\nreasonably be expected (i. e. fairly called upon) to act on\\nsuch principles. What may reasonably be expected (in one\\nsense of the word) must be, precisely the practice of the\\nmajority; since it is the majority of instances that constitutes\\nprobability what may reasonably be expected (in the\\nother sense) is something much beyond the practice of\\nthe generality; as long at least as it shall be true that\\nnarrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there\\nbe that find it.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0352.jp2"}, "353": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 307\\nEXPERIENCE. This word, in its strict sense, applies\\nto what has occurred within a person s own knowledge.\\nExperience, in this sense, of course, relates to the jjast\\nalone. Thus it is that a man knows by experience what\\nsufferings he has undergone in some disease, or what height\\nthe tide reached at a certain time and place.\\nMore frequently the word is used to denote that Judg-\\nment which is derived from experience in the primary\\nsense, by reasoning from that, in combination with other\\ndata. Thus, a man may assert, on the ground of Expe-\\nrience, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medi-\\ncine that that medicine is, generally, beneficial in that\\ndisorder; that the tide may always be expected, under\\nsuch circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly\\nspeaking, none of these can be known by Experience, but\\nare conclusions derived from Experience. It is in this\\nsense only that Experience can be applied to the future, or,\\nwhich comes to the same thing, to any general fact as,\\ne. g. when it is said that we know by Experience that\\nwater exposed to a certain temperature will freeze.\\nThere are again two different applications of the word\\n(see Book III. 10), which, when not carefully distin-\\nguished, lead in practice to the same confusion as the\\nemployment of it in two senses vis:, we sometimes under-\\nstand our own personal Experience sometimes, general\\nExperience. Hume has availed himself of this (practical)\\nambiguity, in his Essay on Miracles in which he observes,\\nthat we have experience of the frequent falsity of Testimony,\\nbut that the occurrence of a miracle is contrary to our\\nExperience, and is consequently what no testimony ought\\nto be allowed to establish. Now had he explained whose\\nExperience he meant, the argument would have come to\\nnothing: if he means, the Experience of mankind uni\\\\cr-\\nsally, i. e. that a Miracle has never come under the\\ng", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0353.jp2"}, "354": {"fulltext": "308 APPENDIX.\\nExperience of any one, this is palpably begging the ques-\\ntion if he means the Experience of each individual who\\nhas never himself witnessed a Miracle, this would establish a\\nrule (visa, that we are to believe nothing of which we have\\nnot ourselves experienced the like) which it would argue\\ninsanity to act upon. Not only was the King of Bantam\\njustified (as Hume himself admits) in listening to no evi-\\ndence for the existence of Ice, but no one would be autho-\\nrized on this principle to expect his own death. His\\nExperience informs him, directly, only that others have\\ndied. Every disease under which he himself may have\\nlaboured, his Experience must have told him has not ter-\\nminated fatally if he is to judge strictly of the future by\\nthe past, according to this rule, what should hinder him\\nfrom expecting the like of all future diseases?\\nSome have never been struck with this consequence of\\nHume s principles and some have even failed to perceive\\nit when pointed out but if the reader thinks it worth his\\nwhile to consult the author, he will see that his principles,\\naccording to his own account of them, are such as I have\\nstated.\\nPerhaps however he meant, if indeed he had any distinct\\nmeaning, something intermediate between universal, and\\nindividual experience viz. the Experience of the gene-\\nrality, as to what is common and of ordinary occurrence\\nin which sense the maxim will only amount to this, that\\nfalse Testimony is a thing of common occurrence, and that\\nMiracles are not an obvious truth, indeed but too general\\nto authorize, of itself, a conclusion in any particular case.\\nIn any other individual question, as to the admissibility of\\nevidence, it would be reckoned absurd to consider merely\\nthe average chances for the truth of Testimony in the\\nabstract, without inquiring what the Testimony is, in the\\nparticular instance before us. As if, e. g. any one had", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0354.jp2"}, "355": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 309\\nmaintained that no testimony could establish Columbus s\\naccount of the discovery of America, because it is more\\ncommon for travellers to lie, than for new Continents to be\\ndiscovered. See Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon\\nBuonaparte.\\nIt is to be observed by the way, that there is yet an\\nadditional ambiguity in the entire phrase contrary to\\nexperience in one sense, a miracle, or any other event,\\nmay be called contrary to the experience of any one who\\nhas never witnessed the like; as the freezing of water was\\nto that of the King of Bantam in another and stricter\\nsense, that only is contrary to a man s experience, which he\\nknows by experience not to be true as if one should be\\ntold of an infallible remedy for some disorder, he having\\nseen it administered without effect. No testimony can\\nestablish what is, in this latter sense, contrary to experience.\\nWe need not wonder that ordinary minds should be be-\\nwildered by a sophistical employment of such a mass of\\nambiguities.\\nSuch reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and\\nprofound, on account of the Subject on which they are\\nemployed; if applied to the ordinary affairs of life, they\\nwould be deemed unworthy of serious notice.\\nThe reader is not to suppose that the refutation of\\nHume s Essay on Miracles was my object in this Article.\\nThat might have been sufficiently accomplished, in the way\\nof a reductio ad absurdum, by mere reference to the\\ncase of the King of Bantam adduced by the author him-\\nself. But this celebrated Essay, though it has often per-\\nhaps contributed to the amusement of an anti-christian\\nsophist at the expense of those unable to expose it- fallacy,\\nnever probably made one convert. The author himself\\nseems plainly to have meant it as ;i specimen of lii- inge-\\nnuity in arguing on a given hypothesis: lor he disputes", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0355.jp2"}, "356": {"fulltext": "310 APPENDIX.\\nagainst miracles as against the Course of Nature whereas,\\naccording to him, there is no such thing as a Course of\\nNature his scepticism extends to the whole external\\nworld; to everything, except the ideas or impressions on\\nthe mind of the individual so that a miracle which is\\nbelieved, has, in that circumstance alone, on his prin-\\nciples, as much reality as anything can have.\\nBut my object has been to point out, by the use of this\\nexample, the fallacies and blunders which may result from\\ninattention to the ambiguity of the word Experience and\\nthis cannot be done by a mere indirect argument which\\nrefutes indeed, but does not explain, an error.\\nFALSEHOOD and FALSITY.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Truth.\\nGOSPEL. This is instanced as one of the words which is\\npractically ambiguous, from its different applications, even\\nthough not employed (as it sometimes is) in different senses.\\nConformably to its etymological meaning of Good-\\ntidings, it is used to signify (and that especially and\\nexclusively) the welcome intelligence of Salvation to man,\\nas preached by our Lord and his followers. But it was\\nafterwards transitively applied to each of the four histories\\nof our Lord s life, published by those who are called the\\nEvangelists. And the term is often used to express collec-\\ntively the Gospel-doctrines i, e, the instructions given men\\nhow to avail themselves of the offer of salvation: and\\npreaching the Gospel, is accordingly often used to include\\nnot only the proclaiming of the good tidings, but the\\nteaching of what is to be believed and done, in consequence.\\nThis ambiguity is one source of some important theological\\nerrors many supposing that Gospel truth is to be found\\nexclusively, or chiefly, in the Gospels to the neglect of the\\nother Sacred Writings.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0356.jp2"}, "357": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 311\\nAgain, since Jesus is said to have preached the Gospel/ 1\\nand the same is said of the Apostles, the conclusion is often\\nhence drawn, that the discourses of our Lord and the\\nApostolic Epistles must exactly coincide and that in case\\nof any apparent difference, the former must be the standard,\\nand the latter must be taken to bear no other sense than\\nwhat is implied by the other a notion which leads ine-\\nvitably and immediately to the neglect of the Apostolic\\nEpistles, when every thing they contain must be limited and\\nmodified into a complete coincidence with our Lord s Dis-\\ncourses. Whereas it is very conceivable, that though both\\nmight be in a certain sense good tidings, yet, one may\\ncontain a much more full development of the Christian\\nscheme than the other which is confirmed by the con-\\nsideration, that the principal events on which the Religion\\nis founded (the atoning sacrifice and resurrection of Christ)\\nhad not taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our\\nLord, when he preached, saying, the Kingdom of\\nHeaven is at hand; not that it was actually established;\\nas it was, when his Apostles were sent forth to preach\\nto all nations. See Essays on the Difficulties, c.\\nEssay II.\\nHENCE.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Reason and Why.\\nIDENTICAL.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See One and Same.\\nIMPOSSIBILITY. According to the definition we\\nmay choose to give of this word, it may be said either that\\nthere are three Species of it, or that it may be used in three\\ndifferent senses. 1st. What may be called a mathematical\\nimpossibility, is that which involves an absurdity and soil-\\ncontradiction e. g. that two straight lines Bhould enclose a\\nspace, is not only impossible but inconceivable, as it would", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0357.jp2"}, "358": {"fulltext": "312 APPENDIX.\\nbe at variance with the definition of a straight line. And it\\nshould be observed, that inability to accomplish anything\\nwhich is, in this sense, impossible, implies no limitation of\\njjower, and is compatible, even with omnipotence, in the\\nfullest sense of the word. If it be proposed, e. g. to con-\\nstruct a triangle having one of its sides equal to the other\\ntwo, or to find two numbers having the same ratio to each\\nother as the side of a square and its diameter, it is not from\\na defect of power that we are precluded from solving such\\na problem as these since in fact the problem is in itself\\nunmeaning and absurd it is, in reality, nothing, that is\\nrequired to be done:\\n#dly. What may be called a Physical Impossibility is\\nsomething at variance with the existing Laws of Nature,\\nand which consequently no Being, subject to those Laws,\\n(as we are) can surmount but we can easily conceive a\\nBeing capable of bringing about what in the ordinary course\\nof Nature is impossible e. g. to multiply five loaves into\\nfood for a multitude, or to walk on the surface of the waves,\\nare things physically impossible, but imply no contradiction;\\non the contrary, we cannot but suppose that the Being, if\\nthere be such an one, who created the Universe, is able\\nto alter at will the properties of any of the Substances it\\ncontains.*\\nAnd an occurrence of this character we call miraculous.\\nNot but that one person may perform without supernatural\\npower what is, to another, physically impossible as, e. g.\\na man may lift a great weight, which it would be physically\\nimpossible for a child to raise because it is contrary to the\\nLaws of Nature that a muscle of this degree of strength\\nshould overcome a resistance which one of that degree is\\nSee an able disquisition on Miracles, subjoined to the Life of Apol-\\nlonius Tyanseus, in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0358.jp2"}, "359": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 3]3\\nequal to. But if any one perform what is beyond the\\nnatural powers of man universally, he has performed a\\nmiracle. Much Sophistry has been founded on the aeglecl\\nof the distinction between these two senses. It has even\\nbeen contended, that no evidence ought to induce a in. in\\nof sense to admit that a miracle has taken place, on the\\nground that it is a thing impossible; in other words, that it\\nis a miracle; for if it were not el thing impossible to man,\\nthere would be no miracle in the case so that such an\\nargument is palpably begging the question but it has often\\nprobably been admitted from an indistinct notion being\\nsuggested of Impossibility in the first sense; in which\\nsense (viz. that of self-contradiction) no evidence certainly\\nwould justify belief.\\n3dly. Moral Impossibility signifies only that high degree\\nof improbability which leaves no room for doubt. In this\\nsense we often call a thing impossible, which implies no\\ncontradiction, or any violation of the Laws of Nature, but\\nwhich yet we are rationally convinced will never occur,\\nmerely from the multitude of chances against it as, e. g.\\nthat unloaded dice should turn up the same faces one\\nhundred times successively. And in this sense, we cannot\\naccurately draw the line, so as to determine at what point\\nthe improbability amounts to an Impossibility; and hence\\nwe often have occasion to speak of this or that as almost\\nimpossible, though not quite, be. The other Impossi-\\nbilities do not admit of degrees. That a certain throw\\nshould recur two or three times successively, we should\\nnot call very improbable the improbability is increased at\\neach successive step; but we cannot say exactly when it\\nbecomes impossible; though no one would scruple to call\\none hundred such recurrences impossible.\\nIn the same sense we often call things impossible which\\nare completely within the power of known agents to bring", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0359.jp2"}, "360": {"fulltext": "314 APPENDIX.\\nabout, but which we are convinced no one of them ever will\\nbring about. Thus, e. g. that all the civilized people in\\nthe world should with one accord forsake their habitations\\nand wander about the world as savages, every one would\\ncall an impossibility though it is plain they have the power\\nto do so, and that it depends on their choice which they\\nwill do. In like manner, if we were told of a man s having\\ndisgracefully fled from his post, whom we knew to be pos-\\nsessed of the most undaunted courage, we should without\\nscruple (and with good reason, supposing the idea formed\\nof his character to be a just one) pronounce this an Im-\\npossibility meaning that there is sufficient ground for\\nbeing fully convinced that the thing could never take place\\nnot from any idea of his not having power and liberty to\\nfly if he would for our certainty is built on the very cir-\\ncumstance of his being free to act as he will, together with\\nhis being of such a disposition as never to have the will to act\\ndisgracefully. If, again, a man were bound hand and foot, it\\nwould be, in the other sense, impossible for him to fly viss*\\nout of his power. Capable has a corresponding ambiguity.\\nThe performance of anything that is morally impossible\\nto a mere man, is to be reckoned a miracle, as much as if\\nthe impossibility were physical. E. G. It is morally im-\\npossible for poor Jewish fishermen to have framed such a\\nscheme of ethical and religious doctrine as the Gospel\\nexhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretell\\ndistant and improbable future events with the exactitude\\nof many of the prophecies in the Old Testament.\\nMuch of the confusion of thought which has pervaded,\\nand has interminably protracted the discussions respecting\\nthe long-agitated question of human freedom, has arisen\\nfrom inattention to the ambiguity which has been here\\nnoticed. If the Deity, it is said, foresees exactly what I\\nshall do on any occasion, it must be impossible for me to", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0360.jp2"}, "361": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 315\\nact otherwise and thence it is inferred that man s actions\\ncannot be free. The middle term employed in such an\\nargument as this is impossible, or impossibility cm-\\nployed in two senses he to whom it is in one Bense\\nimpossible, (viz. physically) to act otherwise than he does,\\n(i. e. who has it not in his power J is not a free agent\\ncorrect foreknowledge implies impossibility in another Bense,\\nmar. moral impossibility; the absence of all room for\\ndoubt.* And the perplexity is aggravated by resorting,\\nfor the purpose of explanation, to such words as may,\\ncan, possible, must, \u00c2\u00a7c., all of which are affected\\nby a corresponding ambiguity. (See Tucker s Light of\\nNature, in the Chapters on Providence, on Free-will, and\\nsome others.) I have endeavoured to condense and to\\nsimplify some of the most valuable parts of his reasonings\\nin the notes and appendix to an edition of Archbishop\\nKing s Discourse on Predestination.\\nINDIFFERENCE, in its application in respect of the Will,\\nand of the Judgment, is subject to an ambiguity which some\\nof my readers may perhaps think hardly worth noticing\\nIt should be observed, that many things which are not usually\\ntermed mathematically necessary or impossible, will at once appear\\nsuch, when stated, not abstractedly, but with all their real circumstances\\ne. g. that Brutus stabbed Csesar, is a fact, the denial of which, though\\na falsehood, would not be regarded as self-contradictory (like the denial\\nof the equality of two right angles because, abstracted///, we can COOr\\nceivc Brutus acting otherwise but if we insert the circumstances (which\\nof course really existed) of his having complete power, libert;/, and also\\na predominant will, to do so, then, the denial of the action amounts to a\\nmathematical impossibility, OT self-contradiction for to act voluntarily\\nagainst the dictates of a predominant will, implies an riled without fl ante.\\nOf Future events, that Being and no other, can ha\\\\c the lame know-\\nledge as of the past, who is acquainted with all the cauece, remote oc\\nimmediate, internal and external, on which each depends.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0361.jp2"}, "362": {"fulltext": "316 APPENDIX.\\nthe distinction between unbiassed candour and impartiality,\\non the one side, and carelessness on the other, being so\\nvery obvious. But these two things nevertheless have been,\\nfrom their bearing the same name, confounded together;\\nor at least represented as inseparably connected. I have\\nknown a person maintain, with some plausibility, the\\ninexpediency, with a view to the attainment of truth, of\\neducating people, or appointing teachers to instruct them,\\nin any particular systems or theories, of astronomy, medi-\\ncine, religion, politics, \u00c2\u00a7c, on the ground, that a man\\nmust wish to believe and to find good reasons for believing,\\nthe system in which he has been trained, and which he\\nhas been engaged in teaching and this wish must prejudice\\nhis understanding in favour of it, and consequently render\\nhim an incompetent judge of truth.\\nNow let any one consider whether such a doctrine as\\nthis could have been even plausibly stated, but for the\\nambiguity of the word Indifference, and others connected\\nwith it. For it would follow, from such a principle, that no\\nphysician is to be trusted, who has been instructed in a\\ncertain mode of treating any disorder, because he must\\nwish to think the theory correct which he has learned nay,\\nno physician should be trusted who is not utterly indifferent\\nwhether his patient recovers or dies; since else, he must\\nwish to find reasons for hoping favourably from the mode\\nof treatment pursued. No plan for the benefit of the\\npublic, proposed by a philanthropist, should be listened\\nto since such a man cannot but wish it may be success-\\nful \u00c2\u00a7c.\\nNo doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclina-\\ntions but it is possible, and it should be our endeavour, to\\nguard against this bias.* If a scheme be proposed to any\\nIt is curious to observe how fully aware of the operation of this\\nbias, and how utterly blind to it, the same persons will be, in opposite", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0362.jp2"}, "363": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 317\\none for embarking his capital in some speculation which\\npromises great wealth, he will doubtless wish to find tliat\\nthe expectations held out are well-founded but every one\\nwould call him very imprudent, if (as some do) he should\\nsuffer this wish to bias his judgment, and should believe,\\non insufficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him.\\nBut we should not think such imprudence an inevitable con-\\nsequence of his desire to increase his property. His wishes,\\nwe should say, were both natural and wise but since they\\ncould not render the event more probable, it was most\\nunwise to allow them to influence his decision. In like\\nmanner, a good man will indeed wish to find the evidence\\nof the Christian religion satisfactory but a wise man docs\\nnot for that reason take for granted that it is satisfactory\\nbut weighs the evidence the more carefully on account of\\nthe importance of the question.\\nAnd it may be added, that it is utterly a mistake to sup-\\npose that the bias is always in favour of the conclusion\\nwished for it is often in the contrary direction. The pro-\\nverbial expression of too good news to be true, bears\\ncases. Such writers, e.g. as I have just alluded to, disparage the\\njudgment of those who have been accustomed to study and to teach the\\nChristian religion, and who derive hope and satisfaction from it on\\nthe ground that they must wish to find it true. And let it be admitted\\nthat their authority shall go for nothing and that the question shall be\\ntried entirely by the reasons adduced. But then, on the same principle,\\nhow strong must be the testimony of the multitudes who admit the\\ntruth of Christianity, but to whom it is a source of uneasiness or of\\ndismay: who have not adopted any antinomian system to quiet their\\nconscience while leading an unchristian life but, when they hear of\\nrighteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, tremble, and try\\nto dismiss such thoughts till a more convenient season. The case of\\nthese, who have every reason to wish Christianity untrue, is pasted by,\\nby the very same persons who are insisting on the influence of tin-\\nopposite bias. According to the homely hut expreesive proverb, tin\\nare deaf on one ear.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0363.jp2"}, "364": {"fulltext": "318 APPENDIX.\\nwitness to the existence of this feeling. There is in some\\nminds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases where their\\nwishes are strong; a morbid distrust of evidence which\\nthey are especially anxious to find conclusive e. g. ground-\\nless fears for the health or safety of an ardently-beloved\\nchild, will frequently distress anxious parents.\\nDifferent temperaments (sometimes varying with the state\\nof health of each individual) lead towards these opposite\\nmiscalculations, the over-estimate or under-estimate of the\\nreasons for a conclusion we earnestly wish to find true.\\nOur aim should be to guard against both extremes, and\\nto decide according to the evidence; preserving the In-\\ndifference of the Judgment, even where the Will neither\\ncan, nor should be indifferent.\\nLAW is, etymologically, that which is laid down and\\nis used, in the most appropriate, sense, to signify some\\ngeneral injunction, command, or regulation, addressed to\\ncertain Persons, who are called upon to conform to it. It is\\nin this sense that we speak of the Law of Moses, the\\nLaw of the Land, Sfc.\\nIt is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the state-\\nment of some general fact, the several individual instances\\nof which exhibit a conformity to that statement, analogous to\\nthe conduct of persons in respect to a Law which they\\nobey. It is in this sense that we speak of the Laws of\\nNature when we say that a seed in vegetating directs\\nthe radicle downwards and the plumule upwards, in compli-\\nance with a Law of Nature, we only mean that such is\\nuniversally the fact and so, in other cases.\\nIt is evident therefore that, in this sense, the conformity\\nof individual cases to the general rule is that which con-\\nstitutes a Law of Nature. If water should henceforth never\\nbecome solid, at any temperature, then the freezing of water", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0364.jp2"}, "365": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 319\\nwould no longer be a Law of Nature: whereas in the Other\\nsense, a Law is not the more or the less a Law from the\\nconformity or non-conformity of individuals to it if an act\\nof our legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly disre-\\ngarded by every one, it would not on that account be the\\nless a Law.\\nThis distinction may appear so obvious when plainly\\nstated, as hardly to need mention: yet writers of great note\\nand ability have confounded these two senses together; I\\nneed only mention Hooker (in the opening of his great\\nwork) and Montesquieu the latter of whom declaims on\\nthe much stricter observance in the Universe of the Laws of\\nNature, than in mankind, of the divine and human Laws\\nlaid down for their conduct: not considering that, in the\\nformer case, it is the observance that constitutes the Law.\\nMAY, and likewise MUST, and CAN, (as well as\\nCANNOT) are each used in two senses, which are very\\noften confounded together. They relate sometimes to\\nPoiver, sometimes to Contingency.\\nWhen we say of one who has obtained a certain sum of\\nmoney, now he may purchase the field he was wishing\\nfor, we mean that it is in his poiver it is plain that he\\nmay, in the same sense, hoard up the money, or spend\\nit on something else; though perhaps we are quite sure,\\nfrom our knowledge of his character and situation, that\\nhe will not. When again we say, it may rain to-mor-\\nrow, or the vessel may have arrived in port, the ex-\\npression does not at all relate to power, but merely to\\ncontingency: i.e. we mean, that though we are not Mire\\nsuch an event will happen or has happened, we are not\\nsure of the reverse.\\nWhen, again, we say this man, of so grateful i dis-\\nposition, must have eagerly embraced Buch an opportunitj", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0365.jp2"}, "366": {"fulltext": "320 APPENDIX.\\nof requiting his benefactor, or one who approves of\\nthe slave trade must be very hard-hearted, we only\\nmean to imply the absence of all doubt on these points.\\nThe very notions of gratitude and of hard-heartedness\\nexclude the idea of compulsion. But when we say that\\nall men must die, or that a man must go to prison who\\nis dragged by force, we mean whether they will or not\\nthat there is no power to resist. So also if we say that\\na Being of perfect goodness cannot act wrong, we do\\nnot mean that it is out of his power; since that would\\nimply no goodness of character but that there is sufficient\\nreason for feeling sure that he will not. It is in a very\\ndifferent sense that we say of a man fettered in a prison,\\nthat he cannot escape meaning, that though he has\\nthe will, he wants the ability.\\nThese words are commonly introduced, in questions\\nconnected with Fatalism and the Freedom of human actions,\\nto explain the meaning of necessary, impossible, $c.\\nand having themselves a corresponding ambiguity, they\\nonly tend to increase the perplexity.\\nChaos umpire sits,\\nAnd by deciding worse embroils the fray.\\nMUST.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See May.\\nNECESSARY. This word is used as the contrary to\\nimpossible in all its senses, and is of course liable to a\\ncorresponding ambiguity. Thus it is mathematically\\nNecessary that two sides of a triangle should be greater\\nthan the third there is a physical Necessity for the\\nfall of a stone and a moral Necessity that a Being of\\na certain character should act, when left perfectly free,\\nconformably to that character i. e. we are sure he will act\\nso; though of course it is in his power to act otherwise;", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0366.jp2"}, "367": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 321\\nelse there would be no moral agency. 4 Thia ambiguit] is\\nemployed sophistically to justify immoral conduct mnce\\nno one is responsible for anything done under necessity,\\nI. e. physical necessity as when a man is dragged any-\\nwhere by external force, or falls down from being too\\nweak to stand; and then the same excuse is fallaciously\\nextended to moral necessity also.\\nThere are likewise numberless different applications of\\nthe word necessary (as well as of those derived from it)\\nin which there is a practical ambiguity, from the diffe-\\nrence of the things understood in conjunction with it: e.g.\\nfood is necessary; vh. to life: great wealth is ne-\\ncessary to the gratification of a man of luxurious habits\\nthe violation of moral duty is in many cases necessary\\nfor the attainment of certain worldly objects the renuncia-\\ntion of such objects, and subjugation of the desires is M ne-\\ncessary to the attainment of the Gospel-promises, Sfc.\\nAnd thus it is that necessity has come to be the\\ntyrant s plea; for as no one is at all responsible for what\\nis a matter of physical necessity, what he has no power\\nto avoid, so, a degree of allowance is made for a man s\\ndoing what he has power to avoid, when it appears to be\\nthe least of two evils as, e. g. when a man who is famishing\\ntakes the first food he meets with, as necessary to\\nsupport life, or throws over goods in a storm, when it i\\nnecessary, in order to save the ship. But if the plea\\nof necessity be admitted without inquiring for what the act\\nin question is necessary, anything whatever may be thus\\nvindicated; since no one commits any crime which i not.\\nin his view, necessary to the attainment of some sup-\\nposed advantage or gratification.\\nThe confusion of thought is further increased In the\\nemployment on improper occasions of the phrase ab*o-\\nSee the article [mpMubilitj note.\\nv", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0367.jp2"}, "368": {"fulltext": "322 APPENDIX.\\nlutely necessary which, strictly speaking, denotes a case\\nin which there is no possible alternative. It is necessary\\nfor a man s safety, that he should remain in a house which\\nhe cannot quit without incurring danger it is absolutely, or\\nsimply, necessary that he should remain there, if he is\\nclosely imprisoned in it.\\nI have treated more fully on this fruitful source of so-\\nphistry in the Appendix (No. I.) to King s Discourse on\\nPredestination. In the course of it, I suggested an ety-\\nmology of the word, which I have reason to think is not\\ncorrect but it should be observed, that this makes no\\ndifference in the reasoning, which is not in any degree\\nfounded on that etymology; nor have I, as some have\\nrepresented, attempted to introduce any new or unusual\\nsense of the word, but have all along appealed to common\\nuse, the only right standard, and merely pointed out\\nthe senses in which each word has actually been employed.\\nSee the introduction to this Appendix.\\nOLD. This word, in its strict and primary sense, de-\\nnotes the length of time that any object has existed and\\nmany are not aware that they are accustomed to use it in\\nany other. It is, however, very frequently employed\\ninstead of Ancient, to denote distance of time. The\\nsame transition seems to have taken place in Latin. Horace\\nsays of Lucilius, who was one of the most ancient Roman\\nauthors, but who did not live to be old\\nquo fit ut omnis\\nVotiva pateat veluti descripta tabella\\nVita Senis.\\nThe present is a remarkable instance of the influence of an\\nambiguous word over the thoughts even of those who\\nare not ignorant of the ambiguity, but are not carefully on", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0368.jp2"}, "369": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS.\\nthe watch against its effects; the impressions and ideas\\nassociated by habit with the word when used in one sense,\\nbeing always apt to obtrude themselves unawares when it\\nis employed in another sense, and thus to affect our rea-\\nsonings e.g. Old times, the Old World, $c. are\\nexpressions in frequent use, and which, oftener than not,\\nproduce imperceptibly the associated impression of the\\nsuperior wisdom resulting from experience, which, as a\\ngeneral rule, we attribute to Old men. Yet no one is\\nreally ignorant that the world is older now than ever it\\nwas and that the instruction to be derived from observa-\\ntions on the past (which is the advantage that Old persons\\npossess) must be greater, supposing other things equal, to\\nevery successive generation and Bacon s remark to this\\npurpose appears, as soon as distinctly stated, a mere truism\\nyet few, perhaps, that he made, are more important. There\\nis always a tendency to appeal with the same kind of defe-\\nrence, to the authority of Old times, as of aged men.\\nIt should be kept in mind, however, that ancient customs,\\ninstitutions, \u00c2\u00a7c. when they still exist, may be literally\\ncalled Old and have this advantage attending them, that\\ntheir effects may be estimated from long experience\\nwhereas we cannot be sure, respecting any recently-esta-\\nblished Law or System, whether it may not produce in\\ntime some effects which were not originally contemplated.\\nONE is sometimes employed to denote strict and pro-\\nper numerical Unity, sometimes, close Resemblance\\ncorrespondence with one single description. See Same.\\nFacies non omnibus UNA,\\nNee diversa tamen qualem decet esse sore-rum.\\nOv. Met am. 1). ii.\\nIt is in the secondary or improper, not the primary and\\nproper sense of tins word, that men arc exhorted to w be\\nv2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0369.jp2"}, "370": {"fulltext": "324 APPENDIX.\\nof one mind i. e. to agree in their faith, pursuits, mutual\\naffections, c.\\nIt is also in this sense that two guineas, e. g. struck from\\na wedge of uniform fineness, are said to be of one and the\\nsame form and weight, and also, of one and the same\\nsubstance. In this secondary or improper sense also, a\\nchild is said to be of one and the same (bodily) substance\\nwith its mother or, simply of the substance of its\\nmother for these two pieces of money, and two human\\nBeings, are numerically distinct\\nIt is evidently most important to keep steadily in view,\\nand to explain on proper occasions, these different uses of\\nthe word lest men should insensibly slide into error on\\nthe most important of all subjects, by applying, in the\\nsecondary sense, expressions which ought to be understood\\nin the primary and proper. See Person.\\nPERSON,* in its ordinary use at present, invariably\\nimplies a numerically distinct substance. Each man is one\\nPerson, and can be but one. It has also a peculiar theolo-\\ngical sense, in which we speak of the three Persons of\\nthe blessed Trinity. It was probably thus employed by our\\nDivines as a literal, or perhaps etymological, rendering of\\nthe Latin word Persona. I am inclined to think, however,\\nfrom the language of Wallis (the Mathematician and Logician)\\nin the following extract, as well as from that of some other\\nof our older writers, that the English word Person was\\nformerly not so strictly confined as now, to the sense it\\nbears in common conversation among us.\\nThat which makes these expressions (viz. respecting the\\nTrinity) seem harsh to some of these men, is because they have\\nused themselves to fansie that notion only of the word Person,\\nMost of the following observations will apply to the word Per-\\nsonality,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0370.jp2"}, "371": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 325\\naccording to which three men are accounted to be three persons,\\nand these three persons to be three men. But lie may consider that\\nthere is another notion of the word Person, and in common use\\ntoo, wherein the same man may be said to sustain divers persons,\\nand those persons to be the same man that is, the same man as\\nsustaining divers capacities. As was said but now of Tully,\\nTres Personas Units sustineo; meam, adcersarii, judieis. And\\nthen it will seem no more harsh to say, The three Persons, Fa-\\nther, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God, than to say, God the\\nCreatour, God the Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, are one\\nGod it is much the same thing whether of the two\\nforms we use. Letters on the Trinity, p. 03.\\nThe word Person (persona) is originally a Latin word, and doth\\nnot properly signify a Man, (so that another person must needs\\nimply another man) for then the word Homo would have served,\\nand they needed not have taken in the word Persona; but rather,\\none so circumstantiated. And the same Man, if considered in\\nother circumstances (considerably different) is reputed another per-\\nson. And that this is the true notion of the word Person, appears\\nby those noted phrases, personam induere, personam deponcre,\\npersonam agcre, and many the like in approved Latin authours\\nThus the same man may at once sustain the Person, of a \u00c2\u00a3tflg\\nand a Father, if he be invested both with regal and paternal\\nauthority. Now because the King and the Father are for the\\nmost part not only different persons but different men also, (and\\nthe like in other cases) hence it comes to pass that another Person\\nis sometimes supposed to imply another man; but not always,\\nnor is that the proper sense of the word. Tt is Englished in our\\ndictionaries by the state, quality or condition whereby one man\\ndiffers from another and so, as the condition alters, the Person\\nalters, though the man be the same.\\nThe hinge of the controversy, is, that notion concerning the\\nthree somemhats, which the Fathers (who first used it) did intend\\nto design by the name Person so that we are not from the word\\nPerson to determine what was that Notion; but from thai Notion\\nwhich they would express, to determine in what MOM the WOld", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0371.jp2"}, "372": {"fulltext": "326 APPENDIX.\\nPerson is here used, fyc. tyc. Letter V. in Answer to the Ariaris\\nVindication.*\\nWhat was precisely the notion which these Latin Fathers\\nintended to convey, and how far it approached the classical\\nsignification of the word Persona, it may not be easy to\\ndetermine. But we must presume that they did not intend\\nto employ it in what is, now, the ordinary sense of the word\\nPerson; both because Persona never, I believe, bore\\nthat sense in pure Latinity, and also because it is evident\\nthat, in that sense, three divine Persons would have\\nbeen exactly equivalent to three Gods; a meaning\\nwhich the orthodox always disavowed.\\nIt is probable that they had nearly the same view with\\nwhich the Greek theologians adopted the word Hypostasis\\nwhich seems calculated to express that which stands under\\nfi. e. is the Subject of) Attributes. They meant, it may be\\npresumed, to guard against the suspicion of teaching, on the\\none hand, that there are three Gods, or three Parts of the one\\nGod; or, on the other hand, that Father, Son, and Holy\\nGhost are no more than three Names, all, of the same sig-\\nnification; and they employed accordingly a term which\\nmight serve to denote, that, (though divine Attributes\\nbelong to all and each of these, yet) there are Attributes\\nDr. Wallis s theological works, considering his general celebrity,\\nare wonderfully little known. He seems to have been, in his day, one\\nof the ablest Defenders of the Church s doctrine, against the Arians and\\nSocinians of that period. Of course he incurred the censure, not only of\\nthem, but of all who, though not professedly Arian, gave such an expo-\\nsition of the doctrine as amounts virtually to Tritheism. I beg to be\\nunderstood however as not demanding an implicit deference for his, or\\nfor any other human authority, however eminent. We are taught to\\ncall no man Master, on earth. But the reference to Dr. Wallis may\\nserve both to show the use of the word in his days, and to correct the\\nnotion, should any have entertained it, that the views of the subject\\nhere taken are, -in our Church, anything novel.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0372.jp2"}, "373": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 327\\nof each, respectively, which are not so strictly applicable\\nto either of the others, as such; as when, for instance,\\nthe Son is called especially the Redeemer, and the\\nHoly Spirit, the Comforter or Paraclete, \u00c2\u00a7c. The no-\\ntion thus conveyed is indeed very faint, and imperfect\\nbut is perhaps for that very reason, (considering what\\nMan is, and what God is,) the less likely to lead to error.\\nOne may convey to a blind man, a notion of seeing, cor-\\nrect as far as it goes, and instructive to him, though very\\nimperfect: if he form a more full and distinct notion of\\nit, his ideas will inevitably be incorrect. See Essay VII.\\n5, Second Series.*\\nIt is perhaps to be regretted that our Divines, in render-\\ning the Latin Persona, used the word Person, whose\\nordinary sense, in the present day at least, differs in a most\\nimportant point from the theological sense, and yet is not\\nso remote from it as to preclude all mistake and perplexity.\\nIf Hypostasis, or any other completely foreign term had\\nbeen used instead, no idea at all would have been conveyed\\nexcept that of the explanation given and thus the danger at\\nleast of being misled by a word, would have been avoided. f\\nOur Reformers however did not introduce the word into\\ntheir Catechism though it has been (I must think, inju-\\ndiciously) employed in some popular expositions of the\\nCatechism, without any explanation, or even allusion to its\\nbeing used in a peculiar sense.\\nAs it is, the danger of being not merely not understood,\\nIt is worth observing, as a striking instance of the little reliance t\\nbe placed on etymology as a guide to the meaning of a word, that II\\npostasis, Substantia, and Understanding, so widely different in\\ntheir sense, correspond in their etymology.\\nt I wish it to he observed, that it is the ambif/i/i/i/ of the word Penon\\nwhich renders it objectionable; not, its being nowhere employed in\\nScripture in the technical sense of theologians; for this Circumstance fa\\nrather an advantage.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Sec Essay V!. (Second Series) I. note.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0373.jp2"}, "374": {"fulltext": "328 APPENDIX.\\nbut ^understood, should be guarded against most sedu-\\nlously, by all who wish not only to keep clear of error, but\\nto inculcate important truth by seldom or never employing\\nthis ambiguous word without some explanation or caution.\\nFor if we employ, without any such care, terms which we\\nmust be sensible are likely to mislead, at least the unlearned\\nand the unthinking, we cannot stand acquitted on the plea of\\nnot having directly inculcated error.\\nI am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, may\\nbe traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It is not\\nwonderful that some should be led to renounce a doctrine,\\nwhich, through the ambiguity in question, may be represented\\nto them as involving a self-contradiction, or as leading to\\nTritheism; that others should insensibly slide into this\\nvery error; or that many more (which I know to be no\\nuncommon case) should, for fear of that error, deliberately,\\nand on principle, keep the doctrine of the Trinity out of their\\nthoughts, as a point of speculative belief, to which they have\\nassented once for all, but which they find it dangerous to\\ndwell on though it is in fact the very Faith into which,* by\\nour Lord s appointment, we are baptized.\\nNor should those who do understand, or at least have once\\nunderstood, the ambiguity in question, rest satisfied that they\\nare thenceforward safe from all danger in that quarter. It\\nshould be remembered that the thoughts are habitually in-\\nfluenced, through the force of association, by the recurrence\\nof the ordinary sense of any word to the mind of those who\\nare not especially on their guard against it. See Fallacies,\\n\u00c2\u00a75.f\\nels to ovo^ia, into the Name; not in the Name. Matt.xxviii. 19.\\nf The correctness of a formal and deliberate Confession of Faith, is\\nnot always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against error in the habitual\\nimpressions on the mind. The Romanists natter themselves that they\\nare safe from Idolatry, because they distinctly acknowledge the truth,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0374.jp2"}, "375": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 329\\nNor again is the habitual acknowledgment of One God,\\nof itself a sufficient safeguard; since, from the additional\\nambiguities of One and Unity, (noticed in the pre-\\nceding Article) we may gradually fall into the notion of a\\nmerely figurative Unity; such as Unity of substance merely,\\n(see the preceding Article) Unity of purpose, concert of\\naction, \u00c2\u00a7c. such as is often denoted by the phrase one\\nmind. See Same, in this Appendix, and Disser-\\ntation, Book IV. Chap. v.\\nWhen however I speak of the necessity of explanations,\\nthe reader is requested to keep in mind, that I mean, not\\nexplanations of the nature of the Deitt/, but, of our own use\\nof uords. On the one hand we must not content ourselves\\nwith merely saying that the whole subject is mysterious and\\nmust not be too nicely pried into while we neglect to notice\\nthe distinction between divine revelations, and human expla-\\nnations of them; between inquiries into the mysteries of\\nthe Divine nature, and into the mysteries arising from the\\nambiguities of language, and of a language too, adopted by\\nuninspired men. For, whatever Scripture declares, the\\nChristian is bound to receive implicitly, however unable to\\nunderstand it but to claim an uninquiring assent to expres-\\nsions of man s framing, (however judiciously framed) without\\neven an attempt to ascertain their meaning, is to fall into one\\nof the worst errors of the Romanists.\\nOn the other hand, to require explanations of what God is\\nin Himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach of t In-\\nhuman faculties, and foreign from the apparent design of\\nthat God only is to be srrrrrf MX. with Latvia; though they\\nallow Adoration, hvperdulia and dulia to the Virgin and\\nother Saints, to Images, and to Relics: to which it lias beenji\\nreplied, that supposing this distinction correct in itself, it would be, in\\npractice, nugatory; since the mass of the people must BOOU (as experience\\nproves) lose sight of* it entirely in their habitual devotions.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0375.jp2"}, "376": {"fulltext": "230 APPENDIX.\\nScripture-revelation;* which seems to be, chiefly if not\\nwholly, to declare to us, (at least to insist on among the\\nessential articles of faith) with a view to our practical benefit,\\nand to the influencing of our feelings and conduct, not so\\nmuch the intrinsic nature of the Deity, as, what He is rela-\\ntively to us. Scripture teaches us (and our Church-Catechism\\ndirects our attention to these points) to believe in God,\\nwho, as the Father, hath made us and all the World, as\\nthe Son, hath redeemed us and all mankind, as the Holy\\nGhost, sanctifieth us, and all the elect people of God. f\\nAnd this distinction is, as I have said, pointed out in the\\nvery form of Baptism. Nothing indeed can be more de-\\ncidedly established by Scripture, nothing more indistinctly\\nexplained (except as far as relates to us) than the doctrine of\\nthe Trinity J nor are we perhaps capable, with our present\\nfaculties, of comprehending it more fully.\\nAnd as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such in-\\nstructions as are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, it\\nseems the part of a like wisdom, to abstain, during this our\\nstate of childhood, from curious speculations on subjects in\\nwhich even the ablest of human minds can but see through\\na glass, darkly. On these, the Learned can have no ad-\\nvantage over others though we are apt to forget that any\\nIn these matters our inquiry, at least our first inquiry, should\\nalways be, what is revealed nor if any one refuses to adopt as an article\\nof faith, this or that exposition, should he be understood as necessarily\\nmaintaining its falsity. For we are sure that there must be many truths\\nrelative to the Deity, which we have no means of ascertaining nor does\\nit follow that even every truth which can be ascertained, must be a part\\nof the essential faith of a Christian.\\nf Hawkins s Manual, p. 12.\\nCompare together, for instance, such passages as the following for\\nit is by comparing Scripture with Scripture, not by dwelling on insulated\\ntexts, that the Word of God is to be rightly understood Luke i. 35, and\\nJohn xiv. 9; John xiv. 16, 18, 26, Matt, xxviii. 19, 20; John xvi. 7,\\nColoss.ii. 9; Philipp. i. 19, 1 Cor. vi. 19 Matt. x. 20, and John xiv. 23.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0376.jp2"}, "377": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 33]\\nmysterious point inscrutable to Man, as Man, BUipaniiig\\nthe utmost reach of human intellect, must be sucfa to the\\nlearned and to the ignorant, to the wise and to the simple\\nalike; that in utter darkness, the strongest sight, and the\\nweakest, are on a level.*\\nWith presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded\\nto, many theologians, even of those who lived near, and in-\\ndeed during, the Apostolical times, f seem to have been alike\\nSir, in these matters, (said one of the most eminent of our Re-\\nformers, respecting another mysterious point,) I am so fearful, that I\\ndare speak no further, yea almost none otherwise, than as the Scripture\\ndoth as ifc were lead me by the hand.\\nAnd surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture, and take it for a\\nguide, than to resort to it merely for confirmations, contained in detached\\ntexts, of the several parts of some System of Theology, which the student\\nfixes on as reputed orthodox, and which is in fact made the guide which\\nhe permits to lead him by the hand; while passages culled out from\\nvarious parts of the Sacred Writings in subserviency to such system, are\\nformed into what may be called an anagram of Scripture and then, by\\nreference to this system as a standard, each doctrine or discourse is\\nreadily pronounced Orthodox, or Socinian, or Arian, or Sabellian, or\\nNestorian, fyc. and all this, on the ground that the theological scheme\\nwhich the student has adopted, is supported by Scripture. The materials\\nindeed are the stones of the Temple; but the building constructed with\\nthem is a fabric of human contrivance. If instead of this, too common,\\nprocedure, students would fairly search the Scriptures with a view not\\nmerely to defend their opinions, but to form them, not merely for argu-\\nments, but for truth, keeping human expositions to their own propel\\npurposes, [See Essay VI. First Series,] and not allowing these to become,\\npractically, a standard, if in short, they were as honestly desirous to be on\\nthe side of Scripture, as they naturally are to have Scripture on their tide,\\nhow much sounder, as well as more charitable, would their conclusions\\noften be\\nt It is important to remember,\u00e2\u0080\u0094 what we are very liable to klM\\nsight of\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the circumstance, that, not only there arose grievous errors\\nduring the time of the Apostles, and consequently such were likely to\\nexist in the times Immediately following, but also that when theM\\ninspired guides were removed, there was no longer the same infallible\\nauthority to decide what was error. In the absence of such a guide,\\nsome error- might he received as orthodox, and some sound doctrim\\nbe condemned as heterodox.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0377.jp2"}, "378": {"fulltext": "332 APPENDIX.\\nchargeable, widely as they differed in respect of the par-\\nticular explanations adopted by each\\nUnus unique\\nError sed variis illudit partibus.\\nThe Gnostics* introduced a theory of ^ons, or successive\\nemanations from the divine Pleroma or Fullness; one\\nof whom was Christ, and became incarnate in the man\\nJesus.f The Sabellians are reported to have described\\nChrist as bearing the same relation to the Father, as the\\nilluminating ((ptoTLGTiKov) quality, does to the Sun; while the\\nHoly Ghost corresponded to the warming quality: (SoXttov)\\nor again, the Three as corresponding to the Body, Soul, and\\nSpirit of a man; or again, to Substance, Thought or\\nReason, and Will or Action. The Arians again appear to\\nhave introduced in reality three Gods; the Son and The\\nHoly Spirit, created Beings, but with a certain imparted\\ndivinity. The Nestorians and Eutychians, gave opposite,\\nbut equally fanciful and equally presumptuous explanations\\nof the Incarnation, \u00c2\u00a7c. \u00c2\u00a7c.\\nNor were those who were accounted orthodox, altogether\\nexempt from the same fault of presumptuous speculation.\\nWho, says Chrysostom, was he to whom God said,\\nLet us make man? who but he the Son of God?\\nAnd Epiphanius, on the same passage, says, this is the\\nlanguage of God to his Word. Each of these writers, it\\nmay be observed, in representing God (under that title) as\\naddressing Himself to the Son as to a distinct Being pre-\\nviously to the birth of Jesus on earth, approaches very closely\\nto the Arian tritheism. And Justin Martyr in a similar\\nOf these, and several other ancient heretics, we have no accounts but\\nthose of their opponents which however we may presume to contain\\nmore or less of approximation to what was really maintained.\\nf These heretics appear to have split into many different sects,\\nteaching various modifications of the same absurdities. See Burton s\\nBampton Lectures.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0378.jp2"}, "379": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 333\\ntone, expressly speaks of God as One, not in number, but\\nin judgment or designs. I will not say that such parages\\nas these may not be so interpreted as to exclude both the\\nArian and every other form of tritheism but it is a dangerous\\nthing, to use (and that, not in the heat of declamation, but in\\na professed exposition) language of such a nature that it is\\na mere chance whether it may not lead into the most un-\\nscriptural errors. If the early writers had not been habitually\\nvery incautious in this point, that could hardly have taken\\nplace which is recorded respecting the council held at Rimini,\\n(a.d. 360) in which a Confession of Faith was agreed upon,\\nwhich the Arians soon after boasted of as sanctioning their\\ndoctrine, and the Church, we are told, was astonished\\nto find itself unexpectedly become Arian. f\\nThe fact is, that numberless writers, both of those who\\nwere, and who were not, accounted heretics, beinu- dis-\\npleased, and justly, with one another s explanations of the\\nmode of existence of the Deity, instead of taking warning\\naright from the errors of their neighbours, sought, each, the\\nremedy, in some other explanation instead, concerning\\nmatters unrevealed and inexplicable by man. They found\\nnothing to satisfy a metaphysical curiosity in the brief and\\nindistinct, though decisive, declarations of Scripture, that\\nGod was in Christ, reconciling the World unto Himself;\\nthat in Him dwelleth all the Fullness of the Godhead,\\nbodily that it is God that worketh in us both to will\\nand to do of his good pleasure that if we keep Christ s\\nsaying, He dwelleth in us, and we, in Him that if an\\\\\\nman have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his f and\\nthat the Lord is the Spirit, $c.% They wanted something\\nOvtos yeypapnevos Ofoy, iVcpoS \u00c2\u00abOTI TOV ro tthi th\\n7rou iaavTOS Qeov, opidpco Af -yco, aXX OV yvu iiij A\\nt See Essay VI. (Second Series) 2. Note b.\\n1 Not, as in our version, that Spirit o oVRvptoc TO irptvp", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0379.jp2"}, "380": {"fulltext": "334 APPENDIX.\\nmore full, and more philosophical, than all this and their\\ntheology accordingly was spoiled, through philosophy and\\nvain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of\\nthe World, and not after Christ. Hostile as they were to\\neach other, the grand mistake in principle was common to\\nmany of all parties.\\nAnd in later ages the Schoolmen kept up the same Spirit,\\nand even transmitted it to Protestants. Theology teaches,\\n(says a passage in a Protestant work) that there is in God,\\none Essence, two Processions, three Persons, four Relations,\\nfive Notions, and the Circumincession, which the Greeks call\\nPerichoresis. What follows is still more to my\\npurpose but I cannot bring myself to transcribe any further.\\nWho is this that darkeneth counsel by words without\\nknowledge\\nBut the substance of great part of what I have been\\nsaying, has been expressed in better language than mine,\\nin a late work which displays no ordinary ability, Mr.\\nDouglas s Errors regarding Religion.\\nThe radical mistake in all these systems, whether heretical\\nor orthodox, which have embroiled mankind in so many scan-\\ndalous disputes, and absurd and pernicious opinions, proceeds\\nfrom the disposition so natural in man of being wise above what\\nis written. They are not satisfied with believing a plain decla-\\nration of the Saviour, I and the Father are one. They under-\\ntake with the utmost presumption and folly to explain in what\\nmanner the Father and the Son are one but man might as well\\nattempt to take up the ocean in the hollow of his hand, as\\nendeavour by his narrow understanding, to comprehend the\\nmanner of the Divine existence. P. 50.\\nHeresies, however, are not confined to the heterodox.\\nWhile the Arians and Semi-Arians were corrupting the truth\\nby every subtilty of argument and ingenious perversion of terms,\\nthe orthodox all the while were dogmatizing about the Divine", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0380.jp2"}, "381": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 335\\nnature with a profusion of words, which either had no meaning,\\nor were gross mistakes, or inapplicable mataphon when applied\\nto the infinite and spiritual existence of God. And not content\\nwith using such arguments against the heretics as generally\\nproduced a new heresy without refuting the former one, as\\nsoon as they obtained the power they expelled them from the\\nRoman empire, and sent them with all the zeal which perse-\\ncution confers, and which the orthodox, from their prosperity,\\nhad lost, to spread every variety of error amongst the nations of\\nthe barbarians.\\nOrthodoxy was become a very nice affair, from the rigour\\nof its terms, and the perplexity of its creed, and very unlike the\\nhighway for the simple, which the Gospel presents. A slip in a\\nsingle expression was enough to make a man a heretic-. The\\nuse or omission of a single word occasioned a new rent in Chris-\\ntianity. Every heresy produced a new creed, and every creed\\na new heresy Never does human folly and learned\\nignorance appear in a more disgusting point of view than in these\\ndisputes of Christians amongst themselves nor does any study\\nappear so well calculated to foster infidelity as the history of\\nChristian sects, unless the reader be guided by light from above,\\nand carefully distinguish the doctrines of the Bible from the\\nmiserable disputes of pretended Christians. P. 53.\\nTo discuss this important subject more fully (or perhaps\\nindeed as fully as it has been here treated of) is hardly\\nsuitable to a logical work: and yet the importance of\\nattending to the ambiguity I have now been considering,\\ncannot be duly appreciated, without offering some remarks\\non the subject-matter with which that ambiguity is con-\\nnected; and such remarks again, if scantily and imperfectly\\ndeveloped, are open to cavil or mistake. I must take the\\nliberty therefore of referring the reader to such works,\\nboth my own, and those of others, as contain something\\nof a fuller statement of the same news. See Etm I First\\nSeries), Essay [I. f 4, and Essays l\\\\. and V.; Second", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0381.jp2"}, "382": {"fulltext": "336 APPENDIX.\\nSeries, Essay VI. 2, p. 199; VII. 3; and IX. 1.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nOrigin of Romish Errors, Chap. ii. 1 Archbishop\\nKings Sermon on Predestination, c, and Encyclop. Me-\\ntropol. History, Chap, xxvii. p. 589, and Chap, xxxiv.\\np. 740.\\nPOSSIBLE.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 This word, like the others of kindred\\nmeaning, relates sometimes to contingency, sometimes to\\npower; and these two senses are frequently confounded.\\nIn the first sense we say, e.g. it is possible this patient\\nmay recover, not meaning, that it depends on his choice\\nbut that we are not sure whether the event will not be\\nsuch. In the other sense it is possible to the best man\\nto violate every rule of morality since if it were out of his\\npower to act so if he chose it, there would be no moral\\ngoodness in the case though we are quite sure that such\\nnever will be his choice. See Impossible.\\nPRIEST.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Dissertation, Book IV. Ch. iv. 2.\\nEtymologically, the word answers to Presbyter, i. e.\\nElder in the Christian Church and is often applied to the\\nsecond order of Christian Ministers at the present day.\\nBut it is remarkable that it never occurs in this sense, in\\nour translation of the Scriptures the word -n-pecyftyrepog\\nbeing always rendered by Elder and its derivative, Priest,\\nalways given as the translation of lspevg. This latter is\\nan office assigned to none under the Gospel-scheme,\\nexcept the ONE great High Priest, of whom the Jewish\\nPriests were types, and who offered a sacrifice (that\\nbeing the most distinguishing office of a Priest in the\\nsense of lepzvg) which is the only one under the Gospel.\\nIt is incalculable how much confusion has arisen from\\nconfounding together the two senses of the word Priest,\\nand thence, the two offices themselves.\\nI have enlarged accordingly on this subject in a Sermon,", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0382.jp2"}, "383": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 337\\npreached before the University of Oxford, and subjoined to\\nthe last edition of the Bampton Lectures. See also Errors\\nof Romanism, Chap. ii.\\nREASON. This word is liable to many ambiguities, of\\nwhich I propose to notice only a few of the most important.\\nSometimes it is used to signify all the intellectual powers\\ncollectively; in which sense it can hardly be said to be\\naltogether denied to brutes; since several of what we\\nreckon intellectual processes in the human mind, are evi-\\ndently such as some brutes are capable of.\\nReason is, however, frequently employed to denote those\\nintellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from\\nbrutes though what these are no one has been able pre-\\ncisely to define. The employment at will of the faculty of\\nAbstraction seems to be the principal that being, at least,\\nprincipally concerned in the use of Language. The Moral\\nfaculty, or power of distinguishing right from wrong, (which\\nappears also to be closely connected with Abstraction,) is\\none of which brutes are destitute but then Dr. Paley and\\nsome other ethical writers deny it to man also. The de-\\nscription given by that author of our discernment of good\\nand bad conduct, (mm, as wholly dependent on expectation\\nof reward and punishment,) would equally apply to many\\nof the brute-creation, especially the more intelligent of\\ndomestic animals, as dogs and horses. It is in this sense,\\nhowever, that some writers speak of Reason as enabling\\nus to judge of virtue and vice not, as Dr. Campbell in his\\nPhilosophy of Rhetoric has understood them, in the sense\\nof the power of argumentation.\\nReason, however, is often used for the faculty of carrying\\non the third operation of the mind; m*. Reasoning. And\\nit is from inattention to this ambiguity which has been re-\\npeatedly noticed in the course of the foregoing treatise that\\nz", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0383.jp2"}, "384": {"fulltext": "338 APPENDIX.\\nsome have treated of Logic as the art of rightly employing\\nthe mental faculties in general.\\nReason is also employed to signify the Premiss or Pre-\\nmises of an argument; especially the minor Premiss; and\\nit is from Reason in this sense that the word Reasoning\\nis derived.\\nIt is also very frequently used to signify a Cause; as\\nwhen we say, in popular language, that the Reason of\\nan eclipse of the sun is, that the moon is interposed between\\nit and the earth. This should be strictly called the cause.\\nOn the other hand, Because (i. e. by Cause) is used to\\nintroduce either the Physical Cause or the Logical Proof:\\nand Therefore, Hence, Since, Follow, Conse-\\nquence, and many other kindred words, have a correspond-\\ning ambiguity e. g the ground is wet, because it has\\nrained or it has rained, and hence the ground is wet\\nthis is the assignment of the Cause; again, it has rained,\\nbecause the ground is wet the ground is wet, and there-\\nfore it has rained this is assigning the logical proof the\\nwetness of the ground is the cause, not of the rain having\\nfallen, but of our knowing that it has fallen. And this pro-\\nbably it is that has led to the ambiguous use in all languages\\nof almost all the words relating to these two points. It is\\nan ambiguity which has produced incalculable confusion of\\nthought, and from which it is the harder to escape, on\\naccount of its extending to those very forms of expression\\nwhich are introduced in order to clear it up.\\nWhat adds to the confusion is, that the Cause is often\\nemployed as a Proof of the effect:* as when we infer, from\\na great fall of rain, that there is, or will be, a flood which\\nis at once the physical effect, and the logical conclusion.\\nThe case is just reversed, when from a flood we infer that\\nthe rain has fallen.\\nSee Fallacies. Non causa pro causa. Book III. 14.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0384.jp2"}, "385": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. JJjjg\\nThe more attention any one bestows on this ambiguity,\\nthe more extensive and important its results will appear.\\nSee Analytical Outline, 2.\\nREGENERATION.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 This word is employed by Borne\\nDivines to signify the actual new life and character which\\nought to distinguish the Christian by others, a release from\\na state of condemnation, a reconciliation to God, adop-\\ntion as his children, J*c.,* which is a necessary prel imina ry\\nto the entrance on such a state; (but which, unhappily, is\\nnot invariably followed by it) and these are, of course, as\\ndifferent things as a grain of seed sown, and the full corn\\nin the ear.\\nMuch controversy has taken place as to the time at\\nwhich, and the circumstances under which, Regeneration\\ntakes place the greater part of which may be traced to this\\nambiguity.\\nSAME (as well as One, Identical, and other words\\nderived from them) is used frequently in a sense very dif-\\nferent from its primary one (as applicable to a single\\nobject) vis, it is employed to denote great shnilarifi/.\\nWhen several objects are undistinguishably alike, One single\\ndescription will apply equally to any of them and thence\\nthey are said to be all of one and the same nature, appear-\\nance, c. as e.g. when we say, this house is built of the\\nsame stone with such another, we only mean that the stones\\nare undistinguishable in their qualities not, that the one\\nbuilding was pulled down, and the other constructed with\\nthe materials. Whereas Sameness, in the primary sense,\\nBaptism, wherein WQS marie a member of Oirist, a child\\nof God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven. A drain\\nunto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness. Ac We being\\nregenerate, and made thy children by adoption and grnc.\\n2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0385.jp2"}, "386": {"fulltext": "340 APPENDIX.\\ndoes not even necessarily imply Similarity for if we say of\\nany man that he is greatly altered since such a time, we\\nunderstand, and indeed imply by the very expression, that\\nhe is One person, though different in several qualities, else it\\nwould not be he. It is worth observing also, that Same,\\nin the secondary sense, admits, according to popular usage,\\nof degrees we speak of two things being nearly the same,\\nbut not entirely: personal indentity does not admit of\\ndegrees.\\nNothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the error of\\nRealism than inattention to this ambiguity. When several\\npersons are said to have One and the Same opinion\\nthought or idea, many men, overlooking the true simple\\nstatement of the case, which is, that they are all thinking\\nalike, look for something more abstruse and mystical, and\\nimagine there must be some One Thing, in the primary\\nsense, though not an individual, which is present at once in\\nthe mind of each of these persons and thence readily\\nsprung Plato s theory of Ideas, each of which was, according\\nto him, one real, eternal object, existing entire and complete\\nin each of the individual objects that are known by one\\nname. Hence, first in poetical mythology, and ultimately,\\nperhaps, in popular belief, Fortune, Liberty, Prudence,\\n(Minerva,) a Boundary, (Terminus,) and even the Mildew\\nof Corn, (Rubigo,) Sfc, became personified, deified, and re-\\npresented by Statues somewhat according to the process\\nwhich is described by Swift, in his humorous manner, in\\nspeaking of Zeal, (in the Tale of a Tub,) how from a\\nnotion it became a word, and from thence, in a hot summer,\\nripened into a tangible Substance. We find Seneca\\nthinking it necessary gravely to combat the position of some\\nof his Stoical predecessors, that the Cardinal Virtues\\nare Animals while the Hindoos of the present day, from\\nobserving the similar symptoms which are known by the", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0386.jp2"}, "387": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. j\\nname of Small-pox, and the communication of the like from\\none patient to another, do not merely call it (aa uc do one\\ndisease, but believe (if we may credit the accounts given\\nthat the Small-pox is a Goddess, who become incarnate\\nin each infected patient. All these absurdities are in fact\\nbut the extreme and ultimate point of Realism.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Dis-\\nsertation, Book IV. Chap. v.\\nSIN, in its ordinary acceptation, means some actual\\ntransgression, in thought, word, or deed, of the moral law,\\nor of a positive divine precept. It has also, what may\\nbe called, a theological sense, in which it is used for that\\nsinfulness or frailty, that liability, or proneness, to trans-\\ngression, which all men inherit from their first parents,\\nand which is commonly denominated original Sin in\\nwhich sense we find such expressions as in Sin hath my\\nMother conceived me. The word seems also to be still\\nfurther transferred, to signify the state of condemnation\\nitself in which the children of Adam are, by nature\\nborn, in consequence of this sinful tendency in them (or,\\naccording to some divines, in consequence of the very guilt\\nof Adam s ofTence being actually imputed to each individual\\nof his posterity.)f It must be in the sense of a state of\\ncondemnation that our Church, in her office for Infant\\nBaptism, speaks of remission of Sins, with reference to a\\nOf the degree of this depravity of our nature, various accounts are\\ngiven some representing it as amounting to a total loss of the moral\\nfaculty, or even, to a preference of evil for its own sake others making\\nit to consist in a certain undue preponderance of the lower propensities\\nover the nobler sentiments, fyc. But these Beem to bo not different x\\nto the sense of the word, (with which alone we are here concerned) but\\nas to the state of the far/.\\nt I must again remind the reader that 1 am inquiring only into tin-\\nsenses in which each word has actually been used not into the truth or\\nfalsity of each doctrine in question. On the present question, I\\non the Difficulties in St. Paul s Writing, Essay VI.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0387.jp2"}, "388": {"fulltext": "342 APPENDIX.\\nchild, which is no moral agent following the innocency\\nof children/ e. of actual Sin) being mentioned within a\\nfew sentences. And as it is plain that actual Sin cannot, in\\nthe former place, be meant, so, neither can it be, in this\\nplace, man s proneness to Sin since the baptismal office\\nwould not pray for, and hold out a promise of, release 1\\nand remission of that ^p6vr\\\\}ia oapKog which, according\\nto the Article, remains even in the regenerate.\\nThough all Theologians probably are aware of these\\ndistinctions, yet much confusion of thought has resulted\\nfrom their not being always attended to.\\nTHEREFORE.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Reason, and Why.\\nTRUTH, in the strict logical sense, applies to Propo-\\nsitions, and to nothing else and consists in the conformity\\nof the declaration made to the actual state of the case\\nagreeably to Aldrich s definition of a true proposition\\nvera est, quae quod res est dicit.\\nIt would be an advantage if the word Trueness or\\nVerity could be introduced and employed in this sense,\\nsince the word Truth is so often used to denote the true\\nProposition itself. What I tell you is the Truth the\\nTruth of what I say shall be proved the term is here used\\nin these two senses. In like manner Falsehood is often\\nopposed to Truth in both these senses being commonly\\nused to signify the quality of a false proposition. But as\\nwe have the word Falsity, which properly denotes this, I\\nhave thought it best, in a scientific treatise, always to employ\\nit for that purpose.\\nIn its etymological sense, Truth signifies that which\\nthe speaker trows, or believes to be the fact. The\\netymology of the word AAH0ES seems to be similar; de-\\nnoting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0388.jp2"}, "389": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 3\\nLie: and may be called Moral, as the other may Logical,\\nTruth. A witness therefore may comply with hi- oath to\\nspeak the Truth, though it so happen that he is mistaken\\nin some particular of his evidence, provided he is fully con-\\nvinced that the thing is as he states it.\\nTruth is not unfrequently applied, in loose and in-\\naccurate language, to arguments; where the proper ex-\\npression would be correctness, conclusiveness, or\\nvalidity.\\nTruth again, is often used in the sense of Reality.\\nPeople speak of the Truth or Falsity of facts properly\\nspeaking, they are either real or fictitious it is the state-\\nment that is true or false. The true cause of\\nany thing, is a common expression meaning that, which\\nmay with Truth be assigned as the cause. The senses of\\nFalsehood correspond.\\nTruth in the sense of reality is also opposed\\nto shadows, types, pictures, Sfc. Thus, the Law waa\\ngiven by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus\\nChrist: for the Law had only a shadow of good things\\nto come.\\nThe present is an ambiguity of which the Romanist- have\\noften availed themselves with great effect; the ambiguity\\nof the word Church (which see) lending its aid to the\\nfallacy. Even the Protestants, they say, dare not\\ndeny ours to be a TRUE CHURCH; now there can he\\nbut ONE TRUE CHURCH; (which they support l\\nthose passages of Scripture which relate to the collective\\nbody of Christians in all those several branches which also\\nare called in Scripture Churches;) ours therefore musl\\nbe the true Church; if you forsake us, you forsake the\\ntruth and the Church, and consequently shut yourself out\\nfrom the promises of the Gospel. Those who are of i\\nlogical and accurate turn of mind will easily perceive th.n", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0389.jp2"}, "390": {"fulltext": "344 APPENDIX.\\nthe sense in which the Romish Church is admitted by her\\nopponents to be a true Church, is that of reality it is a\\nreal, not a pretended Church it may be truly said to be\\na Church. The sense in which the Romanists seize the\\nconcession is, that of a Church teaching true doctrines;\\nwhich was never conceded to the Church of Rome by the\\nProtestants who hold, that a Church may err without\\nceasing to be a Church.\\nWHENCE.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 See Why, and Reason.\\nWHY As an interrogative, this word is employed\\nin three senses: piss. By what proof? (or Reason)\\nFrom what Cause? For what purpose? This last is\\ncommonly called the final cause. E. G. Why is this\\nprisoner guilty of the crime? Why does a stone fall\\nto the earth? Why did you go to London? Much\\nconfusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different\\ninquiries. See Reason.\\nN.B. As the words which follow are all of them con-\\nnected together in their significations, and as the expla-\\nnations of their ambiguities have been furnished by the\\nkindness of the Professor of Political Economy, it seemed\\nadvisable to place them by themselves, and in the order\\nin which they appeared to him most naturally to arrange\\nthemselves.\\nThe foundations of Political Economy being a few\\ngeneral propositions deduced from observation or from\\nconsciousness, and generally admitted as soon as stated, it\\nmight have been expected that there would be as little\\ndifference of opinion among Political-Economists as among", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0390.jp2"}, "391": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 345\\nMathematicians; that, being agreed in their premise*,\\nthey could not differ in their conclusions, but through some\\nerror in reasoning, so palpable as to be readily detected.\\nAnd if they had possessed a vocabulary of general terms\\nas precisely defined as the mathematical, this would pro-\\nbably have been the case. But as the terms of this Science\\nare drawn from common discourse, and seldom carefully\\ndefined by the writers who employ them, hardly one of\\nthem has any settled and invariable meaning, and their\\nambiguities are perpetually overlooked. The principal\\nterms are only seven: viz. Value, Wealth, Laboi k.\\nCapital, Rent, Wages, Profits.\\n1. VALUE. As value is the only relation with which\\nPolitical Economy is conversant, we might expect all\\nEconomists to be agreed as to its meaning. There is no\\nsubject as to which they are less agreed.\\nThe popular, and far the most convenient, use of the\\nword, is to signify the capacity of being given and received\\nin exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation. The\\nvalue of any one thing must consist in the several quantities\\nof all other things which can be obtained in exchange for\\nit, and can never remain fixed for an instant. Most writers\\nadmit the propriety of this definition at the outset, but they\\nscarcely ever adhere to it.\\nAdam Smith defines Value to mean either the utility of\\na particular object, or the power of purchasing oilier goods\\nwhich the possession of that object conveys. The first lie\\ncalls Value in use, the second Value in exchange.* 1 But\\nhe soon afterwards says, that equal quantities of labour .it all\\ntimes and places are of equal Value to the labourer, whatever\\nmay be the quantity of goods he receives in return for them\\nand that labour never varies in its own Value. It ifl dear\\nthat he affixed, or thought he had affixed, M me other", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0391.jp2"}, "392": {"fulltext": "346 APPENDIX.\\nmeaning to the word as the first of these propositions\\nis contradictory, and the second false, whichever of his two\\ndefinitions we adopt.\\nMr. Ricardo appears to set out by admitting Adam\\nSmith s definition of Value in exchange. But in the greater\\npart of his Principles of Political Economy, he uses the\\nword as synonymous with Cost and by this one ambiguity\\nhas rendered his great work a long enigma.\\nMr. Malthus* defines Value to be the power of pur-\\nchasing. In the very next page he distinguishes absolute\\nfrom relative Value, a distinction contradictory to his defini-\\ntion of the term, as expressive of a relation.\\nMr. M Cullochf distinguishes between real and ex-\\nchangeable, or relative, Value. And in his nomenclature,\\nthe exchangeable, or relative, value of a commodity consists\\nin its capacity of purchasing its real Value in the quantity\\nof labour required for its production or appropriation.\\nAll these differences appear to arise from a confusion of\\ncause and effect. Having decided that commodities are\\nValuable in proportion to the labour they have respectively\\ncost, it was natural to call that labour their Value.\\n2. WEALTH. Lord Lauderdale has defined Wealth\\nto be all that man desires. Mr. Malthus, J those\\nmaterial objects which are necessary, useful, or agreeable.\\nAdam Smith confines the term to that portion of the results\\nof land and labour which is capable of being accumulated.\\nThe French Economists, to the net product of land. Mr.\\nM Culloch\u00c2\u00a7 and M. S torch, to those material products\\nMeasure of Value, p. 1.\\nf Principles of Political Economy, Part III. sect. 1.\\nX Principles of Political Economy, page 28.\\nSupplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. VI. p. 217.\\nCours d Economie Politique, Tome I. p. 91. Paris edit.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0392.jp2"}, "393": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 317\\nwhich have exchangeable value; according to Colonel\\nTorrens* it consists of articles which possess utility and\\nare produced by some portion of voluntary effort M. Saj I\\ndivides wealth into natural and social, and applies the latter\\nterm to whatever is susceptible of exchange. It will be\\nobserved that the principal difference between these defini-\\ntions consists in the admission or rejection of the qualifi-\\ncations exchangeable, and, material.\\nIt were well if the ambiguities of this word had done\\nno more than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave\\nbirth to the mercantile system. In common language, to\\ngrow rich is to get moneij; to diminish in fortune is to lose\\nmoney: a rich man is said to have a great deal of momem\\na poor man, very little: and the terms Wealth and Money\\nare in short employed as synonymous. In consequence of\\nthese popular notions (to use the words of Adam Smith)\\nall the different nations of Europe have studied even means\\nof accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries\\nThis they have attempted by prohibiting the exportation of\\nmoney, and by giving bounties on the exportation, and im-\\nposing restrictions on the importation, of other commodities,\\nin the hope of producing what has been called a u favourable\\nbalance of trade; that is, a trade in which, the Imports\\nbeing always of less value than the exports, the difference i\u00c2\u00bb\\npaid in money. A conduct as wise as that of a tradesman\\nwho should part with his goods only for money; and instead\\nof employing their price in paying his workmen s wages, or\\nreplacing his stock, should keep it for ever in his till. The\\nattempt to force such a trade has been as vain, as the trade.\\nif it could have been obtained, would have been mischievous.\\nBut the results have been fraud, punishment, and pn\\\\ert\\\\\\nat home, and discord and war without. It has made na-\\ntions consider the Wealth of their customers ;i source of loss\\nProduction Wealth, i 1.\\nt M Train- d Economk Pol. Liv, II. Chap. ii", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0393.jp2"}, "394": {"fulltext": "348 APPENDIX.\\ninstead of profit; and an advantageous market a curse instead\\nof a blessing. By inducing them to refuse to profit by the\\npeculiar advantages in climate, soil, or industry, possessed\\ni y their neighbours, it has forced them in a great measure\\nto give up their own. It has for centuries done more,\\nand perhaps for centuries to come will do more, to retard\\nthe improvement of Europe than all other causes put to-\\ngether.\\n3. LABOUR. The word Labour signifies both the act\\nof labouring, and the result of that act. It is used in the\\nfirst sense when we talk of the wages of labour; in the\\nsecond when we talk of accumulated labour. When used\\nto express the act of labouring, it may appear to have a\\nprecise sense, but it is still subject to some ambiguity.\\nSay s definition* is, action suivie, dirigee vers un but.\\nStorch s,f Taction des facultes humaines dirigee vers un\\nbut utile. These definitions include a walk taken for the\\npurposes of health, and even the exertions of an agree-\\nable converser.\\nThe great defect of Adam Smith, and of our own eco-\\nnomists in general, is the want of definitions. There is,\\nperhaps, no definition of Labour by any British Econo-\\nmist. If Adam Smith had framed one, he would probably\\nhave struck out his celebrated distinction between pro-\\nductive and unproductive labourers; for it is difficult\\nto conceive any definition of Labour which will admit the\\nepithet unproductive to be applied to any of its sub-\\ndivisions, excepting that of misdirected labour. On the\\nother hand, if Mr. M Culloch or Mr. Mill had defined\\nLabour, they would scarcely have applied that term to the\\ngrowth of a tree, or the improvement of wine in a cellar.\\nTraite, c. Tome II. p. 506.\\nf Cours, c. Liv. I. Chap. iv.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0394.jp2"}, "395": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 349\\n4. CAPITAL. This word, as might have been expected,\\nfrom the complexity of the notions which it implies, bai\\nbeen used in very different senses.\\nIt is, as usual, undefined by Adam Smith. The general\\nmeaning which he attached to it will however appear from\\nhis enumeration of its species. He divides it* into Fixed\\nand Circulating: including in the first what the capitalist\\nretains, in the second what he parts with. Fixed Capital\\nhe subdivides into 1. Machinery; 2. Shops and other\\nbuildings used for trade or manufacture; 3. Improvements\\nof land; 4. Knowledge and skill. Circulating Capita] he\\nsubdivides into 1. Money; 2. Provisions in the hands of\\nthe provision-venders 3. Unfinished materials of manu-\\nfacture; 4. Finished work in the hands of the merchant\\nor manufacturer; such as furniture in a cabinet-maker-\\nshop, or trinkets in that of a jeweller.\\nThe following is a list of the definitions adopted by\\nsome of the most eminent subsequent economists:\\nRicardof that part of the wealth of a country which is\\nemployed in production; consisting of food, clothing, tools,\\nraw materials, machinery, c, necessary to give effect to\\nlabour.\\nMai thus X that portion of the material possessions of\\na country which is destined to be employed with a view to\\nprofit.\\nSay\u00c2\u00a7 accumulation de valeurs soustraites a la eon-\\nsomption unproductive. Chap. iii. Machinery, necessa-\\nries of the workman, materials.\\nStorch|| un fonds de richesses destine a la production\\nmaterielle.\\nBook II. Chap. i.\\nf Principles of Political Economy, 89, 3rd tdit\\nj Principles, c. p. 293.\\nTrain c.Tome EI.p W4.\\nII Cours. C Liv. II. Chap. i.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0395.jp2"}, "396": {"fulltext": "350 APPENDIX.\\nM Culloch* that portion of the produce of industry\\nwhich can be made directly available to support human\\nexistence or facilitate production.\\nMillf something produced, for the purpose of being\\nemployed as the mean towards a further production.\\nTorrensJ Those things on which labour has been\\nbestowed, and which are destined, not for the immediate\\nsupply of our wants, but to aid us in obtaining other articles\\nof utility.\\nIt is obvious that few of these definitions exactly coin-\\ncide. Adam Smith s (as implied in his use of the term\\nfor he gives no formal definition) excludes the necessaries of\\nthe labourer, when in his own possession all the rest (and\\nperhaps with better reason) admit them. On the other\\nhand, Adam Smith admits (and in that he seems to be\\nright) those things which are incapable of productive con-\\nsumption, provided they have not yet reached their con-\\nsumers. All the other definitions, except perhaps that of\\nMr. Malthus, which is ambiguous, are subject to the incon-\\nsistency of affirming that a diamond, and the gold in which\\nit is to be set, are Capital while the jeweller keeps them\\nseparate, but cease to be so when he has formed them into\\na ring; almost all of them, also, pointedly exclude know-\\nledge and skill. The most objectionable, perhaps, is that\\nof Mr. M Culloch, which, while it excludes all the finished\\ncontents of a jeweller s shop, would include a racing-stud.\\nAdam Smith, however, is far from being consistent in\\nhis use of the word thus, in the beginning of his second\\nbook he states, that all Capitals are destined for the main-\\ntenance of productive labour only. It is difficult to see\\nPrinciples, c. p. 92.\\nf Elements, c. p. 19, 3rd edit.\\nt Production of Wealth, p. 5.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0396.jp2"}, "397": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 36]\\nwhat labour is maintained by what is to be unproductive] v\\nconsumed.\\n5. RENT. 6. WAGES. 7. PROFIT.\\nAdam Smith first divided revenue into Rent, Wages,\\nand Profit; and his division has been generally followed.\\nThe following definitions will best show the degree of\\nprecision with which these three terms have been em-\\nployed.\\nAdam Smith.\\n1. Rent. What is paid for the licence to gather the\\nproduce of the land. Book I. Chap. vi.\\n2. Wages. The price of labour. Book I. Chap. v.\\n3. Profit. The revenue derived from stock by the person\\nwho manages or employs it. Book I. Chap. vi.\\nSay. (Traite cTEconomie Politique.) 4cme Edit.\\n1. Rent. Le profit resultant du service productif de la\\nterre.\u00e2\u0080\u0094 Tome II. p. 169.\\n2. Wages. Le prix de l achat d un service productif\\nindustriel. Tome II. p. 503.\\n3. Profit. La portion de la valeur produite, retiree par\\nle capitaliste. Tome I. p. 71, subdivided into interet, profit\\nindustriel, and profit capital.\\nStorch. (Cours oVEconomie Politique.) Paris, 1883.\\n1. Rent. Le prix qu on paye pour l osage dun fonds\\nde terre. Tome I. p. 354.\\n2. Wages. Le prix du travail.-\u00e2\u0080\u0094 p. 883.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0397.jp2"}, "398": {"fulltext": "352 APPENDIX.\\n3. Profit. The returns to capital are considered by\\nS torch, under the heads, rente de capital, and profit de l en-\\ntrepreneur. The first he divides into loyer, the hire of fixed\\ncapital, and interet, that of circulating capital. The second\\nhe considers as composed of, 1st, remuneration for the use\\nof capital 2d, assurance against risk 3d, remuneration for\\ntrouble. Liv. III. Chap. ii. viii. xiii.\\nSismondi. (Nouveau Principes, %c.)\\n1. Rent. La part de la recolte annuelle du sol qui\\nrevient au proprietaire apres qu il a acquitte les frais qui\\nFont fait naitre and he analyzes rent into, 1st, la compen-\\nsation du travail de la terre 2d, le prix de monopole\\n3d, la mieux valeur que le proprietaire obtient par la com-\\nparaison d une terre de nature superieure a une terre\\ninferieure 4th, le revenu des capitaux qu il a fixes lui-\\nmeme sur la terre, et ne peut plus en retirer. Tome I.\\np. 280.\\n2. Wages. Le prix du travail. p. 91.\\n3. Profit. La valeur dont l ouvrage acheve surpasse\\nles avances qui l ont fait faire. L avantage qui resulte des\\ntravaux passes. Subdivided into interet and profit mer-\\ncantile. p. 94, 359.\\nMalthtjs. {Principles, %c.)\\n1. Rent. That portion of the value of the whole pro-\\nduce of land which remains to the owner after payment of\\nall the outgoings of cultivation, including average profits\\non the capital employed. The excess of price above wages\\nand profits. p. 134.\\n2. Wages. The remuneration of the labourer for his\\npersonal exertions. p. 240.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0398.jp2"}, "399": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERM8\\n3. Profit. The difference between the value- of the\\nadvances necessary to produce a commodity, and the value\\nof the commodity when produced. p. ^f);\\nMill. (Elements, \u00c2\u00a7c.) 3rd K.I.\\n1. Rent. The difference hetween the return made to\\nthe most productive, and that which is made to the least\\nproductive portion of capital employed on the land.\\np. 33.\\n2. Wages. The price of the labourer s share of the\\ncommodity produced. p. 41.\\n3. Profit. The share of the joint produce of labour and\\nstock which is received by the owner of stock after replacing\\nthe capital consumed. The portion of the whole annual\\nproduce which remains after deducting rent and wages.\\nRemuneration for hoarded labour. Chap. ii. iii.\\nTorrens. (Corn Trade.) 3rd Ed.\\n1. Rent. That part of the produce which is given to\\nthe land-proprietor for the use of the soil. p. 130.\\n2. Wages. The articles of wealth which the labourer\\nreceives in exchange for his labour. p. 83.\\n3. Profit. The excess of value which the finished work\\npossesses above the value of the material, implements, and\\nsubsistence expended. The surplus remaining after the\\ncost of production has been replaced. Production\\nWealth, p. 53.\\nM Cullocii. (Principles, \u00c2\u00a7e.)\\n1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth\\nwhich is paid by the farmer to the landlord for the use i\\nthe natural and inherent powers of the soil. p. 065.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0399.jp2"}, "400": {"fulltext": "354 APPENDIX.\\n2. Wages. The compensation paid to labourers in re-\\nturn for their services. Essay on Rate of Wages, p. 1.\\n3. Profit. The excess of the commodities produced by\\nthe expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that\\nquantity of capital. Principles, p. 366.\\nRicardo. (Principles, Sfc.) 3rd Ed.\\n1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth\\nwhich is paid to the landlord for the use of the original\\nand indestructible powers of the soil. p. 53.\\n2. Wages. The labourer s proportion of the produce.\\nChap. v.\\n3. Profit. The capitalist s proportion of the produce.\\nChap. vi.\\nThe first observation to be made on these definitions, is,\\nthat the Rent of land, which is only a species of an exten-\\nsive genus, is used as a genus, and that its cognate species\\nare either omitted, or included under genera to which\\nthey do not properly belong. Wages and Profits are of\\nhuman creation they imply a sacrifice of ease or imme-\\ndiate enjoyment, and bear a ratio to that sacrifice which is\\nindicated by the common expressions of the rate of\\nwages, and the rate of profits: a ratio which has a\\nstrong tendency to uniformity. But there is another and\\na very large source of revenue which is not the creation of\\nman, but of nature which owes its origin, not to the will\\nof its possessor, but to accident; which implies no sacri-\\nfice, has no tendency to uniformity, and to which the term\\nrate is seldom applied. This revenue arises from the\\nexclusive right to some instrument of production, enabling\\nthe employment of a given amount of labour or capital to\\nbe more than usually productive. The principal of these", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0400.jp2"}, "401": {"fulltext": "AMBIGUOUS TERMS.\\ninstruments is land; but all extraordinary powers of body\\nor mind, all processes in manufacture which are pro-\\ntected by secrecy or by law, all peculiar advanta\\nfrom situation or connexion, in short, every instrument\\nof production which is not universally accessible, affords a\\nrevenue distinct in its origin from Wages or Profits, and\\nof which the Rent of land is only a species. In the classi-\\nfication of revenues, either Rent ought to have been\\nomitted as a genus, and considered only as an anomalous\\ninterruption of the general uniformity of wages and pro-\\nfits, or all the accidental sources of revenue ought to have\\nbeen included in one genus, of which the Rent of land\\nwould have formed the principal species.\\nAnother remark is, that almost all these definitions of\\nProfit include the wages of the labour of the Capitalist.\\nThe continental Economists have in general been aware of\\nthis, and have pointed it out in their analyses of the com-\\nponent parts of Profit. The British Economists have\\nseldom entered into this analysis, and the want of it has\\nbeen a great cause of obscurity.\\nOn the other hand, much of what properly belongs to\\nProfit and Rent is generally included under Wages. Al-\\nmost all Economists consider the members of the liberal\\nprofessions under the class of labourers. The whole sub-\\nsistence of such persons, observes Mr. M Culloch,* is de-\\nrived from Wages; and they are as evidently labourers\\nas if they handled the spade or the plough. But it h\u00c2\u00ab\u00c2\u00bbuld\\nbe considered, that those who are engaged in any occupa-\\ntion requiring more skill than that of a common husband-\\nman, must have expended capital, more or leas, OD the\\nacquisition of their skill: their education must have COS*\\nsomething in every case, from that of the handicraft\\nI rinri| lrs. fcft p. 228.\\n2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0401.jp2"}, "402": {"fulltext": "356 APPENDIX.\\napprentice, to that of the legal or medical student and\\na Profit on this outlay is of course looked for, as in other\\ndisbursements of capital and the higher profit, in propor-\\ntion to the risk vi%. the uncertainty of a man s success\\nin his business. Part, therefore, and generally far the\\ngreater part, of what has been reckoned the wages of his\\nlabour, ought more properly to be reckoned profits on the\\ncapital expended in fitting him for that particular kind\\nof labour. And again, all the excess of gains acquired\\nby one possessing extraordinary talents, opportunities, or\\npatronage (since these correspond to the possession\\nof land, of a patent-right or other monopoly, of a\\nsecret, \u00c2\u00a7c.) may be more properly regarded as Rent\\nthan as Wages.\\nAnother most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from\\nthe use of the word Wages, sometimes as expressing a\\nquantity, sometimes as expressing a proportion.\\nIn ordinary language, Wages means the amount of some\\ncommodity, generally of silver, given to the labourer in\\nreturn for a given exertion and they rise or fall, as that\\namount is increased or diminished.\\nIn the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the\\nlabourer s proportion of what is produced, supposing that\\nproduce to be divided between him and the Capitalist. In\\nthis sense they generally rise as the whole produce is dimi-\\nnished; though, if the word be used in the other sense,\\nthey generally fall. If Mr. Ricardo had constantly used\\nthe word Wages, to express a proportion, the only\\ninconvenience would have been the necessity of always\\ntranslating this expression into common language. But\\nhe is not consistent. When he says,* that whatever\\nraises the Wages of labour lowers the Profits of stock,\\nPrinciples, c. p. 312.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0402.jp2"}, "403": {"fulltext": "AMBlGUOl s i i.i; 3.\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\nhe considers Wages as a proportion. When he says,*\\nthat high Wages encourage population; lie consider!\\nwages as an amount. Even Mr. M Culloch, who hafl\\nclearly explained the ambiguity, has not escaped it. He\\nhas even suffered it to affect his reasonings. In liis\\nvaluable essay, On the Rate of Wages, f he admits thai\\nwhen Wages are high, the Capitalist has to pay a larger\\nshare of the produce of industry to his labourers. An\\nadmission utterly inconsistent with his general use of the\\nword, as expressing the amount of what the labourer\\nreceives, which, as he has himself observed, may increase\\nwhile his proportion diminishes.\\nA few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which\\nattach to the seven terms that have been selected and\\nthese terms have been fixed on, not as the most ambiguous,\\nbut as the most important, in the political nomenclature.\\nSupply and Demand, Productive and Unproductive,\\nOvertrading, and very many others, both in political\\neconomy, and in other subjects, which are often used with-\\nout any more explanation, or any more suspicion of their\\nrequiring it, than the words triangle or twenty,\\nare perhaps even more liable to ambiguities than those\\nabove treated of. But it is sufficient for the purpose of\\nthis Appendix to have noticed, by way of specimens, a\\nfew of the most remarkable terms in several different\\nbranches of knowledge, in order to show both the fre-\\nquency of an ambiguous use of language, and the im-\\nportance of clearing up such ambiguity.\\nPrinciples, a p. 83. P. 161.\\nPrinciples of Political Economy, 365.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0403.jp2"}, "404": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX.\\nNo. II.\\nMISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF\\nLEARNERS.\\nN. B. In such of the following Examples as are not in a\\nsyllogistic form, it is intended that the student should\\npractise the reduction of them into that form; those of\\nthem, that is, in which the reasoning is in itself sound:\\nviz. where it is impossible to admit the Premises and\\ndeny the Conclusion. Of such as are apparent syllo-\\ngisms, the validity must be tried by logical rules, which\\nit may be advisable to apply in the following order:\\n1st. Observe whether the argument be Categorical or\\nHypothetical recollecting that an hypothetical Premiss\\ndoes not necessarily imply an hypothetical Syllogism,\\nunless the reasoning turns on the hypothesis. If this\\nappear to be the case, the rules for hypothetical Syllo-\\ngisms must be applied. 2dly. If the argument be cate-\\ngorical, count the terms. 3dly. If only three, observe\\nwhether the Middle be distributed. 4thly. Observe\\nwhether the Premises are both negative (i. e. really,\\nand not in appearance only,) and if one is, whether the\\nConclusion be negative also or affirmative, if both\\nPremises affirmative. 5thly. Observe what terms are\\ndistributed in the Conclusion, and whether the same are", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0404.jp2"}, "405": {"fulltext": "EXAMPL]\\ndistributed in the Premises. 6thly. If the Syllogism ii\\nnot a Categorical in the first Figure, reduce it to thai\\nform.\\n1. No one is free who is enslaved bj bis appetito\\nsensualist is enslaved by his appetites therefore a sen-\\nsualist is not free.\\nNone but Whites are civilized: the ancient Germans\\nwere Whites therefore they were civilized\\n3. None but Whites are civilzed: the Hindoos are not\\nWliites therefore they are not civilized.\\n4. None but civilized people are Whites: the Gauls were\\nWhites therefore they were civilized.\\n5. No one is rich who has not enough: no miser has\\nenough therefore no miser is rich.\\nG. If penal laws against Papists were enforced, they\\nwould be aggrieved: but penal laws against them are not\\nenforced therefore the Papists are not aggrieved.\\n7. If all testimony to miracles is to be admitted, the\\npopish legends are to be believed: but the popish legends\\nare not to be believed: therefore no testimony to miracles\\nis to be admitted.\\n8. Ifmenarenot likely to be influenced in the perform-\\nance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform it, the\\noaths commonly administered are superfluous: if they are\\nlikely to be so influenced, every one should be made to\\ntake an oath to behave rightly throughout his lite; but one\\nor the other of these must be the case: therefore either the\\noaths commonly administered are superfluous, or ever)\\nman- should be made to take an oath to behave rightly\\nthroughout bis life.\\n9. The Scriptures must be admitted to be agreeable to\\ntruth; and the Church of England 18 roinfonnable to the\\nScriptures: A. B. is a divine of the Church of England;", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0405.jp2"}, "406": {"fulltext": "360 APPENDIX.\\nand this opinion is in accordance with his sentiments there-\\nfore it must be presumed to be true.\\n10. Enoch (according to the testimony of Scripture)\\npleased God but without faith it is impossible to please\\nHim (for he that cometh to God must believe that He\\nis, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek\\nHim): therefore, $c.\\n11. If Abraham were justified by works, then had he\\nwhereof to glory [before God:] but not [any one can have whereof\\nto glory] before God; therefore Abraham was not justified\\nby works.\\n12. He that is of God heareth my words ye therefore\\nhear them not, because ye are not of God.\\n13. Few treatises of science convey important truths,\\nwithout any intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and\\ninteresting form and therefore, though a treatise would\\ndeserve much attention which should possess such excel-\\nlence, it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve\\nmuch attention.\\n14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for\\nreligious duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory\\non us but we are bound to set apart one day in seven for\\nreligious duties and hence it appears that the fourth com-\\nmandment is obligatory on us.\\n15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference\\nto the divine institution of sacrifices one of the precepts\\ndelivered to Noah was abstinence from the eating of blood\\ntherefore one of the precepts delivered to Noah contained\\nthe divine institution of sacrifices.\\n16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed be-\\nfore the Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not of\\nceremonial sin (which could not then exist), but of moral\\nsin if so, the Levitical sacrifices must have had no less\\nefficacy and in that case, the atonements under the Mosaic", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0406.jp2"}, "407": {"fulltext": "EXAMPLES. 36]\\nlaw would have made the comers thereunto perfect\\npertaining to the conscience; but this waa not the case:\\ntherefore, cjjc [Davison on Prophecy.]\\n17. The adoration of images is forbidden to Christians,\\nif we suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israel-\\nites alone, but for all men: it was designed, however, for\\nthe Israelites alone, and not for all men: therefore the ado-\\nration of images is not forbidden to Christians.\\n18. A desire to gain by another s loss is a violation of\\nthe tenth commandment: all gaming, therefore, since it\\nimplies a desire to profit at the expense of another, involves\\na breach of the tenth commandment.\\n19. All the fish that the net enclosed were an indiscri-\\nminate mixture of various kinds those that were set aside\\nand saved as valuable, were fish that the net enclosed\\ntherefore those that were set aside, and saved as valuable,\\nwere an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds.\\n20. All the elect are finally saved such persons as are\\narbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the\\ndivine decree are the elect therefore such persons as are\\narbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the\\ndivine decree, are finally saved. [The opponents of this Conclusion\\ngenerally deny the Minor Premiss and admit the Major; the reverse would\\nbe the more sound and the more effectual objection.]\\n21. No one who lives with another on terms of confi-\\ndence is justified, on any pretence, in killing him: Brutus\\nlived on terms of confidence with Caesar: therefore he was\\nnot justified, on the pretence he pleaded, in killing him.\\n22. He that destroys a man who usurp despotic power\\nin a free country deserves well of his countrymen: Brutus\\ndestroyed Cajsar, who usurped despotic power in Rome:\\ntherefore he deserved well of the Romans.\\n23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is volimt.in virtue i\\nvoluntary: therefore so i vice. [Arte. Eth. B, iii.J", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0407.jp2"}, "408": {"fulltext": "362 APPENDIX.\\n24. A wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards\\nand punishments of a future state, or must be able to\\nappeal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing them\\nregularly in this life Moses did not do the former there-\\nfore he must have done the latter.\\n25. Nothing which is of less frequent occurrence than\\nthe falsity of testimony can be fairly established by testi-\\nmony: any extraordinary and unusual fact is a thing of\\nless frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony\\n(that being very common) therefore no extraordinary\\nand unusual fact can be fairly established by testi-\\nmony.\\n26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very likely\\nto be false the evidence on which most men believe that\\nthere are pyramids in Egypt is testimony: therefore the\\nevidence on which most men believe that there are pyra-\\nmids in Egypt is very likely to be false.\\n27. The religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans was\\na tissue of extravagant fables and groundless superstitions,\\ncredited by the vulgar and the weak, and maintained by\\nthe more enlightened, from selfish or political views the\\nsame was clearly the case with the religion of the Egyp-\\ntians: the same may be said of the Brahminical worship\\nof India, and the religion of Fo, professed by the Chinese\\nthe same, of the romantic mythological system of the Pe-\\nruvians, of the stern and bloody rites of the Mexicans, and\\nthose of the Britons and of the Saxons hence we may\\nconclude that all systems of religion, however varied in\\ncircumstances, agree in being superstitions^kept up among\\nthe vulgar, from interested or political vilws in the more\\nenlightened classes. [See Dissertation, Chap i. 2. p. 234.]\\n28. No man can possess power to perform impossibilities\\na miracle is an impossibility therefore no man can possess\\npower to perform a miracle. [See Appendix, p. 299.]", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0408.jp2"}, "409": {"fulltext": "EXAMPLES. 363\\n29. A. B. and C. I), arc each erf them equal to L. I\\ntherefore they are equal to each other,\\n30. Protection from punishment la plainly due to the\\ninnocent: therefore, as you maintain thai this person ought\\nnot to be punished, it appears that you arc convinced of hi s\\ninnocence.\\n31. All the most bitter persecutions have been religious\\npersecutions-i among the most bitter persecution- were\\nthose which occurred in France during the revolution:\\ntherefore they must have been religious persecutions.\\n32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does,\\nhas neither merit nor demerit in his action: a liberal and\\nbenevolent man cannot possibly act otherwise than he\\ndoes in relieving the poor therefore such a man has\\nneither merit nor demerit in his action. [See Appendix, pp.\\n314, 315.]\\n33. What happens every day is not improbable some\\nthings against which the chances are many thousands to\\none, happen every day: therefore some things against\\nwhich the chances are many thousands to one, are not\\nimprobable.\\n34. The early and general assignment of the Epistle to\\nthe Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either\\nfrom its professing to be his, and containing his name, or\\nfrom its really being his; since, therefore, the former of\\nthese is not the fact, the Epistle must be Paul s.\\n35. With some of them God was not well pleased for\\nthey were overthrown in the wilderness.\\n36. A sensualist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratifications\\nwithout satiety: it is impossible to enjoy perpetual grati-\\nfications without satiety: therefore it is impossible for I\\nsensualist to obtain his wish.\\n37. If Paley s system is to be received, one who has DO\\nknowledge of a future state has no means of QWtinguishing", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0409.jp2"}, "410": {"fulltext": "364 APPENDIX.\\nvirtue and vice now one who has no means of distinguish-\\ning virtue and vice can commit no sin therefore, if Paley s\\nsystem is to be received, one who has no knowledge of a\\nfuture state can commit no sin.\\n38. The principles of justice are variable the appoint-\\nments of nature are invariable therefore the principles of\\njustice are no appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. v.]\\n39. Every one desires happiness virtue is happiness\\ntherefore every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. iii.]\\n40. A story is not to be believed, the reporters of which\\ngive contradictory accounts of it the story of the life and\\nexploits of Buonaparte is of this description: therefore it is\\nnot to be believed. [Fide Elements, p. 28.]\\n41. When the observance of the first day of the week as\\na religious festival in commemoration of Christ s resurrec-\\ntion, was first introduced, it must have been a novelty:\\nwhen it was a novelty, it must have attracted notice when\\nit attracted notice, it would lead to inquiry respecting the\\ntruth of the resurrection when it led to this inquiry, it\\nmust have exposed the story as an imposture, supposing\\nit not attested by living witnesses therefore, when the ob-\\nservance of the first day of the week, $c. was first introduced,\\nit must have exposed as an imposture the story of the re-\\nsurrection, supposing it not attested by living witnesses.\\n42. All the miracles of Jesus would fill more books than\\nthe world could contain the things related by the Evangelists\\nare the miracles of Jesus therefore the things related by\\nthe Evangelists would fill more books than the world could\\ncontain.\\n43. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been\\nwritten without knowledge of the events of the time of\\nChrist, they could not correspond with them exactly and\\nif they had been forged by Christians, they would not\\nbe preserved and acknowledged by the Jews they are", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0410.jp2"}, "411": {"fulltext": "EXAMPLES 3(51\\npreserved and acknowledged by the Jews, and they corre-\\nspond exactly with the events of the time of Christ: there-\\nfore they were neither written without knowledge of those\\nevents, nor were forged by Christians,\\n44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred: occasional\\nturbulence, therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism,\\nis to be preferred to it.\\n45. According to theologians, a man must possess faith\\nin order to be acceptable to the Deity: now he who be-\\nlieves all the fables of the Hindoo mythology must possess\\nfaith: therefore such an one must, according to theologians,\\nbe acceptable to the Deity.\\n46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been either\\nby faith or by works: now he was not justified by faith,\\n(according to St. James,) nor by works (according to St.\\nPaul): therefore Abraham was not justified.\\n47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it:\\nall punishment is an evil therefore no punishment should\\nbe allowed that good may come of it.\\n48. Repentance is a good thing wicked men abound in\\nrepentance [Arist. Eth. B. ix.]: therefore wicked men abound\\nin what is good.\\n49. A person infected with the plague will (probably)\\ndie [suppose three in five of the infected die]: this man i- pro-\\nbably) infected with the plague [suppose it an even ehai\\ntherefore he will (probably) die. [Query, what u tin- amount off\\nthis prohahility Again, suppose the probability of the major to In- (in\\nof -5-) i, and of the minor, (instead of to be What will In tin\\nprohahility of the conclusion?]\\n50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has\\nbeen accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the\\ncondition of a slave many of the negroes, however, may\\nbe happy in the condition of slaves, because they I\\nnever been accustomed to enjoy liberty.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0411.jp2"}, "412": {"fulltext": "366 APPENDIX.\\n51. Whatever is dictated by Nature is allowable: de-\\nvotedness to the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that\\nof gain in old age, are dictated by Nature [Arist Rhet. B. a.]\\ntherefore they are allowable.\\n52. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that\\nperson s greatest good a virtuous man seeks the greatest\\ngood for himself: therefore a virtuous man is the greatest\\nlover of himself. [Arist. Eth. B. ix.]\\n53. He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action,\\nexercises no self-denial in the practice of that action: a\\ngood man has a confirmed habit of Virtue: therefore he\\nwho exercises self-denial in the practice of Virtue is not a\\ngood man. [Arist. Eth. B. in]\\n54. That man is independent of the caprices of Fortune\\nwho places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual\\nexcellence a true philosopher is independent of the ca-\\nprices of Fortune therefore a true philosopher is one who\\nplaces his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excel-\\nlence.\\n55. A system of government which extends to those ac-\\ntions that are performed secretly, must be one which refers\\neither to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the\\nrewards and punishments of another world every perfect\\nsystem of government must extend to those actions which\\nare performed secretly no system of government there-\\nfore can be perfect, which does not refer either to a regular\\ndivine providence in this life, or to the rewards and punish-\\nments of another world. [Warburton s Divine Legation.]\\n56. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds\\nby diligent study, the incitement of academical honours is\\nunnecessary and it is ineffectual, for the idle, and such as\\nare indifferent to mental improvement: therefore the in-\\ncitement of academical honours is either unnecessary or\\nineffectual.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0412.jp2"}, "413": {"fulltext": "EXAMPLES. 3g7\\n57. He who is properly called an actor, does oof en-\\ndeavour to make his hearers believe that the BentimentB he\\nexpresses and the feelings he exhibits, are reall\\\\ his own:\\na barrister does this: therefore he is not properly to be\\ncalled an actor.\\n58. He who bears arms at the command of the m\\ntrate does what is lawful for a Christian the Swiss in the\\nFrench service, and the British in the American service,\\nbore arms at the command of the magistrate: therefore\\nthey did what was lawful for a, Christian.\\n59. If Lord Bacon is right, it is improper to stock a new-\\ncolony with the refuse of Jails: but this we must allow not\\nto be improper, if our method of colonizing New South\\nWales be a wise one if this be wise, therefore, Lord\\nBacon is not right.\\n60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aris-\\ntotle is to be regarded as infallible: but he is not: Logic\\ntherefore is not worthy of being cultivated.\\n61. All studies are useful which tend to advance a man\\nin life, or to increase national and private wealth: but the\\ncourse of studies pursued at Oxford has no such tendency\\ntherefore it is not useful.\\n62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed,\\ntends to heighten in others the dread of undergoing the\\nsame fate, it may be expected that those soldiers who have\\nseen the most service, should have the most dread of death\\nin battle: but the reverse of this is the case: therefore the\\nformer is not to be believed.\\n63. If the everlasting favour of God i not bestowed at\\nrandom, and on no principle at all, it must bo bestowed\\neither with respect to men s persons, or with reaped to\\ntheir conduct: but God is no respecter of persons M\\ntherefore his favour musl be bestowed with reaped t\u00c2\u00ab\u00c2\u00bb\\nmen s conduct. [Sumner i Apostolical Preach", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0413.jp2"}, "414": {"fulltext": "368 APPENDIX.\\n64. If transportation is not felt as a severe punishment,\\nit is in itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime if it is\\nso felt, much of its severity is wasted, from its taking\\nplace at too great a distance to affect the feelings, or even\\ncome to the knowledge, of most of those whom it is de-\\nsigned to deter but one or other of these must be the\\ncase: therefore transportation is not calculated to answer\\nthe purpose of preventing crime.\\n65. War is productive of evil: therefore peace is likely\\nto be productive of good.\\n66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other per-\\nceptible purpose but to gratify the sight: many flowers\\nhave great beauty and many of them accordingly answer\\nno other purpose but to gratify the sight.\\n67. A man who deliberately devotes himself to a life of\\nsensuality is deserving of strong reprobation: but those\\ndo not deliberately devote themselves to a life of sensu-\\nality who are hurried into excess by the impulse of the\\npassions such therefore as are hurried into excess by the\\nimpulse of the passions are not deserving of strong repro-\\nbation. [Arist. Eth. B. vii.]\\n68. It is a difficult task to restrain all inordinate desires:\\nto conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a restraint\\nof all inordinate desires therefore it is a difficult task to\\nconform to the precepts of Scripture.\\n69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemn-\\ning a book without reading it: some Reviewers do not\\nrefrain from this therefore some Reviewers are not\\ncandid.\\n70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a\\nchange of established laws, no laws could reasonably be\\nmaintained: but some laws can reasonably be maintained:\\ntherefore no objection that can be urged will justify a change\\nof established laws.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0414.jp2"}, "415": {"fulltext": "i:x implbs. 369\\n71. If any complete tlieory could be framed, to explain\\nthe establishment of Christianity by Daman causes, Bucfa a\\ntheory would have been proposed before now but none\\nsuch ever has been proposed therefore no such theory can\\nbe framed.\\n72. He who is content with what he lias, La truly rich\\na covetous man is not content with what he has: no covet-\\nous man therefore is truly rich.\\n73. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the cir-\\ncumstances of such an event as could not be conjectured by\\nnatural reason this is the case with the prophecies of the\\nMessiah contained in the Old Testament therefore these\\nare true prophecies.\\n74. The connection of soul and body cannot be compre-\\nhended or explained; but it must be believed: therefore\\nsomething must be believed which cannot be comprehended\\nor explained.\\n75. Lias lies above Red Sandstone Red Sandstone lies\\nabove Coal therefore Lias lies above Coal.\\n76. Cloven feet belonging universally to horned animals,\\nwe may conclude that this fossil animal, since it appears to\\nhave had cloven feet, was horned.\\n77. All that glitters is not gold tinsel glitters therefore\\nit is not gold.\\n78. A negro is a man therefore he who murders a negro\\nmurders a man.\\n79. Meat and Drink are necessaries of lite die reve-\\nnues of Vitellius were spent on Meat and Drink: then-\\nfore the revenues of Vitellius were spent on the necc oaari cg\\nof life.\\n80. Nothing is heavier than Platina feathers are heavier\\nthan Nothing: therefore feathers are heavier than Platina.\\n81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother;\\nshe governed her husband: he governed Athena; Aih.\\nI) 15", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0415.jp2"}, "416": {"fulltext": "370 APPENDIX.\\nGreece and Greece, the world therefore the child of\\nThemistocles governed the world.\\n82. He who calls you a man speaks truly he who calls\\nyou a fool, calls you a man therefore he who calls you a\\nfool speaks truly.\\n83. Warm countries alone produce wines: Spain is a\\nwarm country: therefore Spain produces wines.\\n84. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to\\nfreeze Quicksilver: the climate of Siberia is sufficient to\\nfreeze Quicksilver therefore the climate of Siberia is\\nintensely cold.\\n85. Mistleto of the oak is a vegetable excrescence which\\nis not a plant and every vegetable excrescence which is not\\na plant, is possessed of magical virtues therefore Mistleto\\nof the oak is possessed of magical virtues.\\n86. If the hour-hand of a clock be any distance (suppose\\na foot) before the minute-hand, this last, though moving\\ntwelve times faster, can never overtake the other for while\\nthe minute-hand is moving over those twelve inches, the\\nhour-hand will have moved over one inch so that they\\nwill then be an inch apart; and while the minute-hand is\\nmoving over that one inch, the hour-hand will have moved\\nover y? inch, so that it will still be a-head; and again,\\nwhile the minute-hand is passing over that space of T T inch,\\nwhich now divides them, the hour-hand will pass over -j-\u00e2\u0080\u0094\\ninch; so that it will still be a-head, though the distance\\nbetween the two is diminished; $*c. fyc. $*c., and thus it is\\nplain we may go on for ever therefore the minute-hand can\\nnever overtake the hour-hand. [This is one of the sophistical\\npuzzles noticed by Aldrich (the moving bodies being Achilles and a Tortoise;)\\nbut he is not happy in his attempt at a solution. He proposes to remove the\\ndifficulty by demonstrating that, in a certain given time, Achilles would over-\\ntake the Tortoise as if any one had ever doubted that. The very problem\\nproposed is to surmount the difficulty of a seeming demonstration of a thing\\npalpably impossible to show that it is palpably impossible, is no solution of\\nthe problem.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0416.jp2"}, "417": {"fulltext": "EXAMPLES. 371\\nI have heard the present example adduced M a proof that th,\\nof Logic are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect logical demomtrmtioa\\nmay lead from true premises to an absurd conclusion. The rev\\ntruth: the example before us furnishes a confirmation of the utility of an\\nacquaintance with the syllogistic form in which form the pretended demon-\\nstration in question cannot possibly be exhibited. An attempt to do so will\\nevince the utter want of connection between the premises and the con-\\nclusion.]\\n87. Theft is a crime theft was encouraged by the laws of\\nSparta therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged crime.\\n88. Every hen comes from an egg: every egg comes from\\na hen therefore every egg comes from an egg.\\n89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn therefore the son of\\nJupiter was the grandson of Saturn.\\n90. All cold is to be expelled by heat this person s dis-\\norder is a cold: therefore it is to be expelled by heat.\\n91. Wine is a stimulant: therefore in a case where stimu-\\nlants are hurtful, wine is hurtful.\\n92. Opium is a poison but physicians advise some of\\ntheir patients to take Opium therefore physicians advise\\nsome of their patients to take poison.\\n93. What we eat grew in the fields loaves of bread zrc\\nwhat we eat therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields.\\n94. Animal-food may be entirely dispensed with (as is\\nshown by the practice of the Brahmins and of some monk-\\nand vegetable-food may be entirely dispensed with (as is\\nplain from the example of the Esquimaux and others;) but\\nall food consists of animal-food and vegetable-food: there-\\nfore all food may be dispensed with.\\n95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it a\\nmining speculation is no trifling business therefore a min-\\ning speculation will enrich those engaged in it.\\n96. He who is most hungry eats most he who rat- least\\nis most hungry: therefore he who eats hast eats DDOft\\n[See Aldrich s Compendium: Fallacia? where tbil i rightly id\\n97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in\\nB B 2", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0417.jp2"}, "418": {"fulltext": "372 APPENDIX.\\nthe place where it is, or in a place where it is not neither\\nof these is possible therefore there is no such thing as\\nmotion. [In this instance, as well as in the one lately noticed, Aldrich\\nmistakes the character of the difficulty which is, not to prove the truth of\\nthat which is self-evident, but to explain an apparent demonstration militat-\\ning against that which nevertheless no one ever doubted. He says in this\\ncase, solvitur ambulando; but (pace tanti viri) this is no solution at all,\\nbut is the very thing which constitutes the difficulty in question for it is\\nprecisely because we know the possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of\\nits impossibility produces perplexity. See Introduction, p. 4.]\\n98. All vegetables grow most in the increase of the\\nmoon hair is a vegetable therefore hair grows most in\\nthe increase of the moon.\\n99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to\\nthe improvement of the mind all the works of the most\\ncelebrated ancients are among the studies pursued at Ox-\\nford therefore some of the works of the most celebrated\\nancients conduce to the improvement of the mind.\\n100. Some poisons are vegetable no poisons are use-\\nful drugs therefore some useful drugs are not vegetable.\\n101. A theory will speedily be exploded, if false, which\\nappeals to the evidence of observation and experiment:\\nCraniology appeals to this evidence therefore, if Cranio-\\nlogy be a false theory, it will speedily be exploded. [Let\\nthe probability of one of these premises be 7 and of the other Query.\\nWhat is the probability of the conclusion\\n102. Wilkes was a favourite with the populace he who\\nis a favourite with the populace must understand how to\\nmanage them; he who understands how to manage them,\\nmust be well acquainted with their character: he who\\nis well acquainted with their character, must hold them in\\ncontempt: therefore Wilkes must have held the populace\\nin contempt.\\n103. To discover whether man has any moral sense, he\\nshould be viewed in that state in which all his faculties", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0418.jp2"}, "419": {"fulltext": "EXAMPLLS. 373\\nare most fully developed; the civilized state is thai in\\nwhich all man s faculties are most fully developed there-\\nfore, to discover whether man has any moral sense, he\\nshould be viewed in a civilized state.\\n104. Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, \u00c2\u00a7c. have\\nbeen countenanced by public opinion in several coun-\\ntries all the crimes we know of are Revenge, Robbery,\\nAdultery, Infanticide, Sfc. therefore, all the crimes we\\nknow of have been countenanced by public opinion in\\nseveral countries.\\n105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who\\nare not well qualified to perform their part. None but\\nveterans are well qualified to perform their part. None\\nbut veterans should be brought into the field.\\n106. A monopoly of the sugar-refining business is bene-\\nficial to sugar-refiners: and of the corn-trade to corn-\\ngrowers and of the silk-manufacture to silk-weavers,\\n8fc. Sfc. and thus each class of men are benefited by some\\nrestrictions. Now all these classes of men make up the\\nwhole community: therefore a system of restrictions is\\nbeneficial to the community. Chap. iii. 11.]\\n107. There are two kinds of things which we ought\\nnot to fret about: what we can help, and what we cannot.\\n[To be stated as a Dilemma.]", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0419.jp2"}, "420": {"fulltext": "APPENDIX.\\nNo. III.\\nPRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.\\nSome have expressed much contempt for the mode in\\nwhich Logic is usually taught, and in which students are\\nexamined in it, as comprising no more than a mere enu-\\nmeration of technical rules, and perhaps an application of\\nthem to the simplest examples, exhibited in a form already\\nsyllogistic, or nearly so. That such a description, if in-\\ntended to be universal, is not correct, I am perfectly certain;\\nthough, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition of Logic\\nfrom all candidates for a Degree, has confined both lectures\\nand examinations, in a greater degree than is desirable, to\\nthis elementary character. But the student who wishes to\\nacquire, and to show that he has acquired, not only the\\nelementary rules, but a facility of applying them in prac-\\ntice, should proceed from the study of such examples as\\nthe foregoing, to exercise himself in analysing logically,\\naccording to the rules here given, and somewhat in the\\nmanner of the subjoined specimen, some of Euclid s de-\\nmonstrations, various portions of Aristotle s Works, the\\nopening of Warburton s Divine Legation, (which ex-\\nhibits the arguments in a form very nearly syllogistic)\\nseveral parts of Chillingworth s Defence of Protestantism,\\nthe concluding part of Paley s Horae Paulihae, Leslie s\\nMethod with the Deists, various portions of A. Smith s\\nWealth of Nations, and other argumentative Works on\\nthe most dissimilar subjects. The latter part of 1.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0420.jp2"}, "421": {"fulltext": "PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 375\\nChap. V. of the Dissertation on the Province of K\\ning, will furnish a convenient suhject of a short analysis.\\nA student who should prepare himself, in this manner,\\nin one or more such books, and present himself for thit\\nkind of examination in them, would furnish a good tesl\\nfor ascertaining his proficiency in practical Logic.\\nAs the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after they\\nhave been exhibited at full length in the bare elemental)\\nform, it may be useful to subjoin some remarks on the\\nmode of analysing and reducing to that form, any train of\\nargument that maybe presented to us: since this must in\\ngeneral be the first step taken in an attempt to apply logical\\nrules.\\nFirst then, of whatever length the reasoning may be,\\nwhether treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin witli the\\nconcluding assertion; not necessarily the last sentence\\nexpressed, but the last point established; and this whe-\\nther it be formally enunciated, or left to be understood.\\nThen, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe on what\\nground that assertion is made. The assertion will be\\nyour Conclusion; the ground on which it rests, your Pre-\\nmises. The whole Syllogism thus obtained may he tried\\nby the rules of Logic.\\nIf no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed t\\ntake the premises separately, and pursue with each the same\\nplan as with the conclusion you first Mated. A premiss\\nmust have been used as such, either because it required no\\nproof, or because it had been proved. If it have Q0( been\\nproved, consider whether it be so selt -c\\\\ideni a- to have\\nneeded no proof. If it have been proved, ?0U must regard\\nThese directions are, in substance, and nearly, in rtracted\\nfrom the Preface to Hinds i abridged [ntrodus^on i\u00c2\u00ab I", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0421.jp2"}, "422": {"fulltext": "376 APPENDIX.\\nit as a conclusion derived from other assertions which are\\npremises to it: so that the process with which you set\\nout will be repeated viz. to observe on what grounds the\\nassertion rests, to state these as premises, and to apply\\nthe proper rules to the syllogism thus obtained. Having\\nsatisfied yourself of the correctness of this, proceed, as\\nbefore, to state its premises, if needful, as conclusions de-\\nrived from other assertions. And thus the analysis will\\ngo on (if the whole chain of argument be correct) till you\\narrive at the premises with which the whole commences;\\nwhich of course should be assertions requiring no proof,\\nor, if the chain be any where faulty, the analysis will pro-\\nceed till you come to some proposition, either assumed as\\nself-evident, though requiring proof, or incorrectly deduced\\nfrom other assertions.*\\nIt will often happen that the same assertion will have\\nbeen proved by many different arguments and then, the\\ninquiry into the truth of the premises will branch out ac-\\ncordingly. In mathematical or other demonstrative rea-\\nMany students probably will find it a very clear and convenient\\nmode of exhibiting the logical analysis of a course of argument, to draw it\\nout in the form of a Tree, or Logical Division thus,\\n[Ultimate Conclusion.]\\nZ is X,\\nproved by\\nYisX,\\nproved\\nby\\nZis Y,\\nproved by\\nAisY,\\n[suppose\\nadmitted.]\\nZis A,\\nproved by\\nc.\\nthe argument that\\nB is X, Y is B\\nc. c.\\nana by\\nargument\\nCisX,\\nc.\\nthe\\nthat\\nYisjCT\\nc.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0422.jp2"}, "423": {"fulltext": "PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 377\\nsoning, this will of course never take place, since absolute\\ncertainty admits of no increase: and if, Bfl ia often the\\ncase, the same truth admits of several different demonstra-\\ntions, we select the simplest and clearest, and discard the\\nrest. But in probable reasoning there is often a Cumula-\\ntion of arguments, each proving the same conclusion r.\\neach proving it to be probable. In such cases therefore\\nyou will have first to try each argument separately; and\\nshould each of them establish the conclusion as in some\\ndegree probable, you will then have to calculate the aggre-\\ngate probability.\\nIn this calculation Logic only so far assists as it enables\\nus to place the several items of probability in the most\\nconvenient form. As the degree of probability of each\\nproposition that is assumed, is a point to be determined\\nby the reasoner s own sagacity and experience as to the\\nmatter in hand, so, the degree of probability of each con-\\nclusion, (given, that of each of its premises,) and also\\nthe collective probability resulting from several different\\narguments all tending to the same conclusion, is an arith-\\nmetical question. But the assistance afforded by logical\\nrules in clearly stating the several items so as to prepare\\nthe way for the other operations, will not be thought tightly\\nof by any who have observed the confusion of thought and\\nthe fallacy, which have often been introduced through the\\nwant of such a statement.\\nExample of Analysis applied to the first part of Pah-fs\\nEvidences.\\nThe ultimate Conclusion, that The Christian Religion\\ncame from God is made to rest (afl fa- a- the direct\\nhistorical evidence is concerned) on these two preim\\nSet- Fallacies, J I I. near the end.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0423.jp2"}, "424": {"fulltext": "378 APPENDIX.\\nThat A Religion attested by Miracles, is from God;\\nand that The Christian Religion is so attested.\\nOf these two premises, it should be remarked, the Minor\\nseems to have been admitted, while the Major was denied,\\nby the unbelievers of old whereas at present the case\\nis reversed.*\\nPaley s argument therefore goes to establish the Minor\\npremiss, about which alone, in these days, there is likely\\nto be any question.\\nHe states with this view, two propositions viz.\\nProp. I. That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, pro-\\nfessing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed\\ntheir lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily under-\\ngone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely\\nin consequence of their belief of those accounts and that they\\nalso submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct.\\nProp. II. That there is not satisfactory evidence, that\\npersons pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar\\nmiracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the\\naccounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of\\ntheir belief of the truth of those accounts.\\nOf these two propositions the latter, it will easily be\\nperceived, is the Major premiss, stated as the converse by\\nIt is clear from the fragments remaining of the ancient arguments\\nagainst Christianity, and the allusions to them in Christian writers, and\\nalso from the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus which are still extant,\\nthat the original opponents of Christianity admitted that miracles were\\nwrought, but denied that they proved the divine origin of the religion,\\nand attributed them to Magic. This concession, in persons living so\\nmuch nearer to the times assigned to the miracles, should be noticed as\\nan important evidence for, credulous as men were in those days respect-\\ning magic, they would hardly have resorted to this explanation, unless\\nsome, at least plausible, evidence for the miracles had been adduced.\\nAnd they could not but be sensible that to prove (had that been possible)\\nthe pretended miracles to be impostures, would have been the most deci-\\nsive course since that would at once have disproved the religion.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0424.jp2"}, "425": {"fulltext": "PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.\\nNegation (Book II. Chap. ii. of a universal aflinuaiiu- j\\nthe former proposition is the Minor.\\nAs a Syllogism in Barbara therefore, the whole will stand\\nthus\\nAll miracles attested by such and such evidence, are worthy\\nof credit: (byconversion, none which are not worthy of credit\\nare so attested.\\nThe Christian miracles are attested by such and such evi-\\ndence Therefore they are worthy of credit.\\nThe Minor premiss is first proved by being taken afl\\nseveral distinct ones, each of which is separately esta-\\nblished. See Book II. Chap. iv. 1.\\nI. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity\\nsuffered; by showing\\n1st. A priori, from the nature of the case, that they were\\nlikely to suffer: [because they were preachers -t a\\nreligion unexpected and unwelcome: 1. to the Jews;\\nand 2. to Gentiles.]\\n2d. From profane testimony.\\n3d. From the testimony of Christian writings. [And\\nhere comes in the proof of one of the premise- of\\nthis last argument; viz. the proof of the credibility,\\nas to this point at least, of the Christian Writings.]\\nThese arguments are cumulative i. c. each separately\\ngoes to establish the probability of the one common conclu-\\nsion, that the first propagators of Christianity suffered\\nBy similar arguments it is shown that their sufferings\\nwere such as they voluntarily exposed themselves to.\\nII. It is proved that What they Buffered for was\\nmiraculous story by\\n1st. The nature of the ease They could have had nothing\\nbut miracles on which to rest the claim- of the \\\\w\\\\\\\\\\nreligion.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0425.jp2"}, "426": {"fulltext": "380 APPENDIX.\\n2d. By allusions to miracles, particularly to the Resur-\\nrection, both in Christian and in Profane Writers, as\\nthe evidence on which the religion rested.\\nThe same course of argument goes to show that the\\nmiracles in attestation of which they suffered were such as\\nthey professed to have witnessed.\\nThese arguments again are cumulative.\\nIII. It is proved that The miracles thus attested are what\\nwe call the Christian miracles in other words, that the\\nstory was, in the main, that which we have now in the\\nChristian Scriptures by\\n1st. The nature of the case viz. that it is improbable\\nthe original story should have completely died away,\\nand a substantially new one have occupied its place\\n2d. by The incidental allusions of ancient writers, both\\nChristian and profane, to accounts agreeing with those\\nof our Scriptures, as the ones then received\\n3d. by The credibility of our Historical Scriptures This\\nis established by several distinct arguments, each sepa-\\nrately tending to show that these books were, from the\\nearliest ages of Christianity, well known and carefully\\npreserved among Christians viz.\\ni. They were quoted by ancient Christian writers,\\nii. with peculiar respect.\\niii. Collected into a distinct volume^ and\\niv. distinguished by appropriate names and titles of\\nrespect.\\nv. Publicly read and expounded, and\\nvi. had connnentaries, fyc. written on them:\\n\u00c2\u00a7vii. Were received by Christians of different sects;\\nSfc. 8{c*\\nFor some important remarks respecting the different ways in which\\nthis part of the argument is presented to different persons, See Hinds\\non Inspiration, p. 30 46.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0426.jp2"}, "427": {"fulltext": "PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANAL!\\nThe latter part of the first main proposition, bra\\ninto two; viz. 1st, that the early Christian, submitted to\\nnew rules of conduct; 2d, that they did so, in cons*\\nof their belief in miracles wrought before them.\\nEach of these is established in various parts of the above\\ncourse of argument, and by similar premta the\\nnature of the case,\u00e2\u0080\u0094 the accounts of heathen writers, -and\\nthe testimony of the Christian Scriptures, \u00c2\u00a3c.\\nThe Major premiss, that Miracles thus attested are\\nworthy of credit, which must be combined with the former,\\nin order to establish the conclusion, that the Christian\\nmiracles are worthy of credit, is next to be established\\nPreviously to his entering on the second main propo-\\nsition, (which I have stated to be the Converse by nega-\\ntion of this Major premiss) he draws his conclusion (Ch. x.\\nPart I.) from the Minor premiss, in combination with the\\nMajor, resting that Major on\\n1st The a priori improbability that a false story should\\nhave been thus attested viz.\\nIf it be so, the religion must be true.* These men could not\\nbe deceivers. By only not bearing testimony, they might have\\navoided all these sufferings, and have lived quietly. Would men\\nin such circumstances pretend to have Been what they never saw;\\nassert facts which they had no knowledge of; go about lying, to\\nteach virtue; and, though not only convinced of Christ s being\\nan impostor, but having seen the snccvss of his imposture in his\\ncrucifixion, yet persist in carrying it on; and so persist, as\\nbring upon themselves, for nothing, and with a full knowledg\\nthe consequence, enmity and hatred, danger and death P\\nThis 1S the ultimate conclusion deduced from the premie, that it\\nis attested by real Minahs which, in the pre-, nt da\\\\ oomei\\nsame thing: since those tor whom he is writing IN ready at OHM t\\nadmit the truth of the religion, if convinced o( the reality of tin mn.i", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0427.jp2"}, "428": {"fulltext": "362 APPENDIX.\\n2d. That no false story of Miracles is likely to be so\\nattested, is again proved, from the premiss that no\\nfalse story of miracles ever has been so attested; and\\nthis premiss again is proved in the form of a propo-\\nsition which includes it; viz. that No other miraculous\\nstory whatever is so attested.\\nThis assertion again, bifurcates; viz. it is proved\\nrespecting the several stories that are likely to be, or\\nthat have been adduced, as parallel to the Christian,\\nthat either\\n1 They are not so attested or\\n2 They are not properly miraculous i. e. that admit-\\nting the veracity of the narrator, it does not follow\\nthat any miracle took place as in cases that may be\\nexplained by false perceptions, accidents, $c.\\nIn this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest\\nof the work, and to fill up the details of those parts of the\\nargument which I have but slightly touched upon.*\\nWhen the Student considers that this is only one out of many\\nbranches of evidence, all tending to the same point, and yet that there\\nhave been intelligent men who have held out against them all, he may\\nbe apt to suspect either that there must be some flaw in these arguments\\nwhich he is unable to detect, or else, that there must be much stronger\\narguments on the other side than he has ever met with.\\nTo enter into a discussion of the various causes leading to infidelity\\nwould be unsuitable to this occasion but I will notice one, as being more\\nespecially connected with the subject of this work, and as being very\\ngenerally overlooked. In no other instance perhaps (says Dr. Haw-\\nkins, in his valuable Essay on Tradition) besides that of Religion, do\\nmen commit the very illogical mistake, of first canvassing all the objections\\nagainst any particular system whose pretensions to truth they would ex-\\namine, before they consider the direct arguments in its favour. (p. 82.)\\nBut why, it may be asked, do they make such a mistake in this case?\\nAn answer, which I think would apply to a large proportion of such\\npersons, is this Because a man having been brought up in a Christian\\ncountry, has lived perhaps among such as have been accustomed from\\ntheir infancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0428.jp2"}, "429": {"fulltext": "PRAXIS OF LOCK \\\\l. ANALYSIS.\\nIt will be observed that to avoid unnecessary prolixity,\\nI have in most of the above syllogisms suppressed one\\nregard an uninqtdring assent as a mark of commendable faith and\\nhence lie lias probably never even thought of proposing to himself me\\nquestion, Why should I receive Christianity as a divine revelation!\\nChristianity being nothing new to him, lie is not stimulated to\\nreasons for believing it, till he finds it controverted. And when it u\\ncontroverted, when an opponent urges How do you reconcile this, and\\nthat, and the other, with the idea of a divine revelation these objections\\nStrike by their novelty,\u00e2\u0080\u0094 by their being opposed to what is generally\\nreceived. He is thus excited to inquiry which he sets about, naturally\\nenough, but very unwisely, by seeking for answers to all mete l j\u00c2\u00ab e-\\ntions: and fancies that unless they can all be satisfactorily\\nought not to receive the religion. As if, (says the Author already\\ncited) there could not be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable\\narguments, and yet at the same time obnoxious to objections, numerous,\\nplausible, and by no means easy of solution. There are objections (said\\nDr. Johnson) against a plenum and objections against a vacuum hut\\none of them must be true. lie adds, that sensible men, nallv de-\\nsirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that reason directs them to\\nexamine first the argument in favour of that side of the question, where\\nthe first presumption of truth appears. And the presumption is mani-\\nfestly in favour of that religious creed already adopted by the country\\nTheir very earliest inquiry therefore must be into the direct arguments fot\\nthe authority of that book on which their country rests its religion.\\nBut reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a strong\\ntemptation, and one which should be carefully guarded against, to adopt\\nthe opposite course to attend first to the objections which are brought\\nagainst what is established, and which, for that very reason, rouse the\\nmind from a state of apathy.\\nWhen Christianity was first preached, the state of things m\\nSeeing that all these things cannot be tpoken agamU^ ye ought to be\\nqidet, was a sentiment which favoured an indolent acquiescence in the\\nold pagan worship. The stimulus of novelty was all on the nd\\nthose who came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The fust inquiry\\nof any one who at all attended to the subject, must have been, not,\\nWhat arc the objections to Christianity but, On what grounds do these\\nmen call on me to receive them as divine men And the same\\nappears to be the case with the Polynesians among whom our Mission-\\naries arc labouring: they begin by inquiring. Why should we receive\\nthis religion. and those of them accordingly who have embraced if.\\nappear to be Christians on much more rational and deliberate conviction", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0429.jp2"}, "430": {"fulltext": "384 APPENDIX.\\npremiss, which the learner will be able easily to supply\\nfor himself. E. G. In the early part of this analysis it will\\neasily be seen, that the first of the series of cumulative\\narguments to prove that the propagators of Christianity\\ndid suffer, would at full length stand thus;\\nWhoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews and to\\nthe Gentiles, was likely to suffer\\nThe Apostles did this\\nTherefore they were likely to suffer, tyc. fyc.\\nIt is also to be observed, that the same proposition used\\nin different syllogisms may require to be differently ex-\\npressed, by a substitution of some equivalent, in order to\\nrender the argument in each formally correct. This of\\ncourse is always allowable, provided the exact meaning be\\npreserved e. g. if the proposition be, The persons who\\nattested the Christian miracles underwent sufferings in attes-\\ntation of them, I am authorized to state the same assertion\\nin a different form, thus, The Christian miracles are attested\\nby men who suffered in attestation of their reality, Sfc.\\nGreat care however should be used to avoid being mis-\\nled by the substitution of one proposition for another, when\\nthe two are not (though perhaps they sound so) really equi-\\nvalent, so that the one warrants the assumption of the other.\\nLastly, the learner is referred to the Supplement to\\nChap. iii. 1, p. 95, where I have treated of the statement\\nof a proposition as several distinct ones, each implying all\\nthe rest, but differing in the division of the Predicate from\\nthe Subject. Of this procedure the above analysis affords\\nan instance.\\nthan many among us, even of those who in general maturity of intellect\\nand civilization, are advanced considerably beyond those Islanders.\\nI am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a religious educa-\\ntion but, pointing out the peculiar temptations which accompany it.\\nThe Jews and Pagans had, in their early prejudices, greater difficulties\\nto surmount, than ours but they were difficulties of a different kind.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0430.jp2"}, "431": {"fulltext": "INDEX\\nPRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS.\\nAbsolute terms, page 123.\\nAbstraction. The act of drawing off in thought, and attend-\\ning to separately, some portion of an object presented to\\nthe mind, 128.\\nAbstract terms, 124.\\nAccident. In its widest technical sense, anything that is attri-\\nbuted to another, and can only be conceived as belonging\\nto some substance (in which sense it is opposed to Sub-\\nstance in its narrower and more properly logieal Bense,\\na Predicable which may be present or absent, the essence\\nof the Species remaining the same, 134.\\nAccidental Definition. A definition which assigns the Proper-\\nties of a Species, or the Accidents of an Individual; it is\\notherwise called a Description, 140.\\nAffirmative denotes the quality of a Proposition which asserts\\nthe agreement of the Predicate with the Subject, 62.\\nAnalogous. A term is so called whose Single signification\\napplies with unequal propriety to more than one object,\\n122, 1ST.\\nAntecedent. That part of a Conditional Proposition on which\\nthe other depends, 111.\\nApprehension (simple.)\u00e2\u0080\u0094 The operation of the mind by which\\nwe mentally perceive or form a notion of some object, I.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0431.jp2"}, "432": {"fulltext": "3S() INDEX.\\nArgument. An expression in which, from something laid down\\nas granted, something else is deduced, 73.\\nCategorematic. A word is so called which may by itself be\\nemployed as a Term, 58.\\nCategorical Proposition is one which affirms or denies a Pre-\\ndicate of a Subject, absolutely, and without any hypothesis,\\n62.\\nCommon term is one which is applicable in the same sense to\\nmore than one individual object, 47, 60, 123.\\nCompatible terms, 124.\\nConclusion. That Proposition which is inferred from the Pre-\\nmises of an Argument, 25, 74.\\nConcrete term, 124.\\nConditional Proposition is one which asserts the dependence\\nof one categorical Proposition on another. A conditional\\nSyllogism is one in which the reasoning depends on such a\\nProposition, 111.\\nConsequent. That part of a conditional Proposition which\\ndepends on the other. (Consequens), 111.\\nConsequence. The connection between the Antecedent and\\nConsequent of a conditional Proposition. (Consequentia),\\n111.\\nContingent. The matter of a Proposition is so called when the\\nterms of it in part agree, and in part disagree, 64.\\nContradictory Propositions are those which, having the same\\nterms, differ both in Quantity and Quality, 90.\\nContrary Propositions are two universals, affirmative and\\nnegative, with the same terms, 68.\\nContrary terms, 127.\\nConverse 70.\\nConversion of a Proposition is the transposition of the terms, so\\nthat the subject is made the Predicate, and vice versa, 70.\\nCopula. That part of a Proposition which affirms or denies the\\nPredicate of the Subject viz. is, or is not, expressed or\\nimplied, 57.\\nDefinite terms, 126.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0432.jp2"}, "433": {"fulltext": "INDEX. :;s;\\nDefinition. An expression explanatory of that which is defined,\\ni.e. separated, as by a boundary, from everything else, 139.\\nDescription. An accidental Definition, 1 1\\nDifference (Differentia,) The formal or distinguishing part of\\nthe essence, of a Species, 132.\\nDilemma. A eomplex kind of conditional syllogism, having\\nmore than one Antecedent in the Major Premiss, and a\\ndisjunctive Minor, 10G.\\nDiscourse. The third operation of the mind, Reasoning, 55.\\nDisjunctive Proposition is one which consists of two or more\\ncategoricals, so stated as to imply that some one of them\\nmust be true. A syllogism is called disjunctive, the rea-\\nsoning of which turns on such a proposition, 104.\\nDistributed is applied to a Term that is employed in its full\\nextent, so as to comprehend all its significates, every-\\nthing to which it is applicable, 44, 76.\\nDivision, logical is the distinct enumeration of several things\\nsignified by a common name and it is so called metapho-\\nrically, from its being analogous to the (real and properly-\\ncalled) division of a whole into its parts, 13G.\\nEnthymeme. An argument having one Premiss expressed, and\\nthe other understood, 115.\\nEquivocal. A Term is defined to be equivocal whose different\\nsignifications apply equally to several objects. Strictly\\nspeaking, there is hardly a word in any language which\\nmay not be regarded as, in this sense, equivocal hut tin-\\ntitle is usually applied only in any case where a word is\\nemployed equivocally; e. g, where the middle term is used\\nin different senses in the two Premises; or where a Pro-\\nposition is liable to he understood in various senses, accord-\\ning to tin- various meanings of one of its terms, l,s.;.\\nEssential Definition is one which assigns, not the Properties 01\\nAccidents of the thing defined, hut what are regarded as its\\nlential parts, whether physical or logical, l 39.\\nExtreme, The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition .ire called\\nits Extremes or Terms, being, as if were, the two boun-", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0433.jp2"}, "434": {"fulltext": "388 INDEX.\\ndairies, having the copula (in regular order) placed between\\nthem. In speaking of a syllogism, the word is often under-\\nstood to imply the extremes of the Conclusion, 57.\\nFallacy. Any argument, or apparent argument, which professes\\nto be decisive of the matter at issue, while in reality it is\\nnot, 146.\\nFalse m its strict sense, denotes the quality of a Proposition\\nwhich states something not as it is, 63, 342.\\nFigure of a Syllogism denotes a certain situation of its middle\\nterm in reference to the Extremes of the Conclusion The\\nMajor and Minor terms, 83.\\nGeneralization. The act of comprehending under a common\\nname several objects agreeing in some point which we\\nabstract from each of them, and which that common name\\nserves to indicate, 128.\\nGenus. A Predicable which is considered as the material part\\nof the Species of which it is affirmed, 129.\\nHypothetical Proposition is one which asserts not absolutely,\\nbut under an hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction. An\\nhypothetical Syllogism is one of which the reasoning depends\\non such a proposition, 1 00.\\nIllative Conversion is that in which the truth of the Converse\\nfollows from the truth of the Exposita, or Proposition\\ngiven, 70.\\nImpossible. The Matter of a Proposition is so called when the\\nextremes altogether disagree, 68 Ambiguity of, 311.\\nIndefinite Proposition is one which has for its Subject a Com-\\nmon term without any sign to indicate distribution or\\nnon- distribution, 64.\\nIndefinite terms, 126.\\nIndividual. An object which is, in the strict and primary sense,\\none, and consequently cannot be logically divided; whence\\nthe name, 136.\\nInduction. A kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole\\nclass, what has been ascertained respecting one or more\\nindividuals of that class, 228.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0434.jp2"}, "435": {"fulltext": "INDEX. 389\\nInfer. To draw a conclusion from granted premises. 266, Set\\nProve.\\nInfitna Species is that which is not suhdivided, except into\\nindividuals, 13*2.\\nInseparable accident is that which cannot be separated from\\nthe individual it belongs to, though it may from the\\nSpecies, 134.\\nJudgment. The second operation of the mind, wherein we pro-\\nnounce mentally on the agreement and disagreement of two\\nof the notions obtained by simple Apprehension, 54.\\nLogical definition is that which assigns the Genus and Diffe-\\nrence of the Species defined, 139.\\nMajor term of a Syllogism is the Predicate of the conclusion.\\nThe Major Premiss is the one which contains the Major\\nterm. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Hypothetical Pre-\\nmiss is called the Major, 78, 101.\\nMiddle term of a categorical Syllogism is that with which the\\ntwo extremes of the conclusion are separately compared,\\n78, 83.\\nMinor term of a categorical Syllogism is the subject of the\\nconclusion. The Minor Premiss is that which contains the\\nMinor term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Categorical\\nPremiss is called the Minor, 78, 101.\\nModal categorical proposition is one which asserts that the\\nPredicate exists in the Subject in a certain mode or manner.\\n62, 95.\\nMood of a categorical Syllogism is the designation of its three\\npropositions, in the order in which they stand, according to\\ntheir quantity and quality, 81.\\nNecessary matter of a proposition is the essential or invariable\\nagreement of its terms, ()8. Necessary, ambiguity of, 880.\\nNegation conversion by (otherwise called conversion by contra-\\nposition), 71.\\nNegative categorical proposition is one which asserts the dis-\\nagreement of its extremes, 2.\\nVegative terms, 1*25.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0435.jp2"}, "436": {"fulltext": "390 INDEX.\\nNominal Definition\u00e2\u0080\u0094 is one which explains only the meaning of\\nthe term defined, and nothing more of the nature of the\\nthing signified by that Term than is implied by the Term\\nitself to every one who understands the meaning of it,\\n141, 253.\\nOpposed. Two propositions are said to be opposed to each\\nother, when having the same Subject and Predicate, they\\ndiffer either in quantity or quality, or both, 66.\\nOpposition of terms, 126.\\nPart logically, Species are called Parts of the Genus they come\\nunder, and individuals, parts of the Species really, the\\nGenus is a Part of the Species, and the Species, of the\\nIndividual, 137.\\nParticular proposition is one in which the Predicate is affirmed\\nor denied of some part only of the subject, 63.\\nPer Accidens. Conversion of a proposition is so called when\\nthe Quantity is changed, 71.\\nPhysical definition is that which assigns the parts into which\\nthe thing defined can be actually divided, 140.\\nPositive terms, 125.\\nPredicate of a proposition is that Term which is affirmed or\\ndenied of the other, 57.\\nPredicable. A Term which can be affirmatively predicated of\\nseveral others, 130.\\nPremiss. A proposition employed to establish a certain conclu-\\nsion, 74.\\nPrivative terms, 125.\\nProbable arguments, 96, 261.\\nProperty. A Predicable which denotes something essentially\\nconjoined to the essence of the Species, 132.\\nProposition. A sentence which asserts, i.e. affirms or denies, 61.\\nProve. To adduce Premises which establish the truth of a\\ncertain conclusion, 266.\\nProximum Genus of any Species is the nearest or least remote\\nto which it can be referred, 132.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0436.jp2"}, "437": {"fulltext": "i n i i 391\\nPure categorical proposition is one which asserts simply that the\\nPredicate is, or is not, contained in the Subject, 62,\\nReal definition is one which explains the nature of the tiling\\ndefined viz. either the whole nature of it (as in Mathema-\\ntics), or else something beyond what is necessarily under-\\nstood by the Term, 141, 253.\\nReferences fallacy of, 206.\\nRelative terms, 123.\\nQuality of a Proposition is its affirming or denying. This is\\nthe Quality of the expression, which is, in Logic, the essen-\\ntial circumstance. The Quality of the matter, is, its being\\ntrue or false which is, in Logic, accidental, being essential\\nonly in respect of the subject-matter treated of, 62.\\nQuantity of a Proposition is the extent in which its subject is\\ntaken viz. to stand for the whole, or for a part only of its\\nSignificates, 63.\\nQuestion. That which is to be established as a Conclusion stated\\nin an interrogative form, 73.\\nSecond intention of a term, 185.\\nSeparable accident is one which may be separated from the\\nindividual, 134.\\nSignificate. The several things signified by a Common Term\\nare its Significates (Significata), 63.\\nSingular term is one which stands for one individual. A Sin-\\ngular proposition is one which has for its Subject either a\\nSingular term, or a Common term limited to one individual\\nby a singular sign, e.g. This, 60, 64, 123.\\nSorites. An abridged form of stating a series of Syllogisms, of\\nwhich the Conclusion of each is a Premiss of the succeed-\\ning, 116.\\nSpecies. A predicate which is considered as expressing the\\nwhole essence of the individuals of which it is affirmed, 129.\\npeculiar sense of, in Natural History, 284.\\nSubaltern Species and Genus is that which is both a Species of\\nsome higher Genus, and a Genus in respect t the Species\\ninto which it is divided. Subaltern opposition, 18 between", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0437.jp2"}, "438": {"fulltext": "392 INDEX.\\na Universal and a Particular of the same Quality. Of these,\\nthe Universal is the Subalternant, and the Particular the\\nSubalternate, 68, 132.\\nSubcontrary opposition is between two particulars, the affir-\\nmative and the negative, 68.\\nSubject of a proposition is that term of which the other is\\naffirmed or denied, 57.\\nSummum Genus is that which is not considered as a Species\\nof any higher Genus, 132.\\nSyllogism. An argument expressed in strict logical form viz.\\nso that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of\\nthe expression alone, without any regard to the meaning of\\nthe Terms, 73.\\nSyncategorematic words are such as cannot singly express a\\nTerm, but only a part of a Term, 58.\\nTerm. The Subject or Predicate of a Proposition, 57.\\nTrue Proposition is one which states what really is, 63.\\nUniversal Proposition is one whose Predicate is affirmed or\\ndenied of the whole of the Subject, 63.\\nUnivocal. A Common term is called Univocal in respect of\\nthose things to which it is applicable in the same signifi-\\ncation, 122.\\nTHE END.\\nPRINTED BY R. CLAY. PRE AD-STREET-HILL.", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0438.jp2"}, "439": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0439.jp2"}, "440": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0440.jp2"}, "441": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0441.jp2"}, "442": {"fulltext": "Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.\\nNeutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide\\nTreatment Date: Sept. 2004\\nPreservationTechnologies i\\nA WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION j\\n1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive\\nCranberry Township, PA 16066\\n(724) 779-21 1 1", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0442.jp2"}, "443": {"fulltext": "", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0443.jp2"}, "444": {"fulltext": "IB **RY 0F\\nJD|i\\n\u00e2\u0096\u00a0\u00e2\u0096\u00a0H", "height": "3725", "width": "2234", "jp2-path": "elementsoflog00what_0444.jp2"}}